India and China in Southeast Asia 9789819769025, 9789819769032

Table of contents :
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction: Where Powers Meet—India and China in Southeast Asia
References
2 Indian and Chinese Diaspora in Singapore as a Factor in the Evolving India–China Relations
Introduction
Methodology
Indian and Chinese Diaspora in Singapore
Indian Diaspora and Tracing the Roots and Historical Development of the Indian Community in Singapore
Chinese Diaspora—The Historical Evolution and Significance of the Chinese Community in Singapore
A Historical Context to the Early Chinese Diaspora in Singapore 1819–1950s
New Chinese Immigrants to Singapore
The Underlying Logic of the “New Diaspora” Policy Framework
Socio-Economic and Cultural Contributions of the Indian and Chinese Diaspora
Political Influence and Representation
Bilateral Relations Between India and Singapore
Exchanges Between India and Singapore
The Prevailing Notion of Indian Diaspora and Its Political Influence in Singapore
New Perspectives of Diaspora’s Political Notion in India and Singapore
Transnational Connections and Dual Identities
Inter-Community Relations and Integration with the Host Society
Attitudes of New Chinese Immigrants Towards Integration
Co-ethnic Tensions and Social Prejudice Experienced by New Chinese Immigrants
Conclusion
References
3 India’s Ties with Myanmar: The China Factor
Shift in India’s Foreign Policy Towards Myanmar
India’s Myanmar Policy in Contemporary Years
Conclusion
References
4 The Reflexive Silhouette of China in the Indo-Vietnam Mirror: Competition, Confrontation and the Future
Down Memory Lane: Avenues of Indo-Vietnam Solidarity During the Cold War Period
Post-Cold War Dynamics: Implications of India’s Stature in ASEAN for Indo-Vietnam Ties
Parameters of Indo-Vietnam Collaboration: Post-Cold War Milieu
Indo-Vietnam Relations During the Post-Cold War Period: Strategic Understanding in Perspective
Indo-Vietnam Relations During the Post-Cold War Period: Economic Cooperation in Perspective
India’s Emerging Role in Indo-Pacific: China’s Perception
Conclusion
References
5 A Comparative Study of India and China's Cultural Diplomacy in Southeast Asia
Introduction
Justifying the Case Choice
Cultural Diplomacy of China
India’s Cultural Diplomacy
Reception of Countries Toward China and India Overtures
Conclusion
References
6 India and China's Competing Infrastructural Engagements in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam
Introduction
Theoretical Underpinning
Infrastructural Projects in the Region
Chinese Infrastructural Projects in the CMV Countries
Cambodia
Myanmar
Vietnam
Vietnam’s Hedging Approach to BRI
Indian Infrastructural Projects in the CMV Countries
Cambodia
Myanmar
Vietnam
The Politics of Infrastructural Projects
Challenges Surrounding the Projects
Debate on Debt Trap
Environmental Concerns Related to Projects
Political Instability in Myanmar
Conclusion
References
7 Teaching for the Rise: Chinese Education in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore
Introduction
Brunei and Singapore: Comparative Sociocultural, Political and Educational Contexts
Chinese Schools in Brunei: Historical Contexts and Government Policies
The Relevance of Chinese Schools in Brunei: Multicultural and Multilingual Goals
Special Assistance Plan Schools in Singapore: History, Policies and Cultural Influences
Challenging the Relevance of SAP Schools
Conclusion
References
8 Strategic Calculations: India's Prudent Entry into the South China Sea
Introduction
India's Augmented Involvement “with Caution” in the SCS
Mapping India's Policy and Interests in the South China Sea
India’s Response to Chinese Assertion in the SCS
Fostering Stronger Maritime Connections with ASEAN
SCS: India-China's Peripheral Sphere of Dispute
Conclusion
References
9 Decoding China-India Engagements in Southeast Asia-A Chinese Perspective
Southeast Asia: A Strategic Nexus of China and India
China-India Competitive Engagements in Southeast Asia
Geopolitics
Game on the South China Sea Issue
India’s Role in Quad and China’s Response
Arms Sales Race
Economy
Trade Competition
Investment Competition
Initiative Competition
Diplomacy
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
Framework and Mechanisms for Cooperation
Conclusion
References
10 Philippines Perception on the Leadership of the Two Asian Argonauts in Southeast Asia
Introduction
Post-Pandemic Economic Recovery
Hague Ruling: An Eye Strain to Competing Powers
Brahmos Missiles and Military Modernization
Broken Lines of Communication and Durian Diplomacy
Acceleration of Military Technological and Maritime Cooperation
Conclusion
Bibliography
11 China and India in Indonesia: Trilateral or 2 Versus 1?
Introduction
Theoretical Framework
Indonesia’s Ties with China and India
Indonesia-China-India Relations
Trilateral “Marriage” Relations: In Existence but Additional Hurdles
Potential in Indonesia-India-China Cooperation
Indian Ocean Integration
Strengthening the Pharmaceutical Industry
Transition Energy: Green Economy?
Conclusion
References
12 Indonesia’s Engagement with China and India: Pragmatic or Ideational?
Introduction
Common Interests Between China and Indonesia
Common Interests Between India and Indonesia
The Impacts of China-India Political Tensions on Engagement with Indonesia
Chinese and Indian Diaspora and Bilateral Relations with Indonesia
Chinese Diaspora in Indonesia and Indonesian Diaspora in China
Indian Diaspora in Indonesia
Conclusion
References
13 Diplomatic Battleground or Arena for Cooperation? How China’s Scholars Analyze India’s Act East Policy, Indo-Pacific Strategy, and Sino-India Relations in Southeast Asia
Introduction
From Look East Policy to the Indo-Pacific Strategy: Chinese Scholars’ Views of India-Southeast Asia Relations
Look East Policy and Hopeful Optimism
Act East Policy, India’s Great Power Ambition, and the US Factor
Act East Policy, BIMSTEC, Pivotal States, and the Cooperative-Competitive Dynamics
Act East Policy Under the Indo-Pacific Strategy: ASEAN-India Divergence, RCEP, the Quad
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

SOUTH ASIA’S GEOPOLITICAL & STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT

India and China in Southeast Asia Edited by Amit Ranjan · Diotima Chattoraj · AKM Ahsan Ullah

South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement

Series Editors Amit Ranjan, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore Jivanta Schottli, Director, Ireland India Institute, Dublin, Ireland

Asia has emerged as a new arena for global power competition, leading South Asia to gain heightened geostrategic and geopolitical importance. To outmanoeuvre one another, major powers are actively developing extensive connectivity routes and alternative networks. Concurrently, these influential nations are enticing smaller, less developed South Asian countries with loans, grants, and other forms of assistance to foster infrastructure development and economic progress. Within these dynamics of geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic competition among global powers, smaller South Asian nations find themselves entangled. Historically, these smaller countries have endeavoured to maintain a delicate equilibrium in their relationships with the two dominant Asian powers, India and China. However, the escalating political tensions between New Delhi and Beijing have placed constraints on their previous policy choices and practices. Considering this evolving regional landscape, this series aims to: a. Examine how the geostrategic importance of South Asian countries is attracting the interest of extra-regional powers. b. Analyse the reasons behind smaller South Asian countries abstaining from taking sides and explore how they strive to strike a balance between the major powers. c. Investigate the impact of the geo-economic rivalry between major powers on the smaller South Asian countries.

Amit Ranjan · Diotima Chattoraj · AKM Ahsan Ullah Editors

India and China in Southeast Asia

Editors Amit Ranjan Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore Singapore, Singapore

Diotima Chattoraj Nanyang Technological University Singapore, Singapore

AKM Ahsan Ullah Universiti Brunei Darussalam Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam

ISSN 3005-186X ISSN 3005-1878 (electronic) South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement ISBN 978-981-97-6902-5 ISBN 978-981-97-6903-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Leonello Calvetti/Stocktrek Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore If disposing of this product, please recycle the paper.

Foreword

The competition underpinning Sino-Indian relations is multifaceted, spanning geopolitical, economic, and strategic dimensions. Geopolitically, both nations vie for influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its investments in neighboring countries like Pakistan (through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor) and Sri Lanka have raised Indian concerns about encirclement. Conversely, India’s Act East Policy and its involvement in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad (with the US, Japan, and Australia) aim to counterbalance China’s dominance. Economically, China and India are major trading partners, but there is a significant trade imbalance favoring China. India has sought to reduce its dependence on Chinese goods through initiatives like “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-Reliant India). Additionally, India has resisted joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) due to concerns over Chinese economic dominance. Strategically, the border disputes, particularly the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, underscore the persistent territorial tensions. Both countries have ramped up military infrastructure and deployments along their disputed borders. In Southeast Asia, both nations compete for strategic partnerships and influence, with China’s aggressive economic investments contrasting with India’s strategic and cultural engagements. Overall, the Sino-Indian rivalry is becoming serious, impacting regional stability and global geopolitics. It is in this context that China and v

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FOREWORD

India’s contestation in Southeast Asia reflects their broader strategic and economic interests in the region, marked by a blend of competition and cooperation. This contestation can be understood through various lenses, including geopolitical strategies, economic engagements, and soft power influence. For China, the South China Sea is a major focal point as it seeks to assert extensive territorial claims backed by military installations on artificial islands. China’s BRI includes the Maritime Silk Road, aiming to enhance connectivity and trade routes through Southeast Asia, cementing its influence in the region. China’s growing military presence in the region, including naval exercises and defense agreements with countries like Cambodia and Laos, aims to project power and secure its maritime interests. India’s Act East Policy seeks to strengthen ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). India’s strategic interest lies in ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering China’s dominance. India’s involvement in regional forums like the East Asia Summit and the Quad reflects its commitment to a rules-based order in Southeast Asia. India has enhanced its military cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, conducting naval exercises like SIMBEX (with Singapore) and coordinated patrols with Indonesia. India’s defense exports to Southeast Asia have also increased as it aims to balance China’s influence. New Delhi’s advocacy for a rules-based international maritime order, especially its emphasis on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), reflects a stance against unilateral actions that threaten regional stability. This stance, while rooted in India’s principled foreign policy approach, also indirectly challenges China’s expansive territorial claims and activities in the South China Sea and reflects India’s positioning of itself as a responsible stakeholder committed to regional stability and security. China’s economic dominance in the region remains strong as it is the largest trading partner for many Southeast Asian countries, heavily investing in infrastructure projects under the BRI. Countries like Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia have received significant Chinese investments in sectors ranging from railways to ports. Through initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China offers development loans and aid, albeit often strategically tailored.

FOREWORD

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While India’s economic footprint is smaller compared to China, it is growing. India has engaged in trade agreements with ASEAN and invested in infrastructure projects like the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway to enhance connectivity. India’s outreach aims to diversify its trade relations and reduce reliance on China. India provides capacity-building assistance and development aid focused on human resource development, healthcare, and education. India’s approach is often viewed as more benign and cooperative. Where the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia plays a significant role in facilitating economic ties and fostering cultural linkages, the Indian diaspora, especially in countries like Malaysia and Singapore, helps in strengthening bilateral relations and promoting Indian culture. In recent years, New Delhi has strongly promoted engagement with the diaspora. The Sino-India rivalry in Southeast Asia is still subtle and not overt but it can lead to geopolitical tensions, with smaller Southeast Asian nations often caught in the middle. Issues like the South China Sea disputes and competition for resources can exacerbate regional instability. Both China and India can potentially collaborate on regional stability initiatives, disaster relief, and combating transnational threats like piracy and terrorism. ASEAN’s centrality in the regional architecture offers a platform for both powers to engage constructively. In this age of the Indo-Pacific, the strategic convergence between India and Southeast Asia has evolved dramatically shaped by common concerns regarding maritime security, terrorism, and the changing balance of power. India’s strategic partnerships with countries like Vietnam and the Philippines have deepened security cooperation, particularly in areas such as counterterrorism, defense technology, and maritime surveillance. Moreover, India’s “Act East” policy emphasizes connectivity projects, such as the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which aim to enhance regional connectivity and promote economic development. The emergence of a strategic dimension in India’s outreach to the East is a relatively recent phenomenon. Launched in 2014, the “Act East” Policy has sought to give a more proactive and action-oriented focus to Indian engagements in East and Southeast Asia by deepening economic integration, expanding strategic partnerships, and fostering cultural and people-to-people ties with countries in the region. By deepening its engagement with countries in Southeast Asia and beyond, India seeks to play a more prominent role in shaping the evolving geopolitical dynamics

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FOREWORD

of the region while advancing its own national interests and objectives. And China has been a big factor behind this evolution. The contestation between China and India in Southeast Asia is a complex interplay of strategic, economic, and cultural factors. This book which brings together a mix of young and established academics is a valuable addition to the literature on the Chinese and Indian engagements in various parts of Asia. It covers a huge ground and seeks to answer some critical questions as we seek to comprehend better the importance of this vital geography called Southeast Asia for China and India. Harsh V. Pant Professor of International Relations King’s College London, UK Vice President for Studies Observer Research Foundation New Delhi, India

Acknowledgements

The three editors extend their heartfelt gratitude to all the contributors whose invaluable contributions have made this volume possible. We are deeply thankful to each of them for their patience, cooperation, and dedication throughout the process. Despite their busy schedules, the contributors demonstrated remarkable commitment by submitting their drafts and revised chapters punctually. We would also like to express our appreciation to Aparajita Singh and her team at Palgrave Macmillan for their support and assistance in bringing this project to fruition. Furthermore, the editors wish to extend sincere thanks to their parents, spouses, and children for their unwavering support and understanding, without which this endeavor would not have been possible. Their encouragement and blessings have been instrumental in our achievements. Finally, we are grateful to the many friends who have directly and indirectly contributed to the completion of this book. Their good wishes and support have been invaluable throughout the journey.

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Contents

1

2

Introduction: Where Powers Meet—India and China in Southeast Asia Amit Ranjan, Diotima Chattoraj, and AKM Ahsan Ullah

1

Indian and Chinese Diaspora in Singapore as a Factor in the Evolving India–China Relations Diotima Chattoraj and AKM Ahsan Ullah

15 41

3

India’s Ties with Myanmar: The China Factor Amit Ranjan

4

The Reflexive Silhouette of China in the Indo-Vietnam Mirror: Competition, Confrontation and the Future Tridib Chakraborti and Mohor Chakraborty

63

A Comparative Study of India and China’s Cultural Diplomacy in Southeast Asia Claudia Chia Yi En and Liao Bo Wen

91

5

6

India and China’s Competing Infrastructural Engagements in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam Sreeparna Banerjee

115

xi

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CONTENTS

7

Teaching for the Rise: Chinese Education in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore Hannah Ming Yit Ho and Ying-kit Chan

143

Strategic Calculations: India’s Prudent Entry into the South China Sea Archana Atmakuri and Chayanika Saxena

167

Decoding China-India Engagements in Southeast Asia-A Chinese Perspective Zou Zhengxin

187

Philippines Perception on the Leadership of the Two Asian Argonauts in Southeast Asia Chester B. Cabalza

211

8

9

10

11

China and India in Indonesia: Trilateral or 2 Versus 1? M. Habib Pashya, Yeta Purnama, and Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat

12

Indonesia’s Engagement with China and India: Pragmatic or Ideational? Anak Agung Banyu Perwita and Peni Hanggarini

13

Diplomatic Battleground or Arena for Cooperation? How China’s Scholars Analyze India’s Act East Policy, Indo-Pacific Strategy, and Sino-India Relations in Southeast Asia Ngeow Chow Bing

Index

237

263

281

299

Notes on Contributors

Archana Atmakuri is a geopolitical research analyst and a communications professional. She has co-authored a book chapter on the US–China conflict in the South China Sea in 2021. She has written on geopolitical issues in South Asia and researched on India–China rivalry in the region. Previously, she worked as a researcher at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observe Research Foundation, specializing in the geopolitical and strategic affairs of Myanmar and Thailand. Her primary research focus is on the Rohingya issue within the Bay of Bengal region, with additional research on connectivity initiatives in the area. Sreeparna is currently pursuing doctoral studies on the Rohingya issue at West Bengal State University, India. Liao Bo Wen is a PhD student at the Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS). He earned his BA and MA in Malay Studies from Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU) and NUS respectively. His research focuses on Malay(sian) religion and society, and has broad interests in Buddhism and interreligious dialogue, Malaysia– China & Southeast Asia–China relations, and knowledge production. He has published several journal articles and book chapters. Chester B. Cabalza is the Founding President of the International Development and Security Cooperation (IDSC), a Manila-based think tank. xiii

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

He is the author of the Philippine Territorial Defense (2024) and the prime co-author of the Rise of Philippinedization: Philippinedization is not Finlandization (2024). He teaches and mentors thousands of graduate students, senior military officers, and government officials at the University of the Philippines, National Defense College of the Philippines, and the Development Academy of the Philippines. He is a leading strategist of his generation in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Tridib Chakraborti was a former Professor and head of the Department of International Relations at Jadavpur University, Kolkata. He is an expert on South, Southeast Asian, and Asia-Pacific affairs, Indian political thought, foreign policy, and strategic studies. He has written more than 79 scholarly articles in internationally and nationally refereed and peerreviewed reputed journals, 61 book chapters, and co-edited 8 books on international relations. He frequently delivers lectures and attends international seminars and conferences overseas. In 2015, he was selected as a visiting Professor of ICCR Chair at Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland. Currently, he is holding the post of Emeritus Professor and Dean, School of Liberal Arts and Culture Studies, ADAMAS University, Barasat, West Bengal, Kolkata, India. Mohor Chakraborty is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at South Calcutta Girls’ College (aff. To University of Calcutta), Kolkata, India. Her research focus is International Relations, Area Studies, and Conflict & Peace Studies. She has co-authored three books and has contributed articles and chapters in refereed journals and edited books by Routledge, Wiley, Palgrave Macmillan, IGI Global, and other Indian publishers like Indian Council of World Affairs, Pentagon, Gyan, and Readers’ Service. Ying-kit Chan is an Assistant Professor of Chinese Studies at the National University of Singapore, Singapore. He was formerly a research fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden University. He is now the deputy chief editor of the International Journal of China Studies and sits on the editorial boards of Ming Qing Studies, Malaysian Journal of Chinese Studies, and Southeast Asia: A Multidisciplinary Journal. His latest book is Southeast Asia in China: Historical Entanglements and Contemporary Engagements (with Chang-Yau Hoon). Diotima Chattoraj a Research Fellow at the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University,

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xv

and an Adjunct Research Fellow at the Department of Social and Health Sciences, James Cook University, Singapore. She completed her PhD at Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. She was a former Researcher at the Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health at NUS, in collaboration with NTU and SMU. Prior to that, she was based as a Researcher at the Faculty of Social Sciences (FASS) in Universiti Brunei Darussalam and was involved in several research projects on Asian migration. Her research focuses on Asian migration, mobility, development, ethnicity, international relations, and boundary-making. She has authored over 25 journal articles, 5 books, 9 book chapters, and 9 book reviews in leading journals in migration and development namely, Mobilities, South Asia Research, India Quarterly, Asian Journal of Social Sciences, International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, and many more. She is the Deputy Editor of South Asia Research (Sage) and serves as a peer reviewer for several refereed journals. In addition, she has established collaborations with scholars across the globe and has presented her works at multiple international conferences as a keynote and invited speaker. Ngeow Chow Bing is an Associate Professor and Director of the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He received his PhD in Public and International Affairs from Northeastern University, Boston. Ngeow is co-editor of Populism, Nationalism and the South China Sea Dispute (Springer, 2022) and editor of Researching China in Southeast Asia (Routledge, 2019). He has published more than 40 academic articles and book chapters. Ngeow has written on various topics related to Chinese politics and history, including China– Malaysia relations, the South China Sea dispute, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Taiwan issue, grassroots politics in China, and the politics of think-tanks and intellectuals in China, among others. Ngeow is also a non-resident scholar at Carnegie China and a co-convener of the East Asian International Relations Caucus. Claudia Chia Yi En is an independent researcher based in Singapore and a former research analyst at the Institute of South Asian Studies. She earned her BA and MA in South Asian Studies from the National University of Singapore. Her work experiences spanned across the international defense industry and think-tanks, with publications of reports, op-eds, and commentaries. Her research interests lie in international relations, South Asia–China relations, and the defense industry.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Peni Hanggarini is a Lecturer of International Relations at Paramadina University, Jakarta, Indonesia. She holds a Doctoral Degree from the Republic of Indonesia Defense University. She is also a Women in Foreign Policy Fellow at Foreign Policy Community Indonesia (FPCI) and a Fellow at the Center for Geopolitics and Geostrategy Studies Indonesia (CGSI). Her main interests are foreign policy, defense diplomacy, and international politics. Hannah Ming Yit Ho is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Brunei. She is also a research associate at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. She was a postdoctoral fellow at King’s College London and formerly a research fellow at the University of California, Berkeley. She is currently an associate editor of Southeast Asia: A Multidisciplinary Journal. She also co-edited Engaging Modern Brunei: Research on Language, Literature and Culture (Springer, 2021). M. Habib Pashya is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in International Relations at Universitas Gadjah Mada, having previously graduated from Universitas Islam Indonesia. His research focuses on intricate dynamics within international relations, particularly exploring Indonesia– China relations, China’s foreign policy, and the complex interactions involving the US, China, and Taiwan. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita is currently a Professor of International Relations and Security Studies at the Republic of Indonesia Defense University in Sentul-Bogor, Indonesia. He has been a Fulbright Fellow at the University of South Carolina, USA, an Asian Visiting Fellow at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies in Copenhagen, Denmark, and Giessen University in Germany. Presently, he is also serving as a Visiting Professor at Guangxi University, China (2019–2024) and is an active resource person/policy consultant for the National Resilience Council of RI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia. Yeta Purnama is a Researcher within the China-Indonesia Desk at the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS). She holds an undergraduate degree in International Relations from Universitas Islam Indonesia. Yeta’s noteworthy contributions to the field of ChinaIndonesia relations are evidenced by the publication of her works in

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xvii

reputable international media outlets such as the South China Morning Post, The Diplomat, Australian Outlook, etc. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is Director of the China–Indonesia Desk at the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS) in Jakarta, Indonesia. After completing a BA at Qatar University, he pursued an MA and PhD in Politics at the University of Manchester. Zulfikar also holds affiliated positions at the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore, the London School of Economics’ IDEAS, and Busan University of Foreign Studies. His expertise lies in the political economy of international cooperation, focusing on China–Indonesia, China–Middle East, and Indonesia–Middle East relations. Amit Ranjan is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. His latest books include Migration, Memories and the “Unfinished” Partition (Routledge, London, 2024), The Breakup of India and Palestine: The Causes and Legacies of Partition (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2023) with Victor Kattan, Urban Development and Environmental History in Modern South Asia (Routledge, London, 2023) with Ian Talbot, and Contested Waters: India’s Transboundary River Water Disputes in South Asia (Routledge, London and New Delhi, 2020). He is also the author of India Bangladesh Border Disputes: History and Post-LBA Dynamics (Springer, Singapore, 2018). Dr. Ranjan has edited India in South Asia Challenges and Management (Springer, Singapore, 2019), Partition of India: Postcolonial Legacies (Routledge, London and New Delhi, 2019), and Water Issues in Himalayan South Asia: Internal Challenges, Disputes and Transboundary Tensions (Singapore, 2019). His papers, review essays, and book reviews have been widely published in journals, including Asian Survey, Asian Affairs, Asian Ethnicity, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Economic & Political Weekly, India Review, Indian Journal of Public Administration, India Quarterly, Journal of Migration Affairs, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Roundtable: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Social Change, Social Identities, Studies in Indian Politics, Society and Culture in South Asia, South Asia Research, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Water History and World Water Policy.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Chayanika Saxena was a President’s Graduate Fellow at the National University of Singapore (2018–2022). She holds a PhD in Geography and her work looks at the intersection of geopolitics, security, and risk management. She specializes in Afghanistan and has written for various Indian and international news sites, think-tanks, and policy institutes. She also appears regularly on talk shows and in seminars and conferences on issues concerning security in the APAC region. AKM Ahsan Ullah is an Associate Professor of Geography, Environment and Development at the University of Brunei Darussalam (UBD). He has an extensive research portfolio and has worked with prestigious institutions such as the City University of Hong Kong, IPH at the University of Ottawa, McMaster University, Saint Mary’s University, Dalhousie University in Canada, the American University in Cairo (AUC), Osnabruck University, Germany, and the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), Thailand. His research areas include migration and mobilities, intercultural encounters and development, with a geographic focus on the Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Middle East, and theoretical focus on globalization and neoliberalism, development and human rights, transnationalism, gender, intersectionality, and the everyday life. He has published more than 15 books, 60 articles in refereed journals, and 40 book chapters. Zou Zhengxin is a PhD candidate in Political Science, University of Delhi, India. He is Director Assistant at the Centre for South Asia-West China Cooperation and Development Studies, Sichuan University, P. R. China. His research interests cover maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, Indian foreign policy, and China–India relations.

List of Figures

Fig. 12.1 Fig. 12.2

Map of Asia: Geographical Location of Indonesia, China, and India (Source freepik.com [copyright-free]) Trade Balance between Indonesia and China (2018—March 2023) (Source [Perdagangan, 2023b])

265 267

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List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table Table Table Table Table Table

12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 13.1

India’s bilateral trade relations with Vietnam from 2018 to 2023 values in US$millions Vietnam’s bilateral trade relations with China from 2018 to 2023 values in US$millions Indonesia’s exports to china Indonesia’s Imports from China Trade balance between Indonesia and India Indonesia’s Exports to India Indonesia’s Imports from India Chinese scholars’ views of the evolution of India’s policy toward Southeast Asia

75 77 268 269 270 271 272 285

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Where Powers Meet—India and China in Southeast Asia Amit Ranjan, Diotima Chattoraj, and AKM Ahsan Ullah

The phrase “Where Powers Meet—India and China in Southeast Asia” used here is inspire by the title “Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast Asia” authored by David Shambaugh. It suggests the intersection of geopolitical interests and influence between India and China within the context of Southeast Asia. This intersection reflects the region’s strategic significance and the competition for influence

A. Ranjan National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] D. Chattoraj (B) James Cook University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore A. A. Ullah Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_1

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among major global powers. Both India and China have been expanding their diplomatic, economic, and security engagements in Southeast Asia, seeking to enhance their respective positions and shape regional dynamics. This dynamic relationship between India and China in Southeast Asia has significant implications for regional stability, economic development, and the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific region. Escalating tensions and competition between India and China are visible in different parts of Asia, including Southeast Asia, which has a total population of about 668 million and a combined gross domestic product in 2022 of around US$3.6 trillion. In the postcolonial years, the India–China contest and competition in Southeast Asia began after decolonization of Asia in the 1940s. During the Cold War (1947–1991), India and China have strong contrasting interests in Southeast Asia. In post-Cold War times, India launched the Look East Policy (LEP) in 1991, which, besides economic, had a strategic component to secure New Delhi’s security interests mainly against China, though not directed towards the “containment” of Beijing (Ghoshal, 2013). Naval diplomacy was a part of the LEP. A Naval exercise called the Milan (Meeting) commenced in 1995 with the participation of Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia. A few other Southeast Asian countries joined the exercise in the following years. In the 2024 edition of Milan, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia and Vietnam participated. In 2014, LEP was rechristened to Act East Policy (AEP). Explaining India’s ties with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), a regional grouping of the Southeast Asian countries, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, speaking at the first ASEAN Future Forum in April 2024, said (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2024), ASEAN is at the heart of our Act East Policy and is a crucial pillar in India’s wider Indo-pacific vision. We support ASEAN unity, centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific. India believes that a strong and unified ASEAN can play a constructive role in the emerging regional architecture of the Indo-Pacific. Synergy between India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) that is reflected in our ASEAN-India Leaders Joint Statement provides a strong framework for cooperation, including in addressing challenges to comprehensive security

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Jaishankar, added (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2024). India was among the first to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia indicating our collective resolve towards maintaining peace, prosperity and stability in the region. We have held the First ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise in 2023 and aim to hold the second edition at a mutually convenient date. Our recent operations in the Red Sea area have rendered protection and support, and evacuation of crew, including of ASEAN Member States. As net security provider and first responder, India’s initiative of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) is aimed at contributing towards peace and stability in the region.

India–China bilateral relations have often influenced their engagement with individual Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN. More recently, political tensions between India and China began after Indian and Chinese troops confronted each other at the Doklam tri-junction in Bhutan in 2017. The military stand-off ended after the two countries agreed to disengage in August 2017, after 73 days of tensions. Following the Doklam crisis, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Chinese President Xi Jinping held two informal dialogues at Wuhan in China in 2018 and Mamallapuram in India in 2019. Nothing concrete emerged from the two rounds of informal meetings, as India–China ties slid in 2020 when soldiers from the two countries clashed in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley in the western sector of their border. In that clash, 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers were killed. After that clash, a series of talks between the border commanders from the two countries were held to reduce tensions. In 2023, Modi and Jinping came face-to-face at BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Summit at Johannesburg in South Africa. In a brief conversation, Modi (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2023a), … highlighted India’s concerns on the unresolved issues along the LAC [Line of Actual Control] in the Western sector of the India-China border areas. [Indian] Prime Minister underlined that the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the border areas and observing and respecting the LAC are essential for the normalization of the India-China relationship. In this regard the two leaders agreed to direct their relevant officials to intensify efforts at expeditious disengagement and de-escalation.

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Despite a series of meetings between border commanders and a brief talk between Modi and Jinping, political tie between India and China is not “normal”. Jaishankar reaffirmed when he said “I have explained to my Chinese counterpart that unless you find a solution on the border, if the forces will remain face-to-face and there will be tension, then you should not expect that the rest of the relations will go on in a normal manner, it is impossible” (Mint, 2024). An example underscoring the tense relationship between the two countries is the appointment of senior diplomat Xu Feihong as the new ambassador to India, ending an 18-month vacancy in the position. It is widely believed that the appointment may to catapult an improvement in Sino-Indian relations (Chen, 2024). Interestingly, the deterioration in political ties has not significantly affected trade between India and China. Bilateral trade between the two countries rose sharply before registering a 0.9% decline in the first half of 2023. China’s exports to India amounted to US$56.53 billion in the first half of 2023 compared to US$57.51 billion in 2022, while India’s exports to China during this period amounted to US$9.49 billion compared to US$9.57 billion in 2022 (The Economic Times, 2023). China has emerged as India’s largest trading partner in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2023–2024 with US$118.4 billion two-way commerce, narrowly edging past the US (The Economic Times, 2024). In the fiscal year 2023–2024, the bilateral trade between India and the US amounted to $118.3 billion. It’s noteworthy that Washington held the position of being New Delhi’s primary trading partner in both FYs 2021–2022 and 2022–2023. According to the report of Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI), India’s exports to China rose by 8.7% to US$16.67 billion in the last fiscal year. The main sectors which recorded healthy growth in exports include iron ore, cotton yarn/fabrics/ madeups, handloom, spices, fruits and vegetables, plastic and linoleum. Imports also increased by 3.24% to US$101.7 billion. The GTRI reported that China witnessed a marginal decline in exports by 0.6%, from USD 16.75 billion to USD 16.66 billion, while imports from China surged by 44.7%, from USD 70.32 billion to USD 101.75 billion. According to data from the Commerce Ministry of India, China held the position of India’s leading trading partner from 2013–2014 until 2017–2018, and again in 2020–2021 (The Economic Times, 2024). The rivalry between China and India in South Asia is intensifying. Mutual suspicion explains their relationship. Both countries vie for influence in areas of strategic interest, particularly the Indian Ocean region (May, 2023). China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strengthens its ties

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with South Asian countries through infrastructure investments, alarming India about its encroaching influence and a potential “String of Pearls” strategy. India responds with a “Neighbourhood First” Policy and “Act East” Policy, prioritising regional engagement and connectivity. While China faces criticism for its BRI’s lending practices, India’s foreign policies are scrutinised for inconsistencies and perceived regional hegemony ambitions. Growing “anti-India” sentiment in some South Asian countries complicates bilateral relations (May, 2023). The rivalry occurs amidst broader China–US competition, offering opportunities for smaller South Asian nations to leverage offers from both powers. For instance, Ranjan and Chattoraj (2022) demonstrated that China’s presence in Sri Lanka has led to uncertainty in India. Furthermore, India’s policy towards Sri Lanka has been significantly influenced and impacted by Colombo’s deepening ties with China and Pakistan (Ranjan & Chattoraj, 2022). In Southeast Asia, India has relatively closer bond with Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia than Indonesia, Thailand and Brunei. After launching LEP, India became a Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in 1992 and became a Dialogue Partner in 1995. From 2002, India began participating in ASEAN annual Summit, becoming a Strategic Partner in 2012, and in 2015, India set up a Mission to ASEAN to deepen its engagement. In 2022, India–ASEAN relations completed 30 years and progressed into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Joint Statement on ASEAN–India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, 2022). In 2023, an India–ASEAN joint statement was released, focussing on maritime cooperation and food security. On maritime matters, the two countries reaffirmed their commitment (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2023b). to promote the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, guided by the fundamental principles, shared values and norms that have steered the ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations since its establishment in 1992, including those enunciated in the Vision Statement of ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit (2012), the Delhi Declaration of the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit to mark the 25th Anniversary of ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations (2018), the ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in the Region (2021), and the Joint Statement on ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2022).

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Trade relations between India and ASEAN have increased in the last three decades with Singapore being the largest trade partner. In 2003, the ASEAN–India Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation was signed. A Free Trade Area Agreement was signed in 2009 and entered into force in January 2010. India’s trade volume with each ASEAN country in the fiscal year 2021–2022 (in US$ billion) is as follows (Bhardwaj, 2023): Country

Export

Import

Total trade

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar The Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

0.043 0.198 8.471 0.014 6.995 0.892 2.107 11.105 5.751 6.702

0.394 0.094 17.702 0.0008 12.424 1.001 0.729 18.956 9.332 7.435

0.437 0.293 26.174 0.015 19.419 1.894 2.836 30.107 15.083 14.138

ASEAN–China Dialogue Relations commenced in July 1991. China was accorded full Dialogue Partner status in July 1996. In 2003, ASEAN and China signed a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. In 2012, China appointed its first resident Ambassador to ASEAN and established its Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta (ASEAN Secretariat Paper 2020). In November 2021, China and ASEAN agreed to elevate their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership (The State Council: The People’s Republic of China, 2021). At the 26th ASEAN–China Summit on 6 September 2023, they agreed to enhance maritime cooperation, implement the ASEAN–China Joint Statement on Synergising the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 and Belt and Road Initiative to deepen regional connectivity, implement the United Nations 2030 Agenda Sustainable Development, Support multilateralism, deepen regional economic integration and implement the ASEAN–China Joint Statement on Cooperation, and Promote development of digital economy (ASEAN–China Joint Statement on Mutually Beneficial Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 2023). China and ASEAN entered into Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in November 2002 to deepen their economic ties and established

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ASEAN–China Free Trade Area in January 2010 (Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry, Government of Malaysia). China has strong trade relations with all Southeast Asian countries. In 2020, trade between ASEAN and China was about US$685.28 billion (Xinhua Net, 2021). In 2022, after the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)1 came into effect China’s trade to ASEAN was 6.52 trillion yuan (USD 903 billion) billion, an increase of 15% from the previous year. Of the total exports, 3.79 trillion yuan (US$525 billion), and imports, 2.73 trillion yuan (US$378 billion) (Global Times, 2023). Although China has a close tie with many ASEAN countries, it is also involved in political disputes with some of them. One of the major reasons for political disputes between China and some of the ASEAN countries is Chinese territorial claims in Southeast Asia. In its 2023 edition of map released by China’s Ministry of Natural Resources on 28 August 2023, Beijing reasserted its claims over the large South China Sea (SCS) disputed by Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei. China’s new map revived the use of a “10-dash” line, a break from the usual nine-dash line Beijing has been using in recent years to stake its claims over SCS (Yusof, 2023). The Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam rejected the map as baseless (Reuters, 2023). A few days after China published the map ASEAN members met. The Chairman’s statement of the 43rd ASEAN Summit, delivered by Joko Widodo, then President of Indonesia, marked the SCS issue. The statement said (Chairman’s Statement of The 43rd ASEAN Summit, Jakarta, Indonesia, 2023, 32–33): 1. …We further reaffirmed the need to pursue peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention 1 The RCEP Agreement is a Free Trade Agreement between 15 countries: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Australia, China, Japan, Republic of Korea and New Zealand. It is the world’s largest FTA, comprising about 30% of global GDP and about a third of the world’s population. RCEP negotiations began at the 2012 ASEAN Summit in Cambodia and the Agreement was signed on 15 November 2020. It entered into force on 1 January 2022 for ten participating countries (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Japan, Lao PDR, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam). It has also entered into force for South Korea (1 February), Myanmar (4 March) and Malaysia (18 March). It will enter into force for the remaining participating countries after they meet criteria. Ministry of Trade and Industry, Government of Singapore “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. https://www.mti.gov.sg/Trade/Free-Trade-Agreements/RCEP.

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on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). We emphasised the importance of non-militarisation and self-restraint in the conduct of all activities by claimants and all other states, including those mentioned in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea that could further complicate the situation and escalate tensions in the South China Sea. 2. We reaffirmed the importance of maintaining and promoting peace, security, stability, safety, and freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea and recognised the benefits of having the South China Sea as a sea of peace, stability, and prosperity…We stressed the importance of undertaking confidence building and preventive measures to enhance, among others, trust and confidence among parties, and we reaffirmed the importance of upholding international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. Tensions over the SCS and alleged Chinese aggression and assertion of power in the region have led many extra-regional powers to extend support to the smaller countries from Southeast Asia. India has largely supported Vietnam’s claims to the SCS. India has even provided defence assistance and support to Vietnam. The US–China rivalry and the revival of the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) have further heightened tensions in the SCS and beyond. Japan, the USA, India and Australia are members of the QUAD. Linking QUAD’s objectives with ASEAN’s goals, Jaishankar said (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2024), I would also like to mention here that Quad Leaders have been consistent in extending their unwavering support for ASEAN Centrality and Unity. We believe that Quad compliments the ASEAN and the ASEAN-led mechanisms in their effort to make the region prosperous through delivery of people-centric benefits such as Quad Infrastructure and STEM [Science, Technology, Engineering and Math] Scholarship.

Furthermore, India and China also display cultural diplomacy in Southeast Asia. The cultural diplomacy is possible and gets traction because of the presence of a large number of Indian and Chinese Diasporas in ASEAN region. It is estimated that over six million Indian Diaspora live in the ASEAN region. Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines are home to a sizable ethnic Chinese population. Southeast Asian Chinese comprise

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over 80% of the global Diaspora Chinese population. The historical and contemporary diasporic linkages between India, China, and Southeast Asia underscore the dynamic interplay of cultures, trade and cooperation in the region, which shapes its rich diversity and interdependence (Ba, 2014; Chua, 2017). The Diaspora communities have actively engaged in trade and business activities, facilitating the flow of goods and capital between their host countries and their countries of origin. The Chinese and Indian Diasporas have also enriched the cultural landscape of Southeast Asia. They brought their languages, religions and traditions with them, contributing to the vibrant image of the region’s diverse cultures. The presence of Chinese and Indian temples, festivals and cuisines in Southeast Asia testifies to the continuing influence of these communities on local culture. The Chinese and Indian Diasporas have played a bridging role between their host countries and their countries of origin. They have promoted people-to-people exchanges, thus contributing to better understanding between the nations involved (Bunnell, 2004). In addition, through their involvement in local politics and society, they have a say in shaping policies that affect their communities and, by extension, the relationship between their host countries and India or China. It is important to note that the importance and contribution of these Diasporas in Southeast Asia is complex and multi-faceted (Varma, 2011). Their presence has not been without challenges, including problems related to assimilation, discrimination and political tensions. Nevertheless, the Chinese and Indian Diasporas remain influential players in the socioeconomic and cultural dynamics of the region, and their contribution to India–China–Southeast Asia relations cannot be underestimated. Due to the significance of Southeast Asia for India and China, many literatures are available to the readers. Some of them are by Wilbur (1956), Zhong (2007), Acharya (2017), etc. Yet, some of the pertinent questions have not been satisfactorily addressed or surface and resurface because of swift changes in international and regional affairs. This book intends to seek answers to the following questions: 1. In the changed global and Asian political equation, how important Southeast Asia is for India and China? 2. How India–China political tensions influence their engagements with respective Southeast Asian countries? 3. How does India–China political ties affect ASEAN countries’ engagement with New Delhi and Beijing?

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4. How important are the two big markets—India and China—for the ASEAN economy and vice-versa? 5. How do Indian and Chinese Diasporas living in the ASEAN region influence their country’s relations with respective Southeast Asian countries? The primary challenge in editing a book is to do justice to its overarching theme. In our case, one of the main challenges has been ensuring a representative number of chapters from Southeast Asian countries. Malaysia and Thailand, being significant players in the region, are notably underrepresented in this volume. Readers might notice the absence of chapters from these countries. Incorporating more contributions from Chinese scholars would have enriched the theme further as well. Despite these omissions, the importance of our volume in the academic world remains undiminished. We hope that this encourages other scholars to address these gaps in future endeavors. This book begins with a chapter on Indian and Chinese Diaspora by Diotima Chattoraj and AKM Ahsan Ullah. The second chapter is on China factor in renewed ties between India and Myanmar by Amit Ranjan. The third chapter by Tridib Chakraborti and Mohor Chakraborty titled The Reflexive Silhouette of China in the Indo-Vietnam Mirror: Competition, Confrontation and the Future. The fourth chapter is a Comparative Study of India and China’s Cultural Diplomacy in Southeast Asia by Claudia Chia Yi En and Liao Bo Wen. Chapter 5 is India and China’s Competing Infrastructural Engagements in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam by Sreeparna Banerjee. The sixth chapter is titled “Teaching for the Rise: Chinese Education in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore” by Hannah M. Y. Ho and Chan YingKit. The seventh chapter by Archana Atmakuri and Chayanika Saxena is on India’s Prudent Entry into the South China Sea. Chapter 8 is by Zou Zhengxin, “Decoding China-India Engagements in Southeast Asia-A Chinese Perspective”. Philippines Perception on the Leadership of the Two Asian Argonauts in Southeast Asia by Chester B. Cabalza is Chapter 9. Chapter 10 is “China and India in Indonesia: Trilateral or 2 versus 1?” by M. Habib Pashya, Yeta Purnama and Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat. Chapter 11, “Indonesia’s Engagement with China and India in Southeast Asia: Pragmatic or Ideational?” is authored by Anak Agung Banyu Perwita and Peni Hanggarini. The last chapter of this book “Diplomatic Battleground or Arena for Cooperation? How China’s Scholars

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Analyze India’s Act East Policy, Indo-Pacific Strategy, and Sino-India Relations in Southeast Asia” is written by Ngeow Chow Bing.

References Acharya, A. (2017). China and India in the Emerging Global Order: Lessons from ASEAN . Oxford University Press. Ba, A. D. (2014). Is China Leading? China, Southeast Asia and East Asian Integration. Political Science, 66(2), 143–165. https://doi.org/10.1177/003231 8714557142 Bhardwaj, B. (2023, September 8). Boosting India-ASEAN Economic Collaboration: Key Highlights from PM Modi’s 12-Point Proposal. ASEAN Briefing. https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/boosting-india-asean-economic-collab oration-key-highlights-from-pm-modis-12-point-proposal/ Bunnell, T. (2004). Malaysia, Modernity and the Multimedia Super Corridor: A Critical Geography of Intelligent Landscapes. Routledge. Chairman’s Statement of The 43rd ASEAN Summit, Jakarta, Indonesia. (2023, September 5). ASEAN, Indonesia. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2023/09/CHAIRMAN-STATEMENT-OF-THE-43RD-ASEAN-SUMMITFIN-2.pdf Chen, A. (2024, May 10). China Names New Ambassador to India After 18-Month Vacancy Amid Border Dispute Deadlock. South China Morning https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3262160/ Post. china-names-new-envoy-india-after-18-month-vacancy-amid-border-disputedeadlock Chua, B. H. (2017). Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore. NUS Press. Ghoshal, B. (2013). China’s Perception of ‘Look East Policy’ and Its Implications. IDSA. https://www.idsa.in/monograph/ChinasPerceptionofLookEastPolicya ndItsImplications Global Times. (2023, January 13). Trade Between China and ASEAN Grows 15% in 2022, First Year of RCEP’s Enforcement. https://www.globaltimes. cn/page/202301/1283779.shtml#:~:text=In%202022%2C%20China’s%20t rade%20with,percent%20of%20the%20total%20trade Hong, Z. (2007, April). India and China: Rivals or Partners in Southeast Asia? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29(1), 121–142. Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Joint Statement on ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. (2022, November 12). https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Joint-Sta tement-on-ASEAN-India-CSP-final.pdf

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May, G. (2023, May 18). India and China’s Rivalry Is Reshaping South Asia. ASPI. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-chinas-rivalry-is-res haping-south-asia/ Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry, Government of Malaysia “Malaysia’s Free Trade Agreement”. https://fta.miti.gov.my/index.php/pages/view/ asean-china?mid=33#:~:text=The%20ASEAN%2DChina%20Framework%20A greement,of%20ASEAN%2DChina%20economic%20relations. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2023a, August 24). Transcript of Special Briefing by Foreign Secretary on Prime Minister’s visit to South Africa and Greece. https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/ 37049/Transcript_of_Special_Briefing_by_Foreign_Secretary_on_Prime_Min isters_visit_to_South_Africa_and_Greece_August_24_2023 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2023b). ASEAN-INDIA Joint Statement on Maritime Cooperation. https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/ CPV/ASEAN-India-Joint-Statement-on-Maritime-Cooperatio_230907_160 027.pdf Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Remarks by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the 1st ASEAN Future Forum. (2024, April 23). https://www. mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/37784/Remarks_by_EAM_Dr_S_J aishankar_at_the_1st_ASEAN_Future_Forum Mint. (2024, January 13). Normal Relations with China Impossible If…’: EAM S Jaishankar on India-China Ties. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/nor mal-relations-with-china-impossible-if-eam-s-jaishankar-on-india-china-ties11705142640054.html Ranjan, A., & Chattoraj, D. (2022). The Tamil Issue in India-Sri Lanka Relationships: Priorities and Interests. India Quarterly, 78(1), 104–120. Reuters. (2023, August 31). Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia Reject China’s Latest South China Sea Map. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philip pines-taiwan-malaysia-reject-chinas-latest-south-china-sea-map-2023-08-31/ Shambaugh, D. (2021). Where Great Powers Meet: America & China in Southeast Asia. Oxford University Press. New York. The Economic Times. (2023, July 13). India-China Trade Shows First Signs of Slowdown in Years. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/ foreign-trade/india-china-trade-shows-first-signs-of-slowdown-in-years/articl eshow/101735216.cms?from=mdr The Economic Times. (2024, May 12). China Overtakes US to Become India’s Top Trading Partner in FY24. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ economy/foreign-trade/china-overtakes-us-to-become-indias-top-trading-par tner-in-fy-2023-24/articleshow/110049223.cms?from=mdr The State Council: The People’s Republic of China. (2021, November 22). China, ASEAN form Comprehensive Strategic Partnership as Xi Chairs

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Summit. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202111/22/content_ WS619b8df5c6d0df57f98e54c6.html Varma, S. K. (2011). Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia. Sage. Wilbur, C. M. (1956). Southeast Asia Between India and China. Journal of International Affairs, 10(1), 87–99. Xinhua Net. (2021, September 10). China-ASEAN Trade Sees Annual Growth of 16.5 pct Over 30 Years. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-09/10/c_ 1310180518.htm Yusof, A. (2023, August 31). Analysis: China’s New Map a Timed Move to Reassert Its Territorial Claims, Flex Muscles Ahead of Regional Summits. CNA. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/china-new-map-ter ritory-g20-asean-summit-india-malaysia-russia-indonesia-protest-3737366

CHAPTER 2

Indian and Chinese Diaspora in Singapore as a Factor in the Evolving India–China Relations Diotima Chattoraj and AKM Ahsan Ullah

Introduction The historical context of Indian and Chinese immigration to Singapore is deeply rooted in the region’s colonial past, with waves of immigration in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Indians came as labourers and traders, while the Chinese migrants sought economic opportunities during this period of British colonisation (Liu et al., 2020). The diverse diaspora in Singapore reflects the complicated interplay of cultural, economic and political forces that shaped migration patterns (Gamlen, 2008). The study of the diaspora in Singapore is crucial

D. Chattoraj (B) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] A. A. Ullah Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_2

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to understanding Indo-Chinese relations due to the city-state’s role as a cultural melting pot. The presence of vibrant Indian and Chinese communities provides a unique vantage point to examine the historical interactions, cultural exchanges and economic relations between the two nations (Ullah et al., 2019). By unravelling the narratives of migration, integration and coexistence in Singapore (Ullah, 2013), scholars gain valuable insights into the complex dynamics that have influenced Indo-Chinese relations over the years. Diaspora communities, which refers to transnational immigrant groups living abroad while maintaining strong economic, political, social and emotional ties with their homeland and other communities of the same origin (Chattoraj, 2022), play a pivotal role in shaping and influencing international relations by acting as cultural ambassadors and mediators of economic and political relations between their host countries and their countries of origin (Chattoraj, 2023). In the context of the dynamic and complex relationship between India and China, diasporas residing in Singapore emerge as a notable factor influencing the evolving dynamics between these two Asian giants. This study seeks to explore the intricate interplay of the Indian and Chinese diasporas in Singapore and their impact on India–China relations more broadly. As a vibrant and multicultural centre, Singapore serves as a unique setting to examine how these diasporic communities navigate their identities, maintain ties and contribute to the diplomatic landscape of the broader Asian region. Understanding the role of the Indian and Chinese diaspora in Singapore in the context of India–China relations has significant implications for diplomatic, economic and cultural analyses. The diaspora serves not only as a bridge between their respective countries of origin and Singapore, but also as a conduit for fostering closer ties between India and China (Chen, 2016). By exploring diaspora narratives, cultural exchanges and economic cooperation, this study aims to uncover nuanced insights into the contribution of these communities to regional stability and cooperation more broadly (Vertovec, 1999). As diplomatic tensions and geopolitical shifts continue to shape the global landscape, a thorough examination of the influence of the diaspora is essential for policy makers, scholars and practitioners concerned with international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Research on the Indian and Chinese diaspora in Singapore examines the central role that these communities play as influential factors in shaping the evolving relationship between India and China

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(Cohen, 1997). Examining their cultural, economic and social contributions offers valuable insights into the complicated dynamics between the two nations.

Methodology This chapter is based on a series of 23 in-depth interviews conducted in Singapore between 2022 and 2023. The interviewees were Chinese and Indian immigrants who have been granted permanent residency in Singapore. A subset of participants were also included in follow-up interviews to gain additional insights and provide a more nuanced understanding of their experiences and perspectives. The sample comprised 13 men and 10 women between the ages of 30 and 60, so a wide range of voices and experiences were represented. All participants are either permanent residents of Singapore or Singapore citizens who migrated several years ago through the Employment Pass programme or as entrepreneurs and investors. This diversity of their migration pathways provides a comprehensive overview of the various challenges and opportunities faced by immigrants in Singapore. The interviews, which were conducted in English, lasted approximately one hour each and allowed for in-depth and detailed conversations. Participants were recruited using a snowball approach, a method that utilises participants’ networks to identify other interviewees, ensuring a broad and representative range of experiences. This method is particularly effective when it comes to reaching population groups that are difficult to reach with conventional sampling methods. To place the interview data in a broader political and social context, additional analyses of media articles and political events were conducted. This approach ensures that the results are not only based on personal narratives, but also reflect the broader social and political context in which these individuals live and work. To protect the anonymity of the interviewees, pseudonyms were used throughout the chapter to maintain confidentiality and ethical research standards.

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Indian and Chinese Diaspora in Singapore Indian Diaspora and Tracing the Roots and Historical Development of the Indian Community in Singapore Indians were already present in Southeast Asia before the Christian era, when traders, merchants, labourers, teachers and medical personnel came from India. The early Indian settlers in Singapore came from the burgeoning Indian trading community that migrated from the neighbouring Malaysian state of Penang. Most of them were merchants or petty traders (Sandhu & Sandhu, 1969). Parallel to Singapore’s expansion in the nineteenth century, there was an influx of people migrating directly from their home countries, including Tamil labourers from South India. However, historical records show that Indian immigration to the colony was very limited and sporadic compared to the rest of the immigrant population. In 1845, the Indian community in Singapore made up less than 10% of the total population. This was because the majority of Indian immigrants had already moved to Penang before Singapore was established. The British had taken control of Penang in 1786. The Indian population formed the second largest population group in the settlement. The limited number of Indian immigrants in early Singapore was due to a mandate issued by the colonial government in the 1920s. In 1922, the Indian government introduced the Emigration Act to regulate the process of Indian immigration and limit the number of Indians in the colony (Sadiq & Tsourapas, 2021). Although the Indian community was a minority, together with Chinese, Malays and Europeans, they formed the population of early Singapore and played an important role in shaping the cosmopolitan trading society that the colony had evolved into. Indian experts in information technology (IT) and communications have played an important role in diversifying the labour force, particularly in Singapore, since the late twentieth century (Rai, 2008). Indian populations exist throughout Southeast Asia, but their importance is particularly pronounced in Singapore. In Singapore, they constitute an important minority group and have played a crucial role in the development of the region since the nineteenth century. Most Indians were exposed to colonial endeavours primarily as labourers and assistants, which later formed the basis for their involvement in these communities (Chattoraj, 2023). Therefore, the Indian diaspora in Singapore is an example of a profound cultural heterogeneity that originated in the early nineteenth century,

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when Indian migrants played a crucial role in shaping the country’s history and contributed significantly to its socio-economic progress. The Constitution of Singapore guarantees that no citizen of Singapore will be discriminated against on the basis of religion, race, descent or place of birth. Since independence in 1965, Singapore has been ruled by a single political party, the People’s Action Party (PAP). The Indian population is adequately represented in both Parliament and the Cabinet, where they hold various positions and responsibilities (Rai, 2008). They are represented at all levels of the civil service. Singapore’s goal of creating a collective sense of national belonging among its various ethnic groups led to the implementation of measures that strengthened loyalty to the nation and emphasised the need to preserve one’s cultural identity (Rai, 2008). Despite the diversity of the population and the division into four sections known as “CMIO” (Chinese, Malays, Indians and “Others”), ethnic values and customs have been able to hold their own. As far as Indians are concerned, they are portrayed as a cohesive community in official discourse, despite major differences in terms of origin, religion and language. The goal of preserving cultural diversity has been anchored in the school system through the introduction of “multilingualism”. This allows pupils to choose one of the following languages as their mother tongue: Chinese, Malay, Tamil, Hindi, Punjabi, Gujarati, Urdu or Bengali, while retaining English as their primary language (Chattoraj, 2023). From an economic perspective, the status of Indians in Singapore has improved significantly. At independence, the Indian population consisted mainly of labourers, but there was a significant presence of Indians in the fields of law and medicine (The Straits Times, 2018). Subsequently, the state’s commitment to meritocracy has led to Indians finding employment in the state sector more easily (Ministry of Manpower, 2020). Since the 1990s, the focus has shifted to building a “knowledge economy” and addressing the challenges of an ageing population. As a result, there has been a significant influx of immigrant Indian professionals (Lee & Tan, 2019). There has been a shift in the job distribution of Indians in the private sector (Raghuram et al., 2008). Since the late 1990s, the number of Indian entrepreneurs setting up businesses in Singapore has increased significantly. This is a marked change from the period before the 1990s, when educated Indians mainly sought employment in the government sector. The arrival of a significant number of Indian professionals has had a remarkable impact on the image of the Indian community in Singapore.

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The descendants of recent Indian immigrants have achieved remarkable success in public schools. In 2021, Singapore’s Indian population accounts for about 9% of Singapore’s total population, which is about 0.7 million people. Of this, about 300,000 people are of Indian descent, referred to as PIOs, while 350,000 people are non-resident Indians (NRIs) or part of the diaspora (Chattoraj, 2023). Singapore’s Indian residents have many origins, with ethnic Tamils and Hindus forming the majority. Malayalees, who can trace their ancestry back to Kerala, as well as Punjabi, Gujarati and Sindhi together make up 7.67% of Singapore’s Indian population, according to MEA, 2021 and Chattoraj, 2023. About 29.68% of the population is made up of various smaller groups whose ancestors come from both South India (e.g. the Telugus) and North India (e.g. the Hindustanis, referring to Hindi-speaking Indians). There are also ethnically mixed Singaporeans who are of Indian descent on their father’s side (Chattoraj, 2023; MEA, 2021). Population Profile of Singapore Indians (Chattoraj, 2023; MEA, 2021): Tamils Malayali Kerala Punjabi Gujarati Sindhi Others (Telugu, Bengali and Goans)

54.18% 7.57% 5.35% 1.18% 1.14% 29.8%

Chinese Diaspora—The Historical Evolution and Significance of the Chinese Community in Singapore A Historical Context to the Early Chinese Diaspora in Singapore 1819–1950s The Chinese diaspora in Singapore has undergone significant development over the centuries, characterised by successive waves of migration that have profoundly shaped the country’s cultural, economic and social development. The origins of the early Chinese diaspora in Singapore can be traced back to the founding of the country as part of the British colony of “Peninsular Malaya” (Ling-yin, 2001). Ling-yin (2001) argues that while Singapore was a settlement within Malaya in the nineteenth century,

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the early Chinese immigrants formed an exclusive diasporic group that formed its own ethnic enclaves within the British settlements, separate from the larger Malay colonies. A combination of political and social factors facilitated the emergence of Singapore as a distinct enclave within British Malaya. From 1819, Singapore came under the administration and protection of the East India Company, marking the beginning of British colonisation and the formal establishment of the island as a colony in British Malaya (Abraham, 2002). The introduction of colonial administration accelerated the economic and commercial growth of the originally modest fishing settlement. In the nineteenth century, the colonial government consistently pursued a policy of free trade and reduced harbour dues to a minimum, making Singapore a free port that attracted numerous traders. Singapore’s strategically favourable geographical location soon contributed to its economic and commercial rise. Its natural, sheltered harbour and location at the southernmost point of the Straits of Malacca made it an ideal port for trade with China and the rest of the eastern archipelago (Ling-yin, 2001). Trade activities included various commodities and agricultural products sourced both from the Straits, such as rattan, sago, nutmeg, cloves and other jungle exports, and from China, such as tea, dried fish, silk, tobacco and pottery. These goods were transported in large Chinese junks, especially during the northeast monsoon (ibid). The island was home to a large number of merchants who traded between China and the Straits Settlements and between India and China, facilitating the exchange of goods that flowed into the colony (Chew, 1991). As a result, Singapore emerged as the main collection and distribution centre for the Malay Peninsula, Central Sumatra and Borneo (Turnbull, 1989). The synergy of free trade policies, favourable geographical location and colonial status enabled Singapore to flourish as a trading port throughout the nineteenth century (Tan, 2005). This economic prosperity was accompanied by a significant increase in population. Historical data shows that the population in 1821 was about 5,000, including 3,000 Malays, over 1,000 Chinese and about 600 Indians, Europeans and other ethnic minorities (Arshat & Tey, 1988). The first wave of Chinese immigrants was mainly from Riau and Malacca, which earned them the name “Straits-born Chinese” due to their settlement history in the Straits Settlements.

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Historical records show that the industrial expansion of early Singapore catalysed the development of trade, plantations, tin mines and infrastructure, with the labour force being predominantly provided by immigrants, particularly Chinese, but also Indians and indigenous Malays (Boon, 1998). Alongside the Chinese and Malays, the European and Indian settlers made up the rest of the community and formed distinct ethnic minorities. As historian Turnbull noted, most of the early Europeans were primarily merchants and colonial officials who belonged to the British East India Company and whose presence in the colony was largely determined by official and commercial constraints. In 1824, Singapore gained formal independence from Malay rule when the East India Company obtained full cession, thereby detaching itself from Malay political affairs. In the context of nineteenth-century Singapore, Yong suggests that social status and wealth were determinants of membership of the gentry, with many wealthy Chinese merchants, known as “Straits-born Chinese”, establishing themselves as influential and responsible leaders of the community (Cowan & Swettenham, 1951). In the 1930s, during the period of the Second World War, Singapore’s history underwent a significant change. From 1939 to 1945, after the Japanese conquest and occupation, communication between Britain and the colony was severed. During this period, Singapore was renamed “Syonan” and ruled by the Tekkikan (Japanese intelligence) and the Kempeitai (Japanese military police) (Trocki, 2018). On 6 September 1945, Singapore was liberated by British troops with the support of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPJA), leading to the resumption of British colonial rule (Yeo, 2005). Under the leadership of the People’s Action Party (PAP), Singapore transitioned to full autonomy. In 1963, Singapore gained independence from British rule along with other Malay colonies, and in 1965, it was officially established as an independent nation-state distinct from Malaya (Tan, 2019). The development of the early Chinese diaspora in Singapore comprised two main communities: the Chinese born in the Straits and the Chinese born in China. John R. Clammer, who examines the early diaspora from a sociological perspective, emphasises the internal divisions within the diasporic community. Clammer (2000) notes that the early Chinese community in Singapore was divided into the Straits-born Chinese and the China-born Chinese, with the influx of migrants from China exacerbating the internal sociological differences within the broader Chinese population.

