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Independent ally : Australia in an age of power transition
 9780522869668, 0522869661, 9780522869675, 052286967X

Table of contents :
Title
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgements
PART 1: Conceptual Framework
1 Introduction
2 Junior Allies and Power Shift in the International System
PART 2: Australian Engagement with a Rising United States, 1908–51
3 Deakin and a Rising United States
4 Lyons and the Trade Diversion Policy
5 Menzies, Spender and the New Pacific Power
PART 3: Australian Engagement with a Rising China, 1971–2007
6 Whitlam and the Diplomatic Recognition of China
7 Hawke’s Response to Tiananmen Square
8 Howard and Growing Chinese Strategic Power
PART 4: Reflections and Comparisons
9 Australia, an Independent Ally
Epilogue
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Defence Studies Series editors Associate Professor Peter J. Dean and Associate Professor Brendan Taylor The aim of this series is to publish outstanding works of research on strategy and warfare with a focus on Australia and the region. Books in the series take a broad approach to defence studies, examining war in its numerous forms, including military, strategic, political and historic aspects. The series focus is principally on the hard power elements of military studies, in particular the use or threatened use of armed force in international affairs. This includes the history of military operations across the spectrum of conflict, Asia’s strategic transformation and strategic policy options for Australia and the region. Books in the series consist of either edited or single-author works that are academically rigorous and accessible to both academics and the interested general reader.

Independent Ally Australia in an Age of Power Transition Shannon Tow

MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING An imprint of Melbourne University Publishing Limited Level 1, 715 Swanston St, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia [email protected] www.mup.com.au

First published 2017 Text © Shannon Tow 2017 Design and typography © Melbourne University Publishing Limited, 2017

This book is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 and subsequent amendments, no part may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means or process whatsoever without the prior written permission of the publishers. Every attempt has been made to locate the copyright holders for material quoted in this book. Any person or organisation that may have been overlooked or misattributed may contact the publisher. Text design by Phil Campbell Cover design by Phil Campbell Typeset by J&M Typesetting Printed in Australia by OPUS Group

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Creator: Tow, Shannon R., author. Title: Independent Ally: Australia in an age of power transition / Shannon R Tow.

ISBN: 9780522869668 (hardback) ISBN: 9780522869651 (paperback) ISBN: 9780522869675 (ebook)

Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index. Subjects: Australia—Foreign relations—21st century. Australia—Politics and government—21st century.

For my family

Contents Acknowledgements PART 1: Conceptual Framework 1 Introduction 2 Junior Allies and Power Shift in the International System PART 2: Australian Engagement with a Rising United States, 1908–51 3 Deakin and a Rising United States 4 Lyons and the Trade Diversion Policy 5 Menzies, Spender and the New Pacific Power PART 3: Australian Engagement with a Rising China, 1971–2007 6 Whitlam and the Diplomatic Recognition of China 7 Hawke’s Response to Tiananmen Square 8 Howard and Growing Chinese Strategic Power PART 4: Reflections and Comparisons 9 Australia, an Independent Ally Epilogue Bibliography Index

Acknowledgements This book has come to fruition only because of the assistance and support of many people along the way. The initial iteration was developed as a doctoral thesis at the Australian National University (ANU) and I am deeply grateful to my supervisors, Pauline Kerr, Jacinta O’Hagan and Hugh White, for assisting me to develop the project. All three pushed me to ask difficult questions, while at the same time providing guidance and encouragement. Special thanks are also due to Robert Ayson and Chris Reus-Smit, who suggested that I focus on the nexus between history and international relations. They encouraged me to embrace the incongruity between theory and the ‘real world’, rather than be thwarted by it. I would also like to acknowledge those individuals and institutions that were so important in the development of the book. The book would never have come about without the support of Melbourne University Publishing. In particular, I would like to thank series editors Brendan Taylor and Peter Dean for their enthusiasm for the project and support for publishing a work on Australian diplomatic history. I am grateful to Catherine McInnis for shepherding the manuscript through the publication process and to Meryl Potter for her copyediting assistance. The manuscript also benefited from the incisive comments of several academic colleagues at various stages. I particularly wish to thank Robert Sutter, Geoffrey Wiseman, Ian Hall, William Tow, Russell Parkin and Michael Lankowski. Various institutions have also provided invaluable assistance at critical junctures throughout the project. In particular, I would like to thank the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, for providing me with a visiting fellowship during the final stages of the drafting process. I am also grateful to Andrew Sargeant and Karen Johnson from the National Library of Australia, who helped me to navigate and make the most of the vast archival records of that institution. Additionally, I would like to thank the National Archives of Australia, the US National Archives and Records Administration, the Bob Hawke Prime Ministerial Library, the Australian Parliamentary Library, the Whitlam Institute and the US Library of Congress for the assistance provided. A special note of thanks to my interviewees who so generously gave of their time and agreed to have their accounts published. Meeting and speaking with these individuals was an immense privilege and I hope that this book does justice to their accounts. There is much to be learned from their experiences. On a personal note, no project can be completed without the support of friends and family. Raelyn Campbell provided me with a home during multiple research trips to Washington DC. I am also grateful for the support and encouragement of David Envall, Megan O’Donnell, Emily-Claire Saly, Yvette Pollack, Michael Shoebridge and Alexander See. I am particularly indebted to my partner, Grant Baldwin, who cheerfully endured the many nights and weekends spent at the National Library. I am truly fortunate to have a partner who is not only extremely supportive but who is never afraid to challenge my

thinking and made the book much stronger as a result. Finally, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my family—my grandparents, Harry and Shirley Tow, and my parents, William and Leslie Tow. They instilled in me an understanding of the importance of education and have been a never-ending source of encouragement. The older I get, the more I realise how much they sacrificed so that I could have opportunities. With thanks, I dedicate this book to them.

Part 1 The Conceptual Framework

CHAPTER 1 Introduction

In October 2003, United States President George W Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao addressed two joint sittings of the Australian Parliament on successive days. This was an honour that the Australian Government had not previously extended to any leader other than a US president and demonstrated the growing status of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or hereafter China) in Australian foreign affairs.1 To then Australian Prime Minister John Howard, this event epitomised the success of Australia’s ‘foreign policy in building close relations with Asia while further deepening our already close relationship with the United States’.2 Commentators heralded it as signifying a new phase in Australian strategic policy, in which Australia was able to successfully build close ties with its traditional ally, the United States, and with China as the new rising power of Asia. The Howard Government effectively rebuilt the Sino-Australian relationship, following strained ties in 1996 after its public criticism of China for firing missiles near Taiwan and its political support for the United States’ deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups in response. The Howard Government’s subsequent success in forging a close Sino-Australian relationship while simultaneously deepening the American alliance is frequently portrayed as one of that Government’s greatest policy achievements.3 What was surprising was the acclaim this achievement drew from academics and public commentators when, in fact, it was merely representative of a longstanding trend in Australia’s strategic policy. Since Federation in 1901, Australian policymakers have often sought to develop a close relationship with a rising power while maintaining an alliance with a globally dominant power. They have done so despite the rivalry that usually existed between these powers. During the first part of the twentieth century, Australia forged a cooperative relationship with a strategically ascendant United States while maintaining its imperial relationship with Great Britain. It did so notwithstanding Anglo-American competition for influence in the Pacific and occasional British dissatisfaction with Australian overtures toward the United States. Since 1971, Australian policymakers have similarly sought to develop a cooperative and enduring relationship with a rising China, while concurrently seeking to preserve, and even strengthen, Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States. They have done so despite oscillating Sino-American relations during the same period. Instances of engagement with a rising power, from within an alliance with a dominant global power, are not limited to Australia. In recent years, many US allies in the Asia–Pacific have been driven by political and economic imperatives to strengthen their relations with a rising China while also consolidating their defence cooperation with the United States. In

Northeast Asia, the Republic of Korea (ROK) announced a ‘strategic cooperative partnership’ with China in 2008, while also extending the US–ROK alliance beyond the defence of Korea to ‘contribute to peace and prosperity at the regional and global level’.4 There have been similar trends in Southeast Asia. Thailand has strengthened its security cooperation with China in various ways, including through joint maritime exercises and weapons sales, but it has not done so at the expense of its alliance with the United States.5 Despite strained US–Thailand relations following the 2014 military coup, both countries have maintained core alliance activities, such as the co-sponsored military exercise Cobra Gold, and have re-established interaction among senior officials.6 While not formal US allies, Indonesia and Singapore have also sought to cultivate positive-sum relationships with Beijing and Washington. US junior allies and partners in the Asia–Pacific have generally sought to engage with a rising China, not as a precursor to realignment, but while preserving or intensifying their relationships with the United States.7 These trends in Asia–Pacific countries’ foreign and defence policies are counterintuitive to longstanding theoretical assumptions in international relations. There is a dominant narrative in the international relations literature that a junior ally’s preoccupation with preserving the security benefits of an alliance with a dominant global power will exercise an overwhelming influence on its foreign and defence policies. Its efforts to preserve these benefits will compel it to lend political support to that power.8 This generally precludes it forging a cooperative relationship with a rising power, as the senior ally’s principal political and strategic contender for leadership.9 These assumptions are prominent in the international relations literature on power transition and alliances, which are the bodies of work that deal most centrally with power shift in the international system and are grounded in the realist school of thought of international relations. Both of these literatures have reaffirmed these assumptions, despite their fundamentally different portrayals of how change in the international distribution of power affects the international system.10 ‘Power transition’ occurs when a rising power acquires sufficient economic and military power and diplomatic support among other countries that there is a transfer of leadership in the international system between the dominant power and the rising power.11 This is usually a protracted process and involves a long-term shift in power relativities, or ‘power shift’, between the dominant power and rising power that usually precedes a full power transition.12 The tendency of both the power transition and alliance literatures to focus on the major powers as the key protagonists of such change, however, has largely precluded comprehensive exploration of how an alliance with a dominant global power impacts smaller countries’ relationships with a rising power. An exception is alliance theorist Glenn Snyder’s theory on alliance management, which sets out propositions on when an alliance will constrain a state from conciliating with an external power.13 However, these propositions are part of a general framework on intraalliance management and are not contextually specific to power shift. An absence of systematic exploration of how an alliance with a dominant global power influences a junior ally’s relations with a rising power has led to assumptions about this influence—principally,

that junior allies either align with a dominant global power or realign with a rising power— that have not yet been critically examined. These same assumptions pervade recent commentary on the rise of China. Scholars analysing the impact of China’s rise on the Asia–Pacific security landscape typically posit that regional countries may have to choose, in future, between accommodating China’s rising power and preserving a vibrant relationship with the United States.14 In one of the most prominent studies on how China’s rise will affect regional order in the Asia–Pacific, China analyst Robert Ross argues that a bipolar security landscape will re-emerge as mainland continental Asian countries accommodate China and maritime countries continue to align with the United States.15 David Kang, a specialist on the international relations of Asia, offers a counterpoint, arguing that East Asian countries will adhere to hierarchic cultural practices and will defer to China as the dominant power in East Asia. Kang cautions that this will introduce tensions in these countries’ alliances with the United States.16 Both depictions suggest a fundamental tension between cultivating positive relations with a rising China and maintaining a robust American alliance. That tension is also evident in some academic and public commentary about Australia’s strategic policy.17 Prominent Australian defence academic Hugh White has argued that the emergence of China as a strategic contender to the United States in Asia will present Australia with difficult choices. These could include choosing between China and the United States as an increasingly competitive Sino-American relationship emerges. White argues that the only way Australia can avert this choice is by encouraging the United States to enter into a regional power-sharing arrangement with China.18 Australian strategic studies expert Paul Dibb argues that, given the underlying weaknesses in Chinese military capabilities that will prevent it from emerging as a serious competitor to the United States for some time, it would be premature for Australia to abandon a strategy that neither accommodates nor balances Beijing.19 This book does not refute the argument that an adversarial Sino-American relationship would render Australia’s strategic circumstances more difficult. However, the Australian historical experience does raise an interesting question. If junior allies like Australia are generally compelled to choose between supporting a dominant global power or a rising power, why and how have they sought—and often so successfully managed—to deepen relations with both? This is an important question at a time when several countries in the region, including Australia, are recalibrating their foreign and defence policies in response to the shift in economic and strategic weight toward the Asia–Pacific. The argument that junior allies face an imminent choice between engaging with a rising power and maintaining a strong alliance with the dominant global power, if not critically examined, could lead to a false understanding of whether and when such a choice may be necessary. This has implications for both our understanding of how power shift occurs as well as significant policy implications. This book therefore adopts a fundamentally different departure point. Instead of forecasting when Australia may have to choose between its dominant global ally and a rising

power, it explores why, for more than a century, Australia has been able to engage with rising powers from within its alliances to dominant global powers. It does so by exploring the following three subsidiary questions. To what extent were Australian decisions to engage with a rising power dominated by the senior ally’s preferences and policies? How did the alliance influence Australian policymakers’ decisions to engage with a rising power? And how did Australian policymakers reconcile engagement with a rising power with maintaining their country’s reputation for alliance loyalty? Answers to these questions are critical to understanding the relationship between the political obligations of an alliance and foreign policy toward a rising power, which are central to debates about whether Australia and other junior allies need to choose between a rising power and dominant global ally. It is argued here that concurrent strong Australian ties with a dominant global ally and rising power have been possible because the relationship between alliance membership and engagement with a rising power has been more complex than generally assumed. This is for two reasons. First, in the Australian context, an alliance with the dominant global power and that power’s preferences have far from determined whether Australian policymakers decided to engage with a rising power. More significant were Australia’s independent interests toward rising powers. These interests were critically informed by whether Australian prime ministers believed rising powers could be conditioned over time to behave consistently with Australia’s strategic interests in regional order. This belief was premised on, but was not limited to, whether the rising power accepted the dominant global power’s regional presence and its alliance with Australia as a manifestation of that presence. This suggests that a junior ally can develop independent interests toward a rising power, which are consistent with its alliance but which are not necessarily determined by its senior ally’s preferences. This is not to say that senior ally preferences have not had any bearing. For Australian policymakers, reconciling Australian interests in a rising power with alliance membership has not demanded total conformity with the dominant global ally’s policies or preferences. Australian prime ministers were confident to engage with a rising power provided the dominant global ally could be persuaded, over time, to acquiesce to Australia’s policies. The senior ally did not have to endorse all of Australia’s initiatives toward the rising power, but could not strenuously object to them. Australian policymakers’ judgements about the relative likelihood of such acquiescence were based on what they perceived as shared understandings of alliance contribution, linked to their interpretations of alliance purpose. Provided the alliance was not directed against the rising power, Australian policymakers generally believed that they could persuade the senior ally to acquiesce to their engagement strategy and were not overly concerned about jeopardising alliance benefits. This lower threshold for maintaining a dominant global power’s support (rather than compliance with its preferences) has meant that Australian policymakers have been able to maintain strong relationships with both powers.

Implications of a New Approach

By examining this ostensibly counterintuitive Australian policy outcome, this book could contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how smaller countries in the international system—particularly junior allies of a dominant global power—respond to power shift. It does so by testing the assumptions in the international relations literature on power transition and alliances about how junior allies respond to power shift, rather than taking these assumptions as given. If a country like Australia does not behave in ways that align with these assumptions, this raises questions about their broader viability. This outcome is important because, while not causing a power shift, most scholars identify these countries’ political support for the rising power as critical to a power shift and to a subsequent power transition occurring.20 If, under some circumstances, junior allies like Australia can develop strong ties with a dominant global ally and rising power concurrently, they may have greater influence than previously supposed over how power shift occurs. They may be participants in shaping that process rather than dutifully supporting the two great powers who determine the trajectory themselves. From a policy perspective, this may lead decision-makers in Australia and elsewhere to view changing regional power dynamics differently from the way much of the current public commentary suggests. To contribute to a deeper understanding of how junior allies respond to power shift, this study adopts a different tack from power transition theory in three ways. First, it evaluates the influence of an alliance on a single junior ally’s relations with a rising power, rather than assuming the degree and nature of this influence. Second, it examines this influence by exploring policymakers’ decision-making. This approach enables us to trace whether and how Australia’s alliance with the dominant global power shaped the development of its policy toward a rising power. It does not negate the relevance of factors relating to international system constraints or changes in bureaucratic politics. It focuses, however, on individual decision-making as the proximate cause of engagement outcomes, through which other factors are manifest.21 And finally, this study examines the changing dynamics of a single junior ally’s engagement over time. Understanding what gave rise to these changing dynamics is important to understanding the relative influence of the alliance, compared with other factors, in shaping foreign policy toward a rising power. Throughout the twentieth century, Australian relations with rising powers included phases of engagement, disengagement and non-engagement. Engagement, briefly defined, is a strategy through which a country seeks to enhance its long-term cooperation with another country, whether through broadening cooperation across a range of areas or deepening cooperation on a single issue.22 Disengagement involves temporarily suspending or withdrawing cooperation in response to a specific conflict of interest or a dispute over the interpretation of, or adherence to, a mutually agreed obligation. It is directed at suspending relations to compel a better outcome, rather than abrogating the relationship.23 Both are distinguished from non-engagement, in which there is no intention to pursue a long-term cooperative relationship and little interaction takes place.24 This book does not seek to develop a generalised theory of engagement, explaining when countries are more or less likely to engage, disengage or not engage with a rising power. This

would involve assessing the relative influence of a wide range of factors that would detract from this study’s central focus on understanding how junior allies come to engage with a rising power from within an alliance with a dominant global power. This book is more concerned with tracing the relative influence of the alliance in shaping these various responses. The book also does not purport to claim that Australia’s example is applicable to all junior allies of a dominant global power. A common criticism of studies based on a single country is that their findings are not generalisable. This book focuses on Australia as an example of how a single junior ally can effectively engage with a rising power from within an alliance with a dominant global power over time. This warrants a thorough examination of historical detail from different time periods. Investigating several countries’ engagement strategies, in this fashion, would significantly extend the study and potentially weaken analysis. By focusing on a single country, this book serves as a pilot study. It draws conclusions from the Australian historical experience which can be tested against other cases and thus contribute to an understanding of how junior allies respond to power shift and any subsequent power transition.

Why Australia? Australia is one of the few countries that have been a junior ally of successive dominant global powers, while concurrently engaging with rising powers. Its history enables comparison and analysis of this strategic behaviour across different time periods and with different dominant global powers and rising powers. This book examines Australian engagement with rising powers, from within alliances with dominant global powers, across two major power shifts. Given the protracted nature of the power transition process, the term ‘power shift’ is employed more frequently throughout this study to describe specific intervals of change in the dominant power–rising power relations under review. The study focuses on Australian behaviour during these power shifts to assess how Australia was influenced by these changes in the international distribution of power. The first period is the Anglo-American power shift, regional manifestations of which became evident in the Asia–Pacific at the turn of the twentieth century and intensified during World War II. The growth of the US economy and US naval power as well as US colonial forays into the Asia–Pacific all signified the United States’ emergence as a challenger to British regional supremacy. Australian policymakers engaged with this rising Pacific power concurrent with maintaining their imperial connection to Great Britain. This trend in Australian strategic policy has been evident again since 1971. Australian policymakers have increasingly viewed China as an emerging political, economic and strategic power in the Asia–Pacific. The power relativities between China and the United States have narrowed over the past four decades and China emerged as a potential future economic and strategic contender to the United States in the Asia–Pacific not long after the end of the Cold War. Since 1971, successive Australian governments have sought to engage

with a rising China—even when China’s rise was more expected than apparent—while simultaneously preserving a strong US alliance. They have continued to do so despite the more competitive Sino-American relationship that has emerged in recent years, as China seeks to exercise influence commensurate with its economic and military power. There were, of course, important differences between these two periods of Australian strategic history, not least of which were different power relativities between the dominant global power and the rising challenger. The Anglo-American power shift culminated in a global power transition after World War II, whereas China remains only an economic and strategic contender to the United States in the Asia–Pacific. Nonetheless, there are sufficient similarities between the major power shifts identified to render them a good comparison of the problem-set underpinning this study. During both periods, the emerging great power relationships were ‘cooperative–competitive’ ones—they were neither entirely cooperative nor purely adversarial. There were elements of cooperation and rivalry across multiple dimensions of the relationships.25 In both instances, Australia also maintained an alliance with the dominant global power. An alliance is a promise between states, which gives rise to shared expectations of unilateral or mutual military support in conflict and political support during peacetime.26 During both the Anglo-American and Sino-American power shifts, Australian policymakers also sought to affirm Australia’s alliance loyalty by demonstrating political support for their ally, while concurrently pursuing independent interests with a rising power in the Asia-Pacific. Australia is also a valuable focus because its strategic behaviour should have closely mirrored the patterns that power transition and alliance theorists identify. This is because Australian policymakers have historically assigned a high importance to their alliances. Despite Australia moving toward greater defence self-reliance since the 1980s, the alliance with the United States is still deemed to be at ‘the core of Australia’s security and defence planning’.27 In line with power transition and alliance theories, one would expect the alliance to be the pre-eminent influence on Australian policymakers’ decision-making and for this to preclude close engagement with a rising power or, alternatively, to echo the dominant global ally’s engagement with that power. Yet the incongruity between such expectation and Australian strategic policy, in practice, demonstrates the need to revisit common assumptions about the relationship between alliance membership and engagement with rising powers. By exploring why Australia has been able to forge strong relationships with rising powers from within its alliances, this book also offers a new perspective on Australian foreign policy. Until now, most of the Australian foreign policy and strategic studies literature has focused on the impact of Australia’s alliances or ‘middle power’ status on its foreign and defence policies. The dominant thesis in this debate, most famously espoused by distinguished Australian academic Coral Bell, is that Australia is a ‘dependent ally’—it adopts policies that complement, if not conform, to those of its senior ally and has contributed to allied war efforts in order to secure that ally’s military assistance during a future time of need.28 Bell suggested that a more assertive Australian foreign policy emerged following the more nationalist Whitlam Government, but she is ambiguous on whether this signified a new trend

in Australian foreign policy.29 More recently Australian foreign policy scholars have linked an autonomous Australian foreign policy to ‘middle power diplomacy’ or multilateral coalition–building in multilateral forums.30 However, there has been limited research dedicated to whether and how Australian policymakers are pursuing an autonomous foreign policy in a bilateral setting.31 A key exception is Australian foreign policy scholar Richard Leaver, who notes that Australia has often diverged from its senior ally on economic and security issues, but does not explain how this came about and how Australian policymakers reconciled an autonomous foreign policy with alliance imperatives.32 By explaining how Australia was able to reconcile independent interests with alliance imperatives—even if limited to the specific context of engagement with rising powers—this book may narrow the gap between accounts of Australia as a dependent ally and independent middle power. This book portrays Australia as an independent ally.

Outline of the Book This book comprises four sections. Part 1 explores the conceptual puzzle underpinning this study. It identifies assumptions in the existing international relations literature about how junior allies respond to power shift in the international system and explores the challenges of applying these assumptions to understand junior allied engagement with rising powers. Glenn Snyder’s theory of alliance management provides the most useful starting point for explaining when junior allies are likely to engage with a rising power. It outlines deductive principles that could be applied to understand when a junior ally is more likely to engage with that power. However, the weakness of Snyder’s theory is that it does not fully explain when a junior ally is likely to privilege its interests in a rising power relative to contending alliance pressures. Chapter 2 develops a framework, setting out additional theoretical arguments that address this gap and against which to assess the diplomatic history that follows. Parts 2 and 3 present a history of Australian engagement with a rising America and with a rising China respectfully. Each of the chapters in parts 2 and 3 is a case study that focuses on a turning point in Australia’s relations with the rising power—a shift to either engagement or disengagement. It is during these shifts that the factors underpinning a decision to engage with a rising power, including an alliance, feature most prominently. Each of these shifts is assessed through the lens of an Australian Prime Minister’s thinking. In most instances, the Prime Minister was central to decision-making about Australia’s relations with both a rising power and a dominant global power. The prime ministers usually adopted these relationships as part of their portfolio because of the significance of these relationships to Australia’s national security. Using process-tracing methods and drawing on extensive archival and interview-based research, each chapter explores these prime ministers’ decision-making within a framework based on the following three questions.33 Was the decision to engage with a rising power overwhelmingly determined by the senior ally’s policies and preferences?

What was the relative influence of the alliance in shaping this decision? How did Australian policymakers reconcile any perceived tension between engagement with a rising power and maintaining their country’s reputation as a loyal ally? Part 2 explores these questions in relation to Australian engagement with a rising United States, from within the imperial relationship with Great Britain, between 1908 and 1951. From 1908, Australian governments looked to a rising United States, not as an alternative security guarantor, but as a supplement to the British Empire to which Australia remained loyal. This part analyses how Australia navigated this circumstance by examining three turning points in Australia’s relations with a rising America. Chapter 3 explores Prime Minister Alfred Deakin’s decision to invite the US naval fleet to visit Australia in 1908. Chapter 4 reviews an instance of disengagement: the 1936 Australian trade diversion policy, which imposed limited trade sanctions against the United States. It explores why Prime Minister Joseph Lyons acted against British preferences to introduce this policy and, surprisingly, how the British compelled him to terminate these sanctions in 1937. Chapter 5 examines Prime Minister Robert Menzies’ and Minister for External Affairs Percy Spender’s efforts to secure the 1951 Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty), despite initial British objections. Part 3 compares and explores Australian engagement with a rising China, while at the same time modernising its alliance with the United States between 1971 and 2007. Chapter 6 discusses Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam’s participation in the 1971 Australian Labor Party (ALP or Labor) delegation visit to China. This visit laid the foundation for the Whitlam Government’s diplomatic recognition of China in December 1972, and the strong political and economic relationship with China that has endured for forty years. Chapter 7 examines the Hawke Government’s disengagement strategy toward China following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Chapter 8 explores the first significant expansion of SinoAustralian relations, after Tiananmen, under Prime Minister John Howard. Between 1996 and 1998, Howard established a new framework to restore and rebuild the Sino-Australian relationship, paradoxically, during a period of more competitive Sino-American relations. These chapters demonstrate that the understandings Whitlam brokered with China and the United States in the early 1970s continued to underwrite later Australian governments’ approaches to reconciling the two relationships. The book concludes in part 4 by drawing comparisons between Australia’s response to the Anglo-American and Sino-American power shifts. From the preceding diplomatic history, it evaluates theoretical predictions and this study’s own theoretical arguments. It assesses the viability of this study’s arguments in understanding how, and under what circumstances, Australia has been able to engage with rising powers from within alliances with dominant global powers. It also postulates implications for our understanding of how change takes place, and the role of junior allies in shaping that change during power shift. A short epilogue describes Australia’s relations with China and the United States since the Howard Government and how this study’s conclusions help explain Australian policy in an ever-changing regional and global strategic balance.

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Hugh White, ‘The US, Taiwan and the PRC, Managing China’s Rise: Policy Options for Australia’, Melbourne Asia Policy Papers, 5, 2004, p. 4. Cited in Hamish McDonald, ‘China Supports our Role in Region’, Age, 18 October 2003, p. 1. Paul Kelly, Howard’s Decade (Double Bay, NSW: Longueville Media, 2006), p. 11; Hugh White, ‘Torn between the Panda and Uncle Sam’, Age, 23 March 2005, p. 15; Dennis Shanahan, ‘US Understands our China Dilemma’, Australian, 16 July 2005, p. 8. The White House, ‘Statement of ROK-US Summit’, 6 August 2008, accessed at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives/gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080806-6.html; Heeok Lee, ‘China’s Policy toward (South) Korea: Objectives of and Obstacles to the Strategic Partnership’, Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, 22(3), 2010, pp. 283– 301. Catherin Dalpino, ‘The US–Thailand Alliance: Continuity and Change in the 21st Century’, in Ashley Tellis, Abraham Denmark and Greg Chaffin (eds), Strategic Asia 2014–15: US Alliances and Partnerships (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014), p. 158. Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Managing the Strained US–Thailand Alliance’, Diplomat, 16 December 2015, accessed at http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/exclusive-managing-the-strained-us-thailand-alliance/. The term ‘junior ally’ is commonly used in international relations literature to denote a materially weaker power, either in a bilateral or multilateral alliance. The term is used in this book in this context. See, for instance, Stephen Dyson, ‘Alliances, Domestic Politics, and Leader Psychology: Why did Britain Stay out of Vietnam and Go into Iraq?’, Political Psychology, 28(6), 2007, pp. 647–66; Avery Goldstein, ‘The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging Choice’, China Quarterly, 168(December), 2001, pp. 835–64; James Curran, ‘The Dilemmas of Divergence: The Crisis in Australian–American Relations, 1972–75’, Diplomatic History, 38(2), 2014, pp. 377–408. For examples of this dominant narrative, see Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 30; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 30; Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tammen, ‘Regional Challenge: China’s Rise to Power’, in Jim Rolfe (ed.), The Asia–Pacific: A Region in Transition (Honolulu: The Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 47; George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 74. AFK Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958), pp. 352–4; Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 30–6; Jacek Kugler, Ronald Tammen and Brian Effird, ‘Integrating Theory and Policy: Global Implications of the War in Iraq’, International Studies Review, 6(4), 2004, pp. 164–5. On key differences between these literatures, see Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth, ‘Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War’, Security Studies, 9(3), 2000, pp. 60–107. Organski, World Politics, p. 339; Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 28–36. AFK Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 26. Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). David Shambaugh, ‘Asia in Transition: The Evolving Regional Order’, Current History, 105(690), 2006, pp. 153–9; Hugh White, ‘The Limits to Optimism: Australia and the Rise of China’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59(4), 2005, pp. 469–80; G John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China: Power, Institutions and the Western Order’, in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng (eds), China’s Ascent (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), p. 107. Robert Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies, 15(3), 2006, pp. 355–95. David Kang, ‘Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations’, in G John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (eds), International Relations Theory in the Asia–Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 174. See, for example, Robert Ayson, ‘Choosing Ahead of Time? Australia, New Zealand and the US–China Contest in Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 34(3), 2012, pp. 338–64; Rory Medcalf, ‘The Balancing Kangaroo: Australia and Chinese Power’, Issues and Studies, 50(3), 2014, pp. 103–135. Hugh White, ‘Power Shift: Australia’s Future Between Washington and Beijing’, Quarterly Essay, 39, 2010, pp. 55–9. Paul Dibb, ‘Knocking on Nobody’s Door’, Australian, 18 July 2011, accessed at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/knocking-on-nobodys-door/story-e6frgd0x-1226096366875. See, for example, Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 30–4; Kugler, Tammen and Efird, ‘Integrating Theory and Policy’, pp. 164–5. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Towards a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 99– 102.

22 23

24 25

26 27 28

29 30

31

32

33

This definition is based on international relations scholar Marc Lynch’s conceptualisation of engagement as an intentional and calculated strategy of cooperation. Marc Lynch, ‘Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement’, European Journal of International Relations, 8(2), 2002, p. 203. Victor Cha observes that an engaging state may adopt limited sanctions to compel behavioural change, but does not identify this as a distinct disengagement variant. Other scholars have referred to disengagement to describe withdrawal of cooperation or imposition of punitive sanctions, but have not further elaborated on this concept. Victor Cha, ‘Engaging North Korea Credibly’, Survival, 42(2), 2000, p. 147; Evan Resnick, ‘Defining Engagement’, Journal of International Affairs, 54(2), 2001, p. 564; Richard Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan, ‘Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies’, Survival, 42(2), 2000, p. 123. Lynch, ‘Why Engage?’, p. 203. This study draws on David Reynolds’s use of a similar construct as applied to Anglo-American relations during the late 1930s. David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937–41: A Study in Competitive Cooperation (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), pp. 2–3, 286–92. Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 6–8. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016), p. 121. See, for instance, Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 1–5, 199–203; TB Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Angus and Robertson, 1968), pp. 7–9; Bruce Grant, Fatal Attraction: Reflections on the Alliance with the United States (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2004), p. 89; Malcolm Fraser (with Cain Roberts), Dangerous Allies (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press), p. 4. Bell, Dependent Ally, pp. 178–9, 186, 193, 203. Bell noted that there are independent allies but, in 1984, argued that Australia still had not obtained this status. Bell, Dependent Ally, p. 4. Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1993), pp. 24–5; Andrew Carr, Winning the Peace: Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia–Pacific (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2015), pp. 258–63. An exception is Shannon R Tow, ‘Diplomacy in an Asymmetric Alliance: Reconciling Sino-Australian Relations with ANZUS, 1971–2007’, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific, 12(1), 2012, pp. 71–100. This work considers the use of specific Australian diplomatic tactics from within the ANZUS alliance but only in the case of Australia’s engagement with China between 1971 and 2007. Richard Leaver, ‘Patterns of Dependence in Post-War Australian Foreign Policy’, in Richard Leaver and Dave Cox (eds), Middling, Meddling, Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy (St Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1997), pp. 71–2. Process tracing is a social science method that involves tracing the causal processes that gave rise to particular outcomes. It usually involves examining the various factors that underpin key decision or policy-making processes. Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. 206.

CHAPTER 2 Junior Allies and Power Shift in the International System

The rise and fall of great powers in the international system has been a central focus of study in international relations. Most international relations scholars have focused on the dynamics of the relationship between the dominant hegemon and emerging challenger. After all, it is the great powers which, by virtue of their economic and military capabilities, are likely to have the most profound effect on the international system. They can determine whether power transition occurs peacefully or through war.1 Much less attention has been dedicated to how smaller states respond to power transition and the power shift implicit to that process. This is a significant oversight, given that power shift is a function of changes not just to the dominant global powers’ and rising powers’ material strength, but also to their authority in the international system. This authority is evident in their respective coalitions of supporting states. Smaller states provide the dominant or rising power with political support and, often, additional economic and military resources.2 In short, alliances matter. Until recently, however, coalitions have generally been conceived as axiomatic to the power shift process itself. The dominant narrative in the international relations literature is that, with changing power relativities among the great powers, smaller states choose between supporting the dominant power or the rising challenger.3 If a junior ally of a dominant power wants to preserve economic and security benefits it draws from that power, it needs to demonstrate allegiance by eschewing close ties with a rising power.4 Yet Australian diplomatic history demonstrates that this may not always be the case. The Australian example illustrates the need to review longstanding assumptions about how smaller states respond to power shift. The first part of this chapter explores the conceptual gap that has emerged in the international relations literature concerning junior allied engagement with rising powers. Glenn Snyder’s theory of alliance management is the only theoretical work that comprehensively examines when alliance membership will constrain a state’s relations with an external power.5 The second part of the chapter explores the merits and weaknesses of applying this theory to understanding Australian and, potentially more broadly, other junior allies’ engagement with rising powers. It builds on Snyder’s theory by setting out additional theoretical arguments that help resolve ambiguities in his theory when applied to this context. These arguments provide a framework through which to assess the Australian historical detail in the chapters to follow.

Junior Allies and Engagement with Rising Powers The difficulties in explaining why Australia has concurrently maintained strong relationships with both dominant and rising powers stem from a conceptual gap in the international relations literature. To the extent that the literature has focused on smaller states, it has generally focused on explaining the dynamics of asymmetric alliances or the engagement strategies of smaller states toward a rising power.6 There has been little systematic analysis of the mutual influence, if any, that these two separate relationships have on each other. This gap has led to diverging, and largely untested, assumptions about how junior allies respond to power shift. There are three bodies of international relations scholarship that centrally explore how junior allies respond to power shift in the international system: the power transition, alliance and engagement literatures. Both the power transition and alliance literatures are grounded largely in the realist tradition of international relations. They share several assumptions about the nature of the international system, and the primacy of economic and military power as a determinant of influence in the international system and its impact on smaller states.7 Common to both theoretical strands is an assumption that a dominant global power’s preferences will exert an overwhelming influence on its smaller allies’ foreign and defence policies.8 These scholars suggest that, provided the junior ally seeks to maintain its alliance with the dominant global power, it will not establish a close relationship with a rising power.9 Power transition theorists base these arguments on three core assumptions. First, they generally conceive of international politics in terms of a stark allied–adversarial divide between the dominant global power and the rising challenger. The dominant power is a ‘satisfied’ state that seeks to preserve the status quo, while the rising challenger is generally portrayed as a ‘dissatisfied’ state that wants to improve its position in the international hierarchy.10 Second, each of these powers presides over a coalition of states which, while not necessarily formal allies, provide support to these powers—in effect, they bandwagon.11 In this study, ‘bandwagoning’ refers to weaker states aligning with a dominant global power or, alternatively, a rising power by extending their military and political support to that power’s objectives. This weaker power strategy often involves supporting the great power’s policies on issues such as its interests relative to the other great power.12 Third, support to a dominant global or rising power is generally construed by power transition theorists in zero-sum terms. A weaker state cannot truly conciliate with a rising power, without jeopardising the trust and allegiance of the dominant global power.13 Power transition theorists suggest that a weaker state is therefore only likely to develop a relationship with the rising power—particularly if that power wants to challenge the status quo—if it too is dissatisfied with the international system. This dissatisfaction may stem from discontent with the economic and security benefits it derives, the prevailing rules and norms of the international system, or, alternatively, a shared ideology with the rising power.14 If a weaker state forges a closer relationship with a rising power, it does so with a view to realignment.15 An exception is if the weaker state is merely lending support to the dominant

global ally as that power forges its own rapprochement with the rising power.16 Alliance theorists portray junior allies’ support for a senior partner in similar terms. A core tenet underpinning alliance theory is that alliances exist to balance against a dominant power or external threat.17 As alliance theorist George Liska observes, alliances ‘are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something’.18 Despite some work that has emerged on why alliances endure without a threat, there is a dominant assumption that there is an inherent allied–adversarial divide in the international system.19 A related assumption also prevails that alliance cohesion requires countries to make zero-sum choices in professing their support. Alliance scholars generally agree that if an ally forges a close relationship with an adversary or even another external power, this could cast doubt on its loyalty and ultimately jeopardise the alliance relationship.20 This proposition linking alliance cohesion to zero-sum choices has impeded deeper exploration of how, when and why allies may conciliate with an external power. This is particularly the case for junior allies, where alliances are often portrayed as exercising an inordinate influence on their foreign and defence policies. Most alliance scholars agree that weaker states’ limited military capabilities cause them to place a premium on an alliance with a stronger power. This greater need for the alliance, coupled with their limited capacity to materially contribute to shared objectives, underscores their dependence on the alliance and mitigates their influence in that institution.21 Junior allies are therefore more likely to demonstrate their value by lending political support to their senior partner’s policies and preferences—they demonstrate similar behaviour to what power transition theorists identify. As political scientist James Morrow observes, ‘the minor power will make autonomy concessions to the major power in return for the security the major power can provide’.22 By this logic, a senior ally’s preferences will be the principal determinant of a junior ally’s approach toward an external power. In the context of an adversarial great power relationship, the junior ally’s objective to preserve its alliance with a dominant global power will inhibit it from engaging with the rising power. Some scholars have begun to challenge this dichotomous and hierarchical representation of the international system. International relations theorist John Ikenberry, for instance, argues that hierarchical political constraints are modified by democratic political values. He suggests that these values have provided US junior allies with considerable leeway to influence US policies and preferences since World War II.23 Communicative action theorist Thomas Risse-Kappen similarly argues that, in spite of the disparity in military capabilities between the US and its European allies, democratic values have prevented Washington from fully exerting its dominance in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).24 Both Ikenberry and Risse-Kappen suggest that democratic norms can offset the impact of material capabilities in determining intra-alliance influence. Traditional notions of international hierarchy have also been challenged by a growing literature on ‘hedging’. Hedging means that states concurrently forge relationships with multiple great powers, rather than siding with one power over another. Strategic studies academic Evelyn Goh explores this behaviour in a Southeast Asian context, observing that

several Southeast Asian countries have sought to balance their cooperative relationships with both China and the United States. In doing so, they have sought to preserve their autonomy by avoiding overdependence on a single great power.25 Goh concludes that the relationship and direction of influence between a dominant global power and smaller states in the international system is therefore more nuanced than is suggested by power transition and traditional alliance theorists.26 While mounting a credible challenge to traditional assumptions about hierarchy in the international system, these scholars do not fully explain how junior allies of a dominant global power reconcile their desire to deepen relations with a rising power with potentially competing imperatives of alliance loyalty. Ikenberry and Risse-Kappen identify one potential explanation, with their emphasis on democratic norms. Yet they suggest that these norms are privileged over and above other aspects of alliance identity, which could be just as significant in governing intra-alliance behaviour. Goh correctly observes that such liberal–institutionalist explanations do not fully acknowledge the role of power in hegemon–small state relationships.27 Yet while Goh and other hedging theorists suggest that alliances with a dominant global power can accommodate engagement with a rising power, they do not explain how decision-makers in countries that are junior allies reconcile engagement with alliance loyalty. Such an explanation is important, however, to understand how, when and why engagement occurs from within a bilateral alliance with a dominant global power. The literature on engagement further exposes this conceptual gap. In contrast to most power transition and alliance theorists, engagement scholars do not assume an inherent allied–adversarial divide in the international system. They point to relationships that extend concurrently to the dominant global power and the rising power. Empirical studies of the ROK and Japan, for instance, highlight how, despite those countries’ strategic dependence on the United States, their bilateral alliances with the United States have not precluded them from historically establishing separate relationships with a rising China.28 The engagement literature also cites a range of factors, unrelated to an alliance, which influence whether a country will be inclined to adopt an engagement strategy. In their study on regional countries’ engagement strategies toward China, China analysts Robert Ross and Alastair Iain Johnston observe that whether a country engages with a rising power (as opposed to other policy options, such as ‘balancing’ where countries increase their military capabilities or forge an alliance to counter that power) depends on whether it maintains a conflict of interest or identity with that power.29 When analysing whether a country is likely to engage with a rising power, most engagement scholars privilege factors inherent to that bilateral relationship.30 Yet the engagement literature does not stipulate how smaller states reconcile distinct interests in a rising power with strategic interests in maintaining an alliance with the dominant global power. A junior ally may have divergent preferences from the dominant global power over whether and how to engage with a rising power. In such cases, a junior ally’s dependence on its senior partner may engender a dilemma over whether to pursue these divergent engagement preferences or, instead, to cede to the senior ally’s position. To the extent that the engagement literature explicitly addresses this issue, it portrays junior allied

engagement with a rising power as a fraught process that sits uncomfortably with a more powerful ally.31 While the engagement literature does not assume that an alliance precludes junior allied engagement with a rising power, there is still insufficient rigorous analysis of how it may be affected by an alliance with the dominant global power. The interplay between the two relationships is not explored. This book addresses this conceptual gap, using Glenn Snyder’s theory alliance management as a starting point.

Snyder’s Theory of the Alliance Security Dilemma Glenn Snyder’s theory provides a useful analytical starting point for understanding junior allied engagement because it is the only one, to date, that explores the relationship between alliance management and a junior ally’s relations with an external power. His theory provides scope for a junior ally to develop autonomous interests toward an external power, while also outlining how, and when, a junior ally will be constrained by an alliance in pursing them.32 His theory was developed as a general and deductive model of alliance politics, but could also have application for understanding how, and under what circumstances, states are able to engage with rising powers from within an alliance. Snyder’s theory, like other alliance theories, is framed in terms of an allied-adversarial divide. However, this study will show that his theory can also be applied in a different context: where the rising power’s relationship to the dominant global power is cooperativecompetitive—that is, where the relationship contains elements of rivalry but is not adversarial.33 In contrast to other alliance theories, Snyder observes that allied states may seek to conciliate with an adversarial power.34 In Snyder’s theory, two allies may share common strategic objectives in the international system, but can differ over how these are translated into strategies toward an external power—in Snyder’s theory, toward an adversarial power or in this study, toward a rising power.35 Snyder argues that whether an allied state pursues separate interests toward an adversary depends on its policymakers’ perceptions of both relative intra-alliance bargaining power and the ‘alliance security dilemma’.36 These are nested concepts, both of which are predicated on policymakers’ perceptions rather than an objective distribution of material capabilities.37 Policymakers’ perceptions of intra-alliance bargaining power are informed by their relative risk tolerance on a given issue. If policymakers believe they have greater risk tolerance in a given situation than the ally, they are more likely to perceive themselves as maintaining comparatively greater intra-alliance bargaining power.38 They will, therefore, be more inclined to pursue their own interests, with fewer concerns about negative repercussions for the alliance. Snyder argues that perceptions of intra-alliance bargaining power in specific situations can both influence, and may be influenced by, perceptions of the alliance security dilemma.39 The alliance security dilemma reflects allies’ perceptions of their longer-term relative positions in the alliance.40 Snyder argues that allied policymakers’ perceptions of the alliance security dilemma are shaped by their fears of alliance abandonment and entrapment.

Abandonment fears stem from policymakers’ concerns that an ally will defect, will not fulfil its alliance commitment, or will deny its partner specific benefits. When policymakers fear abandonment, they usually respond by enhancing political or military support for the ally.41 These efforts to demonstrate support for the ally enhance a country’s security at the expense of its autonomy, potentially weakening the country’s intra-alliance bargaining power in specific situations.42 Snyder observes that abandonment fears also result in a country adopting a firmer posture toward an adversary, potentially increasing risks of entrapment.43 Fears of entrapment arise when policymakers are concerned they will be ‘dragged by one’s commitment into a war’ over an ally’s interests that they do not share.44 An example he provides is when policymakers are pressured by an ally to coordinate policies toward an adversary, which policymakers deem unnecessarily provocative.45 Snyder observes that dominant entrapment fears usually impel policy-makers to restrain their ally by signalling their state’s weakened commitment to the alliance. Conciliating with an adversary is a potential avenue for communicating this intent.46 By signalling its weakened commitment, however, the junior ally could cast doubt on its reputation for alliance loyalty and increase the risk of abandonment.47 It is the tension in addressing these two fears—where mitigating one fear inversely increases the risk of another—that led Snyder to term the relative balance between them alliance security dilemma.48 The alliance security dilemma and perceived intra-alliance bargaining power are contingent not on the distribution of military capabilities but on policymakers’ risk tolerance defined by their perceptions of relative dependence, commitment and interest.49 Snyder argues that a country’s relative dependence is defined by its threat perceptions, its capacity to meet that threat, the extent to which the ally can fulfil that need and other alternatives to the ally being available.50 The more policymakers perceive their country as asymmetrically dependent on an alliance and the weaker they view the ally’s commitment, the more likely they will fear abandonment and perceive themselves as maintaining low intra-alliance bargaining power.51 If they also assign a low value to the interest over which they are bargaining, this will further undercut their intra-alliance bargaining power.52 Snyder argues that the country will be more inclined to cede to the ally on the issue over which they are negotiating, which could include a divergent approach to the adversary, and to support the ally to preserve its reputation for alliance loyalty. The country is also likely to refrain from conciliating with the adversary to dispel any doubt about its reputation for alliance loyalty.53 Conversely, the less policymakers view their country as asymmetrically dependent on an alliance and the stronger they perceive their ally’s commitment to be, the more likely they are to fear entrapment.54 Such perceptions may also translate into greater intra-alliance bargaining power in an issue-specific context, particularly if the country assigns a high value to the interest over which it is negotiating. Snyder elevates interest, even above dependency and commitment, as a determinant of bargaining power. He observes: ‘An ally that is more dependent and more committed than its partner might nevertheless have superior bargaining power if it can convince the partner that it places a greater value on whatever they are negotiating about’.55 Under these circumstances, even a country that is asymmetrically

dependent on its ally may be more inclined to pursue or bargain harder for its interests. These could include conciliating with an adversary.56 In doing so, however, the country could also increase the risk of abandonment by casting doubt on its alliance loyalty.57 Through these propositions, Snyder has developed a theory that could have potential modified application to understanding how and when junior allies of dominant global powers engage with rising powers. His theory overcomes the limitations of other bodies of literature in two respects. First, he notes that even states that are asymmetrically dependent on an alliance, with relatively weaker military capabilities, can develop autonomous interests toward an external power. Second, his theory stipulates when an allied state is more or less likely to be constrained by an alliance in pursuing these interests or forging a cooperative relationship with that external power. Snyder’s theory therefore accommodates and could go some way to explain a junior ally’s engagement and disengagement responses toward a rising power from within an alliance with a dominant global power.

Snyder’s Theory and Engagement with Rising Powers Snyder’s theory has both strengths and weaknesses in helping us to understand why junior allies may come to engage with rising powers from within their alliances. He argues that what he terms the ‘alliance political halo’ is central to the challenges associated with conciliating with an adversary (or, for the purposes of this study, a rising power that may be a competitor but is not an adversary), while also maintaining the trust of an alliance partner.58 The alliance political halo is defined as expectations of political support that fall short of a military commitment enshrined in a treaty, but which, nonetheless, are essential to validate an alliance.59 To what extent can a junior ally conciliate with a rising power without impinging on this alliance political halo and undermining the alliance? Snyder usefully identifies some circumstances where junior allies may be able to conciliate with an external power, but the question remains whether he sufficiently defines these circumstances so that his theory has application in the context of junior allied engagement with rising powers during power shift. Strengths of Snyder’s Theory Snyder does identify situations in which a junior ally could more effectively conciliate with an external power from within an alliance; these are the strengths of his theory that could apply in an engagement context. First, Snyder observes that it is easier to conciliate with an adversary while also maintaining one’s reputation for alliance loyalty during periods of low tension between one’s ally and the adversary. He observes that ‘in non-crisis periods, contacts across alliances are quite compatible with alliance solidarity’.60 This is particularly the case when there is a competitive, but non-conflictual, relationship between the ally and the adversary (although Snyder is silent on how allies still navigate the competitive aspects of these relationships).61 Second, through his concept of intra-alliance bargaining power, Snyder suggests that

even a materially weaker state or junior ally may conciliate with an adversary if it values this interest highly enough. This highly valued interest could offset bargaining disadvantages stemming from a junior ally’s perceptions of its asymmetric dependence on the alliance and the ally’s relatively weak commitment. This could result in perceptions of relatively greater intra-alliance bargaining power, leading junior allied policymakers to bargain harder for, or even to pursue their interests in, conciliating with an adversary despite divergence from a senior ally’s preferences.62 There is a strong correlation between these propositions and the Australian historical experience with rising powers. In line with Snyder’s theory, Australian engagement with a rising United States and a rising China occurred in the context of non-conflictual great power relationships. In fact, Australian engagement occurred in the context of cooperativecompetitive great power relationships. Great Britain and the United States had essentially ruled out the prospect of conflict between them by the turn of the twentieth century, despite continuing rivalry in the Pacific.63 Australian engagement with a rising China was also preceded by a Sino-American rapprochement, with the Nixon administration signalling détente toward the communist regime. Yet while these cooperative–competitive great power relationships may have facilitated Australian engagement, they do not account for variation in Australian engagement with a rising China and rising United States over time. Shifts in Australian engagement more closely correlated with Australian policymakers’ willingness to assume greater risk in the alliance because of highly valued interests in a rising power. In contrast to the postwar Chifley Government, which favoured a multilateral approach to international affairs, the Menzies Government assigned a high value to procuring a US security guarantee in 1951 from within Australia’s imperial alliance with Great Britain. This was because of the impending communist threat to Asia. Significantly, however, Australian policymakers also disengaged from a rising power when they assigned a high value to their interests in doing so. During the early 1930s, the Lyons Government wanted to avoid defaulting on its London debts and so adopted a trade diversion policy toward the United States, despite British dissatisfaction.64 These instances suggest that the value Australian policymakers assigned to their interest in the rising power and, consequently, their perceived intra-alliance bargaining power, could be an important factor in understanding when Australia was likely to engage with a rising power from within an alliance. Weaknesses of Snyder’s Theory While the correlation between perceived intra-alliance bargaining power and Australian engagement outcomes points to a strength of Snyder’s theory when applied to junior allied engagement, it also highlights the ambiguities of his theory in this context. First, Snyder elevates interests as a critical determinant of intra-alliance bargaining power and corresponding policies toward an external power, but this only further underscores the need to explore how these interests are formed. This includes the role, if any, that the alliance plays in shaping these interests and whether they come to favour an engagement or disengagement outcome. While Snyder assumes these interests are autonomously derived,

the heavy emphasis in the power transition and alliance literatures on the alliance as a determinant of these interests suggests a need to address whether and how these interests are shaped by the alliance. Second, the correlation between highly valued interests and corresponding Australian engagement strategies also suggests a need to explore the factors that give rise to a highly valued interest toward a rising power from within its alliance. When applied to junior allied engagement, Snyder’s framework of intra-alliance bargaining power is tautological. It suggests that a highly valued interest will automatically give rise to a corresponding engagement (or disengagement) strategy. Conversely, if a junior ally assigns a low value to an interest in a rising power, it will be constrained from pursuing its desired strategy. To escape this tautology and better understand the relationship between engagement and alliance membership, this study will stipulate when a junior ally is more likely to assign a high value to its interest in a rising power from within an alliance with a dominant global power. Exploring the factors that influence how junior allies assign value to their interests is important to understanding when they will pursue their autonomous interests in the rising power or, alternatively, will be constrained by alliance dependence. Snyder’s theory is therefore useful to the extent that it provides general deductive principles that could be applied to understand when a junior ally is more likely to engage with a rising power. The question is whether the relationship he identifies between an alliance and a junior ally’s foreign policy toward an external power is sufficient, given conceptual ambiguities around how a junior ally’s interests develop and the value a junior ally assigns to them. It is argued here that additional theoretical propositions need to be developed to supplement Snyder’s theory to address these gaps. The next section develops a theoretical framework to guide the exploration of Australian diplomatic history in a way that will assist to further refine these propositions in chapter 9.

Explaining Junior Allied Engagement Central to both Snyder’s theory and the research question driving this study is the concept of ‘interest’. Does a junior ally develop autonomous interests toward a rising power and how does it come to pursue these interests from within an alliance with a dominant global power? The theoretical framework set out in this chapter initially defines the relationship between interests and engagement outcomes. It then unpacks the concept of ‘interest’ to explore to what extent a junior ally’s interests are derivative of its senior partner’s preferences and, second, how an alliance might ‘shape’ or otherwise influence the development of a junior ally’s interest toward a rising power. Third, it more fully explores the circumstances under which an alliance may ‘constrain’ how such interests are translated into corresponding engagement or disengagement strategies. Such explanation is critical to developing an evidence-based and more precise understanding of the relationship between junior allied engagement and alliance membership than has existed to date.

Interests and Strategies Toward Rising Powers Understanding how junior allies come to engage with a rising power involves elucidating the policy process underpinning this outcome—specifically the relationship between interests and strategies—and how an alliance affects this process. In his theory, Snyder depicts a linear policy process in allied states. He suggests that allied states independently develop their interests which, in turn, are mediated by alliance considerations to result in a particular strategy.65 The distinction between interests and strategies is important to understanding whether, and at what stage of the policy process, alliance membership meaningfully impacts on engagement. Snyder defines interests as either ‘general’ goals relating to some overall condition of the international system or ‘particular’ objectives in relation to specific countries or assets.66 However, while a country may have a particular interest in an external power (in this case, a rising power), this may not equate to a corresponding strategy. Various external factors, including an alliance, could affect whether, and how, this interest is transformed into an actionable policy. In reality, the policy process may not be so neatly demarcated, with decision-makers often refining their interests in response to anticipated and actual external constraints. Nevertheless, at least theoretically distinguishing between interests and strategies is important in illuminating how an alliance influences engagement outcomes and at what stage of the policy process. Does an alliance shape how junior allies define their interests or does it simply affect the value attached to these interests and constrain whether, and how, preferences are translated into strategies? Equally important to understanding whether, and how, an alliance influences junior allied engagement is a clear definition of the strategies or outcomes that this study seeks to explain (see table 2.1). In defining these outcomes, it is important to distinguish between an engagement-based approach and an engagement strategy. An engagement-based approach presumes policymakers’ deliberate intent to broaden or deepen their country’s long-term relationship with another country.67 Within this approach, there are two variant strategies: engagement and disengagement. An engagement strategy is generally associated with an interest in deepening cooperation with a country. It entails the use of positive material or diplomatic incentives to provide that country with a stake in the evolving relationship.68 It also involves dialogue to identify common interests, define shared expectations for the relationship and develop ways of managing difference.69 Table 2.1: Engagement, disengagement and non-engagement

In contrast, a disengagement strategy is usually associated with an interest in temporarily suspending or retracting cooperation with a country in response to a conflict of interest. It involves withdrawing positive incentives, or imposing punitive sanctions, to compel change in that country’s stance on a given issue.70 Significantly, disengagement is directed at suspending a relationship, rather than abrogating it entirely, and policymakers usually implement measures to limit any negative outcomes from influencing other aspects of the relationship.71 This strategy is therefore still a subset of an engagement-based approach. Despite diminished cooperation in the short term, it is still directed at intentionally strengthening cooperation over the longer term. This contrasts to a non-engagement based approach, which is not informed by a conscious intent to deepen or broaden cooperation over time and could lead to a range of outcomes. These could range from everyday interaction to a containment strategy in which one country seeks to balance against and even stymie the other’s growth.72 But how do the interests underpinning these strategies come about, and to what extent and in what ways does an alliance shape these? Snyder’s general deductive model, when applied to junior allied engagement with rising powers, suggests that a junior ally’s interests in a rising power and the value it assigns to these are a critical determinant of its perceived intra-alliance bargaining power and, consequently, whether it translates engagement preferences into strategies.73 In an engagement context, however, this deductive model is less helpful in explaining how such interests come about in the first place. What is the scope for junior allies to develop autonomous interests toward rising powers from within an alliance? Does the alliance merely affect how junior allies’ interests are translated into strategies or

does it more fundamentally shape the evolution of these interests and whether they favour engagement or disengagement? The Alliance as a Shaping Influence This book argues that junior allies are able to concurrently develop strong ties with both a dominant global power and rising power, because an alliance has a more limited influence on how junior allies develop their interests toward rising powers than power transition and alliance theorists suggest. Reconsidering how alliance membership shapes the development of junior allies’ interests toward rising powers is important, given vastly diverging assumptions in the international relations literature about the nature and extent of this influence. These discrepancies have emerged, in part, because key influences on how junior allies conceive of their interests toward rising powers have for too long been assumed rather than rigorously examined. Both rationalists and constructivists highlight the importance of exploring how countries’ interests come about in order to better understand their international relations. They argue that interests and interest formation should be the subject of analysis, rather than assumed as having a fixed content and being shaped only by external forces in the international system.74 Constructivists argue that countries’ interests derive from constituted identities, which are shaped by both material factors and intersubjective understandings and norms. States’ interests are predicated on the unique material and social context in which they evolve.75 Yet even rationalists have advocated a deeper exploration of how state interests develop in order to better understand causal influences. This includes psychological factors or specific ideas or ideologies.76 Rational choice theory, which informed Snyder’s work, generally assumes exogenously given preferences and choice options.77 Yet as political scientists Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein argue, the most important determinant of strategic decisions is not the process of choosing among options, but the prior definition and construction of the problem.78 This study does not privilege either constructivist or rationalist approaches. It does, however, draw on a growing consensus in the literature that countries’ interests and, indeed, the very process of interest formation need to be assessed to more accurately understand their foreign and defence policies. This extends to the influence of an alliance in shaping junior allies’ interests toward rising powers. Snyder’s framework of intra-alliance bargaining power suggests that junior allied policymakers develop and conceive of at least some of their interests independently of the alliance. However, Snyder’s interpretation of how interests are formed needs to be critically examined to determine the applicability of this framework in an engagement context. The very contestability of this interpretation is underscored by power transition and alliance theorists’ depiction of junior allies’ responses as predominantly reflecting their support for the senior ally and their overriding preoccupation with preserving the security benefits the alliance bestows.79 Developing autonomous interests toward a rising power, and the degree to which the alliance impacts on that process cannot be assumed. The alliance could, in fact, have a more nuanced influence than either over-determining a junior ally’s interests or,

alternatively, having no influence at all on how these interests come about. Snyder’s framework is also predicated on assumptions about the way in which an alliance influences how interests evolve. He observes that an alliance will modify a junior ally’s preformed interests through intra-alliance bargaining scenarios. But an alliance could also shape the development of these interests in more subtle ways. Both rationalists and constructivists have explored how countries’ membership of institutions affects how they view and define particular situations and, in turn, determine appropriate courses of action. Rationalists explore this argument in the context of regimes. Regimes are forums in which countries share information, more clearly communicate their intentions and agree on norms to govern their behaviour. These forums play an important role in defining how states understand situations and, consequently, determine and pursue their interests.80 Constructivists, meanwhile, illuminate the role of shared identities in shaping how states conceive of their interests and define legitimate foreign policy actions as a way of enacting these identities. For example, in his analysis of Middle Eastern politics during the mid-twentieth century, constructivist theorist Michael Barnett explores how a common Arab identity led leaders to conceive of their interests in terms of supporting the formation of the Collective Arab Security Pact in April 1950.81 Both rationalist and constructivist examples demonstrate how social collectives, such as alliances, exert a profound shaping influence on how interests are defined—not just a constraining influence after they are formed. Interests are not simply the product of a conscious choice in relation to a senior ally’s preferences. They can also develop from shared understandings within an alliance that define junior ally policymakers’ reference points. A cursory look at the Australian historical record suggests that Australia’s alliances may have shaped engagement strategies toward rising powers in this more limited and subtle way. Historians James Curran and Stuart Ward highlight the important role that Australia’s traditional allies have historically played in the country’s political and social consciousness.82 In this context, Australian policymakers’ interests and strategies toward a rising power did not stem from the dominant global ally imposing its interests: Australian policymakers independently developed their interests in a rising power. However, this book argues that such interests were based, in part, on whether Australian policymakers viewed the rising power as behaving consistently with Australia’s strategic interests in regional order— strategic interests which themselves had elements in common with the ally’s core objectives related to regional power projection. Most important to the evolution of an engagementbased approach were Australian perceptions that the rising power in question would respect the dominant global power’s regional presence and the integrity of Australia’s alliance with that country. Although not as prohibitive as power transition theorists suggest, the alliance did therefore shape how Australian policymakers developed their interests and preferences toward rising powers. Yet even if a junior ally’s interests reflect some of its dominant global ally’s core objectives in regional order, they may not necessarily echo that ally’s policies or preferences toward the rising power. How then does the junior ally reconcile these independent interests

in a rising power with the senior ally’s preferences and the political obligations of alliance membership? This is particularly important in the context of the alliance political halo, which Snyder depicts as a modifier of these interests. This underscores the importance of examining the alliance’s impact on junior allies’ interests toward rising powers, not just as a shaping influence, but also as a potential constraint. The Alliance as a Constraint In exploring the alliance as a constraint on a junior ally’s engagement strategy toward a rising power, this book looks at how, and under what circumstances, Australia’s perceived alliance political obligations (including its ally’s preferences) affected how it translated its interests in the rising power into strategies. Using Australia as an example, it examines junior allied engagement from the perspective of alliance management. In doing so, it reopens the academic argument that a junior ally has to sacrifice its autonomy and comply with a senior ally’s preferences in order to preserve alliance security benefits. This book argues that, in fact, junior allies are able to develop concurrent relationships with a dominant global power and rising power because alliances are more complex institutions than power transition theorists and most alliance theorists portray. In the Australian case, maintaining a dominant global power’s support has been contingent not on compliance but on actively eliciting that power’s support over time for a potentially divergent policy or strategy. In advancing this argument, this book further builds on Snyder’s framework to more fully understand when the alliance serves as a constraint on a junior ally’s interests toward a rising power. Snyder suggests that it is not just the substance of a junior ally’s interests that matters in shaping its foreign policy strategy toward an external power, but also the value it assigns to this interest in an intra-alliance context. Snyder argues that asymmetrically dependent junior allies are more likely to fear abandonment and will therefore be reluctant to pursue interests toward an external power that diverge from its senior ally’s preferences.83 A key exception is if a junior ally assigns a high value to a particular interest, in which case it could be more inclined to bargain harder for this interest.84 The question remains, however, when is a junior ally is more inclined to assign a high value to its interests toward a rising power in an intra-alliance context? When will it bargain harder for these interests and when will it be constrained by its asymmetric dependence? Identifying the factors that influence whether a junior ally assigns a high value to its interest in a rising power is critical to determining whether and when it will engage with that power from within an alliance. Identifying such factors is particularly important for understanding risk-averse junior ally behaviour. In privileging interests as a determinant of strategy, Snyder potentially represents the calculations of only risk-acceptant allies. James Morrow defines a risk-acceptant ally as one that is willing to pursue its security goals at the expense of the alliance and any political capital it may have previously accrued.85 This contrasts to risk-averse allies, which value their security more than their autonomy.86 A risk-averse junior ally is one that seeks to realise its autonomous interests without jeopardising the alliance and its associated benefits. The latter is an apt description for most US allies in the Asia–Pacific, including Australia.

Since Federation, Australia has generally been what Morrow would term a risk-averse ally. This is because Australian policy-makers have assigned a high value to alliance security benefits. The 2016 Defence White Paper observes that Australia’s ‘security is underpinned by the ANZUS Treaty, United States extended deterrence and access to advanced United States technology and information’.87 There are several historical examples of Australian policymakers also modifying their stance on a particular issue to preserve alliance security benefits. In the early 1970s, for example, the Whitlam Government adjusted Labor’s preelection commitment to enhance public transparency around the Australian-American joint facilities and to withdraw from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation.88 Snyder and other more traditional alliance theorists equate preserving alliance security benefits with demonstrating alliance loyalty by complying with a senior ally’s preferences. Yet not all of a junior ally’s autonomous acts or conflicts of interest will cast doubt on alliance loyalty or prompt a senior ally to check its junior partner. Alliance relationships, like human relationships, are more complex. Allies are likely to have a range of differing interests and to attach differing values to those interests. Despite his mostly zero-sum interpretation of the allied–adversarial divide in the international system, Liska remarks that an ally can conciliate with a potential adversary to the extent that it remains ‘within the limits of the allies’ essential loyalty to each other’s vital interests’.89 Indeed, there are several examples throughout history in which allies have disagreed over particular policy initiatives without the underlying fabric of the alliance unravelling.90 Based on the Australian historical experience, this book argues that junior allied policymakers may be more inclined to highly value and pursue their interest in the rising power if they believe the senior ally could be persuaded to acquiesce to their corresponding strategy. Acquiescence does not mean the senior ally has to have identical preferences or even that it has to actively endorse its junior partner’s engagement strategy. Quite simply, the senior ally cannot strenuously object to this strategy. Acquiescence mitigates the risk that the senior ally will abandon the alliance or will withdraw important alliance security benefits— whether formally or through a demonstrated weaker commitment. Given a low likelihood that divergence from a senior ally’s preferences will result in negative consequences, the junior ally will be more inclined to assign a high value to, and pursue its interests in, the rising power. Perceptions of a senior ally’s acquiescence, and the low likelihood of a negative allied response, can offset the weight that junior ally policymakers assign to dependence and commitment as factors that might otherwise constrain their response. If junior ally policymakers believe the senior ally will acquiesce in their engagement preferences, they are more likely to conclude that they wield substantive intra-alliance bargaining power. The senior ally’s preferences will therefore bear less influence on whether and how the junior ally translates its engagement preferences into an ensuing strategy. The concept of a weaker power drawing on a stronger power’s acquiescence to augment its bargaining power, while novel in an alliance context, is grounded in the broader international relations literature. In diplomatic studies, there is a growing consensus that weaker states sometimes exercise greater influence than the distribution of material power

suggests by effectively using diplomatic tactics to persuade or elicit cooperation from a senior counterpart.91 These tactics may include drawing on aspects of a stronger power’s position to support its demands, enlisting specialised knowledge to support its position or coopting third parties to persuade the senior counterpart.92 Communicative action theorists also explore the role of argument and persuasion in generating influence and leading to outcomes that cannot be explained by the distribution of material power alone. Thomas Risse-Kappen has explored how allied democratic countries externalise internal political norms to resolve disputes through consultation, compromise and joint decision-making.93 These bodies of work highlight how junior allies often resort to persuasion and strive to reach a compromise with a more powerful country, rather than limiting themselves to compliance. The following chapters systematically explore the role of Australian policymakers’ perceptions of allied acquiescence in mediating between the dominant global ally’s preferences and Australia’s corresponding engagement strategy. They also examine when these perceptions were more likely to emerge. Determining what factors engender perceptions of acquiescence is also important to understanding how, and under what circumstances, an alliance constrains a junior ally’s engagement strategies. A few of these factors have been already identified, such as intra-alliance democratic norms of consultation. But these are not exhaustive and were not the most applicable to the Australian experience. For example, during the first half of the twentieth century, there were several instances in which Australian policymakers feared they would be outsmarted by their democratic British counterparts, whom they perceived as working at odds with their own strategic objectives in developing a closer relationship with the United States.94 While democratic norms of compromise and consultation may therefore exist, they are not the only norms or shared understandings that matter. The Australian experience certainly demonstrates that norms and shared understandings are important and can play a role in defining what allies consider acceptable and unacceptable behaviour and thus what actions will garner allied acquiescence. Norms exercise this influence in two ways. First, they have a constitutive function in that they help to define the parameters of legitimate behaviour and, consequently, the realm of available policy options.95 Second, norms and shared understandings also have a regulative function. Allies can refer to these understandings to justify a particular course of action and, in so doing, counter a negative response from their partner. This is analogous to Risse-Kappen’s depiction of norms as ‘collective understandings of appropriate behaviour, which can be invoked by participants in a discourse to justify their argument’.96 In the Australian context, the norms that mattered were not related to a shared democratic identity but were instead based on what Australian policymakers perceived as shared understandings of alliance contribution. Such understandings were historically contingent and subject to constant negotiation as the Australian policymakers and dominant global ally’s policymakers debated the overall purpose of the alliance and Australia’s role in contributing to these objectives. These understandings played an important role in defining a range of acceptable foreign and defence policy initiatives toward the rising power to which the senior

ally would likely acquiesce. They also had an important regulative role—a shared basis from which Australian policymakers could approach the dominant global ally to justify a potentially divergent approach toward a rising power. As long as Australian policymakers believed their engagement preferences aligned with, or could be justified in terms of, shared understandings, they were more likely to believe that the dominant global ally would acquiesce. Consequently, they assigned a high value to their interest in the rising power. In helping to define the engagement outcomes with which a senior ally is likely to acquiesce, shared understandings of alliance contribution were an important mediator of the value Australia assigned to its interests toward a rising power. Based on the Australian case, these understandings, coupled with ensuing perceptions of allied acquiescence, serve as an important interface between a junior ally’s alliance obligations and its willingness to pursue autonomous interests toward a rising power. Because allied acquiescence does not equate to conformity with a senior ally’s preferences, a junior ally’s interests may more prominently shape the dynamics of engagement with a rising power than is generally represented. Under these circumstances, even a dependent junior ally may conduct relatively independent relations with a rising power. This helps to explain why Australia pursued a relatively independent strategic policy toward rising powers far earlier than Coral Bell and other Australian foreign policy scholars have generally represented.

The Case Studies The rest of the book will more fully explore how, historically, Australian policymakers have come to engage with rising powers from within an alliance, when most of the alliance literature suggests they should have made a choice. This involves more deeply exploring how alliances influence Australian policymakers’ decision-making toward rising powers, both as a shaping influence and as a constraint. Parts 2 and 3 investigate instances of Australian engagement and disengagement to determine whether there is any correlation between these strategies and Australian policymakers’ perceptions of the dominant global ally’s preferences or other alliance-related factors. Part 2 explores the influence of the imperial connection on Australian policymakers’ decisions to engage or disengage with a rising United States between 1908 and 1951. Part 3 examines the changing dynamics of Australian engagement with a rising China, from within ANZUS, between 1971 and 2008. Each chapter will explore whether the decision to engage or disengage was determined by the senior ally’s policies and preferences; the role of the alliance relative to other factors in shaping this decision; and how Australian policymakers reconciled this strategy with alliance obligations. By exploring the decision-making that gave rise to Australian engagement and disengagement with rising powers across different historical periods, the rest of this book will more fully explore the arguments advanced in this chapter and will subsequently draw conclusions about how and when Australia has been able to engage with a rising power from within an alliance. These conclusions will need to be tested in case studies of other countries to determine their wider viability, but could provide a basis for a more empirically grounded

and coherent theoretical framework that illuminates how and when junior allies of a dominant global power come to engage with rising powers.

Notes 1 2

3

4

5 6

7

8 9

10 11 12

13 14 15

Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 15, 29–35; AFK Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 23, 28. Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 33–4; Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, p. 60; G John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China: Power, Institutions and the Western Order’, in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng (eds), China’s Ascent (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), pp. 102–5; Woosang Kim, ‘Alliance Transitions and Great Power War’, American Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 1991, pp. 834–5. See, for example, AFK Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958), p. 354; Jacek Kugler, Ronald Tammen and Brian Efird, ‘Integrating Theory and Policy: Global Implications of the War in Iraq’, International Studies Review, 6(4), 2004, p. 165; Jack Levy, ‘Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China’, in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng (eds), China’s Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 13; David Rapkin and William Thompson, ‘Power Transition, Challenge, and the (Re)Emergence of China’, International Interactions, 29(4), 2003, p. 318. Organski, World Politics, pp. 352–4, 368; Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 30–6; Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tammen, ‘Regional Challenge: China’s Rise to Power’, in J Rolfe (ed.), The Asia–Pacific: A Region in Transition (Honolulu: The Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003), p. 47. Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). See, for example, seminal works such as Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Robert O Keohane, ‘The Big Influence of Small Allies’, Foreign Policy, 2(Spring), 1971, pp. 161–82; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (eds), Engaging China (London: Routledge, 1999); Reinhard Drifte, ‘US Impact on Japanese–Chinese Security Relations’, Security Dialogue, 31(4), 2000, pp. 449–61. On similarities between the literatures on power transition and the balance of power, see Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth, ‘Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War’, Security Studies, 9(3), 2000, pp. 60–107. Organski, World Politics, p. 354; Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 30; George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 74. Organski, World Politics, pp. 352–4; Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 30–6; Kugler and Tammen, ‘Regional Challenge’, p. 47; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 32. Organski, World Politics, pp. 370–1; Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 29–36. Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, p. 60; Kim, ‘Alliance Transitions and Great Power War’, pp. 834–5. The definition of ‘bandwagoning’ is contested in the international relations literature. Neorealist theorist Kenneth Waltz refers to bandwagoning in the context of aligning with a power with superior resources. Alliance theorists Stephen Walt and Eric Labs define it as, aligning with the most threatening state in the international system. This study more loosely refers to ‘bandwagoning’ in the context of aligning with either a dominant power or a rising power (both of whom have superior resources relative to weaker states or junior allies). This broader application is more consistent with the ideas conveyed in the power transition literature of coalitions of small states gathering around the great powers to which they defer and support its interests relative to any external challenger. A country can bandwagon with a great power and, through this alignment, with the great power’s policies toward the external challenger. Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Publishing, 1979), chapter 6; Stephen M Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 18–19, 22; Eric Labs, ‘Do Weak States Bandwagon?’, Security Studies, 1(3), 1992, pp. 388, 398, 411. On alignment, see Robert Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies, 15(3), 2006, p. 368. See, for example, Organski, World Politics, pp. 350–4; Kugler and Tammen, ‘Regional Challenge’, p. 47. Organski, World Politics, p. 368; Gilpin, War and Change, p. 34; G John Ikenberry and Charles A Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, International Organization, 44(3), 1990, pp. 291–2. This assumption is implicit in the accounts of Gilpin, Organski, Kugler and Tammen. Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 32–

16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28

29

30

31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

4; Organski, World Politics, pp. 364–8; Kugler and Tammen, ‘Regional Challenge’, p. 47. Charles Kupchan identifies several peaceful power transitions. Under these circumstances, it is not inconceivable that, in bandwagoning with a dominant global power, junior allies might also conciliate with a rising power. Charles Kupchan, et al., Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001). Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 127; Stephen M Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, Survival, 39(1), 1997, pp. 156–8. Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 12. For work on alliance endurance without a threat, see Celeste A Wallender, ‘Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War’, International Organization, 54(4), 2000, pp. 705–35. Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 147; Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 32. Labs, ‘Do Weak States Bandwagon?’, pp. 383–416; Stephen M Walt, ‘Alliances in a Unipolar World’, World Politics, 61(1), 2009, pp. 90, 98. James D Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances’, American Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 1991, p. 914. Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China’, pp. 100–1. Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO’, in Peter J Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 369–71. Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analysing Regional Security Strategies’, International Security, 32(3), 2007–08, p. 140. Goh, ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order’, pp. 122–3. Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 33. Victor Cha, ‘Engaging China: Seoul–Beijing Détente and Korean Security’, Survival, 41(1), 1999, pp. 73–98; Michael Green, ‘Managing Chinese Power: The View from Japan’, in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (eds), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 152–75. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, ‘Conclusion’, in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (eds), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 284–5. On balancing, see Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 18. Alice Ba, ‘Who’s Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations’, The Pacific Review, 19(2), 2006, pp. 163–8; David Edelstein, ‘Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers’, Security Studies, 12(1), 2002, p. 13. Drifte, ‘US Impact’, pp. 454–8; David Shambaugh, ‘Asia in Transition: The Evolving Regional Order’, Current History, 105(690), 2006, p. 154. Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 196–8, 332–7. This book applies Snyder’s theory in a different context as the two dyadic relationships examined – Great Britain and a rising United States in the early twentieth century and, later, the United States and a rising China – were not adversarial relationships but cooperative-competitive ones. Australian policymakers also perceived these relationships as cooperative-competitive. ibid., p. 195. ibid., p. 165–6. ibid., pp. 166, 180. ibid., pp. 176, 180. ibid., pp. 175. ibid., p. 180. ibid. ibid., pp. 181–4. ibid., p. 184. ibid., p. 194. ibid., p. 181. ibid., pp. 181, 183. ibid., p. 195. ibid. ibid., p. 181.

