India and Central Europe: Perceptions, Perspectives, Prospects [1 ed.] 9811628491, 9789811628498

Table of contents :
Contents
Notes on Contributors
Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
Outline of Chapters
Economic Engagement
Civil Society Linkages
India-V4+ Engagement
A Prime Ministerial Visit
Towards a Strategic Partnership?
Modi’s Re-engagement
Further Research
References
2 India and Central Europe: From the Margins to the Centre in Three Stages
The Soviet Era, 1947–1989
Hungarian Uprising of 1956
Prague Spring of 1968
Reform Era, 1989–2001
Investment Era, 2001 to the Present
Strategic Era?
References
3 Indian Perceptions of Central Europe
Defining Central Europe
Nehru and Central Europe
Reservations About Indian Independence
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and Embassies
Central Europe in the Ministry of External Affairs
Relations, an Adjunct of Indo-Soviet Relations
Nehru and Soviet Colonialism in Central Europe
The India-China War, 1962
India’s Image in Central Europe till the Early 1970s
Détente in Europe
Central-East Europe in Indian Scholarly Literature
Teaching and Research on Central and East Europe
Teaching of Central European Languages
Perceptions of Trade and Economic Ties
Post-Cold War Perceptions
Perceptions of Trade with Central Europe in the 1990s
Eastward Enlargement of NATO and the European Union
Central Europe in Parliamentary Debates in the 1990s
FICCI’s Perspective
Implications of EU Enlargement
Opportunities in the 2010s
The Confederation of Indian Industry
Modi and Central Europe
Indians Perceptions of Chinese Inroads in Central Europe
Cultural Ties
Conclusion
References
4 India and the Czech Republic
Nehru’s 1938 Visit
The Cold War Years
The Nehru (1955) and Siroky (1958) Visits
The 1960s
Prague Spring
The 1970s and the 1980s
Salient Features of Prime Ministerial Visits
Economic and Trade Relations
The Post-Cold War Era
Havel’s Visit, 1994
Outreach to Asia in the 2000s
The 2000s
Reform of the UN
The Nuclear Suppliers Group
The Modi Years, 2014–2020
President Kovind and Premier Babis’ Visits
Skilled Indian Migrants in Czechia
Defence Cooperation
Weapons for the Nizam of Hyderabad
The Cold War Years
The 1990s
The 2000s
Tatra Trucks
Czech Arms Exports, 2003–2017
Make in India
Training
Cooperation in Nuclear Energy
Parliamentary Questions and Debates
Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia in Indian Academic Literature
Czechoslovak/Czech Perceptions of India
Early Czechoslovak Perceptions
Growth of Indology
Popularity of Tagore
Contemporary Images of India in the Czech Republic
Indian Perceptions
The 1940s, the 1950s and the Early 1960s
The Post-Cold War Era
Cultural Cooperation
Conclusion
Prospects: Towards a Strategic Partnership?
References
5 India and Hungary
Relations During the Cold War
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
The Hungarian Uprising, 1956
Execution of Imre Nagy
The 1960s
India-China War, 1962
The Late 1960s
The 1970s
Kashmir
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, 1974
The Late 1970s and the 1980s
Rajiv Gandhi’s Six Nation Peace Initiative
Economic and Trade Relations
The 1990s
Eastern Opening Strategy, 2010
Orban’s, 2013 Visit
Jaishankar’s Visit, August 2019
Economic and Trade Relations since the 1990s
Foreign Direct Investment
Arms Supplies and Defence Cooperation
Exchange of Visits
Hungarian Arms Exports to India Since the 1990s
Perceptions in Scholarly Literature
The Hungarian Uprising
Indian Perceptions of Hungary
1989 Changes
The 1990s
Parliamentary Debates and Questions
Hungarian Uprising, 1956
The 1990s and 2000s
Cultural Relations
Early Contacts
Cultural Relations during the Cold War
The mid-1990s till 2010s
Teaching of Hungarian Language
Tourism
Indian Students
Ayurveda
Conclusion
References
6 India and Poland
Initial Perceptions
Early Contacts
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
The 1950s
Nehru’s Visit
Polish Economists
Poznan Riots, June 1956
Polish Premier’s Visit, March 1957
The Rapacki Plan
The Rapacki-Menon Meeting
India-China War, 1962
Recognition of Frontiers
Indira Gandhi’s Visit, 1967
The 1970 Polish Riots
The Bangladesh Crisis, 1971
Martial Law in Poland
The Late 1980s
The Post-Cold War Era
Walesa’s Visit, March 1994
Poland Reaches Out to Asia
India and Poland in the 2000s
Defence Cooperation
The 1990s and Early 2000s
Defence Cooperation Agreement, 2003
Joint Working Group on Defence
Major Contracts
Polish Arms Exports to India, 2008–2017
Poland in the Indian Parliament
Polish Riots, 1956
Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968
Wrong Depiction in Maps
Emergency in Poland, 1981
Changes in Eastern Europe
Gomulka and Walesa
Poland Comes up in Debates on the Ayodhya Dispute
Perceptions of Poland in Scholarly Literature
Polish Perceptions of India
Economic and Trade Relations, 2004–2020
The Modi Years
Jaishankar’s Visit, 2019
Conclusion
References
7 India and Slovakia
Perceptions of Velvet Divorce
The Divorce and After
Political Relations
The 2000s
President Gasparovic’s Visit, 2004
Exchange of Visits
Economic Relations
Joint Economic Committee
The 2000s
Trade Relations
Foreign Direct Investment
Defence Cooperation and Arms Transfers
Slovak Exports of Military Material
The 2010s
The Modi Years, 2014–2020
Slovakia in Scholarly Journals
Slovakia in Indian Parliament
Mutual Perceptions
Cultural Relations
Indology
Tourism
Scholarships, the Indian Diaspora
Conclusion
References
8 India's Trade and Economic Relations with the V4 Countries
Introduction
Evolution of Trade and Economic Relations
Trade and Economic Cooperation: Potential for Expansion
India’s Trade in Goods with the V4 Countries
Composition of Trade
Trade in Services
Conclusions and Prospects
References
9 Indian Foreign Direct Investment in  Central Europe
Introduction
Evolving Role of FDI in V4 and India’s Development
Indian FDI in the V4 Countries
V4 as an Investment Attraction
Indian FDI Flows to the V4 Countries
Select Indian FDI in the V4 Countries
V4 Investment in India
Investment Attraction for India
V4 FDI Flows to India
Select V4 Investment in India
Conclusions and Prospects
References
10 Indian Diaspora in Central Europe
Introduction
Origins of Indian Migration to Central Europe
Indians in Poland
Indians in Czechia
Indians in Hungary
Indians in Slovakia
Characteristics of the Indian Diaspora in V4
Conclusions
References
11 India and Central Europe: A Road More Travelled?
Introduction
Economic Cooperation
Political Cooperation
A Regional Approach
The Way Forward
References
Appendix A: India-Czechoslovakia Visits, 1947–1992
Appendix B: India-Czech Republic Visits, 1993–2020
Appendix C: India-Czechoslovakia Agreements, 1949–1991
Appendix D: India-Czech Republic Agreements, 1993–2018
Appendix E: India-Hungary Visits, 1948–2021
Appendix F: India-Hungary Agreements, 1949–2019
Appendix G: India-Poland Visits, 1951–2020
Appendix H: India-Poland Agreements, 1949–2019
Appendix I: India-Slovakia Visits, 1992–2020
Appendix J: India-Slovakia Agreements, 1993–2019
Appendix K: India-Central Europe Agreements, Comparative Chart
Appendix L: Foreign Direct Investment in India, April 2000–March 2020
Index

Citation preview

India and Central Europe Perceptions, Perspectives, Prospects Edited by Rajendra K. Jain

India and Central Europe

Rajendra K. Jain Editor

India and Central Europe Perceptions, Perspectives, Prospects

Editor Rajendra K. Jain Centre for European Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India

ISBN 978-981-16-2849-8 ISBN 978-981-16-2850-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Dedicated to Sunita, Ruchika, Anekant and Jigyasa

Contents

1

Introduction Rajendra K. Jain

2

India and Central Europe: From the Margins to the Centre in Three Stages Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

1

13

3

Indian Perceptions of Central Europe Rajendra K. Jain

29

4

India and the Czech Republic Rajendra K. Jain

79

5

India and Hungary Rajendra K. Jain

137

6

India and Poland Rajendra K. Jain

181

7

India and Slovakia Rajendra K. Jain

235

8

India’s Trade and Economic Relations with the V4 Countries Karina J˛edrzejowska and Anna Wróbel

267

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CONTENTS

9

Indian Foreign Direct Investment in Central Europe Karina J˛edrzejowska and Anna Wróbel

285

10

Indian Diaspora in Central Europe Patryk Kugiel and Konrad P˛edziwiatr

307

11

India and Central Europe: A Road More Travelled? Patryk Kugiel

333

Appendix A: India-Czechoslovakia Visits, 1947–1992

343

Appendix B: India-Czech Republic Visits, 1993–2020

353

Appendix C: India-Czechoslovakia Agreements, 1949–1991

369

Appendix D: India-Czech Republic Agreements, 1993–2018

375

Appendix E: India-Hungary Visits, 1948–2021

379

Appendix F: India-Hungary Agreements, 1949–2019

401

Appendix G: India-Poland Visits, 1951–2020

409

Appendix H: India-Poland Agreements, 1949–2019

429

Appendix I: India-Slovakia Visits, 1992–2020

435

Appendix J: India-Slovakia Agreements, 1993–2019

443

Appendix K: India-Central Europe Agreements, Comparative Chart

447

Appendix L: Foreign Direct Investment in India, April 2000–March 2020

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Rajendra K. Jain was formerly Professor and Chairperson at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has been Director, Europe Area Studies Programme, JNU, and the first Jean Monnet Chair in India (2010–2015). He has also been Adjunct Research Professor, Monash European and EU Studies Centre, Monash University, Melbourne (2010–2015). He was formerly Visiting Professor, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya (2010), and Visiting International Fellow, Monash Europe and EU Centre, Melbourne (2009). He was Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Fellow at the University of Constance (1992–1993, 1994) and Visiting Fellow at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London (1993) and the Foundation for Science and Politics (1995), Ebenhausen, Germany. He has been Visiting Humboldt Foundation Professor at Freiburg, Leipzig and Tuebingen universities and at the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris (2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013). He has also been Visiting Professor at the universities of Sofia, Warsaw and UPFM Barcelona. He was Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) Professor of Contemporary India, Leuven University (2015). He is the author/editor of over 35 books and has written over 150 articles/book chapters. He has travelled extensively in Asia, Europe and North America and has lived in the United States (5 years) and Germany (3 years). He has most recently edited Changing Indian Images of the European Union: Perception and Misperception (Palgrave, 2019), India and the European Union in a Turbulent

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

World (Palgrave, 2020) and India, Europe and Asia: Convergence and Divergence (Palgrave, 2021). Karina J˛edrzejowska is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw. She is a graduate of the University of Manchester (M.Sc. Globalization and Development, 2008), Warsaw School of Economics (M.A. in Finance and Banking, 2007), and an M.A. in International Relations from the Institute of International Relations, Warsaw University 2005. Since April 2017, she is a Governing Board Member and Treasurer of the World International Studies Committee (WISC). She is co-editor of The Future of Global Economic Governance: Challenges and Prospects in an Age of Uncertainty (2020). Patryk Kugiel is the Head of the International Economic Relations and Global Issues Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw. He is a specialist on South Asia and international development cooperation. His research in PISM focuses on the foreign policy of India and Pakistan, the security situation in South Asia, United States and EU policies towards the region, implications of India’s rise on the global order as well as the development cooperation policy of Poland and the EU. He is the co-editor of India-Poland Relations in the 21st Century: Vistas for Future Cooperation (Vij Books, 2014) and India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy (Routledge, 2017). Pramit Pal Chaudhuri is a Distinguished Fellow and Head, Strategic Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre and the Foreign Editor of the Hindustan Times. He writes on political, security and economic issues. He was a member of National Security Advisory Board of the Government of India (2011–2015) and is a member of the Asia Society Global Council and the Aspen Institute Italia, the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Mont Pelerin Society. Konrad P˛edziwiatr is Senior Researcher at the Centre for Advanced Studies of Population and Religion at the Cracow University of Economics and in the Centre for Migration Research at the University of Warsaw. His publications include Transformation of Islamism in Egypt and Tunisia in the Shadow of the Arab Spring (2019), Polish Migration Policy—In Search of New Model (2015), The New Muslim Elites in European Cities (2010) and From Islam of Immigrants to Islam of Citizens (2007).

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xi

Anna Wróbel is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw. She holds a Ph.D. on the policy of liberalization of international trade in services. A Member of the Polish Association of International Studies, she is also the co-editor of The Dragon and the (Evening) Stars: Essays on the Determinants of EU-China Relations (in Polish) (2013) and The Future of Global Economic Governance: Challenges and Prospects in an Age of Uncertainty (2020).

Abbreviations

AAI AI AJT ASEAN BBC BEML BHEL BJP BPO BRI CBI CEECs CEIF CFE CIH CII CMEA COP CPI CPI-M CTBT DRDO EU FDI FICCI FOCs

Airports Authority of India Artificial Intelligence Advance Jet Trainer Association of South East Asian Nations British Broadcast Corporation Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (BEML) Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) Bharatiya Janata Party Business Process Outsourcing Belt and Road Initiative Central Bureau of Investigation Central and East European countries Central Europe India Forum Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Central Institute of Hindi Confederation of Indian Industry Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Conference of Parties Communist Party of India (CPI) Communist Party of India-Marxist Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Defence Research and Development Organization European Union Foreign Direct Investment Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry Foreign Office Consultations xiii

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ABBREVIATIONS

FRY FTA GATT GDP GSQR HICC HZDS ICBM ICCR ICEBF ICSC ICT ICWA IDEB INF INSTC ISIS ITEC JDC JEC JNU JWG LSD MEA MFA MOA MoU MP MTCR MW NATO NPT NRI NSG OCI OECD OEM PIO PNE PPP PSP SAARC SIPRI

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Free Trade Agreement General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product General Staff Qualitative Requirements Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Indian Council for Cultural Relations India-Central Europe Business Forum International Commissions of Supervision and Control Information and Communication Technology Indian Council of World Affairs International Defence Exhibition Bratislava Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces International North-South Transport Corridor Indian School of International Studies Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Joint Defence Committee Joint Economic Committee Jawaharlal Nehru University Joint Working Group Lok Sabha Debates Ministry of External Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of Association Memorandum of Understanding Member of Parliament Missile Technology Control Regime Mega Watt North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Proliferation Treaty Non-Resident Indian Nuclear Suppliers Group Overseas Citizenship of India Organisation of Cooperation and Development Original Equipment Manufacturer Persons of Indian Origin Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Purchasing Power Parity Praja Socialist Party South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

ABBREVIATIONS

SMEs SS SWJN TCS TOI TSI UN UNCTAD V4 WMD WTO

Small and Medium Enterprises Second Series Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Tata Consultancy Services Times of India Three Seas Initiative United Nations United Nations Conference of Trade and Development Visegrad 4 Weapons of Mass Destruction World Trade Organization

xv

List of Figures

Graph 9.1 Graph 9.2 Graph 10.1 Graph 10.2 Graph 10.3 Graph 10.4 Graph 10.5 Graph 10.6 Graph 10.7 Graph 10.8 Map 10.1

Outward Indian FDI in V4 Countries, 2006–2018 V4 FDI in India, 2006–2018 Indian Citizens residing legally in V4 countries, 2010–2018 Foreigners Residing Legally in Poland with Valid Residence Permits, 2010–2018 Growth of the Indian Community in Poland, 2010–2019 Immigrants in Czechia, 2009–2019 Citizens of India Residing in the Czech Republic, 2008–2018 Foreign Citizens Residing in Hungary (without asylum seekers), 2009–2019 Number of Valid Residence Permits for Third Country Nationals in Slovakia, 2009–2019 Indian Citizens in Slovakia, 2009–2019 Indian Citizens in Poland in 2014 (Green) and 2019 (Red)

294 298 312 314 315 319 319 322 324 324

317

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 9.1 Table 9.2

India’s Trade with Central Europe Export of Czech military equipment to India, 2003–2017 Hungarian export of arms and military equipment to India, 1992–2018 Export of Polish military equipment to India, 2008–2017 India–Slovakia Trade, 2000–2019 Export of military material by Slovakia to India, 2004–2017 India–V4 trade in Goods: Exports, 1996–1997 to 2018–2019 India–V4 Trade in Goods: Imports, 1996–1997 to 2018–2019 India–V4 Trade in Services: Exports, 1996–2017 India–V4 Trade in Services: Imports, 1996–2017 Outward Indian FDI in V4 countries, 2006–2018 (in million US dollars) V4 FDI in India, 2006–2018

39 103 155 208 247 252 274 275 279 279 293 299

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Rajendra K. Jain

From the mid-1950s till the end of the Cold War, India’s relations with the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) were an adjunct of Indo-Soviet relations. Having been let down by the West, India turned to the Soviet Union in 1955 as a partner in economic and industrial cooperation. The CEECs followed suit after Moscow offered economic, financial and technical assistance for large public sector projects. There was no serious conflict of interest and almost identical views on most international issues. The CEECs also did not have any colonial hangovers and were indifferent to some of the issues that troubled West European lobbies when dealing with India such as human rights, Kashmir, treatment of minorities and so on (Sibal, 2019: 78). Central Europe figured in parliamentary debates only on critical issues which received wide publicity. During the relatively well-informed debates on the Hungarian uprising (1956) and the Czechoslovak crisis (1968), the Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s government faced substantial criticism. No debates on Central Europe took place subsequently in the Indian Parliament though references to individual countries did resurface periodically. The West usually gave no credit either to the Indian Parliament

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_1

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or to Indian leaders for ‘speaking plainly, though in guarded language, on Hungary or Czechoslovakia. The restraint was dictated by the need to be helpful’, but it was not ‘appreciated by either side’ (Damodaran, 2000: 114–115). In the post-Cold War era, India and the CEECs viewed each other from opposite directions: the Visegrad 4 looked towards the European Union and India focused on its key partners in Western Europe. As Central Europeans aligned their foreign policy with those of the EU, India and the CEECs began to have divergent worldviews and differences on how they perceived the world and the challenges that confronted it. There was little that brought them together. Indian foreign policy took time to adjust to the changing realities in Central and Eastern Europe. Mutual indifference led to slim political interaction and meagre peopleto-people ties. For nearly a decade-and-a-half (1990–2004), Central European countries concentrated on gaining admission in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Their preoccupation with a ‘return to Europe’ and transatlantic relations left them little time or interest in India. New Delhi too showed little economic and strategic interest in the region given the radical transformation of the socioeconomic and geopolitical milieu in Central Europe. Mutual neglect for nearly two decades led to a sharp decline in political contacts as well as people-to-people ties. The communist glue had withered away though some observers felt that clichés about post-communist societies in the older generation still persisted in India. The CEECs began to rediscover India after they gained membership of the European Union in 2004 and more consciously after the 2008 financial crisis. India also took time to recalibrate its policies. Today, India and Central Europe have a convergence of views on issues like terrorism, reform of the United Nations and non-proliferation. There were however differences over Western interventions in Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), crises in Syria and Ukraine in which India had no geopolitical interest or stake.

Outline of Chapters India’s postwar relationship with Central Europe, argues Pramit Pal Chaudhuri in the second chapter, has undergone three distinct phases. The first phase, during the communist period, was a subset of India’s relations with the Soviet Union. The collapse of communism left New

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Delhi with almost no points of engagement with the newly democratic Central Europe. This was compounded by the fact both India and Central Europe began a process of reforming their socialist-oriented economies that continued through the 1990s. The early 2000s saw the beginnings of a new economic relationship with a few Indian firms beginning to invest in countries like Poland. Today, Indian firms and their European subsidiaries are both large investors and have a footprint in almost all Central European states. The combination of Brexit, the rise of China and India’s expanding geoeconomic interests have led the Narendra Modi government to contemplate relations with Central Europe through a more strategic lens though New Delhi is doing what it can in terms of its capabilities. Chapter 3 examines Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s interwar and postwar perceptions of Central Europe. It describes how the geographical scope of the Central Europe Division of the Ministry of External Affairs gradually expanded to comprise thirty countries at present. It goes on to examine Indian perceptions of Central Europe in the early 1990s and discusses how Central Europe figured in parliamentary debates. It assesses the changing perspectives of the region by India’s two leading corporate chambers. The chapter provides a succinct overview of Indian scholarly literature on economic and political relations as well as the evolution and current state of teaching of contemporary Central Europe at Indian universities. In conclusion, the chapter examines New Delhi’s proactive re-engagement with Central Europe with greater vigour and the Indian commentariat’s perceptions of Chinese inroads in Central Europe. Chapter 4 discusses political relations between India and Czechoslovakia from 1947 to 1992. It outlines how the Czech Republic’s preoccupation with securing membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union left it with little time or political interest for nearly a decade in cultivating relations with India. It goes on to examine renewed efforts by the Czech Republic to reach out to Asia in order to enhance trade and foreign direct investment and the broad contours of the relationship in the 2000s. It discusses how Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic figured in Lok Sabha) debates/questions from 1947 to 2019 since the agitated debates over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. After making a detailed examination of defence cooperation, the chapter discusses how Czechoslovakia has been perceived by Indian scholars and the commentariat, Czech

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perceptions of India as well as cultural relations between the two countries. Chapter 5 examines the vicissitudes of political and economic relations between India and Hungary during the Cold War. It critically assesses the changes in the relationship since the early 1990s and the upswing in relations with Hungary’s ‘Eastern Opening Strategy’ (2011). It examines parliamentary (Lok Sabha) debates since Independence and highlights how Hungary figured in parliamentary questions and debates over the years. It discusses Indian perceptions of Hungary in one of the leading English national dailies as well as Indian scholarly literature. It makes a detailed study of defence cooperation as well as cultural relations between India and Hungary. In conclusion, the chapter assesses prospects for the future. The next chapter examines the initial Indian perceptions of Poland during the 1930s and the 1950s and goes on to discuss the vicissitudes of political relations during the Cold War and the perceptions of Poland in Indian scholarly literature. The chapter assesses the transformation of the relationship in the post-Cold War era. It discusses Polish efforts to reach out to Asia at the turn of the millennium and the motivations and impact of the Polish Strategy towards Non-European Developing Countries (2004). It goes on to examine the relationship in the 2000s and how Poland figured in the Modi government’s renewed re-engagement with Central and Eastern Europe. The chapter examines Lok Sabha debates from 1947 to 2019 to highlight how Poland figured in parliamentary questions and debates since the Polish uprising of 1956. It critically examines the nature, problems and prospects of defence cooperation between India and Poland. After evaluating Polish and Indian perceptions of each other, the chapter discusses prospects for the future. Chapter 7 examines Indian perceptions of the Velvet Divorce, which led to the establishment of two separate states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Politically, Slovakia has remained largely peripheral to Indian foreign policy concerns because of its small size, low volumes of trade with visits being confined to Deputy Ministers. It discusses the slow evolution of the relationship in the 2000s and during the Modi years (2014–2020) and presents a brief overview of economic and trade relations as well as FDI whose high point is a £1 billion investment by the Tata Group’s UK subsidiary in the ‘Detroit’ of the region. It examines Lok Sabha debates

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INTRODUCTION

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to illustrate now marginally Slovakia figured in the parliamentary deliberations since 1993. It discusses defence cooperation as well as cultural relations between India and Slovakia. After a brief historical review of economic relations between India and Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, Karina J˛edrzejowska and Anna Wróbel examine the legal framework for current cooperation and assess the salient features of their economic and trade relations over the past decade. The lack of a more coherent Indian strategy, they argue, has enabled China to surpass India in the region. In conclusion, the chapter identifies potential areas for enhanced trade. Given its population of over 60 million, highly developed human capital with relatively cheap cost of labour, and its strategic location, Central Europe presents itself as an attractive location for Asian investments. In Chapter 9, Karina J˛edrzejowska and Anna Wróbel provide an overview of Indian foreign direct investment in the four Central European countries as well as Central European FDI India. It discusses the rationale for Indian economic engagement in the region and identifies the key challenges faced by Indian investors and looks at prospects for the future. Based on the analysis of the secondary sources as well as new statistical information, big data and qualitative research (including participant observations, in-depth interviews and a survey), Patryk Kugiel and Konrad P˛edziwiatr analyse the origins and growth of Indian communities in Central Europe and provide a detailed overview of the key features of the Indian diaspora in each of the Visegrad 4 countries. They explore their role in their new ‘homes’, assess their impact on India-Central Europe relations and look at future trends and significance in India’s relations with the region. In the concluding chapter, Patryk Kugiel makes a case for greater Visegrad 4-India engagement. As India’s global ambitions grow, he argues, it requires more trusted partners in Europe to promote its interests in relation to the European Union, the United States or in multilateral fora like the United Nations Security Council or the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Unlike many developed Western nations, the V4, he adds, have similar views to those of India on a number of international challenges from climate change to terrorism. New Delhi, Patryk argues, should take greater cognizance of the fact that the V4 send 106 MEPs (out of a total of 751) to the European Parliament as well as one non-permanent member to the UN Security Council. With growing

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recognition of India’s importance by the EU and the V4’s desire to develop a more balanced approach towards Asia, he maintains, prospects for improved India-Central Europe relations have improved. The chapters are followed by a dozen appendices, which have been painstakingly collected from diverse sources. These would be of immense value to scholars, students and policy-makers as a ready reference. The lists of bilateral visits (cultural, economic, political and military) as well as agreements owe their present form to a determined scouring of diverse sources, including periodicals, newspapers, official publications, journals of India and the Central European countries as well as reports and publications of governmental ministries, Departments and agencies concerned. I have sought to ensure the correctness of the details by cross-checking them carefully with those appearing in official sources and have retained only those that I have found reasonably accurate.

Economic Engagement The low levels of trade and investment present an opportunity for both India and the Visegrad Four to widen and deepen economic ties. The V4 tend to be viewed by many Indian companies as a bridgehead for investments in the much larger West European economies. Indian IT software majors have been ramping up their operations in the region to tap the intellectual calibre and language skill-sets of the engineering talent of the region to tap West European markets. Indian entrepreneurs tend to look to bigger markets in Western Europe and recognize that there are structural limits to what is possible in Central Europe. As the storehouse of niche technologies, Central European technologies are more attuned to Indian conditions. As repositories of frontier technologies and expertise in clean technology, skill development and education, the Visegrad 4 are complementary partners for many flagship programmes of the Modi government. To a certain extent, the challenge is of overcoming lack of information and simply making the connection. The first India-Central Europe Business Forum (ICEBF) (now IndiaEurope29) has not led to a structured business dialogue and continues to face the perennial problem of lack of adequate follow-up. While the idea is inherently good, it is too large a body bringing together 30 countries under the geographical scope of the Ministry of External Affairs’ Central Europe Division with diverse interests from very different regions and with different expertise.

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Civil Society Linkages Since the early 1990s, historical narratives have ceased to be relevant in India-Central Europe relations because for modern young Indians, the Cold War is largely forgotten. Traditional postwar linkages between India and the Visegrad Four have long withered away; traditional sensitivities of history with India are no longer evident. The problem of direct connectivity between V4 and India has been overcome to a certain extent with the introduction of direct LOT Warsaw-Delhi flights in September 2019. Greater civil society linkages will contribute to removing traditional clichés and stereotypes of post-communist societies of Central Europe and foster positive images of a rapidly growing region. Bollywood is being actively wooed. ‘All it needs is one film and that can change the dynamics’ as the film ‘Kick’ did in the case of Poland. Some years ago, one Central European embassy even had ‘a three-page rate card’ for technical experts, camera hire, etc.1 A further fillip to tourism can be expected since Bollywood films have now been shot in all V4 countries.

India-V4+ Engagement Central Europe has not figured prominently in Indian foreign policy priorities for decades even though it has become politically stable and economically prosperous due to mutual indifference and neglect. As a political grouping, the Visegrad countries have lost their earlier distinctiveness and failed to get enough political attention in the capital. All of them except perhaps Poland are political lightweights within the European Union. New Delhi tends to perceive them as having little impact on EU foreign policy and of being of marginal importance in India-EU relations since they tend to get submerged in EU structures. Observers caution that the shared direction of the V4 within the EU is not ‘stable or permanent’ and that ‘separate interests and issues disrupt the coherence of the group and weaken it in terms of unified promotion of these interests in the EU’ (Bauerova, 2018: 134). The Slovak Presidency of the Visegrad Group in 2014 proposed a new V4+1 format for India’s engagement with the region. This led to the firstever engagement at the Joint Secretary level with the V4 in Bratislava 1 Conversation with a former Joint Secretary (Central Europe), MEA.

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on 25 February 2015. This interaction was envisaged as a supplementary feature of bilateral and India-EU interactions. From the outset, it was obvious that the periodicity of such an interaction was not likely to be institutionalized, though there were many areas of mutual benefit (Chhabra, 2015: 7). This format was not in response to the 16+1 (later 17+1) promoted by the Chinese. The two were ‘independent processes’, with India seeking to do what it could in terms of its capabilities.2 The initial V4+1 meeting was followed up in 2015 when the Minister of State for External Affairs V.K. Singh met the V4 Foreign Ministers on the sidelines of the eleventh GLOBESEC Security Forum in April 2016. No meetings in the V4+ India format have been held thereafter.

A Prime Ministerial Visit Central Europeans have often referred to the deficit in reciprocal visits from New Delhi. A long-standing, genuine complaint of the CEECs has been that there has not been a prime ministerial visit to the region for 33 years, i.e. ever since Rajiv Gandhi visited Hungary in 1988. Prime ministerial visits abroad are undoubtedly of much consequence for the projection of foreign policy. High-level visits do make a difference and create much momentum in focusing attention on a country and/or region. They also create institutional pressures to line up deliverables for the visit. In the past, a prime ministerial visit to the region was constantly pushed back apparently because of the inherent lack of substantial economic linkages and the absence of any political imperatives. A prime ministerial visit, MEA mandarins generally argued, generally takes place when a relationship has reached ‘a particular level; one has to wait for it to mature’. In fact, a prime ministerial visit is ‘the culmination of a relationship; a PM does not go there to merely cut the ribbon’.3 The Ministry of External Affairs has only recently taken cognizance of Central Europe as ‘a strong voice’ and the Visegrad Group as ‘a robust force’ within the European Union (India, MEA 2020a: 25; 2021: 20). There is growing realization in New Delhi that a prime ministerial visit to the region is long overdue. There was considerable expectation that a prime ministerial visit to Central Europe would take place in the

2 Private conversation with a former Joint Secretary (Central Europe), MEA. 3 Private conversation with a former Joint Secretary (Central Europe), MEA.

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second half of 2020, but the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed it to late 2021 or even later. Alternately, a prime ministerial meeting with V4 counterparts can also take place on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in the near future though a visit to the region would send across a better message. A V4+ India summit at the prime ministerial level would undoubtedly give the relationship a special focus and highlight the region’s importance.

Towards a Strategic Partnership? India does not presently have a strategic partnership with any Central European country. After the conclusion of a strategic partnership with China (December 2011), Poland had proposed a strategic partnership with India. The MEA however felt that relations ‘had not yet reached that level’. After all, a strategic partnership is ‘the last mile’, which is often ‘the most difficult’.4 There was the problem of justifying a strategic partnership to higher authorities as it usually gave rise to questions of prioritization, human resource constraints, bureaucratic overload and the quantum of trade. For the first time, India recently concluded the fifth strategic partnership in Europe with Denmark. Called a ‘Green Strategic Partnership’, it has been described as ‘a mutually beneficial arrangement to advance political cooperation, expand economic relations and green growth, create jobs and strengthen cooperation on addressing global challenges and opportunities’ (India, MEA 2020b). This functional strategic partnership, with an Action Plan yet to be worked out, envisages cooperation through relevant Ministries, institutions and stakeholders is illustrative of New Delhi’s efforts to make strategic partnerships more result-oriented. India has also begun recently to explore new geographical spaces and configurations. The MEA and the Confederation of Indian Industry recently organized the first India-Nordic-Baltic Conclave (5 November 2020) with ministerial participation from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland and Latvia on renewable energy and clean technologies and the factories of the future, on Artificial Intelligence and blockchain-led transformation, on supply chain and logistics, on fintech (Jaishankar, 2020). This innovative engagement tends to improve prospects of a strategic

4 Private conversation with a former Joint Secretary (Central Europe), MEA.

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partnership currently under discussion with the Czech Republic and possibly Poland provided the right synergies and mutual benefits can be identified with Warsaw.

Modi’s Re-engagement India’s re-engagement of Central Europe by the Narendra Modi government in recent years reflects how the region is slowly being gradually recognized as a region of promise and potential. In view of a proactive Chinese overdrive around the world, New Delhi has sought to show its flag in a kind of competitive diplomatic engagement in consonance with its resources and capabilities to reach out to various countries where few ministers or senior officials had travelled for decades. Between 2014 and 2020, there nearly a dozen visits by senior Indian dignitaries, including the President and the Vice-President, to Central and Eastern Europe took place. These were not merely goodwill/ceremonial visits. They required a certain degree of preparation and led to tangible results. The robust engagement with the region could also have possibly been the result of the fact that for the first time since Independence, S. Jaishankar is the first Foreign Secretary/Foreign Minister to have spent two cycles in Central and Eastern Europe—in Budapest (1990–1993) and as Ambassador to Prague (2001–2004). Central Europe is an important constituency for the reform of the United Nations Security Council and support of the Indian candidature. With the Visegrad 4 being members of all four export control regimes, their support has been crucial to secure membership since decisions in them are by consensus and a single negative vote can stop any move in favour of India. While the V4 do not often form a unified bloc or vote in unision in the EU or other global forums, they can be of interest in raising India’s profile (Kugiel & Upadhyay, 2018: 138). In the future, the primary focus will continue to be on economy and trade. Different Visegrad Group countries will develop their relationships with India at different speeds, with varying levels of engagement and commitment, and with different trajectories and results.

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Further Research For decades, India-Central Europe relations has been an under-researched and neglected area of research. There are many gaps in existing scholarly research. There is a glaring lack of archival research on India-Central Europe relations. The National Archives of India contain recently declassified MEA documents, which primarily comprise monthly reports from Indian Embassies, diplomatic cables, transcript of conversations involving foreign leaders or interlocuters as well as policy memoranda by officials based in Delhi and overseas embassies. No research has yet been done on the archives of the Ministry of External Affairs, which have been recently digitized, but access continues to be problematic. Similarly, archives of the Central European countries have yet to be fully explored to provide insights into V4 perceptions and approaches towards India. Secondly, there is hardly any research on the making of India’s foreign policy towards Central Europe and vice versa, including the role of various ministries as well as the dynamics and constraints of inter-ministerial interaction and coordination. Thirdly, apart from a few studies of Indian perceptions of Poland (Kugiel, 2019), there are no meaningful studies of how mainstream Indian newspapers, electronic media and elites perceive Central Europe and vice versa. Fourthly, scholars continue to be seriously hampered by the lack of primary source material on the subject. A comprehensive documentary study on India-Central Europe relations would undeniably encourage further research. The editor and the contributors hope that this pioneering volume would foster greater scholarly research of India’s relations with Central Europe, which has been an orphaned subject for far too long.

References Bauerova, H. (2018). The V4 and European integration. Politics in Central Europe, 14(2), 121–139. Chhabra, R. (2015, March 3). Keynote Address by Joint Secretary (Central Europe), Ministry of External Affairs, at a seminar on ‘India and Central Europe’ organized by the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Damodaran, A. K. (2000). Beyond autonomy, India’s foreign policy. Somaiya Publications. India, MEA. (2020a). Annual report 2019–2020. New Delhi.

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India, MEA. (2020b, September 28). Joint statement for India-Denmark green strategic partnership. Retrieved 12 May 2021 from https://mea.gov.in/bilate ral-documents.htm?dtl/33069/joint+statement+for+indiadenmark+green+str ategic+partnership. India, MEA. (2021). Annual report 2020–2021. New Delhi. Jaishankar, S. (2020, November 5). Remarks by foreign Minister at the IndiaNordic-Baltic CII Enclave. Retrieved 12 May 2021 from https://mea.gov. in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33165/eams+remarks+at+the+india++nor dic++baltic+cii+conclave. Kugiel, P. (2019). Indian perceptions of Poland. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Changing Indian images of the European Union: Perception and misperception (pp. 151– 154). Palgrave Macmillan. Kugiel, P., & Upadhyay, D. K. (2018). India and Central Europe: Post-cold war engagement. International Studies, 54(1–4), 127–143. Sibal, K. (2019). India and the European Union: Perceptions and misperceptions. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Changing Indian images of the European Union: Perception and misperception (pp. 61–78). Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 2

India and Central Europe: From the Margins to the Centre in Three Stages Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

Independent India’s relationship with Central Europe has undergone three distinct phases. The first phase, during the communist period, was a subset of India’s relations with the Soviet Union. The second phase was a political and economic vacuum. It followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc. New Delhi had almost no engagement with the newly democratic Central European states. Both India and Central Europe began a process of reforming their socialist-oriented economies at this point that continued through the 1990s but gave them minimal ability to engage with each other. The early 2000s saw the beginnings of a third phase centred around a new economic relationship with a few Indian firms investing in countries like Poland. Today, Indian firms and their European subsidiaries are both large investors and have a footprint in almost all the major Central European states. The combination of Brexit, the

P. Pal Chaudhuri (B) Head, Strategic Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre, New Delhi, India Foreign Editor, New Delhi, India

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_2

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rise of China and India’s expanding geo-economic interests in Europe are leading the Narendra Modi government to contemplate relations with Central Europe through a more strategic lens. If these fructify, it could mark a fourth phase in India-Central European relations.

The Soviet Era, 1947–1989 India’s Central European policy under its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was strongly coloured by his perspective of the Soviet Union. For a number years, Nehru also looked to the Yugoslav ruler, Josip Broz Tito, for insights on the region (Dixit, 1998: 324). In his first decade in office, Nehru had a relatively benign view of communism and a suspicion of the United States which skewed his understanding of the nature of Soviet control over the Central European states. All of these contributed to his weak response to the Hungarian uprising of 1956. His daughter and later prime minister, Indira Gandhi, responded equally ambivalently to the crushing of the Prague Spring of 1968 but by then the geopolitical bond between New Delhi and Moscow had become much stronger and overrode any other consideration. Overall, however, Central Europe barely figured in India’s foreign policy calculations while the communist governments of the region expressed much rhetorical support for India as an echo of what was being said by their superiors in the Kremlin. Nehru’s Autobiography, Glimpses of World History and letters all indicate that he saw the Russian Revolution of 1917 that led to communist rule as a point in a spectrum that went back to the French Revolution. In one letter, he wrote that the popular demand for freedom in the French and Russian Revolutions were an inspiration for India’s own slogan of ‘Inqilab zindabad!’ (Long live the revolution!) against British colonial rule. In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, he often expressed his admiration for communist ideology and theory of history, though over time he began to separate this from the practice of Soviet communism per se. Nehru was to become increasingly concerned about the fault lines that kept erupting within the international communist system and their impact on the Indian communist movement and the political stability of India as a whole. But his theoretical admiration for communism meant he was initially unconcerned about the Soviet occupation of Central Europe and did not see it as an example of the colonialism that he had spent his life opposing. After all, he argued, other countries recognized the Central

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European communist regimes and small countries being dominated by a larger power was common in other parts of the world (Nayudu, 2018).

Hungarian Uprising of 1956 Nehru’s uncertainty about the nature of Soviet rule in Central Europe was reflected in his response to the popular revolt in Hungary against Soviet occupation. This was the high watermark of nonalignment and Nehru, if anything, still seeing much of the world in terms of the colonial era and hence wary of Western views and actions. When the uprising began, Nehru declined to support any initiative taken by the United States making India the only democratic government not to criticize the Soviet Union’s brutal suppression of the uprising. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower privately said Nehru was ‘falling for the Moscow line—buying their entire bill of good’ (Nayudu, 2015). The Indian prime minister was hampered by the illness of Ambassador K. P. S. Menon, who was based in Moscow and concurrently accredited to Budapest, and delays in the arrival of Embassy reports about what was taking place. Nehru expressed concerns that the uprising represented ‘fascistic elements’, worried that Moscow was being internationally isolated, and corresponded mostly with Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Yugoslavia’s President Tito. Bulganin obviously gave the Soviet line on what was happening. The United States fretted that Nehru was so much under the premier’s influence that they referred to the Indian prime minister’s ‘Bulganinisation’. Having kept his country out of the Warsaw Pact and free of Soviet control, Tito initially expressed support for the Hungarians but later worried the unrest would spread and undermine his own one-party system (Nayudu, 2017). As Nehru became more familiar with what was happening in Hungary, his position shifted. New Delhi became more critical of the Soviet Union but declined to align directly with the statements and actions of the United States. Thanks in part to telegrams from the Indian embassy sent by the Charge d’Affaires M. M. Rahman, Nehru came to accept that the Hungarian protestors were ‘nationalists’ rather than reactionaries. Indian diplomats were allowed to join the international chorus demanding that the United Nations be allowed to send observer teams to Hungary, along with humanitarian supplies. But Nehru decided that nonalignment meant he should avoid condemnation of the Soviet Union. India would be best served by ‘leaving the door open’ to Moscow even while taking a principled stand. It could be said that India’s response to the 1956 uprising was to provide a template for Indian foreign policy reactions to other

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Cold War eruptions in the decades to come (Nayudu, 2019). But the aftermath of the Hungarian uprising did make Nehru more sceptical of the Soviet Union.

Prague Spring of 1968 Indira Gandhi was prime minister at the time of the Soviet Union’s military intervention against the reformist Alexander Dubcek Government in Czechoslovakia. The prime minister was public in her criticism of the intervention at home, declaring in the lower house of parliament, ‘The right of nations to live peacefully and without outside interference should not be denied in the name of religion or ideology’. At the UN and diplomatically, however, India held back from attacking the Soviet Union, abstaining from a UN vote against the military action. Indira Gandhi was influenced by a number of factors. Unlike Nehru’s confusion about events in Hungary, she does not seem to have any doubts as to the nature of Moscow’s actions. Indira Gandhi was more influenced by hard-nosed interests. One, India had a five-year defence cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union to develop the country’s military capacity following the defeat of the 1962 border war with China. Two, Washington was mired in its war in Vietnam and signalled a broad disengagement from South Asia by allowing Moscow to take the lead in mediating the 1966 Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan. Three, Indira Gandhi had shifted the country leftward both politically and economically. She increasingly saw the Indian left parties as political allies—though not all Indian communists were necessarily supportive of the suppression of the Prague Spring (Nayudu, 2017). In the coming decades, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, India’s foreign and military closeness to Moscow only increased. This, in turn, meant New Delhi came to see its Central European policy as little more than a subset of its relationship with the Soviet Union. Economic relations with the Soviet-led Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, better known as COMECON, were frugal with minimal trade and negligible investment, especially if the Soviet component was removed. As COMECON members set artificial government-determined export and import targets rather than basing their trade on demand and competitiveness and payments were done through rupee-rouble exchange, the economic engagement was wholly driven by government diktats. An example of this was East Germany’s secret police, the Stasi, getting

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involved in the promotion of trade with India (Tatke, 2017). The collapse of the Soviet bloc wiped out the rupee-rouble payments system and took the entire state-driven economic relationship between India and Central Europe with it.

Reform Era, 1989–2001 The breaking of the Berlin Wall, subsequent end of the Soviet-backed regimes in Central Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union also ended India’s engagement with Central Europe. When Yugoslavia came apart at the seams from 1989 to 1992, New Delhi was only further isolated from the region. Having had little in the way of people-to-people relations or economic ties with this region, India would have to rediscover and rebuild relations with the swathe of countries ranging from Latvia to Bulgaria almost from scratch. But India and Central Europe shared a common economic experience during this time. Namely, they both began the painful and difficult process of shedding the socialist economic policies they had followed since the 1950s and 1960s and sought to become more externally oriented and market driven. However, this meant the two sides had even less capacity to invest in a set of relationships that were not seen as central to the wrenching economic and diplomatic efforts being undertaken. The former members of the Soviet bloc were single-mindedly driven by a desire to join Western organizations like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union and a plethora of new bodies created to ease the post-Soviet transition of Europe. The government of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao was consumed by the need to open up the crisis-ridden Indian economy and find a new foreign policy path with the end of the Cold War. Central Europe was not seen as contributory to either of these goals. Prime Minister Rao’s foreign policy had two pillars. One was to attract foreign investors to put a bet on the struggling Indian economy. The other was to find interlocutors who could help India to foster a new, postCold War relationship with the United States. The first goal led him to visit Germany, his first overseas trip as prime minister, and then later shift to Southeast Asia and South Korea in what was to become labelled India’s Act East policy. The second goal led him to upgrade India’s relationship with Israel, a country he believed would be best suited to facilitate the development of a new post-Cold War relationship with the United States.

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‘Prime Minister Rao realised that the road to Washington DC ran through Tel Aviv’, writes his biographer (Sitapati, 2015). Israeli diplomats say he was also interested in Israel as an alternative source of weapons as Russia slipped into disarray.1 Central Europe was simply not part of this worldview. India was quick to recognize the newly democratized regimes of the Central European countries but had no vision beyond this. Rao even visited two Central Asian countries en route to Russia for a state visit to kick-off a new era of relations with these ex-Soviet republics but gave Moscow’s European satellite countries a miss. Central Europe, for its part, was in the throes of its own economic restructuring as it sought to purge itself of Soviet era planning and state dominance. Most of the former Soviet satellites were completely focussed on bringing their economies, security arrangements and political systems in line with the standards set by the EU under the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, membership in the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe and the requirements for adopting the Euro (European Commission, 2014). India and much of the world barely registered in all this. The economic restructuring that many of these countries had to undergo—the term ‘shock therapy’ was used to describe some of the more drastic versions—was far more painful than the dislocation India endured from its own economic reforms (see Blanchard, 1991). The collapse of Yugoslavia and the ethnic wars that followed were another distraction. Much of the Central European membership, including many of the spinoff nations born out of the former Yugoslavia, left the Nonaligned Movement to join NATO. It says something about how distracted India was that this barely registered. Normal diplomatic relations began to be restored from about 1992 onwards. Indian diplomats who served or dealt with Central Europe say there was minimal ill-will over New Delhi’s support for Moscow. It was largely understood India had been a marginal player in that part of the world. When Lech Walesa, leader of the Solidarity movement which helped overthrow Poland’s communist regime, came to India in 1994 on a five-day presidential visit he bluntly asked the then Minister of State for External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh, ‘Tell me where was India all these 10 years?’ Singh responded by saying, ‘I want to talk to you about the future, not the past’. Singh admitted India no longer had any contacts in

1 Private conversation with senior Israeli diplomat, New Delhi, December 2006.

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the region and had been caught unawares by what happened (Rasgotra, 1998: 154). However, Walesa made it a point to visit Jodhpur to see the palace murals in Umaid Bhavan painted by Stefan Norblin, a Polish artist who fled to India during the Second World War and stayed there for a number of years rather than live under Stalinist rule (Marek, 2017; Hamilton, 2019). Similar acts of support by individual Indians are still remembered. For example, M. N. Rahman, the Indian Charge d’Affaires during the Hungarian uprising took the initiative to intervene with Moscow to save the life of one of the participants of the uprising, the intellectual Arpad Goncz. Goncz was imprisoned for six years, but survived and later served as Hungary’s president from 1990 to 2000. Goncz later expressed the view he was saved by India’s diplomatic intervention and made it a point to have a delegation to India personally meet Rahman, by then retired (Mohan, 2013). Similarly, H. P. Singh, a second secretary at the Indian Embassy in Prague resigned in protest against the weakness of Indira Gandhi’s response to the Soviet repression and achieved minor folk hero status.2

Investment Era, 2001 to the Present India’s minimal trade relationship with the communist governments of Central Europe more or less collapsed with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The end of the rupee-rouble trade was the primary reason as well as the economic disruption experienced by all the countries concerned at the time. Local political upheavals such as the breakup of Czechoslovakia, India’s main trading partner in the region during the Soviet era, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia added to the economic malaise. In the early 2000s, two companies with Indian connections arrived in Poland with investments on their mind. One was ArcelorMittal, the largest European steel maker but with an indirect Indian link through the Calcutta origins of its owner, Lakshmi Mittal. ArcelorMittal bought the newly privatized Polskie Huty Stali steel company in 2004 and today owns about 70% of the country’s entire steel sector. The other firm was Infosys, one of the largest Indian software firms, which set up a business process outsourcing and information technology outsourcing centre in 2 Interview with Ronen Sen, former Indian ambassador to Russia and the United States, who happened to be in Prague during the crisis, New Delhi, 2 August 2020.

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Lodz in 2007. By the time it celebrated its first decade in Poland, Infosys had 2,700 employees and was being praised by Lodz business leaders for having established their city’s reputation as a centre for business services (infosysbm.com, 2017). The two firms served as trailblazers for the third and most recent phase in India’s relationship with Central Europe, one that revolves around investment. In the decade before the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent global financial crisis, there was a surge in Indian overseas corporate investment. Indian firms, buoyed by double-digit growth at home and hefty profits, began expanding overseas. The EU, India’s single largest trading partner, was an obvious point of interest. Indian manufacturing industries and information technology service companies, looking to invest in countries that gave them access to the EU market but also offered low taxes and low labour costs, began looking at Central Europe (Pradhan, 2008). The Czech Republic was the largest investment hub for India in Central Europe, in part because of corporate relationships that went back to the communist era and when Czechoslovakia existed. One well-known Czech firm, the shoe firm Bata, has had a commercial presence in India since the British Raj. Czech strength in machinery, engineering and automobile components and its close integration with German industry have been major attractions for Indian firms. Indian investment to the Czech Republic largely reflect this competitive edge and now include a number of major Indian heavy industrial manufacturers. Today, Indian firms like Motherson Sumi Systems, Lloyd Electric and Engineering, and Ashok Leyland have plants there. Indian FDI totalled $4.1 billion in 2017, up from $1.67 billion in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2020; India, Embassy in Czech Republic, 2020). In Poland, thanks perhaps to Infosys’s success there, has seen a more diversified portfolio of investment with a substantial portion in the service sector including other IT service firms like Wipro. In manufacturing, Indian investment includes firms like Videocon, Escorts, Strides Arcolab, Reliance Industries, Essel Propack, Zensar Technologies and Berger Paints. Indian FDI into Poland is in the region of $3 billion (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020a). The second chapter in the investment story was the spread of Indian firms into Hungary, Slovakia and to a lesser extent Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. Hungary has been a remarkable investment story for Indian firms with Indian FDI rising from $9 million in 2012 to $1.5 billion in

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2018. In 2014, India was the largest greenfield investor in the country. Hungary has seen the entry of a large number of Indian IT service companies and specialized industrial acquisitions by Indian firms. Indian IT firms who have set up in Hungary include Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Tech Mahindra, Genpact and Cognizant. The industrial investors include Crompton Greaves, Apollo Tyres, SRF and Bakony Wipers. There have been other, smaller stories of success including Indian small-scale agricultural investments in Bulgaria and two-way pharmaceutical investments with Croatia (India, Embassy in Hungary, 2020; Business Standard, 2019; India, Embassy in Slovakia, 2020). One set of Indian firms that have developed a footprint throughout Central Europe were the pharmaceutical companies, many of which had a presence dating back to the Soviet era. All of the major Central European countries have Indian pharmaceutical investments with Sun Pharma/Ranbaxy and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals having the largest presence. The most recent accelerator for Indian investment has been the Brexit referendum, the 2016 vote by the British public in favour of having their country leave the EU. Britain has traditionally been overwhelmingly the favourite destination of Indian corporate investment to Europe. Before the Brexit referendum, Indian firms invested more in Britain than they invested in the rest of Europe combined. This was despite trade relations between India and Britain being relatively weak. Indian firms used Britain as their gateway to the rest of the EU, a role threatened by the Brexit vote and the uncertainty about the future trade relationship between Britain and the EU. Many new Indian investors began to consider relocating to the European continent. At the very least, the larger Indian firms began adopting a ‘Britain plus one’ strategy: even if they retained their offices or factories in Britain they would set up alternative centres of economic activity in another EU member-state. The most prominent consequence has been the decision of Jaguar Land Rover to build its newest factory in Slovakia, reflecting the country’s emergence as a major automobile manufacturing hub. The $1.6 billion factory opened up in Slovakia in 2018. As it is carried out by the British firm, the investment is tabulated as British FDI into Slovakia even though Jaguar Land Rover is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tata Motors (Deutsche Welle, 2019). There has been some Central European investment in India as well, albeit on a smaller scale than the flow of investments in the other direction. Much of this has been by Czech firms, reflecting its advanced

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industrial sector. Skoda Auto and Skoda Power have high brand recognition in India. Vitkovice Machinery Group, ZKL Bearings, Bonatrans and Tatra are among the other prominent Czech firms that have invested in India. A variety of Polish firms, representing about $600 million in investment, operate in India (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020b). Two decades after the communist era, Central European governments now see India primarily as a major source of investment and, to a lesser extent, trade in their countries. The larger more advanced countries of the region, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, have become aggressive about wooing Indian companies and developing people-to-people exchanges. The largest Indian chambers of commerce have released studies about the potential of business in Central Europe (FICCI, 2015; Deloitte-CII, 2014). Indian students, businessmen and tourists are actively wooed and a number of airlines now have direct flights between Central Europe and India. Ambassadors from countries like Poland and Hungary which have seen the rise of nativist, right-wing governments privately stress that none of the anti-immigrant sentiment in their countries has ever been directed against Indians. Some of these countries have also seen a minor resurgence in the study of Indian culture and language, an echo of the strong academic tradition of Indology that has existed in Central Europe for centuries.

Strategic Era? Indian foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made a deliberate attempt to reach out to parts of the world that have traditionally received little attention from the Indian Government. This outreach has included part of the Indian Ocean littoral region, the Pacific islands, segments of Africa and the smaller countries of continental Europe. This reflected the Modi government’s view that India’s interests had reached the point the country needed to engage beyond the same 20 or so countries that dominated New Delhi’s worldview. The Brexit vote and Britain’s imminent departure from the EU has also led to a re-evaluation of India’s overall European policy. Until the Brexit vote, India was satisfied in having Britain serve as its primary interlocutor in Europe with subsidiary relationships with France and Germany. London having removed itself from the picture, New Delhi began to contemplate a European policy in which it maintained several points of

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engagement. Modi signalled as much, and India officials confirmed that this was the intent, when he visited France, Germany, Spain and Brussels during his first major European tour.3 He also held a Nordic summit that incorporated the three Scandinavian countries, Finland and Iceland. The evidence points to Modi planning a similar regional outreach for Central Europe, probably built around the four Visegrad countries plus a few other Southeast European countries. India had started moving up the diplomatic escalator towards that goal with simultaneous state visits by Indian President Ram Nath Kovind in 2018 to Bulgaria and the Czech Republic and Vice-President Venkaiah Naidu to Serbia and Romania, followed by Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar visiting Hungary and Poland in August 2019 (Roy Chaudhury, 2018). The joint communique issued after Jaishankar’s visit to Poland stated that ‘he conveyed India’s readiness to engage more actively in the region of Central Europe, which should have a positive impact on the overall EU-India cooperation. He also expressed India’s desire to engage with Poland in the Visegrad format’ (India, Ministry of External Affairs, 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic that broke out in early 2020 put a hold on any further movement in this direction and it remains to be seen whether the pandemic’s economic and political consequences will allow the Modi government to pick up the baton again. There has been considerable commentary on Indian interest in countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Balkans and Central Europe in general. While the Modi government has been active in opposing the BRI and other Chinese strategic moves in the economic and technological space, India has preferred to concentrate on providing alternatives to BRI projects in the Indian Ocean and parts of the Maritime Silk Road, the seaborne element of the BRI. It has announced plans for joint infrastructure projects with Japan, for example, in the Bay of Bengal area, Africa and the Indian Ocean island states. But India has treated the BRI in Central Asia and Europe as beyond its scope of activity and best left to other countries to handle. India may eventually carry out investments that thwart the ability of China to expand its influence in Central Europe and the Balkans, but this will be a secondary goal of any such activity in that region (Jaishankar, 2018; Roy Chaudhury, 2018).

3 Private conversations with senior Indian diplomats, New Delhi, June 2017.

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Any Indian interest in working with a Visegrad plus formula in Central Europe would be primarily driven by its desire to develop new points of influence in Europe and within the EU. The Polish Foreign Minister, Jacek Czaputowicz, made this implicit in the 2019 joint communique where he ‘affirmed Poland‘s commitment to actively shape the EUIndia agenda to the benefit of both parties’ (India, Ministry of External Affairs,2019). A secondary interest would be to garner support for some of its multilateral goals including a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and expanding its climate-oriented programmes like the International Solar Alliance and the ‘One Sun, One World, One Grid’ proposal. The Modi government’s strongest advocate for a more strategic approach to Central Europe is believed to be Foreign Minister Jaishankar, a person who began his diplomatic career in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, is fluent in Russian and has a working knowledge of Hungarian. India will also remain unwilling to adjust its strong, if waning, relationship with Russia because of Central European concerns. New Delhi’s response to the Russian occupation of Crimea4 had echoes of its response to the Hungarian uprising. Nonetheless, the Modi government represents the first attempt by New Delhi to conceive of a larger relationship with Central Europe that treats the region as an autonomous element within India’s foreign policy rather than a footnote of its relations with other great powers.

References Blanchard, O. et al. (1991). Reform in Eastern Europe MIT Press. Business Standard. (2019, 27 August). ANI, Hungary seeks more investments from India. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.business-standard. 4 Without explicitly invoking non-alignment, Prime Minister Modi had taken an identical position on the problem of Crimea, an erstwhile Russian-majority province of Ukraine that broke away and declared its intention to join Russia in early 2014. Modi has said that India’s effort will be ‘to sit together and talk, and to resolve problems in an ongoing process’. Indeed, Modi has also referred to nations who ‘want to give advice’ and has obliquely said, ‘they too have sinned in some way’. The remarkable parallel with 1956 is Nehru’s utter disdain for the West’s censure of Russia because Britain and France had simultaneously attacked Egypt in what came to be known as the Suez Canal Crisis. In both cases then, and now again vis-à-vis Crimea, India has made it amply clear that her position on any issue was rooted in her assessment of the issue, and was independent of Western or American thinking.

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com/article/news-ani/hungary-seeks-more-investments-from-india-119082 701518_1.html. Deloitte-CII. (2014, February). Trade and investment relations between India and Central Europe: A study of opportunities. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www2.deloitte.com/in/en/pages/tax/articles/tradeand-invest.ment-relations-between-india-and-centraleurope.html. Deutsche Welle. (2019, 30 April). Jaguar Land Rover Defender assembly moved from UK to Slovakia. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.dw.com/ en/jaguar-land-rover-defender-assembly-moved-from-uk-to-slovakia/a-485 52552. Dixit, J. N. (1998). Across borders: Fifty years of India’s foreign policy. Picus Books. European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation. (2014). 25 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain: The State of integration of East and West in the European Union. European Commission, 2014. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://ec.europa.eu/research/socialsciences/pdf/policy_reviews/east-west_integration.pdfFICCI. FICCI. (2015). India and Central Europe: Harnessing business complementaries. October 2015, Retrieved July 20, 2020 from http://ficci.in/spdocument/ 20704/India-&-Central-Europe-Harnessing-Business-Complementarities.pdf Hamilton, B. (2019, January 8). The Maharaja of Jodhpur. The renaissance of portrait. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from http://basiahamilton.blogspot.com/ 2008/10/maharaja-of-jodhpur.html. India, Embassy in Czech Republic. (2020, July). India-Czech Republic economic relations. eoiprague.gov.in. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.eoi prague.gov.in/docs/1594892647India-Czech%20Economic%20Relations% 20(1).pdf. India, Embassy in Hungary. (2020). India-Hungary relations. eoibudapest.gov.in. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.eoibudapest.gov. in/page/india-hungary-relations/. India, Embassy in Poland. (2020a). Indian Companies in Poland. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.indianembassywarsaw.gov.in/eoi.php?id=com_ india. India, Embassy in Poland. (2020b). Polish Investment in India. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.indianembassywarsaw.gov.in/eoi.php?id=pol_inv estment. India, Embassy in Slovakia. (2020). India-Slovakia economic relations. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from http://www.eoibratislava.gov.in/economic-relations.php. India, Ministry of External Affairs. (2019, August 29). Joint statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of India and Poland. Retrieved July 20, 2020 https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/31777/joint+sta tement+of+the+ministers+of+foreign+affairs+of+india+and+poland.

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Infosysbpm.com. (2017, October 10). Press release. Infosys BPO in the news. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.infosysbpm.com/newsroom/inf osys-bpo-in-the-news/Pages/poland-dc-10th-anniversary.aspx. Jaishankar, D. (2018, September 5). Here’s why Central and Eastern Europe may become an area of promise for India. Brookings India. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/heres-why-central-and-eas tern-europe-may-become-an-area-of-promise-for-india/. Kepa, M. (2017, March 8). Rediscovering Norblin: The pole who filled Indian palaces with art. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://culture.pl/en/article/ rediscovering-norblin-the-pole-who-filled-indian-palaces-with-art. Marek, K. (2017, March 8). Rediscovering Norblin: The Pole who filled Indian palaces with art. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://culture.pl/en/article/ rediscovering-norblin-the-pole-who-filled-indian-palaces-with-art. Mohan, A. (2013, July 16). India and Central Europe: A road less travelled. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm? 21946/india+and+central+europe+a+road+less+travelled. Nayudu, S. K. (2015, January 12). Response to Russian interventionism: India and the questions of Hungary 1956 and Crimea 2014. Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/swapnakonanayudu. Nayudu, S. K. (2017, July). When the Elephant swallowed the hedgehog: The Prague spring and Indo-Soviet relations 1968. Cold War International History Project (Working Paper No. 83). Woodrow Wilson Centre. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/when-the-ele phant-swallowed-the-hedgehog-the-prague-spring-indo-soviet-relations-1968. Nayudu, S. K. (2018, November 14). Nehru—The professor and the revolutionary. The Wire. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://thewire.in/history/ jawaharlal-nehru-russian-revolution. Nayudu, S. K. (2019). The Soviet peace offensive and Nehru’s India 1953–1956. In M. Bhagavan (Ed.), India and the cold war (pp. 36–56). Penguin India. Pradhan, J. P. (2008). Rise of Indian outward FDI: What implications does it hold for host developing countries? scielo.org.mx. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid= S0188-33802008000200002. Rasgotra, M. (1998). Rajiv Gandhi’s India: A golden jubilee retrospective. Foreign policy: Ending the quest for dominance. Vol. 3. Rajiv Gandhi Foundation. Roy Chaudhury, D. (2018, August 28). With eye on China’s Belt Road Initiative, India to step up economic partnership with Eastern, Southern Europe to counter China’s BRI. Economic Times. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://economictimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-plans-to-

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boost-economic-partnership-with-southern-europe-to-counter-chinas-bri/art icleshow/65564128.cms?from=mdr. Sitapati, V. (2015). Half-Lion: How P.V. Narasimha Rao transformed India. Penguin India. Tatke, S. (2017, July 23). The Stasi’s interest in India: From love affairs to Indira Gandhi. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.livemint.com/Sunday app/ioNmA2kbrCPOOVao2aZWCP/The-Stasis-interest-in-India-From-loveaffairs-to-Indira-G.html. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2020). FDI Bilateral statistics. unctad.org. Retrieved August 20, 2020 from https://unctad.org/ Sections/dite_fdistat/docs/webdiaeia2014d3_IND.xls.

CHAPTER 3

Indian Perceptions of Central Europe Rajendra K. Jain

The foreign policy choices and behaviour of actors are considerably influenced by images. The ‘reputation, the reflection of the reality of power in the mind of the observers’, Morgenthau points out, can be ‘as important as the reality of power itself. What others think about us is as important as what we actually are’ (Morgenthau, 1965). Perceptions in fact determine behaviour. In turn, perceptions are also ‘influenced by behavior’ (Sridharan, 2001: 86–87). Images and perceptions of other nations provide ‘the basic framework within which the conduct of international relations and conflict resolution takes place’. Thus, international perceptions and attribution function as ‘a justificatory mechanism for the rationalization of many foreign policy decisions or actions taken in favour of or against another nation’ (Movahedi, 1985: 19). This chapter examines Indian perceptions of Central Europe during the Cold War and from the 1990s to the present. It begins with a discussion of the genesis of the term ‘Central Europe’ and discusses how Jawaharlal Nehru used it during and after the interwar period. It examines Indian efforts to establish diplomatic relations and embassies in the region. It traces the evolution and the gradually expanding geographical

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_3

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scope of the Central Europe Division in the Ministry of External Affairs to comprise 30 countries at present. The chapter provides a broad overview of the scholarly literature on India-Central Europe economic and political relations as well as the evolution and current state of teaching of Central and Eastern Europe as well as languages at Indian universities. It critically evaluates post-Cold War perceptions of trade and economic ties with Central Europe in the 1990s and deals with Indian reactions to the 2004 eastward enlargement of the European Union. It discusses how Central Europe figured in parliamentary debates and discussions from 1947 to 2019 and assesses the changing perspectives of the region by the two prominent corporate chambers. It assesses the proactive engagement of Central Europe under Prime Minister Narendra Modi as well as Indian perceptions of the Chinese inroads in Central Europe, especially the Belt and Road Initiative and the 17+1 format.

Defining Central Europe The states of Central and Eastern Europe were described by a Czech novelist as the ‘kidnapped continent’: geographically in the middle, culturally in the West and politically in the East. A clear demarcation of Central Europe has been somewhat difficult because its borders have changed considerably in the past with the result that the ‘cultural borders do not completely coincide with the political ones’ (Agh, 1998: 3). The idea of Central Europe has been one that is ‘more political and cultural than geographic in origin. It is a region that does lie in the middle of Europe...but [its] geographical form has not been its most important characteristic’ (Lewis, 1994: 8). The term ‘Central Europe’ was first developed by Metternich and subsequently by Friedrich Naumann in his book Mitteleuropa (1915) (Ash, 1990; Judt, 1990: 24). This was generally perceived as ‘a code word’ for a German sphere of influence from the Rhine to the Danube. The Poles associated it with the German Drang nach Osten (Drive to the East) (Rupnik, 1990: 256–257). During the Cold War, there was no ‘middle’ and the term fell into disuse. The term most commonly used during the postwar period was ‘Eastern Europe’ to denote Central European as well as Warsaw Pact countries. With the end of Communist regimes in East Europe in the 1980s, the term ‘Central Europe’ again came into vogue, and the Hungarians, Czechs and Poles started calling themselves Central

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Europeans (Roskin, 1994: 11). The main dividing line between Central (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and Western (Bulgaria, Romania), according to a Polish scholar, was determined by their allegiance to either the Roman Catholic or the Orthodox cultural sphere (Stepanovsky, 1992; 75). For nearly 45 years after 1945, the term ‘Central Europe’ was almost ‘entirely absent from the political parlance of Europe’; the Cold War division into East and West obliterated it (Ash, 1999). In the post-Cold War era, some scholars ‘used the term “East Central Europe” to cover all countries between Germany and Russia, but this term is neither geographically precise nor politically self-evident’ (HydePrice, 1996: 6). East Central Europe is ‘more usually defined as the four countries of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic/Czechia and Slovakia’ because it denotes ‘a common regional identity which distinguishes them from their many neighbours’, but the fact remains that geographically, culturally and historically, it not possible to give a precise geographical definition of the region (Hyde-Price, 1996: 7). The ‘myth of the pure Central European past is perhaps a good myth’ (Ash, 1986). In the 1990s, the term was used in a somewhat divisive way to distance the Visegrad states from other countries which were viewed as laggards in implementing neoliberal reforms, which were politically and economically unstable, often defined religiously by Christian Orthodoxy, and located further east than Poland and the Baltic states, and south of Hungary and Slovenia (Buchowski & Cervinkova, 2015: 2–3). The ‘negative stereotype’ of Eastern Europe, two Central European scholars argue, was invented by Western Europe during the Enlightenment and was used time and again thereafter. With the 2004 eastward enlargement of the European Union, the border of the Union moved further to the east. As a result, that ‘previous East—now Central—Europe ceased to denote the otherness of the West. In other words, that otherness moved further to the East’ (Moskalewicz & Przybylski, 2018: 3–4). Belief in the idea of Central Europe has generally been considered to have been a key factor in the establishment of the Visegrad Group (V4) though a considerably more important one was the conviction that a smaller, more homogenous group would expedite EU membership. In recent years, V4 countries seem to have different notions about the idea of Central Europe.1 The initial goal of the V4 was to create ‘a new Central 1 For Poland, it was ‘a kind of a balance’ between Russia and Germany. For Slovakia, it was ‘a chance to abandon political isolation’ and to become a full-fledged member of the

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Europe’. Despite some scepticism, the project has survived and has been probably ‘the most coherent and successful incarnation of the Central European idea in recent history’ (Rupnik, 2016: 58). The 2008 financial crisis and the Ukranian crisis posed major challenges to Visegrad cooperation. Thus, Visegrad is ‘good for fair weather cooperation—it works well when you are focusing on accession to European Union, when you have shared goals to cooperate on’. However, when crises come, the divisions of Visegrad become far more obvious (Rupnik, 2016: 59). In this volume, we use the term Central Europe politically to denote the Visegrad Four, viz. Poland, the Czech Republic/Czechia,2 Hungary and Slovakia.

Nehru and Central Europe When Jawaharlal Nehru visited Europe in 1927 to attend the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels, he was able to establish contacts with socialist and nationalist leaders from all over the world. In his Glimpses of World History, he makes numerous references to Central Europe. Within a few months of Adolf Hitler becoming Chancellor in 1933, Nehru wrote: ‘The defeated countries—Germany and the small countries of central Europe—were very badly hit by the post-war conditions, and their currencies collapsed, ruining their middle classes’ (Nehru 1962: 908). He depicted Central Europe as ‘a heaving mass of petty nations suffering in the grip of the slump and from the after-effects of the World War, and now thoroughly upset and frightened by Hitler and his Nazis. In all these Central European countries... Nazi parties are growing’ (Nehru, 1962: 979). As a result of Hitlerism and in fear of it, he remarked, ‘all the States of Central Europe and the East which had so far bitterly hated each other drew nearer to one another’—the Little Entente, Poland, Austria, Hungary, and the Balkan States. There had even been talk of an region. The other three—Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary—had aspirations to be a leader of the V4. As the biggest country with the highest economic growth, Poland seems to be ‘a natural leader’ of the grouping. However, the idea is not shared by others (Kuzelewska et al., 2015: 158). V4 cooperation became virtually politically insignificant in 2008 when a major gas crisis revived it, but by 2014 a conviction grew that these countries did not actually share the same fundamentals anymore (Przbylski, 2015: 73, 75). 2 The official name of the country continues to remain as Czech Republic, but Czechia became the official shortened geographic name in 2016 (BBC, 2016).

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economic union between them. These countries, and notably Poland and Czechoslovakia, had also become ‘more friendly towards Soviet Russia since the Nazi eruption in Germany’ (Nehru 1962: 980). Nehru, who had visited Europe in 1936 and 1938, reacted strongly against the ‘make-believe’ policy of appeasement. It was at his insistence that the Indian National Congress criticized every act of aggression by the fascist powers (Damodaran, 1997: 120–122, 140–141; Nanda, 1995: 43). ‘How could India’, he was convinced, ‘hold aloft the banner of freedom and democracy in Czechoslovakia or Poland while she was herself in bondage?’ (cited in Nanda, 1995: 136–137) India was ‘quite sensitive to the Central European tragedy’ and German attempts to annex the ‘Polish Corridor’ (Damodaran, 1990: 47). During the postwar era, Jawaharlal Nehru occasionally used the term ‘Central Europe’ while referring to issues relating to the region, which he regarded as one of the three principal areas of tension and possible conflict (apart from the Far East and the Middle East) (Nehru, 1956a: 306). On several occasions, he remarked that the problems of Central Europe were ‘intimately connected’ with that of Germany. However, most Indian commentators, scholars and the official statements have generally used the term ‘East Europe’ to signify all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and not just ‘Central Europe’.

Reservations About Indian Independence Newly independent India had created ‘a favourable image’ in the minds of the people of East European countries because Indian national leaders had expressed support for the rights of small states, and deplored the indifference of major powers like Britain to the growing threat of Nazi totalitarianism before the Second World War. Joseph Stalin regarded independent India as a bourgeois ally of Anglo-American imperialism and anti-socialism. East European ‘Communist elites’ entertained reservations about the genuineness of Indian independence because of its continued membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and because the vast majority of Indian leaders disliked Communism (Rajan, 1964: 300). Reservations also persisted because India had attained Independence by a peaceful transfer of power and not by the ideas of violent revolution then prevalent in East Europe. This fostered the ‘fantastic idea’ that the new Indian rulers continued to be subservient to their erstwhile imperialist masters. As a result, some East European Communist parties erroneously

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placed their reliance on the revolutionary potential of the Communist Party of India (CPI)—a party which came to play a progressively declining strategic role in the Indian polity (Sondhi, 1963: 157). The Communist nations treated India politically as ‘a sort of unofficial and honorary member of the Western bloc’. They ‘ridiculed’ India’s claim of being non-aligned and following an independent policy in world affairs. Ideologically, they classified India as ‘a capitalist country whose affairs were in the hands of the landlords and the bourgeoisie’ (Rajan, 1964: 300). It was only after India asserted its individuality in foreign affairs, especially at the time of the Korean War (1950) that ‘a diametrically different image’ of India began to emerge gradually in those countries (Sondhi, 1963: 157). India’s diplomacy in the Korean War led the Soviet Union and its East European allies to recognize and accept India’s posture of non-alignment as a respectable and even valuable stance in world politics as a result of India’s skilful manoeuvring between the two power blocs (Heimsath & Mansingh, 1971: 403). In 1950, India, according to the first Foreign Secretary, regarded the governments of East Europe to be ‘no more than instruments of Communist expansion’ (Menon, 1950: 8). Soviet policy towards CEECs was primarily determined by its quest for security. The Soviet Union sought ‘to establish a regular Soviet belt, a cordon sanitaire. Poland, Hungary, Finland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, are all links in this iron girdle’ (Menon, 1950: 10). The Soviet attitude towards ‘the satellite states in Eastern Europe’ did not inspire one ‘with much confidence’. On the contrary, it made India feel that ‘the condition of Soviet friendship is political subservience’ (Menon, 1950: 13–14). During the Cold War and between the two blocs, India stood ‘alone, unfriended, melancholy, slow...belonging to neither bloc and somewhat disliked by both’ (Menon, 1950: 12).

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and Embassies India followed the British pattern in the establishment of missions. Priority was given to Western Europe, Commonwealth countries, the two superpowers, China and the neighbouring countries of India. Other areas

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were comparatively neglected3 (Pant, 2008: 182). As a result, all West European countries had received either an embassy or a legation and almost all of them had commercial attaches because of substantial trade with them. The Commissioner General for Economic and Commercial Affairs based in London was responsible for the whole of Europe.4 A Trade Commissioner resident in Paris was made responsible for those areas where there was no representation, who was working under the direction of the Ministry of Commerce (India, 1948: 47; Pant, 2008: 60). Three months after attaining Independence, the first country with which India established diplomatic relations in Central and Eastern Europe was on 18 November 1947 with Czechoslovakia—which had also been the first country to open a Consulate in Bombay as early as 1920 and shortly thereafter in Calcutta. Diplomatic relations with Hungary and Poland were established on 18 November 1948 and 30 March 1954, respectively. The first embassy to be set up in Central Europe was in Czechoslovakia in December 1948. The second embassy in the region was opened six years later. As a measure of economy, the opening of an Embassy in Yugoslavia—a prominent partner in the non-aligned movement—was postponed for several years before it was eventually opened in 1954, with the ambassador being concurrently accredited to Romania and Bulgaria. A major reason why India did not open embassies was to conserve scarce foreign exchange resources.5 As a measure of economy, quite a few junior and senior posts at the headquarters and in the missions abroad were not filled and some were even abolished during 1952–1953.6 The principle of concurrent accreditation was adopted in the mid-1950s, which made it possible to extend representation with a minimum number

3 For details of India’s diplomatic representation till 1952, see Appendix 3 in Pant (2008: 60–61). 4 India had two Commissioner-Generals for Economic Affairs—one in London and the other in Washington—to promote investments in India. 5 In the late 1940s, there was growing public criticism of the Ministry of External Affairs—that India was expanding its foreign diplomatic representation far beyond its financial resources and out of proportion to its needs. The lack of a proper balancing of needs of diplomatic representation also came in for criticism (TOI, 1949: 6). 6 For instance, Czechoslovakia was one of the eight countries where the post of Information Officer was abolished.

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of personnel and the least possible expenditure and because, as Nehru put it, ‘we have not got men to put up Embassies everywhere’ (Nehru, 1956b: col. 589). India’s tendency to be over-represented in Western Europe and ‘underrepresented’ in Eastern Europe was criticized by Iqbal Singh in an op-ed article in the Times of India in 1952. The limited diplomatic contacts, he lamented, with these countries and none with Poland—a country which was ‘actually and potentially more important’. Even in the case of Czechoslovakia, with which India had had a long cultural and commercial association, after an early period of cordiality, there had been ‘a lack of initiative which, unless corrected, could lead to stagnation of [the] relationship’ (Singh, I., 1952: 6). The deficit of diplomatic representation in Eastern Europe, he argued, was partly due to the shortage of trained diplomatic personnel, which was accentuated by linguistic difficulties. More importantly, there seemed to be, he maintained, some evidence of ‘psychological resistance’ to developing fully diplomatic and other contacts with East European countries, ‘if not at policy-making level, at least on the policy at the operating level’. Such an attitude, he bemoaned, was ‘manifestly indefensible both on grounds of principle and practical politics’. This reflected a somewhat ‘adolescent approach’ to the problems of Indian diplomacy. Social revolution in East European countries, he maintained, was a fact and there was ‘no sensible argument for practising a diplomatic untouchability’ (Singh, I., 1952: 6). Iqbal Singh went on to urge the amplification of diplomatic, cultural and economic relations where they were under-developed since India was opposed to Cold War politics and sought to promote peace. The conclusion of trade agreements with the Soviet Union and East Europe in the mid-1950s resulted in the expansion of Indian missions in this area. An Embassy in Warsaw (initially located at the Bristol Hotel) was opened in 1957 with the Indian Ambassador in Moscow holding concurrent charge of Poland. On 1 December 1959, Hungary and India decided to raise the level of their diplomatic representation to the level of an embassy. K.P.S. Menon, the Ambassador of India to the USSR, was concurrently accredited as the first Ambassador of India to Hungary.

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Central Europe in the Ministry of External Affairs Since Independence, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had functional as well as territorial divisions which dealt with a number of countries grouped on a geographical or ‘territorial basis’. Territorial jurisdiction was decided upon the basis of contiguity and/or geographical grouping of the countries involved, or on the basis of administrative convenience. The ‘Western Division’ had a vast geographical focus: it consisted of several Sections, which dealt with all countries in Europe, both Eastern and Western (excluding the UK), the former French Establishments in India and their administration, countries in North and South America, including Cuba. It also, inter alia, dealt with matters relating to international organizations concerned mainly with Europe, viz. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe, etc. (India, MEA, 1957: 2; Lok Sabha, 1961: 8, 55; also see Organization Chart of MEA in Appendix 6). The Estimates Committee of the Lok Sabha found the Western Division rather ‘unwieldy’ and recommended that it be reorganized ‘to ensure that the work and its load’ were ‘rationalized and evenly distributed’ (Lok Sabha, 1961: 78). Thus, the Europe Division was drawn up according to ‘no rational principles and certainly not geopolitical ones’ (Tharoor, 1982: 165). As of 1 January 1960, two of the Sections of the ‘Western Division’ consisted of Europe (East) and Europe (West). The former was headed by an Under Secretary (EE). Above him was the Deputy Secretary (West Europe), who headed both the Europe Sections as well as the ‘Americas Branch’. His superiors, in turn, were the Joint Secretary (West) and the Foreign Secretary (India, MEA, 1960: Appendix 6). By the late 1960s, the MEA had nine territorial divisions, one of which was called the ‘Europe Division’, which was further divided into two, viz. Europe (West) and Europe (East) (India, Ministry of External Affairs, 1968: 91; Khilnani, 1975: 391). The geographical focus of the MEA’s East Europe Division has fluctuated over time. For instance, in 1989–1990, the East Europe Division covered only nine countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Yugoslavia) (India, Ministry of External Affairs, 1990: A3-A4). With the unification of Germany, the East Europe Division dealt with only eight countries (India, Ministry of External Affairs, 1991: A3). The ‘East

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Europe Division’ has been generally headed by a Joint Secretary and included two Deputy Secretaries and one an average four Under Secretaries. The Under Secretary or an Attache was Desk Officer and the junior-most executive rung of the IFS (Dixit, 2005: 77–78). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the MEA undertook ‘a major reorganisation and streamlining’ of the work at Headquarters so that the Ministry could respond more effectively to the changed and changing international situation. Some territorial divisions were merged to ensure better coordination of policies in the concerned area and some new Divisions were created to enable the Ministry to focus more closely on developments within those regions. A new Central Asia Division was established to look after the newly created CIS states (India, Ministry of External Affairs, 1993: 12). By 1996–1997, the East Europe Division had expanded to deal with 21 countries—Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia (FYR Serbia and Montenegro) (India, MEA, 1997: 142–143). Subsequently, 13 countries—Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey—were shifted from the Europe West Division to the Central Europe Division. Four countries—Armenia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine—were shifted from the Central Europe to the Eurasia Division. This brought the total number of countries dealt with by the Central Europe Division to 30—a classification also followed by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI, 2015: 8). In the wake of the impending eastward enlargement of the European Union, the Ministry of External Affairs created the Europe II Division in March 2004 (India, MEA, 2005: iv, 88). At present, the Ministry of External Affairs’ Central Europe Division covers a diverse group of 30 countries—five Scandinavian countries (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland), three Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia, Lituania), the Visegrad Four (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia), three countries of the Eastern Balkans (Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova), the Western Balkans/former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania), three Alpine countries (Austria, Switzerland and Leichtenstein), four Mediterranean countries (Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey) and the Holy See. Headed by a Joint Secretary,

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the Central Europe Division is currently supported by three Directors and two Under Secretaries. The Secretary (West), MEA is overall in-charge of the Central Europe Division (India, MEA, 2019). The 30 countries dealt with by the Central Europe Division comprise 25 with a parliamentary form of government, four have a constitutional monarchy and one is monarchical-sacerdotal (Holy See). It includes 18 EU Member States, 11 members of the Eurozone and 15 member states of NATO, and 18 out of 26 Schengen countries. Seventeen countries are former communist nations, viz. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. With a total GDP of over $5 trillion, they comprise a total area of 3,620,839.4 square kilometres (Chhabra, 2015). In terms of trade, the biggest volume was with the Alpines (see Table 3.1). The bilateral relationship with a country or region is primarily driven by the territorial divisions of the Ministry of External Affairs. Depending on the countries included in each territorial division, the chain of command may run up to the Foreign Secretary or any of the other Secretaries responsible (Abhyankar, 2018: 317). Some initiatives like the first interaction with the Visegrad 4 at the level of Joint Secretaries on 27 February 2015 or the idea of organizing the India-Central Europe Business Forum (ICEBF) were the result of policy initiatives of the Joint Secretary (CE). Table 3.1 India’s Trade with Central Europe (in million US dollars) Category Scandinavian/Nordics Western Balkans Mediterranean Baltics Visegrad 4 Eastern Balkans Alpines Total Source Chhabra (2015)

Export

Import

Total trade

2657.9 566.4 4997.1 197.4 2488.1 465.0 2133.7 13.5 billion

3075.3 357.0 924.9 278.5 1550.8 469.8 20,140.3 26.7 billion

5734.1 923.3 5922.0 475.9 4032.7 934.8 22, 274.0 40.2 billion

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Relations, an Adjunct of Indo-Soviet Relations In the aftermath of the Second World War, with ‘the liberation of Eastern Europe by the Red Army, other proletarian states sprang up. Poland—the ‘bastion of anti-communism’ during the interwar period—became a ‘New Democracy’ while Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania and later Czechoslovakia joined the ‘proletarian camp’ (Panikkar, 1956: 245). There was, he noted, appreciation in Asia and Africa for the ‘system of planned economy’ which had enabled the ‘Soviet and Eastern democracies’ to catch up with the technology of the West (Panikkar, 1956: 245). Independent India accepted ‘the post-war hegemony of the Soviet Union over the countries of Eastern Europe as she accepted the Monroe Doctrine of US hegemony over Latin America’ (Mansingh, 1965: 145). Central and East European countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary as well as the Soviet Union, Nehru maintained, were frightened about the rearmament of Germany since they had experienced the ‘terrible consequences’ of German invasion in the past and sought to take notice about it in the future as well. The ‘mere act’ of rearmament of West Germany therefore became a vital challenge the Soviet Union and its ‘associated countries’ (Nehru, 1951: 633). There were marginal exchanges between India and Eastern Europe immediately after India gained independence, but began to pick up in the mid-1950s. India’s relations with these countries developed as ‘a necessary adjunct’ (Kaushik, 1985: 14) or ‘a natural extension’ (Joshi, 1998: 39) of Indo-USSR relations. Under the influence of the then dominant concept of monolithic unity of the Communist bloc, relations with the East European countries were conducted with ‘an eye’ to the need to cultivate and consolidate relations with the USSR (Kaushik, 1985: 14– 15). In fact, until 1954, there was very little of what could be called direct relations between India and the Socialist countries; it was largely confined to interactions at international organizations and conferences. This seemed to have been the result of three factors. Firstly, there was growing recognition of the fact that India pursued a genuinely nonaligned and independent foreign policy, especially after its role in the Korean War (1950) and the exchange of prisoners of war in Korea. Secondly, the growth of the non-aligned movement enabled the nonaligned countries to serve as a balancing factor between the two opposing blocs. Thirdly, despite political and ideological disposition in favour of the West, there was a commonality with the Communist countries on a

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number of international issues, including the promotion of international peace and security, opposition to racial discrimination and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In the mid-1950s, the US-Pakistan alliance, the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Indian border dispute, all helped to bring Moscow and Delhi together (Gupta, 2018: 151). India’s reasons for forging closer relations with East Europe and reorienting its policy of being ‘negatively friendly’ towards them underwent a change for several reasons. It was, firstly, desirable to develop wider and deeper relations with the Soviet bloc, including East Europe in order to keep Western pressures at bay and continue to pursue an independent foreign policy. Secondly, unlike the Western bloc which were critical of India’s stand on the Kashmir issue and Goa, the Communist bloc, though not yet in favour, had ‘at least remained neutral with the inherent possibility that some day she might throw the weight of her support in favour of India’ (Rajan, 1964: 304). Thus, since the mid-1950s, a key objective of Indian political diplomacy towards Central and Eastern Europe was to secure political support in world organizations on vital issues. The support to India on Goa and on the Kashmir issue (after December 1955) from ‘the Soviet bloc was welcomed as a contribution to the maintenance of a minimum level of security’ (Sondhi, 1963: 157). Thirdly, a key reason was the need to diversify the sources of external assistance of every kind—financial, technical, commercial (Rajan, 1964: 304; Sondhi, 1963: 156). Until Nehru’s visit to the Soviet Union in June 1955 and the visit of Prime Minister N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to India at the end of 1955, Eastern Europe had, in fact, been ‘inhibited’ because of the lack of warmth in Indo-Soviet relations. The attitude of Soviet leaders towards Nehru was ‘very cautious and rather cold’ (Lounev, 2004: 63).

Nehru and Soviet Colonialism in Central Europe Nehru was sceptical whether the term ‘colonialism’ could be applied to countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This did not imply that he sought to condone ‘Soviet colonialism’. Given ‘a chance’ every country, he maintained, would have its freedom. Irrespective of the brand of ‘colonialism’, the only right way to deal with them was by peaceful means (The Hindu, 16 July 1956, cited in Rajan, 1960: 216, footnote 61). It was, Nehru stated at Bandung, ‘quite absurd’ to talk about colonialism

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in connection with Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries of the region. Someone may not, he added, necessarily agree with the kind of democracy in these countries, but ‘to consider it as colonialism is, on the face of it, wrong’ since they are considered ‘independent internationally’ recognized as sovereign states by a vast majority of other states and maintained diplomatic and treaty relations with them (Nehru, 1955a: 101). When asked if there was some kind of restriction on the sovereignty of East European countries, Nehru responded that they were sovereign nations, but ‘what influence or pressure may be exercised by a big country on a small country is another matter. That is being done all over’ (Nehru, 1955a: 288). After the Second World War, Nehru perceived the Soviet Union to be in ‘a position of great strength’ in Eastern Europe. Moscow apparently had ‘some Czarist ambitions to spread out, more especially over the Slav areas. It had also the desire to protect itself in the future by having as many friendly countries as possible next to its borders. The easiest way to have a friendly country appeared to them to have a Communist regime there under their patronage’ (Nehru, 1955b: 268). But when he asked at a Washington press conference if he considered the Soviet Union to be a colonial power, Nehru replied that if the term was used in the sense of exercising a dominating influence, the answer was in the affirmative, and gave the example of Hungary (Nehru, 1956c: 503). In Europe, Nehru distinguished between three major forces: ‘the communist, that is essentially Soviet communism; the progressive communist, represented by Poland and with a considerable appeal in some other countries, and the non-communist or anti-communist’. The events in Poland and Hungary had seen the so-called progressive communists who were largely influenced by the ‘concept of national freedom’ as well as individual freedom within the socialist economy had come into prominence. This wave of change in the communist world was visible in the Soviet Union as well as, more especially, in Poland and the other East European countries (Nehru, 1957: 689).

The India-China War, 1962 There was some degree of caution and uncertainty in the response of some of the East European countries in 1959 when the facts about the India-China border conflict came to be known. It was only after the

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first Tass Agency statement on the India-China border conflict, that East European countries fell in line with the Soviet point of view. The SinoIndian war undeniably put an additional strain on Indo-Soviet relations as well relations of the socialist countries with India (Hilger, 2017: 152). When China suddenly attacked India in October 1962, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh wondered whether the socialist countries of Eastern Europe would support China for ideological reasons. This was, he felt, a ‘moment of trial’ for Indian policy. But one after the other, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland passed resolutions at successive party meetings, denouncing the Chinese aggression against India. Czechoslovakia gave her firm support to India on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council in May 1964 (India, MEA, 1965: 64–65; Singh, S., 1965: 222). Some political parties too had reservations. For instance, the Jana Sangh was in favour of developing close relations with East European countries, which were ‘beginning to follow independent foreign policies after two decades of Russian tutelage’ (Madhok, 1967: 5).

India’s Image in Central Europe till the Early 1970s In a candid article in 1973, M.L. Sondhi—one of the pioneers of East European studies, a member of the Indian Foreign Service who had served in Prague in the early 1960s, a member of the Lok Sabha and a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University—made a thoughtful analysis of India’s political and economic image in Central Europe. Since the early nineteenth century, he wrote, many East European intellectuals turned to India for inspiration in their quest for a cultural renaissance. At the time, East European imagination looked to India for common ground for ‘new political conceptions, which would contribute vitally to ending the old era of imperial domination and cultural enslavement’ (Sondhi, 1972: 95). There was a general ‘positive intellectual appraisal’ of India in those countries. Nehru’s criticism of the betrayal of Czechoslovak democracy won the respect of democrats all over Eastern Europe (Sondhi, 1972: 97). In the aftermath of the Second World War, Yugoslavia’s challenge to ‘the Stalinist monolith’ was a premonition that nationalist stirrings were irrepressible. After Independence, India was preoccupied with tasks of nation-building and the Cold War competition between the two super powers. As a result, New Delhi could spare ‘little time or effort’ for

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Central Europe except establishing diplomatic relations. Since the threat of Central Europe being engulfed in a conflagration was very real, Indian attitudes and policies were largely judged in the region by New Delhi’s efforts to prevent a head-on collision between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the 1956 Hungarian crisis, Indian Ambassador to the United Nations V.K. Krishna Menon had highlighted the continued difficulties in ‘the powder keg of Central Europe’ (Menon, 1956: 202). India’s assiduous efforts to influence American and Soviet attitudes in favour of peaceful co-existence were generally welcomed in Eastern Europe and enhanced its ‘existing favourable image’ (Sondhi, 1972: 98). Similarly, Indian efforts to promote serious discussions on disarmament were appreciated. An ‘adverse psychological impression’ was however created in Central Europe by the concurrent accreditation of India’s ambassador to Moscow to Hungary and Poland. Such ‘clumsy diplomatic procedures,’ Sondhi felt, often created the impression that India was ‘relatively indifferent to the national objectives of those countries on a regional basis and was more interested in global diplomacy’ (Sondhi, 1972: 98). The East Europeans did not always understand India’s needs for largescale foreign assistance. Sometimes they spoke of New Delhi’s ‘mendicant mentality’ which, they felt, ought to be replaced by greater emphasis on self-reliance. Till the early 1970s, India’s economic image in East Europe was that of ‘a trading nation which places an affirmative value on a freer flow of trade’ (Sondhi, 1972: 99). Its ‘stereotyped formulations’ and ‘moribund outlook’ towards India-East European trading arrangements led to negative consequences, especially as New Delhi perceived trading problems in the region to be ‘irrevocably subservient to Soviet economic interests’ and led to its failure to constructively expand economic relations by experimenting with greater flexibility in multilateral trade with the region (Sondhi, 1972: 100). Sondhi felt that Indian diplomacy had been shackled with ‘an unusual degree of overemphasis on the effectiveness of Soviet politico-economic domination’ of East European countries and its failure to lay down guidelines for a meaningful dialogue with the elites and intellectuals of the region (Sondhi, 1972: 100). In conclusion, he advised, that the Indian image in Eastern Europe would not be broadly strengthened by pretending that India was ‘a political-cum-ideological bridge’ between the Soviet Union and the West, but by ‘a frank and unequivocal identification’ with East European expectations of their ability to control and adapt their

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technological, social and cultural environment to what they regarded as ‘an obsolescent imperialism’ (Sondhi, 1972: 101). One lingering perception in East-Central Europe was their resentment that countries like India for long had tended to take the friendship of East European countries for granted on the rather specious assumption that they would always follow the Soviet lead in maintaining cordial relations with it. This was resented in some East European countries since they felt they tended to be looked down upon by the outside world as ‘some sort of Soviet dependencies with no independent policies or existence of their own’. This resentment was further accentuated by the fact that Afro-Asian prime ministers and foreign ministers hardly ever cared to visit them despite repeated invitations. High-level political visits were usually goodwill visits to primarily erase this erroneous impression. Thus, though political issues naturally came up especially in the changing situation in Europe, the general focus was on boosting economic relations and cultural links (Reddy, 1967: 9).

Détente in Europe India welcomed the process of détente in Europe (Jain, 1977) and the process of gradual relaxation and understanding which was doing away with the rigidity of the Cold War (Singh, S., 1966: 205–206). New Delhi welcomed the renunciation of force in the ‘historic’ treaties of Germany with the Soviet Union (August 1970) and Poland (December 1970), which marked ‘a new realism’ (India, MEA, 1971: 1). Prime Minister Indira Gandhi appreciated the ‘welcome spirit of detente’, which would hopefully soon lead to stable security in Europe and have ‘a stabilising influence’ in Asia and other parts of the world (Gandhi, 1971: 299). The normalization of conditions in Europe suggested that European nations gradually realized the ‘incalculable harm’ of the arms race and of the disastrous consequences of large-scale confrontation (Gandhi, 1972: 151). The conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty had paved the way for relaxation of tension and the acceptance of existing boundaries in Europe had removed ‘one sensitive source of continued tension and uncertainty’ (Singh, S., 1972b: 395). The simultaneous admission of the two German States to the United Nations in September 1973 might well ‘signal the disappearance of tensions and hostilities of the past and the beginning of a new era of understanding and cooperation in Central Europe’ (Singh, 1973: 344).

