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In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s
 0300061110, 9780300061116

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
Preface
Prologue: War in American History
Part One. The Militarization of America
1 Emergence, 1933 - 1941
2 Triumph, 1941 - 1945
3 Consolidation, 1945 - 1953
4 The Uneasy Balance, 1953 - 1961
5 The Crisis of Militarization, 1961 - 1966
Part Two. The Reshaping of American Militarization
6 The War Mentality in Triumph, 1966 - 1974
7 Back to the Future, 1975 - 1981
8 The Illusory Remilitarization, 1981 - 1988
9 A Farewell to Militarization? 1988 - 1995
Conclusion
Endnotes
Essays on Sources
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

IN T H E S H A D O W OF W A R

IN THE SHADOW OF W AR The United States Since the 1930s

M IC H A E L S. S H E R R Y Yale University Press

New Haven and London

This publication has been supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency. Copyright © 1995 by Yale University. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole o r in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Designed by Sonia L. Scanlon. Set in Bembo type by The Composing Room of Michigan, Inc. Printed in the United States o f America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sherry, Michael S., 1945In the shadow of war Michael S. Sherry, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. I. United States— Politics and government— 19331945.2. United States— Politics and government— 1945-1989. 3. United States— Politics and government— 1989- 4. United States— History, Military— 20th century. 5. War— Social aspects— United States— History— 20th century. 6. National security— United States— History— 20th century. I. Title. E743.S53 1995 973.9— dc20 94-46849 CIP ISBN 0-300-06111-0 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. © T h e paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

To my parents, John and Pauline Sherry

CONTENTS

Illustrations follow pages 84 and 436 Acknowledgments Preface

viii

ix

Prologue: War in American History

I

I

THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA

1

Emergence, 1933-1941

2

Triumph, 1941-1945

3

Consolidation, 1945-1953

4

The Uneasy Balance, 1953-1961

5

The Crisis o f Militarization, 1961- 1966

II

15 64 123 188 237

THE RESHAPING OF AMERICAN MILITARIZATION

6

The W ar Mentality in Triumph, 1966-1974

7

Back to the Future, 1975-1981

8

The Illusory Remilitarization, 1981- 1988

9

A Farewell to Militarization? 1988-1995

Conclusion Endnotes

498 505

Essay on Sources Bibliography Index

569

556

543

283

337 391 431

A CK N OW LEDGM EN TS

My primary debts are to a small group of friends and readers. Three— Marilyn Young, Lane Fenrich, and Leo Ribuffo—worked through a huge and frustratingly paginated manuscript to provide the kind of advice an author considers ideal. They were sympathetic to this book's purposes, shrewd about where it failed to meet them, and constructive about how to remedy the prob­ lems, even though some inevitably remain. All three made suggestions incor­ porated here but inevitably not fully reflected in citations. Lane Fenrich pro­ vided not only criticism but a sounding board for my ideas and a source of new ones, meticulous help in editing and shaping the final manuscript, and sustain­ ing friendship. Laura Hein provided smart advice, important tips, and unfail­ ing encouragement. George Chauncey and I traded stories and advice about the difficulties of finishing long books. Numerous graduate and undergradu­ ate students responded helpfully to sections of this book or arguments in it de­ livered in other forums. Andrea Gregg provided prompt and precise research assistance at the final stage of this project. Charles Grench, the Yale University Press editor of all my books, provided the flexibility, quiet support, and timely advice for which he is rightly well known. While most granting agencies were not forthcoming (perhaps because re­ viewers thought the book too "ideological," as I was told early on, or because works of synthesis still rarely get funded). Northwestern University gave es­ sential support. A grant from its President's Fund for the Humanities provided a year's leave, an additional quarter's leave was given by the university, sym­ pathetic department chairs allowed me to arrange my schedule to maximize time for writing, and the College of Arts and Sciences provided further funds to finalize the manuscript. James Beal was once again indulgent of the absences, truncated vacations, and the like necessary for me to complete a book, and helpful in other ways as well. So too were other family members. I thank them all. Lake Ann, Michigan September 1994

PREFACE

Since the late 1930s, Americans have lived under the shadow of war. This is their history under that shadow and a reflection on its legacy—the story of America's militarization and how it changed the nation. To say that Americans lived in war's shadow is to indulge in a metaphor, but one appropriate to their sensibilities. A 1941 advertisement (see fig. 2) display­ ing a bomber's shadow darkening a suburban home offered a metaphor apt for a half-century of anxiety about the nation's safety. It showed both the ominous shadow cast by war and the still untouched scene beneath it—both hovering danger and lingering tranquility, external threat and domestic innocence. For that was how most Americans perceived the threat of war. To them, war came from outside America to intrude upon their lives and to wrest them from their pacific ways (War Comes to America was the title of a famous World War II propaganda film). And war itself seemed a murky phenomenon. Enemies were distant and elusive, and the proper response to them hard to define. Larger dangers— to life as the nuclear dilemma emerged, to liberty as the "garrison state" grew—defied measurement still more. Even films and photographs of­ ten left war in the shadows: Americans saw the mushroom clouds of nuclear explosions but rarely the destruction unleashed beneath them. And of course war's destruction almost never came to America. War's shadow hung over the nation, but its substance was hard to grasp. Both regrettable hypocrisy and laudable idealism were involved in Ameri­ cans' perceptions of war's sources. Regarding military vigilance and action as imperatives imposed upon them by external forces, they rarely acknowledged that their immersion in those imperatives arose also from their own values and ambitions. They talked about how war changed America, as if they were its passive victims, but less about how, deliberately or inadvertently, they changed themselves through war and changed war making itself. In the understandable but simple moral drama they saw, bad guys—Nazis, Japs, Commies, Russians—made them take up arms. But that outlook, by shoring up their selfimage as a pacific people, also granted only tenuous legitimacy to the vast ap­ paratus of national security they built, for if war's shadow receded, the appa­ ratus might itself wither. National myth thus provided space for other pursuits—of profit or equality or moral perfection— to persist, even as they were yoked to war's demands. Viewed as an imposition upon the nation, the demands of national security held compelling urgency but lacked fundamental legitimacy.

X

PREFACE

The metaphor of this book's title suggests how Americans perceived their transformative experience, and also how we might now interpret it, for its ef­ fects on our history were often as shadowy as they were far-reaching. Some results were trivial though telling: a French fashion designer designated his new women's bathing suit the bikini, after the Pacific island where the United States tested atomic bombs in 1946. (Scantily clad women were, after all, re­ garded as "bombshells.") Some results were grandly apparent though poorly reckoned with: once an intermittent and often unimportant concern, national security assumed permanent and paramount importance in American life, so that much of the nation's treasure was devoted to it, its armed forces spread over much of the globe, and its science and industry were profoundly reor­ iented. The fortunes of politicians also hinged on their relationship to war, as when Lyndon Johnson's 1964 campaign portrayed opponent Barry Goldwater as itching to start a nuclear war. And every social group found its fate altered or at least reconceived amid hot and cold war; it was no coincidence that at the end of this era one of the most esteemed black Americans was a general, Colin Powell. Other results were hard to pin down, in part because the weighty demands of war were in persistent tension with war's remoteness for most Americans. Nuclear weapons embodied that tension most dangerously, their cataclysmic potential paired with their virtual invisibility and total nonuse in war after 1945, but that tension cut through most of American life. Perhaps most insid­ ious and hard to pinpoint, war defined much of the American imagination, as the fear of war penetrated it and the achievements of war anchored it, to the point that Americans routinely declared "war" on all sorts of things that did not involve physical combat at all. Thus militarization reshaped every realm of American life—politics and for­ eign policy, economics and technology, culture and social relations—making America a profoundly different nation. To varying degrees, almost all groups were invested in it and attracted to it—rich and poor, whites and nonwhites, conservatives and liberals (the last more so than is usually recognized today). Certainly, all were changed by it. Any book analyzing broad patterns leaves out a great deal. This book em­ phasizes war as agent of and rationale for the nation's transformation, as the blank screen on which unrelated concerns were often projected, and as the paradigm in which Americans defined themselves, pursued change, or re­ sisted it. It is impossible to cite all instances of those phenomena, however, and foolish to suggest that militarization was determinative of all of this era's his­ tory. Divisions involving race, class, and gender, for example, like the nation's much-touted decline in economic vitality, all had autonomous dynamics as well as connections to the forces of militarization. As with terms for other pe­ riods, the label "Age of Militarization" is a creative oversimplification. Militar­ ization did not define or cause everything that happened. It simply loomed

PREFACE

xi

large and persistently enough to give unity to a half-century of history, to make of it something of a common piece, distinct from the history that preceded it and possibly from the next half-century. Other labels have been devised to describe aspects of that history: "the na­ tional security state" and "the warfare state," for institutions; the "Cold War," for the dominant conflict of this period; "hegemony" or "imperialism," for the global power that the United States exercised. But these terms, though un­ avoidable at times in a work like this, tend to posit a static condition and fail to capture both the breadth and the partiality of America's militarization. The fed­ eral government never became a "national security state" with the singlemin­ dedness that term implies, for it was too chronically in disarray and too chal­ lenged by other tasks to give national security sole priority. "National security" itself is a slippery term; it long ago acquired a neutral, timeless, objective qual­ ity, when in fact the term is a politically constructed artifact of the period under study. Nor did the nation quite become a "warfare state," for it never celebrated or entered war wholeheartedly enough for the term to do it justice. "Cold War" describes the great rivalry between the Soviet and American spheres of influ­ ence, but that rivalry flowed in part from a deeper revolution in international relations and American consciousness, and "Cold War" obscures the hot wars that occurred under its aegis. And while America's role in the world was often "imperial," the term hardly accounts for much else in American culture and politics. Hence I use the broader term "militarization" to capture the historical pro­ cess that the United States entered in the 1930s. Militarization bears a close rela­ tionship to an older term, "militarism," but the latter is more politically charged—evocative of Prussia, Nazi Germany, or imperial Japan—and it re­ fers more to a static condition than to a dynamic process. Militarization can be defined as "the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society or­ ganizes itself for the production of violence."11use the term more broadly to refer to the process by which war and national security became consuming anx­ ieties and provided the memories, models, and metaphors that shaped broad areas of national life. Caveats about this term are in order. First, militarization was not a uniquely American experience, nor was the United States alone responsible for its global scale in the twentieth century. Second, a militarized nation need not be domi­ nated by military institutions and elites: America's civilian leaders often pur­ sued national security and embraced military values more fervently than mili­ tary officers. Third, such a society need not be warlike, in the sense of relishing war; in the American case, countervailing emotions, like dread at the prospect of war and desire to enjoy affluence, prevented a war ethos from fully develop­ ing. Finally, though obviously expressed in the "production of violence," mil­ itarization may have sources and outlets far removed from violence and mili­ tary power. Although overlapping phenomena, war and militarization did not

xii

PREFACE

march in historical lockstep. In fact, intense involvement in war absorbed ener­ gies, while diminished involvement often released them into other outlets for militarization, as when metaphors of war spread widely in American politics and culture during the 1980s. Those caveats also suggest that the concept of militarization "is a little blurry around the edges."2 But what it lacks in precision it makes up for in breadth. Since militarization, like industrialization, was a varied and changing rather than uniform historical process, it makes sense that the term for it embraces varied, even discordant, phenomena. If not already clear to readers, it will become obvious that I view America's past half-century critically, but I seek no scapegoats among individuals or insti­ tutions. Presidents, and others who influenced or challenged them, receive much attention because their record is a common and plausible way to give coherence to a crowded history, because they did exercise much power, and because they shaped the moods and opinions of Americans. Their role in his­ tory was as much illustrative as determinative, however, and their respon­ sibility for its outcomes was shared with others. Criticism of individual leaders remains appropriate, but the United States and its leaders were not alone re­ sponsible for the Cold War, the arms race, or other evils of our time—or for their passing. The forces militarizing America were deeply embedded, as are those which will establish a different path. Regarding the methodological and theoretical issues that now vex histo­ rians, I have, through conscious choice and force of training and habit, taken an eclectic approach. Attentive to new approaches that "decenter" American his­ tory and dismantle its traditional narrative forms, I have nonetheless posited a center for this story, the national state and the political culture which it helped to construct and express. But I see that center as unstable, disrupted by tensions within and challenges from without, ones substantial enough to defy rigid no­ tions of "center" and "margins." And I see a narrative focused on that center as a compelling, though not the only, way to organize this history. In turn, this narrative usually follows but sometimes challenges the chronological divisions Americans generally see in their past. This book draws on my previous scholarship and teaching, on limited pri­ mary sources (generally of an accessible sort), and on the work of other scholars. Anyone in the field realizes that this scholarship is voluminous and ever-growing, and knows useful titles that I have not cited. At the same time, precisely because of its groaning volume, this scholarship now warrants a syn­ thesis, one other scholars will test, refine, or reject, since the task of making sense of America's age of militarization is just beginning.

PROLOGU E: W A R IN A M E R IC A N H ISTO R Y

War created the United States. Although many Americans professed genu­ ine hostility toward it, war was central to their history, the instrument by which they forged and expanded their nation and often defined themselves. The American Revolution was itself a war, often a nasty one. It broke out in part over military issues—the fiscal burdens, intrusive presence, and ideologi­ cal threat many Americans perceived in English military ambitions and institu­ tions. It presented the rebels with a dilemma that would persist in American history: How could they wage war against the evils of militarism without creat­ ing them in their own midst? And it left Americans in a tenuous military condi­ tion; despite their victory, reliable defense of the nation's borders was in doubt for three decades. Politics and folklore sustained the centrality of war for Americans long after the Revolution. No figures loomed larger in political mythology than George Washington, the warrior President, and Abraham Lincoln, the war President. From Washington through Teddy Roosevelt, former military officers seized the presidential nominations of their parties and often the presidency itself. The Revolution and the Civil War remained touchstones of national memory, their meanings repeatedly plumbed and refashioned. A nation bom in war, threat­ ened by invasion, expanded through conquest, and finally reconceived in civil war, owed much to Mars. True, it paid its debt grudgingly. Americans often celebrated what war gained them, but rarely war's institutions and burdens. Their distrust of profes­ sional "standing armies"—of their origins in a decadent Europe, of their power to corrupt or overawe the Republic—was deep. The new nation sanctioned only a bare-bones, decentralized military force. It relied on the voluntary en­ thusiasm of amateurs—men Washington described as "just dragged from the tender Scenes of domestick life" and all too "ready to fly from their own shadows"1—and hence also on the coercion of ideological fervor rather than the compulsion of the state to wage its wars. And although military service added attractive plumage to a political candidate, military officers as a class did not gain great social prestige or telling political clout. From the outset, then, a deep ambivalence pervaded American attitudes toward war and its institu­ tions: dependence on both matched distrust of each. The armed forces nonetheless played a telling role in defending, expanding.

2

PROLOGUE

and building the new nation. As if to resolve their ambivalence, Americans liked their military forces best when they undertook decidedly unmilitary functions. President Thomas Jefferson established the United States Military Academy at West Point less as a schoolhouse in destruction than as an academy of science and engineering, the role it played for decades in a nation hell-bent on internal development but lacking institutions with the requisite expertise. Army officers like Meriwether Lewis and William Clark surveyed the West and searched out its scientific secrets. Academy graduates, either in uniform or after entering private business, helped to build bridges, canals, harbors, and railroads. They were happy to do so, seeing in that role, rather than in war mak­ ing, their main hope for gaining social prestige and economic security. Their efforts forged a lasting link between the armed forces and the nation's eco­ nomic and technological development. That link went further. The army's Har­ pers Ferry and Springfield arsenals pioneered standardized mass production. In the 1840s, Congress debated how development of iron-clad warships might nourish the iron industry. Later, businessmen and technical experts gleaned the Civil War's record for lessons on how to rationalize the burgeoning corpo­ rate economy. During the nineteenth century, Americans also developed their particular, though not unique, style of imagining and waging war. American officers fa­ vored a "strategy of annihilation"2 entailing head-on assaults against an en­ emy's armed forces or productive capacity, rather than limited campaigns of movement, surprise, or attrition. It was a brutal style of war waged against Na­ tive Americans and in the Civil War, when many Americans embraced war's destructiveness as an instrument of higher causes and took "flight into unrea­ son: into visions of purgation and redemption, into anticipation and intuition and spiritual apotheosis, into bloodshed that was not only intentional pursuit of interests of state but was also sacramental, erotic, mystical, and strangely gratifying."3Wars of annihilation drew on such attitudes, and on the capacity to mass produce weapons and war materiel and the locomotives and ships to move them. The system was synergistic, if rarely seen as such: the armed forces spurred economic development, which in turn enhanced American military power. Some Americans carried this vision further. Developing the "cult of the su­ perweapon," they imagined stunning new weapons enabling the nation to usher in a Pax Americana by smashing its enemies or by making war too hellish to be waged, so that "war shall cease to desolate the world nor burning cities mark its dreadful track," as the inventor Robert Fulton hoped.4 By century's end, the notion was commonplace that submarines, airships, or other devices might deter or humanize war, despite doubts about what would happen if the magical weapon belonged instead to an enemy, or got used in a civil war among Americans, or made killing too easy rather than too horrific. Mark Twain savagely mocked the vision of American weapons making peace in A

PROLOGUE

3

Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court (1889), a comic nightmare of auto­ mated butchery in battle. But dreams of triumphal American technology con­ tinued to hold sway. They tapped Americans' ambivalence about war, promis­ ing that the nation could gain what it wanted from war through superior technology rather than through the dreadful leviathan of large standing armies. Imagining future wars, Americans also continued to plumb the meaning of past ones—above all the Civil War, which gripped the American imagination so long in part because a half-century went by before another major war. Amer­ icans judged politicians by their wartime heroism and waved the "bloody shirt" in political campaigns. They employed war as a metaphor for other struggles, as in one scholar's History of the Warfare of Science and Theology in Christendom. They compared the Civil War's attractive model of idealism, disci­ pline, and self-sacrifice to the rank materialism, squalid corruption, and corpo­ rate giantism of post-Civil War America. Few Civil War veterans wanted an­ other war or joined Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in urging Americans "to pray, not for comfort, but for combat." But many Americans joined Teddy Roosevelt in celebrating the strenuous and democratizing virtues of wartime service. Or they tried to extract the virtues of war from war itself. Champions of civil ser­ vice reform drew on an "ideal of military professionalism." Social reformers saw charity work as akin to enlisting in an army at war, now "with vice and poverty as the enemy." Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888) imagined a utopia at peace but operated by a disciplined army of workers. In 1910 came the crowning appeal to exploit war's virtues in peacetime, William James's "The Moral Equivalent of War." James proposed to rekindle the Civil War spirit by drafting youth into an "army against nature" whose soldiers would dig coal, wash dishes, erect skyscrapers, and generally "get the childishness knocked out of them"— a proposal often seen as a precursor to the New Deal's Civilian Conservation Corps and John Kennedy's Peace Corps. Views like James's, al­ though easily seen as opposed to the bellicose militarism of a Teddy Roosevelt, in fact only bent similar assumptions to different purposes. James, too, believed that "militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood."5 Reflections on the Civil War also emerged amid fears of a new war (for which the Paris Commune of 1871 served as a frightening model) that might pit the nation's social classes, racial or ethnic groups, or ideological factions against each other. Indeed, military forces repeatedly intervened on the side of the new corporate giants to subdue striking workers, just as embattled workers saw themselves as "industrial armies" and marched in 1894 as "Coxey's Army." Afraid of the enraged masses, prominent Americans proposed an expanded army to garrison cities—arguments more successfully used for modernizing state militias, or the National Guard, as collectively they came to be called. From a different vantage point, authors of apocalyptic visions—Twain in Con­ necticut Yankee, Ignatius Donnelly in Caesar's Column (1890)—cast war as a civil

4

PROLOGUE

conflict harnessing dreadful new weapons to internal passions. Although fear of class war abated after the century's turn, champions of preparedness claimed that universal military service would close the fissures of class and ethnicity by giving all boys a common discipline and training in democracy's virtues. For Americans fearing domestic strife, the Civil War had resonance. It loomed over succeeding generations just as World War II did over later genera­ tions fearing another international war. The great class war never erupted, just as World War III never broke out, but in both cases skirmishes in the imagined war—conflicts with labor in the late 1800s, the "limited wars" of Korea and Vietnam—kept the specter alive. In such ways, war occupied a central place in America's earlier history, as in our own times. But the similarities cannot be pushed very far. Above all, after the War of 1812 the new nation enjoyed remarkable immunity from attack, though not the "free security" that nostalgic Americans in the mid-twentieth century imag­ ined. Border disputes, threats to trade. Native Americans' resistance to con­ quest, and growing imperial ambitions offered real challenges. But it was with reason that young Abraham Lincoln could ask in 1837, "Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant to step the ocean and crush us at a blow?" and an­ swer boastfully, "Never! All the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined . . . could not by force take a drink from the Ohio or make a track on the Blue Ridge in a trial of a thousand years."6The only serious threat to the nation, Lin­ coln recognized, came from within it. A term like "national security," implying broad and continuous efforts to de­ fend a country, as yet had no place. The United States maintained a War Depart­ ment (and a Navy Department)—not yet a Defense Department and a National Security Council—a designation suggesting that war was an episodic event, not the object of sustained anxiety. War intruded only occasionally into the lives of Americans, and when it did occur, its circumstances (except for the Civil War) allowed leaders great latitude about whether to participate. The Civil War loomed over the American imagination, but as a site of contested memories about a bitter division, not as the touchstone of national unity against a foreign threat. It therefore lacked the resonance with world events that World War II would hold for Americans. Few nineteenth-century Americans saw their nation's fortunes as bound up with distant wars in a seamless world and as dependent on massive military power. What became war's constant shadow was then only a passing eclipse. By the same token, war and defense rarely dominated national politics. The Spanish-American War, the difficult war to conquer the Filipinos that followed, and the simultaneous modernization of the armed forces all reflected a higher priority on military force and more intense debate about it. But as late as the raucous debate on military preparedness in 1915-16, no credible, immediate threat to national safety could be invoked; bellicose advocates of preparedness

PROLOGUE

S

were "more interested in polishing the fire engines than finding the blaze."7 Instead, that debate pivoted on almost everything else: trade, national pride, the internal cohesion of a polyglot and class-riven nation. Too, the armed forces only slowly became a truly national instrument of power wielded by a centralized state. The navy's ships were dispersed among far-flung stations, only starting to join in a battleship navy in the 1890s. The army remained broken into small units long after major activity against Indians ended. The National Guard was largely a creature of state governments. War­ time recruitment of soldiers and sailors lay mostly in the hands of states and localities. The professional training of soldiers and officers remained in infancy. Except for the President, no central authority knit together this hodgepodge. Given its fragmented structure, most soldiers in the Spanish-American War, many even in World War I, marched as a unit from the same locality, which held their loyalties and scrutinized their progress for signs of local pride or grief. They were Milwaukee's finest or Ohio volunteers, not homogenized in­ struments of Washington's impersonal authority, which they often keenly re­ sisted. Above all, the armed forces lacked the size to drive the nation's economy and politics. In select areas, as with their technological contributions, their role was critical to the nation's development. And telling precedents for the future did emerge: the "very extensive and expensive old-age assistance program for [Civil War] veterans" constituted the first major federal welfare program, one that foreshadowed the powerful linkage between welfare and military service in the twentieth century. But that precedent was not immediately followed up. By century's end, universities had also displaced service academies as the pre­ mier engineering schools and "the day of the soldier-technologist, well versed in science and committed to its peacetime uses, had largely disappeared." Brit­ ain's "military-industrial complex" was already the unstable fulcrum for its economy and a leader in the global arms trade. In contrast, arms contracts were significant in tum-of-the-century America (President Grover Cleveland warned in 1894 that "if no new contracts are given out, contractors must dis­ band their workmen and their plants must lie idle"), but the nation had at most only the "keel of a navy-industrial complex."8 Spending on the armed forces reflected their modest place in the nation's po­ litical economy. Until well into the twentieth century, military expenditures in peacetime took 0.4 to 0.9 percent of gross national product annually. National defense did comprise 20 to 25 percent of federal spending from the 1880s through the 1920s, and far more if payments to veterans and on the federal debt—obligations largely acquired in war—are also counted. But the federal budget comprised so small a share of GNP (less than 3percent before the 1920s) that defense spending still commanded few national resources. Moreover, debt service and veterans' payments, primarily reflecting the episodic burdens of war rather than the ongoing costs of national defense, are often excluded in

«

PROLOGUE

broad chronological and cross-national comparisons. Judged by direct expen­ ditures on armed forces, peacetime military spending before the 1930s paled in comparison to the post-World War II era, when it seized about 10 percent of GNP (itself far larger than a half-century earlier).9 The armed forces did grow, not only in costs but in manpower. Contrary to Cold War mythology, which held that the nation had foolishly disbanded its armed forces after each war, those forces increased sharply in the wake of all wars after 1848, tripling after the Spanish-American War to some 150,000 per­ sonnel and nearly doubling again by the mid-1920s. Still, these forces were only 10 to 20 percent of what nations like France and Britain maintained at the turn of the century. Active-duty military forces comprised less than 0.1 percent of America's population in the 1890s, and under 0.2 percent in the 1920s, but from 1.3 to 1.8 percent of the total population in the 1950s and 1960s. The cadre of civilians working for the armed forces was also modest— less than 20 percent of total federal civilian employment through the 1920s (when such employ­ ment exceeded 500,000), but roughly half of that employment in the mid-1950s (when total employment reached 2.4 million). Only by one critical standard, death in war, did the nineteenth-century record eclipse that of the twentieth. No other American war matched the Civil War in casualties, especially as mea­ sured against total population— over 600,000 military dead (one in every five white males of military age in the South, one in sixteen in the North), plus thou­ sands of civilian dead—or in physical destruction to the nation.10 In sum, until well into the twentieth century national defense claimed only a minor part of the nation's resources. War imposed enormous burdens, but de­ fense as an ongoing activity did not. Despite blood-curdling expressions of mil­ itaristic sentiment from some Americans, militarization as a grand historical process was at most incipient, well behind the stage it had reached in Europe. The forces were nonetheless gathering to advance that process in America. War's democratization, industrialization, and professionalization were often seen in the nineteenth century as likely to make war more humane and less frequent, but those developments, tied as they were to that century's powerful nationalism and imperialism, only prepared the way for the titanic warfare of the twentieth century. Europe was caught up in an arms race bearing down on and sucking in the rest of the world. Americans responded to that arms race with a confused and limited expan­ sion of their own armed forces. Some chastised Old World militarism, but others were eager to join the race, especially its showy competition in battleship navies. No single ideological viewpoint or cluster of interest drove the growth of American arms. Because many anti-imperialists were also virulently antiBritish, for example, they supported a big American navy able to challenge the world's largest fleet or expand American commerce. While industrialists pressed for contracts and scientists like Thomas Edison promised amazing weapons, their efforts to secure defense monies had only limited results in the

PROLOGUE

7

absence of intense interservice rivalries or widespread alarms about the na­ tion's safety. What drove military modernization and expansion at its critical stage during the Roosevelt and Taft presidencies was a small coalition of patri­ cian civilians like Elihu Root, Henry L. Stimson, and Roosevelt himself, and re­ formers within the officer corps. Still, their calculations of interest did not alone propel modernization and expansion. Only occasionally, and then not very plausibly, did reformers cite territorial safety as justification. They also wanted military power in order to support American hegemony over a world-capitalist economy, but that argu­ ment too was strained and episodic. Military institutions were "organic growths developing, as do most great social institutions, out of complex soils of vested interests, political and economic ambitions, unanalyzed fears and un­ tested assumptions about historical causation." Like Roosevelt, many Ameri­ cans believed that military power expressed more than it underwrote the na­ tion's ascendancy: big nations needed big navies and the expansion that went with them, "or we are not great" and face only "stagnation and decay," so naval officers could argue. That view prevailed easily before World War I, when war, at least in its horrific forms, seemed remote, so that the nation's new engines of war "were thought of simply as beautiful pieces of machinery completely un­ connected with the destruction of human life"—symbols of national pride and technological achievement. The growth of American arms also proceeded be­ cause the resources to realize it were abundant, and because Progressive re­ formers admired effective national government and saw armed forces as an ex­ pression of it.11 The ease with which the armed forces expanded allowed for substantial con­ fusion about ultimate purposes. A convenient war, as with Spain in 1898, or a convenient war scare, as with Japan during Teddy Roosevelt's presidency, pro­ vided pretext but little compelling reason for the armed forces' growth. Eco­ nomic and territorial imperialism, strategic anxieties, nationalism and racism, elitist longings to enhance the nation's internal cohesion, attraction to darkly determinist notions— such impulses behind expansion thrived in a climate where none was severely tested and at force levels still so low that few Ameri­ cans needed to worry about joining Europe's powers in the abyss of war and militarism. Americans did peer into that abyss during World War I, which marked a wa­ tershed in their relationship to war. Mindful of Europe's methods of total war, American political, business, and military leaders constructed a national ma­ chinery for harnessing resources. Manpower, industry, science, food, trade, and opinion were conscripted into service, as war's democratization yielded its paradoxical results: war in the name of the people sanctioned their mobiliza­ tion and death at unimaginable levels. All too often, it is true, the machinery of American war making jammed, its gears only beginning to mesh when the war ended. American forces remained

8

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surprisingly dependent on the British and French for airplanes, artillery, and other implements of war. Complicating America's mobilization was a volatile mix of antiwar fervor, idealistic war aims, repressive impulses, sectional divi­ sion, and class conflict among Americans ("If you conscript men for war, con­ script wealth for war," one congressman demanded). Perhaps most important was the persistence amid the new approach to war of an older ethic of volun­ tary, decentralized mobilization for war, evident when President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed the new Selective Service Act, though surely an act of state compulsion, as only a "selection from a nation which has volunteered in m ass."12New federal agencies like the War Industries Board were as much the captives as the rulers of America's corporations. All too often, hesitancy about brandishing state power led only to its underhanded employment or to ugly vigilantism and popular hysteria to substitute for it. Voluntarism and compul­ sion, enthusiasm and efficiency, freedom and discipline—such dualisms, long familiar in American history, cut through the American war effort, framed how many Americans viewed it, and revealed their ambivalence about entering a world of mass slaughter and global power. American leaders nonetheless built the rudiments of a national security state. These included agencies of economic mobilization; a capricious appa­ ratus of internal security; organizations to enlist universities, scientists, and in­ tellectuals into the cause; the battle fleet "second to none" long sought by ar­ dent navalists; a mass and partially mechanized army; and a fledgling air force attracted to new doctrines of strategic bombing. In another way, too. World War I illuminated America's future: as a massive if disappointing experiment in using war to serve political and social agendas. The desire to extract constructive change from war was hardly new to Ameri­ cans in 1917, but no war exposed it so boldly, in part because the newly asser­ tive state promised riper opportunities for action. In his famous formulation of war's opportunities, John Dewey, speaking for progressive intellectuals reluc­ tant to enter the maelstrom, presented war as a "plastic juncture" in history that held out the possibility of securing "the supremacy of public need over private possessions."13 Diverse interests shared Dewey's sense of war's malleability, though not his interest in liberal reform: businessmen keen on expanding trade, controlling the embryonic apparatus of economic regulation, or smash­ ing organized labor; union leaders like Samuel Gompers, seeking to enhance labor's status and power; feminists and moral reformers, seizing the chance to push for woman's suffrage and prohibition; nationalists and nativists, yearning to purify a polyglot nation; blacks, hoping their contribution to victory would speed their full citizenship—and the list could go on. Many of these groups were to be bitterly disappointed because they either failed to get what they wanted (as with black leaders) or found the price too high (as with progressive intellectuals). World War I reworked the basic fissures of American society, but in ways few groups could anticipate or con-

PROLOGUE

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trol. Randolph Bourne's memorable barb at progressives applied to others as well: "If the war is too strong for you to prevent, how is it going to be weak enough for you to control and mould to your liberal purposes?"14The question would endure. Never again would Americans so brazenly champion the po­ tential of war abroad to unleash beneficent change at home. The lure of that potential would persist, however, muted in future rhetoric but if anything more powerful in actuality. Just as impressive as the speed with which Americans plunged into World War I and divined its meanings was the rapidity with which they discarded much of its legacy. As preparation for the age of national security, this war, in part because America's role in it was so brief, was a dress rehearsal after which the props were stored and even the stage sometimes abandoned. The jerrybuilt machinery to mobilize men and materiel soon was in shambles. As the Red Scare dwindled, the apparatus of internal security shrank, although lega­ cies like immigration restriction endured. Wartime visions of seizing world markets, though partly realized, faded before the lure of a robust market at home. The armed forces, it is true, were now enlarged, modernized, and innovative, developing some of the world's best weapons, studying the war's lessons about modem industrial warfare, and forging links to science and industry through new organizations like the National Advisory Committee on Aeronau­ tics and the Army Industrial College. And on the West Coast there emerged the embryo of a "metropolitan-military complex" shaped less by authorities in Washington than by fledgling entrepreneurs, ambitious scientists, and local boosters tapping the imperial dreams of the West's fast-growing cities. But no orderly system of militarization was yet in place. Thus Congress, steeped in antistatist and anticorporate ideology and fearing "a powerfully independent military-industrial clique that would fleece the taxpayer and foment war," im­ posed rules that pitted the pace-setting aircraft companies savagely against each other and against the armed services, their primary market. Presidential parsimony, popular antagonisms, interservice rivalries, and weak institutional linkages curbed long-range planning in strategy and logistics. Whatever the lessons of World War I, they were at best partially implemented.15 War also taught lessons in the necessity of avoiding it as well as the means to wage it. Americans had already experienced the horrors of modem war in their Civil War, but that war's predictive value was not widely recognized here or abroad, its ferocity instead being seen as anomalous, due to the nature of civil war. World War I, however, as an international war that erupted amid growing anxiety about technological and economic change, made apparent the destruc­ tive and dehumanizing nature of modem warfare. Tentatively during the war, savagely after it, some soldiers, reformers, politicians, and writers exposed the mechanized madness and excoriated the civilization that produced it. World War I taught Carrie Chapman Catt, for example, that "war is in the blood of

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men; they can't help it. They have been fighting ever since the days of the cave­ men" (such sentiments led the War Department to red-bait and harass antiwar feminists).16Indeed, war-borne visions of an armed American colossus fell vic­ tim in part to the ideological pacifism and diffuse antimilitarism of the 1920s. Yet the lessons touted by war's opponents triumphed no more clearly than those proclaimed by advocates of armed vigilance. War was rarely the main target of "disillusioned" postwar writers and artists, many of whom, like Er­ nest Hemingway, were not pacifists. Instead, World War I was "a fabulously useful, if expensively purchased, metaphor for the corruption of the culture they had under siege." Besides, what dismayed Americans was less the war itself—brief, triumphant, and relatively inexpensive for them (116,516 Ameri­ can personnel died, fewer than half in battle)—than its aftermath of revolution, greed, and stillborn treaties abroad, and inflation, hysteria, and squabbling at home. War's multiple legacies seemed less to coalesce than to cancel each other out.17 No simple retreat into isolation or "normalcy" accounted for the stalemate, for no such retreat was possible or even desired by most Americans. Wilson's Republican successors shared his vision of American leadership in a global capitalist system even as they shifted the tactics designed to achieve it. Despite the Senate's defeat of the Treaty of Versailles, the United States made vigorous diplomatic and financial efforts on the world stage. Those included arms con­ trol treaties which capped the size of the great powers' fleets while encouraging the technological innovation in which the United States was emerging as preeminent—in essence, carefully balancing the conflicting lessons drawn from the war experience. Meanwhile, diverse political forces— feminists and other pacifists opposed to any war, populists and progressives suspicious of eastern capitalists, unilateralists opposed to alliances, conservatives more wor­ ried about the domestic order—repeatedly assaulted the potent symbols of America's past or prospective involvement in world war. They defeated Amer­ ica's entry into the League of Nations and the World Court; railed against the evils of chemical warfare; denounced the financiers and militarists presumed to thrive on war and weapons; embraced the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war; and attacked plans for a mass American army capable of once again storming Europe's battlefronts. Their efforts were linked to a widespread de­ sire among Americans to gain the advantages of global economic power with­ out sustaining its costs, including those of wielding military power. In Warren Cohen's phrase, they sought "empire without tears." That desire, seen during World War II as lamentably weak and hypocritical, made sense in the 1920s, when no credible threat to American interests existed to justify a firmer em­ brace of military power. But the pacific aspirations and antimilitarist politics of this era also obscured the nation's deepening involvement in the world and the growing military power used to underwrite it. American culture, particularly in its fascination

PROLOGUE

I I

with new technologies, also masked these changes. Heroes like aviator Charles Lindbergh were celebrated as exemplars of an old pioneer spirit, paragons of a m odem scientific age, and creators of an international web of travel and com­ munication that would smother the provincial forces of nationalism and war. Crusaders for air power like Gen. Billy Mitchell were seen not as proponents of a deadly new technology but as populist rebels against the forces of militarism. And the technologies themselves, above all the bomber, were celebrated as in­ struments for preserving the nation's immunity from war, not as a new means to wage it. In that fashion, the progress of American armaments between the world wars seemed indicative more of bygone virtues and peace-loving im­ pulses than of new terrors and challenges. Even those thinking about such terrors still held out hope. Many Americans remembered the scientific butchery of the past war and feared its resumption. They penned horrifying tales of the carnage made possible by recent or antici­ pated inventions—gas and bacteriological weapons, long-range bombers, even an atomic device. They glimpsed nothing less than mankind's ability to "accomplish its own destruction," as Winston Churchill put it, or to carry out a military and ecological "holocaust" in a matter of hours, as the American social critic Stuart Chase worried.18 And yet such prophets offered a more hopeful message as well: precisely because another war was so horrific a prospect, na­ tions led by rational leaders either would never allow it to occur or would toler­ ate it so briefly that it would reach a mercifully quick end. In this dimension too, that of grand imaginings of the future, Americans did not yet have to anticipate constant peril to their safety and strenuous efforts to avert it. War's place in the nation's history was large, but its militarization—the large and sustained focus of anxieties and resources on military power—was evident only in teasing outline. Well into the 1930s, "the shadow of the future was already plain; but there was nothing with which to give it substance."19

PA R T O N E TH E M IL IT A R IZA T IO N OF A M E R IC A

I EM ERGENCE, 1933-1941

As If “Invaded by a Foreign Foe** On a gray and grim March 4,1933, in a city that seemed like "a beleaguered capital in war time," President Franklin Roosevelt invoked war as a metaphor for the nation's economic crisis and a model for its solution. He proposed to solve unemployment "by direct recruiting by the Government itself, treating the task as we would treat the emergency of a war"; to follow "lines of attack" on the financial crisis; to summon Americans to be "a trained and loyal army"; to urge on them "a unity of duty hitherto evoked only in time of armed strife"; to assume "unhesitatingly the leadership of this great army of our people." Near the conclusion of his First Inaugural Address came his boldest challenge. If Congress failed to take effective action, he would ask for "broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe." There followed the crowd's loudest cheer, a response Eleanor Roosevelt found "a little terrifying."1 On a day famous for his claim "that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself," the analogy to war was hardly Roosevelt's only theme, and too much can be made of it: he never explicitly asked Congress for "broad executive power." Still, war provided FDR his dominant metaphor, just as he explicitly rejected others ("We are stricken by no plague of locusts," he insisted). The war analogy addressed multiple purposes and audiences. It was de­ signed to revive the unity (exaggerated in memory) of World War I. Taking Americans back to 1917, it implicitly repudiated the 1920s, and with it the petty materialism and rigid economic dogma which many believed had caused the Depression. Treating the nation as if "invaded by a foreign foe," the war anal­ ogy vaguely imputed an external cause for economic disaster, diminishing American culpability for it. Invoking war, FDR also served notice that he would draw on the last war's models of bureaucratic and presidential action; its invocation was intended, and understood, to strengthen his legal and politi­ cal claim to power. FDR also used the analogy at a time of international insta­ bility, with dictators on the march and the First World War's sour legacy of rev­ olution, nationalism, and debt fresh to Americans. Above all, the war analogy

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reflected the felt gravity of the economic crisis and FDR's sense of what would best mobilize Americans behind his course of action. Hardly confined to political rhetoric, war-related models and metaphors also suffused culture in the early 1930s. Film and fiction displayed contempo­ rary fears (or hopes) that fascistic government, military measures like martial law, or war itself might be used to overcome the economic crisis or curb the predators and revolutionaries it bred. Released just after FDR's inauguration, Gabriel Over the White House had its cinematic president form an Army of Con­ struction "subject to military discipline," use military courts-martial to try and execute racketeers, and display America's air power to force the world's na­ tions to disarm.2Similar moods surfaced in nervous admiration of Mussolini's Italian fascism—far less often Hitler's version—and in recurrent speculation that FDR's New Deal or other forces (like Louisiana's senator Huey Long) might usher in fascism. There was no consensus that militaristic solutions were desirable—more Americans probably feared them than wanted them—but their mere mention indicated how hard it was to imagine solutions to the Great Depression that did not partake of war, revolution, or some mixture of the two. These uses of the idea and the institutions of war drew them closer to the center of American politics and revealed that their emerging centrality derived from dynamics internal to the nation as well as from challenges beyond its shores. In particular, those uses of war exposed how much the nation's coming militarization owed to uneasiness about the growing size and power of na­ tional government. Passionate calls for federal action to cope with the Great Depression collided with persistent distrust of a powerful state, a distrust in­ scribed in the Constitution and linked to faith in individual responsibility, which strong government would presumably undermine. Sometimes ex­ pressed by FDR himself, distrust of the state impeded its authority to take large, effective action. It required the sanction of war— as memory, model, metaphor, or menace— to sustain that authority. As William Leuchtenburg later commented, use of the "war analogue" during the 1930s exposed "both an impoverished tradition of reform and the reluctance of the nation to come to terms with the leviathan state," as if the nation could find no way "to organize collective action save in war or its surrogate."3Federal action to discipline corporations, employ the im­ poverished, or aid the elderly seemed of arguable necessity—useful, but rarely compelling to the nation's survival. The arena of war, on the other hand, pre­ sumably compelled action: nothing less than the nation's survival and honor were at stake. Borrowing from that arena, Roosevelt and others gained legit­ imacy for state action otherwise viewed suspiciously and tried to forge the unity that war presumably entailed—to override differences of class, ideology, race, and the like that supposedly hampered state action. Enhancing the state's legitimacy, the war analogy also served the New Deal's conservative purposes. War, as Americans increasingly understood it, required

EMERGENCE,

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centralized direction and executive supremacy. The New Dealers' "war ap­ proach," according to Leuchtenburg, "rejected both mass action and socialist planning" in favor of corporate-government cooperation. New Dealers most feared not "the opposition of the conservatives, who were discredited," but in­ stead "the menace of antiplutocratic movements. Yet in damping the fires of popular dissent, they also snuffed out support they would need to keep the reform spirit alive." To be sure, the "war approach" was not consistently fol­ lowed, FDR did sometimes stoke the "fires of popular dissent," and antistatism limited the New Deal's centralizing tendencies. But the war analogy, with all its connotations of emergency and peril, did presume entrusting national elites with extraordinary power.4 Although the metaphors and models of war enhanced the power and legit­ imacy of the state, few Americans consciously intended that result. The war analogy came too easily to require much calculation. Sometimes its use was simply trivial, a mere gloss on other rationales more deeply felt. And it did not lead directly to war or to the nation's militarization: only in concert with chang­ ing economics, politics, and technology on the international stage could those results occur. But use of war as metaphor and model did help prepare Ameri­ cans materially and psychologically for war. And by allowing them to avoid the central dilemma of the state's legitimacy, it eased political conflict in the 1930s at the price of strengthening the habit, destined to reappear over the next half-century, of harnessing politics and state initiatives to the imperatives and models of war. In those indirect but powerful ways, it furthered the transition to a militarized America. Roosevelt was ideally suited to preside over and speed along that transition. Few modem presidents had the background and temperament to move so comfortably in the arenas of both war and peace. His first major position, as assistant secretary of the navy during World War I, increased his knowledge of war abroad and politics at home. His gravest political crisis before his presidency—his 1919 investigation into homosexual behavior at the Newport Naval Training Station met a Senate subcommittee's harsh reprimand and a public outcry over his use of youthful sailors to entrap alleged offenders— came at the troubled intersection of military policy and domestic culture, where conflicts would arise repeatedly in the next decades. Rhetorically, FDR was gifted at employing the images of one arena in the other, as when domestic crisis led him to invoke the metaphors of war, and later when he translated war's demands back into the homefront's language of production. Most of all, he was comfortable with the demands of war and the power he exercised in it. He shared little of the era's fear of corporate-military institutions and their power to manipulate or corrupt the nation. He was instead in that tradition of elite easterners like Teddy Roosevelt and Henry L. Stimson, who championed preparedness and accepted the institutional demands that modem war seemed to make. At the same time, he was not awed by the romance of war or by the

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men and institutions that conducted it. He presented war's demands with a coolness appropriate to the modem temper and to a nation suspicious of the lofty idealism of 1917. It is true that his attitudes and talents did not always serve him well. It is also true that he alone did not guide the nation toward mil­ itarization, whose course he only partly intended and dimly foresaw. Lesser leaders might have taken that course. Roosevelt did so expertly. FDR drew on an old tradition of using war politically and rhetorically. Amid the prosperity of the 1920s, few found war a useful metaphor for domestic crisis simply because few perceived a crisis. But as a model of national unity and state control of a chaotic economy. World War I loomed large even in pros­ perous times among "more advanced Progressives," who "looked back fondly toward the war mobilization which seemed to have drawn a blueprint for America's future."5 The decade's bold initiative in prohibition also emerged out of wartime idealism, experimentation, and anti-immigrant feeling. Cau­ tious reformers like Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, who saw govern­ ment's role as catalytic rather than coercive, found wartime experience equally instructive. Just how instructive emerged sharply after 1929, when hard economic times crippled Hoover's presidency. The common phrase "fighting the Depression" itself drew on military imagery, and analogies to war now flowed freely. The New Deal, Stuart Chase's widely read 1932 analysis, called for a "general staff" to direct the forces of economic recovery. The Nation compared the crisis of the 1930s to the Civil War. At one point. Hoover proclaimed, the nation had fought its "battle of Chateau-Thierry" and now had to regroup for its "battle of Soissons," referring to two key battles of World War I. Keenly aware of the na­ tional mood if inept at altering it. Hoover drew on the Great War's uses of pro­ paganda in trying to lift the nation's spirits. He awkwardly compared the De­ pression to war: "We have the combats, if against an unseen foe of inestimable strength. We have our men and we have our casualties among them." Hoover saw himself as "the commanding officer at general headquarters," an aide re­ called. "We have all been saying to each other the situation is quite like war," Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson observed.6 Proposals for economic recovery during the Hoover years also drew on war­ time experience. General Electric's Gerald Swope urged a federal bond issue of wartime dimensions to finance public works. Economist Richard T. Ely sought an economic general staff to direct an army of the unemployed that would "re­ lieve distress with all the vigor and resources of brain and brawn that we em­ ployed in the World War." Favorite legacies from the last war were its War In­ dustries Board and War Finance Corporation, the latter a model for the new Reconstruction Finance Corporation.7 Remembered in different ways. World War I was inevitably used to diverse purposes in the 1930s. While some progressives saw in it a model for forceful action. Hoover used "the metaphor of war to serve a conservative function: that

EMERGENCE,

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of draining internal antagonisms onto a common national enemy." Such uses of war were problematical, as some critics recognized: war's organizational ma­ chinery was designed to swell production, whereas during the Depression pro­ duction far outstripped demand; and war sanctioned temporary improvisa­ tions, whereas many reformers sought long-term structural change. An effort to drain "internal antagonisms onto a common national enemy" was also risky, since war produced an identifiable enemy, but the foe now was an abstraction, the "Depression." For that reason among others, Hoover's effort to rally sup­ port did him little good. He did no better during the bleak summer of 1932, when the "Bonus Army" of World War veterans marched on Washington to demand early receipt of their service bonuses. Placards reading "Cheered in '17, Jeered in '32" symbolically linked the war and the Depression, but Hoover went far beyond symbols when he called in the army, under Gen. Douglas MacArthur, whose tanks and infantry expelled the veterans from Pennsylvania Av­ enue and torched their shacks at Anacostia flats.8 The problematic utility of the war analogy at such specific levels suggests that its appeal went deeper. War was invoked to sanction action itself as much as any specific action. Americans were told to "consider what would happen if the United States declared war today. Everybody knows what would happen. Congress would immediately stop this interminable talk and appropriate." As Roosevelt condemned Hoover in 1932: "Compare this panic-stricken policy of delay and improvisation with that devised to meet the emergency of war fif­ teen years ago." His claim that in 1917 "the whole Nation mobilized for war" also implied that a warlike unity against the Depression would override divi­ sions among Americans. Of course, the Democratic Party, having held the White House during the Great War, more easily laid claim to its legacy.9 That was quickly apparent in the parade of agencies and actions improvised by the administration and Congress in 1933. FDR's first major step was to in­ voke the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 to declare a national bank holi­ day. Days later, he drew on the authority Congress had given Wilson during the war to ask for emergency powers to balance the budget—supported by congressmen citing "a state of war" and the necessity to "follow the flag."10 "There was scarcely a New Deal act or agency that did not owe something to the experience of World War I." Major organizations owed a debt, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, whose anchor was a wartime government nitrate and power project at Muscle Shoals, and the Agricultural Adjustment Admin­ istration, inspired by the War Food Administration and headed by George Peek, for whom "this whole thing clicks into shape" because of "his war experi­ ence." Most New Deal agencies owed debts to the legal authority, program­ matic example, bureaucratic shell, key personnel, or rhetorical inspiration of the Great War, and collectively to two grand wartime legacies, bureaucratic im­ provisation and deficit financing. Meanwhile, New Dealers fondly cast their jobs and goals in military language, whether they "volunteered" or were

20

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MILITARIZATION

OF AMERI CA

"drafted," served at "general headquarters in Washington, D.C." or in "the front-line trenches," worked as generals or as "noncoms," marched in "divi­ sions" or as "shock troops." Indicating the grimness of their task, their meta­ phors invoked army duty, not more glamorous naval or air service. Implicitly, they also rendered the New Deal as men's work; women did not buy easily into military language.11 Few agencies revealed the debt to the last war more than the National Recov­ ery Administration, set up in 1933 to regulate production, prices, and wages. It was modeled on the War Industries Board, inspired by "the great cooperation of 1917 and 1918" (as FDR called it), headed by Gen. Hugh Johnson, a West Pointer involved in wartime mobilization, and promoted by propaganda tech­ niques borrowed from the World War.12 Those techniques exposed both the menacing and laughable possibilities la­ tent when war's models are harnessed to domestic crusades. Johnson figured that he could speed economic recovery with a patriotic campaign designed to pressure businesses into signing agreements on wages, prices, and production. Plastered on thousands of storefronts, the Blue Eagle (critics thought it distur­ bingly similar to Nazi icons) and its slogan "We Do Our Part" became symbols of compliance with NRA codes and support for the New Deal. Women will "save our country," Johnson proclaimed, and achieve "as great a victory as the Argonne. It is zero hour for housewives. Their battle cry is 'Buy now under the Blue Eagle!' " Johnson likened failure to join "this great army of the New Deal" to wartime treason and dubbed anyone disloyal to the effort a "slacker," a World War I term for those who evaded patriotic duty. Roosevelt, no slacker at rhetoric himself, said the same thing less harshly. "In war, in the gloom of night attack, soldiers wear a bright badge on their shoulders to be sure that comrades do not fire on comrades," he noted in urging Americans to display the Blue Eagle. "On that principle, those who cooperate in this program must know each other at a glance." The hoopla climaxed in September 1933 with the big­ gest parade in New York City's history.13 A different thrust of the New Deal— to link recovery with rearmament— was less important at the time but telling in its implications. Military spending fell in the early 1930s, reaching a historic low as a percentage of total budgets, but began a sharp rise in fiscal 1935. Meanwhile, the official defense budget excluded the use of Public Works Administration funds to build aircraft car­ riers, bombers, attack planes, military airports, aviation research facilities, and army barracks. Those funds, $824 million over several years, were large, about equal to the official defense budget in any one year, and such imaginative bud­ geting generated controversy: Congress forbade it in 1935.14 As with much else in the New Deal, the close connection between military programs and economic recovery was not unique to the United States during the depression. Critics as diverse as business conservatives and the Commu­ nist Party's Daily Worker, and even some New Deal sympathizers, compared

EMERGENCE,

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this a n d o th e r practices to those of N a zi G erm an y a n d o th er natio n s. M ilitary sp e n d in g to p ro m o te recovery, w o rk cam p s for th e u n e m p lo y ed , a n d th e sta te 's u se of m artia l rhetoric w ere am o n g the sim ilarities. C o m m o n to th em all w a s a m o re a ssertiv e sta te re sp o n d in g to crisis o r ex p lo itin g it. Too m u ch can b e m ad e of su c h co m p ariso n s, how ever. T hey in d icated less som e ideological affinity th a n th e m a n n e r in w h ic h econom ic crisis d ro v e d ifferent political sy stem s to ­ w a rd co m m o n responses (as often h a p p e n s in w a r as well). In th e A m erican case, th ey also in d icated a g ain the im p o v e rish ed tra d itio n of g o v e rn m e n ta l ac­ tion, in w h ic h th e m ilitary sto o d o u t as the o ldest, biggest, b est-train ed b u re a u ­ cracy for tak in g large actions, w ith its long record of b u ild in g d am s, co ping w ith n a tu ra l d isasters, m obilizing m en, a n d p ro cessin g p a p erw o rk . T he w a rlik e fren zy of 1932-1933 so o n su b sid e d , b u t som e u ses of w a r as m et­ a p h o r a n d m o d el su sta in ed p o p u la r N e w D eal p ro g ra m s th ro u g h o u t th e 1930s, m o st of all the C ivilian C o n serv atio n C o rp s (CCC). E nlisting th o u sa n d s of u n ­ e m p lo y ed y o u n g m e n (an d o ld er W orld W ar I veterans), "R oosevelt's Tree A rm y " w a g e d w a r o n forest fires, floods, a n d soil erosion. A lth o u g h C o n g ress scaled b ack FD R 's d e sig n for a m ore reg im en te d p ro g ram , m o b ilizatio n of " O u r Forest A rm y a t W ar" u n lea sh e d m em o ries of 1917, a n d th e U n ited States A rm y ra n th e co rp s (reluctantly, w h e n o th er agencies p ro v e d u n e q u a l to th e task). Boys received rig o ro u s physical train in g , lin ed u p for roll call b y p la ­ toons, a n d g o t "d ish o n o rab ly d isc h arg e d " if th ey left th e co rp s early. A d m irers saw in th e CCC v irtu e s lo n g a ttrib u te d to u n iv ersal m ilitary service— a n "A m erican izin g influence" p u llin g b o y s loose from th eir local ties, fam iliariz­ in g th em w ith the n a tio n 's w h o len ess a n d g ra n d e u r, a n d forg in g a sense of n a ­ tio n h o o d o u t of d iv erse ethnic, regional, a n d class id en tities.15 T he C C C a lso fo resh ad o w ed th e m ilita ry 's tro u b le d b u t p io n eerin g role in race relations, for C ongress in clu d ed a n ex tra o rd in a ry b a n o n racial d iscrim in a­ tio n in th e co rp s's o p eratio n . E nforcing th a t b a n w a s a n o th e r m atter. Especially in th e South, b u t n o t only there, a ch o ru s of p ro test, com p lete w ith shrill a larm s a b o u t d a n g e rs to w h ite w o m a n h o o d , arose a g ain st racial in te g ratio n o r th e en ­ c a m p m e n t of blacks nearby. R oosevelt, seein g "political d y n a m ite " in th e issue, d u c k e d it, a n d the CCC n e v e r effectively in te g rate d blacks o r p laced th em o n a n e q u al footing. T hey d id ev en tu ally achieve eq u al rep re se n ta tio n in th e corps, h o w ev er, a n d the C C C 's achievem ents in race relations, exceeding th o se of m o st N e w D eal agencies, w ere a reh earsal for th e tim e w h e n global crisis h itc h ed th e fo rtu n es of A frican-A m ericans to th e a rm e d forces.16 D espite its record in race relatio n s— or, for m in o rities, b ecau se of it— the CC C w a s the m o st p o p u la r N e w D eal agency. N o t th a t A m erican s em b raced it as a train in g g ro u n d for w ar. W h en the a ssistan t secretary of w a r lik en ed th e corps to "econom ic sto rm tro o p s" in 1934, o r its civilian d irecto r b o a sted in 1937 th a t CC C bo y s c o u ld be " tu rn e d into first-class fig h tin g m e n a t alm o st a n in ­ sta n t's notice," critics p o u n c e d h a rd , voicing w id e sp re a d fear th a t th e corps co u ld becom e a vehicle for fascistic o r bellicose im p u lses. Its p o p u la rity n o n e-

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theless rem a in e d o v erw h elm in g . T he co rp s w a s celeb rated as a w a y to c h an n el con structively th e explosive p o ten tial of th o u sa n d s of y o u n g m e n a n d to im ­ p a rt d irectio n to a n a tio n b a tte re d b y th e D epression. T h at celeb ratio n c o u ld u n fo ld d e sp ite th e d e c a d e 's in ten se a n tiw a r sp irit b ecau se th e C C C fulfilled a n o ld d ream . It p ro v id e d th e v irtu e s of m ilitary service w ith o u t th e vices of w ar, its attractiv e form s w ith o u t its u g ly substance. A m erican s c o u ld th in k of th eir a rm y as alm o st a social service agency, n o t a n in stru m e n t of w a r.17 T he CCC n o n e th e le ss p re p a re d A m erican s for w a r in w a y s m o stly ig n o red at th e tim e. It m a d e th e a rm e d forces seem essen tial to n a tio n a l vitality. It accus­ to m ed a g e n eratio n of y o u n g m e n to m ilitary service. A n d it g ave th e a rm y p o ­ litical resp ect a n d u sefu l experience in th e logistics of d e alin g w ith larg e n u m ­ b ers of m en. N o t su rp risin g ly , the CCC easily sh ifted fu n ctio n late in th e 1930s, w h e n p o lls sh o w e d o v e rw h elm in g a p p ro v a l for in tro d u c in g fo rm al m ilitary tra in in g into th e CCC. By 1940 "R oosevelt's Tree A rm y " h a d b ecom e a train in g g ro u n d for h is real arm y. T he CCC w a s o n ly a m o re p o in te d illu stra tio n of h o w th e N e w D eal p ro ­ v id e d w h a t R oosevelt w o u ld call "in te rn a l p re p a re d n e ss" for th e co m in g w o rld crisis. Recovery, n o t p re p a re d n e ss, w a s h is p rim a ry objective in 1933, b u t b y 1936, before th re a ts fro m ab ro a d d o m in a te d h is a g en d a , FDR b e g a n p u ttin g a d ifferent tw ist o n th e N e w Deal. "N a tio n a l d efen se a n d th e fu tu re of A m erica w ere in v o lv ed in 1917. N a tio n a l d efense a n d th e fu tu re of A m erica w ere also in v o lv ed in 1933," h e a n n o u n c e d .18 A s h e a n d o th e r N e w D ealers su g g ested , th e N e w D eal se rv ed n a tio n al d e ­ fense in w ay s b ro a d e r a n d m o re p ro fo u n d th a n its specific m ilitary p ro g ram s. It p ro tec te d a n d d e v e lo p e d n a tu ra l resources, fro m riv ers to forests to farm lan d , n e e d e d in w ar. T h ro u g h p ro g ra m s like ru ra l electrification a n d h ig h w a y d ev el­ o p m en t, a n d th ro u g h the a d m in istra tio n 's a d ro it u se of th e m ed ia, it p u lle d local co m m u n ities a n d iso lated A m ericans in to th e n a tio n al g rid of m ed ia sys­ tem s, p ro m o tin g n a tio n al consciousness a n d loyalties. It reo rie n te d c o rp o ra ­ tions, u n io n s, farm g ro u p s, a n d o th er p o w e rfu l in terests to w a rd W ash in g to n a n d accustom ed th e m to th e p o w e r th a t g o v e rn m e n t w o u ld h av e in w artim e. It m o d ern ize d th e p h y sical a n d o rg an izatio n al stru c tu re s of g o v e rn m e n t a t all levels a n d its ability to fu n ctio n decisively in crisis. It sp o n so re d artistic efforts th a t celebrated the n a tio n 's tra d itio n s a n d h e ig h te n e d n a tio n al consciousness. It stre n g th e n ed th e h e a lth a n d m o rale of y o u n g w o rk e rs w h o m ig h t carry w a r's b u rd en s. A bove all, it su sta in e d th e h o p e s of b e le ag u e red A m erican s a n d th eir tru st in g o v ern m en t. M any of these achievem en ts w e re intan g ib le, b u t Roose­ velt, n o in co n sid erab le stu d e n t of w arfare, so o n a p p re cia te d h o w th o se in ta n ­ gibles co n trib u te d to the n a tio n 's stre n g th in w ar. H e d id so v iv id ly in h is Ja n u ary 4,1939, A n n u a l M essage, a t a tim e w h e n th e global crisis w a s m u c h o n h is m in d . " O u r n a tio n 's p ro g ra m of social a n d eco­ nom ic refo rm is therefore a p a rt of defense, as basic as a rm a m e n ts th em selv es," h e a n n o u n ce d , offering illustrations. A lm ost co nflating th e N e w D eal w ith n a-

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tio n al defense, h e g ra n d ly proclaim ed: "N e v er h av e th ere b e e n six y ears of su c h far-flung in te rn a l p re p a re d n e ss in o u r h isto ry ."19 W artim e o b serv ers so o n echoed R oosevelt's them es. T he N e w D eal "sto o d u s in g o o d ste ad w h e n w a r cam e u p o n u s," o n e scholar a rg u e d , for " o u r A m eri­ can cities faced the call to w a r w ith g reater un ity , h ealth , skills, a n d p ro d u c tiv e p o w er, a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g of w h a t th ey are fig h tin g for a n d ag ain st, th a n co u ld p o ssib ly h a v e b e e n tru e o th erw ise." D ixon W ecter, h isto ria n a n d acute ju d g e of w a rtim e m o o d s, a rg u e d in 1944 " th a t A m erica's y o u n g le a d ersh ip believ ed coolly— as France's, for exam ple, h a d n o t— th a t th eir c o u n try h e ld so m eth in g v a lu a b le e n o u g h to be p a id for b y d e a th ." W ecter a sk ed " w h e th e r A m erica w o u ld h a v e lo o k ed w o rth d y in g f o r . . . if it h a d b e en th e n a tio n of th e H a rd in g scan d als, th e B onus A rm y, a n d th e so u p kitch en s of M r. H o o v e r's rep u b lic?" N o , h e a n sw e re d firm ly, for th e R oosevelt era " w e n t far to w a rd c u rin g th e cyni­ cism of y o u th g ro w in g u p in th e sh a d o w of m aterialism , d e p ressio n , a n d the b a n k ru p t peace of th e ir fath e rs."20 T h o u g h p a rtisa n a n d co n tested , su c h in ter­ p re ta tio n s of the N e w D eal c a p tu re d a n elem en t of its success a n d th e w a y m a n y A m ericans p erceived it. O th e r d e v elo p m e n ts b esid es th e N e w D eal, n o tab ly th e e ra 's d istin ctiv e n a ­ tionalism , also h e lp e d A m ericans to p re p a re m aterially a n d psychologically for w ar. T he d e c a d e 's d o m in a n t c u ltu ra l a n d intellectu al tre n d s im p a rte d a n acute sense of A m erican h isto ry a n d cu ltu re. P o p u la r n o v els like Gone with the Wind (1936), a m b itio u s projects like th a t a t W illiam sb u rg to reco n stru ct a p h y sical p ast, a n d th e artistic a n d h istorical e n d ea v o rs sp o n so red b y th e N e w D eal b u ilt a n e w consciousness of h isto ry a n d trad itio n . It w a s e v id en t, W arren S u sm an a rg u e d , in th e strik in g p o p u la rity of R u th B enedict's Patterns of Culture (1934) a n d , "fo r th e first tim e, freq u e n t reference to a n 'A m erican W ay of life.' " T his "effort to seek a n d to define A m erica as a c u ltu re" g ain ed en erg y from th e inse­ c u rity th a t th e D ep ressio n b re d a n d th e resu ltin g d esire to fin d a n an ch o r in a co m m o n p a st.21 T he d e v e lo p m e n t of n a tio n w id e m ed ia sy stem s e n h an c ed th is c u ltu ra l selfconsciousness. T he n e w a rt of o p in io n p o llin g sh o w ed A m erican s "th e core of v a lu e s a n d o p in io n s" th a t su p p o se d ly u n ite d them . R adio a n d m o v ies h e lp e d to m ak e for "th e sh a rin g of co m m o n experience, b e th ey of h u n g e r, d u stb o w ls, or w a r." 22 FDR a n d h is N e w D ealers p ro v e d a d e p t at lea d in g th e n e w m ed ia (less so the p rin t m edia) to p ro v id e sym bols of n a tio n al action. In p o p u la r cul­ tu re, these d e v elo p m e n ts w e re v iv id ly d e m o n stra te d o n O ctober 30,1938, in th e w a k e of th e M u n ich crisis, w h e n O rso n W elles's ra d io d ra m a tiz a tio n of H . G. W ells's The War of the Worlds trig g ered a n in fam o u s p an ic am o n g listeners co n v inced a M a rtia n in v asio n w a s actually tak in g place. T h o u g h a distinctive n a tio n alism resu lte d from these d ev elo p m en ts, it d ic­ ta te d n o one political stance. In stead , C harles A lex an d er arg u es, it c o u ld em ­ b race "in te rn atio n alism a n d isolationism , socialism a n d co n serv atism , n o t to m en tio n radicalism , liberalism , a n d e v en fascism ." A s S u sm an notes, "It w a s

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n o t. . .sim p ly th a t m a n y w rite rs a n d a rtists a n d critics b e g a n to sin g g lo w in g ly of A m erican life a n d its p a s t" — alth o u g h , significantly, th ey d id . M ore im p o r­ ta n t w a s a n acute th o u g h h a rd ly u n ifo rm sense of th e tra d itio n s a n d a ttitu d e s th a t p re su m a b ly u n ite d A m erican s— of n a tio n h o o d itself. T he c o n test o v er h o w to define n a tio n h o o d w a s sh a rp a n d u n reso lv ed , b u t th e c o n test itself d e ­ fin ed th e e ra 's n atio n alism m ore th a n p a rtic u la r stances taken. Its im p o rt lay n o t in m ak in g A m ericans m ore bellicose b u t in g iv in g th em a k een er sen se of w h a t th ey m ig h t d efe n d in w ar. It th u s m irro re d th e N e w D eal's ach iev em en ts in " in te rn a l p re p a re d n e ss." 23 T hose achievem ents in in tern al p re p a re d n e ss, a n d in d e e d th e cleverness of th e p h ra se itself, m a rk e d a final w a y in w h ic h R oosevelt b o rro w e d fro m th e aren a of w a r to confer legitim acy o n the sta te 's role a t hom e. Ju st b ecau se FDR w a s successful a t su c h b o rro w in g d id n o t, h o w ev er, g u a ra n te e h im control o v er th e n a tio n 's foreign a n d m ilitary policy. E xploiting w a r's m o d els a n d m et­ a p h o rs w a s one thing. C h a rtin g a p a th for th e n a tio n in a g ro w in g w o rld crisis w a s so m e th in g else. In th a t effort, FDR w a s m o re cau tio u s th a n h e w a s in fash ­ io n in g p ro g ram s of econom ic o rd e r a n d recovery. A n d for go o d reason. For one th in g , th e in te rn atio n al a ren a w a s far less p re ­ d ictable a n d controllable b y h im th a n the dom estic. For an o th er, h e w a s less su re a b o u t w h a t to d o abroad. Ja p a n 's ex p an sio n in C h in a, M u sso lin i's fascism . H itle r's rea rm am en t, th e sta g n a n t in te rn atio n al eco n o m y — su c h th re a ts to global stability FDR u n d e rs to o d fairly w ell, b u t far less so h o w to d e al w ith them . M oreover, th e forceful exercise of foreig n a n d m ilitary policy, w h a te v e r its co n tent, co u ld a g g ra v ate fears of sta te p o w e r a n d a d ictato rial p resid en c y a lre ad y h a rb o re d b y his o p p o n en ts. A lth o u g h these factors co m p elled caution, o th ers g ave FDR elb o w room . W ith th e line b e tw e e n dom estic a n d foreign p olicy m o re b lu rre d th a n ever, ac­ tio n in one sp h e re co u ld spill o v e r in to th e other, as u sin g re a rm a m e n t as a re­ covery m easu re alre ad y h a d show n. C onstitu tio n ally , th e p re sid e n t h a d a freer h a n d vis-à-vis C ongress a n d the c o u rts in fo reig n a n d m ilita ry affairs th a n in dom estic policy. Finally, m a n y A m ericans w ere g e n u in e ly a la rm e d a b o u t the w o rld crisis, if d iv id e d a b o u t h o w to d eal w ith it. If ex tern al th rea ts w ere p e r­ ceived to be sufficiently m enacing, m an y A m erican s w e re p re p a re d to reg a rd th e sta te 's action ab ro ad as com pelling. T hey w ere h a rd ly p re p a re d to d o so a t m id -d e ca d e, ho w ev er. M em ories of W orld W ar I w ere a m ajor reason. P articip atio n in th a t w a r w a s v iew ed su s­ picio u sly b y m a n y A m ericans a n d w a r itself w a s b itin g ly p o rtra y e d in p o p u la r cu ltu re, as in the A cadem y A w a rd -w in n in g All Quiet on the Western Front (1930), th e b est of a n e w g enre of a n tiw a r film s. A lread y v iew ed u n e asily in the 1920s, W orld W ar I only seem ed m ore tragic in th e 1930s, since th e econom ic d isru p tio n it h a d u n lea sh e d a n d the b u rd e n of d e b t it h a d left b e h in d w ere of­ ten seen as causes of the G reat D epression. The backlash a g ain st p a rticip a tio n in the w ar, in clu d in g a k een sense th a t th e

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n a tio n h a d b e e n sn o o k ered into it, clim axed a t m id -d e ca d e w ith a congres­ sional in q u iry h e a d e d b y Sen. G erald N ye. S en satio n ally c o n d u cted , sen sa­ tio n ally co vered b y th e m ed ia, sen satio n ally ech o ed in bestsellers like The Mer­ chants of Death, th a t in q u iry b u ilt o n a d e c a d e 's d e b ate a b o u t th e causes of th e w ar, a n d o n su sp icio n s of co rp o rate a n d m ilitary p o w e r lo n g felt b y p o p u lists, a n tib u sin ess progressives, socialists, a n d v a rio u s radicals. N y e 's co m m ittee fo u n d collusion o n a n a tio n al a n d in te rn atio n al scale am o n g financiers, arm s m ak ers, a n d g o v e rn m e n t officials. T he com m ittee g ra sp e d h o w th a t collusion arose o u t of th e com plex d e m a n d s of m o d e m w a r a n d m o d e m capitalism , b u t c o n d e m n e d h o w it h a d p u lle d the U n ited States in to w a r in 1917 a n d feared h o w it m ig h t d o so again. It also w a rn e d th a t e v en in p eacetim e su c h collusion fu rth e re d th é c o n cen tratio n of co rp o rate a n d g o v e rn m e n ta l p o w e r a n d th e reg ­ im e n ta tio n of A m erican lives. T he N y e com m ittee criticized the p a s t m ore effectively th a n it sh a p e d th e fu ­ ture. It w a s p a rtly responsible for th e series of n e u tra lity law s p a sse d b y C o n ­ gress b e g in n in g in 1935 a n d d e sig n ed to p ro h ib it th e econom ic en tan g lem en ts th a t m ig h t suck the n a tio n in to a n o th e r w ar, b u t its o th er p ro p o sa ls— to n a tio n ­ alize m u n itio n s in d u strie s a n d cu rb w a r p ro fite erin g — w ere n e v er serio u sly re­ alized. T he issues it raised w ere d e e m e d p e rip h e ra l to d e b ate o v er fo reig n p o l­ icy a t th e d e c a d e 's close a n d rem a in e d p e rip h e ra l u n til resu rrec te d in th e 1960s. C o n tro v ersy ov er th e in stitu tio n al u n d e rp in n in g s of m ilitarizatio n , it m ig h t b e said , th u s flared u p a n d th e n d ie d o u t in th e m id-1930s, ju st w h e n m ilitarizatio n w a s g ain in g m o m e n tu m , a n d th e N y e co m m ittee itself b ecam e th e object of snickers from so p h isticated q u a rte rs th a t rid ic u le d its sen satio n alism w h ile o v erlo o k in g its substance. Still, th e c o m m ittee 's d elib eratio n s w ere a reliable b a ro m e te r of p e rsistin g re­ v u lsio n a g ain st the last w a r a n d a m o u n tin g a n tiw a r sp irit. H isto rian s p ro v id e d a n o th e r m ea su re of th a t revulsion. In 1935, jo u rn alist-h isto rian W alter M illis offered Road to War: America, 1914-17, a d a m n in g bestseller. A m o n g p ro fes­ sional h isto rian s, a sh a rp co n test a b o u t th e orig in s of W orld W ar I h a d clim axed in th e 1920s, b u t th ey fo u n d a su rro g a te for it d u rin g th e 1930s w h e n th ey re­ h a sh e d th e causes a n d consequences of th e C ivil W ar, n o w lab eled th e "n e e d ­ less w a r," th e " w o rk of politicians a n d p io u s cran k s," th e p ro d u c t of a "b lu n ­ d e rin g g en eratio n ," a n d "th e gh astly scourg e."24 M an y college stu d e n ts sh a red th eir m o o d , a n d o n ly th e 1960s w o u ld see co m p arab le stu d e n t a n tiw a r activism . S tu d e n ts rallied a g ain st co n scrip tio n a n d w ar, e v en th o u g h th e U n ited States w as e n g ag e d in n e ith e r a t m id-d ecad e. O n som e cam p u ses, th ey succeeded in e n d in g req u ire m e n ts (still in force at m an y state schools) th a t m ale stu d e n ts take reserv e officer train in g . T hey also attack ed collegiate sp o rts for inculcating w arlik e a ttitu d e s a n d w ith d e a d ly h u m o r created m ock o rg an izatio n s like th e V eterans of F u tu re W ars, F uture C h ap lain s of F uture W ars, a n d F uture W ar P rofiteers.25 A n tiw a r stu d e n ts w ere p a rt of a q u arrelso m e alliance of o u trig h t pacifists.

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activists from le a d in g P ro te stan t d o m in a tio n s a n d from th e n a tio n al YM CA a n d YW CA, w o m e n 's g ro u p s, co m m u n ists a n d socialists a n d lab o r o rg an izers, a n d co nservatives fearful of the p o w e r th a t w a r w o u ld give R oosevelt a n d the D em ocrats. T h at alliance h a d n o stable ideological core, o n ly a n in ten se a n tiw a r spirit. It em braced som e p e o p le in d ig n a n t a b o u t th e h o rro rs of S talinist R ussia a n d o th ers m ore fearful of fascism , in clu d in g som e w h o jo in ed th e fig h t a g a in st it w h e n th e S p an ish C ivil W ar (1936-1939) p itte d F ranco's rebels, su p p o rte d b y N azi G erm an y a n d fascist Italy, a g ain st S p ain 's c o n stitu tio n al g o v ern m en t. It em b raced o th ers still searching for w a y s to u se th e L eague of N a tio n s o r p riv a te p h ila n th ro p ic o rg an izatio n s to m ak e peace p revail. But th is m o tley alliance w a s n o t far fro m th e m ain strea m of A m erican op in io n , w h ich , as p o llsters sh o w ed , o v e rw h elm in g ly re p u d ia te d e n try in to th e last w ar. N o less resp ectab le a figure th a n K ansas p u b lish er W illiam A llen W hite b e w ailed th e w a ste a n d fu tility of th e G reat W ar, w ritin g in 1933 th a t "th e b o y s w h o d ie d ju st w e n t o u t a n d d ied . To th eir o w n so u ls' g lory of co u rse,— b u t w h a t else? . . . Yet th e n e x t w a r w ill see th e sam e h u rra h a n d th e sam e b o w w o w of th e b ig d o g s to g et th e little d o g s to go o u t a n d follow the b lo o d scent a n d g e t th e ir e n trails ta n g le d in th e b a rb e d w ire."26 V iew s like W hite's, th o u g h h a rd ly u n iv ersal, w e re w id e sp re a d , e v en fashionable. T hose v iew s g e n erate d m u c h of th e s u p p o rt for a far-reaching ch allen g e to p resid en tia l po w er, a p ro p o se d c o n stitu tio n al a m e n d m e n t e m p o w e rin g C o n ­ gress, except in th e case of d irect attack a n d a few o th e r ev en tu alities, to call a p o p u la r refe ren d u m to d ecid e w h e th e r the n a tio n w o u ld d eclare o r e n g ag e in w ar. T he a m e n d m e n t n a rro w ly failed a key test in th e H o u se in 1938 after stre n ­ u o u s lobbying a g ain st it b y the a d m in istratio n , a n d its p ro p o n e n ts w ere d is­ m issed th ereafter as n a rro w -m in d e d pacifists a n d isolationists, p e o p le w ith "n o co nception of w h a t m o d e m w a r . . . involves," as R oosevelt p riv a te ly p u t it. T he charge w a s inaccurate. T he a m e n d m e n t d re w su p p o rt from d iv erse sources, in clu d in g a rd e n t in tern atio n alists a n d p re p a re d n e ss ad v o cates, all u n ite d b y a d e te rm in a tio n to d em o cratize w a r-m a k in g policy. T h at d e te rm in a ­ tio n d id n o t d isa p p e a r after 1938, b u t n o su c h b ro a d challenge to p resid en tia l p o w e r w o u ld re a p p e a r u n til the 1960s. A s w ith th e N y e co m m ittee's failure, th e a m e n d m e n t's d efeat m a rk e d th e crest of resistance to a co u rse o n ly sta rtin g to accelerate.27 The m o v em en t for the a m e n d m e n t also ex p o sed th e role of w o m e n a n d g e n ­ d e r in w a r a n d foreign policy. Its chief spo n so r, In d ian a D em o crat L ouis L udlow , h a d long c h am p io n e d w o m e n 's rig h ts a n d a p p e a le d for su p p o rt from w o m e n 's g ro u p s. O verw helm ingly, th ey p ro v id e d it, b u t th ey offered little d is­ tinctive fem inist rhetoric in p ressin g for th e a m e n d m e n t o r for o th e r p la n k s in th e peace m o v em en t's p latform . M an y w o m e n 's o rg an izatio n s felt forced to d e ­ v o te en erg y to th eir lo n g stan d in g in terest in social w elfare, n o w h e ig h te n e d b y the D epression. Fem ale professionals, like th e jo u rn alist D o ro th y T h o m p so n a n d Nation p u b lish er Freda K irchw ey, p la y e d a g ro w in g role as in d iv id u a ls in

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m ed ia d e b ate a n d in th e N e w D eal bureaucracy, b u t th e m o st visible w o m e n in p o litics— Secretary of L abor Frances P erkins a n d E leanor R oosevelt— b o th sy m p a th iz e d w ith th e P re sid e n t's o u tlook a n d w e re c o n strain ed fro m ch allen g ­ in g it. C u ltu ra l im ag es com plicated w o m e n 's efforts to a d d re ss issu es of w a r a n d peace. T he G reat W ar, w ith its m ass carn ag e a m o n g m e n p itte d a g ain st its lib eratin g effects for m a n y w o m en , h a d left a n u g ly im p licatio n in A ngloA m erican c u ltu re th a t w o m e n w ere w a r's beneficiaries a n d m e n its victim s; a P u litze r P riz e -w in n in g 1937 cartoon, for exam ple, d e p ic te d w a r as a "syphilitic w h o re " te m p tin g m e n to th eir d re a d fate (see fig.1]!).28 M o d e m w a rfare w as c h an g in g w o m e n 's place in politics a n d cu ltu re, b u t in c h arg ed w a y s th a t m ad e w o m e n 's voices b o th concerned a n d cautious. T h ro u g h all th e d e b ates o n w a r a n d foreig n policy, a k in d of "iso latio n ism " d id p ersist. In 1944, B ritish c o m m en ta to r D. W. B rogan rem em b ered St. L ouis o n th e eve of the w a r as "th e calm , d e a d cen ter of a to rn a d o w h o se o u te r b o u n d ­ aries w ere too far aw ay for c o m p re h en sio n o r ap p re h en sio n ." T he n a tio n 's lo­ calism s h u c k him . "T he U n ited States is n o t a n d w ill n o t b e a v a st M etro lan d ." B rogan recalled the m o o d sy m pathetically: "It to o k th e actu al sh a d o w [of w ar], re p e a te d a g ain a n d again, to a w ak e n S om erset [E ngland]; Illinois h a d to a w a k e n w ith far less h e lp from th e eye a n d ear." But th e iso latio n ism h e d e ­ scrib ed w a s m ore a m o o d th a n a political p ositio n , a lin g erin g , d e sp e ra te sen se of in su larity from th e w o rld 's ills. Its stra in of "b ellig eren t n a tio n alism " d id th re a te n FD R 's d e sig n s for collective security, b u t iso latio n ism d ic ta te d few p o ­ sitio n s o n o th er issues, like rea rm am en t.29 M ore telling w a s h o w A m ericans co n sid ered th e fu tu re of w a rfare a n d th eir n a tio n 's role in it. For th e m o st p a rt in the 1930s, th ey im a g in ed a b e n ig n A m eri­ can a rm e d force in a m alig n w o rld of m ilitarism a n d technological change. Jap­ an ese forces w a rre d in C hina a n d Italian s in E thiopia, a n d G e rm a n re a rm a m e n t w a s o ste n ta tio u sly d isp la y e d to th e w o rld . L u rid tales, g iv en credence e v en b y so b er co m m en tato rs, circulated in science fiction, p u lp literatu re, a n d th e p o p ­ u la r p ress a b o u t fu tu re w a rs in itiated su d d e n ly b y air attack w ith gas, bio lo g ­ ical, incendiary, o r atom ic w e ap o n s, d ecim atin g n a tio n s o r civ ilization itself in h o u rs. T hese fantasies of technological ap o caly p se m a d e a n o th e r w a r seem lo ath so m e b u t also im p lied th a t w a r h a d becom e too h o rrib le to occur, o r th a t A m erican technological su p e rio rity m ig h t prevail. A g ain st a b ack d ro p of ag g ressio n ab ro a d a n d fan tasy u n ch eck ed , A m erica's a rm e d forces seem ed m o d est, e v en stodgy, g eared to d efen se a n d u n lik ely to w a g e m ajor w ar. The a rm y w a s sm all. T he n a v y w a s p o w e rfu l— alarm in g ly so to critics— b u t its m issio n rem ain ed defensive. T he A rm y A ir C o rp s w a s d e v el­ o p in g n e w bom bers, b u t backers of air p o w e r p o rtra y e d th em as d efen siv e w e a p o n s d e sig n e d to b last a n y forces crossing th e oceans to in v a d e A m erica. W h en A m erican B-17s in tercep ted a n Italian lin er in th e A tlantic in a train in g exercise g iv en live ra d io coverage, n e w sp a p e rs c a p tu re d th e d efen siv e p a ra ­ digm : "FLYING FORTS, 630 MILES OUT, SPOT ENEM Y TRO O P SH IPS."30 In

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a n y event, th e A ir C o rp s's u g ly stru g g le for in d ep e n d en c e fro m th e a rm y g ain ed m ore a tten tio n th a n its capabilities in w arfare. M ean w h ile, u se of A m er­ ican m ilitary p o w e r in C en tral A m erica a n d th e C arib b ean w a s d eclining, a n d its co m m itm en t to d e fe n d in g th e P h ilip p in es w a s in d o u b t. A ll in all, A m erican m ilitary p o w e r in the m id-1930s seem ed lim ited in size a n d m ission, its p o te n ­ tial reach o b scu red b y th e p a ra d ig m of defense, b y th e sm o k e g e n erate d in in ­ terservice rivalries, a n d b y u n flatte rin g co m p ariso n s to m ore fo rm id ab le p o w ers. In su ch circum stances, th e fo u n d a tio n s for global A m erican m ilitary p o w e r co u ld b e stre n g th e n ed w ith o u t attractin g m u c h atten tio n . T h o u g h k e en to e n ­ large th a t po w er, m ilitary officers n e ith e r foresaw a n o th e r w o rld w a r n o r w a n te d to e n te r it; th ey p re se n te d re a rm a m e n t in m o d e st term s, as a defen siv e m easu re. The gains in A m erican m ilitary po w er, in stea d of in v o lv in g g ross in ­ creases in a rm a m e n ts a n d p erso n n el, w ere g en erally su b tle, low -key, o r o u t of p u b lic view . T he m ilita ry 's train in g a n d strategic p la n n in g becam e m o re so­ p h isticated , as d id its linkages w ith civilian au th o rity , p riv a te in d u stry , a n d sci­ ence. Technological d e v e lo p m e n t p ro ce ed e d all th e m o re easily in a field like aviation, w h e re key a d v an ces d re w o n o r b en efited a civilian tra n s p o rt in d u s­ try th a t seem ed to e p ito m ize peaceful progress. K een to g u a rd a g ain st a rep e ti­ tio n of 1917, politicians a n d jo u rn alists focused o n n e u tra lity leg islatio n a n d w a rn e d a g ain st a m ass g ro u n d arm y, b u t often o v erlo o k ed th e su b tler d e v elo p ­ m en ts o r sim p ly fo u n d th em n o t th rea te n in g to th e v a g u e p rem ises of isola­ tionism . A t least u n til 1937, R oosevelt offered n o sig n s th a t A m erican m ilitary p o w e r w o u ld b e u se d ab ro a d in a m ajor w ar, for h e h a d n o in te n tio n th a t it sh o u ld be, or p ressin g n e e d to ch an g e course. M u ch of W ash in g to n 's a tte n tio n w e n t to m atters of econom ic d ip lo m acy ra th e r th a n to p ro b lem s of w a r a n d strategy. T he in ten tio n s of p o ten tial enem ies rem a in e d m u rk y , th o u g h h a rd ly co m fo rt­ ing, a n d the ability of old-line p o w e rs like France a n d B ritain to resist su c h en e­ m ies still seem ed substantial. By 1937, FDR so u g h t to e x p a n d th e n a v y a n d to o k m o d e st step s to explore h o w G erm an, Italian, a n d Jap an ese a d v an ces m ig h t b e resisted, b u t n o sense of im p e n d in g crisis g rip p e d h im a n d n o forceful lea d er­ sh ip ensued. T he w a n in g m o n th s of 1937 a n d the o p e n in g ones of 1938 saw a sh ift b o th at h o m e a n d abroad. R oosevelt's ill-fated a tte m p t to "p ack " th e S u p rem e C o u rt b y en larg in g its m em bership, strikes led b y n e w in d u stria l u n io n s, a n d a sh a rp recession set off b y cutbacks in g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g in ten sified th e clash of econom ic interests, stra in e d the N e w D eal coalition, a n d e ro d e d FD R 's p re s­ tige. "M id d leto w n " (M u n d e , In d ian a) h a d earlier g reeted fed eral aid like "m a n n a d irect from heav en ," b u t b y 1936 it d isp la y e d "a m o o d of an x io u s re­ se n tm e n t to w a rd those o n relief," a n d to w a rd fed eral p o w e r as w ell.31 A b ro ad , Japan a n d C hina ren ew ed full-scale w a r in th e su m m e r of 1937 a n d G e rm a n y g o b bled u p A u stria the follow ing spring.

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A m id this "sea of tro u b les" for R oosevelt, issues o th erw ise of se co n d ary im ­ p o rtan c e b ecam e flash p o in ts at th e ju n ctu re of foreign a n d dom estic policy. FD R 's req u e st of C ongress for p o w e r to reorg an ize executive agencies, com ing after th e C o u rt-p ack in g ep iso d e a n d ju st w h e n H itler seized A u stria, u n lea sh e d w ild charges (from conservative R oosevelt-haters am o n g oth ers) of d ictato r­ ship, allegations th a t "intensified w o rry th a t R oosevelt w a s im p o rtin g E u­ ro p e a n to talitarian ism into the U n ited States." A t th e sam e tim e, rig h t-w in g co n g ressm en shrilly d e n o u n c e d the N e w D eal as a tool of th e c o m m u n ist m e n ­ ace a n d a trea su ry for fu n d in g it.32 FDR w a s in tro u b le a t h o m e ju st as tro u b le escalated ab ro ad , th e tw in crises m erg in g in political rhetoric w h e n o p p o n e n ts a p p lie d m o d els of to talitarian ism to R oosevelt a n d the N e w Deal. T here w a s a logic to these co n n ected crises, a n d in d e e d to the w h o le course of th e N e w D eal a n d th e D epression. Seen as a k in d of w a r a n d m o d eled o n efforts to w ag e the last w ar, th e N e w D eal stru g g le a g ain st th e D ep ressio n could logically b le n d in to p re p a ra tio n s to w a g e w ar. Ju st w h ere, after all, d id one " w a r" e n d a n d th e n ex t begin? G ain in g legitim acy th ro u g h the m e ta p h o rs a n d m o d els of w ar, th e state m ig h t g a in fuller legit­ im acy th ro u g h w a r itself o r th ro u g h p re p a ra tio n s to w a g e it. R oosevelt su rely d id n o t foresee su ch a tran sitio n , only m u d d lin g h is w a y th ro u g h it. H e su rely w a s n o t eag er to e x p an d the n a tio n 's defenses, th e effort to d o so carry in g p o lit­ ical risks. Ju st as surely, h ow ever, his n o tio n of th e N e w D eal as "in te rn al p re ­ p a re d n e ss" n e atly stra d d le d a n d conflated th e tw o sp h e res of n atio n al action.

The Construction of National Security A lth o u g h p la y e d o u t in E urope, the M u n ich crisis of S ep tem b er 1938 m a rk e d a tu rn in g p o in t for the U n ited States as w ell. H itle r's d e m a n d for C zechoslova­ k ia's S u d e ten lan d , a n d his th re a t to go to w a r to g et it, sh o o k E u ro p e's capitals, as p an ick ed g o v e rn m e n ts gave gas m ask s to th eir citizens a n d d e sp e ra te e n ­ vo y s d a rte d a b o u t try in g to a v ert w o rld w ar. B ritish a n d F rench lead ers felt th ey h a d a w e ak h a n d : th eir re a rm a m e n t w a s in d isarray , th eir frien d across the A tlantic seem ed d isen g ag ed , th eir o th er possible ally (the Soviet U nion) scared them , th eir em p ires taxed th eir stren g th , th eir citizens d re a d e d w ar. A bove all, th ey feared attack b y the G e rm a n L uftw affe o n th eir cities. "We cannot expose ourselves now to a German attack," one E nglish g en eral insisted. "We simply com­ mit suicide if we do." B ritish p rim e m in ister N eville C h am b erlain reso lv ed th e crisis b y g iv in g H itler the S u d eten lan d , a lth o u g h H itler, y e arn in g for m ilitary conquest, w a s d isa p p o in te d th a t G erm an s seem ed su llen a t th e p ro sp e ct of w ar. For h is p a rt, C h am b erlain to o k p rid e in g ain in g tim e for B ritish rea rm a ­ m ent. The evils of "a p p e a se m e n t" d ru m m e d in to later g en eratio n s as the lesson of M u nich w ere n o t im m ed iately a p p a re n t.33 R egardless, R oosevelt to o k in stru ctio n from G e rm a n victory. Secretive, som etim es m isinform ed, often v a g u e o r fatu o u s, a n d b u ffeted b y fast-changing

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cu rren ts, h e n o n eth eless saw h im self as fash io n in g a h a rd -h e a d e d v iew of th e w o rld a n d th e role of p o w e r in it. For h im , co n v en tio n al in d ices of m ilita ry stre n g th m a tte re d little— b y th a t sta n d a rd , B ritain a n d France m ig h t h a v e p re ­ v ailed in the M u n ich crisis. W h at m a tte re d m o re w a s H itle r's a d ro it m ix of v er­ b al in tim id atio n , p ro p a g a n d a , a n d th rea ts to u n le a sh h is air p o w er, all b ra n ­ d ish e d in a w o rld w h e re in sta n t c o m m u n icatio n s a n d d e a d ly technologies in ten sified b o th real d a n g e rs a n d p ercep tio n s of th em . A s FDR saw it, th ese n e w form s of p o w e r h e ig h te n e d th e p e ril to A m erica b u t also, th o u g h h e said less a b o u t it publicly, th e p o ssib ility for exercising A m erican p o w e r— if h e co u ld b e a t H itle r a t his o w n gam e. FDR w a n te d the tools of th a t pow er. In th e p ith y su m m a ry of M u n ich offered b y o n e of h is a m b a ssad o rs, "If y o u h av e e n o u g h a irp lan e s y o u d o n 't h av e to go to B erchtesgaden" (w h ere C h a m b e rla in p re su m a b ly cav ed in to th e L uftw affe's threat). Because of th eir p o w e r to in tim id a te a n d destroy, b o m b ers seem ed to R oosevelt the tru m p card in th e n e w gam e. " H a d w e h a d th is su m m e r 5,000 p lan e s a n d th e capacity im m ed iately to p ro d u c e 10,000 p e r y ear," FDR to ld h is a d v iso rs in N ovem ber, "H itle r w o u ld n o t h a v e d a re d to tak e th e sta n d h e d id ." G u n s a n d barrack s " w o u ld n o t scare H itle r o n e b lan k ety -b lan k -b lan k bit!" o n e g en eral p a ra p h ra s e d R oosevelt. "W h a t h e w a n te d w a s airp lan es!" H is a t­ te m p ts to get th em w ere slo w ed b y a co n serv ativ e m ilitary b u rea u cra cy a n d b y su sp icio n s th a t h is p la n to sell aircraft to B ritain a n d France w o u ld en sn are A m erican fo rtu n es w ith th o se of w eak -w illed , d u p lic ito u s allies (w h o se ste a d ­ fastn ess R oosevelt also d o u b ted ). M o d est b y later sta n d a rd s, th e aircraft h e so u g h t w ere too few a n d cam e too late to c arry off a n y M u n ich in rev erse o r to p ro v id e m u ch h e lp to allies. N onetheless, h e h a d tak e n a m o m e n to u s tu rn b y p ro m o tin g the n e w est m ilitary technologies, b y m ak in g n a tio n a l secu rity h is p rim a ry concern, a n d b y a d v an c in g a n e w co n cep tio n of it.34 F ond of p lay in g sch o o lm aster to th e n atio n , R oosevelt p re se n te d th a t con­ c ep tio n w ith vigor. In A u g u s t 1938, h e h a d w a rn e d th a t "w e in th e A m ericas h av e becom e a co n sid eratio n to ev ery p ro p a g a n d a office a n d to ev ery g en eral staff b e y o n d th e seas."35 By January, h e w a s u n fo ld in g h is n e w c o n cep tio n in d e p th a n d detail: the U n ited States n o w resid ed in a seam less w o rld of com ­ m erce, com m unication, ideology, a n d technology, all of w h ic h w ere tea rin g d o w n the b a rrie rs th a t once h a d in su la te d A m erica. A s alw ays, R oosevelt's p u rp o se s w ere m u ltip le — to challenge th e n e u tra lity law s, justify rearm am en t, a n d ou tlin e th e evils of p o ten tial enem ies a n d th e th rea t to A m erica of th eir econom ic n atio n alism . But as h e saw it, th e p e ril w a s less econom ic o r ideological th a n technological a n d strategic. A s h e said o n Jan­ u a ry 4,1939, "T he w o rld h a s g ro w n so sm all a n d w e a p o n s of a ttack so sw ift" th a t peace h a s becom e indivisible, w a r u n co n tain ab le, a n d "ev e n ts of th u n ­ d e ro u s im p o rt h av e m o v ed w ith lig h tn in g sp e ed ." T echnological change, e sp e­ cially in aviation, h a d so sh ru n k space th a t e v en d ista n t en em ies co u ld th re a te n A m erica. Ju st as im p o rtan t, it h a d sh ru n k tim e, so th a t "su rv iv al c an n o t b e

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g u a ra n te e d b y a rm in g after th e attack b e g in s /' n o t w h e n "th e h o u r-g lass m ay b e in th e h a n d s of o th er n a tio n s."36 A lth o u g h technological a n d strategic p e ril lay a t th e h e a rt of R oosevelt's n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security, h e d id n o t red u c e it to a m ere m a tte r of w e a p ­ onry. M agnifying the th re a t w ere d ictato rsh ip s w h ic h "co m m an d th e full stre n g th of a reg im en te d n a tio n ," c o n scrip t th e m a n y resources n e e d e d for to tal w ar, a n d w ie ld n e w tech n iq u es of psycholo g ical a n d econom ic in tim id atio n . C o n sequently, A m erican secu rity rested o n all co n stitu en ts of n a tio n al p o w er, n o t o n ly o n m ilitary force, a n d especially o n th e u n ity a n d m o rale of th e A m eri­ can p e o p le — hence his freq u e n t if futile inju n ctio n s to th e n a tio n 's n e w sp a p e rs to re p o rt o n ly the tru th (as h e saw it) a n d his recastin g of th e N e w D eal as "six y ears of su c h far-flung in te rn al p rep a red n e ss. " In d ee d , h is Ja n u ary 4 a d d re ss so w o v e to g e th e r h is dom estic a n d n a tio n al secu rity policies th a t th ey em erg ed as a lm o st in d istin g u ish ab le.37 M an y co n tem p o raries su sp ec ted th a t R oosevelt w a s p u rs u in g re a rm a m e n t in o rd e r to revive th e sag g in g fo rtu n es of the econom y, h is presid en cy , a n d th e N e w D eal. Privately, h e som etim es gave th a t im p ressio n . Foreign o rd ers for A m erican a irp lan es "m e a n p ro sp e rity in th e c o u n try a n d w e c a n 't elect a D em ­ ocratic P a rty u n less w e g et p ro sp erity ." E ven p u b licly h e p o in te d o u t th a t su c h o rd e rs "ca n give e m p lo y m en t to th o u sa n d s." 38 B ut R oosevelt p o o rly u n d e r­ sto o d th e econom ic stim u lu s of g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g a n d h a d n o t g iv en u p o n a d v a n c in g the N e w D eal further. W hile a m b itio n s for A m erican econom ic re­ co v ery a n d h eg em o n y d id sh a p e h is th in k in g (decisively so for th o se h isto ria n s w h o see h is co u rse largely as a m ean s to th e e n d of th a t h eg em o n y ),39 FDR h a d n e ith e r th e tem p e ra m e n t n o r the circum stan ces to so rt o u t m ean s a n d e n d s so neatly. W h atev er h is lo n g -term goals, th e strategic crisis of th e late 1930s, in w h ic h econom ic p o w e r lo o m ed m o re as w e a p o n th a n as goal, seem ed m o re im m ed iate, a n d it d e e p ly fascinated a n d w o rrie d R oosevelt. H e likely saw eco­ no m ic b en efits as only a b o n u s to b e p lu c k e d fro m th e n ecessary evil of rea rm a ­ m en t, a n d in d e e d th a t b o n u s w a s a t first m o d est. D efense sp e n d in g rose 50 p e r­ cen t b e tw e e n fiscal 1936 a n d fiscal 1940, b u t n o t u n til 1940 d id it increase e n o u g h to d riv e th e econom y. O n ly if h e foresaw in 1938 th e far larg er b u d g e ts of 1940-1941— for w h ic h th ere is little ev id en ce— co u ld h e h av e calculated g reat a d v a n ta g e to rearm am en t. C ritics' n a rro w re a d in g of FD R 's in te n tio n s m issed th e d e e p e r logic e m b e d ­ d e d in seeing the N e w D eal as "in te rn a l p re p a re d n e ss." R earm am en t m erely co n firm ed a n d am plified, albeit to g rea t effect, th e ex istin g im p u lse to legiti­ m ate th e sta te 's role a t h o m e b y lin k in g it to th e a ren a of w ar. E ven early in th e d ecad e, som e N e w D ealers h a d foreseen h o w agencies m o d eled o n m o b iliza­ tio n d u rin g th e last w a r co u ld b e reto o led for an o th er; o th e r N e w D ealers later em b raced m o b ilizatio n as a w a y to h e lp m ak e th e N e w D eal p e rm a n en t. W h en the D ep ressio n h a d b e en re n d e re d as a w ar, w a r c o u ld seem alm o st a logical outcom e of the D epression. "T his c o u n try in a sense e m b a rk ed u p o n som e of

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th e co n d itio n s of a w a r econom y w h e n w e first u n d e rto o k to fig h t th e d e p re s­ sion," one ob serv er n o te d in 1941. "N ow , in a v a stly in ten sified fashion, w e face in d u stria l m o b ilizatio n for a g reater w a r." 40 M o b ilizatio n for d efen se w a s less a w h o lly n e w e n te rp rise th a n a c o n tin u atio n of th e earlier stru g g le o n a d ifferen t front, one w ith a n identifiable en em y to replace th e faceless foe of th e D ep res­ sion. FDR co u ld link th e N e w D eal a n d d efen se m o b ilizatio n b ecau se of th a t logic, n o t ju st because of h is silver tongue. C ritics th e n a n d later also ch arg ed th a t FDR foresaw a n d so u g h t A m erica's e n try into a g en eral w ar. FDR, ho w ev er, a lth o u g h ru lin g n o th in g out, in stea d p ro b ab ly a ssu m e d a c o n tin u atio n of th e bluffs, in tim id a tio n , a n d lim ited w a r th a t ch aracterized E u ro p e a t the tim e of M u n ich a n d th e Far E ast u n til Pearl H arb o r. A fter M unich, h e so u g h t to w a g e a w a r of n erv es, n o t of w e ap o n s. "T here are m a n y m e th o d s sh o rt of w ar, b u t stro n g e r a n d m o re effective th a n m ere w o rd s," h e said o n Jan u ary 4,1939, "o f b rin g in g h o m e to ag g resso r gov­ e rn m e n ts th e ag g reg ate se n tim en ts of o u r o w n p eo p le." In M arch, h e lec tu re d rep o rte rs a b o u t A m erica's u n d e c la re d n a v al w a r w ith th e French in th e 1790s. "T his b u sin ess of carry in g o n a w a r w ith o u t d eclarin g a w ar, th a t w e th in k is new , is n o t n ew ." E ven if w a r e ru p te d , h e m u se d d u rin g th e M u n ich crisis. H itle r's en em ies-w o u ld reso rt to " p o u n d in g a w ay a t G e rm a n y from th e air," p e rh a p s w ith A m erican help, a co u rse "m o re likely to su cceed th a n a tra d i­ tio n al w a r b y la n d a n d sea." A fter E u ro p e's w a r b e g a n o n S ep tem b er 1,1939, h e still so u g h t to stre n g th e n B ritain a n d France as w ell as A m erica's d eterren ce a n d in d u stria l capacity. A lth o u g h it slow ly w a n e d , h is h o p e of k eep in g A m er­ ica's role in th e w a r lim ited w a s finally c ru sh e d o n ly b y P earl H arb o r.41 M oreover, R oosevelt's p u b lic statem en ts, th o u g h g e ared to th e im m e d ia te crisis, also im p lied a rev o lu tio n in n a tio n a l secu rity th a t w o u ld o u tla st it. H itle r's ag g ressio n exem plified th rea ts w h ic h FD R saw as ro o ted in lastin g ch an g es in tech n o lo g y a n d strategy, ones th a t strip p e d A m erica of its geo­ g rap h ic isolation a n d m a d e p re p a re d n e ss a p e rm a n e n t task d ra w in g o n all sin ew s of n a tio n al stren g th . W ar a n d defense, o ld er term s for m o re occasional a n d n a rro w ly m ilita ry activities, w ere y ield in g to th e ex p an siv e d e m a n d s of "n atio n al security," a te rm FDR b e g an using. T hose d e m a n d s w ere to becom e p a ra m o u n t a n d p e rm a n en t. It w a s a change th a t R oosevelt d ro v e h o m e a g ain a n d a g a in — o n ly reitera ­ tion, b y o th ers as w ell as FDR, co u ld effect th e c o n stru ctio n of n a tio n al security. G e rm a n y 's in v asio n of P o lan d p ro m p te d his re m in d e r th a t " w h e n peace h as b e e n b ro k e n an y w h ere, th e peace of all c o u n tries e v ery w h e re is in d a n g er." W h en G erm an arm ies rolled into W estern E u ro p e a n d N o rw a y in th e sp rin g of 1940, th e frequency a n d v iv id n e ss of FD R's fo rm u la tio n s increased. H e d ecried h o w "a false teaching of g e o g ra p h y " created th e illu sio n of "so m e form of m y s­ tic [A m erican] im m u n ity th a t could n e v er be v io la te d " — science's "an n ih ila ­ tio n of tim e a n d of space" d e stro y ed th a t illusion. To th e p o in t of ted iu m , h e rattled off th e flight tim es of b o m b ers o v er all so rts of ro u te s— from G re en lan d

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to N o v a Scotia, A frica to B razil— to e m p h asize "th e a m a zin g sp e ed w ith w h ic h m o d e m e q u ip m e n t c an reach a n d attack th e e n em y 's co u n try ." Such changes, h e a rg u e d o n A u g u s t 2, o b literated p arallels to earlier A m erican history: "W e w ere [in 1917] co m p letely free from a n y attack. N ow , th a t w ill n e v e r h a p p e n ag ain in th e h isto ry of th e U n ited S tates." In a w o rld w h e re "n o attack is so u n ­ likely o r im possible th a t it m ay b e ig n o red ," A m erica's secu rity w a s a global affair. It also p re se n te d lim itless d em an d s: "If th e U n ited States is to h a v e a n y defense, it m u s t h a v e to ta l defense. W e can n o t d e fe n d o u rselv es a little h e re a n d a little th ere." C o ld W arriors w o u ld n o t v iew n a tio n al secu rity m o re ex p an ­ sively.42 T h ro u g h o u t 1940, R oosevelt stressed th e n a tu re of m o d e m w a rfare m o re th a n th e evil o f fascism o r th e v irtu e of n a tio n s resistin g it. Issu in g little u p lift­ in g W ilsonian rhetoric, h e in stea d offered a d ru m b e a t a b o u t th e cold realities of th e w o rld . T h at w a s th e case a g ain a t su m m e r's e n d , w h e n C o n g ress en acted th e first p eacetim e draft: w ith o n ly a n o d to th e o ld er lan g u a g e of v o lu n ta rism a n d m ix in g "A m ericans from all w alk s of life," FDR fo cu sed o n th e h a rs h real­ ities th a t p ro m p te d selective service a n d th e com plex, ted io u s, d e m a n d in g tra in in g th a t m e n w o u ld u n d e rg o .43 T he d ru m b e a t c o n tin u e d d u rin g th e b itte r stru g g le b e tw e e n R oosevelt a n d W endell W illkie for th e presidency. D espite FD R 's n o to rio u s v o te-g ettin g p le d g e s— "Y our P re sid e n t says this c o u n try is n o t g o in g to w a r," h e p ro m ised o n N o v em b er 2, 1940— h e c o n tin u ed h is alarm s a b o u t sh rin k in g space a n d tim e, "to ta l d efense," a n d th e like. H e offered h o m ely d etails a b o u t th e com ­ plexities of m o d e m w a r p ro d u ctio n , d e p lo re d "th e fatal e rro rs of a p p e a se ­ m en t," a n d d e fe n d e d th e N e w D eal as a tool of n a tio n a l security. Som e em ­ p h a ses sh ifted in D ecem ber, w h e n h e h a m m e re d h a rd e r o n th e necessities of p ro d u c tio n a n d o p e n ed h is c am p aig n for L end-L ease a id to th e British. But e v en th o u g h telegram s "b eg g e d m e n o t to tell ag ain of th e ease w ith w h ic h o u r A m erican cities could b e b o m b ed ," as h e to ld th e n atio n , h e c o n tin u ed to d o so. S u m m ing u p th e historical changes h e h a d d escrib ed for tw o y ears, o n Ja n u ary 6,1941, h e sta rk ly co n tra sted th e c u rre n t p e ril to a long, earlier era w h e n " in n o case h a d a serio u s th re a t b e e n ra ise d a g ain st o u r n a tio n al safety o r o u r co n tin ­ u e d in d ep e n d en c e."44 O u tlin in g a n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security, R oosevelt p re se n te d it as reactive to b ro a d changes in the in te rn atio n al en v iro n m en t. A n d it p a rtly w as. But h e w a s sh a p in g p e rc ep tio n s as w ell as offering th em , seek in g to m o ld a n ew w o rld as w ell as to p o rtra y it. R arely d id h e m en tio n th a t in th e closed w o rld sy stem h e p o rtra y e d , A m erican in terests h a d b e e n e x p a n d in g o u tw a rd ju st as o th er n a tio n s w ere im p in g in g m ore o n A m erica. R arely d id h e ack n o w led g e th a t th e changes h e n o te d in com m erce a n d tech n o lo g y w ere as m u c h A m er­ ica's d o in g as th a t of o th e r n a tio n s. R arely d id h e su g g est th a t ju st as a n e n em y 's b o m b ers m ig h t so o n reach th e U n ited States, A m erica's b o m b ers m ig h t soon reach the enem y. R arely d id h e n o te th a t n e w in v en tio n s w h ic h ex te n d ed the