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67 68 69 70

71 72 73 74

75 76

77 78 79 80 81 82

ibid., pp. 166, 176. ibid., p. 167. ibid., p. 188. ibid., p. 171. ibid., p. 195. ibid., p. 181. ibid., p. 171. ibid. ibid., p. 195. ibid., pp. 195–6, 356–7; Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 12; Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 29. Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 356–7. ibid., p. 197. ibid., pp. 336–7. ibid., p. 171. Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914 (New York: Atheneum, 1968), pp. 95–6, 233. Bernard Attard, ‘Financial Diplomacy’, in Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (eds), Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation to the Second World War (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000), p. 126. Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 24–8, 170. ibid., p. 26. Marc Lynch, ‘Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement’, European Journal of International Relations, 8(2), 2002, p. 203. Richard Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan, ‘Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies’, Survival, 42(2), 2000, p. 117. Thomas Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, 54(1), 2000, p. 13; Lynch, ‘Why Engage?’, pp. 194, 204. As discussed in chapter 1, several international scholars have referred to disengagement but have not elaborated on this concept or explored it as a variant of a broader engagement–based approach. See, for instance, Victor Cha, ‘Engaging North Korea Credibly’, Survival, 42(2), 2000, p. 147; Haass and O’Sullivan, ‘Terms of Engagement’, p. 123. Former US diplomats Richard Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan argue that these measures are part of a successful engagement strategy, but do not link it to disengagement: Haass and Sullivan, ‘Terms of Engagement’, p. 125. Lynch, ‘Why Engage?’, p. 203; Randall Schweller, ‘Managing the Rise of Great Powers’, in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (eds), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 10. Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 171. James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, ‘Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 63–4; Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, 46(2), 1992, pp. 396–403. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’, pp. 403–07; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 5–6. Arthur Stein, ‘The Limits of Strategic Choice: Constrained Rationality and Incomplete Explanation’, in David Lake and Robert Powell (eds), Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 205; Judith Goldstein and Robert O Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, ‘Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies’, World Politics, 41(2), 1989, p. 150. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, ‘Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter’, World Politics, 41(2), 1989, p. 214. See, for example, Organski, World Politics, pp. 352–4; Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry’, p. 913. For a comprehensive explanation of regimes, see Stephen D Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Organization, 36(2), 1982, pp. 185–205. Michael Barnett, ‘Identity and Alliances in the Middle East’, in Peter J Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 414. James Curran, The Power of Speech (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2004), pp. 5–12, 113; Stuart

83 84 85 86 87 88

89 90 91

92 93 94 95

96

Ward, Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1991), p. 2. Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 181, 188–9. ibid., p. 171. James D Morrow, ‘On the Theoretical Basis of a Measure of National Risk Attitudes’, International Studies Quarterly, 31(4), 1987, p. 434. ibid. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016), p. 121. Manuscript on Australian Defence Policy, Tange Papers, National Library of Australia, MS 9847, Box 10; ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Secretary’s Meeting with Australian PM Gough Whitlam’, 31 July 1973, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Islands Affairs, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 31, RG59, National Archives and Records Administration. Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 153. Robert O Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, International Organisation, 23(2), 1969, p. 307 Frank Pfetsch and Alice Landau, ‘Symmetry and Asymmetry in International Negotiations’, International Negotiation, 5(1), 2000, p. 25; I William Zartman and Jeffrey Z Rubin, ‘Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation’, in I William Zartman and Jeffrey Z Rubin (eds), Power and Negotiation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 277–81. Zartman and Rubin, ‘Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation’, pp. 277–81. Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, pp. 35–7. Alan Watt, Australian Diplomat: Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972), p. 180. This argument draws on Michael Barnett’s observations about how pan-Arabism ideology in the 1940s shaped what Middle Eastern countries viewed as socially acceptable security policies. Barnett, ‘Identity and Alliances in the Middle East’, pp. 400–47. Risse–Kappen, ‘Collective Identity in a Democratic Community’, p. 369.

Part 2 Australian Engagement with a Rising United States, 1908–1951

CHAPTER 3 Deakin and a Rising United States

Australia’s longstanding tradition of engagement with a rising power, from within an alliance with a dominant global power, dates back to the early twentieth century. Although Australia did not yet have charge of its own foreign affairs, it worked to establish a cooperative relationship with a rising United States. Over the next forty years, Australian prime ministers sought to cultivate a close relationship with the United States while maintaining a strong connection with the British Empire. They viewed the United States as a possible security guarantor in the Pacific that could supplement the waning strength of the British Empire.1 Yet a process that would take more than forty years, and culminate in the signing of the ANZUS Treaty, all began with an inauspicious letter in December 1907. On 24 December 1907 and 7 January 1908, Australian Prime Minister Alfred Deakin (1903–04, 1905–08 and 1909–10) wrote respectively to the US Consul-General in Melbourne and to the US Ambassador in London. He asked both to ensure a favourable reception to a forthcoming invitation for the US fleet to visit Australia during its 1908 world tour.2 He assured them that an official invitation would be sent from the British Foreign Office. However, the British Government had no knowledge of Deakin’s initiative. Indeed, it was not until almost three weeks later that Deakin informed Governor-General Lord Henry Northcote of his intentions about the fleet visit and asked the British Government to issue an invitation.3 Great Britain and the United States had forged a rapprochement by the early twentieth century as a result of concerns they shared about other European great powers, but the British Government still had misgivings about growing American influence in the Pacific.4 These included reservations about a US fleet visiting a British dominion’s shores. After all, the US fleet was second in size only to that of Great Britain and the aim of the tour was to demonstrate that the United States could enforce its strategic interests in the Pacific.5 British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Sir Winston Churchill thought the invitation ‘ought to be discouraged from every point of view’.6 Yet to refuse to issue an official invitation, after Deakin had already informed US officials it would be forthcoming, would adversely impact Anglo-American relations. Deakin had effectively tied British hands. The Foreign Office issued the invitation, which was accepted by the United States.7 The US fleet received a lavish reception during its Australian tour between 20 August and 17 September 1908. The atmosphere was electric, with nearly half a million people lining the streets in Sydney, festivities and jingoistic songs about Big Brother Jonathan’s visit to the ‘lonely kangaroos’.8 The fleet visit also served as a precursor to further Australian entreaties. Almost immediately following the fleet visit, the Australian Government invited

US President Theodore Roosevelt to visit Australia on his world tour. The White House declined the invitation, but Deakin persisted in encouraging deeper cooperation. During the US fleet’s second world tour in 1909, he wrote to British Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Crewe with what he termed a ‘proposition of the highest international importance’.9 Deakin advocated ‘an Agreement for extension of the Monroe Doctrine to all countries around the Pacific supported by the guarantees of the British Empire, Holland, France and China added to that of the United States’.10 The Monroe Doctrine, initially articulated by US President James Monroe in 1823, asserted US influence in the Western hemisphere and forewarned European powers against interfering in the politics of countries in the Americas. Deakin was essentially advocating a modified version of the Monroe Doctrine that geographically extended to the Pacific and that was underwritten by the United States, the British Empire and other friendly powers, to preserve the existing political and territorial status quo in the Pacific.11 While the Colonial Office politely rejected Deakin’s proposal for a geographic extension of the Monroe Doctrine, these forays all signified a concerted shift to Australian engagement with a rising United States. The Prime Minister was at the heart of this shift. Deakin believed that Australia’s external affairs (conceived mostly as its relations with Great Britain and the other dominions), could only be handled by the head of government.12 This is not to say that Deakin was not influenced by others. He was supported in his role as prime minister by then Secretary of the Department of External Affairs Atlee Hunt. Deakin’s views about the future strategic environment—so integral to the decision to invite the US fleet—were also shaped by Director of Australia’s Naval Forces Sir William Creswell, and by British journalist Richard Jebb. Yet, it was the Prime Minister’s decision alone to invite the US fleet to visit Australia in 1908. This chapter therefore focuses on Deakin’s thinking to best understand this turning point in Australian–American relations. His decision was all the more remarkable given that he did not believe Australia had the constitutional authority to engage in relations with countries outside the British Empire.13 How then did such a decided shift to engagement come about? Deakin’s decision to approach the United States seems counterintuitive to Australia’s status as a British dominion and to dominant theoretical assumptions about how junior allies respond to power shift in the international system. At a time when the United States was challenging the British Empire’s global and regional primacy, Australia, as a satisfied dominion, should have drawn closer to Great Britain to preserve the British-led international order. Yet, in contrast to the assumptions of power transition theory, he engaged with the United States, not as a precursor to realigning with that country, but from within Australia’s imperial alliance with Great Britain. Why did Deakin seek out the United States and how did he reconcile engagement with Australia’s continuing support for the British Empire? The Prime Minister’s interest in deepening cooperation with the United States was grounded in his ideas about how best to fortify the British Empire in the Pacific. Deakin was concerned by the threat of a possible German-Japanese alliance and looked to US naval power as the only acceptable supplement to British strength in the Pacific. An Anglo-

American entente would help to deter those powers. This vision was underpinned by Deakin’s belief that the United States was an essentially benign regional power and that, through such initiatives as the fleet visit, it could be persuaded to act in ways that supported, rather than undermined, the British Empire. Cooperation with the United States was not only consistent with, but also essential to, realising Australia’s distinct strategic interests in regional order, which included preserving the British Empire’s regional primacy. While Deakin and British officials both shared this interest, they had differing views about how it was best achieved. The US fleet visit was, in fact, a manifestation of deeper issues in the imperial relationship. An imperialist first and foremost, Deakin was acutely conscious of how London would respond to his initiative toward the United States. He believed that any Australian request would be held up in the Colonial Office, before finally being rejected.14 Yet he invited the US fleet to visit Australia, in part, to provoke Great Britain into redefining its relationships with its dominions into more mature partnerships. Deakin had become frustrated at what he perceived to be the British Government’s indifference to embarking upon any substantial reform in intra-imperial relations and to implementing greater intraimperial consultation, as had been agreed at the 1907 Colonial Conference. His actions in circumventing the Colonial Office and inviting the US fleet to visit Australia were directed at reinforcing to London the importance of intra-imperial consultation. By couching the invitation to the US fleet in these terms, and thus ultimately as a contribution to a stronger empire, Deakin hoped to mitigate any damage to Australia’s reputation for alliance loyalty. He believed he could secure the British Government’s reluctant acquiescence to the visit— not least because Great Britain’s own relationship with the United States was at stake—while at the same time compelling the British to engage in the reform he deemed so necessary to the future strength of the British Empire. Deakin was consequently able to reconcile his engagement initiative with building a stronger imperial alliance. To understand the context of Deakin’s decision-making, this chapter examines to what extent Deakin’s decision to engage with the United States aligned with British policies and preferences during the beginning of an Anglo-American power shift. It then traces how the imperial alliance influenced what became a distinctly Australian interest in deepening cooperation with the United States, evidenced by the US fleet visit. Finally, it explores how Deakin reconciled Australia’s emerging interests in the United States with its alliance political obligations. Far from just ‘looking to America’, Deakin was seeking innovative ways to build a regional order that protected Australian strategic interests of preserving the British Empire’s global and regional primacy.

Origins of the Anglo-American Power Shift By the early 1900s, at both global and regional levels, the Anglo-American power shift, had already commenced. For centuries, British global primacy had been founded upon Great Britain’s rapidly growing industrial economy, the supremacy of British naval power and its

vast colonial empire. Deakin was conscious that these traditional pillars of British power were eroding with the emergence of other economic and strategic competitors.15 While Britain retained its overall preeminence in the international system, the growth of the United States, Germany and Japan all signalled the beginning of Great Britain’s relative decline. Deakin’s ideas about international relations were grounded in social Darwinist thought, in which nations competed for survival and must either grow or perish, and he feared that the British Empire was heading into decline.16 By 1900, Britain was no longer the only highly industrialised country in the world. Over the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, Germany and the United States had also achieved impressive economic growth rates, and had become trading competitors to Great Britain.17 Deakin, the leader of the Australian Protectionist Party, was convinced that it was only through a system of imperial preference, and a corresponding increase in intra- imperial trade, that the British Empire could preserve its economic, and ultimately, its strategic primacy in the international system.18 Deakin also believed that the British Empire’s superior naval strength was essential to protect its international commerce and the empire’s future strategic primacy.19 The Royal Navy had long been the largest fleet in the world, but by the 1890s Germany, France, Russia, Japan and the United States were all constructing extensive naval forces. The United States became the world’s second largest naval power, adding twenty-eight major ships to its fleet between 1898 and 1907.20 By 1909, Britain, the United States, Germany and Japan had all laid down their first dreadnought battleships which, based on their firepower and speed, had rendered all earlier models of battleship obsolete. Their introduction led to escalating AngloGerman rivalry in dreadnought construction. Director of Australia’s Naval Forces Sir William Creswell recognised that international naval rivalry was challenging Britain’s ability to maintain its traditional maritime predominance. In a 1907 memorandum for Deakin, Creswell observed that, while Great Britain still retained its traditional superiority over any two powers, ‘the margin of superiority over any two powers would be much reduced, perhaps disappear, if a European and an Extra-European combined against Great Britain’.21 This relative decline in British naval power was particularly evident in the Pacific. The British Admiralty had adopted the view that concentration of British naval strength in European waters was the best long-term strategic disposition for protecting the empire. By 1908, almost 86 per cent of the Royal Navy was concentrated in or near home waters to meet the impending German naval threat.22 By signing the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance, the British had sought an expedient way to reduce its commitment to the Far East. Following Japan’s victory over Russian forces in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the British Committee of Imperial Defence deemed Japan capable of assuming an even larger role in maintaining the overall regional balance of power. The Admiralty subsequently withdrew its five battleships and most of its old cruisers from the Far East and combined its Indian, Chinese and Australian squadrons into one Eastern Group.23 Such developments resulted in Deakin becoming increasingly concerned that the British were forfeiting naval supremacy in the Pacific and that Australia’s distance from Britain would impose a heavy, if not impossible, naval burden on that power.24 His opinions are

likely to have been shaped by the 1905 report by Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Fanshawe, British Commander-in-Chief of the Australia Station, which observed that the British ‘have lost mastery of the Pacific (and with it all trade) and that the sea is free to an enemy’s expeditionary force on a large scale’.25 While Japan now dominated the northwest of the Pacific, the United States dominated the eastern littoral.26 Creswell reflected that ‘the time is fast approaching when the existence of Australia “will depend on the good will of America and the politeness of Japan”’.27 The power gap between Great Britain and the United States was narrowing in the Pacific. The US fleet tour demonstrated that the United States was a power to be reckoned with in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, and that it could ‘pass at will’ between these two oceans.28 The fleet tour was directed at sending a powerful diplomatic message of deterrence to Japan in response to US concerns that Japan might violate previously agreed understandings regarding territorial possessions in Asia. Unbeknownst to Deakin, it was also a surveillance mission in the event that Great Britain and the United States were brought into conflict as a result of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and escalating US–Japan tensions over racial segregation policies in San Francisco and Japanese activities in Manchuria.29 During the fleet visit to Australia, the US Navy produced several detailed reports about how Australia could be defeated, should it emerge as a hostile base during an Anglo-American conflict.30 Power transition theory would suggest that, as the United States emerged as a genuine contender for regional leadership, Australia should have bandwagoned with Great Britain to demonstrate its political support for the British-led order. Why then did Deakin—who was so assiduously working to strengthen the empire—extend an invitation to the US fleet to visit Australia and how did he propose to reconcile this with maintaining a strong imperial alliance?

The Influence of British Policies Australian apprehensions about the relative decline of British power at the turn of the century did not translate into what power transition theorists would label as dissatisfaction with Pax Britannica or a British-led regional order—in fact, quite the contrary. In part, this was because Australia was still constitutionally bound to the British Empire and did not have the relevant powers for its external affairs. More significant, however, was that the Australian people still culturally identified with Great Britain. Imperial sentiment was an important component of Australian nationalism.31 Deakin described himself as an ‘independent Australian Briton’.32 Deakin and most other Australians conceived of state, national and imperial loyalties as interdependent.33 Australia’s satisfaction with a British-led global and regional order was also grounded in the Deakin Government’s recognition that the country’s economic and strategic future was intertwined with the Empire. In 1908, the vast bulk of Australian trade still occurred within the empire.34 Australian policymakers and military advisers were also convinced that the Royal Navy was the only true guarantor of Australia’s defence in the event of a great power

conflict.35 Deakin recognised the broader strategic significance of the British Empire as a global balancer which ‘to us [represents] the best guarantee of … peace without which our social adaptations and readaptations cannot proceed’.36 It was because of the importance of the British Empire to Australia’s economy and security that Deakin dedicated himself to fortifying it at both the global and regional levels. Contrary to what power transition and some traditional alliance theorists would suggest, however, Deakin did not believe that demonstrating political support for Pax Britannica necessitated bandwagoning with Great Britain by deferring to its preferences. Deakin’s engagement strategy toward the United States was underpinned by more complex factors than simply echoing the emerging British global rapprochement with the United States. By the early 1900s, the Anglo-American relationship had become a genuinely cooperative–competitive one. The two great powers had largely ruled out a direct conflict between them (with the exception of a possible Japanese contingency where Britain could be dragged into a conflict through the Anglo-Japanese alliance).37 The British Admiralty assessed that, in the event of an Anglo-American war, Great Britain could not obtain victory without completely withdrawing its battle fleet from Europe—a prospect that was increasingly unlikely with the escalating Anglo-German naval rivalry.38 Great Britain subsequently set about negotiating and resolving outstanding points of contention with the United States. Of all its strategic competitors, Great Britain viewed the United States as the least threatening and the most important to assuage.39 At the same time, however, there were still elements of rivalry across multiple dimensions of the Anglo-American relationship. Both powers presented themselves as the chief moral force in the international system and championed competing democratic ideologies.40 This extended into a broader competition for prestige and influence, which was particularly evident in the Pacific. The United States embarked on its own imperialist endeavours with the annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines, and demanded the same status and recognition as the European powers.41 As Roosevelt wrote, ‘I wish to see the United States as the dominant power on the Pacific Ocean’.42 Still, the British were apprehensive about growing US influence in that ocean and the US fleet’s 1908 voyage through the Pacific brought this rivalry to the forefront. London feared the Americans were taking advantage of Great Britain’s need to concentrate the Royal Navy in the Atlantic to usurp British global and regional influence. The Foreign Office, in particular, was perturbed by the US fleet’s stopovers in Trinidad and other British colonies and dominions, including Australia.43 It was also anxious that the fleet’s tour might alienate its principal regional ally, Japan.44 As the commander of the US fleet, Admiral Charles Sperry, observed in his correspondence during the visit to Australia, the ‘general aspect of good will is undeniable, but I do not think the imperial English altogether enjoy it though they know it is for the common good’.45 Deakin was certainly aware of these British misgivings. While Foreign Office and Colonial Office officials never made their disquiet known, he surmised their general disapproval through letters received from journalists and political contacts in London. In one

letter to Deakin, journalist Leopold Maxse noted: ‘There is some anxiety here as to the growth of American influence in Australia, which will be stimulated by the visit of the American fleet—an event which I imagine is attributable to the weakening of British squadrons in more distant oceans’.46 Despite British misgivings, however, Deakin persisted in his engagement initiatives toward the United States both before, and after, the US fleet visit. Given Anglo-American rivalry at the regional level, it is therefore difficult to characterise Deakin’s shift to engagement with the United States as bandwagoning with Britain in response to the Anglo-American global rapprochement. Glenn Snyder’s framework of intra-alliance bargaining power offers a more helpful starting point than power transition theory, or much of the alliance theory, for understanding Deakin’s shift to engagement. Rather than simply bandwagoning with a senior ally and its preferences to demonstrate support or to balance against external threats, Snyder’s framework posits a more sophisticated relationship between alliance membership and a junior ally’s relations with an external power. It accommodates a greater role for a junior ally’s interests in shaping how it responds to the rising power. In line with Snyder’s framework, Deakin’s decision to invite the US fleet could have resulted from Australian perceptions of greater intra-alliance bargaining power in this issue-specific context. Based on the limited documentary evidence available, Snyder’s framework appears to best capture the core policy dilemma that Deakin confronted—principally, how to reconcile what he perceived as Australian interests and those of the greater British Empire with London’s differing interpretation. This conundrum was all the more challenging given Australia’s continuing economic and strategic dependence on Great Britain and the pressures this engendered to maintain a positive and constructive relationship with that country. In line with Snyder’s framework, these pressures were intensifying as Australia’s abandonment fears became more acute. By 1907, Prime Minister Deakin and Deakin’s military advisers had all come to regard Australia as more vulnerable than at any other time during the young country’s history.47 These fears were closely linked to the rise of Japan. Australian policymakers had long been concerned by what they perceived as the potential economic and social threat from Japanese migration to Australia. Such concerns resulted in the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, which sought to limit non-European immigration to Australia. It was only after Japan defeated Russian forces in 1905, however, that Deakin began to publicly refer to Japan as a potential strategic risk to Australia.48 Coupled with Britain’s withdrawal of its battleships and cruisers from the Far Eastern theatre, these developments led Deakin and Creswell to fear that Japan might opportunistically take advantage of the power vacuum left in the Pacific to defect from the Anglo-Japanese alliance and to pursue expansionist aims.49 Even if it did not choose to invade Australia, Deakin and Creswell feared that Japan could threaten Australia’s supply lines and coerce the country into abandoning its restrictive immigration policies.50 In this more dangerous environment, Australia looked to the Royal Navy as its first line of defence against any aggressor on the high seas.51 Australia had only weak defences. Local coastal ships that Australia had inherited from Great Britain were dilapidated, and there was

inadequate training to ensure they were effectively manned.52 In 1907 and 1908, Deakin sought to create an independent Australian naval force that could supplement the Royal Navy, but this small force was to be primarily directed at local naval defence and countering raids and attacks by enemy cruisers that evaded the British main fleet.53 As Deakin observed, ‘the security of Australia [was] based on the dominant position of the British navy’.54 Given Australia’s asymmetric dependence on Great Britain, Deakin viewed Britain’s strategic withdrawal from the region with trepidation. The British Committee of Imperial Defence continually reassured the Deakin Government that Britain was committed to Australian defence, but these assurances were undermined by the British Government’s unwillingness to provide a binding written agreement.55 Following the 1907 Colonial Conference, the British Admiralty refused to pledge to maintain particular vessels in Australian waters.56 Nor did London agree to a schedule of regular ship visits. Coupled with Britain’s withdrawal of battleships from the Far East, these events suggested a weaker British commitment to the Pacific and to its dominions in that ocean. Anglo-Australian discord over Britain’s weakening commitment to the Pacific was based, in part, on different assessments about how the region should be secured and its relative importance to the British Empire’s security. Deakin and Creswell were sceptical of entrusting Pacific security to Japan, whom they regarded as an unreliable ally that would take advantage of Britain’s absence in the Far East to disable the British Empire.57 Meanwhile, the British had confidence that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would restrain Japan and safeguard against Russian aggression in the Pacific.58 The British Admiralty maintained that the outcome of any great power conflict would be decided in the European theatre.59 Given escalating AngloGerman naval competition in the North Atlantic, it viewed Britain’s Pacific commitment as adequate and proportional to the risk of danger. Deakin’s perceptions of a relatively weak British commitment to the Pacific, as a result of this strategy, led to intense fears of abandonment. Snyder’s framework suggests that fears of abandonment ordinarily exert pressure to enhance political support for an ally. Despite these fears, however, Deakin acted against British preferences in inviting the US fleet to visit Australia. He pursued Australia’s interest in deepening cooperation with the United States with minimal concern about negative British recriminations. In practical terms, this resembles what Snyder terms greater intra-alliance bargaining power. But why was this so, given contending pressures associated with fears of abandonment and Deakin’s other efforts to cultivate a more steadfast British commitment? Had he just lost patience with waiting for the British to deliver? Assessing the intra-imperial dynamics underpinning Deakin’s decision —in terms of how they both shaped and constrained Australian interests in the United States —are critical to understanding how Deakin reconciled engagement with an ascendant America with maintaining a strong imperial alliance.

Australia’s Interest in a Rising United States Deakin’s invitation to the US fleet resulted from an emerging Australian interest in building a

long-term cooperative relationship with the United States. Grounded in diverging Australian and British perceptions about how best to shore up the empire in a more competitive international environment, Deakin started to develop a clearer notion of Australian strategic interests separate from those of the ‘mother country’. As Leader of the Opposition in 1910, he expressed his hope that Australian representatives would ‘not forget to impress upon their colleagues at the [Imperial] Conference that Australia, in spite of herself, is being forced into a foreign policy of her own because foreign interests and risks surround us on every side. A Pacific policy we must have’.60 In a more threatening regional environment, Deakin believed that cooperation with the United States—far from undermining the British Empire—was essential to realising Australia’s strategic interests in regional order which included preserving the future primacy of the British Empire. Australian Emerging Strategic Interests in Regional Order By 1908, Deakin had developed a clearer view of the type of regional order that would best give effect to emerging Australian strategic interests. Deakin certainly wanted to preserve the primacy of the British Empire in the Pacific. He repeatedly observed that the security of Australia rested upon maintening the supremacy of the British Navy.61 Great Britain was the only power that was committed to Australia’s defence in the event of regional conflict. However, Deakin’s growing scepticism about the prospects for retaining British naval supremacy in the Pacific, led him to think about other ways of preserving British regional supremacy and regional stability. These included imperial defence consolidation, whereby the dominions, including Australia, would develop independent naval capabilities to supplement the Royal Navy and mitigate its need for fleet dispersal.62 Until such time that the dominions could develop these capabilities, however, Deakin believed that the best way of preserving the British Empire’s regional primacy was to restore a stable balance of power in the Pacific. Indeed, it was the power imbalance between Japan and other great powers in the Pacific that caused Deakin to be apprehensive about Japanese expansionism.63 Only Japan maintained modern armoured ships in the Pacific.64 To restore the balance of power in the Pacific, Deakin considered the possibility of forming cooperative relationships with other ‘friendly’ Pacific countries, thus providing a valuable stopgap measure until the dominions could assume a larger defence role in the Pacific.65 A stable regional balance of power was important to realising Australia’s other strategic interests, including preventing hostile powers from intruding into Australia’s near approaches and protecting the Australian mainland. Australia had long, but unsuccessfully, advocated for its own Monroe Doctrine in the Southwest Pacific.66 At the 1883 Australasian Convention, representatives from the Australian colonies, New Zealand and Fiji met to discuss the federation of the Australasian colonies and the annexation of adjacent islands. The Australian declaration at the convention stated that, ‘further acquisition of dominion in the Pacific south of the equator by any foreign power would be highly detrimental to the safety and well-being of the British possessions in Austral-Asia and injurious to the interests of the Empire’.67 By 1907, Deakin and his Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Atlee Hunt, were

fearful that Germany, in particular, would seek to further expand its Pacific empire with the acquisition of the Netherlands East Indies and the rest of Samoa (including the US naval base at Pago Pago).68 This could adversely impact on Australian commerce and lines of communication to Great Britain, which were deemed critical to Australia’s future ‘business life’ and the continuation of the Australian nation.69 Based on these interests, the Deakin Government had a relatively clear vision of Australia’s preferred construct of regional order. Deakin and his advisers ultimately sought to preserve a regional order in which the British Empire maintained naval predominance. Until the dominions could develop their own naval forces to strengthen the empire, however, they hoped to restore a stable regional balance of power by orchestrating an entente between the British Empire and other friendly countries. This would help deter German and Japanese adversarial behaviour. Deakin’s belief that the United States was the best potential ally and that it could be persuaded to act in ways that supported Australia’s strategic interests were critical to Deakin’s decision to invite the US fleet to visit Australia in 1908. The United States as a Benign Regional Power While there were several ascendant great powers at the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was the only power that Deakin believed was unlikely to engage in conflict with the British Empire. Deakin viewed US foreign policy objectives as essentially complementary to Australia’s strategic interests and to those of the broader British Empire. His views were predicated on both emerging trends in US foreign policy and his belief that Washington could be persuaded to support these strategic interests through greater interaction with the British Empire over time.70 Deakin’s evolving perceptions of the United States were critical to defining an Australian engagement-based approach toward that country—as distinct from a more guarded approach toward other powers—and were based on four underlying assumptions. First, despite Anglo-American rivalry, Deakin did not believe that the United States would ever directly challenge the British Empire in the Pacific. Based on his social Darwinist ideas, he believed that racial similarities between the two countries made the United States less likely to use force against Great Britain to achieve its aims. Because the Americans were mostly of ‘diluted British stock’ and shared similar cultural and political traditions, Deakin considered the United States a more ‘natural’ and reliable ally than Japan.71 These considerations framed Deakin’s decision to invite the US fleet. In correspondence to Amery, Deakin wrote that the invitation: has nothing to do with our national development but everything to do with our racial sympathies … After all, the Americans, pace Canada, have least to gain of all the great powers by a quarrel with the Mother Country. The closer the alliance between us the better, for though I am fully alive to many objectionable features of their political life, after all they are nearest to us in blood and in social, religious and even

political developments.72 While race helped define Australia’s relationships with other countries, it did not determine these relationships, as illustrated by Deakin’s inclusion of China, but exclusion of Germany, as signatories to the proposed Agreement to extend the US Monroe Doctrine.73 Second, and more important was Deakin’s assessment that the United States’ ultimate aims were consistent with Australian strategic interests in regional order, particularly as they related to the British Empire’s future role in the Pacific. Whereas Deakin regarded Germany and Japan as harbouring expansionist ambitions that could undercut the British Empire and challenge Great Britain’s future presence in the Pacific, he believed that US aims aligned with the empire maintaining a preeminent global and regional role. Despite Roosevelt’s rhetoric about the United States becoming the dominant Pacific power, the US actually supported Anglo-Saxon unity in the international system.74 The US also backed many of the pre-existing institutions of the British-led international system and resorted to international arbitration, rather than force, to resolve disputes with Great Britain: the establishment of an Anglo-American settlement on fishing rights in Newfoundland in 1908 is one example. Deakin came to view the United States as a ‘great arbiter between the warring nations of the globe’.75 All of these trends suggested that the United States was unlikely to directly and fundamentally challenge the British Empire or Great Britain’s regional presence through conflict. Third, Deakin also believed that, while seeking to expand its influence, the United States recognised, and would continue to recognise, that Australia was a stalwart member of the British Empire. Deakin and Hunt received numerous letters from British and French journalists in 1908, speculating that the US fleet visit was aimed at cultivating favour with the Pacific dominions at Great Britain’s expense.76 Deakin refuted these claims. Shortly before the fleet visit, Deakin wrote to one journalist that ‘the “influences” of the undertaking … (though it sounds absurd) is of Australia upon America … There is no other influence they can bring to bear upon us which will not be equally due and thus shared with the Mother Country’.77 Hunt similarly responded to a French journalist, noting, ‘to say that we even dreamed of transferring our allegiance from our Mother-country to the United States is to make an assertion that would not be supported by one person in a thousand of the Australian people’.78 The Australians were conscious of British jealousies surrounding the fleet visit but looked at the visit as a way of regaining a long-lost ‘cousin’ of the Empire rather than as a precursor to fragmentation. Australia’s enduring alliance with Great Britain was not even a question, let alone up for discussion. Finally, the Australians had also become less concerned about US activities in the Southwest Pacific relative to the British Empire’s continuing dominance in that ocean. During the 1870s, the United States had become aware of the commercial and strategic possibilities of the Southwest Pacific and established a trans-Pacific shipping line. In 1899, the United States and Germany also partitioned Samoa. By the early 1900s, however, renewed isolationist pressures in Washington and a greater American focus on Japan

prevented the United States from pursuing its ambitions in that region.79 As the Melbourne Herald newspaper noted during the fleet visit: ‘There was a sentiment, somewhat strong a few years ago, that the growth of American power in the [Southwest] Pacific might be a challenge, if not a menace to our own flag. That sentiment has either died away or is rapidly becoming extinct’.80 Deakin’s perceptions of essentially benign US intentions were critical to his shift toward engagement with the United States. This is in contrast to Australia’s almost non-existent political relationship with Japan.81 The difference in approach related mostly to how Deakin perceived of the United States and Japan in relation to Australia’s emerging strategic interests in the region, including, but not limited to, the future global and regional primacy of the British Empire. While Deakin regarded cooperation with Japan as potentially injurious to these interests, he believed that the United States could be persuaded to act in ways that were complementary. Deakin did not think that US sympathies toward the British Empire could be naturally assumed, but he did think they could be actively cultivated. While historians usually portray Deakin as looking to the United States as a natural partner of the British Empire, his letters reveal his apprehensions that Washington might tacitly support Germany rather than the British Empire, particularly in the Southwest Pacific.82 Deakin believed strong anti-British political sentiments still existed in Washington, alongside the pro-British racial ones. By inviting the US fleet to visit Australia, Deakin hoped to induce the Americans to support imperial over German interests.83 In private correspondence to journalist Leopold Maxse, Deakin observed: ‘What the White House may realise yet … is that their reception here [is] … to help counteract German appeals to American sympathy … [Germany] is I hear much exasperated that out of the way Australia should have kindled so friendly a feeling towards the English flag’.84 Deakin hoped the fleet visit would, in turn, lay the foundation for a broader Anglo-American entente that would support Australian strategic interests by reestablishing the regional balance of power against a potentially hostile Germany and Japan. Through engagement, Deakin therefore hoped not just to lessen the risk that the United States would act adversely to Australian interests (such as relinquishing Samoa to Germany), but also to enlist growing US naval power in support of Australia’s strategic interests. The Deakin Government was impressed by the formidable naval fleet that the Americans had built in a relatively short time and was acutely conscious of US geographical advantages, relative to Great Britain, in wielding this power in the Pacific.85 While historians disagree over the nature of the US commitment that Deakin sought, his letters suggest that he was most likely seeking to bring about an Anglo-American entente in the Pacific.86 The entente was probably premised on raised expectations of mutual support, but without any formal promise to come to each other’s aid. As Deakin wrote to Maxse, his ‘hope is and was when sending it [the invitation to the US fleet] that it could be the means of bringing the two British and American peoples closer together and so prepare the way for a defensive alliance based upon our common interests’.87 By simply inviting the US fleet to Australia, he considered there was ‘an implied warning to Japan and Germany that, in the

Pacific, the Republic has to be considered for the future’.88 While conscious of British sensitivities, and even playing upon these to elicit a British naval display, Deakin believed the US fleet visit would overwhelmingly support rather than undermine the British Empire’s strategic position in the Pacific. Reaching a Shared Understanding with the United States For Deakin, the fleet’s Pacific tour signified an important opportunity to cultivate a deeper, more cooperative relationship with the United States. The time appeared opportune for Australia to capitalise on American pro-British racial sentiments as a result of converging Australian and US interests in the Pacific.89 Deakin was conscious of growing anti-Japanese sentiment within the United States. In October 1906, the San Francisco School Board passed an ordinance that segregated Japanese children in local schools, which the Japanese perceived as violating an 1894 treaty that gave Japanese immigrants to the United States the same rights as US citizens. While Roosevelt intervened to remove the ordinance, AmericanJapanese diplomatic tensions over this and Japanese efforts to establish a greater degree of control over Manchuria intensified over the next few years.90 Deakin correctly interpreted the transfer of the US Atlantic fleet to the Pacific as a response to these tensions.91 Behind the pageantry and festivities of the US fleet visit, Deakin gently pressed the commander of the US fleet, Admiral Sperry, on the changing regional security environment and prospects for deeper Anglo-American cooperation in the Pacific. Deakin raised Australian concerns, similar to those on the American west coast, that Japan would be in a strategic position to coerce Australia to remove legislative restrictions on Japanese immigration.92 He also raised concerns about the growing Japanese threat to Pacific security more broadly. As Sperry noted in a letter at the time, in ‘Australia and New Zealand, they have had a severe case of nerves over the possibility of being swallowed up by Japan’.93 By the end of the US fleet’s tour, both men seemed to have reached a shared understanding of the strategic problem in the Pacific. Sperry was just as concerned as Deakin about a possible Japanese threat and, in his correspondence, recurrently highlighted the critical importance of the US Navy in checking Japanese adventurism following Great Britain’s strategic withdrawal from the Pacific.94 Sperry broadly supported Deakin’s ideas about how the British Empire and the United States should respond to the changing Pacific strategic environment. While falling short of the Anglo-American entente that Deakin had hoped for, Sperry advocated forming a community of commercial interest.95 He argued that ‘every dollar spent in developing trade’ in the Pacific Islands on the route to Vancouver and San Francisco was ‘worth ten put into fortifications because the world would recognise the community of our commercial interests and would not dare affront us as long as we held together’.96 The community of commercial interest was more important than so-called ‘ties of blood’ and ‘would be a natural alliance far stronger than any written treaty of alliance—and less offensive’.97 He observed that Deakin appeared receptive to these ideas.98 Sperry never spoke of an Anglo-American alliance in the Pacific, but did publicly state that ‘there is an unbroken chain of common interest’ and that

‘common interests require common protection’.99 Significantly, this union of common interests was between the United States and the British Empire as a whole—not just Australia. Sperry was conscious of the British ‘jealousies’ that the fleet visit provoked and reflected upon the community of commercial interest in terms of the importance that ‘we, Great Britain and ourselves’ attach to developing Pacific territories to ‘consolidate our material interests’.100 Such statements suggested US recognition of Australia as an indivisible part of the British Empire. Deakin sought to reaffirm this understanding, declaring that Australia ‘welcomed the fleet not simply as a meeting between Americans and Australians but as Australians representing the whole people of the Empire, and a fleet representing the people of the United States’.101 While Deakin wanted to engage with the US, he was doing so on the basis that Australia’s allegiance with the British Empire was not in question. Deakin’s interest in deepening cooperation with the United States was therefore still shaped by the imperial connection, even though it did not reflect British preferences. It was premised on the belief that Washington could be conditioned to support Australia’s strategic interests in regional order. These included, though were not limited to, support for a continuing leadership role for the British Empire in the Pacific and interaction with Australia as an indivisible part of the British Empire. Deakin’s conversations with Sperry and the shared understanding they reached only reaffirmed Deakin’s views that the United States could be conditioned to support the British Empire in the Pacific. Without this belief, it is unlikely that Deakin would have engaged the United States, evident by the tenuous links between Australia and Japan. The imperial alliance therefore critically shaped Deakin’s interest in deepening cooperation with the United States, but in a more nuanced way than bandwagoning with British preferences. This is not to say Deakin acted without regard to these preferences. In line with the problem-set Snyder identifies in his framework of intra-alliance bargaining power, Deakin had to weigh how highly he valued this interest against Australia’s continuing economic and strategic dependence on Great Britain and intensifying fears of abandonment. Why did Deakin choose to pursue Australia’s interest in deepening cooperation with the United States rather than being constrained by Australia’s dependence on Great Britain and British preferences?

The United States and the Alliance Political Halo Developments in intra-imperial relations in the early 1900s provide an important backdrop to how Deakin negotiated his engagement strategy from within the imperial alliance. He was certainly conscious of the need to manage Australia’s reputation for alliance loyalty and to cultivate Great Britain’s good will. This was evident on several occasions. For instance, recognising the importance of British assistance in building an Australian navy, Deakin deferred to Admiralty advice on the constitution of this navy over Creswell’s recommendations.102 The Prime Minister was also risk-averse in how he framed the US fleet

visit. Deakin and Hunt conducted an extensive public affairs campaign around the visit, writing to journalists and anonymously in British media outlets about the visit’s imperial motives and refuting perceptions of an Australian transfer of loyalty.103 At the same time, however, Deakin invited the US fleet to Australia despite what he knew to be British sensitivities surrounding such a visit. He was unconstrained by British sentiments, in part, because he believed Britain would ultimately have no choice but to acquiesce to the visit. Great Britain could not afford to alienate the United States in the Pacific, while simultaneously confronting Germany in the Atlantic. Deakin also sought to persuade British officials to refrain from criticising Australia by representing the fleet visit as an action that reinforced, rather than undermined, intra-imperial relations. The early 1900s was a dynamic time for the British Empire as Deakin and other prominent officials, both within and outside Great Britain, debated the empire’s future evolution. The empire was a civilisational entity joined together by ‘ties of blood, sympathy, history and tradition’, but Deakin, in particular, thought this was no longer sufficient in a competitive strategic environment.104 He was concerned that the empire would be unable to act effectively when confronted with monolithic and centrally administered states on issues of war and trade.105 For these reasons, he believed that the core purpose of the British Empire needed to evolve from that of a purely civilisational entity to one that harnessed and grew imperial economic and military power. As he observed in one address, as ‘a united whole, we appear none too strong to protect ourselves against those other Powers who are today our rivals, and may at any time become our foes’.106 To successfully compete with these countries, he argued that the empire needed to form an ‘Imperial Federation’—that is, ‘an Empire existing with the glad consent, harmonious and relatively independent action of its parts’.107 Deakin envisaged an increasingly intimate alliance between Great Britain and the dominions, which provided for common action, policy and legislation but did not equate to a formal union of specified powers (such as in the United States).108 Deakin’s concept of Imperial Federation had two components, which impacted on how he viewed Australia’s contribution to building a stronger empire. First, it entailed greater imperial decentralisation by fully recognising the autonomy of the self-governing dominions. Among other things, this would allow the dominions to build local navies to participate in common imperial defence.109 Yet Deakin also emphasised the importance of recentralisation through the establishment of imperial institutions, and more transparent and frequent communication between Great Britain and the dominions.110 This would help ensure that, with greater dominion autonomy, the British Empire would continue to act in a coordinated manner. The dominions would also be able to voice their interests and shape the imperial policies that affected them.111 In short, Deakin sought to renegotiate the relationships between Great Britain and the dominions from that of metropole–colony to sovereign governments in alliance.112 Deakin assiduously advocated imperial reform along these lines at the 1907 Colonial Conference attended by the British and Dominion prime ministers. He proposed resolutions, which included the establishment of a permanent secretariat to keep dominions informed

between the regular Colonial Conferences; a system of imperial preference; strengthening of British interests in the Pacific; and re-examination of the 1903 Naval Agreement, which would enable Australia to develop its own navy.113 Conference outcomes fell short of Deakin’s objectives. The prime ministers agreed to establish an imperial secretariat to keep the dominions informed between conferences, but this entity was linked to the British Colonial Office and was not the representative organisation Deakin envisaged.114 The Conference also opposed strengthening British interests in the Pacific.115 While agreeing to establish a local Australian navy, Great Britain and Australia disagreed about how it should be constituted and which country would retain control of this force. It would take another year before the British and Australian governments reached consensus on these issues, with the British Admiralty agreeing to Deakin’s scheme for a naval force and to Australia retaining control of this force.116 Nonetheless, while many of his proposed resolutions were rejected, Deakin continued to advocate these reforms and conceived of Australia’s imperial contributions in these terms— particularly in terms of the establishment of a local Australian navy, to which the British were receptive. If Australia was to fully contribute to the empire as a self–governing dominion, it would need to contribute to the security of the country by developing an independent navy for local defence and to seek out other ways of strengthening British interests in the Pacific in the interim.117 Independent naval forces would enable the dominions to contribute to protecting Pacific lines of communication while the Royal Navy was concentrated in the Atlantic. Deakin noted that an independent Australian naval scheme would also help satisfy the Australian ‘sentiment of the duty of self-defence’.118 Deakin’s perceptions of this alliance contribution impacted on how he saw Australia’s external policy and, therefore, relations with the United States. Deakin believed that, by establishing a local navy that would almost certainly come under the command of the Royal Navy during war, Australia and the other dominions had a right to shape imperial foreign and defence policy at the political level during peace. Deakin observed in a 1907 address to Parliament that the: Prime Minister of Great Britain … add[ed] the extremely pregnant statement that the control of naval defence and foreign affairs must always go together … [The statement] implies also with equal clearness, that when we do take a part in naval defence, we shall be entitled to a share in the direction of foreign affairs.119 This axiom underpinned Deakin’s efforts to establish genuinely imperial institutions, such as a permanent secretariat, to ensure dominions had a greater voice in representing their interests and shaping imperial foreign policy between colonial conferences. British and dominion prime ministers agreed at the 1907 Colonial Conference that a new dominions section of the Colonial Office should keep ‘parties informed during periods between the Conferences in regard to matters which have been, or may be, matters for discussion’.120 Deakin therefore viewed enhanced intra-imperial communication as an important new,

reciprocal alliance contribution and a step forward for the recentralisation premise inherent in Imperial Federation.121 Deakin’s decision to invite the US fleet to Australia should be viewed against this backdrop. By December 1907, Deakin and Hunt had become increasingly frustrated with what they perceived as the Colonial Office’s failure to keep the dominions informed, as had been agreed at the 1907 Colonial Conference. In a letter to the Colonial Office on 23 December 1907, Hunt complained that Australia had not been informed on matters relating to Newfoundland or on several other matters of imperial interest, particularly as they related to the Pacific. He noted that, ‘while these are perhaps not large matters, the arrangements that seemed to have emerged were different from those to which the Australian Government agreed’.122 On the same day, Deakin wrote to British journalist and author Richard Jebb that ‘[T]he new Secretariat of the CO [Colonial Office] is proving its utter inefficiency. For matters are being dealt with at present—Newfoundland’s rights and Burns Philp’s claims against Germany for the Marshall Islands … On neither of these matters … have we had a simple word or scrap of information’.123 These letters were drafted only one day before Deakin wrote to the US Consul-General to seek support for an Australian invitation to the US fleet. By inviting the US fleet without consulting the Colonial Office, Deakin was proving a point to the British about the importance of the new communications obligations agreed to at the Colonial Conference. In demonstrating the implications of greater dominion autonomy through an independent external affairs initiative, Deakin sought to provoke the British into understanding the importance of those obligations agreed at the Conference if the British Empire was to remain coordinated. As Deakin observed in a letter to then British journalist Leopold Amery: ‘I hardly understand your want of sympathy with the visit of the US Fleet. We should have welcomed it if we obtained all that we are seeking in the shape of Imperial Federation’.124 By couching his actions in terms of the need to strengthen intra-imperial norms in the face of repeated British violations, Deakin could mitigate damage to Australia’s reputation for alliance loyalty and garner reluctant British acquiescence—particularly as London’s own relationship with Washington was at stake if it refused to send the invitation to the United States on Australia’s behalf. The likelihood of British acquiescence underpinned the high value that Deakin assigned to his interest in deepening cooperation with the United States and helps to explain Australia’s divergence from British preferences. Deakin’s calculations were reinforced by the British Government’s silence on the fleet visit through formal channels. The Australian initiative was not favourably received by British government agencies. The Foreign Office was apprehensive that the initiative would disrupt Anglo-Japanese relations and that Australia was playing Great Britain and the United States off against one another. The Admiralty was concerned that it could not match the demonstration of US force in the Pacific. Yet British government officials never conveyed these misgivings to Deakin, fearing it would only make matters worse.125 Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey noted that it ‘would be undesirable to say anything at the moment which might prompt Mr Deakin to say that it was evident, because of the Japanese alliance, that we

did not approve of this having been sent’.126 The Colonial Office issued only a mild rebuke to Deakin that all matters of external affairs should be passed to the British Government, but did not comment on the actual fleet visit or Australia’s deeper engagement with the United States.127 Deakin was aware of these British sensitivities, but interpreted the absence of any official objection as tacit British acceptance of the initiative. This contrasts starkly with Deakin’s efforts to further deepen cooperation with the United States in 1909 by advocating an agreement that would formally extend a modified version of the United States’ Monroe Doctrine to the Pacific. In his letter to then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Crewe, Deakin emphasised ‘how [the proposal] might prove of inestimable service to the Empire’.128 An agreement of this nature, he claimed, would help to preserve the Pacific branch of the empire while Britain was engaged in, or recovering from, a conflict with Germany. Yet, in his reply to Deakin, Crewe conveyed that such an agreement would materially damage British interests in the Pacific because it would force Great Britain to seek US permission before proceeding with any course of action in that ocean.129 Although the British acquiesced to the Monroe Doctrine in the western hemisphere, they were not inclined to do so in the Pacific.130 Moreover, the Foreign Office was apprehensive that an agreement that excluded Germany and Japan could potentially antagonise those powers.131 On learning of these reservations, Deakin abandoned this initiative given the difficulties associated with securing British acquiescence and the need for British agreement to any such arrangement. He deferred to British preferences and the imperial alliance again became the most prominent influence on Australian engagement with a rising America.

Conclusion Far from conforming to the British Government’s wishes, Deakin’s invitation to the US fleet and his broader engagement strategy toward an ascendant United States was underpinned by a nuanced interplay between emerging Australian interests in regional security and interests in maintaining a cordial alliance with Great Britain. Power transition and traditional alliance theories do not fully capture this relationship. These theories cannot account for how Australia came to engage with a rising United States from within its imperial alliance, especially if it was looking to preserve Pax Britannica. Snyder’s theory better accounts for this outcome by providing greater discretion for a junior ally’s distinct interests to shape its policies toward a rising power. Yet, it still cannot explain the most important factors that shaped Deakin’s interest in deepening cooperation with the United States—including the shaping influence of the imperial alliance—and why Deakin prioritised these interests given his growing fears of British abandonment. The imperial alliance did have an important bearing on how Deakin’s interests and engagement strategy toward the United States evolved, but it was far from the overwhelming influence that power transition and alliance theorists portray. In line with Snyder’s theory, most critical to Deakin’s shift to deeper engagement with the United States was the fundamentally non-adversarial Anglo-American relationship and the global partnership that was developing between these two countries. Yet

the British and the Americans were still rivals in the Pacific. The British Government was concerned that US efforts to cultivate influence in that ocean would erode British power.132 The tour of the US fleet in the Pacific only further reminded the British Government of this American challenge. In contrast to his British counterparts, Deakin saw the US fleet tour as an opportunity to shape how the United States emerged as a great power and to potentially strengthen the British Empire’s position in the Pacific. The Australians and the British both wanted to preserve the regional primacy of the British Empire, but had differing views about how this was best achieved. Whereas Britain had invested heavily in its relationship with Japan, Australia was looking more closely at a partnership with the United States. Through deeper engagement, Deakin hoped to convince Washington to support the British Empire, rather than Germany. This would help to re-establish a regional balance of power and deter a potentially belligerent Japan. Deakin’s interest in deepening cooperation with Washington was underpinned by his belief that the United States could be conditioned to support Australia’s strategic interests in regional order. Australia did not think that the United States would ever wage war against the British Empire. Although it was seeking to cultivate greater influence in the Pacific, Deakin also believed that the United States accepted and dealt with the dominions as indivisible parts of the British Empire. Deakin believed that the United States was more likely to buttress the empire in the Pacific rather than contribute to its fragmentation. These assumptions were reaffirmed by Deakin’s discussions with Admiral Sperry. Deakin and Sperry were able to reach a consensus on the strategic problem confronting the Pacific and on establishing an Anglo-American community of commercial interest in lieu of a formal entente. Sperry also expressed a wish to forge a community of commercial interest not just with Australia but with the British Empire as a whole, suggesting he recognised and supported the idea of working with Australia as an agent of the empire. These understandings were critical to Deakin reconciling his interests in deepening cooperation with an ascendant America with the imperial alliance. The emergence of this distinct Australian interest in an ascendant United States is not to completely negate the constraining influence of the imperial alliance on Deakin’s engagement strategy. Deakin was certainly conscious of the economic and security benefits that Australia derived from Great Britain and did not want to completely sacrifice British good will. By couching the invitation to the US fleet as a retaliatory gesture geared at sensitising the British to the importance of understandings about imperial contribution reached at the 1907 Colonial Conference, Deakin was able to mitigate the damage to Australia’s reputation. In doing so, he paradoxically presented his actions as strengthening the British Empire. His assessment that the British would ultimately (if reluctantly) acquiesce to the fleet visit proved correct. Deakin subsequently prioritised his interests in deepening cooperation with the United States and, in line with Snyder’s theory, believed he had greater intra-alliance bargaining power on this issue. At the same time, however, the limits of this autonomy were clearly demonstrated in 1909, when the British made it clear that they could

not accept the Australian initiative to encourage the United States to extend a modified version of the Monroe Doctrine to the Pacific. Deakin’s initiative to host the US fleet was important in laying the foundation for a cooperative security relationship between Australia and the United States, which would take forty years to fully materialise. It was the first time that Australia sought a more direct role in shaping imperial foreign and defence policy commensurate with its emerging security interests. Deeper cooperation with the United States to buttress the British Empire and preserve the regional balance of power would become even more important as the twentieth century progressed.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

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This book uses the term ‘the Pacific’ to denote what would now be commonly termed the Asia–Pacific region. Australian policymakers used this term to describe the region until the 1960s. Neville Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901–14 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1976), p. 164 Deakin to Governor–General Northcote, 24 January 1908, A1, 1908/11034, National Archives of Australia (NAA). Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 164. Russell Parkin and David Lee, Great White Fleet to Coral Sea: Naval Strategy and the Development of Australian– United States Relations, 1900–1945 (Barton, ACT: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008), p. 7. Cited in JA La Nauze, Alfred Deakin: A Biography (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1965), p. 490. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 165. Parkin and Lee, Great White Fleet to Coral Sea, p. 16. Neville Meaney, ‘“A Proposition of the Highest International Importance”: Alfred Deakin’s Pacific Agreement Proposal and its Significance for Australian–Imperial Relations’, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 5(3), 1967, p. 211. ibid. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 192. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 262. ibid. Australia maintained constitutional power over its external affairs, but these powers were usually limited to trade arrangements. They did not encompass diplomatic negotiations with foreign powers or dispatch of ambassadors. Sir Kenneth Bailey, ‘Treaty Rights’, in WJ Hudson (ed.), Towards a Foreign Policy: 1914–1941 (Sydney: Cassell Australia, 1967), p. 14. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 490. Alfred Deakin, ‘Imperial Federation: An Address Delivered by Alfred Deakin MP at the Annual Meeting of the Imperial Federation League of Victoria’, 14 June 1905 (North Fitzroy, Victoria: Echo Publishing, 1905), pp. 5–7; Alfred Deakin, ‘A National Policy Speech: Australia for the Australians’, 18 May 1906 (Melbourne: Sands and McDougall, 1906), pp. 2–3. See, for example, Deakin, ‘Imperial Federation’, p. 6. Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 24. Deakin, ‘A National Policy Speech’, pp. 2–3. Alfred Deakin, ‘Needs of Empire: Great Imperial Speech Delivered at the Baltic Shipping Exchange’, 15 May 1907, Deakin Papers, National Library of Australia (NLA), MS 1540, 15/15.3.5/1668. Phillips Payson O’Brien, British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900–1936 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 50. Sir William Creswell, ‘Considerations Affecting the Naval Defence of the Commonwealth’, in GL Macandie (ed.), The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy: A Compilation (Sydney: Government Printer, 1949), p. 178. James R Reckner, Teddy Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. 4. Nicholas Lambert, ‘Economy or Empire? The Fleet Unit Concept and the Quest for Collective Security in the Pacific, 1909–14’, in Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson (eds), Far Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of

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Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 57. Alfred Deakin, ‘Speech by the Honourable Alfred Deakin, MP, Prime Minister, on Defence Policy’, 13 December 1907 (Melbourne: J Kemp, 1907), p. 3. Sir Arthur Fanshawe, ‘Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Fanshawe’s Views and Captain Creswell’s Criticisms’, in GL Macandie (ed.), The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy: A Compilation (Sydney: Government Printer, 1949), pp. 133, 141. Parkin and Lee, Great White Fleet to Coral Sea, p. 24. Sir William Creswell, ‘Australian Defence’, 26 October 1908, Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, vol. 21, p. 371. Parkin and Lee, The Great White Fleet to Coral Sea, p. 7. ibid., p. 10. Peter Edwards, Permanent Friends? (Double Bay, NSW: Lowy Institute, 2005), p. 6. Charles Grimshaw, ‘Australian Nationalism and the Imperial Connection, 1900–1914’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 3(2), 1958, p. 161. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 483. Deakin, ‘A National Policy Speech, p. 1. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, pp. 278–82. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 519. ibid, p. 479. Sir Edward Grey, Twenty-five Years (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1925), p. 84; Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914 (London: Victor Gollancz, 1969), pp. 95–6. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, p. 186. Donald Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 29. HG Nicholas, The United States and Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 1, 4. ibid., p. 56. Cited in Howard Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 38. Perkins, The Great Rapprochement, p. 233. ibid. Charles Sperry to Edith Sperry, 9 September 1908, Sperry Papers, MSS40923, Box 5, Library of Congress (LOC). Maxse to Deakin, 5 June 1908, Deakin Papers, NLA, MS 1540, 1/1.22/1/2013–14. For British concerns, see also Amery to Deakin, 10 August 1908, Deakin Papers, NLA, MS 1540, 1/1.23/1/2069–73. Alfred Deakin, ‘The Defence of Australia’, Herald (Melbourne), 12 June 1905, p. 3; DCS Sissons, Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890–1923, MA Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1956, pp. 48–53. Deakin, ‘The Defence of Australia’, p. 3; David Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850–1939 (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1999), p. 108. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 121; Creswell to Richard Jebb, 31 July 1907, Jebb Correspondence 1905–16, NLA, MS 813, 1/32. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 121. Deakin, ‘Speech by the Honourable Alfred Deakin, MP, Prime Minister, on Defence Policy’, pp. 2–4. Sir William Creswell, ‘Captain Creswell’s Plea for the Local Naval Force’, in GL Macandie, The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy: A Compilation (Sydney: Government Printer, 1949), p. 178. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 135; La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 520. Cited in La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 524. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 525. Cable from Elgin to Northcote, 13 December 1907, A2, 1908/4189, NAA. Creswell, ‘Considerations Affecting the Naval Defence of the Commonwealth’, pp. 178–180; Cable from Deakin to Northcote, 23 December 1907, A11816, 47, NAA. Letter from Lucas to Hunt, undated, Hunt Papers, NLA, MS 52, 15/863. Cable from Fawkes to Governor-General, 18 February 1907, A2, 1908/4189, NAA. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 25 November 1910, pp. 6859–60. ‘Extracts from Speech by the Prime Minister’, in Gordon Greenwood and Charles Grimshaw (eds), Documents on Australian International Affairs, 1901–1918 (West Melbourne, Victoria: Thomas Nelson, 1977), p. 141. Alfred Deakin, ‘Prime Minister’s Speech at the Royal Yacht Club of Victoria’s Dinner’, 1 September 1908, Deakin Papers, NLA, MS 1540, 15/15.4/3880.

63 64 65

66 67 68

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82

83 84 85 86

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 121; Creswell to Jebb, 31 July 1907, Jebb Correspondence 1905–16, NLA, MS 813, 1/32. Lambert, ‘Economy or Empire?’, p. 57. Deakin was conscious of the ephemeral nature of any entente between the United States and the British Empire in the Pacific, leading him to continue to emphasise the importance of developing an Australian navy. See A Deakin, ‘Prime Minister’s Speech at Royal Yacht Club’; Deakin, ‘Imperial Federation’, pp. 5–6. Greg Fry, ‘Australia’s Regional Security Doctrine: Old Assumptions, New Challenges’, in Greg Fry (ed.), Australia’s Regional Security (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991), pp. 2–3. Cited in ibid., p. 2. Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study in Australian–American Relations between 1900 and 1975 (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1987), p. 10; Cable from Deakin to Northcote, 23 December 1907, A11816, 47, NAA. Creswell, ‘Considerations Affecting the Naval Defence of the Commonwealth’, p. 176. Deakin to Maxse, 24 July 1908, M Series: Letters of Leopold James Maxse 1887–1931, West Sussex Record Office, Chichester, England, NLA, Australian Joint Copy Project, reel M1954. Cited in M Ruth Megaw, ‘Australia and the Great White Fleet 1908’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, 56(2), 1970, p. 128. Cited in La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 490. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 192. Parkin and Lee, Great White Fleet to Coral Sea, pp. 25–6. Deakin, ‘A National Policy’, p. 1. Maxse to Deakin, 5 June 1908; Amery to Deakin, 10 August 1908; Hunt to YM Goblet, 3 May 1910, Hunt Papers, NLA, MS 52, 25/1308. Deakin to Maxse, 24 July 1908. Hunt to YM Goblet, 3 May 1910. Levi, American–Australian Relations, pp. 77–9. Cited in Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend, p. 13. Neville Meaney, Towards a New Vision: Australia and Japan through 100 Years (East Roseville, NSW: Kangaroo Press, 1999), pp. 60, 66–7. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 490; Deakin to Maxse, 24 July 1908. For an example of the argument that the United States was a ‘natural’ partner, see Megaw, ‘Australia and the Great White Fleet 1908’, p. 121–2; Meaney, The Search for Security, pp. 163–9. Cited in La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 490; John Hirst, ‘Nation–building, 1901–14’ in Alison Bashfold and Stuart MacIntyre (eds), The Cambridge History of Australia, vol. 2 (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 32. Deakin to Maxse, 24 July 1908. Alfred Deakin, ‘Prime Minister at Ballarat’ (Melbourne: Commonwealth Liberal Party, 1910), p. 17; Charles Sperry to Edith Sperry, 28 August 1908, Sperry Papers, MSS40923, Box 5, LOC. Neville Meaney suggests Australia desired a formal alliance between the United States and the British Empire, whereas Carl Bridge suggests that Deakin was more interested in the ramifications of the US fleet visit for intraimperial relations. This chapter argues that Deakin’s expectations probably fell somewhere between these two extremes. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, pp. 166, 170–1; Carl Bridge, ‘Relations with the United States’, in Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (eds), Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation to the Second World War (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000), pp. 172, 176; Deakin to Maxse, 24 July 1908. Deakin to Maxse, 24 July 1908. ibid. Parkin and Lee, Great White Fleet to Coral Sea, pp. 7–8. US Department of State Office of the Historian, ‘Japanese–American Relations at the Turn of the Century 1900–1922’, accessed at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/japanese-relations. ‘The American Fleet’, (2 March 1908), in La Nauze (ed.), Federated Australia, p. 229. Charles Sperry, ‘The Strategic Fortification in the Pacific and the Cruise of the Atlantic Fleet, December 1907 to February 1909’, unpublished manuscript, Sperry Papers, MSS40923, Box 13, LOC. Cited in Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend, p. 11. Charles Sperry to Edith Sperry, 9 September 1908. ibid.

96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124

125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132

ibid. ibid.; Charles Sperry to Edith Sperry, 16 September 1908, Sperry Papers, MSS40923, Box 5, LOC. Charles Sperry to Edith Sperry, 16 September 1908. Cited in Megaw, ‘Australia and the Great White Fleet 1908’, p. 128. Charles Sperry to Edith Sperry, 28 August 1908; Charles Sperry to Edith Sperry, 9 September 1908. Cited in Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend, p. 14. Meaney, The Search for Security, p. 157. See, for example, ‘The American Fleet’, (2 March 1908), in La Nauze (ed.), Federated Australia, p. 240; Deakin to Maxse, 24 July 1908; Hunt to YM Goblet, 3 May 1910. Deakin, ‘Imperial Federation’, p. 6. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 479. Deakin, ‘Imperial Federation’, p. 6. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 478. ibid. Deakin, ‘Imperial Federation’, p. 13. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, pp. 476–8; Deakin to Jebb, 29 May 1907, Deakin–Jebb Correspondence, NLA, MS 339, 1/13A (-B). Deakin, ‘Imperial Federation’, pp. 20–1. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 142. Ibid., p. 145; ‘Appendix D: Australian Resolutions of 1907 not Adopted’, Deakin Papers, NLA, MS 1540/15/1623. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 148. ‘Appendix D: Australian resolutions of 1907 not adopted’. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 529. Deakin, ‘Speech by the Honourable Alfred Deakin, MP, Prime Minister, on Defence Policy’, p. 4. Cited in Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 139. Deakin, ‘Speech by the Honourable Alfred Deakin, MP, Prime Minister, on Defence Policy’, p. 4. Deakin to Northcote, 19 November 1907, Hunt Papers, NLA, MS 52, 13/792. ibid., Hunt to Hopwood, 23 December 1907, Hunt Papers, NLA, MS 52, 13/785. Hunt to Hopwood, 23 December 1907. Deakin to Jebb, 23 December 1907, Deakin–Jebb Correspondence, NLA, MS 339, 1/17A. Cited in La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 479. La Nauze and Meaney adopt a similar interpretation of Deakin’s efforts to circumvent the Colonial Office. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, p. 490; Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, p. 164. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, pp. 164–5. Cited in ibid., p. 165. ibid. Meaney, ‘“A Proposition of the Highest International Importance”’, p. 211. Secretary of State for the Colonies Crewe to Deakin, 15 December 1909, Deakin Papers, NLA, MS 1540, 15/15.5/15/2271. ibid. Sir Edward Grey to Lord Crewe, 11 November 1909, reproduced in Meaney, ‘“A Proposition of the Highest International Importance”’, p. 212. Perkins, The Great Rapprochement, p. 233.

CHAPTER 4 Lyons and the Trade Diversion Policy

Following the US fleet visit in 1908, Australia and the United States maintained friendly, but distant, relations. As the Roosevelt administration refocused on stabilising US relations with Japan, the immediate impetus for deeper Australian-American cooperation dissipated.1 During the interwar period, some Australian governments intermittently sought to build on Deakin’s precedent by identifying ways to deepen strategic cooperation between the British Empire and the United States in the Pacific. After World War I, Prime Minister Billy Hughes (1915–23) sought a great-power guarantee for the Pacific, which included the United States and would preserve the regional status quo after the Anglo-Japanese alliance terminated in 1922.2 Prime Minister Stanley Bruce (1923–29) hosted a second US fleet visit to Australia in 1925. Yet it was not until 1935 that there was a more concerted approach to engagement, when Prime Minister Joseph Lyons (1932–39), of the United Australia Party, visited US President Franklin Roosevelt and US Secretary of State Cordell Hull in Washington, DC to discuss the establishment of a trade agreement and deeper long-term political and security cooperation. At the same time, Australian grievances against the United States had also built up during the interwar years and crystallised in the 1930s. The US stance on former German colonies in the Southwest Pacific, its insistence on British repayment of war debts, several AustralianAmerican commercial disputes and a US trade surplus with Australia all contributed to resentment in Canberra.3 During his initial interview with the new US Consul-General Jay Pierrepont Moffat in October 1935, Minister for External Affairs George Pearce listed Australia’s grievances toward the United States. He believed the relationship had peaked during the 1908 US fleet visit and had been in decline ever since.4 Differences were still managed within what Lyons hoped would become a deeper long-term economic and strategic relationship with the United States. Yet, in 1936, there was a sudden and notable shift to Australian disengagement from the United States. On 22 May, the Lyons Government introduced a new tariff schedule, which increased rates on several items of which the United States was the main supplier. It also introduced a licensing system that adversely affected US and Japanese exports to Australia. Australia would grant licences for imports, such as metal-working machinery and iron and steel, only if the imports originated from countries with which it maintained a favourable balance of trade. Licences would be denied for imports from countries that were ‘bad customers’, like the United States, who did not grant reciprocal advantages to Australia in their markets. All goods of British Empire origin (with the exception of motor chassis) were

exempted from licensing. Sectors of Australian trade that had previously been dominated by US imports were therefore diverted to domestic or imperial suppliers. These measures came to be known as the ‘trade diversion’ policy. Although justified in economic terms, trade diversion also had political undertones and was grounded in what Australian policy-makers perceived to be US indifference to Australia’s welfare.5 The policy was the brain child of the minister responsible for trade treaties, Sir Henry Gullett, who was increasingly dissatisfied with the adverse trade balance with the United States and the principles guiding that country’s trade with Australia.6 Cabinet was divided over ‘the practicability’ and ‘efficacy’ of the proposal.7 Yet, heading a fractious coalition Government comprised of the United Australia Party and the Country Party, Lyons was susceptible to the influence of his ministers. He was also personally frustrated by the Roosevelt administration’s unwillingness to negotiate a trade agreement following his 1935 visit to Washington.8 In April 1936, Gullett convinced Lyons that Canberra should seek alternative recourse on the issue.9 Although trade diversion was referred to a ministerial subcommittee for consideration, Lyons critically endorsed the policy from the outset and promoted it throughout 1936 and 1937.10 His thinking, and why he was influenced by Gullett, over other influential ministers such as Treasurer Richard Casey, is central to understanding how trade diversion and the shift to disengagement came about.11 The sudden shift to disengagement is not easily accounted for by power transition or traditional alliance theories. Trade diversion certainly benefited the British market, but it is difficult to characterise it as a bandwagoning response when, in fact, the policy was at odds with British preferences and policies. British economic and foreign policy toward the United States was actually moving in the opposite direction. In 1935, the British Government had commenced preliminary negotiations with Washington on an Anglo-American trade treaty, which it hoped would not only yield commercial benefits but also draw the United States out of strategic isolation.12 The British had made their reservations about Australia’s trade diversion policy known to Australian ministers, but the Lyons Government persisted with Australia’s disengagement strategy for over a year. Far from being determined by British preferences, the Lyons Government’s disengagement strategy stemmed from a breakdown in what the Australians had assumed to be shared Australian and US expectations about how to manage the bilateral economic relationship. Australia adopted a fundamentally different approach than the United States on how to liberalise trade in the international system. This led to different expectations in Canberra and Washington about how to manage Australia’s adverse trade balance with the United States and high US tariffs on Australian products. Despite Australia’s own tariffs and its preference margins to Great Britain, Washington’s unwillingness to negotiate reciprocal economic concessions that would help address the adverse trade balance led to Australian frustration that the Americans were indifferent to Australia’s economic welfare.13 The importance that Lyons attached to addressing this adverse trade balance, given its link to maintaining Australia’s credit-worthiness, meant that this economic conflict of interest partially obscured strategic considerations that were propelling Australia and the United

States closer together. In light of growing German and Japanese military threats, Lyons sought to forge a security relationship with the United States to help realise Australia’s own strategic interests in regional order.14 These considerations continued to underpin a broad engagement-based approach toward the United States. Rather than abrogating the relationship entirely, Lyons hoped to compel Washington into trade negotiations by other means, which would ultimately lead to an improved long-term economic and strategic relationship with the United States. It was the disjuncture between a breakdown in shared expectations over the economic relationship, coupled with strategic incentives to deepen cooperation, that prompted Australia’s shift to disengagement. Nevertheless, while the impetus for disengagement stemmed primarily from the bilateral relationship, the imperial connection still had an important influence on Lyons pursuing this economic conflict of interest. After the credit crisis of the late 1920s, and in a more dangerous regional security environment, Lyons and his ministers were acutely conscious of Australia’s continued economic and strategic dependence on Great Britain. In 1936, Lyons assigned a high value to Australia’s diverging economic interests in the United States only because he believed the British would ultimately acquiesce to trade diversion. The policy benefited Great Britain by providing it with a greater Australian market share. The policy was also consistent with principles of imperial contribution, agreed at the 1932 Imperial Conference, in which the dominions would build their economic and strategic capacity to contribute to a stronger Empire. There was consequently little risk that Australia would damage its reputation as a loyal ally by using trade diversion to strengthen intra-imperial trade and Australia’s strategic industrial capacity. Lyons’s assessment was borne out with tacit, albeit reluctant, British acquiescence to trade diversion in 1936. This assessment changed in 1937, however, as British pressure on Canberra intensified to surrender some of Australia’s imperial trade preferences, with corresponding implications for trade diversion. Washington had linked the successful conclusion of an Anglo-American trade treaty to the dominions surrendering some of their intra-imperial preferences.15 With British acquiescence to trade diversion increasingly unlikely in light of Washington’s position, Lyons had little choice but to succumb to London’s pressure. Australia’s continuing economic and strategic dependence on Great Britain overshadowed the value Lyons attached to sanctioning the United States. The Australian Government subsequently abandoned trade diversion in December 1937 in deference to British preferences. This chapter explores the changing dynamics of Australian engagement with a rising United States in 1936–37 and the reasons for the sudden shift to disengagement. After briefly exploring how the Anglo-American power shift had evolved during the late 1930s, it examines the extent to which the Lyons Government’s decision to adopt trade diversion was influenced by British policies and preferences. It then analyses the factors that gave rise to the trade diversion policy, before considering why Lyons supported this policy for so long, until his government progressively abandoned it in 1937 in response to British pressure. This case study of Australian disengagement from the United States illuminates the extent to which the alliance or other factors were more important in determining whether Australia

engaged with, or disengaged from, a rising power.

Changing Anglo-American Power Relativities After World War I, Great Britain entered a period of relative decline. Historians disagree over the extent to which this decline was taking place. Some, such as Paul Kennedy, argue that this decline was a rapid one given a significant decrease in Great Britain’s economic and military power.16 Yet others, such as David Reynolds, observe that British power was also a function of softer elements, such as prestige and diplomacy, and against this backdrop, argue that the country’s decline was more gradual.17 The tension between Britain’s declining military and economic power, but still considerable global political influence, was manifested in Australian policymakers’ perceptions of British dominance during the 1930s. Lyons and his ministers recognised that, in material terms, Britain was no longer as powerful as it had been before World War I. Economically, Great Britain ran a persistent balance of payments deficit from 1931, reflecting its weakened industrial position in the postwar world.18 This problem was exacerbated by growing trade protectionism in Great Britain’s largest markets in Europe and the United States, and increasing competition from cheaper American and Japanese exports to dominion markets. To offset these difficulties, London worked to consolidate imperial economic ties through a series of bilateral agreements with the dominions, collectively known as the ‘Ottawa system’.19 These agreements granted Britain and the dominions reciprocal preferential trading privileges. Yet, Great Britain’s deteriorating balance of payments position made it less able to absorb the dominions’ agricultural surpluses.20 Its less competitive manufacturing industries also prevented it from significantly increasing its market share in the dominions.21 Gullet was acutely conscious of these trends and looked to trade diversion to artificially reinvigorate intra-imperial trade, so that Australia could improve its exports to Great Britain.22 By 1937, even Lyons noted that, while intra-imperial trade was important, the dominions had ‘become increasingly aware of the need for wider markets than even the Empire can supply’.23 Lyons and Defence Minister Sir Archdale Parkhill recognised that this relative economic decline, coupled with Great Britain’s adherence to postwar disarmament treaties, had also led to a relative decline in British military power.24 In July 1928, British Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Winston Churchill secured the British Government’s agreement that the ‘ten year rule’ should apply to defence spending estimates unless otherwise reversed (a decision which was later revoked in 1932). The ‘ten year rule’ was a British government guideline that the armed forces should conduct their planning and develop their spending estimates, based on the assumption that Britain would not be involved in war for at least a decade.25 Britain’s relative strategic decline was also manifested in its switch in 1920 from a longstanding twopower naval standard to a one-power standard: the Royal Navy would seek parity only with the next largest naval power, the United States, instead of with any two navies that could be brought against it.26 At the same time, Germany was rapidly rearming, despite concluding the

1935 Anglo-German Naval agreement that limited its naval strength to 35 per cent of British strength. These changing power relativities led Lyons and Parkhill to privately (and at times publicly) encourage British rearmament efforts to ‘recapture the benevolent authority that Britain alone could wield for the peace of the world’.27 Both politicians were apprehensive about the impact of Britain’s relative global strategic decline at the regional level. The 1922 Washington Treaty institutionalised Great Britain’s and the United States’ naval parity, and numerical naval dominance relative to Japan, through the ratios it imposed on capital ship tonnage. However, Japan announced its intent to formally terminate the Treaty in December 1934. By denying Britain and the United States the opportunity to develop new forward bases in the Pacific, the Treaty had also given the Japanese a regional geographic advantage that offset British and US numerical superiority.28 Although Great Britain still maintained naval bases at Hong Kong and Singapore, it did not have a permanent naval presence in that ocean and its regional power projection depended on transferring a component of its fleet from the European theatre in the event of a Pacific war.29 Doubts about Britain’s capacity to deploy the fleet to Singapore, if it was simultaneously embroiled in a European war, led to considerable public debate in Australia about how to apportion defence funding.30 While the ALP and the Army argued that the Royal Navy was likely to remain in home waters to defend Britain rather than dispersing to Singapore, the Lyons Government stated publicly that the Royal Navy would arrive at Singapore in due course and would limit any attack on Australia.31 Nonetheless, private concerns about British delays in constructing the Singapore naval base, as well as Britain’s capacity to deploy the fleet prompted Defence Minister Parkhill to formally raise these questions during the 1937 Imperial Conference, though he received little reassurance on the matter.32 Despite Great Britain’s relative decline, however, Lyons and his ministers still viewed that country as the preeminent global and regional power. These perceptions of British global pre-eminence were largely based on ‘soft power’ elements, linked to prestige and influence. Great Britain still presided over a large empire, which gave it authority in international affairs.33 Lyons believed that the British Empire served as a model of collective security, around which other peaceful countries might rally.34 Great Britain was also the only power that was actively engaged in, and sought to manage, international order.35 It was the driving force behind international collective security principles (including the naval disarmament regimes of the 1922 Washington Treaty, and 1930 and 1935 London Conferences) and used its diplomacy to induce countries to adhere to these norms. Lyons believed that this distinguished Great Britain from other powers, including the United States. The Prime Minister observed that Britain was unique because of the ‘high moral example’ it provided and that Australia ‘had always remembered that Great Britain had been alone in her efforts. She had no consistent collaborator or partner, no support, and no help’.36 Despite the Anglo-American power shift, Lyons and his ministers therefore did not yet view the United States as equal to Great Britain. There was no doubt that the United States was an important Pacific country, with formidable economic and naval power, that was narrowing the material power gap with Great Britain. However, Australian ministers

remained uncertain about whether the United States would actually draw on this power to meaningfully shape international order.37 US actions suggested an almost countervailing trend, with the 1935 and 1937 Neutrality Acts prohibiting the United States from exporting arms and ammunition to belligerents at war.38 Australian officials also viewed US efforts to finalise steps for Philippine independence as further evidence of its withdrawal from regional responsibilities.39 As the Department of External Affairs noted in its brief to the 1937 Imperial Conference ministerial delegation, ‘little has occurred in recent months to alter the view that the United States remains isolationist’.40 The Lyons Government therefore still regarded Great Britain as the dominant global and regional power, despite growing US economic and strategic prowess. At first glance, trade diversion seems directed at shoring up the imperial economic bloc in the face of a US contender. Yet, while the policy benefited the British economy, it diverged from Great Britain’s own evolving approach toward the United States. Given this incongruity, how did Australia’s policy come about and what, if any influence, did British preferences and policies have on Lyons’s decision to support trade diversion?