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India welcomed the Helsinki Conference which marked ‘hopefully, the end of an era of hostile confrontation’. The process of détente in order to be meaningful and enduring, New Delhi felt, must extend to all regions and areas of the world (Chavan, 1975). Prime Minister Indira Gandhi too felt that détente, which was limited in content and geographical scope, must be consolidated and extended to the rest of the globe (Gandhi, 1976).

Central-East Europe in Indian Scholarly Literature There have not been many articles on Central and Eastern Europe in India’s two premier journals on international affairs—India Quarterly (the journal of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) published since 1945. The second important forum for the expression of Indian views on international affairs was International Studies , published since 1959 by the Indian School of International Studies and subsequently by the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Writing in 1949, V.S. Sastry in his article in India Quarterly discussed the state of the economy of East European countries excluding Albania at the end of the Second World War and the steps taken to end inflation, control prices and bring about economic stability. In conclusion, the author went on to suggest how further studies on the subject could be pursued and how India could benefit from the example of Eastern Europe (Sastry, 1949). In the next seven decades (1949–2019), India Quarterly published nine specific articles dealing with Central and Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia (Desai, 1973; Krasa, 1989; Sik, 1960), the Hungarian crisis (Mansingh, 1965), East–West relations (Golebiowski, 1972; Lange, 1957), the Czech Republic (Randhawa, 2002b), East Europe (Kaushik, 1985), Poland (Randhawa, 2002a) and EU’s eastward enlargement (Jain, 2001). Yodhraj examined the serious economic problems confronted by European countries since the end of the Second World War. After Soviet Russia ‘incorporated within its orbit a large number of European countries’, the trade of the free world was further restricted with the closure of West European markets in Eastern Europe. East European countries’ priority to industrial growth led to food shortages and scarcity of consumer goods (Yodhraj, 1954: 12). A key characteristic of trade between the Soviet Union and the countries within ‘the Soviet sphere of influence’ was the

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supply of defence equipment in exchange for consumer goods (Yodhraj, 1954: 14). Writing in 1956, K.M. Panikkar—journalist and later Ambassador to France—wrote that the end of the First World War left Central Europe in ‘a state of political disintegration after its superhuman effort to fight the combined power of the rest of the world’ (Panikkar, 1956: 223). During the interwar period, the political history of Central European countries was ‘very unfortunate’. The partition of Poland and the incorporation of Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the Hapsburg Empire had been ‘a great drag on their economic development’. Thus, during the interwar period (1919–1939), with the exception of Czechoslovakia, political regimes in Central European countries were ‘reactionary, oppressive and controlled by very short-sighted and inept cliques’ (Gyan Chand, 1952: 6). The first article to appear in International Studies was in 1962 by M.L. Sondhi, who wrote a fairly detailed survey of research, including a variety of Czech language source material, on ‘Historical and Political Studies on Czechoslovakia since 1948’ (Sondhi, 1962). Next year, Sondhi wrote a more topical article against the background of the Chinese invasion of India. After briefly discussing bilateral relations with a number of East European countries, he focused on China’s relations with Eastern Europe and the likely impact of Beijing’s ideological challenge in Eastern Europe on India. It was, Sondhi felt, clearly ‘a weakness of Indian policy to place or reliance on having the support of the Soviet Government’; a policy which underestimated the importance of the East European countries under the conditions of polycentrism in the Communist world (Sondhi, 1963: 165–166). In the long run, East European countries seemed to be moving in the direction of developing friendly relations with India, but in the short term, the reluctance to offer support on issues of vital importance to India need not necessarily derive from ‘any hostility towards India, and could even be regarded as some sort of procedural acrobatics which are inevitable in and the geological setting’ (Sondhi, 1963: 166). With the development of polycentric trends in both the Western and Eastern power blocs, he suggested that Indian policy would have to be modelled increasingly with a view to understanding the national security objectives of European countries, that India should carefully consider its policy on the German question in the context of its relations with Eastern Europe, and that India should be willing to enhance its economic links with East European countries (Sondhi, 1963: 167–168).

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In the subsequent 46 years (1963–2019), only three articles were published on Central/East Europe in International Studies —on political parties and democracy in Hungary (Jha 1999a), Hungarian minorities in Eastern Europe (Sarkar & Jha, 2002) and on the economic, political and cultural relations between India and Central and Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era, primarily since the 2000s (Kugiel & Upadhyay, 2018). A number of articles on India-East European economic relations were also published in Artha Vijnana—the quarterly of the Gokhale Institute of Economics and Politics, Pune in the 1980s (Bapat, 1984; Csaba, 1985; Das Gupta, 1984; Debroy, 1986; Emese, 1987; Narayanswamy, 1985, 1986; Nyitrai, 1985), two in the 1990s (Emese, 1991; Nambiar et al., 1990) and one in the next two decades (Mitra, 2001) and one in the Indian Economic Journal (Dave, 1961). Since Independence, only a few scholarly books have been published on Central/Eastern Europe in India. In a brief monograph, anthropologist Ramarishna Mukerjee (1951) appreciated the progress made by Czechoslovakia under people’s democracy since 1945. He was apprehensive of an armed aggression from ‘the imperialist war-mongers in the capitalist world’. P.K. Sundaram’s edited volume on the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (1969) contained articles by persons ‘generally friendly’ to the Soviet Union, questioned its right to intervene in the internal affairs of another country in the name of defending socialism or in any other name (Sundaram, 1969). A survey of Area Studies in India done in the late 1980s found ‘hardly any significant political studies’ on Central Europe; it mentioned only two articles dealing with Austria, but none with the Central European countries (Prasad & Phadnis, 1988: 124, 126). There have been several sponsored volumes on India and the Socialist world (Chopra, 1983; Czekus, 1978). Since the late 1990s, there have been several edited volumes dealing with transition in Eastern Europe (Jha & Sarkar, 2002), ethnicity and nation-building (Jha, 1998), and the nation state in Eastern Europe with a focus on Hungary (Sarkar, 2004). There have been half a dozen book chapters on ethnicity and nation-building in Eastern Europe by Indian scholars (Jha, 1999b, 2002; Jha & Sarkar 1998; Kapur, 2002; Sarkar, 2002; Sarkar & Jha, 2002), and East European politics and democracy (Jha, 1999a). There have only been a few books on India-East European economic relations (Hasan, 1972; Koptevskii, 1976; Kumar, 1987; Menon, 1970;

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Swamy, 1988), but comparatively more journal articles, especially in Foreign Trade Review—the journal of the Institute of Foreign Trade funded by the Government of India—(Bhattacharyya, 1977; Chisti, 1977; Mehrotra, 1983; Ramachandran, 1975; Rudra, 1967; Shah, 1983; Sharma, 1977; Yadav, 1983) and a few book chapters (e.g. Sachdeva, 2002). Most articles regularly published in commemoration of different anniversaries and official visits by both Indian and Soviet/East European scholars tended to approve and endorse the official narrative. Since the 1990s, almost all books on Indian foreign policy rarely mentioned Europe and there is no mention whatsoever of Central and Eastern Europe. While Indian Foreign Policy: Agenda for the 21st Century, 2 vols. commissioned by the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), Ministry of External Affairs had a short chapter on India and Central and Eastern Europe (Joshi, 1998), the FSI’s 1149-page study a decade later had none (Sinha & Mohta, 2007). There is no mention in recent books by senior diplomats like Shyam Saran (Saran, 2017) or Shiv Shankar Menon (Menon, 2016). Eastern Europe, Shashi Tharoor acknowledged in his Pax Indica (2012) that East Europe is that part of Europe that is ‘rarely discussed’ these days in India. He devoted only three lines to the region: ‘While a considerable amount of rhetoric was expended on celebrating ties with the states of Eastern Europe during the era of India’s special relationship with the Soviet Union, they are no longer a significant preoccupation for India today’ (Tharoor, 2012: 252).

Teaching and Research on Central and East Europe European studies was launched in India as part of the Department of International Politics and Organization programme of the Indian School of International Studies (ISIS) (established in October 1955). A separate Soviet Area Study department was established in 1963 in the ISIS (Vaidyanath, 1969: 150). However, it was only in the late 1960s, that East European studies became a part of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies. After the ISIS merged with Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in June 1970, the European Studies department was split into two to reflect Cold War realities of the 1970s: West European Studies with the American Studies while clubbing East and Central European Studies with Soviet studies on the basis of the ideological proximity of

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the United States to Western Europe and of the former Soviet Union to the rest of Europe7 (Rajan, 2005: 197). However, the situation became rather untenable after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the changes in East Europe. As a result, a decade and a half later, the two European studies programmes were merged into a new Centre for European Studies in 2005. After the ISIS’s merger with JNU in 1970, several courses on Eastern Europe were taught at the MPhil level—‘Economic Development of the USSR and Eastern Europe’, ‘Foreign Economic Policies of the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary’, ‘Foreign Economic Policies of the USSR and Selected European Socialist Countries’, ‘The Government and Politics of Eastern Europe’ and a postgraduate course entitled ‘Economic Socialism: The USSR and Eastern Europe’ (Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1988: 224–229, 239). Between 1998 and 2005, a MPhil course on ‘Economic Transformation in Post-Socialist Russia and Eastern Europe’ was taught at the Centre for Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies. But the Centre’s faculty published only a few articles on Eastern Europe between 1971 and 1986 (Jayashekhara, 1983, 1984), but no books on the region (Jawaharlal Nehru University 1986). The only course being taught on India on Central Europe (since 2013) is on ‘Politics and Society in Central and Eastern Europe’ at the Centre for European Studies, JNU. Apart from JNU, East European studies had not been able to take root in any other Indian university. The University Grants Commission established a Centre of Study of Economics of East European Countries in the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune in 1977 as a part of its Area Studies programme (University Grants Commission, 2006: 10). With the help of a few faculty and several research scholars, it focused on eight countries of the region (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia). It was engaged in translating, editing and preparing reading materials in English on the working of the socialist economies and the preparation of bibliographies of literature about the

7 Some teachers of the Indian School of International Studies objected to JNU clubbing together American/European studies and the clubbing of Soviet studies with East and Central European studies. They would have preferred to have separate American and European departments, but were ‘forced to accept the new geographical alignments because the Vice-Chancellor insisted on them’ (Rajan, 1995: 204).

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region (Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, n.d.: 13). After the retirement and/or exodus of the few faculty, the programme ceased in the late 1980s after the completion of a couple of MPhil dissertations.

Teaching of Central European Languages The teaching of the Hungarian language was introduced in the University of Delhi in 1969. The teaching of Polish was introduced in the Department of Modern European Languages at the University of Delhi in 1968 as a result of the Indo-Polish cultural agreement. At present, the Polish language is part of the 3-year course in practical Polish (Certificate, Diploma and Advanced Diploma) (Poland, Embassy in India, 2020). Currently, Polish attracts about 60 students. The Polish language was introduced in Benaras Hindu University in 2000 by a one-year Certificate in Polish Language, but it seems to have been taught intermittently. For the academic year, 2011–2012, a two-year Polish course was provided (ibid.). A 3-month beginner-level course in Polish is being taught at the Centre for Foreign Languages, Manipal University since 2012, but it only attracts 3–5 students. The teaching of the Czech language was introduced in the Department of Modern European Languages, University of Delhi in the 1970s. The Department of Slavonic and Finno-Ugarian Studies at the University of Delhi is presently the only department which offers courses in Slavonic languages, including Czech, Hungarian and Polish at three levels—one-year courses at certificate, diploma and advanced diploma levels (Department of Slavonic and Finno-Hungarian Studies, 2020).

Perceptions of Trade and Economic Ties Prior to the Second World War, with the majority of developing countries being colonies, there was no possibility of establishing direct commercial links with third countries (Mishra, 1972: 419). Given the high priority to rapid industrialization after 1947, India was in great need of capital goods and modern technology. In its effort to develop along a noncapitalist path, New Delhi discovered considerable commonality with East European countries which had made great strides in industrialization and modernization of their societies. Trade agreements with Socialist countries envisaged payment in rupees and the bilateral balancing of trade became the cornerstone of a mutually beneficial pattern of trade—both of

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which were an extremely ‘important, and radically different arrangement’ at that time (Dhar, 1972: 416–417). During the Cold War, India had very positive perceptions of trade and economic ties with the Central and East European countries, especially as the West was reluctant to help India establish basic industries in the public sector. Trade with Socialist countries had several key advantages. Firstly, it enabled India to utilize idle capacities in various industrial sectors and start new export-oriented industries. Secondly, it facilitated the import of capital and other essential goods, including special supplies for industrial and ‘strategic programmes’, needed for the reconstruction of the economy. Thirdly, trade with East Europe provided additional resources by way of credits and facilitated the reduction of expenditure of scarce hard currency. East European countries had also proven to be ‘sympathetic and cooperative’ in international forums on trade and development issues (Singh, I., 1952: 6; Singh, S. 1972a: 414–415). They facilitated, as Planning Minister D. P. Dhar explained, rapid progress in basic industries without which it would have been impossible ‘to conceive of a self-generating process of development’ (Dhar, 1972: 416). The rupee trade agreements were, in fact, novel since there was no precedent for organising trade relations on the principle of bilateral balancing of trade through the negotiation of annual trade protocols which specified the products to be traded and the amounts thereof; trade being channelled through government agencies. Thus, trade with Eastern Europe provided India with an assured market for Indian manufactured and processed goods, which could not be easily sold in hard currency areas, the possibility of obtaining capital goods on a barter basis, and the determined effort by both sides to balance the trade (Heimsath & Mansingh, 1971: 425). The introduction of trade in convertible currency, the fading away of traditional agencies like public sector units and state trading companies, and the shift towards more competitive, alternative sources of supply however put an end to a large portion of trade with East European countries. The trade relationship with East European countries was, in fact, based on ‘a distorted international trading regime’ merely because of the special arrangement with the Soviet Union. There was really ‘no economic rationale’ for such a relationship (Sengupta, 2004: 95).

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Post-Cold War Perceptions When the tumultuous changes were taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sent Minister of State for External Affairs K. Natwar Singh to these countries in 1989 to ‘find out what was going on and establish contacts’ (Singh, K.N., 1995: 154). India did not anticipate the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. The Government of India, former Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit acknowledged, dealt with these changes with ‘a distinct lack of imagination’. New Delhi was frankly out of touch with evolving ground realities and ‘the new forces that were to dominate Russian affairs and, by implication, the entire Soviet area of influence from 1990 onwards’ (Dixit, 2003: 212). India was a little slow to make an overall politicoeconomic assessment of the changing landscape in Eastern Europe and assess implications for itself. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ‘lifting of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe’, according to the Ministry of Defence, had brought to an end the ‘kind of adversarial East–West tensions that had vitiated the international arena for decades’ (India, Ministry of Defence, 1992: 1). These changes had led to the collapse of ‘the post-World War structure of Europe, divided into two opposing military alliances and competing ideologies’ (India, Ministry of Defence, 1991: 1). The transformation of the geopolitical milieu and foreign policy priorities and perspectives of Central and East European countries (CEECs) in the post-Cold War era have had significant repercussions on Indian foreign policy. The East European revolutions destroyed many impressions and delusions. To take stock of the momentous changes in East Europe, Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral convened a meeting of all Indian heads of mission in Eastern Europe—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia—in Belgrade on 9 March 1990. He urged the Indian missions in all East European countries to gear for the changing political and economic environment. He advised them to take full advantage of India’s contacts with the people in these countries which predated the establishment of communist regimes. India, he said, should take advantage of traditional linkages for establishing closer ties through an exchange of information and culture (TOI, 1990a: 8). India was also contemplating restructuring and strengthening its diplomatic missions in Eastern Europe with a view to opening new vistas of cooperation. Nearly a week later,

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Gujral told the Lok Sabha that ‘our policy is being framed and all this is tailored according to the changing environment’ (Gujral, 1990a: col. 27). Gujral perceived the ‘radical changes’ in Central and Eastern Europe to be the result of perestroika. The ‘re-ordering’ of Eastern Europe, he felt, was ‘epoch-making’ and generally welcomed the ‘reaffirmation of the democratic spirit’ (Gujral, 1990d: 61). New Delhi welcomed the trends in the direction of democratization, political pluralism and the evolution of more representative systems and institutions reflecting popular aspirations. Clearly, the East European revolutions destroyed many impressions and delusions. The lesson, Gujral concluded, was that ‘successful socialism needs democratic party participation’ (cited in Crossette, 1990). With the failure of state socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the state socialist model had ceased to be a realistic option for the South. India’s relations with Eastern Europe as well as with Russia and Central Asia did not show any forward movement because these regions were enmeshed in their own internal conflicts and because Foreign Minister Gujral tended to focus attention only on South Asia (Dixit, 2003: 228). Unlike the past, the Central and East European countries in the postCold War era no longer perceived India with Moscow’s eyes. The 1990s witnessed radical shifts in their perceptions and assessments of Indian domestic and foreign policy. New Delhi could no longer take their political and moral support on various international issues for granted. Much prior to their accession, the CEECs had already realigned their foreign policy priorities with those of the European Union and its Member States. They were less appreciative of or openly critical of India’s stand towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty, human rights violations in Kashmir, the situation in Punjab, and policies towards neighbours. They were critical of India’s 1998 nuclear tests and had divergent views on various international issues—Iraq (2003), Libya (2011) and Syria (post-2011). Eastern Europe was said to be undergoing a ‘painful, yet challenging transition from the East bloc to being a party of united Europe’ (Nayar, 1995). The former Socialist countries seemed to be in ‘an uneasy, noman’s land: the old universe that linked them to the Soviet Union is dead, while the new world they were hoping to be born into, the European Union, has yet to accept them’. While they were in such ‘a limbo’, a journalist opined, the region was open to overtures from other countries such as India (Abraham, 1994).

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In its annual reports, the Ministry of External Affairs initially sought to put a positive spin on the relationship with East European countries. The MEA expressed the hope that in keeping with India’s ‘traditionally close and friendly relations’ with the peoples of these countries as well as the excellent ties of friendship, cooperation and understanding between India and these countries are ‘bound to be strengthened and expanded in the future’ (India, MEA, 1990: 35). In reality, Indian policy-makers viewed ‘East Europe’ through the Russian prism. With the withering away of the traditional bonhomie, India had to forge closer political ties with new elites. India therefore began to take a fresh, hard look at events in the region. In spite of the domestic preoccupations of the Socialist countries and a reorientation of their foreign policy priorities, the ‘traditionally close’ ties with these countries were claimed to have been ‘reaffirmed and renewed’ (India, MEA, 1991: 43). The twin processes of political transformation and economic reform had given rise to ‘a plethora of problems’ in the region, including the rise of ethnic nationalism, migration, multiplicity of parties and movements as well as self-doubt about the time frame in which economic recovery was likely to take place. The evolution of Central-East European countries in the direction of democratic pluralism and market-oriented economic structures had brought them ‘ideologically more in line with India’s own non-ideological orientation and democratic beliefs’ (India, MEA, 1993: 60; 1995: 55; 1999: 53). These changes posed challenges for Indian foreign policy, which were sought to make ‘adjustments, as necessary, in a dynamic and forward-looking manner’ (India, MEA, 1996: 59). Political relations with Central and East European countries were described as ‘problem free’. Despite the move by a majority of countries of the region to seek greater integration into EuroAtlantic structures, they have continued to place emphasis on traditional ties with India (India, MEA, 2000: 52; 2002: 50). The Central and East European countries were described as ‘the “Third World” of the affluent West’ who had ‘a stronger claim to the latter’s generous hands of assistance than that of the real Third World’. There was the expectation that the East–West thaw should not result in depriving the developing world of increased economic assistance (Gujral, 1990d: 61). The political preoccupation of the industrialized countries with Eastern Europe and their disregard for development issues on the international agenda was likely to ‘come in the way of the revival of the North-South dialogue’ (India, MEA, 1991: ix). Changes in Central

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and Eastern Europe were not likely to have any tangible impact on EU’s development aid policy to India (Jain, 1996).

Perceptions of Trade with Central Europe in the 1990s The disruption of old trading arrangements with Central and Eastern Europe took away the earlier tidiness provided by annual trade plans for exports and imports, the mechanism for balancing them over a fiveyear period and the identification of items in bilateral trade. The East European markets had become increasingly competitive, especially as they switched to trading in hard currency.8 This was on top of traditional problems in boosting exports to the CEECs because of Indian constraints in being able to provide substantial suppliers’ credits and their desire for more sophisticated and quality goods. Domestic economic needs compelled Central and Eastern Europe to shed its old euphoria and adopt economically more viable policies in trade and aid towards developing countries. India’s trade (both exports and imports) from the CEECs declined progressively till the mid-1990s as a result of their transition from centrally planned socialist economies to market-oriented ones. The East European countries were also expected to evaluate the cost and efficacy of their joint ventures in India and were likely to abandon the ones not found to be efficient or effective (Chandola, 1990). There were apprehensions that as the CEECs, especially the Visegrad Four (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), were elevated in the European Union’s hierarchy of trade preferences and gradually reached the apex of the ‘pyramid of privilege’ sooner than later, India was likely to face serious challenges and confront fiercer competition and severe adjustment problems in its traditional Western markets.

8 At the beginning of 1990–1991, India had bilateral clearing arrangements providing for trade on the basis of payments of a non-convertible Indian rupee and on a balanced basis with five out of eight countries in the region, viz. the USSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland and Romania. With the unification of the two Germanys, the rupee payment arrangement with the GDR ended in December 1990. An agreement with Czechoslovakia (17 January 1991) extended the bilateral trade and payments arrangement for two years, i.e. until December 1992. Trade with Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia began to be conducted on the basis of payments in any freely convertible currency.

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Eastward Enlargement of NATO and the European Union India ‘welcomed’ the eastward enlargement of the European Union, which was bound to enhance the Union’s political influence, although the economic costs would, in the short term, be considerable (India, MEA, 2000: 157). However, it was unlikely to have any appreciable change on the nature and content of India’s political and strategic dialogue with the Union. Enlargement brought the EU closer to troubled areas on the periphery of its new boundaries to both the east and the south, thereby reinforcing the trends towards a more Eurocentric Europe. The Accession Countries’ perception of threats and security interests differed from the existing Member States. They were likely to urge that greater attention be paid to promoting stability and prosperity in eastern and southeastern Europe as well as Central Asia and the Caucuses (Jain, 2001, 2002). With the discovery of its own Third World next door, Western Europe was expected to accord greater priority for financial flows, technology transfer, market access and diversion of development aid (Jain, 1996: 38–41). The Accession Countries were expected to be extremely busy with making a success of their EU membership, and therefore, they were not likely to have much sympathy or interest in problems of developing countries. Eastward enlargement and the new political constellation in Eastern Europe made it imperative for India to forge closer political ties with the new elites in these countries. It required ‘a re-profiling of mindsets about a changing European Union in a changing Europe’ (Jain, 2004: 84). Since the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the East Europeans had with growing intensity expressed a keen desire to be associated more closely with Western security organizations, especially NATO. To the East Europeans, NATO represented the only effective and functioning security organization on the continent to safeguard against the revival of the Russian threat and counterbalance the potential hegemonic aspirations of Russia. There is a rivalry or competition between the Visegrad countries regarding their access to NATO (Jain, 1995). From 1992 until 2004, the Central and East European countries, according to a former Joint Secretary (Central Europe), MEA, were ‘obsessed’ with admission in the EU and NATO. For a decade, they were preoccupied with these processes, which left them little time beyond the EU and transatlantic relations. Most of these small countries did not have the wherewithal to cope with relations with India as membership

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of EU and NATO was ‘a priority’.9 Until their admission in the European Union, said a former Indian Ambassador to a Central European country, the CEECs were simply ‘not interested in India’. They joined hands with the European Union and ‘sided entirely with the West, which pained many developing countries which believed that East Europe was an ally’.10 After establishing balanced relations with all the major powers at the turn of the century, India began to look at penetrating regions it had tended to neglect in the recent past. Eastern and Central Europe, in general, and Poland, in particular, a leading commentator urged, ‘must necessarily form an important component of India’s global diplomacy’, especially as ‘a fund of goodwill’ had survived the Cold War in these countries (Raja Mohan, 2004).

Central Europe in Parliamentary Debates in the 1990s There have been several debates in the Indian Parliament on topical issues relating to Central and Eastern Europe, primarily on critical issues which got wide publicity and agitated the minds of parliamentarians, viz. the Hungarian crisis (1956) (see Chapter 5), the invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) (see Chapter 4) and the declaration of martial law in Poland (1981) (see Chapter 6). This section examines the discussion and debates in the Lok Sabha on the changes in Eastern Europe. Foreign Minister Gujral underlined the need for India to understand the reasons for changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 1990, Europe, he remarked, was ‘very different’ from what Europe was yesterday. The coming down of the Berlin Wall and the changes in Eastern Europe reflected the transformation of ideologies, philosophies, the perceptions and the backgrounds that were perceived in the nineteenth and twentieth century (Gujral, 1990b: cols. 582–583). Changes of the early 1990s, Jaswant Singh (BJP)—and later Foreign and Defence Minister—remarked, signified the end of the Cold War, but had

9 Conversation with a former Joint Secretary (Central Europe), Ministry of External Affairs, May 2008. 10 Conversation with a former Indian Ambassador to a Central European country, May 2008.

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paradoxically led to the continuance of regional conflicts in the developing world (Singh, J., 1990, 10 April: col. 389). Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh regarded the vast changes in Europe to be ‘very momentous and profound’. Gorbachev’s political initiatives, he felt, had been the catalyst for the ‘dramatic and profound changes’ in the whole of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, leading to the collapse of the ‘European Central Front’. As a result, the concept of military blocs, if not totally demolished, has certainly got eroded’. Though the new situation had not yet crystallized, India, he stated, had ‘yet to formulate’ its response to it. However, while there was de-escalation of global conflict, local wars, low level and medium level conflicts and tensions had increased (Singh, V.P., 1990: col. 479). The Indian Government had welcomed the changes in Eastern Europe towards ‘democratization reflecting popular aspirations’ (Gujral, 1990c: col. 320). Several Members of Parliament felt that the changes in Eastern Europe would lead to a reduction in share of development aid from the International Development Association and from other countries (Faleiro, 1990: col. 448; Poojary, 1990: 461). Surprisingly, during the debate on the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Amendment) Ordinance on 18 December 1991, there were frequent references to changes in Eastern Europe with several MPs arguing that the changes in East European countries or in the Soviet Union did not imply that the days of socialism had passed (e.g. Fernandes, 1991: col. 501). Rangarajan Kumaramangalam (Congress), on the other hand, felt that it signified the end of ‘an authoritative dogma’ (Kumaramangalam, 1991: col. 511). During the discussion on the economic situation in 1991, Prithviraj D. Chavan (Congress) felt that the important lesson of the economic collapse of the Soviet Union and East European countries was that India had to review the direction of the economy after a certain stage of social development. The Soviets, he remarked, had delayed this process, but India should not. At the present stage of the country’s social development, India could not abandon the Nehruvian model of mixed economy and ‘blindly run’ after free enterprise and market economy. What was needed, he urged, was a slight adjustment of the economy to keep up with the reality of the fast-changing world (Chavan, P.D., 1991: col. 526). Mani Shankar Iyer (Congress) maintained that the fall of socialism was because there was ‘something wrong with socialism’, viz. that there was no democracy there (Iyer, 1991: col. 542). While replying

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to the debate, Finance Minister Manmohan Singh argued that the political turmoils in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were rooted in economic mismanagement (Singh, M.M., 1991: cols. 616–617). Unlike the debates in the Lok Sabha on the British application to join the European Community, where the Government of India was subjected to ‘only ad hoc scrutiny and review’ (Jain, 2019: 36), many Members of Parliament displayed greater awareness and knowledge about developments in Central Europe and subjected the Government of India to more stringent and critical scrutiny.

FICCI’s Perspective As early as 1960, G.L. Bansal, the Secretary-General of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce (FICCI)—the oldest apex business organization—undertook a tour of Western and Eastern Europe. In his report submitted to the Chamber’s President, Poland as well as Czechoslovakia, he wrote, had been forced to temporarily halt purchases from India till further ‘trade facilities’ (presumably credits) were made available. The situation, he added, was likely to improve when equipment for the foundry-forge and heavy machinery-building plants and other projects started to arrive from those countries. East European countries, he stressed, were willing to develop trade relations with Indian private exporters (TOI, 1960: 7). FICCI’s key objective was to move India’s trade beyond government-to-government annual trade plans by encouraging greater participation of Indian companies in trade and transfer of technology. 1989 was regarded as a year of change by FICCI President Raunaq Singh. East European countries, he said, had ‘joined the free enterprise system’ (FICCI, 2002: 248). The likely withdrawal of the Rupee trade agreements between India and East European economies, a FICCI report pointed out, as a fallout of the process of free market economy initiated by these countries could have an adverse impact on India’s balance of trade position. To ward off the adverse impact from the likely discontinuance of the rupee trade, FICCI urged that Indian exports to the region should be made globally competitive (TOI, 1990b: 15).

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Implications of EU Enlargement The eastward enlargement of the European Union in 2004 was likely to create a larger market for Indian goods and services. Overall, the opportunities created were likely to be limited primarily because the Accession Countries would only add five per cent to the current GDP levels of the EU. Only three had populations of more than 5 million and most of them had high unemployment rates. The prevalent volumes did not really reflect much potential for enormous growth. This was primarily because of the lack of trade awareness among businesses on both sides, infrequent business promotion and networking events, inadequate commercial arrangements to facilitate trade payments such as correspondent banking, lines of credit, export guarantee insurance trade documentation and legalization procedures, and insufficient links as in air routes, and visa and consular arrangements (FICCI, 2004: 5). Consequently, market demands in Accession Countries were either unmet or were serviced through other entry points in Europe and often with more competitive products. Awareness levels of EU enlargement were deemed to be ‘very low’ among Indian business persons. There had been, FICCI acknowledged, ‘no, or negligible, internal research’ on the impact of EU enlargement in industry organizations and trade bodies, at the product group level. Business continued to perceive the EU not ‘as one entity, but as a conglomerate of states’, as a result of which the business focus continued to be at the level of individual Member States and not on the EU as a common trade entity. With better possibilities of intraEU labour mobility, especially of young and relatively skilled persons, it was apprehended that India might face stiff competition on two counts, viz. temporary movement of its natural persons to the EU and business processing outsourcing (BPO) by EU to India. Opportunities in the 2010s Central Europe had emerged in the mid-2010s as ‘a focus area’ for the Indian Government and industry (FICCI, 2015: 1). Central Europe occupies ‘a strategically important place on the global economic map’ linking the developed western Europe with Asia. The Central European economies themselves are at the threshold of economic resurgence, having successfully tided over the challenges that countries in political and economic transition encounter (FICCI, 2015: 5). FICCI noted the

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relatively limited size of India’s external trade with CE-30 countries with major economies like Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary figuring in the list top 100 trade partners in FY 2014-2015 (FICCI, 2015: 9).

The Confederation of Indian Industry The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) preferred to focus on ten countries of Central Europe (CE-10), viz. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland (CII & Deloitte, 2014: 8). Switzerland, Poland and the Czech Republic were considered as the top three priority markets by the Indian businesses looking at exploring this region for business development or by the companies already having some establishments in this area (CII & Deolite, 2014: 25). It identified several potential areas for exports by Indian companies, viz. textiles, nanotechnology, bulletproof dresses, pharmaceuticals, automobiles, etc. Countries of the region displayed considerable enthusiasm towards Bollywood, Ayurveda, spirituality, Hinduism and Indian food (CII & Deolite, 2014: 31). The Czech Republic was described as the hub of manufacturing/technology for Russian businesses and boasted about the presence of high-level technical skills in manufacturing of high tolerance machinery, steel, forging, casting, etc. Hungary, the Report noted, had a significant potential to be a major trade partner for India and this could be explored through technical cooperations and partnerships. Hungarian companies already had a presence in India in several sectors including pharmaceutical, defence and IT. But they seemed to be short of liquid cash for further investments in India (CII & Deolitte, 2014: 31). A number of Indian companies, majority of them in the BPO sector, already had establishments in Poland, which are serving European markets with a majority of their talent pool comprising Swedish, Dutch and Polish professionals. India, it stated, ranked second after Singapore in terms of investments from Poland. With China’s aggressive engagement in trade activities with Poland and its ‘Go China’ programme, India had not been able to establish ‘a strong foothold’ in the country. While Indian exports stood a great opportunity and advantage due to their high quality, but unclear policies and entry barriers tended to inhibit stronger trade ties (CII & Deolitte, 2014: 32). Slovakia enjoys ‘a unique locational advantage’ in Central Europe as it is not far to the west and comparatively close to East Europe. Its robust

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infrastructure like airports, the Danube River and highways made it an ideal transport and storage hub. Given its historical expertise of over 100 years in the automotive sector and the lowest labour costs (even lower than India), it could serve as a good location to store/produce car parts to give players a flexibility to serve markets in Europe and at the same time ensure connectivity with the suppliers (CII & Deolitte, 2014: 32). But the Report urged Indian companies to revisit their approach strategy in order to reach out to Slovakia (CII & Deolitte, 2014: 33). Indian investors, the Report concluded, tended to have a ‘natural inclination’ towards the four big countries in the Central Europe, namely, Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Switzerland. But it felt there were a number of opportunities in countries like Slovakia or Hungary, where even few initiatives from the Indian Government or industry organizations could lead to tremendous growth in trade and investment activities (2014: 34). With the strong base in technology in the Central European countries, it would be helpful for India, the Report argued, for companies to collaborate since it could provide the desired technological edge and access to the European market in other industries including pharmaceuticals and raw materials for manufacturing (CII & Deolitte, 2014: 34).

Modi and Central Europe Though Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made a number of trips to Western Europe, he has not so far visited any Central and East European country. This has been in keeping with the perception of the region, which has been ‘long seen as an area of competing Russian and Western interests’ and a region which has ‘not always featured prominently in India’s foreign policy agenda’ (Jaishankar, D., 2018). There have however been a number of visits to Central and Eastern Europe during 2014– 2019—Minister of State M. J. Akbar to the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in May 2017, President Kovind to Cyprus, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic (2–9 September 2018), Vice President M. Venkaiah Naidu to Serbia, Malta and Romania (14–20 September 2018), and VicePresident Naidu to the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) (17–21 August 2019) and Foreign Minister Jaishankar to Hungary and Poland towards the end of August 2019. These visits were not been merely about showing the flag in countries which had been neglected for decades and had received no meaningful Indian visit. The visits of the Vice-President

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and the President were not merely ceremonial, but resulted in ‘tangible results in terms of signing of MoUs and agreements (see Appendices). These visits, in fact, represent a more concerted outreach towards Europe in general and Central and Eastern Europe in particular. This high-level outreach is in sharp contrast to New Delhi’s earlier outreach to Central and Eastern Europe which tended to be ‘prefunctory rather than consistent’ (Singh, S., 2018). These visits seem to be certainly part of ‘a well-planned Indian strategy to re-enter a neglected area, suddenly becoming geo-strategically important’ (Sachdeva, 2018b). India and the Czech Republic are working on a strategic partnership in the near future. However, one cannot apparently argue that this heightened attention to Central and Eastern Europe seems to be more motivated both by the desire to access the special skills and technologies of the region as well as its desire to counteract growing Chinese influence in the region as in Africa where it has decided to open 18 new embassies in Africa between 2018 and 2021, thereby raising the number of resident missions from 29 to 47 (Roche, 2018).

Indians Perceptions of Chinese Inroads in Central Europe There has been no official comment or any significant commentary in the Press or academic discussion about the Chinese inroads into Central and Eastern Europe and the ‘16+1’ format. Most of the focus has been on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on South Asia or the likely implications of the Maritime Silk Road (see Sachdeva, 2018a). While India’s general assessment and criticism of the BRI—a position with which the EU concurs—would be applicable to the ‘16+1’, but there has been no official reference to it. For instance, the ‘16+1’/17+1 summit held in Budapest in December 2017 went ‘entirely unreported’ in India. That India is ‘hardly interested in this new forum underlines the problem it has in dealing with changing Eurasia’ (Raja Mohan, 2017). In referring to the BRI in Central and Eastern Europe, Kishan S. Rana argues that BRI funding can easily be absorbed in the economic environment of these countries, and would ‘mainly be welcomed, with few inhibitions’. But the overriding local concern would be over the scale of the investments, the inevitably long gestation period for the road, rail and port infrastructure, and the burden of repaying all the Chinese loans,

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which are mainly not at concessional rates (Rana, 2017: 6). Another study mentioned the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which seeks to connect India better with Iran, Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Northern Europe in the long run (Purushothaman & Unnikrishnan, 2019: 79–80). China, former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal argues, seeks ‘strong entry points’ in the European Union through East European countries and the Balkans which are considered to be ‘the soft underbelly’ of Europe. The Chinese economic penetration has caused major EU countries ‘to rethink about Chinese expansion in Europe and the price Europe will pay for this eventually’ (Sibal, 2019: 75). Europe, Indrani Bagchi remarks, the growth of ‘an aggressive and expansionist China with massive ambitions of connectivity, trade and acquisitions in Asia and Europe, suddenly jolted EU out of its complacency’. Europe, which had been fairly indulgent to China’s growing presence, witnessed leaders like Viktor Orban of Hungary by 2017 steering away from old Europe to welcome China into Europe, even as he swung away from Merkel’s refugee policies to shut the doors to migrants streaming in from Syria and Africa into Europe. The BRI was ‘a wake-up call for many in Europe. It had an unforeseen impact in many countries in Europe, as they began to realise that the BRI ended at their doorstep, making them vulnerable to Chinese ambitions. The murmurs against the 16+1 Group has only gotten louder’ (Bagchi, 2018). Europe was facing another challenge—a challenge characterized by competition and collaboration. The second BRI Conference (2019) was attended by all the leaders of Europe or by their high-level representatives. Irrespective of all the problems that Europeans envisage, their key concern is whether China ‘plays by the rules that have been put in place earlier and whether they would be in a position to influence the behavior of China’. After Italy became the first G7 country to sign the BRI, Portugal too came on board, especially as China had recently brought in concepts like openness and transparency which were missing in earlier agreements that China was showcasing. It even argued that the EU should not try and stop it from going to someone is willing to help it by trying to build infrastructure while Brussels had not been in a position to fulfil its demands (Balasubramaniam, 2019, 26 June). Thus, Beijing is perceived as having ‘slowly chipped away at Europe’s periphery—beginning with the 16+1 format that it incubated with the Eastern European nations’ (Saran & Deo, 2019: xiii) and that Beijing has ‘effectively sidelined’ the

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European Union through its 16 + 1 Forum (Saran & Deo, 2019: 80). Czech President Milos Zeman even regarded his country an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier for China in Europe’ (New York Times, 12 August 2018, cited in Saran & Deo, 2019: 80).

Cultural Ties India signed a number of cultural agreements with East European countries in the 1950s and the 1960s—Poland (27 March 1957), Romania (1957), Czechoslovakia (7 July 1959), Hungary (30 March 1962) and Bulgaria (1963). They provided the framework for the pursuit of cultural relations in agreed fields and disciplines. Broadly speaking, the emphasis and orientation in India’s foreign cultural policy has been on language, philosophy and performing arts. However, within the sphere of performing arts, a greater emphasis seemed to have been placed on dance-form than to the other arts (Dixit, 1979: 464). East European countries fell in ‘a category by itself’ in terms of cultural relations. The number of Friendship Societies dealing with India in these countries was perhaps the most numerous. Almost all important East European countries had separate Houses of Culture and Cultural Centres in India. These countries had taken particular interest in Indian linguistics and studies in selected spheres of Indian cultural and scientific activities (Dixit, 1979: 463). The primary objective of Indian Cultural Centres abroad is ‘to establish, revive and strengthen cultural relations and mutual understanding’ and ‘to promote awareness and appreciation of India’s composite cultural heritage abroad (Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 2013: 7) Out of 37 Cultural Centres as of 31 March 2019, two (out of five [others being London, Berlin and The Hague] in Europe) are functioning in Central Europe since 2011—Budapest (formally opened in November 2010; officially renamed as Amrita Sher-Gil Cultural Centre on 15 August 2014) and the Swami Vivekanand Cultural Centre, Prague (Indian Council of Cultural Relations, 2019: 17). The opening of a third cultural centre in Warsaw had been under active consideration in 2006 (Lok Sabha 2006: 57), but the idea was subsequently dropped (India, MEA, 2012: 162). Central European countries have been responsive to the establishment of Chairs of Indian Studies in their universities. New Delhi’s response to this interest has however been within ‘the framework of its own policy and value system, with no great political overtones’ (Dixit, 1979: 464).

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As of 31 March 2019, there were 69 operational MoUs for Indian Studies and Language Chairs overseas. In Central Europe, there are three ICCR Chairs in Poland—two for Hindi and Tamil at the University of Warsaw and one for Indian Studies (History) at Jagiellonian University, Krakow (2017–2018 to 2019–2020). There is a Chair for Hindi at ELTE University, Hungary since 1992. The ICCR also runs a Distinguished Visitors’ Programme and offers Junior and Senior Fellowships, which have occasionally included invitees from Central Europe. It has also from time to time organized conferences to which participants from the region have been invited. It sponsored the first Central and Eastern European regional conference of Indology in Warsaw University in September 2005 in which 19 scholars from 11 countries participated.

Conclusion This chapter has sought to fulfil the long-felt gap in available literature on India-Central Europe perceptions, which has truly been an orphaned subject. Apart from a few studies of Indian perceptions of Poland (Klodkowski, 2011; Mathur, 2014; Kugiel, 2019), there is no comprehensive analysis of the subject. Like much of Western Europe, recent years witnessed similar features in Central European societies and polities—populism, xenophobia, distrust in political parties and parliamentary politics and lack of faith in the European Union. However, this has not been the subject of much discussion or debate in India.

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Singh, S. (1972a, December 2). Foreign Minister’s speech at the Seminar on Trade with East Europe, New Delhi, in Foreign Affairs Record, December 1972. Singh, S. (1972b, December 7). Statement in the Lok Sabha while initiating the debate on the international situation, in Foreign Affairs Record, December 1972. Singh, S. (1973, October 2). Statement in the UN General Assembly, in Foreign Affairs Record, October 1973. Singh, S. (2018, October 25). India’s outreach in Central and Eastern Europe: A roundup of two visits. Retrieved 2020, December 19, from https://icwa. in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=4326&lid=3217. Singh, V. P. (1990, April 10). Lok Sabha Debates, 9th series, 2nd sess., vol. 3, no. 20. Sinha, A., & Mohta, M. (Eds.). (2007). Indian foreign policy: Challenges and opportunities. Academic Foundation. Sondhi, M. L. (1962). Historical and political studies on Czechoslovakia since 1948. International Studies, 4(4), 413–422. Sondhi, M. L. (1963). India and East Europe. International Studies, 5(102), 156–168. Sondhi, M. L. (1972). India’s image in Eastern Europe. In M. L. Sondhi (Ed.), Non-appeasement: A new direction for Indian foreign policy (pp. 95–101). Abhinav. Sridharan, K. (2001). Regional perceptions of India. In F. Grare & A. Matto (Eds.), India and ASEAN: The politics of India’s look east policy (pp. 67–90). Manohar. Stepanovsky, J. (1992). Central and Eastern Europe: The missing link. In O. Pick (Ed.), The Cold War legacy in Europe (pp. 69–78). New York. Swamy, R. (1988). Gorbachov, Economic Reform and Eastern Europe. Himalaya Publishing House. Sundaram, P. K. (Ed.). (1969). Whither Czechoslovakia? New Delhi. Tharoor, S. (1982). Reasons of state: Political development and India’s foreign policy under Indira Gandhi 1966–1977 . Vikas. Tharoor, S. (2012). Pax Indica: India and the world of the 21st century. Penguin Books. TOI. (1949, August 11). India’s diplomatic missions: Search for economies. TOI. (1960, September 5). India’s trade with Soviet Bloc, some expansion reported. TOI. (1990a, March 10). India for more ties with E. Europe. TOI. (1990b, September 10). FICCI report, ‘East European transition my hit balance of trade’. University Grants Commission. (2006, October). Report of the expert committee on Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics (GIPE), Pune, New Delhi.

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Vaidyanath, R. (1969). Soviet studies in India. Canadian Slavonic Papers, 11(2), 145–155. Yadav, S. N. (1983). India’s trade and economic ties with East Europe. Foreign Trade Review, 18(1), 21–27. Yodhraj. (1954). Some aspects of post-war European economics. India Quarterly, 10(1), 11–23.

CHAPTER 4

India and the Czech Republic Rajendra K. Jain

As a small state in the heart of Europe, Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of the First World War sought to energetically establish diplomatic missions abroad in order to promote its economic and political interests. It sought markets for its manufactured products and sources of raw materials for the growth of its export-oriented industrialized economy (Muelenbeck, 2016: 17). By the mid-1920s, its diplomatic network had become one of the largest in the world. It had opened a Consulate in Bombay in October 1920 and established another one in Calcutta in December 1929.1 Since 1931, it has had an Embassy in New Delhi. It was also the first Central European country with which India established diplomatic relations on 18 November 1947. The first Czech Ambassador to India Jaroslav Sejnoha presented his credentials to Lord Mountbatten on 14 February 1948. This chapter examines India-Czechoslovak economic and political relations during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. It discusses the Czech Republic’s outreach to Asia, including India, in the 2000s and looks at the state of relations during the Modi Years (2014–2020). It goes 1 The Consulate in Calcutta was closed down in 1940 due to the Second World War,

but was re-opened in 1962.

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_4

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on to analyse how Czechoslovakia has figured in Indian scholarly literature since the 1950s and in Lok Sabha debates from 1947 to 2019. The chapter assesses defence cooperation between the two countries. It deals with the historical and contemporary Indian images of Czechoslovakia, perceptions of India in the Czech Republic, and cultural cooperation between India and Czechia.2

Nehru’s 1938 Visit Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit to Czechoslovakia in 1938 occurred at a time of Nazi expansion in Central Europe (Nehru, 1953a: 604–605). Though Nehru’s week-long trip to Czechoslovakia3 was of a private nature, he was received as the representative of the general public opinion of India (Krasa, 1989: 339; Trhlik, 1989). As a staunch critic of the rise of fascism and Nazism in Europe in the 1930s, he was convinced that if they were not checked in time, it would lead the world into a world war. By midAugust, the Central European situation had become ‘very critical’ and he feared the worst. He was aghast that the British Government went on indirectly encouraging ‘Hitler and his gang’ (Nehru, 1938a: 108). Nehru found Europe to be ‘a volcano on the point of bursting’. The European crisis, he felt, was ‘solely due to Hitler’s determination to dominate Europe by crushing Czechoslovakia and thus reaching Rumania with her oilfields and wheat’. Once a war began, it would ‘shake and paralyse the world and affect India deeply’ (Nehru, 1938b: 117–118). He sensed ‘the tension and fear’ that gripped the people and appreciated how ‘the little country of Czechoslovakia, an island of democracy in a sea of reaction’ carried on with it work normally in the face of preparation for war (Nehru, 1938d: 111). India sympathized with Czechoslovakia because it

2 On 17 May 2016, the Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations informed the UN that the short name to be used for the country is Czechia though the country retained its full name, the ‘Czech Republic’. 3 . During his stay, he mostly travelled in Northern Bohemia. He made a sightseeing trip to Plzen and the Skoda Works there as well as a one-day trip to Zlin. He then went by train to Budapest, he spent one and a half day in Bratislava, where he especially saw the housing projects for workers (Nambiar, 1964). Nehru had earlier visited the famous Czech spa of Karlovy Vary at the age of 18 in 1909 with his father Motilal Nehru and his cousin Sridhar Nehru when both were students at Magdalene College, Cambridge (Krasa, 2000: 197).

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had been ‘a bulwark of democracy’ in Central Europe (Nehru, 1938c: 131). The Munich agreement (30 September 1938) was seen as ‘a turning point in Europe and world history’, which had led to ‘a new division of Europe’ (Nehru, 2003: 964). Nehru reacted strongly against the policy of appeasement. It was at his insistence that the Indian National Congress criticized the German occupation of Czechoslovakia (Damodaran, 1990, 1997: 120–122, 140–141; Nanda, 1995: 43). Czechoslovakia, he wrote rather graphically, had been transformed from ‘a proud free nation’ to ‘a country sunken in sorrow and despair, with hungry wolves snarling and biting off bits of it, and shrunken remains becoming almost a colony of Nazi Germany’ (Nehru, 1938e: 188). Subhash Chandra Bose had also visited Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1934, when he participated in the founding meeting of the Indian Association which had been established as part of the Oriental Institute in Prague, which had been established to enhance awareness of India in Czechoslovakia, promote knowledge about each other and foster friendly relations. Bose’s second visit took place in the Autumn of the same year when he met Vithalbhai Patel at one of the Bohemian spas. In 1938, as President of the Indian National Congress, Bose had established a similar society in Bombay (Zbavitel, 1984: 47).

The Cold War Years After the Second World War, the governments of Eastern Europe, independent India’s first Foreign Secretary maintained, had turned out to be ‘instruments of Communist expansion’. And ‘where there were nonCommunist elements, experience showed, as in Czechoslovakia, that they would be allowed to stay there long’ (Menon, 1950: 8–9). In its quest for security, the Soviet Union sought to establish ‘a regular Soviet belt, a cordon sanitaire’. Poland, Hungary, Finland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia—all were ‘links in this new iron girdle’ (Menon, 1950: 8, 10). The Soviet attitude towards ‘the satellite States in Eastern Europe and, in particular, her conduct in Czechoslovakia which, one had hoped, would be a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe, does not inspire us with much confidence’ (Menon, 1950: 13–14). The mysterious death of Jan Masaryk—the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia and the last campaigner against communist dominance in Prague—on 10 March 1948 ‘greatly distressed’ Nehru. Public opinion in

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India too had become ‘very critical of Russian attitude in Czechoslovakia’ (Nehru, 1948: 546). In the mid-1950s, Czechoslovakia followed the Soviet lead in its outreach towards the Third World (after Khrushchev’s trip to India in 1955) in order to regain economic opportunities, demonstrate its loyalty to Moscow by being an asset to Soviet foreign policy and enhance the communist regime’s legitimacy (Muelenbeck, 2016: 19). As one of the largest developing countries and leaders of non-aligned countries, India became the object of special Czechoslovak attention. The Nehru (1955) and Siroky (1958) Visits Jawaharlal Nehru arrived with his daughter Indira Gandhi on 6 June 1955 for a 24-hours stay in Prague en route to the Soviet Union. The Indian prime minister expressed the desire that relations between the two countries should be closer and that ‘our contacts should grow’ (TOI, 1955: 1). An enduring impression of the visit was that Czechoslovakia seemed to Nehru to be ‘a very unhappy country’ (Nehru, 1955a: 305). It was clear to him that even ‘if Soviet influence or domination were disliked, the fear of the German invasion was much greater than was in fact a cementing factor of all these countries and the Soviet Union’ (Nehru, 1955e: 431). On his return, he felt that there could be little doubt that after the Second World War, communism in Czechoslovakia and other Central and East European Countries (CEECs) was ‘imposed by Russian arms’. All CEECs, except Czechoslovakia and East Germany, were ‘backward socially and economically and standards were low’ (Nehru, 1955b: 268). During Prime Minister Viliam Siroky’s return visit in January 1958, the Panchsheel or Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence was endorsed. The two countries adjudged disarmament to be ‘the most urgent and vital problem of international concern’. They called for the immediate cessation of the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons which would constitute the first, concrete step which should be immediately adopted (India, MEA, 1958: 1–2). The visiting prime minister explicitly endorsed India’s stance on Kashmir, stating that it formed ‘an integral part of the Republic of India and consequently there is nothing to be discussed’ (Siroky, 1958: 1).

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The 1960s As part of his East European trip, Finance Minister Morarji Desai, accompanied by B. K. Nehru, Commissioner-General for Economic Affairs (External Financial Relations), visited Prague in June 1960. Though the country was advanced, Desai discerned ‘a feeling of suppression amongst the people...only about 7 or 8 per cent of the population believed in communism while the rest believed in democracy’. The hold of the ‘Communist dictatorship was very strong. They had to behave as Moscow directed them to do an those who carried on the Government were all Communists’ (Desai, 1974: 151). Like other East European countries, Czechoslovakia passed resolutions at successive party meetings denouncing Chinese aggression against India in October 1962, thereby putting at rest concerns whether the Socialist countries would support China for ideological reasons (Singh, 1964: 221). Czechoslovakia was among the first countries that India appealed for immediate assistance. Prague expressed its readiness to offer technical assistance and enlarged barter trade to assist India in the emergency. Prague gave its firm support to India on the Kashmir issue in the United Nations Security Council in May 1964 and subsequently during Prime Minister Jozef Lenart’s visit (March 1965) when he stated that Indo-Pak differences should be resolved by peaceful means, by ‘direct, patient negotiations between the Governments of the two countries without any interference’ (India, MEA, 1965a: 44). Seven months later, this was reiterated during President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan’s visit to Czechoslovakia (India, MEA 1965b: 263). Discussions during President Antonin Novotny’s visit to India in November 1966 revealed an ‘identity of views’ on many important international issues, and on those on which views were not identical, they were ‘very close’ (Chagla, 1966: 286). Novotny expressed his strong support for the Tashkent Declaration, which provided the basis for a peaceful resolution of all outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan (India, MEA, 1966b: 284). Prague Spring The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the suppression of Czech sovereignty and democracy led to a sharp reaction among educated opinion as well as the Press and Indian elites. The Czechoslovak

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issue had shaken up inner-party alignments and set in motion the muchdreaded process of ideological polarization in the Congress (Masani, 1975: 192). The Prime Minister’s statement in Parliament on 1 August 1968 was the culmination of a day of hectic lobbying and canvassing. The draft statement had been hotly debated in the External Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Morarji Desai argued in favour of stronger criticism of the Soviet Union. Mrs. Gandhi however felt that this would only alienate Moscow and jeopardize India’s supply of arms without any tangible benefits to the Czech cause. Most of the colleagues had supported her stand and Desai eventually acquiesced in the views of the majority in the Cabinet (Masani, 1975: 191; Tharoor, 1982: 95). Union Planning Minister Asoka Mehta even resigned from the Cabinet on the issue. In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (1968), Indira Gandhi felt that peace in Central Europe remained fragile. An ‘establishment scholar’, however, acknowledged that though ‘an indignant public opinion’ demanded that the Government of India should follow the rest of the world in condemning Soviet aggression, it was also ‘widely felt’ that close Indo-Soviet relations were also vital (Appadorai, 1969: 174). This was characteristic of Mrs. Gandhi’s ‘selective application of ideology’ and her reluctance to apply ‘anti-imperialism to the Soviets over Czechoslovakia’ (Tharoor, 1982: 399). The 1970s and the 1980s Unlike her father’s one-day stop-over, Indira Gandhi arrived in Prague for a four-day goodwill visit. She fondly referred to her 1938 visit as ‘political education’ which gave her insights into the labyrinthine ways of international diplomacy and acquaintance with well-known personalities (Gandhi 1972b: 149). She appreciated its prompt support for Bangladesh and the growth of the machine tool and electrical equipment industries in India (Gandhi, 1972a: 148). Détente in Europe, she remarked, indicated that while European nations were gradually realizing the incalculable harm of the arms race and the disastrous consequences of large-scale confrontation, the rest of the world was not at peace, with Asia being wrecked by vicious wars and an uneasy truce. There was ‘a remarkably close similarity of views’ on international questions (Gandhi, 1972c: 152; India, MEA,

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1973: 49). No agreements were signed, but it was decided in principle to conclude an agreement on legal assistance, prevention of double taxation and on scientific and technical cooperation. Salient Features of Prime Ministerial Visits Almost all prime ministerial visits till the 1980s were essentially goodwill visits—Jawaharlal Nehru (June 1955), Villiam Siroky (January 1958), Jozef Lenart (March 1965) Indira Gandhi (June 1972), Morarji Desai (June 1979), Lubomir Strougal (February 1984), and Rajiv Gandhi (11 August 1987). Serious business on economic and trade relations—the core of the relationship—was essentially done in the Joint Commission for Economic, Trade and Industrial Cooperation.4 Apart from Indira Gandhi’s four day and Morarji Desai’s three-day trip, the other two prime ministerial visits were very brief: Jawaharlal Nehru made a one-day (24 June 1955) transit halt on his way to Moscow and Rajiv Gandhi (10 August 1986) for a meagre two hours—discussions for an hour-and-a-half and half-an-hour of sightseeing in Prague—on his way back from Mexico by diverting his flight to Prague instead of making a refuelling halt at Frankfurt. Agreements were not generally signed during the visits. The only exception was the visit of Prime Minister Strougal in December 1974 when four agreements were signed. The joint statements or other speeches made during the visits reflected almost identical views on most topical issues. Czechoslovakia accepted, without reservations, the peaceful nature of India’s nuclear programme in the wake of its peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. During Rajiv Gandhi’s 1986 visit, Prague expressed support for his Six-Nation Initiative for peace and disarmament and praised India’s role in the anti-nuclear weapon campaign (TOI, 1986a, 1986b).

4 The main objective of the Committee was to make joint studies of the developmental needs of the two national economies and explore the possibilities of cooperation, particularly in the field of production and in devising measures for effective implementation of the various economic agreements between the two countries. The Committee would also study and utilize the planning activities of the two countries for furthering its objectives. (Lok Sabha Debates, 14th sess., 3rd series, 15 April 1956, vol. 53, no. 40, 3rd series, col. 11,006).

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Economic and Trade Relations As an advanced industrialized nation, Czechoslovakia had supplied equipment for several sugar factories, power plants and for India’s first aluminium plant during the interwar period (1919–1939). After Independence, India was not considering trade relations on an ideological basis with countries like Czechoslovakia. Trade was ‘limited’ because it was ‘conditioned’ by the past. Moreover, due to the devaluation, New Delhi was increasingly compelled to trade within the Sterling Area (Nehru, 1949: 394). Czechoslovakia was the first Central European country with which India signed a trade agreement for exchange of commodities worth Rs.50 million on 29 March 1949. It was also the first CEEC to offer to render all possible assistance including technical personnel to build up new industries and improve existing ones in India. India however encountered difficulties in paying for imports and the rates were usually high (Nehru, 1951: 572). The 1949 trade agreement was extended annually until the signature of the first three-year trade agreement of 30 September 1957. Thereafter, the exchange of goods and services began to be regulated between Czech foreign trade corporations and the State Trading Corporation and other commercial organizations in India with payment for both commercial and non-commercial transactions being made in Indian Rupees (India, MEA, 1957: 165–166). The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) was however keen to move trade beyond governmentto-government annual trade plans by encouraging greater participation of the private sector in trade and transfer of technology (TOI, 1960a: 7). Nehru felt that ‘a special effort’ had to be made to encourage trade, in order of preference, with Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia, ‘although perhaps the latter has more to offer’ (Nehru, 1955c: 459 n. 3). The first trade and payments agreement providing for bilateral, balanced trade in non-convertible Rupees was signed on 7 November 1963 and subsequently renewed on 30 October 1969, 4 December 1974, 3 December 1979 and 11 October 1984. Czechoslovakia extended three long-term credits—Rs.231 million (24 November 1959), Rs.400 million (11 May 1964) and of Rs.300 million (5 November 1965)—for the delivery of machinery and equipment for

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about 60 large and medium-sized industrial plants in establishing important branches of heavy industry in India in the public sector. This not only gave a boost to trade, but was of vital importance in India’s quest for economic independence and industrial development at a time when the West was reluctant to do so in the public sector.5 Over the years, Czechoslovakia had grown into one of India’s ‘most significant collaborators in heavy industry’ and aided Indian efforts to attain selfreliance (Gandhi, 1974: 323). By 1965, Czechoslovakia had contributed nearly $100 million to India’s industrial development (Shastri, 1965: 43). Owing to the poor quality, terms of delivery and reliability of Soviet machinery exports, Czechoslovak competitors had increased their share in the Indian market at the expense of Soviet ones (Hilger, n.d.). The Indo-Czechoslovak Inter-Governmental Committee for Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation was a precursor of similar ones with other Central European countries—Poland (1972) and Hungary (1973). They served a useful purpose by transcending bilateral agreements with a given country and provided a sort of supreme review body or an overall ‘umbrella’ to oversee, accelerate and coordinate the activities of the various existing bilateral agreements apart from identifying, from its vantage point, additional fields of cooperation in, keeping, with the changing needs of industrial and commercial developments (India, MEA, 1973: 75–76.) Bilateral trade had increased nearly four-fold from Rs.207 million in 1960 to Rs.800 million in 1973, but declined to Rs.660 million in 1977 (India, MEA, 1981: 307), but rose again to Rs.2.450 billion in 1987.

5 These included (a) a metallurgical foundry forge plant at Ranchi (which made it possible for Indian heavy engineering industry to make heavy castings and forgings as well as machines for other industrial branches); (b) the Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. at Tiruchirappalli; (c) a heavy machine tools factory at Ranchi; (d) Bharat Electrical Ltd. Plants at Hyderabad for building steam turbo-sets up to a capacity of 100 MW (in 1965); (e) Tirucharippalli (a plant for the manufacture of the corresponding steam boilers) [equipment manufactured under licenses and documentation submitted by Skoda Plzen and the First Brno Engineering Works); (f) the Heavy Engineering Corporation at Ranchi for the manufacture of large capacity cement plants in the range of 1,200–1,200 tonnes per day; (g) Bharat Heavy Plates and Vessels at Visakhapatnam; (h) Machine Tools Institute at Bangalore; and (i) the Vizag Steel Rolling Plant. Czechoslovakia also played a crucial role in the energy sector: the steam power plant at Singrauli with four 500 MW units, a 500 MW unit for the Trombay power plant and a 210 MW unit for the steam power plant. The Czech Republic also supplied a heavy power equipment plant near Hyderabad and a high-pressure boiler plant at Tiruchi.

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The Post-Cold War Era India did not anticipate the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and was totally out of touch with the new forces that dominated the region. The Ministry of External Affairs however continued to highlight traditionally close and friendly relations with the CEECs. India-Czech Republic trade declined considerably with the fading away of balanced trade through annual trade plans for exports and imports and the collapse of state companies as the country moved towards a market economy, and the shift to trading in hard currency from 1993 onwards. With the Czech Republic totally engrossed in its quest for admission in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (in 1999) and the European Union (in May 2004), it had little interest or time for India. After the Velvet Divorce, the first Asian minister to visit Prague after the peaceful division of the country was Minister of State for External Affairs R. L. Bhatia in mid-February 1993. He offered India’s readiness to enter into any new agreements to promote bilateral cooperation in different fields and offered India’s assistance in training Czech personnel in various sectors like banking, insurance, computers, foreign trade and diplomacy (India, MEA, 1993: 64). He informed his interlocutors that a trade delegation would visit Prague in March 1993 to work out new trade and payments arrangements. Four months later, Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec visited India along with an important business delegation to revitalize links. The Czech Republic, Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh told his counterpart, enjoyed ‘an excellent business image’ in India and that both sides must exploit business opportunities (Singh, 1993: 91). Havel’s Visit, 1994 President Vaclav Havel, who arrived in India on 6 February 1994 on a five-day visit, was hailed as ‘a former dissident, playwright and essayist, who during the days of Communist rule over united Czechoslovakia was internationally known as the foremost representative of the intellectual opposition’ (Dhar, 1994). Undivided Czechoslovakia was stated to be India’s ‘leading trade partner’ in Central-East Europe. Politically, the two countries had been ‘appreciative and understanding of each other’s concerns’ (India, MEA, 1994a: 25). Havel assured New Delhi that while his country wanted to be integrated with Europe, this did not imply that it would be ‘Eurocentrist’.

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The Czechs, Havel remarked, were conscious of the complicated history of Kashmir. The ideal solution, he added, was by peaceful negotiations as was done before in the Simla Agreement. When Pakistan sought to raise the Kashmir issue in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights at that time, he did not feel that it was necessary to internationalize the issue and that a peaceful solution lay through peaceful bilateral dialogue (India, MEA, 1994b: 40). Three days later, he sought to carefully distinguish his personal stand from the political one of his government on Kashmir. He declined to offer any personal views on Kashmir and the allegations of human rights violations since he had not been able to personally see the realities (cited in Bose, 1994: 13).

Outreach to Asia in the 2000s In accordance with the Policy Statement of August 1998 and the ‘Concept of Foreign Policy, February 1999’, the Czech Republic emphasized that its key strategic priorities were membership of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, good and stable relations with neighbouring states and regional cooperation as well as external economic relations. To overcome earlier neglect, Prague announced its intention to pay greater attention to relations with countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to regain market share and restore economic ties. India was acknowledged to have played ‘a prominent role’ in world organizations, the Indian subcontinent and ‘the whole of Asia’. India had been a major trading partner of the Czech Republic linked by ‘traditional long friendly contacts’ (Czech Republic, MFA, 1999: 175). In 2003, it was Prague’s leading export destination in Asia (Czech Republic, MFA, 2004a: 172). In 2001, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs described India as ‘among the regional super-powers’ which also sought to play the role of ‘a super-power on a worldwide scale’ (Czech Republic, MFA, 2001: 167). This rosy language was toned down next year by a bland statement that relations between the two countries had been ‘traditionally of a good standard’ (Czech Republic, MFA, 2003b: 190). The second ‘Conceptual Basis of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic for the 2003–2006 Period’ sought to develop bilateral and multilateral relations with Asia on the basis of mutually beneficial cooperation, especially in the economic field. Its relations with the region, it stated, would be developed ‘in conformity’ with the policy pursued

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by the European Union towards the region and seek participation in the Asia Europe Meeting (Czech Republic, MFA, 2003a: 18–19). Bilateral political relations continued to be friendly and displayed ‘a high degree of cooperation’ (Czech Republic, MFA, 2005a: 218). Relations with India derived from the tradition of ‘long-standing and problemfree friendship’ between the two countries, which displayed ‘a rising tendency and a high level of mutual contacts’ (Czech Republic, MFA, 2008a: 361). In its annual reviews of Czech foreign policy, the Czech Institute of International Relations funded by the MFA dealt with the ‘Far East’ (Fürst, 2010), relations with India were not examined for over a decade-and-a-half apparently because of the lack of expertise and/or interest. Recognition of the need to extend and diversify trade from an undue economic dependence on the West led the Czech Republic to draft ‘The Czech Republic in Asia: Strategy for the Development of Relations with Regions and Countries of Asia’ (2006). However, this strategy was not published. The Ministry of Industry and Trade’s Export Strategy for the Period 2006–2010 identified India as well as China and Vietnam as ‘economically relevant countries’ for trade and investment. Inresponse to the global financial crisis, the Export Strategy for 2012–2020 recognizedIndia’s potential and China, India and Vietnam in Asia were among the twelve priority countries identified for major attention (Czech Republic, Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2012: 16). The Conceptual Basis of Czech Foreign Policy for 2011 declared its intention to develop relations with India and Brazil ‘as international players with significant growth potential and increasing leverage in world politics’. Both countries offered significant opportunities for fostering relations in the security and military fields (Czech Republic, MFA 2011a). Four years later, the Czech Foreign Ministry came out with a new Concept of the Czech Republic’s Foreign Policy (3 August 2015), which took note of changes in world politics. There was, it acknowledged, a change in global power relations leading to a shift towards a multipolar world order at the economic, strategic-policy and demographic level. The economic growth of emerging economies, especially in East, Southeast and South Asia, had bolstered ‘the global South’s claims to rule-setting regarding the global economy and international trade’. There was recognition that the Czech Republic was ‘small country in a global context and a medium-sized country on a European scale’. The Asia-Pacific represented a region of significant economic opportunities. It was one of the

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world’s key regions in view of its expanding economic, political and security importance. It recognized India as ‘the dominant economic partner’ in South Asia and flagged security (Afghanistan) as an important issue in the region (Czech Republic, MFA, 2015a). Though the document listed relations with India as noteworthy, they remained ‘somewhat unfulfilled’ (Fürst et al., 2018: 222).

The 2000s Accompanied by the Ministers of Trade and Industry, Finance and Agriculture as well as a large business delegation, Prime Minister Milos Zeman visited India in March 2001. This was followed up next year by two visits of Minister of Trade and Industry Jiri Rusnok in August 2002 and January 2003. Czech membership of the European Union in May 2004 provided another area of meaningful interaction between the two countries (India, MEA, 2006: 1706). Both sides felt that ‘regular exchanges’ of high-level visits would help to sustain the momentum of bilateral relations (ibid.: 1709). President Vaclav Havel visited India in November 2005 and expressed Czech support for India’s candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. This visit was followed by that of Prime Minister Jiri Paroubek in January 2006. In 2007, preparatory negotiations went ahead regarding a treaty on social security, an agreement on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments, an agreement on cooperation in the defence industry and a programme of cooperation in the fields of education, science and culture. In its 2008 report, the Czech MFA only dealt with economic and cultural relations and made no reference to political relations in its reports for the next two years (2009–2010). The visit of Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna for the EU Troika ministerial meeting in Prague in June 2009 was followed by ‘a highly significant’ official bilateral visit of Vice-President Hamid Ansari (Czech Republic, MFA, 2010a: 10). Reform of the UN The Czech Republic had lent support to India’s demand for the enlargement of the United Nations Security Council as early as February 1994 when President Havel visited India. The Czech Republic initially considered the reform of the United Nations to be ‘a thematic and long-term task’. The reform of the UN Security Council to make its composition

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reflect global changes, it felt, constituted ‘a special challenge’ (Czech Republic, MFA, 2003b: 21). Despite the absence of a common EU position on UN reform, during the Spring of 2005 the Czech Republic was one of the early co-sponsors of the G-4 (Germany, Japan, India and Brazil) resolution for the enlargement of the UN Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. Prague considered the G4 resolution as ‘the most realistic of all models presented so far’ (Czech Republic, MFA, 2006a: 84). Prague also supported the re-tabling of the G-4 resolution at the UN in 2006. Prague considered it necessary to expand both permanent and non-permanent categories, on the basis of equitable representation, with the inclusion of both developed and developing countries. Prime Minister Paroubek reiterated that, as the world’s largest democracy with an active global role, India has all the credentials for permanent membership in an expanded Security Council (India, MEA, 2006). The Nuclear Suppliers Group When the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative came up in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2005, the Czech Republic acknowledged that while India had not expressed an intention to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it had made a commitment to separate its civil nuclear programme from its military one. At NSG meetings, Prague expressed its willingness to participate in any possible opening of trade with India regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that was consistent with its international commitments and stressed the significance of the strict separation of the civilian nuclear sector from the military (Czech Republic, MFA, 2006a: 121–122). At the two extraordinary NSG sessions in June and August 2008, which led to the adoption of an exception for the export of nuclear items to India for exclusive use in its civilian nuclear sector, Prague supported India’s case.

The Modi Years, 2014–2020 Since 2014, there has been a spurt in the exchange of visits between the Czech Republic and India: three visits by Czech Foreign Ministers (December 2016, June 2017 and January 2020), the visit of President Ram Nath Kovind (September 2018) after a gap of 22 years, and the visit of Prime Minister Andrej Babis in January 2019 after a gap of 12 years.

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Several meetings were also held on the sidelines of important international gatherings—President Milos Zeman and President Pranab Mukherjee in Moscow on the margins of the Victory Day celebrations (May 2005); Prime Minister Babis and Vice-President M. Venkaiah Naidu on the sidelines of the twelfth ASEM summit in Brussels (October 2018); and probably for the first time Foreign Minister Tomas Petricek met Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar on the sidelines of the 74th session of the UN General Assembly (29 September 2019). In January 2020, the Czech Foreign Minister expressed the hope that India, ‘a growing power and the largest democracy in the world, can and will be Europe’s firm ally in tackling the crucial challenges’ (Petricek, 2020). President Kovind and Premier Babis’ Visits The visit of President Ram Nath Kovind to the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Cyprus was not merely about showing the flag in Central and Eastern Europe, which had long been neglected, but was used by the Modi Government to transact meaningful business. The visit led to the conclusion of five MoUs.6 President Kovind described the Czech Republic as ‘a leading economic partner’. India’s growth story and Czech technological expertise and manufacturing prowess, he added, made them ‘natural partners’ (Kovind, 2018a). The two countries expressed the desire to further strengthen and develop ‘the strategic aspects’ of the bilateral relationship and concurred that further discussions may be useful for ‘strengthening bilateral relations to a strategic partnership’ including through facilitating of temporary movement of professionals on both sides (India, MEA, 2018). The two sides also had similar views on a variety of international issues including the comprehensive reform of the United Nations and terrorism. The two sides acknowledged a long history of defence and security cooperation which has traditionally been ‘an integral part of their relationship and an important factor of mutual confidence building’ (India MEA, 2018: para 14). Prague reiterated its support for 6 These were (1) MoU between the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and the Czech Academy of Sciences on scientific and technological cooperation; (2) Work Plan for support of Indo-Czech projects for the years 2019–2022 in diverse areas of science and technology; (3) Agreement on Visa Waiver for Diplomatic Passport holders; (4) MoU between ELI Beamlines and Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in the field of laser technology; (5) MoU on cooperation between the Haryana Agricultural University and the Czech University of Life Sciences.

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India’s claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and its membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Prime Minister Babis visited India in January 2019 along with a large business delegation. The visit reflected Czechia’s pursuit of a clear export strategy for Asia and Africa, which were perceived as having great potential for Czech business. In his speech at the inaugural session of the biennial Vibrant Gujarat Global Summit—where the Czech Republic was one of the sixteen partner countries and where more than 50 Czech companies participated—the Czech prime minister expressed the desire to elevate relations with India to a strategic partnership. Czech-Indian business ties, he stated, not only had a long tradition but great potential for the future (Czech Republic, Embassy in India, 2019a).

Skilled Indian Migrants in Czechia The first time that an offer to send workers to meet the shortage of labour in Czechoslovakia was made by President V. V. Giri in October 1973. Czech leaders politely declined, stating that they were receptive to the idea, which would have to be carefully studied before a final decision could be taken (Giri, 1973: 4). The offer was clearly much before its time. In July 2003, the Czech Government launched a five-year pilot project entitled ‘Selection of Qualified Workers’ to contribute to the development of the economy. The foreign workers would be permanently integrated in Czech society along with their families (Czech Republic, Ministry of the Interior, 2020). In 2018, the Czech Government selected India (apart from the Philippines, Mongolia, Serbia and Ukraine) for the Employee Card scheme (Czech Republic, MFA, 2019: 16). Prague’s decision to create a special window to facilitate the movement of 500 long-stay visas for highly qualified Indian professionals was part of an extension of its economic migration programmes (Bagchi, 2018; Czech Republic, MFA, 2020: 20; India, Trade Promotion Council, 2018; see Drbohlav & Janurova, 2019). New Delhi appreciated the Czech recognition of the need to enhance the mobility of Indian professionals and students into the Czech Republic to upscale the economic partnership (Kovind, 2018b). Prague introduced an annual quota of 500 for India, w.e.f. 1 September 2019 (Czech Republic, Embassy in India, 2019c) since

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it continued to suffer from supply-side constraints. In order to attract educated highly qualified people from India, the Czech Government created a special window to fast-track the movement of highly qualified Indian professionals, which was likely to be expanded in future (Chauhan, 2020).

Defence Cooperation Weapons for the Nizam of Hyderabad Even before Indian attained independence, Indian intelligence reports claimed that the Nizam of Hyderabad had discussed £3 million worth of orders with Czech arms factories, but it was not possible to find anyone in Europe willing to sell guns to a non-state and to transport them across several hundred miles of Indian territory into Hyderabad (Hajari, 2015: 172, 234–235). Nehru considered it ‘constitutionally wrong’ of the Czech Government’s efforts to have separate dealings for the supply of arms to the Nizam of Hyderabad. It was ‘a matter affecting our security’ and was contrary to earlier treaties. He ruled out the possibility of India being able to purchase arms from Czechoslovakia (Nehru, 1947: 432). He advised Ambassador V. K. Krishna Menon to immediately approach the Czech Embassy in London and request that the transaction should be stopped ‘immediately pending full and formal enquiry’ by the Czech Government (Nehru, 1947: 434). The Cold War Years Czechoslovakia had re-established itself as a major arms exporter by the mid-1950s and export of arms to the Third World became a valuable source for earning badly needed convertible foreign currency. In September 1955, Czech Ambassador to India Ladislav Durdil met Nehru and conveyed his Government’s desire to invite Union Minister for Defence Organization Mahair Tyagi to Czechoslovakia in order to discuss ‘problems of defence production and supply’. Prague, he said, was in ‘a position to supply defence material of various kinds’. Nehru acknowledged that it would be possible for Czechoslovakia to provide military equipment as it was a ‘highly industrialised country with great capacity for producing military and other equipment’. The Skoda Works had been world-famous for over a century. He therefore felt that it would be ‘be

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desirable to find out what we can get there in case of need’. This, he felt would, also be ‘helpful in checking prices elsewhere’ (Nehru, 1955d: 345). A number of agreements were signed with Czechoslovakia for the setting up of facilities and plants in the public sector for meeting defencerelated requirements in the 1960s. These included an agreement on 19 September 1960 with Czech firm Kovo for a boat manufacturing plant in Kanpur (TOI, 1960b: 9). In July 1963, R. K. Nehru, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, visited Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in a new effort to secure more varied items of military hardware from Communist countries. He reported good prospects of acquiring additional equipment for strengthening air defence arrangements, defence production and other defence requirements (Nehru, 1963: 179). In 1965, India entered into agreements to buy high-power transmitters from several countries including the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (Gandhi, 1966: 154). On 25 March 1965, two agreements were signed with Czechoslovakia for the setting up a 12,000 tonnes annual capacity steel forgings plant in the public sector in Wardha, near Nagpur and a 15,000 tonnes of finished iron castings plant at Jabalpur. Both of these plants were principally produced forgings for use in vehicles manufactured for the defence services (TOI, 1965: 3; Foreign Affairs Record, March 1965: 46). In the 1970s, due to the delay in the production of the HJT-16 Kiran trainer, India ordered Aero L-39 basic trainers in 1974 from Czechoslovakia. However, subsequently Polish WSC-Mielec Ts-11 Iskra jet trainers were purchased instead (SIPRI, 1976: 176). Under the economic agreement of 30 November 1974, Prague agreed to help India develop radar equipment for the defence forces (TOI, 1974; India, MEA, 1974: 289). During the Cold War, SIPRI records the sale of 1 Aero-45S light aircraft in 1955 and 300 armoured personal carriers (APCs) OT-62A TOPAS between 1969–1972 and 300 OT-64C APCs between 1971– 1974 (SIPRI Arms Trade Register of Czechoslovak transfer of major weapons between 1950 and 2018). The 1990s During the Cold War, Czechoslovakia and Poland were the second and third largest armaments manufacturers in the Warsaw Pact and the bulk of their arms exports went to Warsaw Pact partners, primarily the Soviet

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Union. However, Poland and Czechoslovakia also exported arms to several developing countries, including India. In the early 1990s, the reliance of the Czechoslovak arms industry on developing countries had increased to 70% as a result of non-availability of traditional markets, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in Europe, and a glut in the international arms market (Hardt & Kaufman: 137). The collapse of the Warsaw Pact led to a major crisis in the defence industry of Czechoslovakia (and Poland); both were saddled with production overcapacity after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. All Central European countries had not been able regain volumes achieved during the Cold War (Bromley, 2007: 204). After the Velvet Divorce, Defence Minister Mallikarjun visited the Czech Republic in June 1994 to explore possibilities of the upgradation of Soviet-origin equipment. In 1999, a delegation led by First Deputy Minister of Defence Novotny participated in the inaugural DefExpo— a major platform for international defence companies to exhibit and promote their products and services. However, all Central European countries, including the Czech Republic, were encountering a major problem in procuring defence contracts. The most significant change from the Soviet era was that since defence deals were done on a tender system (even a restricted one at times), it hindered public sector defence companies from getting contracts because it brought in non-traditional suppliers.7 The 2000s A defence cooperation agreement was signed on 22 December 2003. It was also decided to establish a Joint Defence Committee (JDC). This was established in January 2006 and was co-chaired by Director-General (Acquisitions), Ministry of Defence and Deputy Minister of Defence from the Czech Republic. The first two meetings of the JDC took place annually in 2006 and 2007. The third and fourth JDC took place in April 2009 and September 2011. The next one took place five years later in Prague in November 2016. The fifth meeting of the JDC took place on 3 February 2020.

7 Conversation with a former Joint Secretary (Central Europe), MEA, in Prague, May 2008.

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Defence Minister George Fernandes accompanied by Defence Secretary visited the Czech Republic in October 2003. An expert-level defence delegation visited Prague to explore possibilities for sourcing platforms, equipment, systems, spares and overhauling in the Czech Republic (India, Ministry of Defence, 2004: 196). In early May 2009, a three-member Army Headquarters delegation was in the Czech Republic to attend the Defence Exhibition in Brno. There have also been several visits by the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to the Czech Republic. These included the visit of Chief Controller Prahalada in December 2009 and another one in September 2013 for finalizing and signing of agreement on a cryptography course at Masaryk University. Czech defence visits to India in the 2000s included those by Defence Ministers Vladimír Vetchý (February 2001) and Jaroslav Tvrdik (February 2003). In March 2012, Defence Minister Alexander Vondra attended the seventh International Defence Exhibition on Land and Naval System (DEFEXP India 2012) accompanied by a 46-member business delegation. Two years later, Defence Minister Martin Stropnicky visited New Delhi and Bengaluru in connection with the AERO India show (18–20 February 2015). He met Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar for discussions on the supply of Tatra vehicles for the Indian Army as well as a ˇ tender for the supply of assault rifles manufactured in Ceský Brod. Czech companies have also been assisting India in the supply of winter clothing. Contracts were given by the Airports Authority of India (AAI) to ELDIS Pardubice in 2012 for eight radar surveillance systems in 2012 and for another six in 2014. Placed at twelve airports,8 they monitor almost two million flights ensuring safe travel for more than 220 million passengers annually. Almost 90% of Indian airspace was covered by another contract to ELDIS in 2017 for the installation of three more radars at Aurangabad, Berhampur and Bikaner (Czech Republic, Embassy in India, 2019b). Tatra Trucks Tatra’s all-terrain trucks have remained an important component of the vehicle fleet of the Indian armed forces. They were being imported from

8 These were for airports in Ahmedabad, Amritsar, Cochin, Delhi, Guwahati Chennai, Imphal, Kolkata, Lucknow, Mangalore, Mumbai and Trivandrum.

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Omnipol Foreign Trade Corporation since 1969.9 The Indian Army had imported about 1,340 vehicles by May 1983, when the Government of India resolved that future requirements should be met by indigenous production based on a licence agreement with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in order to conserve foreign exchange and achieve self-sufficiency in production, spares and maintenance support of Tatra vehicles (India, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2014: 19). In May 1986, Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (BEML) signed an agreement with Omnipol for licensed production for ten years.10 An agreement was signed (against Ministry of Defence rules) in June 1997 with Tatra Sipox UK Ltd.—a London-based intermediary (in selling trucks to India—for component parts, but this was not implemented and superseded by a strategic alliance agreement in September 1997 (valid for ten years) which included Tatra vehicles as well as other items.11 A MoU—a legal document describing a bilateral agreement between parties, which generally lacks the binding power of a contract—was subsequently signed in March 2003 with Tatra Sipox UK12 for ten years covering the current range of Tatra vehicles as well as Tatra-based heavy recovery 9 Defence Minister A. K. Antony however stated in the Lok Sabha that imports began only in 1973 (Antony, 2012). 10 The agreement envisaged transfer of complete knowhow and technical documentation of the vehicles with continual upgradation with payment of Rs30 million as technical documentation fee. It also covered extensively the component parts and spare parts and stipulated that components to the value of Rs399.50 million would be purchased by BEML. The license agreement was for three types of Tatra vehicles (T-T-815 VTI 26,265 8 × 8, T-815 VVIT 20,235 6 × 6 and T-815 VVN 26,265 8 × 8). (India, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2014: 19). 11 The agreement also covered other vehicles like the Katasi 4 × 4 vehicle, phantoon main steam bridge system excavators and finishing machines mounted on Tatra chassis, cranes mounted on Tatra chassis, etc. (India, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2014: 20). 12 Tatra was privatized in 1993 by the Czech government after the collapse of the Czech truck industry in the 1990s. The failure to sell the company and revive continuous production led the Czech Government to reclaim majority stake in 1999. In November 2001, it sold its stake in the debt-ridden Tatra to the US-based SDC International, which in turn sold 40.6% shares to Terex Corporation, which subsequently increased its share to 71% (Pavlinek, 2008: 138). In July 2006, Terex sold 81% of its share to Blue River (later renamed Tatra Holding) a consortium led by Ravinder Rishi’s Tatra Sipox UK Ltd. All of Tatra Sipox’s shares were later transferred to Vectra Ltd. In 2013, control of Tatra trucks returned to Czech hands when two Czech entrepreneurs bought Tatra Holdings for e7 million when Tatra Holdings declared insolvency (Thapar, 2015).

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vehicles AV 15, but it excluded many items like axles and certain components from the indigenization process, which were included in earlier agreements (India, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2014: 20). Subsequently, a MoU and a Memorandum of Association (MOA)13 was signed with Tatra Sipox UK—a stakeholder in Tatra at the time. This agreement covered the indigenous manufacture of another variant of Tatra vehicle (Tipper trucks with 22–28 tonne capacity) and more advanced Euro II engines for Tatra vehicles. It stipulated that around 60–65% indigenization of the engine would be achieved by after three years from commencement of production.14 From 1986 to 2012, India purchased 6,500 vehicles from the Tatra company. Out of this total number, owing to special circumstances in 1999 (Kargil War) and 2001–2002 the Government of India purchased 1,950 vehicles from Tatra. Given the special need of ‘Operation Parakram’,15 another 1,950 trucks were purchased.16 Between 1987–1988 to 2013–2014, BEML had produced 7,943 vehicles and reached an indigenization of 62.50% in 2010–2011. BEML thus produced Tatra vehicles by importing critical components—like the axle, which constituted 25% of the vehicle cost—from the Czech manufacturer, who also supplied spares since indigenization of spares did not begin until 2007, thereby leading to considerably delay in the overhaul and repair of Tatra vehicles. Tatra had also set up a joint venture called Tatra Udyog in Hosur (50 km south of Bangalore) to produce heavy trucks for the civil sector. Prime Minister Milos Zeman identified a 50% customs duty on automative parts as the main obstacle for the successful development of the joint venture (Radio Prague, 2001).

13 A MOA is a legal document describing a bilateral agreement between parties to cooperatively work together on an agreed upon project and hold the parties responsible to their commitment. 14 The cost of the indigenization process and transfer of technology of the engine was US$4 million. Towards this sum, Rs.187 million was paid in July 2010 and January 2011 (India, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2014: 20). 15 The 2001–2002 India-Pakistan military standoff in the aftermath of the attack on the Indian Parliament (13 December 2001) was India’s largest military mobilization since the 1971 conflict. 16 According to a noted defence correspondent, India reportedly purchased only 788 trucks in 2002 (Thapar, 2015).

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On 26 September 2008, the Army revised the 1986 General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR), whereby not a single truck was purchased from Tatra (Antony, 2012: 27). In February 2012, Chief of Army Staff General V. K. Singh alleged that he had been offered a bribe to approve the purchase of 800 Tatra trucks. Deliveries from Koprivnice stopped and Tatra was blacklisted in March 2012. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) launched an investigation into the allegation that trucks reaching the Indian Army were being shipped through a Londonbased intermediary resulting in the Army paying 100–120% more per truck on the factory price. After a two-year probe, the CBI closed the case in August 2014 on the grounds of insufficient prosecutable evidence. In December 2014, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar partially lifted the ban on Tatra when he stated that BEML had been allowed to supply spare parts for the Tatra trucks as long as it did not deal with the British subsidiary of the company, which had been banned by the Manmohan Singh Government. India had lifted ‘the restricted ban for technical and purchases of spares from the original company’ provided they had nothing to do with the people who have been blacklisted. The company which had been banned was Tatra UK and that MoD had permitted BEML to deal with ‘the original company which is owned by different people now’. A restricted Non Objection Certificate had been granted to BEML because Tatra vehicles had become ‘critical for certain applications’ since spares and servicing were adversely affected (The Economic Times, 2014). Despite the CBI’s closure of the case, Tatra still continued to be listed among firms from which only ‘restricted procurements’ were permissible on the basis of ‘operational urgency, national security and non-availability of other alternatives’ according to a Union Defence Ministry Circular of 19 February 2018 (India, Ministry of Defence, 2018). Before the ban on Tatra was lifted by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar in December 2014, the ownership of Tatra underwent a change with two Czech entrepreneurs buying the company for e7 million from the insolvent Tatra Holdings SRO—a Vectra (Ravi Rishi)-led consortium—thereby wiping clean all traces of the Ravi Rishi footprint. Under a new legal name, Tatra Trucks A. S. (instead of the old Tatra A.S.), India could now begin to engage the ‘new’ entity afresh in conformity with Indian procurement procedures of dealing directly with the original equipment manufacturer (Thapar, 2015). This facilitated the re-entry of Tatra in the Indian market in February 2015, when it signed a MoU with BEML for continued supplies and production support during the

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visit of Defence Minister Martin Stropnicky (Czech Republic, Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces, 2015). This opened the way for specific orders for chasses and parts. In July 2015, contracts were signed for the supply of 260 semi-knocked-down kits for final assembly in India, out of which 120 were to be delivered in 2015 (Tatratrucks.com, 2015). After sales services would be provided to the Indian fleet of Tatra trucks by the Indian subsidiary called Tatra India. Tatra vehicles have been the prime vehicles used to move all heavy military equipment, including radars, artillery and missiles and rocket systems, including Brahmos and Agni-V Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). As one of the largest users of Tatra trucks in the world, India is a strategically extremely important market for the Czech Republic. Today, the Indian Army operates more than 10,000 Tatra heavy vehicles, including 3,925 assembly sets which were delivered between 2003 and 2012. In 2010, about 56% of Tatra Truck’s annual production went to India (Tatratrucks.com, 2015). Czech Arms Exports, 2003–2017 In 2003, the Czech Republic exported e17.025 million of military equipment to India, which included e14.157 million (tanks, armoured and other vehicles and specially designed components thereof) and e2.5 million (electronics, measuring equipment and specially designed components thereof (Czech Republic, MFA, 2004b: 22). In 2004, the Czech Republic exported arms worth e17.240 million to India. These were out of a total arms exports of e83 million in 2003 and e90 million in 2004 (Czech Republic, MFA, 2004b: 28). In 2005, Czech export of military equipment to India sharply fell to e3.477 million, but rose again in 2006 to e33.842 million, but peaked to e38.226 million in 2007—the highest during 2003–2017 (see Table 4.1). Czechia’s export of military equipment to India during 2015, 2016 and 2017 was e28.534 million, e36.919 million and e30.853 million, respectively. Among non-EU countries, India was ranked as the second leading importer of military equipment from the Czech Republic in 2003. During the next two years, it continued to be the leading importer, but India slipped to third position in 2006. For four consecutive years (2007– 2010), India regained its position as the leading arms importer among non-EU countries from the Czech Republic (Czech Republic, MFA, 2008b, 2010b: 5). In 2011, however, it slipped to third place, with

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Table 4.1 Export of Czech military equipment to India, 2003–2017 (in million Euros) Year

No. of licenses issued

Value of licenses

Actual exports

2003a 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

79 91 54 73 32 22 18 30 25 29

17.126 17.191 3.477 33.842 38.226 13.227 20.034 31.189 10.659 38.124

17.025 17.24 3.793 7.024 39.457 20.43 17.097 29.382 12.464 6.22

2013 2014 2015

18 30 38

33.936 4.048 28.534

0.426 2.803 12.683

2016

60

36.919

30

2017

44

30.853

32.2

Categories of military equipment 3, 6 3, 6 6, 11 6 6, 5 6, 18, 24 6, 10, 11, 7, 22 6, 5, 7, 3, 4, 1, 15 6, 18, 7 3, 4, 6, 7, 13, 14, 17 6, 11, 15, 17, 18 3, 6, 10, 15, 18, 22 1, 3, 6, 14, 15, 18, 22 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 18, 22 3, 6, 14, 15, 18, 21

Note a Includes e14.157 million (tanks, armoured and other vehicles and specially designed components thereof) and e2.5 million (electronics, measuring equipment and specially designed components thereof). Czech Republic, MFA, 2004b: Table 2, p. 22 Source Czech Republic, MFA, 2005b: Table 2, p. 2; 2006b: Table 1, p. 1; 2007: Annex 2, p. 2; Annex 5, p. 2; 2008b: Annex 2, p. 2; 2009: Annex 2, p. 2; 2010b: Annex 2, p. 2; 2011b: Annex 2, p. 2; 2012: Annex 2, p. 2; 2013: Annex 1, p. 3/5; 2014: Annex 2, p. 4/22; 2015b: Annex 2, p. 4/29; 2016: Annex 2, p. 4/32; 2017: Annex 2, p. 4/36 Categories of Military Equipment Supplied 1 Weapons and components specially designed for them 3 Ammunition and fuse setting devices, and specially designed components therefor 4 Bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missile and components specially designed for them 5 Fire-control systems and sub-systems and components specially designed for them 6 Ground vehicles and components 7 Toxic agents 10 Aircraft and helicopters 11 Electronic equipment specially designed for military use 13 Special armoured vehicles 14 Specialised equipment for military training 15 Military infra-red equipment, heat-imaging and image-enhancing equipment 17 Miscellaneous materials 18 Production equipment 22 Technologies 24 Services

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Czech arms exports of e12.5 million) (Czech Republic, MFA, 2012: 7). In 2017, India again ranked third in terms of Czech arms and military equipment exports, accounting for e32.2 million (Czech Republic MFA, 2018: 5–6). Make in India In July 2018, Tatra entered into a joint venture with Anil Ambani’s Reliance Defence on a 51–49 partnership17 —one of the first joint ventures in the defence sector after the relaxation of FDI norms under the ‘Make in India’ initiative. Given the precarious financial position of the Anil Ambani group, the prospects of this joint venture fructifying remain bleak. A MoU for a relationship in the nature of a strategic alliance was signed in Prague on 7 September 2018 between BEML and Tatra Trucks to explore the possibility of entering into a collaboration for joint manufacturing of components, aggregates and spare parts of Tatra vehicles, joint designing and development of new products, exports of products jointly manufactured in India to other countries and global customer service support. In January 2019, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis urged Prime Minister Modi to remove Tatra from the restricted/banned list of suppliers of the Ministry of Defence. ‘There is a long story and that does not concern the active [Czech] shareholders’, he said. The Czech Government was ready to ‘increase the defence cooperation in the private sector’ once this is sorted (cited in Jha, 2019; Maheshwari, 2019). Two months later, Defence Minister Lubomir Metnar, who attended the Aero India 2019 show in March 2019 in which eleven Czech defence companies participated, again urged Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman to intercede in resolving ‘some pending cases’ in which Czech companies were involved in order to pave the way for ‘a significant development of our cooperation with Indian companies not only here, but also in third markets’ (cited in Cimova, 2019).

17 The joint venture was expected to set up a production facility for the trucks at the Dhirubhai Ambani Defence Park in Maharashtra for Indian as well as global requirements. The joint venture also seeks to partner for maintenance and overhaul facilities, upgrades as well as manufacturing units for the trucks in India as part of the ‘Make in India’ initiative. However, the process of registering the company and obtaining licences was pending.