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reach of p o ten tial enem ies also p ro v id e d n e w m ean s to c o u n te r them : Facing A n g lo-A m erican n av al a n d a ir p o w e r in th e A tlantic, H itler co u ld on ly e n v y th e ease w ith w h ich B ritish a rm ies h a d reach ed A m erica in 1776. By m ak in g technology cen tral to a n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security, FDR sp o k e to A m erican preferences a n d p rio rities, for it w a s in tech n o lo g y th a t A m ericans excelled a n d perceiv ed m u c h th a t h a d tra n sfo rm e d th eir lives. Since A m ericans h a d p io n ee red so m u c h technology, h o w co u ld it n o t b e th e decisive elem en t of a c h an g in g w o rld ? To su g g e st o th erw ise d im in ish e d th e A m erican ach iev em ent a n d m a d e th e outcom e of th e w o rld stru g g le h in g e o n o th er form s of p o w er, in w h ich th e U n ited States m ig h t n o t excel. R oosevelt d id n o t m erely perceive the im p o rtan ce of tech n o lo g y in m o d e m w arfare, h e seized o n it as fitting the n a tio n 's stren g th s, a n d h e d e e p e n e d th e A m erican im p u lse to achieve global p o w e r th ro u g h technological suprem acy. In sh o rt, h is concep­ tio n of n atio n al security w a s a n ideological con stru ctio n , n o t m erely a p e rc ep ­ tu al reaction. T h at conception also d e riv e d fro m p a rtic u la r anxieties in A m erican cu ltu re. In m an y w ays, R oosevelt a n d o th ers to o k o ld e r v iew s of tech n o lo g y a n d in ­ v e rte d them . In th e 1920s, m a n y A m ericans h a d celeb rated h o w rad io , av iation, a n d o th er devices w ere k n ittin g to g eth er th e n a tio n a n d th e w o rld , lea d in g co u n tries a n d cu ltu res to m ix w ith a n d u n d e rs ta n d each other. In th e 1930s, h o w ev er, technologies once o ften v ie w e d b en ig n ly seem ed in creasin g ly m a ­ lign, a t least w h e n enem ies co n tro lled them . T h at shift w a s e v id e n t in A m erican s' n erv o u sn ess a b o u t tech n o lo g y 's p lace in th eir lives. In film s like F rank C a p ra 's It Happened One Night (1934), th e d o m i­ n a n t ico n o g rap h y alw ay s in v o lv ed tra n sp o rta tio n a n d c o m m u n ica tio n s— the railro ad station, th e W estern U n io n office, th e autom obile, th e p h o n e b o o th , the a irp la n e — a n d characters achieved h a p p in e ss on ly w h e n th ey e scap ed su ch contrivances. Such film s co nveyed u n easin ess a b o u t "th e in ab ility of in d iv id ­ u als to co m m u n icate p riv ately in th e w o rld of su ch aw esom e, c o n stan t, u n iv e r­ sal p u blic co m m u n icatio n s."45 A sim ilar u n easin ess arose a b o u t w a r a n d diplom acy. In its first se rio u s foray in to in tern atio n al n ew scasting, A m erican ra d io co v ered th e M u n ich crisis w ith a startlin g im m ediacy th a t d id n o t d im in ish b e w ild e rm e n t a t w h a t o ccu rred (or p anic w eeks later after the "W ar of th e W orld s" broadcast). R oosevelt's p u b lic statem en ts w ere p e p p e re d w ith references to tech n o lo g y — "th e flood of m ail a n d teleg ram s" h e h a d received, th e d ip lo m a t ju st d isp a tc h e d b y airp lan e, "th e first tra in press conference since G e rm a n y m o v ed in to D en m ark ," th e ra d io b ro ad c ast h e ju st m a d e to th e A m ericas, th e p h o n e call ju st c o m p leted w ith a n im p o rta n t p ersonage, a n d the like. T h o u g h so m etim es m a d e in a celeb rato ry v e in — as if to su g g est h o w the n a tio n 's lea d ers w ere ab reast of th e latest téch n o logy— such references also rev ealed a n a g g in g an x iety th a t tech n o lo g y w as in a d e q u a te for, ev en d a m a g in g to, a n u n d e rs ta n d in g of o n ru sh in g events. (O ne satirical novel featu red a "p h o n o sc o p e" th a t p e rm itte d m o v ieg o ers to

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w a tc h a w a r as it w a s tak in g place.) Ju st as C a p ra 's ch aracters liv ed in a w h irl of tech n o lo g y th a t im p e d e d real p riv a te com m u n icatio n , n a tio n al lea d ers seem ed to o p e ra te in a w h irl of in te rn atio n al contacts (all th e m ed ia e m p h a siz e d th a t C h a m b e rla in flew to G erm any) th a t left th em in d e sp a ir of real p u b lic c o m m u ­ nication. Such anxieties fu rth e r sh a p e d the n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n a l secu­ rity.46 R oosevelt, of course, h a rd ly co n stru cted th a t co n cep tio n sin g leh an d ed ly . O th e rs p a ra lle led his efforts. S urprisingly, h o w ev er, lead ers in g o v e rn m e n t a n d th e a rm e d forces d id n o t often d o so. M an y in th o se circles d id s u p p o rt h is policies, b u t few conceived n a tio n al security so b ro a d ly o r w ith su c h em p h asis o n technology. L eaders of key C ab in et ag en cies— State, W ar, N avy, a n d T reasu ry — te n d e d to sp e ak the o ld er lan g u a g e of p re p a re d n e ss a n d to focus o n th e specific aspects of policy for w h ich th ey w ere responsible. M ilitary officers in p a rtic u la r re sp o n d e d cau tio u sly to FD R 's co n cep tio n of n a tio n a l security. Like him , th ey e m p h a size d s te m n ecessities ra th e r th a n g lam o ro u s possibilities. "T here is n o th in g ro m an tic, d ram atic, o r satisfy in g in m o d e m conflict," G en. G eorge C. M arsh all to ld th e A m erican L egion. "It is all h o rrib le, p ro fo u n d ly d ep ressin g ; a n d n o w it carries w ith it a d re a d fu l th re a t to civil p o p u la tio n s." M ore b lu n tly th a n FDR, M arsh all c o n d em n ed A m erican s' alleg ed indifference to n a tio n a l defense. A ir C o rp s officers, im p re ssed like FDR b y air p o w e r's role in the M u n ich crisis, p o n d e re d its lessons of '" U n w a g e d W ar,' " foresaw "fu tu re 'M u n ic h s,' " a n d m u se d o n h o w a glo b e-g ird lin g A m er­ ican air force c o u ld "sto p th e ag g resso r n a tio n from e v en p la n n in g th e attack, th ro u g h fear of retaliatio n ." M arshall, th e a rm y 's n e w chief of staff in th e su m ­ m er of 1939, also co n sid ered su c h possibilities. B ut h e w o rrie d m o re a b o u t h o w air p o w e r "sta g g ers th e im ag in atio n ," se n satio n alized p u b lic d eb ate, a n d d is­ to rte d the allocation of n a tio n al resources (tem p tatio n s to w h ic h h e felt FDR so m etim es succum bed). T he caution of officers like M arsh all w a s d e ep ly rooted. T hey w ere inclined to v iew w a r 's causes in n a rro w econom ic term s, g iv en to seeing A m erican interests b e y o n d th e h em isp h e re as lim ited , w a ry a b o u t a fickle p u b lic o p in io n a n d its fads, p o sitio n e d still a t th e frin g es of p o w er, a n d co n strain ed from sp e ak in g lo u d ly in public. Skeptical a b o u t h o w m u c h tech n o lo g y w o u ld ch an g e w a rfa re — "W e expect too much of machines," M arsh all to ld th e n a tio n — m o st m ilitary lead ers e m p h a size d th e m less th a n the P resid ent. In all these w ays, th ey follow ed m o re th a n led R oosevelt in th e con­ stru c tio n of n a tio n al security, e v en as th ey lab o red to e d u ca te h im a n d th e p u b ­ lic in its m u n d a n e realities.47 O th e r voices w ere a t least as im p o rtan t. A cad em ician s seek in g a role in for­ e ig n policy b e g a n talk in g a b o u t "n atio n al security." T he te rm w a s n o t new , b u t its earlier m ea n in g h a d b e en n a rro w er, su g g estin g m ilitary p re p a re d n e ss o r (am o n g stru ttin g A m ericanists) d efense a g ain st alien influences w ith in th e n a ­ tion. Scholars n o w u se d the term to refer to th e sh rin k ag e of space a n d tim e a n d the c o n seq u e n t d e m a n d s th a t FDR also su m m o n e d up. Self-conscious "real-



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ists," th ey saw them selves as g ro u n d in g A m erican fo reig n policy in cold calcu­ latio n s of n a tio n al in terest a n d balances of p o w e r ra th e r th a n in m o ral id ealism or political ideology. Less inclined th a n FDR to e m p h a size technological change, th ey fo u n d m ore c o n tin u ity b e tw e e n p a s t a n d c u rre n t d ilem m as in th e n a tio n 's security, b u t th eir o utlook b ro a d ly p a ra lle led R oosevelt's. "R earm a­ m e n t is n o t sufficient," w ro te P rin ceto n 's E d w a rd M ead Earle: all sources of p o w e r m u st be h a rn e ssed to each o th er a n d to effective policy, a n d still w o u ld n o t b e u sefu l "u n less the iro n of d e te rm in a tio n en te rs o u r so u l." A t th e sam e tim e, th ey a g reed w ith R oosevelt th a t total w a r w a s n o t th e on ly option: "T he to ta litaria n states w ag e covert w a r a g ain st th e rest of th e w o rld ," E arle a rg u e d in th e w in te r of 1941, im p ly in g th a t th e U n ited States m ig h t d o likew ise. L argely b a sed a t elite in stitu tio n s in the N o rth ea st, th ey offered a k in d of aca­ dem ic cachet for R oosevelt's outlook, a n d in flu en ced co m m en tato rs like W alter L ip p m a n n w ith a w id e audience.48 T heir o u tlo o k co rre sp o n d e d w ith a b ro a d e r reo rie n ta tio n am o n g A m erican intellectuals, m a n y of w h o m "n o w ren o u n c ed pacifism w ith th e sam e ferv o r w ith w h ich th ey h a d p rev io u sly d e n o u n c e d w a r." Intellectu als attack ed m o ral relativ ism in th eir "effort to rea rm th e W est sp iritu a lly for th e b a ttle w ith th e to talitarian s," a rg u in g th a t su c h relativ ism " h a d m o rally d isa rm e d th e U n ited States for th e com ing stru g g le." N o t all intellectu als g ra sp e d th e cold calcula­ tio n s of p o w e r th a t attrac ted the n e w n a tio n al secu rity experts. In stead , som e d e fe n d e d th e "u ltim ate tru th of th e d e b ase d 'lib era lism ' of o u r recent p a st" or restated g ra n d ideological claim s a b o u t dem o cracy o r still g ra n d e r religious or p h ilo so p h ical values. But w h e th e r stressin g h a rs h realities o r lofty ideals, m an y w a rn e d of fascism 's inescapable m enace a n d lash ed o u t at o p p o sin g intellec­ tu als "for w e ak e n in g A m erican fiber in its stru g g les w ith to talitarian s." In 1938, C h arles B eard— th e e ra 's m o st p ro m in e n t h isto ria n a n d intellectu al o p p o n e n t of FD R 's foreign p olicy— fo u n d him self b e ra te d for h is " u n fo rtu n a te influence . . . from th e p o in t of v iew of k eep in g alive a n ecessary p atrio tic glo w in the ju v enile b reast." "Irresp o n sib le" intellectuals, as p o e t A rch ib ald M acLeish la­ b eled them , w ere too "scientific, n e u te r [w ith th a t w o rd 's c o n n o tatio n s of em as­ culation], skeptical, d e ta c h e d " to u n d e rs ta n d th e w o rld stru g g le, m u c h less w ag e it. In th a t vein, L ew is M u m fo rd d e n o u n c e d "th e a rid p ra g m a tism " th a t left A m erican liberals u n a b le to u n d e rs ta n d "th e basic issu es of g o o d a n d evil, of p o w e r a n d form , of force a n d grace, in th e actual w o rld ." T hese intellectuals, h elp in g to ch an g e n o tio n s of n a tio n al security, w ere also c h an g e d in th e p ro ­ cess, inevitably p riz in g m ore th e ir allegiance a n d service to th e state.49 A t first glance, intellectuals' su m m o n s to h ig h e r tru th s seem ed a t o d d s w ith th e th ru st of foreign policy "realists," w h o claim ed to esch ew id eo lo g y a n d id e ­ alism . But realists them selves laid claim to u n iv ersal tru th : th e h a rd realities of in tern atio n al relations. A n d the intellectuals' reo rie n ta tio n p aralleled th e n e w co n ception of n atio n al security b y em p h a sizin g th e v a lu e of w h a t w as to b e p ro tected from the fascist threat. It also replicated a k ey elem en t of th a t concep­ tion, for b y in sin u atin g links b e tw ee n the in sid io u s id eas of to ta litaria n sy stem s

EMERGENCE,

1 9 3 3 - 1 94

37

a n d th e o u tlo o k of "irresp o n sib le" A m ericans, it im p lied a n intellectual seam ­ lessness to th e w o rld : th rea te n in g id eas co u ld leap g reat d istan ces ju st as th rea t­ en in g w e a p o n s m ight. By the sam e token, in tellectuals e m p h a size d h o w b ro a d ly n a tio n al secu rity w a s n o w conceiv ed — like R oosevelt, th ey re g a rd e d id eas as e q u al to w e a p o n s in im portance. In d eed , M ax L em er en titled h is 1940 tract Ideas Are Weapons. T his in tellectual reo rie n ta tio n w a s com plex, resisted, a n d inco m p lete before Pearl H arbor. By n o m ean s d id it silence intellectu al o p p o sitio n to FD R 's policy. N o r d id it alw ay s single o u t N a zi G erm an y as th e o n ly enem y: th e co n cep t of to talitarian ism w a s also a p p lie d to the Soviet U n io n (an d Japan), especially af­ ter th e 1939 H itler-S talin p a ct d iv id in g E astern E u ro p e a n d again, m o re force­ fully, after th e w ar. P ro p o n e n ts of intellectual re a rm a m e n t also seem ed at tim es to a d m ire w h a t th ey claim ed to condem n. M acLeish, for one, feared th a t totalita ria n s "w ere stro n g e r in a rm s because th ey w ere stro n g e r in h e a rt."50 Intellec­ tu a ls' attacks o n m o ral decadence, o r th e effort of so m eo n e like M u m fo rd to restrict freed o m of ex p ressio n in th e n a m e of d e fe n d in g it, stru ck critics as d is­ tu rb in g ly sim ilar to to ta litaria n cru sad es, sp a rk e d b y d esire less to face enem ies ab ro a d th a n to cleanse c u ltu re a t hom e. D espite its d isso n an ces, h o w ev er, intel­ lectual reo rie n ta tio n w a s co h eren t e n o u g h to stre n g th e n th e n e w id ea of n a ­ tio n al security. In co n tra st to th e lea d in g role of intellectuals, b u sin e ssm e n p la y e d a lesser p a rt in th e co n stru ctio n of n atio n al security. To b e sure, b u sin e ss w as n o m o n o ­ lith. Som e of its c o sm o p o litan lead ers a n d m ed ia (like Fortune m agazine) saw g rav e econom ic a n d strategic issues a t stake in th e w o rld crisis, a n d p ro fits to be h a d from rearm am en t. But b u sin e ss's ties to g o v e rn m e n t rem a in e d tense, a n d n o cohesive "m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex" h a d y e t em erg ed , especially since C o n g ress ra th e r th a n the a rm e d forces still w ro te th e ru les for d efen se con­ tracts. T h u s the aircraft in d u stry , a lth o u g h technically a d v an c ed a n d d e p e n ­ d e n t o n m ilitary ord ers, w a s still so riv en b y co m p etitio n , so vio len tly antilabor, a n d so fru stra te d b y its losses o n g o v e rn m e n t o rd ers th a t it c o u ld forge n o close alliance w ith N e w D ealers reg a rd in g n a tio n al security. O th e r b u sin ess le a d e rs— som e auto in d u stry h e ad s, for ex am p le— feared th ey w o u ld lose ci­ v ilian m ark e ts a n d create excess p ro d u ctiv e capacity if th ey to o k d efen se con­ tracts. T hey also feared the a d m in istra tio n itself, u n til its ra p p ro c h e m e n t w ith R epublicans a n d b u sin e ss b e g a n in 1940. M an y b u sin e ssm e n jo in ed th e a n ti­ in te rv en tio n ist cause, w h ile o th ers w ere co m p ro m ised b y th e ir econom ic ties to G erm an y o r o th er countries. D ivisions in the b u sin ess co m m u n ity in h ib ited ar­ ticu latio n of a forceful m essage, as d id its relu ctan ce to w a d e in to a n y co n tro ­ v e rsy after th e b e atin g its p u b lic esteem h a d tak e n in th e D epression. Too, u n til 1941 th e econom y still h a d too m u c h "slack" to force a d e b ate o v er th e choice b e tw ee n " g u n s a n d b u tte r" th a t m ig h t en g ag e b u sin essm en . For su ch reasons, th ey offered n o clear lea d ersh ip collectively, h o w e v er p o w e rfu l som e in d iv id ­ u al voices w ere. W om en w ere also o n the m argins, th o u g h n o t for w a n t of try in g to p lay a

38

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role. W om en's g ro u p s p lu n g e d into p u b lic d e b a te — a n d sp lit b ad ly , ev en th o u g h w o m e n w ere m o re inclined th a n m e n to a n a n tiw a r stance. F em inist peace activism fell in m em b ersh ip , finances, a n d v isibility from its 1920s h ey ­ day, as aggression ab ro a d led m a n y w o m e n to re p u d ia te pacifism w h ile d e ­ p ressio n a t h o m e shifted energies to o th e r issues. Few w o m e n h a d th e p ro m i­ nence in public d eb ate th a t Jane A d d a m s h a d d u rin g W orld W ar I. A n exception w a s A nne M o rro w L in d b erg h , w h o w ro te of h e r fear th a t fascism w a s "th e w a v e of the fu tu re." H e r b o o k of th a t title, p u b lish e d in 1940, seem ed an ti-in terv en tio n ist in sp irit, a lth o u g h she ch afed a t h e r h u s b a n d 's iso latio n ist a n d anti-Sem itic sentim ents. T he lan g u a g e of n a tio n al secu rity w a s ill su ite d to lea d in g w o m e n , w h o se fem inism a t th is stag e stressed w o m e n 's role as h u m a n ­ ita ria n s a n d idealists. C o n cern s d o m in a n t in W orld W ar I— d em o cratic id eals a n d relief for w a r-to m p o p u la tio n s— h a d in v ite d w o m e n to p la y a le a d in g role, b u t in 1940 those concerns y ield ed to th e h a rd , m ascu lin e categories of tech n o l­ ogy, security, a n d n a tio n al in te rest th a t b o th FDR a n d h is o p p o n e n ts u se d . In n o n e of those areas w a s w o m e n 's com peten ce p re su m e d ; in n o n e d id w o m e n h av e m ore th a n a to eh o ld organizationally. "T he freq u en cy w ith w h ic h th e w o rd 'm o th e r' " a p p e a re d in th e n a m e s of w o m e n 's g ro u p s in d icates th a t th ey "o ften e x p re sse d v e ry tra d itio n a l a ttitu d e s to w a rd th e role of w o m en . . . . Sim ple av ersio n to w a r w a s o ften th e th ru s t of th eir m essag e."51 But "sim p le av ersio n " seem ed in a d e q u a te to a d d re ss th e issu es of th e d a y o r to u n ite w o m e n them selves. FDR's policies did, of course, face form idable opposition. A nti-interventionists o ften strid en tly ch am p io n e d th e necessity a n d practicality of in su la tin g th e U n ited States from the E u ro p ea n crisis (their v iew s o n th e F ar E ast w e re m o re com plicated). Yet in som e w a y s th e ir concep tio n of n a tio n al secu rity resem b led R oosevelt's. M any saw n o less m alig n a w o rld system , th o u g h d ifferin g o v er th e source of its evil (com m unism , m a n y th o u g h t, ra th e r th a n fascism ) a n d its th re a t to A m erica (let E u ro p e's b a rb a rian s d e stro y each oth er, so m e arg u ed ). L ikew ise, m a n y e m p h a siz e d technological ch an g e as m u c h as FDR, o n ly ta k in g its logic in different directions; th u s th ey focused n o t o n h o w e n em y b o m b ers m ig h t th rea te n the U n ited States, b u t o n h o w A m erican air p o w e r c o u ld k eep enem ies far from the h em isp h ere. E ven o n specific policies, th e ir differences w ith R oosevelt, w hile b itte rly arg u e d , w ere lim ited. W ith av iato r C h arles L in d ­ b erg h as a chief sp o k esm an , th ey w ere e v en m o re attrac ted to air p o w e r th a n FDR. To them , arm ies a n d b attlesh ip s, n o t bo m b ers, sy m b o lized m ilitarism a n d ad v en tu rism . T hus th ey g enerally s u p p o rte d re a rm a m e n t e v en th o u g h th e y fo u g h t R oosevelt ov er th e particu lars. In these w ays, his o p p o n e n ts also e n g ag e d in th e co n stru ctio n of n a tio n al security. If an y th in g , the m o st strik in g q u a lity of d eb ate befo re Pearl H a rb o r w as h o w few p e rsu asiv e altern ativ es to FD R 's o u tlo o k w ere a rticu lated . N o t th a t n o n e w as im aginable. A w o rld v ie w free of technological d e te rm in ism w o u ld h ave b e en a start, a n d critics like B eard d id e m p h a size A m erica's eco­ nom ic en tan g lem en ts a b ro a d a n d its econom ic n e e d s a t h o m e. But in a c u ltu re

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39

g eared to seeing tech n o lo g y as decisive in global affairs, critics like B eard seem ed to ignore n a tio n al secu rity ra th e r th a n offer a d ifferen t v ie w of it, w h ile o th ers like L in d b erg h em b raced th e technological d e te rm in ism th a t FD R artic­ u lated . In a n y ev en t, th e issu e raised b y R oosevelt's n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n a l secu­ rity w a s n e v e r fully jo in ed in th e y ears before P earl H arb o r. T he im m e d ia te crisis of w a r ab ro ad , n o t lo n g -term v iew s of n a tio n al security, u n d e rs ta n d a b ly d o m in a te d th e "G reat D ebate" of 1939-1941. C ertain facets of th a t d e b ate fu r­ th e r lim ited its d e p th , th o u g h n o t its b ittern ess. L ong fo cu sed o n p arallels b e ­ tw e e n 1917 a n d 1940, m u c h of it looked b a ck w a rd ra th e r th a n fo rw ard . Roose­ v e lt's gift for fin d in g co m m o n g ro u n d in th e d e b a te — h e m isp h e re defense, air p o w er, a n d in d u stria l p ro d u c tio n — sh ifted a tte n tio n from th e m o re co n tested e lem en ts in h is co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security. E ven th e a p p a re n t lag g ard n ess of A m erican p re p a re d n e ss— stories filled th e p ress of so ld iers m arch in g w ith ­ o u t g u n s, p ro d u c tio n foul-ups, fo o t-d rag g in g b u sin essm en , a n d d isru p tiv e la­ b o r strik e s— colored deb ate, for it created th e im p re ssio n th a t th e tim e w a s d is­ ta n t in d e e d w h e n th e n a tio n could b e a global m ilitary p o w er. P artisan politics clarified little, since W illkie sh a re d m u c h of FD R 's w o rld v ie w d u rin g th e 1940 p resid en tia l contest. Finally, th e v e ry sh rilln ess of th e d e b a te b ecam e as m u ch a n issu e as th e p o sitio n s taken, especially b y 1941, w h e n a lo n g reco rd of rich invective a n d b itte r n a m e calling h a d accu m u lated . A ll th ese facets of th e d e ­ b ate, typical of A m erican politics w h e n g re a t p a ssio n s are g e n erate d , m e a n t th a t it w a s o ften as superficial as it w a s ugly. M eanw hile, A m erican c u ltu re reflected R oosevelt's o u tlo o k in w ay s th a t tra n sc e n d e d th e p a rticu la rs of debate. C arto g ra p h ers, for exam ple, u rg e d A m erican s to re th in k th e ir rela tio n sh ip s in tim e a n d space to th e w o rld . Som e­ tim es in te rv en tio n ists, so m etim es a ttrac ted to th e tre n d y "geo p o litics" fash io n ­ able a m o n g N azis, m ap m ak e rs also h a d a p ro fessio n al n e e d to ch an g e th eir o u tp u t, once g eared to la n d a n d sea travel, to th e ag e of aviation. N e w m a p s a n d globes u rg e d A m ericans to see Jap an a n d th e U n ited States as far closer to each o th er th a n once th o u g h t; to realize th a t B uenos A ires w a s farth e r from th e A m erican h e a rtla n d th a n all E u ro p ea n capitals save M oscow ; to th in k of th e U n ited States a n d E u rope as jo in t m em b ers of a n A tlantic co m m u n ity ; to u n ­ d e rs ta n d A m erican p ro x im ity to p o ten tial ag g resso rs u sin g p o la r ro u tes of at­ tack; a n d to ask, "C an A m erica Be B om bed?" as a science m u se u m h e a d lin e d o n e exhibition. N o iv o ry to w e r exercise, c a rto g ra p h y in flu en ced ren d e rin g s of th e w o rld crisis offered b y th e m ed ia, like the p o w e rfu l Time-Life-Fortune chain. By d ram a tic u se of red lines, m en acin g arro w s, a n d concentric rings, th e p ress offered im ages of A m erica's "encirclem ent" in a "closed-space" w o rld system . C a rto g ra p h e rs' w o rk p a ra lle led th a t of av iatio n p ro m o te rs p u sh in g p ro g ram s of global "airm in d e d n e ss" to e d u ca te A m erican y o u th in h a rsh realities a n d tra in th em in a v iatio n technology. W ittingly o r n o t, su ch efforts b u ttre ssed th e co n stru ctio n of n a tio n al security u n d e rw a y .52 T he n e w m ed ia a b ette d th a t co nstruction, in p a rt b ecause of th eir bias to w a rd

40

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th e in terv en tio n ist position. R adio n e w scasters w ere "u n in h ib ite d b y a n y tra d i­ tio n of in d e p e n d e n t political advocacy o r of d ilig e n t n e w s-g a th e rin g ," as o n e h isto ria n p u ts it. A ccording to an o th er, th ey w ere v irtu a l "to o ls of th e a d m in is­ tratio n ," n o t least because ra d io (an d to a d eg ree H o lly w o o d ) d e p e n d e d o n th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t for v a rio u s k in d s of licensing a n d o v ersig h t. S uch b ias p u t a p re m iu m o n m ag n ify in g the th re a t to A m erica of w a r ab ro ad , a n d o n oblit­ e ra tin g a sense of psychic d istan ce b e tw ee n A m erican s a n d th eir p u ta tiv e allies u n d e r siege abroad. W ith g o o d reason, A rchib ald M acL eish celeb rated E d w a rd R. M u rro w 's fam o u s ra d io re p o rts o n the L uftw affe's b litz a g ain st Britain: "You b u rn e d th e city of L o n d o n in o u r h o m es a n d w e felt th e flam es th a t b u rn e d it. . . . You d e stro y ed the su p e rstitio n of d istan ce a n d tim e." O r, as o n e h isto ­ ria n p u t it, M u rro w "m a d e A m ericans th in k of th e B attle of B ritain as a p re lu d e to th e b o m b in g of N e w York o r W ash in g to n ."53 But th e m e d ia 's role in sh a p in g v iew s of n a tio n al secu rity w e n t b e y o n d im ­ m ed iate (and h a rd ly uniform ) sy m p ath ies. W h ereas n e w sp a p e rs reta in e d a lo­ cal id en tity a n d audience, n e tw o rk n ew scastin g h a d n o e v id e n t local affinities. It co u ld only p lau sib ly cover n a tio n al a n d in te rn atio n al ev en ts for a n a tio n al audience. R adio as w ell as n ew sreel th u s h a d a p o w e rfu l com m ercial in cen tiv e to trea t d ista n t ev en ts as im m ed iate a n d th rea te n in g to A m erican s a n d to o rien t th eir a tte n tio n o u tw a rd , e v en if o n ly superficially. O n ly b y d o in g so co u ld ra d io c o m m an d a n au d ien ce a n d a d v e rtisin g rev en u es, a n d th ereb y ch allen g e th e p rin t m ed ia as A m erican s' p rim a ry source of n ew s, w h ic h it d id w ith strik in g sp e ed b e tw ee n 1938 a n d 1941. T he u se of ra d io b y FDR a n d N e w D eal agencies p re p a re d th e w ay, b u t th e M u n ich crisis u sh e re d in m o d e m n ew scastin g ; one CBS co m m en ta to r d eliv ered 102 b ro ad casts in e ig h teen d ay s, a n d th e n e tw o rk s lea rn ed the com m ercial viability of n ew s. "For th e first tim e h isto ry h a s b e en m a d e in the h e arin g of its p a w n s," the Nation claim ed after M unich, a n d ob­ serv ers so o n no ticed th a t e v en in rem ote places "sh o e d ru m m e rs, gas sta tio n a tten d a n ts, tru ck d riv ers, co u n ty farm a g en ts— e v ery b o d y w a s listen in g ."54 T h u s rad io n ew scasters d elib erately conjured u p a p ictu re of a seam less w o rld , w h ile rad io itself d id so as a m e d iu m reg ard less of n ew scasters' in ten tio n s, sim ­ p ly th ro u g h the sp e ed a n d im m ediacy of its live coverage of ev en ts ab ro ad . The n e w e r m e d ia 's role in th e c o n stru ctio n of n a tio n a l secu rity w a s also con­ tin g e n t o n circum stances, n o t sim p ly o n the m e d ia 's in h ere n t qualities. In isola­ tio n from o th er influences, im ages of a seam less, w a r-m a d w o rld m ig h t h av e d e e p e n e d the d e te rm in a tio n of m a n y A m erican s to w ith d ra w in to isolation. But in concert w ith th e efforts of politician s a n d intellectuals, th e m ed ia stre n g th e n ed the m o o d a n d a rg u m e n ts u n d e rly in g th e n e w co n cep tio n of n a ­ tional security. T h at w a s all th e m ore so becau se th eir p o rtra y a ls of w a r a b ro ad w ere v iv id e n o u g h to be ala rm in g b u t n o t g o ry e n o u g h to b e d isillu sio n in g , as th ey carefully b alan ced th eir n e e d to exploit ev en ts ab ro a d a g ain st co n v en tio n s of reticence a n d the d a n g e rs of an ta g o n iz in g au d ien ces a n d ad v ertisers. Specific dep ictio n s of w a r 's o u tb reak fu rth e r b u ttre sse d th e co n cep tio n of

EMERGENCE,

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n a tio n a l security. "WAR! BOMB W A RSA W /' scream ed a Chicago Tribune h e a d ­ lin e a b o u t G e rm a n y 's in v asio n of P oland in 1939; th e Chicago Daily News sim p ly said , "W AR!" It w a s w a r in a n alm o st generic sense th a t seized a tte n tio n m o re th a n a n y o n e n a tio n 's specific threat. T he im m e d ia te m essag e in su c h coverage, p ara lle lin g th e a n tiw a r m o o d of th e 1930s, w a s "n o t th a t th e 1939 conflict w a s th e w ro n g w ar; it w a s th a t w a r itself w a s ru in o u sly w ro n g ," o n e h isto ria n h a s su g g ested . B ut to see th e evil as ab stract a n d g en eralized also g ave it a lastin g quality, su g g e stin g th a t th e d a n g e r to A m erica lay n o t o n ly in w h a t G erm an s o r Jap an ese m ig h t d o b u t in th e in sid io u s a n d in escapable n a tu re of m o d e m w a r itself. T h at m essage, if m o m e n tarily of u se to th e a n ti-in te rv en tio n ist forces— w h o , after all, w a n te d to e n te r su c h folly?— rein fo rced th e p rev a ilin g sense of p eril.55 O th e r c u rre n ts in m ed ia tre a tm e n t of the w a r flo w ed in to th e n e w concep­ tion. For one th in g , th e m ed ia h ig h lig h ted th e m o st technologically ad v an c ed fo rm s of w ar. G e rm a n y 's d ram atic c o n q u est of W estern E u ro p e a n d its aerial b o m b a rd m e n t of E n g lan d w e re th e aren as of w a r for w h ich A m erican jo u rn a l­ ists h a d a rin g sid e seat. E m p h asis o n "lig h tn in g " w a rfare m esh ed nicely w ith a p o p u la r c u ltu re th a t p rim e d A m ericans to focus o n technological w iz a rd ry a n d ap o calyptic d a n g e rs in w arfare. In contrast, th e g rin d in g ly im p o rta n t w a r in th e A tlantic a n d the N azi in v asio n of th e Soviet U nion, b o th less e v id e n tly o n th e c u ttin g e d g e of technology, w ere sp ra w lin g a n d inaccessible to n ew sm en , less subject to v iv id p resen tatio n . For so m e of th e sam e reasons, Ja p an 's w a r in C h in a a n d its a d v an c es o n S outheast A sia also lay at th e m arg in s of n e w s coverage. In d ee d , m e d ia coverage of the Far E ast rev ealed one w a y in w h ic h th e con­ stru c tio n of n a tio n al security w a s incom plete. D espite im ag es of a closed w o rld system , th e n e w v iew w a s heav ily a ttu n e d to E u ro p e a n d th e W estern H em i­ sphere. T h at focus reflected th e c u ltu ra l affinities of m o st A m erican s a n d th e a d m in istra tio n 's strategic p rio rities, as w ell as FD R 's fears a b o u t v o latile A m er­ ican a ttitu d e s to w a rd Japan; th e c o u n try seem ed "re a d y to p u ll th e trig g e r if th e Japs d o a n y th in g ," h e once rem a rk ed .56 But it also reflected th e p reo c cu p a tio n w ith technology a t the h e a rt of th e n e w conception: th e Jap an ese w ere w id e ly re g a rd e d as racial a n d technological inferiors; o n ly Pearl H a rb o r w o u ld p u ll th e Far E ast o n to A m erican s' m en tal g rid of a closed w o rld system . In m a n y w ays, h ow ever, the n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n al secu rity h a d tak en rem ark ab le h o ld before P earl H arbor. O f course, th a t h o ld is easier to m easu re am o n g elites a n d th eir in stitu tio n s th a n a t th e g rass roots. O p in io n polls sh o w e d o v e rw h elm in g a p p ro v a l of rearm am en t, su b sta n tia l satisfaction w ith h o w th e a d m in istra tio n h a n d le d it, d e te rm in a tio n to stay o u t of w ar, a n d g ra d ­ u al resig n atio n to th e likelihood of entry. But po lls w ere g eared to crises, n o t to b ro a d changes in sensibility a n d ap p reh en sio n . A m erican s d id d isp lay a n e n o r­ m o u s a p p e tite for n e w s a n d c o m m en ta ry a b o u t th e w o rld crisis, b u t c ru d e evi­ d en ce of th eir o rien tatio n to far-aw ay ev en ts reveals little a b o u t its content.

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T here is also teasin g ev id en ce in lan g u a g e of "h o w w id e ly th e w a r h a d p e n e ­ tra te d the consciousness of A m ericans," as term s like blitz— th e c o m m o n label for G e rm a n y 's sw ift m e th o d s of attack in 1940 a n d 1941— b ecam e p o p u lar. In C hicago, a c an d id a te for a n Elks office "saw h is 'b litz ' fizzle," citizens "o rg a­ n ize d a 'b litz ' o n rats," th e W o m an 's C h ristia n T em perance U n io n p la n n e d a "Blitzkrieg o n Booze," a n d a L eague of W om en V oters official u rg e d m em b ers n o t to b e "b litzk rieg ed o u t of th eir convictions." (R oosevelt once c o n d em n ed the "blitzkrieg of verb al in cen d iary b o m b s" h u rle d a t h im in th e 1940 cam ­ paign.) W h eth er su c h lan g u a g e rev ealed a su b lim in al in co rp o ra tio n of tech n o l­ o g y 's im pact o n w a rfa re — o r ju st the e n d less a p p e a l of w a r m e ta p h o rs— is im ­ p o ssible to say.57 P o p u la r c u ltu re p ro v id es a n o th e r clue to m ass o p in io n . T he cred ib ility so m e A m ericans fo u n d in th e "W ar of th e W orld s" b ro ad cast, w h ic h d elib erately m im icked new scasts a b o u t th e M unich crisis, o w e d to "th e p e n e tra tio n of ap o c­ alyptic expectation s," according to one histo rian . A s p o llste r H a d le y C an tril w ro te, "A m y sterio u s in v asio n fitted w ith th e m y sterio u s ev en ts of th e d e ­ cad e," a n d th e "psychological d ise q u ilib riu m " created b y th e D ep ressio n stre n g th e n ed read in ess to believe th a t the w o rs t m ig h t befall A m erica in w ar. T h at read in ess w a s also sh o w n b y A m erican s' ro b u st a p p e tite for a p u lp lite ra ­ tu re of technological a n d ecological ap o caly p se— h o rro r film s d e p ic tin g sci­ ence rim am ok, space-age fiction, a n d n o v els like L. R on H u b b a rd 's Final Black­ out (1940), w h ic h d e p ic te d global d ecim atio n u n le a sh e d b y atom ic a n d biological w eap o n s. H ig h -b ro w a rtists fo u n d a p o p u la r o u tle t for ap o caly p tic th em es as w ell. Jam es T h u rb e r's b itte r fable The Last Flower a p p e a re d in Life m ag azin e (N ovem ber 1939) a n d c o n clu d ed a b o u t a fu tu re w ar: "T his tim e th e d e stru ctio n w a s so com plete, th a t n o th in g a t all w a s left in th e w o rld , ex cep t for one m an, a n d one w o m a n , a n d one flow er." Such lite ra tu re w a s h a rd ly con­ su m e d on ly b y th e m asses; m ag azin es su c h as Astounding Science Fiction, like "a p ro b e su n k into th e back b ra in of A m erican technology," in flu en ced som e of th e scientists w h o conceived the atom ic bom b. M ost of all, su c h lite ra tu re re­ v ealed w id e ly felt anxieties a b o u t A m erican v u ln era b ility a n d lo n g in g s for technological m aste ry th a t b o th in flu en ced a n d w ere ta p p e d b y th e architects of n a tio n al security.58 In stitu tio n al change m ore o b v io u sly m a rk e d th e co n stru ctio n of n a tio n al se­ c u rity a n d d ro v e it h o m e to A m ericans. B etw een M u n ich a n d Pearl H arb o r, fed eral officials a n d th eir c o u n te rp a rts in o th er in stitu tio n s b u ilt a n a tio n a l se­ c u rity bureaucracy. To b e sure, the process w a s h a p h a z a rd , o v e rsee n b y FDR in h is u su a l confusing a n d casual w ay, a n d often b ack w ard -lo o k in g , b a se d p a rtly o n the im p ro v isatio n s of 1917 a n d 1933. Likew ise, chaos a n d conflict o ften d is­ ru p te d the n ew m ach in ery of m obilization, especially w h e n it faced tw o d i­ lem m as: h o w to b alance co m p etin g d e m a n d s o n resources, a n d h o w to w e ig h im m ed iate m ilitary stre n g th a g ain st its lo n g -term g ro w th . S h o u ld v e te ra n m ili­ tary m en be se n t ab ro ad to p ro tec t A m erican o u tp o sts, o r b e k e p t h o m e to tra in

EMERGENCE,

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43

still larg e r forces? S ho u ld aircraft factories ru sh to p ro d u c e a n ex istin g p ro to ­ ty p e so o n to b e obsolete, o r w a it for n e w d esig n s th a t m ig h t tak e y ears to e n te r p ro d u ctio n ? To m e n w e ig h in g su c h decisions, th ey p o ssessed a n u n p rec e ­ d e n te d com plexity a n d gravity. The crucial d ecisions w ere m ad e , h o w ev er, w ith a tolerable d e g re e of e rro r a n d w ith rem ark ab le con tro l b y R oosevelt o v er them . T he confusion a n d conflict in m o b ilizatio n o b scu red its n o v el elem en ts, in ­ c lu d in g its scale a n d com plexity a n d its creatio n w h ile th e n a tio n w a s tech n i­ cally still a t peace. A b e w ild e rin g strin g of ag en cies— am o n g th e m th e W ar R esources B oard, th e N a tio n a l D efense A d v iso ry C om m ission, th e Office of P ro d u c tio n M a n ag e m en t— ov ersaw th e m o b ilizatio n of in d u s try a n d labor, lin k ed th em to th e a rm e d services, financed n e w facilities, a n d g in g erly allo­ cated resources. L inkages b e tw e e n g o v e rn m e n t a n d science w e re m o re stable, agencies like th e N a tio n a l D efense R esearch C o m m ittee (1940) a n d th e Office of Scientific R esearch a n d D e v elo p m en t (1941) stay in g in tact for th e w h o le w ar. W hile th e a rm y a n d n a v y rem a in e d c o n stitu tio n ally a n d fu n ctio n ally sep arate, th eir ties w ith each o th er a n d w ith th e W hite H o u se grew . M u ch in th a t aren a still g o t tran sac te d a t a p e rso n al level— G eorge M arsh all for th e a rm e d forces a n d H a rry H o p k in s for th e W hite H o u se w ere k ey fig u res— b u t th e sto d g y Joint B oard so o n b ecam e th e w a rtim e Joint C hiefs of Staff. M ean w h ile, n e w agencies to o k charge of th e first p eacetim e d raft, p ro p a g a n d a efforts a t h o m e a n d a b ro a d , m ilitary intelligence a n d in te rn a l security, civil d efen se a n d eco­ no m ic w arfare, a n d o th e r activities of th e v ig ila n t state. C o m plex a n d a m b itio u s, th is a p p a ra tu s w a s also n o tab le for its so p h istica­ tio n in p la n n in g o v e r th e lo n g te rm a n d o n a global scale. S trategists w e ig h ed c o m p e tin g th rea ts in E u ro p e a n d the Far East, a ssig n ed decisive p rio rity to th e form er, a n d sk etch ed w ith som e accuracy th e h u g e req u ire m e n ts of w a g in g glo b al w a r sh o u ld th e U n ited States p lu n g e in to it. P la n n ers a d ju d ica ted com ­ p e tin g d e m a n d s o n resources from th e a rm e d forces, allies like B ritain, w a ry in d u stria lists, a n d co n su m ers eag er to enjoy a re tu rn in g p ro sp erity . M an y lo o k ed fu rth e r in to th e fu tu re, to th e political settlem en ts th a t m ig h t com e o u t of th e w ar, th e w e a p o n s th e n a tio n m ig h t th e n w a n t, th e econom ic clo u t it m ig h t th e n w ield. T he in stitu tio n al m ach in ery of n a tio n a l secu rity w a s n o v el in o n e o th er w ay: som e of its creators w ere d e te rm in e d th a t it o u tla st th e c u rre n t crisis— th a t th ey co n stru ct so m eth in g p e rm a n e n t. T he scale a n d specifics of th a t m ach in ery w o u ld , th ey knew , ch an g e after th e w ar, a n d th e ir o p p o rtu n itie s to p e e r in to th e fu tu re w ere lim ited. B ut for g en erals like M arshall, ex asp e rate d a t th e n a tio n 's a p p a re n t lack of p re p a re d n e ss in th e 1930s; o r for scientists, frig h te n ed ab o u t th e w e a p o n s o th e r n a tio n s m ig h t d ev elo p a n d attrac ted to th e b en efits of g ov­ e rn m e n t sp o n so rsh ip ; o r for c o rp o ra te leaders, g ettin g accu sto m ed to d efen se co n tracts a n d eag er to p ro te c t A m erican econom ic in terests a b ro a d — for su ch p eo p le, som e en larg ed , p e rm a n e n t m ach in ery of m o b ilizatio n seem ed neces-

44

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sary for self-interest a n d n a tio n al safety. To Jam es C o n an t, th e H a rv a rd U n iv er­ sity p re sid e n t d e ep ly in v o lv ed in scientific m o b ilizatio n , it seem ed in 1940 tim e "fo r a m ajority of the th in k in g p eo p le to b ecam e co n v in ced th a t w e m u s t b e a w o rld pow er, a n d the price of b ein g a w o rld p o w e r is.w illingness a n d a cap ac­ ity to fight w h e n necessary." A State D e p a rtm e n t official co n fid ed to h is d ia ry th a t y ear th a t "th e only possible effect of th is w a r w o u ld b e th a t th e U n ited States w o u ld em erge w ith a n im p erial p o w e r g reater th a n th e w o rld h a d e v er seen." A n o th e r ob serv er d isc u sse d p u b licly "th e m ain ten an ce of a p o w e rfu l m ilitary force as p a rt of th e n o rm al stru c tu re of o u r society."59 N o t all fed eral a n d p riv ate lead ers sh a red su c h view s, a n d th eir ability to im p o se th e m o n o th er A m ericans rem ain ed u n certain . To som e d egree, th e p e rm a n en c e of th eir creatio n w as su g g ested o n ly b y im plication: th e d e a rth of p led g e s b y R oosevelt a n d o th ers of a w a r to e n d all w a rs im p lied th a t th ere w o u ld be n o e n d to th e p erils the n a tio n n o w faced. W ith different em p h ases, h ow ever, the o u tlo o k of m an y elite figures echoed th a t of R oosevelt. By th e tim e of Pearl H arb o r, th e co n stru ctio n of n a tio n al secu­ rity, th o u g h n o t com plete, w a s w ell ad v an ced . It w o u ld p rev a il to a su b sta n tia l d eg ree for th e n e x t h alf-cen tu ry of A m erican history.

The Shadow of War "T he situ atio n to d ay is u tte rly different from th a t of 1917," G en. G eorge M ar­ shall to ld the n a tio n o n S eptem ber 16, 1940. "Then w e w ere at w a r— b u t w e foresaw sm all possibility of m ilitary d a n g e r to th is country. Today, th o u g h a t peace, su ch a possibility trem bles o n the verge of b eco m in g a pro b ab ility ." M ar­ shall a p tly characterized the n a tio n 's u n c ertain situ atio n a n d n e rv o u s m o o d . N e v er before h a d w a r 's sh a d o w h u n g so o m in o u sly a n d y e t so elu siv ely over th e n ation. W ar rag e d far a w ay in E urope a n d C h in a, b u t a p p a re n tly w ith u n ­ p rec ed e n ted p o ten tial to reach the W estern H em isp h ere. A m erican s w ere p re ­ p a rin g for it y e t h a d n o idea if o r w h e n th ey m ig h t e n te r it. T he n a tio n w a s slip ­ p in g into a tw ilig h t w o rld of neither-w ar-n o r-p eace, a t once a n o n c o m b a t bellig erent a n d n o n b ellig eren t in com bat. Yet th ere w as also w elcom e c h an g e — a p ro sp e rity long d e n ie d a n d a m ission lon g a p p a re n tly m issin g d u rin g the p rev io u s tw o "d ecad es of d iv id e d p u rp o se s," as o n e c o m m en ta to r called th em .60 T he p e rio d before Pearl H a rb o r w a s also a train in g g ro u n d for th e n e w age of n atio n al security, a n u n w ittin g reh earsal for th e C old W ar. O n th e eve of Pearl H arb o r, ju st as in the d a w n of th e C old W ar, p re p a re d n e ss seem ed a n o p en e n d e d challenge, enem ies lu rk ed a t h o m e a n d ab ro ad , th e p ro p e r m ean s to sto p th em w ere unclear, a n d g o v e rn m e n t a ssu m e d n e w p o w e rs in th e a tte m p t to d o so. A s the line b e tw ee n w a r a n d peace d isa p p e a re d , a w a r m en tality flo u rish ed ev en w ith n o fighting w a r to w age, tem p o ra ry m o b ilizatio n sh a d e d off in to p e r­ m a n e n t m ilitarizatio n in w ay s h a rd to recognize, a n d th e challenge y ield ed at-

EMERGENCE,

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tractiv e b u t seem ingly u n in te n d e d changes. M o bilization w a s re g a rd e d as a n e ­ cessity forced o n A m ericans, p ro sp e rity a n d p u rp o se its u n in te n d e d consequences. M e tap h o rs echoed th a t outlook. A t th e o u tb reak of w a r in E u ­ ro p e, FD R w ish e d h e co u ld "offer th e h o p e th a t the sh a d o w o v er th e w o rld m ig h t sw iftly pass. . . . T he d isa ster is n o t of o u r m aking; n o act of o u rs e n g e n ­ d e re d th e forces w h ich a ssa u lt the fo u n d atio n s of civilization."61 T he R oosevelt a d m in istra tio n 's g ra n d strateg y b o th cau sed a n d reflected this m o o d of u n c ertain ty a b o u t w h e th e r the n a tio n w a s a t w ar. N e ith e r p riv a te ly n o r p u b licly d id FDR ru le in or (w ith election-year exceptions) ru le o u t a p lu n g e in to full-scale w ar. The lin ch p in of h is strateg y w as g alv an izin g th e "a r­ sen al of dem ocracy," as h e p ro claim ed the U n ited States to be o n D ecem ber 29, 1940. A m erica's w a r p ro d u c tio n w o u ld succor its fig h tin g allies (p rim arily the B ritish a n d Soviets), p re p a re a n A m erican w a r m achine, d e te r enem ies, a n d ju st p o ssib ly k eep the n a tio n o u t of w ar. T here w as d u p lic ity in h is v a g u en e ss ab o u t w h e th e r A m ericans m ig h t fight, b u t th e resu ltin g "cred ib ility g a p w a s n o t sim ­ p ly a P resid en tial exercise, it w a s a n a tio n al project. E veryone h e lp e d o u t."62 A m erican s focused m ore read ily o n p ro d u c tio n itself, w ith th e p ro sp e rity it in ­ d u c e d a n d th e sym bols of p o w e r it y ield ed , th a n o n th e w a r m ak in g it m ig h t m ak e possible. D espite his v ag u en ess, R oosevelt d id signal certain preferences. H is d ra ­ m atic call in M ay 1940 for the n a tio n to m ak e fifty th o u sa n d p lan e s a year, h is p ro m o tio n of L end-L ease, h is efforts to tig h te n th e econom ic n o o se a ro u n d Ja­ p a n , a n d h is d e p lo y m e n t of A m erican n av al p o w e r in b o th oceans all co n v ey ed h is w ish to u se the n a tio n 's econom ic a n d technological resources, ra th e r th a n its g ro u n d forces, in th e w o rld struggle. T hey also co nveyed, for all FD R's talk of a sh ru n k e n w o rld , the lin g erin g h o p e to rem a in a t a rm 's len g th from it— to h av e allies b e a r th e b ru n t of an y fig h tin g o n lan d , as seem ed m o re likely after th e Soviet U n io n en te red the w a r in June 1941. O th e r a u th o rities s u p p o rte d th o se preferences. W h en C ongress b arely ren e w e d co n scrip tio n in A u g u st 1941, W alter L ip p m a n n a rg u e d th a t a large g ro u n d a rm y w a s "th e cancer w h ic h o b stru cts n a tio n al u n ity "; a n y A m erican w a r effort sh o u ld consist "b a ­ sically of N avy, A ir, a n d m an u fa ctu rin g ." O p in io n p o lls reflected sim ilar p ref­ erences.63 So d id R oosevelt in p riv ate. In Ju n e 1940, h e to ld m ilitary p la n n e rs h o w h e im a g in ed th e U n ited States a t w ar, " b u t w ith n av al a n d air forces only," alo n g w ith a id to its allies. A year later, H a rry H o p k in s fo u n d h im still "a b eliev er in b o m b in g as the o n ly m ean s of g a in in g a victory." "T here m u st be som e k in d of factory in ev ery [G erm an] to w n ," FDR a rg u e d , a n d b o m b in g ev ery to w n "is th e o n ly w a y to b reak the G e rm a n m orale." FDR, A verell H a rrim a n once o b serv ed , " h a d a h o rro r of A m erican tro o p s lan d in g ag ain o n th e c o n tin en t" a n d e n te rin g "tren c h w a rfare w ith all its a p p allin g losses." In effect, R oosevelt w as w ag in g a cold w a r a g ain st the A xis p o w ers, h o p in g th a t at m o st it w o u ld becom e a lim ­ ite d h o t w a r for th e U n ited States. M arshall, for one, k n ew h o w h a rd it w as for



THE

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A m ericans to m obilize w ith o u t a d e clara tio n of w ar, a n d u rg e d resistin g th e easy w a y out: "B ut must w e declare war in o rd e r to facilitate tra in in g a n d m o ­ rale? Must y o u bum down the b u ild in g in o rd e r to ju stify th e Fire D e p artm en t?" A m erican s' sense of b ein g in a tw ilig h t of n eith er-w ar-n o r-p eace reflected n a ­ tio n al policy.64 T he m o b ilizatio n of resources w a s FD R 's to p p riority. In line w ith n a tio n al strategy, m o b ilizatio n favored so p h isticated , cap ital-in ten siv e w e a p o n s— fifty th o u sa n d plan es; b attlesh ip s, aircraft carriers, su b m a rin e s, a n d o th e r craft for a tw o -o cean navy; a n d n e w devices p u rs u e d in secret (an d o ften in co n cert w ith th e B ritish, w h o reta in e d a technological ed g e in m a n y areas), su c h as ra d a r a n d th e ato m ic bom b. For a v a rie ty of reasons, p ro d u c tio n accelerated fitfully, b u t FDR u n d o u b te d ly re g a rd e d his p ro d u c tio n g oals as g alv an izin g objectives m o re th a n realistic quotas. T he resu ltin g econom ic b o o m w a s u n e v e n ly d istrib u te d . It fav o red reg io n s w h ere capital-intensive in d u strie s thrived: coastal cities, th e far W est w ith its aircraft com panies, a n d th e in d u stria l h e a rtla n d w h e n au to m o b ile co m p an ies b e g a n sh iftin g to th e p ro d u c tio n of tan k s a n d p lan es. In a d d itio n , th e b o o m fa­ v o red a n d in u n d a te d th e n e rv e center of it all, W ash in g to n , D.C. In th e lo n g ru n , it also re w a rd e d large co m p an ies w ie ld in g a m p le cap ital a n d expertise, a lth o u g h it m o m e n tarily stav ed off oblivio n for m arg in al co m p etito rs, like P ackard a n d S tu d e b ak e r in the a u to in d u stry , th a t ju m p e d m o re rea d ily o n to w a r co ntracts th a n th e lu m b e rin g giants. In g en eral, too, th e b o o m cam e later to blue-collar w o rk e rs a n d last to m arg in al g ro u p s like b lack A m ericans. In tu rn , su c h u n e v e n n e ss fostered in ten se lab o r-m an ag em en t conflict in 1940-1941, to th e p o in t th a t "th e in d u stria l w a r" o ften su cceed ed in "cro w d in g th e b attle a g ain st H itle r off th e h e a d lin e s."65 In som e w ay s, ho w ev er, the " in d u stria l w a r" m ask ed th e su b sta n tia l h a r­ m o n y e v id e n t d u rin g m obilization. C onflict e ru p te d sp ectacu larly in tw o sec­ to rs d o m in a te d b y tw o w illful leaders, th e a u to in d u s try 's H e n ry F ord a n d th e coal u n io n 's John L. L ew is, b o th vio len tly anti-R oosevelt a n d b o th sy m b o ls of a n older, p e rso n al style of leadership. E lsew here, b u sin e ss a n d u n io n lea d ers w ere g ro w in g accustom ed to th e in tricate co m p ro m ises in g o v e m m e n tin d u stry -la b o r relatio n s th a t th e N e w D eal p ro m o te d . C o rp o ra te lead ers d o m i­ n a te d those relations as w ell as g o v e rn m e n t's a p p a ra tu s of m obilizatio n , b u t less firm ly th a n in th e p rev io u s w a r o r in th e p o stw a r era. Because b u sin e ssm e n lacked expertise o r v isio n in critical areas, a n d for political reaso n s as w ell, FDR in clu d ed h o ld o v e r N e w D ealers a n d lab o r lea d ers in th e a p p a ra tu s; one in p a r­ ticular, th e U n ited A u to W orkers' W alter R euther, p la y e d a critical role in con­ v e rtin g the auto in d u stry to w a r p ro d u ctio n . D espite its technological e m p h asis, m o b ilizatio n p ro d u c e d w id e n a tio n al p ro sp e rity b y 1941, p a rtly because th e U n ited States w a s p io n ee rin g m ass p ro ­ d u c tio n b y low -skilled labor ev en of com plex item s like sh ip s a n d aircraft. M u n d a n e item s from foodstuffs to ten ts w ere also in h e av y d e m a n d b y allies

EMERGENCE,

1933-1941

47

a n d th e A m erican a rm e d forces, a n d , becau se of th e ir sim plicity, w ere often m o re rea d ily ru sh e d in to p ro d u ctio n . T h u s farm incom e, critical w h e n a lm o st h a lf th e p o p u la tio n still liv ed in ru ra l areas o r sm all to w n s, in creased sh a rp ly in 1941, th o u g h it also h e lp e d finance m ech an izatio n th a t w o rse n e d th e p lig h t of te n a n ts a n d laborers. W ith few controls y e t o n c o n su m p tio n a n d w ith p e n t-u p d e m a n d fro m th e D ep ressio n for civilian g o o d s, th a t sector also g rew briskly, w h ile o v erall G N P for 1941 ra n 25 p e rc en t h ig h e r th a n in 1940. U n e m p lo y m en t fin ally slip p e d b e lo w 10 p e rc en t late in 1941, While th o se a lre ad y w o rk in g often fo u n d th e ir h o u rs a n d w a g es increasing. For o n e m agic y e ar a t least, b o th g u n s a n d b u tte r seem ed a b u n d a n t. T here is n o d o u b t w h a t d ro v e the b u rg e o n in g econom y. In 1941, fed eral sp e n d in g w a s fo u r tim es its m id-1930s figures, a n d its 20 p e rc en t of G N P w a s d o u b le D ep ressio n -era levels, six tim es its sh are in th e 1920s. D efense sp e n d in g cau se d all th e increase, seizing 13.1 p e rc en t of G N P in 1941, u p from less th a n 1.5 p e rc e n t for m o st of th e 1930s. T he m ig h ty effects of w h a t cam e to b e called m ili­ ta ry K eynesianism w ere e v id en t, a n d w elcom e in d e e d to A m erican s sta rv e d of th e sy m b o ls of affluence a n d o ften th e su b stan ce of a to lerab le life. T he p ro x im ity of w ar-b o rn e affluence to recen t econom ic calam ity w as criti­ cal. H a d th e b o o m follow ed o n th e h eels of g en eral p ro sp erity , its b enefits w o u ld h av e seem ed m in o r a n d its d islocatio n s p ain fu l. A s it w as, th e n e w ­ fo u n d p ro sp erity , b y em erg in g in the w a k e of a terrib le d e p ressio n , fo rg ed a p o w e rfu l co n n ectio n b e tw e e n affluence a n d m ilitarizatio n , o n e th a t " w o u ld b e im p o ssible to forget," n o tes one h isto rian . Som e n o ticed it a t th e tim e. "T he N e w D eal fo u g h t a n u p h ill b a ttle in its efforts to resto re pro sp erity . N o w w e accept w ith little q u e stio n g o v e rn m e n ta l in te rv e n tio n in in d u stry o n b eh alf of a g rea t d efense p ro g ra m ." 66 But for th e m o m e n t th ere seem ed little n e e d to d w ell o n th a t shift: th e n e w p ro sp e rity a p p e a re d d riv e n b y th e n e e d to m obilize a g ain st d is ta n t enem ies, n o t b y d esig n s to rev iv e a sta g n a n t econom y. A s for th e co n cen tratio n of p o w e r in W ash in g to n th a t resu lted , it elicited b a rb s as it h a d in th e 1930s, b u t su rp risin g ly little su sta in e d o p p o sitio n . FD R's foes still su sp e c te d h is lu st for po w er, b u t th ey also h a rp e d o n h is failu re to cu rb strikes, control resources, a n d co n cen trate executive a u th o rity — th a t is, th ey "ag re ed th a t tim id ity w a s th e m o st p e rsiste n t sh o rtco m in g of th e R oosevelt A d ­ m in istra tio n ." FD R 's liberal su p p o rte rs gave sim ilar v iew s m o re p o sitiv e ex­ pression: "O n ly th ro u g h th e chief executive can w e fin d th e co n cen tratio n of p o w e r th a t is necessary."67 If p ro sp e rity seem ed th e u n in te n d e d b y -p ro d u c t of rea rm am en t, so m e rec­ o g n ized a different relationship, one e v id e n t in FD R 's d efen se of th e N e w D eal a n d a t th e core of m ilitarization. For m a n y liberals, p ro sp e rity w a s a p rec o n d i­ tion, e v en a tool, of rea rm am en t, n o t ju st its consequence. "To b e w o rth d y in g for, a political sy stem m u st m ake possible a society th a t is w o rth living in," the N a tio n a l R esources P lan n in g B oard m ain tain ed : dem o cracy h a d to o u tp erfo rm to ta litaria n ism to w in th e stru g g le a g ain st it. In th a t light, social w elfare pro-

48

THE

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OF AMERICA

g ram s w ere n o t "se n tim en ta l h u m a n ita ria n ism " b u t th e "first line of n a tio n al d efen se."68 Such co m m en ts su g g e ste d th e m a n y w ay s, b e y o n d m ere affluence, in w h ic h m o b ilization w a s w elco m ed , ju st as it h a d b e e n in 1917. W ords a n d em p h a se s h a d changed. In th e colder lan g u a g e of 1941, A m erican s ex tolled v a rio u s c h an g e s— the solidification of th e N e w D eal th a t liberals w a n te d , for exam ple, o r th e d ism a n tle m e n t of it th a t m a n y co n serv ativ es so u g h t— less as lofty goals in th em selv es th a n as in stru m e n ta l tasks su b o rd in a te to n a tio n al defense. M em ories of W orld W ar I w ere too acute for a sense of plastic p o ssib ilities to b e ex p ressed as lavishly as in 1917. B ut in tem p ere d fo rm it rea p p e a re d , th o u g h n o w o ften d e n u d e d of o v e rt "political ideology," w h ic h o n e c o n te m p o ra ry saw as u sefu l only "to th e ex ten t th a t it h e lp s o r h in d e rs . . . th e p u rp o s e of th e sta te ."69 T he U n ited States h a d to m obilize h u m a n as w ell as econom ic resources. The a rm y g rew eightfold in tw o years, to n e arly 1.5 m illio n m e n b y th e su m m e r of 1941. T his task m ig h t h a v e seem ed easy, g iv en th e larg e p o o l of u n e m p lo y ed , b u t n a tio n al lea d ers reco g n ized th a t w h ile sh eer n u m b e rs w e re n o p ro b lem , th eir d istrib u tio n am o n g m a n y claim an ts (of w h ic h th e a rm e d forces w ere only one) w as. For g o o d reason, the d ra ft law w a s called (as in 1917) th e Selective Service Act. Its m a n y ex em p tio n s in clu d ed critical o ccu p atio n s, a n d 12 m illion of th e 17 m illion m e n reg istered received d e fe rm en ts (alm o st 50 p e rc e n t of th e 1 m illio n first called for in d u c tio n w ere rejected as p h y sically unfit). T he m o st ch arg ed asp ect of conscription w a s its n o v e lty as th e n a tio n 's first p eacetim e d raft, p ro m p tin g fears of a coercive sta te a n d of A m erican b o y s d y in g in E urope. C o n sc rip tio n "w ill slit the th ro a t of th e last g rea t dem ocracy," th u n d e re d M o n tan a se n ato r B urton K. W heeler, o n e of FD R 's h a rsh e st foes.70 Yet th e su rp rise a b o u t co n scrip tio n w a s th e ease w ith w h ic h A m erican s ac­ cep ted it. Som e 86 p e rc en t of those p o lled in A u g u s t 1940 a p p ro v e d d ra ft legis­ lation, a n d w h ile m illions av o id e d service leg ally — th e ru s h of y o u n g m e n to m a rry w a s alm o st a n a tio n al e m b a rra ssm e n t— o n ly a few h u n d re d o p e n ly v io­ lated the 1940 act. A cceptance of the d ra ft o w e d to several factors: its rem o v al as a n issu e from p resid en tial politics (b o th W illkie a n d FDR su p p o rte d it), g o o d tim in g (the m ea su re reached C ongress in th e w a k e of F rance's fall), a n d a n o d to a n ti­ in te rv en tio n ists (a b a n b y C ongress o n u se of d raftees o u tsid e th e W estern H e m isp h ere or A m erican bases). T hen too, th e d ra ft's sh rillest o p p o n e n ts gave u p m u c h g ro u n d , u su a lly g ra n tin g the n e e d for larg er a rm e d forces a n d object­ in g o n ly to the m eth o d . M ost tellingly, th eir alarm s a b o u t d ictato rial g o v e rn ­ m e n t fell m o stly o n d e a f ears. Felt necessities w ere only one reason for acceptance, h o w ev er. The N e w D eal h a d accustom ed m an y A m ericans to a n activist state. Ju st as th e C iv ilian C o n ­ serv atio n C o rp s h a d ta u g h t the social a n d econom ic b en efits of a rm y life, backers of conscription n o w n o ted su ch ad v an tag es. S tatin g a n o ld ratio n ale.

EMERGENCE,

1933-194

49

M arsh all to u te d th e o p e n in g affo rd ed b y m ilitary service to b rid g e social d iv i­ sions a n d en h an ce "resp ec t for c o n stitu ted au th o rity ." W ritin g sh o rtly after Pearl H arb o r, John Steinbeck celebrated h o w m ilitary service g ave m e n a n es­ cape from "directionless d ep re ssio n " a n d a n "an tid o te for th e p o iso n s of this id len ess a n d in d irectio n ." T he in d u ctee w ill becom e a b e tte r m an , p ro claim ed o n e co n tem p o rary : "H e w ill e at sim p le foods a t reg u la r h o u r s . . . stra ig h te n h is p o stu re ," a n d , " w h e th e r h e likes it o r not, com m u n icate w ith n a tu re in all h e r m o o d s." A lth o u g h its a d v e n t w a s "n o t a m a tte r of choice," ra n a m o re ab stract 1941 com m entary, "th e d a y of th e positive state is u p o n u s." M o bilization of­ fered "v a st a n d larg ely u n e x p lo re d " chances for th e m ilitary to h e lp a tta in "d e ­ sirab le social a n d econom ic e n d s," e n d s w h ich m e a n t th a t m ilitary officers co u ld n o lo n g er rem a in " a p a rt from th e m ain c u rre n t of A m erican life," ju st as " a n ineffective a rm y " w as n o lo n g er "a sig n of g race."71 In th a t sp irit, p oliticians jo in ed experts o n h e a lth a n d social w elfare to stu d y th e d ra ft's evidence of a p p allin g physical a n d e d u ca tio n al co n d itio n s am o n g m a n y y o u n g m en, a n d to u se the n a tio n al em erg en cy to rem e d y th o se co n d i­ tions. R eform ers a n d ex p erts to o k u p specific challen g es— im p ro v in g literacy o r d e n ta l care, cu rb in g v en ereal d isease a n d p ro stitu tio n (to critics, each m ili­ ta ry cam p attrac ted a "v eritab le carnival of vice"). E leanor R oosevelt h o p e d th a t th e co n d itio n s rev ealed b y th e d ra ft w o u ld s p u r a n a tio n al h e a lth p ro g ram , a n d F ranklin took u p the cause, once ag ain fu sin g social w elfare a n d n a tio n al defense. "It is n 't a t this tim e a m a tte r so m u c h of a id in g im m ed iate n a tio n al d efen se for this year, o r th e n e x t year, as of g ettin g a stro n g e r race of A m erican s in th e d a y s to com e." H alf-jokingly h e su g g ested a "p erio d ic [m edical] ch eck u p o n ev ery b o d y " a n d th e g o v e rn m e n t's "rig h t to say to th a t fellow , 'N o w , look, d o n 't d i e . '. . . C onstitutionally, h e h as the rig h t to d o it [die]. But th e G o v ern ­ m e n t o u g h t to k n o w w h a t his a ttitu d e is." H is h u m o r nicely c a p tu re d p rev ail­ in g a ttitu d es: n a tio n al d efense a n d social w elfare, ra th e r th a n clashing objec­ tives, req u ire d each o th er.72 T he m o b ilizatio n of h u m a n resources also offered o p p o rtu n itie s for specific g ro u p s— at least m en in them , since the task w a s u n d e rs to o d in g e n d ered term s. A lth o u g h n o t d e sig n e d to ch an g e ineq u ities of class a n d race, m o b iliza­ tio n n o n eth eless m a d e som e ch an g e possible, especially for A fricanA m ericans. Blacks often felt indifferent to th e stru g g le in E u ro p e a n d su s­ p icio u s of th e racial d y n am ics in th e d e v elo p in g A sian conflict, b u t m o re vex in g w a s th e p a te n t d isc rim in atio n th ey faced in w a r p la n ts a n d th e a rm e d forces. U su ally p o o r a n d resid in g in a S outh w h ere Jim C ro w still ru led , black m en w ere a ttrac ted to m ilitary service, w ith its p ro m ise of incom e a n d a m easu re of statu s, o n ly to fin d th eir en tran ce often blocked w h e n th ey v o lu n te ere d or g ot d rafte d . E ven if allow ed in, th ey faced d iscrim in atio n a n d segregation; th o u g h a n im p o rta n t legal step, a b a n o n racial d iscrim in atio n in th e 1940 Selective Ser­ vice A ct c h an g e d little in practice. W riter L an g sto n H u g h e s cau g h t th e irony: "W e are elev ato r boys, janitors, red caps, m a id s— a race in u n ifo rm ," b u t n o t in

50

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the n a tio n 's u n ifo rm .73 P erh ap s m o st of all, th ere w a s th e in fu ria tin g p ro sp e c t of join ing a w a r for freed o m w ith o u t h av in g it a t ho m e, a d d e d to b itte r m em o ­ ries of d a sh e d expectations in the last w ar. In th e sp rin g of 1941, black lead ers w ru n g w h a t lev erag e th e y co u ld from this situ atio n , th rea te n in g a m arch o n W ash in g to n u n less FDR acted. F earin g p o liti­ cal tu rm oil, R oosevelt g ru d g in g ly offered ju st e n o u g h to g et th e m arch called off: a n executive order, w ith a w e a k enforcem en t m ech an ism , b a rrin g d iscrim i­ n a tio n b y em p lo y ers a n d lab o r u n io n s en g ag ed in d efen se b u sin ess, p lu s to k en ch an g es in the a rm e d forces. H is ratio n ale w a s clear: n a tio n al defen se, n o t so­ cial justice. A n a tio n facing "to ta litaria n ism " n e e d e d all its w o rk e rs a n d n e e d e d to stre n g th e n its " u n ity a n d m o rale b y refutin g a t h o m e th e v e ry th eo ries w h ic h w e are fighting a b ro a d ."74 T he ep iso d e w a s a tu rn in g p o in t in race relations. A n e w black m ilitan cy co­ in cid ed w ith th e sta te 's g ro w in g n e e d for resources a n d for ideological con­ sistency, y ield in g th e m ass-action tactics, rationales, a n d — in m e n like A. P h ilip R a n d o lp h — m u ch of th e le a d ersh ip th a t w o u ld sh a p e race relatio n s for d e ­ cades to com e. For blacks, the o p p o rtu n ity o p e n e d w a s a m ix ed blessing; offer­ in g th em n e w leverage, it also su b o rd in a te d racial justice to n a tio n al security; tactically em p o w erin g th em , it also ideologically circu m scrib ed th em . Still, FD R 's action ack n o w led g ed th a t n a tio n al secu rity co u ld o p e n th e w a y for so­ cial justice in ad m issib le to m o st w h ite A m erican s as a goal in its o w n right. The n e e d s of n a tio n al secu rity w ere ch allen g in g fears of activist g o v e rn m e n t in the aren a of race, ju st as th ey d id in th e field of social w elfare. A s a lever for social change, n a tio n al secu rity larg ely sto p p e d a t th e n a tio n 's b o rd ers. It could n o t o v errid e in g ra in e d p reju d ices a g ain st o u tsid e rs try in g to g e t in o r a g ain st others, su c h as H isp an ics a n d Japanese-A m ericans, still seen as aliens. The issue em erg ed forcefully reg a rd in g Jew ish refu g ees from E urope. By a n d large. C ongress a n d th e a d m in istra tio n b a rre d th e do o r, w ith s u p p o rt from m o st A m ericans, w h o se anti-Sem itic preju d ices w e re p ro b a b ly p e a k in g a t th is tim e. The a d m in istra tio n lacked th e w ill a n d th e political n e e d to ch allenge th o se prejudices, a n d som e Jew ish lead ers feared th a t a n y challenge b y th e m w o u ld only inflam e anti-Sem itism . P o w erfu l m em o ries of d isto rte d p ro p a ­ g a n d a a b o u t G e rm a n atrocities in W orld W ar I d im in ish e d th e cred ib ility of charges a g ain st th e N azis. A b o u t 150,000 Jew s d id e n te r th e U n ited States b y m id-1942— n o t a b a d record c o m p a red to th a t of o th er n atio n s, b u t a m ere frac­ tio n of those e n d an g e re d . T h at m a n y p ro m in e n t Jew ish refu g ees g o t in sh o w ed h o w celebrity, class, o r ability to serve n a tio n a l d efen se (as refu g ee Jew ish sci­ en tists d id in the atom ic b o m b project) created loopholes. T h at C h ristia n refu ­ gees also faced som e obstacles to ad m issio n , w h ile th e p lig h t of A sian refugees w a s b arely even a n issue, su g g ests th a t anti-S em itism also sh a d e d off in to dif­ fuse n a tiv ism a n d racism , a n d into an tirad icalism , g iv en th e e q u a tio n som e m ad e b e tw ee n Jew s a n d leftist conspiracies. In d eed , the refugee issue arose ju st w h e n a m o b ilizatio n of fear w a s ad v an c-

EMERGENCE,

19 3 3 - 1 94

SI

in g alo n g sid e th e m o b ilizatio n of econom ic a n d h u m a n resources. A lth o u g h ch allen g ed b y A frican-A m ericans, a m o n g o th ers, racism a n d n a tiv ism flow ed in o th e r d irections o p e n e d u p b y th e fear th a t im p e n d in g w a r b red . N a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t offered le a d ersh ip in th is fo rm of m o b ilizatio n as in o th ers, a n d w h ile racial a n d ethnic g ro u p s w ere rarely th e in te n d e d o r on ly targ et, th e fear of alien influences h a d p erm eab le b o u n d a rie s. Since W orld W ar I, W alter M illis later n o te d , "a quasi-religious n a tio n alism h a d b e en se d u lo u sly c u ltiv ated in th e U n ited States," so th a t p atrio tic ritu a ls a n d sym bols on ly lately in v en ted n o w seem ed tim eless (an d req u ired ) for A m ericans. W ith th eir help, a once u n ­ im ag in ab le "d eg re e of reg im en ta tio n a n d c en tralizatio n . . . h a d b y 1941 b e ­ com e n o m o re th a n a n o rm al a n d p a te n tly necessary o rd e r of affairs."75 E v id en t in m a n y sp h eres of A m erican life, th a t sp irit of reg im en tatio n sh a p e d th e m o­ b ilizatio n of fear in p articular. R oosevelt him self so u n d e d th e a la rm a b o u t sub v ersio n . It flo w ed logically fro m h is co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security, after all, th a t su b v e rsio n c o u ld leap th e oceans ju st as w e a p o n s m ig h t, a n d th a t "to ta l d efen se" req u ire d vigilance a g ain st enem ies at hom e. "W e k n o w of n e w m e th o d s of attack," h e a n n o u n ce d in M ay 1940. "T he Trojan H orse. T he Fifth C o lu m n th a t b e tra y s a n a tio n u n ­ p re p a re d for treachery. Spies, sa b o teu rs a n d traito rs are th e actors in th is n e w strateg y." So too m ig h t b e those w ith n o ties to a n enem y: ap o stles of "g ro u p h a tre d o r class tro u b le" w ere am o n g th e forces of " u n d ilu te d p o iso n ."76 E ven th o se w h o sim p ly o p p o se d his policies, h e su g g ested , m ig h t b e en em ies of th e natio n . Before R u ssia's e n try into th e w ar, FD R so m etim es w a rn e d of c o m m u n ist su b v ersio n , as h a d lu rid congressional in v estig atio n s (often a im ed a t h is a d ­ m in istratio n ) in th e late 1930s. M ore often, h e set h is sig h ts o n N a zi sab o teu rs, h o m e g ro w n (often G erm an-A m erican) sy m p ath izers, a n d rig h t-w in g ex trem ­ ists. T he far rig h t w a s a m otley b u n c h — u su a lly racists a n d anti-Sem ites, h eirs to v a rio u s C atholic a n d P ro te stan t anxieties, g en erally rab id foes of co m m u ­ nism . It in c lu d e d the R everend G erald L. K. S m ith (H u ey L o n g 's fo rm er ally), W illiam D u d le y Pelley (of th e Silver Legion), E lizabeth D illing (au th o r of The Red Network), a n d F ather C harles C o u g h lin (the fam o u s "rad io p riest"). A g ain st su c h people, R oosevelt a n d o th er po litician s h e lp e d to fo m en t a "B row n Scare" before a n d after Pearl H a rb o r.77 A lth o u g h d irected a t differen t targ ets a n d p racticed o n a lesser scale, it resem b led th e Red Scares a t th e close of W orld W ar I a n d a fter W orld W ar II in its slo p p y reg a rd for civil liberties, affin­ ity for conspiracy theories, m a n ip u la tio n of concerns for n a tio n al security, a n d in stitu tio n al m achinery. In d ee d , the B row n Scare w a s a n o th e r act in th e re­ h earsal for th e C old W ar, g oing far to g e n erate th e m en tality a n d th e a p p a ra tu s m o b ilized a g ain st th e left after W orld W ar II. L en d in g specific co n ten t to the B row n Scare w ere th e concerns a n d tactics of antifascist forces. A lread y in 1935, S tu art C h ase h a d co m p lain ed th a t h e co u ld "h a rd ly go o u t to d in n er, o p e n a n e w sp a p e r [or] tu rn o n th e rad io w ith o u t en-

52

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O F AMERl 'CA

co u n terin g the term 'fa s c is t/" T hat te rm w a s flu n g in m a n y d irectio n s— a t tim es at the N e w D eal itself— as if m an y A m erican s w ere m o re in terested in som e h o m e g ro w n fascism th a n in its G e rm a n a n d Italian p ro to ty p es. L iberals a n d leftists m o st often w ie ld e d the term , th eir ch arg es ech o in g th e c o u n te rsu b ­ v ersiv e th em es (less o ften the viciousness) of th e rad icals o n th e rig h t w h o m th ey attacked. B ehind th em lay a legacy of c o u n te rsu b v e rsiv e cru sad es, as w ell as fears set loose b y W orld W ar I of h o w c u n n in g p ractitio n ers of p ro p a g a n d a co u ld d u p e th e gullible m asses. P o p u la r c u ltu re fan n e d su c h fears w ith p s e u ­ d o d o c u m e n ta ry exposes, novels su ch as Sinclair L ew is's It Can't Happen Here (1935), film s like Black Legion (1936), a n d rad io c o m m en ta ry (W alter W inchell rep e ate d ly u rg in g th e a rre st of foes o n the right). S uch lite ra tu re ig n o red the rig h t's g en u in e A m erican roots a n d e x ag g erated its ties to en em ies a b ro a d — "Is L in d b erg h a N azi?" one in te rv en tio n ist p a m p h le t ask ed in 1941— ju st as few antifascists recognized th a t "th ere w a s n o n ecessary co n n ectio n b e tw e e n co n servative theology a n d far rig h t activism . . . a m ajo rity of d e v o u t fu n d a ­ m en talists, because th ey w ere poor, so u th e rn , or b o th , v o ted for R oosevelt."78 Liberals th ereb y conjured u p im ages of a closed w o rld of in sid io u s id eo lo g y a n d subversion. In th eir view , rig h t-w in g ers a t h o m e w ere im p o rtin g o r m im ­ icking th e id eas a n d tactics of fascist forces a b ro a d — a n d h a d to b e sto p p e d . R oger B aldw in a t th e A m erican C ivil L iberties U n io n accu rately d e te cted a m o n g liberals a n d rad icals a d rift to w a rd " 'L ib erty for O u r S id e' only." E ven th o se w h o w a rn e d a g ain st "m ass h y ste ria " also b eliev ed th a t "to leran ce for th e into lerance of alien sy stem s" could n o t b e accep ted b y tru e d em o crats. In th a t sp irit cam e L ew is M u m fo rd 's p ro p o sa l to o u tlaw as trea so n th e e sp o u sa l of fas­ cism , a n d M ax L e m e r's desire for a T ru th in O p in io n Act, w h o se co m m is­ sioners w o u ld ro o t o u t "p o iso n o u s" p ro p a g a n d a .79 C o n g ress a n d FDR w o u ld n o t go th a t far, b u t m a n y liberals s u p p o rte d ren ew al of th e H o u se C o m m ittee o n U n -A m erican A ctivities in 1938 a n d p assag e of th e A lien R egistration A ct (the S m ith Act) in 1940. A t th e sam e tim e, R oosevelt, rem o v in g earlier p ro h ib itio n s o n p o litical su r­ veillance, p ressed the Federal B ureau of In v estig atio n in to a w id e -ra n g in g p ro b e of "su b v ersiv e" g ro u p s o n th e far rig h t, as w ell as m ain strea m a n ti­ in te rv en tio n ist o rg an izatio n s like A m erica First a n d pu b lic fig u res like Joseph K ennedy, B urton W heeler, a n d C harles L indbergh. D espite h is a n im u s to w a rd th e left, FBI d irecto r J. E d g ar H oover, a m aste r e m p ire b u ild e r, c o m p lied w ith a zeal exceeding FD R 's intentions, offering a flood of re p o rts a b o u t rig h t-w in g e rs to a keenly in terested R oosevelt a n d m ak in g p la n s to d e ta in alleg ed en em ies of th e state. Legal p ro secu tio n g enerally a w aited form al e n try in to th e w ar, w h e n it rev ealed "scan t links b e tw ee n B erlin a n d e v en th e m o st vicio u s antiS em ites."80 P ro m o ted b y different forces, the fears m o b ilized o n th e eve of w a r d id n o t fully cohere. A nti-Sem itism sto o d b esid e fear of fascism , su sp icio n s of ItalianA m ericans jostled w ith su rp risin g tolerance to w a rd G erm an -A m erican s, racist

EMERGENCE,

1933-194

53

sen tim en ts to w a rd Japanese coexisted w ith sy m p a th y for b e leag u ered C hi­ nese, a g en eral n a tiv ism c o u n terb alan ced a sense of so lid arity w ith allies ab ro ad . M ost w id e sp re a d , h ow ever, w a s fear of th e fascist forces, sh a d in g off in to g en eral anxiety a b o u t th e n a tio n 's security. M obilization in d u c e d a n o th e r fear as w ell— of th e v e ry m ach in ery th a t p ro ­ d u c e d it. L iberal critics likened th e FBI to b o th th e G estap o a n d th e Soviet secret police w h e n it in tru d e d o n the politics a n d p riv acy of th eir political com ­ p atrio ts. A few o n the left, like th e red o u b tab leS o cialist N o rm a n T hom as, q u e s­ tio n e d FBI actions a g ain st th e fringe rig h t, ju st as som e co n serv ativ es rose to d e fe n d civil liberties for th eir political foes. In a m ore reflective fashion, intellectuals ru m in a te d o n ch anges th a t m ig h t o u tla st th e w ar. In 1941, political sociologist H a ro ld L assw ell a n n o u n c e d th e em erg ence of the "g arriso n state." T h o u g h w a rn in g of th e co m in g "su p re m a c y of th e soldier," h e in fact d e p ic te d a su b tler d e v elo p m e n t, th e em ergence of "sp ecialists o n violence" v ersed in m o d e m tech n o lo g y a n d m erg in g th e skills of th e soldier, the m anager, a n d the "p ro m o te r of large-scale civilian en ter­ p rise ." Such m en m ig h t m an ip u la te "u n iv ersa l fear" a n d ex p lo it "th e b o tto m layers of th e p o p u la tio n ." 81 L assw ell's a u d ien ce a n d in ten tio n s w ere largely scholarly, h ow ever, a n d m o st intellectuals w ere p reo c cu p ie d b y th e im m ed iate crisis, to w h ich fear of a "g arriso n state" to o k seco n d place. Sim ilarly, su sp i­ cions a b o u t state p o w e r voiced b y conservativ es like H e rb e rt H oover, w h a t­ ev er th eir lastin g validity, w ere for the m o m e n t d riv e n b y a n im u s to w a rd FDR a n d h is in te rv en tio n ist policy. In general, then, criticism of th e em erg in g n a tio n a l secu rity state d isp lay e d occasional insight b u t lim ited clout. A lth o u g h flo w in g from som e of th e sam e a n tistatist cu rren ts, it lacked the stin g a n d ideological coherence of earlier a t­ tacks o n th e N e w Deal. Like attacks o n co n scrip tio n o r econom ic m obilization, it also fell victim to th e in ten se factionalism a m o n g R oosevelt's o p p o n e n ts a n d to ala rm a b o u t the n a tio n 's safety. Ju st as the state m obilized, so too d id c u ltu re itself, a lth o u g h , g iv en its d ecen ­ tralized n a tu re , it d id so in a less sp e e d y a n d sy stem atic w ay. H o lly w o o d , for exam ple, w a s n o to rio u sly slow to id en tify w ith th e in te rv en tio n ist cause or to trea t th e w o rld crisis. W h atev er the sy m p a th ies of its m a n y Jew ish leaders, th ey w ere lo n g offset b y fears of alien atin g key seg m en ts of th e global m ark e t a n d b y th e vigilance of H o lly w o o d 's chief censor, w h o su sp ec ted th a t Jew s in H olly­ w o o d "w ere try in g to u se th e N a zis' trea tm e n t of Jew s to m ak e p ro p a g a n d a p ictu res." Confessions ofa Nazi Spy (1939) b reach ed th e d a m , w h ile d e e p e r forces e ro d e d it. N azi c o n q u est of E u ro p e e n d e d co n cern a b o u t m ak in g film s p a la t­ able for au d ien ces there, a n d B ritain's su rv iv a l m a d e it a b o o m m a rk e t for antiN azi film s. The sta te 's h e av y h a n d — the a d m in istra tio n 's th re a t of a n titru st actio n — also p la y e d a role in m o v in g H o lly w o o d to w a rd a n in terv en tio n ist stance. So too d id in fo rm al co o p eratio n am o n g a d m in istra tio n figures, in ter­ v e n tio n ist g ro u p s, a n d H o lly w o o d executives, w riters, a n d artists. In th e en d .

54

THE M ILITA RIZ ATIO N OF AMERICA

H o lly w o o d p re se n te d the in te rv en tio n ist v iew w ith far less n u a n ce a n d b alan ce th a n o th er m edia. M eanw hile, th e an ti-in te rv en tio n ist cause d id n o t len d itself to th e d ram atic u ses H o lly w o o d m a d e of re a rm am en t, w h ic h w a s easily glam ­ o rized in new sreels a n d film s a b o u t sp ectacu lar w a r g am es a n d d a re -d ev il p i­ lots. N o w o n d e r FDR p u b licly th a n k e d th e in d u s try for its " sp le n d id co o p era­ tio n ."82 C o o p e ratio n reached its z en ith in S ep tem b er 1941 w ith th e release of Sergeant York, th e m o st so p h isticated a n d influential in te rv en tio n ist film . FDR g reeted W orld W ar I hero A lvin York a t the W hite H o u se for a special screening, th e a rm y u se d th e occasion to recruit, a n d lu m in a rie s a tte n d e d th e lav ish N e w York p rem iere: E leanor R oosevelt, G en. John J. P ersh in g , W endell W illkie, a n d Tim e-Life's H e n ry Luce. S u p p o rtin g in te rv en tio n ism itself, k ey film s also d ro v e h o m e b ro a d e r m essages. Confessions of a Nazi Spy, for exam ple, d isp u te d o ld n o tio n s of w a r as so m eth in g form ally declared , as E d w a rd G. R obinson as­ se rted th a t G erm an y w a s a lre ad y a t w a r w ith th e U n ited States: "It's a n e w k in d of w a r b u t it's still w a r." 83 Sergeant York d id n o t d irectly a d d re ss th e issu es of 1941, b u t as a m o ral d ra m a of Y ork's p assag e fro m C h ristia n pacifism to m ili­ ta n t realism d u rin g W orld W ar I, it su g g e ste d th e fu tility of pacifism in 1917, 1941, a n d a n indefinable future. M ore im p o rta n t th a n su c h o v e rt m essages, h o w ev er, w a s H o lly w o o d 's p ro ­ m o tio n of a w a r m e n ta lity — a sense of the in ev itab ility of w a r a n d th e p e r­ v asiv eness of its n e e d s— th a t tra n sc e n d e d p a rtisa n p o sitio n s o n fo reig n policy. In ach ieving th a t effect, o th er m ed ia also p la y e d a role. "T he w a r w a s ev ery w h e re — th e m ovies, the songs, e v en th e term in o lo g y of sp o rts. O n e saw it in a su m m a ry of th e m atch b e tw ee n [Joe] L ouis a n d [Billy] C onn: 'A sp e e d y lig h t cru iser of the rin g failed to w ith sta n d th e h e a v y firin g of th e g reatest d re a d n o u g h t of m o d e m boxing." R adio c o n tin u e d its role, as d id cartoonists, n o v elists, a n d journalists, w h o sh o w ed th em selv es o r th eir h a rd b o ile d h ero es u n d e rg o in g a conversion experience in w h ic h th ey sh e d th e cynicism of th e in ­ te rw a r y ears to m ake th eir w e a ry b u t d e te rm in e d co m m itm en t to dem ocracy. M aking w a r " a n in stru m e n t of m erch an d isin g ," a d v e rtise rs w o rk e d defen se in to th eir m essag es— "A n y o n e b u y in g a n e w P ly m o u th to d ay ," ra n o n e ad , "h as th e satisfaction of n o t on ly o b tain in g the finest car in P ly m o u th h istory, b u t of k n o w in g h e h a s also g iv en su p p o rt to the d efen se p ro d u c tio n stru c tu re ."84 The sta te 's role in sh a p in g c u ltu re b ecam e m o re so p h isticated as w a r a p ­ pro ach ed. W hile m a n y fed eral officials fav o red d rac o n ian cen so rsh ip a n d h e av y -h an d e d p ro p a g a n d a , others, in clu d in g FDR h im self a t tim es, reco g n ized th a t a softer sell a n d in d irect p ressu re s o n th e m ed ia g a in e d th eir objectives at less political cost. T hey eschew ed m o st of the stro n g -arm m e th o d s of 1918— o r of 1941 in places like G e rm a n y — in favor of a n in fo rm al p u b lic -p riv a te co o p er­ atio n th a t w o u ld largely p rev a il for decad es after th e w ar. O ne m in o r in cid en t p ro v id e d a n o th e r foretaste of th e C o ld W ar. E x asp erated b y th e d rift of m ed ia preferences, a n ti-in te rv en tio n ist co n g ressm en lau n ch ed

EMERGENCE,

1933-1941

SS

a n in v estig atio n in to H o lly w o o d in th e fall of 1941, ju st w h e n Sergeant York a p ­ p e ared . T he effort w a s led b y Sen. G erald N ye, w h o "reassem b led th e cast of c o n sp irato rs h e flayed so effectively in h is 'm erc h an ts of d e a th ' h e arin g s of 1934-36," n o w fin d in g th e m in H o lly w o o d a n d its Jew ish lead ersh ip . T h o u g h d e a f to the su b tle r m e th o d s of c u ltu ra l control, N y e g ra sp e d th e in sid io u s san i­ tizatio n of w a r en d em ic to m o d e m culture: Film s sh o w ed n o m e n "cro u ch in g in th e m u d . . .b o y s d isem b o w eled , b lo w n to bits. You see th em m erely m arc h in g in th e ir b rig h t u n ifo rm s, firing th e b e au tifu l g u n s a t d ista n t targ ets." H olly­ w o o d 's defense, m o u n te d b y W endell W illkie, w a s slip p ery in w a y s th a t in­ v ite d th e in d u stry 's later cap itu la tio n to differen t p u rp o se s. W hile a d m ittin g th a t "w e m ak e n o p rete n se of frien d lin ess to N a zi G erm an y ," W illkie d e n ie d p re ssu re fro m th e W hite H ouse. "Frankly, th e m o tio n -p ictu re in d u stry w o u ld b e a sh a m e d if it w e re n o t d o in g v o lu n ta rily w h a t it is n o w d o in g in th is p atrio tic cause." T h o u g h ig n o rin g the sta te 's arm tw istin g , th a t sta te m e n t p o in te d to b o th th e larg e r ach iev em en t a n d the larg er problem : th a t th e sh a p e rs of cu ltu re w illin g ly se rv ed th e sta te 's p u rp o se s.85 N y e 's sally a g ain st H o lly w o o d w a s a n o th e r in cid en t in th e "G reat D ebate" o v er foreign policy. The fall of France in Ju n e 1940 h e lp e d th e in te rv en tio n ist cause b y sh a tte rin g analogies b e tw e e n 1917, w h e n France h a d stay ed the course, a n d th e n e w crisis. In the follow ing y e ar cam e th e fiercest d eb ate, from w h ich th e a d m in istra tio n w re ste d p u b lic su p p o rt for re a rm a m e n t a n d L endLease, b u t o n ly after th e accusations g o t nasty. A ssailing th e L end-L ease law. Sen. R obert Taft d eclared th a t "th e v e ry title of th e bill is a frau d . L en d in g w a r m ateriel is m u c h like len d in g ch ew in g g u m ," a n d "certain ly w e d o n o t w a n t th e sam e g u m b ack ."86 W hile a d m in istra tio n sp o k e sm e n im p lied th a t L in d b erg h a n d h is k in d w ere N azis, the av iato r re sp o n d e d in a fam o u s sp eech ch arg in g th a t Jew s, N e w D ealers, a n d the B ritish w ere d ra g g in g th e c o u n try in to w ar. T he final m o n th s before P earl H a rb o r saw th e e x h au stio n of d e b a te — n o t of its bittern ess, b u t of its capacity to g en erate n e w a rg u m e n ts a n d real dialo g u e. The d e b ate ex p o sed few clear d iv isio n s am o n g A m erican s b e y o n d th o se a b o u t in terv en tio n ism itself, a lth o u g h eth n icity w a s a factor. In o p p o sin g Roo­ sevelt, "Pacifists e n listed a lo n g w ith fo rm er m ilitary m en , social refo rm ers m arch ed b esid e e x -L ib e rty L eaguers, lab o r activists sh o w e d u n accu sto m ed so lid arity w ith b u sin essm en , a n d co m m u n ists [before Ju n e 1941] jo in ed ran k s w ith C h ristia n fu n d am e n ta lists." D espite accu satio n s th a t it h a rb o re d G e rm a n sy m p ath izers, A m erica First resem b led in te rv en tio n ist g ro u p s m o re th a n th e G erm an-A m erican B und in its ideology a n d class co m position. A lth o u g h d i­ v ersity m e a n t th a t "n o n in te rv en tio n ists could n e v e r achieve real u n ity ," it also d o g g ed in te rv en tio n ists, except th a t the W h ite H o u se w a s o n th eir sid e an d w o rsen in g w o rld crisis stre n g th e n ed th eir h a n d s.87 M ore im p o rta n t th a n th e co u rse a n d co n ten tio n s of th e d eb ate, ho w ev er, w ere its to n e a n d term s. M ark in g th e a d v e n t of a "realist" p a ra d ig m for foreign policy, d e b ate to a rem ark ab le d eg ree focused o n A m erican self-interest ra th e r

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th a n o n A m erican ideals o r the p lig h t of p eo p les ab ro ad . O th e r ratio n ales n e v er d isa p p ea red . In terv en tio n ists u rg e d a "F ight for F re e d o m /' as th e m o st d e te r­ m in ed lobby of liberals w a s called, a n d ex p ressed sh am e a n d d isg u st th a t th e U n ited States h a d tu rn e d its back o n the "g o ld en o p p o rtu n ity " for w o rld le a d ­ e rsh ip " h a n d e d to u s o n th e p ro v erb ial silver p la tte r" in 1919, as H e n ry Luce p u t it in Life. For th eir p a rt, FD R 's o p p o n e n ts w a rn e d th a t e n try in to w a r w o u ld u n d e rm in e A m erican dem ocracy a n d lead to o th e r d an g ers: to th e tu n e of "G o d Save A m erica," p ro p o se d one Irish-A m erican C o n g ressm an , sing, "G o d save A m erica, from B ritish ru le." But su c h ideals a n d fears w e re o ften h a zily a rticu ­ lated , seen as in a d e q u a te for co p in g w ith b ru ta l tim es, o r d ism isse d as a rtfu l p ro p a g a n d a glossing o v e r real interests. T hey to o k seco n d place in d e b ate b e ­ h in d v a rio u s calculations of n a tio n al security.88 O ften re g a rd e d as a sign of m a tu rity for th e n atio n , th e "realistic" te m p e r of d e b ate also h a d draw backs. It te n d e d to u n d e rc u t m o re p a ssio n a te a rg u m e n ts a n d to en co u rag e reliance o n co ol-headed elites for d ecisio n m ak in g , conse­ q u en ces th a t ex te n d ed b e y o n d W orld W ar II, c o n trib u tin g to th e illu sio n of a n " e n d to ideology" in p o stw a r A m erica. It fo resh ad o w ed th e m u te d , v a g u e sense of p u rp o se m o st A m ericans h a d d u rin g th e w ar. A n d it c o n trib u te d to the fram ew o rk in w h ic h A m ericans u n d e rs to o d th e w a r 's acts of in h u m a n ity . The b ru talities of N azis a n d o th ers w o u ld b e re g a rd e d as tragic, b u t e v en m o re as em blem atic of the generic h o rro rs of w a r fro m w h ic h th e U n ite d States h a d to sh ield itself— to p re v e n t or sto p su c h acts lay b e y o n d th e n a tio n 's g o al of self­ p rotection, except in so far as victo ry itself e n d e d them . T he realist p a ra d ig m , if n o t alone responsible for su ch consequences, m a d e it difficult to a p p ly an y sta n d a rd h ig h e r th a n n a tio n al security to th e c o u n try 's actions in w ar. T he te m p e r of d eb ate c o n trib u te d to one o th er co nsequence, th e te n d e n c y to reg ard the em erg in g d o m in a n ce of n a tio n al secu rity as im p o se d u p o n A m eri­ cans b y external forces. Because d eb ate fo cu sed o n A m erica's safety, m o st A m ericans av o id ed p o n d e rin g w h e th e r th eir n a tio n o r its lead ers also so u g h t p o w e r for reasons o th er th a n defense. In th e realist p a ra d ig m , "d efen se" w a s th e w o rd co n stan tly d e p lo y e d a n d in sisten tly sh o u te d — a n d accu rately reflect­ in g the sensibility of m o st A m ericans. The exhausting, en erv atin g q u a lity of the G reat D ebate h a d m u c h th e sam e effect, m ak in g A m erica's slide to w a rd w a r seem irresistible a n d b e y o n d its con­ trol. In 1940, tw o ob serv ers n o ted , A m erican s "seem ed to b e w a tc h in g th e e n ­ actm ent of a d ra m a in w h ic h th eir role h a d alre ad y b e e n fixed." "In a fu n d a ­ m en tal sense, th ere w as n o foreign policy d e b ate after len d -lease," a rg u e s a s tu d e n t of C hicago's n e w sp a p e rs, w h ich b y late 1941 " h a d ceased try in g to in ­ fluence policy or aro u se opinion. T hey settled b ack u n e asily to a w a it ev en ts." By th a t tim e, arg u es a n o th e r scholar, a " p ro p a g a n d a d in so p e rv a siv e a n d so d iv erse in its sources" w as telling. "Its effect, m u c h to th e d isa p p o in tm e n t of m ilitants, w as n o t to shock o r enrage, b u t to n u m b th e resistance to w ar." T h o u g h h a rd ly u n iv ersal, a p a lp a b le sense of h e lp lessn e ss— in th e face n o t o n ly

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of global ev en ts b u t also of a n u g ly a n d stalem ated p u b lic d e b a te — h a d set in, a m o o d b o th co n firm ed a n d am p lified b y pub lic o p in io n polls. Som e still a rg u e d o th erw ise, b u t foreign n a tio n s a n d forces, it seem ed , n o t A m erican choices, d ic­ ta te d th e n a tio n 's course. "B lindly, un in ten tio n ally , accidentally a n d really in sp ite of ourselves, w e are a lre ad y a w o rld p o w e r in all th e triv ial w ay s," a rg u e d H e n ry Luce in h is fam o u s "A m erican C e n tu ry " ed ito ria l u rg in g th e n a tio n to exercise th e p o w e r h e th o u g h t it h a d n o choice b u t to w ield . By th e tim e the G reat D ebate e n d ed , it seem ed less a n ep iso d e in n a tio n al decisio n m ak in g th a n a n o th e r p h a se in the process b y w h ic h A m erican s a cco m m o d ated them selv es to a m ilitarized course.89 S m oothing the p a th to w ar, th a t process also fo resh ad o w ed th e C old W ar. To b e sure, th e reh earsal differed from th e p ro d u c tio n to follow . W a r's w o rst h o r­ rors, genocide a n d n u c le ar w arfare, w ere b arely im ag in ab le in 1941. The d re a d sense in 1941 of slid in g in to a w a r already going on differed fro m th e later fear of a w a r that might happen. W h at w as novel in 1940, like a p eacetim e d raft, w a s less sta rtlin g w h e n rep e ate d d u rin g th e C old W ar. T he reh earsal w a s b rief a n d in ­ tense, th e C old W ar p ro trac te d a n d inconclusive. But like the C old W ar, the eve of W orld W ar II exh ib ited b o th th e u rg en cy a n d th e p a rtiality w ith w h ich m ilitarizatio n cam e in to A m erican life. A ffluence alo n g sid e anxiety, m o b ilizatio n w ith o u t w ar, a p o w e rfu l state b u t p e rsisten t an tistatism , acute d a n g e r am id lin g erin g safety, felt innocence a n d a fo rm id a­ ble d riv e for p o w e r— su ch d u a lism s w o u ld also m a rk th e C o ld W ar era. W ar rem ain ed elusive, R oosevelt p u b licly w o rrie d in July 1941. "P eople in th is c o u n try u n fo rtu n a te ly h a v e n 't g o t e n o u g h id ea of w h a t m o d e m w a r m ean s," h e co m p lain ed .90 Soon th ey w o u ld le a m m ore.