The Influence of British Policies Power transition theorists would attribute Australia’s disengagement from the United States in the 1930s to its efforts to support Great Britain as the dominant global and regional power. Some traditional alliance theorists might similarly attribute this response to Australian efforts to support Great Britain to balance against a perceived challenger. Despite Britain’s relative economic and strategic decline, Australia still remained an essentially satisfied ally and wanted to buttress its alliance. As Lyons declared at the 1937 Imperial Conference: ‘we stand as a group of peace-loving nations united by our allegiance to the Throne, and bound together by our faith in democracy and our common love of liberty and justice’.41 Although apprehensive about Britain’s relative military and economic decline, Lyons and his ministers believed this was best redressed by intra-imperial efforts to strengthen cooperation within the British Empire.42 After all, Britain was still Australia’s primary trade partner and only strategic guarantor. Yet, the Lyons Government’s support for British global leadership and efforts to strengthen the British Empire did not actually translate into bandwagoning with British policies toward a rising America as power transition and alliance theorists would suggest. As it was in 1908, the Anglo-American relationship remained a cooperative–competitive one. The cooperative aspect of the relationship was increasingly dominant from 1936 onward. The British Government sought to preserve the British Empire’s global preeminence, but recognised that US support was essential to preserve the international status quo against the challenge posed by revisionist powers.43 London and Washington had shared interests in preserving the independence of the British Empire, containing German expansionism in Eastern Europe, and stabilising the Far East.44 This cooperation increasingly extended to the economic arena, where both Great Britain

and the United States saw links between economic cooperation and improving international security. Initially, both countries were committed to working toward greater trade liberalisation, but differed over how this should be achieved. Whereas Washington viewed the Ottawa system as an exclusive trading community that was responsible for contracting international trade and encouraged the dominions to abandon their Ottawa preferences, the British viewed US general tariff reductions under the auspices of the 1934 Trade Agreement Act as directed at expanding US industrial exports rather than liberalising global trade.45 Yet with greater international instability in 1936, British priorities shifted from economic recovery to international security. The British Government viewed an Anglo-American trade agreement as one way of deterring the revisionist powers by establishing a community of trade interests.46 It abandoned its previously hardline negotiating stance on imperial preference and, in January 1937, announced it was ‘ready to examine any possibilities of making adjustments in individual Ottawa agreements to reach a trade agreement’.47 While Australia’s policies toward the United States demonstrate a similar (if delayed) broad trend, they did not actually stem from British policies. In fact, there is little evidence to suggest that trade diversion even aligned with British preferences. As early as May 1936, the British Board of Trade was concerned that the trade diversion policy would complicate Anglo-American trade negotiations.48 While London adopted an initially hardline negotiating stance toward Washington, it did not favour punitive discrimination against US trade. Australian Deputy Prime Minister at the time, Earle Page later recalled that, when presenting the policy to British Board of Trade President Walter Runciman in May 1936, he and then Attorney-General Robert Menzies received the opposite reaction to what they expected. He recalled Menzies’ remarks that ‘[y]ou offered him a present of from ten to twenty million pounds in Australian trade, and he looked as though you’d kicked him in the stomach’.49 Runciman refused to publicly endorse the policy or to conclude that it was an action ‘as being agreed between two governments’.50 Despite Runciman’s unfavourable response, the Lyons Government persisted with the disengagement strategy for a year and a half. Moreover, there was considerable lag between British efforts to reach a settlement with the Americans from January 1937 and Australia’s willingness to negotiate with the United States at the end of the year. Like Deakin’s engagement strategy in 1908, it is difficult to characterise the Lyons Government’s disengagement strategy as bandwagoning with British preferences or policies. Snyder’s more nuanced interpretation of how alliances influence countries’ relations with external powers provides an alternative lens through which to understand disengagement.51 Snyder’s theory of the alliance security dilemma is difficult to apply in this instance. Snyder’s theory would suggest that Australia withdrew from cooperation with the United States because of dominant fears of abandonment and corresponding efforts to demonstrate political support for Britain. Yet, such an explanation, and indeed Snyder’s theory of the alliance security dilemma, implicitly assumes an antagonistic great power relationship. In fact, the Lyons Government was distancing itself from the United States at the same time that Great Britain was deepening cooperation with Washington.

Snyder’s framework of intra-alliance bargaining power, rather than the alliance security dilemma, has greater resonance in explaining why Australia diverged from its ally’s preferences during a period of Anglo-American rapprochement. The intra-alliance bargaining power framework explains when allies pursue their own (potentially diverging) interests, but is not necessarily linked to an antagonistic great power relationship.52 Like Deakin’s decision to invite the US fleet in 1908, Lyons’s decision to adopt trade diversion was underpinned by his assessment that Australia maintained greater intra-alliance bargaining power on this issue than Great Britain. In practical terms, this was based on his evaluation that the Government could pursue Australia’s interests in the United States, with minimal concern that it would jeopardise imperial economic and security benefits. Lyons was certainly conscious of Australia’s continuing economic and strategic dependence on Great Britain, particularly given Australia’s vulnerability in what had become a more volatile international climate. Economically Australia also remained dependent on Great Britain as a source of finance. In 1937, Australia maintained a total external debt of £735.5 million, £689 million of which was drawn from British loans.53 With few alternative lending sources available, Australian policymakers—specifically, Gullet, Casey and then High Commissioner to the United Kingdom Stanley Bruce—were conscious of avoiding default on these loans to maintain British investor confidence.54 Britain also remained Australia’s largest export market, which was essential to financing these loans. As economic historian Tim Rooth observes: ‘[i]f bargaining leverage is to be measured by relative trade dependence, that of Britain should have been immense’.55 Given Australia’s reliance on its economy to support national rearmament, Australia’s economic dependence on Great Britain only further entrenched its already significant strategic dependence on that power. Australia continued to rely on the British not only for protection against invasion but also for protection of its international commerce through sea lanes of communication to Great Britain.56 Both Lyons and Parkhill were conscious that this was a task that could only be undertaken by the Royal Navy, with limited support from the dominions.57 In a paper that Parkhill sent to Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence Sir Maurice Hankey, the Commonwealth Government declared: ‘Australian Defence is inseparably bound up with Empire Defence, and the plans for its own security are inseparable from the plans for the security of the Empire as a whole’.58 Casey pronounced in 1937 that Australia’s policy was ‘based on the belief that the British fleet, or some appreciable portion of it will be able to move freely eastwards in case we in Australia get into trouble in our part of the world’.59 Britain’s ability to provide for the security of the empire and to protect sea lanes to the Far East was brought into question, however, by the prospect of a German-Italian axis in Europe, and a concurrent and growing Japanese threat in the Far East.60 A close GermanItalian relationship was problematic for the Royal Navy, which depended on free access through the Mediterranean to reach distant parts of the Empire.61 At the same time, Japanese regional adventurism seemed likely, with growing militarist influences within the Japanese government; Japan’s rapid naval rearmament; and its decision to join the anti-Comintern

Pact.62 The anti-Comintern Pact, concluded between Germany and Japan in November 1936, was directed against the Communist International movement and implicitly against the Soviet Union. Given this strategic alliance between Germany and Japan, the Lyons Government, like Deakin’s in 1908, feared that, if the British were embroiled in a European conflict that left a power vacuum in the Far East, Japan was likely to take the opportunity to fill it.63 Throughout 1936 and 1937, Australian policymakers were therefore preoccupied with the relative British commitment to Pacific defence. Whitehall assured the Lyons Government that resources would be made ‘available for the disposal of and for the benefit of any part of the British Empire that was attacked’.64 Yet both Lyons and Parkhill were concerned about whether Britain would have the capacity to provide for Far Eastern defence in the event of a Pacific war and whether such assistance would be timely.65 Vague British assurances prompted the Lyons Government to intensify its national rearmament efforts, particularly after the 1937 Imperial Conference.66 In the economic sphere, Britain’s weakening commitment to the Ottawa system, in light of British efforts to stimulate production in its own agricultural industries, made it less able to absorb primary products from the empire.67 Australian abandonment fears were therefore prominent in both the strategic and economic arenas. These circumstances suggest that intra-alliance bargaining power should have overwhelmingly favoured Great Britain and that British preferences should have been a dominant influence in determining Australian policy toward the United States. However, this was qualified by the value Lyons attached to Australia’s interest in withdrawing from economic cooperation with the United States. Despite British resistance to trade diversion, Lyons confidently pursued Australia’s interest in the United States with little concern that it could damage the imperial alliance. This is analogous to what Snyder terms greater intraalliance bargaining power, although Lyons did not consciously think in these terms: he simply thought that Australia could get away with it. It was not until mid-1937 that his evaluation of Australia’s intra-alliance bargaining power changed, leading to greater Australian deference to British preferences and ultimately ending trade diversion. The trade diversion episode therefore raises important questions about how Australia came to develop such different interests toward the United States and why it valued these so highly given its intensifying abandonment fears. Why did Australia demonstrate such independence at a time when it was so concerned with procuring a stronger British commitment to the Far East?

Australia’s Interest in a Rising United States Australia’s interest in tactically withdrawing from cooperation with the United States stemmed largely from factors inherent in the Australian-American relationship, rather than the imperial alliance. In 1936 and 1937, Lyons was grappling with how to reconcile Australia’s economic interests in the United States with its long-term strategic interests

toward that country. Lyons had already defined these long-term strategic interests in terms of cultivating a stronger security relationship with Washington.68 Yet, the Lyons Government’s immediate economic goal of redressing Australia’s adverse balance of trade with the United States was pushing it in the opposite direction. By instigating the trade diversion policy, Lyons sought to compel Washington to enter trade negotiations and to grant reciprocal market access.69 Trade diversion was not directed at abrogating the relationship, but at creating a relationship that would better accommodate Australian economic interests. Disengagement was therefore only a subset of a longer term engagement-based approach toward the United States, resting on Australian security imperatives. The imperial alliance did shape Australia’s interests in the United States—both the disengagement component and efforts to retain a broader engagement-based approach toward the United States—but in more subtle ways than complying with London’s preferences. Breakdown in Shared Expectations The growing prominence of economic disputes in the Australian-American relationship after 1935 was based on Lyons’s own changing priorities. With powerful dissenting voices in Cabinet, the Prime Minister exercised decisive influence on this issue.70 Understanding why Lyons was influenced by Gullett’s arguments in April 1936 is critical to understanding how Australia’s interest in withdrawing from cooperation with the United States came about, despite countervailing British foreign policy trends. In early 1936, the Prime Minister was deeply concerned about another future Australian economic crisis. In the 1934/35 financial year, Australia had failed to meet its interest obligations on its British loans and was forced to draw further on these funds. Given Australia’s continuing dependence on Great Britain as a source of finance, Lyons recognised the importance of meeting Australia’s interest and loan repayments to maintain British confidence and ensure a continuing flow of British capital into Australia.71 In March 1936, Casey wrote to Bruce, outlining a range of potential policy options to overcome this challenge, including a general tariff on imports.72 Both Casey and Bruce concluded that imposing such a tariff would lead to an adverse British response.73 By May 1936, Casey had become more optimistic about the future of Australia’s balance of payments and at least initially opposed legislative efforts to redress the situation.74 This optimism, however, did not pervade the rest of the Cabinet. Gullett explained to United Kingdom High Commissioner to Australia Geoffrey Whiskard that he feared that ‘if a Labor [ALP]Government were to come into power, they would take the excuse of the burden imposed on them by overseas indebtedness to repudiate, and once that had been done it would be final and payments would never be resumed’.75 Lyons was also concerned that a drought or downward trend in export prices could again jeopardise Australia’s balance of payments position. He was therefore swayed by Gullett’s arguments that structural steps needed to be taken to stabilise Australia’s loan withdrawals from London to prevent the need for further repudiation.76 In opposition to Casey, Lyons therefore supported Gullett’s proposal for a licensing system that would stabilise Australia’s long-term balance of payments position

by diverting trade from the United States and Japan.77 Ironically, preserving Australia’s longterm financial relationship with Great Britain necessitated that it diverge from London’s preferences toward the United States by adopting trade diversion. Trade diversion rectified any future balance of payments crisis and therefore preserved Australia’s financial relationship with Great Britain in three ways. First, it reduced Australian expenditure by decreasing imports from ‘bad customers’, such as the United States, with whom Australia maintained an adverse trade balance. Second, it increased the market share available for ‘good customers’, which might reciprocally expand access to Australian exports.78 By facilitating a greater British market share in automotives and manufactured goods, the Lyons Government hoped to expand Australia’s exports of primary goods to that country and generate additional revenue.79 Finally, by curbing US imports, the Government sought to use the opportunity to build a domestic manufacturing base that would reduce Australia’s overall reliance on imports over the longer term and contribute to rearmament.80 The calculations underpinning this strategy, however, were driven by Lyons’s conviction that the United States could not be convinced to negotiate on the bilateral trade balance. He was profoundly disappointed by what he perceived as US intransigence. Between 1934 and 1936, the Lyons Government had made several entreaties to the United States to commence negotiations on a trade treaty that would result in concessions on primary products, but with few tangible results.81 In October 1935, Lyons warned Moffat that, without trade concessions, Australia would have to resort to import quota restrictions to redress the balance of trade.82 Yet Moffat continued to reiterate to Lyons and Pearce the political difficulties of conducting negotiations on competitive items at this early stage of the US trade liberalisation program.83 The Roosevelt administration was unwilling to compromise its trade liberalisation project to accommodate Australia’s balance of payment concerns. The subsequent breakdown in what the Australians had presumed to be shared expectations about how trade should be managed within the overall relationship was grounded in the two countries’ different views about how trade liberalisation should occur in the international system. Both countries were committed to trade liberalisation. However, the Australians privileged preferential reciprocal bargaining. As a longstanding ‘good customer’ of US exports, Lyons and Gullett believed that the United States had a moral duty to reciprocate by extending concessions to Australia. In Lyons’s letter to Hull justifying trade diversion, he explained: ‘there is a growing feeling in this country … we have not received from the United States that measure of practical reciprocity which the high position Australia has always held as an overseas market of the United States has entitled to respect’.84 The Roosevelt administration’s failure to extend reciprocal concessions led the Lyons Government to assess that US platitudes about trade liberalisation were a false pretence for advancing narrow US economic interests.85 The Roosevelt administration had adopted a fundamentally different approach to trade liberalisation, distinct from the Ottawa reciprocal preference system. The 1934 Trade Agreement Act extended most favoured nation (MFN) status to all importers of a particular item rather than just the principal negotiating party. The US approach to trade liberalisation

was based on egalitarian and not reciprocal preferential commercial concessions. Hull hoped this would lead to general reduction of tariff barriers worldwide.86 As Moffat explained to Pearce in October 1935, ‘there was something far broader in Mr Hull’s mind than mere tariff bargaining … The ultimate solution lay along the lines of generalisation of concessions, and universalising increases in trade, and only if a country discriminated against us would it fail to get the benefits we gave’.87 Given this differing approach to trade liberalisation, Hull found it difficult to understand Lyons’s normative arguments about why Australia should receive additional trade concessions.88 With both countries at odds over the principles of trade liberalisation, they had different interpretations of what constituted appropriate behaviour to address Australia’s adverse trade balance. What Lyons perceived as US intransigence led him to conclude there was little choice but to pursue trade concessions through other means. Through coercive economic tactics, Lyons and his ministers hoped to ‘induce the United States Government to view Australian trading relationships in a more favourable light’.89 Far from prompting Washington to negotiate, however, trade diversion led the United States, in turn, to withdraw Australia’s MFN trading privileges. This had limited practical effect on Australian trade, but was an important symbolic gesture. While the breakdown of a workable shared understanding on trade led Australia to temporarily withdraw from economic cooperation with the United States, underlying strategic imperatives for cooperation encouraged the Government to preserve the fundamental political fabric of the relationship. Lyons was genuinely shocked by the extent of the negative US response to trade diversion, expecting that the Australian-American economic relationship could be compartmentalised from the broader political and security relationship. Shortly after the introduction of trade diversion, Lyons wrote to Hull that the policy was not implemented in a spirit of ‘unfriendliness’.90 Trade diversion might compel the United States to enter into negotiations on a trade agreement, which would, in turn, connote other ‘advantages arising in the Pacific from economic friendship with the USA’.91 He subsequently implemented measures to mitigate negative implications for other aspects of the relationship, including the appointment of an Australian liaison officer to Washington in June 1936 ‘to offset any misunderstanding which might have resulted from the Commonwealth’s trade diversion policy’.92 Longer-term strategic imperatives underpinned the Lyons Government’s broad engagement-based approach toward the United States, of which disengagement was only a tactical ploy to enhance Australia’s long-term economic interests. Like Deakin, Lyons believed that longer-term strategic cooperation with the United States, far from undermining the British Empire, was essential to preserving Australia’s strategic interests in regional order, and the future global and regional primacy of the British Empire. Australia’s Strategic Interests and Enduring Imperatives for Cooperation By the 1930s, Australian policymakers were increasingly conscious that future developments in the Pacific would profoundly impact Australian security and, increasingly, the Australian

economy. The emergence of the United States and Japan as formidable economic and strategic competitors to the British Empire focused Australian attention on the region.93 The Prime Minister recognised the importance of Australia’s relationships with both regional powers, demonstrated by his initiative to send Minister for External Affairs John Latham on an ‘Australian Eastern Mission’ in 1934, and his decision to send Australian liaison officers to Washington and Tokyo in 1936. By 1936, growing concern about a potential Japanese military threat was forcing Lyons to examine how principles of collective security and imperial defence, which he espoused in a global context, might be applied regionally. Like Deakin, Lyons was developing a distinctively Australian perspective on how to maintain the security of the British Empire in the Far East and what constituted Australia’s strategic interests in regional affairs. He remained committed to applying collective security principles in a regional context. At the 1937 Imperial Conference, Lyons proposed a regional pact for non-aggression (or Pacific pact). Following Japan’s abrogation of the Washington Treaty, Lyons hoped the pact would forestall regional hostilities by securing pledges of non-aggression.94 Lyons’s initiative was also directed at institutionalising the Washington Treaty’s naval armament ratios, favouring Great Britain and the United States, after the Treaty lapsed. Following a conversation with Lyons in 1935, Moffat wrote: ‘the idea … was based on a recognition of the present status quo in the Pacific as the normal balance of strength which all countries should undertake to respect’.95 Although it never came to fruition, the so-called Pacific pact was as much about preserving a favourable regional power balance as it was about averting conflict. Like Deakin, Lyons sought to preserve a regional power balance that favoured the English-speaking democracies. Certainly, Lyons wanted to do so by maintaining a strong British regional presence—if not pre-eminence—in the Pacific. He recognised that if collective security regimes disintegrated, Australia would rely on Great Britain for its defence. The Royal Navy would be essential to securing Australia’s sea lanes of communication and to potentially preventing an invasion of the Australian mainland.96 The Lyons Government therefore pressed the British Government to hasten construction of the Royal Navy’s Singapore base and to provide a more detailed and specific commitment to the Pacific.97 Yet, Lyons, in particular, remained sceptical that such a commitment would be forthcoming, particularly if Great Britain was preoccupied with Germany.98 In lieu of a firmer British commitment to the Far East, Lyons sought, as early as 1935, to also cultivate the United States to potentially supplement British naval power in the Pacific and to help underwrite the regional balance of power.99 He was acutely conscious that an Anglo-American defensive arrangement during peacetime could preserve Anglo-American naval dominance in the Pacific and deter Japanese aggression.100 By deterring Japan, as well as providing additional capability in the event of war, an Anglo-American entente would allow Australia to more narrowly focus its efforts on those strategic interests closer to home. These included maintaining the Southwest Pacific as an exclusive preserve for British bases and protecting the Australian mainland against raids through local defence measures.101

Why did Australia look to the United States as a ‘friendly’ power to help underwrite the regional balance of power? This is a particularly interesting question given that Australian perceptions of the United States as a benign regional power were more qualified in the mid1930s than they had been at the turn of the century. For the first time, the United States posed a challenge to Great Britain at the global, and not just the regional, level. Yet, Lyons and his ministers still regarded the United States as less objectionable than Germany and Japan. Most critically, and in contrast to these powers, they believed US aims were essentially consistent with Australian strategic interests. Unlike Germany and Japan, the United States did not directly challenge the British Empire. Although individuals in the Lyons Cabinet differed in their regard for the United States, this view was held by Lyons and other prominent ministers.102 There were few situations that Lyons and his ministers could envisage in which the British Empire and the United States would enter into hostilities. In part, this was because of a shared cultural and linguistic heritage, and common democratic values. Lyons told his confidante, Leo Buring, that if he was forced to choose between Tokyo or Washington, he would choose the latter because of a similarity of traditions and culture.103 To Australian policymakers, cultural and political similarities led to predictability in US foreign policy, which contrasted with Germany and Japan. In further contrast to these countries, the United States was perceived as having only limited revisionist aims in the international system. The Australians resented those US initiatives they perceived as weakening British prestige in the international system, such as insistence on parity with Great Britain in numbers of naval cruisers and the 1934 Trade Agreement Act.104 As in 1908, however, Australian policymakers still viewed the United States as a stakeholder in British-led international institutions. Unlike Japan, the United States continued to adhere to the Washington Treaty. Moreover, in no instance did the United States use force to pursue its claims to great power status. Washington consistently demonstrated its willingness to employ negotiation and arbitration to resolve disputes with Great Britain. This approach was particularly evident in Anglo-American and AustralianAmerican negotiations over Southwest Pacific territorial claims. While the Lyons Government did not view American claims to the Southwest Pacific islands favourably, the US propensity to negotiate these claims with Great Britain rendered its behaviour less threatening to Australian strategic interests than might have otherwise been the case.105 The Lyons Government sought conciliation with Germany and Japan, but Australia’s strategic polices toward those powers were appeasement rather than engagement. The aim was to prevent those powers from disrupting the regional status quo rather than developing a basis for long-term and expanding cooperation. This was in sharp contrast to the Lyons Government’s dealings with the United States: Lyons’s and his ministers’ perceptions of relatively benign US intentions underpinned an engagement-based approach. Lyons actively sought to cultivate a long-term and deeper relationship with that country to restore a durable power balance in the Pacific. To that end, Lyons, like Deakin, wanted to broker a defensive cooperative understanding

between the British Empire and the United States in the Pacific. He discussed this during his meeting with President Roosevelt in Washington in 1935. Roosevelt reassured Lyons that while the American people would never consent to participation in a purely European war, ‘let there be one hint of trouble in the Pacific and they’d swing overnight’.106 He explained that, in the event the British were wholly engaged in Europe, ‘Australia, in his view, need never fear isolation. Australia was a natural base that no Pacific power could afford to have in hostile hands. America would always come to her aid’.107 Lyons recounted this conversation at the 1937 Imperial Conference, explaining that, ‘Mr Roosevelt had told him that if serious trouble arose in the Pacific the United States would be prepared to make common cause with the members of the Commonwealth concerned’.108 Significantly, Lyons viewed potential US assistance in terms of support for the British Commonwealth in the Pacific, not just Australia—he never regarded this initiative as being at the expense of the Anglo-Australian relationship.109 Instead, he saw it as the first step toward forging a broader Anglo-American defensive cooperative understanding. As historian David Bird observes: ‘the defence assurances of 1935 were far from a guarantee’ but they suggested that ‘some possibility now existed that the American eagle may supplement that of the British lion in an echo of Deakin’s time’.110 There were still questions about the level of US assistance the British Empire could expect and under what circumstances. In a review prepared for the 1937 Imperial Conference, the Australian liaison officer in Washington, Keith Officer, observed the ‘policy of the United States can hardly be described otherwise than being more isolationist than ever’.111 Yet, Lyons was more optimistic.112 This was demonstrated by his assiduous efforts to procure US support for regional security in response to an increasingly dangerous Japanese threat between 1935 and 1937. With the right approach, he believed the United States could be encouraged to contribute to a regional order that favoured Australian strategic interests. The deterrent effects of an Anglo-American entente would help to preserve a regional order in which the British Empire maintained a leadership role. The imperial alliance therefore did shape Australia’s long-term engagement-based approach as well as its temporary disengagement strategy but in more subtle ways than compliance with British preferences toward the United States. While disengagement was primarily a response to a breakdown in Australian and US shared expectations about how to manage the bilateral economic relationship, it emerged, in part, because of Australian dependence on Great Britain for finance and the need to preserve that link. At the same time, Lyons sought to preserve a political and strategic relationship with Washington because he believed the United States could be persuaded to act in ways that were consistent with Australian strategic interests, including maintaining an important role for the British Empire in regional order. This subtle role of the imperial alliance in shaping Australia’s interests toward the United States is not to say that British preferences and policies toward the United States did not have any influence. Although trade diversion did not align with British preferences, it did depend on certain facilitative conditions within the alliance. What were these conditions that enabled

Lyons to pursue trade diversion for such a long time?

Trade Diversion Policy and the Alliance Political Halo Although at odds with British preferences, Lyons’s decision to adopt and persist with trade diversion was not made in disregard for the imperial alliance. In 1936, Australia was, more than ever, a fundamentally risk-averse junior ally. While Lyons conceived of a distinctive Australian commercial and foreign policy based on the country’s geographic location in the Pacific, he and his ministers viewed Australian policy as interdependent, rather than independent of the actions and policies of the British Empire as a whole.113 The Lyons Government framed trade diversion in these terms. In this context, the interesting question is why Lyons thought he would be able to reconcile trade diversion with Australia’s reputation for alliance loyalty, given Britain’s diverging policies of economic rapprochement toward the United States. In line with Snyder’s framework of intra-alliance bargaining power, Lyons attached a high value to his interest in tactically withdrawing from cooperation with the United States, even though it contended with Australia’s asymmetric dependence on Great Britain. Although Lyons did not consciously think in these terms, the relative weight he assigned to this interest, and to subsequently pursuing trade diversion, was based on his assessment of where the locus of dependence fell. Would British officials assess Australia’s alliance loyalty on the basis of Australia’s ability to meet its debt repayments and foster intra-imperial trade or, alternatively, on coordinated foreign policy toward the United States? The British did not necessarily have to endorse Australia’s trade diversion policy, but it was important they acquiesced to it. Lyons’s beliefs about British acquiescence were based on his interpretation of evolving shared intra-imperial understandings about Australia’s alliance contribution. By the late 1930s, the British Empire was evolving further toward the construct of Imperial Federation that Deakin had espoused at the turn of the century. Although Lyons and his ministers still conceived of the Empire as a civilisational entity based on shared ancestry and a common political heritage, they also increasingly viewed it as an economic and strategic alliance in an increasingly competitive international system.114 Economically, the empire offered trade prospects at a time when other countries were adopting autarchic trading practices.115 Strategically, the Lyons Government wanted to work with Great Britain and other dominions to strengthen the British Empire sufficiently to deter rival powers from instigating war and to protect imperial sea lanes of communication.116 At the 1937 Imperial Conference, Lyons highlighted this shift toward a greater strategic focus for empire, declaring that, ‘it [is] essential for the British Commonwealth and for the peace of the world that we should be strong enough to provide for the defence of the Empire and its vital interests and to meet our international obligations’.117 Parkhill went further, arguing that, ‘[i]f we wish to flourish in peace we must be strong enough to deter those who seek to profit by war’.118 The shift to an overriding economic and strategic purpose for the empire, in addition to a

civilisational one, was also hastened by changes to imperial organisation. The 1926 Balfour Declaration recognised that Great Britain and the dominions were equal in status and Great Britain’s 1931 Statute of Westminster granted the dominions formal administrative control over their foreign affairs. Following from these milestones, and similar to what Deakin had advocated at the 1907 Colonial Conference, imperial relationships increasingly resembled sovereign governments in alliance rather than metropole–colony relationships.119 While there were still mutual expectations of support, ‘no part of the Empire could by its actions impose automatic obligations on any other part’.120 With greater dominion purview over defence and foreign affairs, came associated problems of maintaining imperial unity—what Deakin had represented as recentralisation. Conscious of Britain’s relative decline, Lyons believed that the empire could only viably continue to exist and promote the security and prosperity of its members through the interdependent and coordinated cooperation of its parts.121 Against this backdrop, Lyons and his ministers conceived of Australia’s alliance contribution in terms of contributing to interdependent economic and strategic cooperation. This did not mean Australia had to comply with British preferences, but changes in intraimperial organisation led Australia to aspire to unified imperial policies shaped by both British and dominion voices.122 Australia would also work with Great Britain and the other dominions to bring the empire’s larger strategic and economic goals to fruition. Lyons conceived of Australia’s various alliance contributions in these terms. For instance, while still relying on the Royal Navy as its first line of defence, Australia could contribute its local defence capabilities to imperial naval defence and to defending Australia against enemy raids that evaded the British main fleet.123 Lyons and Parkhill also believed Australia could contribute to imperial strategic goals by supplying raw materials, munitions and aircraft.124 This vision of Australia as a contributor to an interdependent and stronger empire extended to trade: by providing reciprocal trading advantages, Great Britain and the dominions could build a powerful trading bloc. As Lyons observed at the 1935 Prime Ministers’ Summit,‘[Ottawa’s] immediate and particular intent was the quickening and growth of inter-Empire trade, but its higher aim was to make a substantial contribution to all that is embraced by the term British Empire’.125 Australia was both a contributor to, and beneficiary of, imperial economic interdependence. While Australia was one of the largest markets for British manufactured goods, Britain reciprocally absorbed the vast bulk of Australia’s primary produce. Any diminution of Britain’s capacity to export manufactured goods would lead to a reduced capacity to purchase Australian raw materials.126 Trade diversion was not only predicated on this economic interdependence but also justified in these terms. Even though the policy was more narrowly based on maintaining Australia’s balance of payments position, the Lyons Government couched it in terms of contributing to an economically stronger empire. By diverting trade from the United States to Great Britain, the Lyons Government emphasised that trade diversion would provide Britain with a greater Australian market share.127 With a more substantial Australian market, Lyons and his ministers believed that Great Britain’s Board of Trade would not only acquiesce to trade diversion but also grant reciprocal trade concessions to Australia during the Ottawa

review process in 1938.128 Trade diversion would also yield tertiary benefits to Britain by enhancing Australia’s capacity to develop its secondary industries and rearm.129 Australia would therefore be able to contribute to the British Empire by providing munitions, vehicles and aircraft during a war. Lyons was certainly conscious that London might raise concerns about the policy—a concern that was borne out by Page’s and Menzies’ discussions with Runciman in May 1936. Nonetheless, by appealing to shared understandings of alliance contribution based on economic interdependence, the Lyons Government hoped to persuade the British to acquiesce in this disengagement strategy and thereby mitigate damage to Australia’s reputation for alliance loyalty. It was this assumption that initially encouraged Lyons to so highly value his interest in withdrawing from economic cooperation with Washington. It also underpinned his perceptions of Australia’s relatively greater intra-alliance bargaining power on this issue. He correctly assessed that Australia cared more about pursuing trade diversion than London did in opposing it—particularly with the trade benefits that the policy bestowed on Great Britain. These perceptions were affirmed by London’s fractured response to the policy. The Board of Trade reacted negatively, chastising the Australian Government for not consulting beforehand.130 However, the Dominions Office responded more favourably, with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs declaring that we share your hope the policy on which the proposals are based will not only hope to solve the particular problems of Australia to which you refer but will also prove valuable stimulus to the revival of migration and Imperial cooperation generally and that it will strengthen the trade between the two countries.131 The Lyons Government’s arguments for trade diversion had successfully convinced the Dominions Office. Unaware of the relative subordinance of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in British Cabinet discussions, the Lyons Government concluded that trade diversion would ultimately be accepted, if not endorsed, by the British Government.132 It was not until 1937 that Lyons’s perceptions of British acquiescence and, consequently, the value he assigned to his interest in trade diversion began to change. Abandoning Trade Diversion The deteriorating international situation caused Lyons to review his interpretation of the British response to trade diversion. During the 1937 Imperial Conference British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain made clear to Lyons the great importance that Britain assigned to concluding an Anglo-American trade agreement. Chamberlain believed that this agreement would not only improve prospects for peace by facilitating broader economic appeasement in Europe, but by suggesting Anglo-American unity, would also potentially deter revisionist powers.133 Yet, Washington predicated this agreement on the British dominions surrendering some of their Ottawa preferences.134 Further, if the British offered the United States such

concessions as part of an Anglo-American trade agreement, London would undermine the bargaining power that Australia derived from denying the United States economic advantages through trade diversion.135 If Australia wanted to secure concessions from the United States, it would have to commence negotiations with that country in parallel to the Anglo-American negotiations and, consequently, abandon its discriminatory trade diversion policy. Washington refused to enter trade negotiations with any country that discriminated against US trade.136 As British representations on Australia surrendering its Ottawa preferences intensified during the latter part of 1937, the Lyons Government found it increasingly difficult to withhold such preferences and to pursue trade diversion. A November 1937 Cabinet Paper argued that: In so far as the aim of this system is to divert trade to the United Kingdom there is hardly any doubt that the latter would be glad to see it go, particularly if it is an irritating factor with the United States and is likely to interfere with the smooth flow of negotiations … The British Government considers there is no factor in the international trade field more conducive to preserving peace than the maintenance of cordial relations between the British Commonwealth and the United States … To Britain, therefore, the matter is vital.137 By December 1937, Chamberlain was directly appealing to Lyons to surrender Australia’s Ottawa preferences so that Anglo-American negotiations could proceed.138 The evolving British position sharply curtailed Lyons’s perceptions that the British could be persuaded to accept Australia’s diverging economic policy toward the United States. The redefinition of British economic interests toward the United States also prevented Australian policymakers from couching trade diversion in terms of shared understandings of alliance contribution. The locus of what constituted a valuable alliance contribution had changed. Interdependent alliance contributions were reframed from building the economic strength of the British Empire to facilitating an Anglo-American economic and political rapprochement. Australian policymakers increasingly viewed the surrender of their Ottawa preferences, and abandonment of trade diversion, as central to their alliance contribution. This made it harder to reconcile trade diversion with maintaining Australia’s reputation for alliance loyalty. Lyons’s declining confidence that London would acquiesce in trade diversion lessened the value he assigned to withholding economic cooperation from the United States. Australia’s economic and strategic dependence on Great Britain and the Government’s abandonment fears assumed the more prominent role in shaping Australian policy. A November 1937 Cabinet Paper, brought forward by Page and endorsed by the Government, noted that if ‘the effort by the United Kingdom and the United States failed because Australia held back, there would be a revulsion of feeling in the United Kingdom against Empire trade’.139 The Lyons Government—most critically Lyons himself—recognised that Australia no longer had intra-alliance bargaining power on this issue. There would be significant

economic costs if Australia did not comply with British preferences and abandon both its Ottawa preferences and trade diversion. The Government consequently endorsed the Cabinet paper, recommending that, ‘with appropriate show of reluctance, we should not indicate our preparedness to engage in discussions with both the United Kingdom and the United States. It would, in fact, be most difficult to avoid doing so’.140 On 8 December 1937, the Government announced it would end trade diversion and replace it with more general (and less restrictive) duties to protect Australian industry.

Conclusion There are strong parallels between Deakin’s engagement strategy in 1908 and the Lyons Government’s disengagement strategy in 1936. Despite both prime ministers’ sentimentality toward empire, neither complied with British preferences nor even consulted with London before investigating their diverging policies toward the United States. In contrast to what power transition and alliance theorists would suggest, Australia’s sudden shift from engagement to disengagement in 1936 was less a factor of British preferences than it was of Australia’s own economic interests and the extent to which it was able to effectively negotiate differences with the United States. By allowing greater discretion for a junior ally’s interests to shape its foreign policy toward an external power, Snyder’s framework of intra-alliance bargaining power better accounts for the shift to disengagement in 1936. Australia’s diverging disengagement strategy was based on Lyons’s perceptions of Canberra having greater intra-alliance bargaining power than London, based on the high value he assigned to Australia’s interests in withdrawing from economic cooperation with the United States. This interest resulted from a breakdown in shared expectations with the United States about how to manage the bilateral economic relationship. Concurrently, there were also long-term imperatives for strategic cooperation with the United States. Although the Lyons Government adopted trade diversion, in part, to maintain its long-term financial relationship with Great Britain, the influence of the imperial alliance was also evident in factors propelling Australia into closer cooperation with the United States. This did not stem from British preferences but from Lyons’s belief there was merit in engaging with the United States to forge an Anglo-American defensive arrangement in the Pacific. This would help to deter revisionist powers and, ultimately, contribute to Australia’s strategic interest of maintaining a preeminent role for the British Empire. As demonstrated by the Lyons Government’s abandonment of trade diversion in 1937, however, Australia’s disengagement strategy was also predicated on facilitative conditions within the alliance. The value that Lyons attached to Australia’s interest in withdrawing from economic cooperation with the United States was predicated on what he perceived as British acquiescence in that policy. Lyons’s perceptions about British acquiescence were based on intra-imperial understandings of alliance contribution. He believed British acquiescence in Australia’s trade diversion policy would be forthcoming as long as Australia’s alliance

contribution was defined in terms of contributing to the British Empire’s economic strength. It was only when the locus of this contribution shifted to imperial foreign and economic policy toward the United States that the Prime Minister believed he had no other option but to comply with British preferences. Once the rising power became central to the goals of the alliance and how the Prime Minister viewed Australia’s alliance contribution, he regarded Australia’s intra-alliance bargaining power and autonomy in forging a policy toward that power as circumscribed. Australia had to conform to British preferences to maintain its reputation for alliance loyalty. Far from a response to growing Anglo-American rivalry, the Lyons Government’s disengagement strategy was much more a case of Australia learning to navigate differences in an increasingly separate relationship with the United States. The fact that the British had to force a rapprochement between Australia and the United States in 1937, in some ways, highlights the complexities of an Australian-American relationship that was starting to take an independent life. Although Australia was forced to surrender its Ottawa preferences and abandon trade diversion as a result of British representations, Canberra and Washington did not resolve the differences that led to the breakdown in shared expectations in the first place. For these reasons, the Australian-American relationship remained cordial but was not especially close after 1937. Strategic imperatives compelled closer cooperation during World War II, but there were still lingering differences and misunderstandings. It was not until Prime Minister Robert Menzies came to power in 1949 that issue-specific disputes were subsumed to building an overarching relationship and that Australia again embarked upon a concerted engagement campaign toward the United States.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9

Russell Parkin and David Lee, Great White Fleet to Coral Sea: Naval Strategy and the Development of Australian– United States Relations, 1900–1945 (Barton, ACT: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008), pp. 27–8. Parkin and Lee, Great White Fleet to Coral Sea, pp. 69–70. Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Diaries of Jay Pierrepont Moffat 1935–37, Harvard University Library, reel 7251, National Library of Australia (NLA), p. 57. ibid., p. 58. ibid., p. 57. United Kingdom High Commissioner to Australia, Geoffrey Whiskard, to Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, 19 May 1936, Public Records Office (PRO) Series: BT11/628. Australia–USA Commercial Negotiation Relations, 1934–38, NLA, Australia Joint Copying Project (AJCP), reel PRO 6945; Consul–General at Sydney (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State, 8 February 1935, in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), vol. 2 (1935) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 11–13. Whiskard to MacDonald, 19 May 1936. Lyons’s letter copied in Consul-General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State, 7 May 1936, FRUS, vol. 1 (1936) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 749 Whiskard to Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Sir Edward Harding, 27 April 1936, PRO Series: BT11/628. Australia–USA Commercial Negotiation Relations, 1934–38, NLA, AJCP, reel PRO 6945; ‘Telegram from the United Kingdom High Commissioner in the Commonwealth of Australia’, 16 April 1936, PRO Series: BT11/628. Australia–USA Commercial Negotiation Relations, 1934–38, NLA, AJCP, reel PRO 6945; Consul-General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State, 6 April 1936, FRUS, vol. 1 (1936), (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 745.

10

11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37

‘Note of conversation with Sir Henry Gullett, 27 April 1936’, enclosed in Whiskard to Harding, 27 April 1936, PRO Series: BT11/628. Australia–USA Commercial Negotiation Relations, 1934–38, NLA, AJCP, reel PRO 6945. On the Prime Minister’s support, see P Liesching to W Bankes Amery, 14 April 1936, PRO Series: BT11/628. Australia–USA Commercial Negotiation Relations, 1934–38, NLA, AJCP, reel PRO 6945; Moffat, Diaries of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, p. 307. On Casey’s opposition to the proposal, see ‘Telegram from the United Kingdom High Commissioner in the Commonwealth of Australia’, 16 April 1936. Chamberlain to Lyons, 6 December 1937, A2910, 437/5/120A PART I, National Archives of Australia (NAA). Moffat, Diaries of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, pp. 53, 57–65, 307; US Consul–General Pierrepont Moffat to JA Lyons, 19 May 1936, PRO Series: BT11/628. Australia–USA Commercial Negotiation Relations, 1934–38, NLA, AJCP, reel PRO 6945. David Bird, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian: Appeasement and Rearmament in Australia, 1932–39 (North Melbourne, Victoria: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2008), p. 115. ‘USA–Australia Commercial Negotiations’ enclosed in ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Cabinet, 15 December 1937’, A2694, 363, NAA. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 315–18. David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 1–5. ibid., p. 17. BJC McKercher, Transition of Power: Britain’s Loss of Global Preeminence to the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 108. Benjamin Rowland, Commercial Conflict and Foreign Policy: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, 1932–1938 (New York: Garland, 1987), p. 80. Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian–American Relations between 1900 and 1975 (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1987), p. 75. ibid., p. 76. ‘Speech by Mr JA Lyons, Prime Minister, to First Plenary Session of Imperial Conference’, 14 May 1937, in RG Neale (ed.), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (DAFP), 1937–49, vol. 1 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1975), p. 69. See, for example, Archdale Parkhill, ‘Statement of the Government’s Defence Policy Regarding the Defence of Australia’, 2 December 1935, (Canberra: LF Johnston, 1935), p. 5. Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two World Wars (London: Temple Smith, 1972), p. 89. John McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 1918–39: A Study in Air and Sea Power (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1976), p. 133. ‘Minutes of Fourth Meeting of Principal Delegates to Imperial Conference’, 22 May 1937, in Neale (ed.), DAFP, p. 77. See also Bird, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian, pp. 155; Parkhill, ‘Statement of the Government’s Defence Policy’, pp. 5–6. Archdale Parkhill, ‘The International Situation in Relation to Defence’, 4 February 1936 (Melbourne: HJ Green, 1936), p. 16. ‘Report by Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of Imperial Defence on Questions Raised by Australian Delegation to Imperial Conference’, 9 June 1937, in Neale (ed.), DAFP, 1937–49, vol. 1, p. 154. McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, p. 140; ‘Minutes of Meeting to Discuss Defence Questions’, 21 June 1937, in Neale (ed.), DAFP, 1937–49, vol. 1, p. 169. Archdale Parkhill, ‘The Imperial Conference 1937—Its Importance to Australian Defence’, 11 March 1937 (Melbourne: HJ Green, 1937), pp. 7–8. For ALP and Army views, see John Curtin, 25 August 1937, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), p. 102; Neil Gow, ‘Australian Army Strategic Planning, 1919–39’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 23(2), 1977, pp. 170–1. ‘Minutes of Meeting to Discuss Defence Questions’, pp. 166–9; Minister to Secretary of Naval Board, 6 November 1936, A1608, C5/1/10, NAA. ‘Minutes of Fourth Meeting of Principal Delegates to Imperial Conference’, p. 78. ‘Speech by Mr JA Lyons, Prime Minister, to First Plenary Session of Imperial Conference’, p. 69. ibid., p. 67. ‘Minutes of Fourth Meeting of Principal Delegates to Imperial Conference’, p. 77. This is evidenced by Lyons’s speculative, albeit optimistic, approach to US participation in a regional pact for non-

38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

aggression. ‘Minutes of Fourth Meeting of Principal Delegates to Imperial Conference’, p. 78. ‘Memorandum Prepared for Delegation to the Imperial Conference’, 11 May 1937, in Neale (ed.), DAFP, 1937–49, vol. 1, p. 63. Moffat, Diaries of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, p. 58. ‘Memorandum Prepared for Delegation to Imperial Conference’, 10 March 1937, in Neale (ed.), DAFP, 1937–49, vol. 1, p. 54. ‘Speech by Mr JA Lyons, Prime Minister, to First Plenary Session of Imperial Conference’, p. 65. Parkhill, ‘The Imperial Conference 1937—Its Importance to Australian Defence’, p. 8; ‘Speech by Mr JA. Lyons, Prime Minister, to First Plenary Session of Imperial Conference’, p. 69. David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937–41: A Study in Competitive Cooperation (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), p. 10. ibid., pp. 290–1. McKercher, Transition of Power, p. 176; M Ruth Megaw, ‘Australia and the Anglo-American Trade Agreement, 1938’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 3(2), 1975, p. 193. Rowland, Commercial Conflict and Foreign Policy, pp. 196–218. ‘Review of Relations between the United Kingdom and the USA’, 1936, CP4/2, 47, NAA. John B O’Brien, ‘Empire v. National Interests in Australian–British Relations During the 1930s’, Historical Studies, 22(89), 1987, p. 582. Earle Page, Truant Surgeon (Grafton, NSW: Examiner Print, 1959), p. 246. O’Brien, ‘Empire v. National Interests’, p. 582. Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 194–5. ibid., p. 171. Werner Levi, American–Australian Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1947), p. 127. ‘Note of Conversation with Sir Henry Gullett, 27 April 1936’, enclosed in Whiskard to Harding, 27 April 1936; Casey to Bruce, 23 March 1936, A1421, 1, NAA; Bruce to Casey, 13 March 1935, A1421, 3, NAA. Tim Rooth, ‘Ottawa and After’, in Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (eds), Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation to the Second World War (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000), p. 140. See, for example, Parkhill, ‘Statement of the Government’s Policy’, pp. 9–10; JA Lyons, ‘Defence Aspects of the Imperial Conference: Australian Position’, 28 July 1937 (Melbourne: HJ Green, 1937), p. 1. Archdale Parkhill, ‘The Imperial Conference 1937. Defence Aspect’, 29 July 1937 (Melbourne: HJ Green, 1937), p. 7; ‘Speech by Mr JA Lyons, Prime Minister, to Second Plenary Session of the Imperial Conference’, 15 June 1937, in Neale (ed.), DAFP, 1937–49, vol. 1, p. 165. ‘Summary of Papers and Questions on Defence Submitted by Delegation to Imperial Conference’, in Neale (ed.), DAFP, 1937–49, vol. 1, p. 57. RG Casey, ‘Australia in World Affairs’, Australian National Review, 2(7), 1937, p. 8. ‘Memorandum Prepared for Delegation to the Imperial Conference’, 10 March 1937, p. 41. Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, vol. 3 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937–58), p. 154. Moffat, Diaries of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, p. 393. ‘Review of Foreign Policy’, [probably 1937], A2938, 3, NAA. Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 141. Bird, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian, p. 91; ‘Minutes of Meeting to Discuss Defence Questions’, pp. 168–70. Bird, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian, p. 162. Rowland, Commercial Conflict and Foreign Policy, p. 80. Bird, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian, p. 115. Whiskard to Dominions Office, 28 July 1936, PRO Series; BT11/628. Australia–USA Commercial Negotiation Relations, 1934–8, NLA, AJCP, reel PRO 6945. P Liesching to W Bankes Amery, 14 April 1936; ‘Telegram from the United Kingdom High Commissioner to Australia’, 16 April 1936. Lyons to Chamberlain, 18 May 1936, A425, 1939/2673, NAA; Consul-General at Sydney (Moffat) to Secretary of State, 4 March 1936, FRUS, vol. 1 (1936) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 743. Casey to Bruce, 14 February 1936, A1421, 1, NAA; Casey to Bruce, 23 March 1936, A1421, 1, NAA. Casey to Bruce, 7 April 1936, A1421, 1, NAA; Casey to Bruce, 23 March 1936, A1421, 1, NAA; Bruce to Casey, 13 March 1935, A1421, 3, NAA.

74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105

106

Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend, pp. 74–5; Whiskard to W Bankes Amery, 16 April 1936, PRO Series: BT11/628. Australia–USA Commercial Negotiation Relations, 1934–38, NLA, AJCP, reel PRO 6945. ‘Note of Conversation with Sir Henry Gullett’ enclosed in Whiskard to Harding, 27 April 1936. Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend, p. 75; Lyons to Chamberlain, 18 May 1936, A425, 1939/2673, NAA. P Liesching to W Bankes Amery, 14 April; ‘Telegram from United Kingdom High Commissioner in the Commonwealth of Australia’, 16 April 1936. ‘The Trade Diversion Policy and its Bearing on Australia’s Trade with the United States’, undated, A5954, 1054/4, NAA; ‘Trade Diversion’, Page Papers, NLA, MS 1633, Box 26. Lyons to Chamberlain, 18 May 1936, A425, 1939/2673, NAA; Page to MacDonald, 6 July 1936, Page Papers, NLA, MS 1633, Box 230; Levi, American–Australian Relations, p. 133. ‘Note of a Conversation with the Prime Minister on 24th April 1936’, enclosed in Whiskard to Harding, 27 April 1936, PRO Series: BT11/628. Australia–USA Commercial Negotiation Relations, 1934–38, NLA, AJCP, reel PRO 6945. Memorandum by the Secretary of State, 9 July 1935, FRUS, vol. 2 (1935) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 13–15. Moffat, Diaries of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, p. 53. ibid., pp. 54, 60–1; The Consul-General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State, 4 March 1936, FRUS, vol. 1 (1936) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 742–3. Lyons’s letter copied in Consul-General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State, 7 May 1936, FRUS, vol. 1 (1936) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 749. ‘The Trade Diversion Policy and its Bearing on Australia’s Trade with the United States’, undated, A5954, 1054/4, NAA. Secretary of State to Consul-General at Sydney (Moffat), 10 April 1936, FRUS, vol. 1 (1936) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 746. Moffat, Diaries of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, p. 61. Raymond Esthus, From Enmity to Alliance: US–Australian Relations, 1931–41 (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 14–15. Lyons to Buring, 19 May 1936, A461, 323/1/4, NAA. Consul-General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State, 7 May 1936, FRUS, vol. 1 (1936) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 749. ‘Trade Negotiations with the USA’, probably 1938, Page Papers, NLA, MS 1633, Box 21. ‘Review of Relations between the United Kingdom and the United States’, 1936, CP4/2, 46, NAA. Harold Harris, Australia’s National Interests and National Policy (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1938), p. 123. ‘Memorandum Prepared by Delegation to Imperial Conference’, 28 May 1937, in Neale (ed.), DAFP, 1937–49, vol. 1, pp. 91–2. Moffat, Diaries of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, p. 55. ‘Speech by Mr JA Lyons, Prime Minister, to Second Plenary Session of Imperial Conference’, p. 165; Bird, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian, p. 30. ‘Minutes of Meeting to Discuss Defence Questions’, pp. 168–9. Bird, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian, pp. 30, 91. ibid., pp. 116. This was suggested by questions the Australia delegation asked and statements made during the 1937 Imperial Conference. ‘Memorandum Prepared by Delegation to Imperial Conference’, 28 May 1937, p. 93. On the role of local defence in providing deterrence and defence against raids, see Parkhill, ‘Statement of the Government’s Policy’, pp. 10–12. Bird, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian, pp. 110, 116; Peter Heydon, Quiet Decision: A Study of George Foster Pearce (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), p. 109; Casey, ‘Australia in World Affairs’, p. 7. Cited in Bird, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian, p. 121. Moffat, Diaries of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, p. 58–65. While Australia pressed British officials to negotiate with the Americans on terms that favoured Australia’s strategic interests, the British were reluctant to accommodate these demands. The territorial disputes shifted from complicating Australian–American relations to being a mere thorn in intra-imperial relations. On Southwest Pacific island disputes, see M Ruth Megaw, ‘The Scramble for the Pacific: Anglo-United States Rivalry in the 1930s’, Australian Historical Studies, 17(69), 1977, pp. 458–60. Enid Lyons, So We Take Comfort (London: Heinemann, 1965), p. 243.

107 108 109 110 111 112 113

114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140

Lyons, So We Take Comfort, p. 244. ‘Minutes of Fourth Meeting of Principal Delegates to Imperial Conference’, p. 81. Bird, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian, p. 116. ibid., p. 115. ‘Review of Relations between the United Kingdom and the United States’, 1936, CP4/2, 46, NAA. See, for example, ‘Minutes of Fourth Meeting of Principal Delegates to Imperial Conference’, pp. 80–1. RG Casey, ‘Australia’s Voice in Imperial Affairs’, in WGK Duncan (ed.), Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1938), p. 48; Frederick Shedden, ‘Chapter 96—Defence Policy in the Light of the London Discussions (1937)’, A5954/1, 1295/3, NAA. ‘Speech by Mr JA Lyons, Prime Minister, to the First Plenary Session of the Imperial Conference’, p. 65–8. ‘Imperial Conference, Prime Minister’s Statement’, A5954, 1073/1, NAA. Lyons, ‘Defence Aspects of the Imperial Conference: Australian Position’, pp. 3–4. ‘Prime Minister’s Concluding Speech, Imperial Conference’, A5954, 1049/4, NAA. Parkhill, ‘Statement of the Government’s Defence Policy’, p. 5. ibid., p. 65; ‘Speech by Mr JA Lyons, Prime Minister, to Second Plenary Session of Imperial Conference’, p. 163. Casey, ‘Australia’s Voice in Imperial Affairs’, pp. 45–6. ‘Speech by Mr JA Lyons, Prime Minister, to First Plenary Session of Imperial Conference’, pp. 67, 69; ‘Minutes of Fourth Meeting of Principal Delegates to Imperial Conference’, p. 78. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, p. 138. McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, p. 51. Lyons, ‘Defence Aspects of the Imperial Conference: Australian Position’, pp. 5–6; Parkhill, ‘The Imperial Conference 1937. Defence Aspect’, pp. 6–7. Cited in O’Brien, ‘Empire v. National Interests’, p. 570. ‘Memorandum of Conclusions Reached in the Trade Discussions Between Representatives of His Majesty’s Government and Australia’, Page Papers, NLA, MS 1633, Box 25. ‘Note of a Conversation with the Prime Minister on 24th April 1936’, enclosed in Whiskard to Harding, 27 April 1936. Lyons to Bruce, 16 May 1936, Page Papers, NLA, MS 1633, Box 25. Bird, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian, p. 166. O’Brien, ‘Empire v. National Interests’, p. 582. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to PM’s Department, 20 May 1936, A425, 1939/2673, NAA. O’Brien, ‘Empire v. National Interests’, p. 578. ‘For press 23 November 1937’, November 1937, A461, 323/1/4, NAA; Message from Chamberlain to Lyons, 6 December 1937, A2910, 437/5/120A PART I, NAA. ‘USA–Australia Commercial Negotiations’, enclosed in ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Cabinet, 15 December 1937’, A2694,363, NAA. Prime Minister’s Department to the High Commissioner, London, 9 December 1937, Page Papers, NLA, MS 1633, Box 22. Prime Minister’s Department to Bruce, 26 November 1937, Page Papers, NLA, MS 1633, Box 22; Bruce to PM Department, 9 December 1937, Page Papers, NLA, MS 1633, Box 22. Earle Page, ‘United Kingdom–United States Trade Negotiations and their Empire Significance’, 24 November 1937, A1667, 430/B/52E, NAA. Chamberlain to Lyons, 6 December 1937, A2910, 437/5/120A PART I, NAA. Earle Page, ‘United Kingdom–United States Trade Negotiations and their Empire Significance’, 24 November 1937, A1667, 430/B/52E, NAA. ibid.

CHAPTER 5 Menzies, Spender and the New Pacific Power

The 1942 fall of Singapore to Japanese forces during World War II forever altered Australia’s strategic assumptions, which had been based on British primacy in the Far East. It confirmed longstanding Australian suspicions that Great Britain would not be able to protect its interests in the Far East if it was also fighting a war in Europe. Shortly before, in December 1941, Australian Labor Prime Minister John Curtin (1941–45) published an article in the Melbourne Herald, declaring: ‘Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom’.1 This statement is often portrayed as a turning point in Australian foreign policy, signifying the transfer of loyalties from Great Britain to a more powerful US protector.2 Yet, as a revisionist school of historians has argued, this portrayal obscures the complexity of Australian foreign policy during the 1940s and 1950s.3 Curtin’s appeal to the United States was an acknowledgement of Australia’s strategic reliance on it as the now dominant Pacific power, but that did not translate into a commensurately strong Australian-American political relationship. Canberra made few efforts to deepen the relationship beyond the wartime military partnership and focused instead on future intra-imperial relations. Longstanding irritants in Australian-American relations persisted, including Australia’s preferential trade with Great Britain and disagreements over the use of Southwest Pacific military bases.4 While the postwar Labor Chifley Government sought to establish closer defence relations, this was not embedded within a broader engagement strategy directed at improving the overall political relationship. This was partly because of different Australian and US worldviews about how to manage global order, which inhibited a common focus for the relationship. Australian Minister for External Affairs Herbert Evatt privileged the role of the United Nations in managing global security and pitched Canberra as a mediator between the United States and Soviet Union.5 The US Government viewed Evatt’s mediatory efforts with suspicion, as its own containment strategy toward the Soviet Union was crystallising.6 It was not until the Liberal-National Party Coalition Government, under Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1949–66), was elected in December 1949 that Australia made concerted efforts to deepen the overall Australian-American political relationship as a way of enhancing strategic relations.7 In his first major foreign policy speech to Parliament, Minister for External Affairs Percy Spender declared that it was the Government’s objective to ‘build up with the United States somewhat the same relationship as exists within the British Commonwealth’ and ‘where our general objectives coincide, we shall seek to have done with

petty disagreements and follow broad avenues of cooperation’.8 Spender became the chief architect of a new Pacific pact proposal, which culminated in what later became known as the ANZUS Treaty, signed on 1 September 1951. This Treaty established the ANZUS alliance— a tripartite reciprocal defence guarantee between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. In contrast to Evatt, Spender pursued a US security guarantee within a broader strategy of political engagement. He set about resolving outstanding bilateral disputes and cast Australia as a valuable supporter of US foreign policy objectives, both globally and regionally.9 His efforts to establish a long-term political relationship marked the end of Canberra’s ambiguous diplomacy toward Washington that had persisted since the Lyons Government’s trade diversion policy. Prime Minister Menzies provided Spender with considerable autonomy to pursue a Pacific pact, but still played a critical role in this shift to engagement. Most accounts of what later became known as the ANZUS negotiations downplay the role of the Prime Minister and portray Spender as courageously overcoming Menzies’ reluctance.10 Menzies was certainly cautious, advising Spender in August 1950 that Washington was unlikely to sign up to a Treaty and that there was no need for a Pacific pact as the Americans ‘are already overwhelmingly friendly to us’.11 On deeper examination, however, the final result of the negotiations—the ANZUS Treaty—was very much the product of Menzies’ and Spender’s political partnership. As Prime Minister, Menzies’ support for the initiative was crucial. Menzies maintained a strong interest in issues relating to foreign affairs and defence. As former Secretary of the Department of External Affairs Alan Watt recalls, in ‘these related fields the Prime Minister [had] strong convictions and, if there was a conflict of opinion, his views prevailed’.12 Menzies not only provided Spender with the leeway to conduct negotiations with Washington, but also supported the initiative in Cabinet and made representations to London protesting British interference in the negotiations. While the following Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey, also played a minor role in finalising the Treaty, he was essentially a defender of the work that Spender and Menzies had already done.13 Understanding the shift to deeper Australian engagement with the United States that resulted in ANZUS, and how this came about from within the imperial alliance, therefore warrants deeper exploration of Menzies’ and Spender’s thinking. Power transition theorists would attribute this shift in Australian foreign policy to the demonstrated strength of US military power relative to Great Britain during World War II. They would paint Australian diplomacy as a response to dissatisfaction with Great Britain as a security protector and an effort to realign with the United States after an Anglo-American power transition had occurred, both regionally and globally. This parsimonious explanation resonates to the extent that the Australians realised after World War II that they were strategically reliant on the United States. Yet, it does not account for the lag of almost ten years between the fall of Singapore and intense Australian engagement with the United States. Nor does it explain why the Menzies Government continued to foster the imperial relationship and, to some extent, even accommodated London’s concerns in relation to a proposed Pacific pact. These factors suggest that the relationship between the international

power distrbution and junior allies’ foreign policies toward rising powers is more complex than power transition theorists typically represent. Traditional alliance theory is equally difficult to apply for similar reasons as Australia neither fully bandwagoned with, nor did it balance against, either power. It wanted to strengthen relations with both. Snyder’s concept of intra-alliance bargaining power provides a more helpful lens through which to explain deeper Australian engagement with the United States. As in the Deakin and Lyons cases, it better represents the contending imperatives that Australian policymakers were grappling with at the time. Despite Great Britain’s relative decline, the Menzies Government recognised that Australia was still dependent on that power and was constrained by its desire to preserve the economic, diplomatic and strategic benefits it derived from the Commonwealth (still referred to by Australian politicians as, and hereafter termed ‘the British Commonwealth’).14 Australia was sensitive to alienating London, not least because of the close Anglo-American relationship and potential for Great Britain to obstruct any Pacific pact proposal through independent representations in Washington. Yet, as Snyder’s theory suggests, these constraints were offset by the value that Menzies and Spender assigned to deeper political and strategic cooperation with Washington. How did this interest evolve, given the challenges of deepening cooperation with the United States at a time when Great Britain was declining and was seeking political support from the wider British Commonwealth? How did Menzies and Spender balance their independent interest in cultivating an American security guarantee with Australia’s strategic interest in, and indeed the need to maintain a strong imperial relationship to bring the ANZUS Treaty to fruition? Spender’s initiative to pursue an American security guarantee was driven by the same factors that had prompted Deakin and Lyons to adopt an engagement-based approach toward the United States earlier in the century. Spender’s notion of a Pacific pact was not just about gaining a US security guarantee (although that was important): he believed that the time was opportune to cultivate the United States as a contributor to regional order. As in earlier decades, Australia wanted to encourage the United States to shape regional order in a way that favoured Australia’s strategic interests. Engaging the United States was even more important than in earlier periods, with Britain’s diminished capacity to wield substantive force in the Pacific and an intensifying communist threat in Europe and Asia. Menzies and Spender believed that only the United States, supplemented by the British Commonwealth, could deter communist expansion and provide for regional stability. This conclusion was predicated on the assumption that the United States was willing to work in partnership with the British Commonwealth. For these reasons, Menzies and Spender did not see any inherent tension between forging an American alliance and maintaining Australia’s imperial connection. Despite good intentions, however, Australia faced challenges in optimising its relationships with its two ‘great and powerful friends’. The British made known their concerns about a Pacific pact, including that it was injurious to British prestige in the Pacific.15 Yet Spender, supported by Menzies, continued to pursue the initiative on the basis that Britain might be persuaded to acquiesce over time to such a pact. Australia’s preference

for a Pacific pact, underpinned by a US security guarantee was consistent with evolving understandings of imperial contributions in the postwar world. These understandings were increasingly focused on regional decentralisation of imperial defence and local powers assuming greater defence responsibility. Menzies and Spender reasoned that a formal US alliance would render Australia more, not less able, to meet its imperial obligations both for local defence and for contributions to British Commonwealth operations further afield.16 It would just take time and cunning to convince the British and to prevent them from derailing the proposal. To understand how the Menzies Government navigated its two strategic alliances, this chapter is divided into three main sections. First, it explores the Anglo-American power transition in the postwar world and the extent to which these dynamics, or Britain’s own changing policies, influenced Australia’s shift to closer engagement with Washington. Second, it examines the role of the imperial alliance, among other factors, in shaping Australian foreign policy toward the United States at this time. If power transition theory assumptions are correct and Australia was aiming to realign with the United States, the imperial alliance should have featured less in Australian policymaking. How and why did it continue to be a significant factor? Third, the chapter reviews how the Menzies Government reconciled its interest in deepening cooperation with the United States with its membership of the British Commonwealth. It examines why Menzies and Spender were confident Australia could maintain both relationships concurrently. A short postscript follows, offering conclusions based on the preceding cases about how and why Australia was able to engage with a rising United States from within its imperial alliance during the early twentieth century.

Anglo-American Power Transition World War II hastened the decline of Pax Britannica and the emergence of Pax Americana. Yet, even after the war, the Anglo-American power transition was a gradual one and was perceived as such by Australian policymakers.17 In material power terms, Britain emerged from the war significantly weakened: it lost one-quarter of its national wealth, one-third of its merchant marine and 265 000 military personnel.18 The United States, however, emerged from the war wealthier than before as a result of full industrial mobilisation. The United States also had a technologically developed armed force and was the sole possessor of the atomic bomb. The material power differential between Britain and the United States widened further during the immediate postwar period, with Britain’s contracting economy and significant national debt. Both Menzies and Spender were well aware of Great Britain’s relative economic and military decline. They also recognised the implications of this economic decline for Britain’s ability to act as a global military player. On his visit to the United Kingdom in 1950, Australian Chief of the General Staff Sydney Rowell reported that British forces could not be deployed globally in the event of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union.19

Indeed, the British were forced to withdraw their peacekeeping forces in Greece and Turkey, with the US assuming this responsibility in 1947 under the Truman Doctrine. Based on a speech that US President Harry Truman delivered to Congress in 1947, the Truman Doctrine provided for US military, economic and political assistance to democratic countries under threat from authoritarian forces and, consequently, foreshadowed a larger US global role in maintaining international stability. The decline in British global and economic power, meanwhile, was not lost on Spender, who observed: ‘Great Britain is desperately weakened. Two wars have left her in such condition that alone she is quite incapable of defending herself against massive aggregation of power’.20 Menzies and Spender recognised that the United States and the Soviet Union had emerged from World War II as the materially strongest powers, with Britain as only a distant third.21 Yet while both men acknowledged that Great Britain was no longer a global hegemon, they still viewed it as a ‘pivotal’ power in the international system. They believed that the British Commonwealth, if united, was a major power and could continue to exercise decisive influence on world affairs.22 After all, it encompassed one-quarter of the world’s population and geographically covered large parts of Asia, the Middle East, the Caribbean and Latin America. It included a string of territories and garrisons astride vital sea lanes of communication. Menzies observed that, if ‘the British Empire is to be regarded as a series of separate even if respectable fragments’, then the future of Europe would be settled by contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. He argued, however, that if a united British Empire ‘acts as a great power, then it can not only alter the character of the contest, but it can make an immense contribution to European peace’.23 Like Lyons in the 1930s, Menzies and Spender also believed that Great Britain’s soft power would continue to render it a significant force in international affairs. They believed that, as a former world hegemon, Great Britain had considerable experience from which the United States could benefit.24 They also believed that Britain exercised moral leadership in the international system, as the founder of Western civilisation and parliamentary democracy.25 This moral leadership was deemed to be particularly important at a time when Western democratic culture was pitted against totalitarian communist forces during the onset of the Cold War. Global security was about not just military forces, but also securing hearts and minds through competing political ideologies. Based on this soft power, coupled with the still significant material power of the British Commonwealth, the Menzies Government viewed that entity and the United States as interdependent at the global level: neither could successfully counter the Soviet Union without the other.26 In the Pacific, this Anglo-American interdependent partnership was more limited. After the fall of Singapore, Australian defence planners recognised that Great Britain was no longer able to exercise substantive force in the Far East. In 1946, the Australian Chiefs of Staff concluded that Britain’s military and economic decline meant that Australia could not expect much assistance from that power. They observed that the United States was ‘the predominant Power in the Pacific and her immediate assistance to the British Empire in the event of war with Russia is of paramount importance’.27 Menzies and his ministers shared

this view. As Menzies wrote to New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland in 1951: ‘It is well known that the United Kingdom, for understandable reasons, has been obliged by circumstances to regard the Pacific area as predominantly an American responsibility’.28 Yet, while the United States was the strongest Pacific economic and military power, Australian perceptions of US regional dominance were still qualified by uncertainty about whether that power would commit its resources to regional defence. The 1947 Appreciation of the Strategic Position of Australia, a strategic guidance document endorsed by the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee, emphasised that the British Commonwealth could not rely on the ‘automatic assistance’ of the United States in a major war.29 By 1950, the Menzies Government had greater confidence that the United States was willing to underwrite Pacific security.30 In December 1949, US President Truman endorsed policy directive NSC48/2, which declared that ‘the gradual reduction and elimination of preponderant power and influence of Russia in Asia’ was a US foreign policy objective.31 America’s military contribution to the Korean War underscored its commitment to defeating communism in Asia. As the United States became more powerful than Great Britain, both globally and regionally, one would expect, in line with power transition theory, that US policies and preferences should have factored more and British policies and preferences should have featured less in the Menzies Government’s decision-making. Australia’s sense of abandonment by Great Britain during World War II should have led to dissatisfaction with that power and encouraged Canberra to realign with the United States as the dominant Pacific power. Yet, the Menzies Government endeavoured to maintain close relationships with both powers. What does this suggest about Great Britain’s continuing influence on Australian foreign policy? Why and how did Australia navigate these two great power relationships concurrently? Why didn’t Anglo-American rivalry, stemming from power shift, and ultimately power transition, make this harder than in previous decades? If ever there was a time for demonstrating one’s loyalty by choosing sides, it was now.

The Influence of British Policies Power transition theory resonates in this case to the extent that Britain’s inability to provide for Australian security during the war prompted Canberra to look to the United States as an alternative strategic guarantor. As Watt reflects, ‘Australia and New Zealand became allies of the United States in ANZUS not because they had come to love America more and Great Britain less, but because the facts of power in the Pacific had changed during and subsequent to the Second World War’.32 To view the Menzies Government’s quest for a Pacific pact only in these terms, however, oversimplifies the Australian-American negotiations that culminated in the ANZUS Treaty. While the Menzies Government was conscious of Britain’s limitations as a security guarantor in the Pacific, this did not mean that it was dissatisfied with all aspects of Pax Britannica. Menzies, Spender and Casey had all spent their formative years during the

heyday of the British Empire. Like most Australians at that time, they identified culturally with Great Britain and viewed themselves as British subjects.33 They believed Australia was a trustee of British civilisation in the Pacific.34 They were also conscious of the significant economic, diplomatic and security benefits that Australia had received, and indeed continued to derive from Great Britain. Great Britain remained Australia’s largest trading partner.35 Britain also provided an important security presence in Southeast Asia. Recognition that Great Britain could no longer be Australia’s security guarantor did not, therefore, lead Canberra to realign exclusively with the United States. In fact, the Menzies Government continued to take into account and to partially accommodate British concerns when negotiating what ultimately became the ANZUS Treaty. In contrast to what both power transition theorists and traditional alliance theorists would suggest, Australia endeavoured to optimise its relationships with both Great Britain and the United States—not choose between them. While power transition and most alliance theorists highlight the tensions that junior allied policy-makers face when forging closer relations with a rising power and dominant (or formerly dominant) global power concurrently, they do not explain how junior allies overcome these tensions. A key exception is if those powers are also forging a close relationship and the junior ally chooses to bandwagon with its major power ally.36 Yet, it is difficult to characterise the Menzies Government’s shift to engagement as simply bandwagoning with Great Britain as the formerly dominant power with which it was still aligned, given the vastly differing nature of the Anglo-American relationship at the global and regional levels. Globally, Britain and the United States were forging a close security partnership. By early 1946, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin wanted to revive the wartime Anglo-American alliance as the only effective counterweight to Soviet power.37 The United States acceded, doubting American capacity to successfully fight the Soviet Union without British assistance.38 Anglo-American relations in the Pacific, however, were still characterised by the cooperative–competitive dynamic that had existed for much of the early twentieth century. In October 1950, Great Britain and the United States agreed to coordinate military planning for the British Commonwealth Malayan region and the broader Pacific theatre. Both countries also fought in the Korean War. Important differences, however, continued to inhibit deeper regional cooperation and demonstrated continuing rivalry.39 Differences arose on points of foreign policy, such as diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, China). The British were also sensitive to what they perceived as American efforts to erode their regional power and status.40 Australian efforts to negotiate a Pacific pact went to the heart of these sensitivities. The British Government agreed, in principle, to the importance of the United States providing strategic reassurance to Australia and New Zealand.41 However, the British Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office objected to the offshore–island chain pact that US Special Representative of the President John Foster Dulles proposed in January 1951. An initial version of the pact was to comprise of Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and, potentially, Indonesia, with a declaration that these countries would consult to develop

measures inherent to their right of collective self-defence. The British argued, however, that any such pact might not only detract from Australia’s and New Zealand’s potential contributions to Commonwealth military efforts in the Middle East, but also lead to abandonment fears among excluded mainland Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean territories that would play into the communists’ cause.42 British Ambassador to Japan Sir Alvary Gascoigne communicated his Government’s concerns to Dulles and its opposition to any pact that did not also include Great Britain. He explained that from ‘the standpoint of the United Kingdom’s position as a world power, the proposal would be interpreted in the Pacific and elsewhere as a renunciation of responsibilities and possibly as evidence of a rift in policy between us and the United States’.43 British High Commissioner to Australia Edward Williams conveyed the same sentiments in February 1951 to Arthur Fadden, who was acting Prime Minister while Menzies was travelling to London.44 The Australian and New Zealand governments sought to address these concerns by proposing a tripartite rather than a multilateral alliance with the United States even though Washington was also coming to this same conclusion. This proposal would mitigate damage to British prestige by excluding other countries that might not have the same power or influence in the Pacific as Great Britain. Despite this change to the proposed Pacific pact’s form, however, British officials continued to express reservations about Britain’s exclusion from any formal Pacific defence association up until, and even after, the draft ANZUS Treaty was endorsed by the British Cabinet on 12 March 1951. In a letter to Menzies, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Gordon Walker protested that, ‘the Treaty in its present form … might give the impression that the United Kingdom was being unduly subservient to the United States in the Pacific which … would not be in the best interests of Anglo-American relations’.45 Given continuing British representations against a Pacific pact proposal that ultimately evolved into the ANZUS Treaty, it is difficult to characterise the Australian Government’s shift to engagement as bandwagoning in response to the evolving Anglo-American global partnership. The Menzies Government persisted with this initiative, despite British representations against a Pacific pact. The Menzies Government’s persistence in pursuing this particular security framework suggests that, in line with Snyder’s framework, it perceived that it had comparatively greater intra-alliance bargaining power than London on this issue. Yet, how it arrived at this assessment is not clear, given its strong fears of abandonment by Great Britain. These fears derived from Australia’s continuing asymmetric dependence on Great Britain, coupled with that power’s relatively weak commitment to Australia, which exerted a powerful influence on Australian foreign policy in the postwar period. Despite Britain’s inability to wield substantive force in the Pacific, Australia still looked to that power as its principal ally—particularly with Australia’s growing strategic vulnerability with the onset of the Cold War. As early as 1948, the Australian Chiefs of Staff observed that the Soviet Union posed a global strategic threat to the Western powers. They concluded:

A state of ‘war’ at present exists between the USSR and the Western Powers although it does not involve the employment of orthodox facilities … It is best described as a ‘cold war’ in which Soviet aggression is characterised by the exploitation of minorities and disaffected elements in foreign countries, with the ultimate objective of communising the world.46 The accession to power of communist parties throughout Eastern Europe and the 1949 victory of Chinese communist forces underscored to the Menzies Government that the West was confronting an expansionist, monolithic communist threat. On his return from the 1951 Prime Ministers’ Conference, Menzies declared to Cabinet that the ‘end of 1953 is a deadline. The odds are on a [global] war in that time’.47 Spender was particularly concerned about the communist threat in the Pacific. Following the conclusion of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the Menzies Government assessed that the Soviet Union, in partnership with China, was exploiting destabilised conditions in Asia. Spender was particularly concerned about perceived Chinese efforts to ‘stir up unrest and rebellion’ in Southeast Asia’.48 In 1950, he elaborated an early version of the ‘domino theory’, arguing that, if communism was allowed to prevail in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would offer little resistance.49 A communist insurgency had also emerged in Malaya in 1948. While the Menzies Government did not regard this as a direct threat to Australia, it wanted to ensure the security of Malaya to provide defence-in-depth for Australia.50 The Government was also concerned about a potentially resurgent Japan or expansionist Indonesia over the longer term, but the Menzies Cabinet agreed that Chinese communism was the more immediate concern that warranted urgent attention.51 The regional communist threat, and its link to a larger global communist threat, underscored Australia’s reliance on its great and powerful friends. As Menzies observed, ‘our defence effort ceases to be of merely local significance, but becomes part of the concerted efforts of the free world’.52 Australia subsequently adopted a ‘forward defence’ posture, acting in concert with allies to keep communist expansion distant from Australia. This posture further entrenched Australia’s continuing dependence on Great Britain.53 Britain remained critical to Australian security for four reasons. First, both countries remained bound together by their Commonwealth membership and an implicit promise of mutual military support, even if there were limitations on British capacity. In 1950, Great Britain was still the only great power with at least a moral commitment to provide defence assistance to Australia and New Zealand.54 Second, while the North Pacific and Far East were deemed a US defence responsibility, the United States was hesitant until the end of 1950 to accept any military responsibility for Southeast Asia—an area of strategic importance to Australia that Washington designated a British Commonwealth responsibility.55 Third, Britain continued to provide for Southeast Asian countries’ internal security and for the security of sea lanes of communication in this region. As Australian historian David Goldsworthy observes, as long as Britain ‘stayed in Southeast Asia with some semblance of

strength, the imperial factor continued to matter in Menzies’ calculations of Australian interest’.56 Fourth, the Menzies Government viewed the British presence in the Middle East and its Indian Ocean protectorates as integral to securing Australia’s trade routes to Great Britain.57 By 1950, the Anglo-Australian relationship was certainly more interdependent than it had been in previous decades. Britain’s extensive global commitments and limited infantry made it increasingly reliant on wider British Commonwealth contributions to Malaya and, in the event of global war, the Middle East.58 Nevertheless, the Menzies Government still viewed Australia as asymmetrically dependent on Great Britain. While Malaya and the Middle East were both critical to Australian interests, any Australian contribution would be minimal compared to the British capabilities deployed to those theatres.59 Australia sought to preserve Britain’s commitment to these theatres, which were central to Australian strategic interests, but in which it was unable to exercise an autonomous strategic role. However, limited British capacity, coupled with the tenuous British commitment to the Far East, gave rise to Australian apprehensions. The British Chiefs of Staff declared: ‘at the outbreak of [global] war, it is at present the intention that, the greater part of the Royal Navy in the Far East will be withdrawn for employment in the main theatre’.60 Britain’s tenuous commitment to Southeast Asian defence was further underscored during the 1951 Commonwealth Defence Ministers’ Meeting, when the British Chiefs of Staff assessed that Southeast Asia was the principal gap in global allied strategy.61 Based on these developments, Australia maintained intense fears of abandonment by its imperial ally during the early 1950s. These abandonment fears, based on Australia’s asymmetric dependence on Great Britain, should have led to pressures to comply with London’s preferences and to hold back from pursuing formal strategic cooperation with the United States. Yet, the Menzies Government confidently pursued its interest in seeking deeper and more formal strategic cooperation with the United States, despite prompting the initial ire of the British Government. Although they did not consciously think in these terms, this suggests that Menzies and Spender believed they had greater intra-alliance bargaining power than London on this issue. How did this arise? How did Australia’s interest in deepening cooperation with the United States evolve given intensifying pressures to support Great Britain and its continuing global role as it was being eclipsed by Pax Americana?

