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India in Global Nuclear Governance
 9780367437732, 9781003005681

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Foreword
Contributors
Introduction: Global Nuclear Governance in the Making
Chapter 1: India's Nuclear Infrastructure Status and Challenges
Chapter 2: Global Nuclear Governance and India
Chapter 3: India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Lessons for Outlier States
Chapter 4: Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Systems
Chapter 5: The Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership An Indian Answer to the Nuclear Security Challenge
Chapter 6: What Next for India’s Nuclear Diplomacy?
Chapter 7: The Humanitarian Initiative to Ban Nuclear Weapons and India's Strategic Engagemet
Index

Citation preview

India in Global Nuclear Governance In the prevailing international security situation, the world community, including India believes nuclear security must be conferred high priority for global peace and security. As a responsible member of this community, India finds itself prioritising this aspect more than ever before. In its more than five decades of its nuclear weapons programme, there has not been a single nuclear incident in India. Despite so, India has not allowed any complacency in its efforts to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. India believes that in the twenty-first century nuclear terrorism is a significant threat that poses catastrophic consequences to world peace and security. It is this understanding that makes India to reject a potent argument that nuclear terrorism as an overrated threat. India has strongly contended skeptics that since the probability of nuclear terrorism is extremely remote, it does not deserve much attention India’s nuclear policy is premised upon the appreciation that it is essential to ensure that nuclear weapons, materials and technology never falls into wrong hands. Hence, it is essential to plug any weak link in the chain of nuclear security. India’s seriousness towards combatting against nuclear terrorism is evident from the fact that it has actively participated in the entire Nuclear Security Summit process from 2010 to 2016. India continues to render its vital support to global cooperation and diplomacy in building effective defences against the threat of nuclear terrorism. Reshmi Kazi is an Associate Professor at Jamia Milia Islamia, where she teaches issues of peace and conflict in South Asia. She also specialises in nuclear security, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues. Åshild Kolås is a Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), where she has coordinated the institutional cooperation between PRIO and the IDSA since 2005. Her latest book, co-edited with Pedro Ibarra Güell, is Sovereignty Revisited: The Basque Case.

India in Global Nuclear Governance

Edited by

Reshmi Kazi Åshild Kolås

KNOWLEDGE WORLD

KW Publishers Pvt Ltd New Delhi

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Reshmi Kazi and Åshild Kolås; individual chapters, the contributors; and KW Publishers Pvt Ltd The right of Reshmi Kazi and Åshild Kolås to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Print edition not for sale in South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan or Bhutan) British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-43773-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-00568-1 (ebk) Typeset in Adobe Caslon pro by KW Publishers

Contents

Foreword

vii

Contributors

ix

Introduction: Global Nuclear Governance in the Making Reshmi Kazi and Kanica Rakhra

xi

1. India’s Nuclear Infrastructure Status and Challenges Steinar Høibråten and Elin Enger

1

2. Global Nuclear Governance and India Roshan Khanijo 3. India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Lessons for Outlier States Kanica Rakhra 4. Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Systems Reynaldo Morales 5. The Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership An Indian Answer to the Nuclear Security Challenge Reshmi Kazi 6. What Next for India’s Nuclear Diplomacy? Priyanjali Malik

23

35

55

83

107

7. The Humanitarian Initiative to Ban Nuclear Weapons and India’s Strategic Engagemet Maika Skjønsberg

123

Index

149

Foreword

In his Statement on 27 May, 1998 made in India’s Parliament on our nuclear tests conducted earlier that month, the Prime Minister concluded with a verse from the Bhagawat Gita, that reads in translation (1): Action, it is said, is the means To reach the heights of yogic strength; One reached, though—it is said, again— Restraint is the proper course.

That exemplary restraint was not only not acknowledged, it was in glaring contrast to the hardly-secret activities of both Pakistan and China in aiding, abetting and engaging-in the proliferation of technologies usable for the development of nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery, by missiles in particular. It took the trauma of the terrorist attacks of the 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre in New York city of the United States to jolt the Security Council of the United Nations to adopt in 2004 Resolution 1540.  That required all member states of the UN to refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery— in particular for terrorist purposes.  The A.Q. Khans of Pakistan, and their likes elsewhere, had to be put out of business, and their activities held in law to be criminal. Climate change attributable to global warming caused by the burning of fossil fuels makes increases in nuclear sources of electricity —besides perennial sources like wind and solar—an inevitability.  International flows of nuclear and nuclear-related technologies are

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bound to increase manifold.  India is already a significant participant in this commerce. Indeed, she is likely to be a key source of fuel and technologies once the commercial potential of her Thorium-based reactors is achieved.  The governance of these technologies is already a significant feature of India’s nuclear journey A new generation of scholars born after the Pokhran tests are legatees of the efforts made by their parents to transit difficult times of nuclear discrimination and exclusion.   That generation is also flooded with information available on the web, and in social media on matters of nuclear policy is a burden, and taxing of patience—a virtue that is not in copious supply. To those young scholars this book will be an authentic, authoritative reference to guide them as they prepare to take their places in the seats of nuclear governance in India and worldwide. Venkatasubbiah Siddhartha Former Expert (2007-9) serving the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004)

(1) See footnote (13) in, Narasimha, Roddam: Lecture delivered to the XIII International Amaldi Conference on Problems of Global Security, Rome, Italy, 2000.

Contributors

Reshmi Kazi is an Associate Professor at Jamia Milia Islamia, where she teaches issues of peace and conflict in South Asia. She also specializes in nuclear security, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues. Åshild Kolås is a Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), where she has coordinated the institutional cooperation between PRIO and the IDSA since 2005. Her latest book, co-edited with Pedro Ibarra Güell, is Sovereignty Revisited: The Basque Case. Elin Enger has worked as a Scientist at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) since 2007. She is engaged in studies of the nuclear weapons programmes of various states, including India. She has also been actively involved in the UK-Norway Initiative, a British-Norwegian research cooperation exploring new methods to verify nuclear disarmament. Steinar Høibråten works as Chief Scientist at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). In 2003, he served as a nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq for the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations. At FFI, he works mainly on defence-related nuclear physics, including nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines and related environmental and waste-handling issues, as well as nuclear disarmament. Roshan Khanijo is a Senior Research Fellow and Research Cocoordinator at the United Service Institution of India (USI). Her academic qualification includes BSc, MA and Ph.D. She is a strategic

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analyst. She has authored and edited books, Monographs and Occasional papers and has been a panelist in number of national and international workshops/Seminars. Priyanjali Malik is an independent researcher based in London, working on politics and nuclear security in South Asia. She is the author of India’s Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb (Routledge, 2010), which examines Indian debates on nuclear issues from Independence to the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008. Reynaldo Morales is a physicist who has worked in the Pentagon as Special Scientific Advisor in the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. He served as Foreign Affairs Specialist in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington, DC. Morales was an official member of the US delegation to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Kanica Rakhra is currently working as a consultant with the Policy Planning and Research Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. She has held research positions in several Indian think tanks, and written on nuclear and security issues for national and international websites and journals. Maika Skjønsberg is Associate Researcher at Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP), Belgium, and Visiting Researcher at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) research center, REPI (Recherche et Enseignement en Politique Internationale). Her areas of expertise include international security, arms control and nuclear disarmament.

Introduction Global Nuclear Governance in the Making Reshmi Kazi and Kanica Rakhra

In the current context of international security, nuclear security is a high priority for the world community including India. As a responsible member of this community, India finds itself prioritizing this aspect more than ever before. In its more than five decades of its nuclear weapons programme, there has not been a single nuclear incident in India. Despite so, India is convinced that in the twenty-first century nuclear terrorism is a significant threat, with catastrophic consequences to destabilise world peace and security. A forceful argument against the dangers of nuclear terrorism is that its probability is extremely remote and hence it does not deserve the given attention while dealing with it. However, even as skeptics have trivialized the danger of nuclear terrorism as an overrated threat, India has not let it influence its perception of the same. There is a tacit understanding which India shares with the international community that even though the threat of nuclear danger is low, its potential to unleash catastrophic horror is sufficient to abandon all complacency and strengthen nuclear security. Hence, India’s nuclear policy is premised upon the appreciation that it is essential to ensure that terrorists never acquire nuclear weapons. It is equally important to plug any weak link in the chain of nuclear security, as it can be fatal for international peace and security. This includes implementation of measures to prevent terrorists and other malicious actors from gaining access to nuclear materials or technology with which they could make an improvised nuclear device. India’s seriousness towards combatting against nuclear terrorism is evident from the fact that it has actively participated in the entire Nuclear Security Summit process from 2010 to 2016. India continues to render its vital support to

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global cooperation and diplomacy in building effective defences against the threat of nuclear terrorism. The threat of nuclear terrorism is far from over. The doomsday clock has moved to two minutes to midnight and has put the world on a dangerous trajectory with increased threats to nuclear security. The nuclear landscape is marred with major nuclear powers engaged in arms race, rise of new nuclear powers like North Korea, and worsening risk environments with the emergence of ISIS. Hence, there is a need for alternatives to today’s fragmented and frail nuclear governance mechanisms. India has an ambitious nuclear energy program to meet its growing energy needs. Much of the debate on the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement focused on the granting by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of a waiver for India to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. However, the agreement has also been vital in facilitating a civil-military nuclear Separation Plan, and an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections agreement. As debates on civil nuclear cooperation continue worldwide, a key challenge is to develop a comprehensive global nuclear governance vision. This volume argues that India, which is an understudied case in the existing literature on global, nuclear governance, is integral to this vision. This edited book envisages a more comprehensive and predictable nuclear governance architecture for the future, and discusses how India might play a proactive role in this effort. India is an emerging economy with numerous nuclear energy projects underway, and has been seeking membership in all the major export control mechanisms, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group. India is also among the nuclear powers that remain outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), despite a consistent ‘No First Use’ policy. India is a key country for any effort to develop a comprehensive architecture for global nuclear governance, which is a critical need in the contemporary world. This volume will be of interest to policymakers, academics, students, civil society actors, and practitioners in the fields of nuclear governance, nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. It brings together scholars working on nuclear safety, security, non-proliferation and disarmament, to

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discuss the challenges and opportunities of the emerging global nuclear governance architecture, and how India can contribute towards strengthening this architecture. What is noteworthy is that this volume provides deep insight into India’s contribution in building and improving sustainable nuclear security architecture as seen from abroad. There is an urgent need for alternatives to today’s fragmented and frail nuclear governance mechanisms. This volume with seven essays explores various aspects of nuclear security mechanisms, which are urgent for a proactive global nuclear security approach in the twenty-first century. It envisages a more robust and comprehensive nuclear governance architecture for the future, and suggests how India might play a proactive role in this effort. The first essay provides a broad overview of India’s nuclear infrastructure related to its civilian and military nuclear programmes. Steinar Høibråten and Elin Enger in India’s Nuclear Infrastructure: Status And Challenges have emphasized that the path to the development of India nuclear capability was fraught with several challenges. The 1974 Pokhran I tests was criticized bitterly by the Western countries and shocked the international community. This impeded international cooperation seriously and India was left alone to tread upon the nuclear path. Despite this India has been successful in developing its nuclear capability, indigenously. In May 1998, India conducted the Pokhran II tests and established itself as a nuclear capable power. India’s continued perseverance in its nuclear research has resulted in an elaborate nuclear infrastructure, which includes several nuclear facilities, fuel cycle facilities and reprocessing plants. Today, India has achieved a degree of maturity and self-sufficiency in developing nuclear power. It is noteworthy that ‘India looks at nuclear technology and nuclear materials primarily as a resource for meeting a part of its requirements for electricity.’ The authors have detailed various types of power reactors, both operational and planned, to meet the rapid growth in nuclear energy generation in India. Simultaneously, India has a strategic programme for protection of its national interests. India, despite being a de facto nuclear weapon state outside the NPT, has responsibly

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demarcated its civilian nuclear industry from the military sector. As of 2017, 16 of the 22 civilian nuclear reactors have been placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. However, there are several challenges in keeping the military nuclear facilities sector separate from the civilian one. In spite of this, India’s separation plan is an important step in separating the civilian sector from the military one. It also plays a significant role in boosting confidence of the international community about the fact that as a nuclear weapon nation, India manages its nuclear matters with utmost responsibility. The essay further reflects upon a very pertinent issue, which is, transport of fissile and other radioactive materials. India has developed indigenous fuel fabrication techniques, to extract useful fissile materials for recycling and to lessen the quantity of high-level radioactive wastes. India reprocesses its spent nuclear fuel in one of the three reprocessing plants in Trombay, Tarapur or Kalpakkam. Spent nuclear fuel is highly radioactive and the transportation of these hazardous materials to reprocessing facilities and other locations is a complicated task. These highly radioactive materials, with specialized sources for industrial applications, are an attractive option to terrorists seeking to acquire them. Further, these hazardous sources when transported over vast distances are vulnerable and hence require the maximum attention for their safety and security while in transit. The authors have emphasized that given the sensitivities involving nuclear and radiological materials, India has undertaken substantial measures to well protect its fissile and other radioactive materials against accidents as well as theft. India must continue to improve and upgrade the transportation security of its hazardous fissile materials. The essay highlights how such an approach is a crucial requirement to thwart any complacency in strengthening nuclear security and establishing a strong security culture in the country. The second essay, Global Nuclear Governance and India by Roshan Khanijo focuses on the evolving role of global nuclear governance in the face of diversified nuclear challenges. She has focused upon India’s approach to nuclear governance and how it can contribute towards developing a robust global nuclear governance mechanism. She rightly

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argues that global nuclear governance is a complex phenomenon that is faced with the daunting challenge of being constantly aware of emerging threats. What is more challenging for global nuclear governance is to develop various binding and non-binding multilateral treaties as response mechanisms to mitigate those threats. In the Indian case, given its close geographical proximity to operating terrorists’ hub in its immediate neighbourhood, it becomes imperative to continuously improve and upgrade the nuclear security apparatus. As a counter-measure to combat existing threats, India has demonstrated its commitment to uphold and adhere to the global yardsticks of nuclear security. India is a signatory to all the 13 universal instruments as benchmarks for a state’s commitments to combat international terrorism. In consonance with the IAEA directives, India recognises that nuclear security is primarily a state responsibility. It is incumbent upon each state to implement appropriate and effective national systems for robust nuclear security architecture that can facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy and enhance global efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. Khanijo suggests that India could further contribute towards building a cohesive nuclear security structure by developing a security culture that can help in mitigating nuclear threats. A dynamic security culture that permeates through all the departments and agencies of the nuclear establishment is a crucial link in further strengthening the chain of global nuclear security. A strong global nuclear security chain devoid of weak links is an essential prerequisite to combat against nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. The essay raises a pertinent question that in spite of stringent laws and elaborate treaties, the threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation still continue. The author rightly reasons that issues of limited mandate, veto power, non-binding, non-ratification and nonuniversality of major treaties raises complexities and weakens the chain of security. The edifice of nuclear governance rests on three important principles - nuclear safety and security, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These principles constitute the foundation of an effective global nuclear security regime. However, the post Cold War period has been marked with the influx of more and more countries desiring

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civil nuclear energy for developmental purposes, which raises the bar of global nuclear proliferation threats. Hence, Khanijo suggests that in the post Cold War era, new nuclear capable states must be involved in nuclear governance processes by integrating them into the system. This would necessitate reconsideration of membership criteria of important treaties like the NPT and also multilateral export control groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The mechanisms of global nuclear governance can benefit by involving nuclear capable states like India within the system. In the third essay, India and Nuclear Non-proliferation: Lessons for Outlier States, Kanica Rakhra draws attention to a new phenomenon within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The prospect of concluding country-specific civil nuclear deals has raised questions on the functionality of the NPT. The enactment of the India-US Civil Nuclear Energy Initiative in 2005 permitted India, an outlier state, to bypass the NPT parameters on civil nuclear commerce with other countries. She raises a germane question on whether India be allowed entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), without signing the NPT. Rakhra argues that even though India’s nuclear policies have been dominated by a set of contradictions, New Delhi has consistently maintained its stand on issues pertaining to nuclear disarmament and proliferation. So while India has vehemently resisted the discriminatory nature of the NPT, it has also adhered to the disarmament goals and refrained from entering into any arms race with nuclear-capable Pakistan. She has argued that despite being an outlier state, India has upheld the ethos of non-proliferation objectives, and points out how India has set an example for other states by virtue of its nuclear behaviour. India’s dual and conflicting position has been gradually recognised by the international community. India has reiterated this official position during the ongoing negotiations for membership at the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Rakhra has emphasized that India’s position needs to be perceived in the context of the evolving nature of the international nuclear governance system, and the exceptionalism that continues to define India’s nuclear behaviour. The author also suggests that India’s

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exceptionalism might be exemplary to other outlier states which can imbibe from India’s ‘nuclear lessons’ in their dual quest for security and nuclear energy. The author has emphasized that India’s exceptionalism has helped it gain leverage as a “responsible nuclear power.” This has undeniably redefined India as a legitimate nuclear power even as it continues to refuse to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. This legitimacy has accorded India the relevant platform to advance disarmament initiatives. India’s disarmament objectives have acquired greater credibility in the post-Pokhran II phase. Earlier when India did not possess nuclear weapons capability, India’s disarmament initiatives were not given suitable attention. Post 1998 nuclear tests, as a nuclear armed state, India’s continued perseverance towards disarmament goals, essentially demonstrates its dedicated support for total elimination of nuclear weapons. Rakhra explains that India’s disarmament initiatives, along with its consistent anti-proliferation measures as vindicated by the international community, act as more defining factors of state nuclear behaviour. This has made India a good model for other outlier states to learn from and correct their nuclear behaviour in times to come. The fourth essay, Proliferation-resistant Nuclear Systems by Reynaldo Morales, addresses the issue of whether nuclear technologies can be made proliferation resistant. Morales begins with a realistic assessment that there is a rising demand for a reliable supply of energy to accelerate economic development of nations. Nonetheless, nuclear energy involves a Faustian bargain, as the projected growth in nuclear power involves consequent risks of potential nuclear proliferation. Morales’s essay argues that current nonproliferation efforts are focused on detecting clandestine nuclear activities and countering illicit procurement of sensitive equipment and materials. But a concurrent issue that requires greater attention is the possibility of breakout by states that may acquire enrichment or reprocessing capabilities while violating their commitments to peaceful use of nuclear energy in the future. The author claims that no currently known nuclear fuel cycle is completely proliferation-proof. This goes by the logic that no security can be

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100 percent foolproof. Technical options for increasing proliferation resistance may impact economics, environment, waste management, and safety of nuclear installations. He suggests that all national, regional, and international infrastructure of any technology option or system for increasing proliferation resistance should evaluate these impacts. All of these impacts should be carefully evaluated to determine the best path forward for the future development of nuclear power. Proliferation resistance will play an important role in the determination of the future path for nuclear power. Better understanding of what proliferation resistance is and how technology can impact proliferation resistance as well as the other issues affecting nuclear power will help frame a realistic assessment of related vulnerabilities and remaining risks. The author opines that how these factors determine the pace and direction of nuclear power development in the future is best left in the hands of the individual States which will develop and deploy nuclear power in the future and which, therefore, must make their own assessment of this balance within the context of their own situation. Morales suggest that a combination of institutional and technical measures can add robustness to nonproliferation and counter-terrorism efforts. He argues that advanced reactor designs have the capability to considerably mitigate the risk of proliferation by consuming the plutonium they produce or simply not producing it in significant amounts. Additionally, IAEA safeguards can verify whether a State is living up to its international commitments not to divert its civilian nuclear programme for bomb making purposes. Improved proliferation resistance can be achieved by a combination of the intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, arranged to provide defence in depth against a broad range of proliferation-related threats. Implementation of technical options for increasing proliferation resistance can reduce the reliance on extrinsic measures. Similarly, increments in overall proliferation resistance can also be accomplished by increments in the extrinsic measures. However, technical approaches alone cannot eliminate the need for extrinsic measures. While future nuclear energy systems and fuel cycles may have the potential to be more intrinsically proliferation

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resistant, the actual proliferation resistance will depend on details such as where the facilities are located, how they are implemented what safeguards are applied, and the objective, strategies and capabilities of the adversary. Further, no single diplomatic, military, economic, institutional, or technical initiative alone will be able to fully deal with this proliferation challenge. The best prospect for achieving nonproliferation goals while expanding nuclear power, he believes, is to engage all appropriate means. In the fifth essay, The Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership: An Indian Answer to the Nuclear Security Challenge, Reshmi Kazi explores the present challenges to nuclear security from an Indian perspective. Kazi has assessed the prevailing nuclear security threat scenario. Russia is reportedly facing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. Despite this, Russia’s decision not to attend the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C. has impacted upon global efforts to combat the danger of nuclear terrorism and impeded efforts to strengthen nuclear security. China has enormous stakes in contributing towards a strengthened nuclear security regime and hence played an active role in the Nuclear Security Summit process. However, rampant corruption and lack of transparency within China’s nuclear industry has remained a matter of grave concern to the international community. China alleged proliferation nexus with Pakistan has further impeded global efforts towards a robust global nuclear security architecture. The growing demand for nuclear power expansion, which some experts project, is going to rise manifold within Asia and forebodes rising dangers in the region. Kazi suggests that to combat nuclear theft and sabotage, it is essential to develop a strong and effective nuclear security culture that can play a crucial role in building and improving its nuclear security. India views the primary aim of its nuclear security policy as a measure to secure nuclear weapons, fissile materials and associated facilities against unauthorized access, sabotage, and to also prevent, detect and effectively respond to any nuclear incident. An important development in the field of nuclear security is awareness of the significant linkages between nuclear safety

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and security. Given the increasing challenges to nuclear security, nuclear safety and security can no longer be compartmentalised. Keeping in sync with this understanding, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C. announced the foundation in India of a nuclear centre of excellence (CoE) – the Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP). Kazi has highlighted that the GCNEP plays a crucial role in mitigating nuclear risks through by providing a platform for the sharing of best practices with partner countries. As a centre of excellence, the GCNEP, strives for establishing distinction through awareness raising, training and education. The CoE also acts as a conduit to expand and outreach the work of the International Network of Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC) under the IAEA to strengthen and sustain the provision of nuclear security training. Kazi explains that the principal objective of India’s nuclear security is to strive incessantly towards strengthening and upgrading its nuclear security measures and make them an integral aspect of security policy. This can help in developing a strong security culture within every department and agency of nuclear security establishment. To achieve this objective, the GCNEP provides the institutional framework for effectively enhancing nuclear safety and security. The principal objective of India’s nuclear security is to continuously strive towards strengthening and upgrading its nuclear security measures and make them an integral aspect of security policy. This persistent pursuit of consolidation not only advances and elevates the nuclear security system, but also establishes a strong culture of nuclear security awareness. India’s nuclear establishment strives towards an upgraded nuclear security system embedded within the framework of a strong nuclear security culture. To achieve this, it is essential to have an institutionalised framework dedicated to “enhance nuclear safeguards to effectively and efficiently monitor nuclear materials and facilities”. India’s centre of excellence (CoE), the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) has been effectively founded on this principle. The essay on What Next for India’s Nuclear Diplomacy? by Priyanjali Malik argues how after years of nuclear ambivalence, New Delhi is

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now unequivocal about wanting a place at the governing tables of the collectives that control trade in nuclear and dual-use materials as there is more than just commerce at stake. Malik focuses on the issue of India being a player in, rather than an object of, the world’s most important export control regimes. Now that the action in nuclear diplomacy appears to have moved from non-proliferation—with all its historical baggage—to nuclear safety and security, India potentially has the opportunity and space to build a platform for itself as a global player. However, there are still political obstacles to overcome, and it is in this realm that India will need some truly creative diplomacy to disarm the holdouts. Indian diplomacy will need to tackle the legacy of India’s non-proliferation negotiations, especially the bitterness about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); more actively counter the idea that India should not be rewarded for ‘bad behaviour’ in collapsing the stance of no additional nuclear weapons states to the Nuclear 5; and finally, deflect the cut and thrust of regional politics that seeks to limit India’s global ambitions. The author believes that even though circumstances have now changed and it might be in the government’s interest to sign the treaty—in effect trade in its unilateral moratorium for a legal obligation—the virulent opposition to the CTBT that was encouraged in 1996 will take a lot of political capital to undo. Malik states that less than two decades after its nuclear tests, India’s weapons programme appears to be an accepted part of the political landscape. It is this pace of rehabilitation that has caused some disquiet amongst those who originally castigated India for its tests. The waiver granted by the NSG in 2008 on full-scope safeguards to enable commerce with members of the collective was a tacit acceptance of India’s nuclear weapons programme. Membership, when it comes through, will further give New Delhi a seat at the rule-making table, the same table that had earlier sought to fetter India’s nuclear ambitions. The Bush administration chose to expend considerable political capital in pushing through this deal for India in 2008, and effectively enable, in the words of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, ‘the end of India’s decades-long isolation from the nuclear mainstream’. The case for

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India’s inclusion thus, is being built on its non-proliferation credentials and history of non-proliferation advocacy; its No First Use doctrine; its growing technology and manufacturing base; its nuclear safety and security record; and its adherence to NSG and MTCR guidelines. The author observes that if the state of relations on the subcontinent is just an excuse for blocking Indian membership, then that too will come to light. Such a stance would push stakeholders to engage with India on its own terms and not in connection with Pakistan. The essay on The Humanitarian Initiative and India’s Strategic Engagement by Maika Skjønsberg highlights how the humanitarian initiative on nuclear weapons has grown bigger and stronger. It has reframed the debate on nuclear weapons by highlighting the grave consequences of a nuclear detonation for humankind and the environment. The humanitarian initiative has given rise to a UN process to negotiate a global prohibition on nuclear weapons. The author highlights how as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the disarmament pillar of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have been perceived as standing still, some states chose to push the nuclear disarmament process from another angle. While the nuclear weapon states (NWS) see a threat in this initiative and argue that it weakens the NPT, the pro-camp asserts that it is aimed at strengthening the established disarmament bodies. India, which is not a party of the NPT but a de facto nuclear power, has through the years made a strong call to abolish nuclear weapons while fighting hard to be part of the established global nuclear order at the same time. India, which at first actively supported the initiative, withdrew from it and joined the boycott of the nuclear weapon states. It abstained during the vote at the UNGA and did not participate at the first negotiation session in March 2017. The author feels that the humanitarian movement has been seriously starting to trouble the NWS. Some of the experts arguing against a ban have recently made calls for both parties to strike a hand to the other side to end the polarisation between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). The pro-ban movement stresses that the debate around nuclear weapons cannot only be based on power politics and

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military doctrine; there is a need for a global reflection on the threat those weapons pose for humankind and our planet. The movement also points at the insufficient capacities of the international community to address the humanitarian emergencies that would result from the use of nuclear weapons. The author believes that the movement created an opportunity for non-nuclear weapon states to come together and share their frustration over the lack of political will among the NWS to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons as stated in the NPT. Distrust towards NWS for not doing enough for disarmament is not new. For over 20 years, cross-regional political groupings such as the New Agenda Coalition have pointed to the lack of significant progress towards nuclear disarmament and called for multilateral negotiations. However, the humanitarian initiative is way more worrisome for the NWS because it follows its own path outside of the established nuclear disarmament platforms. Maika opines that the ban treaty will focus on the legal prohibitions—including the use, possession, development, deployment and transfer of nuclear weapons - but will not contain dismantlement and disarmament verification provisions (NTI 2016b). This is one of the reasons why the initiative is perceived as unrealistic by nuclear states. However, it is also because of this very reason that the proponents of the ban argue that the participation of the NWS is not required. The concepts that have defined nuclear dynamics for the last twenty years are being questioned at different ends. Non-nuclear weapon states are putting across their perspective via the nuclear ban treaty that nuclear weapon states are evolving their arsenal while heavily investing in nuclear energy projects around the world. Global nuclear governance, thus, becomes the need of the hour where proliferation checks in collaboration with the IAEA need to run parallel to finding a direction of in this governance. As a significant member of the nuclear community, India has always lent its voice to issues that are important for its national identity. Global nuclear governance is one such issue that has always found a voice of support from India. All the chapters in this book individually look at aspects on how India has contributed in

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the past, where it can contribute and what are the future challenges for global nuclear governance from an Indian perspective. India’s unique position, as an important stakeholder in the global nuclear governance system, is highlighted by its volatile neighbourhood and the growing threat of nuclear terrorism. Further, the historical baggage of past nuclear negotiations has had a deep impact on the decision making body of India and this is bound to be reflected in the decisions of the state. India has consistently walked the tight rope between aiming for disarmament and developing its nuclear programme and this has provided New Delhi with a platform to understand and balance the viewpoints of not only the Nuclear Weapons States but also those of the Non-Nuclear Weapons States. This book fleshes out the various aspects of India and its role in Global Nuclear Governance.

1. India’s Nuclear Infrastructure Status and Challenges Steinar Høibråten and Elin Enger

When discussing a country’s nuclear programme, whether it is for peaceful purposes or for weapons development, it is essential to consider that country’s nuclear infrastructure as this generally constitutes the main bottleneck for reaching the county’s political goals. The sections below briefly present and discuss the Indian infrastructure related to its civilian and military nuclear programmes, as seen from abroad. We first provide a very brief historical overview and then present today’s nuclear fuel cycle and industrial facilities related to the nuclear programmes. This is followed by a discussion on the handling and transport of radioactive materials (including waste products) and on general safety and security concerns. Detailed technical discussions are beyond the scope of this text. Introduction Before India conducted its first nuclear test explosion in 1974 (claimed to be a so-called ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’), the country had been developing a substantial civilian nuclear programme for almost two decades. The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Mumbai was founded in 1944, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was established in 1948, relatively soon after the Indian independence in 1947. The task of the AEC was to lead India’s research on nuclear energy. When the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signatories in 1968, India was an outspoken opponent of it. The treaty allowed parties that had already conducted a nuclear test explosion, to keep their arsenals, while all other states would have to join the NPT as Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

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(NNWS), abolishing their right to ever develop such weapons. The Indian argument was that this made the treaty discriminatory in its nature, and that it especially discriminated against developing nations. This has remained India’s official position,1 and India has consequently never signed the NPT. By the 1970s, India had in operation several nuclear reactors, uranium and thorium mines, a nuclear fuel production plant and a plant for separation of plutonium. The Indian Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974 came as a shock to the world, and the subsequent reactions from the international community made international cooperation with India in the nuclear field very difficult. In spite of this, India continued its nuclear research, both in the civilian and the military sector. However, no further nuclear tests were conducted until 1998, when India carried out two tests involving a total of five nuclear devices.2 Some important terms from nuclear physics Nucleus: An atom consists of a nucleus, which is made up of particles called protons and neutrons, surrounded by a number of electrons. The number of protons in the nucleus determines the element (such as oxygen, gold, uranium, etc.). Isotope: Nuclei of a given element may contain different numbers of neutrons. The different possibilities make up the different isotopes of this element. Isotopes are identified by the total number of protons plus neutrons in each nucleus, such as for example oxygen-15, oxygen-16, uranium-235 and uranium-238. Fission: The splitting of the nucleus of a heavy atom, such as uranium, into typically two smaller nuclei plus a few neutrons. Chain reaction: If a neutron from a fissioning nucleus hits another nucleus, it may initiate fissioning of this second nucleus. Neutrons from this second fission process may subsequently hit other nuclei and cause further fission processes, etc.

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Fissionable: Nuclei of a fissionable isotope may fission if they are hit by a neutron. Fissile: If nuclei of a fissionable isotope have a sufficiently high probability of undergoing fission when hit by neutrons from an earlier fission process to sustain a chain reaction, the isotope is called fissile. Natural uranium: Uranium containing the same mix of isotopes as found in nature (approximately 99.3 percent uranium-238 and 0.7 percent uranium-235). Enriched uranium: Uranium which has been processed such that it contains a larger fraction of the fissile isotope uranium-235 than natural uranium does. Uranium which is enriched to 20 percent or more uranium-235 is known as highly enriched uranium. Uranium in reactor fuel is often enriched to 3-5  percent uranium-235, while uranium for nuclear weapons is typically enriched to more than 90 percent uranium-235. Depleted uranium: When uranium is enriched, the ‘waste product’ will be large amounts of uranium containing a smaller fraction of uranium-235 than natural uranium does. This is known as depleted uranium. Heavy water: A water molecule consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom (H2O). In heavy water, the most common isotope of hydrogen (hydrogen-1 with a nucleus consisting of one proton only) is replaced with the isotope hydrogen-2 (with a nucleus consisting of one proton and one neutron), also known as deuterium. As a non-signatory of the NPT, India is formally excluded from becoming a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This is a group of nuclear supplier countries that was established in 1974 in order to “contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports”.3 However, since 2006, India has

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had a separate agreement with the United States allowing transfers of nuclear technology,4 and this was followed by a similar decision by the NSG in 2008.5 This allows India access to international markets for nuclear technology for its civilian programme, as long as the civilian and the military programmes are kept strictly separated. In 2009, an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force, letting the agency apply its safeguards measures for all nuclear facilities in India listed as civilian, along the lines of the measures used in states that have signed the NPT as non-nuclearweapon states.6 Nuclear infrastructure Today, there are a large number of nuclear facilities for various purposes scattered across India. The use of nuclear power is expanding, India is about to commission it’s first domestically built nuclear submarines, and the country will soon have a full triad of nuclear weapons (that is, launched from land, aircraft and submarines). Aspects and consequences of this are discussed below. The nuclear fuel cycle in India By the term ‘nuclear fuel cycle’ one usually understands the entire lifespan of nuclear fuel beginning with its production through its use in reactors to its eventual storage or ‘reprocessing’ for recycling. For various reasons, India has its own approach to much of this. The first few power reactors were built in cooperation with other countries. India’s reserves of uranium are fairly small, so the decision was made to go for so-called ‘pressurised heavy-water reactors’ (PHWR), which are fuelled by natural uranium, to make the most efficient use of the uranium reserves. This design was also well suited to the country’s somewhat limited engineering capabilities at the time. (One may note that this type of reactor is well suited for the production of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons as well.) The early PHWR development took place in cooperation with Canada, but after India conducted its first nuclear test explosion in 1974,

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international cooperation with India in the nuclear field came to an abrupt halt which lasted for the next three decades. India has, therefore, to a large extent, carried out its development of nuclear energy on its own. Several domestically developed PHWR-based nuclear power plants were built at various sites throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. They all use natural uranium fuel. As mentioned India’s uranium reserves are relatively small. However, India has large reserves of thorium—larger than most other countries. There are no fissile isotopes of thorium, so this element cannot be used directly for energy production, but in a reactor; the very common isotope thorium-232 may be converted to uranium-233, which is fissile. Figure 1. India’s planned three-stage nuclear power programme

(From Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, http://www.barc.gov.in/reactor/tfc_3sinpp.html, accessed on January 11, 2017.)