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New Chinese Immigrants to Singapore Although Singapore is a majority Chinese nation, new Chinese immigration to Singapore is predominantly a post-1990 phenomenon, facilitated by the establishment of diplomatic relations in that year (Liu, 2021). Since the late 1980s, Singapore has faced two pressing challenges: the need for talent to maintain its global economic competitiveness and the need to address issues related to its below-average birth rate. In response, the state took several measures. Firstly, the government encouraged the recruitment of foreign talent by working closely with companies and recruitment agencies. Secondly, the government recruited foreign talent through its own education system. Since the early 1990s, Singapore has used a combination of American-style English-language programmes and free or subsidised tuition fees to attract foreign students. Since 1992, Singapore has offered high school students from China full scholarships to study at local junior colleges and universities and also facilitated permanent immigration after graduation to attract foreign students. The foreign permanent resident population represents the fastest growing segment of Singapore’s population. Although Singapore’s foreign talent initiative did not target a specific ethnic group or nation, China has emerged as a major source over the past three decades and is second only to Malaysia. This is largely due to the relaxation of Chinese emigration controls and Singapore’s long history of immigration, as well as its cultural and geographical proximity to China (Koh, 2017). The new Chinese diaspora has become a significant population group in Singapore. This group is heterogeneous and consists of people from different socio-economic, regional and sub-ethnic backgrounds. They are highly selective: they are better educated than the average population and most have university degrees from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia and other Western countries (Yeoh, 2004). These individuals have “transferable” or “portable” professional qualifications and work experience and are often in well-paid occupations. The government applies strict criteria to applicants’ educational qualifications and salary levels when granting permanent residency (Kaur, 2013). According to the World Migration Report 2020, the number of migrants from China is 10.7 million. These new immigrants, who have transferable skills, are generally better educated than the native population and are over-represented in some research and higher education fields (International Organisation for Migration, 2020). This trend reflects the government’s deliberate policy of recruiting foreign immigrants who are

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divided into high-skilled and low-skilled labour. The former correspond to the nation’s pursuit of the so-called fourth industrial revolution. In contrast, low-skilled foreign labour is needed for manual work, a sector that is largely unattractive to Singaporeans, and they have no prospect of settling in Singapore due to policy restrictions (Yeoh & Huang, 2010). The influx of large numbers of new Chinese migrants into Singapore has provoked mixed public reactions, including hostility and discontent among many Singaporeans who have voiced their concerns in newspapers, in Parliament and on the Internet. There are three distinct but related perceptions: Although these migrants share the same ethnicity and, to some extent, the same language as native Singaporean Chinese, they are perceived as socially and culturally different; they are seen as competing with the natives for jobs, education, housing, etc.; and the newcomers, including the naturalised ones, are seen as sentimental and politically loyal to China (Yeoh & Chang, 2001). Public dissatisfaction with the migration issue was a major factor contributing to the ruling People’s Action Party’s worst performance in the 2011 general election since the country’s independence in 1965. It received 60.1% of the vote, while the opposition parties made significant gains. This dramatic event triggered a series of political changes, including a rise in nationalism among the population. Historian Jason Lim (2015) explains: “Popular nationalism is concerned with local issues of national identity, social cohesion and appreciation (or at least understanding) of local heritage. Proponents of popular nationalism… see Singapore as a nation-state with a unique and evolving identity that is destabilised by liberal immigration policies”. The Underlying Logic of the “New Diaspora” Policy Framework The development of the new Chinese diaspora in Singapore was significantly influenced by the policies of the Singaporean government. Although the majority of international migrants are from Malaysia, this group faces minimal integration challenges due to the long-standing social, economic and cultural ties between the two countries, dating back to the colonial history under British rule and the brief unification before Singapore’s independence in 1965. Therefore, integration efforts are primarily focussed on the second largest source of international migrants: People from mainland China. These integration initiatives also reflect the government’s attempts to counter public resistance to the growing number of migrants in the small island nation.

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There are two main reasons for the government’s attitude towards the new diaspora. The first reason is economic and demographic—Singapore needs to attract foreigners with good education and skills to drive economic transformation and mitigate the country’s declining birthrate. The second reason is political and identity-related—to ensure that the new arrivals are politically loyal to Singapore (if they are naturalised as Singaporean citizens) and that they integrate into the local multiethnic socio-cultural fabric. Although both reasons are important, the government has prioritised the latter over the past ten years. As a young nation developing its own national identity, the Singapore government is keen to avoid any potential obstacles that could hinder this important project. This concern is especially true for new migrants from China, a rising power with a long cultural tradition. Rising tensions between the US and China over the past decade have further fuelled the political preference for nation-building and strengthening Singaporean identity. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong emphasised this point in June 2020 when he stated that the significant number of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia was a “politically sensitive issue” and an “obstacle that would prevent China from assuming the security role currently played by the United States”, pointing to the unique challenges faced by Singapore, the only Southeast Asian country with a majority ethnic Chinese population in its multiracial society. Apart from China, Singapore is the only sovereign state with such a demographic structure. However, Singapore has made considerable efforts to create a multiracial, rather than Chinese, national identity and has been careful to avoid anything that could be seen as an influence from China. This cautious approach is evident in Singapore’s diplomatic history. It only established formal diplomatic relations with China in 1990, making it the last Southeast Asian country (other than Brunei) to do so. Guided by these economic, demographic, political and identity considerations, the Singapore government has developed a series of interrelated policies towards the Chinese community in general and the new migrants in particular. In 2015, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security, Teo Chee Hean, emphasised the important role of the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations (SFCCA) in shaping Singapore’s identity. He cited three key functions of the SFCCA: it serves as a bridge between communities, connects new and old generations, and fosters inter-country relations (Hean, 2018). Formulating and

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strengthening a uniquely Singaporean identity has been at the centre of state policy over the past decade. During Singapore’s bicentenary celebrations in 2019, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong explained the origins and distinctiveness of this identity. He pointed out that Singapore’s history began before the arrival of the British in 1819 and dates back to the fourteenth century, which sets it apart from its neighbours. Singapore’s history can be traced back to the sixteenth century, which sets it apart from its neighbours. He explained that over the course of two centuries, different cultural threads have been woven together to create a rich tapestry that forms a shared sense of destiny and ultimately a Singaporean identity. He emphasised that it is the duty of each generation to continue this construction for future generations. Integrating new Chinese migrants into Singapore’s multiracial society and engaging them in business networks with China has therefore become a cornerstone of the Government’s approach to new Chinese migrants. In November 2016, at an event organised by the Singapore Hua Yuan Association—a prominent voluntary association representing new migrants from China—the then Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office, Chan Chun Sing, highlighted the multifaceted role of Chinese clan associations. He likened them to a construction crane that stands on a solid foundation and helps Singapore connect with different parts of the world, not just China. He emphasised that the new Chinese immigrants need to integrate not only with the older immigrants and their Singapore-born descendants, but also with the minority communities. Similarly, Chan Chun Sing spoke at the launch of the Singapore Jiangsu Association in March 2017, emphasising that the new citizens are an integral part of the social fabric of Singapore. He explained that it is crucial for them to integrate well and contribute to society to ensure sustainable growth for Singapore. He emphasised the Association’s role in promoting social inclusion and enhancing harmony and growth in Singapore. He called on the Jiangsu Association to promote exchanges and cooperation between Singapore and Jiangsu, as well as China as a whole, in the areas of trade, technology, culture and education. Community groups representing Chinese migrants in Singapore have publicly supported the government’s messages. In 2017, the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations, which comprises more than 300 local and tribal associations, opened the Chinese Cultural Centre under the patronage of Lee Hsien Loong. The

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aim of the centre is to integrate newcomers to Singapore and showcase the local Chinese identity. Its vision is “a vibrant Chinese culture in Singapore rooted in a cohesive multiracial society” and its mission is to “nurture Chinese culture in Singapore and promote social harmony” The Singapore Hua Yuan Association has established the New Migrants Outstanding Contribution Awards to recognise significant contributions to Singapore, open to all, not just Chinese migrants. The Singapore Tianfu Association, another new migrants association, is committed to contributing to Singapore while maintaining ties with China by utilising significant social and economic capital in its activities. Over the past decade, significant changes have taken place in Singapore’s political economy and society. Three interrelated forces are driving the transformation of the new Chinese diaspora: government policies that focus on identity formation in a multiracial Singapore and harnessing the diaspora for the country’s economic future through cross-border business networks (Chee, 2017); demographic change and the increasing number of new Chinese migrants (Yeoh & Lin, 2019); and China’s emergence as Asia’s largest economy and its growing influence in Southeast Asia (Kwa, 2018). China is actively engaging with its diaspora by encouraging investment in China and promoting Chinese businesses abroad, with Singapore being a focal point, particularly in the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Zheng & Liu, 2020). Building a cohesive national identity is a key concern of the Singapore government in relation to Chinese migrants (Kong, 2016). Equally important are economic imperatives such as meeting the challenges of population growth in the face of declining birth rates and a rapidly ageing society (Teo, 2020). The Chinese diaspora plays a central role in business transnationalism between China and Singapore, a nation that has prioritised internationalisation as a fundamental economic strategy since the mid-2010s (Leong, 2018). Socio-Economic and Cultural Contributions of the Indian and Chinese Diaspora The Indian and Chinese diaspora in Singapore has significantly enriched the nation’s socio-economic fabric by fostering a vibrant multicultural society, contributing to dynamic economic growth, and preserving diverse cultural traditions that collectively define the unique identity of the city-state.

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Political Influence and Representation The political influence and representation of the Indian and Chinese diaspora in Singapore play pivotal roles, shaping the nation’s diverse political landscape and reflecting the multicultural fabric that defines the country. Bilateral Relations Between India and Singapore India and Singapore have a strong and intimate relationship characterised by deep economic, cultural and social ties (Muthu & Pandey, 2021). In 2015, Narendra Modi travelled to Singapore to participate in the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), which was upgraded to a strategic relationship between India and Singapore. In 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Singapore with the aim of building a new strategic partnership. The Prime Minister attended the ASEAN–India Summit for the second time as an official representative. In January 2018, Lee Hsien Long travelled to India to attend the Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi and to chair the 2018 ASEAN–India Commemorative Summit (AICS). India and Singapore share similar ideals and attitudes, as well as economic opportunities, cultural engagement and political interactions that help to enhance their bilateral relations. Both governments have entered into agreements to foster bilateral relations. Agreements include the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (2005) and its second review (2018), the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (1994, with protocols signed in 2011), the Bilateral Air Services Agreement (1968, revised in 2013), the Defence Cooperation Agreement (2003, with an extended agreement signed in 2015), the Agreement on Consultation with the Foreign Office (1994), the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance (2005), the Agreement on Mutual Recognition in the Field of Nursing (2018) and Fintech Cooperation (2018) and the Agreement on the Conduct of Joint Military Training and Exercises (renewed in 2019). Suranjan Das analyses the policy implications of India–Singaporeexchanges in various areas such as defence, trade and investment, aviation and maritime transport, smart city development, skills development, innovation in science, technology and research, and legal, judicial, financial and parliamentary cooperation in his article “India and Singapore: Fifty Years of Diplomatic Relations”. Recently, India and Singapore have committed to enhancing cooperation in emerging and futuristic areas during the second India-Singapore Ministerial Roundtable (ISMR) led by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman

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and Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong which took place on 26th August 2024 in Singapore (Press Trust of India, 2024). The discussions focused on six key pillars: digitalisation, skill development, sustainability, healthcare, advanced manufacturing, and connectivity. The meeting also highlighted the successful outcomes of the first ISMR, including MoUs in healthcare, education, digital cooperation, and the semiconductor ecosystem. The leaders discussed plans to commemorate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations and emphasized regional and global cooperation. Singapore has been a key source of foreign direct investment (FDI) for India, leading with $11.77 billion in 2023–24 and a cumulative FDI inflow of $159.94 billion from April 2000 to March 2024 (Press Trust of India, 2024). In bilateral trade, Singapore was India’s sixth-largest global trade partner in 2023–24, with a total trade value of $35.61 billion, accounting for 29% of India’s trade with ASEAN. India’s exports to Singapore were $14.41 billion, while imports were $21.2 billion, resulting in a trade gap favoring Singapore (Press Trust of India, 2024).

Exchanges Between India and Singapore Cooperation in defence and security The defence partnership between India and Singapore has decided to increase the exchange of naval information, improve cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and explore cooperation in areas such as geospatial data and cyber security, among others. In the 2018–2019 fiscal year, the total amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Singapore to India was USD 16.23 billion, accounting for a significant share of the total FDI inflows to India of USD 44.37 billion. Singapore is home to 9000 registered Indian companies. Six Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), nine banks, India Tourism, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Air India and Jet Airways have opened their offices in Singapore. In total, around 440 Singaporean companies are officially based in India. These include two banks as well as the presence of Enterprise Singapore (ES), Economic Development Board (EDB) and Singapore Tourism Board with their respective offices in India. The India–Singapore CEO Forum was inaugurated in November 2018. In March 2019, DBS Bank launched its domestically registered subsidiary, DBS Bank India (DBIL).

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Singapore has direct connections with 15 Indian airlines. Vistara, a joint venture between airlines and the Tata Group, launched its first international flights from Singapore to Delhi and Mumbai in 2019. Subsequently, Go-Air launched flights from Bangalore and Kolkata to Singapore. Creating smart urban areas Singapore companies are involved in smart cities, urban planning, logistics and infrastructure. Singapore is working with Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and Maharashtra to design comprehensive township development plans. Private and public entities, including NITI Aayog, signed three Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) in the field of urban and rural development during Prime Minister Modi’s visit in 2018. In November 2019, a Singaporean company was awarded the contract to build 15,000 housing units in four cities in the state of Gujarat. Singapore is working with the national and state governments to set up specialised sectors that focus on skill enhancement. In 2013, a World-Class Skill Centre (WCSC) was set up in Delhi. During Prime Minister Lee’s visit, a Centre of Excellence in Tourism Management was inaugurated in Udaipur. Prime Minister Modi’s visit in 2018 led to the finalisation of five skill development agreements. The two governments agreed to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) to work on fintech. Narendra Modi introduced the first global version of Indian products, including the Rupay card, the BHIM-UPI app and the UPI-based remittance software. He initiated the launch of APIX, a global digital network, with the aim of connecting fintech companies and banks. The first focus of this endeavour is on India and ASEAN. The government, Nanyang Technological University and prominent Indian universities have entered into agreements to collaborate in various areas, including emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning and blockchain, and space technology. Indians in Singapore hold important positions in elections and hold many important offices such as civil servants, ambassadors, cabinet ministers, chief justices, federal legislators, parliamentarians and federal lawmakers. The Prevailing Notion of Indian Diaspora and Its Political Influence in Singapore Indians have significant representation in national politics, being present in both the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) and the opposition parties. The primary factors contributing to the establishment of the People’s Action Party in Singapore are the country’s rapid economic growth and

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enhanced social welfare. The political influence of India–Singapore relations and the Indian diaspora’s political participation form the basis of its political influence. A significant proportion of the Indian population holds positions such as the president, deputy prime minister, civil servants, diplomats, various cabinet members and members of parliament. Pritam Singh made history in the 2019 elections by becoming Singapore’s inaugural opposition leader. The Workers’ group, led by Singh, secured 10 out of the 93 parliamentary seats in the general election, establishing itself as the largest opposition group ever in Singapore’s parliament. According to Dr. Tony Tan’s statement in the Economic Times in 2011, Indians in Singapore are crucial contributors to the city’s political and economic progress. The diaspora exerts a significant influence on the advancement of economic, social and political domains. The diaspora has had a significant impact on various sectors such as the economy, healthcare, trade, investment, law and judiciary. New Perspectives of Diaspora’s Political Notion in India and Singapore The study of the political processes and interactions between the Indian and Singaporean diasporas has been enriched by recent political developments. India and Singapore have developed a strong friendship characterised by increased economic cooperation and closer political ties (Das & Bhattacharya, 2020). At the political level, both nations have held talks on a wide range of issues, including defence, trade and investment, air and maritime transport, smart city development, skills upgradation, scientific research, and legal, judicial, financial and parliamentary cooperation. The governments of India and Singapore influence each other and work together to formulate comprehensive strategies that include both economic and social policies. Both regions have similar levels of economic development, particularly in terms of trade and investment. The expansion of trade markets for goods and services and the unimpeded flow of goods, services and capital benefit both nations and encourage significant growth in bilateral trade through trade agreements. Singapore, which has the third largest labour force in trade, has seen an increase in bilateral trade talks with India, which has led to slow growth in investment. Economic interdependence has inevitably impacted political interactions and attitudes. The BJP government in India, which follows a social democratic ideology, has tactically created a new domain of political power centred on promoting investment in the economic and social

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development of the country. The affluent segments of Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs) and People of Indian Origin (PIOs), who often support the Hindutva ideology of the BJP, contribute significantly to remittances to India. The Indian government is aggressively engaging the diaspora to leverage its influence in social media and politics. Highprofile events, such as the Howdy Modi Event 2019, are organised to strengthen diaspora bonding and political engagement. Both governments have significant influence in shaping the political engagement and participation of their respective diasporas. Transnational Connections and Dual Identities The Indian and Chinese diaspora in Singapore exemplifies a dynamic interplay of transnational connections and dual identities, where individuals navigate between their cultural roots and the cosmopolitan fabric of Singaporean society. This complex interweaving of cultural heritage and global influences not only shapes their personal identity, but also fosters a unique cultural diversity that defines the country’s rich social landscape. Inter-Community Relations and Integration with the Host Society Inter-community relations and integration into the host society play a central role in shaping the harmonious coexistence of the Indian and Chinese diaspora in Singapore. Through cultural exchange programmes and mutual respect, these communities contribute to the rich tapestry of Singaporean society, fostering a sense of unity amid diversity. Attitudes of New Chinese Immigrants Towards Integration Although Singapore is a country where the majority of the population is of Chinese descent, it has developed a distinctive cultural mix through its commitment to multiculturalism (Ho & Yu, 2017). For new Chinese immigrants, this means not only understanding the country’s history and culture, but also engaging with the social norms that shape cross-cultural interactions, often by participating in activities infused with elements of Singaporean culture. As Andrew, a 53-year-old Chinese–Singaporean citizen, noted, these activities are essential for newcomers to immerse themselves in the local ethos.

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The integration process for new Chinese immigrants is often seen as an adjustment to avoid cultural clashes and foster harmonious relations with the locals. Wu Teo, a 35-year-old permanent resident, emphasised the need to “avoid conflict with the local culture”, “while Theresa, a 47-yearold Chinese-Singaporean citizen, highlighted the importance of “getting along with the locals”. Many new immigrants recognise that integration means embracing the values of multiculturalism and meritocracy, which are fundamental to Singapore’s identity and underscore the principle of equal treatment for all cultural groups. Ho and Yu (2017) have shown that the values of meritocracy and multiculturalism resonate strongly with new Chinese immigrants. Ms Ho, a 59-year-old permanent resident who has lived in Singapore since 1991, expressed her gratitude: “I am a Chinese citizen and was neither born nor raised in Singapore. But when I entered society, Singapore was the place that gave me all the opportunities”. Several other interviewees expressed similar sentiments, noting that they tried to integrate into Singaporean society by participating in activities organised by Chinese associations. Despite these efforts, many new immigrants unintentionally find themselves in predominantly Chinese social networks, reflecting both the ethnic diversity and segmented nature of Singaporean society. The new Chinese associations are closely linked to the wave of emigration from mainland China since 1979, while the established or pioneer associations of Chinese clans have their origins in earlier periods of immigration during the colonial era (Ullah, 2010). Compared to their predecessors, recent immigrants come from a wider range of provinces in mainland China. Montsion (2014) notes that the temporal qualities of Chineseness differ among these different types of associations. While the pioneer clans endeavour to preserve their dialect roots among the younger, westernised Singaporean Chinese, their role in social cohesion has diminished as the society has grown older. However, with renewed immigration, some pioneer clans are seeking new roles in integrating newcomers (Montsion, 2014; Yeoh & Lin, 2013). The new clan associations established after 1979 aim to build bridges with Singaporean society through collaboration with mainland Chinese clan associations and other local organisations. Their mission is to provide platforms for members to interact and familiarise themselves better with Singaporean society. This approach is in line with the government’s integration efforts, as both types of clan associations work closely with government agencies and political elites to promote integration. These

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associations also play a crucial role in facilitating the entry of Singaporean companies into the Chinese market, thus promoting economic and cultural ties between the two regions. Eddie, a Chinese–Singaporean woman, shared her perspective on joining one of the new associations: “Our reasons for joining this association are different from those of the early immigrants who joined clan associations. The early immigrants often faced great difficulties and sought support in a new place. However, today’s new Chinese immigrants usually have a good educational and professional background. Their motivation to join social organisations goes beyond basic needs; they seek emotional and social interactions”. The interviews suggest that many new Chinese clan associations aim to forge close ties with Singapore’s political elites, often channelling their integration efforts through government-led initiatives such as the People’s Association (PA) activities. They often invite ministers and MPs as guests of honour to their events. However, these close ties between the new Chinese immigrants and the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) have led to speculation on social media. Some suspect that the pro-immigration policies could give the PAP an electoral advantage, as the new citizens are more likely to support the party. The fact that new Chinese immigrants are so heavily represented in Singapore compared to other immigrant groups has also led to claims that the government’s policy is intended to maintain the Chinese majority in the population and thus reinforce Chinese privilege over minority groups. However, this argument ignores the differences within the Chinese community. Singapore-born Chinese are often different from the new Chinese immigrants who arrived after 1979. There is also a difference between the skilled labourers who arrived in the 1990s and the later cohort of entrepreneurs and investors. This shift corresponds to China’s economic transition from a low-income developing country before the 1990s to a middle-income developing country in the early 2000s. The focus of new Chinese immigrants on entering Singaporean society through Chinese clan associations limits their involvement in broader Singaporean society. Young Chinese in Singapore, in particular, tend to communicate in English or Singlish and are socially distant from the Chinese traditions and customs that the pioneer clan associations use to organise their activities. While they learn Mandarin as a second language due to the bilingual education policy, English or Singlish remains the lingua franca.

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This language difference limits their ability to communicate and socialise with new Chinese immigrants. Many new Chinese immigrants reported that they have few social contacts with non-Chinese Singaporeans, such as Malays, Indians and Eurasians. Co-ethnic Tensions and Social Prejudice Experienced by New Chinese Immigrants Despite ongoing efforts to promote social cohesion through integration measures, Singapore still struggles with nuanced intra-ethnic differences within the Chinese population, as well as inter-ethnic differences within the broader social fabric. New Chinese immigrants often face these complexities, particularly in terms of language skills and cultural assimilation. For many newcomers, the challenge is to express themselves effectively in English or Singlish, which affects their sense of belonging and integration. This language barrier not only affects their confidence when interacting with English or Singlish-speaking locals, but also limits their opportunities for meaningful interaction with non-Chinese Singaporeans. Recognising the importance of local Chinese dialects for communication, especially with older generations, highlights the complicated dynamics at play. Pei Pei, a Chinese–Singaporean woman, talks candidly about her struggles with language skills and the resulting social distance this creates. Her feelings reflect the broader issue of structural hurdles and social prejudices faced by new Chinese immigrants. The idea that an “accent” serves as an identity marker and, unfortunately, a target for stereotyping, reflects deeper societal prejudices. Yang Li’s experience highlights the subtle yet palpable prejudices encountered in social settings where cultural differences are sometimes met with curiosity and judgement. The term “aunties” encapsulates the generational divide and the potential for intercultural misunderstanding, despite all attempts at politeness. Ang Mei’s narrative sheds light on the persistent stereotypes surrounding Chinese immigrants, despite their contribution to Singaporean society. The persistence of such prejudices, especially among the older generations, underscores the need for continued dialogue and education to promote better understanding and integration.

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The legacy of pioneer immigrants and the subsequent influx of newcomers show how perceptions and attitudes towards Chinese immigrants are evolving. Mia Ng’s reflection on initial misunderstandings emphasises the importance of empathy and open communication in bridging cultural divides. Belinda’s report emphasises the generational shift in perceptions of China, reflecting broader global trends in the perception and appreciation of the country’s economic growth and cultural development. Nevertheless, stubborn stereotypes persist, especially among older segments of society. This illustrates the complexity of intra-ethnic dynamics within the overall story of immigration and integration. In examining these narratives, it becomes clear that the challenges faced by new Chinese immigrants in Singapore are multi-layered and encompass structural, linguistic and socio-cultural dimensions. Addressing these challenges requires not only policy initiatives, but also grassroots efforts to promote empathy, understanding and mutual respect between all members of society.

Conclusion The relationship between India and China encompasses a multifaceted interplay of economic cooperation, territorial disputes and geopolitical dynamics, reflecting the complicated landscape of Asian geopolitics. As key players on the regional and global stage, both nations engage in a diplomatic discourse aimed at reconciling disagreements and promoting cooperation on a wide range of issues. In the context of Singapore, the Indian and Chinese diasporas are proving to be influential actors in the field of diaspora diplomacy, significantly shaping bilateral relations through a range of cultural, commercial and communal endeavours. The burgeoning relationship between India and Singapore epitomises a convergence of mutual interests and mutual admiration, laying the foundation for a symbiotic relationship with potential implications in the political sphere. At the same time, the governments of both countries have developed strategic initiatives to empower and engage their respective diaspora communities to increase their influence in the political landscape. This study attempts to describe the evolving perception of the political influence of the Indian diaspora in Singapore. It draws on a nuanced analysis of bilateral agreements and policy frameworks that span economic, social and cultural spheres.

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An integral part of this analysis is an examination of the instrumental role that the Indian diaspora plays in electoral processes where ambassadors, politicians, ministers and various other stakeholders exert a tangible influence. Moreover, initiatives aimed at mobilising the Indian diaspora in India itself serve as an additional object of study, especially in the backdrop of the Narendra Modi government, which has shown a keen interest in strengthening diaspora engagement and fostering closer ties with Singapore. Through an examination of the burgeoning bilateral agreements and mutual exchanges, this study highlights the move towards deeper economic and political integration of the Indian diaspora in the context of Indo-Singaporean relations, which is a crucial step towards greater diaspora empowerment and cross-cultural synergies.

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CHAPTER 3

India’s Ties with Myanmar: The China Factor Amit Ranjan

In January 2023, Myanmar’s military Junta carried an air strike on what they perceived as a prominent training camp for pro-democracy forces close to its border with India. In that air attack, two bombs dropped by the Myanmar Air Force landed near Farkawn village in the Champhai district of the Indian State of Mizoram. The attack was primarily aimed at Camp Victoria in Myanmar’s Chin State. In Myanmar, five Chin National Front soldiers, including two women, were killed in that attack while no injuries were reported on the Indian side (Al Jazeera, 2023). Assam Rifles, an Indian paramilitary force that guards the India–Myanmar border, denied that bombs were dropped on the Indian side of the border during the air strike (The Indian Express, 2023). Again, in April 2023, when Myanmar’s Junta resorted to air strikes in Kanbalu township in the country’s Sagaing region, India reiterated that problems should be

A. Ranjan (B) Instititute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_3

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peacefully resolved (The Economic Times, 2023). A few days later, military Junta’s representatives along with officials from other ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, were a part of the second 1.5 Dialogue on Myanmar (Nayanima, 2023) at the External Affairs Ministry-funded think tank-Indian Council of World Affairs. The abovementioned developments on the India–Myanmar border and participation of the Myanmar’s official in 1.5 Dialogue are examples of increasing pragmatism in India’s policy towards Myanmar where interests matter more than anything else. This chapter discusses a shift in India’s policy towards Myanmar. Then, the chapter examines the factors India calculated while deciding to shift its value-based stance on Myanmar. Finally, the chapter analyses how and why Myanmar is important for India in the fast-changing geopolitical realities in South and Southeast Asia. This chapter argues that, like past, China and the presence of troublesome insurgent groups from Northeast India in Myanmar have pushed India to shift its policy towards the country; however, ambivalence remains. On a few occasions, India has sounded favouring democracy in Myanmar. Secondly, the growing pragmatism in the Indian foreign policy towards Myanmar has made New Delhi remain silent or issue soft statements over issues such as human rights violation, Rohingya crisis, etc. In fact, as reported in media and human rights reports, New Delhi’s support has even helped military junta to earn revenues and procure arms to fight against the ethnic insurgents and pro-democracy workers. This chapter uses published primary sources such as government documents and official statements. Critical secondary sources such as books, book chapters, and journal articles have been used to understand India’s relations with Myanmar. Finally, newspaper reports have been used to get factual information on developments between India and Myanmar. In this paper, Myanmar has been used throughout and not Burma—the country’s old name.

Shift in India’s Foreign Policy Towards Myanmar Although politically falls in Southeast Asia and shares a border with many countries from the region, Myanmar is closely knitted with South Asia. The country shares long boundary, ethnic kinship, and resources with South Asian countries such as India and Bangladesh. It was a British colony from 1824 to 1948. In 1937, Myanmar separated from British India but remained under the colonial rule until its independence in

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1948. In an early days of independence of India and flight of British colonialists, a “Friends of Burma Society” was formed in Rangoon to foster better ties between the Indians and people living in Burma. The society had the blessings of the then Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, December 1948–February 1949, 453). A Conference was held in New Delhi on 28 February 1949 between the representatives of Australia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Britain. In that Conference, civil war situation was discussed and a consensus opinion was “peace and prosperity can be restored to Burma primarily through conciliation” (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, December 1948–February 1949, 456). Soon after the country’s independence, Myanmar entered into civil war when the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), declared war against the central government in January 1949. The KNLA was supported by Thai and the US governments to prevent the spread of influence of the Burmese Communist Party in the country and spill over into Thailand (Myat, 2021). To address the insurgency situation in Myanmar, in 1949, Nehru in a long letter to Thakin Nu offered mediation between the Burmese government and insurgent groups. But Burma did not accept it (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, February 1949–April 1949, 415). Nu, in a letter to Nehru, suggested that India, Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Burma should come together for joint defence and economic pacts. Nehru rejected this idea, arguing India and Pakistan were apart on any such idea and Ceylon was unlikely to join any such arrangements (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru May 1949–June 1949, 372). Myanmar was also anxious because of Kuomintang (KMT) troops’ entry into Eastern Burma during their fight to overthrow the Government of the People’s Republic of China. Nehru shared concerns of Nu and agreed on urgent steps to remove them. As Myanmar unable to dislodge KMT troops from its land, Nu wanted to go to the United Nations (UN) over the issue but Nehru suggested to postpone such proposal and wait for reactions from the US and UK (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, July 1951–October 1951, 637). In 1953, Myanmar filed a formal complaint seeking the evacuation of the KMT soldiers and their families from the country; India supported it (Malik, 2016, 41). Afterwards, a military commission was set up on initiation of the US comprising China, the US, Myanmar, and Thailand to negotiate withdrawal of KMT. After negotiations, withdrawal took place in three phases in 1953. However, some of the irregular troops numbering around 6,000

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remained in Myanmar against whom Myanmar launched military action with the assistance of China. Eventually, in 1961, Myanmar got rid of KMT guerillas and their dependents. In July 1951, India and Myanmar signed Friendship Treaty under which the two countries agreed to negotiate to improve their political relations and cultural ties and facilitate trade and commerce (Treaty of Friendship between India and the Union of Burma, 1951). During that period, India also wrote off 50% of the debt Myanmar owed to New Delhi. Myanmar incurred the debt to the British India whose successor was India. In 1957, despite her own economic constraints, New Delhi extended a loan of INR 300 million to Myanmar on favourable terms (Malik, 2016, 44). All such initial bonhomie was due to more than traditional ties—China was a factor that determined New Delhi’s early approach towards Myanmar. When General Ne Win carried out a coup, India was not happy. One of the reasons for it was Ne Win’s Chinese ancestry. New Delhi believed that due to his ancestry, Ne Wing would look more towards China for inspiration. Only after some persuasion, Nehru, reluctantly recognized the military government (Malik, 2016, 49). In post-Nehru years, Ne Win visited India in February 1965 and then Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri landed in Yangoon in December of that year. It is estimated that 150,000 people of Indian origin, mainly those engaged in business were forced to leave Myanmar between 1964 and 1968 because of Ne Win-led government’s nationalization policy. Most of the oustees were never compensated (Malik, 2016, 49). When Indira Gandhi was India’s Prime Minister, the relationship between the two countries was largely due to “mutual necessity”. During that period, Myanmar responded favourably to the Indian offer of joint patrolling on the India–Myanmar border to control insurgent activities and prevent transit of Indian insurgents through Myanmar, to or from, China or East Pakistan (Malik, 2016, 55). In 1967, India and Myanmar signed a treaty to address their boundary demarcation issues. The two countries share 1643 kilometres of territorial and maritime boundaries in the Bay of Bengal region. The Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram share territorial boundary with Myanmar. In 1987, the two countries signed an accord to demarcate their maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal region, the Coco Channel, and the Andaman Sea (Ramachandran, 2006).

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Then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Rangoon in 1987 was seen as a change in India’s policy towards Myanmar. He offered Myanmar to become a member of the now suspended South Asia’s regional organization-South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation. However, political developments in Myanmar made India to reconsider its policy towards the country. In August 1988, Myanmar saw big protests against the country’s military rule. At that time, India supported the pro-democracy leaders and was vociferously critical of the country’s military rulers. The Indian Embassy in Yangon was said to have helped the democratic protestors, and some embassy officials were in touch with the opposition leaders. In September 1988, the military under General Saw Maung recaptured the power and established State Law and Order Restoration Council. In 1990, polls were held but power was not transferred by the military to the elected members of the National League for Democracy (NLD), which had won an overwhelming majority in that year’s general elections. In 1992, India sponsored a resolution in the United Nations calling need to take all steps to restore democracy in Myanmar (Ramachandran, 2006). During the protests and afterwards, the Burmese service of the All India Radio broadcasted programmes critical to the military government. In 1993, India conferred Jawaharlal Nehru Award to Myanmar’s pro-democracy leader-Aung San Suu Kyi. Soon realizing the change in domestic situation in Myanmar and regional order, India amended its old policy towards the country. In August 1992, after preliminary discussions, an eight-member delegation led by U Aye, Director-General of the Political Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visited India. A few months later, then Indian Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit visited Yangon in March 1993 (Ramachandran, 2006). Myanmar re-joined Non-Aligned Movement in 1992 in a bid to improve ties with the member states including India (Myat, 2021). Dixit (2001, 325–326) talks about three considerations that influenced India to make a change in its attitude towards the military rulers and rule in Myanmar. First, Myanmar’s geostrategic location sharing border with India’s northeast and in the Bay of Bengal region. Due to its location, Myanmar could affect India’s security-related interests in the region; second, Myanmar’s role in countering insurgency in India’s northeast region, drugs smuggling, and narcotic crimes was considered significant. It was acknowledged that if the country comes under other’s influence, mainly China, India may face a tough situation in the region; and, third, Indian policy makers acknowledged that, although India believes in

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democracy, it does not have sole responsibility to bring democratic order in non-democratic countries of the world. As relations began to improve, the two countries have had various bilateral visits. One of the important visits that truly revived India’s ties with Myanmar was by India’s then Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh in 2001. It was a culmination of a process that started during Narasimha Rao’s regime in March 1992 (Dixit, 2001, 330). Myanmar hosted India’s Vice-President Bhairon Singh Shekhawat in 2003 and President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam in March 2006. In 2012, then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Myanmar. India has dealt with Myanmar’s military Junta and then State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi government between 2015 and 2020. U Htin Kyaw, then President of Myanmar, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi made official visits to India in August and October 2016 respectively. In September 2017, Indian Prime Minster Narendra Modi made a visit to Myanmar. The visit was a few days after the terror attack by Harakah-al-Yaqin, also called the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), in which 12 Myanmar soldiers, officials, and 80 insurgents were killed. The attack was followed by brute violence carried out by Myanmar’s military on the Rohingya population of Rakhine region. It was reported that around 3000 homes belonging to Rohingyas were burnt, women were raped and some fleeing people were executed. More than 656,000 Rohingyas landed only in Bangladesh (Amit Ranjan & Kaveri, 2020). A visit by Narendra Modi at that time made many countries and individuals to expect a statement on the humanitarian crisis. However, the joint statement said “India condemned the recent terrorist attacks in northern Rakhine State, wherein several members of the Myanmar security forces lost their lives. Both sides agreed that terrorism violates human rights and there should, therefore, be no glorification of terrorists as martyrs” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2017). The Joint Statement also stated (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2017), The two sides shared the view that the situation in Rakhine State had a developmental as well as a security dimension. In this context, they agreed to bring about overall socio-economic development in the State by undertaking both infrastructure and socio-economic projects, particularly in the spheres of education, health, agriculture and allied activities, agro-processing, community development, construction of small bridges, upgradation of roads, small power projects, livelihood activity, setting

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up of training centres, promotion of household crafts, conservation of environment and cultural heritage. Myanmar welcomed India’s offer of assistance under the Rakhine State Development Programme and the two sides agreed to finalize the implementation modalities within the next few months.

India–Myanmar Joint Statement annoyed Bangladesh. Then Bangladeshi High Commissioner to India, Syed Muazzem Ali, met the then Indian Foreign Secretary, S. Jaishankar to record his country’s concerns. Later, changing its position a bit, then Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj in a telephonic conversation with Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said that India would “push” Myanmar to take back the Rohingyas refugees. India also provided around 7,000 metric tonnes of relief and aid through Operation Insaniyat (humanity) to Rohingya refugees stranded in Bangladesh (Ranjan, 2017). In 2021, Myanmar Junta carried out a coup by not giving Suu Kyi led NLD, which won the November 2020 elections, an opportunity to take an oath to the office. The NLD won 315 out of 440 seats. After the coup, India expressed “deep concern” over the political situation in Myanmar. However, it has agreed to work with junta regime named State Administration Council headed by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. More than months after the coup, on 27 March 2021, India and eight other countries, Russia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand— attended a military parade to mark Tatmadaw Day in Naypitaw (Prabhash, 2021).

India’s Myanmar Policy in Contemporary Years In international politics, countries are obsessed to serve and protect their interests. To do so, they can go to any extent and make frequent incremental change/s or carry out paradigmatic shift in their foreign policy. Such shifts are considered necessary when a country is in power competition with its rival. Shift in India’s policy towards Myanmar is an example. In the past India had supported democracy and pro-democracy forces in Myanmar but when it found itself in a stiff competition with China, New Delhi made a paradigmatic shift in its policy and agreed to do business and engage with the Military Junta. Besides external reason, like past, shift in New Delhi’s policy is because many insurgent groups from Northeast

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India have established their base in Myanmar. They use Myanmar’s territory to train their recruit and establish contacts with the agencies from the countries inimical to India’s interest and pose multiple challenges to its internal security. An increasing pragmatism in the Indian Foreign Policy to deal with Myanmar has made New Delhi remain mute or issue soft statements over issues such as human rights violation, Rohingya crisis, etc. India’s foreign policy towards Myanmar is largely guided by the factors mentioned below. Growing Chinese Influence: On the present situation, in August 2022, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, “Our relationship is not something which should be judged… by the politics of the day” (The Irrawaddy, 2022). One of the influencers in Myanmar’s day-to-day politics is China. The two countries have a borderline of 2200 miles (3540.6 kilometres) (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2020). China and Myanmar signed an agreement to address their boundary demarcation-related matters in October 1960. The closeness between China and Myanmar increased over the years. China has supported the Junta rule on an international platform. For instance, in February 2021, soon after the coup, China vetoed the United Nations Security Council’s joint statement on the military takeover (BBC, 2021). Besides deep political ties, Myanmar’s trade with China has enormously increased to US$9 billion in 2022. The country’s trade with India that year was only US$1.5 billion. Also, as mentioned below, India’s foreign direct investment in Myanmar is a small fraction of China’s (Zsombor, 2023). As mentioned above, in the 1990s, China was one of the major reasons why India began engagements even with the military regime. Since then geopolitical condition in Asia has changed a lot, and India and China are on the opposite side. There has been an increase in the number of clashes on the Sino-India border. In 2017, Indian and Chinese soldiers were in stand-off position at Doklam, Bhutan trijunction. Then, in 2020, fighting in Galwan Valley caused the death of 20 Indian and 4 Chinese soldiers. Since Galwan Valley fight, Sino-India ties have plunged. To calm the situation at the border, the officials from the two countries have interacted but not engaged in a long dialogue to improve their military and political ties. For instance, on the Western Line of Actual Control, the military commanders had held several rounds of meetings to restore peace.

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In August 2023, in a brief interaction on the sidelines of the 15th BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) summit at the South African city of Johannesburg, Narendra Modi and the Chinese President Xi Jinping “agreed to direct their relevant officials to intensify efforts at expeditious disengagement and de-escalation” of tensions along Line of Actual Control (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2023). It was the first interaction between the leaders since the Galwan Valley incident. Interaction at Johannesburg drew parallel to a similar encounter between Modi and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in July 2017 in the German city of Hamburg (Suhasini, 2023) during a 73-day military stand-off between Indian and Chinese Armies at Doklam. Modi later travelled to China for that year’s BRICS summit. The two countries then engaged in informal meetings in 2018 and 2019 at Wuhan (China) and Mamallapuram (India), respectively. Those engagements normalized political ties between India and China. However, conversation in Johannesburg could not break the ice between Beijing and New Delhi. More than the normalization of their bilateral ties, India’s concern is China’s expanding and strengthening influence in its neighbourhood including Myanmar. Over the years, China and Myanmar have developed close political and economic ties. Beijing has always been supportive to whosoever is in power in Myanmar. In terms of economic relations, China is the most important partner of Myanmar. In 2023, Beijing’s total investment is in around 597 projects totaling US$21.863 billion. Chinese investment accounts for 23.5% of total foreign investment in Myanmar. Some of the major Chinese investments are in a deep-sea port in Rakhine State’s Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), tin, copper, and rare earth mining, railway linking, etc. (The Irrawaddy, 2023). In 2017, during the visit of Suu Kyi to Beijing, Myanmar joined the Chinese initiated and led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2018, an agreement on China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) was signed. It is under the BRI framework. In 2019, the two countries signed two MoUs and an agreement letter detailing strengthened cooperation between them on the CMEC, trade, and technology. Once in full operation, the estimated 1,700-kilometer-long corridor will connect Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan province, to Myanmar’s major economic points—Mandalay in central Myanmar, and then east to Yangon and west to the Kyaukphyu SEZ (Nan, 2019). In 2019, China proposed 30 projects under the CMEC but Myanmar approved only nine of them.

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Under CMEC, China is building three border economic cooperation zones in Shan and Kachin states. The CMEC would allow a direct flow of Chinese goods into the southern and western regions of Myanmar and also Chinese industries could transfer their operation base in Myanmar to abate the rising labour costs in the country and overcapacity of China’s industries (Nan, 2019). The Kyaukphyu port, a crucial component of the CMEC will grant easy direct access to China to the Indian Ocean and allowing its oil imports to bypass the Strait of Malacca “dilemma” (Nan, 2020). During the visit of Xi Jinping to Myanmar in 2020, the two countries signed 33 MoUs, agreements, exchange letters, and protocols. Some of them were related to infrastructure projects such as on the China–Myanmar Ruili–Muse cross-border economic cooperation zone, establishing local cooperation under the framework of jointly implementing the CMEC between Yunnan Province and Mandalay Region, and working on feasibility studies for the Yangon River Estuary West Bank Protection, Mandalay–Bagan Railway Line and Watalone Tunnel projects (Nan, 2020). In 2023, during his visit to Myanmar, then Chinese Foreign Minister, Qin Gang called to “speed up” the projects under BRI. To India’s concern, Kyaukphyu City is located a little more than 100 kilometres away from Sittwe in Rakhine, discussed below. The deep port at Kyaukphyu is part of US$7.3 billion SEZ project, a joint venture led by China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC). In the agreed framework signed in November 2018, the Chinese side has a 70% stake, and Myanmar 30% (BNionline, 2023). Strategically, Kyaukphyu port is within a distance of around 1000 kilometres of the Indian Naval Station, Varsha in the Bay of Bengal (Girish, 2022). Domestic Matters: Many of the Indian states bordering Myanmar also share cross border kinship ties. Since 2021, around 50,000 people from Myanmar fled into the Indian side of the border. The Union Government calls them “illegal migrants” so they have no aid. However, the State Government of Mizoram has provided refuge to many refugees. In Mizoram, the ethnic Mizos identify themselves with the Chin community from Myanmar. Not only the State even civil society groups, churches, and individuals have helped the Chins running from Myanmar (Emily, 2023). In 2021, when people, including police personnel, began fleeing Myanmar the Ministry of Home Affairs directed the Assam Rifles, which guard border, and the border-sharing states’ administration to identify and deport the “illegal migrants”. In its statement, the ministry said that India is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and its

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1967 Protocol. It added that state governments have no power to grant refuge to any foreigner. The order was not well taken in Mizoram. The state government said it is an “emotive and sensitive” issue in Mizoram. Also, Rajya Sabha MP K. Vanlalvena, a member of the State’s ruling Mizo National Front said the refugees are like “family” and cannot turn away (Krishnankutty & Bismee, 2021). Contrary to what locals feel about Myanmarese crossing into the Indian territory to protect their lives, in 2023, when the Indian State of Manipur fell into grip of ethnic violence, the Indian Home Minister Amit Shah blamed the influx of Kukis from Myanmar into Manipur for creating insecurities among Meities community (Angshuman, 2023). He pointed at Kuki Democratic Front for trouble. However, there is no such group by the name “Kuki Democratic Front” that exists in Myanmar. Instead, a Meiti group part of “Valley Based Insurgent Groups”, Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), was involved in the deadly ambush of an Indian Army convoy in Manipur’s Chandel district in June 2015, killing 18 soldiers. The KYKL has a strategic presence across the India–Myanmar border (Angshuman, 2023). Not only people cross into India from Myanmar when crisis occur, people from India also move into the Myanmar side of the border during bad times. For instance, after ethnic clashes began in Manipur, around 400 residents from Moreh have crossed over into Myanmar (Sukrita, 2023). The emotive issues do not influence much of India’s ties with Myanmar; however, it is certainly a serious matter in Mizoram, where the feeling for ethnic ties is very strong. More than kinship ties, India’s Myanmar policy is guided by help provided by the country in nabbing and finishing the members of insurgent groups from Northeast India who have taken shelter there. India has repeatedly accused China of providing hideouts and arms to insurgent groups from India (South China Morning Post, 2020). Chinese aid to India’s northeast insurgents has a history of more than 50 years. In fact, China is regarded as the main reason for the spread and sustenance of insurgency in the region. The beginning of Chinese support to insurgents from India’s northeast can be traced when a batch of the Naga National Council (NNC) led by Thuingaleng Muivah and Thinoselie M Keyho reached Yunnan in southwestern China 1966– 1967 (Pathak, 2021, 14–16). Many other groups such as cadres and leaders of the Mizo National Front (MNF) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from Manipur followed. To support the insurgent groups Chinese have used facilities in Myanmar. For instance, in the 1980s China used

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the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Myanmar to train PLA cadres and many recruits of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). The training facilities in the Kachin region were closed in 1989 after a pact between KIA and India’s Intelligence agency—Research and Analysis Wing (Pathak, 2021). Despite that, over the years, China, as accused, armed and provided all sorts of help to the northeast insurgent groups via Myanmar. It has also encouraged insurgency among the tribal groups along the India–Myanmar border by exploiting insecurity and feelings of alienation (Dinkar, 2023). One of the big reasons, as argued by some researchers, China providing support to insurgents is Indian support to Tibetan rebels (Bhaumik, 2007, 8). Highlighting the significance of Myanmar in addressing insurgency issue, S. Jaishankar said at Chulalongkorn University “India could not avoid dealing with the military junta regime because of border issues such as organized crime, coronavirus and Indian insurgents in Myanmar…We also have to manage our border relationship and the complexities of being a neighbour” (The Irrawaddy, 2022). After a military coup in Myanmar, India expected that Junta would help New Delhi demolish camps and finish insurgents; however, it has not happened yet. There are seven Indian insurgent groups with bases in the country, including the anti-talks faction of the ULFA from Assam, and the People’s Liberation Army and the United National Liberation Front from Manipur (Bhattacharyya, 2022). Earlier, in 2015, the Indian Army carried out a surgical strike inside Myanmar against Naga group killing 38 and injuring seven insurgents (The Hindu, 2015). In 2019 Operation Sunrise I and II were carried out to flush out insurgents. In that operation carried by Indian and Myanmar armies, the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang), the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), the United Liberation Front of Assam, and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland were the targets. At that time, the trigger was threat to the India-aided Kaladan project. Major rebel infrastructures were destroyed during that operation, including the camps at Taga in the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) (NSCN(K) dominated Sagaing Region. However, the rebels have regrouped and do not fear Myanmar’s Junta, which is too overstretched in fighting against anti-Junta forces from the country (Bhattacharyya, 2022). Myanmar’s Geo-economic importance: Historically, Myanmar has been an important destination for trade and commerce. During colonial years, many people from India were taken by the British rulers to

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work as labourers in various then newly set up companies. Some of the Indians also set up businesses in Myanmar. The situation changed after Myanmar became independent, and the nationalization process began during General Ne Win’s term. The rise of Burman nationalism and changes in citizenship law in sucessive years toughned conditions for the Indian-origin people living in Myanmar for centuries. In post-independence years, one of the major economic shifts occurred in 1991 when India adopted New Economic Policy (NEP) underlying opening the country’s economy and liberalisng trade with other parts of the world. Southeast Asia, home to countries such as Singapore et al attracted Indian policymakers who came out with the Look East Policy (LEP) during the tenure of the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (1991–1996). The LEP’s primary objective was to establish deep trade links with East Asian countries and engage with them. The LEP increased the significance of Myanmar as it is a link to South and Southeast. In 2014, the LEP was rechristened as Act East Policy (AEP) by the Narendra Modi government. India’s LEP/AEP has a strong economic component but is not insulated from New Delhi’s strategic calculation in the region where China is a major player. As a part of LEP, Indian Navy became a part of naval diplomacy connecting with the naval forces from Southeast Asian countries. For instance, since 1995, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia are part of the annual naval exercise Milan (meeting) (Bhattacharya, 2016, 94–99). However, New Delhi has various limitations in sustaining a naval presence to protect Indian assets such as ONGC Videsh in the South China Sea (Bajpaee, 2023). The LEP/AEP also manifested in debates about counter-balancing China’s increasing presence in South Asia by engaging closely with East Asian countries, particularly with countries having political problems with China such as Japan and Vietnam (Bajpaee, 2023). In Myanmar, India has carried out projects worth around US$2 billion, of which US$1.25 billion are grant-in-aid. India’s investment is mainly in connectivity infrastructure; agricultural research, education, Information Technology, skill development, etc. (Embassy of India, Yangoon, 2022). India is also engaged in connecting itself to a third country via Myanmar. The India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway could create a completely new axis of economic activity in Asia. Once come into operation, the Highway “can radically expand the interface between South-East

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Asia and South Asia, to the mutual benefit of both” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2022). One of the most significant works India started in Myanmar in 2008 and partially completed in May 2023 is Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport project on Kaladan River in Rakhine State. The total cost of this project is around US$484 million. The project connects India and Myanmar via shipping, inland water, and road. Stretch

Mode

Distance (km)

Kolkata to Sittwe port in Myanmar Sittwe to Paletwa (River Kaladan) Paletwa to Indo-Myanmar Border (in Myanmar) Border to NH.54 (Lawngtlai) (in India)

Shipping Inland Water Transport Road

539 158 110

Road

100

Source Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, Government of India, 2014. https://mdoner.gov.in/kaladan-multi-modal-tra nsit-transport-project-inland On 9 May 2023, the first cargo ship from Kolkata was received at Sittwe Port in Myanmar. Once completed, the transport will reduce the time and cost of transportation between Kolkata, Agartala, and Aizwal by more than 50%. It will also link India’s Northeast to international sea route (Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, 2023). This route will connect Paletwa in Myanmar to Sittwe through an inland waterway and from Paletwa to Zorinpui in Mizoram by road. Then goods from Kolkata to Sittwe Port can be shipped to Teknaf Port, Bangladesh. From Teknaf Port, goods can be transported by road to Sabroom in the Indian State of Tripura (Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, 2023). The Kaladan project will help Myanmar to export rice, timber, fish and seafood, petroleum products, and garments and textiles. The major imports by Myanmar include construction materials such as cement, steel, and bricks among others (Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, 2023). In 2017, India and Myanmar agreed on the development of Pakokku Airport or Kalay Airport, with financial and technical assistance from India. The two countries also agreed on a deputation of an Indian team to study and prepare a report for the rail link between Tamu

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and Mandalay. Numaligarh Refinery of India and Parami Energy Group of Myanmar have an agreement on the supply of diesel to Myanmar across the land border. The first consignment of the high-speed diesel reached Myanmar on 4th September 2017 (Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, 2023). The two countries have established trade points. The first trade point Moreh (Manipur, India)Tamu (Sagaing, Myanmar) was opened in 1995. The second point at Zokhawthar (Mizoram, India)—Rikhawadr (Chin State, Myanmar) was opened in 2005 (Bhatia, 2016, 177). A third Avakhung (Nagaland, India)—Pansat/Somrai (Myanmar) is under proposal. In 2011, India and Myanmar signed an agreement to open border haats (rural market) to facilitate trade between the local communities. The following locations were suggested by the State Governments from Northeast to the Union Government of India (Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, Government of India, 2011): Border Haat

Location in India

Location in Myanmar

Pangsau Pass (Nampong) Chingsa (Khimiyang Circle) Makantong (Khimiyang Circle) Wakka/Pongchao/Lazu

Changlang Changlang Changlang Tirap

Pangsau, Kachin Province Langhong, Kachin Province Ngaimong, Kachin Province Kachin Province

After a series of meetings between the officials from the two sides, as of December 2020, it has been agreed to establish border haats at Pangsau Pass (Arunachal Pradesh), New Somtal (Manipur), and Avakhung (Nagaland) on priority basis (Embassy of India in Yangoon, 2020). As a rising economy, India needs energy. India has invested in Myanmar’s gas field. Oil and Natural Gas Videsh Limited (ONGC Videsh Ltd or OVL) is exploring and developing project in Shwe in Myanmar. Till 2019 the OVL invested US$722 million in the project. In 2020, India invested an additional US$121.27 million to further develop A-1 and A-3 Blocks of Shwe oil & gas project in Myanmar (Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, 2020). The OVL is partner to companies such as KOGAS (Korean Gas Corporation), POSCO International, MOGE (Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise), GAIL (Gas Authority of India Limited), and CNUOC (China National United Oil Corporation) (ONGC Videsh Limited n.d.a). Like India, China has made huge investments in Myanmar’s gas field. Construction of a Gas pipeline to transport gas from Myanmar to China began in 2010 and in 2013, the pipeline

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started transporting natural gas to China. The pipeline is 793 kilometres in length with a designed annual capacity of 5.2 billion cubic metres. It runs from Myanmar to Ruili in China’s Yunnan Province. South-East Asia Crude Oil Pipeline Company and South-East Asia Gas Pipeline Company operate the project with China National Petroleum Corporation taking a 50.9% stake in each. The project has investment from four corporations from—China, Myanmar, South Korea, and India (Global Times, 2023).

Conclusion Although India has made a shift in its policy towards Myanmar; it remains ambivalent on various matters. An example of it, as Jaishankar said in Bangkok, “we deeply believe that Myanmar is best served by being a democracy, by reflecting what are the sentiments and wishes of its people” (The Irrawaddy, 2022). Despite showing support for democracy, India, as reported by United Nations Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews, has also facilitated arms shipment used by Myanmar’s military against its population. The report says that between 2021 and early 2023, private and state-owned companies registered in China transferred arms worth US$267 million to the Junta (Human Rights Council, 2023, 17). During the same period, 22 unique suppliers—private and state-owned entities— from India shipped arms worth US$51 million to Myanmar (Human Rights Council, 2023, 29). The biggest source of arm supply to Junta is private and state-owned entities from Russian Federation which have supplied arms worth US$406 million (Human Rights Council, 2023, 4). In September 2022, Russia signed a contract with Myanmar to supply six Russian Su-30 SME fighter jets. Two of them were supplied in September 2023 (The Straits Times, 2023). The ambivalence in India’s policy towards Myanmar is largely because it has to maintain ties with the Western democracies as well as meet the Chinese challenge in the neighbourhood. Post-2021 military coup, most of the Western countries imposed sanctions on Myanmar and called on the military government to transfer power to the NLD. Unlike them, India has tried to walk on a tight rope where it has talked about the essentiality of democracy without compromising on its larger geopolitical and geo-economics interests in Myanmar. Hence, engaging with Myanmar’s junta is mainly driven by pragmatism and does not entail the core ideas and values that define (old) Indian Foreign Policy.

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Prabhash, K. D. (2021, March 30). India Attends Military Parade in Myanmar 2 Months After Coup. Why It’s Significant. India Today. https://www.indiat oday.in/news-analysis/story/india-attends-military-parade-myanmar-monthsafter-coup-why-significant-1785075-2021-03-30 Ramachandran, S. (2006, April–June). Engaging Myanmar’s Generals: Advantage India? Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 1(2), 58–73. Ranjan, A. (2017, September 25). The Rohingya Crisis—A Challenge for India and Bangladesh (ISAS Working Paper). https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wpcontent/uploads/media/isas_papers/ISAS%20Working%20Papers%20No.% 20271%20-%20The%20Rohingya%20Crisis.pdf, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Series 2 Volume 9 December 1948–February 1949, p. 453. https://nehruselectedworks.com/ Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Series 2 Volume 10 February 1949–April 1949, pp. 410–416. https://nehruselectedworks.com/ Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Series 2 Volume 11 May 1949–June 1949. https://nehruselectedworks.com/ Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Series 2 Volume 16 Part 2, July 1951– October 1951. https://nehruselectedworks.com/ South China Morning Post. (2020, December 7). India Accuses China of Helping Rebel Groups on Its Myanmar Border. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/ south-asia/article/3112851/india-accuses-china-helping-rebel-groups-itsmyanmar-border Suhasini, H. (2023, August 24). PM Modi, President Xi Call for Speedy Disengagement Along LAC. The Hindu. Sukrita, B. (2023, September 5). A Home Across the Border: As Moreh Burnt, How 400 People Crossed over to Myanmar. The Indian Express. https://ind ianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/manipur/manipur-moreh-familiesmyanmar-border-assam-monastery-8925061/. The Economic Times. (2023, April 13). India Calls for Cessation of Violence by All Sides in Myanmar. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/ india-calls-for-cessation-of-violence-by-all-sides-in-myanmar/articleshow/994 68497.cms?from=mdr. The Hindu. (2015, November 16). Myanmar Operation: 70 Commandos Finish Task in 40 Minutes. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Myanmaroperation-70-commandos-finish-task-in-40-minutes/article60327140.ece. The Indian Express. (2023, January 12). Assam Rifles Says No Bombs Dropped in India During Air Strike within Myanmar. https://indianexpress.com/ article/north-east-india/assam-rifles-says-no-bombs-dropped-in-india-duringair-strike-within-myanmar-8378513/ The Irrawaddy. (2023, August 22). China Pouring in Billions to Prop Up Myanmar’s Military Regime. https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/mya nmar-china-watch/china-pouring-in-billions-to-prop-up-myanmars-militaryregime.html

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The Irrawaddy. (2022, August 19). Indian Foreign Minister Defends Ties with Myanmar Junta. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/indian-foreignminister-defends-ties-with-myanmar-junta.html The Straits Times. (2023, September 10). Myanmar Receives First Shipment of Russia’s Su-30 Fighter Jets: Russian State News Agency. https://www.strait stimes.com/asia/myanmar-receives-first-shipment-of-russias-su-30-fighter-jet s-ria Treaty of Friendship between India and the Union of Burma, LII India, 7 July 1951. http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1951/ 12.html Zsombor, P. (2023, May 27). India Opens Myanmar Port with Wary Eye on China. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/india-opens-mya nmar-port-with-wary-eye-on-china/7111753.html.

CHAPTER 4

The Reflexive Silhouette of China in the Indo-Vietnam Mirror: Competition, Confrontation and the Future Tridib Chakraborti and Mohor Chakraborty

India is wholeheartedly supporting and assisting us in many ways in the fields of agriculture, animal husbandry, communication and transport, science and technology. We consider these as valuable contributions to healing the wounds of war and national construction in Vietnam. Our feelings for you are crystallized like a cloudless sky.(Foreign Affairs Record, 1978, 109)

T. Chakraborti Adamas University, Barasat, India e-mail: [email protected] M. Chakraborty (B) South Calcutta Girls’ College, Kolkata, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_4

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This sentiment, expressed by the Vietnamese Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong in February 1978 has recurred in the saga of Indo-Vietnam ties and has been sincerely reciprocated by India. The convergence of India–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relations across a wide spectrum—historical, cultural, commercial, defence and strategic—is a time-tested and enduring phenomenon. Among the ASEAN countries, Vietnam holds a niche in India’s foreign relations. The elevation of bilateral cooperation from ‘Strategic Partnership’ in July 2007 to ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ in 2016 has bolstered their ties further. The relations have matured and institutionalised within the framework of India’s ‘Look East’ Policy (LEP) and ‘Act East’ Policy, further consolidated through the converging dynamics of the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). A common stimulus to the bolstering of Indo-Vietnam relations is China’s growing assertiveness and hegemonism in the Indo-Pacific region. With respect to China as the third unit of analysis, India’s ties with its eastern neighbour deteriorated in the wake of the 1962 border clashes, further exacerbated by New Delhi’s proximity with the former Soviet Union and Vietnam since the early 1970s. The matrix of Sino-India relations, reeling under the challenge of an unresolved border dispute and occasional transgressions by China, has been vitiated by Beijing’s sustained support and ‘all-weather’ alliance with Pakistan and attempts to enhance its regional clout, through the pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the extension of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) through what India calls Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) while Pakistan calls it Azad (independent) Kashmir, hegemonism in the South China Sea, ‘cheque-book diplomacy’ and application of soft power in order to deter New Delhi. Therefore, the ‘China factor’ has become decisive in the mirror of Indo-Vietnam ties, as both countries attempt to address the challenges posed by it bilaterally and at the multilateral level. In this context, the chapter attempts to evaluate the China factor in India–Vietnam relations in the post-Cold War years in the Indo-Pacific domain. The analysis is based on China’s prismatic perception to IndoVietnam relations, emanating from a mosaic of parameters, viz. • Indo-Vietnam relations during the Cold War era. • Significance of India’s ‘Look East’, ‘Act East’ and Indo-Pacific policies as a springboard for enhanced Indo-Vietnam understanding.