Australia’s Interest in the New Pacific Power Australia’s interest in deepening strategic cooperation with the United States stemmed from the further evolution of Australia’s distinct interests in regional security during World War II. The war had two significant implications for Australian foreign policy. First, the Australian Government ratified the Statute of Westminster in 1942, which rendered dominion governments equal in status to the British Government. Australia was subsequently able to conduct its own independent foreign relations. Second, the fall of Singapore underscored the

increasing importance of the Pacific region in Australia’s foreign policy. As Spender wrote in 1944: ‘Australia has become primarily a Pacific power, principally dependent for her security and development on her own efforts’.62 Menzies, Spender and Casey were all dedicated to defining Australia’s strategic interests in a changing Pacific order and to actively shaping this order by cultivating regional relationships.63 The negotiations leading to the ANZUS Treaty should be viewed in this context. These negotiations, were not just about procuring a US defence guarantee, but also fostering a regional order that would best facilitate Australia’s strategic interests. While some of these interests were shared with Great Britain, Canberra and London had differing views about how these should be achieved and, therefore, about how Australia’s interests toward the United States should evolve. For example, both sought to preserve a balance of power in Asia but had different views on what form of cooperation this would encompass with the United States—the British believed that the existing gentleman’s agreement with Washington was sufficient, whereas the Australians sought a formal binding obligation.64 Australia’s strategic interests in regional order, under the Menzies Government, reflect the transition that was occurring between Pax Britannica and Pax Americana in the Pacific. While some of these interests resembled those of the Deakin and Lyons periods, when it was hoped Britain could regain regional primacy, others were morphing into what would become Australia’s strategic interests under a US-led regional order during the latter half of the twentieth century. Australia’s Strategic Interests in Regional Order Like Deakin and Lyons, Menzies and Spender still subscribed to balance of power principles.65 The Menzies Government certainly took into account the changing AngloAmerican power balance after World War II. Menzies, Spender and Casey all recognised that only the United States, as the predominant Pacific power, had the military capacity to underwrite the future stability of the regional order.66 Cooperation with the United States was essential to deterring communist expansion and protecting regional countries in the event of war.67 Menzies believed that only the United States could prevent China from gaining control of Japan and extending its influence into mainland Southeast Asia.68 This was the first time that an Australian Government linked its strategic interests to a US-led regional order, underwritten by US military power. Yet, this did not equate to support for a US-led regional order to the exclusion of Great Britain. Britain’s relative decline prevented it from being the primary regional security guarantor, but the Menzies Government believed that it was critical for the United States to work in partnership with the British Commonwealth, through coordinated planning, to effectively manage regional order.69 This was particularly important given US reluctance to assume responsibility for Southeast Asia. The Menzies Government believed that a strong British presence in Southeast Asia was essential to preserve the internal stability of this area and mitigate against China’s influence. Accordingly, the Menzies Government supported Britain’s continuing military and policing presence in Malaya and encouraged a continuing

British governance role in Singapore. It viewed Australia’s security interests as inextricably tied to the British Empire’s fortunes in Southeast Asia.70 For these reasons, the Menzies Government believed that a Commonwealth–United States partnership would maintain a regional balance of power that would facilitate Australia’s ‘defence-in-depth’. It would enable Australia to make contributions to coalition operations in the event of global war, while also fortifying its immediate defence perimeter. The Australian Government no longer sought to maintain the Southwest Pacific as an exclusive imperial preserve as it had in the 1930s, but it did still seek to deny this area and Australia’s northern approaches to potential aggressors.71 During the early 1950s, for example, Canberra offered to take over the British share of the New Hebrides and to assume responsibility for several British Indian Ocean protectorates. Spender designated these islands part of a ‘vital strategic screen’ for Australia.72 The Menzies Government conceived of Australia’s defence more broadly than just defence of the continent—the defence of Australia also entailed control of Australian air and sea communications.73 These strategic interests form a relatively coherent image of Australia’s preferred construct of regional order at this time. What underpinned Australia’s shift to engagement with the United States in the early 1950s was Menzies’ and Spender’s views that there was a natural congruence between Australian and US visions of regional order. In contrast to previous Labor Governments, both politicians not only identified synergies in these visions but also believed that the time was right for Australia to shape US foreign policy in ways that would further contribute to Australia’s strategic interests. The United States as a Benign Global and Regional Power Menzies’ and Spender’s assessments that the United States could be encouraged to contribute to Australia’s strategic interests in regional order was critical to the evolution of Australia’s interest in deepening cooperation with Washington and the shift to engagement in 1950. Most importantly, they believed that the United States could be conditioned to work in partnership with the British Commonwealth. This assessment was premised on several assumptions. First, both recognised that even though the United States was more powerful than Great Britain, it was unlikely to threaten the British Commonwealth in the Pacific or globally through expansionist aims or recourse to force. Like their predecessors, they based this assumption on a shared Anglo-American cultural inheritance and common democratic political values.74 Menzies envisioned an ‘organic alliance’ between the United States and the British Commonwealth based on their common political ideology.75 Second, it was not simply the United States’ political ideology, but its international behaviour that underpinned Menzies’ and Spender’s perceptions of a great power that could work in partnership with the British Commonwealth. While the United States sought minor changes to the status quo, such as greater self-determination in Asia, Australians generally viewed it as a fellow defender of the postwar regional order.76 Finally, the United States demonstrated an inclination to work with the British Commonwealth in managing regional order. Increasingly, the United States set about

coordinating strategic planning with Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. For example, in February 1951, US Commander-in-Chief for the Pacific Admiral Arthur Radford met with Australian Chief of Naval Staff John Collins to coordinate strategic planning between the Commonwealth-led Anglo–New Zealand–Australia–Malaya (ANZAM) joint planning area and the broader Pacific.77 Although the United States did not permit British participation in ANZUS, this was not because British membership was unwelcome. Rather, the US State Department feared that including Great Britain would invite entreaties for participation from other colonial powers.78 Nevertheless, Anglo-American coordination on a security framework for the Pacific was still evident. This included Anglo-American consultations on the precise form of a US security guarantee to Australia and New Zealand. The United States was conscious of not injuring British prestige or encroaching on Britain’s sphere of influence in Southeast Asia.79 The United States also heeded London’s views and demonstrated its respect for the continuing strength and indivisibility of the British Empire. As Menzies observed in 1950: ‘American policy, both during and since the war, had afforded the clearest proof that the people of the United States attach a high importance to British strength and are prepared to assist, with superb generosity, to restore and maintain it’.80 For this and other reasons, he publicly rejected the premise that Australia needed to choose between the British Commonwealth and a US alliance, comparing Australia’s membership of ANZUS with Britain’s membership in the NATO.81 Neither of these alliances was predicated on a discontinued association with the Commonwealth. In addition to working in partnership with the British Commonwealth, the United States demonstrated that its aims were consistent with other Australian strategic interests. For instance, Washington recognised and supported Australia’s special interests in the Southwest Pacific. For several years, Australia and the United States had not been able to reach consensus on the terms for US use of Southwest Pacific naval bases. Yet as US attention focused on containing communism in Northeast Asia, it tacitly accepted Australian efforts to assert dominance in the Southwest Pacific by assuming greater responsibility for British protectorates and exercising a leadership role in the Southwest Pacific Commission.82 Menzies’ and Spender’s perceptions of American intentions, which were complementary to Australia’s strategic interests, underpinned the shift to engagement with the United States in 1950. Yet, Spender’s advocacy of a Pacific pact should not be assumed as something that was a foregone conclusion. In 1944, Spender had advocated that Australia strengthen its relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and China concurrently.83 What led to the specific focus on the United States and the genesis of Spender’s Pacific pact proposal was Washington’s status quo aims; its respect for the British Commonwealth’s continuing regional presence; and a proclivity to work in partnership with the Commonwealth. This contrasted to what Menzies and Spender perceived as Soviet and Chinese revisionist intentions to obstruct the United Nations and expand their political and ideological influence.84 Evolving images of the Soviet Union and China hastened Australian efforts to contain

those powers through a Pacific pact and other regional initiatives. Historians generally attribute Spender’s aggressive pursuit of a US security guarantee to a lenient Japanese peace treaty, which allowed for Japanese rearmament.85 Spender, more than some of his Cabinet colleagues, intensely distrusted Japan and was concerned about its long-term resurgence.86 The Menzies Cabinet as a whole, however, was far more concerned about the perceived Soviet and Communist Chinese threat rather than the more distant and only potential Japanese threat.87 With the onset of the Korean War, the Soviet and Communist Chinese threat assumed greater urgency for the Australian Cabinet and they endorsed the negotiation of a Pacific pact with Dulles on this basis.88 In this strategic environment, the Menzies Government wanted to enlist American military power to underpin a regional balance of power that favoured the Western democracies. As Spender observed at the time: ‘defence arrangements can be worked out in the Pacific which will deter any country from threatening the area … My objective has been to obtain an arrangement which will benefit the whole of the Western Pacific area’.89 Spender initially posited a Pacific pact not as a tripartite treaty but as a broad defensive association, consisting of a nucleus of British Commonwealth countries (including Great Britain) and the United States, which other Pacific countries might join.90 Washington sought to limit the scope of the pact to exclude Great Britain. While this was not an optimal outcome, Spender remained adamant that ‘a Pacific Pact which did not include the great power of the United States would only be a meaningless gesture’ and both he and Menzies were unwilling to sacrifice the pact because of Britain’s exclusion.91 Nevertheless, Spender believed that what eventually became the tripartite ANZUS Treaty was only a starting point for a broader regional security arrangement that would develop over time.92 His concept of a viable regional security arrangement strongly resembled Deakin’s and Lyons’ earlier constructs of a Commonwealth–US strategic entente. To emphasise the role of ANZUS in providing for a regional power balance is not to negate the importance that Menzies and Spender assigned to the ANZUS Treaty in providing a US security guarantee to Australia. Menzies and Spender both believed (or came to believe) that a formal US security guarantee was critical if Australia were to contribute forces to areas outside the Pacific, such as the Middle East.93 Moreover, unlike Menzies, Spender was unwilling to settle for a unilateral presidential declaration. He did not believe that a presidential declaration would guarantee Congressional support for a US military contribution to the Southwest Pacific in the event of global war.94 The ANZUS Treaty specified a looser Monroe Doctrine–type commitment rather than NATO’s binding obligation. Nonetheless, Australian policymakers were satisfied that, in the event of an armed attack against Australia, the US would honour its commitment.95 They also recognised that ANZUS institutionalised a US commitment to regional security and that Australia’s strategic interests were tied to a stable regional balance of power underwritten by US military power.96 Yet securing this US commitment was another matter. Despite the Truman Doctrine, both Menzies and Spender were conscious of the longstanding US foreign policy trend of ‘no entangling commitments’. Menzies, in particular, was pessimistic, cabling to Acting Prime

Minister Arthur Fadden in August 1950, ‘tell Percy Spender that the Pacific Pact is not present on the map because the Americans are uneasy about the stability of most Asiatic countries’.97 Although more optimistic than Menzies, Spender had also been initially gloomy about Washington’s willingness to discuss a Pacific pact proposal. In January 1950, he complained to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin that the Americans seemed unwilling to discuss defence issues with Canberra, noting US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s lukewarm response to past Australian enquiries. It was not until Bevin told him that the Americans had been adverse to Evatt and might be more inclined to negotiate with the new Australian Government that Spender aggressively pursued his Pacific pact proposal.98 Bevin’s encouragement prompted Spender to instigate exploratory discussions in Washington. He believed that, with the right approach, the United States might just be persuaded to join a Pacific pact that would preserve the regional balance of power in the face of communist expansion. The only question was how. Establishing Shared Expectations The negotiation of ANZUS Treaty was about Australia reaching shared understandings with the United States on mutual obligations in the postwar era. This included shared understandings on the respective roles of the United States, Australia and New Zealand in global allied strategy. While there was a genuinely shared view on the urgency of the Soviet and Communist Chinese threat, the Western democracies had different expectations about the nature and form of the response—particularly in the Pacific.99 Spender’s quest for ANZUS was directed at ensuring the global allied response supported Australia’s strategic interests and provided for Australian access to global allied planning through possible liaison with NATO.100 If Australia was to contribute to Commonwealth operations in the Middle East, it wanted a US commitment to underwrite Pacific security.101 Initially encouraged by Bevin’s comments, Spender persisted with his representations as a result of growing US responsiveness to Australia’s overtures. By 1950, Washington was warming to the idea of extending a US defence commitment to the Far East. In January 1950, Acheson outlined US regional defence policy objectives in terms of a Northern Pacific defensive arc, reaching from Alaska to the Philippines.102 The Korean War, which had started in June 1950, lent further impetus to US State Department thinking about a regional defence association and, for the first time, the need to potentially extend the US defensive arc further south, given growing communist influence in Southeast Asia.103 By the end of 1950, the Truman administration was contemplating a multilateral defence arrangement, which included the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and, potentially, Indonesia.104 These changes in the strategic construct for US defence responsibility were critical to the US responsiveness that was so important to Spender persisting with a Pacific pact proposal. Acheson’s positive response to Spender’s March 1950 foreign policy speech, advocating a pact, encouraged the Minister in External Affairs to canvass the idea more broadly with US officials.105 In September 1950, Spender was able to gain greater traction with the proposal,

particularly with Dulles and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Dean Rusk, as these officials worked to finalise a Japanese peace treaty.106 Spender was further buoyed by Dulles’s offer to visit Australia to discuss the Japanese Peace Treaty and Pacific pact idea in February 1951.107 The Dulles negotiations, 14–18 February 1951, provided an opportunity to reach a shared understanding about how Australia, New Zealand and the United States would respond to global communism. Spender still believed he faced an uphill battle in securing US agreement to a Pacific defence association that favoured Australia’s strategic interests.108 During the Dulles negotiations, he enlisted two bargaining tactics to secure US agreement to his proposal. First, Spender emphasised Australian fears of a resurgent Japan and reaffirmed that Australia would refuse to sign a lenient Japanese peace treaty if it did not receive security assurances. Spender observes in his memoirs that the ANZUS alliance did not result because of the Japanese peace treaty—some kind of Pacific pact was an end in itself. Both Spender and Menzies believed, however, that the peace treaty provided Australia with important bargaining leverage.109 Spender recognised that, from Washington’s point of view, Australia’s signature on the peace treaty was ‘highly desirable’ and that Washington would seek to avoid ‘disagreement and sustained opposition from her most important fighting ally in the Pacific’.110 Second, Spender argued that any Australian contribution to Commonwealth forces in the Middle East would be premised on American protection from a resurgent Japan and other regional threats through a Pacific defence association. As Spender contended with Dulles, ‘Australia’s capacity to live up to its obligations in the Middle East would directly depend on the extent to which it was secure in its own territories’.111 By predicating Australia’s contribution to global allied strategy on an American security guarantee, Spender hoped that he would be able to convince the Americans to accede to a Pacific pact proposal. He was ultimately successful, with Dulles indicating that there was ‘no hesitation or reluctance … as regards the substance of what you want’, but only ‘unresolved issues over the form’.112 Dulles returned to Washington with a draft treaty for consideration. The eventual shared understanding that Australia reached with the United States on a tripartite ANZUS Treaty was helped by the Menzies Government’s commitment to prioritising an overarching deeper Australian-American relationship. In contrast to the Lyons Government and previous Labor governments, Spender was committed to cultivating the political relationship without letting differences on minor issues obscure this objective.113 Importantly, Spender also set about negotiating the terms for the broader bilateral relationship —essentially, shaping the political obligations associated with the US alliance beyond the actual treaty obligations. This involved supporting US regional objectives at the time, which included contributing Australian forces to the Korean War and contemplating how Australia’s relationship with the United States might influence its China policy.114 The Menzies Government also sought to forge shared expectations about how the new US alliance would accommodate Australia’s and New Zealand’s continuing membership of the British Commonwealth and, potentially, a future role for Great Britain. Although

Australia concluded the arrangement independently of Great Britain, Menzies and Spender still believed that Australia and New Zealand were acting as representatives of the British Commonwealth in the Pacific.115 This was demonstrated in the preamble to the ANZUS Treaty, which recognised that, ‘Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific area’.116 US acceptance of this formulation affirmed Menzies’ and Spender’s assumption that the ANZUS alliance would not inhibit Australia from maintaining its Commonwealth connection and meeting its imperial obligations. This assumption was also supported by Washington’s agreement to Article VIII in the ANZUS Treaty, which was intended to provide for a consultative arrangement between the ANZUS Council and Great Britain.117 The imperial alliance did shape the Menzies Government’s shift to engagement toward the United States, but not in the way that power transition or traditional alliance theorists suggest. The shift to engagement was not a knee-jerk reaction to the change in the international power distribution, directed at either restoring Pax Britannica and bandwagoning with British foreign policy or, alternatively, fully realigning with the United States. While the Menzies Government’s engagement strategy toward the United States was certainly influenced by Britain’s relative decline and recognition that US power was essential to underwriting regional stability, the timing of this shift to engagement was influenced by factors in the bilateral Australian-American relationship. Critically, it depended on whether the Australian and US governments could overcome differences and reach a shared understanding of how to shape regional and global order. That the United States was not only willing to accept a continuing regional role for the British Commonwealth, but also wanted to work in partnership with that entity, mitigated the tension between Australia’s new American alliance and Australia’s imperial connection. It was Great Britain that was making it difficult to reconcile the two relationships. As events unfolded during 1950–51, the Australian negotiations with the United States evolved in a way that was at odds with British preferences—particularly with Britain’s exclusion from proposals that were being mooted. Menzies and Spender were both taken aback by British objections to, and diplomatic interference to prevent the conclusion of, a Pacific pact. Yet their persistence, despite these objections, suggests that they believed they had intraalliance bargaining power on this issue. Why did they choose to pursue these interests rather than being constrained by the imperial alliance? How did they ultimately reconcile these two relationships given the importance of London’s support to successfully concluding ANZUS?

ANZUS and the Imperial Connection Despite changes in the Anglo-American power balance after World War II, Australia remained a risk-averse ally of Great Britain during the early 1950s. A continuing sociocultural attachment and political connection to Great Britain led Menzies, Spender and Casey to view the British Commonwealth as qualitatively different to, and irreplaceable by, the US alliance.118 The British Commonwealth also provided Australia with important economic and

security benefits, which the United States could not necessarily replace at that time. In particular, Menzies and Spender recognised that the British Commonwealth was an important diplomatic asset that augmented Australia’s influence in international affairs, including its influence in Washington. Spender believed that without the Commonwealth, Australia would be just another small state in the international system, ignored by the great powers.119 Menzies and Spender thus advocated for deeper Commonwealth cooperation in addition to closer ties with the United States.120 Given the importance of the British Commonwealth to Australia, the Menzies Government wanted to portray itself as a dependable member of that association. It was concerned not to unduly offend Great Britain and jeopardise the benefits it derived from the relationship. For these reasons, Menzies and Spender consulted with British officials and, to some extent, even accommodated British concerns during the Pacific pact negotiations with the United States. The Menzies Government was also acutely conscious that Australia was still only a pawn in a larger Anglo-American global partnership.121 Menzies and Spender were reminded of this by British efforts to persuade Dulles against a formal Pacific defence association just before his Australian visit in February 1951. During negotiations in Canberra, Dulles noted ‘the difficulty in proceeding if the British continue to feel as strongly as they have indicated’.122 Spender recognised that London’s acquiescence would be critical to successfully concluding the ANZUS Treaty, later recalling that he ‘sought from it [Britain], not approval of the proposed treaty, but her statement that it was not opposed to it. This was of prime importance, because if it were opposed, her influence with the US could have been critical’.123 Both before and after British representations to Dulles, Menzies and Spender persisted with negotiations on a Pacific pact, which ultimately culminated in the ANZUS Treaty, because they believed that they could persuade Britain to acquiesce to the initiative. They would need to secure this acquiescence through parallel Australian negotiations with London. Menzies and Spender recognised that they had a strong case as a result of shared understandings of Australia’s changing contributions to the British Commonwealth, stemming from the evolving purpose of that entity in the postwar era. From the outset, they anticipated that these understandings should make it easier, not harder, to reconcile close relationships with both Great Britain and the United States. In the postwar era, the purpose of the British Commonwealth had evolved further along the lines outlined in 1908 and 1937. With diminishing British economic and military power after World War II, Menzies and Spender emphasised the importance of strengthening the British Commonwealth to both deter expansionist aggressors and to preserve its global power and influence. They deemed this to be particularly important given loosening Commonwealth structures to accommodate independent republics.124 Both Menzies and Spender argued that the British Commonwealth would not be able to re-emerge as a major power if Great Britain did not receive assistance from its former empire and without strengthened intraCommonwealth bonds and consultative machinery.125 Within this broader framework, Commonwealth strategic objectives were clearly

articulated during the 1951 Commonwealth Defence Ministers’ Meeting and during the visit to Australia in May 1950 of Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir William Slim. There were three main components. First, the security of Great Britain and its vital sea communications remained critical given that Britain was the heart of the British Commonwealth and the Soviet Union was most likely to direct its aggression against Europe.126 Second, the defence of the Middle East was imperative to global allied strategy as a land bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa, and given its importance to Commonwealth communications.127 The loss of this region would significantly damage the prospect of Western powers winning a war against the Soviet Union.128 Third, the British Commonwealth would need to coordinate defence arrangements with the United States in the Pacific to deter communist powers in Asia. Menzies ultimately agreed with Slim that the priorities for Commonwealth defence should be Western Europe and the Middle East during a global war, and Malaya during the Cold War.129 Against this backdrop, the Australians’ understandings of their alliance contributions had changed to accommodate these new alliance objectives. The British sought, and the Australian Cabinet eventually agreed in December 1951 to provide, an Australian contribution to the Middle East in the event of global war. Australia also assumed a greater role in Pacific security. This followed from the 1946 Prime Ministers’ Conference, where the British and dominion prime ministers agreed that the dominions would assume the burden for their home defence and would undertake joint defence planning, in cooperation with other Commonwealth countries, for their local region and for protection of their sea lanes of communication.130 The ANZAM joint planning area, established between Australian, British and New Zealand Service representatives, was one manifestation of this new principle. It provided for coordinated Commonwealth defence planning for the Malayan Peninsula and Southwest Pacific. The Australians viewed regional decentralisation of Commonwealth defence as important to strengthening the material and political influence of the British Commonwealth as a whole.131 Australia’s assumption of greater regional defence responsibility had implications for how it conducted its foreign policy. While Australian policymakers still viewed imperial consultation as important, regional decentralisation of defence clarified when Australia should or should not subordinate its diverging interests to those of Great Britain. At the 1946 Prime Ministers’ Conference, the Australian Government advocated, and garnered support for, the principle that a common British Commonwealth policy could be carried by a dominion ‘in an area or in relation to a subject matter which is of primary concern to that Dominion’.132 As the principal dominions responsible for regional defence, Australia and New Zealand were to have primary influence on foreign policy matters that related to the Pacific. Spender adopted similar views, advocating an independent Australian foreign policy in the Pacific and Far East. He argued that this policy was to be ‘independent in the sense that in relation to these areas, the British Government would regard Australia’s interests as dominant, just as Australia has, as an “advising” Dominion, had been prepared to accept as final British decisions on European affairs’.133 If there were conflicts of interests between Britain and Australia on Pacific security, Australian interests would take prominence.

In this context, Menzies and Spender believed that Australia’s engagement strategy toward the United States in 1950–51 was not only consistent with shared understandings of alliance contribution but also that Britain should acquiesce to this strategy. Obtaining a US commitment to the defence of Australia and New Zealand was consistent with those dominions proactively assuming greater responsibility for their territorial and regional defence.134 In 1950, Spender recognised that a US security guarantee would reduce the burden on Great Britain to contribute to Australia’s defence and, by enabling Australia to contribute troops further afield, facilitate imperial objectives in Europe and the Middle East.135 While Australia and New Zealand duly consulted with Britain on the Pacific pact proposal culminating in the ANZUS Treaty, Spender believed that, as the metropolitan powers in the Pacific, Australian and New Zealand interests should take precedence.136 The Australian Government was therefore surprised by continuing British opposition to the evolving Pacific pact proposal.137 As described earlier, the British High Commissioner to Australia, Edward Williams, made the British Government’s concerns known to the Australian Government in February 1951. These included: that such an arrangement might cut across Australia’s and New Zealand’s possible Middle East contributions; that a Pacific pact which excluded mainland Southeast Asia would render those areas more susceptible to communist influence; and that the arrangement would be injurious to British prestige and suggest an Anglo-American rift.138 Both Menzies and Spender recognised that they would need to persuade the British to accept the proposal by either refuting or dealing with these concerns. When writing to British representatives, both argued that the proposed Pacific pact aligned with what they understood to be Australia’s postwar alliance contribution. If Australia was to assume greater responsibility for its home defence, given reduced British interests in the Pacific, it was prudent for Australia to discuss a security pact with the United States.139 A Pacific pact would strengthen, not weaken, the British Commonwealth in the Pacific.140 They also argued that a Pacific pact would be more likely to facilitate (than prevent) an Australian contribution to the Middle East. Spender explained to Australia’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Eric Harrison, that concluding ‘some Pacific security arrangement with the United States which will “bolt the back door” is essential to the performance by Australia of obligations in the Middle East or other areas outside the Pacific’.141 In some instances, Menzies and Spender worked with British officials to accommodate their concerns and to reach a compromise. Just before the Dulles negotiations, for example, British Ambassador-at-Large in the Far East Sir Esler Dening suggested to Spender that London may be more amenable to a tripartite security arrangement between Australia, New Zealand and the United States.142 A narrower tripartite pact would reduce the risk of Southeast Asian abandonment fears and would mitigate British officials’ embarrassment that Great Britain was excluded from the pact. The Australians subsequently agreed to pursue negotiations with the United States for a tripartite arrangement, rather than a multilateral pact. Dening’s support for this idea provided the Australian delegation with confidence that it had at last arrived at a formula in which London might acquiesce.

Yet the Australians also signalled the limits of their willingness to meet British concerns, based on shared understandings of alliance contribution and, correspondingly, intra-alliance consultation. On learning of British efforts to persuade Dulles against a Pacific defence association, without first consulting with Canberra, Spender believed that the British had violated these understandings and acted ‘directly prejudicial to Australian vital interests’.143 He exclaimed to Williams, ‘We are not a Colony, you know. You will hear more about it’.144 Spender justified Australia’s prerogative on a Pacific pact to the British by explaining: ‘Australia is a metropolitan Pacific power. We have to live in the Pacific—our headquarters are in the Pacific. This puts us in a different position from any country whose metropolitan territory is in another area of the world’.145 Menzies backed Spender’s arguments. In a letter to Williams, he reaffirmed the importance Australia assigned to a treaty with the United States and that his Government ‘takes it for granted that the United Kingdom will lend its utmost efforts in achieving this end’.146 Based on shared understandings devolving greater responsibility to Australia for Pacific defence, Menzies and Spender believed that London had few grounds to object. The Menzies Government still awaited the British Cabinet’s approval of the draft ANZUS Treaty, which was forthcoming on 12 March 1951. Despite continuing British reservations that were communicated to the Australian Government, the British eventually agreed to the Treaty for the same reasons that the Australians promulgated.147 The British recognised that, by providing for US security assurances, the ANZUS alliance would be more likely to facilitate Australian and New Zealand contributions to the Middle East in the event of global war. They also wanted to preserve strong political relationships with Australia and New Zealand, which would be important if Canberra and Wellington were to represent British interests in the new Pacific defence arrangement with the United States.148 Menzies’ and Spender’s beliefs that they could persuade the British to acquiesce to the initiative therefore ultimately proved correct.

Conclusion Occurring at the height of the Anglo-American power transition in the Pacific, the ANZUS negotiations provide a good test of existing theories of how junior allies respond to power shift. In line with power transition theory, Britain’s demonstrated incapacity to defend its interests in the Far East during World War II should have led Australia to align more closely with the United States, while distancing itself from Great Britain. Yet, this explanation does not account for the nearly ten-year delay between the fall of Singapore and Australia’s overarching political engagement strategy toward the United States. Nor do power transition or alliance theories account for how or why Australia cultivated a strong relationship with the United States, as the new dominant Pacific power, while seeking to preserve its pre-existing relationship with Great Britain. Far from realigning with the United States, the Australian Government worked to strengthen both relationships concurrently. Snyder’s theory of intra-alliance bargaining power better accommodates and explains this

outcome, by elevating the role of a junior ally’s interests in determining its position toward an external power.149 According to this theoretical framework, Australia’s shift to engagement with the United States in 1950 was the result of it its own highly valued interest in deepening strategic cooperation with that power. The value that Australia assigned to this interest offset the constraining influence of Australia’s continuing dependence on Great Britain, leading to Australian intra-alliance bargaining power on this issue. Yet, Snyder’s theory does not explain how this interest came about (particularly given Australia’s continuing attachment to the British Commonwealth) and how Australia reconciled it with the imperial alliance political halo given British objections to a Pacific pact. The Menzies Government’s interest in deepening cooperation with the United States was certainly influenced by the Anglo-American power transition but was not determined by it. Much more important was the Menzies Government’s assessment that the United States could be persuaded to contribute to building a regional order that supported Australia’s strategic interests. This included working in partnership with the British Commonwealth to build a balance of power that would deter communist expansion in Asia. Menzies’ and Spender’s beliefs that the United States wanted to support and strengthen the British Commonwealth, rather than undermine or fragment that entity, critically underpinned Australia’s engagement-based approach. The timing of the pact proposal was also not so much a product of the Anglo-American power transition, but of Canberra’s and Washington’s ability to reach consensus on mutual obligations within their overarching political relationship. This distinguished the Menzies Government’s sustained political engagement strategy from the Chifley Government’s entreaties toward the United States in the late 1940s. The United States’ willingness to work in partnership with the British Commonwealth in the Pacific certainly helped facilitate Menzies’ and Spender’s efforts to cultivate positive-sum relationships with both powers. Yet, the ANZUS negotiations also highlighted the potential of Australia’s Commonwealth association to constrain Australia’s engagement strategy. In view of the broader Anglo-American global partnership, Canberra recognised that British acquiescence, if not support, was critical to bring ANZUS to fruition.150 Menzies and Spender therefore set about persuading the British to acquiesce in the initiative, basing their arguments on what they perceived as shared understandings of postwar imperial contribution. Both politicians highlighted the importance of ANZUS in enabling Australia to meet its imperially designated responsibilities for home defence and in facilitating a possible Australian contribution to the Middle East.151 Britain’s ultimate acquiescence to ANZUS, on this basis, mitigated intra-alliance risk and led the Menzies Government to assign an even greater value to its already significant interest in deepening cooperation with the United States. This contributed to its intra-alliance bargaining power on the issue. Menzies and Spender correctly calculated that they could successfully convince Great Britain and optimise their new security alliance with the United States while effectively managing Australia’s imperial connection. The ANZUS Treaty signified the culmination of Australian diplomatic efforts over the previous forty years. It gave practical effect to a longstanding Australian ambition to

cultivate an alliance with the United States to supplement the power of the British Commonwealth in the Pacific. ANZUS also signified the emergence of an increasingly independent Australian relationship with the United States. The shift to engagement in 1950 was based on Canberra’s and Washington’s ability to develop a shared vision of regional order and to reach a consensus on their mutual roles and obligations in global defence planning. It had little to do with British preferences, which were directed at preventing the conclusion of a formal treaty. Yet Menzies and Spender worked assiduously to redefine the terms of Australia’s relationships with both Great Britain and the United States so that Australia would not have to choose between them in future. Far from representing a simple transfer of Australian loyalties to the United States, the ANZUS negotiations demonstrate an Australia that was exercising an independent foreign policy to better support its own strategic interests in regional order. * The Deakin, Lyons and Menzies cases all point to a growing maturity in Australian foreign policy, but what do they suggest about how Australia has historically been able to engage with a rising power while maintaining its alliance with a dominant global power? A cooperative–competitive Anglo-American relationship was certainly critical. It created an atmosphere in which Australia’s engagement strategy toward the rising power was shaped to a greater extent by Australia’s own evolving strategic interests rather than by British preferences or policies. This would have been harder if Great Britain and the United States had been adversaries. Yet Australia still had to navigate muted Anglo-American competition for regional influence. Deakin, Lyons and Menzies were all able to reconcile a deeper strategic relationship with the United States with maintaining Australia’s imperial connection, in part, because of how Australia’s interests toward the United States developed. Australia’s interests toward a rising United States were based on whether the relevant Prime Minister (and the Minister for External Affairs in 1950–51) believed that the United States could be conditioned to support Australia’s strategic interests in the regional order. This was predicated, in part, on their assessment that the United States would not challenge the British Empire or Australia’s membership of that empire. The United States not only accepted Great Britain’s continuing regional presence but was also willing to work in partnership with the British Empire to maintain a regional balance of power against potential aggressors. Deakin, Lyons and Menzies all believed that the United States could be conditioned to provide diplomatic or military support to the British Empire in an increasingly competitive international environment. This underwrote their engagement-based approach toward Washington. Although the Lyons Government adopted a disengagement strategy toward Washington in 1936, this stemmed primarily from factors inherent to the Australian-American relationship rather than the imperial alliance, and was only a tactical variant of a broader engagementbased approach. Fundamentally, the Australians did not see any inherent tension between concurrently strengthening relations with both the United States and Great Britain. The challenge was that London often had differing views from the Australians about this

and about how to best preserve the global security and economic prosperity of the British Empire. In all three cases (although for different reasons), this presented challenges in terms of pursuing Australia’s engagement or disengagement strategy from within the imperial alliance. Whether the Australians translated their interests in the United States into a corresponding engagement or disengagement strategy depended on whether they thought they could persuade London to acquiesce to this strategy. These assumptions were influenced by whether they could couch their desired strategy in terms of what they perceived as shared understandings of alliance contribution. Critically, these understandings of alliance contribution were not directed against the United States, as they were against Germany and the Soviet Union. More often than not, they actually facilitated a relatively independent Australian foreign policy toward the United States. This was because Australian prime ministers could portray Australia’s engagement or disengagement strategy as aligning with, or facilitating, Australia’s imperial contributions and, as such, could claim that their engagement initiatives were contributing to the strength of the empire. They subsequently advocated for British acceptance of—if not support for—their respective engagement or disengagement strategy toward the United States. Australian prime ministers’ beliefs that they could successfully secure British acquiescence defined the value they assigned to their interest in pursuing (or not pursuing) deeper cooperation with the United States. If there was a high likelihood of British acquiescence, there was low intra-alliance risk associated with pursuing the proposal. Australian policymakers subsequently assigned a high value to their interest in the rising power, leading to perceptions of intra-alliance bargaining power and rendering them more likely to pursue their chosen strategy toward the United States. The likelihood of British acquiescence critically determined whether Australian policymakers were constrained by their alliance or whether they pursued their autonomous interests. Deakin’s willingness to invite the US fleet, but reluctance to pursue an agreement to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the Pacific, is a case in point. With the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, Australia had a new strategic alliance with the United States and a new set of political obligations to manage. To what extent were the lessons that Australian policymakers had learned in successfully managing the AngloAustralian relationship, while simultaneously engaging with a rising power, applicable in this new context? While this would not become an issue for another twenty years, it is a particularly important question given the historical context in which ANZUS emerged. In advice to Menzies in 1951, Spender suggested that Australia’s reputation as a valuable US ally could be influenced by its respective policies toward Formosa and China.152 The following chapters explore how, from 1971 onwards, Australia navigated eventual diplomatic recognition and deeper engagement with China with maintaining a strong American alliance. To what extent did Australian policymakers replicate the approaches and patterns of their predecessors in this very different strategic context?

Notes 1 2

3

4 5

6 7 8 9

10

11 12 13 14

15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Cited in Peter Edwards, Permanent Friends? (Double Bay, NSW: Lowy Institute, 2005), p. 9. See, for example, Bruce Grant, Fatal Attraction: Reflections on the Alliance with the United States (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2004), p. 89; Joseph A Camilleri, Australian–American Relations: The Web of Dependence (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980), p. 2. See, for example, Edwards, Permanent Friends?, pp. 10–13; Carl Bridge, ‘Introduction’, in Carl Bridge (ed.), Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1991), p. 2; Stuart Ward, Australia and the British Embrace (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2001), p. 15. Glen St John Barclay, Friends in High Places: Australian–American Diplomatic Relations since 1945 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 13. David Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’: Australia’s Cold War, 1948–1954 (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1999), p. 17; Christopher Waters, The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1995), p. 129. Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’, pp. 18, 40. Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 50. Percy Spender, 9 March 1950, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), pp. 635–6. David Lowe, ‘Percy Spender, Minister and Ambassador’, in Joan Beaumont, Christopher Waters, David Lowe with Gary Woodard, Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2003), p. 69; Cablegram from Spender to Menzies, 3 February 1951, in Roger Holdich, Vivianne Johnson and Pamela Andre (eds), ANZUS Treaty 1951 (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), p. 53. See, for instance, David Lowe, Australian Between Empires: The Life of Percy Spender (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2010), p. 135; Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1969), p. 39, 109, 118. Cable from Menzies to Fadden, 3 August 1950, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), ANZUS Treaty, p. 19. Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 303. Richard Casey succeeded Spender as Minister for External Affairs in May 1951. WJ Hudson, Casey, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 241. In 1949, the former British Commonwealth became formally known as the Commonwealth of Nations but was still frequently referred to as ‘the British Commonwealth’ by Australian politicians. The Commonwealth included the former dominions, which were granted independent legal status under the Statute of Westminster. It also included some independent former colonies of the British Empire. Letter from Williams to Fadden, 8 February 1951, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), ANZUS Treaty, p. 57. Cablegram from Spender to Harrison, 21 February 1951, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), ANZUS Treaty, pp. 95, 97. On the gradual nature of the Anglo-American power shift, see Ritchie Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War, 1945–51 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 278. HG Nicholas, The United States and Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 103. ‘Report by SF Rowell on visit to the UK 10 May to 5 June 1950 at CIGS Meeting’, A5954, 1551/3, National Australian Archives (NAA). Percy Spender, ‘Serious International Situation: Need for Liberal Party to Clearly Indicate its Foreign Policy’, 25 June 1948, Spender Papers, National Library of Australia (NLA), MS 4875, Box 2. ibid; RG Menzies, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations in International Affairs’, 26 June 1950 (Sydney: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1950), p. 11. Spender, ‘Serious International Situation’; Menzies, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations in International Affairs’, p. 11. Menzies, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations’, p. 11. ibid. Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’, p. 10; Percy Spender, ‘The Empire in a Changing World’, 28 October 1947, Spender Papers, NLA, MS 4875, Box 2. See, for example, RG Menzies, ‘Broadcast over CBS by the Right Honourable RG Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia’, 28 July 1950 Menzies Papers, NLA, MS 4936/8/2, Box 326. ‘Appreciation of the Strategical Position of Australia—February 1946’, A5954, 1645–6, NAA.

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

54 55 56 57 58 59 60

61 62

Menzies to Holland, 16 March 1951, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), The ANZUS Treaty, p. 123. ‘Appreciation of the Strategical Position of Australia, September 1947’, in Stephan Fruhling (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy since 1945 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009), p. 109. Minute from Dexter to Shaw, 27 October 1950, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), The ANZUS Treaty, p. 29; Note by Officer, 13 October 1950, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), The ANZUS Treaty, p. 25. Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance, p. 166. Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, p. 140 Ward, Australia and the British Embrace, p. 24; Lowe, Australian Between Empires, p. 183. ibid. David Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of the British Empire (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2002), p. 18. As described in chapter 2, it is not inconceivable that, in bandwagoning with a dominant global power, junior allies might also conciliate with a rising power. Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance, p. 275. CJ Bartlett, The Special Relationship: Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Boston: AddisonWesley Longman, 1992), p. 56. John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939–1984: The Special Relationship (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 61. W David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy–Making, Strategy, and Diplomacy, 1945–55 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 401. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 90. ibid., p. 91. ‘Notes on Conversation between Ambassador Dulles and the British Ambassador’, 2 February 1951, Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles (1947–52), Lot Files 54-D-423, Microform C-0043, RG59, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Letter from Williams to Fadden, 8 February 1951, pp. 57–9. Message from Gordon Walker to Menzies, 14 March 1951, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), ANZUS Treaty p. 118. ‘The Strategic Position of Australia—Review by Chiefs of Staff’, 1948, A8744, SDC 323, NAA. ‘Notetaker AS Brown—Notes of meeting on 22 February 1951’, 22 February 1951, A11099, 1/12, NAA. Spender, 9 March 1950, CPD, pp. 625–6. Lowe, ‘Percy Spender, Minister and Ambassador’, p. 71. ‘Australian Strategy in relation to Communist Expansion into the Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Far East during the Cold War Period—Appreciation by the Australian Chiefs of Staff, Sept 1950’, A5954, 1682/4, NAA. ‘Submission to Cabinet by Spender’, 15 February 1951, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), The ANZUS Treaty, p. 67; ‘Notetaker AS Brown—Notes of meeting on 15 February 1951’, A11099, 1/11, NAA. RG Menzies, ‘An Australian View of the Pacific Settlement’, copy of article contributed to Foreign Affairs, NLA, p. 6. The Menzies Government’s efforts to provide for forward and continental defence simultaneously prevented it from effectively building up the Australian Defence Force in 1950 and 1951. Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, vol. 1 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), p. 96. Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–68 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 11. ‘A Suitable Basis for the Distribution of Strategic Responsibility and War Effort, June 1950’, in Fruhling (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy, p. 154. Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket, p. 26. TB Millar, ‘Australia’s Defence Policies 1945–65’, Working Paper, 7 (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 1967), p. 24. Karl Hack, Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore, 1941–1968 (Richmond, London: Curzon, 2001), pp. 143–4. ibid., p. 79. ‘Strategic Planning in Relation to Cooperation in British Commonwealth Defence—UK Chiefs of Staff Views on Matters arising from Discussions with the UK Planners and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff’, 1950, A5799, 32/1950, NAA. ‘Meeting of the Commonwealth Defence Ministers, Defence Policy and Global Strategy—South East Asia’, 8 August 1951, A4905/1, 71, NAA. Percy Spender, Australia’s Foreign Policy: The Next Phase (Sydney: FH Booth and Son, 1944), p. 25.

63

64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74 75 76

77 78

79

80 81 82

83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Spender, 9 March 1950, CPD, pp. 625–6; RG Casey, Friends and Neighbours: Australia and the World (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1954), p. 74; RG Menzies, ‘Australia’s Place in the World’, 13 December 1951, Menzies Papers, NLA, MS 4936/2/86, Box 46. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 65. Percy Spender, ‘The British Commonwealth: Its Place in the World’, 2 June 1948, Spender Papers, NLA, MS 4875, Box 2. ‘Notetaker AS Brown—Notes of meeting on 15 February 1951’, A11099, 1/11, NAA. Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, pp. 111–13; Letter from Spender to Menzies, 15 March 1951, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), The ANZUS Treaty, p. 121; Casey, Friends and Neighbours, p. 28. Philip McBride, Oral History Interview with Suzanne Walker, 4 June 1974, TRC 290, NLA. Menzies, ‘Australia’s Place in the World’. Lowe, Australian Between Empires, p. 183; Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, p. 113; ‘The Basic Objectives of British Commonwealth Defence Policy and General Strategy’, June 1950, in Fruhling (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy, p. 147. Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket, p. 24. Roger C Thompson, Australia and the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1998), p. 144. Cited in ibid. O’Neill, Australia and the Korean War, p. 42. Menzies, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations in International Affairs’, p. 22; Lowe, Australian Between Empires, pp. 182–3. Robert Menzies, Afternoon Light: Some Memories of Men and Events (London: Cassell, 1969), p. 262. Christopher Waters, ‘Casey: Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign Policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 51(3), 2005, p. 387; David Lowe, ‘Brave New Liberal: Percy Spender’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 51(3), 2005, pp. 397–8. ANZAM was a joint planning arrangement established in 1949 between the British, Australian, and New Zealand service representatives. It provided for joint coordination of the external defence of Malaya. ‘Notes on Conversation Among Ambassador Dulles, Australian and New Zealand Ministers for External Affairs and their Staffs’, 17 February 1951, Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles (1947–52), Lot Files 54-D-423, Microform C-0043, RG59, NARA. ‘Comment on Draft of Pacific Ocean Pact’, 1 March 1951, Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles (1947– 52), Lot Files 54-D-423, Microform C-0043, RG59, NARA; J Allison, ‘Memorandum: Pacific Pact’, 4 January 1951, Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles (1947–52), Lot Files 54-D-423, Microform C-0043, RG59, NARA. ‘Broadcast over CBS by the Right Honourable RG Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia’, RG Menzies. Menzies, ‘An Australian View of the Pacific Settlement’, p. 6. Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian–American Relations between 1900 and 1975 (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1987), p. 153; C Hartley Grattan, The United States and the Southwest Pacific (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 220. Spender, Australia’s Foreign Policy, p. 23. ‘Notetaker AS Brown—Notes of meeting on 15 February 1951’, A11099, 1/11, NAA; Spender, ‘The British Commonwealth: Its Place in the World’. McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, pp. 1, 285–8; Dean McHenry and Richard Rosecrance, ‘The “Exclusion” of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS Pact’, International Organisation, 12(3), 1958, p. 320. Neville Meaney, ‘Look Back in Fear: Percy Spender, the Japanese Peace Treaty and the ANZUS Pact’, Japan Forum, 15(3), 2003, p. 409. ‘Notetaker AS Brown—Notes of meeting on 15 February 1951’, A11099, 1/11, NAA. ibid. Percy Spender, ‘Statement to Parliament’, 14 March 1951, Spender Papers, NLA, MS 4875, Box 2. Spender, 9 March 1950, CPD, p. 632. Cited in McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, p. 259; McHenry and Rosecrance, ‘The “Exclusion” of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS Pact’, p. 323. McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, pp. 345, 351. ‘Notetaker AS Brown—Notes of meeting on 15 February 1951’, A11099, 1/11, NAA; Cablegram from Spender to Harrison, 21 February 1951, p. 95. Alan Watt, Australian Diplomat: Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972), p. 178. Philip McBride, Oral History Interview with Suzanne Walker, 4 June 1974, TRC 290, NLA; RG Menzies, The

96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111

112 113 114

115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122

123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135

Measure of the Years, (London: Coronet Books, 1972), p. 54. Menzies, The Measure of Years, p. 52. Menzies to Fadden, 3 August 1950, p. 19. McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, p. 185. ibid., p. 223. Submission to Cabinet by Spender, 15 February 1951, p. 67. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 90. McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, p. 65. ibid., p. 286. David McLean, ‘ANZUS Origins: A Reassessment’, Australian Historical Studies, 24(94), 1990, p. 68. McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, p. 185. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 66. Cablegram from Spender to Menzies, 3 February 1951, p. 53. McLean, ‘ANZUS Origins’, pp. 74–5. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 47, Menzies to Spender, 6 February 1951, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), The ANZUS Treaty, p. 56. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 47. ‘Notes on Conversation Among Dulles, Australian and New Zealand Ministers for External Affairs and Staffs’, 16 February 1951, Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles (1947–52), Lot Files 54-D-423, Microform C-0043, RG59, NARA. ibid. Spender, 9 March 1950, CPD, pp. 635–6. Cablegram from Spender to Menzies, 3 February 1951, p. 53; ‘Submission to Cabinet’, 19 February 1951, in Stuart Doran and David Lee (eds), Australia and Recognition of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1972 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002), p. 52. Lowe, Australian Between Empires, p. 183; Menzies, ‘An Australian View of the Pacific Settlement’, p. 6. Menzies, ‘An Australian View of the Pacific Settlement’, p. 6. Cablegram from Spender to Casey, 12 July 1951, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), The ANZUS Treaty, pp. 181–2. Casey, Friends and Neighbours, p. 28; Menzies, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations’, p. 23; Lowe, Australian Between Empires, p. 183. Spender, ‘Serious International Situation’. See, for example, Menzies, ‘British Commonwealth of Nations’, p. 15; Spender, 9 March 1950, CPD, pp. 621, 634. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 162; Alan Watt, Oral History Interview with Bruce Miller, 11 December 1974, TRC 306, NLA. ‘Notes on Conversation among Ambassador Dulles, Australian and New Zealand Ministers for External Affairs and Staffs’, 16 February 1951, Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Fester Dulles (1947–52), Lot Files 54-D-423 Microform C-0043, RG 59, NARA. Percy Spender, Politics and a Man (Sydney: Collins, 1972), p. 268. Menzies, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations in International Affairs’, pp. 9, 14; Spender, ‘The British Commonwealth’. Menzies, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations in International Affairs’, pp. 11, 16–17; Spender, ‘The British Commonwealth’. McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, pp. 188–90. Lowe, ‘Percy Spender, Minister and Ambassador’, p. 71. Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance, p. 112. McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, pp. 188–90. ‘British Commonwealth Conference 1946—Defence and Security’, A5954, 1662/1, NAA; ‘Cooperation in British Commonwealth Defence—No. 1’, 1946, A5954, 1828/3, NAA. See, for example, RG Casey, ‘The Conduct of Foreign Policy’, 25 September 1952 (Melbourne: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1952), p. 10. ‘Cooperation in British Commonwealth Defence—No. 1’, 1946, A5954, 1828/3, NAA. Spender, Australia’s Foreign Policy, p. 15. Menzies, ‘Australia’s Place in the World’. Cablegram from Spender to Harrison, 21 February 1951, p. 95; Cablegram from Spender to Walker, 21 March 1951, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), The ANZUS Treaty, pp. 133–4.

136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152

Cablegram from Spender to Harrison, 21 February 1951, p. 97. Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 180. Letter from Williams to Fadden, 8 February 1951, p. 57. Cablegram from Menzies to Harrison, 16 March 1951, in Holdich, Johnson and Andre (eds), The ANZUS Treaty, p. 125. Cablegram from Spender to Walker, 21 March 1951, p. 137. Cablegram from Spender to Harrison, 21 February 1951, p. 97. McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, p. 313. Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 180. Cited in Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’, p. 79. Cablegram from Spender to Harrison, 21 February 1951, p. 97. ibid., p. 95. Message from Gordon Walker to Menzies, 14 March 1951, pp. 118–120. John Williams, ‘ANZUS: A Blow to Britain’s Self–Esteem’, Review of International Studies, 13(4), 1987, p. 250. Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 171. Spender, Politics and a Man, p. 268. Cablegram from Spender to Harrison, 21 February 1951, p. 95; Cablegram from Menzies to Harrison, 16 March 1951, p. 125. Cablegram from Spender to Menzies, 3 February 1951, p. 53.

Part 3 Australian Engagement with a Rising China, 1971– 2007

CHAPTER 6 Whitlam and the Diplomatic Recognition of China

On 21 December 1972, the Australian Government signed a joint communiqué which recognised and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, hereafter, China). In this communiqué (the Paris Communiqué), the two governments agreed ‘to develop diplomatic relations, friendship and co-operation on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence’.1 This act, while momentous, was the outcome of only one of more than forty ground-breaking decisions that Prime Minister Edward Gough (‘Gough’) Whitlam and Deputy Prime Minister Lance Barnard made in the sixteen days following the ALP election victory on 2 December 1972.2 The haste with which the Whitlam Government established these relations, however, obscures the complexity of the decision-making process that led to this outcome. The decision to recognise China and to expand Sino-Australian relations was an outcome of negotiations during an ALP delegation visit to Beijing, led by Whitlam as Opposition Leader, in July 1971. During this visit, Whitlam announced at a joint press conference with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that an ALP Government, if elected, would immediately recognise China.3 The ALP delegation negotiated not only the terms on which Australia would recognise China, but also the enduring principles that would guide the development of SinoAustralian relations from Whitlam’s prime ministership onward. The events and decisionmaking processes leading up to, and during, the ALP delegation visit to China are, therefore, critical to understanding Australia’s policy shift to engagement with China and how Australia has reconciled closer relations with China with its alliance to the United States. Gough Whitlam is the protagonist in this story. As Opposition Leader, his endorsement was critical for the ALP delegation visit to proceed. Whitlam also played an important role as chief negotiator during the visit and was integral to establishing the terms that would guide the future development of Sino-Australian relations. Yet Whitlam was not the only person who shaped these historic events. Indeed, he was reluctant to participate in the delegation visit when it was first proposed by then ALP Federal Secretary Mick Young. Remembering the electoral swings against the ALP during the 1966 election, Whitlam was concerned that an ALP delegation visit to China would cause the Australian electorate to view the ALP as too ‘soft’ on communism.4 Young, who maintained an interest in China throughout his political career, along with ALP National President Tom Burns and Shadow Primary Industries Minister Rex Patterson all persuaded Whitlam that,

while an ALP delegation visit would not necessarily engender political gains, it would not lead to electoral losses.5 Their efforts led to Whitlam’s support for the proposal and encouraged him to lead the delegation.6 The delegation comprised Whitlam, Young, Burns, Patterson, adviser and interpreter (and later Ambassador to China) Stephen FitzGerald and Press Secretary Graham Freudenberg. While on the periphery of the ALP delegation visit to China, then Deputy Leader of the Opposition and Shadow Minister for Defence Lance Barnard played an important role in developing the ALP position on foreign and defence policy. Understanding how Australia came to recognise China in 1972 is therefore a question of understanding not just Whitlam’s thinking, but also his interactions with these colleagues and how they shaped his thinking during the two years preceding diplomatic recognition. In promising to recognise China as one of his first acts of Government, Whitlam and his ALP colleagues laid the groundwork to reverse more than twenty years of Australian Government policy. Alliance politics played an important role in this policy. The Labor Chifley Government had initially favoured recognising China in 1949, following British recognition of China that same year. However, the electoral victory of the Liberal–Country Party Menzies Government in December 1949 led to a policy approach, influenced by that of the United States, of non-recognition and strategic containment. The Menzies Government, and successive Liberal–Country Party Coalition governments (hereafter, referred to as Coalition governments) regarded a coordinated approach to China policy as important to demonstrating Australia’s bona fides as a loyal ally.7 While the foundations for this policy began to unravel in the early 1970s, with emerging Sino-American rapprochement, the Coalition Government was reluctant to abandon this policy. In 1971, the Coalition Government of William McMahon (1971–72) announced that it would normalise relations with China through trade and cultural exchanges, but refused to link these measures to diplomatic recognition. Given that both the Coalition and the ALP were continuing to develop their respective China policies during this time, how did they arrive at such different outcomes? This is particularly surprising given some striking similarities between how both sides viewed the world. Both the Coalition and ALP recognised that the region was becoming increasingly multipolar with the emergence of China and Japan as regional powers.8 Both parties also supported an ongoing US presence and viewed the ANZUS alliance as critical to Australian security.9 Whitlam advocated a more independent Australian foreign policy, but from within the US alliance, and he was conscious that alliance membership also brought political obligations.10 His endorsement of an ALP delegation visit and pursuit of deeper SinoAustralian relations is therefore not easily attributable to any lesser value he assigned to the alliance or to supporting a US regional presence. How then did Whitlam come to endorse such a progressive China policy and why, in contrast to his Coalition counterpart, was he so unconstrained by the alliance in doing so? While domestic political factors were an important determinant of timing, Whitlam spearheaded deeper Sino-Australian relations because he was able to reconcile this relationship with Australia’s strategic interests and alliance obligations. He was able to do so

for two reasons. First, he had fundamentally different beliefs than Prime Minister McMahon about Chinese intentions and the effects of cooperation with China on regional order. He believed that it was only through political recognition and deeper cooperation that China could be conditioned, over time, to behave in ways that contributed to Australia’s strategic interests in regional order. Second, Whitlam and Barnard had a fundamentally different interpretation of what would constitute an alliance contribution in the post–Vietnam War era and, consequently, the implications of the alliance for Australia’s China policy. They did not believe that Australia needed to coordinate its China policy with the United States to maintain its reputation as a reliable ally. Rather, they regarded diplomatic relations with China as consistent with Australia exercising a more independent regional role following a projected US military retraction from the region. Whitlam’s and Barnard’s discussions with US Secretary of State, William Rogers, and US Ambassador to Australia, Walter Rice, in 1970 seemed to validate this understanding. Following these discussions, Whitlam and his ALP colleagues confidently pursued their independent China initiatives, including the 1971 ALP delegation visit and diplomatic recognition, without engaging in any further consultation with Washington or fearing any negative repercussions for ANZUS. To understand how Whitlam and his ALP colleagues came to pursue closer cooperation with China, from within ANZUS, this chapter adopts a similar approach to the AngloAmerican cases. It briefly explores changing regional power dynamics during the early 1970s before examining the extent to which Australia’s policy shift toward China was a response to changes in US foreign policy and the emerging Sino-American rapprochement. It then postulates that the alliance was not the dominant influence, but did shape how Whitlam thought of Australian interests toward China and the framework that Whitlam negotiated for the management of Sino-Australian relations. The final section of the chapter examines how Whitlam reconciled this shift toward engagement in Australian foreign policy with Australia’s alliance obligations.

Origins of the Sino-American Power Shift During the early Cold War, the United States consolidated its position as the dominant power, both globally and regionally.11 By the late 1960s, Australian policymakers had come to regard the Soviet Union as the only competitor to the United States at the global level. The British had receded as a global power, symbolised by the 1968 British announcement to withdraw military forces east of the Suez. The 1968 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, a strategic guidance document that was developed by the Australian Department of Defence and considered by the Australian Government, noted that ‘[s]ince the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II, the balance of power has rested principally in the relations between the USA and the USSR’.12 Yet while the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the United States, it lagged behind in both economic strength and technological sophistication. Australian defence planners regarded this as setting limits on the Soviet

Union’s long-term strategic capacity. While Australian defence planners viewed the Soviet Union as a secondary contender for global and regional leadership, they regarded China as a distant third power, albeit the ‘predominant Asian nation’.13 China successfully tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, but its limited nuclear capability inhibited it from emerging as a serious contender for regional dominance.14 The 1958 Sino-Soviet split, a deterioration of relations between Moscow and Beijing as a result of ideological differences, further undercut Chinese power. The split denied China access to Soviet industrial and military assistance, led to a decline in China’s participation and influence in international affairs, and focused Chinese military forces on countering the Soviet military threat on China’s northern border.15 Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s communist economic philosophy, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, in the mid-1960s further curtailed Chinese power by impeding the country’s economic growth.16 During the Cultural Revolution, Mao sought to instigate a revolutionary and distinctly Chinese communist ideology and to ensure a successor that was loyal to these ideas, throwing the country into turmoil in the process. China’s unwillingness to abandon the ‘antiimperialist’ struggle against the United States (in contrast to the Soviet Union which favoured an accord with Washington), in addition to its encouragement of communist political movements in other countries, only further entrenched its diplomatic estrangement.17 While Australian defence planners viewed Chinese revolutionary ideology and efforts to subversively expand its political influence in Southeast Asia with trepidation, China was still recognised for what it was—a local power that exercised influence covertly to avert confrontation with the major powers.18 By the late 1960s, however, a series of events began to challenge Australian strategic assumptions about power relativities. On both sides of government, Australian policymakers became increasingly conscious of a relative decline in US power. The 1968 North Vietnamese Tet Offensive, in which US and South Vietnamese forces sustained heavy losses, qualified Australian perceptions of the United States’ capacity to project power in mainland Southeast Asia. The Guam Doctrine also cast doubt on the United States’ will to intervene in future communist insurrections. This Doctrine, articulated by US President Richard Nixon during his 1969 visit to Guam, placed responsibility for their own self-defence, short of a nuclear attack, on US Asia–Pacific allies. From the Australian perspective, these developments suggested that US power would, in future, be circumscribed to an offshore balancing role.19 Both sides of Government believed that the United States would remain the world’s most powerful nation in economic and military terms for years to come, but were conscious that US power was not absolute or unconditional.20 These beliefs were buttressed by what both parties viewed as the emergence of an increasingly multipolar power structure, both globally and in the Asia–Pacific. While the United States and the Soviet Union remained the two principal powers, their ability to exercise this power (short of nuclear exchange) was viewed as increasingly conditional on emerging regional powers. The 1971 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy paper, developed by the Australian Department of Defence, highlighted these changing strategic

dynamics, noting that the ‘essentially bipolar organisation of power in the world is … giving way to a more complicated strategic situation in which China, Japan and Western Europe have greater importance, as do also the smaller independent states’.21 Whitlam made similar observations at the time about the regional environment, reflecting that ‘the future of Southeast Asia will be determined principally by the large Asian powers, China, Japan, Indonesia, and India’.22 A key difference between the Coalition Government’s and Whitlam’s worldviews, was the potential that Whitlam envisioned for future Chinese growth. Among Australian government departments, there was lack of consensus as to whether the Soviet Union, China or Japan would emerge as the strongest power in Asia. Former Australian Ambassador to China Stephen FitzGerald recalls that the Department of Foreign Affairs was factionalised as to which of these great powers would emerge as the most important in the region over the longer term.23 The Department of Defence highlighted the limits of Chinese power as a result of its economic weakness and the comparative military strength of Japan.24 But Whitlam was less pessimistic. Echoing Nixon’s views about the prospective rise of China, Whitlam observed that within the next twenty years, the ‘relative status of China will be greater’ and there ‘won’t be such a big gap between China and Japan or between China and Russia’.25 Although China was still economically underdeveloped, he believed that its landmass and population provided a basis for significant future growth.26 Labor perceptions of a more powerful China were also underpinned by that country’s growing status and influence in the international system.27 In the early 1970s, Beijing launched a diplomatic offensive to re-engage with the international system after its diplomatic isolation during the Cultural Revolution. This offensive culminated in growing international recognition of the communist regime as the legitimate government of China as well as China’s admission to the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1971. Visits to China by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Nixon in July 1971 and February 1972, respectively, also elevated China’s status in the international system by suggesting a shift toward genuine global tripolarity.28 Whitlam and his ALP colleagues were realistic about the protracted nature of China’s future power trajectory.29 However, the idea of China as a rising power was becoming increasingly embedded in Australian policy circles.

The Influence of US Policies Changing regional power dynamics prompted both the McMahon Coalition Government and the ALP to re-examine Australia’s foreign and defence policies. Both parties continued to view the United States as the dominant power and sought to preserve Pax Americana in the Asia–Pacific.30 This support for the US-led regional order was grounded, in part, on the shared liberal democratic values between the two countries and, more pragmatically, on the security benefits Australia continued to derive from this order.31 The United States was the only power capable of deterring Soviet expansionism, and curbing Soviet and Chinese

influence in the region. Whitlam and Barnard viewed an offshore US presence as providing invaluable reassurance while Australia and other Asia–Pacific countries worked to develop associations in the post–Vietnam War regional security architecture.32 In this context, power transition and alliance theorists would suggest that both the Coalition and ALP leadership should have been preoccupied by changes in US foreign policy toward China and demonstrated their support by coordinating their own China policy accordingly. Yet the emergence of distinctively partisan Australian policies on China suggests that, while the Nixon administration’s China policies had an important bearing, this did not necessarily translate into bandwagoning with US China policy. The secrecy and ambiguity surrounding China policy in the United States at this time made it difficult to coordinate with Washington on China issues. Strategic studies scholar and historian Evelyn Goh observes that the Nixon administration adopted a bifurcated approach toward China. On the one hand, the Nixon administration adopted a modified soft containment strategy toward China, characterised by a reaffirmation of the United States’ Asia–Pacific alliance commitments and encouragement of collective Asian security groupings.33 Concurrently, Nixon and Kissinger navigated a rapprochement with China to gain strategic leverage in US relations with the Soviet Union.34 By the early 1970s, China’s fears of strategic encirclement by the Soviet Union to its north, Japan to its east and India to its south prompted Mao Zedong to reciprocate Nixon’s overtures.35 This resulted in a series of Sino-American confidence-building measures between 1969 and 1972, including relaxing trade and travel restrictions, Kissinger’s visits to China in July and October 1971, and Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972. These developments culminated in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, in which the United States acknowledged that ‘there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China’.36 The Communiqué foreshadowed Washington’s intention to progressively normalise relations with China. While McMahon was sensitive to the conservative strand of US foreign policy, Whitlam was acutely attuned to US foreign policy trends of détente. This formed part of the consciousness within which his considerations took place.37 He paid particular attention to Nixon’s 1967 Foreign Affairs article, in which the future American president advocated the United States ‘to urgently come to grips with the reality of China’.38 To Whitlam, relaxation of American trade and travel restrictions to China foreshadowed a US foreign policy shift.39 The Opposition Leader had no prior knowledge of Kissinger’s visit to China (which was to occur only a week following the ALP delegation’s arrival). Nonetheless, Whitlam’s Press Secretary Graham Freudenberg and his adviser Stephen FitzGerald recall that these general trends suggesting Sino-American rapprochement significantly mitigated ALP perceptions of alliance risk in establishing closer Sino-Australian relations.40 The shift from an adversarial to a more cooperative–competitive Sino-American relationship was certainly an important facilitator of Whitlam’s decision to engage more closely with Beijing. But it was not sufficient. Even after Kissinger’s and Nixon’s visit clarified the dominant trend in American foreign policy, neither McMahon’s nor Whitlam’s deliberations suggest that Sino-American relations had an overwhelming influence on Australia’s future China

policy or that there was a propensity to bandwagon with US foreign policy. Despite McMahon’s previous efforts to coordinate Australian and US China policy, his suspicion of Chinese intentions in Southeast Asia and fear of losing the political support of the staunchly anti-communist Democratic Labor Party (DLP) inhibited him from making the necessary concessions to normalise relations with China.41 Similarly, despite Whitlam’s more accurate interpretation of US foreign policy, he viewed the delegation visit and Sino-Australian diplomatic relations not in terms of reflecting changes in US China policy but as a means to proactively encourage those changes. He conceived of Australia’s role as helping to consolidate détente by enhancing the great powers’ mutual understanding.42 Contrary to what power transition and traditional alliance theorists suggest, support for the US regional order neither inhibited the ALP from engaging with a rising China nor did it lead to Australian bandwagoning in response to changing American foreign policy. Snyder’s theory of intra-alliance bargaining power better encapsulates the policy dilemma that Whitlam and his colleagues were grappling with at the time: how to pursue Australia’s interests in China, while not infringing on the alliance political halo and compromising the diplomatic, security and other benefits the alliance engendered. Whitlam sought to pursue what he viewed as a less imitative and more independent foreign policy than the Coalition Government, but was eager not to fundamentally jeopardise the alliance connection.43 Throughout the late 1960s, he consolidated support for the alliance in the ALP by successfully devising a formula that reconciled ALP opposition to the Vietnam War with ongoing support for ANZUS.44 While keen to encourage US rapprochement toward China, the same factors that Snyder associates with fears of allied abandonment did still enter into Whitlam’s and Barnard’s thinking at this time. Key among these factors was an acute awareness of Australia’s strategic reliance on the United States, coupled with what was projected to be that power’s relatively weaker commitment to the region in the wake of the Guam Doctrine and with the end of the Vietnam War. Even in Opposition, Whitlam and Barnard were concerned about the fluidity of regional order, internal unrest in mainland Southeast Asia and the possibility of a more militarised Japan.45 This was exacerbated by the projected strategic withdrawal of British military forces from Southeast Asia by 1971. By embedding an offshore US strategic presence in the region, ANZUS would provide reassurance while Australia and Southeast Asian countries worked to develop collective political and security associations.46 ANZUS also provided important security benefits to Australia at a time when it was relatively weak militarily. Despite Australia’s contribution to the Vietnam War, ongoing cuts in capital spending and looming obsolescence of several key military capabilities threatened to diminish Australia’s military strength. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Australia retained broad strategic objectives that geographically extended into Southeast Asia but without a coherent view on how to support these objectives or adequate funding for capability development.47 In 1969, the ALP developed ‘continental defence’ as an alternative strategic doctrine for Australia in the post–Guam Doctrine era. Central to this concept was the premise of limiting Australia’s defence objectives to focus only on the Australian

continent, neighbouring island territories and air–sea approaches, rather than forward projection into Southeast Asia.48 However, the ALP had not yet considered how this doctrine was to be translated into a new force structure. In this context, former Defence Secretary Sir Arthur Tange recalls that, on assuming government, Whitlam did not need to be convinced of the importance of the alliance underwriting regional perceptions ‘of the strength with which Australia could be defended’.49 In addition to a nuclear guarantee, the alliance also facilitated access to classified defence technology, intelligence and logistical support, which were recognised as important to Australian Defence Force capability.50 Yet while recognising that Australia was still strategically reliant on the United States, Whitlam was also apprehensive about the future US commitment to the region. As early as 1967, Whitlam expressed doubt about the long-term durability of the US presence in Southeast Asia, and both Whitlam and Barnard, while in Opposition, sought reassurances from American officials that the United States would remain engaged in the subregion.51 On assuming office in December 1972, they received briefings on the importance of US defence facilities located in Australia to the global strategic balance. They were subsequently more confident that the United States would be ‘reluctan[t] to see Australia come under a rival’s strategic influence’.52 Nonetheless, the future US role in Southeast Asia was still unclear. The McMahon Government and the ALP responded to this uncertainty about the future US commitment to Southeast Asia in different ways. In line with what traditional alliance theorists would predict, successive Coalition governments adopted the ‘insurance principle’. They worked on the premise that a junior ally that demonstrates ‘proven willingness to bear a fair share of the burden of regional security is far more likely to secure a favourable response in an emergency’.53 This premise compelled greater coordination with US regional policies, both militarily and diplomatically. While Whitlam and Barnard’s abandonment fears made them cautious not to compromise US regional interests, these fears also underscored the value they assigned to Australia’s distinct national interests, particularly as they related to repositioning Australia in the Asia–Pacific and building relationships with regional countries.54 Whitlam’s decision to lead an ALP delegation to Beijing and to instigate deeper SinoAustralian relations should be viewed against this backdrop. His decision was indicative of the high value he assigned to this interest in deeper Australian cooperation with China and perceptions of greater intra-alliance bargaining power on this issue, despite concurrent fears of abandonment by the United States. Whitlam and his ALP colleagues aggressively pursued this initiative without being constrained by concerns about recrimination from US officials. No doubt this was aided by the fact that they were in Opposition, rather than bearing the responsibilities of government, but as will be discussed later, Whitlam was still conscious of how the initiative would play out in an alliance context. Despite Sino-American détente, ongoing ambiguity in the great power relationship and a forward-leaning ALP China policy meant that intra-alliance bargaining power was still important.55 Yet, as in the AngloAmerican cases, the limits of this construct in explaining Australia’s policy shift are also evident. To fully understand how Australia came to engage with China from within ANZUS,

it is important to determine how the ALP’s interest in deepening Sino-Australian relations developed in the first place. How did the alliance shape the development of this interest and how did Whitlam come to assign such a high value to this interest in an alliance context?

The ALP Interest in a Rising China The ALP interest in deepening Sino-Australian relations resulted from a unique constellation of factors. Domestic political factors certainly played an important role in determining the timing of this Australian policy shift. Whitlam’s decision to endorse the 1971 ALP delegation China visit was critically influenced by ALP Federal Secretary Mick Young’s arguments that the electorate was ready to embrace change, and by Labor’s 12 per cent positive swing in the 1969 federal election.56 The Chinese decision to cancel Australian wheat contracts in 1971 also emboldened Patterson, who argued that the ALP could use the delegation visit to ‘pull off a political coup that would demonstrate to Country voters that the loss of the Chinese market was the price they were paying for the petty politicking of … the Liberal Party’.57 The ALP Federal Executive’s decision to send the ALP delegation to China was subsequently justified in terms of economic motives associated with recovering the Chinese market for Australian wheat.58 Yet both Stephen FitzGerald and Eric Walsh recall that, while this was a more publicly acceptable motive, the economic rationale was secondary to politico-strategic imperatives as a driving force behind the decision to send an ALP delegation visit to Beijing.59 It was these politico-strategic imperatives that underpinned the substance of the ALP’s interest in deepening cooperation with China. While the ALP had added diplomatic recognition of China to its party platform in 1955, Whitlam’s commitment to this cause and the evolution of the ALP interest to encompass deeper Sino-Australian relations more broadly was underpinned by changing perceptions of Chinese foreign policy. The McMahon Government had been constrained by what it regarded as irreconcilable Australian economic and strategic interests. Although the McMahon Government sought to capitalise on the Chinese wheat market, it was unwilling to do so if that entailed recognising China and, in so doing, implicitly condoning what were perceived as Chinese revolutionary aims in the region. But the ALP faced no such dilemma. In contrast to McMahon, Whitlam believed that, over time, China could be conditioned to behave in ways that were complementary to Australia’s strategic interests in regional order. This included Chinese acceptance of the ANZUS alliance. Australian Strategic Interests in Regional Order There were strong elements of both continuity and change between how the McMahon Government and ALP interpreted Australia’s strategic interests in regional order. Like McMahon, Whitlam supported a US-led regional order and maintained a strong commitment to preserving a strong offshore US presence in Southeast Asia.60 He deemed that this US

presence was integral to deterring an undefined, but potentially expansionist, regional power in the future and that it provided important reassurance to regional countries.61 ANZUS and other US alliances were important manifestations of this US presence. The first Labor Government-endorsed Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy paper noted in 1973 that the ‘ANZUS Treaty, expressing the US interest in the Pacific area and in Australia’s and New Zealand’s security, will remain important to our defence and strategic policy’.62 The ALP also wanted to discourage hostile regional powers from interfering in Southeast Asia and to facilitate conditions in which Southeast Asian governments could address other destabilising issues, such as underdevelopment and nationalism.63 While Australian governments previously entrusted Southeast Asian security to the United States and Great Britain, Whitlam and Barnard recognised the importance of supplementing those powers’ presence in the wake of the Guam Doctrine and British withdrawal from Southeast Asia. They sought to both strengthen regional political cooperation and maintain a strong defence capability in Southeast Asia. The ALP supported Australia assuming greater responsibility for Singaporean and Malaysian external defence through the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).64 The FPDA, established under the McMahon Government in 1971, created an obligation for Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Great Britain to consult in the event of an attack or threat of external attack against Malaysia or Singapore. Although never coming to fruition, Whitlam and Barnard also mooted the idea of a regional defence association to US officials during the early 1970s.65 Additionally, they sought to preserve stability in Australia’s immediate defence perimeter. They supported neutral ‘zones of peace’ to mitigate the risk of great power competition in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific.66 They also favoured preserving the rough balance of power between the great powers in these oceans.67 In these ways, the ALP hoped to ensure ‘the security of our territory and off-shore resources from attack’ and prevent the subordination of Southwest Pacific territories to potentially hostile powers.68 These various strategic interests converged to form a preferred Australian construct of regional order. Whitlam’s and his fellow delegation members’ views that China could be conditioned to accept, or even to potentially contribute to, these strategic interests was integral to the policy shift to deepen Sino-Australian engagement. China as a Potentially Benign Regional Power The Coalition’s and ALP’s divergent assessments of Chinese foreign policy, relative to Australia’s strategic interests in regional order, underpinned the differences between the two parties’ China policies. These differences were grounded in their assessments of the implications of China’s political ideology for its foreign policy behaviour. Successive Coalition governments viewed China as a country whose ideological commitment to revolution could undermine Australian strategic interests.69 Indeed, the implications of the 1958 Sino-Soviet split were not even fully understood within the Australian foreign policy bureaucracy until the early 1970s.70 Whitlam was more attuned to changing trends in Chinese foreign policy and the growing de-linkage between China’s political ideology and its foreign

policy. Following the ALP delegation visit to Beijing, Whitlam concluded that China’s foreign policy was ‘Chinese first, Maoist second, and Communist third’.71 As such, he did not believe that Chinese intentions were inherently antithetical to Australia’s strategic interests in regional order. These perceptions were particularly important as they related to a future US presence in the Asia–Pacific. In 1971, the Coalition Government and the ALP had vastly diverging views regarding China’s readiness to accept a continuing US regional presence. Successive Coalition governments believed that China was, by virtue of its revolutionary ideology, committed to eradicating US influence in Asia.72 These views were supported by the advice from the Department of Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs. The 1971 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy paper, endorsed by the Australian Defence Committee, referred to China’s ‘generally hostile and intransigent attitude towards the West’ and efforts to ‘create buffer states to its South and to exclude Russian and United States influence’.73 As late as March 1972, the North Asia Branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs also highlighted the difficulties of reconciling a central contradiction in Chinese foreign policy: that Beijing wished to see US power and influence removed from Asia but not if it led to a corresponding increase in Soviet or Japanese power.74 Whitlam and his China adviser, Stephen Fitzgerald, were considerably more optimistic about Chinese intentions toward the United States. They were conscious that, following the diplomatic isolation of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was focused on extricating China from its strategic isolation. This included mending fences with Washington, in view of what Beijing perceived as the larger threats posed by the Soviet Union and a potentially militarist Japan.75 Whitlam was confident that common Sino-American interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union would ultimately transcend their ideological differences.76 These perceptions were confirmed during Whitlam’s conversation with Zhou during the 1971 delegation visit. Whitlam subsequently wrote in the Australian that he ‘did not detect the depth of animosity towards the United States I would have expected’.77 Rather than being ‘public enemy number one’, Whitlam discovered that the United States took third place after Japan and the Soviet Union.78 Critically, it was not just Chinese acceptance of the US regional presence that underpinned deeper engagement, but also Beijing’s acceptance of ANZUS as a manifestation of that presence. The ALP delegation was conscious that China retained an ideological hostility toward alliances generally, but was heartened by the fact that this did not translate into active opposition to ANZUS.79 Whitlam later reflected that ‘Zhou Enlai was more sceptical of ANZUS than hostile towards it’.80 Both Zhou and Acting Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Chi Peng-fei appeared to accept Whitlam’s claims regarding the defensive nature of ANZUS and its importance to Australia.81 Whitlam subsequently concluded that there was no inherent contradiction between strengthened Sino-Australian cooperation and maintaining the American alliance. As he noted at the end of his visit: ‘[o]ne thing is certain. We are not going to be confronted with a choice between China and the United States’.82 His assessment starkly contrasted to that of the Department of Foreign Affairs who emphasised

China’s ‘unhappiness about Australia’s close relationship with the United States’.83 Significantly, it was Chinese acceptance of a US regional presence and ANZUS as a manifestation of this presence, rather than Washington’s preferences, that shaped the ALP’s interest in deepening Sino-Australian relations. Yet, continuing US regional presence, supported by ANZUS, was not the only Australian strategic interest that mattered. The Coalition Government’s and the ALP’s differing interpretations of Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia were also important in the subsequent shift to normalised Sino-Australian relations. Successive Coalition governments’ China policies had been underwritten by the view that China posed an expansionist threat to Southeast Asia in the same way that Nazi Germany did to Europe during the 1930s.84 They regarded Chinese assistance to North Vietnam as illustrative.85 In this context, the McMahon Government identified three conditions for extending diplomatic recognition to China: first, China should ‘disavow the achievement of political objectives by the force of arms’; second, ‘it should stop insurgency and subversive activities in neighbouring countries’; and third, ‘it should allow these countries to determine their own futures’.86 In contrast, ALP perceptions of China as an expansionist threat to Southeast Asia had receded by 1969. The dominant view within the ALP was that, while China was assisting North Vietnam, the Vietnam War was neither created nor perpetuated by China: it was a predominantly a nationalist struggle.87 China might provide support for insurgency movements, but the risks of overt Chinese aggression in the subregion were negligible.88 Beijing’s increased efforts to cultivate relations with regional states suggested that China could be drawn into political cooperation and conditioned over time to behave in ways that were conducive to Australian strategic interests in Southeast Asia. This is not to suggest that Whitlam was complacent about China. Whitlam’s Press Secretary Graham Freudenberg recalls that the Opposition Leader was under no illusions about the nature of the regime with which he was dealing.89 China was still emerging from the Cultural Revolution and the leadership conflict between moderates and radicals during that period was not finally decided until extremist Maoist components were removed in 1976.90 The longer term future of Chinese foreign policy was far from certain. The 1973 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy highlighted this ambiguity, noting that the ‘future of China’s policies cannot be accurately predicted. It could be affected by developments in the global equilibrium and by leadership changes’.91 Yet Whitlam and his ALP colleagues viewed uncertainty about the long-term trajectory of China’s foreign policy behaviour as all the more reason to engage with that power. In the context of China’s changing foreign policy, Whitlam believed that deepening cooperation with China—and encouraging Washington to cooperate with Beijing as well—would reinforce those changes.92 Over the longer term, this approach would better support Australian strategic interests in regional order. This assumption was, again, grounded in the ALP’s differing assessment of the extent to which China could be conditioned. The Coalition Government, which cast China as a totalitarian danger to Australia, like Germany in World War II, believed that China would view conciliation only as a sign of weakness.93 In contrast,

Whitlam compared the broader situation in Asia to World War I.94 He was conscious of what has since been labelled the ‘spiral model’, where confrontational approaches and armed mobilisation exacerbate the insecurity of another state and subsequently lead to escalatory arms build-ups.95 Whitlam reasoned that so long as China was ostracised from the international community, it was more likely to emerge as a resentful power.96 He criticised the Coalition Government’s China policy on that basis, arguing: ‘Instead of assisting her to arrive at a more reasonable view, we encourage her to continue her doctrinaire ignorance. Turned in upon herself, she imagines all sorts of plots against her’.97 He posited that a resentful China could have negative repercussions on both regional order and Australia’s strategic interests in that order. To prevent this scenario, he proposed that ‘China must be drawn out of this prison house in which she is placed’.98 Whitlam therefore advocated diplomatic recognition of China and admission of China to the United Nations. Grounded in his own personal values regarding the importance of enhancing international understanding, he placed a premium on improving dialogue between China, Australia and the broader international community to forge a common basis for cooperation.99 Whitlam observed, immediately following his talk with Zhou, that if ‘we can adopt a posture of influence with, but independence of Japan and the United States, we can have a positive role in improving relations between all three powers’.100 Enmeshing China into the international community would be even more important as China’s material power and diplomatic influence grew.101 While a US regional presence in the Asia–Pacific, supported by ANZUS, was a critical Australian strategic interest, it was only part of a broader preferred construct of regional order that Whitlam sought to cultivate by adopting an engagement-based approach towards China. The only question was whether he could, at least in principle, convince Beijing to reach this same understanding. Establishing Shared Expectations with China Whitlam characterised the primary objective of the ALP delegation visit as seeing ‘how far the people of China and the people Australia were able to talk to each other’.102 The terms for diplomatic recognition were certainly an important issue to be addressed. Yet both the Coalition and the ALP viewed recognition through the prism of broader objectives associated with shaping Chinese foreign policy behaviour. Conscious not to be seen as condoning Chinese subversive activities in Southeast Asia, the McMahon Government was willing to discuss only trade and cultural contact with China, without addressing recognition. This negotiating position stymied any accord between the two countries.103 To elicit an invitation for the 1971 delegation visit, Whitlam crucially suggested in his telegram to Zhou that the delegation was anxious ‘to discuss the terms on which your country is interested in having diplomatic and trade relations with Australia’.104 In contrast to the Coalition Government, the ALP conceded to China’s condition of dealing with recognition as a starting point for discussion, preceding normalised relations, rather than as an endpoint. For the ALP delegation, the visit was not just about recognition. As Stephen FitzGerald

recalls, Whitlam’s conversations with Zhou Enlai and Chi Peng-fei were about establishing a set of principles on which future Sino-Australian relations would be based.105 In conducting relations with China, Whitlam recognised the importance of establishing an agreement that set out ‘mutual rights and obligations’, and then honouring this agreement.106 The terms the delegation set for future Australian recognition of China included Chinese non-interference in Australian domestic affairs, Chinese non-aggression against regional countries and acceptance of Australia’s alliance with the United States.107 During the delegation visit, Whitlam was careful that the ALP should not be perceived as in any way ‘opting out’ of the alliance.108 As historian James Curran observes, Zhou sought to draw Whitlam into denouncing ANZUS.109 Whitlam, however, emphasised to both Zhou and Chi the continuing importance of ANZUS to Australia, whichever Australian Government was in power.110 In so doing, he conveyed to the Chinese that ANZUS was a non-negotiable term that would be demarcated from Sino-Australian diplomacy.111 By establishing this principle as a basis for cooperative Sino-Australian relations, Whitlam was able to ensure that closer Sino-Australian interests were consistent with ANZUS. He was able to not only ascertain Chinese acceptance of ANZUS, but also institutionalise this through the terms on which diplomatic recognition and future Sino-Australian relations were established. The ALP delegation and Chinese officials were not able to successfully resolve or reach agreement on all issues. Differences persisted between the delegation and Chinese officials over China’s continuing nuclear weapons program and negotiation of a settlement to Vietnam before foreign troop withdrawals. The ALP delegation believed these minor differences could be worked out over the course of the relationship.112 On core issues—whether China would respect ANZUS and other Australian strategic interests such as non-aggression against regional countries—the parties reached a workable shared understanding. Zhou accepted the ALP’s policy toward China on these terms.113 He referred to the visit as a turning point in Sino-Australian relations and invited Whitlam to return as a future Prime Minister.114 The ALP delegation was filled with confidence that they would be able to successfully work with Beijing to establish a deeper relationship, should the ALP win the 1972 election. It was the ALP’s and the Coalition’s differing perceptions of China’s respect for Australia’s strategic interests in regional order, and how China would perceive cooperation, that ultimately led to their vastly diverging China policies. Whereas the Coalition believed that China would view conciliation and recognition as condoning its past activities, Whitlam believed that cooperation would enable the international community to shape Chinese foreign policy behaviour in ways that supported Australia’s strategic interests—including ANZUS as a manifestation of a US regional presence—over the longer term. The alliance therefore shaped how Whitlam thought about Australia’s interest in China, but in more subtle ways than coordination with US policies, as power transition and some alliance theorists would suggest. This is not to negate the role of the intra-alliance setting in which the ALP’s emerging China policy played out. In line with Snyder’s theory, the Australian policy shift toward

China was critically underpinned not just by the ALP’s interest in deepening Sino-Australian relations but also by the high value Whitlam and his colleagues assigned to this interest in an intra-alliance context. It is likely that they believed that Australia had comparatively greater intra-alliance bargaining power on this issue. There was little concern that the delegation visit would have any negative alliance implications.115 Why was the ALP so confident in advancing ahead of US diplomacy towards China? How did Whitlam reconcile his interest in normalising Sino-Australian relations with maintaining Washington’s confidence that a future Labor Government would be a responsible alliance manager?