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Training Training has been a component of India-Czech Republic defence cooperation.18 Prague offers India training in its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence facilities as well as counter-improvised explosive devices (Kugiel, 2016: 28). One batch of Indian defence officials had been trained in protection against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) at the Czech Military Academy in 2000 (TOI, 2001: 9). From 22 September to 20 December 2013, thirteen officers from the DRDO, including one officer from Indian Navy, attended the course on ‘Short Term Intensive Course in Information and Communication Technology (ICT)’ at Masaryk University as part of a cooperation agreement between DRDO and Masaryk University. A delegation of 24 officers from the College of Defence Management visited Czech Republic as part of a weeklong International Strategic Management Tour in October–November 2013. Subsequently, a group of 14 officers joined a six-month Cryptography course on Information and Communication Technology at Masaryk University in Brno.

Cooperation in Nuclear Energy On 9 November 1966, India and Czechoslovakia signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes providing for a broad spectrum of cooperation between the Atomic Energy Commission of the two countries in the use of nuclear energy for health, agriculture, industry and power generation; envisaged exchange of scholarships, fellowships and exchange of visits by scientists to acquaint themselves with the latest progress and development made by each country in this field (India, MEA, 1966a). At the time the agreement was signed, the two countries were more or less at the same stage of development as the first atomic plants of both countries were going into operation around the same time. A separate agreement to supply ‘a substantial quantity’ of heavy water from the Trombay atomic power power plant was signed on 9 November 1966. Czechoslovakia, according to Vikram Sarabhai, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, was to supply India special equipment like 18 A total of 3,480 Indians are said to have received training in the USSR and Eastern Europe from 1955 to 1984 (Kramer, 1987: 62).

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compressors and a chemical plant for setting up new atomic power stations (TOI, 1966: 1). India imported generator sets for its atomic power plants from several countries including Russia and Czechoslovakia. On 24 May 2001, this agreement was revalidated by an exchange of letters. The Czech Republic had earlier supplied 235 MW turbosets for nuclear plants at Kalpakkam, Narora and Kakarpara (Ramesova, 1984: 40). In recent years, Prague had sought to sign an agreement for nuclear power cooperation with India. In September 2018, the two countries agreed to initiate cooperation in civil nuclear energy. A prospective agreement between the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, Jhajjar, Haryana and a relevant Czech institution is being worked out.

Parliamentary Questions and Debates During 1947–2019, a total of 303 questions were asked regarding Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic in the Lok Sabha. Of these, the maximum number of questions focused on economic and trade relations—the core of the relationship. During this period, there were only nineteen political questions whereas defence and cultural issues accounted for six each. There was one question relating to the agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The first parliamentary question was asked as early as 4 December 1947 relating to the supply of boilers for locomotives. The last question was asked on 31 March 2017 about the defence agreement with the Czech Republic. The maximum number of questions (131 out of a total of 303 questions) was asked in the 1960s when nearly 60 projects were under negotiation/implementation. During the 1970s, a total number of 59 questions were asked. This declined further to 39 questions in the 1980s and plummeted to 6 questions in the 1990s, three in the 2000s and two in the 2010s (up to 2019). The number of economic/trade questions sharply fell in the next two decades: the 1970s (54 questions) and the 1980s (35 questions). The number of economic and trade questions declined to three each in the 1990s and 2000s. During the 2010s, there were only two questions, both relating to defence; there were no questions on economics and trade. The decline in the number of questions on Czechoslovakia since the end of the Cold War could be attributed to the sharp decline in political interest in Central Europe after the break-up of the Soviet Union,

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the sharp fall in trade, growing foreign policy focus on the West, the general disinterestedness of Members of Parliament in foreign policy and the availability of more information on the Internet. On 19 November 1956, Prime Minister Nehru during a Motion on the International Situation remarked that since Czechoslovkia, Poland and Hungary had suffered from repeated invasions from Germany, there was a fear of both an armed Germany as well as from the Soviet Union. It may, he added, even be ‘a balancing of fears’ (Nehru, 1956: col. 381). In 1965, Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari clarified that all the aid that came from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia was in terms of projects. For ‘specific projects that you put to them, if they are suitable and if they fix them with their own plan, they give aid’ (Krishnamachari, 1965: col. 3861). Three years later, M. L. Sondhi had argued in the Lok Sabha that Indira Gandhi seemed unable to develop an appreciation of the various new trends and particularly the upsurge of new movements of the world, including the upsurge of nationalism in East Europe (Sondhi, 1968b: cols. 2298–2299). Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia The Parliament was in session when news of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia broke out. Lengthy debates took place on 22, 23 and August 1968. The non-Communist Opposition was vociferous in demanding that the House be adjourned on the issue. The first discussion in the Lok Sabha on the Czechoslovakia crisis took place on 1 August 1968 in response to a Call Attention Motion to a matter of urgent public importance by A. Sreedharan and Jyotirmoy Basu (CPI-M). In her reply, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did not deem it prudent to express any views on the merits of the issue in view of the ‘sensitivities of the situation’ since ‘any comment may accentuate the difficulties rather than make a useful contribution’. She ended her two paragraph statement by expressing the hope that ‘matters pertaining to the policies in Czechoslovakia’ and its relations with its neighbours would be ‘resolved amicably’ and that processes of détente would continue in Europe (Gandhi, 1968a: col. 3479). India did not, she asserted, believe in ‘interference from outside’ (ibid.: col. 3482). When Madhu Limaye (Samyukta Socialist Party) pressed the Prime Minister to clearly state that the country’s sympathies lay with Czechoslovakia and that Moscow be

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requested that it should not seek to stop the efforts of a small country to carry out internal reform by military pressure and threats, Mrs. Gandhi replied that it was not a question of where sympathies lay, but that in ‘a delicate situation’, it was mandatory for the government that it should refrain from taking any step that would tend ‘to make it more serious’ (Gandhi 1968a: col. 3488). The debate continued for some time as many MPs, including M. L. Sondhi (BJP), made critical comments on the government’s restrained attitude (Sondhi, 1968c: col. 3478–3494). On 14 August 1968, Surendranath Dwivedy (PSP) moved a resolution in the Lok Sabha on praising the Czech people’s movement to liberalize and democratize their political life (Dwivedy, 1968: col. 2383). This led to a hour-long discussion. H. N. Mukerjee (CPI-M) remarked that the events in Czechoslovakia were the result of the ‘subversive actions of imperialism’ (Mukerjee, 1968: col. 2400). M. L. Sondhi (BJP) urged Mukherjee not to ‘smell a plot in every discussion’. It was necessary to recognize that the Czechs had suffered ‘too many tragedies’ (Sondhi, 1968d: col. 2402). He urged India to respond to ‘the new ideological imperatives’ of the region and recognize the ‘enhanced importance’ of Prague, which was the meeting point of a new Europe (Sondhi, 1968d: col. 2403). In conclusion, he regretted that the Ministry of External Affairs was not ‘always mindful’ of India’s close relationship with Czechoslovakia and other East European countries. What was required was ‘specific...historical knowledge of these countries since for the MEA the CEECs were ‘sometimes the terra incognito beyond the Suez Canal; they regard them as vilayat, as all shades of England, or something like that’ (Sondhi, 1968d: col. 2407). On 21 August 1968, there was another discussion in the Lok Sabha on the Czechoslovak situation when agitated Members of Parliament pressed Indira Gandhi to make a formal statement in the House. She made brief interventions during Question Hour to the effect that, ‘What we say is not going to make any difference there; the Soviet tanks are not going to be recalled by our saying anything here’ (Gandhi 1968b: col. 3226). After a lengthy debate, she made a formal statement in the House in the late afternoon (Gandhi, 1968b: cols. 3444–3451). Towards the end of the debate, she again expressed the hope that the forces which had entered Czechoslovakia would be withdrawn at the earliest possible moment and that the Czech people would be able to determine their future according to their own wishes and interests (Gandhi, 1968b: col. 3446).

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On 22 August 1968, there was a marathon debate of approximately five hours on a Motion moved by R. D. Bhandare on the Prime Minister’s statement of the previous day. The Government of India came under fire for its abstention on the West-sponsored UN Security Council resolution on Czechoslovakia. Defying the Whip, Sucheta Kripalani (Congress) moved an amendment in Parliament which accused the Soviet Union of ‘a clear violation’ of the UN Charter (Kripalani, 1968: col. 366). M. R. Masani (Swatantra Party) criticized the Prime Minister’s ‘miserable performance’ of the previous day when she kept repeating her ‘concern’ at the events in Czechoslovakia, but did not have the ‘guts to condemn, or even deplore the outright act of aggression and breach of international law’ (Masani, 1968: col. 371). In response, Indira Gandhi expressed the hope that it would be possible to restore ‘the normal and legally constituted’ Government of Czechoslovakia and reiterated that there should be no external interference in the internal affairs of any state and that force should not be used as the arbiter of decisions (Gandhi 1968c: cols. 460, 462). She affirmed support for the entire UN resolution of 22 August with the solitary exception of the word ‘condemn’ (Gandhi, 1968d: col. 892; 1968e: 173–175). The use of provocative language, she argued, would not ameliorate the situation on the ground. Another opportunity to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia presented itself on 30 August 1968 when a one-hour debate took place when Surendranath Dwivedy (PSP) moved a resolution in the Lok Sabha calling upon all freedom-loving countries to extend their support and sympathy for the movement in Czechoslovakia. Asoka Mehta (Praja Socialist Party) made a fervent appeal to support the people of Czechoslovakia in their struggle against the Soviet forces (Mehta, 1968: cols. 3627–3634). N.K. Somani (Swatantra Party) regretted that India could not even express ‘righteous indignation’ about the events in Czechoslovakia (Somani, 1968: col. 3635). Dwivedy’s motion was adopted; the Treasury Benches also lent their support to this rather innocuous resolution. There was a short discussion in the Lok Sabha on Indian Press comments on the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia on 11 December 1968. In response to a question by A. Sreedharan, when Deputy Minister of External Affairs Surendra Pal Singh gave a cryptic reply on 11 December 1968, the Member of Parliament gave him an equally sharp retort: ‘When it comes to such important questions and when the government is in a muddle, they always give this stock reply’ (Sreedharan, 1968:

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col. 1). When the MP persisted that he had not received a satisfactory reply to his questions, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reiterated New Delhi’s stance in the matter. On 20 November 1968, several MPs asked a question on the UN resolution on the issue of Czechoslovakia issue and on the inclusion in the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly (Deo et. al., 1968: cols. 104–105). Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, L. K. Advani (BJP) remarked that he would like to see a world where there were no power blocs. Each country, he added, should be free to practice its own foreign policy in the way that India was doing. He would be happy, he continued, ‘if countries like Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia which are in the Soviet bloc, have their independent foreign policy’ (Advani, 1990: col. 7).

Czechoslovakia in Indian Academic Literature Writing in 1954 in India Quarterly—the premier international affairs quarterly (launched in 1945) of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)—Yodhraj discussed salient aspects of postwar European economics. He briefly dealt with Poland and Czechoslovakia and referred to the latter’s efforts to decontrol and stabilize prices of basic necessities of life including foodstuffs, the doubling of its pre-war industrial production, and its success in coal mining (Yodhraj, 1954: 12–13). Two years later, K. M. Panikkar—a journalist and later Ambassador to France—wrote the first article in the journal which made some reference to Central Europe. The end of the First World War, he argued, had left Central Europe in ‘a state of political disintegration after its superhuman effort to fight the combined power of the rest of the world’ (Panikkar, 1956: 223). During the interwar period (1919–1939), with the exception of Czechoslovakia, political regimes in Central European countries were ‘reactionary, oppressive and controlled by very short-sighted and inept cliques’ (Gyan Chand, 1952a: 6). However, the first specific article in India Quarterly published on Czechoslovakia was in 1960. Entitled ‘Economic Policy in People’s Democratic Czechoslovakia’, it discussed the specific features and impact of Czech economic policy, the principal stages of planned development as well as its achievements and objectives from 1949 to 1960 (Sik, 1960). Nearly a decade-and-a-half later, India Quarterly published a speech delivered by S. H. Desai at Charles University in December 1972. He

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began by tracing the philosophy behind Indo-Czechoslovak relations, which he felt had deep roots in the past. He dwelt on two fruitful past legacies, viz. parallel struggles for freedom and strong cultural ties built by Indology scholars. He felt that the Socialist countries of Europe were ‘a most significant factor’ in the emergence of a new Asia (Desai, 1973: 47). The rest of the article was a brief descriptive survey of economic cooperation, trade and cultural exchanges till the early 1970s. Towards the end of the 1980s, the ICWA journal published an extensive and extremely informative article with several appendices by Miloslav Krasa entitled ‘Jawaharlal Nehru and Czechoslovakia at the Time of the 1938 Crisis’ (Krasa, 1989). Devendra Kaushik made some passing references about Czechoslovakia: about Rabindranath Tagore’s two visits in the 1920s, the role in developing heavy industry, but also remarked that Czechoslovakia and Poland were competitors in contracts for sale and renovation of defence equipment (Kaushik, 1985). R. K. Randhawa’s article briefly discussed the impact of the June 1990 and 1992 parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia. The first election had led to a divide between the coalition partners—the Civil Forum in the Czech Republic and the Public Against Violence in Slovakia—as their leaders had different outlooks and sought to steer the country’s economy and politics to divergent directions. The 1992 elections further consolidated divergences and after negotiations on the division of Czechoslovakia were conducted in ‘a most civilized manner’. The separation meant that the Czech Republic was no longer burdened with supporting its ‘economically weaker partner’ which was ‘not able to match the success of...its earlier better half [the Czech Republic]’ (Randhawa, 2002: 167). The first exhaustive and well-researched article to appear on Czechoslovakia in International Studies —the international affairs quarterly of the Indian School of International Studies and later Jawaharlal Nehru University—was a survey of historical and political studies on Czechoslovakia since 1948, including Czech language sources, by M. L. Sondhi. A creative interest in the study of international relations in Czechoslovakia, he felt, had been fostered by the active role played by it at the League of Nations. This was followed by a review of Western sources and Czech language sources (Sondhi, 1962). The exhaustive survey was clearly the result of the author having served as Second Secretary in the Indian Embassy in Prague during 1960–1961. In 1963, Sondhi wrote a more topical and significant article. In a paragraph devoted to Czechoslovakia, he termed it as ‘the most advanced

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country industrially in the Communist world’. Unlike the Western position on Czechoslovakia which was adversely affected by the past history of the Munich Pact, most Czechoslovaks recalled with gratitude the support of Indian national leaders ‘at the fateful hour of history’. He did not consider the Czechoslovak political system to be ‘rigidly fixed in a Stalinist mould’. An Indian policy which increasingly took account of the changing political factors, he argued, could possibly lay the foundations for a steady relationship in the future (Sondhi, 1963: 158). He went on to urge Indian policy-makers that in the wake of the Chinese aggression, they should endeavour to explain India’s security objectives to East European countries, including Poland and Czechoslovakia and impress upon them that they was grave danger if they remained on the sidelines while Indian national security was being undermined (Sondhi, 1963: 168). Writing after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Sondhi urged that Indian foreign policy must reflect adherence to equal standards in so far as New Delhi’s condemnation of actions against independence and territorial integrity. India’s approach would only lead to isolation from the new forces which were emerging in Eastern Europe. He urged Indian policymakers to give close attention to Eastern Europe than had been the case so far (Sondhi, 1968a: 10–11). There was not a solitary article in Strategic Analysis —the journal of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses—on either Czechoslovakia or Slovakia. One of the rare articles mentioned the Soviet Union’s ‘ruthless march across Hungary and Czechoslovakia’ in the post-Second World War era (Kanwal, 1999: 366). An article on the educational system in Czechoslovakia was published in the Journal of Indian Education (Goyal, 1978). The first book to be published on Czechoslovakia in India was in the early 1940s (Baros, 1943) followed by a sociologist’s perspectives on the country (Mukerjee, 1951). There were a number of sympathetic accounts on Indo-Czechoslovak relations in an edited volume published by B. K. Rao (1965), who also published another volume on reactions to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (Rao, 1968). Four studies were published on the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 (Jain 1969; Juyal & Tewari, 1969; Srivastava, 1968; Sundaram, 1969). The second book contained essays written by leftist intellectuals, economists and journalists on the various issues relating to sovereignty, independence and equality of socialist states. It was critical of the Soviet occupation of

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Czechoslovakia with discussion revolving around the non-violent character of Czechoslovak resistance. It evaluated the question raised by the military intervention in whether the Soviet Union and its communist party should have the role of arbiter in the theory and practice of socialism (Dua, 1988: 189–190). P. K. Sundaram’s edited volume on the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (1969) contained articles by persons ‘generally friendly’ to the Soviet Union, questioned its right to intervene in the internal affairs of another country in the name of defending socialism or in any other name (Sundaram, 1969). In a volume on Indian foreign policy in the early 1970s, Czechoslovakia was described as ‘one of the most industrially advanced countries of Eastern Europe, naturally took a lead in democratizing a communist State. But this movement for freedom in that country was suppressed by the Soviet Union’ (Karunakaran, 1974: 96).

Czechoslovak/Czech Perceptions of India Early Czechoslovak Perceptions In the first half of the twentieth century, Czech perceptions of India had four strands. Firstly, the dominant Czech perception of India was based on the affinity thesis that involved common ancestry (Hribek, 2015: 226). Secondly, Czechoslovak intellectuals turned to India in the early nineteenth century for inspiration in their quest for cultural renaissance (Sondhi, 1972: 95). Czech Romantics searched for ‘a regenerative cure’ for the enervated materialist Europe in the spiritual traditions of India (Hribek, 2015: 225). Thirdly, the Czech and Slavic languages in general were proclaimed to be ‘the direct descendants and the closest relatives of Sanskrit’, which at that time was considered the mother of all languages. The Czech language, in fact, was deemed to be structurally and lexically closer to Sanskrit than the German language (Strnad, 2007: 284). Fourthly, Czechoslovak imagination looked to India for common ground for ‘new political conceptions, which could contribute vitally to ending the old era of imperial domination and cultural enslavement’ (Sondhi, 1972: 97). Czech intellectuals sought to establish that the Indian movement for self-determination and subsequently for Indian statehood was essentially a contemporary and ‘parallel cause to the Czech

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nationalist struggle of an oppressed people fighting an external domination’ (Hribek, 2011: 55). Czech national awakening fructified in the establishment of an independent Czechoslovakia out of Slav-dominated northern territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. Thus, ‘imagination of, and knowledge about, India had a role to play in the very first phase of the Czech national awakening’ (Hribek, 2011: 49–50). Czechoslovak Revivalists were aware of the Bengal Renaissance and the reforms of the Brahmo Samaj, which was related directly to the opposition against German cultural hegemony. The Czech nationalist project was identified with Rabindranath Tagore’s universal humanist project (Hribek, 2015: 226). In the eyes of the educated Czech public, the Indian struggle for independence made the Indians look like ‘distant allies’ (Strnad, 2007: 287). Thus, Czechoslovak attraction for India was based on ancient Indian culture and the linguistic and ethnic affinity with the Slavs led to the growth of Czechoslovak interest in India, its culture and literature, religions, morals and customs, economic and political life and its struggle for freedom. Growth of Indology Czech and Slovak scholars initially showed interest in the Indian subcontinent from the middle of the eighteenth century. However, this was mostly in connection with comparative Indo-European linguistics and its origins were closely linked with the national, cultural and political revival in the country (Krasa, 1967: 12). In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the first Sanskrit treatises began to appear in literary and specialized journals. The first full-fledged professor in Indology was appointed in 1850 (August Schleicher) at Charles University—which had a virtual monopoly of Oriental Studies. The appointment of Josef Zubaty at the Czech University paved the ground for the establishment of classical Indology as a separate field of study. Though there were some Czech scholars who went beyond the issues of pure philology and literature, their work was constrained by the lack of access to primary sources. There was rapid expansion of Indian Studies at Charles University under Vincenc Lesny (1882–1953), who devoted himself to the study of Indian culture. As the Director of Oriental Institute in Prague, he played a key role in laying the solid foundations for the growing cultural relations

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between Czechoslovakia and India. The appointment of Moriz Winternitz (1863–1937)—who had written a monumental work on History of Indian Literature, 3 vols.—at Prague’s German University enhanced the study of Indian languages and literature. However, the study of Sanskrit at Czech and Slovak universities in the nineteenth century was mostly in connection with the study of Indo-European comparative linguistics rather than Indology proper (Zbavitel, 1967: 99–100). Another noted Czech Indologist was Dusan Zbavitel who translated 60 Sanskrit works, including the Upanishads. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Indological research focused on linguistics, literary studies and history, initially with an emphasis on the distant past (Hribek, 2011: 46). The onset of the Cold War led to the introduction of full-fledged degree courses in modern Indian languages and renewed interest in contemporary social and political processes in South Asia. Popularity of Tagore Even more than Nehru, the figure most revered and remembered in Czechoslovakia is said to be Rabindranath Tagore (Venkateswaran, 2015: 136). The Czechs felt a great affinity with Tagore, who was perceived by them as a purveyor of Oriental wisdom, a celebrated writer, a Nobel Laureate, and ‘a cultural ambassador of a brotherly nation’ (Hribek, 2014: 334). Tagore’s first visit to Prague in June 1921 led to ‘an unusual popularity’ of his works in Czechoslovakia (Zbavitel, 1984: 46). During Tagore’s second visit in October 1926, the National Theatre performed two of his plays and the German Theatre performed one of them. Tagore was invoked by the Czechs to confirm the struggle of an ethnic minority within the Austro-Hungarian Empire against German cultural domination’, which resulted in independent statehood was ‘the embodiment of the greater and global humanist project’ (Hribek, 2014: 349). After the Velvet Revolution, however, the nationalist interpretation of Tagore faded away, but he remained a renowned literary figure and a representative of Eastern philosophical thought.19 A curious consequence of a tram station being named after Tagore (Thakurova) being located on a much travelled 19 By the early 2010s, there were 39 Czech and seven Slovak translations of Tagore published as books (excluding reprints and new editions), a large part of them done from Bengali originals (Hribek 2014: 335).

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route, his name has been firmly etched in the minds of numerous Prague commuters who would otherwise remain ignorant of the great Bengali poet’s existence (Hribek, 2014: 348). Contemporary Images of India in the Czech Republic The Czech attraction and interest in India has been because of its spiritual heritage, yoga and scriptures, including the Bhagavad Gita. Czech tourists who travelled to India generally sought to relish the natural beauty, the works of art, architecture and sculpture. Since 1989, there has been a considerable growth of interest in India as a result of the freedom of expression and the freedom to travel abroad. The growth in the use of modern technology, especially the Internet, has led the Czech public to be inundated with various publications, radio broadcasts and TV programmes focusing on India. All the information that is obtained by these means is not necessarily ‘correct, balanced and adequate’, however. Many people who promote India are ignorant of the ‘true state of affairs or simply focus on presenting sensational news and news that is attractive to consumers’ (Vavrouskova, 2008: 126). The large geographical distance and cultural differences between the Czech Republic and the Asia-Pacific has fostered ‘a general disinterest of the Czech public in the political scene and regional security of the region’. For instance, in 2017 India remained largely under the radar in the Czech public space as their coverage was overshadowed by the polarizing Czech stance on China. Overall, the lack of involvement in events and ‘overall disconnectedness’ from Asia was apparent (Fürst et al., 2018: 229). The general focus in the Czech Press has been on topical themes and sensational news. Reports were ‘largely constructed to shock the domestic audience’. The objective was not to educate people or raise interest in the Asia-Pacific, but primarily to entertain and ridicule them stemming from ‘a low level of knowledge and low awareness of their regional context and dynamics’ (Fürst et al., 2018: 230).

Indian Perceptions The 1940s, the 1950s and the Early 1960s Since the late 1940s and the 1950s, it was common for English language dailies like the Times of India to regularly run news stories, editorials and

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op-eds on Czech domestic politics and foreign policy. For instance, as early as February 1948, the Times of India editorially remarked that the Czechoslovak Cabinet crisis was similar to crises where Communist policy had precipitated in other East European countries where anti-Communist opposition had become intolerable to Moscow (TOI, 1948: 6). Four days later, another op-ed article was published (Reed, 1948: 6). Czechoslovakia, according to another TOI editorial, was the only ‘satellite country’ which had the economic and political sinews which made for independence. The purge, it added, was more representative of ‘a “purification” campaign to remind Prague that it pays to follow the devious and narrow path of Marxist duties and responsibilities than a suppression of “nationalist Communism”’ (TOI, 1951: 4). Gyan Chand, a noted economist and Economic Advisor to the Planning Commission (1948–1951), published a series of seven highly informative op-eds in the Times of India under the title ‘Behind the Iron Curtain’. In his first article, he highlighted the backwardness of Czechoslovak agriculture on which 38% of the population was dependent. Heavy industries with a few exceptions, he added, had received no attention at all and industrial development was lacking in coherence and balance both from the regional as well as occupational standpoints (Gyan Chand, 1952a: 6). After the transfer of over three million Germans from Czechoslovakia and the nationalization of over 70% of the manufacturing industries, Czechoslovakia sought to accelerate the development of those industries which had earlier been competitive on world markets, viz. heavy industry, heavy machinery production, metal and chemical industries (Gyan Chand, 1952b: 6). Czechoslovak industrialization strategies and the socialization of agriculture, he maintained, reflected the social philosophies of the new regime. To ensure the survival and growth of Czechoslovakia, he felt, it was necessary for it to acquire the quality of ‘a flowing passion and incidentally suffer from the excesses of a new gospel’ (Gyan Chand, 1952c: 9). M. R. Masani chided those Czech leaders who entertained the naïve notion that conciliation with Moscow would ensure friendship (Masani, M. R., 1953: 11). The demonstrations that took place at various cities of Czechoslovakia between 2 and 9 June 1953 against the Czech Government’s fixation of wages, announcement of a new formula of pension, and abolition of food rationing, Nehru felt were ‘detrimental to Soviet prestige’ since they highlighted that workers were ‘reacting against Soviet domination’ (Nehru, 1953b: 575). After Stalin’s death, Nehru felt, the Soviet Union had

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‘toned down’ its policy in Poland and Czechoslovakia probably because of resentment against its excessive ‘attempt at Sovietization of these countries and of treating them as satellites’ (Nehru, 1953c: 418). Moscow had to change its policy because it had ‘failed and had to change it’ (Nehru, 1953d: 672). After returning from a visit to Czechoslovakia in 1956, veteran journalist D. R. Mankekar wrote a three-part op-ed entitled ‘Czechoslovakia Today’ in the Times of India, at a time when a new ferment had engulfed the country in the aftermath of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union. The Czechs as a race, he wrote, were ‘an undemonstrative, reticent type, unlike the volatile Poles’. It took, he added, ‘some rousing for the Czechs [to] come out and shout about anything’ (Mankekar, 1956a: 6). Unlike the Poles, whose traditional national enemy had always been the Russians, the Czechoslovaks, he observed in his second op-ed, regarded the Russians as their traditional national friend, as the kindly Slav ‘big brother’. In this predatory world, as a small nation, Czechoslovakia regarded Russia as ‘a tried, dependable friend’ (Mankekar, 1956b: 6). In his concluding op-ed, Mankekar described Czechoslovakia as being keen to export to new markets for its manufactured goods, especially non-aligned India and Egypt and the non-Communist world in general (Mankekar, 1956c: 6). A. P. Venkateswaran, who was Charge d’Affaires in Prague for several months in 1956, described Czechoslovakia as a ‘highly pro-Stalinist country’.20 Reporting from London after a short trip to Czechoslovakia, the foreign correspondent of the Times of India in his lively ‘Letter from London’ op-ed, described the Czechs as ‘a cautious and law-abiding people’, who had apparently reconciled themselves to communist rule as inevitable in the circumstances. The vast mass of Czechs, he maintained, had become politically apathetic, concerning themselves only with material needs and amusements of every-day life’. Czechoslovakia, he added, was the only country taken over by the Communists as ‘a going 20 During his posting in Prague, Venkateswaran recounts an experience while sending a telegram to the Indian Embassy in Washington, D.C. that Vice-President S. Radhakrishnan would be arriving in the US capital. When the telegram was not delivered even after four days, he discovered that the telegram had never been disptached from Prague. When he made enquiries, the Postmaster General told him that they did not know which Washington to send it to. When he asked the Postmaster General that it could only be one Washington which could be the capital. The Czech Foreign Office replied that ‘the erring clerk would be “liquidated”’ (Venkateswaran, 2015: 135).

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concern—an industrial nation practically undamaged by war’ (Reddy, 1961: 6). Dileep Padgaonkar, the Paris-based correspondent of the Times of India, after a visit to Czechoslovakia wrote a three-part op-ed entitled ‘In Czechoslovakia Today’. Czechoslovakia, he concluded, had implicitly accepted the Brezhnev doctrine of ‘limited sovereignty’, but it was not quite certain whether the Czechoslovaks have also done so or that the ‘stains and shadows of 1968’ have been erased from their minds (Padgaonkar, 1970a: 8). In his perceptive third op-ed, Padgaonkar remarked: ‘More than any other East European capital, Prague was the hotbed of avant-garde movements: dadaism, cubism and surrealism flowered here and the city’s linguistic circles made important contributions to structuralist theories’. Purges, he added, had been carried out in the trade unions, political parties, the police and secret service and ‘most drastic of all, in the mass media’ (Padgaonkar, 1970b: 10). Nobody, he said, read newspapers. He recounted a joke prevalent at the time: ‘This daily [Rude Pravo] contains truths, half-truths and lies: the truths are on the sports page, the half-truths on the meteorological columns and the lies everywhere else’ (Padgaonkar, 1970b: 11). The Post-Cold War Era Czechoslovakia was reasonably well reported in many English dailies like the Times of India since Independence till the late 1980s. However, subsequently with the severe contraction in the space allocated to foreign affairs, which prioritized the superpowers, the neighbourhood and China, there was not much space devoted to Western Europe and the European Union. As a result, the Czech Republic is rarely mentioned except where there is India-specific news. The former Czechoslovakia has been generally ‘positively’ perceived in India (Radio Prague International, 2006, 18 January). Since 1993, the Czech Republic has been able to capitalize on the positive image of the former Czechoslovakia. Two things the Czechs were famous for and which are found everywhere in India are Czech glass, which is extremely famous in India and the famous Czechoslovak shoe company, Bata21 21 Bata, a well-known brand with a high recall value today, set up one of the largest tanneries in Asia in 1952. It later subsequently moved its global headquarters from Czechoslovakia to Canada to escape communism at home and about a decade ago to

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Works, which were set up in India with 120 Czechoslovak nationals employed in Konnagar, later Batanagar, near Calcutta in 1931. Other well-known brands in India are Skoda, Zetor (tractors), and Jawa (motorcycles). Today, India regards the Czech Republic as ‘a modern, dynamic, high-tech country that places great emphasis on research and development’ (Chauhan, 2019); it is still perceived as ‘an industrialized country with modern technologies’ (Tlapa, 2018). Yoga and Aryuveda have become extremely popular in the Czech Republic. Czech textbooks also deal with colonial India and the contribution of Mahatma Gandhi to world philosophical thought. However, Czech theatres do not show Bollywood films, though a local organization has been organizing an annual festival of Indian films since 2004. Indian cuisine is popular in the Czech Republic with more than 75 Indian restaurants in Prague alone (Chauhan, 2020).

Cultural Cooperation Cultural cooperation between India and the Czech Republic began with the signing of the first cultural agreement on 7 July 1959 for a period of five years. Subsequent agreements were generally signed for three years containing a detailed programme encompassing broad exchanges in the fields of education, science and technology, art and culture, radio, films and television. An Indian Cultural Centre—now called the Swami Vivekananda Cultural Centre—was established in early 2011. It is functioning from the Chancery to promote and propagate cultural activities like screening of movies, delivering lectures, organising the performing art events by local talent and artistes from India and other countries. The number of Indian tourists to the Czech Republic increased from 67,000 tourists in 2016 (Roy, 2017) to more than 100,000 annually as a result of Czech promotional efforts, the shooting of a number of Bollywood films22 despite the absence of any direct flights from India.23 In Switzerland. Bata India is currently 53% owned by the privately held Swiss parent. In 2014, it accounted for about $350 million sales in India (Raghunath, 2015a, 2015b). 22 These include ‘Rockstar’ (2011), ‘Ishkq in Paris’ (2013), ‘Bang Bang’ (2014), ‘The Ring’ (2016) and ‘Jab Harry Met Sally’ (2017). 23 Air India had been operating air services through Czechoslovakia since 1956 while Czechoslovak Airlines began operating a service to India in August 1959.

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January 2020, Foreign Minister Tomas Petricek held discussions about the possibility to re-establish direct flights between the two countries since there was a flight between Prague and Mumbai three decades ago. In an attempt to emulate the Swiss example where 25 Bollywood films are shot every year and around 200,000 Indians visit Switzerland for vacation, Prague has also offered many incentives to woo the Bollywood elite to make better use of Czech film services and spectacular locations (Frankova, 2013).

Conclusion During the Cold War, Czechoslovakia made a significant contribution to the establishment of heavy industry (especially heavy engineering) and the transfer of technology to public sector enterprises in the 1960s. It has also emerged as the second largest arms supplier to India after the Soviet Union. Like other Central European countries, the primary focus of IndiaCzech Republic relations is on economic and trade relations. The Czech Republic has niche technological competencies in industrial machinery and plants, machine tools and engineering, and has extensive research and development in areas like nanotechnology, robotics, cybernetics and lasers. Since 2012, bilateral trade has been greater than $1 billion. It reached US$1.567 billion in 2019 (with India’s exports US$918 million and imports $649 million) (India, Embassy in Czech Republic, 2020). Defence has been ‘a key pillar’ of Indo-Czech bilateral relations. In the future, the expectation is that the two sides will move forward from a traditional buyer–seller relationship to one where the two can co-develop and co-produce defence equipments (Kovind, 2019). As a member of the four export control regimes—the Wassenaar Agreement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—the Czech Republic has been a supporter of India’s desire to join these clubs.

Prospects: Towards a Strategic Partnership? The Czech Republic’s has three strategic partnerships in Asia—South Korea (February 2015), Azerbaijan (September 2015) and China (March 2016) (see Simecka & Tallis, 2016: 3). The diplomatic initiative of Prime Minister Babis to conclude strategic partnerships in Asia with

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India (January 2019) and Japan (October 2019) is part of his drive to significantly enhance the engagement with major potential markets ever since he became prime minister in 2018. The Czech rationale for mooting strategic partnerships with Asian countries include, among others, growing recognition that the world’s ‘economic centre has largely moved to Asia’ and because a strategic partnership offers new opportunities in economic relations, investment, tourism, science and innovation (Sobotka, 2014). Another possible reason is the desire to diversify and enhance exports to other continents which offer considerable possibilities since about 85% of its exports are to Europe (Babis, 2019). There are also commonalities on a number of international issues, including multilateralism, terrorism, UN reform and support for Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and a rules-based order. During President Kovind’s visit to the Czech Republic, the two countries expressed the desire to further strengthen and develop ‘the strategic aspects’ of the bilateral relationship and hold discussions for ‘strengthening bilateral relations to a strategic partnership’ (India, MEA, 2018). On 18 January 2019, Prime Minister Andrej Babis formally expressed a desire to elevate relations to a strategic partnership in his address at the Gujarat Vibrant Global Summit and subsequently over lunch with Prime Minister Modi. Foreign Minister Tomas Petricek reiterated the desire in his meetings with Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar on the sidelines of the 74th session of the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2019 and his visit to New Delhi in January 2020 (cf. Czech Republic, MFA 2019: 30). Indian considerations for exploring a strategic partnership with the Czech Republic seem to be the following. Firstly, strategic partnerships give India ‘actual or potential access to markets, finance, technology, arms, intelligence and other commodities that it does not possess at present in the quantity and quality it would like’ (Hall, 2016: 12). Secondly, the conclusion of a strategic partnership fits in very well with New Delhi’s proactive engagement with Central and Eastern Europe in recent years. Thirdly, as a highly industrialized country, the Czech Republic is perceived as a valuable partner in many key sectors to facilitate India’s modernization and flagship programmes like ‘Make in India’. The Czech Republic has proven expertise in heavy engineering (which constitute the bulk of Indian imports from the country), power transmission, defence and in emerging areas like automation and nanotechnology. Fourthly, the Czech Republic has proven to be a reliable partner in the past, making a valuable contribution to Indian heavy industries in the

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1960s and had been willing to share technology in the public sector and has recently been entrusted with their modernization. Fifthly, Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar is well conversant with the capabilities, promise and potential of the Czech Republic as he had earlier been Ambassador to the Czech Republic from 2001 to 2004. Sixthly, the Czech Republic’s strained relationship with China may also be a contributory factor apart from the recent proactive engagement with Central and Eastern Europe by the Modi Government. Finally, a strategic partnership with the Czech Republic, if its documents with South Korea are any indication, are not unduly complex—a Declaration (Czech Republic, Government, 2014) and an Action Plan for 2019–2021 (Czech Republic, Government, 2019), which extended the existing collaboration to include robotics, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology or lithium processing— a process which took five years to negotiate and finalize. India and the Czech Republic have agreed ‘to start discussions’ at the end of which they ‘could come to an agreement that we can elevate it to the level of strategic partnership’ (Hovorka, 2019; emphasis added).

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Menon, K. P. S. (1950). Speech on ‘India’s foreign policy’ by foreign secretary to the Defence Staff College, Wellington. NMML, K.P.S. Menon Collection, Speeches and Writings File No. 35. Retrieved on July 29, 2020 from: http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/ 94991/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/5a6fd963-3193-4dd7-a1c994a71d3124ac/en/Speech_Menon_1950.pdf. Muelenbeck, P. (2016). Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1968. Palgrave Macmillan. Mukerjee, H. N. (1968, August 14). Lok Sabha Debates, 4th series, 5th sess., vol. 19, no. 17. Mukerjee, R. (1951). New Czechoslovakia: An Indian sociologist looks at Czechoslovakia today. Bombay. Nambiar, A. C. N. (1964, November 14). With Nehru in Czechoslovakia. Hindustan Standard. Nanda, B. R. (1995). Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and statesman, 1995, 136–137. Nehru, J. N. (1938a, August 16). Cable to J.B. Kripalani, Prague, AICC File No. C-71/1938. In Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (hereinafter cited as SWJN ), Series 1, vol. 9. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1976. Nehru, J. N. (1938b, August 30). Letter to J.B. Kripalani, Budapest. SWJN, Series 1, vol. 9. JNMF, 1976. Nehru, J. N. (1938c, September 5). Interview with correspondent of Amrita Bazar Patrika. SWJN, Series 1, vol. 9. Nehru, J. N. (1938d, September 9). The Birth of the National Herald. National Herald. SWJN, Series 1, vol. 9. Nehru, J. N. (1938e, October 15). The Hoax, National Herald, 25 October 1938. SWJN, series 1, vol. 9, 188–191. Nehru, J. N. (1947, August 23). Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon (undated), London. SWJN, Series 2 (SS), vol. 4. Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1986. Nehru, J. N. (1948, March 12). Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit, India’s Ambassador in Washington. SWJN, SS, vol. 5. New Delhi: JNWF, 1987. Nehru, J. N. (1949, November 7). Press conference on his departure from the United States, New York. SWJN, SS, vol. 13. New Delhi: JNMF, 1992. Nehru, J. N. (1951, December 10). Telegram to S.S. Dhawan. SWJN, SS, vol. 17 . New Delhi; JNMF, 1995. Nehru, J. N. (1953a). An autobiography. Bodeley Head. Nehru, J. N. (1953b, July 16). Letter to Chief Ministers. SWJN, SS, vol. 23. New Delhi: JNMF, 1998. Nehru, J. N. (1953c, November 11). Letter to U Nu. SWJN, SS, vol. 24. New Delhi: JNMF, 1999. Nehru, J. N. (1953d, November 15). Letter to Chief Ministers. SWJN, SS, vol. 24. New Delhi: JNMF, 1999.

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Nehru, J. N. (1955a, June 8). Minutes of Nehru’s meeting with Premier N.A. Bulganin, Moscow. In SWJN, SS, vol. 29. New Delhi: JNMF, 2001. Nehru, J. N. (1955b, June 19). Note, The Prime Minister’s Visit to the Soviet Union and Other Countries (June–July 1955). File No. I(3)/R&I/59, MEA. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 29. New Delhi: JNMF, 2001. Nehru, J. N. (1955c, August 10). Note to N.R. Pillai, Secretary-General, MEA. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 30. New Delhi: JNMF, 2002. Nehru, J. N. (1955d, September 8). Note to Union Defence Minister Kailash Nath Katju and Defence Secretary M.K. Vellodi. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 30. New Delhi: JNMF, 2002. Nehru, J. N. (1955e, December 30). Note to V.K. Krishna Menion, SecretaryGeneral, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 31. New Delhi: JNMF, 2002. Nehru, J. N. (1956, November 19). Lok Sabha Debates, 6th sess., vol. 8, part 1. Nehru, J. N. (1963, August 19). Statement in the Lok Sabha. Foreign Affairs Record, August 1963. Nehru, J. N. (2003). Postscript: Glimpses of world history. Oxford University Press. Padgaonkar, D. (1970a, October 13). In Czechoslovakia Today, I—People Take Refuge in Indifference. TOI. Padgaonkar, D. (1970b, October 15). In Czechoslovakia Today, III—Intellectuals’ Plight. TOI Panikkar, K. M. (1956). The twentieth century in Asian and world history. India Quarterly, 12(3), 217–249. Pavlinek, P. (2008). A successful transformation?Restructuring of the Czech Automobile Industry. Physica Verlag. Petricek, T. (2020, January 15). Keynote Speech of Foreign Minister, Raisana Dialogue 2020. Czech Republic, Embassy in India. Retrieved June 11, 2020, from: https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/about_the_ministry/organization_ of_the_ministry/minister/speeches_and_articles/x2020_01_15_keynote_s peech_of_minister_petricek.html. Radio Prague. (2001, March 14). Zeman promotes trade with India. Radio Prague International. Retrieved June 10, 2020, from: https://english.radio. cz/news-radio-prague-8053069. Raghunath, A. (2015a, July 22). Bata—Shoemaker for Indians from the 1930s. Forbes. Retrieved June 11, 2020, from: https://www.forbes.com/sites/anu raghunathan/2015/07/22/bata-shoemaker-for-indians-from-the-1930s/# 10c5f39c6bc2. Raghunath, A. (2015b, July 22). Swiss footwear Bata expands in India with bigger, brighter stores. Shoemaker for Indians from the 1930s. Forbes. Retrieved June 11, 2020, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/anuraghun athan/2015/07/22/swiss-footwearmaker-bata-expands-in-india-with-biggerbrighter-stores/#38cc77403531.

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Sondhi, M. L. (1963). India and East Europe. International Studies, 5(102), 156–168. Sondhi, M. L. (1968a). Wanted a national foreign policy. Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Sondhi, M. L. (1968b, April 4). Lok Sabha Debates, 4th series, 4th session, vol. 15, no. 37. Sondhi, M. L. (1968c, August 1). Lok Sabha Debates, 5th sess., vol. 18, no. 9. Sondhi, M.L. (1968d, August 14). Lok Sabha Debates, 4th series, 5th sess., vol. 19, no. 17. Sondhi, M. L. (1972). India’s image in Eastern Europe. In M. L. Sondhi (Ed.), Non-Appeasement: A new direction for Indian foreign policy (pp. 95–101). Abhinav. Sreedharan, A. (1968, December 11). Lok Sabha Debates, 4th series, 6th sess., vol. 23, no. 23. Srivastava, A. P. (Ed.). (1968). Rape of Czechoslovakia: Facts, documents, press reports, and eye-witness accounts. Entente. Strnad, J. (2007). India as reflected in Czech Consciousness in the era of the nationalist revivalist movement of the nineteenth century (ca. 1800–1848). Oriental Archive (pp. 279–290). Sundaram, P. K. (Ed.). (1969). Whither Czechoslovakia? Dawn Publishers. Tatratrucks.com. (2015, September 11). Tatra Trucks makes first renewed deliveries to the Indian Army. Retrieved June 20, 2020, from: https://www. tatratrucks.com/about-the-company/press-and-media/news/tatra-trucksmakes-the-first-renewed-deliveries-to-the-indian-army/. Thapar, V. (2015, January 31). Once banned Tatra is back in business with government. The Sunday Guardian. Retrieved May 8, 2020, from: http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/once-banned-tatra-isback-in-business-with-government. Tharoor, S. (1982). Reasons of state: Political development and India’s foreign policy under Indira Gandhi, 1966–77 . Vikas. Tlapa, M. (2018, July 23). Deputy Foreign Minister Martin Tlapa received new Ambassador of India. Czech Republic, Embassy in India. Retrieved June 11, 2020, from: https://www.mzv.cz/newdelhi/en/bilateral_relation/India/ deputy_foreign_minister_martin_tlapa$1325.html?action=setMonth&year= 2018&month=5&day=1. TOI. (1948, February 24). Editorial. Czechoslovakia’s Dilemma. TOI. (1951, February 15). Editorial. Czech Unrest. TOI. (1955, June 7). Mr. Nehru in Prague: Meets Ministers. TOI. (1960a, September 5). India’s trade with Soviet bloc. TOI. (1960b, September 20). Pact with Czech firm. TOI. (1965, March 26). 2 Projects with Czech Aid. TOI. (1966, November 10). Trombay heavy water for Czechoslovakia. TOI. (1974, December 1). Pact with Prague to double trade.

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CHAPTER 5

India and Hungary Rajendra K. Jain

During the Interwar period, Jawaharlal Nehru visited Hungary twice: in 1918 and in the third week of August 1938 with his daughter, Indira, who fell ill in Budapest.1 Nehru had ‘a glimpse’ of Budapest, but it was not ‘a very satisfying spectacle; then came the big war’ (Nehru, 1956f: col. 380). After the end of the Second World War, India signed a peace treaty with Hungary—designated as an ‘enemy or ex-enemy’ country—as one of the Allied and Associated Powers on 10 February 1947.2

1 Indira was examined by a doctor in Budapest after she had contracted a chill in Prague. The doctor diagnosed pleurisy and advised hospitalization. She spent three weeks in a hospital in Budapest before being permitted to travel to England where she was admitted to Middlesex Hospital in September 1938 (Jayakar, 1992: 98). 2 The treaty was signed on 10 February 1947 by the Indian High Commissioner in London, Sir Samuel Runganadhan, who headed the Indian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In a statement in the Central Legislative Assembly to ratify the treaty on 11 April 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vice-President of the Interim Government, stated: ‘India as such is not directly or intimately concerned with many matters raised in these treaties which affect the boundaries in Europe and various other matters but India is intimately concerned because these treaties may lay the foundation of peace or of war.’ India, he added, had very little to do with the smaller countries in the ‘course of war or otherwise’.

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_5

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This chapter examines the political and economic relations between India and Hungary during the Cold War and discusses the vicissitudes of relations since the early 1990s. It deals with the nature and impact of the Eastern Opening Strategy (2010), and the renewed focus during the Modi Years (2014–2020). It goes on to examine the nature of defence cooperation and Hungarian exports of military equipment to India. It explores Indian perceptions of Hungary in scholarly literature and looks at how Hungary figured in parliamentary discussions in the Lok Sabha from 1947 to 2019. After discussing various dimensions of cultural relations between the two countries, the chapter makes some concluding observations.

Relations During the Cold War Establishment of Diplomatic Relations India and Hungary established diplomatic relations on 18 November 1948. Initially, the Hungarian Minister to Cairo was concurrently accredited to New Delhi (Keskar, 1951: col. 4478–4479). Hungary opened an embassy in New Delhi in 1951. It was five years later that India opened a Legation in Budapest in October 1956. New Delhi did not respond positively to repeated Hungarian requests to upgrade the legations to embassies largely because it would have signalled Indian approval of the Janos Kadar Government (Das Gupta, 2017: 263), which had been installed by the Soviet Union after crushing the uprising on 4 November 1956. A way Nehru chose to express his ‘continued unhappiness’ over the situation in Hungary was to refuse these requests (Dutt S., 1977: 187). Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt counselled Nehru in October 1958 against upgrading the legations to embassies as it would send a wrong signal to Hungary and the world (Das Gupta, 2017: 264). It was only on 1 December 1959 that the legations were upgraded to embassies.

As a result, it was not considered suitable or fitting that India should be a claimant to reparations. Indian Information (1947: 447–448). The treaty came into force on 15 September 1947.

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The Hungarian Uprising, 1956 The political upheaval in Hungary, which began on 23 October 1956,3 was the result of economic problems—large-scale industrialization which led to lop-sided development, including food shortages and unemployment (Nehru, 1957a: 80). It was the outcome of the people’s demand for ‘more democracy, for more consumer goods and for removal of all vestiges of Soviet control’. It was not a repudiation of socialism as such, but of the manner in which the goals of socialism had been ‘subverted by terror, bureaucratisation and subservience to outside control’ (TOI, 1956a: 6). Five key factors—economic deterioration, the reign of the Stalinists, the rehabilitation, Soviet troops and Titoism—were ‘instrumental in filling the powder keg’ (Rahman, 1956). On 24 October, Soviet troops and tanks marched into Budapest and opened fire on demonstrators, but then pulled back to the barracks on 30 October. However, after Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced the end of one-party rule, the next day Hungary left the Warsaw Pact and declared neutrality, Soviet troops re-entered the capital. For ten days (4– 15 November), heaving fighting took place, which led to the killing of about 20,000 Hungarians. Several factors complicated/delayed the Indian response to events in Hungary. Firstly, within the Ministry of External Affairs, Hungary took ‘a second place’ to those in the Suez (Dutt, 1977: 177). Egypt was an important non-aligned country and Nehru had developed close friendly relations with Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Hungarian issue did not have ‘the same emotional appeal’ in India that the Suez issue possessed (Ramesh, 1997: 111–112). Secondly, Hungary was ‘somewhat distant from India and the facts about the Hungarian upheaval were not very clear’3 (Dutt, 1977: 177). In the absence of reliable information, Nehru was reluctant to avoid ‘any public condemnation’ of the Soviet Union in Hungary (Dutt, 1977: 178). Thirdly, during the Hungarian crisis, Nehru and Marshal Josip Broz Tito were in constant contact. As ‘a competent 3 When Russian tanks moved into Budapest, Nehru asked K.P.S. Menon to go to Budapest and report on what was happening in Hungary. But he was unable to go since he was down with an attack of influenza. It was only in the first week of November 1956 that M.A. Rahman, First Secretary of the Indian Embassy in Budapest, could send messages to the MEA from Vienna. During those crucial days, New Delhi had to rely almost entirely on mostly Western agency reports, which were ‘not entirely dependable’ (Dutt, 1977: 175).

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consultant’, he advised Nehru how to treat the Soviet Union4 (Miskovic, 2014: 116, 129). In his first public reaction on 25 October, Nehru regarded the Hungarian uprising to be ‘a nationalist upsurge’ (Nehru, 1956a: 5) and a ‘powerful and widespread national uprising…against Soviet forces and interference’ (Nehru, 1956b: 452; 1956d: 456). On 6 November, he conveyed to Premier Nikolai Bulganin his disapproval of strong countries coercing weaker ones (Nehru, 1956c: 436). Of the three resolutions of 8 and 9 November 1956 at the UN General Assembly, India voted against the first one because it called for elections to be held in Hungary under UN auspices. New Delhi abstained on the second resolution sponsored by the United States condemning Soviet actions in Hungary and calling for a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces. India voted in support of the third resolution sponsored by Austria, which called for increased aid to Hungary. New Delhi had voted against US-sponsored resolution because it was different from a ‘fact-finding mission’. Nehru considered the proposal ‘not only unconstitutional but dangerous precedent for other countries’ (Nehru, 1956d: 462). India took ‘strong exception’ to the holding of elections in Hungary under UN supervision because it was contrary to the UN Charter and because it would reduce Hungary to ‘less than a sovereign State’. Foreign supervised elections would also set ‘a precedent which might be utilised in future for intervention in other countries’ (Nehru, 1956e: cols. 265–266). New Delhi’s staunch opposition to UN-supervised elections in Kashmir was widely known. The Indian vote was bitterly criticized in many countries including India. The venerable socialist leader Jayaprakash Narayan was critical of the application of double standards regarding Egypt and Hungary. Krishna Menon, without authorization from the Foreign Office,5 had 4 Nehru explained his reasons for consulting Tito in the Lok Sabha: ‘…in the last two or three years… Yugoslavia has become a country with which we exchange our appraisals of the world situation more frequently than with any other country. We attach great value to this in regard to Europe. That is because Yugoslavia, first of all, is geographically so situated as to be in intimate touch with the developments in Central and Eastern Europe… I am free to confess that we have, to some extent, been guided by their appraisals of the European situation’ (Nehru, 1956g: col. 582). 5 For a detailed account of day-to-day developments as the crisis unfolded, the intraministerial differences, the frustrations of Foreign Secretary Dutt, the imbalanced reporting of K.P.S. Menon and the evolving attitude of Nehru, see Das Gupta (2017: 251–266).

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voted in favour of the USSR in the UN, thereby greatly tarnishing the image of India (Das Gupta, 2017: 249). Nehru instructed K.P.S. Menon, who was Ambassador to the Soviet Union and concurrently accredited to Hungary, to make an on-thespot report from Budapest, but since he was down with an attack of influenza, he instructed J. N. Khosla, Ambassador in Prague, to proceed to Vienna and he subsequently travelled to Budapest as his personal representative. Menon eventually submitted his report on 8 December, whose main points were stated by Nehru in a statement in the Rajya Sabha on 13 December. According to the information provided by him, 25,000 Hungarians and 7,000 Russians had been killed in the fighting in Hungary. The damage to Budapest, Menon reported, was ‘heart rending’ and on a ‘wartime scale’. The atmosphere in Budapest, he added, was reminiscent of the civil disobedience days in India. The only difference was that Hungarians had to face ‘tanks and not lathis’ (Nehru, 1956h: 206–208). With the missions of K.P.S. Menon and J.N. Khosla, ‘the anticommunists [MEA Secretary General N.R. Pillai and Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt] won the battle (Das Gupta, 2018: 151). However, there was an alternate view in the MEA at the time, and held much later too, that there was ‘a fundamental difference between former imperial powers intervening in a former colony and a great power intervening in its immediate backyard’ (Raghavan, 2018). The UN General Assembly adopted 11 resolutions in all on the Hungarian question. India voted in favour of three, against one and abstained on seven. India abstained from voting on resolutions on Hungary in the UN General Assembly on the grounds that those resolutions which used language inimical to conciliation, those which were ideologically motivated, those which implied a non-independent status for Hungary and those which tried to introduce UN personnel into Hungary without the explicit consent of the Hungarian Government (Heimsath & Mansingh, 1971: 429–430). Nehru’s overwhelming concern, however, was to ensure that no war emerged from the ‘powder keg of Central Europe’ (Mansingh, 1965: 155; Menon, 1956). The question of sending relief supplies to Egypt and Hungary figured in the Union Cabinet, which felt that considerable help should be given This account is based on Subimal Dutt’s diaries and the internal archives of the Ministry of External Affairs.

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to both countries. It was decided to send Rs1 million (US$2,014,920 at 2020 rates), which took the form of tea, coffee, cloth, blankets, etc.6 (Nehru, 1956f: 446–447). Subsequently, Nehru concluded that the Hungarians had completely ‘lost control’ and unwisely ‘openly appealed to the Westerners for help against their “enemy—Russia”’. This was unacceptable to Moscow. Thus, ‘regardless of the merits of the dispute’, the tragedy occurred. Nevertheless, it was ‘a tremendous moral defeat’ for Russia, which was unwilling to take any risks (Nehru, 1958a: 429). The Soviet action reflected ‘an element of self-defence’ (Nehru, 1962b: 495). By the mid-1950s, Nehru had realized that being ‘clinically nonaligned and impartial’ in world affairs was not desirable because India needed friends to support its cause on certain issues in which other world powers could get interested. Thus, at a time when the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries were showing an inclination to become friendly towards India, there was no point in becoming critical of Moscow on the Hungarian issue which ‘in no way impinged directly on any Indian interests’ (Dixit, 2003: 66–67). Unlike the Suez crisis, where India adopted a high moral posture, New Delhi ‘temporized’ and was ‘ambiguous’ and not critical of the Soviet Union for invading Hungary (Dixit, 2003: 349). The Hungarian crisis also exposed India’s non-alignment to be ‘somewhat partisan, reflecting a leftward leaning’ (Tharoor, 2012: 12–13). Execution of Imre Nagy The execution of detained Hungarian leader Imre Nagy and his associates (Defence Minister General Pal Maleter and two others) in Budapest on 16 June 1958 had greatly shocked Hungarian public opinion. Foreign Secretary Dutt asked Nehru how the GoI should respond, but advised against criticizing it in public (Dutt, 1958: 650, fn. 2). Nehru was ‘greatly distressed’ at the news. The secret trial and execution reflected ‘rigidity and to some extent a reversion to older methods which we thought had been given up’. It also took mankind ‘further away’ from any relaxation of world tension or world peace (Nehru, 1958b: 650). The communists had been ‘amazingly foolish’ in undertaking such ‘a cold blooded act’ 6 The Indian Air Force Fairchild aircraft carried about 4,000 lb. of medical supplies, 500 lb. of coffee and 2,000 lb. of tea for Egypt about 3,500 lb. of tea and 300 lb. of coffee for Hungary (TOI, 1956b: 7).

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(Nehru, 1958c: 653–654). What happened in Hungary was not ‘essentially a conflict between communism and anti-communism. It represented nationalism striving for freedom from foreign control’ (Nehru, 1958d: 6). The 1960s During the goodwill visit of Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Munnich (25–27 August 1961), there was ‘friendly exchange’ of views on matters of mutual interest as well as the current international situation, including the question of the German peace treaty, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. There was agreement that ‘energetic measures’ should be taken to end colonialism and racial discrimination. Finance Minister Morarji Desai (September 1961) discussed Gandhian philosophy and compared notes with Prime Minister Janos Kadar on political imprisonment since both had been political prisoners for seven years. Desai also visited some factories, including the Gottwald Electric Equipment Factory, which in pre-war days had supplied railway equipment to India (Kamath, 1961: 9). The impression Desai got from his visit was that Hungary was getting ‘more and more industrialised’ and that there were possibilities for increasing economic cooperation (Desai, 1961: col. 1604). The Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union and concurrently to Hungary, Subimal Dutt, was relieved that Desai, known to be anti-communist, did not make ‘any tactless remark’ about the Hungarian political system (cited in Das Gupta, 2017: 429). India-China War, 1962 Prime Minister Janos Kadar expressed his ‘profound anxiety’ at the ‘tragic situation’ that had arisen on the Indian border. He urged Nehru to accept the Chinese proposal for negotiations (Kadar, 1962: 767–769). ‘No selfrespecting country, much less India’, Nehru replied, could submit to ‘the military dictates of an arrogant and expansionist aggressor’ who sought to not only retain the gains of its aggression (Nehru, 1962c: 358). Initially, Hungary had an ambivalent attitude towards the Chinese aggression in 1962. It was only when Moscow’s attitude changed in favour of India that the CEECs passed resolutions at successive party meetings denouncing the Chinese action against India. These countries ‘stood’ by India and were thus deemed to be ‘important politically’ (Singh, S., 1964: 222).

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The Late 1960s Prime Minister Gyula Kallai’s visit (February 1966) led to the conclusion of a long-term trade agreement, an agreement on civil aviation as well as on scientific and technical cooperation. The two Prime Ministers found that their positions on fundamental questions of the international situation were ‘identical or similar’. They stressed the need to settle disputed questions, including border disputes, between states without the use of force and through peaceful negotiations. Both Prime Ministers stressed the need for continued efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament and expressed support for atom-free zones and agreed on the urgency of an international agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. India stressed the ‘necessity’ of peaceful settlement of the German problem (India, MEA 1966: 30). Overall, relations with Hungary were said to be ‘close and many-sided’ (Gandhi, I., 1968: 168). During the visit of President Zakir Husain to Hungary (June 1968) and that of President Pal Losonczi (November 1969) to India, the Indian President remarked that despite being located in different continents with different historical experiences, they had much in common (Husain, 1968: 1) and that there were ‘no problems or disputes’ between them (Giri, 1969: 229). India’s non-alignment policy, Losonczi remarked, had allowed it to play ‘a significant role’ in safeguarding peace and security primarily in Asia. He appreciated New Delhi’s interest in the consolidation of a security system in Europe and recognition of European realities (Losconczi, 1969: 230–231). Next year, during President V. V. Giri’s visit, the Hungarians proposed the establishment of a Joint Committee of Economic Cooperation, which was accepted (TOI, 1970: 11). The 1970s The first Indian prime ministerial visit to Hungary took place nearly a quarter century after the establishment of diplomatic relations. Indira Gandhi acknowledged that Budapest had consistently shown ‘political understanding’ towards India and stood by it when events in Bangladesh confronted New Delhi with an unprecedented challenge. She welcomed the spirit of reconciliation and appreciated the significance of the treaties signed by West Germany with the Soviet Union and Poland as well as the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin (see Jain, 1993). She, however, felt that this spirit of peace was not being extended to conflicts in Asia

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(Gandhi, I., 1972: 156–157). Discussions on important international questions revealed ‘identical or very close’ positions (India, MEA, 1972: 158–159). During Prime Minster Jeno Fock’s visit two years later, the two countries again reiterated ‘the closeness or identity of positions’ on most international issues. They expressed the hope that the easing of tension in Europe with the convening of the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation would help in the relaxation of tensions and solution of conflicts in other parts of the world (India, MEA, 1974: 295). Bilateral trade had increased from Rs320 million to Rs720 million in two years, but India essentially remained a supplier of raw materials and importer of industrial goods and technology (Economic Times, 1974). Kashmir Hungary, like other Central European countries, generally accepted Kashmir to be an integral part of India. Since the Tashkent Declaration (1966), Budapest had taken the line that the outstanding problems between India and Pakistan should be solved in the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration on the basis of non-interference in internal affairs and without the use of force. Subsequently, it reiterated its continued support for the Simla Agreement as a firm basis for the establishment of good neighbourly relations and the building of durable peace in the subcontinent. Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, 1974 India, according to a Hungarian Foreign Ministry Memorandum, had stayed away from every effort at disarmament since the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) primarily because of the perceived threat from China and partly because of its ‘big power aspirations’ for which an independent nuclear programme was deemed necessary. It was ‘a rather difficult task’ for the Socialist countries to deal with India’s peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) (18 May 1974) since they neither wanted to condemn India nor go against their established viewpoint. They therefore preferred to refrain from expressing their opinion, which was ‘duly appreciated by the Indian leadership’, which on several occasions thanked them for their ‘expressive silence’ (Hungary, MFA, 1974). European Socialist countries went along with the Indian official declaration that the PNE served peaceful

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purposes, but their common evaluation was that it might ‘hinder IndianAmerican rapprochement and further aggravate Indian-Chinese relations’ (Hungary, Embassy in India 1974). For over two decades, Hungary made no official statement about India’s nuclear programme, but it felt that India-China ‘strategic conflicts.. and their competition for hegemony over Asia’ were ‘almost of an antagonistic nature’ (Hungary, MFA, 1987). The Late 1970s and the 1980s During the late 1970s and the 1980s, the number of high-level visits, exchanges of parliamentary delegations and ministerial consultative, informative, working-level talks between India and Hungary were extensive in terms of both level and covering practically every field of cooperation. Hungarian leaders supported the imposition of the Emergency in 1975 (TOI, 1975: 7). During the first-ever visit of a Hungarian Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja in February 1976—nearly three decades after the establishment of diplomatic relations—the two sides reiterated their common approach to various world problems. Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan welcomed efforts for the relaxation of tensions in Europe and expressed the hope that the process of détente would be stabilized in Europe and extend as well as benefit all parts of the world (Chavan, 1976: 59). Budapest also supported India was on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace (India, MEA, 1976: 343–344). Rajiv Gandhi’s Six Nation Peace Initiative In the aftermath of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Rajiv Gandhi took the initiative at the summit of the ‘Six’ (the Six Nation Five-Continent Peace Initiative) in late January 1988 in Stockholm (Gandhi, R., 1988a), which sought to foster a global process of disarmament so that it would eventually lead to the elimination of all nuclear weapons to encompass every country which possesses nuclear weapons, including China. Budapest found the proposal to have ‘few new elements’ since it sought to establish an integrated, multilateral system of inspections under the aegis of the United Nations (Oláh, 1988). During his two-day visit to Budapest, Rajiv Gandhi spoke about the rich cultural links between India and Hungary and his speech at the United Nations at the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, where he put forward an action plan which sought the total

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elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2010. He appreciated Hungary’s support for India’s proposal for a New International Economic Order (Gandhi, R., 1988b: 196). The Hungarian offer of a credit of $200 million ‘figured prominently’ during the discussions (India, MEA, 1989: 178). Economic and Trade Relations During the Cold War, India was a major partner of Hungary in Asia in trade and economic relations even though it comprised a small share of its international trade. Hungary’s role in India’s economic development was limited during the Cold War. In the 1960s, its role was confined to telecommunications (supply of VHF radio-telephones and multi-channel tape recorders to Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department), a lamp factory in the public sector, the pharmaceutical industry (basic drugs) and detonators. The most significant collaboration was the establishment of an integrated 200,000 tonne annual capacity aluminium complex at Korba at an estimated cost of Rs390 million, which started operations in 1973. By the mid-1980s, there were 55 projects set up in India with Hungarian collaboration.7 The major institutional mechanism for trade and economic relations was the Indo-Hungarian Economic and Technical Scientific Cooperation Committee, which was established in 1974—eight years after the one with Czechoslovakia. Meeting biennially, it became the primary institution for industrial cooperation and drawing up annual trade plans. Till 1978, bilateral trade agreements operated on the basis of a clearing payment system, and thereafter, the two countries shifted to trading in free convertible currency. The size of the Hungarian market was not very significant in terms of India’s overall trade, but it did offer an additional market at times when the market for Indian products was shrinking in West Europe. It was a useful first European market for several non-traditional Indian products including Maruti cars and mopeds.

7 Industrial plants established through cooperation with Hungary included a blasting fuse plant for the mining industry, a kilowatt-hour meter factory, basic drugs, including a B-12 vitamin plant, construction of hydro power stations at Mohr and Ganderbal in Kashmir in the early 1960s and at Pune in 1975, etc. (Chopra et al., 1985: 27–30; Czeckus, 1978: 123).

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Trade increased from Rs31 million in 1960 to Rs359 million in 1979 and doubled to Rs710 million in 1981 (India, MEA, 1988: 329). Bilateral trade during the 1980s remained above US$100 million and in some years even touched $200 million (India, Embassy in Hungary 2019c). The major items of export from India before 1990 were tea, tobacco, pepper and other spices, de-oiled cakes, finished leather and shoe uppers, iron ore and pellets, cotton and jute goods, engineering goods, Maruti vehicles, chemicals and chemical products. Imports from Hungary included steel and steel products, chemicals, machine tools, pulses, peas, newsprint and engineering goods, especially for railways and power projects.

The 1990s With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Hungary’s primary focus was on gaining membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. Since the early 1990s, Budapest’s foreign policy had aligned closely with that of the EU. During the Kargil conflict, Budapest supported India’s position and regarded Pakistan as having violated the Line of Control. Despite a broad convergence of interests on international issues, there were also some differences. For instance, India was apprehensive that the eastward enlargement of NATO was ‘a matter of global concern as it could lead to revival of tensions and rivalries which have only recently abated’ (India, MEA, 1994: 54). Similarly, there were differences of views on the military involvement of NATO in Kosovo. Budapest was also critical of the 1998 nuclear tests and urged India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other non-proliferation treaties.

Eastern Opening Strategy, 2010 Given its preoccupation with the accession to the European Union and NATO from 1989 to 2004, Hungary turned away from ‘geographically or geopolitically distant areas’ of Asia, Africa, Latin American and the post-Soviet region (Hungary, MFA, 2011: 38). Budapest introduced the concept of ‘Global Opening’, which sought to revitalize ties with those parts of the world that had been accorded ‘lesser importance’ in Hungary’s foreign policy focus in recent years (Hungary, MFA, 2011: 9). Apart from China, India had also emerged as ‘an inevitable player of

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the global economy and politics’. Their relatively low share in Hungary’s foreign trade concealed ‘a significant potential for growth increase, in view of the robust development of Asian economies’ (Hungary, MFA, 2011: 43). Prime Minister Viktor Orban launched the ‘Eastern Opening’ policy on 5 September 2010 at a meeting of the Hungarian Permanent Council in Budapest during which he declared that ‘We are sailing under a Western flag, though an Eastern wind is blowing in the world economy!’ The full text of the strategy was not made public; only reports in the press were published. However, there was no clarity or consensus about the geographical scope of the term ‘East’ in Hungarian foreign policy thinking (Racz, 2011: 145). The key objective of the Eastern Opening was to diversify Hungary’s economic relations and develop relations with non-EU countries, double exports, and promote exports of Hungarian small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Elteto & Antaloczy, 2017: 47). Orban appointed his personal spokesman, Peter Szijjarto, as State Secretary in charge of Foreign and External Economic Affairs to implement the Eastern Opening policy.8 Since his appointment, economic diplomacy and the vigorous pursuit of economic interests have played a much more significant role in Hungarian foreign policy. The key motivations behind the Eastern Opening were to salvage the crisis-ridden economy, reduce the economic dependence on the West by enhancing exports and attract foreign direct investment from the rapidly growing Asian markets by high-level visits and the pursuit of a proactive economic diplomacy. Hungary’s growing differences with Brussels since 2011 also enabled Budapest to present greater Hungarian activism in the ‘East’ as a substitute for weakened relations (Jozwiak, 2017: 2). The goal of the Eastern Opening, according to the Foreign Trade Strategy of the Ministry of National Economy, was to enable Hungarian enterprises through exports to ‘enjoy higher profits, thanks to the growing import needs of dynamically developing economies (China, India, Russia, South Korea)’. Hungarian exports were projected to grow from 6% in 2011 to 10% by 2015. Agricultural technologies and food

8 After assuming this position, Szijjártó criss-crossed the globe in an effort to promote Hungary’s bilateral trade with various developing countries. Within 18 months of his appointment, he made 34 official visits to 28 different countries, travelling a total of 250,000 kms, over six times around the Earth at its equator. The Orange Files, ‘Eastern Opening’, Retrieved June 22, 2020, from: https://theorangefiles.hu/eastern-opening/.

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processing were identified as the most promising areas of export to India (Hungary, Ministry of National Economy, 2011: 139). To that end, Hungarian delegations made repeated visits to India. A Consulate General in Mumbai—the country’s financial and industrial capital—was also opened. However, the Eastern Opening was not ‘a coherent policy, but rather a collection of steps and gestures towards Eastern states which possess the capacity to invest in the country or to finance its debt’ (Tarrosy & Voros, 2014: 279; 2020: 132).

Orban’s, 2013 Visit To mark the 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán visited India on 16–18 October 2013 with a 100-member delegation, including 80 businessmen. India, he stated, should think of itself not as a regional power but as a global power and to draw all the consequences and challenges that come with that role. With India’s ‘global role in mind’, Budapest had supported New Delhi’s candidature for a permanent seat to the United Nations Security Council. Hungary, he added, had managed to successfully pull itself out from the verge of bankruptcy and was keen to enter into ‘an economic partnership with emerging economies of the world for a win–win partnership’ (Orban, 2013). He urged India to look more closely at Central Europe as an emerging region instead of Western Europe, which was declining. It was time, he concluded, for the two countries to look beyond the ‘age-old relationship’ reinforced by culture and heritage links to build ‘a solid economic foundation’ (India, Embassy in Hungary, 2013: 6–7). He urged Indian companies to look at Hungary not as a 9.5 million market, but as part of ‘an emerging power region of Central Europe’ (India, Embassy in Hungary, 2013: 7; 17 October: 1952). He identified areas like infrastructure, power, energy and renewable energy, agro and food processing, water, waste management and defence technologies, etc., in which Hungarian companies could invest and support India’s development. Indian companies also looked at Hungary as ‘a strategic partner’ in their drive to penetrate the EU (Kaur, 2013). Prime Minister Manmohan Singh appreciated the ‘Eastern Opening’ policy and expressed the hope that the two countries could find ‘opportunities in each other and also be each other’s bridge to Europe and Asia’ (Singh, M., 2013: 1954).

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Orban’s visit led to the signing of four Memoranda of Understanding and two letters of intent.9

Jaishankar’s Visit, August 2019 Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited Hungary from 25 to 27 August 2019. He addressed the opening session of the annual conference of Hungary’s Heads of Missions in Budapest on 26 August. The two ministers resolved to intensify bilateral cooperation in the fields of education, tourism and science and signed a Cultural Exchange Programme for 2019–2022. The Hungarian side announced their decision to join the International Solar Alliance. (India, Embassy in Hungary 2019b). The future Hungarian focus, Foreign Minister Szijjarto stated, would be on five main areas, viz. film production, digitalization, water management, solar energy and pharmaceuticals for strengthening cooperation with India. Indian companies, he added, comprised the fourth largest Asian investor community in Hungary (Hungary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019).

Economic and Trade Relations since the 1990s Following the far-reaching changes of 1990s, the rapid privatization of the economy, the disappearance of traditional markets and the infusion of ‘Western’ investments resulted in dissolution of Hungary’s old commercial links with India. New trading links to replace them were slow to emerge. While deregulation and liberalization of the economies had thrown up fresh opportunities in both countries for enhanced and meaningful commercial and economic cooperation, there has not yet been any significant utilization of these opportunities. After Hungary joined the European Union in 2004, India and Hungary established a Joint Economic Committee, which provides the institutional framework for

9 These were an MOU on Bilateral Cooperation in Traditional Systems of Medicine;

(2) MOU on Cooperation in the field of Sports; (3) MOU on Cooperation in the areas of Defensive Aspects of Microbiological and Radiological Detection and Protection; (4) Cultural Exchange Programme for 2013–2015; (5) Letter of Intent on Revision of Air Services Agreement; and (6) Letter of Intent for Indo-Hungarian Strategic Research Fund (enhanced Hungarian contribution of about Euro 2 million each for 2014–2017).

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intergovernmental discussions on economic cooperation between the two countries. Indo-Hungarian trade declined to a meagre US$47 million in 1992, but increased to $162 million in 2003 (Foreign Affairs Record, October 1993: 280; India, MEA 2005: 1661). In 2009, bilateral trade amounted to US$588.3 million. It rose to $625.5 million and peaked to $840.8 million in 2011. During 2012, the momentum could not be sustained owing to a 42.7% decrease in Hungarian exports to India, though Indian exports increased by modest 2.7%. The value of bilateral trade in 2012 was US$642.6 million. Trade continued to fluctuate in subsequent years. In 2018, it amounted to US$736.7 million. Since 2012, India has continued to enjoy a small trade surplus with Hungary. Foreign Direct Investment Till 1989, about 25 Indo-Hungarian joint ventures were operating in India, primarily in the areas of pharmaceuticals and vacuum technology. With the changes in the Hungarian economy in the 1990s, including rapid privatization, the disappearance of traditional markets and the infusion of Western investments, most of these joint ventures had either been terminated or were indigenized leaving only a handful of Hungarian companies present in the Indian market (India, MEA, 2016: 2). Indian companies are attracted to Hungary due to its congenial business environment and locational advantages. India was the largest investor in Hungary in 2014 (e494.8 million), or a third of the total and more than double the second-biggest partner, China, and more than triple Japan, the third-ranked partner that year (Kugiel, 2016: 32). In 2015, Indian FDI in Hungary increased to $1.5 billion. The most significant greenfield FDI was the e475 million ($510 million) Apollo Tyres factory in Gyöngyöshalász. At present, about 40 Indian companies have invested over US$2 billion and currently employ more than 10,000 Hungarian nationals (Chhabra, 2019; Szijjarto, 2020b). This includes nearly two dozen investments including many IT majors (Tata Consultancy Services, Genpact, Wipro, Cognizant, Satyam Computers/Tech Mahindra) in Hungary. Among the half a dozen Hungarian investments in India, the two largest are Richter-Gedeon Ltd. (pharmaceuticals) and the oil and gas company MOL. In May 2008, MOL bought a 35% share in an ONGC oilfield and has been collaborating in the field of oil and gas exploration

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in India. However, after unsuccessful drilling, this joint venture came to an end in 2013.

Arms Supplies and Defence Cooperation Since Hungary had a relatively small defence industry among Warsaw Pact nations, there was very modest defence cooperation with India. The first instance was the establishment of a 64-million capacity detonator (for use in border roads) factory in Hyderabad with a private sector company, Indian Detonators Ltd. (now IDL Ltd.). Under the August 1961 agreement, Hungary supplied the plant and equipment for the factory in rupee payment without any royalty or price for technology (TOI, 1961: 3). In the 1980s, Hungary supplied microwave equipment to Doordarshan as well as telecommunications equipment to the railways and the Department of Telecommunications (TOI, 1988a: 10). In September 1989, India and Hungary agreed to cooperate in the manufacture of electronics-related defence items on the conclusion of the Hungarian Defence Minister Ferenc Karpati’s visit to India. Cooperation in this area was stated to be a ‘major’ aspect of bilateral defence cooperation (TOI, 1989b: 11). After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Hungarian defence industry shrunk considerably owing to tough external market conditions, a sharp decline in domestic orders because of the drastic downsizing of the Hungarian armed forces and the loss of its main markets in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. It took considerable time for the defence industry to revive itself. India and Hungary signed an agreement on defence cooperation on 3 November 2003, which was expected to strengthen India’s defence modernization programme (Vajpayee, 2003: 1360). The two countries established a Joint Defence Committee (JDC)—‘the highest level forum at elaborating and reviewing the defence cooperation programmes’ (Hungary, Ministry of Defence 2012). Co-chaired by the Joint Secretary (Defence Production), Ministry of Defence and the Deputy State Secretary for Defence Economy, its first meeting was held in April 2007. Subsequent meetings were generally held annually until the eighth one in March 2015; no meetings of the JDC have been held since then primarily because Hungary has not exported any military equipment to India since 2016.

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The key areas that the JDC focused on were training and research and technology aspects of nuclear, biological, chemical defence; upgradation and modernization of Soviet/Russian origin armament and armaments systems; upgradation of some segments of battle systems of the Indian Armed Forces; military medical cooperation; cooperation in the field of training and education (Hungary, Ministry of Defence 2012) in Hungarian military institutions for Indian armed forces’ personnel. On 17 October 2013, a MoU between the Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian Ministry of Defence regarding cooperation in the areas of defensive aspects of microbiological and radiological detection and protection was signed. It sought to facilitate the transfer of know-how, experience and technical information in the areas of biological, radiological and chemical warfare (Kugiel, 2016: 28). In mid-2015, it was reported that a MoU on defence science and technology cooperation was expected to be signed shortly (India, Embassy in Hungary 2015: 8). Next year, a MoU on establishing a Joint Science and Technology sub-group with the Hungarian Ministry of Defence was expected to be ‘finalized shortly’ (India, MEA, 2016: 4). Neither of these two agreements seem to have been signed so far. Exchange of Visits Exchange of defence delegations between India and Hungary began in the 1980s. The first visit by an Indian Defence Minister was in May 1984 of R. Venkataraman. Two years later, Chief of Army Staff General K. Sundarji was in Hungary. Defence Minister K.C. Pant visited Hungary in October 1988. He was followed by Minister of State for Defence Mallikarjun in October 1993. The first visit by the Hungarian Defence Minister General Ferenc Karapati took place only in September 1989. Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis visited Hungary in October 1999. Hungarian Minister of Defence Imre Szekeres visited India in February 2008—nineteen years after his predecessor had visited India. A 16-member delegation of the National Defence College visited Hungary on a familiarization visit on 23–27 May 2011. This was followed by the visit of a 3-member Indian defence delegation (28–30 April 2014) to Hungarian nuclear biological and chemical establishments for finalizing cooperation in the field of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear equipment, training, aerial CBRN and lab testing facilities. Col. Laszlo Pallos participated in the 55th National Defence College course in 2015. Since then, there have been no defence visits.

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Hungarian Arms Exports to India Since the 1990s During 1992–1995, Hungarian arms exports to India reached e13.785 million. This doubled to e27.684 million during 1996–2000. Hungarian arms exports to India were e5.880 million in 2001, but dropped to e2,620 million in 2002. They amounted to e623,100 in 2006 (Hungary, Export Control and Precious Metal Verification Department, 2018: 29). Table 5.1 Hungarian export of arms and military equipment to India, 1992–2018

Year 1992–1995 1996–2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Amount (in thousand Euros) 13,784.6 27,683.7 5,879.5 2,620.1 777.7 512.3 107.6 623.1 207.3 235.1 485.9 1,031.9 1,1312.7 393.6 1,284.3 156.1 392.1 0 0 0

Source Hungary, Trade Licensing Office, Authority on Military Industry and Export Controls (2017: 36), Hungary, Government Office of the Capital City of Budapest, Commercial, Military (2018: 29; 2019: 36)

In 2008, Hungary exported arms worth e235,109 (against a license of e835,000) in the ML 10 category (aircraft, lighter than air vehicles, unmanned airborne vehicles, aero-engines and aircraft equipment and components, etc.) (Hungary 2008: 6). This increased to e486,000 in 2009 (Hungary, Trade Licensing Office, 2009). In 2013 and 2014, Hungary’s military exports to India amounted to e1.2843 million. This

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declined to e156,100 in 2014, but more than doubled to e392,100 in 2015 (Hungary 2014: Annex 2). Since then, Hungary has not made any supplies of military equipment to India (Table 5.1).

Perceptions in Scholarly Literature There has been scanty coverage on Hungary in India’s two premier quarterlies on foreign policy—India Quarterly (the house journal of the Indian Council of World Affairs) and International Studies —the journal of the Indian School of International Studies/Jawaharlal Nehru University. The first article to deal with Hungary appeared in 1949. Examining dimensions of postwar East European economies, V.S. Sastry observed that in 1945, Hungary experienced inflation, which was worsened by the enormous costs of Russian occupation and the reparation payments to Russia. To curb inflation, the Hungarian Government undertook currency reform. Owing to the limited nationalization of heavy industries, 80% of industrial production continued to be controlled by private industry (Sastry, 1949: 338). Unlike Poland and Czechoslovakia„ Hungary chose to concentrate primarily on light industry in order to obtain a pre-war level of production in agriculture and light industry. Among all the ‘buffer’ states, Hungary alone sought to produce consumer goods needed most by the masses (Sastry, 1949: 339). Examining the economic problems confronted by European countries in the aftermath of the Second World War, Yodhraj argued that East European countries gave priority to industrial growth, which led to food shortages and shortage of consumer goods. In fact, in Hungary, the industrial production had increased three times over pre-war levels (Yodhraj 1954: 12–13). Two years later, K.M. Panikkar found Central Europe to be in ‘a state of political disintegration’ after the First World War (Panikkar, 1956: 233). There were ‘eruptions’ in Hungary and Germany, but these were put down without much difficulty. As a result, there was no prospect of ‘the proletariat of the world’ following the 1917 Russian Revolution (Panikkar, 1956: 226). However, with the ‘liberation’ of Eastern Europe by the Red Army, Hungary joined the proletarian camp (Panikkar, 1956: 245). A decade later, Bela Csikos-Nagy made a detailed examination of the Hungarian economy and the nature and impact of economic reforms (Csikos-Nagy, 1965).

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In a perceptive article on the Hungarian uprising, Surjit Mansingh argued that India’s ‘emotional non-involvement and relative ignorance’ of Central Europe lent an objectivity to its assessment of events in Hungary which was ‘lacking in the attitudes of countries more intimately associated with that area by policy or culture’ (Mansingh, 1965: 138). New Delhi’s approach towards all the crises of 1956—Algeria, the Suez and Hungary—a general characteristic of Indian diplomacy was rooted in its concern with ‘the feasibility of any action, the unwillingness to condemn merely for the sake of condemning’ (Mansingh, 1965: 138). However, India’s repugnance at the military intervention in Hungary did not translate itself into support for condemnatory resolutions in the United Nations against the Soviet Union, which was consistent with Indian past and future practice of ‘mild-mannered diplomacy. Without being abusive, Indian leaders continued to criticise the suppression’ (Mansingh, 1965: 148). Verma (1989: 315) concluded that the Soviet invasion of Hungary made a mockery of high-sounding phrases and highlighted that Panchsheel, as a code of international morality, was not effective in new situations. The first article to refer to Hungary in International Studies was by M.L. Sondhi. The Hungarian revolution and the statements made by Imre Nagy, he argued, indicated that the Indian policy of Panchsheel made ‘a profound impact’ in political circles in Hungary. He even went on to state that for a major country like India, there was ‘obviously no need to fit in with the overall Soviet strategy to Eastern Europe’ (Sondhi, 1963: 160). In fact, the development of normal relations with Asian and African governments had a threefold advantage for East Europe: development of economic ties, enhancement of their political importance which had been adversely affected by the policy of ‘containment’ and to secure the mediation of non-aligned countries like India on important issues like disarmament (Sondhi, 1963: 162). The first specific article to appear on Hungary was four decades after International Studies was launched by the Indian School of International Studies in 1974. Discussing the emergence and evolution of the party system in Hungary, it examined the nature and impact of three postcommunist parliamentary elections of 1990, 1994 and 1998. From the point of overall political and parliamentary performance, Jha concluded, the track record of Hungarian parties had been much better than in other countries of Central Europe (Jha, 1999: 292).

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Three years later, Bhaswati Sarkar and S.K. Jha addressed the issue of Hungarian minorities—the second largest minority in Europe and the largest in East Europe—in three countries, viz. Romania, Slovakia and Yugoslavia. The basic objective of the Hungarians in these countries, the authors argued, was to maximize possible benefits of political democracy and market economy in the post-communist era without compromising their distinct ethnic identity. There was, they concluded, ‘increasing pragmatism as opposed to rhetoric and ethnic chauvinism in the majorityminority relationship’ and an awareness that the demarcation of borders is ‘a given reality and solutions must be found within’ (Sarkar & Jha, 2002: 164). The first book on Hungary to be published in India was a 967page book by Hori Lal Saxena, The Hungarian Story, which was mostly descriptive and a travelogue (Saxena, 1961). The next book was published nearly four decades later (Sharma & Lavei, 1997), which comprised of mostly papers presented at the seventh Indo-Hungarian round table conference of economists and policy-makers held at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in March 1995. The volume focused on the varied experiences of the two countries in the field of liberalization and economic transformation. A sponsored volume by the Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre dealt with political, economic and cultural ties between India and Hungary (Kalmar & Major, 1983a) and a compendium of papers by Hungarian and Indian scholars on the various facets of the political system and institutions of the two countries (Malhotra, 2000). Another seminar volume featured papers presented at another round table of Indian and Hungarian scholars dealing with economic conditions and changes as well as democratic experiences in both countries (Joshi, 2000). More recently, another study focused on the Hungarian experience in nation-building (Sarkar, 2004). The Hungarian Uprising A number of books and articles have been published on the Hungarian uprising of 1956. With the emergence of polycentrism in the Soviet bloc in the early 1960s, India began to pay greater attention to forging closer relations with East European countries ‘individually and independent of the relations with the USSR’ (Kaushik, 1985: 14–15). In the wake of Sino-Soviet ideological rivalry, Chinese ideological pressure in East Europe, Sondhi argued, was intended to dissuade them from developing

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normal relationships with Afro-Asian countries and urge them to devote their full energies in helping bringing about the seizure of power by local Communist parties. This highlighted the possible implications for India of the Chinese ideological challenge in Eastern Europe. Friendship with the Soviet Union, he argued, did not ‘automatically secure friendship’ in each of the Communist countries. Indian interests would therefore have to be protected primarily by Indian policy in each Communist country (Sondhi, 1963: 164). Indian and Hungarian authors have published half a dozen chapters in a recently edited volume on the Hungarian 1956 uprising (Bethlenfalvy, 2014; Jha, S. K., 2014; Sarkar, 2014; Sarkar & Jha, 2014).

Indian Perceptions of Hungary Hungary, the London correspondent of the Times of India wrote in an op-ed, had gone through ‘nerve-shattering experiences’ in 1956. However, visiting it again in the early 1970s, he felt that it had a more flexible government than the pre-1956 Stalinist regime. Its economic reforms had tried to steer a cautious middle course. Drawing a lesson from the Prague upheaval of 1968, the Hungarian Government had relaxed the rigours of the system without threatening the basic concept of a oneparty state. As a small landlocked country, Hungary derived 40% of its national income from foreign trade. Since it was unable to export industrial machinery to Western countries, it was looking for markets in the Third World. That is why Hungarian leaders were ‘so pleased’ to welcome Mrs. Gandhi in 1972 (Singh, J.D., 1972: 6; 1975: 8). Imre Nagy’s ‘liquidation’, wrote another commentator, sought to strike fear into the hearts of all ‘revisionists’ in the Soviet camp (Reddy, 1958: 7). In an op-ed in The Times of India in early 1966, K.C. Khanna opined that the gulf across the East–West divide appeared thin in Hungary all over. Almost alone in the Socialist camp, the Hungarian authorities, he noted, allowed free circulation to the capitalist press. Hungarian individualism, he felt, was a by-product of the rugged Hungarian nationalism, a bouncing economy and the nation’s particular ethos, which Moscow respected (Khanna, 1966: 6). In a two-part op-ed entitled ‘Hungary 25 Years Later’, eminent economist H.K. Paranjape on his return from a brief visit to Hungary was impressed by the equality and prosperity he witnessed. But Hungary had also achieved the ‘doubtful distinction’ of having one of the highest

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divorce and suicide rates in Europe (Paranjape, 1981a: 8). Hungary unquestionably remained a one-party state but with improved consumption standards. He was impressed by the spirit of experimentation, of learning from experience and of carrying on a dialogue at academic as well as practical levels. The lively differences were being earnestly debated in Hungary (Paranjape, 1981b: 8). In the mid-1980s, Hungary had become ‘the showcase of eastern Europe’. Janos Kadar, who was perceived by many as a traitor for taking over with Soviet support in 1956, was now ‘genuinely popular’. However, the image, it argued, was better than the reality since Hungary’s debts were high and its economy was struggling. Reforms had brought prosperity to some, but poverty remained. The consensus, however, was that 10.6 million Hungarians enjoyed a better life and greater democracy than most, if not all, other Warsaw Pact countries. Unlike most East Europeans, Hungarians could travel regularly to the West (TOI, 1986: 31). 1989 Changes There was considerable reporting about the changes in Hungary in 1988– 1989. With the septuagenarian Kadar having been gracefully ‘kicked upstairs’ to the newly created position of party president on 22 May 1988, the Times of India editorially observed, real power had passed out from the hands of the post-Stalinist old guard to younger radicals. The induction of pro-changers in the Politbureau was reflective of Hungary’s determination to remain the most open economy and polity in the Soviet bloc (TOI, 1988b: 8). These changes were the beginning of the cultural and political revolution in Hungary, which continued to reel under a $18 billion external debt and inflation at 20% (Naravane, 1989: 19). The logic of economic perestroika, the Times of India editorially commented, would inevitably lead to political pluralism with the endorsement of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party of a multi-party system for the country (TOI, 1989a: 14). In 1989, another commentator termed it as the beginning of Hungary’s journey on the path of a ‘peaceful transition to capitalism’. Though the arrangement of political forces in Hungary seemed ‘complex and confusing’, the pace at which it was moving in undertaking reforms was proceeding at a ‘much faster pace than anywhere else in eastern Europe’. Though this was likely to create problems, the overall situation,

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he surmised, was less volatile and more stable. As a result, the likelihood of ‘a successful transition to western-style social democracy within the next decade (if that long) is greater’. The motivating spirit at this time was ‘the rejection of socialism in any communist or Marxist version, as incompatible with democracy and the “good life”, viz. Western-style consumerism. Hungary’s social market reforms, he concluded, were unlikely to being in large-scale foreign direct investment since Hungary has ‘no raw materials and its domestic market was relatively small’ (Vanaik, 1989: 12). In an article analysing the turmoil in Eastern Europe in the Times of India, the Hungarian way was perhaps ‘the most honourable and the most drastic’ since Kadar’s ouster since it demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops and dismantled the barbed wire with Austria, thereby setting off the exodus of East Germans. For Hungary, it seemed that there was no going back, irrespective of the fluctuations in the Kremlin (Prasannarajn, 1989: A3). The 1990s The Hungarian Communist Party was the first ‘to sniff the winds of change’ when it began reforms and liberalization in 1988 which enabled Hungary to maintain, if not increase, its economic lead over Czechoslovakia and Poland. At the same time, Hungary had been hit by recession and inflation and an increase in social tension (Naravane, 1992: 8). The Times of India interestingly published a detailed article on the demise of Prime Minister Jozef Antall, elected in the country’s first free election in 1990 (Naravane, 1993: 11). Even though Poland and Hungary in 1994 voted former communist parties back to power, this did not signify ‘a failure for democracy or a nostalgia for the past’; it only reflected unhappiness with the performance of the previous government (Naravane, 1994: 1).