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• The burgeoning Indo-Vietnam strategic understanding, with special reference to defence cooperation and nuclear energy collaboration. • Trade relations compared along the Indo-Vietnam, Sino-Vietnam and Sino-India matrices. • China’s perception vis-à-vis India’s role in the Indo-Pacific construct; and • Conclusion.

Down Memory Lane: Avenues of Indo-Vietnam Solidarity During the Cold War Period India’s relations with Vietnam run through the labyrinth of history, fostered by shared experiences of liberation from colonial rule and traditionally proximal socio-cultural affinities. India’s establishment of diplomatic relations with unified Vietnam on 7 January 1972, was not only regarded as a Cold War phenomenon, but also as its first ‘Look East’ strategy. Rather, it may be considered as the first individualistic ‘Look East’ posture, given the politico-strategic considerations of Great Power calculus, serving as a robust foundation for the development of strategic relations. During the Cold War period, Indo-Vietnam relations were cordial, except for minor blemishes in the early years, which could be attributed to Vietnam’s cordial relations with China (Chakraborti, 2001– 2002, 240–242). India and Vietnam converged on issues of strategic and political interests. For instance, India sided with Vietnam, opposing US military intervention, even at the cost of embittering Indo-US relations. India’s strategic understanding with the former Soviet Union and Hanoi’s tepid relations with Moscow, further facilitated bilateral cooperation. Following the Sino-Indian border conflict (1962) and the Sino-Soviet dispute (1969), the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (1971) fortified their ties further. With the common strain of Soviet proximity acting as a synchronising force, Indo-Vietnam cordiality was instituted on a solid pedestal in 1966, when the then Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi exhorted the immediate cessation of US bombings and the resolution of the Vietnam conflict within the framework of the Geneva Accords. At the United Nations-General Assembly session (1970), New Delhi demanded a strict schedule for US troops’ withdrawal from Vietnam.

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In the post-Vietnam unification years (post-1975), Indo-Vietnam ties were cordial and complementary in nature, with steady progress in defence, economic, commercial, scientific and technological spheres. India’s pro-Soviet, pro-Vietnamese policies were integrated further with its stand on Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia/January 1979) and installation of Heng Samrin as the Head of State by removing Pol Pot, facilitated by Soviet military assistance. The Congress (I) Government preferred the Heng Samrin regime to Pol Pot from a moral and humanitarian point of view and thought it prudent to take an identical stand with the Soviet Union (Chakraborti, 1985, 89, 127). Although the Indian stance provided a major ‘security relief’ to the Vietnamese government, it tarnished New Delhi’s international image as a non-aligned nation. Since the mid-1960s, Sino-Vietnam relations deteriorated with the drying up of China’s economic aid, the Sino-Soviet rift and the subsequent flaring up of bilateral discord, such as the mass emigration of resident Chinese from Vietnam, the Kampuchean crisis, border clashes1 (Amer, 1994, 357) and disputed sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. These issues facilitated proximity between India and Vietnam. Since 1972, India, with its limited capacity, contributed substantial credit and other resource assistance to Vietnam to restructure its war-shattered economy and develop small-scale industries. The two countries signed a series of agreements, such as Cultural Cooperation Agreement; Trade Agreement; Agreement of Scientific-Technological Cooperation; Agreement on Encouraging and Protecting Investment, etc. Besides, the Government of India, under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme set up the O’Mon Water Rice Research Centre and the Song Be Milk Buffalo Forage Research Centre, in addition to providing technical and capacity-building support (Chakraborti, 1997, 45). Vietnam was one of India’s largest aid beneficiaries for restructuring its dilapidated economy and received credit assistance of Rs. 141.15 crores on soft term, with repayment being spread over 15 years, at a modest 5% rate of interest, to import equipment for railways, telecommunication and sugar production (Chakraborti, 1995, 155). Till 1985, Vietnam received five lakh tonnes of wheat and rice as commodity loan from India, 1 Between 1979 and 1987 (August), six major flare-ups were registered along the border.

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which was also used to address its acute food crisis. Treating Vietnam as a ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN), on 18 December 1982, India signed an agreement for setting up a ‘Joint Economic, Scientific and Technical Commission’, the first with a Southeast Asian nation. In addition to countries belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), India’s economic assistance to Vietnam figured prominently in its national reconstruction process. The promising economic relations between New Delhi and Hanoi during the Cold War years (particularly between 1977 and 1990) was not shaped by their Soviet linkages, but developed primarily as a self-styled, coordinated bilateral approach, based on mutual confidence and solidarity. India’s economic aid to Vietnam is a classic illustration of a developing country helping another waning developing counterpart and creating close interdependence, often referred to as ‘…an ideal model for South-South economic cooperation for the developing world’. Indian response may be described as the first individualistic ‘Look East’ solidarity Vietnam policy (Chakraborti, 1990, 55–56) towards any country of Southeast Asia. Summarily then, India exhibited friendship and camaraderie with Vietnam in the Cold War saga and the congenial ties were cultivated further by the common perception of the ‘China threat’. In this perspective, the gamut of relations among these three states may be viewed through the prismatic paradigms of realism/hedging and neoliberal interdependence. Since hedging provides mutual advantages for state actors, particularly under highly uncertain circumstances, India and Vietnam pursue the policy of hedging vis-à-vis China, supplementing it with internal balancing through military modernisation and reform and external balancing by promoting bilateral/multilateral cooperation and engagement. Hedging also acts as a strategy to address the onset of a security dilemma (Jervis, 1978, 78), resulting from China’s (in this case) offensive stance of maximising power and seeking hegemony in the region. On the other hand, India and Vietnam seek to ensure the regional balance of power by maximising security through deterrence. Besides, international opinion and reaction pertaining to China’s greyzone tactics of intimidating littoral states like the Philippines and Vietnam are bolstered by the voices of like-minded partners like India, United States (US), etc., having a deterrent effect on Beijing. Deterrence is a significant guarantee to maintaining the status quo and respect for the tenets of a peaceful and stable maritime order. In this context, Acharya’s (2003–2004, 150) explanation may be extrapolated to argue that, while

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adhering to the theory of interdependence, characterised by ‘bargaining’ and ‘accommodation’ of China in pragmatic pursuit of national interests, on the one hand, Vietnam’s resort to ‘bamboo diplomacy’ or external balancing strategy of forging cooperative engagements with ‘likeminded’ partners like India, on the other, entails a deterrent effect on China. Furthermore, in the context of the interdependent, neoliberal, global order, the policies of states are driven by economic pragmatism and political-economic logic of expanding, deepening and diversifying economic cooperation, so as to facilitate domestic development on the one hand, and focus on trust and confidence-building, on the other. This has been demonstrated in the policy pursuits of India and Vietnam mutually and vis-à-vis China in their respective interactions.

Post-Cold War Dynamics: Implications of India’s Stature in ASEAN for Indo-Vietnam Ties With the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union on 31 December, 1991signalling the end of the Cold War, momentous changes emerged in the international milieu. In this global scenario, India embarked upon a foreign policy transformation and prioritisation towards the Southeast Asian region. Vietnam had also embarked on economic transformation from a centralised planned economy to an open, liberalised marketoriented system or ‘Doi Moi’ (renewal) and deemed it prudent to join ASEAN in 1995. During the initial post-Cold War years, India identified ASEAN as a major spotlight of its foreign, economic and defence policies, within the framework of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and LEP. This outlook coincided with ASEAN’s ‘Look West’ and rationalisation thrust, while unveiling a novel phase of rediscovery and revival in Indo-ASEAN collaboration. The successful implementation of LEP, with India’s elevation to ASEAN’s Full Dialogue Partner status and membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1995 and 1996 respectively, culminated in its attainment of the Summit-level partnership of ASEAN in 2002. India’s elevated position within the ASEAN was hailed as ‘…a significant development in our relations with ASEAN countries, as India joined the ranks of a handful of countries with which ASEAN has summit dialogues, namely, China, Japan and South Korea’ (Annual Report: 2002– 2003, 2003, 17). On 4 September 2003, the then External Affairs Minister of India, Yashwant Sinha, at the Plenary Session of the Second India–ASEAN Business Summit, held in New Delhi, officially declared:

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India’s Look East Policy has now entered its Phase-II (Remarks by Shri Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister of India at the Second India– ASEAN Business Summit held on 4 September 2003, 2003) implying an expanded definition of East, from Australia to China and East Asia, with ASEAN as its core and marking a shift in focus from exclusively economic issues to security issues, including joint efforts to protect sea lanes, coordination on counter-terrorism, etc., within the framework of the ‘Move East’ policy. In this broad ASEAN perspective, then Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee highlighted the holistic transformation in India’s Vietnam policy and signalled improvement of historical ties, expressed in terms of, ‘It is not Look East. It is Re-Look East’ (cited in The Week, 2002). India’s significant position and potential of playing a major role in international affairs was vindicated by its induction in ASEAN-led East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 (Statement of the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh at the First East Asia Summit held in Kuala Lumpur on 14 December 2005, 2005). LEP received further boost with the introduction of the ‘Act East’ Policy in 2014 by the National Democratic Alliance-II (NDA) government, transforming it from ‘…to not just look but act East’ and making it proactive, as opposed to being reactive in approach (Remarks of the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi at the Ninth East Asia Summit held in Nay Pi Taw on 13 November 2014, 2014). As the central actor of the Indo-Pacific architecture, ASEAN’s regional vision, contained in the AOIP refers to the ‘…wider Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions’ as the Indo-Pacific ‘not as contiguous territorial spaces but a closely integrated and interconnected region’, with ASEAN adorning a central and strategic position therein (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, 2019, 1–2). India respects ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific region and its IPOI vision falls in line with the basic pillars of AOIP, emphasising shared vision and mutual cooperation between India and ASEAN (ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability and Prosperity in the Region, 2021). With the LEP and ‘Act East’ policy forming the bulwark, India–ASEAN relations in general and Indo-Vietnam relations, by extension, have matured, institutionalised and consolidated through the converging dynamics of the IPOI and AOIP.

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Parameters of Indo-Vietnam Collaboration: Post-Cold War Milieu As discussed in the preceding section, India’s re-activated and reaccelerated LEP highlighted the principles and engineered the future roadmap of India–ASEAN cooperation, with an impact on Indo-Vietnam linkages. Since the signing of the Vientiane Declaration in November 2000, Indo-Vietnam relations developed along a rising trajectory. Regular high-level exchanges between the two sides provided opportunities for reviewing bilateral ties in a plethora of spheres like defence, economy, science, culture, education, science, technology, etc. The following section discusses bilateral cooperation in the sphere of defence. Indo-Vietnam Relations During the Post-Cold War Period: Strategic Understanding in Perspective Geographically and geo-politically India’s connection with the Southeast Asian region has been governed by two important communication links— land and sea. Peninsular Southeast Asia forms a geographically contiguous region with India, connected by terrestrial routes. The imperative of maintaining a stable and peaceful maritime order has necessitated the development of strategic ties between India and Vietnam, though incrementally. A seminal agreement in this regard was signed between the two countries in September 1994, which provided for the maintenance and upkeep of military equipment supplied to Vietnam by the erstwhile Soviet Union. The focal mission of this agreement was to promote cooperation between the defence establishments of the two countries and was not aimed at any third country (The Pioneer, 1994). Within the framework of the India–Vietnam Joint Commission Meetings, India’s cooperation in spare parts supply to Vietnam, apart from providing service of Sovietorigin defence equipment on a commercial basis, established the pedestal for situating cooperation in defence as ‘…an important aspect of bilateral relations between India and Vietnam’ (Times of India, 1997). The landmark visit of the Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes to Hanoi in March 2000, which marked distinction as the first ever to be conducted by the Defence Minister, witnessed the signing of a 15-point agreement, providing for repair and overhaul of the Russian MiG aircraft fleet of the Vietnamese Air Force; training pilots; assisting Vietnam in defence industry; manufacturing small and medium weapons and certain

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ordinance products; assistance by the Indian Navy in the repair, upgrade and building of vessels for the Vietnamese Navy and providing personnel training; training Vietnamese officials in the application of information technology and software development in the defence field, among others (Annual Report: 2000–2001, 2001, 25; Mohan, 2000). In course of this visit, George Fernandes hailed Vietnam as India’s ‘…most trusted friend and ally’ and acknowledged Hanoi’s support for India’s nuclear tests (1998). This defence accord institutionalised the framework for regular meetings between their Defence Ministers to discuss matters relating to shared threat perceptions, apart from paving the way for visits by Indian naval ships to Vietnamese ports and naval exercises (Solanki, 2021, 220). In the context of addressing China’s hegemonic overtures which pose traditional security threats, India and Vietnam have been engaging in a plethora of defence and security cooperation initiatives, within the broad ambit of the Strategic Partnership (2007) and Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2016). The Joint Vision Statement on India– Vietnam Defence Relations (2015) provides further momentum and direction to substantive bilateral cooperation, while the India–Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People (2020) forms the pedestal for future development of their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Vietnam’s favourable position as a vital pillar in India’s ‘Act East’ policy (Speech of the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi at Joint Press Statement between India and Vietnam, 2016) has been accepted by Hanoi thus expanding the space for defence cooperation between them.. Several institutional mechanisms and initiatives like the Bilateral Maritime Security Dialogue, annual Deputy Ministerial Defence Policy Dialogue and Security Dialogue, Strategic Dialogue between the Foreign Ministers, Joint Vision Statement on Defence Partnership towards 2030, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to simplify procedures for Mutual Logistics Support (June 2022) in addition to regular and friendly visits to each other’s ports by naval and coast guard ships, have bolstered the contours of bilateral collaboration.. A pivotal addition to the bilateral initiatives, the Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People (2020) has ushered in greater momentum in India–Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, seeking to elevate military-to-military exchanges, training and capacity-building programmes across the three services and coast guards and intensification of defence-industry collaboration. Further defence exchanges are also envisaged through mutual logistics support, regular ship visits, joint naval exercises, exchanges in military Science

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and Technology, etc. (India–Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People, 2020, Cl. 2). Besides, the Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People focuses on exploring newer avenues with huge developmental potential, like blue economy, maritime security and sustainability, sustainable resource mobilisation, thus ensuring optimal security and development for all stakeholders (List of Outcomes: India–Vietnam Virtual Summit, 2020, Cl. 3,4). Summarily then, the Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People and a Plan of Action (2021–2023) have unveiled a plethora of opportunities for cooperation between India and Vietnam for the purpose of sustaining peace, stability, order and openness of the Indo-Pacific region. The importance of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership ‘…as a source of security, stability and progress’ in the IndoPacific region has been underscored at several high-level exchanges, thus reflecting the commitment of the two countries in upholding the same as the cornerstone of collaboration in various spheres, including defence and security (Vietnam attaches importance to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with India: PM, 2023). Two important agreements, Implementing Arrangement on Defence Industry Cooperation (December 2020) and MoU to simplify procedures for Mutual Logistics Support (June 2022), are poised to bolster bilateral cooperation by enabling defence-industrial collaboration (ibid) expanding the scope and domain of defence ties by 2030, by allowing the respective defence forces to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies (India, Vietnam ink military logistics support pact and Vision Document to expand defence ties, 2022). Furthermore, in terms of practical cooperation, Vietnam sought New Delhi’s support, exhorting it to ‘…exert diplomatic pressure on Beijing’, as part of its efforts to mobilise international opinion against China in the wake of the latter’s ‘interference’ with ongoing oil and gas activities in South China Sea (Peri, 2019). Furthermore, high-level exchanges between the two sides have taken place in course of the Minister of National Defence of Vietnam, Gen. Phan Van Giang’s official visit to New Delhi in June 2023, when he reviewed the progress of bilateral defence exchanges with his Indian counterpart, Rajnath Singh, in addition to charting the means to enhance the level of cooperation, especially in defence-industrial, multinational and maritime security spheres. Serving as a ‘milestone’ in Vietnam’s defence capacity enhancement, the Indian Defence Minister announced gifting of ‘INS Kirpan’—an indigenously built fully operational missile corvette— to the Vietnamese Navy, the only nation to have been gifted the same

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(till date). The corvette is equipped with a medium-range gun, surface to surface missiles, among other equipment, enabling it to perform a wide variety of roles, including coastal and offshore patrol, coastal security, surface warfare, anti-piracy and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations (Raksha Mantri and Minister of National Defence of Vietnam hold talks in New Delhi to carry forward bilateral defence cooperation, 2023). Besides, Rajnath Singh met his Vietnamese counterpart on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in Jakarta in November 2023, and reaffirmed commitment towards deepening multifaceted cooperation across the wide spectrum of training, capacity building, defence-industrial in research and joint development, in addition to bilateral ship visits and exercises (Raksha Mantri holds bilateral meetings with his Indonesian and Vietnamese counterparts on the sidelines of 10th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in Jakarta, 2023). Acknowledging defence and security cooperation as ‘…a key pillar of our engagement’ (Visit of External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar to Vietnam, 2023) Vietnam’s urgency in garnering New Delhi’s vocal support against China’s infringement upon its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the South China Sea indicated greater acceptance of India as a power capable of offsetting China’s ambitions in the region, to a considerable extent. The introduction of the Government of India’s flagship ‘Make in India’ programme since September 2014, further supplemented by the ‘Aatma Nirbhar Bharat’ mission launched in the context of the COVID19 pandemic, have been successful in showcasing India’s investor-friendly countenance and a much-relaxed regulatory ambience in terms of attracting foreign investment as well as promoting self-reliance and indigenization. These policies have opened doors to the public and private sectors, incentivized domestic production and created space for defence corridors and joint ventures (Launch of ‘Aatma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyaan’ is a ‘watershed’ moment in the economic history of India: Raksha Mantri, 2020). In the non-traditional security domain, the Indian Navy has demonstrated its responsible role as the first responder in HADR endeavours, undertaken in the wake of environmental disasters and the pandemic. The commitment of the Indian Navy deserves sincere acknowledgement in this regard because such exercises were conducted since May 2020, at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic (India believes in Security & Growth for all in the Region to focus on cooperative measures for sustainable use

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of oceans: President Kovind, 2022). Such assistance has assured Vietnam regarding India’s capabilities and readiness to address contingency issues. Nuclear energy cooperation: As the challenges to energy security are burgeoning by the day, provides another mantle of bilateral collaboration. India’s assistance was initiated in 1986, when the Atomic Energy Commission signed an accord on peaceful use of atomic energy (August 1986), paving the way for Vietnamese scientists and experts to receive training in India. This nuclear pact, though limited to training, described as a ‘memo of cooperation in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes’ (The Indian Express, 1988) was another milestone in IndoVietnamese collaboration. Subsequently, in 1999, the two countries signed an agreement for cooperation in the field of nuclear power, exchange of scientists and assistance in setting up a training centre in Vietnam. As a result, around 25 Vietnamese scientists received training at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Mumbai. During Vajpayee’s visit to Vietnam in 2001, an MoU was inked between the Department of Atomic Energy of India and the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment of Vietnam, providing that cooperation for the utilisation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes signed in 1986, would be valid until May 2002. It also accorded continued cooperation in the field of human resource development and the exchange of expertise (Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visits Vietnam, 2001). This agreement was an extension of the MoU (April 1998). The most remarkable development in this sphere was the signing of the Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (2016) and signing of MoU (March 2018) to strengthen the technical cooperation in the field of atomic energy for peaceful purposes (India & Vietnam enhance nuclear cooperation, 2018). These agreements provide a broad-based arena of collaboration including research on nuclear reactors and other niche areas, in which India has developed comprehensive capabilities, like mining, uranium production, fuel fabrication, nuclear power production, spent fuel reprocessing and waste management. Therefore, civil nuclear cooperation has been a momentous addition to bilateral strategic ties, evidently demonstrating a major thrust in India’s Vietnam policy in the post-Cold War era.

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Indo-Vietnam Relations During the Post-Cold War Period: Economic Cooperation in Perspective The present section provides a comparative analysis of bilateral trade relations along the Indo-Vietnam, Sino-Vietnam and Sino-India trajectories. At the bilateral level, India is among the top 10 trading partners of Vietnam. Economic and commercial cooperation has been identified as a thrust area in the domain of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Among the Indo-Vietnam agreements, the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (1994); Bilateral Investment Protection Agreement (1997); Binh Bo Pumping station project in Phu Thu province worth US$9.5 million (Annual Report: 2017–2018, 2018, 36) signing of seven MoUs for grants-in-aid of US$1.5 million for social infrastructure projects for the Cham community in Ninh Thuan province (2018) (Annual Report: 2018–2019, 2019, 81–82) launching of direct flight operations by private airlines between major cities (Annual Report: 2019–2020, 2020, 85), etc., are remarkable developments. India’s trade relations with Vietnam have been positive and mutually advantageous over the last two decades, as bilateral trade increased from US$52 million in 1991–1992 to US$3.72 billion in 2010–2011, US$9.26 billion in 2014–2015 and US$14.7 billion in 2022–2023. While export figures were nearly US$5.9 billion and imports about US$8.8 billion, the Balance of Trade (see Table 4.1) in the last five years has been in favour of Vietnam. In its latest research report, ‘Future of Trade 2030: Trends and Markets to Watch’, Standard Chartered forecasts Vietnam will be a major driver of global trade growth over the next decade, while India will emerge as a fast-growing export corridor for Vietnam with 11% annual Table 4.1 India’s bilateral trade relations with Vietnam from 2018 to 2023 values in US$ millions Year

Export

Import

Total trade

2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021 2021–2022 2022–2023

6,507.38 5,059.90 4,999.64 6,702.67 5,909.16

7,192.23 7,283.42 6,120.66 7,438.52 8,794.73

13,699.61 12,343.32 11,120.30 14,141.19 14,703.89

Source Export Import DataBank (2023)

Balance of trade −684.86 −2,223.53 −1,121.02 −735.85 −2,885.57

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average growth in the 2020–2030 period (Nhat, 2021). Since 2009, bilateral trade figure has increased by an annual average of 16%. However, this figure constituted only 1.05% of India’s total global trade and nearly 10% of ASEAN trade. At present, Vietnam is India’s 19th largest trading partner and 11th largest export destination. It is also India’s fourth-largest trading partner among the ASEAN countries, succeeding Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia (Vietnam: Economic & Commercial Relations, 2021). Currently, India’s investments in Vietnam are estimated at around US$2 billion including investments routed through third countries. According to Vietnam’s Foreign Investment Agency, India has 378 projects with total invested capital of over US$1.07 billion in Vietnam. Major sectors of Indian investments are energy, mineral processing, agro processing (coffee, tea, sugar, etc.) Information Technology (IT), automobile components, pharmaceuticals, hospitality and infrastructure. Indian Business Chambers provides a platform for Indian businesses through its presence in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. As of 2021, Vietnam has six investment projects in India with total estimated investment of US$28.55 million, primarily in the areas of pharmaceuticals, IT, chemicals and building materials (India–Vietnam Trade and Economic Relations, 2022). Furthermore, Vietnam is also a partner country in Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) mechanism and India through its Initiative of ASEAN Integration (IAI) programme and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), since 2017, has been actively involved in various provinces in Vietnam for development of community infrastructure at the grassroots level (India–Vietnam Relations, 2021). Another area of cordial understanding between India and Vietnam is the former’s economic assistance in building hydropower plants for electric generation. In 2008, India’s EXIM Bank provided US$45 million credit for building 200 MW Nam Chien hydropower plant, which is the largest project India is currently financing in Vietnam (India–Vietnam Relations, 2012, 2). The construction project is executed by the public sector company, Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited (BHEL), and the dam is expected to generate 814 million KWatt of electricity per year (Hydro plant begins generating electricity, 2013). Under the banner of India’s ‘Act East’ policy and as an important partner in its Indo-Pacific strategy, New Delhi attempts to explore Vietnam’s market, resources and human advantages to develop bilateral trade.

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Sino-Vietnam economic ties are based on a solid foundation. In comparison with India, Sino-Vietnam trade figure has scaled higher. As of September 2023, China’s exports to Vietnam were US$146, 96 million, while imports from Vietnam was US$87.96 million, resulting in a negative trade balance of US$59.00 million, in favour of China (see Table 4.2). During the last 26 years, China’s exports to Vietnam have increased at an annualised rate of 22.1%, whereas during the same period, Vietnam’s exports to China have increased at an annualised rate of 22.4%. Between September 2022 and September 2023, the exports of China have decreased by US$371 million (−2.9%) from US$12.8 billion to US$12.4 billion, while imports increased by US$110 million (1.17%) from US$9.36 billion to US$9.47 billion. Vietnam’s imports from China include about 214 items, more than double the quantity of Vietnamese goods exported to China. As of the second half of 2023, China is running 4,032 projects in Vietnam with a total registered investment capital of over US426 billion, ranking third among the 144 countries and territories investing in Vietnam. Chinese investment covers a wide range of sectors, including textiles, machine manufacturing, electronics and new energy. On cooperation in the economic corridor among five provinces and cities of Hanoi, Hai Phong, Quang Ninh and Lao Cai in Vietnam and China’s Yunnan province, the two sides have signed an MoU to jointly promote the connection between the ‘Two Corridors, One Belt’ framework of Vietnam and the BRI (Linh, 2023) Furthermore, the two countries envisage cooperation in the spheres of infrastructure and connectivity, enabling customs efficiency through the model of ‘smart border gate’ in addition to boosting Table 4.2 Vietnam’s bilateral trade relations with China from 2018 to 2023 values in US$ millions Year

Export

Import

Total trade

2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021 2021–2022 2022–2023

41,366 41,434 48,880 55,923 87,96

65,516 75,586 84,198 108,851 146,96

106,882 117,020 133,078 164,774 23,492

Balance of trade −24,150 −34,152 −35,318 −52,928 −5,900

Source Compiled by the authors based on Vietnam Trade Balance-Exports and Imports (2021) and China & Vietnam Trade (2023)

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the sectors of economy, trade and investment, education, training and people-to-people contact (Dong, 2023). Such endeavours will facilitate transport infrastructure connectivity between the main economic centres and border areas in China and Vietnam. A momentous step to emphasise the future course of bilateral cooperation was taken by the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, when he visited Vietnam in December, 2023, after a six-year hiatus. It signalled the willingness of the two sides to elevate the Vietnam–China Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership, and build ‘a Vietnam-China Community with a shared future having strategic significance’ (Joint Statement between Vietnam and China, 2023). Bilateral cooperation between China and Vietnam is complemented by multilateral coordination, guided by international and regional frameworks and agreements, like ARF, AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), East Asia Summit (EAS), World Trade Organization (WTO) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement. In course of a meeting in connection with the third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF), the Vietnamese President, Vo Van Thuong and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping agreed to uplift specific directions and measures to enhance political trust, deepen and elevate comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership in the coming years. The two countries issued a 13-point Joint Statement, including strategic contents guiding the development of bilateral relations in all fields for the future. Simultaneously, they emphasised strengthening of relations in keeping with the 16-word motto, ‘Friendly neighbours, comprehensive cooperation, long-term stability, looking to the future’ and the spirit of the four virtues, ‘good neighbours, good friends, good comrades, good partners’ (Vietnam–China political trust continues to be strengthened and deepened, 2023). Having discussed the trajectory of economic cooperation between India, Vietnam and China, it is clear that Vietnam’s economic relations with China are better and quantitatively much higher, when compared to India, the bitterness in Sino-Vietnam ties pertaining to territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea notwithstanding. This trend may be explained considering Vietnam’s efforts to accelerate integration into the global market and diversify its trade and investment profile. On the other hand, factors behind the deceleration of economic ties between New Delhi and Hanoi, when compared to China are:

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First, protectionist policies and high customs duty. Second, India is not party to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and has withdrawn from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) due to anxieties over its trade deficit issue with other RCEP members. Third, although India is signatory to ASEAN–India Free Trade Area (AIFTA) (of which Vietnam is also a part), New Delhi has not signed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Investment Protection Agreement with Hanoi. Fourth, underutilization of lines of credit. Fifth, Indian exports to Vietnam have not displayed consistent growth in the last five years (since 2017–2018), accounting for US$6 billion in 2022–2023. Sixth, with reference to Indian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Vietnam, the former should develop facilities for reducing information asymmetry among Indian companies and encourage Indian businessmen to tap the Vietnamese market and compete with other foreign investors by utilising the spirit of solidarity. Seventh, India lacks focus on simplification of customs procedures, improving trade infrastructure and tax regulations and procedures must be uniformly implemented and less frequently amended. Furthermore, these policies should align with trade policies to assist firms in scaling up production, for which, India must follow a cooperative sustainable development model. Eighth, need for improving physical connectivity linkage through land, sea and air, via third party to reach its investment destination, mainly through its IAI programme with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CMLV) as well as the India–Myanmar– Thailand trilateral highway linking India with Thailand via Myanmar, and its proposed extension to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The proposed connection of this highway with a four-lane highway with the ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity and the ASEAN East–West Corridor will be a welcome development in this regard (Wadhwa, 2019). Ninth, China’s BRI has unveiled a new vista in terms of cooperation with Vietnam. Vietnam is part of the project and willing to cooperate with China due to its advantages. In order to sustain its presence in Vietnam’s economic turf, India must embark on more concrete steps

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to promote economic integration with CLMV through projects such as the India-CLMV Business Conclave and the MGC. Moreover, India should collaborate with Vietnam to promote the diversification of aid in mainland Southeast Asia. Vietnam is not only a close strategic partner of India but also a proactive middle-sized member-state of ASEAN, playing a critical role in facilitating mainland Southeast Asia’s socio-economic progress through ASEAN platforms and the Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam Developmental Triangle Area. Hanoi is also keen on integrating extra-regional players in the Mekong region to foster regional growth and economic diversification. Vietnam can act as an important bridge-builder between India and CLMV in the sphere of connectivity and economic cooperation. India’s role in improving economic understanding will be essential since it does not have a BRI programme of China’s ilk, while China has consolidated its economic position not just in Vietnam but also in the wider Mekong region through projects like BRI and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (Nair & Dung, 2021). It is a fact that the evolving competitive outlook vis-à-vis China, fuelled by tensions in the South China Sea and the strategic implications of overdependence, have pushed Hanoi to reach out to alternative economic partners, including India. Since India lags behind in various vital parameters as a preferred business destination, New Delhi must address the limitations. Therefore, to tap the Vietnamese economic market and balance China, India needs to rethink its economic policy towards Vietnam as well as mainland Southeast Asia.

India’s Emerging Role in Indo-Pacific: China’s Perception China has cast its silhouette on the foreign and defence policies of India, as well as on the matrix of Indo-Vietnam ties. Among various issues, the unresolved Sino-India border problem, China’s ‘all-weather’ alliance with Pakistan and Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions in the South China Sea have been major causes of trepidation. Like India, pending its phase of national liberation, China’s policies have been circumspect in Vietnamese policy circle. Vietnam’s border problem with China, aggravated by the boundary clash in February 1979, has amply demonstrated its hegemonic posture.

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This outlook was further entrenched by the territorial disputes over the contested sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. China perceived its premeditated concerns regarding India and Vietnam diplomatically, thereby exerting incessant external pressure to destabilise them. Axiomatically, the shared strategic interests of India and Vietnam with respect to China provide the basis for building and reinforcing Indo-Vietnam cooperation. New Delhi, through its Indo-Pacific policy, is committed towards a free, open and rules-based liberal maritime order, emphasising security of the sea lanes of communication. India’s ‘Look East’ naval diplomacy, in conjunction with the Maritime Doctrine, have influenced its relations with littoral ASEAN states, including Vietnam, which perceive India as a capable balancer of China. Different versions of the Indian Maritime Doctrine (2004, 2007, 2009 and 2015) envision the ‘…arc from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca as a legitimate area of interest’ and the South China Sea as its secondary area of interest, a domain having direct connection with areas of primary interest impinging on future deployment. The 2015 edition of the Indian Maritime Doctrine (Indian Maritime Security Strategy/IMSS, 2015) justifies the significance of the Indian Navy as the primary instrument to secure the oceanic neighbourhood for economic purposes, given India’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific (Chakraborti & Chakraborty, 2020, 68–71). As a manifestation of its naval outreach, interoperability and cooperation with other stakeholders and the demonstration of its capability of playing its four-pronged role, viz. military, diplomatic, constabulary and benign, the Indian Navy conducts on a regular basis bilateral and multilateral exercises with partner countries and occasional exercises like HADR, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); high-level maritime strategic interactions, etc. India’s expanding outreach, emerging position as a first responder and net security provider in the Indo-Pacific and the establishment of alliance relations with major littoral players, including Vietnam, Australia, Japan, the US and other ASEAN members either bilaterally, or multilaterally, have raised serious concerns for China, specifically in the backdrop of Washington’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy and references to the region as the Indo-Pacific. India’s role in the QUAD and Vietnam’s ties with the QUAD partners have created trepidations for China, since it views the grouping as an anti-China coalition, realising its deterrent effect. Besides, the burgeoning level of Indo-US strategic and economic ties has far-reaching implications for China, since the region is

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an arena of Sino-US competition in the contested South China Sea, as well as over economic and trade matters. As China continues its grey-zone tactics of intimidating states which have commercial stakes and disputes over territorial claims in the South China Sea, international opinion against this unilateral infringement of a state’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction, bolstered by voices of regional powers like India, does not augur well for Beijing’s unbridled assertiveness.

Conclusion Having discussed the trajectory of Indo-Vietnam relations from the prism of China from the Cold War to the post-Cold War years, it is evident that Cold War ties at the bilateral level were determined by great power politics. However, the paradigmatic shifting of the strategic, political and economic centre of gravity from the Euro-Atlantic to Asia in general and Southeast and East Asia, in particular, entailed the sudden demise of the former Soviet Union. India, in the context of the new-fangled worldwide arrangement, radically re-designed its foreign policy, based on economic imperative, introducing the New Economic Policy, LEP and ‘Act East’. India acknowledged Vietnam’s distinction as a partner, throbbing with the potential of emerging as a regional power, having a long seaboard on the South China Sea, besides sharing extensive convergence of strategic interests with India. As both countries pragmatically realise the geo-strategic imperative, in the context of the elongating and aggressive silhouette of China, they should strive towards a concerted effort to keep China peacefully engaged in the region. India has accorded paramount importance to its security, strategic objectives and economic interests, in the framework of which, Vietnam assumes a niche. Indo-Vietnam partnership could emerge as the ‘critical element’ and potential balancer to the Sino-Pakistan nexus, as well. Hanoi recognises New Delhi as a global player and believes that increased synchronisation will be strategically significant in this new global order. This doable strategic partnership needs to be nurtured relentlessly and sustained on a long-term basis, rather than on tactical expediency. The analysis of India–Vietnam relations from the perspective of China would be incomplete without accounting for occasional dilemmas, having a bearing on their respective foreign policy agenda and strategies, based

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on pragmatic national interests. Vietnam’s relations with China are essentially sweet and sour, the latter spurred by thorny, unresolved strategic issues, dominated by the South China Sea crisis. This strategic contention, however, does not preclude Hanoi’s economic engagement with China, fuelled by the former’s considerations of national interests and the advantages of BRI membership, facilitated by Xi Jinping’s aspirations of prioritising neighbourhood diplomacy and emphasis on ‘…steadily promoting the building of a China-Vietnam community with a shared future that carries strategic significance’ (Xi Kicks off Vietnam visit, calling for China–Vietnam community with a shared future, 2023). Therefore, despite the trepidation in Sino-Vietnam relations, bilateral trade, investment and people-to-people/tourism interactions have demonstrated a positive trend, providing impetus to their soft power-based association. Vietnam’s trade and economic relations with China are impressive, their points of discord and occasional bitterness on several political and strategic issues, notwithstanding. Therefore, considering its national interests, Vietnam follows a two-pronged strategy vis-à-vis China: while on the one hand, it pursues engrossing China with the aim of mending and expanding the domain of bilateral relations, it emphasises the strategy of cooperative engagement with other states like US, India, Japan, Russia and other ASEAN members, to counter China’s assertive policy in the region, on the other. This endeavour has been evident in the elevation of diplomatic relations with the US to ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, at par with China and Russia, in course of the American President, Joseph Biden’s historic visit to Hanoi in September 2023. While acknowledging the ‘exceptional opportunity’ provided by this visit to enable the signing of bilateral agreements pertaining to multiple issues like trade and investment, science and technology, supply chain development, new energy, biotechnology, semiconductors, rare earth elements, etc., Biden and Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, reiterated their commitment and support for ‘…our shared vision for broader bilateral cooperation, deeper institutional ties and extensive and innovative economic engagement, including in support of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity’ (Fact Sheet: President Joseph R. Biden and General Secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong Announce the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, 2023). Biden’s categorical denial that this visit and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam that emerged as its result were not reflective of a strategic move aimed at ‘containing’ China (Baker &

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Rogers, 2023) however, does not mask Washington’s attempt to forge ‘win-win’ cooperation with Hanoi as a conduit to consolidate its regional role and the deterrent effect both in terms of strategic and trade and investment potential vis-à-vis Beijing. China’s response to this ‘historic’ development in US–Vietnam ties has been cautious, reiterating its optimism in Hanoi’s emphasis on ‘…developing long-term, stable and sound Vietnam-China relations as the top priority of Vietnam’s diplomacy, as well as the top priority for Vietnam’s external exchanges’. On the other hand, while acknowledging the US’ bid to contain China, the Spokesperson of Chinese Foreign Ministry’s caveat to Washington to ‘…abandon the Cold War mentality and zero-sum mindset’ in its relations with Asia, calling on it to ‘…abide by the basic norms of international relations’ (Sheng & Yuying, 2023) clearly points to Beijing’s disquiet. This may be viewed in the context of the potential of the US–Vietnam partnership in facilitating US’ Indo-Pacific diplomacy in general and deepening cooperation with Vietnam pertaining to the maritime domain, port infrastructure, joint research and development, global supply chains, Rare Earth elements and semiconductors in particular. For India, such a development will definitely be welcome and perceived positively in the context of deterring China’s regional hegemonism and enabling greater balance of power and stability in the region. Vietnam’s attempt to maintain an open, accommodative and diversified foreign policy based on both bilateral and multilateral approaches, with occasional hedging, remains a prerequisite for its successful handling of pressure from China. With reference to India, in spite of solidarity, friendship and convergence on a number of political and strategic issues, its economic relations with Vietnam have not been as satisfactory as expected, particularly on a comparative scale with China. Likewise, over the decades, Sino-India relations have been strained by a host of issues, discussed above. Besides, both India and Vietnam face threats as lower-riparian countries, bearing the brunt of China’s dam-building activities as upper-riparian on the Brahmaputra and the Mekong Rivers respectively. These conflicting dynamics have blemished the domain of Sino-Indian and Sino-Vietnamese relations, with China’s commonality as the principal threat, motivating India and Vietnam to forge mutually synergized ties, thus erecting a bulwark against Chinese political and strategic advances in the Indo-Pacific regions. Summarily then, while underpinning the elevated vision of an Asian Century, which is becoming increasingly real with the tectonic shift of the economic and strategic centre of gravity from Euro-Atlantic to

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Asia, India, Vietnam and China are determined to carve their respective positions in the world order. India and Vietnam have been judiciously efficacious in addressing the crucial and outstanding issues in their ties with China. However, the discomfort in their political and strategic ties with China endures, due to the factors mentioned above. An interesting point to be noted at this juncture is that Indo-Vietnam relations have not been impacted by ‘ideology’ and the path of solidarity followed in the Cold War period has maintained its rhythm in the post-Cold War years. It thus necessitates the three countries under discussion to build upon the roadmap of cooperation, while relegating competitive and conflicting trends to the backburner. While explaining the paradox of India–Vietnam relations, in the current scenario, Beijing’s assertive behaviour is shifting the power dynamics in the domain of India–Vietnam ties, leading them to move towards greater convergence for securing national interests or, in some cases, to adopt a hedging policy, to expedite a multipolar, rules-based regional order that narrows the space for unilateral adventures by Beijing. In the context of the interdependent world order, countries would be diplomatically well-informed to weigh the costs of being pulled into bilateral ‘mind-games’ (Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaishankar S., as cited in Hindustan Times, 2024) and supplement it with diversified interactions at multilateral, regional and even sub-regional levels as the underlying principle of deterrence and balancing against active or potential hegemons. In doing so, both India and Vietnam must follow the ‘middle path or Buddha path’ as the best alternative strategy, being cognisant of and prioritising national interests and strategic autonomy.

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Sheng, Y., & Yuying, Z. (2023, September 11). China Confident in Vietnam Ties Despite US Lifting Partnership. Global Times. https://www.globaltimes. cn/page/202309/1298014.shtml. Accessed 18 February 2024. Solanki, V. (2021). India-Vietnam Defence and Security Cooperation. India Quarterly, 77 (2). Speech of the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi at Joint Press Statement between India and Vietnam. (2016, September 3). New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. https://www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-at-the-joint-pressstatement-in-hanoi-vietnam-522149. Accessed 20 October 2023. Statement of the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh at the First East Asia Summit held in Kuala Lumpur on 14 December 2005. (2005). New Delhi: Press Information Bureau. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease. aspx?relid=53427. Accessed 15 October 2023. The Pioneer. (1994). 8 September. The Week. (2002). 28 January. Times of India. (1997). 3 August. Vietnam attaches importance to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with India: PM. (2023, October 16). Vietnam Plus. https://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnamattaches-importance-to-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-with-india-pm/ 269722.vnp. Accessed 28 February 2024. Vietnam Trade Balance-Exports and Imports. (2021). https://wits.worldbank. org/CountryProfile/en/Country/VNM/Year/2021/TradeFlow/EXPIMP. Accessed 16 November 2023. Vietnam: Economic and Commercial Relations. (2021). Hanoi: Embassy of India. https://www.indembassyhanoi.gov.in/page/economic-and-commer cial/. Accessed 16 November 2023. Vietnam-China political trust continues to be strengthened and deepened. (2023, November 14). Vietnam. https://www.vietnam.vn/en/tin-cay-chinh-tri-vietnam-trung-quoc-tiep-tuc-duoc-cung-co-va-di-vao-chieu-sau/. Accessed 17 November 2023. Visit of External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar to Vietnam. (2023, October 18). New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. https://www.mea.gov.in/ press-releases.htm?dtl/37196/Visit+of+External+Affairs+Minister+Dr+S+Jai shnakar+to+Vietnam+October+1518+2023. Accessed 24 February 2024. Wadhwa, A. (2019, August 9). India’s Act East Policy. Speech Delivered at Dr. Harisingh Gaur University. Madhya Pradesh, https://www.mea.gov.in/distin guished-lectures-detail.htm?840. Accessed 16 October 2023. Xi Kicks off Vietnam visit, calling for China-Vietnam community with a shared future. (2023, December 12). Xinhua. https://english.news.cn/20231213/ c6bb337d3a454a468ad426793ea4f0cb/c.html. Accessed 1 March 2024.

CHAPTER 5

A Comparative Study of India and China’s Cultural Diplomacy in Southeast Asia Claudia Chia Yi En and Liao Bo Wen

Introduction In the aftermath of the Cold War (1948–1991), characterized by a diversification of international issues, an amplified emphasis on soft power of nations, and accelerated flows of information and personnel mobility, a discernible paradigm shift has engendered a wider acknowledgment of cultural diplomacy. Many countries have started to articulate cultural diplomacy in their public diplomacy frameworks. This phenomenon persists amidst contemporary trends of deglobalization, the global spread of COVID-19, and disruptions to political and trade interactions, attesting to the resilience of cultural exchanges and influences.

C. C. Y. En (B) Independent Researcher, Singpore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] L. B. Wen Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, Singpore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_5

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The oft-quoted definition of cultural diplomacy advanced by Cummings (2003, 1) encapsulating it as “the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding,” underscores its participatory nature and the two-way relations building between the state and host nation. Fundamentally, cultural diplomacy can be construed as the deliberate planning and selection of one’s cultural assets to communicate values and beliefs to foreign audience. In addition, such assets are employed to engage the participation of the local populace in host nations, thereby fostering social relationships beyond official diplomatic channels. Across countries, the typical programs encompassed within cultural diplomacy are (1) the establishment of cultural and language centers, (2) implementation of educational programs and scholarships, (3) facilitation of exchanges between cultural and religious entities, and (4) coordination in heritage restoration. Importantly, cultural diplomacy transcends the sole purview of the state; its execution requires the active involvement of non-state actors, particularly within the creative and cultural industries. As highlighted by Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010, 10), “unlike in other areas of diplomacy, the state cannot do much without the support of non-governmental actors such as artists, curators, teachers, lecturers and students.” However, the role and manifestation of culture in the realm of international relations remain elusive, especially when juxtaposed with economic and political dimensions. The role and employment of culture has often been an afterthought of traditional diplomacy as Arndt (2005, XVIII) stated: “cultural diplomacy only takes place when the governments pay attention to this complex field and try to give sense to chaos so as to configure it, to some extent, and put it at the service of the elusive ‘national interest’, so difficult to define.” Mazrui (1990, 8) asserted that “culture is at the heart of the nature of power in international relations” notwithstanding, the abstract and broad conception of culture continues to pose challenges to the theoretical construction of cultural diplomacy. The diversity and flexibility of cultural exchange agents—whether state or non-state—along with the vague and latent pathways of cultural interactions and challenges in outcome assessment continue to lead to a “semantic muddle” (Mark, 2009, 1). Notably, the cultural motifs and materials chosen for diplomatic endeavors are endowed with state legitimacy, representing the officially

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sanctioned culture for export and serving as a reflection of the state’s selfconception. Often, these cultural elements are also laden with political meanings and purposefully crafted into narratives for the local audience. In this manner, cultural diplomacy can be considered a strategic maneuver aimed at gaining favorable perceptions towards the state. At the heart of cultural diplomacy lies a recognition of the impact that cultural exchanges can have on shaping perceptions, fostering goodwill and building relationships between nations. By strategically deploying cultural initiatives, countries seek to project a nuanced image of their societies, values, and heritage to the global stage. The reception of the host nations towards these diplomatic overtures is thus a crucial determinant of the efficacy of the state’s cultural diplomacy.

Justifying the Case Choice The cultural diplomacy endeavors of India and China in Southeast Asia present a compelling case study as it offers a rich tapestry for inquiry, epitomized by the combination of economic, geopolitical, and historical factors. Both countries have been propelled by their rapid economic growth which has catapulted them to geopolitical significance and their geopolitical proximity to Southeast Asian countries. Further, both have substantial reservoirs in civilizational and cultural capital that have had major historic influences on the socio-cultural developments in Southeast Asia. Motifs like Buddhism and Hinduism intertwined with trading routes resonate deeply with the historical fabric of Southeast Asian societies, wherein tales of monks and merchants’ travels, intertwined kingdoms, scriptures study, and temples visits have perpetuated many facets of everyday life. As the following sections would reveal, India and China have often leveraged elements of their shared civilizational, religious, and cultural heritage with the region. Official articulations from both countries often stress cultural exchanges framed within the paradigms of reciprocity and mutual respect, and grounded in the overarching goal of fostering mutual understanding and trust between nations and their citizens. Additionally, the resonating influence of both China and India within the landscape of Southeast Asia is further amplified by the substantial presence of their diasporic communities. These diasporas play multifaceted roles in shaping the cultural, social, and economic dynamics of their adopted homelands. In certain instances, they have not only assimilated into the local ethnic fabric but

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actively participated in political processes. The integration highlights their potential to act as conduits for cross-cultural dialogue and understanding on behalf of China and India, fostering not only surface-level cooperation but also nurturing shared appreciation for diversity and enduring ties. The examination of cultural diplomacy in this context offers useful insights into the broader aspects of the practice. Delving into the structural underpinnings of both Indian and Chinese cultural diplomacy reveals that they have often been directly orchestrated or at least significantly backed by governmental or quasi-official entities. This approach underlines a deliberate and coordinated effort on the part of both countries to wield cultural diplomacy as a potent instrument that aligned with their broader national interests and foreign policy objectives.

Cultural Diplomacy of China Cultural exchanges represent an innovative concept unique to Chinese diplomacy, deriving from a conceptual reinvention based on traditional Chinese culture. The term ‘cultural’ (人文) traces its origins to the I Ching or Book of Changes《周易》: “The interplay of the strong and the weak manifests the principles of the heavens. With civilization, it epitomizes humanity. By observing celestial patterns, one discerns temporal changes. Through understanding human culture, one brings transformation to the world” (Renwen n.d.a). Ancient Chinese scholars placed ‘cultural’ on par with ‘celestial,’ believing in its potential to transform the world. As China increasingly moves to the center of the global stage, with its growing frequency and scope in international affairs, the country has realized the importance of building new international relationships and win–win cooperation through cultural means. It also comes from a deep realization that China’s national image abroad has not kept pace with its economic ascent. The emergence of narratives such as the “China threat theory” and predictions of China’s impending collapse in Western mainstream discourse exacerbated the overall image of China across the globe. To counter these negative perceptions, China sought what Kurlantzick (2007) called “charm offensive” to espouse concepts of ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘benevolent power.’ Within this, cultural diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges became ever more important to change others’ perceptions of China.

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The administrative framework for China’s cultural diplomacy was established in the 1990s, characterized by a combination of overarching coordination and specific implementation. The primary agency responsible for this macro-level coordination is the State Council Information Office, founded in 1991. Its mandate includes organizing interdepartmental large-scale cultural exchange activities, as well as producing and distributing books, audio-visual materials, and film publications introducing China to the world. Key official bodies tasked with detailed implementation comprise of the Department of International Cooperation and Exchanges under the Ministry of Education, the Office of the Chinese Language Council International (commonly referred to as the ‘Hanban’),1 and the Bureau of External Cultural Relations under the Ministry of Culture. Noteworthy non-governmental organizations engaged in these efforts include the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, the China International Culture Exchange Center, and the China Association for International Cultural Exchanges. In recent years, the Confucius Institutes and overseas Chinese Cultural Centers have emerged as enduring mechanisms for China’s cultural diplomacy. Meanwhile, short-term cultural outreach initiatives have been featured in large-scale events such as the World Exposition and the Olympic Games. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party in late 2012, President Xi Jinping has on numerous occasions elaborated on the significance of cultural exchanges in his speeches, elevating them to a strategic level to serve the construction of a community with a shared future for humanity. In 2017, the Chinese government released the ‘Opinions on Strengthening and Improving Cultural Exchanges between China and Foreign Countries,’ 《 ( 关于加强和改进中外人文交流工作的若 干意见》) which laid out a specific action plan for the furtherance and enhancement of cultural exchange initiatives. The guidelines underscored the necessity of promoting mutual understanding and learning between Chinese and foreign publics as the cornerstone of cultural exchanges.

1 In July 2020, the main office of the Confucius Institute in Beijing, also known as Hanban (汉办), underwent a rebranding and officially adopted the name Ministry of Education Centre for Language Education and Cooperation (教育部中外语言交流中心). Notably, despite this name change at the headquarters, the Confucius Institutes located overseas retained their original branding.

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They advocated for a people-centered approach, mutual learning, openmindedness, systematic exemplification, multilateral participation, and reformative innovation, integrating these principles into every facet of China’s international engagements. Chinese cultural exchange activities have a long-standing history in Southeast Asia. In the Ming Dynasty, Zheng He led a grand fleet on seven voyages to the Western Oceans, bringing to the regions he visited products like silk, tea, and porcelain, while also engaging in extensive cultural exchanges and disseminating Chinese culture. In Indonesia’s port city of Semarang stands the majestic Sam Poo Kong temple, housing many artifacts left behind by Zheng He’s fleet. Given Zheng He’s adherence to Islam, he also introduced the religion to Southeast Asia. Since its inception in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has traversed a decade of developmental endeavors and China, guided by the principle of ‘culture first,’ has fervently leveraged cultural diplomacy as a connecting link, establishing a foundation of shared public sentiment and understanding for the collaborative construction of the BRI. Countries in Southeast Asia, positioned at the nexus of the terrestrial and maritime convergence of the BRI, stand out as a priority direction and pivotal partner in China’s advancement of this grand project. These countries not only share a long-standing history of interactions with China, but in contemporary times, they also represent focal points in China’s proactive peripheral diplomacy. In recent years, cultural diplomacy between China and Southeast Asia has seen a vibrant upward trajectory, characterized by many bilateral agreements in the cultural domain, frequent mutual visits by cultural delegations, and the regular organization of various cultural events. Educational exchanges with the Southeast Asian region stand at the forefront of China’s cultural diplomacy efforts. Several types of scholarships are offered by the Chinese government and universities, including China Scholarship Council (CSC) Scholarships, University-Based Scholarships, Confucius Institute Scholarships, and Provincial Government Scholarships. Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia rank prominently among the top source countries for international students in China. The aim is not only to narrate the Chinese story outward but also to absorb and bring back the rich cultural essence of Southeast Asia into China. These students are envisioned to serve as ambassadors of cross-cultural exchange, paving the way for expanded educational interactions between the Chinese and the Southeast Asian population.

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The Confucius Institute (CI) is one of the pivotal initiatives in China’s educational exchanges with Southeast Asia. The CIs and Confucius Classrooms (CC) represent non-profit educational entities established by China in joint ventures with foreign universities and secondary educational organizations, marking the emergence of a novel educational model. In this way, the CI could be considered beyond being a ‘Chinese’ institute but also as a language education center of the host university. In contrast to Western equivalents like the British Council, Germany’s Goethe Institute, or the Alliance Française, the CIs are directly integrated into the campuses of local universities and often provide the local department of Chinese studies with staff, scholarships, teaching materials, and support for cultural events. With the continuous strengthening of China’s political, economic, and cultural prowess, these institutions, designated for the promotion of the Chinese language and culture, have attracted increasing attention. Southeast Asia, home to the world’s largest diaspora of Chinese individuals, has historically been more profoundly influenced by Han culture in comparison to Western and other Asian nations. However, in juxtaposition to Europe, America, and East Asia, the quantity and distribution of CIs and CCs in Southeast Asia appear relatively scant and uneven. As of January 2024, out of the 11 Southeast Asian nations, with the exception of Brunei, which has not established any, have inaugurated 43 CIs and 17 CCs. Thailand stands out with the highest number of CIs (16) and CCs (11), thereby being the Southeast Asian nation most ardently endorsing these institutes. Crucially, cultural affinity, ethnocultural commonalities, national acceptance, and economic opportunities all play a role in determining the distribution and number of CIs. In the case of Thailand, the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban) of China and the Thai Ministry of Education inked the ‘Sino-Thai Framework Agreement on Chinese Language Teaching’ in 2006. This was also in conjunction with the Thai national policy to promote Chinese language education in its five year (2006–2010) strategic plan. Subsequently, that very year, Thailand established 10 CIs, thereby transitioning Chinese language teaching from being primarily grassroots to a formal inter-governmental collaboration between China and Thailand. The Thai Confucius Development Alliance, an unofficial organization, helps to facilitate resource sharing and cooperation within different CIs in the country. At the peak, over 2000 Chinese teachers and

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volunteers were teaching the Chinese language in Thailand (Global Times, 2023). Princess Sirindhorn, a member of the Thai Royal Family, has actively advocated for Sino-Thai cultural exchanges. Being interested in Chinese language and culture, she speaks the language and travels extensively to China. The highly esteemed royal family, having a robust foundation of public admiration, exerts significance influence on national policy orientations, thereby facilitating the rapid growth of CIs in Thailand. Her support led directly to the establishment of the CI in her alma mater, the Chulalongkorn University. Additionally, China has set up its first China Cultural Center in Southeast Asia in Bangkok. Nonetheless, while these factors are multifaceted, the impact of any singular factor remains limited. Confucius Institute and confucius classroom in Southeast Asia Country

Confucius Institute

Confucius classroom

Cambodia (3) Confucius Institute of the Royal Academy of Cambodia Confucius Institute at University of Battambang Confucius Institute at Cambodia University of Technology and Science Indonesia (8) Tourism Confucius Institute at Udayana University Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at Universitas Negeri Surabaya Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at Malang State University Confucius Institute at Universitas Sebelas Maret Confucius Institute at Universitas Kristen Maranatha Confucius Institute at Hasanuddin University Confucius Institute at Universitas Tanjungpura Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at University of Al Azhar Indonesia Laos (2) Confucius Institute at Souphanouvong University Confucius Institute at National University of Laos (continued)

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(continued) Confucius Institute and confucius classroom in Southeast Asia Country

Confucius Institute

Confucius classroom

Malaysia (6)

Confucius Institute at University College of Technology Sarawak Confucius Institute at SEGi University Confucius Institute at Universiti Malaysia Sabah Confucius Institute at Universiti Malaysia Pahang Kongzi Institute for the Teaching of Chinese Language at University of Malaya Confucius Institute at Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman

Confucius Classroom at Pay Fong Middle School Malacca

Myanmar

Singapore (2) Singapore Silk Road Confucius Institute Confucius Institute at the Nanyang Technological University Thailand (16) Confucius Institute at Chulalongkorn University Confucius Institute at Assumption University Confucius Institute at Betong Municipality Confucius Institute at Phuket, Prince of Songkla University Confucius Institute at Prince of Songkla University Confucius Institute at Chiang Mai University Confucius Institute at Bansomdejchaopraya Rajabhat University Confucius Institute at Kasetsart University Confucius Institute at Mahasarakham University

Confucius Classroom at Fuxing Language and Chinese Class Confucius Classroom at Fuqing Language and Computer School Confucius Classroom at Eastern Language & Business Centre Confucius Classroom (Crestar)

Confucius Classroom at Assumption Commercial School Confucius Classroom at Xingmin School Confucius Classroom at Phuket Wittayalai School Confucius Classroom at Nawamintharachinuthid Horwang Nonthaburi School Confucius Classroom at Lampang Kanlayanee School Confucius Classroom at Swang Boriboon Witaya School Confucius Classroom at Suankularb Wittayalai School Confucius Classroom at Rayong Wittayakorm School Confucius Classroom at Chltralada School (continued)

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(continued) Confucius Institute and confucius classroom in Southeast Asia Country

Philippines (5)

Vietnam (1)

Confucius Institute

Confucius classroom

Confucius Institute at Khon Kaen University Confucius Institute at Mae Fah Luang University Maritime Silk Road Confucius Institute Confucius Institute for Traditional Chinese Medicine at Huachiew Chalermprakiet Maritime Silk Road Confucius Institute at Phranakhon Rajabhat University Confucius Institute at Burapha University Confucius Institute of Suan Dusit Rajabhat University at Suphanburi Confucius Institute at Ateneo de Manila University Confucius Institute at Angeles University Foundation Confucius Institute at the University of the Philippines Confucius Institute at Ateneo De Davao University Confucius Institute at Bulacan State University Confucius Institute at Hanoi University

Confucius Classroom at Srinakorn School Confucius Classroom at Traimit Wittayalai High School

Timor-Leste

Confucius Classroom at the Institute of Business

Compiled by authors from Confucius Institute website in March 2024, https://ci.cn/ en/qqwl

China Cultural Centers in Southeast Asia Year established

Country

City

2012 2014 2016 2017

Thailand Laos Cambodia Myanmar

Bangkok Vientiane Phnom Penh Yangon (continued)

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(continued) China Cultural Centers in Southeast Asia Year established

Country

City

2018 2019

Malaysia Vietnam

Kuala Lumpur Hanoi

Compiled by authors from China Cultural Center website in March 2024, http://en.ccc web.org/

Conservation of heritage represents another cultural diplomacy instrument increasingly bestowed importance by China. In 2021, China led the formation of the Alliance for Cultural Heritage in Asia (ACHA) with thirteen countries to strengthen collaboration in conservation of heritage across Asia. For Southeast Asia, Cambodia and Myanmar are members with Singapore and Vietnam as observers (China Daily, 2023). The ACHA has successfully raised about US$12 million for ongoing conservation projects, pointing towards substantial opportunities for future initiatives. Further, in the Theravada Buddhist mainland Southeast Asian countries: Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, China has sought to utilize tours of Buddhist relics, organization of Buddhist conferences by the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) and mutual visits of Buddhist clergy, to build multilateral Buddhist engagements (Raymond, 2020). Amplifying grassroots engagements with Southeast Asian countries and establishing enduring societal linkages constitutes another key focal area of China’s cultural diplomacy. At the current stage, bilateral cooperation predominantly unfolds at the governmental level. Paradoxically, interactions at the grassroots level between the two entities remain rather underdeveloped. In recent years, although official interactions between China and Southeast Asian countries seem robustly intertwined, they lack a solid foundational basis, especially in the economic and societal domains. In recent years, youth exchange initiatives emblematic of this growing connection, such as the ‘Study in China Education Exhibition,’ ‘Experience China Summer Camp,’ ‘China Roots-Seeking Summer Camp,’ and ‘Youth Mutual Visit and Exchange Study Programs,’ have emerged as pivotal platforms for the youth of both sides to deepen mutual understanding and foster friendships. Beyond bilateral youth interactions, China and ASEAN countries are also amplifying youth exchanges within multilateral frameworks. Instances like the China–ASEAN Youth Camp,

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ASEAN Youth Leadership Training Sessions, and the China–ASEAN Young Entrepreneurs Forum testify to the escalating frequency of such intercultural youth exchanges.