China and the Alliance Political Halo Despite strained US–Australian relations during his government, Whitlam was a risk-averse actor when it came to the alliance, particularly while in Opposition. The alliance not only provided defence and security benefits, but also underwrote Australia’s regional diplomatic credentials. Although Whitlam hoped to create a more regionally focused Australian foreign policy, he recognised that Asian countries (including China) took an interest in Australia partly because of its US connection.116 He wanted to recast the alliance so that Australia was less imitative of Washington’s policies, but was in no doubt that ANZUS was fundamental to Australian security and, while in Opposition, reiterated to American officials the value he attached to that institution.117 Consequently, he did not pursue policies that he thought would jeopardise that connection. On learning of US concerns about security, for instance, Whitlam and Barnard adjusted their pre-election commitment to enhance public transparency regarding US defence facilities in Australia.118 But where did Australia’s China policy fit in the context of managing a dynamic alliance? How did Whitlam determine the extent to which he could pursue an independent policy on China and still maintain Australia’s reputation as a reliable US ally? Whitlam’s thinking was affected by what he viewed as Australia’s changing alliance contribution in the post–Vietnam War era. Whereas Australia’s contributions to the empire evolved with changes to sovereignty, contributions to ANZUS were predicated on shared interests and collective defence burden-sharing. ANZUS partners were united not by the imperative to preserve the strength and influence of a cohesive civilisational Empire, but by the shared strategic interests in the Pacific. During the early 1950s, these interests, and corresponding understandings of alliance contribution, were focused on containing an ideologically expansionist China. Australia’s alliance contribution was conceived principally in terms of contributing to a broader Western containment strategy’.119 As discussed in chapter 5, Australia had contributed to this strategy by adopting a forward defence posture, in concert with the United States and Great Britain, to keep communist expansion distant from Australia. This resulted in Australian contributions to counter-insurgency operations on the Malayan Peninsula and, later, the Vietnam War. Australia concurrently adopted a hardline diplomatic stance towards China to support this strategy, including non-recognition of China and voting against its admission to the UN.

These defence and political contributions were viewed as important not only to limiting China’s southward expansion, but also to demonstrating that Australia was a reliable and supportive ally.120 However, the Nixon administration’s rapprochement with China and the 1969 Guam Doctrine altered the premise of ANZUS and what constituted a valuable US alliance contribution. The McMahon Government and the Opposition drew different lessons from these events. The McMahon Government remained sceptical about the durability of any Sino-American détente and, at least initially, continued to coordinate its China policy with Washington.121 Kissinger’s visit to Beijing was therefore met with shock and disappointment. McMahon wrote to President Nixon that, ‘we were placed in a quandary by our lack of any foreknowledge of what is certainly a dramatic step in the foreign policy of the United States: the more so because we have attempted under all circumstances to coordinate our policies and support you in what you are doing’.122 In contrast, Whitlam recognised that strategic containment of China was no longer the focal point of the alliance. In line with Nixon’s policy of rapprochement and the Guam Doctrine, he believed that the purpose of ANZUS was evolving. As he observed at the time: The whole aim of Liberal foreign policy for the last twenty years has been to keep the United States embroiled militarily on the mainland of Asia in order to ‘contain’ China … The Australian Labor Party believes that we in Australia have to recognise the changed circumstances in our region and the changed feeling in the United States. If we don’t, we’re just burying our heads in the sand and, in fact, creating a situation where ANZUS will become … moribund and irrelevant to the real world of the 1970s … ANZUS must change or die.123 Whitlam believed that the new premise of ANZUS was to facilitate an enduring US presence in the Asia–Pacific at a time when power relativities were changing. To this end, he envisioned one of Australia’s principal alliance contributions as maintaining Australian support for ANZUS and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO).124 Although initially opposed to SEATO as a defence association that reflected Cold War ideological cleavages, Whitlam later abandoned the ALP policy that Australia would withdraw from that organisation under a Labor Government.125 He did so in response to US concerns about the implications this would have for maintaining congressional support for a broader US commitment to Southeast Asia and Australasia. Whitlam maintained Australian participation in SEATO as a contribution to preserving ANZUS—Australia’s more important security alliance.126 He also envisioned ANZUS not simply as a military alliance but as a broader association of interests which, by embedding a US offshore presence in Southeast Asia, could promote regional stability and development.127 These new interpretations of alliance purpose and alliance contribution had important implications for how Whitlam conceived of Australia’s foreign policy. First, as Australia assumed greater responsibility for its own defence, in line with the Guam Doctrine, it was

also able to adopt a more independent approach toward the region (including with China).128 Whitlam advocated stronger Australian relationships with both Southeast Asian countries and regional great powers to help preserve regional stability in the face of a transitioning US presence.129 Second, Whitlam did not believe that maintaining Australia’s reputation as a reliable ally depended on coordinating, or even consulting, with Washington on every issue. Recalling the relationship between Australia and Great Britain in the aftermath of World War II, Freudenberg observes that Whitlam believed Australia and the United States could maintain a similar relationship in the post–Vietnam War era. Australia and the United States still maintained common overarching interests. However, Canberra also maintained other interests that did not necessarily coincide with Washington’s priorities, which it could pursue without damaging the alliance.130 These evolving understandings of alliance contribution supported the more limited role of the alliance as a constraint on ALP China policy. Whitlam still sought to validate these understandings as they related to Sino-Australian relations. In a meeting with US Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant Secretary Winthrop Brown in July 1970, Whitlam declared that he ‘found attraction’ in the Canadian and Italian approaches to recognise Communist China. However, ‘he would not wish to proceed in such a way as to embarrass or affront the US’.131 In response, Rogers observed that ‘the US, itself, is trying to improve relations with Communist China and would like to see the Communist Chinese emerge from their self-imposed isolation and take a responsible place in the international community’. He declared that the United States ‘had no reason to object to another country’s seeking to engage Communist China in dialogue, as we ourselves seek to do’.132 Although Whitlam could not be certain that Sino-American rapprochement would continue indefinitely, that conversation signalled US acquiescence to the broad parameters of the ALP’s China policy. Although the Secretary of State did not explicitly endorse recognition, neither did he strenuously object to it when Whitlam posited it as future Australian policy. As time progressed, Whitlam’s confidence that Washington would accept Australian diplomatic recognition of China was further buoyed by observing other allies’ efforts to normalise relations with that country. In October 1970, Canada recognised China using a ‘One China’ formula (that is, recognising Taiwan as a province of China rather than as a separate state or the sole government of China). It was followed closely thereafter by Italy and Austria, all of whom were members of the Western bloc and recognised China without substantive recrimination from Washington. This contributed to Whitlam’s confidence in using the 1971 ALP delegation visit to negotiate the terms for diplomatic recognition. As he later observed: Now the thing which, of course, impressed us … was the fact that Canada had taken this initiative … and there was no adverse reaction in the United States. So therefore, it became a matter of political practicality and economic necessity that Australia could contemplate a similar action to Canada. And it was in the light of this that I was able to visit Peking with some of my colleagues.133

Whitlam believed that if Canada and the European countries could recognise China without adverse consequences for their alliances, so too could Australia.134 Against this backdrop, and in the context of the Guam Doctrine, Whitlam and Barnard felt increasingly less compelled to consult with Washington as ALP China policy evolved. In a meeting with US Ambassador to Australia Walter Rice in October 1970, Barnard framed the ALP’s decision to recognise China in terms of Australia ‘[t]hinking for itself instead of letting Washington do Canberra’s thinking’.135 Following Whitlam’s conversation with Rogers in July 1970, there is no record of Whitlam or any of his ALP colleagues seeking US views before the 1971 delegation visit to China or in the lead-up to the signing of the Paris Communiqué in 1972. When later relaying the details of the ALP delegation’s visit to China, Whitlam conveyed to Rice that Australia was simply following the Guam Doctrine by not necessarily checking with Washington before every foreign policy decision.136 The US Government broadly endorsed this approach in view of what it recognised to be growing Australian nationalism.137 The absence of any US remonstrance before, or after, the ALP delegation visit—at least as communicated to Whitlam and his advisers—strengthened their perceptions that there was minimal risk attached to independent ALP policy forays toward China.138 If anything, senior US State Department officials were curious to ascertain Whitlam’s impressions about the Chinese leadership following his conversation with Zhou.139 Such positive reinforcement was suggestive of underlying changes in ANZUS in the post–Vietnam War era. For Whitlam and his advisers, maintaining Australia’s reputation for alliance loyalty was no longer tied to a coordinated approach with the United States towards China or a compliance-based relationship that inhibited Australia from engaging with that country. Instead, Australia’s reputation for alliance loyalty was tied to evolving understandings about alliance contribution, which Whitlam believed made US acquiescence likely. With changes in Washington’s own China policy and the broader US role in the Asia–Pacific, China was increasingly demarcated from the alliance political halo. In this context, Whitlam and his ALP colleagues assessed that there was minimal intra-alliance risk associated with negotiating the terms for diplomatic relations during the ALP delegation visit. When cast in terms of Snyder’s theory, the likelihood of US acquiescence underscored the high value that Whitlam and his colleagues assigned to their interest in deepening Sino-Australian relations and underwrote their perceptions of intra-alliance bargaining power. These perceptions help to account for the absence of substantive consultation with Washington before the 1971 delegation visit and the haste with which diplomatic relations were established when Whitlam became Prime Minister in December 1972.

Conclusion The considerations underpinning the ALP delegation visit to China in 1971, and subsequent Australian policy shift in December 1972, differ from what power transition and most alliance theorists suggest should have happened. Whitlam and his ALP colleagues supported

US primacy in Asia, but did not equate support with bandwagoning with US policies or refraining from developing relationships with rising powers. Contrary to what these theorists suggest, the ALP viewed growing fluidity within the region as an opportunity to engage with a rising China. Nor was this simply a knee-jerk response to an evolving US China policy. Whitlam endorsed the decision to send an ALP delegation to China without any knowledge of Kissinger’s visit in July 1971. His decision to proceed ahead of US China policy is at odds with the prominent role that power transition, alliance theorists, and many Australian foreign policy scholars assign to a senior ally’s overwhelming influence in shaping a junior ally’s foreign and defence policies. Whitlam and his ALP colleagues were able to reconcile engagement with alliance management because of the more subtle, but still critical, influence that the alliance had in shaping Australian decision-making at that time. What underpinned the McMahon Government’s and the ALP’s differing policy approaches toward China was their different assessments of China in relation to Australia’s preferred construct of regional order, of which the alliance was an important, but not the only, component. The McMahon Government continued to view China as an aggressive, ideologically driven power, which sought to exclude the United States from regional order and undermine Southeast Asian governments. McMahon believed that China would interpret Australian diplomatic recognition as condoning these activities.140 In contrast, Whitlam believed that China was, first and foremost, a nationalist power that could be conditioned to respect Australia’s interests in regional order.141 This included accepting (if not supporting) an offshore US presence in the Asia–Pacific as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union and ANZUS as a manifestation of this presence. Whitlam believed that diplomatic recognition and an engagement-based approach would help to shape Chinese behaviour in ways that preserved these strategic interests. To this end, he negotiated the terms of diplomatic recognition in such a way that China accepted Australia’s alliance with the United States as an enduring and non-negotiable Australian strategic interest.142 This agreement facilitated deeper Sino-Australian relations while accommodating ANZUS. While Chinese acceptance of ANZUS reduced the risks surrounding engagement in an intra-alliance context, it did not eliminate them. Whitlam was conscious of Australia’s continuing strategic dependence on the United States. He did not wish to pursue policies that would fundamentally jeopardise the alliance. As Snyder’s theory would suggest, his decision to recognise and deepen Australia’s cooperation with China was influenced by the value he assigned to this interest and corresponding perceptions of intra-alliance bargaining power. The value he assigned to this interest was underpinned by his perceptions of US acquiescence, based on his understanding of what comprised a valued Australian alliance contribution. To Whitlam, Australia’s alliance contributions were transitioning from supporting a US-led Chinese containment strategy to supporting an ongoing US regional presence in the post–Vietnam War era. China was increasingly peripheral to the alliance political halo. This mitigated the risk associated with pursuing a more independent, engagement-based China policy in an intra-alliance context. Whitlam’s perceptions of US

acquiescence were a critical mediating factor in translating an engagement preference into an engagement strategy. The decision-making process and negotiations that led to Australia’s diplomatic recognition of China are important because they established the parameters that were to guide Australia’s China policy for the next forty years. The terms that Whitlam negotiated with both the Chinese and the Americans obviated the need for Australia to choose between closer Sino-Australian relations and the ANZUS alliance. Based on these foundations, factors inherent to Sino-Australian relations assumed greater prominence thereafter in determining the dynamics of that relationship. Chapter 7 explores the Australian policy shift to disengagement in 1989 and further illuminates how these bilateral factors became increasingly important in shaping Australia’s China policy.

Notes 1

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5 6 7

8

9

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‘Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the Australian Government Concerning the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between China and Australia’, 21 December 1972, accessed at http://cem.uws.edu.au/R? RN=55011260. Troy Bramston, ‘The Whitlam Government through the Cabinet Papers’, in Troy Bramston (ed.), The Whitlam Legacy (Sydney: Federation Press, 2013), pp. 97–8. ‘China Talk with Chou’, AAP, 6 July 1971, pp. 8–9. Interview with Kim Beazley, 14 June 2007; Interview with Graham Freudenberg, 27 July 2007. On Whitlam’s hesitancy on China because of the political risks, see also Clyde Cameron, China, Communism and Coca Cola (Melbourne: Hill of Content, 1980), pp. 11–12. Interview with Freudenberg; Interview with Bill Hayden, 30 July 2007. Interview with Freudenberg. Henry Albinski, Australian Attitudes and Policies towards China (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 434; Billy Griffiths, The China Breakthrough: Whitlam in the Middle Kingdom 1971 (Clayton, Victoria: Monash University Press, 2012), p. 9. ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971’, in Stephan Fruhling (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy since 1945 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009), pp. 395–6; ‘The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—1973’, A5931, CL 1030, National Archives Australia (NAA). ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence 1971’, in Fruhling (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy, p. 401; Kim C Beazley, Post Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the United States Alliance: An Analysis of the Effects of Selected Australian Foreign Policy and Defence Issues on the Evolution of Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the United States Alliance, 1961–72, MA Thesis, University of Western Australia, 1974, pp. 249. James Curran, The Power Speech (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2004), p. 113. The Australian Department of Defence Strategic Basis Papers drafted between 1950 and 1971 generally referred to the United States as the dominant global and regional power since World War II. ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1968’, and ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971’, in Fruhling (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy, pp. 349, 362, 400. ‘Strategic Basis of Australia’s Defence Policy 1968’, in Fruhling (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy, p. 347. Whitlam similarly referred to China as the ‘principal’ power in Asia. EG Whitlam, 25 March 1965, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), p. 383; ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1959’, in Fruhling (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy, p. 254. ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1964’, in Fruhling (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy, p. 314. John Lindbeck, ‘Australia and China’, in HG Gelber (ed.), Problems of Australian Defence (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 6. ibid. ibid., pp. 7–8; Gordon H Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union 1948–1972

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37

38 39 40 41

42

43

44 45

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 206. ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1968’, in Fruhling (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy, p. 314. Beazley, Post Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the United States Alliance, pp. 243–4. ‘Strategic Basis of Australia Defence Policy 1971’, in Fruhling (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy, p. 400; Beazley, Post Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the United States Alliance, pp. 243–4. ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—1971’, A5882, CO 1191, NAA. EG Whitlam, Australia: Base or Bridge? (Sydney: Sydney University Fabian Society, 1966), p. 5. Interview with Stephen FitzGerald, 2 May 2007. ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—1971’, A5882, CO 1191, NAA. ‘Whitlam–Frost Interview Recorded in Canberra, 29 November 1973’, Cameron Papers, National Library of Australia (NLA), MS4614, bound volumes entitled ‘Press Releases, Television, Radio Interviews by Hon. E Gough Whitlam, 5/12/72–11/11/75’. Interview with Freudenberg; Interview with Eric Walsh, 12 June 2007. Interview with Walsh; Interview with FitzGerald. Interview with Peter Bailey, 12 April 2007. Interview with Freudenberg; Interview with Walsh. ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Visit of Australian Member of Parliament’, 25 May 1971, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Islands Affairs (OANZPIA), Subject Files (1959–74), Box 25, RG59, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); Griffiths, The China Breakthrough, p. 64. ‘Memorandum of Conversation: The US in Southeast Asia’, 16 July 1970, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 22, RG59, NARA. Beazley, Post Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the United States Alliance, p. 225; Whitlam, 25 March 1965, CPD, pp. 219–20. Evelyn Goh, Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit Ally’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 106. Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 289. Michael Schaller, The United States and China: Into the Twenty-first Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 165. ‘Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Shanghai Communiqué)’, 28 February 1972, accessed at http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26012.htm. Interview with Freudenberg. Indeed, even those former advisers who observed that Whitlam’s decision-making took place largely independently of the US alliance linked this independence to the Sino-American rapprochement and recognition by other US allies as a basis for risk mitigation. Interview with Walsh; Interview with FitzGerald. Interview with Freudenberg; Richard Nixon, ‘Asia after Viet Nam’, Foreign Affairs, 46(1), 1967, p. 119. Interview with Freudenberg; Interview with FitzGerald. Interview with Freudenberg; Interview with FitzGerald. Roderic Pitty, ‘Way Behind in Following the USA over China’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 51(3), 2005, p. 441; Edmund SK Fung and Colin Mackerras, From Fear to Friendship: Australia’s Policies Towards the People’s Republic of China 1966–1982 (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985), p. 121. EG Whitlam, ‘Address by Mr E Gough Whitlam, Leader of the Australian Parliamentary Opposition to the American– Australian Association, New York, February 1, 1972’, Hall Papers, NLA, MS 8725/15/3, Box 51; American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State Washington, DC, July 21 1971, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 25, RG59, NARA. EG Whitlam, ‘Address by Mr EG Whitlam, QC, MP, to the National Press Club, Luncheon, Canberra’, 26 July 1971, courtesy of Richard Woolcott; Curran, The Power of Speech, p. 113. The Whitlam Government is associated with a period of strain in Australian–American relations. This was largely due to Australian ministers’ public criticism of the US bombing of Saigon and Whitlam’s correspondence to Nixon on this issue in December 1972. Despite fraught Australian–American relations that ensued, Whitlam did make efforts to repair the alliance and, in fact, appealed to the ALP’s and Nixon’s convergence on China to help mollify the US President. Whitlam, ‘Address by Mr E Gough Whitlam, Leader of the Australian Parliamentary Opposition to the American–Australian Association’, 1 February 1972, Hall Papers, NLA MS8725/15/3, Box 51. Interview with Paul Kelly, 25 July 2007. ‘Edward Gough Whitlam, Leader, Australian Labor Party’, enclosed in ‘Memorandum for Mr Kent Crane, Office of the Vice-President’, 15 July 1970, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 22, RG59, NARA; American Embassy to Department of State, 10 June 1970, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific

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52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59 60 61

62 63

64 65

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76

Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 22, RG59, NARA. American Embassy Canberra to Department of State, 2 January 1970, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 22, RG59, NARA; Whitlam, 25 March 1965, CPD, p. 220. Arthur Tange and Peter Edwards (eds), ‘Defence Policy–making: A Close-up View, 1950–1980’, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, 169, (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008), p. 20. Clem Lloyd, ‘Self Defence: Labor’s Long Shadow’, in Hugh Emy, Owen Hughes and Race Mathews (eds), Whitlam Re-visited: Policy Development, Policies, and Outcomes (Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto Press, 1993), pp. 210–28. Manuscript on Australian Defence Policy, Tange Papers, NLA, MS 9847, Box 10. ‘The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—1973’, A5931, CL 1030, NAA. EG Whitlam, 6 May 1965, CPD, p. 219; ‘To the Secretary From Marshall Green’, 26 October 1971, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 22, RG59, NARA; ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Visit of Australian Minister for Defense’, 7 April 1970, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 22, RG59, NARA. ‘The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—1973’, A5931, CL 1030, NAA. Alan Watt, ‘The ANZUS Treaty: Past, Present, and Future’, Australian Outlook, 24(1), 1970, p. 36. Curran, The Power of Speech, p. 107; Whitlam, 6 May 1965, CPD, p. 219. Former Whitlam advisers Eric Walsh, Stephen FitzGerald and Graham Freudenberg all cite factors that mitigated the risk of damage to the alliance, and thus increased Australia’s leverage within that institution, as important to Whitlam’s China diplomacy. Eric Walsh, in particular, commented that the Americans were unlikely to overreact to the ALP’s diplomatic China initiatives in view of their interests in retaining the Australian-located defence facilities. Interview with Walsh; Interview with FitzGerald; Interview with Freudenberg. Interview with Freudenberg. Cameron, China, Communism and Coca Cola, p. 11. Undated note [probably April 1971], Hall Papers, NLA, MS 8725/15/2. FitzGerald cited in Fung and Mackerras, From Fear to Friendship, p. 169; Interview with Walsh. Beazley, Post Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the United States Alliance, p. 213. ibid, pp. 249, 254; American Embassy Canberra to Department of State, 2 January 1970, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 22, RG59, NARA; ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with Mr Gough Whitlam, Prime Minister of Australia’, 3 August 1973, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 25, RG59, NARA. ‘The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—1973’, A5931, CL 1030, NAA. EG Whitlam, ‘Opening Address by the Prime Minister, the Hon EG Whitlam, QC, MP’, in Australian Institute of Political Science (ed.), Foreign Policy for Australia: Choices for the Seventies (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973), p. 3. ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Visit of Australian Member of Parliament’, May 25 1971, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 25, RG59, NARA. In a conversation with US Ambassador to Australia Walter Rice, Barnard noted that this regional security pact, comprised of Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, would operate in accordance with the principle that, ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. American Embassy Canberra to Department of State, June 10 1970, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 22, RG59, NARA. Graham Freudenberg, ‘Aspects of Foreign Policy’, in Hugh Emy, Owen Hughes and Race Mathews (eds), Whitlam Re-visited, p. 208. ‘The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—1973’, A5931, CL 1030, NAA. ibid. Fung and Mackerras, From Fear to Friendship, p. 76. Lachlan Strahan, Australia’s China: Changing Perceptions from the 1930s to the 1990s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 227. EG Whitlam, ‘China and the US’, Australian, 18 July 1971, p. 15. Fung and Mackerras, From Fear to Friendship, p. 121. ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—1971’, A5882, CO 1191, NAA. ‘Paper by North Asia Branch’, 16 March 1972, in Stuart Doran and David Lee (eds), Australia and Recognition of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1972 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002), p. 716. Stephen FitzGerald, Talking with China: The Australian Labor Party Visit and Peking’s Foreign Policy (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972), p. 45. Beazley, Post Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the United States Alliance, p. 221.

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112

113 114 115

116 117 118 119 120

Whitlam, ‘China and the US’, p. 15. American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State Washington, DC, 16 July 1971, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 25, RG59, NARA; Whitlam, ‘China and the US’, p. 15. FitzGerald, Talking with China, p. 23. Cited in Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam in Politics (South Melbourne, Victoria: Macmillan, 1977), p. 208. FitzGerald, Talking with China, pp. 22–3, 38–9. Whitlam, ‘China and the US’, p. 15. ‘Cablegram to Canberra’, 8 November 1971, in Doran and Lee (eds), Australia and Recognition, 1949–1972, p. 652. Strahan, Australia’s China, p. 139. Woodard, Asian Alternatives, pp. 158, 299. McMahon (1971) paraphrased in Doran and Lee (eds), Australia and Recognition, p. 422, fn 3. Fung and Mackerras, From Fear to Friendship, p. 71. The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—1973’, A5931, CL 1030, NAA; EG Whitlam, 17 August 1967, CPD, p. 224. Freudenberg, ‘Aspects of Foreign Policy’, p. 202. Strahan, Australia’s China, p. 205. ‘The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—1973’, A5931, CL 1030, NAA. EG Whitlam, ‘President Nixon on China, Statement by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Whitlam, Adelaide 15 April 1971’, M170, 71/31, NAA. Strahan, Australia’s China, pp. 136–9. Curran, The Power of Speech, p. 96; Whitlam, 6 May 1965, CPD, pp. 1252, 1254. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 66; James Curran, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2015), pp. 79–80. EG Whitlam, ‘President Nixon on China’, M170, 71/31, NAA. EG Whitlam, Australian Foreign Policy, 1963 (Melbourne: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1963), p. 17. ibid. Whitlam, 25 March 1965, CPD, p. 384; Curran, The Power of Speech, pp. 95–6. EG Whitlam, ‘Labor’s Leader Reports on his Trip to China’, Sunday Australian, 11 July 1971, p. 11. Interview with FitzGerald; EG Whitlam, ‘Australia and China’, NOW, 16 December 1970, M170, 70/141, NAA. FitzGerald, Talking with China, p. 15. Fung and Mackerras, From Fear to Friendship, p. 120. EG Whitlam to Chou Enlai, 21 April 1971, Hall Papers, NLA, MS 8725/15/2, Box 51. FitzGerald, Talking with China, p. 44. Gough Whitlam, ‘Sino-Australian Diplomatic Relations 1972–2002’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 56(3), 2002, p. 331. FitzGerald, Talking with China, pp. 22–7, 37–9. Interview with Freudenberg. Curran, Unholy Fury, p. 121. FitzGerald, Talking with China, pp. 23, 37–38. Interview with Kelly. As Whitlam commented in his interview with Zhou Enlai, ‘neither of your Ministers and none of your officials questioned our right to have different assessments from those of the Chinese Government … when there were differences they were understood and respected’. ‘China Talk with Chou’, AAP, p. 3. FitzGerald, Talking with China, p. 19. ‘China Talk with Chou’, AAP, p. 9. Former Press Secretary Graham Freudenberg and media adviser Eric Walsh recall that there was little risk of any American acrimony over the Labor delegation visit. The United States was not going to jeopardise its relationship with Australia over the ALP’s China initiative. Interview with Walsh; Interview with Freudenberg. Beazley, Post Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the United States Alliance, p. 225. Curran, Unholy Fury, pp. 114, 127. Manuscript on Australian Defence Policy, Tange Papers, NLA, MS 9847, Box 10. Albinski, Australian Attitudes and Policies Towards China, p. 434. Woodard, Asian Alternatives, p. 273, Albinski, Attitudes to China, p. 434.

121 ‘Summary Record of Telephone Conversation between McMahon and Waller’, 19 August 1971, in Doran and Lee (eds), Australia and Recognition, p. 580; ‘Submission to Cabinet’, 9 February 1971, in Doran and Lee (eds), Australia and Recognition, p. 388. 122 ‘Cablegram to Washington’, 18 July 1971, in Doran and Lee (eds), Australia and Recognition, p. 509. 123 ‘Whitlam on Foreign Affairs’, 8 November 1972, Cameron Papers, NLA, MS4614, bound volumes entitled ‘Press Releases, Television, Radio Interviews by Hon E Gough Whitlam, 5/12/72–11/11/75’. 124 ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Secretary’s Meeting with Australian PM Gough Whitlam’, 31 July 1973, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 31, RG59, NARA. 125 Beazley, Post Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the United States Alliance, p. 224. 126 ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Secretary’s Meeting with Australian PM Gough Whitlam’, 31 July 1973, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 31, RG59, NARA. 127 Beazley, Post Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the United States Alliance, p. 243; EG Whitlam, 22 May 1969, CPD, p. 2164. 128 ‘Whitlam on Foreign Affairs’, 8 November 1972, Cameron Papers, NLA, MS4614, bound volumes entitled ‘Press Releases, Television, Radio Interviews by Hon E Gough Whitlam, 5/12/72–11/11/75’; Whitlam, ‘Opening Address by the Prime Minister’, p. 3. 129 Nancy Viviani, ‘The Whitlam Government’s Policy Towards Asia’, in David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds), Evatt to Evans: The Labour Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1997), p. 107; Whitlam, 25 March 1965, CPD, p. 220. 130 Interview with Freudenberg. For a similar argument, see Gregory Pemberton, ‘Whitlam and the Labor Tradition’, in David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds), Evatt to Evans: The Labour Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1997), p. 140. 131 ‘Visit of Gough Whitlam’, 16 July 1970, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959– 74), Box 22, RG59, NARA. 132 ibid. 133 ‘Address by Mr E Gough Whitlam, Leader of the Australian Parliamentary Opposition to the American–Australian Association’, 1 February 1972, Hall Papers, NLA, MS 8725/15/3, Box 51. 134 Interview with FitzGerald; Interview with Walsh. 135 American Embassy to Department of State, 10 June 1970, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 22, RG59, NARA. 136 American Embassy Canberra to Secretary of State Washington, DC, 7 October 1971, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 25, RG59, NARA. 137 ibid. 138 Interview with FitzGerald. 139 American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, 16 July 1971, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959–74), Box 25, RG59, NARA. 140 Fung and Mackerras, From Fear to Friendship, p. 120. 141 Whitlam, ‘China and the US’, p. 15. 142 Interview with Kelly.

CHAPTER 7 Hawke’s Response to Tiananmen Square

Following Australian recognition of China in December 1972, Sino-Australian relations rapidly gained momentum. Successive Australian governments increasingly viewed the bilateral relationship as important in its own right, rather than solely through the prism of regional and global geopolitics.1 Australian Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke (1983–91), through his efforts to institutionalise closer Sino-Australian relations, is inextricably linked to this trend in Australian foreign policy. Under the auspices of close personal relationships he established with General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Yaobang and Chinese Premier (and later General Secretary from 1987-89) Zhao Ziyang, Hawke oversaw the deepening and broadening of this relationship during the mid-1980s. His Government concluded a series of bilateral agreements with China that resulted in legal, educational and cultural exchanges, and enhanced scientific and technological cooperation. Through the establishment of large joint venture projects, the Hawke Government also sought to integrate the Australian and Chinese iron and steel industries.2 Such institutionalised cooperation provided the basis for an enduring partnership, which resulted in the Sino-Australian relationship assuming a status second only to the US alliance in Australian foreign policy.3 But everything soon changed. On 4 June 1989, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) killed hundreds of student protestors, who were calling for political reform and had gathered around Tiananmen Square. In the week following, the PLA arrested approximately 1800 student dissidents for ‘counterrevolutionary’ activity.4 These events struck Hawke personally. At a public memorial service at Parliament House on 9 June, the Prime Minister wept while reading out the account of events provided by the Australian embassy in Beijing. Hawke viewed the Tiananmen Square crackdown—in particular the PLA’s use of force against young students—as a morally reprehensible act that could not go unnoticed.5 The Hawke Government responded to these events by publicly condemning the Chinese Government’s actions and instigating a series of political sanctions. These included cancelling Hawke’s impending visit to China, suspending all ministerial visits, and terminating the scheduled port-call of HMAS Parramatta at Shanghai. Hawke was the leading architect of this response, supported closely by his International Affairs Adviser, John Bowan, and Hawke’s Chief of Staff, Sandy Hollway. The disengagement strategy evolved further in response to unfolding events in Beijing. The second phase of Australia’s disengagement strategy was administered by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), but within the original policy framework established by Hawke.6 Following a DFAT review of the

bilateral relationship, the Hawke Government implemented broad-ranging political sanctions on 13 July 1989. These entailed suspending ministerial and parliamentary visits for the remainder of 1989, indefinitely terminating all high-level Defence visits, suspending the Market Advisory Program, and providing support to international institutions that were deferring new loans to China. These measures were introduced to punish the Chinese leadership and to compel the Chinese Government to demonstrate tangible progress in addressing its human rights record.7 However, the sanctions were directed only at suspending Sino-Australian relations, not fundamentally abrogating them.8 The Hawke Government was acutely conscious of the need to register Australia’s disapproval, while also protecting Australia’s long-term interests in preserving a cooperative Sino-Australian relationship.9 While then Chinese Premier Li Peng warned that Australia would ‘pay a price’ if it continued to adopt a harsh stance on Chinese human rights issues, the Hawke Government was convinced that it maintained significant leverage in the relationship.10 This assumption was borne out by Chinese efforts to get the relationship back on track as soon as possible.11 This shift toward disengagement is not easily explained by power transition or alliance theory. It is difficult to link this disengagement strategy to any perceived change in relative satisfaction or to an Australian bandwagoning response in support of the United States. Although there were parallels between the Australian and US responses to Tiananmen, Australia’s China policy did not derive from the United States. Australia instigated its initial tranche of sanctions before the United States and three weeks before Hawke’s long-planned visit to Washington. When recollecting the factors that shaped Australia’s policy response, Hawke and his advisers all identified the primacy of Australian interests as a shaping influence on Australia’s post-Tiananmen China policy.12 The Hawke Government’s disengagement strategy was dictated by factors inherent in Australia’s bilateral relationship with the rising power. The Australian Government’s response was, first and foremost, a reflection of Hawke’s personal reaction to events and the breakdown of what had, up until that point, been assumed as shared expectations governing the relationship. Although conscious that China was not a democracy, the Hawke Government had expected that it would make demonstrable progress on human rights as a signatory of the UN Declaration on Human Rights (UNDHR).13 From Australia’s perspective, Tiananmen Square clearly demonstrated China’s disregard for international human rights standards, and Hawke judged that this disregard could not be ignored within the confines of normal diplomatic interaction.14 At the same time, the Prime Minister recognised the importance of fostering a long-term cooperative relationship with China to prevent it emerging as a potentially disruptive player in the international system and threatening Australia’s strategic interests in regional order.15 The Hawke Government’s shift to disengagement therefore resulted from the disjuncture between a breakdown in shared expectations governing the relationship and Australia’s long-term strategic incentives to cooperate with China. The Hawke Government confidently pursued this policy independently of the alliance. Although Hawke and his advisers assumed that the US response would parallel their own,

this confidence was fundamentally underwritten by assumptions of American acquiescence grounded in changing perceptions of alliance contribution. The Hawke Government’s adoption of a policy of defence self- reliance, designed to fully reflect the implications of the 1969 Guam Doctrine, transformed Australian foreign policy. By assuming responsibility for its own self-defence and raising the threshold for American involvement, the Hawke Government was able to adopt an independent regional foreign policy.16 The Government regarded Australia’s regional policies—including its policy toward China—as Australia’s own sovereign prerogative and no longer felt bound to consult with the United States on every issue. It was therefore able to shift between engagement and disengagement with China, without coordinating with Washington or fearing adverse alliance implications. These understandings, based on Australia’s defence self-reliance, were critical to the emergence of a truly independent Australian foreign policy from within ANZUS. To fully understand the shift to disengagement and the increasingly circumscribed role of the alliance in shaping the dynamics of Sino-Australian relations, this chapter explores the factors that underpinned the Australian policy response to Tiananmen. It examines evolving Australian perceptions of Sino-American power relativities during the 1980s and the influence of US policies toward post-Tiananmen China on Australia. Given the limited influence of US policies on Australia’s response, it then analyses the factors that shaped the Hawke Government’s disengagement strategy and the relative influence of the alliance as a constraint. Why did Hawke so confidently pursue this disengagement strategy in an alliance setting? The shift back to normalised Sino-Australian relations in July 1991 further highlights the limited influence of US policies on Australia’s China policy. By the late 1980s, the SinoAustralian relationship had well and truly assumed a life of its own.

Changing Sino-American Power Relativities In 1989, the Hawke Government was anticipating the end of the Cold War, following a period greater strategic accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union as a result of changing Soviet foreign and defence policies under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Despite this profound transformation in the international system since the 1970s, however, there were striking similarities between how Gough Whitlam, and Hawke and his ministers viewed changing regional power dynamics. Both leaders were grappling with how potential changes to US global power projection would affect regional power relativities. The Hawke Government still viewed the United States as the foremost global and regional power.17 The end of the Cold War only further underscored US dominance. While the United States and the Soviet Union were both still global superpowers, the Soviet Union had a poor economy and was technologically behind the United States.18 The United States also maintained a strong alliance network in Western Europe and the Asia–Pacific in contrast to the Soviet Union’s declining influence over its crumbling ideological bloc in Eastern Europe.19 US dominance was particularly marked in the Asia–Pacific. Despite the Soviet Union’s

modernisation of its Pacific fleet and naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, Western naval superiority in the Pacific remained undiminished.20 The Soviet Union was unable to match US regional naval deployments in frequency or number.21 The Hawke Government did harbour concerns about a decline in US regional power relative to what it had been in previous years.22 Then Defence Adviser to Bob Hawke Hugh White recalls concerns that the end of the Cold War would potentially remove the strategic rationale for US forces in the Pacific and that ‘America’s instinctive isolationism would reassert itself’.23 This was particularly the case in Southeast Asia, where lingering ideological competition diminished during the 1980s.24 However, any potential relative decline in US power was viewed as an issue of American will, not capacity.25 The United States did strategically retract from the region, with US troop reductions in Asia as had been foreshadowed by the US East Asia Strategy Report in 1990. In 1989, Hawke’s ministers surmised with a US strategic retraction from the region, the relative regional influence of Japan, China and India would grow commensurately. The Foreign Minister explained that: we are likely to see over the next ten years a transition phase which will culminate in a more traditional situation in which a number of states of varying characteristics exercise great power status. The United States and the Soviet Union will loom relatively less large and will be joined by Japan, the European Community, China and India as major global influences … [E]ach of these great powers will possess a distinctive combination of strengths and weaknesses and assert its role in some geographical regions more than others.26 Japan had emerged as ‘the dominant Asian economic power’ and an increasingly important military power by the late 1980s.27 Yet, some within the Hawke Government believed that China could eclipse Japan over the longer term.28 This view was gaining traction in Canberra. Hawke believed that Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s implementation of his ‘Open Door’ and ‘Four Modernisations’ policies (aimed at strengthening agriculture, industry, technology and defence) would fundamentally change global and regional power relativities.29 Instigated in 1978, these policies led to a period of sustained and large-scale economic growth in China: its growth in output averaged about 9 per cent per year between 1977 and 1989.30 As early as 1986, the Hawke Government noted China’s goal to quadruple its gross domestic product (GDP) over the next twenty years, ultimately leading to a Chinese economy in 2030 that would be approximately the same size as the US economy at the time.31 Based on such trends, the Australian embassy in Beijing argued that, if Chinese reforms continued, China could ultimately become another Japan (although this analysis was still contested by the Australian Embassy in Tokyo).32 A 1986 Cabinet Submission postulated that, ‘as China modernises it will increasingly acquire some of the attributes of a superpower [and will be] the third most important nation in strategic terms after the United States and the Soviet Union and ahead of the other members of the

Security Council and Japan’.33 Although recognising that the full benefits of China’s economic growth to Australia would not be fully realised for some time to come, Hawke projected that China would emerge as a great power—if not the predominant power—in Asia.34 There are continuities between Whitlam’s and Hawke’s characterisation of China as a power that would, in future, challenge regional power relativities. What is different between them is the scale of change they anticipated, grounded in differing historical contexts. Whereas Whitlam viewed China as having great economic potential, Hawke was witnessing the beginning of Chinese industrialisation and speculating about its implications for the region. By the 1980s, the idea of China as a rising power had become deeply entrenched in Australian policy circles.35 These perceptions were, however, still qualified. China’s future power trajectory was still predicated on its continuing economic reform and a degree of economic stability.36 While Hawke was confident that Chinese economic reform would continue, the Australian Government was conscious that the Chinese leadership was still debating the pace and merit of the reform process.37 The Tiananmen Square incident highlighted some of the challenges confronting China in the pursuit of its reformist agenda and, ultimately, in realising its greatpower ambitions. The crackdown, endorsed by Deng Xiaoping, led to a shift in the balance of power within the Chinese leadership, toward the conservative faction led by Chinese Premier Li Peng. This faction opposed the economic and political reforms that had been instigated by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang (under Deng’s authority), believing that they had precipitated the student crisis. This conservativism remained dominant until Deng revived China’s economic reform agenda in 1992.38 Until the early 1990s, there was still lingering uncertainty, both in the Australian embassy in Beijing and in Canberra, about the prospects for Chinese economic reform and what this would mean for future Chinese economic growth. This uncertainty was reflected in the Australian Government’s defence update, endorsed by the Hawke Government in 1989 with a public version released in 1992, which noted that, while ‘China is developing strategic influence and reach, its preoccupations will remain internal. Economic growth will slow and China’s capacity to provide resources for defence will be impaired’.39 The Tiananmen Square incident also threatened to jeopardise much of the diplomatic influence that China had won since re-opening to the international community in 1971. The Chinese Government’s resorting to force to quell the student protestors gave rise to concern in several Southeast Asian capitals about Beijing’s long-term strategic intentions.40 Following Tiananmen, Australian policymakers by no means dismissed China as a future rising power of Asia, but they recognised that its trajectory to great-power status would not be smooth. China would not be in a position to challenge US regional power and influence for several decades. This was further underscored by perceptions, at that time, that China was emerging as an economic power rather than a military power in Asia.41 Defence was the last of Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernisations to be implemented. While China maintained nuclear weapons and a large land army, its conventional forces were under-equipped and principally positioned for northern defence against the Soviet Union. It maintained only limited air and

naval capabilities, with high inflation nullifying large increases in defence spending and limiting the Chinese leadership’s ability to purchase modern military systems.42 It was not until after China began to purchase Soviet military technology in 1992 that the Australian Department of Defence, and the Australian Government more broadly, began to think of China as a rising strategic power.43 Given the continuity between Whitlam’s and Hawke’s assessment of regional power dynamics, it is difficult to attribute Australia’s shift to disengagement to changing perceptions of power relativities—Australian policymakers still perceived the United States as the dominant regional power. More relevant is what power transition theorists would posit as Australia’s relative satisfaction with the United States and China. Did Tiananmen give rise to Australian disengagement because it underscored the ideological differences between Australia and China and enhanced Australia’s relative satisfaction with the United States? Was Australia’s disengagement strategy merely a bandwagoning response in support of US policies during a fragile period in Sino-American relations?

The Influence of US Policies The Tiananmen Square incident graphically highlighted the ideological differences between China and Australia, but did not lead to any fundamental change in what had been Australia’s longstanding satisfaction with the US-led regional order. As in previous decades, this satisfaction was grounded in the enduring liberal democratic values that Australia shared with the United States. Both Hawke and Evans referred to these values as a uniting force between the two countries, which was brought into sharper relief with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the overriding dominance of Western liberalism at the end of the Cold War.44 The Hawke Government also regarded US global and regional leadership as an important force for stability during this period of profound change in the international system. Hawke and his ministers publicly espoused the importance of the US regional presence as a source of strategic reassurance as Asia–Pacific countries looked to develop enduring local confidence-building measures.45 Both before and after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Hawke Government was seized with finding ways to preserve US leadership and engagement in the Asia–Pacific.46 Yet the Hawke Government’s efforts to do so did not lead to a return to the policies of the 1960s, when Australia calibrated its China policy with Washington as a demonstration of its support. While Australian and US approaches to post-Tiananmen China converged, Australia’s policy did not stem from the United States. There is much evidence to suggest that the two countries developed their policies relatively independently of one another. First, Australian efforts to coordinate with US China policy would have been complicated by the inherent unpredictability of US foreign policy toward China during this time. From 1989, US foreign policy toward China was increasingly bifurcated between the executive and legislative branches of government. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, US President George HW Bush condemned the human rights violations that had occurred and instigated sanctions

similar to Australia’s. These included suspension of US and Chinese defence visits, suspension of government-to-government sales and commercial exports of weapons, and a ban on all high-level official contacts. Yet, Bush also sought to preserve the underlying cooperative foundations of the Sino-American relationship.47 Sino-American relations had fundamentally changed as a result of the end of the Cold War and China’s rapid economic growth. No longer did Washington view this relationship simply in terms of weighing against the Soviet Union.48 China itself was rapidly emerging as a major power in Asia. It was in US interests to develop a positive and productive relationship with China, in order to preserve the United States’ strategic position in the region over the longer term.49 For these reasons, Bush sent his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Beijing in July and November 1989 respectively. The first visit was designed to keep lines of communication open between the two countries, while the second was aimed at establishing a roadmap to move the relationship forward.50 At the same time, the US Congress was outraged by what was perceived as Bush’s duplicity in conducting such secret diplomacy with Beijing. Congress tied China’s most favoured nation (MFN) trading status to that country’s human rights performance.51 From 1989, Bush was continuously engaged in mustering sufficient Congressional support to constitutionally veto the bill revoking China’s MFN status. It was not until 1995 that the United States lifted all sanctions on China. The unpredictability of US foreign policy during this time would have made it difficult for Australia to actively calibrate its policy response with Washington, even if Australian policymakers had wished to do so.52 The timing of the Hawke Government’s policy response further militates against any link between the two countries’ policies. The Hawke Government condemned the Tiananmen human rights violations and announced its first round of limited diplomatic sanctions on 4–5 June—two days before the Bush administration imposed US sanctions and three weeks before Hawke’s visit to Washington. Moreover, little substantive discussion about Tiananmen took place between Hawke and President Bush during this visit, beyond reaffirming their convergent, albeit independent, policy approaches and possible tactical coordination of these sanctions.53 Far from bandwagoning with Washington, Hawke, Evans and their key advisers all recall the negligible role of the United States in shaping Australia’s Tiananmen response.54 The limited role of US China policy in shaping this response raises questions about the relationship, if any, between ANZUS and the shifting dynamics of Australian engagement with a rising power. If the alliance was not a decisive factor, what were the most important determinants in instigating this fundamental shift in Australian foreign policy? Given the Hawke Government’s continuing support for a US-led regional order and the centrality of the alliance to Australia’s security, why was the Hawke Government not more concerned about calibrating Australia’s policy response with that of the Bush administration? There are two possible explanations: either an absence of any real conflict of interest with the senior ally over this issue or perceptions of greater intra-alliance bargaining power. The first explanation does have some resonance. Hawke’s Chief of Staff Sandy Hollway recalls that alliance considerations were subsumed when forming Australia’s Tiananmen response

because of what was presupposed to be convergence between Canberra and Washington on how to manage China. This assumption stemmed from the allies’ shared democratic values.55 Yet, to attribute the marginal influence of the alliance entirely to these convergent interests obscures the complexity of Australian foreign policy at this time. Convergent interests can still presuppose an element of consultation and consensus among allies. While convergent interests helped to facilitate the Hawke Government’s independent policy response to Tiananmen, they do not fully explain why the Hawke Government so confidently pursued an independent policy toward China without deference to Washington’s position. This is much more reminiscent of a situation in which Australian policymakers felt they had some intra-alliance bargaining power on this issue. In a more general context, Australia certainly brought some assets to the alliance. Hawke and Beazley were both conscious that the United States maintained strategic interests in Australia, centring on the joint Australia– US defence facilities. These facilities provided critical early warning of ballistic missile launches and helped verify arms control in the Soviet Union.56 Australian perceptions of intra-alliance bargaining power on Australia’s Tiananmen response are still surprising, however, given dominant fears of US abandonment at this time. These fears were predicated on growing strategic uncertainty brought about by the end of the Cold War and a continuing dependence on the US alliance. The emerging US–Soviet Union rapprochement meant that the international system was less dominated by superpower competition. The Australian Department of Defence concluded in 1992, however, that ‘[c]hange in the familiar global order will mean greater strategic uncertainty elsewhere, including Australia’s region’.57 The Hawke Government anticipated that Australia’s security might again be directly affected by competition between Asia’s major powers.58 This was compounded by a growing recognition that internal domestic problems could also have destabilising effects, of which Tiananmen Square was a powerful reminder.59 The value of the respective strategic benefits that Australia and the United States received from the alliance still led the Hawke Government to view it as a fundamentally asymmetric one.60 As then DFAT Secretary Richard Woolcott has since recalled, a ‘constant factor in our connection with the United States is that it is not a relationship between equals … The United States is of enormous importance to Australia; but Australia is of lesser importance to the United States’.61 While Australia was working to develop its own independent defence capability, this was not a panacea for the range of problems that Australia might confront in an increasingly uncertain regional security environment. The 1986 Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (the Dibb Review) and 1987 Defence White Paper outlined force structure priorities for a ‘self-reliant’ Australian defence capability. However, this self-reliant capability was qualified in the following ways: first, defence efforts were limited to Australia’s area of direct military interest;62 second, the level of conflict would fall short of invasion;63 third, Australia was not confronted by a technologically superior major power adversary;64 and fourth, that self-reliance took place within an alliance context.65 The limitations of the self-reliance doctrine underscored Australia’s continuing reliance

on the United States for contingencies falling outside these parameters. Australia still valued the alliance for its nuclear deterrent and as a vehicle for maintaining a US regional presence that would prevent major powers from penetrating into the Pacific—Australia’s sphere of primary strategic interest.66 The United States also remained a source of intelligence, defence technology and logistical support that were all critical to developing Australia’s self-reliant defence capability.67 Abandonment fears emanating from Australia’s dependence on the alliance stemmed from what was perceived as a potentially weaker US regional commitment after the end of the Cold War. The strategic rationale for a US military presence in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia, had come into question. A continuing US presence depended not just on ANZUS, but also on the efforts of other regional allies to uphold shared strategic interests with Washington.68 Furthermore, New Zealand’s suspension from ANZUS in 1986, following its decision to deny port access to US nuclear submarines, graphically illustrated that US interests in its allies were not immutable. Hawke and his ministers retained confidence in the US commitment to Australian security, but this was qualified in two ways. First, US regional military retraction led the Hawke Government to become less confident of US military support at the lower threshold of conflict, underscoring the imperative for greater defence self-reliance.69 Second, as Australia shifted toward defence self-reliance, it still needed to demonstrate a willingness to contribute to military operations and shared strategic objectives further afield.70 Given underlying abandonment fears and efforts to sustain the alliance by contributing to shared strategic goals, it is surprising that Hawke and his advisers dedicated so little attention to Washington when developing Australia’s post-Tiananmen China policy. Hawke’s advisers and former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans recall that, even if Washington’s response had differed, the Hawke Government would have still responded in the same way.71 This suggests that Hawke and his advisers highly valued Australia’s evolving interest in suspending cooperation with China, offsetting the constraining influence of abandonment fears and leading to greater intra-alliance bargaining power on this issue. But how did this interest come about and why was it so highly valued in an intra-alliance context?

Australia’s Interest in China after Tiananmen Australia’s interest in suspending cooperation with China after Tiananmen was based on factors inherent in the bilateral relationship. The Hawke Government was principally concerned with balancing its efforts to promote human rights with the need to maintain a cooperative long-term relationship with Beijing.72 Previously, China’s demonstrable progress on human rights and shift toward greater economic and political liberalisation allowed the Hawke Government to reconcile these two imperatives. However, the Tiananmen Square crackdown pitted Australian values against the strategic and economic imperatives underpinning Sino-Australian cooperation. These strategic imperatives included Chinese respect for Australia’s strategic interests, such as the alliance. The resulting disjuncture

between a breakdown in Australian and Chinese expectations over the human rights in the relationship, and ongoing strategic imperatives for future cooperation, led to Australia’s shift to a disengagement strategy. Breakdown in Shared Expectations Australia’s post-Tiananmen response was driven primarily by Hawke’s emotive reaction to events. Tiananmen invoked the Prime Minister’s own sense of personal morality.73 He viewed the Tiananmen Square crackdown—principally, the PLA’s use of force against young students—as a reprehensible act that could not go unnoticed.74 He believed that he had a personal moral obligation to register his own and, more generally, Australia’s concern regarding the tragedy. It was, in his view, simply the right thing to do.75 Through his public condemnation of the Chinese Government’s actions and instigation of political sanctions, his response was directed at punishing the Chinese leadership without hurting the Chinese people. The intensity of Hawke’s emotion stemmed, in part, from the breakdown of what he and his Government had previously viewed as shared expectations with the Chinese about how to manage human rights issues within the relationship. Until 1989, Australian human rights policy toward China centred on private diplomacy to achieve practical outcomes.76 The UNDHR was the single human rights benchmark to which the Hawke Government held China accountable as a signatory.77 It was not expected that China would adhere to the letter of this charter, but that it would make demonstrable progress towards compliance.78 During the late 1980s there were positive signs to this effect. Chinese legal and agricultural reform suggested greater respect for the rule of law.79 Hawke, Evans and Hawke’s advisers also assumed that as economic liberalisation proceeded, so too would political reform. They did not think political reform would equate to Western democratic practices, but that it would entail greater respect for individual freedoms.80 As a 1986 Cabinet Submission on Australia’s future China strategy concluded: It is too early to predict the extent to which [economic reforms] will lead to political democracy [but] … the leadership’s determination to introduce the concept of ‘the rule of law’ … and to define more precisely the rights and obligations of the individual in a socialist society, together with the impact of the ‘open door’ policy on Chinese generally, should see further progress towards a more acceptable level of observance of human rights in China.81 Chinese progress in adhering to at least the spirit of the UNDHR was also perceived as broadly symbolic of its adherence to international norms and willingness to fully participate in the international community (in contrast to the revolutionary days of Mao and the Gang of Four, prior to 1978). But Hawke and his advisers viewed Tiananmen as a clear and public step backwards.82 An Australian embassy cable, which Hawke received from Beijing, graphically described the events of Tiananmen. The cable suggested that the Chinese leadership had intentionally made

use of high-level violence to quell the student protestors. The issue of intentionality was decisive for Hawke. He viewed Tiananmen as a deliberate ‘massacre’, rendering it qualitatively different from simple dispersal of a crowd in an authoritarian state.83 The ensuing breakdown in shared expectations about the role of human rights in the relationship was compounded by the Chinese leadership’s lack of responsiveness to international concern. Both in the lead-up to, and immediately following, the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Australian Government urged the Chinese leadership to handle the situation without resort to violence. On 5 June 1989, Foreign Minister Evans observed that: Everything depends on the extent to which the Chinese Government comes to its senses … If some degree of stability returns as we all very much hope it will, then I guess relations can be resumed with some degree of normality. If that doesn’t happen then it is anyone’s guess as to what China’s relations with the rest of the world will become.84 In the first few days, the Hawke Government therefore appeared to wager the future of the Sino-Australian relationship (beyond Hawke’s initial round of symbolic sanctions) on whether the Chinese Government would assume restraint.85 However, the Chinese Government’s support for ongoing arrests and continuing persecution of Chinese dissidents led the Hawke Government to decide that it was unable to reach an acceptable agreement with Beijing on managing human rights in the relationship. Additional Australian sanctions were imposed in July 1989. What was perceived as a breakdown in shared expectations was grounded in fundamentally differing perceptions among the Chinese and Australian leadership about the importance of human rights and its role in China’s foreign relations. The Chinese leadership viewed Tiananmen primarily in terms of its paramount goal of maintaining internal order and stability. As Chinese Premier Li Peng relayed to Australian envoy and then Secretary of DFAT Richard Woolcott a few days before Tiananmen, the student protests signified there was ‘chaos in Beijing’ and the Chinese Government would take measures ‘to stop the chaos and restore normal social order’.86 Whereas reformist leaders such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang had advocated economic and political reform, Li Peng’s comments demonstrated growing conservatism in the Chinese leadership that opposed their vision of reform and supported returning to a more centralised system. The conservatives viewed human rights in terms of collective social and economic rights that the sovereign state bestows in the interest of the polity as a whole.87 Tiananmen signified the final outcome of this debate within the Chinese leadership, with conservative views assuming prominence.88 While Deng continued to support Chinese economic reform and development, he supported the Tiananmen crackdown because he prioritised domestic stability and maintaining the power of the Communist Party.89 With the purge of reformers such as Zhao Ziyang from the Party, he presided over a more conservative Chinese leadership that did not fully embrace economic reform, much less political reform.90

The Australian Government and the Chinese leadership also differed over how human rights should be managed in China’s relations with other countries. The Chinese leadership was defensive about the international community’s response to Tiananmen. It believed that principles of sovereignty should take precedence over international human rights norms.91 Conversely, the Australian Government advocated that there were universal human rights standards (to which China subscribed based on its acceptance of the UNDHR) that transcended state sovereignty and provided a legitimate basis on which to predicate SinoAustralian relations.92 With respect to Tiananmen, Evans observed, ‘what is involved here is a fundamental human rights issue: violent suppression of what was manifestly a peaceful demonstration. Australia deplores human rights violations all around the world. We make no exception for China’.93 To the Hawke Government, the events at Tiananmen Square violated the fundamental norms of international society to which China must adhere if it wished to join the comity of nations.94 Moreover, the Australian public was affronted by the Tiananmen Square incident. It was difficult to sustain a positive and enduring Sino-Australian relationship if China did not demonstrate some effort to address its poor human rights record. While Hawke’s response to Tiananmen was primarily underwritten by his personal reaction to events, popular sentiment served as a powerful reinforcing factor.95 In condemning the Chinese leadership’s violence, Hawke believed he was acting on behalf of all Australians.96 Paradoxically, a temporary shift toward disengagement, which used sanctions to compel change in China’s approach to human rights, was important to maintaining long-term cooperative Sino-Australian relations. Yet while the breakdown of a workable agreement on the role of human rights in the relationship led Australia to shift to a disengagement strategy, longer-term strategic imperatives for cooperation dissuaded the Hawke Government from abrogating the relationship altogether. A Cabinet Submission on Australia’s relations with China, considered by the Hawke Government in July 1989, noted that Australia’s response to Tiananmen needed to be ‘carefully crafted’ to condemn the Chinese leadership’s actions ‘while avoiding unnecessary and enduring damage’ to Australia’s strategic and commercial interests.97 The Hawke Government worked hard to preserve institutional links, such as bilateral educational exchanges and joint venture iron mining in Australia which helped promote enduring cooperation. The Government also adopted unofficial avenues to discuss matters affecting relations. In 1990, for instance, former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and former DFAT Secretary Stuart Harris visited China to maintain lines of communication between the two governments.98 Although the factors underpinning the Hawke Government’s shift to disengagement were grounded in bilateral relations, the subtle influence of the alliance in shaping Australia’s China policy was evident in the Hawke Government’s efforts to preserve long-term cooperative Sino-Australian relations. Sino-Australian relations had evolved since the 1970s, but the fundamental terms of the relationship, with respect to Australia’s strategic interests in regional order and discretion for the US alliance, remained remarkably unchanged. These terms made it easier for the Australian Government to reconcile an independent China policy

—whether engagement or disengagement—with ANZUS. Australia’s Strategic Interests and Enduring Imperatives for Cooperation By the 1980s, many of the strategic interests that the ALP had defined in the post–Vietnam War era had crystallised—as had the role of ANZUS and engagement with China in supporting these strategic interests. The Hawke Government’s preferred construct of regional order was conceived in terms of a series of concentric circles. At each level, it hoped to facilitate conditions for both reassurance, which would encourage Asia–Pacific countries to embrace regional political cooperation, and insurance designed to deter and protect against the emergence of a potentially expansionist power in the region. Within the broader region, the Hawke Government sought to facilitate these conditions for reassurance and insurance by maintaining US regional leadership through an active American security presence. As Hawke declared in 1991: ‘Australia’s view … is that a key to maintaining a stable security system in Asia, and providing the foundation of security as the region evolves, is the continued strategic engagement of the United States in the West Pacific’.99 The Hawke Government viewed the US defence presence in Asia, supported by US alliances, as a useful transition mechanism as regional countries worked to deepen cooperation and build a new Asia–Pacific security architecture.100 The Government also regarded a US presence as important in providing insurance in the event of a regional conflict or the emergence of an expansionist power. Hawke observed that there were ‘no signs yet of an emerging expansionist power in our region, but should one emerge, the US military presence would be a powerful countervailing force’.101 The US presence would help to preserve a benign regional environment that would increase the likelihood of security in Southeast Asia and Australia’s immediate strategic approaches. At the subregional level, the Government also had a strategic interest in preserving the conditions for a stable Southeast Asia that was not dominated by an expansionist power.102 To this end, the Hawke Government adopted a two-pronged approach. First, it advocated regional political cooperation in the form of subregional security dialogues and confidencebuilding measures.103 This approach would help to mitigate the risk of conflict among Southeast Asian states and foster regional strategic cohesion, which would prevent external powers from interfering in Southeast Asian affairs.104 Second, the Government sought to lend weight to the deterrence aspect of regional strategic cohesion by strengthening defence cooperation with key Southeast Asian countries. Examples include strengthening the FPDA, replacing Australia’s Mirage fighters stationed in Malaysia with more advanced FA-18 and F-111 aircraft, and expanding defence and intelligence cooperation with Indonesia and Thailand. The Government viewed such incremental and low-key bilateral defence cooperation as a way to develop a ‘community of regional strategic interests’, which could later provide for a more structured defence community.105 The Hawke Government adopted a similar two-pronged approach to the Southwest Pacific. Given its proximity to Australia’s strategic approaches, the Government had a strategic interest in preserving a stable subregion to its east.106 While not necessarily seeking

to deny the area to external powers, the Hawke Government sought to mitigate potential security challenges there by establishing closer Australian ties with, and effective regional cooperation among, Southwest Pacific states.107 The Pacific Patrol Boat Program, through which the Australian Government provided surveillance vessels to Southwest Pacific countries to patrol their territorial waters, was a tangible manifestation of Australia’s commitment to the region. In both Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, the Hawke Government sought to build regional cooperation, while minimising opportunities for an adverse great power presence. The Hawke Government’s engagement-based approach toward Beijing was premised on the Prime Minister’s belief that China could be conditioned, over time, to behave in a way that respected, and even supported, these strategic interests in regional order. The Hawke Government viewed China as a fundamentally defensive power that had, for too long, been treated badly by the international community.108 China’s growing openness to the international community was perceived as an affirmation of Whitlam’s logic for engagement during the early 1970s. The Hawke Government adopted the view that China was more likely to respond positively if other countries welcomed it into the international community.109 Hawke regarded Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform policies as a further opportunity for other countries to shape the future of Chinese foreign policy. The priority China assigned to liberalising its national economy made the country increasingly dependent on the international market and, correspondingly, on a stable international system.110 As a 1986 Cabinet Submission observed: ‘China’s reformist leadership will continue to see its interests in modernisation as best served by regional stability’.111 Even after Tiananmen, the Hawke Government’s confidence that the Chinese leadership could be persuaded to continue with economic reform engendered confidence that Sino-Australian cooperation could still be consistent with, and was even imperative to, advancing Australia’s strategic interests.112 These state interests included Chinese acceptance of a continuing US regional presence and ANZUS as a vehicle for this presence—both of which had been so central to Australia’s reconciliation of its independent China policy with the US alliance since 1971. Far from wishing to exclude the United States from the region, the Chinese leadership was viewed in Canberra as wanting to preserve a US presence at the end of the Cold War, in part, due to con- cerns about a disintegrating Soviet Union.113 By providing reassurance to regional countries, the US presence contributed to stability in the Asia–Pacific that was conducive to China’s economic development. China also acquiesced in the US presence in Asia because of the inherent value of positive Sino-American relations. This relationship not only enhanced China’s regional prestige, but also provided it with access to US investment and technology.114 For these reasons, and despite the emerging prominence of a more antiWest conservative Chinese leadership, Australian diplomats remained confident about the future of Sino-American relations even after Tiananmen. As then Australian Ambassador to China David Sadleir observed: the USSR cannot replace the US as a source of investment, as a source of technology,

or as a market for Chinese goods—and the Chinese authorities have been very careful even from the earliest days of US responses to the events in Beijing to stress that they are not about to replace one superpower with the other.115 So long as China continued with economic reform (even if this was more modest and pragmatic than Zhao Jiyang envisaged), Beijing’s acceptance of a US regional presence was likely to continue. By extension, so too was China’s acceptance of ANZUS as a manifestation of this presence. This tacit Chinese acceptance was codified in the framework for the relationship that the Hawke Government negotiated early on with the Chinese leadership as a ‘model’ of cooperation ‘between countries with different social systems and at different levels of development’.116 Interpreting what this framework meant in practice in a world still ideologically divided by the Cold War, former Australian Ambassador to China Ross Garnaut later reflected that: The Australian Government always made it clear that Australia was an aligned country, that the United States alliance was central to Australia’s defence policy. Chinese leaders never dissembled their view that China’s socialist system would continue to make it different from Australia—that Sino-Australian relations were and would continue to be between countries with different social systems.117 Hawke similarly recalls that the alliance was ‘part of the sub-structure’ of all the strategic discussions he had with the Chinese and that the ‘alliance with the United States was always presented as central to Australia’s interests’.118 The Hawke Government’s framework codified Beijing’s continuing acceptance of Australia’s membership of ANZUS as non-negotiable. It perpetuated the terms of the relationship that Whitlam had originally brokered in 1971, delinking ANZUS from deeper Sino-Australian relations. The Hawke Government’s confidence that China could be encouraged to respect Australia’s strategic interests in regional order was reinforced by its perceptions of Chinese intentions in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. In contrast to the early 1970s (particularly under the McMahon Government), the Australian Government no longer regarded China as a potentially expansionist or subversive power in Southeast Asia. Instead, it concluded that China wanted to maintain a defensive buffer zone in the subregion to foster a stable environment that was conducive to economic development.119 While China did resort to military force, such as against Vietnam in 1979, it was in the limited context of territorial disputes where Beijing deemed its sovereignty to be under attack. It did not foreshadow China becoming an aggressive power. Nor was it accompanied by a broader Chinese military build-up.120 Despite the Chinese leadership’s use of force against the Chinese population in Tiananmen Square, there was nothing to suggest to Australian policymakers that there was any change to fundamentally peaceful trends in Chinese foreign policy behaviour.121 Even

after Tiananmen, the possibility that China could still become a constructive regional player in a way that supported Australia’s strategic interests, is what led the Hawke Government to shift to disengagement rather than abrogating the relationship altogether. This is not to suggest that Hawke and his advisers were complacent about the critical juncture that confronted Chinese foreign policy at this time. A measured Chinese foreign policy was only likely to continue if Chinese economic reform continued. Hawke believed the international community should avoid actions that could further entrench support within the Chinese leadership for the anti-reform, anti-Western position advocated by the conservative faction.122 Like Whitlam, Hawke believed that, if the international community imposed harsh international sanctions or ostracised China, this would prompt a defensive reaction in Beijing and strengthen anti-reform elements in the Chinese leadership.123 Where a reformist and integrated China would be more likely to support the existing international order, a closed and ostracised China could pose a risk to this order and, by extension, to Australia’s strategic interests.124 The Hawke Government consequently argued against completely abrogating relations between China and the international community, and Hawke promoted this message during his international travels. During his visit to Washington in late June 1989, Hawke publicly reaffirmed in his press conference with US President Bush that ‘it’s important that those who seek to have a continuation of economic reform [in China] should be encouraged … [T]o the extent that they want to have openings up with the West that that opportunity should be there’.125 It was not until Deng Xiaoping’s ‘southern tour’ to Guangzhou in 1992 that China’s commitment to economic reform was institutionalised.126 Deng’s southern tour provided him with an opportunity to publicise and cultivate support within the Communist Party for a renewed Chinese economic reform agenda. Other factors further underscored the Hawke Government’s commitment to preserving the underlying fabric of the relationship. For instance, Hawke and his advisers were conscious that China was emerging as a regional great power and that building a constructive relationship with that power was important at this nascent stage of its power trajectory.127 Evans recalls the centrality of a positive and productive relationship with China to finding an enduring solution to the Cambodian conflict.128 Hawke also viewed China as an emerging regional economic power.129 The value of Australian exports to China doubled between 1983 and 1985, presenting clear economic incentives to cooperate with that country.130 However, these incentives were only meaningful to the extent that China remained committed to economic reform, and was politically and economically integrated into the international order. It was only through a stable, open and economically prosperous China that Australia could obtain significant economic benefits.131 It was these underlying politico-strategic imperatives, rather than trade as such, which ultimately led to the Hawke Government’s dualistic foreign policy toward China after Tiananmen. Australia’s disengagement strategy was critically shaped by Hawke’s beliefs about how China could be conditioned to best support Australia’s strategic interests in regional order. The alliance shaped this strategy, not in terms of coordination with US policies, but to the

extent that the US regional presence and ANZUS were two of the strategic interests that the Hawke Government sought to protect. Chinese respect for these interests, even after Tiananmen, was important to the continuation of Australia’s broad engagement-based approach toward that country, of which disengagement was only a subset. This made it easier to reconcile Australia’s independent foreign policy toward China with Australia’s enduring alliance membership. What was distinct from the Whitlam era was the extent to which Sino-American relations and the US response to Australia’s China policy was a less conscious factor in Hawke’s and his advisers’ thinking. The Hawke Government was less constrained than Whitlam by considerations of how Australia’s China policy would play out in an intra-alliance context. Whereas Whitlam sought to verify Australia’s changing and less coordinated approach toward China with the US Secretary of State, what is surprising about Tiananmen is that Hawke and Bush did not have these conversations. The Hawke Government’s limited coordination with the United States on Tiananmen points to Australian perceptions of greater intra-alliance bargaining power or minimal concern about adverse alliance implications on this issue. What is less clear is why this was the case and how this change came about over a twenty-year period.