Parliamentary Debates and Questions During 1947 to 2019, a total of 196 questions were asked regarding Hungary in the Lok Sabha. Of these, the maximum number of questions (169) focused on economic and trade relations—the major focus of the relationship. During this period, there were only 18 political questions (e.g. wrong depiction of India’s international boundary in Hungarian maps (7 August 1961), discussions with the Hungarian President (3

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December 1969), visit by Hungarian Foreign Minister (11 March 1976)) and eight on cultural dimensions while no questions were asked on defence issues because defence cooperation was nominal. The first question was asked on 14 February 1950 relating to a trade agreement. The last question was asked on 17 November 2016 on the signing of the MoU on 16 October 2016 regarding cooperation in the field of water resources development and management. During the 1950s, the total number of questions asked were 15. This increased to 58 in the 1960s and 56 in the 1970s. In the 1980s, a total number of 47 questions were asked. From the 1990s, this declined substantially to 12 questions in the 1990s and four questions each in the 2000s and 2010s (up to 2019). The number of question on economic/trade relations rose from 8 in the 1950s to 52 each in the 1960s and the 1970s. They were reduced to 41 questions on economic and trade-related questions in the 1980s. Subsequently, they numbered 11 questions and three questions on trade and economic questions each in the 2000s and 2010s. The decline in the number of questions on Hungary since the 1990s could be attributed to the sharp decline in political interest in and trade with Central Europe after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the general disinterestedness of Members of Parliament in matters of foreign policy and general availability of more information on the Internet. Hungarian Uprising, 1956 The most extensive debate in the House of the People (Lok Sabha) was on the uprising in Hungary in 1956. Nehru made a long statement in the Lok Sabha on 16 November 1956. India’s basic view regarding Hungary, the Indian Prime Minister told the House, was that ‘the people of Hungary should be allowed to determine their own future according to their own wishes and that foreign forces should be withdrawn’ (Nehru, 1956g: col. 265–266). Three days later, another marathon debate lasted for nearly six hours, most of which was devoted to Hungary. Any kind of violent suppression of the freedom of the people, Nehru reiterated, was ‘an outrage on liberty’ (Nehru, 1956h: col. 374). During the debate, A.K. Gopalan (CPI) expressed deep regret that the process of democratization that took place in a peaceful manner in Poland was not possible in Hungary (Gopalan 1956: 398). Asoka Mehta (PSP)—one of the most bitter critics

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of the government—expressed satisfaction that Prime Minister had ‘corrected the focus and set the record straight’ (Mehta, 1956: col. 404). S.N. Sinha (Congress) remarked that the Soviet action had reduced Hungary to ‘the lowest level of a slave State’ (Sinha, 1956: col. 426). V.N. Gadgil (Congress) defended Nehru and remarked that it was not fair to give a dogmatic judgement when the situation was ‘so fluid’ (Gadgil, 1956: col. 422). On 20 November 1956, another lengthy debate of nearly five hours took place in the Lok Sabha when agitated Members of Parliament criticized the government’s stance during the Hungarian crisis as well the developments in the Suez. Acharya J.B. Kripalani (PSP) strongly criticized Krishna Menon’s statement at a press conference in Coimbatore that the ‘uprising in Hungary was just like the riot in Ahmedabad’. Indian diplomats, he added, had not properly assessed the situation and sense of what was going on in Hungary (Kripalani, 1956: cols. 500, 504). In a lengthy intervention, H.N. Mukerjee (CPI) argued that the ‘fruits of socialist labour’ had been endangered by a counter revolution. It was therefore ‘in perfect conformity with the Warsaw Treaty to call in the help of the Soviet forces’ (Mukerjee, 1956: col. 520). Frank Anthony (Nominated) felt that India’s approach had ‘gratuitously attracted a stigma again at the high moral authority with which India has spoken in the councils of the world’ (Anthony, 1956: 532–533). Lanka Sundaram (Independent) felt the time had come for India to redefine its attitudes ‘finally and fundamentally’ towards all the East European countries (Sundaram, 1956: col. 540–541). U.M. Trivedi (Jana Sangh) asserted that one could not look with equanimity to the aggression on Hungary, to the ‘rape’ that had been committed (Trivedi, 1956: col. 569). Responding to the debate, Nehru stated that India had to talk in a responsible manner about a deep crisis since India’s primary concern was to avoid war (Nehru, 1956i: col. 572; 1956j: 207). Periodic references to the situation in Central Europe occurred subsequently. Military pacts had ‘come in the way’ in Central Europe and Hungary; they did not help ‘the cause of peace or security’ (Nehru, 1957b: col. 653). Nath Pai (PSP) lamented that the vacillations in defining the Indian attitude towards Hungary which led to concerns about the moral basis of the country (Pai, 1957: col. 1551). Expressing his surprise at some of the interventions of the Members of Parliament, Nehru urged Members to be clear that India did not have in ‘its power to go about managing the affairs of the world, to put an end to the Cold

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War, of checking aggression in Egypt or somewhere else or checking what has happened in Hungary, as if we can do all this’. The ‘first thing for us’, he added, was to realize ‘how far we can go, and how far we cannot go and not to indulge in talk or in resolutions or in some kind of action which is utterly beyond our capacity’ (Nehru, J., 1957c: col. 1569; 1957, 23 July: cols. 4738–4739; 1957d: col. 11,323). Gayatri Devi (Swatantra Party) even asserted that India’s neutrality seemed ‘pro-communistic’ (Devi, 1963: col. 4478). The term ‘rape of Hungary’ by the Soviet Union was used several times in brief mentions during subsequent debates (Barua, 1966: col. 1756; Guha, 1966: col. 2019; Trivedi, 1963: col. 1558; 1964: col. 10,538; 1966: col. 513). Hungary also came up repeatedly during the lengthy discussion on the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 (Masani, 1968: col. 367; Ranga, 1968: col. 853). Hungary came up eight years later on in July 1971 (Mohanty, 1971: col. 273) and 1979 (Dutt, A.K., 1979: col. 573). The 1990s and 2000s Eleven years later, Hungary was mentioned by Lal Krishna Advani (BJP) when he expressed the desire to see a world without any power blocs. He said he would be happy if countries like Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia had their independent foreign policy (Advani, 1990: col. 7). On 8 April 2003, Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi (Congress) stated that one should not compare or misconstrue the incidents of Iraq with the incidents of Czechoslovakia and Hungary (Dasmunshi, 2003: col. 7). On 4 February 2004, Kharabela Swain (BJP) wondered whether India was truly non-aligned when the USSR ‘captured’ Hungary and Czechoslovakia. India, he asserted, did not do anything. Therefore, ‘can we say that we were actually non-aligned at that time? We were very much aligned with one party, and we are telling everybody that we are non-aligned’ (Swain, 2004: col. 325).

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Cultural Relations Early Contacts The first Hungarian known to have visited India was György Huszti, who was not motivated by either academic or cultural ambitions. He reached the western coast of the subcontinent in 1538 as a slave in the army of the Turkish sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent. As a learned man, Huszti wrote an account of his experiences. Historical links between India and Hungary can be traced back to the 1820s when the Hungarian linguist and explorer Alexander Csoma de Koros (1784–1842) reached India after travelling for two and a half years in search of the original homeland of the Hungarian Magyars. Though he studied Sanskrit, Bengali and other Indian languages, he made major contributions to Tibetology, not Indology. Hungarians had their first contacts with Indian culture through intermediaries. However, from the second half of the nineteenth century, Indian philosophy, religions and culture began to spread more directly in Hungary. Curiousity about Indian culture led to the publication of a number of Hungarian translations of Indian religious and literary works (Szenkovicz, 2019b: 98–99). India became one of the most important countries for Oriental studies in Hungary, and Hungarian scholars of Indology were often at the front ranks of international scholarship and knowledge (Bethlenfalvy, 1980; Duggal, 1985; Lazar, 2007). These included Jozsef Schmidt who was the head of the Department of Indo-European Linguistics until 1919. The centre of traditional Indological studies has been the Department of Indo-European Linguistics at Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest. Modern Indologists worked in institutes of the Academy of Sciences, including the Institute of World Economics in the fields of economics, history and sociology (see Gati, 1992). Sanskrit was taught at the Department of Indo-European Linguistics, University of Budapest, from 1873 till 1920, when the Department ceased to function. As part of his lecture tour of Europe, Rabindranath Tagore also visited Hungary from 23 October to 12 November 1926. A significant number of his works had already been translated in Hungarian before his arrival in Budapest. He delivered a lecture on ‘Civilization and Development’ at the Music Academy on 26 October 1926. He subsequently convalesced for several weeks at Balatonfüred, a town on lake Balaton, because of a heart ailment. His visit fostered greater interest in Indian culture.

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A number of Hungarian Indologists went to India after the First World War. Ervin Baktay’s travelogue My Years in India (1938) explained India to generations of Hungarians for the first time. Cultural Relations during the Cold War Among Central European countries, a formal agreement with Hungary was signed on 30 March 1962—five years after the one with Poland and three years after the one with Czechoslovakia (text in India, Ministry of Culture, 2019). There was a high degree of institutionalization of contacts, including other cultural, scientific, educational and exchange programmes at both governmental and non-governmental levels. Though there was a cultural agreement, but many Hungarians had yet to discover many aspects of each other’s life (TOI, 1968: 8). Much momentum to meaningful cultural relations was facilitated by the establishment of the Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre (HICC) in New Delhi in 1978. It was the only Hungarian cultural centre in Asia till 2013, when a Hungarian Cultural Institute was established in Beijing. After the 1990s, the HICC was run along more professional lines and integrated with the cultural and scientific life of the host country. The mid-1990s till 2010s A striking new element during 1995–2015 was the growing number of complex, highlighted events, a very high grade of visibility, achieved by high-level political attendance and intensive media attention. The biggest cultural festivals in the history of the cultural relations between the two countries took place in the 2010s, among them two ‘Focuses’ that were practically a chain of festivals, lasting for several months. Different fields of cultural diplomacy have received different emphasis during different times from Hungarian films, music and literature and art. The leading fields of Indian cultural presence in Hungary are literature, music and dance (Lazar, 2015: 5). While the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) was sensitizing Hungarian audiences of Indian culture, the Indian Cultural Centre in Budapest (housed within the Indian Embassy) became operational in 2011 and was named the Amrita Sher Gill Cultural Centre on 15 August 2014. Since 2015, the Centre has regularly organized the International Yoga Day (annually since 2015) and an Indian Film Festival (annually

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since 2013)—the Ganges-Danube Festival (since 2016)—in which Indian dance groups, orchestras and performers bring authentic Indian culture closer to the Hungarian public. Teaching of Hungarian Language Teaching of Hungarian language and literature began at the Department of Slavonic Studies, University of Delhi in 1969. Between 1970 and 1976, the language course was taught at the certificate level, and thereafter, a two-year diploma course was offered (Kalmar & Major, 1983b: 124–125). However, in 1989, the Department introduced M.A. in Russian with an optional in Hungarian, Polish, Czech or Slovak. In 1991, the Department in the South Campus was renamed the Department of Slavonic and Finno-Ugrian Studies. The teaching of the Hungarian language in the Department was helped by guest lecturers sent from Hungary within the framework of the Indo-Hungarian Cultural Exchange Programme. Since 2004, Hungarian classes are held by a resident teacher. Unlike the past when all cultural diplomacy activities, including the exchange of scholars, students, exhibitions, artistic groups and individual artists, were exclusively conducted under the periodic cultural exchange programmes, nowadays non-governmental actors like universities, research institutes, foundations, associations, societies and even private actors perform much of the cultural activities. The ICCR has been deputing a Visiting Professor in Hindi to the Department of Indo-European Linguistics of the Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest (ELTE) since 1992 under the bilateral cultural exchange programme. The Central Institute of Hindi (CIH), Agra, under the Ministry of Human Resources Development of the Government of India allocated scholarship slots to Hungarian nationals for the study of Hindi under the scheme of propagation of Hindi abroad. ICCR has offered scholarship slots for Hungarian nationals for pursuing Ph.D. Degrees in Indology at Indian universities. With ICCR sponsorship, a Tagore Research Fellowship on Indology was established at ELTE, Budapest.

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Tourism Tourism has recently begun to pick up. In 2014, over 6,000 Indian tourists visited Hungary; this represented a 57% increase over the number that visited in 2013 (Budapest Business Journal, 2015). About 16,000 Indians directly visited Hungary in 2018, excluding those who arrived in Hungary after visiting other European countries (Tuhin, 2019: 19). However, by 2019, the number of Indian tourists who travelled to Hungary rose to more than 50,000. Tourism was also likely to pick up further with the recent finalization of a film production agreement (Szijjarto, 2020a). In October 2013, in a revision to the 1966 air service agreement, Hungarian low-budget airline Wizz Air had been allowed to add Mumbai to its Budapest-Dubai flight, thereby overcoming the lack of a direct air connection between the two countries. These flights have not yet begun, but as and when they do, they would certainly give an impetus to business, tourism and educational exchanges. Indian Students After the conclusion of an educational exchange programme on 19 November 2014, Hungary offered 200 scholarships annually to Indian students under the framework of education cooperation within the Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship programme (Hungary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015), which seeks to promote the study of foreign students in Hungarian higher education institutions’ graduate and postgraduate studies programmes in natural and life sciences, engineering, information science and economics. The long-term objective is to ‘permanently acquire’ a qualified workforce10 for its own labour market and can count on the knowledge and work of these people in the longer term.11 In return, India offers 35 scholarships for Hungarian students and research fellows who may study English and Hindi languages or other disciplines at the postgraduate and doctoral levels. During the academic 10 As of August 2019, 1,526 Indians had applied for residence permits in Hungary with the intention to work (Budapest Business Journal 2019, 27 September). 11 Országgy˝ ulés Külügyi Bizottsága, Jegyz˝ okönyv [Protocol of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Hungarian Parliament], 20 May, 2015, No.: KUB-40/72– 2/2015, http://www.parlament.hu/documents/static/biz40/bizjkv40/KUB/1505201. pdf, cited in Tarrosy and Voros (2020: 124–125).

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year 2018–2019, more than 800 Indian students applied for scholarships, which were awarded to 134 whereas only 4 Hungarian students applied for studies in India (Szenkovics, 2019a: 10). Under the ITEC programme, ten scholarships are allotted to Hungary every year. Ayurveda In Hungary, Ayurveda was incorporated as an official healthcare system, in 1997 by the Government Act on Naturopathy. Furthermore, Ayurveda was mentioned in the First Hungarian Pharmacopoea in 1879. Many thermal facilities in Hungary offer ayurvedic massages as a form of treatment. The Ayurveda Therapist and Counsellor Education Programme at the University of Miskolc has been opened. Dr. Professor Asmita Wele from India has been the head of the Ayurveda Chair at the University of Debrecen (Ahmed, 2001; Chhabra, 2018: 20). On 17 October 2013, India and Hungary signed a MoU for the promotion and development of traditional systems of medicine—the only country in Central Europe with which such an agreement has been signed.

Conclusion Like other Central European countries, the real driver behind India’s relations with Hungary is trade and commerce. The size of the country and its companies tends to impede its capacity to cooperate with Indian counterparts on a much bigger scale. Since the 2010s, Hungarian foreign policy is primarily about business. To that end, it merged the portfolios of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2014. Politically, there is apparently a ‘lack of vibrancy’ in India-Hungary engagements apparently because of the absence of any problem between them (Petho, 2019). A long-standing complaint of all Central European countries has been the lack of regular high-level reciprocal visits by Indian dignitaries to Hungary. In June 2011, Viktor Orban highlighted the need for regular high-level dialogue and renewed invitations to Indian leaders to visit Hungary on mutually convenient dates. There is need to do much more to increase the visibility of Hungary in India.

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Mukerjee, H. N. (1956, November 20). Lok Sabha Debates, 6th sess., vol. 8, no. 5. Naravane, V. (1989, October 14). Future of Hungary uncertain. TOI. Naravane, V. (1992, November 29). Nationalism on the rise in Hungary. TOI. Naravane, V. (1993, December 19). Uncertain scenario in Hungary. TOI. Naravane, V. (1994, December 30). E. Europe, A continent in flux. TOI. Nehru, J. (1956a, October 25). Statement at a press conference, New Delhi. ‘Mr. Nehru Commends India’s Suez Plan,’ TOI, 26 October 1956. Nehru, J. (1956b, November 2). Cable to K.P.S. Menon. In SWJN, SS, vol. 35. New Delhi: JNMF, 2005. Nehru, J. (1956c, November 3). Cable to G.L. Mehta, Indian ambassador to the United States. SWJN, SS, vol. 35, New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984. Nehru, J. (1956d, November 5). Cable to G.L. Mehta, Indian ambassador to Washington. In SWJN, SS, vol. 35, New Delhi: JNMF, 2005. Nehru, J. (1956e, November 6). Letter to Bulganin. SWJN, SS, vol. 35, New Delhi: JNMF, 2005. Nehru, J. (1956f, November 15). Cable to G.L. Mehta, Indian ambassador to the United States. SWJN, SS, vol. 35, New Delhi: JNMF, 2005. Nehru, J. (1956g, November 16). Statement on the international situation. Lok Sabha Debates. 6th sess., vol. 8, no. 3. Nehru, J. (1956h, November 19). Lok Sabha Debates. 6th sess., vol. 8, no. 4. Nehru, J. (1956i, November 20). Lok Sabha Debates, 6th sess., vol. 8, no. 5. Nehru, J. (1956j, December 13). Statement by Prime Minister Nehru on the events in Hungary in the Rajya Sabha. Foreign Affairs Record, December 1956. Nehru, J. (1957a, February 3). Speech at a public meeting to inaugurate the election campaign of the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee, Ramlila Grounds, Delhi. SWJN, SS, vol. 36 (1 December 1956–21 February 1957). New Delhi: JNMF, 2005. Nehru, J. (1957b, March 25). Prime Minister’s introductory remarks during the Motion on the international situation. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. 1, part 1 (19–28 March 1957), 15th session. Nehru, J. (1957c, May 22). Remarks during the debate on the resolution regarding thermo-nuclear test explosions. Lok Sabha Debates, 2nd series, 1st sess., vol. 1 (10–22 May 1957). Nehru, J. (1957d, September 2). Remarks during the motion on the international situation. Lok Sabha Debates, 2nd sess., 2nd series, vol. 6, no. 31. Nehru, J. (1958a, January 9). Speech at a conference of Inspectors-General of Police, New Delhi. SWJN, SS, vol. 41 (1 January–31 March 1958). New Delhi: JNMF, 2010.

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Szenkovics, D. (2019a, August 22). Indo-Hungarian relations: Past, present and future. Paper presented at the seminar on “India and Central Europe” organized by the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Szenkovics, D. (2019b). Cultural ties between Hungary and India: A short overview. Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 16: 91–119. Szijjarto, P. (2020a, January 17). Interview of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade with MTI. Budapest Business Journal. Retrieved June 28, 2020. https://bbj.hu/culture/hungary-to-attract-more-bollywood-pro ductions_176829. Szijjarto, P. (2020b, February 15). Cited in R. Marshall. Tata intent on upskilling and empowering its growth. Budapest Business Journal. Retrieved June 20, 2020. https://bbj.hu/business/tata-intent-on-upskilling-and-emp owering-its-growth_177352. Tarrosy. I., & Voros Z. (2014). The foreign policy of ‘Global Opening’ and Hungarian positions in an interpolar world. In I. Tarrosy, et al (Eds.), European integration: perspectives and challenges: How ‘Borderless’ is Europe (pp. 273–296). IDResearch Kft., Publikon. Tarrosy, I., & Voros, Z. (2020). Hungary’s pragmatic foreign policy in a postAmerican world’. Politics in Central Europe, 16(1), 113–134. Tharoor, S. (2012). Pax Indica: India and the world of the 21st century. Penguin Books. The Orange Files. (2018, May 21). Eastern opening. Retrieved June 22, 2020. https://theorangefiles.hu/eastern-opening/. TOI. (1949, November 8). Polish proposals on disarmament. TOI. (1956a, October 26). Editorial. Hungary’s turn. TOI. (1956b, November 20). Relief supplies. TOI. (1956c, December 11). India Envoy reports, happenings in Hungary. TOI. (1961, August 27). Detonators to be made in India, collaboration with Hungary. TOI. (1968, June 7). Editorial, India and Hungary. TOI. (1970, October 8). India and Hungary to expand trade. TOI. (1975, September 28). Hungary Backs Delhi steps. TOI. (1986, October 27). Hungary picks up after 1956. TOI. (1988a, April 14). Indo-Hungary pact on electronics. TOI. (1988b, May 25). Editorial. Glasnost in Hungary. TOI. (1989a, February 17). Editorial. Pluralism in Budapest. TOI. (1989b, September 24). Defence tie-up with Hungary. Trivedi, U. M. (1956, November 20). Lok Sabha Debates, 6th sess., vol. 8, no. 5. Trivedi, U.M. (1963, August 20). Lok Sabha Debates, 3rd series, 5th sess., vol. 19, no. 6.

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CHAPTER 6

India and Poland Rajendra K. Jain

India’s relations with Poland—the largest and most populous country in Central Europe—during the Cold War were characterized by close but never intense political engagement. Relations discernibly cooled since the early 1990s as Warsaw became preoccupied with gaining membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. From the mid-2000s, Poland reached out to Asia, including India in its quest to diversify trade and seek foreign direct investment. In recent years, New Delhi has begun to appreciate Poland’s growing profile, but trade continues to be modest and high-level political interaction lacking. This chapter examines the initial Indian perceptions of Poland during the early 1930s and the early 1950s. It discusses the vicissitudes of political relations during the Cold War and the perceptions of Poland in Indian scholarly literature. The chapter assesses the transformation of the relationship since the early 1990s to the present. It discusses Polish efforts to reach out to Asia at the turn of the millennium and the motivations and impact of the Polish Strategy towards Non-European Developing Countries (2004). It goes on to examine the relationship in the 2000s and how Poland figured in the Modi Government’s renewed re-engagement

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_6

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with Central and Eastern Europe. The chapter goes on to examine parliamentary (Lok Sabha) debates from 1947 to 2019 to assess how Poland figured in parliamentary questions and debates. It makes a detailed study of defence cooperation between India and Poland. After evaluating Polish and Indian perceptions of each other, the chapter assesses prospects for the future.

Initial Perceptions During the 1930s, India was quite sensitive to the Central European tragedy. As a staunch anti-imperialist, Jawaharlal Nehru lauded Polish courage and determination in the wake of German annexation. The Soviet occupation of Poland, he felt, had ‘saved half of Poland from the clutches of Hitler and closed the road to Rumania for him’.1 During his visit to Poland in July 1933, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose proposed to establish the Indo-Polish Society (Bose, 1933: 155, 158), but this initiative did not fructify (see Moron, 2015). In September 1939, the Congress Working Committee passed a lengthy resolution drafted by Nehru condemning German aggression on Poland. Just after the German invasion of Poland—‘a conflict between democracy and freedom on the one side and Fascism and aggression on the other’—Indian sympathies must ‘inevitably’ lay on the side of democracy (Nehru, 1972: 119). Indian leaders as well as the Press had great admiration for Poland’s reconstruction efforts. Poland, Nehru felt, had ‘a fascinating tradition of struggles for freedom, with a very powerful nationalism which has moved it throughout history’ (Nehru, 1957a: 59; 1961c: 7). His daughter, Indira Gandhi, felt that the travail of the Polish people was in itself ‘a saga of the invincibility of the human spirit’ (Gandhi, I., 1973: 24; 1977: 24). There was admiration for how the city of Warsaw had ‘arisen phoenixlike’ from the ashes of the Second World War (Gandhi, R., 1985: 49; Giri, 1970: 123). Poland was among ‘the most tragic and heroic countries’ in the world2 (Mehta, 1959: 8). Indian leaders also spoke of a

1 Nehru’s speech three weeks after World War II (Nehru, 1939). 2 Poland had lost 6 million out of a population of 35 million in the Second World War.

38% of its wealth was destroyed and one out of every three persons had been forced to change his abode (Mehta, 1959: 8).

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similarity between Indian and Polish efforts at nation-building (Radhakrishnan, 1961: 342) and of freedom being lost and regained (Gandhi, I., 1977: 14).

Early Contacts South Asia was not a priority for Poland after it became independent in 1918. A Polish consulate was established in Bombay as early as 1933 to promote business between Polish and Indian companies.3 Two years later, an honorary consulate was set up in Calcutta. The consulate in Bombay (from 1939 to 1945 as a Consulate General) played an increasingly important role during the Second World War in assisting Polish refugees, mainly children who ended up in India due to the wartime turmoil.4 In fact, during the 1942–1948, Indian contributions for the Polish orphans amounted to Rs. 600,000, or e6,765,607 in 2008 terms (Bhattacharjee, 2013: 1743). After India gained independence, the Polish Ministry of Shipping in 1952 stressed ‘the development of Polish shipping interests’ in India and emphasized the need to establish diplomatic outposts or consulates there.

3 Eugeniusz Banasinkski—the first Polish Consul in Bombay—arrived in Bombay in November 1933 and served till 1944. He was appointed as Consul-General in 1939, with additional charge of Ceylon and Burma. He was placed in charge of new Polish missions in Kolkata and Colombo (Reinhard-Chalanda, 2016: 234). There was a fourfold increase in India-Poland trade from $1.5 million in 1933 to $5.8 million in 1939 (Łupinska, ´ 2008: 123, cited in Reinhard-Chalanda, 2016: 234). 4 The passage to India and ensuing domicile of Polish refugees is generally assumed to have taken place under a British-sponsored and British-financed scheme though some even argued that the Polish Government paid all the expenses (Duszynska, 1946: 6). However, Anuradha Bhattacharjee reveals that it was the Indian Princely State of Nawanagar that offered the first domicile to the Polish children evacuated out of the Soviet Union. The first 500 Polish children were hosted in Balachadi in Nawanagar State and were maintained by charitable funds raised in India, subscribed to by several Indian princes and wealthy individuals. The reception of the Polish civilian war victims in India in 1942 was initiated by the Indian Princely State of Nawanagar when no place for the 500 orphaned children, who reached Bombay in May 1942, could be found in the whole of British India (Bhattacharjee, 2013: 1743). The 1942 Nawanagar offer to host Polish children is significant because it came at a time when no other country in the world was willing to accept Polish refugees. In fact, it paved the way for several thousand Polish refugees to be received in various parts of the world. The Indian connection has played ‘a critical role’ in the preservation of the Polish diaspora in the English-speaking countries (Bhattacharjee, 2013: 1754).

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The Ministry of Foreign Trade concurred. In 1953, it planned to ‘delegate a representative to Hindustan… in the capacity of the Head of Economic Mission’ (Poland, Embassy in India, 1954). The first ‘official’ contact with Warsaw was made on 10 February 1947 by Jawaharlal Nehru who was the Vice-President of the Executive Council (the Prime Minister) and Foreign Minister of the Interim Government. Nehru wrote to Polish Foreign Minister Wincenty Rzymowski thanking him for the Polish delegation’s support for India’s motion on the discrimination of Indians in South Africa during the autumn of 1946 (Goralski, 1990: 52–53). This correspondence was not continued.

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Direct contracts between Nehru and Poland took place only after the establishment of diplomatic relations on 30 March 1954. While presenting his credentials, K. P. S. Menon—India’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union who held concurrent charge of Poland—remarked that although both countries were exchanging diplomatic representatives for the first time, they had not been strangers to each other and from the moment of India’s independence had developed relations ‘slowly but surely’ (cited in Goralski, 1990: 54). A The Times of India op-ed criticized India’s over-representation in Western Europe and under-representation in Eastern Europe. The lack of any diplomatic contacts with Poland—‘a country which was actually and potentially more important’—came in for special criticism (Singh, I., 1952: 6). Poland was the third country in Central Europe with which India established diplomatic relations—nearly seven years after diplomatic relations were established with Czechoslovakia (18 November 1947) and two months after Hungary (22 January 1954). An Embassy was opened in Warsaw in 1957, but for seven years the Indian Ambassador in Moscow was concurrently accredited to Budapest and Warsaw rather than having a separate head of mission. This tended to create ‘an adverse psychological impression’ in those countries. Such ‘clumsy diplomatic procedures’ tended to often create the impression that India was ‘relatively indifferent to the national objectives of those countries on a regional basis and was more interested in global diplomacy’ (Sondhi, 1972: 98). However, the primary reason why India did not open embassies was economic: to

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conserve scarce foreign exchange. The principle of concurrent accreditation was adopted to facilitate extensive representation with minimum personnel and the least possible expenditure (Nehru, 1956e: col. 589). Poland’s first ambassador, Jerzy Grudzinski, ´ arrived in India at the end of June 1954. He opened an office at the Imperial Hotel and presented his credentials on 7 July 1954 (Poland, Embassy in India, 1954). In May 1959, the Polish Ambassador in India urged Nehru that with the impending departure of K. P. S. Menon around September 1959, a separate Ambassador should be sent to Warsaw at the time of this change, especially as Warsaw had had one in New Delhi for more than five years. Nehru appreciated the argument and advised the MEA that it should keep the matter in mind and explore the possibility of sending a separate Ambassador there in September or October. Poland, he said, was ‘important from many points of view and in a sense is nearer to us than any of the East European countries’ (Nehru, 1959: 618). However, it was only in April 1961 that L. R. S. Singh assumed charge as India’s first Warsaw-based Ambassador to Poland.

The 1950s During the 1950s, India and Poland were associated in several international commissions. In the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (1953–1954), India was chairman and representatives from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland were its members. Subsequently, the 1954 Geneva Agreement set up three International Commissions of Supervision and Control (ICSC) for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, each of which comprised India as chairman and Poland and Canada as members—a pattern for overseeing settlements which had succeeded in Korea and accurately reflected the tri-polar structure of world politics (Heimsath & Mansingh, 1971: 254; see Thakur, 1984). Whereas Canada represented the Western and Poland the Eastern bloc, non-aligned Asian India was meant ‘to keep the balance’ as the chairman. Delhi avoided taking sides between the ‘often-disagreeing’ Canadians and Poles in order not to create the impression of favouring one of the Cold War camps over the other (Das Gupta, A., 2017: 209). After Stalin’s death in March 1953, Soviet policy towards Poland had toned down apparently because of the realization that a policy of excessive Sovietization had failed and that treating Warsaw as a satellite had led to much resentment (Nehru, 1953a: 418; 1953b: 672). Nehru refuted

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claims that Poland was subject to Soviet imperialism since it was represented in the United Nations (Nehru, 1955a: 101). It was, he asserted, ‘quite absurd to talk about colonialism’ in connection with Poland and other East European countries even though one may not necessarily approve of the type of democracy they had because they were regarded by other countries as ‘independent internationally’ (Nehru, 1955, 3 May: 145–146). Poland was, in fact, ‘much more independent and nationalistic’ than Czechoslovakia. It was ‘too big a country to be easily dominated over’ (Nehru, 1955c: 305).

Nehru’s Visit During his visit to Poland in June 1955, Nehru was extremely overwhelmed with sorrow and anger when he visited the Auschwitz concentration camp—the ‘most gruesome place’ where six million Jews had been done to death by the Nazis (Nehru, 1955d: 272). Unlike the feeling of depression and unhappiness he sensed during his visit to Czechoslovakia a day earlier, he found Poland to be imbued with ‘a feeling of self-confidence’ as well as ‘a sense of pride’ in their achievements. Relations between the two countries were described as friendly, with ‘no problems or controversies’ (India, MEA, 1955: 129). Poland became the thirty-second country to endorse the Panchsheel or the five principles of peaceful co-existence.5 Warsaw apparently perceived Nehru as a ‘possible neutral spokesman’ during the Cold War who could lend credence to the Soviet brand of co-existence. He certainly had captured a good share of Polish ‘imagination’ as well as much favourable press comment (United States, Department of State, 1955: 44).

Polish Economists In the mid-1950s, the Planning Commission and other Indian institutions hosted around 400 foreign experts from the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Germany and elsewhere who worked on the Second Five Year Plan (1956–1961). P. C. Mahalanobis, head of the Indian Statistical 5 These were mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; nonaggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs for any reasons, either of an economic, political or ideological character; equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.

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Institute (ISI), Kolkata, invited a number of left-oriented economists, including Oscar Lange of the Planning Institute at Warsaw. He spent half a year between December 1954 and April 1956 at the ISI and was engaged in the preparation of papers on various aspects of India’s economic development (Mazurek, 2018: 588).

Poznan Riots, June 1956 The violent suppression of the Poznan riots in June 1956, when 30,000 industrial workers marched through the city, led to significant policy changes. Nehru deemed the changes in Poland in the wake of deStalinization to be ‘even more remarkable’ (Nehru, 1956a: 568). India watched with ‘interest and appreciation’ the new forces working towards democratization in Eastern Europe and welcomed ‘the peaceful changes’ in Poland (Colombo Countries’ Prime Ministers Statement, 1956: 176). The Poles’ demand for complete freedom was ‘settled peacefully’ (Nehru, 1956b: 58–59). The ‘process of democratic liberalization or democratization’ had brought about greater stability as well as ‘a much larger degree’ of democracy in Poland (Nehru, 1956c: 288). The ‘Polish October’ of 1956 was perceived in the Indian Press as ‘the watershed between the period of Stalinist regimentation, centralized power and “socialist realism” and the new era of liberalism’. The Poles were pragmatic; they had settled for what was possible, not abandoned communism (Verghese, 1960: 6). The Communist Party of India did not feel that the developments in Poland had any lessons for it. Moscow had wisely decided not to intervene with armed force in Poland to suppress the liberal tendencies there since it would have ‘alienated the Polish people much more’. The Polish leaders too were ‘wiser and more restrained and could control their people’ (Nehru, 1958b: 428–429). The revival of parliamentary life after the 1956 Polish events had created ‘a favourable impression’ in India where there was a strong faith in parliamentary institutions (Sondhi, 1963: 159). Indian diplomats welcomed the peaceful change in Poland. If this was the new trend in Poland’s judicial system, it would be tantamount to a fundamental change, which would probably have repercussions all over Eastern Europe (Ahuja, 1956). Gomulka’s rise to the office of the First Secretary of the ruling party in Poland in October 1956, according to H. N. Kunzru, President of the Indian Council of World Affairs, was ‘a revolutionary development’.

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Gomulka’s statement that there were several routes to socialism, he felt, reflected Poland’s determination to work out its own destiny (Kunzru, 1957: 7). Gomulka’s victory in the January 1957 Polish elections, the Times of India editorially observed, had fully endorsed the concept of national communism and by implication rejected Stalinism and Moscow’s ideological leadership’ (TOI, 1957a: 8).

Polish Premier’s Visit, March 1957 In order to stabilize the western border, Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz sought to secure New Delhi’s support for the international recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line. In order to secure Delhi’s trust and confidence, the Polish Premier supported India’s ‘full right’ to Kashmir and Goa and expressed the desire that a ‘successful settlement’ of the Kashmir question should be made without outside interference (Cyrankiewicz, 1957: 7). Apprehensions about German revanchism and the quest for consumer goods motivated Poland to gain India’s friendship. As the leader of the non-aligned world, Warsaw felt that Indian endorsement could encourage other developing countries to also recognize the inviolability of its western border (Mathur, 2014: 317). By 1960, the Indian Press had begun to perceive Poland as ‘a unique phenomenon’ in the communist world: it was ‘communist, but nonconformist’, ‘a people’s democracy and yet staunchly Catholic’. Public ownership in industry also coexisted with peasant-proprietorship in agriculture (Verghese, 1960: 6).

The Rapacki Plan Indian official circles initially took ‘no position’ on Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki’s proposal (2 October 1957) to establish a de-nuclearized zone in Central Europe encompassing Poland, the two German states and Czechoslovakia. It was only in late November and early December that the Press began to refer to the Rapacki Plan when discussing the international situation. The Polish Government formally sent the proposal to New Delhi through diplomatic channels in December 1957. Nehru appreciated the ‘neutral zone’ proposal since anything that lessened tension and fear should be welcomed (Nehru, 1958a: 788–789). If the proposal was agreed upon, it would be ‘a great gain’ if the principle could be extended elsewhere. However, he felt that if ‘a parallel

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proposal’ relating to a large number of countries in Asia were to be made at this stage, it could come in the way of even ‘the limited Polish proposal being considered on its merits’ (Nehru, 1958c: 750) From a military point of view, the Polish proposal did not take ‘one very far’ or make much of a difference one or two other countries joined it (Nehru, 1958d: col. 1384) and possibly lead to the achievement of general and complete disarmament (India, MEA, 1961). Recently declassified Polish documents however claim that India’s position was ‘more difficult to discern’ (Musto, 2019). Rapacki noted India’s ‘devotion to neutrality’ in his conversations with Nehru, which reflected the Polish tendency to equate non-alignment with neutrality (Rapacki, 1963). The Indian Press, the Polish Ambassador to India, Katz-Suchyf6 explained in a cable to the Polish Foreign Minister, generally continued to deal with the Rapacki Plan from ‘the information point of view’. In spite of ‘all their sympathy’ for the Polish proposal, the Indian elite was perceived as being ‘primarily guided by the “desire”, “fear” of excessive involvement and the “consideration” “balancing” the support offered to us by some support for opposite plans’. Their constant objections included ‘limited significance of the plan, unclear forms of control, and the approach to issue of foreign troops as well as the question of classical weapons on the territory of the proposed zone’. The Polish Ambassador found ‘a more favorable approach and a better understanding’ of the Rapacki Plan in the Parliament (Katz-Suchyf, 1958). Nobody, Nehru maintained, suggested that the acceptance of the Rapacki Plan would solve the major problems of Europe ‘either in a military sense or in any other sense’. But it was ‘a good first step’ which could lead to ‘a bigger step of making that area, or indeed any area, an area of ‘disengagement’ of nuclear weapons as well as other arms (Nehru, 1958e: 742). While Poland and Czechoslovakia had a vital interest in disarmament, large Asian countries like China, India and Japan would have to participate at some stage or the other in the solution of the disarmament problem (Nehru, 1960: 405).

6 The Polish Ambassador was also invited to give a talk at the Indian Council of World

Affairs entitled—‘The Current International Situation: General and Partial Solutions’— which dealt with the Rapacki Plan. This was subsequently published in the February 1958 issue of the ICWA’s Foreign Affairs Report. The Embassy, the Polish Ambassador reported with a sense of achievement, added the text of Rapacki’s speech ‘at the proofreading stage’ (Katz-Suchyf, 1958).

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The Rapacki-Menon Meeting On 21 July 1960, a ‘long talk’ took place between K. P. S. Menon, India’s Ambassador in Moscow and concurrently accredited to Poland, and Adam Rapacki at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Polish Foreign Minister’s ‘main concern’ was to impress on the Indian visitor ‘the increasing gravity of the German question’ and how Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was endorsing territorial claims in its former territories which were now part of Poland since India occupied a unique position, and enjoyed great prestige, in world affairs’. Menon thanked Rapacki for his ‘exposition’, but informed his host that problems nearer home touched New Delhi ‘more intimately’. New Delhi, Menon assured the Polish foreign minister, realized that the German problem was ‘the most important and potentially the most dangerous of all’. Rapacki responded that he was aware of the problems that Menon was referring to. The trouble between India and China, he stated, should not have been allowed to reach ‘even such proportions’. He expressed the hope that the two countries would be able to solve it in the spirit of their ‘immemorial friendship’. When Menon informed Rapacki that a key objective of the Third Five Year Plan was to attain self-sufficiency in foodgrains, the latter replied that he envied India because it was able to profit from other people’s mistakes. Rapacki, Menon wrote to the Foreign Secretary, was undoubtedly thinking of how excessive concentration of industrialization had proven to be to the detriment of agriculture in the CEECs and had been one of the causes of the 1956 revolutions in Hungary and Poland (Menon, 1960).

India-China War, 1962 Poland did not initially fully support India’s stance on the 1962 IndiaChina War. It was only in 1967 after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s discussions in Moscow and Warsaw that there was ‘a perceptible change’ for the better in the Soviet and Polish approach to the Sino-Indian conflict. In the past, they had conceded that China was deliberately exploiting its border conflict with India to increase tension in the region. However, they did not fall in line with the Indian view that the border dispute itself was part of a wider geopolitical and geopolitical conflict developing between the two countries. But since 1967 they readily acknowledged that the Chinese threat was essentially aimed at undermining India’s very political foundations (Reddy, 1967a: 1).

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Recognition of Frontiers India was forthright in asserting that the eastern and southeastern borders of Germany should be defined in conformity with the postwar settlement and that the Oder-Neisse Line be universally endorsed. At the time of the Berlin crisis and the construction of the Berlin Wall (1961), the German question had ‘a very intimate relation’ to the possibility of war or the continuance of peace in Central Europe. Nehru urged the unequivocal acceptance of the Oder-Neisse frontier because any talk or ‘even hinting at the possibility of a change’, would make the situation much worse (Nehru, 1961a: 232, 234–235) and be disastrous for mankind (Nehru, 1961c: 7). The East Europeans’ fears of a rearmed, revanchist West Germany was a major stumbling block to any general settlement in Europe. The whole atmosphere, Nehru told the Rajya Sabha, was ‘vitiated by the uncertainty in regard to frontiers’. ‘If anything is certain’, he added, ‘it is this, that any attempt to change that [German] frontier will lead to war’ (Nehru, 1961b: 435). Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik (Jain, 1993) had made a significant contribution in overcoming Poland’s fears. India had, in fact, from the very beginning expressed its ‘open support’ to Poland’s boundaries in the west. New Delhi was pleased that the Warsaw Treaty (7 December 1970) had recognized this both ‘in fact and in law’ (Gandhi, I., 1973: 24–25). New Delhi supported Polish efforts to foster East–West détente within the framework of the Helsinki Declaration on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Jain, 1977), which it felt, would ‘do much good’ (Sen, S., 1971: 219).

Indira Gandhi’s Visit, 1967 Twelve years after she had accompanied her father on a visit to Poland, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi arrived in Warsaw in October 1967 for a goodwill visit. She appreciated the remarkable progress made by Poland in economic development and was visibly impressed by the rebuilding of Warsaw as ‘a monument to the undying courage of the Polish people’ (Gandhi, I., 1967: 188). During her visit, differences emerged over nonproliferation, which was a key element of the Central European quest for stability and normalization of the situation in Europe. The Poles were keen that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) should soon enter into force as it was a crucial step towards disarmament (Golebiowski, 1972:

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338). Though Polish leaders urged India to sign the NPT in the larger interests of world peace, New Delhi refused to do so since it regarded it as a discriminatory treaty and an impediment to meaningful steps towards nuclear disarmament. India’s own security, Indira Gandhi reiterated, made it imperative that it receive credible guarantees before signing the NPT (Reddy, 1967b: 1). Warsaw expressed its appreciation of the Indian view without openly associating itself with it. As a result, no specific mention was made in the joint communique of the two problems that figured very prominently at the talks, viz. the German problem—a regular item in any joint statement with the Socialist countries—and the question of nuclear non-proliferation. The omission seems to have been largely the result of lack of agreement rather than any tangible change in India’s stance on German reunification.

The 1970 Polish Riots A number of news items on developments in Poland appeared regularly in the Indian press, especially when social unrest engulfed the country. Poland, the Times of India editorially remarked, seemed to be ‘relapsing into pre-1956 ways’ with hardliners having seized control of much of the Communist Party apparatus and stepped up their efforts to secure major changes in the top leadership so that they could influence the preparation, orientation and outcome of the party congress in the Autumn of 1968 (TOI, 1968: 8). The Polish riots of December 1970 had been sparked by economic difficulties, including a 20% hike in food prices (George, 1970: col. 328). Edward Gierek, a veteran journalist noted, was ‘no Dubcek’, nor was he ‘the Soviet nominee’. There was some evidence, he concluded, to suggest that the political process in Eastern Europe had become at least ‘partially autonomous and that the forces at work there cannot be denied expression, however hard the Soviet Union may try’. The riots left ‘no room for doubt’ that the détente with West Germany was likely to partially erode Russia’s hold in Eastern Europe (Jain, G., 1970: 10). Even in the late 1970s, the Poles, The Times of India’s Paris correspondent observed, continued to feel exasperated at the government’s ability to come to grips with the acute malaise which afflicted the country. The Polish Communist Party, he felt, seemed to be haunted by the prospect of workers and intellectuals coming together to question the bureaucratic nature of socialism (Padgaonkar, 1976: 8). K. Natwar Singh, Ambassador to Poland (1971–1973), subsequently reminisced that Poland had ‘no

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independent foreign policy’. The foreign policy of the East European countries was dictated by Moscow. However, in private the Poles were not ‘overfond’ of the Soviets (Singh, K. N., 2018).

The Bangladesh Crisis, 1971 India appreciated the stand of most East European countries, including Poland, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic, which were among the first countries to recognize Bangladesh and favourably supported India in the United Nations on the freedom struggle in Bangladesh (Singh, S., 1972: 94–95). Warsaw supported India’s stand on the East Pakistan crisis in the United Nations (India, MEA, 1972: 15–16). Warsaw’s recognition of Bangladesh was personally conveyed by the visiting Deputy Foreign Minister S. Trepozyniski to the head of the Bangladesh mission H. R. Chowdhury in New Delhi. The East European countries, according to the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, took their cue from the Soviet Union. Thus, while Poland and Czechoslovakia expressed their sympathies for the refugee problem facing India, they ‘refused to acknowledge either the strength of the resistance movement or the necessity for a political solution involving the creation of an independent state’ (Haksar, 1971 cited in Raghavan, 2013: 157).

Martial Law in Poland There was considerable coverage in the Indian Press of the crisis in Poland, which led to the imposition of martial law in December 1980. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) was clearly hostile to Solidarity and E. M. S. Namboodiripad publicly affirmed that his party would support a Soviet invasion of Poland if it took place (cited in Vanaik, 1981: 8). Soviet reluctance to order the tanks was an indication that the Kremlin itself recognized these differences between the situation in Poland that of Czechoslovakia and Hungary (Jain, G., 1981: 8). The real danger in Poland, argued another senior journalist, was not of Soviet military intervention, but of civil strife because Lech Walesa was opting for confrontation and plunging the country into disaster (Malhotra, 1981: 1). Like the popular uprisings in Poland in 1956 and 1970, the events of 1981 highlighted that whenever there was a revolt, Polish leaders resorted to some economic measures, but refused to make any structural changes (Talwalkar, 1982).

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As a result of the internal turmoil, everything between 1981 and 1986 came to ‘a standstill’ in Poland. The 29 November 1987 referendum— the first of its kind under a communist system—gave birth to a number of unsettling questions. General Wojciech Jaruzelski was described as Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘closest ally’ in Eastern Europe (Padgaonkar, 1987: 8). With Poland becoming a virtual ‘untouchable’ since the declaration of martial law, New Delhi became the only destination for the Polish Premier’s visit in February 1985 (Bhutani, n.d.), which was somewhat vitiated by the revelation a few days before his arrival of an espionage scandal in which the Deputy Commercial Attache Jan Haberka was allegedly involved (TOI, 1985: 1).

The Late 1980s When Minister of State for External Affairs K. Natwar Singh was in Warsaw in June 1989 to sign an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation, the Indian Embassy had informed the Solidarity leadership in Gdansk that the Minister would like to meet Lech Walesa. By this time, Walesa’s party had already won 99% of the seats in Parliament, but New Delhi had not up to that point recognized Solidarity (Singh, K. N., 1995: 154). Surprisingly, word came from Gdansk that the Minister need not travel to the northern port town to meet the Noble Prize winner and ‘the beacon of hope for all political dissidents in Eastern Europe’, that Walesa would come to Warsaw to meet the Minister. The two men met for an hour at the modest office of the Polish-Indian Friendship Society in Warsaw. The significance of this gesture was poignantly brought home when less than three weeks later when the then US President George Bush journeyed from Warsaw to Gdansk to meet Lech Walesa (Nayar, 1995). The gesture was apparently made because of Walesa’ life-long admiration for Mahatma Gandhi, whose ideals had inspired his own political struggle. Decades later, India lauded how Mahatma Gandhi had inspired Martin Luther King’s civil rights movement as well as Lech Walesa’s ten million strong Solidarity movement (Sen, N., 2005: 2172; Tusk, 2010: 34).

The Post-Cold War Era By the end of the 1980s, Indo-Polish ties had discernibly cooled. Poland was portrayed as being politically and economically in the ‘twilight zone’ (Talwalkar, 1990: 13). When these changes were occurring in Central

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Europe, Minister of State for External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh visited East Germany, Hungary and Poland in June 1989. He recounted a discussion with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, who asked: ‘… tell me where was India all these ten years?’—a reminder of India’s neglect of the region during the Cold War era. The Indian Minister replied: ‘Mr. Walesa, I want to talk to you about the future, not the past’. As a former Ambassador to Poland, Singh admitted: ‘I knew we had absolutely no contacts in these countries, and frankly, because we did not expect those changes’ (Singh, K. N., 1995: 154). Since the 1990s, Poland was preoccupied with gaining membership of NATO (1999) and the European Union (2004) and improving relations with the United States. As a result, relations with non-European countries were simply put to ‘the back burner’ (Kacperczyk, 2005: 192). India faded into the margins of Polish foreign policy. In mid-1990, President Jaruzelski reassured the visiting Lok Sabha Speaker that Warsaw understood and appreciated India’s position on Kashmir and that any dispute should be solved bilaterally between India and Pakistan in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Simla Agreement (India, MEA, 1990: 147). However, President Walesa remained somewhat cool towards India given New Delhi’s friendly relations with the Soviet Union all these years (Talwalkar, 1990: 13). The coolness dissipated somewhat with the visit of a Polish Parliament delegation in December 1992 and the visit of Minister of State for External Affairs R. L. Bhatia to Warsaw in February 1993.

Walesa’s Visit, March 1994 The visit of President Lech Walesa (3–8 March 1994)—the first visit by a Polish head of state in 33 years—made it possible to resume high-level political dialogue. Warsaw was sensitive to Indian concerns about Kashmir and agreed that outstanding issues between India and Pakistan should be settled bilaterally. However, at a press conference when a correspondent asked whether India had raised the issue of how Pakistan sought to internationalize the Kashmir issue by referring to human rights violations in Kashmir, Walesa studiously avoided making any reference to the Kashmir issue. Instead, he stated, that the issue of human rights was discussed in general terms. ‘We are against human rights violations in all parts of the world’, he said (TOI, 1994: 10). At Geneva, however, Warsaw, like EU

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Member States, did not support Pakistan’s resolution introduced in the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1994 (India, MEA, 1994: 57). Discussions led to agreement that India and Poland would exchange views on the restructuring of the United Nations Security Council and the Permanent Representatives of the two countries would consult each other and formulate proposals in this regard. It was also agreed to cooperate and coordinate efforts in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the follow-up of the Uruguay Round, especially the MultiFibre Agreement. During Walesa’s visit, both sides stressed the need to strengthen trade and economic ties. India was perceived as ‘a stable and emerging economy’ with which mutually beneficial economic linkages could be developed on a long-term basis. It was also decided to resume meetings of the Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation (not held since September 1990), but were now scheduled to be held later in the year (Khurshid, 1994: cols. 53–54). Interestingly, it was an accident of history that the Coal Ministry instead of the Commerce Ministry had been placed in charge of the Joint Commission since Poland had traditionally been a major supplier of mining equipment and technology for the Indian coal industry. Subsequently, a journalist urged Indian policy-makers and businessmen to use the legacy of goodwill left by years of Socialist solidarity to forge closer political and economic ties. The former Socialist countries, he argued, were ‘now in an uneasy, no man’s land: the old universe that linked them to the Soviet Union is dead, while the new world they were hoping to be born into, the European Union, has yet to accept them’. Therefore, while they are in such ‘a limbo, the region is open to overtures’ from countries like India. However, he cautioned, once they are admitted into the EU, they would ‘no longer be so receptive’ (Abraham, 1994). Four years after Walesa’s visit, President Alexander Kwasniewski visited India in January 1998. Accompanied by the Ministers of Economy, Agriculture as well as other ministers and senior officials along with a 25member business delegation, his primary objective was to revive economic relations and attract foreign direct investment. Poland adopted a critical attitude towards India’s 1998 nuclear tests and expressed its concern about nuclear and missile proliferation and urged India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (see Weston, 1998).

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Poland Reaches Out to Asia The geographic scope of post-1989 Polish foreign policy was ‘limited’ to the United States and Europe and anchoring Poland in European structures. For a dozen years, Asia ‘figured dimly’ in Polish foreign policy (Goralczyk, 2003: 365–366, 368; Rowinski & Milewski, 2011: 366). Since the 1990s, Poland sought to make its non-European policy more active, but its attempts were more of ‘a conceptual and verbal than practical character’. It was however becoming increasingly conscious of the need to approach them more ‘seriously and systematically’ (Kuzniar, 2009: 278). Poland was often perceived in the Asia-Pacific as ‘a third-rank country or is not noticed at all’ (Rowinski & Milewski, 2011: 370). At the turn of the millennium, the importance of the dynamic, fastgrowing countries of Asia began to be reflected in government statements and high-level visits to the region commenced. In mid-2001, Foreign Minister W. Bartoszewski told the Sejm (Parliament) that Asia and the Pacific were among the most attractive areas with a vast capacity to contribute to the world economy. Political dialogue with the region, he added, was motivated by economic and trade concerns to reduce the growing trade deficit with the region and diversify the sources of FDI (Poland, MFA, 2003: 288–289). To that end, Foreign Minister W. Cimoszewicz convened a special meeting with Warsaw-based Asia-Pacific ambassadors on 23 November 2001. He assured the resident ambassadors (including that of India) that Polish diplomacy’s ‘strong preoccupation’ with European and Euro-Atlantic issues would not lead to ‘a loss of interest’ in other regions, especially the Asia–Pacific (Poland, MFA, 2003: 289). China and India were particularly highlighted as ‘newcomers to the club of world powers’ (Cimoszewicza, 2003: 4). In view of the weak inflow of foreign direct investment from its traditional sources, viz. the United States, the European Union and Japan, Warsaw sought to woo and diversify its sources of investment by using its ‘trump card’ of EU membership (Poland, MFA, 2004: 324). The adoption of a Polish Strategy Towards Non-European Developing Countries 7 in November 2004—the first comprehensive document laying 7 The Strategy listed the following short-, mid- and long-term goals: (1) securing a political consensus and mobilising state institutions in Poland in a bid to intensify nonEuropean policy; (2) creating appropriate mechanisms for the stimulation and coordination of activities; (3) effectively influencing the awareness of the Polish business community to take good advantage of opportunities in non-European areas; (4) creating a climate

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down foundations for further cooperation with non-European countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America—sought to deal with non-European relations in ‘a more consistent and comprehensive way’ (Kuzniar, 2009: 281). The key motivating factors behind the Strategy included poor internationalization of Poland’s economy, low trade, a persistent trade deficit with Asia, globalization, the growing importance of some non-European regions/countries, and the desire to maintain relative competitiveness (Fotyaga, 2007; Kacperczyk, 2005: 190–191). China and India were identified as ‘priority’ states in Northeast and South Asia. The Strategy was generally acknowledged as a compromise document, with many weaknesses and challenges of implementation; it was nevertheless an advance in the evolution of Poland’s policy towards Asia. Since 2002, Warsaw’s ‘offensive’ towards the Asia-Pacific, according to Tomasz Kozlowski, Director of the Polish Foreign Ministry’s Asia-Pacific Department (2003–2004), sought to deepen political dialogue, significantly enhance economic relations and promote Poland. Warsaw was, above all, interested in making dialogue stable and regular and extend its scope to non-traditional areas of cooperation (Kozlowski, 2004: 212). More comprehensive efforts were made in 2003 to promote Poland in Asia with a view to overcome its ‘existing prejudice and obsolete perception’ and project an image of Poland as ‘a stable country with a solid market economy’ endowed with advanced technical solutions in many areas (Kozlowski, 2004: 213). The Strategy highlighted the positive factors contributing to greater cooperation with India, viz. a very large consumer market, substantial GDP growth rate, developed cooperation with the EU, gradual reduction of import tariffs, inclusion of India in the list of countries which were eligible for Polish Government credits and high intensity of bilateral economic contacts. However, the Strategy considered ‘the potential

conducive to cooperation through more intense political contacts; (5) effectively formulating Poland’s position on current affairs involving EU agreements, projects and initiatives with regard to developing countries, in keeping with Poland’s interests; (6) improving economic cooperation with non-European countries; (7) increasing trade; (8) markedly reducing Poland’s deficit in trade with several countries; (9) increasing the scope and value of services provided; (10) increasing the number of Polish specialists working in these regions; (11) encouraging full involvement in EU programmes; (12) effectively using the previously identified niches of cooperation; (13) guaranteeing the best possible external conditions for the country’s economic development; and (14) guaranteeing security in the broad sense of the notion (Kacperczyk, 2005: 193–194).

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failure of negotiations on the disputed territory of Kashmir and the escalation of the conflict with Pakistan’ as ‘a major threat’ to the further development of bilateral cooperation (Poland MFA, 2004: 22–23).

India and Poland in the 2000s In 2000, the Ministry of External Affairs continued to give an unduly positive spin to an otherwise lacklustre relationship. Despite the efforts of Central and East European countries to join Euro-Atlantic ‘security structures’ and the EU, the MEA persisted in maintaining the fiction that relations of these countries with India continued to develop on the ‘traditional friendly basis’. It either ritually reiterated that India’s cooperation with these countries was ‘multi-dimensional in character’ encompassing economic, commercial, defence, scientific and technological as well as cultural spheres (India, MEA, 2000: 52) or that political relations had been ‘problem-free’. Poland, which for many years had been focusing on domestic reforms and membership of NATO and the EU, had again begun ‘looking outwards’ (India, MEA, 2009) with regular visits and ‘continuously expanding’ bilateral relations (India, MEA, 2010: 76). Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited Warsaw in June 2000 but primarily for a ministerial conference of ‘Towards a Community of Democracies’. As a member of the EU, Poland was described by a Union Minister as a possible gateway to both Western and Eastern Europe and ‘a supply base for penetrating markets in the CIS region and the Baltic states’ (Nath, 2005). There also seemed to be some degree of bureaucratic inertia or mutual lack of interest in regularly holding Foreign Office Consultations (FOCs). After the initial two FOCs in October 1996 and April 1997, the next two were held after a gap of five years each—February 2002 and August 2007. The fifth FOC was held in June 2008, but once again, the next two were held after an interval of four years—November 2012 and August 2016. FOCs have now settled down on a biennial rhythm with the eighth one being held in January 2018 and the ninth one on 10 August 2020 as a virtual meeting owing to the Covid-19 pandemic. Eighteen years after his predecessor, Prime Minister Leszek Miller’s visited India from 15–18 February 2003. On the eve of his visit, the two countries were said to share a ‘warm, deep-rooted and traditionally friendly relations’ characterized by mutual understanding and cooperation ‘in several areas’. The two countries had ‘a close identity of views’ on

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political issues and fully appreciated ‘each other’s interests and concerns’ (India, MEA, 2003a). Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee described Poland as ‘a key partner in Central Europe’ (Vajpayee, 2003: 1389). The Polish Premier unequivocally condemned the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament and said no distinction could be made between good and bad terrorism. He expressed interest in establishing bilateral cooperation with states of the Indian Union and the relaunch of the Polish national airline LOT’s flights on the Warsaw-Delhi sector (India, MEA, 2004: 75). The visit led to the signing of three agreements on 17 February: an agreement on defence cooperation, an extradition treaty (text in Bhasin, 2004: 1373–1388) and an agreement on cooperation in combating organized crime (text in Bhasin, 2004: 1379–1388). It was also decided to appoint a Joint Commission which would examine various possibilities and initiatives in fostering economic cooperation.8 Miller’s visit led to two rounds of discussions between the National Security Council Secretariat and the Polish National Security Bureau in April and October 2003. Poland had somewhat reluctantly supported India’s candidature for a permanent seat in an expanded United Nations Security Council in 2005. On several subsequent occasions, Warsaw reaffirmed its support, but tended to link it with wider structural reform of the United Nations and the evolution of a common EU position on UN reforms. For instance, in July 2011 Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski told Polish reporters that he viewed Indian UNSC membership in the context of wider reform of the United Nations which would make the European Union, as ‘a future superpower, also a permanent member of the UN’ (Kugiel, 2011, 1–2; PAP News Agency, 2011). The visit of Minister of Commerce and Industry Kamal Nath in May 2006 was the first one by a Union Cabinet Minister to Poland since 2000. In July 2008, the Special Envoy of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Poland to seek support for a waiver of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Warsaw extended its unconditional support for India’s specific waiver at the NSG meeting that took place in August 2008 in Vienna. President Pratibha Patil’s visit to Poland in April 2009 led to the signing of two agreements on cooperation in tourism as well as health care 8 The intergovernmental commission on economics, trade, scientific and technological cooperation facilitates cooperation in the relevant fields replaced the one established in 1972 and held its first meeting in New Delhi in May 2008.

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and medical science. Next year, the key objective behind Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s visit to India in September 2010 was to enhance trade and economic ties; it set a goal to double trade by 2014. He reaffirmed Polish support for India’s candidature for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council for 2011–2012. Towards the end of the 2000s, there was growing recognition in Poland that its political and economic objectives in Asia was ‘poorly defined and equally ineffectively’ pursued (Rowinski & Milewski, 2011: 366). Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski in May 2009 urged that Polish efforts in Asia ought to be ‘better thought out and more professionally prepared’. Asia, he bemoaned, was ‘running away from us and without redoubled efforts… Poland will lag behind not only [in] Asia’s most dynamic regions, but also other European countries’ (Sikorski, 2009: 347). In order to enhance Poland’s brand awareness globally and as part of the Polish cultural offensive in Asia, Warsaw established a Polish Institute in New Delhi in June 2012. The Institute’s activities have however been curtailed in recent years due to budgetary cuts.

Defence Cooperation As part of the Soviet military industrial complex, none of the Central and East European countries, including Poland, had the R&D capability to produce a wide range of sophisticated military equipment on their own (Wieczorek & Zukrowska, 2000: 123). However, Polish expertise in high technology in areas like armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs), building of warships, opto-electronics and radar system was well known. Polish assistance in modernizing and updating the Soviet equipment has been regarded ‘very critical’ for India’s defence sector, especially since hardware and services were offered on favourable terms (Sakhuja, 2014: 132). Defence cooperation between India and Poland began in the early 1970s when much of Indian defence equipment was of Soviet origin. At that time, Poland supplied India with spares as well as technology for maintaining and upgrading several kinds of equipment, including tank recovery vehicles. New Delhi also looked to Warsaw for the upgradation and maintenance technology since Poland had expertise in some specific kinds of Soviet aircraft (Bose-Harrison, 2010) During the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, Indira Gandhi and Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram had given the armed forces a free hand as well as time to build up fully before

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going to war with Pakistan. This included emergency, bulk import of used Soviet-made T-55 tanks from Poland (Gupta, S., 2015). In the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, India received four Polnochny-class amphibious warfare vessel/landing ship tank from the Gdynia shipyard in two batches.9 These vessels were built by Poland’s Stocznia Marynarki Wojennej or Naval Shipyard Gdynia in two batches of four on direct order from the Indian Navy. Owing to the sudden deterioration of the De Havilland Vampires being used by the FTW for advanced stages of jet training, 50 PZL TS-11 Iskra jet trainers were airlifted in AN-12 transport aircraft from Poland and inducted in the Indian Air Force between October 1975 (four) and the remaining in May 1976 (Bharat Rakshak.com, 2013). These were used for nearly three decades before they were de-commissioned in 2004. After their number dwindled to 30 aircraft, an agreement for the supply of another 20 Iskra TS-11 trainers was signed in 1999. In what was an ‘offthe-shelf’ purchase, the former Polish military aircraft had been acquired at throwaway prices (Hebbar, 1999). Indian Air Force officers used to frequently travel to the Polish city of Radom for training. For decades, Poland also supplied India with ammunition. Since these were secret transactions, it is difficult to assess their scale (Warsaw Voice, 2002). During the Cold War, Poland was the seventh largest supplier of arms to India with 1% market share. For Poland, however, India was the second biggest market for military equipment after the USSR (Kugiel, 2014: 2). The 1990s and Early 2000s In view of the acute crisis in East European defence industry in the 1990s, the Polish Government was determined to push armament exports. To that end, in March 1990 it permitted all enterprises of the arms industry to export armaments, military equipment and services, even to regions of political and military tension (Wieczorek, 1991: 8–9). However, it was only in March 1999 that Deputy Defence Minister Romuald Szeremietiew visited India. During the Kargil War (May–July 1999), 9 In 1974–1976, India received four ships (Ghorpad, Kesari, Shardul and Sharabh. The four Polish-built ships commissioned in 1985–1986 were INS Cheetah, INS Mahish, INS Guldar and INS Kumbhir (Bharat-Rakshak.com). The INS Kumbhir was commissioned at Gdyna, Poland on 31 August 1986 (India, Ministry of Defence, 1987: 14).

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India made some emergency purchases of spares for its Russian MiG aircraft from Poland (TOI, 2001). Bumar-Labedy has been supplying spares (including torsion bars) for the T-72 tanks, which are also equipped with internal anti-radiation liners by Zakłady Chemiczne Jelchem SA. The Indians had also purchased single units of both air surveillance radars by Radwar (the N21 on SUM chassis and the N22 on Tatra chassis) for extensive operational tests in Deccan, and these were likely to be co-produced by Bharat Electronics (Military Technology, 1999). In December 1997, the Ministry of Defence issued tenders for 87 armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs). Bumar and Unimpex—a Slovak company—were selected as preferred bidders to deliver 44 WZT-3M and 42 Slovak VT-72C vehicles, respectively. In April 1999, Bumar and Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (BEML) signed a $32 million contract to produce and deliver 44 WZT-3M ARVs. These were to be assembled at BEML’s facility; they were handed over to the Indian Army in 2001 (Army-technology.com, 2020). Within a span of four years, Polish defence ministers had made four trips to India. Deputy Defence Minister Romuald Szeremietiew made two trips to India: in March 1999 (after a gap of 13 years) and after becoming Defence Minister in February 2000 as the leader of an army delegation to participate in the Aero India Space International exhibition in Bangalore and hold discussions with Indian interlocutors. Two months later, Defence Minister George Fernandes told the Lok Sabha that a Polish delegation led by Minister of Economy Janusz Steinhoff had met him to explore possibilities of collaboration in areas of joint development/coproduction and joint marketing and sale of Polish arms and ammunition (Fernandes, 2000: col. 182). Polish companies have been a regular participant at DefExpo—the biennial edition defence expositions organized in various parts of the country—and making a sustained promotional effort to offer their products and technology to the Indian armed forces. Defence Minister Janusz Zemke’s visit made a 5-day trip to India (2– 4 February 2004) to participate in the DefExpo in New Delhi, where Poland had its own pavilion because India was ‘the biggest purchaser of Polish arms and military equipment’ (Zemke, 2004). In early 2002, the Polish Finance Ministry had opened a $200 million credit line for selling Polish arms to India, which apparently facilitated the signing of two contracts: a $73 million contract (1 March 2002) for the installation of thermal-imaging fire-control DRAWA-T systems for 250 Soviet-made T-72 tanks were at the tank factory in Avadi, south India

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(Renik, 2002; Sherman, 2002: 2; Warsaw Voice, 2003). This annoyed the Russians, who felt that the Polish company had won the contract because it apparently offered more attractive financial terms. The credit line also facilitated another contract signed on 31 March 2002 for 80 WZT-3M ARVs produced by Bumar—a consortium of 23 manufacturing and trading defence-sector companies which had been active in the Indian market since 2000 in three sectors, viz. delivery and indigenization of equipment, cooperation in R&D projects and modernization of production lines. Deliveries began in 2003 and were completed in 2004. The final batch of 40 ARVs were assembled in India from kits supplied by the Bumar-Labedy factory and were powered by the Indian-built V 46.6 diesel engine at BEML’s Avadi Engine Facility. Other agreements signed were for Polish technical assistance to produce radars and supplying 650 assault parachutes to the Indian Army. In fact, Polish and Indian radio/electronic industries had been cooperating in the development of radars for a number of years. For instance, the CEAR 1100 radar had been developed in India with a substantial contribution from a Warsaw-based company, Radwar (Warsaw Voice, 2002). Defence Cooperation Agreement, 2003 On 17 February 2003, India and Poland signed a defence agreement, which broadly envisaged cooperation in the field of defence technology, research and development, training, peace support and combating terrorism (Fernandes, 2003). The areas specified for cooperation included exchange of experience in the field of military planning and functioning of armed forces; military education and training of military personnel; maintaining peace and fighting terrorism; organization of armed forces, their logistic support, personnel management and administration; exchange of information; military science and research; the supply and modernization of armament and military equipment; and military medicine and legal issues in the field of defence (India, MEA, 2003b). The agreement was concluded for a period of five years and was renewable thereafter.10 Another MoU between the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and 10 Till Miller’s visit, the value of contracts signed with India reportedly amounted to $182 million, which included the ones for the modernization of the Drawa TR fire targeting systems valued at $72 million in 250 T-72 tanks (Warsaw Voice, 2003).

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the Polish Chamber of Defence Manufacturers was also signed to foster cooperation with the private sector. Nearly a month after the Polish Defence Minister’s visit, an expertlevel Indian defence delegation visited Poland to explore possibilities for sourcing platforms, equipments, systems, spares and overhauling (India, Ministry of Defence, 2004: 196). This was followed by the visit of Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Poland (30 October–2 November 2004)—18 years after Minister of State for Defence had visited Poland in December 1986 and three decades after the visit of Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram in July 1974. Joint Working Group on Defence An agreement to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Defence Cooperation was reached during the visit of Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Poland in 2004. The JWG was expected to serve as a mechanism to facilitate and expand defence cooperation. However, the first meeting of the JWG took place in April 2006. The next two took place regularly while the fourth and fifth ones were held in October 2008 and April 2010. The Polish delegation was usually led by Secretary of State for National Defence whereas the Indian delegation was headed by the Secretary (Defence Production). No meeting of the JWG has been held after the seventh one in New Delhi in December 2013. The JWG on Defence Cooperation had been discussing a variety of issues, including upgradation of technology in defence production, PhD programmes in defence studies, and defence-related training programmes (India, MEA, 2008: 78). The JWG, among other things, led to training, which had been ‘under way’ (Bose-Harrison, 2010). Major Contracts The Ministry of Defence signed a contract with Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. on 5 February 2004 for the delivery of 228 WZT-3M armoured recovery vehicles to the Indian Army under a two-year $202 million contract (PAP News Agency in BBC Monitoring Service, 5 February 2004; Warsaw Radio, 5 February 2004). To meet this requirement, BEML and Bumar signed an agreement in March 2004. Deliveries began in 2004 and were completed by 2007. About 20–40% of the components under this deal were to be manufactured in India (SIPRI Arms Trade Register, 2018).

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Bumar and BEML had also agreed to set up a joint venture to jointly produce various arms systems for the Indian Army. Warsaw and New Delhi also signed agreements on Poland providing technical assistance to produce radars and supplying parachutes to the Indian Army (Warsaw Voice, 2003). In June 2005, India had also purchased 220 12.7 calibre machine guns from Poland (PAP News Agency, 2005: 1).11 Since then, Bumar had been negotiating with BEML for the supply of several hundred tank-recovery vehicles to transport damaged or disabled tanks from the battlefield for repairs. On 5 June 2009, seven defence companies including B. V. T. Poland—a firm engaged in marine engineering and naval architecture—were blacklisted by India for allegations of bribery charges against a former Director-General of Ordnance Factory Board. In November 2011, the Ministry of Defence placed a $275 million repeat order with BEML for the supply of 204 WZT-3M ARVs. In January 2012, BEML signed a cooperation agreement with Bumar whereby the Polish company was to provide full technology transfer for key systems of the ARVs for the Indian Army’s Russian-made T-72 main battle tanks. Under the contract, 50% of the ARVs were to be built by BEML with the full critical technology transfer of crucial sub-systems that Bumar was to provide. In May 2017, India cancelled the $275 million contract. In June 2017, India was pursuing to file a lawsuit against Polski Holding Company (PHO)—the new name of the Bumar Group since May 2014—for not honouring the deal for full technology transfer and recovery of liquidity damages. PHO had also refused to open a performance bank guarantee of $100 million for technology transfer to critical systems for ARVs. Despite several reminders, it had refused to honour its commitment (Raghuvanshi, 2017). India has so far conducted only one military exercise with Poland in November 2011 when Indian and Polish special forces at the CounterInsurgency and Jungle Warfare School in Mizoram.

11 According to the Polish newspaper Dziennik, Bumar had reportedly clinched contracts for the supply of 100 PZA Loara mobile anti-aircraft units, 110 self-propelled canons, 80 Kroton de-mining vehicles and 1,000 tank engines for the upgradation of the T-72 tanks engines (cited in Defenseindustrydaily.com, 2008).

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Polish Arms Exports to India, 2008–2017 In 2008, Poland granted 96 arms export licences valued at e17.15 million for EU Common Military List category 6 (ground vehicles and components), and 10 (aircraft and helicopters). Next year, this increased to 93 licences valued at e21.595 million for the above two Military List categories as well as category 1 (weapons and components) and 11 (electronic equipment) (Poland, MFA, 2010: 22; see Appendix 13). However, the Polish Foreign Ministry’s Annual Reports for the Export of Arms and Military Equipment for the years 2008 to 2012 only listed the number of licences issued and the value thereof and gave no figures of the value of actual exports, which were given for the first time in its report for 2013, when 43 licences for arms exports were issued for e13.224 million. Of this, the value of actual exports was e13.224 million in Military List categories 6 (ground vehicles and components), 18 (production equipment) and 10 (aircraft and helicopters) (Poland, MFA, 2014: 23). During 2015–2016, there was a significant difference between the number of arms export licences and the value of actual exports. In 2015, Warsaw issued 37 arms export licences valued at e10.912 million, but actual exports were e6.187 million in Military List categories 10 and 14 (Poland, MFA, 2016: 27). In 2016, Poland issued 27 arms export licences for India valued at e12.227 million, but actual exports were about onethird e4.438 million (Poland, MFA, 2017: Table 5). In 2017, however, 21 arms export licences for India valued at e5.132 million were issued but actual exports were e6.755 million (Poland, MFA 2018: Table 5) (see Table 6.1). In terms of value, India’s overall ranking among importers of Polish arms in 2008 was fifth and remained more or less at this level during 2009–2011, but rose to the third position in 2012. In subsequent years, this continued to decline. India was at eighth rank among importers in terms of value in 2013 and 2014, but declined to fourteenth and sixteenth rank in 2015 and 2016, respectively. In 2017, India was ranked thirteenth among importers in terms of value. The Polish export yearbook for 2008–2009—the first time that Poland published its report on the export of arms and military equipment— expressed concern about ‘the relatively low position of India, which used to be a leading partner of the Polish arms industry’ (Poland, MFA, 2010: 22). This concern was expressed in the annual reports for the next two years (2011: 23; 2012b: 26), but not in subsequent reports.

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Table 6.1 Export of Polish military equipment to India, 2008–2017 Year

No. of licences issued

Value of licences in Euros

2008 2009 2010

96 93 97

17,155,320 21,595.346 22,297,576

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

123 88 43

21,256,544 26,233,225 13,224,218 8,100,000 10,912,391 12,226,919 5,131,722

37 27 21

Value of actual export

7,684,605 6,186,605 4,438,219 6,755,309

Military list category 6, 6, 6, 7, 6, 6, 6,

10 1, 11, 10 1, 10, 5, 9, 2, 16 18, 10, 9 10, 9 18, 10

10, 14 6, 10, 9 6, 10, 9, 18, 17, 1

Source Poland, MFA (2010: 22; 2011: 22; 2012b: 25; 2013: 27; 2014: 30; 2015: 23; 2016: 27; 2017: Table 5; 2018: Table 5) Brief descriptions of EU Common Military List categories ML 1. Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories, and specially designed components therefor. ML 6. Ground vehicles and components. ML 9. Vessels of war, (surface or underwater) special naval equipment, accessories, components and other surface vessels. ML 10. ‘Aircraft’, ‘lighter than air vehicles’, unmanned airborne vehicles, aero-engines and ‘aircraft’ equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed or modified for military use. ML 11. Electronic equipment, not controlled elsewhere on the EU Common Military List, and specially designed components therefor. ML 14. Specialised equipment for military training or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon specified by ML1 or ML2, and specially designed components and accessories therefor. ML 18. Production equipment and components of products referred to in the EU Common Military List.

Warsaw has been conscious about Indian sensitivities about the sale of arms to Pakistan. In March 2004, Deputy Defence Minister Janusz Zemke told a visiting Indian delegation: ‘It is our policy that as we establish a high-level military-technical cooperation with India, we do not intend to develop a similar relationship with Pakistan. We cannot supply you tanks and then sell anti-tank missiles to Pakistan’ (cited in Raja Mohan, 2004).

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Poland in the Indian Parliament From 1950 to 2019, a total of 318 questions on Poland were asked in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian Parliament). The maximum number of questions was asked in the 1960s (83 questions), the 1970s (94 questions) and the 1980s (66 questions). Interest in Poland among parliamentarians began to wane in the 1990s (27 questions), which declined to 15 questions in the 2000s. A meagre 10 questions were asked by Members of Parliament (MPs) in the 2010s. Of these, the bulk of the questions pertained to economic and trade relations (268) followed by political (21 questions), defence (13 questions), cultural (4 questions), science and technological cooperation (4 questions) and atomic energy cooperation (3 questions). Interestingly, of the total of 318 questions, over 20% pertained to coal and mining cooperation (30 questions) and shipping (purchase, etc.) (38 questions). During this period, there were three questions relating to the visit of the Polish President in 1986 and 1994, two questions on Polish prime ministerial visits (2003 and 2010), and two questions on the conferment of a Polish award to the Maharaja of Jamnagar (2011), and three questions on the wrong depiction of maps (21 August 1968, 23 November 1970 and 16 March 1972). Among questions on defence cooperation, one pertained to the 2003 defence agreement and five pertained to defence deals or the cancellation of defence contracts. The first reference to Poland during a debate in the Lok Sabha was on 20 April 1950 when A. N. Rathnawami (Madras) remarked that an undemocratic system was prevalent there (Rathnawami 1950: col. 3084). Five years later, Acharya Kripalani (Independent) cited Mahatma Gandhi as having once remarked that the fight of Poland against Hitler was the ‘nearest approach’ to satyagraha (Kripalani, 1955: col. 8502). Polish Riots, 1956 Poland did not occur too often in Indian parliamentary debates. It came up several times during the debate on the Hungarian crisis in the Lok Sabha in November 1956. ‘Certain currents and motions’, which had partially liberalized the functioning of East European regimes, went ‘perhaps farther’ in Poland than in other places (Nehru, 1956d: col. 381). A. K. Gopalan (Communist Party [Marxist]) regretted that the process of peaceful democratization that had taken place in Poland had not been

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possible in Hungary (Gopalan, 1956: col. 398). Asoka Mehta (Praja Socialist Party) sarcastically remarked that Gomulka had gone to Moscow and agreed to retain the Soviet troops because he could not be ‘the free agent’ of the wishes of the Polish people (Mehta, 1956: col. 409). S. N. Sinha (Congress) argued that the real reason why the Soviet Union came to terms with Gomulka was because Soviet troops were stationed there (Sinha, 1956: col. 428). On 20 November 1956, H. N. Mukherjee (Communist Party) stated that the process of improvement in Poland had been hindered and distorted by certain factors in Hungary (Mukerjee, 1956: col. 518). The revolts in East Germany, Hungary and Poland, remarked another MP, had occurred because some countries had been ‘planned to damnation’ due to their over-emphasis on heavy industries and neglect of consumer industries and agriculture (Kripalani, 1957: col. 2670; 1958: col. 3719). Replying to the debate, Nehru felt that a key cause of apprehension in Poland and the USSR was that the Polish western boundary had never been accepted by Germany. The fear of another German invasion was ‘one of the dominating thoughts’ in the mind of everybody in Eastern Europe (Nehru, 1956e: col. 578). Unlike Hungary, Poland was able to itself gradually resolve its ‘internal ferment’—a process which had begun in the Soviet Union by ‘loosening certain restrictions and shackles that they had there’ (Nehru, 1956e: col. 579). Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968 Poland naturally cropped up during the debate on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was marked by sharp differences among Members of Parliament. For instance, H. N. Mukerjee (Communist Party (Marxist)) reminded the House that it was very easy to spread ‘anti-Soviet venom’. In Poland, he added, 600,000 soldiers of the Soviet Red Army had given their lives for the liberation of that country (Mukerjee, 1968: cols. 2400–2401). Surendranath Dwivedy (Praja Socialist Party), on the other hand, was convinced that if the Czechs could stand on their own legs in coping with Soviet imperialism, it would have led to revolution and change in Poland and Hungary as well (Dwivedy, 1968: col. 907).

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Wrong Depiction in Maps The issue of the wrong depiction of Kashmir and parts of the North Eastern Frontier Agency in maps published by several East European countries (Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia) was raised in the Lok Sabha on several occasions: August 1968 (Gandhi, I., 1968: cols. 3307– 3308), 23 November 1970 and 16 March 1972 (Singh, S. N., 1972: col. 30). Foreign Minister Swaran Singh clarified to the House that Polish maps broadly followed the Chinese alignment though some of these maps showed the border with a broken line indicated that the borders were regarded as unestablished (Singh, S., 1970: cols. 32–33). After Prime Minister Morarji Desai’s visit to Poland in June 1979, Warsaw agreed to revise its maps of South Asia and show India’s boundary with Tibet in accordance with the alignment depicted in Indian maps. Warsaw had earlier revised the alignment in the eastern sector, but now agreed to revise the northern sector as well (Hindustan Times, 17 June 1979, 1, cited in Mathur, 2014: 319). Emergency in Poland, 1981 Several Members of Parliament spoke warmly of the Polish peoples’ struggle before the declaration of martial law by General Jaruzelski in December 1981. Interjecting in the debate on 29 March 1982, Madhavrao Scindia (Congress) felt that Poland was witness to ‘the flame of nationalism asserting itself’ and ‘proxy leaderships facing this resurgence of nationalist sentiment’. Poland, he added, was an example of an ‘emotional awakening in what were formerly docile client states’ (Scindia, 1982: col. 477). Madhu Dandavate (Janata Dal) urged the GoI on 14 December 1981 to make a statement to the declaration of emergency in Poland (Dandavate, 1981a: col. 333). The next day, he termed the declaration of emergency in Poland as ‘a grave threat’ to the movement for freedom and democracy and ‘an onslaught’ on all democratic institutions. The developments of Poland could not be considered ‘an internal problem’ of Poland (Dandavate, 1981b: col. 358). In a statement in both Houses of Parliament on 17 December 1981, Foreign Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao remarked that the Government had been following the developments in Poland ‘under conditions of interrupted communications’. New Delhi, he remarked, approached the

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developments in Poland from the standpoint of the principle of noninterference. What was happening in Poland, he stated, was ‘primarily’ the concern of its government and people and expressed the hope that the crisis would be overcome by them in the shortest possible time (Rao, 1981: 344). Changes in Eastern Europe Referring to the far-reaching changes taking place around the world in 1990, Y. P. Shastri (Janata Dal) noted that Soviet troops were withdrawing from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland (Shastri, 1990: col. 1002). L. K. Advani (BJP) remarked that he would be happy if countries like Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia pursued an independent foreign policy (Advani, 1990: col. 7). Gomulka and Walesa Among Polish leaders, Gomulka was mentioned half a dozen times in the late 1950s and twice in the mid-1960s. In the 1990s, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa was mentioned on several occasions in the Lok Sabha. Rabi Ray (Janata Dal) recalled how Walesa had used Gandhiji’s weapon of satyagraha to win freedom from the communist regime for fellow citizens (Ray, 1992: col. 736). Chandra Shekhar (Samajwadi Janata Party, National) cited Walesa while arguing that Poland had achieved nothing by adopting the liberal policies; only the rich Western countries had got an opportunity to exploit markets in his country (Chandra Shekhar, 1992: col. 955). More recently, Bharatruhari Mahtab (Biju Janata Dal) recalled the non-violent struggle of Lech Walesa who fought against a very oppressive government (Mahtab, 2013). Poland Comes up in Debates on the Ayodhya Dispute Surprisingly, Poland was mentioned on several occasions during the discussion on Ayodhya in the Lok Sabha. Atal Bihari Vajpayee (BJP) referred to Poland as an example of a dispute over religious structures. When Russia occupied Warsaw, a church, he stated, had been built there. However, when Poland became independent, the first thing it did was to demolish the church (Vajpayee, 1992: col. 471). Subsequently, in another debate on Ayodhya, Kharabela Swain (BJP) stated that the Poles had

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destroyed the church built by the Russians because they felt it was a blot on the Polish nation (Swain, 2002: col. 107).

Perceptions of Poland in Scholarly Literature Postwar scholarship on India’s relations with East European countries was ‘rudimentary’ and virtually ‘non-existent’ on Indo-Polish relations (Mathur, 2014: 315). The first article on Poland in India Quarterly— the premier international affairs quarterly of the Indian Council of World Affairs—was on the Polish approach towards East–West relations (Golebiowski, 1972). It was published nearly three decades later after the journal was launched. It took another three decades for the second article to appear in the journal, which traced Poland’s travails in establishing democracy and highlighted its transition to a market economy. The article cursorily discussed Indo-Polish relations in one paragraph dealing mostly with historical and cultural ties (Randhawa, 2002: 149). Several other articles in the ICWA’s house journal made brief references to Poland. For instance, Devendra Kaushik mentioned in passing that India’s relations with Poland could be traced from the ancient and medieval times (Kaushik, 1985: 11). In an article in International Studies —the international affairs quarterly of the Indian School of International Studies—M. L. Sondhi in 1963 argued that Poland had made ‘prodigious efforts’ to secure the support of non-Communist countries to recognize its existing borders from as many countries as possible. From the very beginning, India gave open support to Poland’s boundaries in the West, viz. the Oder-Neisse Line; this had contributed to strengthening ‘a vital interest of Poland’ (Sondhi, 1963: 158–159). In a situation where even Europe or the European Union is rarely discussed in edited volumes on Indian foreign policy, a separate chapter on Indo-Polish relations was unimaginable. For instance, a two-volume study (Mansingh, L., 1998) commissioned by the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), Ministry of External Affairs did have a chapter on India’s relations with Central and Eastern Europe, which made several passing references to Poland and noted that while Warsaw approved of India’s candidature for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council, it disapproved of India’s position on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Joshi, 1998: 43). However, a 1149-page volume on Indian foreign policy

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published a decade later by the FSI did not have a chapter on either the region or any Central European country (Sinha & Mohta, 2007). The first book to be published in India on Poland was in 1941 by the Calcutta-based Indo-Polish Friendship Society founded by Rabindranath Tagore (Indo-Polish Friendship Society, 1941). Another full-length study on Indo-Polish relations was published more than 70 years later—a compendium of seminars organized by the Indian Council of World Affairs and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (Sakhuja et al., 2014). In almost all books by former diplomats, Poland is either mentioned in passing or not at all. For instance, Shashi Tharoor makes a passing reference to the success of the Solidarity movement in Poland or to how the League of Nations was reduced to debating the standardization of European railway gauges the day the Germans marched into Poland (Tharoor, 2012: 296, 372).

Polish Perceptions of India During the Cold War, the Polish media praised India’s ‘important’ role in international politics. Poland, it felt, was keenly watching its progress towards economic modernity, advocacy of disarmament and support for the peaceful resolution of international crises (Mathur, 2014: 316). In the late 1960s, the Polish Press continued to regard India as ‘a great Asian power, a “genuine” friend and its main trade partner in the developing world’ (Mathur, 2014: 317). Even though Warsaw held Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in high esteem, the Polish Press occasionally criticized her leadership style and sterilization campaign. However, the tone towards her became somewhat more favourable in the early 1970s. In June 1979, when Prime Minister Morarji Desai visited Poland, India was characterized as a great Asian nation with ‘important’ authority. Between 1981 when martial law was imposed and 1985 there was no high-level visit by a Polish dignitary to India. However, the developments associated with perestroika, glasnost , and the Solidarity movement in the late 1980s, as a former Indian Ambassador to Poland put it, led ‘the Polish mind to imagine India less and less’. India too did not find any ‘commonality’ with the Solidarity movement primarily because India officially dealt only with legitimate governments.12 12 Interview with former Indian Ambassador to Poland Gurdip Singh, 18 May 2008. Cited in Mathur (2014: 320).

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The Polish Press and people took considerable interest in various facets of Indian civilization, including its mysteries, climate, social customs as well as its diversity and the celebration of religious and social occasions. Surprisingly for a country under Soviet tutelage, it took considerable interest in the workings of the Indian Parliament (Mathur, 2014: 320– 321). A particular good chapter in the bilateral relationship had been the magnanimity of prominent Indians, especially Maharaja Jamsaheb Digvijaysinhji to provide shelter to over 6,000 Polish refugees, a majority of which were children during 1942–1948 (Bhattacharjee, 2012; Glazer et al., 2008). The Polish Press did not refrain from criticizing or questioning India. For instance, it depicted India as a rich country with poor people, a country where caste impeded its progress and modernization (Mathur, 2014: 322). Since consumer goods were in great demand in Poland, Polish tourists arriving in India on LOT airlines would often barter their vodka for meat in Indian markets. Hence, LOT was nicknamed the’salami airlines’ by the Poles and ‘Vodka airlines’ by the Indians!13 The print and electronic media in Poland carries scant information about modern and rapidly developing India and tends to focus more on sensationalization of crimes, corruption scandals and natural disasters. Whenever an Indian dignitary visits Poland, a long-time Indian journalist living in Poland notes, there was hardly any mention in the Polish media and the Polish Government did not emphasize their importance (Bhutani, n.d.). Thus, during the visit of Prime Minister Donald Tusk to India in 2010, the Indian press gave considerable coverage to the visit, but the Polish press hardly mentioned it. Polish mainstream media ‘“rarely” covers Asian issues and if it does, it is “yellow” journalism rather than in-depth or relevant analysis’ (Kuszewska, 2015: 219). Generally speaking, awareness of the rapidly rising economic and political position among Polish ruling elites continued to be ‘limited’ (Rowinski & Milewski, 2011: 370) especially after its ‘return’ to Europe and prioritization of membership of NATO and the EU. Like China, the Polish media does not adequately reflect the complex reality of India (Mierzejewski, 2014: 93) Poles are ‘rarely interested’ in Asian affairs. In any substantial discussion, their knowledge about Asia and developing

13 Interview with former Indian Ambassador to Poland Gurdip Singh, 18 May 2008. Cited in Mathur (2014: 322).

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countries beyond Europe is ‘superficial and sometimes based on prejudices’ (Kuszewska, 2015: 220). There are hardly any Polish specialized publications, reports or literature which covers contemporary Asian issues. Central Europeans are primarily interested in regional or local issues which directly impact their security, e.g. especially Russia, the Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership. Even in the Polish Foreign Ministry, one Polish academic even argued, that people usually have ‘only some basic knowledge about Asia and only engage in speculations that hardly translate into concrete actions’ (Kuszewska, 2015: 219). A study of perceptions of India among young Poles between 17 and 25 revealed that 83% confirmed that they were not taught anything about India at school while 15% responded, ‘just a little’. Their knowledge about India was sourced primarily from the popular media. They tended to associate India with Bollywood, cultural diversity, good cuisine, female infanticide and discrimination against women—topics which were also the focus of mainstream Polish media. Twenty per cent identified India as a cultural power and a similar number as an economic power. However, 78% were not able to identify a single Indian company. 88% of the respondents felt the European Union should deepen cooperation with India (Kuszewska, 2014). Poland, according to a former Polish Ambassador to India, has constructed its own versions of ‘clashing images’ of India: a combination, like elsewhere in Europe, of some ‘stereotyped elements’—like ‘social divisions (castes), spirituality (gurus and Brahmins), religious beliefs (sacred cow) which often reflect the reality in a distorted form’ (Klodkowski, 2012: 322–323). Since the end of the 1990s, India’s image in Poland has changed significantly when Indian soft and economic power became much more noticeable globally and was also accepted in the Polish mainstream media (Klodkowski, 2012: 332). Bollywood has become popular in Poland. The shooting of several Indian films has also tended to give a boost to Indian tourism as well. Among Central European countries, Poland has taken the lead in enticing Bollywood to shoot films, soap operas, commercials and periodic melodrama in Polish locations (Mishra, 2018). The number of Indian tourists going to Poland had increased from 11,356 in 2011 to 14,238 in 2013 (Pandey, 2014). This increased to 16,800 in 2016 whereas approximately 25,700 Polish tourists came to India in 2017. The resumption of direct Warsaw-Delhi LOT flights after a gap of 25 years in September 2019 will certainly help in promoting tourism and better people-to-people links.

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In a March 2019 Pew Center Public Opinion Survey, Poland had almost similar perceptions of India’s role in world politics. When asked if they thought India played a more important role in the world as compared to ten years ago, they replied: a more important role (17%), a less important role (22%) and as important as 10 years ago (27%). In contrast, West European countries felt that India’s global role had become increasingly more important than 10 years ago—France (49%), Germany (38%) and the UK (46%) (Pew Research Center, 2019: 25).

Economic and Trade Relations, 2004–2020 In the wake of the financial crisis (2008), Poland’s response was based on four key elements, namely promotion of brand, economic missions of officials, assistance to Polish firms with information on foreign markets and financial support. In 2016, a distinct change was the support of Polish firms abroad became one of the five pillars of the new general growth strategy (Elteto & Antalozy, 2017: 47). Non-EU markets emerged as a major focus. Indian exports to the Visegrad 4 constituted 4.5% of total Indian exports to the EU ($2.6 billion) and imports constituted 2.3% of Indian imports from the EU ($1.35 billion). Poland was ranked as India’s fortythird in terms of India’s top 50 markets. Poland has also emerged as the largest recipient of Indian foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe. In 2018–2019, Indian exports of goods to Poland amounted to $1572.8 million and imports from Poland to $793.39 million. In 2017, India exported services amounting to $102 million and imported services valued at $119 million (see Chapter 8 in this volume).

The Modi Years In the 2010s, India and Poland were said to enjoy ‘a multifaceted beneficial relationship’, with the two countries having ‘a similarity of outlook on a host of matters of common interest’ (India, MEA, Press Release, 11 July 2012). With its transition to a democratic polity and market economy, high growth over the last decade, its size and strategic location and Poland’s deep sense of history and culture, Poland seemed destined to play ‘a key role in the region and in Europe’s future’ (India, MEA, 2012).

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited ten West European countries during 2014–2020, but Poland—the largest country in Central Europe— was not on his radar largely because of modest trade ($2.955 billion in 2018–2019) (Poland, Statistics Poland, 2019: 100), weak people-topeople links, and probably because of the lack of a substantial Indian diaspora. Indian FDI is gradually growing in the region, but it continues to remain relatively modest. While Modi may not have visited Central Europe, but eleven visits did take place during this period to the region by Vice-President M. Venkata Naidu, President Ram Nath Kovind (Czech Republic) and Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar to Hungary and Poland, which seem to have been part of a concerted outreach to the region. By the mid-2000s, Poland had already transitioned from a State-led coal and mining-based economy in the late 1980s to ‘a strong, progressive, dynamic and ambitious country’ which had weathered the global slowdown and grown at over 4% (India, Embassy in Poland, 2019b). During the 2010s, India had also begun to appreciate Poland’s growing importance and profile. Poland was perceived as ‘an important emerging economy not just in Europe but also globally’ and as its largest economic partner in Central Europe (India, MEA, 2017). Its location as a buffer State between the East and West blocs, which had hitherto caused it great loss and suffering during the World Wars and later, has now evolved as its greatest strength, as it is positioned to serve as ‘a nerve centre or logistics and manufacturing hub between Asia and Europe, with its relatively low operating cost, being its most prominent appeal for global companies’ (India, Embassy in Poland, 2019b). In Polish Foreign Policy Priorities, 2012–2016 (March 2012), Warsaw acknowledged that the position held by emerging economies would ‘continue to grow stronger’. But it noted that they were not ‘always willing to comply with human rights standards, employee and welfare rights or principles’ (Poland, MFA, 2012a: 4). With American primacy being called into question, the world was becoming multipolar in which the ‘assertiveness’ of emerging economies was rising. The financial crisis, it noted, did not serve as a catalyst for an overhaul of international institutions to better reflect the current global situation. There was recognition that unless emerging powers had ‘more say’ about the decisions taken by international institutions, they would not be ‘prepared to assume greater responsibility for the direction in which the world is moving’ (Poland, MFA, 2012a: 4). The importance of the Asia-Pacific region, it pointed out, was growing in the world. It was therefore essential for Poland

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‘to build a positive image as an important EU Member’ (Poland, MFA, 2012a: 20). Poland has been left with ‘a skills deficit’ and a severe shortage of skilled and semi-skilled manpower (Indian Embassy in Poland, 2019b) and the exodus of workers to West Europe, especially the UK as well demographic trends indicating an ageing population.14 However, discussions with Poland about legal migration of skilled workers did not progress after initial discussions in June 2007.15 Poland began accepting EU Blue Card applications from highly skilled third country nationals from 12 June 2012, Indians generally preferred to go to West European destinations rather than those in Central and East Europe. Poland remains the only major Central European country with which negotiations for a social security agreement continue to drag on even though agreements with Hungary (1 April 2013) and the Czech Republic (1 September 2014) were concluded nearly a decade ago. Jaishankar’s Visit, 2019 After a gap of 32 years, Foreign Minister Subramaniam Jaishankar visited Poland on 28–29 January 2019 against the background of the 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations and prior to the official launch of the direct flights between Warsaw and New Delhi by LOT Polish Airlines. He expressed gratitude to Poland, which as the monthly chair of the UN Security Council, had been ‘more than helpful’ when China took the Kashmir issue to the Security Council (Bagchi, 2019). Jaishankar had, in fact, called up Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz on 6 August—a day before Home Minister Amit Shah announced in the Rajya Sabha the decision of the Government of India to strip Jammu and Kashmir of its special status and to reorganize the state into two Union Territories—that the move was an internal affair of India and sought to bring security to a region particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The Polish Foreign Minister responded that Warsaw 14 More than half the population in Poland is expected to be 50 or older by 2050 (Labour Market Assessment in 6 EU Countries: 121). 15 In mid-June 2007, discussions were held between Polish Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, Anna Kalata in India to discuss availability of Indian workers to Poland in sectors such as construction, agriculture and services as there is a shortage of skilled workers in these sectors in Poland.

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stood ready, if necessary to engage in preventing actions ‘impacting the security situation’ (Poland, MFA, 2019). Polish Foreign Minister Czaputowicz emphasized India’s role as ‘a prominent regional power, an active and significant player in G20 and in the United Nations as well as Poland’s key partner in South Asia’. The Indian Foreign Minister, in turn, stressed Poland’s role as an important member of the European Union and ‘a leader of Central and Eastern Europe’. As if atoning for previous neglect, Jaishankar expressed India’s readiness to engage more actively in Central Europe, which was likely to have a positive impact on the overall EU-India relationship. In a welcome change, he expressed India’s desire to engage with Poland in the Visegrad 4 format (India, MEA, 2019). India supported Poland’s candidature for a non-permanent seat for the years 2018–2019, while Warsaw expressed support for India’s candidature for a non-permanent seat for the years 2021–2022.