The Chip on the Shoulder The ev ents of 1941, a n d the m a n n e r in w h ich A m ericans sh a p e d a n d saw them , sealed th eir sense of an in ad v e rte n t, u n w illin g p lu n g e in to th e age of n a tio n al security. W riting sh o rtly after Pearl H arb o r, an th ro p o lo g ist M arg aret M ead p ro b e d th a t psycho logy of in advertence. "A g g ressio n in th e A m erican charac­ ter is seen as resp o n se ra th e r th a n as p rim a ry b eh av io r," sh e o b serv ed . "T he ch ip o n the sh o u ld e r . . . is the folk ex p ressio n of th is set of a ttitu d e s. In m an y p a rts of A m erica sm all b o y s d elib erately p u t ch ip s o n th e ir sh o u ld e rs a n d w alk a b o u t d a rin g a n y o n e to knock th e chips off." For M ead, th a t b o y ish folkw ay exem plified "a special A m erican form of agg ressiv en ess," o n e "so u n su re of itself th a t it h as to be p ro v e d ." W ith Pearl H arb o r, "Jap an cam e alo n g a n d p u sh e d the chip off o u r sh o u ld e r a n d left u s free to fig h t."91 She w a s right: in the A tlantic as w ell as th e Pacific, the U n ited States in d e e d p u t th e ch ip o n its shoulder. To be sure, as M e ad 's analysis su g g ested , a n y A m erican in te n tio n to p ro v o k e w a r w a s m u rk y a t best, a n d h a rd ly co m p arab le to th e v a u ltin g a m b itio n s of the

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A xis p ow ers. Japan, G erm any, a n d Italy, th o u g h less in co n cert strateg ically o r ideologically th a n m o st A m ericans th o u g h t, w e re reaching th e z e n ith of th o se am b itions in 1941. A fter a skillful c am p aig n of d ecep tio n . H itle r s p ru n g h is arm ies o n the Soviet U n io n in June 1941 a n d th ereb y fo rg ed th e u n lik ely A ngloA m erican-S oviet alliance a g ain st him . H e also escalated h is su b m a rin e w a r in the A tlantic ju st as L end-L ease a n d B ritish d e sp e ra tio n w e re accelerating the flow of A m erican supplies. A m o n g th e c o n te n d in g Jap an ese elites, th e convic­ tio n h a rd e n e d o v er th e su m m e r th a t Japan, a t w a r in C h in a since 1937, w o u ld h av e to strike before th e A nglo-D utch-A m erican econom ic n o o se a n d A m eri­ can re a rm am en t irrevocably tu rn e d th e o d d s a g ain st it. W ith th e Soviet U n io n in a d e a th stru g g le w ith G erm any, w ith all E u ro p ea n im p e ria l p o w e rs except B ritain c o n q u ered in th e ir h o m elan d s, a n d w ith th e B ritish a n d A m erican s scram bling to c o u n ter G erm any, a rare chance o p e n e d u p for Jap an to o v e rru n S o u th east A sia, the D utch E ast Indies, a n d m ore. T here seem ed n o w a y to p u r­ su e th a t course w ith o u t also strik in g a t A m erican forces. The A m erican g o v e rn m e n t perceiv ed Jap an 's in ten tio n s im perfectly, in p a rt b ecau se m a n y officials still clu n g to a m o d el of lim ited w ar: in th e sp rin g of 1941, som e th o u g h t G e rm a n p re p a ra tio n s to attack th e Soviet U n io n w e re a n ­ o th er H itle ria n bluff, a n d in th e fall som e d o u b te d Ja p an 's cap acity to m o u n t sev eral offensives a t once, h o p in g th e one th ey d id u n le a sh w o u ld com e a g ain st R ussia. Inevitably in a large a n d loose b u reau cratic system , A m erican officials d isag reed a b o u t en em y in ten tio n s a n d A m erican p rio rities. M oreover, A ngloA m erican intelligence, th a n k s to n e w m ean s for d eco d in g Jap an ese m essages, w a s in u n d a te d w ith a flood of in fo rm atio n it co u ld n o t rea d ily sift, w h ile Ja­ p a n 's dip lo m acy w as e v en m ore co n fu sed th a n A m erica's a n d ch arg ed racial im ages d isto rte d p ercep tio n s in b o th Tokyo a n d W ashington. In this confusing situ atio n , R oosevelt h a d th e a d v a n ta g e of a u n ifie d a d m in ­ istration. T here w ere n o d isse n ters left in it, on ly th o se like H e n ry L. Stim son, th e seventy-three-year-old secretary of w ar, w h o ch afed a t FD R 's d isin ­ g e n u o u sn ess a n d c h am p io n e d m ore o v e rt e n try in to th e w a r a g ain st G erm any. Stim son, U n d ersecretary of State S u m n e r W elles, a n d H a rry H o p k in s w ere R oosevelt's closest confidants, w h ile the navy, th e h a ir-trig g e r in co n fro n tin g G erm an y a n d Japan, w a s the a rm e d service h e m o st closely m o n ito red . A n in ­ form al W ar C ouncil— Stim son a n d Secretary of th e N a v y F ran k K nox, A dm . H a ro ld Stark a n d G eneral M arshall as m ilitary chiefs, a n d H o p k in s a n d Secre­ tary of State C ordell H u ll— also m et w ith R oosevelt to p ro v id e so m e sy stem to offset his h ig h ly p e rso n al style of co m m an d . In late su m m e r 1941, a t FD R 's d i­ rection, the a rm e d services fo rm u la te d a "V ictory P ro g ram ," a c o h eren t if u n ­ av o id ab ly c o n tin g en t sta te m e n t of strateg y a n d logistics. By then, A m erican global stra te g y w a s reaso n ab ly clear a n d co n sisten t in d e ­ sign. R oosevelt still so u g h t to w ag e lim ited, u n d e clare d w a r a g ain st th e Axis. If h e occasionally h in te d at d o in g m ore, it w a s p ro b ab ly to p lacate a n x io u s allies o r im p a tie n t su b o rd in ates, a n d if h e h e ld back fro m d o in g m ore, h is calcula-

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tio n s of n a tio n a l in terest, as m u c h as congressio n al a n d p u b lic o p in io n , w ere p ro b ab ly th e reason. H e certain ly k n ew h is co u rse co u ld lead to all-o u t w ar, a n e v e n tu a lity h e accepted a n d w ith som e c an d o r p u b licly a ck n o w le d g ed in 1941. B ut u n d e c la re d belligerence reta in e d p o w e rfu l a d v a n ta g e s as lo n g as it m ig h t last a n d its ten sio n s co u ld b e e n d u re d : m o re tim e to m obilize A m erican re­ sources, b ro a d p u b lic su p p o rt, a n d avoidan ce of th e b u rd e n s of fig h tin g — especially a w a r w ith Japan, for w h ic h the U n ited States w a s ill p re p a re d . "In p a rticu la r," one h isto ria n a d d s, R oosevelt feared th a t fo rm al e n try in to th e w a r m ig h t cause a "d isa stro u s cutback in su p p lies to th e A llies as A m erican s d e ­ m a n d e d to ta l c o n cen tratio n o n U.S. rea rm am en t, a n d th a t w a r w ith G e rm a n y w o u ld in ev itab ly m e a n w a r w ith G e rm a n y 's ally, Jap an ."92 W ith in th a t g en eral fram ew o rk , R oosevelt still re g a rd e d G e rm a n y as th e g rea ter th reat, p laced to p p rio rity o n e x te n d in g th e A tlantic lifeline to B ritain a n d later th e Soviet U nion, a n d h o p e d th a t m ilitary d e terren ce a n d H u ll's gift for fo o t-d rag g in g d ip lo m acy w o u ld keep Jap an a t bay. For sev eral reasons, h o w ev er, Ja p an n o w w e ig h ed m o re in his calculations. Its ex p an sio n th re a t­ e n e d A m erican interests, B ritain's ability to h a n g on, a n d h is o w n credibility. H a v in g d e n o u n c e d a p p e a se m e n t in E urope, h e co u ld n o t p ractice it in th e Far East, especially before a n a u d ien ce of A m ericans, in clu d in g som e in h is o w n a d m in istratio n , b o th in d ig n a n t a n d sn e erin g a b o u t Ja p an 's p rete n sio n s to p o w er. E xecuting g ra n d stra te g y w a s a n o th e r m a tte r a t a tim e w h e n co m b at-read y A m erican forces w ere few a n d w id e ly scattered , w h e n th e glo b al situ atio n seem ed to ch an g e w eekly, a n d w h e n th e p ressu re s o n R oosevelt, p a rtic u la rly fro m W in sto n C hurchill, w ere in ten se a n d conflicting. M o v in g g ra d u a lly — o u t of fear of p u b lic o p in io n b u t also to allow th e n a v y to becom e b a ttle -re a d y — R oosevelt increased th e A m erican presence in th e A tlan tic in stag es d u rin g 1941. T he fleet first p a tro lle d th e w e ste rn A tlantic, th e n co n v o y ed m erc h an t vessels, a n d finally assisted B ritish w a rsh ip s d irectly a n d g a in e d a u th o riz a tio n to fire o n G e rm a n subs, w h ile a d iv id e d C o n g ress a p p ro v e d th e a rm in g of A m erican m erc h an t ships. A g ain st Japan, th e a d m in istra tio n e m p lo y ed a v o l­ atile m ix of dip lo m acy a n d deterren ce, w ith th e o n e so m etim es a t cross­ p u rp o se s w ith th e o th er a n d th e c o m b in atio n stro n g e n o u g h to b e p ro v o cativ e b u t too w e a k to b e in tim id atin g . By late su m m er, after fu rth e r Jap an ese ex p an ­ sion in S outheast A sia, these m ea su re s in clu d ed a v irtu a l e m b arg o o n th e flow of oil to Jap an fro m th e U n ited States, its allies, a n d p lia n t L atin A m erican n a ­ tions. But th e a d m in istra tio n 's h o p e rested ab o v e all o n a ir po w er: b e la te d ef­ forts b e g a n in A u g u st to base lo n g -ran g e b o m b ers in th e P h ilip p in es, w h e re th ey m ig h t d e te r o r d is ru p t fu rth e r Japanese ex pansion. It w a s FD R 's last, d e s­ p e ra te a tte m p t to tu rn th e in tim id a tin g tactics of M u n ich a g ain st th e A xis po w ers. A lth o u g h these m easu res a d d re sse d m u ltip le p u rp o se s, th e y in effect p laced th e chip o n A m erica's sh o u ld e rs before its enem ies. "I a m n o t w illin g to fire the

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first shot," R oosevelt once to ld confidants; as a C ab in et m em b er a d d e d , "it seem s th a t h e is still w a itin g for th e G erm an s to create a n 'in c id e n t/ " (A t a n e m o tio n al level, p e rh a p s th a t in cid en t h a d a lre ad y o ccu rred , for in M ay FDR d re a m t of retreatin g to a b o m b -p ro o f cave w h ile G e rm a n b o m b ers p a sse d o v er N e w York City.)93 E nem y resp o n ses d id n o t p recisely p arallel A m erican ch allen g es— it w a s in th e A tlantic w h e re A m erican sh ip s first fired o n (an d w ere fired o n by) th e e n e m y — b u t it w a s Jap an th a t k n o ck ed th e ch ip off th e A m erican sh o u ld e r o n D ecem ber 7. A n d in th e larg er b alan ce of th in g s, the A xis p o w e rs offered th e u ltim ate pro v o catio n , th ro u g h m ilitary conquest. A m erican policy n o n eth eless h a d its p ro v o cativ e qualities. T he im p o rtan ce of this series of m u tu a l p ro v o catio n s a n d resp o n ses lay n o t in lea d in g the p a rties to w a r (d eep er forces p re su m a b ly a cco u n ted for th a t re­ sult) n o r in tarn ish in g th e rig h tn e ss of the A llied cause, b u t in su sta in in g th e A m erican p o stu re of aggressive innocence th a t M ead ex p lain ed . In tu rn , it w a s th e a p p a re n t h y p o crisy of th a t innocence th a t R oosevelt's o p p o n e n ts attacked. A lread y in N o v em b er 1940, C harles B eard, fearin g w a r w ith Jap an , h a d o b ­ serv ed th a t "w a rs are n o lo n g er declared. S itu atio n s exist or are created. A c­ tio n s are tak e n b y au th o rities in a p o sitio n to act. The p e o p le w a it for th e ir p o r­ tio n ."94 A n ti-in terv en tio n ists h a d lo n g a rg u e d th a t FDR w a s lea d in g th e n a tio n to w ar, w h ile th e a d m in istra tio n d e fe n d e d its co u rse as th e b e st w a y to k eep the U n ited States o u t of w ar, o r at least full belligerency. N o w o p p o n e n ts attack ed th e a d m in istra tio n for specific p ro v o catio n s to th e en em y in th e A tlan tic— A m erican m oves a g ain st Jap an w ere b o th m o re secret a n d less w o rriso m e to m o st o p p o n e n ts— a n d a d d e d th a t w ith G e rm a n y b a ttlin g th e Soviet U n io n (w hose defeat ferv en t an tico m m u n ists eag erly aw aited ). H itle r's credible th re a t to the U n ited States h a d d im in ish ed . W rong a b o u t m a n y p articu lars, m ore conv in ced th a n R oosevelt h im self th a t h e w a n te d all-out w ar, shrill in th eir attacks, so m etim es d ism issiv e of A xis p o w e r a n d som etim es ex ag g eratin g it, FD R 's o p p o n e n ts n o n eth eless m a d e a v alu ab le co n trib u tio n to debate. A bove all, th ey k e p t alive th e v iew th a t the U n ited States sh a red responsibility for its p lu n g e in to w o rld w a r a n d a n ag e of n atio n al security. Since th e late 1930s, R oosevelt a n d h is su p p o rte rs h a d p re ­ sen ted th eir policies as reactive to external th rea ts a n d forces— if th e n a tio n h a d a choice to m ake, it in v o lv ed o n ly h o w to react. A n ti-in terv en tio n ists in sisted th a t th e n a tio n h a d choices a n d th a t reaction itself w as a choice, o n e trig g ered n o t b y (or on ly by) the dictates of n a tio n al safety b u t b y co n n iv in g allies, im p e ­ rial am bitions, a m isplaced dem ocratic idealism , th e N e w D eal's failure to b rin g recovery, or a d e v io u s P resident. A m o n g th eir m a n y failures, a n ti­ in te rv en tio n ists could rarely agree o n w h ic h of th o se factors w a s g o v e rn in g th e d rift into w ar. T heir larger v irtu e lay in challen g in g th e p o stu re of h elp lessn ess th a t m o st A m ericans, a n d th eir leaders, h a d assu m ed . T hey m a d e a n o th e r co n trib u tio n as w ell b y criticizing th e e x tra o rd in a ry p o w e rs a ssu m e d b y the P re sid e n t w ith o u t a d eclaratio n of w a r a n d w a rn in g of

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th e p erils to dem ocratic process a n d ideals in a m ilitarized A m erica. "Foreign p o lic y /' C harles a n d M ary B eard h a d w o rrie d in 1939, "co u ld easily b e m ad e th e in stru m e n t to stifle dom estic w ro n g s u n d e r a b lan k e t of m ilitarist c h au v in ­ ism , p e rh a p s d isg u ise d b y th e h ig h -so u n d in g title of w o rld p eace." C h arles B eard, am o n g others, th o u g h su p p o rtin g th e objectives of L end-L ease, con­ d e m n e d th e specific legislation as "a bill for w a g in g a n u n d e clare d w a r," decry ­ in g th e w id e d iscretion it gave R oosevelt a n d foreseeing its futility u n less th e U n ited States p ro tec te d its convoys of treasu re from G e rm a n su b m arin es.95 T he o u tb reak of u n d e clare d w a r th a t a u tu m n p ro m p te d m o re criticism of exec­ u tiv e authority. B itterly offered, it w as w ell fo u n d ed , ev en if a d m in istra tio n b e ­ h a v io r d id n o t fulfill the d o o m sd a y p red ictio n s som e critics m ad e. FD R 's exer­ cise of p o w e r h a d its legal, constitutional, a n d h istorical p reced en ts, b u t h e stretch ed th em far a n d e stab lish ed a p re c e d e n t for successors to go ev en fu r­ ther. T h at w a s so n o t o n ly in his h a n d lin g of m ilitary force b u t in h is u se of th e FBI a n d o th er agencies a g ain st h is o p p o n en ts. Seeking to m ain tain a p o stu re of A m erican innocence, R oosevelt also stretch ed th e m ea n in g of p a rtic u la r events. O n S ep tem b er 4, th e d e stro y er Greer, o p e ra tin g n e a r Iceland, trailed a G erm an su b m a rin e w h ich , a g ain st sta n d in g G erm an o rd ers b u t o n the belief it w as u n d e r assau lt, in itiated a n u n ­ successful attack o n the A m erican ship. In p u b lic com m ents, FDR re p o rte d o n ly th e G erm an attack — "p iracy legally a n d m o ra lly "— n o t th e p u rs u it car­ ried o u t b y the Greer, a n d a n n o u n c e d o rd ers for w a rsh ip s to sh o o t o n sig h t w h e n en g ag in g G erm an subs. O n O ctober 27, after a G erm an su b to rp e d o e d th e d estro y er Kearny— w ith o u t sin k in g it, b u t w ith th e d e a th of elev en A m erican s— h e a n n o u n c e d th a t "h isto ry h a s reco rd ed w h o fired th e first sh o t." O n occasion FD R 's m etap h o rs su g g e ste d so m e th in g else, as if h e so u g h t to knock th e chip off G e rm a n y 's sh o u ld ers. F ollow ing th e Greer in cid en t, h e p ro ­ claim ed th a t "w e h ave so u g h t n o sh o o tin g w a r" (the p h ra se itself, im p ly in g a "n o n sh o o tin g " w ar, w a s aw kw ard). "B ut w h e n y o u see a rattlesn ak e p o ise d to strike, y o u d o n o t w a it u n til h e h a s stru ck before y o u cru sh h im ."96 But m o st pu b lic com m ents b y R oosevelt a n d o th er officials ju x ta p o se d g en eral ex h o rta­ tio n s to b e a t H itle r a g ain st professions of A m erican innocence in specific cir­ cum stances. M eanw hile, th e a u tu m n crisis in Japanese-A m erican relatio n s c a u g h t FD R's foes, a n d to a d eg ree h is o w n a d m in istratio n , off-guard. It h a d b e e n over­ sh a d o w e d b y the th rea t of w a r in th e A tlantic, b y th e com p licated b allet of Japanese-A m erican diplom acy, an d , w ith in official circles, b y g ro w in g confi­ dence in A m erican deterrence. Stim son, for one, w a s b u o y a n t in O ctober, after th e first B-17 b o m b ers a rriv e d in the P hilipp in es. "Far from b ein g im p o te n t to influence ev en ts in th a t area," h e w ro te R oosevelt, "w e su d d e n ly find o u rselv es v ested w ith th e p ossibility of g rea t p o w e r." The b o m b ers, h e m u se d o n a n o th e r occasion, m ig h t e v en h e lp "to shake th e Japanese o u t of th e A xis." A d m in istra ­ tio n lead ers still h o p e d to d e te r w a r w ith Japan, o r k eep it lim ited a n d u n d e -

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d a re d . "T here is w a r in C h in a a n d th ere is w a r in th e A tlantic a t th e p re se n t tim e, b u t in n e ith e r case it is d eclared w a r," M arsh all re m in d e d h is staff. G o in g fu rth er, FDR p o lled his C ab in et a b o u t " w h e th e r th e p e o p le w o u ld b ack u s u p in case w e stru ck a t Jap an d o w n there," h in tin g th a t th e U n ite d States m ig h t strik e first, p e rh a p s after a n in cid en t offered a p rete x t to d o so. O n N o v e m b er 15, M ar­ shall, tak in g jo u rn alists into confidence, ex p ressed h is h o p e th a t d eterren ce w o u ld w o rk — once th e Japanese le a rn ed of th e B-17s, h e su g g e ste d , th ey w o u ld conclude, "W e'd b e tte r go slo w " — b u t if d e terren ce failed, h e w o u ld "se t th e p a p e r cities of Jap an o n fire" w ith o u t "a n y h e sita tio n a b o u t b o m b in g civilians."97 T he a d m in istra tio n 's p la n for its n e w b o m b ers w a s unclear, since th ey lacked th e ran g e to strik e Jap an effectively, a lth o u g h so m e officials v ain ly h o p e d to a rra n g e for th em to refuel a t Soviet S iberian b ases close to Japan. W h atev e r th e p lan , it e n d e d literally in ashes. Jap an c a u g h t A m erican forces b y su rp rise n o t o n ly a t Pearl H a rb o r b u t in th e P h ilip p in es, w h e re th e B-17 force, n o t sc h ed u le d to reach full stre n g th u n til February, d isin te g rate d . T here fo llo w ed ra p id ly th e A m erican d eclaratio n of w a r o n Japan, a n d th e n G e rm a n y 's d e clara tio n o n th e U n ited S tates— a relief to m a n y in th e a d m in istratio n , for th e rea d in ess of A m ericans o p e n ly to e n te r w a r a g ain st G e rm a n y rem a in e d in d o u b t. T he d e p lo y m e n t of th e B-17s a n d th e h o p e s v e sted in th e m rev ealed A m eri­ can a ttitu d e s o n th e b rin k of w a r a n d d u rin g it: a chronic u n d e re stim a tio n , ro o ted in p a rt in racial stereotypes, of Japanese m ilita ry abilities a n d a p e rsis­ te n t o v erestim atio n of A m erican technology. In tu rn , so o p in io n p o lls sh o w ed , m o st A m ericans seem ed to view w a r w ith Ja p an — th o u g h n o t w ith G e rm a n y — eagerly, a lm o st cavalierly. "U.S. C h eerfu lly Faces W ar w ith Jap an ," Life claim ed o n the eve of Pearl H arb o r. A m erican s felt, "rig h tly o r w ro n g ly , th a t th e Japs w ere p u sh o v e rs," a schoolboy's w o rd c o n g ru e n t w ith M e ad 's m e t­ a p h o r of a n a tio n placing a chip o n its sh o u ld e r.98 T he h o p e of u n le a sh in g its b o m b ers a g ain st Japan, p e rh a p s in a su rp rise attack, also acco u n ted for m u c h of th e in d ig n a tio n felt a b o u t Ja p an 's act of "in fam y " (as FDR called it) o n D ecem ­ b e r 7. W h at galled A m erican lead ers w a s n o t sim p ly Ja p an 's treach ery b u t th eir fru stratio n a t h av in g it occur before th e U n ited States c o u ld m o u n t its o w n su r­ prise. M ost A m ericans accepted th e re n d itio n of Jap an ese treach ery offered b y FDR a n d o th er leaders, b rin g in g to a conclu sio n th e process M ead later d e ­ scribed. E ven the v iru le n tly anti-R oosevelt Chicago Tribune c o n clu d ed th a t w a r h a d com e " th ro u g h n o v o litio n of a n y A m erican ." O n e jo u rn alist, a n a rd e n t in ­ terv en tionist, d id p ro te st " o u r p o se of in ju red innocence" a n d th e belief " th a t w e w ere innocently m in d in g o u r o w n b u sin e ss w h e n th e d o o r o p e n e d a n d th ere w a s the A xis w ith a knife."99 But o n ly R oosevelt-haters, rig h t-w in g fa­ natics, a n d lonely h isto ria n s like B eard c o n tin u e d to challenge th e "p o se of in ­ ju red innocence," often d o in g so w ith u n su sta in ab le ch arg es of a R oosevelt conspiracy to p ro m o te th e Pearl H a rb o r attack; ev en th o se ch arg es sim p ly

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sh ifted "in ju re d innocence" from th e n a tio n as a w h o le to e v ery b o d y o u tsid e th e a d m in istratio n . Left intact w a s a sense of A m erica's help lessn ess, in a closed w o rld d o m in a te d b y m alig n forces, to resist its e n try in to w a r a n d th e m ilita riza tio n th a t w e n t w ith it. T here w ere re d e em in g v irtu e s in the p erfo rm an ce of th e n a tio n 's political cu ltu re. M ore th a n before the p rev io u s w a r o r th e o nes to follow , A m erican s d id a d d re ss the g rea t issues of w a r a n d peace in a su sta in e d fash io n a n d w ith w id e p u b lic p articip atio n . It m ay e v en be th a t th e "G reat D ebate" g ave th em a sense of p a rtic ip a tio n in n a tio n al decision m ak in g th a t e n h an c ed acceptance of its outcom e. T he n u m b n ess, futility, a n d b itte rn e ss of d e b ate b y th e a u tu m n o f 1941 cut th e o th e r w ay, how ever. By then, w a itin g anxiously, m o st A m ericans m u s t h av e felt scarcely m ore control ov er th eir o w n g o v e rn m e n t's co u rse th a n th ey d id o v e r th e global crisis in to w h ic h fate seem ed to h av e su ck ed them .

2 T R IU M PH , 1 9 4 1 -1 9 4 5

In Pearl Harbor*s Wake O n th e n ig h t of D ecem ber 8 -9 ,1 9 4 1 , G en. John D eW itt, h e a d of th e W estern D efense C o m m an d , b e ra te d a cro w d a t the San Francisco m a y o r's office. “Jap a­ nese p lan es w ere ov er this c o m m u n ity last n ig h t," h e in sisted , co n d em n in g city officials a n d resid en ts for "sh am efu l" a n d "crim in al" co n d u ct. "I can n o t p ro m ­ ise y o u to p re v e n t a n y b o m b in g of San Francisco, b u t d o n 't be jittery. L earn to take it. Y ou've got to take it, a n d if y o u c a n 't tak e it, g et th e hell o u t of San F ran ­ cisco before it com es."1 A cross the country. L ib rarian of C o n g ress A rchibald M acLeish p re p a re d to evacuate the cap ital's c u ltu ral treasu res. Ja p an 's attack o n Pearl H a rb o r n o t only b ro u g h t the U n ited States officially into th e w a r b u t seem ed to confirm A m ericans' g a th e rin g fears of a d a n g e ro u s w o rld a n d im m i­ n e n t attack. It th ereb y sh a p e d initial A m erican actions in th e w a r a n d u n d e r­ w ro te m ilitarizatio n in the long ru n , p ro v id in g th e m o st e n d u rin g sy m b o l of its a p p a re n t necessity. In D ecem ber 1941, it is true. Pearl H a rb o r w as n o t y et th e to u ch sto n e of alarm , anger, a n d v en eratio n th a t it w o u ld becom e. The full m easu re of catas­ tro p h e th e re — eig h teen sh ip s a n d n early tw o h u n d re d p lan es d e stro y ed or crip p led , som e tw en ty -fo u r h u n d re d A m erican s d e a d — w a s k e p t secret from A m ericans on the g ro u n d s of security, a lth o u g h Jap an m ea su re d A m erican losses w ith som e accuracy. In h ead lin es. Pearl H a rb o r co m p eted w ith Ja p an 's strik in g advances a g ain st A m erican forces in th e P h ilip p in es, cau g h t off-g u ard d e sp ite w o rd of the earlier Pearl H a rb o r attack, a n d a g ain st o th er A m erican, British, a n d D utch positions. M oreover, the official sta rt of G erm an -A m erican w a r c a p tu re d attention, w hile Jap an 's cu lp ab ility w as o ften o b scu red b y h in ts th at it h a d d o n e G erm an y 's b id d in g (the Pearl H a rb o r attack w as "th e m eth o d of H itler him self," FDR said). N o t yet d id Pearl H a rb o r c ro w d o u t o th er ev en ts of th a t caco p h o n o u s w in ter.2 N o r w ere first reactions to Pearl H a rb o r un ifo rm . Rage w as w id e sp re a d b u t n o t universal. "N o one sh o w ed m u ch in d ig n a tio n ," one jo u rn alist n o ticed a t the N avy D epartm ent. H ostile acts to w ard Japanese-A m ericans w ere few. Panic a b o u t Jap an 's m ilitary pro w ess d id n o t im m ed iately tak e hold: in M anila, W ashington, an d L ondon, officials for a few d a y s still h o p e d to carry o u t the

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im m e d ia te "b u rn in g of Japanese cities b y in cen d iary b o m b s," as W in sto n C h u rch ill p u t it. N a tio n a l u n ity w a s lo u d ly p ro claim ed b u t d id n o t go m u ch b e y o n d a v a g u e d e te rm in a tio n to w in the w ar.3 Political co n stru ctio n s as m u c h as visceral reactions, th e em o tio n s a ttrib u te d retro actively to D ecem ber 1941 took tim e a n d fu rth e r A m erican d efeats to b e sh a p ed . P erh ap s th e m o st co m m o n first resp o n ses, from th e P re sid e n t's in n er circle to o rd in a ry street co m ers, w ere sim p le relief th a t th e ag o n izin g ten sio n of recen t m o n th s h a d e n d ed , fatalistic resig n atio n to th e aw fu l task a h ea d , a n d a n u p b e a t em brace of th e p u rp o se fu ln e ss th a t w a r m ig h t brin g . Few m o u rn e d th e e n d of a n u g ly era m a rk e d b y a cynical b u sin e ss cu ltu re, th e "b etray al of th e p eace," g rin d in g d e p ressio n , a n d a b itte r d e b ate a b o u t foreign policy.4 T h o u g h w ith little of the w a r fever of 1917, A m erican s h a d reaso n s to accept w a r's onset. Still, th e P earl H a rb o r attack so o n serv ed as a p o w e rfu l sy m b o l of A m erican innocence, Japanese perfidy, a n d lastin g p e ril to th e U n ited States. Its sym bolic p o w e r d e riv e d n o t sim p ly from the e v en t b u t from th e w a y A m erican s fit it in to th e ir n e w conception of n a tio n al security. Pearl H a rb o r serv ed to co n firm th a t co n ception, as R oosevelt to ld th e n a tio n o n D ecem ber 9: The "terrib le lesson" lea rn ed in th e " p a st few y e ars" a n d the " p a s t th ree d a y s" w a s th a t "th ere is n o su c h th in g as im p reg n ab le defense a g ain st p o w e rfu l ag g resso rs w h o sn eak u p in th e d a rk a n d strike w ith o u t w a rn in g . . . . W e can n o t m ea su re o u r safety in term s of m iles o n a n y m a p a n y m o re." P lay in g sch o o lm aster to a rad io a u d i­ ence o n F eb ru ary 23, h e ask ed A m ericans to sp re a d th eir w o rld m ap s in fro n t of th e m w h ile h e e x p o u n d e d o n th e m ilitary g e o g ra p h y of A m erican v u l­ n erab ility a n d strategy.5 "Isolationists" p re su m a b ly b lin d to th a t v u ln erab ility w ere d e a lt a d e a th b lo w b y Pearl H arb o r, it w a s w id e ly assu m e d . A lth o u g h shocking, Ja p an 's attack w a s assim ilated in to ex istin g p ercep tio n s of a closed w o rld . C on sequently, too, p an ic m o u n te d after D ecem ber 7 a b o u t attack o n the U n ited S tates— panic u n fo u n d e d in retro sp ect b u t th e logical ou tco m e of y ears of talk a b o u t technological w iz ard ry , b litzk rieg w ar, a n d A m erican v u l­ nerability. FDR w a rn e d o n the n in th th a t "th e attack a t Pearl H a rb o r c an b e re­ p e a te d a t a n y one of m a n y points, p o in ts in b o th oceans a n d alo n g b o th o u r coast lines a n d a g ain st all the rest of th e h e m isp h e re." O rd in a ry citizens ab etted th e ala rm w ith claim s of sp o ttin g Japanese aircraft a n d w ith co u n tless ru m o rs (Japanese-A m erican farm ers, it w a s said, cu t th e ir cane fields in to v ecto rs to g u id e attacking en em y planes). If a n y th in g , h ig h officials felt th e p an ic m ore, at one p o in t fearing a G e rm a n attack o n the Sault Ste. M arie locks th ro u g h w h ic h m o st of the n a tio n 's iro n ore p assed . Few officials w ere as excitable as D eW itt, b u t A rm y C hief of Staff G eorge M arshall o rd ere d p recio u s m e n a n d m ateriel d iv e rte d to h o m e defense. A few in cid en ts gave th e alarm credibility. Japanese a n d G erm an su b m a rin e s sa n k sh ip s n e a r A m erican coasts, a n d in February, d ay s after FD R's w a rn in g th a t it w a s "perfectly po ssib le" for N e w York C ity o r



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D etro it to be b o m bed, a Japanese su b lobbed shells in to a Santa B arbara p e tro ­ leu m com plex. A s late as Ju n e 1942, w ith Jap an ese forces o n th e m o v e in A lask a's A leutian Islands, the W ar D e p a rtm e n t feared air ra id s o n th e W est C oast. A v a st a p p a ra tu s of civil d e fe n se — blackouts, block w a rd e n s, air ra id d rills— n o w s p ru n g into action th a t b o th d re w o n local anxieties a n d carried th e n a tio n al ala rm d o w n to the local level. E ven a sm all in la n d city co u ld "act as if it w ere im m ed iately b e h in d th e battlefron ts. M ore th a n one p a ir of eyes h a d looked into the h eav en s expecting to see a fleet of G e rm a n b o m b ers," a n d "th e g reat trial black o u t of A u g u st 1942" en co u rag e d "ev ery o n e in th e m id ­ co n tin en t h o m es of Jonesville to th in k of th e e n em y as a th re a t to th eir o w n se­ curity." C h ild re n c au g h t u p in air raid drills, o r g iv en I.D. tag s a n d fin g er­ p rin te d o n the chance th ey w o u ld be killed o r ev acu ated , faced fears a n d ritu a ls co m m only associated w ith th e atom ic age. In W ausau, W isconsin, as o n e a d u lt later recalled a ch ild h o o d scene, "h o w lin g sirens scream ed a cruel w a rn in g . T he w h o le scene filled m y im a g in atio n of a real attack." T he lessons of A m eri­ can v u ln era b ility w ere im p rin te d w ith special force o n y o u n g ste rs.6 Panic d id m ore th a n reveal fears of n a tio n al peril. It m a rk e d a w ild lu rc h — from d ism issal to e x ag g eratio n — in v iew s of en em y capabilities, a n d a lin g er­ in g in flation of w h a t the b o m b er co u ld do. M ost of all, it serv ed to m obilize th e n a tio n in th e absence of th e im m ed iate p e ril m o st co m b a ta n ts faced: in a w a r fo u g h t "o n im a g in atio n alone" b y m o st A m ericans, th e im a g in atio n search ed for som e real-w o rld co n firm atio n of d an g er. The p an ic th ereb y also co n firm ed A m erican s' u n d e rs ta n d in g of th e w a r 's stakes. In so far as P earl H a rb o r p re ­ sag ed attack o n the U n ited States, n a tio n al su rv iv a l a g ain st p re d a to ry enem ies seek in g "th e c o n q u est of the U n ited States" (as FD R p u t it) seem ed a t stake m o re th a n ideological o r m o ral m ean in g s to th e w ar. M an y A m erican s still saw su ch m eanings, b u t those w ere su b su m e d u n d e r a m o re diffuse fear of d a n ­ g ero u s enem ies.7 P articularly the Japanese enem y, w h o se th re a t a n d evil seem ed to m o st A m ericans confirm ed b y Pearl H arbor. T he a d m in istra tio n rem a in e d a t p a in s to d esig n ate G erm an y as the g reater en em y b u t rig h tly w o rrie d th a t m a n y A m ericans, a ttu n e d to the w a r's racial d im en sio n s, h a d d ifferen t preferences. Like o th er responses to P earl H arb o r, racist se n tim en t d id n o t em erg e full­ b lo w n o n D ecem ber 7. The m o v em en t to p u t 120,000 Jap an ese-A m erican s o n th e W est C oast into co n cen tratio n cam ps, for exam ple, crested on ly in th e sp rin g of 1942. It re sp o n d e d to n o real th reat, fed eral ag en ts h a v in g a lre a d y d e ­ tain ed those seen as d a n g ero u s, b u t officials a n d jo u rn alists re g a rd e d th e ab ­ sence of sabotage as a sig n of the clever d e v io u sn ess of Japanese-A m ericans. (In H aw aii the th rea t w as m ore plausible, b u t th eir n u m b e rs a n d econom ic v alu e p re c lu d e d system atic incarceration.) Incarceratio n also d re w o n c o n tin u in g A m erican h u m iliatio n in the Pacific (the last o u tp o st in th e P h ilip p in es fell in M ay), o n a desire to w re ak vengeance o n th e o n ly available v ersio n of th e en-

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em y, o n g re e d y schem es to seize Japanese-A m erican farm s a n d b u sin esses, a n d o n efforts b y officials to placate th o se e m o tio n s a n d act o n th eir o w n prejudices. B eyond th o se specific im p u lses w ere th e fears of su b v e rsio n a lre ad y risin g b e ­ fore P earl H a rb o r a n d a "m o re gen eralized x en o p h o b ia" sp re a d in g after it.8 T h o u sa n d s of G erm an - a n d Italian-A m erican s w ere also locked u p , som e of w h o m w e re p a te n tly d a n g ero u s, b u t far m ore n u m ero u s, p olitically stro n g , a n d econom ically v ital th a n Japanese-A m ericans, th ey m et far less severe trea t­ m ent. A n im o sity to w a rd th e Japanese also sh a p e d A m erican o p e ra tio n s a b ro a d in 1942. U n ite d States forces sto p p e d Ja p an 's n a v y a t th e B attle of M id w a y in Ju n e a n d to o k th e offensive b y in v a d in g G u a d alc an a l in A u g u st. In th e E u ro p ea n w ar, the g rim task of g e ttin g a id to B ritain a n d R ussia in th e teeth of G e rm a n su b m a rin e s w a s vital, b u t o n ly th e in v asio n of N o rth A frica in N o v e m b er m a rk e d a m ajor offensive effort. O p e ratio n s like A p ril's D oolittle b o m b in g ra id o n Tokyo, w h ich lacked m u ch tangible m ilitary p u rp o se , re sp o n d e d to p o p u la r ferv o r for action first a g ain st Jap an a n d p la y e d to th e "ex term in atio n ist sen ti­ m e n t" am o n g A m ericans, sh o w n in June w h e n a p atrio tic p a ra d e in N e w York d isp la y e d "a b ig A m erican eagle lea d in g a flight of b o m b ers d o w n o n a h e rd of y ello w ra ts."9 Fears of A m erican strategic v u ln era b ility a n d Jap an ese racial evil d o m in a te d initial A m erican p ercep tio n s of th e w a r b u t h a rd ly d efin ed all th e reactions of a d iv erse people. For som e, w a r w ith Ja p an raised tro u b leso m e racial issu es (one black sh arec ro p p er re p o rte d ly to ld h is b o ss after Pearl H arb o r, "By th e w ay. C ap tain , I h e a r th e Japanese d o n e d eclared w a r o n y o u w h ite folks"). C o n se rv a ­ tives saw a g o ld en chance to scuttle th e N e w D eal, w h ile liberals like Vice P resi­ d e n t H e n ry W allace so u g h t to cem en t loyalties to th e w a r effort b y sk etch in g e x p a n d e d social p ro g ra m s o r b y asse rtin g lib eral tru th s a b o u t "o n e w o rld ," th e title of heretic R epublican W endell W illkie's bestseller. For m o st A m erican s th e w a r m e a n t m ore specific things: th e an n o y an ce of ratio n in g o r th e p lea su re of risin g w ages, a d ra ft call to h e ed o r a so n to m o u rn , a sm all b u sin e ss to fold u p b ecau se m erch an d ise w a s scarce o r a d efense p la n t job to tak e in a d ista n t city. But th e m o o d of A m ericans in 1942 w a s m ercu rial a n d h a rd to identify. T hey seem ed to d isp la y confidence th a t th eir cause w a s ju st b u t p e rp le x ity a b o u t w h y it w as, a n d "a k in d of p u z z le d b o re d o m a b o u t th e w a r in g e n eral" th a t sh ifted into "talk of th e w a r b e in g o v e r in six m o n th s." 10 E ven less clear w a s th e lo n g -ran g e significance th ey saw in P earl H a rb o r's a p p a re n t lessons, for in 1942 A m ericans sa id little a b o u t th eir p o stw a r m ilita ry pow er. E xceptions to th e reticence d id little to challenge it: th e b o o k Victory through Air Power (1942), a n o to rio u s a p p e a l (later re n d e re d in a n im a te d fo rm b y W alt D isney) to incinerate Japanese cities, p o rtra y e d p o stw a r A m erican h e ­ g em o n y effortlessly achieved th ro u g h th e bom ber. Reticence o w e d little to im ­ m ersio n in the task a t h a n d , for sp e cu la tio n a b o u t w a r 's a fte rm a th in o th e r

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w ay s w as rife, o r to confidence th a t this w a r w o u ld b e th e last one, w h ic h few A m ericans had. In stead , it o w ed to o th er lim its o n the w a rtim e im ag in atio n . M an y liberals feared th a t m en tio n of the m ilita ry 's role in th e n a tio n 's fu tu re w o u ld sap the c u rre n t w ill to fight. "P ro p o sals in C ongress for a g reat sta n d in g a rm y after th e w a r are confessions of d efeat," M arg aret M ead a rg u e d , a n d "w e ak e n u s as a p eo p le." "M en fig h t b e tte r w h e n th ey k n o w for w h a t th ey a re fig h tin g ," S tu a rt C h ase w ro te, b u t the possible n e e d for "a larg er m ilitary m ach in e" after th e w a r w a s h a rd ly bracing; econom ic justice a n d secu rity w o u ld b e tte r g alv an ize A m ericans. M ore generally. C hase a n d M ead, like m a n y o th ers, h a d a cyclical v iew of h isto ry in w h ic h a recurrence of the G reat D ep ressio n w a s th e n ig h t­ m are. "W e c a n 't go back," C hase d eclared, b u t h e o b v io u sly feared th a t "w e " could. F ocusing o n cu ltu re, P hilip W ylie feared m u c h th e sa m e — th e re tu rn of a b o tch ed civilization (unless the w a r m a d e A m erican s realize th a t " h u n d re d s of th o u sa n d s of A m erican flow ers of w o m a n h o o d are w h o res. A n d th a t m illions of n o b le A m erican m e n get in b e d w ith them "). For a fu tu re im ag in ed as a rev er­ sio n to th e u g ly p ast, th ere w a s little n e e d to e x te n d th e v ecto rs of w a rtim e ch an g e into th e future. C o m m e n tato rs in stea d im ag in ed a bell cu rv e of h isto ri­ cal ch an g e rising d u rin g the w a r a n d th e n reced in g to p re w a r n o rm ality ; th ey foresaw w a r 's rip p le effects b u t n o lasting m ilitarizatio n . E ven W ylie, w h o d e ­ cried A m erica's p re w a r m ilitary w eak n ess, e n v isio n ed a pacific A m erican h e ­ g em o n y after th e w ar: "C o n v ersio n for w o rld reco n stru ctio n w o u ld o p e n u p th e o n e e v erlastin g frontier. W e can w in th e w a r a n d re-estab lish m a n ." 11 T h u s few A m ericans in 1942 e x tra p o la ted th e ir n e w lessons a b o u t n a tio n al secu rity in to the future. T hey w ere su rro u n d e d b y evid en ce of th eir m ilitary m ig h t, b u t it w a s o bviously g eared to this w a r's exigencies. M ilitarizatio n w a s re g a rd e d as so m eth in g d ifferen t— the evil w h ic h th e en em y p rac tic ed — a n d th u s lacked explicit sanction, rem a in in g c o n tin g en t o n a w a r y e t to be w o n a n d o n issues y et to b e faced, ev en as th e im plicit san ctio n offered b y Pearl H a rb o r g rew in sym bol a n d m em ory. P earl H a rb o r h a d m a d e its m ark , b u t h o w d e ep ly w a s n o t im m ed iately a p ­ p aren t. It becam e a n a ll-p u rp o se m e ta p h o r for disaster; A m erican s m ig h t "su f­ fer a n o th e r Pearl H arb o r," ra n one g loom y p red ic tio n of p o stw a r econom ic d e ­ pression. It sp a rk e d im ages of a w o rld sh ru n k b y aviation; n ew sreels a n d m orale-boosting film s m a d e M id w a y "n o t a speck in th e Pacific b u t 'o u r fro n t y a rd ' "; "W h at's C h u n g k in g d o in g in N ev ad a?," a sk ed a C o n so lid ated V ultee A ircraft a d (see fig. 3). Yet for A m ericans im ag in in g n e w p e ril b u t still safe fro m attack. Pearl H a rb o r w as also a n elusive sym bol, as a n E nglish v isito r realized w h ile flying over N ebraska. T he "ste w ard e ss d e p o site d m y lu n ch tray. . . .A s I reach ed av id ly to attack m y b u tte r p a t there, n e atly in scrib ed o n it, w a s th e in ­ ju n ctio n REMEMBER PEARL HARBOR. It n e e d e d th e b u tte r to rem in d o n e of th e g u n s." M a d iso n A venue tech n iq u es sh o u ld n o t b e e q u a te d w ith w a rtim e m o o d s, b u t the n e ed to use th em w a s revealin g .12

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69

The Business e l War A t th e h e ig h t of the A m erican w a r effort, th e B ritish o b serv er D. W. B rogan su m m e d u p "th e A m erican w a y of w a r," w h ic h h e th o u g h t "b o u n d to b e like th e A m erican w a y of life." It w a s "m ech an ized like th e A m erican farm a n d k itch en (the farm s a n d kitchens of a lazy p e o p le w h o w a n t w a sh in g m achines a n d b u lld o z ers to d o the job for them "). It w as practiced b y "a n a tio n of colossal b u sin e ss en terp rises, often w astefu lly ru n in detail, b u t w in n in g b y th eir m ere scale." To A m ericans, B rogan co ncluded, " w a r is a b u sin ess, n o t a n art; th ey are n o t in te reste d in m oral victories, b u t in victory. N o g reat c o rp o ra tio n ev er suc­ cessfully excused itself o n m o ral g ro u n d s to its sto ck h o ld ers for b ein g in the red; th e U n ited States is a great, a v e ry great, c o rp o ra tio n w h o se sto ck h o ld ers e x p e c t. . . th a t it w ill be in th e black.13 In d ee d th e g reat c o rp o ra tio n d id ru n "in th e black," p ro m o tin g victory ab ro ad , affluence a t h o m e, a n d m ilitarizatio n in th e lo n g run. H o w ev e r dusty, th e m easu res of A m erican p ro d u c tiv e triu m p h rem a in d a z ­ zling. M an u factu rin g o u tp u t d o u b le d b e tw e e n 1940 a n d 1943. A rm am e n ts p ro ­ d u c tio n increased eightfold b e tw e e n 1941 a n d 1943, to a level n e arly th a t of B ritain, the Soviet U nion, a n d G e rm a n y com bined. O u tp u t of sh ip s, o ften b y rem ark ab le assem bly-line m eth o d s, w a s staggering. M ost telling w a s success in technically a d v an c ed fields: aircraft p ro d u c tio n zo o m ed from 5,856 in 1939 to 96,318 in 1944— m ore th a n d o u b le w h a t a n y ally o r en em y p ro d u c e d , ev en th o u g h the U n ited States m a d e b ig g er planes. U n d e r Lend-Lease, it also s u p ­ p lie d its allies: 400,000 m o to r vehicles a n d 2,000 locom otives to th e Soviets, a n d o v er a fo u rth of B ritain's m ilitary e q u ip m e n t b y 1944. F rien d s a n d foes p e r­ fo rm ed ju st as im pressively, g iv en the b u rd e n of co m b at a n d d e stru c tio n u n d e r w h ic h th ey labored: the Soviet U n io n o u tp ro d u c e d A m erica in tan k s b y 1944, for exam ple, a n d G erm an y a n d Jap an reach ed p e a k p ro d u c tio n th a t y e ar d e ­ sp ite A llied b o m b in g a n d blockade. By th e sam e token, A m erica's in su latio n from attack a n d en o rm o u s reso u rces— h alf th e w o rld 's m a n u fa ctu rin g took place in the U n ited States b y 1945— p a rtly acco u n ted for its su p erio rity . But A m erican triu m p h w as n o t a sim p le one of "m ere scale," as B rogan p u t it. In av iatio n (despite G erm an b re a k th ro u g h s in jet aircraft a n d rockets), in elec­ tronics, a n d in atom ic w eap o n s, A m erican in v en tiv e su p rem acy (w ith A llied a n d refugee assistance) w a s u n riv aled . M ak in g th e A m erican triu m p h d o u b ly gratifying, the p ro d u c tio n of n o n w a r g o o d s also in creased — a lu x u ry n o o th er m ajor co m b atan t e n jo y ed — d e sp ite th e cessation of som e p ro d u c ts (auto­ m obiles) a n d the ratio n in g of o th ers (gasoline, for exam ple). R oosevelt facilitated this p ro d u c tiv e triu m p h . H e d id so th ro u g h key d ecisions— to p u s h aircraft p ro d u ctio n , for exam ple, a n d to au th o rize th e M an ­ h a tta n Project to b u ild atom ic bom bs. H e also d id so th ro u g h pu b lic oratory, d riv in g h o m e the cen trality of p ro d u c tio n in m o d e m w a r w ith m u n d a n e b u t telling illustrations: "E very Flying Fortress th a t b o m b ed h a rb o r in stallatio n s at

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N ap les," h e re m in d e d A m ericans in July 1943, "re q u ire d 1,110 g allo n s of g as­ oline for each single m ission," o r "th e eq u al of a b o u t 375 'A ' ra tio n tick ets— e n o u g h gas to d riv e y o u r car five tim es across th is c o n tin e n t."14 S uch o ra to ry serv ed several p u rp o ses: it reinforced th e n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security, lin k ed d e m a n d s ab ro ad to sacrifices a t ho m e, a n d sh ifted a tte n tio n a w ay from w a r's g rim m er dim en sio n s. R oosevelt a p p re cia te d th e fu n d a m e n ta ls of this w a r— w h a t it to o k to w in, to m in im ize A m erican sacrifice, a n d to m ax im ize A m erican o u tp u t. H is tran sla tio n of th a t a p p re cia tio n in to o rg an iz ed action, o n th e o th e r h a n d , seem ed w a n tin g , o r so m a n y co n te m p o ra rie s ju d g e d it. N o o n e ag en cy o r in d i­ v id u a l except FDR him self ev er co n tro lled th e v a st a p p a ra tu s of econom ic m o ­ bilization. The W ar P ro d u c tio n B oard (WPB) cam e closest b u t d e le g a te d m u c h of its a u th o rity to the a rm e d services a n d larg e co rp o ratio n s. Its coercive role w a s co nfined largely to issu in g o rd ers lim itin g p ro d u c tio n of fin ish ed p ro d u c ts a n d u se of ra w m aterials, each o rd e r fu n ctio n in g "like th e tu rn in g of a v alv e o r a th e th ro w in g of a sw itch," se n d in g "m ateria ls c o u rsin g th ro u g h th e m ach in e, so th a t th ey em erg ed as h elm ets o r p u p ten ts ra th e r th a n as b read b o x es a n d h a m ­ m o ck s."15 M oreover, m u c h in th e m o b ilizatio n effort lay b e y o n d th e W PB 's p u rv ie w — in the h a n d s of agencies like the Office of Scientific R esearch a n d D ev elopm ent, the Office of Price A d m in istratio n , a n d th e R eco n stru ctio n Fi­ n an ce C o rp o ratio n (a N e w D eal holdover). A su p e rag e n cy estab lish ed in 1943, th e Office of W ar M obilization, a d d e d little coherence to th e system , b u t it d id ex p lo it the talen ts of th e m a ste r political fixer w h o h e a d e d it, Jam es B yrnes, for­ m er S outh C arolina se n ato r a n d S u p rem e C o u rt justice. N o t su rp risin g ly , g iv en th e p le th o ra of c o m p etin g au th o rities, th e g ears of th e m achine som etim es jam m ed . E specially in 1942, critics ex co riated w aste, slu g g ishness, a n d co rp o rate profiteering. M o b ilizatio n w a s "b itch ed , b o tch e d a n d b u g g e re d from sta rt to finish," ch arg ed B ruce C atto n , w ritin g fro m h is v a n ­ tag e p o in t o n the WPB staff. C ostly m istak es w ere m ad e , like F ord M o to r C o m ­ p a n y 's tro u b le d effort to m ass-p ro d u ce b o m b ers, th e air force's ta rd y s u p p o rt for th e P-51 fig h ter n e e d e d to acco m p an y its b o m b ers, a n d th e ru s h to m ak e a n ill-designed B-26 b o m b er (to flyers, th e "Flying P ro stitu te — n o visible m ea n s of su p p o rt"). G iven th e "polycratic chaos" of N a z i m o b ilizatio n (d isg u ised a t th e tim e b y its to ta litaria n im age), w h y d id a p p a re n t A m erican chaos y ield vic­ to ry ?16 B esides favorable circum stances of g e o g ra p h y a n d resources, su p e rio r p re s­ cience w a s critical. By late 1941, A m erican, British, a n d Soviet lea d ers g ra sp e d th e likely len g th a n d d e m a n d s of the w a r a n d g e ared m o b ilizatio n accordingly, w h ereas H itle r a n d the N azis, o v erco n fid en t after in itial success w ith b litzk rieg tactics, d elay ed full m o b ilizatio n u n til 1942-1943, e v en th e n h e sita tin g in im ­ p o rta n t w ays. Fidelity to th eir ideological go als— as in k eep in g w o m e n a t h o m e ra th e r th a n em p lo y in g o n th e scale the A llies d id , o r sla u g h te rin g Jew s a n d o th ers ra th e r th a n exploiting th eir lab o r m ore fu lly — also h a m s tru n g th e N azis,

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7I

w h ile the A llies' ideological c au tio n allo w ed all en erg ies to flow in to th e p u r­ su it of victory, th e o n ly goal c o m m an d in g u n iv ersal su p p o rt. T he p e cu lia r "chaos" in A m erican m o b ilizatio n w a s ju st as im p o rta n t, for chaos also m e a n t flexibility. W h atev e r th e fo rm al b u reau cratic b o u n d a rie s, key g ro u p s a n d in d iv id u a ls co u ld p ress possibilities b lo ck ed in o n e ch an n el th ro u g h a n o th e r a n d su sta in elab o rate w eb s of co m m u n icatio n . T h u s th e atom ic b o m b project w a s p u sh e d b y scientists d e sp ite th e m ilita ry 's initial cool resp o n se, a n d resistance b y som e av iatio n firm s to assem bly-line p ro d u c tio n w a s likew ise overcom e (it w a s n o t in G erm any). F lu id ity across o v e rla p p in g realm s of a u th o rity d id trig g e r b itte r tu rf w a rs, b u t th ey w ere b y -p ro d u cts of a h e a lth y process. E ven in G erm any, skillful im p ro v isa tio n o u tsid e fo rm al stru c ­ tu res acco u n ted for m u c h of its b e la te d success at p ro d u ctio n , b u t in d iv id u a l fiefdom s w ith in th e N a z i econom ic k in g d o m w ere jealo u sly g u a rd e d a n d H itle r in te rv e n e d in th eir w o rk in g s capriciously. In co n trast, R oosevelt gave w id e la titu d e to e x p erts in th eir fields, w h ile th e p e rm e ab le b o u n d a rie s of A m erican elites a n d sta te o rg an izatio n s p ro m o te d m o v em en t a m o n g th em b y in d iv id u a ls a n d initiatives. In d ee d , one source of A m erica's success in th e p ro ­ d u c tio n w a r w a s the in tricate m esh in g of m ilitary a n d civilian elites, in c o n tra st to th e rig id su b o rd in a tio n to N a z i p o w e r faced b y su c h elites in G erm any. In tu rn , th a t success set in m o tio n v ital ch an g es in th e A m erican political econom y, in clu d in g th e regional re d istrib u tio n of p o w e r a n d w ealth . The w a r tra n sfo rm e d the A m erican W est, w h e re fed eral d efen se d o llars flo w ed because of its p ro x im ity to th e Pacific w ar, its p re su m a b ly favorable clim ate, a n d its sp a rse ly in h ab ited lan d s su itab le for testin g n e w technologies like jet aircraft a n d th e atom ic bom b. T he b ig w in n e r w a s th e W est C oast, especially C alifornia, w h ic h received 12 p e rc en t of all w a r o rd ers a n d saw its aircraft a n d sh ip b u ild ­ in g facilities reaching from San D iego to Los A ngeles b ecom e "th e n a tio n 's larg­ est u rb a n m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex." The in la n d W est w a s less fav o red b y th e b o o m in m a n u fa ctu rin g (alth o u g h D enver, o d d ly e n o u g h , c h u rn e d o u t su b m arin e-ch asin g ships), b u t it p ro sp e re d th ro u g h th e g ro w th of m ilitary bases a n d the e x p an sio n of ag ric u ltu ral a n d extractive in d u stries. T he w a r ef­ fo rt "tra n sfo rm e d a colonial econom y" into a "d iv ersified " econom ic p o w e r­ h o u se p a ce d b y a d v a n c e d technologies a n d elem en ts of w h a t cam e to b e called a "p o st-in d u stria l" system . D espite the W est's lin g erin g d e p e n d e n c e o n fed eral m onies, its su b o rd in a tio n to th e N o rth a n d th e E ast ra p id ly fad ed . In th e w ak e of th a t g ra n d change cam e others: a n e w im age, as co m p an ies like H u g h e s A ir­ craft a n d D ouglas A viation em erg ed as heroic e n te rp rises of technological vic­ tory; n a tio n al p reem in en ce for in stitu tio n s like th e U n iv ersity of C alifornia a n d th e C altech Jet P ro p u lsio n L aboratory, w h e re p ro m in e n t A m erican a n d ém igré scientists flocked; a h a sten e d , th o u g h h a rd ly co m p lete o r effortless, e n try into th e m a in strea m of A m erican life for H isp an ic A m ericans; a n d a m assiv e p o p u ­ latio n shift into p a rts of th e W est. "It w a s if so m eo n e h a d tilted th e country: p eo p le, m oney, a n d soldiers all sp illed w e st." 17

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The W est's g ain s w ere n o t necessarily o th er reg io n s' losses. T he S o u th 's coastal areas saw a "sta g g erin g " tran sfo rm atio n , in itiatin g th e "S u n b elt" p ro s­ p e rity no ticed in th e 1970s a n d 1980s; a n d for so u th e rn ers "th e w a r ch allen g ed th eir provincialism ," d ra w in g th em m ore fully in to a n A m erican id e n tity a n d b rin g in g fed eral p o w e r m o re forcefully to th e ir region. T hose sectors su fferin g econom ic o r p o p u la tio n loss b e lo n g e d to n o single reg io n b u t in stea d w e re scat­ tered am o n g ru ra l areas a n d sm all to w n s (in terio r n o rth e rn N e w E n g lan d , for exam ple). W artim e p ro sp e rity in o th e r sectors, h o w ev er, so m etim es m ask ed lo n g -term shifts a g g ra v ate d b y th e w ar. Farm o u tp u t a n d incom e so ared , b u t th e farm p o p u la tio n c o n tin u e d to shrink. In o ld er in d u stria l states like M ichi­ g a n (only N e w York exceeded its share of p rim e d efen se contracts), "th e sh ap e, if n o t the size, of [the] econom y e m e rg ed fro m th e w a r relativ ely u n c h a n g e d ." T hose states p ro sp e re d for th e m o m e n t b u t lacked th e n e w in d u strie s th a t w o u ld fuel c o n tin u ed p ro sp e rity .18 The w a r accelerated regional shifts of a g ra n d e r so rt as w ell, th o se o n a n in ­ tern atio n al scale. L arge A m erican c o rp o ra tio n s e m e rg ed fro m th e w a r flu sh w ith capital a n d expertise, eager to ex p lo it m ark e ts a b a n d o n e d b y w e a k e n e d E u ro p ea n com petitors, m ore m a n e u v era b le as a resu lt of n e w ly d ecen tralized stru ctu res, a n d backed b y the w o rld 's m o st p o w e rfu l g o v ern m en t. O nce m o re con cerned w ith d o m estic m arkets, those co rp o ratio n s b ecam e m u ltin atio n al firm s a n d reached th e z e n ith of th eir in te rn atio n al p o w e r in th e tw o d ecad es after 1945. A lth o u g h th a t d e v e lo p m e n t w as largely o n h o ld u n til th e w a r w a s over, it w a s assisted b y changes d u rin g th e w ar. A m erica's econom ic lev erag e allo w ed it to a rm -tw ist allies d e p e n d e n t o n A m erican assistan ce in to accepting tariff a n d m o n etary ag reem en ts th a t p rie d o p e n m u c h o f th e w o rld , especially E u ro p e's colonial em pires, to A m erican tra d e a n d in v estm en t. Soviet p o w er, rev o lu tio n a n d chaos in m u c h of the deco lo n izin g T h ird W orld, a n d o th e r fac­ to rs w o u ld lim it th e A m erican achievem ent. A n d it w as d u b io u s in d e e d to claim , as Secretary of State C ordell H u ll once d id , th a t A m erican p rin cip les of free tra d e a n d dem ocracy w ere "beneficial a n d a p p e a lin g to th e sen se of justice, of rig h t a n d of th e w ell-being of free p e o p le s e v e ry w h e re ."19 B ut H u ll a n d o th ers d id m u c h to realize a n old v isio n of a n o p e n econom ic w o rld d o m in a te d b y A m erican capitalism . M ost telling, h ow ever, w ere changes in tern al to th e A m erican p o litical econ­ om y. T he w a r effected a p a rtn e rsh ip b e tw e e n b ig g o v e rn m e n t a n d b ig b u sin ess, after d ecad es of erratic a n d som etim es stra in e d relatio n s, w h ic h larg ely h eld for th e h alf-century to follow. B oth conscious policy a n d in a d v e rte n t conse­ q u en ce forged the p a rtn e rsh ip , w h ic h "successively m o b ilized b ig b u sin ess, a g g ra n d iz e d it, a n d lin k ed it to the m ilitary estab lish m en t." N a tio n a l lead ers d e cid ed th a t only g en ero u s c o o p eratio n w ith co rp o rate g ian ts co u ld w in the w a r— in th e o ft-quoted co m m en t of Secretary of W ar Stim son, w h e n a cap italist co u n try goes to w ar, "y o u h av e to let b u sin ess m ak e m o n ey o u t o f th e process or b u sin ess w o n 't w o rk ."20 Since m en like Stim son d o m in a te d m o b ilizatio n —

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th ree-fo u rth s of the W PB executive staff w ere "d o llar-a-y ear" m e n w h o re­ m ain ed o n th e ir c o m p a n y p a y ro lls— th eir view s p rev ailed . A s a resu lt, m o b ilizatio n e n h an c ed b o th th e im m ed iate p ro fits a n d th e last­ in g p o w e r of larg er co rp o ratio n s. P ro cu rem en t flo w ed to them ; b y 1943, one h u n d re d co m p an ies h e ld contracts for 70 p e rc en t of d efen se p ro d u ctio n . W ar­ tim e policy g u a ra n te e d th e m profits, freed o m fro m co m p etitio n a n d a n titru st action in m o st cases, a n d g o v e rn m e n t capital o r o th er in cen tiv es for p la n t ex­ p an sio n . N e w e r in d u strie s like aviation, sy n th etic ru b b er, a n d atom ic en erg y w ere a lm o st w h o lly financed b y g o v e rn m e n t capital. For m a n y com p an ies, the b o n a n z a w e n t far b e y o n d w a rtim e profits: th ey g ain ed b y "sq u e ez in g o u t m ar­ g in al co m petitors, forging p e rm a n e n t links w ith th e n a tio n al g o v ern m en t, g a in in g th e in sid e track o n research in to n e w technologies, a n d ab so rb in g statefin an ced cap ital ex p an sio n a t h ig h ly favorable rate s after th e w a r." 21 A m o n g c o m p an ies n o t d o in g essential w a r w o rk , sm aller firm s o ften fo ld ed , b u t larg er ones w ith clout in W ash in g to n a n d m o n ey to ad v ertise o ften su cceed ed in id e n ­ tify in g w ith th e cause: C oca-C ola accom pan ied th e tro o p s o v erseas a n d a stick of W rigley's g u m w e n t in to each so ld ie r's K -ration package. T ough p ro p o sals to cap o r tax in d iv id u a l salaries a n d c o rp o ra te p ro fits w ere b e a te n b ack o r w a ­ tered d o w n , w h ile fed eral policies o n reco n v ersio n to a peacetim e econom y w ere also beneficial to th e in terests of b ig bu sin ess. To b e sture, the triu m p h of in stitu tio n al b ig n ess w a s u n ev en : som e u p sta rt co m p an ies blo sso m ed m agnificently, a n d a n o ld ru n t like th e P ackard M otor C o m p a n y saw e m p lo y m e n t z o o m from sev en h u n d re d to th irty -n in e th o u sa n d w o rk ers. N o r w a s th a t triu m p h confined to b u sin ess, e v id e n t as it also w a s am o n g ed u ca tio n al in stitu tio n s, lab o r u n io n s, ag ric u ltu ral in terests, a n d gov­ e rn m e n t itself. But o th e r in stitu tio n s lacked th e p o w er, th e w ill, th e u n ity — o r all th re e — to challenge co rp o rate d o m in an ce of th e political econom y. By th e sam e token, m a n y a lesser co m p a n y like P ackard flo u n d e re d a g ain after th e w ar. T he c o rp o ra te-g o v e rn m e n t p a rtn e rsh ip w a s p alatab le to m o st A m erican s b e ­ cause it seem ed to b e a tem p o ra ry e x p ed ien t a n d w a s acco m p an ied b y b ro ad p ro sp erity , ev en b y a sm all b u t n o tab le d o w n w a rd red istrib u tio n of incom e. (The rich g o t richer, b u t at a slightly slo w er ra te th a n o th e r A m ericans, a n d n o n ­ w h ite m ale w o rk e rs' share of incom e rose sharply.) W h en m ilita ry sp e n d in g p ro d u c e d a b u n d an c e, few A m ericans w e re in clined to q u a rre l o v er th e rela­ tio n sh ip s of p o w e r th a t resulted. In d eed , p o p u la r anim osities d u rin g th e w ar, sto k ed b y FD R 's en em ies b u t sh a re d b y m a n y in the a d m in istratio n , ra n far m o re a g ain st w o rk e rs a n d u n io n s th a n a g ain st co rp o rate giants. W h en u n io n lea d er John L. L ew is b ro k e la b o r's w a rtim e no -strik e p led g e in 1943— coal w o rk e rs faced sta g n a n t w ag es a n d a n a p p allin g casu alty rate ("ap p ro a ch in g th a t of com b at") of five h u n d re d m in ers killed o r h u r t w e ek ly — h e b ecam e p e rh a p s th e m o st h a te d A m erican, seen as a n en em y w h o sab o tag ed th e lives of servicem en, since coal w a s v ital to the

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en tire w a r econom y. FDR h a n d le d the d e v ilish issu es of labor, w ag es, a n d infla­ tio n a d ro itly a n d "sa v ed the u n io n m o v em en t w ith o u t co m p ro m isin g p ro d u c ­ tivity." But o n occasion h e th re a te n e d to d ra ft strik in g w o rk e rs o r seize stru ck in d u strie s, a n d h e s u p p o rte d a n a tio n al service law (n ev er p assed ) to "p re v e n t strik es" a n d "to m ake available for w a r p ro d u c tio n o r for a n y o th er essen tial services ev ery able-bodied a d u lt in this N a tio n ."22 M eanw hile, friction in v o lv in g g o v e rn m e n t a n d b u sin e ss d id n o t cease, b u t it u su a lly in v o lv ed th e p la y of co m p etin g interests, in clu d in g riv alries w ith in the a rm e d forces, ra th e r th a n a co h eren t " g o v e rn m e n t" p itte d a g ain st a cohesive b u sin ess com m unity. It co u ld h a rd ly b e o th erw ise w h e n b u sin e ssm e n w ere ru n n in g m u ch of th e g o v ern m en t. A ccordingly, re se n tm e n t a g ain st th e g o v e rn ­ m en tal discipline th a t w a r en tailed w a s lim ited. E xperience w ith a m o re p o w e r­ ful state d u rin g the last w a r a n d th e D epressio n , th e a d ro it m ix tu re of v o lu n ta r­ ism a n d coercion w ith w h ich g o v e rn m e n t m o b ilized th e econom y, a n d th e felt g rav ity of d a n g e r to n a tio n al security all k e p t th e lid o n a d v e rse reactions, if n o t o n g ru m b lin g a b o u t W ash in g to n 's follies, co rp o ra tio n s' g reed , o r la b o r's self­ ishness. T entative term s for a lastin g b u sin e ss-g o v e rn m e n t p a rtn e rsh ip w ere set b y th e w ar. G o v e rn m e n t (especially th e executive b ran ch ) a n d b u sin e ss (especially larg e co rp o ratio n s) w o u ld b e the sen io r p a rtn e rs in th e firm . C o n g ress w o u ld h e lp set policy a n d b ro k e r d isp u tes b u t w o u ld fu n ctio n m o re as a n aren a for conflict th a n as a decisive force itself. Ju n io r p a rtn e rs w o u ld b e o rg an iz ed labor, ag ric u ltu ral interests, a n d sm all b u sin ess, all of w h ic h g a in e d a m ea su re of se cu rity — u n io n m em b ersh ip so arin g to n e arly fifteen m illio n b y 1945— a t the p rice of a b an d o n in g am b itio n s for a d o m in a n t role. E ven th e ir sta tu s as ju n io r p a rtn e rs w a s often in d o u b t. T he aircraft in d u stry , for ex am p le, rem a in e d n o to ­ rio u sly antilabor, th a n k s to the illegal a n ti-u n io n tactics of so m e of its lead ers, to so u th e rn C alifornia's an tilab o r cu ltu re, a n d to th e a b u n d a n c e of "celery p ick ers" a n d " c o u n try b o y s" w h o , a t least as lo n g as th e D ep ressio n 's effects lin g ered, felt "n ig g er rich " o n eig h teen d o lla rs a w e ek a n d p ro v e d difficult to u n io n ize.23 O ccupying a m id d le p o sitio n in this h ierarch y w ere m ilita ry a n d scientific in stitu tio n s a n d th eir lead ersh ip . T hey lacked th e cap ital o r th e in sid e r p o w e r of co rp o rate a n d political leaders, b u t th e w a r d id en h an ce th eir im p o rtan c e a n d statu s, a n d th eir skills a n d v alu es w ere m erg in g w ith th o se of political a n d cor­ p o ra te lead ers in the com plex effort a t technological w arfare. W ith g en erals like G eorge M arshall a ssu m in g w e ig h ty d ip lo m atic a n d a d m in istra tiv e resp o n ­ sibilities, w ith co rp o rate executives d e ep ly im m e rsed in w a g in g w ar, w ith sci­ en tists reaching b e y o n d m ere in v en tio n to g u id e m ilitary a n d e v e n d ip lo m atic policy, once-clear d istin ctio n s am o n g these g ro u p s w ere fad in g . T heir roles in ­ creasingly o v e rla p p e d (one scientist, for exam ple, serv ed sim u lta n eo u sly as a vice p re sid e n t of A m erican T elephone a n d T elegraph, m em b er of th e N atio n al D efense R esearch C o m m ittee, a n d p re sid e n t of th e N a tio n a l A cad em y of Sci-

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ences). The m erg in g of roles w a s e v id e n t n o t o n ly a m o n g to p lea d ers b u t a m o n g o rd in a ry serv icem en w ith p riz e d technical skills, su c h as air force p ilo ts a n d technicians, w h o looked fo rw a rd to attractiv e jobs in civilian b u sin e ss after th e w ar. A t th e in stitu tio n a l level, g o v e rn m e n t sp o n so rsh ip of science a n d tech­ n o lo g y fo rg ed linkages am o n g th e a rm e d services, p riv a te c o rp o ratio n s, a n d ed u ca tio n al in stitu tio n s like th e M assachusetts In stitu te of Technology. W h at re su lte d w a s a triu m p h for n e ith e r "civ ilian " n o r "m ilita ry " v alu es b u t in stea d , as H a ro ld L assw ell h a d anticipated,*their su b sta n tia l fusion. A "civil­ ia n m ilitarism " e m e rg ed in w h ic h "civilians n o t o n ly h a d a n ticip a te d w a r m o re eag erly th a n th e professionals, b u t p la y e d a p rin c ip a l p a rt in m ak in g com bat, w h e n it cam e, m o re absolute, m o re terrib le th a n w a s th e c u rre n t m ilitary w o n t o r h a b it."24 T he fu sio n w a s reflected in w a rtim e cu ltu re, th e hero es of w h ic h ex te n d ed b e y o n d o ld -fash io n ed cap tain s of in d u stry a n d b lo o d -an d -g u ts g e n ­ erals to in clu d e c o rp o ra te w iz a rd s like sh ip b u ild e r H e n ry K aiser, m aste r "o rg a­ n iz e rs of v icto ry " like M arshall a n d G en. D w ig h t E isenhow er, a n d elite w a r­ rio rs w h o se skills lay as m u c h in technology as in com bat. P a rtn ersh ip in v o lv e d policy as w ell as relatio n s o f p o w er. In th is reg a rd too, w a r d e lin ea ted possibilities w ith o u t fixing th e m firm ly, ab o v e all su g g estin g h o w to reconcile conflicting visio n s of th e role of g o v e rn m e n t a n d b u sin e ss in se cu rin g th e n a tio n 's fu tu re p ro sp e rity a n d p o w er. A m o n g ch am p io n s of activ­ ist g o v e rn m e n t, the w a r m a rk e d a retre at fro m d esig n s for g o v e rn m e n t coer­ cion of econom ic e n te rp rise in favor of fed eral fiscal policy: th e sp ig o t of gov­ e rn m e n t sp e n d in g ra th e r th a n th e h a m m e r of th e sta te 's reg u la tio n w o u ld g u id e econom ic energies. T he a sto u n d in g p ro sp e rity p ro d u c e d b y w a rtim e sp e n d in g , c o rp o ra te c a p tu re of th e g o v e rn m e n ta l a p p a ra tu s of reg u la tio n a n d m obilization, a n d the b alefu l exam ple of to ta litaria n coercion all p ro m o te d th is sh ift am o n g liberals, w h o also b e g a n to a b a n d o n D ep ressio n -era a ssu m p tio n s of chronic econom ic stag n atio n . T hey c o u ld read ily see th e w a r as a triu m p h of Jo h n M a y n ard K eynes's p rin cip le s of g o v e rn m e n t in v estm en t a n d deficit fi­ nancing: on ly a b o u t h a lf of th e w a rtim e fed eral b u d g e t (w h ich rose from 9 bil­ lio n d o lla rs in 1939 to 100 billio n in 1945) cam e from taxes, th e rest from w a r b o n d s a n d o th er b o rro w in g . A s R obert L ek ach m an arch ly p u t it in th e 1960s, "T he w a r p o in te d a sh a rp K eynesian m oral. A s a p u b lic w o rk s project, all w a rs (before th e n u c le ar era) are ideal. Since all w a r p ro d u c tio n is sh eer econom ic w aste, th ere is n e v e r a d a n g e r of p ro d u c in g too m u c h ." 25 A t th e sam e tim e, cor­ p o ra te lead ers also increasingly se t a sid e th eir reflexive su sp icio n s of fed eral a u th o rity — som e h a d d o n e so lo n g before th e 1940s— to accept a m ajor role for fiscal policy in p ro m o tin g p rosperity. The c o m m o n g ro u n d of fiscal p olicy d e ­ fined th e m ea n s b y w h ic h g o v e rn m e n t co u ld stim u late th e econom y w ith o u t coercing its p riv a te institutions. To b e sure, th a t co m m o n g ro u n d rem a in e d ill d e fin e d a n d c o n te sted — ju st h o w m u c h g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g , focused o n w h a t activities, b ack ed b y w h a t tax a n d m o n e ta ry policies? L ooking b e y o n d th e w ar, so m e liberals fav o red a

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"social K eynesianism " em p h a sizin g social w elfare a n d p u b lic projects; co rp o ­ rate lead ers te n d e d to prefer a "b u sin ess K eynesianism " h a rn e ssin g p riv a te e n ­ terp rise b y lo w erin g its taxes o r b u y in g its goods; econom ic conservatives, still p o w e rfu l in b u sin e ss a n d b o th political p arties, fo u n d e ith e r a p p ro a c h offen­ sive, ev en im m oral. Less clearly a rticu lated w a s th e "m ilita ry K eynesianism " th a t w o u ld p a rtly prevail, in w h ic h defense sp e n d in g w o u ld b e a m ajor lev er of stability a n d g row th. Still, the w a r experience, co m b in ed w ith fear of re n e w e d d ep ressio n , d id ch art a b ro a d area of agreem en t, as w ell as specific possibilities a llu rin g to m a n y gro u p s. Federal sp o n so rsh ip of science a n d technology, for exam ple, p ro m ised rich benefits: for c o rp o ra tio n s seek in g sk illed p e rso n n el a n d n e w p ro d u cts; for scientists a n d u n iv ersities overco m in g o ld in h ib itio n s ag ain st g o v e rn m e n t p a tro n ag e; for m ilitary lead ers em b racin g technological w arfare; a n d for those liberals eag er to see A m erican s enjoy technological ab u n d an ce. Forging links am o n g g o v ern m en t, b u sin ess, science, a n d o th er p a rtn e rs, th e w a r effort d e m o n stra te d th e tem p o ra ry a ttractio n s of m ilitarizatio n — pro sp erity, po w er, v icto ry — a n d h in te d a t m o re p e rm a n e n t ones. B ut A m eri­ cans could h a rd ly b e fau lted for failing to d e b ate th o se a ttractio n s fully d u rin g th e w ar. T hey w ere, after all, o n a course only p a rtly o f th e ir choosing. E u ro p e h a d b e en "th e cen ter of th e process of m ilitarizatio n ," se ttin g in m o tio n "a m il­ ita riz a tio n of the w o rld " in w h ich E u ro p e itself b ecam e th e "first a n d m ain ca­ su alty ."26 A m ericans w ere relative new co m ers to th is h isto rical process. T heir fu tu re course w a s n e ith e r easily foreseen n o r fu lly set, co n tin g en t as it w a s o n decisions y et to be m a d e a n d o n a su sta in in g id eo lo g y y et to b e co m p leted . M ost A m ericans d id see som e connection b e tw e e n w a r sp e n d in g a n d th e re­ tu rn of prosperity. It w a s d riv e n h o m e to th em in th eir d aily lives, tru m p e te d in th e m ed ia, a n d a n aly zed b y econom ists. The necessity of g o v e rn m e n t action to a v ert a p o stw a r d e p re ssio n w a s a stap le of w a rtim e com m entary, w h ile a d v e r­ tising a n d political rhetoric in stru cted A m erican s to reg a rd p ro sp e rity a n d af­ fluence as n o t o n ly a re w a rd for victory b u t as th e core of th a t "A m erican w a y of life" for w h ic h th ey w ere fighting. W artim e affluence also raised ex p ectatio n s b y im p ro v in g living sta n d ard s: ev en w ith ratio n in g , p e r cap ita food c o n su m p ­ tio n increased (an n u al m e a t c o n su m p tio n rose from 134 p o u n d s to 162 p o u n d s). D espite the w a r-in d u c ed p rosperity, the u rg en c y to ex ten d it after th e w ar, a n d th e w id e sp re a d a ssu m p tio n th a t g o v e rn m e n t w o u ld be resp o n sib le for it, A m ericans rarely a d d re sse d the fu tu re relatio n sh ip b e tw ee n n a tio n al se cu rity a n d n a tio n al prosperity. In stead , d e b ate stalled larg ely at th e p o in t reach ed in 1942, stu ck o n the d a n g e r of a re tu rn to the 1930s a n d th e altern ativ es p o se d b y N e w D ealers a n d th eir o p p o n en ts. T he U.S. C h a m b e r of C om m erce sim p ly n o te d in 1944 th a t a p o stw a r d ep re ssio n "w o u ld b e ro o ted u ltim ately in th e ces­ satio n of g o v e rn m e n ta l d e m a n d for a rm a m e n ts." Its stan ce w a s ty p ical d u rin g a n d after the w ar, according to tw o h istorian s: "M issing from th e political dis-

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co u rse of th is p e rio d w a s su sta in e d d iscu ssio n of th e lo n g -ru n im p lications for b u sin e ss of these m o m e n to u s changes [w ro u g h t d u rin g th e w ar] in th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t's role in the econom y." E ven am o n g h e a d s of th e larg est c o rp o ra ­ tions, w h o h a d go n e farth est " to w a rd acco m m o d atio n w ith th e n e w ly e n larg ed n a tio n al state," su c h d iscu ssio n w a s slight, ju st as ex p ectations of a p o stw a r m ilitary m a rk e t w ere g enerally low .27 D iscussion w a s scarcely m ore b risk am o n g liberals. T hey so m etim es railed a g ain st c o rp o ra te c a p tu re of th e m a c h in e ry 'o f w a r m obilization; R oosevelt, th o u g h n o w w a ry of an tib u sin ess rhetoric, assailed th e "p ests w h o sw a rm th ro u g h th e lobbies of th e C ongress a n d th e cocktail b a rs of W ash in g to n " a n d "th e w h in in g d e m a n d s of selfish p ressu re g ro u p s w h o seek to feath er th eir n ests w h ile y o u n g A m ericans are d y in g ." But liberals rarely foresaw th a t n a ­ tio n al d efense w o u ld sh a p e the A m erican eco n o m y in som e lastin g fashion. T h u s S tu a rt C hase, w ritin g a t th e w a r's en d , extolled th e "five-year m iracle" of p ro d u c tio n trig g ered b y w a rtim e sp e n d in g , b u t a d d e d th a t "th e co nclusion h e re is n o t th a t chronic w a rfare is th e cure for chronic d ep ressio n ." T h u s Roose­ velt, in Ja n u ary 1945, a rg u e d th a t p riv a te "p u rc h a sin g p o w e r" m u st becom e "sufficiently h ig h to replace w a rtim e G o v e rn m e n t d e m a n d s." 28 Silence o n the econom ics of p o stw a r n a tio n al secu rity w a s n o t total. O n cer­ ta in specifics, a tte n tio n co u ld be intense. G en ero u s aid to v eteran s, for exam ple, received en o rm o u s d iscu ssio n a n d a p p ro v a l, its p o te n tia l for m itig atin g a p o st­ w a r d e p re ssio n b e in g one of its appeals. T he co n trib u tio n s of g o v ern m en tsp o n so red science a n d technology to p ro sp e rity a n d m ilitary p o w e r w ere also w id e ly recognized. G iven th e in terest-g ro u p focus of A m erican politics, h o w ­ ever, d e b ate a b o u t fu tu re m ilitary sp e n d in g d w e lt o n specific sectors a n d the co m p etin g in terests a t w o rk in th em ra th e r th a n o n m acroeconom ic effects, a n d it a d d re sse d p ro g ra m s tan g e n tia l to o r o u tsid e th e core b u d g e ts of th e a rm e d forces. It is tru e th a t b y 1944, a m b itio u s p la n s for p o stw a r d efen se h a d b een sk etch ed b y th e a rm e d forces a n d th eir allies am o n g scientists, scholars, a n d b u sin essm en . In 1944, for exam ple. Secretary of th e N a v y Jam es Forrestal, a for­ m er W all Street executive, d e te rm in e d th a t "A m erican b u sin e ss [w ould] re­ m ain close to th e Services," fo u n d e d the N a tio n a l Security In d u stria l A ssocia­ tion, w h ile G eneral Electric's C harles W ilson p reach ed "full p re p a re d n e ss" after the w a r b a se d o n a p a rtn e rsh ip of g o v ern m en t, in d u stry , a n d science.29 But th ese view s, confined to a m in o rity of b u sin e ssm e n anyw ay, w ere n o t the stu ff of w a rtim e h ead lin es, a n d th eir p ro p o n e n ts p a id little a tten tio n to th e m acroeconom ic effect of the p o stw a r m ilitary p ro g ra m s th ey sou g h t. In sh o rt, those w o rrie d a b o u t th e p o stw a r eco n o m y p a id little a tte n tio n to sp e n d in g o n n a tio n al security (except to a ssu m e its v irtu a l cessation), w h ile th o se w o rrie d a b o u t n a tio n al secu rity rarely p ro b e d th e econom ics in v o lv ed (except to w o rry a b o u t w h a t m o n ies th ey c o u ld get). Two stream s of w a rtim e im a g in atio n th u s ra n p arallel to b u t largely se p ara te from each other, one striv-

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ing for p o stw a r a b u n d a n c e a n d econom ic security, th e o th er for p o stw a r p o w e r a n d m ilitary security. Efforts to foresee the fu tu re w e re c o m p licated b y a w a rtim e celeb ratio n of "free e n te rp rise " a n d "free science" th a t o b scu red th e lin k ag es fo rm in g a m o n g th e a rm e d forces, b u sin ess, a n d science- In reality, g iv en g o v e rn m e n t's m assiv e sp e n d in g a n d its g u a ra n te e s of c o rp o ra te pro fits, "free e n te rp rise " triu m p h e d o n ly in so far as th e o rg an izin g talen ts of b u sin e ssm e n w ere su b stan tial. W en­ d ell W illkie, for one, c o n d e m n e d " p ro p a g a n d a o n th e p a rt of p o w e rfu l g ro u p s w h o h av e n o t p racticed real e n te rp rise in a g e n eratio n ." M ore p erv asiv e, h o w ­ ever, w a s p raise for " in d iv id u a l in itiativ e a n d free en te rp rise," as o n e co m p a n y p u t it, o r claim s th a t A m ericans w ere fig h tin g a g ain st "b ein g p u s h e d a ro u n d b y so m e b rig h t y o u n g b u re a u c ra t," as R epublic Steel m ain tain ed . " 'If Free E nter­ p rise h a d n o t flo u rish ed h e re ,' The Saturday Evening Post in fo rm ed a n im ag in ­ a ry h o u sew ife in H a m b u rg , 'th e cause of w o rld freed o m m ig h t n o w b e lo st for c en tu ries.' "30 Like p raise for "free science," su c h claim s w ere a d v a n c e d to in ­ flate th e rep u ta tio n s of th e in terests in v o lv ed , to fig h t g o v e rn m e n t restrictio n s o n th e largesse th ey received, a n d to reflect real b u t e x ag g erated differences b e tw e e n th e U n ited States a n d its en em ies in h o w th e y m o b ilized for w ar. W h atev er th e m otives, w a rtim e a d v e rtisin g a n d rh eto ric su sta in e d a n o ld er a n d in creasingly irrelev a n t p a ra d ig m of conflict b e tw e e n n a tio n al g o v e rn m e n t a n d p riv a te in terests a n d m ask ed th e th ick w e b of con n ectio n s b e tw e e n them . D u rin g th e w ar, a n d am o n g m a n y h isto ria n s after it, th e m o st significant stru g g le seem ed to h av e b e e n ov er th e fate of N e w D eal efforts a t social w elfare a n d econom ic regulation. T h at c o n test w a s in d e e d im p o rta n t, sh a rp ly fo u g h t, a n d su b stan tially w o n b y the N e w D eal's o p p o n e n ts, w h o se b itte rn e ss to w a rd FDR scarcely a b ated d u rin g the w ar. R epublicans w ere e m b o ld e n e d b y b ig g ain s in th e 1942 congressional elections, led b y th e in tellig en t co n serv ativ e se n ato r R obert Taft, a n d o ften jo in ed b y S o u th ern D em o crats u p s e t b y th e u r ­ b a n p rio rities a n d racial liberalism of m a n y N e w D ealers— th o se "social gain ers, do -g o o d ers, b lee d in g -h e arts a n d lo n g -h airs," as so u th e rn co n serv a­ tiv es re g a rd e d th em .31 T ogether, these forces scu ttled o r scaled b ack N e w D eal relief agencies, a lth o u g h in su ran ce p ro g ra m s like Social Security re m a in e d in ­ tact. R oosevelt p u t u p little fight, reg a rd in g so m e p ro g ra m s as te m p o ra ry o r m a d e u n n ecessary b y th e w ar, v iew in g v icto ry in w a r as m o re u rg e n t th a n d o ­ m estic legislation, a n d e n v isio n in g n e w initiativ es once th e w a r e n d ed . Lib­ erals, d isillu sio n ed as in 1918 th a t w a r failed to p ro m o te social reform , to o k som e h o p e from th o se initiatives a n d from FD R 's 1944 election v icto ry o v er T hom as D ew ey, w h o p ro m ised to k eep th e w elfare state b u t ru n it better. But the w a rtim e c am p aig n a g ain st th e N e w D eal th re w a sm o k escreen of sym bolic a n tistatism ov er d e ep e n in g g o v e rn m e n t resp o n sib ility for social w el­ fare a n d econom ic prosperity. A lo n g w ith o th e r forces, th a t c am p aig n d id n o t so m u c h d im in ish su c h responsibility as red irect it in to n e w ch an n els carv ed o u t b y th e p ree m in e n t concern w ith n a tio n a l security. T he failure to secure na-

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tio n al h e a lth in su ran ce, a n d the c o n tra stin g success of th e GI Bill for v e te ran s' a ssistan ce— certain ly a w elfare p ro g ram , a n d a n ex p en siv e o n e a t th a t— illu stra te d the shift. So to o d id R oosevelt, as h e c o n tin u e d to lin k a n o ld er lib eralism w ith n a tio n al security. U rg in g a n "econom ic bill of rig h ts" for A m ericans, h e su g g e ste d th a t w a rtim e m o rale a n d efficiency req u ire d n e w fed eral g u a ra n tee s of econom ic security: "O u r fig h tin g m en a b ro a d — a n d th e ir fam ilies a t h o m e — expect su ch a p ro g ra m a n d h a v e th e rig h t to insist u p o n if?" H e also im p lied th a t su c h g u a r­ an te es w o u ld serve A m erica in th e fu tu re, "fo r u n less th ere is secu rity h e re a t h o m e th ere can n o t b e lastin g peace in th e w o rld ." In d ee d , h is u se of "se c u rity " — a reso n an t w o rd for A m erican s in th e w a k e of d e p re ssio n a n d in th e m id s t of w a r— lin k ed its v a rio u s m eanin g s. "T he o n e su p re m e objective for th e fu tu re," h e a n n o u n ce d , is "Security. A n d th a t m ean s n o t o n ly p h y sical secu­ rity . . . from attacks b y aggressors. It m ea n s also econom ic security, social se­ curity, m o ral se cu rity — in a fam ily of N atio n s." H e fo llo w ed a sim ilar line o n specific m easu res like fed eral a id to im p o v e rish ed school districts: " N o th in g c an p ro v id e a stro n g e r b u lw a rk [against w ar] in th e y ears to com e th a n a n e d u ­ cated a n d en lig h ten e d a n d to le ra n t citizenry, e q u ip p e d w ith th e a rm e d force n ecessary to sto p ag g ressio n a n d w a rfare in th is w o rld ." Sim ilarly, h e s u p ­ p o rte d c o m p u lso ry service for y o u n g m e n after th e w a r as sim u lta n eo u sly se rv in g defense, social w elfare, a n d reform , goals lin k ed in h is 1944 cam p aig n rheto ric, in w h ic h FDR c o m p a red the w a r effort to th e N e w D eal ju st as h e h a d e arlier c o m p a red th e N e w D eal to m o b ilizatio n in W orld W ar I. Ju st as A m eri­ can s h a d "joined in a c o m m o n w a r a g ain st econom ic b re a k d o w n a n d d e p re s­ sio n ," th ey n o w "joined in a co m m o n w a r a g ain st th e Fascist ru th lessn ess," FDR p ro claim ed . N e w D eal p ro g ra m s w ere "fortifications . . . b u ilt to p ro tect th e p eo p le." T he "co m in g b a ttle for A m erica a n d for civ ilization" resem b led earlier "b attles a g ain st ty ra n n y [the fascists] a n d reaction [the N e w D eal's foes]." FD R 's rhetoric h a rd ly g a in e d h im all th e leg islatio n h e w a n te d , a n d it so a red above th e possibility of m ilitary -b u sin ess lin k ag es to su sta in p o w e r a n d p ro sp erity , b u t it sh o w e d h o w liberalism w a s d irected in to th e n e w ch an n els of n a tio n a l security.32 In su c h w ay s, th e politics a n d econom ics of w a rtim e m o b ilizatio n stre n g th ­ e n e d th e forces of m ilitarizatio n w ith o u t yet g u a ra n te e in g th e m victory. W ar ta u g h t A m erican s to associate defense sp e n d in g w ith p ro sp erity , e v en if th ey d id n o t th in k m u c h a b o u t h o w th e connectio n m ig h t be su sta in ed , a n d it ta u g h t th e m to reg a rd th e ir in d u stria l a n d technological m u scle as th e key to p ro sp e r­ ity a t h o m e a n d p o w e r ab ro ad , e v en if th ey co u ld n o t an ticip ate h o w m u c h th ey w o u ld flex it. It e n h an c ed th e p o w e r of larg e co rp o ratio n s, acco m m o d ated th e m to n a tio n al g o v ern m en t, a n d en co u rag e d th em to p io n eer a d v an c ed tech­ no lo g ies for m ilitary m arkets, e v en if few b u sin e ssm e n foresaw h o w th e w a r­ tim e b o n a n z a m ig h t be su sta in e d after the w ar. It red irected liberals, a n d key in tellectu al elites like scientists, to w a rd th e n e e d s a n d o p p o rtu n itie s of n a tio n al

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security, e v en if th ey d id n o t a b a n d o n o ld er visions. It co o p ted altern ativ e p o w e r b ases like o rg an ized labor, e v en as w a rtim e p ro sp e rity seem ed to m ak e th e b a rg a in acceptable. A n d am id all those changes, th e d ra m a of o ld er issu es— the d a n g e r of a re tu rn to th e D epression, th e v en erab le stru g g les am o n g capital a n d labor a n d g o v e rn m e n t, a n d th e d e m a n d s of w a r itself— o b scu red th e p ossibility th a t te m p o ra ry chan g es m ig h t b eco m e p e rm a n e n t fix­ tures. U p for election a g ain in 1944, R oosevelt "realized th a t th ere w a s n o m o re effective w a y for h im to ru n th a n ag ain to m ak e th e race a g ain st th e m em o ry of H e rb e rt H o o v er."33 S uch p a rd o n a b le political ex p ed ien cy h a rd ly d irected at­ ten tio n to th e critical changes u n d e rw a y d u rin g th e w ar.

Strategies for World Power Ju st as D. W. B rogan saw th e A m erican w a y of w a r as "m ech an ized like the A m erican farm a n d kitchen," A m erican m ilitary officers b eliev ed th a t "A m eri­ can p olicy is to e x p en d m achines ra th e r th a n m en ." The U n ited States, th e y ar­ g u ed , "m ay w ell h av e altered the d ic tu m to 'g e t th ere fu stest w ith th e m o stest m e n ' to a m ore sensible a n d m ore econom ic— 'g e t th ere last w ith th e m o st m a­ ch in es.' M achines are cheap in A m erica; m en are n o t."34 A m erican strategy, th ey knew , d e riv e d from the n a tio n 's econom ic a n d technological ab u n d an ce. T h at a b u n d a n c e su b stan tially allo w ed it to su b stitu te m ach in es for m en o r to p a y o th ers to fig h t— one reaso n th a t B ritain's losses of life w ere h e av ier p ro p o r­ tional to its p o p u la tio n th a n A m erica's (250,000 a n d n e a rly 300,000 co m b at d eath s, respectively), a n d the Soviet U n io n 's far h e av ier (at least 7 m illio n in com bat). R eliance o n A m erican a b u n d a n c e m a d e sense for sev eral reasons. It w a s p re ­ cisely th a t a b u n d an c e th a t allies, often skeptical a b o u t th e co m b at abilities of A m ericans, m o st w a n te d the U n ited States to p ro v id e. N a tio n s a t w a r u su a lly d ra w o n th eir stre n g th s a n d m in im ize th eir w eak n esses, a n d econom ic a b u n ­ d a n ce w a s A m erica's g reatest a sse t— bom b ers, b attlesh ip s, in fa n try -su p p o rt w eap o n s, ra d a r a n d co de-breaking m achines, p lu s th e in g en u ity a n d in d u stry to p ro d u c e them . It also p o ssessed a tra d itio n of d ra w in g o n th a t a b u n d a n c e — as w ell as o n its im m u n ity from attack a n d allies g en ero u sly e n d o w e d w ith m a n p o w e r— to p rev ail in w arfare. A preference for m ach in es o v e r m en like­ w ise re sp o n d e d to m em ories of the costs of g ro u n d w a rfare d u rin g W orld W ar I a n d to fears am o n g lead ers of h o w w ell A m erican s w o u ld to lerate su ch costs o n th e v a ster scale of W orld W ar II. It also reflected A m erican s' d e ep -ro o ted a n tista tism — it took considerable g o v ern m en tal coercion to tap A m erican a b u n d a n c e a n d conscript m illions of m en, b u t far less th a n if th e A m erican g ro u n d a rm y h a d b o rn e a h e av ier b u rd e n of fighting. R eliance o n A m erican a b u n d a n c e also flow ed from th e p e cu lia r c u rre n ts of A m erican m ilitarization, d o m in a te d as it w a s b y civilian elites a n d th eir values. T hose elites— b u sin essm en , scientists, law yers, econom ists, am o n g o th e rs— n a tu ra lly p rize d the technical, o rg anization al, a n d econom ic skills th ey pos-

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sessed, a n d th ey allied m o st easily w ith technically so p h isticated b ran c h es of th e m ilitary, especially th e A rm y A ir Forces (AAF). Like m o st A m ericans, th ey asso ciated co m b at zeal w ith th e c ru d itie s of m ilitarism , eith er th e atavistic k in d su p p o se d ly d isp la y e d b y su icid al Japanese so ld iers o r th e reg im en ted , to tal­ ita ria n v e rsio n d e m o n stra te d b y th e G erm an a rm e d forces. To A m erican elites, th e n a tio n 's technological v irtu o sity in w a rfare d id n o t seem like m ilitarism a t all: it d e riv e d fro m th e v a lu e s a n d expertise of civilians m o re th a n of m ilitary m en; it m in im iz ed th e sacrifice of A m erican lives; a n d it seem ed to free A m eri­ can s fro m th e b ru ta lity a n d bellicosity w h ic h its enem ies p racticed . A s G eneral E lectric's C harles W ilson a rg u e d , "W e can p o ssess th e m ig h tiest a n d d e ad lie st a rm a m e n t in th e w o rld w ith o u t b eco m in g ag g resso rs in o u r h earts, b ecause w e d o n o t h a v e th e intoxicating lu st for b lo o d w h ic h p erio d ically tran sfo rm s the G e rm a n m ilitary caste."35 A m ericans w ere to w a g e w a r coolly, th eir p a ssio n co n fin ed to th e g rim d e te rm in a tio n to p rev ail a t m in im u m cost. B ut w a r w ith o u t p a ssio n w a s im possible. A m erican w a r m ak in g d isp la y e d a "technological fan aticism "— a zeal to inflict technological d e stru c tio n o n its en em ie s— th a t co n tra sted w ith th e a p p a re n t h u m a n fan aticism of g en o cid al N azis a n d c razed Japanese. By v irtu e of th e ir econom ic a n d technological su p e ­ riority, A m ericans co u ld act o u t w a r's d e stru ctiv e im p u lses w h ile seeing th em ­ selves as different from th e ir enem ies. R arely w itn essin g th e h u m a n costs to the enem y, scientists could p ress n e w technologies o n th e a rm e d forces, air force crew s co u ld incinerate en em y cities, a n d b a ttlesh ip s co u ld p u m m e l Japaneseh e ld islan d s from m iles offshore. T he intricate tech nology of w a r p ro v id e d p h y sical a n d psychic d istan ce from the enem y. A n aircrew felt n o th in g ab o u t w h a t its b o m b s d id , C harles L in d b erg h co n clu d ed from firsth a n d experience in th e Pacific: "It is like listen in g to a rad io acco u n t of a b a ttle o n th e o th er side of th e earth. It is too far aw ay, too se p a ra te d to h o ld reality." T he e u p h em istic lan ­ g u ag e of technological w a r increased th e distance. T he d e stru c tio n of Japanese cities w a s only "p in -p o in t, in cen d iary b o m b in g ," th eir civilians sim p ly "d eh o u se d " a n d th e atom ic b o m b d ro p p e d n o t o n a city b u t o n "a m ilitary base," acco rd ing to P re sid e n t H a rry T rum an. The n a tu re of a ir p o w e r a g g ra v ate d b o th its d estru ctiv en ess a n d indifference to it. W hile th e g ain s m a d e b y arm ies a n d nav ies w ere easily m ea su ra b le (territo ry co n q u ered , sh ip s sunk), th e resu lts of b o m b in g w ere so h a rd to calculate th a t the A A F ro u tin ely ju d g e d th e effort m a d e — th e n u m b e r of sorties ru n o r bo m b s d ro p p e d , o r w h a t its o w n h isto ­ rian s called the "n u m b e rs ra c k e t"— ra th e r th a n th e effect ach iev ed .36 Technological w arfare, then, d id n o t so m u ch lim it A m erican fu ry as p ro v id e a n e w c o n d u it for it, p a rticu la rly for the racial p assio n s th a t e ru p te d in th e Pa­ cific w ar. It also allo w ed th e g ro w th of A m erican m ilitary p o w e r to p ro ceed w ith A m ericans d istin g u ish in g them selves from th eir m ilitarist en em ies a n d d isg u isin g th eir o w n visceral attractions to d estru ctio n . A n d for A m ericans alone, the attractio n s of technological w arfare w ere n o t ch allen g ed b y b ein g o n th e receiving e n d of it. C ertainly, too m u ch can b e m a d e of these distinctions. The w a r w as a h ig h ly

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technological stru g g le for all co m b atan ts, w h e th e r th e G erm an s w h o fired rockets a t L o n d o n o r the Soviets w h o shelled m u c h of B erlin in to rubble, ju st as it w a s b ru tal for all th o se w h o h a d to fight, in clu d in g A m ericans. H o m efro n t k n o w led g e of w a r 's h o rro rs h a rd ly p re v e n te d R ussians, British, G erm an s, a n d o th ers from m etin g th em o u t to enem ies. E u p h em ism s w ere so m etim es recog­ n ize d as such; th ey co u ld n o t alw ay s p ro tec t th e scientist w ith m o ral q u a lm s o r th e g en eral facing a difficult decision, m u c h less th e aircrew sh o t u p b y th e e n ­ em y o r the in fan try m a n in com bat. M oreover, econom ic a n d technological p ro w e ss sim p ly m a d e v icto ry p o s­ sible; only strateg y a n d co m b at could m ake it h a p p e n . A b u n d a n ce p ro v id e d o p tions; lead ers still h a d to sift a n d im p le m e n t them . B etw een 1940 a n d 1943, A m erican strateg ists d e cid ed h o w to d o so. T hey p laced first p rio rity o n d efeat­ in g G erm an y as the m o re fo rm id ab le foe. In line w ith a g e n eratio n 's faith in strategic bom bing, th ey e m p h a size d its u se a g ain st en em y factories, cities, a n d lines of su p p ly , in concert w ith econom ic stra n g u la tio n b y A ng lo -A m erican n a ­ v al pow er. H e d g in g th e ir bets, h ow ever, th ey also p re p a re d a larg e arm y, itself fo rm id ab ly e q u ip p e d for technological w ar, to in v a d e th e en em ies' h o m elan d s. In se ttin g a n d follow ing this course, A m erican strateg ists a n d so ld iers w ere largely eq u al to. th e ta sk — victory o v er Jap an w ith o u t in v asio n c a p p e d th eir success— b u t n o t before m eetin g fo rm id ab le obstacles. T he first of th o se arose w h e n A m ericans h a d to fight before th ey h a d fully m o b ilize d — less a p ro b lem in th e w a r a g ain st G erm an y a n d Italy, w h ere allies co u ld sh o u ld e r th e b u rd e n u n til A m erican forces w e re ready, th a n in th e Pacific, so m u c h a n A m erican w ar. Im p o sin g geo g rap h ic a n d strategic b a rrie rs also d e la y ed th e effort to b rin g A m erican technological su p e rio rity to bear: far-aw ay en em ies co u ld n o t b e b lo ck ad ed u n til th eir n a v al forces w ere su b d u e d , n o r b o m b e d u n til b ases n e a r th em w ere secured. H ere, too, the Pacific w ar, w ith its v a st d istan ces a n d its islan d o u tp o sts te n a ­ ciously d e fe n d e d b y the Japanese, often p re se n te d th e g rea ter challenge, one p o o rly an ticip ated because A m ericans h a d u n d e rra te d Ja p an 's m ilitary pro w ess. A m erican forces ap p ro a ch e d Jap an alo n g tw o lines: one cam p aig n , d o m in a te d b y the A m erican a rm y (w ith A u stra lia n h elp) a n d G en. D o u g las M acA rthur, p u sh e d n o rth w a rd from th e Solom ons a n d clim axed w ith th e in v a ­ sio n of the P h ilip p in es in 1944; the other, m o re a n a v al o p e ra tio n c o m m an d e d b y A dm . C hester N im itz, p ro ce ed e d w e stw a rd across th e cen tral Pacific th ro u g h T araw a, th e M arshalls, a n d the M arian as Islan d s, from w h ic h A m eri­ can B-29 bo m b ers co u ld strike Jap an itself (an effort to b o m b Jap an from C hi­ n ese b ases p ro v e d a logistical nightm are). E ven th o u g h som e Jap an ese-h eld is­ lan d s w ere b y p a sse d (critics a rg u e d th a t m ore co u ld h av e been), th e fig h tin g o n those in v a d e d w a s p e rh a p s th e m o st b ru tal of th e w a r for A m erican soldiers. In co n trast, from the sta rt G reat B ritain p ro v id e d air b ases (as w ell as its o w n h u g e B om ber C o m m an d ) for th e b o m b in g of co n tin en tal E urope, as so o n d id recon­ q u e re d N o rth A frica a n d so u th e rn Italy, a lth o u g h G e rm a n forces cau sed h o rri-

TRIUMPH,

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b le losses a m o n g A llied b o m b er crew s (British B om ber C o m m a n d lo st n early 50,000 m en), w h ic h g a in e d su p e rio rity a n d decisive resu lts o n ly in 1944. C onflicts am o n g th e A llies also sh a p e d strategy. A ll w a n te d to h a rn e ss A m erican a b u n d an c e, b u t th ey differed o v er h o w to ta p it a n d h o w m u c h to c o u n t o n it. Stalin b e littled th e A nglo-A m erican b o m b in g of G erm an y a n d in ­ v asio n s of N o rth A frica a n d Italy as p o o r su b stitu tes for a real seco n d fro n t— a n in v asio n of France a n d G e rm a n y — th a t w o u ld lo w er th e Soviet U n io n 's h o rri­ ble b u rd e n s in fig h tin g th e b u lk of G erm an forces. B ritish lead ers like C h u rch ill a b h o rre d th e costs of su c h a n invasion, p refe rrin g actio n in th e M ed iterran ean , w h e re B ritish in terests w ere large. G enerals E isen h o w er a n d M arsh all ap p reci­ a te d S talin's n eed s, d o u b te d th a t b o m b in g alone c o u ld d e fe at G erm any, a n d d isp u te d th e v a lu e of in v a d in g N o rth A frica a n d Italy (w here, d e sp ite Italy 's su rre n d e r a n d M u sso lin i's overthrow , a costly a n d larg ely p o in tless A llied c a m p a ig n d ra g g e d o n u n til 1945 th an k s to to u g h G e rm a n resistance). But th ey h e sita te d to in v a d e France u n til A m erican forces w ere fu lly m o b ilized a n d co m b at-tested. T h at cam e only in June 1944, carried o u t u n d e r E isen h o w er's c o m m an d b y B ritish, A m erican, C a n ad ian , Free French, a n d o th e r forces. The w a r a g ain st Ja p an p ro v o k ed less inter-A llied conflict, if o n ly b ecau se it w a s su c h a n A m erican effort. C onflict w ith in th e A m erican a rm e d forces, h o w ev er, w a s en d em ic re g a rd ­ in g b o th th eaters. A t stake w ere differing strategic visions, th e con tro l of w a r­ tim e resources, b ra g g in g rig h ts to victory, a n d in tu rn claim s o n p o stw a r b u d ­ g ets a n d statu s. FD R p ro v id e d som e g u id an ce, p a rticu la rly in g o a d in g A m erican c o m m an d e rs to b o m b Japan, b u t th e p rin cip al m ech an ism for resolv­ in g in tra m ilita ry conflict, the n e w Joint C hiefs of Staff, w a s c o m m itted to w o rk ­ in g b y c o n sen su s a n d o n ly cautiously reso lv ed its differences. T he A A F re­ se n te d still b e in g su b o rd in a te to th e a rm y a n d called o n to su p p o rt g ro u n d a n d n a v al c am p aig n s, d e e p ly b elieving its b o m b ers co u ld w in th e w a r if g iv en th e chance. T he n a v y ju st as a d a m a n tly m a in ta in e d th e v irtu e s of sea p o w er. In the Pacific, M a cA rth u r— "th e m o st p o m p o u s, g ran d io se, a n d m en d acio u s A m eri­ can c o m m a n d e r in W orld W ar II," a n d a th re a t to FDR as a p o ssib le c an d id ate for th e p resid en c y — p u rs u e d th e a rm y 's v isio n (at least h is v e rsio n of it) of vic­ tory. For g o o d reason, c o n tem p o raries a n d h isto ria n s h av e d escrib ed th e w a r am o n g th e A m erican a rm e d services as o ften m o re fierce th a n th e w a r ag ain st th e enem y. M arshall, th e a rm e d forces' p re e m in e n t stra te g ist a n d politician, h e lp e d to co m p ro m ise su c h conflicts. So, too, d id sh eer A m erican a b u n d an c e b y 1944, w h ic h allo w ed a re d u n d a n t stra te g y w h e reb y each service co u ld p u r­ su e its favored course. W asteful in m a n y w a y s— n ecessitatin g tw o ro u tes to Ja­ p a n in stea d of one a n d com pelling b o m b ers to b last factories th a t b lo ck ad e h a d a lread y c rip p le d — su c h red u n d a n cy , in line w ith a n A m erican tra d itio n of "strateg ies of an n ih ilatio n ," d id h av e th e strategic m erit of b rin g in g all forces to b e ar o n th e enem y.37 Political objectives also p re se n te d obstacles to stra te g y — o r m ore accurately

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sh a p e d it, since n o strateg y m a d e sense th a t d id n o t m eet su c h objectives. O ne objective w a s u n co n tro v ersial am o n g m o st A m erican s— th e "u n co n d itio n al su rre n d e r" of G erm an y a n d Japan. O th ers w ere m o re p roblem atic. It w a s one th in g , for exam ple, to h av e the Soviets b e a r th e b ru n t of th e w a r a g ain st G er­ m any, q u ite a n o th e r to let th em m ove too far in to C en tral E u ro p e in th e process. T h at p ro sp e ct a d d e d a n o th e r reaso n for the in v asio n of France a n d G e rm a n y b y th e W estern A llies a n d p ro v o k ed bick erin g am o n g A n g lo -A m erican lead ers a b o u t w h e th e r to co n q u er Berlin before th e Soviets d id (the costs of su c h a n o p eratio n , am o n g o th e r things, d issu a d e d E isen h o w er from th e attem p t). Polit­ ical objectives also led the U n ited States into a h a p le ss effort to assist C h in a in th e w a r a g ain st Jap an a n d allo w ed M acA rth u r to p rev a il in h is d e te rm in a tio n to liberate th e P h ilip p in es ev en th o u g h m a n y strateg ists d o u b te d th eir im p o r­ tance in th e w ar. P erh ap s m o st im p o rtan t, stra te g y w a s sh a p e d b y preferences e v id e n t in political culture. A m ericans' in d ig n a tio n o v e r Pearl H a rb o r a n d ra ­ cial fu ry to w a rd th e Japanese e ro d e d the E u ro p e-first stra te g y a n d h e lp e d sanc­ tio n th e final o n sla u g h t o n Japan, the firebo m b in g a n d atom ic b o m b in g of its cities in 1945. A lth o u g h n o t u n co m fo rtab le w ith su c h p references, R oosevelt a n d his m ilitary lea d ers som etim es felt h e m m e d in b y them . Finally, g ra n d strateg y w as com plicated b y o p e ra tio n a l obstacles w h ic h A m erican leaders, tru stin g th eir n a tio n 's technological p ro w ess, o ften u n d e r­ rated . T hey m isju d g ed h o w w ell strategic b o m b in g forces c o u ld assess, locate, a n d h it critical targ ets ("W e m a d e a m ajor a ssa u lt o n G e rm a n a g ric u ltu re" w a s th e w ry co m m en t of one b o m b er crew ), a n d th ey d isc o u n te d th e e n e m y 's abil­ ity to w ith sta n d su c h attack. T hey o v e rra ted th e ability of b o m b ers to strik e e n ­ em y forces close to A llied lines in France— tw o d isa stro u s attack s in Ju ly 1944 killed o r w o u n d e d h u n d re d s of A m erican s— a n d th e cap acity of n av al fire­ p o w e r to p u lv erize Japanese forces in th eir islan d o u tp o sts ("M aybe w e 'll w a lk ashore," one colonel m u se d before th e in v asio n of T araw a).38 Such m isju d g m e n ts p a le d in co m p a riso n to th o se m a d e b y th e enem y, h o w ­ ever, a n d b y 1943, A llied forces w ere o n the offensive in b o th theaters. By th e e n d of 1944, E isen h o w er's forces w ere n e a rin g G e rm a n y 's w e ste rn b o rd e rs as Soviet forces sw e p t e astw a rd , a n d o th er A m erican forces w ere b o m b in g Ja­ p a n 's cities a n d c rip p lin g its econom y th ro u g h a rem ark ab le su b m a rin e cam ­ paig n . By then, too, A m erican scientists w ere n early su re th a t atom ic b o m b s w o u ld b e rea d y w ith in several m o n th s. A llied u n ity seem ed to p e a k ju st w h e n th e w a r effort d id , as conferences of C hurchill, FDR, a n d Stalin a t T eh ran (N o­ v em b er 1943) a n d Yalta (F ebruary 1945) attested . By 1944, too, A m erican p la n n in g for the p o stw a r era w as in full sw ing. For d ecad es after 1945, m an y h isto rian s. C old W arriors, a n d R oosevelt-haters ar­ g u e d th a t the ad m in istratio n , fixated o n victo ry a n d o b livious to A m erican in ­ terests a n d Soviet intentions, failed in su ch p lan n in g . But th eir ch arg es w ere essen tially w ro n g , in sp ired b y fru stratio n th a t A m erica's p re e m in e n t p o w e r h a d failed to secure all its am bitions after W orld W ar II. G ran ted , w a rtim e p lan -

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“Corne on in, Vil treat you right. I used to know your Daddy." Fig. 1. At the start of their age of militarization, most Americans understood war as an external force bearing down on them. This 1937 Pulitzer Prize-winning cartoon by C. D. Batchelor indicated their anxiety that another European war might erupt and draw them in. Showing war as a diseased whore luring men to their death, it also revealed the strikingly— sometimes maliciously— gendered ways in which war was often portrayed in m odem American culture. (Reprinted by permission of Tribune Media Services)

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A# spring fallows winter, so fmmw **sii retttf«, »How*«g the work! to resume it» progress to Iteiter ways o f doing things. Far* sigh tesi men are thinking o f the future, keeping tomorrow in mimi tk tfe à è i g today's urgent task. Today we of Keasbey & Matti* mm wtlliitgfy give preei^hmec to ♦*rdcr* from defense industries, as vo*t wmild have os do. Onr piatita are running day and night, we are enlarging our working forre and adding to our machine capacity. liven so we are finding it diibridi at the present time to

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deliver some products to many of our customers. But, like you, w e are keeping one eye ou the future. When normal times return . . . when we are able to ship you everything you want, when y ou w ant i t . . . we expect to have found ways of doing things better, offering von asbestos prod* wets that wilt last longer, prove more economical atei serve your purposes better.

some specific problem that could he overcome by a new applica lion of asbestos ? We w ill give thor­ ough consideration to any sugges­ tion, in the hope that it will prove to be practical from a manufac­ turing standpoint. We’d greatly appreciate a letter from you.