The Tiananmen Response and the Alliance Political Halo Like Whitlam, Hawke was a risk-averse actor when it came to the alliance. One of Hawke’s central objectives during his prime ministership was to establish his Government’s credibility as a reliable alliance manager.132 Hawke recognised that an ALP Government could not sustain popular domestic support if it did not successfully manage the alliance.133 Moreover, he was acutely aware of the importance of ANZUS as an instrument of strategic insurance in an increasingly fluid international environment.134 The Hawke Government sought to prevent a broader unravelling of ANZUS by protecting core US interests in the alliance.135 For these reasons, it instigated the 1983 ANZUS Review, which was intended to be an objective assessment of Australia’s continuing strategic interests in the alliance. The aim of the review was to neutralise opposition to ANZUS and to prevent circumstances arising which could jeopardise the joint facilities in Australia.136 Beazley has since observed that the Hawke Government’s concern not to disrupt the US alliance permeated most of its foreign policy and defence decision-making.137 Despite this broadly risk-averse approach to the alliance, however, Australia did not unqualifiedly defer to, or support, Washington’s position on every policy issue. US policies did not significantly feature in Hawke’s decision-making on China, either before or after Tiananmen.138 As discussed earlier, this partly resulted from convergent Australian and US interests toward China. Shared democratic political values gave rise to Hawke’s and his advisers’ assumption that, after Tiananmen, Australian and US policy approaches would be compatible.139 More fundamentally, however, they did not defer to Washington and pursued a relatively independent policy because of the value they assigned to their interest in China. In

the event that Australian and US reactions to Tiananmen differed, Hawke’s advisers surmise that Australia would have still pursued its divergent, but highly valued, interest toward China.140 In part, Hawke’s advisers attribute this to the profound personal response that Tiananmen evoked from the Prime Minister.141 Yet Hawke’s response was also situated within a more general assessment that, even if different from American policy, Washington would most likely acquiesce in Australia’s disengagement strategy. This assessment was not just predicated on a parallel US response. Rather, it was grounded in changing understandings of alliance purpose and alliance contribution during the 1980s and decreasing centrality of China to these understandings.142 The alliance had significantly evolved since the early 1970s: it was no longer focused on containing China. Although this had begun to change in the early 1970s, Whitlam had still sought to verify his understandings of the implications of the Sino-American détente for ANZUS and for coordination with Washington on China policy.143 Yet as time progressed, Whitlam’s concept of ANZUS as an instrument through which to anchor the US in the region, and to promote regional peace and stability, had become increasingly embedded in Australian policy circles. By the 1980s, Australian policymakers increasingly defined both the purpose of the alliance and Australia’s alliance contributions in these terms. They viewed the purpose of the alliance in terms of preserving the global strategic balance and maximising strategic opportunities in a fluid strategic environment.144 This included providing for a continuing US regional presence through ANZUS and preserving a stable strategic environment that would facilitate the establishment of regional multilateral institutions, such as the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.145 Both countries also sought to maintain freedom of access and sea lane security in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.146 Additionally, they sought to uphold a range of broader global security interests, including the emergent global collective security regime vested in the United Nations.147 Hawke and his advisers couched Australia’s alliance contributions in terms of these shared interests underpinning the alliance. Hawke regarded the Australia–US joint facilities as one of Australia’s most important contributions to the alliance. The importance of these facilities to preserving the global strategic balance led the Australians to view this contribution as non-negotiable.148 Other critical alliance contributions included facilitating an ongoing American presence by providing port access to US vessels, while also developing a self-reliant defence capability.149 Through defence self-reliance and mitigating the burden that Australia imposed on the broader Western alliance, the Hawke Government sought to reduce the costs that the United States would bear in maintaining a security alliance with Australia.150 The Hawke Government viewed defence self-reliance as the natural result of the 1969 Guam Doctrine, which squarely placed responsibility on US allies for their self-defence short of nuclear attack.151 At the same time, Beazley reassured US counterparts that a selfreliant defence posture did not equate to an isolationist one and Australia would continue to contribute to US-led global operations.152 The Hawke Government’s interpretation of Australia’s alliance contributions had

profound implications for Australian foreign policy. First, they helped to define the boundaries of when consultation with Washington was needed and what was more likely to fall outside the purview of the alliance. The more central an issue to Australia’s principal alliance contributions, the more likely that Australia would need to consult with Washington. For instance, the Hawke Government’s 1984 public statement on the joint facilities, directed at enhancing public transparency around the facilities, as well as Australia’s unwillingness to be involved in US MX missile testing in 1985, were both the subject of discussions between the Australian and US governments because of their perceived importance to the alliance and maintaining the global nuclear balance.153 As long as Australian policy did not detract from its key alliance contributions, however, differences could be afforded on more peripheral issues. China was one such issue, with tactical differences sometimes emerging between the two countries on specific aspects of policy.154 While Australian policymakers were eager not to elicit strong US objections, China was viewed as less central to the alliance and an issue that was therefore less likely to prompt such objections. Second, Australia’s alliance contribution of self-reliant defence (at least in aspiration if not yet in practice), facilitated a more independent regional Australian foreign policy. Hawke and his ministers viewed this as important in breaking the longstanding insurance principle that had shaped Australian foreign policy during the Cold War—where Australia actively coordinated aspects of foreign policy with Washington in the hope this would render future US assistance more likely. As Evans observed in 1988: In a very real sense, the Hawke Government’s defence policy has once and for all liberated Australian foreign policy … [I]t is no longer necessary for Australian foreign policy to begin with the assumption that its first task is to ensure the defence of Australia by attracting the protective attention of great and powerful friends.155 Beazley was also conscious of this interrelationship. He believed that the higher the threshold for US intervention in Australian defence, the greater independence Australia would gain in its foreign and strategic policies.156 A force structure, underpinned by the principle of defence self-reliance, provided Australia with the confidence to act diplomatically as a regional power without consulting with the United States on every issue.157 Defence self-reliance therefore facilitated an alliance culture that accommodated both independent Australian foreign policy initiatives, and allied differences, on regional issues. It engendered an implicit assumption that the United States would acquiesce to Australia’s independent regional policies (unless representations were made to the contrary) and that Australia could pursue these without consciously considering US preferences. This shift in thinking, and the implicit assumption of American acquiescence, permeated the Hawke Government’s approach to its China policy both before and after Tiananmen. Even more so than its Labor predecessor, the Hawke Government viewed China policy as outside the central ambit of the alliance.158 Australia’s independent post-Tiananmen response was consistent with the more independent regional foreign policy, brought about by the shift

toward defence self-reliance. It was simply part of Australia’s sovereign prerogative as an independent and self-reliant country.159 This interpretation of the legitimate role of the alliance with respect to Australia’s China policy was reaffirmed by the US response. Former US Secretary of State under the Reagan administration George Shultz recalls that the Americans were comfortable with Australia conducting its own independent relations with third states. They shared the views of their Australian counterparts that this was quite simply Australia’s sovereign prerogative.160 This was particularly the case with respect to China, where there was no clear consensus in Washington about what sort of actor China would become.161 In fact, the United States valued Hawke’s and other Australian policymakers’ insights about China, given the intensity of the Sino-Australian relations for much of the 1980s. This was particularly apparent after Tiananmen. During his visit to Washington in June 1989, Prime Minister Hawke explained to US President Bush that he did not think there would be a recurrence of Tiananmen events and that economic reform was likely to continue.162 The Bush administration welcomed Australia’s policy response to Tiananmen and used it to legitimise its own more moderate approach to China against that of a more hardline Congress.163 Yet former National Security Adviser to the Bush administration Brent Scowcroft has observed that a differing Australian response to Tiananmen would not have posed any significant problems for the alliance.164 Scowcroft’s observation demonstrates the extent to which changing understandings of alliance contribution had become internalised and that China had become increasingly removed from the alliance political halo. This is not to say that there was no engagement on China within the alliance. Bush and Hawke discussed the implications of Tiananmen during Hawke’s visit to Washington in June 1989. Frequent consultations about China also took place among Australian and US officials at embassies in both Washington and Beijing.165 Yet while consultations may have affected Australian and US perspectives about China, Australia’s policy response was not predicated on American views. The implicit assumption of US acquiescence in Australia’s China policy, grounded in changing understandings of alliance contribution, reduced the risk of negative effects for the alliance. There was therefore no inherent conflict between Hawke’s personal values and Australia’s perceived alliance obligations. The limited consequences for the alliance reinforced the high value that the Hawke Government already assigned to its independent interests in China and engendered intra-alliance bargaining power in this issuespecific context. The extent to which this intra-alliance bargaining power underpinned an independent Australian China policy is evident not only in Australia’s post-Tiananmen response, but also in Australia’s efforts to independently re-establish relations with China in 1991. The Hawke Government’s decision to begin normalising relations with China was not a response to alliance considerations or any change in US policies but rather to a greater Chinese willingness to substantively engage with human rights concerns.166 By 1991, the Chinese leadership had sought to re-engage with the international community and was increasingly amenable to the idea of an Australian parliamentary delegation visiting to inspect Chinese

human rights practices.167 To Evans, this delegation visit signified China’s ‘accept[ance] that human rights are a proper subject for discourse in its bilateral relationships and have a legitimate place on the international agenda’.168 The delegation visit allowed Australian representatives to evaluate the extent to which China’s constitutional guarantees, judicial procedures, and freedoms of expression and association were in accordance with the UNDHR. By establishing this mechanism as a regular form of human rights monitoring, the Hawke Government and the Chinese leadership were able to renegotiate and reach agreement on shared expectations governing the relationship regarding human rights. Strategic and economic imperatives to engage with China could again be reconciled with Australian values and, over the longer term, the relationship could regain the support of the Australian people. Following Chinese agreement to host the human rights delegation in 1991, the Hawke Government lifted most of the remaining post- Tiananmen sanctions. The emotive and aspirational relationship of the 1980s was tempered as the Hawke Government laid the foundation for a more pragmatic Sino-Australian relationship in the 1990s.

Conclusion Although Whitlam had established the necessary understandings in both Beijing and Washington to facilitate an independent Australian China policy, the Hawke Government’s post-Tiananmen response demonstrates how far this independent foreign policy had progressed by the late 1980s. The rupture in Australian foreign policy toward China during that decade had less to do with the alliance, than to factors inherent in bilateral SinoAustralian relations. This differs from assumptions underpinning power transition and traditional alliance theories. Despite the Hawke Government’s zeal to support a continuing US leadership role in the Asia–Pacific after the end of the Cold War, its China policy was not a bandwagoning response in support of that leadership. The Hawke Government instigated its initial round of sanctions against China without deferring to Washington and well before Hawke’s visit to the United States later that month. Snyder’s concept of intra-alliance bargaining power provides a better framework for understanding the shift in Australia’s China policy because it privileges the role of a junior ally’s interests in shaping its policy toward an external power. The Hawke Government’s highly valued interest in temporarily suspending cooperation with Beijing stemmed from what was perceived as a breakdown in expectations governing the human rights aspect of the relationship. However, this did not obviate longer-term politico-strategic imperatives for preserving a cooperative relationship. Tiananmen only reinforced the importance of maintaining a broad engagement-based approach so as not to entrench conservative anti-West views in the Chinese leadership.169 This approach would hopefully facilitate the conditions for a China that continued to pursue economic reform and that would, consequently, act in a way that was consistent with Australian strategic interests in regional order. These strategic interests included maintaining a US presence in the Asia–Pacific, with ANZUS as a manifestation of that presence. The evolution of Sino-Australian relations in such a way that

continued to segregate ANZUS as a non-negotiable term of the relationship, made it easier for Australia to reconcile its China policy with its alliance membership. What is surprising in comparison with the Whitlam period, however, is the extent to which the US response to Tiananmen and alliance considerations were not consciously considered in developing Australia’s China policy. American acquiescence to Australia’s post-Tiananmen China response was implicitly assumed rather than actively sought. This was due to evolving understandings of alliance contribution. While Whitlam actively sought to validate de-linkage between Australia’s alliance contributions and its China policy, this understanding was well established by the late 1980s. Australia’s aspirational objective of achieving defence self-reliance underpinned a relatively independent and discrete Australian policy on regional issues, including on China. This limited any alliance risk associated with temporarily suspending Australian cooperation with China. Hawke and his advisers therefore assigned a high value to this interest in an intra-alliance context, facilitating perceptions of comparatively greater intra-alliance bargaining power on this issue. This underpinned a relatively independent Australian disengagement strategy toward China. Far from being compelled to choose between a rising power and dominant global power, Australia’s increasingly discrete relationships with both China and the United States demonstrate how it came to effectively navigate these separate great power relationships. It was effectively able to do so because these relationships were premised not on compliance with major power preferences, but on accepted boundaries of behaviour. The Hawke Government more deeply consolidated the same understandings, originally negotiated by Whitlam, to ensure that Sino-Australian relations were in no way prejudicial to ANZUS and that Australia’s principal alliance contributions were in no way connected to China. Its independent China policy was a natural progression, and further reinforcement of, these understandings. Australia consolidated these understandings at a time when Australian policymakers viewed China as a rising economic power, but not in any way challenging US regional leadership. The following chapter explores whether and how well these understandings endured in a fundamentally different strategic age.

Notes 1

2 3 4 5 6 7

By 1980, the Fraser Government endorsed an interdepartmental working group’s findings that the Sino-Australian relationship had become important to Australia in its own right. The Hawke Government reaffirmed this finding when it assumed government. Kim Nossal, The Beijing Massacre: Australian Responses (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National University (ANU), 1993), p. 9; ‘Australian Policy Towards China’, 5 April 1983, A13977, 19, National Archives of Australia (NAA). ‘Australian Policy Towards China’, 5 April 1983, A13977, 19, NAA. David Goldsworthy, ‘Regional Relations’, in David Goldsworthy and Peter Edwards (eds), Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), p. 143. Ann Kent, Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China (Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1989–90), p. 21. Interview with Bob Hawke, 24 July 2007; Interview with Sandy Hollway, 19 September 2007. Interview with David Sadleir, 17 July 2007. Interview with Hollway; Interview with Gareth Evans, 18 July 2014.

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21

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26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

Russell Trood, ‘From Cooperation to Conflict: Australia and China in 1989’, in Colin Mackerras, Kevin Bucknall and Russell Trood, The Beijing Tragedy: Implications for China and Australia (Nathan, Queensland: Griffith University, 1991), p. 75. Penny Wensley, ‘Policy on China’, in Gary Klintworth (ed.), China’s Crisis, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, 57 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 1989), p. 22. Interview with Michael Costello, 5 September 2007. Interview with Sadleir, 17 July 2007. Interview with Hawke; Interview with John Bowan, 18 September 2007; Interview with Hollway. Interview with Stuart Harris, 16 July 2007; Correspondence with David Sadleir, 17 July 2007. Interview with Hollway; Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 1 August 2007. Interview with Sadleir, 17 July 2007. Peter Fitzsimmons, Beazley (Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999), p. 230; Interview with Kim Beazley, 14 June 2007. Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1991), p. 7; Interview with Paul Dibb, 19 July 2007; Interview with Bill Hayden, 30 July 2007. Interview with Dibb. Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations, p. 6; Bob Hawke, ‘Speech by the Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon RJL Hawke AC MP Dinner Held by the Lord Mayor of London Mansion House, London’, 21 June 1989, Bob Hawke Prime Ministerial Library (BHPML). Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1992), p. 18. Gareth Evans, ‘Australia’s Regional Security: Ministerial Statement by the Hon Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 1989’, in Greg Fry (ed.), Australia’s Regional Security (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991), p. 172. Interview with Hugh White, 5 September 2007; Evans, ‘Australia’s Regional Security’, p. 176. Hugh White, ‘Four Decades of the Defence of Australia: Reflections on Australian Defence over the Past Forty Years’, in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds), History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, 167 (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2007), p. 173. Evans, ‘Australia’s Regional Security’, p. 176. Interview with White, 5 September 2007; Kim C Beazley, ‘Australia and the Asia–Pacific Region: A Strategy of SelfReliance and Alliance’, 30 June 1988, in Kim C Beazley (ed.), Compendium of Speeches by the Hon Kim C Beazley, MP, Minister for Defence (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1989), p. 230. Evans, ‘Australia’s Regional Security’, p. 172. Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Planning, p. 15. Interview with Harris, Correspondence with Sadleir, 17 July 2007. Bob Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs (Port Melbourne, Victoria: William Heinemann, 1994), p. 346. Ross Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989), p. 38. ‘Australia–China Relations’, 15 December 1986, A14039, 4466, NAA. Correspondence with Sadleir, 17 July 2007. ‘Australia–China Relations’, 15 December 1986, A14039, 4466, NAA. Interview with Harris; Interview with Sadleir, 17 July 2007. Interview with Harris; Beazley, ‘Australia and the Asia–Pacific Region’, p. 231. Interview with Sadleir, 17 July 2007. ibid.; Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 1 August 2007; ‘Prime Minister’s Brief: Visit by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Hu Yaobang, April 1985’, A9491, 95, NAA. Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US–China Relations, 1989–2000 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 122–7. Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Planning, p. 17. Interview with Hollway. Interview with White, 5 September 2007; Correspondence with Sadleir, 17 July 2007. James Mulvenon, ‘Chinese Nuclear and Conventional Weapons’, in Elizabeth Economy and Michael Oksenberg (eds), China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1999), p. 327. Interview with White, 5 September 2007. Bob Hawke, ‘Speech by the Prime Minister of Australia, the Hon RJL Hawke, AC MP, Joint Meeting of the United States Congress’, 23 June 1988, BHPML; Gareth Evans, ‘Alliances and Change’, 9 October 1990 (Austin, TX:

45 46

47 48

49 50 51 52

53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

61 62

63

64 65 66 67 68 69 70

71 72

Edward A Clark Center for Australian Studies, 1990), p. 17. Evans, ‘Alliances and Change’, p. 17; Kim C Beazley, ‘Australia and the World: Prologue and Prospects’, 9 December 1988, in Beazley (ed.), Compendium of Speeches, p. 238. Hawke, in particular, was concerned with maintaining this presence. In 1991, Evans planned to give a speech at the Trilateral Commission, in which he anticipated a future in which Asian countries would be able to increasingly look after themselves. On learning of this speech, Hawke advised Evans of the pivotal importance of preserving US engagement in the region. Interview with White, 5 September 2007. George HW Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), p. 65; Interview with Douglas Paal, 16 September 2008; Interview with Brent Scowcroft, 23 September 2008. Interview with Scowcroft. George Shultz observed that the Reagan administration was already beginning to de-link American China policy from the Soviet Union during the early 1980s. Interview with George Shultz, 30 September 2008. Interview with Scowcroft. ibid. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, p. 100. As one former Australian official observes, there was a realisation that Washington would not necessarily consult Australia before proceeding with its China policy. Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 1 August 2007. Interview with Hawke. Interview with Hawke; Interview with Evans; Interview with Bowan; Interview with Hollway. Interview with Hollway. Desmond Ball, A Base for Debate: The US Satellite Station at Nurrungar (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987), p. xi. Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Planning, p. 2. White, ‘Four Decades of the Defence of Australia’, p. 173. Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Planning, pp. 2, 7–8. While Beazley recurrently reminded his US counterparts of the significance of Australia’s contribution to the alliance through the joint facilities, the facilities were not routinely used as a source of bargaining leverage on other diplomatic issues. As Hawke later reflected in his memoirs: ‘I regarded it as intellectually unacceptable and morally indefensible …The joint facilities could not go up for grabs with every argument or disagreement Australia had with the United States’. Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, p. 265; Interview with Beazley. Richard Woolcott, The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings (Pymble, NSW: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), p. 247. The 1987 Defence White Paper defined Australia’s ‘area of direct military interest’ to guide the development of Australia’s military. This area comprised ‘Australia, its territories and proximate ocean areas, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and other nearby countries of the South-West Pacific’. Commonwealth of Australia, The Defence of Australia 1987 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1987), p. 2. Paul Dibb, ‘The Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: The History of an Idea’, in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds), History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence 167(Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2007), p. 18. Commonwealth of Australia, The Defence of Australia 1987, p. 2. Commonwealth of Australia, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986), p. 46. Interview with White, 5 September 2007; Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Planning, p. 45. Kim C Beazley, ‘Thinking Defence: Key Concepts in Australian Defence Planning’, 6 November 1987, in Beazley (ed.), Compendium of Speeches, p. 166. Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Planning, p. 13. Interview with White, 5 September 2007; Beazley, ‘Thinking Defence’, p. 166. As Australia shifted towards a self-reliant posture, for instance, the US sought assurance that Australia would not become isolationist and would still contribute to military operations further afield. More generally, the Hawke Government also sought to portray Australia as a ‘contributor’ to, instead of a ‘consumer’ of, security. Interview with Beazley; Interview with Richard Brabin-Smith, 18 July 2007. Interview with Evans; Interview with Hollway; Interview with Bowan. A similar argument was presented in a Cabinet Submission on Australia’s relations with China, considered by the Hawke Government on 13 July 1989. ‘Cabinet Submission 6571- Australia’s Relations with China – Decision 12812’, 13 July 1989, A14039, 6571, NAA.

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105

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111 112 113 114 115 116

Interview with Hawke; Interview with Hollway; Interview with Bowan. Interview with Hawke; Interview with Hollway. Interview with Hawke. Interview with David Ambrose, 10 September 2007; Interview with Harris. Interview with Harris. Author correspondence with Sadleir, 17 July 2007; Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 1 August 2007. Interview with Ambrose. Interview with Evans; Interview with Bowan; Interview with Hollway. ‘Australia–China Relations’, 15 December 1986, A14039, 4466, NAA. Interview with Hollway; Interview with Bowan. Interview with Hollway. Cited in Trood, ‘From Cooperation to Conflict’, p. 67. ibid., p. 67. ‘Li Peng Meets the Special Envoy of the Australian Prime Minister’, People’s Daily, 20 May 1989, courtesy of David Sadleir. Kent, Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China, p. 7. Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 1 August 2007. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, p. 62. ibid. Trood, ‘From Cooperation to Conflict’, p. 70. Ian Russell, ‘Australia’s Human Rights Policy: From Evatt to Evans’, in Ian Russell, Peter Van Ness and Beng-Huat Chua, Australia’s Human Rights Diplomacy (Canberra: Department of International Relations, ANU, 1992), pp. 34–8. Cited in Trood, ‘From Cooperation to Conflict’, p. 65. Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 1 August 2007; Interview with Hollway. Interview with Hollway. Interview with Hawke. ‘Cabinet Submission 6571- Australia’s Relations with China – Decision 12812’, 13 July 1989, A14039, 6571, NAA. Interview with Harris. Bob Hawke, ‘Australia’s Security in Asia’, 24 May 1991, Office of Bob Hawke. Evans, ‘Alliances and Change’, p. 13; Hawke, ‘Australia’s Security in Asia’. Hawke, ‘Australia’s Security in Asia’. Interview with White, 5 September 2007; Evans, ‘Australia’s Regional Security’, pp. 188–90. Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia–Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s (St Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1996), p. 22. Evans, ‘Australia’s Regional Security’, pp. 190, 213. Evans, ‘Australia’s Regional Security’, p. 189. Australia’s Strategic Planning went so far as to observe that ‘regional countries would benefit from considering joint approaches to monitoring and responding to the extra–regional expansion of military power’. Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Planning, p. 43. Evans, ‘Australia’s Regional Security’, p. 214; Beazley, ‘Australia and the World’, pp. 241–2. Evans, ‘Australia’s Regional Security’, p. 215. Interview with Harris; Interview with Hayden. ‘Australian Policy Towards China’, 5 April 1983, A13977, 19, NAA. Hawke’s views that Chinese economic reform was linked to more predictable and positive foreign policy behaviour were evident in many of his speeches at the time. See, for example, Bob Hawke, ‘The Challenge of Change in the Asia–Pacific Region’ (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), pp. 10–11. ‘Australia–China Relations’, 15 December 1986, A14039, 4466, NAA. Correspondence with Sadleir, July 2007; Bob Hawke, ‘Transcript of News Conference, Blair House, Washington’, 25 June 1989, BHPML Interview with Harris. Interview with Hawke; David Sadleir, ‘The View from Beijing’, in Klintworth (ed.), China’s Crisis, p. 14. Sadleir, ‘The View from Beijing’, p. 14. Ross Garnaut, ‘The Emergence of Substantive Sino-Australian Relations, 1983–88’, undated paper, accessed at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Garnaut,_THE_EMERGENCE_OF_SUBSTANTIVE_SINOAUSTRALIAN_RELATIONS,_1983-88.pdf, p. 14.

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126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154

155 156 157 158 159 160

ibid., p. 15. Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, p. 359. Interview with Harris, 16 July 2007; Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Planning, p. 17. Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations, p. 102. ibid. See, for example, Hawke, ‘Transcript of News Conference, Blair House, Washington’. Interview with David Sadleir, 2 July 2007. Interview with Sadleir, 17 July 2007. Bob Hawke, ‘Transcript of News Conference, Embassy of Australia, Washington’, 27 June 1989, BHPML. In July 1989, the Hawke Cabinet agreed that ‘the processes of economic reform and liberalisation in China be encouraged by all appropriate means’. ‘Cabinet Submission 6571- Australia’s Relations with China – Decision 12812’, 13 July 1989, A14039, 6571, NAA. Interview with Ross Garnaut, 29 August 2007. Interview with Harris. Interview with Evans. Interview with Hawke; Interview with Hollway. Ross Garnaut, ‘Sino-Australian Economic Relations, 1983–95’, in Colin Mackerras (ed.), Australia and China: Partners in Asia (South Melbourne, Victoria: Macmillan, 1996), p. 75. Correspondence with Sadleir, 17 July 2007; Hawke, ‘The Challenge of Change’, pp. 8–11. Interview with White, 5 September 2007; Interview with Bowan. Interview with Bowan. Interview with Hawke; Hawke, ‘Australia’s Security in Asia’. Interview with Bowan. Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, p. 214. Kim C Beazley, ‘The Hawke Years: Foreign Affairs and Defence’, in Susan Ryan and Troy Bramston (eds), The Hawke Government: A Critical Retrospective (Melbourne: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 350. Interview with Hawke; Interview with Evans. Interview with Hollway. ibid; Interview with Bowan. Interview with Hollway. Hawke’s advisers also attribute the Hawke Government’s independent policy response to Tiananmen to these broader intra-alliance understandings. Interview with Bowan; Interview with Hollway. ‘Visit of Gough Whitlam’, 16 July 1970, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, OANZPIA, Subject Files (1959– 74), Box 22, RG59, National Archives & Records administration. Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, p. 213. Hawke, ‘Australia’s Security in Asia’; Bob Hawke, ‘Speech by the Prime Minister of Australia, the Hon RJL Hawke AC MP, to the National Press Club’, 26 June 1989, BHPML. Interview with James Przystup, 23 September 2008; Interview with Beazley. Interview with Paal; Interview with Beazley. Interview with White, 5 September 2007; Interview with Hollway. Interview with White, 5 September 2007; Interview with Beazley. Beazley, ‘Australia and the Asia–Pacific Region’, p. 233. Interview with White, 5 September 2007; Beazley, ‘Thinking Defence’, p. 166. Interview with Beazley; Interview with Dibb. On the relationship between these issues and the global nuclear balance, see Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, pp. 215, 287. For instance, Australia and the United States differed over whether China should be permitted to launch the AUSSAT satellite (a Chinese-launched satellite useful to Australian telecommunications). Interview with Paal; Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, p. 100. Gareth Evans, Making Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Australian Fabian Society, 1989), p. 9. Fitzsimmons, Beazley, p. 230; Interview with Beazley. Interview with Beazley; Fitzsimmons, Beazley, p. 231. Interview with Hollway. Interview with Hawke; Interview with Evans. Interview with Shultz; Interview with anonymous former US official, 23 September 2008.

161 Interview with Przystup. 162 Interview with Hawke. 163 Interview with Paal; George Bush, ‘The President’s News Conference’, 27 June 1989, accessed at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=607&year=&month. 164 Interview with Scowcroft. 165 Interview with Paal; Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 1 August 2007. 166 Interview with Evans. 167 Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 1 August 2007. 168 Cited in Russell, ‘Australia’s Human Rights Policy’, p. 38. 169 Hawke, ‘Transcript of News Conference, Embassy of Australia, Washington’; Interview with Sadleir, 2 July 2007.

CHAPTER 8 Howard and Growing Chinese Strategic Power

Sino-Australian relations were slow to recover after the Tiananmen Square incident. While the Hawke Government had lifted most Australian political sanctions against China in February 1991, the relationship remained somewhat tepid. Like his predecessor, Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating (1991–96) recognised that Australian interests were best served by an open and outwardly engaged China.1 He therefore sought to enmesh China in the evolving regional security architecture by advocating China’s entry into APEC and the newly formed ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Yet powerful psychological barriers and issue-specific disputes, such as China’s incarceration of Australian businessman James Peng in 1993, tempered the relationship.2 The situation was also complicated by growing uncertainty, both within Australia and the region, about the implications of China’s rise as a strategic, and not just an economic, power. Keating worked to cultivate other regional relationships and structures as a hedge against a potentially more difficult China in the future.3 Such lingering equivocation prevented the relationship from developing much beyond normalisation. In 1996, things went from bad to worse. Shortly after Liberal Prime Minister John Howard (1996–2007) assumed office, a series of events threatened to further undermine Sino-Australian relations. In March 1996, the Australian Government expressed political support for the US deployment of the Seventh Fleet off the coast of Taiwan, following Chinese missile launches and military exercises near Taiwan. This event was soon followed by the Australian Government’s cancellation of the Development Import Finance Facility (a mixed-credit program for developing countries), its expression of concern about human rights in post-handover Hong Kong, and Howard’s meeting with the Dalai Lama. None of these events were intentionally directed at distancing Australia from China, but they were perceived as such by Beijing.4 The Chinese leadership responded by freezing official contact between the two countries. These events plunged bilateral relations to their lowest point since 1989.5 The Howard Government subsequently moved to mend relations. Prime Minister Howard assumed direct control over China policy, working closely with international affairs adviser Michael Thawley, Secretary of DFAT Philip Flood and Australian Ambassador to China Ric Smith. Together, they sought to repair the damage to Sino-Australian relations and to construct a framework for more substantive cooperation between the two countries.6 As a first step, they sought to restore relations in the lead-up to, and during, Howard’s meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the November 1996 APEC Summit. A second stage involved rebuilding the relationship during and after Howard’s visit to Beijing in April 1997.7

These meetings were a critical turning point and an essential precursor for the modern Sino-Australian relationship. By establishing a new framework for the relationship after Tiananmen, Howard oversaw the most important phase in Australia’s relationship with China since diplomatic recognition.8 He established a framework that took into account China’s rise as a strategic power in the Asia–Pacific, foreshadowing a significant expansion of SinoAustralian relations during his prime ministership and beyond. Moreover, he sought to rebuild those relations concurrently with deepening Australia’s alliance with the United States. This is particularly at odds with what much of the power transition and alliance literature suggests. These theorists would argue that strengthening relationships with both powers, during a period of intensifying power shift between them, should have become more challenging and less likely—not the other way around.9 Given the increasingly complex Sino-American relationship, what accounts for the shift in Australian policy towards deeper engagement with China and how was Howard able to reconcile expanding Sino-Australian relations with a deeper American alliance? Howard’s shift toward deeper engagement, in the context of more prominent SinoAmerican competition, was predicated on the same factors that led to Australian engagement under the Whitlam Government during the early 1970s. Fundamentally, Howard’s engagement strategy was based on his changing perceptions of Chinese foreign policy. After meeting with Jiang, Howard adopted a more benign assessment of Chinese intentions in relation to Australia’s strategic interests in regional order—most critically, Australia’s alliance with the United States.10 Like his Labor predecessors, the Howard Government adopted the view that it was only through deeper cooperation with China over time that the country could be encouraged to engage with the international system in ways that would reinforce Australian strategic interests. Within this context, Australia could also capitalise on economic and other opportunities associated with China’s rise. The Howard Government’s engagement strategy was also facilitated by the way in which the US alliance had evolved since the end of the Cold War. While the alliance assumed a more regional focus and supported a continuing US leadership role in Asia, this did not lead to a redefinition of the alliance’s purpose, or Australia’s alliance contributions, in a way that suggested a need for Australia to more closely coordinate with Washington on China policy. Instead, Australia’s alliance contributions remained generally defined in terms of supporting a continuing US presence in Asia, supporting regional strategic stability and contributing to US global missions. These alliance contributions, framed in terms of general ‘collective goods’, continued to facilitate an independent Australian China policy from within ANZUS. Provided that Sino-Australian relations were not prejudicial to ANZUS or to these alliance contributions, Howard implicitly assumed American acquiescence in Australia’s broad engagement-based approach toward China. Howard regarded Australia’s relations with third countries as Australia’s own sovereign prerogative.11 He was therefore able to pursue Australia’s interests in deepening cooperation with China, while reconciling this with Australia’s alliance obligations. To understand the continuities and differences in Howard’s engagement strategy relative

to Whitlam’s and Hawke’s, this chapter explores the context and evolution of his strategy. Initially, it situates Howard’s China strategy in terms of evolving regional power dynamics, with China beginning to emerge as both a potential strategic and economic contender to the United States in Asia. It then explores why the influence of US preferences on Australia’s China policy was less prominent than power transition and alliance theorists would suggest. What factors, including the alliance, led the Prime Minister to shift to more concerted engagement in the late 1990s and, ultimately, to the considerable expansion of the relationship thereafter? Why didn’t the alliance significantly constrain Howard’s engagement strategy, particularly as Sino-American relations became more tenuous between 1999 and 2001? This chapter explores how and why Sino-Australian relations assumed a momentum of their own in a more competitive strategic environment.

Sino-American Power Shift Australian policymakers became increasingly conscious of the changing strategic power relativities between China and the United States during the mid-1990s. The Keating Government had initially looked at these changes with uncertainty about US willingness to exercise a regional leadership role in the post–Cold War era.12 Yet, by 1997, this perception had changed—both because of Prime Minister Howard’s more optimistic view of US global influence and a series of events that demonstrated the ongoing US commitment to the region.13 Most significant to changing Australian perceptions was the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis, when the US deployed the Seventh Fleet off the coast of Taiwan in response to Chinese military exercises near the island in March 1996. This incident demonstrated US resolve in a regional context. The US commitment to retain 100 000 permanently deployed military personnel in the Asia–Pacific, outlined in the 1995 US East Asia Strategy Report, also underwrote Australian confidence in continuing US leadership and dominance in that region.14 The Australian Government’s 1997 Defence Statement, Australia’s Strategic Policy, noted that, ‘post-Cold War uncertainty about America’s strategic commitment to the Asia– Pacific has now been assuaged. US statements and actions have made it clear that it intends to remain closely engaged in the Asia–Pacific’s strategic affairs, both for its own interests and to support wider regional stability’.15 Such considerations underpinned the assertion in Australia’s 1997 Foreign Affairs White Paper that the ‘United States will remain, over the next fifteen years, the single most powerful country in the world … [and] will also continue to see its best interests being served by maintaining its strategic engagement in East Asia’.16 The US response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on 11 September 2001 further underscored the Howard Government’s perceptions of US global preponderance and regional primacy. US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq signalled a new and more interventionist phase in US foreign policy.17 The Howard Government concluded that this demonstration of US strength would prevent other major powers from risking confrontation and that, in the ‘foreseeable future’, ‘no other country or group of countries will be able to challenge the United States’

overall capacity to shape the global environment’.18 Australian confidence in US power in an Asia–Pacific context and the continuing US commitment to that region was further buoyed by the 2004 US Global Defence Posture Review, which emphasised the need to secure US military access to forward operating sites extending from the Middle East, through South Asia and into the Asia–Pacific.19 Renewed faith in US global and regional power, however, did not mean that the Howard Government was oblivious to changing regional power relativities. From 1993, Australian Government officials identified the rise of China as the most important change in the region.20 While the United States would remain the dominant power, the gap between the United States and China was narrowing as a result of China’s growing power. With Chinese economic growth rates continuing at close to 10 per cent per annum, the Australian Government anticipated that China could one day economically surpass Japan or even the United States.21 The strategic significance of China’s growing economic prowess was also becoming more apparent. The decline of the Soviet threat, the availability of Soviet military technology, increased Chinese prosperity, and US demonstration of high-tech capabilities during the Gulf War and Taiwan Straits Crisis all led China to rapidly expand its surface, subsurface and aircraft capabilities. For the first time, China was emerging as an air and maritime power, not simply a continental power.22 It was also rapidly expanding its ballistic missile capabilities and, as a result, disrupting the cross-strait military balance with Taiwan.23 Australian policymakers predicted that as China’s economic and strategic power grew, so too would its regional political influence.24 Then Secretary of DFAT Philip Flood has recalled that Howard recognised that China’s economic growth would be the most important strategic development in the region for the next fifteen years.25 Australian policymakers began to contemplate a future in which China not only eclipsed Japan, but could potentially challenge US primacy in the Asia–Pacific.26 Perceptions of growing Chinese power became more deeply entrenched during Howard’s prime ministership as that country continued to maintain high levels of economic growth, in spite of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and as it further expanded its military. By 2000, the Defence White Paper observed that China was the country ‘with the fastest growing security influence in the region’ and that while ‘no country in the world will have the military or economic power to challenge US global primacy over the next few decades … the United States could be obstructed and frustrated at the regional level’.27 Australian policymakers still foresaw a number of hurdles to China emerging as a genuine regional strategic competitor to the United States. While the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis sensitised China to the challenges of a US anti-access and denial strategy, and hastened Chinese military preparations for a potential cross-strait contingency, Chinese defence capabilities were still the fourth of the ‘Four Modernisations’.28 Moreover, China was starting from a low capability base.29 During the mid-1990s, the vast majority of Chinese naval vessels were equipped only for coastal operations or limited projection into the South China Sea.30 Senior Australian officials in the Department of Defence therefore predicted that any Chinese strategic challenge to the United States would not take place for several years.31

Howard’s confidence in US global dominance led him to share these views.32 Yet, for the first time, Australian policymakers began to recognise that China could potentially emerge as a future challenger to the United States and as the preeminent Asian power in the twenty-first century.33 As this idea became more entrenched in the Australian policy community, one would expect that Australian policymakers should have felt compelled to demonstrate political support for one of the two great powers and calibrated their policies accordingly. Yet, both the Prime Minister and his Government continued to reiterate the core message that Australia did not have to ‘choose between her history and her geography’.34 Australia would maintain its historical great power relationships while establishing vibrant partnerships with emerging regional powers.35 The alliance factored less, not more, in Howard’s concerted engagement strategy toward China after 1997. Why?

The Influence of US Policies The Howard Government was even more satisfied (as power transition theorists would define the term) with the US-led regional order than its predecessors. While Whitlam and Hawke supported and sought to preserve US leadership in the Asia–Pacific, they were both conscious that this might wane in the face of retracting US power after the Vietnam War and Cold War respectively. In contrast, Howard believed that US power was on the rise as it strengthened its regional commitment and adopted a globally interventionist posture despite future potential changes in Sino-American power relativities in the Asia–Pacific.36 Shared liberal democratic values also had great importance to Howard.37 Howard believed that the region should accept Australia for what it was.38 Howard was a ‘cultural traditionalist’ who placed his concept of traditional Australian values at the centre of his foreign policy.39 This was a sharp reaction to what he perceived as Keating’s emotive approach to regional engagement, which he believed compromised Australia’s identity grounded in the European liberal-democratic tradition.40 While Howard was cognisant that the region was central to Australia’s economic and political interests, he believed that Australia could never have the same intimate strategic relationship with regional powers that it had with the United States because of the shared history and liberal-democratic values uniting the two countries.41 Howard later observed: ‘the greatest strength of the American–Australian alliance is that we believe in the same things—we believe in freedom, we believe in democracy, we believe that open societies are better than closed societies’.42 Like its predecessors, the Howard Government’s satisfaction with the US-led regional order was also based on the practical strategic and economic benefits that US leadership bestowed. While China was emerging as a strategic power, it did not exercise leadership by contributing to regional security in the same way that, for decades, the United States had. The Howard Government regarded the United States as an important force for regional stability during a time of profound structural change.43 Like Whitlam and Hawke, Howard believed the United States was an important source of reassurance as regional countries developed

mechanisms for multilateral cooperation, as well as insurance in the event of a regional conflict or the emergence of an expansionist hostile power.44 By providing for regional stability, the United States would also help to underwrite regional economic prosperity. Regional countries would be more inclined to devote resources to economic development instead of participating in arms races.45 In line with what power transition theorists would suggest, the Howard Government encouraged the United States in its leadership role by providing political support for continuing US regional engagement. As Foreign Minister Alexander Downer observed at the time, it ‘is in the interests of Australia and others in the region to support an active US engagement in the region’s affairs … Australia’s consistent approach will be to reinforce US engagement, underscoring the importance of established US security ties’.46 This was more strongly reiterated in the Government’s 1997 Defence Statement, which noted that it ‘would not be in Australia’s interests for China’s growing power to result in a diminution of US strategic influence’.47 Australian support for US leadership was further manifest in several practical initiatives. For instance, the Howard Government sought to reinvigorate ANZUS through the 1996 Sydney Statement, which outlined a more region-centric strategic rationale for the alliance in the post–Cold War era.48 The Howard Government also supported US leadership by promoting regional multilateral forums, such as APEC and the ARF, which included the United States rather than being limited to East Asian participation. However, this political support for a continuing US leadership role in the Asia–Pacific did not extend to unqualified coordination with Washington on China policy. The Howard Government’s approach to China certainly paralleled that of Washington during the late 1990s, but did not result from US policy. After Sino-American tensions over Taiwan in March 1996, US President Bill Clinton adopted engagement towards China as one of his key foreign policy objectives. This stemmed from the Clinton Administration’s realisation that China was rapidly emerging as an important Asian power and that Sino-American relations had become increasingly fragile.49 Disappointed with the results of coercive tactics against China, Clinton opted for a more cooperative approach, which he hoped would yield greater economic and political benefits.50 This shift in US China policy toward more concerted engagement ultimately gave rise to the summit diplomacy of 1997 and 1998, in which Clinton and Jiang agreed to work toward ‘a constructive strategic partnership’.51 Within this overarching framework, intergovernmental working dialogues were established to resolve Sino-American differences on specific issues. Clinton also reinstituted bilateral military and civilian defence dialogues. Yet the overriding construct of a Sino-American ‘strategic partnership’ was aspirational and the Clinton Administration was careful to use future-tense language when describing it.52 Washington still approached the relationship with caution. Clinton sought to engage with China but at the same time was eager to put an end to the Chinese discourse of ‘multipolarisation’ of the international system.53 This Chinese discourse was based on both descriptive and normative claims about the rise of second-tier powers (including China), which would counterbalance US dominance.54 Although China was by no means powerful

enough to contend US strategic dominance in Asia, US officials were conscious that China could emerge as a significant regional strategic challenge. US military engagement with China had the dual purpose of both securing Chinese goodwill and deterring Chinese military leaders by demonstrating American defence superiority.55 At the same time, the SinoAmerican relationship was also still subject to attack by Congress. Within days of Clinton’s return from Beijing in 1998, Congress reaffirmed the US commitment to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, particularly clauses such as the US right to sell defensive arms to Taiwan.56 Clinton also had to intervene to ensure annual renewal of China’s most favoured nation status, in the face of congressional opposition, before passage of legislation granting China permanent normal trade relations in 2000.57 The Howard Government welcomed Clinton’s engagement-based approach toward China between 1996 and 1997, but was also conscious of the underlying fragility of Sino-American relations. The Government was aware that there were elements in Washington that viewed China as a threat.58 This was again reflected in the 1997 Australian Defence Statement, which observed that ‘competition’ between China and the United States ‘is not inevitable, because the regional strategic balance need not be a zero-sum game. But there are some—in China and elsewhere—who are inclined to see it that way’.59 The term ‘elsewhere’ was an indirect reference to the United States.60 Like the Hawke Government, the Howard Government was neither willing nor able to predicate future Sino-Australian relations on a still potentially unpredictable American foreign policy framework. This was manifest in increasingly divergent Australian and American approaches toward China during the late 1990s and the early years of the Bush Administration. Little progress in reaching the aspirational milestones of the strategic partnership, coupled with the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo campaign, led to deteriorating Sino-American relations. Relations further worsened when a US Navy EP-3 plane collided with a Chinese fighter in April 2001, and when US presidential candidate George W Bush openly referred to China as a ‘strategic competitor’ during the 2000 US election campaign.61 This rhetoric was echoed in the 2001 US Quadrennial Defence Review, which observed: Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions critical to US interests. In particular, Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large scale military competition … The possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region.62 Yet following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, US China policy again shifted toward engagement. The United States sought to strengthen cooperation with China while it was preoccupied with the war on terror.63 Australia’s China policy did not mirror these vacillations and the Howard Government worked assiduously to refute any such assumption. At the time, Downer declared that while

‘US–China relations have been strained for much of 1999’, this ‘had no resonance in Australia’s relations with China—and nor should it’.64 Flood recalls that, in dealing with China, Howard ‘came to accept that in the prevailing circumstances he could pursue a policy different to the US’ and ‘there was no attempt to coordinate Australia’s policy with that of the US’.65 In fact, Howard saw a role for Australia in helping to shape Washington’s preferences in a way that encouraged non-zero-sum Sino-American relations.66 He sought to do so by providing the United States with insights about China that would continue to facilitate ‘calm and constructive dialogue’ between the two countries.67 Like Whitlam’s, Howard’s engagement strategy did not axiomatically follow from Washington’s as power transition theorists would suggest—instead, Howard sought to proactively consolidate a stable SinoAmerican relationship. This is particularly surprising in the context of Howard’s zeal to reinvigorate the US alliance and to provide support for US leadership in the Asia–Pacific. Australia still maintained latent fears of abandonment by the United States, based on its continuing strategic dependence, though these fears were at a lower level than at any other point during the twentieth century as a result of the United States’ demonstrated commitment to the region. While Australian defence planners did not envisage a direct military threat to Australian territory, they were apprehensive about regional instability and the possibility that circumstances could arise that might reduce Australia’s future security.68 The breakdown of the Cold War international system—a system that had previously constrained regional powers from competing for influence—meant that Australian security would again be affected by developments beyond Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.69 As former Defence Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence Hugh White recalls, it ‘quickly became clear that strategic competition between the great powers of Asia could in future—as in the past—intrude into and destabilise Australia’s nearer region and potentially pose a threat to Australia itself’.70 The Howard Government significantly invested in and modernised the Australian Defence Force (ADF), but a more capable ADF, in itself, was insufficient to ensure Australian security. As during previous decades, Australia remained reliant on the United States for preferential access to defence technology, logistical support and intelligence.71 Against the backdrop of regional power shift and a more complex regional security environment, Australia was also still dependent on the alliance as an instrument for maintaining US engagement in the Asia–Pacific. By embedding a US presence in the region, the alliance helped to reassure regional countries and prevent regional destabilisation through security competition.72 The unique role of the United States as a stabilising balancer of last resort rendered it critical to Australian security.73 It also complicated adversary planning in the event of lower scale contingencies.74 This was demonstrated by the Australian-led peacekeeping mission to East Timor in 1999, where a US warship located offshore was important in deterring the Indonesian military from engaging in hostilities.75 What the Howard Government perceived as a strengthened US commitment to the region tempered abandonment fears arising from Australia’s continuing strategic dependence.

However, the Howard Government still viewed the alliance as fundamentally asymmetric as a result of the disproportionately valued benefits Australia derived from ANZUS.76 The United States was important to Australia’s national defence—not the other way around. Ensuring a continuing US commitment to Australia’s security and the broader region meant that Australia would need to contribute to shared regional and global objectives.77 In light of latent abandonment fears and the pressures they generated to provide political support to the United States, why was Australia’s policy toward a potential future American peer competitor not more affected? Howard and his advisers recall that it was Australia’s economic and strategic interests that were the primary determinant of the country’s shift to more intense engagement with China.78 The primacy of Australian interests in shaping policy toward China, despite ongoing latent abandonment fears, suggests an important role for intraalliance bargaining power. While Howard did not consciously think in these terms, his decision-making demonstrates its effects. He believed Australia could engage with China without being concerned about any negative repercussions for the alliance.79 Significantly, and in contrast to the ALP during the early 1970s, Howard was less concerned about how to balance Australia’s interests in a rising China with the alliance political halo of ANZUS. He did not see any contradiction between the two relationships.80 But how did he arrive at this conclusion? How did he reconcile Australia’s interests in China with his Government’s efforts to support a continuing US leadership role in the Asia–Pacific? Why did the alliance not more significantly influence Australia’s China policy, given the increasingly competitive Sino-American relationship?

Australia’s Interest in a Strategically Ascending China Australia’s shift to more concerted engagement with China after 1996 stemmed not from a parallel shift in American policy but from a fundamental change in how the Prime Minister saw Australia’s national interest in relation to that country. Howard was grappling with the same problem that Prime Minister William McMahon confronted in the early 1970s: were Australia’s economic interests in China reconcilable with its strategic interests in regional order? Howard arrived at a fundamentally different conclusion from his Liberal predecessor. His shift to a more concerted engagement strategy was indicative of his growing comfort that these interests could be reconciled over time, in large part due to his perceptions of China’s intentions. Howard’s engagement diplomacy was predicated first and foremost on a SinoAustralian relationship that was consistent with Australia’s strategic interests in regional order. Economic and diplomatic benefits provided incentives to deepen cooperation with China, but only in the context that China emerged as a positive force for regional stability. Australia’s Strategic Interests in Regional Order During the Howard Government, the region assumed an even more prominent role in Australian foreign policy than in earlier decades. This was for several reasons. First, the

locus of economic and military power had shifted since the end of the Cold War. Australia’s security was no longer tied to the global balance between the superpowers but to the evolving dynamics of great power relations in the Asia–Pacific.81 Second, Australia’s trade was increasingly tied to the region. By 1997, more than 60 per cent of Australia’s exports were absorbed by East Asia.82 Finding ways to foster regional stability, so as to reinforce future regional prosperity, was central to Howard’s policy agenda. Finally, while global issues such as counter-terrorism assumed greater importance after September 2001, the Howard Government also recognised that these issues had a regional component. The Howard Government was keen, for example, to build state capacity in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific to prevent terrorist groups from establishing footholds in areas that were close to Australia.83 Despite a fundamentally different strategic context, there were continuities with the Whitlam and Hawke Governments in the strategic interests that the Howard Government sought to advance. Most significantly, the Howard Government sought to preserve a US leadership role in the Asia–Pacific. Changing regional power relativities meant that this no longer equated to simply ensuring a continuing US regional presence, as it had in previous decades. Instead, the Howard Government linked this to maintaining the relative influence of the United States in the region and to credible demonstrations of US resolve.84 US dominance underpinned regional stability by limiting competitive rivalries between regional powers.85 The United States also provided an important source of strategic reassurance and insurance to regional countries, including Australia, through its regional bilateral alliance network.86 Howard viewed ANZUS as the most significant vehicle through which Australia could further entrench a US regional presence and preserve the benefits of US regional leadership.87 The Howard Government also maintained a strategic interest in fostering stable relations among regional great powers. The Government viewed bilateral relations among these countries—specifically, between China, Japan and the United States—as the most important determinant of future regional stability.88 APEC and the ARF were developing into promising forums for confidence-building and multilateral cooperation, but they existed only within the broader cooperative framework provided by the great powers.89 Howard posited a role for his Government in enhancing the great powers’ mutual understanding and mitigating risks of competition and conflict. This was particularly the case for the Sino-American relationship, which the Howard Government deemed most critical to future regional stability.90 As Howard later reflected, ‘Our aim is to see calm and constructive dialogue between the United States and China … as a nation which has different but nonetheless close relationships with both countries, Australia is well placed to promote that constructive dialogue’.91 The Howard Government additionally had a strategic interest in maintaining a ‘benign security environment’ in Southeast Asia. Such an environment would not be dominated by a power with interests inimical to Australia and would safeguard the territorial integrity of Southeast Asian countries.92 This interest echoed the Hawke Government’s earlier concept of building Southeast Asian strategic cohesion to deter external powers from interfering in Southeast Asian affairs. The 1997 Defence Statement observed that Southeast Asian

countries are ‘strong and self-confident enough to resist pressure from without [and] cohesive enough to cooperate … Our strategic objective is to help maintain these positive elements’.93 To realise this objective, the Howard Government encouraged cooperation between Southeast Asian countries and sought to develop shared strategic perceptions between these countries and Australia.94 It subsequently worked to deepen defence relations with these countries, demonstrated by Australia’s continuing commitment to the FPDA and assiduous efforts to repair the relationship with Indonesia after the East Timor peacekeeping deployment. Such efforts were directed at preserving a stable, resilient subregion to Australia’s north.95 The Howard Government maintained a similar strategic interest in the Southwest Pacific. It sought to preserve regional stability amidst growing political turbulence in that subregion, while ‘ensuring that no potentially hostile power achieves undue influence’.96 These objectives were interrelated. Small island states’ political and economic weakness could make them vulnerable to influence from outside powers and to transnational threats such as terrorism and organised crime.97 To prevent these situations from emerging, the Howard Government strengthened political and economic linkages between Australia and Southwest Pacific countries. It also sought to enhance Southwest Pacific countries’ capacity to protect their sovereignty and contribute to their own internal stability, while affirming Australia’s role as a primary defence partner.98 Australian ADF peacekeeping operations in Bougainville in 1997 and in the Solomon Islands in 2003, were both aimed at restoring internal stability following protracted civil war or civil unrest in these places. Not all of these strategic interests assumed the same priority for the Howard Government. Howard’s speeches and official government publications of the time suggest his Government was most concerned with maintaining US regional engagement and political cooperation among the great powers.99 This provided the framework for cooperation and stability in the broader region, which mitigated the likelihood of a threat to Australia and allowed the ADF to focus on engagement activities and operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Howard’s evolving perceptions of China, and whether political cooperation with that country would support Australia’s strategic interests in regional order, critically underpinned the shift to engagement with China from 1997 and, ultimately, his ability to reconcile this strategy with alliance management imperatives. China as a Potentially Benign Regional Power Neither Howard nor his ministers viewed China’s growing material power as inherently threatening. They accepted that China’s growing power would lead to commensurate Chinese efforts to enhance its influence and to define the terms for its participation in international institutions.100 For Howard, the key question was how China would enhance its influence and what this meant for US regional leadership and Australia’s other strategic interests. In early 1996, China’s belligerent response in the Taiwan Straits Crisis and hostile discourse about the future US presence in Asia caused some initial concern. While the Howard Government did not regard China as a threat, it did view that country as a potential ‘strategic challenge’.101 Yet, as the Prime Minister learned more about China through his meetings with Jiang, his

perceptions changed. Most critical to Howard’s evolving perceptions of China, and subsequent willingness to engage with that power, was whether China would go on accepting a continuing US regional presence in Asia, with ANZUS as a manifestation of this presence. Like the Americans, the Howard Government was concerned about the implications of Chinese discourse on ‘multipolarisation’.102 Senior Chinese officials reiterated an ideological opposition to the US regional presence and the alliance network. In place of these structures, they advocated a ‘New Security Concept’, in which security was ‘based neither on military build-up nor on military alliance, but rather … should be grounded in mutual trust and common interests’.103 Howard and others in the Australian Government, particularly within the Department of Defence, were concerned that Beijing was toying with the idea of predicating Australia’s positive relations with China on looser alliance structures and associations with the United States.104 Howard was unwilling to distance Australia from the United States in order to build more favourable relations with Asian countries.105 Yet Howard was assuaged on this issue after his initial meeting with Jiang at the APEC Summit in November 1996.106 Prior to this meeting, Flood briefed Howard that China’s real view of the Australian–American alliance differed from its declaratory statements. Flood advised Howard that, in his assessment, Beijing understood Australia’s alliance with the United States and bore no significant objection to it.107 Beijing was concerned only that the alliance was not directed against China or would not be used as a ‘launching pad’ for an attack against China or in the event of a Taiwan contingency.108 Any lingering concerns Howard may have had were further ameliorated during his meeting with Jiang. Howard reiterated to Jiang that, while ANZUS was not directed against China, Australia would remain a close US ally and that this was non-negotiable.109 Howard recalls that Jiang accepted this position.110 The Prime Minister signalled Sino-Australian accord on this point in a subsequent press conference, in which he observed: We have an alliance with the United States borne out of a clear-headed and independent assessment of our national interest and that has been our position for a long time and will always be our position … [T]he Australian-US relationship is not directed at anybody, I’ve made that very clear. I am encouraged to believe that perhaps is understood within the Chinese leadership.111 Howard reaffirmed the same understanding that had facilitated successful Sino-Australian relations from within ANZUS since Whitlam’s discussion with Zhou Enlai in 1971. Australia’s alliance with the United States was not directed against China, but nor was it up for discussion. This accord was critical to Howard’s shift to engagement in 1996–97 and to flourishing Sino-Australian relations thereafter. The Prime Minister’s optimism about China was underscored by his changing views about Chinese foreign policy more broadly. This was a factor both of Howard’s growing knowledge of China and that country’s own changing approach to the region. While Chinese

respect for ANZUS was critical to engagement, it was not the only Australian strategic interest that mattered. In 1996, a series of Chinese actions gave rise to initial misgivings about whether China’s emerging strategic posture and deeper Sino-Australian relations would be consistent with the Government’s interest in fostering region-wide stability and political cooperation.112 Howard’s former international adviser Michael Thawley recalls that one of the purposes of the Howard Government’s response to the Taiwan Straits Crisis was to signal to China that its behaviour was unacceptable and to urge it to adopt greater restraint in future.113 Howard and his advisers wanted China to emerge as a ‘responsible’ participant in the international system.114 This entailed transparency in military modernisation; respect for international norms and conventions; assurance for regional countries; and constructive relationships with other regional powers.115 It was not until late 1996 that the Howard Government was more confident that, over time, Beijing could be persuaded to meet these standards. Prior to his visit to Beijing in March 1997, Howard was briefed by then Ambassador to China, Ric Smith, who explained that around 43 per cent of China’s gross domestic product derived from the international economy. Consequently, China could not easily extricate itself from the international system without significantly damaging its economic base.116 This assessment profoundly impacted Howard’s thinking, shaping his views that China was unlikely to emerge as a disruptive power in the international system for at least the short- to medium-term future.117 As Howard observed during his 1997 visit to Beijing: It seems to me that the last thing a country that wants to achieve historic transformation would do would be to act in a hostile fashion towards the very countries, that is the countries of the region and many others outside the region, that are crucial and fundamental to economic transformation.118 The ascendance of Zhu Rongji—a committed economic reformer—to the position of VicePremier, and later the role of Premier of China, strengthened Howard’s confidence that deeper Sino-Australian relations would be consistent with Australia’s strategic interest in regional political cooperation.119 These perceptions became more deeply entrenched with China’s changing approach toward the United States and the region after 1996. Following Sino-American tensions over Taiwan in March 1996, China was anxious to repair the Sino-American relationship. Beijing viewed stable Sino-American relations as necessary to preserve access to the US market and to maintain the international stability that was conducive to China’s own economic growth.120 China also sought to reassure the region through actions that demonstrated its responsible power credentials.121 For instance, China voted in favour of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and co-hosted the ARF inter-sessional group on confidence-building measures in 1997. All of these measures had a positive effect on Australian policymakers’ perceptions of China. They led Downer to observe in 1997 that, ‘beyond the unparalleled dynamism of the market place, China is making a number of constructive contributions in

regional and international forums … China is already deeply engaged with the rest of the world and its engagement is accelerating’.122 China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 and its support for the United States in the global war on terror further underscored these perceptions.123 The Howard Government increasingly assessed that China could emerge as a responsible regional power and, consequently, overcame its initial caution in deepening Sino-Australian relations. Australia’s alliance with the United States, as an entity that the Howard Government sought to protect rather than an instrument that compelled compliance with US policies, exerted a more subtle influence on Australia’s China policy than either power transition or traditional alliance theorists would suggest. The alliance was also only one of many Australian strategic interests that mattered and upon which deeper engagement was predicated. This is not to suggest that all of the Government’s concerns about China were ameliorated. There were still lingering uncertainties about how China’s foreign policy would evolve over the longer term. The 1997 Australian Foreign Affairs White Paper observed that ‘[h]ow China manages its economic growth and pursues its international objectives, and how other nations, particularly the United States and Japan, respond to China will be crucial issues over this period’.124 Concerns about specific issues also persisted—principally, how a more powerful and capable China would respond to the US alliance network. Howard and his advisers could not be certain that China would not, in the future, try to ‘finlandise’ Australia from the United States.125 Another concern was China’s refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.126 Yet, lingering uncertainties about how long China would continue to respect Australian strategic interests did not obstruct deeper cooperation with that country— on the contrary, they provided additional impetus to engage with that power. As in the Whitlam and Hawke periods, the Howard Government’s interest in deepening Sino-Australian relations was underpinned by an assumption that deeper cooperation would decrease the likelihood of China emerging as a future strategic challenge. Howard and Downer believed that how Chinese intentions evolved partly depended on how the international community responded to China’s growing power. If China was treated as an enemy, it would be more likely to emerge as an enemy. Conversely, if China was brought into regional multilateral institutions and embedded into global economic networks, it would be more likely to define its long-term objectives in ways consistent with the international status quo.127 As Howard observed at the time, ‘it is in no one’s interests to treat China as a threat. We want to see China fully involved in regional and global institutions’.128 A status quo– oriented China was deemed far more likely to act in ways that were consistent with Australia’s strategic interests. Howard felt that by engaging with China at a time when it was still a nascent rising power—and somewhat reliant on positive relations with the international community— Australia could better devise the terms for its long-term relationship with that power. Howard saw an opportunity to establish a framework for cooperative Sino-Australian relations that did not compromise core Australian interests and values. This included institutionalising

Chinese respect for Australia’s democratic political system and alliance with the United States.129 The main incentive for more concerted engagement with Beijing was to entrench a relationship that would reinforce Australian strategic interests as China’s power grew. Commonalities between Whitlam and Howard in this respect are striking, despite backdrops of vastly differing stages of China’s power trajectory. There were also strong economic incentives to deepen cooperation. At a time when world production was shifting to East Asia, Howard and his advisers viewed economic cooperation with China as central to the Australian economy. By 1997, Australia’s trade with China was already growing twice as rapidly as its trade with the rest of the world and China was projected to become Australia’s third largest trading partner by 2000 (a prediction that was fulfilled).130 Howard viewed Australia and China as ‘natural economic partners’.131 Australia could provide China with commodities and, increasingly, financial, legal and management expertise. China, in turn, was a major supplier of clothing and steel. Given this trade complementarity, Howard developed the concept of a Sino-Australian ‘strategic economic partnership’. Like Australia’s relationship with Japan during the 1950s, Howard viewed Australia as a reliable supplier of commodities that would fuel China’s future economic modernisation and growth. This would reciprocally contribute to both Australia’s economic growth and prosperity in the Asia–Pacific.132 Yet, economic imperatives for deeper Sino-Australian cooperation remained secondary to politico-strategic ones. Howard was conscious that Australia’s economic and political relationships with China were inextricable. Australia would only be able to maximise trade opportunities if it also maintained positive political relations with Beijing.133 Nevertheless, it was not until Howard was assured by Chinese acquiescence to ANZUS and by China’s broader regional posture that he set about deepening Sino-Australian relations. He subsequently worked to develop a framework that institutionalised these circumstances and that was integral to more concerted engagement after 1997 and to longer term SinoAustralian relations. Establishing Shared Expectations What distinguished the Howard Government’s strategy toward China from a less intense Australian engagement strategy after Tiananmen was the Prime Minister’s confidence that he could re-establish shared expectations with Beijing. Several of the same disputes that had marred Sino-Australian relations during the Hawke and Keating Governments persisted, including China’s unwillingness to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and its ongoing human rights abuses.134 Howard and Jiang did not settle these issues during their 1996 and 1997 summits, but they were able to establish shared expectations for handling these issues and for managing other differences in the bilateral relationship.135 This led to a similar framework to what Whitlam had established with China during the early 1970s. In contrast to the post-Tiananmen era, Howard reasoned that unless disagreement with China emerged over an important strategic interest (such as the alliance), or China took action to disrupt regional stability, it was better to focus on the general

relationship.136 The Prime Minister subsequently developed an overarching framework for Sino-Australian relations of ‘mutual interest and mutual respect’.137 Through this framework, he sought to build a pragmatic Sino-Australian relationship that focused on shared interests rather than accentuating differences. This approach also institutionalised Chinese respect for differences, such as Australia’s democratic political system and the alliance.138 This is not to say that Howard ignored contentious points. To the contrary, Howard made representations during his 1997 visit to China regarding the importance of the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait dispute.139 What was important about Howard’s framework was that it established a way of managing differences so as not to damage the broader relationship. When Australian officials and their Chinese counterparts reached an impasse over an issue in the years that followed, they resorted back to their first principle of ‘mutual interest and mutual respect’ to lessen negative repercussions for the relationship.140 This principle, and shared expectations of how to manage the relationship, provided for a deeper Australian interest in cooperating with China and, ultimately, a more sustainable partnership. The framework allowed the relationship to flourish in a way that was complementary to Australian strategic interests. By predicating the framework and broader relationship on the non-negotiability of ANZUS, Australia could continue to cultivate deeper relations with China without compromising its alliance. Howard reaffirmed the same understandings that had underpinned Whitlam’s and Hawke’s interest in cooperating with a rising China, but in an era in which Chinese acquiescence to a continuing US presence and the US alliance network in the Asia–Pacific was less than assured. Howard confidently pursued Australia’s interest in deepening cooperation with Beijing, while Sino-American structural competition was intensifying. How did he come to do so at a time when—as power transition theorists suggest—power shift in the Asia–Pacific should have engendered greater pressure to support the United States? How did he reconcile Australia’s interest in deepening cooperation with China with the political expectations associated with being a loyal US junior ally?

Engagement with China and the US Connection The primacy of Australian interests, rather than Washington’s preferences, in directing Australia’s China policy again suggests that the concept of intra-alliance bargaining power is a better framework through which to view Australia’s shift to a more concerted engagement strategy from 1997. In contrast to power transition and alliance theories, this framework accommodates circumstances in which junior allies pursue their independent interests toward a third power, if they value these highly enough, despite their asymmetric dependence on an ally. Howard was conscious of the need to manage Australia’s reputation as a reliable and useful junior partner in the alliance. Like his Labor predecessors, he was risk-averse when it came to ANZUS. While less concerned than Whitlam or Hawke to demonstrate his credentials in alliance management, he regarded ANZUS as Australia’s most vital strategic

asset.141 Bilaterally, Australia continued to garner useful defence technology, intelligence and logistical support. Regionally, ANZUS supported a continuing US presence in the Asia– Pacific and provided Australia with greater credibility when relating to Asian countries. The value Howard assigned to the relationship was demonstrated by his efforts to reinvigorate the alliance by enhancing ADF interoperability with US forces, expanding defence activities, cooperating with that country in regional multilateral forums and, later, providing Australian military contributions to US-led counter-terrorism campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet this risk aversion did not extend to coordinating with Washington on China policy. Howard and his advisers certainly viewed convergent Australian and US approaches toward China as helpful. Australian engagement with China was premised on a non-conflictual or non-zero-sum Sino-American relationship. If China and the United States were at odds with one another, it would have been far more difficult for the Howard Government to reconcile its engagement diplomacy with its alliance commitment.142 Throughout Howard’s prime ministership, the Sino-American relationship remained a cooperative–competitive one rather than an adversarial one. In 1997, Australia and the United States both sought to encourage a China that was stable and prosperous, and participated in regional multilateralism.143 As Howard remarked during his 1997 visit to the United States: ‘I don’t think there’s any difference in our end objective. We are both concerned to have a constructive relationship with China … It’s a question of how you get there and the differences are not great’.144 Convergent Australian and US approaches meant that, for the time being, alliance considerations were comfortably subsumed in Australian policy development toward China.145 The Howard Government did not necessarily assume this convergence would continue into the future. Nor did this convergence extend to every aspect of China policy. Differences between the Clinton Administration and Howard Government emerged on issues including how to address Chinese human rights, China’s entry into the WTO, and how to view Chinese military modernisation.146 A principal difference from the 1980s was that American policymakers increasingly began to view US strategic interests in the Asia–Pacific through the prism of China—particularly as some in the American foreign policy establishment began to regard China as an emergent strategic competitor.147 Yet Howard and his advisers were not constrained by differences or by potential future shifts of emphasis in US China policy. While American policymakers increasingly looked at US strategic interests in relation to China, this did not affect the nature or purpose of ANZUS. If anything, the alliance was even less threat-centric and more order-centric than in the 1980s. The central purpose of the alliance had evolved to advancing common regional strategic interests.148 This was manifest in the 1996 Sydney Statement, which provided for the post–Cold War reconfiguration of ANZUS. The Sydney Statement reaffirmed that the alliance provided the basis for a broader bilateral security relationship, through which both countries would work to enhance regional security. This involved preserving a permanent US regional presence and advancing other common interests, such as promoting democracy and regional economic prosperity. The Sydney Statement also reaffirmed the significance of the

alliance in ‘maintaining and consolidating Australia’s capability for self-reliant defence’.149 The Howard Government conceived of Australia’s alliance contributions in terms of measures that supported these interests. First, Australia regarded the alliance as an anchor for a continuing US regional presence.150 The defence activities that the alliance supported— including joint exercises and US use of training ranges in northern Australia—were all directed to this end. Australia also supported broader strategic stability by extending the American lease for the joint intelligence facilities. These facilities continued to play an important role in verifying arms control agreements.151 Second, Canberra continued to work with Washington to promote regional trade liberalisation through APEC and the WTO.152 Third, the Howard Government focused on enhancing Australia’s defence capability and interoperability with the United States, both to increase Australia’s self-reliant defence capacity and to more effectively participate in US-led coalition operations.153 The Howard Government recognised that Australia would be most valuable to the United States as a militarily capable ally, able to shoulder greater strategic responsibility in regional and global operations. In an interview for the Bulletin magazine in September 1999, the Prime Minister espoused a more activist role for Australia in leading responses to low-intensity regional conflicts, while noting that the United States remained the regional security leader of last resort.154 Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the global dimension of the alliance assumed greater prominence. The attack on US territory resulted in both countries invoking Article 4 of the ANZUS Treaty—that is, to act to meet a common danger in accordance with constitutional processes. In light of what were perceived as the growing security challenges posed by transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Australian Government subsequently contributed forces to the US-led campaigns in Afghanistan from 2001 and in Iraq from 2003.155 Although less prominent than Australian military commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, and downplayed in Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) communiqués at the time, the alliance retained common regional objectives, and Australia made contributions that were conceived in these terms. In particular, the Howard Government supported a continuing US regional presence through such measures as enhanced joint training, a regular program of aircraft visits and support for APEC as the preeminent regional forum.156 There was, therefore, an element of continuity in Australia’s contributions to alliance objectives. Howard and his advisers recognised that, provided Australia met these alliance contributions, differences on other foreign policy issues were acceptable—and even natural —within the alliance. Howard viewed ANZUS as a defence alliance, not an allencompassing framework for foreign policy.157 Flood adopted a similar view, arguing that Australia’s independence should not be assessed in terms of the number of disagreements with the United States, but that ‘any disagreements stem from a clear judgement of Australian interests and are managed without any significant impact on the core elements of the relationship’.158 So long as Australia respected these core elements, there was significant scope for an independent Australian foreign policy and an implicit assumption of American

acquiescence. These understandings of the alliance implications for Australian foreign policy facilitated the Howard Government’s independent approach to China in 1997 and thereafter, despite an intensifying Sino-American power shift during the late 1990s and early 2000s. China was in no way linked to the core purpose of the alliance or to how the Howard Government saw Australia’s alliance contributions. The Howard Government regarded Australia’s foreign policy toward China as falling largely outside the purview of the alliance. Downer and other former officials attribute this to Australia’s status as an independent and self-reliant country ‘that does not need to seek permission from its ally on every issue’.159 Australia’s relations with third states were deemed part of its sovereign prerogative.160 This was a continuation of the independent Australian regional foreign policy brought about by the shift to a self-reliant defence capability under the Hawke Government. Howard did not believe that Washington would appreciate Australia any more if the Australians did exactly what the US wanted on China policy.161 Implicit assumptions of US acquiescence in the broad parameters of Australia’s China policy were reinforced by the American response to Australia’s China policy. While the United States sought to build and maintain alliances, this did not extend to dictating to US allies how they developed their relations with third countries.162 This was particularly the case with respect to China where, as in the 1980s, there was still no clear consensus within Washington about what sort of strategic actor that power would become in future. This made it difficult to define US expectations of allies in relation to China. Australia and the United States did exchange views on China.163 Nonetheless, Australia, and other US allies, continued to have considerable autonomy in forging their own independent policies toward China.164 A possible exception was US expectations of allies in relation to a possible future SinoAmerican conflict over Taiwan. During the 1999 Australian–American Leadership Dialogue, Richard Armitage, then an influential member of US presidential candidate George W Bush’s campaign team, suggested that Washington would expect Australia to provide meaningful military support in the event that the United States and China should resort to force over Taiwan.165 Uncertainty about US expectations over Taiwan surfaced again when, in a 2004 press conference, Downer disputed that military activity in the Taiwan Strait would invoke the ANZUS Treaty.166 Howard subsequently responded that ‘America has no more reliable ally than Australia’ and that ‘we have to consult and come to each other’s aid when we’re under attack or involved in conflict’.167 However, the Prime Minister noted that Australia had a separate relationship with China and that ‘it is not in Australia’s interests for there to be conflict between America and China’.168 The aim of the Howard Government’s diplomacy was to instead prevent such a conflict from emerging in the first place.169 Howard persistently reiterated that Australia’s aim was to ‘see calm and constructive dialogue between the United States and China on those issues which might potentially cause tension between them’.170 With this approach, Howard promulgated an argument that was not only consistent with the US approach toward China and cross-strait relations but which perpetuated understandings of alliance contribution linked to strategic stability rather than

any specific threat or contingency. In doing so, he was essentially preserving the alliance understandings that had existed since the Whitlam era, which compartmentalised SinoAustralian relations from Australia’s core alliance contributions. What Howard and his advisers perceived as implicit American acquiescence to Australia’s engagement-based approach toward China was critical to their confidence in developing Sino-Australian relations from within ANZUS. This implicit acquiescence, based on a convergent US approach to China and an order-centric rather than threat-centric alliance, reduced the risks of deepening cooperation with China from within the alliance. It reinforced the high value that Howard assigned to his interest in deepening cooperation with China and offset the constraining influence of Australia’s continuing strategic dependence on the United States. The assumption of implicit US acquiescence contributed to the Howard Government’s greater intra-alliance bargaining power on this issue. In practical terms, Howard was able to deepen relations with a strategically ascendant China, with minimal concern about any negative repercussions for the alliance.

Conclusion What is striking about the Howard Government’s shift to engagement is the continuity with Whitlam’s and Hawke’s engagement-based approaches, despite the intensifying SinoAmerican power shift in the Asia–Pacific. Power transition and traditional alliance theorists would suggest that the greater uncertainty brought about by a strategically ascendant China should have led the Howard Government to consolidate its support for the United States at the expense of its ties with Beijing. Yet, in fact, the opposite occurred. Howard and his advisers viewed the strategic rise of China as an important opportunity for engaging with that country and for potentially shaping how it emerged as a great power. This engagement strategy was not simply a bandwagoning response to a parallel shift in US policy. While Australia’s engagement strategy was critically facilitated by a non-adversarial Sino-American relationship, it was not determined by the United States. This was demonstrated by the Howard Government’s consistent approach to deepening relations with China over an eight year period, despite oscillating Sino-American relations. This is not to say that the alliance did not affect this engagement strategy but that it had a more subtle influence than aligning Australia’s China policy to accommodate Washington’s preferences. Howard’s decision to engage with China was at least partly predicated on assurance from Jiang that China would respect Australian strategic interests, including the non-negotiability of ANZUS. Howard reaffirmed the same accord that Whitlam had established with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1971, but with a fundamentally different China—a strategically ascendant power that could potentially challenge US regional leadership in future. This accord was essential to building a close Sino-Australian relationship that maintained discretion for ANZUS. It was achieved, in part, through the shared understanding that Howard reached with Jiang on managing the Sino-Australian relationship within the framework of ‘mutual interest

and mutual respect’. This framework underpinned the Australian engagement strategy by emphasising the totality of the bilateral relationship over issue-specific disputes (much like Whitlam’s approach to the bilateral relationship in 1971). It also institutionalised respect for differences, including China’s respect for the ANZUS alliance, as that country became more powerful. There were, of course, other factors that drove closer Sino-Australian relations, such as evolving trade complementarities. However, these only augmented cooperation from within a framework that was fundamentally based on China’s respect for Australia’s strategic interests and shared expectations about how the relationship should be managed. Howard’s pursuit of deeper relations with China should not obfuscate his risk-aversion as an alliance manager. Howard sought to deepen Australia’s alliance with the United States at the same time that he was working to strengthen relations with China, but he did not see an inherent contradiction between these two objectives. This was based on his assumption of American acquiescence to Australian engagement with China. This assumption was grounded in the Howard Government’s interpretations of Australia’s alliance contributions, stemming from an evolving alliance purpose. Despite intensifying Sino-American competition, Australia’s alliance contributions were defined in terms of supporting broader strategic stability in the Asia–Pacific. This included supporting a US regional presence as well as building Australia’s own self-reliant and inter-operable defence capability to better contribute to regional and global operations. Based on these terms—and provided the SinoAustralian relationship did not develop in a way that was prejudicial to ANZUS—there was discretion for Australia to forge a separate and cooperative relationship with China. Far from developing a novel approach to managing the Sino-Australian and alliance relationships, Howard’s success lay in affirming the same understandings that had facilitated Australian compartmentalisation of these relationships since the Whitlam Government. Like his predecessors, Howard premised future Australian engagement with China on Beijing’s acceptance of ANZUS as non-negotiable and defined Australia’s alliance contributions in terms of supporting strategic stability rather than in any way directed against China. Despite an intensifying Sino-American power shift, Australia’s China policy still had little bearing on its reputation for alliance loyalty. The Howard Government was able to cultivate separate and positive-sum relationships with both powers. Whether, and for how long, this will continue will depend partly on the how the Sino-American relationship evolves—that is, whether China and the United States are able to maintain a cooperative–competitive relationship as strategic power relativities change. Nonetheless, Howard laid the foundation for Australia to maintain close relationships with both powers in the modern strategic era: one in which a strategically ascendant China has become as important as the United States in shaping the future of the Asia–Pacific region.