India has carefully evaluated possible uses of thorium and has come up with a long-term, three-stage approach to a fuel cycle that can make the most of its limited uranium resources. This is described below7 and illustrated by the sketch in Figure 1.

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x

x

x

x

In Stage 1, pressurised heavy-water reactors fuelled by natural uranium generate 12 GW of electric power. By reprocessing the spent fuel, one can extract fissile plutonium as well as leftover uranium (known as ‘depleted uranium’ since it contains less of the fissile isotope uranium-235 than the 0.7 percent found in natural uranium). After operating in Stage 1 for 30 years or so, sufficient plutonium should be available to start Stage  2 in which, at full capacity, 300 GW of electric power is generated in what is known as ‘fast breeder reactors’, which are fuelled mainly by plutonium (mixed with depleted uranium and possibly also thorium). By surrounding the reactor cores with ‘blankets’ of depleted uranium and thorium, the fast breeder reactors can be used to produce more plutonium for their own use (from the depleted uranium) as well as the fissile isotope uranium-233 for use in the future Stage 3 (from thorium). After another maybe 30 years, enough uranium-233 should have been produced to start Stage 3. The plan is to make use of ‘advanced heavy water reactors’ (AHWRs) fuelled with uranium-233 mixed with thorium and plutonium. More uranium-233 will be produced both in the thorium fuel and in a surrounding blanket of thorium. This will allow India to make use of its large thorium supplies, and the sketch in Figure 1 suggests generating 500  GW of electric power for 500  years in this stage. Technology is already under development for Stage 3, but its implementation will not take place in the near future. One source expects thorium-based reactors to be deployed “beyond 2070”.8 The Indian plans as described above are unique and should in the long term provide the country with much-needed electricity in a cost-effective manner. This possible success is still far into the future, however, and presently unpredictable developments may change the situation long before Stage 3 could be in operation.

Fuel cycle facilities India is a large country, but as mentioned above, it does not have large domestic supplies of uranium. In 2013, it had to import about

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40 percent of its uranium needs.9 The remaining 60 percent came from several mines in south central and eastern India. The ore is processed in uranium mills near the mines to produce so-called ‘yellowcake’, which can be transported for further processing elsewhere. There are plans to open more uranium mines. Presently, India’s main nuclear fuel cycle facilities are all located at the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad in Telangana in central India. This is owned by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). Here, yellowcake is refined to uranium dioxide, UO2. This form of uranium is used in the production of nuclear fuel which also takes place at the Hyderabad complex. Six of the facilities in Hyderabad are under international safeguards through the IAEA. There are plans for another two or three fuel cycle complexes at other locations in the country to serve the expanding nuclear power production.10 Many of the nuclear reactors in India are moderated by heavy water and can be fuelled by natural uranium. Some reactors require ‘enriched’ fuel with substantially higher contents of the fissile isotope uranium-235, however, particularly those used in India’s nuclear submarines. For this purpose, there is a small enrichment plant at the Department of Energy’s Rare Materials Plant near Mysuru (Mysore) in the south of India.11 Reprocessing is very important in order to extract plutonium and uranium from spent reactor fuel or from the blankets surrounding some of the reactor cores. In a reprocessing plant, the spent fuel, which is intensely radioactive, must be dissolved in strong nitric acid before any products can be extracted. Such facilities are therefore very complex with sophisticated remote handling of the various material flows. India has three reprocessing plants operated by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). The first was commissioned in 1964 at Trombay in Mumbai on the western coast and has reportedly been used for the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. The other two are in Tarapur north of Mumbai and Kalpakkam on the eastern coast south of Chennai (Madras). These facilities all reprocess indigenous fuel and are not under IAEA safeguards. Two new reprocessing plants are planned.

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These will be under international safeguards and will therefore be able to reprocess fuel of foreign origin.12 India has one of the largest reserves in the world of thorium. This is not a fissile material that can be used directly for energy production, but as mentioned earlier, in a reactor the very common isotope thorium-232 may be converted to uranium-233, which is fissile. As described above, India has made extensive plans for the utilisation of thorium in its nuclear power production. In addition to special reactor designs, this also calls for thorium mines, facilities to make thorium fuel and special reprocessing facilities. Presently, the work on thorium is to a large degree experimental and therefore involving only a moderate amount of thorium. The plan is reportedly to reprocess thorium fuel in connection with the reprocessing plant in Kalpakkam.13 Nuclear power India’s large population has great needs for electric power. The burning of fossil fuels generates most of this power, but a number of nuclear power plants are also in operation. Some nuclear power reactors are under construction, and several more are being planned to meet future ambitions. Today’s Stage 1 power reactors are all under control of the state-owned company Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL). Fast breeder reactors for Stage 2 are developed by Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited (Bhavini), another state-owned enterprise. India’s Atomic Energy Act of 1962 permits only stateowned companies in the nuclear power complex.14 At the end of 2016, a total of 21 power-generating nuclear reactors distributed between seven sites across the country were on-line with a total nominal capacity of about 5.8 GW of electric power supplying about 3.5 percent of India’s electricity (see the map in Figure 2).15,16 Another reactor was connected to the power grid, but was not yet in commercial operation. As the numbers indicate, most Indian reactors generate much less power than a ‘typical’ power reactor in other countries. This is due to the historical circumstances described in the above section on the nuclear fuel cycle. Most of the reactors have a

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capacity of 220 MW electric power. Two of the most recent PHWRtype reactors have a capacity of 540  MW, and four more PHWRs under construction are designed to generate 700 MW. 17 Figure 2. India’s nuclear power plants both operating and planned sites

(From World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in India,” http://www.world-nuclear.org/ information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx, dated December  28, 2016, accessed January 11, 2017.)

The Kudankulam Atomic Power Project in the southern state of Tamil Nadu consists of two Russian VVER1000 reactors. Both are connected to the power grid, but only one reactor is in commercial operation so far. They have a capacity of 1000 MW electric power each. These are by far India’s largest nuclear reactors, and they are the only

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foreign-supplied reactors since the 1960s. The reactors are ‘pressurised water reactors’ (PWR) which do not use heavy water. Such reactors require enriched fuel which Russia will supply for the lifetime of the reactors. An agreement between the two countries allows India to reprocess the spent fuel and keep the plutonium for use in its future Stage  2 fast breeder reactors (see the above section on the nuclear fuel cycle).18 In preparation for Stage 2, construction of a 500 MW prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) started in 2004 at Kalpakkam near Chennai. Twelve years later, the reactor was still not in operation, but according to Bhavini, the project is in an “advance[d] stage of commissioning”,19 and according to an official announcement, the reactor may be commissioned in 2018.20 As mentioned earlier, India is a de facto nuclear-weapon state outside the NPT. One important requirement in order to permit trade of international nuclear technology with India has therefore been the establishment of a clear division between its civilian nuclear industry and its military nuclear activities. Civilian nuclear facilities should be under IAEA safeguards. As of 2017, 16 of the 22 power reactors were covered by safeguards agreements, two of them having been added to the list that year.21 According to the World Nuclear Association, there are plans for 20 additional nuclear power reactors of various kinds in India, and a further approximately 55 reactors are proposed.22 Numbers published by DAE predict a rapid growth in nuclear energy generation to about 30 GW electric power by 2022, about 60 GW by 2032, about 130 GW by 2042 and more than 270 GW by 2052.23 The highest figure is almost 50 times the nuclear power generated in India in 2016. Military uses of nuclear energy India is a de facto nuclear-weapon state. Today, it is assumed to have a nuclear arsenal of an estimated 120-130 warheads, and enough weapons grade plutonium to make several more.24 From the beginning, India has based its nuclear weapons programme on the use of plutonium as

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fissile material. For a state with limited access to uranium, this makes perfect sense, as much less natural uranium is needed to produce plutonium for a weapons programme than to produce enough weapons grade uranium. However, today, in addition to one reactor producing weapons-grade plutonium and corresponding reprocessing capabilities, India also has a uranium enrichment plant, the Rare Materials Plant near Mysuru, which is classified as part of the military sector. This plant most likely produces enriched uranium for use in fuel for the Indian nuclear submarines, but if desired, it could also be supplying weaponsgrade uranium.25 India has had two reactors producing plutonium for military purposes. The first, CIRUS, was a ‘Canadian Deuterium Uranium reactor’ (CANDU), which was put in operation in 1960 in Trombay near Mumbai. This reactor was shut down at the end of 2010 as part of the 2006 agreement with the United States, while Dhruva, built in the 1980s, is still running.26 Like CIRUS, Dhruva is located at BARC in Trombay near Mumbai and believed to be a 100 MW heavy water reactor.27 A plutonium reprocessing plant is located in the same complex.28 As reported in the section on the nuclear fuel cycle, India is planning substantial use of plutonium in Stage 2 of its reactor programme and will need to produce and reprocess plutonium for this purpose. While the requirements for the quality of the plutonium differ in the two cases, the plants needed for reprocessing and treating the plutonium will be similar. The prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam, which will use plutonium as part of its fuel, is classified as a military project and will not be subjected to IAEA inspections.29 Since the 1980s, India has been working on the development of nuclear submarines. Submarines powered by nuclear reactors have strategic advantages because they have an essentially unlimited range and can remain submerged for much longer than submarines using diesel engines. The first Indian-built nuclear submarine class, the Arihant class, is well underway in cooperation with Russia. The first of these submarines, INS Arihant, was launched in 2009, but was still

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on sea trials as of August 2017. One further submarine of the Arihant class, INS Arighat, was launched in November 2017, and a few more may follow in the years to come.30, 31 In short, India’s military, nuclear infrastructure is much smaller than the civilian, nuclear infrastructure. Matters are complicated, however, by the fact that the military facilities and the corresponding material flows are less transparent than those on the civilian side, and by the difficulty in keeping the activities of the two sectors separate from each other. Handling and transport of fissile and other radioactive materials Regulatory structure Regarding nuclear energy, the highest authority in India is the Atomic Energy Commission, which was established already in 1948. It is closely connected to the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) through the Secretary to the Government of India in the DAE who is ex officio Chairman of the Commission.32 The state-owned companies operating the various nuclear energy facilities are in turn controlled by the DAE. This structure, including some of the operators, is illustrated in Figure 3. Note the position of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. This is the nuclear regulatory authority in India, and its apparent lack of independence from the central government has been a recurring topic of discussion in various fora. Nuclear fuel The handling of nuclear fuel is discussed in several other sections as well. Today, all fuel fabrication takes place at the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad in central India. Another fuel fabrication facility is under construction at Kota in Rajasthan, and two more are planned.33

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Figure 3. Connections between the most important bodies in the field of nuclear power in India. NPCIL is the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, UCIL is Uranium Corporation of India Limited, and AMD is the Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research.

(From World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in India,” http://www.world-nuclear.org/ information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx, dated December  28, 2016, accessed January 11, 2017.)

Spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed in one of the three reprocessing plants in Trombay, Tarapur or Kalpakkam to extract useful elements. Spent nuclear fuel is highly radioactive and is normally left in pools at the power plants for a few years for some of the activity to subside before it is taken to a reprocessing plant. To get a sufficient supply of plutonium for Stage 2 and uranium-233 for Stage 3, this ‘cooling time’ needs to be as short as possible in India, and this in turn makes the reprocessing more challenging. Since as a rule all spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed, there is no need for long-term storage of spent fuel. As described, the fuel handling is to a large extent centralised. This necessarily creates needs for transport of both new fuel and spent fuel. New fuel is not very radioactive, so the radiation hazard is fairly straightforward to manage. Transport of highly radioactive spent fuel on the other hand is much more complicated to manage from a safety point of view.

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Radioactive waste Nuclear power plants and reprocessing plants generate a lot of radioactive waste. Some of it is very highly radioactive and correspondingly challenging to handle. The waste may be solid, liquid or gaseous, and it may have very different physical, chemical and radiological properties. Different waste streams must therefore be handled differently. In India, the general rule is to treat and store radioactive waste locally at each site.34 Much of the waste falls in the category of low and intermediate level solid waste. After appropriate processing, for example compression, this waste is placed in near-surface repositories co-located with the nuclear installation that generated the waste. As mentioned earlier, spent nuclear fuel is considered to be a resource, not a waste product. It is reprocessed to recover useful elements such as uranium, plutonium and caesium. However, since spent nuclear fuel is dissolved in nitric acid at the reprocessing plants, the final, highly radioactive waste product is liquid. In India, as in many other countries, such high-level liquid waste is typically vitrified, that is, solidified by mixing it into a glass matrix. Because of the intense radioactivity, the canisters holding the vitrified waste get very hot. These canisters are initially placed in interim storage with good ventilation for thirty years or more till the radioactivity, and thereby the temperature, is sufficiently reduced to permanently place them in a deep geological repository.35 India has three plants for reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Two ‘waste immobilisation plants’ for vitrification are co-located with the reprocessing plants at Trombay and Tarapur, both in the Mumbai area. At Trombay there is also an operational interim storage facility. No geological repository has yet been established. This must be established around 500  m underground in stable rock formations, and work is underway both to locate suitable sites and to develop a good facility design.36 Considering India’s ambitious expansion plans for its nuclear power production, its radioactive waste storage facilities and repositories may be seriously challenged by the rapidly increasing amounts of

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nuclear waste. How much waste can be deposited in the near-surface repositories? Will there be sufficient capacity for reprocessing and vitrification? How about storage capacity for canisters of vitrified highlevel waste? When will a deep geological repository be available? Transport of fissile and other radioactive materials India’s policy of co-locating nuclear facilities such as, for example, power plants and waste handling facilities, reduces the need for transport of radioactive materials. However, India is a large country, and large amounts of radioactive materials still need to be transported. The safety code governing such transport is set by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board based on IAEA regulations.37 This provides rules for packaging, registration, approvals, etc., of the different categories of radioactive materials. The actual shipping could take place by road, rail, sea or air. India has vast distances and an extensive railway system, so it would be reasonable to assume that rail transport plays an important role, especially for physically large items like new and spent nuclear fuel and canisters of vitrified waste. New uranium-based nuclear fuel coming from the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad is not very radioactive and is fairly easy to shield. Furthermore, natural and low-enriched uranium, which is used in the nuclear power plants, is of little value for anybody seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons. The transport of spent nuclear fuel is a different story, particularly for fuel from nuclear power plants that are not co-located with a reprocessing plant. Spent fuel is highly radioactive and must be transported in heavily shielded containers. The containers must be able to withstand essentially any imaginable external forces caused by accidents or deliberate actions. The same goes for canisters of vitrified waste from the reprocessing plants. Low and intermediate level radioactive waste comes in all shapes and forms and in large volumes, but this is mainly stored in nearsurface repositories at the various facilities, thereby significantly reducing the need for transport among the general public. If an accident should occur during transport, radioactive contamination

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near the accident site may lead to extensive and costly clean-up, but it is not likely to constitute a significant threat to public health and safety. Highly radioactive, specialised sources for industrial applications, on the other hand, must be well protected and well-guarded since some of them could cause serious contamination and/or be of use for possible terrorists. The sources may be transported over vast distances in such a large country and thereby raise serious safety and security concerns. Nuclear weapons India’s nuclear weapons programme has since the start been based on the use of plutonium as the main fissile material, and India is believed to have an arsenal of 120–130 warheads today.38 Some of these warheads will be gravitational bombs for delivery with airplanes, but India also has ballistic missiles, Agni and Prithvi, that are assumed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads. Documents describing the detailed handling and transport of nuclear weapons and missiles in India are necessarily not generally available. However, because of the extreme sensitivity of nuclear weapons, there are reasons to believe that they are correspondingly well protected against accidents as well as theft. Fissile materials to be used in the manufacturing process as well as resulting waste products may constitute more of a concern, and they might be considered very attractive by a number of actors, but as BARC at Trombay in Mumbai appears to be the site for most of the steps required to manufacture nuclear weapons,39 the need for transport of weapons-related radioactive waste and fissile materials on public roads and railways should be fairly limited. Safety and security concerns Previous sections have touched upon a number of issues related to safety and security. In short, safety addresses how to protect people from harmful effects of fissile and other radioactive materials, while security is about protecting these materials from potential unlawful acts. In general, many safety measures, such as heavy shielding, controlled

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access, etc., are also good security measures in that they make these materials less accessible. Satisfactory safety of radiation workers, that is, personnel working in an environment in which they may be exposed to radiation from radioactive materials, would be ensured by following recommendations by IAEA and other international bodies. This includes measures such as for example protective clothing, good procedures, appropriate shielding and dosimetry. The implementation of good safety measures is an important part of a nation’s safety culture and must be implemented through formal rules and regulations as well as by education and local reminders and enforcement. As discussed earlier, the handling, transport and storage of low and intermediate level radioactive materials cause many worries. However, assuming that basic safety measures are taken care of, such activities should not constitute major safety or security concerns. Accidents and incidents may have a significant local impact, but they would not constitute a threat to public health and safety beyond the accident site. An exception would be diversion of radioactive materials for willful dispersion as part of criminal or terrorist activities. As a general rule, radioactive materials spread over a large area would not be sufficiently concentrated to constitute a significant radiation hazard; nevertheless, it could be very costly and time consuming to clean up the contaminated area. Clearly, radioactive materials that are particularly well suited for malicious purposes must be well secured and guarded both where they are used and when transported. We should also mention what is known as ‘orphan’ radioactive sources. These are radioactive sources of all kinds that were once used for a particular purpose and have since been lost, forgotten or stolen. Most radioactive sources are relatively harmless, but some may be very harmful, and accidents with orphan sources have happened all over the world, also in India.40 Finally, safety and security relating to fissile materials must also be addressed. Highly enriched uranium and all forms of plutonium have potential nuclear weapons applications and may be of interest to

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other states as well as some non-state actors. These materials may be part of spent nuclear fuel in which case they are surrounded by highly radioactive products and correspondingly hard to access. They may also be on a pure form as fresh fuel for nuclear power plants or nuclear submarines or for use in nuclear weapons. Fissile materials relevant for nuclear weapons (‘special nuclear materials’) always call for extreme security measures, but details about how these measures are actually carried out, are for obvious reasons not publicly available. A special concern here is the large quantities of plutonium fuel that must be transported to the Stage 2 fast breeder reactors in times to come. Reactor-grade plutonium is not optimal for use in nuclear weapons, but all plutonium is fissile. It is unlikely that the state of India will want to use this plutonium for weapons, but a non-state actor unable to acquire weapons-grade plutonium might want to make use of it. All transport of plutonium fuel must therefore be surrounded by very heavy security measures. It is beyond the scope of this work to perform an independent analysis of nuclear safety and security in India. We choose to quote from the NTI Nuclear Security Index assembled by Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and their panel of international experts.41 The study evaluates and ranks the security from theft of weaponsusable nuclear materials from the 24  countries in the world that possess at least one kilogram of this, and it evaluates and ranks the security from sabotage of nuclear facilities in 45 countries with such facilities. In the theft ranking, India comes out as number 21 (ahead of Pakistan, Iran and North Korea).42 It receives high scores on following global norms and implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on preventing the proliferation to non-state actors of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. On the other hand, the large number of nuclear facilities and the associated security and control measures, in particular security during transport, contribute much to the overall low ranking, as do corruption and the lack of an independent regulatory agency. In the sabotage ranking, India ends up as number 36 out

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of the 45  countries.43 The positive and negative aspects are quite similar to those quoted in the theft ranking. Based on this study, one may conclude that while India has a lot of the formal documents, agreements and procedures in place, there is still room for significant improvements to the implementation of these procedures as well as to the security culture in general. Nuclear weapons are always well guarded. The risk of loss or theft of a nuclear weapon is therefore clearly smaller than corresponding risks in connection with fissile and other radioactive materials in use elsewhere. Conclusion In the above, we have seen that India has a large and ambitious nuclear power programme as well as a substantial nuclear weapons programme. These efforts take place at numerous sites all over the very large country and involve large quantities of fissile and other radioactive materials. These materials must all be handled and transported. India has a policy of placing its low and intermediate level radioactive waste in near-surface repositories at the site where the waste was produced. This reduces the need for transport of radioactive materials on public roads and railways, but the need is still necessarily quite large. Safety and security related to fissile and other radioactive materials involved in all the many processes that take place all over the country, is our main concern. India appears to have implemented a good system of regulations and procedures. Even so, the situation is not perfect today, and improving it while keeping up with the large growth in the nuclear programmes will constitute a big challenge in the years to come. Notes 1.

2.

As stated for instance in Government of India, Ministry of Defence, “Annual Report 2004-2005,” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/14991/MOD-English2005India.pdf, accessed April 4, 2018, p. 14. V.N. Mikhailov, Ed., Catalog of Worldwide Nuclear Testing, (New York: Begell-Atom LLC, 1999), p. 113.

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3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

21.

22.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), “About the NSG,” http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup. org/en/about-us, accessed April 4, 2018. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Communication dated 25 July 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of India concerning a document entitled ‘Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July  18, 2005: India’s Separation Plan’,” INFCIRC/731, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/ documents/infcircs/2008/infcirc731.pdf, dated July 25, 2008, accessed February 15, 2017. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Communication dated 10 September 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of Germany to the Agency regarding a ‘Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India’,” INFCIRC/734 (Corrected), https://www. iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2008/infcirc734c.pdf, dated September 19, 2008, accessed April 5, 2018. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Agreement Between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities,” INFCIRC/754, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/ publications/documents/infcircs/2009/infcirc754.pdf, dated May  29, 2009, accessed January 24, 2017. World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in India,” http://www.world-nuclear.org/ information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx, dated December 28, 2016, accessed January 11, 2017. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, “Plants Under Operation,” http://www. npcil.nic.in/main/AllProjectOperationDisplay.aspx, accessed January 23, 2017. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “India,” https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/ CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=IN, accessed January 24, 2017. World Nuclear Association, n. 7. Ibid. Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited (Bhavini), “Present Status of 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR),” http://bhavini.nic.in/Userpages/ViewProject. aspx, accessed January 23, 2017. U. Tejonmayam, “Prototype fast breeder reactor to be commissioned in two months: IGCAR director,” The Times of India, December 7, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes. com/city/chennai/prototype-fast-breeder-reactor-to-be-commissioned-in-two-monthsigcar-director/articleshow/61968967.cms, accessed March 2, 2018. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities – Addition to the List of Facilities Subject to Safeguards Under the Agreement,” INFCIRC/754/Add.8, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/ publications/documents/infcircs/2009/infcirc754a8.pdf, dated September  19, 2017, accessed April 5, 2018. World Nuclear Association, n. 7.

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23. Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy, “Strategy for Growth of Electricity in India,” http://www.dae.nic.in/?q=node/123, accessed January 23, 2017. 24. H.M. Kristensen and R.S. Norris: “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2017,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.  73, No.  4 (2017), pp.  205–209, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ pdf/10.1080/00963402.2017.1337998?needAccess=true, accessed April 5, 2018. 25. World Nuclear Association, n. 7. 26. Ibid. 27. This reactor produces 100 MW of thermal power (heat). If this heat had been used to generate electricity, it would have generated maybe around 30 MW of electric power. 28. International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Material Report 2015,” http:// fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr15.pdf, accessed February 7, 2017, p. 26. 29. World Nuclear Association, n. 7. 30. Jane’s Fighting Ships, “Arihant class,” http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jfs_b325-jfs_, dated December 15, 2017, accessed April 5, 2018. 31. Jane’s World Navies, “India – Navy,” http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwna0070-jwna, dated March 21, 2018, accessed April 5, 2018. 32. Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy, “Government of India Atomic Energy Commission,” http://www.dae.nic.in/?q=node/394, accessed January 27, 2017. 33. Ibid. 34. K. Raj, K.K. Prasad and N.K. Bansal, “Radioactive Waste Management Practices in India,” Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol. 236 (2006), pp. 914–930, https://www.sciencedirect. com/science/article/pii/S0029549306000859, accessed January 25, 2017. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, “Transport of Radioactive Material,” http://www.aerb. gov.in/AERBPortal/pages/English/transport/transport_jsp.action, accessed January  30, 2017. 38. H.M. Kristensen and R.S. Norris, n. 25. 39. World Nuclear Association, n. 7. 40. One incident is quoted in World Nuclear News, “Orphan sources in Indian scrap market,” http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Orphan_sources_in_Indian_scrap_ market_2304101.html, dated April 4, 2010, accessed February 15, 2017. 41. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action,” third ed. ( January 2016), http://ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ NTI_2016-Index-Report_MAR-25-2.pdf, accessed February 1, 2017. 42. Ibid., p. 74. 43. Ibid., p. 107.

2. Global Nuclear Governance and India Roshan Khanijo

Introduction Global Nuclear Governance is a complex phenomenon, and the legislative and executive mechanisms are constantly being challenged by the state-systems. Post Hiroshima, nuclear governance began formulating global norms, however; the contours of which continue to change even today. This variability can be attributed to the fact that over time, nuclear challenges globally, have also diversified; hence the role of nuclear governance has been not only to identify constantly emerging threats but also to develop various binding and non-binding multilateral treaties to mitigate those threats. Nuclear governance thus primarily constitutes three main areas, namely, Nuclear Safety and Security, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Disarmament and Arms Control. As far as India’s role in nuclear governance is concerned, India was an early supporter of nuclear disarmament and the then Indian Prime Minister Pt Jawaharlal Nehru had proposed an end to nuclear testing in 1954.1 Furthermore, India played a major role in the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and was also involved in the negotiations of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). As Scott Sagan points out, “In the actual negotiations creating the NPT text, Sweden and India proposed to include a commitment to a number of ‘tangible steps,’ including security assurances for nonnuclear-weapons states, an end to nuclear testing, and a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons in the treaty. The US and the Soviet Union refused to allow such specific measures to be included in the final text of the NPT.”2 Despite these efforts, the inherently discriminatory

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nature and unequal power balance manifested within NPT, impelled India to refuse to sign the treaty. Nevertheless, even though India was a reluctant partner initially, (since its experience with Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) was fraught with complications), the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2005, has led to its greater integration into the global nuclear order and ever since then it has actively participated in the organization and implementation of nuclear governance. Challenges to Nuclear Governance One of the major challenges that nuclear governance must overcome today is the question of how to build a non-discriminatory world order, where the treaties are adopted by maximum nations, and the nuclear mechanisms such as implementation, monitoring and the surveillance of nuclear plants and fissile material gain global acceptance. Though the IAEA has taken steps to strengthen the safeguard issue by developing mechanisms like Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), Additional Protocol (AP), Model Additional Protocol, etc., but still a lot needs to be done. Considering the fact that the non-renewable sources of energy will get depleted in future, and the possibility of number of countries opting for nuclear power plants will increase, (as nuclear energy is often considered as a clean source of energy), this will necessitate a greater coordination amongst the various institutions, responsible for nuclear security. The IAEA, which serves as the core governing body will be stretched to maximum capacity and will consequently require financial as well as administrative help. While the situation seems daunting and problems abound, a systematic analysis may help address some of the major issues and challenges. This paper, attempts to analyse the Indian approach to nuclear governance, its role, and how it can help in strengthening the global nuclear governance mechanism as a whole. India’s Approach to Nuclear Governance India is committed to fighting terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation. India’s foreign secretary S. Jaishankar in his welcome address at the Implementation and Assessment Group

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Meeting Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), had also stated that “terrorism remains the most pervasive and serious challenge to international security…the dangers of discriminating among terrorists – good or bad or even yours and mine - are increasingly recognized. Terrorism is an international threat that should not serve national strategy”3. The fact that several treaties are trying to combat this threat proves that terrorism should not be made a political game. India since 2002 has been highlighting this issue in the UN General Assembly and has even co-sponsored a resolution on “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”. On its part India has also signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). These two issues are of particular concern for India due to India’s precarious geo-strategic location. India’s immediate neighbourhood serves as a hub for terrorist activities The Af-Pak region harbours groups like Al-Qaida, Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Jaish-e-Mohammed ( JEM), etc. Therefore, strengthening of global nuclear governance is directly in India’s best interests. Thus, India’s approach has been to participate in all the major instruments, which are considered as global yardsticks, for demonstrating a state’s commitment to comprehend the dual task of nuclear safety and security and combating international terrorism. These include, apart from the above-mentioned treaties, the other treaties where India has actively participated, including the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), Nuclear Security Summits, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), etc. Since India had been one of the proponents of the IAEA in its formative stage, it has always emphasized the role of the IAEA as central with regard to the governance of nuclear issues. Furthermore; India’s role and commitment to nuclear governance can also be gauged through the domestic compliance of various international treaties which it signed such as the Missile Technological Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Agreement, Australian Group, etc., in its efforts to assist the IAEA in its various activities. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano

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in 2017 also acknowledged that “India has been a reliable partner of the IAEA in fulfilling its mandate … India’s support to developing countries both directly and through the IAEA is extremely important,” he said, “as the IAEA is receiving an increased number of requests for support from Member States, including small island states, for capacity building”.4 Also further, IAEA-nominated experts in advanced nuclear energy, and radiation technologies will be able to use the new training facilities which India has developed. For example, in future, India’s services at the Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) could be utilised by IAEA experts especially in areas of radiological safety, nuclear security, nuclear material characterisation and applications of radioisotopes, etc. Major Nuclear Governance Treaties and India As far as nuclear security under the UN charter is concerned, there are 4 major components which are significant, as they deal with the protection of nuclear fissile material, nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. These are: x The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its amendment; x The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT); x UN Security Council Resolution 1540; x IAEA activities and documents. India believes that tracking and controlling radiological and fissile materials, and preventing nuclear terrorism requires international cooperation, hence it has not only signed but also ratified CPPNM and its 2005 amendment, thus bringing the domestic transportation of nuclear material under the ambit of the convention5. In order to protect against attacks on nuclear targets, and to punish the perpetrators, through their prosecution and extradition of the alleged terrorists,6 India has signed the ICSANT because India does not want to harbour or support terrorist groups. Nuclear non-proliferation is a concern for

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India, so it supports and has implemented the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and has pledged to prevent WMD transfer to nonstate actors. With regard to IAEA activities, India has supported the 5th revision of IAEA’s INFCIRC/225 and participated in the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB). India has also cooperated with the Interpol’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit and the World Customs Organization-on nuclear trafficking issue, and is a party to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. India’s Contribution in the Global Nuclear Governance India is emerging as a major power, and it fully acknowledges the expectations of the International community regarding its role in shaping the nuclear world order. India’s endeavour has been to strengthen nuclear governance through active participation in various international activities. The major events which India has steered in the last few years are; (a) India has conducted nine regional training seminars on nuclear security in cooperation with the IAEA. (b) India has been participating in IAEA’s Advisory Groups and Technical Committees and contributes to its activities by providing experts, organizing training programs and workshops, and providing equipment7 (c) India has contributes $50,000 annually to IAEA’s International Project on Innovative Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and it was also one of its founding members.8 (d) India has participated in Nuclear Security Summits-hosted meetings of NSS Sherpas in 2012, and has set up the ‘Global Center of Nuclear Energy Partnership”(GCNEP) , which is a center of excellence in nuclear security. India Domestic Nuclear Compatibility with Global Norms It is essential that a country’s legislation should be in congruence with international legal systems, and its execution should be supervised under an international team, as this will set a good precedent for other nations. It is also a definitive marker of a country’s commitment to nuclear safety and security. As far as India’s domestic compatibility is concerned, as of September 2018, it has placed 26 nuclear facilities

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under the IAEA safeguards9 and India has also separated its civilian and military facilities with an aim to prevent the cross-feeding of fissile materials. India has also tried to revamp its export control system (SCOMET-Special Chemicals Organisms Material Equipment and Technology-list) in accordance to the guidelines and technology control list of the NSG and MTCR. As a result India has become a member of all the major groups namely; MTCR, Wassenaar Agreement and the Australian Group. As far as India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) is concerned it is stuck more due to political power play than for technical reasons. India’s civilian nuclear power plants were reviewed by the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) of the IAEA and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO).10 India had also requested the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)and the Peer Review Mission of IAEA to conduct a review of the nuclear power plants in India, which it did in 2015. In its report the Executive Vice President Ramzi Jammal had concluded that there is a strong commitment to safety in India.11 All this demonstrates that India is trying to adjust its domestic laws to match the legal provisions, practices, and expectations of the international nuclear order. Nevertheless, there are still a few areas where India can improve its performance. While there haven’t been any explicit cases concerning an advertent or inadvertent leakage of nuclear materials, however, incidents like six employees of the Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant (KARP) being exposed to radiation exceeding the annual dosage limit prescribed by the regulatory authorities in January 21, 2003, require stricter monitoring.12 The Indian government can implement mechanisms for providing more transparency in on-site and off-site emergency response arrangements, which can be shared with international institutions. The best mechanism would be to have a comprehensive white paper on safety and security. However, there is a very fine line regarding the disclosure of internal security information via open sources. The disclosure of such sensitive information, albeit for altruistic purposes, poses a major threat to homeland security as the advent of technological advancement can lead to this information being used by the non-state actors in a negative way.