India’s Cultural Diplomacy Similar to China, India predominantly conducts its cultural diplomacy at the governmental level. The pivotal agency steering India’s cultural diplomacy is the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), created in 1950. Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first Prime Minister, was also the ICCR’s first President. The ICCR operates as an independent body under the administrative control of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and typically has an Indian diplomat as its director-general. ICCR (ICCR, About Us) has been identified “as a pre-eminent organisation of MEA with a mandate of India’s soft power abroad, ICCR’s activities are spread across the globe ranging from providing scholarships to organizing exhibitions to performing arts and visuals arts programme.” The official objectives of the ICCR are delineated as follows: (1) actively participate in the formulation and implementation of policies and programs pertaining to India’s external cultural relations; (2) to foster and strengthen cultural relations and mutual understanding between India and other countries; (3) to promote cultural exchanges with other countries and people; and (4) to develop relations with nations. As of December 2023, ICCR has established 37 Indian Cultural Centres (ICCs) worldwide, 6 of which are located in Southeast Asia. As indicated by the ICCR Report (2021–2022), the selection of locations is based on “countries where India has significant strategic, economic, political and cultural interests, also in countries which have a large Indian community.” Supporting this outreach effort are 18 regional offices across various states of India, facilitating a spectrum of cultural activities and educational programs. Indian Cultural Centers in Southeast Asia Year established

Country

City

Name

1989

Indonesia

Jakarta

2005 2009

Indonesia Thailand

Bali Bangkok

Jawaharlal Nehru Indian Cultural Centre Swami Vivekananda Cultural Centre Swami Vivekananda Cultural Centre (continued)

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(continued) Indian Cultural Centers in Southeast Asia Year established

Country

City

Name

2009 2010

Myanmar Malaysia

Yangon Kuala Lumpur

2016

Vietnam

Hanoi

Swami Vivekananda Cultural Centre Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose Indian Cultural Centre Swami Vivekananda Cultural Centre

Compiled by authors from ICCR website in January 2024. https://iccr.gov.in/cultural/ indian-cultural-center-map

In addition to managing the ICCs, the ICCR administers educational and scholarship programs and overseas the establishment of Chairs of Indian Studies and Indian Languages and Tagore Chairs in foreign universities. Annually, over 3000 scholarships are disbursed to foreign students under 24 different scholarship schemes. The set up of Chairs of Indian Studies is often accompanied with a corresponding India Studies Centre in the host universities as well. These studies centers are funded by the Ministry of Culture through Grant-in-aid to Indo-Foreign Friendship Cultural Societies. Scholarships from the India-based Nalanda University and Doctoral Fellowship in India for ASEAN students also constitute integral components of India’s educational initiatives in Southeast Asia. ICCR established chairs in Southeast Asia Sr. No

Country

University/Institute and City

Subject

1

Thailand

2 3

Cambodia Indonesia

Silpakorn University Thammasat University Chiang Mai University PSRB University, Phnom Penh Udayana University

Sanskrit Hindi In process Buddhist and (Sanskrit) Studies Sanskrit

One distinctive element of ICCR activities that sets it apart from the typical cultural programs is the commissioning of busts and statues of eminent Indians, like Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore, for installation abroad. In 2015, India gifted Singapore’s Indian Heritage Centre (IHC), the first museum dedicated to Indian history in the city-state, the busts of Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose.

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Under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi since 2014, India has taken a more proactive approach to engaging Southeast Asia especially with the transformation of the Look East Policy to Act East Policy (Dash, 2023, 439–464). Cultural diplomacy has expanded to include the promotion of Buddhism, Yoga, spirituality, and Vedic knowledge. Recognizing the global appeal of Yoga as a uniquely Indian practice, India had proposed the International Day of Yoga to the United Nations General Assembly in 2014 and ICCR subsequently started to organize conferences on Yoga since 2018. Modi even has a YouTube channel titled ‘Yoga with Modi’ where viewers could view a series of animated yoga videos in different languages. The ICCR has also often organized Yoga workshops in their cultural centers in Southeast Asia. In October 2021, the ICCR organized seven pre-conferences on Buddhism in the run-up to the Global Buddhist Conference. An ICCRsponsored International Conference on Buddhism Heritage in Southeast Asia was organized at Phnom Penh in December 2010 with participation of scholars from India, Cambodia, China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. In 2014, the ten-day “festival of India in Thailand,” the first of its kind in Thailand had a unique Buddhist exhibition (Dharma Darshan) organized by the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara University. The MEA also forged a collaborative partnership with Gautam Buddha University to organize a comprehensive three-day course focused on India’s Buddhist heritage. Titled “Engaged Buddhism: A joint way forward for India and ASEAN,” the program is meticulously crafted for ASEAN diplomats, civil servants, and academics. Numerous ASEAN member states have enrolled in this specialized course, which was conducted virtually as part of the Centre’s Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme. Earlier in 2016, Modi’s visit to Vietnam saw him inaugurating annual scholarships for Vietnamese students to pursue advanced Buddhist studies at Indian educational institutes for Buddhist Sangha members. All these reflects India’s endeavor to promoting a harmonious blend of physical and spiritual well-being on the global stage. From November 2021 and August 2023, the ICCR ran several iterations of the ‘Gen-Next Democratic Network,’ a new flagship program bringing bring young social and political delegates from 77 democracies to India for dialogue. This initiative adds a significant new color to the ICCR’s usual echelon of cultural activities and educational coordination. The dialogue supports only participants from identified democracies, illuminating that India’s cultural diplomacy has taken on a value-driven

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and political messaging. The identification of the ‘democratic countries’ reflects who India wants to be associated with and the political stance that India takes globally. Currently, the ICCR is fully funded by the MEA. The funding amount for ICCR has also increased in recognition of the importance of projecting India’s influence abroad. A recent Committee Report on External Affairs (2022–2023) has proposed recommendations for the ICCR to explore Public–Private Partnership model to attract external partners for project execution and broaden its scope and range of activities. Furthermore, since becoming a strategic partner of ASEAN, India has leveraged this connection to enhance its relations with Southeast Asian countries. Many initiatives such as the ASEAN–India Artists’ Camp and ASEAN–India Music Festival have emerged as platforms for cultural and talent exchange. Universities in India have also taken a lead in organizing talks and lectures with ASEAN members. For example, the Delhi School of Journalism of the University together with the Center for Vietnam Studies organized a seminar titled “State, media, and society in India and Vietnam” in September 2020. Buddhism promotion Heritage Conservation Education Scholarship Yoga promotion

Sankrit promotion

India's cultural diplomacy

Sending cultural delegations abroad Holding of Indian cultural festival abroad Establishing and maintaining India studies in chairs of university abroad Teaching Hindi language abroad Art/ Cultural exhibitions abroad Sending of statues/busts of great personalities of India

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Main activities of Indian cultural diplomacy (Laskar, 2019, 252–253). Italics added by authors. Beyond the ICCR, cultural and creative institutions such as the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA), India International Centre (IIC), and the three academies—the Lalit Kala Academy, the Sahitya Academy, and the Sangeet Natak Academy—also propagate their own cultural and language activities to the foreign audience, albeit at a lesser scale. Additionally, Bollywood films and Indian television series have seen increasing popularity in many Southeast Asian countries. For example, Indonesian TV station, ANTV has regularly broadcasted Indian soap dramas and organized visits to small towns by Indian celebrities (Jakarta Post, 2020). Major film stars like the three Khans—Shah Rukh Khan, Amir Khan, and Salman Khan, are also widely known to the Southeast Asian audience. Another notable component is India’s heritage diplomacy, largely undertaken by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), under the Ministry of Culture, which has been actively involved in initiatives to restore Hindu and Buddhist temples and cultural monuments in Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Indonesia, and Laos. While most of the projects have been undertaken with Memorandum of Understanding signed between countries and the Indian government, some of the projects have been conducted with third-party international agencies such as the UNESCO World Heritage Committee. One of the largest Indian aids for heritage diplomacy was a US$2.25 million project for the conservation and restoration of Cham temples in Central Vietnam’s UNESCO World Heritage Site at My Son from 2017 to 2022. The challenges of conversation and restoration attests to the highly skilful ASI experts which has won India goodwill among the Southeast Asian countries. The successful conservation of Angkor Wat, with the assistance of ASI, has been a notable achievement in India–Cambodia relations. The value of heritage diplomacy has been noted by the Indian government, having set up a division within the MEA in 2020 for the Development Partnership Administration to administer partnerships for heritage conservation schemes abroad. More projects such as Mausam, Sagarmala, Spice Route, and Cotton Route have sprung up to support outreach efforts of the Indian government to cultivate relations with Southeast Asian nations.

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Reception of Countries Toward China and India Overtures It is important to note that “[a]udiences can interpret cultural diplomacy in an entirely different way from how its creator or source intended” (Rawnsley, 2021, 29). Despite the push of cultural diplomatic ventures, the willingness and receptiveness of the host nations are critical determinants of the scale and successes of the efforts. Cultural diplomacy, at its core, is a two-way flow of exchanges. The efficacy of China’s cultural diplomacy towards Southeast Asian countries is entwined with intricate dynamics shaped by geopolitical considerations and the magnitude of its cultural influence. From a geopolitical perspective, Southeast Asian nations exhibit heightened sensitivity to their surroundings, especially those who share borders and conflicts with China. The sensitivity level varies among these nations, with considerations influenced by neighboring major powers, historical dominations, and territorial disputes. A paradigmatic illustration of this geopolitical complexity is discernible in the case of Vietnam. Historically, Vietnam has grappled with a pronounced asymmetry vis-à-vis China in terms of territorial expanse, population, economic prowess, and military might. The enduring imprint of Chinese dominance, spanning from the third century BCE to the tenth century CE, has left an indelible mark on Vietnam’s socio-cultural landscape and memory. Although the Vietnamese culture has been deeply influenced by China, historical frictions and contradictions have accumulated over time, exacerbated by the South China Sea disputes. Consequently, Vietnam perceives a significantly greater geopolitical pressures from China, setting the stage for a cautious approach to embracing Chinese cultural dissemination. The cancelation of the Chinese–Vietnamese historical drama ‘Li Gongyuan: The Road to Th˘ang Long City’ (Lý Công Uẩn Ðu,ờng tới thành Th˘ang Long) in 2010 and the subsequent directive by Vietnam’s Ministry of Culture in 2014 to remove Chinese-style stone lions from historical sites due to its perceived excessive ‘sinicization’ underscore the nuanced nature of Vietnam’s reception. The Vietnamese government has to date only approved the establishment of a single CI at the University of Hanoi. This institute, after over eight years of preparatory efforts, was officially inaugurated in 2014. Moreover, in recent years, due to the continuing South China Sea disputes between China and Vietnam,

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Vietnam has sought to ban Chinese series and the Barbie film circulation as a result of showing controversial maps (BBC, 2023). Despite historical ties that have imbued Vietnamese culture with Chinese influences, contemporary Vietnam navigates the delicate balance between acknowledging shared heritage and safeguarding its cultural identity in the face of geopolitical complexities. Contrastingly, Thailand, positioned distantly from China’s borders and having absence of experiences under Chinese rule, reacts positively to China’s cultural diplomatic overtures. Since the establishment of bilateral diplomatic ties in 1975, cultural collaborations have flourished. The active involvement of Thai royalty, exemplified by Princess Sirindhorn’s commitment to Chinese language and culture, exemplifies the depth of cultural engagement. Notably, her recognition as one of the ‘Top Ten International Friends of China’ in 2009 and being awarded the China’s Medal of Friendship in 2019 underscores the mutual appreciation and fruitful cultural exchange between the two nations. Furthermore, China has been Thailand’s largest trading partner for the last decade and the learning of Chinese language and culture has been perceived as a source of employment opportunities and economic benefit by the government and locals. This prompted the Sino-Thai community to help channel Chinese investments into the local economy. Estimates revealed that about 15% of the total Thai population can be classified as Sino-Thai, and within this demographic, over 25% are involved in prominent Thai businesses and 53% of Thai prime ministers have been of Chinese descent (Rappa, 2022). The community has often lobbied for increased Chinese economic engagement and investments. With the proliferation of Chinese goods, investments, and tourists, major Cambodian cities have witnessed a ‘Mandarin Fever,’ with the Chinese language on the verge of becoming the country’s second-most prominent language. The emergence of Chinese language as a coveted linguistic asset is propelled not merely by political motivations but is substantially underpinned by the economic opportunities and advantages it affords. For instance, the number of Chinese tourists visiting Cambodia has steadily risen, reaching approximately 1.2 million in 2017. For the first time, China became the largest international tourist source for Cambodia. The Duanhua Chinese School located in Phnom Penh currently enrolls over 10,000 students, with an additional 2,000 attending night classes. Chinese works, including ‘Justice Bao’ and ‘Pleasant Goat and Big Big

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Wolf,’ have been introduced to Cambodian audiences through translations. Cambodia’s national television network has even dedicated a segment titled ‘Chinese Theater.’ Currently, Cambodia, with its relatively weak cultural influence, faces not only challenges in promoting its culture internationally but also has a rather limited development in its domestic cultural sector, expressing a high demand for international cultural assistance and tourism income. Its geopolitical situation has made Cambodia particularly attentive to the role China plays in safeguarding its national development, leading to a welcoming attitude towards the spread of Chinese culture. As a result, Cambodia has predominantly adopted a proactive collaboration in its cultural diplomacy with China. The establishment of CIs has also met with the problem of nomenclature in Indonesia and Malaysia due to sensitivities of local politics. In the former, the term ‘Confucius’ was unfavorable due to the state’s recognition of Confucianism as a religion, and local representatives provided five names without ‘Confucius’ to the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia for selection (Theo & Leung, 2018). As a result, Pusat Bahasa Mandarin, the Indonesian name is used for CIs in the Bahasa Indonesian language whereas ‘Confucius’ is retained for its English nomenclature. In short, countries in Southeast Asian especially those enticed by the economic potential of China’s economy, actively seize the opportunity to learn the language and engage with the Chinese market. On one hand, they leverage China’s influence to bolster their own socio-economic development, reaping the benefits of China’s rapid growth and political imperatives. On the other hand, they reciprocally utilize their unique strengths to promote their national image to both the Chinese state and its populace, thereby enhancing their cultural influence and boosting their tourism industry. India’s cultural diplomatic overtures have garnered a largely positive reception within Southeast Asia, possibly attributed to the absence of territorial conflicts and geopolitical tensions with the countries in the region. This congenial atmosphere has fostered a reciprocal influence and mutual understanding between India and the host nations. Over the years, India has formalized cultural agreements with several countries: Vietnam (1976), Thailand (1977), Laos (1994), and Cambodia (1996), Singapore (2015). The setup of Cultural Exchange Programmes (CEPs) also exist with Myanmar (2004–06), Cambodia (2013–2015) and (2018–2022), Laos (2011–2013), Vietnam (2011–2014), and Thailand (2016–2019).

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These agreements serve as structured frameworks for the building of collaboration between India and the countries involved. In particular, India’s outreach activities have been most successful in the widespread popularity of Yoga and Bollywood in some of the countries. For instance, Vietnam has embraced Yoga with enthusiasm, evidenced by the hundreds of attendees for yoga events organized by ICCR and the Indian Embassy. The founding of the Vietnam Yoga Federation in 2016 further attests to the growing interests and participation of locals in yoga-related activities. In 2022, the Quang Ninh province collaborated with the Embassy of India to organize a cultural and yoga event at Ha Long Bay, a UNESCO World Heritage site. The popularity of Bollywood in Southeast Asia led to some countries taking initiatives to attract the Indian film industry. In 2008, Shah Rukh Khan became the first Indian actor to be conferred with the prestigious Malaysian title of Datuk, in recognition of promoting tourism to Malaysia through his films. In his speech at the business summit hosted by the Confederation of Indian Industry, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India in 2012, Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, cited the huge appeal of Bollywood films in Singapore and the vast potential of the industry (Prime Minister’s Office, 2012). Thailand has also become a popular destination for the Indian film industry, mainly South Indian films, helped by the support of a large Indian diaspora. India’s cultural diplomacy within Southeast Asian region gained significant momentum in the 2010s, marking a relatively recent development that has yet to yield discernible impacts on the local population. The faith-based diplomacy, particularly through the utilization of Buddhism and Yoga practice, represents a novel addition to the Indian toolkit of cultural diplomacy. Therefore, a comprehensive assessment of the impact on targeted societies remains contingent upon the sustained continuation of these diplomatic initiatives in the near future. The evolving nature of India’s cultural diplomacy repertoire not only highlights creativity and adaptability of how states construe their cultural diplomacy, but it also points to the importance of longitudinal observation and studies to capture the shifts in perceptions and responses within the host nations and foreign audience.

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Conclusion This chapter underscores that host countries do not merely play the role of a passive audience. Beyond formalizing agreements and participating in exchanges, host nations actively engage in shaping and responding to these overtures, thereby contributing to the intricate interplay of confluence, collision, and mutual attraction of different thoughts and cultures with China and India. This comparative exploration into the cultural diplomacy endeavors of India and China has garnered nuanced insights into the complexities inherent within cultural diplomacy, illuminating the manifold dimensions that underpin interactions between nations and their cultural representation in foreign lands. Critically, this study highlights the significant disparities in the scale and depth of China’s cultural diplomacy in contrast to India, with the former wielding a more expansive influence that permeates deeper into the Southeast Asian societies. Noteworthy are the instances where some Southeast Asian governments, while responding to Chinese cultural overtures with measures aimed at safeguarding cultural sovereignty, have also seen a more favorable reception from their local populace. The reception to Chinese cultural initiatives, especially learning of the language through CIs, highlights the allure of the Chinese economy, emphasizing its potential to generate tourism income and employment opportunities for local communities. Comparatively, the learning of Hindi and Sanskrit language has not commanded similar levels of attention. This divergence may be attributed, in part, to the widespread use of English in India and the relatively lesser number of Indian tourists in Southeast Asia. This dynamic underscores the multifaceted nature of cultural diplomacy, where economic incentives play a pivotal role in shaping the reception of cultural overtures.

References Arndt, R. (2005). The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. PotoMac Books. Barbie movie gets Vietnam ban over South China Sea map. (2023). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66083761 Cummings, M. (2003). Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey. Center for Arts and Culture, hal.1.

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Dash, S. (2023). Overview. In Cultural Dimensions of India’s Look-Act East Policy. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-3529-9_ 11 Enthusiasm for learning Chinese rises in Thailand as Chinese replaces Japanese as second-largest foreign language. (2023). The Global Times. https://www. globaltimes.cn/page/202308/1296691.shtml Gienow-Hecht, J. C. E., & Donfried, M. C. (Eds.). (2010). Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy (NED-New edition, 1, Vol. 6). Berghahn Books. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt9qd42q HALLYU rising in Indonesia, but Indian pop culture still loved after decades. (2020). The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/life/2020/05/ 27/hallyu-rising-in-indonesia-but-indian-pop-culture-still-loved-after-decades. html ICCR. (n.d.). About Us. Official Website of Indian Council for Cultural Relations, Government of India. https://iccr.gov.in/about-us ICCR. (n.d.). Annual Reports & Accounts. Retrieved from Official Website of Indian Council for Cultural Relations. Government of India. https://iccr. gov.in/annual-reports. Kurlantzick, J. (2007). Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World. Yale University Press. Laskar, R. K. (2019). India’s Public Diplomacy Instruments. Research Review International Journal of Multidisciplinary, 4(2), 250–255. Mark S. (2009). ‘A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy’, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. Clingendael Institute. Mazrui, A. A. (1990). Cultural Forces in World Politics. J . Heinemann. More states join key Asian alliance, pledge to protect cultural heritage. (2023). China Daily. https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202304/25/WS6446b8f 3a310b6054facf81f.html Rappa, A.L. (2022). The Teochew Chinese of Thailand. In BOHR International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research (Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 10–16). BOHR Publishers. https://doi.org/10.54646/bijsshr.003 Rawnsley, G. (2021). Cultural Diplomacy Today: A ‘Culture of Dialogue’ or a ‘Dialogue of Cultures’? In J. Ptáˇcková, O. Klimeš, & G. Rawnsley (Eds.), Transnational Sites of China’s Cultural Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan. Raymond, G. V. (2020). Religion as a tool of influence: Buddhism and China’s Belt and Road initiative in mainland Southeast Asia. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 42(3), 346–371. https://doi.org/10.1355/cs42-3b Renwen (Human Culture). Key concepts in Chinese thought and culture. (n.d.). https://www.chinesethought.cn/EN/shuyu_show.aspx?shuyu_id=2283

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Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the business summit hosted by the Confederation of Indian Industry, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India. (2012, July). Prime Minister’s Office Singapore. https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/speech-prime-minister-lee-hsienloong-business-summit-hosted-confederation-indian Theo, R., & Leung, W. (2018). China’s Confucius Institute in Indonesia: Mobility, Frictions and Local Surprises. Sustainability, 10(2), 530. https:// doi.org/10.3390/su10020530

CHAPTER 6

India and China’s Competing Infrastructural Engagements in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam Sreeparna Banerjee

Introduction Southeast Asia, with its intricate web of cultural diversity, economic potential, and geopolitical significance, has become a focal point for major global players seeking influence and economic benefits (Limaye, 2021). As two of the most prominent economies in the Indo-Pacific region, India and China are actively investing in the region to secure their positions in the evolving geopolitical landscape (Ghosh et al., 2022). Nestled strategically between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Southeast Asia provides a gateway to vital trade routes and holds immense potential for economic growth. Both India and China have expanded their diplomatic ties and are directing investments into the region’s infrastructure to solidify their foothold and advance their strategic interests.

S. Banerjee (B) Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata, West Bengal, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_6

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In South and Southeast Asia, infrastructure initiatives encompassing roads, communication networks, and trade hubs accentuate the intersection of political dynamics and cultural narratives stemming from colonial legacies and present-day geopolitical contexts (Hill, 2013; Larkin, 2018; Lindquist & Xiang, 2017; Schnitzler, 2016). New academic discourse challenges conventional perceptions of infrastructure as neutral or devoid of political implications and endeavors to illuminate how these projects’ decisions on inclusion and exclusion manifest in daily experiences beyond their physicality and design (Amin, 2014; Graham & McFarlane,2014; Murphy, 2016). Infrastructure often serves as a rationale for land acquisition and its subsequent organization and security measures (Heming et al., 2001; McLean, 2014). Examining instances of “friction,” where certain groups face constraints on mobility, can elucidate underlying inequalities and injustices (Cresswell, 2014). Roads and marketplaces, alongside canals, dams, and bridges, reshape both rural and urban landscapes, blurring distinctions between centers and peripheries as well as national borders (Barnes, 2016; Gonzalez, 2020). The multifaceted dimensions of such endeavors prompt novel theoretical approaches capable of addressing the impacts of diverse political regimes in countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam. The main objective of this chapter is to analyze the intricacies of infrastructural investments made by India and China in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CMV), highlighting potential differences in their approaches and the geopolitical factors influencing these investments. These three countries have been chosen for this study because of their strategic significance in the region and the substantial ongoing infrastructural projects involving both India and China. Through engagement with New Delhi and Beijing, CMV seeks to draw foreign investment, boost infrastructure, and stimulate economic progress, thereby advancing their overarching development goals and fostering greater connectivity within the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The methodology for this study primarily involves the analysis of infrastructural projects financed by India and China in the CMV countries between 2017 and 2023. For this paper, the author has used published data and reports by the CMV countries and investing states’ governments. The paper uses secondary sources such as reports from nongovernmental organizations, critical research articles, gray literature, and opinion pieces and reports published in newspapers and on news websites. The information and discussions published in the sources have been evaluated by the

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author to understand the scale and impact of infrastructural projects, as well as challenges such as delays, political instability, and security concerns. Infrastructural projects were identified based on their strategic importance and prominence in regional development discourse. This chapter is divided into four sections: the first section analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of India and China’s interests in CMV countries; the second section evaluates ongoing infrastructural projects since 2017; the third section examines infrastructural politics between India and China; and, the last part identifies challenges associated with these projects. The chapter concludes by synthesizing findings.

Theoretical Underpinning Under the lens of critical comparative political economy, the evolving dynamics of India and China’s engagement in Southeast Asia underscore the intricate interplay between geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations within foreign policy frameworks. This perspective challenges the traditional neo-realist emphasis on national uniqueness, arguing instead for a broader understanding of how external imperatives related to accumulation shape nations’ regulatory frameworks (Radice, 1999, 2000). Following the collapse of the former USSR in 1991, the transition from the predominance of military might to the increased influence of economic power reshaped global geopolitics, marking a shift from politics-centric to economics-centric dominance. This transformative economic structural change, emblematic of globalization, has elicited varied responses, from promotion to resistance, as entrenched sociocultural and political norms are challenged (Cerny, 1999). The concept of geo-economics gained traction in the post-Cold War era, highlighting the interconnectedness and disparities in economic opportunities and their broader implications for political and international relations. In the Southeast Asian context, India and China’s interactions exemplify the complex interplay between economic diplomacy and strategic interests. India’s “Act East” policy and initiatives like the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) reflect its geo-economic ambitions in the region, aiming to enhance connectivity, trade, and investment. India’s role in the AAGC involves facilitating infrastructure development, capacity building, and economic cooperation across the regions, thereby strengthening its strategic and economic ties with both Asia and Africa.

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This approach deepens India’s engagement with the region, promoting mutual growth and stability. Conversely, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers infrastructure development and economic partnerships, signaling its intent to expand its influence in Southeast Asia. However, their strategic intent to gain a political and economic foothold is also important to note. In this respect the advancement of the two countries in the Mekong subregion is noteworthy. The Mekong sub-region, referred to as the CMV countries by the Indian government, holds significant strategic importance as it connects the Bay of Bengal to the South China Sea via land. For India, the strategic significance of this sub-region stems from its long land and maritime boundaries with Myanmar, in the Bay of Bengal, and its partnership with Vietnam, which faces maritime territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea—a vital route for about 55% of India’s trade within Indo Pacific region (Pant, 2021). The CMV countries make up 32% of the ASEAN region and have attracted increased attention due to their promising economic potential. India’s trade with the CMV nations is around 11,000 million USD (MoCI, 2016). These countries have open investment regimes, offering non-discriminatory treatment to foreign and local investors alike. Since 2017, the World Bank has classified the CMV nations as “lower-middleincome” economies. India is actively fostering closer ties with these countries due to their strategic location near India’s northeastern states through Myanmar and their overall geographical significance. Their economic growth, stable macroeconomic environment, and potential for accelerated development make them attractive for foreign direct investment (FDI). The CMV countries offer significant opportunities through abundant cheap labor, liberal trade and investment policies, and growing markets. While still lagging behind other ASEAN members such as Indonesia and Thailand in terms of economic development, the gap presents a substantial opportunity for further growth and expansion in the region. India began shifting its focus toward trade integration with CMV countries in 2014 due to the perceived shortcomings of its free trade agreement with ASEAN (Chakrabarty, 2019). In pursuit of this strategy, the Indian government is actively endorsing the establishment of manufacturing hubs by the private sector in these countries. This approach

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aims to provide Indian manufacturers investing in the region with streamlined access to the ASEAN market and advantageous privileges under the Generalised System of Preferences, allowing imports from least developed countries into developed countries with minimal or zero duties. Furthermore, such investments open doors for accessing significant markets like China, Japan, and Australia. Among the CMV countries, Vietnam, as the subregion’s largest economy, has gained increased importance for India, particularly in the context of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade framework. Myanmar has emerged as a noteworthy destination for investors following the removal of Western sanctions after the country transitioned to democracy in 2016. However, the coup in 2021 has slowed much of the progress since the current environment is volatile. Meanwhile, despite being a smaller economy, Cambodia exhibits promising potential for catching up on economic growth. China’s relationship with the CMV countries represents a significant aspect of its broader foreign policy in the Southeast Asian region. Traditionally, Southeast Asia has been acknowledged as a sphere of influence for China, particularly in the CMV region where the geographical proximity is underscored by the shared Mekong River. These countries are recognized as emerging forces within ASEAN and the broader Asian context. Various initiatives, encompassing infrastructure development, the establishment of deep-sea ports, and the construction of roads, have been implemented in the region. China’s engagement with countries is characterized by economic cooperation, infrastructure development, strategic partnerships, and geopolitical considerations. Each CMV country presents unique opportunities and challenges, and China’s approach to each reflects a nuanced strategy tailored to the specific circumstances of each country.

Infrastructural Projects in the Region To conduct a thorough analysis of the infrastructural landscape within the CMV countries, it is crucial to delve into the projects that have significantly shaped the region in recent years. This section serves as a dedicated exploration into the ongoing initiatives spearheaded by both India and China, unraveling the intricate tapestry of development efforts in Southeast Asia. Going beyond the examination of ambitious connectivity corridors and environmental initiatives, this scrutiny aims to shed

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light on the diverse projects that underscore the strategic importance of the CMV corridor. This in-depth exploration not only aims to reveal the infrastructural transformations taking place but also seeks to unveil the geopolitical undercurrents that play a pivotal role in shaping these endeavors. By analyzing the multifaceted projects initiated by both nations, the study strives to provide a holistic understanding of the region’s developmental landscape. This examination serves as a comprehensive narrative, capturing not only the tangible outcomes of infrastructural developments but also the nuanced geopolitical dynamics that contribute to the evolving story of progress within the CMV countries. Chinese Infrastructural Projects in the CMV Countries Cambodia Cambodia is a reliant partner of China due to its economic and political relations. In January 2022, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the China–Cambodia Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) came into effect. Benefits have since been unlocked, and bilateral trade and investment have been progressively liberalized and facilitated. With a record high of US$16.02 billion in bilateral trade in 2022— a 17.5% annual increase—China surpassed Cambodia as Cambodia’s top trading partner for the eleventh consecutive year (MOFCOM, 2023). China, the country that now imports the most rice and bananas from Cambodia, has opened its market to the country’s high-quality agricultural products, such as longans and mangoes. China and Cambodia have been working together in several areas, including infrastructure, agriculture, textiles and apparel, and process manufacturing. Chinese businesses invested more than US $10 billion in Cambodia by the end of 2022 (Khmer Times, 2023). There are around 101 projects in Cambodia under the BRI (Menon, 2023). A substantial portion involves loans for physical transport infrastructure development, including the US $2 billion, 190-kilometer Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, significant airports like Siem Reap International Airport and one in Phnom Penh, and various smaller connectivity projects. As of June 2021, China had completed 3287 kilometers of roads and constructed eight main bridges totaling approximately 7.7 kilometers as part of the BRI (Menon, 2023).

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Cambodia’s strategic embrace of the BRI is deeply rooted in a convergence of legitimization pathways. However, this does not imply an exclusive reliance on China. Driven by a desire to diversify its dependencies and respond to domestic concerns about China’s influence, the Hun Sen regime has adopted a hedging strategy (Chheang, 2021). Externally, Cambodia has actively pursued partnerships with Japan to broaden its strategic and economic ties. Internally, Cambodian elites have crafted narratives emphasizing the benefits of the BRI while aiming to balance short-term gains with long-term risks. This hedging approach also involves maintaining an open stance toward improving relations with the United States, recognizing the dangers of overreliance on any single country (Chheang, 2021). Cambodia’s strategy of hedging primarily focuses on strategic and economic diversification to reduce dependency. For instance, despite a comprehensive partnership with China, Cambodia established a second strategic partnership with Japan in 2013. Additionally, Cambodia publicly supported the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative proposed by Japan, viewing Japan as a potential counterbalance to China’s influence. During Lieutenant General Hun Manet’s visit to Japan in February 2022, both sides agreed to strengthen defense and security cooperation under the Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework (East Asia Forum, 2022). This strategic maneuvering underscores Cambodia’s efforts to navigate geopolitical dynamics while safeguarding its national interests (VOA Khmer,2019). Viewing Chinese investment as crucial for socioeconomic development and poverty reduction, Cambodia perceives the BRI as a valuable resource to advance its domestic objectives, particularly infrastructure development and industrialization. The government’s Industrial Development Policy 2015–2025 outlines ambitious plans that hinge on significant infrastructure investments. However, Cambodia faces challenges, ranking 73rd out of 160 countries for infrastructure quality, with logistics, customs facilitation, and costly electricity hindering growth (Chheang, 2017). To address these deficiencies, Cambodia requires substantial annual investments, estimated at over US$600 million, to develop roads, bridges, power grids, and irrigation systems. The country also aims to construct new expressways by 2040, totalling US$9 billion and US$26 billion, respectively (JICA, 2016). Recognizing the BRI as a potential catalyst for growth, Cambodia views it as a means to diversify industries, facilitate trade and investment, promote tourism, and expand exports to China, particularly agricultural products. Consequently, the BRI is poised to serve as a critical

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funding source for infrastructure projects essential to sustaining growth and positioning Cambodia as a regional economic hub. Furthermore, Cambodia’s involvement in the BRI serves to strengthen the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) by providing resources to key political-business networks (Nyíri, 2017). These networks, led by politically connected tycoons and firms, benefit from BRI projects. For example, projects like the new Phnom Penh International Airport and the Techo 1 satellite venture involve joint efforts between politically linked entities and Chinese partners, highlighting the symbiotic relationship between political and economic interests in BRI initiatives (Bahree, 2014; Chheang, 2021). Myanmar Myanmar holds strategic importance for China due to its abundant resources, favorable geographic position along the Bay of Bengal, and shared land border. This strategic positioning facilitates cost-effective overland oil transport from Myanmar’s ports to Beijing. China, being the major trading partner and the second-largest foreign investor, has spearheaded numerous infrastructural projects, particularly under the BRI. Approved Chinese investment in Myanmar from 1988 to June 2019 exceeded $25 billion, representing nearly 26% of the total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the country (Banerjee & Basu, 2021). Since 1988, China has been the sole country investing in Myanmar, especially when Western countries imposed sanctions due to Myanmar’s undemocratic practices and human rights concerns. However, Myanmar’s transformation into a semi-military regime in 2010 prompted positive reforms and economic liberalization in 2011, encouraging the diversification of foreign partners beyond China. Despite initial public resentment leading to the suspension of projects like the Myitsone dam in 2011 and resistance to the Letpadaung project, China adapted its approach by making changes to the internal policy to safeguard its image and business activities in Myanmar. Increased attention to local laws, enhanced corporate social responsibility initiatives, and engagement with the local population became priorities, especially after Myanmar’s democratic government took office in 2015. In 2018, Myanmar signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the BRI, with the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) emerging as a flagship project under its framework. The CMEC aims to connect Kunming, Yunan’s capital, to Mandalay, extending further to

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Yangon and Kyaukphyu. This initiative revitalized stalled projects and introduced new ones, including the Leptadaung Copper mine project (US $1.065 billion), the Kunming–Kyaukphyu railway (US $8.9 billion), the New Yangon City project (US $1.5 billion), and various economic zones for instance, Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (US $ 1.5 billion), Kyaukphyu deep sea port (US $ 1.3 billion), power plant (US $180 million), Kanpiketi CBECZ (US $ 22.4 million). Post the military coup of February 2021, relations between China and the military government have improved since the latter was shielded by Beijing at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Banerjee, 2023). Myanmar has been receiving continuous backlash from Western nations by the imposition of sanctions on military-controlled agencies. For the first time, ASEAN changed its noninterference policy and asked Myanmar to adopt the 5-point consensus in 2021 only months after the coup that emphasizes opening channels of dialogue with the other parties, and releasing the ex-counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and other political leaders from confinement. Myanmar has been barred from ASEAN Summits for not adhering to the ASEAN peace plan and now holds relations with ASEAN members on a bilateral basis, especially with Thailand (Banerjee & Saha, 2023). This has pushed Myanmar to maintain close relations with China. Both countries have shown significant interest in three new projects, namely, (i) the rail-road-Indian Ocean Route connects Chengdu in Sichuan Province with Singapore through Yunnan Province, the Northern Shan State, and finally with the Yangon port; (ii) the trade route connecting Chongqing province in Southwest China with Myanmar including its neighboring countries like Laos and Thailand; (iii) the maritime route connecting directly the Beibu Gulf port in China’s Guangxi province with Myanmar’s Yangon port. These connections will enhance projects like CMEC, and Lancang Mekong Cooperation under the BRI. However, the coup and fighting with the resistance groups post Operation 1027 have hampered much of the progress and it may take a while to resume. Vietnam Vietnam maintains a cordial relationship with China despite the tensions in the South China Sea. Despite the occasionally unfriendly political environment, there has been a clear improvement in the two countries’ economic ties. Vietnam overtook Malaysia in 2018 to take the first spot among China’s Southeast Asian trading partners. Since then China has

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maintained its position as the region’s top spot. China was only 14th out of 94 nations in 2011 when it came to investing in Vietnam, but by 2023, it had risen to the third rank, investing US $ 2.33 billion (VIR, 2023). The bulk of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) that enters Vietnam is invested in manufacturing and processing, particularly in laborintensive sectors. Real estate, air conditioning, and the production and distribution of gas, electricity, and water are other investment sectors. Chinese companies invested in 45 new projects in Vietnam during the first 50 days of 2023, the highest from a single country, following the conclusion of China’s zero-COVID-19 policy in December 2022. The rising cost of labor in China, the tightening of US trade restrictions on hightech commerce with China, and the reciprocal tariffs from the Sino-U.S. trade war—which in the past spurred a surge of Chinese investment in Vietnam—all contribute to the move (Vietnam Chamber of Commerce, and Industry,2023). The majority of Chinese enterprises investing in Vietnam today are smaller businesses that provide goods and services to larger Chinese multinationals that already have facilities in the country. These smaller businesses benefit from cost advantages, agility, and niche specialization, allowing them to integrate efficiently into the supply chains of larger firms. Their ability to form local partnerships and adapt quickly to changing market conditions helps them navigate Vietnam’s growing economy and leverage new opportunities. For instance, suppliers of support services like plastic molding, die casting, and energy storage have flooded the Vietnamese solar panel market, which is controlled by Chinese companies (Reuters, 2023). Vietnam’s Hedging Approach to BRI Vietnam approaches China’s BRI with caution, reflecting a careful assessment of potential implications for the nation (Nguyen, 2023; Le, 2019). The negotiation process for the MoU between Vietnam and the involved parties spanned two years, indicating existing differences in perspectives, particularly regarding priority areas (Trinh & Do, 2023). The title of the MOU itself, emphasizing connectivity enhancement between the “Two Corridors, One Belt” framework and the BRI, underscores Vietnam’s desire to maintain autonomy over its plan (Nguyen, 2023). This cautious stance is understandable given historical tensions between Vietnam and China, compounded by escalating anti-China sentiments within Vietnam,

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notably in the aftermath of South China Sea disputes (Trinh & Do, 2023). Several projects in Vietnam were initially announced independently and later incorporated into the BRI by China. Notable examples include the Cát Linh–Hà Ðông railway project (railway 2A), which was signed in 2008, and the V˜ınh Tân power station in 2007. While these projects are often considered co-funded efforts by China and Vietnam, they have become part of the expanding list of BRI projects in the past decade. Vietnam, while offering formal support for the BRI, emphasizes key principles such as consensus, equality, and adherence to international law in its execution (Le, 2019). Vietnamese scholars voice concerns about potential dependence on China and highlight issues like inadequate labor rights protection and environmental practices by Chinese firms (Trinh & Do, 2023). Vietnam is actively exploring alternatives for financing infrastructure projects, including loans from international financial institutions and Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) (Nguyen, 2023; Pongphisoot et al., 2023). Despite Vietnam’s formal support, it refrains from active participation in BRI projects or receiving investment funding under the initiative’s scheme (Nguyen, 2023). Instead, Vietnam’s approach can be characterized as hedging, aiming to avoid over-reliance on China while maintaining diplomatic posture (Trinh & Do, 2023). Notably, Vietnam’s rejection of Chinese funding for certain projects reflects its concerns over national security and sovereignty (Nguyen, 2023). Hanoi rejected a loan from Beijing for the construction of the Van Don-Mong Cai high-speed rail route citing supposed delays to the project and excluded Chinese technology giant Huawei from involvement in developing Vietnam’s 5G telecommunications infrastructure. Vietnam justified its decision based on national security concerns, citing them as the primary reason for declining Chinese investment (Le, 2019; The Nation, 2016). In its hedging strategy, Vietnam diversifies relations with other influential countries, notably Japan and the United States (Trinh & Do, 2023). Enhanced ties with Japan, particularly through the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure Investment, demonstrate Vietnam’s preference for alternative investment sources (Nguyen, 2023). Similarly, Vietnam’s collaboration with the United States, including economic and defense cooperation, serves as a counterbalance to China’s influence (Trinh & Do, 2023). During his first-ever visit to Vietnam, US President Joe Biden in 2023 secured deals on semiconductors and minerals, strengthening

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ties with the strategically important Southeast Asian nation. Vietnam also elevated Washington to its highest diplomatic status, placing the US on par with China and Russia in terms of diplomatic relations (The Hindu, 2023). Indian Infrastructural Projects in the CMV Countries Cambodia India’s focus in Cambodia has been on the 3Cs, which are connectivity, commerce, and culture, as well as trade, investment, and commerce. Both sides are also considering a preferential trade agreement to further boost and diversify trade between our countries. Under the Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) of the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), a grant of US$ 50,000 per project was allocated for the execution of five socio-economic projects each year. Between 2015–2016, 2016–2017, and 2017–2018, a total of fifteen QIPs were sanctioned and executed, spanning areas such as agriculture, health, women’s empowerment, capacity building, sanitation, and the environment. These projects garnered positive responses and had a discernible impact on the beneficiaries (Embassy of India, Phnom Penh, 2023). In January 2018, during the State visit of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to India, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced an increase in the number of QIPs from 5 to 10 to be carried out annually in Cambodia. As of 2022, 23 projects have been completed, and an additional 23 projects are in various stages of implementation (Embassy of India, Phnom Penh, 2023). India ranks among the top 10 foreign investors in Cambodia, which plans to establish a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with India, complementing its existing FTAs with South Korea, Japan, and China. This is expected to benefit Cambodia due to India’s strong economy and technology sector. Phnom Penh also appreciates New Delhi’s contribution to COVID-19 vaccines, under the QUAD vaccine initiative (Banerjee, 2022a). Additionally, India has significantly contributed to the restoration efforts of renowned temples such as the iconic Angkor Wat temple in Cambodia, earning appreciation from both the Cambodian people and the government. Another notable project is the ongoing restoration of the Ta Prohm temple complex, with India completing two phases and commencing the third phase in 2016, slated for completion by 2026.

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Concerning infrastructural development and connectivity, the completion and operation of the India–Thailand–Myanmar trilateral highway, set to be extended to include Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam promises to enhance connectivity between India and Cambodia. Moreover, with India acquiring the operational rights to operate the Sittwe port, advancing inter-port connectivity and development between Sittwe and Kolkata Port, there is potential to advance maritime routes and port connectivity with Cambodia and other southeast Asian nations (Banerjee, 2024, 2022a). Given India’s commitment to a rules-based order and autonomy, Cambodia stands to benefit strategically, providing it with a more balanced approach to its relationship with China. Myanmar Myanmar occupies a significant position in India’s geopolitical aspirations, serving as a cornerstone of both the Act East Policy and the Neighbourhood Initiative. Its role extends beyond merely facilitating the development of India’s Northeast Region, as it also establishes vital connections between India and Southeast Asia through key infrastructure endeavors. These projects include vital initiatives such as the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMT-TH), which are instrumental in enhancing regional connectivity and fostering economic cooperation between India and Southeast Asia. Upon completion, these projects are anticipated to stimulate job creation and foster development in regions that have been grappling with the repercussions of a prolonged insurgency (Xinhua, 2019).Through these endeavors, Myanmar emerges as a linchpin in India’s broader vision for regional integration and development. The Chin and Sagaing regions face challenges attracting investments due to transportation difficulties and the absence of essential infrastructure, such as a reliable power supply. The limited inflow of investments has hindered economic growth in these areas. Recognizing the urgent need for improvement, both India and Myanmar have initiated plans to address these challenges. Since Myanmar’s opening in 2011, both the quasi-military and subsequent democratic governments (post-2015) have acknowledged the vital importance of enhancing regional connectivity. A 2016 report from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) emphasized the need to increase transport investment from 1–1.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP) to 3–4% (Banerjee, 2023). The proposed strategy involves raising additional

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finance through private sector participation, offering concessions, and utilizing the public–private partnership (PPP) route. This comprehensive approach aims to overcome infrastructure challenges and promote economic development in the region (OECD, 2020). The KMTTP encompasses a waterways segment of 158 km on the Kaladan River, stretching from Sittwe Port to Paletwa in Myanmar, and a road segment of 110 km from Paletwa to Zorinpui in Mizoram on the India–Myanmar border that is still under construction (Banerjee, 2023). On a welcome note, India has secured the right to operate Sittwe Port, in Myanmar where India Ports Global Ltd. (IPGL) will manage the entire port on the Kaladan River similar to other Indian domestic ports on 6 April 2024 (The Business Standard, 2024). However, the completion of the road section is crucial for leveraging the multimodal component of the Kaladan project. The 110 km road component faces various challenges, including a lack of coordination among border agencies, difficult terrain, issues related to land compensation, and significant security concerns due to insurgency in the area. In 2019, Indian workers were abducted by the Arakan Army (AA) during work on the Kaladan inland waterway. The pandemic, the 2021 coup and the current Operation 1027 where the ethnic groups have now taken over Rakhine and Chin states in Myanmar have further hindered progress due to the ongoing fighting (Banerjee, 2023). The stretch of lands where work is left has been severely impacted by aerial strikes and continuous attacks (Banerjee, 2023). The IMT-TH functions as an East–West corridor connecting India’s northeast with Myanmar and Thailand. The IMT-TH is particularly significant as it stands as the sole corridor linking Cambodia and Vietnam, serving as the only land connection between India and these Southeast Asian nations. The strategic importance of the IMT-TH lies in its role as a key land route facilitating connectivity and economic cooperation between India, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Despite their significance, both connectivity projects, have experienced delays due to the pandemic, and the current political instability in Myanmar post the 2021 coup. The ongoing war among ethnic groups with the Junta makes the completion of ongoing connectivity projects uncertain due to security concerns. (Banerjee, 2023). On another front, India aims to bolster its role in the energy sector, with plans to enhance power transmission connectivity between India, Myanmar, and Thailand. These efforts align with India’s Act East policy

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and the International Solar Alliance’s One World One Sun One Grid initiative (Mint, 2023). However, the realization of this vision faces hurdles such as subsea cable costs, raw material prices, and geopolitical tensions, especially within Myanmar. Overall, while Myanmar plays a pivotal role in India’s regional connectivity projects and development plans, ongoing political instability and security concerns present significant challenges to the timely completion of these key infrastructure projects. Vietnam Vietnam holds an important place in India’s foreign policy. Considered to be a close ally of India Vietnam’s cooperation has been mostly in security and defense architecture along with trade and commerce (Pant, 2018). India’s investments in Vietnam are estimated at around US$ 1.9 billion including investments routed through third countries (MEA, 2022). According to Vietnam’s Foreign Investment Agency, as of April 2021, India has 299 valid projects with a total invested capital of US$ 909.5 million, ranking 26th among countries and territories investing in Vietnam (MEA, 2022). Significant sectors of Indian investment are energy, agro-processing, mineral exploration, agriculture, manufacturing, agrochemicals, IT, and auto components (MEA, 2022). As of March 2023, India is one of the top 8th trading partners of Vietnam while Vietnam is the 15th largest trading partner of India and the fourth in Southeast Asia (Embassy of India, Hanoi, Vietnam, 2023). Vietnam occupies the 97th position in FDI equity inflows into India with a cumulative FDI amount of US$ 5.45 million from April 2000 to March 2023 (Embassy of India, Hanoi, Vietnam, 2023). Under the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) framework, India has been taking up QIPs, each valued at US$ 50,000, in different provinces of Vietnam for the development of community infrastructure. India has 317 valid projects worth over US$ 1 billion in Vietnam, ranking 23rd out of the 129 countries and territories investing in that country (MEA, 2022). While brief, the QIPs assist communities at the grassroots level. On 21 December 2020, during a significant meeting between the Prime Ministers of India and Vietnam, it was decided to increase the number of annual QIP projects in Vietnam to 10. Since 2017, 27 QIPs have been accomplished across 23 provinces, with 10 new projects currently underway

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in 10 provinces and an additional 10 projects under discussion (MEA, 2022). Moreover, 7 grant-in-aid assistance projects that benefit the Cham community in Ninh Thuan province were finalized in December 2020 with an outlay of around US$ 1.54 million. India is providing US$ 2.25 million for the conservation of ancient Cham monuments at the My Son World Heritage Site in Quang Nam Province. This effort highlights the strong cultural and historical ties between the two nations, with experts from the Archaeological Survey of India leading the work. Engaging with India in connectivity infrastructural projects remains crucial to strengthening ties between the two nations. The IMT-TH once completed will connect the nations via land. The Politics of Infrastructural Projects When examining infrastructural investments, it is crucial to acknowledge the enduring significance of land and maritime connectivity. Road connectivity plays a pivotal role in global trade and regional development, complementing maritime and air connectivity in several critical ways. It enables accessibility to remote areas, fosters economic growth and social development, facilitates the transportation of goods and people, creates jobs, and stimulates local economies (Banerjee, 2023; Yhome, 2017). Moreover, road networks are essential for last-mile delivery, providing flexibility and cost efficiency, particularly for smaller shipments and short distances. Unlike maritime or air transport, roads are widely available and adaptable, enhancing disaster resilience and emergency response by allowing the swift movement of aid during crises. They also bridge economic disparities by connecting urban and rural areas, fostering inclusivity. Land infrastructure, unlike air or sea routes, is less susceptible to change or removal and serves purposes beyond trade, including geopolitics and people-to-people interactions. Once completed, it often traverses various regions and communities, making local involvement crucial in development and maintenance. From a geopolitical perspective, establishing transnational roads carries strategic influence that extends beyond trade and transportation to impact international relations (Banerjee, 2023; Yhome, 2017). Countries with well-developed infrastructure often gain political leverage and power, which can manifest in various ways, including support

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on global issues, access to natural resources, and alignment on political matters. Recognizing these multifaceted dimensions is essential when navigating the landscape of land infrastructural and connectivity projects. As both India and China venture into the infrastructural dimension, Beijing strategically leverages the geostrategic position of the CMV countries to access the Indian Ocean and integrate their economies with its larger and more robust economy. This involves constructing rail and road networks and laying energy pipelines. It allows China to gain economic footprints, gain strategic access to key maritime routes, and foster closer ties with the government in the region. While India too is equally invested and trying to complete its infrastructural projects and increase its footprints in the region, implementation is one area where it lags behind. There is a wide prevailing opinion in India that the Indian government needs to establish a monitoring team to evaluate each of its projects in Myanmar. Such a mechanism was set up in 2009, but it was on an ad-hoc basis and has not been pursued since. National and sectoral-level meetings continue to be held to follow the projects; joint working groups and committees have been created (Banerjee, 2023). India’s comparatively lower investment in the CMV countries can be attributed to the absence of a cohesive government-led investment strategy, unlike China, South Korea, and Japan. While Indian companies express interest in investing in the region, the lack of a coordinated approach hampers effective support for these investments. The Government of India initiated a study in 2015 through the Export–Import Bank of India (Exim Bank) to evaluate the feasibility of establishing an institutional mechanism to promote investments by Indian companies in CLMV countries (Yhome, 2017). This proposed Project Development and Facilitation Framework (PDFF) and PDA aims to identify viable industrial sectors for Indian investments and outline an institutional structure to harness these opportunities. However, the sporadic nature of such initiatives highlights the need for regular studies to maintain their effectiveness and significance. In addition to addressing the implementation challenges, India can increase its significance as a crucial partner for Vietnam and Cambodia by demonstrating its commitment to the region’s development needs. This could involve offering tailored support and assistance in key areas such as infrastructure development, capacity building, and sustainable growth initiatives. By actively engaging with local communities and governments, India can showcase its willingness to contribute meaningfully to the

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socioeconomic progress of the Mekong region. Moreover, leveraging cultural diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges that New Delhi is already exercising can foster closer ties and enhance India’s soft power influence, thereby strengthening its position as a preferred partner for Vietnam and Cambodia. Through strategic collaborations and mutually beneficial partnerships, India can effectively position itself as a responsible ally in the CMV corridor, fostering greater cooperation and integration within the Southeast Asian region. India’s increasing engagement with the CMV subregion necessitates a shift toward a soft power-oriented approach. Without this strategic adjustment, India may fall behind other economic powerhouses in neighboring regions. New Delhi must adopt an integrated approach involving private entities, alongside active engagement from embassies and diplomatic missions.

Challenges Surrounding the Projects China and India’s engagements in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam reflect contrasting approaches to infrastructural development and regional influence. While China prioritizes large-scale investments and strategic infrastructure projects under the BRI framework and otherwise, India emphasizes sustainable development, partnership, and cultural diplomacy. However, both countries face similar challenges, including concerns about debt sustainability, environmental impact, and political interference, which shape the politics surrounding infrastructural projects in the region. Debate on Debt Trap For over a decade, China has extended loans for infrastructure projects in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Between 2013 and 2018, China allocated USD 37.83 billion for foreign aid, including grants, interestfree loans, and concessional loans (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2021). Grants primarily supported social welfare projects, while interest-free loans focused on public facilities and livelihood improvements. Concessional loans supported industrial and infrastructure projects in developing countries. The China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export–Import Bank of China (EXIM) play central roles in providing loans under the BRI. Over the same period, Chinese lenders committed approximately US $148 billion in

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loans, including zero-interest, concessional, and commercial loans, with limited availability of zero-interest loans. These loans, provided by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), have generous terms and are not subject to the same regulatory pressures as financial institutions, making debt discussions more straightforward (Lui, 2020). In 2022, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson claimed Beijing’s outperformance in the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiatives and expressed proactive support for developing nations in loan repayment, emphasizing a burden-sharing process (Banerjee, 2022b). Efforts to restructure, such as the withdrawal of debt and adjustments to repayment conditions, lack clarity, making it difficult to assess the support required from other creditors. China’s absence from the Paris Club, an organization that emphasizes openness and clear communication, exacerbates the challenge of evaluating the overall debt situation and the necessary support from other creditors. Chinese creditors Exim Bank and the China International Development Cooperation Agency have reportedly deferred over US $1.3 billion in debt service in 23 countries under the G20 program (Banerjee, 2022b). However, the lack of disclosure on the terms of initial agreements makes it challenging to identify the amount of debt exonerated by China. Concerns arise from problematic loan issues in Sri Lanka, contributing to reservations about Chinese debt. Myanmar, familiar with Chinese transparency issues, unsustainable projects, and debt concerns, has previously negotiated terms or suspended projects like the Myitsone dam. While Myanmar sought engagement with other neighbors like India, Singapore, Japan, and the Western countries to balance Chinese influence, the current backlash from Western countries and ASEAN allies post-2021 coup has forced a tactical shift. Myanmar’s growing reliance on China, despite attempting to resuscitate its economy through ongoing projects, raises concerns about inadequate risk assessment. The challenge of ensuring financial viability and debt sustainability is anticipated to impact infrastructural projects and connectivity. In Vietnam, despite vocal support for BRI the country’s actual participation is limited due to several issues most prominently the South China Sea. Vietnam diplomatically endorses the BRI but refrains from active engagement and does not receive investment funding. Vietnam’s praise for the BRI is viewed as a diplomatic gesture, with experts attributing caution to past negative experiences with Chinese projects for instance Cat

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Linh–Ha Dong railway, which had significant cost overruns and delays in timely completion (Nguyen, 2023). The Hedging strategy that it shows at times bandwagoning and at times balancing has been pronounced in this. Overall, the country adopts a pragmatic approach to diplomacy, recognizing the necessity of engaging with all relevant stakeholders, including China. While being cautious and mindful of its sovereignty and security concerns, Vietnam seeks to leverage its relationship with China to advance its interests and objectives in areas such as trade, investment, and regional cooperation. In the case of Cambodia, the 2019 Debt Sustainability Analysis found a low risk of external debt distress, with concerns about debt traps and BRI-related diplomacy deemed misplaced. Cambodia’s external public debt in 2020 was $8.8 billion, with about US $4 billion attributed to China which does not hold debt trap debates (Menon, 2024; International Development Association (IDA) and International Monetary Fund, 2019). On the contrary, India’s lines of credit operate on a demanddriven basis, fostering mutually beneficial relationships between India and the recipient country without imposing traditional conditionalities (Chakrabarty, 2022). The extension of these credit lines additionally facilitates the entry of Indian exporters into new markets and the expansion of their presence in established ones. Nevertheless, the economic benefits of collaboration with Myanmar should be reevaluated, and India must ensure that it adheres to project completion deadlines (Banerjee, 2023). Environmental Concerns Related to Projects Numerous qualitative studies underscore the environmental repercussions of (BRI) infrastructure projects. Post the second BRI Summit and under the influence of US President Joe Biden’s Build Back Better World (B3W) proposal, there are indications that environmental considerations are gaining traction. Notably, the construction of the Phnom PenhSihanoukville Expressway incorporates measures to protect the ecosystem, including minimizing construction impact on green hills and water bodies to prevent erosion. The use of recycled materials and waste reduction technologies is evident, such as implementing sewage treatment plants for recycling domestic wastewater in neighboring farmlands. While these initiatives suggest a move toward more eco-friendly practices, it remains uncertain if this trend will become a broader industry norm. Challenges

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persist, including concerns over land grabbing in resettlement programs and the effective implementation of environmental impact assessments, requiring separate attention (Roy Chaudhury, 2023). In countries like Cambodia, the initial impacts are likely to center on human capital development through skills transfer and training. Immediate benefits include increased employment opportunities, but concerns arise regarding the dominance of higher-paying positions, particularly in management, by Chinese nationals. Even in lower to mid-skilled roles, there’s evidence of Chinese investment leading to the import of foreign workers, restricting local economic spillover and job prospects. Despite the pandemic, labor market conditions for lower to mediumskilled workers remain constrained, emphasizing a perceived rather than real cost (Menon, 2023). Studies on extensive Chinese investments in Preah Sihanouk province emphasize the limited spillover effects on the local community. While the hotels and casinos in entertainment complexes may not be directly part of the BRI, the associated transport and infrastructure development are integral to the BRI. Therefore, assessing the BRI’s impact involves considering its role in the overall transformation of Sihanoukville, which has evolved into an entertainment and leisure hub centered around gambling—an indirect consequence of the Initiative. Similarly, Indian projects near the India–Myanmar border have come under scrutiny for environmental factors. Environmental concerns associated with this project include deforestation, habitat fragmentation, and loss of biodiversity, particularly in areas where the highway is being constructed through forests and natural habitats. There are also concerns about the potential for soil erosion and degradation along the highway corridor. Additionally, the construction of bridges and other infrastructure may impact local water bodies and aquatic ecosystems. Nonetheless, the two governments largely think that environmental assessments conducted on the sites have been deemed comprehensive and reliable. Political Instability in Myanmar The current situation in Myanmar’s investment landscape is clouded with uncertainty due to the ongoing conflict between pro-democracy ethnic armed groups and the military, which commenced in 2021. Operation 1027, spearheaded by the three-brotherhood ethnic alliance group, has placed significant pressure on the Junta, resulting in the suspension of

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numerous infrastructural projects. Among these affected projects is the IMT-TH corridor, crucial for linking India with Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Until Myanmar achieves political and social stability, the feasibility of these projects remains uncertain. Connectivity initiatives within conflict-ridden regions encounter challenges related to securitization, complicating their intended function as economic or community conduits. Security concerns become intertwined with trade and movement, impeding both economic progress and community welfare (Banerjee, 2023). China’s involvement in Myanmar’s affairs plays a significant role in navigating the conflict landscape. By maintaining relationships with ethnic groups and the ruling regime, China aims to ensure stability for its infrastructural ventures and bolster its influence over bordering territories. In January 2024, discussions between Chinese officials and Myanmar’s military regime focused on enhancing cooperation regarding China– Myanmar megaprojects, including the CMEC and ensuring the safety of the Chinese workers amid security concerns following Operation 1027 (The Irrawaddy, 2024). Despite the ongoing conflicts, China remains a pivotal player in Myanmar, exerting its influence through economic assistance and diplomatic engagement. In light of the complex situation in Myanmar, India seems to have shifted its approach of not engaging with the regime in power alone a policy it has followed since 1991. In the last week of February 2024, an Indian delegation went to meet AA to discuss the status of the connectivity projects (Banerjee, 2024; Myanmar Now, 2024). This shift is crucial to maintaining connectivity projects and managing the security dynamics in the region effectively. By engaging with both the regime and ethnic armed groups, India can contribute to fostering stability and facilitating dialogue toward conflict resolution. This inclusive approach aligns with India’s broader objectives of promoting peace, security, and regional cooperation in Myanmar and the surrounding areas.

Conclusion The engagement of India and China in the CMV corridor reflects a dynamic interplay of strategic interests, economic initiatives, and geopolitical considerations. The challenges and opportunities presented underscore the need for nuanced approaches to ensure sustainable development and regional stability.