Notes 1 2

Interview with Allan Gyngell, 29 February 2008. See, for example, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Australia China Report

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10 11 12

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(Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1996), p. 26. Interview with Gyngell. Interview with Alexander Downer, 11 March 2008; Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 12 August 2008; Interview with Hugh White, 15 August 2008. Michael Wesley, ‘The Challenges of China: Australian Perceptions and Reactions’, in Institute for National Strategic Studies, Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China (Washington, DC: National Defence University, 2001), p. 57. Interview with Philip Flood, 20 September 2007; Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 3 August 2007. Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 3 August 2007. Interview with Paul Kelly, 25 July 2007. For examples of this argument, see AFK Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958), pp. 352–4; Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tammen, ‘Regional Challenge: China’s Rise to Power’, in Jim Rolfe (ed.), The Asia–Pacific: A Region in Transition (Honolulu: The Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 47; George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 147. Interview with John Howard, 15 July 2008; Interview with Flood. Interview with Downer; Interview with Flood. The 1994 Australian Defence White Paper expressed concern that US economic constraints, coupled with the absence of a post–Cold War strategic rationale for US forward deployment, would undermine its willingness to ‘accept primary responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the region’. Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1994), p. 8. Interview with White, 15 August 2008; John Howard, ‘Transcript of the Address by the Hon John Howard MP, Dinner Hosted by the Foreign Policy Association’, 30 June 1997, accessed at http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/1997/fpa.html. Interview with White, 15 August 2008. Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Policy (ASP 1997) (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1997), p. 14. Commonwealth of Australia, In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper (INI 1997) (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997), pp. v–vi. Commonwealth of Australia, Advancing the National Interest (ANI) (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003), p. 21. ibid., p. 21. DFAT, ‘Australia–United States Joint Ministerial Consultations Joint Communique 2004’, accessed at http://dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations-jointcommunique-2004.aspx; Stacey Pettyjohn, ‘US Global Defense Posture, 1783–2011’, RAND Corporation, 2012, accessed at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1244.pdf, pp. 88–9. Interview with White, 15 August 2008. The 1994 Defence White Paper observed that, ‘If the patterns of recent years are sustained, China’s economy will become the largest in Asia and the second largest in the world within the next fifteen years. This will affect global power relationships and become a dominant factor in the strategic framework of Asia and the Pacific’. Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia, p. 9. Hugh White, ‘Four Decades of the Defence of Australia’, in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds), History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, 167 (Canberra: ANU E-press, 2007), p. 173. James Mulvenon, ‘Chinese Nuclear and Conventional Weapons’, in Elizabeth Economy and Michael Oksenberg (eds), China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 326–38. David Shambaugh, ‘Sino-American Strategic Relations’, Survival, 42(1), 2000, p. 103. Commonwealth of Australia, INI 1997, p. 63; Alexander Downer, ‘Australia and China: Engagement and Cooperation’, 10 September 1997, accessed through Pandora Archive, National Library of Australia (NLA). Philip Flood, Dancing with Warriors (North Melbourne, Victoria: Arcadia, 2011), p. 259. Interview with White, 15 August 2008; Interview with Allan Behm, 22 August 2008. Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2000), pp. 17, 37. Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 12 August 2008. Department of Defence, ASP 1997, p. 14. Mulvenon, ‘Chinese Nuclear and Conventional Weapons’, p. 331. Interview with White, 15 August 2008; Interview with Chris Barrie, 20 August 2008. John Howard, ‘Australia’s International Relations: Ready for the Future’, 22 August 2001, accessed through Pandora

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Archive, NLA. Interview with Behm; Interview with White, 15 August 2008. John Howard, ‘Australia’s International Relations’. Michael Wesley, The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia (Sydney: ABC Books, 2007), p. 10. Paul Kelly, Howard’s Decade (Double Bay, NSW: Longueville Media, 2006), p. 49. Kelly, Howard’s Decade, p. 49. Flood, Dancing with Warriors, p. 257. Kelly, Howard’s Decade, p. 23. James Curran, The Power of Speech (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2004), p 349. Flood, Dancing with Warriors, p. 259. John Howard, ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP’, 10 September 2001, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. Commonwealth of Australia, ASP 1997, p. 14; Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000, p. 34. Interview with White, 15 August 2008; Alexander Downer, ‘Asia–Pacific Security: Practical Cooperation in an Asian Context’, 19 September 1996, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. Commonwealth of Australia, INI 1997, p. 58; Alexander Downer, ‘Australia and the United States—A Vital Friendship’, 29 May 1996, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. Downer, ‘Australia and the United States’. Commonwealth of Australia, ASP 1997, p. 14. DFAT, ‘Sydney Statement Joint Security Declaration’, 26 July 1996, accessed at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/ausmin/sydney_statement.html. Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), p. 418; Interview with James Przystup, 23 September 2008. Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US–China Relations, 1989–2000 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 283. Shambaugh, ‘Sino-American Strategic Relations’, p. 98. Interview with anonymous former US official, 24 September 2008; Interview with David Shambaugh, 15 September 2008. Interview with anonymous former US official, 24 September 2008. Yong Deng, ‘Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on US Global Strategy’, Political Science Quarterly, 116(3), 2001, p. 346. Interview with anonymous former US official, 24 September 2008. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, p. 349. Robert Sutter, US–Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present (Lantham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), pp. 106, 109. Interview with Howard; Interview with Barrie. Department of Defence, ASP 1997, p. 14. Interview with White, 15 August 2008. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, p. 398. US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001, accessed at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. Sutter, US–Chinese Relations, p. 153. Alexander Downer, ‘Australia and China – Partners for Progress’, 25 November 1999, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. Flood, Dancing with Warriors, p. 259. Interview with Howard; Interview with Michael Thawley, 26 September 2008. Interview with Howard; John Howard, ‘Address to the Asialink–ANU National Forum: Australia’s Engagement with Asia’, 13 August 2004, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. Commonwealth of Australia, ASP 1997, p. 4. ibid. pp. 8–10. White, ‘Four Decades of the Defence of Australia’, p. 173. Interview with Barrie; Desmond Ball (ed.), Maintaining the Strategic Edge: The Defence of Australia in 2015, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, 133 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University (ANU), 1999), p. 14. Interview with White, 15 August 2008; Commonwealth of Australia, ASP 1997, pp. 14, 19.

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84

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114

Wesley, The Howard Paradox, p. 85. Commonwealth of Australia, ASP 1997, p. 18. John R Ballard, Triumph of Self–Determination: Operation Stabilise and United Nations Peacemaking in East Timor (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), p. 60. Interview with Behm; Interview with Ron Huisken, 20 September 2007; Interview with White, 15 August 2008. Interview with Huisken; Howard, ‘Dinner Hosted by the Foreign Policy Association’. Interview with Howard; Interview with Downer; Interview with Thawley; Interview with Flood; Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 3 August 2007; Flood, Dancing with Warriors, p. 259. Interview with Howard. Howard, ‘Address to the Asialink–ANU National Forum’; Howard, ‘Australia’s International Relations’. Commonwealth of Australia, ASP 1997, pp. 8–9. Howard, ‘Dinner Hosted by the Foreign Policy Association’. Geoffrey Barker, ‘The Howard–Downer Legacy: Global Deputy, Regional Sheriff’, in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006–2010 (South Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 27; Commonwealth of Australia, ANI, pp. 37–38. Several of Howard’s speeches and the Government’s official publications highlight that the Government was not just concerned with maintaining a US regional presence but also with maintaining a US–led regional order. In 1997, he observed that the ‘United States has been crucial to the unprecedented stability and growth that the Asia–Pacific has achieved’ and that ‘it would be an error of historic proportions for the United States to diminish the level of its engagement’. Howard, ‘Dinner Hosted by the Foreign Policy Association’; Commonwealth of Australia, ASP 1997, p. 14. Commonwealth of Australia, ANI, pp. 21–2. Interview with White, 15 August 2008; Commonwealth of Australia, ASP 1997, pp. 18–19. Howard, ‘Australia’s International Relations’. Commonwealth of Australia, ASP 1997, p. 7; Commonwealth of Australia, INI 1997, p. 29; Alexander Downer, ‘Australia and Asia: Taking the Long View’, 11 April 1996, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. Commonwealth of Australia, INI 1997, p. 53; Interview with Downer. Interview with Howard; ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister, the Hon John Howard MP, Interview with Neil Mitchell, Radio 3AW’, 20 August 2004, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. Howard, ‘Address to the Asialink–ANU National Forum’. Commonwealth of Australia, ASP 1997, p. 8. ibid., p. 21. ibid., p. 22. Commonwealth of Australia, ANI, p. 38. Commonwealth of Australia, ASP, p. 13. ibid., p. 13. Commonwealth of Australia, ANI, p. 39; Commonwealth of Australia, ASP, pp. 21–2. See, for example, John Howard, ‘Australia and Asia: An Enduring Engagement’, 8 May 1997, Australian Parliamentary Library (APL); Howard, ‘Dinner Hosted by the Foreign Policy Association’. Downer, ‘Australia and Asia’; Howard, ‘Dinner Hosted by the Foreign Policy Association’. Interview with White, 15 August 2008; Interview with Thawley. Downer, ‘Australia and China’. Qian Qicheng, ‘Opening Statement by HE Mr Qian Qichen, ASEAN Regional Forum’, 27 July 1997, accessed at http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/china/qian-arf-9707.html. Interview with Flood; Interview with Downer; Interview with White, 15 August 2008. Interview with Thawley. Interview with Howard; Interview with Flood. Interview with Flood. Interview with Howard; Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 12 August 2008. Interview with Howard; Interview with Thawley. Interview with Howard. John Howard, ‘Press Conference, Diaoyutai State Guest House’, 1 April 1997, APL. Interview with White, 15 August 2008; Interview with Barrie; Interview with Thawley. Interview with Thawley. Interview with Thawley; Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 3 August 2007.

115 This concept of ‘responsibility’ is based on the definition provided by former Ambassador to China Ric Smith in a 2006 speech. Ric Smith, ‘Looking Forward by Looking Back: Reflections on China 1996–2000’, 13 April 2006, accessed at http://www.defence.gov.au/secretary/speeches/smith/speech20060413.htm. 116 ibid. 117 Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 3 August 2007. 118 Howard, ‘Press Conference, Diaoyutai State Guest House’. 119 Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 3 August 2007. 120 Phillip C Saunders, ‘China’s America–Watchers: Changing Attitudes towards the United States’, China Quarterly, 161(March), 2000, p. 60. 121 Yong Deng, ‘Hegemon on the Offensive’, p. 360. 122 Alexander Downer, ‘Australia and China: A Partnership in Growth’, 21 April 1997, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. 123 Commonwealth of Australia, ANI, pp. 79–80. 124 Commonwealth of Australia, INI, p. v. 125 Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 3 August 2007. 126 Interview with Thawley; Smith, ‘Looking Forward by Looking Back’. 127 Stuart Harris, Will China Divide Australia and the US? (Sydney: Australian Centre for American Studies, 1998), p. 47; Interview with Downer; Interview with Howard. 128 Howard, ‘Australia and Asia’. 129 Interview with Howard. 130 John Howard, ‘Address at the Reception to Mark the 25th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between Australia and China’, 17 December 1997, APL; Downer, ‘Australia and China: A Partnership in Growth’. 131 Howard, ‘Address at the Reception to Mark the 25th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations’. 132 Interview with Thawley; Howard, ‘Australia and Asia’. 133 Interview with Howard. 134 Interview with Thawley; Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 12 August 2008. 135 Smith, ‘Looking Forward by Looking Back’. 136 Interview with Thawley. 137 Howard, ‘Press Conference, Diaoyutai State Guest House’. 138 Interview with Howard. 139 Howard, ‘Press Conference, Diaoyutai State Guest House’. 140 Interview with Andrew Shearer, 15 July 2008. 141 Kelly, Howard’s Decade, p. 3. 142 Interview with Howard; Interview with Thawley. 143 Harris, Will China Divide Australia and the US?, pp 39–45. 144 John Howard, ‘Radio Interview—ABC Programme’, 26 June 1997, Pandora Archive, NLA. 145 Interview with Downer; Interview with Howard; Interview with Thawley. 146 Interview with Kelly; Interview with Barrie. 147 Interview with White, 15 August 2008; Interview with Randall Schriver, 26 September 2008. 148 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, p. 119. 149 DFAT, ‘Sydney Statement Joint Security Declaration’. 150 See, for example, Commonwealth of Australia, ASP 1997, p. 18. 151 Allan Behm, ‘Managing Alliance Relations’, paper presented to Australia–Taiwan Strategic Dialogue, 9–11 May 2005, p. 5. 152 ‘Joint Press Conference at the Conclusion of the AUSMIN Talks’, 31 July 1998, accessed at http://canberra.usembassy.gov/irc/us-oz/1998/07/31/press.html. 153 Russell Trood and William T Tow, ‘The Strategic Dimension’, in William T Tow (ed.), Australian–American Relations: Looking Toward the Next Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 114; DFAT, ‘Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations Joint Communique 2002’, 29 October 2002, accessed at https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/ausmin/ausmin02_joint_communique.html. 154 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, p. 85. 155 In 2001, the Australian Government provided a Special Operations Task Group to the US-led campaign in Afghanistan. Australia also contributed 2000 ADF personnel to the Iraq campaign in March 2003. 156 DFAT, ‘Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations Joint Communique 2005’, 17–18 November 2005, accessed at https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/ausmin/ausmin05_joint_communique.html; DFAT, ‘Australia–United States

157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170

Ministerial Consultations Joint Communiqué 2006’, 12 December 2006, accessed at http://dfat.gov.au/geo/unitedstates-of-america/ausmin/Pages/australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations-joint-communique-2006.aspx. Interview with Howard. Philip Flood, ‘Regional Diplomacy and the Alliance: A DFAT Perspective’, in Tow (ed.), Australian–American Relations, p. 64. Interview with Downer. This corresponded with accounts from other officials involved in shaping Howard’s China policy. Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 3 August 2007; Interview with Flood. Interview with Downer; Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 3 August 2007; Interview with Shearer. Interview with Thawley. Interview with Schriver; Interview with Przystup; Interview with anonymous former US official, 23 September 2008. Interview with anonymous former US official, 23 September 2008. Interview with Przystup; Interview with anonymous former US official, 23 September 2008. Allan Behm, ‘Australia’s Strategic Options in the US–China Relationship’, in David Lovell (ed.), Asia–Pacific Security: Policy Challenges (Canberra: ANU E-press, 2003), p. 48. Alexander Downer, ‘Media Conference, Beijing’, 17 August 2004, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP’, 20 August 2004, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. ibid. Interview with Howard. ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister, the Hon John Howard MP, Address to the Houses of the Parliament of Australia’, 24 October 2003, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA.

Part 4 Reflections and Comparisons

CHAPTER 9 Australia, an Independent Ally

International relations commentators often focus on when the small and middle powers of Asia will need to choose between China and the United States.1 But why have so many junior allies not had to choose between pursuing a relationship with a rising power and preserving their alliance to a dominant global power? Answering this question will not only better inform existing debates but also lead to a more sophisticated understanding of power shift and power transition and how they impact on the broader international system. For too long, the international relations literature has examined power shift from the vantage point of the great powers and made assumptions about how junior allies respond, rather than considering these responses as the focus for study. This book has explored the historical experience of a single country—Australia. It is a particularly powerful case, however, given that country’s past economic and strategic dependence on ‘great and powerful friends’. Power transition theory and alliance theory both suggest that the more a junior ally values its alliance, the more likely it is to want to preserve that alliance by presenting itself as a loyal ally and by eschewing ties with a rising power or another external power.2 Yet, these predictions were not borne out by the Australian historical experience. During two major power shifts of the twentieth century, Australia engaged with rising powers from within its alliances with successive dominant global powers. What conclusions can therefore be drawn from the Australian historical cases? This study has found that Australian prime ministers have been able to maintain cooperative relationships with both a dominant global power and a rising power because of a more complex interrelationship between alliance membership and engagement with a rising power than has been traditionally assumed. Much of the existing work on power transition was developed in response to World War I or the Cold War. Conclusions were based on outcomes where small and medium-sized states clearly aligned with one of two or more great power adversaries. Yet there is merit in exploring how junior allies respond to power shift under different circumstances and in drawing on methods that enable analysis of policymakers’ decision-making. In the Australian case, analysis of this decision-making revealed that a non-adversarial, albeit still competitive, great power relationship was critical to Australia successfully reconciling an alliance with a dominant global power with a close relationship with a rising power. Under these circumstances, Australia’s alliance far from determined its engagement strategy toward a rising power. Instead, the alliance exerted a subtler influence on Australian prime ministers’ thinking than what most international relations theorists would assert—both

as a shaping influence on Australian interests toward the rising powers and as a constraint on how those interests translated into strategies. This more subtle influence of the alliance allowed leeway for Australian prime ministers to develop independent policies toward rising powers in line with Australia’s strategic and economic interests. Whether Australia engaged or disengaged from a rising power was more often related to Australia’s interests in the rising power than the senior ally’s policies or preferences. Australian prime ministers therefore found it easier to engage with a rising power, from within an alliance with a dominant global power, than what most international relations scholars would suggest. Australia was a stalwart ally but a much more independent one than has generally been portrayed in the international relations and Australian foreign policy literature.

The Historical Record of Australian Responses to Power Shift This chapter will more fully explore these arguments by analysing the findings of the preceding six case studies in relation to the three lines of enquiry set out in chapters 1 and 2. First, to what extent were Australian prime ministers’ decisions to engage or disengage, with a rising power dominated by considerations of the senior ally’s preferences or policies? Second, how did an alliance shape Australian interests toward a rising power and subsequent decisions to engage with that power? Third, how did Australian prime ministers reconcile such engagement with maintaining Australia’s reputation as a loyal ally—in other words, did the alliance constrain how Australian interests were translated into strategies? After analysing and comparing the findings of the case studies, their significance for our understanding of Australian foreign policy and for how junior allies respond to power shift will be explored. Lessons will be drawn and assessed from Australia’s historical experience to inform current academic and public policy debates. Australia’s biggest strategic challenge may not be choosing between a rising power and a dominant power, but determining its strategic interests in a rapidly changing regional order and how best to shape its relationships with the great powers to bring these interests to fruition. Influence of the Senior Ally’s Policies and Preferences Power transition theorists usually equate a junior ally’s support for a dominant global power’s continuing leadership of the international system with support for that power’s policies toward the rising power. They generally assume that, during power shift, this will result in the junior ally eschewing closer relations with a rising power.3 An exception may be if the dominant global power seeks a closer relationship with the rising power (such as Great Britain did with the United States during the early twentieth century). Nevertheless, they generally presume that the junior ally’s policies toward the rising power reflect those policies or preferences of the dominant global power ally.4 Much of alliance theory adopts similar assumptions, suggesting that, if a junior ally values its alliance, its proclivity to support that ally will overwhelmingly influence its policies and inhibit it from conciliating with an

external power.5 The six case studies in this book reveal Australia as a country that continued to support its dominant global ally and the ally’s leadership role in the international system. This support was grounded in a shared cultural and political heritage with that ally as well as the practical security and economic benefits Australia derived from the dominant global ally’s leadership. Even when British power was waning during the 1950s, Prime Minister Robert Menzies and Minister for External Affairs Percy Spender sought to strengthen Commonwealth machinery and valued British efforts to maintain stability and order in Southeast Asia—a role that the United States was unwilling to assume at the time. During the latter half of the twentieth century, the United States’ vast military capabilities and regional presence led Australian prime ministers to regard that power as the principal underwriter of stability and economic prosperity in the Asia–Pacific. They supported a continuing US leadership role by maintaining a dynamic and relevant Australian–American alliance and by promoting US inclusion in regional multilateralism. What is surprising, however, is that Australian prime ministers have not equated support for the dominant global ally or its leadership with unequivocal deference to the ally’s policies or preferences toward a rising power. Certainly, a non-adversarial great power relationship was important in facilitating Australian engagement with a rising power from within an alliance. In the first part of the twentieth century, Australia’s engagement strategy toward the United States was helped by the emerging Anglo-American global strategic partnership. Australia would, for example, have found it more difficult to cultivate a strategic relationship with Germany—Great Britain’s foremost adversary until the end of World War II. Later in the century, Australia’s engagement with a rising China was facilitated by Sino-American détente during the late 1960s. The rapprochement between Washington and Beijing formed part of the consciousness within which ALP Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam decided not only to recognise China but to establish an engagement-based approach toward that power (see chapter 6). Convergent Australian and US approaches toward China during the 1980s and 1990s also meant that the alliance was largely subsumed as a consideration in the development of Australia’s China policy. Yet it is difficult to characterise Australian engagement strategies as simply a bandwagoning response to the senior ally’s policies and preferences toward the rising power, not least because there were still competitive impulses in the great power relationship. In several instances, Australian prime ministers actually pursued engagement initiatives toward the rising power that diverged from the senior ally’s preferences. Examples include Prime Minister Alfred Deakin’s decision to invite the US Fleet to Australia and the Menzies Government’s willingness to be party to a Pacific pact that excluded Great Britain. In both cases, the British were concerned that the United States was taking advantage of waning British power in the Pacific and viewed Australian engagement as damaging to British prestige. While there was no parallel example in the China cases, it is significant that, despite the vagaries of Sino-American relations, prime ministers Bob Hawke and John Howard did

not consult with Washington before instigating their respective disengagement and engagement strategies toward Beijing. In most instances, the senior ally’s policies and preferences were not the primary consideration in Australian prime ministers’ policy development toward the rising power. The timing and dynamics of Australian engagement strategies toward a rising United States and a rising China often followed their own causal trajectory. Australian policies did not vary with the senior ally’s changing policies toward the rising power. This was particularly evident during the Sino-American power shift. Despite what they perceived as the tenuous nature of Sino-American cooperation, Whitlam, Hawke and Howard all adopted a steady engagementbased approach toward China. Shifts to disengagement with a rising power, such as during Joseph Lyons’s and Bob Hawke’s prime ministerships, were based on Australia’s evolving interests toward that power and not changes in the senior ally’s policies. This is not to say that Australian policies toward rising powers were developed in isolation of its alliances, but these patterns do suggest that Australia’s interests, rather than the senior ally’s preferences, should be the starting point for analysis. Indeed, there is a strong correlation between Australian interests and corresponding engagement or disengagement strategies toward the rising power in all six cases in this book. For the most part, Australian prime ministers demonstrated what Glenn Snyder has termed greater intraalliance bargaining power in this issue-specific context.6 This means that they pursued Australia’s interests in deepening cooperation with a rising power, with minimal concern about adverse alliance consequences. Yet while Snyder’s framework accommodates this outcome, it does not fully explain it. The framework cannot account for how and why Australian policymakers developed an interest toward the rising power which, in some cases, differed from the dominant global ally’s interest. Nor does it explain why several Australian prime ministers confidently pursued Australia’s interest toward a rising power, despite contending pressures associated with alliance dependence, fears of abandonment and the need to maintain Australia’s reputation as a valuable ally. It has been argued in this book that Australian prime ministers were able to reconcile Australia’s interests in a rising power with its alliance for two reasons. First, the alliance exercised a subtler influence on how Australia’s interests toward the rising power evolved than has been traditionally assumed. The alliance was a critical factor, but was only one of many strategic interests that Australia sought to protect and that shaped how Australia’s interests toward the rising power developed. Second, Australian prime ministers sought the senior ally’s acquiescence in, but not necessarily its endorsement of, Australia’s policies toward the rising power. This lower threshold for securing allied support, instead of compliance with a senior ally’s preferences, made it easier for Australian prime ministers to pursue independent and potentially diverging engagement and disengagement strategies. The Role of the Alliance in Shaping Australian Interests Australian engagement strategies were not about bandwagoning with a senior ally’s policies and preferences but about shaping a regional order that favoured Australia’s strategic

interests. The six case studies in this book demonstrate that if an Australian prime minister believed that a rising power could be encouraged to behave in a way that was consistent with, or even contributed to, Australia’s strategic interests, Australia was more likely to engage with that power. This was the critical factor in determining whether or not Australia adopted an engagement-based approach. What were these strategic interests? They varied depending on the time period and the political values of the particular Government. However, there were striking similarities across the six time periods. First and foremost, they included a preeminent leadership role for Australia’s dominant global ally in the Pacific or, at the very least, that power’s continuing regional presence. Even in the wake of Great Britain’s decline after World War II, Australia still envisaged an important role for Britain in preserving stability in Southeast Asia and, along with Australia and New Zealand, supplementing US deterrence in the Pacific. Most Australian prime ministers also viewed Australia’s alliance with the dominant global power as an important way of anchoring that power to the region. These were not the only Australian strategic interests that mattered. The rising power’s respect for other Australian strategic interests in regional order—such as a stable Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific in which there was no adverse great power presence—was also important. However, as a benchmark of its intentions, the rising power’s respect for the dominant power’s continuing regional presence and Australia’s alliance with that country was critical to Australian prime ministers’ decisions to adopt an engagement-based approach. For instance, Deakin’s interest in cultivating deeper relations with a rising United States was underpinned by an assumption that a common Anglo-Saxon heritage rendered the United States more likely to supplement, rather than challenge, British power in the Pacific.7 The importance that Australian leaders assigned to these strategic interests was also evident during the shift from an Australian containment approach to an engagement-based approach toward China during the early 1970s. In contrast to successive Coalition governments, Whitlam did not believe that China wanted to evict the United States from the region. He was also encouraged by what he perceived as Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s acquiescence in ANZUS as a manifestation of the US regional presence and to the enduring importance of that institution to Australian security.8 After a key conversation with Zhou, Whitlam observed, ‘We are not going to be confronted with a choice between China and the United States’.9 This statement is important for what it says about how an alliance with a dominant global power influenced the development of Australia’s interests toward a rising power and how Australian prime ministers have been, in turn, able to reconcile closer relations with a rising power with an alliance. Australian engagement strategies toward rising powers have historically been supportive of the dominant global ally’s leadership. This was because they were predicated on the rising power accepting the dominant power’s regional presence and the enduring importance of Australia’s alliance with that country. This is not something that the dominant global ally directed Australia to do, but was something that Australian leaders considered to be in Australia’s strategic interests. This made it easier for Australian

policymakers to reconcile engagement with a rising power with the alliance. There were other factors that contributed to Australia’s pursuit of an engagement strategy toward a rising power. These included potential security and economic benefits that such engagement might yield. During the early twentieth century, Australian engagement with a rising America was motivated by the prospect that US military power could be enlisted to support the British Empire in the Pacific through a tacit Anglo-American entente. During the latter part of that century, Australian engagement with China was motivated by the need to engage with that power to discourage its emergence as an ostracised and potentially resentful Asian power, as well as by economic opportunities arising from China’s rapid economic growth. Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Open Door’ and ‘Four Modernisations’ policies promised significant returns for the Australian economy, but necessitated a closer Sino-Australian political relationship. While security and economic benefits increased the desirability of deeper Australian engagement, Australia’s engagement-based approach was still predicated on Australian prime ministers’ assessments that the rising power would respect Australia’s strategic interests in regional order. This was most evident in Australian engagement with a rising China. Despite the growing trade benefits that closer political relations with China promised, the Whitlam, Hawke and Howard governments all predicated Australian engagement with China on Beijing’s acceptance of ANZUS and a continuing US regional presence. Whitlam, Hawke and Howard all judged that it was only if China supported these interests that other economic and security benefits would be maintained. For example, while Howard was eager for Australia to benefit from the rapidly growing Chinese economy, he recognised that Australia’s long-term prosperity ultimately depended on the regional stability underwritten by a US presence in the Asia–Pacific. Yet while the alliance was critical to the emergence of an Australian engagement-based approach toward the rising power, it had less to do with whether Australian prime ministers adopted an engagement or disengagement strategy; these strategies were linked more to factors inherent in Australia’s bilateral relationship with the rising power. Whether Australian prime ministers adopted an engagement or disengagement strategy was critically affected by whether they could reach and maintain shared expectations, or a workable shared understanding with the rising power, to govern the relationship. This included agreeing upon mutual obligations and how differences should be managed. In the two cases of disengagement examined in this book, Australian policymakers were unable to forge genuinely shared expectations with the rising power or there was a breakdown of these expectations as a result of differing interpretations of mutual obligations. Australia’s 1936 trade diversion policy was a response to a breakdown in shared expectations about how trade should be managed in the Australian–American relationship. This breakdown reflected the inability of the Lyons Government and the Roosevelt administration to agree on common principles of trade liberalisation. The Hawke Government’s political sanctions toward China in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident resulted from different Australian and Chinese interpretations about the importance of human rights in

China’s relations with foreign countries.10 In both cases, relations only normalised when Australia and the rising power were able to agree on how differences should be managed. It is telling that, in all four cases of engagement, Australian and either US or Chinese leaders reached agreement on the importance of privileging the totality of the relationship over issuespecific disputes. The prospect of developing shared expectations or a shared understanding to govern the relationship critically shaped Australian interests in a rising power. Yet, these interests did not always translate into a corresponding engagement or disengagement strategy. Most notably, strong British pressure prevented Deakin from further advocating an agreement that extended a modified version of the Monroe Doctrine to the Pacific. British representations about the importance of Australia making trade concessions to facilitate an Anglo-American trade treaty also forced the Lyons Government to abandon Australia’s trade diversion policy. These examples highlight the relevance of the alliance as a potential constraint on Australian foreign policy. While the rising power’s acceptance of Australia’s alliance to the dominant global power helped mitigate tension between engagement and Australia’s alliance obligations, it did not completely eliminate it—particularly when the senior ally held differing preferences. Under these circumstances, Australian policymakers grappled with how to pursue the country’s interests in a rising power while also maintaining Australia’s reputation as a loyal ally of the dominant global power. How did Australian policymakers reconcile these two contending imperatives? Reconciling Engagement with the Alliance Political Halo Glenn Snyder argues in his intra-alliance bargaining power framework that, given a junior ally’s dependence on an alliance, whether it pursues its interests will depend on the value it assigns to those interests.11 This premise was borne out in the Australian historical cases. If Australian prime ministers attached a high value to Australia’s interest in either deepening cooperation or withdrawing from cooperation with a rising power, they were more likely to pursue this interest irrespective of the senior ally’s preferences. When Australian prime ministers assigned a low value to their interest in the rising power, considerations of alliance dependence and the senior ally’s preferences took precedence. The problem is that Snyder’s framework is not helpful in enabling us to determine when a junior ally, such as Australia, is more likely to assign a high value to its interests. This book has argued that, in the Australian context, the value attached to interests was mediated by the perceived likelihood that the dominant global ally would acquiesce to Australia’s engagement or disengagement strategy. If the Australian Prime Minister believed that the senior ally could be persuaded to acquiesce to Australian engagement or disengagement over time, they were more likely to assign a high value to their interest in the rising power in an intra-alliance context and to pursue the corresponding strategy. This was because there was low perceived risk that the ally would withhold security or economic benefits as a result of Australia’s stance. Securing allied acquiescence did not mean adopting identical policies to, or even

reaching policy consensus with, Great Britain or the United States. A key difference between this study’s findings and the power transition literature and much of the alliance literature is that Australian policymakers did not regard the senior ally’s preferences as immutable. Its preferences could be changed, over time, through argument or actions. Securing a senior ally’s acquiescence meant convincing its policymakers about the worth of Australia’s independent policy toward the rising power to the extent that the ally would not strenuously object to it. Australian prime ministers’ considerations about whether a senior ally would acquiesce in Australia’s engagement strategy were usually based on whether they believed this strategy was consistent with Australia’s alliance contributions, stemming from the alliance’s central purpose. Australian interpretations of both alliance purpose and Australia’s alliance contributions were dynamic and negotiated and renegotiated with dominant global allies over time. Australian policymakers relied on these shared alliance understandings for guidance as to what policies toward the rising power were feasible in an alliance context. For an alliance to facilitate Australian engagement with a rising power, it could not be directed against the rising power and Australia’s alliance contributions could not be defined in such terms. It was even more helpful if the Australians could couch their policy toward the rising power in terms of contributing to core alliance objectives. The latter was particularly evident during the Anglo-American power shift. During the first half of the twentieth century, Australian prime ministers (and ministers) increasingly viewed the British Empire as an alliance of sovereign states. They believed that the dominions needed to contribute military assets to imperial defence to preserve the British Empire’s influence and to deter potential rivals. As Australia assumed greater responsibility for its own defence and contributed to British-led operations further afield, it successfully negotiated with Great Britain for greater foreign policy autonomy. By the 1950s, Spender viewed regional decentralisation of imperial defence and Australia’s increased defence responsibilities as legitimising his forward-leaning efforts to obtain a US security guarantee. He couched his pursuit of the ANZUS Treaty in these terms. He advocated that a US security guarantee would help to protect British interests in the Pacific and render it more likely that Australia could contribute to Commonwealth operations further afield.12 He argued against British objections on the basis of intra-imperial understandings that, as the relevant local powers, Australian and New Zealand interests should prevail on Pacific matters.13 During the Sino-American power shift, Australian interpretations of what comprised an alliance contribution, and consequently the prospects for allied acquiescence, had less to do with sovereign devolution of powers than with shared interests underpinning the alliance. ANZUS had originally been a response to containing communism in Asia. Yet during the 1970s, Australia’s contribution to ANZUS transformed from supporting US-led efforts to contain Communist China to facilitating a US regional presence that would underwrite regional stability and prosperity. Once Australian prime ministers’ interpretations of Australia’s alliance contribution became less China-centric during the 1970s, Australia exercised greater discretion in its policies and engagement initiatives toward Beijing. This

discretion was reinforced by Australia’s increasingly self-reliant defence capability, following from the Guam Doctrine. This capability led to greater Australian self-confidence in developing a commensurately independent regional foreign policy. Consequently, US policy toward China became a less conscious consideration in Whitlam’s, Hawke’s and Howard’s policy development toward China. Hawke and Howard, in particular, assumed implicit US acquiescence to Australia’s China policy, which underscored the high value they assigned to deepening cooperation with China but from within an alliance construct. This is not to say that dominant global allies’ acquiescence in Australia’s engagement or disengagement strategy was a given. There were periods when this was not the case. For example, while the Lyons Government pursued its trade diversion policy for more than a year, it was able to do so only because it had couched this policy in terms of fostering intraimperial trade to build the British Empire’s economic strength. Yet Britain redefined imperial objectives in 1937, shifting the locus of what constituted a valuable alliance contribution from building imperial trade to facilitating an Anglo-American trade treaty. Britain’s reluctant acceptance of trade diversion subsequently transformed into strong representations against this policy.14 The Lyons Government judged that Australia was unlikely to continue to secure British acquiescence in trade diversion, with the Australian policy negatively affecting British trade negotiations with Washington.15 It therefore abandoned trade diversion to mitigate damage to Anglo-Australian relations. The end of the trade diversion policy is just one example of when Australian policymakers have assigned a lower value to their interest in the rising power because they did not think they could convince the dominant global ally to acquiesce in Australia’s strategy. Fears of allied abandonment became more prominent and Australian policymakers were more likely to defer to their ally’s preferences. Australian perceptions of allied acquiescence affected the value that Australian policymakers assigned to their interest in the rising power in an intra-alliance context, mediating between fears of abandonment by the ally and Australia’s subsequent engagement strategy. This is an important additional theoretical proposition that lends greater determinacy to Snyder’s theory when applied to junior allied engagement with a rising power. In sum, Snyder’s theory accommodates junior allied engagement but cannot fully explain how and when Australia engaged with a rising power from within an alliance with a dominant global power. Australia’s ability to do so was enabled by three key factors, which could serve as the basis for supplementary theoretical propositions to Snyder’s theory in an engagement context. First, during both power shifts, it was essential that the dominant global ally and the rising power had a cooperative–competitive, rather than an adversarial, relationship. Second, Australian policymakers developed an interest in engaging with a rising power only because they believed that the rising power was likely to accept both the dominant global power’s continuing regional presence and Australia’s alliance with that power as non-negotiable. Finally, in the event that the ally had different policies or preferences, Australian policymakers assigned a high value to their interest and were more likely to translate their interest in a rising power into a corresponding strategy if they

believed they could convince the ally to acquiesce to this strategy over time. This lower threshold than what power transition and alliance theorists would suggest for securing allied support meant that Australia was able to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy toward rising powers for most of the twentieth century.

Implications for Understanding Junior Allies’ Engagement These findings could have important implications for understanding the impact of power shift on the broader international system. As a result of its central focus on a single junior ally and policymakers’ decision-making processes, this study has presented a fundamentally different interpretation of how a medium-sized state in the international system responds to power shift. What it found was that, under circumstances when there is a cooperative–competitive great power relationship, Australia’s support for its globally dominant ally’s leadership has not precluded it from cooperating with a rising power. The Australian historical record suggests there may be greater scope for a junior ally to autonomously engage with a rising power from within an alliance to a dominant global power than current theories of international relations imply. The dynamics of engagement in the periods considered were also determined more by Australia’s interests in the rising power, and whether it perceived it was able to forge shared expectations with that power, rather than by alliance considerations. These trends point to the need to explore alternative frameworks that accommodate a more significant role for a junior ally’s interests in shaping its relationships with a rising power. Snyder’s framework of intra-alliance bargaining power presents one such model, but it needs to be supplemented with additional theoretical propositions, based on the conclusions of this study, if it is to have broader application in explaining junior allies’ engagement with rising powers. These theoretical propositions are that a junior ally’s engagement with a rising power is more likely if: 1. there is a non-adversarial relationship between the dominant global power and the rising power 2. the junior ally perceives the rising power as accepting the dominant global power’s continuing regional presence and the non-negotiability of its alliance with that power 3. the junior ally believes that the dominant global power is likely to acquiesce in its strategy toward the rising power. Provided that these three conditions are met, junior allies may be able to more freely pursue their interests toward the rising power—whether this results in engagement or disengagement strategies. This has significant implications for how we conceive of the role of junior allies of a dominant global power during power shift. Based on the autonomy that Australia exhibited in its foreign policies toward rising powers, it showed itself as not just responding to changing power dynamics but as proactively working to shape how power shift, and how any

subsequent power transition, was occurring—specifically, in a way that aligned with Australia’s own strategic interests in regional order. During both power shifts examined here, Australia worked to maintain and help shape a constructive and non-adversarial relationship between the great powers. It sought to engage with the rising power to help condition that power to become accepting of, if not sympathetic toward, the dominant global power’s regional presence and its alliance with Australia. It also sought to shape intra-alliance understandings of Australia’s alliance contributions in ways that were conducive to engagement with the rising power—whether through exercising greater autonomy in its regional policies or defining its contributions in terms that were directed at maintaining regional order rather than directed toward the rising power. In doing so, Australia was working to preserve the very conditions that were not only in its strategic interests, but which would also make it easier to reconcile a strong relationship with its dominant global ally and with a rising power over the longer term. This study’s conclusions, including the theoretical propositions outlined above, are based on a single country’s diplomatic history. To develop a more general understanding of junior allies’ engagement with rising powers that fundamentally challenges the assumptions of power transition and alliance theories, this study’s conclusions need to be tested in the context of other junior allies. Japan, the ROK, the Philippines and Thailand have all, at some point over the past forty years, sought to forge cooperative relations with China from within their US alliances. They could present valuable case studies, both for the similarities and differences they reveal when compared with Australia. This study’s conclusions also need to be tested against different conditions, such as periods of intense competition or crisis between the rising power and dominant global ally or in the context of different alliance structures. This could lead to a more generalisable theoretical framework for understanding junior allies’ engagement with a rising power. Developing a deeper understanding of how junior allies respond to international power shift is particularly important in light of the structural change that is occurring in the Asia– Pacific. Several observers argue that the cooperative–competitive relationship between a rising China and the United States is likely to continue.16 Both powers have sought to avoid conflict and defuse crises and to develop mechanisms for mitigating miscalculation.17 Nevertheless, elements of great power competition are evident in the forward deployment of military capabilities in Asia and in these powers’ efforts to cultivate political influence among Asian countries.18 The Sino-American balance of political influence has become an important component of the power shift taking place.19 Understanding the factors that shape how junior allies respond to a rising power, while maintaining their US alliance, will become increasingly central to understanding the dynamics of power shift and the evolving regional order in the Asia–Pacific.

Implications for Australian Foreign Policy Studies While contributing to a better understanding of how power shift impacts on the broader

international system, this book also enhances our understanding of Australian foreign policy. It challenges the dominant dependency school of Australian foreign policy studies, which regained prominence following Australia’s contributions to US-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.20 Dependency theorists echo many of the assumptions of power transition and traditional alliance theory. Coral Bell and others have portrayed Australia as calibrating its foreign policy with its senior ally’s policies and providing token military contributions to allied war efforts in order to ensure its ally’s assistance during a future time of need.21 While this study does not negate the importance of the alliance in Australian foreign policy, it represents the alliance as more subtly influencing Australian foreign policy and as only one of several factors that shaped its policy toward rising powers. At times, Australian policymakers even pursued policies that differed from its senior ally’s preferences. Several diplomatic historians have previously identified independent Australian policy forays in specific historical contexts.22 However, it is argued here that Australia’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy from within a bilateral alliance has actually been a longstanding trend. Australia has entrepreneurially exercised autonomy not just in multilateral contexts, as middle power theorists argue, but also in its bilateral alliances with its great and powerful friends.23 This book, therefore, supports the development of a third school in Australian foreign policy studies, which would focus on Australian foreign policy independence from within an alliance. It builds on the work of Richard Leaver, who observed that Australia has often diverged from its ally on economic and security issues, but does not explain how Australian policymakers reconciled this with alliance management imperatives.24 These arguments are developed in this study by more systematically exploring how Australian policy-makers have pursued a reasonably independent foreign policy from within an alliance. In the case of Australia’s foreign policy toward rising powers, this is because not all interests in an alliance are created equal. The extent to which Australia was able to pursue an independent policy toward the rising power depended on how Australian policymakers perceived their alliance contributions in relation to that power. During some historical periods, Australian policymakers viewed Australia’s policy toward the rising power as central to Australia’s alliance contribution and it was hard to pursue a completely independent foreign policy toward that power while demonstrating Australia’s bona fides as a loyal ally. Under these circumstances, the arguments of dependency theorists have greater credence. Australia’s China policy during the 1960s, which largely echoed that of the United States, is a case in point. Another example is Australia’s changing policy toward the United States in late 1937, in response to British pressure, when the successful conclusion of the Anglo-American trade treaty became a core imperial objective. Conversely, if Australia’s alliance contributions were not defined in terms of and were especially not directed against the rising power, it was much easier for Australia to secure its dominant global ally’s acquiescence to its relatively autonomous foreign policy toward that power. Australia’s capacity to exercise a more independent foreign policy was also linked to its growing defence self-reliance—a trend that continued well into the Howard Government

years. Based on these factors, there was considerable scope for Australia to pursue its own interests toward a rising power from within its bilateral alliance—not just the multilateral context that middle power theorists identify. Although further work is needed to support the development of a third school of thought in Australian foreign policy studies, the broad range of historical cases examined in this book suggests it has validity. Further work needs to be done on whether Australia adopted a similar approach of seeking the ally’s acquiescence, based on understandings of alliance contribution, when pursuing divergent policies from its ally in other contexts. Such work could also more systematically explore when Australia has altered its policy in response to its senior ally’s preferences. A reconceptualisation of Australian foreign policy, in terms of Australia exercising independence from within its alliance, could prompt greater exploration of what policy options are available to Australian policymakers to maintain this independence despite changing regional power dynamics.

What Next for Australian Foreign Policy? The challenge of calibrating Australia’s relationship with a rising power with its alliance to a dominant global power will not disappear any time soon. Australia continues to have an interest in supporting China’s rise as a peaceful regional power and growing its economic relationship with that power.25 At the same time, Australia continues to have enduring interests in an active US regional presence and a strong US alliance.26 Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper observed: ‘For Australia, our relationships with both countries will remain different in crucial ways’.27 The White Paper stated that the US alliance would continue to be ‘the centrepiece’ of Australian defence policy, but that Australia welcomed the opportunities from China’s economic growth and would seek to deepen the bilateral relationship.28 The extent to which Australia can maintain its relative independence and concurrently manage these two relationships will depend partly on the continuation of the circumstances that rendered this possible during the late twentieth century. A cooperative–competitive SinoAmerican relationship will be critical. While both China and the United States have committed to building a constructive relationship, differences could lead to rising tensions. Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper notes that there is a potential for great-power friction on issues such as the East China and South China seas and rules that govern international behaviour in the space and cyber domains.29 As in the past, there may be a future role for Australia in helping to preserve the current temper of Sino-American relations by providing Beijing and Washington with insights about each other to mitigate risks of misperception or miscalculation. Another factor that will be important to Australia’s ability to concurrently deepen its relationships with both powers will be Beijing’s respect for a continuing US presence in the Asia–Pacific and its acquiescence to ANZUS. As Robert Gilpin has argued, rising powers often seek to redefine international norms and rules to shape the international system in ways

that accommodate their interests.30 China’s growing power has certainly led it to seek to greater influence over regional order. Since 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping has advocated a ‘new model’ of great power relations between China and the United States, based on non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation.31 Such statements suggest a power-sharing arrangement between China and the United States in managing regional order. They are at odds, however, with other Chinese statements (including those advanced by Xi) advocating an Asian security order managed by Asian countries.32 Xi has also criticised US efforts to strengthen its regional alliances.33 Whether China will shape regional order in a way that aligns with Australia’s longstanding strategic interests will be important in the future development of Sino-Australian relations. Past Australian experience suggests that the US alliance will also need to be carefully managed during this period of power shift. Australia has achieved considerable discretion in its foreign policy toward China over the past forty years, largely because Australia’s contributions to ANZUS have been defined not in terms of China but in terms of maintaining a stable regional order. As long as there is a cooperative–competitive Sino-American relationship, it is plausible that this will continue and Australia is likely to continue to enjoy considerable leeway in its diplomacy toward Beijing. This will become harder if SinoAmerican rivalry intensifies and Washington looks to redefine its own regional interests and the purposes of its alliances accordingly. Developments in the Sino-American power shift at the beginning of the twenty-first century demonstrate the persistence of the real challenge that Australian policymakers have so often confronted over the past century. This is not whether to choose between a rising power and dominant power but how Australia can best shape its strategic environment so that it can realise its interests and without having to choose between these powers. The increasingly complex and multifaceted cooperative–competitive Sino-American relationship suggests that Australia and other US junior allies in the Asia–Pacific will continue to grapple with this challenge for some time yet to come. Understanding the complexities that will shape how US junior allies and other countries in the Asia–Pacific respond to these developments is important to understanding the dynamics of a power shift. From an Australian policy perspective, they are also important in understanding precisely what trade-offs need to be made. While Australia may not have to choose between China and the United States, there is a need to carefully consider Australia’s most important strategic interests in this evolving regional order and how these are likely to be affected by changing power dynamics. There is also merit in clearly articulating and developing innovative ways for Australia to advance these strategic interests in its bilateral relationships. A debate that focuses not on whether Australia has to choose between the great powers, but how it best articulates its interests to these powers, could offer useful solutions. Although we may not yet know the future of the Sino-American power shift in the Asia– Pacific, a clear understanding of Australia’s interests and how these interests might be pursued could help us begin asking the right questions to proactively shape Australia’s regional order.

Notes 1

2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20

21

22

23

24

See, for instance, Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp 80–2; Avery Goldstein, ‘Parsing China’s Rise’, in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng (eds), China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 78. See, for example, AFK Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958), pp. 352–4, 368; Jack Levy, ‘Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China’, in Ross and Feng (eds), China’s Ascent, p. 13; Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tammen, ‘Regional Challenge: China’s Rise to Power’, in J Rolfe (ed.), The Asia–Pacific: A Region in Transition (Honolulu: The Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003), p. 47; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 32. See, for example, Organski, World Politics, pp. 352–4, 368; Kugler and Tammen, ‘Regional Challenge’, p. 47; Levy, ‘Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China’, p. 13. Organski, World Politics, p. 354; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 30–2. See, for example, George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 147; Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 32. Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 175. M Ruth Megaw, ‘Australia and the Great White Fleet 1908’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, 56(2), 1970, p. 128. Stephen FitzGerald, Talking with China: The Australian Labor Party Visit and Peking’s Foreign Policy (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972), p. 23. EG Whitlam, ‘China and the US’, Australian, 18 July 1971, p. 15. Russell Trood, ‘From Cooperation to Conflict: Australia and China in 1989’, in Colin Mackerras, Kevin Bucknall and Russell Trood, The Beijing Tragedy: Implications for China and Australia (Nathan, Queensland: Griffith University, 1991), p. 70. Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 71. Cablegram from Spender to Harrison, 21 February 1951, in Roger Holdich, Vivianne Johnson, and Pamela Andre (eds), ANZUS Treaty 1951 (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), p. 97. ibid. Chamberlain to Lyons, 6 December 1937, A2910, 437/5/120A PART I, NAA. Earle Page, ‘United Kingdom–United States Trade Negotiations and their Empire Significance’, 24 November 1937, A1667, 430/B/52E, NAA. Robert Sutter, US–Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2010), pp. 274–5; Phillip C Saunders, ‘China’s Rising Power, the US Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for US–China Relations’, Issues and Studies, 50(3), 2014, p. 28. Sutter, US–Chinese Relations, p. 156; Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: WW Norton & Co, 2011), p. 2. Lyle Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US–China Rivalry (Washington, DC: Georgetown, 2015), pp. 277–82. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, pp. 200–14. See, for instance, Bruce Grant, Fatal Attraction: Reflections on the Alliance with the United States (Melbourne: Black Inc, 2004); Malcolm Fraser (with Cain Roberts), Dangerous Allies (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2014). Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 2– 5,192–3, 203; TB Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Angus and Robertson, 1968), pp. 7–9; Grant, Fatal Attraction, p. 89. See, for example, Joan Beaumont, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1901–1945 (East Melbourne: Deakin University, 1989), p. 3; Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard, ‘Introduction’, in Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (eds), Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation to the Second World War (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000), pp. 2–3. See, for example, Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1993), pp. 24–5; Andrew Carr, Winning the Peace: Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia–Pacific (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2014), pp. 258–63. Richard Leaver, ‘Patterns of Dependence in Post-war Australian Foreign Policy’, in Richard Leaver and Dave Cox

25

26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

(eds), Middling, Meddling, Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy (St Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1997), pp. 71–2. Malcolm Turnbull, ‘Australia and the United States: New Responsibilities for an Enduring Partnership’, 18 January 2016, accessed at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2016-01-18/australia-and-united-states-new-responsibilities-enduringpartnership. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016), p. 41. ibid., p. 44. ibid. ibid., p. 43. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 35–6. Ren Xiao, ‘Modelling a “New Type of Great Power Relations”: The Chinese Viewpoint’, Asan Forum, 4 October 2013, accessed at http://www.theasanforum.org/modeling-a-new-type-of-great-power-relations-a-chinese-viewpoint. Xi Jinping, ‘New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation’, 21 May 2014, accessed at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml. Timothy Heath, ‘China and the US Alliance System’, Diplomat, 11 June 2014, accessed at http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-u-s-alliance-system.

Epilogue

Debates about whether Australia needs ‘to choose’ between China and the United States have intensified in recent years. A dominant theme in these debates is that Australia’s ability to concurrently deepen its relationships with both China and the United States has been a product of historical circumstances that are now rapidly fading as China looks to exercise regional influence commensurate with its economic and military power. Some scholars argue, for example, that Australia’s successful optimisation of these relationships was based on China’s acceptance of US regional leadership, but that a strategically ascendant China may be less inclined to accept this leadership and to subjugate its own regional ambitions. They argue that, for these reasons, Australia may confront a choice between China, as its chief economic partner, and the United States, as Australia’s principal security partner.1 Others suggest this is possible if Sino-American relations become more competitive.2 To what extent are Australia’s experiences in engaging with a rising power, from within an alliance with a dominant global power, therefore confined to the twentieth century? A review of Australian foreign policy since the end of the Howard Government shows that, surprisingly, Australia has continued to pursue a strong relationship with Beijing while also deepening the US–Australia alliance. Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (2007-10, 2013) posited Australia as a ‘true friend’ of China, while also declaring that ANZUS was ‘the bedrock of Australian strategic policy’ and encouraging the United States to remain engaged in the region.3 Following tensions in Sino-Australian relations after the 2009 Australian Defence White Paper, after the arrest of Chinese-Australian mining executive Stern Hu, and over Chinese state investment in Australian resources, Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard (2010-13) sought to rebuild the Sino-Australian relationship by concluding a bilateral ‘strategic partnership’ in April 2013. This initiative provided for an annual leaders’ dialogue and was directed at reinvigorating engagement and building strategic trust. Her Government also announced the US force posture initiatives in November 2011, which comprised of rotational US Marine deployments to Australia and the future prospect of increased rotations of US aircraft through northern Australia. The Coalition Government of Prime Minister Tony Abbott (2013-15) continued this trend of deepening relations with both China and the United States. In 2014, the Abbott Government concluded the Force Posture Agreement with the United States which provided a framework for the implementation of the US force posture initiatives, while at the same time prioritising the successful negotiation of the China– Australia Free Trade Agreement and the development of nascent Sino-Australian defence cooperation.4 Despite changing strategic circumstances, these developments demonstrate that longstanding Australian patterns of cultivating a strong and enduring relationship with China,

while also deepening ANZUS, remain largely unchanged. Indeed, this became a clearly articulated Australian foreign policy goal. As former Prime Minister Julia Gillard has reflected: ‘I particularly wanted to show that you could improve relationships with the USA and China at the same time. That this was not a zero-sum game’.5 In the following pages, it is argued that Australian governments since the Howard Government have worked tenaciously to preserve the very conditions that have enabled close engagement with a rising China, from within ANZUS, over the past forty years. This has become more difficult, but has also been perceived by Canberra as more worthwhile in light of the changing regional power balance and a more competitive Sino-American relationship. Australia’s recent experiences suggest the continuing relevance of the supplementary theoretical propositions to Snyder’s theory that this book has developed to explain junior allied engagement with a rising power from within an alliance. These include the importance of a non- adversarial great power relationship, a rising power’s acceptance of the dominant global power’s continuing regional presence and alliance with a junior ally, and a junior ally’s belief that its senior partner will acquiesce in its strategy. This epilogue reflects on the foreign policy of four Australian governments since the Howard Government: the Rudd Labor Government; the Gillard Labor Government; the Abbott Coalition Government; and the Turnbull Coalition Government (from 2015 to the time of writing in June 2016). It focuses on these four governments, rather than on a single prime minister, because there has been no clearly delineated ‘turning point’ in Australian foreign policy toward China since the Howard era. The relationship since the Howard era has been characterised more by what China scholar Linda Jakobson has described as ‘fits and starts’ rather than distinct shifts between engagement and disengagement.6 In addition, Australia’s evolving bilateral relationships over the past decade are better viewed as the product of cumulative decisions by successive prime ministers rather than decisive moments that are easily linked to a single prime minister. For these reasons, this epilogue adopts a thematic approach to examining whether the same factors that supported Australian engagement, from within an alliance, during the twentieth century still apply. For consistency, it adopts the same lines of enquiry as previous chapters. The epilogue first summarises changing Sino-American power dynamics since the Howard Government, followed by an exploration of the extent to which Australian engagement with a rising China has been dominated by US policies and preferences during a period of intensifying Sino-American competition. It examines the degree to which, and in what ways, the alliance has otherwise influenced how Australia’s engagement strategy toward a rising China has evolved and how Australian governments have reconciled this engagement with the alliance political halo. Far from compromising its relationships with China or the United States, Australia has actively pursued independent policies toward both of these powers to help shape a regional order that aligns with its own strategic interests.

An Intensifying Sino-American Power Shift

A key difference between the policy context in which the Howard Government operated and that of subsequent Australian governments is that, for the first time, China was emerging as a genuine economic and strategic contender to the United States in Asia. It was no longer a distant future challenger. Chinese economic and military growth had occurred faster than the Howard Government had anticipated. The 2009 Global Financial Crisis was a pivotal event, highlighting the resilience of the Chinese economy at a time when US fiscal viability was weakened. Some scholars have argued that China’s strong fiscal position and ability to grow during the crisis provided it with ‘new clout’ in the international economy.7 While it is not yet clear how China will weather the transition from a trade- and investment-based economic model to one based on consumption, Australian governments have regarded China as a major economic power.8 Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper projected that, by 2030 China would become a ‘major driver of economic activity, both globally and in the region, and will have strategic influence beyond East Asia’.9 In March 2016, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull noted that, while China would have slower growth rates than previously, it was still about to become the largest single national economy in the world.10 China has used this economic power to significantly strengthen its military and regional diplomatic influence. It has invested heavily in its nuclear force, as well as in its maritime and air capabilities, which are enabling it to expand its reach into the Pacific and Indian Oceans.11 China now has the largest air force and navy in Asia.12 Moreover, China is using its military assets to support its claims in the South China Sea and corresponding land– reclamation activities.13 China is drawing on these force capabilities to project power into the ‘first island chain’ and, some academics posit, could take a greater interest in the ‘second island chain’ over time.14 These developments point to changing strategic power relativities, with implications for how the United States maintains regional access and influence. Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper observed: ‘While China will not match the global strategic weight of the United States, the growth of China’s national power, including its military modernisation, means China’s policies and actions will have a major impact on the stability of the Indo–Pacific out to 2035’.15 Nevertheless, successive Australian governments have still recognised the United States will be the globally dominant power for some time to come.16 Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper, for example, observed that, taking into account trade, aid and financial flows, the United States would remain the paramount global economy. It also stated that the United States will ‘remain the preeminent global military power over the next two decades’.17 The United States continues to maintain the largest defence budget. It also retains its leading edge in technology in which the United States has continued to invest through the US Defence Department’s ‘third offset strategy’. The third offset strategy is directed at identifying and investing in technology and other innovative ways to sustain the United States’ military competitive advantage in future decades.18 Significantly, the United States has also refocused its power projection to the Asia– Pacific. In a ‘rebalance’ to the Asia–Pacific, following drawdown from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has enhanced its force presence in that region and

sought to better integrate its diplomatic, economic and military efforts to maximise their collective effect.19 By 2020, 60 per cent of US air and naval forces are scheduled to be homeported in the Asia–Pacific.20 The United States has also reconfigured its Asia–Pacific force posture, shifting from a focus on Japan to a more distributed, resilient and sustainable posture throughout the broader Western Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. This was demonstrated by the 2011 announcement that US Marines would rotationally deploy to Australia. This initiative was later complemented by the 2014 US Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines which provided the US military access to Philippine bases on a rotational basis; the deployment of US littoral combat ships to Singapore; and wide-ranging exercises with Asia–Pacific allies and partners.21 Southeast Asia has emerged as a fulcrum for Chinese and US power projection in the Asia–Pacific for several reasons.22 First, it is due to Chinese and US reconceptualisation of the Asia–Pacific region into a broader Indo-Pacific region. Both countries have interests in protecting trade and energy supplies that pass through the sea lanes of communication from the Middle East to North Asia. Second, China and other regional countries have increasingly sought to advance and protect their territorial claims in the South China Sea. China has expanded its land-reclamation efforts thereby building artificial islands to support infrastructure for potential power projection (such as missile batteries and airstrip) and has challenged its regional neighbours’ activities near, and US Navy surveillance flights over, the features it occupies.23 The United States has responded by advocating peaceful resolution of disputes, adherence to international law and freedom of navigation.24 It has also conducted freedom of navigation operations with ships coming within 12 nautical miles of Chinese features. Third, both China and the United States have strengthened their diplomatic engagement with Southeast Asian countries and within ASEAN-led multilateral forums. As a US ally geographically proximate to Southeast Asia, Australia has not been immune to the competitive dynamics of the Sino-American relationship. Australia is no longer seen as being in a remote part of the world, but in a geographically important part of the world between the Indian and Pacific oceans, and close to the Straits of Malacca.25 It is at the heart of the Indo-Pacific. Australia has welcomed US efforts to strengthen its regional presence through the rebalance and the US force posture initiatives.26 China responded adversely to Australia’s support for the US force posture initiatives, which Beijing argued perpetuated ‘Cold War thinking’.27 Yet, Australia has remained eager to maintain a positive relationship with China, while modernising ANZUS. How has it been able to do so, given the competitive aspects of the Sino-American relationship? In line with dominant international relations theories, shouldn’t Australia have demonstrated support for US global and regional leadership by curtailing its relations with Beijing?

Influence of US Policies Like their predecessors, successive Australian governments since the Howard Government have steadfastly supported a US-led regional order, because of both shared values and

interests between Australia and the United States. As Prime Minister Gillard declared in a speech to the US Congress in March 2011: ‘You have an ally in Australia … Geography and history alone could never explain the strength of the commitment between us. Rather, our values are shared and our people are friends. This is the heart of the alliance’.28 Australia continues to yield significant economic and strategic benefits from its alliance with the United States. The alliance provides Australia with an extended nuclear deterrent, access to defence acquisitions and technology, and an important intelligence relationship. It also continues to support the US presence in the Asia–Pacific, which Australian governments have continued to regard as key to regional stability and prosperity. For Australia, the US rebalance ‘underline[d] an increased United States’ focus on Asia’ and the perpetuation of these collective regional benefits.29 Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper, moreover, observed: ‘Australia will continue to … support the United States’ strategy of focusing resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific through its strategic rebalance’.30 Australia has many shared interests in regional order with the United States and, to a degree, both countries have adopted a similar approach toward China. Both countries want to pursue a constructive relationship with China and ensure the emergence of a stable, prosperous China that contributes to global and regional security.31 An important component of the US rebalance to the Asia–Pacific was fostering deeper ties with China to assist in ‘shaping and participating in a rules-based global order’.32 This approach resulted in at least initial US and Chinese agreement that there needed to be a ‘new model’ of cooperation between the two countries—if not a formal US agreement to the Chinese construct of a ‘new model for great power relations’—directed at strengthening cooperation on common interests.33 While US President Barack Obama was no longer using this terminology in 2015, he continued to emphasise the importance of expanding cooperation to advance mutual interests.34 Like Australia, the United States had also established forums such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China to facilitate regular senior dialogue on bilateral issues of immediate and long-term economic and strategic interest as well as expanding the scope and depth of Sino-American military cooperation.35 At the same time, however, there is still a significant hedging component in the US approach toward China. As China scholar Phillip Saunders observes: ‘The broad US strategy of seeking to integrate China more fully within the global order, while discouraging any efforts to reshape that order by the use of force, remains in place’.36 The United States has pressed for greater transparency in China’s defence policies and expressed concern about what it perceives as incremental Chinese steps to increase control over disputed areas in the East and South China seas.37 The US Department of Defence 2015 Asia–Pacific Maritime Security Strategy noted that By ‘undertaking these actions, China is unilaterally altering the physical status quo in the region, thereby complicating diplomatic initiatives that could lower tensions’.38 The United States has also continued to invest in defence technology, rebalance its forces in the Asia–Pacific and conduct freedom of navigation operations as part of this hedging strategy. Australian international relations academic Rory Medcalf observes that Australia has also adopted elements of a hedging strategy relative to China by strengthening

its force structure and maintaining its alliance with the United States.39 Despite some parallels in approach, however, Australia’s policy toward Beijing has been based on its own interests and has not simply echoed that of Washington. The Australian Government continues to characterise the Sino-American relationship as a cooperative– competitive one: ‘a mixture of cooperation and competition depending on where and how their interests intersect’.40 While there is a low risk of armed conflict, there are frictions between China and the United States over issues such as the East and South China seas and in rules governing behaviour in space and cyberspace.41 Australia has persistently sought to encourage preservation of a cooperative–competitive Sino-American relationship, maximising the elements of cooperation while minimising elements of competition.42 Australian prime ministers have often positioned Australia as a broker between China and the United States, assisting both countries to better understand the other. For example, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd initially cast Australia as a country that could help reconcile China’s regional vision of a ‘harmonious order’ with the US vision of China becoming a ‘responsible stakeholder’.43 Later under the Gillard Government, then Foreign Minister Bob Carr, also posited Australia as a potential candidate for building confidence between the United States, China and Japan on territorial claim issues.44 Increased Sino-American geopolitical rivalry in the Asia–Pacific has not resulted in Australia demonstrating its support for the United States by completely conforming to US policies, as some scholars have suggested.45 Rather, Australia has worked tenaciously to preserve a key Australian interest—a stable, cooperative great power relationship that has facilitated an independent Australian foreign policy. Australia still pursues an independent foreign policy toward China. While former US senior officials have called on Australia to avoid becoming too economically enmeshed with China, Australia has continued to deepen its economic ties with that country, for example, such as through ratification of the China–Australia Free Trade Agreement in 2015.46 Australia also agreed in 2015 to join the Chinese-led international financial institution, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, despite US discouragement.47 While Australia’s independence should not be measured in terms of the extent to which Canberra disagrees with Washington, these developments suggest that Australia continues to pursue an independent foreign policy that accommodates occasional differences with the United States on China-related issues. Simultaneously, disruptions to the Sino-Australian relationship have resulted mostly from disagreements over issues inherent to that relationship rather than the US alliance. This suggests that Snyder’s concept of intra-alliance bargaining power—where, under some circumstances, a junior ally pursues its interests with minimal concern for alliance consequences—still has some application. While a cooperative–competitive SinoAmerican relationship remains an important backdrop, Australia’s policy toward China and its alliance with the United States still seem firmly based on its own strategic interests.

Australia’s Interests in China as an Asian Power

The rise of China has led some scholars to assert that, for the first time in decades, Australia is now in a contested Asia rather than in a region underwritten by US dominance, and that Australia’s interests might change in this new strategic order.48 What is surprising, however, is the extent to which Australia’s strategic interests have remained unchanged, despite the intensifying power shift and greater Sino-American competition. While there have been changes to how Australia’s regional strategic interests are publicly presented, they can still be roughly grouped into the following five themes. First, Australia continues to support a US regional leadership role and the ANZUS alliance as way of supporting a US regional presence. Successive Australian governments have emphasised that the United States continues to underpin regional stability through its extended deterrence guarantees to allies and forward deployed military capabilities.49 Like the Howard Government’s 1997 Defence Statement (discussed in chapter 8), Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper suggested that diminished US influence was not in Australia’s interests.50 There were no such statements in the 2016 Defence White Paper, but it did note: ‘Australia welcomes and supports the critical role of the United States in ensuring stability in the Indo–Pacific region … The levels of security and stability we seek in the Indo–Pacific would not be achievable without the United States’.51 Against this backdrop, a second Australian strategic interest is to preserve stability in the broader Indo–Pacific. Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper widened the focus of this interest from the Asia–Pacific to the Indo–Pacific to take into account the rise of India and regionally significant sea lanes of communication spanning from India to Northeast Asia.52 These sea lanes are important for Australia’s access to ‘an open, free and secure trading system’.53 To foster regional stability, Australia has supported the development of a regional architecture that brings together all regional powers in multilateral forums to constructively manage regional security challenges.54 The Rudd Government, in particular, advocated US inclusion in regional multilateralism, initially through its unsuccessful Asia–Pacific Community concept and then later in the East Asia Summit.55 The Rudd Government also wanted to ensure no power in the region ‘would be able to coerce or intimidate others in the region through the employment of force or the implied threat of force, without being deterred, checked, or, if necessary, defeated by the political, economic or military responses by others in the region’.56 The 2016 Defence White Paper affirmed Australia’s interests in promoting a ‘stable Indo–Pacific’ and minimising the risk of coercion.57 Third, Australia maintains a continuing interest in the security and stability of Southeast Asia. Maritime Southeast Asia remains of enduring importance to Australia as an area through which an adversary would need to operate to project power against Australia and also given Australia’s reliance on access to sea lanes of communication access for maritime trade.58 As during the Hawke and Howard prime ministerships, the 2013 Defence White Paper noted that Australia would be concerned ‘if potentially hostile powers established a presence in Southeast Asia that could be used to project military power against Australia’.59 The Australian Government has also continued to urge the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea in accordance with international law and maintains interests

in protecting freedom of navigation in Southeast Asia.60 Fourth, Australia continues to retain an interest in a secure ‘nearer region’, including the South Pacific and Australia’s northern approaches. In the South Pacific, Australia has an interest in the security, stability and governance capacity of these countries, as well as ensuring that ‘no major power with hostile intentions establishes bases in our immediate neighbourhood from which it could project force against us’.61 Fifth, Australia’s most ‘basic’ strategic interest is to protect Australia against attack or the threat of attack or coercion.62 This also now includes protection from non-geographic threats, including cyber attacks and ballistic missile systems.63 Based on their speeches and biographical accounts, Australian prime ministers and ministers have continued to view Australia’s relations with China primarily through the lens of these strategic interests. This is not to negate the significant economic aspect of the relationship, demonstrated by the importance the Abbott Government assigned to concluding the China–Australia Free Trade Agreement.64 In 2015, Australia’s total merchandise trade with China stood at $137 billion and China is Australia’s largest goods export destination and services market.65 Yet, Australian prime ministers have continued to link Australia’s and the region’s future prosperity to China’s ‘openness’ to the international system and the continuing stability of the broader region.66 This stability encompasses the realisation of several of Australia’s strategic interests in regional order. Australian prime ministers and ministers have believed that China could be encouraged to act in a way that contributed to these interests, although uncertainty about the extent to which a more powerful China would do so in future introduced greater complexity into the relationship. Most critical is the extent to which China will accommodate a future US regional presence and US alliances as a manifestation of that presence. Successive Australian prime ministers have not viewed China’s rise as inherently antithetical to such a presence. They have been encouraged by China’s efforts to mitigate tensions with the United States through such constructs as a ‘harmonious world’, a ‘new model of great power relations’, and more recently Chinese President Xi Jinping’s focus on averting the ‘Thucydides trap’ (where rising powers avoid creating anxieties in others that could result in conflict).67 At the same time, positive Chinese messaging has been juxtaposed by Chinese efforts to limit US freedom of manoeuvre in the Asia–Pacific by adopting anti-access and area-denial capabilities.68 While Foreign Minister, Carr also noted China’s reinvigoration of its arguments against the US alliance system in Asia, with some Chinese officials postulating that these alliances are part of an outdated Cold War mentality.69 At a 2014 regional conference, Xi observed: ‘It is disadvantageous to the common security of the region if military alliances with third countries are strengthened’.70 Chinese officials have also expressed concern about what they perceive as an intensification of the US–Australian alliance through the US force posture initiatives and upgraded military activities.71 This tension between what Australian prime ministers and ministers have interpreted as positive trends in Chinese foreign policy in some respects, and yet concerns about other developments, has also been evident in relation to Australia’s other strategic interests. In line

with Australia’s interest in fostering stability in the Indo–Pacific, Australia has been encouraged by China’s use of regional multilateral forums to pursue its policy goals.72 As Carr observed in a speech in 2013: ‘we acknowledge the leadership that China is increasingly displaying on global and regional issues. We want more of it, not less. We are very comfortable with China achieving its place in the councils of the nations of the world’.73 At the same time, China has pursued unilateral actions, such as the declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea in November 2013, which raised tensions with Japan. This led Australia to join the United States and Japan in opposing ‘unilateral or coercive change in the status quo’.74 Similarly, in the South China Sea, Prime Minister Turnbull has expressed concern about unilateral Chinese land–reclamation activities. He has encouraged China and other claimants to peacefully resolve disputes and to ‘reassure neighbours of and build their confidence in China’s intentions’.75 Such developments have led the Australian Government to acknowledge that Australia’s and China’s ‘strategic interests may differ in relation to some regional and global security issues’.76 Despite these developments, Australia has continued to adopt an engagement-based approach toward China, based on the longstanding premise that dialogue and cooperation with China will render it more likely to contribute to Australia’s strategic interests. As Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper stated, the ‘Government does not approach China as an adversary. Rather, its policy is aimed at encouraging China’s peaceful rise and ensuring that strategic competition in the region does not lead to conflict’.77 Australia has sought to encourage this peaceful rise in several ways. First, it has sought to deepen economic engagement with China, to provide that country with an increased stake in Australia’s prosperity.78 It has also deepened political engagement in an effort to create predictable dialogues, build strategic trust and develop habits of cooperation that can withstand difference.79 Finally, Australia has continued to encourage China to work within multilateral frameworks, including through the East Asia Summit, the ARF and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus to resolve contentious issues.80 Canberra has also endeavoured to institutionalise Chinese respect for Australia’s strategic interests through the shared expectations of the bilateral relationship it has cultivated with Beijing. This is best demonstrated by the Gillard Government’s efforts to rebuild the relationship following bilateral tensions in 2009. During their visits to China, Gillard and Carr worked to proactively reaffirm the same understandings about a continuing US regional presence and ANZUS, which had existed for the past forty years. Despite Chinese concerns about the US rebalance, Gillard and Carr stressed the importance that Australia attached to a continuing US regional presence and the rebalance as an affirmation of that presence.81 In a media interview in China, the Prime Minister observed: ‘Australia’s outlook on peace and security is of long standing, it is well known to our interlocutors in China … We welcomed the rebalance of the United States to our region. The United States has been a force for … stability and security in our region … and we believe that will continue’.82 The Gillard Government also sought to reaffirm shared expectations regarding the nonnegotiability of ANZUS. In one speech in 2012, Carr reflected on Gough Whitlam’s meeting

with Zhou Enlai in 1971, in which Whitlam refused to repudiate the ANZUS alliance and emphasised Australia’s enduring interests in that institution. Carr explained that he sometimes heard echoes of Zhou’s arguments today and ‘mention[ed] this only to emphasise —as I have emphasised to Chinese interlocutors—that the Australia–US alliance is a very long-term, fundamental fact of life’.83 Following a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Carr similarly observed: ‘I think China understands that Australia has, and very likely always will have, a treaty relationship with the United States. It was signed in the wake of the Second World War … and I think the Australian people would be very reluctant ever to relinquish that treaty’.84 Carr further explained to Chinese counterparts that Australia’s enhanced defence cooperation with the United States was a natural growth of the longstanding Australia-US defence relationship.85 In making such statements, Carr was consciously reaffirming the understandings that had governed Sino-Australian relations since 1971. Significantly, the US alliance was not the only factor that mattered in building a shared understanding to govern the Australia–US relationship. Like its predecessors, the Gillard Government also focused on developing an architecture that would privilege the totality of the relationship over issue-specific disputes, particularly following tensions over issues such as human rights and Chinese investment in Australian resources. Its proposed SinoAustralian strategic partnership was critical in this regard, comprising three separate bilateral dialogues: an annual leaders’ dialogue, an annual foreign and strategic dialogue, and an annual economic dialogue. These dialogues would enable Australia to press specific concerns relating to human rights or regional security issues, while preserving the foundations of the relationship and even advancing it in other dimensions. This architecture for dialogue provided an institutionalised opportunity for discussion when differences might otherwise test the relationship.86 Despite differences with Beijing that have since emerged over issues such as Australia’s support for the US and Japanese position in the East China Sea, it is significant that Australia and China have maintained this dialogue structure and managed to preserve a constructive Sino-Australian relationship. Sino-Australian relations have continued to follow their own independent trajectory and developed a momentum of their own, shaped by elements inherent in that bilateral relationship. The US–Australia alliance has exerted an important shaping influence but, as in previous decades, as only one of several Australian strategic interests. What has been most important is how Australian prime ministers and ministers view China through the lens of these strategic interests. The Gillard Government, in particular, dedicated considerable attention to cultivating shared expectations with Beijing that respected these strategic interests and that would subsequently enable the relationship to flourish. While ANZUS by no means determined Australia’s foreign policy toward China, such shared expectations with Beijing made it easier for Australia to reconcile engagement with a rising China with its alliance obligations.

A Rising China and the Alliance Political Halo Reconciling engagement with China with a strong US alliance has not just been a matter of Australian prime ministers and ministers reaffirming longstanding understandings with China. It has also had much to do with how these prime ministers and ministers have shaped the development of the US alliance. Combined with a non-adversarial Sino-American relationship, Australian (and US) efforts to maintain an order-based purpose for ANZUS have been important to continued US acquiescence to a relatively independent Australian China policy. This has been essential to Australia pursuing a China policy based on its own national interests, rather than becoming more constrained by the alliance, and is an important consideration given the significant changes in ANZUS over the past decade. During the drawdown of US-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Rudd and Gillard governments looked to adjust the alliance to a degree to ensure it remained dynamic and relevant to changing strategic circumstances.87 Following from the Global Financial Crisis and drawdown of these operations, the Australian Government knew that the United States would be making choices about its engagement priorities and wanted to maintain US engagement in Asia.88 The Gillard Government, in particular, emphasised a reinvigorated regional focus for the alliance, in addition to a continuing global focus. The 2011 AUSMIN Communiqué highlighted this shift of emphasis, recognising the importance of the alliance in providing for ‘peace and security in the region’ and ‘further fostering Asia’s tremendous economic growth’.89 Similar to the principles detailed in the 1996 Sydney Statement, Australia and the United States aim to use the alliance to support a strong US presence in Asia, which Canberra and Washington perceive as underwriting regional stability.90 Both allies also seek to strengthen regional architecture by promoting inclusive and robust regional multilateral institutions and by deepening networks between US allies and regional partners.91 Other shared interests include maintaining freedom of navigation and sea-lane security to support commerce, addressing emerging security challenges in the space and cyber domains, and supporting a rules-based global order.92 As it has since Whitlam’s 1971 Washington visit, the alliance remains focused on providing for a US regional presence and strengthening regional stability and prosperity, rather than being directed against China or any other country. Australia’s alliance contributions are defined in similar terms, aimed at realising shared Australian–American interests rather than related to any particular country. In response to the alliance’s renewed focus on the region, Australia’s alliance contributions have also been mostly regionally focused. Australia’s primary contribution to the alliance has been to support the US rebalance through various force posture initiatives. As mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Gillard and President Obama announced a key set of US force posture initiatives in November 2011 that provided for rotational deployments of a US Marine Air Ground Task Force as well as the future prospect of increased rotations of US aircraft through northern Australia.93 These specific initiatives contributed to the diversification of the United States’ regional posture, with an enhanced focus on Southeast Asia.94 They also

provided a means through which both the United States and Australia could strengthen their engagement with other allies and partners, including joint exercises between the US Marines, the ADF and other regional militaries.95 Although the Australian Government also continued to support the joint facilities in Australia and the United States’ inclusion in the East Asia Summit and other regional multilateral forums, the force posture initiatives were the most visible demonstration of Australia’s efforts to support a continuing US regional presence. Australia also contributed to the other shared Australian–American interests underpinning the alliance. For instance, it has contributed to a robust security architecture by independently strengthening its relations with other US allies and partners, including Japan, the ROK and Singapore. Australia has also sought to modernise the alliance to address space and cyber-security challenges through such initiatives as the 2010 Australia–United States Space Situational Awareness Partnership and 2011 Joint Statement on Cyber.96 While Australia’s regionally focused alliance contributions have become more prominent, they have not totally eclipsed other contributions linked to shared global interests. In September 2014, Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced Australia’s commitment of ADF personnel and air assets to support the international coalition operation against the Daesh terrorist threat in the Middle East. An especially significant, although less visible, contribution to the alliance is Australian efforts to maintain ADF interoperability with US forces so that it can continue to participate in coalition operations in support of a rules-based global order. This is, in part, facilitated by acquisition of high-end US defence platforms and technology. Before 2020, Australia will acquire F-35A Joint Strike Fighters, EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, C-27J battlefield airlift aircraft, and MH-60R Seahawk anti-submarine helicopters.97 A credible and capable ADF not only contributes to the selfreliant defence of Australian territory, but aligns with an increased focus on coalition operations.98 Significantly, the ways in which successive Australian governments have defined their contributions to the ANZUS alliance have allowed a relatively independent China policy— for three main reasons. First, Australia has continued to maintain a self-reliant defence capability, with the same corresponding implications for foreign policy that have existed in previous decades. Australia’s self-reliant defence capability continues to underwrite an alliance with the United States in which it can pursue independent relations with other regional countries and draw on the US alliance to support its national interests.99 Second, ANZUS and Australia’s alliance contributions are not focused on China but on regional and global collective goods, such as supporting a continuing US regional presence, strengthening the regional security architecture and countering transnational terrorism. China remains peripheral to the overriding purpose of the alliance and how successive Australian governments have sought to contribute to that alliance. In fact, Australia and the United States have been at pains to stress that ANZUS and activities associated with deepening that alliance are not intended to contain China.100 Australia’s reputation as a valuable and dependable ally rests on its ability to contribute to regional and global collective goods, leaving latitude for its own independent approach toward Beijing.