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Therefore, a delicate balance needs to be maintained when it comes to information sharing and security. India’s AERB has performed satisfactorily so far but establishing an independent regulatory board will help in negating the grievances of some monitoring institutions and it can also serve to bring in more neutrality and impartiality in the implementation process. India had introduced the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority Bill introduced in the Parliament in 2011; this Bill would have created a more independent nuclear regulator. However, with the country going into general elections, the bill lapsed and is yet to be reintroduced in the Parliament.13 A fresh Bill similar to the one introduced earlier, is under examination and the proposed Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority will provide a statutory basis for nuclear safety regulation in India, thus ensuring its de jure independence, and will further strengthen nuclear and radiation safety regulations in the country.14 Hopefully it would be passed soon. However, since safety and security posit a constant, ongoing process, in the interests of security, each country needs to update its data and legislation periodically. India’s Role in Mitigating Nuclear Challenges India would like to contribute to the creation of a unified and cohesive nuclear security architecture, with stringent laws against ‘Nuclear Technology Proliferation’ and ‘Nuclear Terrorism’. It is essential to build a robust ‘Security Culture’ and for that all the stakeholders such as, the government, the regulatory bodies, and the industry need to work together towards the creation of a secure global order. Here the role of academia and nongovernmental organisations is also of significance in providing awareness and bringing to light hitherto eclipsed issues. The IAEA publication also highlights the “Developing, fostering and maintaining a robust nuclear security culture” where a nuclear security culture is defined as: “The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviours of individuals, organizations and institutions which serve as a means to support, enhance and sustain nuclear security”.15 The establishment of Centers of Excellence and other nuclear security training and support centers can greatly aid these endeavours.

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India’s GCNEP programme has five schools, namely: Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems, Nuclear Security Studies, School of Radiological Safety Studies, Nuclear Material Charecterisation Studies and Application of Radioisotopes and Radiation Technologies. These are trying to organise training courses and workshops for nuclear safety and security awareness. A considerable amount of HEU has been down-blended to low-enriched uranium (LEU), but a lot more work still needs to be done in this area, and India can help other countries through the facilitation of such conversations by sharing of similar technologies with them. Additionally non-HEU technologies can also be used in another significant area—producing radioisotopes. India would like to strengthen global governance through the creation of a triad mechanism of ‘Surveillance-Inspection-Verification’ which can then bring greater transparency and aid in controlling nuclear issues as discussed in this article. India can also help in capacity-building for nuclear security through cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. However, the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency is the core of any international nuclear security framework. There is going to be a drastic increase in the scope of civilian nuclear energy programmes as over 45 countries are actively considering embarking upon nuclear power programmes ranging from sophisticated economies to developing nations—the front runners being UAE, Turkey, Vietnam, Belarus, and Poland.16 It could be suggested that the IAEA may perform the dual role, of firstly, creating binding nuclear safety and security agreements, and secondly certifying compliance to such agreements. However, this will stretch the IAEA facilities in terms of its fiscal and technical capacity, but countries like India can help the IAEA in both these areas through the provision of financial capital, technical experts as well as the organisation of training programmes, workshops and equipment. There are still many relevant areas where information and expertise sharing is required, such as nuclear detection and forensics, and in the future, India can help in these areas. The Indian government and scientists had drafted a proposal to construct a national nuclear forensic

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laboratory as part of international efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.17 The plan had called for the nuclear forensic center to be built in Karnataka in southwest India no later than 2018 or 2019, and it seeks approximately $4.7 million to support the laboratory’s establishment and the acquisition of internationally developed sequencing technology.18 However, this still needs to fructify. India can also help in the research and development of new ‘Innovative Designs’ aimed at reducing the threat to nuclear security and increasing overall stability. Furthermore, India can initiate and mediate the creation of multilateral agreements where the aspirations of both North-South are catered to, under a UN system. Finally, the security architecture of nations can also be strengthened if countries host periodic peer reviews, conducted by International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions, and endorse those recommendations. India can help the IAEA by providing them with the requisite resources to do so. Information Security is one area where a lot needs to be done. Cybercrimes and hacking posit serious threats to any nuclear security architecture as they can severely damage nuclear power systems. Preventing non-state actors from obtaining information technology to disrupt critical information infrastructure and control systems is a major challenge that all the countries need to address. This can be done through awareness and emphasis on more synergy between cyber workers and nuclear reactor officials, and also through the conduction of workshops and training programmes. This is a relatively new domain and there is still a lot that can be done. Future of Global Nuclear Governance The question one needs to ask is that despite having so many treaties, why threats like nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation still continue? The response to this, will also give us an indication, as to what the future trajectory of global nuclear governance will be. There are two issues here, and both are interrelated. First, one needs to deal with issues like limited mandate, veto power, non-binding, non-ratification and compliance issues of major treaties. Second, arising from the first

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issue is the matter of how to effectively implement, monitor and enforce security laws. If one analyses the major treaties then one finds that the compliance rate is average, if countries, who have been actively involved in nuclear proliferation and have vulnerable domestic environment if they do not ratify these treaties, then effectiveness of these treaties are compromised. Second the nuclear environment post-Cold War has changed and the nuclear power is no longer spoken in binaries but with new nations acquiring nuclear weapon status, the nuclear power in a multi-polar world has been disseminated and has become difficult to control. One effective way of doing so, is to involve these states actively in the nuclear governance process by making them members of treaties. This requires a relook of many treaties like the NPT and other Multilateral Export Control Regimes. India is not a member of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) but can aid the system much more if it was, because India has an active civilian nuclear program and is developing new technologies which can be used by other nations. For example India is working on the use of thorium as a future substitute for fuelling nuclear reactors; also, India would now like to export Pressurised Heavy Water reactor (PHWR). In reality, all these export control regimes are important mechanisms which support development and regulate nuclear safety, and some of the best practices were devised in these institutions so it is essential that these non-proliferation and Multilateral Export Control Regimes accept the new members based on objectivity and looking into historical non-proliferation records so that both the parties benefit. The question which now arises is do we need to restructure the nuclear governance mechanisms? Or do we amend the major treaties to incorporate the new members. More nations will ratify a non-discriminatory treaty, and this can thus solve the problems of compliance, implementation and enforcement of safety and security laws. Thus a more coherent approach is required in the legislation and execution of these major treaties, and until this is achieved the objectives of the global nuclear governance will remain unfinished.

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Conclusion Nuclear safety and security are of paramount importance in today’s environment, because the threat of nuclear terrorism is much more real now than it was in the past. The rise of new groups like ISIS, and the presence of old non-state actors like Al Qaida and Taliban are constantly challenging the global safety and security environment. India has attempted to demonstrate the need for action through its active participation in global security measures and by its compliance with the caveats of major treaties. India also has been a constant motivational player for Nuclear Non-proliferation and disarmament. Through its Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, it had tried to decipher a path for a ‘World Free of Nuclear Weapons’. As far as safety and security are concerned, India is actively participating in the nuclear governance, and contributes to IAEA. Also through its GCNEP programme, India is trying to organise international training programmes and workshops to address various aspects of safety and security. Without being a member of NPT and some other export control regime, India, by amending its domestic laws, revamping its export control system (SCOMET) and the review of its civilian nuclear power plants by the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART), has shown that it is ready to go that extra mile when it comes to nuclear safety and security of its nuclear plants. However, if global nuclear governance is to be successful, it needs to reformulate itself. There needs to be more coherence, realism, and an accommodative environment. It needs to be non-discriminatory so that more nations join its realm which will ensure that nuclear threats are addressed in a more holistic manner. Thus the rationale is to innovate and adapt pre-existent measures. The foundation is already there—, what is required now, is to build a strong structure. Notes 1. 2.

Text of Nehru’s demand is available on http://www.pugwashindia.org/Issue_Brief_ Details.aspx?Nid=73. Scott D. Sagan, “Convenient Consensus and Serious Debate about Disarmament,” Discussion Paper Presented to the Working Group on an Expanded Non-Proliferation System, Washington, DC, June 8-9, 2010. Log on to http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Co nvenientConcensusDebateDisarmament-ScottSagan-060610_2.pdf ?_=1326132026.

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3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17. 18.

Welcome address by Foreign Secretary at Implementation and Assessment Group Meeting Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), New Delhi, February 08, 2017,MediaCenter ,Ministry of External Affairs, Government of IndiaLog on to https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/28012/Welcome_address_by_ Foreign_Secretary_at_Implementation_and_Assessment_Group_Meeting_Global_ Initiative_to_Combat_Nuclear_Terrorism_GICNT_New_Delhi. Ibid. Nuclear Security in India, Document, Ministry of External Affairs,18 March 2014; Log on to http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?23091/Nuclear+Security+in+India. Text of The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; Log on to https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-15.pdf. Nuclear Security Governance in India, Institutions, Instruments and Culture, Sitakanta Mishra and Happymon Jacob,Sandia Report, January 2015, Cooperative Monitoring Center Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico - 87185 and Livermore, California - 94550. “India and the IAEA,” Indian Embassy (Vienna), Government of India. Log on to http://www.indianembassy.at/pages.php?id=64. M Somasekhar, “India puts four more nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards,” BusinessLine, September 19, 2018 at https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/ india-puts-four-more-nuclear-facilities-under-iaea-safeguards/article24988409.ece (Accessed on December 19, 2018). See,N-5,Nuclear Security Governance, pp.-35. IAEA Mission Concludes Peer Review of India’s Nuclear Regulatory Framework, IAEA, 27 March 2015. Log on to https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-missionconcludes-peer-review-india-nuclear -regulatory-framework. T.S. Subramanian The Kalpakkam Incident , Frontline, Volume 20 - Issue 17, August 16 - 29, 2003; Log on to https://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2017/ stories/20030829002404400.htm. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, W hy India’s nuc lear secur it y challenge demands attention, July,07 2017, Commentaries, ORF, on https://www.orfonline. org/research/42286-why-india-nuclear-security-challenge-demands-attention/ Government Of India Department Of Atomic Energy Rajya Sabha Untarred Question No. 1284 To Be Answered On 27.07.2017 on http://dae.nic.in/writereaddata/parl/ monsoon2017/rsus1284.pdf Self - assessment of Nuclear Security Culture in Facilities IAEA Nuclear Security and Activities, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No-28-T, on https://www-pub.iaea.org/ MTCD/Publications/PDF/PUB1761_web.pdf Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries,Updated February 2016; Log on to http://www. world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energycountries.aspx. Accessed on 10 March 2016. Dr.Rukmani Krishnamurthy & Nisha Menon, “Role of Nuclear Forensics in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism”; Log on to http://www.helik.in/files/helik_1.pdf Ibid.

3. India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Lessons for Outlier States Kanica Rakhra1

With individualized nuclear deals becoming the new norm, a number of questions are being raised on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its functionality. Is the NPT past its age? Should there be a new treaty for all? Should India be allowed entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), without signing the NPT? How should the NSG then respond to Pakistan’s request for the same? What reactions would Brazil and South Africa (who gave up their programs) have to these changes? Could this trigger other NPT signatories to rethink their decision, putting the precarious nuclear order at risk? And can the momentum that led to the NPT be generated for all states to come together for another landmark treaty? These questions stem from the 123 Agreement, a nuclear deal between India and the United States (US), which allowed India, an outlier state, to bypass the NPT regulations on civil nuclear trade with other countries. India’s nuclear policies have been dominated by a set of contradictions. While it has promoted nuclear disarmament as a universal goal, the state has also tested nuclear weapons. On the one hand, it has fought vehemently against the discriminatory nature of the NPT, and on the other, it has refrained from falling into an arms race with Pakistan and developing tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). India has consistently maintained its stand on issues pertaining to nuclear disarmament and proliferation; from the time of NPT’s initiation until the recent quest for NSG membership. India’s position, thus, needs to

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be understood in the context of the development of the international nuclear governance system, and the exceptionalism that continues to define India’s nuclear behaviour. This exceptionalism might, in turn, also act as an example for other outlier states such as North Korea, where India’s ‘nuclear lessons’ might guide states in their dual quest for security and nuclear energy. This chapter traces India’s history with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) from the time of its inception, when India followed the normative path of the treaty without making it a legal obligation by becoming a signatory. Highlighting the various disarmament initiatives undertaken by India before and after it conducted its nuclear tests, the chapter brings forth arguments in favour of India’s role as an example for other outlier states vis-à-vis the NPT. Genesis of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was initiated after a series of discussions in the United Nations regarding the future of nuclear weapons and the dangers of proliferation. Initiated by Ireland in 1958, these talks waxed and waned as consensus was missing. In 1960, tests conducted by France added to the pressure for a universal nuclear treaty. Notably, then US President J.F. Kennedy spoke of the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons in his 1961 State of the Union address: The deadly arms race, and the huge resources it absorbs, has too long overshadowed all else we must do. We must prevent the arms race from spreading to new nations, to new nuclear powers and to the reaches of outer space. (Kennedy, 1961a)

Kennedy designed a well thought out Disarmament Plan (Kennedy 1961b), which was initiated at the 1961 United Nations General Assembly, along with an Irish resolution calling on nuclear powers to refrain from more tests. With this, the discussions for control of nuclear weapons began in earnest.

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India was already an active participant in discussions on banning nuclear weapons, and had proposed an end to nuclear testing in 1954. An Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) was formed, which included the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC) members along with active participation from non-aligned states such as India, Brazil and Mexico. The ENDC talks lasted for more than half a decade, from 1962 until 1969, but broke down when nuclear weapon states pushed for slow disarmament and non-aligned countries in the committee pushed for “tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate stocks of nuclear weapons” (ENDC-244, 1969). India’s idea of a non-proliferation treaty called for an “overall and universal concept of disarmament and not as a simple exercise in imposed non-armament of unarmed countries” (Trivedi, 1967). Once it was clear that no tangible limits were being set for the nuclear weapon states, India backed out of the negotiations, and withdrew from the eventual treaty. Even though it did not agree with the terms of the treaty, New Delhi had consistently supported and initiated proposals towards nuclear non-proliferation. India signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, while China was preparing to test its weapons, which it did in 1966. The ENDC process added fuel to fire for India, as it could not accept the proposition that it had ‘missed the bus’ to be acknowledged as a nuclear weapon state. A bond of trust in the international system had been broken, as India chose to invest in the making of an international treaty and refrain from developing its nuclear program, only to be rewarded with a treaty that failed to address the problems of disarmament. In the Indian view, the resultant treaty was discriminatory. Before the NPT came into force, US President Eisenhower had attempted to stop nuclear weapons proliferation with his Atoms for Peace plan (1953). Although India received many benefits under Eisenhower’s plan, it had begun its nuclear journey much before the United States of America had initiated the said program. India’s first Atomic Energy Act (1948) was initiated two years after that of the United States (Weiss, 2010) leading to the creation of the Indian

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Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), later known as the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). Homi Bhabha, the head of the organization, had done his PhD in nuclear physics from Cambridge and had a network consisting of government insiders and nuclear energy pundits. After the commencement of the Atoms for Peace plan, Homi Bhabha was made president of the first U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, in Geneva. Here he was successful in getting U.S. and Canadian assistance to India’s nuclear programs (Spring and Dillon 2006; Perkovich 1999). The purpose of the ‘Atoms for Peace’ program was to help states develop nuclear energy while abstaining them from developing nuclear weapons which could lead to increase in proliferation to non-state actors or security threats between states. The NPT is also driven by a similar purpose; as a nuclear treaty, it has held onto a precarious balance between the nuclear and non-nuclear states for more than four decades. The nuclear deals of Iran and India along with the recent tests by North Korea have questioned the credibility of this landmark treaty. However, the NPT is still relevant as a guiding light because it brings together around 190 states to agree on the terms of nuclear energy exchange; no alternate viable option has brought the international community together in the same manner. The focus of the NPT, since its existence, has been to achieve universality. The 1995 NPT Extension Conference and the subsequent NPT review conferences (RevCons) (2000, 2005, 2010, 2015) have all focused on making the NPT universal and by implication, stronger. Statements made during the RevCons specifically point to all states becoming a part of the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) and as a consequence, a number of states that were previously against the treaty did eventually endorse the agreement (Nayan 2010). International pressure to join the treaty was felt by India too. However, it chose to refrain from joining the treaty as the trust had been eroded during the ENDC talks. The focus of the NPT and its RevCons on universality is understandable, as this would reduce the threat of proliferation.

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However, a number of NPT signatories have been accused of illicit nuclear trade and have not been expelled or punished for indulging in such activities. Thus, being a part of the NPT might not guarantee universality of norms. On the other hand, following the NPT in principle, whether a signatory or not, does set the right example for other states. Legitimacy of the NPT “The NPT itself requires only that internationally-traded nuclear material and technology be safeguarded—a condition that India has continually made clear it is willing to accept, even though it declines to disarm and join the NPT as a ‘non-weapon-state’” (World Nuclear Association n.d.). As stated earlier, the necessity of laws on non-proliferation was a result of the fear that nuclear technology and weapons should not reach the hands of war-mongering states. The aim of introducing the NPT and action plans such as ‘Atoms for Peace’ was to create global and internationally recognized norms and principles on the usage of nuclear technology. Individualized deals between the international community and Iran, or the United States and India, are hence seen as events that weaken the normative hold of the NPT. Critics questioned the legitimacy of the NPT in the wake of the waiver that India received on entering into the US-India nuclear deal, just as they questioned the NPT in the wake of the inability of the international community to stop North Korea from testing its nuclear missiles. Claims made on the degeneration of the NPT as a landmark treaty that is now beyond its time period do not come from a well-defined thought as the alternative to the NPT still eludes the international community. Individualised deals are also, however, a reality of today. Economic changes that make India a leading place of investment, Iran’s growing regional clout and subsequent security threat to its neighbours are realities that need to be integrated within the NPT. Debarring the NPT, on the other hand, opens a can of worms that would be difficult to contain. Hence, it is important for the international community to

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come together and support the deals while simultaneously upholding the NPT’s legitimacy as a guiding light in state-to-state negotiations. The nuclear deals of Iran and India with the larger international community should be seen not as a questioning of the NPT, but rather as support structures that help the NPT find relevance in a fast changing and evolving nuclear governance structure. Even though these deals are not within the legal framework of the NPT, they uphold the essence of the NPT while striving for more nuclear security. This helps strengthen the norms on the usage of nuclear technology, while giving due consideration to the political realities of these states. The NPT has come through as a landmark treaty that helps control the global proliferation of nuclear materials. It has largely been credited as a successful attempt. The debate that began in the United Nations (Doherty 2016) on the nuclear ban has led 50 states to come together and sign a treaty to ban nuclear weapons. However, the nonparticipation of nuclear weapon states is problematic as the security dynamic prevents them from outlawing their nuclear weapons. At the same time, individualized nuclear deals with the USA such as the 123 Agreement (with India) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (with Iran) help keep a check on nuclear proliferation while accommodating the security needs of regional powers. This does not, however, give other states free access to sensitive nuclear materials. India and Iran have different agreements based on their nuclear track record. The nuclear behaviour of states refers to their proliferation record and disarmament initiatives, which act as barometers for good and bad behaviour. While decisions are also based on strategic interests, within the nuclear domain, these are the two aspects that generally sway a decision towards more international sanctions or diplomacy. This chapter traces India’s tryst with the NPT and its notions of disarmament, and points out how India has set an example for other states by virtue of its nuclear behaviour. Maintaining its position of not signing the NPT while continuing to endorse its ideals, India has gradually managed to convey its dual and conflicting position to the international community.

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Non-proliferation norms: The NPT as India’s guiding light India has been, for the greater part of history, associated with Pakistan and Israel as the three main outlier states that have refused to participate in making the world nuclear weapons-free. However, the international community is slowing acknowledging India’s efforts towards nonproliferation. In 2012, the US State Department spokesperson came out in support of India’s proliferation record stating that, “India has a solid non-proliferation record. They’re engaged with the international community on non-proliferation issues” (Press Trust of India 2012). Nicholas Burns added to India’s reputation in an interview stating: “The fact is that India has a record of non-proliferation, which is exceptional” (Burns 2005). India has the incomparable position of being a state from the developing world that has had no links in any external proliferation networks. Every other known state east of Europe, be it China, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel or Iran have been drawn into one proliferation link or the other. India has managed to not be clubbed in this group and has maintained a zero-proliferation record. Even when charges of covert nuclear trade were levied against India, the state chose to bring out facts in the open. It refuted the allegations and explained the difference in perception while upholding international laws in its defence. In an interview with a government official, the latter was clear to point out that: “It took us 10 to 15 years of sustained effort to get back into the civil nuclear mainstream and working with regulators. Why should we do a thing like that?” The state has taken all the necessary precautions to ensure that “nothing slips the licensing list”: These include harmonising the export and procurement lists with those of the NSG and the Missile Technology Control Regime, implementing all the UNSC resolutions on Iran, North Korea and Syria, an extensive overhaul of its own processes, out-reach to the industry and improved coordination between licensing and implementing agencies. India also enacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act

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that gives authority to intercept suspect shipments of goods besides services and technology” (Dikshit 2013). India’s zero-proliferation record is well documented. Yet, a 2013 report by David Albright clubbed India among a group of “future illicit nuclear trade suppliers of concern”, claiming that India’s enforcement of export control laws is worse than that of Germany. Sitakanta Mishra (2013) argues that if India did indeed have such intentions, it would not have “rebuffed Libya’s request for nuclear weapons help in 1978”. India’s export control framework matches global standards and its policy of non-transfer of reprocessing and enrichment technologies, in fact, puts it in an “NPT plus” category. He further highlights that India’s adherence to the UNSCR 1540 (2004) has aligned the state with global best practices. India also has held outreach events to strengthen its export control framework. Adding to that, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (1995) and Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act (2005) introduced nearly all global best practices into the Indian export controls system (see Government of India 2005). In addition to all that has been done by the state, India has recently made more changes to its national export control list—the Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Electronics, and Technology (SCOMET) where ‘Category Zero’ of the list now includes “nuclear materials, nuclear-related other materials, equipment and technology”. Additionally, India is now a member to three export control groups, The Wassenar Arrangement (WA), The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group (AG). In 1992, in an effort to induce expanded participation in the NPT, an informal ‘club’ of nations called the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided —as a matter of policy, not law—to prohibit all nuclear commerce with nations that have not agreed to full-scope safeguards. This precondition effectively required countries to join the NPT as non-weapon-states if they were to participate in nuclear commerce. As a practical matter, this left India as a pariah in the world of nuclear commerce. India’s response has been to intensify its embrace of the ethos of self-reliance

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as it continued its dual policy of maintaining a small nuclear deterrent while pursuing peaceful nuclear power on an ever-larger scale (World Nuclear Association n.d.). A decade later, in October 2002—while India was hosting a major conference of signatories to the International Framework Convention on Climate Change—the Indian Prime Minister called for a rational review of global non-proliferation policy. Specifically, he asked the international community to: x Focus on clandestine and illegal development and transfer of missile and nuclear technology; x Recognize that India’s indigenous nuclear weapons program provides nothing more than a “minimum credible deterrent” that is necessary for its regional security and that India has not contributed to nuclear proliferation beyond its borders; x Note the global environmental importance of India’s civil nuclear power program and co-operate with it, using safeguards to ensure that all traded material is used for peaceful purposes” (World Nuclear Association n.d.). Considering India’s historical record and the strict measures it has introduced time and again in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, it would not be wrong to state that India, as a late entrant in the nuclear race, provides a spotless image of itself. It has adhered to the international laws in principle even though the NPT was not legally binding for the state. Not only did this bring India goodwill, but it also helped in developing trust in the domain of foreign policy. Rajesh Basrur argues that India’s position vis-à-vis the NPT gives it authority to speak on specific issues. By building on a successful partnership with the United States, India was also able to leverage itself as a “responsible nuclear power” while persuading “sceptics in the United States and among the members of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) that an exception could be made to the regime’s rules to permit trade in nuclear materials with it. The indirect but undeniable result was that India effectively gained

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legitimacy as a nuclear power since the arrangement involved a legal agreement by which India would separate its military and civilian nuclear facilities” (Basrur 2010). This legitimacy, in turn, gave India a platform to take the initiatives on disarmament forward. As a state that chose to not indulge in proliferation activities even when given the chance, India fits into the space of a model nation that has the legitimacy from the NPT as well as from the outlier states. India’s Disarmament Initiatives Manpreet Sethi (2012) opines that, “As a state with nuclear weapons, India brings greater credibility to the call for elimination of nuclear weapons. When the country made this case before 1998, when she did not have the weapons, it was dismissed as a case of sour grapes, where India did not have the weapon and did not want others to have it either. But as a nuclear-armed state, India brings to the table her commitment to remove these weapons from her own arsenal and this lends sincerity to her demand for disarmament” (Sethi 2012:169). This argument holds ground across scientists, researchers and the government who believe that their voices have been given faces with the weaponisation of 1998. Rajesh Basrur highlights India’s disarmament initiatives that go back from the time it became an independent entity: In 1954, it proposed an end to nuclear testing. In 1965 it favoured a nondiscriminatory treaty banning nuclear proliferation, but walked away from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the ground that it discriminated between nuclear haves and have-nots. In 1978, India called for negotiations toward an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. (Basrur 2010)

Apart from these, the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988 is considered a landmark proposal that could have changed the international narrative, if it would have been genuinely considered by the nuclear powers of the day.

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Sethi (2012) expands on the Action Plan, explaining how it is still valid for the realisation align text of a Nuclear Weapons Free World. The plan, according to Sethi, focuses on concepts such as: Universality: in order to be viable and sustainable, nuclear disarmament must necessarily be equally applicable to all. Each country that has nuclear weapons or the capability to build them has to accept the obligation to eliminate its stockpile, while those that are non-nuclear have to commit themselves to remaining so; Non-discrimination, for commitments to be uniformly applicable, verification procedures and a singular standard of compliance is critical; Verifiability, since only this can promise transparency in the process to foster confidence amongst states to stick to their pledges. While it is true that the scope of verification measures may need to be different for possessors and non-possessors of nuclear weapons, both intrusiveness and stringency must be equal in principle, theory and practice; Simultaneity of collateral measures traversing security issues other than nuclear, such as confidence building in areas of conventional forces, international treaty on prohibition of weaponisation of outer space, or getting the United Nations to evolve by consensus a new strategic doctrine of non-provocative defence. Only if nuclear disarmament is either the result of or results in more cooperative and secure inter-state relations, will countries not feel the need to move towards building other weapons to compensate for the perceived loss of security; Tolerance and acceptance, the new world order will have to be based on respect for various ideologies, on the right to pursue different socio-economic systems, and the celebration of diversity. (Sethi 2012: 169-170)

Sethi opines that for a nuclear weapons free world, it is imperative for security to be cooperative and not competitive, and that the UNSCR 1887 provides for a vital link between nuclear disarmament and the promotion of international stability. India has commenced many disarmament initiatives in the last decade too. In March 2008, India’s Ambassador to the United Nations

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Conference on Disarmament, Hamid Ali Rao, presented a sevenpoint agenda for nuclear disarmament, which called for: Unequivocal commitment to the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons; Reduction in the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; A No-First-Use agreement among all nuclear-armed states; An agreement not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear armed states; A convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; A convention proscribing the development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons; and Verifiable and non-discriminatory elimination of all nuclear weapons (Samanta 2008). In April 2009, Rao welcomed the new mood among scholars and statesmen (Rao 2009). In March 2010, he noted again that there was a “new momentum for global disarmament” and that India “continues to attach the highest priority” to that goal (Rao 2010). In June 2010, the Working Group on an Expanded Non-Proliferation System, established by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Nuclear Threat Initiative in Washington D. C., urged the US and Indian Governments to work towards the inclusion of India in the broad non-proliferation regime (Basrur 2010). Following this, an Informal Group formed by then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that “India can and must play an effective and credible role as the leader of a campaign for the goal of universal nuclear disarmament, both because India can bring to the campaign its moral strength deriving from six decades of consistently campaigning for nuclear disarmament but also now the weight of its growing presence in the international system” (see Sethi 2012: 168).2 The list of disarmament initiatives India has introduced has been growing steadily. This highlights the importance New Delhi gives to its disarmament policy. India has been termed by many as a reluctant power, where it developed its nuclear capacity not under a wave of threat, but under the pressing need to be heard in the international community. Indian leaders still shy away from discussing the state’s nuclear arsenal, though mainly because they do not see merit in it. Although none of the initiatives offered by India have been taken forward in an active manner, they have helped build India’s image

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as pro-disarmament. This has led activists such as Alyn Ware to ask India to take the baton of disarmament further, suggesting that the state could “build bridges” between the nuclear armed and non-nuclear states. According to Ware, such a move could help break the “deadlock” that has “prevented multi-lateral negotiations for nuclear disarmament for the past 20 years” (Press Trust of India 2015). India: A Good Example? India’s track record in its nuclear behaviour holds stead with its zeroproliferation record, numerous disarmament initiatives along with a clean legal record. But what do other states imbibe from India’s proliferation record? How do states with a different nuclear history imbibe aspects of India’s nuclear behaviour? While analysing the term nuclear learning from the different definitions provided, this chapter uses India’s nuclear behaviour along with a few other states’ nuclear behaviour to explain what learning states can undertake from India. In defining the term nuclear learning, Jeffery Knopf (2012) provides a perceptive understanding of the different aspects of nuclear learning. As the article began a fresh debate on nuclear learning, it offers a basic overview of what the term encompasses and how it can help states evolve their nuclear interactions. The term, for Knopf, has empirical and conceptual components where the former “involves the facts of the case: doctrines, strategies, and force postures developed by the countries in question, decisions and actors each has taken during crises, nuclear diplomacy between the countries concerned, and so forth” (Knopf 2012: 79). He also differentiates between the type of learning as factual and inferential. Not choosing one over the other, he explains how factual learning involves basic facts and thus acts as a base for inferential learning, which “involves broader inferences that are drawn from fundamental facts” (Knopf 2012: 81). While India’s non-proliferation record acts as a fact, the larger inferential learning that outlier states can draw from New Delhi is one of consistency regarding its views on the nuclear dynamic. India has held on to its views in the face of tough sanctions especially when its economy was in

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a weak state. It did not succumb to the pressure of an offer from Libya to become a part of the proliferation network. In understanding the expression, most scholars go back to the roots of the term learning. Naeam Salik (2014) refers to different types of learning, quoting Joseph Nye and Jack Levy to explain how different levels of analysis play a significant role in defining the term. While Knopf argues that learning is inherently normative, he suggests that in order for something to be called learning, the lesson that is learned would have to be correct. Thus, the normative influence that India provides would deserve to be called correct learning. Outlier states such as Pakistan and North Korea have also attempted to develop individualized nuclear deals in pursuit of the twin goals of security and nuclear energy, though they have not been successful in their quest. China’s clandestine deals with Pakistan are an example of behaviour that goes against international norms and principles. China is a signatory to the NPT and the NSG, two important agreements. Yet, China violates the NSG by engaging in trade with a non-signatory (Pakistan), and also overrides the 2010 NPT RevCon consensus document that requires a recipient of nuclear material to be under IAEA safeguards, which again, Pakistan is not. Examples such as the China-Pakistan nuclear deals would thus be incorrect learning, as a number of international laws have been violated by these deals. For Janice Stein, “learning is an explicitly normative concept” (Stein 1994). It is an “improvement” in knowledge for the actor concerned —the subject of learning—though it may not be so for others who are analysing that phrase. If learning is, as Stein puts it “explicitly normative” then it is important for the outlier states to be provided with lessons from India on its nuclear behaviour. States that have been complicit in proliferation activities could learn from India’s nuclear behaviour and ‘improve’ upon their decision-making after re-analysing their behavioural patterns. For example, North Korea was in a long negotiation process for a nuclear deal, but after talks broke down it tested nuclear devices. Controlling proliferation of nuclear material from North Korea is one of the most pressing issues in the world today,

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and if the right examples are provided before and during negotiations, there may be a possibility for a deal that would benefit all concerned parties and the world at large. Comparing the different understandings of learning, Happymon Jacob (2014: 18) argues that states are constantly on a learning curve, though more often than not it is impossible to “pin down the ‘learning experience’ of a particular individual in a state in order to show that learning has actually taken place”. It may not even be possible to pin down the governmental agency that is the subject of learning: “It is not just direct experiences that lead to learning by state actors, but also the power of normative contexts that has the potential to persuade actors to learn” ( Jacob 2014: 19). Thus, learning has a direct link to the behaviour of states. However, is this behaviour of states learnt and imbibed for future reference? And if a state’s nuclear behaviour is record-worthy, could it potentially help other states learn aspects of this behaviour? Jacob (2014: 20) argues that “if correct learning is what enables an actor to achieve its goals better, then incorrect learning is what prevents the achievement of its defined goals.” This argument, however, depends on a state’s awareness of what its defined goals are. For India, the goal of non-proliferation has been consistent, and matching with the goal of the NPT. When a state is unaware of its goals, learning will take longer time. Furthermore, sometimes outcomes are better understood and policies are calibrated accordingly in the course of a policy initiative, rather than prior to the undertaking of a particular policy.” More importantly, Jacob (2014: 22) explains that because of the role of political socialization, states want to “mainstream themselves in the system and imitate norms prevalent in the international arena”. Adding to this argument, as Irving Janis (1972) points out: “intense social pressures toward uniformity and in-group loyalty within decisionmaking groups can build to the point where they seriously interfere with both cognitive efficiency and moral judgment” (cited in Tetlock 1979: 1314). India’s desires to follow the norms of non-proliferation were based on its moral outlook and on its need to mainstream itself in the international

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system. While upholding the rules of non-proliferation and not succumbing to the easy access provided by states such as Libya, India has consistently proved it self to be an upholder of the NPT. India’s example stands out because of its steady nuclear behaviour, whether in crises such as the December 2001 Parliament attack or the Kargil war. Even when India and Pakistan were close to a full-scale military stand-off, New Delhi never changed its No-First-Use position. These behavioural patterns, along with the outlined proliferation track record and a string of disarmament initiatives, provide credibility to India’s normative stance. India is hence delivering the behavioural patterns that make it a good example for other outlier states of the non-proliferation regime. Conclusion India was actively involved in the initial discussions for a comprehensive nuclear treaty that could help contain nuclear proliferation. Even though the resultant Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) failed to accommodate the vision that India set out for, it did not stop following the norms of the treaty. It refrained from participating in the nuclear proliferation racket while bearing the brunt of strict international sanctions that hurt its economy. Nevertheless, India consistently brought forward new initiatives for global disarmament. And most importantly, India followed through on all its international obligations by controlling the export and import of nuclear materials with utmost care. The nuclear tests conducted in 1998 led the US President to infamously comment that India was “on the wrong side of history” (Cable News Network, 1998). With nuclear deal negotiations and a proven track record, India changed this perception and proved the statement incorrect when it signed nuclear agreements with the United States and other civil nuclear powers such as Japan. There are a number of other factors that add to the final assessment of a states’ nuclear behaviour; its economic capability and military prowess, as well as its regional influence. However, disarmament initiatives, along with consistent anti-proliferation measures vindicated

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by the international community act as more defining factors of state nuclear behaviour. Such behaviour helps a state integrate its need for security and energy, while also serving as an example for other states. India’s current nuclear record is the result of numerous disarmament initiatives, initiated both before and after its nuclear tests. New Delhi also stands out as the only country east of Europe that has not been involved in proliferation with other states. Israel, South Africa, Iran, Pakistan and North Korea have all been associated, in one form or another, in proliferation links with other states. The decision by New Delhi not to engage in such activities has held it in good stead in the international community. This has made India a good model for other outlier states to emulate in the years to come. References Albright, D. et al. (2013) Future World of Illicit Nuclear Trade, Report Institute for Science and International Security [online]. Log on to: http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/ documents/Full_Report_DTRA-PASCC_29July2013-FINAL.pdf [Accessed on 26 December 2016]. Basrur, Rajesh (2010) India and Nuclear Disarmament, Security Challenges, 6(4): 69-81. Burns, Nicholas (2005) Briefing on the Signing of the Global Partnership Agreement Between the United States and India, 19 July 2005, by Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs United States Department of State [online]. Log on to: http://2001-2009. state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/49831.htm [Accessed on 26 December 2016]. Cable News Network (1998) Clinton says India is on ‘wrong side of history’ with Nuclear Tests - May 16, 1998. CNN [online] Log on to:http://edition.cnn.com/US/9805/16/clinton. radio.address/ (Accessed on 29 December 2016). Dikshit, S. (2013) India denies charge of involvement in illicit nuclear trade, The Hindu [online]. Log on to: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-denies-charge-ofinvolvement-in-illicit-nuclear-trade/article5286629.ece [Accessed on 26 December 2016]. Doherty, B. (2016) UN votes to start negotiating treaty to ban nuclear weapons, The Guardian [online]. Log on to: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/28/un-votes-to-startnegotiating-treaty-to-ban-nuclear-weapons [Accessed on 26 December 2016]. ENDC-244 (1969) Final Verbatim Record of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Meeting 244  Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament [online]. Available on: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/4918260.0244.001?view=text&seq=15 [Accessed on 26 December 2016]. Government of India (2005) Weapons of Mass Destruction Act Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India [online]; Log on to: http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/ PublicationDocs/148_The-Weapons-Mass-destruction-And-Delivery-SystemsAct-2005.pdf [Accessed on 26 December 2016].