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Both India and China have embarked on ambitious projects aimed at enhancing connectivity, fostering economic cooperation, and exerting influence in the region. China’s approach, epitomized by the BRI, emphasizes large-scale investments in strategic infrastructure projects across Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia. These projects not only aim to bolster China’s economic presence but also serve as instruments of geopolitical influence, fostering closer ties with key regional players. On the other hand, India’s engagement in the CMV corridor is characterized by a focus on sustainable development, partnership building, and cultural diplomacy. Projects like the KMTTP and the IMT-TH underscore India’s commitment to enhancing regional connectivity and fostering economic cooperation while respecting the sovereignty and developmental aspirations of partner nations. Despite their respective approaches, both India and China face challenges in the implementation of infrastructural projects in the CMV corridor. Delays, political instability, and coordination issues have hindered progress, highlighting the need for more cohesive and proactive strategies. Moving forward, India can enhance its significance as a key partner for the CMV countries by addressing implementation challenges, demonstrating commitment to the region’s development needs, and leveraging cultural diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges. By adopting a soft power-oriented approach and actively engaging with local communities and governments, India can strengthen its position as a responsible ally in the CMV corridor and foster greater cooperation and integration within the Southeast Asian region. By navigating the challenges and leveraging opportunities effectively, both nations can contribute to the socio-economic progress and regional stability of the CMV countries and beyond.

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value chains: Nirmala Sitharaman.’ Ministry of Commerce & Industry. https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=134438 Radice, H. (1999). Taking Globalization Seriously. In L. Panitch & C. Leys (Eds.), The Socialist Register 1999: Global Capitalism Versus Democracy. Merlin Press. Radice, H. (2000). Responses to Globalization: A Critique of Progressive Nationalism. New Political Economy, 5(1), 5–19. Roy Chaudhury, D. (2023, July 13). Environmental Damage from Belt and Road Initiative Projects on Rise. The Economic Times. https://econom ictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/environmentaldamage-from-belt-and-road-initiative-projects-on-rise/articleshow/101715 401.cms Schnitzler, Antina Von. (2016). Democracy’s Infrastructure: Techno-Politics and Protest after Apartheid. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2021, January 10). China’s international development cooperation in the new era [White paper]. http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2021-01/10/ content_77099782_4.htm The Irrawaddy. (2024, February 7). Chinese Economic Attaché Lobbies Junta on Investment Projects. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmar-chinawatch/chinese-economic-attache-lobbies-junta-on-investment-projects.html Trinh, V. D., & Do, H. H. (2023, March 15). Vietnam Hedges Its Bets on the BRI . East Asia Forum. https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/03/15/vietnamhedges-its-bets-on-the-bri/ Vietnam’s Provincial Committee Rejects $300 Million Loan from China. (2016, August 9). The Nation. https://www.nationthailand.com/international/302 92528 Yhome, K. (2017, February 7). The Road to Mekong: The IndiaMyanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-road-to-mekong-the-indiamyanmar-thailand-trilateral-highway-project/

CHAPTER 7

Teaching for the Rise: Chinese Education in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore Hannah Ming Yit Ho and Ying-kit Chan

Introduction Across the globe, China’s soft power rise in terms of culture has been evident through Chinese schools that are established not only to instruct Chinese language but also transmit Chinese culture. While Communicative Language Teaching is an approach that is employed in language classes (Richards, 2006), scholars have simultaneously addressed the transmission of cultural identity that can occur in the Chinese language classroom in Chinese schools (Che, 2016; Li & Duff, 2014; Lu, 2014). Furthermore, Qi’s comparative study (2003) of culture transmission via teaching instructors in England and China highlights the moral values and principles that are instilled during class activities. Following on

H. M. Y. Ho (B) Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam e-mail: [email protected] Y.-K. Chan National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_7

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from its economic prowess, China’s committed push for soft power in recent years as a means to shape perceptions of and forge positive relations with other nations exhibits its bid at establishing itself as a “cultural superpower” (Xi 2011, cited in Shambaurgh, 2015, 99). President Xi Jinping’s further announcement in 2014 to the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee that “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s messages to the world” (cited in Shambaurgh, 2015, 99) has resulted in an onslaught of Belt and Road initiatives backed by billions of dollars of funding to realize “the Chinese dream” or the “Asia–Pacific dream” across the international community (Shambaurgh, 2015, 99). Consequently, a demand for Chinese language competence around the globe has resulted in various international countries offering Mandarin language learning to their communities. Primarily catered to Chinese diaspora communities, Chinese schools including Confucius institutes in Europe, America, Japan and South Korea have promoted Chinese language and culture (Kim, 2009; Ren, 2012; Starr, 2009; Zhao & Jianbin, 2010). In Southeast Asia, the rise of Chinese schools can be witnessed in nations including Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines (AngSee, 1995; Chokkajitsumpun, 2001; Hoon & Kuntjara, 2019). While the impact of Chinese language education has also been independently studied in two other Southeast Asian nations (Curdt-Christiansen, 2014; Koh et al., 2021; Lee, 2012; Li et al., 2016), there lacks a comparative study that analyzes the similarities and differences of Chinese schools in the two close-knitted nations of Brunei Darussalam and Singapore that share a strong political relationship. This comparative dimension between Brunei Darussalam and Singapore is important to expound considering China’s soft power push in Southeast Asia (Liu & Tsai, 2014; Lum et al., 2008) and its wider implications to education and cultural politics in the region. This chapter aims to contribute to discussions on the role of Chinese schools in Brunei Darussalam (henceforth Brunei) and Singapore as they respond to the global rise of China and, in turn, Chinese language education. While China’s soft power is manifested in Chinese schools around the world, its reach is less apparent in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, as illustrated in the discussions of individual and political motivations in both nations that will feature as the focus of this chapter. Given the practical considerations of Bruneian parents (Hoon & Ho, 2023), Chinese schools in Brunei have been perceived not so much as tools of China’s soft

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power as much as conduits for Bruneian children to gain academic success (Ho, 2023; Ho & Hoon, 2024). Despite their similarities, stark differences will also be highlighted when examining case studies of Chinese schools in Brunei and Chinese-medium schools in Singapore. Factors such as governmental policies, infrastructural support, social reception and parental perceptions are key indicators of academic institutions that are studied to compare and contrast the developments of education, but also to glean insights about cultural and sociopolitical developments in each of these nations. Ultimately, the place, perspectives and relevance of Chinese schools amid their historical contexts, cultural influences and governmental policies are discussed to analyze the role of Chinese schools in these sovereign states.

Brunei and Singapore: Comparative Sociocultural, Political and Educational Contexts As neighboring countries within Southeast Asia, Brunei and Singapore share common geopolitical histories and territorial positioning within the Malay world. In both nations, Malay language takes prominence as the official language of Brunei Darussalam and as one of the official languages of Singapore. Beyond the ethnic Malay population, ethnic Chinese communities comprise heterogeneous clans, such as Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese, Teochew and Foochow. The two sovereign nationstates have in common a colonial history as they were both under British occupation in the last century. Separated by the South China Sea, Brunei sits on an area of 5765 square kilometers on Borneo Island, while Singapore is an island-state of about 734.3 square kilometers located at the tip of the Malay peninsula. The political relationship between Brunei and Singapore is close and cordial, as well as a long-standing one with their governments’ mutual working relationship since national independence. Both countries’ currencies are also pegged, as the Singapore and Bruneian dollar are regarded as legal tender in the two nations. This sense of security suggests a good friendship, understanding and support of each other as small nations in the Southeast Asian region. In terms of education, Brunei also models itself after Singapore. K-12 education is compulsory, and several students take the Brunei-Cambridge Ordinary Level examinations in their final year of secondary education in Brunei while students in Singapore are offered the Singapore-Cambridge Ordinary Level examination. However, differences in national ideologies and

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populations are also apparent. In the Malay world, Brunei stands out for its Malay Muslim Monarchic (Melayu Islam Beraja, MIB) national ideology (Ho, 2019). Proclaimed as its national philosophy upon independence day on 1 January 1984, this tripartite structure has guided many of Brunei’s state policies, including educational and language planning (Salbrina & Mabud, 2021). Cultural localization processes also focus on the intertwining of Islamic religion and Malay ethnicity in Brunei (Ho, 2021b). While Malay is its official language, English is widely spoken (Deterding & Ho, 2021). Additionally, Mandarin is offered as a core subject in Chinese schools and an elective subject in state schools. Brunei is predominantly Malay with 73% of the total population identifying as such, while Chinese account for its largest ethnic minority group comprising 9.6% of its total population (Department of Economic Planning). Today’s young Chinese writers are a product of a bilingual Malay-English educational system that has resulted in their English proficiency, thus producing Anglophone works of contemporary fiction (Ho, 2021a). In contrast, Singapore’s founding tenet of multiculturalism enshrined from independence on 9 August 1965, the year it separated from the Federation of Malaya, embraces a diverse cultural composition and multilayered social fabric. First announced in its Parliamentary White Papers in 1991, Singapore’s Asian Values ideology adopted an approach to endorse various mother tongues for its Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others (CMIO) population. Even while it served as a strategic response to Western cultural encroachment that manifested in a Singaporean identity crisis (Hill, 2000; Ho & Ho, 2019; Thompson, 2001), the Asian Values ideology catered loosely to a Confucian morality that ultimately prioritized Chinese hegemonic philosophy. In terms of Mandarin education, unlike in Malay-dominant Brunei, Mandarin is a compulsory subject and often a medium of instruction for Chinese who constitute 75.9% of Singapore’s total population.

Chinese Schools in Brunei: Historical Contexts and Government Policies Historical developments of Mandarin language education in Brunei are informed through language planning directed by the Ministry of Education. In state and private schools in Brunei, the medium of teaching has shifted from Malay in state schools and Mandarin in private Chinese schools to English as the medium of instruction. Language policies

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have resulted in this transformation to a widespread academic use of English. During the British protectorate era, Brunei national curriculum of 1972 was introduced that mandated a common examination across all schools. The Bilingual educational system that was implemented after political independence privileged Malay and English. In 2009, the new national educational policy of Sistem Pendidikan Negara Abad ke-21 placed a greater emphasis on English as the medium of instruction in schools (Salbrina & Jaidin, 2020). In line with these developments, Chinese-medium schools that taught Mandarin as a core subject and used to employ Mandarin as the medium of instruction for other subjects, including Math and Science, switched to English instead. In recent years, Mandarin continues to be taught as a compulsory subject in Chinese schools in Brunei. However, it is presently a stand-alone subject that complements the two core language subjects of Malay and English, which have been mandated by the Ministry of Education. While state schools may choose to offer Mandarin as an elective subject, it is highly dependent upon available teaching resources and ethnic Chinese teachers who are employed to teach other subjects in the national curriculum, but who can spare time to offer Mandarin as an extracurricular subject. Coupled with Brunei’s discovery of oil in 1929, a migration fever in the preceding years resulted in growing numbers of Chinese communities arriving into Brunei. Chinese schools in Brunei were first established in the early twentieth century as a response to an influx of mainland Chinese immigrants arriving into Brunei. In this era, Chinese schools helped to strengthen ties between China and Brunei, as migrants from China were able to maintain a semblance of their roots through the preservation and teaching of Chinese culture and language via teaching materials and a curriculum from China. Since their origins in the previous millennium, Chinese schools have evolved into English-medium schools that employ English as the language of instruction but without compromising the availability of Mandarin as a compulsory language subject for its native, second and foreign language learners, who comprise ethnic Chinese, Malay and Indian children studying and living in Brunei. These schools are private academic institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, which design and dictate the national school curriculum. Chinese entrepreneurs in Brunei set up the first Chinese school called Yik Chye School in 1916 (Ho & Hoon, 2024). Six years later, it was renamed as Chung Hwa Middle School (CHMSBSB). Two more middle schools would be established, and another five Chinese primary schools

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would be introduced to the educational scene in the following years. Chung Hua Middle School in Kuala Belait (CHMSKB) was opened in 1933. Chung Ching Middle School in Seria was also set up a few years after CHMSKB. Chinese primary schools were established in Kiudang, Tutong, Labi, Sungai Liang and Temburong. These are currently witnessing an increased enrollment of non-Chinese students. Consequently, while the three Chinese middle schools enjoy a high enrollment among ethnic Chinese, the primary schools are gaining popularity among non-Chinese. Given Brunei’s educational and national policies catered to privilege Malay and English languages, it is not surprising to find a lack of integration and planning for Mandarin teaching that is geared toward China’s “global rise” (Ang, 2021). Based on their studies, Koh et al. (2021) point out a void of state institutional enthusiasm for Chinese language education in Brunei. A lack of resources and infrastructural support from stakeholders such as state actors and governmental agencies are a few challenges that have been encountered (Koh et al., 2021). As such, teaching for the rise may not be visible in Brunei. Unlike Singapore that is to be discussed in the second half of this chapter, Brunei is neither obliquely nor overtly deploying resources to develop a population that can communicatively engage with China as it intensifies its global economic reach. To various extents, the global trend of Mandarin Fever, which manifests the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s soft influence in the educational sector, has had little sociocultural impact in Brunei where MIB ideology is upheld. Differences in teaching for the rise between Brunei and Singapore are due to several factors, such as geopolitical, national and cultural ideological inclinations. Domestic developments and global trends tend to shape the reception and evolution of Chinese schools in Brunei and Singapore. As will be discussed, Singapore’s ready deployment of resources to develop a bilingual elite well-versed in Mandarin and English is a stark contrast to Brunei’s educational policies that underscore Malay-English bilingualism. In the forthcoming sections, an examination of parental perceptions of Mandarin language learning based on one-to-one interviews conducted in Brunei suggests that parents, including those from non-Chinese familial backgrounds such as Malays and Indians, are interested in equipping their children with Mandarin fluency, even though they are not obligated to do so by the Brunei government. Comparing

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Brunei’s findings with Singapore’s case of Chinese schools, elite Chinesemedium Singaporean schools known as Special Assistance Plan (SAP) schools prioritize Mandarin education for high-achieving students. The aim of Chinese-medium SAP schools is to produce bilingual and bicultural elites who are fluent in both English and Mandarin. A historical overview of SAP schools will be offered to understand the challenges that these schools pose in the nation. While these two case studies carry similarities in terms of a transmission of Mandarin language and Chinese culture in Chinese schools, notable contrasts between Brunei and Singapore are highlighted in the following comparative analysis of Chinese schools in the two nations.

The Relevance of Chinese Schools in Brunei: Multicultural and Multilingual Goals Notwithstanding a lack of national resources and infrastructural support for Mandarin language teaching in Chinese schools, non-Chinese parents are increasingly enrolling their children in these schools to learn Mandarin in Brunei. For one, Chinese primary schools are experiencing an uptick of Malays in their student population. This trend marks an increasing relevance of private Chinese schools in the local society, as non-Chinese enrollment numbers suggest an attentiveness to Mandarin language uptake in today’s overall development of China’s rising power. Based on oral interview data with twenty non-Chinese parents whose children attend Chinese schools in Brunei, there is evidence of an awareness of the rise of China in global politics and business that have partially influenced their decisions to choose Chinese schools over other private and state schools for their children. Apart from Mandarin proficiency, parents cite multicultural awareness and a cosmopolitan citizenship offered by Chinese schools to equip their children with multiple languages and cultural knowledge for a hybrid and flexible future in the nation-state, as well as within regional and inter-regional spaces. To explicate on the methodology of the data collection, participants were gathered through a snowball method. The category of non-Chinese is measured using both self-identification and national identification on their local identity cards. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in mid- to late 2022, and their duration was up to an hour each to enable parents of children who attend/ed Chinese schools to elaborate their reasons and motivations for sending their children to study in these

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schools. There were positive tokens of affect related to academic success of Chinese schools, including the perception that excellence is attainable in various school subjects, including STEM subjects and Mandarin language learning that are offered in Chinese schools. Despite Koh et al.’s study of a lack of evidence for Mandarin Fever in Brunei, it should be noted that this present study’s non-Chinese parents were keen and invested in Mandarin language learning as reflected in their enrollment of their children in Chinese schools. Although parents may express disappointment with their children’s actual academic performance and level of language competence, their steadfast belief in the teachers’ strict discipline to guide students to academic excellence were largely articulated in the interviews. An analysis of the findings is presented in the following paragraphs, which explore parents’ criteria for selecting Chinese schools for their non-Chinese children. Three main points will be discussed in relation to interviews with parents and Chinese school alumni in Brunei Darussalam that were collected from 10th May to 12th December 2022. NonChinese parents’ motivations for patronizing Chinese schools consist of their personal views that Chinese language education is relevant for firstly, trilingual competence; secondly, multicultural awareness; and thirdly, success via academic rigor. First, trilingual competence was a prime motivation for parents who chose a Chinese school education for their children from the outset. A parent notes that “Mandarin classes have been offered a lot. Chinese language is in demand.” Furthermore, “It’s also not a bad thing to be able to speak multiple languages.” Viewing the relevance of Chinese language, another parent opines “I think it’s good. There’s a lot of benefits, for example, nowadays, it acts as a second language in most places. Chinese as opposed to the English language is considered as a second language around the world.” This reflects the parental view that Mandarin will supplant Chinese as a global language. Reflecting on the benefit of Mandarin knowledge, another parent gestures to the relevance of Chinese language in terms of future job prospects: “[the children] can contribute in terms of setting up a business, that’s the most evident contribution.” The economic rise of China is alluded to in this statement. Nonetheless, there were also few parents who suggested that Mandarin language competence is not totally necessary: “But personally, sending my kids to Chinese schools is not a priority.” Moreover, the stress related to not being able to help with Chinese language assignments at home was also

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noted by non-Chinese speaking parents, who rely on their older children to guide their younger ones. Secondly, multicultural awareness through Chinese language education was also an important area of consideration for the parents who sent their children to Chinese schools. Bruneian parents’ displayed desires to equip their children with a cosmopolitan sense of belonging. Even so, different cultural values and divergent philosophies may cause a conflicted identity while non-Chinese parents acknowledged the “advantages” of Chinese language and cultural transmission. Parents commended Chinese language education as offering an additional world view. An interview respondent explained, If [as] parents [we] give an early exposure and make [our] kids understand as to why they are sent there. Not just solely for the language, [but] to learn about the culture. There are a lot of advantages that you can get. The Chinese system, or their behavior… I was inspired by my principal who used the yin and yang system. If we understand that, it would be good for us, for our body and mind. But as a Muslim, we need to have our own guidelines as well.

For this parent, the benefits of receiving a comprehensive cultural education overweighed the potentially problematic navigation of different value systems. Contrasted with Malay-Muslim codes of life, another Malay parent admitted that “[she and her child] didn’t get the Chinese concept. Once [my child] started attending religious school, it made it harder [for us to adapt]. We were not exposed and nurtured to adapt with these things.” With mandated religious education for Muslim students via the Compulsory Religious Education Order 2012, parents reflected on the incongruous cultural teachings when their children attended both Chinese day school and Ugama (Religious) school. Despite this, cultural transmission in Chinese schools was welcomed by other parents who noted the school’s activities related to mooncake, dragon boat and Lunar New Year festivals. Along this line, a parent revealed the excitement of his child when “marching with lanterns that were lit. They [Today’s children] still learn how to make lanterns these days. My youngest [child] still kept his rabbit [shaped lantern] given by the teacher, he was so happy to receive it too.” It also became evident that “the kids get excited knowing about these [cultural] things.” Hence, the cosmopolitan aspect of socialization and Chinese language education were welcomed by a segment of

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parents while others, including those from a Malay-Muslim background, lamented on the challenges of resolving cultural differences. Finally, Chinese schools’ reputation as excellent academic institutions for producing top students in the nation was another reason that parents supported Chinese education. A parent’s comment on Chinese school’s “first in ranking” and the added perspective that it is related to pedagogy that “toughen[s] [students’] ability to study” demonstrate an environment of systematic teaching rigor to produce “outstanding” academic output. Notwithstanding the strict and assertive pedagogy, other parents reflected on their ambivalence when their children could not cope with academic pressures. As a parent stated, “Attending Chinese school is great. Not attending Chinese school is great too. It depends on everyone’s path.” This statement was made in relation to specific children’s failure to manage teachers’ high academic expectations. Although the good reputation of Chinese schools preceded them, parents also vocalize the disappointment when their children do not match up to it to deliver outstanding results. Moreover, the stress related to daily homework and oversubscribed extracurricular activities proved overwhelming for some parents and their children. From this case study of Brunei, it is evident that non-Chinese parents’ subscription to Chinese schools is a lukewarm response to Mandarin Fever, as other factors come into play such as academic success and preparing children for a multicultural participation in the global context that simultaneously embraces English, Malay and Chinese. Although encouraging, their subscription to Chinese culture and language is not unproblematic as it is also accompanied with a degree of cultural ambivalence. The sociocultural context of living in a Malay and Muslim nation presented some Bruneian parents with a contradiction in terms of the cultural paradox concerning the transmission in Chinese language classrooms versus Ugama schools that uphold Malay-Muslim cultural identity. In the following section, the case of Singapore’s elite Chinese schools is discussed vis-a-vis China’s rise to a global power. A historical overview of the establishment of Chinese-medium schools is offered, followed by a qualitative analysis of their relevance and challenges within Singaporean society.

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Special Assistance Plan Schools in Singapore: History, Policies and Cultural Influences The People’s Action Party (PAP) government first gained power in selfgoverning Singapore in 1959. Compared to its British colonial rulers, the PAP had less patience for accommodating Chinese culture in school curriculum, fighting what it called a communist insurgency from leftwing elements within its own party and a wider communist threat from Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese proxies. Seeking a merger with the Federation of Malaya, the PAP premier Lee Kuan Yew (1923–2015) and his cadres strove to avoid the perception that Singapore was a Chinese chauvinist stronghold. With the prospect of independence in sight, the PAP sought to replace Chinese identity with a Singaporean-centered consciousness, but it must do so without closing down Chinese-medium schools that would alienate Chinese voters, on whom it depended heavily for electoral support (Wong, 2002, 187–188). The solution, then, was regulation rather than closure. Shortly after its electoral victory in 1959, the PAP, through the Ministry of Education, created an official timetable for Chinese-medium schools. It strengthened the teaching of English, added Malay to the curriculum, and increased the time for teaching science and mathematics. The unintended consequence was that the new timetable consigned the social sciences, which were used by Chinese-medium schools to transmit knowledge of China and Chinese culture, to a negligible position (Wong, 2002, 188). The revised syllabi for history and geography allocated more attention to Singapore and the Malay Peninsula instead, for obvious political reasons. Nevertheless, the PAP enjoyed only limited success on this count. Publishers with strong embodiments of Chinese culture continued to produce textbooks and instructional materials that emphasized Chinese history and geography while answering the government’s call to focus on Singapore and the Malay Peninsula as well. The PAP permitted Chinese-medium schools to use these materials, probably deciding to go gradual with its intended changes (Wong, 2002, 192). In any case, the curriculum is always a site of conflict and compromise within the state and between the state and cultural and political movements outside it (Apple, 2021, 19). The PAP government conducted several studies and produced many reports for reforming the education system over time. While earlier reports highlighted the inadequacy of the education system to cater beyond the needs of “average” or “mediocre” students, it was a particular

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report, released in 1979, that finally set in motion—and in stone—the elitist structure for which the PAP government would be known. The Report on the Ministry of Education 1978, known as the Goh Report compiled under Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee (1918–2010), was quickly endorsed by the parliament. The Goh report identified three key shortcomings in the education system: high education wastage, low levels of literacy and ineffective bilingualism. It made several recommendations that formed the basis of a new education system, which introduced the streaming of students into different courses at the upper elementary and high school levels depending on their language proficiencies and academic abilities. It recommends different streams of education to suit the “slow, average, above average, and outstanding learners” (Talib, 2020, 21). More specifically, it recommends that students who cannot cope with two languages would be better off being literate in one language than trying to learn two languages and being literate in neither. Provisions should be made for slow learners to proceed at a more relaxed pace, and those who do not excel academically could succeed in technical training (Talib, 2020, 21). Based on the Goh report, the Ministry of Education took the opportunity to gradually phase out the Chinesemedium schools. The ministry launched the Special Assistance Plan (SAP) to nurture bilingual elites at selected schools, limiting the learning of Chinese as a first language to the top eight percent of elementary school leavers. The SAP schools would become torchbearers of the Chinesemedium schools and replace the latter in inculcating Chinese culture, language and tradition among ethnic Chinese children and young adults in postcolonial Singapore. Geopolitically speaking, the founding of SAP schools was no mere coincidence. In November 1978, China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) had visited Singapore, among other Southeast Asian countries, to seek regional support against the Vietnam-Soviet Union threat. Deng was surprised at the rapid transformation of Singapore into a modern metropolis, to which Lee Kuan Yew responded: “We Singaporean Chinese are the descendants of Chinese from Southern China, such as Guangdong and Fujian, whose ancestors are uneducated and landless peasants, while the elites and intellectuals all stay in China. It is possible that China can achieve what Singapore has achieved and do even better” (Lee, 2000, 720). Although Deng offered no response, he would cite Singapore as a success in his speeches and pronouncements, arguing that China should follow Singapore’s example of welcoming

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foreign capital for taxes, wages and infrastructure. In 1984, China’s State Council appointed Goh Keng Swee, who also served as Singapore’s finance minister, as an economic adviser. In 1985, during Lee Kuan Yew’s third state visit to Beijing, China’s central government agreed to let Singapore deal directly with provincial governments in implementing economic cooperation plans (Yang & Ortmann, 2020, 31). Several visits by Singaporean leaders to China built their confidence that China would stick to the opening-up policy, and China’s perceived cultural and language affinity promised immense potential for economic cooperation (Yang & Ortmann, 2020, 31). In contrast to the Bruneian context, the Singaporean state deploys its educational resources to develop a bicultural, bilingual elite to engage with a rising China through the 1980s and 1990s until sometime in the 2010s, when the education system became relatively more domestically oriented in response to ongoing criticisms that it remained elitist and counterproductive to social cohesion and mutual ethnic understanding. Singapore’s SAP schools present an opportunity to see how supposedly domestic schools can serve geopolitical purposes amid China’s rise from a regional player into a superpower. Surprisingly, Singaporeans increasingly perceive the SAP schools as obsolete just as China’s rise is becoming more apparent, suggesting that many of them reject the state’s argument that education is intrinsically political or even geopolitical. They reject the politicization of education and ask for a more equitable distribution of resources among schools, in tandem with growing trends elsewhere in the world toward egalitarian ideals of education. In the postwar milieu of the 1950s, graduates from Chinese-medium schools faced difficulties in finding employment in colonial Singapore, and the prominent presence of the Chinese educated in leftist politics led to their stereotyping as pro-China communists (Qu & Wong, 2021, 47). That said, the elevation of Malay to the status of national language and the establishment of Nanyang University as a Chinese-medium college challenged the hegemony of English. Since independence, Singapore under the PAP government highlighted the importance of English for its value in finance, science and technology. Mandarin became a unifying language and heritage marker for Singapore’s Chinese community, which was comprised of speakers of other Chinese languages such as Hokkien, Teochew and Cantonese; these other languages were rejected for public usage. As economic ties with China began to warm since Deng’s visit to Singapore, the state actively groomed a bicultural, bilingual elite for

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business, many of whom were projected to be alumni of SAP schools. This was perhaps inevitable, given that Singapore’s technocratic leaders tended to prioritize a race-based concept of culture rather than a concept of culture based on learning (Qu & Wong, 2021, 46). In 1979, Chinese-medium schools had by then experienced dwindling enrollment, and those that remained standing came under state administration and became government schools, teaching all subjects in English with the exception of Chinese as a second language, subsequently known as “mother tongue.” The education ministry selected nine schools to form the inaugural batch of SAP schools. These schools were perceived to have retained some Chinese characteristics, be they founded by an ethnic Chinese educator or businessman or enjoying a long history of Chinese learning, funding and commitment. They were selected based on their “well-established tradition, academic performance, good facilities, faithful staff, and popular choice of parents” (Ministry of Education 1978, 2). The SAP schools accepted some of the top scorers at the national entrance examinations (i.e., Primary School Leaving Examination), who by default had achieved excellent grades in English, science and mathematics; those who had performed exceptionally well in both Chinese and English were even offered a third language program, in which they could choose to learn French, German, Malay and Japanese. Reserved for the top eight percent of elementary school leavers, SAP schools were elitist in outlook, to say the least. Domestically, they were designed to strike a balance between Chinese and English education in postcolonial Singapore, even though only elite students enjoyed the opportunity to receive a truly bicultural, bilingual education. The introduction of SAP schools caused unease among the Malays, Indians and even among some English-educated Chinese. If access to the prestigious and well-funded SAP schools, which had their own language laboratories and overseas immersion programs, was restricted almost exclusively to the Chinese, the alumni of SAP schools would be deprived of the experience of interacting with students of other ethnicities. For the PAP government, however, it was mostly the Chinese who had been affected by the deculturization of national development, and they alone needed special assistance to help them recover their Chineseness (Vasil, 2020, 107). Lee Kuan Yew’s personal convictions were also crucial for sustaining the SAP schools. He believed that Chinese-medium schools were worth

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preserving for the traditional Chinese values they imparted, such as “courtesy, respect for authority, discipline, awareness of one’s cultural roots, and social responsibility” (Lee, 2011, 5). Notwithstanding that Lee was “cherry picking in the orchard of cultural discourse” and selectively embracing the values of Singapore’s ethnic communities as it suited him (Barr & Skrbis, 2008, 45), he did respect what he saw as the “toughness” of the Chinese-educated, whom he thought possessed the cultural values of a civilization. Why Lee’s love for all things Chinese erupted from the late 1970s onward remains a mystery, but his exploration of his own Chineseness and concomitant repulsion at the bourgeois society he had created might have played a part (Barr & Skrbis, 2008, 101). Whatever the case might be, as historian Michael D. Barr suggests, “there can also be no doubt that the prospective opening up of China to investment and trade with the rise of Deng Xiaoping was a contributing factor in accelerating the program of Sinicisation once it had started” (Barr & Skrbis, 2008, 101). In effect, Lee’s cadres and lieutenants entertained a form of bifurcated thinking, simultaneously stressing the importance of multiracialism (for social harmony) and upholding the ultimate importance of Chinese culture and values (for prosperity). Needless to say, the PAP government offered children at SAP schools several advantages over those at ordinary schools, which included preparatory year programs and graduate English teachers to ensure high standards of English (Barr & Skrbis, 2008, 93). Concerned with incorporating Chinese education into the mainstream nation-building project, and learning from colonial history that local schools could be subject to foreign intervention, the government distrusted independent Chinese schools and closed down the Chinese-medium Nanyang University in 1980, around the same time when the first SAP schools were selected (Barr & Skrbis, 2008, 94–95). Under the watchful eye of the government, SAP alumni would be effectively bicultural and bilingual, serving only national interests and replacing graduates of Nanyang University as the pillar of Sino-Singaporean exchanges. In reality, however, SAP schools also perpetuated social inequality by instilling cultural capital in its students, enabling them to gain an edge over their compatriots, particularly those of other ethnicities, in a world where China is an emerging economy of opportunities. Exposed to higher levels of culture, language and values, SAP alumni possessed further opportunities of succeeding professionally and maintaining or advancing their social statuses (Gien,

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2019, 50). They were awarded generous subsidies and even full sponsorships under the Bicultural Studies Programme (BSP) to visit China, indicative of the substantial state funding that was invested in them (Gien, 2019, 52). At an event celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the SAP program, Education Minister Ong Ye Kung reiterated the relevance of SAP schools to the education system, stating that with these schools, a core group with “an intuitive understanding of Chinese culture, history and thinking, and with standards of Chinese close to those in China, Taiwan or Hong Kong” will be developed (Ong, 2019). The word “intuitive” suggests that among the ethnicities, only the Chinese could assume such a role for Singapore.

Challenging the Relevance of SAP Schools Since their inception, SAP schools have caught some flak from Singaporeans, both Chinese and non-Chinese. It was obvious to most, if not all, that SAP schools were a form of institutionalized ethnic bias (Ngu, 2020, 24). Through the SAP, Chinese students were systematically privileged, while other ethnicities were disadvantaged. The inequality was systemic, a direct consequence of education policy and structure. Due to the SAP, disproportionately more vacancies were available to Chinese students at prestigious schools. SAP schools offered only the Express stream, compared to government schools that also enrolled Normal Academic and Normal Technical students whose entry scores were lower at the PSLE. As government-aided schools, SAP schools could collect additional school fees, on top of the standard government fee. State resources poured into SAP schools, while Malay and Indian stream schools were left to decline. While Ong Ye Kung maintained that other cultures and languages were not overlooked, the facts proved otherwise. Singapore has six Islamic madrasahs (private Islamic schools), a Tamil language center, the Elective Malay Language Programme at high schools, and conversational language programs for students to learn a third language of another ethnicity. However, madrasahs are private institutions with its own funding and receive significantly less support from the government. The Tamil language center is but a center, unlike a full-fledged school like SAP schools (Ngu, 2020, 25). The underrepresentation of Malays at local universities and overrepresentation of Malays at rental flats are glaring, even though SAP schools are not a direct cause.

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Moreover, whether or not SAP schools have helped nurture for Singapore its bicultural and bilingual elite has come under increasing scrutiny over the years. Alumni of SAP schools report that they seldom speak Mandarin or write Chinese in Anglophone Singapore, especially those who do not work in China or for China-related businesses and institutions (Ngu, 2020, 31). They also claim to possess only a superficial understanding of Chinese culture, having vague memories of calligraphy and tea appreciation (Ngu, 2020, 32). While Lee Kuan Yew believed that Chinese culture instills personal traits (embodied capital) that transform a person into a diligent and efficient worker, the truth is SAP schools do not necessarily influence students’ habits, practices and perspectives to form embodied cultural capital, which can otherwise be expressed to mainland Chinese. If SAP schools cannot inculcate embodied Chinese cultural capital, then such capital cannot be reaped (Ngu, 2020, 32). Success stories serve more as poster boys and girls than as the norm, particularly when their Chinese cultural capital appears more attributable to family rather than to the effectiveness of SAP schools (Ngu, 2020, 34). For the Chinese, the state rhetoric that SAP schools facilitate meaningful interactions with China becomes suspect, given that Chinese cultural capital has played a negligible role in socioeconomic outcomes. Moreover, with China having the largest rising population of English speakers in the world (Xu, 2023), the need for Singaporean-Chinese to acquire Mandarin has become less imperative and more of a chore that the government has imposed. For many Singaporeans, then, “SAP” has become a euphemism, a thinly veiled attempt by the government to be subtle in privileging the Chinese (Gien, 2019, 56). The geopolitical caution that the government exercises vis-à-vis Singapore’s predominantly Muslim neighbors such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei is less conspicuous in the case of SAP schools, if only because the “rise of China” discourse makes sense and has taken root through the PAP’s brand of pragmatic policymaking. The ambivalence of simultaneously promoting a notable Chinese dimension while repudiating any loyalty toward China has confused the mainland Chinese government, which has observed Singapore’s domestic policies and public diplomacy and occasionally expected the ethnic Chinese in Singapore to behave like a patriotic diaspora; it is disappointed when Singapore appears unsupportive of its own foreign policy and more aligned with US interests in the region (Leifer, 2000, 119). Former

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Foreign Minister George Yeo tried to resolve the tension by distinguishing “cultural Chinese” from “political Chinese” (Yeo, 2001), but crises in Sino-Singaporean relations, such as Singapore’s vocal support for the South China Sea arbitration ruling against China and Hong Kong’s impoundment of Singapore’s armored carriers in transit from Taiwan, negated the segregated management of Chineseness (Liew, 2020, 14). Within the PAP ranks, calls have been made to reconsider existing programs of segregating Singaporeans. In 2016, Member of Parliament Denise Phua urged the parliament to “re-dream and slay the sacred cow of physically separating people who learn differently” and rethink the idea of SAP schools, among other such institutions (Talib, 2020, 187). The fact that Ong Ye Kung maintained in his 2019 speech that SAP schools remain relevant, however, shows that he did not share her view, meaning that SAP schools are here to stay, whether or not they deliver the promised benefits.

Conclusion In comparing case studies of Chinese schools from Brunei and Singapore, this chapter has examined Chinese language education’s place, purpose and reception vis-à-vis national discourses and China’s politico-cultural rise. Even while these neighboring nations are geopolitically situated in the Malay world within Southeast Asia, the public perception of and intent for their locally situated Chinese schools differ. Brunei’s MalayMuslim majority, who are steered by the Malay and Muslim cultural pillars of its national ideology, and Singapore’s Chinese majority under the governance of the People’s Action Party since political independence have informed these nations’ contrasting approaches to Chinese schools, in which Mandarin language education and Chinese cultural transmission simultaneously take place. In these two countries, Chinese and Chinesemedium schools serve different national-ethnic demographics as they prepare the Chinese community and, in Brunei’s case, non-Chinese children for academic success and a future in and beyond the nation. Political ideologies aside, the motivations for Mandarin language education in Chinese schools reflect parental, social and national awareness of China’s economic and cultural rise in the world. For Singapore, the establishment of Chinese-medium schools to nurture an ostensibly cultural Chinese community that is separated from the politically engaged Chinese has faced ambivalence in the public sphere. As instantiated through a recent

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call in parliament, “the Chinese dream” in Singapore has been confronted in the invitation to re-dream government policies of education that have segregated students according to their aptitude and, strategically, ethnicity. In contrast, an appeal to a cosmopolitan citizenship in Brunei’s Chinese schools reflects the multilingual and multicultural developments that serve as impetuses for subscriptions to a Chinese school education. While Singapore’s Special Assistance Plan (SAP) schools pander to an elitist notion of Chineseness, Brunei’s private Chinese schools have reached a wider audience to attract non-Chinese communities who are receptive to Mandarin language education even while incongruities with dominant Malay linguistic and Muslim cultural values remain. Notwithstanding PAP’s aim to produce bilingual Chinese Singaporeans that works toward the goal of upholding Singapore’s founding tenet of multiculturalism and multilingualism, SAP schools have conversely been perceived with increasing scrutiny for its supposed premium goal of equipping high-performing Chinese Singaporeans with Chinese cultural capital that secures their socioeconomic success. As discussions of the two case studies illustrate, the similar-yet-contrasting models of Chinese education offered in private Chinese schools in Brunei and government-supported Chinesemedium schools in Singapore exhibit the ways in which educational policies are shaped by local and global influences, which feed into narratives of multicultural societies with their intentions for cosmopolitan participation beyond strict cultural ideologies. In the multilingual context, these models of Chinese language education with their historical background, cultural influences and shaped by government policies stand as imperative paradigms to study global educational practices of linguistic and cultural transmission in Southeast Asia. For the rest of the world, lessons about the production and reception of Chinese education in this study will prove a useful frame of reference for enquiring into Chinese schools during China’s rise.

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CHAPTER 8

Strategic Calculations: India’s Prudent Entry into the South China Sea Archana Atmakuri and Chayanika Saxena

Introduction The contested waters in the South China Sea (SCS), spanning approximately 3.5 million square km, is a strategically vital waterway disputed between China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam. It holds immense economic and political significance due to its abundant fisheries, substantial reserves of oil and natural gas, and its role as a crucial

Archana Atmakuri is a geopolitical research analyst and a communications professional Chayanika Saxena is an Australia based researcher and analyst A. Atmakuri (B) Wellington, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected] C. Saxena Gladstone, QLD, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_8

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maritime trade route (Bhatt, 2024). Over the years, the SCS has been a stage for a multitude of disputes, territorial claims, and military posturing between China and East Asian countries rendering it a region of persistent global concern. Current conflicts in SCS revolve around territorial disputes, military deployments, and disagreements over freedom of navigation. The central point of contention is the sovereignty claims over numerous islands, atolls, and reefs within the region. Foremost among these claims is China’s assertion of sovereignty over nearly the entire SCS, as delineated by the enigmatic nine-dash line. This extensive territorial claim overlaps with the claims of East Asian nations, including Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, creating a convoluted web of territorial disputes. In the Northern sector of the SCS, China is currently engaged in a territorial dispute with Vietnam concerning the Paracel Islands. Sovereignty conflicts persist between the Philippines and China over both the Ayungin Shoal and the Scarborough Shoal to name a few. The Southern sector, internationally recognised as the Spratly Islands, comprises the largest cluster of maritime features in the SCS. Prominent features in this region include Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef. The coastal states bordering the SCS heavily rely on its fisheries and harbour approximately seven per cent of the world’s coral reefs. This region is renowned as a global hub for shallow-water, tropical biodiversity. Additionally, the SCS is estimated to house substantial energy resources, with roughly 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves according to the United States Energy Information Agency. The region stands as a geopolitical cauldron, engulfing multiple nations in maritime disputes with China. There are two interesting aspects to the conflict in the SCS. First, as this chapter was taking shape, the SCS continues to be a source of turmoil, inciting reactions from India, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Russia. The previously contentious nine-dash line has now expanded to a ten-dash line,1 evoking criticism from both claimant and non-claimant countries in the SCS including India. The Chinese government’s latest move encompasses a map that lays claim to disputed land territory, including parts of Indian eastern state Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin, a portion of Russia’s 1 The nine-dash line is a demarcation line asserted by China, outlining its territorial claims in the South China Sea. In 2023, China released a new map featuring a Ten-Dash Line, which extends its territorial claims far beyond its recognised Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

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territory, and the conflicted nine-dash line in the SCS. China’s claims in the SCS conflicts with the neighbouring countries and the international community. Second, Beijing’s extensive land reclamation projects have transformed previously submerged reefs into fortified outposts on features for which ASEAN particularly the claimant nations expressed concerns. Notably, Chinese activities within the exclusive economic zones of contested nations have drawn significant attention. For instance, in the case of the Philippines and the Spratly Islands, China has erected barriers, militarised Mischief Reef, and deployed a militia that has caused damage to coral reefs in the Scarborough Shoal. As of 2023, the Philippines lodged 445 diplomatic protests against Chinese illegal activities in the disputed waters (Tatad, 2023). The ongoing conflicts over the SCS have far-reaching implications for regional stability, freedom of navigation, and the global economy. As these issues continue to evolve, it is imperative for involved nations to engage in diplomatic efforts, uphold international law, and seek peaceful resolutions to prevent further escalation in this strategically important part of the world. The presence of external non-claimant countries in the SCS further complicates the disputes. India, the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Japan are all the non-claimant states united by the idea of upholding rules-based international order. The United States, a key ally of many Southeast Asian countries, has expanded its military presence with air bases in Antonio Bautista Air Base, Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay, Lumbia Air Base, and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base and conducted freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s territorial claims (Lamothe, 2016). For instance, the Philippines and the United States have, for the first time, conducted a joint sail in waters west of the disputed Palawan Island in September 2023. The role of non-claimant external countries is out of the scope of this paper apart from India. Nonetheless, India’s interests in the SCS would be incomplete without addressing the Quad’s interests in the SCS particularly when viewed from an Indo-Pacific strategy lens. For China, the fundamental interest is to not only achieve sovereignty over the SCS but to provide detailed justifications for these aspirations. Firstly, China asserts its authority over certain parts of the SCS, designating them as internal waters. According to this perspective, other countries are denied the right to peaceful transit through these areas. Secondly, China claims a 12 nautical mile (NM) territorial sea originating from the Paracel baseline, rather than from individual islands. In the case of the Spratly Islands, China extends this claim to various

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features that do not confer such territorial rights, including artificial islands according to international law. Finally, China declared a 200 NM Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) beyond the territorial sea, where it asserts the right to regulate military activities. These three positions collectively enable China to claim over approximately 80 per cent of the SCS. Additionally, China employs the nine-dash line to encompass the remaining territory, reinforcing its claims on parts of SCS as its “historic waters” (Wood, 2021). India is neither a claimant state nor is geographically impacted directly from the SCS disputes. However, several factors, mentioned below, determine its interests in the SCS. New Delhi is relatively a new entrant as a maritime supporter into the web of SCS disputes. Militarization of contested areas has not only heightened tensions but has also raised concerns about the security of vital sea lanes through which trillions of dollars in trade traverse annually. Chinese argument that it is safeguarding its sovereignty, maritime rights, and interests over Scarborough Shoal remains steadfast. However, the instances of military activities heighten the risk of accidental clashes. SCS serves as India’s secondary sphere of influence, predominantly functioning as a vital economic corridor. Moreover, SCS matters to India because of the democratic principles to uphold international law and rules-based order. New Delhi’s interest is to contest China’s SCS policy indirectly by balancing with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. The regional security dynamics through India-US relations that have been strengthening and the IndoPacific Strategy makes SCS an important aspect. On the geopolitical front, India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, in coordination with the Quad countries, compels New Delhi to adopt a stance on the SCS issue to a certain extent. It is important to note several developments in India’s revised Maritime Strategy released in 2015 that is useful to determine India’s interests in the wider Indo-Pacific and thereby the SCS. The 2015 revised maritime strategy takes a special focus on the safety and security of seaborne trade and energy routes, especially in the Indian Ocean Region, considering their effect on global economies and India’s national interests. Second, India recognises the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation and strengthening the international legal regime at sea, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), for all-round benefit. The third new development is to recognise the scope and value in undertaking cooperation and coordination between various navies, to counter common threats at sea. Theoretically, India’s policy in the SCS,

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explained by the defensive realist logic of security maximisation, seeks to maintain the status quo through defensive strategies, and this echoes the classical posture of “states balancing against hegemons” or deterring them to guarantee the region’s balance of power. But this paper views India’s engagement with SCS as a step towards the balance of power in the region more than a response to China for the border disputes. Set in this backdrop, this chapter argues that India’s stance on SCS disputes has evolved from mere statements to proactive response by offering to balance power in the region by deepening its maritime engagement with Southeast Asia. As seen during the 2016 Arbitrary Tribunal, India released a statement that the rules-based order must be upheld without publicly showing its support to the Philippines. Whereas there is an evident shift during Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s visit to the Philippines in March 2024, noting the importance of disputes in the SCS in the overall India-ASEAN relations. During his visit, Jaishankar, said, “I take this opportunity to firmly reiterate India’s support to the Philippines for upholding its national sovereignty” (The Indian Express, 2024). Capturing the shift, this chapter factors in India’s strategic perspective on SCS and the overall ties with ASEAN and China. By doing so, this chapter provides an overview of India’s interests in the SCS, its responses to Chinese actions in the contested waters, the growing importance of the SCS in Indian strategic policy. Since India’s SCS policy is better understood through the lens of its strengthened maritime partnerships with Southeast Asian nations, rather than solely evaluating its official statements on China’s compliance with UNCLOS, this chapter analyses India’s maritime engagement with the Southeast Asian countries in dispute with China in the SCS—namely: Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In doing so, the chapter provides evidence of India’s attempts to balance China with an enhanced maritime engagement with disputed countries in the Southeast Asia.

India’s Augmented Involvement “with Caution” in the SCS Over the last decade, since 2014, there are three policy shifts that determine India’s SCS policy. First, the shift from Look East to Act East Policy. Second, New Delhi’s renewed outlook on the Indo-Pacific and the interests to safeguard UNCLOS. Third, shifts in India’s domestic political landscape. India’s strategic priorities in the region were led by the

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“Act East Policy” under the Bharatiya Janata Party government in 2014, marking the beginning of a change in the way India engaged with Southeast Asia- moving away from soft power engagement towards an active defence engagement with ASEAN countries, particularly in the maritime space. India’s approach towards ASEAN has been entwined with historical, maritime and cultural aspects. Furthermore, several factors shaped India’s maritime engagement with ASEAN in the last decade including India’s Look East to Act East; thereby increasing interests in the protection of Seas. India’s Act East Policy from a maritime sphere led to the initiative SAGAR (Security and Growth for all in the Region). Other factors such as the birth of the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the rising tensions with China along the border certainly had an impact on the way India engaged with ASEAN in the SCS. India’s SCS Strategy is defined as augmented involvement but with caution, which conveys that India is increasing its participation or engagement in the SCS region, but the engagement is cautious and with well-thought-out boundaries or limitations (Bhatt, 2023). India’s engagement with ASEAN has entered a renewed phase marked by a deepened strategic partnership, although disputes in the SCS do not feature at the centre. For instance, SCS is often not mentioned in the official statements from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs following the India-ASEAN annual summits (Government of India, 2023). Instead, the joint maritime efforts in the SCS are primarily driven by India’s own interests, vision for the Indo-Pacific and counterbalancing China from Southeast Asian nations. India’s growing maritime engagement with claimant Southeast Asian countries in the SCS especially over the last decade is shaped by three main factors. First, the significance of the maritime domain and the Indian Ocean as a crucial strategic theatre is resurfacing in Indian strategic considerations once more, primarily due to increasing competition with China. From a foreign policy standpoint, India is choosing “flexibility” in international relations and underlined the importance of “variable geometry” in the current global context, as Indian analyst C Raja Mohan puts it. (Mohan, 2024). India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, in his book Why Bharat Matters, makes a case for how India must learn to leverage geopolitics for national development and interests. The shift in India’s maritime interests (to recognise that SCS is a secondary sphere of influence) naturally overlaps with the idea to safeguard critical sea lanes and facilitate swift humanitarian assistance across South Asia and increasingly throughout the

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broader Indo-Pacific region. India’s enduring stability plays a pivotal role in stabilising the volatile Indian Ocean region, ensuring that no single power dominates the Asia Pacific, thus contributing to a stable balance of power. Given India’s importance among the Quad, it is an indispensable partner in addressing complex global challenges. Furthermore, India’s diverse and pluralistic democracy stands out in a world where authoritarianism poses new threats to the interests of the Indo-Pacific countries especially in the seas. As a host of G20 Summit in 2023 and showing the way for the Global South in aspects such as the Digital Public Infrastructure, India is at a unique juncture with the potential for significant transformation. While sticking to non-interference in domestic politics in ASEAN, India will continue to strengthen maritime ties with ASEAN on a bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Second, India’s counterbalancing strategy with China on both land and sea. Chinese military began frequent shadowing of foreign military aircraft in the airspace with several cases of conflicts with the United States and Australia. Additionally, the creation of artificial islands and militarising them complicates the disputes further. Through the increased deployment of naval assets along the Indian Ocean Region coastlines, Beijing has indicated its reluctance to acknowledge maritime South Asia as exclusively under Indian influence. India is employing a similar counterprojection strategy in the SCS by increasing maritime and defence support to Southeast Asian countries. China’s assertiveness in the SCS contradicts its “peaceful rise” narrative within Southeast Asia (Raditio, 2019, 105), thereby enhancing India’s strategic value as a counterbalance (to China) in the eyes of Southeast Asian states. This allows India to exert strategic pressure on China in response to China’s efforts to expand its strategic influence in the Bay of Bengal and the broader Indian Ocean region (IOR). Ultimately, China’s expanding showcase of power in the IOR, in turn, incentivised India to enhance its own presence in the SCS. Another noteworthy example of this counterbalancing narrative on land emerged when parallels were drawn between India’s objections to China’s CPEC projects, in the disputed territory of what New Delhi calls Pakistanoccupied Kashmir (POK) while Pakistan terms it “Azad Kashmir”, and China’s opposition to Indian investments in offshore blocks with Vietnam in the SCS. This demonstrated the readiness of Indian strategic experts to challenge what they saw as China’s “double standards”. China referred to the CPEC as a “livelihood”, “non-political”, or “commercial” project while objecting to India’s actions in the SCS on similar grounds. This

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underscored a perceived equivalence between Chinese actions in South Asia and Indian actions in Southeast Asia. (Panda, 2017, 86). Third, at the multilateral level, India’s engagement with the SCS is, to a certain extent, driven by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. The overarching approach shared among Quad members—the United States, Australia, India, and Japan—centres around the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” (FOIP). The Quad countries have come together for joint maritime exercises in the SCS that China perceives as a coordinated challenge to its interests. Over time, the Quad countries have independently adopted a firm stance against Chinese aggression in the SCS. The United States was first among countries openly calling out on Chinese territorial claims in the SCS, categorically labelling Beijing’s assertions as “completely unlawful” (US Department of State, 2020). Following the U.S. statement, the Indian government reasserted its position, affirming that the SCS is considered part of the “global commons”. India reiterated its unwavering commitment to preserving peace and stability in the SCS region (Government of India, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). It’s worth noting that India is the sole Quad member entangled in a land border dispute with China. This unique factor impacts India’s approach, as it does not always uniformly align with the Quad’s initiatives and at times asserts its strategic independence. For instance, India has opted out from participating in the trilateral and multilateral naval exercises that involve Australia, Japan, and the United States in the SCS, particularly in the Philippines Sea (Australian Defence Government, 2024). This also justifies India’s strategic autonomy insofar as its foreign policy interests are concerned, especially for its national development.

Mapping India’s Policy and Interests in the South China Sea India’s approach towards ASEAN has been entwined with historical and cultural aspects. A number of factors shaped India’s defence engagement with ASEAN in the last decade: (a) India’s Look East to Act East; (b) growing importance of the protection of Seas and therefore, introducing initiatives such as SAGAR (Security and Growth for all in the Region), (c) the birth of the Indo-Pacific Strategy and finally, (d) India’s rising tensions with China along the border. How do each of these factors impact the way India engages with ASEAN in the South China Sea?

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India has consistently advocated for a regional security framework grounded in the principles of collective security and prosperity. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi articulated this vision in 2015 through Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). Through SAGAR, India acknowledges the pivotal role played by the seas and oceans in fostering sustainable economic advancement within a secure and stable environment. However, Indian analyst, Jagannath Panda, argues that initiatives like SAGAR were the outcome of Beijing’s MSR which “induced India to start thinking about how to renew its Indian Ocean strategy” (Panda, 2017, 85). It also ties into India’s perspective on the Indo-Pacific region as 90% of India’s trade and 80% of critical freightCoal, Petroleum and Gas, Iron Ore, Fertilisers, etc. passes through the Indo-Pacific region (Press Information Bureau, 2023). India aspires to see the Indo-Pacific region not only better linked but also safeguarded against both conventional and unconventional threats, ensuring the unimpeded movement of goods, people, and ideas. In achieving this objective, India places great importance on upholding international law, including the UNCLOS. In this entire context, ASEAN is a pertinent stakeholder. New Delhi’s maritime engagement with ASEAN, like the blue economy, is driven by initiatives such as coastal surveillance, offshore patrolling capabilities, hydrographic services, and information sharing, all aimed at enhancing maritime domain awareness. The initiatives are paramount for safeguarding vital sea lanes of communication and addressing the growing convergence of interests between ASEAN and India concerning naval vessel and ship developments in the SCS. Within this context, the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda hold significant importance for India in the region. Not just that, the notable aspect of growing importance of ASEAN in the larger Indo-Pacific strategy is reflected in India’s engagement with Southeast Asian countries particularly in the maritime space. During his address at the 2018 Shangri la Dialogue, Narendra Modi clearly indicated the geographical swath of New Delhi’s conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific to stretch from Africa to Americas, thereby covering the entire Indian and Pacific oceans, in tandem with that of Japan. He, however, emphasised on a few key facets reflecting New Delhi’s policy perspective on Indo-Pacific region, which included inclusiveness, openness, ASEAN centrality and that the concept was not directed against any country. These are indicative of the Prime Minister’s policy guidance that strategic deterrence needs to be reinforced in tandem with gentler

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persuasive and dissuasive pressures upon China (Government of India, 2018). It is important to note that while Indo-Pacific strategy was being conceptualised among the democratic countries- Australia, the US, Japan, and India- China inaugurated Sansha City to govern the islands and reefs of the Xisha Islands, Zhongsha Islands, and Nansha Islands- in the contested regions of the SCS (Wang, 2012). Chinese analysts turned to the media to argue that the Indo-Pacific geostrategy was scripted by countries such as the United States and Japan to use India with the aim to balance and even contain China’s increasing influence in the Asia–Pacific region and the Indian Ocean. India’s Response to Chinese Assertion in the SCS After India and China’s border clashes in 2020 at the Line of Actual Control in Galwan Valley, the bilateral ties have faced another roadblock. The clashes did not stop India from broadening its interests in the SCS through enhanced ties with ASEAN. Notably, India’s stand on Chinese incursions in the SCS shifted from neutral to carefully vocal over the last half a decade (Devirupa, 2023). India’s maritime engagements with Southeast Asian nations in the SCS reaffirm New Delhi’s interests. Among these developments, the inaugural of the first ever India and ASEAN Maritime Exercise (AIME) in 2023, signifies the growing importance of the SCS in India’s security policy. Such initiatives demonstrate New Delhi’s aspiration to contest China’s disputes in SCS and its visibility in the discourse on maritime security and rule-based governance in international waters. Without naming China directly, S. Jaishankar expressed that “actions and incidents in the SCS had eroded trust in the ongoing negotiations on the proposed code of conduct in the region” during the 15th East Asia Summit in 2020 (Government of India, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). This is a testament to the enduring pursuit of getting China to adhere to international norms, even in the face of complex bilateral challenges between India and China. Besides these developments, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines have turned to India to acquire BrahMos missiles, although Vietnam’s discussions of purchasing continue to be underway (The Economic Times, 2023).

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Fostering Stronger Maritime Connections with ASEAN The increasing frequency of India’s maritime exercises and bilateral relationships with ASEAN underscores the significance of the SCS beyond official statements. For the first time, India and ASEAN initiated a joint maritime exercise in 2023, held in the SCS, to enhance interoperability and demonstrate the ability of navies from both sides to operate as an integrated force to promote peace, stability, and security in the region (Press Information Bureau, 2023). Both sides have exclusive maritime exercises, even within the contested Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the SCS, an area marked by recurring Chinese incursions (Devirupa, 2023). Analysing the distinct policies of each disputed country in the SCS in relation to India offers a more intricate insight into New Delhi’s approach to the region. Vietnam is one of the ASEAN members directly impacted by the disputes in the SCS involving China. India’s entry into the SCS and enhancing ties with Vietnam reflect New Delhi’s growing interests to keep the SCS free and open. Both countries have mutual interests in “pursuing the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, particularly the 1982 UNCLOS, without resorting to threat or use of force” (Government of India, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). Over time, India and Vietnam enhanced their military-to-military interactions, introduced training initiatives, and expanded capacity-building programs spanning all three branches of their armed forces as well as their coast guards in pursuit of mutual interests in the SCS. To strengthen Defense Industrial Cooperation with Vietnam and support the capacity building of Vietnam’s Defense forces, the Indian government has allocated a total of US$ 500 million in Defense Lines of Credit. As part of this initiative, 12 High Speed Guard Boats are currently under construction for the Vietnam Border Guard Command, funded through a US$ 100 million Defense Line of Credit (Government of India, 2021). Moreover, in 2023, India handed over INS Kirpan to Vietnam at the Cam Ranh Bay port, marking the first time India transferred a naval vessel to Vietnam. The Indian Navy is among the few foreign navies granted permission to anchor at this port. Another important aspect of India-Vietnam ties is the oil and gas exploration in the SCS. Since 1988, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh Ltd has been actively engaged in exploration activities off the Vietnamese coast, aiming to bolster its energy security. In 2023, ONGC secured an extension to

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operate in Block 123 of the SCS that is along the nine-dash-line claimed by China (Reuters, 2023). India continues to engage with Vietnam at the maritime and trade level particularly in the SCS. Like its approach with Vietnam, India lends support to the Philippines in countering China’s presence in SCS. The Philippines faces not just one, but five contested flashpoints in the SCS namely the Reed Bank, Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef (Carpio, 2023). During the initial phases of diplomatic ties between New Delhi and Manila, their inaugural joint bilateral statement was issued in 2011. Notably, this statement did not make reference to the UNCLOS. India has historically distanced itself from getting into the China and the Philippines maritime disputes. Over 60 years of diplomatic ties between India and the Philippines, mutual interests were centred around enhancing trade, education, and cultural ties, although regular foreign policy and security dialogue meetings took place until 2009 without a focus on the SCS disputes. The developments in 2011 during the naval incursions recording five incursions by Chinese vessels in one year in the Filipino-Chinese contested region Spratly Islands and the Amy Douglas Bank, situated off the contested coast of Palawan Island (Reuters, 2011), India began to acknowledge the issue. The same year, India and the Philippines inaugurated the Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation (Government of India, 2011). In 2015, India’s former External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj advocated for a peaceful resolution of the West Philippine Sea/SCS dispute. Both parties reaffirmed the significance of settling all disputes through peaceful means and refraining from employing or threatening to use force, as per universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS (Government of India, 2015a, 2015b). In this context, the former Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and her Filipino counterpart Albert F. Del Rosario reiterated the necessity for a prompt and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Parties in the SCS.2 Ever since, the Philippines and China’s disputes in the SCS worsened with the former recording about 445 diplomatic complaints against the latter. The Indo-Filipino ties in 2023 significantly scaled up. India 2 China and ASEAN member nations signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in Phnom Penh in 2002 reiterating the principles of maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight, settling disputes peacefully, and exercising selfrestraint in carrying out activities.