* * * Amure made axftestm; Keuxbey & Matti »on ha» made it sen»* m an kin d. . . since 1873.

To that end, we need your help now. Can you, who use asbestos materials, give us some ideas for tomorrow ? Have you encountered

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Fig. 2. Appearing in the Dec. 8,1941, issue of Newsweek— one day after the Pearl Harbor attack— this corporate advertisement offered a simple visual statement of war as an external force that Americans were loathe to engage, rendering it as a set of menacing shadows hovering over a scene of domestic tranquility.

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CONSOLIDATED VULTEE AIRCRAFT Fig. 3. Wartime culture was rife with images of "a world shrunk so small" by technology, as this corporate advertisement in Life (Sept. 6,1943) put it, that there "can be no such thing as a hermit nation." Also common was the promise, as the ad continues, that wartime technology would yield postwar peace and bounty, with aviation "welding the peoples of the earth together in friendly trade and intercourse and mutual understanding." (Reprinted by permission; all rights reserved)

“Today Philco research is w o rk in g for v ic to r y , h elp in g to s p e e d th e a d v a n c e o f electron ic scien ce th r o u g h t h e r a d io m ir a c le s o f m o d ern co m b a t in th e air.



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Fig. 4. Wartime culture— corporate advertising in particular— promised that military inventions would yield postwar technological plenty, a promise that persisted largely unchallenged into the 1960s and reemerged in the 1980s. (Life, May 14,1944.; PHILCO is a registered trademark of Philips Electronics North America Corporation)

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Fig. 5. War suspended or altered existing restrictions on erotic images. Although perhaps not a conscious depiction of same-sex eroticism, this advertisement (Life, Aug. 16,1943) celebrated the joys and demands of an all-male military environ­ ment. While Cannon noted that Life's readers "might not enjoy the bathing facil­ ities of our boys in the service," the boys depicted seemed to be doing so. (By permission of Cannon Towels, a division of Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc.)

Fig. 6. This typical government poster caught several themes in wartime culture: the assurance of technological triumph through American air power, the sense of the enemy's bestial nature, and the belief that subhuman enemies deserved vindictive destruction. (Courtesy National Archives, Still Picture Branch, 44PA-978)

Fig. 7. World War II widened the opportunities for favorable depictions of African-Americans, as in this U.S. government poster of boxer Joe Louis in uniform, in a notably manly and aggressive pose. But the poster's caption also implied that blacks were to subordinate their interests to the grander cause of national safety and moral righteousness, and wartime culture rarely depicted blacks and whites serving together on an equal basis. (Courtesy George Roeder and National Archives, Still Picture Branch, 44-PA-87)

Fig. 8. One of the most enduring images of World War II— and adapted to count­ less political purposes after it—Joe Rosenthal's photograph of this semistaged scene on Iwo Jima in February 1945 was also a reassuring image, meshing indi­ vidual effort with collective will, excluding war's grislier aspects, reaffirming classical poses of heroism, and celebrating American victory. (Courtesy George Roeder and National Archives, Still Picture Branch, (W&C, no. 1221)

Fig. 9. As illustrated for Life (Aug. 20,1945), the destruction wrought on Hiro­ shima by the atomic attack was invisible beneath the explosion's giant cloud— a depiction that celebrated Americans' military might while obscuring its conse­ quences. At the war's end, as at its start, war for most Americans remained quite literally a shadowy phenomenon, its substance hard to grasp. (Rendering by A. Leydenfrost for Life magazine)

TRIUMPH,

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85

n in g for th e p o stw a r w a s chaotic, d e p riv e d of FD R 's close atten tio n , a n d u n ­ ev en ly a rticu la te d to th e A m erican p eo p le, b u t it h a rd ly lacked co n ten t a n d p u rp o sefu ln ess. It w a s sh a p e d in p a rt b y the v iew of recen t h isto ry n o w p rev a ilin g a m o n g A m erican leaders. In th a t view , th e calam ities of econom ic d e p re ssio n a n d w o rld w a r h a d b e en avoidable, cau sed b y th e ab d icatio n of lea d ersh ip b y th e U n ited States a n d b y the failures of th e w o rld 's dem ocracies. T he v icto rio u s p o w e rs of W orld W ar I, in this read in g , im p o sed a p u n itiv e peace th a t p o iso n e d G e rm a n politics, d is ru p te d th e global econom y, a n d h e lp e d to u sh e r in a global d ep ressio n , w h ich in tu rn b re d th e c o n d itio n s th a t d ictato rs exploited. T hey sq u a n d e re d th e chance to u se th e L eague of N atio n s to control econom ic chaos a n d m ilita ry aggression, in p a rt because the U n ited States h a d refu sed to jo in it. In ste ad , th e W estern dem ocracies trie d policies of a p p ea sem e n t, d isa rm a m e n t, a n d isolationism th a t e m b o ld en e d the ag g resso rs— " a n in v itatio n to M ussolini, H itle r a n d th e Japanese w a r lo rd s to ru n the w o rld ," according to N av y Secre­ tary F orrestal in 1944.39 A n d th ey failed to g ra sp th e d a n g e rs p o se d b y n e w technologies a n d ideologies o p e ra tin g in a closed w o rld system . For m an y A m ericans, th e V ersailles T reaty e n d in g W orld W ar I sy m b o lized th e sta rt of these follies, M unich th eir apogee. Pearl H a rb o r th e ir co n seq u en ces for A m eri­ cans, a n d G erm an V-2 rockets th e fu tu re th a t su ch foolishness co u ld b ring. Soon H iro sh im a a n d the H o lo cau st w o u ld jo in th e litan y of sym bols. It w a s a strik in g ly d a rk a n d self-castigating v iew of th e p a s t for a triu m p h a n t n a tio n to ad o p t. It w a s a p a st th a t m u s t n o t a n d n e e d n o t b e rep e ate d , A m erican s w ere told. N o w lo o m ed a "second chance" for th e m to lead th e w o rld . T his e m p h a sis o n a seco n d chance ob scu red a n y A m erican d riv e for p o w er. A m erican s w ere, it seem ed, looking b ack w ard m ore th a n fo rw ard , a to n in g for sin s of th e p a st m o re th a n seeking d o m in a tio n of th e future. Ju st as th ey saw w a r as forced u p o n th e m in 1941 b y aggressors (em b o ld en ed b y th e d em ocracies' w eakness), so th ey n o w saw p o stw a r p o w e r a n d respon sib ility as sim p le necessities. If a m ea su re of A m erican d o m in a tio n en su ed , it in v o lv ed n o lu st for p o w e r a n d w o u ld b e w elcom ed b y all n a tio n s seeking lib eratio n from th e tra u m a s of d e ­ p ressio n a n d w ar. "N o one charges u s w ith w a n tin g a n y th in g of a n y b o d y else's," M arsh all asserted , a n d "n o one is fearful of o u r m isu se" of m ilitary p o w er.40 Several versions of second-chance th in k in g e m e rg ed am o n g elites, in clu d in g p la n s for a n e w w o rld o rg an iz atio n to p ro m o te econom ic recovery a n d collec­ tive security, a n d u n ila tera l efforts to p ro m o te global cap italism u n d e r A m eri­ can auspices. A m o n g these versions, h ow ev er, th e id eo lo g y of n a tio n al p re ­ p a re d n e ss w a s especially influential. B rogan n o ticed th a t "A m erican s h av e lo n g b e en accustom ed to jest a t [their] re p e ate d state of m ilitary n ak ed n ess. 'G o d looks after children, d ru n k a rd s , a n d the U n ited States.' " T hose d a y s n o w seem ed gone. A s W alter L ip p m an n p u t it, A m erican s "h av e com e to th e e n d of

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o u r effortless secu rity " (and of "lim itless o p p o rtu n itie s," h e a d d ed ). A d vocates of p re p a re d n e ss stressed th e political a n d technological im p e rativ es for replac­ in g indifference to m ilitary p o w e r w ith a n e w "sta te of m in d , so firm ly im b e d ­ d e d in o u r so u ls as to becom e a n invincible p h ilo so p h y ," as o n e scien tist said. F u tu re ag g resso rs w o u ld only b e d e te rre d b y m ilitary force. A s o n e a d m ira l p u t th e co m m onplace a rg u m e n t, if th e U n ited States h a d sh o w n its m ilita ry m ig h t "before, and not after, a series of M u n ich c o n fe re n c e s,. . . th e p e rso n a l fo llow ing of a n y fu tu re H itle r w o u ld b e lim ited to a few w o u ld -b e su icid es." P re p a ra tio n to d e te r o r w a g e w a r c o u ld n o t a g ain a w ait th e o n se t of a crisis, n o t for "a n a tio n g ro w n so large in a w o rld th a t h a s sh ru n k so sm all," n o t for a n age w h e n a n en em y could strike w ith "a s u d d e n d e v asta tio n b e y o n d a n y 'P earl H a rb o r' ex­ p erien ce o r o u r p re se n t p o w e r of im a g in atio n to conceive." For th o se aw are of th e atom ic b o m b project, p e ril lo o m ed e v en larger: "E v ery cen ter of th e p o p u la ­ tio n in the w o rld in th e fu tu re is at the m ercy of th e e n em y th a t strik es first," a d v ise d the scientist V annevar Bush. A d v an cin g su c h a rg u m e n ts, ad v o cates of p re p a re d n e ss codified a n d projected fo rw a rd th e n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n a l secu rity o u tlin e d o n th e eve of W orld W ar H.41 T he v a rio u s stra n d s of second-chance th in k in g co u ld b e h a rm o n iz e d in so m e w ay s. A dvocates of p re p a re d n e ss a rg u e d th a t A m erican forces m ig h t serv e in a U n ited N atio n s "In tern a tio n al Police Force," a n d som e p ro p o n e n ts of a n "o p en -d o o r" w o rld econom y ap p re cia te d th e m ilitary fo u n d a tio n s o n w h ic h it m ig h t rest. T here w ere n o n eth eless im p o rta n t ten sio n s a m o n g these sch em es— w o u ld p o w e rfu l A m erican a rm e d forces, critics a sk ed , ala rm o th e r co u n tries a n d u n d e rc u t the n e w U n ited N ations? T here w ere also tensions am o n g th o se p reach in g p re p a re d n e ss. Each m ili­ ta ry service p red ictab ly favored its o w n k in d of m ilitary p o w er. Fueling th e ten ­ sions w a s the services' b itte r stru g g le ov er w h e th e r th ey sh o u ld b e jo in ed in a single d e p a rtm e n t of defense, a goal u n d e rlin e d for m a n y A m erican s b y Pearl H arb o r, a n d th eir u n se em ly scram ble to lay claim to p o stw a r b u d g e ts. The q u a rre lin g services co m p ro m ised som e differences— th e a rm y 's M arsh all a g reed th a t "A ir P ow er w ill b e th e q uick rem e d y " for fu tu re aggression, all g ave lip service to u n iv ersal m ilitary train in g , a n d all so u g h t a m u c h larg er peacetim e estab lish m en t a n d tig h te r linkag es am o n g its m ilitary a n d civilian com p o nents. The air force, ho w ev er, g ain ed th e u p p e r h a n d in th is stru g g le. It ex ag g erated its role in victory, p ro m ise d m ax im u m p o w e r at m in im u m cost, a n d ta p p e d d e e p cu rre n ts of technological an x iety a n d o p tim ism . A erial tech­ n o lo g y loom ed as the u ltim ate source of b o th d a n g e r a n d d eliv eran ce for th e U n ited States. In the w ro n g h a n d s, it w o u ld leave th e n a tio n n a k e d to to tal d e ­ struction. In A m erican h a n d s, it m ig h t m ake p o ssible a Pax A ero n au tica for the w o rld . "The p eo p le are sold o n peace th ro u g h air p o w e r," Fortune co n clu d ed in Ju n e 1945.42 For his p a rt, R oosevelt seem ed to gloss ov er th e ten sio n s, h is v a g u en e ss cal­ cu lated to satisfy conflicting interests at h o m e a n d to h e d g e h is b ets in a n uncer-

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ta in w o rld . T h u s h e gave stu rd y s u p p o rt to th e n e w U n ited N a tio n s b u t sh ra n k fro m eg alitarian d e sig n s for it, h a p p y to see it d o m in a te d b y th e "F o u r P o licem en "— Britain, th e Soviet U nion, C hin a, a n d a U n ited States retain in g m ilita ry suprem acy. T h o u g h in atten tiv e to th e intricacies of p o stw a r m ilitary p la n n in g , h e s u p p o rte d its essentials, in clu d in g c o o p eratio n a m o n g m ilitary, in d u stria l, a n d scientific in stitu tio n s a n d rete n tio n of o v erseas b ases from w h ic h A m erican air forces co u ld o p e ra te globally. A bove all, h is atom ic policy, h o w e v e r d e v io u s a n d inconsistent, sh o w ed h is d e te rm in a tio n to m a in tain A m erican p o w e r w ith o u t ru lin g o u t loftier possibilities. H e in d ic ate d h is w ill­ in g n ess to use atom ic b o m b s a g ain st Jap an a n d h is in terest in w o rk in g w ith the Soviets a n d o th er p o w e rs to control th e n e w w e ap o n , b u t h e also d e cid ed to m a in ta in a n A nglo -A m erican m o n o p o ly o n atom ic w e a p o n s (an d A m erican d o m in a n ce of th a t p artn ersh ip ). H e u n d e rs to o d b o th th e com m ercial p o ten tial of ato m ic en erg y a n d its d ip lo m atic p o ten tial as a c o u n te rw e ig h t to Soviet p o w e r o r o th er threats. H e, too, h a d d ra w n th e fam iliar lesso n " th a t if w e d o n o t p u ll th e fangs of the p re d a to ry an im als of th is w o rld , th ey w ill m u ltip ly a n d g ro w in stre n g th — a n d th ey w ill b e at o u r th ro ats once m o re in a sh o rt g e n era ­ t i o n . '^ N u m e ro u s sources of friction a n d u n c ertain ty co m p licated an y effort to act o n th a t lesson. A nglo-A m erican relations d u rin g th e w a r w ere o ften fractious, for exam ple, w ith so m e A m ericans b o th a la rm e d at th e d eclin e of B ritish p o w e r a n d a n g ry a t th e B ritish for exercising w h a t rem a in e d of it. B ritish d eclin e w a s a t least ro u g h ly calculable. Far h a rd e r to p re d ic t w ere th e fo rtu n es of th a t v a st "T h ird W orld" (as it cam e to b e called), w h e re p o w e rfu l m o v em en ts so u g h t to o v e rth ro w im p e ria l ru le b y E u ro p ea n o v erseers o r b y Japan, o r to challenge less fo rm al W estern d o m in a tio n , in clu d in g th a t b y th e U n ited States. R eg ard in g th a t v ast, u n se ttle d aren a, A m erican lead ers d isp la y e d a certain sy m p a th y for th e forces of d ecolonization, a d e cid ed reluctan ce to give th e m a tte r h ig h p rio r­ ity, a n d a d istin ct am bivalence a b o u t w h e th e r d eco lo n izatio n w o u ld really w o rk to A m erican interests. Such p ro b lem s c o u ld n o t b e d iv o rced from th e tan g le of q u estio n s a b o u t So­ v iet intentions. B ritish leaders, for exam ple, h a d so m etim es b e e n w illin g d u r ­ in g th e w a r to acco m m o d ate Soviet p o w e r in E astern E urope, to th e c o n stern a­ tio n of A m erican d ip lo m ats. Soviet lead ers h a d lo n g sh o w ere d rh etorical su p p o rt, if less practical assistance, o n rev o lu tio n ary forces in th e colonial w o rld . T he w a r h a d d o n e little to abate A m erican d istru st of M oscow , ev en th o u g h political rhetoric a n d p o p u la r c u ltu re celeb rated th e Soviet U n io n as a n ally in the antifascist struggle. W artim e sy m p a th y for th e Soviets b arely ob­ scu red th e friction b e tw e e n Soviet a n d A m erican lead ers o v er strategy, o v er Stalin's policy as h is arm ies sw e p t th ro u g h E astern E urope, o v er Soviet esp io ­ n ag e (in A m erica's M a n h a tta n Project, for exam ple), a n d o v er th e d a ily g rin d of d ip lo m atic contact, w h ic h led d ip lo m a ts like G eorge K en n an to d e p lo re th e So­ viets' d u p lic ito u s w ays.

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Yet as the w a r d re w to a close, u n c ertain ty a b o u t Soviet in te n tio n s g o v e rn e d A m erican p la n n in g m o re th a n a fixed convictio n of th eir d an g er. T h at convic­ tio n g rip p e d som e factions in th e State D e p a rtm e n t a n d o th e r co n serv ativ es lo n g h o rrified b y co m m u n ist ideology a n d Soviet am b itio n s, b u t it h a d less of a h o ld o n the a rm e d forces' u n ifo rm e d a n d civilian lead ers (excepting N a v y Sec­ retary Forrestal). M any m ilitary lead ers h a d fo u n d th e ir Soviet c o u n te rp a rts m o re co operative th a n A m erican d ip lo m a ts h a d ; m a n y a p p re cia te d h o w th e sav ag e w a r w o u ld leave th e Soviet U n io n p reo c cu p ie d w ith its in te rn a l reco n ­ struction; som e h a d confidence in A m erican p o w e r to p rev a il an y w ay ; few a n ­ ticip ated a p ro tra c te d A m erican m ilitary presen ce, ex cep t p e rh a p s th ro u g h air p o w er, in E u rope after th e w ar. In th e ran k s as w ell, sim ilar a ttitu d e s m ay h av e p revailed: w ritin g in 1944, D ixon W ecter w a s aw are of Soviet-A m erican te n ­ sions a n d of the p o ten tial for "so m e k in d of R ed Scare" after th e w ar, b u t fo u n d th e A m erican G I "m o re likely to look to w a rd o u r p re se n t en em ies for th e n ex t w a r."44 C ertain ty a b o u t a Soviet th re a t w a s n o t necessary, h o w ev er, to m ak e th e case for p o stw a r p rep a red n e ss, for th a t case rested o n p ro p o sitio n s far b ro a d e r th a n an y th re a t from one pow er. T he w o rld rev o lu tio n in tech n o lo g y a n d p o litics a n d th e p e rm a n e n t d a n g e r it offered to A m erican secu rity seem ed sufficient alone to com pel p rep ared n ess. L ater p ro o f (as A m erican s saw it) of M o sco w 's h eg em onic d esig n s serv ed only to confirm th a t a rg u m e n t. P u t differently: a "cold w a r" m entality, c o n stru cted o u t of th e ex p erien ce of d e p re ssio n a n d w o rld w ar, p rec ed e d the C o ld W ar itself w ith th e Soviet U nion, a n d to a d eg ree it d efin ed h o w A m ericans cam e to u n d e rs ta n d th e Soviet th reat. T h at m en tality ex tra p o la ted the recent p a st in to th e future: a n o th e r H itle r le a d ­ in g a n o th e r to ta litaria n n a tio n m ig h t th rea te n a n ew ly v u ln era b le A m erica a n d cause a n o th e r w o rld w a r (no o th er k in d seem ed im aginable), a n d to sto p th a t th re a t req u ire d possessio n of the m ilitary p o w e r th a t co u ld h av e d e te rre d H itler a n d d id finally d e fe at him . T h at o u tlo o k also e x tra p o la ted cu rre n tly p re ­ d o m in a n t form s of technological pow er, especially av iatio n , in to th e future. A s w ith o th er d im e n sio n s of w a rtim e experience, th e effort to scrip t a fu tu re b a sed o n recent experience w a s still co n tin g en t a t th e w a r 's close a n d c lo u d e d b y old labels a n d issues. Just as R oosevelt ra n a g ain st H o o v er in th e 1944 cam ­ p aig n , politicians still d e b a te d the evils of "iso latio n ism ," th e d e sig n for th e U n ited N atio n s to replace th e old L eague of N atio n s, o r th e term s for u n ify in g th e a rm e d forces. M ilitarization p ro ceed ed , o b scu red b y th a t b ell-cu rv e m o d el of h isto ry in w h ich a re tu rn to p a st evils seem ed m o re likely th a n e n try in to a decisively n e w age.

Perceptions off War A s D ixon W ecter said in 1944, "T he consequ en ces of a n y b ig w a r sp re a d in cir­ cles to infinity."45 Soon, ig n o rin g th a t tru ism , m o st A m erican s rem e m b e red th e

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w a r as in v o lv in g a n alm o st u n iv ersal experience of u n ity a n d co m m o n p u r­ pose. L ater, critics assailed th a t m em ory, a rg u in g th a t b e n e a th th e surface of p u b lic cu ltu re, w ith its o m n ip re se n t talk of v icto ry a n d freedom , lay sh a rp ly v a rie d experiences sh a p e d b y g en d er, race, ethnicity, religion, region, age, a n d o th er factors. S om ew here b e tw ee n th o se tw o v iew s of w a rtim e ex p erien ce lies th e ro u g h if v ariab le tru th . N e ith e r e m p ty n o r u n ifo rm , public c u ltu re p ro v id e d o n e w a y for A m erican s to d iv in e m ea n in g in th e ir experiences. M oreover, alm o st all h a d some ex p eri­ ence of th e w ar, a n d a n aw aren ess th a t "th eirs w a s a w o rld su d d e n ly g ro w n sm all a n d com plicated." T his w a s "to ta l w a r " — in p ercep tio n at least, o n e w ell e v o k ed b y M arg aret M ead: "T he sim p lest m o u n ta in farm er m ay live o n a re­ m o te sp o t w h e re a p a ra ch u tist d r o p s . . . . Ju st as a n y tree or b u sh , a n y village o r su b u rb , is as possible a ta rg e t for a b o m b as a forest o r a city, so to tal w a r stretches o u t th e h u m a n b ein g s w h o fo rm a n a tio n in to a g reat strag g lin g chain, as stro n g as th eir ability to join h a n d s ra p id ly a g ain if o n e d ro p s o u t." M ore th a n a t a n y o th er tim e in th eir history, a consciousness of sh a re d experience gave A m ericans a n intangible b u t p o w e rfu l u n ity .46 For th e m o st p a rt, th ey sh a re d so m eth in g else: belief in th e A m erican cause a n d v a g u en e ss a b o u t w h a t m a d e it v irtu o u s. Polls a tteste d to th a t v ag u en ess, ju st as lead ers feared th a t it m ig h t u n d e rm in e m orale. A b u n d a n t c o m m en ta ry ex p o sed a v a p id , e v en b a n a l sense of p u rp o se . "By a n d large," W ecter n o ticed , "th e sym bols of this w a r h ave n o t c a u g h t on. T he V -for-V ictory is quick ly d e ­ b a sed to a m o n o g ram o n h a n d b ag s; a tru ss m a n u fa c tu re r in C alifornia lately a d v ertised . T o th e F our F reedom s A d d a Fifth: F reed o m from R u p tu re.' " Such triv ializatio n reflected reality, W ecter realized: "L acking a N a n k in g , o r a C ov­ entry, o r th e ab atto irs of K harkov, w e A m erican s h av e n o t felt th e sam e p a s­ sio n ate defense of o u r soil a n d skies th a t o u r A llies k n o w ."47 A b stractio n s— liberty, peace, p o w e r— m ig h t h av e d efin ed p u rp o se s, b u t th ey su ffered a re p u ­ tatio n for h av in g d u p e d A m ericans in W orld W ar I. In d ee d , m a n y saw m a tu rity in h o w A m ericans w a g e d w a r w ith o u t the idealistic ferv o r of 1917. True, a n elab o rate p u b lic-p riv ate m ach in ery fu n ctio n ed to cen so r th e p ress a n d en list the n a tio n in the cause. T he som etim es ten se relatio n sh ip b e tw e e n H o lly w o o d a n d W ashington y ield ed a flood of fictional, didactic, a n d n e w s film s, a n d skillful p ro p a g a n d a like th e Why We Fight series m a d e for th e a rm y b y d irecto r F rank C apra. T ogether these film s p o w e rfu lly sh a p e d p u b lic cul­ ture, h e lp in g to m ake it p e rh a p s m ore u n ifo rm th a n a t a n y p o in t in th e n a tio n 's h isto ry a n d to create a real d im e n sio n of w a rtim e unity. A h o d g e p o d g e of fed eral agencies c o m p e te d in sh a p in g th a t cu ltu re, h o w ­ ever. N o m in ally in charge. Office of W ar In fo rm atio n chief E lm er D avis "felt like a m a n w h o h a d m a rrie d a w a rtim e w id o w a n d w a s try in g to raise h e r chil­ d re n b y all h e r p rev io u s h u sb a n d s." H e m m e d in b y R oosevelt-haters, secrecym in d e d m ilitary officials, a n d p ro fit-h u n g ry b u sin essm en , agencies like OW I often c ap itu la te d to the p rev a ilin g v ag u en ess, p refe rrin g th a t w a r 's p u rp o se s

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em erge indirectly th ro u g h e n te rta in m e n t o r th e "u se of sacred a n d se n tim en ta l sym b o ls."48 A s a result, th e w a r w a s u b iq u ito u s in c u ltu re — th e flag w a s e v ery w h ere, a n d e v en T arzan "en listed for the A llies"— b u t its p u rp o se s w ere h a zily a rtic u ­ lated. Few A m ericans k n ew m u c h a b o u t th e A tlantic C h a rte r sig n ed b y FDR a n d C hurchill in 1941. Polls claim ed th a t th e p e o p le w ere m o re in te reste d in d om estic th a n in in tern atio n al affairs. A n d th e m essag es th ey g o t fro m g o v e rn ­ m en t, corporate, a n d m ed ia d e p ic tio n s of th e w a r's p u rp o s e s — p a in te r N o r­ m a n R ockw ell's ren d e rin g s of FD R 's "fo u r freed o m s," for ex am p le — g en erally in v ited th em "to join the w a r effort in o rd e r to d e fe n d private in terests a n d d is­ ch arg e private m o ral obligations," above all th o se in v o lv in g th e ir fam ilies. Like m o st peoples, D. W. B rogan n o te d , A m erican s v iew ed w a r parochially: "W e k n o w th a t the C hinese w ere fig h tin g th e Japanese lo n g before w e w ere, b u t w e d o n 't feel it. W e co u ld rem em ber, if w e tried , th a t th e Poles w ere fig h tin g th e G erm an s" before a n y o n e else, "b u t w e d o n 't feel a n y u rg en cy to recall it." For g o o d reason, then. T reasu ry Secretary H e n ry M o rg e n th au d e c id e d th a t w a r b o n d d riv es w o u ld h av e to instill ra th e r th a n reflect n a tio n al p u rp o s e — h e w o u ld "u se bonds to sell the war, ra th e r th a n vice versa/' U sin g M ad iso n A v en u e m e th o d s to sell the w ar, ho w ev er, o n ly c o m p o u n d e d th e triv ializa tio n th o se m e th o d s w ere su p p o se d to counter.49 For sure, e v en shallow slogans a n d im ages h a d content. T hey sp o k e to real concerns of A m ericans b a tte re d b y d e p re ssio n a n d b e w ild e re d b y w a r in p o r­ tray in g th em as fighting c u n n in g N azis a n d cross-eyed Jap an ese in d efen se of M om , a p p le pie, th e flag, a n d a su b u rb a n hom e. E xpressed in th e slo g an s a n d sym bols of a n a d v ertisin g cu ltu re, h ow ever, th o se concerns d id n o t easily con­ geal in to articu late p u rp o se s. T he satirical p o ste r fash io n ed b y o n e d isillu ­ sio n ed p ro p a g a n d ist " d isp la y e d a C oca-C ola b o ttle, w ra p p e d in th e A m erican flag, w ith a leg en d below : 'S tep rig h t u p a n d g e t y o u r fo u r delicio u s freedom s. It's a refreshing w a r.' "50 The o u tlook of m o st G Is seem ed to ty p ify b ro a d e r a ttitu d e s. T hey k n e w little m o re th a n " th a t p o w e r in th e h a n d s of the U n ited States a n d o u r A llies is p o w e r u se d less cruelly a n d b u lly in g ly th a n in A xis h a n d s." For th em , A m erica's ene­ m ies "w ere d ra g o n s to be slain, after w h ic h th e h e ro co u ld re tu rn to h is fair la d y in h e r fair lan d ." E ven th a t sim p le o u tlook fad e d for m e n in co m b at, w h o se "m icrocosm ic" w o rld ex te n d ed only a few y ard s. M an y also re g a rd e d A m erica's allies (R ussians excepted) " w ith to le ra n t co n tem p t." "E n g lan d ? M y God! You n e v er saw so m an y p e rv e rts in y o u r life," o n e so ld ier rep o rte d . "A n d France, I'd say, is a co u n try w ith o u t m o rals." Som e o b serv ers saw in su c h a ttitu d e s a h e alth y realism "far less likely to go so u r th a n th e h e a d y w in e tu rn e d to v in eg a r of a Lost G en eratio n " of W orld W ar I soldiers. Still, it w a s w o rriso m e th a t the av erag e v e te ran "saw the w a r as a v a g u e co n sp iracy conceived b y m e n of w h o m he k n ew n o th in g a n d m o tiv a te d b y forces of w h ic h h e h a d n o co m p re­ h en sio n ." Soldiers "k n ew w h a t the w a r w a s ag ain st," co n clu d ed o n e sociolo-

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gist, " b u t few . . . h a d a n y id ea of its p u rp o se ." B rogan, too, th o u g h t th a t the A m erican so ld ier k n o w s " w h a t he is fightin g against," b u t m u c h less " w h a t h e is fig h tin g for; the A m erican w a y of life d o es n o t seem to h im to b e in m u ch d a n g er," a lth o u g h B rogan d id n o t see th a t v a g u en e ss as a p e cu lia rly A m erican failing. T he so ld ie r's sense e v en of w h a t h e fo u g h t against w a s b e la te d ly in ­ stilled. A fter seeing a N a zi d e a th cam p a t th e close of th e w ar, E isen h o w er com ­ m en ted , "W e are to ld th a t th e A m erican so ld ier d o es n o t k n o w w h a t h e is fight­ in g for. N ow , a t least, h e w ill k n o w w h a t h e n s fig h tin g against." N ow , in th is case, w a s th e sp rin g of 1945.51 S om etim es p u rp o se s later a ttrib u te d to th e A m erican w a r effort failed ev en to reach o bvious audiences. A s Leslie E pstein recalled h is Jew ish ch ild h o o d , "In C alifornia, in su n sh in e, th e conflict w a s far m o re a m a tte r of th e Japanese th a n of th e G erm an s a n d th e Jew s . . . . T he G erm an s in m o v ies w e re sim p ly too a d u lt, . . . w itty, cu n n in g , p ro n e to u n d e rs ta te m e n t a n d reserv e" to elicit the fear o r h a tre d th a t th e Japanese d id . By th e sam e token, se n sitiv ity to th e w a r 's p u rp o se s m ay n o t h av e coincided w ith the a d v a n ta g e s of social class o ften as­ su m e d . W ecter fo u n d " th a t e n listed m e n attach g rea ter im p o rtan c e th a n d o of­ ficers to th e aim s of th e w a r," a n d "th e ideology-conscious classes of o u r b ig cities [p resu m ab ly w orking-class a n d eth n ic-id en tified A m ericans] p ro b ab ly com e n e arer th a n a n y o th er g ro u p to feeling th is w a r a c ru sa d e ."52 T hen, too, it said so m e th in g th a t th e sh allo w n ess of A m erican p u rp o se w a s itself re p e ate d ly criticized d u rin g th e w ar. It w a s co m m o n to la m e n t th a t "fas­ cism is still a n u n rea l th in g " to the A m erican soldier, w h o "ca n n o t really h a te it."53 L iberals like Vice P re sid e n t H e n ry W allace, a n d b lack lea d ers w ith a sh a rp eye for hypocritical claim s of a fight for freed o m , trie d to h a m m e r o u t m o re p o in te d w a r aim s. O th ers, m o re pessim istic, feared m alig n ra th e r th a n u n cer­ ta in p u rp o se , seein g in A m erican w a rtim e c o rp o ra te a n d m ilitary p o w e r th e so rt of fascism th a t N o rm a n M ailer claim ed to ex p o se in The Naked and the Dead (1948). If e x p o n en ts of sh a rp e r w a r aim s d id n o t m u c h succeed, it w a s in p a rt becau se R oosevelt calculated th a t A m erican s' u rg en cy to achieve v icto ry w a s sufficient a n d because h e feared th a t sh a rp e r d e b ate a b o u t w a r aim s, o r a b o u t ineq u alities a m o n g A m ericans, w o u ld ero d e th e u n ity n e e d e d to achieve it (one reaso n th a t FDR d u m p e d W allace as ru n n in g m ate, rep lacin g h im w ith Sen. H a rry T ru m a n in h is 1944 reelection bid). In th e process, h o w ev er, som e liberals ex p o sed a n u n se ttlin g d iv e rsity of o p in io n u n d e rn e a th th e freed o m -an d -ap p lep ie rhetoric. T here w a s little su c h d iv ersity reg a rd in g th e Japanese, ho w ev er. B eyond a b ro a d sense of A m erican v irtu e , w h a t u n ite d m o st A m erican s w a s racial h a ­ tred. It w a s sh a re d b y w h ite allies fighting Jap an a n d m irro re d b y Jap an itself, so th a t m u tu a l h a tre d s p la y e d off each other. Jap an ese racism w as different, ho w ev er, less vicious in its w o rd s a n d im ages, th o u g h n o t necessarily in action, as atrocities a g ain st w h ites a n d o th er A sians sh o w ed . Ja p an 's racism sp ra n g in p a rt from A sia's historic su b o rd in a tio n to th e W estern p o w ers. It m in g led

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c o n te m p t for the W est w ith aw e of its pow er, w h e rea s A m erican h a tre d d is­ p la y e d a far m ore u n ifo rm d isg u st. T hus, w h ile Jap an ese p ro p a g a n d a p o r­ tray ed W estern lead ers as su p e rh u m a n dev ils, d em o n s, a n d ogres, A m erican p ro p a g a n d a sh o w ed the Japanese as su b h u m a n — apes, insects, rats, reptiles, o r o cto p u ses— a lth o u g h it also b e tra y e d a lu rk in g fear of Ja p an 's pow er. A lm ost n o one d o u b te d th a t A m ericans d e sp ise d Jap an ese far m o re th a n G erm ans. "T he slo g an w a s co n sp icu o u sly Remember Pearl Harbor," Paul Fussell notes. "N o one ev er sh o u te d o r sa n g Remember Poland." Few also d o u b te d th a t Jap an w a s th e m ore fanatical foe, e v en th o u g h o n ly G e rm a n y practiced sy stem ­ atic g enocide a n d p e rsiste d in th e w a r u n til in v ad e d . Racial h a tre d fo u n d u g ly ex p ression in w a rtim e p ro p a g a n d a , tre a tm e n t of Japanese-A m ericans, a n d m il­ ita ry action, a n d m ore su b tly am o n g political a n d in tellectu al elites. "Exterm in atio n ist" im p u lse s e ru p te d am o n g A m ericans, as in th e M arch 1945 M a­ rin es Leatherneck m agazine, w h ich p ic tu re d a lo ath so m e, b u c k to o th ed Japanese insect a n d looked fo rw a rd to "th e gigantic task of e x term in atio n ." Im ages also sh a p e d action, in su ch atrocities as killing su rre n d e rin g Japanese so ld iers (or G erm an soldiers, too, b u t n o t in racial fury).54 M ore th a n tim eless racial an im o sity w a s in v o lv ed , h o w ev er, for th e w a r's course a n d official policy k e p t a lterin g it. T h at a n im o sity w a s sto k ed b y th e v i­ ciousness of fighting o n Pacific islan d s w h e re n o retre at w a s possible, b y revela­ tio n s carefully tim e d b y th e A m erican g o v e rn m e n t a b o u t Japanese atrocities a g ain st A m erican PO W s, a n d b y n e w technologies facilitating v en g ean ce a g ain st th e Japanese. By th e sam e token, h a tre d of th e Jap an ese w a s n o t u n iv er­ sal; som e A m ericans c h allen g ed it a n d su rp risin g ly , tro o p s fig h tin g th e G er­ m an s expressed th a t h a tre d m o re th a n those fig h tin g th e Japanese. T h at h a tre d also b e g a n b rea k in g d o w n late in the w ar, especially as rev elatio n s a b o u t N azi genocide h e lp e d d isc red it racist a ttitu d e s a m o n g A m ericans. T h at sh ift w a s too little a n d too late, h ow ever, to a rre st the d e stru c tio n of Japanese cities or to a lter a u n ity b a sed o n lo ath in g of th e Pacific enem y. A ssu m p tio n s a b o u t A m erican v irtu e a n d Jap an ese evil u n ite d m o st A m eri­ cans b ro ad ly b u t n o t e n o u g h to b rid g e a chasm , p e rh a p s th e w a r 's d eep est, b e ­ tw e en civilians a n d fighting m e n a n d w om en . T h o u g h h a rd ly o b livious to the so ld iers' p light, civilians w ere p e rh a p s less sen sitiv e to it sim p ly b ecau se of th eir o w n im p ro v e d chances to live longer: d u e to b e tte r econom ic a n d m ed ical conditions, life expectancy rose d u rin g the w a r d e sp ite o v e r 400,000 m ilitary d eath s. N o t su rprisingly, so ld iers a n d th eir sp o k e sm e n co n d em n ed th e casu al affluence a n d the indifference to w a r's b ru ta lity a m o n g A m erican s safe at hom e. M arshall a n d S tim son w o rrie d th a t civilians w o u ld n o t stay th e course a n d accept the sacrifices n e e d e d for victory. D o w n th e ran k s, m ore v isceral re­ se n tm e n ts arose. R eporter R obert S h erro d sp o k e for m a n y at T araw a w h e n h e co n d em n ed h o w the w a r w as san itized in th e m ed ia a n d h o w A m erican s a t h o m e w ere "w allo w in g in u n p re c e d e n te d p ro sp erity ." W ecter fo u n d re tu rn in g v e te ran s resentful of "p a u n c h y v acatio n ers a n d fat w iv es p u s h e d a ro u n d in

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b a th chairs. . . . R u m ors of chiseling, profiteerin g , indifference to th e w a r . . . set th e re tu rn in g so ld ie r's tee th o n ed g e." So too d id m ed ia coverage th a t m ad e th e w a r "a k in d of Rose Bowl gam e, w ith u s alw ay s m arch in g d o w n th e field." "C ivilians w ere different, m ore like 'fo re ig n e rs/ in d e e d ra th e r like th e enem y," P au l Fussell later recalled. T roops h a te d "th e com placent, u n im a g in ativ e in n o ­ cence of th eir h o m e fronts a n d rear echelon s" a b o u t th e disease, d ep riv atio n , a n d d e h u m a n iz a tio n th ey experienced.55 Yet, as th e m en tio n of "re a r echelons" sug g ests, m o re w a s in v o lv ed th a n a sim p le ch asm b e tw ee n soldiers a n d civilians. B itterness also arose am o n g com ­ b a t forces to w a rd tro o p s b e h in d th e lines, a n d am o n g en listed m e n to w a rd offi­ cers. M oreover, d a n g e r d id n o t alw ay s w e a r a uniform : th o u sa n d s of civilians d ie d in w ar-related w o rk , w h ile m a n y m ilitary p e rso n n el n e v e r left th e U n ited States o r faced d a n g e r abroad. In technological w arfare, th e b u rd e n of co m b at fell o n a few — p e rh a p s 20 p e rc en t of th e h u g e force asse m b le d — in c o n tra st to th o se servicem en "for w h o m th e w a r w a s m erely foreign trav el tem p ere d b y excessive reg im en ta tio n ."56 E ven those facing com bat differed d e p e n d in g o n w h e n a n d w h e re th ey serv ed , th e ir ra n k a n d b ra n c h of service, a n d o th er factors. T roops in E u ro p e e n d u re d long, d ra w n -o u t slu g g in g m atches, b u t th o se assau ltin g Pacific islan d s o ften saw action telescoped into a few h o rrib le d a y s o r w eeks, th e n lo n g p e ­ rio d s of excruciating b o re d o m a n d ex p o su re to disease. E ven w h e n co m b at cam e v e ry close, m e n could keep th e ir distance. W atching a k am ik aze raid o n a n e a rb y A m erican aircraft carrier. M arine av iato r Sam uel H y n es " d id n 't k n o w w h a t w a s h a p p e n in g to h u m a n lives w h ile w e w a tch e d , b u t e v en if w e h a d , I w o n d e r if it w o u ld h av e m attere d . . . p e rh a p s a m ile is too far to project the im a g in atio n to a n o th e r m a n 's d e a th ." M ost A m erican s w ere w ell train ed , b u t as m a n p o w e r a n d patien ce ra n sh o rt n e a r th e w a r 's en d , som e w ere ru sh e d into co m b at w ith ju st six w eek s' train in g (m an y qu ick ly p a id th e price). H ig h e r class o r e d u ca tio n al sta tu s offered little p ro tec tio n from service or d e a th in it, b u t it d id raise the o d d s of g ain in g officer ra n k a n d service in th e n a v y o r air force, a n d therefore of secu rin g sta tu s a n d am en ities th a t e n listed a rm y m e n co u ld on ly envy, especially g iven th e c o n te m p t th ey faced. (A rm y so ld iers "w ere called D oggies," H y n es recalled, "w h ich w a s sh o rt for D og-faces, a n d M arines d e sp ise d them , along w ith th eir c o m m an d e rs.")57 To a d d to th e com plexities, com bat w a s h a rd ly th e o n ly d a n g e r faced b y m en a t w ar. A lth o u g h this w a s the first A m erican w a r in w h ic h b a ttle d e ath s (291,557) o u tn u m b e re d o thers, 113,842 still d ie d o u t of co m b at (in clu d in g som e 36,000 airm en, c o m p a red to 52,000 in com bat), as d isease a n d accidents to o k a h eav y toll. E ven in com bat, d e a th o ften w a s n o t d u e to en em y guns: th o u sa n d s d ie d in accidents of a ssau lt as g lid ers crash ed , lan d in g craft stru ck reefs, a n d sh ip s fo u n d e re d at sea. T he e n em y acco u n ted o n ly for one-fifth of th e B-29s d o w n e d in b o m b in g Japan, the rest falling to n a v ig atio n al erro rs, fuel e x h au s­ tion, a n d e q u ip m e n t failure ov er th e trackless ocean, so th a t B-29 crew s "b eg an

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to fear th eir o w n aircraft a n d o u r field o rd e rs m o re th a n th e devices of th e e n ­ em y ."58 For these m en, th e enem y, a n d h a tre d of h im , seem ed a secondary, e v en irrelev an t m atter. G e n d er a n d m in o rity sta tu s sh a p e d experien ce as w ell. It o ften lim ite d expo­ su re to co m b at— alm o st entirely for w o m e n a n d o ften for blacks, lo n g d e e m e d in cap ab le of fighting. But b e in g fem ale, black, gay, o r eth n ic left m a n y v u ln e r­ able to in fo rm al ab u se a n d official d isc rim in atio n w ith in th e m ilitary, a n d offbase as w ell. The a rm e d forces also th riv e d o n in cu lcatin g a h a tre d of th e e n em y th a t o ften w a s d isp laced on to fellow A m erican s, ju st as h a tre d of th e "n ig g er," "p an sy ," "bitch," o r "k ik e" w a s so m etim es ex p lo ited b y officers as a k in d of w a rm -u p for the d e h u m a n iz a tio n of th e en em y w h ic h co m b at p re su m a b ly re­ q u ired . G iv en th a t w a r ju m b les p eacetim e categories e v e n as it reinforces th em , h o w ­ ever, m a n y o u tsid ers also fo u n d u n e x p ec te d o p p o rtu n ities. W orld W ar II jarre d o p e n th e d o o r to pro fessio n al careers in th e m ilita ry for so m e blacks a n d w o m en. N ativ e A m ericans, p ro fitin g from w h ite stereo ty p es of th e m as w a r­ riors, faced little seg reg atio n in m ilitary service, b ecam e v a lu e d for special skills (the N avajo lan g u a g e w a s a n u n b reak ab le m ilita ry code), fo u n d p raise for th e ir heroism , a n d enjoyed a n u n p re c e d e n te d "chance to in teract sim p ly as in ­ d iv id u a ls o n the b attlefield s a n d in th e factories." Jap an ese-A m erican s cu lled fro m incarceration cam p s c o m p iled a sp le n d id co m b at reco rd th a t ch allen g ed racial stereotypes. For gay m e n w ith a taste for d ra g , th e a rm e d forces sanc­ tio n ed tro u p e s of fem ale im p e rso n a to rs to e n te rta in so ld iers w h e re w o m e n w ere b a rre d . D esp erate for m an p o w er, d o cto rs a n d d ra ft b o a rd s w h isk e d o th er g ays into service d e sp ite p ro h ib itio n s a g ain st th em . In d ee d , w ith 16 m illio n A m ericans from alm o st all social categories serv in g , it w a s n o t alw ay s clear w h o w a s a n in sid er a n d w h o w a s not. A n d for all g ro u p s, th e so lv en t of w a r m ig h t su sp e n d n o rm al prejudices. A rriv in g a t a Pacific islan d , Sam H y n e s w a s b e m u se d to see the notice of a c o u rt m artial: so m eo n e " h a d b e e n fo u n d g u ilty of sodom y. H ow , I w o n d e re d , co u ld th ere be on ly o n e so d o m ist? A n d w h ic h one w a s h e?"59 A lso b lu rrin g the categories of w a rtim e experience w a s th e ch an g in g rela­ tio n sh ip b e tw ee n civilian a n d m ilita ry values. O ld -fash io n ed m ilitary b ru ta lity a n d "chickenshit" p ersisted . Yet th ey h a d lim its. S w am p e d w ith m illions of m en, p rofessional officers a n d N C O s— those " p ro n e to look u p o n th e so ld ier as a b u n d le of co n d itio n ed reflexes, a belly, genitalia, a n d a p a ir of fee t"— co u ld n o t tra in a fraction of th em , a n d th e task fell h eav ily to officers fresh from civil­ ian life. L eaders like M a rsh a ll— sy m p ath etic to th e m e n in service, w o rrie d a b o u t the m ilita ry 's p u b lic im age, aw are th a t m en cost m o re th a n m ach in es— so u g h t to curb m in d less p ractices a n d b e sto w th e b e st m ed ical care, train in g , a n d en tertain m en t, especially o n expensive m en, su c h as aircrew s. W hile th e m ilitary 's task w as to tra n sfo rm civilians, in th e p ro cess civilians "w ere tra n s­ fo rm in g the A rm y." M oreover, the technical skills n e e d e d b y th e a rm e d forces

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o ften resem b led th o se v a lu e d in civilian life. T here seem ed "little to d istin g u ish th e fu n ctio n s a n d p ro b lem s of m a n y of the so ld iers a n d civilians," o b serv ed o n e sociologist. In d ee d , m a n y task s w ere sim p ly p e rfo rm e d b y civilians; th e air force alone e m p lo y ed a half-m illion, in clu d in g m a n y w o m en . S tren g th en in g th e civ ilianizing forces w a s th e co n tractu al relatio n sh ip b e tw ee n so ld ier a n d co u n try: elite w a rrio rs like a irm e n often serv ed a specified n u m b e r of m issions ra th e r th a n "fo r th e d u ra tio n ," a n d all servicem en ex ch an g ed th e risks of ser­ vice for th e p ro m ise of b enefits a fte rw a rd .60 In th e face of su c h com plexities, the n o tio n disso lv es of a "real" w a r experi­ en ced o n ly b y so ld iers o r m e n in co m b at— th e w a r w a s "real" to all, so ld ier a n d civ ilian alike. T he sh a rp line often d ra w n b e tw e e n th o se w e n t to w a r a n d th o se w h o d id n o t illu m in a ted o n e tru th a b o u t th e w a r b u t d isg u ise d ano th er. In a w a r w h e re civilian a n d m ilitary roles o ften o v e rla p p e d a n d w h e re all A m eri­ can s w ere p re su m a b ly a sk ed to serve in som e fashion, th a t d istin ctio n often fad ed . For o th er c o u n tries a t w ar, it often collap sed a lto g e th e r— u n d e r a b a r­ rag e of e n em y b om bs, m a n y civilians rig h tly felt th a t th ey too w ere o n th e fro n t lines. W hile A m erican civilians c o u ld o n ly im ag in e su c h d a n g ers, th ey too of­ ten felt th ey w e re — o r m ig h t so o n b e — o n th e fro n t lines. Still, all the in fu sio n of civilian v alu es a n d efforts to h u m a n iz e m ilitary ser­ vice c o u ld n o t m itig ate th e d e p erso n a liz atio n a n d terro r m a n y service p e rso n ­ n el faced. "T he ex-soldier n e v e r forgets h is serial n u m b e r," Fussell w rites. "N o r, if h e h a d n o m id d le n a m e , th e w a y on e w a s su p p lie d , in th e a rm y N M I (N o M iddle Initial), in th e M arine C o rp s N O N E , so th a t h e e n d e d as John N M I Jones o r F rederick N O N E Sm ith, in n a m e as little d ifferen t as p o ssib le from o th er p eo p le." B rutal tra in in g seem ed d e sig n e d to m ak e m e n lo n g for com bat. Soldiers ex p ressed th e ir b e w ild e rm e n t a n d resen tm en t, in w ild gossip, for ex­ am ple; a ru m o r th a t E leanor R oosevelt w a n te d "all v en ereal cases [to] b e q u a r­ a n tin e d o n som e offshore isla n d " p ro v e d so b eliev ab le th a t "sh e felt ob lig ed to issue a d en ial," according to Fussell, w h o sees ru m o r as p referab le to a terrify­ in g "absence of n a rra tiv e ." O r soldiers re sp o n d e d w ith lite ra ry fran k n ess a n d foul lan g u ag e, y ield in g A m erican c u ltu re (to m en tio n th e m ild e st exam ple) ac­ ro n y m s like SN A FU (S ituation N o rm al, A ll Fucked U p). "In d isp en sab le b o th to those a d m in iste rin g chickenshit a n d to those receiving it, fucking h e lp e d ex­ p ress th e re se n tm e n t of b o th sid e s."61 It is, to b e sure, im possible to calculate h o w m u c h th e so ld ie r's p ercep tio n of W orld W ar II, m u c h less th e reality of it, differed from th a t in earlier w ars. C er­ tainly, d e sp ite expectations of a ra p id w a r of m o v em en t, m u ch action in b o th th eaters of W orld W ar II resem bled c o n d itio n s o n th e W estern F ront in W orld W ar I— a n e n g in e e r's w a r o v e r h ig h ly fortified lines a n d po sitio n s. O k in aw a w a s a "latter-d ay V erd u n ," w ith "a stin k in g c o m p o st p ile" of d e a d M arin es a n d Japanese, w h e re "fat m ag g o ts tu m b le d out. . . . W e d id n 't talk a b o u t su ch things. T hey w e re too h o rrib le a n d obscene e v en for h a rd e n e d v e te ran s," E u ­ gene Sledge, a M arine, recalled. E ven so lofty a figure as E isen h o w er n o ticed

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th a t in France it "w a s literally possible to w a lk for h u n d re d s of y a rd s a t a tim e, ste p p in g o n n o th in g b u t d e a d a n d d ecay in g flesh." N o t new , either, w a s th e excruciating ten sio n of w a itin g for com bat, th e h u m iliatio n of soiling oneself (the p h ra se "scared shitless" p o ssessed a "literal tru th "), th e p a in a t seein g a b u d d y d ism em b ered , a n d th e experience of it all b y th e v e ry y o u n g (conscrip­ tio n reached eighteen-year-old A m ericans, a n d y o u n g e r b o y s co u ld enlist).62 N o n etheless, A m ericans w h o w ro te a b o u t co m b at in W orld W ar II e x p ressed a k een er sense of th e m indless, a n o n y m o u s n a tu re of w a r th a n h a d th e so ld iers of W orld W ar I. W here th e la tter gave th e ir ch aracters a "p ersistin g in d iv id u ­ ality as th ey b u c k a g ain st th e forces o p p o se d to th e ir u n iq u en e ss," th e so ld iers of th e Second W orld W ar w ere re n d e re d " d e v o id of p e rso n a l id e n tity " — "th e ball tu rre t g u n n e r," "a p ilo t from the c a rrie r" — a n d b ereft of h o p e for p re se rv ­ in g th eir in d iv id u ality . "You are so m e th in g th ere are m illio n s of," p o e t R an d all Jarrell a d d re sse d a convalescent soldier.63 T he sh ift in to n e a n d su b stan ce w a s d u e in p a rt to fam iliarity w ith the lite ra ry th em es of W orld W ar I, w h ic h m a n y w rite rs so u g h t to ex ten d ra th e r th a n sim p ly replicate, a n d to a n e m p h a sis in A m erican c u ltu re d u rin g th e in te rw a r y ears o n m achine-age d e h u m a n iz a tio n a n d cosm ic p u rp o selessn ess. To a n in d efin ab le degree, it also o w e d to n e w technologies, w h ic h created n e w terrors. C rew s o n a irp lan es a n d su b m arin es, tra p p e d for h o u rs o r w eek s in fragile devices, w ere v u ln era b le to em o tio n al b re a k d o w n , all th e m o re so b e ­ cause th ere w a s n o ratio n al w a y to e x p lain w h y som e su rv iv e d a n d sta y ed san e a n d o th ers d id not: v e te ran s w ere as v u ln era b le to d e a th as novices a n d the "n eu ro tic" m ig h t resist b re a k d o w n b e tte r th a n th e "n o rm al." E ven m o re th a n in fan try soldiers, su c h m en also d e p e n d e d for su rv iv a l o n a h a n d fu l of fellow crew m en, w h o se loss co u ld be d ev astatin g : "th e 's u rv iv o r's g u ilt' h a u n ts the in d iv id u al; h e is 'g h o ste d ,' as one m a n p u t it, b y h is d e a d frien d s, w h o w ill n o t leave h im alone." P roblem s arose d u e to th e a p p a re n t m ean in g lessn ess a n d g rin d in g im p e rso n a lity of b o m b in g u n se e n targets. "T he sense of aim lessness of th e w a r ev er q u ite left m e," H y n es w ro te of h is experience d ro p p in g b o m b s o n O k inaw a. "O ccasionally w e d ro p p e d o n th e w ro n g troops. . . . B ut o u r o w n so ld iers w ere n o t m u c h m ore real to u s th a n th e enem y." G iv en su c h ex p eri­ ences, the w a r m o v ed the technologies of d e stru c tio n a n d th e q u estio n s th ey raised closer to th e center of c u ltu ra l anxiety, a n d it w id e n e d th e g a p b e tw e e n a n official c u ltu re m ore b la n d ly com forting a n d m a n ip u la tiv e th a n e v er a n d the lived experience of m a n y o rd in a ry A m erican s at w a r.64 N o t su rp risin g ly , the fig h tin g m a n 's tra u m a s w ere u n k n o w n to m o st civil­ ians, a lth o u g h n o t ju st because th ey w ere in h ere n tly inaccessible. The v e te ra n s' in ability to sp eak of those trau m as, the h o m efro n t's safety, a n d th e n a tu re of technological w a r w ere also reasons. Strategic b o m b in g w as n o to rio u sly diffi­ cu lt for jo u rn alists to cover, for exam ple; rarely c o u ld th ey rid e th e b o m b ers, m u ch less d ep ict the hell u n fo ld in g o n the g ro u n d . In a v isu al cu ltu re, th e w a r w as in som e w ay s a m ovie for m a n y A m ericans, o n e in w h ic h m u c h of th e w a r n e v er a p p ea re d .

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Inaccessibility w a s also co n stru cted b y political a n d c u ltu ra l a u th o rities w h o chose h o w to re n d e r com bat, a n d the w a r 's m an ifo ld o th e r aspects, to A m eri­ cans a t hom e. T hey fo rb ad e p u b licatio n of p h o to g ra p h s of d e a d A m erican sol­ d iers u n til th e fall of 1943, w h e n h o m efro n t com placency, m o u n tin g casualties, a n d d e m a n d s fro m o rd in a ry A m ericans for g reater fran k n ess p ro m p te d th em to c h an g e policy, e v e n th e n m ak in g su re th a t o n ly intact b o d ies of iso lated in d i­ v id u a ls w ere show n. T hey e n d o rse d H o lly w o o d 's escapist, heroic, a n d san i­ tiz e d film s. T hey censored th e v isu a l record of w a r 's h o rro rs ab ro a d a n d its im ­ ag es of u n se ttlin g changes am o n g A m erican s th em selv es— p h o to s of black so ld iers d an cin g w ith w h ite w o m en , o r A m erican G Is fig h tin g w ith A llied sol­ d iers, w ere taboo. T hey p re se n te d th e b o m b in g of cities as a process of surgical d e stru c tio n a d m in istere d b y cool-headed A m ericans. "T hey cen so red ab o v e all th e w a r 's com plexity," con clu d es one h isto ria n .65 Several c o n sid eratio n s g o v e rn e d su c h decisions, w h ic h w ere c o m m o n a m o n g all co m b atan ts th o u g h v a rie d in substance: a v a g u e sense of w h a t A m erican s w o u ld tolerate; a careful calculation n o t to u p se t fam ilies a n d tax­ p a y ers; a n d a b ro a d concern to av o id q u estio n s a b o u t th e m e th o d s a n d costs of A m erican w a r m aking. T hose co n sid eratio n s ex p ressed a u tilita rian concern for v icto ry a n d pow er. A less sa n itized a p p ro a c h m ig h t h av e m a d e little d iffer­ ence, a n d the one tak e n d id d a m p e n celebratio n of m artia l v irtu e s a n d b lo o d ­ th irsty actions. It n o n eth eless m a d e w o rse th e im p o v e rish m en t of civilian sen ­ sibilities ab o u t this w a r a n d m o d e m w arfare. T he conv en tio n s a n d tech n iq u es of A m erican c u ltu re also g o v e rn e d re p re ­ sen tatio n s of the w ar. F ighting m e n w ere re n d e re d as "ju st like u s," th ru st in to extrem e circum stances b u t u n c h a n g e d b y them . C o rp o rate a d v ertisin g p o r­ tra y e d w a rrio rs in h ig h ly sty lized w a y s reflecting d o m in a n t class a n d ethnic prejudices; m o st m e n a p p e a re d as "go o d -lo o k in g A ry an s, b lo n d a n d tall, b e ­ lo v ed b y slim b lo n d e w o m e n a n d s u rro u n d e d b y m u ch -d esired c o n su m er g o o d s," as if "all y o u n g m en are in th e A ir C o rp s, w h ere th ey are officers a lm o st b y d efin itio n ."66 O f co u rse the p u rp o se of su c h a d s w a s to sell p ro d u c ts o r su s­ tain a co m p a n y 's im age u n til it re su m e d civilian p ro d u ctio n , n o t to p o rtra y com bat, b u t th eir u b iq u ity m a d e th em a n im p o rta n t len s for A m erican s o n sol­ d ie rs' experiences. Sim ilar circum stances a n d co n v en tio n s lim ited u n d e rs ta n d in g of w a r's im ­ p act o n o th er peoples. The N a zi H o lo cau st w a s th e m o st fam o u s exam ple. D i­ m en sio n s of the A m erican resp o n se e v id e n t earlie r— th e tim id ity o r in d if­ ference of politicians, th e fear of som e Jew ish lead ers of in flam in g A m erican anti-Sem itism , the skepticism a b o u t claim s of G e rm a n atro cities— p ersisted . U ntil the w a r's last m o n th s, w o rd s a n d p ictu res w ere u n o b tain ab le, san itized , censored, o r sh u n te d off in to in co n sp icu o u s places. L an g u ag e a n d categories in h erite d from W orld W ar I also lim ited com prehension: "atrocities," th e d o m i­ n a n t term , im p lied specific acts of cru elty a n d m u rd er, n o t system atic "g en o ­ cide," as it w as later called. A n d w h ile th e fate of Jew s in E u ro p e received little m en tio n, th a t of o th e rs— gays a n d G ypsies in N azi cam ps, Japanese civilians in

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to rch ed cities, C hinese m u rd e re d o r sta rv e d in c o u n tless n u m b e rs— a lm o st n e v e r crossed the screen of w a rtim e im ag in atio n . It c o u ld h a rd ly b e o th erw ise, since ev en th eir o w n so ld iers' suffering w a s b e y o n d th e reach of m o st A m eri­ cans. A ll these factors re n d e re d th e experience of w a r b e n ig n for m o st A m ericans a t h o m e, except w h e n th e loss of loved ones in tru d e d . A ffluence, p ro m ises of m o re of it after the w ar, a n d a m ea su re of u p w a rd social m o b ility en h an c ed m a n y A m erican s' satisfaction. Ju st as im p o rta n t w a s th eir sen se of b e in g c au g h t u p in the excitem ent a n d p u rp o se (h o w ev er v ag u e) of a g ra n d event. M a n y — th e o rd in a ry w a r w orker, th e h o u sew ife salv ag in g scrap, th e scientist seek in g a n e w w e a p o n — felt w h a t one w o m a n later recalled: "D o y o u know , it w a s m o re lively d u rin g the w ar! It seem ed like th ere w a s life, a n d it w a s a m ix tu re of the e m o tio n al th in g a b o u t fighting a n d th e bo y s w ere g o n e." "In sim p le term s," a rg u e d one stu d e n t of w a rtim e m o o d s, m o st A m erican s " h a d m o re fu n in th e seco n d W orld W ar, ju st as th ey d id in the first, th a n th e y h a v e h a d at a n y o th er p e rio d of th eir lives." To th e ir e v e ry d a y satisfactions w a s a d d e d a g en eral sense of social harm ony. W ar in flam ed m a n y passio n s, b u t it also allo w ed "in te rn al an ta g o n ism s" to b e "d ra in e d o u t of the g ro u p o n to th e c o m m o n en em y ."67 E n h ancing acceptance of th e w a r w a s th e n a tu re of g o v e rn m e n ta l a u th o rity a n d a g ro w in g acco m m o d atio n to it. A lth o u g h m o re cen tralized th a n in W orld W ar I, th is w a r effort still p ro ce ed e d th ro u g h a la b y rin th of local a n d p riv a te a u th o ritie s— d ra ft b o a rd s a n d civil d efen se team s, c o rp o ra tio n s a n d ch arities— th a t p re se rv e d a n eth o s of v o lu n ta ry service to th e cause a n d local iden tification w ith it. D u rin g W orld W ar I, a co m b u stib le m ix of v o lu n ta rism a n d sta te a u th o rity ex p lo d e d in rep re ssio n a n d v ig ilan tism . In its o w n w ay. W orld W ar II w a s ju st as repressive, in so far as su c h c o m p ariso n s can e v e n b e m ad e, b u t few A m ericans ex p erien ced it th a t w ay, in p a rt b ecau se th e rep re s­ sio n w as focused m ore tig h tly b y th e sta te o n to few er a n d m o re m arg in al g ro u p s— "fascists," real a n d alleged G e rm a n sab o teu rs, Jeh o v ah 's W itnesses a n d o th er conscien tious objectors to m ilitary service, a n d ab o v e all JapaneseA m ericans. E specially in the m o n th s after P earl H arb o r, som e liberals a n d con­ serv atives w a n te d the n e t cast w id er, to in clu d e "d efe atists" o r "d iv isio n ists" o r c o m m u n ists o r Jew -baiters o r an ti-in terv en tio n ists like C h arles L in d b erg h , b u t th ey rarely g o t th eir w ay. T he FBI a n d m ilitary intelligence exercised far b ro a d e r surveillance th a n in th e p re v io u s w ar, a n d th e c o u rts o n ly b e la te d ly resisted the engines of in te rn al security, b u t sh a rp m em o ries of th e u g ly rep re s­ sio n of W orld W ar I h e lp e d cu rb its ra n d o m release in W orld W ar II. T hen, too, A m ericans e n te red W orld W ar II m o re accu sto m ed to W ashing­ to n 's authority, w h ich w a s in tu rn m ore p racticed a n d sure-footed. The sh e er len g th of W orld W ar II also m a d e a difference. M obilization, th e m ach in ery of state, a n d ideological consensus w ere far m o re in place b y D ecem ber 1941 th a n in A p ril 1917, a n d th e n h a d n early fo u r years, n o t n in etee n m o n th s, to b e finetu n ed . Finally, the m a g n itu d e of W orld W ar II p ro v id e d m o re extensive o u tlets

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for th e energies a n d fervor of A m ericans— in m ilitary service for som e 16 m il­ lion, in scrap a n d w a r b o n d cam paigns, o n ratio n in g b o a rd s a n d civil d efen se team s, in w a r jobs or charities. In th ese a n d o th er w ay s, th e w a r w as a stu d y in co n trasts for m o st A m eri­ cans. B o m b ard ed b y talk of d a n g e r to th e n a tio n 's v e ry su rv iv al a n d of im m i­ n e n t attack o n its soil, th ey su rv iv e d at h o m e w ith o u t th e d a n g e r ev er b eco m in g real. A nxious o r d e v a sta te d a b o u t the fate of lo v ed o n es far aw ay, th ey co u ld b a re ly im ag in e th a t fate. C onscious of a w o rld rip p e d u p b y w ar, th ey h a d little to h e lp th e m c o m p re h en d h o w o th er n a tio n s experien ced th e tragedy. T he 1941 a d sh o w in g a b o m b e r's o m in o u s sh a d o w ov er a m o d e st su b u rb a n h o m e h a d it a b o u t right: the sh a d o w w a s in d e e d o m in o u s, b u t th e su b stan ce of tra n q u ility a n d a b u n d a n c e rem ain ed . A m ericans h a d m a d e th eir e n tran ce in to a n e w w o rld of w a r a n d p e rp e tu a l d an g er, b u t for m o st, th e en tran ce w a s o n ly p artial, p ro v id in g a terrify in g g lim p se th a t d id n o t offset th e satisfactions of w ar. N e ith e r th a t a sp ect of w a rtim e experience n o r m o st o th ers d irectly h a ste n e d th e co urse of m ilitarization. C ertain ly m o st A m erican s d id n o t becom e fo n d of w ar: W ecter w a s rig h t th a t "th e intoxicant of w a r per se is n o lo n g er so co m p el­ lin g ."68 T heir experiences n o n eth eless co n trib u te d in d irectly to m ilitarizatio n . The relative ease a n d em o tio n al satisfaction of w a rtim e for m o st A m ericans m u te d d e b ate a b o u t th e w a r itself a n d a b o u t su b se q u e n t m ilitarizatio n . N o o ne said th a t w a r a n d m ilitary p o w e r w ere desirab le, b u t po licy o n b o th u n fo ld e d a g ain st a b ack d ro p of su b sta n tia l silence o r e q u an im ity a b o u t th e ir b u rd e n s. A sh a rp e r con fro n tatio n w ith w a r m ig h t n o t h av e altered th e o u tco m e— n atio n s th a t suffered m ore, like B ritain a n d th e Soviet U nion, still stro v e after the w a r to m a in ta in th eir m ilitary po w er, a n d A m erican co m b at v e te ran s u su a lly su p p o rte d th e ir n a tio n 's p o stw a r m ilita ry m ight. B ut A m erican experiences d id sh a p e h o w th e outcom e w o u ld b e u n d e rsto o d . In th is b ro a d realm of experience a n d m o o d , as in o th e r a re n as of th e w ar, th e p re su m p tio n of h isto ry 's cyclical n a tu re also m ask ed th e p o ten tial for m ilitariz­ ation. A m erican m orale, "fo rm e d a ro u n d a g o al of e x p ed ien t necessity, im plies th e su sp e n sio n of p rev io u s aim s a n d v a lu e s ra th e r th a n th eir tran sfo rm a tio n ," o n e scholar co m m en ted in 1943. "T he co m m o n ex p ressio n 'fo r th e d u ra tio n ' is m o re th a n a co n v en ien t circum locution. . . . It signifies th e th o u g h t a n d expec­ tatio n of ro u g h ly resu m in g from the p o in t of in te rru p tio n occasioned b y th e w a r." T here w o u ld occur, W ecter w ro te in 1944, a n "X -D ay for elev en m illion A m erican m e n n o w in u n ifo rm ," alm o st a m agical d a y w h e n u n ifo rm s w ere sh elv ed a n d the n a tio n jerk ed back, h o w e v e r aw k w ard ly , to norm ality. T he e n o rm o u s focus d u rin g th e w a r 's last y ears o n v e te ra n s' re a d ju stm e n t to civil­ ian life— in m a n y speeches a n d books, th a t seem ed th e o n ly issu e w o rth d isc u ssin g — ex p o sed th a t expectation. It su g g e ste d th a t o n ly m e n in u n ifo rm (fem ale v e te ran s w ere rarely m en tio n ed ) h a d b e en c h an g e d b y w a r a n d th a t th eir re a d ju stm e n t w o u ld co m p lete h isto ry 's cycle. It d isg u ise d h o w th e w a r h a d facilitated a "tran sfo rm a tio n " ra th e r th a n a m ere "su sp e n sio n " of A m eri-

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can aim s a n d values. E ven the acerbic W ecter closed h is acco u n t w ith assu ran ce a b o u t th e v eteran , a n d hence th e nation: "A s h e w e n t forth, so h e w ill retu rn : friendly, g enerous, easy-going, brave, th e citizen -so ld ier of A m erica."69 In this d e ep stru c tu re of m o o d a n d expectation. W orld W ar II retain ed a w a rm glow of p u rp o se fu ln e ss, satisfaction, a n d v iv id n e ss th a t o p e ra te d p o w ­ erfu lly for decades. T h o u g h few celebrated w a r itself. W orld W ar II b ecam e a baseline a g ain st w h ich to ju d g e in d iv id u a ls a n d th e n atio n , a n d a m o d el for w h a t th ey co u ld achieve a t th eir best. A m ericans rem em b ered , o r w ere to ld to recall, th a t th ey h a d b e en h a p p ie st in the "g o o d w a r," w h e n th eir n a tio n 's p u r­ p o se (so it seem ed) a n d p o w e r (w ith o u t a d o u b t) reach ed th eir zen ith . If m u ch in later d ecad es failed the test of co m p a riso n to W orld W ar II, th e co m p ariso n itself d id m u ch to define politics a n d culture, as d id th e u rg e to recreate th e lost m om ent. D ecades later, one v e te ra n nicely c a p tu re d h o w th e w a r o p e ra te d in m em ­ ory: "W h en I recall these difficult tim es, I a m alw ay s sta rtle d to realize h o w v iv id th ey still seem , h o w m u c h m ore alive w e w ere. . . . By co m p ariso n , m y c h ild h o o d seem s like a p a in te d lan d sca p e in a m u se u m , b u t m y d a te s as a sol­ d ier are carv ed in g ranite, a few incidents, som e of th em irrelev an t, still sta n d ­ in g in b o ld relief after the erosion of forty y e a rs."70 T h at th e v e te ra n w a s R alp h D av id A bernathy, the p ro m in e n t civil rig h t lea d er of th e 1960s w h o h a d serv ed in a seg reg ated arm y, su g g ests h o w b ro a d ly sp re a d w as th e glo w of W orld W ar II, ev en for those w ith reaso n to d e te st it.

The Militarization of Social Change In D ecem ber 1944, the su rp rise G erm an c o u n terattack th a t p ro m p te d th e fa­ m o u s B attle of the Bulge also p ro m p te d chan g e in A m erican race relations. Fac­ in g u n fo reseen casualties am o n g w h ite troops, o n e of E isen h o w er's com ­ m a n d e rs u rg e d giv ing black so ld iers in rear echelons "th e p riv ileg e of jo in in g o u r v e te ran u n its a t the fro n t" b y v o lu n te erin g for co m b at (w hich som e h a d a lre ad y seen in Italy a n d the Pacific).71 T hey g o t th a t p riv ileg e, in seg reg ated u n its th a t fo u g h t w ell alo n g sid e w h ite soldiers. T he in cid en t revealed the a m b ig u ities of social ch an g e ro o ted in a necessi­ ta ria n logic of w ar. Few w h ite m e n h a d th e lu x u ry of v o lu n te erin g for com bat, b u t "p riv ileg e" reeked of the d e m e an in g circu m stan ces of black so ld iers b ro u g h t into battle. W ar's exigencies carried th em p a rtw a y in to th e eg alitarian h o st of a rm e d A m ericans, b u t th e b lu rrie st line se p ara ted a n im p licit sta te m e n t of th eir e q u ality from a m o m e n tary e x p lo itatio n of th eir lives. D u rin g the w ar, black activists a n d w h ite allies u n easily w a lk ed th a t line, m ixing d e m a n d s for justice w ith u tilita rian arg u m en ts. W hile FDR som etim es a rg u e d th a t racial change w o u ld jeo p ard ize victo ry b y u n le a sh in g social con­ flict, civil rig h ts lead ers c o u n te red th a t the sta tu s q u o je o p a rd iz ed it ev en m ore b y d e n y in g the n a tio n the full co n trib u tio n of blacks to victory, th e ideological difference from racist enem ies it n e ed e d , a n d th e im age ab ro a d it w a n te d to

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cultivate. "O u r failures" in race relations, W alter W hite w a rn e d , "are b ein g w a tc h e d b y o th er colored peo p les, w h o con stitu te a m ajo rity of th e p e o p le s of th e e arth ." "A re y o u for H itle r's W ay or th e A m erican W ay?" ask ed a g ro u p p ro te stin g seg reg atio n in W ashington, D.C.. Black n e w sp a p e rs a n d o rg an iza­ tio n s e q u a te d "D eu tsch lan d a n d D ixieland." T he W ar D e p a rtm e n t's o w n film The Negro Soldier (1944) p o in te d ly sh o w e d a p reach er re a d in g "th e racist invec­ tiv e of Mein Kampf." A ssisting su c h stances w a s a scholarly a ssa u lt o n racism th a t filtered into th e p o p u la r press. Fascism , A sh ley M o n tag u arg u e d , sh o w ed "w h e re w e e n d u p if w e th in k th a t th e sh a p e of th e n o se o r th e color of th e skin h a s a n y th in g to d o w ith h u m a n v alu es a n d c u ltu re ."72 A frican-A m ericans h a d fo u g h t before, h o w ev er, o n ly to resu m e inferio r sta­ tu s in th e m ilitary o r be forced o u t of it altogether. The im p o rt of D ecem b er's in itiativ e w a s e v en less clear set a g ain st th e larger, tro u b le d reco rd of w artim e race relations. T h o u g h energetic, the Fair E m p lo y m en t Practice C o m m ittee (FEPC) "b y n o m ean s reflected the sen tim en ts of th e R oosevelt a d m in istratio n , w h ic h o p p o se d its creation, gave it lip service in stea d of su p p o rt, u se d it cal­ lo u sly to d efu se black p ro test, a n d blocked it w h e n political ex p ediency so dic­ tate d ." W hite a n d black w o rk e rs som etim es allied, b u t violence a g ain st blacks (especially b y ru ra l w h ites n e w to in d u stria l labor) o ften e ru p te d in th e w o rk ­ place a n d c o rp o ra te lead ers b ra n d e d th e FEPC th e "D ev il's W orkshop." La­ b o r's resp o n se to blacks' asp iratio n s v aried , b u t especially in th e South, n o w h ite u n io n ist d a re d "to b e called a n ig g er lo v er" a n d w h ite lab o r lead ers "faced th e co n tra d ic tio n b e tw ee n a n a rro w dem o cracy th a t p riv ileg ed th e in ter­ ests of the w h ite m ajority a n d a m o re inclusive v isio n th a t so u g h t eq u al rig h ts for w h ite a n d black alike." Blacks still e n d u re d legal a n d in fo rm al seg reg a­ tion, u g ly racial violence, a n d p a in fu l hum iliatio n s: th ey w a tch e d G erm an p riso n ers-o f-w ar d in e w h e re black soldiers w ere fo rb id d en , saw ch am p io n s of racial ch an g e labelled "co m m u n ist," a n d fo u n d sy m p a th ize rs like E leanor R oosevelt subjected to vicious ru m o rs. "Before v icto ry in E u ro p e a n d Japan, blacks k n ew th a t th ey h a d lost the b a ttle for v icto ry a t h o m e."73 Yet this w a r w a s different. Like o th er w ars, it p ro d u c e d im m en se tem p o rary ch an g e w ith rip p le effects long after, b u t m o re th a n th a t it also forged a lasting in teractio n b e tw e e n n a tio n al security a n d social ch an g e th a t w as h a rd to fore­ see in 1944. A s im p o rta n t as the gains a n d losses for p a rtic u la r g ro u p s in this n e w era w a s a basic ch an g e in the ru les of th e gam e: th e lan g u ag e a n d p e rc ep ­ tio n s of n a tio n al security increasingly set those rules. E ven if on ly g iv in g th em lip service, FDR e n u n ciated the n e w rules: "In som e co m m u n ities em p lo y ers dislik e to h ire w o m en . In o th ers th ey are relu c ta n t to h ire N egroes. We can n o lo n g er afford to in d u lg e su c h p rejudice." O r as one black w o m a n said , sp eak in g to b o th race a n d g en d er, "H itle r w a s the one th a t g o t u s o u t of th e w h ite folks' k itch en ."74 A p p eals for eq u ality g ro u n d e d in th e necessities of global p o w e r a n d im age only g ain ed force w h e n w o rld w a r gave w a y to cold w ar. T his w a r's a fte rm a th w o u ld be different. E ven tem p o ra ry social changes w ere m assive in race relations a n d o th er

02

THE

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OF AMERICA

spheres. R enew ing a n o ld m ig ratio n , blacks flo o d ed o u t of th e ru ra l S o u th into its cities or to those in th e N o rth a n d W est, w h e re lab o r sh o rtag es g ave th e m som e leverage in g ain in g jobs. T hey jo in ed w h ite s in a m ig ra tio n to w a rtim e jobs th a t o ften b re d sh a rp conflicts, in ten se e v en w h e n race w a s n o t a n issue, b e tw ee n a to w n 's n e w a n d o ld e r in h ab itan ts. D etro it's 1943 race riots, in w h ic h blacks suffered th e w o rst, w ere the m o st in fam o u s result. E ven in a so u th e rn city like B irm ingham , h ow ever, blacks' "daily, u n o rg a n iz e d , evasive, seem ­ in g ly sp o n ta n e o u s actions" a g ain st p e tty o r v io le n t in d ig n ities from w h ite b u s d riv e rs a n d p a sse n g ers sh o w ed h o w th e w a r b e g a n to u n d e rm in e Jim C ro w a n d h o w resistance to it w e n t b e y o n d m iddle-class b lack o rg an izatio n s. Black am b ition, w h ite racism , a n d w a rtim e n e e d so m etim es cu rio u sly w o rk e d to ­ gether. M ilitary lea d ers d e sp e ra te for m a n p o w e r lo o k ed to ill-ed u cated blacks p rev io u sly e x clu d ed fro m service, ju st w h e n black resen tm en t a t exclusion m o u n te d a n d M ississippi se n ato r T h eodore Bilbo v e n te d w h ite fu ry a t h o w th e d ra ft w a s "tak in g all th e w h ites to m eet th e q u o ta a n d leav in g th e g reat m ajo rity of th e N egroes a t h o m e." A s a result, "th e a rm y co m m itted itself to a m ajo r ef­ fo rt to u p g ra d e th e e d u c a tio n of black recru its," as w ell as p o o re r w h ites a n d no n -E n g lish -sp eak in g m em b ers of m in o rities.75 The e n try of w o m e n in to the w o rk force, p ro m o te d b y g o v e rn m e n t a n d b u si­ n ess as a n o th e r re q u ire m e n t for victory, w a s e q u ally visible. T he p a id fem ale w o rk force g rew o v er 50 p e rc en t b e tw e e n 1940 a n d 1945; th ree -fo u rth s of n e w fem ale w o rk e rs w ere m arried , th o u g h o n ly a m in o rity of m o th e rs w o rk ed . By 1945, w o m e n c o m p rise d 36.1 p e rc en t of th e civilian lab o r force. M ore strik in g w a s th e m o v em en t of a few h u n d re d th o u sa n d in to m ilita ry service, w h e re th ey n o w g ain ed form al m ilitary sta tu s ra th e r th a n serv in g , as w o m e n h a d p re v i­ ously, as m ere ad ju n cts to the a rm e d forces. M ost w o m e n in a n d o u t of th e m ili­ ta ry still h e ld sex -stereo ty p ed jobs in n u rsin g , clerical w o rk , lig h t assem bly, a n d th e like, b u t o th ers w o rk e d in h e a v y in d u stry , se rv ed as m ilitary d o cto rs, o r (for a b o u t one th o u sa n d w o m en ) teste d a n d ferried w a rp la n es. Real o r alleged co nvulsions in fam ily life w ere a n o th e r d im e n sio n of w a rtim e social change, attrib u ta b le in p a rt to accelerated g eo g rap h ic m obility, th e ab ­ sence of fathers, a n d the e n try of m o th e rs in to th e w o rk force. A la rm m o u n te d a b o u t the b re a k u p of ex te n d ed fam ilies, ju v en ile delin q u en cy , w ifely infi­ delities, a n d the th re a t to social stab ility a n d fam ily in te g rity th a t th ese ch an g es p resu m ab ly posed. T he w a r also d im in ish e d ethnic a n d religious cleavages, in p a rt b ecau se th ey w ere su b o rd in a te d , a t least in theory, to "th e id ea th a t w h a t u n ite d A m ericans w as a g reat deal m ore im p o rta n t th a n w h a t d iv id e d th em ." W artim e cu ltu re a n d m ilitary service w o rk e d p o w e rfu lly to assim ilate E u ro p ea n ethnics, e sp e­ cially the m en am o n g th em , a n d to forge th eir A m erican identity. T h at cine­ m atic staple, the m u lti-eth n ic a n d in te rd en o m in atio n al a rm y p la to o n o r b o m b er crew , only c ru d ely reflected reality b u t also re sh a p e d it, a n d H o lly ­ w o o d m ad e su re th a t "fo reig n ers w e re n o lo n g er fu n n y folk w ith rid ic u lo u s

TRIUMPH,

1941-1945

I 03

accents a n d in co n g ru o u s cu sto m s," w ith exceptions for G e rm a n s a n d Japanese. Som e g ro u p s also g ain ed from political initiatives. M ovies c h an g e d in p a rt u n ­ d e r p re ssu re fro m fed eral officials w h o feared alien atin g allies a b ro a d o r e th ­ nics a t ho m e. E yeing the b allo t box, FD R m in im iz ed restrictio n s o n G e rm a n a n d Italian aliens. Jew ish a n d H ispanic-A m erican s also m a d e gains, d e sp ite p e rsistin g h o stility to w a rd b o th g ro u p s (an d violence b y serv icem en ag ain st M exican-A m erican "zo o t-su iters" in Los A ngeles). O th e r factors d im in ish e d social divisions: w a rtim e m ig ra tio n loosened ties to eth n ic n e ig h b o rh o o d s; im ­ m ig ra tio n 's v irtu a l e n d sh ru n k th e p ro p o rtio n of n o n citizen s in th e p o p u latio n . S uch easin g of ethnic friction w o rk e d h a n d in h a n d w ith th e m u tin g of class lin es th a t w a rtim e affluence e n co u rag e d , a lth o u g h th ere w ere lim its: "W here eth n ic d istin ctio n s w ere m u te d a n d class lines b lu rre d , racial differences w ere e x acerb ated ."76 Italian-A m ericans illu stra te d h o w "th e w a r w a s th e fuel of th e m eltin g p o t." T hey b e g a n th e w a r in a n a w k w a rd p o sitio n — a w id e ly d isd a in e d m inority, o n e earlier inclined to reg a rd Benito M ussolini favorably, th eir h o m e la n d offi­ cially a t w a r w ith th e U n ited States u n til 1943. D espite th o se d isa d v an tag e s, th ey m a d e n o tab le g ain s after Pearl H arbor. It h e lp e d th a t th ey ex p ressed p a s­ sio n ately A m erican loyalties in w a y s th a t "flattered th e n a tio n 's ego," a n d y et felt little n e e d to forgo " tra d itio n a l Italian p a trio tism " since M u sso lin i w a s n o w v iew ed as its betray er, n o t its exem plar. It h e lp e d also th a t th e p ress n o w trea te d M ussolini as a joke ra th e r th a n a m enace (the "S a w d u st C aesar" full of "balco ny b rag g ad o cio "), th ereb y d ism issin g th e u g lin ess of h is fascist ru le a n d th e fact th a t m a n y A m ericans, WASP as w ell as h y p h e n a te d , once a d m ire d him . C o n tem p t, like fear, h a d a p ric e — FDR th o u g h t Italian s w ere "a lot of o p era sin g ers," w h ile G erm an s w ere " d a n g e ro u s" — b u t it let Italian -A m erican s off th e h o o k to a d egree. B aseball's D iM aggio b ro th ers, m u sic's A rtu ro Toscanini, H o lly w o o d 's F ran k C ap ra, a n d N e w Y ork's M ay o r Fiorello L aG u ard ia becam e icons of lo y alty a n d achievem ent, a n d Italian -A m erican m e n fo u n d m ilitary service, d u rin g a n d a fte r W orld W ar II, a vehicle of assim ilatio n , u p w a rd m o ­ bility, a n d in som e cases political electability. So d id o th er E u ro p ea n ethnics, especially C atholics: John K en n ed y 's w a rtim e heroics o n th e P T 109 w ere v ital for h im a t the b a llo t box in the late 1940s. For these eth n ic A m ericans, th e w a r w a s a m ajor reaso n for th e ir a ttac h m en t to p atrio tic c u ltu re in th e C old W ar a n d for th eir fu ry a t th o se w h o attack ed it d u rin g th e V ietn am W ar.77 If E u ro p ea n eth n ics b en efited , Filipinos in A m erica m e t m o re com plex cross­ c u rre n ts in w a r 's m eltin g pot. E leanor R oosevelt cau g h t th e id ealist w ave, p raisin g Filipinos w h o fo u g h t b esid e A m erican s a t B ataan as " a n excellent ex­ am p le of w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n tw o different races resp ect each o th er." C h a n g e cam e, b u t a t tim es in ironic w ays: Filipinos w ere u rg e d to b u y th e lan d of in ter­ n e d Japanese-A m ericans, w h o m m a n y Filipinos sco rn ed , sh o w in g h o w w a r re­ d irected social hostilities as m u ch as it am elio rated them . For A sian-A m ericans generally, as for blacks a n d ev en m ore so for E u ro p ea n ethnics, leverage w a s

I 04

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w ru n g from w a rtim e n e e d for th eir service a n d th e sp irit of u n ity a g ain st racist foes. A s one A sian In d ia n a rg u e d , g iven H itle r's claim for "th e rig h t of the m y th ically su p e rio r N o rd ic" race to c o n q u er "so-called in ferio r p e o p le s," th e U n ited States co u ld "ill afford to practice racial d isc rim in atio n " to w a rd "A sia­ tic c o u n tries" o r th e ir k in in A m erica. B arriers to im m ig ratio n a n d m ilita ry ser­ vice w ere low ered, to "silence th e d isto rte d Japanese p ro p a g a n d a ," as FD R p u t it. It m a d e all th e difference if a g ro u p id en tified w ith a c o u n try (like C h in a a n d th e P h ilippines) ra v a g e d b y the en em y o r resistin g its ad v an ce (as w ith In d ia, th o u g h u n d e r B ritish rule). W artim e leverag e h a d lim its, h o w ev er. D o m in an t v iew s co u ld still b e hostile, lu m p in g all A sian s w ith th e Japanese enem y, o r ca­ su ally condescending: th e w a r w as "a p e rso n al g ru d g e " for "th ese p in t-siz ed so ld iers," th e American Legion Magazine said of Filipinos in A m erican u n i­ fo rm .78 For o th er social g ro u p s, w a rtim e ch an g e w a s less a p p a re n t o r lasting. D is­ ab led A m ericans saw th e ir n e e d s a n d co n trib u tio n s h ig h lig h ted , as th ey p ro ­ v id e d a d ra ft-p ro o f po o l of w o rk e rs for lab o r-h u n g ry b u sin esses or re tu rn e d h o m e in ju red from w a r duty, b u t th ey rem a in e d m arg in al to m a in strea m A m er­ ica. E ven m ore a m b ig u o u s w ere th e changes for g ay a n d lesb ian A m ericans, w h o w ere barely ack now ledged. R are in d e e d w a s a p u b lic p red ic tio n like P h ilip W ylie's, th a t w a rtim e co n d itio n s "w ill in a u g u ra te a n e w sp re a d of h o m o ­ sexuality," m u c h less his a d m o n itio n th a t "to trea t it as a fien d ish m an ifesta­ tion, like a x -m u rd e rin g , is silly."79 Still, perceiv ed w a rtim e n e e d s d id m ak e for change. M ilitary officials often o n ly w in k e d a t th e b a n o n h om osexuals, a n d th eir p referen ce for th e y o u n g a n d th e u n m a rrie d — a p re g n a n t w o m a n w a s the last th in g th ey w a n te d — tilted re­ c ru itm e n t a n d c o n scrip tio n to w a rd gay m e n a n d w o m en . W ar jobs a n d m ilita ry service to o k gay p e o p le aw ay from fam ily a n d sm all-to w n c u ltu re in to cities w ith g ay b a rs a n d o th er elem ents of a n e w su b cu ltu re. M ilitary life b lu rre d b o u n d a rie s b e tw ee n h o m o sex u ality a n d hetero sex u ality ; sh a rin g a b u d d y 's b u n k or sh o u ld e r w a s so com m on th a t y o u "co u ld g e t a w ay w ith it in th a t at­ m o sp h ere," as one officer p u t it.80 For m a n y lesbians a n d g ay m en , th e w a r ex­ p erien ce m ad e it easier to realize a n d act o n th eir iden tities. E lem ents of th eir experience ev en surfaced to p o p u la r atten tio n , th o u g h n o o n e p u t a label o n th em . This Is the Army, replete w ith o u trag e o u s d ra g ro u tin es b y soldiers, to u re d the n a tio n as stage sh o w a n d m ovie. For g ay A m ericans, th e w a r m a rk e d a tran sitio n to a m ore cohesive sense of co m m u n ity a n d a n e w p u b lic profile. For them , how ever, as for w o m e n generally, w ith w h o m th eir fo rtu n es often w ere linked, the w a r cut in tw o sh a rp ly o p p o se d w ay s, y ield in g b o th h e ig h t­ e n ed pro g ress a n d h e ig h ten e d peril. G ro w in g v isibility w a s p a rt of the p ro b le m — a w o m a n in a n o n ste reo ty p ed job as w e ld e r o r d octor, o r a g ay sol­ d ier w h o se sexual id en tity w as revealed, w as also ex p o sed to d iscrim in atio n a n d ridicule. T here w ere su b tler p ro b lem s as w ell, in clu d in g ch an g es in p u b lic

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105

po licy a n d cu ltu re, the full effects of w h ic h o n ly e m e rg ed after th e w ar. The m ilitary, for exam ple, u rg e d o n b y p sy ch iatrists a n d o th e r ex p erts, fo rm alized a p ath o lo g ical concept of h o m o sex u ality a n d a p p lie d it p u n itiv e ly to g ays a n d lesbians, especially after th e w ar. The w a r th u s placed lib eratin g a n d rep ressiv e forces o n a collision course w ith each other, lea d in g "to a red efin itio n of h o m o ­ se x u ality as a political issu e."81 A sim ilar collision a w a ite d m a n y w om en. From th e start, th e call for th em to serv e th e cause w a s h a lfh e a rte d a n d contested j t w a s n e v e r as stro n g as in Brit­ ain, w h ic h u se d co n scrip tio n to ch an n el w o m e n w o rk ers. It w a s resisted b y m a le-d o m in ated u n io n s a n d com panies. A n d it w a s sh a rp ly lim ited reg a rd in g m ilita ry service; w ith fem ale soldiers o ften b ra n d e d as slu ts (or lesbians), re­ c ru itm e n t fell far sh o rt of G eneral M arsh all's goals. M oreover, p ro p a g a n d a a n d p o litical rhetoric insisted th a t w o m e n re tu rn to tra d itio n a l roles as w iv es a n d m o th e rs after v icto ry — the a p ro n w a s n earb y in m a n y w a rtim e ad v ertisem en ts p ic tu rin g w o m e n a t w o rk — o r in d e e d th a t th ey h a d n e v e r d e p a rte d from th o se roles. T he u b iq u ito u s te rm "h o m efro n t," w h ere m o st w o m e n p resu m ab ly serv ed , im p lied th a t th ey n e v e r really left the h o m e b u t o n ly e x te n d e d its reach. E ven in u n iform , th eir fem ale c o m m an d e rs m ain tain ed , th ey w ere "o n ly p e r­ fo rm in g the d u tie s th a t w o m e n w o u ld o rd in arily d o in civilian life" a n d w ere "as likely as o th er w o m e n to m ake m arriag e th eir p ro fessio n " after th e w ar. The p re ssu re o n w o rk in g w o m e n to re tu rn h o m e w a s all th e g reater g iv en th e b lam e th ey g o t for fam ily tu rm o il a n d child neglect: th e "latch k ey ch ild w as o n e of the m o st p itie d h o m efro n t figures of th e Second W orld W ar, a n d h is o r h e r w o rk in g m o th e r w a s n o t o n ly criticized b u t e v en rev iled ." Too, w o m e n w ere assig n ed resp o n sib ility for sm o o th in g m ale v e te ran s' re a d ju stm e n t to civilian life. Fed­ eral law gave force to su ch attitu d es; re tu rn in g v e te ran s (w ho w ere m o stly m en) h a d a claim o n jobs th a t civilians, in m a n y cases w o m en , h a d tak e n d u rin g th e w ar. A s a result, "th e b re a k d o w n of th e sex-segregated lab o r m a rk e t neces­ sita te d b y W orld W ar II d id n o t su rv iv e." T he w a r d id p ro m o te lastin g c h an g e s— d ra in in g w o m e n a w ay fro m ag ricu ltu re a n d dom estic service, lead ­ in g m a rrie d w o m e n to w o rk — b u t n o t in the sta tu s a n d sex-segregated n a tu re of m o st w o m e n 's w o rk .82 O ften sh a rin g p rev a ilin g a ttitu d e s, m a n y w o m e n fo u n d th e m reinforced b y practical circum stances: loneliness a n d d isru p tio n of fam ily life, w a rtim e scar­ cities, a n d th e absence of m e n m a d e p a id w o rk a b u rd e n for m any, especially g iv en a risin g b irth ra te (the v a u n te d p o stw a r "b ab y b o o m " b e g a n d u rin g the w ar). H ence som e w o m e n w o rk e d relu ctan tly o r briefly, eag er to go h o m e w h e n the w a r w as over. T hey h a d reaso n to em brace "th e id eo lo g y of 'fam ily to g eth ern e ss' " u su a lly associated w ith the p o stw a r y ears b u t sw ellin g d u rin g th e w a r.83 A s alw ays, m a n y w o m e n — w id o w e d , d iv o rced , p o o r, black— h a d n o su c h luxury, a n d w a rtim e su rv e y s sh o w ed th a t m o st w o rk in g w o m e n w a n te d to keep th eir jobs, b u t p rev a ilin g a ttitu d e s a n d law , w h ile n o t arrestin g w o m e n 's lo n g -term m o v em en t into p a id labor, co n stricted th e term s o n w h ich

I 06

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th ey w o u ld w o rk after the w ar. It could h a rd ly b e o th erw ise, g iv en th a t w o m e n 's role w as g ro u n d e d in calculations of n a tio n al ex p ed ien cy m o re th a n social justice. T hose calculations also lim ited w o m e n 's role in politics. S h o rtag es of m e n in g o v e rn m e n t a n d p a rty o rg an izatio n s o p e n ed so m e d o o rs for w o m e n — th eir sh are of g o v e rn m e n t jobs d o u b le d b e tw e e n 1940 a n d 1944— a n d th e visibility of a few w o m e n like E leanor R oosevelt a n d Frances P erk in s w a s strik in g . Still, political w o m e n d u rin g the w a r a n d early C old W ar y ears "e m p h a siz e d w o m e n 's responsibilities as citizens ra th e r th a n w o m e n 's rig h ts."84 T hus, w h ile w a r raised w o m e n 's im p o rtan ce to th e n atio n , it also su b o rd in a te d th e ir in te r­ ests to a p re su m e d collective urgency. M oreover, w a r sw elled in stitu tio n s of p o w e r th a t m en d o m in a ted , w hile su b o rd in a tin g o r sh rin k in g th e social w el­ fare bu reaucracies in w h ich p rofessional w o m e n earlier h a d g a in e d n u m b e rs a n d po w er. W artim e c u ltu ra l co n serv atism also lim ited ch an g es in g e n d e r a n d w o m e n 's roles. E specially early in the w ar, th e forces of sex u al re stra in t a n d cen so rsh ip w ere o n th e m arch. T he Post Office lau n c h ed a n e w c ru sa d e to elim in ate ob­ scene m aterial from th e m ails, a n d th e m ovie in d u stry reitera te d its b a n o n "il­ licit sex w ith o u t a d e q u a te c o m p e n sa tin g m o ral v alu es, offensive sex su g ­ g estiveness, n u d ity . . . sex p erv e rsio n ," a n d th e like.85 W hile su c h m ea su re s cu rb e d im ages d e g ra d in g to w o m e n , th ey also rested o n th e n o tio n th a t w o m e n w ere responsible for m a in tain in g sexual v irtu e, all th e m ore so since th e y p re ­ su m a b ly sta y ed b e h in d to m a in ta in th e hom e. M en in service, too, w e re u rg e d to practice sexual restrain t, b u t as a m a tte r of m ilita ry n ecessity ra th e r th a n m o ral duty. W artim e anxieties a b o u t sexual license, like th o se a b o u t fam ily in ­ stability, bore d o w n far m ore o n w om en. W om en's roles a n d d u tie s w ere a t least m atters of o p e n if n o t e d ify in g d e ­ bate. Less a p p a re n t w a s a n u n d e rc u rre n t of ch arg ed im ag es of w o m e n th a t sw elled in A nglo-A m erican c u ltu re d u rin g a n d after th e w ar. A t o n e level, these im ages w ere positive, o r so it m ig h t seem in th e w a rtim e id e a liz atio n of "M om " as a sym bolic rep o sito ry of the security for w h ic h so ld iers p re su m a b ly fo u g h t, o r in the fad of the far-aw ay so ld ie r's p in -u p girl, seen b y W ecter as " n o t on ly a sy m p to m of sex b u t a sym bol of h o m e ."86 A t an o th e r level, h ow ever, these im ages ex p o sed d a rk em o tio n s, like the u g ly insistence th a t w o m e n sacrifice sexually to m e n (even as th e y w ere also to u p h o ld sexual virtue). "Jokes ab o u t w o m e n g o in g 'a ll-o u t' for th e w a r effort w ere legion," one h isto ria n notes, w h ile th e T reasu ry D e p a rtm e n t once sold w a r b o n d s w ith a "d eta ch m en t of th irte e n N e w York ch orines w h o b o a rd e d th e W ashington-R ichm ond tra in w e arin g th e scan tiest of b a th in g su its, th e rest of th eir b o d ies covered w ith ten-cent d efense stam p s. . . . In v itin g p a sse n g ers to p u rch a se sta m p s a n d peel th em off, the chorin es b ro u g h t in five h u n d re d d o l­ lars to the U.S. T reasury in the space of n in e m in u tes." U rg ed to serv e m e n sex­ ually, w o m e n also e n d u re d m ale resen tm en ts o v er th e sacrifices m e n m a d e o r

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th e em ascu latio n , literal or figurative, m e n faced. John H ersey p o rtra y e d th e " w a r lo v er" as "a sadistic w o m an -h ater, w h o in b e d "m ak es h a te — attacks, rap es, m ilks h is g lan d ; a n d th in k s th a t m ak es h im a m a n ." 87 O th e r im ages b e tra y e d resen tm en t of th e au th o rity a n d co m fo rt w o m e n g a in e d a t hom e. "T he fat w ife com fortably sleep in g / Sighs a n d licks h e r lips a n d sm iles," one p o e m beg an . S oldiers' letters fo u n d som e of th em "b eg in n in g to w o n d e r a b o u t th eir h e n p ec k ed sta tu s after th e w ar, in re tu rn in g to th e m as­ terfu l w o m e n w h o se p ictu res th ey see d riv in g riv ets a n d lo ad in g tru ck s." W ith po etic license, w o m e n could e v en b e h e ld resp o n sib le for m e n 's aw fu l fate in w ar: O w a r is a casual m istress A n d th e w o rld is h e r d o u b le bed. She h a s few ch arm s in h e r m ech an ized arm s But y o u w a k e u p a n d fin d y o u rself d ead . M ovies so o n reflected m ale anxieties: p o rtra y a ls of fem ale com p eten ce gave w a y to im ages of "treach ery o r h elp lessn ess" (or "d o w n rig h t stu p id ity "). W o m en's m a n ip u la tiv e evil w a s p o w e rfu lly co n v ey ed b y B arbara S tan w y ck in Double Indemnity (1944), as she se d u ce d Fred M acM u rray in to killing h e r h u s ­ b a n d .88 T here w a s also fear th a t a fem in ized A m erica w o u ld b e u n e q u a l to th e task of w a r a n d w o rld pow er. E ven before P earl H arb o r, m a te rn a l o v e rp ro te ctio n — or d e p riv a tio n — w a s seen as u n d e rm in in g th e n a tio n 's m o ral fitness o r m ascu lin e fiber. "W h a t h a s becom e of th e m an h o o d of A m erica, th a t w e h av e to call o n o u r w o m e n to d o w h a t h a s ev er b e e n th e d u ty of m en ?" ra n a co m p lain t ag ain st a llo w in g w o m e n in to th e a rm e d forces. Jo n a th an D aniels p u t th e a rg u m e n t for m ascu lin e v irtu e m ore positively: "In a n A m erica g ro w n m agn ificen tly m ale a g ain w e h av e th e chance to fight for a h o m elan d . . . . [N ow ] a m a n can b e w h a t a n A m erican m ean s, can fight for w h a t A m erica h a s alw ay s m ea n t." P ain ter T h o m as H a rt B enton, in phallic im agery, h o p e d th a t " w h e n th is w a r is over, a n e w a n d b e tte r A m erica w h ip p e d into sh a p e b y sacrifice a n d h a rd e n e d b y a re b irth of m ale w ill is going to rise. If this d o es n o t occur th ere w ill b e n o A m er­ ica."89 N o w o n d e r, S u san G u b a r concludes, th a t w o m e n 's lite ra tu re a b o u t W orld W ar II d o c u m e n te d " w o m e n 's sense th a t th e w a r w a s a b litz o n th em ," o r th a t o n e h isto ria n offered th e a m b ig u o u s title Women at War with America. In tu rn , m e n 's alien atio n from w o m e n sa n ctio n ed th eir in te n se b o n d s am o n g each o th e r— th o u g h n o t sexual ones, "for h o m o sex u als are typ ically p re se n te d in W orld W ar II lite ra tu re as g u ilt-rid d en , p ath o lo g ically violent, a n d suicid al." O th e r im ag es— p ro p a g a n d a p o rtra y in g w o m e n infecting so ld iers w ith v e n e ­ real disease a n d n o v els p o rtra y in g N azis as d e p ra v e d h o m o sex u als— lin k ed w o m e n a n d gays w ith the enem y.90 O f course, c u ltu ra l im ages w ere h a rd ly u n ifo rm a n d h a rd ly reflected th e di-

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verse experiences of real m en a n d w om en. A n d it m a y be th a t a n y p ro tra c te d w a r ten d s to in sp ire su ch im ages, g iven th e p re m iu m it trad itio n a lly places o n m ascu line v irtu e, m ale sacrifice, a n d w o m e n 's s u p p o rt of th o se values. In m a n y c o u n tries b e sid es the U n ited States, n atio n alism a n d w a r h av e p ro m o te d d e ­ g ra d in g im ages of w o m e n a n d hom osexuals, th e rep re ssio n of sexual license u n lea sh e d b y w a r's dislocations, a n d "p ro -n ata list" ideo lo g ies a n d policies e n ­ sh rin in g th e fam ily a n d w o m e n 's role in servicing m e n a n d b re e d in g chil­ d ren .91 But W orld W ar II exacerbated th o se tendencies. M en en te red it w ith little of th e protective id ealism felt in W orld W ar I, a n d sen sed g rea ter em ascu ­ latio n a n d d e h u m a n iz a tio n a t the h a n d s of a d v an c in g technology. A n d w o m e n felt less of the cohesion a n d o p tim ism p ro v id e d b y fem in ism at its h ig h tid e in 1917, a n d a k een er se n se — in a n ticip atio n th o u g h n o t experience for A m erican s— th a t m o d e m technology m a d e th e h o m efro n t, a n d therefo re w o m en , v u ln erab le to d estruction. Ju st as w a r offered b o th h e ig h te n e d p ro m ise a n d h e ig h te n e d p e ril for w o m e n a n d hom osexuals, it d id so for all m arg in al social g ro u p s to som e d e ­ gree. Prejudices o v e rla p p e d in com plex o r seem in g ly b iza rre w ays: Jew s w ere som etim es lu m p e d w ith G erm an s as in itiato rs of E u ro p e's w ar; ru m o rs in th e S outh of "E leanor C lu b s" fu sed n o tio n s of g e n d e r a n d race in v isio n s of "col­ o red cooks a n d m a id s w h o h av e v o w e d to a b a n d o n d o m estic service as d e ­ g ra d in g ."92 Still, p ro m ise a n d p e ril w ere n o t c o n fro n ted e q u ally b y all g ro u p s. Som e enjoyed strik in g b u t tra n sie n t gains: th e in co m es of A m erican In d ian s a n d th eir contacts w ith w h ite society so ared d u rin g th e w ar, b u t th e g ain s o ften d id n o t o u tlast th e w a r a n d assim ilatio n d isru p te d th e ir in d iv id u a l a n d collec­ tive identities. G ro u p s h a d different experiences in p a rt b ecau se th ey h a d v a rie d access to th e ideological leverage the w a r p ro v id e d . E ven su p erficial acq u ain tan ce b y m o st A m ericans w ith N a zism te n d e d to d isc red it racial a n d eth n ic prejudice. N o com parable leverage existed for w o m e n a n d gays, a lth o u g h E leanor R oose­ velt d id d en o u n ce ru m o rs of im m o rality a n d lesb ian ism am o n g serv icew o m en as " 'N az i in sp ired ,' evidence of H itle r's desire to 'g e t all w o m e n b ack in to th e h o m e a n d o u t of the w a r e ffo rt.'" A n d leverage cam e b e la te d ly a t b e st to Japanese-A m ericans, o r to In d ian s, w h o se co n trib u tio n w a s o ften v a lu e d o n ly in w h ite term s ("A red m a n w ill risk h is life for a w h ite as d a u n tlessly as h is an cestor lifted a p aleface's scalp," ra n one jo u rn a list's p raise).93 W h atever the balance sh eet of gain s a n d losses fo r th ese d isp a ra te g ro u p s, h o w ev er, th ey h a d in co m m o n the linkage of th e ir fo rtu n es to th e in stitu tio n s, rationales, a n d c u ltu re of w ar. M em bers of each g ro u p trie d to w re st w h a t th ey co u ld from th a t lin k ag e— in tu rn o n ly tig h te n in g it. T h at w a s e v id e n t in the w a y som e w o m e n 's g ro u p s u se d the w a r to revitalize su p p o rt for an E q u al R ights A m en d m en t, n o w h alfh earted ly e n d o rse d b y b o th m ajo r political p a r­ ties, a n d to give w o m e n p e rm a n en t, reg u la r sta tu s in th e m ilitary. It w a s evi-