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Irving, Lester Janis (1972) Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin. Jacob, H. (2014) Conceptualizing Nuclear Learning: A Study of the Indian Experience. In Khan et al. (eds.), Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade, Centre on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, California, pp. 16-34. Kennedy, J. F. (1961a) JFK on Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation, State of the Union Address [online] Log on to: http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/11/17/jfk-on-nuclearweapons-and-non-proliferation-pub-14652 [Accessed on 26 December 2016]. Kennedy, J. F. (1961b) JFK on Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation, Address before the United Nations General Assembly [online] Log on to: http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/11/17/jfkon-nuclear-weapons-and-non-proliferation-pub-14652 [Accessed on 26 December 2016]. Knopf, J. W. (2012) The Concept of Nuclear Learning, The Nonproliferation Review, 19(1): 79-93. Mishra S. (2013) Misgivings on India’s Non-Proliferation Record a Folly, South Asian Voices, 18 October 2013. Nayan, R. (2010) ‘India and the NPT: Accommodating the Exception’, Strategic Analysis, 34(2), pp. 309–321. Perkovich, G. (1999) India’s Nuclear Bomb, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Press Trust of India (2015) India can lead global nuclear disarmament initiative: Activist Alyn Ware. Economic Times [online]. Log on to:http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes. com/2015-03-09/news/59931824_1_disarmament-nuclear-weapon-free-world-indo-usrelations [Accessed on 26 December 2016]. Press Trust of India (2012) U.S.: India has a solid non-proliferation record. Business Standard [online]. Log on to: http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/us-indiahas-a-solid-non-proliferation-record-112042000082_1.html [Accessed 26 December 2016]. Rao, H. A. (2010) Statement by Ambassador Hamid Ali Rao, Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, at the 2010 Substantive Session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, New York, 30 March 2010. Rajesh Basrur (2010), India and Nuclear Disarmament, Security Challenges, 6(4): 69-81. Rao, H. A. (2009) Statement by H. E. Mr. Hamid Ali Rao, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, at the 2009 Session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, New York, 15 April 2009. Rajesh Basrur (2010), India and Nuclear Disarmament, Security Challenges, 6(4): 69-81. Salik, Naeam (2014) “The Concept of Nuclear Learning: Pakistan’s Learning Experience” in Khan et al. (eds.) Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade, Centre on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, California, pp. 35-47. Samanta, P. D. (2008) India for No-nuke World Order, Ready to Make No-First- Use a Multilateral Pact, Indian Express, 3 March 2008. Sethi, M. (2012) India’s Disarmament Initiative 1988: Continuing Relevance, Valid Pointers for an NWFW, Cadmus, 1(5): 166-173. Spring, B. and Dillon, D. R. (2006)  Nuclear India and the Non-Proliferation Treaty Report The Heritage Foundation [online]. Log on to: http://www.heritage.org/research/ reports/2006/05/nuclear-india-and-the-non-proliferation-treaty#_ftn5 [Accessed 26 December 2016].

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Stein, J. G. (1994) Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner, International Organization, 48(2): 170. Tetlock, Philip (1979) Identifying Victims of Groupthink from Public Statements of Decision Makers, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(8): 1314-1324. Trivedi, V. C. (1967) Statement by V. C. Trivedi at the 18th National Disarmament Committee on 23 May 1967 on Disarmament. In Singh, G. and Sharma, S. K. (2000),  Documents on India’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy: Nehru Era. New Delhi: Anamika Publishers and Distributors, pp. 612-626. UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 United Nations [online]. Log on to: http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/ [Accessed on 26 December 2016]. World Nuclear Association (n.d.) India, China and the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) World Nuclear Association [online]. Log on to: http://www.world-nuclear.org/informationlibrary/safety-and-security/non-proliferation/india,-china-npt.aspx [Accessed on 26 December 2016]. Weiss, L. (2010) India and the NPT, Strategic Analysis, 34(2): 255–271.

Notes 1. 2.

The views expressed in this paper are that of the author and do not represent the views of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. The Group was instituted under the chairmanship of Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar, honourable Member of Parliament. The members included Cmde Uday Bhaskar (later Adm Ramdas joined in his place), Ambassador Satish Chandra, Dr Arvind Gupta, Ambassador Saurabh Kumar, Professor Amitabh Mattoo, Dr Manpreet Sethi and Mr. Siddharth Varadarajan.

4. Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Systems Reynaldo Morales

Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Systems The need to reduce carbon emissions while maintaining a reliable supply of energy that allows the economic development of nations is undisputed. There is widespread agreement that fossil fuel production should be reduced by mid-century. What is uncertain is whether renewable energy technologies can meet demand on this time scale. Other issues with nuclear power are the disposition of the radioactive wastes and potential nuclear proliferation. This paper addresses the issue of whether nuclear technologies can be made proliferation resistant. No currently known nuclear fuel cycle is completely proliferation proof. “Rather, proliferation resistance is a comparative term, a matter of degree. Proliferation resistance involves establishing impediments to misuse, to increase the difficulty, time, cost and detectability, as a disincentive, and to provide sufficient delay for the international community to have timely warning and opportunity for intervention.”1 “In the International Energy Outlook 2017 (IEO2017) Reference case, total world energy consumption rises from 575 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) in 2015 to 736 quadrillion Btu in 2040, an increase of 28 percent. Most of the world’s energy growth will occur in countries outside of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), where strong, long-term economic growth drives increasing demand for energy. Non-OECD Asia (including China and India) alone accounts for more than half of the world’s

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total increase in energy consumption over the 2015 to 2040 projection period. In the long term, the IEO2017 Reference case projects increased world consumption of marketed energy from all fuel sources— except coal, where demand is essentially flat—through 2040 (Figure 2). Renewables are the world’s fastest-growing energy source, with consumption increasing by an average 2.3 percent/year between 2015 and 2040. The world’s second fastest-growing source of energy is nuclear power, with consumption increasing by 1.5 percent/year over that period.”2 This transformation will allow the world to meet its growing power needs more sustainably—helping to create a cleaner, healthier, and brighter future. Nuclear power is technology that can supply an alternative to fossil fuels while also producing no air pollution. However, nuclear power raises the problems of the disposition of radioactive waste and nuclear proliferation. An important question is whether nuclear technologies can be made proliferation resistant. “Consideration of proliferation resistance began in the 1970s with the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Examination (INFCE) carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)3, and the Non-proliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) carried out by the USA. Both NASAP and INFCE were more focused on identifying positive directions for fuel cycle development with regard to minimizing proliferation risks, than with developing comprehensive means for evaluating such risks. The conclusion of these studies was that no technology alone would provide sufficient proliferation resistance, but in combination with extrinsic measures may help to ensure that the use of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle remains an unattractive mean to acquire material for a nuclear weapons programme.”4 Energy Demand and the Role of Nuclear Energy “The current world population of 7.3 billion is expected to reach 8.5 billion by 2030, 9.7 billion in 2050 and 11.2 billion in 2100 according

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to a new UN DESA report, ‘World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision’…Understanding the demographic changes that are likely to unfold over the coming years, as well as the challenges and opportunities that they present for achieving sustainable development, is key to the design and implementation of the new development agenda, said Wu Hongbo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs.”5 “To sustain this growth the demand for energy must increase substantially over that period. Both population growth and increasing standards of living for many people in developing countries will cause strong growth in energy demand.” According to the World Nuclear Association, “The world will need significantly increased energy supply in the future, especially cleanlygenerated electricity. Electricity demand is increasing twice as fast as overall energy use and is likely to rise by more than two-thirds to 2040. Nuclear power provides about 11% of the world’s electricity, and 18% of electricity in OECD countries. All major international reports on future energy supply suggest an increasing role for nuclear power as an environmentally benign way of producing reliable electricity on a large scale.”6 “The Government of India intends to draw twenty-five per cent of its energy from nuclear power by 2050. This plan includes 20,000 MW of installed capacity from nuclear energy by 2020, and 63,000 MW by 2032.”7 Radioactive Waste and Nuclear Accidents Radioactive waste There are a number of concerns regarding both radiation and radioactive waste. “Like all industries, the thermal generation of electricity produces waste. Whatever fuel is used, this waste must be managed in ways which safeguard human health and minimise their impact on the environment. The nuclear industry has developed—and implemented

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—most of the necessary technologies required for the final disposal of all of the waste it produces. The remaining issue is one of public acceptance, and not of technological feasibility. The amount of waste produced by the nuclear power industry is small relative to other industrial activities. Ninety-seven percent of the waste produced is classified as low- or intermediate-level waste (LLW or ILW ). Such waste has been widely disposed of in near-surface repositories for many years. In France, where fuel is reprocessed, just 0.2 percent of all radioactive waste by volume is classified as high-level waste (HLW). The amount of HLW produced (including used fuel when this is considered a waste) during nuclear production is small. In providing 11 percent of the world’s electricity, nuclear power stations produce approximately 34,000 m of HLW annually. Unlike other industrial toxic wastes, the principal hazard associated with HLW—radioactivity; diminishes with time. At present, interim storage facilities provide an appropriate environment to contain and manage existing waste, and the decay of heat and radioactivity over time provides a strong incentive to store HLW for a period before its final disposal. In fact, after 40 years, the radioactivity of used fuel has decreased to about one-thousandth of the level at the point when it was unloaded. Interim storage facilities also allow a country to store its spent fuel until a time when it has generated sufficient quantities to make a repository development economic. In the long-term, however, appropriate disposal arrangements are required for HLW due to its prolonged radioactivity. The safe, environmentally-sound disposal of HLW is technologically proven, with international scientific consensus on deep geological repositories. Such projects are well advanced in some countries, such as Finland, Sweden, France, and the USA. In fact, in the USA a deep geological waste repository (the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) is in operation for the disposal of transuranic waste (long-lived ILW contaminated with military materials such as plutonium). Countries where plans for deep geological repositories have been advanced demonstrate that efforts

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to resolve political and public acceptance issues at a community and national level can be successful. Progress is being made to achieve public acceptance, but it is important that governments follow the lead of countries more advanced in the process of long-term disposal of HLW.8 “A major environmental concern related to nuclear power is the creation of radioactive wastes such as uranium mill tailings, spent (used) reactor fuel, and other radioactive wastes. These materials can remain radioactive and dangerous to human health for thousands of years. Radioactive wastes are subject to special regulations that govern their handling, transportation, storage, and disposal to protect human health and the environment. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates the operation of nuclear power plants. Radioactive wastes are classified as low-level waste or highlevel waste. The radioactivity in these wastes can range from just above natural background levels, like in uranium mill tailings, to much higher levels, like in used (spent) reactor fuel or in the parts inside a nuclear reactor. The radioactivity of nuclear waste decreases over time through a process called radioactive decay. The amount of time it takes for the radioactivity of radioactive material to decrease to half its original level is called the radioactive half-life. Radioactive waste with a short half-life is often stored temporarily before disposal to reduce potential radiation doses to workers who handle and transport the waste. This storage system also reduces the radiation levels at disposal sites. By volume, most of the waste related to the nuclear power industry has a relatively low level of radioactivity. Uranium mill tailings contain the radioactive element radium, which decays to produce radon, a radioactive gas. Most uranium mill tailings are placed near the processing facility or mill where they come from. Uranium mill tailings are covered with a sealing barrier of material like clay to prevent radon from escaping into the atmosphere, and then the barrier is covered by a layer of soil, rocks, or other materials to prevent erosion of the sealing barrier.

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The other types of low-level radioactive waste are the tools, protective clothing, wiping cloths, and other disposable items that become contaminated with small amounts of radioactive dust or particles at nuclear fuel processing facilities and nuclear power plants. These materials are subject to special regulations that govern their handling, storage, and disposal so they will not come in contact with the outside environment. High-level radioactive waste consists of irradiated or spent nuclear reactor fuel (i.e., fuel that is no longer useful for producing electricity). The spent reactor fuel is in a solid form, consisting of small fuel pellets in long metal tubes called rods.”9 B. Nuclear Accidents “All incidents and accidents in civilian nuclear facilities must be reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency. There are eight defined levels—from harmless to catastrophe. To grasp incidents that have no immediate relevance for security, but which could eventually lead to more severe further incidents if neglected, there is a definition for a level 0 incident. That could include minor leaks in cooling systems, a failure of the uninterruptible power supply or a failure in testing emissions. Also, a cable fire or one in a transformer could be qualified in that category. The lowest form of an incident is an ‘anomaly’ (level 1). This can be the case if a faulty component such as a damaged power generator triggered a shut down of the reactor. Also, a severe mistake in the management of power plant rules and processes can be qualified as a level 1 incident. Throughout all of the 1990s, there were 75 such events in Germany. A real “incident” (level 2) occurs when there is a significant failure in safety provisions. A ‘serious incident’ (level 3) involves the leaking of a small amount of radioactive material into the environment. This usually means an exposure of personnel to radioactivity, resulting in contamination or health problems. This always involves the failure of several parts of the

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safety provisions. Such events are extremely rare even on the global scale, happening around once a year around the world. An accident with local consequences (level 4), an accident with wider consequences (level 5) or a serious accident (level 6) mean that a significant amount of radioactive material has been released. The different levels are differentiated by the severity of radiation and the number of casualties. If the radioactivity of the spilled substances amounts to hundreds of Terabecquerels (1 Tbq = 1 Trillion radioactive fission processes per second), or if there is at least one fatality, the accident will be considered level 4. If the radiation is at least 100 times higher, or are there several fatalities, the accident is level 5. Level 6 is reserved for accidents with tens of thousands of Tbq and widespread contamination. Generally speaking, accidents around nuclear facilities are rare. Level 4 accidents include the partial meltdowns in the French power plant Saint-Laurent in 1969 and 1980. The Three-Mile-Island accident in Pennsylvania in 1979 was classified level 5, after a third of the reactor core melted then—but could be contained. The release of radioactivity led to a considerable increase of cancer rates downwind from the reactor by as much as 150 percent. “An example of a level 6 accident was the massive release of radioactive substances from a military nuclear plant in Majak in Siberia in 1957. More than 10.000 people in the sparsely populated area had to be resettled. Today, Majak is considered the third most severe accident of the nuclear era. The catastrophe Since nuclear power was invented, there were two catastrophic accidents (level 7): Chernobyl in 1986, and 2011 in Fukushima. Both accidents saw a complete meltdown of one (Chernobyl) or more (Fukushima) core reactors. In both cases, the outer walls of the reactor-building were destroyed by hydrogen explosions and nuclear substances could freely escape. In both cases, vast areas were contaminated. In Chernobyl, about 50

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people died shortly after the accident from radiation sickness. Different estimates about the long term effects assume that there may have been tens of thousands of fatalities due to cancer. Also for Fukushima, there are competing estimates ranging from 15 victims to thousands of possible victims, which the accident may yet claim, due to increasing cancer rates.10 Concerns About Nuclear Energy—Proliferation Resistance The notion that nuclear energy systems must become more ’proliferation resistant’ has been a goal for decades. (The risks of proliferation are discussed below.) As Lyman points out “any suggestion that nuclear power systems must become more proliferation resistant in the future carries the inherent implication that the risks are too high today.”11 “Over the last decade access to information on material sciences and to dual use technologies necessary to conduct a covert nuclear weapons program have become easier to obtain, and the means to implement procurement, deception and concealment strategies have become increasingly sophisticated. The continuing development of technology, and the education and experience of scientists worldwide (who can move freely) combined with the readily available access to a wide range of information, have resulted in the increased risk that a country intent on nuclear proliferation might be successful in developing the necessary capabilities without early detection. These developments have underscored the need for ensuring effective nuclear safeguards.”12 “There is also a potential proliferation risk when a State can master, even on a modest scale, the extraction of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, although it might be more difficult to build and operate such a facility covertly. However, nothing in the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)13 prohibits a country from developing such a capability for peaceful purposes, even though there would be no apparent need for doing so given the State’s nuclear fuel cycle. Indeed, under the NPT a State would be entitled to produce a

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stockpile of separated plutonium as long as this plutonium is placed under IAEA safeguards. States could also develop processes such as conversion of uranium into metallic form, as would be used in nuclear weapons, ostensibly for peaceful purposes such as research, use as shielding material or in non-nuclear applications. A State possessing nuclear material and advanced nuclear technology (such as enrichment or reprocessing) and, in parallel, mastering the know-how of assembling a nuclear weapon, could acquire such weapons in a short period of time if it so decided.”14 “The main functions of the IAEA are to: encourage and assist research, development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that such activity assisted by the Agency is not used to further any military purpose; apply safeguards to relevant activities at the request of Member States; apply, under the NPT and other international treaties, mandatory comprehensive safeguards in non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) Parties to such treaties.”15 “The NPT is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.”16 “The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power may depend to a significant degree on the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen proliferation resistance and nuclear materials accountability.”17 “The term proliferation resistance has been in use in regards to the nuclear fuel cycles since the 1950’s. Numerous scientists have made proposals for proliferation resistant technologies over the past 30 to 40 years with specifications as to what proliferation resistance means to them. However, there is not common understanding as to exactly what proliferation resistant technology entails. The IAEA defines proliferation resistance as follows: Proliferation resistance is

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that characteristic of a nuclear system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology by states in order to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In this analysis, we expand this often used definition of proliferation resistance by including the implementation of measures that would impede the successful exploitation of stolen nuclear materials by terrorists or other subnational groups for nuclear explosives.”18 “The need for both institutional and technical measures is reflected in the IAEA definition of proliferation resistance, namely: x That characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology by [a state] seeking to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. x The degree of proliferation resistance results from a combination of, inter alia, technical design features, operational modalities, institutional arrangements and safeguards measures.” Thus, proliferation resistance involves the establishment of impediments to the misuse of civil nuclear energy systems to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. These impediments can be described as being intrinsic (inherent, built-in) or extrinsic (external): x Intrinsic proliferation resistance refers to technical characteristics of nuclear facilities, such as design features, that increase technological difficulties for diversion of fissile material and manufacture of nuclear weapons. x Extrinsic proliferation resistance refers to institutional barriers, such as safeguards and international arrangements that limit the availability of sensitive technologies and materials. The focus of proliferation resistance—reflected in the IAEA definition—is on possible misuse by states. However, measures taken for proliferation resistance can also contribute to the security of nuclear materials and facilities, protecting them against access and misuse by non-state actors. For example, avoidance/elimination of weapons grade

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materials in civil nuclear programs reduces the risk of terrorists being able to produce a workable nuclear explosive device. Another key point is that proliferation resistance does not mean proliferation proof. No currently known nuclear fuel cycle is completely proliferation proof. Rather, proliferation resistance is a comparative term, a matter of degree. Proliferation resistance involves establishing impediments to misuse— to increase the difficulty, time, cost and detectability—as a disincentive, and to provide sufficient delay for the international community to have timely warning and opportunity for intervention. Finally, it is noted that incorporation of proliferation resistant features can make a major contribution to the effectiveness and efficiency of performing safeguards: safeguards address proliferation risk—where this risk is lower, there can be a corresponding reduction in safeguards effort. The importance is now recognised of incorporating facility features to assist the safeguards task—what is termed ‘safeguards by design’.”19 “Efforts are underway in the U.S., the European Community, and to a lesser extent in a few other countries, to design reactor technologies and nuclear fuel cycles that are safer, more efficient in their generation of nuclear waste, and more proliferation-resistant than today’s systems. This research, though its scope is modest at best, given the enormous stakes involved, is potentially of great significance, if it succeeds in identifying technologies and fuel-cycle options that could realistically be implemented. Of course, for this to happen, the new technologies and fuel cycles would also have to be attractive in all dimensions, conferring advantages in safety, waste disposal, and economics in addition to proliferation resistance. But the focus here will be mainly on proliferation-resistance.” 20 Advanced Reactor Concepts Decreased Proliferation Risk: “Most advanced reactor designs would lower the risk of proliferation by consuming the plutonium they produce or simply not producing it in significant amounts. These reactors can also take the plutonium stockpiles from countries that have nuclear weapons programs and use that plutonium for power

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production instead. This would continue the momentum of the Megatons to Megawatts program that ended in 2013, where the U.S. purchased approximately 20,000 nuclear bombs worth of excess highly enriched uranium from Russia and used it as fuel for American civilian nuclear reactors. Other advanced designs can use depleted uranium, the waste remnants of the uranium enrichment process. This would eliminate the need for centrifuges—also required for the production of highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium—and would dramatically reduce the proliferation risk from countries like Iran that might use a civilian nuclear program as cover for military ambitions. Allowing Iran to maintain these centrifuges was a central sticking point in the nuclear negotiations with the U.S.” 21 Generation IV reactors (Gen IV ) are a set of designs currently being researched for commercial applications. For more than a decade, Generation IV International Forum (GIF) has led international collaborative efforts to develop next generation nuclear energy systems that can help meet the world’s future energy needs. Generation IV designs will use fuel more efficiently, reduce waste production, be economically competitive, and meet stringent standards of safety and proliferation resistance. With these goals in mind, some 100 experts evaluated 130 reactor concepts before GIF selected six reactor technologies for further research and development. These include the: Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR), Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR), Molten Salt Reactor (MSR), Supercritical Water-cooled Reactor (SCWR), Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) and Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR). Some of these reactor designs could be demonstrated within the next decade, with commercial deployment beginning in 2030. China has begun construction of a prototype High Temperature Reactor (HTR-PM) a first step towards the development of the VHTR. Both France and Russia are developing advanced sodium-fast reactor designs for near-term demonstration. A prototype lead fast reactor is also expected to be built in Russia in the 2020 time frame.22

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The year 2014 marked a period of important progress in terms of safety design guidelines for Generation IV reactors. There has been an established hierarchy of safety standards, starting with Safety Fundamentals, and moving on to Safety Design Criteria and Guidelines, ending with Technical Codes & Standard. The safety criteria is also being explored for the variety of different systems that have been prototyped, including VHTR (Very High Temperature Reactor), SFR (Sodium Fast Reactor), SCWR (Super Critical Water Reactor), GFR (Gas Fast Reactor), LFR (Lead Fast Reactor), and MSR (Molten Salt Reactor). These six are the main designs being explored, with modifications being made after the Fukushima accident. The six designs fall under two general categories thermal reactors, and fast reactors. Main safety designs being explored would allow reactors to avoid pressurised operations, and have automatic reactor shutdowns in the case of emergency. Many designs also seek to avoid the usage of water to cool the reactor (which would reduce the risks in the situation where water is lost through leaks or heat. The main advantages Generation IV seeks to provide is reducing the amount of time the waste remains radioactive for (on the magnitude of ten, reducing from millenias to centuries), improving the energy yield for the nuclear fuel, increasing the variety of fuels that can be used to power the reactor, and allowing for reactors to use already present nuclear waste in its operations. Many of these goals are encompassed under the umbrella of sustainability, to enable nuclear reactors to become more sustainable and environmentally friendly.23 One technology that shows great promise is the NuScale SMR. The NuScale SMR is an advanced light-water reactor wherein each NuScale Power ModuleTM is a self-contained unit that operates independently within a multi-module configuration. Up to 12 modules are monitored and operated from a single control room. x The reactor measures 65 feet tall x 9 feet in diameter. It sits within a containment vessel. x The reactor and containment vessel operate inside a water-filled pool that is built below grade. The reactor operates using the

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x

x

principles of natural circulation; hence, no pumps are needed to circulate water through the reactor. Instead, the system uses a convection process. Water is heated as it passes over the core. As it heats up, the water rises within the interior of the vessel. Once the heated water reaches the top of the riser, it is drawn downward by water that is cooled passing through the steam generators. The cooler water has a higher density. It is pulled by gravity back down to the bottom of the reactor where it is again drawn over the core. Water in the reactor system is kept separate from the water in the steam generator system to prevent contamination. As the hot water in the reactor system passes over the hundreds of tubes in the steam generator, heat is transferred through the tube walls and the water in the tubes turns to steam. The steam turns turbines which are attached by a single shaft to the electrical generator. After passing through the turbines, the steam loses its energy. It is cooled back into liquid form in the condenser then pumped by the feed water pump back to the steam generator where it begins the cycle again.”24

“Benefits and Challenges: “How will Gen IV reactors reduce nuclear proliferation risks? Along with the physical and administrative monitoring, control and security measures currently in place, careful selection of the fuel composition and reprocessing techniques may further increase the proliferation resistance of the Gen IV nuclear fuel cycle. Making nuclear material less suitable for use in a nuclear weapon, or less prone to diversion for such use, can be achieved in three different ways, which are not reactor but fuel cycle specific: x By increasing the radiological intensity of the material itself, so that it cannot be handled without severely exposing the people handling it or without heavy and specialised shielding equipment, x By assuring that at no point during the fuel cycle will the isotopic composition of the fuel be suitable for the production of an explosive nuclear device, without prior complex reprocessing,

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x

By minimising the opportunities for diversion, such as during intermediate storage, transport to and from reprocessing, etc.