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will continue to support the Philippines in strengthening its defence capabilities not just in the multilateral engagements under the border Indo-Pacific Strategy but also bilaterally. In 2023, Jaishankar visited the Philippines and reassured support in upholding the latter’s national sovereignty (Republic of Philippines, 2024). Besides issuing statements, the defence engagement between India and the Philippines has improved significantly since the first joint commission in 2011. This includes regular or enhanced official-level interactions among defence agencies in both countries and the establishment of a resident Defense Attaché office in Manila. Additionally, India is actively assisting in supporting the defence requirements of the Philippines, which involves acquiring naval assets and expanding training and joint exercises focused on maritime security and disaster response, among other initiatives. Enhancing military capacities is critical for the Philippines to protect their sovereignty in the face of repeated clashes in the disputed parts of the SCS. India’s BrahMos missile sale to the Philippines will improve the latter’s coastal defence in the SCS. In Indonesia’s Natuna Islands that geographically falls within China’s Nine-Dash-Line, there were several incidents of clashes resulting from Chinese illegal fishing in the EEZ and naval drills. Beijing acknowledges Indonesian sovereignty over the Natuna Islands; however, the Chinese Foreign Ministry characterises the adjacent waters along Natuna islands as China’s traditional fishing grounds (Embassy of People’s Republic of China in Jamaica, 2020). India and Indonesia share mutual security interests, particularly in the Aceh region, which has maritime boundaries with India and lies just 162 kilometres from the closest point to the Bay of Bengal. As a response to China’s actions in the SCS, especially in proximity to Natuna Island, Indonesia seeks partnerships with external powers like India to acquire technical support and coordinate efforts in safeguarding the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC). New Delhi’s strong overlap with Indonesia’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific makes the former an important partner. Both countries reaffirm a free, open, and rules-based order in the international sea, a commitment underscored by Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ (GMF) vision, resonating with India’s SAGAR. In addition to India’s participation in multilateral interactions with Indonesia via forums like the India-ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Forum, and India-ASEAN Maritime Exercises, the two nations also foster bilateral relations through their defence partnership. Taking the steps to fully realise the potential of bilateral defence cooperation, Narendra Modi

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and the former counterpart Indonesian Prime Minister Joko Widodo committed to regular meetings and staff talks among their armies, navies, and air forces, highlighting the importance of the inaugural Air Force to Air Force Staff talks through the Joint Defence Cooperation and the high-level ministerial Dialogue. The Garuda Shakti Army Exercises and the growing frequency of military training interactions, including cadet exchanges show the mutual interest to enhance maritime cooperation. Both sides inaugurated bilateral naval exercises such as Samudrasakti (which loosely translates to power of the sea) in 2018. The fourth bilateral exercise concluded in the SCS to reaffirm commitment of both navies to “promote peace and stability in the region” (Indian Navy, 2023). Indonesia’s interest in securing BrahMos missile and defence technologies from India goes to show mutual interest of both sides to strengthen defence and maritime partnership. (The Economic Times, 2023). Across Indonesia’s border, in Malaysia, over five islands in the contested zone with China in the SCS. Akin to the Philippines and Vietnam, Malaysia grounds its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claim in the SCS on a significant contiguous land surface—specifically, the eastern Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. The islands under Malaysia’s occupation within the SCS fall within its claimed EEZ, originating from Sabah. This claim, especially when compared to China’s, aligns with the principle established by the UNCLOS, wherein economic zones should be founded on land and insular territories. Malaysia and India have protested China’s 10-dash line map released in 2023. Malaysia currently occupies. Both sides have shared similar interests and committed to their principle of collective responsibility for maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region. Though both sides have strong maritime engagements through joint naval exercises such as MILAN and Samudra Lakshmana, there have been no major target joint exercises in the SCS.

SCS: India-China’s Peripheral Sphere of Dispute In the Indian immediate strategic interests, Malacca Strait and the Bay of Bengal fall under the primary spheres of importance whereas SCS should be categorised as a secondary sphere of influence. Competition between India and China often unfolds in the Bay of Bengal, particularly in Sri Lanka, where New Delhi’s engagement with the island nation, post-civil war, has been influenced by China and Pakistan (Ranjan & Chattoraj,

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2022). Similarly, India’s strategic choices in ASEAN with regards to SCS reflect a balancing act vis-à-vis China. The strategic importance of SCS in the wider India-China bilateral relations is broadly analysed by two schools of thought in India. The first school proposes that India could offset China’s geo-strategic advantage on land by leveraging its own maritime strengths. This perspective gained traction following tensions along the Sino-Indian land border, leading India to invest in border infrastructure. Advocates of this approach argued that bolstering India’s naval capabilities to disrupt Chinese commercial shipping would be a more effective use of military resources. And in doing so, exploiting China’s vulnerability in the maritime domain and countering China’s strength along the land border. For instance, in the words of Raja Menon, a former Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations), “the Chinese weakness lies in the Indian Ocean, a fact that even Beijing will readily concede” (Menon, 2013). He argued that the sea lines of communication were a strategic vulnerability for China, suggesting that India could potentially capitalise on this weakness, causing China’s actions along the Himalayan border to be influenced by India’s strength in the Indian Ocean. On the contrary, some scholars contest the practical and strategic significance of such an approach. For instance, a long-time security analyst argued that a ‘core interest on the land border’ could not be adequately safeguarded through ‘peripheral, horizontal escalation in the maritime domain’ (Singh, 2013). As Singh (2023) argues, “for India, continental geopolitics can never be compensated by a maritime geostrategy”. In essence, this implies that India’s land conflict with China cannot be significantly influenced by its increased maritime and defence engagement with claimant states in the SCS, and vice versa. Taking a deeper dive into both schools of thought in India, it is evident that the current geopolitical context necessitates the Indian state to focus on the land/border aspects of its national security namely various threats to the territorial integrity of Jammu & Kashmir, the historical border dispute with China, and its potential impact on the sub-Himalayan region, the rise of Indo-Pacific as well as the need to strengthen economic and political connections within the neighbourhood. For India, it’s evident that the pressure along its land borders surpasses that along its maritime borders suggesting that New Delhi’s enhanced maritime engagements in the SCS is independent of its land border disputes with China (Singh, 2013).

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Insofar as the reasons behind India increasing its maritime engagements with ASEAN is concerned, the evolving international landscape is leading India to re-evaluate its stance and approach in a multipolar world, and to take on more significant roles in shaping its future and to a certain extent to balance China. Given its distinct geographical location on the periphery of Eurasia and at the entrance of the Indo-Pacific, India’s foreign policy is expected to prioritise both the balance of power and order establishment in the continental and maritime regions surrounding the subcontinent. This is not to suggest that India’s increasing maritime and defence assistance to Vietnam, or the Philippines is not perceived as a challenge or a response to Chinese interests in the SCS. It does exert pressure on China, but it may not significantly impact the bilateral (border) issues. Indian policymakers are cautious about their engagements in the SCS by selective participation in Quad maritime exercises in the SCS.

Conclusion India’s stance on the SCS has undergone a significant evolution, transitioning from a neutral observer to a careful hands-on supporter for free and open sea lines of communication in ASEAN. This shift, intertwined with India’s strategic engagement with ASEAN through its Act East policy, delineates India’s SCS strategy and its broader foreign policy objectives. This transformation has positioned India to serve as a crucial counterbalance to China’s growing influence in the SCS, particularly evident in its maritime support for claimant countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. The evolving geopolitical landscape necessitates a more proactive role for India in the SCS, but this adjustment is executed with careful consideration. By vocalising support for open sea lines of communication alongside Quad partners and extending cooperation to ASEAN nations, India emerges as a pivotal player in shaping the future of the SCS and its wider geopolitical implications. Notably, India collaborates with ASEAN in joint maritime drills but abstains from similar activities within the Quad framework, signalling a nuanced approach with potential repercussions on the equilibrium of the region and India’s relationships with ASEAN and China. India’s engagements in the SCS are pivotal in influencing regional dynamics. While seeking to counterbalance China’s influence, India is cognisant of avoiding the escalation of disputes along the India-China border. This delicate balancing act underscores India’s commitment to upholding regional stability while safeguarding its own interests.

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The Economic Times (2023, June 13). The Business of BrahMos: How India’s Defence Exports Blasted off . https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ defence/the-business-of-brahmos-how-indias-defence-exports-blasted-off/ articleshow/100961603.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium= text&utm_campaign=cppst The Indian Express (2024, March 27). South China Sea dispute | India supports Philippines in Upholding its Sovereignty: Jaishankar in Manila. https://ind ianexpress.com/article/india/south-china-sea-dispute-india-supports-philip pines-in-upholding-its-sovereignty-jaishankar-in-manila-9235188/ U.S. Department of State (2020, July). U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-cla ims-in-the-south-china-sea/ Wadhwa, A. (2019, August 9). India’s Act East Policy, Distinguished Lectures. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Retrieved on October 10, 2023, from https://www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?840 Wang. H. (2012, July 24). The Founding Meeting and Unveiling Ceremony of Sansha City was grandly held on Yongxing Island, Xinhua News Agency. https://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-07/24/content_2191106.htm

CHAPTER 9

Decoding China-India Engagements in Southeast Asia-A Chinese Perspective Zou Zhengxin

With the global geopolitical centre shifts to the Indo-Pacific region, Southeast Asia is at the centre of this dynamic region and crossroad connecting east and west. As Southeast Asia’s immediate neighbours, China and India are mobilizing resources to invest in this region and eventually meet together. This paper analyzes the significance of Southeast Asia in China’s and India’s respective strategies and then argues that the region is becoming a strategic nexus between the two countries. A kind of competitive engagement mode is forming in Southeast Asia that is characterized by three aspects: geopolitics, economy, and diplomacy. This paper argues that China and India should take hold of the overall scenario of the development of their relations and the prosperity of the region to construct an inclusive co-opetition engagement framework in which

Z. Zhengxin (B) Sichuan University, Chengdu, China e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_9

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China, India, and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) can all participate while upholding the centrality of ASEAN, to jointly promote the development of the Asia–Pacific region through orderly competition and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Southeast Asia: A Strategic Nexus of China and India Southeast Asia is one of the most dynamic and resilient economies in the world, with an ASEAN GDP growth rate of 5.7% in 2022. ASEAN’s projections of 4.7% in 2024 and 5.0% in 2025 are expected to outpace global average growth estimates currently sitting at 2.8% and 3.0% respectively (ASEAN: regional economic outlook, 2023). In terms of purchasing power parity, ASEAN’s economy accounted for 5.3% of the world’s total in 2022, making it among the fifth-largest economies after China, the United States, the European Union and India (钟, 2023). Consequently, as a result of the eastward relocation of the global geopolitical gravity, the evolution of the United States Indo-Pacific strategy, and the pursuit of ASEAN’s “centrality”, the strategic standing of ASEAN has experienced a notable elevation, leading to an enhanced influence in the international sphere. A series of institutional arrangements initiated or spearheaded by ASEAN have become important variables in resolving regional crises and shaping the regional security architecture. Historically, both China and India have established enduring commercial and cultural connections with Southeast Asia via both terrestrial and maritime channels. Given the geopolitical developments in Asia and the emergence of China and India as significant players, it is not unexpected that both nations have intensified their strategic attention and investment in Southeast Asia, which serves as a crucial pivot between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Located at the intersection of land and sea, Southeast Asia holds significant importance in China’s neighbouring diplomacy and serves as a crucial region for the implementation of the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping initially introduced the concept of the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” during his visit to Indonesia. The objective was to rejuvenate historical maritime trade and enhance connectivity, with Indonesia serving as a crucial hub, which together with the land-based “The Silk Road Economic Belt” constitutes the BRI—a Chinese proposal to promote mutual development and

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prosperity worldwide and to advance the establishment of a community with a shared future for mankind. With the joint efforts of both parties, China-ASEAN relations have realized all-round development. China and 10 ASEAN nations have signed bilateral cooperation documents for the BRI. Another landmark event is that in November 2019, the 22nd ChinaASEAN (10 + 1) Summit issued the Joint Statement on the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 and the Belt and Road Initiative. China and ASEAN economic data are equally dazzling. In 2022, bilateral trade will be valued at US $975,3 billion, an increase of 11.2 per cent yearover-year and an increase of 1.2 times compared to 2013’s US $443.6 billion (中华人民共和国中央人民政府, 2023). China and ASEAN have been each other’s largest trading partners for three consecutive years and have maintained their status as important investment partners for decades, with six of the top ten non-financial direct investments made by Chinese enterprises along the Belt and Road route occurring in ASEAN nations (中华人民共和国商务部, 2023). Stimulated by a succession of concepts such as BRI, China-ASEAN FTA 3.0 Upgrade Negotiations, The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the construction of a “five-pronged approach” (namely policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people ties) between China and ASEAN has witnessed tremendous growth. In terms of people-to-people exchanges, for example, the number of people travelling between the two sides has increased from 18.2 million in 2013 to 65 million before covid-19 (中华人民共和国驻 东盟使团，2023). Southeast Asia is a holistic geographical area in close proximity to China, and it holds significant relevance for China’s peripheral security, economic growth, and mitigation of China-U.S. rivalry. First, maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. The South China Sea issue is one of the most significant variables hindering the development of relations between China and ASEAN. In 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), the very first political document on the South China Sea. After years of tough efforts, the parties decided in 2017 to begin consultations and negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), which has entered the second round of text reading. It is undeniable that the building of rules and order in the South China Sea that are acceptable to all parties will take a considerable amount of time due to the overlapping influence of multiple factors, including different national

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positions, the negative effect of the “South China Sea arbitration case”, and the interference of extraterritorial forces (胡, 雷, 闫, 2022). Nevertheless, it is essential to acknowledge that China and the ASEAN countries are primary stakeholders in the South China Sea issue and, as such, should possess the expertise to effectively manage it. It is imperative for all nations involved to prioritize the resolution of their divergences and conflicts, collaborate harmoniously to facilitate the successful execution of the pertinent agreements and build a “common homeland in the South China Sea” together. Second, contributing as a key economic partner. China and ASEAN have produced fruitful results in recent years and have always viewed each other as an essential economic development support. ASEAN represents a convergence zone of the BRI and “dual circulation” development paradigm, which allows the domestic and overseas markets to reinforce each other, with the domestic market as the mainstay, as well as a significant and stable opportunity for China’s economic development in the new era. Taking the China-ASEAN FTA 3.0 as an example, the two sides have already conducted three rounds of negotiations. It has been widely recognized for its potential to significantly strengthen the China-ASEAN comprehensive strategic partnership and facilitate regional economic integration by enhancing collaboration between the two parties in areas such as the digital economy, green economy, and supply chain industry (中华人 民共和国中央人民政府, 2023). Simultaneously, Southeast Asia, due to its proximity to China and favourable conditions, assumes a significant role in facilitating the establishment of a mutually beneficial trade system within the framework of China’s “dual circulation”. Consequently, it is anticipated that the economic interdependence and internal dynamics between China and ASEAN will experience heightened growth in the future. Third, it is an important arena for mitigating China-US competition. As the United States assertively promotes its “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework”, its intention to unite ASEAN nations to contain China has become more apparent. ASEAN, which is embroiled in the competition between the United States and China, is under pressure to “pick a side”. However, ASEAN countries have consistently adhered to the strategy of great power balance, bolstering cohesion and resilience by maintaining ASEAN’s centrality and actively expanding the partnership network to promote inclusive development in the region and mitigate the risks posed by China-US competition (杨, 2021). As can be seen, ASEAN is acutely aware that the risk of China-US rivalry and

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even potential conflict is not in its best interest, and the main ASEAN nations are all working towards China-US detente. A healthy ChinaASEAN relationship can therefore serve as a “buffer” for the China-US relationship. For India, Southeast Asia is an ideal region for its strategic calculations to embrace the Indo-Pacific and expand its influence. India put forward its “Look East” policy as early as 1991, and the Narendra Modi government upgraded it to an “Act East” policy in 2014, giving it diplomatic and security connotations beyond economics (Ngaibiakching, & Pande, A, 2020). India expects to use this policy to actively integrate itself into the Asia–Pacific and, on this basis, to embark on Indo-Pacific diplomacy to highlight India’s new geopolitical role, i.e., to move from the periphery to the centre of Asian politics, and thus to play a key role in the construction of a regional order (李, 2018). Within the framework of the Indo-Pacific discourse, the connotation and expansion of the “Act East” policy have been significantly broadened, assuming a pivotal role in India’s endeavours to define its position in Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific region. In response to India’s Act East policy, the minister of state in the Ministry of External Affairs, V. Muraleedharan recently affirmed that “the objective of Act East Policy is to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties and develop strategic relationships with countries in the IndoPacific region through continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, thereby providing enhanced connectivity in its broadest sense, including political, economic, cultural and people-to-people relations (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2023)”.This is further evidence of India’s ambitions in Southeast Asia and the latter’s increasing significance to India’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Simultaneously, owing to its geographical attributes of bridging the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Southeast Asia holds significant relevance as an area for the advancement of India’s maritime strategy. India’s maritime strategy has historically centred on the Indian Ocean. However, as India’s maritime capabilities have grown and the geopolitical concept of the Indo-Pacific has evolved, Indian decision-makers and strategic elites have started to expand their focus beyond the traditional boundaries of the Indian Ocean in South Asia. They now seek to define India’s strategic space and national interests within the broader perspective of the Indo-Pacific (吴, 2021). India’s maritime strategic thinking has been appropriately modified, and its engagement in Southeast Asian issues concerning the Indo-Pacific region is a notable demonstration of this

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adaptation. The maritime security strategy introduced by India in 2015 marked the inaugural inclusion of the term “Indo-Pacific”. It also elevated the significance of the eastern and western chokepoints within the Indian Ocean as the primary areas. This development was accompanied by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Security and Growth for All in the Region” (SAGAR) and the “Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative” (IPOI), which collectively signify India’s nuanced and well-considered perspective on the Indo-Pacific region beyond its conventional sphere of influence, and assume a more prominent position in matters pertaining to the Indo-Pacific domain. South-East Asia, with its “pivot” role connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is a natural maritime strategic alternative for India. Recent coordinated maritime exercises with South-East Asia represent India’s most recent effort to expand its military presence. Furthermore, India has proved its intention to foster the Southeast Asian region as a prospective market for military exports (Grossman, 2023a, 2023b). In recent years, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has actively advocated for the “Make in India” initiative and emphasized the need for self-sufficiency in the defence sector, with the ultimate goal of positioning India as a prominent worldwide hub for defence manufacturing. Motivated by the Indo-Pacific vision, India aspires to assume the role of a “net security provider” within the expansive Indo-Pacific region and seeks to augment its economic gains by means of bolstering its armament exports. Nations situated in Southeast Asia, namely the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, exhibit considerable potential as prospective recipients of India’s defence exports. Since 2021, India has come out with a list of 152 defence items that are available to friendly nations. This includes the Tejas fighter aircraft, Dhruv and Rudra choppers, besides the Light Combat Helicopter, the BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, and the Akash air defence systems (汪, 张, 2021). In 2022, India signed a US $375-million contract for the BrahMos shore-based anti-ship missile system to the Philippines (Rezaul H Laskar, 2022). India is quite encouraged that this is the first export order for this type of weapon and the single largest order for Indian defence exports, paving the way for India to sign more such agreements with other ASEAN countries under negotiation such as Indonesia and Vietnam. The aforementioned comparison reveals that Southeast Asia, situated at the confluence of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, occupies a pivotal position in the strategic interests of China and India. China places significant emphasis on Southeast Asia as a primary focus of its neighbouring

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diplomacy and a crucial region for the implementation of the BRI. This strategic approach holds paramount importance in ensuring peace and stability within the South China Sea. The region also serves as a significant area for India’s “Act East” policy and Indo-Pacific vision, which are critical for India’s embrace of the Indo-Pacific and the enhancement of its influence. Hence, Southeast Asia is emerging as a significant strategic nexus between China and India. Both nations are employing various political, economic, and diplomatic approaches to enhance their strategic focus and investment in Southeast Asia, to actively shape the regional security dynamics according to their respective calculations. As a result, the competitive engagements between China and India in Southeast Asia are progressively gaining prominence.

China-India Competitive Engagements in Southeast Asia Southeast Asia is a key region for India’s eastward integration into the Indo-Pacific and its move towards global power. Similarly, this region is one of the centres of gravity of the strategic game between China and the United States. Biden’s first formal National Security Strategy identifies China presents “America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge” (National Security Strategy, p. 11), and with the rising sensitivity of the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea in China-US relations, the United States will likely increase its investment in Southeast Asia, and China-US competition in the region will become more intense. And while India’s eastward movement into Southeast Asia is in the interest of the US and its allies to counter China, RAND researchers assert that New Delhi’s Southeast Asia policy—even at its current level— is positive for the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China (Grossman, 2023a, 2023b). Due to the strong draw of the United States, India will be tied to the US’ anti-China chariot to some extent. As a result, ChinaIndia engagements in Southeast Asia will appear primarily competitive, which can be understood in three ways. Geopolitics Geopolitical factors play a crucial role in influencing China-India policies and actions in Southeast Asia. These factors encompass various aspects such as the South China Sea dispute, which involves China’s sovereign

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interests; the containment strategy implemented by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and China’s counter-containment; and the China-India arms race in Southeast Asia. Game on the South China Sea Issue India, as an extraterritorial nation in the South China Sea, has consistently adopted a neutral stance of non-intervention in the South China Sea dispute. After the eruption of the China-India border conflict in 2020, the bilateral relations between the two nations have significantly deteriorated. As a consequence, India has expedited the recalibration of its policy pertaining to the South China Sea, transitioning from its prior position to assume a more active role as a direct participant. As a result, India has highlighted the strategic, economic and diplomatic significance of the South China Sea to India; continued to strengthen its military deployment and interaction in the South China Sea; and increasingly clarified its position and stance on the South China Sea issue. Recently, India even made a rare public statement in support of the so-called “South China Sea Arbitration” declared by Philippines in 2016, and held the first IndiaASEAN joint maritime exercise (AIME-2023) in the South China Sea on 08 May 2023. It is evident that India has shifted its stance from a previously neutral policy and has aligned itself with certain Southeast Asian countries referred to as “claimant states” in the South China Sea dispute, especially with Philippines. India has leveraged its open solidarity with these countries and its collaborative endeavours with the United States to emphasize the principles of “freedom of navigation” and a “rules-based international order” in order to address China, either explicitly or implicitly. These actions introduce new factors into the struggle between China and India. China says that it has indisputable sovereignty over the Nanhai Zhudao (islands in the South China Sea) and the adjacent waters (MFA, China, 2023). The involvement of India will only exacerbate the already complex situation in the South China Sea, which is not conducive to the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea or the overall development of China-India relations. India’s Role in Quad and China’s Response The Quad mechanism holds significant importance within the United States Indo-Pacific strategy, serving as a crucial forum for policy coordination among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia about China.

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The United States considers India to be a significant member of the Quad framework and a crucial partner in the Indian Ocean region to counter China, hence maintaining a balance of power. The enhancement of India’s relations with the other three countries under the quadrilateral framework holds the potential to achieve its political, economic, and diplomatic objectives, which may encompass the containment of China. Some Indian scholars confessed that through the Quad, India can counterbalance China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific region, including its BRI which has led to it building port facilities in countries neighbouring India, giving rise to a sense of encirclement in New Delhi (Pant, 2022). While India does not intend to fully align with the United States, it also seeks to avoid excessive risk in unilaterally opposing China. Therefore, the adoption of a “hitchhiking” approach aligns with India’s long-term objectives in Southeast Asia and the Pacific region. It is evident that the United States and India possess a shared objective of restraining China’s ascent, and as a result, they have demonstrated a willingness to enhance the Quad framework. In light of the protracted Sino-Indian border dispute, India has increasingly aligned itself with the United States and adopted a more assertive approach in leveraging the Quad as a means to counterbalance China. In the year 2020, India sent an invitation to Australia to partake in the Malabar exercise after 13 years. Furthermore, India actively engaged in the initiation of two significant frameworks, namely the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Framework (IPMDA) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) with the US and its allies. From China’s perspective, the Indo-Pacific Strategy concocted by the United States is keen on creating various sorts of small cliques by ganging up on others under the banner of “freedom and openness”. While claiming to “change China’s surrounding environment”, the strategy aims to contain China and attempts to make Asia–Pacific countries “pawns” of U.S. hegemony (MFA, China). China characterizes the Quad as a strategic instrument aimed at constraining and encircling China while upholding the hegemony of the United States (魏, 2022). India, as a significant member and active participant in the Quad framework, naturally attracts heightened attention from China. The current emphasis of the Quad appears to be predominantly centred on the Pacific region, introducing an additional factor to the India-China competition that extends beyond their respective boundaries and the Indian Ocean. The escalating focus and engagement of the United States, Japan, and Australia in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait may

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potentially compel India to align itself with these nations. Consequently, this could lead to an intensification of the Sino-Indian rivalry in Southeast Asia and other regions adjacent to China. Arms Sales Race Due to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Russia’s declining proportion as an arms supplier to Southeast Asia has created opportunities for China and India to increase their arms supplies to Southeast Asian countries. As far as defence purchases are concerned, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines who have ongoing skirmishes with Beijing find themselves on one end of the spectrum while Cambodia, Laos and Thailand find themselves on the other end (Bhonsale, 2023). Given its geographical proximity to Southeast Asia, China possesses the potential to serve as an advantageous source of affordable weaponry for the region. Nevertheless, Southeast Asian nations have not uniformly embraced the procurement of Chinese armaments. Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines now engaged in maritime conflicts with China, have expressed a desire to broaden their supplier base, with India emerging as a potential alternative. India aims to augment its annual defence exports to US $5 billion by the fiscal year 2024–25, representing a substantial rise from the existing US $1.5 billion (Dutta, 2023). As previously said, in accordance with the “Act East” policy, India’s defence exports primarily focus on Southeast Asian nations, particularly those involved in maritime disputes with China, as discussed above. The military sales competition between China and India in Southeast Asia is evident in two key dimensions. Firstly, both nations are actively increasing their respective shares of military sales in the region while also fostering stable procurement partnerships. Secondly, India strategically prioritizes countries engaged in maritime disputes with China as its primary military sales partners, aiming to bolster its capabilities and exert influence to counter China’s presence in the South China Sea. Economy China and Southeast Asian nations are significant contributors to each other’s economic growth, and bilateral cooperation has significantly advanced regional economic integration and stability. Southeast Asia is also a significant destination for India’s eastward expansion, nearly 55 per cent of India’s trade with the Indo-Pacific region passes through these

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waters, according to official statistics. As China and India expand their presence in Southeast Asia, competition in terms of trade, investment, and initiatives is intensifying between the two nations. Trade Competition At present, China-ASEAN trade cooperation has been steadily upgrading, with China maintaining the status of ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 14 consecutive years and the two sides being each other’s largest trading partner for three consecutive years. Last year, China-ASEAN trade exceeded US $970 billion, up 11.2 per cent year-on-year (中华人民共 和国外交部, 2023). Among ASEAN member countries, the top three trading partners with China are Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia respectively. China and ASEAN countries are traditional neighbours, and the advancement of the China-Indochina Peninsula connectivity project has facilitated economic and trade cooperation between the two sides. Meanwhile, China and ASEAN have complementary markets, with China’s share of ASEAN imports rising sharply, while ASEAN’s share of China’s imports has also improved. In addition, with the implementation of the China-ASEAN FTA and RCEP and other free trade institutional arrangements, more impetus has been injected into the economic and trade cooperation between the two sides. India-ASEAN trade is also growing, led by India’s “Act East” policy and Indo-Pacific vision. India and ASEAN registered a bilateral trade of USD 131.5 billion in 2022–23. The trade with ASEAN accounted for 11.3% of India’s global trade in 2022–23 (Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India, 2023). While India’s exports to ASEAN increased from $ 25.63 billion in 2010–11 to $ 43.51 billion in 2022– 23, its imports also increased from $ 30.61 billion to $ 87.59 billion in the same period (De, 2023). India and ASEAN signed the FTA in 2009, but this ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) has not been successful in bolstering India’s economic influence in ASEAN, as China has simpler access to ASEAN markets than India. ASEAN has consented to consider a bilateral FTA in response to India’s concerns, which would significantly revitalize the bilateral trade partnership. In addition, the Indo-Pacific Economic Initiative (IPEF), which is sponsored by the United States, has become an important channel for India to engage with ASEAN nations and counterbalance China. This is because ASEAN nations are members of both IPEF and RCEP, and India refused

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to join RCEP at the last minute. India’s Southeast Asia policy is a combination of diplomacy, defence cooperation, and economic engagement. As a result, India will continue to increase its economic influence in ASEAN, and its antagonism with China will intensify in this region. Investment Competition Southeast Asia is a land of opportunity for Chinese companies. The ASEAN Investment Report 2022: Pandemic Recovery and Investment Facilitation shows that Chinese FDI investment in ASEAN grew by 96% to nearly US$14 billion in 2021, mainly in manufacturing, electric vehicle-related activities, digital economy, infrastructure and real estate ( 中国国际贸易促进委员会, 2022). For Chinese companies, ASEAN’s relatively young and cheap labour force, abundant natural resources, and more stable political environment make it an ideal investment destination. According to the Directory of Chinese Enterprises Outbound Investments published by the Ministry of Commerce, approximately 20% of the enterprises have submitted their investment destinations in the ten ASEAN countries. Considering that close to 40% of the enterprises in the directory listed their investment destinations as tax havens and investment transit locations, the proportion of Chinese enterprises favouring Southeast Asia among those interested in outbound investment is significantly higher than 20% (魏, 梁, 王, 翟, 2023). This all sets the stage for extra Chinese investment in ASEAN in the future. As India-ASEAN upgraded its relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, India’s enthusiasm for investing in Southeast Asia has grown. ASEAN views India as a welcome partner and encourages India to further promote trade and investment with ASEAN. Indian leaders nowadays advocate “decentralized globalization” and “re-globalization” to make India one of “multiple centres of production”. With Southeast Asia also a preferred destination of GVC diversification, there is significant potential for India-ASEAN GVC linkages to grow. In the words of Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, “better-connected India and ASEAN would be well-positioned to promote decentralized globalization and resilient and reliable supply chains” (Ha & Tan, 2023). Benefiting from Vietnam’s geographical advantage of connecting Northeast India and Southeast Asia. India is estimated to have invested nearly US$2 billion in Vietnam, including funds channelled via other countries. Over 200 Indian investment projects in Vietnam are primarily focused on sectors including

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energy, mineral exploration, agrochemicals, sugar, tea, coffee manufacturing, IT, and auto components. Several major Indian businesses, such as Adani Group, Mahindra, chemicals major SRF, and renewables giant Suzlon, have shown interest in venturing into Vietnam (Das, 2020). As Chinese and Indian investments converge in Southeast Asia, their competitive landscape will become more pronounced. Initiative Competition After China proposed the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, India was sceptical and openly opposed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. India became the only one of China’s major neighbours not to sign the Belt and Road Initiative documents and skipped three Belt and Road Initiative International Cooperation Summits. In Southeast Asia, the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation(LMC)and The China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC) under the BRI have achieved remarkable results. With the opening of the China-Laos Railway, China’s connectivity with Southeast Asia has been further enhanced. Currently, the China-Thailand Railway is under construction, and in the future it will form a railroad network covering most of the Southeast Asian countries, which will become the main north–south artery of the Indochina Peninsula, greatly facilitating the flow of materials and people. Similarly, China and India’s competition over their Southeast Asia initiative is intensifying. C. Raja Mohan, a renowned Indian strategist, once stated that whether India recognizes or wants to participate in the BRI is not a fundamental issue and that if India wishes to counter it, India must put forth its strategy of connectivity and external cooperation, which represents India’s primary strategic concept to counter the BRI (梅, 2018). Accordingly, India’s reinvigorated competitive hedging strategy, the “Act East” policy and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Economic and Technical Cooperation (BIMSTEC), which have “spatial overlap” and “institutional competition” with the BRI. Based on the development of North East of India, the Modi government has invested a great deal of effort and positioned India’s Act East Policy at the heart of its eastward orientation and ties in with the broader approach to the Indo-Pacific (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2019). By highlighting topics such as trade and investment, energy cooperation, Buddhist exchanges and civil interaction under this policy framework,

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India is attempting to advance its Southeast Asian strategy with a softbalance tactic to gain greater political space and flexibility for it to balance China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia. Diplomacy In recent times, the diplomatic ties between China and India with Southeast Asia have progressed significantly towards a comprehensive strategic partnership. Both nations have actively engaged in various cooperation frameworks and mechanisms led by the ASEAN to enhance bilateral collaboration. Consequently, their involvement in regional affairs has been elevated, and their competitiveness has been underscored. Comprehensive Strategic Partnership At a special summit to commemorate the 30th anniversary of ChinaASEAN dialogue relations on November 22, 2021, China and ASEAN officially announced the establishment of a China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 2021). This is a milestone event of historical significance in the relations between the two sides, marking a new stage in China-ASEAN relations. The dialogue process between China and ASEAN was initiated in 1991, with China attaining the status of a comprehensive dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996. Subsequently, in 2003, China took the lead in becoming an ASEAN dialogue partner by acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). This development marked the establishment of a strategic partnership between China and ASEAN, with a shared focus on fostering peace and prosperity. One year later in 2022, the 19th ASEAN-India Summit took place, at which ASEAN and India officially elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Vice President’s Secretariat, 2022). This development positioned India as the third nation, following Australia and China, to establish a comparable level of engagement with ASEAN. The establishment of the ASEAN-India Dialogue Relationship took place in 1992, with further upgrades to a Comprehensive Partnership in December 1995, and further advancements to a High-level Partnership and Strategic Partnership in 2002 and 2012, respectively. China and India initiated the process of dialogue with ASEAN around the same period. China forged a strategic partnership with ASEAN in 2003, while India elevated its bilateral relationship to a strategic partnership in

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2012. However, both nations concurrently established a comprehensive strategic partnership with ASEAN, signifying the highest level of bilateral engagement, during a similar timeframe. The establishment of the India-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership aligns with India’s strategic goal of countering China’s influence in Southeast Asia. This objective is evident from India’s ongoing efforts to develop economic and security alternatives to China in the region, where China continues to hold a significant level of power. During the India-ASEAN Summit held on September 7, Prime Minister Modi unveiled a 12-point plan aimed at enhancing collaboration with ASEAN. This plan encompasses various domains, including connectivity, digital public infrastructure (DPI), and counter-terrorism. The plan envisions the establishment of multimodal transport and economic corridors that will facilitate connectivity between India, Southeast Asia, West Asia, and Europe (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2023).The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership presents an opportunity for the further development of India-ASEAN relations, which will foster cooperation in the fields of energy, technology, investment, and climate change. Maritime security is also a major area of cooperation between the two sides, and India has shown increasing interest and aggressiveness on the issue of the South China Sea and has attempted to realize the IPOI and ASEAN Outlook for the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) docking to deepen the integration of maritime domain awareness systems, which has more far-reaching implications for China, as it is also a major concern for the Quad. Framework and Mechanisms for Cooperation China supports ASEAN’s continued centrality and leadership in the evolving regional architecture and the strengthening of ASEAN-led mechanisms for East Asian cooperation, including ASEAN-Dialogue Partner Cooperation, ASEAN-China-Japan-Republic of Korea Cooperation, the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus, and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). Similarly, India has been more proactive in ASEAN-led mechanisms in recent years, exploring opportunities for cooperation on a range of issues of bilateral interest. Nonetheless, China and India are perceived very differently within the ASEAN-led framework. Consider, for instance, the statements made by the two countries’ leaders at the 18th East Asia Summit. Modi reiterated

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the importance of the EAS mechanism and reaffirmed support for further strengthening it. He underlined India’s support for ASEAN centrality and called for ensuring a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific. Prime Minister highlighted synergies of visions for Indo-Pacific between India and ASEAN and underscored that ASEAN is the focal point of Quad’s vision (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2023). India’s emphasis on the “rules-based Indo-Pacific Order” and the Quad is part of the United States’ narrative to counter China in the Indo-Pacific region, which China has consistently opposed. Similarly, a speech by Chinese Premier Li Qiang at the 18th East Asia Summit pointed out “We have all committed to upholding the principles of ASEAN centrality…China firmly opposes the attempts to create competing structures or small blocs, still less do we want to see regional countries forced to pick sides or get embroiled in meaningless disputes that harm their own people’s interests (The State Council, People’s Republic of China, 2023)”. It is also very clear that China opposes the United States Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Quad’s attempts to blockade China, and India’s injection of geopolitical competition factors into such a mechanism. This shows that China and India are actively involved in various mechanisms led by ASEAN, but have not reached a consensus on many regional affairs. Especially in the context of the current U.S. efforts to promote the “Indo-Pacific strategy” and draw India closer, China and India to participate in the ASEAN regional mechanism have geopolitical considerations to gain competitive advantages.

Conclusion ASEAN has expanded to become the robust fifth-largest economy, assuming a progressively crucial position in both international and regional matters. For the emerging power China and India, both geographically proximate to Southeast Asia, perceive later as a promising opportunity and a significant actor for strategic calculation. China views Southeast Asia as a lucrative export market and a logical continuation of the BRI, India thinks of it as an optimal hub for expanding its influence beyond the traditional South Asian region and embracing the wider Indo-Pacific region. In line with the interests of medium-sized countries or groups, ASEAN countries express a desire to enhance their diplomatic engagement and uphold a nuanced equilibrium between various actors, including the United States and its allies, as well as emerging powers

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like China and India. Given the recognition of ASEAN as a significant collaborator in the BRI and Act East policy, it is certain that India and China would persistently enhance their influence and connections within the region, which is progressively transforming into a strategic nexus for India-China engagement. At present, interactions between China and India in Southeast Asia are primarily competitive and can be categorized into three distinct aspects. From a geopolitical standpoint, Southeast Asia holds significant importance for both China and India as they seek to extend their spheres of influence. Consequently, these two nations have engaged in strategic manoeuvring concerning the South China Sea sovereignty dispute, the regional security architecture, and the arms sale race. The South China Sea dispute pertains to China’s maritime delimitation and territorial sovereignty, both of which are fundamental concerns for China’s national security. In the context of the long-delayed border issue between the two countries, India has sought to use the South China Sea issue to challenge China’s maritime claims, thereby exerting pressure on China. The Quad, which has clear implications for U.S. containment of China, is an additional subject of discussion. The United States often portrays India as the “driver” of this mechanism, which, despite not having fully realized this objective, has the potential to evolve into a multilateral structure for the comprehensive containment of China in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, the arms sale race between China and India towards Southeast Asia is motivated in part by a desire to prevent the other from attaining military superiority in the region. This represents a significant strategic objective for both nations, as it serves to bolster their respective political and military sway in the area. On the economic level, China and South-East Asia are mutually significant markets, and their economic and commercial interactions are mutually beneficial. While India is making progress in this aspect, it is indisputable that a significant disparity remains with China. The primary domains of competition between the two nations are investment, trade, and initiatives. China is constructing a highly integrated regional economic sphere and promoting connectivity across the IndoChina Peninsula by utilizing physical infrastructure as part of its BRI. In contrast, India is actively reviving its “Act East” policy with the aim of fostering land (Northeast India) and sea (Bay of Bengal) connectivity with Southeast Asia. While the aforementioned initiatives in Southeast Asia exhibit similarity and compatibility, their heightened competitiveness

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is regrettably attributable to the political relationship between China and India, as well as regional nations. In addition, China and India are capitalizing on their respective strengths to enhance trade and investment in Southeast Asia, as well as to broaden the market interface with the local market. This latter will likely shape the future competition between the two countries in the region. On the diplomatic front, ASEAN is gaining prominence on the diplomatic agenda of China and India. In 2021 and 2022, respectively, China and India established a comprehensive strategic partnership with ASEAN, which signifies that ASEAN considers both China and India to be of equal significance. The deepening of diplomatic relations lays the groundwork for deeper cooperation between ASEAN and India and China in areas such as the economy, regional affairs, regional trade agreements, and green development in the future, and means that China-India interactions in ASEAN have become more inevitable. Concurrently, China and India have increased their involvement in ASEAN-led regional mechanisms, including the ASEAN-Dialogue Partner Cooperation, ASEAN-ChinaJapan-Republic of Korea Cooperation, the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus, and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). It is not difficult to discern the nuances of China and India’s positions in the ASEAN-led mechanism and their divergences on a number of regional issues from the speeches of their respective leaders. International politics is characterized by the regular occurrence of competitive interactions among major powers, particularly on the agendas that affect the interests and progress of nations. Nevertheless, competitive engagements between China and India in Southeast Asia serve no purpose for both nations, and the broader region. China and India, as rising powers in Asia, require a tranquil and secure internal and external atmosphere. Engaging in regional competition will only deplete additional resources and impede the progress of national objectives. Meanwhile, the policy flexibility of regional countries may be constrained by the dynamics of the great power competition, particularly in relation to sensitive matters including sovereignty and security, which could potentially expose the region to the risk of conflict. Instead, it is the moment to call on China and India to work together with regional countries to create an inclusive co-opetition engagement framework between China, India, and ASEAN, while preserving ASEAN’s centrality.

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Firstly, jointly uphold ASEAN’s centrality and reduce the negative impact of geostrategic games. Both China and India have expressed their support for maintaining the “centrality” of ASEAN. However, it is important to acknowledge that the Asia–Pacific region is currently experiencing a multifaceted and significant transformation. The United States and its allies are currently engaged in the development of two security frameworks: Quad and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS). These initiatives have caused significant disruption to the existing strategic equilibrium in the region, resulting in a reconfiguration of the regional architecture that was previously centred around the United States, rather than ASEAN (刘, 2021). Maintaining the “centrality” of ASEAN necessitates respecting the fundamental demands of ASEAN nations and constructing a regional security order led by ASEAN that is also consistent with the demands of China and India. Simultaneously, China and India should collaborate to mitigate the negative effects of the strategic game played by the major powers in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, China and India should not view Southeast Asia as a new field for strategic manoeuvres. There are dissenting voices in the Indian academic community who said that “India is taking major strides to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, a move that will allow countries to counter China’s dominance in the region (Bala, 2023)”. India’s relations with South-East Asia should not be perceived as a counterbalance to China, as this is neither in China’s nor India’s best interests nor is it what Southeast Asian nations expect. On the other hand, China and India should strive to maintain the balance of power in Southeast Asia and prevent the region from becoming a pawn in the “Indo-Pacific strategy” of the United States and the game against China. Secondly, jointly explore the possibility of linking the economic initiatives of China, India, and ASEAN. As an open economic initiative proposed by China, it is a pity that India is not part of the BRI. As far as Southeast Asia is concerned, India’s Act East policy and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (MSR) have the potential and possibility of docking, which is also in the interests of ASEAN countries. There has been a great deal of discussion on this issue between China and India in the past few years. In June 2019, the 34th ASEAN Summit released the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which articulates ASEAN’s propositions on regional cooperation. Both China and India have expressed the desire to align their respective initiatives with the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook, which also opens up the possibility of aligning multilateral

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economic initiatives on a regional scale. The similarity of China and India’s policy objectives towards Southeast Asia, coupled with the tradition of balanced diplomacy practised by ASEAN countries, does not necessarily constitute a competitive relationship between China and India in Southeast Asia. ASEAN, as the host country, should play an active role in attracting China and India to participate in the regional connectivity and economic integration process. In addition, on January 1, 2022, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) formally came into force, marking the official landing of the world’s most populous free trade area with the largest economic and trade scale and the most development potential. India’s final decision to withdraw after eight years of running with it is understandable that its considerations, RCEP for India’s return to always retain the window of opportunity, including China and Southeast Asia, are looking forward to India’s early return to this mechanism, which is in line with India’s national interests and the overall development of the region in the long term. It is believed that China, India and ASEAN jointly participate in the regional initiative and economic agreement is bound to release greater dividends. Thirdly, understanding each other’s core concerns and reaching mutual understanding. Both China and India are now facing the mission of national revitalization and accelerated modernization of their countries, which should be an opportunity rather than a challenge for each other. In the new coopetitive relationship in Southeast Asia, the two sides should also have frank exchanges to understand each other’s core demands and explore ways of coexistence. In Southeast Asia, China is concerned about the South China Sea issue and the United States Indo-Pacific strategy. China is working with the countries directly involved in the South China Sea issue to resolve the disputes peacefully through friendly consultation, and the legitimate rights and interests of extraterritorial countries, including India, will be effectively safeguarded. Under the shadow of the border conflict, India is gradually recalibrating its South China Sea policy (Saha, 2021) and has been challenging China over the South China Sea arbitration and the so-called freedom of navigation. India’s involvement will only exacerbate the complexity of the South China Sea issue and slow down the progress of the negotiations on the COC and the tranquillity of the South China Sea. Another concern for China is India’s role in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quad Mechanism, which India is admittedly more moderate in its wording. However, in international relations, a country is often more concerned with concrete behaviour rather

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than expression, and the Quad has significantly deepened its interaction at all levels, making it more assertive to China. India has significant political, economic and diplomatic interests in Southeast Asia, especially under the leadership of the Act East policy, India’s ambition to move towards the broader Indo-Pacific through Southeast Asia has also become more obvious. China should face up to the fact that India is rising, and the two countries, as important members of international mechanisms such as the G20, SCO and BRICS, should further explore coordination and cooperation in regional and international affairs. More importantly, the two countries should give full understanding and respect to each other’s concerns and issues and find a mutually acceptable balance. Finally, inquiring coopetitive from the perspective of the overall development of China-India relations. The engagement in Southeast Asia is only a part of China and India, and it’s not the main aspect. Therefore, the two countries need to look at the engagement at the regional level in the context of the bilateral relationship as a whole. For the time being, the mainstay of China-India relations remains the protracted border disputes, trade imbalances, and lack of mutual trust. As president, “If China and India speak with one voice, the world will listen”. Only by adhering to the strategic consensus of “not posing a threat to each other and treating each other as an opportunity for development”, resolving disputes and differences through dialogue and consultation, and ensuring the smooth and positive development of relations between the two countries can we create a favourable environment for cooperation between the two countries in Southeast Asia, as well as in other regions. Southeast Asia is vast and open enough, and orderly competition and mutually beneficial cooperation should be the way for China and India to coexist and develop in Southeast Asia. China and India should work together with Southeast Asian countries to realize mutual benefits and win–win, and jointly promote the development of the Asia–Pacific region.

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刘卿. (2021年11月21日). “东盟印太展望”:维护东盟中心地位的艰难折冲. 新华 网. http://www.news.cn/world/2021-11/21/c_1211455028.htm 梅冠群,“印度对‘一带一路’态度的态度变化及其战略应对”,《印度洋经济体研究 》,2018年第2期,第50页。 汪金国,张立辉,“‘印太’视角下印度与东盟国家海洋安全合作新动向”,《南亚东南 亚研究》,2022 年第 5 期,第30页。 魏少璞. (2022年2月11日). 美日印澳四国外长将开会着重讨论中国,外交部:遏制 中国的所谓联盟不得人心. 环球网. https://world.huanqiu.com/article/46m 2y2SyGAX 魏子龙,梁 坤,王雪莹,翟东升,“中国对东南亚直接投资的政治影响及作用机制”,《 南洋问题研究》,2023年第2期,第59页。 吴兆礼,“印度莫迪政府‘印太海洋倡议’发展、路径与趋势”,《太平洋学报》,2021 年第12期,第42页。 杨悦,“东盟对中美竞争的认知与应对”,《国际问题研究》,2021年第4期,第42页。 中国国际贸易促进委员会. (2022年10月20). 东盟发布2022年投资报告(一): 东盟外国直接投资疫后强劲复苏. https://www.ccpit.org/indonesia/a/202 21020/20221020bx2r.html 中华人民共和国商务部. (2023年8月1日). 专访中国驻东盟使团经商公参李岸: 中国和东盟生产网络深度融合,将在数字经济、绿色经济等领域加强合作. http://asean.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/202308/20230803424967. shtml 中华人民共和国外交部. (2023年9 月14日). 2023年9月14日外交部发言人毛宁 主持例行记者会. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202309/t20230 914_11142916.shtml 中华人民共和国中央人民政府. (2023年6月26日). 中国—东盟自贸区3.0版第三 轮谈判在云南昆明举行. https://www.gov.cn/govweb/yaowen/liebiao/202 306/content_6888412.htm 中华人民共和国中央人民政府. (2023年8月26日). 中国—东盟经贸合作提质升 级,https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202308/content_6900182.htm 中华人民共和国驻东盟使团. (2023). 不断书写中国东盟共建“一带一路”新篇章. http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/stxw/202310/t20231010_11158774. htm 钟飞腾.(2023年9月9日).中国助力东盟打造经济增长中心. 经济日报. http:// paper.ce.cn/pc/content/202309/09/content_280671.html

CHAPTER 10

Philippines Perception on the Leadership of the Two Asian Argonauts in Southeast Asia Chester B. Cabalza

Introduction Three years after since the world crushed to global lockdown and almost panicked from annihilation caused by the coronavirus pandemic, the tick of the clock altered to renew Asia’s pendulum of fortune on its great favour. The two traditional Asian Argonauts—China and India—fastened to accelerate Covid-19 vaccine diplomacy and neither was doing pure charity to its Southeast Asian neighbours—but inoculation aids were coated in approaches syphoned with respective ambition, strategy, and operationalization (Yang, 2021). Admittedly, the binary Asian civilization-states and resident great powers in the world’s largest continent competed for international recognition of global supply chain for the Covid-19 vaccine distribution.

C. B. Cabalza (B) University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_10

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Unlike Beijing that struts for global attention through its own developed Sinopharm vaccine in spite of the contagious virus that originated from Wuhan in Central China, New Delhi’s vaccine diplomacy displayed a meek regional dole out and manufacture of Oxford-AstraZeneca to provide public goods to regional partners. Even with the heightened power play of superpowers in the IndoPacific region, the U.S. and China pledged large donations of Covid-19 vaccines to the community of nations (Reuters, 2021). While China had shipped vaccines to widen its vaccine diplomacy to poor continents in Africa and Latin America, India remains competitive in its own medical distribution in Asia. While China is the world’s largest source of coronavirus vaccines at 33% of all doses produced, the U.S. comes next as second with 27%, the European Union at 19%, and India with 13% for third and fourth places, respectively (CNBC, 2021). Despite Beijing’s lead in producing vaccines, Washington is the largest donor of Covid-19 vaccines globally according to public data compiled by UNICEF. In the Philippines alone, China expressed its vaccine diplomacy to Manila as a way of elevating the spirit of ‘Bayanihan’ (communal cooperation) despite its business as usual of flexing military muscle in the South China Sea where the two neighbouring countries split on maritime and territorial tug-of-war. Meanwhile, India’s support to the archipelagic Southeast Asian country widens its huge capacity on elevating vaccine diplomacy to gain further political influence and strengthen ties in emerging markets in the region. But India and China are two Asian naval juggernauts that are competing for economic networks and strategic maritime advantages in the newly defined Indo-Pacific region, which is in the neighbourhood of the Philippines. There are predictions that there will be force projections by New Delhi and Beijing in a newly emerged world order that compares and contrasts the hegemonic profitability of the two contending superpowers in the future (Cabalza, 2021). This chapter explores the triangular co-existence of the three major powers in the Indo-Pacific by understanding the security architecture of China, India, and Southeast Asia, particularly the case of the Philippines. It further puts emphasis on the post-pandemic economic recovery of Beijing and New Delhi and how these two Asian Argonauts have led the region, and in one way or the other, helped and challenged Manila in its exit strategy from the pandemic. It also contributes to put into proper

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context the importance of the 2016 Arbitral Award of the Philippines as China continues to dispose the international court’s decision while India supports the UNCLOS Award by helping the Philippines’ military modernization with the recent sale of the world’s fastest BrahMos missiles to Manila. It ends with the current technological edges of these three key countries in the world’s largest continent and how they reconstruct the maritime security environment of the region.

Post-Pandemic Economic Recovery Since 1978 almost a billion Chinese people were lifted from extreme poverty in the 45-year economic plan of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while the leader of the Global South proudly stands as the world’s second-largest economy today. Efforts to tremendously improve Chinese education and health services benefitted China’s dream of becoming an upper-middle-income economy. The four-decade economic resurgence of China was not an overnight dream. Given its success story, pessimists are contending that China’s economic boom is not sustainable in the long term mainly due to a range of internal and external factors. China went up largely driven by its desire to psychologically challenge the West given its bonus population and massive labour force. Most importantly, the economy grew fatter when it joined the World Trade Organisation and started opening up the Chinese economy to global markets (Hung, 2015). The current security dilemma on ageing population, environmental degradation, economic inequality, and potential for social unrest could further deter China from achieving its economic gains. Meanwhile, the Beijing Consensus that propels China’s own alternative developmental model creates schizophrenia controlled by a strong central and interventionist capitalist state that emphasizes economic growth and stability over political freedoms. China’s rise is greatly attributed by its centralized government system and state-owned enterprises to achieve national economic goals. More so, Beijing’s economic influence has spread to major international institutions, trade, and investments by emulating the Chinese economic model despite the lack of universal appeal (Halper, 2010). However, year 2022 turned out to be risky for Beijing’s exit strategy from Covid-19 and the expansive economic influence since the launching of the 2013 controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on other

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developing economies. Asia’s largest country battled from rapid ageing population, double-edged sword zero Covid policy, and the commencement of the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s political journey for securing his third term of office at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing that occurred on March 10, 2023 during the 14th National People’s Congress of China. Despite stiff guidance of the Chinese central government in their stateowned enterprises, the degree of government intervention in China’s financial system is breaking the merit of economic competitiveness. And despite the appearance of economic success in the past decades, China’s financial system remains fragile as it is seen today due to inherent risks and challenges of non-performing loans, overcapacity, and the potential for financial instability as the national coffer transitions from state-directed financial system to more market-oriented reforms (Walter & Howie, 2011). On the other hand, India saw impressive economic resiliency to external shocks despite some signs of moderation in growth. In 2022, New Delhi climbed to becoming one of the fastest-growing economies in the world; still on track to achieving a high-middle-income status by the time India reaches centenary of its independence in 2047. The fifth largest economy in the world remains formidable as the Indian banks remain well capitalized. India has been at the forefront of the blue economy conversation seen in its unique geographical and geostrategic location (Sharma, 2022). With 95% of the subcontinent’s commerce volume and 65% of the trade value being carried out through maritime transport, the maritime sector is essential to its total trade value and growth (Maritime India Vision 2030, 2021). Most of India’s trade is conducted by water, two-thirds of domestic energy production comes from offshore facilities. New Delhi meets 70% of its oil needs through maritime imports influenced by this maritime environment that emanates a national interest that is protected and enabled through its strong maritime power. Once a breakout nation, India’s strides to sterling economic performance and experienced rapid growth brought by the political leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi as he continuously articulates New Delhi’s economic trajectory which can be sustained through political stability, sound economic policies, effective governance, and demographic trends. India’s political landscape has played a significant role in economic outcomes that contributed to the economic success, notwithstanding, the

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risks and challenges that emerging markets face in terms of bad governance, perennial corruption, and external shocks (Sharma, 2012). The subcontinent now boasts of its large, young, and growing population that can contribute to a ‘demographic dividend’ under the right conditions using pragmatic approach to understanding the complexities of emerging markets. India’s economic reforms since 1991 marked New Delhi’s proactive economic trajectory through globalization and liberalization practices that opened up India’s economy to the world. While India has tremendously addressed socio-economic issues on the quality of education, caste dynamics, democratic system, and the emergence of the new middle class—infrastructural development remains a critical factor for the continued economic and strategic rise of the country. Although, several regions within India still lag behind in the overall national economic growth and considering the opportunities and obstacles that lie ahead, India continues to modernize and influence the world (Luce, 2008). Bracing for headwinds amid the delicate balancing act caught between the hegemonic rivalry of superpowers in its own backyard, Manila is poised to remain one of the most dynamic economies in Southeast Asia. The strong consumerism culture reinforced by robust remittances of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) around the world and a vibrant labour market increased the growing middle class and young demography after the Philippine government transitioned to a new Marcosian regime. But the Philippines missed out almost completely a better economic formula, in spite of having many of the same conditions for successful economic growth of ‘Asian tiger’ economies in the region. Manila’s historical economic patterns, social conditions, and asymmetric regional development have hindered its national economic goals imprinted on its diversified agricultural, industrial, and service sectors (Sicat & Hill, 2003). Hence, the Philippines has learned its lessons as it addresses future challenges embarking on sustainable, durable, and equitable growth trajectory. Similarly, observation on broader canvass of economic reforms in the Philippines was influenced by evolving political culture in the archipelagic country. Major aspects of political and institutional factors influenced economic policy episodes and robust international economic relations which have flourished in various presidencies or dynastic political administrations that may have helped the Philippines pursue a sound economic policy.

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Finally, the acceleration in reopening the economies of China, India, and Southeast Asia in 2023 certainly fastens the growth momentum in the Indo-Pacific region. The two decades of higher and massive stable development in the triangular Asian economic spheres is a living testament that the trio drivers of the global economy could carry a new wave of optimism in the aftermath of the Covid-19. This brings the three important competing corridors of Asian economies to address rising tensions of trade war, rapid ageing and climate risks in the vibrant region while casting doubts of sustainable growth in the world.

Hague Ruling: An Eye Strain to Competing Powers While India and China are embattled over the pursuit of greatness, their ideological differences and economic models have certainly influenced the current multiplex global environment. These Asian giant nation-states have had tensions before over the McMahon Line border. The SinoIndian border dispute, erupting to actual war in 1962, has also led to multiple skirmishes between both camps in 2020. The Philippines shares the same experience as it currently confronts a maritime and territorial dispute with China in the contested South China Sea (Cabalza, 2021). On July 12, 2023, Manila celebrated its 7th arbitral award it won from the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 following liberal maritime rule-based norms. The Hague Ruling, as it is commonly known, deepened the importance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as a landmark international decision on maritime disputes in the South China Sea that invalidated Chinese historical claims drawn from a nine-dash line marginal illusion. The U.N. Ruling also redefined rocks from islands while it encouraged Filipinos’ utilization of natural resources in the Philippines’ own exclusive economic zones. Even before the jovial legal victory celebration, India has divulged its new approach on the 2016 ruling in a joint statement during the 5th India-Philippines Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation when Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo met in New Delhi from June 27–30, 2023 as they discussed bilateral issues set by the two strongest Asian democratic countries (Lariosa, 2023). While more nations reaffirm their support for the Philippines on its West Philippines Sea ruling, China still rebukes the commemoration that

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reminds them of the classic asymmetrical combat of David versus Goliath. The lawfare has been Manila’s knight in shining armour in consolidating a troubled defiance to a giant neighbour on China’s ardour will of continuous illegal occupation over the Philippines’ maritime entitlements and sovereignty rights in the longest disputed South China Sea. On August 05, 2023, the China Coast Guard (CCG) shadowed and fired water cannon to the resupply mission of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and Philippine Navy (PN) in the Second Thomas Shoal which is 200 kilometres or 124 miles off from the Philippine island of Palawan against China’s far distance of more than 1,000 kilometres from major landmass of Hainan island. The CCG was also accused of hitting the PCG vessel doing a resupply mission with a military-grade laser, a form of electronic warfare in defence parlance, while temporarily blinding some of its crew as a blatant violation of Manila’s sovereign rights. The swarming of CCG’s ironclad ships simultaneously blocked the Philippine patrol craft BRP Malapascua from approaching the Second Thomas Shoal on February 13, 2023. This was the first time a dangerous manoeuvre occurred under Philippines’ President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. who revived Manila’s alliance with Washington when he hosted the biggest military exercises of more than 17,600 members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the U.S. military from April 11–28, 2023 after the planned expansion of four rotational military bases in Northern Philippines was announced last February 01, 2023 to respond to the Taiwan Strait conundrum and other strategic areas including the West Philippine Sea and the Philippine Rise or Benham Rise under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed on April 28, 2014. But in November 2021, during the twilight year of the draconian Filipino leader Rodrigo Duterte’s administration, the CCG sprayed a powerful stream of water at two Philippine boats carrying supplies to troops posted in a decommissioned shipwreck aground in the Spratly Islands to serve as an outpost of the Philippine Marine Corps to assert Philippine sovereignty in the contested waterways. Rodrigo Duterte was known to have unsuccessfully pivoted to Beijing for five years before he reverted to Washington when he reaffirmed the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement while the tough expresident attempted to cancel the contentious military agreement during his government. He made headlines again last July 19, 2023, when the retired president was officially received on a red carpet treatment by

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Xi Jinping at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing following an informal diplomatic setting to fill up the vacuum in the China-Philippines strategic relationship which has been frayed by territorial disputes. The talked-about back channel occurred almost a week before the second State of the Nation Address of his successor President Bongbong Marcos Jr. Firing of water canon was re-enacted on August 05, 2023, as the CCG hosed down one of the Philippines’ civilian supply ships to the resupply mission of Filipino coast guardians and marines that appear in various episodic incidents whenever the Philippines uses its finest strategic weapon of lawfare. The first naval assault of water cannon in the West Philippine Sea happened in February 24, 2014, almost a year after Manila internationalized a legal case against Beijing in 2013 as a result of the tensed stand-off between the two claimant-states in the South China Sea on April 08, 2012 when gray and white ships from the two maritime neighbouring countries refused to leave the rich fishery shoal for a number of weeks that almost escalated to a shooting war. The episodic incident where a Chinese vessel sprinkled a heavy water canon for the first time at Filipino fishermen near the triangle-shaped chain of reefs and rocks called Scarborough Shoal would soon be repeated in 2021 and 2023 to Filipino coast guardians and marines. While Beijing sensed again that Manila is considering of elevating the winning 2016 arbitration case to the United Nations General Assembly to secure a referendum from representatives of the United Nations and perhaps to embarrass China in the theatrical stage of international community as Xi Jinping paves his way for Chinese rejuvenation policy as a leading global economy in the near future; and the unconventional water cannon are built-in to numerous Chinese coast guard vessels used in shooting high-velocity water usually seen for fighting and crowd control in driving away intruders at sea. The episodic incident where a Chinese vessel interspersed heavy water cannon for the first time at Filipino fishers near the triangle-shaped chain of reefs and rocks called Scarborough Shoal were repeated in 2021, 2023, and 2024 to Philippine coast guardians. In the South China Sea, Beijing repudiates the 2016 Arbitral Ruling which nullified their ‘historic claim’ drawn in its overhauled 10-dash line map published in 2023. The Communist Party of China regards this ruling as a ‘piece of paper’ bound for the trash bin as soon as it went public (Philipps et al.,

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2016). Although, the same ruling became an instrument for the Philippines to diplomatically rally other regional and international players to reject Chinese maritime adventurism. In this regard, China has effectively continued the momentum it once gained from double-crossing the Philippines during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis and the unstoppable development of dual-use, artificial islands in the Paracel and Spartly Islands since 2013. Aside from proclaiming the disputed waters as an integral interest, China’s state leadership still insinuates the claims based on a historical disagreement, alluding to the discovery of land portions in the South China Sea by its own people during the western Han dynasty. From Beijing’s perspective, contentions on the historic rights are private rights vested in the state and arguably an alignment with the international law’s other important rules maintained by the Law of the Sea Convention. But much like its adjacent waters claim, China’s argument is flawed from a scholarly viewpoint, thus altering historical narratives that could be contradictory to the dictum of the UNCLOS; as it does not validate these types of disputations (Gupta & Geraci, 2020; Mastro, 2021). As a result, Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr. approved his fiveyear National Security Plan (NSP) 2023–2028 through an Executive Order No. 37 on August 12, 2023 (Guita-Carlos, 2023), pushing for the Southeast Asian middle power to achieve an independent foreign policy. Manila’s third NSP under Marcos Jr. sums up his political slogan of unity by recognizing the current seismic transformation in the Philippine national security landscape, a harbinger of contention in the new Marcosian worldview of global realisms. While the fresh policy paper flexes an outward-looking realpolitik, the latest NSP sticks to its raison d’etre as guidelines for addressing his country’s national security needs that must fit into the drafted National Security Strategy to better implement the vision expounded in the newly-approved policy document. The NSP 2023–2028 is widely clear in its stout proclamation on the Philippine claims in the West Philippine Sea as the pivotal document marks a strong language, to wit: “The West Philippine Sea/South China Sea issue remains a primary national interest of the Philippines. The Philippines exercises sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the West Philippine Sea, under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is affirmed by the final and binding 2016 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea” (National Security Council, 2023). The consistency of narratives addressed in the supreme security policy of the Philippines is based on

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the firm speeches of Bongbong Marcos Jr. that clearly reflect the ownership of the Philippines’ maritime entitlements espoused with sovereignty rights in the South China Sea. China is arguably the most aggressive actor in raking the maritime features, contending that it has ‘indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters’. Ambiguity arises from this argument, as China has failed to define and clarify the extent of its maritime entitlements aside from its contentious historical claims (Congressional Research Service, 2022). In addition, it also does not clearly elaborate on the classifications of a ‘rock’ or an ‘island’. The question of ambiguity once again emerges when China failed to provide a geographic scope of its exclusive economic zone or continental shelf (Gupta & Geraci, 2020). To address the differences of the two Asian neighbours, Beijing inked a Joint Statement on the Framework of Bilateral Cooperation Mechanism on the South China Sea in May 2017 to manage disputes and enhance cooperation. However, maritime tensions escalated in recent years. In 2023, Beijing and Manila signed a Joint Action Plan for 2023–2025 on agricultural and fisheries cooperation between the Philippines’ Department of Agriculture and China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, as well as Memorandum of Understanding in cooperation to expand the Belt Road Initiative. In January 2024, Philippine Foreign Undersecretary Theresa Lazaro and Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Nong Rong held a frank exchange of views covering depths of security issues while co-chairing the Eighth Meeting of the Philippines-China Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea in Shanghai. But in March 2024, the DFA has summoned a Chinese charge d’ affaires of the Chinese embassy in Manila following another sea confrontation of the Philippine Coast Guard’s rotational and resupply mission in Ayungin Shoal to protest the aggressive action of the China Coast Guard and maritime militia (Philstar, 2024). New Delhi immediately responded to Beijing’s water cannon attack to Manila on March 23, 2024. The Government of India reiterated its support for the Philippines of its assertion on territorial rights in the West Philippine Sea. India’s ‘very resolute’ position to uphold the 2016 UNCLOS Award won by the Philippines widened the closeness of the two Asian democratic countries. Hence, Indian Jaishankar stated to Bongbong Marcos that, ‘we can be your ship’, as the subcontinent India reassured to archipelagic state Philippines of the importance of upholding

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international law to maintain peace and order in the Indo-Pacific region. The Filipino leader responded to the Indian envoy and he said that the support of the Indian government is ‘an important development’ for his people (Gascon, 2024).