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d e n t in race rela tio n s— in the v e ry a ssu m p tio n th a t th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t h a d in d efense contracts the sanction it p resu m ab ly o th erw ise lacked to b a n d is­ crim in ation, a n d in the decision of black lead ers to m ak e in te g ratio n of th e a rm e d forces th eir p rem ier goal. E ven th e m o st m arg in al g ro u p s ev in ced the p attern : g ay v e te ran s in d ig n a n t ov er th e d en ial of benefits o r m ilitary careers fo rm ed th e first, fledgling gay rig h ts g roups. T he a ttac h m en t of social ch an g e to w a r a n d n a tio n al secu rity in tu rn m ad e th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t m ore th a n e v er the k ey force in social relations. W hile th e w a r w e ak e n ed N e w D eal liberalism a n d co n serv ativ es seized o n it to g et g o v e rn m e n t o u t of "social en g in eerin g ," in fact th e w a r d e e p e n e d g o v e rn ­ m e n t's im m ersio n in social w elfare a n d social change. It also sh ifted th e action, h o w ev er, from N e w D eal social service agencies to in stitu tio n s of w ar, above all th e a rm e d forcés, w h ic h relu ctan tly or resen tfu lly p io n ee red n e w roles for w o m e n a n d blacks. W hile th a t shift w a s anom alo u s, assig n in g refo rm to a n a u ­ th o rita ria n in stitu tio n , it also m a d e it h a rd to categorize th e m ilitary as a conser­ v a tiv e institution. E ven h id e b o u n d officers h a d to accept social change. T he GI Bill, p a sse d b y C ongress in 1944, w as th e c ro w n in g ex am p le of gov­ e rn m e n t's n e w role in social change. G a m e rin g e n o rm o u s atten tio n , it e m b o d ­ ied th e w a r 's co m p etin g forces of ch an g e a n d stasis. Som e of th o se w ere p a ro ­ chial: th e A m erican L egion w e ig h ed in heavily, as d id th e h o u sin g in d u stry a n d h ig h er ed u catio n , b o th h o p e fu l th a t GI benefits w o u ld h e lp th em recover from th e w ar, w h e n college a tten d a n ce a n d h o m e co n stru ctio n sh ran k . G ra n d e r d e ­ signs for n a tio n al p o w e r a n d p ro sp e rity also sh a p e d th e bill. S p eak in g to w a r­ tim e exigencies, FDR saw it as g iv in g "em p h atic notice to th e m en a n d w o m e n in th e a rm e d forces th a t th e A m erican p eo p le d o n o t in te n d to le t th em d o w n ." A s o n e official b lu n tly p u t it, "T he n e e d to u p h o ld th e m o rale of th e servicem en co m p elled th e A d m in istra tio n to act." R etrain in g v e te ran s in n e w specialties like av iatio n a n d electronics also w o u ld stre n g th e n A m erica's fu tu re m ilitary a n d econom ic po w er, ju st as re w a rd in g this g e n eratio n 's so ld iers w a s v ital for recru itin g th e next. O v er su ch specific calculations h u n g a g en eral sense of obli­ g a tio n to v eteran s, m a d e stro n g e r because m o st w ere d ra fte d .94 T he re su lt w as a sh a rp d e p a rtu re from p a st p ro g ram s for v eteran s, w h ich h a d b e e n n arro w , m iserly, a n d o ften co rru p t. For 16 m illion v eteran s, the Ser­ v icem en 's R eadjustm ent A ct of 1944 offered u n e m p lo y m e n t b en efits for u p to a year, aid a n d preference in g e ttin g jobs, tu itio n a n d living allow ances to p u rsu e ed u catio n , low -interest m o rtg ag es (som e 3.75 m illion v e te ran s b o u g h t h o m es u n d e r th e law , o ften w ith a to k en o n e-d o llar d o w n p ay m en t), loans to p u rch ase b u sin esses o r farm s, m edical care th ro u g h th e V eterans A d m in istra tio n (VA), su b sid ies a n d reh ab ilitatio n for th e d isab led , a n d special access to su rp lu s w a r p ro p erty . T here w ere lim its to th e generosity. S o u th ern w h ites fearful of losing su b serv ien t black labor trim m ed the law 's e d u ca tio n al pro v isio n s. D enied cov­ erag e w ere v e te ran s d ish o n o ra b ly d isch arg ed (w hich in clu d ed m a n y g ay m en

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a n d lesbians), convicted of crim in al acts, o r e n g ag e d in q u a sim ilita ry d u ty — M erch an t M arines, d e sp ite th e ir severe casu alty rate, a n d W o m en 's A irforce Service Pilots. T he m ea su re n a rro w e d a n d rech an n eled th e im p u lse to w a rd e x p a n d e d so­ cial w elfare th a t m a n y liberals ch am p io n ed . S hortly before p assag e, W ecter p red ic te d th a t aid to v e te ran s w o u ld b e fo ld ed in to " b ro a d e r id eas of social re­ sp o n sib ility " arisin g o u t of th e N e w D eal, w ith n a tio n al h e a lth a n d accid en t in su ran ce "o n th e cards." But as one h isto ria n n o tes, "N e w D eal a tte m p ts to lin k in d isso lu b ly v e te ra n s' benefits w ith g en eral n e ed s of th e p o p u la tio n failed: th e GI Bill of R ights e m e rg ed as a v e te ra n s' m easu re." T h at failu re sp lit th e n a ­ tio n 's w elfare sy stem into "o n e for th e g en eral p o p u la tio n , o n e for th e v e te ra n p o p u la tio n ," creating "a special w elfare state" for th o se " d e e m e d esp ecially d e ­ serv in g ." O utlays o n v e te ra n s' services a n d benefits, a v erag in g $7 b illio n in fis­ cal y ears 1947-1950, w ere m ore th a n trip le all o th er sp e n d in g o n social w elfare, h ealth , h o u sin g , a n d ed u catio n , a n d h a lf as larg e as th e d efen se b u d g e t, c u sh ­ io n in g its sh a rp d ecline in these years. By th e sam e to k en , th e GI Bill sh o w ed h o w w a r sa n ctio n ed initiatives in social w elfare o rd in arily u n accep tab le to m a n y A m ericans, a sanction th a t w o u ld e n d u re lo n g after th e w ar. N a tio n a l p o w er, n e v er a b sen t e v en in the 1930s as a ratio n ale, ju stified actio n m o re th a n social justice a n d econom ic stability.95 T he G I Bill also m irro re d d o m in a n t social a n d c u ltu ral v alu es, ab o v e all re­ g a rd in g gender. Fem ale v e te ran s d id u se the G I Bill, b u t th ere w ere few of th em , so th a t benefits flow ed o v e rw h elm in g ly to m en. T he resu lts w e re stu n n in g in h ig h e r education. V eterans flooding c am p u se s m a d e u p a lm o st h a lf of th e 2.3 m illio n college stu d e n ts b y 1947. Schools h a p p y to a d m it w o m e n d u rin g w a r 's lean y ears n o w scram b led to find places for su b sid iz ed m ale v eteran s. M ore w o m e n d id g ra d u a te (104,000 in 1950 a g ain st 77,000 in 1940), b u t a lth o u g h th ey co m p rised 40 p e rc en t of all g ra d u a te s in 1940, th e y w ere ju st 25 p e rc e n t in 1950. Sim ilar declines for w o m e n w ere e v id e n t in m ed ical a n d g ra d u a te p ro g ra m s a n d in the ran k s of college faculties. W ives d id b en efit in d irectly w h e n h u s ­ b a n d s raised th eir e d u ca tio n al sta tu s, g o t a lo w -in terest m o rtg ag e, a n d clim bed the socio-econom ic lad d er. A n d th e GI Bill w a s n o t solely resp o n sib le for su ch sh ifts— c u ltu ral im ages d isc o u rag e d w o m e n from p u rs u in g e d u c a tio n a n d careers— b u t its im p o rtan c e w a s im m ense. A n d pro tracted . It took y ears for all v e te ran s to tak e a d v a n ta g e of th e law , a n d th e K orean W ar created a n e w co h o rt g ra n te d sim ilar benefits. T he stick of federal p o w e r reinforced th e carrot of v e te ra n s' benefits: p o stw a r law u su a lly d eferred m en from the d ra ft w hile a tte n d in g college, a p o w e rfu l in d u c e m e n t for th em to d o so. E ven in 1959, w o m e n c o m p rised ju st o n e-th ird of all college g ra d u a te s— n o t y e t back to th eir sh are in 1940. A n d fed eral p olicy h a d su b tler effects. M en 's h u g e n u m b e rs o n cam p u ses, alo n g w ith h ig h fed eral sp e n d in g on technology a n d science, stre n g th e n ed technical fields to w h ic h m e n w ere

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attrac ted a n d o ften p a rtially tra in e d as a re su lt of w a rtim e service, a n d tilted the ed u ca tio n al sy stem a w ay from w o m e n 's interests. In tu rn , th e G I Bill h e lp e d b u ild a sy ste m th a t tra in e d p e o p le to staff th e co rp o ratio n s, lab o rato ries, a n d b u reau cracies of a m ilitarized A m erica. O th e r p ro v isio n s of th e GI Bill reinforced its effects o n gender. T he fin an cin g of v e te ra n s' m o rtg a g es sp e d su b u rb a n iza tio n , w hich, like th e re tu rn of m e n to colleges, also flo w ed from p e n t-u p w a rtim e d e m a n d . T he id eal of s u b u rb a n life p a ra lle le d th e id eal of h ig h er e d u c a tio n in p rescrib in g d o m estic roles for w o m en: m a rg in alize d in colleges, th e y w ere to fin d th eir n ich e as w iv es a n d m o th e rs in th e su b u rb a n hom e. C ertain ly th a t n ich e w a s h a rd to fin d in th e fed ­ eral C ivil Service. W hile th e GI Bill e x te n d ed p referen ce to fem ale v eteran s, w iv e s of d isa b le d v e te ran s a n d w id o w s of d eceased ones, o n e-h alf of all fed eral civilian em p lo y ées w ere v e te ra n s— u su a lly m ale — b y 1954. A s w ith g en d er, th e GI Bill reinforced d o m in a n t v alu es of class a n d race. Like m u c h N e w D eal legislation, it serv ed a b ro a d co n stitu en cy of m id d le-class a n d u p p e r w orking-class A m ericans. C ollege stip e n d s w ere of little u se to v eteran s, d isp ro p o rtio n a te ly p o o r a n d black, w h o h a d n o t c o m p leted h ig h school, al­ th o u g h the bill also m a d e pro v isio n s for vocatio n al ed u catio n . E ven u n d e r th e b ill's g en ero u s term s, h o m e b u y in g w a s o u t of reach for m a n y p o o re r v eteran s, a n d th e bill offered little to those w h o n e e d e d to rent. Som e of th e b ill's d iscrim i­ n a to ry effects w e re in ad v e rte n t, b u t also intractable: b a n k s co u ld h a rd ly w rite VA m o rtg a g es for In d ian s in tribal c o m m u n ities lacking in d iv id u a l la n d d eed s. O th e r su c h effects w ere m ore deliberate: fed eral agencies like th e VA favored th e p u rc h a se of n e w h o m es in su b u rb a n d ev elo p m e n ts w ith legal o r d e facto racial b a rrie rs few blacks c o u ld challenge, a n d th ey o ften "red -lin ed " poorer, in ner-city districts, co n trib u tin g to th e ir lo n g -ru n d eterio ratio n . Explicit racial d isc rim in atio n in allocating GI benefits c o m p o u n d e d these effects. G o v e rn m e n t's w a rtim e role in social w elfare ex te n d ed b e y o n d th e G I Bill. W hile n a tio n al h e a lth in su ran ce w a s a n a th e m a to m o st doctors, W ash in g to n u n d e rw ro te m edical care a n d research to a n u n p re c e d e n te d d egree. T he an tib i­ otic penicillin w as a d ram atic b rea k th ro u g h , w h ile n e w p ro g ra m s raised h e a lth care for m o th e rs a n d children, especially in m ilitary fam ilies (w ith th e m o rale of serv icem en ag ain a concern), a n d e n h an c ed th e sta tu s of em erging*m edical specialties, especially psychiatry. Som e w a rtim e policies ch allen g ed d o m in a n t in terests a n d values, b u t th ereb y also lacked w id e sp re a d o r a t least lastin g s u p ­ p o rt. H o p in g to b rin g m o th e rs in to th e w o rk force, th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t fu n d e d th o u sa n d s of day-care centers, o n ly to h av e w o m e n stay a w ay in d ro v es u n til late in the w ar. Likew ise, it e m b a rk ed o n a h o m e-b u ild in g p ro g ra m for w a r w o rk e rs flocking to places like H an fo rd , W ash in g to n , a n d H a rtfo rd , C o n ­ necticut, b u t h o m e b u ild in g , like child a n d h e a lth care, largely re tu rn e d to p ri­ v a te a u th o rities after th e w ar. Such p a tte rn s of social ch an g e a n d policy in w a rtim e A m erica co n trasted

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sh a rp ly to those in som e o th er nations. In B ritain, for exam ple, th e w a r sp a rk e d th e ascendancy of th e L abor P arty a n d a b ro a d co n sen su s to h av e th e w elfare state p ro v id e n e arly u n iv ersal coverage. O n th e o th e r h a n d , few n a tio n s m atch e d th e U n ited States in its ex pansio n , h o w e v e r g ru d g in g , of o p p o r­ tu n ities for w o m e n a n d m inorities, a n d of co u rse G e rm a n y o n ly m a d e rep re s­ sion m ore total. M an y A m ericans g ra sp e d th e specifics of w a rtim e social change. Far m o re elu siv e w a s the lo n g -term process w h e reb y social c h an g e b ecam e h a rn e sse d to n a tio n al security, in p a rt because th e process w a s d e p e n d e n t o n still u n se ttle d decisions a b o u t p o stw a r policies. In a d d itio n , th e in te rest-g ro u p focus of A m er­ ican politics zo o m ed in o n th e fate of p a rtic u la r g ro u p s, n o t th e b ro a d e r lin k ag e of social change to n a tio n al security. In tu rn , th a t lin k ag e w a s itself com plex. B oth liberals a n d co n serv ativ es becam e in v ested in m a n ip u la tin g th e w a r ex p e­ rience to achieve social goals, often forging alliances (as w ith th e G I Bill) h a rd ly red u cible to fam iliar political categories. M oreover, g o v e rn m e n ta l action w a s h ig h ly v aried , ran g in g fro m n e a r silence reg a rd in g g ay s to th e visible b u t a m ­ b iv alen t m essages a b o u t w o m e n to th e slow b u t g ro w in g effort o n b e h alf of civil rig h ts for racial m inorities. G iven su c h v ariatio n s, th e p a tte rn itself w a s h a rd to discern. T he p re su m p tio n of a re tu rn to th e sta tu s q u o also sh a p e d sp ecu latio n a b o u t social change. In d eed , one p u rp o se of th e GI Bill w a s to re tu rn v eteran s, a n d hen ce th e nation, to th e sta tu s q u o (an id ealized v ersio n of it, course, n o t its D epression-era form ). Som e a u th o rities d id p re d ic t change, b u t o ften e rro ­ neously: the early p o stw a r y ears failed to y ield a " fu rth e r rise in th è sta tu s of w o m e n ." Racial change w a s w id e ly a n ticip ated , b u t also h a rd to p red ict. Blacks h a d reaso n to d e sp a ir th a t it w o u ld com e; so u th e rn p oliticians, h a rd ly b o w in g to th e inevitable, w ere only e m b o ld en e d to fig h t it; a n d th e a fte rm a th of W orld W ar I a u g u re d b a d ly for th a t of W orld W ar II. A n d in d e e d th e racial ch an g e to com e b u ilt less o n th e w a r 's m eag er legal ach iev em en ts th a n o n th e lastin g ex­ p ectations it fostered a n d financed: m a n y blacks, especially so u th e rn v eteran s, e n d e d the w a r m ore w illin g to m igrate, b e tte r tra in e d to achieve success, m o re a d eq u a te ly p a id in th eir jobs, a n d m ore d e te rm in e d to b re a k racial b o n d s, ju st as m ilitary service lau n ch ed the careers of m a n y black leaders. But su c h d e ep ly stru c tu re d sources of change w ere n o t easily g lean ed in 1945.96 In a n y event, m o st A m ericans w ere p rim e d b y th e w a r to focus o n th e d a n g e r of n e w econom ic d isa ster a n d th e lu re of p o stw a r affluence, n o t o n social rela­ tions. The m ilitarizatio n of social ch an g e d u rin g th e w a r h a d b e en in ten se a n d p ro fo u n d — u n iq u e am o n g the n a tio n 's m o d e m w a rs b ecau se of th e sh eer n u m ­ b ers m obilized in the w a r effort a n d the political a n d ideological stak es in ­ v o lv ed in the global struggle. But as w ith o th er facets of A m erican life, its con­ tin u a tio n into th e p o stw a r era rem ain ed b o th obscure a n d co n tin g en t o n decisions yet to be m ade.

The C rossroads of Victory V ictory to o k m a n y form s in the sp rin g of 1945: th e A llies' triu m p h o v er G er­ m any, th eir success a g ain st Japan, a n d th eir effort at lastin g peace w h e n th e n e w U n ited N atio n s m e t at San Francisco. T hese victories offered A m ericans real satisfactions b u t only lim ited joy a n d little clarity a b o u t th e future. The Pa­ cific w a r w as m ore costly th a n ever. Rifts am o n g th e A llies w id en ed . A n d the sw eetn ess of victory w a s d im in ish e d b y a stu n n in g e n co u n ter w ith w a r 's h o r­ rors. R eactions to the w a r's final triu m p h s a n d trag ed ies ab ette d A m erica's m il­ itarizatio n , b u t th a t resu lt w as n e ith e r read ily e v id e n t n o r co h eren tly p u rs u e d in 1945— it could n o t be, g iven the flux at h o m e a n d in a w o rld to rn a su n d e r b y w ar. A b e w ild e rin g d isp lay of d e a th a n d d e stru ctio n u n fo ld e d in 1945. The d e ­ stru c tio n of en em y cities m o u n te d , in a to rre n t of R u ssian shells o n Berlin, in the last A nglo-A m erican b o m b in g of G erm any, a n d m o st n o tab ly in Japan. In M arch, one A m erican B-29 ra id alone killed a t least 85,000 p e o p le in Tokyo, leav in g b eh in d "a d ra b a n d m o n o to n o u s p a n o ra m a of h o p elessn ess,"97 a n d th e en su in g firebom bing to rch ed all of Jap an 's m ajor cities except th o se sav ed as targ ets for the atom ic bom b. Such b o m b in g c o n trav en ed ev ery sta n d a rd of w a r­ fare th a t A m erican lead ers h a d pro fessed in th e 1930s, b u t w ith few exceptions (p riv ate d o u b ts b y Secretary of W ar Stim son, for exam ple) it a ro u se d little con­ troversy. The long erosion of m o ral scruples d u rin g th e w ar, th e visible im p a ­ tience of m o st A m ericans to get the w a r d o n e (vacationing, inflation, job ab sen ­ teeism , a n d th e like w ere m o unting), the p ro m ise of v icto ry th a t b o m b in g seem ed to offer, a n d the desires for vengeance it satisfied all forestalled co n tro ­ versy. So too d id n ew evidence of the e n em y 's fanaticism : th e sig h t of em aci­ a te d A m erican PO W s freed d u rin g th e lib eratio n of th e P h ilip p in es; th e scale of Jap an ese k am ikaze attacks d u rin g the A m erican in v asio n of O k in aw a. In p a rt because A m ericans re g a rd e d the Japanese as th e m o re bestial enem y, h o w ev er, the m o st shocking revelations cam e w h e n A llied arm ies o v e rra n N azi d e a th cam ps before a n d after G erm an y 's su rre n d e r o n M ay 8. S tu n n ed A m erican co m m an d ers like E isenhow er o rd ere d th eir tro o p s, a n d G erm an s as w ell, to v iew these h orrors; b a ttle-h a rd e n e d soldiers, v isitin g congressm en, a n d jo u rn alists w ere left n a u se o u s or n u m b b y w h a t th ey saw . W ords, p ictures, a n d n ew sreels sw ep t back to th e U n ited S tates— "L est W e Forget," as an exhibi­ tio n m o u n te d b y p u b lish er Joseph P u litzer w as titled. A few critics at the tim e, a n d m ore later, fau lted A m erican s for indifference to th e fate of E u ro p ean Jew s a n d to the n a tu re of genocide. Yet b y a n d large, A m ericans w ere n o t insensitive. R ather, the categories a n d concerns of 1945 sh a p e d m ean in g s different from those th a t em erg ed later. T he term in o lo g y of "atro cities" still g o v e rn e d — "g en o cid e" a n d "H o lo cau st," ev o k in g system atic ex term ination, cam e later. In h eritin g an idio m of sp eech lessn ess a b o u t w a r's

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h o rro rs, rep o rte rs a n d officials a n n o u n c e d th a t "th ey h a d n o w o rd s to describe the cam p s . . . ev en as th ey d id so a t g reat len g th a n d in so m etim es g risly d e ­ tail," a n d insisted th a t a t b e st o n ly p ictu res, as in th e P u litze r ex hibition, co u ld convey the cam p s' m ean in g .98 T h at is, th ey e m p h a size d th eir o w n h o rro r m ore th a n th e evil d o n e, b u t th ey d id so as th eir w a y of g ra sp in g th a t evil. C o n cern ed w ith G e rm a n w ick ed n ess, th ey also rig h tly re g a rd e d it as em blem atic of th e g en eral sco u rg e of m o d e m w a r e v id e n t th a t sp rin g in o th e r w ays, su c h as th e p h y sical d e stru c tio n in E u­ ro p e a n d th e spectacle of som e 30 m illion d isp laced p e rso n s there. N o t su r­ p risin g ly a t th e e n d of a b ru ta l w ar, th ey d e p lo y e d th e sto ry of g en o cid e n o t ju st to w a rn of w h a t G erm an y co u ld d o o r Jew s co u ld suffer, b u t to sig n ify w h a t w a r itself en tails a n d to insist th a t it n e v e r a g ain o ccu r— th e m essag es of P u litz e r's "L est W e Forget." A s Time p u t it in so m e w h at d ifferen t term s: th e causes of N azi g enocide w ere " d e e p e r th a n a n y ten d e n cy to scientific b ru ta lity o n th e p a rt of th e G erm an people. T hey lay in th e p o litical p h ilo so p h y of to ta litaria n ­ ism , which is not the exclusive property of any people."99 H en ce A m erican s' focus o n th eir o w n h o rro r, w h ic h ex p ressed the fear th a t th ey too co u ld becom e the victim s of w a r a n d h a d n a rro w ly escaped b e in g so in th is w ar. P arochial in som e w ays, cosm o p o litan in others, those reactions w ere n o n e th e le ss p o w e r­ ful. M eanw hile, in secret, A m erican lead ers carried o n a ra g g e d d iscu ssio n ab o u t th e atom ic bom b. O bjections to its u se a g ain st Jap an ese cities w ere offered b y lea d in g m ilitary figures (M arshall, E isenhow er, A dm . W illiam L eahy) a n d sci­ en tists like Leo Szilard, b u t the fo rm er w e re d iffid e n t in th eir o p p o sitio n a n d th e latter o u tsid e of— a n d o u tm a n e u v e re d b y — th e in n e r circle of decisio n ­ m akers. A s a n e w p re sid e n t in h eritin g R oosevelt's decisions, H a rry T ru m an w a s d isinclined to e n te rta in d o u b ts o r resist th e lo n g -d ev e lo p in g b u reau cratic m o m e n tu m to u n le a sh th e n e w w eap o n . Several a rg u m e n ts su p p o rte d u se of th e b o m b o n a Japanese city. It w o u ld sp e ed v icto ry for im p a tie n t A m erican s a n d for lead ers fearing the costs of in v a d in g Jap an (alth o u g h th e ir ex p ectatio n s of A m erican losses w ere far b elo w th e figures of o n e m illio n a n d th e like later a ttrib u te d to them ). T he b o m b 's use m ig h t instill cau tio n in th e Soviet lead er­ sh ip a n d shock the w o rld into controlling th is aw fu l n e w technology. But n o n e of th o se a rg u m e n ts w as v e ry cogently o r con sisten tly ad v an ced . M ore decisive w as th e sense th a t re stra in t in A m erican b o m b in g h a d a lre ad y d isa p p e a re d , a n d th a t the Japanese d e serv e d n o th in g less a n d w o u ld su b m it to n o th in g else. Ju st as critics fau lted A m erican resp o n ses to th e H olocaust, som e d ecried th e in sen sitiv ity of A m erican lead ers to th e rad ical n o v elty a n d evil of atom ic w eap o n s. N o clear m o ral line, ho w ev er, se p a ra te d th e fireb o m b in g of Jap an ese cities from th eir atom ic incineration; the d e a th toll at H iro sh im a w a s n o t m u ch larger th a n a t Tokyo o n M arch 9. A n d so m e w h o ap p re cia te d th e b o m b 's th re a t to h u m a n k in d , like p h y sicist R obert O p p en h eim er, also e n d o rs e d its u se a g ain st Jap an as a w a y to d ra m a tiz e th a t th re a t to th e w o rld . O n A u g u s t 6, the

TRIUMPH,

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A m erican air force d e stro y e d m o st of H iro sh im a w ith o n e ato m ic b o m b , a n d on A u g u s t 9 m u c h of N ag asak i w ith a n o th e r (even m a n y d e fe n d ers of th e b o m b 's u se q u e stio n e d th e n e e d so so o n of this secon d attack). B etw een th o se d ates, the Soviet U n io n , fulfilling a n earlier p led g e, e n te red th e w a r a g ain st Japan, p lay ­ in g a role in Ja p an 's su rre n d e r th a t m o st A m ericans, tran sfix ed b y th e b o m b 's a p p a re n t decisiveness, so o n overlooked. A c aco p h o n y of reactions to th e b o m b 's a d v e n t arose sw iftly am o n g A m eri­ cans. Som e stressed p rid e in A m erican ach iev em en t a n d satisfaction in g ain in g v en g ean ce a g ain st th e Japanese. T ru m a n a n n o u n c e d th a t th e Japanese "h av e b e e n re p a id m an y -fo ld " for Pearl H arb o r; a m in o rity of A m erican s w ish e d th e w a r h a d go n e o n lo n g er so m ore atom ic b o m b s co u ld h av e b e e n u se d a g ain st Japan. O th e rs— especially soldiers w h o a ssu m e d th a t a n in v asio n of Jap an w a s th e o n ly a ltern a tiv e to th e b o m b 's u se — w elco m ed th e peace th a t th e b o m b h a d sp e e d e d , a n d th e b o m b itself as a tool for en forcing c o n tin u ed peace. O v e rla p ­ p in g th o se reactions w a s another: as in re sp o n d in g to th e H o locaust, m an y A m ericans saw the b o m b as ev id en ce of th e sco u rg e of m o d e m w a r— in th e face of w h ic h the w isd o m of A m erican u se seem ed a m in o r m atter. "[O ne] forgets th e effect o n Jap an ," according to th e New York Herald Tribune, "as one senses the fo u n d atio n s of o n e 's o w n u n iv erse trem b lin g ."100 D espite pro fessin g th e ir s u d d e n e n try in to a n e w w o rld , h o w ev er, A m eri­ cans h a d to em p lo y a n existing id io m to g ra sp th e n o v el, ju st as in co n fro n tin g th e H olocaust. So th ey c o m p a red th e b o m b 's effects to "co n v en tio n al" B-29 at­ tacks, a n d th ey d re w o n a tra d itio n of apocaly p tic p red ic tio n a b o u t w a r in o rd er to see th e atom ic fu tu re in sta rk term s, as a choice b e tw ee n d o o m sd a y a n d d e ­ liverance. One World or None w a s th e title of a 1946 bestseller b y th e F ed eratio n of A m erican Scientists. "Peace in th e w o rld , o r th e w o rld in p ieces" w a s the final line of th e c o u n try m usic so n g "O ld M a n A to m ." Jo u rn alists, scientists, a n d p reach ers d ro v e h o m e th is M an ich ean outlook: th ey w ere " h a u n te d b y fears of a n e v en g rea ter catastro p h e," w o rrie d th a t n a tio n s w ere "d o o m e d to fall in to the d itch ," o r afraid th a t h u m a n ity sto o d "o n a tin y led g e ab o v e the abyss of an n ih ilatio n ." H o w m u c h o th e r A m erican s sh a red su c h fears is less clear, b u t th ey w ere g iven d ire w a rn in g s of w h a t atom ic w a r w o u ld m ean , in ­ clu d in g ecological extinction ("a w o rld of tro g lo d y tes," "th e m am m alia n w o rld 's d e a th w a rran t"), a n d g rap h ic d e p ic tio n s of w h a t a n atom ic b o m b co u ld d o to N e w York o r C hicago. "Sole p o ssesso rs a n d u se rs" of th e n e w w e ap o n , Paul Boyer h as w ritte n , "A m ericans e n v isio n e d th em selv es n o t as a p o ten tial th rea t to o th er peo p les, b u t as p o te n tia l victim s." A s w ith th e H o locaust, so w ith the bom b: u n d e rstan d a b ly , A m erican s w o rrie d a b o u t th e im p licatio n s for their o w n safety a n d sanity, so n a rro w ly p re se rv e d in th e w a r ju st e n d e d .101 Those fears a b o u t th e fu tu re of w a r c o n tra sted w ith a n o th e r m o o d in 1945— p rid e, exuberance, e v en arrogance a b o u t A m erican p o w er. Few A m ericans co uld avoid som e aw aren ess of th eir n a tio n 's sin g u lar p o sitio n in p o ssessin g th e w o rld 's m o st p o w e rfu l econom ic system , fo rm id ab le m ilitary m ig h t, ad-

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v an ced science a n d technology, a n d a d a p ta b le (if q u arrelso m e) p o litical sy s­ tem . Few also d w e lle d o n the tem p o ra ry n a tu re of m a n y of th o se a d v an tag e s, w h ic h o w e d in p a rt to the d e m o litio n o r e x h au stio n of o th er n a tio n s in w ar. A m bition w as b o th the p a re n t a n d offsprin g of A m erican p o w er. N o t for th e first tim e, b u t m ore b o ld ly in 1945, lea d in g A m erican s sk etch ed g ra n d goals for th e n ation. It w o u ld reb u ild a w a r-to m w o rld . It w o u ld co n stru ct a w o rld econ­ o m y b a sed o n free tra d e a n d free en te rp rise th a t w o u ld b en efit th e U n ited States b u t also foster a b u n d an ce, a n d therefo re peace, for o th er n atio n s. A n d it w o u ld enforce th a t peace w ith its o w n m ilitary force or, so it seem ed p o ssib le in 1945, th ro u g h th e b e n ig n in stru m e n tality of th e U n ited N atio n s. B ritain 's global role in th e n in e te e n th cen tu ry w a s one m o d el for A m erican h eg em o n y , a m o d el th a t som e A m ericans (and B ritish a n d others) explicitly u rg e d th e n a tio n to fol­ low. The A m erican v isio n in 1945 in v o lv ed m o re th a n h egem ony, h o w ev er. It d re w also o n th e fear of v u ln era b ility d ru m m e d h o m e since th e late 1930s a n d d ra m a tiz e d b y genocide a n d atom ic w arfare. M ilitary p o w e r seem ed v ital less to score n e w triu m p h s of global d o m in an ce th a n to p re v e n t n e w d isa sters of d ep re ssio n a n d w ar. A n d som etim es it h e ld n o clear p u rp o se a t all, b u t w a s ch erished in its o w n rig h t a n d as a sym bol of A m erican ach iev em en t— as T ru­ m a n p u t it, the atom ic b o m b w a s "th e g reatest th in g in h isto ry ."102 A m bition, arrogance, a n d fear justified, a t least for m a n y A m ericans, th eir n a tio n 's c o n tin u ed po ssessio n of g reat m ilitary p o w er. But h o w m u c h p o w er, a n d of w h a t sort? N o co n sen su s existed in 1945, in p a rt b ecau se arro g an ce also u n d e rc u t the u rg en cy to a n sw e r su c h questio n s. So g rea t w a s A m erican p o w e r th a t its c o n tin u ed triu m p h seem ed inevitable to m a n y A m ericans; to som e, th e atom ic b o m b alone g u a ra n te e d it. L eaders d id foresee d a n g e rs— Soviet p o w er, a n u n controllable n u c le ar a rm s race, a fractu red w o rld econom y, a n d (th o u g h it d re w less scrutiny) rev o lu tio n in C h in a a n d E u ro p e's colonial em p ires. C onfi­ d e n t of th eir ability to m a ste r su ch challenges, h o w ev er, A m erican s to le rate d co n sid erable u n c e rta in ty a b o u t h o w th e ir v a u ltin g a m b itio n s w ere to b e m et. U n certain ty w a s m irro re d in a n d exacerbated b y p o litical instabilities. FDR h a d left b e h in d a com plex, a m b ig u o u s legacy of policies to w a rd th e p o stw a r w o rld — a n d n o one q u ite k n ew w h a t it w as, g iv en h is gift for secrecy a n d in d i­ rection. T ru m a n 's lea d ersh ip w a s m ore u n c ertain th a n com plex, m o re erratic th a n am biguous. Far from quickly b ecom in g a C o ld W arrior, "h e w a v e re d for alm o st tw o years, in fact."103 H is atom ic policy w as n o firm er, b u ffeted b y clashing d isp lay s of arrogance a n d d o u b t reg a rd in g th e b o m b 's u se a g ain st Ja­ p a n a n d its p o ten tial leverage in the p o stw a r w o rld . (Told h e h a d " a n atom ic b o m b u p [his] sleeves," T ru m an rep lied , "I a m n o t su re it can ev er b e u se d ." )104 The political flux ex te n d ed b e y o n d T rum an, ho w ev er. W h eth er b y h is choice o r th eir ow n, the to p w a rtim e lead ers n early all retired: g one b y th e fall w e re Stim son, M o rg en th au , M arshall (until T ru m a n called h im b ack for a m issio n to C hina), a n d a h o st of others. T he a rm e d forces w ere locked in b itte r stru g g le ov er the lessons of Pearl H a rb o r a n d the term s of a u n ified d efen se d e p a rtm e n t.

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w h ile C ongress, as it u su a lly d o es after a w ar, so u g h t to reassert its pow er. The in stitu tio n al flux w a s e v en g reater in the global arena. T he R oosevelt a d m in is­ tra tio n h a d c o n stru cted the a p p a ra tu s of in te rn atio n al c o o p eratio n it favored, b u t few A m ericans k n ew h o w o rg an izatio n s like th e U n ited N atio n s w o u ld function. N o r d id th ey agree o n h o w su c h o rg an izatio n s sh o u ld function. D espite a n en d -o f-w ar em brace of "in tern atio n alism ," natio n alistic m o o d s w ere ev id en t. A m in o rity railed a g ain st the U n ited N a tio n s ("a m o n stro u s crim e ag ain st A m erican liberties") a n d a g ain st alleged giv eaw ay s of A m erican m o n ey a n d in terests to th e Soviets (and the British). L iberals also so u n d e d n atio n alist th em es insofar as th ey so u g h t to project " o u r w a y of living, th e o n ly w a y w o r­ th y of a free m a n " (as Sen. J. W illiam F ulbrig h t p u t it) o n to th e rest of th e w o rld , ju st as n a tio n alism w as e v id e n t in the c o n tra stin g visio n s of th e "A m erican C e n tu ry " a n d the "ce n tu ry of the co m m o n m an " earlier p ro claim ed b y H e n ry Luce a n d H e n ry W allace. The "b rittle" in te rn atio n alism of A m erican s in 1945, G eoffrey P errett h as a rg u e d , w as "really little m o re th a n th e o ld -fash io n ed b o o sterism o n a global scale." M any A m ericans, n o tes R obert D allek, b eliev in g th a t technology a n d m ass co m m unications h a d k n it to g eth er th eir o w n n atio n , "a ssu m e d th a t the sam e state of affairs co u ld tak e h o ld ab ro ad ; one A m erica co u ld n o w becom e one w o rld ." H eartfelt b u t v ag u e, su c h a ssu m p tio n s w ere h a rd to tran slate in to concrete policies a n d left A m erican s ill p re p a re d for th e p o w e r politics th a t th e Soviet U n io n — a n d th e U n ited States a n d its allies— practiced a t the w a r 's close.105 P artisan politics d isp lay e d a n d co arsen ed th ese u n sta b le m o o d s. T he w a r h a d accelerated a long decline in th e p a rty system : g eo g rap h ic m o b ility w e a k ­ e n ed o ld loyalties, in terest g ro u p s often m ob ilized v o ters m o re effectively th a n p a rty structures, racial politics cut across p a rty lines, a n d th e R e p u b lic a n so u th e rn D em ocrat coalition c o n tin u ed to g ain p o w e r in C ongress. A m erican political p a rties rarely re p re se n t stro n g class o r ideological coalitions, b u t th e y d id so ev en less in the 1944 elections, w h ic h to o k a toll o n th e p ro n o u n c e d lib­ erals a n d conservatives of b o th parties. Yet th ere w a s n o e v id e n t a ltern ativ e to the p a rty system for sh a p in g a n a tio n al consen su s, a n d R epublicans a n d D em o­ crats co m p eted m ore ran co ro u sly th a n ev er as th e fiction of w a rtim e u n ity d is­ sipated. R ed-baiting in p a rtic u la r intensified , as w h e n D ew ey a sse rte d in 1944 th a t th e D em ocratic P arty "is subject to cap tu re, a n d th e forces of C o m m u n ism are, in fact, n o w c a p tu rin g it," a n d it e x te n d ed b e y o n d p a rty politics, a im ed at the civil rights m o v em en t, o rg an ized labor, a n d liberals generally. In July 1945, Life asserted th a t "th e fellow -traveler [of com m u n ism ] is everyw here: in H olly­ w o o d , o n college faculties, in g o v e rn m e n t b u r e a u s ,. . . e v en o n th e e d ito rial staffs of em in en tly c ap italist jo u rn als." H o lly w o o d stars rally in g for FDR re­ sp o n d e d in kind: "T he old red h e rrin g , the o ld red h e rrin g , it looks like H itler a n d it sm ells like G oering." Such charges in d icated h o w p o w e rfu l b u t a m o r­ p h o u s concerns a b o u t n a tio n al security w ere sh a p in g p o litics.106 D iscontent boiled u p from b elo w as w ell, am o n g in terest g ro u p s a n d m asses

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of A m ericans eag er to enjoy peace. O p e n challen g es to T ru m a n 's foreign p o licy w ere few, b u t his p la n s to cu rb inflation, c o n v ert th e eco n o m y to p eacetim e sta ­ tu s, a n d m ain tain lab o r peace w ere so o n in sh am b les, d ism a n tle d b y th e a d m in ­ istratio n itself o r d e stro y e d b y fears, real a n d m a n ip u la te d , of a n e n la rg ed fed ­ eral g o v ern m en t. P en t-u p c o n su m er d e m a n d a v e rte d th e lo n g -feared p o stw a r d e p ressio n , b u t n o t n e rv o u sn ess a n d conflict o v e r th e e co n o m y 's future. M ore d istu rb in g to A m ericans lea d ers w a s a fu ro r o v e r th e slo w p ace o f m ilitary d e ­ m o b ilizatio n (careful p la n s w ere ru in e d b y th e Pacific w a r's u n e x p ec te d ly a b ru p t end). "B ring Back D a d d y " clubs sp ru n g u p , b a b y shoes tag g e d "b rin g d a d d y h o m e" flo o d ed C ongress, one rep re se n ta tiv e w a ile d th a t "a g e n e ra tio n of fatherless ch ild ren w o u ld m ak e o u r c o u n try a seco n d rate p o w e r," a n d rio ts e ru p te d am o n g G Is a b ro a d d e m a n d in g a b o a t h o m e. N a v y Secretary Jam es Forrestal th o u g h t h e saw th e influence of left-w in g ers a n d co m m u n ists, b u t th e clam o r d re w from m a n y sources: co n serv ativ es extolling th e n e e d s of fam ilies d is ru p te d b y th e w ar; resen tm en ts of fed eral p o w er, m ilitary au th o rity , a n d th e b u rd e n s of occupying d e fe ate d enem ies; a n d R ep ublican b a sh in g of T rum an. T he clam or also ex p o sed th e n e rv o u sn e ss of lea d ers e v en a t th is m o m e n t of th eir n a tio n 's su p re m e pow er. R apid d em o b ilizatio n , T ru m a n feared, w a s cost­ in g A m erica th e p o w e r to p rev a il ab ro ad , w ith o u t w h ic h "w e are h e a d in g d i­ rectly for a th ird w o rld w a r." 107 In tru th , m o st A m ericans w ere n o t going to forfeit th a t p o w er, b u t th e u p ro a r o v er d e m o b ilizatio n d id reinforce w a rtim e p e rc ep tio n s of th e term s o n w h ic h th ey w o u ld accept its global use: th ey w a n te d to rely o n th e n a tio n 's econom ic a n d technological m uscle ra th e r th a n o n a m ass arm y. R eactions to th e atom ic b o m b stre n g th e n ed th a t fo rm ula, a n d the collapse of su p p o rt for u n iv ersal m ili­ ta ry tra in in g — n o t e v en th e e n o rm o u s esteem of M arsh all a n d E isen h o w er sal­ v a g e d th e a rm y 's p ro p o sa l— co n firm ed its p o litical w isd o m . It w a s n o t a n id eal fo rm u la in the eyes of m ilitary a n d political lead ers, since th ey h a d o n ly th e sketchiest id ea of h o w to u se th e atom ic b o m b in fu tu re crises a n d w o rrie d a b o u t the signal se n t to p o ten tial ag g resso rs b y th e n a tio n 's reluctance to k eep m asses of m en u n d e r arm s. But it w a s a tolerable fo rm u la. It still p ro v id e d far larg er forces (including the arm y) th a n before W orld W ar II. It d re w o n A m eri­ can econom ic a n d technological stren g th s a ssu m e d to b e e n d u rin g . Partic­ u larly for advocates of a globe-circling air force, it p ro m ise d to ex ten d A m eri­ can p o w e r ab ro ad w h ile p reserv in g a t least a n illu sio n of A m erican iso latio n a n d easy security. M ilitarization w o u ld p ro ceed , b u t in a p a rtia l fash io n accept­ able to m o st A m ericans. A s th a t form ula for A m erican p o w e r em erg ed in th e fall of 1945, th e m ea n ­ in g s of the H o lo cau st a n d H iro sh im a coalesced, to tak e th eir place a lo n g sid e th e w a r's o th er g reat sym bol. Pearl H arbor. T hose ev en ts d ictate d n o single course for A m ericans: pacifists, ad v o cates of w o rld g o v e rn m e n t, isolationists, c h am p io n s of p re p a re d n e ss, a n d o th ers co u ld d e p lo y th e m to th eir respective p u rp o se s. A s in te rp reted , th ey som etim es carried conflicting m e a n in g s— for

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so m e a t least. Pearl H a rb o r h a d justified racial v en g ean ce, w h ile th e H o lo cau st d e m o n stra te d its u ltim a te h o rro rs. T hey c o u ld also b e triv ialized : "By 1947, th e M a n h a tta n telep h o n e d irecto ry listed forty-give b u sin esses th a t a p p ro p ria te d th e m agic w o rd , in clu d in g th e A tom ic U n d e rg a rm e n t C o m p an y ."108 N o n e th e ­ less, th ey all su rg e d to n a tio n al a tte n tio n a t th e close of th e w ar, w h e n Pearl H a rb o r b ecam e th e object of a w id e ly no ticed co n g ressio n al investigation. A s m a n y A m ericans in te rp re te d these ev en ts, th e y h a d m u ch in com m on. A ll th ree w ere re a d as sig n s of th e rad ical d isc o n tin u ity of th is w a r fro m th e p a st. P reced en ts for th em , processes le a d in g to th em , th e histo rical b ack g ro u n d of th e m — earlier su rp rise attacks, earlier ep iso d es of genocide, th e lo n g escala­ tio n of aerial b o m b in g — w ere largely forgotten. H istory, it seem ed, h a d b een su n d e re d , h u m a n k in d h a d b e g u n a n e w era. T he sense of ru p tu re w a s m o st em p h atic in reactions to th e atom ic bom b. A s "a b lin d in g , sh a tte rin g force," its a d v e n t ra n k e d only " w ith th e d iscovery of fire, a n d th e d isco v ery of ag ricu l­ tu re," according to S tu a rt C hase. The "A tom ic A ge" h a d b e g u n , a n n o u n ce d Life. "T he final crisis in h u m a n h isto ry h a d com e," w ro te o n e m in ister.109 Pearl H a rb o r a n d N azi genocide elicited a sim ilar if less p o in te d sense of ru p tu re . Shock w a s h e ig h ten e d b y c o n te m p o ra ry focus o n technological novelty: o n th e stu n n in g d istan ce trav e le d a n d su rp rise ach iev ed b y Jap an ese aircraft, o n th e m ech an ized efficiency of N a zi d e a th cam ps, o n th e o th e rw o rld ly p o w e r of th e b o m b a n d its rad iatio n . U n d e rstan d a b le, th a t focus n o n e th e le ss slig h ted th e political, m oral, a n d in stitu tio n al forces b e h in d th ese acts— b o th their n o v elty a n d th eir historical roots. A m ericans also c o n tin u e d to re n d e r these ev en ts in a h ig h ly ab stract o r g e n ­ e ralized fashion, seeing th em as in d icativ e of th e evil of w a r in alm o st a generic sense, one tran sce n d in g a p a rtic u la r n a tio n 's ag en cy o r a p a rtic u la r p e o p le 's fate. E ven as h e took p rid e in A m erican achievem ent, T ru m a n d o w n p la y e d th e b o m b as a n A m erican invention: "P ro v id en ce" h a d d e n ie d it to th e G erm ans; "h av in g fo u n d th e b o m b [as if alm o st b y accident] w e h a v e u se d it." 110 H ence, too, d isp a ra te ev en ts w o u ld becom e lin k ed in lan g u ag e: "h o lo cau st," a term qu ick ly a p p lie d b y som e to H iro sh im a, later also b ecam e a te rm for N azi g en o ­ cide, su g g estin g th a t these different h o rro rs h a d so m e th in g fu n d a m e n ta l in com m on. Technology, too, seem ed to cut across n a tio n a l a n d ideological b o u n d a rie s, ev en to lie b e h in d h u m a n control. W h at stretch ed a h e a d w as "sci­ ence, th e e n d less fro n tier" (as V annevar B ush titled a n im p o rta n t 1945 report), as if th e d ise m b o d ied force of science w a s m o v in g n a tio n s to th e abyss of ex­ tin ctio n (or to p eak s of fulfillm ent). This abstract fo rm u la tio n of m ean in g s w a s in som e w a y s n a iv e o r ex p edient: it o b scured N azi anti-Sem itism , facilitated A m erican em b race of W est G er­ m an y in the C old W ar, a n d len t inevitability to A m erican d e v e lo p m e n t a n d u se of th e bom b. But it also e m p h a siz e d ju st w h a t FDR a n d o th ers h a d earlier as­ serted a b o u t n atio n al se cu rity — th a t th e p e ril to A m erican safety w as fu n d a ­ m en tal a n d p e rm a n en t, ro o ted in inescapable ch an g es in tech n o lo g y a n d w ar-

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fare to w h ich the U n ited States w a s com p elled to re sp o n d , n o t ju st in the tran sie n t th reats of p a rtic u la r nations. T he resu ltin g fear a n d in secu rity w ere e v id e n t in h o w A m erican s im a g in ed th e fu tu re of w ar. Few co u ld see w a r tak in g a n y fo rm b u t total, global conflict: th e n ex t w a r w o u ld b e a rep eat, if far m o re cataclysm ic, of W orld W ar II, as if th e e v o lu tio n of w a r h a d reached a conclusion. Im ag in in g a n y o th er w ar, a n y th in g b e tw e e n w o rld peace a n d w o rld d e stru ctio n , b ecam e difficult. T his o u tlo o k w a s e v id e n t in th e m ilita ry 's p o stw a r p lan s to reassem ble a m ass W orld W ar I I style arm y, w ag e epic n a v al cam p aig n s once ag ain , g ird le th e globe w ith b o m b ers carry in g atom ic w e ap o n s, a n d lau n ch a n u c le ar a ssa u lt o n Soviet cities in the e v en t th a t M oscow "in itiated ag g ressio n " o r in d ic ate d th a t it w a s " im m in e n t."111 O f course, a rm e d forces ro u tin ely m o d el th e fu tu re o n th eir c u rre n t ex p eri­ ence. M ore su rp risin g , th eir o p p o n e n ts o ften d id likew ise. T he n e w Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p u b lish e d b y scientists a n d intellectu als critical of th e n a ­ tio n 's p o stw a r n u c le ar policy, in tro d u c e d its fam o u s "d o o m sd a y " clock w ith its h a n d set a few m in u tes before th e m id n ig h t of n u c le ar d e stru ctio n , a sym bol (one critic later w rote) th a t v a lid a te d "th e p rem ise of th e th re a t— of n u c le ar h o ­ locaust, of W orld W ar III." (O ther voices also e m p lo y ed th e m etap h o r: o n e fu n ­ d a m e n ta list p erio d ical saw "th e h a n d s of th e clock of Bible p r o p h e c y . . . m o v ­ in g o n w a rd a n d u p w a rd to th e tim e w h e n it m u st strik e — th e m id n ig h t h o u r.") T he an xiety a b o u t a n o th e r w o rld w a r w as h a rd ly m isp laced , b u t it o v e rro d e aw aren ess of w a rfare 's possible ch an g es a n d d iv e rg e n t form s. N o r d id later ex­ perien ce m u c h a lter expectations. C olonial w a rs in A sia a n d civil w a r in C h in a late in th e 1940s, the K orean W ar in 1950, the b u sy reco rd of c o m m u n ist su b v e r­ sion: m o st A m ericans, p o licy m ak ers in p articu lar, te n d e d to re g a rd e d th em all as step s along, o r m in o r d iv ersio n s from , th e p a th to to tal w a r.112 N o tio n s of to tal w a r a n d im ages of its m o st shocking ev en ts h a d so m eth in g else in com m on: e v en as th ey e m p h a siz e d th e n a tio n 's n e w v u ln era b ility to a t­ tack, they also e v o k ed its lin g erin g rem o ten ess fro m w ar. Pearl H arb o r, H iro sh im a, a n d the H o lo cau st all h a p p e n e d far fro m co n tin en tal A m erica. T hey w ere k n o w n to m o st A m erican s only th ro u g h v erb al a n d v isu al im ages of w h a t h a p p e n e d th ere (those of atom ic d e stru ctio n h eav ily cen so red for d ecad es b y th e A m erican g o vernm ent), o r of w h a t might h a p p e n to th e U n ited States. Such im ages im p lied w h a t th e n a tio n h a d escap ed , th e u n iq u e c o n d itio n th a t A m ericans feared to lose a n d lo n g ed to retain. S tu art C h ase w a n te d A m erican a n d w o rld leaders to w itn ess first-h an d an atom ic blast, a n d all o th ers to see film s a n d p h o to g ra p h s of H iro sh im a a n d N agasaki: "W e m u st co n stan tly be shocked into aw aren ess— as w h e n lig h tn in g strikes close by." John H e rse y 's fa­ m o u s w ritte n account, Hiroshima (1946), w a s celeb rated for p ro v id in g "th e m ean s to see w h a t ev en p ictu res could n o t reveal," as one h isto ria n ex p lain s its im p act.113 Texts like H e rse y 's a n d sym bols like th e m u sh ro o m clo u d su b sti­ tu te d for realities w hich A m ericans could on ly u n d e rs ta n d seco n d -h an d . T hey

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o p e ra te d b o th to challenge a n d to reinforce a sense th a t th e n a tio n still w a s in ­ su la te d fro m th e d e v a sta tio n of m o d e m w ar. Im ages of p a s t a n d fu tu re m ass d e stru ctio n d id u n d e rw rite m ilitarizatio n , b u t g iv en th eir ab stract o r v icario u s quality, th ey gave it little specific sh ap e, o n ly a d d in g to th e flux a n d u n c e rta in ty in politics a n d in stitu tio n s. W ith m il­ ita riz a tio n g eared to g ra n d h istorical changes, to ch arg ed b u t w eig h tless sy m ­ bols, to d rastic altern ativ es of d o o m sd a y o r d eliverance, it w a s at once u rg e n t a n d directionless. T he resu ltin g confusion d id n o t p re v e n t c o n tin u ed m ilitariz­ a tio n b u t d id h e lp m ake it p artial, erratic, so m etim es secret, a n d h a rd to grasp. T h u s, w h ile A m erican lea d ers p laced a p re m iu m o n th eir atom ic clout a n d sci­ en tists w o rk e d to en h an ce it, m an u fa ctu re of atom ic b o m b s alm o st h a lted a n d th e air force d id little to p re p a re for d e liv erin g them . W hile u n iv ersal m ilitary tra in in g failed in C ongress, co n scrip tio n w as tem p o rarily (so it seem ed) re­ n ew ed . W hile the A m erican g o v e rn m e n t h e lp e d to p ro secu te N azi w a r crim i­ nals, the A m erican a rm e d forces secretly scram b led to c ap tu re N azi scientists a n d technology. T he list co u ld go o n — of secret a n d p u b lic initiatives tak en , of o th ers left to languish. T here w a s n o t m u c h coherence to it. Insofar as these u n ­ tid y in itiatives h e lp e d to m ak e A m erica a global p olicem an, th a t w a s n o t clear in 1945 a n d 1946, especially since lead ers cried o u t th a t d e m o b ilizatio n w a s tu rn in g the A m erican g ian t into a pygm y. It m ay w ell b e th a t A m ericans p refe r th eir g rea t ch an g es in w a r a n d foreign policy to em erge piecem eal, w ith th e g ra n d labels th a t g iv e th em coherence o n ly com ing later. R oosevelt a n n o u n c e d a "N e w D eal" e v en before h e k n ew its co n ten ts, b u t n o su c h label a tte n d e d th e m ilitarizatio n d e v elo p in g d u rin g a n d after W orld W ar II, e ith er fro m d e fe n d e rs o r detracto rs. E ven a co h eren t state­ m e n t of n a tio n al policy cam e on ly in 1950, its co n ten ts p a rtly secret lo n g after th a t year. In th e late 1940s, on ly the te rm "C o ld W ar" im p a rte d som e coherence to th e ch an g es u n d e rw ay , a n d "co n ta in m e n t" to th e specific policies u n d e r­ taken, a n d those term s h a rd ly c a p tu re d th e full b re a d th of th e changes. T he reluctance to spell o u t th e course th e U n ited States to o k after v ictory seem s u tte rly u n d e rsta n d a b le , g iven the flux a t h o m e a n d ab ro a d a n d th e shock felt in resp o n se to th e w a r's final events. A t th e sam e tim e, th a t h esitatio n , like m u ch else d u rin g th e 1940s, allo w ed m ilitarizatio n to p ro ce ed — p o o rly u n d e r­ sto o d , rag g e d ly d e b ated , in a d e q u ately ackn o w led g ed . A s John G illis describes A m erica's m ilitarization: if "th e old m ilitarism glorified w a r b u t o ften failed to p re p a re for it, th e em erg in g m ilitarizatio n process in ten sified th e p re p a ra tio n w h ile concealing its p u rp o se s a n d ob scu rin g its c o n seq u en ces."114 By the sam e token, h ow ever, the term s justify in g m ilitarizatio n left space for ch allenging it. Because it w as cast as a resp o n se to ex ternal th reats a n d global changes in technology a n d politics, th e p o ssib ility rem ain ed to rev erse its course. E ager m ilitarists w o u ld h av e g ra sp e d m ilitary p o w e r for its o w n sake or for the conquests it m ad e possible. R eluctant w a rrio rs— w h ich w as h o w m o st A m ericans saw th em selv es— p re su m a b ly w ish e d to shelve th eir a rm s if

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th reats co u ld b e su b d u e d , technology controlled, in te rn atio n al relatio n s stab i­ lized. If th ere w a s h y p o c risy in th a t v ie w — a d en ial of attractio n s to m ilitary p o w e r a n d h e g em o n y — it also left o p e n a differen t course. T he legitim acy g ra n te d A m erica's m ilitarizatio n w a s b o th p o w e rfu l a n d ten u o u s: A m erican s felt th ey had to accept it, b u t th ey p re su m a b ly w ish e d to a b a n d o n its b u rd e n s as so o n as possible. For d ecad es after 1945, A m erican lead ers rarely th o u g h t th a t m o m e n t w a s im m inent, b u t o th er A m erican s h a d san ctio n to search for it.

3 C O N SO L ID A T IO N , 1945-1953

Transition W ith the w a r over, "its back w ash sm ears ov er u s," w ro te jo u rn alist John G u n ­ th e r in 1946, as the n a tio n su ccu m b ed "to g reed , fear, in e p titu d e , fu m b lin g ." P o p u lar, prolific, a n d rarely p ro fo u n d , G u n th e r n o n eth eless cau g h t A m erican s' q u arrelso m e, anxious m o o d a n d asked b itin g q u estio n s a b o u t its m ean in g . D o the n a tio n 's strife a n d lack of v isio n "sh o w th at, to becom e efficient, th is co u n ­ try n e ed s the stim u lu s of w ar? D oes it m ea n th a t 295,000 A m erican s h av e to be killed in o rd e r to give u s tru e effectiveness as a n atio n ? W ere th e d e a d n o m o re th a n b ait?" T he n a tio n 's self-im age as the last b a stio n of freed o m w o u ld m ea n little, G u n th e r w o rrie d , "u n til the c o u n try [learned] b e tte r to m an ag e its o w n peacetim e affairs."1 N a tio n al lead ers gave h im cause to w orry. W h en strik es g rip p e d steel, au to ­ m o tiv e p lan ts, coal m ining, a n d railro ad s, w a rtim e reflexes jerk ed in to action. W ith in one year, T ru m an h a d the g o v e rn m e n t seize coal m in es, railro ad s, m eat-p acking p lan ts, oil refineries, e v en th e G reat L akes T ow ing C om pany. W h en railro ad w o rk e rs defied a g o v e rn m e n t o rd e r in M ay 1946, h e th rea te n ed to d ra ft th em into the arm y a n d p e n n e d a bellicose sp eech to C ongress. W ar­ tim e strikes h a d b e en "w o rse th a n b u llets in th e back to o u r so ld ie rs"— b y im ­ plication, so w ere the p o stw a r strik es— a n d T ru m an w a n te d h is "co m ra d es in arm s" w h o h a d " fo u g h t the b a ttles to save th e n a tio n ju st as I d id tw enty-five y ears ago" to join h im in d efeatin g "C o m m u n ist" labor lead ers "a n d th e R us­ sian sen ato rs a n d rep resen tativ es." It w as tim e to "h a n g a few traito rs . . ., tell R ussia w h ere to get off a n d m ake the U n ited N atio n s w o rk ."2 N o to rio u s for letting off ste am in letters n e v er m ailed a n d sp eech es n ev er u ttered , T ru m an b y no m ean s a lw ay s tu rn e d his invective in to policy. W ith the railro ad strike settled ju st as h e b e g an speak in g , his in flam m ato ry co m m en ts w ere n ev er d eliv ered a n d the bill to d ra ft w o rk ers n e v er p a sse d C ongress (am ong o th er things, co nservatives feared th a t it w o u ld also allow c o rp o ratio n executives to be drafted). Still, th e im p u lse to a p p ly w a rtim e reflexes to p o stw a r p roblem s w as w id e sp rea d . C lark C lifford, T ru m a n 's key aide, w o rrie d th a t a

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P resid en t w ith o u t the p o w e r to su b d u e labor co u ld h a rd ly sq u a re off ag ain st Stalin a n d "d ea l w ith the d a rk e n in g w o rld situ atio n ." T ru m a n 's en em ies co u ld p lay a sim ilar gam e. The A m erican M edical A ssociation b ra n d e d h is p la n for n a tio n al h e alth in su ran ce "th e k in d of reg im en tatio n th a t led to to talitarian ism in G erm any." W orried a b o u t su c h talk, E lean o r R oosevelt g en tly ch id e d T ru­ m a n a b o u t th e d a n g e r of slip p in g , "because of th e difficulties of o u r peace-tim e situ atio n , into a m ilitary w a y of th in k in g ." She m ig h t h av e cau tio n ed m a n y o th er A m ericans as w ell.3 Som e of the p in c h e d a n d b itte r m o o d of 1946 so o n d issip a te d , as th e g rea t strik es w ere settled (or crushed), as restless v e te ran s a n d w a r w o rk e rs fo u n d n e w niches, a n d as u n ex p ected p ro sp e rity b lessed th e n atio n . G u n th e r's q u e s­ tio n s n o n eth eless rem a in e d a p p ro p ria te , h in tin g at o n e reaso n w h y m ilitariza­ tio n w o u ld becom e co n so lid ated in th e co m in g years. In th e w a k e of th e v a p id m aterialism of th e 1920s a n d th e econom ic d e sp e ra tio n of th e 1930s, W orld W ar II had b ro u g h t A m ericans pro sp erity , p u rp o se , a n d v ig o ro u s n a tio n al g o v e rn ­ m ent. A t th e sam e tim e, h ow ever, it h a d left u n reso lv ed th e p ro b lem th a t Roo­ sevelt h a d a rtfu lly finessed: h o w g o v e rn m e n t co u ld achieve th e legitim acy to foster p ro sp e rity a n d p u rp o se in peacetim e. First as m o d el a n d m e ta p h o r u n ­ d e r th e N e w D eal, a n d th e n as aren a of action, w a r h a d p ro v id e d te m p o ra ry solutions. In 1946, altern ativ e so lu tio n s w ere u n c le ar a n d co n tested . T he so lu ­ tio n s finally chosen m a d e p e rm a n e n t m a n y of th e m ilitarized featu res of A m er­ ican life a n d politics im p ro v ised d u rin g th e 1930s a n d W orld W ar II. W ar— as d e e d o r state of m in d o r m odel, as h o rro r to b e co n tem p lated , d e te rred , o r w a g e d — m o v ed to th e cen ter of A m erican political c u ltu re in a m o re lastin g w ay. Several forces d ro v e this process: a chaotic in te rn atio n al sy stem th a t in v ited th e rise of Soviet a n d A m erican p o w e r a n d th e clash b e tw e e n th e tw o; th e sense of A m erican v u ln era b ility to th e p erils of m o d e m w ar; th e chronic in ab ility of n a tio n al g o v e rn m e n t to act "save in w a r o r its su rro g a te "; a n d th e legacy of W orld W ar II, in w h ic h th e n a tio n h a d fo u n d its g reatest triu m p h a n d a m o d el for its future. T he C old W ar, a n d the decisions b y A m erican lead ers to w a g e it, cataly zed these forces a n d d re w th em to g eth er in to a p o w e rfu l ideological con­ figuration. N atio n al lead ers set the pace b y offering a rhetoric of peril, b y con­ so lid atin g the w a rtim e a p p a ra tu s of n a tio n al security, b y p lu n g in g a h ea d in th e a rm s race, a n d b y co n fronting c o m m u n ism a n d Soviet p o w er. T heir lead in g role w a s u n d e rlin e d b y th eir p ersisten ce in th e face of e v id e n t relu ctan ce o r d is­ in terest am o n g w ar-w e ary A m ericans. The C old W ar d id n o t alone cause these d ev elo p m en ts. Because it so con­ su m e d n a tio n al energies a n d w e n t o n so long, h o w ev er, it o b scu red th e process of m ilitarizatio n , m ak in g th e latter seem a resp o n se to th e C o ld W ar ra th e r th a n its a n te ce d en t (and therefore d e stin e d to w ith e r aw ay sh o u ld th e C old W ar end). To be sure, the pace a n d scale of th a t process w ere o ften k ey ed to th e C old W ar's dynam ics: A m erican a rm e d forces sh ra n k d rastically after 1945, a n d

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on ly in 1950, in resp o n se to a p erceived escalation in Soviet p o w e r a n d p re s­ sure, d id force levels, d efense b u d g e ts, a n d th e a p p a ra tu s of n atio n al secu rity tak e o n th e ir full C o ld W ar dim en sio n s. From a n o th e r v a n ta g e p o in t, ho w ev er, th a t g ra d u a l co u rse m a rk e d th e inevitable g ro w in g p a in s of m ilitarizatio n as m u ch as th e C old W a r's dynam ics. (M uch th e sam e n o tio n of fitful a n d reactive a d v an ces can, after all, also be a p p lie d to Soviet behavior: S tabilization of E ast­ ern E u ro p e d id n o t em erge full-blow n in 1945, w h e n Soviet arm ies first p ro ­ v id e d th e o p p o rtu n ity , b u t in stages o v e r th e n ex t fo u r y ears lin k ed closely to the c o n so lid atio n of A m erican p o w e r in E urope, in a classic a c tio n /re a c tio n sy n d ro m e.) O f course, m ilitarizatio n req u ire d tim e to overcom e resistance, crystallize objectives, a n d id en tify threats. But five y ears to co n so lid ate the p ro cess— o r a decade, if one d a te s its s ta rt fro m 1940 or so — w a s a rem ark ab ly b rief tim e for a g reat n a tio n to com plete su c h a historic change. M oreover, m u c h th a t em erg ed b y 1950 h a d b e e n p la n n e d , d esired , o r fore­ seen b y 1945, before th e Soviet U n io n b ecam e th e g alv an izin g focus of A m eri­ can leaders. A lread y b y th e n th o se lea d ers so u g h t to d issem in ate a n id eo lo g y of p rep a red n e ss, to forge a p e rm a n e n t m ilitary-industrial-scientific estab lish ­ m en t, to reo rg an ize the a rm e d forces, to in stitu te a p e rm a n e n t sy stem of u n iv er­ sal train in g , to acquire far-flung m ilitary bases, to occu p y d efeated enem ies w ith A m erican forces, to reta in a m o n o p o ly of atom ic w e ap o n s, a n d to create a h ig h -tech A m erican Pax A eronautica. T h at th ey d id n o t k n o w q u ite h o w o r w h e n th ey w o u ld achieve these objectives, th a t th ey d id n o t achieve th em all, th a t th ey q u a rre led a b o u t h o w to d o so a n d a b o u t th e m erits of o th e r form s of p o w e r— all th a t seem s u n su rp risin g reg a rd in g th e fu lfillm en t of g ra n d b u t nec­ essarily inchoate designs. A m erican m ilitary p o w e r also h e lp e d to u n d e rw rite a n A m erican im p eriu m , b u t, u n d e rsta n d a b ly , em p ire w as as h a rd to recognize as m ilitarizatio n . A fter all, A m erica's p o stw a r em p ire rested little o n territo rial acquisition, p lu n d e r, or b ru te force, a lth o u g h m ore th a n m o st A m erican s cared to ad m it. In stead , it w a s m ain ta in e d th ro u g h co n sen su al a rra n g e m e n ts w ith allies a n d clients th a t often p ro d d e d th e U n ited States to exercise m ore p o w e r or so m etim es d efied th a t pow er. A bove all, m ea su re d a g ain st c ru d e Soviet aggression, A m erican policy seem ed reactive a n d A m erican ideals lofty. In sh o rt, it h a rd ly seem ed like em ­ pire, at least n o t of th e so rt th a t E u ro p ea n p o w e rs once am assed . P erh ap s, say h isto rian s fin e-tu n in g the lan g u ag e, it w as o n ly "co n sen su al h e g em o n y " o r "em p ire b y consent," at least in W estern E urope: "th e A m erican 'E m p ire ' in G erm an y w a s less im p erial th a n federal" a n d W est G erm an y w a s "m o re like a state su ch as C alifornia o r Illinois t h a n . . . a colony o r p ro tecto rate." T he "p re ­ p o n d e ra n ce of p o w e r" A m ericans so u g h t, a rg u es a n o th e r h isto rian , " d id n o t m ean d o m in a tio n ," only the creation of "a w o rld e n v iro n m en t h o sp itab le to U.S. in terests a n d v a lu e s."4 Even p u t th a t w ay, how ever, the a m b itio n w a s g ra n d , a n d th e resu lts of it resem bled o th er em p ires in strik in g w ays. "O f course, ev ery em p ire d efin es its

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role as d e fe n siv e /' C harles M aier h a s n o te d .5 In th a t w ay, in th e riches g en er­ a te d for the im p erial center, in th e u n iv ersalist claim s for A m erican ideals, in th e racial o r g e n d e re d lan g u ag e u se d to describe n o n w h ite p eo p les, in th e re­ se n tm e n ts it aro u sed , a n d above all in the reach of its m ilita ry p o w er, th e U n ited States after W orld W ar II achieved m u c h of th e reality a n d m a n y of the tra p p in g s of em pire. Precisely h o w m u c h seem s a m a tte r o n ly for qu ib b lin g . In th e late 1940s, A m ericans co u ld o n ly d im ly g ra sp th e m ilita riza tio n a n d em p ire b u ild in g a t w ork. For g o o d reason, th ey still o ften lo o k ed to th e p ast, w o rry in g a b o u t ren e w e d econom ic w o es a n d refig h tin g o ld b attles o v er th e N e w D eal, labor, a n d capital. T heir d o m in a n t c o d ew o rd s su g g e ste d m o d est, n o t m essianic, aspirations. "Security," econom ic a n d n atio n al, w a s th e w o rd m o st o ften e n sh rin e d in official p ro n o u n ce m en ts, its n e u tra l to n e a n d d efen siv e co n n o tatio n m a k in g it a p ro v e n "co n sen su s-b u ild e r" a n d b ely in g th e am b i­ tio u s th ru st of A m erican policies.6 N a tio n a l lea d ers d id also sp e a k of grav e challenge a n d p e rm a n e n t change, b u t th e d aily m o o d w a s o n e of crisis a n d im ­ p ro v isation. T h at m o o d w a s n o t o n ly h o w m o st A m erican s ex p erien ced th e p e ­ rio d b u t w h a t h e lp e d th em to e n d u re a n d to lerate th e ch an g es th ey w ere expe­ riencing. G iven a script, th ey m ig h t w ell h av e rejected it.

The Militarization of American Policy O n F eb ru ary 9,1946, Joseph Stalin d eliv ered a sp eech w h ic h set W ash in g to n abuzz. H e p ra ise d the w a rtim e antifascist alliance b u t also stressed d e v elo p ­ m e n t of h e av y in d u stry to su p p o rt Soviet reco n stru ctio n a n d a rm e d stren g th . G iv en its m ixed m essages, S talin's speech d re w a su rp risin g ly a la rm e d re­ sp o n se from A m erican p u n d its a n d officials. It w a s "th e d e clara tio n of W orld W ar HI," Justice W illiam D ouglas to ld N a v y Secretary Jam es F orrestal, a zealo u s C old W arrior w h o th o ro u g h ly agreed. W alter L ip p m a n n b eliev ed th a t since Stalin h a d d e cid ed "to m ake m ilitary p o w e r h is first objective, w e are forced to m ake a co rre sp o n d in g decision." O n ly C om m erce Secretary H e n ry W allace n o te d th at, given the n e a r global reach of A m erican m ilitary b ases, "w e w ere challenging h im a n d his sp eech w a s tak in g u p th e ch allen g e."7 The d ram atic m o n th after S talin's speech ex p o sed n e arly ev ery c o d ew o rd , reflex, concept, a n d p erso n ality th a t w o u ld d o m in a te th e A m erican o u tlo o k early in the C old W ar. D ays later, the sto ry b ro k e of Soviet esp io n ag e ag en ts seeking A m erican atom ic secrets. T ru m a n c o n d em n ed " a p p e a se m e n t" of th e Soviet U nion, w h ile G O P lead ers c o n d em n ed h im for a llo w in g it (as Sen. A r­ th u r V andenberg p u t it privately. Secretary of State Jim m y B yrnes h a d b een "lo itering a ro u n d M unich"). From M oscow , G eorge K en n an se n t h is in flu en tial "long teleg ram " o u tlin in g a ratio n ale a n d strateg y for co n ta in m e n t of th e Soviet U nion. O n M arch 5, C hurchill issu ed his fam o u s w a rn in g of a n "iro n c u rta in " d escen d in g o n E urope, asking the E nglish-sp eak in g p e o p le s to rev erse th e situ ­ atio n b y relying o n the b o m b th a t "G o d h as w ille d " them . Soviet p ressu re o n

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T urkey to sh are control of th e Black Sea straits led Forrestal to p ro p o se se n d in g th e b a ttle sh ip Missouri a n d a n a v al task force th ere.8 P e rh ap s th e C o ld W ar h a d n o t y e t b e g u n (h isto rian s d isag ree a b o u t th e key d a te , as if a com plex a n d in crem en tal stru g g le co u ld b e traced to o n e m om ent). T here w a s as y e t n o form al A m erican C o ld W ar "policy," n o n av al task force reach ed T urkey for a n o th e r six m o n th s, a n d T ru m a n still w a x ed h o t a n d cold o n th e Soviets. B ut th e essen tials of A m erican lea d ers' o u tlo o k w ere b eco m in g ev id en t. The n e w stru g g le w a s largely th e old one a g ain st to ta litaria n s in n e w g u ise — th e n o tio n of S talinism as " re d fascism " tig h te n e d th e im ag in ativ e linkage. "T he So­ v ie t U n io n 's a ssa u lt u p o n the W est," a rg u e d o n e State D e p a rtm e n t official in 1947, "is a t a b o u t th e stage of H itle r's m an e u v e rin g in to C zechoslovakia." A n d since it w as, the m istak es of th e 1930s h a d to b e a v erted a n d th e lessons of W orld W ar E acted u p o n . A m erican lead ers so o n re p e a te d m a n y of th e w o rd s a n d ac­ tio n s th a t p rec ed e d Pearl H a rb o r— w h a t w a s n o v el in 1940 w a s p rec ed e n t b y 1946— albeit w ith o u t b en efit of FD R 's m asterfu l rhetoric, a n d w ith th e ferv en t h o p e to a v ert th e final cataclysm . A lth o u g h all in stru m e n ts of p o w e r h a d to b e d e p lo y e d , m ilitary force seem ed critical, less b ecau se Stalin w a s a b o u t to u n ­ leash h is arm ies (privately, few W ash in g to n in sid ers th o u g h t so) th a n becau se h e alleg ed ly (like H itler) u n d e rs to o d n o o th e r fo rm of p o w er. "U n less R ussia is faced w ith a n iro n fist a n d stro n g lan g u a g e," T ru m a n th o u g h t, " a n o th e r w a r is in th e m ak in g ." If a n a rm e d A m erica resu lted , it h a rd ly seem ed b y A m erican choice; as L ip p m a n n said, "w e are forced to m ak e a co rre sp o n d in g d ecisio n ."9 To b e sure, th a t o u tlo o k w a s h a rd ly th e sole cau se of th e C o ld W ar. D rastic ch an g es in th e stru c tu re a n d m o d es of p o w e r w ith in th e in te rn atio n al sy stem p ro b ab ly m a d e S oviet-A m erican conflict in so m e form inevitable. So m u ch h a d th e w a r d a m a g e d o th er m ajor p o w e rs th a t th e resu ltin g "v a c u u m " of p o w e r (as co n tem p o raries o ften called it) in v ite d Soviet a n d A m erican p o w e r to flow o u t­ w ard . B oth h a d e n o rm o u s p o w e r— a lth o u g h o n b alan ce th e a d v a n ta g e lay w ith the U n ited S tates— as w ell as global asp iratio n s. B oth also p o ssessed the recen t h isto rical experience, a n d th e p lau sib ly th rea te n in g enem y, to cast th o se a sp iratio n s sincerely in d efensive term s, as Stalin d id in h is b ru ta l su b ju g atio n of E astern E u ro p e a n d T ru m a n d id in A m erica's m o re su b tle d e p lo y m e n t of pow er. N o r d id A m erican lea d ers focus o n ly o n th e Soviet th reat. T hey k n e w th a t d iv erse A m erican in terests h a rd ly all fit w ith in th e C o ld W ar fram ew o rk . T heir su p rem e ach iev em en t u n d e r T rum an, the M arsh all P lan to a id W estern E u ­ rope, w as sh a p e d in p a rt b y h u m a n ita ria n m otives, c u ltu ra l affinities, a n d eco­ nom ic anxieties— a p ro stra te E u ro p e d ra g g e d d o w n th e A m erican eco n o m y as w ell as in v itin g Soviet a g g ra n d ize m e n t. Likew ise, th eir intricate policy of " d u a l c o n tain m en t" in E u ro p e w a s "d e sig n e d to keep b o th th e Soviet U n io n a n d G er­ m an y from d o m in a tin g th e C o n tin en t." D istru st of b o th th o se p o w e rs led A m erican lead ers to p u s h for G e rm a n y 's d iv isio n a n d th e Federal R epublic's

I 28

THE

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in co rp o ra tio n in to the W estern alliance, w h ile a n tico m m u n ism led th e m "to a d ep lo rab le series of co m p ro m ises w ith th e legacies of N azism ," in clu d in g re­ p a tria tio n to the U n ited States of G e rm a n scientists asso ciated w ith th e N azi regim e. But ag ain th e m o tiv es w ere com plex: th o se scientists w e re sn a tch e d in o rd e r to b en efit A m erican scientific a n d c o rp o ra te in terests as w ell as A m erican m ilitary po w er, to d e n y G e rm a n y the capacity to rearm , to b e a t o u t frien d s w h o seem ed to b e g e ttin g the ju m p o n th e U n ited States (as o n e official co m p lain ed , "W e h av e c au g h t the French re d -h a n d e d ag ain stealin g scientists o u t of o u r zone."), a n d o n ly g ra d u a lly to w a g e th e C o ld W ar o n a n o th e r front. E ven w ith in th e C old W ar fram ew o rk , A m erican lea d ers reco g n ized differences of in te rest am o n g c o m m u n ist n a tio n s m ore th a n th eir p u b lic im ag es of a m o n o ­ lithic en em y a ck n o w le d g ed .10 Still, th e A m erican o u tlo o k d id m u c h to tu rn a n in ev itab le riv alry in to a b itte r C old W ar a n d to stre n g th e n th e forces of m ilitarizatio n . For all th e co m p lex ity w ith w h ic h A m erican lead ers p riv a te ly calcu lated A m erican in terests a n d e n ­ em y th reats, th e y chose to "scare hell o u t of th e A m erican p e o p le " in p re se n tin g th e T ru m an D octrine in 1947, to h ig h lig h t th e co m m u n ist m enace in d e fe n d in g th e M arshall Plan, to d ep lo y a lan g u a g e of M an ich ean stru g g le ("N early ev ery n a tio n m u s t choose b e tw ee n altern ativ e w a y s of life," a n n o u n c e d T rum an), a n d to p o u r o u t a stream of analogies to W orld W ar II a n d d ire w a rn in g s a b o u t im p e n d in g m ilitary cataclysm .11 T h at is, th ey su b su m e d d iv erse in terests a n d d iv erse m o d es of p o w e r u n d e r th e g ra n d th em es of C o ld W ar, co n tain m en t, a n d W orld W ar III— especially in public, b u t in p riv a te as w ell. M eanw hile, th e m ilitarizatio n of A m erican policy a n d th e escalatio n of the C old W ar p ro ceed ed in confusing fits a n d starts. T he p an ic sh o w n in th e late w in te r of 1946 so o n a b ated , th o u g h S oviet-A m erican n eg o tiatio n s o n E astern E u ro p e a n d control of atom ic w e a p o n s k e p t th e p o t boiling. Panic re tu rn e d a y e ar later, w h e n B ritish w ith d ra w a l from G reece a n d T u rk ey p ro m p te d th e T ru m an D octrine, w ith its o p e n -e n d ed p ro m ise "to s u p p o rt free p e o p le s w h o are resisting a tte m p te d su b ju g a tio n ."12 O v er th e follo w in g year, th e M arsh all P lan to ok sh ap e, sig n ed b y T ru m a n o n A p ril 3,1948, a n d p ro v id in g $12.4 b illio n to W estern E urope ov er th e n ex t fo u r years. By th en , th e d ru m b e a t of crises a n d in itiatives w a s relentless. In F eb ru ary 1948, a C o m m u n ist co u p in C zechoslova­ kia fu rth e re d the S tabilization of E astern E urope. A n e n su in g w a r scare in M arch, com plete w ith loose talk of a Soviet in v asio n of W estern E u ro p e, w a s in p a rt m an u fa ctu red b y W ashington officials in o rd e r to force C o n g ress to a p ­ p ro v e the M arshall Plan, rein state conscriptio n , a n d step u p d efen se sp en d in g . But th e co u p d id to u ch a raw A m erican nerv e, v a lid a tin g fears of to ta litaria n ag g ressio n a n d W estern w eak n ess e m b o d ied in p o w e rfu l im ag es of M u n ich a n d ap p easem en t: h a d n o t H itle r's triu m p h o v er th e C zechs ten y ears before led to w o rld w ar? A few m o n th s later, as W est G e rm a n y 's rev iv al p ro ceed ed u n d e r A m erican auspices, the Soviets lau n ch ed a b lo ck ad e of W est Berlin, the A nglo-French-A m erican zone d e e p w ith in C o m m u n ist E ast G erm any. A n e w

CONSOLIDATION,

I945-I9S3

29

w a r scare g av e w a y to the m ig h ty spectacle of th e A m erican airlift th a t n u r­ tu re d W est B erlin u n til th e Soviets lifted th e b lo ck ad e in M ay 1949. By th en , th e N o rth A tlantic T reaty O rg an izatio n , d e sig n ed to p ro v id e m ilitary a n d political secu rity to W estern E urope, w a s b e in g finalized. M o n th s later tw o m o re b lo w s struck: th e Soviets e x p lo d e d a n atom ic b o m b a n d C h in ese co m m u n ists com ­ p le te d th e ir ro u t of C h ian g K ai-shek's N ationalists. T he C o ld W ar in E urope offered A m erican s a clear a n d a p p a re n tly fam iliar sto ry line: once again, as in the 1930s, th e ir c u ltu ral co u sin s w ere in d e sp era te stra its facing a to ta litaria n enem y. The C old W ar in A sia offered few su c h satis­ factions. T he A m erican v isio n of Jap an 's place in th a t stru g g le d id becom e clear: it w a s to b e a n an tico m m u n ist bastion, d e m ilitariz ed (except for A m erican forces b a se d there) b u t an ch o rin g its o w n p ro sp e rity a n d th a t of E ast A sia th ro u g h m u tu a l tra d e a n d A m erican assistance. N o th in g else in A sia seem ed as obvious. M an y A m ericans sy m p a th iz e d w ith th e anticolonial revolts sw ee p in g A sia— in B ritish India, the D utch E ast Indies, French In d o ch in a, a n d elsew h ere— b u t since th ey w ere carried o u t a g ain st A m erica's W estern E u ­ ro p e a n allies, th ey raised to u g h questions. S h o u ld th e U n ited States h e lp its al­ lies cling to th e ir em p ires a n d th ereb y alienate th e subject p e o p le s w h o se alle­ giance in th e C old W ar it also sought? O r sh o u ld it o p p o se its allies' efforts a n d th ereb y risk in g alien atin g them? W ith reg a rd to In d o ch in a, W ash in g to n fo u n d n o satisfactory a n sw e r to those questions. C h in a co n fo u n d e d a n d d iv id e d A m ericans e v en m ore. W h en T ru m a n a n d Secretary of State M arsh all p r u ­ d e n tly lim ited A m erican a id to th e C hinese N a tio n alists fig h tin g co m m u n ists for control of the n atio n , th ey also d ilu te d the m o ral force of A m erican an tico m ­ m u n ism . D id it a p p ly o n ly w h e re v icto ry w a s relativ ely easy, as in E urope? D id th eir C h in a policy. R epublicans ch arg ed , con stitu te a p p e a se m e n t o r so m eth in g w o rse, traceable to trea so n o u s "g iv eaw ay s" b y R oosevelt a t Yalta? N o aren a of policy m a d e the a d m in istra tio n m o re v u ln erab le, a n d n o n e w a s m o re vexing, th a n th a t in v o lv in g A sia. Several factors a d d e d to th e ran co r a n d confusion. T he line b e tw e e n "co m m u n ist" a n d "n o n co m m u n ist" forces— fairly sh a rp in E urope, from w h ic h m o st A m erican s d re w th eir u n d e rs ta n d in g of th e C o ld W ar— w a s b lu rry a t b e st in A sia's stru g g les, w h e re n a tio n alism a n d an tico lonialism loom ed so large. A lliances b e tw ee n M oscow a n d A sian com ­ m u n ists w e re easily exaggerated; th e y w ere sh a k y e v en to th e c o m m u n ists in ­ v olved. Few A m ericans w ere of A sian b ack g ro u n d , a n d A m erican s' affinity to a n d experience of A sia w ere shallow , so th a t th ey read ily re d u c e d d iv erse p eo p les to a m onolithic, d e v io u s h o rd e. N o r h a d its m ilitary a n d political ac­ tions in W orld W ar II g iven th e U n ited States th e in tim ate k n o w led g e a n d p o w ­ erfu l p o sitio n s acq u ired in E urope: in the Pacific w ar, th e a p t n a m e for it from a n A m erican v a n ta g e p o in t, th e c o u n try 's m ajor o p e ra tio n s h a d b e e n confined largely to th e p e rim ete r of A sia. The T ru m an a d m in istra tio n re sp o n d e d to d ev elo p m e n ts th ere a n d to Soviet p o w e r in E urope w ith policies th a t h a rd ly seem ed th e stu ff of m ilitarizatio n to

30

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m o st observers. C ongress rein stitu te d m ilitary co n scription, b u t o n a y early basis a n d w ith o u t the sy stem of u n iv ersal train in g m a n y lead ers w a n te d . T he N a tio n al Security A ct of 1947 e la b o rated a n d co n so lid ated th e in stitu tio n al a p ­ p a ra tu s of m ilitarizatio n , b u t it w a s acco m p an ied b y b itte r conflict th a t e v en seem ed to d e v o u r its p rim a ry architect (Jam es Forrestal, th e first secretary of defense, c o m m itted suicide). W h at o ften g rab b e d h e ad lin e s w a s n o t th e scale of th is n e w a p p a ra tu s b u t in stea d the spectacle of a rm e d forces fig h tin g o v er b u d ­ gets, forces, a n d m issions. T he clim ax cam e in a "rev o lt of th e ad m irals," fu ­ rio u s w h e n D efense Secretary L ouis Johnson canceled a su p e rc a rrie r in favor of fu n d in g th e air force's B-36, a h u g e h a u le r of atom ic b o m b s p o w e re d b y sixp isto n m o to rs (w ith jets so o n ad d ed ). To jo u rn alists co v erin g th ese sq u ab b les a n d p o liticians w eig h in g in o n them , little of th is lo o k ed like th e fo rw a rd m arch of m ilitarizatio n , certainly n o t th e im p u lse of m ilitary m e n to cling to fam iliar b u reau cratic turf, o ld er form s of w eap o n ry , a n d p a s t w a rs as m odels. In stead , it ju st lo oked like a m ess. C o m p o u n d in g the im age of m ilitary d e b ilita tio n w a s th e sw ift sh rin k a g e of A m erican forces after V-J D ay a n d the d u b io u s m e th o d s u se d to m ea su re th eir stren g th. A m erican lead ers d ecried a n a p p a re n t collapse of u sab le p o w e r as th e 12 m illion p e rso n n el in u n ifo rm a t the w a r 's e n d sh ra n k to few er th a n 1.6 m il­ lion b y 1947. W ith m o st of th o se tied d o w n in o ccu p atio n , logistical, a n d tra in ­ in g d u ties, co m b at-read y forces w ere few. To in sid ers p riv y to secret in fo rm a ­ tion, ev en A m erica's u ltim ate w e a p o n seem ed frail: o n ly n in e atom ic b o m b s w ere available as of June 1946 a n d fifty-three tw o y ears later, th e air force w a s p o o rly e q u ip p e d a n d tra in e d to c arry th em , a n d n o clear stra te g y g o v e rn e d th eir use, m u ch less th e full sp e c tru m of A m erican m ilita ry p o w er. Fiscal w atch d o g s, w h o in clu d ed T ru m a n h im self a n d R epublicans frettin g a b o u t A m erican im potence, k e p t d efense b u d g e ts low , a t least in th e eyes of m ilitary officials. A m id all this, th e b ro a d e r course of m ilitarizatio n w a s h a rd to fath o m (or easy to ignore). R arely d id politicians o r p u n d its c o m p are A m erican d em o b iliz­ atio n to th e Soviet U n io n 's, w h ic h w a s only so m e w h a t less drastic. T heir b ase­ line w as the m a m m o th w a rtim e force, n o t p re w a r p eacetim e sta n d a rd s, as if h isto ry w ere irrelev an t u n less it y ield ed d ire w a rn in g s a b o u t th e fu tu re. E ven a force of 1.6 m illion p e rso n n el w a s five tim es larg er th a n its p re w a r c o u n te rp a rt of th e mid-1930s. D efense sp e n d in g , earlier a b o u t 15 p e rc en t of th e fed eral b u d ­ g et a n d 1.5 p e rc en t of G N P, n o w seized o n e-th ird of th e fo rm er a n d 5 p e rc en t of G N P — ex cluding sw ollen costs of d e b t service, v e te ra n s' p ro g ram s, a id to al­ lies, a n d the like. L ikew ise, th e d efense sy stem co u ld d o far m o re after W orld W ar II th a n before: assu m e o ccu p atio n d u tie s of u n p re c e d e n te d scale a n d geo­ g rap h ic range, m ain tain far-flung bases, p ro d u c e n u c le ar w eap o n s, c h u m o u t n e w b o m b ers a n d jet fighters, a n d d ev elo p m o re a d v an c ed w eap o n s. D esp ite a sh o rta g e of co m b at-read y forces, it c o u ld sw in g in to action w ith strik in g sp e ed a n d force, as it d id in the B erlin airlift in 1948 a n d K orea in 1950.

CONSOLIDATION,

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I3 I

It also h a d u n p re c e d e n te d legal a n d political u n d e rp in n in g s. W ith th e b rief ex cep tion of 1940, th e U n ited States n o w h a d its first p eacetim e d raft. N A TO m a rk e d a n e x tra o rd in a ry d e p a rtu re from A m erican trad itio n s: in fo rm al alli­ ances h a d p ro ce ed e d A m erican e n try in to b o th w o rld w a rs, b u t th is alliance in v o lv e d a legally b in d in g trea ty ratified b y th e Senate. T he C en tral Intelligence A gency, created in 1947, w a s g ra n te d co nstitu tio n ally d u b io u s p o w e rs of se­ crecy a n d action, a n d so o n exceeded th o se p o w ers. M ost im p o rta n t, h ere w a s a sy ste m th a t A m erican lea d ers w ere w illin g t a u se a n d in creasin g ly p refe rred o v e r diplom acy. T he U n ited States h a rd ly d isa rm e d after 1945. T he g ro w th of its m ilita ry p o w e r sim p ly lag g ed b e h in d a n e v en m o re strik in g escalatio n in th e m issio n s its lea d ers called o n it to fill. C o n ta in m e n t a n d m ilitarizatio n also m e t resistance, as th e clam o r for ra p id d em o b ilizatio n h a d m a d e clear. In O ctober 1945, o n ly 7 p e rc en t of A m erican s re g a rd e d foreign p ro b lem s as the "m o st v ital" o nes facing th e c o u n try (Forrestal th a t m o n th th o u g h t th e c o u n try w a s "g o in g b ack to b e d a t a frig h ten in g ra te " a n d th ereb y o p e n in g th e w a y for "th e co m in g of W orld W ar III"). Public o p in io n to w a rd th e Soviets, a n d to w a rd th e T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n for b ein g to o "so ft" o n them , so o n tu rn e d n egative, y e t in 1947 th e State D e p a rtm e n t still fo u n d th a t 67 p e rc en t of A m ericans th o u g h t th e U N "th e b e st chance for p eace" a n d o n ly 28 p e rc en t a p p ro v e d of "try in g to stay a h ea d of th e R u ssian s b y b u ild ­ in g atom ic b o m bs." O ne State D e p a rtm e n t official c o m p a red th e situ a tio n to th a t b efore Pearl H arbor: "p o w erlessn ess o n th e p a rt of th e g o v e rn m e n t to act b ecau se of C o ngressional o r p u b lic u n a w are n ess of th e d a n g e r o r cost of inac­ tio n ." By 1948, p o lls fo u n d m o st A m erican s w o rrie d a b o u t th e Soviets, b u t also 63 p e rc en t "w a n tin g a m eetin g w ith Stalin o r so m e o th er b o ld stro k e to red u c e th e d a n g e r of w a r." 13 A m ericans w ere n o u n ifo rm m ass; race, religion, a n d o th er factors so rte d th e m out. C atholics, for exam ple, especially th o se of E ast­ e rn E u ro p ea n b a c k g ro u n d , w ere k een o n a n anti-Soviet policy. Still, th a t m y ste­ rio u s entity, "p u b lic o p in io n ," rallied slow ly to th e cause. M an y A m erican s d is­ tru ste d th e Soviet U n io n a n d w a n te d to see it k n o ck ed a ro u n d b u t w e re u n w illin g to p a y a g rea t p rice to d o so. A d m in istra tio n officials, castin g th em selv es as c o sm o p o litan realists w h o g ra sp e d the e n e m y 's th re a t to A m erica, in te rp re te d indifference to th e ir C old W ar policies as signs of a parochial, u n e d u c a te d p u b lic opinion. A ccordingly, th ey so u g h t to m an ip u la te it— v iew in g th e T ru m an D octrine, for exam ple, as "th e o p e n in g g u n in a c am p aig n to b rin g p eo p le u p to [the] realizatio n th a t the w a r isn 't ov er b y a n y m ean s," in C lark C lifford's w o rd s. Ironically, th e y felt th ey could in stru ct A m ericans in global realities on ly b y d isto rtin g th em , al­ th o u g h th ey also so u g h t to b a n k th e fires of a n tico m m u n ism th ey sto k ed , lest "th e h ysterical so rt of an ti-C o m m u n ism " get o u t of control, as G eorge K ennan w o rried . T heir elitist a p p ro a c h to p u b lic o p in io n g ain ed credence from w riters a n d scholars w h o reacted to H itle r's m a n ip u la tio n of th e G e rm a n m asses b y em p h asizin g the gullibility a n d ignorance of o rd in a ry p eople. A s R ichard Bar-

I 32

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n e t h as su m m e d u p th eir outlook, "To en co u rag e h o p e b a se d o n th e cap acity of th e av erag e citizen to g o v e rn w a s to p ro m o te d a n g e ro u s illusions, for H itle r a n d Stalin d e m o n stra te d h o w easily p o p u list y e arn in g s tu rn in to n ig h t­ m a re s."14 T he n o tio n of lev el-h ead ed elites p itte d a g ain st volatile m asses w a s m isle ad ­ ing, h o w ever, for lead ers too w ere p re y to visceral in stin cts a n d a b ru p t ch an g es of m o o d. T hey co u ld p an ic a n d talk of in itiatin g atom ic w ar, o r (as w ith Forrestal) becom e p a ra n o id a b o u t Jew s, co m m unists, o r o th er alleg ed enem ies. H av ­ in g set one course, th ey co u ld re p u d ia te it: K en n an sp e n t m u c h of h is rem a in in g career d isp u tin g im plications in h is co n ta in m e n t policy th a t o th ers th o u g h t self-evident. T hen too, som e, like K ennan, w ere b u n d le s of eth n ic a n d class p reju d ice w h o lo ath ed m u c h of the society th ey p re su m a b ly d e fe n d ed . O n oc­ casion, th ey also d esce n d ed to cru d e rep ressio n a n d red -b aitin g . In tellig en t, ca­ p ab le m en, th ey n o n eth eless succeeded in sh a p in g p u b lic o p in io n b ecau se of th eir p o w e r m ore th a n th e ir su p e rio r rationality. In d eed , the v e ry claim of th a t ratio n ality rested o n n o tio n s of class, race, a n d g e n d e r d o m in a n t am o n g policy m ak ers a t this ju n ctu re. T hese lead ers te n d e d to reg a rd o rd in a ry A m ericans m u c h as th ey p erceiv ed w o m e n a n d n o n w h ite p e o p le s— as "em otional, irrational, irrespo n sib le, u n b u sin esslik e, u n stab le, a n d childlike," or, in th e case of H in d u m en , as passiv e, "effete," o r h o m o sex ­ ual. Secretary of State John Foster D ulles, for exam ple, b eliev ed th a t In d ia 's lead ers h a d "a n alm o st fem inine h y p ersen sitiv en ess w ith resp ect to th e p re s­ tige of th eir c o u n try " (w hereas W estern o b serv ers o ften th o u g h t " In d ia n w o m e n w ere heartless, d o m in eerin g , a n d em asculating"). W h eth er foreign o r A m erican, su c h peo p le, A m erican lead ers a ssu m e d , n e e d e d th e tu telag e of th eir p a triarc h al authority, th o u g h less so if th ey w ere stau n ch ly a n tic o m m u n ist— A sian lead ers in th a t m o ld w ere a ssig n ed a m ore virile, m asculine, ag gressive im ag e.15 T h at o utlook in tu rn ratio n alized th e le a d ers' au th o rity o v er p recisely th o se g ro u p s g en eratin g m u ch of th e o p p o sitio n to A m erican policy: fem in ist p eace o rg an izations, A frican-A m ericans like Paul R obeson, n e u tra l lead ers like In ­ d ia n p rim e m in ister Jaw aharlal N e h ru , a n d rebellious co lo n ized p o p u la tio n s ab ro ad challenging A m erica's alliance w ith E u ro p e's im p erial p o w ers. The cel­ eb ratio n in 1940s A m erican c u ltu re of m ale au th o rity , fam ily ord er, a n d " tra d i­ tio n al" w o m e n 's roles reinforced the policy elite's role as a w ise, fath erly o v er­ seer to d e p e n d e n t, unruly, a n d u n in fo rm e d p e o p le s at h o m e a n d ab ro ad . To b e sure, th eir p atriarc h al v iew w a s h a rd ly h e ld b y th em alone, since th e global ex­ perien ce of w a r in th e 1940s reinforced m ale au th o rity in m a n y settings; a m o n g A m ericans, peace activism a n d o p p o sitio n to p o licy m ak in g elites w ere p e rh a p s m ore m ale-d o m in ated early in th e C old W ar th a n a t a n y tim e in th e century, a n d n o m ore m ale a n d m ascu lin ist elite could b e fo u n d th a n th e Soviet U n io n 's. Still, p olicy m ak ers' sense of class, racial, a n d g e n d e r h ierarch ies h e lp e d to forge th eir p o stu re of su p e rio r w isd o m a n d authority.