Conclusion India tends to accord ‘a peripheral place’ to Poland—a country with which it has no particular strategic assets and with which it has neither important links nor interests (Kugiel, 2019: 140, 143). The problem is compounded by the existence of an information deficit and mutual neglect. The poor visibility of Poland in the Indian media and the lack of knowledge and limited interest in the country also foster lack of political will in upgrading the relationship (Kugiel, 2019: 149). While Polish analysts have urged that ‘serious consideration’ ought to be given to a strategic partnership with Poland (Kugiel, 2012), Indian analysts remained somewhat sceptical and do not see any intrinsic advantages in establishing a strategic partnership with Poland, though they do recognize the merit in forging a more intense and multi-faceted engagement (Jain, 2014). Poland is not generally perceived in India as a political heavyweight in the European Union, which is able to play a key role in the formulation of the Union’s foreign and security policy. Despite its economic buoyancy, its impact on the world stage is perceived to be minimal. New Delhi has traditionally tended to prioritize in the ‘Big Three’ (France, Germany and the UK). Prime Minister Narendra Modi raised the issue of cooperation in defence manufacturing as part of the Make in India vision in his meeting

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with Deputy Prime Minister Janusz Piechocinski on 10 January 2015. However, prospects of significant defence cooperation with Poland seem to have diminished with the breach of contract by PHO—Poland’s largest and most diversified arms manufacturer. With a growing emphasis on Make in India and defence exports, India might even be seen as a potential competitor. For instance, in March 2020 India had overtaken Russian and Polish manufacturers to win a $40 million contract for supply of four indigenously built ‘Swathi’ weapon locating radars to Armenia (Negi, 2020). Polish defence companies have apparently been reluctant to share technology and proactively explore research and development opportunities. More than a decade ago, the Ministry of External Affairs acknowledged that there had not been a high-level Indian visit to Poland ‘for a while’ (Surie, 2009). No Indian Prime Minister has visited Warsaw since Morarji Desai’s visit in June 1979. President Prabha Patil’s visit had filled ‘a vacuum which had begun to sort of come up’ (India, MEA, 2009) while the visit of Vice-President Hamid Ansari in April 2017 tended to be perceived by Poles as a compensatory visit. Thus, a long-standing and legitimate Polish complaint has been that India needs to give ‘clear political stimuli’ to boost bilateral ties in the form of high-level return visits to Poland (Kozlowski, 2004: 217). Until recently there have been long gaps in high-level Polish visits to India. After Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz’s visit to India in 1957, subsequent Polish Prime Ministers’ visits occurred after long intervals: Piotr Jaroszewicz after 16 years (January 1973), Wojciech Jaruzelski after 12 years (February 1985) and Leszek Miller after 18 years (February 2003). It was ‘definitely too much’ that a Polish Prime Minister was visiting India after 18 years (Miller, 2003: 1370). Greater political engagement would undeniably give a boost to the relationship and help overcome the information deficit. Despite a recognition that ‘any relationship no matter how strong or deep the economic, cultural, political, scientific and other areas of cooperation might be can only be sustained through high level visits’ (India, Ministry of External Affairs, 2017), a prime ministerial visit to Central Europe has not taken place in four decades. With Foreign Minister Jaishankar having expressed a desire to ‘engage Poland in the Visegrad format’ in January 2019, a regional V4+India summit—on the lines of the 2018 India-Nordic summit—sometime in 2021 will help overcome the neglect of the region.

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CHAPTER 7

India and Slovakia Rajendra K. Jain

India’s relations with Slovakia—the smallest country among the Visegrad Four—are relatively recent.1 For nearly a decade-and-a-half, since it became independent in 1993, Bratislava was preoccupied with its neighbourhood. The relationship has been characterized by low key, irregular political interaction, nominal trade and marginal foreign direct investment. This chapter examines Indian perceptions of the Velvet Divorce and its aftermath, political relations in the 1990s and the 2000s, economic trade relations as well as foreign direct investment. The chapter goes on to discuss defence cooperation and Slovak export of military equipment to India, the nature of relations during the Modi years and looks

1 During his visit to Europe in the summer of 1938, Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter, Indira, on their train journey from Prague to Budapest spent one-and-a-half days in August 1938 in Bratislava, where he saw the housing projects for workers (Krasa 1989: 343). A plaque—‘Glavnaya Namestie’—at Hviezdoslavovo Square commemorates their meeting with Vladimir Clementis—a Slovak communist politician and later Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1948–1950 in the former Kerns Restaurant.

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_7

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at how Slovakia has figured in Indian scholarly journals and in parliamentary questions and debates from 1993 to 2019. In conclusion, the chapter discusses mutual perceptions, cultural relations and makes some concluding observations.

Perceptions of Velvet Divorce The initial perceptions of the ‘velvet divorce’ of Czechoslovakia establishing the two separate states–the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic on 1 January 1993 was discussed in the Indian media. The Velvet Revolution ended when one began to face the ‘harsh realities’ of the transition towards market economics. There was ‘a nationalistic war’ on in Czechoslovakia, which cloaked the ‘real war’, which was economic (Naravane, 1992a: 9). Slovakia had truly resented Czech domination ever since the CzechSlovak federation was established in 1918. With the overthrow of the Communist government in 1990, the Slovaks believed that their ‘historical aspiration for equality’ in the federation would become a reality. However, this was unacceptable to both the Czechs and the federalists. This was exacerbated by the fact that Slovakia bore a disproportionate burden of the market economy reforms pushed by the Czechs. The uneasy union of the Czechs and Slovaks, which had been sustained for four and a half decades by Communist rule, the Times of India editorially observed, looked ‘unlikely to survive’. In fact, the Czechs, it added, had been the dominant group in the Czech-Slovak federation since its formation in 1918. The differences between the Czechs and the Slovaks, the editorial concluded, were ‘not bitter and the likelihood of an acrimonious war’, like the one in Yugoslavia, was remote (TOI, 1991: 16). The June 1992 election led to a sweep by Vaclav Klaus’s Civil Democratic Party in the western part of Czechoslovakia whereas voters in the eastern part chose the leftist and nationalist-minded Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led by Vladimir Meciar resulting in a deadlocked parliament (TOI, 1992b: 13). It reflected ‘tangible resentment’ in Slovakia–-the ‘smaller and poorer’ eastern republic of the Czechoslovak federation. There was widespread resentment among Slovaks who made up one-third of Czechoslovakia’s population, which had an estimated unemployment of 12%— three times as much as in the Western Czech provinces. The eastern part was agricultural and poor whereas the western part was

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industrial and affluent. Slovakia also received only 5% of all foreign investment. The Federal Republic of Germany, the biggest investor in Central and Eastern Europe, had located 80% of its projects in Moravia and Bohemia and very few in Slovakia (Naravane, 1992a: 9). A parting of ways between the Czechs and the Slovaks appeared to be ‘inevitable’, The Times of India editorially observed. The general election had polarized the two units of the federation along ‘sharply antagonistic lines’. During the electoral campaign, Merciar had ‘bitterly complained’ that the economic reform initiated by Klaus had widened the gulf between the prosperous Czech region and less developed Slovakia. Whereas Klaus sought to vigorously pursue pro-market policies, Meciar was keen that the state retained its interventionist role. In fact, Meciar warned that as soon as his party came to power, he would hold a referendum on whether Slovakia should declare itself as a sovereign entity with a separate constitution, its own president and own seat in the United Nations. A divorce between the two units of the federation, the TOI argued, seemed to be on the cards. The ‘pro-federalist forces’ hoped that Klaus and Meciar would be able to iron out their differences on the scope and nature of the economic reforms and autonomy had not materialized. Their prognosis that Meciar was sensitive about the danger that an independent Slovakia would immediately have to face a recrudescence of agitation by the restless Hungarian minority. Several West European countries cautioned that a warning that a united Czechoslovakia alone stood a chance of gaining admission to the European Union (TOI, 1992c: 10). The ‘only consoling factor’ in these dramatic developments was that the divorce may not be ‘a messy one and that the splitting of Czechoslovakia will not be as traumatic as the collapse of Yugoslavia’ (TOI, 1992c: 10). For Slovakia, separation would prove ‘a costly affair’, but a boon to the Czech economy which was saddled with a $500 million annual subsidy burden. For the eastern republic of Czechoslovakia, a divorce would signify devaluation of the new Slovak currency, more unemployment and less competitiveness (Naravane, 1992a: 9). Slovakia was expected to cope with ‘serious problems’ when it would begin its independent existence. The new Slovak currency was expected to undergo several devaluations (TOI, 1992e: 12). A break-up would leave the Czech Republic with the biggest share of production in many key industries—coal, passenger cars, fertilizers, steel—and the Slovaks with loss-making armaments factories and a restive

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Hungarian minority in the south. It would leave the Czech Republic with 80% of all foreign investment and the confidence of Western investors (Naravane, 1992b). While the Czech Republic was generally regarded as an exemplary candidate for membership of the EU and NATO, Slovakia tended to be viewed as a strongly problematic country because of its anti-democratic and authoritarian nature. Four months after the general elections, Slovakia—‘the poorer eastern part of the country’—seemed to have realized that its earlier decision to seek a divorce from the federation might not yield the desired dividends when Vladimir Meciar supported the proposal of the left-wing Czech opposition of a union with the Czech state. However, there was no positive response from the Czech state. Thus, the likelihood of a rebirth of Czechoslovakia was very dim. The Times of India editorially commented: ‘The pragmatic Mr Klaus may be now convinced that an economically barren Slovakia remaining “sovereign” is a blessing as the Czech land can now use its resources, without sharing, for its own evolution into a market economy. For ‘all practical purposes, the Velvet Revolution is dead, and for Vaclav Havel, a second coming is a distant possibility’ (TOI, 1992d: 12).

The Divorce and After Like ‘any estranged couple that has finally decided on a divorce, however amicable’, the Czechs and the Slovaks were now engaged in some serious squabbling (TOI, 1993c: 6). There were various problems, including a possible identity crisis among the nearly 60,000 Czechs who lived in Slovakia and the 300,000 Slovaks who lived in the Czech lands. Another issue was the decision which 500,000 mixed families would have to take about deciding where to live. There was the widespread public perception in Slovakia that it had been ‘short-charged in the division of spoils’, especially with unemployment being four times as high as in the Czech part and receipt of barely one-tenth of FDI in the unified country was ‘bound to deepen the grudges’ (TOI, 1993c: 6). Slovakia was less developed. The emphasis on primary production in Slovakia resulted in the continuance of a largely agricultural labour force and rural population while the structural transformation of the economy and economic growth took place in the Czech lands. The investment that took place in Slovakia supported the building of factories for military equipment which became obsolete with decline in demand with the end

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of the Cold War. Since 1990, Slovakia’s dependency on Prague regarding capital inflows increased considerably. The growing sectors of the Czech economy attracted manpower from the low labour demand regions of Slovakia (Bookman, 1992: 118, 121–122). The general expectation was that the divorce would create better opportunities for improvement in bilateral relations with India (TOI, 1993b). For the two new Czech and Slovak republics, life after the divorce would be ‘one of velvet co-existence’ (TOI, 1992d: 12). By the end of 1993, the Czech and Slovak republics’ velvet divorce was showing signs of strain. Many Slovaks felt bitter because without the support of the richer Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia, they were much worse off than before (Naravane, 1993).

Political Relations India promptly recognized the two new states which emerged from the division of the CSFR. In a congratulatory message sent to the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao recalled the tradition of friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation in the commercial, economic, scientific, defence, cultural and other areas. On 1 January 1993—the day both the Czech and Slovak republics came into existence—the Slovak Charge d’Affaires in New Delhi Odolen Smeral expressed the hope that new conditions would create better opportunities for improvement in bilateral relations with India (TOI, 1993a: 6). India established diplomatic relations with Slovakia immediately following the creation of the new republic. In 1994, the Slovak Republic upgraded its diplomatic representation in India to that of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and also established an Honorary Consulate in Calcutta. New Delhi opened a resident Mission in Bratislava in August 1995; till then, the Indian Ambassador in Prague was also accredited to the Slovak Republic. The proposal to establish an embassy in Bratislava initially encountered some opposition. Those against a full-fledged mission in the Slovak capital argued that it was only 30 minutes away from Vienna; the Indian Embassy in the Austrian capital could therefore look after the country’s interests in Slovakia. But South Block decided that Bratislava deserved an independent mission, a small set-up under a Charge d’Affaires opened in

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June 1995. This was expanded when the Indian Ambassador arrived in November 1995 (Nayar, 1995). The first fact-finding mission to explore possibilities of cooperation between India and Slovakia was made by Foreign Minister Pavol Demes in mid-April 1992. Several items in the engineering and machinery sector of the Slovak Republic, he felt, could find a ready market in India. He stressed the need for bridging the information gap between the two countries to enhance the potential for economic cooperation (TOI, 1992a: 13). In February 1993, Minister of State for External Affairs, R.L. Bhatia, arrived in Bratislava on the occasion of the inauguration of the Slovak Republic and appreciated its becoming an independent state in ‘a peaceful and constitutional manner’ (Bhatia, 1993a). The first high-level visit from Slovakia was that of its Prime Minister Josef Moravcik in July 1994. Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, complimented ‘the great political maturity’ shown by Czechoslovakia in respect of its official division in two countries. The Slovak Prime Minister spoke of the strong industrial base of that his country had inherited, especially in defence and expressed great interest in fostering greater scientific and technological cooperation (India MEA, 1994: 123). The Slovak side reiterated that on the Kashmir issue, it favoured the bilateral approach without the internationalization of the issue. The visit resulted in an agreement to set up a Joint Business Council and a Joint Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (hereinafter Joint Economic Committee). It also led to the signing of a MoU on scientific and technological cooperation and a protocol on annual Foreign Office consultations. Like other countries of Central Europe, India felt that Slovakia’s evolution in the direction of democratic pluralism and market-oriented economic structures had brought it closer in terms of basic orientation. Even though these countries accorded first priority to integration with West European political, security and economic structures, they also recognized the importance of preserving and strengthening their traditionally close relations with important Asian countries like India, which had emerged as a potential large market and an attractive destination for foreign investment (India, MEA, 1995a: 55). India and Slovakia signed an agreement on 7 July 1994 to start Foreign Office consultations. During his visit to Bratislava for the second round, V.K. Grover, Secretary (West) of the Ministry of External Affairs,

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discussed the possibility of joint projects to be taken up under a multilateral fund instituted by the European Union to assist the economic transition of the former socialist Central European states to market-driven economies (India, MEA, 1995b). The first high-level Indian visit to Slovakia was by President Shankar Dayal Sharma from 9–10 October 1996, which was described as giving ‘a particular impetus’ to ties with the Central European country (India, MEA 1997: 59). The visit led to the signing of an agreement on cooperation in the field of science and technology as well as an air services agreement. Being on a goodwill visit, the Indian President refrained from delving into Slovakia’s democratic development. He had no desire to say that he supported Slovak moves towards democracy as that would have sounded rather patronizing (Fontana, 1996).

The 2000s India continued to describe relations with East and Central Europe as ‘historically close and traditionally warm and friendly’ (India, MEA, 2000: 52) and as being ‘multi-dimensional in character and comprehensive in content’. They were ‘problem-free’, but trade and economic cooperation were not commensurate with its true potential (India, MEA, 2002: 54). During Vice-President Krishan Kant’s visit to Slovakia (June 2000), Slovakia expressed support for India’s candidature for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. Slovakia was admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) five years after the Czech Republic (29 March 2004) and the European Union in 1 May 2004. The first visit of the Slovak President (Rudolf Schuster) was scheduled to take place on 2–5 September 2003 (India, MEA, 2003), but it apparently did not take place and his successor President Ivan Gasparovic visited India in December 2004 accompanied by State Secretaries in the Ministries of Economy (Eva Simkova), Defence (Martin Fedor) and Foreign Affairs (Ivan Korcok). President Gasparovic’s Visit, 2004 The first visit by a Slovak President and head of a country that recently acceded to the European Union was undertaken by President Ivan Gasparovic from 11–15 December 2004. Slovakia’s central location in Europe, President Abdul Kalam remarked, placed it in the hub of many

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socio-political and economic developments in the last century (Kalam, 2004: 1404). India considered the Slovak Republic to be ‘an exceptionally friendly State’ and respected the political path chosen by the people of Slovakia (India, MEA, 2004: para 9). Bratislava strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The two countries concurred that combating terrorism had to be a comprehensive and sustained effort. Slovakia reiterated its support for India’s candidature for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. India’s ‘permanent presence’ as the largest democracy in the world in an expanded UN Security Council would give it ‘greater legitimacy and enhance its effectiveness’ (India, MEA, 2004: para 11). The visit resulted in the signature of an economic cooperation agreement (text in Bhasin, 2005: 1408–1409) and a MoU between the National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. and the National Agency for Development of Small and Medium Enterprises as well as a Programme for Cooperation in the field of Culture and Arts for the period 2004–2007 (text in Bhasin, 2005: 1410–1417). The Slovak President also formally inaugurated the Honorary Consulate in Mumbai. Given the meagre volume of bilateral trade (US$26.9 million in 2003–2004), the two sides emphasized the importance of ‘optimum utilization’ of the existing mechanisms such as the Joint Committee on Economic and Commercial Cooperation and the Indo-Slovak Joint Business Council (India, MEA, 2004). Exchange of Visits After a gap of 14 years, Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma visited Slovakia from 22–24 March 2007 for wide-ranging discussions. During the visit, an agreement was reached to establish a joint working group on defence. The two sides shared similar perceptions on issues like UN reform, international terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Western Balkans (Sharma, 2007). Six months later, Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee met Foreign Minister Jan Kubis on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2007, during which the two sides stressed the need ‘to build upon the commonalities in the bilateral relationship, predating Slovakia’s current political configuration’ (India, MEA, 2007).

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During the visit of Foreign Minister Janus Kubis in April 2008, Slovakia indicated its willingness to support India’s case at the 45member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and expressed its understanding for New Delhi’s desire to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The MEA despatched Secretary (Economic Relations) to Slovakia as a special envoy of the Prime Minister. Slovakia subsequently supported India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting held in September 2008. The year 2009 witnessed the continuation of ‘a constructive dialogue’ with India in order to enhance cooperation and create favourable conditions for multi-faceted development of relations, especially commercial and economic contacts (Slovakia, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs [MFEA], 2010: 20). The next year’s report reiterated that the focus of the foreign policy activities in Asia would be oriented towards strengthening economic and political dialogue with ‘important’ countries of the region—China, Japan, India and South Korea (Slovakia, MFEA, 2011a: 6). The MFEA noted that large, fast-growing economies such as China, India and Brazil were ‘increasingly reinforcing their positions’ (Slovakia, MFEA, 2011b [FP Report]: 1). The Slovak Foreign Policy Guidelines 2011 stated that Slovakia’s policy towards Asia would focus on improving economic and political dialogue with ‘the most important’ countries of the region, namely China, Japan, India, South Korea and Indonesia (Slovakia, MFEA, 2012: 7). The Report on Fulfilling Slovakia’s Objectives and Responsibilities in Foreign and European Policy in 2013 had a separate section on ‘Asia and the Pacific’, which expressed Slovakia’s efforts to seek opportunities to strengthen economic, scientific and technological cooperation in ‘the dynamically developing Asian continent’ (Slovakia, MFEA, 2014a: 13). In 2013, the Slovak Minister of Finance attended the Joint Commission meeting with India, which led the meetings to be upgraded to the level of State Secretaries.

Economic Relations During the Cold War, Czechoslovakia was the third most important trading partner amongst East European countries and the second one in 1989. Amongst developing countries, India was the third largest trading partner of Czechoslovakia in 1986 and the second largest one in Asia after China. After the division of the country, while India’s trade links with the Czech Republic continued at the same level as before, but

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trade with Slovakia declined considerably primarily because of confusion over the division of the country, the transition from the earlier system of balanced trade in non-convertible Indian Rupees to payment in convertible currency from 1 January 1993. A new trade and payments agreement was signed with Slovakia in May 1993. Bratislava also had an extremely restricted visa regime which discouraged Indian investors and businessmen. The democratic rebirth of Central and Eastern Europe led to a painful process of transition from a socialist to a free market economy. These transition processes posed a challenge to India since old patterns of State trading and special trading arrangements gave way to new relationships based on international and technological competitiveness (India, MEA, 1995: 55). The Indo-Slovak Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (14 May 1993) provided, among others, for the promotion of bilateral trade and economic cooperation on a long-term and stable basis; mutual Most-Favoured Nation treatment, setting up of a Joint Committee which would examine the possibilities of increasing and diversifying mutual trade and economic relations. It envisaged a shift from the barter and clearing system to hard currency with retrospective effect from 1 January 1993 (the expiry date of the Indo-Czechoslovak trade agreement). The agreement was initially valid for a period of five years with the provision for automatic successive extensions (Mukherjee, 1993b: cols. 201). Another protocol was signed for the liquidation of non-convertible rupee balance in the list of commodities. By the mid-1990s, there were calls for Slovak companies to move away from concentrating too much trade with neighbouring and European countries and look towards Asia, which comprised half of the world’s population and offered ‘great space’ for growth (Mihok, 1996). Joint Economic Committee The first step in establishing institutional links for the promotion of economic and trade relations was reached during the visit of Prime Minister Josef Moravcik to India in July 1994, a Joint Economic Committee (JEC), which would see the process of greater interaction between the business and industrial communities of the two countries and undertakes a comprehensive review of bilateral trade and economic relations. The Committee is chaired by the Commerce Secretary on the Indian side and the State Secretary for Economic Strategy, Trade and

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Tourism of the Ministry of Economy from the Slovak side. In 1995, an India-Slovak Business Council encompassing private companies and business associations was established. The first meeting of the JEC was held in Bratislava in June 1995, which identified several areas of cooperation including infrastructure, tourism and communications, primarily between the private sectors of both countries. It also discussed the possibility of joint projects under a multilateral fund set-up by the European Union to facilitate the economic transition of former socialist Central European states (India, MEA, 1995a: 178). The second session of the Joint Economic Committee was held in December 1996, but the third one was held in October 1998. However, the fourth session of the JEC was held after six years in April 2004 and the fifth one in October 2004, while the sixth one was held in November 2006. The seventh session was, however, held seven years later, in July 2013. Thus, the JEC failed to meet regularly apparently because of the low volumes of trade and more importantly to follow up on the agreed decisions. Thereafter, the sessions of the JEC have been held every two years—eighth (February 2015), ninth (April 2017) and tenth (February 2019). Interestingly, the Government of India Mint, Hyderabad, awarded a contract in July 1998 for production and supply of 700 million coins of Re 1 denomination to India by the Slovak Mint, Mincovna Kremica. In June 1999, Kremica Mint again won an international tender for supply of an additional 300 million coins of Re 1 denomination to India. The 2000s An agreement on economic cooperation was signed on 13 December 2004 (text in Bhasin, 2005: 1407–1409), which inter alia, set up the Joint Economic Committee and stipulated for its annual meetings. An ‘Enterprise India Exhibition’ was jointly organized by the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) and the Ministry of Small Scale Industries in Bratislava from 27 September–3 October 2005. On 25 September 2006, India and Slovakia signed an agreement for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. Slovakia has been a regular participant in the India-Europe 29 Business Forum (launched in 2014).

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Trade Relations Indo-Slovak trade amounted to US$38.12 million in 1997–1998. It decreased to US$17.49 million during 1998–1999 and remained more or less stationary at US $17.57 million in 2000. It declined further to US$16.28 million in 2001–2002 and increased to US$21.30 million in 2001–2002 (India, MEA, 2003). According to the Statistics Office of the Slovak Republic, in 2002, Slovak exports totalled e32.2 million and Slovakia imported e41.1 million in goods from India. In 2003, Slovakia exported e21.7 million to India and imported e40 million in goods (cited in Durianova, 2004). In 2004, President Abdul J. Kalam proposed a target of $1 billion to achieved in the next four years (Kalam, 2004: 1405). The primary reason for the low volumes of trade were ‘insufficient knowledge of each other’s capabilities’ and the fact that Slovakia had ‘pretty much closed itself to Indian businessmen’ (Saha, 2010) because of its extremely stringent visa regime for Indian businessmen, which eased somewhat after Slovakia joined the Schengen area. In 2007, Indo-Slovak trade amounted to $228.441 million compared to $124 million in 2005 and $136.5 million in 2006. Indian exports to Slovakia stood at $171 million, while imports were $57.5 million (Durianova, 2008; Saha, 2008). However, in 2008, trade between the two countries reached $244 million. Trade peaked to $376.52 million in 2017, but declined to $344 million in 2018. India has consistently had a trade surplus with Slovakia. This increased from $43 million in 2008 to around $200 million in 2018 (see Table 7.1). Bilateral trade went from a two-digit growth before the 2008 financial crisis to a two-digit decline, but in 2013, trade growth again resumed. Slovakia has had a consistent negative trade balance with India. About 85% of Slovak exports go to the European Union. From a modest $43.74 million in 2008, it more than doubled to $101.769 million in 2009 and peaked to $268.6 million in 2014 and stood at $200.1 million in 2018. Slovak exports to India comprise products of international companies based in Slovakia (Novotny, 2013). Indo-Slovak bilateral trade represented 0.22% of Slovakia’s global trade in 2018. Slovakia did not have a separate export strategy in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 unlike other Central European countries until 2014. In its quest for new destinations for Slovak exports in Asia, the Strategy of External Economic Relations of the Slovak Republic for 20142020 listed India as a country with good prospects of Slovak exports.

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Table 7.1 India–Slovakia Trade, 2000–2019 (in million US dollars) Year

Indian exports

Indian imports

Total trade

Trade balance

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

143.945 182.036 217.961 287.982 227.198 278.034 320.341 302.102 292.848 312.063 321.155 299.762

100.208 80.267 95.030 95.952 71.211 43.275 40.796 59.599 55.720 55.108 85.386 109.017

244.153 262.303 312.991 383.934 298.409 321.309 361.137 361.701 348.568 367.171 406.541 408.799

43.737 101.769 122.931 192.030 155.987 279.545 268.607 242.503 237.128 256.955 235.769 190.745

Source Slovakia, Ministry of Economy/National Bank of Slovakia. India, Embassy in Slovakia (2020a)

However, as a distant market, Slovak exports would probably have to focus on technologies and more demanding products in the demanding Indian market since the price of transport increases the prices of exports (Korsnak, 2013). Foreign Direct Investment There are no significant Indian investments in Slovakia, or from Slovakia into India. Since the early 1990s, Indian companies had explored investment opportunities in auto accessories, tyre manufacturing and the spa and wellness sectors in Slovakia, but nothing concrete materialized until the early 2010s. Despite its advantages of having a good physical infrastructure, key geographical location, a skilled labour force and a member of the Eurozone, Indian investors have found Slovakia’s neighbours (Hungary and Poland), which provide larger markets and lower costs, have proven to be more attractive investment destinations (India, Embassy in Slovakia, 2020a: 3). Some Indian companies have invested in Slovakia (Tanax, ArcelorMittal Slovakia, and K1 Engineering India Private). However, plans of Appollo Tyes and carmaker Reva to set up shop in Slovakia did not materialize.

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The most significant Indian investment in a greenfield project was in the automotive sector since Slovakia had been variously described as the ‘Detroit of Europe’ (Ahmed, 2004) or ‘an automotive superpower’ by the Slovak Minister of Economy (Miskov, 2011), which represents over 40% of its overall industry. Like other automobile majors, who increasingly preferred Central Europe as an important production hub (like Volkswagen, General Motors, Toyota, and Hyundai), the Tata Group’s UK subsidiary Jaguar Land Rover also decided in August 2015 to an automobile manufacturing plant in Nitra with an investment of £1 billion or e1.4 over a five-year period (2016–2021) with a capacity of 300,000 cars per annum with a view to lower product costs while retaining EU market access and quality standards (Nathalie, 2015). The factory started production in October 2018. The project received e125 million as financial support from the Slovak government. TCS had also invested in India, but overall, Indian FDI in Slovakia was less than 1% of the total FDI (Ferencz, 2019). Slovak FDI in India is nominal. By 2013, FDI inflow from Slovakia was US$5.22 million out of its total investment abroad which amounted to US$4.309 billion (India, Ministry of Commerce 2013). Slovak FDI in India from 2000 to 2020 amounted to US$18.29 million (Rs1090.98 million). Its overall ranking being 76th amongst investors in India (India, Ministry of Commerce, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, 2020). There are also several Slovak firms successfully operating in India, for example, Slovak India Trading, which produces shoes and employs about 400 people.

Defence Cooperation and Arms Transfers In 1993, while the Slovak Republic inherited significant industrial capacity regarding heavy military weapons, including tanks, infantry combat vehicles, self-propelled artillery, ammunition and explosives, it was not selfsufficient because electronics, communication equipment as well as small arms were manufactured in the Czech Republic.2 The long-standing strains between the Czech and Slovak governments made any meaningful defence cooperation unlikely (Szulc, 2004). Though Slovakia was able to 2 In the post-war era, the production of all heavy military equipment was concentred in the eastern part—out of 36 large arms factories in Czechoslovakia, 25 of which were located on Slovak territory (Stavrianakis & Korba, 2002: 119)—in order to escape a possible German attack.

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fill some of the most serious gaps by finding other foreign suppliers, but its arms industry confronted the virtual total absence of domestic orders and faced serious troubles in external markets. Moreover, until 1995, most of the large companies were state-owned when a process of privatization started, but that did not prove to be really helpful (Szulc, 2004). The urgency for Slovakia to sell arms was obvious since sales of arms and ammunition accounted for between 25 and 50% of foreign exchange earnings, which was badly needed to finance imports of oil and natural gas (Laurent, 1993: 161). In the 1990s, defence cooperation was high on the minds of visiting Slovak leaders since a large defence contract from India could help revive Slovakia’s crisis-ridden arms factories which were virtually closed. As early as 1992, Bratislava offered to supply spare parts for some of the military hardware obtained from the erstwhile Soviet Union. The offer was considered ‘significant’ since India was facing difficulties in getting spares for Soviet military equipment in the aftermath of its disintegration (Demes, 1992: 9). Virtually, all senior Slovak leaders who visited India were accompanied by defence officials or ministers. India too was interested in developing defence cooperation with the Slovak Republic. To that end, Minister of State for Defence Mallikarjun Goud visited Slovakia on 1–3 June 1994. During his visit, he discovered that much of the defence equipment that the Indian armed forces had got used to describe as Czech were actually made in the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia. In February 1995, Slovakia had participated in a defencerelated exhibition in New Delhi. The Indian Defence Secretary visited Slovakia on 16–17 April 1996. The first major order that India gave to Slovakia was in 1993 for 35 VT-72B Armoured Recovery Vehicles (ARVs) based on the T-72 main battle tank valued at $32 million. Twenty-five of these were imported in semi-knocked down kits (SKD) for local assembly at the Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) plant in Trichy. The remaining were to be made under license from UNIMPEX of Slovakia. Delivery was completed in 1995 (SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, generated on 27 November 2019; TOI, 1994a: 20). The Tatra trucks were to be co-produced with the Slovak firm Sipox—the only part of the Tatra group which was located in Slovakia (Kiss, 1997: 71 n. 58). After the visit of Minister for Defence Mallikarjun Goud to Slovakia, India ordered 78 VT-72B ARVs in 1994, which were delivered in 1996– 1997. These were ordered after planned Indian production was given up

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due to problems with producing T-72 M chassis. An additional 42 ARVs were ordered in 1999 (delivered in 2001–2002) in a $30 million deal (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, generated on 27 November 2019). In July 1994, Prime Minister Moravcik expressed keen interest in selling defence equipment to India and stressed the strong industrial base, especially in the defence field, that Slovakia had inherited (TOI, 1994b: 9). Next month, he signed a MoU with India on sales and cooperation in the military sector and expressed his hope to expand bilateral defence cooperation and possible sale and joint production of armoured vehicles and artillery with India (Prague Post, 1994; The Economist, 22 October 1994). After the Zuzana3 self-propelled gun and the modernized T-72 tank were exhibited at the 1994 Brno defence exhibition, Prime Minister Moravcik accompanied by the Ministers of Defence and the Economy visited India in July 1994. This was followed by participation in a defence-related exhibition in New Delhi in February 1995. A year later, India and the Republic of Slovakia signed a MoU on Defence Cooperation (13 November 1995), which sought to promote bilateral defence cooperation in specific areas including product support in projects relating to defence equipment and components, including public sector units in various areas including transfer of technology through exchanges of information, training and joint projects (Kumar, 1997: 7). New Delhi hoped that such an arrangement would provide ‘a viable alternative’ to Russia for product support to defence hardware of erstwhile Soviet origin (cited in TOI, 1995: 7). Apart from these orders, India did not purchase any significant military equipment from Slovakia. Though a working group on defence cooperation exists, but there is no meaningful cooperation in this field. In 1997, the visiting Slovak Deputy Defence Minister Jozef Gajdos offered to sell the Yak-130 Advance Jet Trainer (AJT) at prices cheaper than any other AJT was made. However, he stated that while India could manufacture the airframe, but a similar arrangement for the Slovak-built DV-2 engines might not be possible. He reiterated the Slovak offer to sell the Zuzana self-propelled guns which were evaluated by the Indian Army in 1995. Other offers include upgrading the Indian Army’s vintage T-55 tanks of Russian origin and supply assembly jets for the armoured 3 The Czechoslovak Dana 152-mm calibre self-propelled artillery system was fitted with a 155-mm calibre gun and renamed the Zuzana.

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recovery vehicles. He said they would also be willing to supply complete system for the T-72 tanks of Soviet origin that the Army was upgrading at the time (Gajdos, 1997, 25 October 1997). Apparently, neither of these offers reached fruition. On 26 March 1999, ZTS TEES Martin in cooperation with Unimpex Martin Company signed a contract for the supply of salvage tanks for disengaging stuck heavy military equipment worth $65 million to India (The Slovak Spectator, 1999). The Tatra truck manufactured in Slovakia was described as ‘a remarkable vehicle’ which had rendered excellent service in Indian defence. A joint venture plant was reportedly coming up near Delhi, which would manufacture Tatra vehicles in collaboration with Slovakia for civilian use (Kalam, 2004: 1405). India had also apparently expressed interest in Slovakia’s mine-breaching technology (Lokesh, 2004). Slovak Exports of Military Material Figures of Slovak exports of military material are only available from 2004, when Slovakia published its first-ever report on the country’s arms trade. In 2004, Slovak licensed entities exported military material worth Slovak Koruna (Sk) 2.5 billion (e66.8 million). It issued seven licenses valued at 84.209 million Sk, but did not provide any details of what was exported and of what value (Table 7.2). Marginal Slovak arms exports to India led Bratislava to close the post of Defence Attache in its New Delhi Embassy in September 2014. The 2010s The Government of India awarded a contract worth Rs 6.7 billion to Punj Lloyd for the upgradation of the Indian Army’s ageing Zu-23-2B anti-aircraft guns capable of engaging both aerial and ground targets. The Indian firm has partnered with Slovakian defence company, EVPU to convert the mechanical Zu-23-2B anti-aircraft gun into an automatic system. The existing 468 guns would be upgraded with an electro-optical fire control system for detecting, tracking and engaging targets with precision over a period of four years. The contract also covered the maintenance of the guns for 15 years (aviation-defence-universe.com (2019); Singh, 2016).

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Table 7.2 Export of military material by Slovakia to India, 2004–2017 Year

No. of licenses issued

2004 2005

7 1 15 1

2006 2007 2008

10 15 2

2009 2010

5 14a

2011 2012 2013 2014

17 0 6 10 1 1 1 7 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 2

2015

2016

2017

Value of licenses in SKK/Euros in SKK 84,209, 922 360,000 74,061,682 400,000 78,821,682 38,454,398 49,645,100 1,123,100 in Euros 934,109 241,661 1,425,279 3,114,860 0 1,116,462 1,148,062 380,000 50,200 2,157 1,732,837 2,376,344 754,245 0 1,786 752,503 2,157 147,030 170,516

Value of actual Exports

n.a. 342,000 43,506,141 0 43,848,141 18,515,264 15,936,164 727,863 313,233 94,529 533,021 722,151 0 376,289 99,892 375,000 36,200 2,157 516,407 0 140,305 0 0 0 0 43,716 0

Military List category

1 6 15 6 1,6 6 6 2 6 6 6 6 10 22 1 6 22 6 2 16 18 1 18 6

a For both ML 6 and ML 2 Sources Slovak Republic, Ministry of Economy, First Annual Report on Military Material Trade in 2004, p. 20–21; Slovak Republic, Ministry of Economy, Annual Report on Military Material Trade in 2005: 18; 2006: 15; 2007 : 12, 18; 2008: 17; 2009: 17; 2010: 16; 2011: 19–20; 2013: 15; 2014: 13; 2015: 13; 2016: 14; 2017 : 10, 14. Brief descriptions of EU Common Military List categories ML 1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories, and specially designed components: rifles, carbines, revolvers, pistols, submachine guns and machine guns and other smoothbore weapons. ML 2: Weapons with a smooth barrel of a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or weapons armament of a calibre greater than 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches), throwers and accessories and specially designed components: cannons, howitzers, mortars, anti-tank weapons, projectile launchers, military flame throwers, recoilless rifles and apparatus for reducing distinguishing features therefor, digital, gas and pyrotechnic military throwers or generators and aiming devices for weapons

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Table 7.2 (continued) ML 6: Ground vehicles and components ML 9: Vessels of war, (surface or underwater) special naval equipment, accessories, components and other surface vessels ML 10: ‘Aircraft’, ‘lighter than air vehicles’, unmanned airborne vehicles, aero-engines and ‘aircraft’ equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed or modified for military use ML 11: Electronic equipment, not controlled elsewhere on the EU Common Military List, and specially designed components therefor ML 14: Specialized equipment for military training or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any fi rearm or weapon specified by ML1 or ML2, and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 15: Imaging or defence equipment, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 18: Production equipment and components of products referred to in the EU Common Military List ML 22: Technology: technology required for the design, assembly of components and operation, maintenance and repair facilities for the production of items

Slovak State Secretary Lukáš Parízek met the Minister of State for Defence Subhash Bahmre in September 2017. He was accompanied by a delegation including officials of the Ministry of Defence and National Armament Director Major General Zmeko who also held separate talks with the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). Slovak armaments manufacturers participated in a defence exposition in February 2014. More than half a dozen Slovak companies (MSM Group, DMD Group, EVPU, etc.) were represented under a common exhibition stand funded by the Slovak Ministry of Defence at the DefExpo 2018 at Chennai. Interestingly, in 2019, the MSM Group acquired a division of the Spanish company Santa Barbara Sistemas, specializing in the production of ammunition and rockets, which is already exporting to a number of countries including India (MSM, 2019). India along with other countries participated in the ‘Capable Logistician 2013—the Multinational Standardization and Interoperability Field Training Exercise’—held in the Slovak Republic. Four Slovak military professionals graduated from a course organized by the UN Centre for Peace Operations in New Delhi in 2012–2013 and one from the logistics course under UNSLOC-11 in 2014 (Kugiel, 2016: 30).

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The Modi Years, 2014–2020 Given the very low volumes of trade, the degree of political interest displayed by India in Slovakia has been limited. In recent years, it was visited mostly by Deputy Ministers of State for External Affairs to participate in a panel at the GLOBSEC Security Forum. Thus, General, V.K. Singh, visited Bratislava in April 2016 and two years later M. J. Akbar in May 2018 to participate in the Forum. The latter visit coincided with the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Akbar also visited the seventh International Defence Exhibition Bratislava (IDEB)—an important exhibition of defence and security technologies in Central Europe (Akbar, 2018). There were more frequent contacts between line ministers (Commerce and Industry, Culture and Education Agriculture, Finance, Defence, Science and Technology, etc.). The visit of State Secretary led to the signing of the Action Plan for Cooperation between the Slovak Office of Standards, Metrology and Testing and the Bureau of Indian Standards. He also opened the third Honorary Consulate of Slovakia in Bengaluru (after those in Mumbai and Kolkata). Slovakia stated that it paid particular attention to creating favourable conditions for developing the economic dimension of bilateral relations with the EU’s strategic partners in Asia (Slovakia, MFEA, 2014b: 6). Bratislava asserted that its key objective under the Union’s Common Commercial Policy would be to improve market access to the largest and fastest growing economies of the world by concluding and implementing FTAs with the United States, Japan, Canada, India (even though negotiations had been suspended in 2013) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Slovakia’s primary objective would be to help increase exports of both its traditional industries and other sectors (Ibid.: 7).

Slovakia in Scholarly Journals No specific article on Slovakia has been published in any of the three leading academic journals—India Quarterly, International Studies and Strategic Analyses —so far. There was a solitary article on the June 1990 elections in Czechoslovakia—the first free elections held after the overthrow of Soviet control—were swept by the Civil Forum in the Czech Republic and the Public Against Violence in Slovakia. Soon after the elections, their leaders started to drift apart because their leaders possessed different outlooks and sought to steer the country’s economy

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and politics to divergent directions. The 1992 parliamentary elections consolidated divergences and after conducted negotiations on the division of Czechoslovakia in ‘a most civilized manner’, agreement was arrived at to end the 74-year old Czechoslovak Union on 31 December 1992 (Randhawa, 2002: 167). The separation meant that the Czech Republic was no longer burdened with supporting its ‘economically weaker partner’ which was ‘not able to match the success of...its earlier better half [Czech Republic]’ (Randhawa, 2002: 167).

Slovakia in Indian Parliament In 26 years (1993–2019), thirteen questions were asked in the Lok Sabha regarding Slovakia: six pertained to economics, five on political dimensions and two regarding defence. The first question asked in the Lok Sabha was about trade with the Czech and Slovak republics. A protocol on the liquidation of rupee balances held by the Czech/Slovak republics was signed in March 1993 which envisaged the remittance of about Rs7 billion from India to liquidate the existing rupee balances as well as the rupee funds expected to be generated on the basis of old contracts signed before 31 December 1992 (Mukherjee, 1993a: col. 34–35). A week later, in response to a question by Manoranjan Bhakta (Andaman and Nicobar Islands), the Minister of State for External Affairs R. L.Bhatia stated that though Czechoslovakia was oriented towards the West, the two new republics were ‘continuing with their bilateral relations and there is no change as such’. The new trade agreement, he added, had been signed based on hard currency. However, in so far as old contracts were concerned, they would continue and India would supply goods against that rupee account (Bhatia, 1993b: col. 27). There have been no debates regarding Slovakia so far in the Lok Sabha. However, in a parliamentary debate on developments in Czechoslovakia on 14 August 1968, M.L. Sondhi, who had served as First Secretary in the Indian Embassy in Prague, urged the House to understand Slovak resurgence and that the Slovaks sought ‘mutuality of cultural interests with other Slavs and with the Czechs’. They wanted, he added, ‘a genuine sort of federalism and rehabilitation of those people who suffered the crimes of Stalin’ (Sondhi, 1968: cols. 2403–2404). Czechoslovakia, he

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continued, was a country which wanted national integration on the basis of a modern economic outlook. The Czechs and the Slovaks, he went on, were ‘realists; they have been; they are nation united today’ (Ibid., cols 2404–2405). On several occasions, some Members of Parliament made casual remarks relating to Czechoslovakia. For instance, in March 1999, T.R. Baalu (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) remarked that the disintegration of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia took place because of ‘the language issue’ (Baalu, 1999: col. 382). On 4 August 2003, Mani Shankar Aiyar (Congress) cited the example of how a dozen countries, including Slovakia, through which the Danube River passed, had been able to sort out and settle what should be the basis of water sharing among them. He implied that this was a lesson for India where the National Water Policy should not be treated as a piece of paper. It was necessary, he added, to have active progress on specific elements and this involved cooperation among states and not the politicization of inter-State disputes into party political matters aimed entirely at securing electoral advantage for one party or the other (Aiyar, 2003: col. 474– 475).

Mutual Perceptions After 1992, Slovakia was hardly reported in the Indian Press. Stereotype perceptions of India seem to have persisted in Slovakia. Relations with India have been described as ‘friendly, problem-free... and free of pending issues that would hamper their future development’ (Slovakia, Embassy in India, 2017). India is perceived as ‘an important regional player with the ambition to increase its influence within the globalized world’ (Parizek, 2017). To a certain extent, for Slovakia, India still remains a country known largely through history books or art encyclopaedias. Real experiences have only marginally bridged the geographical distance and cultural differences between the two countries (Lokesh, 2004).

Cultural Relations India-Slovak relations are bedevilled by geographic distance, sketchy historical links and little people-to-people interaction. While tracing historical links sometimes one refers to the migration of the Roma community long ago. The litterateur Tomaskov wrote compositions in

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Sanskrit in the nineteenth century. The Slovak Academy of Sciences has preserved manuscripts of Portuguese voyages to India. Mahatma Gandhi’s works on non-violence were published in the Slovak language. Indian fairy tales have also been translated into the Slovak language. Indo-Slovak cultural links are relatively recent. The first cultural agreement between India and Slovakia encompassing culture, art, education, science, tourism sports and mass media was signed on 11 March 1996 (text in India, MEA Foreign Affairs Record, March 1996: 77) The agreement made the cultural agreement of 7 July 1959 null and void. Subsequently, a programme for cooperation in the field of culture and arts for 2004–2007 was signed in New Delhi on 13 December 2004 (text in Bhasin, 2005: 1410–1415). Indology Slovakia was the home of the noted historian, author and linguistic of the period of national revival, Pavel Josef Safarik (1795–1861). In his writings, he tended to support the view of the Indian origin of the Slavs and compared the relationship between the Indians and the Slavs in the sphere of the development of religious ideas using more scholarly methods. He had mastered Sanskrit and the first to point out how its introduction into the group of Indo-European languages had given an impetus to linguistic studies in his time (Krasa, 1967: 14). Oriental studies began in Slovakia with the establishment of the Department of Oriental Studies at the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava on 1 March 1960 with the support of Academician Jan Bakos, who was also appointed as external Director of the Department. The overemphasis on linguistics and literary studies was subsequently somewhat rectified with the appointment of new staff in the Department who dealt with modern Asian history and economics. At the Philosophy Faculty of the J.E. Purkyne University in Brno, Sanskrit and comparative Slavonic Hittite studies were pursued for many years by Caclav Machek, a Professor of Comparative Indo-European Linguistics, and subsequently by Adolf Erhard (Soucek, 1967: 114). The Department of Oriental Studies, which was dissolved in 1982 as a result of an ill-considered and expert intervention in the structure of the social science part of the academy, was restored in 1990. Since 2005, it was renamed the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava. Out of its staff of nearly two dozen people, it has at present one person—Deputy Director Anna Racova who deals with Indology.

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Tourism Tourism between India and Slovakia was rather limited because of Slovakia’s strict visa requirements for Indians. However, with Slovakia joining the Schengen zone in April 2003, small groups of Indian tourists began to visit Bratislava. However, most of them generally went on a one-day tour from Vienna and then go back. The Indian Embassy issued 1,231 tourist visas in 2008. This increased to 1,356 in 2009 and 1,572 in 2010 (Puri, 2011). By 2018, around 12,000 Indians travelled to Slovakia (Jain, 2019). Slovakia was included in the e-Tourist Visa, which came into effect on 15 April 2015. In the 1930s, a number of maharajas visited Piešˇtany, which became a popular destination for wealthy families. The city can become similarly attractive for affluent Indian tourists today if a product package could be marketed to people straight away, for example, a one-week visit programme that could be offered to Indian tourists. There are some Ayurvedic spas in Slovakia that have been active for some time. Tourism has not picked up largely because of the lack of awareness amongst Indian tourists that Slovakia is much cheaper than other European countries. The Visegrad Four has been periodically organizing V4 roadshows in India (e.g. in Mumbai and Delhi in 2016. Roadshows were scheduled to be held in five Indian metros in April 2020, but had to be postponed because of the Covid-19 pandemic). The first Bollywood film ‘Chehre’ (Faces)—an Indian-Slovak-Polish production—was shot in Slovakia’s Tatra mountains in 2019 as the cost of filming in Slovakia was cheaper than in Austria. Like elsewhere, the movie is likely to give a boost to tourism. Moreover, there are no direct flights, and Air Slovakia’s direct flights4 were short-lived. Vienna, which has a direct daily flight from New Delhi, is located in close proximity to Bratislava and serves as the principal airport for Slovakia.

4 The takeover of Air Slovakia began soon after Harjinder Singh Sidhu got a job as a financial adviser to Air Slovakia. In 2006, he purchased the 60-employee Air Slovakia for $30 million—the first Punjabi in the world to own an airline (Mahajan 2006: 13). The maiden flight from Cologne to Amritsar arrived in October 2006. The new owner’s desire was to convert into a ‘Punjabi airline’ and transform Air Slovakia into a ‘Punjabi experience’ with crew, food and in-flight entertainment coming from Punjab (Mukerjee & Anand, 2006: 8).

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Scholarships, the Indian Diaspora Since 2005, India has doubled its slots to ten under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme under which students from Slovakia come to India for short-term courses like IT, proficiency in the English language, business training, accountancy. The Non-Resident/OCI (Overseas Citizenship of India) population is estimated to be around 550. The around 80–100 OCIs are engaged in small businesses, such as ethnic groceries, garments and textiles, handicrafts and restaurants. Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) on the other hand can be divided into two groups: the first consisting of 40–50 technically qualified IT and other professionals on short-term assignments of 1–2 years, and the second group working as cooks and waiters, and masseurs/masseuses at Ayurvedic and other spas (India, Embassy in Slovakia 2020a: 6).

Conclusion The degree and scope of India’s political interaction and engagement with Slovakia—the smallest country in Central Europe with a population of 5.45 million—has to a large extent been conditioned by the relatively low level of trade. Since Slovakia is a relatively small market, trade flows cannot by themselves add substance to the economic relationship. The two countries have a common viewpoint on many global issues, such as the fight against terrorism, environmental protection, reform of the United Nations Security Council and nuclear non-proliferation. However, the primary focus, like other Central European countries, remains primarily on economics and trade. Political visits have been confined to those by Deputy Ministers. There have been two Presidential visits by Slovakia (1993 and 2004), while there has been only one by the Indian President (1996) and one by Vice-President Krishan Kant in 2000. There has been no visit by an Indian Foreign Minister in nearly three decades, though there has been one meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2007. There have been a number of visits by Deputy Foreign Ministers (1993, 2007, 2012, 2016 and 2018). In the last two instances, the visits coincided by participation in the GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum. Initially, the first three Foreign Office consultations were held annually (1994, 1995 and 1996). The fourth one, however, took place in 1999,

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but none have been held in the next two decades. Interestingly, the firstever official interaction with the Visegrad 4 was held in Bratislava on 27 February 2015. The Joint Committee has been meeting intermittently—ten times in 26 years. Since 2013, however, the Joint Commission has been meeting regularly every two years. Similarly, after the visit of Minister of State for Defence Mallikarjun Goud in July 1994, there has been no subsequent high-level defence visit. There has been no prime ministerial visit to Slovakia. This does not seem to be entirely an issue of neglect, but also indicates the modest, low-key nature of the political relationship. Due to its size and meagre trade, it is not of great commercial interest. Slovakia is not even at the margin of the interest of foreign policy news in Indian printed media. Visibility continues to be a major challenge for both countries.

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CHAPTER 8

India’s Trade and Economic Relations with the V4 Countries Karina J˛edrzejowska and Anna Wróbel

Introduction Central Europe appears to be among the most underrated regions on India’s external economic policy agenda. Although the region has had a long and rather successful story of cooperation with India, its economic linkages with India deteriorated significantly since the end of the Cold War. Policy re-orientation on both sides resulted in current trade and economic relations between India and Central Europe being rather modest and below their economic potential. The economic potential of India and Central and East European countries (CEECs) should ideally lead to greater economic cooperation. India today is the world’s third largest economy in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms primarily because of significant transformations of the Indian

K. J˛edrzejowska (B) · A. Wróbel Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Warszawa, Poland e-mail: [email protected] A. Wróbel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_8

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economy over the last three decades. The same period also marked substantial systemic transition in economic and political systems of the CEECs which was further enhanced by their accession to the European Union in 2004. Given India’s close economic ties with Europe, it is rather surprising that its trade and economic relations with some of the fastest growing European economies remained circumscribed. Moreover, the lack of a coherent Indian strategy towards Central and East Europe creates space for a greater economic presence of China in the region. This chapter seeks to provide an overview of India’s trade and economic relations with the Visegrad Four (V4), viz. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia since the early 1990s. The chapter is based on the assumption that there is a gap between the actual and potential economic cooperation between India and Central Europe. The chapter examines the major determinants of the current trade and economic relations between India and the CEECs and highlights areas for enhanced economic cooperation. Most of the statistical data used in this chapter is derived from the databases of the Government of India and the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Although some definitions of Central Europe include other countries in addition to the Visegrad 4, we have chosen to concentrate on the V4 since they are the biggest and fastest growing economies in the region, and hence constitute preferred trading partners for India. Most of the conclusions of the chapter are also relevant for the remaining countries of Central and East Europe. The chapter begins with a discussion of the evolution of trade and economic relations between India and the V4 countries. It examines the role and impact of historical factors on present-day trade relations and discusses major challenges. The chapter goes on to deal with selected areas for possible enhanced economic cooperation between India and V4. The chapter looks at recent developments in India-V4 trade in goods as well as services.1 In conclusion, the chapter makes some concluding observations and assesses prospects of future India-V4 trade and economic relations.

1 Bilateral investment flows are a significant element of India-V4 cooperation. This is discussed in Chapter 9 of this volume.

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Evolution of Trade and Economic Relations There have been three phases of trade and economic relations between India and the V4 countries since India’s independence in 1947. The first period is the Cold War era, which was characterized by close political and economic cooperation with the Communist bloc. The second period relates to the post-Cold War period when both India and Central Europe undertook major economic reforms, but their economic ties were minimal. The third period is the period since the accession of the V4 countries to the European Union in 2004, the global financial crisis (2008) and gradual rise in trade and investment flows between India and V4 in recent years. Since the mid-1950s, India has had close political ties with the Soviet Union and other members of the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War (Garde & Karnups, 2017: 949; Mehrotra & Clawson, 1979). Economic cooperation with members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) enabled India to purchase military equipment on concessional terms, conclude barter transactions and receive financial and technical assistance for industrial and infrastructural projects. This cooperation was further facilitated by the fact that the Indian economy was largely modelled after the Soviet template of inclusive economic planning and a dominant public sector (Kapur, 2009). Both India and the CMEA relied on strong state intervention and highly protectionist policies (J˛edrzejowska, 2014: 101–102). These similarities led to a steady rise in trade since the mid-1950s. As a result, India had become the CMEA’s biggest trading partner in the developing world with trade growing sixfold between 1970 and 1986 (Olshany, 1988; Thakur & Thayer, 1992: 169). The debt crisis of the 1980s, end of the Cold War and subsequent economic reforms in both India and Central and East Europe contributed to the weakening of economic cooperation in the subsequent decade (Kugiel, 2013; Singh, 1995: 69). Although there was no political friction between India and V4 during this period, the V4 did not show any interest in fostering greater economic cooperation with India. Economic (and political) interests of India and V4 changed with India focusing more on cooperation with Asia and major global powers, while V4 countries were looking towards closer cooperation with West European economies and the United States (Kugiel & Upadhyay, 2018: 129–130).

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The conclusion of the India-EU strategic partnership and the accession of the CEECs to the European Union in 2004 marked another turning point in the economic relations between India and the V4. Though EU accession did not lead to an immediate increase in trade and capital flows between India and the V4, it transformed the framework and nature of trade and economic relations. Since 2004, there has been a continuous (though rather moderate) rise in trade and investment—a rise which has not been deterred by the global financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. The Visegrad countries have been among the European economies that were least affected by both crises, with Poland registering positive growth even during the global financial crisis (Svobodová & Fernandes, 2014: 421). The combined GDP of V4 countries exceeds $1 trillion, which together with stable economic environment and a consumer market of over 60 million makes the region an attractive trading partner for Indian companies. However, this potential remains to be reflected in trade and economic linkages. In recent years, both sides have displayed growing interest in expanding economic cooperation. Recent visits by Foreign Minister Subramaniam Jaishankar to Hungary and Poland in August 2019 reflect the desire for closer engagement (Chaudhury, 2019; Gulevich, 2019). Despite growing interest in strengthening economic cooperation, India still does not have a coherent strategy towards the Visegrad V4. Similarly, neither V4 as a grouping nor any of its members have a specific India-oriented policy. One can discern some elements of greater attention to India in the foreign policy strategies of Central European countries. For instance, the ‘Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021’ seeks to strengthen its economic ties with South Asia (Poland, MFA 2017: 18). Since the V4’s trade and economic cooperation with India is to a large extent contingent on the EU’s regulatory framework, the never-ending story of the India-EU Free Trade Agreement negotiations can be seen as yet another obstacle to boosting India-V4 economic relations (Felbermayr et al., 2016: 15). In this context, one should also mention that Prime Minister Narendra Modi is yet to visit any of the V4 countries (Jaishankar, 2018). The mutual neglect in both bilateral and plurilateral relations by India and the V4 is in stark contrary to the Chinese attitude towards Central Europe. Chinese growing involvement in the Visegrad Four primarily through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or the

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‘16+1’/17+1 framework might hinder future Indian efforts to intensify economic cooperation with the region. On the other hand, India’s economic presence in V4 countries and the broader region of Central and East Europe might serve to counterbalance Chinese influence (Jaishankar, 2018; Mandelson, 2007: 5).

Trade and Economic Cooperation: Potential for Expansion Despite the lack of a uniform economic cooperation framework, several initiatives launched both by India and the V4 foster greater economic cooperation. India’s ‘Make in India’, ‘Skill India’, or infrastructure development projects might contribute to an increase in investment and technological cooperation. Similarly, Poland’s ‘Go India’ (2015) seeks to help Polish companies to increase cooperation with India. The Visegrad Four have also undertaken several initiatives at the local level (Kugiel & Upadhyay, 2018: 139; Upadhyay & Kugiel, 2015: 4). Some Central European countries have launched a variety of promotional activities and business meetings to enhance economic cooperation with India. In September 2019, the ‘Poland-India Business Forum: New Partnerships for Innovation, Sustainable Development and Environment’ was organized in New Delhi. The forum sought to enhance bilateral cooperation between Polish and Indian companies in the fields of artificial intelligence, information technologies, clean energy, waste management and Smart Cities. The event was organized on the occasion of inauguration of the direct PLL LOT flight from Warsaw to New Delhi with the support of the Embassy of Poland in India and the Indo-Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Poland-India Business Forum, 2019). The expansion of transportation routes between India and V4 can significantly expand economic linkages and business opportunities. An extensive report prepared by the Deloitte in cooperation with the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) highlighted the growing interest among the Indian corporate sector in developing closer trade and investment ties with the CEECs (Svobodová & Fernandes, 2014). Although the study employed a much broader definition of Central Europe, its conclusions are relevant for the V4 countries as well. The Report highlighted the relative comparative advantage of Indian industry vis-a-vis the CEECs in various areas, including agricultural products (sugar, coffee, spices, etc.), pearls and precious stones, textiles, minerals as well as

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computer and information industry. Similarly, the CEECs have a competitive advantage over their Indian counterparts in areas like machinery, automobile, pharmaceuticals, insurance and financial services as well as travel and transport services (Deloitte and CII 2014: 6). According to the Deloitte study, the Indian economy as whole considerably relies on the primary sector industries as well as the services industry, whereas the industrial and manufacturing sectors have a dominate share in the CEECs’ economies. A ‘closer look at the economic structure, government policies and future plans of these economies, however, shows that both the regions have tremendous opportunities to enhance their trade and investment relations and benefit significantly from enhanced trade and investment activity’ (Deloitte and CII 2014: 6). The results of the study are in line with the results of the analysis of contemporary India-V4 trade relations presented in the next section. Most analysts concur that the greatest potential for growth lies, especially in agricultural products and food processing (PwC, 2017: 4–6), tourism (Upadhyay & Kugiel, 2014: 5) and the defence sector. This conclusion is corroborated by subsequent sections of this chapter which examine the trade dynamics as well as an investment flows in these sectors. Other areas of potential India-V4 economic cooperation include opportunities originating from a closer cooperation in energy efficiency and in renewable and alternative sources of energy (Svobodová & Fernandes, 2014: 422). Another issue closely linked to the current state of India-V4 economic relations is an increasing number of Indian workers in the CEECs, including the V4. Developments in the V4 labour market and growing Indian investment in the region might lead to increase in capital movements between the two areas together with an increase in the scale of workers’ remittances sent from the CEECs to India (Kugiel & P˛edziwiatr, 2014: 29).

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India’s Trade in Goods with the V4 Countries2 The Visegrad Four are not presently among the leading economic partners of India. Although the European Union is still India’s most important trading partner, the combined participation of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in EU’s trade with India can be interpreted as exceptionally modest. Although between 1996 and 2019, a general trend of increasing trade between India and the V4 countries can be observed, their share in total exports of India did not exceed 1%. Since the mid-1990s, this indicator ranged between 0.39–0.82% (Table 8.1). The situation is even worse in case of the group’s share in total Indian imports. This indicator does not even reach the level of 0.5%. According to the data presented in Table 8.2, this indicator in the analysed period was in the range of 0.19% (2000–2001)–0. 41% (2009–2010). According to the Indian Ministry of Commerce, India’s exports to the EU in 2018–20193 amounted to US$57,172.26 million. In the case of the Visegrad countries, this indicator reached the level of $2605.97 million, which represented 4.5% of total Indian exports to the EU. In 2018–2019, India’s imports from the EU amounted to $58,425.13 million. Imports from V4 countries amounted to $1,350.8 million, representing 2.3% of India’s imports from the EU. By comparison, in 1996–1997, India’s exports to the V4 amounted to $147.48 million and imports to $96.28 million. This means that since the mid-1990s, India had increased its exports to the V4 by more than seventeen times and imports fourteen times. Variable dynamics characterize trade in goods between India and V4. In general, for exports and import an upward trend is observed, although its scale varies from country to country and from one period to the next (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2). The low rate of growth in trade is characteristic 2 As there are no directly comparable sources of data for trade in goods and services, the analysis in the study was based on the Government of India data for trade in goods and the OECD data for trade in services. Therefore, the analysis period is different for these two dimensions of trade relations. In particular, the following databases were used: Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, Export Import Data Bank (retrieved on August 17, 2019) and the OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services (OECD 2004, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2019). 3 The data follows the financial year which lasts from April to the end of March of the consecutive year. Hence, 2018–2019 relates to the period between 1 April 2018, and 31 March 2019.

154.47 34,784.98

0.44

147.48 33,469.95

0.44

0.53

0.5

0.63

0.46

215.77 212.85 666.22 59.47 1154.31 249,815.55 0.48

271.85 316 787 94.36 1469.21 305,963.92

2011–2012

0.39

0.46

0.49

251.4 323.74 810.85 107.01 1493 300,400.58

0.42

0.58

387.08 343.62 995.5 104.42 1830.62 314,405.30

0.51

330.95 63,842.55

91.87 134.21 16.85

88.02

2003–2004

0.61

378.56 349.26 1050.79 136.9 1915.51 310,338.48

2014–2015

222.31 52,719.43

48.26 105.64 10.99

57.42

2002–2003

2013–2014

204.72 43,826.72

46.69 108.31 8.64

41.08

2001–2002

2012–2013

177.08 44,560.29

42.66 86.22 9.81

38.39

2000–2001

0.76

488.59 345.13 1025.3 137.51 1996.53 262,291.09

2015–2016

0.52

435.77 83,535.94

108.1 176.3 63.37

88

2004–2005

103.8 306.57 36.24

102.66

2006–2007

0.82

533.14 406.29 1197.81 146.15 2283.39 275,852.43

2016–2017

0.47

0.82

405.36 402.69 1541.36 152.46 2501.87 303,526.16

2017–2018

0.43

484.59 549.27 103,090.53 126,414.05

84.16 226.96 76.6

96.87

2005–2006

0.55

905.6 163,132.18

230.41 447.45 47.46

180.28

2007–2008

0.78

429.13 458.08 1572.8 145.96 2605.97 330,078.09

2018–2019

Source Authors’ own calculations based on Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce (2019)

177.76 269.68 421.13 35.76 904.33 178,751.43

183.3 439.69 518.45 35.83 1177.27 185,295.36

0.44

164.73 36,822.49

31.7 91.66 7.58

33.79

1999–2000

2010–2011

178 33,218.72

35.53 93.06 15.11

34.3

1998–1999

2009–2010

35.6 87.43 6.03

31.04 76.51 4.08

2008–2009

25.41

35.85

Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovak Rep V4 India’s Total Share of V4 in India’s Total

Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovak Rep V4 India’s Total Share of V4 in India’s Total

1997–1998

India–V4 trade in Goods: Exports, 1996–1997 to 2018–2019 (in million US Dollars, percent)

1996–1997

Table 8.1

274 K. JEDRZEJOWSKA ˛ AND A. WRÓBEL

119.17 41,484.49

0.28

96.28 39,132.40

0.24

0.23

0.41

0.32

0.4

676.78 342.97 386.04 88.03 1493.82 369,769.12 0.38

718.88 437.28 624.25 87.98 1868.39 489,319.48

2011–2012

0.19

0.2

0.37

644.26 262.91 863.25 63.44 1833.86 490,736.64

0.25

156.32 61,412.13

20.61 38.84 11.39

85.48

2002–2003

0.31

517.97 220.48 622.57 53.14 1414.16 450,199.78

2013–2014

106.6 51,413.27

23.92 31.39 12.66

38.63

2001–2002

2012–2013

101.06 50,536.44

15.06 42.63 6.96

36.41

2000–2001

0.34

517.87 239.55 635.6 137.04 1530.06 448,033.41

2014–2015

0.25

198.83 78,149.10

27.32 49.05 10.62

111.84

2003–2004

31.62 107.81 39.86

260.38

2005–2006

117.13 117.23 19.81

353.71

2006–2007

0.36

507.89 242.64 569.66 64.64 1384.83 381,007.76

2015–2016

0.28

0.39

539.25 218.78 690.98 68.53 1517.54 384,357.03

2016–2017

0.29

0.38

669.54 270.84 766.99 95.2 1802.57 465,580.99

2017–2018

0.32

320.13 439.67 607.88 111,517.42 149,165.72 185,735.23

31.53 90.37 22.89

175.34

2004–2005

0.31

794.65 251,654.00

113.62 189.46 43.84

447.73

2007–2008

0.26

258.84 241.15 793.39 57.42 1350.8 514,078.42

2018–2019

Source Authors’ own calculations based on Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce (2019)

562.45 194.95 387.29 40.3 1184.99 288,372.87

491.87 190.34 266.12 46.01 994.34 303,696.30

0.2

102.06 49,738.05

12.38 38.49 11.69

39.5

1999–2000

2010–2011

98.49 42,388.70

9.38 33.81 11.17

44.13

1998–1999

2009–2010

12.05 32.7 32.09

7.38 28.78 3.99

2008–2009

42.33

56.13

Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovak Rep V4 India’s Total Share of V4 in India’s Total

Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovak Rep V4 India’s Total Share of V4 in India’s Total

1997–1998

India–V4 Trade in Goods: Imports, 1996–1997 to 2018–2019 (in million US Dollars, percent)

1996–1997

Table 8.2

8 INDIA’S TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE V4 COUNTRIES

275

276

K. JEDRZEJOWSKA ˛ AND A. WRÓBEL

of the second half of the 1990s. A particular acceleration in the growth rate of trade links between India and V4 is noticeable just before and after the admission of the V4 into the European Union. Compared to 2002– 2003, Indian exports to the Czech Republic and Slovakia increased by over 53% in 2003–2004. The highest increase in exports was recorded for Hungary (over 90%), the lowest in the case of sales to Poland only about 27%. The situation was slightly different for imports. The increase of Indian imports above 30% as compared to 2002–2003 occurred for the Czech Republic and Hungary. Imports from Poland increased by over 26%. In turn, a decline of 6.71% was recorded in the case of Slovakia. During 2014–2019, Indian exports to the Czech Republic recorded the most significant increase in 2015–2016 (29.07%) and Poland in 2017–2018 (28.68%). Table 8.2 indicates that the Czech Republic and Slovakia have the greatest difficulties in increasing exports to India. In case of these two countries, significant decreases in Indian imports were noted several times between 2014 and 2019. For example, in 2018–2019, India’s imports from the Czech Republic decreased by more than 61% compared to 2017–2018. In the case of Slovakia, a double-digit decline in imports from India was noticeable in 2015–2016 and 2018–2019. Among the V4 countries, Poland is India’s most important trading partner. In 2018–2019, it ranked in forty-third place among India’s top export markets. It was also the eighth largest destination4 for exports and the tenth as a source of imports among EU Member States.5 In the case of imports, Poland was no longer in the group of 50 most important trade partners of India, taking fifty-seventh place. The other V4 countries are ranked much lower among New Delhi’s main trading partners. In exports, their rankings were Hungary (75th), Czech Republic (78th) and Slovakia (115th). Regarding imports from India, their respective ranks were Czech Republic (88th), Hungary (90th) and Slovakia (114th).

4 Poland is ranked after the UK ($9,309.29 million), Germany ($8,902.43 million), the Netherlands ($8,812.84 million), Belgium ($6,729.93 million), Italy ($5,593.42 million), France ($5,232.57 million) and Spain ($4,182.49 million). 5 Poland is ranked after Germany ($15,161.08 million), Belgium ($10,469.22 million), the UK ($7,561.93 million), France ($6,665.67 million), Italy ($5,292.38 million), Netherlands ($4,062.80 million), Spain ($1,680.50 million), Sweden ($1,326.85 million) and Finland ($1,124.08 million).

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India has had a positive trade balance with the Visegrad Four. In 2018– 2019, it amounted to $1.255 billion since Indian exports have been growing more rapidly than imports from the Visegrad group. The Czech Republic is an exception to this rule. In 2003–2019, India recorded a positive balance of trade with the Czech Republic only once, namely in 2018–2019 ($170.29 million). India also registered a trade surplus with Poland ($779.41 million), Hungary ($216.94 million) and Slovakia ($88.54 million). Composition of Trade Major Indian exports to the V4 include textiles, garments, footwear, pharmaceutical products, organic chemicals, vehicles, automobile parts, machinery and iron and steel. The share and position of these product groups in trade with individual V4 countries are slightly different. For example, in 2018–2019, iron and steel products ($63.11 million) were the most important item of Indian export to the Czech Republic. The largest share in exports to Poland comprised by articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted ($143.42 million). In case of Slovakia, footwear ($24.32 million) was the leading item of export, whereas nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances ($109.19 million) constituted the major items of export to Hungary. Indian imports from the V4 mainly consist of machineries and mechanical and electronic devices, power-generating machinery and equipment, vehicles and their parts, mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation, chemical and connected industrial products, plastic, rubber, glass and glassware. In 2018–2019, there was a decline in imports of these products from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. In fact, there were significant decreases in import value for the most important product groups from these countries. For the Czech Republic, only two of the ten main product groups, namely optical, photographic, measuring and medical instruments (12.45%) and iron and steel (19.90%), saw an increase in Indian purchases. A similar trend was observed in Hungary. India only increased imports of organic chemicals (31.71%) and pharmaceutical products (136.81%). Slovakia increased its exports to India of three product-categories, viz. organic chemicals (181.09%), optical, photographic, measuring and medical instruments (255.65%) and miscellaneous articles of base metal (14.84%).

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The situation regarding imports from Poland in 2018–2019 was entirely different. In the 10 main categories of goods imported by India, only three showed a decrease in the value of purchases compared to 2017– 2018. These were electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof (−25.78%), rubber and articles thereof (5.62%) and organic chemicals (−7.22%).

Trade in Services Given the role of services in Indian exports (Wróbel, 2014: 135–148) and the rising importance of this sector in the countries of the Visegrad group, this section examines the trade in services, which is much lower compared to trade in goods. There are no detailed statistics of the volume of trade in services between India and the V4 countries in the 1990s. However, it can be assumed that the scale of this trade was very limited primarily because the V4’s share in international trade in services was marginal because of the low development of the services sector and because their primary focus was on the development of heavy industry. The economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe initiated in the 1990s gradually led to the growing importance of services in both GDP and employment as well as the export of services. India, on the other hand, has witnessed major increases in the value of trade in services since the 1990s. Today, India is the eighth largest exporter of services worldwide (WTO, 2019: 102). In 2017, the value of Indian exports of services to the V4 amounted to $227 million. The largest share was recorded in relation to Poland (45%; $102 million), followed by the Czech Republic (30%; $68 million), Hungary (19.8%; $45 million) and the Slovak Republic (5.2%; $12 million) (Table 8.3). Indian imports of services from V4 in 2017 amounted to $483 million (Table 8.4). Among the Visegrad 4, the highest value of imported services was recorded in the case of Hungary ($273 million; 56.5%) followed by Poland ($119 million; 24.6%), the Czech Republic ($84 million; 17.4%) and the Slovak Republic ($7 million; 1.5%). Since 2000, India has increased its exports of services to V4 by more than 75 times and imports by more than 120 times. As in the case of trade in goods, an increase in the value of mutual trade in services has been observed since the accession of V4 countries to the European Union. A year before this accession, Indian exports of services to V4 countries

8

INDIA’S TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE V4 COUNTRIES

279

Table 8.3 India–V4 Trade in Services: Exports, 1996–2017 (in million US $)

Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovak Rep V4

Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovak Rep V4

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

.

.

.

.

3

6

5

5

3

11

14

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

0 . .

1 . 1

1 . .

2 . 1

9 13 .

12 8 1

19 9 1

…

.

.

.

3

8

6

8

25

32

43

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

23

37

29

73

96

88

94

94

80

102

68

22 12 1

35 15 5

25 45 2

32 49 3

32 48 6

32 63 6

40 72 7

42 80 10

39 77 11

40 92 11

45 102 12

58

92

101

157

182

189

213

226

207

245

227

Source Authors’ own calculations based on OECD (2004, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2019)

Table 8.4 India–V4 Trade in Services: Imports, 1996–2017 (in million US Dollars)

Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovak Rep V4

Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovak Rep V4

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

.

.

.

.

4.00

2

4

5

6

15

20

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

0 . 0

0 . 0

1 . .

1 . .

10 14 0

25 7 0

44 8 0

.

.

.

.

4

2

5

6

30

47

72

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

21

29

21

48

29

29

33

24

65

80

84

30 13 5

63 9 3

56 44 1

52 79 2

39 57 1

143 71 2

194 61 3

289 74 4

300 88 2

273 95 4

273 119 7

69

104

122

181

126

245

291

391

455

452

483

Source Authors’ own calculations based on OECD (2004, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2019)

2006

2017

280

K. JEDRZEJOWSKA ˛ AND A. WRÓBEL

amounted to $8 million. In 2004, it had increased to $25 million. The import of services in 2003–2004 increased from $6 to $30 million. Similar to the development of India-V4 trade in goods, trade in services between India and V4 in the last five years has been characterized by ups and downs in certain exports. From 2013 to 2017, the value of Indian exports of services to V4 countries ranged from $207 million in 2015 to $245 million in 2016. In the case of Slovakia and Hungary, export of services had been consistently low. In the case of Poland, during 2013–2017 Indian exports of services increased from $72 million to $102 million. Exports of services to the Czech Republic have been more volatile with periods of stability and growth interrupted by periods of declining export values. The value of exports of services from India to the Czech Republic decreased significantly in 2015 and 2017. During 2013–2015, there was a discernible tendency of an increase in imports of services from V4 countries only in Poland. In this period, India has increased its purchases of intangible goods from Poland from $61 to $119 million. India has a negative balance in services trade with V4, mainly due to a significant deficit in the case of travel services. For instance, in 2017, Indian imports of such services from Hungary amounted to $235 million followed by the Czech Republic ($45 million), Poland ($33 million) and the Slovak Republic ($2 million). Thus, there is a substantial difference in the value of imports from Hungary and the Czech Republic. In 2017, imports of services from Hungary were more than five times higher than from the Czech Republic. In the case of other V4 countries, the difference was even more significant. When analysing the structure of trade in services between India and V4 countries, the highest export value is recorded in the case of other commercial services ($97 million) than in transport ($71 million) and travel services ($20 million). As regards import of services, the situation is somewhat different. The highest value of purchases in 2017 was recorded for travel services ($315 million), followed by other commercial services ($95 million) and transport ($35 million). These figures indicate that India has a surplus in trade, in transport ($36 million) and other commercial services ($2 million), while maintaining a significant deficit in the travel services mentioned above ($−295 million).

8

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Conclusions and Prospects India-V4 trade and economic relations might appear modest, but economic cooperation has grown over the last two decades. During 2014–2019, there has been a steady growth in trade and the launch of government policies to boost economic cooperation between India and the V4 countries. This positive trend in trade in goods and services is likely to continue and expand into new sectors of the economy. Any radical change in India-V4 trade and economic relations will not be possible without an upgradation of the institutional framework for cooperation. To that end, it is imperative that both sides revisit their approaches and consider adopting a sub-region or country-specific strategy. Moreover, the conclusion of a strategic partnership between India and the Visegrad Four is likely to lead to greater trade and economic relations. Without an enhanced cooperation framework, trade would continue to expand, but would tend to remain well below its potential. India would also continue to lag behind the Chinese engagement with the CEECs, including the V4. One has to remember that the real issue is not of the actual volume of India-V4 trade, but of its growth potential. Dynamic economic development and increase of purchasing power of societies of both India and the V4 countries create opportunities for enhancing trade linkages. These are further intensified by actions undertaken by enterprises eager to establish their presence in new markets. Another factor that might contribute to greater India-V4 trade relates to trade liberalization. The entry into force of the EU-Republic of Korea free trade agreement, and the removal of trade barriers has led to a significant increase in trade in a relatively short period. Similarly, if and when the EU-India FTA is concluded, one can witness a similar growth in trade. One cannot, of course, envisage a realistic timeframe for the conclusion of such an agreement because both sides have a number of sensitive issues. With the deadlock, in WTO multilateral trade negotiations, trade liberalization at the global level is also not likely any time soon either.

References Chaudhury, D. R. (2019). India explores partnership with Visegrad Group in Central Europe with Jaishankar visit. The Economic Times. Retrieved November 26, 2019 from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/pol

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itics-and-nation/india-explores-partnership-with-visegrad-group-in-centraleurope-with-jaishankar-visit/articleshow/70862243.cms?from=mdr. Deloitte and Confederation of Indian Industry. (2014). Trade & investment relations between India and Central Europe: A study of opportunities. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu India Private Limited and Confederation of Indian Industry. Felbermayr, G., Mitra, D., Aichele, R., & Gröschl, J. (2016). GED study, ‘Europe and India Relaunching a troubled trade relationship’. Study of the Ifo Institute on behalf of the Bertelsmann Foundation Final Report on September 13. Garde, V., & Karnups, V. P. (2017). Assessing the role of Latvia’s participation in Indo-EU value chains. European Research Studies Journal, XX (3A), 942–960. Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce. (2019). Export Import Data Bank. Retrieved November 26, 2019 from https://commerce-app.gov.in/eidb/iecnt.asp. Gulevich, V. (2019, October 23). India and Visegrad four: Meeting each other halfway. Modern Diplomacy. Retrieved November 26, 2019 from https:// moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/10/23/india-and-visegrad-four-meeting-eachother-halfway/. Jaishankar, D. (2018, September 5). Here’s why Central and Eastern Europe may become an area of promise for India. Brookings. Retrieved November 26, 2019 from https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/heres-why-central-and-eas tern-europe-may-become-an-area-of-promise-for-india/. J˛edrzejowska, K. (2014). Economic transition in Poland and India: Not so different story? In V. Sakhuja, D. K. Upadhyay, & P. Kugiel (Eds.), India– Poland relations in the 21st century: Vistas for future cooperation (pp. 99–117). Vij Books. Kapur, A. (2009, November 19). India’s path was paved by Soviet fall. New York Times. Retrieved November 26, 2019 from https://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/11/20/world/asia/20iht-letter.html. Kugiel, P. (2013, January 8). India’s policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. The CSS Blog Network. Retrieved November 26, 2019 from https://isnblog. ethz.ch/uncategorized/indias-policy-towards-central-and-eastern-europe. Kugiel, P., & Upadhyay, D. K. (2018). India and Central and Eastern Europe: Post-cold war engagement. International Studies, 54(1–4), 127–143. Kugiel, P., & P˛edziwiatr, K. (2014). The Indian Diaspora and Poland–India Relations. The Polish Institute of International Affairs. Mandelson, P. (2007). Europe’s trade policy with India and China’. Cesifo Forum, 8(1), 3–7. Mehrotra, S. K., & Clawson, P. (1979). Soviet economic relations with India and other third world countries. Economic and Political Weekly, 14(30/32), 1367–1392.

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OECD. (2004). OECD statistics on international trade in services 1999–2002 (Vol. II). OECD Publishing. OECD. (2005). OECD statistics on international trade in services 2000–2003 (Vol. II). OECD Publishing. OECD. (2006). OECD statistics on international trade in services 2001–2004 (Vol. II). OECD Publishing. OECD. (2010). OECD statistics on international trade in services 2004–2008 (Vol. II). OECD Publishing. OECD. (2014). OECD statistics on international trade in services, volume 2013, issue 2, detailed tables by partner country. OECD Publishing. OECD. (2019). OECD statistics on international trade in services, volume 2018, issue 2, detailed tables by partner country. OECD Publishing. Olshany, A. (1988). Trade and economic cooperation between CMEA countries and India. Foreign Trade (USSR), 7 , 26–28. Poland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2017). Polish foreign policy strategy 2017– 2021. Retrieved November 26, 2019 from https://www.gov.pl/web/diplom acy/what-we-do-. Poland–India Business Forum. (2019, September 13). Invitation to Poland– India Business Forum (New Delhi). Retrieved November 26, 2019 from https://india.trade.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/301299,Poland-India-BusinessForum-2019.html. PwC. (2017). Food sector in Poland—Opportunities for India. Info pack for Indian Exporters and Investors. Report commissioned by Embassy of India in Poland. Singh, A. I. (1995). India’s relations with Russia and Central Asia. International Affairs, 71(1), 69–81. Svobodová, V. H., & Fernandes, O. (2014). New focus on India: A CEE perspective for investment, business and trade development. Studia Commercialia Bratislavensia, 7 (27), 417–425. Thakur, R., & Thayer, C. A. (1992). Soviet relations with India and Vietnam. Palgrave Macmillan. Upadhyay, D. K., & Kugiel, P. (2014, December 8). India and Central-Eastern Europe: Building a synergized relationship. Indian Council of World Affairs Issue Brief . Upadhyay, D. K., & Kugiel, P. (2015, July 15). India-Central and Eastern Europe relations: Search for new paradigm. Indian Council of World Affairs Policy Brief . Wróbel, A. (2014). The service sector in Indian economy. In J. Zaj˛aczkowski, J. Schöttli, & M. Thapa (Eds.), India in the contemporary world, polity, economy and international relations. Routledge. WTO. (2019). World Trade Statistical Review 2019. WTO.

CHAPTER 9

Indian Foreign Direct Investment in Central Europe Karina J˛edrzejowska and Anna Wróbel Introduction Bilateral investment flows constitute an important—though significantly underused—component of economic relations between India and Central and East Europe. Owing to almost three decades of fairly stable economic growth, most Central and East European (CEE) countries have become reliable hosts for foreign investors. Abundant resources of human capital and the relatively low cost of labour coupled with a well-developed infrastructure and strategic location have made CEE an attractive location for investors from Asian emerging markets, including India. Simultaneously, India’s rapid economic development together with its fast growing internal market and a population exceeding 1.2 billion has contributed to steadily rising investment flows from Central and East Europe to India. During the transition process from the planned to the market economies, Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland

K. J˛edrzejowska (B) · A. Wróbel Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Warszawa, Poland e-mail: [email protected] A. Wróbel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_9

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and Slovakia) opened up their economies to foreign direct investment (FDI). In the 1990s, multinationals from Western Europe and other developed countries dominated the investment landscape in the region. However, since their accession to the European Union in 2004, investment flows from developing economies, mostly from Asia to CEE countries commenced (Gubik et al., 2020: 239). These inflows increased after the economic and financial crisis of 2007–2008 when many CEE countries sought to reduce their dependence on Western markets and offer incentives to multinationals from the Global South (Szunomár, 2018: 1). Also in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 2007–2008, investors from the CEE countries began to perceive the rapidly growing Asian countries as attractive investment locations since they had significantly restructured and liberalized their economies. However, the first notable CEE investments in Asia took place only in the early 2000s, with India quickly gaining importance as an investment destination (Andreff 2016: 79). This chapter analyses investment relations between India and the Visegrad Four (V4) countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) since the mid-2000s. It discusses the determinants of FDI outflow from India to the V4 as well as the determinants of Central European FDI in India. The chapter argues that as in the case of trade relations,1 there is still potential for greater FDI in both directions. China appears to be the leading source as well as destination for Central European FDI. There is also no common Visegrad Group investment strategy. In fact, apart from the common framework of the EU regulations, the V4 are characterized by differentiated inward and outward investment policies. Moreover, the investment relations between India and V4 have developed in conditions where both remain net FDI hosts. Owing to limited existing literature, this chapter is based on statistics on FDI flows between India and the V4 have been extracted from the Organisation of Co-operation and Development (OECD) databases. This chapter defines foreign direct investment as ‘the category of international investment that reflects the objective of a resident entity in one economy to obtain a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy’ (OECD 2001). The chapter discusses the developmental role of FDI both

1 See Chapter 8 of this volume.

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for India and the V4 countries. It provides an overview of Indian investment in V4 countries. Subsequent sections deal with the attractiveness of Central Europe as FDI hosts from an Indian perspective, provide an overview of investment flows from India to V4 countries, and highlight the major characteristics of Indian investments in the region. A similar discussion takes place in the case of V4 investments in India.The chapter makes some concluding observations and assesses prospects of the future trajectory of India-V4 investment relations.

Evolving Role of FDI in V4 and India’s Development Among different types of capital inflows, FDI is generally considered as the safest and the most beneficial for the host country form of foreign capital. In spite of several potential drawbacks (e.g. negative impact on exchange rates), the benefits of FDI in the form of technology transfer or job creation prevail, and contribute to socio-economic development of their host countries without adding a burden of foreign debt (Dorozy ˙ nski ´ & Kuna-Marszałek, 2016: 120). This is especially important for developing countries which often rely heavily on the inflow of foreign investment in order to boost economic growth. This statement is also true for both India and the Visegrad countries where FDI has played a significant role to facilitate economic restructuring. Even though the experience of economic liberalization in India and post-Soviet countries may seem very different, there are also some similarities. In the 1990s, both India and the V4 countries introduced policies encompassing inter alia radical changes in fiscal and monetary management, the development and promotion of private sector, economic opening, privatization of inefficient state-owned enterprises and modernization of financial sector. A significant component of the transition was contingent on enhanced inflows of foreign capital, mostly in form of FDI. The incoming foreign capital allowed a shift from agrarian and industrial based economies towards service-based modern economies. It contributed to accelerated economic growth as well as an increase in wages and workers’ qualifications. As a result, the Visegrad Four can be included among the advanced economies which are well integrated into global production chains. Three decades since liberalization, India has been one of the fastest growing countries in the world, but it still

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confronts many problems typical for developing countries. Nevertheless, both India and post-Soviet V4 countries can be regarded today as globally competitive, being both host and home countries for growing FDI volumes (Bobeniˇc Hintošová, 2019: 38–39; J˛edrzejowska, 2014: 100–116). The Visegrad countries had begun to attract foreign capital since the early 1990s. FDI inflow initially increased because of privatization processes in Central and East Europe and subsequently because of their impending membership of the European Union. During the 1990s, V4 countries accounted for more than 60% of FDI inflows in all postcommunist CEE economies with most of the capital coming from West European countries. EU enlargement led to the adoption of policies enhancing economic openness and quality of institutions in V4 such as Internal Market Directives or the Transparency Directive. New legislation and removal of trade barriers within the EU along with relatively low labour costs and an advantageous geographical location led to growing interest of non-European investors in V4 markets. These included a new category of investors—multinationals from developing countries, including from India (Mazur & Takemura, 2020: 11; Rucinska & Fecko, 2015: 21). Shortly after the EU accession, the services sector in the V4 countries was able to attract greater FDI than industry (Allen & Overy, 2006: 4; Czerniak & Blauth, 2016: 7; Dorozy ˙ nski ´ & Kuna-Marszałek, 2016: 125–126). Even though outward investments of the V4 countries began in the 1990s, it was only in the 2000s that their FDI increased largely because of economic growth since their transition to free market economies. In the short history of their outward investment, V4 countries initially concentrated on their neighbours, including other CEE countries. With their accession to the EU, there was marked concentration of V4 FDI in other EU Member States. The V4 investments outside Europe are a relatively recent phenomenon, which is the result of global financial crisis 2007– 2008, and the subsequent economic slowdown in Europe (Elteto & Sass, 2015: 1–4; Gorynia et al., 2011). In spite of the considerable increase in outward FDI flows, the V4 countries remain minor outward investors and their outward stock of FDI remains dwarfed by the incoming FDI (Magdolna & Vlokova, 2019: 79). Similarly, FDI inflows to India increased significantly with the progress of liberalization processes, contributing inter alia to the rise in employment (Mishra & Palit, 2020: 1481). According to the World Investment

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Report 2020 (UNCTAD, 2020), India has gradually advanced to the world’s ninth largest FDI recipient with major investments coming from Singapore, the Netherlands, the United States and Japan or—indirectly— via Mauritius. CEE countries have yet to play an important role in the Indian investment landscape, but their presence in the region has been steadily growing since the global financial crisis. Until the 1990s, outward FDI was regulated by the Government of India and considered an important policy tool for export promotion. As a result, Indian early investments were located in other developing countries. It was only with the liberalization of the Indian economy in the 1990s that the number of Indian companies investing abroad increased, and the geographic coverage of their activities expanded (Andreff 2016: 80–81). The Foreign Exchange Management Act (2000) facilitated greater FDI outflows (Dygas, 2020: 114). Since the 2000s, the geographical distribution of outward Indian FDI has been a combination of neighbouring countries, major developed countries and tax havens. This occurred at a time when manufacturing had displaced services as the principal outward FDI sector and the rapid growth of industry’s share in Indian FDI. The financial crisis 2007–2008 significantly hampered the spread of Indian international presence. However, it led to a consolidation of Indian foreign operations and a growth in investment in services. During the crisis, Indian companies showed increased interest in CEE countries since they appeared more resilient to crisis than Western Europe (Andreff 2016: 86, 108; Roman et al., 2014: 1667).

Indian FDI in the V4 Countries With FDI constituting an important factor in the economic policy for most governments, there is intense international competition among potential host countries in attracting foreign investors. Given the growing popularity of Indian investors in most European countries, Indian companies have been able to choose optimal locations for their venture, including in the Visegrad Four. But Central Europe continues to lag behind their West European counterparts in terms of ability to attract Indian investment.

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V4 as an Investment Attraction Even though the regulations of the Single European market provide a general framework for operations of foreign investors in the EU, the European business environment is far from homogenous. The political, economic and social factors differ from one Member State to another and sometimes, at the country level, from one region to another. This is also the case for the V4 countries, each of which provides different incentives as well as—different restrictions for the incoming FDI (Roman et al., 2014: 1667–1669). In these circumstances, one cannot regard the V4 countries as a single bloc. Chinese experience with the 16+1/17+1 initiative has shown that peculiarities of the investment climate of each country need to be considered (Brînz˘a, 2020). Unlike China, India has been approaching each of the V4 countries separately. Even though the Minister of External Affairs, Jaishankar Subrahmanyam, during his visit to Poland in August 2019 expressed India’s desire is to engage with the region in the V4 format, no specific initiatives followed. Moreover, Indian investments in the region are not politically motivated, but constitute an element in the inorganic growth strategies of Indian multinationals rather than a government initiative (Dygas, 2020: 110; Mohan, 2013). In spite of differences in investment policies between the V4 members, attracting more investment from emerging markets seems to be a shared priority for them (Kugiel, 2016: 6). Collectively, the V4 constitute the fifth largest economy in Europe and the twelfth largest in the world, thereby presenting Indian investors with a huge opportunity (Chaudhury, 2018). Looking at the pull factors attracting investors to Central Europe, some common features can be named. The Visegrad Four have relatively lower cost of production factors compared to the rest of the EU. The high qualifications and skills of human resources also draw investors. Another advantage of the region is undoubtedly their membership of the European Union. The V4 countries benefit from access to EU funds, almost unlimited access to the EU markets, non-VAT trading inside the EU, advantageous legal environment, less regulated migration of labour force, lower costs of operations due to higher competition or improvement regarding transport corridors (Dorozy ˙ nski ´ & Kuna-Marszałek, 2016: 120; Su et al., 2018: 1959). Additional pull factors for the investments to the region are related to relatively low tax rates, stable currencies, low

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inflation or the benefits coming from the membership in major international economic organizations, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the OECD (Bobeniˇc Hintošová et al., 2018: 233; Su et al., 2018: 1965–1966). Moreover, all V4 governments offer the foreign investors various types of investment incentives. These include equal and non-discriminatory treatment of foreign investors (the Czech Republic), tax exemptions for new investments (Hungary, Poland) or financial assistance for FDI promotion (Slovakia). In the case of Poland, an important pull factor is Special Economic Zones (SEZ) which provide several additional incentives for investors (Allen & Overy, 2006: 32; Deloitte 2014: 12–14; Su et al., 2018: 1959–1961). All the above factors are generally cited as the main determinants of FDI in the V4 countries, including from Asia in most research being done on Japanese and Chinese FDI (Mazur & Takemura, 2020: 11; Szunomár, 2018: 13). On the basis of the few existing studies on Indian FDI in the region, one can assume that similar factors are relevant for Indian companies (Su et al., 2018). When analysing Indian outward investment, Andreff (2016: 111–112) cited the abundance of natural resources, stock market capitalization, a skilled work force, high degree of economic openness and bilateral trade relations as factors which positively affecting FDI decisions of Indian companies in the V4. The attractiveness of the V4 countries for investors is further confirmed in the results of leading international rankings. According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2019 (2019: xiii), all V4 countries are positioned in the top 50, with the Czech Republic holding the highest position in the region (32nd). In Ease of Doing Business Ranking (World Bank, 2019: 4), the highest positioned V4 country is Poland (40th), whereas Hungary is the lowest (52nd). In the Ernst & Young Attractiveness Survey, CEE countries are regularly ranked above most emerging markets (EY Attractiveness Survey 2020). Finally, all the V4 countries are classified in the list of global top 50 services locations according to the 2019 Kearney Global Services Location Index (Kearney, 2019), which is an important factor for Indian businesses given the structure of Indian FDI. Indian FDI Flows to the V4 Countries Before looking at the inflow of FDI from India to Central and East Europe, some technical issues affecting the analysis need to be pointed

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out. Firstly, the analysis of capital flows in the form of FDI between India and the V4 countries is often hampered because of the lack of comparable statistical data. As already indicated, this study uses OECD datasets.2 Since 2006, the FDI data of members of this organization has been compiled according to the same methodology and in the same currency (US Dollars). Previous FDI data for V4 countries in OECD statistics was reported in national currencies, which does not facilitate analysis. Moreover, slightly different conclusions may be drawn from different indicators relating to FDI. The study is based on Foreign Direct Investment Position data. This indicator represents the value of the stock of direct investments held at the end of the reference period (typically year). Secondly, in case of FDI inflow, both to the V4 countries and India, the official numbers are often understated. This is because of the common practice of channeling investment through intermediary countries (e.g. because of tax optimization motives). This is the reason why the major investor in India is Mauritius and why the number of Indian companies active in V4 differ depending on the database used. Gubik et al. (2020: 241) argue that there is a significant difference between FDI coming directly from Asia and the overall stock of FDI of Asian origin in the Visegrad region. Table 9.1 presents the inflow of Indian FDI to the V4 countries. Between 2006 and 2017, Indian FDI in V4 countries increased from $40 million to over $3,036 million. Judging by the scale of investments, the most attractive locations for Indian investments are in the descending order: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Table 9.1). In 2017, Indian companies invested over $2,676 million in Hungary. In the case of Poland, the amount was almost ten times lower; it received. FDI worth about $271 million. Indian FDI in the Czech Republic in 2017 was over $91 million and in Slovakia it was negative—$2.7 million. According to the OECD foreign direct investment statistics, explanatory notes negative FDI positions ‘largely result when the loans from the affiliate to its parent exceed the loans and equity capital given by the parent to the affiliate’ (OECD, Foreign Direct Investment Statistics. Explanatory Notes: 4). I There has been increasing interest in Hungary as a location for Indian FDI since 2014. Previously, as in Slovakia, Indian investment 2 The OECD dataset is the only dataset that provides year-by-year statistics of bilateral investment flows between India and each of the V4 countries.