Brahmos Missiles and Military Modernization The 66-year-old Treaty of Friendship signed in Manila on July 11, 1952 between India and the Philippines was paved a way by the father and namesake of current Filipino President ‘Bongbong’ Ferdinand Marcos Jr. But five years ago, Duterte honoured the 25th ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit in New Delhi hosted by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The defence relations of the two maritime nation-states have been marked by frequent visits by Indian navy warships and coast guard ships to Manila since 1998 and thereafter in 2017 under the terms of the 2006 Philippines-India Defence Cooperation Agreement (Cabalza, 2018). On April 19, 2024, the first batch of BrahMos cruise missiles from New Delhi arrived in Manila, making the Philippines the third Southeast Asian nation to acquire the world’s supersonic anti-ship missile system. The Indian Air Force C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft delivered the BrahMos at Clark International Airport. The Indian-Russian made cruise missiles contain 300-kilogramme semi-armour piercing warhead which can provide deterrence against foreign aggressors that attempt to undermine the country’s sovereignty and sovereign rights. The Coastal Defence Regiment of the Philippine Marine Corps will be the gatekeeper of the BrahMos. Acquisition and possession of the expensive missile system are relevant as the Philippines projects a defence posture in its contested waters while the AFP stages its 39th Balikatan military exercises observed by 14 countries. It also mirrors the upgraded defence spending and public investment of Manila on its military modernization (Corrales, 2024). India believes that the delivery of BrahMos to the Philippines, the firmest missiles in the world market to date, would serve as a strategic signal for the two democratic nations in Asia. It is the first step to countering China in its backyard and more missiles for the Philippines are needed (Shortryia, 2024). In recent years, India and the Philippines have sought to strengthen their economic and security cooperation, with a focus on maritime security and trade. The Indian Navy has conducted joint exercises with

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the Philippine Navy, and both countries have participated in regional maritime security initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. While India has been actively pursuing closer maritime ties with Southeast Asian countries, Manila and New Delhi share historical and cultural ties as Indian traders and seafarers visited the archipelagic country since ancient times. In recent years, India and the Philippines have sought to strengthen their economic and security cooperation, with a focus on maritime security and trade. The Indian Navy has conducted joint exercises with the Philippine Navy, and both countries have participated in regional maritime security initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. India has also expressed interest in participating in the development of the Philippines’ maritime infrastructure, including ports and shipping routes. On the other hand, Manila is aspiring again to become a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council, which it enjoyed the position from 2005 to 2006, when India withdrew its candidacy in favour of the Philippines. As a reciprocal reward, Manila also supported New Delhi in 2011 when Asian subcontinent was elected to the rotating two-year membership in the Security Council (Cabalza, 2018). New Delhi has placed premium bilateral security relationship with Manila when it decided to sell first the BrahMos supersonic shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles for nearly USD 375 million to the Philippines. BrahMos is perceived to be the world’s fastest and most formidable indigenous seeker of this calibre and class that marks India’s breakthrough for the supersonic missile. The advanced missile weapon systems are aimed at re-equipping the Southeast Asian maritime nation’s armed forces in its timeline of a 15-year-long military modernization program, part of enhancing an even stronger and more lethal army artillery regiment from its Cold War-era assets. However, it should be understood that good procurement is critical to ensuring good public services from purchasing goods and services. It also protects the national interest of a nation-state in all areas pertaining to public procurement, while keeping the country’s regional and international treaty obligations. For instance, this involves a government-togovernment procurement process like the BrahMos missiles when the Indian government offered to the Philippine government this arms deal to enhance the consistency with which items are ordered and delivered.

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The bilateral relationship between the Philippines and India has been growing in recent years, with both the natural allies and English-speaking Asian nations seeking to strengthen the economic, cultural, and security ties. In terms of economic relations, the trade volume between them has been steadily increasing, reaching a record high of USD 2.6 billion in 2019 before the Covid-19 pandemic. More so, Philippine imports from India increased to USD 2.24 billion in 2022 since post-pandemic era, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade (Trading Economics, 2023). The two pillars of Asian democracy have been exploring new avenues for cooperation, including in areas such as information and communications technology, pharmaceuticals, and renewable energy. India has expressed interest in investing in the Philippines’ infrastructure sector, including in the areas of ports, railways, and highways. The cultural exchange has also been an important aspect of the bilateral relationship, with both countries seeking to enhance people-to-cultural ties. The Philippine government has been promoting Filipino language and culture in India through various events and initiatives, such as cultural festivals and exchange programs. India has also been promoting Indian culture and heritage in the Philippines in the same manner. In terms of security cooperation, both countries have been working closely to address common security challenges in the region, such as piracy, terrorism, and maritime security. The Indian Navy and the Philippines’ Navy have signed various agreements and conducted joint naval exercises in recent years to enhance cooperation between the two countries. In 2017, for instance, India and the Philippines signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Cooperation which includes cooperation in the field of naval training, joint exercises, and exchange of information. In 2018, the two maritime countries through their respective navies conducted for the first time the coordinated patrols in the international waters of the Western Pacific Ocean. In that same year, their navies were participants in several joint exercises including the first-ever Bilateral Maritime Exercise (BIMEX). In November 2020, the two strategic partners signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), which allows both navies to use each other’s facilities for replenishment, refuelling, and repair. In fact, the Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015) recognizes Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as a major enabler for maritime

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security across the conflict spectrum. India’s MDA policy emphasizes the importance of diverse sources of information, including space, air, surface, submarine, cyber, and human domains. MDA encompasses the gathering, fusion, analysis, display, and dissemination of actionable intelligence. Information dissemination enables information sharing, which supports domestic inter-agency and international collaboration, as well as MDA development. Effective MDA and information exchange require a networked architecture. The bilateral defence agreements between the Indian and Philippine naval forces are aimed at enhancing cooperation and coordination between the two navies, promoting regional stability, and countering common security challenges. Both Asian democratic countries recognize the potential for deeper economic, cultural, and security connections. As a result, the deepened bilateral relationship directs to an upward trajectory and moving in the right direction. This vitally essential partnership in the defence and security sector has a brighter future ahead of it as it continues to investigate potential areas of collaboration.

Broken Lines of Communication and Durian Diplomacy On August 13, 2023, Philippine government officials said that it will cut the lines of communication with the CCG since it was inefficient in responding to crisis communication. Philippine Foreign Affairs called up the hotline that was set up in 2017 through a 2016 memo signed by President Rodrigo Duterte which was proposed by the Chinese embassy. Unfortunately, no one responded to the call from Manila amid the water cannon attack PCG on August 05, 2023. In fact, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. did not renew the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) when he paid a two-day state visit to Beijing last January 3–5, 2023 (Ateinza, 2023). Back in 1970s, the Philippine government had a close relationship with Kuomintang-ruled Taiwan and considered China a security concern. The Southeast Asian country began normalizing relations with Beijing in the early 1970s, and the two countries established diplomatic ties on June 09, 1975, when both leaders signed the Joint Declaration (Cabalza & Manalo, 2010). Over the past 48 years, relations between China and the Philippines have progressed, with notable successes and skirmishes in different sectors of bilateral cooperation.

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There has been frequent exchange of high-level visits between China and the Philippines for their mutual benefit by establishing diplomatic relations. In 2015, the Philippines came to be the last member-state to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or AIIB (Department of Finance, 2015) after the Chinese maritime militia started to occupy the Mischief Reef in the West Philippine Sea. Manila followed the same step in joining last in the world’s biggest multilateral economic grouping of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) last June 02, 2023, more than two years since participating countries concluded the free trade deal in November 2020 (Crismundo, 2023). But China uses hybrid warfare to expand its grip over the First Island Chain—the southern tip of Japan to the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Strait of Malacca. Beijing is believed to have used a creeping take over in the East and South China Seas through its gargantuan military and paramilitary vessels avoiding the threshold of war. In short, China may achieve its chief objective by utilizing grey zone tactics (Mazarr, 2015). In 2021, China ranked as the Philippines’ top trading partner and second-largest export market and top import supplier. Manila’s exports to Beijing grew by 17.51% from USD 9.83 B in 2020 to USD 11.55 B in 2021. Likewise, Philippine imports from China expanded by 28.37% from USD 20.87 B in 2020 to USD 26.79 B in 2021 (Department of Trade & Industry, 2021). However, soft power in sports and cultural diplomacy is vital in neutralizing the Philippines and China’s displays of hard power and delicate balancing act while Manila suddenly de-risks and hedges with a giant neighbour and economic power in the region. In April 2024, it is alleged that thousands of Chinese students have been recorded to be living in Cagayan province and enrolled in private universities in Tugeugarao City. The timing of the Chinese nationals’ arrival is dubious given the Taiwan Strait tension, as Cagayan Valley region is composed of the provinces of Batanes nearest to Taipei, Cagayan hosting two EDCA sites of the air field and naval base, and Isabela having one EDCA army camp facing the vast underground plateau of the Philippine Rise or Benham Rise (Maitem, 2024). The Bureau of Immigration admits that around 1,500 Chinese nationals received student visas in 2023 after they were endorsed by a reputable Catholic university in Tuguegarao City which were legally processed and certainly completed documentation (Gulla, 2024). However, the National Security Council believes that there should be a

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proper investigation to the reported influx of Chinese students to avoid espionage and other illegal activities by the foreigners in Tuguegarao City and the Philippines (Cabato, 2024). However, soft power in sport and cultural diplomacy is vital in neutralizing the Philippines and China’s displays of hard power and delicate balancing act while Manila suddenly de-risks and hedges with a giant neighbour and economic power in the region. In the Basketball FIBA World Cup hosted by Manila in 2023, the Philippine team went berserk and beat the Chinese team. If given a fair and square game, Filipinos can meet the eye of the Chinese, and courageously defeat them. Governments may help build solid national support and strengthen bilateral ties by improving domestic and international perceptions. Recently, Chinese media were invited to an event that educated them on Philippine history, politics, and foreign policy to generate more accurate and balanced news about the country. As a result, the huge gap in mutual perceptions between the two countries and their populations was slowly addressed. However, the territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea have dominated relations between the Philippines and China in recent years; the naval standoff over the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 escalated and exacerbated by issues of illegal Chinese occupation, infrastructure construction, and incursions and encroachment within the Philippine exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In January 2013 when the Philippine government launched an arbitration action against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it questioned the legality of China’s nine-dash line claim to the disputed waterways despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s final decision that favoured the Philippines. Meanwhile, China has been continuously firming up its military modernization program for more than two decades by transforming the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) into a modern technological navy that undergoes maritime operations in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and open seas in Europe. PLA-N is now the largest navy in East Asia and has already surpassed the U.S. Navy in battleships. Compared to most Western navies, Chinese naval vessels, aircraft, and weaponry are sophisticatedly modern with state-of-the-art weapons system and cyber capability (Congressional Research Service, 2022). The significant strides in maritime and technological advancements of China have led to rapid transformation of naval assets and capabilities. The

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middle kingdom possesses modern platforms including anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. It has now two aircraft carriers or seagoing airbase, while the third large warship is expected to be completed in 2024. Other upgrading advances include naval doctrine, maintenance, logistics system, and training exercises to establish military might and global grand strategy. However, based on the US-based RAND corporation report from the seven commissioned Chinese experts they interviewed, the analysis revealed the deficiencies and vulnerabilities of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategic naval operations in assessing the organization, combat, and industrial weaknesses. The report has highlighted the poor command structures, untrained personnel, and corruption in the PLA ranks (Geertz, 2015). Another weakness in the Chinese naval arsenal comes from their diesel-powered Liaoning Aircraft Carrier, which has major operational deficiencies that lack the power capability to support the aircraft in taking off and landing the carrier ship compared to US Nuclear Aircraft Carriers. Finally, the PLA-N has its nuclear submarines but still lacks underwater stealth capabilities, which is a major weakness in achieving surprise in warfare (Sweeney, 2020); Although, PLA-N has just recently launched The Fujian, its third aircraft carrier this May 2024. China’s maritime and naval capability development offers its naval forces an inclusive scope of opportunities. China depends mainly on the navy to establish and defend its maritime claims in the near-seas zone, with the coast guard serving as a possible backup force over the horizon. The mutual defence alliance it reinforces with Russia has significantly boosted the number of its navy and coast guard in recent years; making it a formidable and trustworthy tool in naval and marine operations. China also has a sizable maritime manoeuvring force, comprising numerous fishing vessels from many of private’s stakeholders. China’s tremendous naval modernization effort to strengthen defence posture in the Indo-Pacific includes improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises. Given the stout military flexing of muscles of Beijing in the region, when Xi Jinping welcomed Ferdinand Marcos Jr. for a state visit in Beijing in January 2023, the two leaders signed 10 bilateral agreements to foster

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four pillar areas of cooperation covering agriculture, energy, infrastructure, and people-and-cultural exchanges. The Marcos-Xi meeting was aimed to reaffirm the deepening of Philippines-China security ties by cementing the broken line of communications and good neighbourliness, when Duterte broke the line and suddenly realigned with the traditional treaty ally, the U.S. in the twilight years of his administration in 2021–2022. As the former Secretary of Philippine Agriculture, Marcos Jr. forged economic ties with China to increase its trade deal on agricultural products. Beijing arranged for ‘durian diplomacy’ with the Philippines and Southeast Asia meant to increase the niche market in the region through durian—an indigenous king of fruit in ASEAN where China is now the third largest durian consumer after Indonesia and Malaysia, but is expected to become the biggest market by 2030. With this booming market exchange, durian topped the list of fruits imported by China last year, reaching a whopping USD 4.03 billion, with 825,000 tonnes imported, nearly doubling that from 2014 (Xijia, 2023).

Acceleration of Military Technological and Maritime Cooperation Success on the rise of the Indo-Pacific region lies on the resurgence of China, India and Southeast Asia—returning as the centrifugal force for economic, political, and social transformations today and in the future. While the Philippines and its neighbours in ASEAN simultaneously experience the intensity of seismic reconfigurations in the region, becoming a magnet to strategic and hegemonic rivalry of the U.S. and China in the bipolar region, and as a recipient of the friendly competition of Asian titans—China and India—the archipelagic Southeast Asian country must pursue innovative policies to achieve a credible naval defence capability to address the growing tension in the South China Sea. By achieving greater prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, maritime disputes must de-escalate to promote maritime cooperation. For the Philippines to increase a strong strategic partnership with India, Manila must work on comprehensive program to accelerate the country’s state of maritime and technological standing. It should establish a dedicated naval research and development organization, similar to India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The organization should focus on developing advanced defence technologies

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for the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, such as sonars, torpedoes, communication systems, and electronic warfare systems. Collaboration with international strategic partners is important, such as India and like-minded democratic countries including the United States, Japan, South Korea, and European Union to acquire new defence technologies, improve naval training, and enhance the capabilities of the Philippine Navy and its security establishments. In modernizing naval assets, the Philippines must upgrade existing vessels by acquiring new warships, and improving maintenance and repair facilities. This would help to enhance the capabilities of the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard to improve its readiness. Hence, Manila should establish a national maritime strategy that outlines the country’s priorities and objectives in the maritime domain. The strategy should include measures to improve maritime security, enhance the capabilities of the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, and promote the development of the country’s maritime industry. Just like India, by fostering local research and development, assisting regional defence firms, and fostering technology transfer, the Philippines should establish a home grown defence sector. This would encourage economic development and lessen the nation’s reliance on overseas defence suppliers. By expanding the international cooperation, Manila must take part in joint exercises, exchanging intelligence, and cooperating on R&D projects. This is to increase the prospects of the Philippines on foreign cooperation. This would also support regional security and improve the nation’s technological and maritime prowess. These functional and comprehensive programs to advance the nation’s maritime and technological standing are parameters to improve its maritime security, increase economic growth, and strengthen its strategic position in the region by concentrating on important areas like naval research and development, modernization of naval assets, enhancing maritime surveillance capabilities, and extending international cooperation. On the other hand, the Philippines can likewise benefit from India’s interaction with China. India is likewise a casualty of China’s forceful border measures. Geographically speaking, both India and the Philippines naturally border and encircle China. Moreover, the two democracies are highly dependent to China, economically. If China’s national interests are threatened, India can be a strong contender to confront China. By defying Beijing in some circumstances, New Delhi has demonstrated that

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war or severed ties are not the only possibilities. However, it has consistently stated and demonstrated that its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and strategic interests are uncompromising. Meanwhile, for the Philippines to address its external defence challenges with China, it must strengthen the Philippine Navy’s Capability Upgrade Program, guided by the various doctrines developed by the Naval Operating Concept (NOC). The NOC is the Philippine Navy’s implementing plan to the Maritime Operations Strategic Approach, having four (4) operational approaches to achieve on its objectives to attain a credible naval defence posture on maritime security, sea control, sea denial, and archipelagic manoeuvre (Philippine Navy, 2020). To adapt to the best practices on maritime and technological advancements with China, Manila must benchmark on Self-Reliance Defence Posture to understand China’s SRDP capability. The Philippines must take advantage of its own local defence industry to develop and massproduce defence equipment to lower acquisition costs during its Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) modernization program. The prioritization of acquisition of detection and identification equipment is vital for an archipelagic country like the Philippines. This should be given urgency for the acquisition of weapons systems to attain the Territorial Defence Mission Area tenets. Moreover, National Coast Watch Centre’s authority, now renamed as National Maritime Centre, should be expanded into a central maritime domain awareness center, networked with the AFP systems, maritime law enforcement agencies, and other stakeholders. To enhance the Philippines’ cyber security capability where cyberattacks are seen to cripple government critical infrastructures, similar to China, this vital program should not be taken for granted. The agency on information and communications technology should audit and marshal the local telecoms company in the Philippines to strengthen its cyber security from the national to local levelling up to the citizens’ personal computers. Under Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s leadership, the AFP has given clear command guidance—to focus on external defence, especially on the South China Sea (Gomez, 2023). With the political context underpinned for established defence planning, the AFP confronts the challenge to develop jointness of its army, navy, and air force components for multidomain future warfare (Espeña, 2021). Interestingly, the Philippine Army has been taking notes on the military lessons of the Russo-Ukrainian War

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in term of conventional and hybrid warfare concepts (Elemia, 2023). Despite its limited budget, the Philippines has managed to push for USD 5.50 B worth of defence spending for 2022 (IISS, 2023). Largely due to budgetary issues, the AFP confronts procurement halts of the diesel-electric submarine acquisition project (Riñoza & Sepe, 2022) and uncertainties over the selection between American and Swedish models for its F-16 multirole fighter jets (Nepomuceno, 2022). The AFP nonetheless has procured needed assets and weapons and support systems such as the Rizal-class frigates, AW159 Wildcat antisubmarine warfare helicopters, the Spyder air defence system, a squadron of FA-50 multirole fighters, 105 mm Sabrah light tanks, a squadron of, Hermes 450/900 unmanned aerial vehicles, three batteries of Brahmos anti-ship supersonic cruise missiles, among others (Gain, 2019; IISS, 2023; Nepomuceno, 2023; Kajal, 2023). With a changing strategic mindset and muddling defence budgets, the Philippines makes an effort to up its middle power game in future warfare. Although, security experts are apprehensive about the need for the Philippines to conceptualize its future warfare scenarios either with and without its American versus Swedish models for its F-16 multirole fighter jets (Despi et al., 2021) or at least fight until allied reinforcements arrive (Domingo, 2015). Either way, the Philippines faces a tough task to rethink of its future warfare situations, especially in deciding what sort of ‘theory of victory’ (Javier, 2022) it seeks to follow in a volatile strategic environment.

Conclusion India, China, and Southeast Asia are significant current participants in world affairs. In the maritime affairs of the region—as a result to extensive maritime history, strategic location, and increasing maritime capabilities, these Asian Argonauts are global players now and active in reshaping the potential contours of the economic, cultural, and security landscapes of the dynamic region. On the other hand, China and India are also building multilateral and minilateral networks that are advantageous to their respective national interests and bilateral relationships with the formation of the BRICS which prominently include India and China. The acronym of BRICS from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa had come a long way since its inception in 2008. Today, BRICS have come out of its shell and

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become attractive to many emerging economies as its membership grows exponentially. Although, there has been a mixed valuation on the success of BRICS, on one hand, it has identified certain global economic gaps and international security dilemma. Despite these issues, the BRICS does enable the building of trust between its member states (Miller & Miller, 1886). In an age of ambiguous and volatile security landscape forced by the rise of multilateralism, India has also forged membership with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly known as QUAD with the U.S., Japan and Australia as members that extremely counter the framework of the BRICS. The Philippines and Southeast Asia have significant roles to play to sustain various cooperative mechanisms to attain comprehensive security in the Indo-Pacific region brought by profound historical and cultural ties. This relationship has been growing in importance over the past few years. There is also a substantial possibility of China and India reaping additional economic and security benefits as both powerful Asian countries tried to maintain collaborative options for its Southeast Asian middle powers to increase vitality in its diverse investments in the maritime sector of the region. Given the geographical confluence of China, India, and South East Asia through the economic miracles of the Philippines in the world’s biggest continent—it is hoped that in the future of the three great Asian corridors will forge important and massive minilateral cooperation that encompasses cultural, economic, political, security, and scientific cooperation to achieve greater heights of prosperity for these emerging Asian markets. The three important corridors from China, India, and Southeast Asia must pursue tighter partnerships with the countries that border it in the region and to the rest of the world. In this context, India may find a promising partner with the Philippines while Manila must work harder to patch up strategic differences with Beijing on its maritime and territorial disputes in the contested South China Sea which has its own lengthy maritime heritage as well as maritime capabilities that are continuing to evolve and develop. These crucial partnerships among three giant corridors in the Indo-pacific region certainly have a brighter future ahead of it as these countries strive towards increased cooperation in the maritime sphere.

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CHAPTER 11

China and India in Indonesia: Trilateral or 2 Versus 1? M. Habib Pashya, Yeta Purnama, and Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat

Introduction There have been significant developments in Indonesia over the last 20 years. When the 1997 Asian financial crisis struck, the nation was on the verge of collapse (Pang, 2000). Beginning in July 1997 in Thailand and rapidly spreading to Indonesia, the crisis virtually triggered an economic collapse, generated political unrest, intensified violence between

M. H. Pashya Department of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected] Y. Purnama · M. Z. Rakhmat (B) Center of Economic and Law Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected] Y. Purnama e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_11

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Muslims and Christians, and experienced separatist insurgencies. The Suharto era, also known as the New Order regime or Orde Baru, ended amid this turmoil when President Suharto was forced by demonstration to quit in May 1998, after 32 years in office. From that time, Indonesia has developed into a democracy established on tolerance and a moderate interpretation of Islam under the banner of Reformasi or reform (Tyson & Nawawi, 2022). Regarding Indonesia, since it joined the Group of Twenty (G-20) in 2008, it has become the largest economy in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies (Putri, 2020). In light of these notable developments, Indonesia has garnered attention as a significant arena for competition among key nations. China has successfully established a significant presence in Indonesia, bolstering its position as a prominent player in the country’s economic landscape. After the normalisation of ties in 1989 due to economic reasons, ties between China and Indonesia intensified further increasing cooperation between both countries. Unquestionably, China is now Indonesia’s largest trading partner and investor. In 2021, the value of Indonesia’s exports to China, predominantly mineral fuels and nickel, reached US$63.63 billion (Rakhmat, 2022). The import value from China dominated by the raw or auxiliary materials required to boost the productivity of the domestic sector was US$60.71 billion (Embassy of Indonesia in Beijing, 2022). In the first half of 2022, Indonesia’s imports from China, primarily mechanical and electrical devices, achieved US$34.3 billion (Siqi, 2022). China is currently heading many major infrastructure projects in Indonesia. One such development is the US$8billion Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway megaproject, the first highspeed rail link in Southeast Asia (Siregar, 2022). In addition, Indonesia has increased its debt to China, reaching over US$411.5 million (Syahrial, 2022). Moreover, it has begun to improve the use of the Chinese yuan in its foreign transactions. During the pandemic, China also became Indonesia’s largest supplier of vaccines. Several economic research think tanks, such as the Centre of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS) and the Next Policy, have extensively discussed Indonesia’s economic relationship with China, with several suggesting that Indonesia has increasingly relied on China for various economic activities (Widi, 2023). The observations undertaken by these think tanks are grounded in empirical data and the analyses of trade patterns, investment flows and infrastructure projects taking place between both countries (ibid).

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Beyond the economic and health sectors, and despite China’s growing hostility in the South China Sea, Indonesia’s defence engagement with China has witnessed significant development in recent years (Chaudhury, 2021). In December 2018, for instance, the Indonesian President Jokowi appointed an Indonesian General as the defence attaché at the Indonesian embassy in Beijing for the first time. Following Prabowo Subianto’s inauguration as defence minister in 2019, China was the first major power Prabowo visited as minister. During his visit, Prabowo met Chinese State Councillor General Wei Fenghe and the Central Military Commission deputy chairman, General Xu Qiliang, to discuss extending defence partnerships, although it has not yet reached the stage where an agreement has been signed. During the pandemic, Indonesia maintained its military cooperation with China, receiving medical aid and supplies. Likewise, in 2022, the two countries agreed to resume joint military exercises (Lai, 2022). It should also be mentioned that India has also developed into a strategic actor in Indonesia. Amid a flurry of regional diplomacy, India has expanded its ties with Indonesia in the field of defence. It is balanceof-power politics worthy of an international relations textbook: Granting that most Southeast Asian governments have long made it their mantra not to choose geopolitical sides, China’s belligerent stance in and around the South China Sea is driving India and its partners, such as the Philippines and Vietnam in the region closer together (Singh, 2023). As yet, none of these relationships have established alliances or include the concrete deployment of security forces, but the trend of establishing closer ties is evident. Similarly, notwithstanding that the United States and the alliance partners from the Cold war years are also involved, India’s actions raise the tantalising possibility that it will increasingly complement the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China in the coming years. While extensive analyses has been undertaken with regard to ChinaIndonesia and India-Indonesia relations, there is a paucity of analysis regarding the emergence of ties between Indonesia, China and India. Therefore, this chapter aims to fill this gap by examining the competition and cooperation between India and China in Indonesia. It begins by initially examining Indonesia’s relations with India and China separately, which is subsequently followed by an analysis of Indonesia-ChinaIndia relations. Ultimately, the chapter also intends to identify the potential avenues for the three countries to expand their partnership.

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Concerning this chapter, the principal argument revolves around the intricate dynamics and challenges encountered by India, China and Indonesia in establishing official trilateral ties. Highlighting historical contexts and contemporary obstacles, the chapter emphasises the territorial disputes between India and China, aggravated by China’s assertive global stance under the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s leadership. Indonesia’s prioritisation of bilateral engagements with India and China further complicates trilateral relations. However, despite these hurdles and divergent national interests, the chapter identifies potential areas for collaboration, for instance, maritime cooperation and transitioning to a green economy. It signifies that by exploiting shared interests and building upon existing partnerships, these nations can surmount challenges and work towards mutual prosperity and stability in the region.

Theoretical Framework The theoretical framework employed in this paper, produced by Lowell Dittmer, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, functions as a comprehensive tool to understand and analyse the intricate dynamics within the strategic triangle formed by China, Indonesia and India. The conceptualisation posits four distinct scenarios based on each country’s assumed friendly or hostile disposition towards the others. The first scenario, referred to as a “ménage a trois,” envisions a situation where all three nations maintain amicable relations. Drawing parallels with the contemporary dynamics between France, Great Britain and Germany, this scenario implies a cooperative and harmonious coexistence among the three nations. The second scenario, described as a “marriage,” depicts a strategic alliance formed by two partners against a third pariah. This concept was rooted in the early twentieth century when France and Britain united against Germany. This strategic alignment is characterised by shared interests and cooperative efforts, forming a robust union to counter a common adversary. The third scenario, known as a “Roman angle,” illustrates a situation where two traditionally hostile nations cultivate positive relations with a third country. The early 1970s détente sought by the historically adversarial People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union exemplifies this scenario. Despite their historical hostilities, both nations pursued improved relations with a common third party.

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In the specific context of this study, the concept of “marriage” assumes added significance. It represents a situation where two nations, in this case, China and Indonesia or China and India, forge an alliance in certain contexts to counterbalance a third party. However, the dynamics are inherently asymmetric owing to China’s military dominance over both Indonesia and India. This asymmetry is a crucial factor influencing power dynamics, strategic decision-making and the overall trajectory of relationships within the strategic triangle. Recognising and understanding this inherent asymmetry in the relationships is paramount for a detailed analysis of the power dynamics at play. It explains the strategic choices made by each nation and provides a better understanding of the motivations and considerations driving their actions within the broader framework of the strategic triangle. By employing Wu’s theoretical framework, this paper aims to dissect and interpret the intricate interactions, alliances, as well as strategic calculations within the China-Indonesia-India triad. Via this lens, the study endeavours to offer a comprehensive understanding of the geopolitical landscape in the region, emphasising the complexities that arise from the interplay of historical legacies, contemporary geopolitics and power differentials between the involved nations.

Indonesia’s Ties with China and India The dynamics of relations between China, Indonesia, and India are uncertain. The moment began when Soekarno recognised China as a country headed by the Communist Party in 1950. Indonesia, along with China, India, and others, decided to hold the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung (Wood, 2012). It was a significant stand by those parties in response to the pressure imposed by both Eastern and Western powers during the Cold War years. At that point, Indonesia and China were members of the United Nations (UN) (Niu, 2018; Schwelb, 1967). However, both countries agreed to withdraw from the UN. Firstly, Indonesia was disappointed that the UN had failed to solve the issue of the federated state of Malaysia; a position that made China and Indonesia grow closer. Nonetheless, during Soeharto’s regime, China was accused of playing a role in the revolutionary movement provoked by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965, which resulted in the brutal killing of seven army personnel in Indonesia (Abdullah, 2015). Moreover, this tragedy stands as a dark chapter in Indonesia’s history that resulted in the loss of approximately

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300,000 lives (Pruwanto, 2016). Hence, Soeharto took measures to suspend bilateral relations with China. In fact, for more than two decades there was a distinct lack of contact. An attempt to normalise ties occurred in 1989 when Soeharto and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, met in Japan. This was followed by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, visiting China in 1990 (Pashya, 2021). This endeavour was also strengthened by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding the official restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Subsequently, there has been a notable increase in cooperation between both nations. For example, for years, both parties engaged in several exchange visits, together with economic and trade cooperation. During the financial crisis and political unrest in 1998 that affected the Soeharto regime, numerous locals argued that China was the perpetrator of Indonesia’s economic decline as a result of Chinese businessmen expanding into Indonesia. The unrest resulted in anti-Chinese sentiment and a backlash, which Habibie had to promptly address so as to ensure that diplomatic relations with China were not impacted adversely. The Abdurrahman Wahid era (1999–2001) marked a new phase with respect to Indonesia-China relations. Gus Dur not only quelled the antiChinese sentiment by recognising various aspects associated with China, for instance, Confucianism and the Chinese New Year, he also used this period to explore the economic sector. In 2000, during the 50th anniversary of China-Indonesia diplomatic relations, Gus Dur signed a MoU relating to the spheres of political and economic cooperation, along with technology and tourism (Keller, 2011; Pashya et al., 2021). In the same year, the volume of trade between China and Indonesia, increased to US$7.464 billion compared to previous years, when it was only worth US$1.18 billion (Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Medan, 2011), indicating considerable progress. Moreover, it is incontrovertible that Gus Dur played a valuable role in laying the foundation for comprehensive cooperation between China and Indonesia for the next era, notwithstanding that he subsequently had to step down and be replaced by his successor, Megawati Soekarnoputri. In March 2002, Megawati successfully signed the MoU to establish the Second Energy Forum State or Indonesia-China Energy Forum (ICEF) (Badaruddin, 2013). After signing the MoU, Indonesian natural gas was sold to China at US$2.4 per tonne in conjunction with a 20-year contract. Alongside energy cooperation, another area of collaboration between the Jiang Zemin-led Chinese government and Megawati witnessed an increase to

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US$8.8 billion in comparison to the previous year which generated US$8 billion (ibid). In the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) era (2004–2014), cooperation between China and Indonesia intensified in various sectors, for instance the economy, maritime, investment, technology and disaster management. What is interesting is how SBY’s professionalism placed Indonesia in an impartial position in regard to the two main powers, specifically China and the United States. This was the implementation of Indonesia’s free and active politics (Widiatmaja & Albab, 2019). Nevertheless, over the course of the SBY era, a degree of tension was evident concerning the dynamics of the bilateral relations between China and Indonesia, specifically related to the renegotiation of the LNG export counter-trade agreed upon during the Megawati era. SBY noted that the contract tended to be disadvantageous in relation to Indonesia. Therefore, in 2006, negotiations concluded with an agreement on the selling price of liquified natural gas (LNG), which was previously only valued at US$25 per barrel, to be set at US$38 per barrel (Detik Finance, 2008). The closeness between China and Indonesia became more visible in the second period of SBY’s leadership (2010–2014), as trade between both sectors increased by 66.27% in 2010 (Sinaga, 2013). China was also involved in the construction of six development corridors in Indonesia. The strong strategic relationship between China and Indonesia has persisted throughout the Joko “Jokowi” Widodo era (2014–2024), with China materialising as the foremost trading partner. Likewise, in the investment sector, China has succeeded in overtaking Singapore and Japan who had been Indonesia’s principal investors for a prolonged period (Suzuki & Maulia, 2017). This is inseparable from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a megaproject promoted by Xi Jinping since 2013 (Chang, 2019). Moreover, Xi Jinping’s ambition to build the Silk Road of the twenty-first century coincides with Jokowi’s ambition to become the world’s maritime axis and promote infrastructure development throughout the country. Thus, it is unremarkable that the ambitions of both countries are combining to generate substantial outcomes. Since its introduction in 2013, Jokowi’s response to the BRI has attracted significant criticism from economic observers, particularly on account of its dependence on China, which implies that Indonesia is less assertive in dealing with China’s threats in the South China Sea, amidst longstanding tension.

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Additionally, BRI projects in Indonesia are perceived to be of a low standard. For example, numerous accidents occurred in a nickel refining project in Central Sulawesi, due to the lack of Occupational Health and Safety standards. It is also important to mention that the lack of assessment concerning the environmental impacts of various projects has caused substantial environmental damage. For instance, seawater in the PT Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park Industrial area is a reddish hue owing to industrial activity which has produced hotter seawater temperatures. As a consequence, the marine ecosystem has been irreparably damaged and fishermen’s catches have demonstrated a noticeable decrease. In response to this, several residents staged protests in the industrial area, although the company failed to act and address the concerns of people living in the area (Robiatul & Putra, 2023). Likewise, in 2023, clashes occurred which caused casualties as workers held a number of demonstrations to demand decent wages, appropriate employment contracts and adequate job protection (Damarjati, 2023). Nevertheless, workplace accidents continue to occur in the area. Despite this, it is unquestionable that until Jokowi’s second term, China had become a partner and had a major influence on Indonesia’s development. Despite concerns in relation to standards and potential drawbacks, Indonesia has a preference to involve China in its development owing to the significant economic opportunities it presents, particularly in addressing infrastructure challenges and stimulating economic growth (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional, 2023). China’s expertise and financial resources are seen as an opportunity for Indonesia to modernise its infrastructure and create job opportunities, while diversifying its partnerships and reducing reliance on traditional allies. Engaging with China also serves geopolitical considerations, allowing Indonesia to maintain diplomatic relations and negotiate favourable terms. Moreover, it is worth stating that many individuals in Jokowi’s cabinets are businessmen who enjoy personal business ties with China, potentially influencing the decision-making process and furthering Indonesia’s economic alliance with its powerful neighbour (Syarif, 2024).

Indonesia-China-India Relations After a year of diplomatic ties between Indonesia-China, Indonesia also recognised India in 1951 (Bandono et al., 2021). This acquaintance which began in the colonial era is reflected in the provision of a substantial

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amount of land for the Embassy of Indonesia in New Delhi. Additionally, Indonesia and India were among the countries that spearheaded the Non-Aligned Movement which later began the 1955 Asia-Africa Summit in Bandung (ibid). However, the aftermath of Indonesia’s darkest hour in 1965 and the political upheaval of the New Order regime strained their relationship (Krismantari et al., 2015). Without doubt, the most significant reason related to the ideological difference that prevailed between the two. Soeharto, who was more liberal at the time and had close ties with the West and the United States, contrasted with India, which was a socialist nation and sustained friendly relations with the Soviet Union (Yumitro, 2014). Following Indonesia’s reformation in 1998, relations between the two countries did not improve significantly on account of several obstacles, such as Indonesia’s fragile political stability that resulted in the transfer of power in a relatively short period. Indonesia’s fragility also meant that it was willing to relinquish sovereignty in Timor Leste when it was governed by Habibie (Wijaya & Permatasari, 2018). It was reasonably difficult for Indonesia to consistently engage with the international community at that point in time. However, when Abdurahman Wahid or Gus Dur held power, it was a breath of fresh air for Indonesia and India. Gud Dur’s leadership style is recognised for his committed activities abroad in an attempt to introduce Indonesia to the international world (Purnamasari, 2020). Hence, this, in turn, opened up opportunities for both nations to re-establish amicable relations by way of Gus Dur’s visit to India in 2000 (Sekhar, 2007). During his visit, he also offered potential investment opportunities. Ironically, Gus Dur’s leadership lasted only two years, before he was ousted by Megawati following a decision made by the People’s Consultative Assembly, which functioned as the highest institution at the time, during a special session (Farisa, 2022). There were several improvements in cooperation between Indonesia and India during the Megawati era. For example in 2003, a meeting was organised between the two countries to discuss bilateral economic and commercial relations by forming the “India-Indonesia Expert Working Group” in an attempt to address the impact of the economic crisis in Indonesia (Bandono et al., 2021). Earlier in 2002, both countries also agreed to boost cooperation in science and technology, which included remote sensing, satellite launches and space technology (ibid). Similarly, ties between the countries were further strengthened when SBY acquired power as the sixth president of Indonesia, upon replacing Megawati.

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Indonesia-India relations continued throughout the SBY era. The partnership that was established became more comprehensive thanks to SBY’s ability to build relations with the international community that were much stronger than previous leaders. He visited India in 2005 with the intention of discussing the annual “strategic dialogue” at the senior official level (Sekhar, 2007). In addition, both countries agreed to conduct diplomatic and military training. In the security sector, they decided to enhance bilateral cooperation in combating terrorism and transnational crime as well as maritime security by way of sharing information and intelligence, capacity building and legal cooperation. In the context of maritime cooperation, Indonesia and India are both members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) (Aufiya, 2022). Regarding the trade sector, the trade balance between Indonesia and India increased positively in the 2006–2010 period and Indonesia consistently recorded a trade surplus comprising products such as food processing, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, automotive products, textiles, palm oil, paper, mining and the creative industries. As the above collaboration illustrates, Indonesia and India appreciate the potential for both parties to continue to explore strategic cooperation (ibid). Since Jokowi assumed office, India has remained a vital partner for Indonesia over the past decade. Since 2014, Jokowi and Narendra Modi, India’s 15th Prime Minister, have regularly met on the sidelines at regional and international forums, such as the ASEAN and G-20. Accordingly, the cooperation between both countries has strengthened, reflected in the signing of 15 MoUs in 2018, ranging from the defence sector and railways to medical products (Aditya, 2018). Furthermore, Modi has also been optimistic about increasing Indonesia-India’s trade volume by US$50 billion by 2025 (Bonesh, 2023). According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), in 2016, the value of trade between the countries reached US$12.9 billion, subsequently increasing by 28.7% to US$18.13 billion in 2017 (Aufiya, 2022). This discloses that the cooperation between Indonesia and India is much more stable compared to the New Order era. Both nations also have developed their ties in the defence sector. In 2020, Indonesia and India held a discussion on defence consisting of defence ministers to encourage investment in each other’s arms companies and to assist with logistical support (Jha, 2020). It cannot be denied that the increased cooperation between both countries is influenced by India’s ambition to implement the “Act East Policy.” This policy was also

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implemented by Narendra Modi, during his tenure. This is a supporting factor as regards the increase in bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and India. However, compared to the relationship between Indonesia and China, Indonesia and India possess less significance by reason of BRI. Likewise, cooperation between Indonesia and China or Indonesia and India, India and China is unquestionably influenced by historical disputes. The high point of the tension was the Sino-Indian War in November 1962. At that point, India revealed China had unilaterally claimed the Aksai Chin region, which was considered Indian territory (part of Ladakh). However, according to China, Aksai Chin is part of Xinjiang. Previously, both countries had claimed the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a 3,500 km-long area (Singh, 2008). As a consequence, India lost thousands of kilometres of territory, and both countries regrettably lost thousands of lives. In 1976, the two countries again agreed to normalise diplomatic relations. This was followed by a state visit by then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988, marking a significant moment in India-China relations after 34 years of no open communication (Gupta & Lüthi, 2016). Through these meetings, their closeness intensified and significantly improved. For example, China and India agreed to sign “the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership Agreement” in 2005 in relation to the economic sector. From 2000 to 2009, trade value between the nations increased significantly from US$2.9 trillion to US$73.9 trillion. Despite positive relations, the issue of disputed borders has never been firmly addressed, essentially since 2003 (Hoffmann, 1990). This has resulted in both countries “freely” operating military units in these specific areas. Evidently, in late 2020, a clash between the two countries’ military units occurred in Galwan Valley, which is also claimed by China. The incident resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers. To protect the country’s borders, India is increasing infrastructure capacity or sending military personnel on a massive scale (Singh, 2022). In 2021, the Chinese government passed a law related to land borders law. The law is expected to improve coordination between border areas and several sectors, such as economic, social and defence. This progressive regulation is in line with the development of China’s military infrastructure in the border area with India. According to the China military power report, since the clash in Tawang Valley in late December 2022, the Chinese army—the People’s

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Liberation Army (PLA)—has officially promoted infrastructure development around the LAC. One development is the division-level headquarters flanking the Pangong River (Huang et al., 2023). Several satellite links also support this development. Conversely, India has increased the deployment of military personnel around the LAC. In the last report issued in 2021, India sent approximately 50,000 soldiers. Furthermore, to connect several routes for more efficient delivery of military or other equipment, India plans to build 73 strategic roads amounting to roughly 1,430 kilometres (Ramachandran, 2016). At the end of 2021, tensions ratcheted up again and both nations blamed each other for using military weapons, which have been prohibited since 1996. The continuation of the tensions has impacted the economic sector. According to China’s customs department data, by mid-2023, India’s exports to China fell 0.9% from US$56.53 trillion, while imports also dropped to 0.6%; a visible decline. In 2022, trade relations between the two sides peaked at US$135.98 trillion, an increase of 8.4% from 2021 (Krishnan, 2023). In the context of Indonesia, Jokowi met with Indian and Chinese officials in 2018. Jokowi first met with Modi and shortly afterwards with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang. These meetings were significant as both countries, India and China, entered the list of the most powerful and influential economies politically and economically. Nonetheless, after the conflict in Ladakh, Indonesia has not taken a firm stance in planning regular visits to India and China. This denotes that conflict is not necessary for Indonesia. Compared to Indonesia’s position on the Russia and Ukraine conflict, Jokowi separately visited both nations in June 2022. After February 2022, when Russian President Vladimir Putin declared war on Ukraine, a series of economic sanctions were imposed on Ukraine (Deputy Cabinet Secretary for State, 2022). One sanction pertains to the restriction on wheat in the Red Sea. Regarding the restriction, Indonesia is fairly uncomfortable for the reason that wheat commodities are still dependent on Russia. The Central Statistics Agency (BPS) in 2021 noted that Indonesia’s wheat imports experienced an upward trend from 2017 to 2021, reaching up to 1 million tonnes. Examining Indonesia’s stance on the conflict (India-China), Indonesia is respectful of its foreign policy, which was created by Mohammad Hatta, as it is acknowledged to be a free and active policy. In this context, Indonesia remains neutral. Nanto Sriyanto from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) commented that Indonesia should not be excessively concerned by the conflict. The Ministerial Spokesperson of

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the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Teuku Faizasyah, also argued that Indonesia is closely following the development of tension between both countries and hopes that tensions can be reduced for the sake of regional stability (Sofwan, 2018).

Trilateral “Marriage” Relations: In Existence but Additional Hurdles Historically, Indonesia-China-India relations were “formed” because these three countries had the highest number of Muslims worldwide. The three countries have connections in terms of religion, specifically Islam. Islam’s introduction to Indonesia (Nusantara) was based on Gujarat (India) and Chinese theory, which was backed by Persia and Arabia. This is proven by various Chinese artefacts. For example, Raden Fatah of Demak Sultanate was known as Jin Bun, whereas Sunan Ampel or Raden Rahmat was called Bong Swi (Kadir, 2010). These names represent the names of the mosques prevalent in Indonesia in the seventh century. The trilateral ties can also be seen in a number of reports which document how the Chinese and Indian traders were marrying local Indonesians. The closeness of the three countries was observed after World War II when Indonesia and India were two of the five countries that pioneered the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955 (Dinkel, 2018). The conference was held in Bandung and attended by 29 other countries motivated by two main objectives. First, combatting the ideologies of colonialism and imperialism, which were seen to have exploited colonised countries. Second, to establish a neutral position towards the bipolar powers, unequivocally the US and the Soviet Union. The inspiration to be neutral was confirmed in the Bandung Principles. The pinnacle of the Asia-Africa Conferences (KAA) was the holding of the High-Level Conference (Summit) in Yugoslavia, which resulted in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (ibid). The differences in ideology as regards the KAA are appealing, notably Indonesia’s invitation to China (communism)— after Mao Zedong won the Civil War in 1949. Zhou Enlai, China’s Prime Minister and negotiator played an active role in China’s involvement in the KAA (Kedutaan Besar Republik Rakyat Tiongkok di Indonesia, 2015). Prior to the commencement of the KAA, Zhou Enlai established collaborative relations with pioneer countries by emphasising the values of peace. In the middle of his speech at the KAA, he stated that he espoused the principle of “seeking equality and putting aside differences” (Ministry

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of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, n.d). Similar to India and Indonesia, which were colonised, Chinese history also records colonisation as an affront to people. This transpired when China was invaded by Japan and the British. In addition, after gaining independence, relations between Indonesia, China and India have become very limited and it is possibly unfeasible to have a trilateral relationship. There are several reasons to reinforce the argument. Firstly, apart from the fact that ties between China and India have been tempestuous at times, after both nations experienced tension over disputed territory, at the BRICS Summit in South Africa, Xi Jinping and Modi met formally to resolve the territorial dispute. However, there are no definite parameters regarding the sincerity of China and India in reaching an agreement. This also has an adverse impact on both countries engaging in further dialogue, primarily with Indonesia. Interestingly, despite the tension between China and India as BRICS members, both countries realise great potential if Indonesia joins BRICS, especially as a partner in the Southeast Asian region. This is in keeping with the forum’s agenda, which promotes economic cooperation, for instance trade and investment, strengthening the labour market and the digital economy. Basically, Indonesia meets the conditions for strengthening BRICS as it has a substantial market with positive growth. In fact, instead of joining BRICS, in 2024, Indonesia desired to join the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Second, trilateral relations cannot occur by reason of China’s ambition to dominate the world. Besides Ladakh, China has been expanding its military power by enacting the “String of Pearl” policy, particularly in the Indian Ocean. In 2015, Modi’s speech in Mauritius underlined the significance of the Indian Ocean to India, with approximately 68% of India’s trade volume stemming from the waters (Jaishankar, 2016; Arouff, 2015). Ironically, China’s presence in India’s seawaters is challenging for India. China has many strategies, ranging from building “external” ports in places such as Gwadar in Pakistan and Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa. China is also increasing its engagement by negotiating to “control” certain ports in Myanmar and Thailand. Unlike the US, Britain and India, China is the only country that has an official embassy in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar and the Comoros. Studying China’s progress, India is apprehensive that China could control several ports near India’s borders or within India’s neighbours and control

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the Bay of Bengal in particular. The Chinese government also maintains communication with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Despite not being a member of IORA, China organised the Indian Ocean Region Forum for the first time on November 21, 2022. The meeting was attended by representatives of 19 countries, including Australia and several countries from Eastern and Southern Africa, although India did not attend the forum (Moorthy, 2022). Krishnan argues that China has been seeking to “dispense with” India to boost its economic interests in the Indian Ocean. It should be noted that China applies similar strategies in the South China Sea. The Chinese government developed its claim from the nine-dash line to the ten-dash line in China’s New Map released in 2023 (Jett, 2023). Besides, China has grasped the importance of maritime trade with respect to its economy. The increase in tension between China and India could be worse due to India’s presence in the South China Sea (SCS). For years, India has been disinterested in addressing issues involving the ASEAN member states and China. However, more recently, there appears to be a significant shift in India’s role in addressing the dispute. In recent years, India has become involved in attempts to maintain regional security in Southeast Asia, for example, by sending ships to Vietnam when the country requested assistance on account of China’s increasing hostility in the region. Equally, on several occasions at the ASEAN meetings, India has made clear its support for parties to abide by international laws such as the UNCLOS in conflict resolution. India’s impartiality towards China in addressing this issue has led to China issuing various responses that have also unsettled India. For example, in 2023, China released its New Maps, which strengthened China’s position in annexing Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh. During the Jokowi administration, Indonesia and India have formed effective, cooperative maritime relations. Jokowi stated that Indonesia and India could increase cooperation and contribute to stability, security and prosperity. In 2015, India and Indonesia agreed on joint military exercises and security agreements and committed to increasing their military capabilities by way of Jokowi’s visit to India in 2016. The cooperation was boosted in 2018, when both nations agreed to sign the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Indonesia and India view China’s increasing presence in the South China Sea as a potential disruptive force. Between 2019 and 2020, for example, Chinese coast guards traversed the North Natuna Sea—Indonesia changed the name from the South China Sea in

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2017. Indonesia responded verbally and sent a note of objection or nota keberatan (in Bahasa Indonesia) to the Chinese Ambassador in Indonesia (Sebayang, 2020). However, it had no impact. Notwithstanding China’s intimidation, the Indonesian government does not perceive China to be a threat. Indonesia appreciates that most economic sectors depend substantially on China for trade and investment. The Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia (BPS) reported that since 2015, China’s investment in Indonesia has intensified, even during the pandemic, increasing by 9%. In 2022, the investment reached US$ 5.2 billion, the highest amount in the two decades. Jokowi and Xi Jinping have frequent meetings to discuss the BRI, particularly China’s contribution to the KCJB, Indonesia’s high-speed railway. For this reason, most researchers believe that Indonesia tends to remain quiet. However, Indonesia understands that to protect its territory, notably the sea, it must increase its military capability or units. In 2020, the Indonesian Minister of Defence, Prabowo Subianto, visited India to discuss this pressing matter. Noticing China’s increasing hostility, for example, China landed H-K6 long-range bombers close to its border with India in 2021; India has been developing maritime security cooperation with the West, specifically via the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), comprising India, Japan, the US and Australia, in an alternative attempt to deter China. Equally, Indonesia does not see the need for trilateral relations given that it has strong bilateral ties with India and China. By means of inclusivity, Indonesia has valuable bilateral relations with both India and China. In other words, Indonesia still does not perceive an obvious challenge. Third, the Chinese government is strengthening ties with India’s neighbours, various African countries, as well as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives and Mauritius. In contrast, China is also sending millions of dollars in aid to these countries and helping to improve military capacity. Pakistan is one example. For India, Pakistan is a decades old rival. China has established an internal relationship with Pakistan by signing The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2015, which became the springboard for relations between the two countries. According to predictions made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the CPEC will increase Pakistan’s GDP to US$4.2 trillion in 2050 (International Monetary Fund, 2015). One of the CPEC’s mega projects is Gwadar, a port connecting Xinjiang and Gwadar in China. This location purposefully allows China to expand its economy into the Middle East and Africa. Consequently, India is worried that in the next few years, the existence of

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the China-Pakistan port will threaten the Iranian port of Chabahar, even though India contributed to its development. A further concern is China’s involvement in the Kashmir conflict. The Chinese government representative, Mao Ning, repeatedly called for the conflict to cease because China had secured its project in Kashmir. Despite protests, China and Pakistan agreed to construct the Diamer Bhasha dam which is targeted for completion in 2028 at an estimated cost of US$8 billion. China’s involvement proves that it has been a third player in the strained relationship between India and Pakistan since 2015.

Potential in Indonesia-India-China Cooperation Indian Ocean Integration Trilateral cooperation between Indonesia, China and India can work under two specific situations. First, relations between China and India can be improved if China reduced its ambition to control the Indian Ocean. Second, Indonesia’s committed to maritime or non-maritime economic integration could play a decisive role. Indonesia, China and India have the potential to build a solid relationship in the long term, principally regarding maritime trade across the Indian Ocean. Currently, the Indian Ocean is organised through the IORA, totalling roughly 23 countries with China as a partner in dialogue. Saha et al. (2020), argued that this maritime trade relationship is essential given that almost 90% of the maritime routes and 80% of the oil trade passes through the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the three countries are expected to capitalise on the opportunity. All three countries already have a maritime vision. Indonesia, in the era of President Joko Widodo, came up with the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), which is supposedly a “trinity strategy.” This strategy functions on three fronts: geopolitical, geo-strategic and geo-economic. Moreover, Jokowi’s ambition to strengthen maritime trade is in accordance with the slogans articulated by China and India. Xi Jinping also introduced the BRI in 2013, which not only offers projects but also enhances maritime capacity via the trade sector. Narendra Modi introduced the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision and the Naval Maritime Doctrine in 2015 (ibid). According to the document released by the Indian government in 2015, for the first time, India used the

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“Indo-Pacific” term to strengthen India’s maritime strength and repositioned India’s objective from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Like the East Policy Act, SAGAR seeks to consolidate economic cooperation. Recently, at the ASEAN Summit, Modi promoted the “Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative” with a focus on maritime stability. By means of this, Indonesia should be able to exploit the opportunity by improving the capabilities of its existing port in Aceh or Northern Sumatra. These harbours are expected to be the “areas” for maritime trade routes connecting Indonesia with Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Indonesia must be consistent and remain impartial when the two (India or China) are in dispute. Therefore, the government should take the opportunity to develop Indonesia, even if it is not within the trilateral cooperation framework. Conversely, China can utilise the opportunity by reducing the risk of conflict, by beginning to “adhere to” the international system and abstaining from taking sides. In this context, China is a challenge for India and even Indonesia in North Natuna. Therefore, China should open up intensive communication with both countries, particularly as regards processing natural resources in the Indian Ocean.

Strengthening the Pharmaceutical Industry If, in this scenario, all three countries introduce a cooperative relationship, all three countries can develop the pharmaceutical industry. Statistically, in 2023, the world’s pharmaceutical industry will still be predominantly controlled by the US, followed by China, which will hold 12% of the entire pharmaceutical industry. Based on data from the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the pharmaceutical industry in China is experiencing the fastest growth globally. Since 2018, China has been enthusiastically developing innovations in the sector, due to economic challenges, such as the increasing number of elderly people who require medicine. Various pharmaceuticals such as Novartis, Novo Nordisk and AstraZeneca play a considerable role in producing or controlling 8–10% of the market. In 2021, China’s pharmaceutical industry attained 708.75 billion yuan (Xinhua, 2022). China’s pharmaceutical industry is primarily directed at India. According to Chaudhuri, in a study entitled: “India’s Import Dependence on China in Pharmaceuticals: Status, Issues and Policy Options,” in 2020, 47.5% of India’s bulk drug supply came from China. A further report from CareEdge also revealed that 55–66% of India’s bulk drugs

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remain profoundly dependent on China (The Economic Times, 2023). Nonetheless, in recent years, India has implemented a policy to reduce its dependence on China. One of the reasons is that India aspires to be “the pharmacy to the world” by highlighting the production of low-cost and high-quality drugs. Alternatively, it is also believed that Indian pharmaceuticals will contribute significantly to the economy, approximately 30% in 2025. During COVID-19, the Indian pharmaceutical industry accounted for 60% of global vaccines and contributed 40–70% to Tetanus and Pertussis (DPT), Diphtheria and Bacillus Calmette-Guerin vaccines. Simultaneously, during COVID-19 and post the pandemic, Indonesia was stricken by a crisis in regard to importing medicines. According to the CEO of PT Kalbe Farma Tbk (KLBF), Vidjongtius, in the second quarter of 2020, there was not only a decline in public consumption but also the supply of Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) products to Indonesia. By way of this, Indonesia is also hampered in supplying imported raw materials for medicines, 90% of which are still dependent on India and China. Nevertheless, in 2023, Indonesia was attempting to export pharmaceutical products to Tanzania for the first time. Given the favourable trends associated with these three countries, an interesting scenario would be to open up the market between the three countries and create the largest industry in Asia. All three countries, principally Indonesia, should exhibit optimism by centralising the pharmaceutical industry in Asia and reducing dependence on the US. Transition Energy: Green Economy? Indonesia, India and China are the three countries with the largest populations in the world. This could mean that there is high vehicle ownership in conjunction with dependence on crude oil imports. In 2018, China and India were two countries with significant dependence on oil, reaching 69% and 80%, respectively. In 2019, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the use of gasoline-based transportation in China reached 32 billion litres, followed by India with 12 billion litres (Oil & Fats International, 2019). Indonesia is still dependent on diesel, which is expected to increase by 10% in 2024. Similarly, in these three countries, there is a growing trend to reduce dependence on crude oil and switch to biofuels to reduce gas emissions. According to the IEA report, between 2019 and 2024, biofuel production in Indonesia, China, and India will contribute 40% (15 billion litres) to the world (ibid). All three countries

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exploit several methods to create biofuel. China produces ethanol by way of corn and cassava, India uses molasses from the sugar industry, whereas Indonesia remains dependent on palm oil to produce biodiesel. However, the methods applied by each country are still limited due to inadequate infrastructure. In Indonesia, for example, the B35 programme still requires infrastructure management to increase oil capacity. Therefore, there must be cooperation that strengthens and connects all three countries given that they have large markets. In that sense, there needs to be more concrete follow-up. In 2008, China invested in a biofuel company in North Sumatra, Indonesia. Likewise, in 2019, within the framework of the 4th India-ASEAN collaboration, Indonesia is committed to assisting India’s energy transformation in the biodiesel sector by exploiting palm oil.