Most of the Generation IV systems involve fast reactors relying on multiple reprocessing and recycling of fuel, which essentially address all three of the above strategies.25 Research continues on Advanced Nuclear Power Reactors. The nuclear power industry has been developing and improving reactor technology for more than five decades and is starting to build the next generation of nuclear power reactors to fill new orders. Several generations of reactors are commonly distinguished. Generation I reactors were developed in 1950-60s, and the last one shut down in the UK in 2015. Generation II reactors are typified by the present US and French fleets and most in operation elsewhere. So-called Generation III (and III+) are the advanced reactors discussed in this paper, though the distinction from Generation II is arbitrary. The first ones are in operation in Japan and others are under construction in several countries. Generation IV designs are still on the drawing board and will not be operational before the 2020s. Reactor suppliers in North America, Japan, Europe, Russia, China, and elsewhere have a dozen new nuclear reactor designs at advanced stages of planning or under construction while others are at a research and development stage. Fourth-generation reactors are at R&D or concept stage.26 “So-called third-generation reactors have: A standardized design for each type to expedite licensing, reduce capital cost and reduce construction time. A simpler and more rugged design, making them easier to operate and less vulnerable to operational upsets. Higher availability and longer operating life—typically 60 years. Further reduced possibility of core melt accidents. Substantial grace period, so that following shutdown the plant requires no active intervention for (typically) 72 hours. Resistance to serious damage that would allow radiological release from an aircraft impact. Higher burn-up to use fuel more fully and efficiently and reduce

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the amount of waste. Greater use of burnable absorbers (‘poisons’) to extend fuel life.” 27 Advanced Nuclear Fuels and Fuel Cycles “Safe, proliferation-resistant and economically efficient nuclear fuel cycles that minimize waste generation and environmental impacts are important aspects of sustainable nuclear energy. To increase capabilities of the Member States, advanced and innovative technologies are developed to solve issues emerging from nuclear fuel cycle activities utilizing the up-to-date information and projection scenarios.” 28 “Management of separated plutonium and reprocessed uranium arising from the reprocessing of spent fuel and depleted uranium from enrichment processes as a current challenge must be met to alleviate concerns about a sustainable nuclear fuel cycle. These resulting nuclear materials are related to various nuclear fuel-cycle options. In addition, there are other issues associated with the management of ex-defense plutonium and HEU. These nuclear materials are introduced into the nuclear fuel-cycle activities. Disposition or peaceful use of the materials involves to some degree risks with regard to proliferation, environmental burden, and safety. The IAEA is expected to address these interlinking issues, particularly those arising from the current nuclear fuel cycle options and former defense purposes. The exchange of information and the fostering of technical developments to solve the issues are of great importance to alleviate concerns and build mutual understanding of possible approaches to their solution.” 29 The nuclear fuel cycle is the progression of nuclear fuel through a series of differing stages. “The cycle starts with the mining of uranium and ends with the disposal of nuclear waste. The raw material for today’s nuclear fuel is uranium. It must be processed through a series of steps to produce an efficient fuel for generating electricity. Used fuel also needs to be taken care of for reuse and disposal. The nuclear fuel cycle includes the ‘front end’, i.e. preparation of the fuel, the ‘service period’ in which fuel is used during reactor operation to generate electricity, and the ‘back end’,

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i.e. the safe management of spent nuclear fuel including reprocessing and reuse and disposal. If spent fuel is not reprocessed, the fuel cycle is referred to as an ‘open’ or ‘once-through’ fuel cycle; if spent fuel is reprocessed, and partly reused, it is referred to as a ‘closed’ nuclear fuel cycle.”30 “However, the change for the closed nuclear fuel cycle demands a restructuring of reactor design, particularly the reuse of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Mixed oxide (MOX) fuel is a blend of reprocessed uranium, plutonium, and depleted uranium (DU), which behaves like lowenriched uranium (LEU) in light water reactors (LWR) [refer to Open Fuel Cycle]. MOX fuel is an alternative to using enriched uranium. The MOX fuel is thus transported from the byproducts storage in the fuel fabrication phase back to the LWR for further energy output. The main component of SNF is Ur-238. By further processing this isotope residue in uranium, nuclear reactors can harness more energy to use. This recycling process will remove the decaying, radioactive fission products (byproducts of uranium splitting). However, reprocessing technology is highly expensive. The U.S. Energy Department released a report in 2008 estimating that the U.S. would drain $20 billion from federal budget to build the reprocessing plant for the purpose of dissolving 2000 metric tons of spent fuel annually. But the more problematic issue is the risk of nuclear arms proliferation. In its state as SNF, the plutonium bulk remains bound as heavy, and radioactive assemblies, made inaccessible for theft. But when reprocessed, the plutonium would be separated into concentrated powder form, making it easy to steal. Less than 20 pounds of plutonium is needed to make a nuclear weapon. Thus these are the topics centered at the heart of why the closed fuel is not made the candidate for the U.S.’s choice of cycle.”31 Comments on Advanced Reactor Concepts and Advanced Nuclear Fuels The focus of Advanced Reactor Concepts is not necessarily on making them proliferation resistant. Rather the emphasis is on newer advanced

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reactors that have simpler designs which reduce capital cost and that are more fuel efficient and are inherently safer. “Safe, proliferation resistant and economically efficient nuclear fuel cycles that minimize waste generation and environmental impacts are important aspects of sustainable nuclear energy. To increase capabilities of the Member States, advanced and innovative technologies are developed to solve issues emerging from nuclear fuel cycle activities utilizing the up-to-date information and projection scenarios.”32 “Nuclear reactors themselves are not the primary proliferation risk. The principal proliferation concern among the various elements of a nuclear power system are the enrichment and reprocessing facilities, which can produce materials directly usable in weapons. In addition, the spent fuel is a potential source of plutonium that must be safeguarded to prevent its clandestine separation for use in weapons, and fresh low LEU fuel materials are a potential source for clandestine enrichment to nuclear weapons grade material. Further, poorly secured nuclear materials, including plutonium separated for fabrication into reactor fuel, present a risk of proliferation through theft and transfer to another country or terrorist group.”33 Other Concerns Plutonium Isotopes Despite its prominent role, nuclear energy’s use presents challenges, such as mounting stockpiles of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and HLW and a potential for proliferation. There is a perception that a potential terrorist threat exists to the large volumes of radioactive waste currently being stored and the risk that this waste could leak or be dispersed as a result of terrorist action “HLW is kept in secure nuclear facilities with appropriate protection measures. Most HLW produced is held as stable ceramic solids or in vitrified (glass) form, designed to ensure that radioactive isotopes resulting from the nuclear reaction are retained securely in the glass or ceramic. Their structure is such that they would be very difficult

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to disperse by terrorist action, so that the threat from so-called ‘dirty bombs’ is not high. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has responded to suggestions that spent fuel is vulnerable to terrorist actions and should be put into dry storage casks at least five years.” 34 “The most effective way to lower these risks is simply to reduce the density of fuel in the pools by transferring it out of the pools and into dry casks. Dry casks are by far the safest and most secure way to store spent nuclear fuel at the reactors while it is waiting to be moved offsite to interim or permanent storage. Unlike cooling pools, dry casks are air-cooled ‘passive’ systems. They are less vulnerable to technical or human error and to terrorist attacks, reducing the risk of a radiological release. They also are less vulnerable than pools to the potential impact of earthquakes, hurricanes, and other natural disasters. The NRC claims that storage of spent fuel in pools provides ‘adequate protection,’ but storage in dry casks is known to be safer. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) believes that the uncertainties in the available analyses of pool fires are so large that they demand substantial safety margins; these margins can be achieved only by reducing the pool inventory well below the densely packed configuration maintained in many plants today. Because spent nuclear fuel is cool enough to transfer to dry casks after five years, more than 80 percent of spent fuel that is currently in cooling pools is now eligible for dry cask storage.” 35 Nuclear power reactor spent fuel pools are neither easily reached nor easily breached. Instead, they are strong structures constructed of very thick steel-reinforced concrete walls with stainless steel liners. In addition, other design characteristics of these pools can make them highly resistant to damage and can ease the ability to cope with any damage. Such characteristics can include having the fuel in the pool partially or completely below grade and having the pool shielded by other plant structures.36 “For spent fuel, as with reactors, the NRC sets security requirements and licensees are responsible for providing the

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protection. We constantly remain aware of the capabilities of potential adversaries and threats to facilities, material, and activities, and we focus on physically protecting and controlling spent fuel to prevent sabotage, theft, and diversion. Some key features of these protection programs include intrusion detection, assessment of alarms, response to intrusions, and offsite assistance when necessary. Over the last 20 years, there have been no radiation releases that have affected the public. There have also been no known or suspected attempts to sabotage spent fuel casks or storage facilities. The NRC responded to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, by promptly requiring security enhancements for spent fuel storage, both in spent fuel pools and dry casks.”37 “A report released on 25 June 2002 by the National Academy of Sciences concludes that if a dirty bomb attack were to occur, “the casualty rate would likely be low, and contamination could be detected and removed from the environment, although such cleanup would probably be expensive and time consuming.” The disruption caused by such an attack would result from public fear of anything ‘nuclear’, and thus “the ease of recovery ... would depend to a great extent on how the attack was handled by first responders, political leaders, and the news media, all of which would help to shape public opinion and reactions. The IAEA has identified medical and industrial radioactive sources as posing considerable concern in terms of potential terrorist threats from their use in dirty bombs. The need for stronger controls to prevent the theft or loss of control of powerful radiological sources and hence ensure their safety and security has been highlighted as of paramount importance.”38 An additional concern is that plutonium isotopes can be used directly in nuclear explosives. The best approach to this issue is a combination of institutional and technical measures can add robustness to nonproliferation and counter-terrorism efforts. “Denatured” plutonium (that is, Pu that is unsuitable for nuclear explosives) does not exist!

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High Pu-240 isotope content in a nuclear weapon is an engineering complication, not an impediment.” All plutonium isotopes can be used directly in nuclear explosives. In fact, in 1962, the US tested a nuclear explosive made with reactor grade plutonium. ‘Denatured’ plutonium (that is, Pu which is unsuitable for nuclear explosives) does not exist! High Pu-240 isotope content in a nuclear weapon is an engineering complication, not an impediment. A potential proliferating state or subnational group using designs and technologies no more sophisticated than those used in firstgeneration nuclear weapons could build a nuclear weapon from reactorgrade plutonium that would have an assured, reliable yield of one or a few kilotons (and a probable yield significantly higher than that). Advanced nuclear weapon states such as the United States and Russia, using modern designs, could produce weapons from reactorgrade plutonium having reliable explosive yields, weight, and other characteristics generally comparable to those of weapons made from weapons-grade plutonium.” 39 The proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would address the production of the two main components of nuclear weapons: HEU, and plutonium. “A FMCT is a proposed international agreement that would prohibit the production of the two main components of nuclear weapons: HEU, and plutonium. Discussions on this subject are being held within the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), a body of 65 member nations established as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. The CD operates by consensus and is often stagnant, impeding progress on an FMCT. The CD requires consensus for action to take place. Consequently, negotiations for an FMCT have not taken place, though preliminary discussions are ongoing. Those nations that joined the nuclear NPT as non-weapon states are already prohibited from producing or acquiring fissile material for weapons. An FMCT would provide new restrictions for the five recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS—United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China), and for the four nations that are not NPT members (Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea).”40

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Radiological Weapon “A ‘dirty bomb’ is one type of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) that combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive material. The terms dirty bomb and RDD are often used interchangeably in the media. Most RDDs would not release enough radiation to kill people or cause severe illness—the conventional explosive itself would be more harmful to individuals than the radioactive material. However, depending on the situation, an RDD explosion could create fear and panic, contaminate property, and require potentially costly cleanup. Making prompt, accurate information available to the public may prevent the panic sought by terrorists. A dirty bomb is in no way similar to a nuclear weapon or nuclear bomb. A nuclear bomb creates an explosion that is millions of times more powerful than that of a dirty bomb. The cloud of radiation from a nuclear bomb could spread tens to hundreds of square miles, whereas a dirty bomb’s radiation could be dispersed within a few blocks or miles of the explosion. A dirty bomb is not a ’Weapon of Mass Destruction’ but a “Weapon of Mass Disruption,” where contamination and anxiety are the terrorists’ major objectives. Impact of a Dirty Bomb The extent of local contamination would depend on a number of factors, including the size of the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, the means of dispersal, and weather conditions. Those closest to the RDD would be the most likely to sustain injuries due to the explosion. As radioactive material spreads, it becomes less concentrated and less harmful. Prompt detection of the type of radioactive material used will greatly assist local authorities in advising the community on protective measures, such as sheltering in place, or quickly leaving the immediate area. Radiation can be readily detected with equipment already carried by many emergency responders. Subsequent decontamination of the affected area may involve considerable time and expense.

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Immediate health effects from exposure to the low radiation levels expected from an RDD would likely be minimal. The effects of radiation exposure would be determined by: the amount of radiation absorbed by the body; the type of radiation (gamma, beta, or alpha); the distance from the radiation to an individual; the means of exposure-external or internal (absorbed by the skin, inhaled, or ingested); and the length of time exposed. Terrorists have been interested in acquiring radioactive and nuclear material for use in attacks. For example, in 1995, Chechen extremists threatened to bundle radioactive material with explosives to use against Russia in order to force the Russian military to withdraw from Chechnya. While no explosives were used, officials later retrieved a package of cesium-137 the rebels had buried in a Moscow park. Since September 11, 2001, terrorist arrests and prosecutions overseas have revealed that individuals associated with al-Qaeda planned to acquire materials for a RDD. In 2004, British authorities arrested a British national, Dhiren Barot, and several associates on various charges, including conspiring to commit public nuisance by the use of radioactive materials. In 2006, Barot was found guilty and sentenced to life. British authorities disclosed that Barot developed a document known as the ‘Final Presentation.’ The document outlined his research on the production of ‘dirty bombs,’ which he characterized as designed to “cause injury, fear, terror and chaos rather than to kill. U.S. federal prosecutors indicted Barot and two associates for conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against persons within the United States, in conjunction with the alleged surveillance of several landmarks and office complexes in Washington, D.C., New York City, and Newark, N.J. In a separate British police operation in 2004, authorities arrested British national, Salahuddin Amin, and six others on terrorismrelated charges. Amin is accused of making inquiries about buying a ‘radioisotope bomb’ from the Russian mafia in Belgium; and the group is alleged to have linkages to al-Qaeda. Nothing appeared to have come from his inquiries, according to British prosecutors. While neither Barot nor Amin had the opportunity to carry their plans forward to

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an operational stage, these arrests demonstrate the continued interest of terrorists in acquiring and using radioactive material for malicious purposes.”41 Conclusion With the projected growth in nuclear power, there is a concern about the potential danger of nuclear proliferation. Current nonproliferation efforts are focused on detecting clandestine nuclear activities and countering illicit procurement of sensitive equipment and materials. But an emerging issue is the risk of breakout by states that may acquire enrichment or reprocessing overtly but repudiate peaceful use commitments in the future. There is no magic solution to eliminate proliferation risk. No presently known nuclear fuel cycle is completely proliferation proof. But a combination of institutional and technical measures can add robustness to nonproliferation and counter-terrorism efforts. Proliferation risk is being addressed by 1. advanced reactor designs that lower the risk of proliferation by consuming the plutonium they produce or simply not producing it in significant amounts, and 2. IAEA safeguards which can verify that a State is living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear programs for nuclearweapons purposes. No single diplomatic, military, economic, institutional, or technical initiative alone will be able to fully deal with this proliferation challenge. The best prospect for achieving non-proliferation goals while expanding nuclear power is to engage all appropriate means. The conclusions of this study are that no technology alone would provide sufficient proliferation resistance, but in combination with extrinsic measures may help to ensure that the use of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle remains an unattractive means to acquire material for a nuclear weapons program. References 1.

ICNND Research Paper No. 8, Revised, Introduction to the Concept of Proliferation Resistance: John Carlson; June 3, 2009, p. 5.

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https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/ , International Energy Outlook 2017, September 14, 2017 In the International Energy Outlook 2017 (IEO2017); increasing by 1.5%/year over that period. https://www.iaea.org/about/statute, The Statute of the IAEA. Resistance of Nuclear Energy Systems. 2001, June 2010, p. 2 Log on to https://www-pub. iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1464_web.pdf IAEA Nuclear Energy Series; No. NF-T-4.5; Technical Features to Enhance Proliferation. The World Population Prospects: 2015 Revision; July 29, 2015, p. 1 Log on tohttp:// www.un.org/en/development/desa/publications/index.html. World Energy Needs and Nuclear Power; updated November 2017, p.1 Log on tohttp:// www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/worldenergy-needs-and-nuclear-power.aspx, India’s Nuclear Ambition,; Log on to http://www.greenpeace.org/india/en/What-WeDo/Nuclear-Unsafe/Nuclear-Power-in-India/, p. 1. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-wastes/ radioactive-wastes-myths-and-realities.aspx, Radioactive Waste - Myths and Realities; Updated May 2017, pp. 1-2. Nuclear Power and the Environment, updated January 10, 2017, pp. 1-4 Log on to https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=nuclear_environment. Incidents and accidents in nuclear power plants - when are they really dangerous? Log on to http://www.dw.com/en/incidents-and-accidents-in-nuclear-power-plants-when-arethey-really-dangerous/a-19094877, April 3, 2001, pp. 1-4. E.D. Lyman; Can The Proliferation Risks Of Nuclear Power Be Made Acceptable?; Log on to http://www.nci.org/conf/lyman/, April 9, 2001, p. 1. The Increasing Risk of Nuclear Proliferation: Addressing the Challenge International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Functions, Pierre Goldschmidt, February 16, 2018, p. 1 Log on tohttps://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/increasing-risk-nuclearproliferation-addressing-challenge. The Increasing Risk of Nuclear Proliferation: Addressing the Challenge International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Functions, Pierre Goldschmidt, February 16, 2018, p. 1 Log on to https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/increasing-risk-nuclearproliferation-addressing-challenge. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); p. 1 https://www.un.org/ disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/ The Increasing Risk of Nuclear Proliferation: Addressing the Challenge, Log on to https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/increasing-risk-nuclear-proliferationaddressing-challenge, Pierre Goldschmidt, November 26, 2003, pp. 3-4. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Overview, March 31, 2018, p. 1, Log on to http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/international-atomic-energy-agency/ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT is an international treaty whose objective, disarmament and general and complete disarmament.” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Overview, March 31, 2018, p. 1, Log on to http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/international-atomic-energy-agency/ Proliferation Resistance for Fast Reactors and Related Fuel Cycles: Issues and Impacts, Joseph F. Pilat, Jun 26, 2017, p. 1.

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18. LLNL-TR-485491, L. Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Reactor Fuel, W. Gray, K. J. Moody, K. S. Bradley, H. E. Lorenzana, June 3, 2011, p. 7. 19. Introduction to the concept of proliferation resistance, John Carlson, June 3, 2009, p. 5, ICNND research paper No. 8, Revised; Log on to http://www.icnnd.org/research/index. html. 20. The Search For Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power, By Harold Feiveson, Journal Of The Federation Of American Scientists, September/October 2001, p. 1. 21. Advanced Nuclear 101, p. 5, Log on to https://www.thirdway.org/report/advancednuclear-101. 22. Generation IV Systems, Generation IV International Forum, p. 1 Log on to https:// www.gen-4.org/gif/jcms/c_59461/generation-iv-systems. 23. Generation IV Nuclear Reactors, Evelyn Xue, April 29, 2016, pp. 1 Log on to http:// large.stanford.edu/courses/2016/ph241/xue2/ 24. How NuScale Technology Works, Log on to http://www.nuscalepower.com/ourtechnology/technology-overview, 2018, p. 1. 25. Benefits and Challenges; How will Gen IV reactors reduce nuclear proliferation risks?, Log on to https://www.gen-4.org/gif/jcms/c_40368/benefits-and-challenges, April 1314, 2017, p. 1. 26. Advanced Nuclear Power Reactors, updated August 2017, p. 1 Log on to http://worldnuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/advancednuclear-power-reactors.aspx. 27. Advanced Nuclear Power Reactors; Updated August 2017, p. 1 Log on to http://worldnuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/advancednuclear-power-reactors.aspx. 27. How NuScale Technology Works; Log on to http://www.nuscalepower.com/ourtechnology/technology-overview, 2018, p. 1. 28. Advanced Nuclear Fuels and Fuel Cycles, June 14, 2016, p. 1 Log on to https://www.iaea. org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/Technical-Areas/NFC/advanced-fuel-cycles.html. 29. Advanced Nuclear Fuels and Fuel Cycles; June 14, 2016, p. 1 Log on to https://www.iaea. org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/Technical-Areas/NFC/advanced-fuel-cycles-02.html. Management of separated plutonium, possible approaches to their solution; 30. THE nuclear fuel cycle, August 2011, p. 5, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/ nfc0811.pdf. 31. Closed Fuel Cycle, New Nuclear Energy, Fall 2011, pp. 1-2 Log on to https:// newnuclearenergy.wordpress.com/nuclear-cycle-2/closed-fuel-cycle/ 32. Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Materials, June 24, 2016, p. 1 Log on to https://www.iaea.org/ OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/Technical-Areas/NFC/advanced-fuel-cycles.html. 33. A report by the Nuclear Energy Study Group of the American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs, Nuclear Power And Proliferation Resistance: Securing Benefits, Limiting Risk, May 2005, p. 2 Log on to https://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/ proliferation-resistance/upload/proliferation.pdf. 34. Radioactive Waste - Myths and Realities, Updated May 2017, p. 7 Log on to http://www. world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-wastes/radioactivewastes-myths-and-realities.aspx. 35. How Vulnerable are the Pools that Store Spent Nuclear Fuel at U.S. Reactors? David Wright Ask a Scientist - March 2013, p. 2 Log on to https://www.ucsusa.org/publications/ ask/2013/spentfuel.html#.WucxkCiWx9A.

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36. Radioactive Waste - Myths and Realities, Updated May 2017, p. 7 Log on to http://www. world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-wastes/radioactivewastes-myths-and-realities.aspx. 37. Spent Fuel Storage in Pools and Dry Casks Key Points and Questions & Answers, Updated August 09, 2017, p. 10, Log on to https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuelstorage/faqs.html. 38. Radioactive Waste - Myths and Realities, Updated May 2017, p. 7 Log on to http://www. world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-wastes/radioactivewastes-myths-and-realities.aspx. 39. Reactor Plutonium Utility in Nuclear Explosives, Bruce T. Goodwin, November 6, 2015, pp. 2-19 Log on to http://npolicy.org/slides/Goodwin_Reactor-Plutonium-Utility.pdf. 40. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at a Glance, Davis Kimball, April 2018, p. 1, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at a Glance. 41. Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Updated December 12, 2014, pp. 1-2, Log on to https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/ fs-dirty-bombs.html. 42. IAEA Nuclear Energy Series Technical Reports, Technical Features to Enhance Proliferation Resistance of Nuclear Energy Systems, No. NF-T-4.5, June 2010, p. 27 Log on to https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1464_web.pdf.

5. The Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership An Indian Answer to the Nuclear Security Challenge Reshmi Kazi

In the 21 st century, the threat of nuclear terrorism has become more tangible. The Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) run by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) leads one to conclude that nuclear security threats are real and significant. The 2016 ITDB Fact Sheet shows a rise in the number of incidents of significance to nuclear security, including thefts, losses and unauthorised divergence of nuclear and other radioactive material, from 2734 in 2014 to 2889 in 2015 (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2016). In 2016, 189 incidents were reported to the ITDB by 34 States, indicating that unauthorised activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material, including incidents of trafficking and malicious use, continue to occur (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2017). Although statistics do not indicate any steep rise in nuclear securityrelated incidents, it would be a serious mistake to ignore the trend. This point was brought home to security analysts in the aftermath of the November 2015 terrorist attacks in France and Belgium, when a spokesman for the agency in charge of the Mol nuclear research reactor in Belgium expressed concern about “a bombing inside the plant, or a 9/11 style attack with an aircraft” (Homeland Security News Wire, 2016; see also Schreuer and Rubin, 2016).1 Adding to the ‘dirty bomb’ threat, the emerging picture is that of a more elaborate terror attack, involving a strike against a nuclear power plant. This is a stark reminder

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of the synergy between security measures against nuclear terrorism and the safety of nuclear energy facilities. The primary aim of India’s nuclear security policy is to secure its nuclear weapons, fissile materials and associated facilities against unauthorized access, divergence or sabotage, and to prevent, detect and effectively respond to any nuclear incident. In conformity with these objectives, and in recognition of the significant linkages between nuclear safety and security, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took the stage of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C. to announce the foundation in India of a Nuclear Centre of Excellence (CoE): the Global Center for Experts speculated whether the IS were trying to abduct the nuclear official so as to obtain radioactive material for a possible dirty bomb. There was a strong apprehension that the Paris attackers had “the intention to do something involving one of the four nuclear sites” in Belgium (Homeland Security News Wire, 2016). Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) This chapter explores the current challenges to nuclear security from an Indian perspective, and examines the potential of the GCNEP in contravening them. It focuses on the critical role of India’s nuclear CoE as a platform for the sharing of best practices with partner countries, through awareness raising, training and education. The Nuclear Security Threat Scenario Russia’s decision not to attend the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C. is viewed by many as a corrosion of global efforts to strengthen nuclear security. With the world’s largest nuclear stockpiles, including 1796 strategic warheads, Russia continues to face significant weaknesses such as corruption, illicit trafficking in arms and drugs, organized crime and terrorism (Davenport, 2016). The Russian military has also acknowledged that the country faces a “real threat of terrorist acts with use of radioactive and toxic chemical agents” (Russian Federation, 2016). Nevertheless, Russia has terminated several USRussian nuclear cooperation agreements including a research pact,

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conversion of Russian research reactors to LEU, and a treaty on disposal of plutonium. The abrogation of the landmark US-Russia nuclear security agreements forebodes grave disconcert in matters of global nuclear security. China has actively participated in the Nuclear Security Summit process, emphasizing that tackling the threat of nuclear terrorism is a “long and arduous task”, which “cannot be overlooked” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China 2012). China has high stakes in supporting robust global action on nuclear security. However, China’s nuclear industry is challenged by lack of transparency and corruption among mid-level and even senior officials (Zhang 2016). The vast number of both state-owned and private Chinese companies dealing with nuclear technology and equipment increases the risk of corruption, which may manifest in a nuclear black market. This impedes the establishment of a robust nuclear security culture in China, and fails to enthuse international confidence about China’s nuclear security program. US congressmen Mike Rogers (Chairman of the Sub-committee on Strategic Forces) and Ted Poe (Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Trade) have expressed deep concern about China’s alleged aid to Pakistan for acquiring the 2750 km range Shaheen III ballistic missile, which provides Pakistan the capability to strike anywhere in South Asia (Rogers and Poe 2016).2 The congressmen hence maintain that China, a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), flouts the rules of the non-proliferation regime with impunity in advancing the nuclear weapons capability of Pakistan, which also “threatens the national security of the United States and its allies” (Rogers and Poe 2016: 1-2). In South Asia, the nuclear security threat scenario presents a complex matrix characterised by Islamist militancy and proliferation networks centred in Pakistan, with links to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Pakistan is pursuing a rapidly expanding nuclear weapons programme. According to one estimate, its “stockpile could realistically grow to 220 to 250 warheads by 2025, making it the world’s fifth

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largest NWS” (Kristensen and Norris 2015). Pakistan’s marked shift towards deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) coupled with weaknesses of domestic instability, corruption, radicalisation in the army, and frequent terrorist attacks on critical installations are all indicators of a rising danger to nuclear security. Experts conclude that “the risk of nuclear theft in Pakistan appears to be high”, and “the trend seems to be toward increasing risk, as Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal expands and shifts toward TNW, while adversary capabilities remain extremely high” (Bunn et al. 2016). A report from the Stimson Center raises concerns over “a number of attacks by extremist groups against heavily guarded military sites”, some housing tactical nuclear weapons (McCausland 2016). According to the US government, “Pakistan is engaged with the international community on nuclear safety and security issues and is working to ensure its strategic export controls are in line with international standards” (US Department of State 2015). However, high-level US officials continue to express doubt about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons (US Department of State, 2016b). In the words of Gary Samore, “even the best nuclear security measures might break down” (Kerr and Nikitin 2016). Reports on Pakistan’s nuclear security have also cited concerns of onward proliferation. A recent study by Project Alpha of the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s College finds that Pakistan has a “deliberate strategy of using deceptive methods to obtain dual-use goods”, evident from its “systematic use of front companies to supply its strategic industries” (Project Alpha 2016). It is further believed that witting and unwitting suppliers “probably purchase goods from manufacturers in China, Europe, the United States and elsewhere and then arrange their export to Pakistan” (ibid. 25). This goes against Pakistan’s claim that it has a strong non- proliferation record. Crossborder terrorism from Pakistan also has the possibility of threatening India’s nuclear security. It is worth noting that both the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (CPPNMNF)3 and the IAEA nuclear security recommendations on physical

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protection of nuclear materials and facilities (INFCIRC/225/ Rev.5) describe how civilian materials should be secured. However, there is an absence of any obvious guidelines on how to secure materials in the military sector (International Institute for Strategic Studies, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 2016). A common argument is that all strategic nuclear materials are well safeguarded as they are under military control. However, this is contradicted by several incidents of major security breaches in sites housing nuclear materials for military purposes. The list of breaches indicates the degree of vulnerabilities facing nuclear materials in the non- civilian sector (Browne et al. 2015). It is a compelling requirement to restore international confidence in the credibility of adequate physical protection for all nuclear materials in both civilian and military sectors. Critical challenges to nuclear security arise from the increasing demand for nuclear energy, which is expected to grow more rapidly in Asia than any other region in the world (Squassoni 2013). In Asia alone there are 17 states that possess nuclear/radiological materials or technology, and the number is expected to grow.4 Significantly, Asia remains the focus of nuclear power expansion wherein nuclear energy is expected to play a central role.5 Expanding global commerce in weapons grade high-enriched uranium (HEU) for non-weapons purposes constitutes a significant proliferation risk, which also applies to the threat of nuclear terrorism. There is a need for the international community to undertake concerted measures to minimise the dangers of HEU commerce (Kuperman 2013). In December 2014, seven members of an organized criminal group were arrested in Moldova. Investigations revealed that the group was in possession of 200 gm of uranium-238, 1 kg of mercury and 1 kg of an unidentified radioactive material (Interpol 2014). These radioactive substances are attractive materials for building dirty bombs, which could potentially be expended to spread radiological terror. This and other incidents have shifted the debate on nuclear security threats from

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a focus on rogue or fragile states towards the threat of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors. As of 2010, the terrorist groups Al-Qaida and Aum Shinrikyo had both declared the intent to acquire nuclear weapons (MowattLarssen 2010; Geenayfeb 2010). The rise of Islamic State (IS) has once again raised speculations about terrorists’ intentions to acquire nuclear weapons. According to Australian intelligence sources, IS has seized enough radioactive material from government facilities to suggest it has the capacity to build a large and devastating dirty bomb (Withnall 2015). Moreover, the IS official magazine Dabiq has described a hypothetical operation wherein the group [with billions of dollars in the bank] would call on their wilāyah in Pakistan to purchase a nuclear device through weapons dealers with links to corrupt officials (Cantlie 2016; see also Schmitt 2016; Kazi 2016a). While some security experts see the nuclear threat from IS as an alarmist proposition, others warn that the threat must be taken seriously, since the group has a much greater potential to realise their ambitions than Al-Qaida or Aum Shinrikyo, both financially and in terms of human resources (Gaffey 2016; Swanson 2015; Bunn et al. 2016). The spread of IS activities into parts of South Asia further complicates the regional threat matrix. Recognising the threat, India’s Home Minister Rajnath Singh has referred to online recruitment by IS as “a major security challenge for India” (Ghatwai 2015). Considering that the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists is unprecedented, some analysts take an optimistic viewpoint, advocating that an act of nuclear terrorism has a very remote probability. Pessimists, on the other hand, tend to be cynical about the effectiveness of security measures as well as the probability of a nuclear terror attack. This poses a challenge to the prospect of nuclear security, because “the enemy of nuclear security is not only complacency; it’s also paralyzing pessimism” (Shultz et al. 2014: 23). While it is strongly advisable to refrain from alarmism, it is equally necessary to maintain a distinction between over-cautiousness and complacency in nuclear security matters. The possibility of nuclear terrorism may be distant,

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but it is by no means absent. Moreover, a nuclear terror attack would reverberate socially, politically, and economically on a global scale. This calls for strong and consistent measures to safeguard all nuclear and radiological weapons and materials (Bunn 2017). To combat nuclear theft and sabotage, it is essential to develop a strong and effective nuclear security culture, filtering through all nuclear governance agencies. To achieve this objective, several countries have established Centres of Excellence (CoEs) as a mechanism for developing higher nuclear security standards. Since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, 44 countries have either announced or established CoEs or training programs related to nuclear security.6 Several more nations are likely to establish such CoEs in future. A CoE can be defined as a dedicated institution that imparts training on various aspects of nuclear security both at national and regional levels. Though a new concept, the CoEs have already proved to be an essential aspect of the global nuclear security architecture by spreading awareness about the importance of strengthening and sustaining nuclear security. CoEs promote specific training programs in areas such as on aspects like physical protection, insider threat, material accountancy, export controls, nuclear forensics and emergency response mechanisms. The underlying purpose is to develop human capacity building, achieve technological progress, and share best practices with other platforms for improving education and training on nuclear security. The significant rise of Nuclear Security Summit participant states—from 47 in 2010 to 52 in 2016—have provided the necessary stimulus to the IAEA to further strengthen the network of CoEs (Kazi 2016b). The primary objective of the CoE is to further advance the work of the International Network of Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC) under the IAEA, a network of all training centres that seeks to strengthen and sustain the provision of nuclear security training.7 They expound information about nuclear security and make cognizant of proliferation activities through education, quality training programmes and technological support. The CoEs facilitate conduct of degree courses in cooperation with universities to build a dedicated

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body of technologically trained specialists to facilitate enhancement of the nuclear industry and impart practical training through experimental facilities. The centres also play a crucial role in delivering consistent exercises and conducting programs to build a specialized and highly trained workforce to prevent potential thefts and sabotage, and deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism. CoEs thus promote practices that ensure effective physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. They further play a critical role towards the maintenance and promotion of a high standard of nuclear security training, sustaining the enhancement of nuclear security support capabilities. This is extremely significant for fostering an effective interface between education and training. The CoEs thus play a fundamental role in improving alertness to proliferation risks, as well as nuclear security understanding (Kazi 2016b). India’s approach to nuclear security The principal objective of India’s nuclear security is to continuously strive towards strengthening and upgrading its nuclear security measures and make them an integral aspect of security policy. This persistent process of consolidation not only advances and elevates the nuclear security system, but also establishes a strong culture of nuclear security awareness. India’s nuclear establishment strives towards an upgraded nuclear security system embedded within the framework of a strong nuclear security culture. To achieve this, it is essential to have an institutionalised framework dedicated to “enhance nuclear safeguards to effectively and efficiently monitor nuclear materials and facilities” (Government of India, 2016). India’s Centre of Excellence (CoE), the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) has been effectively founded on this principle. The Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership: India’s CoE The GCNEP is a dedicated Research and Development unit supported by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The GCNEP provides an operative platform that showcases India’s

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efforts towards nuclear safety, security, and sophisticated nuclear and radiation technologies. Its aim is to foster capacity building in technology training and human resource development for a dynamic nuclear security system. In January 2014, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh laid the foundation of the GCNEP in Jasaur-Kheri village in Haryana, announcing that the CoE “aims to continue strengthening the security of its nuclear power plants and nuclear materials … together with the development of human resources in the field of nuclear energy” (World Nuclear News 2014). The primary mission of the GCNEP is to “conduct research, design and development of nuclear systems that are intrinsically safe, secure, proliferation resistant and sustainable” with the aim of strengthening nuclear security in the future, “to organize training, seminars, lectures and workshops” on critical issues by Indian and international experts and build a group of trained human resource and “to promote global nuclear energy partnership through collaborative research and training programs” (Government of India 2016). The GCNEP is designed to be a state-of-the-art training centre based upon international collaboration with the IAEA and other interested foreign partners. The Centre symbolizes India’s “commitment to national and international fraternity to forge global partnership for development of technologies and processes which will promote large-scale yet sustainable, safe and secure exploitation of nuclear energy” (Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership 2014a). The GCNEP-related Memorandum of Understanding and other cooperation arrangements have been signed with France, Russia, US, UK and the IAEA. The Centre houses five schools to conduct research into advanced nuclear energy systems, nuclear security, radiological safety, as well as applications for radioisotopes and radiation technologies. These schools include Advanced Nuclear Energy System Studies, Nuclear Security Studies, Nuclear Material Characterisation Studies, Radiological Safety Studies and Studies on Applications of Radioisotopes and Radiation Technologies.