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P o w er a n d m a n ip u la tio n d id not, ho w ev er, alone th ro ttle resistance to n a ­ tio n al policies, for the resistance itself w a s diffuse a n d d iv id e d . A s d u rin g 1940-41, it w a s su sta in ed b y tw o b ro a d political forces th a t sh a re d little b u t th eir resistance. T he conservative w in g , d o m in a te d b y R epublicans like Sen. R obert Taft, w a s n atio n alist, u nilateralist, a n d "iso latio n ist" in th e v iew of the foreign policy establishm ent. T he o th er source of resistance co n sisted of leftists a n d d isaffected liberal D em ocrats, led b y H e n ry W allace after T ru m an fired h im from the C ab in et in 1946 a n d th ro u g h h is q u ixotic P rogressive P arty cam ­ p a ig n for the p resid en c y in 1948. N o t o n ly could the o p p o sitio n cam p s co o p erate little w ith each other, b u t each w a s c o m p ro m ised o n its o w n term s. Taft stre n u o u sly criticized th e overex ten sio n a n d m ilitarizatio n of A m erican policy, th e g ro w th of e n ta n g lin g alli­ ances, th e P re sid e n t's u su rp a tio n of p o w e r in w a r a n d fo reig n policy, a n d , o n occasion, h o w all those tren d s w o rsen e d Soviet-A m erican conflict. M in d fu l of p la n s "to m ain tain a force so p re p o n d e ra n t th a t n o n e shall d a re attack u s," Taft w a rn e d th a t "p o ten tial p o w e r o v e r o th e r n atio n s, h o w e v er b e n ev o len t its p u r­ p o ses, lead s inevitably to im p erialism ." O n ly relu ctan tly d id h e v o te for N A TO after p ro m ises (soon re p u d ia te d ) from Secretary of State D ean A cheson th a t W est G erm an y w o u ld rem a in d isa rm e d a n d th a t n o "su b sta n tia l" A m erican force w o u ld go to E urope. B ut a n tico m m u n ism a n d political o p p o rtu n ism also te m p te d conservatives to b e a t u p o n the T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n for failing to d e fe n d A m erica a n d sto p c o m m u n ism in A sia— as n o te d pacifist A. J. M uste rem ark ed , "For isolationists these A m erican s d o certain ly g e t a ro u n d ." A n d as in 1940, conservatives also em braced the cen tral co m p o n e n t of A m erican p o w e r— a form idable a ir force, n o w carry in g atom ic w e a p o n s— since it a p ­ p e aled to th eir v isio n of A m erican p o w e r u n fettere d b y alliances a n d th e coer­ cive a p p a ra tu s of m ass arm ies. For the T ru m a n a d m in istratio n , co n servatives w ere a m ig h ty n u isan ce b u t n o t a serio u s obstacle.16 A m ong leftists, w h o offered m a n y of the sam e a rg u m e n ts m a d e b y co n serv a­ tives, the m ain p ro b lem w as th e ease w ith w h ic h C o ld W arrio rs co u ld lin k th em ideologically to co m m u n ism a n d the Soviet U n io n (the presen ce of real C o m ­ m u n ists in th e P rogressive p a rty d id n o t help). T heir p o sitio n n o w resem b led th a t of FD R 's rig h t-w in g foes before Pearl H arb o r, w h o h a d b e en c o m p ro m ised b y th eir alleged affinities to fascism . Subject to vicious red -b aitin g , leftists a n d pacifists q u a rre led am o n g th em selv es a n d m u ste re d little effective o p p o sitio n to a d m in istratio n policies after 1948. O p p o sitio n w eak n ess also testified to th e p o w e r of th e n a tio n al secu rity p a ra d ig m a n d th e m em o ry of W orld W ar II. C o n cep ts of "to talitarian ism " a n d " re d fascism " conflated th e em erg in g stru g g le w ith th e o n e ju st w o n , as d id th e d ru m b e a t of co m p ariso n s b e tw e e n Stalin a n d H itler, b e tw ee n "a p p e a se m e n t" in 1938 a n d "w eak n ess" in 1948, a n d b e tw ee n Pearl H a rb o rs p a st a n d p ro sp e c ­ tive. W ith defeat only n a rro w ly av erted in th e last w ar, w ith n e w w e ap o n s only w o rsen in g the n a tio n 's vulnerability, w ith th e n ex t w a r su re to allow n o tim e to

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m obilize, w ith a n e w en em y o n ly m ore in sid io u s th a n th e last one, w h a t A m e ri­ cans c o u ld resist th e ru s h to a rm th èir n a tio n a n d co n fro n t th e enem y? T hey co u ld , as som e d id eloquently, q u e stio n th e m ea n s a n d co n seq u en ces of d o in g so. Far few er c o u ld challenge th e reig n in g p a ra d ig m a n d its a n alo g ies to W orld W ar II, especially since those analogies h in te d a t a silv er lin in g in th e d a rk clo u d s of global struggle: if a d isp lay of force co u ld h a v e sto p p e d H itle r before W orld W ar n , th e n a d isp la y of w ill m ig h t n o w b rin g v icto ry a n d a v e rt w ar. Success req u ire d n o t a ra s h p lu n g e into w a r b u t a ste a d y cap acity a n d w illin g ­ n ess to risk w a r— o r e v en ju st th e ap p ea ra n c e thereof. A ll these c u rre n ts of m o o d a n d policy su rfaced in m o st h y p erb o lic fo rm in d eb ate o v er n u c le ar w eap o n s. T he sh eer scale a n d d e p th of th a t d e b a te testified to th e serio u sn ess w ith w h ich A m ericans to o k th e issu e (a stu n n in g 98 p e rc e n t of th e m k n e w of th e atom ic b o m b a fter H iroshim a). Ju st as strikingly, h o w ev er, th ey th o u g h t of th e b o m b as a n in stru m e n t of th e ir o w n p o te n tia l d estru ctio n . For all th e ir p rid e in A m erican achievem ent, for all th e ir n a tio n 's lead in th is n e w technology, th e y im ag in ed th eir im m in en t d oom . M em o ries of W orld W ar II, sto ries of c o m m u n ist espionage, g rap h ic p re se n ta tio n s of w h a t n u c le ar a t­ tack w o u ld d o to A m erican cities, a n d th e n n e w s th a t Stalin h a d h is o w n atom ic w e a p o n all reinforced th e im ag in ed p e ril a n d th e p a ra d ig m of n a tio n al security. O f course, th a t sense of p e ril also d ro v e A m erican s to c o n sid er altern a tiv e s to a n arm s race. P roposals em erg ed fro m c ru sa d in g w o rld fed eralists like N o r­ m a n C ousins, th o u g h tfu l intellectuals like S tu a rt C hase, a g o n iz e d scientists like R obert O p p en h eim er, h a rd -h e a d e d sta te sm en like H e n ry L. Stim son, a n d fro m th e a d m in istratio n , w h o se p la n for in te rn atio n al co n tro l o f atom ic en erg y w a s b o th b o ld a n d self-interested. Still, atom ic p e ril w a s also p araly zin g . T hose w h o w a rn e d d a rk ly of it w a n te d to p ro v o k e political activism , b u t th e ir b in a ry d ep ictio n of a ltern a tiv e s— "w o rld state o r w o rld d o o m ," as jo u rn a list M ax L em er p u t it— d id n o t c h art a n a p p a re n t practical co u rse b e tw e e n u to p ia n a n d u n th in k a b le outcom es. It fostered a fatalistic belief in technological d e te rm in ­ ism , as if th e b o m b ra th e r th a n p e o p le d e te rm in e d th e w o rld 's co u rse, a n d a d e e p fear w h o se focus co u ld b e tran sfe rred from th e b o m b to th e S oviets— w ith th e b o m b so horrific, h o w terrible w a s th e p ro sp e ct if M oscow p erfected it? W ith "fear of th e R ussians" replacing "fear of th e b o m b ," th e " d re a d d e stro y er of 1945 h a d becom e the shield of the R epublic b y 1950."17 T he b o m b w a s a lre ad y em erg in g as su ch a sh ield in n a tio n al stra te g y before 1950. M ilitary lead ers e n v isio n ed the n u c le ar o b literatio n of th e Soviet U n io n at th e sta rt of the n ex t w ar. A full sta te m e n t of strateg y w a s slo w to em erge, p rey to th e conflicts am o n g the a rm e d forces, a n d stra te g y w e n t b e y o n d th e b o m b , em bracing, as in W orld W ar II, a capacity to m o bilize quick ly for g e n eral w a r a n d to assist allies in b e a rin g th e b u rd e n of w a r as m u c h as possible. But the b o m b w a s the h e a rt of th e m atter, a n d w ith it in tractab le d ilem m as a b o u t h o w to base g ra n d strateg y o n it, as th e n a tio n 's n u c le ar o m n ip o ten ce co n stan tly seem ed to yield its n u c le ar im potence. A m erican a n d W estern Eu-

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ro p e a n lead ers recognized th a t actual u se of n u c le ar w e a p o n s m ig h t d e stro y m u c h th a t w a s to b e d e fe n d ed . A s a French p rem ier m em o rab ly p u t it, a lth o u g h th e U n ite d States m ig h t once a g ain liberate E urope, "th e n e x t tim e y o u p ro b a ­ b ly w o u ld b e lib eratin g a corpse." "O n e u se of it [the n u c le ar sanction] w ill b e fatally too m an y ," th e stra te g ist B ernard B rodie later n o te d .18 H ence, a lth o u g h u se of th e atom ic w e a p o n a n d e v en a "p rev e n tiv e " n u c le ar attack a g ain st th e Soviet U n io n te m p te d som e leaders, th eir stress w a s o n deterren ce. T he b o m b , like A m erica's w h o le sy stem of a rm s a n d alliances, w a s m e a n t to d issu a d e en e­ m ies fro m u n le a sh in g w a r a n d convince th e m of A m erica's w ill to resp o n d . D e­ terren ce h a rd ly reso lv ed m u ch , ho w ev er, especially once th e K rem lin acq u ired n u c le a r w eap o n s: w a s it credible to th re a te n it w ith n u c le ar reta lia tio n if th e e n su in g w a r m ig h t d estro y th e U n ited States o r its allies? Yet if th e th re a t w a s n o t credible, w h a t use d id A m erica's atom ic w e a p o n s h av e, a n d w h a t risk d id th e c o u n try ru n of co m m ittin g th e fatal e rro r of "ap p e a sem e n t"? H a u n te d b y su c h questio n s, A m erican lead ers k e p t lo o k in g to th e atom ic w e a p o n to m ak e a political o r psychological im p ressio n o n th e enem y, since its practical u se in w a r w a s so d o u b tfu l. D u rin g th e B erlin crisis, for exam ple, th e T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n leaked w o rd th a t sixty B-29s w ere b e in g se n t to En­ g lan d , h in tin g th a t th ey could w a g e n u c le ar w ar. T h o u g h th ey carried n o atom ic w e ap o n s, th e b lu ff w e n t fo rw a rd in o rd e r to in tim id a te M oscow a n d set a p re c e d e n t for a p e rm a n e n t A m erican n u c le ar force in E urope. In su c h w ay s, n u c le ar policy k e p t slip p in g d e e p e r in to th e m u rk y , u n m e a su ra b le realm of m o rale a n d im pressions. T h at realm g o v e rn e d the T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n 's decision, fin alized in Jan­ u a ry 1950, to m ake a h y d ro g e n bom b. It reco g n ized th e d a n g e r of fu rth e r esca­ latin g th e a rm s race a n d th e absence of an y co m p ellin g m ilitary reaso n for p lu n g in g a h ea d , since defense officials d o u b te d th a t H -b o m b s co u ld d o m u c h n o t a lre ad y possible w ith atom ic w e ap o n s. Less tan g ib le criteria o v e rru le d su c h reaso n s for caution. G iven th a t th e Soviets m ig h t d ev elo p th e n e w w e ap o n . Joint C hiefs C h a irm a n G en. O m a r B radley a rg u e d th a t "p o ssessio n of a th erm o n u cle ar w e a p o n b y th e USSR w ith o u t su c h p o ssessio n b y th e U n ited States w o u ld b e in to le ra b le"— " p ro fo u n d ly d em o ra liz in g " to A m erican s a n d a " tre m e n d o u s psychological b o o st" for the Soviet U n io n .19 T h u s th e a d m in is­ tra tio n took the n e x t step in th e a rm s race in o rd e r to reassu re A m erican s a n d allies a n d to avoid a p p e a rin g to a p p e a se th e Soviets b y lettin g th e m catch up. T he ratio n ale w a s as im p o rta n t as th e decisio n itself. Policies b a se d o n sp e ­ cific capabilities a n d situ a tio n s— th e p o w e r a n en em y co u ld am ass h ere, the a rm y to b e d e p lo y e d th e re — m ig h t h av e y ield ed large, costly forces, y e t o n es of m ea su ra b ly specific duties. Im p ressin g enem ies a n d rea ssu rin g frien d s, o n the o th er h a n d , w a s a n o p e n -e n d e d task d e v o id of m ea su ra b le criteria for ju d g in g its fulfillm ent: w o u ld it take fifty o r five th o u sa n d n u c le ar w e a p o n s to co m p lete th e job? To be sure, as C old W ar policym akers p o in te d out, m o rale a n d credibil­ ity w ere them selves realities of the global stru g g le, o nes th e state co u ld h a rd ly

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b a n ish from its calculations. Yet to base decisions p rim a rily o n th e m risk ed a n e n d less escalation in the a rm s race, thè fo rm atio n of alliances, a n d th e sp e n d in g of m oney. It m a d e sense o n ly in a w o rld sh a p e d b y M u n ich a n d th e tra g e d y of th e 1930s, w h e n precisely th e anti-Fascists' failure to d isp la y th e ir w ill seem ed to h av e led th em into w ar. T hese d y n am ics of m ilitarizatio n reached fuller ex p ressio n in th e w a k e of th e H -b o m b decision, in A p ril 1950, w h e n the N a tio n a l S ecurity C o u n cil a t last of­ fered a full statem en t, k n o w n as NSC-68, of n a tio n al strategy. NSC-68 ju stified "A m erica's a ssu m in g th e role of w o rld p o licem an a n d cam e close to say in g th a t all ch an g e w a s directed b y the C o m m u n ists a n d sh o u ld th erefo re b e resisted ." Its b rief for m ilitarizatio n w a s sta rtlin g — it p ro p o se d a v irtu a l treb lin g of the A m erican defense b u d g e t to $35 billion a year. E q u ally significant, w h ile its a u ­ th o rs h a rd ly ru le d o u t w o rld w ar, th ey e m p h a siz e d th e in tan g ib les of w ill, p a ­ tience, a n d coercion. A m erican secu rity n o w seem ed "to d e p e n d as m u c h o n perceptions of th e b alance of p o w e r as o n w h a t th a t b alan ce a ctu ally w a s," le a d ­ in g po licym akers "v astly to increase the n u m b e r a n d v a rie ty of in terests." T h at outlook, so expansive a n d so u n g ro u n d e d in th e calculable, g ave p o w e rfu l im ­ p e tu s to m ilitarizatio n .20 T ru m an o rd e re d NSC-68 k e p t secret, b u t d elib eratio n s o v er it w ith in th e a d ­ m in istra tio n gave one m ore clue to th e sources of m ilitarizatio n . A ttu n e d to K eynesian econom ics, im p re ssed b y th e econom ic lessons o f W orld W ar n , the a u th o rs of NSC-68 w ere o p tim istic th a t re a rm a m e n t w a s n o t on ly affordable b u t w o u ld foster econom ic g ro w th a n d "a h ig h e r sta n d a rd of liv in g ."21 N o m o re th a n FDR in 1940 d id these m e n justify re a rm a m e n t as a w a y for g o v e rn ­ m e n t to p ro m o te econom ic g ro w th . N a tio n a l secu rity w a s th e ratio n ale. B ut e v en m ore th a n R oosevelt, th ey w ere a w are of th e reciprocal relatio n sh ip th a t seem ed to exist b e tw e e n p ro sp e rity a n d arm am en ts. Like m o st A m ericans, th ey p re fe rre d th a t th e b a rg a in w h e reb y d efen se stim ­ u lated g ro w th rem a in tacit. To ack n o w led g e it w a s to a d m it to o n e of th e d e e p ­ e st m o tives for m ilitarization. Som e critics a n d jo u rn alists k n e w b etter. Business Week recognized th e p o te n t "co m b in atio n of co n cern o v e r ten se R u ssian rela­ tions, a n d a g ro w in g fear of a risin g level of u n e m p lo y m e n t h e re a t h o m e." U.S. News and World Report w ro te sh a rp ly th a t "g o v e rn m e n t p la n n e rs figure th a t th ey h av e fo u n d th e m agic fo rm u la for alm o st e n d less g o o d tim es . . . [the] C old W ar is an autom atic p u m p p rim e r."22 Such fo rth rig h t ch aracterizatio n w a s rare in 1950, how ever. R earm am en t w a s su p p o se d to m eet a g ro w in g peril. P ro sp erity seem ed only the in ad v e rte n t, th o u g h w elcom e, b y -p ro d u ct.

The Political Economy off Militarization "M r. P rim a D onna, Brass H at, Five Star M acA rth u r," T ru m an w ro te in h is d ia ry o n Ju n e 17,1945. G en. D ouglas M acA rth u r seem ed "w o rse th a n th e C ab o ts a n d th e L odges— th ey a t least talk ed w ith one an o th e r b efore th ey to ld G o d w h a t to

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do. M ac tells G o d rig h t off." It w a s one of m a n y fu lm in atio n s b y T ru m an a g ain st M acA rth u r th a t rev ealed n o t only h is feisty te m p e r b u t h is w a y of ac­ c o m m o d atin g him self to the m ilitarizatio n of in stitu tio n s— b y asse rtin g civil­ ian control ov er th e a rm e d forces. H a v in g k e p t th e g en erals a n d a d m irals in check, T rum an, like m o st A m ericans, d id n o t recognize h o w m u c h m ilitariza­ tio n itself p ro ceed ed . A fter all, h e w as, in Jam es F orrestal's view , "th e m o st rocklike ex am p le of civilian control th e w o rld h a s ev er w itn e sse d ."23 T he first stru g g le ov er civilian control in v o lv ed n u c le ar w e a p o n s a n d e n ­ ergy. T he W ar D e p a rtm e n t p ro p o se d th a t a co m m issio n d o m in a te d b y m ilitary m e n h o ld responsibility, b u t scientists fearin g restrictio n s o n th e ir w o rk , con­ g ressm en w a ry of m ilitary ag g ra n d ize m e n t, a n d T ru m a n h im self sw u n g b e­ h in d legislation p a sse d in 1946 settin g u p a civilian A tom ic E nergy C o m m is­ sion. It w a s n o t m u c h of a victory for civilian control, h o w ev er, b ecau se it still p ro v id e d for a p o w e rfu l M ilitary L iaison C o m m ittee a n d a w eb of secu rity reg ­ u latio n s, a n d e v en m o re because civilian lea d ers a n d ex p erts se rv ed m ilitary p u rp o se s. T ensions w ere a b u n d a n t in th is "loosely fed e rate d g o v e m m en tin d u stria l-m ilitary com plex,"24 a sp ra w lin g n e tw o rk of g o v e rn m e n t lab o ra to ­ ries, universities, a n d p ro d u c tio n p la n ts ru n b y p riv a te co rp o ratio n s, a n d th e m ilita ry 's in terest in b o m b s o ften clash ed w ith scientists' p u rs u it of research a n d co rp o ra tio n s' in te rest in n u c le ar energy. Still, b y th e 1950s m assiv e b u d g e ts p e rm itte d all p a rtie s to p u rs u e th eir goals. T he A EC b ecam e a p o w e rh o u se d e ­ v elo p er of n u c le ar w e a p o n s o p e ra tin g in d e e p secrecy, b a n ish in g d issen ters (R obert O p p e n h e im e r in 1954), a n d b ru sh in g a sid e p ro b lem s of e n v iro n m en t a n d h e a lth in th e testin g a n d p ro d u c tio n of n u c le ar devices. T he stru g g le o v er civilian control o b scu red h o w civilian elites m atch e d th e zeal of m ilitary offi­ cers in p u rs u in g n a tio n al security. A sim ilar outcom e em erg ed o n a larg e r scale from th e N a tio n a l Security A ct of 1947. U nification of th e a rm e d forces a n d civilian control o v e r th em p ro m p te d a p ro tra c te d political b attle, often fo cu sed o n w h e th e r a single m ili­ ta ry chief of staff w o u ld p re sid e o v e r the system . T ru m a n feared " th a t a chief of staff m ig h t a rro g a te too m u c h p o w e r to him self a n d becom e a 'm a n o n h o rse­ back,' a n o p in io n w id e ly h e ld in C o n g ress."25 T herefore th e n e w law req u ired th a t th e Joint C hiefs of Staff sim p ly serve as "p rin cip al m ilitary ad v isers to th e P re sid e n t a n d the Secretary of D efense." O n ly in 1949 d id C ongress e v en au th o ­ rize a ch airm a n for th e JCS, w h ic h in d e e d rem a in e d effectively u n d e r civilian control. H a v in g d isa rm e d a n y fu tu re "m a n o n horseb ack ," C ongress a n d th e a d m in ­ istratio n w ere free to estab lish a w id e -ra n g in g a p p a ra tu s of n a tio n al security. A t its core w ere the th ree a rm e d services (the air force n o w in d e p e n d e n t of the arm y) a n d th e Joint C hiefs, p re sid e d ov er b y th e secretary of defense. It w a s a n u n g a in ly stru c tu re resu ltin g from political com prom ise. The m u ch -h e rald ed unification of th e services in fact left each m u c h autonom y. A lth o u g h later re­ form s gave the secretary of defense m ore a u th o rity a n d staff, th e services' rival-

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ries w ith each o th er a n d in d ep e n d en c e from th e secretary 's (or Joint C hiefs') control rem ain ed endem ic, to the c o n stern a tio n of T ru m an a n d later P resi­ dents. In m a n y w ays, th e n e w law 's m o st sign ifican t p ro v isio n s in v o lv ed lessn o ticed agencies o u tsid e the D efense D ep artm en t: th e N a tio n a l Security Re­ sources B oard, to link the services w ith co rp o ratio n s a n d un iv ersities; th e N a ­ tional Security C ouncil, to ad v ise th e P resid en t; a n d th e C en tral Intelligence A gency, to "co o rd in ate" intelligence activities. O th e r key agencies w ere al­ read y long in place (the FBI, th e N a tio n a l A d v iso ry C o m m ittee o n A eronautics) o r se p ara tely a u th o rize d (the AEC). A n d b e y o n d th e g o v e rn m e n ta l a p p a ra tu s lay in stitu tio n s closely lin k ed to it: u n iv ersity a n d c o rp o ra te lab o rato ries; th in k tan k s like the R A N D corporation; tra d e a n d p ro fessio n al associations; a n d b u sin esses p ro v id in g p ro d u c ts a n d services, from w e a p o n s to w ireta p p in g . H o w ev e r com plex a n d evolving, the sy stem d e v e lo p e d b y 1949 w o u ld re­ m a in largely intact for several decades. Its significance lay less in specifics th a n in its scale a n d rationale. It e m b o d ied th e co n v ictio n th a t in a n ag e of in sta n t a n d to tal w arfare, th e v ig ilan t n a tio n m u s t b e co n stan tly p re p a re d b y h a rn e ss­ in g all its resources a n d linking its civilian a n d m ilita ry in stitu tio n s— in d ee d , o b literatin g the b o u n d a ry b e tw ee n those in stitu tio n s, ju st as th e line b e tw e e n w a r a n d peace seem ed to b e d isa p p ea rin g . So p o w e rfu l w a s th is co n v ictio n th a t it d re w little challenge in the late 1940s, e v en as co u n tless p a rtic u la rs a ro u sed stro n g debate. T he place of n a tio n al security in th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t sw elled accordingly. Federal em p lo y m en t grew m ore th a n fourfo ld from 1932 to 1952, w h e n it reached 2.6 m illion civilians (p lu s 3.6 m illio n in u niform ), of w h o m 1.3 m illion w o rk e d for the D efense D e p a rtm e n t a n d th o u sa n d s m o re for o th e r w ar-relate d agencies. Size alone d o es n o t alw ay s c o m m an d p o w e r (the P ost Office re­ m ain ed a h u g e bureaucracy, for exam ple), b u t th e sw ellin g a p p a ra tu s of n a ­ tional security slow ly m ad e a difference. For a w h ile, w ith stro n g secretaries of state p itte d a g ain st w e ak or sh o rt-term defen se secretaries, th e State D e p a rt­ m e n t h e ld its ow n, a b etted b y T ru m a n 's tru st in secretaries of sta te M arsh all a n d A cheson. In th e long ru n , S tate's place receded; e v en w h e n its lea d ers w e re strong, m ilitarized policies d e m a n d e d m ilita ry expertise. T he d efen se secre­ taries a ssu m e d g ro w in g p o w e r a n d , especially in th e 1950s, so d id agencies like th e CIA a n d AEC. A n d precisely because those agencies w ere too h u g e a n d lab y rin th in e for the W hite H o u se to oversee, th e co m p act N a tio n a l S ecurity C ouncil em erg ed as the P re sid e n t's m ajor in stru m e n t of adv ice a n d p o licy m ak ­ ing. N o r could C ongress often call th e shots o v er th is v a st system . A fter fierce b u d g e t b attles in the late 1940s, p rim a ry in itiativ e rested w ith th e W h ite H o u se a n d th e defense agencies, w hile m o st of the tim e C o n g ress (or its key co m m it­ tees) could only exact leverage b y b ro k erin g tu rf w a rs, service rivalries, a n d regional conflicts, n o t b y assessing a n d settin g th e ov erall b u d g e t. A n d d e sp ite co n stitutional p ro v isio n s for public accountability. C o n g ress w a s o ften in th e

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d a rk , especially a b o u t the finances a n d activities of th e AEC, th e CIA , a n d o th e r intelligence agencies. Ju st as e m p ire d id n o t look im p erial to m o st A m ericans, th e m ilita rize d state d id n o t look m ilitaristic. H ere w a s n o m o n o lith in w h ic h o rd ers cam e d o w n fro m a H itle r o r a P olitburo. In stead , th e A m erican sy stem w a s com plex a n d cu m b erso m e, its p a rts o ften b a ttlin g each other, its P re sid e n t a n d o th e r key p lay e rs som etim es baffled, its initiatives o ften flo w in g u p w a rd o r sid ew ay s ra th e r th a n d o w n from th e top. It o p e ra te d h o t b y sh eer c o m m an d alone (th o u g h taxes, conscription, repression, a n d secrecy d id p roceed) b u t b y con­ se n su s a n d b ro k erin g , b y contracts a n d law s, a n d in som e m ea su re b y th e con­ se n t of th e g o v ern ed . A t tim es, as in th e a rm e d forces' b ack stab b in g rivalries, it h a rd ly seem ed to o p erate a t all. In m a n y areas of th e ir lives, it to u ch e d A m eri­ cans lightly, a n d co n stitu tio n al a n d political trad itio n s, h o w e v e r fray ed , al­ lo w e d th e m to challenge it, as o n occasion som e d id . Its b u rd e n s w ere also k e p t lig h t b y th e n a tio n 's o v e rw h elm in g a b u n d an c e, w h ich su sta in e d u n p rec e ­ d e n te d g ro w th in b o th defense sp e n d in g a n d th e civilian econom y. A s in W orld W ar H, this p o te n t c o m b in atio n of political p lu ralism , in stitu tio n a l com plexity, a n d econom ic a b u n d a n c e p ro v e d m o re efficient th a n c ru d e c o m m an d system s. W h at gave th e sy stem m u c h of its cohesio n a n d success w a s its lea d ers' sh a re d outlooks, o v e rla p p in g roles, a n d class affinities, w h ic h o v e rro d e o ld d is­ tin ctio ns b e tw e e n "civilian" a n d "m ilita ry " in p o litical cu ltu re. A t th e cen ter w a s a c o h o rt of policy m ak ers in d e p a rtm e n ts a n d agencies like State, D efense, th e CIA , a n d th e AEC. T hey h a d a c o m m o n b a ck g ro u n d in elite e aste rn schools, law firm s, c o rp o ratio n s, a n d g o v ern m en t. T hey w ere so m etim es w e a lth y m en (N elson Rockefeller, A verell H arrim an ), o ften h e irs to H e n ry L. S tim so n 's tra d i­ tio n of p a tric ia n le a d ersh ip (R obert L ovett, John J. M cCloy), u su a lly v e te ran s of FD R 's a d m in istratio n , a n d o n ly rarely p ro d u c ts of elective politics. C o sm o p o li­ ta n b y v irtu e of b u sin e ss o r g o v e rn m e n t service, th ey w ere "a n e w tra n sn a ­ tio n al political elite," m e n "w h o se relatio n sh ip s a n d p e rsp ectiv es c u t across n a ­ tio n al lines," th o u g h A m erican in terests cam e first. P ragm atic, a d e p t a t b u ild ­ in g c o n sen su s w ith in A m erican g o v e rn m e n t a n d w ith allies, th ey w ere o ften d e af to th e ir o w n ideological im pulses. S om etim es, as w ith A cheson, th e ir elit­ ist style elicited " p o p u list en v y a n d rag e." A n d yet, th o u g h T ru m a n co u ld sn o rt a t su ch m e n him self, th ey w o rk e d sm o o th ly w ith h im .26 O u tsid e the in n e r circle, o th ers lesser in ra n k sh a re d m u c h of th e elite's back­ g ro u n d a n d o u tlo o k — d ip lo m a ts like G eorge K ennan, strateg ists like B ernard B rodie, a n d science a n d academ ic officials like Jam es C o n a n t a n d V an n ev ar Bush. O f these ju n io r p a rtn e rs, scientists w ere th e m o st p ro n e to d o u b ts. Fears a b o u t c o m p ro m isin g th e ir professional a u to n o m y a n d p a rticip a tin g in th e a rm s race e m e rg ed from e ld e r sta te sm an A lb ert E instein, y o u n g p h y sicist P h ilip M orrison, c o m p u ter g en iu s N o rb e rt W iener, a n d (am b ig u o u sly ) from R obert O p p en h eim er. T he d o u b ts w e re valid: th ey " w o u ld b e m o b ilized to s u p ­ p o rt th e existing o rd e r o n ly to the ex ten t th a t scientists d id n o t th em selv es

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q u e stio n th a t ord er." M ost scientists, how ev er, saw "n o reaso n for refu sin g " g o v e rn m e n t's h elp "in d o in g the scientific w o rk th a t o n e w o u ld h av e trie d to accom plish ev en w ith o u t su c h h elp ," as L ouis N . R id en o u r, a U n iv ersity of Illi­ no is d e a n a n d air force chief scientist, p u t it. A fter all, g o v e rn m e n t p a tro n a g e co u ld n o t be ju d g e d a g ain st a n earlier sta n d a rd o f p u rity . R esearch u n iv ersities a lre ad y relied o n p h ila n th ro p ie s a n d c o rp o ratio n s, th e la tter " a t b e st a fickle a n d d e m a n d in g p a rtn e r," w h e rea s th e federal p a tro n serv ed th e p u b lic w eal ra th e r th a n p riv a te g reed , a n d p ro v e d less fickle a n d m o re g en ero u s. M ost aca­ dem ic scientists a n d officials accepted th e p a ra m o u n t role th a t g o v e rn m e n t, m ain ly its d efense agencies, n o w p la y e d in fu n d in g a n d sh a p in g science. T h at role arose, it h as b e e n a rg u e d , "chiefly d u e to th e in d isp en sab ility of scienced riv e n technologies like atom ic en erg y a n d ra d a r," b u t scientists d id m u c h to defin e in d isp en sab ility in th e first place a n d b en efited e n o rm o u sly from its ef­ fects. In tu rn , th ey changed. The m ilitary -u n iv ersity -co rp o rate alliance " d e ­ fined the critical p ro b lem s" for them , in d e e d "v irtu a lly red efin ed w h a t it m e a n t to b e a scientist o r a n e n g in e e r"— a co m m itm en t to b ig science a n d to tech­ n iq u e.27 C ivilian lead ers sh a re d o utlooks a n d d u tie s w ith m ilita ry lead ers. Few offi­ cers w ere m ore a la rm e d a b o u t th e Soviets a n d th e n a tio n 's secu rity th a n Forrestal; few m atch e d p h y sicist E d w a rd T eller's zeal for n u c le ar w eap o n s; few c h am p io n e d air p o w e r b e tte r th a n Secretary of th e A ir Force S tu art S ym ington. T he ru sh of w a rtim e officers into civilian g o v ern m en t, co rp o rate, a n d research p o sts (Gen. W alter Bedell Sm ith as h e a d of th e CIA, G en. O m a r B radley as b o a rd ch airm a n of B ulova R esearch L aboratories, G en. Leslie G roves as vice p re sid e n t for research a t R em ington R and) also e ro d e d civil-m ilitary b a rrie rs of outlook, statu s, a n d experience. In "b u sin ess circles," Business Week n o te d in 1952, "th e w o rd h a s gone out: G et y o u rself a g e n eral."28 A s th a t co m m en t in d icated , th e in terests th ey d e fin e d g ave b a llast to th e id e ­ ology of n a tio n al secu rity sh a re d b y policy elites, m ilitary officers, c o rp o rate leaders, a n d scientists. A s th ey saw th o se interests, th ey ra n g e d from th e b ro a d goal of p reserv in g th e n a tio n 's safety, a b u n d an ce, a n d p o w e r to n a rro w ly cal­ c u lated m a tte rs— a p ro fessio n al's career, a u n iv e rsity 's fu n d in g , a n ag en cy 's p restig e, a co m p a n y 's profits. To m ost, n a tio n al in terests sh a d e d off in to in stitu ­ tional a n d in d iv id u a l ones w ith o u t clear distin ctio n s, trig g e rin g few q u alm s. The m o st fam ous, if often m isco n stru ed , sta te m e n t of th eir o u tlo o k cam e w h e n C h arles W ilson, fo rm er h e a d of G eneral M otors a n d d efen se secretary d esig ­ nate, said th a t " w h a t w a s g o o d for th e c o u n try w a s g o o d for G en eral M otors a n d vice v e rsa ."29 For m o st su c h m en, a n y clash of in terests in v o lv ed less a n in d iv id u a l's vertical relatio n sh ip to th e sy stem th a n h o riz o n ta l conflicts a m o n g in stitu tio n s a n d com panies fig h tin g for po w er, resources, a n d statu s. To be sure, w ith in each g ro u p calculations v aried , as b u sin ess illu strated . M an y com panies, still w e d d e d to free en te rp rise a n d g o v e rn m e n t retren ch ­ m en t, took little in terest in h o w defense m o n ies m ig h t su sta in th em o r th e econ-

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om y, b u t th ey also d id n o t o p p o se th e d rift in n a tio n al p olicy as lo n g as it a v o id e d N e w D e a l-ty p e initiatives. It h e lp e d th a t "in creased ex p en d itu re s for defense, h ig h w a y s, a n d space d id n o t displace existing p riv ate in v estm en t," th o u g h less no ticed w a s h o w "d efen se in d u strie s a b so rb ed larg e a m o u n ts of cap ital a n d large n u m b e rs of h ig h ly tra in e d technicians a t th e ex p en se of su ch basic in d u strie s as steel, autom obiles, a n d oil." The w a y w a s o p e n for firm s in n e w e r fields like electronics, aviation, a n d n u c le ar en erg y to forge tig h t links w ith W ashington. For co m p an ies like Boeing, D ü P ont, Bell Labs, a n d G eneral Electric, th e benefits in clu d ed p ro fits— in in d u strie s like electronics, "in d irect a n d d irec t m ilita ry d e m a n d acco u n ted for as m u c h as 70% of th e to tal o u tp u t" b y th e m id-1960s— p lu s d e v e lo p m e n t a t g o v e rn m e n t ex p en se of n e w technolo­ gies a d a p ta b le to civilian m ark ets, of in v en tiv e lab o rato ries, a n d of a p roficient w o rk force. G o v e rn m e n t's role in p ro m o tin g television, co m p u ters, a n d jet air­ craft for defense p u rp o se s u n lo ck ed h u g e civilian m ark ets, especially since th e fu n d s in v o lv ed "exceeded b y far the capacities of in d u stry , of un iv ersities, a n d of p riv a te fo u n d atio n s." N o r w ere benefits co nfined to lea d in g firm s; n e w tech­ n o lo g ies sp a w n e d n e w firm s a n d assisted o th ers w ith few ties to defense. "W e are liv ing u n d e r a c u rio u s k in d of m ilitary K eynesianism ," a rg u e d h isto ria n R ichard H o fstad ter, " in w h ic h M ars h a s ru sh e d in to fill th e g a p left b y th e d e ­ cline of th e m ark e t econom y."30 W h eth er th e resu lt w a s a " p o w e r elite" ru n n in g a " p e rm a n e n t w a r econ­ o m y " th a t C. W rig h t M ills excoriated in 1956 is d eb atab le. M ills h im self gave th e te rm power elite elasticity, seeing th e ten sio n s a n d g rad a tio n s of sta tu s w ith in it, a n d the " p e rm a n e n t w a r econom y " w a s h a rd ly a to tal w a r econom y. E ven a t its p o stw a r p e a k of ov er 10 p e rc en t of G N P d u rin g th e 1950s, defen se sp e n d in g p ro v id e d a technological c u ttin g ed g e a n d a su p p le m e n t to lag g in g p riv a te in v estm en t, b u t h a rd ly th e econom ic sy ste m 's sole su p p o rt. L ater h isto ­ rian s differ little from M ills, h o w ev er, a rg u in g th a t d efen se sp e n d in g " h a d farreaching im pacts o n the level of ag g reg ate b u sin ess activity a n d th e p a tte rn s of in v estm en t," e v en th o u g h "o th er ty p es of sp e n d in g m ig h t h av e p ro d u c e d g reater benefits for society o r a g rea ter m u ltip lie r effect in th e econom y." D e­ fense sp e n d in g also p ro v id e d n a tio n al g o v e rn m e n t a k ey tool of econom ic con­ trol. A n d since m o st p e o p le saw it "as a n ab so lu te n ecessity in a d a n g e ro u s age," it d id all this w h ile ig n itin g little "political controversy." In d eed , C harles M aier h a s a rg u e d , ju st as "th e c o m m itm en t to m o b ilizatio n h e lp e d overcom e d e e p conflicts b e tw ee n th e N e w D eal a n d its o p p o sitio n " o n th e eve of Pearl H arb o r, so too d id a sim ilar c o m m itm en t a d e ca d e later: "D isp u tes th a t w ere sh elv ed in 1940 w ere to b e sh elv ed a g ain before K orea." T his w as in d e e d a "p e r­ m a n e n t w a r econom y," if o n ly p a rtially so.31 W h at sp a w n e d this " p e rm a n e n t w a r eco n o m y "— or "m ilitary K eynesian­ ism ," "m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex," "g u n b elt," o r "m etro p o litan -m ilitary c o m p lex "— h a s co n fo u n d e d critics a n d h isto rian s, th eir m an y term s reflecting th e ir d isagreem ents. Its roots w e n t back to th e early tw e n tie th c en tu ry a n d

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W orld W ar II accelerated its d e v elo p m e n t, b u t th e post-1945 m o b ilizatio n of so m u c h of a n o m in a lly peacetim e econom y w a s n e w in scale a n d n a tu re . Econom ic interests p ro v id e a p a rtia l ex p lan atio n . Som e c o rp o ra te b e ­ h e m o th s certainly b en efited , b u t th e ir catalytic ro le w a s m in im a l— fled g lin g e n tre p re n e u rs like D o n ald D ouglas a n d n e w e r c o m p an ies like B oeing w e re of­ te n b ig g er beneficiaries, a lth o u g h of course th ey b ecam e g ian ts in th e process, w h ile m a n y big in d u strie s (steel, railro ad s, autos) so u g h t to fin d th eir p ro fits in a ro b u st civilian m ark e t after 1945. Scientists a n d u n iv ersities p la y e d k ey id eo ­ logical a n d technical roles in th e process b u t lacked th e p o w e r a n d co h esio n to set it in m otion. C ongress h a d th e fo rm al p o w e r to d o so, b u t its role w a s lim ­ ited , a im ed m ore a t d e fe n d in g estab lish ed tu rf th a n a t e x p a n d in g it. M oreover, a n y "th eo ry " of C o n gress's decisive role " w o u ld su g g e st b ro a d d isp e rsio n of d efen se contracts across th e states" ra th e r th a n th e rem ark ab le reg io n al con­ cen tratio n th a t d e v elo p ed , o ften a t th e exp en se of still-p o p u lo u s states w ith clout in C ongress.32 G reater influence seem ed to lie w ith alliances b e tw e e n d efen se b u re a u ­ cracies a n d local "b o o ste rs"— politicians, p u b lish ers, d ev elo p ers, a n d others. T hey w ere especially aggressive in W est C o ast cities, w h ic h h a rb o re d civic d rea m s of im p erial glory, h a d lo n g relied o n fed eral m o n ies a n d m ilita ry bases, faced a sh a rp d o w n tu rn after 1945 as w a rtim e sp e n d in g ceased, a n d rec ru ite d d efen se bases, in d u strie s, a n d lab o rato ries in lieu of th e in d u stria l b ase o ld er reg io n s possessed. B oosters w e re also im p o rta n t in o ld er reg io n s facing eco­ n om ic stag n atio n , su c h as N e w E n g lan d a n d m u c h of th e South. In d ee d , so p o w e rfu l w ere local a n d p riv a te interests th a t a tail-w ag s-d o g sto ry can easily b e to ld in w h ich th e " c e n te r"— n atio n al le a d e rsh ip — fades befo re th e p o w e r of a " p e rip h e ry " of d isp e rse d b u t aggressive interests. A ll of these in terests w ere im p o rtan t, b u t n o one w a s decisive. In d ee d , th ere w a s n o stable "sy stem " o r "com plex," insofar as su c h term s im p ly c o h eren t a n d cen tralized in te n tio n a n d direction, only a n accretion of in terests, forces, a n d objectives th a t later looked like a sy ste m — "a poly cen tric co n fig u ratio n th a t change[d] consistently o v e r tim e."33 T he v e ry m u ltip licity of forces a n d interests in v o lv ed in th e p eacetim e w a r econom y sh ield ed it from analysis a n d attack. O p p o n e n ts n a tu ra lly h o m e d in o n specifics— evil generals, g reed y capitalists, co n g ressio n al ex p erts in p o rk — b u t since n o one elem en t bo re p rim a ry responsibility, attack o n it p ro d u c e d n o p e rsu asiv e ex p lan atio n o r decisive change. T hose w h o trie d to see it w h o le — figures as d iverse as C. W rig h t M ills a n d D w ig h t E isen h o w er b y th e 1950s— rev ealed a system so com plex th a t o p p o n e n ts m ig h t d e sp a ir a b o u t w h e re to b eg in d ism an tlin g it, g iv in g th e im p ressio n of a sy stem b e y o n d control. A n d insofar as im pressions g o v e rn e d realities, it was b e y o n d control. Besides, it w a s ideological forces th a t u n d e rg ird e d the p eacetim e w a r eco n o m y — th e id eo lo g y of n atio n al p rep a red n e ss, a n d the sta te 's d e p e n d e n c e o n w a r a n d d efen se for its role in n atio n al life. O n ly a n a ssa u lt o n these ideological u n d e rp in n in g s co u ld

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a rre st m ilitarizatio n . N o assault, a t least of a b ro a d ly a p p e a lin g sort, arose in th e late 1940s a n d 1950s. W h y d id A m ericans p u t u p w ith this? T he v icto ry of "civ ilian " control, th e sen se of "ab so lu te necessity," the in crem en tal g ro w th of m ilitarizatio n , a n d th e d isp e rse d ch aracter of the in terests in v o lv e d w ere reasons. Ju st as im p o rtan t, th e w a r eco n o m y w a s also m a d e to a p p e a r a n d to a d eg ree fu n ctio n as c o n g ru ­ e n t w ith d o m in a n t asp iratio n s for p ro sp e rity a n d technological ab u n d an ce. "W h o c o u ld se rio u sly co m p lain a b o u t th e resu lts ach iev ed b y U.S. b u sin esses b e tw e e n 1945 a n d th e late 1960s?" tw o h isto ria n s h av e ask ed .34 B eyond sh eer p ro sp e rity , th ere w a s th e p ro m ise, first offered in w a rtim e ad v ertisin g , th a t w a r-b o m in g en u ity w o u ld y ield w o n d ro u s civilian devices. Television, air­ liners, a n d o th e r m arv els e m e rg ed from m ilitary research ("spin-off," as it w a s later d u b b ed ). A m ericans w ere to ld of th e co n n ectio n in a d v ertisin g , g o v e rn ­ m e n t p ro n o u n ce m en ts, p a ea n s to science, m ag azin es, a n d science fiction. N o y o u n g ste r re a d in g Popular Mechanics could m iss it, a n d it su ffu sed m aterial c u ltu re — in cars w ith rocketlike grills a n d space-age fins o r bicycles resem b lin g jet fig hters in m in iatu re. Far from a n obstacle to affluence, n a tio n al secu rity seem ed th e p a th to it, e v en in cid en tal in the face of its benefits. T hese p ro m ises flow ed m o st lavishly re g a rd in g n u c le ar energy. O n e n e w s­ p a p e r foresaw a n "ea rth ly p a ra d ise "; a n o th e r's c arto o n d e p ic te d "a ben eficen t g o d d e ss o p e n in g the locked chest of 'A TOM IC ENERGY' o n e tract. Almighty Atom, p re d ic te d cost-free p o w er, a n d atom ic a irp lan e s a n d cars. G iv en d re a d a b o u t th e b o m b a n d sk ep ticism a b o u t n u c le ar energy, it req u ire d a skillful gov­ e rn m e n t a n d p riv a te c a m p a ig n to su sta in th ese "fan tasies of a techno-atom ic u to p ia " — one w a g e d in p a rt to p u t a b e n ig n face o n th e a to m 's m ilita ry d e v el­ o p m en t. D espite silly talk of "ato m ic-en erg y v ita m in tab lets" a n d th e like, th e p ro m ises w ere h a rd ly confined to a lu n atic fringe. U n iv ersity of C hicago p re si­ d e n t R obert H u tc h in s b eliev ed th a t atom ic en erg y co u ld " u sh e r in a n e w d a y of peace a n d p le n ty " a n d d ev elo p "th e m o st b a ck w a rd places of th e e a rth ." The left-liberal d a ily PM im ag in ed "th e U to p ia th a t m e n h av e d re a m e d of th ro u g h c en tu ries of w ar, d e p ressio n , fam ine, a n d disease." A Nation w rite r w a n te d atom ic b o m b s u se d "to d ig canals, to b re a k o p e n m o u n ta in chains, to m elt ice b a rrie rs, a n d g enerally to tid y u p th e a w k w a rd p a rts of th e w o rld ." 35 Tellingly, the p ro m ised u to p ia w a s o ften p re se n te d n o t as a n a ltern a tiv e to th e b o m b 's d e v e lo p m e n t b u t as its p ro d u ct. "T h ro u g h m ed ical ad v an ces alo n e," Atlantic claim ed in 1946, "atom ic en erg y h a s a lre ad y sav ed m o re lives th a n w e re sn u ffed o u t a t H iro sh im a a n d N ag asak i." "O u t of th e ash es of H iro sh im a a n d N ag asak i," w ro te one doctor, "a b en eficen t ato m ic en erg y . . . w ill rise phoenix-like to b en efit the h e a lth a n d w elfare of o u r n a tio n ." In a n es­ p ecially tasteless exam ple of su c h linkage, o n e article o n rad io activ e isotopes d e p ic te d "a p ajam a-clad m an , o bviously a recently reco v ered in v alid , sta n d in g erect a n d sm iling in the m id st of a m u sh ro o m -sh a p e d clo u d , h is e m p ty w h e el­ ch air in th e b a ck g ro u n d ." The "sp littin g ato m ," a rg u e d a n AEC co m m issio n er

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in 1953, "h as b e en o u r m ain sh ield a g ain st th e B arb arian s— now , in a d d itio n , it is to becom e a G o d -g iv en in stru m e n t to d o th e co n stru ctiv e w o rk of m an k in d ." G iv en its prom ise, "atom ic en erg y is only incidentally a m ilita ry w e a p o n ," P h ilip W ylie a rg u e d in 1945. W ere w e a p o n s the e n d a n d civilian w o n d e rs o n ly th e b y ­ p ro d u c t— or th e reverse? P e rh ap s few A m erican s co u ld h av e said in th e late 1940s.36 Som e of these p ro m ises w ere th an k fu lly n e v e r realized: n o atom ic cars zo o m ed forth; n o p o la r icecaps m elted. O th ers reach ed b e la te d fru itio n , a n d to g eth er th e y fo rm ed the d e n se m ass of m essag es telling A m erican s n o t o n ly to to lerate th e m ilitarized sta te b u t to em brace it as th e source of w o n d e rs in th eir d a ily lives, focusing only "in cid en tally " o n its m ilitary d im en sio n s. T he sw o rd s, if n o t b e aten in to p lo w sh ares, w o u ld a t least g e n erate them . If th a t seem ed to m a n y a n acceptable b arg ain , it still w a s a c o n tin g en t one. It rested o n the p ro p o sitio n , d isp u te d a t th e tim e b y som e, th a t w a r (or p re p a ra ­ tio n s for it) stim u la te d econom ic progress. "T he role of w a r in p ro m o tin g in ­ d u stria l p ro g ress h a d b e e n sm all c o m p a red w ith th e role of in d u stria l p ro g ress in b rin g in g o n w ar," a rg u e d John N ef acidly in 1950. "W arfare is less a cause for in d u stria lism th a n its sh a d o w a n d its n e m e sis."37 It also rested o n su sta in in g p ro sp e rity a t h o m e a n d econom ic p o w e r ab ro ad , w ith o u t w h ich th e b a rg a in m ig h t unravel. E ven early on, som e A m ericans, in clu d in g T ru m a n fitfully a n d E isen h ow er forcefully, w o rrie d th a t defense sp e n d in g m ig h t u n d e rc u t p ro sp e r­ ity a n d pow er. In m ore tro u b le d econom ic tim es, th e d o u b ts d e ep e n ed .

Social Relations in a Militarizing Nation Isaac W o o d w ard , a black w a r v e te ra n still in u n ifo rm , m et th e S o u th a t its u g ­ liest w h e n h e took the b u s h o m e in 1946. A n g ry th a t W o o d w ard to o k so lo n g in a "co lo red" rest room , his d riv e r su m m o n e d local law officers, w h o a rre sted , beat, a n d b lin d e d W o o d w ard w ith a n ig h tstick jam m ed in to h is eyes. T he inci­ d e n t d rew e n o rm o u s atten tio n , th a n k s in p a rt to th e N a tio n a l A ssociation for th e A d v an cem en t of C olored People, a n d T ru m a n ex p ressed shock. "I h a d n o id ea it w a s as terrible as that. W e've go t to d o so m e th in g ."38 T he affair sh o w ed h o w social relations w o rk e d o u t in th e sh a d o w of w ar. It m a d e all th e difference th a t W o o d w ard w as a v eteran. T h o u g h g rad u a l, the m ilitarizatio n of policy a n d in stitu tio n s w a s to som e d e ­ gree calculable; w ars, w e ap o n s, a n d b u reau cracies p ro v id e d som e m easu re. T he m ilitarizatio n of social relations w a s m ore subtle. The refo rm s th a t flo w ed from it could entice leftists su sp icio u s of anti-Soviet policies a n d in fu riate reac­ tionaries w e d d e d to the C old W ar, b u t it co u ld also e n d a n g e r th e fo rm er a n d isolate th e latter. It inv o lv ed n o t only conscrip tio n of social resources b u t th e recasting of social relations in lig h t of n a tio n al security, a n d a com plex d e p lo y ­ m en t of the language, m odels, a n d m o d es of w arfare. W hile it o ften a d v a n c e d a centrist, liberal, assim ilationist a g e n d a — n o m ean feat in th e social clim ate of the 1940s— its significance w e n t m u ch further.

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T he m o st celeb rated exam ple of this process w as T ru m a n 's 1948 o rd e r d eseg ­ reg a tin g th e a rm e d forces. Racial segregatio n , d iscrim in atio n , a n d d ise n ­ fran c h isem e n t still ru le d legally in th e Jim C ro w S outh a n d in so m e n a tio n al in stitu tio n s like th e m ilitary, a n d inform ally in th e N o rth . If an y th in g , th e situ a ­ tio n for black servicem en a n d -w o m en w o rse n e d in 1946. T heir few w a rtim e g ain s seem ed to slip aw ay; m o st m ilitary lead ers stau n ch ly d e fe n d e d th e o ld w ay s; c ru d e violence a g ain st th e m e ru p te d . But a re tu rn to the p re w a r sta tu s q u o w a s im possible. U nlike th e a fte rm a th of W orld W ar I, th e forces p ro d u c in g ch an g e d u rin g th is w a r o u tlasted it because n a tio n a l secu rity p e rsiste d as a h ig h priority. M ilitary lead ers w o rrie d a b o u t rec ru itin g A frican-A m ericans a n d feared th a t C o n g ress m ig h t b a lk a t ren e w in g selective service if seg reg atio n a n d d isc rim in atio n p ersisted . C o n cern w a s g rea test in th e air force, th e service least b o u n d b y tra d itio n a n d a caste of S o u th ern w h ite officers a n d b e st connected to th e civilian w o rld , w h e re w a r­ tim e policy a n d p e rso n n el n e e d s a lre ad y h a d p ro m p te d som e d esegregation. Lt. G en. Jam es D oolittle, a Shell O il executive before a n d after th e w ar, w a rn e d a ir force colleagues th a t d eseg reg atio n w a s "b ein g forced o n in d u s tr y . . . a n d it is g o in g to b e forced o n th e m ilitary. You are m erely p o stp o n in g th e inev itab le a n d y o u m ig h t as w ell tak e it gracefully."39 Left alone, few in th e m ilitary w o u ld h av e acted, b u t th ey w ere h a rd ly left alone, especially b y those m in d fu l of the w a r 's racial crim es. W hite liberals like E leanor R oosevelt a n d lab o r lea d er W alter R eu th er p u s h e d for change, w h ile th e G O P flatly d eclared its o p p o sitio n to m ilitary segregation. M ore decisive w a s p ressu re from black A m ericans. A lrea d y m o b ilized b y th e w ar, th ey d efied m ilitary seg reg atio n from w ith in th e a rm e d forces a n d p ro teste d it th ro u g h th eir n a tio n al organizations. In 1947, A. P hilip R a n d o lp h rev iv ed th e stra te g y of h is 1941 M arch o n W ash in g to n M ovem ent. H e d e m a n d e d leg islatio n to en d m ilitary d isc rim in atio n a n d seg reg ated facilities for tro o p s crossing state lines, to p ro v id e federal p e n altie s for attacks o n servicem en, a n d to e x em p t en listed m e n from th e n o to rio u s p o ll tax in fed eral elections. W h en C ongress to o k n o action, h e d e m a n d e d a n executive o rd e r from T ru m a n a n d called o n black a n d w h ite y o u th to d efy the d ra ft in o rd e r to resist " p e rm a n e n t m ilitary slavery."40 T ru m a n h a d alre ad y a p p o in te d a C om m issio n o n C ivil R ights, w h ic h recom ­ m e n d e d a stu n n in g ran g e of racial reform s. O n Ju ly 26, 1948, h e acted. Re­ sp o n d in g to the v a rio u s p ressu res (the Berlin crisis th a t su m m e r a d d e d to them ), shocked b y w h a t h e h a d lea rn ed a b o u t racial p rejudice, aw are th a t C o n ­ gress w o u ld n o t act a n d h a p p y to em b a rrass it, h e w a s also d e sp e ra te for v o tes in th e u p c o m in g election. H e o rd e re d "eq u ality of tre a tm e n t a n d o p p o rtu n ity for all p e rso n s in th e a rm e d services w ith o u t reg a rd to race, color, religion, o r n a tio n al o rig in ."41 H is o rd e r h a rd ly sw e p t all before it. O n ly th e political p re s­ su res a n d p e rso n n el n e e d s p ro m p te d b y th e K orean W ar m a d e th e a rm e d forces im p le m e n t the o rd e r fully, few blacks g ain ed sen io r ra n k o r ad m issio n to th e service academ ies (legally lo n g o p e n to them ), a n d n e ith e r T ru m a n n o r C o n g ress d id m u ch else to achieve racial reform . N o n eth eless, his o rd e r w as a

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b o ld s te p — a n d a b o ld g am ble th a t p a id off. S o u th ern D em o crats b o lte d th e p arty , ra n S outh C aro lin a's Strom T h u rm o n d for th e presid en cy , seized th irty n in e electoral votes, a n d w o n as m a n y v o tes as W allace a n d th e P rogressives (over a m illion each), b u t T ru m a n g a in e d th e loyalties of n o rth e rn blacks a n d m o st liberals a n d w o n h is fam o u s triu m p h o v e r T h o m as D ew ey. W h atev er th e d iv erse m otives a n d p ressu re s b e h in d T ru m a n 's action, n a ­ tio n al security w as th e d o m in a n t a n d least co n testable ratio n ale for racial change. T h at w as e v id e n t in h o w h e d re w o n h is c o n stitu tio n al p o w e r as com ­ m a n d e r in chief a n d acted in the m ilita ry sp h e re ra th e r th a n so m e other. It w a s ju st as e v id e n t in th e lan g u a g e ju stify in g change, w h ic h e m p h a siz e d th e n e e d for a n efficient m ilitary force a n d th e n a tio n 's im ag e a n d alliances in th e C o ld W ar. A s E leanor R oosevelt p u t it, civil rig h ts " is n 't a n y lo n g er a d o m estic q u e stio n — it's a n in te rn atio n al q u estio n ," o n e th a t "m a y d ecid e w h e th e r d e ­ m ocracy o r co m m u n ism w in s o u t in the w o rld ." U n d e rse cre ta ry of State A cheson h a d w a rn e d in 1946 th a t "d isc rim in atio n a g ain st m in o rity g ro u p s in th is c o u n try h a s a n a d v erse effect o n o u r relatio n s w ith o th e r c o u n tries." Sim ­ ilarly, T ru m a n 's C ivil R ights C om m issio n d eclared: " A n A m erican d ip lo m a t c an n o t arg u e for free elections in foreign la n d s w ith o u t m ee tin g th e challenge th a t in sections of A m erica q u alified v o ters d o n o t h av e access to th e p o lls." T ru m an labeled racial d isc rim in atio n " a n in v ita tio n to co m m u n ism " a n d w a rn e d th a t "th e su p p o rt of d e sp e ra te p o p u la tio n s of b attle-rav a g e d c o u n ­ tries" w a s a t stake. "W e m u st h av e th em as allies" a n d "ca n n o lo n g er afford the lu x u ry of a leisurely attack u p o n p reju d ice a n d d iscrim in atio n ." A s h e to ld the black p ress in 1947: "W e are learn in g w h a t lo u d echoes b o th o u r success a n d o u r failures h av e in ev ery c o m e r of th e w o rld . T h at is o n e of th e p ressin g rea­ so n s w h y w e c an n o t afford failures. W h en w e fail to live to g eth er in peace, the failure touches n o t us, as A m ericans alone, b u t th e cause of d em o cracy itself in th e w h o le w o rld ." O r as h e once p u t it m ore crudely, "T he to p d o g in a w o rld w h ich is 90 p e rc en t colored o u g h t to clean h is o w n h o u se ."42 Black lead ers also e m p lo y ed this rationale. R a n d o lp h a rg u e d th a t seg reg a­ tio n "is th e g reatest single p ro p a g a n d a a n d political w e a p o n in th e h a n d s of R ussia a n d in te rn atio n al c o m m u n ism today," a n d in d e e d th e State D e p a rtm e n t estim ated th a t h a lf of all Soviet p ro p a g a n d a a g ain st th e U n ited States focused o n racial issues. Paul R obeson, the rad ical black actor, singer, a n d activist, also w o rk e d this rationale, in his o w n w ay: A m erican po licy to w a rd A fricans "is sim ilar to th a t of H itler a n d G oebbels," h e alleg ed ly d eclared , a n d A m erican blacks w o u ld n e v e r "go to w a r o n b eh alf of th o se w h o h av e o p p re sse d u s for g en eratio n s" a g ain st the USSR, w h ic h "h as raised o u r p e o p le t o . . . full h u m a n d ig n ity ."43 T he d e m a n d s of w a r a n d n a tio n al p o w e r sh a p e d th e stru g g le for racial ch an g e far b e y o n d T ru m a n 's order, in b o th tim e a n d th e issu es ad d re ssed . W h en Jackie R obinson b ro k e th e racial b a rrie r in m ajor-league b aseb all in 1949, th e H o u se U n-A m erican A ctivities C o m m ittee w a n te d h im to "g iv e th e lie to

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sta te m e n ts b y P au l R obeson th a t A m erican N eg ro es w o u ld n o t fig h t in case of a w a r a g ain st R ussia," a req u e st R obinson fulfilled. W h en civil rig h ts lead ers so u g h t a n e w Fair E m p lo y m en t Practices C o m m ittee after th e o u tb reak of the K orean W ar, th e y jo in ed co n sid eratio n s of efficiency a n d m orale: " O u r c o u n try can n o lo n g er enjoy th e lu x u ry of w a ste d in d u stria l m a n p o w e r" a n d " o u r m e n in K orea n e e d to k n o w in th eir h e a rts a n d m in d s th a t th ey are n o t fig h tin g in v a in ." W h en th e T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n filed a b rief in b eh alf of school d eseg ­ reg atio n, in cases le a d in g u p to the ep o ch al Brown v. Board of Education decision of 1954, it cited A ch eso n 's w a rn in g th a t d isc rim in atio n w a s "a source of con­ sta n t e m b a rra ssm e n t to this g o v e rn m e n t" a n d its "m o ral le a d e rsh ip " in th e free w o rld . N o o n e su m m e d u p these claim s b e tte r th a n D w ig h t E isen h o w er d u rin g h is 1952 cam paign: "In a tim e w h e n A m erica n e e d s all th e b rain s, all th e skills, all th e sp iritu a l stre n g th a n d d e d ic a te d services of its 157 m illio n p eo p le, d is­ crim in a tio n is crim inally stu p id ." 44 E ise n h o w e r's sta te m e n t c a u g h t th e ch an g in g n a tu re , force, a n d lim its of th e n a tio n a l secu rity rationale. D u rin g W orld W ar H, lea d ers like FDR h a d often in v o k ed w a rtim e n e e d to resist racial change, claim ing it m ig h t trig g e r reaction a n d violence im p e d in g n a tio n al m o rale a n d efficiency. N o w th e a rg u m e n t m o re a n d m o re cut th e o th er w ay. V iew ed b y lead ers in W ash in g to n p ressin g th e n a tio n 's m o b ilizatio n a n d c o n tain in g co m m u n ism , racial seg reg atio n seem ed a foolish w a ste of n a tio n al resources, a n o u td a te d p ractice fo u lin g th e m ach in ery of n a tio n al po w er. H o w e v e r reluctantly, th e a rm e d forces n o w w o u ld h av e to h e lp p io n ee r racial change. T his rew o rk ed n ecessitarian ratio n ale h a d sh a rp lim its, h o w ev er. "C rim i­ n ally stu p id " w a s n o t th e sam e as m o rally un ju st. C ivil rig h ts lead ers, a n d T ru­ m a n h im self o n occasion, d id also in voke m o rality a n d justice, b u t n a tio n al se­ c u rity w a s th e d o m in a n t ratio n ale, a n d th e m o st p e rsisten t, e v en in to th e 1960s, w h e n racial eq u ality w a s a d v an c ed m o re as a g oal th a n as a m ea n s to a d ifferen t en d . In the m ean tim e, it b o th forced a n d circu m scrib ed racial reform . Racial ch an g es g ro u n d e d in concerns a b o u t justice g e n erate d less e n th u sia sm , a t least am o n g w h ites. T he d o m in a n t th ru s t w a s assim ilationist: A frican-A m ericans w o u ld b e p riz e d for th eir ability to fad e into n a tio n al in stitu tio n s like th e a rm y a n d to su b o rd in a te th e ir in terests to th e g ra n d e r n a tio n a l cause; a n d th e a rm e d forces' co n serv ativ e officer co rp s w o u ld carry o u t th e g ra n d e x p erim e n t in in te ­ gration. M oreover, the g n a w in g w o rry of n a tio n al elites a b o u t A m erica's im age at h o m e a n d overseas m e a n t th a t m u c h action tak e n w a s little m o re th a n w in ­ d o w d ressin g d e sig n e d to p o lish th a t im age: th e Fair E m p lo y m en t Practices C om m ittee d u rin g the K orean W ar canceled n o t a single d efen se contract, a n d w ell into th e 1950s d e seg re g atio n of th e a rm e d forces p ro ceed as if "sta g e d for th e benefit of foreign a n d do m estic ob serv ers ra th e r th a n b en efitin g th e black serv icem an him self."45 P reo ccu p atio n w ith n a tio n al security, th en , m a d e the refo rm im p u lse b o th u rg e n t a n d lim ited. To b e su re, th a t im p u lse c o n tin u ed to su rg e in initiatives b y state a n d local g o v e rn m e n ts, courts, u n io n s, colleges.

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civil rig h ts g ro u p s, a n d m in o rity citizens them selves. Still, executive action w a s th e c u ttin g edge, a n d n a tio n al security the d o m in a n t fram ew o rk . T he lim its of th a t fram e w o rk w ere d o u b ly e v id e n t w h e n o p p o n e n ts of racial ch an g e exploited its m o st ch arg ed elem ent, h y sterical an tico m m u n ism . S o u th ­ e rn D em ocrats w ere th e m o st vicious a t th is gam e. W h en th e S u p rem e C o u rt in v alid ated restrictive h o u sin g covenants, one co n g ressm an to ld th e H ouse: "M r. Speaker, th ere m u st h av e b e e n a celebration in M oscow last n ig h t." C o m ­ m u n ists h a d " w o n th e ir g reatest victory." S trom T h u rm o n d d eclared th a t "th e radicals, the subversives, a n d th e red s" h a d c a p tu re d th e D em ocratic Party; the civil rig h ts a g en d a w a s d e sig n ed "to create th e chaos a n d co n fu sio n w h ic h lead s to co m m u n ism ."46 Foes of civil rights, w h e th e r so u th e rn b ig o ts o r offi­ cials of the FBI, p o in te d o u t th a t c o m m u n ists c h am p io n e d racial equality, w h ich allo w ed m a n y A m ericans to reg ard it as a n evil id ea im p o rte d fro m abroad. M o d erate g ro u p s like the N A A C P w ere said to b e led o r m a n ip u la te d b y co m m unists; in resp o n se th ey p u rg e d th eir ran k s, ex ch an g ed d o ssiers o n alleged subversives, a n d trim m e d th e ir ideological sails. T he te n u o u s w a rtim e alliance of w h ite a n d black w o rk e rs in C on g ress of In d u stria l O rg an izatio n s u n io n s w ilte d w h e n th e R ed Scare d ecim ated th o se u n io n s. Scholars d isag ree o n h o w m u c h an tico m m u n ism cu rb e d racial refo rm — m o st likely it p u s h e d re­ fo rm into n a rro w e r b u t faster-ru n n in g ch an n e ls— b u t n a tio n al secu rity cer­ tain ly cut b o th w ays. T he m o st v u ln era b le w ere rad icals like P au l R obeson. E xcept for sp o rts stars (an d R obeson h a d b e en a sta r college athlete), h e e n te red th e C old W ar th e m o st a d m ire d a n d in flu en tial black A m erican. D u rin g W orld W ar II, h is m ilita n t a n ­ tifascism h a d b e en u sefu l to A m erican lead ers, a n d h is close ties w ith (th o u g h n o t m em b ersh ip in o r subservience to) the C o m m u n ist P arty h a d b e en toler­ ated. B ut h is su p p o rt of H e n ry W allace in 1948, h is d efen se of th e Soviet U nion, a n d h is d e n u n ciatio n s at h o m e a n d ab ro a d of A m erican racism d e stro y e d h is political a n d artistic careers. The FBI h o u n d e d him ; th e e n te rta in m e n t in d u stry , alo n g w ith local officials a n d m obs, stra n g le d h is career; th e State D e p a rtm e n t (arg u in g th a t race relatio n s w ere a "fam ily affair" n o t to b e aired ab ro ad ) lifted his p a ssp o rt, a fatal b lo w to h is activities; E leanor R oosevelt d isa v o w ed him ; a w itn ess before C ongress b ra n d e d h im "th e black Stalin am o n g N eg ro es." M any A frican-A m ericans still d e fe n d e d R obeson, b u t th eir lead ers becam e w a ry of association w ith him ; e v e n th e m ilita n t B ayard R u stin a rg u e d , "W e h av e to p ro v e th a t w e 're p atrio tic." R obeson m a d e h is en em ies' task easier. Im ­ placable in c o n d em n in g A m erican racism a n d im p erialism , m y o p ic a b o u t Sta­ lin 's b rutalities, h e w a s incapable of the skillful m a n e u v e r th a t m ig h t leave h im in tact to c o n tin u e th e fight, e v en excoriating o th er p ro m in e n t blacks for th eir "craven, faw ning, d espicable lea d ersh ip ." T h at h is stru g g le to reg ain h is p a ss­ p o rt lasted u n til the late 1950s (he w a s a b ro k en m a n b y then) in d ic ate d h o w p e rsiste n t the u g ly m o o d w as, especially w h e n a b lack m a n w a s in v o lv e d — o r a black w o m an , as w ith e n te rta in er Josephine Baker, also h o u n d e d b y ag en ts of th e state for h e r view s o n race.47

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T h at m o o d also en co u rag e d a g en eral celeb ratio n of A m erican perfection. W h at, after all, w a s th e p o in t of w a g in g th e global stru g g le if n o t to d efe n d a su p e rio r system , a n d h o w could th a t sy stem w in if it w ere n o t su p erio r? A s R ichard P olenberg argues, "It w a s o n ly a sh o rt ste p from in sistin g th a t co m m u ­ n ists d id n o t w a n t to im p ro v e co n d itio n s to d e n y in g th a t co n d itio n s n e e d e d m u c h b e tterm e n t. T he C old W ar p ro d u c e d a c o n stan t ten sio n b e tw ee n a d esire to affirm th e fu n d a m e n ta l so u n d n e ss of A m erican in stitu tio n s a n d a recogni­ tio n th a t those in stitu tio n s . . . w ere in m a n y réspects defective." Social com ­ m e n ta ry b y scholars a n d th e m ed ia reflected th e ch an g ed m ood. A lth o u g h th e w a r 's m o d e st ten d e n cy to n a rro w incom e g a p s so o n e n d e d a n d th e co n cen tra­ tio n of co rp o rate w e a lth co n tin u ed , scholarly w o rk back ed aw ay fro m its p re ­ w a r em p h asis o n class differences, stressin g in stea d th e "fluidity, diversity, a n d freed o m " of A m erican society a n d th e absence of sh a rp conflicts w ith in it. In th is "C o ld W ar atm o sp h e re . . . a th o ro u g h g o in g critiq u e of social in stitu tio n s w a s fast g o in g o u t of style."48 N o t th a t a critical stance a lto g eth e r d isa p p e a re d . Som e critics a n d scholars fo u n d th e racial d iv id e in A m erica inescapable a n d tro u b lin g , a n d m an y m o re assailed the b la n d conform ity of m ass cu ltu re, su b u rb ia , a n d co rp o rate life. T heir categories of analysis w ere m o re o ften psychological th a n social, h o w ­ ever, a n d th eir lam en t w a s m ore for the b o rin g sam en ess of A m erican s th a n for th e d iv isio n s am o n g them . A long w ith m ore po liticized fo rm s of a n tico m m u ­ n ism , social co m m en tary h a d a n im p act th a t lea d ers co u ld n o t m iss. A s one T ru m an a id e p u t it in A p ril 1949, "T he c o n su m in g fear of co m m u n ism h a s led m a n y sincere p e rso n s into th e belief t h a t . . . ch an g e (be it civil rig h ts o r a com ­ p u lso ry n a tio n al h e a lth p ro g ram ) is su b v ersiv e a n d th o se w h o u rg e it are e ith er co m m u n ists o r fellow trav ellers."49 M ilitarizatio n d id n o t alo n e cause this m o o d , w h ic h also d re w o n co n serv ativ e reaction a g ain st N e w D eal liberalism a n d racial change, a n d o n th e triu m p h a l o u tlo o k th a t v icto ry in w a r p ro m o ted , b u t to g eth er these forces h e lp e d to keep th e refo rm im p u lse in ten se b u t n a r­ ro w ly channeled. N o n etheless, black A m ericans, m e a su re d b y th eir p re w a r sta tu s, b en efited from the c o u n try 's p u rs u it of n a tio n al security. D id o th er social g ro u p s g ain accordingly? M uch d e p e n d e d o n th eir political clout, place in th e C old W ar, a n d p rio r m o b ilizatio n a n d g ro u p consciousness. Blacks h a d sev eral a d v a n ­ tages, d e sp ite en o rm o u s obstacles: th e ir im p o rtan c e in th e a rm e d forces, th eir p o sitio n in the c o n test ov er th e loyalties of n o n w h ites in th e deco lo n izin g w o rld , a n d th eir ra p id m o v em en t in to n o rth e rn cities, w h e re th ey co u ld v o te a n d h av e it count. O th e r g ro u p s som etim es lacked su c h lev erag e a n d fo u n d th eir fo rtu n es w o rsen in g . T hat w as so for m a n y w o m en . T he W om en 's A rm e d Services In teg ratio n A ct of 1948, p a sse d ju st d a y s before T ru m a n 's o rd e r o n racial in teg ratio n , d id seem to subject w o m e n to the sam e m ilitarizin g forces th a t w ere resh ap in g th e black experience, b y giving th em p e rm a n e n t, reg u la r sta tu s in th e a rm e d forces. Rep. M argaret C hase Sm ith, w h o led the cause, d id in v o k e justice, b u t n a tio n al secu-

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rity w as ag ain th e d o m in a n t a rg u m e n t for change. A rm y C h ief of Staff D w ig h t E isen h ow er saw "p la in efficiency" a t stake, especially since a " p u sh -b u tto n w a r" w o u ld d ra w in all A m ericans. S hortag es of fem ale p erso n n el, ab o v e all n u rses, u n d e rlin e d th e case. T he cause of n a tio n al secu rity em b raced g e n d er e q u ality less easily th a n racial equality, h o w ev er. T he n e w law b a rre d w o m e n from com bat, lim ited th eir n u m b e rs, ran k , a n d a u th o rity o v e r m en , a n d left g e n d e r id eo lo g y intact: m o st fem ale enlistees, Ike p ro m ised , w o u ld serv e briefly a n d th e n " o rd in a rily — a n d th a n k G o d — th ey w ill g et m a rrie d ." G iven h o w few w o m e n w ere allo w ed to serve, "in te g ra tio n " also lacked th e q u a n tita ­ tiv e effect o n w o m e n th a t it h a d o n black m en , w h o e n listed o r w e re d ra fte d in large n u m b ers.50 In d eed , m ilitarizatio n constricted m ore th a n it e n la rg ed w o m e n 's rig h ts a n d o p p o rtu n ities. W artim e legislation o n v e te ra n s' b en efits a n d job p referen ce lim ­ ited w o m e n 's em p lo y m en t. T he fed eral b u rea u cra cy 's tilt to w a rd n a tio n al se­ cu rity c u rtailed job o p en in g s in social services, w h e re w o m e n h a d h a d g reatest success. N otably, th e few w o m e n to g a in hig h -lev el p o sts cam e from o r en te red in to th e n e w ly p o w e rfu l agencies of n a tio n a l security: A n n a R osenberg as assis­ ta n t secretary of d efense u n d e r T rum an; O v eta C u lp H obby, w a rtim e h e a d of th e W ACs, as th e first secretary of h e alth , e d u ca tio n , a n d w elfare u n d e r E isenhow er; a n d E leanor D ulles (sister to Jo h n Foster a n d A llen), h e a d of th e State D e p a rtm e n t's B erlin d e sk in the 1950s. W om en w h o p u rs u e d p o litical ca­ reers, in official p o sitio n s o r p riv a te lobbies, o ften faced red -b a itin g if th eir p o li­ tics w ere liberal, lesbian-baiting if th eir sta tu s w ere single, o r m o re com plex ch arg es— w h e n R ichard N ix o n called H e len G a h ag a n D o u g las a "P in k L ad y . . . rig h t d o w n to h e r u n d e rw e a r" d u rin g th eir 1950 Senate contest, h e lin k ed "lib erated w o m en , u n c h a in e d sexuality, a n d th e C o m m u n ist m enace." T ru m a n lau g h e d aw ay w o m e n 's issues: "It h a s b e e n m y ex p erien ce th a t th ere is n o e q u ality — m e n are ju st slaves a n d I su p p o se th e y w ill alw ay s c o n tin u e to b e ."51 B eyond g e n d e r politics lay ideological shifts p ro m p te d p a rtly b y anxieties a b o u t w a r a n d n a tio n al security. C u ltu ra l im ages o ften p re se n te d w o m e n as w a r's helpless victim s, o r altern ativ ely as its cause, lin k in g w o m e n 's sex u ality to w a r's d estru ctiv e forces (as in th e b ik in i sw im su it a n d "A tom ic Bom b [bur­ lesque] D ancers"). H o lly w o o d m irro re d th e bifu rcatio n , g iv in g v iew ers little choice b e tw ee n helpless or h o rre n d o u s fem ale characters. E njoined to av o id th o se extrem es, w o m e n w ere to p la y su p p o rtiv e, dom estic roles in th e atom ic age, especially since Soviet w o m e n w ere d e m o n iz e d as m a n n ish a n d a g g res­ sive. T hey w ere expected to m a in ta in th e b o m b shelter, or "G ra n d m a 's P a n try " as it w a s som etim es called; " A re n 't th ey ju st p erfect n a tu ra ls for o u r m ass feed­ ing g ro u p s?" a sk ed a fem ale civil d efense official. T hey w ere "to rear c h ild ren w h o w o u ld avoid juvenile delinquency, stay in school, a n d becom e fu tu re sci­ e n tists a n d ex p erts to d e fe at th e R ussians in th e cold w a r." In th e p o stw a r "id e­ ology of m ale resp o n sib ility " for th e in te rn atio n al a n d dom estic o rd er, w o m e n w ere to sh o w "p atrio tism b y co n form ing to a dom estic id eo lo g y of fem ale sub-

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o rd in atio n ." Fear th a t w a rtim e service h a d e m ascu lated m en , m ascu lin ized w o m e n , a n d a lien a ted th e tw o from each o th e r stre n g th e n e d th is ideology; sh a rp ly risin g m a rria g e a n d b irth rates reflected it; po litician s of m a n y strip es a rtic u la te d it. A s A dlai S tevenson a rg u e d in 1955, th e college g ra d u a te 's job w a s to k eep h e r h u sb a n d " tru ly p u rp o se fu l" a n d h e lp "d efe at to talitarian , a u th o ri­ ta ria n id eas." W ith th e n a tio n 's v e ry su rv iv a l a p p a re n tly a t stake, w o m e n 's claim s to e q u ality seem ed laughable, irrelev an t, o r ev en su b v ersiv e.52 T hese d y n am ics, m a n y e v id e n t in th e 1930s, d id n o t o w e o n ly to m ilitariza­ tion. N o r d id "d o m estic id eo lo g y " alw ay s serve to ju stify a m ilitarized course: b efo re a n d after W orld W ar II, "isolationists," o ften C h ristian fu n d am e n ta lists, in v o k ed a v e rsio n of it to fig h t co n scrip tio n a n d u n iv ersal service, a rg u in g th a t m ilita ry life w o u ld c o rru p t d rafte es' m o rals a n d d e p riv e th e m of th e ir m o th e rs' n u rtu ra n c e . M ilitarization d ic ta te d n o single g e n d e r regim e, a n d n o single su ch reg im e p ro m o te d it. C ircu m stan ces— h o w m ilitarized a g e n d a s in tersected a u ­ to n o m o u s anxieties a b o u t g e n d e r a n d sex u ality — m attere d . Still, in th e p o st­ w a r y ears a n ideo lo g y of stro n g m e n a n d su p p o rtiv e w o m e n w a s b e n t to serve th o se ag en d as, w h ile its role in c o u n te rin g th em d im in ish ed . E ven m o re telling as a m a rk e r of m ilitarizatio n , any id eo lo g y of sex a n d g en d er, like a n y of race a n d ethnicity, n o w h a d to a d d re ss its alleged effect o n n a tio n al p o w er. N e v er n e atly d e te rm in a tiv e, th a t sp h e re w a s n o n eth eless inescapable. To b e sure, black A m erican s w ru n g a d v a n ta g e from th is crisis a tm o sp h e re d e sp ite facing a n ideo lo g y a t least as im p riso n in g as th a t facing w o m en , b u t th a t su g g ests h o w ideo lo g y a n d politics differed in co n ten t a n d effects a m o n g v a rio u s g ro u p s. W om en also m e t a different fate b ecau se th ey lacked a co m m o n set of goals, leverage a t the polls, a n d a p erceiv ed place in th e global co n test of loyalties. H o w co u ld th e N a zi record u n d e rlin e th eir cau se in th e w a y th a t it illu stra te d the evils of racism ? W here w ere th e m asses of w o m e n w a itin g else­ w h ere, as n o n w h ite s (p resu m p tiv ely m ale) a p p a re n tly w ere, to choose b e ­ tw e en c o m m u n ism a n d th e free w o rld ? W ith th e evils of fascism a n d c o m m u ­ n ism seen in racial a n d religious term s, w ith th eir id eals a n d practices a b o u t g e n d e r largely ig n o red (p erh a p s because th ey w e re too sim ilar to w h a t gov­ e rn e d in th e U n ited States), w ith w o m e n 's a u to n o m o u s p o w e r h a rd to see in a m ilitarized w o rld , few co u ld arg u e th a t A m erica's global im age h in g e d o n its tre a tm e n t of w o m en . In stead , the C old W a r's outco m e seem ed to h in g e o n w o m e n 's loyal service. T he fate of g ay m e n a n d lesbians also illu stra te d th e p e rn ic io u s effects of m il­ itarization. A gain th e ir fate w a s e n tw in e d w ith th a t of w o m en , as o n e co n g ress­ m a n 's w a rn in g m a d e clear: "T he cycle of these in d iv id u a ls' h o m o sex u al d esires follow s the cycle closely p a tte rn e d to th e m e n stru a l p e rio d of w o m e n ," so th a t a few d a y s each m o n th "th e h o m o sex u al's in stincts b rea k d o w n a n d d riv e the in d iv id u a l into ab n o rm al fields of sexual practice," o nes th a t p resu m ab ly m a d e ho m o sexuals w h o serv ed the n a tio n 's d efen se u n reliab le o r v u ln era b le to blackm ail.53

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A recasting of stereo ty p es also je o p a rd iz ed g ay m e n a n d w o m en . In a n o ld e r g e n d e r sy stem categorizing p e o p le along m ale-fem ale ra th e r th a n g ay -straig h t lines, n o tio n s of "sissy" m e n a n d "m a n n ish " w o m e n h a d re n d e re d th e m reas­ su rin g ly identifiable, if som etim es lau g h ab le, a n d allo w ed o th ers g iv en to n o r­ m ativ e g e n d e r roles to e n g ag e th em sexually w ith o u t th e stig m a of h o m o se x u ­ ality. D u rin g W orld W ar II, h o w ev er, hom o sex u als serv ed in large n u m b e rs, in u n ifo rm s a n d w ith d u tie s th a t e ra se d visible d istin ctio n s b e tw e e n th e m a n d o th er A m ericans. A s a resu lt, n e w stereo ty p es stressed th e ir o rd in a ry a p p e a r­ ance a n d lu rk in g invisibility. "T he S apphic lover," w a rn e d tw o p u lp jo u rn a l­ ists, "is seld o m o b v io u s," a n d "u n so p h istica tes w h o th in k of q u eers as p ra n c ­ in g n an ces w ith ro u g e d lips a n d bleached h a ir" m u s t realize th a t "p an sies in th e State D e p a rtm e n t d o n o t w e a r skirts ov er th eir strip e d p a n ts," a n d th a t "fairies" in clu d e " to u g h y o u n g kids, college football p lay e rs, tru ck -d riv ers a n d w e ath e r-b itte n servicem en." By the sam e to k en , e v en stra ig h t-a p p e a rin g m e n a n d w o m e n n o lo n g er easily escap ed su sp icio n of b e in g gay. A n d as th e w a rn ­ in g a b o u t State D e p a rtm e n t "p an sies" in d icated , n e w n o tio n s of invisible gays w ere lin k ed to fears a b o u t n a tio n al safety, in clu d in g th o se a b o u t d eb ilitatin g , effete p riv ileg e in th e u p p e r reaches of essen tial in stitu tio n s.54 T rying to locate in im ag in atio n w h a t n o w seem ed invisible in a p p earan ce, politicians, jo u rn alists, film m akers, a n d d o c to rs lin k ed h o m o sex u als w ith com ­ m u n ism a n d fascism . A s a congressional re p o rt claim ed, th ey lack th e "o u t­ w a rd characteristics o r physical traits . . . of sex p erv e rsio n ," re n d e rin g th em a n in sid io u s th re a t ak in to, a n d d ra w n to, th e invisible co m m u n ist. A n e w sex p an ic lin k ed gay m en to ab u se of children, a n d p rescrip tiv e lite ra tu re v iew ed th em as im m a tu re m e n w h o failed to m a in ta in th e fam ilies a n d careers n e e d e d to w in th e C old W ar ("T hey can n o t com pete. T hey alw ay s s u rre n d e r in th e face of im p e n d in g com bat"). T hey w ere th u s re g a rd e d as a m enace to th e h o m efro n t a n d th e w a r fro n t as w ell. S traying fro m F re u d ian trad itio n , p sy ch o an aly sts, o ften refugees from N a z i E urope, freq u en tly ascribed th e u g lie st p a th o lo g y to h o m o sex u als (they w ere m u rd ere rs, tra p p e d in "th e h o lo cau st of illn ess" a n d "try in g to e x tin g u ish the race") a n d lin k ed th em to N azism . T he few ex p erts w h o su g g e ste d o th erw ise w ere co n d em n ed for p ro d u c in g claim s th a t "w ill b e politically a n d p ro p ag a n d istic ally u se d a g ain st th e U n ited States ab ro ad , stig ­ m atizin g the n a tio n as a w h o le in a w h isp e r cam p aig n ," as E d m u n d Bergler, th e e ra 's lead in g analytic th eo rist in th is arena, assailed A lfred K in sey 's rep o rts o n h u m a n sexuality.55 G ays re a p e d m a n y of the b u rd e n s a n d few of th e b en efits of m ilitarizatio n . "Sex p e rv e rts" w ere publicly vilified b y executive agencies a n d co n g ressio n al com m ittees, p u rg e d from g o v e rn m e n t a n d m ilitary service, a n d p u rs u e d a n d ex p o sed b y local police in vice raids. T he m o d e m a p p a ra tu s of a n tig ay id eo l­ ogy a n d rep ressio n n o w em erged, d e riv e d less from tim eless a n im u s th a n from historically specific anxieties. M ilitarization red efin ed a n tig ay h o stility a n d th e d a n g e r gays p resu m ab ly p o s e d — to n atio n al as w ell as m o ral safety, th e tw o

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in extricably joined. T ru m a n sh o w ed h o w early a n d easily th e lin k ag e em erg ed w h e n h e ju stified h is decision to fire C om m erce Secretary H e n ry W allace ("a pacifist 100%") for seeking frien d lier Soviet-A m erican relations. "A ll th e 'A rt­ ists' w ith a cap ital A, th e p a rlo r p in k s a n d th e so p ra n o voiced m e n are b a n d e d to g eth er," h e co m p lain e d p riv a te ly in 1946. "I a m afraid th e y are a sab o tag e fro n t for U ncle Joe Stalin."56 Form al resistance to h o m o p h o b ia w a s n early im possible. O n e a ttem p t, th e M attachine Society, fo u n d its initial lead ers (ex-C om m unists ironically p u rg e d fro m th e p a rty for th eir preferences) d riv e n o u t b y th e ir fearful follow ers. N o m a in stre a m g ro u p , n o r th e A m erican C ivil L iberties U nion, w o u ld d e fe n d th em , p reju d ice w a s ra m p a n t am o n g leftists (inclined to see h o m o sex u ality as a fo rm of cap italist decadence) as w ell as co nservatives, a n d h o m o sex u als in p o w e r like the FBI's H o o v er a n d Joe M cC arth y sidekick Roy C o h n w ere w o rse th a n u seless (an d them selves som etim es gay-baited). U nlike o th er g ro u p s, g ay p e o p le co u ld n o t g ain leverage b y to u tin g th eir w a rtim e co n trib u tio n s, since d o in g so risk ed c o n d em n atio n or jail. The fate of g ays u n d e r th e H o lo cau st w a s u n k n o w n , w h ile n o restive m ass of h o m o sex u als o verseas seek in g to choose b e tw ee n c o m m u n ism a n d dem ocracy w a s ev id en t. E ven vicious a tte n tio n offered lo n g -ru n a d v a n ta g e s to g ay p eople. T he lu rid m ag azin e article o r p u b licized vice ra id p ro v id e d th e novice a g u id e to th e b ars, c o d ew o rd s, a n d folkw ays of the g ay u n d e rw o rld . In 1957, w h e n San Francisco police seized copies of p o e t A llen G in sb erg 's Howl— w h ic h celeb rated m en w h o g e t "fu ck ed in th e ass b y sain tly m otorcyclists" a n d sav ag ed C o ld W ar­ rio rs w h o p ra y e d before "M oloch"— th ey se n t sales of Howl a n d k n o w le d g e of th a t city's gay co m m u n ity soaring. In d ee d , th e m o u n tin g a n tig ay c am p aig n h e lp e d forge a n e w gay id en tity th a t slow ly m a d e resistance possible, ju st as resistance, as in G in sb erg 's case, o ften w o u ld in clu d e challenges to m ilitariza­ tio n itself. Few could foresee th a t course of ev en ts in 1950, h ow ever. If blacks m a d e gain s a n d h o m o sex u als fared w o rst u n d e r m ilitarized social relations, E u ro p ea n ethnics p ro b ab ly b en efited th e m ost. U nlike th e case after W orld W ar I, "th e an ti-co m m u n ist im p u lse . . . d id n o t flow p rim a rily alo n g n a tiv ist channels"; in d ee d . E astern E u ro p ea n im m ig ran ts "w o u ld com e to be id en tified w ith th e far rig h t ra th e r th a n w ith th e far left."57 A m erican Jew s could id en tify w ith the victim s of N azism , a n d o ften of c o m m u n ism . E ast E u­ ro p ea n ethnics, a n d th e C atholic ch u rch w ith w h ich th ey w ere u su a lly associ­ ated , w ere seen as p atrio tic C o ld W arriors, easin g th eir task of assim ilation. G erm an-A m ericans, rarely the b ru n t of h o stility a n y w ay d u rin g th e w ar, saw W est G erm an y enlisted in the a n tico m m u n ist cause. The C old W ar h a rd ly d is­ solved all distinctions: an tico m m u n ism recast ethnic id en tities m o re th a n it ob literated them , as A m ericans of Polish, U k rain ian , o r o th e r b ack g ro u n d s as­ serted th eir ties to o p p resse d b re th re n b e h in d th e Iro n C u rtain . D ivisions alo n g religious lines rem ain ed e v en sh a rp er, as C atholics, P ro testan ts, a n d Jew s u s u ­ ally m ain tain ed th eir social a n d c u ltu ral distance. Still, th e m ach in ery of na-

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tional se cu rity — m o st o bviously c o m p u lso ry m ilitary service, less d irectly cor­ p o ratio n s, bureaucracies, a n d u n iv ersities— d id m in g le d iv erse g ro u p s. By the sam e token, the o u tlo o k resh a p in g race relatio n s w o rk e d e v en m o re read ily o n ethnic a n d religious divisions: b a rrie rs a g ain st Jew s, C atholics, or ethnic g ro u p s m ig h t p e rsist inform ally b u t seem ed o u t of place in a n a tio n seek in g to tap all of its resources a t h o m e a n d to p o lish its im ag e ab ro ad . Fear th a t A m eri­ cans w o u ld a p p e a r d iv id e d in facing the en em y d isco u rag ed , th o u g h h a rd ly e n d ed , in ten se ethnic a n d religious assertiv en ess, a n d A m erican lea d ers em ­ p h a size d th e n a tio n 's hom ogeneity. R arely in A m erican h isto ry d id th e m eltin g p o t seem to b u b b le so fiercely. A t least for eth n ics of a n assim ilatio n ist b e n t— p ro b ab ly a g reat m a n y after W orld W ar II— th e id eal of h o m o g en e ity se rv ed a u sefu l p u rp o se . O th e r g ro u p s fared less w ell. M exican-A m ericans w e re freq u en tly d e p o rte d as n a tio n al security risks o r for o th er reasons. O p p o n e n ts of N ativ e A m erican trib al co m m u n ity a n d la n d o w n e rsh ip labeled th o se p ractices as co m m u n istic, a n d th e federal g o v e rn m e n t m o v ed to w a rd "th e co m p lete m erg e r of all In d ia n g ro u p s into th e g en eral b o d y of o u r p o p u la tio n ," as T ru m a n p u t it. C hineseA m ericans d iv id e d am o n g th em selv es w h e n co m m u n ism triu m p h e d in th eir ancestral n atio n , a n d th ey cam e u n d e r m ore su sp icio n , acted o n b y th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t th ro u g h a n o to rio u s "C onfession P ro g ram ," w h e n C o m m u n ist C hinese forces e n te red th e K orean W ar.58 For n o n -E u ro p ean s, th e obstacles in ­ c lu d e d b o th lo n g stan d in g p rejudice a n d te m p o ra ry circum stance: th e C o ld W ar w a s too m u rk y a n d em bryonic in m u c h of A sia a n d L atin A m erica for these g ro u p s to tra d e easily o n th eir p o sitio n in th e global co n test for loyalties. T he C o ld W ar's g ro w in g in ten sity in those areas after 1950 d id m ak e for change, how ever: im m ig ratio n q u o tas, once w ild ly tilted to E u ro p ean s, w ere su sp e n d e d , relaxed, a n d finally a b a n d o n e d in 1965. A ll this su g g ests th a t m ilitarizatio n im p o sed n o o n e p a tte rn o n all social g ro u p s, b u t in one sense it d id . W h at m a tte re d as m u c h as th e fate of p a rtic u la r g ro u p s— a b alance sh eet of losses a n d g ain s for each — w a s th e m a n n e r in w h ich all fo u n d th eir sta tu s ju d g e d b y th eir p erceiv ed p o sitio n in h o t a n d cold w ar. O ld e r im p u lses still o p e ra te d — th a t b u n d le of p rejudices, asp iratio n s, a n d a d v an tag e s th a t d efines A m erican society— ju st as n a tio n al secu rity w a s often in v o k ed to legitim ize im p u lse s th a t lay e n tirely o u tsid e its arena. But th a t is also th e point. T hat arena w a s inescapable, a n d as m a n y co u ld a tte st— th e black of­ ficer w h o g a in e d authority, the w o m a n h e sita n t to choose a career, th e lesb ian WAC d ish o n o rab ly d isc h a rg e d — its d y n am ics w ere p o w erfu l. T hose d y n am ics p riv ileg ed a u tilita rian case for social ch an g e a n d circu m scrib ed claim s b a sed o n justice. T he d istin ctio n w a s n o t absolute, since justice o ften seem ed in th e in terests of n atio n al pow er, b u t it w a s p ersisten t. C o m p o u n d in g this m ilitarizatio n of social relatio n s w a s th e p a rtially m il­ itarized econom y, w h ic h re sh a p e d social relatio n s in w a y s larg ely b e y o n d the reach of form al a rg u m e n t a n d consciousness. O f these effects, th e reg io n al "re-

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m a p p in g " of th e U n ited States, creating a n e w "g u n b elt," w a s th e m o st ob­ v io u s.59 W orld W ar II, req u irin g m ass p ro d u c tio n of h ig h ly sta n d a rd iz e d p ro d ­ ucts, h a d sh o w e re d its econom ic benefits w id ely , since e stab lish ed in d u strie s like au to a n d steel in the N o rth e a st a n d M id w est w ere a d e p t a t m ass p ro d u c ­ tion. T he re d u c e d scale a n d m o u n tin g technological focus of p o stw a r m ilitary p ro cu re m en t, o n th e o th er h a n d , p riz e d m ass p ro d u c tio n far less. In ste ad of m illio ns of rifles o r th o u sa n d s of b o m b ers fro zen in d e sig n for lo n g p ro d u c tio n ru n s, th e P en tag o n so u g h t h a n d fu ls of aircraft carriers a n d h u n d re d s of n e w jet fig h ters a n d b o m b ers— all so com plex a n d fast-ch an g in g technically th a t d e ­ sig n s co u ld n o t b e fixed for h ig h -v o lu m e p ro d u c tio n , a n d skilled d e sig n team s a n d w o rk e rs w ere v a lu e d m ore th a n m asses of blu e-co llar laborers. To b e sure, th is sh ift w a s n o t to ta l— sm all-batch p ro d u c tio n h a d lo n g charac­ terize d n av al a rm a m e n ts a n d the K orean W ar b ro u g h t n e w d e m a n d s for h ig h v o lu m e o u tp u t— b u t it n o n eth eless accelerated reg io n al red istrib u tio n . O ld e r m a ss-p ro d u ctio n in d u strie s w ere n e ith e r w ell su ite d to m eet th e n e w d e m a n d s n o r k een ly in terested in th e m as lo n g as civilian m ark e ts w ere robust. T h u s w e a p o n s d e v e lo p m e n t a n d p ro d u c tio n g rav itate d so u th a n d w e st— to b u lg in g n o d e s in the n u c le ar w e a p o n s com plex like D u P o n t's v a st S av an n ah R iver p la n t in S outh C arolina; to aircraft co m p an ies in Los A n g eles a n d in Seattle; a n d later to rocket a n d space-exploration com plexes in G eorgia, F lorida, Texas, a n d th e W est. A s late as 1952, N e w York w a s still th e to p recip ien t of m ilitary con­ tracts, a n d m id w e s te m states to o k a h a n d so m e sh are of th em . Ju st six y ears later, C alifornia h a d far o u td ista n ce d N e w York, Texas a n d W ash in g to n h a d m o v e d in to th e to p ran k s, "th e M id w e st's sh are fell catastrophically, n e v er ag ain to recover," a n d th e to p te n m ilitary co n tracto rs w ere n o w all in elec­ tro n ics a n d aviation.60 T anks from D etro it w ere out, jets from C alifornia w ere in. Pockets of d efense w o rk rem ain ed in th e o ld h e a rtla n d , b u t th e sh ift w a s rap id . To its beneficiaries, it o w e d to th eir clim ate, o p e n lan d , strateg ic location, a n d e n tre p re n e u ria l spirit. T hose a ttrib u tes, h o w ev er, w ere p ro b ab ly n o t the decisive factors. In stead , com placency am o n g c o rp o ra te a n d p o litical lea d ers in th e o ld h e a rtla n d , th e h ig h -tech e m p h a sis of d efen se p ro cu re m en t, a n d ag g res­ sive p ro m o tio n b y bo o sters fig u red h e av ily in th e shift. T hese regional shifts, v ital in red istrib u tin g capital, expertise, a n d p o p u la ­ tion, also re sh a p e d p a tte rn s of race, class, a n d ideology. R esources flo w ed to co rp o ratio n s th a t h a d less n e e d for blue-co llar w o rk e rs a n d to areas w h e re u n io n s w ere u su a lly w eaker, u n d e rc u ttin g o rg an iz ed lab o r a n d th e b en efits for black w o rk e rs of th eir success in n o rth e rn cities a t g ain in g in d u stria l jobs a n d in te g ratin g in d u stria l unions. Like o th er A m ericans, blacks co u ld follow the econom ic tid e to C alifornia, C onnecticut, o r b ack so u th , b u t d o in g so m e a n t still a n o th er d isru p tio n , a n d som etim es relocation to areas w h e re A fricanA m erican in stitu tio n s h a d sh allo w roots a n d w h ite A m erican s w ere excep­ tionally hostile. Sim ilar results, th o u g h less d ram atic a n d h a rd e r to ascertain, m ay h av e u n fo ld e d for w o m en , w h o , like m o st black A m ericans, lacked the

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train in g n e e d e d for m an y technical jobs in d efen se in d u strie s, a lth o u g h th ey m ig h t join th e low -paid secretarial su p p o rt force also req u ire d in large n u m ­ bers. For gay people, the m aze of security clearances a n d req u ire m e n ts in the p riv a te a n d public sectors of d efense w o rk p re se n te d a special b arrier. In tu rn , the p a rtial w a r econom y w e ak e n ed th e N e w D eal coalition, liberal reform , a n d racial progress. U n d e rcu ttin g o rg an ized lab o r a n d job o p en in g s for black A m ericans, it sw elled o p p o rtu n itie s for w hite-co llar w o rk e rs w h o se eco­ nom ic sta tu s te n d e d to m ake th eir politics R epublican a n d conservative. A n d co rp o rate, political, a n d m ed ia lead ers in these p ro sp e rin g areas su sta in e d a n ex tra o rd in a ry rev u lsio n a g ain st fed eral p o w e r a n d "social e n g in e erin g " ev en as th ey em b raced C old W ar view s p ro m o tin g fed eral p o w er, c o n n iv ed for ev­ ery federal dollar, a n d fostered a m assive re-en g in eerin g of A m erica. C alifor­ n ia 's u rb a n bo o sters "w o u ld curse the fed eral g o v e rn m e n t for th e m ess in w h ic h th e w a r h a d left them , b u t each w o u ld p lain tiv ely b e g " — or skillfully lo b b y — "for m ore of th e econom ic resources th a t cam e w ith th e m ess."61 This in v o lv ed n o R epublican o r conserv ativ e conspiracy, h o w ev er, since D em ocratic p re sid e n ts a n d C ongresses w ere essential in creatin g th e peacetim e w a r econom y, a n d th e local coalitions th a t la n d e d m ilitary contracts a n d b ases tran sce n d ed p a rty a n d ideological distinctions. A n d regional a n d econom ic shifts h a d o th er sources b esid e the w o rk in g s of m ilitarizatio n . N o r w ere racial reform ers helpless in face of these ch an g es— th e civil rig h ts m o v em en t reach ed th e p e a k of its success in th e m id st of th em , in p a rt b y cap italizin g o n o th er facets of m ilitarization. But econom ic m ilitarizatio n e ro d e d th e g ro u n d b e n e a th th em . It "co n trib ­ u te d to the seg reg atio n of A m ericans b y class a n d race" (an d p ro b ab ly b y gender), a n d to th e g ro w th of "large p ools of a n u rb a n u n d erclass as w ell as d isp laced blue-collar w o rk ers." In a m a n n e r sim ilar to th e effects of su b u r­ b a n izatio n , th e econom ic a n d regional effects of m ilitarizatio n w o rk e d b e n e a th th e surface to u n d e rc u t form al efforts a t racial in te g ratio n a n d social equ ality .62 U n d erstan d ab ly , it w a s difficult to foresee a n d sh a p e m a n y of th e conse­ q u ences of m ilitarizatio n for social relations. A s h istorical process, m ilitariza­ tio n w as largely u n reco g n ized o r im plicitly d e n ie d b y th e lan g u a g e of crisis a n d im p ro visation, a n d in a n y ev en t of incalculable d u ra tio n as of 1948 or 1952. Its effects w ere com plex a n d long-term (m any n o te d h ere w ere o n ly in cip ien t in th e 1940s), far from u n ifo rm across all social g ro u p s, so m etim es c o n tra d ic to ry ev en for a single g roup, a n d useful e n o u g h for m a n y to be w elco m ed in a n u n ­ q u estio n in g fashion. All th a t su ch g ro u p s h a d in co m m o n — b u t th is w a s a g reat d e a l— w a s th eir inescapable p a rticip a tio n in an aren a of social relatio n s p ro ­ fo u n d ly sh a p e d b y m ilitarization.

Culture in W ar’ s Shadow Advancing American Art, a n overseas State D e p a rtm e n t exhibit of m o d e rn ist w o rk s, u n lea sh e d a fu ro r in 1947. T raditional artists issu ed a "W ar C ry " ag ain st

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rad ical tre n d s "n o t in d ig e n o u s to o u r soil." T he m ed ia lam b asted "left-w ing p a in te rs w h o are m em b ers of red Fascist o rg an izatio n s." Politicians saw "C om ­ m u n ist c a ric a tu re s. . .s e n t o u t to m islead th e rest of th e w o rld as to w h a t A m er­ ica is like." T he m a tte r d ra g g e d in T ru m an ("If th a t's art. I'm a H o tten to t") a n d C ongress, c au sin g the exhibit's p re m a tu re en d . In to th e 1950s th e ch arg e k e p t ech o in g th a t m o d e m a rt (or literatu re, o r m usic) w e ak e n ed A m erica, c o rru p t­ in g it at h o m e o r d e b asin g its im age abroad: C o n g ressm an G eorge D o n d ero in sin u a te d th e h o m o sex u ality of m o d ern ists, saw th em as p a rt of "a sin ister co n sp iracy conceived in the black h e a rt of R ussia," a n d declared m o d e m a rt c o m m u n ist (th o u g h Stalin also co n d em n ed it) "because it d o es n o t glorify o u r b e au tifu l country, o u r cheerful a n d sm ilin g peo p le, a n d o u r g rea t m aterial p ro g ress." Tellingly, d e fe n d ers of m o d e m a rt w o rk e d in a sim ilar fram ew o rk , h a ilin g it as sym bol of A m erican freed o m a n d p o w er: "T he m ain p rem ises of W estern a rt h av e a t last m ig ra te d to the U n ited States, alo n g w ith th e cen ter of g rav ity of in d u stria l p ro d u c tio n a n d political p o w e r."63 H a rd ly th e first tim e th a t a rt g e n erate d political conflict, th e d e b ate o v er m o d e rn ist a rt w as in stea d n o v el because of th e fram ew o rk of c o n tro v ersy sh a re d b y d e fe n d ers a n d detractors: th eir focus o n n a tio n al safety a n d p o w e r e v en in peacetim e. It w a s a sig n th a t in c u ltu re as in o th e r arenas, m ilitarizatio n w a s proceeding. It d id n o t sim p ly m e a n th e co n scrip tio n of c u ltu ra l resources to w ag e h o t o r cold w ar, o r a c u ltu re th a t celeb rated n a tio n al pow er. It m e a n t also th e m an ifo ld w a y s in w h ic h A m erican s co u ch ed th eir c u ltu ral anxieties a n d am bitions in term s of n a tio n al security, a n d in w h ic h anxieties a b o u t th e n a tio n 's safety su ffu sed culture. It m eant, th a t is, th e seem in g inescap ab ility of w a r in A m erican cu ltu re, b o th in its form al a p p a ra tu s of e n te rta in m e n t a n d th e arts, a n d in its b ro a d e r system s of lan g u ag e a n d sym bols. N o o ne ex p lan atio n p e rsu asiv e ly em braces large-scale c u ltu ral change, h o w ­ ever, a n d the b e st th e h isto ria n can d o is to ack n o w led g e th e com plexities in ­ v olved. To the ex ten t th a t c u ltu re b ecam e m ilitarized , th e ch an g e o ccu rred th ro u g h p riv a te a n d d ecen tralized initiatives a n d o u t of th e m o o d s a n d anxi­ eties of o rd in a ry peo p le, n o t ju st th ro u g h elite p ressu re s (them selves o ften con­ flicting). A lth o u g h h isto ria n s still w rite b ook s like The Culture of the Cold War,64 m u c h sp ra n g from w e ll-sp rin g s d e e p e r th a n th e C old W ar conflict: from ex p o ­ su re to global w ar, genocide, a n d frig h ten in g w eap o n s; from th e n a tio n 's a t­ te m p t to exercise global p o w er; from anxieties a b o u t w h a t A m erica itself w a s becom ing; an d , since n o c u ltu re rein v en ts itself o v ern ig h t, from o ld er c u ltu ral trad itio n s th a t sh a p e d reactions to all of these d ev elo p m en ts. D isparate in sources, c u ltu re 's m ilitarizatio n w a s also com plex in results. The p o stw a r y ears are easily rem em b ered as a n "ag e of anxiety." A n d p lau sib ly so, since reasons for anxiety existed a n d since p e o p le so self-consciously em ­ p lo y ed the label, as w h e n th e B ritish-A m erican p o e t W. H . A u d e n p u b lish ed "The A ge of A nxiety" in 1948 a n d L eonard B ernstein g ave a sy m p h o n y th e sam e title a few y ears later. Yet th e era also saw b u o y a n t o p tim ism a n d so arin g am b ition a b o u t A m erica as th e w o rld 's c u ltu ral capital, econom ic engine, reli-

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g io u s savior, or p ro tecto r a n d policem an. A m erican s co u ld im ag in e th e ir n a ­ tio n b o th in ru in s a n d in m u sc u la r h e g em o n y o v e r th e w o rld . T he p o in t is n o t th a t an xiety o r o p tim ism (or som e o th e r m oo d ) triu m p h e d . (O ne sch o lar fin d s a n am b iv alen t "cu ltu re of con tin g en cy " a sc e n d a n t in th e late 1940s.65) The p o in t is th a t b o th m o o d s w ere sh a p e d b y a n d fo cu sed u p o n th e ex p erien ce a n d th re a t of w a r a n d th e global struggle. G iven the d iv erse n a tu re of cu ltu re, the su b tle m ea n s of resistan ce it offered, a n d its resistance to a n y s u d d e n change, m ilita riza tio n in th is sp h e re w a s m o re p a rtia l a n d u n ev en . Still, b y certain gross if im precise sta n d a rd s, a m ilitarized c u ltu re w a s em erg in g in a n im p ressiv e ran g e of p h e n o m e n a. T he p o stw a r su b ­ u rb a n boom , for exam ple, d riv e n in p a rt b y p e n t-u p w a rtim e d e m a n d a n d g e n ­ ero u s financing for v eteran s, w a s also cast as a w e a p o n in th e C old W ar. "N o m a n w h o o w n s h is o w n h o u se a n d lo t c an b e a co m m u n ist. H e h a s too m u c h to d o ," p ro claim ed W illiam L evitt, th e m o g u l of su b u rb a n d e v elo p m e n t.66 E m ­ b o d y in g the m y th of a classless society, su b u rb ia se rv ed as sig n of A m erican su p e rio rity a n d as d efense a g ain st in sid io u s ideologies. T he sco u rg e of po lio w a s also cast w ith in the c u ltu re of w ar: fu n d ra isin g cam p aig n s a g ain st it d re w o n tech n iq u es of w a rtim e m obilization; M arch of D im es p o ste rs ech o ed w a r­ tim e p ro p a g a n d a (in 1952, "T his Fight Is Y ours" fea tu red a g rim so ld ier lo o m ­ in g o v er a c rip p led child); p o lio 's stealth y co n tag io n seem ed co m p arab le to c o m m u n ism 's in sid io u s w ays, a n d th e u n k n o w a b len e ss of its p e ril to th a t of n u c le ar attack.67 Film also reflected the c u ltu re of w ar. W ar m o v ies w ere a co n sp icu o u s genre, o n e v irtu a lly in v en ted d u rin g W orld W ar II, b u t o th e r g en res reflected sim ilar concerns. Science fiction film s projected w a r in to th e fu tu re o r p re se n te d it in th in ly veiled allegories. So too d id W esterns: High Noon (1952) offered G ary C o o p er as the retired la w m a n (the U n ited States after W orld W ar H) alo n e fac­ in g th e re tu rn e d en em y (totalitarianism ), h is fellow citizens (A m erica's allies) too w eak-w illed to fight, h is w o m e n (a fem in ized A m erican cu ltu re) p le a d in g for peace u n til G race Kelly (a Q u ak er) join s th e cause. Sim ilarly, Jo h n Ford tran sferred "th e ideological concerns of th e W orld W ar a n d its a fte rm a th from th e terra in of th e com bat film to th e m ythic lan d sca p e of th e W estern," a n d th ereb y created "th e m ythic basis for a n e w id eo lo g y " (resting " o n a d elib erate a n d co nsensual falsification of h isto ry ") u n itin g A m erican s a g ain st "th e th re a t­ en in g ad v an ce of Soviet C o m m u n ism ."68 R eligion generally a n d religious revival p articu larly , th o u g h sh a p e d b y m an y forces, also reflected c o n te m p o ra ry concerns a b o u t w ar, w e a p o n s, a n d w o rld pow er. W hen sev en ty th o u sa n d p e o p le p a ck e d C h icag o 's Soldier Field for a M em orial D ay 1945 "Y outh for C h rist" rally, th ey d e m o n stra te d h o w "W orld W ar II a n d the early stages of th e cold w a r en co u rag e d th e rein v ig o ratio n of evangelicalism ." D u rin g th e w a r itself, "p iety b ecam e m o re fash io n ab le alo n g th e Potom ac," religious novels so ared to th e to p of th e b estseller lists, a n d A m ericans sa n g "P raise the L ord a n d Pass th e A m m u n itio n ," e v en th o u g h one

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fu n d a m e n ta list co m p lain ed th a t "p a ssin g th e L ord a n d p ra isin g th e a m m u n i­ tio n " m ore a p tly c au g h t th e ir m ood. T he religious rev iv al of th e p o stw a r era in v o lv ed " n o t so m u c h religious belief as belief in th e value of re lig io n /' a rg u e s o n e h isto rian , above all "th e conviction th a t relig io n w a s v irtu a lly sy n o n y m o u s w ith A m erican n a tio n alism ."69 T here w a s m ore g o in g o n th a n th at, how ev er. A b la n d sense of " th e value of relig io n " d id o ften em erge in the p ro n o u n c e m e n ts of n a tio n al au th o rities, the ecum enical religiosity of m ovies, a n d th e im ag es of c o rp o ra te m ed ia outlets, b u t th ere w a s also th e com plex faith of th eo lo g ian s like R einhold N ieb u h r, th e in te n se convictions of m a n y P ro testan ts, th e apo caly p tic p red ic tio n s of a n en d tim e cen tered o n th e atom ic b o m b 's ad v en t, a n d a m o re g en eral sense of "n e w b e g in n in g s" p ro m p te d b y th e b o m b th a t sp illed across th e political a n d d e n o m ­ in atio n al lines of A m erican religion. Like m a n y A m ericans, relig io u s lead ers re g a rd e d th e b o m b 's ap p ea ra n c e as a sig n of u ltim ate evil o r as a call to g rea ter d e e d s in the w o rld . E arly in his ascent to evangelistic sta rd o m , Billy G ra h a m offered a p o te n t m ix of C h ristia n a n tico m m u n ism a n d ap o caly p tic p red ictio n , p re se n tin g A m erica v ario u sly as b o th called to p rev a il a n d d o o m ed to b e d e ­ stro y e d in th e global stru g g le (Los A ngeles w a s th e e n e m y 's to p choice for atom ic attack, since it w a s " k n o w n a ro u n d th e w o rld b ecau se of its sin, crim e, a n d im m orality"). M ore generally, "V isions of Pax Americana . . . p ro v o k e d a n e w global triu m p h a lism am o n g A m erican ev an g elical lea d ers" w h o so u g h t "g rea ter conquests for C h rist." Jo h n Foster D ulles w a n te d "A m erican s to ex­ te n d th eir conception of m o rality a n d sp iritu a lity to th e rest of th e w o rld ," as h is v iew s h av e b e e n su m m arize d ; P re sid e n t T ru m a n w a n te d th e n a tio n "to b rin g th e g o ld en ru le in to th e in te rn atio n al affairs of th e w o rld "; a n d o n e sen a­ to r a rg u e d th a t "A m erica m u s t m ove fo rw a rd w ith th e atom ic b o m b in one h a n d a n d th e cross in th e o th e r."70 R eligious id en tities a n d conflicts, too, w ere o ften d e fin e d in term s of th e global struggle. C atholics so u g h t legitim acy b y p o in tin g to th e c h u rc h 's resis­ tan ce to c o m m u n ism in E urope. "L ong the subject of n a tiv ist ta u n ts b y th e n a ­ tio n 's P ro te stan t m ajority, th ey co u ld a t last asse rt th e ir A m erican ism — a n d q u e stio n th e p a trio tism of o th e rs— th ro u g h th e vehicle of th e A n ti-C o m m u n ist C ru sa d e." Francis C a rd in a l Spellm an, unofficial "ch a p lain of th e C old W ar," led m u c h of the ch u rch in th a t c ru sad e , u rg in g follow ers to em b race Sen. Joe M cC arthy, attack "p e rv e rts," force p u b lic officials to b a n alleg ed ly obscene film s, a n d challenge th e "C o m m u n ist flo o d in g s of o u r o w n la n d ." M an y P ro t­ estan ts jo in ed th a t crusade. O thers, reflecting o ld relig io u s ten sio n s a n d n e w w a y s to express them , p o in te d to th e P o p e 's au th o rity o v er th e ch u rc h a n d saw C atholics "as b lin d follow ers of a to ta litaria n system , a p p a re n tly n o t u n lik e th e N azi o r Soviet reg im es."71 Pervasive anxieties a b o u t the atom ic b o m b w ere a t th e core of th is m ilitarized culture. A "cu ltu ral crisis" a n d a v irtu a l "n atio n al to w n m eetin g " e n su e d after H iro shim a, sp a rin g h a rd ly a n o o k o r cra n n y of A m erican culture. E ven w h e n

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political d eb ate a b o u t the b o m b w a n e d , c u ltu ra l an x iety a b o u t it p e rsiste d — in ch eap 1950s film s fea tu rin g irra d ia te d insects a n d m o n sters u n lea sh e d b y n u ­ clear explosions, creatu res th a t "filled a v acan t space w h e re th e p u b lic d eclin ed to see real w e ap o n s." A nxiety also p e rsiste d in citizen s' o rd in a ry decisions: co n sid erin g relocation, one scholar p o n d e re d "th e q u e stio n of relativ e loca­ tio n s a n d the a to m b o m b " a n d a n o th e r re tu rn e d fro m E u ro p e, w h e re " w a r a n d th e R ussians w ere too n ear." W h en p u b lic c o n tro v ersy re su m e d in th e m id-1950s, o v er fallout from h y d ro g e n bom b s, its th em es w ere c u ltu ra l as w ell as political, q u estio n in g scientific a u th o rity a n d p io n ee rin g a m o d e m ecologi­ cal consciousness.72 Political a u th o rities p la y e d a m ajor role in m ilitarizin g c u ltu re. T hey offered cues, a n d som etim es n o n e-to o -su b tle coercion— H o lly w o o d g o t th e m essag e to ch an g e its film s from congressional h e arin g s c o n d u cted in 1947. W hile m o st of th e N e w D eal a n d w a rtim e a p p a ra tu s for fu n d in g a n d d irec tin g c u ltu re h a d b e en d ism an tled , n e w g o v e rn m e n ta l m ech an ism s sp ru n g up: for in tellectuals, th e C o ngress for C u ltu ra l F reedom , secretly fu n d e d b y th e CIA; for th e m asses, a "Z eal for A m erican D em ocracy" p ro g ra m a n d a "F reed o m T rain " to u rin g the n a tio n in 1947, d isp lay in g the C o n stitu tio n a n d th e D eclaration of In d e p e n ­ d en ce for visitors to view ; for th e anxious, "A tom ic E n erg y W eek" a n d a m y r­ iad of o th er p ro g ram s from th e AEC d e sig n e d to offer b e n ig n c u ltu ra l im ag es of th e atom . R outine features of the n a tio n a l secu rity state, w ith n o in te n d e d cul­ tu ra l a g en d a , also h a d p ro fo u n d c u ltu ral effects: a g e n eratio n of y o u n g m ales faced conscription, lea d in g m a n y quickly into college, o th ers in to a m ilita ry ex­ p erien ce th a t d is ru p te d ties of fam ily a n d reg io n a n d race, a n d all to face som e v ersio n of a co m m o n rite of passage. State a n d local au th o rities p la y e d a v ital role as w ell, sh a p in g p u b lic e d u c a tio n to reflect C o ld W ar id eo lo g y a n d policy, o r w o rk in g w ith th e A m erican L egion to enact in 1950 a m ock C o m m u n ist co u p in M osinee, W isconsin, a n ev en t th a t " g a rn e re d v a st p u b lic ity — o n rad io , TV, new sreels, a n d th e p a g es of Life." M any efforts w o rk e d across co m plex lines of authority. T h ro u g h o u t th e 1950s, federal, state, local, a n d pu b lic-sch o o l a u th o r­ ities co o p erated to m o u n t civil defense d rills— c u ltu ral "p a g e a n ts in th eir o w n w ay ," as one h isto ria n rig h tly n o tes.73 In tu rn , the m ilitarizatio n of c u ltu re w as lin k ed to A m erica's im p e ria l role in th e w o rld . A lth o u g h n o t a n e w process, A m erican in tellectu al cu rren ts, c u ltu ral fads, a n d co n su m er p ro d u c ts n o w su rg e d o u tw a rd to a n u n p re c e d e n te d d e ­ gree, soon slip p in g p a st the Iron C u rta in w ith su rp risin g ease. T he global sp re a d of A m erican c u ltu re w as n o t alw ay s im p erial in in sp ira tio n o r result; red -b aitin g p ro p elled som e leftist A m erican scholars to flee a b ro a d a n d g ain influence there. Too, official efforts to e x p o rt cu ltu re, like Advancing American Art, m isfired if th ey challenged political a n d c u ltu ral n o rm s a t h o m e. A n d th e c u ltu re a t issue w as n o t ju st th e project of "A m erican s." From th e so u n d tra ck s of film s to rarefied w o rk in science a n d th e h u m an ities, it also relied o n refugee scholars a n d a rtists fleeing fascism o r com m u n ism .