Conclusion The conclusion of this chapter underlines the complex dynamics that exist between India, China and Indonesia, highlighting both the historical context and contemporary challenges that hinder official trilateral ties. The first significant hurdle lies in the territorial dispute between India and China, a longstanding issue that complicates any potential collaboration. Likewise, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China has aggressively flexed its muscles on the global stage, employing its economic strength to increase its influence, chiefly through initiatives like the BRI, which includes significant investments in infrastructure projects in countries such as Pakistan. Indonesia’s stance adds another layer of complexity, as the government has not made any formal overtures towards establishing trilateral relations with India and China, instead prioritising bilateral engagements with each country individually. However, there are indications of burgeoning cooperation, principally between Indonesia and India in the maritime sector. Despite these challenges and divergent national interests, there remains potential for alliances in specific areas. One such area is the assimilation of the maritime sector, where all three nations share common interests and can benefit from mutual cooperation. Additionally, there is scope for cooperation in transitioning to a green economy, addressing shared environmental concerns and promoting sustainable development. In essence, while the historical backdrop and contemporary realities present significant obstacles to formal trilateral ties, there are promising avenues for cooperation that could

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yield mutual benefits for India, China, along with Indonesia. By finding common ground and building upon existing partnerships, these nations can navigate the complexities of regional geopolitics and work towards shared prosperity and stability.

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CHAPTER 12

Indonesia’s Engagement with China and India: Pragmatic or Ideational? Anak Agung Banyu Perwita and Peni Hanggarini

Introduction The strategic geographical positioning of Indonesia, China, and India, as the two Asian major powers, holds the potential to underpin a broad spectrum of geopolitical interests, fostering cooperation among these nations. China, leveraging its proximity, has effectively bolstered its global influence by extending benefits to Southeast Asian nations. However, the significance of India—China’s neighbor—should not be underestimated, given its remarkable strides in economic development. India articulated the vision of “a secure, prosperous, and robust New India” under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership in 2017, further crystallizing it into

A. A. B. Perwita (B) Republic of Indonesia Defense University, Bogor, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected] P. Hanggarini Department of International Relations, Paramadina University Jakarta, Jakarta, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_12

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the “New India 2025” strategy in 2018. Complementing this vision, India has launched initiatives such as “Made in India” and “Digital India.” While Indonesia’s relations with China and India hold considerable significance, they have been marked by certain historical milestones. Indonesia initially established diplomatic ties with China on April 13, 1950, yet these relations were interrupted on October 30, 1967, following the tragic events of September 30, 1965. This event—wherein the Indonesian Communist Party orchestrated the assassination of seven Indonesian generals and attempted to overthrow President Sukarno—led to the suspension of bilateral relations. However, under the presidency of Suharto, Indonesia reinitiated diplomatic relations with China in 1990. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms from 1978 to 1992 heralded significant political transformations in China, prompting Indonesia to reconsider its engagement with a more open and pragmatic China. Nonetheless, bilateral cooperation between the two nations experienced a setback during the May 1998 riots, during which numerous ethnic Chinese in Indonesia reportedly faced discrimination and sexual violence. Subsequently, the Chinese government urged the Indonesian authorities to investigate these crimes and ensure the protection of ethnic Chinese individuals residing in Indonesia (Embassy, 2004). Conversely, over the years, bilateral relations between India and Indonesia have experienced significant improvement since their respective independence. Following independence, leaders of both nations, Jawaharlal Nehru and Sukarno, forged a cooperative pact aimed at combating colonialism and laying the groundwork for a new global order. Notably, in 1955, India and Indonesia, alongside several other nations, convened the Bandung Conference—a pivotal event that laid the foundation for the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. This movement was conceived with the objectives of promoting independence, alleviating poverty, fostering economic development, and opposing colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism. (Fig. 12.1) The geographical positioning of Indonesia, China, and India on the map of Asia underscores the significance of bilateral relations in shaping their interactions. Both China and India strategically engage with Southeast Asia, including through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to advance their interests in the region. Despite this common goal, the approaches taken by these two giants differ. China employs a competitive strategy aimed at forestalling India’s ascendancy

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Fig. 12.1 Map of Asia: Geographical Location of Indonesia, China, and India (Source freepik.com [copyright-free])

and thwarting the expansion of India’s cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries. Conversely, India perceives China as a threat to its security and prosperity. In response, India emphasizes arms trade and the development of maritime cooperation capabilities as essential components of its strategy to compete with China in the region (Chuong et al., 2022). The discourse presented in this chapter is anchored in the concept of national interests, which encompasses a comprehensive set of objectives and goals prioritized by a nation in its foreign relations and the management of international affairs. These interests span diverse realms including political, economic, security, ideological, and cultural dimensions, all deemed critical for ensuring the well-being, security, and prosperity of the nation and its populace. Within the framework of India, China, and Indonesia relations, an exploration of their shared histories, geographical proximity, cultural dynamics, and ideological underpinnings serves as pivotal factors shaping their past and current state of affairs. This chapter delves into Indonesia’s engagements with China and India—the prominent Asian powers. It investigates Indonesia’s shared interests with China and India, the influence of political conflicts between these two giants on their interactions with Indonesia, and the impact of

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the Chinese and Indian diasporas on bilateral relationships. The chapter contends that the strategic geographical positioning of Indonesia, China, and India harbors the potential to cultivate a diverse array of geopolitical interests, laying the groundwork for cooperative endeavors among these nations. However, the dynamic between Indonesia and China leans toward pragmatism rather than idealism, whereas relations with India exhibit a more pronounced ideological orientation.

Common Interests Between China and Indonesia Indonesia’s bilateral relations with China have oscillated between mild indifference and outright hostility. China has leveraged its stronger negotiating position to foster economic ties with Indonesia. Nonetheless, China shares economic interests with Indonesia and actively participates in various ASEAN initiatives. Notably, China has demonstrated its support for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Meeting by hosting the conference in 2000. Additionally, in 2010, China backed the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). In a significant move, China and ASEAN jointly conducted their first naval exercise in 2018 (Dodgson, 2021). As the two nations celebrate a decade of strategic partnership, Indonesia and China are expanding their bilateral relations, underscoring China’s economic relevance to Indonesia (Parameswaran, 2023). China stands as Indonesia’s most crucial trading partner, with the total trade volume reaching USD 123.4 billion in 2021. Furthermore, China emerged as the third-largest investor in Indonesia in 2021, with a realized investment of USD 3.2 billion. This trend continued in 2022, with China becoming the second-highest investor in Indonesia. These developments signify a shared interest in trade between China and Indonesia (Kemlu, 2022). Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the idea of establishing longterm cooperation to build the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in a speech delivered to the Indonesian Parliament on October 3, 2013. This proposal reflects an enhanced level of cooperation between the two nations, as evidenced by bilateral visits. For instance, Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited Chengdu, China, on July 27, 2023, upon an invitation by Chinese President Xi Jinping to discuss various investment projects.

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Subsequently, President Jokowi embarked on a state visit to China from October 16 to 18, 2023, before attending the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) forum. This visit led to the establishment of the ChinaIndonesia High-Level Dialogue and Cooperation Mechanism (HDCM) (Joint Statement on Deepening Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China & the Republic of Indonesia, 2023). Indonesia’s trade relations with China are thriving, exemplified by the favorable trade balance between the two countries, reported by the Ministry of Trade Republic of Indonesia. As depicted in Fig. 12.2, Indonesia recorded a surplus of USD 1.24 billion in trade with China, a stark improvement compared to the previous year’s deficit of USD 2.82 billion (Perdagangan, 2023b).

80000 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 2018

2019

2020

Export to China

2021

2022

JAN MAR' 22

JAN MAR' 23

Import from China

Trade Balance between Indonesia and China (2018-Maret 2023) 0 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

-10000 -20000

Fig. 12.2 Trade Balance between Indonesia and China (2018—March 2023) (Source [Perdagangan, 2023b])

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Table 12.1 Indonesia’s exports to china Product

Million USD

Mineral Fuels Iron and Steel Animal/Vegetable Fats & Oils Nickel Pulp Various Chemical Products Metal Ore, Crust, and Ash Food Industry Dregs/Waste Footwear Organic Chemicals Other

4483.89 4379.06 1460.17 1248.12 723.11 696.78 454 348.23 167.64 164.95 1823.09

Other Organic Chemicals Footwear Food Industry Dregs/Waste Metal Ore, Crust, and Ash Various Chemical Products Pulp Nickel Animal/Vegetable Fats & Oils Iron and Steel Mineral Fuels 0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

Indonesia's Exports to China

Source Perdagangan, 2023b

Mineral fuels, iron, and steel constitute Indonesia’s primary export commodities to China, comprising 88.57% of Indonesia’s total non-oil exports to China (Perdagangan, 2023b) (Table 12.1). In contrast, the main non-oil and gas commodities imported from China to Indonesia during the January–March 2023 period were electrical equipment and mechanical machinery, as illustrated in Table 12.2.

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Table 12.2 Indonesia’s Imports from China Product

Million USD

Electrical Machinery/Equipment Mechanical Machinery/Equipment Iron and Steel Plastic and Plastic Goods Organic Chemicals Vehicles and Spareparts Mineral Fuels Iron and Steel Objects Various Chemical Products Artificial Filaments Other

3686.45 3256.87 762.32 646.98 566.3 514.84 478.95 410.03 306.36 287.85 4,123.19

Other Artificial Filaments Various Chemical Products Iron and Steel Objects Mineral Fuels Vehicles and Spareparts Organic Chemicals Plastic and Plastic Goods Iron and Steel Mechanical Machinery/Equipment Electrical Machinery/Equipment 0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

Indonesia’s Import from China Source Perdagangan, 2023b

Common Interests Between India and Indonesia Indonesia’s trade balance with India presents a distinct picture. From January to June 2023, Indonesia experienced a surplus of USD 5.4 billion in trade with India. This surplus primarily stemmed from a surplus of USD 61 billion in the non-oil and gas sector, counterbalanced by a deficit of USD 0.8 billion in the oil and gas sector (Perdagangan, 2023a) (Table 12.3).

Export –Oil & Gas –Non Oil & Gas Import –Oil & Gas –Non Oil & Gas Trade Balance –Oil & Gas –Non Oil & Gas Total Trades –Oil & Gas –Non Oil & Gas

I

Source Perdagangan, 2023a

IV

III

II

Description

No

13.7 0.1 13.7 5 0.1 4.9 8.7 0.1 8.8 18.7 0.2 18.6

11.8 0.1 11.7 4.3 0.2 4.1 7.5 0.1 7.6 16.1 0.3 15.8

10.4 0.2 10.2 3.8 0 3.7 6.6 0.2 6.5 14.2 0.3 13.9

13.3 0.2 13.1 7.7 0.9 6.8 5.7 0.7 6.3 21 1.1 19.9

2021

2022 23.4 0.1 23.3 9.3 2.2 7.1 14 2.1 16.1 32.7 2.3 30.4

11.5 0 11.4 5.2 1.3 3.9 6.2 1.3 7.5 16.7 1.4 15.3

2022

2020

2018

2019

JAN

Million USD

Table 12.3 Trade balance between Indonesia and India

9.4 0 9.4 4.1 0.8 3.3 5.4 0.8 6.1 13.5 0.8 12.7

2023

JUN

17.87 93.26 17.62 22.28 39.46 16.45 14.18 37.88 18.22 19.25 40.95 17.32

23/22

Change (%)

12.57 12.22 12.52 19.96 108.34 13.43 6.94 – 10.92 14.77 88.17 12.96

18–22

Trend (%)

100 0.03 99.97 100 19.72 80.28 100 14.9 114.9 100 5.96 94.04

2023

Share (%)

270 A. A. B. PERWITA AND P. HANGGARINI

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Indonesia’s exports to India encompass a variety of non-oil and gas products, as detailed in Table 12.4 (Perdagangan, 2023a). Conversely, Table 12.5 delineates Indonesia’s imports from India in the non-oil and gas sector (Perdagangan, 2023a). India and Indonesia share strategic perspectives dating back to the Cold War era, both opting for non-alignment between the Western and Communist Blocs. This ideological similarity has laid a robust foundation for the burgeoning bilateral relations. Furthermore, following the events of September 1965, both nations have come to perceive China as an emerging threat in the region (Brewster, 2011). Table 12.4 Indonesia’s Exports to India Product

Year over year

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

3241.82% 169.21% 51.13% 49.95% 45.04%

Jewelry/Gems Nickel Coffee, Tea, Spices Fish and shrimp Vehicles and their parts

3500.00% 3000.00% 2500.00% 2000.00% 1500.00% 1000.00% 500.00% 0.00%

5 Non-Oil and Gas Export Products with the Highest Growth in 2023 Source Perdagangan, 2023a

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Table 12.5 Indonesia’s Imports from India Product

Year Over Year

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

549.88% 423.20% 123.92% 123.48% 80.13%

Iron and steel objects Vehicle components Optical Devices Food Industry Dregs/Waste Vehicles and their parts

600.00% 500.00% 400.00% 300.00% 200.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1. Iron and steel objects

2. Vehicle components

3. Optical Devices

4. Food 5. Vehicles and Industry their parts Dregs/Waste

5 Non-Oil and Gas Import Products with the Highest Increases in 2023 Source Perdagangan, 2023a

India’s perception of Indonesia differs from that of Vietnam, Japan, or Australia, as it does not view Indonesia as a strong candidate for initiatives aimed at balancing China. Indonesia appears hesitant to provoke Beijing, and it demonstrates a reluctance to embrace a larger security role for India in the Malacca Straits region. Moreover, both India and Indonesia have yet to make significant strides in advancing meaningful arms sales, thus serving as limiting factors for greater strategic convergence between the two countries (Harold et al., 2019). Furthermore, a more balanced and mutually beneficial relationship characterizes India-Indonesia relations. Both democratic nations consider the Indian Ocean as strategically significant for political, educational, defense, and maritime security purposes. Additionally, they share common

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interests in the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific region. Bilateral relations between India and Indonesia leverage a combination of soft power and hard power influences to foster cooperation (Bandono et al., 2021). A shared ideational foundation between India and Indonesia lies in their significant roles in the maritime sector, both serving as guardians of crucial maritime chokepoints. Under the leadership of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Indonesian President Joko Widodo, bilateral relations between the two nations have witnessed substantial enhancement. Initiatives launched during the Modi and Jokowi administrations have played a pivotal role in the development of bilateral relations, with maritime cooperation emerging as a key area of focus. Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum initiative aims to position Indonesia as a prominent maritime force, while Modi’s maritime and diplomatic strategy, known as SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), involves negotiating naval logistical agreements with various countries in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). Notably, initiatives such as SAGAR, the Sagarmala Project, and Project “Mausam,” which share similar objectives to Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum, have been launched under Modi’s leadership (Aufiya, 2022). Modi and Jokowi have engaged in discussions regarding initiatives aimed at enhancing maritime connectivity between the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Sumatra. In May 2018, the “Shared Vision of India-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” underscored the importance of maritime connectivity between these islands, alongside broader marine resource development objectives. This collaborative effort highlights the existing security framework within the boundaries of ASEAN, encompassing various initiatives aimed at fostering regional security and stability, including joint naval operations (Behera, 2021). Moreover, in Narendra Modi’s administration, strategic engagement with numerous countries is characterized by a pragmatic approach that seeks to balance Nehruvian principles based on Panchsheel and Hindutva values. This approach aims to contextualize India’s ancient Hindu civilizational heritage and leverage the ancient Hindu value of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam to position India as a proactive leader in advancing peace and stability in contemporary global politics (Robby, 2022). The parallel trajectory of the governments of Modi and Jokowi illuminates the similarities between India and Indonesia. Both leaders hail from modest backgrounds in the manufacturing and infrastructure sectors.

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However, while India adopts an assertive and strategic foreign policy to assert its position on the global stage, Indonesia tends to adopt a more inward-looking approach as a regional leader (Gill & Yosari, 2023). Nevertheless, the governments of Modi and Jokowi share a common vision regarding maritime cooperation (Izzuddin & Mohan, 2019). Modi’s visit to Indonesia in 2018 resulted in the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership and a new defense cooperation agreement. Subsequently, India and Indonesia launched a joint naval exercise called “Samudra Shakti.” The Indian Navy was actively involved in humanitarian and disaster relief operations following the Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami in Palu in 2018. Additionally, both countries are exploring potential cooperation in the Air Force domain. Efforts are underway to bolster trade and travel links, particularly between Indonesia’s Aceh Province and India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Furthermore, the two nations are collaborating on joint infrastructure projects, such as the development of the Sabang Port in Aceh Province. This initiative may be perceived as India’s response to China’s BRI (Grossman, 2023). India’s status as a security partner for the US emphasizes the significance of Indonesia’s bilateral relations with India in maintaining favorable ties with the US. Despite this, India also adheres to a good neighborhood policy, although its engagement in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) has been somewhat limited (Baruah, 2022).

The Impacts of China-India Political Tensions on Engagement with Indonesia This section delves into how the political tensions between China and India have influenced the engagement of these two Asian giants with Indonesia. These tensions primarily stem from border disputes, with China asserting claims over Indian territory, as well as the enduring effects of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. On a global scale, China and India have displayed cooperation on various issues, including climate change and global trade negotiations, as well as efforts to restructure global financial institutions. However, frictions have emerged in bilateral contexts. China has brought territorial disputes with India to the Asian Development Bank and has even blocked India’s application for a loan for development projects in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as part of its territory (Pant, 2011).

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In its approach to dealing with China, India has adopted a multilateral strategy, particularly with countries in East Asia. India has strengthened its relations with the US, Japan, and Australia through initiatives such as the Quad, while also seeking to manage territorial disputes with China (Limaye, 2022). While China and India maintain significant relations with Russia, the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine has had less direct effects on China and India in the short term. However, it is crucial to examine the long-term implications, particularly regarding India’s reliance on arms exports from Russia. As Russia may potentially face challenges in supplying arms, India may shift its reliance on the US, which could subsequently alter its approach toward China. Conversely, China may turn to Russia to fulfill its arms supply needs. To navigate the rivalry between China and India in the Indian Ocean, Indonesia has adopted a hedging strategy. This strategy aims to mitigate risks amidst escalating tensions in the Indian Ocean between the two giants, while also avoiding direct conflict with China and India (Munabari et al., 2021). Despite China and India’s collaborative efforts and attempts to stabilize their relationship, the boundary crisis and their overall relations remain competitive and have the potential to escalate into conflict (Madan, 2020).

Chinese and Indian Diaspora and Bilateral Relations with Indonesia The following analysis explores the influence of the Chinese and Indian diaspora in Indonesia on bilateral relations with the country. It is posited in this paper that while diaspora communities may have some impacts, their influence on bilateral relations is not deemed significant.

Chinese Diaspora in Indonesia and Indonesian Diaspora in China The challenge faced by the Chinese diaspora in Indonesia is to mitigate suspicion toward China. The establishment of the Indonesia Diaspora in China (IDN-China) and the Indonesian Students’ Association in the People’s Republic of China (ISA-China/PPI Tiongkok), along with other

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Indonesian diaspora organizations in China, is expected to strengthen relations between the two countries (Muas, 2023). As of 2008, there were three to five generations of Chinese diaspora in Indonesia. However, very few members of the Chinese diaspora are involved in politics or government, instead focusing on significant economic investments. Notably, more than three-quarters of Indonesia’s 20 wealthiest individuals at the time were of Chinese descent. The Chinese ethnic community played a central role in the Soeharto government, albeit amidst some controversies. Additionally, the Chinese community in Indonesia has historical ties to mainland China (Harding, 2008).

Indian Diaspora in Indonesia For over 2000 years, India and Indonesia have maintained profound cultural ties, with some even suggesting that the name “Indonesia” finds its roots in the term “Indianised.” Indian traders have a historical presence in Indonesia, fostering cultural linkages despite the predominantly Muslim population. Shared cultural values, including those from the Mahabharata and Ramayana epics, have been embraced and exchanged between the two nations. Furthermore, India played a significant role in supporting Indonesia’s struggle for independence. In its engagement with Indonesia, India opts for soft power strategies over hard power tactics. Beyond narratives from the Mahabharata and Ramayana, both countries recognize the paramount importance of maritime affairs. Thus, soft power initiatives serve as potent catalysts for fostering bilateral cooperation between India and Indonesia (Vadodara, 2018). In Narendra Modi’s administration, the Indian diaspora worldwide, particularly in Europe, the US, and Singapore, has received increasing acknowledgment, particularly since 2014. Modi has actively engaged with and sought to leverage the Indian diaspora to bolster India’s economic growth. However, the Indian diaspora in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia may have been relatively neglected, especially when compared to China’s adept utilization of its diaspora to enhance its economy (Kumar, 2022). Nevertheless, the Indian diaspora in Indonesia has convened in significant forums in cities like Medan and Jakarta, contributing to the Indonesian economy (Gov, 2013).

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The Indian diaspora in Indonesia appears to be gradually assimilating into Indonesian society. They can freely observe their ancestors’ traditional customs. Unlike the Indian diaspora in Malaysia and Singapore, those in Indonesia seem to be more integrated into social life. However, the Government of India has yet to develop a clear policy for organizing its diaspora in Indonesia. Despite the numerous cultural commonalities between the two countries and the potential for deepening collaboration, a coherent strategy for engaging with the Indian diaspora in Indonesia remains elusive (Azizi, 2014).

Conclusion Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy principle has enabled it to cultivate cordial relations with both China and India, the two prominent Asian powers, without prejudice. Both China and India perceive Indonesia as a valuable potential partner. The rapport between Indonesia and China has deepened notably since President Joko Widodo assumed office in 2014, with this trend continuing into his second term until 2024. The tenth anniversary of their strategic partnership marks a significant milestone in the evolving relationship between the two countries. Similarly, the 2018 signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Narendra Modi and Joko Widodo signifies the deepening engagement between Indonesia and India. While China and Indonesia prioritize pragmatic economic objectives, India and Indonesia share more idealistic security visions and goals. Despite political disparities between China and India, these differences have not impeded their interactions with Indonesia. In addition, despite ongoing border disputes between China and India, as well as India’s security alliance with the US, bilateral relations between China and Indonesia and between India and Indonesia remain largely unaffected. Furthermore, China and Indonesia share common interests akin to those between India and Indonesia. Indonesia’s engagements with these two prominent Asian nations have significantly shaped its pursuit of national interests. Compared to its relations with India, Indonesia’s relations with China have yielded more substantial outcomes, particularly in terms of economic cooperation and infrastructure investment. Nevertheless, Indonesia and India harbor numerous shared visions and potential avenues for future collaboration. Maritime security and the principle of

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non-alignment stand out as common interests that can foster greater collaboration between the two countries. The Chinese and Indian diasporas in Indonesia have showcased strong cultural ties that have influenced bilateral relations. However, the impacts of these ties have varied. The Chinese diaspora in Indonesia wields considerably more economic influence than the Indian diaspora. While the cultural bond between Indians and Indonesians has been formalized through specific cultural groups, the Indian diaspora in Indonesia may need to intensify its engagement to further promote people-to-people diplomacy in bilateral relations with Indonesia.

References Aufiya, M. A. (2022). Indonesia-India Bilateral Relations Under Jokowi & Modi Leaderships: An Indonesian Perspective. International Journal of Qualitative Research, 1(3), 170–187. https://doi.org/10.47540/ijqr.v1i3.407 Azizi, N. (2014). Kebijakan Diaspora India di Asia Tenggara: Corak Strategi Ekonomi dalam Ikatan Identitas Budaya. Paradigma: Jurnal Kajian Budaya, 5(1), 36–52. https://doi.org/10.17510/paradigma.v5i1.163 Bandono, A., Bastari, A., & Suharyo, O. (2021). The Relations Concept of Indonesia-India; Political, Education, and Defense Perspective. Global Journal of Engineering and Technology Advances , 7 (3), 071–082. https://doi.org/10. 30574/gjeta.2021.7.3.0080 Baruah, D. M. (2022). Maritime Competition in the Indian Ocean. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/ 05/12/maritime-competition-in-indian-ocean-pub-87093 Behera, K. (2021). Maritime Cooperation between India and Indonesia in 21st Century: Beyond Historical Reminiscence and towards Strategic Conflux. South Asian History, Culture and Archeology, 1(2), 190–204. Brewster, D. (2011). The Relationship Between India and Indonesia: An Evolving Security Partnership? Asian Survey, 51(2), 221–244. https://doi. org/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.221 Chuong, N. A., Hiep, T. X., Binh, N. T., Hue, N. H., & Thao, N. T. P. (2022). Competitive Strategy of India and China in Southeast Asia and Its Impact on the Region. Croatian International Relations Review, 28(89), 225–245. https://doi.org/10.2478/CIRR-2022-0013 Dodgson, J. (2021). China’s Security and Defence Cooperation in Southeast Asia (MDPD Studies). https://www.kas.de/documents/ Embassy, C. (2004). Sekilas Hubungan Bilateral China and Indonesia. http:// id.china-embassy.gov.cn/indo/zgyyn/sbgxgk/

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Gill, P., & Yosari, G. (2023). Parallel Paths : The Shared Development Strategies of Narendra Modi and Joko Widodo. Gov, M. (2013). Indian Diaspora Engagement Meet held in Indonesia Focus on Extensive Trade and Investment Opportunities. https://www.mea.gov.in/Por tal/CountryNews/1127_Press_Release_-_Indian_Diaspora_Meet_in_Medan_ and_Jakarta.pdf Grossman, D. (2023). India Is Becoming a Power in Southeast Asia. In Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/07/india-southeast-asia-chinasecurity-strategy-military-geopolitics-vietnam-philippines-indonesia/?s=03 Harding, B. (2008). The Role of the Chinese Diaspora in Sino-Indonesian Relations. China Brief. http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/cb_ 008_016a.pdf Harold, S., Grossman, D., Harding, B., Hornung, J., Poling, G., Smith, J., & Smith, M. (2019). The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation: Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific. In The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation: Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific. https://doi.org/10.7249/rr3125 Izzuddin, M., & Mohan, C. R. (2019). Jokowi and Modi’s Budding Bromance. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ jokowi-modi-s-budding-bromance Joint Statement on Deepening Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Indonesia (2023). Kemlu. (2022). Two Countries Twin Park Koridor Kerjasama Ekonomi RI— https://kemlu.go.id/beijing/id/news/20943/two-countries-twinRRT . park-koridor-kerjasama-ekonomi-ri-rrt Kumar, S. (2022). India’s Engagement with Its Diaspora in Southeast Asia: A Neglected Diaspora? In Mayilvaganan (Ed.), ASEAN and India-ASEAN Relations Navigating Shifting Geopolitics (pp. 209–223). Routledge. Limaye, S. (2022). Focused on the “Quad” and Border Disputes With China. Comparative Connections, 23(3), 155–170. https://www.proquest.com/sch olarly-journals/focused-on-quad-border-disputes-with-china/docview/263 4591600/se-2 Madan, T. (2020). Emerging Global Issues: The China-India Boundary Crisis and Its Implications. Muas, T. (2023). Diaspora in Indonesia-China Relationship At the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Era. International Review of Humanities Studies, 8(1). https://doi.org/10.7454/irhs.v8i1.1023 Munabari, F., Bulani, D. F., Ihsan, R., & Larasati, N. U. (2021). Hedging Against Giants: Indonesia’s Strategy Towards India and China in the Indian Ocean. Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review, 6(3), 289–305. https://doi.org/10.15294/ipsr.v6i3.31548 Pant, H. (2011, June). China and India: A Rivalry Takes Shape.

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Parameswaran, P. (2023). The Future of Indonesia-China Relations after Jokowi. In Source: Perspectives on Terrorism, 13, (2). https://www.gisreportsonline. com/r/indonesian-chinese-relations/ Perdagangan, K. (2023a). Neraca Perdagangan Bilateral Indonesia-India Periode I Semester I 2023. Perdagangan, K. (2023b). Neraca Perdagangan Bilateral Indonesia-Republik Rakyat Cina (Vol. 2023). Robby, H. M. F. (2022). India’s Relations with Muslim Countries During the Implementation of CAA/NRC. Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), 156–177. https://doi.org/10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879 Vadodara, N. (2018, May 29). India-Indonesia Relations: Between Soft and Hard Power. The Jakarta Post.

CHAPTER 13

Diplomatic Battleground or Arena for Cooperation? How China’s Scholars Analyze India’s Act East Policy, Indo-Pacific Strategy, and Sino-India Relations in Southeast Asia Ngeow Chow Bing

Introduction China has been the world’s second-largest economy for more than a decade, while from 2013 to 2023, India rose from the tenth-largest to become the fifth-largest economy in the world. With strong economic achievements, both major powers are further investing in the development of their science and technology sectors, pursuing military modernization,

The author would like to acknowledge the partial support provided by the Korea Foundation Policy-Oriented Research Grant (Project Code: 2221100-1463) for the writing of this chapter. In addition, the author would like to thank the feedback provided by the editors and reviewers to an early draft of the chapter.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2_13

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expanding diplomatic horizons, cultivating cultural and soft powers, and engaging in bold initiatives. Southeast Asia stands as a crucial ground for both China and India in their respective ambitions to become great powers. In premodern era, China was for long the most dominant power in East Asia, until the advent of the colonial powers. In the modern period, the People’s Republic of China, as a communist power that came into existence after a violent revolutionary war, instilled both fear and inspiration to various post-independence governments in Southeast Asia, depending on their ideological leaning in the context of the Cold War. Since the late 1970s, China changed course and focused on economic reform and opening up, and since then has long courted the Southeast Asian countries. The investment by the ethnic Chinese capitalists from Southeast Asia (together with those from Hong Kong and Taiwan) in the 1980s and 1990s laid an important foundation for the success of China’s economic development. Since 2000s, with its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), China has emerged as a key manufacturing powerhouse, a large domestic market, and also a source of capital, where both governments and businesses from Southeast Asia have actively tried to benefit from (Sarasin, 2006; Wong, 2006). China has managed to forge a number of major economic cooperative agreements with Southeast Asia, including China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). These agreements cement a strong economic linkage between the two sides. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, one of the two legs of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in Indonesia in 2013. Since then, the BRI has a significant presence in the region, as can be seen in the major infrastructure projects such as the China-Lao Railway, the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail in Indonesia, and the East Coast Rail Link in Malaysia. In addition, China has also been one of the most active dialogue partners of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the robust economic and institutional relationship between China and Southeast Asia is overshadowed by the intractable territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea. The South China N. Chow Bing (B) University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected]

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Sea dispute has proved to be a powerful incentive for maritime Southeast Asian countries to be constantly on guard against China’s advances and adventures in the region. India’s links with Southeast Asia also date back to the premodern times, with significant cultural and political influences among the polities and societies in Southeast Asia. After India gained its independence in 1947, India extended its diplomatic outreach to Southeast Asia, seeking partners and friends among the postcolonial and newly born nationstates in the region (Archaya, 2017, 45–48). Nevertheless, in the ensuing decades, India’s relationship with most of Southeast Asian countries gradually became somewhat aloof, due to different geopolitical alignments during the Cold War. India was closer to the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, while ASEAN countries were opposed to it, in tandem with the United States and China. India’s own conservative economic outlook and approach to international economic exchanges before the 1990s also did not help. However, since the 1990s, and in particular with the pronouncement and formulation of the Look East Policy in 1991, India finally managed to “renew, reactive and reinforce its relations with the countries” (Muni & Mishra, 2019, 177) of Southeast Asia. The Look East Policy was heavily focused on the economy, but there were security and strategic components as well, as India’s defense cooperation with several Southeast Asian countries, such as Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, also emerged. Moreover, India began to participate in the ASEAN-based regional architecture and enhanced the institutional linkages between India and ASEAN. India also actively promoted its own sub-regional cooperative initiatives such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC). Engagement with Southeast Asia was crucial for the transformation of India’s outlook to the world. As suggested by S. Jaishankar, the current India’s foreign minister, “contacts and cooperation with Southeast Asia opened up to India the world beyond it” (Jaishankar, 2020, 176). In 2014, the Look East Policy became the Act East Policy. The Act East Policy continued with much of the substance of the Look East Policy, but with a more comprehensive agenda, wider reach, and deeper commitment. It both signified and reflected the confidence, ambition, and aspiration of the government of the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi for India to play a bigger and more substantial role in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region (Muni & Mishra, 2019).

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The rise of both China and India hence provides historic opportunities but also considerable challenges to Southeast Asia. Among the two, China certainly has secured a much more formidable presence in the region, underpinned especially by the extensive economic exchanges, but also with an increasing robust geostrategic presence. Within the academic literature, the “China factor” is often counted as one of the major drivers for India to launch its Look East Policy to engage Southeast Asia (Faizal, 2003; Fang, 2014; Muni & Mishra, 2019; Tellis, 2004; Zhao, 2007;), since both India and Southeast Asian countries are wary of a more imposing China dominating the Southeast Asian region to the detriment of their own respective interests. This chapter undertakes another perspective that is generally less addressed within the academic literature on the triangular relations among China, India, and Southeast Asia, namely how does China perceive and react to the developments of India’s engagement with Southeast Asia and beyond. It aims to undertake this line of inquiry by studying the writings of the scholars within China’s strategic studies circle and South Asia Studies circle. Analyzing the writings of Chinese scholars has become an important method for foreign scholars and observers to understand the views that are being discussed within China, and to gage the range of perspectives and options available to the Chinese leaders and policymakers, since Chinese scholars increasingly have some channels whereby their views can reach the policy sector (through briefing sessions or internal reports, for examples) (Beeson & Zeng, 2016; Li, 2017; Pu & Wang, 2018). This chapter adopts a similar methodological device. It utilizes the major academic database of China –China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). Articles were searched with keywords such as “India-Southeast Asia relations,” “Act East Policy,” and “Indo-Pacific Strategy.” It should be noted here that priority considerations are given to the premier academic journals, such as Yinduyang jingjiti yanjiu (Indian Ocean Political and Economic Review), Taipingyang xuebao (Pacific Journal ), Nanya yanjiu (South Asia Studises ), among others, as these journals are more influential and published by major academic institutions or think tanks. To keep the discussion more focused on the recent developments, this chapter will mainly select articles from the years between 2018 and 2023, although some relevant articles published earlier will also be included in the following discussions.

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From Look East Policy to the Indo-Pacific Strategy: Chinese Scholars’ Views of India-Southeast Asia Relations Overall speaking, China’s scholars generally have similar views on the broad parameters and patterns of evolution of the relationship between India and Southeast Asia. They also generally have similar suggestions of how China should act or react to the continuities and changes of the India-Southeast Asia relationship. There are no discernable different “schools of thought” so to speak, although some minor differing views do exist. Table 13.1 is a summary of how most Chinese scholars understand the evolution of India’s Policy toward Southeast Asia after the Cold War. Table 13.1 Chinese scholars’ views of the evolution of India’s policy toward Southeast Asia India’s Policy

Policy Focus

Look East Policy, 1991–2003

Mainly economic collaboration, some security cooperation Look East Policy, Economic 2003–2013 collaboration, institutional linkage with ASEAN Act East Policy, Economic 2014–2019/2020 collaboration, security, culture, diplomacy Act East Policy Economic under the collaboration, Indo-Pacific connectivity, Strategy, 2019/ security 2020-today Source Author’s own analysis

Mode of engagement

Targeted countries

Relationship with China in Southeast Asia

Bilateral and multilateral

ASEAN countries in general

Cooperative and complementary

Bilateral but stronger on multilateral (ASEAN)

ASEAN and Asia–Pacific countries

Cooperative and complementary

Bilateral, multilateral, sub-regional

ASEAN, selected, ASEAN countries, Bay of Bengal area, Pacific countries Great powers (the Quad), selected ASEAN countries, ASEAN

Cooperative and competitive

Bilateral, multilateral, sub-regional, minilateral

More competitive and less cooperative

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Look East Policy and Hopeful Optimism In analyzing what factors prompted the Indian government to undertake the Look East Policy in the early 1990s, generally speaking Chinese scholars, not unlike analysts in other parts of the world, also counted “the China factor” as a major factor. However, they also understood that India’s very own domestic drivers likely played a prominent role, perhaps even more so, especially in terms of using the outreach to the economically dynamic Southeast Asia and the broader Asia–Pacific to reinforce the economic reforms underway domestically. The two phases of the Look East Policy (1990s to 2003 and 2003 to 2014) were differentiated by the institutional deepening between India and ASEAN, and also a broader extension from ASEAN to the Asia–Pacific (Li, 2018, 37–38; Ning, 2021, 19–21). While Look East Policy reinvigorated or precipitated some security or defense-related cooperation between India and Southeast Asia, Chinese scholars generally did not look at these developments with concern. Reflective of the hopeful optimism in the early 2010s, Chen Jidong, a Sichuan University South Asia expert, argued in a 2010 article that ASEAN could play a role in linking the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and India-ASEAN Free Trade Area, which would help overcome the lingering mutual aloofness between China and India, and eventually foster closer relations among the three parties here. Hence, India’s Look East Policy was seen favorably by these China’s scholars; it was viewed more from the lenses of opportunity and cooperation rather than through the competitive lenses (Chen, 2010, 67–68). Act East Policy, India’s Great Power Ambition, and the US Factor “India, constituted as she is, cannot play a secondary part in the world. She will either count for a great deal or not count” (Nehru, 1956, 43) –this passage from Nehru’s Discovery of India is often quoted by Chinese scholars to illustrate the long-held India’s ambition to become a “Great Power,” similar in statue and prestige to the United States, Russia or China. The upgrade from the Look East to the Act East Policy in 2014 was interpreted having the symbolic meaning in realizing India’s Great Power dream (Yu, 2017). The geopolitical and strategic significance of the Act East Policy hence was as important as the substance or details of the policy itself, for it was a manifestation of India’s ambition and intention, a sort of the “coming out” proclamation from a

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nation full of potentials, long frustrated by slow progress, but finally broke out its constraints and limitations (Li, 2018, 2022; Ning, 2021). Wang Jingchao, an international relations scholar at Huazhong University of Science and Technology, argued that the Act East Policy aimed to consolidate India’s dominant position in its immediate neighborhood and also to extend India’s “neighborhood” under a more expansive concept, therefore rendering India’s position from being the margin to being the center of Asia’s geopolitics, which also allowed India more freedom and status to shape the regional order in accordance with its interests and preferences (Wang, 2021). The international environment was also highly conducive for India’s upgrade of the Look East Policy to the Act East Policy. Other than the “China factor,” many Chinese scholars also accorded a very significant role to the US in facilitating the emergence of India’s Act East Policy. Accordingly, the expanded and more ambitious role of India in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia–Pacific could only be enthusiastically welcomed and supported by the US (and its main regional allies such as Japan), given the alignment of their common objectives and agenda, whether it was the Pivot to Asia under the Obama administration or the IndoPacific Strategy under the Trump administration. Objectively speaking, a successful Act East Policy was consistent with many US policy objectives in the region and could advance the Indo-Pacific agenda considerably. While it would be too much to suggest that the US as having exercising decisive influences, many Chinese scholars however held the view that the encouragement of the US and its allies made India to have greater confidence and determination in pushing forwards its Act East Policy (Ge, 2015, 20; Li, 2018, 43; Luo, 2019, 78–79; Lou & Yu, 2016, 129–132; Yu, 2017, 26; Xie, 2018, 74). Act East Policy, BIMSTEC, Pivotal States, and the Cooperative-Competitive Dynamics Scholars from China also watched carefully the actual policy content and development of the Act East Policy and their implications for China. While taking note of the continuity between the Look East Policy and the Act East Policy, Chinese scholars noted a number of notable new practices and policy measures under the latter, including the emphasis on connectivity, the reinvigoration of sub-regional frameworks under strong India’s influence or leadership such as BIMSTEC, MGC and the Indian Ocean

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Rim Association (IORA), the launching of initiatives such as the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), the wider reach to the South Pacific countries, the greater attention to cultural and soft power, and the greater engagement in Southeast Asian security issues such as the South China Sea dispute (Li, 2018, 72; Luo, 2019, 71–72; Xie, 2018, 71–73). In addition, Chinese scholars also discerned a pattern of differentiated degrees of engagement in Southeast Asia during the Act East Policy stage, whereby India cultivated and built stronger bilateral relations with a select countries considered by India as top tier partners or pivotal states. Almost all Chinese scholars counted Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam as the top-tier states that India actively cultivated and built strategic relations with (Li, 2022, 134; Luo, 2019, 73–76; Ning, 2021, 25–26).1 Among the various sub-regional frameworks, Chinese scholars paid the most attention to BIMSTEC. Among other reasons, the growing prominence of China’s BRI around India’s neighboring states in both South and Southeast Asia apparently provided the strong impetus for Modi to reinvigorate BIMSTEC and focus on connectivity projects (Dai & Wang, 2019; Lu, 2020; Zhang & Shi, 2022). Chinese scholars reckoned that India’s efforts to help the partnering countries under BIMSTEC were genuine regional public good provision, a testament of India’s “Neighborhood First” policy, and a clear statement of India’s fulfillment of responsibilities as a great power (Zhang & Shi, 2022, 51). There was also the recognition that the success of BIMSTEC would have security implications for India, as it would create a more secure and stable zone for India’s Northeastern states (Dai & Wang, 2019, 96). Chinese scholars also understood that there was certainly the dimension of power rivalry with China in India’s promotion of BIMSTEC. They reckoned that India consider the Bay of Bengal as one of its core area of influence. A successful BIMSTEC will help India to create an India-centric zone that can withheld geopolitical pressure from the North (China) and to dilute the progress of another multilateral cooperation where China is involved –the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor (Zhang & Shi, 2022, 58; Zhang, 2022, 40–42). If BIMSTEC were meant to secure the most geographic proximate areas in India’s east, the selected bilateral ties (Singapore, Indonesia, and 1 Myanmar was sometimes included in the list because of its status as the only Southeast Asian country sharing a land border with India.

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Vietnam) played a key role in advancing and securing and stronger and more legitimate India’s presence in the region, on top of India’s existing partnership with ASEAN at the multilateral level. Among these bilateral relationships, the strongest probably is India-Vietnam relationship, and this is also the one that Chinese scholars have observed most attentively. India-Vietnam relations were already well established during the Cold War years, and the current partnership is secured with a lot more common strategic and geo-economic objectives, including the need to balance against a likely common threat (China) and the building up of a regional supply chain that is less reliant on China but more among themselves. Vietnam was also one of the conduits where India asserted its presence and influence in the South China Sea, in terms of naval port visits and exercises, oil and gas cooperation, and intelligence sharing. In addition, in Chinese scholarly analysis, such kind of growing partnership is also highly encouraged by the US, as a supportive pillar aligned with the security frameworks of the US under the Indo-Pacific strategy (Ge, 2015; Wang & Cao, 2020). Overall, most Chinese scholars viewed the introduction of the Act East Policy as presenting a more complicated picture for China. The competitive element was certainly more pronounced, whether in terms of beefing up BIMSTEC to check China’s influence, injecting itself into the South China Sea issue, or working in tandem and in a more aligned fashion with the US and its allies. Nevertheless, the predominant views among the Chinese writings on the Act East Policy were still about trying to forge common ground and find opportunities for cooperation. Lu Guangsheng, a senior international relations scholar at Yunnan University, suggested that the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) can be linked up with BIMSTEC (Lu, 2020), while others argued that China should respect India’s leadership in BIMSTEC while trying to secure a role to advance common interests and cooperation (Dai & Wang, 2019; Zhang & Shi, 2022). Xie Jing, a researcher affiliated with Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences, contended that even if China’s BRI projects were to come under the direct competition with India’s connectivity projects, China should keep an open attitude and consider the India-led projects as complementary with the BRI and as opportunities for the greater good of economic integration (Xie, 2018, 75). Luo Yongkun, a researcher based at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, also suggested that the greater involvement of India in Southeast Asia under the Act East Policy did not have

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to be a negative factor for China, as India’s participation in ASEAN mechanisms allowed China and India to have opportunities of constant interactions, and ways to find cooperation, including on Myanmar issue, non-traditional security cooperation, maritime dialogue and so forth (Luo, 2019, 82–83). As much as the rationale of the Act East Policy had the balancing and countering of China in mind, it was still a policy aimed more for preserving stability and maintaining pragmatic ties, rather than being an outwardly confrontational policy. Henceforth, China should react to this policy with a calm and rational way, and find the space to increase cooperation and reduce the competitive dynamics with India (Lou & Yu, 2016, 134, 138; Yu, 2017, 29). Moreover, whatever competition between China and India in Southeast Asia, the competition mostly assumed a “soft” form whereby direct conflict and confrontation was unnecessary and avoidable. In the long-term, the prospects for cooperation were still stronger, especially in economic and people-to-people spheres. Accordingly, China should not upset or disrupt the existing mechanisms of cooperation between India and ASEAN, while cultivate ways of connecting these mechanisms with China’s own initiatives, so that every party eventually benefits from more cooperation (Lu & Nie, 2020, 96). Act East Policy Under the Indo-Pacific Strategy: ASEAN-India Divergence, RCEP, the Quad The Act East Policy was introduced during the period where the lexicon of the “Indo-Pacific” was increasingly gaining prominence. Around 2016, the “Indo-Pacific” became a fully endorsed term and strategic concept under the Trump administration, and also in many parts of the world, such as Japan, Australia, Europe, and India. The relationship between India’s Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific Strategy is a puzzling question for many Chinese analysts, and different thoughts have emerged. The first view, articulated by Li Li, an India expert based at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, was that the Act East Policy served as the basis, or preparation stage, for India to conduct its IndoPacific Strategy. The latter is simply an extension of the former (Li, 2018, 43–44). The second view was that there was a more fundamental or deeplevel disconnect between the Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific Strategy. According to Li Zhifei, a scholar at Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, from the Look East Policy to the Act East Policy, ASEAN

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was always the core focus for India, and it was through ASEAN platforms that India increasingly fulfilled its great power dream and ambition. But the Indo-Pacific Strategy was fundamentally about great power diplomacy, and ASEAN no longer provided the stage where India’s great power dream could be realized. The main stage of India’s strategic engagement and diplomatic energy now shifted to new mechanisms such as the Quad. In official rhetoric the Indian government is committed to both the Act East Policy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy, but in reality the former is increasingly overshadowed by the latter (Li, 2022, 139–140). The third view is that the Indo-Pacific Strategy has now enveloped the Act East Policy as one of its two pillars (the other pillar being the great power interactions with the Quad). The two-pillar conception is even clearer with the announcement of the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), which is a further clarification and articulation of India’s Indo-Pacific vision. Wu Zhaoli, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, considered IPOI as the real beginning of a clear IndoPacific Strategy, with two main thrusts –Japan, the US, and Australia and the deepening and Quad as the first thrust, and the Act East Policy and ASEAN as the second thrust (Wu, 2021). Regardless of these differing views regarding the relationship between the Act East Policy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy, almost all Chinese scholars viewed the developments since 2019/2020 as a crucial period where the Act East Policy increasingly became more and more aligned with the US’s strategic objectives against China, under the influence of the Indo-Pacific strategic framework. The direction of the Act East Policy had also therefore become increasingly divergent from its original focus on ASEAN (Li, 2022; Ning, 2021; Zhang, 2022). It is notable that Chinese scholars detected this trend even before the deadly clash on India-China border in 2020, which certainly sharpened and reinforced Sino-Indian adversarial relations and India’s greater strategic alignment with the Quad powers. In Chinese scholars’ view, India’s Indo-Pacific worldview went through an evolutionary process as well. The early vision was more flexible, moldable, accommodative of different possibilities, and was more alike with ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific that was issued in 2019 (Ning, 2021, 30; Wan, 2023, 36). But increasingly in the second term of Modi government, India’s Indo-Pacific vision became clearer, sharper, fixated, and more instrumental for India’s great power ambition, but also less inclusive, and diverged from the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific

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(Ning, 2021, 22–23, 28–29). Ning Shengnan, a researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, argued that for ASEAN, the risk of ASEAN ASEAN centrality being marginalized or undermined under the Indo-Pacific strategic framework is real, but under-appreciated by India. ASEAN, at least the majority of its member states, is still not willing to make a choice between the US and China, and does not welcome the intensification of the US-China strategic competition. But India seems to prefer the ongoing US-China rivalry as a crucial opportunity to leverage its ambition and gain more material support from the US. Hence, while India’s official commitment and rhetoric to the importance of ASEAN remains, the strategic importance of ASEAN and the Act East Policy has declined, compared to the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Strategy (Ning, 2021, 34). There was one minority view among the examined Chinese writings, held by Wan Jia, affiliated with Wuhan University, who asserted that ASEAN and the Act East Policy were still important in India’s strategic thinking as they underscored India’s commitment to the vision of multipolarity and its own tradition of strategic autonomy (Wan, 2023, 41). India’s failure to join the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (RCEP), which happened in 2020, only reinforced the common Chinese view of growing India-ASEAN divergence (Zhang, 2022). In the views of these Chinese analysts, India’s engagement in RCEP displayed the crucial differences between India’s selective openness and economic nationalism and ASEAN’s open regionalism, as well as the great discrepancies between the two sides regarding the role of China. ASEAN sees RCEP as its own creation, with China being the largest member of this trade bloc, and that is a plus point because ASEAN countries need to access the huge Chinese market. But India sees China’s membership in RCEP as a threat and fears China’s domination in RCEP (Zhang, 2020; Zhang & He, 2022; Zhang, 2022). In an article co-written by Zhang Jiadong, a well-known Indian expert at Fudan University, and He Xueqian, a scholar at Yunnan University, it was noted that India’s attitude toward RCEP went from a period of participation to a period of anxiety and rejection, around 2019 (Zhang & He, 2022, 18–19). The timing coincided with India’s more explicit embrace of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The decision by India not to pursue its RCEP membership has created some level of unhappiness within ASEAN, and has led to the belief and perception that India’s self-exclusion from RCEP has further undercut the robustness of its Act East Policy, while signified

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its increasing alignment with the broader framework of the Indo-Pacific such as the Quad. Compared to the earlier three phases (in Table 13.1), unsurprisingly Chinese scholars displayed the least optimism in their writings on the prospects of cooperation in the triangular relations between China, India, and Southeast Asia under the latest phase, the Act East Policy under the Indo-Pacific era (2019/2020 to today). While bilaterally, some ASEAN countries (for example, Vietnam) will do well in maximizing the fruits of cooperation with both China and India, the three parties (China, India, and Southeast Asia/ASEAN) as a whole would not be moving in tandem toward a more productive and cooperative future at the moment. Instead, divergence of interests, strategic mistrust, and competitive dynamics characterize the momentum today. Despite this trend, still there are some Chinese scholars who cautioned about adopting a fully competitive and adversarial policy posture by the Chinese government toward India. While recognizing the competitive dynamics are more pronounced today, they mostly recommended that the Chinese government should remain calm and not over-react, should deepen cooperation with India in Southeast Asia should opportunities become available, and ultimately should focus on forging its own development momentum, which will naturally translate into opportunities for cooperation in the years to come (Wan, 2023, 49; Zhang & Shi, 2022, 61–63).

Conclusion In a speech in the late 1990s, Kavi Chongkittavorn, a former executive editor of the Bangkok-based newspaper The Nation, once envisioned the “brotherly engagement” of China, India, and countries of ASEAN (Kavi, 2004). This hopeful and optimistic vision reflected the prevalent ethos of a different era, where economic development and cooperation were the priorities, notwithstanding some lingering strategic mistrust between the three. But since the late 2010s, geopolitics and strategic considerations have increasingly become much more pronounced in the interactions between China, India, and Southeast Asian countries. How does China look at this change? This chapter attempts to decipher and understand how China perceives and reacts to India’s eastward reach to Southeast Asia and the developments of India-Southeast Asia relations, via the analysis and interpretation of the academic articles of Chinese scholars and think tank analysts. It collects a sample of Chinese

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research articles on India’s policy toward Southeast Asia relations and India-Southeast Asia relations. It aims to capture the core arguments and viewpoints among Chinese scholars, including how the development of India’s policy has had implications for China and how China should react and cope. It should not be automatically assumed that the views of the Chinese scholars represent the view of their government. Nevertheless, examining the scholars’ writings provides foreign observers a window to gage the deliberations, considerations, and policy options that are being discussed within China and that are available to the policymakers and officials in the Chinese government. Overall speaking, up until around 2019/2020, a vast majority of the sampled Chinese academic articles here displayed relatively optimistic view about China-India-Southeast Asia cooperation, even with the acknowledgement that the “China factor” played a crucial role in propelling first the Look East Policy and later the Act East Policy of India. That both the Look East Policy and the Act East Policy had/have some elements of “competition with China” were well reckoned, but Chinese scholars believed that ultimately there was a lot more room and benefits in terms of forging cooperation between China, India, and Southeast Asia than otherwise. Most Chinese scholars believed that with the full and more articulate inception of the Indo-Pacific Strategy under the second term of the Modi government, the nature of India’s Act East Policy also changed. While the term “Indo-Pacific” was already accepted and endorsed in the Indian government’s diplomatic discourse under Modi during his first term, it was only in the second term of the Modi government (since 2019), and particularly also since the deadly clash in the China-India border in 2020, that the Indo-Pacific Strategy became a more operational, sharper, focused, and structured strategy, which eventually overshadowed the Act East Policy. Accordingly, the Act East Policy continued to exist, but it was no longer as meaningful to India compared to the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Strategic competition (with China), strategic alignment with the major powers (the Quad), and divergence of interests (with ASEAN) characterized the Act East Policy under the eclipse of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Chinese scholars described this pattern of evolution, however, without much discussion and reflection on some of the underlying causes, including China’s own actions and behavior. It was the growing confrontation on the China-India border that fundamentally caused the

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reassessment of India’s strategic thinking about China. Chinese scholars rarely attributed actions undertaken by China as causing such reassessment. Chinese scholars also generally attributed the US a lot of influences, whether in terms of India’s upgrade of the Look East Policy to the Act East Policy, or India’s embracing of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The kind of analysis tends to interpret actions by other countries as being encouraged or even decided by the US, and is quite popular (though not necessarily uniformly endorsed) within the Chinese strategic circle. While undoubtedly the US did play important roles, it would be a dangerous misreading on the Chinese part if such kind of analysis developed into the conclusion that only the US was exercising agency and other countries had no agency on their own and only were acting at the behest of the US. Unfortunately this kind of logic has perhaps only strengthened within the Chinese strategic studies community as the US-China strategic rivalry has intensified. Finally, despite the significant deterioration in Sino-Indian relations, there was still a reluctance among Chinese scholars to perceive or prescribe a more forceful and competitive posture against India in Southeast Asia. Instead, they still suggested China should continue to look at Southeast Asia more as an arena for cooperation with India.2 In this context, BIMSTEC or the Bay of Bengal was often suggested as an area where China could play a constructive role, while respectful of India’s leadership, although what was often overlooked by these Chinese scholars was that China’s increased role and presence in the Bay of Bengal could also increase India’s strategic anxiety toward China.

References Adhikari, M. (2023). Framing ASEAN’s Cooperation with India and China over Myanmar Post-coup: A Strategic Resourcing Framework. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 45(2), 216–245.

2 It is noteworthy to mention here that a recent special issue of the well-reputed academic journal, Contemporary Southeast Asia, has shown that in the most sensitive security sphere, countries in Southeast Asia have an interest to engage both China and India so that both could play constructive and even complementary roles in addressing various traditional and non-traditional security challenges in the region (Laksamana & Chong, 2023), including defense modernization (Savitri, 2023), health security (Chen, 2023), the Myanmar crisis (Adhikari, 2023), disaster relief (Gong & Jayaram, 2023), and maritime security (Joshi, 2023).

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Index

A Act East Policy (AEP), 2, 53, 127, 128, 172, 182, 191, 199, 203, 205, 207, 246, 283, 284, 286–295 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 2, 3, 6–8, 10, 30, 64, 68, 69, 101, 116, 118, 123, 170–172, 174, 175, 177, 182, 188–190, 197, 198, 200, 202, 204–206, 228, 238, 246, 251, 264, 282, 283, 286, 290 ASEAN centrality, 8, 69, 175, 188, 202, 292 B Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 5, 49, 50, 64, 77, 79, 80, 83, 96, 118, 120–125, 132–135, 137, 188–190, 193, 195, 199, 202, 203, 205, 213, 243, 244, 247, 267, 282, 289 Brunei Darussalam, 10, 144, 145, 150

C Cambodia, 10, 79, 101, 104, 106, 108, 109, 116, 119–121, 126–128, 131, 132, 136, 137, 196 China-India relations, 194, 207 China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), 49, 50, 122, 123, 136 China’s global rise, 144, 148 Chinese, 3, 4, 7–10, 15, 17–19, 21–27, 33–36, 44, 48–51, 56, 66, 77, 78, 84, 94–97, 107–109, 111, 120–122, 124, 125, 132, 133, 135, 136, 143–161, 169–171, 173, 174, 176–179, 182, 188, 196, 198, 202, 213, 214, 216, 218–220, 224–227, 238, 242, 247–253, 264, 266, 276, 282, 284–295 Chinese Diaspora, 8–10, 16, 20, 22–24, 27, 28, 32, 36, 144, 266, 275, 276, 278

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. Ranjan et al. (eds.), India and China in Southeast Asia, South Asia’s Geopolitical & Strategic Engagement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6903-2

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300

INDEX

Chinese language education, 97, 144, 148, 150, 151, 160, 161 Chinese schools’ relevance, 145, 149, 158 Competitive engagements, 187, 193, 204 Connectivity, 5, 6, 53, 77, 79, 80, 116, 117, 119, 120, 124, 126–129, 131, 133, 136, 137, 188, 189, 191, 199, 201, 203, 206, 273, 287–289 Cultural diplomacy, 8, 91–96, 101, 102, 104, 107, 109–111, 132, 137, 225, 226 Cultural relations, 102 D Defence cooperation, 65, 71, 179, 198 Diaspora, 9, 15, 16, 20, 25, 27, 31, 32, 36, 37, 93, 159, 276 E Evolving relationship, 16, 277 G Geopolitical complexities, 107, 108 Geopolitical interests, 1, 263, 266 I India-China, 3, 181, 182, 195, 203, 247, 291 Indian Diaspora, 8–10, 16, 18, 27, 28, 31, 32, 36, 37, 110, 266, 275–278 India-Southeast Asia relations, 284, 285, 293, 294 Indonesia-China, 242, 244 Indonesia-China-India relations, 239, 244, 249

Indonesia-India, 246 Indo-Pacific, 2, 64, 69, 72, 81, 115, 170–173, 175, 179, 181, 182, 187, 191–193, 195, 196, 199, 202, 203, 212, 216, 221, 228, 232, 254, 283, 290–292, 294 Indo-Pacific strategy, 11, 76, 169, 170, 172, 174–176, 179, 188, 190, 191, 193–195, 202, 205, 206, 239, 284, 287, 290–292, 294, 295 Infrastructural projects, 116, 117, 119, 122, 130–133, 136, 137

M Maritime strategy, 170, 191, 229 Military junta, 41, 42, 46, 47, 52 Myanmar, 2, 10, 41–56, 79, 101, 106, 109, 116, 118, 119, 122, 123, 127–129, 131–133, 136, 250, 290

N Nine-dash line, 7, 168, 170, 216, 226, 251

P Parental perceptions, 145, 148 Philippines, 5, 7, 8, 67, 144, 167–169, 171, 176, 178–180, 182, 192, 194, 196, 212, 215, 216, 219–226, 229–232, 239 Power, 8, 25, 31, 45, 64, 67, 82, 117, 130, 132, 136, 137, 144, 145, 149, 152, 153, 171, 172, 193, 195, 201, 202, 225–227, 241, 245, 250, 273, 276, 282, 288

INDEX

R Rivalry, 4, 5, 8, 189, 190, 196, 215, 228, 275, 288, 292, 295 S Singapore, 2, 5, 8, 10, 15–18, 21–37, 53, 101, 109, 133, 144, 145, 148, 149, 153, 154, 158–161, 243, 276, 277, 283, 288 Sittwe Port, 54, 127, 128 South China Sea (SCS), 7, 8, 10, 53, 64, 66, 72, 73, 78, 80–82, 107, 118, 123, 125, 133, 145, 160, 167, 169, 170, 174, 177, 178, 180, 182, 189, 190, 193–195,

301

201, 203, 206, 212, 218–220, 225, 228, 230, 232, 239, 243, 251, 273, 282, 288, 289 South-East Asia, 54, 192, 203, 205 Strategic collaborations, 132

V Vietnam, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 47, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70–72, 74–76, 78–83, 85, 96, 101, 104, 106–110, 116, 118, 123–125, 127–129, 131–133, 136, 137, 167, 168, 171, 176–178, 180, 182, 192, 196–198, 239, 288, 289