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The GCNEP will become an important platform for India to interact with the world community in all aspects of peaceful uses of nuclear technology, covering nuclear energy and safety, as well as nuclear security and non-proliferation (Grover 2014). It will promote international cooperation in nuclear energy applications and assist the formation of “extensive facilities” related to advanced education, research and training in the field of proliferation-resistant nuclear systems, the design of nuclear power plants, nuclear security, radiological safety, nuclear material characterisation and applications of radiation technologies and radioisotopes (Government of India 2012). The Centre will also concentrate on developing improved technologies for cutting-edge nuclear energy systems, advanced nuclear forensics, and the establishment of accreditation facilities for radiation monitoring. The mandate of the GCNEP will include research by Indian and visiting international scientists; training of Indian and international participants; hosting international conferences, workshops and group discussions by experts on topical issues. The mandate further includes design and conduct of nuclear security courses in collaboration with like-minded countries and the IAEA. The centre will be boosted by bringing together Indian and international scientists for their research and training programs. Training facilities are to include virtual reality laboratories and a radiation monitoring, calibration and accreditation laboratory (ibid.). The GCNEP is a signature of India’s commitment to be a “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology” by exploring methods to establish and share nuclear best practices at national and international levels (Government of India 2005). Joint training programmes The GCNEP has a dedicated Outreach Programme Cell that actively showcases India’s technological advancement in several areas, like physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, prevention and response to radiological threats, nuclear material control and accounting practices, protective measures against insider threats, radio chemistry and application of radio isotopes, applications of radioisotopes

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in agriculture and radiation processing of food, and public awareness of DAE technologies for rural India. At the Nuclear Industry Summit 2016 Expo, in Washington D.C., the GCNEP, along with the industry partner Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL), set up a pavilion to showcase India’s efforts towards global nuclear security, through a display of programmes, technologies and products in the areas of nuclear security, radiological safety, advanced nuclear energy systems, and safeguards. The outreach cell has been methodically conducting courses, symposia, and workshops on several aspects related to nuclear security. These courses provide training to participants from various security establishments and facilitate the building of efficient human resources through relevant training. GCNEP is reaching out to a range of target communities using domain specific training programs, as well as orientation programs for students to promote science among young people (Tkur et al. 2016). Training is an integral necessity in all aspects of nuclear security. Training does not involve any formal education but plays a role in sensitizing all human personnel on important aspects of nuclear security like technologies, physical protection, vulnerability analysis, material control and accounting and detection techniques. Training can be further improved through sharing of best practices, shared curricula and periodic peer-review exchange mechanisms. The GCNEP has held collaborative research and detailed studies from time to time through the IAEA NSSC Network for development and running of training courses on nuclear and radiological security. During 4-12 October 2004, India and IAEA held a regional training course on “Physical Protection of Nuclear Installations”, in Mumbai. A total of 25 participants attended the course, including 13 foreign participants (from Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand), and 12 Indian participants from units of the DAE and Ministry of Home Affairs. The participants had free exchanges on a wide range of nuclear security topics, such as physical protection concern, nuclear fuel cycle activities, safety-design and evaluation of physical protection system, International Physical Protection Regime, design basis threat,

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security and control of radioactive materials, safety-security interface, and security culture. The event provided a forum for sharing learning experiences and nuclear security training with personnel associated with the physical protection of nuclear material from several countries. Following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, the Indian nuclear establishment took measures to safeguard against multiple external hazards in nuclear power plants. In collaboration with the IAEA, an international workshop was held on “Safety of Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plant Sites Against External Natural Hazards” from 1719 October 2012 in Mumbai (IAEA 2012). There was a free exchange of ideas and information among the international participants on the desired response mechanisms related to scientific and technical safety of multi-unit NPP sites during an earthquake, tsunami or fire. Experts from regulatory authorities and plant operators from different countries, as well as the IAEA, attended the workshop (Sinha 2013). In an attempt to foster international collaboration for a strengthened nuclear security system, India “called on the nuclear agency to recognise CoEs for human resources development under the Technical Cooperation for Developing Countries (TCDC) programme and offered training facilities to scientists and engineers from developing countries” (Government of India 2000). In 2000, the DAE and the IAEA signed a MoU for conducting regional and inter-regional training events, and promote technical cooperation and advancement through individual and group fellowships training programmes. The MoU is an important milestone in India-IAEA cooperation, and formalises New Delhi’s long standing proposal to make the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) a “centre of excellence/Regional Resource Unit (RRU)” under the Agency’s Technical Co-operation for Developing Countries (TCDC) programme (ibid.). To assess and develop essential mechanisms to prevent and respond to radiological threats, GCNEP held a Regional Training course on “Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities against Sabotage, Assessing Vulnerabilities and Identification of Vital Areas” for 25 participants, including 17 foreign nationals and eight Indian participants, held in

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November 2011 in New Delhi (International Atomic Energy Agency and Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, 2011). The weeklong course covered topics related to physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, nuclear material accounting, and computer security controls and measures to mitigate or minimise consequences of sabotage.8 This was followed up in March 2014 with an additional National Training Course (NTC) on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, jointly organised by GCNEP and BARC in Mumbai (Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, 2014b). The objective was to help participants develop a general understanding of the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities against theft and sabotage. The course concentrated on disseminating information on digital security systems and their functions for nuclear security, as well as important issues like prevention, preparedness and responses involving malicious acts with radioactive materials, medical management and safeguard practices. India has supported IAEA’s goal in assisting national efforts to strengthen nuclear security and has promoted effective international cooperation. As a partner to the IAEA-US Regional Radiological Security Partnership (RRSP), India has pioneered several international training courses in India in collaboration with the IAEA. Through the IAEA-US conducted RRSP, India extended help and cooperation for the “search and recovery of orphan radioactive sources in countries which were unable to effectively deal with them and had sought such assistance” (Government of India 2012). In the trilateral meeting held in February 2005 in New Delhi, “the US and the IAEA representatives welcomed India’s participation in the RRSP programme as a Regional Partner and discussions were held to work out the modalities of this cooperation” (Embassy of India 2005). New Delhi has suggested “providing infrastructure and expertise on a regular basis for conducting international training courses in India under the aegis of the IAEA on issues related to the security of radiological sources and materials as also for locating orphan radioactive sources in countries which are unable to effectively

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deal with them and which seek assistance form the IAEA” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2005). The three sides agreed to hold further deliberations on the subject. India has so far conducted nine regional training seminars on nuclear security in cooperation with the IAEA (Government of India 2012). In August 2013, the GCNEP organised a National Programme on Prevention and Response to Radiological Threats. Two other programmes, one on Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Practices, and the second one on insider threats, were also organised in the same year. There are expectations that the conclusion of Practical Arrangements between GCNEP and the IAEA would further strengthen India’s collaboration with the IAEA in the future (ibid.). India continues to partake in the IAEA’s Coordinated Research Programmes (CRP’s). Currently, Indian institutions are engaged in 65 CRPs (Sinha 2013). India hosted a six-day IAEA Inter-regional Training Course related to production of Molybdenum-99, and proposed to host two more events in November 2015 (ibid.). India has participated in several training activities “including participation in the IAEA effort to take nuclear security training to different member states and to make it really global (National Academy of Sciences 2013)”. The training strategy will provide regional trainees modern and internationally accepted concepts and technology in the area of security of nuclear and other radioactive material and nuclear installations. The School of Nuclear Security Studies (SNSS) The GCNEP still remains a site under construction but has started conducting several “off-campus” courses in New Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad and the state of Haryana. The SNSS organised a workshop on “Vulnerability Assessment for Nuclear Material Security” in October 2014 in Mumbai, in cooperation with the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under the US Department of Energy (Homi Bhabha National Institute 2014). The 20 workshop participants, mainly from various units of the DAE were trained to conduct vulnerability analysis of Physical Protection System at

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Nuclear Facilities to secure against unauthorized removal of nuclear material and sabotage. The SNSS is currently building a Hypothetical Nuclear Facility as part of the facility, which will include all elements of physical protection, including a Barrier Technology and Vehicle Access Control Test Facility and a Sensor Evaluation Test Bed.9 The SNSS plays a crucial role in organising workshop and symposiums periodically for purpose of generating awareness of personnel on the importance of nuclear security and physical protection system. The School of Radiological Safety Studies (SRSS) Unlike a nuclear attack, a radiological attack, or attack by a dirty bomb or radiological dispersal device (RDD) would not cause mass destruction, though it would cause mass disruption and loss of life. Radioactive sources have extensive use in a large number of applications in industry, healthcare and research. The wide applications of radioactive sources make them easily available. These sources are used and transported under stringent regulatory control, but a possibility of their intentional diversion by terrorists always exists. To enhance radiation source security, the School of Radiological Safety Studies (SRSS) under GCNEP is designed to carry out R&D on radiation detection systems and dosimetry. The SRSS sensitises personnel on threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism through assessment of radioactivity releases; address emergency preparedness and response, medical management of radiation emergencies, and conducts fixed field exercises on radiological safety, and emergency response. The SRSS is expected to man an emergency response centre. There are currently 24 Emergency Response Centres (ERCs) across India, and they are monitored by the Indian Environmental Radiation Monitoring Network (IERMON) with modules for mobile and aerial searches, monitoring at ports, and a facility for air monitoring of stand-alone detectors, which communicate using the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) or Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) networks.10 ERC has been built and is operational within the GCNEP site in Bahadurgarh, Haryana.11 Training in this field of expertise is

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already underway. In May 2016, the author attended a Workshop on “Nuclear Forensics: Fundamentals an Applications” organised by the School of Nuclear Material Characterisation and SRSS, in Mumbai. The objective of the workshop was to generate awareness about the effects of radiation and the necessity of effective detection mechanisms to prevent, detect and respond to a radiological disaster. The author also attended an Indo-UK Workshop on “Nuclear Security Culture”, 19-21 October 2016 in Mumbai. The objective of this workshop was to familiarize participants with the importance of security culture and roles and responsibilities of personnel involved in organizations dealing with nuclear and radioactive material. Participants were also sensitized on the interrelationship of safety and security in nuclear installations.12 Sharing best Practices India’s progress in nuclear technology is sought after by nations such as France,13 Russia,14 Republic of Korea,15 United Kingdom,16 Australia,17 and Kazakhstan.18 China has also expressed desire to open talks on cooperation in a sector that New Delhi sees as the solution to its chronic power problems. Recent nuclear cooperation agreements entered into by several nations with India are an indicator of the belief that New Delhi’s advanced nuclear technology and experiences are advantageous to their enhanced security. In November 2012, India and Canada announced the conclusion of negotiations for the Administrative Arrangement that will allow the implementation of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA), signed between the two countries in June 2010. The NCA will allow Canadian firms to export and import controlled nuclear materials, equipment and technology to and from India to facilities under safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The NCA will “further build on Canada and India’s relationship and allow both countries to share expertise in areas such as research and development, safety, and next generation nuclear facilities” (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 2012). India and Bangladesh have agreed to enhance cooperation in nuclear science and technology (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of

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India 2014). India has also agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation with Sri Lanka in the fields of civil nuclear energy and science and technology (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2013). In October 2014, India and Finland signed 19 agreements including one for peaceful use of nuclear energy as well as radiation safety regulations related to nuclear installations, emergency preparedness, and radioactive waste management associated with the operation of nuclear power plants (Press Trust of India 2014). India’s expertise in civilian nuclear technology and radiation safety has not only been provided to its neighbouring states, but to other countries as well. Cyber Security The GCNEP is striving for excellence in several other aspects related to nuclear security, such as nuclear forensics, cyber risks and insider threats, through training courses, programmes and discussions both nation-wide and internationally. There are ongoing programmes with an aim to safeguard digital assets and the information they contain against sabotage or malicious use. In consonance with this aim, the IAEA in cooperation with the BARC held a Technical Meeting on the “Guiding Principles on applying Computer Security Controls to Instrumentation & Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities” under the aegis of the GCNEP in September 23-27, 2013. The purpose of the meeting was to develop and review areas that should be addressed in the IAEA guidance on computer security for digital instrumentation and control systems at nuclear facilities to include the integration of safety and security considerations during the lifecycle of digital control systems (Global Centre of Nuclear Energy Partnership 2013). The agenda was to review and update a draft document entitled “Applying Computer Security Controls to Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Systems at Nuclear Facilities” (to be issued as a Technical Guidance publication within the IAEA Nuclear Security Series), and provide technical comments. The document focuses on cybersecurity matters that are crucial in the “lifecycle of digital I&C security associated with nuclear power facilities systems applied at nuclear facilities.” On

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the basis of the week-long discussions, 25 guiding principles and 145 detailed guidelines for security were finalized (ibid.). Nuclear forensics is an important attribute of nuclear security and the GCNEP has held several courses on it. A May 2016 course held in Mumbai, attended by the author, sought to sensitise and impart basic knowledge on nuclear forensics fundamentals and applications in ensuring security. In addition to the training courses under GCNEP, the Directorate of Forensic Science Laboratories (DFSL) in Bangalore has drawn up a comprehensive plan aiming to take forensic sciences to a global level with the establishment of a centre for nuclear forensic science. The plan is expected to take off by 2019, though the proposal is still pending (ibid.). India’s home department has advised that Karnataka, with its vast potential for academic avenues both in science and technology, can lead the way in nuclear-forensic science (Government of India 2012). It remains the prime responsibility of the GCNEP to coordinate and expedite the DFSL plan to implement a dedicated nuclear forensic science centre in India. India’s GCNEP is actively engaged in addressing the threats of nuclear terrorism, and the possible misuse of radioactive sources for a potential radiation dispersal device. It is developing appropriate technologies and mechanisms to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear and radiological threats. It is also undertaking initiatives to support capacity building in India by training a dedicated body of skilled personnel to help protect against nuclear and radiological threats. Through its training programs, the GCNEP aims to enhance coordination of efforts at the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels. India still faces the challenge of negotiating an outreach programme with Pakistan, despite that nuclear security is fundamentally an issue of common concern. India and Pakistan should build common ground by exploring the mutual benefits of cooperation between their respective CoEs, towards bolstering nuclear security in the region. This could provide a model for nuclear partnerships across the world.

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Homi Bhabha National Institute (2014) Report on “Workshop on Vulnerability Assessment for Nuclear Material Security”. [online]. Available on: http://www.gcnep.gov.in/ programs/details/2014/ReportVAWorkshopOctober2014.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16]. International Atomic Energy Agency and Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (2011) Report on “Regional Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities against Sabotage, Assessing Vulnerabilities and Identification of Vital Areas” [online]. Available on: http://www.gcnep.gov.in/programs/details/ReportRTConPPS2011.pdf [Accessed 13/12/16]. International Atomic Energy Agency (2012) International workshop on “Safety of MultiUnit Nuclear Power Plant Sites against External Natural Hazards” [online]. Available on: http://www-pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/44399/International-Workshop-on- theSafety-of-Multi-Unit-Nuclear-Power-Plant-Sites-against-External-Natural-Hazards. [Accessed on 13/12/16]. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Incident and Trafficking Database (2016) Incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regular control – 2016 Fact Sheet [online]. Available on: https://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/itdb-factsheet.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16]. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Incident and Trafficking Database (2017) Incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regular control – 2017 Fact Sheet [online]. Available on: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/12/itdbfactsheet-2017.pdf [Accessed on 3/10/17]. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non- Proliferation (VCDNP) (2016) Improving the security of all nuclear materials: Legal, political, and institutional options to advance international oversight [online]. Available on t:http:// www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/160920_improving_security_ of_all_nuclear_materials iiss_c ns_report.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Interpol (2014) Moldova police arrest seven suspected uranium smugglers. Interpol [online]. Available on: http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2014/N2014-238 [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Kazi, R. (2016a) Islamic State and the Threat of Chemical Weapons. In S.D. Muni and Vivek Chadha, eds., Asian Strategic Review, Terrorism: Emerging Trends. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, pp. 67-82. Kazi, R. (2016b) Global Centre of Nuclear Excellence: India’s Nuclear Security Provider. Defence and Diplomacy, 5(4): 41-60. Kerr, P. K. and Nikitin, M. B. (2016) Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons. [online] Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service. Available on: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/ RL34248.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Kristensen, H. M and Norris, R. S. (2015) Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71(6): 59-65. Kuperman, J. (2013) Nuclear Terrorism and Global Nuclear Security: The Challenge of Phasing out Highly Enriched Uranium. Abingdon: Routledge. McCausland, J. (2016) Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Operational Myths and Realities [online]. Stimson Center. Available at: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/fileattachments/McCausland.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (2005) Statement by Official Spokesperson on India-US-IAEA meeting on Regional Radiological Security

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Partnership [online]. Available at: http://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases. htm?dtl/5833/Statement+by+Official+Spokesperson+on+IndiaUSIAEA+meetin g+on+Regional+Radiological+Security+Partnership [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2014) Joint Statement on the Third Meeting of the India-Bangladesh Joint Consultative Commission. [online]. Available at: http://mea.gov.in/bilateral- documents.htm?dtl/24024/Joint+Statement+on+the+ Third+Meeting+of+the+IndiaBangl adesh+Joint+Consultative+Commission [Accessed 13/12/16]. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2013) Joint Press Statement on the Eighth India-Sri Lanka Joint Commission Meeting [online].Available at: http://mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/21115/Joint+Press+Statement+on+the+Eighth+IndiaSri+Lanka+Joint+ Commission+Meeting [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China. (2012) Towards Greater Nuclear Security Through Cooperation: Statement at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. Statement by H.E. Hu Jintao President of the People’s Republic of China at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, Seoul, March 27. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ eng/topics_665678/hjtatnsnss_665720/t920822.shtml [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Mowatt-Larssen, R. (2010) Al-Qaeda’s Nuclear Ambitions. Foreign Policy [online]. Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/16/al-qaedas-nuclear-ambitions/ [Accessed on 13/12/16]. National Academy of Sciences (2013) India-United States Cooperation on Global Security: Summary of a Workshop on Technical Aspects of Civilian Nuclear Materials Security. New Delhi: National Academy of Sciences. Press Trust of India (2014) India, Finland to cooperate in civil nuclear energy. The Times of India [online]. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India- Finland-tocooperate-in-civil-nuclear-energy/articleshow/44827311.cms [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Project Alpha (2016) Pakistan’s strategic nuclear and missile industries [online] London: Project Alpha, Centre for Science and Security Studies, King’s College, London. Available at: http://projectalpha.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2016/11/20160929Pakistan-public-version.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Rogers, M. and Poe, T. (2016) Letter to the Congress of the United States [online]. Available at: http://poe.house.gov/_cache/files/ef82a74d-c281-4c5c-a48e- 8e9cae2b6c49/pakistantel.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Russian Federation (2014) The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation [online]. Available at: https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads-001/2015/08/Russia-s-2014- MilitaryDoctrine.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Schmitt, E. (2016) ISIS Used Chemical Arms at Least 52 Times in Syria and Iraq, Report Says [online]. The New York Times [nytimes.com]. 21 November 2016. [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Schreuer. M. and Rubin, A. (2016) Video Found in Belgium of Nuclear Official May Point to Bigger Plot [online]. The New York Times, [nytimes.com]. 18 February 2016. [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Shultz, George P., Drell, Sidney D., Kissinger H. and Nunn, S. (2014) Nuclear Security: The Problems and the Road Ahead. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Sinha, R. (2013) Statement by Dr. Ratan Kumar Sinha, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Leader of the Indian Delegation. International Atomic Energy Agency 57th General Conference, Vienna [online]. Available at: http://dae.nic.in/writereaddata/

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gc2013_stmt.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Staff Writer (2016) Brussels attacks originally planned to attack a nuclear facility: Belgian authorities [online]. Homeland Security News Wire [homelandsecuritynewswire.com]. 28 March. [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Squassoni, S. (2013) Building a Nuclear Security Framework from the Ground Up: Encouraging Coordination among Centers of Excellence in Northeast Asia [online]. Muskatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation. Available at: http://www.stanleyfoundation. org/publications/pab/SquassoniPAB313.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Swanson, A. (2015) How the Islamic State makes its money, The Washington Post [washingtonpost.com]. 18 November 2015 [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Tkur, A., Kumar, A., Jangra, L., Kumar., R. And Mavya, Y. (2016) GCNEP- Boosting Global Efforts on Nuclear Security. IAEA International Conference on “Nuclear Security: Commitment and Actions” [online]. Available at: https://conferences.iaea.org/indico/ event/101/session/40/contribution/349.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16]. US Department of State (2015) The United States and Pakistan: Strong and Enduring Cooperation. [online] Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/01/235883. htm [Accessed on 13/12/16]. US Department of State (2016b) Transcript of Daily Press Briefing by Mark C. Toner, Deputy Spokesperson, US Department of State [online] Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ prs/dpb/2016/02/252465.htm [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Withnall, A. (2015) Isis’s dirty bomb: Jihadists have seized ‘enough radioactive material to build their first WMD’. The Independent [online]. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/middle-east/isiss-dirty-bomb-jihadists-have-seized-enough-radioactivematerial-to-build-their-first-wmd-10309220.html [Accessed on 13/12/16]. World Nuclear News (2014) Indian Research Centre Takes Shape. World Nuclear News [online]. Available at: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Indian-research-centretakes-shape-0301144.html [Accessed on 13/12/16]. Zhang, H. (2016) China’s Nuclear Security: Progress, Challenges, and Next Steps. [online]. Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Available at: http:// belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/Chinas%20Nuclear%20Security-Web.pdf [Accessed on 13/12/16].

Notes 1.

2.

3.

Following the Paris attacks of November 2015, a suspected IS operative was apprehended carrying surveillance footage of a high-ranking Belgian official who had access to secure areas of a nuclear research facility in Mol (Schreuer and Rubin, 2016). A leading specialist in Chinese military technology, Richard Fisher, is believed to have noted similarities between the16-wheel transporter erector launcher (TEL) that carried the Shaheen III during a military parade on the Pakistani national day (23 March 2016) and the Chinese WS51200 TEL manufactured by Sanjiang Special Vehicle Corporation of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). This led Fisher to conclude that CASIC had again enabled Pakistani nuclear missile capability. Similar features were also noticed when China provided TEL to North Korea’s new KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile. The 2005 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material amendment was renamed as Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (CPPNMNF) when it came into force in May 2016.

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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

These are China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh and Taiwan. Several Asian nations including China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Iran are rapidly installing new reactors. The Fukushima Daiichi accident intensified public concern over nuclear power safety but it has not reversed interest in nuclear power. Nuclear power continues to represent a major energy source, supplying about 14 per cent of the world’s electricity, and 21 percent in OECD countries (Fragman 2014). Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, European Union, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States, Vietnam. In 2012, representatives from 30 states gathered in Vienna to establish the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres, with the vision to achieve excellence in nuclear security CHECK TEXT LINK with Previous footnote worldwide and contribute to global efforts to enhance nuclear security capacity building through an effective and collaborative network of nuclear security training and support centres. Amongst foreign participants, five were from Indonesia, three from the United Arab Emirates, two each from Thailand, Bangladesh and USA, and one each from Malaysia, Philippines and Korea. Among Indian participants, three were from BARC, two from the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL), one each from the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Ltd. (BHAVINI), and the Heavy Water Plant at Kota, Rajasthan. There were also two observers from the USA. See International Atomic Energy Agency and Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, 2011. In discussion with officials from BARC and GCNEP in Mumbai. There are an estimated 500 monitoring systems located at more than 80 locations all across India. Personal communication, in discussion with an official from BARC. In a discussion with Anil Kumar, ADG (CID) Police HQ, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, “Nuclear Security Culture,” Indo-UK Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture from October 19-21, 2016 Mumbai, GCNEP. Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 2006. Department of Energy, Government of India, 2010a. Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 2011a. Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 2016. Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 2010b. Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 2011b.

6. What Next for India’s Nuclear Diplomacy? Priyanjali Malik

Six years of intense lobbying paid off in June 2016, when India was finally granted membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). After years of ambivalence towards the nuclear regime, New Delhi is now unequivocal about wanting a place at the governing tables of the collectives that control trade in nuclear and dual-use materials. There is more than just commerce at stake. New Delhi’s diplomatic efforts to gain entry into the MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement are as much about completing the rehabilitation of India after the isolation—however brief—that followed its 1998 nuclear tests. This is an issue of India being a player in, rather than an object of, the world’s most important export control regimes. Now that the action in nuclear diplomacy appears to have moved from non-proliferation—with all its historical baggage—to nuclear safety and security, India potentially has the opportunity and space to build a platform for itself as a global player. Technically, as the MTCR membership demonstrates, India has moved smoothly towards meeting the requirements of each of the aforementioned regimes, with regard to export controls, regulations and internal security procedures. However, there are still political obstacles to overcome, and it is in this realm that India will need some truly creative diplomacy to disarm the holdouts, whatever their reasons for wanting to keep India out. Briefly, Indian diplomacy will need to tackle the legacy of India’s non- proliferation negotiations, especially the bitterness in some circles over India’s change of heart about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

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(CTBT) after originally co-sponsoring the Treaty; more actively counter the idea that India should not be rewarded for ‘bad behaviour’ in collapsing the stance of no additional nuclear weapons states to the Nuclear 5; and finally, deflect the cut and thrust of regional politics that seeks to limit India’s global ambitions. The rest of this chapter will focus on addressing these three challenges. The Legacy Of Non-Proliferation Negotiations India’s attempts to gain membership of the groups that control trade in nuclear and dual-use materials, especially the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), have been a work in progress since President Obama’s 2010 visit to India, when he stated American support for this goal (Varadarajan, 2010; Dikshit, 2010). The push for acceptance in these regimes—and the explicit American support for it—appears a natural progression from the USIndia nuclear deal of 2008, which itself reset India-US relations in a way that was nearly unthinkable before the deal was first mooted in July 2005. The nuclear deal marked a turning point in New Delhi’s efforts to rehabilitate India after the nuclear tests of 1998. The joint statement from President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared that as ‘a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states’ (US Department of State 2005). In effect, India was to be treated as a Nuclear Weapon State in all but name. India’s defensiveness over its tests at Pokharan and its complicated relationship with the nonproliferation regime, pivoted on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was being addressed—to India’s advantage. Yet, the allowances made for India under the deal and the defacto recognition of India’s status still does not address what for some is a contentiously fundamental issue: India’s status viz. the NPT. New Delhi walked away from the NPT in 1968 after championing the treaty and actively participating in its negotiation. Explaining India’s decision, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared that India’s rejection of the NPT was driven by ‘enlightened self-interest and the considerations

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of national security’ (Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs1988). Yet the main story here may not be the stated concerns over China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons so much as the diplomacy that went into negotiating the NPT, when Indian representatives worked very hard to impose equal obligations on both Nuclear Weapons States and Non-Nuclear Weapons States. In their eyes, they did not succeed, and the treaty that emerged was an unequal one (Malik 2010). The depth of feeling over the question of inequality as concerns the NPT should not be overlooked. It has seeped into the fabric of India’s negotiating position on nuclear dealings in a way that elevates principle above much else. Phrases such as ‘nuclear apartheid’ have been used against the NPT with great effect; reinforcing the idea that ‘no Indian government could sign the NPT and survive’ (Subrahmanyam 1993). Indeed, this is now accepted as common knowledge in India. In effect, New Delhi’s hands are tied when it comes to negotiating anything that might be linked to the NPT, as it would be politically unviable to be seen in India to be making any concessions in this field.1 The legacy of these negotiations—and the question of rebuffing inequality—was again played out in India’s rejection of the CTBT. Indeed, the CTBT negotiations in Geneva were viewed by some in India as trying to push in ‘the NPT through the back door’ (Malik, 2010). India blocked consensus on the CTBT in 1996, citing concerns about both security and process. The Indian government argued that the absence of any linkage to disarmament and the scope for subcritical testing allowed nuclear weapons states to continue to rely on deterrence for their security, thereby apparently promoting differential notions of security. These concerns paled in comparison, however, with the heat generated over a clause that tried to impose the CTBT on India once it became clear that New Delhi would not support it. Article XIV of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty provided for its entry into force only if the forty-four states possessing nuclear reactors (and this included India) acceded to the treaty. Nor did it help that holdouts could be threatened with sanctions if they did not sign within three years of the treaty being opened for signature. The ham-handed tactics of trying to

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corral India into the non-proliferation tent rankled much more than India’s substantive security concerns, as the perception of imposing legal obligations on India without its consent has severely tarnished the CTBT in Indian eyes. Even though circumstances have now changed and it might be in the government’s interest to sign the treaty—in effect trade in its unilateral moratorium for a legal obligation—the virulent opposition to the CTBT that was encouraged in 1996 will take a lot of political capital to undo. The point of going over this history of negotiations is not to retread worn ground, but to serve as a reminder of how deeply negatively public opinion views the CTBT. This reduces the Indian government’s room for manoeuvre. The irony is that New Delhi would probably be quite happy to reach a deal on the CTBT, if signing it could be traded for something substantive (see Talbott 2004; Mohan 1999; Kazi 2014).2 However, public opinion was negatively conditioned in the run-up to India’s 1996 rejection of the CTBT, and the political capital required to counter this opinion may be more than most parties would be willing to spend.3 In short, while signing the CTBT is unlikely to be a dealmaker, publicly requiring India to sign it is very likely to prove a dealbreaker. It would therefore probably be futile to hold out for Indian accession to the CTBT as a concession to non-proliferation concerns and a means of working around the link that has been built between membership of the NPT and of the nuclear control regimes. Disarming the Non-Proliferation Hardliners Indians often fail to understand the depth of the anger aimed at New Delhi after the 1998 tests. After all, from an Indian point of view, having stayed out of both the NPT and the CTBT citing security concerns, New Delhi violated no legal obligation with its underground tests of May 1998. Indeed, the last nuclear test by France had taken place in 1996, so there was not even a norm against testing that India might have been charged with breaking.4 India’s bad behaviour, then, lay in not doing as it had said. Having sung the hymn of non-proliferation since the dawn of the nuclear age,

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New Delhi’s international interlocutors expected it to stay in the choir. India is of course hardly alone in being charged with hypocrisy. Even so, the vehemence with which India’s tests were greeted—President Clinton declared that India was ‘on the wrong side of history’— was perhaps more than New Delhi expected (Clinton, 1998). It might be worth recalling that what was being asked of New Delhi in the immediate aftermath of the tests was to ‘roll-back’ its nuclear programme and sign the NPT and CTBT as a non-nuclear weapons state (Mohan 1999). Considering this history, the distance travelled by New Delhi in the two decades since the 1996 rejection of the CTBT is quite remarkable. The sanctions that followed the 1998 tests have all melted away. In 2016, India joined the MTCR and has applied for membership in the NSG, which would further cement its relationship with the collective. The waiver granted by the NSG in 2008 on full-scope safeguards to enable commerce with members of the collective was itself a tacit acceptance of India’s nuclear weapons programme. Membership, when it comes through, will further give New Delhi a seat at the rule-making table, the same table that had earlier sought to fetter India’s nuclear ambitions. Less than two decades after its nuclear tests, India’s weapons programme appears to be an accepted part of the political landscape. It is this pace of rehabilitation that has caused some disquiet amongst those who originally castigated India for its tests.5 The NSG waiver of September 2008 had to overcome opposition from Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland (and, for a while, Japan) ( Jaffer 2008). India also suspected China’s hand in fanning opposition (Agencies, 2008). Though India made its case first in Washington DC and then in Vienna, arguably most of the heavy lifting to overcome resistance to the waiver was done by the United States (Press Trust of India 2008). There were reportedly even late night calls from the US National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, to various heads of government asking for a reconsideration of their stated positions as a personal favour (Boese 2008). The Bush administration chose to expend considerable political

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capital in pushing through this deal for India in 2008, and effectively enable, in the words of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, ‘the end of India’s decades-long isolation from the nuclear mainstream’ (Singh 2008). Even so, there was some unhappiness in India in 2008 when then Minister for External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee, reiterated India’s moratorium on nuclear testing in order to assuage some of the holdouts for the NSG waiver in Vienna (Economic Times 2008; Press Trust of India 2008). Though this statement essentially repeated the unilateral voluntary moratorium offered up by Prime Minister Vajpayee immediately after the 1998 tests, it left the government open to the charge of bowing to non-proliferation pressure. As was noted at the time, the contention was not over closing the avenue to testing, but about maintaining the right to test (Gill 2008). Now that India has formally applied to join the NSG, the Indian government will face the dual challenge of managing domestic sensitivities, while simultaneously addressing the apprehensions of foreign stakeholders who still see India as a problem for nonproliferation. The government is ahead of public opinion in wanting to resolve the question of India’s membership.6 Public sentiment, conditioned by years of negativity towards the NSG, is inherently suspicious of the collective. Amongst Indian scientists, diplomats, and even the general public, there is a sense that India defended its interests quite well, despite the attempts of other states to deny it the technology and material to advance its scientific endeavours. Considering this, there is no real need to make concessions in order to hop the fence. The Indian government has taken some steps towards trying to change these widely held ideas, but much more could be done.7 One suspects, however, that the government is more intent on persuading the stakeholders outside the country. South Block8 is currently working hard to convince those states that see an accommodation of India into the global nuclear governance framework as a weakening of the non-proliferation agenda. The case for India’s inclusion is being built on its non-proliferation credentials

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and history of non-proliferation advocacy; its No First Use doctrine; its growing technology and manufacturing base; its nuclear safety and security record; and its adherence to NSG and MTCR guidelines.9 Joining the MTCR India’s accession to the MTCR in June 2016 was somewhat anticlimactic. The announcement was made days after the very public failure of India’s application to the NSG at its Seoul plenary (Bhattacherjee 2016). Entry into the MTCR had been expected after India had completed a final additional formality of joining the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation in early June (The Hindu 2016).10 By then the political and technical obstacles to India’s entry had melted away, prompting the Dutch Chairperson of the MTCR to tweet that India’s membership was a ‘done deal’ (Haidar 2016). While public attention was still focussed on what went wrong for India at the NSG plenary in Seoul, Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar was handed the MTCR papers at a signing ceremony at South Block on 27 June 2016. India formally applied to join the MTCR in June 2015, with the matter being on the agenda of the group’s plenary meeting in October 2015 (The Hindu 2015). In the run-up to this meeting, India elicited a reiteration of American support for its membership in the MTCR, NSG, and other two groupings ( Jha 2015). Prime Minister Modi also visited Ireland, where India’s MTCR application was raised with his hosts. The subject was aired again at later meetings in Turkey, Russia and France, perceived as sympathetic countries that could be helpful in persuading others in a group that works by consensus (Haidar 2015).11 Switzerland’s diffidence on this issue was addressed by a visit by India’s Foreign Secretary, S. Jaishankar, in September 2015. President Pranab Mukherjee, too, was deployed in winning over Sweden, a key pillar of the entire non-proliferation architecture during his state visit to the country in June 2015 (Kaul 2015). Norway, another ‘non-proliferation hardliner’, was also on board, as was confirmed during a visit to India in November 2015 by the Norwegian Foreign