31 3 6 0 40

2006

57.6 … 30.9 0.3 88.8

2007 35.4 1.8 48.4 −0.1 85.5

2008 68.1 −1.8 44.3 4.3 114.9

2009 38.9 −22.6 71.1 1.3 88.7

2010 42.5 −16.3 73.2 … 99.4

2011 12.7 −19.9 92 −0.9 83.9

2012 89 … 138.2 −1.6 225.6

2013 168.2 1637.5 184 −2.1 1987.6

2014

Outward Indian FDI in V4 countries, 2006–2018 (in million US dollars)

190.9 1798 206.6 −4.6 2190.9

2015

97.1 2200.4 251.5 −3.4 2545.6

2016

(Source Authors’ own calculations based on OECD International Direct Investment Statistics (OECD, 2012, 2014, 2018, 2019)

Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovak Rep V4

Country

Table 9.1

91.6 2676.1 271.8 −2.7 3036.8

2017

86.5 … 276.9 −6.8 356.6

2018

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Graph 9.1 Outward Indian FDI in V4 Countries, 2006–2018 (in million US dollars) Source Authors’ own calculations based on OECD International Direct Investment Statistics (OECD, 2012, 2014, 2018, 2019)

position in the country was negative. During 2010–2013, Poland was the main market for Indian FDI in Central and Eastern Europe (see Table 9.1). Select Indian FDI in the V4 Countries Indian investment activities in the V4 countries comprise both greenfield and brownfield investment. In terms of the sectoral distribution, Indian multinationals have shown interest in both the primary and tertiary sectors. India has been a leading greenfield investor in Hungary in recent years. Significant investments of this type have been made, among others, by Apollo Tyres (tyre production factors in Gyöngyöshalász, e475 million) (Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency, 2017); SRF Limited (Biaxially Oriented Polyethylene Terephthalate (BOPET) film manufacturing plant in Yashfenyszar, e80 million (Prashant, 2020), Samvardhan Motherson Group (unit specialised for injection moulded plastic parts in Túrkeve, e16 million; Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency, 2019). Flex Films Europa (subsidiary of Uflex India Ltd) has also made a

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large investment. It will set up a flexible packaging materials production facility in Rétság (over e71 million). This will be the company’s second investment in Central and Eastern Europe. The first factory of this type was established in Poland (Plasteurope.com, 2019). Other companies present in Hungary include Sun Pharmaceuticals, Orion Electronics Ltd.3 Sona BLW4 Cosmos5 and the largest IT companies (Tata Consultancy Services, WIPRO, Cognizant, Tech Mahindra) and ICT (Satyam Computer Services Limited/Tech Mahindra Ltd (Embassy of India, Hungary and Bosnia & Herzegovina). In Poland, Indian companies invest mainly in the business services sector. Between 2009 and 2019, companies with Indian capital created 2,335 jobs in Poland mainly in the IT and BPO sectors (Dygas, 2020: 113). As in the case of other V4 countries, subsidiaries of Indian corporations, applying the nearshoring strategy, focus on serving Western European clients. Companies such as Infosys BPO (Łód´z), Mphasis (Wrocław), HCL Technologies (Cracow), Tata Consultancy Services (Warsaw), Wipro (Warsaw), Zensar Technologies (Gdansk), ´ Genpact (Cracow, Szczecin, Lublin), KPIT-Infosystems (Wrocław) have already opened their centres in Poland. The largest Indian greenfield investment in Poland is the Uflex food packaging film factory in Wrze´snia, launched in 2012.6 Other Indian companies operating in Poland include: Escorts (Farmtrac Tractors Europe—agricultural tractor factory in Mr˛agowo), Sharda Group (fabrics and bedding), Videocon (cathode ray tube), Eurobatt (batteries, household appliances), Essel Propack (packaging production), Novo Tech (polymer products), Rishabh Instruments Pvt. Ltd. (electrical equipment),7 VVF (soap factory in Racibórz). The statistics on Indian investments in Poland do not include ArcelorMittal, which, due to its headquarters in Luxembourg, is treated as capital from that country. However, in considering Indian investments in Poland, this company cannot be omitted because ArcelorMittal Poland is the largest steel producer in Poland, employing over 11,000 employees in six branches in Silesia, Małopolska and Opole provinces (Mackiewicz, 2015). 3 Orion Electronics Ltd is part of the Indian Thakral Group based in Singapore. 4 Producer of precision forged components for the automotive industry. 5 Fashion textile retail chain. 6 The second production plant was launched in this city in 2018. 7 85% of shares in Lubuskie Zakłady Aparatów Elektrycznych “LUMEL”.

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The sectoral structure of Indian investments in the Czech Republic is very similar to Hungary and Poland. Indian companies invest in IT and BPO, pharmaceuticals, textiles, vehicles, and auto-components, food and packaging production. The main Indian companies operating in the Czech Republic include Infosys (Brno), LEEL (Prague), Tata Global Beverages (Jemnice), Cognizant (Prague), Samvardhana Mothˇ erson (MSSL Advanced Polymers, Dolní Redice), Varroc Excellence (Šenov u Nového Jiˇcín), Pricol (Klecany), Dina-Hitex (Buˇcovice), Glenmark Pharmaceuticals (Prague), Alok Industries/Mileta Horice (Horice), APAG Elektronic (Pardubice), Cafe Coffee Day (Embassy of India Prague, India-Czech Economic Relations). Despite the obvious advantage in the form of the membership in the Eurozone area, Slovakia is losing competition for Indian investment in comparison to other V4 countries. Economies with a larger internal market such as Poland or Hungary seem more attractive to Indian companies. For example, Apollo Tyres initially looked at Slovakia and Hungary when scouting for investment locations in Central and Eastern Europe, but eventually decided to set up a production facility in Hungary. Even though bilateral investment statistics do not show major Indian investment in Slovakia, it has to be mentioned that Indian capital enters the country through third countries. So far the largest investment in Slovakia with Indian capital is the Jaguar Land Rover state-of-art automobile manufacturing plant in Nitra (e1.4 billion, Jaguar Land Rover, 2018). The plant is a subsidiary of the British car producer, which itself belongs to India’s Tata Group. It was assumed that the plant will have the capacity to produce 100,000 cars per year in 2020 (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India). However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, maintaining such production capacity will be difficult. Another example of Indian investment coming to the V4 indirectly is ArcelorMittal. The steel giant is present in the steel sectors of Slovakia and Poland, and it is treated as capital from Luxembourg.

V4 Investment in India Emerging markets like India offer a huge investment potential for the companies from traditionally industrial countries (Roman et al., 2014: 1667). Even though the Visegrad countries only recently joined the ranks of the most advanced economies, their growing interest in opportunities

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offered by the emerging markets is reflected in the number of investments and respective growth of the capital flows to India. Investment Attraction for India Since the adoption of liberalization policies in 1991, the Government of India has adopted various policies to attract foreign capital. The gradual abolition of government restrictions have transformed India into a favourable destination for foreign investors. However, it was only in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2012–2017) (the last five-year economic plan) that precise policy measures for attracting FDI were specified as an important instrument of achieving the desired level of growth (Mishra, 2019: 724–729). The launch of the ‘Make in India’ (September 2014) has made India one of the most liberal regimes for FDI (Mishra, 2019: 725). The initiative was met with favourable responses in V4 countries. For instance, Poland responded by launching a new promotion programme called ‘GoIndia’ in April 2015. Thus far, however, this programme has yet to be operationalized. According to Ernst & Young, the major factors that attract investors to India include high potential of the domestic market, cost competitiveness, access to a highly qualified workforce, and a demand-driven growth model. India is a destination for both services and manufacturing investment (Ernst & Young 2020). These are also the factors that are considered relevant for V4 investors which is reflected in their growing presence in South Asia. India’s strong position as a host country is not necessarily reflected in the international rankings where India usually scores far below its CEE counterparts. India is ranked 68th in the 2019 edition of the Global Competitiveness Report , and 63rd in the Ease of Doing Business Report . An important exception is the Kearney Global Services Location Index where India remains a no. 1 location for services. V4 FDI Flows to India Compared to the data presented in Table 9.1, the scale of FDI of V4 countries in India is significantly lower. However, there is a clear upward trend for each of these countries. Overall, the inflow of investments from CE10 economies between 2000 and 2014 constituted less than 2% of the

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total FDI attracted by India. This signifies that there is further scope of investments from CEE countries into India (Deloitte 2014: 23). Between 2006 and 2018, the value of FDI of V4 countries in India increased from $44 million to over $468 million. A significant advantage of Poland over other countries of the group is visible (Graph 9.2). In 2018, Polish companies invested over $247 million in India. This was similar to over $250 million invested in 2017. The Czech Republic is the second largest country in terms of invested capital. In 2018, it invested more than $80 million in India. Over the last seven years, Hungarian companies have invested around $24 million annually in India. In 2018, it was $23.7 million. Slovakia ranks last in terms of FDI value in India in the V4 Group. In 2018, the value of Slovak investments in India reached $12.8 million (Table 9.2). In line with the OECD data, statistics provided by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade of the India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry indicate that Poland is the biggest investor in India from the region. Between April 2000 and June 2020, total equity inflows from Poland amounted to almost US$685 million. This number equals 0.14% of total FDI to India in the time and positions Poland in 27th place in terms of size of investment in India. In the same period,

Graph 9.2 V4 FDI in India, 2006–2018 (in million US dollars) Source Authors’ own calculations based on OECD International Direct Investment Statistics (OECD, 2012, 2014, 2018, 2019)

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Table 9.2 V4 FDI in India, 2006–2018 (in million US dollars) Country Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovak Rep V4

2006 2007 2008

2009

2010 2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

37.5

46.6

−0.6

45.5

48.7

68.7

80.7

184.9

24

59.7

44.9

28.4

38

10 8 2

22.3 13.1 3

27.8 49.9 1.6

24.1 22.5 22.1 24.5 24.5 25.6 24.3 23.1 24.4 23.7 141.8 174 181.9 217.5 272.9 256.9 235.1 236.1 250.6 247.1 … … … … 0.6 … 6.2 9.2 13.7 12.8

44

98.1 124.2 194.3 234

242

288.6 297.4 328

314.3 337.1 370.4 468.5

Source Authors’ own calculations based on OECD International Direct Investment Statistics (OECD, 2012, 2014, 2018, 2019)

Czech investment amounted only to US$43.27 million, while Hungarian investment was US$24.66 million, and Slovak a little bit over US$18 million (Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade 2020: 7). Select V4 Investment in India Looking at the sectoral distribution of V4 investment in India, even though India is a preferred destination for services, major CEE FDI has occurred in the automotive or processing industry, or pharmaceuticals. There is also a huge variability in terms of both the number and volume of investment between the individual Visegrad countries. Hungarian companies have invested in India in the pharmaceutical sector (Richter-Gedeon Ltd.), IT (Tarant Hungary), energy (Ganz Engineering and Energetics Machinery Limited), transport (Cason Engineering Plc) and the waste water management (Organica Környezettechnológiák Zrt.). To date, the largest investment is in a factory producing semi-finished products for one of the largest Central European pharmaceutical companies Richter Gedeon. The Hungarian company invested in a joint venture with the Indian company Themis Medicare Ltd. $20 million (Embassy of India, Hungary and Bosnia and Herzegovina). India, along with China and Singapore, is one of the most important markets for Polish direct investment in Asia. Polish companies invest mainly in the processing industry. Among the largest Polish investors in India cited by the Polish Investment and Trade Agency are Can Pack (can manufacturing plant in Aurangabad), Torunskie ´ Zakłady Materiałów

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Opatrunkowych (dressing materials factory at Madurai),8 Maflow (automotive air conditioning ducts), Polmor (company producing welded structures for rail vehicles), and Seco/Warwick (furnaces for metallurgical industry). There are also Polish companies in India involved in mining and gas and oil exploitation (Famur SA., Kopex SA, Geofizyka Torun) ´ (PAIH, 2018: 32). So far, about 30 Czech companies have invested in India. A major Czech investor in India is Skoda Auto, which entered the market in 2001 and currently maintains two manufacturing plants in the country (Kugiel, 2016: 30). Further investments include Doosan Skoda Power, Bonatrans Group, LIKO-S, Hamrik, Microelectronics, Stros, Eldis, Technicoat, Gearspect, Czech Aviation Training Centre (CATC), Chemoprojekt, Fermat Gropup, ComAp, Tatra Trucks, Hutni Projekt, Zetor, Lasvit, Flying Academy, Preciosa, ZKL, TAJMAC-ZPS, VH Services, VitkoviceFans (Embassy of India Prague, List of Major Czech Companies in India). These investments have mainly been made in transportation, power, automotive, chemical and the steel sector. The scale of Slovakian investments in India compared to other V4 countries seems almost non-existent. After signing the Memorandum of Understanding with the Indian Ministry of Railways, the Slovakian side counts on the development of cooperation in the field of production of railway wagons and modernization of rail systems, among others. Cooperation on the creation and development of start-ups within the framework of the initiative ‘Slovakia Hub in India’ sponsored by Indian Chamber of Commerce and Culture in the Slovak Republic is also being developed (Indian Chamber of Commerce and Culture in the Slovak Republic).

Conclusions and Prospects Looking at the FDI flows between India and V4 countries, some conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, since the early 2000s, there has been a gradual increase in mutual investment flows between India and the Visegrad Four.

8 Torunskie ´ Zakłady Materiałów Opatrunkowych (Torun´ Dressing Materials Plant) oper-

ates in India through a joint venture with its Indian partner Bella India. Another example of Polish investment in the pharmaceutical sector in India was the modern biotechnology plant in Pune, an investment by Bioton. Two years after the completion of the plant in Pune, however, the Polish company sold its shares in SciGen BioPharma Pvt Ltd (SciGen India).

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Secondly, there are significant differences in the value of Indian investment, which goes to individual V4 countries and vice versa. Undoubtedly, the potential of both India and V4 countries as both recipients and donors of FDI is still on the rise. Investors in both regions benefit from various government assistance schemes. They also seem to take into consideration the market size and economic openness when planning their investment. Moreover, the India-V4 investment relations reflect the overall rise of Asian emerging markets in global capital flows. However, even with the changes in the structure of FDI flows in the recent years neither India nor the V4 can be seen as major investment partners for each other. The signing of an India-EU free trade agreement can lead to additional trade and business opportunities and stimulate inter alia trade expansion in selected sectors (Mazur & Takemura, 2020: 12). However, the likelihood of an FTA being signed in the near future do not seem to be bright. Nevertheless the upward trend for the India-V4 capital flows should persist. The major obstacle for a further increase in India-V4 FDI appears to be the spread of COVID-19. According to UNCTAD (2020: x), the global FDI flows are forecast to drop by 40% in 2020. Even though India is likely to continue to attract market-seeking investment due to its large market, the dynamics of the FDI inflow will be significantly hampered. The same applies to the V4 countries (UNCTAD 2020: 41).

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Chaudhury, D. R. (2018, August 28). With eye on China’s Belt Road Initiative, India to step up economic partnerships with Eastern, Southern Europe. The Economic Times. Retrieved October 20, 2020 from https://economict imes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-plans-to-boost-eco nomic-partnership-with-southern-europe-to-counter-chinas-bri/articleshow/ 65564128.cms?from=mdr. Czerniak, A., & Blauth, K. (2016). The impact of foreign direct investment. Contribution to the Polish Economy in the Past Quarter Century. Polityka Insight. Deloitte and Confederation of Indian Industry. (2014). Trade & investment relations between India and Central Europe: A study of opportunities. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu India Private Limited and Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. (2020). Fact sheet on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from April, 2000 to June, 2020, Quarterly Fact Sheet, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Retrieved November 8, 2020 from https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/FDI_Factsheet_June20_20Octo ber2020.pdf. Dorozy ˙ nski, ´ T., & Kuna-Marszałek, A. (2016). Investment attractiveness: The case of the Visegrad Group countries. Comparative Economic Research, 19(1), 119–140. Dygas, R. (2020). Determinants of foreign direct investment outflow from India to Poland. International Journal of Management and Economics, 56(2), 109– 117. Elteto, A., & Sass, M. (2015). Outward FDI policies in Visegrad countries. Country report—Hungary. Bulletin of the Institute for Western Affairs, 179. Embassy of India Prague, India-Czech Economic Relations. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from https://www.eoiprague.gov.in/docs/159489264 7India-Czech%20Economic%20Relations%20(1).pdf. Embassy of India Prague, List of Major Czech Companies in India. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from https://www.eoiprague.gov.in/docs/159481111 8Annex-III%20%20List%20of%20major%20Czech%20companies%20in%20I ndia.pdf. Embassy of India, Hungary and Bosnia & Herzegovina, India HungaryRelations. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from https://www.eoibudapest.gov. in/page/india-hungary-relations/. Ernst & Young. (2020, October 12). India amongst the top three choices for future investments: CII-EY FDI Survey. Press release. Retrieved October 20, 2020 from https://www.ey.com/en_in/news/2020/10/india-amongst-thetop-three-choices-for-future-investments. EY Attractiveness Survey. (2020). How can Europe reset the investment agenda now to rebuild its future?, Ernst & Young, May.

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The Global Competitiveness Report 2019. (2019). World Economic Forum, Cologny/Geneva. Gorynia, M., Nowak, J., & Wolniak, R. (2011). Outward foreign direct investment of Poland: Exploring geographic and industry trends and patterns. In Conference: 37th EIBA annual conference: Taking IB in Europe to the next level: Emerging issues, strategies and economies Bucharest. Retrieved October 20, 2020 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326261188_Out ward_Foreign_Direct_Investment_of_Poland_Exploring_Geographic_and_ Industry_Trends_and_Patterns. Gubik, A. S., Sass, M., & Szunomár, Á. (2020). Asian foreign direct investments in the Visegrad countries: What are their motivations for coming indirectly. DANUBE: Law Economics and Social Issues Review, 11(3), 239–252. Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency. (2017, April 7). Apollo Tyres Inaugurated their new plant in Gyöngyöshalász. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from https://hipa.hu/apollo-tyres-inaugurated-their-new-plant-in-gyongyoshalasz. Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency. (2019, May 25). New investment of the Samvardhana Motherson Group in Hungary has been inaugurated. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from https://hipa.hu/new-investment-of-thesamvardhana-motherson-group-in-hungary-has-been-inaugurated. India, MEA, India–Slovakia Relations. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Slovakia_december_ 2018.pdf. Indian Chamber of Commerce and Culture in the Slovak Republic, Slovakia Hub in India: Indo Slovak Startup Space. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from http://www.sbagency.sk/sites/default/files/slovakia-hub-boo klet-a4_adf.pdf. Jaguar Land Rover. (2018, October 25). Jaguar Land Rover opens manufacturing plant in Slovakia. Retrieved November 9, 2020 from https://www.jag uarlandrover.com/news/2018/10/jaguar-land-rover-opens-manufacturingplant-slovakia. J˛edrzejowska, K. (2014). Economic transition in Poland and India: Not so different story? In V. Sakhuja, D. K. Upadhyay, & P. Kugiel (Eds.), India– Poland relations in the 21st century: Vistas for future cooperation (pp. 99–117). Vij Books. Kearney. (2019). The 2019 Kearney global services location index. Retrieved October 20, 2020 from https://www.kearney.com/digital-transformation/ gsli/2019-full-report. Kugiel, P. (Ed.) (2016). V4 goes global: Exploring opportunities and obstacles in the Visegrad countries’ cooperation with Brazil, India, China and South Africa. Polish Institute of International Affairs.

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Mackiewicz, A. (2015, June 15). Kto i gdzie inwestuje. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from https://india.trade.gov.pl/pl/indie/inwestycje/445,kto-i-gdzieinwestuje.html. Magdolna, S., & Vlokova, J. (2019). Just look behind the data! Czech and Hungarian outward foreign direct investment and multinationals. Acta Oeconomica, 69(S2), 73–105. Mazur, G., & Takemura, M. (2020). The evolution of merchandise trade between the Visegrad Group countries and Japan in the 21st century. Journal of International Studies, 13(3), 9–24. Mishra, R. (2019). An empirical analysis of the potential of FDI inflows in India. Journal of Mechanics of Continua and Mathematical Sciences, 14(5), 724–736. Mishra, R., & Palit, R. (2020). Role of FDI on employment scenario in India. International Journal of Recent Technological Engineering, 8(6), 1481–1489. Mohan, A. (2013, July 16). India and Central Europe: A road less travelled. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Public Diplomacy. Retrieved October 20, 2020 from https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm? 21946/India+and+Central+Europe+a+road+less+travelled. OECD. (2001). Glossary of statistical terms, foreign direct investment. Retrieved October 20, 2020 from https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1028. OECD. (2012). OECD international direct investment statistics 2012. OECD Publishing. OECD. (2014). OECD international direct investment statistics 2014. OECD Publishing. OECD. (2018). OECD international direct investment statistics 2018. OECD Publishing. OECD. (2019). OECD international direct investment statistics 2019. OECD Publishing. OECD. (2020). Foreign direct investment statistics: Explanatory notes. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/FDI-statistics-exp lanatory-notes.pdf. PAIH. (2018). Indie Przewodnik po rynku. PAIH. Plasteurope.com. (2019, January 4). UFLEX India’s largest multinational flexible packaging maker to build new plant in Hungary. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from https://www.plasteurope.com/news/UFLEX_t241447/. Prashant, P. (2020, August 7). SRF commissions new BOPET plant in Hungary. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from https://www.indianchemicalnews.com/ chemical/srf-commissions-new-bopet-plant-in-hungary-5818. Roman, T., Manolic˘a, A., & Maha, L.-G. (2014). The dynamics of Indian FDI in Europe and its impact on Romanian–Indian relations. Current Science, 107 (10), 1666–1672.

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Rucinska, S., & Fecko, M. (2015). Foreign direct investment in Visegrad Group countries with the focus on service sector. Zeszyty Naukowe Panstwowej ´ Wyzszej ˙ Szkoły Im Witelona w Legnicy, 17 (4), 21–30. Su, W., Zhang, D., Zhang, C., Abrhám, J., Simionescu, M., Yaroshevich, N., Guseva, V. (2018). Determinants of foreign direct investment in the Visegrad Group countries after the EU enlargement. Technological and Economic Development of Economy, 24(5), 1955–1978. Szunomár, Á. (2018). Pull factors for Chinese FDI in East Central Europe. Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS Institute of World Economics, Working Paper No. 249 (2018), 1–20. UNCTAD. (2020). World Investment Report (2020), International Production Beyond the Pandemic, United Nations, Geneva. World Bank. (2019). Doing Business 2020 Report.

CHAPTER 10

Indian Diaspora in Central Europe Patryk Kugiel and Konrad P˛edziwiatr

Introduction Until recently, Indians have not been a significant group of immigrants in Central Europe like those arriving from the former Soviet Union (especially Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Russians). Their number has, however, significantly increased in recent years especially in Poland. They have also begun to forge new socio-economic and political links between India and the region. Forming one of the new visible minorities in the region, the Indian community have not only transformed Central European economies but have also enriched the cultural diversity of the host countries. The emergence of Indian businesses (e.g. restaurants) as well as places of religious worship (Hindu temples, gurudwaras and mosques frequented by Indian Muslims) is part of these new regional diversities.

P. Kugiel (B) Asia-Pacific Programme, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] K. P˛edziwiatr Center for Advanced Studies of Population and Religion, Cracow University of Economics, Cracow, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_10

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In this chapter, Central Europe signifies the Visegrad Group (hereafter V4) comprised of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia— all of which are members of both the European Union (EU) and NATO. This regional grouping was formed in the same year when the USSR collapsed (in 1991) in order to advance political, economic, cultural, military and energy cooperation among the V4 along with furthering their integration within the EU. The Visegrad 4, which share strong historical, cultural and social links, constitute a coherent and homogenous partner for India. The Central Europe Division of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, however, deals with 30 countries from Norway to Turkey. During the last three decades, Central Europe has witnessed major socio-economic and political transformation, which has affected virtually all spheres of life including mobility and migration. During the Communist era, restrictions on international migration led to a situation where the dominant pattern of spatial mobility was a rural-to-urban exodus coupled with growing urbanization and commuting to major industrial centres for work while living outside of them (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski, 2007; Okólski, 2007). International migration was mostly confined to the countries of the socialist bloc with a small number of contractual labourers being allowed to leave for a short period of time and stay in one of the ‘fraternal’ countries of Asia and Africa (e.g. Algeria). Students from those countries were also allowed to come to the region. In the early 1990s, most Central European countries could be classified as relatively homogenous societies and typical emigration countries, with a low (or extremely low) scale of immigration. With the removal of barriers to international mobility, emigration sharply increased in the case of Poland. A remarkable transformation of mobility forms towards more temporary and ‘liquid’ flows has also been observed (Engbersen et al., 2012). In fact, Central Europe in the 1990s became a source of emigrants as well as a destination region. The transitory and permanent migrants came mostly from central-eastern or south-eastern European countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States but also, to an increasing degree, people from the Middle East and Asia. As one study commissioned by the European Parliament stated in 1998: ‘An important development at the eastern border of the European Union is taking place: the transformation of the ten associated central and eastern European countries from countries of emigration into transit and immigration countries’ (Subhan, 1998). However, as economic problems mounted in the region by the end of the millennium,

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immigration to Central Europe declined and a new wave of emigration began. This was primarily influenced by the 2004 eastward enlargement of the European Union, which led to the emergence of ‘new’ Central European diasporas in major Western European countries (Kahanec & Zimmermann, 2010; Okólski, 2012). As a result of the significant outflow of people from V4 countries to ‘older’ EU Member States, the intraEuropean migrations became a major mobility pattern for the next decade. With greater economic growth and progress in Central Europe, the V4 also became migration magnets and gradually were transformed into net receiving areas (P˛edziwiatr, 2019; Górny and Kaczmarczyk, 2018). This chapter analyses the origins and growth of Indian communities in Central Europe and provides a detailed overview of the key features of the Indian diaspora in each of the V4 countries. It explores their role in their new ‘homes’, assesses their impact on India-Central Europe relations and looks at future trends and significance in India’s relations with the region. The chapter is based on the analysis of the secondary sources as well as new statistical information, big data1 and qualitative research (including participant observations, in-depth interviews and a survey) in Poland, which has the largest Indian community in the region.

Origins of Indian Migration to Central Europe Indian migration to Central Europe is a relatively recent phenomenon with no publication on the Indian diaspora in Europe making any mention of any Central European country (Giri, 2001). Generally speaking, Indian emigration over the last two centuries is grouped into five phases—(1) indentured labour migration (the West Indies, Fiji and Mauritius), (2) the Kangani/Maistry labour migration (Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore and Burma), (3) the ‘free’ or passage migration (Africa, South of Sahara), (4) voluntary migration to Europe and North America and (5) labour migration to the Middle East/West Asia (Giri, 2001: 179–196). The Indian community in Central Europe would fit into fourth category even though it began after the end of communism

1 By ‘big data’, we mean data sets characterized by huge amounts (volume) of frequently updated data (velocity) in various formats, such as numeric, textual or images/videos (variety) (Chen et al., 2012, 2014). In this text, we will analyse relevant Facebook data.

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and the beginning of political and economic transformation in the region post-1989. During the Cold War, communist countries in Central Europe enjoyed close political and economic relations with socialist India, but weak people-to-people links. The small Indian community in the region did not exceed 1000 and included Indian students, diplomatic personnel and a few specialists temporarily assigned to some academic or other government institutions (Kugiel & P˛edziwiatr, 2014: 18). Those who decided then to settle down did so mostly for personal reasons (marriage to local partners or setting up families). State-controlled and relatively poor economies in the region had little to offer in terms of jobs, business opportunities and incomes for Indian migrants, who preferred Western European countries, especially the UK. In the post-Cold War era, the situation changed when the first batch of ambitious Indian entrepreneurs began arriving in Central Europe in the early 1990s when economic liberalization and the establishment of free markets offered more opportunities for foreigners. This first significant wave included mostly textile traders and small businessmen. They were predominantly of Sindhi and Gujarati ethnicity (at least in the case of Poland). They did not come directly from India but via third countries such as the United Arab Emirates or South Korea where many Indian businesses were located (Kugiel & P˛edziwiatr, 2014: 18). With the economic slow-down by the end of the millennium, many Indians left the region and newcomers faced increasing legal and economic hurdles. Indian migration to Central Europe was rather symbolic in comparison with migration to Western Europe. The Indian diaspora in Western Europe preferred the UK prior to 1989. In the following decade, however, it went increasingly to other Western European countries, especially Italy and Germany (Naujoks, 2009). Indian migration to Eastern Europe in significant numbers began with the 2004 eastward enlargement of the European Union which promised a new era of economic growth. This naturally increased the attractiveness of the region for Indian migrants. However, due to high unemployment levels, low incomes, restricted migration regimes and cultural barriers, the Central Europe continued to remain of limited interest for Indian migrants for several years who preferred West European countries. According to official statistics, out of some 200,000 first-time permits issued to Indian citizens in the EU in 2010, 98% or 197,000 were given to Indians migrating to one of the 15 West European countries that

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were part of the EU before 2004 enlargement (only 2% to 12 so-called New Member States, in Central Europe), including 63% (or 127,000) in just one country—the UK (Eurostat 2020a). Out of 300,000 of all valid permits of Indian citizens in the EU (excluding the UK) in 2010, almost 290,000 (97%) belonged to Indians living in West European countries (Eurostat 2020b). There were only 2324 Indians with short- and long-term residence permits (Eurostat 2020b) by the end of 2010 in Poland—the largest country in Central Europe. With the financial crisis of 2008 hitting West European countries particularly hard, by the 2010s Central Europe witnessed a steady growth of the Indian diaspora in the region which remained relatively resilient and began to economically catch up faster with the rest of the Union. According to the recent assessment of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, by the end of 2018, there were 8350 Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) in the V4, accounting for a meagre 0.02% of almost 31 million overseas Indians in the world and 0.3% in the EU28 (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2018). This included 4600 in Poland, 2400 in Czechia, 1150 in Hungary and 250 in Slovakia. This unimpressive number seems to be grossly underestimated and much less than even official statistics on Indian citizens in the V4. Indian estimates generally tend to exclude students, minors and other people who arrived for shorter stays. It also does not include people illegally staying in a given country. The official statistics of V4 states or Eurostat—main statistical body of the EU—are therefore more accurate. According to Eurostat, the total number of Indian citizens with residence permits in the V4 by end of 2018 stood at over 20,000 (22,374). This included: 13,934 in Poland, 4461 in Czechia, 3392 in Hungary and 587 in Slovakia (Eurostat 2020b). This was fivefold increase in comparison with 2010, when the total size of Indian community in the V4 was only 4230 persons. Graph 10.1 indicates that the sharp growth of the Indian community began only around 2014–2015 and has subsequently recorded an impressive growth rate. Therefore, it is not the volume but the exponential expansion of this community which deserves special attention. The actual number of Indians in the region, in fact, might be even higher since the aforementioned statistics do not include Indians staying on the basis of valid visas, naturalized Indian citizens who obtained citizenship of V4 countries or any other country, but live in the region, not to mention illegal migrants.

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25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 Slovakia

2010 194

2011 193

2012 216

2013 241

2014 235

2015 263

2016 318

2017 451

2018 587

Hungary

928

1,084

1,124

691

Czechia

784

1,194

1,283

1,538

1,084

1,580

2,217

2,957

3,392

1,824

2,180

3,113

3,612

Poland

2,324

1,943

2,769

2,696

3,475

4,461

4,675

8,637 11,549 13,934

Graph 10.1 Indian Citizens residing legally in V4 countries, 2010–2018 Source Authors’ own calculations of the Eurostat (2019a, b) data

An additional source of information about the size of the Indian community in the region can be derived from the big data. The rise of the Internet, the popularity of the social media and the availability of high quantities of individual geo-tagged data from, for example, Facebook or Twitter provide new data sources that can complement traditional sources of mobility statistics. With some limitations, such data is often able to provide more timely and potentially more accurate information about migration flows than traditional sources (Gendronneau et al., 2019). In this chapter, we analyse relevant geo-referenced big data from Facebook, which is the largest social networking platform with almost 2.5 billion users (March 2020) who log on at least once a month worldwide. Facebook coverage varies in the Visegrad region from 50% of penetration of the total population in Poland (Kemp, 2020b), 51% in Slovakia (Kemp, 2020c), 53% in the Czech Republic (Kemp, 2020d) to 62% in Hungary (Kemp, 2020a). The users share their personal information in Facebook which reveals their mobility. Through its marketing application programming interface (API), Facebook provides access to a large amount of aggregate and anonymous data on the characteristics of its

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users. As Gendronneau et al. pertinently point out, Facebook network users do not make a perfectly representative sample of the general population. However, the data available through the marketing API provides information on nearly three quarters of the EU population between 13 and 65+ years old (Gendronneau et al., 2019: 13). We have used the Facebook Marketing API to search for information about the approximate number of users within the V4 that fit the selected criterion of ‘people who live in’ countries of the V4 and used to ‘live in India’ (formerly ‘expats India’). According to our analysis carried out in February 2020, there were 9400 Facebook users from India between the age of 13 and 65+ who lived in the V4 region. Among them, the vast majority were men (7800) and the rest women. When we added expression of interest in India TV2 to the criterion of living in India in the past, we arrived at the figure of 23,000 users in the region who fulfil these criteria. Among them, 17,000 were men (Facebook 2020).3 Thus, our estimations are only slightly higher than those of Eurostat registers and might more accurately provide information about the size of the Indian community or PIOs in the region.

Indians in Poland The biggest Indian community in the V4 countries is to be found in Poland—the largest country of the region with 38 million inhabitants. Significant growth in the Indian community in Poland began after the collapse of the Communism and its accession to the EU. Poland too witnessed an unprecedented outflow of its citizens mostly to countries of Western Europe. Around 2.5 million Poles left the country and today live in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland—to mention only the largest concentrations of new Polish diaspora (GUS, 2017, 2018), and only more recently also dynamic inflow of migrants (see Graph 10.2). As a result of the transformation of the processes of migration in the last five years (2015–2020), Poland ceased to be a country of emigration and emerged for the first time in modern history as a country of immigration. The largest group of immigrants to arrive in Poland in recent 2 This criterion refers to people who have expressed an interest in or like pages related to India TV. India TV is a national Hindi news channel available on the Internet on www. indiatvnews.com. 3 Country-by-country analysis of the big data is provided in the national sub-sections.

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450000 400000 350000 300000 250000 425000 200000

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Graph 10.2 Foreigners Residing Legally in Poland with Valid Residence Permits, 2010–2018 Source Authors’ own calculations of data of Poland, Office for Foreigners 2020

years are Ukrainians making up over 50% of 425,000 migrants who were holders of residence permits in Poland at the beginning of 2020 (Poland, Office for Foreigners, 2020). Other significant immigrant communities are formed by citizens of countries like Belorussia, Germany, Russia, Vietnam and India. The Indian community is, in fact, the sixth largest in Poland and has witnessed rapid growth. In 2010, there were only around 2,000 Indians living legally in Poland (Poland, Office for Foreigners, 2020). Until 2014–2015 when Poland was transformed from an emigration to an immigration country, the number of Indian immigrants grew very slowly. At the end of 2015, there were slightly above 3000 Indians living in Poland. In subsequent years, the size of the Indian community has been growing annually by approximately 2000 persons. At the beginning of 2020, there were over 10,000 Indians holding valid residence permits (see Graph 10.3). Poland has emerged as one of the most important migration destinations for Indians in Europe. In 2018, Poland issued more first-time resident permits to Indian citizens (10,999) than France, Spain, Belgium or Ireland. In fact, only four EU Member States legalized stay of more Indians than Poland: the UK (74,946), Germany (24,900), Italy (13,517)

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Graph 10.3 Growth of the Indian Community in Poland, 2010–2019 Source Authors’ own calculations on the basis of the data from Office for Foreigners 2010–2019

and Sweden (11,230). Poland accounted for 5.6% of all first-time resident permits issued to Indians that year in the European Union (197,253). By the end of 2018, 13,934 Indian citizens had a legal permit to live in Poland (Eurostat 2020a). This makes Poland the ninth country in EU27 (excluding the UK) with the biggest Indian population [after Italy (162,000), Germany (98,000), Spain (42,000), the Netherlands (33,000), France (27,000), Sweden (26,000), Ireland (21,000) and Greece (14,000)]. One can also assume that the size of the Indian diaspora is much larger when Persons of Indian Origin are included. According to Indian MEA, there were 600 PIOs in Poland in 2018. Between 2000 and 2012, Polish citizenship was awarded to 253 Indians (Kugiel & P˛edziwiatr, 2014: 22). This transformation of Poland from an emigration to an immigration country has been closely linked with the changes in the Polish labour market and its transition from ‘a market of employer’ to a ‘market of employee’ with visible shortages in most of the crucial sectors of the economy (Brzozowski, 2019). This has apparently come to the attention of some Indians. As one Indian businessman and IT specialist living in Poland argued in 2015: ‘Indians are where the money is’ (P˛edziwiatr &

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Kugiel, 2015: 208). According to the Eurostat, in 2016 Poland recorded the highest number of employment-related residence permits (almost half a million) for third country nationals among EU Member States (Eurostat 2017). Three-fourths of Indian citizens in Poland are men. With an increase in Indian immigration to Poland, the number of males increased. In 2014, however, women made up almost 40% of the Indian community in the country. There has also been a significant increase in the number of persons who have short-term residency permits, thereby confirming the relative novelty of the immigration flows. Out of 10,000 Indian residents in Poland, 8870 hold short-term residence permits and over 1100 longterm residence permits. Almost 80% of them are young persons between 20 and 39 years. Slightly over 10% of the Indians in Poland are persons who are below 20 years of age (a significant part of this group is made up of students), and slightly below 10% are persons between 40 and 59 years. There are very few Indians who would be older than 60 years (Poland, Office for Foreigners, 2020). If one looks at the spatial distribution of Indians in Poland, over 50% live in Warsaw and in the vicinity of the capital city. As indicated in Map 10.1, the domination of Warsaw and the wider Mazowieckie Region over other parts of the country has continued over the years. In 2014, the capital city was the most popular place of settlement for Indians living in Poland and remains so until today. Other cities which have attracted a significant number of Indian immigrants in recent years include Cracow, Wroclaw and Gdansk. In Cracow, for example, Indians make up the fifth largest immigrant community in the city after Ukrainians, Russians, Byelorussians and the Italians. The registers of the Regional Authorities mention almost 1000 Indians living within the city boundaries, whereas the City Hall and the Social Insurance registers put the figure of Indians in the city at around 500–600 (P˛edziwiatr et al., 2019). Almost one-third of all Indian citizens currently residing in Poland are pursuing some studies. The growth of this category of immigrants has been particularly remarkable. Their numbers have risen sharply from a meagre 156 students in 2004 to 324 in 2009, but declined marginally to 319 in 2014 and witnessed a tenfold increase in 2019 (3571) (GUS, 2019: 162). Interestingly, according to Eurostat, almost half of resident permits issued to Indians in Poland in 2018 (5080) were for educational reasons, which was also third highest rank in the EU, after the

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Map 10.1 Indian Citizens in Poland in 2014 (Green) and 2019 (Red) Source Authors’ own calculations on the basis of the data from Poland, Office for Foreigners, 2014–2019

UK (15,622) and Germany (7378) and 11% of all that permits across the EU28 (Eurostat, 2020b). What has driven this unprecedented growth? The presence of slightly more than 300 Indian students (out of some 200,000 globally and among 40,000 foreign students in Poland) in 2015 was seen as a matter of concern (P˛edziwiatr & Kugiel, 2015: 193). Reasons for the low attraction of Poland as a study destination for Indian students include, among others the language barrier (both at universities and in daily life), low international recognition of Polish educational institutions, low availability of loans and scholarships, strict visa and immigration policies, limited labour market opportunities and the small Indian diaspora (P˛edziwiatr & Kugiel,

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2015: 200–210). Some of these obstacles have been removed, either by policy interventions or by the ‘invisible hand of the market’. The change has been partly related to Polish economic growth and the ease of finding a job during or after one’s studies (Mucha & P˛edziwiatr, 2019: 56– 57). Some Indian citizens staying in Poland on student visas reportedly study in institutions providing low-quality academic teaching and devote a significant part of their time to gainful employment (e.g. in Uber Eats or Uber) (Fritz, 2019; Szostak, 2019). According to Facebook marketing tools, there were 6000 Indian expats between 13 and 65+ years of age living in Poland in February 2020. Among them, 4500 were men. When the category of interest in India TV was added to the analysis, Facebook tools showed 13,000 persons linked with such criteria; of these, 9500 were men (Facebook, 2020).

Indians in Czechia The second largest Indian community in the region is to be found in the Czech Republic. Although the country had witnessed an exodus after the collapse of the Communism and the Velvet Revolution (peaceful spilt of Czechoslovakia into Czechia and Slovakia), it had adapted the conditions of market economy much faster than Poland and began to attract immigrants. As a result, it was transformed from a net emigration to a net immigration country. The size of the immigrant community in Czechia during 2009–2019 slightly decreased in 2010 and remained significantly high over the whole period (see Graph 10.4). With a population of a little over 10 million people, immigrants constitute a much higher percentage of the total population than in Poland. Although much slower than Poland, the number of immigrants has begun to grow from 450,000 in 2014 to almost 585,000 in 2019. In contrast to Poland, the immigrant community in Czechia is made up of a higher percentage of persons who have permanent residency. In fact, more immigrants in the country have permanent rather than temporary residence permits. Among the largest groups of immigrants in the country are Ukrainians (141,580), Slovaks (120,098), Vietnamese (61,638), Russians (37,000), Poles (21,681) and Germans (21,396). The Indian community has experienced significant growth in recent years. There were slightly below 1500 Indians residing legally in Czechia in 2013. Six years later, they had increased threefold to 4459 (see Graph 10.5). Though the total number

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Graph 10.5 Citizens of India Residing in the Czech Republic, 2008–2018 Source Authors’ own calculations on the basis of the data from Czech Statistical Office, 2009–2019

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of Indians in Czechia is much smaller than in Poland, their presence is more substantial in relation to the total population. By the end of 2018, out of 4459 Indian citizens with valid residence permits in the Czech Republic, 29% (or 1303 persons) were women, 3841 persons had temporary residence permits and 669 persons permanent residency whereas 618 Indians long-term visas. This type of gender composition of the Indian community in the country and the structure of the legal basis of its members highlights a relatively new character of this immigrant presence. The inflow of Indians to Czechia is somehow connected with the growing economic ties and more Indian investments in the country. In order to create better conditions for Indian professionals, Czechia has been one of a few European countries to sign a Social Security Agreement in 2014. During the recent visit of President Ram Nath Kovind in 2018, the Czech Government announced that it would issue 500 visas for Indian professionals to enhance cooperation (Bagchi, 2018). Like Poland, immigrant inflow, including that of Indians, to Czechia, is linked with the internationalization of Czech universities. Out of almost 300,000 students at the public and private universities in Czechia during the academic year 2018–2019, over 43,000 students were foreigners. A primary reason for such large numbers has been that the Czech Republic has been one of the European countries which did not put any restrictions on working for foreign students (Rajan, 2018). The largest number of foreign students in Czechia was made of Slovaks (over 20,000), Russians (over 6000) and Ukrainians (almost 3000). The growing number of students has also included Indians. In 2003, there were only 42 Indian citizens studying at Czech universities. During the academic year 2018– 2019, there were 346 Indian students in Czechia (Kuˇcerová, 2019; Marešová, 2018). According to social media, there were 1700 Indian expats between 13 and 65+ years of age living in the Czech Republic in February 2020. Among them, 1100 were men and 600 women. When the category of interest in India TV was added to the analysis, Facebook marketing tools revealed 3700 persons who fulfilled such criteria; among these, 2700 were men (Facebook, 2020). In other words, big data has been revealing slightly lower figures about the size of the Indian community in the country than the official statistics.

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Indians in Hungary The third largest Indian diaspora in the Visegrad Four is in Hungary. In the 1990s, most immigrants who arrived in Hungary were from the neighbouring countries and of Hungarian ethnicity. Initially, 80% of those who entered Hungary were Romanian citizens, mostly of Hungarian ancestry. Between 1994 and 2002, they settled and naturalized in the country and comprised less than 40% of immigrants (Juhasz, 2003). Hungary witnessed a migration transition earlier than Poland and yet in the first decade of the twenty-first century started to attract significant number of immigrants not only of Hungarian descent but those without it. Some of the largest groups constituted citizens of the former Soviet Union, mainly from the Ukraine and China. At the end of 2019, there were over 24,000 Ukrainians and almost 19,000 Chinese residing legally in Hungary (KSH, 2020). Immigration peaked in 2011 reaching 206,000 persons and then slightly declined for a few years before it grew from 2017 onwards to reach over 180,000 by 2019 (Graph 10.6). One of the important groups of migrants who started to arrive to Hungary in 1990 were persons seeking international protection. Until 1997, Hungary accepted refugees only from European countries and persons fleeing the war in the Balkans who constituted a significant part of total refugees. After lifting these restrictions, asylum applications from non-European citizens (initially from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Iraq) constituted a growing part of the applications and subsequently the majority of such applications. Like other V4 countries, Hungary was also primarily treated as a transit country for asylum seekers whose asylum procedures were usually terminated due to applicant’s ‘disappearance’ (Juhasz, 2003). During the so-called ‘migration crisis’ of 2015, Hungary received over 177,000 asylum seekers; of these, only 345 were Indian citizens. During 2016–2018, their number sharply declined. In 2016, there were less than 30,000 asylum seekers who entered Hungary and 123 of them were Indian citizens. This figure dropped to slightly over 3000; of these, only 6 asylum seekers were from India. In 2018, there was not a single Indian citizen among a total of 671 asylum seekers (KSH, 2020). This was largely because of stringent securitization of the borders and the closure of Hungarian borders to persons seeking international protection. Hungary nevertheless continues to attract a significant number of economic migrants from the world, including from India. According to Indian estimates, there are over 3000 Indians presently living in

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Graph 10.6 Foreign Citizens Residing in Hungary (without asylum seekers), 2009–2019 Source Author’s own calculation of the data from Hungarian Central Statistical Office KSH 2009–2019

Hungary. Many of them are ICT professionals, while some are working in the manufacturing sector of Indo-Hungarian joint ventures and in the agricultural sector (Embassy of India 2020). There are also about 650 Indian students studying at various universities mostly in Budapest, Pecs, Szeged, Miskolc and Debrecen. Generally, the number of foreign students has grown over the past year by 8.2%, and in the academic year 2018– 2019, there were a total of 36,100 foreign students in the country (KSH, 2020). A primary reason why foreign students including Indians prefer Hungarian universities is because an increasing number of courses are taught in English and have acquired an international reputation. The Academic Ranking of World Universities in 2018 included five Hungarian universities. Recent statistics indicate that between 2012 and 2017 the percentage of foreign students in Hungary increased from 7% to 12%. Almost every fourth foreign student that came to study in Hungary has been from Asia. To a large extent, this has been the result of academic scholarships. Interestingly, one of the countries included in scholarship schemes for foreign students (Stypendium Hungaricum) is India. During

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his visit to New Delhi in 2013, Prime Minister Victor Orban announced that Hungary would offer 200 scholarships for graduate and postgraduate studies for Indian citizens. The system was made operational from 2014 onwards) and partially explains the rapid increase in number of Indian students in Hungary in recent years (Kolba, 2019). According to big data, in February 2020, there were 1500 Indian expats between 13 and 65+ years of age living in Hungary. Of these, less than 1000 were men. When the category of interest in India TV was added to the analysis, Facebook tools showed 4200 persons linked with such criteria; among them, 2900 were men (Facebook 2020).

Indians in Slovakia The smallest Indian community among the V4 is to be found in Slovakia—the smallest country of the region—which has less than 5.5 million inhabitants. Like other countries in the region, it has undergone significant changes in migratory patterns in recent decades—instead of exporting labour in the last decade (from 2010 onwards) to increasingly import it. The number of third country nationals legally residing in Slovakia has been steadily growing from slightly over 21,000 in 2009 to over four-fold a decade later. In 2016, third country nationals in Slovakia constituted a group smaller than EU nationals (50,000 versus 54,000). The next year, they were more than EU nationals (65,000 versus 55,000). At the end of 2019, there were 143,000 foreigners living in Slovakia. Of these, 86,000 were third country nationals and 57,000 were EU nationals (Graph 10.7). Some of the largest groups of third country nationals currently residing in Slovakia are Ukrainians (30,447), Serbs (15,522), Russians (4896) and Vietnamese (4505) (MINV, 2019). Indians have been among rapidly growing immigrants in Slovakia. From less than 200 Indians a decade ago, they have grown fivefold to almost 1000 by the end of 2019. The vast majority of Indians currently residing in Slovakia have temporary residence permits (778 persons). The remaining (189 persons) have permanent residency and most probably have been living in the country for a longer period of time (Graph 10.8). This structure of the residence permits confirms a relatively novel character of the Indian community (MINV, 2019). Similar to other Central European countries, Indian students make up a significant part of Slovakia’s foreign student population. During the academic year 2018–2019, there were about 300 Indian students

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100000 90000 80000 70000 60000 50000 85,827

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Graph 10.7 Number of Valid Residence Permits for Third Country Nationals in Slovakia, 2009–2019 Source Authors’ own calculations of the data from MINV 2009–2019

studying at Slovak universities. This represented a significant growth from a meagre 4 students a decade earlier (Cvtisr, 2020). According to big data, there were fewer than 1000 Indian expats between 13 and 65+ years of age living in Slovakia in February 2020. 1200

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When the category of interest in India TV was added to the analysis, Facebook tools were showing 2000 persons linked with such criteria among whom 1400 were men (Facebook 2020).

Characteristics of the Indian Diaspora in V4 Despite some individual differences, Indian migration to the Visegrad 4 reveals a number of similarities. A common feature has been the migration of Indians in the post-Cold War era though a substantial growth has been witnessed in recent years, especially after 2014–2015. Interestingly, this was around the time of the refugee crisis in Europe, when the V4 took harsh anti-migration positions in intra-EU discussions on resettlement of refugees. Contrary to their image, the V4 proved to be especially hospitable to Indian migrants for several reasons. Firstly, Indian migration coincided with important demographic changes and growing crisis on local labour markets in the V4, which transformed them from countries sending migrants to destination countries. Secondly, external developments such as the economic crisis in Western European countries, Brexit, the tightening of immigration policies in the UK and Australia led Indians to look for new migration destinations. In that context, the Visegrad region, which enjoyed remarkable growth over the last three decades seemed to be an attractive destination. Thirdly, a major factor in the rapid growth of the Indian diaspora has been the growing popularity of the region as a destination for higher education and/or Indian investments (e.g. the investment of Apollo Tyres in Hungary or of the Tata’s Land Rover factory in Slovakia). Students and professionals have been frontrunners of Indian migration to the region. Other common characteristics of the Indian diaspora in the V4 countries are that they are predominantly male and young. Most of them stay on short-term residence permits. In all V4 countries, the Indian community comprises three major groups: entrepreneurs, students and professionals (Kugiel & P˛edziwiatr, 2014). In recent years, the last two categories have been expanding most rapidly, which suggest that most Indians choose Central Europe because of education or work opportunities. This apparently explains why this group is highly-skilled, welleducated and relatively prosperous. Indian migration to Central Europe therefore tends to be similar to earlier patterns of skilled (or white-collars) migration to the United States, the UK or Australia rather than the

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migration of semi-skilled labour to the Gulf or some South European countries. The Indian community in the V4 has integrated well in host societies. In Poland, for instance, the Indian community has shown significant adaptive skills and has been contributing positively to host country’s economy, society and culture. Those who settled down for a longer time have also been well integrated and have not been experiencing any major problem in with host society. As a 2014 study concluded: Indians often marry Polish partners, have Polish friends, learn the Polish language and adapt to Polish traditions and social norms. They become increasingly involved in cultural, social and economic life in Poland, which they often consider as their new homeland. Indians constitute a prosperous and skilled minority and enrich Polish society, adding colour to an otherwise quite ethnically and racially homogenous social fabric. They broaden the variety of cuisine options, propose new cultural events with an eastern flavour, and contribute to religious pluralism in Poland. […] It seems that, thus far at least, Indians in Poland do not compete for jobs with Poles, but rather quite successfully create new workplaces and have a positive input to Polish economy. They play a facilitating role in expanding bilateral trade and have contributed to attracting some Indian investments to Poland. (Kugiel & P˛edziwiatr, 2014: 32)

A similar description would probably be valid for other V4 nations. Indians are surprisingly well received in highly homogenous societies of the Visegrad countries. Though there were some media reports about discrimination or mistreatment of Indians in the region, these have been sporadic incidents and were generally quickly condemned by authorities. Indians in Central Europe run their own cultural associations, cultivate Indian traditions and celebrate Indian holidays enriching the cultural diversity of the region. The Indian community is also supported by Indian Embassies in Czechia and Slovakia as well as theIndian Cultural Centre in Prague, which also organizes cultural events, dance performances and music concerts. Moreover, there is an ongoing process of better legal protection and formalization of status of Indian migrants in V4 countries. Czechia and

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Hungary are among 12 EU Member States which have signed bilateral Social Security Agreements with India4 (Melin, 2018) to secure certain rights and services of their respective migrants. V4 governments are making greater efforts to attract and facilitate more immigration from India. This was highlighted by the announcement of 500 special visas for Indian professionals by Czechia and the offer of Hungarian scholarships for 200 Indian students annually. Moreover, the launch of direct flights between Warsaw and Delhi by Polish national airline LOT in September 2019—first between India and the region—will prove to be a major step in increasing contacts and interaction between Indian and Visegrad nations.

Conclusions The growth of the Indian diaspora in the Visegrad countries indicates that the region has emerged as one of the promising migration destinations for Indians in Europe. However, it is by no means certain whether this is a permanent trend or just a temporary phenomenon since most Indians hold short-term permits and a majority of them comprise students who can move to either countries or return to India after the completion of their studies. They could also be professionals who will move in accordance with global assignments of international corporations. Much will depend on the economic situation, the legal framework and the general attitude towards migration in the Visegrad countries. The experience so far allows for limited optimism. The growing economies, the unfolding demographic crisis and expanding labour shortages in all V4 economies will sustain large demand for foreign workers. With rapidly rising incomes and standard of living catching up with Western Europe, the V4 will continue to be attractive destinations for migrants. Moreover, strengthening political and economic cooperation between India and the V4 creates favourable conditions for stronger people-to-people links. Indian migration to V4 is therefore likely to continue though at a less spectacular pace. One can conclude that so far Indian migration to Central Europe has generally been beneficial for migrants, the V4 countries, India as well 4 Other EU Member States that have signed a social security agreement with India are Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Austria and Portugal. The first country in the V4 to sign the SSA was Hungary (2010) followed by Czechia in 2014.

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as India-EU relations. Though relatively small, the Indian diaspora in V4 is rather prosperous as well as well educated, contributing to local economies, the social fabric and exchange of ideas. Above all, the presence of a growing Indian diaspora in Central Europe fosters better exchange of ideas, mutual learning, and helps overcome the information deficit, which can positively contribute to official relations. It has added a strong human bond which had been missing in the past. It can even possibly lead to greater economic cooperation and strengthen political partnership. It is likely to attract stronger interest of Indian leaders, who especially under Prime Minister Modi give greater attention to the well-being of overseas Indians. Finally, Indian migration to V4 may help in improving their international reputation, which was considerably tarnished during the refugee crisis. Legal Indian migration albeit in very small numbers partially contributes to bolster the official V4 position that they are not opposed to immigrants, but are eager to exercise better control over the borders and are not opposed to orderly, safe and legal migration manner. It may very well offer them an opportunity to tell a better story, wherein migration is not seen as a threat but as an opportunity.

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Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/978904 8510979-006. Eurostat. (2017). Residence permits – Statistics on first permits issued during the year. Retrieved January 15, 2020 from dost˛epny w: https://ec.europa. eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Residence_permits__statis tics_on_first_permits_issued_during_the_year#First_residence_permits:_an_ overview. Eurostat. (2019a). Residence permits: Statistics on first permits issued during the year data extracted in September 2019, Table 2: First residence permits issued, by country of citizenship, 2018. Retrieved February 2, 2020, from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Reside nce_permits_-_statistics_on_first_permits_issued_during_the_year#First_reside nce_permits_by_citizenship. Eurostat. (2019b). Residence permits: Statistics on first permits issued during the year, data extracted in September 2019, Table 4: Top five countries whose citizens received first residence permits in the EU-28, by reason and by member state issuing the permit, 2018. Retrieved February 2, 2020, from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Res idence_permits_-_statistics_on_first_permits_issued_during_the_year#First_res idence_permits_by_citizenship. Eurostat. (2020a). First permits by region, length of validity and citizenship [migr_resfirst], (updated 31 January 2020). Eurostat. (2020b). All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year, (updated 31 January 2020). Facebook. (2020). Facebook Ads Manager. Retrieved February 20, 2020, from https://www.facebook.com/adsmanager. Fritz, P. (2019). Dlaczego tak wielu Hindusów przeprowadza si˛e do Polski. Retrieved November 11, 2020 from http://wyborcza.pl/7,156282,244673 74,dlaczego-tak-wielu-hindusowprzeprowadza-sie-do-polski.html. Gendronneau, C., Yildiz, D., Zagheni, E., Fiorio, L., Hsiao, Y., Stepanek, M., Weber, I., Abel, G., & Hoorens, S. (2019) Measuring labour mobility and migration using big data. European Commission. Giri, D. K. (2001). Indians in Europe. In B. Vivekanandan & D. K. Giri (Eds.), Contemporary Europe and South Asia (pp. 179–196). Concept Publishing Company. Górny, A., & Kaczmarczyk, P. (2018). A Known but Uncertain Path: The Role of Foreign Labour in Polish Agriculture. Journal of Rural Studies, 64, 177–188. GUS. (2019). Szkoły wyzsze ˙ i ich finanse w 2018 roku. Warszawa: Główny Urz˛ad Statystyczny.

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GUS [Main Statitical Office]. (2017). Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach emigracji z Polski w latach 2004–2016. Retrieved from Główny Urz˛ad Statystyczny website http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/mig racje-zagraniczne-ludnosci/informacja-o-rozmiarach-i-kierunkach-emigracjiz-polski-w-latach-20042016,2,10.html. GUS [Main Statistical Office]. (2018). Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004–2017 . Główny Urz˛ad Statystyczny. India, Embassy in Hungary. (2020). Hungary and Bosnia & Herzegovina: Indian Community. Retrieved February 20, 2020, from https://www.eoi budapest.gov.in/page/indian-community/?fbclid=IwAR0XXdkGsgheCN0J i0d2snMLEVkfD9k_ix1nMZrrAK7wHTxfUeyyI0DurWs). India, MEA. (2018). Population of overseas Indians (compiled in December 2018). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Juhasz, J. (2003). Hungary: Transit country between east and west. Migrationpolicy.Org. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hungary-transit-cou ntry-between-east-and-west. Kaczmarczyk, P., & Okólski, M. (2007). International migrations in Central and Eastern Europe: Current and future trends. https://doi.org/10.13140/2.1. 4826.4968. Kahanec, M., & Zimmermann, K. F (Ed.). (2010). EU labor markets after postenlargement migration. Springer-Verlag. Kemp, S. (2020a). Digital 2020: Hungary. Hootsuite. Kemp, S. (2020b). Digital 2020: Poland. Hootsuite. https://datareportal.com/ reports/digital-2020-poland. Kemp, S. (2020c). Digital 2020: Slovakia. Hootsuite. https://datareportal.com/ reports/digital-2020-slovakia. Kemp, S. (2020d). Digital 2020: The Czech Republic. Hootsuite. https://datare portal.com/reports/digital-2020-czech-republic. Kolba, D. (2019, February 4) Number of foreign students at Hungarian Universities keeps increasing. Daily News Hungary. Retrieved February 15, 2020, from https://dailynewshungary.com/number-of-foreign-studentsat-hungarian-universities-keeps-increasing/. KSH [Hungarian Central Statistical Office]. (2020). Publication Repertory: Hungarian Central Statistical Office. https://www.ksh.hu/apps/shop.kia dvany?p_kiadvany_id=1051317&p_lang=EN. Kuˇcerová, V. (2019). Studujících cizincu˚ pˇribývá, zajímá je medicína i technika. Universitas, magazín vysokých škol https://www.universitas.cz/tema/2354studujicich-cizincu-pribyva-zajima-je-medicina-i-technika. Kugiel, P., & P˛edziwiatr, K. (2014). The Indian Diaspora and Poland–India relations,’ PISM Report. PISM.

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ˇ na vysokých školách | StatisMarešová, J. (2018). Nejvíce cizincu˚ studuje v CR ˇ tika&My - mˇesíˇcník Ceského statistického úˇradu. Statistikaamy https://www. statistikaamy.cz/2018/01/nejvice-cizincu-studuje-v-cr-na-vysokych-skolach/. Melin, P. (2018). Member states’ social security agreements with India: Lessons for the future of a common EU approach. European Journal of Social Security, 20(2), 173–187. MINV (Mnistry of Interior of the Slovak Republic). (2019). Statistical overview on legal and illegal migration in the Slovak Republic. Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic. https://www.minv.sk/?rok-2019-1. Mucha, J., & P˛edziwiatr, K. (2019). Cudzoziemcy na uczelniach krakowskich, Raport Obserwatorium Wielokulturowo´sci i Migracji (pp. 56–57). Kraków: OWiM. Naujoks, D. (2009, October 15). Emigration, immigration, and diaspora relations in India. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpol icy.org/article/emigration-immigration-and-diaspora-relations-india. Accessed 10 February 2020. Okólski, M. (2007). Europe in movement: Migration from/to Central and Eastern Europe. CMR Working Papers, no. 22/80. Okólski, M. (Ed.). (2012). European immigrations trends, structures and policy implications. Amsterdam University Press. P˛edziwiatr, K. (2019). Local report on policy frameworks targeting migrant entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship in Poland. Kraków: Taskforcome Project UEK. P˛edziwiatr, K., & Kugiel, P. (2015). Poland as a study destination: The case of Indians at polish universities. In A. Surdej, & M. K˛edzierski (Eds.), Economic challenges for higher education in Central and Eastern Europe (pp. 187–213). Wudawnictwo Adam Marszałek. P˛edziwiatr, K., Stonawski, M., & Brzozowski, J. (2019). Imigranci w ´ Krakowie w Swietle Danych Rejestrowych. Obserwatorium Wielokulturowo´sci i Migracji. https://owim.uek.krakow.pl/wp-content/uploads/user-files/rep orts/Raport%20demograficzny.pdf. Poland, Office for Foreigners. (2020) (2019). Foreigners holding valid residence cards in Poland. Retrieved February 20, 2020, from UDSC website www. migracje.gov.pl. Rajan I. S. (ed.) (2018). India Migration Report 2018: Migrants in Europe. Routledge India. Subhan, A. (1998, December). Migration and asylum in Central and Eastern Europe. Working Paper. Directorate General for Research of the European Parliament. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/libe/pdf/ 104_en.pdf. Accessed 5 February 2020. Szostak, P. (2019). Pracowałem na czarno w Uber Eats. Retrieved November 17, 2020 from http://extra.wyborcza.pl/ubereats.

CHAPTER 11

India and Central Europe: A Road More Travelled? Patryk Kugiel

Introduction Central European countries, which used to enjoy close and friendly relations with India during the Cold War era, received far less attention from New Delhi since the 1990s and the end of communism and their transformation to free market democracies. No Indian prime minister has paid a visit to the region for over three decades. The last time an Indian prime minister was in Poland was as long ago as in 1979. Even Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has paid a number of visits to Europe, has not visited Central Europe even once. Visits by Indian ministers of external affairs to the Visegrad 4 were generally rare. When the Indian External Affairs Minister, Salman Khurshid visited Hungary in 2013, after a long break, the Ministry issued special article to explain why this ‘road was less travelled’ and announced that this visit ‘may pave the way for stronger ties between India and Central Europe’ (Mohan, 2013). Yet, when External

P. Kugiel (B) Asia-Pacific Programme, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_11

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Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar travelled to Warsaw on 28–29 August 2019, he was the first Indian foreign minister who visited Poland since 32 years (Roy Chaudhury, 2019). The periodic visits of Indian presidents were unable to undo the widespread impression of neglect by New Delhi. By not paying adequate attention to the region, India might have missed the economic opportunities emerging from the remarkable economic transformation of the region over the last three decades. The Warsaw that Dr Jaishankar recently saw was totally different from what Prime Minister Morarji Desai witnessed 40 years ago. As Central European countries oriented their foreign policies towards Western Europe, they established the Visegrad Four (V4) in 1991 to enhance their prospects to join the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After their accession to the EU in 2004, the V4 remains one of the most vibrant sub-regional groups in Europe, with growing economic and political clout in the Union. With rapid economic growth, close historical ties and convergent strategic views with those of India, this is opportune moment to tap the untapped potential for greater Indian cooperation with the V4.

Economic Cooperation Over the past decade, the four Visegrad countries have been among the fastest growing economies in the European Union. In 2018, each of them grew above the average EU growth rate of 2% GDP, with Poland recording the third highest GDP growth of 5.1% among the EU-28 and Hungary being the fourth at 4.9%. Together, the V4 constitute the twelfth largest economy in the world valued at a little over US$1 trillion; this is about one-third of the size of India’s economy. The V4 also offer a consumer market of 64 million inhabitants, which is 12.5% of the EU’s total. However, the V4’s trade with India—US$4 billion in 2019 (India, Department of Commerce, 2020)—is far below the potential. The V4’s share in the total EU’s external exports constituted 10.1% in 2016. However, its share in the EU’s exports to India was only 3.6%. Similarly, while they count for 9.6% of the total EU imports, their share in imports from India was 5.6% of EU imports from India in 2016 (own calculation based on Eurostat, European Commission). With an economy of over US$550 billion—the biggest in the region and the fifth largest in the EU—Poland is India’s forty-eighth largest trading partner with

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trade in goods worth US$2.4 billion in 2019–2020. There is therefore considerable potential to increase V4-India trade. In the V4 countries’ quest for new economic partners as well as diversification beyond Europe, India is regarded as an attractive destination. Having had a long tradition of cooperation in Indian industrialization from the 1960s to the 1980s, Central European countries are willing to offer new and low cost technologies to facilitate Indian modernization programmes from infrastructure to sanitation and agro-processing. There is still no widespread awareness in India that well-established companies like Bata, Bella India, Home Credit and Skoda are from Central Europe. In general, by June 2020 the foreign direct investments (FDI) inflows from V4 to India amounted to US$770 million (including from Poland: US$684 million, Czech Republic: US$43 million, Hungary: US$25 million, Slovakia: US$18 million) (DPIIT, 2020). Numerous Indian companies (including Tata Motors, Infosys, Dr. Reddys, Wipro, Biocon and many others) have directed their investments in the V4 countries. According to Eurostat, total stock of Indian FDI in the region by 2018 was e46.6 million (including: Poland: e65 million; Czech Republic: −e6.9 million, Hungary: −e5.6 million; and Slovakia: −e5.9 million) (Eurostat,2020a), which is undervalued as most Indian FDI comes through subsidiaries registered in other countries and not reflected in official statistics. Central Europe has already become a new destination for Indian tourists and a place for a gradually growing Indian diaspora. The Czech Republic alone attracted almost 100,000 Indian visitors in 2018, with a high increase in arrivals (TnHGlobal, 2019). Similarly, the size of Indian population living in the V4 has increased from just several thousand in the early 2000s, to over 20,000 in 2019 (Eurostat, 2020b). With one of the lowest unemployment rates across Europe, the region may soon become even more attractive for Asian migrants. The decision by the Czech Republic announced in 2018 to grant 500 high-skilled long stay visas to Indian professionals every year is reflective of this (Bagchi, 2018). Most countries in the region (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) have already signed social security agreements with India, to improve safety of Indian migrants, while Poland may soon follow suit. Visegrad 4 universities are becoming increasingly attractive for Indian students, offering good quality education available in English for competitive prices, as compared to Western Europe. V4 governments have also taken special initiatives to encourage closer educational links and invest in Indian talent.

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For instance, for several years Hungary has been offering 200 scholarships to Indian students. The resumption of direct flights between Warsaw and Delhi in September 2019 will remove another hindrance to closer cultural, economic and people-to-people ties. Though the COVID-19 pandemic brought to a halt people-to-people contacts, one can assume they will restart once the situation allows.

Political Cooperation As India seeks to increase its global position and presence, it would need more reliable partners in Europe, especially after Brexit, to promote its interests within the European Union as well as in multilateral forums like the United Nations Security Council or the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The V4 countries together send as many as 108 members to the European Parliament (Poland: 52, Czech Republic: 21, Hungary: 21, Slovakia: 14) out of 705 in total after Brexit. They have also held influential positions within EU institutions. For instance, Donald Tusk, former Polish Prime Minister (2007–2014), had served as the President of the European Council from 2014 to 2019. In recent years, V4 countries played an increasingly assertive and important role in shaping both the internal agenda and external policy of the EU, willing to block any decisions they see as contrary to their common interest. For instance, in June 2019, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland blocked the European Union from deciding on an unduly ambitious goal of committing to net zero carbon emissions by 2050 (The Guardian, 2019). In July 2019, they also prevented the nomination of Franz Timmermans for President of the European Commission, against the wishes of larger member states like France and Germany (BBC World News, 2019). Moreover, their tougher stance towards irregular migration since the 2015 refugee crisis has led to many of their features become integral elements of new EU approach to migration. Though the rise of right-wing parties to power in Hungary and Poland and tensions with the European Commission over the rule of law situation in these countries weaken their position to some extent, the V4 proven they make a force to be reckoned with. While in external affairs, V4 members are most active in shaping EU policy in its immediate neighbourhood (Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, Middle East) and transatlantic partnership, they show also increasing interest in relations

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with Asia (as their enhanced cooperation with China illustrates). As they make their voices better heard in the Union, they might become greater advocates of enhanced EU-India cooperation. Having had a friendly relationship with India in the past, similar experiences in economic transformation since 1990 and certain similarities in their worldviews (i.e. attachment to sovereignty, believe in strong role for states, etc.), they could show more understanding to India’s concerns, goals and limitations in relations with the EU. Thus, closer V4-India relations are likely to foster a more pragmatic EU-India partnership. At the international level, the V4 members have supported India’s candidature for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council as well as its efforts to join the non-proliferation regimes (the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Agreement, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime). Given their shared historical experiences such as the lack of a colonial heritage and successful transition from socialist to market economies, they have similar approaches to those of India on various international challenges from climate change to terrorism than many developed Western countries. For instance, the Polish presidency of the COP 19 meeting in Warsaw in 2013 facilitated a compromise in global climate change negotiations, including on the concept on intended nationally determined contributions. Moreover, at the COP 24 (Katowice, 2018), Poland promoted the idea of ‘just transition’—a policy to ensure that the shift to green energy does not adversely affect the interests of workers and communities that rely on outmoded industries. The Visegrad countries are also advocates of sovereignty and territorial integrity. As beneficiaries of globalization, they oppose protectionism and support free trade. Central European countries also send one non-permanent member to the UN Security Council. Its significance was highlighted in August 2019 when Poland, then as chair of the United Nations Security Council, handled the Kashmir issue in a more than helpful way to India (Bagchi, 2019). It endorsed New Delhi’s stance that the problem must be resolved ‘bilaterally’ between Pakistan and India. As Chair, it also refused to put the issue for discussion on Pakistan’s request (The Economic Times, 2019). When China sought to bring the issue up for ‘closed consultation’ at the UN Security Council, no President’s statement was issued in order not to give it greater international recognition (India Today, 2019). Moreover, the current geopolitical milieu is very congenial for greater V4-India cooperation. Brussels has acknowledged the growing economic

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and strategic importance of India and seeks to deepen cooperation in many fields as is clearly evident in the 2018 EU Strategy on India. This encourages V4 to strengthen their cooperation with India, especially when their relations with China are worsening after a brief period of closer engagement, in the 17+1 format. Mounting disappointment with this format and increasingly assertive China’s policy globally made the Visegrad countries to re-evaluate their relations with China. Growing doubts about the China’s role during the COVID-19 pandemic and the rising rivalry between the United States and China, strengthened suspicions in the region about Chinese engagements in Europe and beyond. As the India-Chinese relations plunged after the military clashes on the border in Ladakh in June 2020, convergence of views on China emerged. India, as democratic state, seemed to be a strategic partner of choice to all V4 countries, even though their primary economic partner remains China. Closer cooperation with India provided an opportunity for V4 countries to pursue a more balanced approach towards Asia wherein India plays an important role. Moreover, India’s growing stronger defence and strategic cooperation with the United States—a crucial security ally of the V4—is also conducive for enhanced V4-India cooperation in security, defence and strategic issues. Both the Czech Republic and Poland, which were important sources of arms sales to India during the Cold War, have expressed their willingness to contribute to Indian efforts for defence modernization. With the growing liberalization of the Indian defence sector, permitting 100% FDI, arms acquisition, technological cooperation and joint ventures in defence brings new opportunities for V4-India cooperation.

A Regional Approach India can also explore possibilities of cooperation with a sub-regional organization like the V4 to highlight its growing engagement with Central Europe. The V4 already has time-tested mechanisms for cooperation with major non-European partners. Though the Visegrad group serves mainly to coordinate position of states within the EU, it has become part of their global opening and more active foreign policy beyond Europe (Kugiel, 2016). In the ‘V4+’ formula, they have held regular summits with leaders of Japan (since 2013), South Korea (since 2015) and Israel (since 2017). The V4 + formula has also functioned at the level of ministers of foreign affairs or defence of selected countries,

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encompassing not only Japan, South Korea or Israel, but also occasionally other partners, like Brazil (in 2016) or Turkey (2019). These meetings usually facilitate an overview of economic, political and security cooperation and have led to practical initiatives of cooperation in select areas. The Visegrad countries have also engaged in other multilateral platforms for cooperation with non-EU partners like the 16+1 format (changed into 17+1 in 2019) in 2012 for cooperation with China and the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) focused on connectivity and infrastructure development in Central Europe, where the United States plays a special role. The visit of the President Donald Trump to the TSI summit in Warsaw in 2017 was an important signal of American reengagement in this part of Europe. It underlined Central Europe’s role as an important, active and independent actor in international relations willing and capable to start new initiatives and act autonomously from the European Union. Prime Minister Narendra Modi apparently appreciates multilateral formats for both practical (saving time and travel) as well as political (prestige) reasons. For instance, he had invited leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) for his swearing-in ceremony (2014), African leaders for the Africa-India Summit (2015) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders for Republic Day (2016). He had also travelled to Sweden for the Nordic-plus India Summit with five north European countries (Sweden Finland, Norway, Denmark and Iceland) in April 2018. A similar meeting with the four Central European leaders could prove to be a welcome opportunity to make up for the past neglect of the region, explore the potential for cooperation and enhance bilateral engagement.

The Way Forward The Visegrad Four have time and again expressed their desire to enhance traditional friendly ties with India. The visit of Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar to the region (Hungary and Poland) in August 2019 signalled the opening of a new chapter in relations. In Warsaw, he conveyed India’s readiness ‘to engage more actively’ in Central Europe, which should have a positive impact on the overall EU-India cooperation. He also conveyed New Delhi’s desire to engage with Poland in the Visegrad mechanism (India, MEA, 2019).

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A V4+ India cooperation format is apparently a good option for all concerned provided the regional engagement does not replace, but supplements, bilateral cooperation. As V4 governments are looking for upgraded bilateral partnerships with India, they might be wary that V4India summit close the way for highest level bilateral visits. If this concern is resolved, then the new road to Central Europe is ready to travel. A V4+ India summit could possibly take place in 2021. This would give enough time to prepare a robust agenda and facilitate tangible outcomes in economic and political cooperation. The summit meeting should be organized with a V4-India business summit as well as meetings of experts and the media. If V4 countries can handle their national competition for political gains and economic benefits, and come up with a joint offer for India, building on complementarity of national companies and using specific expertise of every nation, this would prove an added value for regional engagement.

References Bagchi, I. (2018, September 12). Prague opens up, to offer high-skill long-stay visas. TOI. Bagchi, I. (2019, August 24). Strengthening ties: Jaishankar to travel to Hungary, Russia, and Poland from Sunday. TOI. BBC World News. (2019, July 1). EU summit: Leaders suspend talks amid disagreement over top jobs. Eurostat. (2020a, March 20). EU direct investment positions, flows and income, breakdown by partner countries (BPM6). Retrieved on October 2. Eurostat. (2020b, September 11). Population on 1 January by age group, sex and citizenship [migr_pop1ctz]. Retrieved on October 2. DPIIT. (2020, June). Quarterly fact sheet, fact sheet on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from April, 2000 to June, 2020. Department for Promotion of Industry and International Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. India Today. (2019, August 17). Pak’s efforts to internationalise Kashmir snubbed as UNSC Consultations end without outcome. India, Department of Commerce. (2020). Export import Data Bank. Retrieved October 1. https://commerce-app.gov.in/. India, MEA. (2019, August 29). Joint statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of India and Poland. Retrieved August 12, 2020 from https://www. mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/31777/Joint+Statement+of+the+ Ministers+of+Foreign+Affairs+of+India+and+Poland. Katowice. (2018). Just Transfer Declaration. Retreived August 12, 2020 from: https://cop24.gov.pl/presidency/initiatives/just-transition-declaration.

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Kugiel, P. (Ed.). (2016). V4 goes global: Exploring opportunities and obstacles in the Visegrad Countries’ cooperation with Brazil, India, China and South Africa. Polish Institute of International Affairs. Mohan, A. (2013, July 16). India and Central Europe: A road less travelled. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Roy Chaudhury, D. (2019, August 27). India explores partnership with Visegrad group in Central Europe with Jaishankar visit. The Economic Times. The Economic Times. (2019, August 16). China’s UNSC Kashmir Plea in Poland’s Court. The Guardian. (2019, June 20). Central European Countries block EU moves towards 2050 Zero Carbon goal. TnH Global. (2019, March 12). Indian footfall to the Czech Republic grows by 12.5% in 2018. Retrieved October 2, 2020. http://www.tnhglobal.com/ind ian-footfall-to-the-czech-republic-grows-by-12-5-in-2018.

Appendix A: India-Czechoslovakia Visits, 1947–1992

1920 1929 1931 1947 1948

1954

October December 18 November February 14

P P P P P

June–July

E

July 2–3

E

July July

C E

August 15–19 End of year

E E

December 11

P

May–June

E

June

C

Czechoslovakia opens a Consulate at Bombay Czechoslovakia opens second Consulate at Bombay Czechoslovakia opens Embassy in India Establishment of diplomatic relations Czechoslovakia opens Embassy in New Delhi; first Ambassador Jaroslav Sejnoha (1948–1949) presents credentials A 7-member trade delegation in Czechoslovakia to negotiate purchase of metal products Finance Minister R.K. Shanmukham Reddy in Prague, accompanied by V.K. Krishna Menon, High Commissioner to Britain A delegation of Indian journalists in Czechoslovakia Technical mission led by M.M. Ruboska in India to investigate requirements of Indian industries Trade delegation led by L.K. Jha in Czechoslovakia Technical mission led by General S.S. Sokhey, Director of Haffkine Institute, Mumbai, in Czechoslovakia First Indian Ambassador to Czechoslovakia N. Raghavan presents credentials Trade delegation led by Francis Adamek, Vice-Chairman of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce, in India to establish contacts Cultural delegation led by Deputy Minister in Czechoslovakia (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

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(continued) June 24

1955

P

C

August

C

October–November

E

April

E

June 6–9

P

July

C

December

C

1957

September

E

1958

January 3–14

P

April

E

June

E

July

C P

August

E

November

E

1956

1959

November–December C 1960

P

January 3–13

P

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in Czechoslovakia for one day on his way to Poland (accompanied by his daughter Indira Gandhi) A 12-member Czech cultural delegation led by Karol Bedrna, First Deputy Minister of Education and Culture, in India A delegation of Czechoslovak State Film Trade in India A 13-member Czechoslovak delegation led by Minister of Foreign Trade R. Dvorak in India for the Indian Industries Fair in New Delhi A 10-member delegation of engineering experts in India for preparation of various project reports Vice-President S. Radhakrishnan in Czechoslovakia A 30-member cultural delegation led by Minister of State for External Affairs, Anil K. Chanda, in Czechoslovakia A 48-member Slick-Slovak Folk Art Ensemble in India Trade delegation led by J. Kohout, Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, in India Prime Minister Villiam Siroky in India accompanied by Foreign Minister, Minister and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, and the Commissioner for Education and Culture V. Novacek of the Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Corporation in India Minister of Industry and Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovak State Circus in India A parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha A. Ayyangar in Czechoslovakia A regular weekly air service between Prague and Bombay by Czechoslovak Airlines inaugurated A trade delegation led by Minister of Foreign Trade F. Krajcir in India 115-member Czech Philharmonic Orchestra tours Calcutta, Bombay and New Delhi Czech Consulate General of Czechoslovakia at Calcutta, which was closed down during the year 1940 due to World War II, was re-opened Parliamentary delegation led by Zdenek Fierlinger, President of the National Assembly of Czechoslovakia, in India (continued)

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(continued)

1961

June 16–18 June

P E

October

E

November

E

February

E

March

C

May 6–9 July

P P E

1962

1963

1964

December

P E

January

E

February

E

March May June

E E E

July

M

October–November February

E E

March

E

October

E

October–November

P

Finance Minister Morarji Desai in Czechoslovakia Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade J. Boczoni in India A delegation to finalize arrangements for setting up two heavy electrical plants in Czechoslovakia Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry K.R.F. Khilnani in Czechoslovakia Minister for Health Dr. Plojhar in India to attend World Health Organization conference in India A delegation of the Czechoslovak Committee of the Defenders of Peace led by Deputy Minister of Health in India to attend session of World Peace Council Vice Foreign Minister Busnaik in India Chief Minister of West Bengal B.C. Roy in Czechoslovakia Union Minister for Food and Agriculture S.K. Patil in Czechoslovakia Minister of Law A.K. Sen in Czechoslovakia S. Vohra, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in Czechoslovakia Czech purchase mission led by a senior official of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Trade in India A 6-member Czechoslovak purchase mission in India Trade delegation in India President of Technoexport, J. Jonas, in India Minister of International Trade Manubhai Shah in Czechoslovakia R.K. Nehru, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, in Czechoslovakia in a renewed effort to procure more varied items of military hardware Foreign Trade Minister Frantisek Hamouz in India Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Ivan Golomeev in India Trade delegation led by F. Ruzicka, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of International Trade, in India Trade delegation led by Deputy Minister of Commerce S.V. Ramaswami in Czechoslovakia Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of Lok Sabha Sardar Hukam Singh on a goodwill visit to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (continued)

346

APPENDIX A: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA VISITS, 1947–1992

(continued) 1965

1966

1967

January 30–February 12

E

March 2–7

P

March

E

June 11–14

E

June

P

June

E

June

E

June 21–27 July

C E

October 4–7 October 26–30

P E

October–November

E

April 7–15 November

P E

November 19–24

P

December

C

January 18–19

E

July 31

E

September

P

Czechoslovak delegation led by Minister of Heavy Industry Pesl in India to study the possibilities of supply of machinery and equipment on a long-term basis for the various projects already set up and to be set up in India under the first and second Czechoslovak credits Prime Minister Jozef Lenart and Foreign Minister Vaclav David in India A delegation led by Chocholous of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Trade in India Minister of Civil Aviation Nityanand Kanungo in Czechoslovakia Minister of State for External Affairs Lakshmi Menon in Czechoslovakia Minister of Community Development and Cooperation S.K. Dey in Czechoslovakia Minister of Planning and Finance Bali Ram Bhagat in Czechoslovakia Education Minister M.C. Chagla in Czechoslovakia Minister of Supply K. Raghuramaiah in Czechoslovakia President S. Radhakrishnan in Czechoslovakia Finance Minister T.T. Krishnamachari in Czechoslovakia to discuss Czech assistance for Fourth Five Year Plan A 4-member delegation led by Minister of Commerce S.V. Ramaswamy in Czechoslovakia Deputy Foreign Minister Ladislav Simovic in India A 4-member delegation led by Frantisek Vlasak, Minister of Technology, in India President Antonin Novotny in India accompanied by Foreign Minister Vaclav David and 25 other Ministers and officials Deputy Minister of Education and Culture T. Kahuda and Deputy Minister of Education of Slovak Region Michalecka in India 1st session of the Joint Commission for Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation, New Delhi (hereinafter Joint Commission); Minister of Heavy Industry Josef Krejci leads Czechoslovak delegation; two Joint Working Groups (JWGs) for trade and industrial cooperation set up Direct radio telegraph services between Delhi-Prague launched Parliamentary delegation led by S.N. Mishra in Czechoslovakia (continued)

APPENDIX A: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA VISITS, 1947–1992

347

(continued) October

E

1968

February

E

1969

October 31– November 2 August 11

E

1970

November 1971

E

E E

November–December P

1972

December 6–7

E

February–March

E

June 17–20

P

July

P

July

E

July

E

November November December

P E E

December

E

Trade delegation led by Deputy Minister of Trade G. Kohlic and Deputy Minister of Consumer Goods Industry J. Drtine in India Special Secretary in the Ministry of Industrial Development N. Subramaniam in Czechoslovakia Foreign Trade Minister B.R. Bhagat in Czechoslovakia 2nd session of the Joint Commission in Prague; Indian delegation led by K.B. Rao, Adviser, Planning Commission Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade J. Strba in India Minister of Tourism and Civil Aviation Karan Singh in Czechoslovakia Deputy Foreign Minister Miloslav Hruza and Head of the Department of South Asia Milan Macha in India 3rd session of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Minister of Foreign Trade A. Barcak in Delhi; sets up two Joint Working Groups (JWGs) on Industrial Cooperation and Trade and on Planning Scientific and Technical Cooperation A purchase delegation led by First Deputy Minister of Internal Trade F. Ruzicka in India for a fortnight Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Czechoslovakia (accompanied by P. N. Haksar, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, S. Than, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade and A. P. Venkateswaran, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs) Parliament delegation led by G.S. Dhillon, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, in Czechoslovakia Computer delegation led by Col. A. Balasubramaniam, Director (Electronics), Department of Electronics, in Czechoslovakia to explore possibilities of greater collaboration in these fields Electronics delegation led by R.M. Nayar, General Manager, Hindustan Aeronautics, in Czechoslovakia Deputy Prime Minister J. Gregor in India Deputy Trade Minister Ivan Peter in India Stanislav Kreb, Director General of Civil Aviation of the Ministry of Transport, in India Deputy Minister of Technology and Investment Development A. Mrazek in India (continued)

348

APPENDIX A: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA VISITS, 1947–1992

(continued) 1973

1974

January 7–17

E

May 29–June 1

P

June 14–22

E

October 6–10

P

December 3–9

P

March 19–23

P

May–June

C

June–July July

E M

November 25–28

E

1st JWG on Planning in New Delhi; a 8-member delegation led by Zdenek Sedivy, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission of Czechoslovakia, in India for a meeting of the Planning Commissions Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Czechoslovakia 4th session of Joint Commission in Prague; Indian delegation led by Commerce Minister D.P. Chattopadhyaya President V.V. Giri in Czechoslovakia (accompanied by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Surendra Pal Singh, Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs V. C. Trivedi) Gustav Husak, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Committee of the National Front of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, in India on his first visit to a non-Communist country (accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Jindrich Zahradnik, Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek, Trade Minister Andrej Barcak and Josef Simon, Minister of Metallurgy and Engineering A 19-member parliamentary delegation led by Chairman of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly Alois Indra in India Minster of Education Nurul Hasan in Czechoslovakia Minister of Finance Y.B. Chavan in Czechoslovakia Minister of Defence Jagjivan Ram in Czechoslovakia 5th session of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Czechoslovak delegation led by Foreign Trade Minister A. Barcak and Deputy Minister of Industry V. Hahus (continued)

APPENDIX A: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA VISITS, 1947–1992

349

(continued)

1975

1976

1977

1978

December 2–8

P

July 29–August 1

C

September 15–24

E

October

C

November 10–15

M

November November

C E

November 30– December 4 December 9–15

P

December 16–18

E

January October

P M

December 12–13

E

December

C

February 1–8

E

E

Prime Minster Lubomir Strougal in India (accompanied by Minister of Foreign Trade Andrej Barcak; Minister of General Engineering Pavol Bahyl; Deputy Minister of General Engineering Vaclav Hanus; Deputy Minister of Metallurgy and Heavy Engineering Jaroslav Janik, Deputy Minister of Technical Investment and Technology Antonin Mrazek; Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission Zdenek Sedivy). Four agreements signed: (a) trade and payments agreement for the years 1975–1979; (b) agreement on cooperation between Planning Commissions; (c) consular convention; (d) agreement on cooperation in the fields of radio and television K.N. Channa, Secretary, Ministry of Education, Social Welfare and Culture in Prague to sign cultural exchange programme for 1976–1977 6th session of the Joint Commission in Prague; Indian delegation led by Commerce Minister D.P. Chattopadhyaya Stefan Chochol, Slovak Minister of Education of the Slovak Socialist Republic in India Minister of Defence Army General Martin Dzur in India Minister for Culture in India Trade delegation led by Deputy Foreign Trade Minister J. Jakubee in India Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek in India Preparatory talks before the 7th Joint Commission meeting; Czech delegation led by Deputy Minister for Heavy Machinery-Building and Metallurgy J. Jamik in India 7th session of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Minister for Foreign Trade Andrej Barcak in India Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan in Czechoslovakia Col. Karel Rusov, Chief of the Army Staff and First Deputy Minister of National Defence, accompanied by four staff officers, on a 6-day visit in India Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Jeroslav Jakubec in India A cultural delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Matej Lucan and Deputy Foreign Minister Zdenek Trhlik in India to explore possibilities of expanding cooperation in the fields of radio, TV and films A delegation led by Minister for Metallurgy and Heavy Engineering Z. Pucek in India (continued)

350

APPENDIX A: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA VISITS, 1947–1992

(continued) November November

P E

March 14–18

P

June 16–18

P

June

P

June

E

April 9–13 June 27–July 10

P C

November 15–18

E

November 18–20

P

1981

November

E

1982

January February

E E

September 1–6

E

October December

E E

July

P

September December 15–17

E P

February 19

E

1979

1980

1983

1984

Deputy Foreign Minister Milos Vojta in India President of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce Cerny in India Private visit of Vasil Bilak, Member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in India Prime Minister Morarji Desai in Czechoslovakia (accompanied by Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee) Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha K.S. Hegde in Poland and Czechoslovakia 8th session of the Joint Commission; Commerce Minister Mohan Dharia in Czechoslovakia Foreign Minister Bohuslav Choupek in India Minister of Information and Broadcasting Vasant Sathe in Czechoslovakia 9th session of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Foreign Trade Minister Andrej Barack in India Parliament delegation led by the President of the Czechoslovak National Assembly and Politburo Member Alois Indra in India 2nd session of the Joint Business Council; Czechoslovak delegation led by President of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce Minister of Metallurgy Eduard Saul in India Minister for Electro-technical Industry M. Kusat in India 10th session of Joint Commission; Commerce Minister Shivraj V. Patil in Prague (has three working groups on transport, industrial collaboration and electronics and science and technology) Minister for Heavy Engineering in India A delegation led by Minister of Foreign Trade Bohumil Orban in India Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha in Czechoslovakia Minister of Industry N.D. Tiwari in Czechoslovakia President Giani Zail Singh in the Czech Republic 1st meeting of the Subgroup on Cooperation in Pharmaceutical Products (continued)

APPENDIX A: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA VISITS, 1947–1992

351

(continued) February 21–23

P

May 21–24

E

November

P

1985

February 21

E

1986

June May 20–22

E E

July

C

August 11

P

February

E

April 2–5 April May May 20–22

P C C E

September 2– October 7

E

November 25–27

P

December 2–5

M

January 4–7

E

January 21

E

June

E

1987

1988

Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal in India (accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Ladislav Gerle, Foreign Trade Minister Bohuslav Urban and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Jindrich Rehorek) 11th session of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Czechoslovak side led by Foreign Trade Minister Bohumil Urban Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal in India for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s funeral 1st meeting of the Subgroup on Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Foreign Trade Minister B. Urban in India 12th session of the Joint Commission in Prague; Commerce Minister P. Shiv Shankar in Czechoslovakia Minister of Information and Broadcasting V.N. Gadgil in Czechoslovakia for the Karlovy Vary Film Festival Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi makes a brief stopover of two hours in Prague on his way back from Mexico; holds discussions with Premier Lubomir Strougal (instead of making a refueling halt at Frankfurt by diverting the flight to Prague) Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade Vladimir Novacek in India Foreign Minister N.D. Tiwari in Czechoslovakia Festival of Indian films in Czechoslovakia Festival of Czechoslovak films in India 12th session of the Joint Commission in Prague; Indian delegation led by Commerce Minister P. Shiv Shankar Exhibition of Indian handicrafts entitled, ‘Magical India’ held at the Naprtsek Museum in Czechoslovakia A 5-member parliamentary delegation led by Alois Indra, Chairman of the Federal Assembly, in India Czechoslovak Defence Minister Milan Vaclavik in India Minister of State for Health and Family Welfare Saroj Kharparde in Czechoslovakia 6th meeting of the Joint Business Council in New Delhi Czechoslovak purchase delegation led by Joseph Rab in India (continued)

352

APPENDIX A: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA VISITS, 1947–1992

(continued)

1989

1990

1991

1992

June

C

September 20–22 April 10

P P

April

C

May November

E C

November

P

January

E

June

P

October 30– November 2

P

December

M

December

E

June

E

October

P

Minister for Information and Broadcasting H.K.L. Bhagat leads Indian delegation to the Karlovy Vary Film Festival President R. Venkataraman in Czechoslovakia Milos Jakes, former General Secretary of the Communist Party, makes a transit halt in Calcutta ‘Days of Indian Culture’ held in Czechoslovakia; inaugurated by Minster of Human Resource Development L.P. Sahi Minister of Industry Petr Hojer in India ‘Days of Czechoslovak Culture’ held in India; visit of Deputy Prime Minister Matej Lucan Vladimir Cerovka, Deputy Minister of Slovak Socialist Republic, in India Deputy Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Trade Otomar Louda in India A parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha Rabi Ray in Czechoslovakia for the first session of the newly-elected multi-party Parliament Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier in India (the first high-level exchange with the new leadership in Central Europe) A Czech and Slovak defence delegation led by Chief of General Staff in India A delegation of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry led by its President Vojtech Bures in India Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Lubomir Martak in India Foreign Office Consultations in Prague; Indian delegation led by K. Srinivasan, Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs

(C = Cultural; D = Defence; E = Economic; M = Military; P = Political; S = Scientific and Technology)