Third, there is a broad convergence of approach between Australia and the United States on China. Both countries have looked to strengthen their political and economic relationship with China and have sought to build greater trust and dialogue with that country.101 In identifying shared objectives to guide the alliance, the 2011 AUSMIN Communiqué noted that both Australia and the United States committed ‘to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China aimed at expanding cooperation on regional and global challenges, while constructively managing differences’.102 Given the likelihood of US acquiescence to Australia’s China policy on this basis, this could explain why the US alliance seemed to be of little concern in the development of Australia’s China policy between 2008 and at the time of writing in June 2016. This conclusion is supported by American accounts of the US response to Australia’s China policy during the Rudd and Gillard Governments. In interviews with the author, former senior US officials affirmed that the alliance was one in which Australia pursued its own independent relations with other regional countries.103 Washington supported the development of Australia’s military-to-military relationship with China, as the United States was also looking for similar mechanisms to build dialogue and trust with China.104 US officials thought that such cooperation would provide an opportunity for Australia to reiterate similar messages to China that Washington was also delivering.105 Far from inhibiting deeper and broader Australian engagement with Beijing, intra-alliance dynamics supported Australia’s approach. Reconciling engagement with China with Australia’s alliance could become harder if the United States or Australia view order-centric shared interests through the prism of Chinese foreign policy behaviour. This is particularly salient in the context of freedom of navigation and sea-lane security in the South China Sea. While the Australian Government has not commented on the legal merits of claims in the South China Sea, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull did express concern that Chinese actions are ‘creating anxieties and raising tensions among its neighbours’.106 It is difficult to predict how issues such as the South China Sea will play out in the alliance. In response to a US freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea in October 2015, Australian Minister for Defence Marise Payne confirmed that Australia was not involved in the US activity but reaffirmed Australia’s ‘legitimate interest’ in ‘unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea’. She noted that approximately 60 per cent of Australian trade passes through the South China Sea.107 Significantly, Australian ministers have approached this issue from the starting point of Australia’s own strategic interests—some of which, such as freedom of navigation, are shared with the United States. Australian efforts remain focused not on bandwagoning with, or balancing against, the great powers but on preserving a regional order that aligns with Australia’s own strategic interests. Ideally, this order is also one which continues to facilitate a positive and constructive relationship with China from within an enduring alliance to the United States.

Conclusion The experiences of recent Australian governments suggest that the same conditions that facilitated strong Australian relationships with a rising power and a dominant global power for much of the twentieth century are still at play, but should not be taken for granted. At first glance, this is surprising given the seemingly greater structural competition that now exists between China and the United States than has previously existed since before US President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972. Yet, while acknowledging the prospect for tension, Beijing and Washington have also, to date, sought to focus on strengthening cooperation around common interests. Under these circumstances, Australia has continued to pursue its own interests toward China from within its alliance to the United States. Successive Australian governments have been able to do so, in part, because they have proactively worked to maintain the same conditions that have facilitated engagement with a rising power from within an alliance with a dominant global power for the past century. They have prioritised a non-adversarial Sino-American relationship as a key Australian interest and have worked assiduously to help the great powers better understand each other and to find common ground where possible. In forging a strategic partnership with China, the Gillard Government reaffirmed the same understandings underpinning the Sino-Australian relationship that Whitlam secured during his visit to Beijing in 1971. These included ensuring that the Chinese leadership understood the enduring importance of ANZUS to Australian security. Successive Australian governments have also sought to modernise the US alliance in a way that remains order-centric and focused on preserving collective regional and global benefits, rather than directed against China or any other country. This has been aided by Washington’s own worldview of looking to strengthen its regional presence in the Indo– Pacific and wanting to work constructively with China to build a stable regional security architecture. These circumstances, and implicit Australian perceptions of US acquiescence they engendered, have provided Australia with considerable scope to continue to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy toward China based on its own national interests. These trends point to the continuing relevance of Snyder’s theory, when supplemented with the theoretical propositions that this book has developed, for understanding how and when junior allies are more likely to engage with a rising power from within an alliance with a dominant global power. The current public commentary on when Australia will have to choose between its economic interests in a rising China and its security interests in its dominant global ally, the United States, may therefore be pre-emptive. Presuming that the Sino-American relationship will become adversarial does not leave room for alternative futures, and alternative frameworks for Australia’s foreign policy. Successive Australian governments have observed that it is in Australia’s interests to develop a constructive relationship with China, while maintaining a strong security relationship with the United States. In light of these longstanding interests, a better starting point may be an examination of Australia’s strategic

interests in regional order and how Australia can constructively shape its relationships with both China and the United States to bring these interests to fruition. What avenues are available to shape the understandings that underpin both relationships? What strategies are available to do so and how are they best employed? This approach starts from the assumption that Canberra need not just respond to power shift but can proactively shape how power shift occurs. Australia can exercise its role as an independent ally to shape its relations with the region’s major powers in ways that support its strategic interests. While circumstances may be more challenging than they have been in past, this is what Australia’s prime ministers have been doing for more than a century. It is time to draw on the lessons from their experience.

Notes 1 2

3

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See, for example, Hugh White, ‘Power Shift: Australia’s Future Between Washington and Beijing’, Quarterly Essay, 39, 2010, pp. 4, 20, 60–3. Rory Medcalf, ‘Grand Stakes: Australia’s Future Between China and India’, in Ashley Tellis, Travis Tanner and Jessica Keough (eds), Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to its Rising Powers (Seattle, WA, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), p. 219. Kevin Rudd, ‘Australia, the United States and the Asia–Pacific Region’, 31 March 2008, accessed at http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/events/2008/3/31-australia/20080331_australia.pdf; ‘Beijing University Speech by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’, Australian, 9 April 2008, accessed at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/kevin-rudds-speech-at-beijing-uni/story-e6frg6n6-1111116015758. ‘AUSMIN Joint Communiqué 2014’, 12 August 2014, accessed at http://dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-ofamerica/ausmin/Pages/ausmin-joint-communique-2014.aspx; Bates Gill, ‘The US–Australia Alliance: A Deepening Partnership in Emerging Asia’, in Ashley Tellis, Abraham Denmark and Greg Chaffin (eds), Strategic Asia 2014–15: US Alliances and Partnerships (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014), p. 100. Julia Gillard, My Story (London: Bantam Press, 2014), pp. 171–2. Linda Jakobson, ‘Australia–China Strategic Partnership: Two Years of Fits and Starts’, Interpreter, 10 April 2013, accessed at http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/04/10/Australia-and-China-Two-years-of-fits-and-starts.aspx. Scott Dewar, Australia and China and the United States: Responding to Changing Great Power Dynamics (Canberra: Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific, 2010), p. 4. Peter Varghese, ‘An Australian Worldview: A Practitioner’s Perspective’, 21 August 2015, accessed at http://dfat.gov.au/news/speeches/Pages/an-australian-world-view-a-practitioners-perspective.aspx. Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia–Pacific Century (DWP 2009) (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), p. 34. Malcolm Turnbull, ‘2016 Lowy Lecture’, 23 March 2016, accessed at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2016-03-23/2016lowy-lecture. Tim Huxley and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Standing Up to China’, Survival, 57(6), 2015, p. 128; David Brewster, ‘The Coming Nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean’, Interpreter, 31 March 2015, accessed at http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/The-coming-nuclearisation-of-the-Indian-Ocean.aspx. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper (2016 DWP) (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016), p. 42. Huxley and Schreer, ‘Standing Up to China’, p. 129. The first island chain is broadly defined as the area extending from Japan and South Korea to Taiwan, the Philippines and the greater Sunda Islands. The second island chain encompasses Guam and the Marianas. Andrew Erickson, ‘Why Islands Still Matter in Asia’, 5 February 2016, accessed at http://cwp.princeton.edu/news/why-islands-still-matter-asia. Department of Defence, 2016 DWP, p. 42. Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013 (DWP 2013) (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2013), p. 10; Department of Defence, 2016 DWP, p. 15. Department of Defence, DWP 2009, pp. 34, 42.

18 19 20

21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

44 45

46 47

Bob Work, ‘The Third US Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies’, 28 January 2015, accessed at http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implicationsfor-partners-and-allies. Phillip C Saunders, ‘China’s Rising Power, the US Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for US–China Relations’, Issues and Studies, 50(3), 2014, p. 23. US Department of Defense, Asia–Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, 21 August 2015, accessed at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300FINALFORMAT.PDF, p. 22. ibid., pp. 21–3. Lyle Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US–China Rivalry (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), pp. 271–83. ibid., p. 281; Huxley and Schreer, ‘Standing Up to China’, p. 130; Michael Green, Bonnie Glaser and Zack Cooper, ‘Seeing the Forest through the SAMs on Woody Island’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 18 February 2016 accessed at http://amti.csis.org/seeing-the-forest-through-the-sams-on-woody-island/. US Department of Defense, Asia–Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, p. 23. Interview with Jeffrey Bleich, 10 August 2014. Julia Gillard, ‘Transcript of Doorstop Interview’, 6 April 2013, accessed through Pandora Archive, National Library of Australia (NLA). Gillard, My Story, p. 160; Bob Carr, Diary of a Foreign Minister, (Sydney: NewSouth, 2014), pp. 51, 331. Cited in Gill, ‘The US–Australia Alliance: A Deepening Partnership in Emerging Asia’, in Tellis, Denmark and Chaffin (eds), Strategic Asia 2014–15, p. 87. Department of Defence, DWP 2013, p. 10. Department of Defence, 2016 DWP, p. 42. Gill, ‘The US–Australia Alliance’, p. 112. Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011, accessed at http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. The White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China Before Bilateral Meeting’, 7 June 2013, accessed at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/07/remarkspresident-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china-. The White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in Joint Press Conference’, 25 September 2015, accessed at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarkspresident-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint. Saunders, ‘China’s Rising Power’, p. 39. Ibid., p. 28. US Department of Defence, Asia–Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, p. 14. ibid., p. 17. Rory Medcalf, ‘The Balancing Kangaroo: Australia and Chinese Power’, Issues and Studies, 50(3), 2014, p. 123. Department of Defence, 2016 DWP, p. 43. ibid. Gill, ‘The US–Australia Alliance’, p. 113; Julia Gillard, ‘Address to CELAP’, 8 April 2013, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. Graeme Dobell, ‘Great Australian Foreign Policy Speeches’, Interpreter, 18 August 2014, accessed at http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/08/18/Great-Australian-foreign-policy-speeches-Rudd-at-PekingUniversity.aspx. Bob Carr, ‘ASPI Conference on Maritime Confidence–building Measures in the South China Sea’, 12 August 2013, accessed at http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2013/bc_sp_130812.html. For scholarly works suggesting that Australia has increasingly conformed to US policies and preferences, see Kerry Brown and Hannah Bretherton, ‘Australian Relations with China and the USA: The Challenge of Grand Strategies’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 70(1), 2016, p. 5; Linda Jakobson, ‘Australia–China Ties: In Search of Political Trust’, Lowy Institute Policy Brief, June 2012, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/jakobson_australia_china_ties.pdf p. 5. Darren Lim, ‘Hillary Clinton’s Trade Warning: Can China Coerce Australia?’, Interpreter, 1 July 2014, accessed at http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/07/01/Hillary-Clinton-trade-warning-China-coerce-Australia.aspx. Paul Kelly, ‘Abbott Switch on China Bank Defies US’, Australian, 16 March 2015, accessed at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/abbott-switch-on-china-bank-defies-us/news-

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74

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76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

story/5e0a2d6a7fb21aec0245b59943da2b09. See, for example, Medcalf, ‘Grand Stakes: Australia’s Future Between China and India’, pp. 195–6. Department of Defence, DWP 2013, p. 10; Department of Defence, DWP 2009, p. 43. Department of Defence, DWP 2009, p. 43. Department of Defence, 2016 DWP, p. 42. Department of Defence, DWP 2013, p. 14. Department of Defence, 2016 DWP, p. 70. Department of Defence, DWP 2009, p. 43. In 2008, the Rudd Government proposed the establishment of the Asia–Pacific Community, as a new multilateral forum for dialogue on strategic and economic issues and with membership encompassing the entire region, including the United States. Kim Beazley, ‘The US Asian Pivot and the Australian Role (part 2)’, Strategist, 31 March 2016, accessed at http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us-asian-pivot-and-australias-role-part-2/. Department of Defence, DWP 2009, p. 43. Department of Defence, 2016 DWP, p. 69. Department of Defence, DWP 2009, p. 43; Department of Defence, DWP 2013, p. 25. Department of Defence, DWP 2013, p. 25. Turnbull, ‘2016 Lowy Lecture’; Department of Defence, 2016 DWP, p. 69. Department of Defence, DWP 2013, p. 25. Department of Defence, 2016 DWP, pp. 68–9. ibid. Gill, ‘The US–Australia Alliance’, p. 100. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘China Fact Sheet’, December 2015, accessed at http://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/Documents/chin.pdf. Malcolm Turnbull, ‘Remarks to the Australia China Business Council Networking Function’, 2 March 2016, accessed at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2016-03-02/remarks-australia-china-business-council-networking-function; Turnbull, ‘2016 Lowy Lecture’. Turnbull, ‘Remarks to the Australia China Business Council Networking Function’; Dobell, ‘Great Australian Foreign Policy Speeches’. Medcalf, ‘The Balancing Kangaroo’, p. 115. Bob Carr, ‘Transcript of Press Conference’, 14 May 2012, accessed at http://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/Pages/2012/bc_tr_120514.aspx?w=SXqMAEY78kBkexjgKl1cQg%3D%3D; Bob Carr, ‘Australia in the China Century Conference’, 14 September 2012, accessed at http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2012/bc_sp_120914.html. Timothy Heath, ‘China and the US Alliance System’, Diplomat, 11 June 2014, accessed at http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-u-s-alliance-system/. Carr, Diary of a Foreign Minister, p. 52. Dewar, Australia and China and the United States, p. 6. Bob Carr, ‘Australia’s Foreign Policy Directions’, 26 June 2013, accessed at http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2013/bc_sp_130626.html. Mark Kenny and Phillip Wen, ‘Tony Abbott Refuses to Back Down over China Comments’, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 November 2013, accessed at http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/tony-abbott-refuses-to-backdown-over-china-comments-20131128-2ydw1.html. Malcolm Turnbull, ‘Australia and the United States: New Responsibilities for an Enduring Partnership’, 18 January 2016, accessed at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2016-01-18/australia-and-united-states-new-responsibilities-enduringpartnership; Turnbull, ‘Remarks to the Australia China Business Council Networking Function’. Department of Defence, 2016 DWP, p. 44. Department of Defence, 2013 DWP, p. 11. Medcalf, ‘The Balancing Kangaroo’, p. 120. ibid.; Julia Gillard, ‘Transcript of Q&A with China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong’, 8 April 2013, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. Medcalf, Balancing Kangaroo, p. 122. For Beijing’s concerns, see Carr, Diary of a Foreign Minister, p. 41; Gillard, My Story, p. 160. Gillard, ‘Transcript of Doorstop Interview’. Carr, ‘Australia in the China Century Conference’. Bob Carr, ‘Transcript of Press Conference in Shanghai’, 12 May 2012, accessed at

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

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94 95 96

97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107

http://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/Pages/2012/bc_tr_120512.aspx?w=SXqMAEY78kBkexjgKl1cQg%3D%3D. Bob Carr, ‘Transcript of Press Conference’, 14 May 2012. Gillard, My Story, pp. 173–4. Department of Defence, DWP 2009, p. 94; Gillard, My Story, p. 158. Kim Beazley, ‘The US Asian Pivot and the Australian Role (part 1)’, Strategist, 30 March 2016, accessed at http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us-asian-pivot-and-australias-role-part-1/. ‘Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations 2011 Joint Communiqué’, 15 September 2011, accessed at http://dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/ausmin-joint-communique-2011.aspx. Department of Defence, 2016 DWP, pp. 121, 123. Gill, ‘The US–Australia Alliance’, p. 105. On shared interests in freedom of navigation, the author drew on interviews with former US officials. Interview with Bleich; Interview with Michele Flournoy, 22 September 2014. For other shared interests, see David Johnston, ‘Address to the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia’, 9 October 2014, accessed at http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2014/10/09/address-to-the-american-chamber-of-commerce-in-australia/; ‘AUSMIN 2010 Joint Communiqué’, 8 November 2010, accessed at http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2010/kr_mr_101108.aspx?ministerid=2. The White House, ‘Prime Minister Gillard and President Obama Announce Force Posture Initiatives’, 16 November 2011, accessed at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/16/prime-minister-gillard-and-presidentobama-announce-force-posture-init-0. Interview with Shawn Brimley, 22 September 2014; Interview with Flournoy. Interview with Brimley. ‘Australia–United States Space Situational Awareness Partnership’, 8 November 2010, accessed at http://dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/australia-united-states-space-situational-awarenesspartnership.aspx; ‘Joint Statement on Cyberspace’, 15 September 2011, accessed at http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2011/kr_mr_110916a.aspx?ministerid=2. Gill, ‘The US–Australian Alliance’, pp. 102–10. Department of Defence, DWP 2016, pp. 33–4; Kim Beazley, ‘DWP 16: A Throwback to a Harder Era’, Strategist, 2 March 2016, accessed at http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/dwp-2016-a-throwback-to-a-harder-era/. Interview with Bleich; Interview with Brian Harding, 18 September 2014; Carr, Diary of a Foreign Minister, p. 28. Saunders, ‘China’s Rising Power’, p. 38; Carr, Diary of a Foreign Minister, p. 41. Interview with Flournoy; Interview with Bleich. ‘Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations 2011 Joint Communiqué’. Interview with Bleich; Interview with Harding. Interview with Bleich. Interview with Harding. Turnbull, ‘2016 Lowy Lecture’. Marise Payne, ‘Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea’, 27 October 2015, accessed at http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/10/27/minister-for-defence-statement-freedom-of-navigation-in-the-southchina-sea/.

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Interviews Interview with David Ambrose, 10 September 2007. Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 1 August 2007. Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 3 August 2007. Interview with anonymous former Australian official, 12 August 2008. Interview with anonymous former US official, 23 September 2008. Interview with anonymous former US official, 24 September 2008. Interview with Peter Bailey, 12 April 2007. Interview with Chris Barrie, 20 August 2008. Interview with Kim Beazley, 14 June 2007. Interview with Allan Behm, 22 August 2008. Interview with Jeffrey Bleich, 10 August 2014. Interview with John Bowan, 18 September 2007. Interview with Richard Brabin-Smith, 18 July 2007. Interview with Shawn Brimley, 22 September 2014. Interview with Michael Costello, 5 September 2007. Interview with Paul Dibb, 19 July 2007. Interview with Alexander Downer, 11 March 2008. Interview with Gareth Evans, 18 July 2014. Interview with Stephen FitzGerald, 2 May 2007. Interview with Philip Flood, 20 September 2007. Interview with Michele Flournoy, 22 September 2014. Interview with Graham Freudenberg, 27 July 2007. Interview with Ross Garnaut, 29 August 2007.

Interview with Allan Gyngell, 29 February 2008. Interview with Stuart Harris, 16 July 2007. Interview with Bob Hawke, 24 July 2007. Interview with Brian Harding, 18 September 2014. Interview with Bill Hayden, 30 July 2007. Interview with Sandy Hollway, 19 September 2007. Interview with John Howard, 15 July 2008. Interview with Ron Huisken, 20 September 2007. Interview with Paul Kelly, 25 July 2007. Interview with Douglas Paal, 16 September 2008. Interview with James Przystup, 23 September 2008. Interviews with David Sadleir, 2 and 17 July 2007. Interview with Brent Scowcroft, 23 September 2008. Interview with Randall Schriver, 26 September 2008. Interview with David Shambaugh, 15 September 2008. Interview with Andrew Shearer, 15 July 2008. Interview with George Shultz, 30 September 2008. Interview with Michael Thawley, 26 September 2008. Interview with Eric Walsh, 12 June 2007. Interviews with Hugh White, 5 September 2007 and 15 August 2008.

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Speeches and Press Releases Beazley, Kim C (ed.), Compendium of Speeches by the Hon Kim C Beazley, MP, Minister for Defence, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1989. Bush, George, ‘The President’s News Conference’, 27 June 1989, accessed at https://bush41library.tamu.edu/?id=607&year=&month. Carr, Bob, ‘ASPI Conference on Maritime Confidence–building Measures in the South China Sea’, 12 August 2013, accessed at http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2013/bc_sp_130812.html. —‘Australia’s Foreign Policy Directions’, 26 June 2013, accessed at http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2013/bc_sp_130626.html. —‘Australia in the China Century Conference’, 14 September 2012, accessed at http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2012/bc_sp_120914.html. —‘Transcript of Press Conference’, 14 May 2012, accessed at http://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/Pages/2012/bc_tr_120514.aspx? w=SXqMAEY78kBkexjgKl1cQg%3D%3D. —‘Transcript of Press Conference in Shanghai’, 12 May 2012, accessed at http://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/Pages/2012/bc_tr_120512.aspx? w=SXqMAEY78kBkexjgKl1cQg%3D%3D. Deakin, Alfred, ‘Speech by the Honourable AD, MP, Prime Minister, on Defence Policy’, 13 December 1907, J Kemp, Melbourne, 1907. —‘A National Policy Speech: Australia for the Australians’, 18 May 1906, Sands and McDougall, Melbourne, 1906. —‘Imperial Federation: An Address Delivered by Alfred Deakin MP at the Annual Meeting of the Imperial Federation League of Victoria’, 14 June 1905, Echo Publishing, North Fitzroy, Victoria 1905. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations 2011 Joint Communique’, 15 September 2011, accessed at http://dfat.gov.au/geo/unitedstates-of-america/ausmin/Pages/ausmin-joint-communique-2011.aspx. —‘Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations Joint Communique 2005’, 17–18 November 2005, accessed at https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/ausmin/ausmin05_joint_communique.html. —‘Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations Joint Communique 2004’, 7 July 2004, accessed at https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/ausmin/ausmin04_joint>communique.html. —‘Sydney Statement Joint Security Declaration’, 26 July 1996, accessed at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/ausmin/sydney_statement.html. Downer, Alexander, ‘Media Conference, Beijing’, 17 August 2004, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. —‘Asia-Pacific Security: Practical Cooperation in an Asian Context’, 19 September 1996, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA.

—‘Australia and China: Engagement and Cooperation’, 10 September 1997, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. —‘Australia and the United States—A Vital Friendship’, 29 May 1996, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. —‘Australia and China: A Partnership in Growth’, 21 April 1997, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. —‘Australia and Asia: Taking the Long View’, 11 April 1996, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. Evans, Gareth, ‘Alliances and Change’, 9 October 1990, Edward A Clark Center for Australian Studies, Austin, TX, 1990. Gillard, Julia, ‘Transcript of Q&A with China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong’, 8 April 2013, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. —‘Transcript of Doorstop Interview’, 6 April 2013, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. Hawke, Bob, ‘The Challenge of Change in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1988. Howard, John, ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister, the Hon John Howard MP, Interview with Neil Mitchell, Radio 3AW,’ 20 August 2004, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. —‘Address to the Asialink–ANU National Forum: Australia’s Engagement with Asia’, 13 August 2004, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. —‘Transcript of the Prime Minister, the Hon John Howard MP, Address to the Houses of the Parliament of Australia’, 24 October 2003, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. —‘Australia’s International Relations: Ready for the Future’, 22 August 2001, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. —‘Address at the Reception to Mark the 25th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between Australia and China’, 17 December 1997, courtesy of the Australian Parliamentary Library (APL). —‘Transcript of the Address by the Hon John Howard MP, Dinner Hosted by the Foreign Policy Association’, 30 June 1997, accessed at http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/1997/fpa.html. —‘Radio Interview—ABC Programme’, 26 June 1997, accessed through Pandora Archive, NLA. —‘Australia and Asia: An Enduring Engagement’, 8 May 1997, courtesy of APL. —‘Press Conference, Diaoyutai State Guest House’, Beijing, China, 1 April 1997, APL. Lyons, JA, ‘Defence Aspects of the Imperial Conference: Australian Position’, 28 July 1937, HJ Green, Melbourne, 1937. Menzies, RG, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations in International Affairs’, 26 June 1950, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney, 1950. Parkhill, Archdale, ‘The Imperial Conference 1937. Defence Aspect’, 29 July 1937, HJ Green, Melbourne, 1937.

—‘The Imperial Conference 1937—Its Importance to Australian Defence’, 11 March 1937, HJ Green, Melbourne, 1937. —‘The International Situation in Relation to Defence’, 4 February 1936, HJ Green, Melbourne, 1936. —‘Statement of the Government’s Policy Regarding the Defence of Australia’, 2 December 1935, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1935. Rudd, Kevin, ‘Australia, the United States and the Asia–Pacific Region’, 31 March 2008, accessed at http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/events/2008/3/31australia/20080331_australia.pdf. Smith, Ric, ‘Looking Forward by Looking Back: Reflections on China 1996–2000’, 13 April 2006, accessed at http://www.defence.gov.au/secretary/speeches/smith/speech20060413.htm. Turnbull, Malcom ‘2016 Lowy Lecture’, 23 March 2016, accessed at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2016-03-23/2016-lowy-lecture. —‘Remarks to the Australia China Business Council Networking Function’, 2 March 2016, accessed at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2016-03-02/remarks-australia-china-businesscouncil-networking-function. —‘Australia and the United States: New Responsibilities for an Enduring Partnership’, 18 January 2016, accessed at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2016-01-18/australia-and-unitedstates-new-responsibilities-enduring-partnership. Whitlam, EG, ‘Opening Address by the Prime Minister, the Hon EG Whitlam, QC, MP’, in Australian Institute of Political Science (ed.), Foreign Policy for Australia: Choices for the Seventies, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1973.

Journal Articles Ayson, Robert, ‘Choosing Ahead of Time? Australia, New Zealand and the US–China Contest in Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 34(3), 2012, pp. 338–64. Ba, Alice, ‘Who’s Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations’, The Pacific Review, 19(2), 2006, pp. 157–79. Brown, Kerry and Bretherton, Hannah, ‘Australian Relations with China and the USA: The Challenge of Grand Strategies’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 70(1), 2016, pp. 1–5. Casey, RG, ‘Australia in World Affairs’, Australian National Review, 2(7), 1937, pp. 2–12. Cha, Victor, ‘Engaging North Korea Credibly’, Survival, 42(2), 2000, pp. 136–55. —‘Engaging China: Seoul–Beijing Détente and Korean Security’, Survival, 41(1), 1999, pp. 73–98. Curran, James, ‘The Dilemmas of Divergence: The Crisis in American–Australian Relations, 1972–75’, Diplomatic History, 38(2), 2014, pp. 377–409. Deng, Yong, ‘Hegemony on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on US Global Strategy’,

Political Science Quarterly, 116(3), 2001, pp. 343–65. Dyson, Stephen, ‘Alliances, Domestic Politics, and Leader Psychology: Why did Britain Stay out of Vietnam and Go into Iraq?’, Political Psychology, 28(6), 2007, pp. 647–66. Friedberg, Aaron, ‘The Future of US–China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?’, International Security, 30(2), 2005, pp. 7–45. Goh, Evelyn, ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analysing Regional Security Strategies’, International Security, 32(3), 2007–08, pp. 113–57. Goldstein, Avery, ‘The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging Choice’, China Quarterly, 168(December), 2001, pp. 835–64. Grimshaw, Charles, ‘Australian Nationalism and the Imperial Connection, 1900–1914’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 3(2), 1958, pp. 161–82. Haass, Richard, and O’Sullivan, Meghan, ‘Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies’, Survival, 42(2), Summer 2000, pp. 113–35. Huxley, Tim and Schreer, Benjamin, ‘Standing Up to China’, Survival, 57(6), 2015, pp. 127– 44. Ikenberry, G John and Kupchan, Charles A, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, International Organization, 44(3), 1990, pp. 283–315. Keohane, Robert O, ‘The Big Influence of Small Allies’, Foreign Policy, 2(Spring), 1971, pp. 161–82. —‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, International Organisation, 23(2), 1969, pp. 291–310. Kim, Woosang, ‘Alliance Transitions and Great Power War’, American Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 1991, pp. 833–50. Krasner, Stephen D, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Organization, 36(2), 1982, pp. 185–206. Kugler, Jacek, Tammen, Ronald; and Effird, Brian, ‘Integrating Theory and Policy: Global Implications of the War in Iraq’, International Studies Review, 6(4), 2004, pp. 163–79. Labs, Eric, ‘Do Weak States Bandwagon?’, Security Studies, 1(3), 1992, pp. 383–416. Lowe, David, ‘Brave New Liberal: Percy Spender’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 51(3), 2005, pp. 389–99. Lynch, Marc, ‘Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement’, European Journal of International Relations, 8(2), 2002, pp. 187–230. McHenry, Dean and Rosecrance, Richard, ‘The “Exclusion” of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS Pact’, International Organisation, 12(3), 1958, pp. 320–9. McLean, David, ‘ANZUS Origins: A Reassessment’, Australian Historical Studies, 24(94), 1990, pp. 64–82. Manicom, James and O’Neil, Andrew, ‘Accommodation, Realignment, or Business as Usual? Australia’s Response to a Rising China’, Pacific Review, 23(1), 2010, pp. 23–44. Meaney, Neville, ‘Look Back in Fear: Percy Spender, the Japanese Peace Treaty and the ANZUS Pact’, Japan Forum, 15(3), 2003, pp. 399–410.

—‘“A Proposition of the Highest International Importance”: Alfred Deakin’s Pacific Agreement Proposal and its Significance for Australian–Imperial Relations’, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 5(3), 1967, pp. 200–13. Medcalf, Rory, ‘The Balancing Kangaroo: Australia and Chinese Power’, Issues and Studies, 50(3), 2014, pp. 103–135. Medeiros, Evan, ‘Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability’, Washington Quarterly, 29(1), 2005–06, pp. 145–67. Megaw, M Ruth, ‘Australia and the Anglo-American Trade Agreement, 1938’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 3(2), 1975, pp. 191–211. —‘Australia and the Great White Fleet 1908’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, 56(2), 1970, pp. 121–33. Morrow, James D, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances’, American Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 1991, pp. 904–33. —‘On the Theoretical Basis of a Measure of National Risk Attitudes’, International Studies Quarterly, 31(4), 1987, pp. 423–38. Nixon, Richard, ‘Asia After Viet Nam’, Foreign Affairs, 46(1), 1967, pp. 111–25. O’Brien, John B, ‘Empire v. National Interests in Australian-British Relations During the 1930s’, Historical Studies, 22(89), 1987, pp. 569–86. Pfetsch, Frank and Landau, Alice, ‘Symmetry and Asymmetry in International Negotiations’, International Negotiation, 5(1), 2000, pp. 21–42. Pitty, Roderic, ‘Way Behind in Following the USA over China’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 51(3), 2005, pp. 440–50. Rapkin, David and Thompson, William, ‘Power Transition, Challenge, and the (Re)Emergence of China’, International Interactions, 29(4), 2003, pp. 315–42. Risse, Thomas, ‘“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, 54(1), 2000, pp. 1–39. Ross, Robert, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies, 15(3), 2006, pp. 355–95. Saunders, Phillip C, ‘China’s Rising Power, the US Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for US-China Relations’, Issues and Studies, 50(3), 2014, pp. 19–55. —‘China’s America-Watchers: Changing Attitudes towards the United States’, China Quarterly, 161(March), 2000, pp. 41–65. Schweller, Randall, and Wohlforth, William, ‘Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War’, Security Studies, 9(3), 2000, pp. 60–107. Shambaugh, David, ‘Asia in Transition: The Evolving Regional Order’, Current History, 105(690), 2006, pp. 153–9. —‘Sino-American Strategic Relations’, Survival, 42(1), 2000, pp. 97–115. Tow, Shannon R, ‘Diplomacy in an Asymmetric Alliance: Reconciling Sino-Australian Relations with ANZUS, 1971–2007’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 12(1), 2012, pp. 71–100.

Walt, Stephen M, ‘Alliances in a Unipolar World’, World Politics, 61(1), 2009, pp. 86–120. —‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, Survival, 39(1), 1997, pp. 156–79. Waters, Christopher, ‘Casey: Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign Policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 51(3), 2005, pp. 380–8. Wendt, Alexander, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, 46(2), 1992, pp. 391–425. White, Hugh, ‘Power Shift: Australia’s Future Between Washington and Beijing’, Quarterly Essay, 39, 2010, pp. 1–74. —‘The Limits to Optimism: Australia and the Rise of China’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59(4), 2005, pp. 469–80. Whitlam, Gough, ‘Sino-Australian Diplomatic Relations 1972–2002’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 56(3), 2002, pp. 323–36.

Books and Book Chapters Albinski, Henry, Australian Attitudes and Policies towards China, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1965. Attard, Bernard, ‘Financial Diplomacy’, in Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (eds), Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation to the Second World War, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2000, pp. 111–32. Ball, Desmond, and Kerr, Pauline, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia–Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1996. Barclay, Glen St. John, Friends in High Places: Australian-American Diplomatic Relations since 1945, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1985. Barker, Geoffrey, ‘The Howard-Downer Legacy: Global Deputy, Regional Sheriff’ in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006–2010, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, Victoria, 2012, pp. 13–31. Barnett, Michael, ‘Identity and Alliances in the Middle East’, in Peter J Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 400–47. Baylis, John, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939–1984: The Special Relationship, Macmillan, London, 1984. Beale, Howard, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1956. Beaumont, Joan, Waters, Christopher; Lowe, David and Woodard, Gary, Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 2003. Beazley, Kim C, ‘The Hawke Years: Foreign Affairs and Defence’, in Susan Ryan and Troy Bramston (eds), The Hawke Government: A Critical Retrospective, Pluto Press, Melbourne, 2003, pp. 347–66.

Behm, Allan, ‘Australia’s Strategic Options in the US–China relationship’, in David Lovell (ed.), Asia-Pacific Security: Policy Challenges, ANU E-press, Canberra, 2003, pp. 47–60. Bell, Coral, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1984. Bird, David, JA Lyons, the Tame Tasmanian: Appeasement and Rearmament in Australia, 1932–39, Australian Scholarly Publishing, North Melbourne, Victoria, 2008. Bramston, Troy, ‘The Whitlam Government Through the Cabinet Papers’, in Troy Bramston (ed.), The Whitlam Legacy, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2013, pp. 96–111. Bridge, Carl (ed.), Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 1991. Bush, George HW, and Scowcroft, Brent, A World Transformed, Knopf, New York, 1998. Camilleri, Joseph A, Australian–American Relations: The Web of Dependence, Macmillan, South Melbourne, Victoria, 1980. Casey, RG, Friends and Neighbours: Australia and the World, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1954. —‘Australia’s Voice in Imperial Affairs’, in WGK Duncan (ed.), Australia’s Foreign Policy, Angus and Robertson/Australian Institute of Political Science, Sydney, 1938, pp. 36–68. Chang, Gordon H, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union 1948–1972, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1990. Cameron, Clyde, China, Communism and Coca Cola, Hill of Content, Melbourne, 1980. Carr, Bob, Diary of a Foreign Minister, NewSouth, Sydney, 2014. Commonwealth of Australia, Advancing the National Interest, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003. —Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2000. —In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1997. —Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994. —The Defence of Australia, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987. Cooper, Andrew; Higgott, Richard and Nossal, Kim, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 1993. Curran, James, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 2015. —The Power of Speech, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 2004. Darby, Philip, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–68, Oxford University Press, London, 1973. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2016. —Defence White Paper 2013, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2013.

—Defending Australia in the Asia–Pacific Century: Force 2030, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2009. —Australia’s Strategic Policy, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1997. —Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1992. Dewar, Scott, Australia and China and the United States: Responding to Changing Great Power Dynamics, Australian National University (ANU) College of Asia and the Pacific, Canberra, 2010. Dibb, Paul, ‘The Self–Reliant Defence of Australia: The History of an Idea’, in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds), History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, 167, ANU E-Press, Canberra, 2007. —Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities: Report for the Minister for Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986. Doran, Stuart, and Lee, David (eds), Australia and Recognition of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1972, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2002. Edwards, Peter, Permanent Friends? Lowy Institute, Double Bay, NSW, 2005. Esthus, Raymond, From Enmity to Alliance: US–Australian Relations, 1931–41, University of Washington Press, Seattle, WA, 1964. Evans, Gareth, Making Australian Foreign Policy, Australian Fabian Society, Melbourne, 1989. Evans, Gareth and Grant, Bruce, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 1991. Fearon, James and Wendt, Alexander, ‘Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations, Sage Publications, London, 2002. Flood, Philip, Dancing with Warriors, Arcadia, North Melbourne, Victoria, 2011. —‘Regional Diplomacy and the Alliance: A DFAT Perspective’, in William T Tow (ed.), Australian–American Relations: Looking Toward the Next Century, St Martin’s, New York, 1998. FitzGerald, Stephen, Talking with China: The Australian Labour Party Visit and Peking’s Foreign Policy, ANU Press, Canberra, 1972. Fitzsimmons, Peter, Beazley, Harper Collins Publishers, Sydney, 1999. Fraser, Malcom, with Roberts, Cain, Dangerous Allies, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 2014. Friedberg, Aaron, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895– 1905, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1988. Freudenberg, Graham, ‘Aspects of Foreign Policy’, in Hugh Emy, Owen Hughes and Race Mathews (eds), Whitlam Re-visited: Policy Development, Policies and Outcomes, Pluto Press, Leichhardt, NSW, 1993, pp. 200–09. —A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam in Politics, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1977.

Fruhling, Stephan (ed.), A History of Australian Strategic Policy since 1945, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009. Fry, Greg (ed.), Australia’s Regional Security, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1991. Garnaut, Ross, ‘Sino-Australian Economic Relations, 1983–95’, in Colin Mackerras (ed.), Australia and China: Partners in Asia, Macmillan, South Melbourne, Victoria, 1996, pp. 69–89. —Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989. Gill, Bates, ‘The US–Australia Alliance: A Deepening Partnership in Emerging Asia’, in Ashley Tellis, Abraham Denmark; and Greg Chaffin (eds), Strategic Asia 2014–15: US Alliances and Partnerships National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, WA, 2014. Gillard, Julia, My Story, Bantam Press, London, 2014. Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981. Goh, Evelyn, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. —Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. Goldstein, Avery, ‘Parsing China’s Rise’, in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng (eds), China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2008, pp. 55–86. Goldstein, Judith, and Keohane, Robert O (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1993. Goldstein, Lyle, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US–China Rivalry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2015. Goldsworthy, David, Losing the Blanket: Australia and The End of the British Empire, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 2002. —‘Regional Relations’, in David Goldsworthy and Peter Edwards (eds), Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 2001, pp. 130–77. Grant, Bruce, Fatal Attraction: Reflections on the Alliance with the United States, Black Inc., Melbourne, 2004. Greenwood, Gordon, and Grimshaw, Charles (eds), Documents on Australian International Affairs, 1901–1918, Thomas Nelson, West Melbourne, Victoria, 1977. Grey, Sir Edward, Twenty-five Years, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1925. Griffiths, Billy, The China Breakthrough: Whitlam in the Middle Kingdom 1971, Monash University Press, Clayton, Victoria, 2012. Harper, Norman, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study in Australian–American Relations Between 1900 and 1975, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1987. Harris, Stuart, Will China Divide Australia and the US?, Australian Centre for American

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Index

Note: References to notes at the end of each chapter are in italics and give page number only. Abbott Government foreign policy, 302, 303, 311 Acheson, Dean, 141, 142 alliances as complex institutions, 37 defined, 12 and identity, 36, 48 alliance security dilemma, 25, 26, 27, 93, 94 ALP defence policy: continental defence, 175; support for ANZUS, 174, 223 defence policy in government, 178 and engagement with rising China, 174, 176–7, 179–80, 181–2, 188, 190; delegation visit to China, 15, 165–6, 168, 173, 176, 180, 183, 184, 198 foreign policy: opposition to Vietnam War, 174; strategic concerns, 174 Amery, Leopold, 74 anti-Comintern Pact, 95 Armitage, Richard, 264 Asia–Pacific, 4, 6, 7, 23, 78 and evolving regional order, power dynamics, 294, 296, 297, 298, 302, 304–5; and territorial claims, 304, 306, 313, 322 multipolar power structure in, 170, 171; after Cold War, 251 reconceptualised as Indo–Pacific region, 305–6, 307; and Australia’s strategic interests, 310, 317 regional security post–Vietnam War, 172, 204, 217, 305, 310–11; APEC, 225, 238, 239, 245, 251, 254; ASEAN, 306; ASEAN Regional Forum, 238, 245, 251, 256; and China, 238, 239, 256; and Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), 178, 218; SEATO, 187; and Southeast Asia, 174, 178, 218, 252, 293, 305, 311; and US presence, 204, 208, 219, 225, 245, (commitment), 241–2, 248, 249, 251, 305–6, 307 and rise of China, 4, 5, 6, 11, 238–9; growing influence in region, 3, 167, 204, 239, 241, 243, 260, 294, 305–6; impact of Tiananmen crackdown, 206–7 Australia economy: credit crisis of 1920s, 87; vulnerability in 1930s, 94, 97 Immigration Restriction Act 1901, 60 nationalism in, 189 and postwar communist threats, 125, 132–3, 139, 167; and Cold War, 127, 132 Australia: foreign and defence policy alliance with dominant powers, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10–11, 12, 294; and alliance loyalty, 12, 70, 167, 168, 186, 188, 190, 267, 282, 288, 295, 318; and Australia’s strategic interests, 285, (presence of ally in region), 282, 285, 286, 287, 290, 296, 310, (regional stability), 287, 290, 310; changes over time, 9, 187, 190, 262, 267; as independent ally, 13, 189–90, 280, 282, 284, 290, 292, 293, 295; and shared heritage, values, 40–1, 57–8, 282; and understandings of alliance contribution, 8, 41, 168, 186, 296, (changes), 227, 228, 230, 237, 289, 290, 291, 293 building an Australian navy, 70, 72–3 decision-making in, 7, 9, 11, 29–30, 36, 38, 53, 94, 103, 286, 292; role of prime ministers, 14, 15, 51–2, 53, 57, 64, 112, 112–13, 152, 190, 200, 280, 282, 283–4, 287, 288, 289, 290, 308, 321 defence policy in 1940s–1950s, 121; continental defence, 158; forward defence, 133, 158, 186; defence policy in 1960s–1970s, 169, 178, (and changing strategic dynamics), 170–1, 172, 174; and Cold War, 169; and

independent regional role, 168; and military strength, 174–5 defence policy in 1980s–1990s: defence self-reliance, 203, 212, 225, 226, 234, 262, 296, (limits of), 211, 234; and Dibb Review, 211; and security issues, 210–11, 235, 251–2 defence policy in 2000s and beyond, 248, 296–7, 302, 307, 308, 317, 319; and location in Indo–Pacific, 306, 310; and strategic interests, 281, 304, 309–11; and strength of United States, 305 Defence Statements (Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997), 241, 245, 247, 252, 310 Defence White Papers, 38, 211, 234, 243, 310, 268, 269; (2009), 302, 304, 305, 310; (2013), 310, 311, 313; (2016), 296, 297, 304–5, 307, 310 engagement with rising powers, 3, 4, 7, 11, 14, 29, 51, 320; factors determining engagement, 7–8, 12, 14, 36–7, 41–2, 286, 287, 290, (Australia’s interests), 283, 284–5, 286–7, 288, 291, 292, (non-adversarial great power relationship), 282, 285, 291, 292, 295, (shared understanding of engagement/relationship), 287, 293; and independent policy, 42, 152, 293, 295, 296; and alliances with great powers, 124, 144, 145, 150–1, 153, 239–40, 267, 283, 284, 291, 295, (influence on policy), 36–7, 41, 42, 43, 280, 285–6, 288, 291, 294–5, 296; phases of engagement, 9–10, 14, 15, (disengagement), 287 Foreign Affairs White Paper (1997), 257 foreign policy perspectives, 12–13, 18, 172, 187–8, 242, 294–6, 302, 303; regional security, 203, 250–1, 257 reconciling independent interests with alliance imperatives, 8, 13, 29, 37, 167, 168, 288, 295 responses to power shift/transition and Australian policy, 57, 91–2, 128–9, 130, 150, 207, 239, 245, 248, 260, 280, 281, 302, 309–10 Australia: relationship with China as rising power ALP’s view of China, 178, 193; as potentially benign power, 179–83, 191; and shared expectations, 183–4 Australian policymakers’ view of China, 11; in 1960s and early 1970s, 169, 170, 171, 179, 180, 181, 295; as rising power, 171, 205, 206, 207, 213–14, 256, 269, (as economic power), 304, (and Sino–American relations, power relativities), 219, 220, 241 China–Australia Free Trade Agreement, 302, 309, 311 Coalition governments’ views/policies on China to 1972, 167, 173, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 186, 191, 208, 295; trade, 176–7 engagement, developing cooperative relationship, 4, 11, 14, 29, 42, 155, 181, 184, 189–90, 191, 192, 200, 290, 321; and Australia’s strategic interests, 178, 180, 182–3, 184, 202, 217, 219, 238, 249, 286; difficulties in 1990s, 238–9; evolution after recognition of China, 200, 230; political and economic relationship, 15, 200, 227, 286; as reversal of longstanding policy, 167 growing importance of China, 3, 200, 231 framework for relationship since 1996, 239, 255, 258, 259; and Australia’s strategic interests, 260, 261, 267, 296, 307, 308, (ANZUS alliance), 313–14, 315, 318, 319; economic ties, 309, 311; engagement strategy, 260, 267, 302, 303, 306, 308, 309, 313, 318, 319; hedging elements in Australian approach, 308; recognising China as strategic regional power, 239, 241, 242–3, 296, (and peaceful rise), 313; and Sino–American relations, 267–8, 306, 308, 309–10, 312, 320; and Sino–Australian defence cooperation, 302, 319; ‘strategic partnership’, 302, 314–15, 320; tensions in relationship, 302, 306, 309, 313, 314 and shared expectations of relationship, 202, 228–9, 313–14, 315, 320; breakdown in, 213, 214, 215, 287; under Howard, 259, 266–7, (dealing with differences), 259–60 understanding Australia’s shift to engagement, 166, 176; domestic politics, 166, 167, 171, 172, 173, 176–7 see also ALP; Hawke Government; Howard Government; Whitlam; Whitlam Government Australia–Great Britain alliance, 4, 14, 29 Australian attempts to foster cooperation between empire and United States in Pacific, 67–8, 69–70, 75, 84 and Australian contribution to alliance, 72–3, 87, 107, 108, 110, 112, 125, 154, 289; postwar, 147, 149, 150, 154, 186, 290 and Australia’s relations with United States, 40–1, 42, 75, 280, 290; Australian policy of close relationship, 51, 52, 64–6

British reservations about: Australian proposals, 53, 72, 75; invitation to US fleet to visit Australia, 51–2, 54, 59, 71, 74–5, 154; Pacific pact (ANZUS Treaty), 15, 123, 124, 125, 131–2, 134, 135, 144–5, 149, 152, 154; trade diversion policy, 86, 87–8, 154, 291 close connection of Australia with empire, 51, 53, 63, 69, 289, (cultural identification), 57–8; and Australian interests, 54, 55, 57, 66, (British-led regional order, security), 56, 58, 60, 61, 62–3, 64, 65, 69, 70, 87, 101, 104, 105, (fears of abandonment), 291, (importance of empire to Australia), 61, 76, 87, 154; extent of alignment with British policies, preferences, 55, 61, 66, 69, 74, 76, 87, 154, 291; foreign affairs under British control, 51, 53, 57, 75, 78, (Statute of Westminster), 106, 135; and trade, 55, 58, 71, 87, 89, 92, 94, 106, 107–8, 109, 122, 134 postwar, 121, 125, 188; and Australia’s strategic interests, 128, 133, 134, 135, 148, 153, 282; benefits to Australia of British Commonwealth, 124, 127, 133; and diminished capacity of Britain, 125, 126, 127, 129, 282; importance of imperial relationship, 123–4, 126, 129, 133–4, 136, 154, (cultural identification), 129, 145, (fears of abandonment), 132, 134 thinking of Australian policymakers, 51, 54, 56, 58, 87, 108, 110, 112; (in postwar era), 137, 144–5 and WWII, 121, 128; implications for Australia’s security, 135 see also Deakin; Great Britain; Lyons; Menzies Government Australia–United States relationship ANZUS alliance, 122, 154, (bipartisan support in Australia), 167, 172, 267, 314; alliance modernised, deepened, 3, 4, 15, 239, 240, 261, 267, 306, 317, 320; and Australian contribution to alliance, 168, 186, 187–8, 190, 192, 203, 210, 212, 224, 225, 227, 230, 234, 240, 263, 265, 267, 297, 316, 318, (ADF interoperability with US forces), 261, 262, 317, (contribution to conflicts, military exercises), 261, 263, 317, (defence self-reliance), 203, 212, 225, 226, 227, 230, 262, 264, 290, 296, 317–18, (US deployments in Australia), 302, 305, 306, 316–17; and Australia’s strategic interests, 176, 178, 182–3, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 196, 208, 211, 217, 223, 224, 226, 241–2, 249, 257, 261, 262, 263, 265, 267, 282, 296, 307, 310, 316, 321, (US-led regional order), 136, 172, 174, 177, 207, 209, 244, 245, 271, 297, 306, 310–11; Australia’s satisfaction with, 207, 244, 245; benefits to Australia, 174, 175, 185, 209–10, 211, 245, 248, 249, 261, 302, 307, 318; and changes in US policies, 186, 187, 188; relatively independent Australian policy approach, 152, 168, 188, 189–90, 192, 194, 263, 264, 303, 318, (and China policy), 202, 203, 223, 224, 226–7, 228, 229, 230, 237, 240, 264, 303, 307, 308, 309, 315, 317–19, 320, (and shaping power shift), 321; and intra-alliance bargaining power, 176, 185, 190, 192, 210, 228, 250, 260, 265; joint defence facilities, 39, 175, 185, 196, 210, 225, 226, 233–4, 262, 317; purpose of alliance, 186, 187, 224–5, 240, 265, 316, 320, (evolving purpose), 262, 267, 290, 315–16, 317, 318; recognition of limits to US power, 170, 174; shared values, interests, 23, 172, 188, 207–8, 210, 224, 244, 306–7, 316; shift in 1950s to deeper engagement, 113, 123, 124–5, 130, (political), 122 Australasian Convention, 63 ANZUS Treaty, 15, 38, 42, 51, 122, 130, 152, 265; Great Britain excluded, 138, 140; invoked, 263 reconciling closer relations with China with US alliance from 1971, 155, 166, 167, 168, 172, 174, 176, 184–5, 188–92, 196, 203, 280, 297, (under Hawke), 223, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230–1, (under Howard), 240, 250, 253, 260, 261–2, 264, 265; and US policies, preferences, 173, 186, 203, 208, 209, 224, 303, 309, 315, 318–19 a rising United States and Australia, 4, 11, 14, 29–30, 40–1; and Australian interests, 62, 66–7, 78; Australian shift to engagement, 52–3, 54–5, 59, 68–9, 286; changing dynamics of engagement (1936–37), 84, 88, (grievances against United States), 84–5, 287; friendly but distant, 84, 113; invitation to US naval fleet to visit, 14, 51–2, 57, 62, 74, (reception of fleet), 52; second US fleet visit, 84; and strategic common interests, 86–7; in WWII, 113, 121 a rising United States and Australia postwar, 113; Australian views on United States, 127, 128, 138, 140; irritants in relations, 122; political relationship, 121, 122 see also Deakin; Hawke Government; Howard Government; junior allies; Lyons; Menzies Government; Whitlam Government Barnard, Lance, 165, 172, 174, 175, 178, 185, 196 role in diplomatic recognition of China, 166, 168, 176, 189 Barnett, Michael, 36, 48 Beazley, Kim C, 210, 224, 225, 226, 233 Bell, Coral, 12–13, 18, 42, 294 Bevin, Ernest, 130, 141 Bird, David, 104 Bowan, John, 201 Bridge, Carl, 82 Brown, Winthrop, 188 Bruce, Stanley, 84, 94, 97

Buring, Leo, 103 Burns, Tom, 166 Bush, George HW, 208, 209, 222, 223, 227, 228 administration of, 210 Bush, George W, 3, 247, 264 administration of, 247 Carr, Bob, 308, 312, 313, 314 Casey, Richard in Lyons Government, 86, 94, 95, 97 in Menzies Government, 123, 129, 135, 145 Cha, Victor, 17 Chamberlain, Neville, 109, 110 Chifley Government, 29, 167 and United States, 122, 151 China, 130, 139 communist victory in, 132 Cultural Revolution, 169–70, 180, 181 economy of, 169, 171; growth, 205, 242, 286, 304; and reforms, 205, 206, 213, 219, 220, 222, 256, 286; and trade, 255, 256 diplomatic isolation, 170, 171, 180, 182; and Sino–Soviet split, 169, 179 diplomatic re-engagement, 171, 189, 258; after Tiananmen, 228 and human rights standards, 201, 202, 213–14, 215, 216, 259; engagement on, 228–9; and Hong Kong, 239 military capabilities, 6, 169, 171, 207, 243; strengthened, 242–3, 304 leadership after Tiananmen, 206, 214, 215–16, 220, 221, 256 relationships in Asia–Pacific, 4, 5, 11, 206–7, 219, 261; with Soviet Union, 172, 180, 207, (Sino–Soviet treaty), 132–3 as rising power, 4, 5, 6, 171, 205, 258; as contender to United States in the Asia–Pacific, 6, 11, 208–9, 241, 243, 266, 304; as economic power, 304; and regional influence, 301, 304, 306, 312; as rising strategic power, 238–9, 253–4, 256–7, 266, 268, 296, 297, 304, (pressing claims in East and South China seas), 304, 306, 308, 313, 319 student protests, crackdown in and around Tiananmen Square, 201, 206–7, 211, 214, 215, 221 and US presence in Asia–Pacific, 179, 180, 301; accepts ANZUS, 180, 221; and US alliances, 312 see also Asia–Pacific; Australia; United States Chi Peng-fei, 180, 184 Churchill, Sir Winston, 52, 89 Clinton, Bill, 246 administration of, 246, 261 Cold War, 127, 132, 169, 203, 220 cooperative–competitive relations, See Great Britain as imperial power; United States as global power Creswell, Sir William, 53, 56, 60, 61, 70 Crewe, Lord, 75 Curran, James, 36, 183 Curtin, John appeal to United States in WWII, 121 Deakin, Alfred, 14, 136 as imperial loyalist, 54, 57–8, 62, 63, 69, 70, 76, 77, 153; desire for imperial reforms, evolution, 54, 71–3, 74, 106, 107 engagement with United States, 52–3, 59–60, 62, 66–7, 69–70, 76–8, 82, 84, 111, 124, 153; and British preferences, 58, 66, 68, 69, 71, 75, 76, 77, 78, 111, 154, 283, 288, (and Australian intra-alliance bargaining power), 30, 40, 59, 60, 62, 70, 78; invitation to US fleet to visit, 51–2, 70–1, 75, 76, 78, 283, (motivation), 54, 57, 62, 64, 65–6, 67–8, 73, 74, 76, 77; proposes modified US Monroe Doctrine for Pacific, 52–3, 65, 75, 78, 101, 154, 288; sees United States as supplementing British strength in region, 54, 64, 65, 76, 140, 285; and shared understanding with United States, 68–70, 77 security concerns: decline of British Empire, 55, 57, (reduced commitment to Pacific), 56, 60, 61–2, 63, 69, 76, 78; possible German–Japanese alliance, 54; threat from Japan, 60, 61, 63, 67, 68–9; threat from Germany, 63–4, 67 Deakin Government, 58, 67 Deng Xiaoping, 205, 206, 207, 215, 219

and reform agenda, 222, 286 Dening, Sir Esler, 149 Dibb, Paul, 6 Downer, Alexander as Foreign Minister, 245, 248, 256, 257, 264, 265 Dulles, John Foster, 131, 142, 145, 146, 149 Eagleburger, Lawrence, 209 engagement disengagement, 32, 33, 46, 293 and interests, 38, 293 non-engagement, 33, 34 as strategy, 32–3, 40, 47, 291, 292, 293 Evans, Gareth, 212, 222, 228 as Foreign Minister, 201, 204–5, 208, 209, 213, 214, 216, 226, 233 Evatt, Herbert, 122, 141 Fadden, Arthur, 131 Fanshawe, Sir Arthur, 56, 141 FitzGerald, Stephen, 166, 171, 173, 177, 178, 183, 196 Flood, Philip, 239, 243, 248, 254, 263 Fraser Government, 231 Freudenberg, Graham, 166, 173, 181, 188, 196, 198 Garnaut, Ross, 220 Gascoigne, Sir Alvary, 131 Germany foreign policy, 103; agreements, 95; and Australia, 103 growth of, 55 naval rivalry with Britain, 56, 58, 61, 282 rearmament in 1930s, 89 Gillard, Julia, 302, 313, 314, 316 Gillard Government foreign policy, 302, 303, 308–9; and China, 312, 313–14, 315, 318, 320; and US alliance, 306–7, 314, 315–16 Gilpin, Robert, 297 Global Financial Crisis and Chinese economy, 304 impact on United States, 304, 316 Goh, Evelyn, 23, 24, 172 Goldsworthy, David, 133–4 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 204 Great Britain and Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), 178 Great Britain as imperial power, 4, 11, 55, 56, 61 and Anglo–American power shift, 4, 11, 12, 55, 91, 289, (postwar), 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 135, 136, 145, 150; origins of, 55–6; United States as challenger to British primacy, 53, 102, 283 Anglo–American relationship: British reservations, 52, 53, 59, 76; cooperative–competitive, 29, 44, 52, 58–9, 65, 76, 92, 101, 153, 281, (common interests), 69, 92, 102, 282; and potential for conflict, 57, 65; and trade negotiations, 86, 87, 93, 109, 110, 295; US use of negotiation, arbitration, 103 Anglo–American relationship postwar: close ties, 124, 130, 132, 153, (US coordination with British Commonwealth), 138, 139; differences, 130–1; as partnership, 152; in Pacific, 128, 129, 130, 145, 151, 283; power disparity, 126, 128 Anglo–Japanese alliance, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 75, 76, 84 decline (relative) after WWI, 88–90, 124; and international security, 92–3; and political influence, 88, 90–1; potential threats, 95 and empire, 71, 87; Balfour Declaration, 106; colonial/imperial conferences, 54, 61, 62, 72, 73, 74, 77, 87, 90, 92, 101,

104, 107, 109; and evolution of, 71–3, 106–7; intra-imperial relations, 54, 70, 71, 73–4, 106, 107; Ottawa system, 89, 92, 99, 107, 109, 110; Prime Ministers’ Summit/Conference, 107, 132; Statute of Westminster, 106, 135, 156 and Monroe Doctrine, 75 postwar: and decline, 124, 126, 282; imperial defence arrangements, 125; role in Southeast Asia, 133–4, 147, 149, 285; and use of soft power, 127; withdraws forces east of the Suez/from Southeast Asia, 169, 174, 178 postwar and British Commonwealth, 124, 134, 156, (purpose), 146–7; ANZAM, 147, 159; Defence Ministers’ Meeting of 1951, 134, 146; Prime Ministers Conferences, 132, 147 and WWII: fall of Singapore, 121, 128, 135, 150 see also Australia–Great Britain alliance Grey, Sir Edward, 75 Gullett, Sir Henry in Lyons Government, 85, 86, 89, 94, 97, 98, 99, 102–3 Haass, Richard, 46 Harris, Stuart, 217 Harrison, Eric, 149 Hawke, Bob and closer Sino–Australian relations, 200, 219, 220–1; joint venture projects, 200 personal reaction to Tiananmen crackdown, 201, 202, 213, 214, 224, 228; and popular sentiment, 216 and United States, 208, 218, 223, 233; visits Washington, 209, 222, 227, 228 views on China’s rise, 205–6, 213, 221–2, 235 Hawke Government and ANZUS alliance: importance of, 223, 224–6; and influence on Sino–Australian relations, 217, 220–1, 226, 227, 283, 286, (Australia’s response to Tiananmen), 203, 208, 209–10, 223, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 283; review of ANZUS, 223–4 and cooperative Sino–Australian relationship, 201–2, 216–17, 220, 227, 282, 290, (strategic interests of Australia), 212–13, 216, 219, 221, 222, 223, 228, 229, 230, 231; growth in trade, 222; and ideological, social differences, 207, 220; resumed after Tiananmen, 203, 228–9 defence and foreign policy, 203, 211, 225–6, 229, 264; security issues, initiatives, 211, 218–19 disengagement strategy after Tiananmen Square crackdown, 15, 192, 202–3, 216, 217, 229, 259, 287; aim of measures, 201, 216, 222–3; breakdown in shared expectations, 213, 214, 215, 216, 229, 287; reasons for disengagement, 207, 212, 213, 283; sanctions, cancellations, 201, 202, 209, 213, 215, (removed), 229, 238; as subset of engagement approach, 223, 229–30 view on China’s modernisation, rise, 205, 206, 207, 212, 219, 231; as emerging regional power, 222; on China’s foreign policy, 221 view of United States, 204, 207–8; and commitment to Australia’s security, 212, 217; and US presence in Asia–Pacific, 204–5, 212, 217–18, 223, 229, 230, 233, 244 Holland, Sidney, 128 Hollway, Sandy, 201, 210 Howard, John, 238, 252 and Australia–China relationship, 239, 250, 265, 268; meets Dalai Lama, 239; meets Jiang Zemin, 239, 240, 253, 254, 259; visits Beijing, 239, 255, 256 foreign policy, 3, 263; and values, 244 on United States, 271; and ANZUS, 254–5, 260–1, 263, 268 Howard Government and China as growing strategic power, 238–9, 240, 242–3, 266; perceptions of Chinese foreign policy, 240, 256–7; as potentially benign power, 253, 255–6 and military engagements, 267; campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, 261, 263, 294; and regional conflicts, 263 modernises the ADF, 249, 261, 262 and peace mission to East Timor, 249, 252 and regional security, 249, 250–1, 252; and counter-terrorism, 251; and relations among regional powers, 251–2, 253; in Southwest Pacific, 252–3 relations with China: and Australia’s strategic interests, 249, 250–1, 253, 256, 258, 266, 267, (ANZUS alliance), 253–5, 259, 260, 264–5, 267, 283; engagement, cooperation strategy, 15, 239, 240, 241, 244, 248, 249, 253, 255, 256, 257,

258, 261, 265, 266, 282, 283, 290, (economic), 258, 267, (political), 258–9; freeze on contacts by the Chinese, 239; mending, rebuilding relations, 3, 239; and Sino–American relations, 247, 248, 252, 264–5, 266, 267 and US alliance, 239–40, 245, 251, 257, 262, 264, 267; and Australia’s relations with China, 240, 241, 244, 245–6, 247, 248, 250, 253, 257, 258, 261–2, 266, 283, 286 views of United States, 242, 243, 245; power on the rise, 244; and regional presence, 249, 251, 253, 254, 260, 261, 262, 263, 267, 271 Hu, Stern, 302 Hughes, Billy, 84 Hu Jintao, 3 Hull, Cordell, 84, 99–100 Hunt, Atlee, 53, 63, 66, 70, 73, 74 Hu Yaobang, 200, 206 Ikenberry, John, 23 India, 171, 172, 204 rise of, 205, 310 Indonesia relations with Australia, 252 relations with China, 4 relations with United States, 4 international relations theorists, 8–9, 40 on alliance management, 25–31, 34, 35–6, 37, 39, 59–60, 62, 70, 76, 93–4, 111, 130, 260, 279, 281, 306 and Australian policy, 12, 20, 28, 76, 93–4, 172, 174, 175, 185, 190, 202, 229, 257, 266, 280, 292, 306 on engagement of junior allies with rising powers, 24–5, 130, 279, 293; and times of intense competition, crisis between powers, 294 and hedging, 23–4 middle power theorists, 12, 295, 296 rise of China, 6, 174 and rise and fall of great powers, 19 theoretical assumptions, 5–6, 7, 8–9, 13, 17, 19–20, 21–2, 34, 35–6, 53; about allied–adversarial divide, 21, 22, 25, 39; ‘bandwagoning’, 157, (definitions), 21, 44; challenges to assumptions, 23–4 see also junior allies; power; power transition Jakobson, Linda, 303 Japan alliance with Great Britain, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 75, 76, 84 and Australia, 66, 70, 103, 104; liaison officer in Tokyo, 101; trade policy, 85 peace treaty, 139, 142–3 rise of, 55, 56, 60, 102; and militarist influences, 95 Japan postwar alliance with United States, 24, 293 as regional power, 167, 174, 204, 205, 251; relationship with Australia, 258, 317 relationship with China, 24, 293, 313 Jebb, Richard, 53, 74 Jiang Zemin, 239, 246, 253, 254, 259, 266 Johnston, Alastair, 24 junior allies, 16, 38 deepening relations with alliance partner and with rising power, 4–5, 7, 9, 20, 24, 34, 298 and intra-alliance bargaining power, 29, 34, 38, 288, 292, (explained), 25–6, 27; relationship with alliance partner, 5, 7, 24; and alliance security dilemma, 25, 26, 27, 93, 94; and democratic norms, 23, 40, 41; and fears of abandonment, 26, 27, 38, 93, and impact on policies, 22, 39, 152; and role of power, 23 and power shift, 8–9, 19, 20, 28, 53, 76, 150, 291; and importance of alliances, 19, 279; role of junior allies in, 15, 293 and rising powers, 6, 7, 13, 124, 130; and alliance influence, 25–6, 30, 31, 34–6, 37–8, 40, 76, 130, 260, (acquiescence), 39–40, 41, 42, 189, 190, 192, 203, 209, 288, 293, 303; engagement with, 5, 10, 20–1, 22, 24, 42, 43, 291, 303, 320, (and non-adversarial great power relationship), 280, 285–6, 292, 303; and interests/interest formation, 30–1, 34–6, 38, 60, 292, 298, 303; policymaking, 32, 39–40

see also international relations theorists; power; power transition Kang, David, 6 Keating, Paul, 238, 244 Keating Government, 241, 259 Kennedy, Paul, 88 Kissinger, Henry visits China, 171, 172, 173, 186 Korea, Republic of (ROK) alliance with United States, 4, 24, 293 and Australia, 317 relationship with China, 4, 24, 293 Korean War, 128, 130, 142 Kupchan, Charles, 44 Labs, Eric, 44 Latham, John, 101 Leaver, Richard, 13, 295 Lebow, Richard, 35 Li Peng, 201–2, 206, 215 Liska, George, 22, 39 Lynch, Marc, 17 Lyons, Joseph, 14, 86, 136 and Australian interest in United States, 96; United States as friendly power, 102–3; liaison officer in Washington, 101, 104; security relationship, 84, 85, 87, 96, 100, 105, 112, 115, 124, 153, (United States supplementing Great Britain), 100–1, 102, 103–4, 105, 140; territorial disputes, 103, 118; trade, 84, (differences), 85, 97, 98–100, 103, 287 and Australia’s strategic interests, 87; concern at British strategic decline, 89–90, 95, 107; dependence on Great Britain, 90–1, 94–5, 97, 102, 106, 110–11; loyalty to alliance and empire, 91–2, 104, 105, 110, (strategic focus), 106, 107, 112, (trade), 107, 112, 113, 290; national rearmament efforts, 96, 98, 108; security in Pacific, 95, 101–2, 103–4, 107 and disengagement from United States, 86, 88, 111, 283; as aspect of broader engagement, 97, 100, 112–13, 153; Australian trade diversion policy, 14, 30, 85–7, 88, 93, 96–7, 99, 105–6, 109, 111, 122, 290, 291, (abandoned), 88, 111, 112, 113, 288, 291, 295, (motivation), 91, 97, 98, 100, 108, 112; breakdown in shared expectations on economic relationship, 85, 86, 87, 97, 99–100, 105, 112, 287; and British policies, preferences, 86, 87–8, 91, 93, 97, 98, 105, 108–9, 110, 111, 113, 288, 290, 295, (and intra-alliance bargaining power), 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 112 Lyons Government, 30, 85–6, 90, 92, 97, 98 McMahon, William, 168, 169, 173, 186 McMahon Government foreign policy of, 174; policy on China, 167, 172, 173, 177, 181, 183, 191, 221, 250, (and change in US policy), 186 and the FPDA, 178 and US alliance, 175–6, 186 Mao Zedong, 172 and the Cultural Revolution, 169–70 Maxse, Leopold, 59, 67 Meaney, Neville, 82 Menzies, Robert, 14, 129 on British Commonwealth, 127 in Lyons Government, 93, 108 role in ANZUS Treaty negotiations, 122–3, 150 sees Great Britain and United States as interdependent, 128 Menzies Government (postwar) Australia’s independent interest, 124, 128, 129, 148, 152; negotiating two alliances, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 145, 152, 283 and relationship with Britain and Commonwealth, 124, 125, 127, 129–30, 145, 146, 147–8, 282; and intra-alliance bargaining power, 132, 134–5, 145, 151, 152; and regional security, 136–7, 147, 151 security concerns, 133, 140; and communist threat, 132–3, 136; policy of non-recognition, containment of China, 167

and shift to engagement with United States, 122, 124, 125, 134, 135–6, 139, 144, (and imperial alliance), 137–8, 144, 145, 148–50, 153, 283, (motivation), 144, 151; ANZUS Treaty, 14, 29, 130, 131, 138, 144, 283, (and security), 140, 141; (and influencing US foreign policy), 137, 142; negotiations with United States on ANZUS, 123, 135, 141, 143, 145–6, 149, (and shared understandings with United States), 141, 142–3, 144, 151, 152; and regional order, 135, 136, 137, 138–9, 140, 147–8 views of Japan, 142–3 Medcalf, Rory, 308 Moffat, Jay Pierrepont, 85, 98–9, 101 Monroe, James, 52 Morrow, James, 22, 38 New Zealand, 129, 131, 138, 148 and ANZUS alliance, 122, 141, 150; suspension, 212 Nixon, Richard, 170, 171, 173, 195, 320 visits China as president, 171, 173 Nixon administration policy on China, 29, 172–3, 186–7 Obama, Barack, 307, 316 Officer, Keith, 104 O’Sullivan, Meghan, 46 Page, Earle, 93, 108, 111 Parkhill, Sir Archdale, 89, 90, 95, 106 Patterson, Rex, 166, 176 Payne, Marise, 319 Pearce, George, 85, 99 Peng, James, 238 Philippines, the, 91 alliance with United States, 293; Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, 305 relationship with China, 293 power, international distribution of dominant powers, 19 multipolar power structure, 170, 171; post–Cold War, 208, 210, 248–9 and power shift: Anglo–American, 11, 12, 57, 91, (postwar), 123, 126, 128, 135, 136, 144; Sino–American, 11, 239, 241–2, 246, 249, 260, 264, 266, 283, 290, 294, 297, 298, (intensifying), 304–5, 309–10, (origins), 169–71; and response of junior allies, 279, 294, 298, (shaping power shift), 321 and a rising power, 5, 6, 11, 297; authority of, 19; and relationship with dominant power, 25; material strength, 19 see also junior allies power transition, 5, 8, 11, 125 Anglo–American, 126–7, 289 and policy of junior allies, 8–9, 19, 34, 123, 279, 281, 289 and senior ally’s preferences, 57, 281, 289 theorists, 44, 59, 91, 111, 123, 244 process tracing, 14, 18 Radford, Adm. Arthur, 138 Reagan administration, 233 Reynolds, David, 88 Rice, Walter, 168, 189 Risse-Kappen, Thomas, 23, 40, 41 Rogers, William, 168, 188 Roosevelt, Franklin, 84 administration of, 85; and trade, 99, 287 and Australian security, 104 Roosevelt, Theodore, 52, 59, 65, 68

administration of, 84 Rooth, Tim, 94 Ross, Robert, 6, 24 Rowell, Sydney, 126 Rudd, Kevin, 302, 308 Rudd Government foreign policy, 302, 303, 310, 324; on China, 318; and US alliance, 315–16 Runciman, Walter, 93, 108 Rusk, Dean, 142 Russia, 56 see also Soviet Union Sadleir, David, 220 Saunders, Phillip, 308 Scowcroft, Brent, 209, 227 Shultz, George, 227, 233 Singapore partnership with United States, 4, 305 fall in WWII, 121, 128, 135, 150 relations with Australia, 317 relations with China, 4 Slim, Sir William, 146, 147 Smith, Ric, 239, 255 Snyder, Glenn, 5, 13 theory of alliance management, 20, 25–8, 34, 35, 37, 39, 45, 59, 62, 70, 76, 77, 93–4, 191, 291, 303, 320; and alliance political halo, 28, 37, (and Australia), 70, 105, 174, 185, 190, 192, 223, 228, 250, 288, 303, 315; and intra-alliance bargaining power, 25, 26, 27, 29, 34, 38, 288, 292, (and Australia), 30, 40, 59, 60, 62, 70, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 112, 284, 288, (and Australia postwar), 124, 132, 134–5, 145, 151, 174, 185, 190, 192, 210, 228, 229, 230, 260, 265, 309; strengths of theory, 28–9, 60; weaknesses of theory, 30–1, 284, 288, 291 Soviet Union, 205 disintegrating, 219 as global power, 127, 139, 169, 170, 204; changing policies, 204 as potential threat, 146, 242 Spender, Percy, 14–15, 132, 133, 135, 282 and engaging United States in region, 124–5; Pacific pact proposal, 122, 139–40, 141, 142, 290, (and Australia as ally), 155; negotiations on ANZUS Treaty, 123, 142–3, 145–6, 152; and Great Britain, 127, 129, 140, 146, 148, 149–50, 290 see also Menzies Government Sperry, Adm. Charles, 59, 68–9, 70, 77 Stein, Janice, 35 Tange, Sir Arthur, 175 terrorism attacks of 2001 on United States, 242, 263 and Daesh threat, 317 Thailand alliance with United States, 293 relationship with China, 293 Thawley, Michael, 239, 255 Truman, Harry, 126, 128 administration of, 142 Turnbull, Malcolm, 304, 313, 319 Turnbull Government foreign policy, 303; and China, 319 United Nations, 122 UN Declaration on Human Rights, 202, 213, 214, 216, 228 United States: alliances

in Asia–Pacific, 4–5, 172, 204, 264; Japan, 293, 305; Philippines, 293, 305; Republic of Korea, 4, 24, 293; Thailand, 4, 293 NATO, 23, 138, 140 in Western Europe, 23, 189, 204 see also Australia–United States relationship United States as global power, 11, 204, 242 and end of Cold War, 204 in Asia–Pacific/Indo–Pacific, 208–9, 211–12, 251, 268, 282; commitment post–Cold War, 241–2, 248; Guam Doctrine, 170, 174, 175, 178, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 203, 225, 290; rebalance to, 305, 306, 307, 308, 313–14, 316, 320; proposed retraction from, 168, 175; military and technological strength, 305, 308 relationship with China, 6, 170, 190, 219–20, 224, 227, 233, 251; ambiguity, complexity of, 172, 173, 176, 239–40, 247, 264, (hedging by United States), 307–8, (and US politics), 208–9, 227, 246–7; changing power relativities, 203, 204–6, 208, 241, 242, 244, 266, 268, 303, 304, 306, 309, 320; as cooperative–competitive, 15, 44, 240, 247, 250, 260, 261, 262, 267, 294, 297, 302, 312, 319, 320; engagement under Clinton, 246–7, (Chinese motivation), 256; intensifying competition, 303, 304–5, 309–10; rapprochement in early 1970s, 29, 167, 168, 171, 172, 173, 180, 186–7, 188, 224, 282,; tensions, 247, 312, (over Taiwan), 241, 246, 253, 256, 264; and Tiananmen crackdown, 203, 207, 208 relationship with Soviet Union, 204, 210 relative decline, 170, 205 terrorist attacks of 2001, 242, 263; and interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, 242, 294, 305, 315; war on terror, 248, 256 United States as rising power, 4, 11, 55, 91 growing influence in Pacific, 52, 57, 66, 68 isolationism of, 91, 104 Monroe Doctrine, 52, 53, 65 as naval power, 56, 57, 59, 67, 89 trade policy, 99–100, 109 United States–Japan relations, 84; tensions, 57, 68, 69 United States as rising power postwar as dominant power in Pacific, 121, 128, 150 and Korean War, 128, 130 military power of, 126 relationship with Soviet Union, 122, 128, 130 and Southeast Asia, 133, 136 Truman Doctrine, 126–7, 140 see also Great Britain Vietnam War, 170, 174, 181, 184, 186 Walker, Gordon, 131 Walsh, Eric, 177, 196, 198 Walt, Stephen, 44 Waltz, Kenneth, 44 Ward, Stuart, 36 Washington Treaty, 90, 101, 103 Watt, Alan, 123, 129 Williams, Edward, 131, 148 White, Hugh, 6, 204, 248–9 Whitlam, Gough, 15 and ANZUS alliance, 167, 168, 172, 174, 175, 177, 184, 185, 187, 188, 192, 223, 224, 316, as envoy to China, 217 and foreign policy, 187–8 and Labor delegation to Beijing: endorses delegation, 176, 191; leads delegation, 15, 165, 173, 178, 189–90; negotiations with Chinese towards engagement, recognition, 165–6, 168, 180, 182, 184, 189, 192, 194, 198, 229, 258, 259, 266, 282, (and ANZUS), 183–5, 189, 198, 221, 223, 230, 248, 255, 285, 314, 320, (US interest), 190 on regional developments and security, 171, 177–8, 187

thinking on recognition of, engagement with China, 166, 168–9, 173–4, 176, 177, 180, 181–2, 188, 189, 191–2, 206, 219, 221 Whitlam Government, 13, 165 defence policy: and ANZUS alliance, 39, 175, 178, 185; regional security, 178 and diplomatic recognition of China, 15, 189, 190, 240; terms of agreement, 165, 166, 191, (significance of), 192 expanding Sino–Australian relations, 165, 166, 283, 290; from within ANZUS alliance, 168, 191, 250, 267 strained US–Australian relations, 185, 195 Woolcott, Richard, 215 Xi Jinping, 297, 312 Yiang Jiechi, 314 Young, Mick, 166, 176 Zhao Ziyang, 200, 206, 215, 220 Zhou Enlai and negotiations with Whitlam, 165, 180, 182, 183–4, 190, 198, 255, 266, 285, 314 Zhu Rongji, 256