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Minister, who restated his country’s support for Indian membership of the MTCR, NSG and the UN Security Council (Press Trust of India 2015). The outgoing MTCR chairman, Roald Næss of Norway, was also broadly supportive, as became clear when he ‘regretted’ the lack of consensus for India’s membership in a tweet on the outcome of the October 2015 meeting (Indo-Asian News Service 2015). Despite these efforts and a broadening of support for India, consensus on India’s membership could not be achieved during the MTCR meeting in October. Agreement was apparently blocked by Italy, who asked for more time to consider the matter, effectively stalling the application for that round. Though the proceedings of the plenary are confidential, Italy’s effective blocking of consensus was leaked subsequent to the meeting.12 What is instructive here is that Italy did not raise nonproliferation concerns to muddy India’s application. Relations between the two countries had been frosty since early 2012 over a bilateral dispute and Italy effectively blocked India at the EU and other multilateral fora over the dispute. The dispute dated back to February 2012, when India accused two Italian marines of shooting and killing two Indian fishermen off the coast of India, whom the marines claimed to have mistaken for pirates (see Kasturi 2015).13 That Italy could use an irrelevant bilateral dispute to delay a multilateral agreement indicated that whatever support India had managed to muster remained tenuous, as it took what India viewed as a fairly flimsy stalling tactic to block consensus. This was also an unwelcome reminder of the mechanics of decision- making in the export control regimes, and the vulnerability of working by consensus. Considering India’s history as a somewhat preachy and disagreeable outlier in the nuclear regime, perhaps more time was needed to build the required momentum behind its application so as to make blocking it on extraneous grounds diplomatically more difficult. Joining the NSG India’s efforts to join the NSG have similarly produced chequered results. Though New Delhi launched a diplomatic offensive to disarm

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the hold-outs prior to officially applying to join the collective in May 2016, in the end, membership remained elusive (Roy 2016a). Though India blamed ‘one country’ for raising ‘procedural hurdles’, all responsibility for the outcome could not be handed to Beijing (Haidar 2016b). Brazil and Turkey raised the need for a ‘criteria based’ process to assess new applications while Austria, Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland invoked the issue of India’s status viz. the NPT (ibid.). The Brazilian, Turkish and Swiss demurrals were particularly difficult to swallow as India had made official overtures to these countries, which New Delhi assumed, had overcome any reservations (Haidar 2016a).14 After the Seoul plenary, the Indian delegation waiting outside the closed door had to return to New Delhi empty-handed, but not completely bereft of hope. The group appointed an interlocutor, Outgoing Chair, Ambassador Rafael Grossi of Argentina, to consult with members on a way forward to address the issues raised by India’s application for membership (Haidar 2016c). On the table is of course the vexed question of NPT membership, though there seems to be a tacit understanding that membership of this treaty cannot be imposed on New Delhi (ibid.). In the meantime, armed with the 2008 waiver, India is still free to engage in nuclear commerce with those states on the other side of the NSG door. That waiver, however, has practical unintended consequences. It had required India to separate its military and civilian nuclear facilities, place the latter under IAEA safeguards and adhere to NSG and MTCR guidelines, which include rigorous export controls. In addition, India had reiterated its unilateral moratorium on testing, pledged to work towards a fissile material cut-off treaty, and not share enrichment and reprocessing technology with others. So, for the last seven years, India has behaved as a member of the NSG—without membership. Thanks to the 2008 waiver, NSG members have in effect obtained Indian compliance without having to dilute their membership guidelines. India, for its part, has been able to undertake nuclear commerce with NSG members through a series of bilateral agreements. India already

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has civil nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States, Russia, France, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Namibia, Canada, Argentina, UK, Australia and Japan. The main limitation concerns India’s access to enrichment and nuclear reprocessing (ENR) technology, since a 2011 amendment to NSG guidelines has barred India from receiving ENR technology by restricting such transfers to states who have full-scope safeguards and have signed the NPT (Press Trust of India 2011). The task before South Block now is to convince the members of the NSG that there is more to be gained from Indian membership than the compliance that has already been achieved, and the commercial benefits of nuclear commerce, which the waiver allows. India has to persuade the members to allow the link between NPT membership and membership of the export control regimes to be broken—a link that did not really exist until the early 1990s. A case in point is France, as a founding member of the NSG only acceded to the NPT in 1992. The technical case for India’s inclusion is not that difficult to make. However, hidden diplomatic pitfalls, due to extraneous or tangential concerns, continue to make South Block’s task demanding. The challenge of regional politics The consensus-driven decision-making that has proved a hurdle at MTCR and NSG plenaries has also placed other obstacles in India’s path to entry. The rationale among some members is that India as an insider in the NSG and MTCR might make it difficult for them to engage Pakistan if and when the need should arise. In any case, Pakistani unhappiness over any special status being accorded to India has been clearly articulated (Reuters, 2015). China, too, has stirred this diplomatic pot by promising Islamabad that it will work for a similar deal for Pakistan at the NSG, where China is a member (Press Trust of India 2016). China’s membership of the MTCR has also been under consideration for some time. In essence, China is attempting to bind India ever closer to Pakistan in New Delhi’s international dealings, even as India tries to shake off hyphenation with its western neighbour. This plays to other

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countries biases when it comes to southern Asia. After all, no matter how hard India tries to break the strategic and nuclear association with Pakistan, New Delhi’s international interlocutors persist in predicating nuclear negotiations with India on a zero-sum game on the Indian subcontinent, if not a nuclear flashpoint.15 One of the main criticisms of the 2008 nuclear deal to allow nuclear commerce with India was that it would free up domestic fissile material for weapons, thus exacerbating tensions on the subcontinent (Weiss 2008). It does not matter how much New Delhi insists that its deterrent is not countryspecific. In the eyes of the non-Indian stakeholders, the binary South Asian nuclear relationship weighs heavily into the strategic analysis. To ameliorate such concerns, New Delhi could let it be known that India as a member of the NSG and other satellite regimes will not block Pakistani membership of these regimes if the other members of the regimes so desire and if Pakistan is able to meet the conditions and obligations that go with such membership ( Jacob 2016). There are three reasons for India to appear reasonable on Pakistan. First, such a stance would expose those countries who demur over Indian membership of the NSG and other regimes on the grounds that India as a member would block any moves to engage Pakistan in a consensus driven organisation. If that is really the issue then New Delhi can assuage those concerns—providing Pakistan is of course able to meet the exacting requirements of these regimes. On the other hand, if the state of relations on the subcontinent is just an excuse for blocking Indian membership, then that too will come to light. Second, such a stance would push stakeholders to engage with India on its own terms and not in connection with Pakistan. Currently, no matter how much Indians talk about the investments in increasing the stability, safety and security of the country’s nuclear assets, New Delhi’s international interlocutors will inevitably steer discussions right back to the instability at the border with Pakistan and the dangers of nuclear war on the subcontinent. Finally, should Pakistan make it into these regimes as well, it is in India’s interest to have its neighbour signed up to as stringent a set of nuclear security provisions as possible.

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These are not suggestions that are likely to be easily accepted in India. There is a strongly held view amongst the security establishment that India does not need to offer any concessions to Pakistan. There is also a sense that India fought hard to gain tacit acceptance of its nuclear weapons programme and recognition for its responsible track record in non-proliferation, as evidenced by the NSG waiver India received in connection with the Indo-US nuclear deal. One could argue, however, that the recognition has served its purpose—India is in from the cold —and now might be a good time to consider trading up for a bigger prize. The government appears to be quietly suggesting that it will not block any country that fulfils all ‘necessary requirements’ from applying for full membership ( Jacob 2016). In short, it is time for India to move from reactive, defensive diplomacy in the nuclear field to some creative, constructive diplomacy.16 Historically, India’s nuclear diplomacy has not always won it friends. Indeed, as the NPT and CTBT negotiations show, New Delhi could be a somewhat disagreeable negotiating partner. New Delhi used whatever means it had at its disposal to fight its nuclear corner while aspiring to a stronger position politically and economically. However, in the run-up to the seventieth anniversary of its independence, India is now in a position to build bridges and assume the responsibilities of a player at the top table. In this author’s view, India should not be held back, either by the scratchiness of its dealings with its neighbours, or indeed the raucousness of its internal democratic debate. References Bhattacherjee, Kallol (2016) India joins Missile Technology Control Regime. Top 5 things to know. The Hindu [thehindu.com]. 28 June. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Boese, W. (2008) NSG, Congress Approve Nuclear Trade with India. Arms Control Today [armscontrol.org] 6 October. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Clinton, W. (1998) The President’s Radio Address. [online] The American Presidency Project. Log on to : www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=55975 . [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Dikshit, Sandeep (2010) Obama backs India on terror, UN reform. The Hindu [thehindu.com], 9 November. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Economic Times (2008) India to abide by voluntary moratorium on N-tests: Pranab. [economictimesindiatimes.com] 5 September 2008. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Gill, A. (2008) India nuclear deal: A new beginning. [online] Stanford Report. Log on to : http://

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news.stanford.edu/news/2008/october 22/gill-102208.html [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Haidar, Suhasini (2016a) India will soon join missile treat club. The Hindu [thehindu.com]. 8 June. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Haidar, Suhasini (2015) India pushes for NSG membership. The Hindu [thehindu.com]. 3 November. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Haidar, Suhasini (2016b) NSG plenary ends without movement in India’s application. The Hindu, [thehindu.com] 24 June [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Haidar, Suhasini (2016c) Members’ concerns delayed India’s NSG chances: Rafael Grossi. The Hindu [thehindu.com] 27 June [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Hibbs, M. (2011) Moving Forward on China, Pakistan and the NSG. [online] Arms Control Wonk. Log on to : http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1100228/movingforward-on- china-pakistan-and-the-nsg/ [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1988) Debate on Foreign Affairs’, Lok Sabha, New Delhi, 5 April 1968. In: India and Disarmament: An Anthology of Selected Writings and Speeches, 1 ed., New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 176. Indo-Asian News Service (2008a) China hopes India’s NSG waiver is for peaceful use. India Today [indiatodayintoday.in]. 8 September. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Indo-Asian News Service (2008b) N-deal, NSG waiver good for country. Hindustan Times [hindustantimes.com]. 7 September. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Indo-Asian News Service (2015) India fails to get MTCR membership but wins wide support. Business Standard [business-standard.com] 12 October. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Jacob, Happymon (2016) Mainstreaming a nuclear Pakistan. The Hindu [thehindu.com] 16 October [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Jacob, Jayanth (2016) India okay if Pakistan gets entry into JSG on merit. Hindustan Times [hindustantimes.com] 4 September [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Jaffer, Mehru (2008) Six NSG members hold out against clean waiver. Hindustan Times [hindustantimes.com]. 1 September 2008. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Jha, Lalit K. (2015) US Supports India’s Membership to MTCR. Outlook Newswire, [outlookindia.com] 22 September 2015. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Kasturi, Charu Sudan (2015) India, Italy work on deal on marines – Secret talks on “road map”. The Telegraph (Calcutta) [telegraphindia.com] 31 December 2015. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Kaul, Sumir (2015) Sweden Backs India’s Bid for Entry into MTCR. Outlook Newswire [outlookindia.com] 2 June 2015. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Kazi, R. (2014) India is a de facto member of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, IDSA Issue Brief, 24.12.14. Malik, P. (2010) India’s Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb. New Delhi: Routledge. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) Speech by the Foreign Secretary at the Inauguration of CEIP India Center (April 06, 2016). [online] Log on to: http://mea.gov.in/Speeches- Statements. htm?dtl/26602/Speech_by_Foreign_Secretary_at_the_CEIP_India_Center_inaugu ration_April_06_2016 [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Mohan, C. (1999) Interview with Jaswant Singh, Minster of External Affairs. The Hindu, 29 November. Mathai, Ranjan (2012) Keynote address to MEA-IDSA National Strategic Export Control Seminar, New Delhi 18 April. Log on to http://voiceof.india.com/lectures/ india-committedto-coluntary-and-unilateral-moratorium-on-nuclear-explosivetesting/2127 [Accessed on 30/11/2016].

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Nayan, R. (2012) India’s Nuclear Security Policy. [online] IDSA Comments, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis. Log on tohttp://idsa.in/idsacomments/ IndiasNuclearSecurityPolicy_rnayan_050112 [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Panda, Ankit (2016) Why India’s Upset About Obama’s Post-Nuclear Security Summit Remarks. The Diplomat [thediplomat.com] 5 April [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Press Trust of India (2016) China links India’s NSG bid with Pakistan, other non-NPT states. The Economic Times [economictimesindiatimes.com] 10 March [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Press Trust of India (2015) Norway supports India’s bid for membership of MTCR, NSG and UNSC. The Economic Times [economictimesindiatimes.com] 2 November. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Press Trust of India (2011) NSG decides to strengthen guidelines on ENR transfer. Hindustan Times [hindustantimes.com] 25 June [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Press Trust of India (2008) Reject India’s revised N-deal draft: ACA to NSG. India Today [indiatoday.com] September 2 [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Rajagopalan, R.P. (2016) India’s Nuclear Security. [online] Nuclear Security Matters, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Available at: http://nuclearsecuritymatters.befercenter.org/blog/india’s-nuclear-security [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Reuters (2015) Nuclear club eyes Indian inclusion, but risks Pakistan’s ire. Dawn [dawn.com] 24 November 2015. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Roy, Shubhajit (2016a) PM Modi opens a window, NSG doors still shut; 7 nations hold out at Seoul. Indian Express, [indianexpress.com] 24 June 2016. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Roy, Shubhajit (2016b) After NSG upset, India set to become member of MTCR. Indian Express [indianexpress.com] 26 June. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Singh, M. (2008) The End of India’s Decades Long Isolation. Outlook Magazine [outlookindia. com]. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Subrahmanyam, K. (1993) An Equal Opportunity NPT. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 49(5). Talbott, S. (2004) Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb. Washington DC: Brookings. The Economist (2008) Time to decide. The Economist [economist.com] 28 August 2008 [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. The Hindu (2016) India joins the Hague Code of Conduct. The Hindu [thehindu.com]. 3 June 2016. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. The Hindu (2015) No decision at MTCR meeting. The Hindu [thehindu.com]. 10 October 2015. [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. US Department of State (2005) Joint Statement by President George W Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Available at: http://2001- 2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2005/49763.htm [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. UN Security Council (1998) Security Council Deplores Nuclear tests Conducted by India Press Release SC/6517 Log on to: http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980514.sc6517.html [Accessed on 30/11/2016]. Varadarajan, Siddharth (2010) US, India “constructing paradigm beyond Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty”. The Hindu [thehindu.com], 7 November. [Accessed 30/11/2016]. Varadarajan, Siddharth (2010) China, Pakistan and the NSG. The Hindu [thehindu.com] 24 June [Accessed on 30/11/2016].

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Weiss, L. (2008) U.S.-India nuclear agreement is reckless foreign policy. [online] Stanford report. Log on to: http://news.stanford.edu/news/2008/october22/Weiss-102208.html [Accessed on 30/11/2016].

Notes 1. 2.

3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

The discussions in the run-up to the 2010 NPT review conference are fairly representative: see Kumar, 2010. Strobe Talbott, Deputy US Secretary of State in the Clinton administration has documented his interaction with the Vajpayee government in trying to get India to sign the CTBT in Talbott, 2004. See also Mohan (1999). At the time, the Vajpayee government wanted to use India’s acceding to the CTBT to end the sanctions imposed after the May 1998 nuclear tests. See Kazi, 2014. For a discussion on popular Indian reactions to the negotiation of the CTBT, see Malik 2010, Ch. 4. The Presidential Statement of the UN Security Council, nevertheless, did lay this charge on India, which the Government of India countered with some pique, recalling, in turn, the tests of 1995 and 1996 (UN Security Council 1998). The ACA’s Daryll Kimball called the US-Indian Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation a ‘non- proliferation disaster’ (Press Trust of India, 2008). The Economist’s ‘Time to Decide’ (2008) is fairly representative of the uncompromisingly hard line it adopted against making any nuclear concessions to India. Then Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai’s key-note speech in 2012 to a joint conference organized by the MEA and IDSA on export controls lays down India’s reasons for joining the four groupings and the plan for doing so well before any formal application to any of the regimes (Mathai 2012). Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai’s speech in 2012 was a rare intervention. It is worth noting that even the Indian government’s participation in various international nuclear security and safety meetings often comes as a surprise to observers in India (see Nayan, 2012). North and South Block are the two imposing Lutyens-era buildings that flank the approach to the Presidential palace. South Block houses India’s Ministry of External Affairs (along with the Ministry of Defence and the Prime Minister’s Office). Mathai made most of these points in his 2012 IDSA speech (Mathai 2012). On the perception of India’s reticence on its nuclear safety record see also Rajagopalan, 2016. This informal convention on the prevention of ballistic missile proliferation is also known as the Hague Code of Conduct. Despite the Indian expectation of Turkish support, it was Turkey that contributed to the failure of India’s NSG application in June 2016, when it asked for Pakistan’s application to be considered at the same time as India’s. This was confirmed at a closed-door meeting in London in January 2016 by a British official who was present at the meeting. Interestingly, by June 2016 both marines had returned to Italy on ‘humanitarian’ grounds, and Italy apparently dropped its objections to India’s membership (Roy 2016b). Turkey asked for India and Pakistan’s membership to be considered together, while Switzerland asked for ‘objective criteria’, which the Indians interpreted as a delaying tactic.

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15. Even President Obama, normally seen as a reasonably sympathetic voice, apparently fell into this trap when he singled out relations between Pakistan and India during a press conference after the last Nuclear Security Summit, a forum supposedly convened to discuss the security of nuclear materials (Panda 2016). 16 Indeed, India’s Foreign Secretary, S. Jaishankar, spoke of the need, more broadly, for an aspiring ‘leading power’ to ‘articulat[e] a contemporary agenda today by going beyond the debates of a less confident era’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).

7. The Humanitarian Initiative to Ban Nuclear Weapons and India’s Strategic Engagement Maika Skjønsberg

Since 2010, the humanitarian initiative to ban nuclear weapons has grown stronger, and in 2017, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. ICAN has indeed reframed the debate on nuclear weapons by highlighting the grave consequences of a nuclear detonation for human kind and the environment. The humanitarian initiative has given rise to a UN process to negotiate a global prohibition on nuclear weapons. A nuclear ban treaty is depicted by several nuclear analysts as an unrealistic proposal put forward by a group of activists. However, this chapter argues that this movement has to be taken seriously in order to form an overall understanding of global nuclear governance. As the Conference on Disarmament (CD)1 and the disarmament pillar of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have been perceived as standing still, some states chose to push the nuclear disarmament process from another angle than that of a ban on nuclear weapons. While the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) see a threat in this initiative and argue that it weakens the NPT, the pro-camp asserts that it is aimed at strengthening the established disarmament bodies. India, which is not a party of the NPT but a de facto nuclear power, has through the years made a strong call to abolish nuclear weapons while fighting hard to be part of the established global nuclear order at the same time. India, which at first actively supported the initiative, withdrew from it and joined the boycott of the nuclear weapon states. India abstained during the vote at the UNGA and did not participate

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at the first negotiation session in March 2017. Hence, the country managed to satisfy all parties and promote its own international agenda. This paper aims at providing an understanding of the humanitarian initiative, identifying the challenges and opportunities it brings and reflecting on the Indian approach. Introduction Since 2010, we have witnessed a growing mobilisation on nuclear disarmament and a series of conferences dedicated to the humanitarian impact and the risks linked to nuclear weapons. The humanitarian initiative aims at stigmatising nuclear weapons, by highlighting the grave consequences of a nuclear detonation, in order to achieve further nuclear disarmament. It puts forward the idea that nuclear weapons are no longer acceptable and that global security is better served without them. Neither the disarmament focus nor the attention brought on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons is new. A ban movement has existed in one form or the other for more than 70 years. However, today, civil society, which has been struggling for years trying to mobilise for nuclear disarmament campaigns, seems more united and stronger than ever. In October 2016, 123 countries voted at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to start negotiations on a nuclear weapon ban treaty. The first session of negotiations for a legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons took place  27-31  March 2017, and gathered between 115 and 129 states. The second one will start on 15 June 2017 with the objective to hand a first draft treaty to the UNGA in July 2017. The humanitarian initiative is highly criticised by the nuclear weapon states (NWS)2 and umbrella states,3 and depicted as an unrealistic proposal. However, this movement has to be seriously taken into consideration when one desires an overall understanding of the global nuclear order. Because of the “one country one vote” system the UNGA offers, there is no doubt that this ban treaty will be adopted by majority decision.

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Nobody can longer ignore the voices of those challenging the nuclear security concept of deterrence. The latter is being weighed up against the global risks linked to a detonation of a nuclear weapon. As the whole concept of nuclear weapons allowing for stability and security is being countered, the humanitarian movement is seriously starting to trouble the NWS. Some of the experts arguing against a ban have made recent calls for both parties to strike a hand to the other side to end the polarization between nuclear and  Non- Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Heather Williams (2017), for example, urges that: “A new ‘attitude of mind’ is in order for nuclear discussions”. The movement has become too large to be ignored and such calls for dialogue and reconciliation are already an important victory for the supporters of the humanitarian initiative. The humanitarian initiative The humanitarian initiative is the result of years of frustration when it comes to nuclear disarmament. It aims at challenging the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and the whole security concept around nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction (Kmentt 2016: 682). The claim that the consequences of a nuclear detonation—either deliberately or by accident—would be disastrous for the human kind and our environment is not new. Already in 1945, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) publicly expressed the wish that nuclear weapons be banned (Kellenberger 2010). According to the ICRC, the use of nuclear weapons is not legal from an international humanitarian law perspective since it cannot distinguish combatants from non-combatants. However, for more than seven decades, the security dimension and protection aspect provided by nuclear weapons has dominated the official international discourse. The recent  (re-)focus on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons can be traced back to a speech made by the former president of the ICRC, Jakob Kellenberger, ahead of the NPT Review Conference in 2010 (Kellenberger 2010).

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The pro-ban movement stresses that the debate around nuclear weapons cannot only be based on power politics and military doctrine: there is a need for a global reflection on the threat those weapons pose for humankind and our planet. The movement also points at the insufficient capacities of the international community to address the humanitarian emergencies that would result from the use of nuclear weapons. This reflection was taken forward towards concrete action in 2012 at the First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Switzerland presented the first cross-regional statement by a group of 16 states (Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Holy See, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland) on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament: In addition to the grave humanitarian concerns, the use of nuclear weapons also raises important legal issues. Nuclear weapons are unique because of their destructive capacity and because of their uncontrollable effects in space and time. All rules of international humanitarian law apply fully to nuclear weapons; those rules notably include the rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution, as well as the prohibition to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and the prohibition to cause widespread, severe and longterm damage to the environment. […] it is essential that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are thoroughly addressed. We call on States Parties, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to give increasing attention to their commitment to comply with international law and international humanitarian law. This should also be adequately reflected in the outcome of the 2015 Review Conference (First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference).

This call emphasized the threat posed by nuclear weapons to the survival of humanity. The statement concluded that “it is of utmost importance that these weapons never be used again, under any circumstances” (ibid.).

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At the same time as the preparatory meeting for the NPT conference, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) released a new study on the global impact of a limited nuclear war (IPPNW 2013). This report showed that previous studies had significantly underestimated global declines in food production and the number of people at risk of mass starvation following a nuclear detonation. Norway took the Group of 16’s initiative further and announced its intention to host a conference in Spring 2013 to highlight the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons “including the incompatibility of their use under international humanitarian law” (Petersen 2012). This humanitarian law focus was not appreciated by the NWS. To them, highlighting issues regarding the legality of use and the humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons was reminiscent of the beginnings of the two past diplomatic processes that had led to legally binding comprehensive ban treaties on anti-personnel landmines4and cluster munitions. 5 Indeed, those two processes came out of considerations of the humanitarian effects of these weapon systems and were characterised by an alliance of states and civil society. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the two treaties were also adopted through ad hoc conferences, rather than through existing disarmament forums (Røed 2014). Opposition by Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) The conference in Norway gathered a diverse set of actors to start discussions on the humanitarian and development consequences of a nuclear detonation and the ways to tackle it (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). The discussions were fact-based and attempted to avoid politicized issues. Still, and even though the event was arranged by a NATO ally, the NWS boycotted the conference. In a joint statement, they argued: We remain concerned that the Oslo Conference will divert discussion away from practical steps to create conditions for further nuclear weapons reductions.

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The practical, step-by-step approach that we are taking has proven to be the most effective means to increase stability and reduce nuclear dangers ( Joint explanatory note 2013).

The Non-Nuclear  Weapon States were frustrated with the Nuclear Weapon States and umbrella states not wanting to take part in discussions. The frustration was even bigger as the aim of the conference was to reflect on ways to handle the consequences of a nuclear detonation—something every nuclear country should feel concerned about. Both India and Pakistan participated in the Oslo Conference. The negative attitude of the five NWS triggered an even more comprehensive political movement. The conference also provided a forum around which civil society groups could mobilise their activities. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), an international coalition of several hundred  non-governmental  organisations advocating for a nuclear weapon ban treaty, organised a civil society forum before the conference that brought together hundreds of activists. ICAN played an essential role in this initiative by promoting a new narrative around nuclear weapons and building strong transnational policy networks (Keck and Sikking 1998: 8). Over the course of the following months, the movement grew bigger and more and more political. At the  follow-up  conference organised by Mexico in February 2014, 146 states and many members from the civil society participated. A recent report by Chatham House on several “nearly nuclear accidents” that had been avoided through history generated a new need for action. More delegations took the floor: a large number of them focused on the disappointing progress on nuclear disarmament and called for new initiatives to achieve the goal of a world without nuclear weapons (Kmentt 2016: 693). In short, the movement created an opportunity for  nonnuclear weapon states to come together and share their frustration over the lack of political will among the NWS to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons as stated in the NPT.

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There is a perception among the NWS that the ban proponents are driven by a wish to undermine the NPT. The NPT has 190 members and three pillars: to promote disarmament,  non-proliferation,  and peaceful uses for nuclear energy. The five legally recognised NWS are in favour of a  step-by-step  approach. They argue that nuclear disarmament has taken place since the end of the Cold War and that further disarmament is contingent on the international security context. President Obama’s famous speech in Prague announcing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia and the reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review were further large steps towards nuclear disarmament. However, instead of appeasing the  pro-disarmament  camp, those steps seemed to have triggered the wish for more radical disarmament actions. The nuclear states’ significant budget allocations and plans for the modernization of their arsenal further undermined trust within civil society and the non-nuclear weapon states (Kmentt 2016: 706). If modernization is truly needed in order to assure the safety of the weapons, it is for the civil society a clear sign that disarmament is not the priority on the short to mid-term. Distrust towards the NWS for not doing enough for disarmament is nothing new. The New Agenda Coalition was established in 1998 by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, and Slovenia—the latter two left the Coalition (NTI 2016a). For over 20 years, cross-regional political groupings such as the New Agenda Coalition have pointed to the lack of significant progress towards nuclear disarmament and called for multilateral negotiations that would lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons through a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC).6 However, the humanitarian initiative is way more worrisome for the NWS because it follows its own path outside of the established nuclear disarmament platforms. The NWS have no control over it and consider it a stab in the back of the NPT. The ban treaty will focus on the legal prohibitions—including the use, possession, development, deployment and transfer of nuclear weapons—but will not contain dismantlement and disarmament

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verification provisions (NTI 2016b). This is one of the reasons why the initiative is perceived as unrealistic by nuclear states. However, it is also because of this very reason that the proponents of the ban argue that the participation of the NWS is not required. The nuclear weapons ban movement argues that there is a legal gap in the NPT when it comes to the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons (Austrian Pledge 2014). The legal gap resides in the fact that, unlike chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons are not a category of weapons of mass destruction explicitly prohibited by international law (Nystuen and Egeland 2016). Nuclear weapon states, on the other hand, maintain that everything is in the NPT and that there is no such thing as a “legal gap” (Rose 2015). Nuclear Weapon States worry that this initiative wants to take actions outside of the NPT. According to them, this will weaken the NPT as the only trustworthy nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament instrument that states have agreed on. The pro-ban supporters argue however that the initiative is in line with the NPT. An initiative supportive of the NPT In 2010, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons were addressed in the outcome document of the NPT Review Conference: The Conference expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law (NPT Review Conference 2010).

This was the first time humanitarian consequences were included in an NPT consensus document since the adoption of the text in 1968. The pro-ban movement, therefore, argues that its initiative is anchored in the NPT. It also refers to the 2010 Action Plan adopted at the Review Conference. Action 1 states that “all States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons” (NPT Review Conference

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2010). The expression of “concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons”, in conjunction with Action 1, was perceived as a de facto mandate to pursue the humanitarian initiative as a means to implement the NPT itself (ibid.). The disarmament part of the Action Plan received particular attention in 2010. According to Austria’s Director for Arms Control,  Non-proliferation  and Disarmament, Alexander Kmentt (2016: 684), the responsibility for implementing the Action Plan became more widely shared between NWS and NNWS. It is commonly understood that most disarmament actions can only be conducted by nuclear states. However, in this Action Plan, other disarmament actions were directed to all state parties. Focusing on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in order to generate a momentum for nuclear disarmament and a world without nuclear weapons was one of the concrete elements that non-nuclear weapon states could, and wanted to, pursue. The states invested in the humanitarian approach thus saw their actions as firmly anchored within the NPT and fully consistent with their own objective of trying to promote a strong and credible NPT (Kmentt 2016: 684). The humanitarian initiative is meant as a  wake-up  call for the nuclear states to reinforce the nuclear disarmament and  nonproliferation regime. According to its advocates, it is furthering the goals of the NPT, and there is a strong willingness to stress this element. States parties to the initiative constantly emphasize that it is anchored in the NPT and the 2010 Action Plan. In the statement by the Group of 16 at the First Preparatory Committee in 2012 for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the states acknowledged that: [T]he only way to guarantee [that nuclear weapons never be used again] is the total, irreversible and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, under effective international control, including through the full implementation of Article VI of the NPT (First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference).

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At the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in Geneva in April 2013, the Permanent Representative of South Africa stated on behalf of 78 countries: Addressing the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons is an absolute necessity. As an element that underpins the NPT, it is essential that the humanitarian consequences inform our work and actions during the current Review Cycle and beyond. (Pressenza 2013)

This discourse is still on today. During the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the Joint Statement delivered by Austria’s foreign minister, on behalf of 159 States, also clearly expressed that the humanitarian initiative is supportive of the NPT: The only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used again is through their total elimination. All States share the responsibility to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to prevent their vertical and horizontal proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament, including through fulf illing the objectives of the NPT and achieving its universality. (Kurz 2015)

During the first session of negotiations at the UN in March 2017, it was also made clear that the preamble and the text of the ban treaty will refer to the NPT in a positive and supportive way. Divisions within the Pro-ban Movement While all countries agree on the goal to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, there are disagreements on how to achieve this goal. Even within the group of member states supporting the humanitarian initiative, there have been and still are diverse opinions as to how the process should take place. The Norwegian government, for example, which hosted the first conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, now clearly opposes the ban. Similarly, Australia made it clear that pushing

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for a ban was not the best solution since nuclear states were the only ones that could take the necessary steps to disarm: Ultimately, we need to create an environment where all countries, including the nuclear- armed states, believe themselves to be more secure without nuclear weapons. Only when the nuclear-armed states accept that as an objective fact - based not just on humanitarian but also security arguments - will we be able to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. (Bishop 2014)

This is not the logic followed by the humanitarian initiative. As concluded by the Chair of the second conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in Mexico: We need to take into account that, in the past, weapons have been eliminated after they have been outlawed. We believe this is the path to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. (Chair’s Summary 2014)

Several states expressed their criticism regarding the political turn the movement had taken—in comparison to the more  factbased conference in Oslo. After the Nayarit Conference in Mexico, there were thus two camps: those in favour of a more political turn of events and those wanting to make sure that we were not going in the direction of a ban (Kmentt 2016: 696). Table 1. Conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons

International conferences

Location

Dates

Participating states

1st conference

Oslo, Norway

4-5 March 2013

127 states

2nd conference

Nayarit, Mexico 13-14 February 2014

3rd conference

Vienna, Austria

146 states

8-9 December 2014 158 states

While the change of government in September 2013 may be the reason of Norway’s change of position, we should not forget that the movement took a much more political turn since the Oslo conference

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in June that year. As a NATO member and a close ally of the U.S., cannot politically afford to openly support a ban. Austria, hosting the third conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, framed the discussions in the light on the next NPT review conference scheduled a few months later. Hence, it was difficult for the more reluctant states to distance themselves from it. The conference was a resounding success: it gathered 158 states and 900 persons. The U.S. and the UK participated for the first time, thus splitting the P5 solidarity. During the conference in Vienna, the NWS and umbrella states voiced the need to follow a step-by-step approach as argued under the terms of the NPT. The summary of the conference contained, therefore, a broad range of views but did not result in a common statement regarding the way forward. At the end of the conference, Austria hence decided to issue the “Austrian Pledge” which called “on all states parties to the NPT to renew their commitment to the urgent and full implementation of existing obligations under Article VI, and to this end, to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons” (Austrian Pledge 2014). It contained an invitation to cooperate “in effort to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks” (ibid.). This pledge calling for a legal mechanism banning nuclear weapons was signed by 43 countries (NTI 2017). During the NPT Review Conference in May 2015, it was renamed the “Humanitarian Pledge”. Even though no consensus on how to close the “legal gap” was achieved at the NPT Review Conference, the initiative was nonetheless perceived as very successful and strongly established on the international agenda (Kmentt 2016: 704). The Nuclear Weapon States’ reluctance to achieve consensus on further disarmament ultimately strengthened the Humanitarian Pledge: during the four-week conference, the support grew officially from 70 to 127 states (NTI 2017). An Open-ended working group (OEWG) was created in order to assess the proposals for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world and

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in October 2016, resolution L.41 to start negotiations on a ban was adopted by the majority at the UNGA (123 states voted in favor while 38 states voted against and 16 abstained) (NTI 2017). The US, the UK, Russia, Israel, France as well as all NATO members (except from the Netherlands) voted against the resolution. China, India and Pakistan abstained, while North Korea voted in favour. The first week of negotiations has taken place in March 2017 and the majority of the world’s states are ready to ban nuclear weapons, despite the strong opposition from the NWS. The frustration over the absence of political will to have a more ambitious regime for nuclear disarmament has become too strong. The idea is no longer to get the NWS on board this initiative. As stated by civil society representatives, the NWS were all along given the possibility to join the discussions and are still invited to participate in the negotiations. During the first week of negotiations at the UN, it was reiterated that the door will always remain open for other states to join. Opportunities and challenges This treaty won’t eliminate nuclear weapons overnight, but it will establish a powerful new international legal standard, stigmatizing nuclear weapons and compelling nations to take urgent action on disarmament—Beatrice Fihn (ICAN 2016) Opponents of a ban mock the naivety of the  pro-ban  camp. Banning nuclear weapons without having the nuclear states involved in the process might indeed seem pointless as the nuclear states are the only ones who can take concrete steps towards disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is an extremely complicated process which can only be achieved with trust, confidence and verification. However, and this was made clear since the beginning of this process, there is no expectation that this will lead to a nuclear-weapon-free world in the immediate or near future. Neither does a ban call for unilateral disarmament. The idea is to stigmatise nuclear weapons, by highlighting the grave consequences of a nuclear detonation, in order to achieve further nuclear disarmament. The humanitarian initiative puts forward the

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idea that nuclear weapons are no longer acceptable and that global security is better served without them. It is meant as a wake-up call for the nuclear states to reinforce the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime. In other words, the humanitarian initiative urges to take nuclear disarmament seriously. It should, therefore, not be seen as a threat to the established nuclear order but rather as an opportunity for the NWS to reinforce the established disarmament regime. The humanitarian initiative has managed to launch a complementary platform to the well-established nuclear disarmament platforms controlled by the nuclear countries. Since the principal actors were not able to achieve further disarmament, the rest of the world decided to take action. The ensuing process has given all states the possibility to play a role in nuclear disarmament: it is an inclusive process which is neither substantially nor procedurally controlled (Kmentt 2016: 705). This is in deep contrast to the established multilateral framework where nuclear weapons are usually discussed. This is surely appealing to many states, which feel a strong sense of empowerment regarding their independent role in the disarmament process. As argued by Kmentt (2016: 705): There is a growing frustration among  non-nuclear  weapon States about the dysfunction of this  set-up,  which ensures full procedural control of the disarmament discourse by the nuclear weapon States, enabling them to deny any development that they do not support. The humanitarian initiative is a framework for  non-nuclear  weapon States to discuss and set an agenda on nuclear disarmament that can be followed without being procedurally stifled and even without the NPT nuclear weapon States, at least initially, participating.