Appendix B: India-Czech Republic Visits, 1993–2020

1993

1994

1995

1996

February 13–16

P

March 15

E

March

E

June 20–21

P

February 7–11

P

June 4–6 August 29

M P

January 9–10

E

November

E

March 29

P

Minister of State for External Affairs R.L. Bhatia in the Czech Republic Delegation of Commerce Ministry in the Czech Republic to work out new trade and payments agreement A 26-member business delegation led by Minister of Trade and Industry Vladimír Dlouhý in India Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec in India (accompanied by a 26-member business delegation) President Vaclav Havel in India (accompanied by Deputy Prime Minster and Finance Minister and Foreign Minister) received 1993 Indira Gandhi Peace Prize for Peace, Disarmament and Development Minster of Defence Mallikarjun in Czech Republic Foreign Secretary K. Srinivasan in Prague for official talks 1st session of revamped Joint Commission of Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation in Prague (co-chaired by Commerce Secretary Tejinder Khanna and Trade and Industry Deputy Minister Miroslaw Somol) (hereinafter Joint Commission) A Czech trade delegation led by V. Kivsbaun, Director, Ministry of Trade and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade J. Jakubee in New Delhi Deputy Foreign Minister Helena Bambasová (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

353

354

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

(continued) August

P

October 10–13

P

October 11 November 8–9 November

P S E

February

E

April 11 September 26

P P

October October 15–16

E P

October 15–17

E

October 15–19

E

May

E

October 5–6

E

October 5–6

E

March 9–12

P

April 16

P

May 16–19

M

August 20 October 12–16

P M

2000

June 30–July 4

P

2001

January 16–21

M

February 8–9

P

1997

1998

1999

Czech Republic opens Honorary Consulate in Calcuttta President Shankar Dayal Sharma in the Czech Republic (leads a major business delegation) 1st Foreign Office consultations Minister of Technology Frantisek Vlasak in India Karel Mrocek, Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Industry and Trade, in India 2nd session of the Joint Commission; delegation led by Deputy Minister of Industries and Trade in India Deputy Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda in India 2nd Foreign Office consultations in New Delhi; Deputy Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda in India 1st meeting of the Joint Business Council in India Deputy Chief Minister of Gujarat Gopinath Munde in the Czech Republic A 25-member delegation of entrepreneurs and businessmen led by Minister of Trade and Industry Karel Kuhnl in India Special exhibition of ‘Czech Business Days’ in New Delhi Minister of State for Coal Dilip Ray in the Czech Republic 3rd session of Joint Commission held in Prague; Indian delegation led by Commerce Secretary P. Prabhu 2nd meeting of the Indo-Czech Business Council in Prague (attended by Indian businessmen) A 7-member parliamentary delegation led by Václav Klaus, Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament, in India Foreign Office Consultations in New Delhi; delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Kmonicek Chief of Army Staff General V.P. Malik on goodwill visit Deputy Foreign Minister Kmonicek in India First Deputy Minister of Defence Novotny at the DefExpo Trade Fair in Delhi A 8-member multi-party parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha G.M.C. Balayogi in the Czech Republic Chief of General Staff of the Czech Army Lt. Gen. Jiri Sidevy in India Minister of State for External Affairs U.V. Krishnam Raju in the Czech Republic (continued)

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

355

(continued)

2002

2003

2004

2005

February 9–13

M

March 11–14

P

February 19–20

P

August 28–30 September 22–26

E E

January 3–7 February 3–7 June 25–27 September 22–25

E M E P

October

M

October 19–22

M

November 15–21

P

End 2003

P

January 5

P

November 25–27

E

December 12–19

E

December 16–17

E

December

C

February 8–12

E

September 5–6

P

Minister of Defence Vladimír Vetchý; takes part in Aero India 2001 at Bangalore Prime Minster Miloš Zeman in India (accompanied by Minister of Trade and Industry Miroslav Grégr, Minister of Finance Pavel Mertlík and Minister of Agriculture Jan Fencl and a large business delegation) Minister of State for External Affairs Omar Abdullah in the Czech Republic Minister of Trade and Industry Jiˇrí Rusnok in India Minister of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises B. V. Patil in the Czech Republic Minister of Trade and Industry Jiri Rusnok in India Minister of Defence Jaroslav Tvrdik in India Minister of Power A. Geete in the Czech Republic Minister of State for External Affairs Digvijay Singh in the Czech Republic Expert-level defence delegation from India to explore possibilities for sourcing platforms, equipment, systems, spares and overhauling in the Czech Republic Defence Minister George Fernandes in the Czech Republic (accompanied by Defence Secretary and senior defence services representatives) Czech parliamentary delegation led by Senator Josef Jarab in India, Delegation of Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic An office of Czech Trade attached to the Consulate General in Mumbai opened Former President Vaclav Havel in India to receive the Gandhi Peace Prize, 2003 Union Minister of State for Environment and Forests Namo Narian Meena in the Czech Republic Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry Miroslav Somol in India 6th meeting of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Czech delegation led by Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Miroslav Somol A number of cultural events including unveiling of a bust of Gurudev Rabindra Nath Tagore and a Festival of Indian films held in Prague Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transport Milan Šimonovský in India; attends India Engineering Fair Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal, Consular and Economic Affairs Pavel Svoboda in India (continued)

356

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

(continued)

2006

2007

2008

November 7–13

P

January 17–19

P

March 26–April 1

E

1st half March 11–15

P P

July 10–13

M

November 18–21

P

December 2–6

P

April

M

July

E

August 18

P

September 8–9

P

September 10–11

E

November 14–17

E

President Václav Klaus in India (accompanied by a business delegation) (eleven years after the visit of President Vaclav Havel in 1994) Prime Minister Jiˇrí Paroubek and Deputy Foreign Minister Jaroslav Basta in India; leads a 15-member business and media delegation in India; agreement to hold annual Foreign Office Consultations (at the level of Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs and Deputy Minister of the Czech Republic); establishment of a Joint Defence Committee (to be co-chaired by Director-General (Acquisitions), Ministry of Defence and Deputy Minister of Defence from the Czech Republic) A delegation of the Economic Committee of the Czech Chamber of Deputies of Parliament in India 1st Foreign Office consultations in Prague 2nd Foreign Office consultations; Deputy Foreign Minister Helena Bambasová in India Vice Chief of Army Staff Deepak Kapoor in the Czech Republic Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg in India on the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations A 16-member parliamentary delegation led by President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic Premsyl Sobotka, Chairman of Czech Senate, leads a business delegation as part of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces Lt. Gen. Vlastimil Picek in India Secretary (Economic Relations), Ministry of External Affairs, in Prague as Special Envoy of Prime Minister to seek support for India’s Civil Nuclear Energy Initiative Czech Republic opens Honorary Consulate in Kolkata Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma in Czech Republic Kamal Nath, Minister of Commerce and Industry, accompanied with official delegation. A 12-member CII delegation led by R. Seshasayee, former President of CII and Managing Director of Ashok Leyland, also accompanied the Commerce Minister ˇ Minister of Trade and Industry Martin Ríman; leads a business delegation of 19 Czech business companies to India (continued)

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

357

(continued) 2009

2010

January 20

E

February 4–5

E

April 1–2

M

April 26–28

C

May 5–7

M

May 21–22

S

June 28–30

P

September 17–18

S

October 21–24

S

December 6–12

C

December 13–17

M

January 11–13

E

Deputy Minister of Environment K. Bláha (EU Troika) in India Minister of Environment Martin Bursík as part of the Czech Republic’s Presidency of the EU Council in India 3rd meeting of the Joint Defence Committee in Prague; Indian delegation led by R.K. Mathur, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Defence R.P. Agrawal, Secretary (Higher Education) led a delegation comprising of Chairman (University Grants Commission), and Director (IIT-Mumbai), Secretary (HE), signed a Joint Declaration on cooperation in the field of education with Czech Deputy Minister of Education A 3-member delegation from Army Headquarters in the Czech Republic to attend Defence Exposition in Brno Rajiv Kumar, Scientist, Department of Science and Technology in the Czech Republic to discuss a programme of cooperation in the field of science and technology Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna in Prague for the India-EU Ministerial Troika (29 June) and bilateral meetings 5-member delegation led by S.K. Brahmachari, Director-General, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in the Czech Republic to explore possibility of cooperation in the areas of mutual interest Madhavan Nair, Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), in the Czech Republic Czech educational delegation led by Deputy Minister for Research and Higher Education Vlastimil Ružiˇ ˚ cka in India for the 1st meeting of the Joint Working Group on Education A delegation from Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) led by Dr. Prahalada, Chief Controller, in the Czech Republic A Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) delegation led by Dinesh Rai, Secretary, Ministry of Micro, Medium and Small Enterprises (MSME) in the Czech Republic (continued)

358

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

(continued) January 27–30

February 5–6 February 17–22 February 25–26

March 7–13 May 11–12 May 23–26

June 6–8

September September 15–17 October 25–28

October 28–30 November November 29–30

December 2011

January 20–26

February 7–12

E

A delegation led by Chairman of Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT) in the Czech Republic for talks with Zetor, Czech company producing tractors; HMT has been producing tractors under a licensing agreement with the Czech company since the 1970s E Environment Minister J. Dusik in India to attend the Delhi Sustainable Development Summit P Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs H. Kmonocek to attend DefExpo P Foreign Office consultations in Prague; Indian delegation led by Vivek Katju, Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs N Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade T. Huner with a delegation of Czech nuclear energy firms E Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry L. Vanˇek (Czech Technology Days) E Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry Milan Hovorka in India to attend an International Telecommunications Union meeting P Vice President Hamid Ansari in the Czech Republic; three agreements signed: (a) social security; (b) protocol to amendments in the bilateral investment protection agreement; and (c) an agreement on economic cooperation C Secretary, Ministry of Culture, in Prague E A 15-member delegation of the National Jute Board in the Czech Republic E Deputy Minister of Transport L. Vykydal with a business delegation of transport infrastructure companies in India E Deputy Minister of Environment L. Hlaváˇc in India M Air Chief Marshal and Chairman of Chiefs of Staffs Committee P.V. Naik in the Czech Republic E 8th session of Joint Commission in New Delhi; Czech delegation led by Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry Milan Hovorka E A business delegation led by Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Milan Hovorka in India E Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry Milan Hovorka accompanied by delegation of machine tool industry in the IMTEX Trade Fair in Bangalore E A 4-member joint delegation from the Ministry of Heavy Industries and Heavy Engineering Corporation, Ranchi led by Saurabh Chandra AS& FA in the Czech Republic (continued)

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

359

(continued) E

2012

May 8–13

P

June 6

P

June 13–16

E

June 24–25

N

September

E

September 27

M

October 9–11

E

November 14–18

E

March 28–30

E

March 28–30

M

April 2012

S

Textile Secretary Ms. Rita Menon visited Czech Republic along with Development Commissioner Handicrafts and Handlooms and Indian companies dealing with glass and handicrafts A delegation of President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic Milan Štˇech in Delhi and Mumbai Foreign Office consultations in New Delhi; co-chaired by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomas Dub and Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs Minister for Coal Jaiswal in the Czech Republic (accompanied by Special Secretary (Coal), Chairman Coal India, Chairman Neyvli Lignite Corporation and other officials) Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission R.K. Sinha, Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy Srikumar Banerjee, and the Chairman of the National Power Cooperation of India Limited as also some scientists from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in the Czech Republic 9th session of the Joint Commission; agreement to set up Joint Working Groups (JWGs) on Skills and Innovation and Heavy Engineering and Mining 4th session of the Joint Defence Committee; Deputy Minister of Defence Rudolf Blažek in India Minister of Industry and Trade Martin Kocourek, led a 50-member delegation of Czech business houses and companies to India. Another prominent member of the delegation was Milan Urban, Chairperson of the Committee on Economic Affairs of the Czech Parliament. A target for an annual trade turnover of US$2 billion set for 2012 A 3-member delegation from the Indian Tobacco Board led by Chairman Tobacco Board, G. Kamala Vardhana Rao in Prague in connection with Tabexpo 2011 exhibition Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry Milan Hovorka (India Engineering Sourcing Show in Mumbai) Defence Minister Dr Alexandr Vondra in India to attend the 7th International Defence Exhibition on Land and Naval System (DEFEXPO India 2012) along with a 46-member business delegation A delegation of the Department of Science and Technology in the Czech Republic (continued)

360

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

(continued)

2013

April 17

P

September 9–11

E

October

P

October 9–14

M

October 31– November 3 March 11–15

P E

May 2

P

September 9–13

M

September 16–21

E

October 9

C

October 27– November 2

M

Czech Republic opens Honorary Consulate in Mumbai 9th session of Joint Commission in Brno; Minister of Commerce, Industry and Textiles Anand Sharma led a high-level business delegation of 135 Indian engineering companies to the Brno International Engineering Fair at which India was the Partner country; inaugurates ‘India Show’ at MSV Fairground, Brno. Both sides decide to launch Joint Working Groups in the areas of Skills and Innovation, Heavy Engineering and Mining Chief Minister of Meghalaya Mukul Sangma in the Czech Republic Deputy Minister of Agriculture Radek Braum accompanied by business delegation in India Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs Preneet Kaur in the Czech Republic Minister of Trade and Industry Martin Kuba in India to attend India Engineering Sourcing Show-2013 in Mumbai; accompanied by an official and business delegation 6th Foreign Office consultations in Prague; Indian delegation led by Sudhir Vyas, Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs A Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) delegation visited Czech Republic for finalizing and signing of agreement on Cryptography course at Masaryk University. 13 officers from DRDO, including one officer from Indian Navy, attended the course on ‘Short Term Intensive Course in Information and Communication Technology (ICT)’ from 22 September to 20 December 2013 at Masaryk University. The course was conducted based on the cooperation agreement between DRDO and Masaryk University. Secretary (Textiles) Zohra Chatterji in the Czech Republic Dr. Jaroslav Vacek, Director, Institute of South and Central Asian Studies, Charles University, Prague received the ‘Presidential Award for Classical Tamil’ for year 2009–2010 from the President of India A delegation consisting of 24 officers from the College of Defence Management visited Czech Republic as a part of International Strategic Management Tour (continued)

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

361

(continued)

2014

2015

November 7–11

P

November

C

February 10–12

P

September 7–9

P

September 8–10

E

September 22–25

E

September 8, 14– February 15, 2015

M

October–November

C

November 3–7

M

January 28

E

January 28–30

E

February 18–20

M

Foreign Minister Jan Kohout in India for the ASEM FMM 11 in New Delhi; meets Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid and other Ministers Culture Minister Jiri Balvin accompanied by representatives of the Czech Cinematographic Fund, the Association of Producers and the Czech Film Commission in India 7th Foreign Office consultations; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomáš Dub in India A 17-member delegation led by G.C Murmu, Principal Private Secretary to Gujarat Chief Minister, in Prague for the Vibrant Gujarat road show, which was attended by over 60 Czech companies and a B2B meeting in the end A 7-member delegation led by Sharad Jaipuria, President, PHD (Punjab, Haryana, Delhi) Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in the Czech Republic A 21-member delegation from the Department of Heavy Engineering led by Joint Secretary R.K Singh in Prague for the meeting of JWG on Heavy Engineering. The delegation included representatives from public sector organizations HEC, HMT machine tools, Neyveli Lignite and Singareni Collieries to enhance cooperation in the mining sector; visited a number of coal mines A group of 14 officers joined a short-term Cryptography Course on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Security at Masaryk University in Brno High representatives of Czech universities in India to deepen cooperation in higher education A delegation of 14 officers from College of Air Warfare, Secunderabad led by Air Vice Marshal D.P. Upot in the Czech Republic as part of the “Instructional Tour Abroad” 10th session of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; co-chaired by Minister of Commerce Nirmla Sitharaman and Czech Minister of Trade and Industry Jan Mladek Delegation led by Minister for Industry and Trade Jan Mladek in India Defence Minister Martin Stropnický in New Delhi and Bengaluru in connection with the AERO India show; meets Defence Minister M. Parrikar mainly for discussion on the supply of Tatar vehicles for the Indian Army as well as a tender for the supply ˇ of assault rifles manufactured in Ceský Brod (continued)

362

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

(continued)

2016

Mar 19–24

E

April 15

E

April 26–30

P

May 11–14

E

May

P

May 19–24

P

June 1

P

September 7–15

E

October 12–16

E

October 27– November 1 November 21–23

P

November 24

E

November 24–26

E

January 13

P

C

A delegation of the Members of the Committee on Economic Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament led by its Vice-President Vojtˇech Filip, Vice-Chairman of the Economic Committee of the PSP Martin Kolovratník, Stepan Stupˇcuk and Vaclav Snopek Czech Republic becomes part of e-Tourist visa (eTV) scheme A delegation comprising members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the Senate of the Czech Parliament in India, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic František Bublan and Senators Hassan Mezian, Patrik Kunˇcar and Jozef Regec Business delegation of Czech companies active in the railway industry in India President Milos Zeman met President Pranab Mukherjee in Moscow on the margins of Victory Day celebrations A delegation of Members of Committee on Economic Affairs of the Czech Parliament led by Vice Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies (Lower house), Dr. Vojtech Filip in India 1st round of Consular consultations to discuss various consular, visa and passport matters Business delegation with interest in water sector in India A delegation of machinery tools used in the energy sector in India Member of Parliament Radim Holecek in India Philologist Jaroslav Vacek (participation in the International Conference of Indologists) at the invitation of the President Pranab Mukherjee 3rd meeting of JWG on Heavy Engineering held in Mumbai, followed by a workshop on high technology manufacturing Delegation led by Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic Jiri Koliba to attend an engineering fair, Mumbai; HEC, Ranchi, and Delhi) 2nd Consular consultations held in Delhi to discuss various visa-related issues (continued)

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

363

(continued) March 16–20

2017

March 28–31

M

April 24–30

P

June 30

P

September 12–15

M

October 3

E

October 3–5

E

October 9–13

E

October 20–23

E

November 19–21

N

November December 18–20

M P

February 14–18

E

March 1–5

P

March 6–10

E

March 16–18

E

A business delegation led by Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Jiri Koliba for the India Aviation Fair in Hyderabad Deputy Secretary of Defense Thomas Kuchta headed the business delegation (including DEFEXPO in Goa – India’s flagship arms show A 9-member parliamentary delegation led by Karel Schwarzenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs of Committee of the Czech Parliament, and members Pavel Holik, Leo Luzar and Rom Kostrica in Punjab and Srinagar 9th Foreign Office consultations in New Delhi; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Security and Multilateral Affairs Ivo Smarek in India Chief of the Army Staff General Dalbir Singh in the Czech Republic 4th meeting of the JWG on Heavy Engineering (set up in 2013) held in Brno; Indian delegation led by Secretary, Heavy Industry, Girish Shankar. The meeting took place on the sidelines of the International Engineering Fair in Brno. A B2B Round Table of Indian and Czech engineering companies was also organized. A delegation led by Secretary in the Department of Heavy Industry Girish Shankar at MSV Brno Fair Minister of State for Commerce and Industry C. R. Chaudhary and Chief Minister of Jharkhand Raghubar Das in Brno Minister of Railways Suresh Prabhu in the Czech Republic A delegation of Czech companies supplying nuclear energy technologies in Mumbai and Delhi; participate in conference and exhibition on “India Nuclear Energy Summit” Joint Defence Committee meeting in Prague Foreign Minister Lubomir Zaoralek in Delhi (accompanied by a 30-member delegation (including 18 businessmen) representing various trade, industrial and financial sectors) State Secretary of the Ministry of Industry and Trade Radek Szurman in India Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Martin Smolek in India A delegation of the Association of Small and Medium Enterprises and Crafts in Bengaluru A delegation of Czech companies participate in the India Engineering Sourcing Show (IESS 2017) (continued)

364

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

(continued)

2018

March 25–28

E

May 29–June 3

E

June

P

September 11–12

C

October 9–12

E

October 9–15 October 16–19

E M

January 10–12 February 21–22

E E

Mar 4–8

E

Mar 4–8

P

March 8

E

April 11–13

M

April 22

P

Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Michaela Marksova Tominova attends Global Economic Summit in Mumbai A delegation of the Committee on Health Care of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament led by Radek Vondracek, Deputy Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (lower House), in India Minister for Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajcak in India A delegation led by Minister of Culture Daniel Herman in India Minister of State for Commerce and Industry C.R. Chaudhary inaugurates International Engineering Fair (where India was the partner country) held at Brno (accompanied by Jharkhand Chief Minister Raghubar Das) A Czech railway industry delegation in India A delegation led by Czech Chief of Defence Forces General Josef Becvar in India A delegation of Czech steel producers in India A business delegation of 12 Czech companies and their Indian partners participate in the 1st Uttar Pradesh Investment Summit 2018 A 35-member delegation led by Tomáš Hüner, Minister of Industry and Trade in Delhi, Aurangabad and Chennai; accompanied by a delegation of Czech entrepreneurs led by Vice President of the Czech Chamber of Commerce Boˇrivoj Mináˇr, along with 13 companies to attend the 4th India-EU 29 Business Forum in Delhi and India Engineering Source Show in Chennai where Czech Republic was the partner country State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Miloslav Stasek in India 5th JWG on Heavy Industry and Advanced Manufacturing held in New Delhi on the sidelines of the India International Sourcing Fair (IESS) 2018 at Chennai; Czech delegation led by Richard Hlavaty, Senior Director General, Ministry of Industry and Trade A delegation of Czech defence companies participate in the DEFEXP India 2018 in Chennai 4th round of Consular consultations in Delhi; Czech delegation led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Martin Smolek in India (continued)

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

365

(continued) September 6–9

P

September 7

E

October 1

E

October 10–14 October

C E

October 18–19

P

October 22–23

E

November 25– December 1

E

November 26–30

E

November 26

P

President Ram Nath Kovind in the Czech Republic (after a gap of 22 years); accompanied by P. Rupala, Minister of State in the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare and Ministry of Panchayati Raj; Members of Parliament (Sunil Kumar Singh and Ram Shakal) and other senior government officials; eight agreements signed during the visit A 50-member Indian delegation representing FICCI, CII, the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Trade Promotion Council of India participate in the India-Czech Business Forum in Prague Czech Government launched a special project called ‘Special Procedures for Highly Qualified Employees’ in India, where applications for employment permits from highly skilled workers from India would be accepted preferentially with an annual quota of 500 such applications 16th Indian Film Festival, Prague 6th meeting of the JWG on Heavy Engineering (meets annually) Prime Minister Andrej Babis meets Vice-President Venkaiah Naidu on the margins of the 12th ASEM summit in Brussels 11th session of the Joint Commission held in Prague; C.R. Chaudhary, Minister of State for Commerce and Industry and Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution, led a four-member delegation; Czech delegation led by Minister of Trade and Industry Marta Novakova; a 104-paragraph Protocol signed Richard Hlvaty, Senior Director General, Ministry of Trade and Industry, led an industrial delegation in India for the launch of the Czech Industrial Clusters (CIC) in Bengaluru A delegation of 20 Czech companies and organizations led by the Director of the Department of Foreign Economic Policies II Richard Hlavatý, in Karnataka Czech Republic opens a new Honorary Consulate in Bengaluru (continued)

366

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

(continued) 2019

January 17–19

P

February 7 February 20–24

C M

February 28–March 1

M

April April 9

E P

May 29–31

M

June 12 June

E C

June 25–28

E

June 27–29

E

July 1–11

E

August

C

Prime Minister Andrej Babis in India (after a gap of 12 years ) (accompanied by Minister of Industry and Trade Marta Novakova and Vice-President of the Government Council for Research and Development Karel Havlicek in Ahmedabad, Pune and Delhi); meets Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 18 January 2019 on the sidelines of the 9th Vibrant Gujarat Global Summit, Ahmedabad, where the Czech Republic a partner country Kerala Tourism roadshow in Prague Defence Minister Lubomir Metnar in India for the Aero India 2019 Show at Bengaluru; 11 Czech companies participate A delegation of Slovak and Czech defence companies led by Zigmund Bertok, former Slovak Ambassador to India, and Alexander Horvath, Vice-President of the Indian Chamber of Commerce in the Czech Republic and half a dozen Czech and Slovak companies participate in the meeting of the Vidharbha Defence Industries Association (VDIA) in Nagpur; participants include Ajay Kumar, Secretary, Defence Production, Ministry of Defence A delegation of Indian food companies in Czechia Czech Republic opens Honorary Consulate in Chennai A Ministry of Defence delegation attends the International Defence and Security Technologies Fair—a pro-export platform of the Czech defence and security industry—at Brno Goa Tourism roadshow in Prague Festival of India held in three Czech cities—Prague, Brno and Ostrava Energy mission led by Richard Hlavaty, Senior Director-General for Foreign Economic Policies, Ministry of Industry and Trade, visited Uttarakhand, Manipur, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi along with four Czech companies dealing with water turbines, hydro-mechanical equipment and metal fittings A delegation of nine Czech companies participate in the International Small and Medium Enterprises Convention 2019 in which the Czech Republic was the partner country A 5-member delegation led by M. Ravichandran, Director, Ministry of Earth Sciences, attended the 42nd Antarctica Consultative Committee meetings in Prague Director of the Diplomatic Academy of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in India (continued)

APPENDIX B: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC VISITS, 1993–2020

367

(continued)

2020

September 25

P

October 7–11

E

October 8

E

October

E

November 11–15

E

January 13–17

P

February 3

M

February 5–8

M

Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar and Foreign Minister Tomas Petricek meet on the sidelines of the 74th session of the UN General Assembly A delegation of 80 Indian companies organized by Engineering Export Promotion Council of India and the Confederation of Indian Industry participate in the 61st International Engineering Fair in Brno JWG on Heavy Engineering meets in Brno; a delegation led by A.R. Sihag, Secretary, Department of Heavy Industry, Chairman of the Engineering and Export Promotion Council (EEPC) Ravi Sehgal and senior officials in the Czech Republic Over 60 Indian engineering companies participate in the MSV International Engineering Fair, Brno CEO of CzechIvest Patrik Reichl accompanied by several companies from the Czech innovation ecosystem Foreign Minister Tomas Petricek in India; speaks at the Raisana Dialogue 2020, New Delhi 6th meeting of the Joint Defence Committee; Czech delegation led by Deputy Minister of Defence for Industrial Cooperation Tomas Kopecny; discussions focused on a number of issues in the field of security policy, industrial cooperation and teaching of staff Eight Czech defence companies participate in Defexpo India 2020 at Lucknow; establishment of a subsidiary PBS India announced

(C = Cultural; D = Defence; E = Economic; M = Military; P = Political; S = Science and Technology)

Appendix C: India-Czechoslovakia Agreements, 1949–1991

1949

March 29

April 6

August 1

Trade agreement for exchange of commodities of approximately Rs50 million (Rs33 million from Czechoslovakia and Rs17 million from India; valid till 31 December 1949 and thereafter for further successive periods as may be mutually agreed before the expiry of the agreement). Czechoslovak Government agreed to render all possible assistance to set up new industries and improve existing ones in India, including the utilization of coal as well as production of machine tools, tractors, diesel motors, aero motors, geared wheels, locomotives, chemicals and drugs. It also provided for export by Czechoslovakia of heavy machinery and 200 tons of mineral products, including oils and manganese ore in exchange for raw materials. Czechoslovakia also agreed to make available technical personnel for setting up various industries. Prior to this, there was no fixed trade agreement between India and Czechoslovakia since the Second World War though a few contracts had been signed. Trade agreement signed in Prague; India to get light engineering products, glass, textiles, chemicals, paper and ceramics in exchange for jute and jute products, iron ore, mica, shellac, coffee and spices; remained in force for one year Trade agreement fixing a ‘more realistic’ quota under the 29 March 1949 agreement to enable India to adjust a deficit of Rs15 million under it (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

369

370

APPENDIX C: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA AGREEMENTS, …

(continued) November 24

1950

April 5

1953 1954 1955

November 17 December 31 June 3

1956

January 20

1957

June 3 September 30

1958

April 1

August 19

1959

July 7 May 30 November 24

1960

September 19 September 19 November 3

1961

June 7

Agreement for economic cooperation; construction of certain industrial plants—equipment for engineering and metallurgy plants, a plant for the manufacture of heavy machine tools and a plant for the manufacture of heavy electro-technical equipment Trade agreement for 1950 (ratified in July 1950); India to export goods worth £534,000; Czechoslovakia to export £1.944 million Agreement regarding the disposal of estates of Indian nationals dying intestate in Czechoslovakia and vice versa Trade agreement Renewal of November 1953 trade agreement Renewal of November 1953 agreement (valid up to 31 December 1955) Trade agreement of November 1953 extended till 31 December 1956 Exchange of letters extending the November 1953 agreement to 30 September 1957 3-year trade agreement (valid from 1 October 1957 to 31 December 1960) Special payment arrangements between the State Trading Corporation of India and the National Bank of Czechoslovakia Agreement on setting up of a foundry forge plant at Ranchi costing approximately Rs85 million on deferred payment basis Cultural agreement providing for exchange of representatives of education, science, culture and arts Protocol to trade agreement Trade and commercial agreement [on economic collaboration regarding establishment of certain industrial plants in India making available to India long-term credit amounting to Rs. 230 million for a period of eight years at 2.5% annual interest within the framework of which Czechoslovakia would deliver machinery and equipment for the third stage of foundry forge, heavy machinery building plant, heavy electrical plant, and for other projects included in the Third Five-Year Plan Agreement on air services (in force 7 June 1961) Agreement between Ministry of Defence and Czechoslovak firm Kovo for a boot manufacturing plant in Kanpur Three-year trade and payments agreement (comes into effect on 1 January 1961; valid for three years) Agreement between Heavy Electricals Ltd and Technoexport for the preparation of detailed project reports for the heavy power equipment plant and high pressure boiler plant to be set up in India (continued)

APPENDIX C: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA AGREEMENTS, …

371

(continued) December 28

1963

April 26 November 7

1964

May 11 June 12

July 29

1965

October March 25

March 25

July 29 November 5 November 30

1966

February 26 April 26

April

A supplementary agreement for financial and technical collaboration between Czechoslovakia and India in setting up the Central Machine Tools Institute in Bangalore Agreement for export of 80,000 tons of iron ore Long-term trade and payments agreement (in force 1 January 1964; valid for five years; subsequently renewed in 1968 and 1974); offer of Rs240 million credit; stipulates trade of Rs195 million for 1964; Rs235 million in 1965 and Rs245 million in 1966 2nd agreement for economic cooperation; Czechoslovak credit of Rs400 million at 2.5% annual interest Agreement for technical collaboration for the development of production at heavy electricals high pressure boiler plant at Tiruverumbur, Tiruchirapalli Protocol defining scope of the second foundry forge plant being set up in the public sector with Czechoslovak collaboration Trade agreement Agreement for 12,000 tonnes annual capacity plant in the public sector for the manufacture of steel castings and forgings to be established at Wardha, Maharashtra Agreement for the establishment of a 15,000 tonne capacity plant for the manufacture of finished iron castings to be principally used in vehicles manufactured for the defence services; proposed to be established at Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh Cultural Exchange Plan for 1965–1966 Agreement for Czechoslovak credit for Rs300 million Agreement with Technoexport of Czechoslovakia for the preparation of design documentation for the proposed plate and vessels project in the public sector Exchange of Letters outlining trade arrangements for 1966 Agreement for scientific collaboration between the Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences Agreement on establishment of a high-powered Joint Committee for Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation; first Joint Commission with any Central European country (continued)

372

APPENDIX C: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA AGREEMENTS, …

(continued) November 9

November 9 December 14

1967

November 28

1969

January 27 October 31 November 18 November 22 November 30

1972

January 22 June 19

October 31 November 2 1973

May 30 June November 28 December 5

1974

December 5 December 4

December 4

Agreement on cooperation in the field of use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes providing for a broad spectrum of cooperation between the Atomic Energy Commission of the two countries in the use of nuclear energy for health, agriculture, industry and power generation; envisaged exchange of scholarships, fellowships and exchange of visits by scientists to acquaint themselves with the latest progress and development made by each country in this field Agreement on the export of heavy water to Czechoslovakia 2-year cultural exchange programme for 1966–1968 (64 scientists, artistes, writers and scholars visited India and 57 Indian artistes visited Czechoslovakia) Trade agreement envisaging exchange of goods of Rs800 million for 1968 Annual trade plan for 1969 envisaged trade turnover of Rs800 million Trade agreement for the period January 1970 to December 1974 envisaging a trade turnover of Rs1 billion by 1974 Trade protocol for 1971 envisaging a trade turnover of Rs1,003 million Contract for the import of 7,000 tractors from Czechoslovakia Cultural exchange programme for 1970–1971 and 1971– 1972 Trade protocol Agreement for periodic meetings of representatives of the Planning Commission of India and Czechoslovakia to review the progress of their respective Five-Year Plans Trade and payments agreement Trade protocol for 1972 envisaging increase of trade to Rs1.3 billion in 1973 Agreement on scientific, technical and industrial cooperation Trade protocol Trade plan for 1974 envisaged turnover of Rs1.5 billion in five years 3rd economic cooperation agreement extending a fresh credit up to Rs800 million at 2.5% interest Protocol on economic, technical and scientific cooperation 3rd 5-year trade and payments agreement for 1975–1979 to double trade to Rs1 billion on a bilateral and balanced basis Agreement on cooperation between the Planning Commissions of India and Czechoslovakia to exchange experience and knowledge in the field of planning (continued)

APPENDIX C: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA AGREEMENTS, …

373

(continued) December 4 December 4 December 4 1975

July 30 September 24

October 17 November 28 1976

August 2 December 17

1977

December 13

1978

February 8 November 3 November 17

1979

December 3

1980

November December 19

1981

June November 25

1982 1983

November

1984

May 24 October 11 November 26 March 19

1985 1986

Consular convention Protocol on cooperation between All India Radio and Czechoslovak Television Agreement on cooperation in the fields of radio and television between All India Radio and Czechoslovak Radio Cultural exchange agreement for 1976–1978 Protocol on the conclusion of the 6th session of the Joint Committee for Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation Protocol on mutual recognition of certificates, degrees and diplomas Trade protocol of 1976 envisaging trade of Rs1.65 billion for 1976 Cultural exchange programme for 1976–1978 Protocol on economic cooperation after 7th meeting of Joint Committee for Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation Trade protocol for 1978 envisaging two-way trade of Rs1.75 billion in 1978 Protocol on industrial cooperation Shipping agreement Cultural exchange programme (eighth) for 1978–1980 Agreement on cooperation in sea transportation 5-year trade and payments agreement in rupee payment (in effect 1 January 1980; valid for 1980–1984) envisaging trade of Rs2000 million by 1985 Trade protocol for 1981 Trade protocol for 1981 envisaging trade of Rs2.35 billion in 1981 (3rd economic agreement extended by 3 years (up to 31 December 1982) Long-term trade plan for 1982–1985 Trade protocol for 1982 envisaging bilateral trade turnover of Rs3.4 billion Trade plan for 1983 envisaging trade turnover of Rs3.862 billion Trade Plan for 1984 envisaging bilateral trade turnover of Rs4.11 billion Trade protocol 5-year trade and payments agreement for 1985–1989 Trade protocol for 1986 Protocol on cooperation in the field of science and technology between the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Academy of Sciences for the years 1986–1988 (continued)

374

APPENDIX C: INDIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA AGREEMENTS, …

(continued) March 22

May 22

1987

May 31 February 10 June November 25

1988 1989 1990

January November 12 January 27

1991

January 17

November

A long-term agreement for import of urea of 40,000 to 45,000 tonnes annually for three years (w.e.f. 1 January 1987) Trade protocol on the conclusion of the 12th session of the Joint Committee envisaging trade to reach Rs4 billion in 1990 Agreement on avoidance of double taxation Trade plan for 1987 envisaging trade turnover of Rs5 billion Cultural exchange programme for 1987–1989 Trade plan for 1988 envisaging trade turnover of Rs5.49 billion Agreement on cooperation in health and medical sciences Cultural exchange programme for 1990–1992 Trade protocol for 1990 envisages trade of Rs7.313 billion in 1990 Trade and payments agreement extending the bilateral Rupee trade and payments arrangements for two years (up to 31 December 1992) Trade plan for 1992 under the trade and payment agreement

Appendix D: India-Czech Republic Agreements, 1993–2018

1993

March 15

March 15

1995

June 30

1996

October 11

October 11 October 11 1997 October

1998

October 1 1999

September 14

5-year agreement on trade and economic cooperation (trade to be in freely convertible currencies w.e.f. 1 January 1993) Protocol on the liquidation of rupee balances Payment switched over to freely convertible currencies Indian Oil Corporation awards a US$370 million contract for Kandla-Bhatinda pipeline to Skodaexport Agreement between the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Czech Academy of Sciences Agreement on the promotion and protection of investments, repatriation of profits and settlement of disputes Agreement on cooperation in the fields of culture, education and science Protocol on regular Foreign Office consultations Bilateral air services agreement Letter of Intent between Maharashtra and Skoda Automobile, a Volkswagen group company, for setting up a $300 million car project at Shendie, near Aurangabad Tatra Udyog joint venture set up at Hosur; production under licensing at BEML in Bangalore dates back to 1986 Agreement on avoidance of double taxation (w.e.f. 2000) Air services agreement (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

375

376

APPENDIX D: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC AGREEMENTS, …

(continued) 2000

April

2001

May 24

2003

October 21 November 4

2006 2007

January November 19

2009

April

September 2010

June 8

June 9 June 10

September 13 November

Protocol between the Czech Commerce Bank, the National Bank of Slovakia and the Reserve Bank of India on the division of account of Rupee claims into the Czech Republic and Slovakia Notes Verbales for validating the following agreements: (a) Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Czechoslovak Republic concerning mutual extradition of fugitive criminals (London, 11 November 1924) and Protocol to this Treaty ( 4 June 1926) extended for the territory of India on 11 July 1927; (b) Agreement on cooperation in the field of exploitation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes (New Delhi, 9 November 1966); (c) Agreement on scientific, technical and industrial cooperation (Prague, 30 May 1973); (d) Third Agreement on economic cooperation (New Delhi, 5 December 1973); (e) Consular Convention (New Delhi, 4 December 1974); and (f) Agreement on cooperation shipping (New Delhi, 3 November 1978) Agreement on defence cooperation MoU between Electronics and Computer Software Export Promotion Council (ESC) and the Hungarian Association of IT Companies (IVSZ) for promoting the development of business relations Agreement to hold annual Foreign Office consultations MoU between Foreign Service Institute of the Ministry of External Affairs and the Diplomatic Academy of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs Joint declaration on cooperation in the field of education and agreement on setting up a Joint Working Group on Education Joint declaration on cooperation in the field of education New trade and economic cooperation agreement; upgrades Joint Economic Committee to a Joint Commission Social security agreement Protocol on amendments to the agreement for the promotion and protection of investments signed on 11 October 1996 to accommodate the Czech Republic’s EU obligations Programme of cooperation for the years 2010–2012 between the Ministries of Culture of the two countries Protocol on Economic cooperation on the occasion of the Joint Economic Commission, 29–30 November 2010 (continued)

APPENDIX D: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC AGREEMENTS, …

377

(continued) November 2011

June

June 7

September

2012

October April

August

September 2014

August 19

2015

September 24 January 9

January 12 January 28

November 24

Revalidation of the November 1966 agreement on the civilian uses of nuclear energy Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. (HEC), Ranchi, signed an MoU with Vitkovice, one of the largest and most diversified industrial groups in the Czech Republic MoU for the establishment of a Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) Chair for teaching Hindi in the Charles University, Prague ˇ MoU between the EXIM Bank of India and Ceská Exportní Banka (CEB) Agreement on liberalizing the business visa regime A Programme for Scientific and Technological Cooperation between Department of Science and Technology (DST) and the Czech Ministry of Education, Youth & Sport and a Work Plan for support of India-Czech joint projects for the years 2013–2015 A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India and Ústav Jaderného Výzkumu e a.s., Czech Republic in the field of nuclear science and technology MoU between the EXIM Bank of India and Ceska Exportini Banka (CEB) 3-year MoU between the Ministry of Roadways and Czech Railways and the Association of Czech Railway Industry (ACRI) on technical cooperation in the rail sector covering logistics of automotive, transport, raising speeds of up to 200 km per hour, station development and modernization of signalling Protocol of Joint Working Group on Heavy Engineering Memorandum of Understanding between the Central Zoo Authority, Ministry of Environment & Forests and Prague Zoo Memorandum of Understanding (Strategic Partnership) between Sakkarbaug Zoo, Gujarat, and Prague Zoo Protocol of the 10th session of the Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation to promote trade, investment and tourism Protocol between the Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises of India and the Ministry of Trade and Industry of the Czech Republic on Cooperation in the field of heavy industry (continued)

378

APPENDIX D: INDIA-CZECH REPUBLIC AGREEMENTS, …

(continued) 2016

January

2017

June 14

2018

September 7

September 7 September 7 September 7 September 7

September 7

September 7 September 7

September 7

October 23 October 23

Protocol for promotion of bilateral cooperation in the field of heavy industry, especially in industrial cooperation and facilities, construction, including modernization of three plants of Heavy Engineering Cooperation and a central public sector enterprise under the Department of Heavy Industries at Ranchi set up with Czech support in the early 1960s Letter of cooperation between the Reserve Bank of India and the Czech National Bank on supervisory cooperation and exchange of supervisory information MoU on S&T cooperation between Czech Academy of Sciences and Council for Scientific and Industrial Research Agreement on laser research between the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research and ELI Beamlines MoU between Hissar Agricultural University and Czech University of Life Sciences MoU between Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (BEML) and TATRA Trucks a.s. on strategic cooperation MoU between PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Association of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (AMSP) on promotion of small and medium enterprises MoU between Faculty of Business Administration, University of Economics Prague and Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore on exchange of students Agreement on exemption from visa requirements for holders of diplomatic passports Work Plan for support of Indian-Czech joint projects for 2019–2022 signed by the Ministry of Science and Technology and Earth Sciences between Department of Science and Technology and Ministry of Youth, Education and Sports Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Czech Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic, on science and technological cooperation Memorandum of Understanding between Invest India and Czech Invest Protocol of the 11th Session of the Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation

Appendix E: India-Hungary Visits, 1948–2021

1948 November 18 1950 1951 1954 January 22

P E P P

June October–December

E E

November

C E

1955

1956 January

C

October

P C P

1957 August 15 September

1958

C

1959 February

E

Establishment of diplomatic relations Hungarian Trade Office established in Mumbai Hungary establishes Legation in New Delhi Peter Kos presents his credentials as Head of Hungarian Legation in New Delhi Trade delegation in India A 4-member technical delegation led by Andrew Kalman, Manager of Komplex, a state-owned trading company, for factory equipment, on a fact-finding mission Cultural delegation in Hungary First Deputy Minister for Metallurgy and the Machine Industry Fereno Biro in India Cultural delegation led by Deputy Minister of External Affairs in Hungary India opens a Legation in Budapest Kumari Vijayantimala’s dance troupe in Hungary Vice Premier Karoly Szarka in India on a day’s visit en route to Colombo Indian delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Conference in London led by H.N. Kunzru in Budapest Ravaz Illes, Honorary Legal Adviser to the Indian Legation in Budapest, in India to study the Indian legal system Hungarian Government opens a Trade Commission in Calcutta (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

379

380

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

(continued) May

N

May 2–17 June December 1

E E P

1960 January March April June 8–17 1961

E P E E E

March 26–29

P

August 25–27 September 23–24 October 15–17 November

P E P N

November

E

1962 1963 June October–November November

November 25– December 4 1964 November

C E E E

P P

November

E

1965 May–June

E

Dr Homi J. Bhabha, Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, and P.N. Thapar, Member for Finance and Administration, Atomic Energy Commission, in Hungary to discuss an agreement for cooperation in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes Indian trade exhibition in Budapest Trade delegation in Hungary Governments of India and Hungary raise the status of their respective Missions from Legation to an Embassy; K.P.S. Menon, Indian Ambassador to the USSR, concurrently accredited as Ambassador to Hungary Trade delegation led by G. Oblath in India First Hungarian envoy Dr Laszlo Reczei arrives Sandor Ronai, Director, Ministry of Construction, in India A 7-member trade delegation led by Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade Jeno Barzoni in India Union Minister for Food and Agriculture S.K. Patil in Hungary First Deputy Prime Minister Antal Apro in India; offers credit of Rs80 million at 2.5% interest repayable in 8–9 years Prime Minister Ferenc Munnich in India Finance Minister Morarji Desai in Hungary Vice-President S. Radhakrishnan in Hungary Antal Apro, Chairman of Hungarian National Atomic Energy Commission, in India Director of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce in India Minister of Law A.K. Sen in Hungary Minister of International Trade Manubhai Shah in Hungary Trade delegation in India Minister of Foreign Trade Inozo Jeno in India; offers a further credit of Rs120 million on 22 November 1963 Hungarian parliamentary delegation in India Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha Sardar Hukam Singh in Hungary A delegation led by Minister of State for Commerce S.V. Ramaswamy in Hungary Minister of Planning and Minister of Finance Bali Ram Bhagat in Hungary (continued)

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

381

(continued) June

C

June

P

October

E

November

P

1966 February

E

February 20–28

P

February 21–23

E

1967 January

E

April

C

September

P

1968 March 30–April 4

E

June 6–10

P

June

P

October–November

E

November 1969 June 11–15

E P

June

C

Cultural delegation led by Minister for Cultural Affairs R.M. Hajarnavis in Hungary to finalize the biennial cultural plans for 1965–1966 and 1966– 1967 Minister of State for External Affairs Lakshmi Menon in Hungary A 4-member delegation led by Minister of Commerce S.V. Ramaswamy in Hungary Parliamentary delegation led by K.D. Malaviya in Hungary to explain India’s viewpoint on the Indo-Pak conflict Deputy Minister for Communications and Post Rudolf Ronai in India Prime Minister Gyula Kallai in India; heads a 22-member delegation consisting of Ministers, Deputy Ministers and officials; concludes 5-year agreement which was due to expire at the end of 1968 Foreign Trade Minister Jozef Biro in India; offers credit of Rs250 million for Fourth Five-Year Plan A 3-member delegation led by Director in the Ministry of Heavy Industry G. Keranyi in India Deputy Minister for Education and Culture Janos Molnar and Director of the Institute of Cultural Relations Gusatav Hollo in India Parliamentary delegation led by S.N. Mishra in Hungary Trade delegation led by Minister of Foreign Trade J. Biro in India President Zakir Husain in Hungary (heads a 27-member delegation; accompanied by Minister of Education Triguna Sen and Foreign Secretary Rajeshwar Dayal) Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha N. Sanjiva Reddy in Hungary Deputy Minister of Commerce Shafi Querishi accompanied by N.P. Jain, Director, East Europe Division in the Ministry of Commerce, and P.N. Subramaniam of the Finance Ministry in Hungary A 3-member trade delegation in India President Pal Losonczi in India accompanied by Matyas Timar, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs (Vencel Hazi), Education (Janos Molnar) and Metallurgy and Machine Industry (Lajos Asztalos) Union Minister of State for Education Bhakt Darshan in Hungary (continued)

382

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

(continued) June

E

1970 April

E

October 4–7 1971

P E E

March 1–7

E

April

E

April 30–May 5

P

September 15–16 November 15–18

E C

1972 January January

E E

March

E

June 20–23 July

P E

July

E

November

E

1973 January

E

January

N

April 1–7

E

Minister of Industrial Development, Internal Trade and Company Affairs, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, in Hungary Deputy Minister for Internal Trade Zultan Johar in India President of India V.V. Giri in Hungary Minister for Industrial Development Moin-ul-Haque in Hungary Minister of State for Agriculture Sher Singh in Hungary A 4-member delegation led by Minster for Heavy Industry Gyula Szeker in India Minister of Food and Agriculture Imre Dimeny in India A 5-member goodwill delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Imre Hollai in India Minister of Foreign Trade L.N. Mishra in Hungary Meeting of the Joint Committee on Cultural Exchange in New Delhi; Deputy Chairman of the Hungarian Institute of Cultural Relations Miklos Nagy in India Annual trade talks in New Delhi An industrial delegation led by B.D. Kumar, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade, and S. Vishwanth, Director-General, Cotton Textile Export Promotion Council, in Hungary Trade delegation led by Minister of Heavy Industry in India to review collaboration with public sector aluminium plants Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Hungary Computer delegation led by Col. A. Balasubraniam, Director (Electronics), Department of Electronics, in Hungary Electronics delegation led by R.M. Nayar, General Manager, Hindustan Aeronautics, in Hungary Deputy Minister for Metallurgy and Machine Industry J. Heiczman in India Y.T. Shah, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, in Hungary A 4-member delegation led by Gyorgy Osztrovszki, Chairman of the Hungarian National Atomic Energy Commission, and Gabor Foldiak, Director, Institute of Isotopes, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in India A delegation led by Deputy Chairman of Hungarian National Planning Bureau Jozsef Drecin in India (continued)

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

383

(continued) May 30–June 5

P

June 14–19

E

June 20–22 October

E E

October 8–12 December

C P

December 8–14

E

1974

N June

P

July

E

September September 28– October 4 October 28–31

E P

November 21–26

P

December

E C

September 9–14

E

September

P

September 26–30 October 4

P E

1975

E

Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha G.S. Dhillon and Minister for Works and Housing and Parliamentary Affairs Om Mehta in Hungary Minster of Commerce D.P. Chattopadhyaya in Hungary to preside over a conference of Indian Commercial Representatives in East Europe 4th session of the Joint Commission Minister of Steel and Mines Biju Patnaik in Hungary Minister of Education Nurul Hasan in Hungary Gustav Husak, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, in India Trade delegation led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Bala Szalai in India Chairman of the Hungarian Atomic Commission in India Foreign Office consultations; Hungarian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Pal Racz in India Minister for Industrial Development T.A. Pai in Hungary Minister of Planning D.P. Dhar in Hungary Chairman of the National Council of the Patriotic People’s Front of Hungary Gyula Kallai in India 1st session of the Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation; Hungarian delegation led by Minister for Metallurgy and Machine Building Gyula Horgos; Working Group on Trade Exchanges set up Prime Minister Jeno Fock in India accompanied by Gyula Horgos, Minister of Metallurgy and Machine Industry; Pal Racz, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Bela Szalai, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Trade delegation in Hungary Lokesh Chandra, Director of the International Academy of Indian Culture, in Hungary Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation Jagjivan Ram in Hungary Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan meets Hungarian Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed in Hungary Minister for Communications S.D. Sharma in Hungary (continued)

384

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

(continued) November November 12–20

1976 February 5–7

E E

P

April 8–17

E

August October

C C

November

E

November December 7–13

E P

December 8–9

E

December 9

E

1977 April 17

E

June 6 June

P E

October–November

C

November 19–22

E

December 15–19 1978 March

E E

Hungarian industrial exhibition in India Trade delegation led by Zsigmond Medve, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Trade, in India Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja in India (first visit by Hungarian Foreign Minister to India) 2nd session of the Joint Commission; Indian delegation led by Industry and Civil Supplies Minister T. A. Pai Artistes of the Kerala Art Academy in Hungary 3-member delegation led by Minister of Education Karoly Polinszky in India (inaugurated a 5-year diploma course in Hungarian language at Delhi University) A delegation led by P. Horvath, President of the Indian section of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, in India Hungarian industrial exhibition in India President Pal Losonczi in India (second visit; first visit in June 1969) Trade delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Istvan Torok in India Health delegation led by Eva Zsogon, Under-Secretary in Hungarian Health Ministry, in India 2nd session of the Joint Commission in Budapest; Indian delegation led by T.A. Pai, Minister for Industries and Civil Supplies and Hungarian delegation led by T. Nameslski, Minister for Machine Building and Metallurgy Foreign Secretary J.S. Mehta in Hungary Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Sandor Udvardi in India Secretary of State and Chairman of the State Committee for Information of Hungary in India A delegation led by Mihaly Bartolak, Deputy Chairman of the All-Hungary Cooperative Association, in India Minister of Foreign Trade Jozef Biro in India A delegation led by Secretary of State, Ministry of Light Industry Zsigmond Bakes in India for 11 days to identify new opportunities for trade (continued)

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

385

(continued) May

E

C September

C

September

E

November 26– December 8

E

November 27– December 26

E

1979 September

E

1980 February 26–March 2 July 28–30

P P

September 1–8

P

September 14–17

E

November 10–15

E

November 14

E

November

E

November

E

1981 July

E

3rd session of the Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation in Budapest; Indian delegation led by George Fernandes, Minister of Industry and Co-Chairman of the Joint Commission, and Janos Keseru, Minister of Light Industry Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre opened in New Delhi Information and Broadcasting Minister L.K. Advani in Hungary and East Europe A delegation of the India section of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce in India Dr. Inotai, Director of the Research Institute of World Economics, in India for a series of economic and technical seminars organized by the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and FICCI on ‘Trading with Hungary—Hungarian Technology’ in five cities Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Sandor Udvardi in India in New Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Dehra Dun, Haridwar, Madras and Bangalore 1st meeting of the Joint Business Council in Budapest; Indian delegation led by H.S. Singhania, President of FICCI Foreign Minister Frigyas Puja in India Chief Minister of West Bengal Jyoti Basu in Hungary Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha Balram Jhakar in Hungary Minister of Commerce Pranab Mukherjee in Hungary 4th session of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; detailed discussions by the four joint working groups on agriculture, chemical fertilizers and pharmaceuticals, industrial cooperation and trade; Hungarian delegation led by E. Keseru, Minister of Light Industry 2nd meeting of the Joint Business Council in New Delhi; Hungarian delegation led by Gyorgy Oblath in India 12-member trade delegation led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Tibor Malega and Minister of Light Industry E. Keseru in India Gyorgy Oblath, President of the Indian section of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, in India Minister of State for Irrigation Z.R. Ansari in Hungary (continued)

386

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

(continued) September October 1982 February March

April November

November 8–12

December 1983 February April September October 1984 April 15–23 May 26–30 November 1–3 1985 March 18–20 October 14–15 October

October 1986 January April 14–15

C

Minister of State for Education and Culture in Hungary E Minister of Foreign Trade Peter Veress in India E 3rd meeting of the Joint Business Council in Budapest E 7-member delegation led by Istvan Papp, General Director of the Institute for Energetics, Director-General of the National Energy Authority, in India C Minister of Culture and Education Imre Pozsgay in India E A 7-member delegation led by Istvan Papp, Director-General of the Institute of Energetics and the Director-General of the National Energy Authority in India E 5th session of the Joint Commission in Budapest; a 12-member Indian delegation led by Narayan Dutt Tiwari, Minister of Industry, Steel and Mines and Co-Chairman of the Joint Commission E A 9-member delegation led by Gyorgy Oblath in India E 4th meeting of the Joint Business Council in New Delhi E A purchase delegation led by M. Andriko, Secretary of State for Home Trade of Hungary, in India P Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in Hungary E Minister of Internal Trade Zollin Zubair in India P Deputy Prime Minster Istvan Srlos in India M A defence delegation led by Defence Minister R. Venkataraman in Hungary P Vice-President Sandor Gaspor and Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi attend Indira Gandhi’s funeral E Joint Business Council meeting in India E Deputy Prime Minster and Head of the National Planning Office Lajos Faluvegi in India E Hungarian Week in India showcasing Hungarian economy; delegation led by Jozsef Goloncser, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Trade E Lajos Faluvegi, Deputy Prime Minister and President of the National Planning Office, in India P Foreign Ministry delegation led by Secretary of State Hom in India for official level talks E Foreign Trade Minister Peter Veress in India P Speaker Istvan Sarlos in India (continued)

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

387

(continued) May 23–26 September September 24–26 October 27–30

1987 May July 20–23

October 23–25

October November 1988 February 15–17 February 19 February 27–March 2 April

June 10–11 October 9–13 October 24–28

1989 February 7–9

April June 20–21

E

Minister for Urban Development Abdul Ghafoor in Hungary M Chief of Army Staff General K. Sundarji in Hungary S Director-General of Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), A.P. Mitra, in Hungary E 6th session of the Joint Commission in Delhi; Hungarian Finance Minister Istvan Hetanyi leads delegation E Minister of Transport Lajos Urban in India P Deputy Foreign Minister Jozsef Benyi in India for finalizing cultural exchange programme for 1988– 1990 E 7th session of the Joint Commission in Budapest; Indian delegation led by Union Minister of Industry J. Vengal Rao E Secretary in the Department of Electronics, K.P. Nambiar, in Hungary P Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozsef Benyi in India E Meeting of the Working Group on Trade in Budapest E 8th meeting of the Joint Business Council P Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi in India E

A high-level delegation led by Logis Koveskuti, President of the Council for Industrial Cooperation, in India P Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Hungary (16 years after Indira Gandhi’s visit) M Minister for Defence K.C. Pant in Hungary E 8th session of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Deputy Prime Minister Petar Medgyessy leads Hungarian delegation; decide to raise trade turnover to $200 million by 1990 (US$150 million as Government-to-Government credit and US$50 million as suppliers credit for financing supply of machinery and equipment, including equipment for thermal power stations) E 2nd meeting of the Indo-Hungarian Group of Planning Experts (set up in 1985) in New Delhi; Hungarian delegation led by Erno Kemenes, State Secretary, Hungarian Planning Commission C Tadueusz Szelachowski, former Vice-President of the Polish-Indian Friendship Society, in India P Minister of State for External Affairs K. Natwar Singh in Hungary (continued)

388

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

(continued) September

M

September October 1990 March

P P P

May

S

June

P

1991 February 22 April 11–15

P P

1992 January 20–21

E

January 23

E

February

C N E E E E

October

P

October December

E P

Hungarian Minister of Defence Col. General Ferenc Karpati in India; the two countries agree to cooperate in the manufacture of electronics-related defence items Parliamentary delegation in Hungary Minister for Justice Kalman Kulscar in India Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs J. Benyi in India Minister of State for Science and Technology M.G.K. Menon, in Hungary to preside over a conference on ‘International Science and its Partners’ at Visegrad Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha Rabi Ray in Hungary to attend the first session of the newly-elected multi-party Parliament—the first contract with the new government in Hungary Transit visit of Hungarian President Arpad Goncz President Arpad Goncz in India (accompanied by Minister for Cultural and Public Education (Bertalam Andrafalvy); Minister for Culture without Portfolio (S. Madl); Head of President’s Office (K. Szunyagh); Deputy State Secretary for Foreign Affairs (D. Tomaj); Deputy State Secretary for International Economic Relations (Istvan Major) A 15-member delegation led by Peter Sujar, Chairman of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, in India 10th session of the Joint Business Council in India; Hungarian delegation led by Lojos Tolnay, President of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce State Secretary for Culture Elemer Biszterszky in India Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission P.K. Iyengar in Hungary Chairman of the Indian Trade Promotion Organization in Hungary Chairman of the Telecommunications Commission in Hungary Maharashtra Minister of Industries in Hungary A delegation of the Ministry of Industry in Hungary to study the labour situation Foreign Office consultations in Budapest; K. Srinivasan, Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs, in Hungary Chairman of Tourism Board Kazmir Kardos in India Minister without Portfolio Erno Pungor in India (continued)

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

389

(continued) 1993 February

P

April 19–24 July 20–22 October 4

C P E

October 5–8

E

1994 March 18–22

M

September 20, 21

P

September 22

P

November 22–26

P

December

C

1995 June 24–29

P

October

S

November 11–19

C

December 18–19

P

1996 February 16–17 August 16– September 6 October 26–30

P C E

1997 January 20–27

P

February

P

September 5–6

P

Minister of State for External Affairs R.L. Bhatia in Hungary ‘Days of Indian Culture’ celebrated in Hungary President Shankar Dayal Sharma in Hungary 11th meeting of the Joint Business Council in Budapest 9th session of the Joint Commission in Budapest (meets after a gap of five years ); agrees to avail Hungarian credit offer of $200 million by 31 December 1994 Political State Secretary for Defence Laszlo Szendrei in India President of Hungary Árpád Göncz in transit at Madras and Bombay 1st Foreign Office consultations in New Delhi; Political State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Szent-Iyanyi in India Parliamentary delegation led by the Speaker of the National Assembly, Dr Zoltan Gal, in India 18-member Tomkins Vocal Ensemble from Hungary visited India under cultural exchange programme for a period of 12 days and presented one performance each in Bangalore, Goa, Bombay and two in Delhi Parliamentary delegation led by Lok Sabha Speaker Shivraj Patil in Hungary Dr. G. Tofalvi, Director of the Hungarian Space Office, in Bangalore Minister of Culture and Education Gabor Fodor in India 2nd Foreign Office consultations in Budapest; Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs, in Hungary Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs in India Kathak group of Durga Arya in Hungary Meeting of Joint Commission’s Working Sub-group on Trade held in Budapest Parliamentary delegation led by Gyorgy Csoti in India Chairman of the Hungarian Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Minorities and Religious Affairs Gabor Gellert Kis in India Minister of State for External Affairs Kamala Sinha in Hungary (continued)

390

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

(continued) October 21

S

November

E

1998 January 25–27

C

July September 22–26

C C

November 26–27

C

1999 March 7–13

P

September

E

September 20–22

P

October 25–28 October 30– November 1 2000 April February 5–6

M P C P

April 23 June

P C

2001 April 25–30

P

2002 February 25

P

2003 May 21–23

C

June

P

3rd meeting of the Joint Committee on Science and Technology in New Delhi; Hungarian delegation led by Andres Siegler, Vice-President of the National Committee for Technological Development Meeting of the Working Group on Trade and Finance of the 10th session of the Joint Commission; Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Industry and Tourism Peter Balas in India Ravi Kapoor, Private Secretary to Human Resources Minister, in Budapest to finalize cultural exchange programme Dancers Guild of Calcutta in Hungary Joint Secretary S. Satyamoorthy in Hungary to discuss cultural exchange programme for 1999– 2001 Minister for Human Resources and Development Murli Manohar Joshi in Hungary on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the National Assembly Janos Ader in India Meeting of the Working Group on Trade in Budapest; Indian delegation led by Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce 4th Foreign Office consultations in Budapest; Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs, in Hungary Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis in Hungary Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi in India Hungarian Art Exhibition at Ajanta Art Gallery Minister of State for External Affairs Ajit Kumar Panja in Hungary 5th Foreign Office consultations in New Delhi Kuchipudi dance group led by Kaushalya Reddy in Hungary to participate in the Budapest Farewell Festival and the Bucsu Festival A 4-member delegation of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly led by its Chairman Istvan Szent-Ivanyi in India Minister of State for External Affairs Omar Abdullah in Hungary Indo-Hungarian workshop on ‘Surface Chemistry and Catalysis on Nano-Particles’ held in Budapest Sushma Swaraj, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs and Health and Family Welfare, in Hungary (continued)

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

391

(continued) July 15 July 18–19

P P

October 1

E

November 2–8

P

2004 March 29

E

November 17–27

P

November 22–25

C

November 24

E

2005 January 31 January 30–February 2 June 23–24 September

P P

2006 January 14–20

C

January 17–22 October 22–23

P C

November 2–6 December 4

P S

2007 January

P C

E

6th Foreign Office consultations in Budapest Minister of State for External Affairs Digvijay Singh in Budapest; chairs the 2nd Heads of Mission Conference of Central and East European countries in Budapest 11th session of the Joint Commission in Budapest; Indian delegation led by Minister for Commerce and Industry Arun Jaitley Prime Minister Pter Medgyessy in India (visit by Hungarian Prime Minister after 29 years); accompanied by Minister of Economy and Transport and Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Information and Communication, Interior, Defence, Cultural, Education; also accompanied by a 30-member business delegation Lakshmi Chand, Secretary (Industrial Policy and Promotion), in Hungary Dr. Andras Balogh, Chief Advisor to Hungarian Prime Minister on International Strategy in India; participates in a seminar on Panchsheel Minister of National Cultural Heritage Istvan Hiller in India; inaugurated Hungarian Week of Culture in New Delhi 1st meeting of the Indo-Hungarian Joint Working Group on Education held in Budapest 7th Foreign Office consultations in New Delhi Deputy State Secretary in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Laszlo Varkonyi in India Foreign Minister K. Natwar Singh in Hungary Dr. Geeti Sen, Chief Editor at the India International Centre Publications, Cultural Historian and Critic, in Hungary Minister of Culture Andras Bozoki in India; inaugurated the Hungarian Cultural Festival Parliamentary goodwill delegation in India Minister of Tourism and Culture Ambika Soni in Hungary to attend the Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution; renew cultural exchange programme for 2007–2010 Foreign Minister Kinga Goncz in India 7th session of the Science and Technology Committee in New Delhi; identifies 22 bilateral projects in areas including life sciences, biotechnology, material science, nontechnology, ICT, health and agriculture Finance Minister Janos Veres in India (continued)

392

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

(continued) January

January January April 25–28 August 29 September September 29 October 3–5 October 24–26 2008 January 8 January 16–19

February 8 May 12–15 July

September 9–11 September November November November 28– December 6 2009 January 15 September September 2010 January January January 17–21

E

1st session of the Joint Economic Committee (formed pursuant to the bilateral economic cooperation after Hungarian membership of the EU); Hungarian delegation led by Finance Minister E 1st meeting of the Joint Business Council P Former Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy in India M 1st meeting of the Joint Defence Committee in Budapest P 8th Foreign Office consultations in Budapest E Minister of State for Health and Family Welfare P. Lakshmi in Hungary C 1st international conference on Ayurveda in Budapest C Istvan Hiller, Hungarian Minister of Culture and Education, in India C International Hindi Conference in Budapest E Agriculture Minister Jozef Graf in India P Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany in India on the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations M Hungarian Defence Minister Imre Szekeres in India M 2nd meeting of the Joint Defence Committee in New Delhi P Secretary (Economic Relations) in Hungary as a Special Envoy of the Prime Minister to seek support for the India-US civil nuclear energy agreement P Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma in Hungary E Commerce and Industry Minister Kamal Nath in Hungary C 14-Member Kathak group of Pandit Birju Maharaj in Hungary C Minister of State (In-charge) for Youth Affairs and Sports M.S. Gill in Hungary C Festival of India in Hungary; 10-member Rajasthani Group of Allah Bhaya in Hungary P 9th Foreign Office consultations in New Delhi S 1st networking conference among Indian and Hungarian scientists in Bangalore S 2nd networking conference among Indian and Hungarian scientists in Bangalore S Dr. Ildikó Kovács, National Office for Research and Technology, in India P Honorary Consul of Hungary in Mumbai upgraded to Honorary Consul General P Foreign Minister Peter Balazs in India (continued)

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

393

(continued) February 1–2

E

February

S S

March

E

June

P

E E E September

P

September September

S E

October 21–23

M

November

S

November

P

2011 May 1–4

May 17–19

P

E

2nd session of the Joint Economic Commission for Economic Cooperation and Joint Business Council in Budapest; Indian delegation led by Minister of Commerce and Industry Anand Sharma (agree to increase trade to $1 billion by 2012) 3rd networking conference among Indian and Hungarian scientists in Bangalore Operationalization of the India-Hungary Science and Technology Fund for e2 million to promote joint research projects. During 2006–2010, the two countries had undertaken 20 joint research projects covering areas like nano-technology, agriculture, molecular and nano-science and biodiversity László Parragh, President of Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in India Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of Lok Sabha Meira Kumari in Hungary; establishment of an India-Hungary Parliamentary Friendship Group by the Hungarian Parliament Business delegation of the North Eastern Small Scale Industries Association (NESSIA) in Hungary Business delegation of the Karnataka Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Hungary A business delegation of the Hungarian Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Indi Speaker of Goa Legislative Assembly Pratap Singh Raoji Rane in Hungary Joint workshop on science and technology in India More than 70 Indian companies participated in the Budapest International Trade Fair 3rd meeting of the Joint Defence Committee in Budapest Joint workshop on science and technology in Hungary Minister of State for External Affairs Preneet Kaur visited Hungary; inaugurated the Indian Cultural Centre in the Annexe of the Indian Embassy in Budapest A 7-member parliamentary delegation led by Ashwani Kumar, Minister of State for Planning, Parliamentary Affairs, Science and Technology and Earth Sciences, in Hungary A 14-member business delegation from the EU-India Chambers of Commerce in Hungary as part of their Central and Eastern European tour to explore business environment and opportunities (continued)

394

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

(continued) May 23–27

June 5–7

October

November 3–4 November 16–19

November 23–24

2012 January 23

February March 19–20

May 23–25

August October 4–5

M

A 15-member delegation from the General Staff course at the National Defence Academy (NDA), including one-star Generals of the Army, Navy and Air Force, civilian office-holders and a delegation of foreign students (from Nepal, Saudi Arabia and France) in Hungary for a one-week study tour P Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna in Hungary to attend the 10th ASEM Foreign Ministers’ meeting at Godollo, Hungary; meets Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi and Prime Minister Viktor Orban E Twelve Indian companies, including representatives from the Handicrafts Export Promotion Council, participated in the International Trade Fair in Budapest M 4th meeting of Joint Defence Committee in New Delhi S Vilasrao Deshmukh, Minister of Science and Technology and Earth Sciences, in Hungary to participate in the World Science Forum, organised by the Academy of Sciences of Hungary; Science and Technology Fund operationalized E A 6-member delegation of CII in Budapest to participate in the Grow India Conference organised by the Ministry of National Economy of Hungary P 10th Foreign Office consultations in New Delhi; Hungarian delegation led by János Hóvári, Deputy State Secretary for Global Affairs in Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Indian delegation led by M. Ganapathi, Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs E Meeting of the JWG on Agriculture in New Delhi (established under the 2008 agriculture agreement C An international conference on Rabindranath Tagore entitled ‘His Writings and Art beyond Bengal’ was held in Budapest in collaboration with ELTE University with the support of the Indian Council of Cultural Relations M 5th meeting of Joint Defence Committee in Budapest; a 5-member defence delegation led by Shekhar Agarwal, Secretary, Defence Production; Hungarian side led by Gabor Marky, Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Defence C Kathak Dance Troupe led by Sharmistha Mukherjee gave performances in four Hungarian cities E A 3-member delegation led by Minister of State in the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology Sachin Pilot, in Budapest to participate in the Conference on Cyberspace (continued)

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

395

(continued) November 24–30

2013 January 15

July 14–16

July August September 30– October 1 October 8–11

October 14 October 15–16 October 16–18

October 17 November 12–14

2014 January

P

A 6-member delegation led by the Speaker of Hungarian National Assembly, Dr László Kövér, in India P Deputy State Secretary for Global Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Szabolcs Takacs, visited India and held bilateral consultations with Secretary (Economic Relations), Ministry of External Affairs Pinak Chakravarti P Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid in Hungary; addresses the annual conference of Hungarian Ambassadors; the first Foreign Minister outside NATO and EU to be invited as the Chief Guest for this conference P Hungary opens Consulate General in Mumbai E Péter Szijjartó, State Secretary for External Economic Relations, in India M 6th meeting of the Joint Defence Committee in New Delhi E Minister of Water Resources Harish Rawat led the Indian delegation and delivered a keynote address on’Green Economy for Blue Water’ at the Budapest Water Summit; expert groups constituted on both sides S Joint Science and Technology Committee meeting E Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation meeting in New Delhi P Prime Minister Victor Orban in India; accompanied by a 100-member delegation, including Minister of National Economy Mihaly Varga, Minister of Human Resources Zoltan Balog, and a 80-member business delegation in Delhi and Mumbai; visit marks 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations M 6th meeting of the Joint Defence Committee in New Delhi P Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi in India for the 11th ASEM Foreign Ministers’ meeting (11–12 November 2013); meets Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid C An AYUSH Information Centre established; the first such centre in Europe (continued)

396

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

(continued) April 28–30

M

September 20–24

C

September 21–24

C

October 28– November 11 November 19

C

November 21–23

C

December

C

2015 January

C

P

February 15–18

E

April 15

E

May 11–12

M

May 20

E

A 3-member defence delegation visits Hungarian nuclear, biological and chemical establishments for finalizing cooperation in the field of chemical biological radiological and nuclear equipment, training, aerial CBRN and lab testing facilities. The main purpose of the visit was to get a first-hand information of the advanced technology available in Hungary on chemical decontamination equipment, aerial radiation equipment, UAVs, and techniques for bio-fuel generation An AYUSH delegation led by Nilanjan Sanyal, Secretary (AYUSH) Ministry of Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy, in Budapest An international Ayurveda conference held in Hungary Hungarian group participates in 8th Delhi International Arts Festival 2014 Education Exchange Programme for the period 2014–2017; encourages cooperation between higher education institutions, exchange of publications, educational materials and curricula and institution of annual scholarships Hungarian group participates in the ‘2nd World Percussion Festival’ organized by the Times of India group and Krishna Prerna Charitable Trust An AYUSH professor takes over the Ayush Chair at the University of Debrecenk Csaba Balogh, Deputy State Secretary for Eastern Opening, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in India A 23-member delegation comprising of 17 pharmaceutical and 5 Ayurveda firms of the Pharmaceutical Export Promotion Council in Hungary Hungary becomes part of 161 countries and territories for e-Tourist Visa 7th meeting of the Joint Defence Committee; co-chaired by G. Mohan Kumar, Secretary for Defence Production and Attila Puskas, Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Defence; other Indian participants were Sanjay Garg, Joint Secretary (DIP), Department of Defence Production, and Gopal Bhushan, Director (Industrial Cooperation), Defence Research and Development Organization Foreign and Trade Minister Péter Szijjártó in Mumbai to meet Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra and leading CEOs (continued)

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

397

(continued) May 27–30

E

June 29–30

E

July 30–August 1

P

August–September October 5–6

C P

October 16–18

C

November 6

P

2016 March 25

C

May

C

June 2

E

June 2–3

E

June 17–19

C

July 4–6

P

A 8-member delegation led by Om Prakash Dhankar, Agriculture Minister of Haryana, in Budapest to attend a conference organized by World Union of Wholesale Markets A delegation of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) in Hungary Chief Minister of Punjab Sukhbir Singh Badal in Hungary (accompanied by a business delegation) Phulkari exhibition in Hungary Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Trade Laszlo Szabo, along with a business delegation in India for the 2nd India Central Europe Business Forum held at Bengaluru Hungarian group participates in the second edition of the ‘International Folk Dance and Music Festival’ organized in Delhi Minister of State for External Affairs (Gen) V.K. Singh (Retd.) meets Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Peter Szijjarto on the sidelines of the ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Luxembourg On the 100th anniversary of its Hungarian premiere, composer Imre Kalman’s ‘The Csardas Princess’ gave a performance at the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi Istvan Ijgyarto, Minister of State for Cultural and Science Diplomacy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in India in connection with establishment of a Hungarian room at Tagore House in Kolkata Joint Business Council held on the sidelines of Joint Economic Commission meeting in Budapest; 18-member FICCI delegation; over 100 B-2-B meetings were held between the Indian companies and the Hungarian companies which participated in the Joint Business Forums 4th session of the Joint Economic Commission held in Budapest; Indian delegation led by Ramesh Abhishek, Secretary, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) and Minster of State for Foreign Affairs and Trade Laszlo Szabo Mahesh Sharma, Minister of State for Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation, in Hungary to inaugurate Ganga-Danube Cultural Festival and International Day of Yoga in 10 cities of Hungary Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Peter Szijjarto in India (continued)

398

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

(continued) July 20

S

August October 15–17

C P

December

E

2017 May 6–9

E

June 13–15

E

June 23

C

October 1–4

C

October 9–15

E

October 25–26

E

October 24–26

C

November 23–24

P

2018 March 6–7

E

9th meeting of the Joint Committee for Science and Technology held in Budapest Art exhibition by Ramesh Terdal in Budapest Vice President Hamid Ansari in Hungary (accompanied by Minister of State for Chemicals and Fertilizers Mansukh L. Mandavia and four Members of Parliament—Kumari Selja, Prabhakar Kore, Javed Ali Khan and Saugata Roy Dr. Pana Petra, Deputy State Secretary for Foreign Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in India A delegation led by the President of the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Hungary A delegation of the Coffee Board in Hungary; also participates in the SCAE World of Coffee event India organized the Ganga-Danube Cultural Festival; Minister of State, Ministry of National Economy Peter Cseresnyes and President of Hungary-India Parliamentary Friendship Group were the Chief Guests on the occasion Special Secretary, Ayush, and Director-General, Centre for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (CCRAS) in Hungary Hungarian Minister of State Public Policy, Csaba Balogh, in India A CII delegation led by Deep Kapuria, Chairman of the CII Central Europe Committee and Chairman of the Hi-Tech Group, in Hungary to attend the World Export Development Forum A delegation of over 100 educational consultants from India led by M/s Uniagents, an education technology consulting firm in Hungary; organized a European Higher Education Summit 2017 Istvan Mikola, Minister of State/State Secretary for Security Policy and International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, participated in the Global Conference on Cyber Space 5th session of the Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation (continued)

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

399

(continued) March 21–22

S

May 4

P

May 12

C

June 23–24

C

September

E

September 24–29

E

October 4–10

C

November 13

P

2019 January

P

January 20–21

C

August 25–27

P

10th session of the biennial Joint Committee on Science and Technology; Hungarian delegation led by Jozsef Palinkas, President of the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDIO); decides to extend agreement on Joint Strategic Research Fund; decides to jointly fund seven projects for a period of three years in the areas of ICT, health, energy, agriculture, waste water treatment, nano-technology and veterinary sciences Minister of State or External Affairs M.J. Akbar met Peter Szijjarto, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary in Dushanbe on the sidelines of the High-Level International Conference on ‘Countering Terrorism and Preventing Violent Radicalization’ An event on promotion of States of India—their economic, culinary and tourism and their ‘Make in India’ potential—was organised in Hungary 3rd edition of “Ganga-Danube Cultural Festival of India” was celebrated in 22 cities of Hungary; Festival showcased yoga, Indian classical dance, music, folk art, films and gastronomy Natarajan Chandrasekharan, Chairman of the Tata Group, in Hungary A delegation from World Skills India, an initiative of National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) under the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship, in Hungary to participate as a guest country in the Hungexpo’s Euroskills events 5th Indian Film Festival was organized in Puskin Cinema, Budapest 1st Hungarian Indian Film and Tourism Symposium in Budapest to commemorate 70th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Hungary (organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary) Peter Sztaray, Minister of State for Security Policy for Raisina Dialogue, in India 1st Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and Hungarian Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) dialogue Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar in Hungary (seven years after the last visit by Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid) (continued)

400

APPENDIX E: INDIA-HUNGARY VISITS, 1948–2021

(continued) September 9–12

E

October 14–17

E

November 20–22

E

December 9–12

E

2020 January 15–17 2021 January 19

P

Chairman, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and Chairman, Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) in Budapest to participate in the International Telecommunication Union Conference 2019 Water Management Minister Gajendra Singh Shekhawat in Hungary Deputy Secretary for External Economic Relations Istvan Joo in India to participate in the IE29F Union Minister of Road Transport and Highways, Nitin Gadkari, in Budapest to attend the 5th ASEM Transport Ministers’ meeting Peter Szijjarto, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in India 10th Foreign Office consultations in Budapest; Indian delegation led by Secretary (West) Vikas Swarup

(C = Cultural; E = Economic; M = Military; P = Political; S = Science and Technology)

Appendix F: India-Hungary Agreements, 1949–2019

1949

April 8

1951 1954 1956 1957

January 20 June 17 January 6 April 11 Jun

1958

January 15

1960

January 13 April 23

June 25

November 3

Trade agreement providing for exchange of goods valued at Rs13 million; payment for goods to be settled in Rupees or Pound Sterling as may be mutually convenient Trade agreement renewed through exchange of letters Trade agreement (valid till 31 December 1955) Trade agreement of 1954 extended till 31 December 1957 Trade agreement (valid until December 1959; subsequently extended upto 30 June 1960) Agreement with State Trading Corporation for payment of Hungarian products in Indian Rupees Trade agreement extending agreement of 17 June 1954 till 31 December 1959 Exchange of letters extending the validity of the trade agreement for a further period of six months to 30 June 1960 Agreement with Chemolimpex (the foreign trade company for chemical products) for the setting up of biogas and bio-fertilizer producing plants First long-term trade and payments agreement for 3.5 years (in effect from 1 July 1960); all commercial and non-commercial transactions to be financed in non-convertible rupees and trade to be conducted on a balanced basis Trade agreement (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

401

402

APPENDIX F: INDIA-HUNGARY AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

(continued) 1961

August 24

August 25 1962

March 30

1963

November 22

1964

November 17

1966

February 23 February 23 February 25

March 21 June 15

1967

April 5 June

1968

April 4

1969 1970

June 30 January 14

Agreement for the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes by an exchange of letters between the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission and the Chairman of the Hungarian National Atomic Energy Commission; initially for a period of five years; renewable by mutual agreement; providing for exchange of information, scientists’ visits, joint projects and two fellowships each on a reciprocal basis for training or visits of scientists in mutually agreed subjects Agreement for the establishment of a detonator factory in the private sector with Hungarian collaboration in Hyderabad 1st cultural agreement for 5 years (containing 85 items/projects in the fields of education, science, technology, medicine, agricultural, art and culture, radio, telecom, film and press and sports); instruments of ratification exchanged in Budapest on 25 April 1963 Trade and payments agreement (w.e.f. 1 January 1964; in force for a period of five years) Agreement for the preparation of a project report by Hungarian experts for the integrated aluminium project at Korba, Madhya Pradesh Protocol on extending trade agreement till 31 December 1970 (letters exchanged on 28 October 1968) Air services agreement Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation between the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Institute of Cultural Relations of Hungary Contract for the export of 2,000 railway wagons to Hungary valued at Rs65 million in next three years Agreement on economic cooperation; Hungarian loan of Rs250 million (Rs125 million to Government of India at 2.5% interest per annum and Rs125 million on suppliers’ credit for purchases by public and private sector importers at 4.5% interest per annum) 2-year cultural exchange agreement Exchange programme for research workers and promoting participation in international scientific and technical congresses, conferences in each other’s country Protocol on the implementation of the trade and payments agreement (also sought to examine and work out a programme of industrial collaboration and joint industrial and commercial cooperation in third countries) Protocol with the Hungarian Institute of Cultural Relations Cultural exchange programme for the years 1969–1971 Trade protocol for 1970 (continued)

APPENDIX F: INDIA-HUNGARY AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

403

(continued) 1971

March 3

March 21 November 18

1972

January 14

1973

January 5 January

April 7 October December 5 December 5 December 14 December 19 1974

February 14

September 25

September November 1

1975

November 18 December 4 January 17 September 11 September 13 November 20

A 5-year trade and payments agreement envisaged an average 10% annual growth in total trade (in force from 1 January 1971 with retrospective effect and valid till 31 December 1975) Inauguration of shipping service with the arrival of Hungaria in Bombay 5th cultural exchange programme for 1971–1972 and 1972– 1973; provided for exchange visits of 66 Indians and 60 Hungarians; contained 85 projects envisaging cooperation in the fields of education, science and technology, medicine, agriculture, art and culture, film and press and sports Trade protocol envisaging a trade turnover of Rs550 million in 1972 Trade protocol envisaging a trade turnover of Rs592 million Agreement on working arrangements on the collaboration in the peaceful uses of atomic energy; scientific cooperation led to closer cooperation in nuclear physics, radio-isotopes, radio-biology, nuclear electronics and nuclear methods in environmental protection and agriculture Agreement on long-term economic cooperation in the fields of metallurgy, heavy engineering, telecommunications Cultural agreement 3rd agreement on economic collaboration 3rd protocol on scientific and technical cooperation 3rd trade protocol envisaging a trade turnover of Rs775 million during 1974 Exchange of letters setting up of the Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement on scientific and technological cooperation (valid for 5 years); provided for the establishment of direct contacts between research institutes, including exchange of publications, consultations, visit of experts, joint research projects, scholarships, and participation in scientific conferences A MoU for enlarging economic and trade relations; provides for the establishment of a Indo-Hungarian group of experts on planning Agreement for cooperation in the field of planning Protocol of 1st meeting Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation MoU on supply of a complete coke oven plant by India Consular convention Trade protocol envisaging a trade turnover of Rs815 million Protocol on cooperation in agriculture and food processing Protocol on water resources development and management Trade plan for 1976 envisaging trade turnover of Rs610 million (continued)

404

APPENDIX F: INDIA-HUNGARY AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

(continued) 1976

March 26 October 23 December 8 December 9

1977

November 22 November 23 December 15

December 15

1978

March May May 25 July September

1979

September 27 October September

1980

November 15 December

1981

February April 14 July 10

1982

April 5

1985

September October 11 October 14

Cultural exchange programme for 1976–1977 and 1978 Agreement on the equivalence of Indian and Hungarian educational degrees Trade protocol for 1977 envisaging trade of Rs710 million 5-year agreement on cooperation in the development of public health Protocol on purchases from each other’s cooperative societies Protocol on flood protection; valid till December 1980 3-year (1978–1980) trade and payments agreement providing for switching over to trade in convertible currency from 1 January 1978; automatic renewal for a period of one year at a time Agreement to liquidate the rupee balances and rupee payment obligations on the termination of the agreement of 3 March 1971 and interest on credits extended by Hungary of Rs300 million of which 80% has been utilized and trade in freely convertible currencies w.e.f. 1 January 1978 Protocol on science and technology (w.e.f. 1 January 1979); valid for three years Agreement on economic and scientific cooperation for 1979– 1981 Protocol on recommendations of third meeting of the Joint Commission Agreement between FICCI and the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce Agreement on cooperation between information organizations and mass media between the Press Trust of India and Hungarian News Agency Agreement on cooperation in the field of information 1st shipping agreement initialled Joint Business Council set up by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Hungarian Chambers of Commerce Protocol on cooperation in trade, industry and agriculture Agreement on cooperation between the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Indian National Science Academy Agreement between the Press Trust of India and MTI Hungarian News Agency Cultural exchange agreement MoU for further cooperation in the field of water resources development 3-year cultural exchange programme for 1982–1984 (9th cultural agreement since 1962) Agreement on cooperation in matters of health Agreement on science and technology for 1985–1987 Protocol on cooperation in planning (continued)

APPENDIX F: INDIA-HUNGARY AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

405

(continued) 1986

September October 30 October 30

1987 October 4

1988

November 4 March 1

1989

June 10 July 7

1991

April 10 April 10 April 10

1992

February October 16 December 8

1994 1995

September 22 October October 27

1997

March October 21

1998 2003

November November 3 November 3 November 3 November 3

Programme for cooperation in science and technology Agreement on avoidance of double taxation (w.e.f. 7 January 1987) Agreement between Maruti Udyog Ltd. and Mogurt of Hungary for the export of 500 Maruti cars annually with the intention to raise the number to 5,000 a year Protocol on trade MoU on widening trade and industrial cooperation in the fields of electronics Cultural exchange programme for 1989–1990 Agreement for greater cooperation in the fields of science and technology for 1989–1990 Agreement between Doordarshan and Hungarian TV Agreement on credit of $200 million at 4.5% interest, repayable over 15 years; to be used primarily to finance Hungarian participation in the 210 MW additional unit at the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Agreement on cooperation in health Cultural exchange programme Agreement on cooperation between Magyar Radio and All India Radio Implementation plan for the cultural exchange programme renewed in 1991 Agreement on cooperation in the field of tourism Agreement on science and technology cooperation (renewed for a further five years) Protocol on Foreign Office consultations Programme of cooperation in science and technology for the years 1996–1998 Agreement between Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and Hungarian Space Office for cooperation in the field of exploration and utilization of outer space for peaceful purposes—the only country in Central Europe with which ISRO has such an agreement MoU between the National Centre for Trade Information and its Hungarian counterpart ITD Programme for cooperation in science and technology for 1998–2000 Cultural exchange programme for 1999–2000 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (entry into force 2 January 2006) Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income Agreement on defence cooperation Agreement on exemption of visa requirement for diplomatic and official passport holders (continued)

406

APPENDIX F: INDIA-HUNGARY AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

(continued) November November November November

November November 2004 2005

March 29 June 23

2006 2008

October January 18 January 18 January 18

January 18

January 18 January 18 January 18

3 3 3 4

MoU on cooperation in information technology and services Cultural exchange programme Education exchange programme MoU between the Electronics and Computer Software Export Promotion Council (ESC) and the Hungarian Association of IT Companies (IVSZ) for promoting the development of business relations Agreement of cooperation between EXIM Banks of two countries Two agreements extending a line of credit of US$10 million for exports from each country Revised agreement on economic cooperation (installed) Agreement on economic cooperation; agrees to establish a ‘Joint Commission’; identifies the energy sector, electronic and electro-technical industry, food processing, bio-technology, pharmaceuticals, auto components, electrical equipment and appliances, small and medium size business and science and technology as areas for long-term cooperation Cultural exchange programme for 2007–2010 signed MoU on cooperation in the field of health and medicine, including Ayurveda MoU on cooperation in prevention of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances Agreement for cooperation in agriculture, plant quarantine and protection and animal husbandry covering agricultural research and technology, agricultural production, horticulture and post-harvest management, including cold chain, agro-processing and agricultural marketing MoU on the establishment of a e2 million India-Hungary Science and Technology Fund (with a contribution of e1 million from each side per annum); operationalized in November 2011 in areas including green chemistry, bio-medicine and space (opto-electronics) MoU between Bharat Electronics Ltd. and Carinex for joint development of TDM VSAT signal monitoring MoU between Bharat Electronics Ltd. and Erideil for TOT for universal systems for VSAT signal monitoring MoU between Bharat Electronics Ltd. and Bonn Hungary for joint development of noise amplifiers and integrated receivers for 3D tactical control radar (continued)

APPENDIX F: INDIA-HUNGARY AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

407

(continued) January 18

May 8

2010

February 2 February

February

2011 November 18 2012 2013

June 5 October 17 October 17

October 17

October 17

October 17

October 17

MoU on cooperation between Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas Plc. for cooperation and joint participation in exploration and production sector in India and abroad, exchange of basic and applied research and development information, transfer of technology in upstream and downstream sectors, and cooperation in respect of training and human resource development (approved by the Government of India on 27 July 2009) Farm-out Agreement between ONGC and BNN Investment Ltd. (a fully owned subsidiary of MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas Pic.) for assignment of 35% participating interest in exploration block HF-ONN-2001/1 located in the Himalayan Foothills Social security agreement (date of accession/ratification 5 June 2012) Agreement on trade and investment cooperation between the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and ITD of Hungary Agreement on arbitration between the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and ITD of Hungary Agreement between Semmelweis University Faculty of Physical Education and Sports Sciences and Sports Authority of India Agreement on scientific cooperation between Indian National Science Academy and Hungarian Academy of Sciences Agreement on social security ratified MoU on cooperation in the field of sports MoU on cooperation in the areas of defensive aspects of Microbiological and Radiological Detection and Protection between the Ministry of Defence of the two countries Cultural exchange programme for 2013–2015 for cooperation in the fields of art, culture, conservation technologies for museum materials, exchange of curators/exhibit designers, scientists, conservators MoU on revision of air services agreement of 23 February 1966; allowing Hungarian low-fare airline WizzAir to add a stop to Mumbai on its Budapest-Dubai flight MoU on establishing a e4 million Indo-Hungarian Strategic Research Fund; enhanced contribution of e2 million by each country for 2014–2017 for collaborative research activities, including a mix of bilateral research projects and scientific symposiums MoU on the promotion of trade and investment between the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and ITD of Hungary (continued)

408

APPENDIX F: INDIA-HUNGARY AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

(continued) October 17 2014

November 19

2015

October

2016

October 16

October 16 2017

October

2018

June 25

September 19 2019

August 26

MoU for the promotion and development of traditional systems of medicine, including Ayurveda Educational exchange agreement for 2014–2017. Hungary offers 200 scholarships annually for Indian students and researchers, primarily in the fields of natural sciences, information technology, economics, business as well as joint research, organization of conferences, etc. India offers 35 scholarships per year to Hungarian students and research areas in Hindi and other scientific areas of interest. MOU between Hungary and the State of Karnataka on Economic Cooperation MoU on water management between the Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation and the Hungarian Ministry of Interior MoU between the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and Institute of Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) of Hungary MoU between the Central Council of Research in Ayurvedic Science and the University of Debrecen for the establishment of the European University of Ayurvedic Sciences MOU on water management between the Council of EU Chambers of Commerce of India (CEUCCI) and the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (HCCI) on future cooperation MoU between ICCR and ELTE University of Budapest for continuation of Hindi Chair at ELTE University Cultural exchange agreement for 2019–2022

Appendix G: India-Poland Visits, 1951–2020

1951 January

E

1954 March 30 August 1–6

P P

1955

E June 24–26 October

1956 January

P E C

March

C

April

E

June 10–14 July

P P

Benedykt O. Polak, representative of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade, in India Establishment of diplomatic relations Representatives of the Governments of Canada, Poland and India met in New Delhi to study the terms and provisions in the agreement relating to the International Commissions and the functions and duties arising therefrom and to initiate the necessary principles to establish the Commissions in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; Polish delegation led by P. Ogrodzinski Polish Trade Mission opened in Calcutta and Mumbai Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in Poland Minister for Foreign Trade Konastanty Dabrowski in India Cultural delegation led by Deputy Minister of External Affairs in Poland An 11-member cultural delegation led by J.K. Wende, Chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations, in India Director-General of Shipping J. Thomorowicz in India Vice-President S. Radhakrishnan in Poland Parliamentary delegation led by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha A. Ayyangar in Poland (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

409

410

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

(continued) July–September

C

1957 March 24–31

P

1958 March June

E E

September 1959 April–May May

E C E E

July

P

October

December 1960 January

C C

May June 14–16

E E

June September 20–27

E P E

July October 11–14

P P

1963 January 19–26 March December

P E E

1961

A delegation of 30 artistes and 5 officials led by Deputy Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary for 3 months A 24-member delegation led by Prime Minister Josef Cyrankiewicz in India S. Strus of the Ministry of Foreign Trade in India A 10-member delegation led by Deputy Commerce Minister Satish Chandra in Poland Polish Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade in India A lawyers’ delegation led by Law Minister in Poland Minister of Foreign Trade W. Trampozynski in India Trade delegation led by Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade J. Burakiewicz in India for talks on renewal of trade agreement expiring at the end of the year Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha A. Ayyangar in Poland Trade delegation led by Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade J. Burakiewicz in India for talks on renewal of the trade agreement expiring at the end of the year 121-member Czech Philarmonic Orchestra in India A delegation led by Marian Rybicki, Minister of Justice, and four senior officials of the Ministry of Law in India Minister of Foreign Trade W. Trampozynski in India Finance Minister Morarji Desai accompanied by B.K. Nehru, Commissioner-General for Economic Affairs (External Financial Relations) of India, in Poland Maritime delegation in Poland Prime Minister Josef Cyrankiewicz in India Union Minister for Food and Agriculture S.K. Patil in Poland Chief Minister of West Bengal B.C. Roy in Poland President Aleksander Zawadzki in India (accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Julian Tokarski, Deputy Foreign Minister Mariam Nazkowski and Alicja Musialowa, Member of the Council of State, as well as by a group of advisers) Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in India Minister of Mining and Power Jan Mitrega in India Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade Franciszck Modrzewski in India (continued)

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

411

(continued) 1964 March

November 1965 January

C

P E

June 23–27

E

November

P

1966 February–March March 1967 September

E E P

October 8–11

P

December

E

1968 January 22–28

E

October

E

October

E

November

E

November November 25–28

E C

1969 August

December 14–20

E

E

1970 February June 16–19 October

E P E

1971 July

E

Minister of Culture T. Galinski in India (1st programme of scientific and cultural exchanged under the Cultural Agreement of 1957) Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha Hukam Singh in Poland Delegation led by M. Karczmar, Director of Finance Department, Ministry of Foreign Trade, in India Minister of Steel and Mines N. Sanjiva Reddy in Poland A goodwill parliamentary delegation led by K. D. Malaviya visited Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Poland to explain India’s viewpoint on the Indo-Pak conflict Trade delegation in India Minister of Foreign Trade W. Trampozynski in India Parliamentary delegation led by Member of Parliament S.N. Mishra in Poland Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Poland (12 years after Jawaharlal Nehru visited Poland) A delegation of Polish economic experts In India for talks on expanding trade Deputy Minister of Mines and Power K. Febris in India Minister of Transport and Shipping V.K. R.V. Rao in Poland Minister of State for Food and Agriculture M.S. Gurupadaswamy in Poland Deputy Minister of Commerce Shafi Quereshi in Poland Trade delegation led by Z. Mazus in India Minister of Culture and Fine Arts L. Motyka and K. Olszweski, Minister for Economic Cooperation with Other Countries, in India for the 1st meeting of the Joint Committee under the Cultural Agreement A 4-member study team led by H.P. Nanda, President of the Indo-Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in Poland Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Strzelecki in India Minister of Shipping Jerzy Szopa in India President V.V. Giri in Poland Trade delegation led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade in India to sign annual trade protocol for 1971 Minister of Steel and Mines S.M. Kumaramangalam in Poland (continued)