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Still, im p e ria l n e e d s d id ch an g e the c u ltu ra l a n d intellectu al w o rk of A m eri­ cans. F ostering th e T h ird W o rld 's econom ic m o d ern iza tio n led eco n o m ists in n e w d irections; e x p o rtin g a rt a n d lite ra tu re c h an g e d au d ien ces a n d ex p eri­ ences for A m erican artists; ju stify in g A m erican m ilitary p o w e r red ire cted th e en erg ies of h u m a n ists a n d social scientists. In b ro a d w ay s, th e sw o rd w a s lash ed to th e Bible, th e slide-rule, a n d th e cinem a. A m erican arm ies of lib era­ tio n a n d o ccu p atio n cleared th e p a th for, o r d irectly em p lo y ed , th e m issio n ­ aries, p ro fessio n al experts, co rp o rate rep resen tativ es, a n d o th ers w h o follow ed in th e ir w ake. T he C IA covertly fu n d e d o r sp o n so re d th e w o rk ab ro ad of tra d e u n io n s a n d c u ltu ra l org an izatio n s, a n d it m o n ito red th e c u ltu ral a n d intellec­ tu a l w o rk th a t A m ericans d id overseas (an d so m etim es a t hom e). D efense agencies h ire d o r co n tracted professionals in n e arly ev ery line of c u ltu ra l a n d in tellectu al w o rk , a n d sh a p e d th e lines of in te rn atio n al intellectu al influence q u ite sharply. C u ltu re, ho w ev er, w a s too d iv erse a n d u n ru ly for political au th o rities, th e m ­ selves o ften at o d d s, to d ictate all of its m ilitarized fo rm s a n d content. N o r is it sufficient to a rg u e th a t A m ericans n a tu ra lly re sp o n d e d to w o rld w ar, atom ic w e ap o n s, a n d cold w a r w ith the a m b itio n s a n d anxieties th e y expressed: w h a t, after all, in stru c te d th e m th a t those w ere th e p ro p e r resp o n ses? O th e r forces m u s t also h av e b e en a t w ork. R eactions to p o stw a r affluence m ay h av e p la y e d a role. A s W arren S u sm an h a s su g g e ste d , affluence gave A m ericans a sen se of a v isio n fulfilled, b u t also a feeling of d re a d th a t th e a b u n d a n t society w a s h o llo w o r th a t affluence allo w ed d a rk forces to surface. "In H o lly w o o d a n d in th e A m erica of th e 1940s a n d early 1950s, th e fulfillm ent of o u r sw eetest d esires lead s in ev itab ly to th e b rin k of d a n g e r a n d d a m n a tio n ," a n d a " d u a l consciousness of a n ideal, co m p leted soci­ ety a n d in n er rebellion d e v elo p ed ." B rooding film noir m ovies, th e pessim istic w ritin g s of theo lo g ian s like R einhold N ieb u h r, ev en th e e x tra v ag a n t fantasies of com ic b ooks a n d science fiction, seem ed to ju x tap o se econom ic fu lfillm ent a n d sp iritu a l d a m n a tio n . T he d re a d seem ed b o rn e o u t b y p h e n o m e n a a b ro ad a n d a t hom e: th e capacity for evil revealed b y w o rld w ar, to ta litaria n g o v e rn ­ m en ts, a n d n e w w e ap o n s, o r b y rebellious y o u th , in sid io u s com m ies a n d q u eers, o r u n sc ru p u lo u s M cC arthyites. "W e h av e ev ery th in g ," w o rrie d th e e d ­ ito r of the Cleveland Press. "W e a b o u n d w ith all of th e th in g s th a t m ak e u s com ­ fortable." But "so m e th in g is n o t th ere th a t sh o u ld b e — so m eth in g w e once h a d ." E xam inations of to talitarian ism seem ed to sh o w w h e re th e resu ltin g sp ir­ itu a l d rift m ig h t lead: E rich From m in Escape from Freedom (1941) a n d T. W. A d o rn o in The Authoritarian Personality (1949) d ia g n o se d p ath o lo g ies in the m o d e m , alien ated p e rso n ality to w h ich A m erican s m ig h t fall victim , ju st as m asses elsew here h a d su ccu m b ed to N a zism a n d co m m u n ism . W ere the A m ericans w h o w ere d ra w n to c o m m u n ism o r M cC arthy n o t exam ples, social critics asked?74 In th a t fashion, anxiety a b o u t w h a t A m erica h a d becom e m esh ed w ith "dis-

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covery of the h o rro rs a n d h y p o c risy of the m o d e m w o rld ." 75 If th e n a tio n h a d m et its historic d e stin y to create the a b u n d a n t society, w h a t n o w w a s to b e its m ission a n d h o w w a s it to w a rd off th e evil a n d d ecay th a t m ig h t se t in? A t least as fash ioned b y C old W arriors in g o v e rn m e n t a n d o th er in stitu tio n s, th e con­ su m in g focus o n enem ies ab ro a d a n d safety im p e rile d m e t b o th n eed s. It p ro ­ v id e d a n e w m ission, one a t w h ic h A m erican s h a d a lre ad y p ro v e n a d e p t in w o rld w ar, a n d one so g ra n d th a t it ra n n o risk of q u ick fulfillm ent. W id e sp re ad n o tio n s of "m a tu rity " b u ttre ssed th e n e w outlook: th e tru ly m a tu re n atio n , like th e tru ly m a tu re in d iv id u a l, to o k o n n e w responsibilities, su c h as th o se for w o rld peace a n d order. A t th e sam e tim e, tho se n o tio n s rev ealed a n u n d e rly in g u n ease, as n a tio n al elites w o rrie d w h e th e r A m erican s w o u ld h av e th e m a tu rity to follow th em a n d sh o u ld e r n e w b u rd en s. Such a n ex p lan atio n of p o stw a r c u ltu re is n ecessarily sp ecu lativ e, b u t it h e lp s ex p lain the parad o x ical m ix of m o o d s ev ident: th e b rittle asse rtio n of A m erican su p e rio rity a n d th e g n a w in g sense of A m erican h o llo w n ess; th e ex­ tra o rd in a ry focus o n external th rea ts a n d th e d e e p fears of in te rn a l su b v e rsio n a n d sloth. O f course, a n u n a n sw e rab le chick en -an d -eg g q u e stio n rem ains: W ere certain v a lu e s u p h e ld to m a in ta in th e n a tio n 's stren g th , o r w a s n a tio n a l secu rity sim p ly in v o k ed to u p h o ld v alu es d e sired for o th e r reasons? T he p o in t is n o t th a t anxieties a b o u t n a tio n al safety caused certain c u ltu ra l p rescrip tio n s, b u t ra th e r th a t c u ltu re w a s in escapably colored b y th o se anxieties. W riters, intellectuals, a n d artists h e lp e d to give sh a p e a n d e x p ressio n to th e th em es th a t e n su e d in this m ilitarized cultu re. T hey h a d a lre ad y w o rk e d to fash io n m ean in g s for W orld W ar II, ju st as m a n y fo u n d it th e ir d u ty to serv e in th e C old W ar. A s in o th er professions, m o st h isto ria n s accep ted "A m erican ideological m obilization," as P eter N ovick h a s called it. "Total w ar, w h e th e r it be h o t o r cold, enlists ev ery o n e a n d calls u p o n ev ery o n e to assu m e h is p a rt," a n n o u n ce d the A m erican H istorical A ssociatio n 's p resid en t, C o n y ers R ead, in h is 1949 ad d ress. "T he h isto ria n is n o freer from th is o b lig atio n th a n th e p h y si­ cist." M erle C u rti fo u n d R ead's sp eech to be "really d re a d fu l fro m a p re sid e n t of th e A H A ," a n d m an y intellectuals resisted co n scrip tio n w h e n so b a ld ly p h rased . O th ers m a d e th eir co n trib u tio n , h o w ev er, as w h e n h isto ria n s em ­ b raced n e w W estern civilization co u rses in o rd e r to m obilize stu d e n ts a g ain st to talitarian d an g ers. W h en the M assachusetts In stitu te of T echnology b e g a n g o v ern m en t-sp o n so red w o rk o n political w a rfare (in a d d itio n to its far larg er w e ap o n s program s), h isto ria n E lting M oriso n offered a resp o n se ty pical am o n g liberal intellectuals: h e w o rrie d a b o u t th e secrecy in v o lv ed a n d th e p o w e r of "th e g a rriso n sta te " b u t d id n o t o p p o se th e project. A n d since th a t project w as secret, n o o p e n d e b ate a b o u t it em erg ed a t M IT (or a t m o st o th e r schools).76 It w a s the shift in focus— to m atters of w a r a n d w e a p o n s— m o re th a n id eo ­ logical changes p e r se th a t revealed the m ilitarizin g process. For sure, ideo lo g i­ cal co n serv atism m a rk e d a n d facilitated th a t shift. M an y a rtists a n d intellec-

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tu a is b ecam e d isillu sio n ed b y th e rig id b an alities of th e A m erican C o m m u n ist Party, b y th e m o n stro sities of S talin's regim e, o r b y th e p erils of a n y a v o w ed ly ideological system . Political p ressu re from college tru stees, g o v e rn m e n t ag en ts, o r fellow intellectuals a b ette d th e change. T he re su lt w a s th e m u c h n o ­ ticed flight of intellectuals from M arxist o r o th er rad ical politics, as th ey (iron­ ically) fash io n ed a n ideological defense of th eir p re su m a b ly n o n id eo lo g ical politics. T he sources a n d im p act of this fligh t can be ex ag g erated , h o w ev er. It d id n o t em brace all a rtists a n d intellectuals, a n d e v id e n t as it w a s before a n d d u rin g W orld W ar H, it d id sp rin g only from p o stw a r an tico m m u n ism . A focus o n th e rig h tw a rd d rift of h ig h c u ltu re also o bscures th e sh ift in a g en d a s ev en a m o n g those w h o o p p o se d n a tio n a l policies. P ro m in en t p o stw a r w rite rs traced th is g ra n d shift, a lth o u g h th e y h a rd ly al­ w a y s celebrated it, as th ey ex p lo red experiences a n d th em es in w a r a n d n a ­ tio n al security: John H ersey in n o n fictio n (Hiroshima, 1946); N o rm a n M ailer in The Naked and the Dead (1948); Irw in Shaw in The Young Lions (1948); Jam es Jones in From Here to Eternity (1951); a n d A rth u r M iller in The Crucible (1953). In one sense, this o u tp o u rin g of lite ra ry atten tio n , o ften p o rtra y in g A m erica o r its gov­ e rn m e n t savagely, w a s n o t su rp risin g , certain ly n o t to rea d ers of p o st-W o rld W ar I fiction, b u t its them es, like its sh eer b u lk a n d critical acclaim , w e re n o ta ­ ble. W riters in the 1920s h a d lo o k ed back o n a w a r th a t h a d com e a n d gone, o ften less in te reste d in th e w a r itself th a n in w h a t it sh o w e d a b o u t th e h y p o cri­ sies of A m erican c u ltu re o r tire frailties of h u m a n n a tu re . P o st-W o rld W ar II w rite rs h a rd ly m issed those th em es, b u t for th e m w a r w a s a n ev er-p resen t m enace, n o t ju st a b y g o n e rev e lato ry event. T hey lo o k ed n o t o n ly b ack o n th e last w a r b u t a h ea d to th e n e x t one, d re a d in g it a n d th e v a lu e s th a t w o u ld p ro ­ d u ce it. O f course, m a n y p o stw a r w rite rs— so u th e rn ers like T ennessee W illiam s a n d E u d o ra W elty, a n d chroniclers of m iddle-class life like John C h e ev e r— larg ely av o id e d w a r th em es a n d settings, stressin g in stea d th e in tim ate a n d th e p e r­ sonal. T h at focus, ho w ev er, m a y h av e reflected th e ir d esire to create a space b e y o n d th e reach of the state, th e b o m b, a n d th e c o m m u n ists— to p reserv e in d i­ v id u a l au to n o m y in a w a r-m a d w o rld . E ven in th o se p riv a te spaces, w a r co u ld in tru d e: C h e e v e r's "C o u n try H u s b a n d ," su d d e n ly flo o d ed w ith m em o ries of w a rtim e b rutality, sta red a t a ro o m of p eo p le " u n ite d in th eir tacit claim th a t th ere h a d b e e n n o p a st, n o w a r— th a t th ere w a s n o d a n g e r o r tro u b le in th e w o rld ." 77 A rth u r Schlesinger, Jr., th e y o u n g h isto ria n a n d D em ocratic liberal, ex p o sed th e sh ift in c u ltu ral e m p h a se s in The Vital Center (1949). A m ericans, h e a rg u e d , live in " a n age of an x iety " a n d "look back to to talitarian ism , to c o n cen tratio n cam ps, to m ass starv atio n , to atom ic w a r." T hey face "a p e rm a n e n t crisis w h ic h w ill test th e m oral, political a n d v e ry possib ly th e m ilitary stre n g th of each side." Schlesinger b eliev ed th a t "Soviet p o w e r w ill su rely sp re a d ev ery w h e re th a t it m eets n o firm resistan ce."78

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Schlesinger d e m o n stra te d h o w m a n y intellectuals, e v en w h ile co n su m ed b y issues of w a r a n d n atio n al security, ig n o red th e d e e p e r p ro cess of m ilitariza­ tion, th eir o w n c o u n try 's role in it, a n d the m a n n e r in w h ic h it w a s ch an g in g th e n atio n . "H isto ry h a s th ru st a w o rld d e stin y o n th e U n ited States. N o n atio n , p e rh a p s, h as becom e a m ore relu c ta n t g rea t p o w e r." D espite h is b leak concern a b o u t to talitarian m enace a n d atom ic peril, Schlesinger lo cated th e causes of m o d e m anxiety elsew here, in " in d u stria l o rg an iz atio n a n d th e p o st-in d u stria l state, w h a te v e r the sy stem of o w n ersh ip ," w h ic h "im p e rso n a liz e econom ic re­ latio n sh ip s." H e m a d e little allow ance for h o w th e C old W ar a n d th e p ro sp e ct of atom ic w a r m ig h t instill anxiety, in p a rt because h e saw th e e n e m y 's m enace as above all ideological a n d covert: "T he special Soviet a d v a n ta g e — th e w a rh e a d — lies in th e fifth co lu m n ." C onsequently, Schlesinger said n o th in g a b o u t h o w m ilitarized in stitu tio n s a n d folkw ays m ig h t sp rin g fro m th e n a tio n 's o w n im p u lse s a n d redefine life for A m ericans. To be su re, th a t w a s in p a rt b e ­ cause, a lth o u g h a n ticip atin g a possible test of "m ilitary stre n g th ," h e d istru ste d th e im p u lse to in tim id a te th e Soviet U n io n w ith a "flo u rish of g u id e d m issiles a n d atom ic b o m b s." Yet in sid e ste p p in g th e w o rld of w a r a n d w e a p o n s a n d locating "an x iety " o u tsid e of it, Schlesinger created a jarrin g , m y o p ic trac t of h is tim es.79 H e m a d e a p o te n t b rew b y a d d in g to C o ld W ar fears a b u n d le of c u ltu ral anxieties a b o u t the m o ral decay, im personality , a n d im m a tu rity of A m erican s in a tim e of peril. In d u strialism b ree d s a n o n y m ity a n d en n u i, h e asserted , a n d "d riv es the free in d iv id u a l to th e w all." In resp o n se, th e foolish a n d fain t­ h e arted , like th e "w ailer," g rasp a t sim plistic solutions: to ta litaria n ideologies, hysterical a n tico m m u n ism , o r the fra u d u le n t rad icalism of W allace's P ro g res­ sives, w h o serve "th e p u rp o se of those w h o w ish free society to fail." "C o n ser­ v atism in its crisis of d e sp a ir tu rn s to fascism : so p ro g ressiv ism in its crisis of d e sp a ir tu rn s to C o m m u n ism ." In strik in g ly p h allic lan g u ag e, Schlesinger saw th e psychic im m a tu rity of enem ies to the rig h t a n d left o f h im as u n d e rm in in g th e n a tio n al eq u an im ity n e e d e d for w in n in g th e C o ld W ar a n d c u rin g th e w o es of in d u strialism . P rogressives are "soft, n o t h a rd ," w ith a fatal "w eak n ess for im p o tence." T otalitarianism "p e rv e rts politics in to so m e th in g secret, sw ea ty a n d fu rtiv e like n o th in g so m u c h . . . as h o m o sex u ality in a b o y 's school: m an y p racticing it, b u t all those c au g h t to b e can ed b y th e h e ad m aste r." In d ee d , com ­ m u n ists resem ble hom osexuals, h e suggested : "T hey can id en tify each o th er . . . o n casual m eetin g b y the use of certain p h rases, th e n am es of certain friends, b y certain e n th u sia sm s a n d certain silences," in a w a y sim ilar to a "fa­ m o u s scene in P ro u st" (the h o m o sex u al French w riter) w h e n tw o ch aracters "su d d e n ly recognize th eir co m m o n co rru p tio n ." Schlesinger saw real rad icals (the liberals h e liked) as sm a rt a n d virile (an d p re su m a b ly m ale). T hey w o u ld o p p o se totalitarianism , p u rg e su b v ersiv es b y "co n stitu tio n al m e th o d s" (unless "a clear a n d p resen t d a n g e r" em erges), a n d p reserv e th e "lim ited state." Per­ h a p s radical as m ea su re d a g ain st p o stw a r co n serv atism , S ch lesin g er's blue-

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p rin t w a s q u ite lim ited b y o th er sta n d a rd s, b u t to u g h n ess a n d cool realism d e ­ fin ed h is rad icals m ore th a n th eir p ro g ram s. T hey h a d "rad ical n erv e," em b raced freed o m as "a fig h tin g faith," a n d k n ew th a t it w o u ld su rv iv e "o n ly if e n o u g h p e o p le b elieve in it d e e p ly e n o u g h to d ie for it." "T he cen ter is vital; th e cen ter m u s t h o ld ." 80 O th e r intellectuals sh a red m a n y of S chlesin g er's em p h ases. H isto rian D av id Potter, in People of Plenty (1954), b rillian tly e x p lo red th e im p act of econom ic a b u n d a n c e o n th e A m erican character, b u t h e sgw little role for w a r a n d m ili­ ta ry p o w e r in m ak in g o r p ro tectin g th a t a b u n d an c e, o r for a b u n d an c e in sh a p ­ in g a n A m erican m ilitary style. In American Life: Dream and Reality (1953), soci­ o lo g ist L loyd W arn er explored the satisfactions th a t w a r h a d for A m ericans, b u t in a n ah istorical m anner: h e m a d e w a r 's a p p ea ls seem tim eless, as if W orld W ar II a n d th e C old W ar created or ex p ressed n o th in g new . W ritin g a few y ears later, John K enneth G alb raith cam e closer to th e m a rk in The Affluent Society (1958). T he p ro b lem h e a d d re ss e d — of p riv ate w e a lth a n d p u b lic im p o v e rish ­ m e n t in a sy stem still g eared to insufficiency— w a s w o rsen e d , h e n o ted , b y the d e v o tio n of so m a n y fed eral resources to defense. Yet G alb raith 's d iscu ssio n of "th e illusion of n a tio n al secu rity " w a s so b rief a n d c o m p a rtm e n ta liz ed , a n d h is faith in the expansive capacity of th e A m erican eco n o m y so stro n g , th a t th e C o ld W ar a n d m ilitarizatio n slip p ed from h is view . E ven w h e n intellectuals v iew ed A m erica's global h eg em o n y a n d m ilitary p o w e r suspiciously, th ey c o u ld also see those d e v elo p m e n ts as signs of n a tio n al m atu rity , since, w ro te h isto ria n R ichard H o fstad ter, th ey also en tailed "th e final in v o lv e m en t of the n a tio n in all the realities it h a d so u g h t to avo id , for n o w it w a s n o t on ly m ech a­ n iz e d a n d u rb an iz ed , b u t in te rn atio n alize d as w e ll."81 W h at d istin g u ish ed liberal intellectuals w a s less a lack of critical edge, th e sin for w h ic h th ey h av e often b e en savaged, th a n th e focus of th eir critical a p titu d e. T hey som etim es d e a lt in sig h tfu lly w ith th e p ro b lem s of m ass c u ltu re a n d afflu­ ence a n d th e d a n g e rs th ey p o se d for A m erica in th e C old W ar, b u t th e tra n s­ fo rm in g capacity of m ilitarizatio n largely escap ed th eir atten tio n . W h en th ey d id notice it, th e ir im p u lse w a s to cau tio n a g ain st excesses— th e hy sterics of M cC arthyism , the te m p ta tio n to u n le a sh atom ic b o m b s— b u t n o t to criticize th é sy stem th a t u n d e rla y them . T hey ex am in ed h o w a n in a d e q u a te c u ltu re u n d e r­ m in ed n a tio n al security, n o t h o w n a tio n a l secu rity red efin ed cu ltu re. T h u s th eir critiques of A m erican "co n fo rm ity " ex p lain ed it as th e resu lt of alm o st ev ery th in g except the d e m a n d s of w a r a n d n a tio n al pow er. To be sure, th ere w a s p e rh a p s a su b tle resistance in v o lv ed in id en tify in g o th er agendas, like p ro b lem s of in d u stria lism a n d a b u n d a n c e — to d o so w as to stake a claim th a t n a tio n al secu rity w as n o t th e on ly concern. A t th e sam e tim e, h o w ev er, the intellectuals' m o rd a n t p o rtra it of a v acu o u s c o n su m er c u ltu re a n d its soft a n d soulless in h a b ita n ts su g g e ste d th eir fear th a t A m erican s w o u ld b e in a d e q u a te to the d e m a n d s of n a tio n al security. T he p ro b lem for th em , Schle­ sin g er believed, w as th a t "th e w o rld tra g e d y still h a s th e flickering u n rea lity of

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a m o tio n p ictu re." A nxiety "is n o t y et p a rt of o u r liv es— n o t of e n o u g h of o u r lives, anyw ay, to in form o u r n a tio n al d ecisio n s."82 N o w o n d e r so m a n y of this g e n eratio n of intellectuals w o u ld so o n b e a ttrac ted to th e m u sc u la r p o stu re s a n d policies of John K ennedy. W om en m ig h t h av e offered a d istin ctiv e voice o n th ese m atters, as th e y h a d before a n d w o u ld again, b u t in m a n y w a y s th is p e rio d m a rk e d th e n a d ir of th eir m o d e m political a n d c u ltu ral presence, in clu d in g a d ra m a tic sh rin k a g e in th eir re p re se n ta tio n in m a n y professions. E lean o r R oosevelt, p e rh a p s th e m o st p ro m in e n t p o stw a r fem ale figure, a d v a n c e d a n a ssertiv e lib eral a g en d a , b u t u su a lly w ith in a C o ld W ar context. T he lo n g tra d itio n of fem in ist c u ltu ra l criti­ cism largely fell silent o r w a s d e n ie d m u c h of a n audience. T here w ere, of course, th o se w h o saw m ilita riza tio n a n d resisted it. T hey of­ ten w o rk e d o u tsid e d o m in a n t in tellectual in stitu tio n s o r fo u n d th em selv es p u sh e d to th e m argins. T he rad ical jo u rn alist I. F. Stone p o u re d o u t a stre a m of topical com m entary. In 1956, th e jo u rn alist a n d h isto ria n W alter M illis, in Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History, c o n d e m n e d th e m ajo r p o w e rs' m ilitary policies for h a v in g "ex tin g u ish ed " freed o m for m u c h of th e w o rld a n d "p ressin g m ore heav ily u p o n [A m ericans] th a n is g en erally realized ." A l­ th o u g h " a d o p te d e v ery w h ere in th e n a m e of 'n a tio n a l security,' " M illis w ro te, th o se policies "h av e sp re a d a c o rro d in g sense of in secu rity th ro u g h all th e m o re a d v an c ed p eo p les of the e a rth " a n d b ro u g h t th em "w ith in p o ssib le d istan ce of th e extinction of civilization, if n o t of h u m a n ity itself. " In th e sam e year, C o lu m ­ b ia U n iv ersity sociologist C. W rig h t M ills p u b lish e d The Power Elite, c o n d e m n ­ in g a triu m p h a n t "m ilitary m etap h y sic s— th e cast of m in d th a t d efin es in te rn a ­ tio n al reality as basically m ilitary," for w h ic h h e h e ld civilian elites m o re resp o n sible th a n m ilitary m en .83 P erh ap s the m o st a n g ry a n d resp ected a m o n g th ese voices w a s L ew is M um ford. A public intellectual ra th e r th a n a n academ ic, e arlier a d o g m atic an tifas­ cist, h e w as largely in v u ln erab le to ty p ecastin g as left-w in g er o r fellow traveler. A lread y sh e d d in g his technological o p tim ism b efore W orld W ar II, h e re­ sp o n d e d to th a t w ar, his so n 's d e a th in it, a n d th e atom ic attack s th a t closed it b y a q u e st to sto p the w a rfare state th a t co n su m ed th e rest of h is lo n g life (18951990). T hat this w id e -ra n g in g intellect b ecam e so c o n su m e d w a s itself a m ark e r of m ilita riza tio n — it em b raced th o se w h o resisted as w ell as th o se w h o fol­ low ed. Ju st as telling w ere M u m fo rd 's m essage a n d its fate. H e so u g h t th e h e a rt of th e n e w m ilitarized sy stem a n d c o n d e m n e d it, n o t ju st th e excesses w h ic h o th er intellectuals u su a lly criticized, seeing those excesses as in h ere n t in th e system . The resu lt w as a n u n c o m p ro m isin g position: " A b a n d o n th e A tom ic Bomb! G ive it up! Stop it now ! T h at is th e only o rd e r of th e day ," h e p ro claim ed in 1946. A bove all, h e so u g h t to strip a w ay "th e w a rfare sta te 's v a u n te d v e n ee r of scien­ tific rationality." To th a t en d , h e sav ag ed reig n in g n o tio n s of th e political n e u ­ trality a n d intellectual objectivity of scientists, "b era tin g th em for th eir alliance

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w ith th e m ilita ry a n d cap italism " a n d an ta g o n iz in g a g rea t m a n y of them . M u m fo rd fo u n d a n audience, b u t n o t alw ay s a recep tiv e one. H e c o u ld n o t b e ig n o red , b u t rev iew ers a n d o p p o n e n ts ty p e d h im , e v en in a m o re sy m p ath etic p o litical clim ate d u rin g th e 1960s, as a n anti-intellectual, angry, d e sp a irin g o ld m an , d e sp ite h is effort to c h a rt a n optim istic co u rse a w ay fro m th e m a d n e ss h e p erceiv ed .84 P a rticu larly in h is attack o n science, M u m fo rd ra n in to a n intellectu al o u t­ lo o k d e v e lo p e d o n th e eve of W orld W ar II a n d ten acio u s after it. "T he d e n ig ra ­ tio n of ideology, one of th e m o st characteristic featu res of A m erican c u ltu re in th e cold w a r era, w as d irectly related to th e celeb ratio n of objectivity as th e h a ll­ m a rk of th o u g h t in th e Free W orld," arg u es P eter N ovick. Scientists, h isto rian s, sociologists, econom ists, a n d o th er intellectuals d isp a ra g e d th e claim s o f id eo ­ logical sy stem s a n d th e w isd o m of ideological d e b ate ("D em ocracy of th e A m erican b ra n d is anti-ideology," a rg u e d Jacques B arzun). T hey saw th e m ­ selves e n g ag e d in "th e d isin te reste d search for objective tru th ," w h e rea s sch o lars a n d scientists in to ta litaria n system s p racticed "g a n g ste r science" d o n e o n th e sta te 's orders. A m erican intellectu als stru c k th a t p o stu re ev en th o u g h , as N ovick acidly com m ents, " 'g a n g s te r scien ce'— h ig h ly o rg an ized , m issio n -o rien ted research — b ecam e th e d o m in a n t [A m erican] m o d e of scien­ tific o rg an iz atio n ."85 W h atev er its epistem ological validity, the p re s u m p tio n of in tellectu als' o b ­ jectivity w a s a revealing c u ltu ral n o rm . S hield in g th e m fro m criticism of th eir role in m ilitarizatio n , it also sh o w ed th e reach of m ilitarizatio n , as "o ld e r n o ­ tio n s of an a d v ersa ria l p o stu re b e tw e e n intellect a n d p o w e r w e re a b a n d o n e d as 'im m a tu re .' "86 It w a s also sh a re d b y m a n y p o licy m ak ers, w h o saw th em selv es as realists objectively assessing en em y th rea ts a n d A m erican interests. In b o th cases, th a t n o rm d isg u ise d m oralistic a n d ideological im p u lse s w h ile it legiti­ m a te d claim s to pow er. M oreover, the n o rm sp re a d far. A m erican s w ere to ld , p e rh a p s m ore th a n a t a n y o th e r tim e in th e ir history, to tru s t objective ex p erts to solve all so rts of p ro b lem s, from the rid d le s of n u c le ar stra te g y to ju v en ile p a ­ th o lo g y a n d fam ily conflict. Ju st as th e v alu es of intellectuals lim ited d isse n t in a m ilitarized cu ltu re, so d id o ld er p atrio tic v a lu e s th a t d efin ed th e o u tlo o k of m a n y A m erican s a n d of­ ten h a d the p o w e r of th e sta te b e h in d them . P atriotic c u ltu re w a s su sta in ed b y H o lly w o o d m ovies a b o u t W orld W ar II, b y th e activities of p atrio tic g ro u p s, a n d b y efforts to m em o rialize epic m o m e n ts of th e w a r like P earl H a rb o r a n d Iw o Jim a. A t th e w a r's close, Joe R osenthal's fam o u s p h o to g ra p h of M arines raisin g th e flag a t Iw o Jim a w a s p laste red o n n e w sp a p e rs, stam p s, w a r b o n d ads, recruiting p o sters, a n d trolley cars, so th a t it quick ly "becam e th e defin i­ tive, collective m em o ry of w ar: its classical, sc u lp tu ra l calm ; th e absence of b lo o d sh ed ; the triu m p h a n t lift of the Stars a n d Stripes all su ite d th e n a tio n al tem p er." T hat "classical calm " c o n trasted sh a rp ly w ith th e h ig h ly d iso rd e re d a n d an o n y m o u s im ages of d e stru c tio n asso ciated w ith d e a th cam p s a n d

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b o m b ed cities. It in d icated a w id e sp re a d a n d o ften sta te -su p p o rte d effort to re­ co n stru ct a belief in w a r 's o rd erlin ess a n d A m erica's p u rp o se fu ln e ss. T h at ef­ fo rt w a s c a p p e d a t A rlin g to n C em etery in 1954 b y th e u n v e ilin g of a n Iw o Jim a m em o rial (based o n R osenthal's photo), a n o u tsized piece of "heroic realism " (to a few critics, too m u c h like th e Stalinist v ersion) th a t seem ed to e m b o d y A m erican p a trio tism a n d p o w e r.87 T his p atrio tic c u ltu re w a s n o u n tro u b le d rep e titio n of earlier p ag ean try . Sands of Iwo Jima (1949) fe a tu red the stau n ch ly a n tico m m u n ist acto r John W ayne b u t p re se n te d h is ch aracter as " p u rs u e d b y p riv a te d e m o n s," ju st as m a n y w a r film s "re p re se n te d th e feelings of m e n a t w a r— n o t th e ir heroic d e ed s." H e rm a n W ouk's bestselling novel, play, a n d m o v ie The Caine Mutiny (1951) c au g h t the tensions, as it seem ed first to e n d o rse a n d th e n to c o n d e m n a n officers' rev o lt a g ain st a n irratio n a l n a v al co m m an d er. T he p o p u la rity of im ­ ag es like those a b o u t Iw o Jim a a n d th e e n d in g of W o u k 's d ra m a , h o w ev er, su g ­ g ested th e e n d u rin g a p p e a l of a heroic v iew of w ar, a celeb rato ry reg a rd for A m erican po w er, a n d deference to w a rd m ilita ry au th o rity . Significantly, g ov­ e rn m e n t p ro p a g a n d a sh o w e d h o w in d iv id u a l in itiativ e, m ilita ry rationality, a n d n atio n al triu m p h co u ld e n d u re e v e n in ato m ic w a r.88 D espite the reach of p atrio tic cu ltu re, resistance d id a p p e a r a m o n g o rd in a ry A m ericans, n o t ju st elite figures like M um fo rd . It cam e n o t o n ly in politicized w a y s— the w o rk of rad ical u n io n ists o r th e lyrics of p acifist songs, for ex am p le— b u t in less articu late c u ltu ra l form s su c h as tee n film s a n d ro ck 'n 'ro ll. So a t least som e a d u lts th o u g h t in th e 1950s, w h e n th ey p laced ro ck 'n 'ro ll o n a slip p ery slope (m ark ed also b y b a d g rad es, delin q u en cy , teen ­ age p regnancy, a n d su g g estiv e m ovies) th a t m ig h t e n d in th e abyss of c o m m u ­ n ism o r besm irch A m erica's im age abroad. S uch concerns p ro m p te d R epubli­ can C lare B ooth Luce, for exam ple, to w o rk w ith th e State D e p a rtm e n t to force th e w ith d ra w a l from th e V enice Film Festival of Blackboard Jungle (1955), a H o l­ ly w o o d film a b o u t u n ru ly big-city h ig h school stu d e n ts. A n d p e rh a p s th e fears w ere n o t baseless: If politics is d efin ed "as a n ab stract b o d y of th o u g h t," a rg u es G eorge L ipsitz, th e n rock songs "w ere apolitical," b u t if d e fin e d "as th e social stru g g le for a goo d life," rock "rep re se n te d politics of th e h ig h e st o rd e r."89 E ven the c u ltu re of c o n su m p tio n offered a su b tle resistance. W h en A m eri­ cans flocked to su b u rb ia , p u rc h a se d n e w p ro d u c ts, a n d g lu e d th em selv es to television sets, th ey sig n aled th a t th eir p rio rities lay w ith th e q u a lity a n d p ro s­ p e rity of th eir d aily lives, n o t w ith n a tio n al p o w e r a n d g ra n d c ru sad e s abro ad . To be sure, those d aily h a b its rarely in v o lv ed conscious resistance to n a tio n al p rio rities, w h ich m o st A m ericans tacitly a p p ro v e d in o p in io n p o lls a n d v o tin g b o o th s, a n d m ay h av e lu re d m a n y A m erican s in to a com placency th a t c o o p ted a n y resistance, as som e foes of C old W ar policy ch arg ed . Yet c u ltu ral resistance d o es n o t alw ays en tail conscious defiance, a n d cer­ tain ly intellectuals a n d politicians o ften w o rrie d th a t th e h a b its a n d v a lu e s of co n su m er c u ltu re u n d e rm in e d th e to u g h n ess n e e d e d to p rev a il in th e w o rld .

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T rue, c o n su m er c u ltu re a n d its fem ale h o m em ak e rs w ere d e p lo y e d as w e ap o n s in th e C o ld W ar, as w h e n Vice P re sid e n t N ixon, in h is fam o u s 1959 "k itch en d e b a te " w ith Soviet p re m ie r N ik ita K hrushchev, p o in te d to th e A m erican k itch en as a n em b lem of A m erican superiority . "W o u ld it n o t b e b e tte r to com ­ p e te in th e relative m erits of w a sh in g m achin es th a n in th e stre n g th of rockets?" ask ed N ixon. A lth o u g h " u n w ittin g soldiers," n o tes o n e h isto rian , "w o m en w h o m arc h ed off to th e n a tio n 's sh o p p in g cen ters to e q u ip th eir n e w h o m es jo in ed th e ran k s of A m erican cold w a rrio rs." But it w a s o n e th in g for A m eri­ cans to take p rid e in th eir affluence, a n o th e r to o v e rin d u lg e it, a n d K h ru sh ch e v 's b o a st th a t R ussian rockets w ere b ig g er w a s nerv e-w rack in g . A s h isto ria n Sam uel Flagg Bemis c h arg ed in 1962, in a co m p lain t c o m m o n after the S p u tn ik "crisis," A m ericans h a d b e en "ex perien cin g th e w o rld crisis from soft seats of com fort, d e b au c h ed b y [the] m ass m ed ia . . . , p a n d e rin g for selfish p ro fit to th e lo w est level of o u r easy ap p etites, fed full of to y s a n d g ew g aw s, o u r m ilita ry p re p a re d n e ss h e ld back b y in sid io u s strik es for less w o rk a n d m o re p o w er, o u r m a n p o w e r so ften ed in w ill a n d b o d y in a clim ate of a m u sem en t." A ffluence stirred p rid e, b u t also alarm for th e n a tio n 's safety.90 A lth o u g h political d isse n t w a s o ften silen ced b y d irect rep ressio n , c u ltu ral resistance w a s less subject to the sta te 's h e av y h a n d , for its m o d es w ere too dif­ fuse, h o n o rab ly A m erican, o r u n calcu lated , as w ith th e c u ltu re of c o n su m p tio n . In a n a tio n w a g in g a confusing global stru g g le a n d lacking th e clarity im p o sed b y full-scale w ar, it w a s o ften h a rd to agree o n w h a t c o n stitu ted su b v ersiv e, divisive, o r w ro n g h e a d e d values. W as m o d e m a rt c o rru p tin g o r a sy m b o l of A m erican su p erio rity ? D id c o n su m er c u ltu re e m b o d y th e A m erican W ay of Life o r u n d e rm in e th e w ill of a p e o p le a t w ar? W as a n g st o v e r n u c le ar w e ap o n s a logical reaction to th e m o r th e e n te rin g w e d g e of o p p o sitio n to n a tio n al p o li­ cies? G iv en those u n certain ties, one o p tio n w a s to c o n tain d u b io u s o r rebellious im p u lse s ra th e r th a n cru sh th em , m u c h as lea d ers so u g h t to c o n tain c o m m u ­ n ism itself. Political a n d professional a u th o rities relied h eav ily o n c u ltu ra l con­ tain m en t, Elaine Tyler M ay su g g ests in Homeward Bound. Too so p h isticated to believe in the w isd o m o r practicality of sta m p in g o u t th o se im p u lses, th ey trie d in stea d to c o n tain sexual liberalism , juvenile defiance, w o m e n 's co m p lain ts, m ale revolt, a n d escalating sp e n d in g h a b its w ith in th e h o m e a n d th e " tra d i­ tio n al" fam ily, a n id eal largely in v en ted in th e p o stw a r era. T h ro u g h early m a r­ riag e a n d freer sexual practices, for exam ple, y o u n g p e o p le w o u ld safely enjoy a n en lig h ten ed , e v en in d u lg e n t sexuality. M u ch th e sam e m ig h t b e said a b o u t d o m in a n t resp o n ses to artistic in n o v atio n o r to th e c u ltu ra l practices of ethnic, racial, a n d religious m inorities. A d d in g u rg en cy to this d riv e to c o n tain c u ltu re w a s n e w evid en ce of its p la s­ ticity. W artim e m o b ilizatio n h a d revealed th a t p re su m a b ly stable a rra n g e ­ m en ts of class, race, g e n d e r a n d th e like w ere m alleable: w o m e n could d riv e rivets; g ay m en could b a y o n e t enem ies; blacks could fly p lan es. Political a n d p ro -

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fessional elites re sp o n d e d to this plasticity b y assertin g th e p re s u m e d tim eless­ n ess of c u ltu ral n o rm s, th o u g h less so w h e n race w a s involved: th e id ealized fam ily was trad itio n al; w o m e n 's dom estic roles were n a tu ra l; th e h o m o sex u al's p a th o lo g y was im m utable. O f course, m an y of th eir actions w e n t far b e y o n d c o n ta in m e n t— h om osexuals co u ld b e locked u p , b o o k s censored, film d irecto rs b lack listed — a n d co n ta in m e n t all b u t co llap sed in th e 1960s, b u t it u sefu lly d e ­ scribes the p rin cip al achievem ent, if n o t alw ay s th e conscious in ten t, of c u ltu ral au th o rities early in the C old W ar. M eanw hile, political lead ers c o n tin u ed to sh a p e c u ltu ra l ritu als. O n Febru­ ary 7,1954, the R everend G eorge D ocherty w a rn e d h is co n g reg atio n of W ash­ in gton, D.C., P resb y terian s th a t the 1892 P led g e of A llegiance to th e Flag w a s in a d e q u a te — "in h is im ag in atio n , h e co u ld h e a r 'little M u sco v ites re p e a t a sim ­ ilar p led g e to th eir h am m er-an d -sick le flag,' for th e USSR also claim ed to b e a republic w ith justice a n d liberty." T he C o n stitu tio n m ig h t m a n d a te se p ara tio n of ch u rch a n d state, b u t " a n atheistic A m erican is a co n tra d ic tio n in term s." P re sid e n t E isenhow er, h a v in g h e a rd D ocherty 's serm o n , to ld a n a tio n al rad io a u d ien ce later th a t d a y th a t all A m ericans, w h a te v e r th eir "p erso n al creed ," b e ­ lieved in a h ig h er pow er. C ongress p a sse d a reso lu tio n in sertin g " u n d e r G o d " in to th e p led g e in tim e for Ike's sig n a tu re o n Flag Day, Ju n e 14.91 N a tio n a l secu­ rity, it seem s, d e m a n d e d th a t G od, too, en list in th e cause.

The Red Scare In 1947, the sam e y e ar th a t Advancing American Art a ro u se d su ch controversy. H o u se U n-A m erican A ctivities C o m m ittee (H U A C) c h airm a n J. P arnell T hom as a sk ed a q u e stio n en d lessly re p e ate d in th e co m in g years: "A re y o u now , o r h av e y o u ever been, a m em b er of th e C o m m u n ist P arty of th e U n ited States?" H is ta rg e t w a s screen w riter John H o w a rd L aw son, o n e of th e "H o lly ­ w o o d Ten," a g ro u p of w riters a n d d irecto rs so o n jailed for c o n te m p t of C o n ­ gress after refusing to c ooperate w ith th e com m ittee (tw o e n d e d u p in jail w ith T hom as, w h o w a s later convicted of accepting kickbacks). The H U A C in q u iry fed o n suspicions of H o lly w o o d as a n alien, Jew ish in d u stry th a t p ro p a g a te d th e co m m u n ist line a n d su b v e rte d c u ltu ral values. In fact, th e H o lly w o o d Ten w ere or h a d b e en p a rty m em bers; Screen A ctors G u ild p re sid e n t R onald Rea­ g an w as n o t w h o lly off-base in testifying a b o u t c o m m u n ist influence. T heir in ­ fluence o n film m aking w a s a n o th e r m atter, h o w ev er, since p ro d u c e rs a n d stu ­ d io h e ad s w ere n o m ore inclined to b u ck the political tid e in 1947 th a n in 1941. It stra in e d th in g s for w rite r A y n R and to cite Song of Russia (1943) as co m m u n istin sp ired because it sh o w ed sm iling R ussians (in reality th ey on ly sm ile " p ri­ vately a n d accidentally," she claim ed). But th e Red Scare n o w h a d its au d ien ce a n d stars; as laconic offscreen as on, G ary C o o p er testified th a t h e d islik ed com ­ m u n ism "because it is n 't o n the level."92 The Red Scare w as a h ig h ly p o liticized form of p o stw a r m ilitarizatio n , a form

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closely lin k ed to its c u ltu ral d im ensions. A s th e H o lly w o o d Ten case su g g ests, th e b o u n d a rie s b e tw ee n c u ltu re a n d politics w ere b lu rry a n d victim s w ere fo u n d in m a n y sectors of A m erican life. L ibraries, u n iv ersities, a n d p u b lic schools w a g e d o r suffered an tico m m u n ist w itch -h u n ts. M em bers of m an y tra d e s a n d pro fessio n s (including w restlers in In d ian a), w o rk e rs in m an y b u si­ nesses, e v en recipients of u n e m p lo y m e n t co m p e n sa tio n (in O hio) w ere re­ q u ire d to sig n lo y alty oaths, w h ile th e C incin n ati R eds w ere so lem n ly ren a m ed th e "R edlegs" for a tim e, lest a n y o n e q u e stio n th e b aseball p la y e rs' p atrio tic cred en tials. A lth o u g h m o st sen satio n al in W ashington, th e Red Scare also b u b ­ b le d u p in th e activities of sta te legislatures a n d m u n ic ip al g o v ern m en ts, creat­ in g a crazy q u ilt of law s a n d ru les b a n n in g in o n e locality w h a t w as legal in an o th er, a n d it w a s carried o n b y p riv a te o rg an izatio n s like th e A m erican Le­ gion, th e C atholic church, a n d countless sm aller a n d n o w fo rg o tten g ro u p s. Som e A m erican s w ere m ore v u ln era b le th a n others: political liberals a n d ra d i­ cals, especially if lin k ed w ith th e N e w D eal; h o m o sex u als in g o v e rn m e n t o r m ilitary service; fo reig n -b o m citizens a n d aliens (th o u g h th is R ed Scare w a s n o ta b ly less n a tiv ist th a n the first); o n occasion, e v en real co m m u n ists. So fickle w ere th e w in d s of suspicion, ho w ev er, th a t th ey cru sh ed m a n y w h o h a d n o reaso n to su sp ec t th eir vulnerability. A lth o u g h p re d a tin g R epublican se n ato r Joe M cC arth y 's sen satio n al career a n d n e v e r confined to it, "M cC arthyism ," as it cam e to b e called, w a s a t the h e a rt of th e R ed Scare. D efined th a t w ay, it w a s sh o rt-liv ed c o m p a red to th e b ro a d e r co u rse of m ilitarizatio n , lastin g u n til th e m id-1950s, b u t it also d re w d e e p ly from th e history, in stitu tio n s, a n d anxieties of m ilitarizatio n . Its p rece­ d e n ts lay in the first R ed Scare a t the close of W orld W ar I a n d th e B row n Scare of W orld W ar II; "T ru m a n d id n o t in v e n t so m u c h as codify, in stitu tio n alize, b ro ad e n , a n d tig h te n FD R 's ju ry -rig g ed w a rtim e p ro g ra m ." 93 Its a ssu m p tio n s w ere the sam e ones p o u n d e d h o m e before a n d after Pearl H arb o r: th a t o ld d is­ tin ctio ns b e tw e e n foreign a n d d om estic policy, b e tw ee n w a r a n d peace, b e ­ tw e e n d isse n t a n d treason, b e tw ee n ex tern al a n d in te rn al enem ies, h a d e v a p o ­ rated . It w a s n o t, th en , som e u n fo rtu n a te o r ex p en d ab le excess of m ilitarizatio n b u t so m eth in g n e a r its core, ju st as rep ressio n a n d su rv eillan ce o u tla sted it. A m o n g th e m a n y p a ra d o x e s of th e Red Scare w a s th e seem in g d isin te rest of its m o st in fam o u s lead ers in th e fu n d a m e n ta ls of n a tio n al p o w e r a n d th e global stru g g le. M en like M cC arthy cared little a b o u t th e intricacies of n u c le ar stra t­ egy, th e d e p lo y m e n t of A m erican p o w e r ab ro ad , o r th e w o rld b e y o n d A m eri­ can shores. In fact, th ey o ften sh o w e d d isd a in for su c h m atters. It w a s d o m estic en em ies th ey so u g h t (th o u g h offstage M cC arth y seem ed to b a re e v en th em n o ill-will). It w a s th e C o ld W ar a t h o m e th ey w a n te d to w in — ro o t o u t th e traito rs, ap p easers, a n d d e v ia n ts a t hom e, a n d triu m p h ab ro ad w o u ld n a tu ra lly follow. In d eed , in th a t sense th ey resisted th e b ro a d e r co u rse of m ilitarizatio n . T hey saw n o p e rm a n e n t crisis b u t in stea d w a n te d a q u ick victory. T em p eram en tally a n d politically, th eir k in w ere som e m ilitary officers a n d o th er A m erican s w h o

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w a n te d a p rev e n tiv e n u c le ar attack o n the Soviets th a t w o u ld e n d th e C o ld W ar w ith o u t th e fuss of large-scale m obilization, cu m b erso m e alliances, o r fru stra t­ ing com prom ises. P rovincial o r reactionary figures like M cC arth y h a rd ly alone cau sed the Red Scare, since m en of w e a lth a n d p o w e r (the K en n ed y fam ily) co u ld su p p o rt th em a n d T ru m a n D em ocrats h a d th e ir o w n fears for in te rn al security, b u t M cC arthy a n d h is k in d d id m u c h to set th e R ed Scare's tone. Fre­ quently, th eir attacks fell o n th e lead ers a n d sy m b o ls of th e v e ry in stitu tio n a l a p p a ra tu s — th e State D ep artm en t, th e P entag o n , a n d th e p resid en c y itself— erected to w a g e cold w a r a n d p ro tect n a tio n al security. By the sam e token, th eir ap p ea l cam e p a rtly fro m th eir attacks o n b ig g o v e rn ­ m en t, w h o se scale a n d a n o n y m o u s p o w e r a lien ated m a n y A m ericans g ro u n d e d in in d iv id u a list a n d a n tistatist trad itio n s. A fter all, M cC arth y a n d h is k in d leveled th eir m o st sen satio n al charges a g ain st th e m e n (an d o n occasion w o m en) w h o w ie ld e d th a t po w er, especially th o se w ith a p riv ileg e d social b ack g ro u n d (T ru m an 's p rovincial orig in s m a d e h im a less easy target). M cC ar­ th y revealed th a t th ru s t in h is first m ajor a d d re ss o n th e c o m m u n ist d a n g e r in F eb ru ary 1950: N e ith e r m in o rities n o r d isa d v a n ta g e d A m erican s "h av e b e en selling this n a tio n o u t," h e d eclared, " b u t ra th e r th o se w h o h av e h a d all th e b e n ­ efits . . . — th e finest hom es, th e finest college ed u catio n , a n d th e fin est jobs in G o v e rn m e n t w e can give." A lger H iss, th e fo rm er assista n t secretary of state convicted (after one h u n g jury) in 1950 of p e rju ry a b o u t h is c o m m u n ist connec­ tions d u rin g the 1930s, w a s a favorite target. A g ra d u a te of Johns H o p k in s a n d H a rv a rd L aw School, H iss e m b o d ied stereo ty p es of e aste rn e stab lish m en t p riv ­ ilege, a n d h is d e fe n d ers, so one jo u rn a l called th em , w ere "th e A m erican re­ spectables, the socially p e d ig re ed , th e c u ltu rally acceptable." Secretary of State A cheson, w ith his B ritish airs a n d lofty m an n er, w a s a n o th e r fav o rite ta rg e t— th e "R ed D ean of the State D e p artm en t," acco rd in g to M cC arthy, w ith h is "cane, spats, a n d tea -sip p in g little finger." If officials also seem ed effete, h in ts of h o m o sex u ality w ere a d d e d to d en u n ciatio n s of th em .94 P o w er a n d p riv ileg e m a d e o th ers v u ln era b le as w ell. " A d lai [Stevenson] the ap p easer," according to N ixon, w a s a "Ph.D . g ra d u a te of D ean A ch eso n 's cow ­ a rd ly college of C o m m u n ist co n tain m en t." T he "C h in a h a n d s" in th e State D e­ p a rtm e n t often fit the sam e bill. T h o u g h less a sy m b o l of p riv ileg e, n o o n e b e­ cam e the object of a m ore vicious attack th a n G en. G eorge M arshall, th e e ra 's su p re m e figure in n a tio n al security. In d ian a se n ato r W illiam Jen n er called h im "a living lie," "a fro n t m a n for traito rs," a n d "eith er a n u n su sp e c tin g sto o g e or a n actual co-conspirator w ith th e m o st treaso n ab le a rra y of political cu tth ro ats ev er tu rn e d loose in the E xecutive B ranch of G o v ern m en t." H e w as, sa id M c­ C arthy, p a rt of "a conspiracy so im m en se a n d a n in fam y so b lack as to d w a rf a n y p rev io u s su c h v e n tu re in the h isto ry of m an ." M cC arth y 's career clim axed in 1954 w ith attacks o n th e Pentagon. H o w ev e r w ild , th o se attacks d isp lay e d his co nsistent focus o n the u p p e r reaches of th e n a tio n a l secu rity state.95 T h o u g h less in the public eye th a n m en like M cC arthy, th e in stitu tio n al ap p a-

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ra tu s for policing d isse n t a n d su b v e rsio n su sta in ed th e Red Scare. T ru m a n 's L oyalty R eview B oard, the m ilitary services a n d th e AEC, th e C IA a n d J. E d g ar H o o v e r's FBI, a n d congressional com m ittees v ario u sly scru tin ized a n d h a ­ rasse d in d iv id u a ls, w a tch e d for spies, m a d e th e p u b lic case for rep ressio n , infil­ tra te d a n d sab o tag ed su sp ect org an izatio n s, ex ch an g ed a w e alth of in fo rm a­ tio n (often o u trag e o u sly inaccurate), a n d arrested , fired, o r d e p o rte d alleged o ffenders, w ith little interference from a co m p lian t c o u rt system . T heir av o w ed ta rg e t w a s co m m u n ists— spies a n d d u p e s d o in g th e K rem lin's b id d in g — a n d w h ile m e n like M cC arthy rarely p ro v e d th eir accusations, real en em y ag en ts d id seek A m erica's secrets, a n d th e C o m m u n ist P arty USA a n d allied g ro u p s d id follow M oscow 's h e av y -h an d e d d irectio n (th o u g h less slavishly th a n m o st A m erican s th o u g h t). To m a n y A m ericans, th e case of Julius a n d E thel R osenberg, executed in 1953 as "atom ic sp ies" for the Soviet U nion, gave co n v in cin g p ro o f of a c o m m u n ist d an g er. They, a t least Julius, likely d id p la y a role in p a ssin g in fo rm atio n ab o u t A m erica's n u c le ar w e a p o n s p ro g ram , b u t resp o n ses to th eir case also sh o w ed h o w au th o rities ex ag g erated th reats d u rin g th e Red Scare (an d h o w g e n d e r an d anti-S em itism c o u ld also p la y a role). G rossly d isto rtin g th e role of th e Rosenb erg s a n d atom ic esp io n ag e g enerally in th e Soviet n u c le ar p ro g ram , as if So­ v ie t scientists h a d n o ta le n t in su c h m atters. Ju d g e Irv in g K au fm an asserted th a t th e R osenbergs h a n d e d M oscow th e atom ic secret "y ears before o u r b est scientists p red ic te d R ussia w o u ld p erfect the b o m b ," a lth o u g h Soviet d e v elo p ­ m e n t of th e b o m b m atch e d th e p red ic tio n s o f m a n y of th o se scientists, a n d d e ­ clared th a t th eir esp io n ag e "h as a lre ad y c a u s e d . . . th e C o m m u n ist ag g ressio n in K orea" a n d p e rh a p s th e lives of "m illions m o re in n o cen t p eo p le" in th e fu ­ tu re.96 Still, su b v ersiv e activities or p a rty connectio n s w ere b y n o m ean s th e only ta rg e t of th e Red Scare: beliefs a n d b eh av io r of a w id e ran g e co u ld b rin g p eo p le u n d e r suspicion. O n e co u ld b e a "lo y alty " risk e v en if n o t a "secu rity " risk, or, as R obert O p p e n h e im e r fo u n d o u t in 1954 w h e n th e AEC d e n ie d h im a secu rity clearance, one c o u ld b e "a loyal citizen" b u t still a secu rity risk. N o r w ere beliefs th e o n ly sig n of p re su m e d d an g er, as th o u sa n d s of h o m o sex u als fo u n d o u t (their p re su m e d v u ln era b ility to blackm ail b y th e en em y w as a n e n d u rin g m y th of th e C old W ar), a n d as M cC arthy k e p t in sin u atin g : h e called D ean A ch eson "th e R ed D ean of fash io n " a n d so u g h t to ro o t o u t th e "C o m m u n ists a n d q u e e rs" a n d "p ran c in g m im ics of the M oscow p a rty line in th e State D e­ p a rtm e n t." T he looseness of su c h sta n d a rd s sh o w ed h o w th e Red Scare fed o n m o re th a n fear of com m unism . M ilitarizatio n in o th er form s co n scrip ted eco­ nom ic, social, a n d c u ltu ral resources; th e Red Scare em b o d ied a n a tte m p t to c o n scrip t th e m o st intangible resources of all: conscience a n d loyalty, a n allen co m p assin g b u t also h o p elessly v a g u e state of m in d a n d character.97 It is tru e th a t the state co n scrip ted th o se resources in a chaotic a n d capricious fash io n — th e "sta te " w as really a h o d g e -p o d g e of agencies a n d h ead lin e-

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g rab b in g in d iv id u a ls often a t o d d s w ith each oth er, n o t th e efficient m ach in e associated w ith to ta litaria n regim es. H ence o n e rea so n for th e ag o n y of A m eri­ cans w h o faced in q u isito rs in sistin g th a t th ey recan t a m u rk y p a st, n a m e u n ­ tru stw o rth y associates, o r o th erw ise e n list in th e cause: th e p ro cess w a s m a d e ev en m ore excruciating b y its v a g u e a n d ever-sh iftin g sta n d a rd s. C ap rice a n d chaos in d icated n o t th e absence of m ilita riza tio n b u t its characteristic A m erican form , how ever. Pluralistic, civil lib ertarian , a n d a n tista tist trad itio n s, like b u ­ reaucratic rivalries, ru le d o u t th e o p e ra tio n of a n y m o n o lith ic m achine. A p o lit­ ical sy stem th a t b o th p racticed rep ressio n a n d d e n ie d th e in te n t to d o so al­ lo w e d a u th o rity to scatter in all so rts of directio n s, w h ic h o n ly en co u rag e d its cap ricious use. T he R ed Scare also fed o n fru stratio n s o v e r A m erica's a p p a re n t failu re to " w in " th e C old W ar d e sp ite its ideological, econom ic, a n d n u c le ar su p erio rity . W orld W ar II h a d m a d e "to ta l v icto ry " th e A m erican goal in facing totalitarian s, y e t m a n y A m ericans d id n o t see th e ir g o v e rn m e n t p u rs u in g to ta l vic­ to ry in this n e w w a r (an d p ro b ab ly d id n o t w a n t it to). W h at c o u ld ex p lain A m erica's failure to w in w h e n it p o ssesse d th e m ea n s to achieve victory, if n o t c o rru p tio n o r sabotage of the w ill to w in? M en like M cC arth y h a d a n a sty a n ­ sw er to th a t n ag g in g question: traito rs in th e u p p e r reaches of g o v e rn m e n t a n d o th er in stitu tio n s w ere d e n y in g A m erica victo ry in th e C o ld W ar. H ence, too, th e close correlation b e tw ee n a p p a re n t A m erican d e fe at in th e C o ld W ar a n d th e m o u n tin g zeal of those cam paigns: th ey p e a k e d in th e late 1940s a n d early 1950s, w h e n c o m m u n ist ru le in E astern E u ro p e a n d C h in a w a s co n so lid ated , w h e n the Soviet U n io n acq u ired atom ic w e ap o n s, a n d w h e n th e K orean W ar reach ed a stalem ate. W ho ru led a t h o m e d ro v e th e R ed Scare as m u c h as w h o c o n q u ered ab ro ad , ho w ev er, so it w a s also d riv e n b y p a rtisa n politics. D em o crats w e re o ften ar­ d e n t p ractitioners, w h e th e r to b e ra te o p p o n e n ts in th e ir o w n p arty , to p ro tect th em selves from R epublican charges th a t th e y w e re "so ft" o n co m m u n ism , o r to act o n th eir o w n w o rries a b o u t n a tio n al security. In a m ajor step, T ru m a n in itiated a n e w loyalty p ro g ra m in F eb ru ary 1947, p ro v id in g a n a p p a ra tu s for d isch arg in g "d islo y al" fed eral em p lo y ees a n d fo rm alizin g th e a tto rn e y gen­ e ra l's listing of g ro u p s d e e m e d "to talitarian , fascist, c o m m u n ist, o r su b v er­ sive." D em ocrats also issu ed som e of th e m o st p u rp le rhetoric. A s J. H o w a rd M cG rath, T ru m a n 's a tto rn e y general, w a rn e d , "T here are to d a y m a n y co m m u ­ n ists in A m erica. T hey are e v ery w h e re — in factories, offices, b u tc h e r stores, o n street com ers, in p riv ate b u siness. A n d each carries in h im self th e d e a th of o u r society." O r as A dlai S tevenson d eclared d u rin g h is 1952 p re sid e n tia l cam ­ p aig n , "Soviet secret ag en ts a n d th eir d u p e s " h a d "b u rro w e d like m o les" into g o v e rn m e n ts ev ery w h ere, a n d "o n e b y one th e lam p s of civ ilization go o u t an d nam eless h o rro rs are p e rp e tra te d in d a rk n e ss." C e n trist D em o crats like T ru­ m a n d id try to restrain free-sw inging w itc h -h u n te rs like M cC arth y a n d to m ain tain d u e process in efforts to ro o t o u t su b v ersio n , b u t th ey also red -b aited

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W allace a n d th e P rogressives a n d sa n ctio n ed a w id e n in g n e t of fed eral efforts to w e e d o u t do m estic foes. M eanw hile, so u th e rn D em ocrats attack ed a d v o ­ cates of civil rights. "O ne of the m o st vicious m o v em en ts th a t h as y e t b e e n in sti­ tu te d b y th e crackpots, th e C o m m u n ists a n d th e p a rlo r p in k s in th is c o u n try is try in g to b ro w b e a t th e A m erican R ed C ross in to tak in g th e labels off th e b lo o d b a n k . . . so th a t it w ill n o t sh o w w h e th e r it is N eg ro b lo o d o r w h ite b lo o d ," ch arg ed C o n g re ssm a n John R ankin.98 D em o crats w ere u su a lly o n th e defensive, ho w ev er. Insofar as th ey b eliev ed th e y "stole th e R epublican th u n d e r" w ith T ru m a n 's loy alty p ro g ram , th ey w ere w ro n g — th e y o n ly fu rth e r v a lid a te d su sp icio n s so o n tu rn e d b ack a g ain st them . R ep u b licans sto o d to g ain th e m o st from the R ed Scare a n d p resse d it h a rd e st fo r political ad v an tag e . L ong o u t of th e W hite H o u se, fru stra te d a n ew b y D e w e y 's stu n n in g loss to T ru m a n in 1948, th ey so u g h t to d isc red it th e D em o­ cratic p a rty b y placin g N e w D eal liberalism o n a slip p ery slope th a t ra n d o w n to socialism a n d co m m unism . T he country, ch arg ed R ep ublican C o n g ressm an K arl M u n d t in a typical attack, "for eig h teen y ears h a d b e en ru n b y N ew D ealers, Fair D ealers, M isdealers a n d [Alger] H iss d ealers w h o h av e sh u ttle d b ack a n d fo rth b e tw e e n F reedom a n d R ed Fascism like a p e n d u lu m o n a k u k o o clock." In 1950 R ichard N ix o n d eclared th a t h is o p p o n e n t for th e Senate, H elen G a h ag a n D ouglas, "follow s the C o m m u n ist P arty line." D esp ite th e ir k n o w l­ ed g e of th e w itc h -h u n te rs' dishonesty, G O P lea d ers like S en ato r R obert Taft e g g ed o n M cC arthy, Jenner, a n d o th er R epublicans, Taft tellin g M cC arth y "if o n e case [alleging su b v e rsio n in the T ru m a n A d m in istratio n ] d id n 't w o rk , to b rin g u p a n o th e r." T he a fte rm a th of th e 1952 elections d e m o n stra te d a n ew the role of p a rtisa n politics in the Red Scare: w h e n M cC arthy c o n tin u e d h is accusa­ tio n s e v e n th o u g h th e G O P n o w controlled th e W hite H o u se, R epublican lea d ers m o v ed , slo w ly b u t effectively, to d riv e h im fro m p o w er, h e lp in g to e n ­ g in eer th e S enate's n a rro w ly crafted censure of M cC arth y in 1954. M eanw hile, a g e n eratio n of y o u n g e r R epublicans like N ix o n lau n c h ed th eir careers b y g o in g a fter alleged co m m u n ists a n d subversiv es.99 T he resu lt w a s a politics d o m in a te d b y th e rhetoric, sym bols, a n d issu es of n a tio n a l security. C itizens c o n tin u ed to v o te o n o th er issues a n d habits: th ere is little ev id en ce th a t M cC arthyite tactics alone sw u n g m a n y elections. "E v ery o n e w a s a g ain st c o m m u n ism ," R ichard Fried notes, "b u t th ere w ere lim its to the ex ertio ns th e av erag e citizen w a s w illin g to in v est in th a t sen tim en t." Still, e sp e­ cially in th e early 1950s, th e politics of fear d o m in a te d m a n y election cam ­ p a ig n s, scream ed o u t in the h ead lin es, seized C o n g ress's atten tio n , b u rd e n e d P resid en ts, a n d g u tte d lea d ersh ip in key agencies. In th a t en v iro n m en t, th ere w a s lim ited room for o th er issu e s— racial a n d econom ic reform , for ex am p le— ju st as o n e th ru st of th e Red Scare w a s to k eep su c h issues a t bay. E ven after th e fu ro r a b ated a t m id -d ecad e, m a n y of its a ttitu d e s a n d practices p e rsisted , ju st as th e c o n tin u in g use of the te rm McCarthyism in to th e 1990s, b y th e n u se d to d isc red it p e o p le a n d beliefs across th e full ran g e of political activity, sh o w ed

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h o w th e te rm c o n tin u ed to in form " o u r la n g u a g e — w ith a slo p p in ess w o rth y of its o rig in s."100 The fate of tw o in stitu tio n s illu strates th e R ed Scare's effects. O rg a n iz ed la­ b o r w a s sy stem atically p u rg e d of co m m u n ists a n d o th e r radicals. T he 1947 T aft-H artley A ct req u ire d u n io n officials to sw ea r th ey w ere n o t co m m u n ists, m a n a g em en t a n d co n serv ativ e u n io n lead ers u se d th e law as a tool for p u rg in g la b o r's ranks, a n d federal agencies like the AEC w o rk e d to d isc red it rad ical u n io n s like th e U n ited Electrical W orkers. T h o u g h la b o r's p o stw a r co n serv a­ tism h a d m a n y sources, the R ed Scare ab ette d a ch an g e th a t left u n io n s ill e q u ip p e d a n d d isin clin ed to challenge C old W ar policy a n d c o rp o ra te control of th e w o rk force. A sim ilar th o u g h less b ra w lin g change u n fo ld e d in academ ia. T eachers fired or d e n ie d jobs p ro b ab ly n u m b e re d o n ly in th e h u n d re d s , b u t, as P eter N o v ick notes, "th e scarcity of o v e rt in stan ces" of rep re ssio n w a s m erely a "m ea su re of its effectiveness." "Like th e a p o cry p h al sm all-to w n N azis w h o p e titio n e d Ber­ lin to se n d th e m a Jew ish sh o p k e ep e r so th ey co u ld b o y co tt h im , th ere m ay h av e b een the w ill w ith in the u n iv ersity a n d th e p ro fessio n to rep re ss d issid e n t h isto ria n s a n d h isto rio g rap h y , b u t th ere w a s n 't m u c h d issid en ce to rep ress." Publicly, elite schools p ro claim ed th eir defen se of academ ic freed o m a n d a u ­ tonom y. Privately, th ey co o p erated w ith th e FBI a n d o th er agencies, in a n effort n o u rish e d b y m u tu a l d e p e n d e n c y b e tw e e n th e acad em y a n d g o v e rn m e n t re­ g a rd in g defense-related m atters, a n d sh ro u d e d in a w eb of secrecy a n d d e ce p ­ tion. T he m o o d w a s c a p tu re d in 1949 b y Yale's p resid en t: "T here w ill b e n o w itch -h u n ts a t Yale because th ere w ill b e n o w itch es." H a rv a rd p re sid e n t Jam es C o n a n t a n n o u n c e d the sam e policy publicly, a n d p riv a te ly w ith a vengeance. A t its w o rst, it e x te n d e d to seeing a n y o p p o sitio n to d o m in a n t policies "as su b v e rsiv e — of n atio n , of fam ily, of social o rd e r itself; it w a s to b e h u n te d a n d u p ro o te d ." In response, som e intellectuals w ere w o rrie d o r d efiant. "W h a t is th e n e w loyalty?" a sk ed h isto ria n H e n ry Steele C om m ager. "It is, ab o v e all, conform ity. It is th e uncritical a n d u n q u e stio n in g acceptance of A m erica as it is." M any intellectuals, h ow ever, q u e stio n e d o n ly eg reg io u s ab u ses of sta te a u ­ thority, n o t the basic n e e d to exercise it a g ain st su b v e rsio n a n d dissen t. T he g o o d liberal state, th ey tru ste d , w o u ld o p e ra te b y fair m eth o d s. H en ce th eir shock w h e n O p p e n h e im e r w as b a n ish e d from th e AEC: h e fell victim n o t to rav in g co n g ressm en o r reactionary college tru stees b u t to "th e executive b ran c h of the fed eral g o v e rn m e n t— the v e ry in stitu tio n th e intellectu als h a d fancied as th eir sta u n ch e st ally." Intellectuals w ere h a rd ly " m o d e m Dr. F ran­ k en steins" n o w "h o rrified b y th e m o n ster th ey h a d created ," ch aracterizatio n s th a t o verstate th eir influence, b u t "liberals' o w n m ilita n t an ti-C o m m u n ism " d id co ntribute to th e Red Scare.101 T he Red Scare h a d m ig h ty effects. Som e w ere ironic o v er th e lo n g term : it fostered o p p o sitio n to m ilitarizatio n from a n g ry stu d e n ts, d isillu sio n ed lib­ erals, in d ig n a n t hom osexuals, m ilita n t A frican-A m ericans, a n d o th ers fu rio u s

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a t its w o rk in g s a n d its legacy. In the m ean tim e, h o w ev er, it h e lp e d to cru sh o p ­ p o sitio n to A m erica's m ilitarized course. The d ay -to -d ay d o m in an ce of its m o o d s a n d issues traced th e scale a n d d e p th of m ilitarizatio n . It is tru e th a t d riv in g th e R ed Scare, alo n g sid e fears for n a tio n al safety, w e re d isp a ra te con­ flicts ro o ted in region, ethnicity, g en d er, class, politics, a n d foreign policy. T hat, h o w ev er, is th e n a tu re of m ilitarization: it n e v e r arises solely o u t of m ilitary n e ed , real o r im ag in ed . Its force d e riv e d from th e m a n n e r in w h ic h all so rts of conflicts becom e su b su m e d u n d e r o r attach ed to d o m in a n t anxieties a b o u t n a ­ tio n a l security.

The Elusive War in Korea "T he average G I," co m m en ted Eric G o ld m an a few y ears after th e K orean W ar, " h a d n o t th e slig h test id ea w h y h e w a s b a ttlin g o n th ese far-off hills. T il fig h t for m y c o u n try / C o rp o ral S tep h en Z eg of C hicago p u t it, 'b u t I'll b e d a m n e d if I see w h y I'm fig h tin g to save this hell h o le .'" 102 P ro b ab ly m o st A m erican s felt like Z eg, th eir reflexive p a trio tism offsetting th eir co n sid erab le b ew ild erm en t. W hile th ey fretted, the w a r 's consequences— in m a n y w a y s th e co m p letio n of A m erica's m ilita riza tio n — settled in. T he w a r b roke o u t in circum stances few A m erican s u n d e rsto o d , a lth o u g h m a n y w ere chronic features of the C old W ar. Like m a n y o th er A sian n atio n s, K orea h a d b e en u n d e r im p erial rule, a lth o u g h Japan, n o t a W estern n atio n , h a d b e en its b ru ta l o v erseer u n til Ja p an 's d e fe at in 1945. A s w ith G erm an y a n d A u s­ tria, K orea's m ilita ry o ccu p atio n h a d b e e n d iv id e d , su p p o se d ly tem p o rarily ; Soviet forces a ssu m e d th e task in th e n o rth , A m erican in th e so u th . T he U n ited States g o v ern m en t, in o rd e r to c o n tain b o th c o m m u n ism a n d S o u th K orea's in ­ te rn a l d iso rd er, th re w its s u p p o rt— reluctantly, a t th e in stig atio n of A m erican a u th o rities in Seoul, b u t decisively— b e h in d co n serv ativ e political a n d social forces led b y S y n g m an Rhee, a P rin ceto n Ph.D ., K orean n atio n alist, foe of Japa­ n ese rule, a n d h e a d of a repressive a n d som etim es m u rd e ro u s g o v ern m en t. In th e n o rth , a co m m u n ist regim e u n d e r K im II S ung to o k p o w e r th ro u g h force, Soviet aid, a n d su b sta n tia l p o p u la r su p p o rt. T he situ atio n w a s u nstable: each sid e w a s a rm e d b y a p a tro n of u n c ertain reliability a n d each laid claim to th e w h o le n atio n , p ro m p tin g a civil w a r b e tw ee n th em in th e late 1940s. A m erican m ilitary leaders, p resse d b y c o m m itm en ts elsew here, m in im ized K orea's strategic significance. Like G en. D o uglas M acA rthur, c o m m an d e r of th e o ccu p atio n in Japan, the Joint C hiefs believ ed th a t "a n y c o m m itm en t to U n ited States use of m ilitary force in K orea w o u ld b e ill-ad v ised a n d im p racti­ cab le."103 T hey got A m erican forces w ith d ra w n in 1949, b u t th e State D e p art­ m e n t resisted full d isen g ag em en t, stressin g South K orea's sym bolic im p o r­ tance a n d th e psychological rep ercu ssio n s of its fall to co m m u n ism . Secretary of State A cheson w a lk ed th e fine line in a fam o u s Jan u ary 1950 a d d ress, later b lam ed for en co u rag in g N o rth K orea's attack, in w h ic h h e placed S outh K orea

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b e y o n d the A m erican d efense p e rim e te r b u t affirm ed th e h o p e it co u ld b e s u p ­ p o rte d w ith o u t m ilitary force. T h at h o p e seem ed reaso n ab le, since A m erican officials a n ticip a te d n o full-scale attack from th e n o rth . Then, o n June 25,1950, the lo n g civil w a r s u d d e n ly escalated w h e n th e N o rth K orean a rm y rolled across th e 38th p arallel, o v e rw h elm ed R hee's forces, a n d sw ep t th ro u g h h is cap ital of Seoul a n d b ey o n d . G iv en five y ears of su p e rp o w e r jockeying for p osition, this w a r w a s p ro b ab ly d o o m e d to b eco m e a C o ld W ar b attlefield, b u t A m erican reactions h e lp e d seal th a t outcom e. Reflexes co n d i­ tio n ed b y y ears of global crisis n o w sn a p p e d in to place. To b e su re, ev id en ce th a t Stalin d irected th e N o rth K orean attack w a s scant: th e absence fro m th e U n ited N atio n s of his a m b assad o r, w h o m ig h t h av e v e to e d A m ericansp o n so red action, su g g e ste d th a t a t least the tim in g of K im II S u n g 's offensive to o k the K rem lin b y su rp rise. T he p ress of A m erican co m m itm en ts elsew h ere a n d th e su sp icio u s logic of C o ld W arriors also m ig h t h av e sta y ed th e a d m in is­ tra tio n 's h a n d : it co u ld h av e a ssu m e d th a t "c u n n in g K rem lin stra te g ists . . . w ere try in g to e n tra p the U n ited States" in to a d iv e rsio n a ry conflict o r a k illing g ro u n d .104 T hat this w a s a civil w a r b e tw e e n rep ressiv e reg im es also a rg u e d for caution. O n th e o th er h a n d , Stalin likely p la y e d som e role, g iv in g th e attack a g reen lig h t if. n o t in stig atin g it, a n d in a n y e v e n t it w a s h a rd to k n o w w h a t h is role w a s (even th e C o ld W ar's e n d y ield ed o n ly teasin g e v id en ce th a t it w a s p a ra m o u n t). C onversely, the fact th a t M oscow d istan c ed itself po litically a n d m ilitarily from N o rth K orea a t th e w a r 's sta rt allo w ed W ash in g to n to e n te rta in in te rv en tio n w ith o u t g rea t fear of co n fro n tin g Soviet forces. W h atev er those com plexities, A m erican lea d ers in te rp re te d N o rth K orea's offensive as p a rt of S talin's m a ste r p la n for w o rld c o n q u est a n d p laced it o n the fam iliar g rid of recent history. T he A m erican a m b a ssa d o r in M oscow lab eled th e N o rth K orean attack a "clear-cut Soviet ch allen g e" a n d State D e p a rtm e n t ex p erts w ere certain th a t N o rth K orea's g o v e rn m e n t w a s "ab so lu tely u n d e r K rem lin control." A s T ru m a n later recalled, h e flew b ack to W ash in g to n m e d i­ tatin g o n "earlier instances" of aggression: "M an ch u ria, E th io p ia, A u stria. I re­ m em b ered h o w each tim e th a t th e dem ocracies failed to act it h a d e n co u rag e d th e ag gressors to k eep g o in g ah ead . C o m m u n ism w as acting in K orea ju st as H itler, M ussolini, a n d th e Japanese h a d acted ten, fifteen, a n d tw e n ty y ears ear­ lier." A t a key W ash in g to n conference, the v iew w a s u n a n im o u s th a t "refu sal to rep el the aggression w o u ld b e n o th in g b u t 'a p p e a se m e n t.' A n d a p p ea sem e n t, as h isto ry h a s sh o w n , w o u ld u ltim ately lead to w a r." By th a t reaso n in g , "w e h a d to m ake a sta n d som e tim e, o r else let all of A sia go b y th e b o a rd ," T ru m a n arg u ed . "If w e w ere to let A sia go, th e N e a r E ast w o u ld collapse a n d n o tellin g w h a t w o u ld h a p p e n in E u ro p e." Press a n d p o litician s so m etim es ech o ed th a t view : "Talk a b o u t parallels!" d eclared one D em o crat in referrin g to " th e actions w h ic h led to the Second W orld W ar." The 1930s d id n o t offer th e o n ly analogy, b u t o th ers (to G reece a n d C zechoslovakia in th e late 1940s) offered th e sam e lesson. T ru m a n quickly d e cid ed to se n d A m erican forces to K orea d e sp ite the reluctance, often sh o w n d u rin g the C o ld W ar, of m an y m ilitary officials.105

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T ied to th is sense of h isto ry w ere co n sid eratio n s of politics a n d policy. Few politicians o r p u n d its in th e d a y s after Ju n e 25 called for th e d isp a tc h of A m eri­ can forces to K orea, b u t for a n a d m in istra tio n alre ad y tak in g b lam e for th e loss of C h in a a n d E astern E u rope to com m unism , em b a rk in g o n n e w co m m itm en ts in A sia a n d E urope, a n d w eig h in g th e re a rm a m e n t p la n laid o u t in NSC-68, the o u tb rea k of w a r seem ed b o th tra p a n d o p p o rtu n ity . A m erican in te rv en tio n in K orea w o u ld o p e n the fiscal sp ig o ts for rea rm am en t, w h ile in action risk ed n e w a b u se fro m o p p o n e n ts a n d a fatal blo w to rea rm am en t, w h ic h w o u ld be h a rd to ju stify if T ru m a n seem ed u n w illin g to u se it. A n d , so p o licy m ak ers also w o r­ ried , if co m m u n ists triu m p h e d in K orea, a w id e r w a r in A sia m ig h t e n su e u n ­ d e r w o rse circum stances, d iv e rtin g ev en m o re resources from E u ro p e a n d je o p a rd iz in g Jap an 's p iv o ta l role in th e an tico m m u n ist alliance a n d its eco­ no m ic w ell-being. "T ru m an h a d to h av e a crisis to sell th e NSC 68 p ro g ra m ."106 H is reaso n in g resem bled FD R's in 1941: action w a s necessary in th e Far E ast in o rd e r to u p h o ld a E urope-first priority, e v en as it risk ed u n d e rm in in g th a t p ri­ ority. H o w co u ld h e p ro claim a global stru g g le a g ain st c o m m u n ism a n d th en elect to w a g e it o n ly in E urope? A s in 1941, a P re sid e n t's expansive v iew of h is p rero g ativ es also e n co u rag ed in terv ention. Taft a n d o th er R epublicans w a n te d T ru m an to c o n su lt C ongress o r seek a d eclaratio n of w ar, b u t T ru m an a n d A ch eso n m a in ta in e d b o th the rig h t a n d necessity of q uick executive action. A s T ru m a n co m m en ted w h e n h e o rd ere d in the first g ro u n d tro o p s o n June 30, "I ju st h a d to act as C o m m an d erin-C hief, a n d I d id ." 107 T h at conception of h is co n stitu tio n al p o w e rs conflated h is a u th o rity to c o m m an d forces in w a r w ith h is rig h t to co m m it th em to w a r (A rticle II m a d e h im c o m m an d e r in chief of A m erican forces " w h e n called in to th e actual service of the U n ited States"), m ak in g h im th e n a tio n 's c o m m an d e r in chief, n o t ju st the m ilita ry 's.108 T ru m a n h a d p re c e d e n t o n h is sid e b u t w e n t b e y o n d FD R's n otable exam ple in th e A tlantic in 1941: K orea w o u ld b e th e larg­ est w a r y e t w a g e d o n p resid en tia l authority. R ecourse to th e U n ited N atio n s Security C ouncil, w h ic h sa n ctio n ed "police action" a g ain st N o rth K orea's in v a ­ sion, assisted the e n d ru n a ro u n d C o n gress's p o w e r to declare w ar. Ironically, it seem ed easier to get the U N th a n C ongress to take action. The parallels w ith 1941 ra n b e y o n d h a rd policy to in tan g ib le m atters of m ood. A s th ey h a d after Pearl H arb o r, som e o b serv ers n o ticed h o w A m ericans w elco m ed the clarity of w a r after y ears of ten sio n a n d confusion. "N e v er b e ­ fore," n o te d Joseph H a rsc h a b o u t h is tw e n ty y ears in W ashington, "h av e I felt su ch a sense of relief a n d u n ity p ass th ro u g h th e city."109 In th a t sp irit, som e W ashington insiders seem ed to w elcom e po ssib le Soviet o r C h inese in te rv en ­ tion in Korea as the p rete x t n e e d e d to lau n ch a decisive n u c le ar attack o n th e Soviet U nion. A s in 1941, c u ltu ral a n d racial arro g an ce also m a d e reco u rse to w a r easier. The a d m in istratio n in itially c o m m itted on ly air a n d n av al forces, because it so u g h t to co n tain A m erican in v o lv e m en t b u t also because it u n d e r­ estim ated the e n em y 's m ilitary p o w e r a n d political a p p e a l to S outh K oreans. The u n lu ck y A m erican g ro u n d forces ru sh e d in to b a ttle in Ju ly — from Japan,

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w h ere th ey h a d suffered the ills of lax train in g , alcohol, a n d v en ereal disease en d em ic to an o ccu p atio n force— sh a red th a t o p tim ism b u t m e t a su p e rio r force a n d h u m iliatin g defeat. W ith th eir defeat, T ru m a n 's o n ly choices seem ed to be full-scale w a r o r total retreat. H e o p te d for th e form er, a n d a see-saw y e ar of w a r se n t A m erican s os­ cillating b e tw ee n exuberance a n d d esp air. A fter A m erican a n d S o u th K orean forces w ere d riv e n into a sm all enclave in K orea's so u th e aste rn co m er. G en eral M acA rth u r lau n ch ed a d a rin g counterattack : o n S ep tem b er 15, h is forces car­ ried o u t a n am p h ib io u s. W orld W ar II-s ty le la n d in g a t Inchon, o n th e w e ste rn sh o re far b e h in d N o rth K orean lines, a n d th e n quick ly re c a p tu re d Seoul a n d sw e p t n o rth b e y o n d th e 38th parallel. In a fateful d ecisio n sh a red b y M ac­ A rth u r, th e Joint C hiefs, th e W hite H o u se, a n d th e U N G en eral A ssem bly, allied forces th e n stru ck n o rth to w a rd th e b o rd e r w ith C h in a in o rd e r to reu n ite Ko­ rea. T hey also d isc o u n te d w a rn in g s of po ssib le C hinese in terv en tio n . T h at cam e in full force a t the e n d of N ovem ber, o v e rw h elm in g M a c A rth u r's overex­ te n d e d forces a n d se n d in g th em reeling back across th e 38th p arallel, alo n g w h ich the fro n t stabilized b y M arch 1951. A t th a t p o in t M acA rth u r trig g ered a sensatio n al crisis th a t laid b a re th e fru s­ tratio n s of co ntainm ent. A m id back-biting o v er resp o n sib ility for N o v e m b e r's d isa ster a n d talk of d ip lo m atic efforts to e n d th e w ar, h e se n t h is forces across th e 38th p arallel again, called for N a tio n a list C h in a (Form osa) to attack C hina, th rea te n ed to b om b C hina, a n d in sisted th a t A sia, n o t E u ro p e, w a s th e decisive C old W ar arena. M uch of th is differed little from th e o u tlo o k of W ash in g to n p o licy m ak ers a few m o n th s earlier: reunificatio n h a d b e en th eir goal; T ru m a n h im self h a d publicly su g g e ste d possible u se of atom ic b o m b s in K orea; v a rio u s officials h a d ev en d iscu ssed "th e atom ic b o m b a rd m e n t of Soviet R ussia itself" or sim ilar schem es if Peking o r M oscow c o n tin u ed to s u p p o rt N o rth Korea. But M acA rth u r h a d gone public, after y ears of ran co ro u s relatio n sh ip s w ith tw o P resid en ts, a n d a n in fu ria te d T ru m a n fired him . M u ch h o o p la e n su ed , as T ru­ m a n 's sta n d in g in o p in io n polls p lu n g e d a n d M a cA rth u r re tu rn e d to the U n ited States "to receive a w elcom e th a t w o u ld h av e m a d e C aesar en v io u s," b a sk in g in ticker-tape p a ra d e s a n d a d d re ssin g C ongress. O n e e x asp e rate d T ru­ m a n ad v iso r scrip ted a m ock v ersio n of M a c A rth u r's w elco m e in W ashington: "12:30, W ades asho re from Snorkel s u b m a r in e . . . 1:50, B u rn in g of th e C o n sti­ tution; 1:55, L ynching of Secretary A cheson; 3:00,21-a to m ic b o m b salute; 3:30; 300 n u d e D .A .R.'s leap from W ashington M o n u m e n t. . . ." T edious co n g res­ sional h e arin g s soon took the w in d o u t of the d ra m a a n d p ro d u c e d G en. O m a r B radley's fam o u s re p u d ia tio n of M a c A rth u r's stra te g y as o n e th a t "w o u ld in ­ volve u s in the w ro n g w a r a t the w ro n g place a t th e w ro n g tim e a n d w ith the w ro n g en em y ."110 T ru m an a n d m an y others, th en a n d later, c o n stru ed h is firin g of M acA rth u r as a triu m p h of civilian over m ilitary authority, b u t it w a s n e v e r p rim a rily that, as the Joint C hiefs' firm su p p o rt of h is decision m a d e clear. In stead , M acA rth u r

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h a d ta p p e d fru stra tio n ov er the am b ig u ities of c o n tain m en t, as th e a d m in istra ­ tio n p ro cla im e d a global struggle, p la y e d o n m em o ries of to tal v icto ry in W orld W ar II, briefly s o u g h t su ch victory in K orea— a n d th en , after C h in a en te red th e w ar, se ttled for m u c h less a n d for a n en d less C old W ar. By sh o w in g "u n re le n t­ in g h o stility to w a rd C h in a a n d R ussia, w ith o u t ev er d o in g a n y th in g to d estro y th e C o m m u n ist n a tio n s," th e a d m in istra tio n seem ed to "be accepting p e rm a ­ n e n t ten sio n , p e rm a n e n t risk, a n d a p e rm a n e n t p o stp o n e m e n t of th e social a n d econom ic p ro m ises of the N e w D eal."111 C ertain ly the c o n d u c t of th e K orean W ar d u rin g th e rest of T ru m a n 's p resi­ d e n c y p ro m ise d n o b e tte r outcom e. The w a r b ecam e a c o n test am o n g en ­ tren c h ed forces o n a scarred a n d cold lan d scap e, w ith th e en em y m ak in g futile ch arg es a n d allied forces u n a b le to g a in a decision. It w a s e v en u g lie r for W orld W ar II v e te ran s called back to com bat w h ile y o u n g e r A m erican s escap ed it (u n ­ til co n scrip tio n p u lle d th em in to the pipeline), a n d b y its e n d fifty-five th o u ­ s a n d A m ericans h a d d ie d in this "m ea t g rin d e r of A m erican m an h o o d ," as C o n g ressm an A lb ert G ore called it. Far m o re K oreans a n d C h in ese su c cu m b e d — p e rh a p s a m illion, e v en tw o m illio n civilians alone in o n e esti­ m ate. By 1951, m o st A m ericans, as ju d g e d b y o p in io n polls, w a n te d o u t of Ko­ rea a n d d islik ed T ru m a n 's h a n d lin g of th e w ar, b u t it d ra g g e d on, w ith a rm i­ stice talks d ead lo ck ed in d isag reem en ts ov er p riso n e rs of w a r.112 T ru m a n d id succeed in c o n tain in g b o th c o m m u n ism a n d th e im p u lse to w a g e w o rld w ar. Still, it w a s a n e a r m iss. K orea w a s a lim ited w a r o n ly in th a t it d id n o t see atom ic w e a p o n s u se d a n d d id n o t spill b e y o n d K orea's b o rd ers. W ith in those b o rd ers, it w a s as ferocious as a n y m o d e m w ar, ex p o sin g an ew th e n a tu re of A m erican w arm ak in g . In p articu lar, th e u se of A m erican air p o w e r rep rise d m a n y of the m otives, m eth o d s, a n d resu lts seen in th e w a r w ith Jap an (w ith Jap an n o w p ro v id in g th e air bases). M in d fu l of h o m efro n t re p u g ­ n an ce a t spillin g A m erican b lood, fru stra te d in th e g ro u n d w ar, a n d e n tra n ce d b y th e p ro m ise of air po w er, A m erican lead ers u n le a sh e d th e b o m b ers again. B-29s sp illed th e ir incendiaries o n P yo n g y an g , N o rth K orea's capital, in Jan u ­ ary 1951, a n d th e firebom bing c o n tin u ed u n til n e arly ev ery N o rth K orean city h a d b e e n su b sta n tia lly d e stro y ed a n d th o u sa n d s of civilians killed. Fighterb o m b ers u se d sim ilar tactics a g ain st sm aller to w n s a n d villages close to the g ro u n d com bat, sh o w erin g th eir in h ab itan ts w ith n ap alm ; re p o rts o n th e raid s, I. F. Stone th o u g h t, h a d "a k in d of gay m o ral im b e c ility . . . as if th e fliers w ere p lay in g in a b o w lin g alley, w ith villages for p in s." T he air force so u g h t to terro r­ ize th e p o p u lace in to su rre n d e r; as D efense Secretary R obert L o v ett p u t it in 1952, "If w e keep o n tearin g th e place a p art, w e can m ak e it a m o st u n p o p u la r affair for the N o rth K oreans."113 Strategic b o m b in g co u ld n ot, ho w ev er, force s u rre n d e r a g ain st a n en em y w ith lim ited in d u stry th a t d re w m u c h of its su p p lies from C h in a a n d R ussia. T he b o m b ers' o th er m a in goal, in te rd ic tin g en em y su p p ly lines ru n n in g d o w n to th e front, m et m ore success, b u t th e c o m m u n ists' a b u n d a n t m a n p o w e r com -

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pensateci for lost trucks a n d train s, w h ile the celeb rated A m erican b o m b in g of b rid g es across th e Yalu R iver m a d e less difference in w in ter, w h e n th e riv er froze anyw ay. T he m o st effective u se of A m erican air p o w e r w a s in close s u p ­ p o rt of g ro u n d forces. M eanw hile, th e b o m b in g effort w a s costly to th e U n ited States. C hinese fighters to o k a h e av y toll of A m erican aircraft a n d th e fireb o m b ­ in g p ro v id e d co m m u n ists a n o p p o rtu n ity to p ro te st alleg ed w a r crim es (com ­ m itte d also b y c o m m u n ist forces, a n d b y S ou th K orea's o n a scale e ith e r g rea ter in reality o r m o re easily do cu m en ted ). T he desire to d o m ore b o m b in g , th o u g h rid ic u le d w h e n M a cA rth u r d is­ p la y e d it, k e p t su rfacing am o n g T ru m a n a n d o th er officials. T h eir p u b lic th rea ts to attack C h in a o r th e Soviet U n io n co u ld b e seen as a tte m p ts to in tim i­ d a te th e en em y ra th e r th a n actually u n le a sh atom ic w e ap o n s, ex cep t th a t in p ri­ vate, too, th ey freq u en tly a n d serio u sly co n sid ered e m p lo y in g su c h w eap o n s. A s late as Jan u ary 27,1952, e v en th o u g h (or p recisely because) th e w a r h a d set­ tled in to a stalem ate, T ru m a n m u se d in h is d ia ry a b o u t issu in g th e Soviet U n io n a n u ltim a tu m w h o se rejection w o u ld m ea n n u c le ar w ar. "It m ean s th a t M os­ cow, St. P etersburg, M u k d en , V ladivostock, Peking, S h anghai, P o rt A rth u r, D airen, O dessa, S talingrad a n d ev ery m a n u fa c tu rin g p la n t in C h in a a n d th e Soviet U n io n w ill be e lim in a te d ."114 Public o p in io n h a rd ly seem ed to restra in him : p olls a n d political co m m en tary sh o w e d co n sisten t su p p o rt for u se of n u ­ clear w eap o n s. T ru m a n knew , ho w ev er, th a t A m erican allies o p p o se d su c h a d rastic step a n d th a t th e Soviet U n io n h a d atom ic b o m b s a n d th e cap acity to d eliv er th em o n th o se allies, th o u g h n o t y e t o n th e U n ite d States. H is fan tasy p ro b ab ly m e a su re d h is fru stra tio n as m u c h as h is inten tio n . The atom ic bo m b s d id n o t fall, b u t the K orean W ar activ ated , en larg ed , o r red irected m a n y facets of A m erica's m ilitarizatio n , a n d in g en eral co m p leted it. T h at w a s m o st e v id e n t in th e sh eer scale a n d am b itio n of n a tio n a l secu rity p o li­ cies after Ju n e 1950, as th e g ra n d p lan s of NSC-68 sp ru n g to life. T he w a r in sti­ g a te d o r crystallized c o m m itm en ts to a id th e F rench in th e ir w a r a g ain st in su r­ g en ts in Indochina; to assist th e Filipino g o v e rn m e n t a g ain st th e H u k insurgency; to p ro tect a n d a rm the N a tio n a list C hinese g o v e rn m e n t o n For­ m osa; a n d to re p u d ia te p rev io u s co n sid eratio n of d ip lo m atic reco g n itio n of C h in a's n e w c o m m u n ist g o v ern m en t. It tig h te n ed a n e w Jap an ese-A m erican alliance, as A m erican sp e n d in g in Jap an for th e w a r effort accelerated Ja p an 's econom ic recovery, w h ile a peace tre a ty g ra n te d th e U n ited States ex ten siv e m ilitary bases in Jap an a n d Jap an th e o p p o rtu n ity for lim ited re a rm a m e n t a n d e n o rm o u s in d u stria l expansion. T he w a r b ro u g h t to N A TO th e m em b ersh ip of G reece a n d Turkey, A m erican su p p o rt for W est G e rm a n rea rm am en t, a n d m o re A m erican forces to th e C ontinent. T he U n ited States also acq u ired n ew b ases in N o rth A frica a n d th e M id d le East, su b sta n tia lly c o m p letin g its aerial encirclem ent of the co m m u n ist bloc. A n d it in creased several-fold its m ilitary aid to allies, if only to assu ag e a fear a m o n g A m erican lead ers th a t inaction w o u ld w e ak e n "foreign resolve a n d A m erican reliability," a ratio n ale th a t w o u ld v irtu a lly forbid an y fu tu re cutbacks.115

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A v a st increase in d efense b u d g e ts w a s th e fo u n d a tio n of th e a d m in istra ­ tio n 's policy. E x p en d itu res o n n a tio n al secu rity (excluding v eteran s) m o re th a n trip led , reach in g fifty billio n d o llars in 1953 (tw o -th ird s of th e fed eral g o v e rn ­ m e n t's b u d g e t), a n d th e ir sh are of G N P sh o t u p from 4.6 to 13.8 percent. T he size of th e a rm e d forces m ore th a n d o u b led , p e a k in g a t 3.635 m illio n p erso n n el in u n ifo rm in 1952. M uch m a n p o w e r a n d m o n ey w e n t to K orea, b u t m u c h also to E u ro p e, to n e w b ases elsew here, a n d to sh a rp ly e x p a n d e d w e a p o n s p ro ­ g ram s. A n e w g e n eratio n of jet fighters a n d b o m b ers e n te red th e p ip elin e, in ­ c lu d in g n e a rly tw o th o u sa n d B-47 b o m b ers a n d th e lo n g er-ran g e B-52, alo n g w ith jet tan k ers, su p ercarriers, a n d n e w tactical w eap o n s, a n d w o rk accelerated o n lo n g -ran g e rockets a n d m issiles a n d o n a n e x p a n d e d n u c le ar arsenal. In O c­ to b er 1952, th e U n ited States teste d its first h y d ro g e n b o m b — in a su p re m e irony, its fallout m ay h av e g iv en Soviet scientists critical clues for d e sig n in g h y ­ d ro g e n b om bs, as O p p e n h e im e r a p p a re n tly feared in o p p o sin g a test.116 Ju st as tellin g w a s w o rk o n tactical n u c le ar w e a p o n s sm all e n o u g h in w e ig h t a n d ex­ p lo siv e p o w e r th a t tan k s a n d artillery c o u ld sh o o t them . T he goal, said th e A E C 's ch airm an , w a s "atom ic w e a p o n s in alm o st as co m p lete a v a rie ty as con­ v en tio n al ones, a n d a situ a tio n w h e re w e can u se th em in th e sam e w a y ."117 Sw elling resources also u n d e rw ro te n e w strateg ies for all-o u t w ar. M o st ex­ p e rts in th e late 1940s h a d c o u n te d o n n u c le ar w e a p o n s to d e te r th e Soviet U n io n 's in itiatio n of g en eral w ar, b u t th ey also h a d re g a rd e d su c h a Soviet ac­ tio n as unlikely. In th e 1950s, su c h a w a r seem ed m o re im ag in ab le a n d the A m erican resources to fig h t it m ore a b u n d a n t, a n d strateg ists co n te m p la te d w a g in g it b y n u c le ar a ssa u lt o n the Soviet U n io n a n d w ith n u c le ar a n d co n v en ­ tio n al forces in W estern E urope. True, a n y im a g in ed scenario for w a r still p re ­ se n ted fo rm id ab le difficulties. E xperts co u ld n o t figure o u t a sure-fire defen se a g ain st n u c le ar attack o n th e U n ited States, o r give p lau sib le a ssu ran ces to E u­ ro p e a n allies a b o u t h o w th ey co u ld e n d u re n u c le ar w ar, o r d isco v er h o w to w in lim ited w a rs w ith acceptable A m erican losses. C on seq u en tly , fierce d eb ates e ru p te d in the 1950s ov er w h ic h strateg ies to p u rs u e a n d w h ic h forces to e m ­ p h asize. Tw o factors d im in ish e d the significance of th ese d eb ates. E ven w a r: fig h tin g strateg ies fit in to d e te rren c e — re a rm a m e n t of N A TO allies, d isp a tc h to E u ro p e of m ore A m erican forces a n d w e a p o n s— a n d th e v e ry talk a b o u t th ese m atters w a s d e sig n e d to d e te r Soviet action. T hese strateg ies p re su m a b ly rein ­ forced A m erica's credibility, the p a ra ly z in g co n cern of its p o licy m ak ers a n d one so capacious th a t it sa n ctio n ed all m a n n e r of w e a p o n s a n d forces. A n d th e en o rm o u s ex p an sio n of resources m a d e all op tio n s, to a d eg ree at least, feasible. A s in W orld W ar II, the ten d e n cy w a s to cover all b ases, p u rs u e all strategies, favor all m ilitary services, e v en at g reat cost. It w a s p a rt of a n o u tlo o k th a t gave the T ru m an a d m in istra tio n "v e ry m u c h a sense of d irectio n w ith o u t d e stin a ­ tion," bereft of w ay s to lim it a n d c o o rd in ate th e m ean s a n d e n d s of A m erican policy.118 A telling m easu re of th e m ilitarizatio n of A m erican policy cam e from a le a d ­ ing figure w h o so u g h t to restra in it. By 1950, G eorge K en n an w as e n te rta in in g

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w ith d ra w a l of A m erican p o w e r fro m C en tral E u ro p e, G e rm a n y 's n e u tra liz a ­ tion, a n d A m erican re stra in t in th e n u c le ar a rm s race. "W e are n o t y e t re a d y to lead th e w o rld to salvation. W e h av e to save o u rselv es first," h e h a d w ritte n darkly. Yet h e s u p p o rte d A m erican in te rv e n tio n in th e K orean W ar a n d m u se d a t its o u tb reak o n th e possibility th a t "w e c o u ld . . .e v e n b o m b in M a n ch u ria " if C h in a e n te red the w ar. A lth o u g h w a rn in g a g ain st th e a tte m p t to reu n ify K orea a n d w illin g to co n sid er Ja p an 's n e u tra liz atio n as p a rt of a se ttlem e n t of th e Ko­ rea n W ar, this m a n su sp icio u s of a m ilitarized fo reig n p olicy felt co m p elled to e n d o rse it in K orea.119 T ru m a n 's exercise of executive a u th o rity also d isp la y e d ev id en ce of m ilitar­ ization. In 1948, h e a u th o riz e d th e CIA to e n g ag e in a w id e ran g e of co v ert activ­ ities (one of its first w a s to fu n d a n tico m m u n ists in a n Italian election), w h ic h w o u ld e x p an d u n d e r E isenhow er. In d ee d , in its "po litical a n d illegal u se s of intelligence a n d in v estig ativ e agencies," its actions ab ro a d "b a se d o n claim s of in h ere n t p o w e rs a n d executive p rivilege," a n d its resistance to "co n g ressio n al o v ersig h t of executive b ra n c h activities," T ru m a n 's a d m in istra tio n fore­ sh a d o w e d th e ab u ses of p o w e r associated w ith later p resid en cies.120 For several reasons, T ru m a n d isc o u n te d th e a rro g a tio n of executive p o w e r a n d th e b ro a d e r m ilitarizatio n tak in g place o n h is w atch . H e v iew ed h im self m odestly, after all— n o t for h im th e tra p p in g s of w h a t cam e to b e called th e "im p erial presidency." H e h a d rein ed in M acA rthur. H e saw c o n tain m en t, rear­ m am en t, a n d lim ited w a r n o t as a m ilitarized policy b u t as a sa feg u a rd a g ain st "a m u c h h ig h er level of m o b ilizatio n " th a t w o u ld b e req u ire d if th e n a tio n w ith ­ d re w from the w o rld a n d th e n faced a to ta litaria n o n slau g h t, as h e w a rn e d late in h is presidency. W ith d raw al " w o u ld req u ire u s to b ecom e a g a rriso n state, a n d to im pose u p o n o u rselv es a sy stem of cen tralized reg im en ta tio n u n lik e an y th in g w e h av e ev er k n o w n . . . . Its a d o p tio n w o u ld b e a m a n d a te for n a ­ tio n al su ic id e ."121 By h is reasoning, w a r a n d re a rm a m e n t w ere w a y s to av o id beco m ing "a g a rriso n state," n o t step s to w a rd its creation. H e w as h a rd ly alone resp o n sib le for the celeb ratio n of p resid en tia l p o w er. Liberals d e fe n d in g FD R 's legacy a n d C old W arriors fearful of co n gressional p aro ch ialism c h am p io n e d the cause. T he p ro sp e ct of " p u sh -b u tto n " w ar, a n d th e sense th a t only experts c o u ld u n d e rs ta n d th e d ile m m a s of n u c le ar strategy, seem ed to m ake congressional d eclaratio n s of w a r im possible, a lth o u g h T ru­ m a n b ru sh e d aside C ongress e v en w h e n tim e to d e lib erate w a s available, as a t th e o u tb reak of the K orean W ar. T he o p p o sin g v iew of p resid en tia l p o w e r cam e p rim a rily from M cC arthyites d e m a n d in g the secrets of executive b u reau cracies a n d conservatives fearing congressional im p o ten ce a n d p resid e n tia l u s u rp a ­ tion. The lim its of o p p o sitio n w ere rev ealed in Life's resp o n se to Taft's insis­ tence th a t T ru m an g e t congressional a p p ro v a l before co m m ittin g A m erican forces to NATO. Life could criticize T ru m a n savagely, b u t th e fu n d a m e n ta l m a t­ ter "is the d u ty a n d p o w e r of the P re sid e n t to act for th e U n ited States in foreign affairs. H is h a n d s are A m erica's h a n d s," it d eclared in a sw ee p in g co n flatio n of

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p e rs o n a n d nation. "T hey m u s t n o t b e tied ." A s co n serv ativ e p h ilo so p h e r C lin­ to n R ossiter m a in ta in e d in I960, "th e P re sid e n t is n o t a G ulliver, im m o b ilized b y te n th o u sa n d tin y cords," b u t in stea d "a k in d of m ag n ificen t lio n w h o can ro am freely a n d d o g rea t d e e d s so long as h e d o e s n o t try to b re a k loose fro m h is b ro a d re serv a tio n ."122 R oam h e o r h is d e p u tie s d id , especially in agencies like th e AEC a n d th e CIA. O nce, T ru m a n w a s corraled. W h en h e seized steel m ills facing a strik e in 1952, in v o k in g his p o w e r as c o m m an d e r in chief, th e S u p rem e C o u rt ru le d th a t h e h a d exceeded h is authority. In tru sio n o n co rp o rate in terests m ark e d o n e lim it, b u t o n e o u tw e ig h e d b y his ability to w a g e a lo n g w ar, a n d d o m u c h else, o n th e stre n g th of h is p o w e r as c o m m an d e r in chief. A t th e sam e tim e th a t th e K orean W ar allo w ed A m erican lead ers to co m plete th e ir m ilitarized policies, h ow ever, it also set lim its o n th eir am bitions. W h en M ac A r th u r 's forces m o v ed n o rth to w a rd th e Yalu R iver in th e fall of 1950, cen­ tris t a n d conservative C old W arriors, lo n g at o d d s w ith each other, h a d jo in ed in a v isio n of rolling back c o m m u n ism — of o v erth ro w in g , n o t m erely co n tain ­ ing, a c o m m u n ist regim e, K im II Sung's. C h in a 's in terv en tio n , raisin g th e costs of rollback to apocalyptic levels, sh a tte red th e ir alliance, so th a t "th e rollback stra te g y a n d its historic co n stitu en cy th e n d rifte d to w a rd th e o b livion of crack­ p o t s u rre a lis m . . . a n d co n ta in m e n t b ecam e th e m o d al choice of fo reig n policy elites." In som e policy circles, e v en m ore in election-tim e political rhetoric, a rm e d liberation of th e e n em y 's lan d s still a p p ea le d , b u t T ru m a n 's R epublican successors h a d little stom ach for it in practice. A s T reasu ry Secretary G eorge H u m p h re y to ld th e N a tio n a l Security C ouncil in 1954, " a n ag g ressiv e co u rse of action to roll back C o m m u n ism " w a s " n o t w o rth th e risk it e n ta ils."123 T he K orean W ar's effects e x te n d e d in to o th e r aren as of A m erican life as w ell, th o se b e y o n d m atters of g ra n d stra te g y a n d p resid en tia l policy. The fru stra ­ tio n s of th e w a r fed th e Red Scare. A lth o u g h so m e liberals a n d leftists criticized th e a d m in istratio n for n o t p u rs u in g d ip lo m atic o p tio n s to e n d th e w ar, th e g reat w e ig h t of criticism cam e from th e right. M cC arth y w a s q u ick to p o u n ce, alre ad y d eclarin g in July 1950 th a t "h ig h ly placed R ed C o u n selo rs" in th e State D e p a rtm e n t w ere "far m ore d e a d ly th a n Red m achine g u n n e rs in K orea."124 The in fam o u s charges a g ain st D efense Secretary M arsh all follow ed. So too d id n e w legislation, th e In tern a l Security A ct (the M cC arran Act), p a sse d o v er T ru­ m a n 's v eto w ith th e w id e sp re a d if g ru d g in g su p p o rt of liberal sen ato rs like M in n eso ta's H u b e rt H u m p h re y a n d Illinois's P au l D ouglas. In culture, too, the w a r 's effects w ere su b stan tial, a lth o u g h th a t sto ry re­ m ain s largely u n w ritte n b y h istorians. For y o u n g b o y s e n co u n terin g a n o n g o ­ ing w a r for th e first tim e, K orea m a y h av e m a d e a n ind elib le im p ressio n , as th ey p lay ed w ith w id e ly m ark e te d m o d els of A m erican Saber jets a n d Soviet M IG fighters, p e ru se d a w e a lth of com ic b o o k s o n th e w ar, a n d w a tch e d fiction film s a n d triu m p h a l television d o c u m e n ta rie s— b o th released in v o lu m e d u rin g the K orean W ar— o n W orld W ar II. T he K orean W ar h e lp e d to reco n fig u re racial

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im ages in culture, w ith o u t d o in g m u c h to ab ate th eir ferocity: S o u th K oreans, a n d a t g reater d istan ce Japanese, w ere n o w A m erica's allies, b u t im ag es of fa­ natical h o rd es of A sian foes once attach ed to th e Jap an ese n o w g o t a p p lie d to N o rth K oreans a n d C hinese. E x p lanations for th e n a tio n 's record in w a r also e m e rg ed as a m ajo r c u ltu ral them e. A m erican so ld iers' su p p o se d ly q u estio n ab le p e rfo rm a n c e — a n d ev en loyalty, since a few d o z e n A m erican PO W s refu sed re p a tria tio n b ack to th e U n ited States after the w a r— w ere som etim es b la m e d o n th e ir alleg ed h o m o ­ sexuality, o n th e stifling m o th e rs w h o p re su m a b ly in d u c e d it, a n d o n a m o re g en eral lack of m an ly fiber am o n g A m erican boys. T he tu rn c o a ts' "a p p a llin g g irl-lessness" before g o in g off to w a r seem ed a tellin g factor in th e ir treaso n . By m ak in g the tu rn co a ts in to c u ltu ra l o u tsid ers, su c h ex p lan atio n s d id offer h o p e a b o u t the v irtu e of m o st A m ericans, b u t th ey also rev ealed h o w failu re to achieve victo ry in K orea n o u rish e d d o u b ts a b o u t A m erican p o ten c y a n d p ro w ess, d o u b ts p e rsiste n t in tim e a n d voiced b y d iv erse social co m m en tato rs. In The Feminine Mystique (1963), Betty F riedan e n d o rse d th e v iew th a t th e tu rn ­ co ats' d islo y alty in d icated " 'a n e w softness' " am o n g y o u n g m e n a n d th e em er­ gence of "th e apathetic, d e p e n d e n t, infantile, p u rp o se le ss b ein g ." She im plic­ itly lin k ed th a t d e v e lo p m e n t to m ale hom osex u ality , seen b y h e r as " sp re a d in g like a m u rk y sm o g o v er the A m erican scene" b ecau se of "th e fem inine m y s­ tiq u e," w h ic h "h as glorified a n d p e rp e tu a te d in th e n a m e of fem in in ity a p a s ­ sive, childlike im m a tu rity w h ic h is p a sse d o n fro m m o th e rs to sons, as w ell as to d a u g h te rs." 125 Yet in o th er w a y s the K orean W ar rev ealed th e c u rio u s p a rtia lity of m ilitariz­ ation. It h a d only lim ited im p act o n th e d a ily lives a n d co n scio u sn ess of m an y A m ericans. W ith im p o rta n t excep tio n s— tho se d ra fte d o r called b ack in to m ili­ tary service, those scru tin ized for d islo y alty — th e y rarely felt th e h e a v y h a n d of a g o v e rn m e n t a t w ar, o r of w a r itself. T he e co n o m y 's m ig h ty cap acity fo r ex­ p a n sio n k e p t inflation in check, w ag e-p rice co ntrols a t a m in im u m , tax rev e­ n u e s grow ing, a n d c o n su m er g o o d s overflow ing. A n y o n e w h o p e ru s e d Life saw co nsiderable coverage of th e w ar, b u t m ain ly o n th e sta te sid e politics of h o w to w in it, a n d alm o st n o n e of th e w a r a d v e rtisin g u b iq u ito u s d u rin g W orld W ar II, o r of p h o to g rap h ic coverage of th e w a r 's g ru eso m e aspects. In th e p o p ­ u lar p ress, o th er m atters often b u lk e d larger, o n es th a t in v este d p u b lic cu ltu re w ith a so u r m ood: the recrim inations p ro m p te d b y th e R ed Scare a n d a d ru m ­ b e at of scandal in th e T ru m an a d m in istratio n , in college b ask etb all a n d W est P o in t football, a n d in volving o rg an iz ed crim e. W ild ru m o rs a b o u t th e c o m m u ­ n ist m enace at hom e, p anic a b o u t b e in g o n th e b rin k of W orld W ar IE, a n d stri­ d e n t calls to u n le a sh A m erica's n u c le ar arsen al w ere all ju x ta p o se d to th e re­ p o se a n d affluence of e v e ry d a y life. Little b rid g e d th e ch asm b e tw e e n th e tw o. W ar rem ain ed shadow y, its issues ag o n izin g b u t its p resen ce elusive. In p a rt because it seem ed so elusive, the K orean W ar d id little to d istu rb the p rev ailin g m o d el of total w ar. In som e w ay s, it ev en seem ed to fit th a t m odel: it

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w a s seen as a possible p re lu d e to a n o th e r w o rld w ar, ju st as o n e reaso n g iv en for w a g in g it w a s to sto p a course of ev en ts lea d in g to su c h a w ar. M eanw hile, m a n y of th e generals, w e ap o n s, strategies, a n d a ttitu d e s cam e rig h t o u t of W orld W ar n , ju st as once ag ain th ere w ere allies— Brits, T urks, a n d o th e rs— a lth o u g h A m erican s a n d S outh K oreans bo re th e b ru n t of th e effort. O th erw ise, K orea seem ed a n a n o m a ly — o u tsid e the m ain ch an n els of w a r 's h isto rical course, lacking an alo g s in A m erica's p a st o r in c o n te m p o ra ry experience (such as F rance's sim u lta n eo u s w a r in Indochina). W h at m o st A m erican s still feared a n d m o st e x p erts still co n tem p lated w as an o th er, m o re cataclysm ic w o rld w ar. T he v e ry fru stra tio n set loose b y th e K orean W ar seem ed to ru le o u t a n o th e r "lim ite d " w a r like it in th e future. A lth o u g h a rm y strateg ists co u ld n o t so cava­ lierly d ism iss th e w ar, since th eirs w a s the service th a t w o u ld m o st h av e to fig h t a n y sim ilar fu tu re w ar, strategic th in k in g rem ain ed fo cu sed o n n u c le ar w ar, o r o n a g en eral w a r in E u rope th a t m ig h t lead to it. T he ten d e n cy to reg ard K orea as a n a n o m a lo u s w a r reflected th e d o m in an ce of W orld W ar II in the A m erican im agination . K orea a p p a re n tly fit n o sc rip t left b e h in d b y th a t w ar. D w ig h t E isenhow er, th e g en eral w h o h a d d eclared th e in ­ v a sio n of France "th e g reat c ru sad e " a n d w ritte n Crusade in Europe, cap italized o n th a t d o m in an ce in his 1952 election cam p aig n . A s P resid en t, h e w o u ld h av e to com e to term s w ith it.