Moreover, civil society is actively contributing to the ban negotiations—which is also in deep contrast to the traditional multilateral framework where nuclear weapons are usually discussed. Civil society is not only noting the risks linked to a detonation, it is also challenging the whole concept of nuclear deterrence. For example,

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it has been argued that winning a nuclear war is impossible (Kmentt 2016: 706). This thus questions the rationality of the concept of nuclear deterrence. Can a party’s readiness to inflict mass destruction not only to its enemy but also to the whole planet be considered an example of rational behaviour? Through the three conferences, it has been established that the immediate humanitarian emergency, but also the long-term atmospheric, climate and food security consequences of a limited nuclear war would be much more devastating than previously believed. While NWS claim that the threat alone is enough to ensure deterrence, civil society highlights that there are serious flaws in this logic, as a threat must be credible in order to function. How can a suicidal act be perceived as a rational action and thus a credible threat? The current ban negotiations have been successful in several ways. First of all, the humanitarian initiative challenges the security concept around nuclear weapons; it contests the notion that nuclear weapons are objects that make the world safer. The idea that nuclear deterrence protects from wars has been the basic tenet of the discourse since the invention of nuclear weapons. The humanitarian initiative argues that the weapons themselves threaten our safety, our environment and our future generations. The humanitarian initiative has made its way into debates previously dominated by the military security aspect of nuclear weapons. The link between existential threats to humanity and nuclear weapons is now so clearly established that countries not participating in the negotiations see the moral and political need to justify their absence. The NWS felt the need to publicly justify their opposition the first day of the ban negotiations and this is for the pro-ban camp already a victory. The ban movement which was at first mocked for being unrealistic is yet too large to be ignored by the nuclear powers. Furthermore, the government of Canada, Norway, Japan, Germany, Belgium and Italy currently face difficulties in explaining their nonparticipation to their respective parliaments (Wright 2017). The latter three, which host U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory, will face more internal pressures to end their bilateral agreements with the U.S. With the coming nuclear ban, nuclear extended deterrence and the planned

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installation of the new tactical nuclear bombs B61-12 in Turkey, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Belgium seems slightly compromised. The ban intends to prohibit transit of nuclear weapons through other states territory. Even though the U.S. might not feel impacted by the ban treaty, the nuclear host states are however likely to face more internal difficulties to allow such a breach of the ban treaty. A ban treaty may hence provide them with the opportunity to finally end their bilateral agreements with the USA. If a nuclear ban goes through at the UNGA, it will probably also have consequences for the nuclear industry. Civil society argues that in the middle- to long-term, it will make the maintenance and development of nuclear arsenal more difficult (Collin 2017). As argued by Matthew Harris, the “real problem” with a ban is that “it is an attack on the nuclear-armed democracies—the United States, in particular—and their allies to the near-exclusive benefit of Russia and China.” (Harris 2017). According to Harris, a potential ban would not impact countries that do not face pressure from civil society. Supporters of a nuclear weapons ban, however, emphasize that the aim of the ban is to discriminate the weapons themselves and not specific countries. In the case of India, it seems nevertheless likely that supporting the humanitarian initiative was perceived as a smart way of diverting attention away from India’s noncompliance with the global nuclear order, and instead, putting pressure directly on the NWS. India and the global nuclear order India has repeatedly pointed to the dysfunctions of the global nuclear order; at the same time it has worked hard to be further integrated into it. The Indian government has an ambivalent approach to nuclear weapons and its conduct during the humanitarian initiative process is a good example of this. The country is characterised by its strong support for total nuclear disarmament. India has actively been engaged in the humanitarian initiative. As a nuclear power, it’s participation in the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons gave some initial

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weight to the proposal. Yet, India’s desire to maintain and improve good relations with the NWS has been reflected by its interventions during the conferences (Varma 2015). India has called for consensus, and like the NWS, did not participate in the OEWG. Finally, the Indian government abstained at the UN vote for starting negotiations on a ban treaty and did not participate at the first session of negotiations in March 2017. One explanation for India’s active involvement in the humanitarian process and its ensuing sudden retirement is the country’s inherent ambivalent approach to nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is important to note the timing of India’s decision to withdraw from the movement, i.e., when it had become clear that a ban was coming. Knowing that the dice was thrown, India discretely retreated and joined the Nuclear Weapon States’ boycott. This was a very smart strategic move. It allowed the government to stay alongside its nuclear allies and, at the same time, enthusiastically appreciate the ban in private. India’s long-fought nuclear combat India’s approach to the humanitarian initiative is consistent with its traditionally ambivalent approach to the nuclear arena. According Rajagopalan (2010: 95), contradictions on nuclear weapons have been visible in India for several decades. India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, expressed his concerns about the disastrous consequences of the hydrogen bomb (Nehru 1954). Still, he was convinced that nuclear technology could be useful for India’s development and thought that nuclear weapons could play a role for national defense if disarmament efforts should fail (Rajagopalan 2010: 95). Throughout history, the country has been one of the fiercest critics of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it has developed its own nuclear arsenal and argued that this was the result of the failures of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts (Biswas and Mahmood 2015). India has never ratified the NPT and its resentment towards the non-proliferation system has always been strong:

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[…] Nor is it acceptable that those who possess nuclear weapons are freed of all controls while those without nuclear weapons are policed against their production. (Gandhi 1988)

The country has maintained the same discourse since: each country should be free to decide how to meet its security needs, but the countries that accepted the NPT shall comply with it. India has for long been pressing the NPT nuclear states to honour their commitments— including the article VI obligation towards nuclear disarmament. For India, the focus on nuclear proliferation is wrongly only directed at horizontal proliferation (proliferation to other countries) and not focused on vertical proliferation (the expansion of the arsenals of the existing members of the nuclear club) (Rajagopalan 2010: 108). India argues that the NPT focuses solely on nuclear energy development and on non-proliferation, while the third pillar dedicated to disarmament does not get much attention from the NWS. From an Indian perspective, the NPT is discriminatory as it allows the U.S., Russia, China and France to legally keep their nuclear arsenal while India, despite having developed nuclear weapons, is asked to sign the treaty as a  Non-Nuclear  Weapons State and subject itself to inspections. The P5 members are free to dispose and develop their nuclear arsenal while the rest of the world is subject to their restriction for the  so-called  benefit of the global security. The humanitarian initiative challenges this point of view and supports India’s strong historical narrative. For the supporters of a ban, nuclear weapons— independent of who possesses them—are a danger for global security. In this way, the ban delegitimises the supremacy of the NWS— something the Indian government appreciates. The humanitarian initiative availed India a strategic opportunity. It offered the country a new platform where it could show it was a responsible nuclear power fighting for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. India has always been for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and Indian officials are pleased to remind the world of this. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi presented the revolutionary 22-

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year Action Plan for the total elimination of nuclear weapons at the UN in 1988 (Gandhi 1988). Still, to the nuclear states, India was unable to establish itself as a responsible nuclear power as long as it opposed signing the NPT and the CTBT. The government was eager to remind the world that India has constantly been advocating for disarmament, has proposed resolutions for a Convention on the Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons (UNGA 1998) and has been the only nuclear country believing that its security would be enhanced and not diminished in a  nuclear-free world (Saran 2009). The humanitarian initiative provided India with a new platform to promote its image as a dedicated nuclear disarmament ally: India has been unwavering in its commitment to universal,  nondiscriminatory  and verifiable nuclear disarmament. Over the years it has initiated or supported several proposals and measures for achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament in a time bound manner. [...]As a responsible nuclear power India has a policy of credible minimum deterrence based on a No First Use posture and non-use of nuclear weapons against non- nuclear weapon states. We are prepared to convert these into bilateral or multilateral legally binding arrangements. (Khan 2014)

With its participation in all three conferences, India first and foremost gave some weight to the initiative. The sole participation of North Korea and Pakistan would not have been much to brag about for the proponents of the ban, but the participation of India allowed the movement to be taken seriously. Furthermore, New Delhi was able to send a strong message to the NWS and to the rest of the world. India stood up as the responsible nuclear power, while the NWS boycotted it and got strongly criticised for it. This gave India a sense of empowerment towards the NWS. The humanitarian initiative was a platform for India to put the pressure on the NWS. At the Vienna conference, the head of the Indian delegation argued that the elimination of nuclear weapons “will require

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commitments on part of the international community, both nuclear states as well as non-nuclear states. This goal will test the political will and credibility of both” (Khan 2014). This is exactly what this initiative has been about for India: pointing at the lack of political will and credibility of the exclusive nuclear club formed by the U.S., Russia, China, the UK and France when it comes to disarmament. India, by being a nuclear state standing alongside disarmament activists, has contributed to making those countries the primary target group of this initiative: For the nuclear weapon states, in particular those that possess the largest arsenals, a commitment to have an agreed multilateral framework of universal acceptance on nuclear disarmament will be an important and essential step, which can then be followed up with steps that would lead to the progressive reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines thus paving the way for their eventual elimination. (Khan 2014)

To summarize, the humanitarian initiative was a useful platform for the Indian government to demonstrate that they have always been “the good guys” fighting for nuclear disarmament while pointing at the lack of engagement from the NWS. A Satisfying Outcome for New Delhi The Indian government has adopted a notably pragmatic approach when it comes to the humanitarian initiative. India participated in all three conferences and voiced its engagement for the elimination of nuclear weapons, thus promoting itself as a responsible nuclear power while at the same time encouraging the pressure on the NWS. It has also been argued that Pakistan and India’s participation in the conference was a way to deflect some of the international pressure put on them when it comes to the nuclear arms race in South Asia and deflect some of the pressure on the NWS (Biswas and Mahmood 2015).

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India was, through this initiative, able to show its support to a nuclear-free world and demonstrate that the reluctance came from the other nuclear countries. This was hence the perfect way to challenge the status quo of the NPT, and as part of the Non-Aligned Movement. At the same time as India was thrilled to be part of a movement stigmatizing NWS, it managed all the way to show support to its allies by advocating the need to include the NWS in the process (Varma 2015). India abstained at the UNGA vote to begin negotiations towards a nuclear weapon ban and joined the boycott of the ban treaty. The Indian government was hence able to stand side by side with its nuclear allies. This was a highly diplomatic move, keeping India in good relations with the NWS and especially the U.S. When the decision to retreat from the humanitarian initiative was taken, it was already clear that a ban was coming. India thus comes out as the great champion of the humanitarian initiative. As a nuclear state, India’s participation helped the movement to be taken seriously. India managed to make the NWS the primarily targets of the initiative and took away the focus from itself and its noncompliance to the global nuclear order. The country was perceived as a responsible power willing to relinquish nuclear weapons. And finally, India was able to leave the process without creating diplomatic tensions and stand alongside its nuclear allies. India can hence happily witness the ban treaty taking shape and the NWS getting nervous. At the same time, it can show support to its nuclear allies and take on a mediation role in future disarmament processes. In its explanatory vote at the UNGA, India stated that progress on nuclear disarmament should take place at the CD. In this context, India is supporting a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention, put forward by the Non-Aligned Movement, dealing with prohibition, elimination and international verification (Varma 2016). By promoting verification and a  step-by-step  approach, India manages to please the NWS; by promoting the CD, India manages to advance its own agenda. For India, the only legitimate body to deal with disarmament is

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the CD since it includes the NWS in addition to India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. By promoting the framework of the CD, the Indian government is trying to reinforce the lost legitimacy of this forum— the only one where India has a role to play. India is thus able to advance its own agenda and the one of the Non-Aligned Movement against the established P5 supremacy. As the NWS are being more and more pressured to take disarmament actions, India’s proposals may gradually appear as the most reasonable ones. Being greatly appreciated by the pro-ban countries and respected by the NWS, India has the international legitimacy to push for progress towards nuclear disarmament. Conclusion A ban treaty against nuclear weapons took place in 2017. While the treaty was far from receiving unanimous support, it seems clear that the humanitarian initiative has succeeded in challenging the security concept around nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapon states still argue that nuclear weapons keep the world safer, the majority of the world’s states voice another reality where the simple existence of those weapons threaten our safety, our environment and our future generations. The movement to ban nuclear weapons is not a threat to the international nuclear order itself, the ban movement only calls for words to be followed by actions. It is meant as a  wake-up  call for the nuclear states to reinforce the nuclear disarmament and  nonproliferation regime. The nuclear ban urges to take nuclear disarmament seriously and should not be seen as a threat to the established nuclear order but rather as an opportunity for the NWS to reinforce the established disarmament regime. However, if the NWS do not take seriously the voices of the majority at the UNGA and do not engage in more extensive disarmament measures, the gap between the nuclear weapon states and the  non-nuclear  weapon states will grow wider, threatening the established nuclear order and maybe even the P5 supremacy. Since it challenges the way of thinking around nuclear weapons and related threats so fundamentally, the humanitarian

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initiative offers a unique opportunity for dialogue and solutions. The coming ban is also an indicator that it is now time for the different communities of experts to come together. It is highly dangerous to continue treating  pro-ban  supporters as naïve activists who do not understand anything of the nuclear reality and anti-ban advocates as murderers of humanity. The  non-proliferation  community and the disarmament community need to reach out to each other and reflect on common solutions. The Indian government immediately saw the strategic opportunity offered by the humanitarian initiative. First and foremost, India could publicly demonstrate the country’s long support for nuclear disarmament and establish itself as a responsible nuclear power. Moreover, India could push for a ban movement pointing at the lack of political will of the NWS to fulfil their disarmament commitments under the NPT. It was, therefore, a way to challenge the status quo of the NPT and promote the CD as the only legitimate forum for nuclear disarmament. India, being greatly appreciated by the  pro-ban  countries and being of high importance to the nuclear weapon states, is currently in a unique position to bridge the two camps and actively contribute to an international nuclear disarmament process. References Austrian Pledge (2014), Pledge presented at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons by Austrian Deputy Foreign Minister Michael Linhart, 9 Dec 2014; log on to   https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/ Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HIN W14/HINW14_Austrian_Pledge.pdf Bishop (2014), Julie Bishop, “We Must Engage, not Enrage Nuclear Countries”,  Sydney Morning Herald, 14 February 2014;  log on to http://www.smh.com.au/comment/wemust-engage-not-enrage-nuclear-countries-20140213-32n1s.html Biswas, Arka and Mahmood, Faiqa (2015), “India, Pakistan, and the nuclear humanitarian initiative: Let’s be real”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 26 April 2015; log on to http:// thebulletin.org/india-pakistan-and-nuclear-humanitarian-initiative-let%E2%80%99s-bereal8256 Chair’s Summary (2014), Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (Nayarit Conference), Chair’s Summary, presentations and selected statements; log on to  http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ nayarit-2014/chairs-summary.pdf

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Collin, Jean-Marie (2016), L’Assemblée générale de l’ONU ouvre la porte à un traité d’interdiction des armes nucléaires, note d’analyse du GRIP, 9 December 2016. Collin,  Jean-Marie  (2017), « Le temps est venu d’interdire les armes nucléaires »,  Opinion internationale, 2 February 2017; log on to  https://www.opinion-internationale. com/2017/02/02/le-temps-est-venu-dinterdire-les-armes-nucleaires-par-jean-mariecollin_48419.html Gandhi, Rajiv (1988), Address by His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India at the Fifteenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, Held at Headquarters, New York, 9 June 1988; log on to http://fissilematerials. org/library/gan98.pdf Harris, Matthew (2017), “The real problem with a nuclear ban treaty”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 March 2017; log on to http://carnegieendowment. org/2017/03/15/real- problem-with-nuclear-ban-treaty-pub-68286 ICAN (2016), “UN votes to outlaw nuclear weapons in 2017”, October 27, 2016; log on to http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/un-votes-to-outlaw-nuclear-weapons-in-2017/ IPNNW (2013), “Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk? Global Impacts of Limited Nuclear War on Agriculture, Food Supplies, and Human Nutrition”, Ira Helfand, 2nd ed. 17 briefing paper, IPPNW and Physicians for Social Responsibility, November 2013; log on to http://www.ippnw.org/nuclear-famine.html Joint explanatory note (2013), Joint explanatory note by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States on nonattendance at the Oslo Conference, 2013; log on to  http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/oslo-2013/ P5_Oslo.pdf Joint explanatory note by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States on nonattendance at the Oslo Conference, 2013; log on to http://www.reachingcriticalwill. org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/oslo-2013/P5_Oslo.pdf Joint Statement (2012), First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Joint Statement by Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, the Holy See, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa and Switzerland, 2 May 2012;log on to:  http://acronym.org.uk/old/official-and-govtdocuments/joint-statement-humanitarian-dimension-nuclear-disarmament-2012-nptprepcom Keck, Margaret and Katherine Sikking (1998), Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Development, Cornell University Press. Kellenberger, Jakob (2010), “Bringing the Era of Nuclear Weapons to an End”, statement, 20 April 2010; log on to:  www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/ nuclear- weapons-statement-200410.htm Khan, Suhel Ajaz (2014), Statement by Dr Suhel Ajaz Khan, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of India, Vienna and Head of the Indian Delegation at The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear weapons, 8-9 Dec 2014, (Online) log on to http://www. indianembassy.at/embassynews.php?nid=329 Kmentt, Alexander (2016), “The development of the international initiative on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and its effect on the nuclear weapons debate”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 897, July 2016. Kurz, H.E. Sebastian (2015), Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons delivered by H.E. Sebastian Kurz Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of Austria, 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the

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Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 28 Apr 2015, (Online) Log on to: http://www. mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000079082.pdf. Lewis, Patricia, Williams, Heather, Pelopidas, Benoît and Aghlani, Sasan (2014), “Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy”, Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 2014, (Online) Log on to: https://www.chathamhouse.org/ publications/papers/view/199200 Nehru, Jawaharlal (1954), “Stand-Still Agreement”, Statement, Lok Sabha, 2 April 1954: Log on to  http://meaindia.nic.in/cdgeneva/?pdf0601?000 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013), Conference: Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear weapons - Oslo, Norway 4-5 March 2013, 11 March 2013; Log on to https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/humanitarian-efforts/humimpact_2013/ id708603/ NPT (1968), The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Log on to: un.org http:// www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html NPT Review Conference (2010), 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ; Log on to http://www.reachingcriticalwill. org/images/documents/Disarmament- fora/npt/revcon2010/documents/MCI-WP1.pdf NPT Review Conference (2010), Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2010/50, Vol. 1, 2010, p. 19; Log on to  http.www.un.org/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20%28VOL.I%29. NTI (2017), “Proposed nuclear weapons ban treaty”, 5 April 2017, http://www.nti.org/learn/ treaties-and-regimes/proposed-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty/ NTI (2016a), “New Agenda Coalition”, 17 November 2016; Log on to  http://www.nti.org/ learn/treaties- and-regimes/new-agenda-coalition/ NTI (2016b), “Proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC)”, 31 October 2016;Log on to   http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-nuclear-weaponsconvention-nwc/ Nystuen, Gro and Egeland, Kjølv (2016), “A ‘Legal Gap’? Nuclear Weapons Under International Law”, Arms Control Today, March 2016; Log o to https://www.armscontrol. org/ACT/2016_03/Features/A-Legal-Gap-Nuclear-Weapons-Under-International-Law Petersen, Jan (2012), First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Statement by Norway, 30 April 2012: Log on to   http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/ images/documents/Disarmament- fora/npt/prepcom12/statements/30April_Norway.pdf Pressenza (2013), NPT conference: Joint Statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, Delivered by Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations at Geneva, 24 April 2013: Log on to https://www. pressenza.com/2013/04/npt-conference-joint-statement-on-the-humanitarian-impactof-nuclear-weapons/ Rajagopalan, Rajesh (2010), India’s Nuclear Policy, 2010, pp.95-111; Log on to https://id.scribd.com/document/219143522/India-s-Nuclear-Polict-Rajesh-Rajagopalan Rose, A. Frank (2015), Opening statement by the Delegation of the United States of America to the 2015 UN General Assembly First Committee, 12 October 2015;  Log on to http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/1com/1com15/ statements/12October_USA.pdf Røed, Lars Jørgen (2014), “A brief introduction to the humanitarian initiative of nuclear weapons”, ILPI Background Paper No 6/2014, ILPI, May 2014;Log on to http://nwp. ilpi.org/?p=2394

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Saran, Shyam (2015), Remarks by Mr. Shyam Saran, Special Envoy of Prime Minister at the Global Zero Summit, 10 May 2009; Log on to http://www.indianconsulate.org.cn/event. php?id=255 Skjønsberg, Maïka (2016), Armes nucléaires américaines en Europe: les raisons du statu quo, les rapports du GRIP 2016/3, April 2016; Log on to http://www.grip.org/fr/node/1972 UNGA (1998), “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”, Draft Resolution/Draft Decision: A/C.1/53/L.14, GA Resolution/ Decision: 53/78 D, introduced by India; Log on to  https://gafc- vote.un.org/ UNODA/vote.nsf/59d47ed5551f4f4605256705006e0a5f/77b50ad36602479c 052566ac0060d4cb?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=3%2C1%2C5%2C4#_Section3 Varma, D. B. Venkatesh (2015), Statement, Geneva Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons at the First Committee of the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 20 October 2015; Log on to http://meaindia.nic.in/cdgeneva/?pdf4420?000. Varma, D. B. Venkatesh (2016), Statement delivered by Ambassador D.B. Venkatesh Varma, Permanent Representative of India to the CD 28 October , Explanation of Vote by India on First Committee Resolution L.41;  Log on to https://pminewyork.org/adminpart/ uploadpdf/11897Eov%20on%20L.41.pdf Williams, Heather (2017), “Does the fight over a nuclear weapons ban threaten global stability?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 9 February 2017; Log on to http://thebulletin. org/does- fight-over-nuclear-weapons-ban-threaten-global-stability10500 Wright, Tim (2017), The ban movement’s early impact, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 23 March 2017; Log on to http://thebulletin.org/ban-movements-early-impact

Notes 1.

2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is a forum established in 1979 by the international community to negotiate multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. It has 65 members including all the nuclear states. The term “nuclear weapon states” (NWS) is used for the five states—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States—officially recognized as possessing nuclear weapons by the NPT. A nuclear umbrella state is a state that is without nuclear weapons, but is under the protection of another state that owns nuclear weapons. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 18 September 1997 (entering into force on 1 March 1999). Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008 (entering into force on 1 August 2010). The Nuclear Weapons Convention is a proposed treaty which aims at outlawing the use, possession, development, testing, deployment and transfer of nuclear weapons, as well as mandate internationally verifiable dismantlement of nuclear arsenals (NTI 2016b).

Index

Albright, David, 42 Al-Qaida, 25, 33, 77, 88 Amano, Yukiya, 25 Amin, Salahuddin, 77 Argentina, 115, 116 Aum Shinrikyo, 88 Australia, 42, 98, 107, 116, 132 Austria, 111, 115, 126, 133, 134 Bangladesh, 93, 98 Basrur, Rajesh, 43, 44 Beijing, 115 Belarus, 30 Belgium, 77, 83, 84, 137, 138 Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), 7, 11, 16, 38, 94, 95, 99 Bhabha, Homi, 38, 96 Brazil, 35, 37, 115, 129 Burns, Nicholas, 41 Bush, George W, 108, 111 Canada, 4, 98, 116, 137 Chechnya, 77 Chennai, 7, 10 Chile, 126 China, 37, 41, 48, 55, 66, 69, 75, 85, 86, 93, 98, 116, 135, 138, 140, 142 Clinton, Bill, 111 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 108, 109, 110, 111, 118, 141 Costa Rica, 126 Denmark, 126 Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), 7, 10, 12, 90, 93, 94, 96 Egypt, 126, 129

Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL), 93 Europe, 41, 51, 69, 86 Finland, 58, 99 France, 36, 58, 66, 75, 83, 91, 98, 110, 113, 116, 135, 140, 142 Gandhi, Indira, 108 Gandhi, Rajiv, 33, 44, 140 Geneva, 38, 109, 132 Germany, 42, 60, 137, 138 Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, 27, 33, 83-100 cyber security, 99-100 India’s approach to nuclear security, 9092 joint training programmes, 92-96 nuclear energy partnership, 84 nuclear security threat scenario, 84-90 school of nuclear security studies, 96-97 school of radiological safety studies, 97-98 sharing best practices, 98-99 Grossi, Rafael, 115 Harris, Matthew, 138 Haryana, 91, 96, 97 Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), 25 Hiroshima, 23 Hongbo, Wu, 57 Hyderabad, 7, 12, 15, 96 India, (passim throughout text) and nuclear non-proliferation treaty, 35-51 conclusion, 50-51

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disarmament initiatives, 44-47 genesis of nuclear non-proliferation treaty, 36-39 good example, 47-50 legitimacy of, 39-40 non-proliferation norms, 41-44 global nuclear governance and, 23-33 approach to nuclear governance, 2426 challenges to nuclear governance, 24 conclusion, 33 contribution in global nuclear governance, 27 domestic nuclear compatibility with global norms, 27-29 future of global nuclear governance, 31-32 introduction, 23-24 major nuclear governance treaties and, 26-27 role in mitigating nuclear challenges, 29-31 nuclear diplomacy, what next for, 107118 challenge of regional politics, 116-118 disarming non-proliferation hardliners, 110-113 joining MTCR, 113-114 joining NSG, 114-116 legacy of non-proliferation negotiations, 107-110 nuclear infrastructure status and challenges, 1-19 conclusion, 19 fuel cycle facilities, 6-8 handling and transport of fissile and other radioactive materials, 12-13 infrastructure, 4 introduction, 1-4 military uses of nuclear energy, 10-12 nuclear fuel cycle in, 4-6 nuclear power, 8-10 radioactive waste, 14-15 safety and security concerns, 16-19

transport of fissile and other radioactive materials, 15-16 strategic engagement, humanitarian initiative to ban nuclear weapons and, 123-145 and global nuclear order, 138-139 conclusion, 144-145 divisions within pro-ban movement, 132-135 humanitarian initiative, 125-127 initiative supportive of NPT, 130132 introduction, 124-125 long-fought nuclear combat, 139-142 opportunities and challenges, 135-138 opposition by nuclear weapon states, 127-130 satisfying outcome for New Delhi, 142-144 Indonesia, 93, 126 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 4, 7, 10, 11, 15, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 48, 56, 63, 64, 70, 74, 78, 83, 86, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 115 Iran, 18, 38, 39, 40, 41, 51, 66, 85 Ireland, 36, 111, 113, 115, 126, 129 Islamabad, 116 Islamic State (IS), 84, 88 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 33 Israel, 41, 51, 75, 135, 144 Italy, 114, 137, 138 Jacob, Happymon, 49 Jaishankar, S, 24, 113 Jaish-e-Mohammed ( JeM), 25 Jammal, Ramzi, 28 Japan, 50, 69, 111, 116, 137 Kalpakkam, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 28 Kargil, 50 Karnataka, 31, 100 Kazakhstan, 98, 116 Kennedy, J.F, 36

INDEX z 151

Kmentt, Alexander, 13, 135, 136 Knopf, Jeffery, 47 Kota, 12 Levy, Jack, 48 Libya, 42, 48, 50, 85 Malaysia, 93, 126 Mexico, 37, 126, 128, 129, 133 Mishra, Sitakanta, 42 Missile Technological Control Regime (MTCR), 25, 28, 42, 107, 108, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116 Modi, Narendra, 113 Moldova, 87 Mongolia, 116 Mukherjee, Pranab, 112, 113 Mumbai, 1, 7, 11, 14, 16, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 100 Namibia, 116 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 23, 139 Netherlands, 111, 135, 138 New Delhi, 37, 46, 47, 50, 51, 95, 96, 98, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115, 117, 118, 142 New York, 77 New Zealand, 111, 115, 126, 129 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 23, 24, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, 62, 63, 75, 85, 108, 109, 110, 111, 115, 116, 118, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 136, 139, 140, 141, 143, 145 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 127, 134, 135 North Korea, 18, 36, 38, 39, 41, 48, 51, 75, 85, 135, 141, 144 Norway, 111, 113, 114, 126, 127, 133, 137 Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), 8, 13 Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC), 89, 93 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 3, 4, 28,

32, 35, 41, 43, 48, 107, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 18, 129, 130, 134, 135 Nye, Joseph, 48 Obama, Barack, 108, 129 Operational Safety Review Team (OSART), 28, 33 Pakistan, 18, 35, 41, 48, 50, 51, 75, 85, 86, 88, 100, 116, 117, 118, 128, 135, 141, 142, 144 Pennsylvania, 61 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 85 Philippines, 93, 126 Poe, Ted, 85 Poland, 30 Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Systems, 55-78 advanced nuclear fuels and fuel cycles, 70-71 advanced reactor concepts, 65-70 comments on advanced reactor concepts and advanced nuclear fuels, 71-72 concerns about nuclear energy, proliferation resistance, 62-65 conclusion, 78 energy demand and role of nuclear energy, 56-57 impact of dirty bomb, 76-78 nuclear accidents, 60-62 other concerns, 72-75 radioactive waste and nuclear accidents, 57-60 radiological weapon, 76 Rajasthan, 12 Rao, Hamid Ali, 46 Rice, Condoleezza, 111 Russia, 10, 11, 66, 69, 75, 77, 84, 85, 91, 98, 113, 116, 129, 135, 138, 140, 142 Rogers, Mike, 85

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Salik, Naeam, 48 Samore, Gary, 86 Siberia, 61 Singh, Manmohan, 46, 84, 91, 108, 112 Singh, Rajnath, 88 South Africa, 35, 51, 126, 129, 132 Soviet Union, 23 Sri Lanka, 99 Stein, Janice, 48 Sweden, 23, 113, 129 Switzerland, 111, 115, 126 Syria, 41 Taliban, 33 Tamil Nadu, 9 Tarapur, 7, 13, 14 Thailand, 93 Trombay, 7, 11, 13, 14, 16 Turkey, 30, 113, 115, 138

United Arab Emirates (UAE), 30 United Kingdom (UK), 69, 75, 91, 98, 116, 134, 135, 142 United Nations (UN), 18, 25, 26, 27, 31, 36, 40, 45, 57, 75, 114, 123, 132, 135, 139, 141 United States, (US), 4, 11, 23, 24, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 43, 46, 50, 57, 58, 69, 73, 75, 77, 84, 85, 86, 91, 95, 96, 108, 111, 116, 118, 135, 138 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 112 Vienna, 87, 111, 112, 133, 134, 141 Vietnam, 30 Ware, Alyn, 47 Washington D. C, 46, 77, 84, 93 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 24, 26, 27, 41