412

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

(continued) September

October 1972 January 6–15

P

C P

February July 6–9 July

C P E

July

E

September

P

December 2–9

P

1973 January 10–18

P

March

E

March 29–April 6 April 1–5

E E

May

E

Parliamentary delegation led by the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha B. D. Khobragade in Poland A 3-member film delegation in India Deputy Prime Minister Jan Mitrega in India accompanied by Stanislaw Trepczynski, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; Franciszek Adamkiewicz, Deputy Minister of Heavy Industry; Ryszard Strzelecki, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade; Stanislaw Wylupek, Deputy Minister of Machine Engineering Industry, etc.; set up Working Groups to study in depth the possibilities of cooperation in the coal mining industry, ship-building industry, engineering industry, chemical industry and trade Vice-Minister of Culture Drutot in India Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Poland Computer delegation led by Col. A. Balasubraniam, Director (Electronics), Department of Electronics, in Poland Electronics delegation led by R.M. Nayar, General Manager, Hindustan Aeronautics, in Poland Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, Shipping and Transport Raj Bahadur in Poland A 11-member parliamentary delegation led by Edward Babiuch, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party and member of the Politburo, in India Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz in India accompanied by Tadeusz Olechowski, Minister of Foreign Trade; Jozef Okuniewski, Minister of Agriculture; Jerzy Olssewski, Minister of Chemical Industry; Jozef Pinkowski, First Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission; Henryk Kisiel, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and other senior officials from Poland Working Groups on mining and commercial exchanges meet in Delhi to prepare the agenda for the 1st meeting of the Joint Commission Minister of Shipping Jarzy Szopa in India Minister for Internal Trade Edward Sznajder in India for meeting of the Committee/Working Group on Trade Exchanges Minister for Foreign Trade L.N. Mishra in Poland (continued)

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

413

(continued) November 2–8

1974 March 11–15 July December 5–13

December 1975 January 20–24

February 14–21 September 29– October 4 October

November 16–18 1976 June 11–15 July

September

October 19–22 November December 15–18

1977 January January 24–27

E

1st meeting of Joint Commission for Economic, Commercial and Scientific Cooperation (hereinafter the Joint Commission) in Warsaw; Indian delegation led by Minister for Steel and Heavy Industries T.A. Pai P Foreign Minister Stephan Olszowski in India M Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram in Poland P A 4-member Polish parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Polish Parliament Stainslow Gucwa in India E Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade and Shipping Stefan Perskowicz in India E 2nd meeting of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Polish delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Jan Mitrega M A 11-member delegation led by Defence Minister General W. Jaruzelski in India P Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha G.S. Dhillon in Poland E Business delegation sponsored by the Indo-Polish Chamber of Commerce led by Jamshed Desai in Poland E Commerce Minister D.P. Chattopadhyaya in Poland E 3rd meeting of the Joint Commission in Warsaw; Indian delegation led by Energy Minister K.C. Pant E A delegation led by M. Roman, Director-General of the Central Administration of Civil Aviation, in India E 14-member delegation led by H.P. Nanda, President of the Indo-Polish Chamber of Commerce, in Poland to explore possibilities of diversifying trade E Polish Minister of Foreign Trade and Shipping J. Olszewski in India E Trade delegation led by J.Kapuscinski, Deputy Director, Minister for Foreign Trade, in India E 4th meeting of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Polish delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Josef Tejchna and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of Poland E. Sznazder P Foreign Minister Emil Wojtaszek in India P First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party Edward Gierek in India C Minister of Education, Social Welfare and Culture Nurul Hasan in Poland E Minister for Civil Supplies and Cooperation A.C. George in Poland (continued)

414

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

(continued) September

October 4–8

November December 1978 January 20–26 November

December 1979 March April 17–24

June 14–16

June 1980 August 1981 January 15–18 1982 October October October November 10–13 November 1983 December 14

1984 March

March

November

E

A 5-member delegation led by Minister and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of Poland Edward Sznadjer in India E 5th meeting of the Joint Commission in Warsaw; Indian delegation led by Minister of Energy P. Ramachandran P Polish parliamentarian Z. Kurowski in India E Trade delegation led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Shipping Wisniewski in India M Vice Admiral Ludwik Janczyszyn, Commander-in-Chief, Polish Navy, in India P A 9-member parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Polish Parliament Stanislaw Guewa in India E Polish trade delegation in India E 6th meeting of the Joint Commission in New Delhi E A 10-member delegation led by H.P. Nanda, President of the Indo-Polish Chamber of Commerce, in Poland P Prime Minister Morarji Desai in Poland accompanied by Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee P Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha K.S. Hegde in Poland E A delegation led by Ajit K. Mukherjee, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, in Poland E Polish Commerce Minister in India E Energy Minister Shiv Shankar in Warsaw E A 4-member trade delegation led by S.K. Sarkar, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, in Poland E Meeting of the Joint Commission in Warsaw P Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowksi in India E A delegation of the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade led by J. Gledwidz in India E 7th meeting of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Polish delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Obodowski E 8th meeting of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Polish delegation led by Mining Minister W. Lejczak P Parliamentary delegation led by Marshal of the Sejm Stanislaw Gucwa in India coinciding with the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations E Meeting of the Joint Working Group on Coal (continued)

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

415

(continued) 1985 January 31–February E 1 February 11–15

June July 1–5 1986 February 22–23 March 9–13 April 1–2

July 9–13 November 6–9 December 13–15 1987 April 2–5 June 2–6 October

November 12–15

1988 February February June November

December 1989 January 10–12

April

9th meeting of the Joint Commission held in Warsaw; Indian delegation led by Minister of Steel, Coal and Mines Vasant Sathe P Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski (accompanied by a 35-member delegation including Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski) P Parliamentary delegation led by Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs H.K.L. Bhagat in Poland E Minister of State for Shipping and Transport Z.R. Ansari in Poland E Commerce Minister P. Shiv Shankar in Poland M A 7-member delegation led by Defence Minister General Florian Siwicki in India E 10th meeting of the Joint Commission in New Delhi; Polish delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Wladyslaw Gwiazda S Minister of State for Science and Technology Shivraj Patil in Poland P President Giani Zail Singh in Poland M Minister of State for Defence Arun Singh in Poland P Foreign Minister N.D. Tiwari in Poland E Minister of State for Mines Ramdulari Sinha in Poland E 11th meeting of the Joint Commission in Warsaw; Indian delegation led by Energy Minister Vasant Sathe E Secretary of State for Foreign Economic Cooperation and Foreign Trade Minister A. Wojcik in India to attend the inauguration of the International Trade Fair in New Delhi S A 5-member delegation led by Minster of Science and Technology Konrad Tott in India P Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski in India E Minister of State for Commerce P.R. Deshmukh in Poland E Business delegation led by Vice-President of the Polish Chamber of Trade and Industry Szopa in India E 3rd meeting of the Joint Committee on Shipping in India E 12th meeting of the Joint Commission held in New Delhi; Polish delegation led by A. Kwasniewski, Minister for International Trade P Vice President and Deputy Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People’s Republic, Dr. Tadeusz Szelachowski in India (continued)

416

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

(continued) June

P

October

E

October 1990 May

C E

June

P

September

E

November

E

December

P

1992 December

P

1993 February 9–11

P

1994 March 3–8

P

May

E

1996 February

E

June 21–28

C

September

E

October 6–9 October 7 November 9–13

P P E

November 12–14 1997 January 8–12 January 20–26

E E C

Minister of State for External Affairs K. Natwar Singh in Poland A 9-member business delegation led by K. Bacikowski, President of the Supreme Cooperative Council of Poland, in India Minister of Justice Kalman Kulscar in India Krzysztof J. Pater of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in India A parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha Rabi Ray in Poland 13th meeting of the Joint Commission in Warsaw; Indian delegation led by Energy Minister Arif Mohammed Khan Minister of Foreign Economic Relations M. Swiecicki in India V.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary (East Europe), Ministry of External Affairs, in Warsaw Parliamentary delegation led by Sejm (Parliament) Speaker Wieslaw Chrzanowski in India Minister of State for External Affairs R.L. Bhatia in Poland President Lech Walesa in India (the first visit by a Polish head of state to the Asian continent since 1989) accompanied by Foreign Minister Andrzef Olechowski and a large business delegation; agreement to resume meetings of the Joint Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation Krzysztof J. Pater of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in India Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Jacek Buchanz in India A 3-member delegation led by Chief Justice of India A.M. Ahmadi in Poland Commerce Secretary in Poland to explore and lay down necessary infrastructure for Indian businessmen President Shankar Dayal Sharma in Poland 1st Foreign Office consultations Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Jan Czaja in India to discuss future plans to increase trade Minister of State for Coal Kanti Singh in Poland Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Poland Grzegorz Kolodko in India First President (Chief Justice) of the Supreme Court of Poland Adam Strzemlrosz in India (continued)

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

417

(continued) April 25 September

September 7–8 October 7–10 1998 January 8–11

January 10 June 22–23 October 14

1999 February 14–16

March May 11–15 September 28

October 7–10

2000 February

P

2nd Foreign Office consultations; Deputy Foreign Minister J. Jakubowski in India E A 5-member delegation led by E. Sznajder, Minister and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of Poland, in India P Minister of State for External Affairs Kamala Sinha in Poland E Deputy Minister of Economy W. Kanter in India P President Alexander Kwasniewski in India (accompanied by Minister of Economy Janusz Wojciech Steinhoff, Minister of Agriculture Janiszewski, other ministers and senior officials, as well as a 25-member business delegation) E CII and Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry summit in Chennai E Working consultations on trade and economic issues in Warsaw E Meeting of the Working Group on Coal in Warsaw; Indian delegation led by Secretary (Coal), S.S. Boparai P Czeslaw Bielecki, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Polish Parliament, in New Delhi to participate in the ‘Global Conference on Democracy’ jointly organized by the Centre for Policy Research and CII in New Delhi M Deputy Defence Minister Romuald Szeremietiew in India M Chief of Army Staff General V.P. Malik on a goodwill visit to Poland P Minister of State for External Affairs Vaasundhara Raje Scindia and Janusz Stanczyk, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland, meet in New York on the margins of the 54th United Nations General Assembly C International Conference of Sanskrit and Related Studies to commemorate the centenary of the birth of Stanislaw Schayer (1899–1941) in Warsaw by the Institute of Oriental Studies, Warsaw University, in cooperation with the Indian Embassy and the Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) M Army delegation led by Vice-Minister of National Defence R. Szeremietiew in Bangalore to attend the Aero India Space 2000 international exhibition (continued)

418

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

(continued) February–March

E

March April 18–21

P E

June 25–27

P

June 28–30

E

July 18–20

S

2001

E March

M

2002 February 21–22

P

February

P M

May 22–26

P

July September

M E

2003 January

P

February 15–18

P

April

M

4th meeting of the Mixed Commission for Cooperation in Scientific Research; Polish delegation led by the Minister of State of Science and Head of the Scientific Research Committee Andrzej Wiszniewski Parliamentary delegation in India Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Janusz Steinhoff in India Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh in Warsaw to participate in the Ministerial Conference “Towards a Community of Democracies” Minister of Environment and Forests visited Poland in connection with the informal high-level consultations for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretary, Department of Space and Chairman Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) visited Poland to participate in the 33rd meeting of the Committee of Space Research (CO SPAR 2000) in Warsaw Indo-Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry established in Mumbai Polish ship ORP Wodnik participates in the International Naval Fleet Review in Mumbai Minister of State for External Affairs Omar Abdullah in Poland (holds conference of Indian Ambassadors in East Europe in Warsaw) 3rd Foreign Office consultations in New Delhi Vice-Minister of National Defence Janusz Zemke in India Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Lok Sabha Murli Manohar Joshi in Poland; subsequently a Polish-India Parliamentary Group was constituted in both parliaments Secretary, Ministry of Defence, in Warsaw Meeting of the Working Group on Coal Mining; Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Economy Marek Kossowski in India Polish parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Senate L. Pastusiak in India Prime Minister Leszek Miller in India (18 years after visit of Prime Minister W. Jaruzelski) 1st consultations between National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Polish National Security Bureau (NSB) in New Delhi (continued)

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

419

(continued) October

M

2004 February 2–6

M

March

M

October 30– November 2

M

December 9–11

P

2005 March August

P E

2006 April May 17–19

M E

May

P

June

S

June 12–15

P

July November 18–22

M P

November 2006– March 2007 December

C

2007 May 28

E P

2nd consultations between National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Polish National Security Bureau (NSB) in Warsaw Defence Minister Janusz Zemke in India to participate in the Defexpo 2004 Expert-level defence delegation in Poland to explore the possibilities for sourcing platforms, equipment, systems, spares and overhauling Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee in Poland (Joint Working Group (JWG) on Defence set up during the visit) Parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the Sejm Jozef Olesky in India on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations Deputy Foreign Minister Boguslaw Zaleski in India A delegation led by J.S. Marshal, Malopolska Region in India 1st meeting of JWG on Defence Cooperation Minister of Commerce and Industry Kamal Nath in Poland (first visit by a Indian cabinet minister since 2000); agreement to revive the Indo-Polish Joint Commission Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Witod Waszczykowski, on an unofficial visit to India; meets Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma; holds political consultations on bilateral matters and regional security, especially Afghanistan 6th meeting of the Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation in India Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma in Poland; holds a conference of Indian Ambassadors in East Europe on 15 June in Warsaw Defence Minister Radislaw Sokorski in India Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Rafal Wisniewski in India in connection with the inauguration of Polish cultural programmes associated with ‘Days of Poland’ in India 2006– 2007—a comprehensive promotional action to present the potential of contemporary Poland ‘Days of Poland in India’ featuring 27 productions and 51 events held in 10 Indian cities President of the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency in India Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee meets Polish Foreign Minister Anna Elzbieta Fotyga on the sidelines of the ASEM meeting in Hamburg (continued)

420

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

(continued) June 13–15

E

August 31 November 5–7

P E

December 10–12

M

2008

E March 10–14

M

May

E

June

P

July

P

September 9–12

E

October

E

October 15–17

M

November 4–6 December

M C

2009 April 23–26

P

October 2010 February 7–17

P E

Minister of Labour and Social Welfare Anna Kalata in India 4th Foreign Office consultations in Warsaw Minister of State for Environment and Forests, S. Raghupathy, accompanied by two official delegates attended the 5th Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe—‘Forests for Quality of Life’ held in Warsaw 3rd meeting of JWG for Defence Cooperation held in Warsaw; Indian delegation led by K.P. Singh, Secretary (Defence Production); issues discussed included upgradation of technology in defence production, offer of PhD programmes in defence studies and defence-related training programmes Indo-Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IPCCI) established in Warsaw Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor in Poland 1st meeting of the reconstituted Indo-Polish Joint Commission in New Delhi; Polish delegation led by Deputy Economy Minister Adam Szejnfeld 5th Foreign Office consultations held in New Delhi; Deputy Foreign Minister R. Schnepf in India Special Envoy of Prime Minister Shyam Saran in Poland to seek support for a waiver of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Minister of State for Coal, Santosh Bagrodia led a delegation to participate in the 21st World Mining Congress (WMC) at Krakow and the “Expo-Mining 2008” Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests, in Warsaw for an informal meeting of Environment Ministers 4th meeting of JWG on Defence Cooperation in New Delhi; Polish delegation led by Secretary of State for National Defence Z. Kosiniak-Kamyzs Defence Minster Bogdan Klich in India Deputy Minister of Culture and National Heritage Tomasz Mertu in India President Prabha Devisingh Patil in Poland (accompanied by Minister of State for Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce Ashwani Kumar, three Members of Parliament and a business delegation) Deputy Foreign Minister Jacek Najder in India A trade delegation of representatives of Polish IT and BPO sectors of Eastern Poland in India (continued)

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

421

(continued) April 7–9

September 6–8

November 22–25

November 23–24

2011 May 25

June 19–22 July 11–12 November 1–5 November 5–10

2012 June 11–12 July 2–4 September November

November 6 January 27–30 June 21–24 October 7–10 October 27–31

M

5th meeting of the JWG on Defence in Warsaw; Indian delegation led by Secretary (Defence Production) R.K. Singh P Prime Minister Donald Tusk in India (accompanied by Undersecretaries in the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economy, Defence and the President of the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency) along with mediapersons and businessmen M Land Forces Commander of Poland Maj. Gen. Zbigniew Glowienka in India to discuss cooperation between the two armed forces C Minister of Culture and National Heritage of Poland Bogdan Zdrojewski in India to participate in the ‘Year of Chopin’ in India E 2nd meeting of the Joint Commission in Poznan; Indian delegation led by R P Singh, Secretary (DIPP) E Minister of Coal Sriprakash Jaiswal in Poland P Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikroski in India C Culture and National Heritage Minister Bogdan Zdrojewski in India P A large business delegation led by Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Beata Stelmach, and Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Economy, Rafal Baniak, in India P Under Secretary of State in Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jerzy Pomianowski in India C Minister of Information and Broadcasting Ambika Soni in Poland E A delegation of the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation in Poland C Polish Minister of Culture and National Heritage Bogdan Zdrojewski in to attend the 43rd International Film Festival in Panaji, Goa P 6th Foreign Office consultations held in Warsaw P Minister of State for External Affairs Preneet Kaur in Poland C Janardan Dwivedi, MP and eminent Hindi scholar, in Poland E 3rd meeting of the Joint Commission E A delegation led by Minister of Steel Beni Prasad Verma in Poland to explore opportunities between the two countries in areas of coal mining and technology (continued)

422

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

(continued) November 10–14

E

November 11–12

P

December 9–10

M

2014 February

P

M

February

E

February

M

February

E

February 13–16

E

February 16–20

C

March 6–7

C

April 14

P

May 18–24

M

A delegation led by Minister of Environment and Forests Jayanthi Natarajan in Warsaw to attend COP-19 Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski in New Delhi to participate in the 11th ASEM Foreign Ministers meeting; meets Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid 7th meeting of the JWG on Defence Cooperation in New Delhi 7th Foreign Office consultations; Undersecretary of State in Ministry of Foreign Affairs K. Kacperczyk in India; attends opening of International Book Fair, New Delhi where Poland was a guest of honour Secretary of State in Ministry of State Treasury Z. Gawlik (twice) for negotiations on defence industry cooperation Secretary of State in Ministry of Environment M. Korolec in India to participate in the World Sustainable Development Summit organized by The Energy and Resources Institute, and Poland-India Energy Summit Polish defence delegation led by Secretary of State in the Ministry of Treasury Z. Gawlik in India; participates in Defexpo 2014, New Delhi; holds discussion on defence industry cooperation As part of the 60th anniversary celebrations, a Polish delegation visited India to participate in the ‘Energy Summit’ in New Delhi A large Polish business delegation took part in the 5th International Mining, Exploration, Mineral Processing Technologies, Metals and Machinery Exhibition at Kolkata Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage Malgorzata Omilanowska in India A 6-member delegation participates in the conference ‘India and Poland—60 years of diplomatic relations: Legacy and ways forward,’ University of Warsaw Former Chief Election Commissioner of India Dr S.Y. Quraishi in Poland at the invitation of the Permanent Secretariat of the Community of Democracies A 17-member delegation from the National Defence College on a study tour in Poland as part of its one-year curriculum on National Security and Strategic Studies’ (continued)

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

423

(continued) June 3–6

E

June

C

July

C

September 4–7

P

September

C

September 20–21 September

C E

September 25

E

December 12–15

E

2015 January 10

P

More than 100 Indian engineering companies, mostly from the micro, small and medium sector, showcased India’s engineering prowess in the ‘India Show’ at Poznan. The event coincided with ITM Poznan, Poland’s biggest technology and machine tools fair and was coordinated by EEPC and Ministry of Commerce and Department of Heavy Industries. Representatives from Department of Commerce and Department of Heavy Industries also participated in the event Ganesh-Kumaresh music group performed in Poznan Rama Vaidyanathan, Rupinder Bedi, and Himanshu Kanakmal Dugar and their respective troupes participated in Brave Festival organized in different cities of Poland As a prelude to the 7th Vibrant Gujarat Summit from 11–13 January 2015 at Gandhinagar, Gujarat, a delegation led by G.C. Murmu, Principal Secretary to Chief Minister, Government of Gujarat visited Poland The ‘India, India…..Festival,’ organized by the Centre for Theatre Practices Gardzienice consisted of theatre performances, workshops, seminars and film shows including a scientific conference dedicated to Wanda Dynowska–Umadevi, a friend of Mahatma Gandhi; renowned artist Mallika Sarabhai and her group performed in the festival India Polo Cup 2014 held in Warsaw Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Economic Development Taduesz Nalewajk in India in connection with exploring India’s market of Polish food products, especially apples ‘Make in India’’ event in Warsaw organized in conjunction with a seminar on ‘Poland-India– Towards an Effective Model of Economic Diplomacy’ at the Polish Parliament Secretary of State in Ministry of Economic Development J.W. Pietrewicz in India Deputy Prime Minister Janusz Piechocniski meets Prime Minister Narendra Modi prior to the 7th Vibrant Gujarat Global Summit in Ahmedabad (continued)

424

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

(continued) Jan 11–13

February

March

March

March March June 12–13

July 8–9 August 15 October

October 5–6

2016 February

E

A delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Janusz Piechocinski ´ to participate in 7th Vibrant Gujarat Global Summit in Ahmedabad; accompanied by Undersecretary of State in Ministry of Foreign Affairs K. Kacperczyk and Undersecretary of State in Ministry of Economic Development T. Nalewajk M Secretary of State in Ministry of State Treasury Z. Gawlik for talks on defence industry cooperation E Minister of Environment M. Grabowski In India to participate in the Delhi Sustainable Development Summit and talks with GoI E Undersecretary of State in Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Z. Szalczyk in India for Indian Food and Hospitality Fair, talks with the ministries on agricultural and food cooperation E A delegation led by Secretary of State of the Ministry of Economy Jerzy Pietrewicz along with the Deputy Marshal of the Lublin Voivodeship Krzysztof Grabczuk and business representatives took part in Progressive Punjab Investors Summit 2015. Poland was a partner country at the Summit. P A 2-member delegation from the Community of Democracies in India E Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development M. Sawicki in India E 4th meeting of the Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation in Warsaw; Indian delegation led by Amitabh Kant, Secretary, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP). Three newly created bilateral Joint Working Groups on Coal, IT and Food Processing met and identified specific areas of cooperation in their respective domains E 1st India Poland IT Forum held in Krakow C Poland included in e-tourist visa scheme P A 19-member Polish-Indian Parliamentary Group, comprising members from both Sejm (Lower House) and the Senate, formed P Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Leszek Soczewica led a high-level delegation of senior officials and business to the 2nd India-Central Europe Business Forum (ICEBF) in Bengaluru in which Poland was a partner country E Deputy Minister for Economic Development Radoslaw Domagalski-Labedzki in Kolkata with a group of Polish companies to attend the 6th Asian Mining Congress (continued)

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

425

(continued) February 13–18

February March 15–19 March

June 6–9

July August 24

August 29–31

September 7–11

September 9–13

September 22–24 October October 12–14 November 28–30

December 8–9

2017 January

E

Minister of Development Mateusz Morawiecki led a high-level business delegation to Mumbai to attend the Make in India Week P Deputy Prime Minister Piotr Glinkski in India E Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Agriculture Ewa Lech attended the food fair AAHAAR in India M A delegation led by President Arkadiusz Siwko of Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ SA)—a holding company established by the Polish Government to unite Polish state-owned defence industry companies—in India for Defexpo Goa E A 4-member coal delegation led by Secretary (Coal) Anil Swarup, including S. Bhattacharya, Chairman, Coal India Ltd., in Poland E A delegation of Polish deep mining experts in India P 7th Foreign Office consultations in Warsaw; Indian delegation led by Sujata Mehta, Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs E Delegation led by Union Secretary for Agricultural Cooperation and Farmers Welfare S.K. Pattanayak in Poland P A 10-member delegation led by S. Aparna, Principal Secretary to the Gujarat Chief Minister in Warsaw, Rzeshow, Krakow and Gdansk to promote the Vibrant Gujarat summit (10–13 January 2017) E A 4-member high-level delegation from Karnataka led by Minister of Large and Medium Industries and Infrastructure Development R.V. Deshpande in Poland E Polish agricultural delegation in India; visits Annapoorna Food Fair E Deputy Minister of Environment Slawomir Mazurek in India E Chandrakant Salunkhe, President of the Small and Medium Enterprises Chamber of India, in Poland E A 16-member delegation of Chemical and Allied Export Promotion Council of India Ltd. (CAPEXIL) in Poland A 9-member Polish delegation covering sectors of energy, furniture, aviation and trade, fairs/exhibitions attend the India-Europe 29 Business Forum in Delhi E A 9-member delegation of the Upper Silesia Province of Poland to attend the Bengal Global Business Summit, 2017 (continued)

426

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

(continued) January 9

P

January 11–14

E

January

P

January 11–14

E

February

E

March

E

March

E

March

E

April 26–28

P

May

E

May

E

July 2–6

E

July 10–13

E

October

C

Deputy Prime Minister Poitr Glinski meets Prime Minister Narendra Modi on sidelines of Vibrant Gujarat Summit A 27-member delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and National Heritage Poitr Glinski comprising officials and businessmen for the 8th Vibrant Gujarat Summit 2017 to which Poland was a partner country; accompanied by the Chief Minister of the provinces of Mazowieckie and Podkarpackie region of Poland Undersecretary of State in Ministry of Foreign Affairs J. Wronecka in India; accompanies Deputy Prime Minister Glinksi at Vibrant Gujarat Undersecretary of State in Ministry of Economic Development T. Ko´scinski ´ in India 15 officials from Coal India undertook capacity building training programmes at the AGH Science and Technology University in Krakow A delegation of the Council for Leather Exports in Poland Anoop Kumar, Chairman and Managing Director, National Buildings Construction Corporation (NBCC), in Poland to explore opportunities for collaboration in the housing/infrastructure sector A delegation led by K.G. Kundariya, President of the Murbi Ceramics Association, in Poland Vice-President Hamid Ansari in Poland (accompanied by the Union Minister of State for the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Giriraj Singh and four Members of Parliament representing both Houses) A West Bengal delegation, including CMD of West Bengal Power Development Corporation; Principal Secretary, Department of Power; Vice-Chancellor, University of Calcutta; and a senior manager of Coal India participate in the European Economic Congress at Katowice A delegation of Coal India participated in the ‘India-Poland Economic Forum’ at Katowice A delegation led by Haryana Local Bodies Minister Kavita Jain to study green technologies practiced by Polish companies for possible adoption in the development of smart cities in Haryana A high-level delegation led by Minister of State for Food Processing Industries Niranjan Jyoti in Poland 1st Indian Film Festival in Warsaw (continued)

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

427

(continued) November

E

E 2018 January 8

P

January

P

January

E

June

E

September

E

2019 January

P

January

E

February

E

March

E

April 5–15

E

May 20–22

E

May 24–26

E

5th meeting of the Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation in New Delhi; Polish delegation led by Deputy Minister Grzegorz Tobiszowski and Deputy Minister of Development Witold Slowik Undersecretary of State in Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development E. Lech in India 8th Foreign Office consultations in Delhi; Polish Deputy Foreign Minister (in-charge of Asia) Marek Magierowski in India; Indian delegation led by Ruchi Ghanshyam, Secretary (West), MEA Undersecretary of State in Ministry of Foreign Affairs M. Magierowski in India; participates in the Bengal Global Business Summit in Kolkata Secretary of State in Ministry of Energy G. Tobiszowski in India to participate in the Bengal Global Business Summit in Kolkata Minister of Finance T. Czerwinska ´ in Mumbai to participate in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) annual reunion; meets Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal Secretary of State in the Ministry of Environment Michal Kurtyka in India Krzysztof Szczerski, Secretary of State and Chief of the Cabinet of the Polish President, in India; meets Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and Minister of Culture Mahesh Sharma Secretary of State in the Ministry of Infrastructure M. Wild in India to participate in the Global Aviation Summit; announces the operation of direct Warsaw-Delhi flights of LOT from September 2019 Secretary of State in the Ministry of Energy G. Tobiszowski in Kolkata to participate in the Bengal Global Business Summit; signs a MoU on coal mining Secretary (Economic Relations), Ministry of External Affairs T.S. Tirumurti in Poland to participate in the Warsaw Process multilateral meeting 60 companies from India and Nepal participate in the second Made in Asia exhibition held in Lodz A Government of Haryana delegation led by Om Prakash Dhankar, Minister of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, in Poland A delegation from the PHD Chamber of Commerce led by Naveen Seth, Principal Director, in Poland to participate in the Warsaw Gift and Deco Show (continued)

428

APPENDIX G: INDIA-POLAND VISITS, 1951–2020

(continued) August 28–29

P

September

E

September 13–14

E

December 16

P

2020 February 19–20

E

March

E

August October 27

P C

Foreign Minster S. Jaishankar in Poland (after 32 years; last visit by Indian Foreign Minister was in 1987) Vice-Minister of Environment Sławomir Mazurek during the High-Level session concluding the 14th conference of the Parties (COP14 UNCCD) in New Delhi Undersecretary of State Marcin Przydacz in India to inaugurate direct flights from Warsaw to Delhi launched by LOT Polish Airlines Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz meets India’s Minister of State for External Affairs V. Muraleedharan on the sidelines of the ASEM Foreign Ministers meeting in Madrid Trade delegation of the Council for Leather Exports participates in the Poznan Fashion Fair Secretary of State in Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development J. Bogucki in India to participate in the Aahar Food Fair; meets Minister of State for Minister of Agriculture and Chairman of the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) Foreign Office consultations (via video conference) 7th roundtable between the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) (via video conference)

(C = Cultural; D = Defence; E = Economic; M = Military; P = Political; S = Science and Technology)

Appendix H: India-Poland Agreements, 1949–2019

1949

April 22

1951 1955 1956

January 6 June 26 April 3 April 11

1957 1958 1959

1960 1961

May 16 September 29 March 27 March 12 November 15 November 2

May 7 June 27 June 17

Trade agreement for import of commodities (valid for one year and thereafter for such successive periods as may be mutually agreed upon before the expiry of this agreement) Exchange of letters for promotion of trade Radio telegraph link opened Trade agreement (in force till 31 December 1959) Agreement for the purchase of 300,000 tonnes of iron and steel products during next 3 years and sale of equal quantity of iron ore to Poland Agreement on shipping service Telecommunications agreement 5-year cultural agreement (came into force on 12 August 1958) Trade agreement (valid till 31 December 1959) Protocol to trade agreement 3-year trade and payments agreement (in force from 1 January 1960) Poland decides to change their Missions at Calcutta and Bombay from Trade Representations to Consulates Credit agreement of Rs143 million Agreement for cooperation in maritime transport Agreement between the National Coal Development Corporation and the Polish firm–CEKOP–for the development of deep-shaft mine project at Sudamdih in Jharia, in Bihar (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

429

430

APPENDIX H: INDIA-POLAND AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

(continued) July 21

1962

May 21 August 18

November 16 November 30 1963

December 18

1964

March 11 March 19 March 29

1965

January 25

1966

March 26

March 26

July 19 1967

October 21

1968

January 10

1969

October 31 November 28 December 18

1970 1972

February 27 May 7 January 7

January 14

Agreement between the Government of India and CEKOP for preparing a project report for the construction of a port silo of 50,000 tons either in Bombay or in Madras $11 million contract for setting up a fully-equipped power station in Bihar Agreement between the National Coal Development Corporation with the Polish firm, CEKOP, for setting up a coal washery at Gidi in the Karanpura fields of Bihar 2nd agreement on economic cooperation Agreement on development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes (in force from 21 February 1963) A 5-year trade and payments agreement (w.e.f. 1 January 1964) Shipping agreement Exchange of letters for cultural and scientific cooperation for 1964–1965 and 1965–1966 Agreement providing for the manufacture in India of modern mining and coal washing equipment An agreement for economic cooperation, a credit of Rs. 105 million for utilization for a power plant comprising of two generating units of 125 MW power projects at 2.5% interest repayable in non-convertible rupees Exchange programme for scientific cooperation, mainly in the fields of pure or fundamental sciences, between the C.S.I.R. and the Polish Academy of Sciences Protocol for scientific cooperation, mainly in the field of applied sciences and technology between the C.S.I.R. and the Committee for Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries by the Council’ of Ministers of the Peoples’ Republic of Poland Agreement for mark-up by 57.5% of respective export contracts 1st long-term agreement for 1977–1980 envisaging trade turnover of Rs200 million Trade agreement envisaging trade turnover of Rs600 million in 1968 5-year trade and payments agreement Cultural exchange programme for 1968–1970 Trade agreement envisaging trade turnover of Rs800 million in 1970 Shipping service agreement Agreement on economic cooperation Exchange of letters for establishing an Indo-Polish Joint Commission for Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Protocol for expanding economic cooperation (continued)

APPENDIX H: INDIA-POLAND AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

431

(continued) February 7

1972

July 7

1973

January 12 January 18 February 7

April 6 December 7 November 8

1974

March 15

December 21 1975

January 21 July 23 November 29

1976

June 8 October December 18

1977

January 25 January 25 January 25 January 25 September 9

October 8 October 8

Cultural programme for 1970–1973 providing for greater scientific and technological exchange (4th cultural agreement since the first one in 1957) Agreement for mutual abolition of visa fees (comes into effect on 1 August 1972) Trade protocol for 1973–1975 envisaging trade turnover of Rs1308 million Joint Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation Cultural exchange programme for the years 1970–1973 providing for greater scientific and technological exchange (fourth cultural agreement since the first one in 1957) Agreement on cooperation in marine fisheries Trade protocol for 1974 Protocol on 1st meeting of Joint Commission in Warsaw; Minister of Heavy Industry T.A. Pai led the Indian delegation Agreement on cooperation in the fields of science and technology (for 5 years; automatically extended for a further period of 5 years) 3-year trade and payments agreement (w.e.f. 1 January 1975) A 2-year working programme for cooperation in science and technology MoU on air services Trade Plan for 1976 envisaging a trade turnover of Rs2.6 billion Protocol on 3rd meeting of the Joint Commission Trade Protocol for years 1977–1980 Protocol providing for reconstruction of Jharia coal field, a fisheries resources survey and acquisition of ships Agreement on air services Agreement on economic, industrial and technical cooperation (for 5 years; automatically extended for 5 years) Cultural exchange programme for the years 1977 and 1978 Programme of cooperation in the field of science and technology for January 1977 to December 1978 Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy (for 5 years; automatically extended for a further 5 years) Protocol of the 5th session of the Joint Commission for Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement on cooperation between the Council of Scientific and industrial Research of India and the Polish Academy of Sciences (continued)

432

APPENDIX H: INDIA-POLAND AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

(continued) 1978

February 16

1979

March 17 June 16 December 10

1981

January 16 January 16

1982 1983

October

August 24 December 14 December 22 1984 1985

November November February March 5

October December 17 1986

February April 3 June 21

1987

February 16

1989

February 21 June 21 December 18

1990

November 26

Trade and payments agreement (w.e.f. 1 January 1978; for 3 years; switchover of trade in convertible currencies from 1 January 1981) Cultural exchange programme for 1979 and 1980 Agreement on cooperation in the field of health (for 5 years; automatically extended for another 5 years) 1st Work Programme for 1980–1981 under the agreement for peaceful uses of atomic energy Trade protocol for 1981 envisaging a two-way trade turnover of Rs2300 million A 5-year trade and payments agreement providing for non-convertible rupees as the mode of payments for all commercial and non-commercial transactions Agreement on avoidance of double taxation Trade agreement Trade protocol for 1983 envisaging trade turnover of Rs3456 million Cultural exchange programme for a period of three years (1984–1986) Protocol of the 11th session of the Joint Commission Trade protocol for 1984 envisaging trade turnover of Rs4 billion Trade Plan for 1985 Agreement for cooperation in health Agreement on cooperation in radio and television 2nd work programme for 1985–1986 under the agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the fields of nuclear physics, plasma physics, radiological protection and nuclear safety Protocol for cooperation in science and technology Trade protocol for 1986 stipulating a trade turnover of Rs4.6 billion for 1986 Long-term trade and payments agreement Protocol for cooperation Cultural exchange programme for 1986–1988 Programme for cooperation in science and technology for 1986–1988 Protocol between Indian Merchants’ Chamber and the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade Cultural exchange programme for 1989–1991 Agreement on avoidance of double taxation and prevention of tax evasion with respect to taxes on income Trade protocol envisaging trade turnover of Rs7.956 billion in 1990 Trade agreement to conduct trade in freely convertible currencies with effect from 1 January 1991 (continued)

APPENDIX H: INDIA-POLAND AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

433

(continued) 1991

Jan 6

1993

January 12

1994

March 4

March 4 1996

March 26 October 7 October 7 October 7

1998

January 10

2003

February 11 February 17 February 17 February 17

2005 2006

March 15 May 19 May 19

2009

April 24

April 24

2010 2011

September 7 May 17

2012

July 4 September 2012

Trade and payments agreement in which all commercial and non-commercial transactions will be settled in free convertible currencies w.e.f. 1 January 1991 Agreement on science and technology cooperation (for 5 years; automatically extended for a further 5 years) Agreement on the coordination of activities in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in areas of trade, textiles Agreement on consultations for reform of the United Nations Agreement between the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Polish Academy of Sciences Protocol on ‘regular’ Foreign Office consultations at senior officials’ level (endeavour to meet at least once in 2 years) Agreement on promotion and protection of investments (for 10 years and automatically extended thereafter) Cultural and educational exchange programme for the years 1997–1999 (within the framework of the Cultural Agreement of 1957) MoU between the Confederation of Indian Industry and the Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry Extradition Treaty (in force after 10 September 2003) Agreement on cooperation in combating organized crime and international terrorism (for unlimited period) Agreement on defence cooperation for a 5-year period MoU between the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Polish Chamber of Defence Manufacturers Cultural Exchange Programme Agreement on economic cooperation Agreement for establishing a Joint Business Council between FICCI and the Polish Chamber of Commerce Agreement on cooperation in the field of health care and medical science (for 5 years; automatically renewed for an additional period of 5 years) Agreement on cooperation in the field of tourism (for 5 years; automatically renewed for an additional period of 5 years) Cultural exchange programme for 2010–2013 MoU between Indian Council of Cultural Relations and Institute of Oriental Philology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow on the establishment of a long-term Tamil Chair at the university (2011–2015) Agreement on audio-visual coproduction MoU between Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and the Indo-Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IPCCI) (continued)

434

APPENDIX H: INDIA-POLAND AGREEMENTS, 1949–2019

(continued) 2013

January 29

2015

October 5

2016

July

August October 11 August 2017

January January January February

February

April 27 May

2019

February 4

Protocol on amending the agreement on avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes and income (ratified 12 April 2013) Agreement on exemption from visa requirement for holders of diplomatic passports MoU between Solaris Bus & Coach from Poland and JBM Auto for an investment of Rs3 billion over the next 3 years, to engineer, design and develop full electric and hybrid buses in India MoU on enhancing scientific and technological cooperation in agriculture ‘Letter of Intent’ of cooperation between Karnataka and the Polish region of Weilkopolska MoU in the field of agriculture and enhancing scientific and technological cooperation in agriculture MoU between Mazovia with Gujarat at the Vibrant Gujarat 2017 MoU between Podkarpackie and Gujarat at the Vibrant Gujarat 2017 Agreement on mining cooperation between the Silesian region and West Bengal MoU for establishment of an ICCR Chair of Indian Studies at the Jagiellonian University, Krakow for the period 2017– 2018 to 2019–2020 MoUs for renewal of Chair of Hindi and Tamil at the University of Warsaw for the next three academic years till 2019–2020 MoU on agricultural cooperation (for an indefinite period) MoU between Warsaw University of Technology and Gujarat Technological University for cooperation in research and educational exchange projects Agreement on cooperation in coal mining, including exploration and extraction of coal as well as the use of clean coal technologies, exchange of information and experience of institutes and academic circles operating in this area

Appendix I: India-Slovakia Visits, 1992–2020

1991 December 1992 April October

1993 February 9–11 March

May September 2–5

October 1994 June 1–3 July 7 July 7–8 1995 March

M

Czech and Slovak defence delegation led by Chief of General Staff in India P Minister for International Relations Pavol Demes in India E K. Srinivasan, Secretary (Economic Relations), Ministry of External Affairs, in Slovakia for bilateral talks with the Federal First Deputy Foreign Minister P Minister of State for External Affairs R.L. Bhatia in Slovakia E Trade and economic delegation in Slovakia to initial new agreements for trade in hard currency and a protocol on liquidation of Rupee balances in favour of Slovakia E Minister of Economy J. Kubecha in India P President Rudolf Schuster in India accompanied by the Minister of Telecommunication and State Secretaries from the Ministries of Finance, Defence and Foreign Affairs S President of the Slovak Academy of Sciences B. Lichardus in India M Minister of State for Defence Mallikarjun Goud in Slovakia P 1st Foreign Office consultations in New Delhi P Prime Minister Josef Moravcik in India E A delegation of the Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry in India (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

435

436

APPENDIX I: INDIA-SLOVAKIA VISITS, 1992–2020

(continued) June

July 11–12

November

November 13–17 1996 March 7

October 9–10

December 12–13

December 14–17

1997 June 15–17 October 1–6 October 20–25 November 3–6 December 8–10 1998 May 3–6

June October 7–8

October 7–8 November 11–21 1999 May 12

E

1st session of the Joint Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (hereinafter Joint Economic Committee) (set up in May 1994) in Bratislava; Indian delegation led by Secretary (West) V.K. Grover P 2nd Foreign Office consultations in Bratislava; V. K. Grover, Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs, in Slovakia E A delegation led by Peter Mihok, President of the Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in New Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta M Defence Minister Jan Sitek in India P 3rd Foreign Office consultations in New Delhi; State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jozef Sestak in India P President Shankar Dayal Sharma in Slovakia accompanied by a delegation of leading industrialists and representatives of FICCI E 2nd session of the Joint Economic Committee; co-chaired by Slovak Deputy Ministry of Economic Dusan Gutan and Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce E Slovak Minister of Economy Karol Cesnik and Deputy Ministry of Economy Dusan Gutan for in India for 2nd meeting of Joint Commission E Minister for Steel and Mines B.R. Baishya in Slovakia E Secretary of State for Finance Ttatyana Silhankova in India M State Secretary of Defence Jozef Gajdos in India E Minister of State for Health and Family Welfare Renuka Chowdhury in Slovakia P Foreign Minister Zdenka Kramplova in India E Union Minister for Environment and Forests Suresh P. Prabhu in Slovakia to attend the Ministerial Round Table of the 4th meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity E A delegation of the Ministry of Finance in Slovakia E 3rd session of the Joint Committee meeting in Bratislava; Indian delegation led by Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce E 1st session of the Joint Business Council E Slovak business delegation led by President of Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry P Marian Tomasik in India as Special Envoy of the Slovak Foreign Minister (continued)

APPENDIX I: INDIA-SLOVAKIA VISITS, 1992–2020

437

(continued) December 13–14

P

2000 March 13–17

P

June 13–16 2001 November 28 November 28–30

P E E

November 29

E

2002 May

P

2004 September October 19

E E

December 11–15

P

2005 September 27– October 3

E

2006 2005–2006

C

2005–2006

C

July

E

November 13

E

November 13–15

E

November 2007 March 22–24

E P

May

E

September 24

P

4th Foreign Office consultations in Bratislava; Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs, in Slovakia President of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Jozef Migas in India Vice President Krishan Kant in Slovakia 2nd session of Joint Business Council in New Delhi Peter Brno, Deputy Minister of Economy of the Slovak Republic, in India 4th session of the Joint Economic Committee in New Delhi State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs J. Chlebo in India A 4-member FICCI delegation in Bratislava 5th session of the Joint Economic Committee in Bratislava President Ivan Gasparovic in India (accompanied by State Secretaries in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Ivan Korcok), Economy (Eva Simkova) and Defence (Martin Fedor) and a large business delegation An ‘Enterprise India Exhibition’ jointly organized by the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) and the Ministry of Small Scale Industries in Bratislava with the participation of 35 Indian entrepreneurs President of the Institute of Public Affairs, Grigorij Meseznikov, in India A Kathak dance troupe sponsored by the Indian Council of Cultural Relations took part in the Bratislava Summer Festival A 5-member delegation from the Pharmaceutical Export Promotion Council in Slovakia 6th session of the Joint Economic Committee in New Delhi Slovak Minister of Economy Lubomir Jahnatek in India accompanied by a high-level business delegation Joint Business and Investment Forum in New Delhi Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma in Slovakia (14 years after the visit of R.L. Bhatia on the inauguration of the Slovak Republic) Indian film festival in cooperation of the Slovak Film Institute in Bratislava Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee meets Slovak Foreign Minister Jans Kubis in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (continued)

438

APPENDIX I: INDIA-SLOVAKIA VISITS, 1992–2020

(continued) December

2008 March April 29–30 July

2009 June 22–25

2010 April

2011 March April 11–13

April 11–13 May 16–21 2012 March April 4

September 16–22

October 16–19

October 17–19 October 29–31

2013 June 17–18

C

Studio Tanca dance group from Banska Bystrica in India; gives performances—‘Night Peace’ and ‘Touch the Dance’—in Delhi, Varanasi and Chandigarh P Chairman of the Slovak Parliament Pavol Paska in India P Foreign Minister Jans Kubis in India E Secretary (Economic Relations) in Slovakia as Special Envoy of Prime Minister to seek support for India-US civil nuclear energy initiative E Dinesh Rai, Secretary in the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME), accompanied by representatives of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) in Slovakia E A 32-member business delegation from the Karnataka Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Slovakia C Secretary, Ministry of Culture, in Slovakia E Slovak Minister of Economy Juraj Miskov accompanied by Andrea Gulova, Deputy Chief Executive of the Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency (SARIO) M Minister of Defence Lubomir Galko in India M A 15-member delegation of the National Defence College in Slovakia P Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Pavol Paska in India E 5th session of the Joint Business Council in New Delhi; co-chaired by the Director-General of Trade and the Slovak Director-General of Trade and Customer Protection E A 14-member weightlifting delegation led by Birendra Prasad Baishya, Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha, in Slovakia P A delegation led by State Secretary in the Slovak Ministry of Environment Jan Ilavsky in India to attend the 11th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Hyderabad P Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajcak in India P Preneet Kaur, Minister of State for External Affairs, accompanied by Joint Secretary (Central Europe), MEA in Slovakia P Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajcak in India (continued)

APPENDIX I: INDIA-SLOVAKIA VISITS, 1992–2020

439

(continued) July 11–12

E

November 2–5

P

November 11–13

P

2014 November 24–26

P

October 15

C

October 27–30

E

2015 February 25

E

February 27

P

July

P

October 7–10 2016 April 15–17

E P

November

C

December 2–5

P

2017 April 21

April

E

E

7th session of the Joint Economic Committee in Bratislava (after a gap of nearly seven years ); co-chaired by Minister of State for Commerce Daggubati Purandeswari and State Secretary for Economy Pavol Pavlis (hereafter held after every two years ) Chief Minister of Meghalaya Mukul Sangma in Slovakia Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajcak in India to participate in the ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs Peter Burian in India A Tourism Fair organized in Bratislava by the Indian Tourism Office, Frankfurt A delegation of officials from the Slovak Ministry of Finance in New Delhi to negotiate the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement 8th session of the Joint Economic Committee in New Delhi 1st Visegrad 4-India interaction in Bratislava at Joint Secretary level; Joint Secretary (Central Europe) Rahul Chhabra in Slovakia Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajcak met Minister of State for External Affairs V.K. Singh on the sidelines of the Community of Democracies Ministerial in San Salvador Slovak Economy Minister Vazil Hudak in India Minister of State for External Affairs Gen. V.K. Singh (Retd.) in Slovakia to participate in GLOBSEC Security Forum, 2016 and for bilateral discussions; meets V4 Foreign Ministers on the sidelines of the summit A delegation of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport in India to attend the World Youth Conference 2016 Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslaw Lajcak in Amritsar to attend the ministerial Heart of Asia—Istanbul Process conference in Amritsar 9th session of the Joint Economic Committee in Bratislava; Indian delegation led by Anita Praveen, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry A FICCI delegation in Slovakia on the occasion of the 9th session of the Joint Economic Committee (continued)

440

APPENDIX I: INDIA-SLOVAKIA VISITS, 1992–2020

(continued) August 28–29

September 26–28

October 11–12

November 9–11

2018 February 21–22

April 11–14

May 15–18

July

2019 January 18–20

February 13

February February

P

Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajcak in India and as President-elect of the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly E A delegation of Slovak business from defence and energy industries led by State Secretary Lukas Parizek in India on a working visit for political consultations and to open the third Honorary Consulate in Bangalore (after Kolkata and Mumbai) E A 7-member delegation of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) led by D.H. Hota in Bratislava E Slovak Hub Summit organized by the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Slovakia and the Slovak Alliance for the Promotion of Innovative Economics (SAPIE) in Mumbai E A business delegation including Tomark Aero participate in the Uttar Pradesh Investors Summit 2018 where Slovakia was one of the partner countries M A defence delegation comprising of officials of the Ministry of Defence and defence manufacturers participate in Defexpo 2018 at Chennai P Minister of State for External Affairs M.J. Akbar in Bratislava to participate as a Speaker in GLOBSEC 2018 Bratislava Forum M Representatives of CSM Industry—manufacturers of trucks and excavators used by mining, defence, fire fighting and patrol units participated in the Vidharbha Defence Industries Association’s Investors Summit in Nagpur E President of the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Slovakia (INDCHAM) attends the Vibrant Gujarat Summit at Gandhinagar E 10th session of the Joint Economic Committee in New Delhi; Slovak delegation led by Vojtech Ferencz, State Secretary in the Ministry of Economy and Radko Khurc, State Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, accompanied by many senior officers from different Ministries/Departments E A 20-member Slovak business delegation in India E A 11-member delegation of the Automotive Component Manufacturer’s Association (ACMA) in Slovakia (continued)

APPENDIX I: INDIA-SLOVAKIA VISITS, 1992–2020

441

(continued) February 28–March 1

M

October

E

November 20–22

E

2020 January 23–26

E

Five Slovak defence companies participate in the Vidarbha Defence Industries Association (VDIA) defence investors summit in Nagpur; Five Slovakian companies participated: INDCHAM, CSM Industry (UDS Trucks), Cargen Start (Starters and Alternators), Way 4 Industries (Bozena de-mining), ESET (endpoint security systems), Innovatrics (Biometric ids), and Incoff Aerospace (creators of drones and avionics of Shark plane) T.K. Pandey, Director of Indian Importers Chambers of Commerce and Industry (IICCI), New Delhi in Slovakia; participate in the Slovak Matchmaking Fair Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Demographic Policy Mariyana Nikolova, Slovak State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs Lukáš Parízek and State Secretary of the Ministry of Economy V. Ferencz in India; accompanied by a 40-member delegation (including 20 businessmen) participate in the 5th India-Europe Business Forum in New Delhi Commercial representatives and marketing executives participate in the ITF Slovakiatour—the international fair of travel and tourism

(C = Cultural; E = Economic; M = Military; P = Political; S = Science and Technology)

Appendix J: India-Slovakia Agreements, 1993–2019

1993

March March May 14 October 26

1994

July July July July

7 7 7 7

1995

March 29

May 23 June 30 November 13 1996

March 11

July 19

Agreement on trade in hard currency initialled Protocol on liquidation of non-convertible Rupee balances in favour of Slovakia Agreement on economic, trade and technical cooperation Agreement on scientific cooperation between Slovak Academy of Sciences and Indian National Science Academy MoU on scientific and technological cooperation Protocol on Foreign Office consultations MoU concerning Indo-Slovak Joint Committee on Trade MoU between the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and Union of Slovak Industry Agreement for formation of the Indo-Slovak Joint Business Council between the Slovak Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (Assocham) Protocol on 1st session of the Joint Committee on Economic and Commercial Cooperation MoU of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) with the Slovak Academy of Sciences MOU on defence cooperation between Ministry of Defence and Slovak Defence Ministry Cultural agreement on cooperation in the spheres of culture, art, education, science, tourism, sports and mass media (for 5 years; remains in force for a further 5 years) Air services agreement providing a framework for future air links between the two countries (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

443

444

APPENDIX J: INDIA-SLOVAKIA AGREEMENTS, 1993–2019

(continued) October 10 October 10

2001 2004

December August 22 December 11 December 11 December December 13

December 13 December 13

2006

September 25

2011

March 24

2014

November

2015

July 29

August 12

2017

April 5

April 2018

February

2019

January

Agreement on cooperation in science and technology (for 5 years; can be extended for 3-year periods) Agreement on air services MoU between Slovak Ministry of Economy and the Centre for Trade and Information of the Ministry of Commerce Protocol on trade and economic cooperation Agreement on scientific cooperation between Indian National Science Academy and Slovak Academy of Sciences Agreement on avoidance of double taxation Programme of cooperation in the field of culture and arts for the period 2004–2007 MoU between the Confederation of Indian Industry and the Slovak Union of Defence Industries MoU between the National Small Scale Industries Federation of India and the Slovak Agency for Development of Small and Medium Enterprises (NADSME) Agreement on economic cooperation MoU between National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. (NSIC), India and the National Agency for Development of Small and Medium Enterprises (NADSME), Slovakia Agreement on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments (for unlimited period) Programme of cooperation between Ministry of Culture of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic for the period 2011–2013 (valid till 31 December 2013) An explanatory MoU with the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) to resolve the application of Article 24 of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement of 1986 MoU between the Bureau of Standards and Slovak Office of Standards, Meteorology and Testing to enhance and strengthen technical cooperation in the fields of standardization and conformity assessment (for 5 years) MoU between Indian Railways and Slovak Railways and the Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development of the Slovak Republic MoU on the Implementation of the EU-India Horizontal Air Services Agreement on the four provisions relating to the liberalization of cargo service Agreement between FICCI and Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency (SARIO) Five MoUs signed at the Uttar Pradesh Investors Summit 2018 in Lucknow with Slovak companies on cooperation in aviation, defence, fire protection and Smart City MoU between the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Slovakia (INDCHAM) and the BRICS Chamber (continued)

APPENDIX J: INDIA-SLOVAKIA AGREEMENTS, 1993–2019

445

(continued) January

MoU between the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Slovakia (INDCHAM) and the Gujarat Chamber of Commerce

Appendix K: India-Central Europe Agreements, Comparative Chart

Agreement

Czechoslovakia

Czech Rep (since 1993)

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia (since 1993)

1

Establishment of diplomatic relations

18 November 1947

1 January 1993

30 March 1954

1 January 1993

2

1st trade agreement

3

1st cultural agreement 1st science and technology cooperation agreement Joint Economic Committee/ Commission Investment protection, promotion agreement Foreign Office consultations

29 March 1949 15 March 1993 7 July 1959

18 November 1948 8 April 1949 30 March 1962 25 February 1966

22 April 1949 27 March 1957 26 March 1966

March 1993 11 March 1996 10 October 1996

19 December 1973 3 November 2003

7 January 1972

7 July 1994

7 October 1996

25 September 2006

22 September 1994

7 October 1996

7 July 1994

24 August 1961

30 November 1962

–

4

5

7

8

9

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

26 April 1966

Revalidated May 2001

April 1966

8 June 2010a

11 October 1996

11 October 1996b

–

11 October 1996; January 2006 revalidated November 2010

9 November 1966

(continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

447

448

APPENDIX K: INDIA-CENTRAL EUROPE AGREEMENTS, …

(continued) Agreement

Czechoslovakia

Czech Rep (since 1993)

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia (since 1993)

10

Air services agreement

19 September 1960

1997; 14 September 1999

25 January 1977

19 July 1996

11

Defence cooperation agreement

–

21 October 2003

12

Social security agreement Equivalence/mutual recognition of educational degrees 1st health cooperation agreement Extradition Treaty

–

9 June 2010 –

23 February 1966; revised 17 October 2003 3 November 2003 2 February 2010 23 October 1976

17 February 2003 –

13 November 1995 –

–

–

9 December 1976 –

16 June 1979

–

16

13

14

17 October 1975 January 1988

–

–

–

Countering Terrorism

–

–

17

Space cooperation

–

–

18

Information and Cultural Centre in India

–

–

19

Indian cultural centre in V4

–

2011

15

17 February 2003 – 17 February 2003 27 October – 1975 since 1978 Polish Institute (June 2012) 15 August – 2014

–

–

– –

–

Notes (a) Upgrades Joint Economic Committee to a Joint Commission (b) Amended on 10 June 2010 to accommodate the Czech Republic’s EU obligations

Appendix L: Foreign Direct Investment in India, April 2000–March 2020

Country

Rank

Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Total

61 73 27 76

Amount (Rs million)

Amount US$ million)

Percentage of FDI

2,460.57 1,430.03 37,390.87 1080.98 42,380.5

42.22 24.66 684.44 18.29 769.61

0.01 0.01 0.15 0.00

Source India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Fact Sheet on Foreign Direct Investment from April 2000 to March 2020. Retrieved June 28, 2020, pp. 6–7 from https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/ FDI_Factsheet_March20_28May_2020.pdf

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

449

Index

A Abdel Nasser, Gamal, 139 Act East policy, 17 Adenauer, Konrad, 190 Advani, Lal Krishna, 164 AERO India show, 98 Aero India Space International exhibition, Bangalore, 203 Aero L-39 basic trainer, 96 Afghanistan, 91, 242, 321 Africa, 22, 23, 40, 64, 65, 89, 94, 148, 198, 308, 309 Africa-India Summit (2015), 339 Agni-V Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), 102 Airports Authority of India (AAI), 98 Air Slovakia, 258 Akbar, M.J., 254 Albania, 37–40, 46, 50 Alexander Csoma de Koros, 165 Algeria, 157, 308 Alok Industries, 296 Ambani, Anil, 104 Amrita Sher-Gil Cultural Centre, 166

Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 255 Andreff, W., 286, 289, 291 Ansari, Hamid, 91, 221 Antall, Jozef, 161 Anthony, Frank, 163 Apollo Tyres, 21, 152, 294, 296 ArcelorMittal, 19, 247, 295, 296 ArcelorMittal Slovakia, 247 Armenia, 38, 221 Armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs), 201, 203, 204, 206, 249 Artha Vijnana, 48 ASEM, 93 Asia, 40, 45, 50, 61, 65, 79, 84, 89, 90, 94, 111, 116, 121, 122, 144, 146–148, 150, 166, 181, 189, 197, 198, 201, 215, 218, 243, 244, 246, 286, 291, 292, 308, 322, 337 Asia-Pacific, 90, 116, 197, 198, 218 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 254, 339 asylum seekers, 321, 322 Atomic Energy Commission, 105

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

451

452

INDEX

Aurangabad, 98, 299 Auschwitz, 186 Australia, 325, 337 Australia Group, 121, 337 Austria, 32, 38, 48, 62, 63, 140, 161, 258 Austro-Hungarian Empire, 114, 115 Autobiography, 14 Avadi, 203, 204 Ayodhya, 212 Ayurveda, 62, 169 Azerbaijan, 121

B Baalu, T.R., 256 Babis, Andrej, 92, 104, 122 Bagchi, Indrani, 65 Bahmre, Subhash, 253 Bakos, Jan, 257 Baktay, Ervin, 166 Balatonfüred, 165 Balkan States, 32 Baltic states, 31, 199 Banasinkski, Eugeniusz, 183 Bangladesh, 84, 144, 193, 201, 321 Bangladesh crisis (1971), 193, 201 Bansal, G.L., 60 Bartoszewski, W., 197 Basu, Jyotirmoy, 107 Bata, 20, 119, 120, 335 Bay of Bengal, 23 Belarus, 38 Belgium, 276, 314, 327 Bella India, 335 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 23, 64, 65 Benaras Hindu University, 51 Bengal Renaissance, 114 Bengaluru, 98, 254 Berlin Wall, 17, 19, 58, 191 Bhagavad Gita, 116

Bhakta, Manoranjan, 255 Bhandare, R.D., 109 Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (BEML), 99–101, 104, 203–206 Bharat Electronics, 203 Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL), 249 Bhatia, R.L., 88, 195, 240, 255 Bhattacharjee, Anuradha, 183 Biju Janata Dal, 212 Biocon, 335 BJP, 58, 108, 110, 164, 212 Bohemia, 237 Bollywood, 62, 120, 121, 216, 258 Bombay, 35, 79, 81, 183 Bonatrans Group, 300 Bose, Subhash Chandra, 81 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 38, 39 Brahmos, 102, 114 Brandt, Willy, 191 Brazil, 90, 92, 243, 339 Brexit, 13, 21, 22, 325, 336 Brezhnev, L., 119 Bristol Hotel, 36 Britain, 21, 22, 24, 33 Brno, 87, 98, 105, 250, 257, 296 Bulganin, N.A., 41 Bulgaria, 17, 20, 21, 23, 31, 35, 37– 40, 43, 50, 53, 56, 62, 63, 66, 93, 193 Bumar, 203–206 Bureau of Indian Standards, 254 Burma, 183, 309 Bush, George, 194 B.V.T. Poland, 206 Byelorussia, 307, 314, 316

C Calcutta, 19, 35, 79, 120, 183, 214, 239 Cambodia, 185

INDEX

Canada, 119, 185, 254 Can Pack, 299 Cason Engineering Plc, 299 Caucasus, 65 Central and East European countries (CEECs), 34, 40, 52–58, 63, 82, 86, 88, 108, 143, 190, 199, 201, 267, 268, 270–272, 281 Central Asia, 23, 38, 54, 57, 65 Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), 101 Central Europe and Modi, 63 Central Europe Division, MEA, 30, 38, 39, 308 establishment of diplomatic relations and embassies, 35 India’s image in, 43 Indian perceptions of Chinese inroads in, 64 in Indian scholarly literature, 46 in parliamentary debates, 30, 58 origins of Indian migration, 309 perceptions of trade and economic ties, 30, 52, 56 perceptions of trade in the 1990s, 30, 56, 106 post-Cold War perceptions, 30, 31, 48, 53, 54, 269 reservations about Indian independence, 33 teaching and research on, 49 teaching of languages, 30, 51 Central Institute of Hindi (CIH), 167 ˇ Ceský Brod, 98 Charles University, 110, 114 Charter of Paris, 18 Chavan, Prithviraj D., 59 Chavan, Y.B., 146 Chehre (Faces), 258 Chemoprojekt, 300

453

China, 16, 23, 34, 42, 43, 47, 62, 65, 66, 83, 90, 116, 119, 121, 123, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 152, 189, 190, 197, 198, 215, 219, 243, 268, 286, 290, 299, 321, 337–339 and Central Europe, 23 rise of, 14 China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), 64 Chowdhury, H.R., 193 Cimoszewicz, W., 197 Civil Democratic Party, 236 Civil Forum, 111, 254 Coal Ministry, 196 Cognizant, 21, 152, 295, 296 Cold War, 16, 17, 29–31, 34, 36, 43, 45, 48, 49, 52–54, 58, 79, 81, 88, 95–97, 106, 115, 119, 121, 138, 147, 148, 164, 166, 181, 185, 186, 194, 195, 202, 214, 239, 243, 267, 269, 310, 325, 333, 338 College of Defence Management, 105 COMECON, 16 Commissioner General for Economic and Commercial Affairs, 35 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 38, 199, 308 Commonwealth of Nations, 33 Communist Party of India (CPI), 34, 162, 163, 187, 193 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 41 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 148, 196, 213 Conceptual Basis of Czech Foreign Policy for 2011, 90 Conceptual Basis of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic for the 2003–2006 Period, 89

454

INDEX

Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), 62, 63, 204, 245, 271, 272 Congress Working Committee, 182 containment, 157 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, 97 COP 19, 337 COP 24, 337 cordon sanitaire, 34, 81 Covid-19 pandemic, 23, 199, 258, 296, 336, 338 CPI-M, 107, 108, 193 Cracow, 295, 316 Crimea, 24 Croatia, 20, 21, 38, 39, 62 Csikos-Nagy, Bela, 156 Cuba, 37 Cyprus, 38, 63, 93 Cyrankiewicz, Józef, 188 Czaputowicz, Jacek, 24, 219, 220 Czech Aviation Training Centre (CATC), 300 Czechia. see Czech Republic Czech Institute of International Relations, 90 Czech Military Academy, 105 Czechoslovakia, 16, 19, 20, 24, 31, 33–37, 40, 42, 43, 46–48, 50, 53, 56, 58, 60, 66, 79–88, 94– 97, 105–115, 117–121, 147, 156, 164, 166, 184–186, 188, 189, 193, 211, 212, 236–238, 240, 243, 248, 249, 254–256, 318 in Indian academic literature, 110 Nehru’s 1938 visit, 80 Soviet invasion of, 83, 107, 112, 210 Czech Republic, 20, 22, 23, 31, 32, 38, 39, 46, 56, 62–64, 79, 80, 87–94, 97, 98, 102–106, 111,

116, 119–123, 218, 219, 236– 239, 241, 243, 248, 254–256, 268, 273, 276–278, 280, 285, 286, 291, 292, 296, 298, 308, 312, 318–320, 335, 336, 338 Concept of the Czech Republic’s Foreign Policy (3 August 2015), 90 Indian tourists, 120 Indians in, 318, 320 Indology, 114, 115 Ministry of Industry and Trade, Export Strategy for the Period 2006–2010, 90 Ministry of Industry and Trade, Export Strategy for 2012–2020, 90 outreach to Asia, 79, 89 skilled Indian migrants, 94 The Czech Republic in Asia: Strategy for the Development of Relations with Regions and Countries of Asia (2006), 90 Czech University, 93, 114, 320 D Dandavate, Madhu, 211 Danube River, 63, 256 Dasmunshi, Priya Ranjan, 164 Dayal Sharma, Shankar, 241 Debrecen, 322 Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), 98, 105, 253 Defexpo, 97, 203, 253 De Havilland Vampires, 202 Deloitte, 22, 62, 271, 272, 291, 298 Demes, Pavol, 240 Denmark, 38, 327, 339 Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, 248, 298, 299

INDEX

455

Department of Indo-European Linguistics, University of Budapest, 165 Department of Slavonic and Finno-Ugrian Studies, 51, 167 Desai, Morarji, 83–85, 143, 211, 214, 221, 334 Desai, S.H., 110 de-Stalinization, 187 détente, 45, 46, 84, 107, 146, 191, 192 Devi, Gayatri, 164 Dhar, D.P., 52 Dina-Hitex, 296 Dixit, J.N., 53 Doosan Skoda Power, 300 Drang nach Osten, 30 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, 256 Dr. Reddys, 335 Dubcek, Alexander, 16 Durdil, Ladislav, 95 Dutt, Subimal, 138, 141, 143 Dwivedy, Surendranath, 108, 109, 210

Essel Propack, 20, 295 Estonia, 38, 39, 63 E-Tourist visa, 258 European Commission, 18, 334, 336 European Parliament, 308, 336 European Union (EU), 17, 18, 20– 24, 30–32, 38, 39, 54, 56–58, 61, 64–67, 88–92, 102, 119, 148–151, 181, 195–200, 207, 208, 213, 215–217, 219, 220, 237, 238, 241, 245, 246, 248, 252–254, 268–270, 273, 276, 278, 281, 286, 288, 290, 308– 311, 313–316, 323, 325, 327, 334, 336–339 Blue Card, 219 Common Commercial Policy, 254 eastward enlargement, 30, 31, 38, 46, 57, 61, 309, 310 EU Strategy on India (2018), 338 Eurostat, 311–313, 315–317, 334, 335 EU Troika, 91 EVPU, 251, 253

E Ease of Doing Business Ranking, 291 Ease of Doing Business Report , 297 East Central Europe, 31 Eastern Opening Strategy (2010), 148 East Germany, 16, 82, 195, 210 Egypt, 24, 118, 139–142, 164 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 15 Eldis, 98, 300 Eotovs Lorand University, Budapest (ELTE), 167 Erhard, Adolf, 257 Ernst & Young, 291, 297 Ernst & Young Attractiveness Survey, 291 Escorts, 20, 295

F Facebook, 309, 312, 313, 318, 320, 323, 325 Facebook Marketing API, 313 Farmtrac Tractors Europe, 295 FDI, 20, 21, 104, 152, 197, 218, 238, 248, 286–294, 297–301, 335, 338 Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce (FICCI), 22, 38, 60– 62, 86 Fedor, Martin, 241 Fermat Gropup, ComAp, 300 Fernandes, George, 98, 203 Fiji, 309 financial crisis (2008), 32, 246, 311

456

INDEX

Finland, 23, 34, 38, 81, 276, 327, 339 Flying Academy, 300 Fock, Jeno, 145 Foreign Exchange Management Act (2000), 51, 259, 289 Foreign Service Institute (FSI), 49, 213 Foreign Trade Review, 49 France, 22–24, 47, 110, 186, 217, 220, 276, 314, 315, 327, 336 French Revolution, 14 frontiers, recognition of, 191 G G4, 92 G7, 65 Gadgil, V.N., 163 Gajdos, Jozef, 250 Gandhi, Indira, 14, 16, 19, 45, 46, 82, 84, 85, 107–110, 137, 144, 182, 190–192, 201, 214, 235 Gandhi, Mahatma, 120, 194, 209, 257 Gandhi, Rajiv, 53, 85, 146 Ganges-Danube Festival, 167 Ganz Engineering and Energetics Machinery Limited, 299 Gasparovic, Ivan, 241 Gdansk, ´ 295 Gearspect, 300 Gendronneau, 312, 313 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 196 General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR), 101 Genpact, 21, 152, 295 Georgia, 38 German Democratic Republic, 37, 50, 53, 56, 193 German University, Prague, 115 Germany, Federal Republic of, 237

Giri, V.V., 94, 144 glasnost , 214 Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, 21, 296 Glimpses of World History, 14, 32 Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, Jhajjar, 106 Global Competitiveness Report 2019, 291, 297 global production chains, 287 Global South, 90, 286 GLOBSEC Security Forum, 254 Goa, 41, 188 ‘Go China’, 62 ‘Go India’, 271 Gokhale Institute of Economics and Politics, 48 Gomulka, 187, 188, 210, 212 Goncz, Arpad, 19 Gopalan, A.K., 162, 209, 210 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 59, 194 Gottwald Electric Equipment Factory, 143 Goud, Mallikarjun, 97, 154, 249 Greece, 38, 315 Grover, V.K., 240 Grudzinski, ´ Jerzy, 185 Gujral, Inder Kumar, 53 Gyan Chand, 47, 110, 117 H Haberka, Jan, 194 Hamrik Microelectronics, 300 Hapsburg Empire, 47 Havel, Vaclav, 88, 91, 238 Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation, 145 Hitler, Adolf, 32, 80, 182, 209 HJT-16 Kiran trainer, 96 Holy See, 39 Home Credit, 335 Hungarian Communist Party, 160, 161

INDEX

Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre (HICC), 158, 166 The Hungarian Story, 158 Hungarian uprising of 1956, 14, 15, 158 Hungary, 15, 16, 19, 21–24, 31, 32, 34–40, 42–44, 47, 48, 50, 53, 56, 62, 63, 65–67, 81, 87, 107, 110, 112, 137–169, 184, 190, 193, 195, 210–212, 218, 219, 247, 268, 270, 273–280, 285, 286, 291–296, 299, 308, 311, 312, 321–323, 325, 327, 333– 336, 339 Indian perceptions of, 138, 159 Indians in, 321 Ministry of National Economy, Foreign Trade Strategy, 149 Husain, Zakir, 144 Huszti, György, 165 Hutni Projekt, 300 I Iceland, 23, 38, 339 ICT, 105, 295, 322 India, 13–24, 30, 33–67, 79–110, 112–116, 118–123, 137–159, 161–169, 181–208, 211, 213– 221, 235, 239–259, 267–281, 285–292, 294–301, 307–310, 313, 314, 318–323, 325, 327, 333–340 Ministry of Commerce, 35, 248, 273–275, 298 Ministry of Defence, 53, 97–99, 101, 102, 104, 153, 154, 202, 203, 205, 206, 253 Ministry of Human Resources Development, 167 Ministry of Railways, 300 Ministry of Small Scale Industries, 245

457

India-Central Europe cultural ties, 66 economic cooperation, 111 FDI, 335 political cooperation, 336 tourism, 168, 216, 258 India-Central Europe Business Forum (ICEBF), 39 India-China war (1962), 42, 43, 143, 190 India-Czechoslovakia defence cooperation, 80 economic and trade relations, 86 post-Cold War era, 119 India-Czech Republic arms exports, 96, 102, 104 contemporary images, 116 cooperation in nuclear energy, 105 cultural cooperation, 80, 120 defence cooperation, 80, 97 defence cooperation, training, 105 Joint Defence Committee (JDC), 97 parliamentary questions and debates, 106 India-EU Free Trade Agreement, 270, 281, 301 India-Europe 29 Business Forum, 245 India-EU strategic partnership, 281 India-Hungary arms exports, 155 cultural relations, 165, 166 defence cooperation, 153 Economic and Technical Scientific Cooperation Committee, 147 economic and trade relations, 151, 161 FDI, 152 Joint Defence Committee, 153 Joint Economic Committee, 151 Ministry of External Affairs, 23, 24, 37, 38, 221, 311, 339

458

INDEX

parliamentary debates and questions, 161 perceptions in scholarly literature, 156 students, 167 teaching of Hungarian language, 167 tourism, 168 UNSC Seat, 200 Indian Army, 98, 99, 101, 102, 203– 206, 250, 251 Indian Chamber of Commerce and Culture, 300 Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), 66, 166, 167 Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), 46, 110, 111, 156, 187, 189, 213, 214 Indian Cultural Centre, 66, 120, 166, 326 Indian Detonators Ltd., 153 Indian diaspora, 218, 309–311, 315, 317, 321, 325, 327, 328, 335 Indian National Congress, 33, 81 Indian Navy, 105, 202 Indian Ocean, 22, 23, 146 Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), 187 Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme, 169, 259 India-Poland arms exports, 207 Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation, 196 defence cooperation, 182, 201 defence cooperation agreement (2003), 204, 209 early contacts, 183 economic and trade relations, 217 initial perceptions, 182

Joint Working Group on Defence, 205 perceptions in scholarly literature, 213 Polish perceptions of India, 214 Polish refugees, 183 tourism, 200 India Quarterly, 46, 110, 156, 213, 254 India-Slovakia Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (1993), 244 cultural relations, 256 defence cooperation and arms transfers, 248 economic relations, 243 foreign direct investment, 247 in Indian parliament, 255 in scholarly journals, 254 Joint Business Council, 242 Joint Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation, 240 political relations, 239 tourism, 258 trade, 246 India-V4 composition of trade, 277 FDI, 335, 338 FDI in India, 286 regional approach, 338 trade and economic relations, 268 trade in goods, 278, 280, 281, 335 trade in services, 278, 279 Indo-Czechoslovak InterGovernmental Committee for Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation, 87 Indo-Hungarian Cultural Exchange Programme, 167 Indology, 22, 67, 114, 115, 165, 167, 257

INDEX

Indo-Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 271 Indo-Polish Friendship Society, 182, 214 Infosys, 19, 20, 295, 296, 335 Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, 112 Institute of Oriental Studies, 257 Institute of World Economics, 165 Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in Mizoram, 206 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 146 Internal Market Directives, 288 International Commissions of Supervision and Control (ICSC), 185 International Defence Exhibition Bratislava (IDEB), 254 International Development Association, 59 International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), 65 International Solar Alliance, 24, 151 International Studies , 46–50, 111, 156, 157, 213, 254 International Yoga Day, 166 Iran, 65 Iraq, 54, 164, 242, 321 Ireland, 313–315 Iskra jet trainers, 96, 202 Israel, 17, 18, 338, 339 Italy, 65, 276, 310, 314, 315

J Jagiellonian University, 67 Jaguar Land Rover, 21, 248, 296 Jaishankar, S., 23, 93, 122, 123, 218, 334, 339 Jana Sangh, 43 Janata Dal, 211, 212

459

Japan, 23, 92, 122, 152, 189, 197, 243, 254, 289, 338, 339 Jaruzelski, Wojciech (General), 194 Jawaharlal Nehru University, 43, 46, 49, 50, 111, 158 Jawa (motorcycles), 120 Jemnice, 296 J.E. Purkyne University, 257 Jha, S.K., 158

K Kadar, Janos, 138, 143, 160 Kakarpara, 106 Kalam, Abdul, J., 241, 242, 246, 251 Kallai, Gyula, 144 Kalpakkam, 106 Kant, Krishan, 241, 259 Kargil War, 100, 202 Karpati, Ferenc, 153 Kashmir, 41, 43, 54, 82, 83, 89, 140, 145, 147, 188, 195, 199, 211, 219, 240, 337 Katz-Suchyf, J., 189 Kaushik, Devendra, 111, 213 Kearney Global Services Location Index, 291, 297 Khanna, K.C., 159 Khosla, J.N., 141 Khrushchev, N.S., 41 Khurshid, Salman, 333 Klaus, Vaclav, 236 Koprivnice, 101 Korba, 147, 248 Korcok, Ivan, 241 Korean War (1950), 34, 40, 162 Kosovo, 148 Kovind, Ram Nath, 23, 92, 93, 218, 320 Kozlowski, Tomasz, 198 KPIT-Infosystems, 295 Krasa, Miloslav, 111

460

INDEX

Kremica Mint, 245 Kripalani, Acharya, J.B., 163, 209 Kripalani, Sucheta, 109 Krishnamachari, T.T., 107 Krishna Menon, V.K., 44, 95 Krishna, S.M., 91 Kubis, Janus, 243 Kumaramangalam, Rangarajan, 59 Kunzru, H.N., 187 Kwasniewski, Alexander, 196

L Ladakh, 338 Lange, Oscar, 187 Laos, 185 Lasvit, 300 Latin America, 40, 89, 198 Latvia, 17, 38, 39, 63 League of Nations, 111, 214 LEEL, 296 Lehman Brothers, 20 Lenart, Jozef, 83, 85 Lesny, Vincenc, 114 Libya, 54 Liechtenstein, 38 LIKO-S, 300 Limaye, Madhu, 107 Line of Control, 148 Lithuania, 38, 39, 63 Little Entente, 32 Lodz, 20 Lok Sabha, 37, 43, 54, 58, 60, 66, 80, 85, 99, 106–109, 138, 140, 161–163, 182, 195, 203, 209, 211, 212, 255 Long-term residence permits, 311 Lord Mountbatten, 79 Losonczi, Pal, 144 LOT, 200, 215, 216, 219, 271, 327 Lublin, 295

M Macedonia, 38, 39 Machek, Caclav, 257 Madurai, 300 Maflow, 300 Mahalanobis, P.C., 186 Maharaja Jamsaheb Digvijaysinhji, 215 Mahtab, Bharatruhari, 212 Major General Zmeko, 253 Make in India, 104, 122, 220, 221, 271, 297 Malaysia, 309 Maleter, Pal, 142 Malta, 38, 63 Manipal University, 51 Mani Shankar Aiyar, 256 Mankekar, D.R., 118 Mansingh, Surjit, 157 maps, wrong depiction in, 211 Maritime Silk Road, 23, 64 Martin Luther King, 194 Masani, M.R., 109, 117 Masaryk, Jan, 81 Masaryk University, 98, 105 Mauritius, 289, 292, 309 Mazowieckie Region, 316 Meciar, Vladimir, 236, 238 Mehta, Asoka, 84, 109, 162, 210 Menon, K.P.S., 15, 36, 141, 184, 185, 190 Menon, Shiv Shankar, 49 Merkel, Angela, 65 Metnar, Lubomir, 104 Middle East, 33, 308, 309, 336 Miller, Leszek, 199, 221 Mincovna Kremica, 245 Miskolc, 322 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 121, 337 Mitteleuropa, 30

INDEX

Modi, Narendra, 14, 22–24, 30, 93, 104, 122, 123, 138, 181, 218, 220, 235, 270, 328, 333, 339 MOL, 152 Moldova, 38, 39 Mongolia, 94 Monroe Doctrine, 40 Montenegro, 38, 39 Moravcik, Josef, 240, 244 Moravia, 237, 239 Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), 236 Mr˛agowo, 295 Mukerjee, H.N., 108, 163, 210 Mukerjee, Ramarishna, 48 Mukherjee, Pranab, 93, 205, 242 Mumbai, 98, 121, 150, 168, 242, 254, 258 Munich agreement (1938), 81, 112 Munnich, Ferenc, 143 My Years in India, 166

N Nagy, Imre, 139, 142, 157, 159 Namboodiripad, E.M.S., 193 Narasimha Rao, P.V., 211, 239, 240 Narayan, Jayaprakash, 140 Narora, 106 Nath, Kamal, 200 National Agency for Development of Small and Medium Enterprises, 242 National Defence College, 154 National Security Council Secretariat, 200 National Small Industries Corporation Ltd., 242 Natwar Singh, K., 18, 53, 192, 194, 195 Naumann, Friedrich, 30 Nawanagar, 183

461

Nehru, B.K., 83 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 14–16, 29, 32, 33, 36, 40–43, 80–82, 85, 111, 137, 182, 184 Nehru, R.K., 96 Netherlands, 276, 289, 313, 315, 327 Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, 185 Nikolai Bulganin, 15, 140 Nizam of Hyderabad, 95 Noble Prize, 194 nonaligned movement, 18 non-proliferation, 144, 148, 191, 192, 259, 337 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 54, 92, 191 Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), 259, 311 Nordic-plus India Summit, 23, 221, 339 North America, 309 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 17, 18, 37, 39, 57, 58, 88, 89, 148, 181, 195, 199, 215, 238, 241, 308, 334 Northeast Asia, 198 North Eastern Frontier Agency, 211 North-South dialogue, 55 Norway, 38, 308, 339 Novo Tech, 295 Novotny, Antonin, 83 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 92, 94, 121, 122, 200, 243, 336, 337 nuclear tests (1998), 54, 148, 196 O Oder-Neisse Line, 188, 191, 213 Omnipol Foreign Trade Corporation, 99 ‘One Sun, One World, One Grid’ proposal, 24

462

INDEX

Operation Parakram, 100 Orban, Viktor, 65, 149, 169 Organica Környezettechnológiák Zrt., 299 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 268, 273, 279, 286, 291–294, 298, 299 Oriental Institute in Prague, 81, 114 Orion Electronics Ltd., 295 Ostpolitik, 191 Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI), 259 P Padgaonkar, Dileep, 119 Pakistan, 16, 41, 83, 89, 100, 145, 148, 193, 195, 196, 199, 202, 208, 337 Pallos, Laszlo (Col.), 154 Panchsheel or Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, 82, 186 Panikkar, K.M., 47, 110, 156 Pant, K.C., 154 Paranjape, H.K., 159 Parízek, Lukáš, 253 Paroubek, Jiri, 91, 92 Parrikar, Manohar, 98, 101 Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), 145 Patel, Vithalbhai, 81 Patil, Pratibha, 200 Peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) (1974), 85, 145 Pecs, 322 perestroika, 54, 160, 214 Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs), 311, 313, 315 Petricek, Tomas, 93, 121, 122 Pew Center Public Opinion Survey (2019), 217 Philippines, 94 Piechocinski, Janusz, 221

Piešˇtany, 258 Pillai, N.R., 141 Planning Commission, 117, 186 Planning Institute at Warsaw, 187 Poland, 13, 18–20, 22, 23, 31–40, 42–47, 50, 51, 53, 56, 58, 60, 62, 63, 66, 67, 81, 86, 87, 96, 97, 107, 110–112, 118, 144, 156, 161, 162, 164, 166, 181– 221, 247, 268, 270, 271, 273– 280, 285, 286, 290–299, 307– 318, 320, 321, 326, 333–339 Emergency (1981), 211 Foreign Ministry, Asia-Pacific Department, 198 Indian diaspora, 311, 313, 316, 326 martial law, 58, 193, 194, 211 riots (1970), 192 Strategy towards Non-European Developing Countries (2004), 164, 208, 269, 270 Poland-India Business Forum: New Partnerships for Innovation, Sustainable Development and Environment, 271 Polish Chamber of Defence Manufacturers, 205 Polish Foreign Policy Priorities, 2012– 2016, 218 Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017– 2021, 270 Polish Institute, New Delhi, 201 Polish Institute of International Affairs, 214 Polish National Security Bureau, 200 Polmor, 300 Polskie Huty Stali steel company, 19 Polski Holding Company (PHO), 206, 221 Portugal, 65, 327 Poznan riots, 187

INDEX

Prague Spring of 1968, 14, 16 Praja Socialist Party (PSP), 108, 109, 162, 163 Preciosa, 300 Public Against Violence, 111, 254 Puja, Frigyes, 146 Punjab, 54, 258 Punj Lloyd, 251 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 267

R Racibórz, 295 Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, 83 Radom, 202 Radwar, 203, 204 Rahman, M.A., 139 Rahman, M.M., 15 Rahman, M.N., 19 Rajya Sabha, 141, 191, 219 Ram, Jagjivan, 201, 205 Rana, Kishan S., 64 Randhawa, R.K., 111 Rao, B.K., 112 Rapacki, Adam, 188–190 Rapacki Plan, 188, 189 Rathnawami, A.N., 209 Ray, Rabi, 212 Richter-Gedeon Ltd., 152, 299 Rishabh Instruments Pvt. Ltd., 295 Rishi, Ravi, 101 Romania, 20, 23, 31, 35, 37–39, 50, 53, 56, 62, 63, 66, 158 Rude Pravo, 119 Runganadhan, Samuel, 137 Rusnok, Jiri, 91 Russia, 18, 19, 24, 31, 33, 38, 46, 50, 54, 57, 65, 106, 118, 142, 149, 156, 192, 212, 216, 250, 314 Russian Revolution of 1917, 14 Rzymowski, Wincenty, 184

463

S Safarik, Pavel Josef, 257 Samajwadi Janata Party, National, 212 Samvardhana Motherson, 296 Samyukta Socialist Party, 107 Sangh, Jana, 163 Sanskrit, 113–115, 165, 257 Santa Barbara Sistemas, 253 Sarabhai, Vikram, 105 Saran, Shyam, 49 Sarkar, Bhaswati, 158 Sastry, V.S., 46, 156 satyagraha, 209, 212 Satyam Computers/Tech Mahindra, 21, 152, 295 Saxena, Hori Lal, 158 Scandinavian countries, 23, 38 S.Capable Logistician 2013—the Multinational Standardization and Interoperability Field Training Exercise, 253 Schleicher, August, 114 Schmidt, Jozsef, 165 Schuster, Rudolf, 241 Scindia, Madhavrao, 211 Seco/Warwick, 300 Second Five Year Plan (1956–1961), 186 Sejm, 197 Sejnoha, Jaroslav, 79 Serbia, 23, 38, 39, 63, 94 17+1, 290 Sharda Group, 295 Sharma, Anand, 242 Shastri, Y.P., 212 Shekhar, Chandra, 212 Sibal, Kanwal, 65 Sidhu, Harjinder Singh, 258 Sikorski, Radoslaw, 200, 201 Simkova, Eva, 241 Simla Agreement, 89, 145, 195 Singapore, 62, 289, 295, 299, 309

464

INDEX

Singh, Dinesh, 88 Singh, H.P., 19 Singh, Iqbal, 36 Singh, Jaswant, 58, 199 Singh, L.R.S., 185 Singh, Manmohan, 60, 101, 150, 200 Singh, Raunaq, 60 Singh, Surendra Pal, 109 Singh, Swaran, 43, 211 Singh, Vishwanath Pratap, 59 Singh, V.K., 101, 254 Sinha, S.N., 163, 210 Sino-Soviet split, 41 Sipox, 99, 100, 249 SIPRI, 96, 205, 249, 250 Siroky, Viliam, 82 ‘Six’ (the Six Nation Five-Continent Peace Initiative), 146 16+1, 271, 290 Skill India, 271 Skoda Auto, 22, 300 Slovak Academy of Sciences, 257 Slovak Foreign Policy Guidelines 2011, 243 Slovakia, 20–22, 31, 32, 38–39, 56, 62–63, 111, 112, 158, 235–252, 254–260, 268, 273, 276–277, 280, 286, 291–292, 296, 298, 308, 311–312, 318, 323–326, 335, 336 Hub in India, 300 Indians in, 323 Indology, 257 perceptions of India, 256 Report on Fulfilling Slovakia’s Objectives and Responsibilities in Foreign and European Policy in 2013, 243 Slovak Mint, 245 Slovak Office of Standards, Metrology and Testing, 254 Slovenia, 31, 38, 39, 62

Smeral, Odolen, 239 social security agreement, 219, 320, 327, 335 Solidarity, 18, 193–196, 212, 214 Somani, N.K., 109 Sona BLW, 295 Sondhi, M.L., 43, 47, 107, 108, 111, 157, 213, 255 South Africa, 184 South America, 37 South Asia, 16, 54, 64, 90, 91, 115, 183, 198, 211, 220, 270, 297 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 339 Southeast Asia, 17 South Europe, 326 South Korea, 17, 121, 123, 149, 243, 310, 338, 339 Soviet Union, 13–17, 34, 36, 38, 40– 42, 44–46, 48–50, 52–54, 58– 60, 81, 82, 84, 88, 96, 97, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 113, 117, 118, 121, 138–144, 148, 153, 157, 159, 162, 164, 183, 184, 186, 192, 193, 195, 196, 210, 249, 269, 307, 321 Spain, 23, 276, 314, 315 Special Economic Zones (SEZ), 291 Sreedharan, A., 107, 109 SRF Limited, 294 Sri Lanka, 309 Stalin, J., 33 State Trading Corporation, 86 Statistics Office of the Slovak Republic, 246 Steinhoff, Janusz, 203 Stipendium Hungaricum, 168, 322 Stocznia Marynarki Wojennej, 202 Strategic Analysis , 112, 254 strategic partnership, 64, 93, 94, 121– 123, 220, 270, 281

INDEX

Strategy of External Economic Relations of the Slovak Republic for 2014–2020, 246 Stropnicky, Martin, 98, 102 Stros, 300 Strougal, Lubomir, 85 Suez Canal, 24, 108 Sundaram, Lanka, 163 Sundaram, P.K., 48, 113 Sundarji, K., 154 Sun Pharmaceuticals, 295 Swain, Kharabela, 164, 212 Swami Vivekanand Cultural Centre, 66 Swatantra Party, 109, 164 Sweden, 38, 185, 276, 315, 327, 339 Switzerland, 38, 62, 63, 120, 121, 185 Syria, 54, 65 Szczecin, 295 Szeged, 322 Szeremietiew, Romuald, 202, 203 Szijjarto, Peter, 149

T T-72 tanks, 203, 204, 206, 251 Tagore, Rabindranath, 111, 114, 115, 165, 214 TAJMAC-ZPS, 300 Tanax, 247 Tarant Hungary, 299 Tashkent Declaration, 16, 83, 145 Tata Consultancy Services, 21, 152, 295 Tata Global Beverages, 296 Tata Motors, 21, 335 Tatra Holdings SRO, 101 Tatra India, 102 Tatra Sipox UK Ltd., 99 Tatra trucks, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104, 249, 251, 300

465

Tatra Trucks A.S., 101 Tatra Udyog, Hosur, 100 TCS, 21, 248 Tech Mahindra, 295 Technicoat, 300 terrorism, 93, 122, 200, 204, 242, 259, 337 Tharoor, Shashi, 49, 214 Themis Medicare Ltd., 299 Three Seas Initiative (TSI), 339 Times of India, 36, 116–119, 159– 161, 184, 188, 192, 236–238 Timmermans, Franz, 336 Tito, Josip Broz, 14, 139 Tomaskov, 256 Torunskie ´ Zakłady Materiałów Opatrunkowych, 300 tourism, 122, 151, 168, 216, 245, 257, 258, 272 Towards a Community of Democracies, 199 Transparency Directive, 288 Trepozyniski, S., 193 Trivedi, U.M., 163 Trombay atomic power power plant, 105 Trump, Donald, 339 Turkey, 38, 308, 339 Tusk, Donald, 201, 215, 336 Tvrdik, Jaroslav, 98 Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2012–2017), 297 Twitter, 312 Tyagi, Mahair, 95

U Uflex, 294, 295 Ukranian crisis, 32 UN Centre for Peace Operations, New Delhi, 253 UNCTAD, 301

466

INDEX

Unimpex, 203, 249, 251 United Arab Emirates, 310 United Kingdom, 37, 217, 219, 220, 310, 313, 325 United Nations, 15, 44, 45, 80, 83, 91, 93, 110, 146, 150, 157, 186, 193, 196, 200, 220, 237, 241, 259, 336, 337 Charter, 109, 140 General Assembly, 93, 122, 140– 141, 242 Security Council, 24, 91–92, 94, 109, 201, 213, 219, 242, 337 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 89 United States, 14, 15, 17, 19, 44, 50, 140, 186, 195, 197, 254, 269, 325, 338, 339 University of Debrecen, 169 University of Delhi, 51 University of Miskolc, 169 UNSLOC-11, 253 Uruguay Round, 196 V Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 200, 212 Varroc Excellence, 296 Velvet Divorce, 88, 97, 235, 236, 239 Velvet Revolution, 115, 236, 238, 318 Venkaiah Naidu, M., 63, 93 Venkataraman, R., 154 Vetchý, Vladimír, 98 VH Services, 300 Vibrant Gujarat Global Summit, 94 Videocon, 20, 295 Vietnam, 16, 90, 185, 314 Visegrad 4, 39, 217, 260, 268, 278, 308, 325, 333, 335 consumer market, 334 economy, size of, 334 GDP, 278

Indian diaspora characteristics, 309 Indian FDI in, 328, 335, 338 Vitkovice Fans, 300 Vladimir Clementis, 235 Vondra, Alexander, 98 VVF, 295 W Walesa, Lech, 18, 193–195, 212 Warsaw Pact, 15, 30, 57, 96, 97, 139, 153, 160 Warsaw Treaty, 45, 163, 191 Warsaw University, 67 Wassenaar Agreement, 121, 337 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 105 Wele, Asmita, 169 West Asia, 309 Western Europe, 31, 34, 36, 50, 57, 61, 63, 67, 81, 119, 150, 184, 286, 289, 310, 313, 327, 334, 335 West Indies, 309 Winternitz, Moriz, 115 Wipro, 20, 152, 295, 335 World Investment Report 2020, 288– 289 World Trade Organization (WTO), 291 World War I, 47, 79, 110, 156, 166 World War II, 19, 33, 40, 42, 43, 46, 51, 79, 81, 82, 112, 137, 156, 182, 183 Wrocław, 295 Wrze´snia, 295 WSC-Mielec Ts-11 Iskra jet trainers, 96 Y Yodhraj, 46, 47, 110, 156 yoga, 116, 120

INDEX

Yugoslavia, 15, 17–19, 34, 35, 37, 38, 43, 50, 53, 56, 81, 86, 96, 140, 158, 236, 237 Z Zakłady Chemiczne Jelchern SA, 203 Zbavitel, Dusan, 115 Zeman, Milos, 66, 91, 93, 100

Zemke, Janusz, 203, 208 Zensar Technologies, 20, 295 Zetor, 120, 300 Zieleniec, Josef, 88 ZKL, 22, 300 ZTS TEES Martin, 251 Zubaty, Josef, 114 Zuzana self-propelled gun, 250

467