4 TH E U N EA SY B A LA N CE, 1953-1961

Politics in a Militarized Age M ickey Spillane's One Lonely Night w as a bestseller in 1951, w ith its h ero M ike H am m er: "I killed m ore p eo p le to n ig h t th a n I h av e fingers o n m y h an d s. I sh o t th em in cold b lo o d a n d enjoyed every m in u te of it. . . . T hey w ere C o m ­ m ies. . . . T hey w ere red sons-of-bitches w h o sh o u ld h av e d ied lo n g ago." A s Eric G o ld m an n o ted , "It w a s a d a y for M ike H am m erism , in b o o k s or in p o li­ tics."1 So it often w as in the 1952 p resid en tia l contest. True, early on Ike seem ed to say little, a n d th a t ra th e r b a d ly (" 'N o w h e 's crossing th e 38th p la titu d e ag ain ,' rep o rte rs w o u ld sigh.").2 N o r w a s h o t-b lo o d ed rhetoric his forte, since h e cast h im self as above the political fray. H e also h a d loftier them es, co n cern in g the n e ed to m atch the m ean s a n d e n d s of A m erican foreign policy to each o th er an d to th e n a tio n 's lim ited resources. The G O P cam p aig n , h o w ev er, relied heav ily o n c ru d e fo rm u la s— "K 1C 2," (Korea, co m m u n ism , a n d co rru p tio n ), evils w h ich R epublicans accused D em ocrats of ab ettin g o r ev en w elcom ing. T hat E isenhow er, as arm y chief of staff a n d N A TO su p re m e co m m an d er, h a d h e lp e d to sh ap e T ru m a n 's co n ta in m e n t policy d id n o t m u ch b o th e r h im (or T ru m a n w h e n he attacked Ike), in p a rt because he u su a lly left th e d irty w o rk of m ak in g these charges to others, su ch as his y o u n g ru n n in g m ate, R ichard N ixon. Still, Ike d id n o t alw ays rise above the nastiness, a n d c am p aig n in g in Sen. Joseph M cC arthy's h o m e state of W isconsin, h e acceded to ad v iso rs in sisten t th a t h e n o t d efen d G eorge M arshall a g ain st M cC arth y 's n o to rio u s charges. D riven in p a rt b y d e sp era tio n , his o p p o n e n t, A dlai Stevenson, som etim es tu rn e d n asty too. The o n e-term Illinois g o v e rn o r w as n o t w ell k n o w n ; h e h a d a q uick w it a n d m in d b u t lacked the co m m o n touch; K orea a n d th e T ru m an a d ­ m in istratio n w ere heavy crosses to bear. O n racial m atters, his p a rty sh elv ed its 1948 co m m itm en t to civil rights, w hile his ru n n in g m ate w as John S p ark m an of A labam a, w h ere all-w hite politics still ru le d — choices, o n e h isto ria n suggests, m atch in g Ike's "g reat sh am e of em bracing Joseph M cC arthy on th e cam p aig n

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trail." D em ocrats also w o rk e d the v e in of an tico m m u n ism m in e d b y th e G O P — albeit m ore defensively, a n d w ith d e n u n ciatio n s of M cC arthyism b y Stevenson. T ru m a n p re se n te d Stevenson as "o n e of th e first to w a rn th a t th e R u ssians w ere b eco m in g a th re a t to peace" a n d claim ed th a t Ik e's statem en ts a t th e close of W orld W ar II a b o u t Soviet-A m erican frien d sh ip " d id a g reat d eal of h a rm ." S tevenson traced b lam e fu rth e r back: c o m m u n ists " h a d b e g u n to m ak e h e a d w a y in th e U.S. only after th e R epublican regim es of th e 1920s h a d b u n g le d th e n a tio n a l econom y into collapse," h is charges h a v e b e en su m m arize d .3 A s u su a l in p resid en tia l elections, articu late differences b e tw ee n th e can d i­ d a te s m a tte re d less th a n th e ir abilities to explo it th e m o o d s a n d lan g u ag e of th e tim e. In w o rk in g th e m em o ry of W orld W ar II, th e fru stratio n s of Korea, a n d the fear of a final cataclysm , E isen h o w er's c am p aig n w a s m asterfu l, for all h is ob­ v io u s ad v an tag es. H e w a s General E isen h o w er— in c am p aig n literatu re, in p ress coverage, in d e tra cto rs' d a m n a tio n s— w ith all th a t th is label su m m e d u p a b o u t h is heroic sta tu s ("Ike" serv ed the sam e p u rp o se). H is o p p o n e n t w a s Gov­ ernor S tevenson— the im balance w a s obvious. References to w a r su ffu sed Ike's rhetoric. "I h ave en listed ," h e a n n o u n c e d before th e G O P convention. " I'm g o in g to C hicago— as a so ld ier in th e ran k s," a lth o u g h as W est P o in t g ra d u a te a n d senior officer, h e w a s h a rd ly a co m m o n soldier. H a v in g w o n n o m in atio n , h e w a s a g ain a co m m an d er, telling A m erican s to "realize th a t to d a y y o u are th e co m b at tro o p s" n e e d e d to w in th e election a n d p re su m a b ly to d e fe at tyranny. D em ocrats m ig h t fire "re d h o t salvos," b u t th a t d id n o t b o th e r him : "I'v e b e en sh o t a t b y real artillerists." Soldiers, h e claim ed, k n e w w a r b e st a n d h a te d it m ost. H e c ap p e d it off w ith a p le d g e to go to K orea if elected.4 T his ex ploitation of his career testified to n o c ru d e m an -o n -h o rseb ack m il­ itarism . A lth o u g h m ilitary service b ecam e a p rere q u isite for th e p resid en cy for n e arly a h alf-cen tu ry after 1945, ju st as it h a d after th e C ivil W ar, n o o th er officer cam e close to Ike's feat, n o t ev en th o se like M acA rth u r w h o w a n te d th e chance. T here w as n o b ro a d y e arn in g to see g en erals a n d a d m ira ls in politics, b u t E isen h o w er's triu m p h d id reflect th e p rim acy of W orld W ar II in political im ag ­ in atio n a n d the d e e p ly felt w ish to w re st the v irtu e s of w a r from w a r itself— t o , secure peace a n d p ro sp e rity after civilians seem in g ly h a d flo u n d ere d in th e at­ tem pt. U nlike M acA rthur, Ike e x u d e d little trace of th e warrior sp irit, p e rh a p s because h e p o ssessed little of it. Like M arshall, h e h a d b e en a g reat "o rg an izer of victory" in w ar. N o w h e w o u ld o rg an ize v icto ry for peace a n d p ro sp erity . In 1952, peace w as the big issue, a n d th e o n e E isen h o w er m o re read ily a d ­ dressed. L argely in su lated b y h is career from social issues, h e a rticu la te d h o p es for dom estic tran q u ility a n d p ro sp e rity in a g en eral w a y b u t w ith little feel for th e pro blem s of o rd in a ry A m ericans. A s P re sid e n t h e w o u ld b e b o th ere d m o re b y th e carp in g d e m a n d s a n d u g ly p aro ch ialism of h is o w n p a rty 's co n serv a­ tives th a n b y th e asp iratio n s of black o r p o o r A m ericans, to w h ich h e w as deaf. T he one social g ro u p w ith w h ic h h e felt a n affinity w a s b u sin essm en , to w h o m

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h e g ra n te d m a n y h igh-level a p p o in tm e n ts; e v en th a t affinity o ften seem ed shallow . But Ike w a s su p e rb ly p o sitio n e d to a d d re ss n a tio n al secu rity a n d to act o n h is convictions a b o u t it— to control th e sp ira lin g costs of n a tio n a l d efen se a n d to restore b alance (as h e saw it) b e tw e e n its claim s a n d th e n a tio n 's n e e d for a h e alth y econom y a n d u n fettere d polity. H e w as, th a t is, d e te rm in e d to lim it, th o u g h n o t reverse, th e course of m ilitarizatio n . In th e late 1940s, h e h a d u rg e d "stren g th e n in g th e econom ic a n d social d ik es a g ain st Soviet c o m m u n ism ra th e r t h a n . . . p re p a rin g for a p o ssib ly e v en tu al, b u t n o t y e t in ev itab le w a r," a n ap p ro a ch h e feared w o u ld o v e rb u rd e n th e A m erican econom y. H e h a d re­ p u d ia te d W orld W ar II as a m o d el for fu tu re w a r a n d th e fan tasy of v icto ry in a n o th e r w o rld w ar. "A fter the w o rld -w id e d e v a sta tio n th a t g ro w s d a ily m o re possible, n o n e m a y b e able to d istin g u ish b e tw e e n th e v icto r a n d th e v a n ­ q u ish e d of a fu tu re conflict," h e d eclared in 1950. A ll n a tio n s w e re " in th e sam e b o a t," w h ich w o u ld b e " sw a m p e d in a series of atom ic b lasts." A n d h e h a d lin k ed th e p ro b lem of w a r to the c h aracter of m o d e m civilization, p lacin g b o th w ith in a m o ral a n d ecological context. T he "sp e cte r as sin ister as th e atom ic b o m b ," th e "creep in g te rro r" faced b y "all p e o p les," w a s "th e w a stag e of th e w o rld 's n a tu ra l resources a n d . . . the crim in al e x p lo itatio n of th e soil. W h at w ill it p ro fit u s to achieve the H -b o m b a n d su rv iv e th a t tra g e d y o r triu m p h , if th e g en eratio n s th a t succeed u s m u s t sta rv e in a w o r l d . . . g ro w n b a rre n as th e m o u n ta in s of the m o o n ?"5 E isenhow er h a d fo rm id ab le resources for acting o n th ese convictions. H is heroic sta tu s a lre ad y fixed in th e n a tio n 's eyes a n d h is o w n , h e felt little n e e d to reinforce th a t sta tu s th ro u g h d ram a tic u se of A m erican p o w er. A m ilitary a n d in m a n y w a y s conservative m an , h e w a s u su a lly in v u ln e rab le to ch arg es of b e ­ in g w e a k o n n a tio n al d efense o r co m m u n ism ; later, co n serv ativ es in th e n o to ­ rio u s John Birch Society a n d a t th e National Review a d v a n c e d su c h charges, b u t to little effect. L ikew ise, h e c o m m an d e d th e a u th o rity to challenge claim s for m ore m en, m oney, a n d w e ap o n s, ju st as h e h a d a lifetim e's m em o ry of a n d ex­ a sp era tio n w ith th e m ilitary 's p aro ch ial a n d free-sp en d in g w ay s. A s h e once to ld congressm en, "I'v e serv ed w ith those p e o p le w h o k n o w all th e a n sw e rs— th ey ju st w o n 't g e t d o w n a n d face the d irty facts of life."6 C o n v en tio n al in his v iew s of the co m m u n ist m enace, h e still reta in e d fro m th e w a r a resp ect for the Soviet a rm e d forces, for som e of its leaders, a n d for th e legacy of SovietA m erican cooperation. H e also h a d th e v a g u e b u t p o w e rfu l m a n d a te th a t com es from a lan d slid e election victory. If h is p o p u la rity rare ly tra n sla te d into success for h is p arty , th a t failure h a m p e re d h im little, since co n serv ativ e Re­ p u b lican s gave h im fits anyw ay. E ven luck seem ed o n h is side: S talin's d e a th in 1953 a p p e a re d to o p en p ro sp ects for easing th e C o ld W ar. H is fo rm id ab le political resources for g ra p p lin g w ith m ilitarizatio n w ere m atch ed b y su b sta n tia l p e rso n al ones. E isen h o w er e n te red office co n v ersan t a n d com fortable w ith m a n y of th e w o rld 's lead ers, a p o sitio n m o st P resid en ts

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w o rk y ears to achieve. H e p o ssessed a b u n d a n t self-confidence a n d k e en a n a ­ lytical p o w e rs, if n o t a w id e -ra n g in g intellect. T he im ag e th a t later em erg ed of h im — as a w e ll-in te n tio n e d b u t b u m b lin g lea d er w h o let o th ers ru n th e sh o w — reflected n o t th e m a n b u t the celebratory v iew of th e p resid en c y th e n p o p u lar, w h ic h a ssu m e d th a t a n y strong P re sid e n t co u ld g e t w h a t h e w a n te d . Like all P resid en ts, h e h a d p ro b lem s m o v in g th e h u g e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t in d e sired directio ns; o ften h e d e cid ed n o t e v en to try. But h is te m p e r c o u ld b e explosive, h is ju d g m e n ts h a rsh , h is tre a tm e n t of su b o rd in a te s forceful— as N ix o n fo u n d o u t— a n d his m in d quick. O f his p a rty 's Senate m ajo rity lead er, W illiam K n o w la n d , h e fu m ed in h is d ia ry th a t "th ere seem s to b e n o final a n sw e r to the q u e stio n 'H o w stu p id can y o u g et?' " G eorge K ennan, w h o h a d h ig h sta n d a rd s in th ese m atters, th o u g h t E isenhow er " sh o w e d h is in tellectual ascen d an cy o v er ev ery m a n in the ro o m " a t one im p o rta n t m eeting. The larg e role h e ac­ c o rd e d su b o rd in a te s like Secretary of State John Foster D ulles reflected Ike's resp ect for e x p ert authority, b u t also h is sh re w d d ecisio n to let o th ers b e a r the p o litical heat. "A ll rig h t," h e later to ld one ad v iso r, "I k n o w w h a t th ey say a b o u t F oster— d u ll, d uller, D u lles— a n d all th at. But th e D em o crats love to h it h im ra th e r th a n m e." "I w o u ld g et h ell," h is p ress secretary p ro te ste d w h e n to ld to tak e p u b lic resp o n sib ility for a m istake. "M y boy, b e tte r y o u th a n m e," Ike rep lied . E ven his n o to rio u s m an g lin g of the E n g lish lan g u a g e in p ress confer­ ences w a s m isleading. E x tem p o ran eo u s sp e ak in g w a s n o t h is forte, b u t h e w a s a n exacting w rite r a n d n o t above u sin g h is re p u ta tio n for v erb al clu m sin ess to d u c k difficult issues: " D o n 't w o rry ," h e once to ld h is p ress secretary. "If th a t q u e stio n com es u p . I'll ju st confuse th e m ."7 H e w as, in one sc h o la r's p h rase, th e " h id d e n -h a n d " p resid en t. O r, as M u rra y K em p to n p u t in 1967, "h e w a s the tortoise u p o n w h o se b ack th e w o rld sa t for e ig h t years. W e la u g h e d a t him ; w e talk ed w istfu lly a b o u t m o ving; a n d all the w h ile w e n e v e r k n ew th e c u n n in g b e n e a th th e sh ell." S uch p raise concealed real w eaknesses. E isen h o w er's c u n n in g w a s erratically a n d so m etim es fool­ ishly d ep lo y ed . H e co u ld confuse sincere d istaste for p u b lic b o m b ast w ith sim p le cow ardice a b o u t tak in g stro n g stances. H e c o u ld eq u ate g o o d in ten tio n s w ith concrete progress. It w a s h is " p a tte rn of action, if n o t th e p u rp o se of th e m an , to h u sb a n d a n d to g u a rd " h is im m en se p e rso n al reso u rces "like savings e a rn e d b y th e sw e a t of a lifetim e," n o te d E m m et Jo h n H u g h e s, h is a d v iso r a n d speechw riter. H e sav ed th e m w ell to p ro tec t h is p e rso n al p o p u la rity b u t left m a n y u n sp e n t in b eh alf of th e causes h e em braced. Still, h e w a s in control of h is ad m in istratio n , at least as m u c h as a n y m o d e m P re sid e n t.8 H is in a u g u ra l a d d re ss barely h in te d at h is fears of m ilitarizatio n . H e d id m ak e h is "first task" n o t to w in th e C old W ar b u t to " d e te r th e forces of ag g res­ sio n a n d p ro m o te the co n d itio n s of peace," e v en b y n e g o tiatin g w ith a d v e r­ saries, a step an ath em a to T ru m a n 's a d m in istra tio n in its later stages. O th er­ w ise, h e offered stock C old W ar rhetoric. "F reed o m is p itte d a g ain st slavery; lightness a g ain st the d a rk ," ra n the fam iliar refrain. "T he faith w e h o ld belo n g s

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n o t to u s alone b u t to th e free of all the w o r ld /' ra n th e echo of c am p aig n p ro m ­ ises to liberate th e c o m m u n ist w o rld . Faith in freed o m "confers a c o m m o n d ig ­ n ity u p o n the French so ld ier w h o d ies in In d o ch in a, th e B ritish so ld ier k illed in M alaya, th e A m erican life g iven in K orea," ra n th e lin k ag e of th e A m erican cru ­ sa d e w ith B ritish a n d F rench im perialism . H e also d ra fte d th e en tire n a tio n to th e task of "w in n in g " the peace: "W e m u s t b e re a d y to d a re all for o u r co u n ­ try. . . . N o p erso n , n o ho m e, n o co m m u n ity can be b e y o n d th e reach of th is call." In 1962, E m m et John H u g h e s c o m p a red th o se w o rd s to K en n ed y 's m o re fam o u s in a u g u ra l— " in p h ra se s m ore felicitous b u t in su b stan ce n o d ifferen t"— a n d w o n d e re d if a n y th in g h a d c h an g ed .9 S o m ething h a d , a lth o u g h p e rh a p s for th e w o rse. A v o id in g w ar, co n tain in g m ilita riza tio n — ju st recognizing th eir p e rils— w ere Ik e's m ajor achievem ents. T hey also, h ow ever, m a d e possible a fu rth e r acco m m o d atio n to m ilitarizatio n , if o n ly b y lessening its b u rd e n s a bit. A n d to th o se w h o saw g ro w in g p e ril in th e 1950s, th ey only w e a k e n e d th e n a tio n further.

The Contending Forces E isen h ow er faced sh a rp ly different o p tio n s for n a tio n al security. T ru m a n 's am ­ b itio u s policy, laid o u t in NSC-68 a n d im p le m e n te d d u rin g th e K orean W ar, p re su m e d p ro trac te d stru g g le w ith co m m u n ism , p o site d a b u n d a n t A m erican resources to w a g e it, a n d p riz e d A m erican ability to re sp o n d sy m m etrically to a n y aggression. N u clear in tim id a tio n o r attack, co n v en tio n al w a r a n d co v ert action, econom ic a n d political p re ssu re — each w o u ld b e m et b y sim ilar fo rm s of A m erican p ow er. A n altern ativ e, ad v an c ed m o stly b y co n serv ativ e R epubli­ can s w h o recoiled a t the costs a n d co m p ro m ises of p ro tra c te d stru g g le, p riz e d asym m etry: the U n ited States sh o u ld n o t m eet th e en em y g u n for g u n b u t in ­ stead rely o n those form s of po w er, above all atom ic a n d aerial, a t w h ic h it ex­ celled a n d w h ich m ig h t p ro v id e q uick victory.10 A s in m a n y areas of policy, Ike chose a "m id d le w a y " b e tw e e n conflicting o p tio n s, g raftin g his lim ited v iew of resources to th e T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n 's a ssu m p tio n s a b o u t global struggle. For h im , too, th e C o ld W ar w a s a p ro trac te d conflict p ro m isin g n o q uick victo ry (cam paig n rh eto ric aside), b u t p recisely for th a t reaso n the U n ited States h a d to h o a rd its resources, lim it its efforts, a n d sp re ad its b u rd en s, o r else ex h au st itself ov er th e lo n g haul. "To am ass m ilitary p o w e r w ith o u t reg ard to o u r econom ic capacity w o u ld b e to d e fe n d o u rselv es a g ain st one k in d of d isa ster b y in v itin g a n o th er," h is 1953 State of th e U n io n m essage declared. "W e c a n 't afford to let th e n e g ativ e actions of th e C o m m u ­ n ists force u s into w o rld -w id e d e p lo y m en t," h e a rg u e d in 1954. "W e n e e d to be free to decide w h ere w e can strike m o st effectively."11 T he resu lt w as the m u ch -to u te d "N e w Look," a n effort to lim it d efen se sp e n d in g b y relying o n en h an ced n u c le ar forces, as w ell as alliances a n d co v ert action, rath e r th a n o n costly con v en tio n al forces to c o u n te r en em y initiatives.

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C o n fro n tatio n w ith the en em y w a s to b e selective, fo cu sed o n conflicts in w h ic h A m erican p o w e r w a s su p e rio r a n d available a t lim ited cost. A t tim es E isen h o w er still echoed th e p rev io u s a d m in istra tio n 's ex p an siv e view : "A s th ere is n o w e a p o n too sm all, n o aren a too rem ote, to b e ig n o red , th ere is n o free n a tio n to o h u m b le to b e forgotten." But the e m p h a sis w a s o n A m erican free­ d o m "to re sp o n d v ig o ro u sly a t places a n d w ith m ean s of its o w n choosing," in D u lles's fam o u s p h ra sin g , o r in th e N a tio n a l Security C o u n cil's w o rd s, it w a s " o n th e cap ab ility of inflicting m assiv e retaliato ry d a m a g e b y offensive strik in g p o w e r." T ru m a n 's p ro g ra m s to m ass-p ro d u ce n u c le ar w e a p o n s a n d b o m b ers created th e m ean s for th is stra te g y — so a b u n d a n tly " th a t th e m arg in of A m eri­ can su p e rio rity seem ed if a n y th in g g rea ter th a n it h a d b e e n in th e d a y s of the A m erican atom ic m o n o p o ly ."12 W h y d id E isen h o w er take th is ap p ro ach ? C ritics once sin g led o u t h is fear of d eficit sp e n d in g a n d b lo ated g o v ern m en t, b u t m a n y c o n sid eratio n s w ere at play, th e ir w e ig h t v a ry in g am o n g m em b ers of th e ad m in istratio n . For Ike, th o se co n sid eratio n s all reflected his anxiety a b o u t m ilitarizatio n , w h ic h d efin ed h is o u tlo o k as m u c h as the C o ld W ar itself. H e w a s p e rilo u sly alone in th a t anxiety. D ulles talk ed of C old W ar a n d diplom acy; T reasu ry Secretary G eorge H u m ­ p h re y of b u d g e ts a n d fiscal p ru d en ce; D efense Secretary C h arles W ilson of p re ­ p a re d n e ss a n d efficiency. E isenhow er too sp o k e in th o se term s, b u t also tra n ­ scen d ed them . N o u n b e n d in g av ersio n to w a r g u id e d h im — h e h a d w a g e d w a r a n d n e v e r ru le d o u t d o in g so a g a in — b u t a com plex av ersio n to m ilitarizatio n d id su sta in him . It in d e e d d e riv e d p a rtly from h is econom ic conservatism . H e w o rrie d th a t th e taxes, capital, a n d ex p ertise n e e d e d for a n ex p en siv e d efen se p ro g ra m , a n d th e in flation a n d g o v e rn m e n t d e b t th a t m ig h t flow from it, w o u ld stifle eco­ nom ic e n tre p re n e u rsh ip a n d g ro w th , in tu rn w e ak e n in g th e econom ic b ase n e e d e d to su sta in n a tio n al security. R ejecting d ire Joint C hiefs of Staff w a rn in g s of n a tio n a l p e ril if cuts in the d efense b u d g e t w ere m ain tain ed , Ike a n g rily p ro ­ p o se d th a t the N a tio n a l S ecurity C ouncil " sh o u ld h av e a re p o rt as to w h e th e r n a tio n al b a n k ru p tc y o r n a tio n al d e stru c tio n w o u ld g et u s first." T he sam e o u t­ look in fo rm ed his d en u n ciatio n s of "p atern alistic g o v e rn m e n t" a n d T ru m an 's Fair D eal, a n d h is n eo -H o o v erian v iew of g o v e rn m e n t's role as c o o rd in a to r a n d cataly st of n a tio n al energies, n o t re g u la to r o r financier. Because Ike's w o rry a b o u t m ilitarizatio n w a s sh a p e d in p a rt b y o rth o d o x R ep u b lican co n serv atism a n d linked to its v iew o n d om estic policies, liberals d e rid e d it as n a rro w ­ m in d e d p e n n y -p in c h in g oblivious to the ex p an siv e possibilities o u tlin ed in K eynesian econom ics.13 But n o t only w o u ld m a n y A m ericans later fin d E isen h o w er's econom ic rea­ so n in g m ore p ersu asiv e, h is w o rries w e n t far b e y o n d econom ic effects. T ru­ m a n 's p ro p o se d defense b u d g e t, h e a rg u e d , w o u ld lead to "a p e rm a n e n t state of m obilization" d estro y in g " o u r w h o le dem o cratic w a y of life." "If w e let d e ­ fense sp e n d in g ru n w ild ," h e to ld a confidan t, "y o u g et in fla tio n . . . th en con-

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trois . . . th e n a g arriso n state . . . a n d then w e 'v e lost th e v e ry v a lu e s w e w ere try in g to d e fe n d ." "S hould w e h av e to reso rt to a n y th in g resem b lin g a g a rriso n state," h e d eclared o n a n o th e r occasion, " th e n all th a t w e are striv in g to d e fe n d w o u ld be w e ak e n ed ." H is re p e a te d w a rn in g s of a "g a rriso n sta te " in d ic ate d concerns far b ro a d e r th a n rock-ribbed R epublican fears for free e n te rp rise .14 T hose concerns also d e riv e d from his cau tio u s g ra n d strategy, w h ic h h e feared th a t bellicose n a tio n al im p u lse s co u ld d isru p t. Like o th e r lead ers, E isen h ow er w o rrie d a b o u t th e im p atien ce a n d im m a tu rity of o rd in a ry A m e ri­ cans, b u t h e feared m ore the lu n g e for th e quick fix a n d th e p ro p e n sity to p an ic h e saw am o n g h a w k ish R epublicans, m o n ey -h u n g ry g en erals, a n d o th e r w ellplaced people. Facing claim s th a t 1953 w a s th e "y ea r of m ax im u m d a n g e r" for the n atio n , h e in sisted p riv ately th a t " w e 're n o t in a m o m e n t of d a n g er, w e 're in a n age of d a n g er," a n d p u b licly th a t " a n y b o d y w h o b ases h is d efen se o n h is ability to p red ic t the d a y a n d the h o u r of th e attack is crazy." Facing a G O P effort to legislate U n ited States w ith d ra w a l from th e U N if it seated R ed C h in a, h e issu e d a typical w a rn in g a g ain st sh o rtsig h ted n e ss, rem in d in g co n g ressm en th a t in 1945 "G erm an y w a s o u r d e a d ly enem y; w h o co u ld th e n h a v e fo reseen it w o u ld becom e a frien d ly associate?" H a v in g e m p lo y ed a g ain st th e G erm an s a p a tie n t strategy, h e saw p atien ce as a fo u n d a tio n n o w for successful strategy. For h im , th e "lo n g h a u l" p re c lu d e d the im p e tu o u s act o r th e b u d g e t-b u stin g p ro g ra m .15 E isenhow er feared strategic d isa ster less th ro u g h c o m m u n ist victory, a b o u t w h ich h is w a rn in g s w ere few, th a n th ro u g h n u c le ar w ar. N o P re sid e n t w o rrie d m o re a b o u t th e d a n g e rs of in itiatin g o r stu m b lin g in to n u c le ar conflict. H is con­ cern d re w in p a rt o n h is d o u b ts as a n a rm y m a n a b o u t air p o w er. A lread y " d a m n tire d of A ir Force sales p ro g ra m s" in h is first m o n th s in office, h e lec­ tu re d congressm en: "W e p u lv e riz e d G e rm a n y . . . b u t th eir actu al rate of p ro ­ d u c tio n w a s as b ig a t the e n d as a t th e b eg in n in g ." E ven if— especially if— b o m b ers could d e stro y the Soviet U nion, h e co u ld see n o real victory, as h e to ld sen io r officers: "G ain su c h a victory, a n d w h a t d o y o u d o w ith it? H ere w o u ld be a g reat area from the Elbe to V ladivostok a n d d o w n th ro u g h S o u th east A sia to m u p a n d d e stro y ed w ith o u t g o v e rn m e n t, w ith o u t its co m m u n icatio n s, ju st a n area of sta rv a tio n a n d disaster. I ask y o u w h a t w o u ld th e civilized w o rld d o a b o u t it? I rep e at th ere is n o v icto ry in a n y w a r except th ro u g h o u r im ag in a­ tions, th ro u g h o u r d ed ic atio n a n d th ro u g h o u r w o rk to av o id it." A s h e lectu red South K orean lea d er S y n g m an Rhee, "If the K rem lin a n d W ash in g to n ev er lock u p in a w ar, the resu lts are too h o rrib le to co n tem p late." R id icu lin g th e "n o tio n th a t 'th e b o m b ' is a cheap w a y to solve th in g s," h e to ld h is C ab in et th a t "it is cold com fort for a n y citizen of W estern E u ro p e to be a ssu re d th a t— after h is co u n try is o v e rru n a n d h e is p u sh in g u p d a isie s— so m eo n e still alive w ill d ro p a b o m b o n th e K rem lin." W arning th e U n ited N atio n s in 1953 a b o u t "tw o atom ic colossi" facing off "across a trem b lin g w o rld ," h e p le a d e d for tak in g th e b o m b from the soldiers a n d p u ttin g it into "th e h a n d of th o se w h o w ill k n o w h o w to strip its m ilitary casing a n d a d a p t it to th e a rts of p eace."16

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A d m in istra tio n lea d ers also said a n d d id m a n y th in g s th a t co n trad icted th ese e lo q u e n t ap p eals. Sim ply th rea te n in g "m assiv e reta lia tio n " to d e te r com ­ m u n is t ad v an c es seem ed to d o so, a n d Ike saw "n o reaso n " w h y atom ic w e a p o n s " s h o u ld n 't b e u se d ju st exactly as y o u w o u ld u se a b u lle t o r a n y th in g else" if e m p lo y e d " o n strictly m ilitary targ ets a n d for strictly m ilitary p u r­ p o ses." H o w d id su c h sta te m e n ts sq u a re w ith h is e lo q u e n t ap p eals? In p a rt th ey reflected a n effort to in tim id a te th e e n e m y — "T he ability to g e t to th e v erg e w ith o u t g e ttin g in to th e w a r is th e n ecessary a rt," D ulles to ld Life in 1956— a lth o u g h E isenhow er w ell k n ew th a t in tim id a tio n m e a n t n o th in g w ith ­ o u t a w illingness, a t least in th e e n e m y 's p ercep tio n , to p u ll th e trigger. It is also tru e th a t th e a d m in istra tio n confined specific th rea ts of n u c le ar retaliatio n larg ely to th e A sian theater, w h e re th e risk s of all-o u t w a r w ere a rg u a b ly less, a n d th a t d e sp ite talk of th e tactical u tility of n u c le ar w eap o n s, E isen h o w er n e v e r claim ed th a t a g en eral n u c le ar w a r w a s w in n a b le o r tolerable. N o t for h im th e fan tasy of n u c le ar triu m p h th a t T ru m a n h a d p riv a te ly in d u lg e d , o r the g aze into th e n u c le ar abyss th a t K en n ed y to o k in th e C u b a n m issile crisis. H e n e v e r flatly ren o u n c ed u se of n u c le ar w e ap o n s, b u t h is in to leran ce of ap o caly p ­ tic possibilities exceeded th a t of m a n y in h is o w n a d m in istratio n , e x p ert circles, a n d political life generally.17 Ik e's resistance to m ilitarizatio n p ro b ab ly d re w m o st o n h is fear of its conse­ q u en ces e v en if w a r w ere avoided. H e w a s reaso n ab ly co n fid en t th a t w a r w o u ld b e av o id ed , a t least o n h is w a tc h — h is v iew of h im self in su c h m a tte rs w a s n o t m o d est. H e w a s less co n fid en t of resistin g a b ro a d e r p o litical process th a t n u rtu re d anxiety, sw o llen b u d g e ts, econom ic stag n atio n , a n d co n strain ts o n freed o m — the evils of th e "g a rriso n state." H is re so u n d in g sta te m e n t of th o se d a n g e rs cam e in a n A p ril 16,1953, a d d ress. T h o u g h b lam in g co m m u n ists for th e C o ld W ar, h e w a rn e d th a t e v e n if atom ic w a r w ere av erted , th e a rm s race offered "a life of p e rp e tu a l fear a n d tension; a b u rd e n of a rm s d ra in in g the w e a lth a n d lab o r of all p eo p les . . . . E very g u n th a t is m ad e , ev ery w a rsh ip lau n ch ed , ev ery rocket fired, signifies, in th e final sense, a th eft fro m th o se w h o h u n g e r a n d are n o t fed, those w h o are cold a n d n o t clothed. T his w o rld in a rm s is n o t sp e n d in g m o n e y alone. It is sp e n d in g th e sw ea t of its laborers, th e g e n iu s of its scientists, th e h o p e s of its c h ild ren ." A s h e elo q u en tly co n clu d ed : "T his is n o t a w a y of life a t all, in a n y tru e sense. U n d e r th e clo u d of th rea te n in g w ar, it is h u m a n ity h a n g in g from a cross of iron." P ro p o sin g w h a t a p o s t-C o ld W ar g e n ­ e ra tio n w o u ld call a "peace d iv id e n d ," h e p ro m ised to d e v o te "a su b sta n tia l p ercen tag e of the sav in g s achieved b y d isa rm a m e n t to a fu n d for w o rld a id a n d reco n struction." T he sav in g s w o u ld b e u se d for "a n e w k in d of w a r . . . a d e ­ clared to tal w ar, n o t u p o n a n y h u m a n en em y b u t u p o n th e b ru te forces of p o v ­ erty a n d n e e d ." 18 C ritics o ften a p p la u d e d these b ro a d sen tim en ts b u t attack ed th e stra te g y th a t flow ed from them , above all its reliance o n th rea ts of m assive retaliation. T hey d ecried the creation of a technologically m u scle-b o u n d A m erica so d e p e n d e n t o n n u clear w e a p o n s th a t it h a d n o choice b e tw ee n c a p itu la tio n a n d catastro p h e

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in th e face of c o m m u n ist ag g ressio n — a stra te g y a t once h elp less a n d h o rrify ­ ing. A s the 1950s w o re on, th e N e w L ook seem ed a feeble b u lw a rk a g ain st the lim ited w a rs a n d su b v ersiv e efforts w a g e d b y c o m m u n ist a n d leftist forces in th e T h ird W orld. Ike him self a ck n o w le d g ed th e force of th is criticism e v en b e­ fore b ecom ing P resident. "W h at sh o u ld w e d o if Soviet political aggression, as in C zechoslovakia, successively ch ip s a w ay ex p o sed p o sitio n s in th e free w o rld ?" h e w ro te D ulles in 1952. "To m y m in d th is is th e case w h e re th e th eo ry of 're ta lia tio n ' falls d o w n ." 19 H e n e v e r d e v ised a satisfacto ry so lu tio n to the p roblem . Still, critics of the N e w Look also te n d e d to caricatu re it— it h a rd ly d e n ie d th e a d m in istra tio n a n o n -n u cle ar capability. B etw een 1954 a n d 1958, th e a rm y fell from 1,404,598 to 898,925 p erso n n el, b u t rem a in e d 50 p e rc en t larg er th a n a t its lo w p o in t in th e late 1940s. O th e r "co n v en tio n al" forces, th e n a v y a n d m a ­ rines, sh ra n k o n ly b y 10 percent, as d id th e air force. T he 2.6 m illio n p e rso n n el of 1958 m ark e d a 30 p e rc en t d ecline fro m th e K orean W ar p eak , b u t th e m ilitary reserv es h a d g ro w n a n d the n a tio n w a s n o lo n g er a t w ar. T his force w a s far m o re capable of lim ited w a r th a n a n y p rev io u s p eacetim e force. It w a s b ack ed u p b y th e C IA 's en h an ced capacity for p a ra m ilita ry a n d c o v ert action, a n d b y m ilitary resources g iven allies a n d clients (Ike in sisted o n foreign m ilitary a n d econom ic aid in the face of co nservatives fu rio u s a b o u t fiscal im p ru d e n c e a n d liberals su sp icio u s of a id in g despots). If E isenhow er n e v e r p lu n g e d co n v en tio n al forces in to m ajor co m b at after Korea, th a t w a s b y choice m ore th a n becau se h e d e n ie d h im self th e m eans. T here w a s v irtu e in self-denial— h e co u ld p le a d in cap acity to w a g e a n o th e r Ko­ rea n W ar— b u t the self-denial w a s m ore a p p a re n t th a n real. M ost im p o rtan t, critics a ssu m e d th a t th ere was som e w a y to challenge co m m u n ist ag g ressio n m ilitarily a t little cost— a successful stra te g y av o id in g b o th th e ag o n y of Korea a n d th e in san ity of n u c le ar w ar. H a n g in g ov er th e arcan e d e b ates of th e 1950s w a s a possibility few ack n o w le d g ed — th a t m ilitary p o w e r in a n y fo rm m ig h t b e of little use to A m erica, o r a n y g rea t pow er. E isen h o w er cam e as close as an y n a tio n al figure to a ck n o w led g in g th a t d ilem m a, a lth o u g h h e n e v er fu lly a d ­ d resse d the strategic a n d political consequen ces th a t flo w ed fro m it. In a d d itio n to force levels, b u d g e ts m e a su re d E isen h o w er's a p p ro a c h to n a ­ tional security. D efense sp e n d in g fell 20 p e rc en t b e tw e e n fiscal 1953 a n d 1955 a n d , th o u g h rising later in the 1950s, c o n tin u ed to m o v e w ith in a n a rro w range. It also d eclin ed as a fraction of the n a tio n al b u d g e t (from tw o -th ird s to one-half b y 1960) a n d as percen tag e of G N P (from 13.8 to 9.1 percent). Taft w a n te d sh a rp e r cuts, b u t E isenhow er d id n o t listen, " p a rtly b ecau se th e clam o r from th e o th er sid e — d e m a n d in g m ore sp e n d in g o n th e m ilita ry — w a s so m u ch lo u d er."20 In d eed , Ike su sta in ed his defense b u d g e ts in th e face of h e a te d p ro ­ tests from the a rm e d forces a n d , after 1957, w id e sp re a d p ressu re to sp e n d m ore. H is b u d g e ts w o u ld h av e b e en u n su sta in ab le if h e h a d failed to co n tain o r

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liq u id a te a series of crises a n d te m p tatio n s to action th a t p e p p e re d his first term . T he m o st ag o n izin g w a s th e w a r in Korea. D rag g in g o n since 1951, a rm i­ stice talks h a d fo u n d e re d o stensibly ov er th e c o m m u n ists' insistence th a t all th e ir PO W s in allied h a n d s be re p a tria te d (as p re c e d e n t a n d in te rn atio n al law req u ired), forcibly if necessary, w h ile th e allies p o stu re d a b o u t th e PO W s' rig h t to freed o m a n d choice. In fact, h o w ev er, T aiw anese a n d S outh K orean forces so m etim es in tim id a te d co m m u n ist p riso n ers, as d id th e c o m m u n ists theirs. B oth sides u se d PO W s as p a w n s in a n elab o rate gam e. O n th e S outh K orean a n d A m erican side, th e y earn in g for to tal victo ry re­ m a in e d strong. In D ecem ber 1952, M acA rth u r h a d ad v ised th rea te n in g to u se n u c le ar w eap o n s. Ike th o u g h t the th re a t m ig h t be useful, b u t a t b e st to achieve a co m p rom ise, n o t to ta l victory, w o rry in g th a t "if w e 're g o in g to ex ten d th e w a r w e h av e to m a k e .su re w e 're n o t o ffending th e w h o le w o rld ." T h ro u g h th e sp rin g a n d early su m m e r of 1953, S y n g m an Rhee, D ulles, R epublican conser­ vativ es, a n d som e D em ocrats m a d e d a rk noises a b o u t g o in g for broke, a n d m em b ers of the G O P o ld g u a rd w ere "h e a rd to m u tte r th a t if T ru m a n h a d sig n ed th e c o n d itio n s E isenhow er w a s w illin g to accept, th ey w o u ld hav e m o v ed to im p e ac h h im ." R hee trie d to to rp e d o a final ag reem en t b y releasing C h in ese a n d K orean PO W s w ith o u t rep a tria tio n , p ro v o k in g n e w hostilities costly to A m erican forces. C ab in et d iscu ssio n of assassin atin g h im , a n d stronga rm efforts to p u ll h im back into line.21 A n arm istice w a s finally achieved in July. In a p erc ep tio n w ith p ro fo u n d con­ seq u en ces for later A m erican policy, Ike's success w a s o ften a ttrib u te d to a th re a t to u se n u c le ar w e a p o n s se n t b y D ulles ind irectly to th e C hinese. But w h ile su ch th re a t w a s m ad e, it w a s n e ith e r n e e d e d n o r d e te rm in a tiv e of the o u tco m e— the real th re a t w a s " E ise n h o w e r's rep u ta tio n " from W orld W ar II "b ack ed b y A m erica's atom ic arsen al," a n d th e essen tial co m p ro m ises w ere al­ re a d y in place before D ulles's w a rn in g . O n e act rarely e n d s w ars, a n d th is w a r's e n d o w ed to m a n y factors: ex h au stio n o n b o th sides, n e w le a d ersh ip in M os­ cow a n d W ashington, a n d th e m ajor p o w e rs' g ru d g in g w illin g n ess to m ak e concessions. Still, E isen h o w er's role w a s critical, for h e "realized th a t u n lim ite d w a r in the n u c le ar age w a s u n im ag in ab le, a n d lim ited w a r u n w in n ab le. This w a s th e m o st basic of his strategic in sig h ts."22 In settling for so m e th in g far less th a n to tal victory, Ike im plicitly ch allen g ed th e stra n g le h o ld of W orld W ar II o n th e A m erican im ag in atio n , an ironic ach iev em en t for th a t w a r's hero. T rue to his n a tu re , h e failed to m ak e th e chal­ len g e p ublicly explicit, th o u g h it w a s e v id e n t in th e ten o r of h is pu b lic rem arks, as h e av o id ed triu m p h a l o r self-co n g ratu lato ry com m ents. In o th er w ay s, too, h e m ay h ave im p lied th e Second W orld W ar's irrelev an ce to th e 1950s. Begged in 1954 to sp eak a t a g litterin g cerem ony d e d ic atin g th e m assiv e m o n u m e n t to th e 1945 flag raising a t Iw o Jim a, E isenhow er all b u t d u c k e d th e occasion w ith ­ o u t u tte rin g a w o rd — eith er d istu rb e d b y the m y th ic falseh o o d s a b o u t th e o rig ­ in al in cid en t o r uncom fortable w ith the ro m an ticizatio n of w a r a n d v icto ry im-

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p licit in th e w h o le affair. Likew ise, once elected, h e d id little to ex p lo it th e m em o ries a n d sym bols of W orld W ar II (alth o u g h , th e cynic m ig h t arg u e, h is re p u ta tio n m a d e it u n n e ce ssa ry to d o so).23 E isenhow er co u ld settle K orea o n u n sa tisfy in g term s b ecau se it b e g a n o n T ru m a n 's w a tc h a n d because of h is p e rso n a l rep u ta tio n . O th e r situ atio n s b e­ lo n g ed m ore sq u arely to h is ad m in istratio n . By 1953, th e French w ere d e e p ly m ire d in a n u n w in n a b le w a r to reclaim In d o ch in a, w h ile th e U n ite d States gov­ e rn m e n t fu n d e d th e French effort, su p p lie d m ilita ry p e rso n n e l to assist it, a n d search ed h a lfh e arted ly am o n g d e p re ssin g op tio n s. T he F rench cause seem ed d o o m ed , b u t F rench w ith d ra w a l w o u ld d o o m V ietn am to c o m m u n ist takeover. T he tricky m id d le g ro u n d o n ly su ck ed the T ru m a n a n d E isen h o w er a d m in is­ tratio n s in deeper. T hey k n e w h o w offensive F ran ce's im p e ria l cause w a s to th e Ind o ch inese, b u t a tte m p ts to coerce France in to g ra n tin g in d e p e n d e n c e to its colonies o n ly trig g ered French th rea ts to w ith d ra w alto g eth er, a n d a n effort to d ev elo p a V ietnam ese "th ird force" b o th an ti-im p e ria list a n d a n tico m m u n ist fo u n d e re d o n its in h e re n t con trad ictio n s, p ro d u c in g h a p le ss fig u reh e ad s like E m p ero r Bao Dai. T he possibility th a t th e leftist V ietm in h forces fig h tin g France m ig h t b e sufficiently n a tio n alist to resist th e sw ay of P ek in g a n d M oscow w a s rare ly considered. E m b o d y in g all th e lessons of a p p e a se m e n t a n d th e 1930s, th e "falling d o m in o e s" principle, as E isenh o w er p u b licly fo rm u la te d it, as­ su m e d the u n ity of all c o m m u n ist forces a n d p rescrib ed th a t once th e y "k n o ck o v er" th e first n o n c o m m u n ist country, "th e last o n e " certain ly w o u ld "g o o v er v e ry quickly."24 Intellectually, E isenhow er d id n o t assu m e a m o n o lith ic c o m m u n ist enem y, m ak in g g estu res to T ito's Y ugoslavia a n d to y in g w ith o v e rtu re s to M ao's C hina. L ittle real feel for T h ird W orld n a tio n alism b ack ed u p h is ab stract p e r­ c ep tio n of diversity, ho w ev er, a n d little ro o m ex isted in A m erican politics to act o n it. The a d m in istra tio n 's strategic su p p le n e ss w a s u n m a tc h e d b y a sim ilar flexibility a b o u t politics a n d ideology. D espite this confining fram ew o rk , E isenh o w er m o v ed to lim it A m erican in ­ v o lv em en t in In d o ch in a d u rin g F rance's final crisis in th e sp rin g of 1954. A s V ietm inh forces encircled th e French b a stio n a t D ien Bien P h u , a p lea for A m er­ ican m ilitary in te rv en tio n cam e from the French g o v e rn m e n t, b ack ed b y con­ serv ative A m erican politicians a n d a d m in istra tio n lea d ers like N ixon, w h ile talk of atom ic b o m b s sp read . Ike blocked th e d e m a n d s to go w a r "b y p u ttin g co n d itio n s o n A m erican in v o lv em en t," ones "d elib era tely created to b e im p o s­ sible of fulfillm ent."25 T hey in c lu d e d C ong ress's assent, u n ite d s u p p o rt from A m erican allies, a n d a h o st of c o n d itio n s o n th e French, in clu d in g full in d e p e n ­ dence for th eir colonies. Forestalling m ilitary in te rv e n tio n w a s a collective— a n d a m b ig u o u s— achievem ent. C ertain ly others, like A rm y C hief of Staff G en eral M a tth e w R idgw ay, also d o u b te d th a t A m erican technolo g y co u ld prev ail. C ertain ly Ike's com plex policy still y ie ld e d — a n d w as d e sig n e d to y ie ld — a d e e p e r A m erican

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c o m m itm en t to th e area th a t p ro d u c e d th e S o u th east A sia T reaty O rg an izatio n , lav ish a id to N g o D in h D iem 's n e w S outh V ietnam ese regim e, a n d san ctio n for D iem 's refu sal to h o ld elections to reu n ify V ietnam . B ehind th a t effort lay ty p ical A m erican a sp iratio n s to b e a m u sc u la r "city o n a h ill" to th e w o rld , e x p o rtin g d em o cracy a n d cap italism a n d m ak in g S outh V ietn am "th e co rn er­ sto n e of th e Free W orld in S outheast A sia, th e k ey sto n e in th e arch, th e fin g er in th e d ik e," as Sen. John K en n ed y p u t it in 1956. T hese asp iratio n s, bitin g ly ex p o sed in G ra h a m G reene's 1955 n o v el The Quiet American, in flu en ced Ike. Still, h e c o n d em n ed u se of g ro u n d forces— "T his w a r in In d o ch in a w o u ld ab so rb o u r tro o p s b y div isio n s!"— a n d saw th a t th e n a tio n 's " tra d itio n of a n ti­ co lo n ialism " fo rm ed " a n asset of incalculable v a lu e to th e Free W orld." Talk of u sin g atom ic b o m b s en ra g ed him : "You boys m u st b e crazy. W e c a n 't u se th o se aw fu l th in g s a g ain st A sians for th e second tim e in less th a n te n years. M y G o d ."26 A s o th e r situ atio n s sh o w ed , n o refu sal to u se p o w e r g u id e d E isenhow er, o n ly a sh re w d d e te rm in a tio n to act w h e n the o d d s w ere favorable a n d th e costs lo w — u n less m isju d g ed . In the nail-biting crises of 1955 a n d 1958 o v er Q u e m o y a n d M a tsu — sm all islan d s n e a r C h in a's coast h e ld b y T aiw an 's N a tio n a list g o v e rn m e n t— th e a d m in istra tio n th re a te n e d a n u c le a r resp o n se if M ao 's gov­ e rn m e n t attacked, w h ile D ulles e q u a te d M ao's "ag g ressiv e fanaticism " w ith th a t of H itler. Ike g a in e d a p p a re n t v icto ry for b rin k m a n sh ip , b u t also "th o r­ o u g h ly d isc red ite d it in th e eyes of the A m erican p u b lic a n d allies o v erseas b y rev ealing h o w little it w o u ld take to p u s h th e a d m in istra tio n in to a w a r w ith C h in a," b y sh o w in g th e a d m in istra tio n 's " b la n d self-confidence th a t it co u ld u se n u c le ar w e a p o n s w ith o u t settin g off a n all-o u t n u c le ar w a r," a n d b y d o in g so in a crisis ov er real estate of p u re ly sym bolic v a lu e (alth o u g h D ulles later b o a sted th a t "h is m o st b rillian t" ach iev em en t h a d b e e n "to save Q u e m o y a n d M atsu .")27 M oreover, th e outcom e seem ed to rest o n o n e m a n w h o se ju d g m e n t, h o w ­ ev er assessed, w o u ld h av e to falter o n occasion. T he F orm osa crises sh o w e d the a d m in istra tio n 's p e n c h a n t for recklessness in sm all m atters as a g ain st restra in t in larg er ones. O n ly w h e n th e 1955 crisis th re a te n e d to ex p lo d e d id Ike sh o w caution. A fter th e Soviet foreign m in iste r sa id th a t n u c le ar w a r w o u ld n o t th rea te n " w o rld civilization" b u t only " th a t ro tte n social sy stem w ith its im p e ­ rialist basis so ak ed in b lo o d ," E isenhow er p u b licly rem in isced a b o u t h is 1945 frien d sh ip w ith M arsh al (now D efense M inister) Z hu k o v , w h o h a d g iv en h im a n "en o rm o u s b e a r h u g " o n h is b irth d ay . "It is necessary," co m m en ts P au l C ar­ ter, "to th in k a n d feel o n e 's w a y back in to th e m o o d of th e fifties to realize h o w rem arkable a sta te m e n t this w a s." 28 Ju st as d a n g e ro u s w ere th e a d m in istra tio n 's b arely co v ert in te rv en tio n s in Iran a n d G uatem ala. W ary of p lu n g in g A m erican forces in to w ar, E isen h o w er tu rn e d to the CIA as one alternative, sh a rin g G en. Jam es D oo little's view s: fac­ ing "a n im placable en em y " seeking "w o rld d o m in a tio n " in a g am e w ith "n o

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ru les," th e U n ited States m u s t "lea rn to su b v ert, sab o tag e, a n d d e stro y o u r e n e ­ m ies b y m ore clever, m ore so p h isticated , a n d m o re effective m e th o d s th a n th o se u se d a g ain st u s." W h en P rem ier M o h am m ed M o ssa d eg h n a tio n alize d Ira n 's oil fields a n d seem ed to th re a te n W estern in terests, A llen D u lles's C IA h e lp e d o rg an ize his o v e rth ro w a n d the sh a h 's re tu rn to th e th ro n e in 1953. W h en a sim ilar d ra m a u n fo ld e d the n ex t y e ar in G u a tem ala — its g o v e rn m e n t co o p erated w ith th e C o m m u n ist Party, carried o u t la n d reform , a n d e x p ro p ri­ a te d h o ld in g s of th e A m erican U n ited F ruit C o m p an y (to w h ic h th e D ulles b ro th e rs h a d close ties) th a t it left fallow — th e C IA su b v e rte d th e refo rm ist re­ g im e a n d replaced it w ith a reactio n ary clique. T he C IA h a d sco red tw o victo­ ries, a t least for co rp o rate interests, a t m in im al cost. T he d o m in o e s w o u ld n o t fall ("M y G o d ," Ike sa id reg a rd in g G u atem ala, "ju st th in k w h a t it w o u ld m ea n to u s if M exico w e n t C om m unist!"). But b y d e stro y in g refo rm ist regim es, th ese v ictories also forced b o th areas in to p a in fu l choices b e tw ee n reactio n ary a n d rev o lu tio n a ry alternatives: G u atem ala e x perien ced rec u rren t civil w a r in to th e 1990s; th e sh a h su c cu m b e d to a n Islam ic u p risin g in 1979. P erh ap s lo n g -term o u tco m es o u g h t n o t to b e p in n e d to E isenhow er: "Sufficient u n to th e d a y are th e crises thereof," n o tes C arter, a n d Ike liq u id a te d h is crises w ith o u t A m erican b lo o d . Still, h is u se of th e CIA m a y o n ly h av e p o stp o n e d th e reckoning, a n d it se t a telling p re c e d e n t for h is successors. C ertain ly h is im p u lse s— to av o id w ar, re stra in m ilitarizatio n , b u t su sta in A m erican h e g e m o n y — coexisted in u n sta ­ b le b alance.29 It w a s all th e m ore u n sta b le because enem ies, allies, a n d o th ers c o u ld u p se t it. T h at b ecam e clear in th e fall of 1956. A com plex crisis in th e M id east d e v el­ o p e d w h e n th e a d m in istra tio n m isju d g ed E g y p tian n a tio n alism a n d A ngloFrench foolishness: E g y p t's N asser seized th e Suez C an al from B ritain, E gyptian-Israeli ten sio n s sw elled, a n d B ritain, France, a n d Israel m o v ed to in ­ v a d e E gypt, w ith o u t in fo rm in g E isenhow er. Ju st as th a t crisis w o rse n e d in O c­ tober, H u n g a ria n s rebelled a g ain st Soviet rule, a n d ju st as th ey seem ed a b o u t to p revail, the Red A rm y cru sh ed th e revolt. G iven G O P talk of lib eratin g e n ­ slaved p eo p les a n d A m erican p ro p a g a n d a u rg in g "cap tiv e n a tio n s" to th ro w off th eir shackles, Ike's refusal to a id the rebels in H u n g a ry w a s em b arrassin g . In th e M iddle East, h is o u trag e forced France, Britain, a n d Israel to cease th eir in v asio n of E gypt a n d e a rn e d the g ra titu d e of m a n y sm aller n atio n s, b u t N A TO a n d A m erican M id east interests seem ed im periled. Relief a t th e avoidance of w a r h e lp e d E isen h o w er g ain a n election lan d slid e in N ovem ber, b u t av o id an ce seem ed to h in g e p erilo u sly o n one m an , a p e rc ep ­ tio n alre ad y u n d e rsco re d b y Ike's h e a rt attack in 1955. In th e Suez crisis E isenhow er sh o w ed "a k in d of goo d sense w e can n o w w ish h a d b e e n sh o w n b y m ore recent p re sid e n ts w h o w ere co n sid ered m o re w o rld ly -w ise th a n Ik e"30— or h a d b e en sh o w n a t the tim e b y A dlai Stevenson, w h o fav o red Israel a n d the im p erial p o w e rs in E gypt ra th e r th a n th e U N reso lu tio n o rd erin g a cease-fire. Still, m ilitarizatio n w as co n tain ed a n d w a r av o id e d b y a b alan ce of

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forces— b e tw e e n th e "free w o rld " a n d its enem ies, b e tw ee n E isen h o w er a n d h is critics, b e tw e e n th e a d m in istra tio n 's o w n conflicting ten d e n cies— th a t w as in d e e d uneasy. It w a s also u n ste a d y w h e n E isen h o w er d e a lt w ith a n o th e r facet of m ilitariza­ tion, the R ed S care's legacy. A t the least, his in flam m ato ry statem en ts o n the m a tte r w ere few , a n d p e rh a p s b o th his sta tu re a n d h is p u b lic sk epticism a b o u t m ilita riza tio n calm ed th e m o o d a bit. Insofar as rep ressio n w a n e d in th e 1950s, h o w e v e r— a n d civil rig h ts lead ers, a m o n g o th ers, h a d reaso n to d o u b t th a t it d id — c o u rt decisions a n d o th er changes w ere m o re resp o n sib le th a n E ise n h o w e r's a d m in istratio n . C o rralin g M cC arth y d id n o t silence o th ers in C o n g ress w h o b a d g e re d the W hite H o u se to ferret o u t co m m u n ists, h o m o sex ­ u als, a n d o th e r alleg ed subversives. E ven w h e n th e sto rm in C ongress ab ated , th e executive b ra n c h 's m ore ro u tin e a n d invisible m ach in ery of rep ressio n g ro an e d o n — in som e w a y s e n la rg ed u n d e r E isenhow er, th o u g h n e ith e r m o re efficient n o r m o re fair. Typically, h e vacillated a n d co m p lain ed , a b o u t th e p o lit­ ical p ressu re s in v o lv ed , a m o n g o th er things. "W h y th e hell sh o u ld w e take cred it for a n y of th ese firings [of fed eral em ployees]?" h e fu m ed ; it w o u ld o n ly m e a n "tak in g c re d it for w h a t w a s p lain ly o u r d u ty ."31 H is co m p lain t m a d e clear b o th his d istaste for th e p ro cess a n d h is c o m m itm en t to it. T he u n e a sy b alance w a s also e v id e n t in th e a d m in istra tio n 's d ealin g s w ith C ongress. T he 1950s w ere n o t th e g o ld e n ag e of b ip artisa n sh ip o ften rem em ­ b e re d later b y C old W arriors lam en tin g su b se q u e n t political divisions. S h arp differences arose b e tw e e n R epublicans a n d D em ocrats, co n serv ativ es a n d lib­ erals, C ongress a n d th e W hite H ouse. In th e en d , "o p p o sitio n forces failed to alter th e su b stan ce of n a tio n al secu rity policy a n d foreign p o lic y . . ., o r ev en to increase congressio nal influence in th e fo rm atio n of th o se policies," arg u es one h isto rian , b u t it w a s " n o t for w a n t of effort. "32 A t m ost, b ip a rtisa n sh ip o ccu rred b y d efau lt, n o t design. C onflict b e tw e e n the W hite H o u se a n d C o n g ress e ru p te d especially o v er a co n stitu tio n al a m e n d m e n t offered b y O h io R epublican se n ato r John Bricker (w ho h a d b e e n D ew ey 's ru n n in g m ate in 1944). B ricker w a n te d to b a n execu­ tive ag reem en ts w ith o th er n atio n s, leav in g th e P re sid e n t on ly th e o p tio n of m ak in g treaties, w h ic h req u ire th e S enate's consent. B ehind h im lay a lo n g tra ­ d itio n of p o p u la r a n d congressional d istru st of p resid en tia l p o w e r in w a r a n d foreign policy, b u t th a t tra d itio n h a d becom e ideologically constricted. Som e D em o crats a n d liberals assailed p resid en tia l arrogance, b u t th e a n im u s b e h in d B ricker's m o v e w a s rig h te o u s R epublican in d ig n a tio n o v er th o se "o u trag e o u s Yalta accords" (as one se n ato r te rm e d them ) a n d o th er executive ag reem en ts th a t p re su m a b ly h a d g iv en co m m u n ists effortless victories in th e 1940s.33 B ehind it, too, w ere fears th a t stark ly d e m o n stra te d th e in se p arab ility of for­ e ig n policy a n d do m estic politics. T he B ricker a m e n d m e n t so u g h t to b a n treaties a b rid g in g a n y in d iv id u a l rig h t o r freed o m u n d e r th e C o n stitu tio n o r affecting " a n y o th er m atters essentially w ith in th e d om estic ju risd ictio n of the

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U n ited States." B ricker's n ig h tm a re w as th e U n ited N atio n s, especially the d ra ft In tern a tio n al C o v e n an t o n H u m a n R ights w ritte n b y "glo b al d re a m e rs" a n d "in te rn atio n al d o -g o o d ers" like E leanor Roosevelt. H e feared th a t th e cov­ e n a n t m ig h t becom e the law of lan d , a n d w ith it liberalism , w elfarism , ev en socialism . S haring h is ala rm a b o u t th e coven an t, w h ite su p rem acists feared for racial seg reg atio n a n d "sta te s' rig h ts," d o cto rs foresaw "so cialized m edicine," a n d th e U.S. C h a m b e r of C om m erce p ro p h e sie d th e e n d of "free e n te rp rise ."34 By a long a n d a d ro it effort, E isenhow er w a rd e d off B ricker's th re a t to h is p re ­ rogatives. H is rec o rd — b e tte r th a n th a t of m o st p o stw a r P re sid e n ts— of con­ su ltin g C ongress h elp ed . So d id co operativ e D em ocrats; b ip a rtisa n sh ip d id so m etim es operate. But from Ike's p o in t of view , it w a s a n e a r m iss a n d a n ex­ h a u stin g nuisance. M ore th a n m o st P resid en ts, h e av o id e d n a m e calling a n d b u rn e d n o b rid g es w ith an y o n e in C ongress, b u t p riv a te ly h e n o ted : "If it's tru e th a t w h e n y o u d ie the th in g s th a t b o th e re d y o u m o st are e n g ra v e d o n y o u r skull. I'm su re I'll h ave th ere th e m u d a n d d irt of France d u rin g in v asio n a n d th e n a m e of S enator B ricker."35 E isenhow er also m ain tain ed , as public reactions co n firm ed , th a t th e U n ited States n o w v a lu e d d ip lo m acy w ith the enem y, th o u g h d ip lo m acy rarely y ield ed concrete results. A 1955 trea ty m a d e A u stria a p e rm a n e n t n e u tra l a n d req u ire d w ith d ra w a l of o ccupying Soviet a n d W estern forces, a sig n ifican t p re ­ ced en t n o t follow ed for solving the w e ig h tier p ro b lem of d iv id e d G erm any. The U n ited States d id n o t e v en sig n th e 1954 G en ev a A ccords o n Ind o ch in a. E isen h ow er offered a m u ch -to u te d "A tom s for Peace" p ro g ra m a n d later a n im ag inative "O p e n Skies" p ro p o sa l— fo resh ad o w in g th e sp irit of later m u tu a l su rv eillan ce— w h e reb y th e su p e rp o w e rs w o u ld g iv e each o th e r "a co m p lete b lu e p rin t of o u r m ilitary e stab lish m en ts" a n d allow each to p h o to g ra p h th e o th er from the air.36 E very su ch p ro p o sa l led to a n a sty ro u n d of p u b lic p o stu r­ ing, Soviet a n d A m erican lead ers b lam in g each o th e r for th e a rm s race. E ven m ore ballyhoo, b u t n o agreem ents, acco m p an ied th e 1955 G en ev a "Big F o u r" m eeting of Ike a n d the Soviet, French, a n d B ritish leaders. E isenhow er, a n d som etim es his c o u n te rp a rts elsew here, w ere d u ly criticized for p e rfo rm in g e m p ty ritu als th a t m ask ed g ro w in g perils. T here w as so m eth in g to be said for ritu al, ho w ev er. R em iniscent of FD R's su m m it diplom acy, E isen h o w er's version, u n d e rta k e n in th e face of shrill p ro p h ecies of "ap p e a sem e n t," e stab lish ed ex p ectations a n d processes for s u ­ p e rp o w e r co n su ltatio n th a t n o later P re sid e n t co u ld ignore. T he lav ish m ed ia a tten tio n given the G eneva su m m it reflected th e su b sta n tiv e sh a llo w n ess of the event, b u t also the h o p es it aro u sed . A s E isen h o w er aid e E m m et Jo h n H u g h e s said, G eneva "w as w id ely u n d e rsto o d to signalize, w ith o u t articu latin g , th e ac­ ceptance b y the m ajor p o w e rs of th e co m m o n n ecessity to sh u n reco u rse to n u ­ clear w ar." A sim ilar signal arose from lofty a n d n o w -fo rg o tten asp iratio n s, earn estly su p p o rte d b y E isenhow er am o n g o thers, th a t th e U n ited N a tio n s b e ­ com e an effective in stru m e n t of w o rld peace a n d p ro sp erity .37 N o netheless, b e n e a th the surface of in te rn atio n al crisis a n d c o n su lta tio n ra n

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c u rre n ts th a t u n d e rm in e d E isen h o w er's h o p e s to co n ta in m ilitarizatio n . In th e sp ra w lin g n a tio n al secu rity a p p a ra tu s , p re ssu re k e p t m o u n tin g to d e v elo p n e w w e a p o n s a n d to su b v e rt a rm s control. T h ro u g h th e b u d g e t process, Ike exercised g en eral control o v er d efense policy b u t n o t o v er its q u alitativ e sh ift to w a rd new , expensive w eap o n s. By b rin g in g scientists in to th e W h ite H o u se, h e g a in e d access to ex p erts skeptical a b o u t n e w p ro g ram s, b u t also subjected h im self to m ore d irect p re ssu re from scientists c h am p io n in g a n ag gressive course. T he a d m in istratio n , co m p lain e d ^T reasury Secretary H u m p h re y in 1957, h a d b e e n "led a stray b y scientists a n d b y v e sted in terests." By d e n u n c ia ­ tio n s of n u c le ar overkill o r sh eer explosions of tem p er, E isen h o w er c o u ld in ter­ ru p t th e m o m e n tu m . H e co u ld n o t o r w o u ld n o t sto p it. N u c lea r w a rh e a d s sw elled in n u m b e rs a n d po w er, th eir m eg a to n n a g e (d estru ctiv e p o w er) soar­ in g fro m 150 in 1953 to 19,000 in 1960, th e h isto ric peak. By m id -d e ca d e the U n ited States w a s p lu n g in g in to th e n e x t stage of th e a rm s race, in terco n tin en ­ ta l rockets for d e liv erin g n u c le ar w e ap o n s. A n u c le ar a rm s race w h o se logic h a d "n o connection to experience o r reality" w a s tak in g over. E isen h o w er a n d th e A m erican p e o p le in sisted o n "clear A m erican superio rity . H o w th ey w o u ld u se th a t le a d — except to in su re deterren ce, w h ic h co u ld b e a ssu re d w ith one h u n d re d b o m b s a n y w a y — th ey d id n o t k n o w ."38 H isto rian s h av e fau lted "th e in ad e q u ac y of [E isenhow er's] lead ersh ip , com ­ b in e d w ith the intractable p ro b lem s h e faced" a n d h is a d m in istra tio n 's "o v er­ b lo w n rhetoric," for creatin g " a n a tm o sp h e re in w h ic h c o n sid era tio n of defen se issu es b ecam e n e arly im p o ssib le."39 B eyond th a t w a s a d ilem m a th a t E isen h o w er b arely g rasp ed . The N e w L ook in v o lv e d a reso rt to tech n o lo g y to co n ta in m ilita riza tio n — n e w w e a p o n s w ere to cu t costs b y m in im izin g force levels a n d av ertin g lim ited w ars. D ra w in g o n a n A m erican tra d itio n of seeking technological so lu tio n s to p ro b lem s created in p a rt b y technology, it a g g ra­ v a te d th e v e ry m ilita riza tio n th a t Ike h o p e d to arrest. M ilitarizatio n w a s a q u a l­ itativ e p h e n o m e n o n , n o t ju st a q u a n tita tiv e o n e m ea su ra b le b y th e size of b u d ­ g ets o r arm ies. T he N e w L ook accelerated it a t its m o st technically exquisite, a n d ex quisitely d a n g ero u s, n u c le ar core. A n y o th er P re sid e n t m ig h t h av e d o n e w o rse in th a t reg ard , b u t th e h ig h e r sta n d a rd of success E isen h o w er set for h im ­ self m ak es th e ju d g m e n t o n h im m ore sev ere— as h e so o n felt. Since his successors rarely d id b e tte r in these m atters, h o w ev er, h e alone w a s o b v io u sly n o t th e p roblem . B eyond h im lay a political c u ltu re h a rd ly h is to con­ trol. H u m p h re y 's p riv a te co m p lain t a b o u t "scien tists" a n d "v ested in terests" su g g e ste d one facet of th e problem . Ike co u ld claim g reater w isd o m th a n g en ­ erals a n d ad m irals, b u t for h im to c o m p lain p u b licly a b o u t th e p ressu re s of sci­ en tists a n d o th er e x p erts w a s v irtu a lly im p o ssib le— it w o u ld h av e sm ack ed of th e an ti-in tellectu alism a n d c ra m p ed visio n alre ad y im p u te d to E isen h o w er a n d h is associates too often for th eir political com fort. To challenge G en. M ax­ w ell T aylor w a s one thing; to d isp u te E d w ard Teller w as a n o th e r a t a tim e w h e n so m u c h w isd o m a n d objectivity w ere a ttrib u te d to scientists. O n e c o n tro v ersy over n u c le ar w e a p o n s d id give Ike a chance to challenge the

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scientists' authority. A test in the Pacific of a n A m erican h y d ro g e n b o m b in 1954 stirred alarm a b o u t its sh eer explosive po w er, b u t e v en m o re a b o u t th e fallout th a t c o n tam in ated A m ericans, area natives, a n d n e a rb y Jap an ese fish erm en (their fate om in o u sly reso n an t w ith A u g u st 1945). E isen h o w er p u b licly d o u b te d scientists' infallibility, an n o u n cin g th a t "th is tim e so m e th in g m u st h av e h a p p e n e d th a t w e h av e n e v e r experien ced before, a n d m u s t h av e su r­ p rise d a n d asto n ish ed the scientists." P rivately, h e said th a t after th e c u rre n t A m erican tests h e w o u ld b e "w illin g to h ave a m o ra to riu m o n all fu rth e r ex p er­ im en tatio n " w ith n u c le ar w eap o n s.40 In stead h e vacillated, th e n d rifte d w ith the tid e of e x p erts seek in g m o re tests, m o re bom bs, a n d m ore vehicles to carry them . H is N e w L ook stra te g y w a s o n e reason, b u t also his desire for elite control, w h ich p u b lic d e b a te n o w th re a te n e d to erode. D issident scientists a n d grass-roo ts activists fo rm ed n e w o rg an iz a ­ tions. B ooks— N evil S hute's On the Beach (1957), W alter M ille r's A Canticle for Leibowitz (1959), M ordecai R o sh w ald 's Level 7(1959)— w id e n e d d eb ate. T he So­ viets g ra n d s ta n d e d w ith n e w p ro p o sa ls to e n d th e a rm s race. N e u tra ls like In­ d ia, h a rd ly w ish in g to b a th e in th e fallout of Soviet a n d A m erican tests, e n ­ liv en ed a global debate. C h a rg ed c u ltu ral sym bols w e re a t p la y — Strontium -90 w as en terin g the food chain, p o iso n in g th e m ilk m o th e rs fed babies. E isenhow er w a s n o t im m u n e to th e anxieties ex p ressed in th is w id e n in g d e ­ bate. H a d a stro n g challenge to n u c le ar policy e m e rg ed w ith in h is policy a p p a ­ ratu s, h e m ig h t h av e acted forcefully: in th a t aren a, sim ilar to th e o n e h e k n ew as a co m m an d er, h e co u ld be co n fid en t a n d co u rag eo u s. B ut in sid ers critical of th e arm s race w ere few — E isenhow er as m u c h as an y o n e, a n d h e d isc o u rag e d th e criticism h e also so u g h t b y his choice of scientific a d v iso rs a n d b y h is w ill­ in g n ess to see O p p e n h eim er forced out. A lifetim e's h a b its m a d e h im d istru st the u n p red ictab le anxieties of outsiders. R ep eated ly h e co n sid ered b lu n t efforts to in fo rm A m ericans of the n u c le ar danger. R ep eated ly h e b ack ed aw ay, sen ­ sin g th a t public ala rm w as as likely to u n d e rm in e efforts a t d isa rm a m e n t as to stre n g th e n them . A lread y in 1953, w h e n the scientist V an n ev ar B ush h a d tak e n u p "th e case for scaring the p eo p le into a b ig tax p ro g ra m to b u ild b o m b d e ­ fenses," Ike h a d seen "th e d a n g e rs in telling too m u c h of th e tru th ." 41 H is d is­ tru st of public can d o r w as n o t u n fo u n d e d , b u t h is ch o sen co u rse serv ed h im n o better. T here w ere alternatives to E isen h o w er's lea d ersh ip in su ch m atters, b u t as u su a l in A m erican politics, th ey w ere m u d d le d . A dlai Stevenson, in 1956 a g ain th e D em ocrats' nom inee, p ro p o se d c u ttin g back th e d ra ft a n d e n d in g n u c le ar w e a p o n s tests, b u t also assailed the a d m in istra tio n for n o t b u ild in g m o re m is­ siles faster. For his p a rt, "E isenhow er th o u g h t th a t testin g w a s far too com plex a n d d a n g ero u s a subject to be d iscu ssed in a political cam p aig n ,"42 th o u g h h e sk ew ered S tevenson on the issue w h e n it seem ed necessary. So e n d e d h is first term , fo u r y ears of p recario u s b alance in w h ich so m u ch seem ed to h in g e o n h im alone, a n d he n o t an ticip atin g h o w "com plex a n d d a n g e ro u s" subjects m ig h t resist elite control.

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H is b e st allies o n defense policy h a d b e en b u sin e ssm e n a n d conservatives, n o t liberals. A few m o n th s after th e election, I. F. Stone a p tly d escrib ed th e con­ te n d in g positions. N o tin g a w a rn in g b y G en eral Electric's p re sid e n t th a t "d e ­ fense e x p en d itu re s d ra in aw ay n atio n al resources," Stone th o u g h t it "stran g e w h e n o n ly a b ig b u sin e ssm a n talks as liberals u se d to." Stone su m m arize d a n ­ o th er d isse n te r's claim th a t "th e R ussian m ilitary m enace h a d b e e n b u ilt u p h ere b e y o n d all reasonable p ro p o rtio n s" a n d th a t "d efen se h a d becom e a g rav y train ." "W hose n a m e w a s sig n ed to this m o v in g a p p eal?" Stone asked. "N o t W alter R euther or U p to n Sinclair o r . . . R einhold N ie b u h r o r . . . A rth u r M. Schlesinger, Jr.," b u t "a D em ocratic co n g ressm an from b e n ig h te d M ississippi." L iberals' "silence," Stone co m p lain ed , "reflects th e v a st a n d in h ib itin g sh a d o w cast across A m erican life b y the sh eer size of th e m ilitary b u d g e t," w ith lab o r a n d cap ital a h d th e acad em y n o w living "off th e search for ev er m o re in g en io u s w e a p o n s." E isenhow er, of course, h a d n o t b e en silen t— S tone's w o rd s m ir­ ro red h is se n tim e n ts— b u t too often h e h a d b e en tim id a n d in co n sisten t.43

Reform in the Paradigm of War In M arch 1953, th e issu e of g e n erato rs for the C hief Joseph D am cam e before a n "u n su sp e c tin g C abinet." It seem ed a m in o r m a tte r of dom estic policy, except th a t foreign policy w as also a t stake: the W hite H o u se h a d p ro fessed its com ­ m itm e n t to free tra d e a n d o p e n e d b id d in g to B ritish firm s, b u t W estin g h o u se w a n te d (an d ev en tu ally got) the contract d e sp ite its h ig h e r bid. For w eek s th e " u n p le a sa n t so u n d of w h irrin g g e n erato rs" filled th e C ab in et room . E m m et Jo h n H u g h e s co m p lain ed .44 The ep iso d e sh o w ed m o re th a n th e a d m in istra ­ tio n 's capacity to get sid etrack ed from m ajor issues. It also sh o w ed th a t few issu es b e lo n g e d w h o lly an y lo n g er to "dom estic policy." G o v e rn m e n t's role in th e n a tio n 's life a n d the a g en d a of reform w a s m o re th a n ev er lo d g ed in the p a ra d ig m of w ar. T he te rra in su ite d E isenhow er in som e w ay s, alth o u g h , as H u g h e s later n o te d , reig n in g stereo ty p es a b o u t the tw o m ajor political p a rtie s— "th e D em o­ crats as 'th e P arty of W ar,' the R epublicans as 'th e P arty of D ep ressio n ' " — m a d e it h a rd to assess Ike's record, th e n a n d for lo n g after h is presidency. H is b io g ra p h e r cam e close to th e m ark. E isen h o w er's lib eralism reg a rd in g d o m es­ tic affairs w as real b u t "u su a lly connected w ith n atio n al security," a n d w ith o u t su c h a connection, it "fad e d ." In d eed , liberalism generally, n o t ju st Ike's ver­ sion, w a s connected to n a tio n al security, ju st as its d istin ctio n from co n serv a­ tism w a s b lu rry .45 O n occasion, E isenhow er reached b e y o n d a m ere p ro g ram m atic lin k ag e b e ­ tw e en refo rm a n d n atio n al security, as w h e n h e u rg e d a p p ly in g resources freed b y d isa rm a m e n t "to a n e w k in d of w a r . . . u p o n th e b ru te forces of p o v e rty a n d n e e d ." 46 T hat language, fo resh ad o w in g L yndon Jo h n so n 's W ar o n Poverty, re­ flected b o th e n tra p m e n t in a n d discom fo rt w ith th e p a ra d ig m of w ar: E isen h ow er w a n te d to reach o u tsid e it b u t co u ld n o t escape it.

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H is difficulty reflected a larger w eak n ess in h is c a m p a ig n a g ain st m ilitariza­ tion: h e offered n o com pelling m ission for A m erica b e y o n d n a tio n a l security. The evils of m ilitarizatio n h e con v ey ed precisely a n d elo q u en tly ; th e a ltern a ­ tives to it h e a rticu lated e arn estly b u t vaguely. T he w a r p a ra d ig m d id lea d h im to act o n a considerable refo rm a g en d a, b u t b y th e late 1950s refo rm ers w e re in creasingly couching th a t a g en d a in th e lan g u a g e of justice. E isen h o w er— ill a t ease w ith th a t lan g u a g e a n d th e g ro u p s e sp o u sin g it, b u t w a ry also of claim s m a d e in b eh alf of n a tio n al se cu rity — th e n o ften lo st h is g rip o n reform . W as h e b e h in d th e tim es o r a h e a d of them ? N o w recalled, h is w o rd s seem to belie the fatu o u s o p tim ism often later a ttrib u te d to th e 1950s a n d h is o w n le a d ­ ership. A t a tim e w h e n A m ericans co n su m ed n a tu ra l reso u rces w ith a b an d o n , h e w o rrie d a b o u t a w o rld "g ro w n b a rre n as th e m o u n ta in s of th e m o o n ," antici­ p a tin g later ecological concerns. In a n era of faith in m ateria l p ro g ress, h e w a rn e d of its in se p arab ility from m artia l d estru ctio n : "L ab o r sw eats to create, a n d tu rn s o u t devices to level n o t only m o u n ta in s b u t also cities."47 W h en m a te ­ rial v alu es a p p e a re d triu m p h a n t, h e in to n e d h ig h e r ideals. A s faith in th e p o w e r of law su ffu sed th e civil rig h ts m o v em en t, h e in sisted th a t o n ly h e a rts a n d h e a d s co u ld effect racial change. O f course, w h a t d e fin e d 1950s o p tim ism w as less a b elittlem en t of p ro b lem s th a n confidence th a t th e n a tio n co u ld solve them . Ike o ften sh a red th a t confidence, b u t h is o u tlo o k h a d a d a rk e r stra in as w ell. H e w a s also less in control of issues of refo rm th a n th o se of n a tio n al stra te g y a n d foreign policy. The latter e n g ag e d his g reatest exp ertise a n d sh a rp e st con­ victions, w h ereas h is ability to sh a p e do m estic po licy seem ed lim ite d — o ne reaso n th a t m o d e m P resid en ts h av e a tte n d e d m o re to n a tio n a l security, w h e re the constitutional a n d political c o n strain ts o n th e m seem ed few er. A s in te rest g ro u p s pro liferated , political p a rtie s w e ak e n ed , a n d m ed ia politics su p p la n te d them , p resid en tia l p o w e r in dom estic m a tte rs a p p e a re d to sh rin k . M aster b ro ­ kers like FDR or L yndon Johnson could overcom e th e obstacles o n occasion, as co u ld e v id e n t m ajority d e m a n d s. A n d E isen h o w er h a d successes: h e g en erally g o t w h a t h e w a n te d in th e w e ig h ty m a tte r of fed eral b u d g e ts a n d m o n e ta ry policy; h e g ain ed a m o d e st e x p an sio n of w elfare p ro g ra m s (increased Social Security benefits, e x p a n d e d u n e m p lo y m e n t co m p en satio n , a h ig h e r m in im u m w age); a n d h e secured m ajor p ro g ra m s of in te rn al d ev elo p m en t. But th e a d ­ m in istra tio n 's g rip o n o th er m atters w a s shaky, especially w h e n it faced g rass­ roots m o v em en ts th a t c ircu m v en ted p a rty stru c tu re s a n d elite control. Such m o v em en ts h a d little room , except as p re su m e d beneficiaries, in h is v isio n of a "co rp o rate c o m m o n w ealth " a d v a n c e d b y p a rtn e rsh ip b e tw e e n g o v e rn m e n t a n d "co rp o rate liberals," th o u g h e v en b u sin e ssm e n o ften ex asp e rate d h im ("They m ake crooks o u t of them selves," h e once co m p lain ed ).48 M eanw hile, E isen h o w er's favorite am o n g h is ach iev em en ts w e n t fo rw ard . The h u g e In terstate a n d D efense H ig h w a y System , a p p ro v e d b y C o n g ress in 1956 at his initiative, d e m o n stra te d the intricate m esh in g of n a tio n al secu rity

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w ith d om estic policy. In a few d ecad es trav elers w o u ld p a y little h e e d to the "D efense" in th e official title, b u t in the 1950s m o to rists co u ld n o t m iss (as Ike later p u t it) seeing the signs " sp ro u t u p alo n g sid e th e p av em en t: 'In th e e v e n t of a n e n em y a tta c k . . . " For E isenhow er, defen se w a s a m ajor reaso n for th e n e w sy stem of ro a d s (an d for th e Saint L aw rence Seaw ay). H e w o rrie d a b o u t h o w to ev acu ate cities in a n u c le ar w a r— th e p re se n t system , h e w a rn e d in 1955, "w o u ld b e th e b re e d e r of a d e a d ly congestio n w ith in h o u rs of a n a tta c k "— a n d h e rejected the o p tio n civil d efen se experte favored, a v a st sy stem of fallout shelters. W orried also a b o u t m ilitary tra n sp o rta tio n , h e v iv id ly recalled jo in in g a n a rm y co n v o y 's ago n izin g , six ty -tw o -d ay cro ss-co u n try trip in 1919 a n d re­ tu rn in g h o m e in 1945, after seeing G e rm a n y 's Autobahnen, to A m erican ro a d s in "sh o ck in g c o n d itio n ." S tretching b e h in d h im w a s th e m ilita ry 's lo n g role, e sp e­ cially th a t of the A rm y C o rp s of E ngineers, in th e n a tio n 's in te rn al d e v elo p ­ m en t. H is choice to h e a d a com m ittee stu d y in g th e issu e b ro u g h t to g eth er all these facets, p lu s th e h ig h w a y lobby: it w a s L ucius Clay, en g in eer, a rm y g en ­ eral, fo rm er h e a d of th e m ilita ry o ccu p atio n of G erm any, a n d m em b er of G en ­ eral M o to rs' b o a rd of directors.49 E isen h o w er's in itiativ e o n h ig h w a y s also reflected a m o d e ra te pro g ressiv ism th a t p riz e d a lim ited fed eral role in p ro m o tin g econom ic stab ility a n d a b u n d an c e. H e saw p u b lic w o rk s p ro g ra m s as a fiscal tool for sm o o th in g o u t th e b u sin e ss cycle w h ile a v o id in g the evils of o u trig h t w elfarism . H e sh a red the p rev a ilin g faith th a t g ra n d ly scaled technological d e v e lo p m e n t w o u ld b rin g "g re a te r c o n v e n ie n c e ,. . . g reater h a p p in e ss, a n d g reater s ta n d a rd s of liv in g ." In w o rd s to m ak e a later g e n eratio n sh u d d e r, h e so o n b o a ste d th a t h is h ig h w a y p ro g ra m u se d e n o u g h concrete to m ak e "six sid ew alk s to th e m o o n " a n d m o v e d e n o u g h rock a n d d irt "to b u ry all of C on n ecticu t tw o feet d e e p ."50 E isen h o w er's o u tlo o k m ay seem o d d to a later g en eratio n th a t sees th e d e ­ m a n d s of d efen se a n d p ro sp e rity as c o m p etin g a g ain st each other, a c o m p eti­ tio n w h ic h w o rrie d Ike him self, b u t a t the tim e th o se d e m a n d s seem ed to be m u tu a lly su p p o rtiv e ra th e r th a n c lash in g — n e w ro ad s, like o th e r p ro g ram s, w o u ld a d d re ss b o th n eed s. It w a s telling th a t th e h ig h w a y p ro g ra m received little criticism , a lth o u g h L ew is M u m fo rd c o n d em n ed it, a n d th a t w h a t d id e n ­ su e rarely a d d re sse d its defen se c o m p o n e n t b u t in stea d its capacity to h a ste n th e d e te rio ra tio n of in n er cities a n d in terstate rail tra n s p o rt (E isenhow er h a d seen th e n e w sy stem o p e ra tin g on ly b e tw ee n cities, fearin g th e m a m m o th costs of u rb a n construction). R evealingly, a d m irin g v iew s of th e n e w h ig h w a y sy s­ tem u se d w a r to m ea su re the triu m p h : it w a s to b e "th e g reatest m an -m ad e p h y sical e n te rp rise of all tim e w ith the exception of w a r."51 Race relations, a m ore c h arg ed issu e th a n h ig h w ay s, fit less com fortably into th e fram e w o rk of w a r a n d n a tio n al security, b u t n o t for w a n t of co n n ectio n s to it. If an y th in g , those connections w ere so m a n y a n d so volatile th a t in stea d of offering coherence to debate, th ey h e lp e d m ak e it sp in o u t of control. T he con­ n ectio ns w ere e v id e n t in h o w the civil rig h ts im p u lse still d re w o n th e leader-

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ship, tactics, a n d a rg u m e n ts set d u rin g th e 1940s. T hey w ere e v id e n t in th e a rm e d forces' visible, pace-setting role in racial in teg ratio n . T hey a p p e a re d in H o lly w ood films: m ovies a b o u t W orld W ar II w ere a m o n g th e first to eschew d e m e an in g stereo ty p es of blacks, w h ile Bad Day at Black Rock (1954) e x p lo red a sm all to w n 's m u rd e ro u s racism after Pearl H a rb o r a g a in st JapaneseA m ericans, w ith a o n e-arm ed w h ite w a r v e te ra n (Spencer Tracy) as th e hero . Since seg reg atio n a n d racism w ere still seen largely as so u th e rn p ro b lem s, th e C ivil W ar, w h o se h u n d re d th a n n iv e rsa ry lo o m ed , p ro v id e d a n o th e r fram e­ w o rk of u n d e rsta n d in g . U se of fed eral tro o p s to resto re o rd e r a n d enforce in te ­ g ratio n in th e S outh ev o k ed R econstruction, for exam ple, w h ile o n e se n ato r co m p lain ed early in the 1960s th a t "in this b a ttle o n th e Senate floor th e roles of G ra n t a n d Lee a t A p p o m a tto x h av e b e e n rev ersed ." In d eed , th e sense of racial w a r cu sto m arily im p u te d to th e 1960s w a s alre ad y e v id en t, o n ly w ith th e m e ta ­ p h o rs differently cast.52 The C old W ar offered a closely related context. L iberals re itera te d th eir calls to p ro tect n a tio n al p o w e r b y im p ro v in g race relations. "W ith th e C o m m u n ists reaching o u t to the u n c o m m itted p e o p le of th e M id d le E ast a n d A frica a n d S outheast A sia," Sen. P aul D ouglas re m in d e d h is colleagues, "each h o u sin g rio t in Illinois, each school rio t in K entucky, a n d each b o m b in g of a p a s to r's h o m e o r in tim id a tio n of a w o u ld -b e N eg ro v o ter in A lab am a o r M ississip p i b e ­ com es n o t only a n affront to h u m a n d ig n ity h ere in th is country, b u t a d e fe at for freed o m in its to u g h w o rld stru g g le for su rv iv al." Vice P re sid e n t N ixon, th o u g h illiberal in outlook a n d equivocal o n specifics, a rg u e d in 1960, "In th e w o rld -w id e stru g g le in w h ic h w e are en g ag ed , racial a n d relig io u s p reju d ice is a g u n w e p o in t at o u rselv es."53 A n d foes of civil rig h ts leg islatio n still a rg u e d th a t it em b o d ied th e h e av y -h an d e d m a n n e r of co m m u n ist g o v e rn m e n ts, a n d th a t th e civil rig h ts m o v em en t w a s in sp ired o r led b y c o m m u n ists, as th e FBI to ld th e W hite H ouse. The in tern atio n al scene fram ed the stru g g le o v er civil rig h ts in su b tler w a y s as w ell. C onnections real o r alleged b e tw e e n sex a n d politics, a stap le of C o ld W ar culture, d o g g ed the civil rig h ts m ovem en t: th e sexual liaisons of M a rtin L u th er K ing, Jr., w ere w o v e n into th e FBI's ta p e stry alleging h is co m m u n ism ; th e h o m osexuality of B ayard R ustin, a n o th e r p ro m in e n t black lead er, e n d a n ­ g ered h im w ith o th er blacks as w ell as th e FBI. T he stru g g le o v e r race relatio n s also p lay e d o u t o n a n in tern atio n al stage. K ing, failing to g ain a n a u d ien ce w ith N ixon, finally m et h im in G hana, w h e re b o th w ere a tte n d in g celebrations of th a t n a tio n 's in d ep en d en ce, a n d th eir su b seq u e n t m eetin g in W ash in g to n w a s d u b b e d , "in the p o p u la r p arlan ce of th e n e w n u c le ar age, th e first 's u m m it con­ ference' " b e tw ee n the tw o.54 K ing's m eetin g s w ith T h ird W orld lea d ers w ere su sp ec t a t a tim e w h e n "n eu tra lism " in the C old W ar w a s h a rd ly acceptable to n atio n al leaders, m u ch less to m a n y o th er A m ericans; h is talk of global n o n ­ violence a n d d isa rm a m e n t p o se d a sim ilar risk. O n d ie o th er h a n d , th e ru s h to in d ep e n d en c e of A frican nations, p re su m a b ly rip e for w o o in g b y th e co m m u ­ nists, sh o red u p fam iliar claim s a b o u t the d a n g e rs of A m erican racism .

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K ing w a s a ttu n e d to all these elem ents. H e k n ew h o w h is a p p e a l d e riv e d fro m a n d p la y e d o u t o n a global stage, a n d h e so u g h t to m obilize w o rld as w ell as n a tio n a l opinion. T he "b ru tality " so u th e rn w h ite officials v e n te d o n black d e m o n stra to rs, h e later w ro te, "w a s c a u g h t— as a fu g itiv e from a p e n ite n tia ry is o ften c a u g h t— in gigantic circling sp o tlig h ts . . . a lu m in o u s g lare rev ealin g th e n a k e d tru th to the w h o le w o rld ." H e d re w in sp ira tio n a n d tactics from th e rev o lt of n o n w h ite s a g ain st im p erial rule, especially G a n d h i's n o n v io le n t cam ­ p a ig n for In d ia n in d ep en d en ce. H is m o v em en t w a s also su ffu sed w ith m ilitary im agery. H is "n o n v io le n t a rm y " w ie ld e d "th e sw o rd th a t h eals," a n d a t th e 1960 sit-in of th e G reensboro, N o rth C arolina, W o o lw o rth 's, d e m o n stra to rs w o rk e d , it h a s b e e n w ritte n , from a " 'c o m m a n d c e n te r '" a n d o p e ra te d "w ith crisp, m ilitary efficiency— b riefin g n e w p ro teste rs o n nonviolence, q u a sh in g ru m o rs, d e sp a tc h in g fresh tro o p s as n e e d e d ." K ing c o n tin u e d in to th e early 1960s to p ress fam iliar a rg u m e n ts a b o u t th e C old W ar a n d th e m ea n in g of W orld W ar n , p o in tin g to th e sh am e of d isc rim in atio n a g ain st b lack A m erican s in u n ifo rm , to the fate of Jew s u n d e r H itler, to th e p e rv e rsio n of law in co m m u ­ n ist co untries, a n d to A m erican ideals in th e C old W ar: "T h ro u g h o u t th e u p ­ h eav als of c o ld -w ar politics, N egroes h a d seen th eir g o v e rn m e n t go to th e b rin k of n u c le ar conflict m ore th a n once. T he justificatio n for risk in g th e a n n ih ilatio n of th e h u m a n race w a s alw ay s ex p ressed in term s of A m erica's w illin g n ess to go to a n y len g th s to p reserv e freedom . To th e N e g r o . . . th ere is a certain b itte r iro n y in th e p ictu res of his c o u n try c h am p io n in g freed o m in foreign la n d s a n d failing to e n su re th a t freed o m to tw e n ty m illio n of its o w n ."55 Yet K ing also p resse d th is fam iliar a rg u m e n t b e y o n d th e sta n d a rd line of n a ­ tio n al expediency. For h im , th e C old W ar h ig h lig h ted th e m o ral issu e of racism , n o t th e o th er w a y a ro u n d . T he m o ral im plicatio n s of hypocrisy, n o t th e expe­ d ie n t d a n g e rs of inconsistency, w ere h is concern. In d eed , K ing, th o u g h n o t alone a n d n o t w ith o u t p o w e rfu l p reced en ts, recast th e m o v em en t in th e fram e­ w o rk of justice a n d m o rality ra th e r th a n of n a tio n al p o w er. E isenhow er a n d m o st m e n a ro u n d h im w ere u n e asy a b o u t th e ap p ea l to ju s­ tice, o r a t least a b o u t acting o n it. T h o u g h a ck n o w led g in g th e im m o rality of rac­ ism , Ike consistently voiced his d o u b t th a t "preju d ices, ev en p a lp a b ly u n ­ ju stified prejudices, w ill succum b to c o m p u lsio n ." S h ap ed b y Earl W arren, Ike's n o m in ee for chief justice of the S u p rem e C o u rt, th e 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision b a n n in g school seg reg atio n (still legal in tw en ty -o n e states a n d W ashington, D.C.) elicited sim ilar reactions fro m E isenhow er. T h o u g h af­ firm in g his o bligation to enforce th e decision, h e p o in te d ly refu sed to e n d o rse it. "W e c a n 't d e m a n d perfection in these m o ral q u estio n s," h e to ld h is staff. "A n d th e fellow w h o tries to tell m e th a t y o u can d o these th in g s b y force is ju st p la in nuts." H e often m ad e these v iew s public, seem in g to d e n ig ra te th e sp irit a n d su b stan ce of the civil rig h ts m ovem ent. E ven w h e n a ssertin g black A m erican s' rig h t to "first-class citizenship," h e in sisted th a t th ey "b e p a tie n t."56 In m an y w ay s h is stance w a s u n su rp risin g . It w as in tu n e w ith th e at b est g ra d u a list a p p ro ach to racial p ro g ress e sp o u se d b y m a n y w h ite A m ericans. It

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d id h im n o h a rm a t the polls: in 1956 h e im p ro v e d his tak e of b o th black a n d so u th e rn w h ite votes, a n d K ing h im self claim ed to h av e v o te d R epublican. N o r w as his stance attrib u ta b le to h is age. H is y o u n g successor w a s scarcely m o re sensitive to racial issues u n til ch an g in g tim es forced h is h a n d , ju st as in h is m em o irs E isenhow er later h in te d th a t h e reg re tte d h is earlier tim idity: A l­ th o u g h as P re sid e n t h e h a d n o t e n d o rse d th e Brown v. Board of Education deci­ sion, "th ere can b e n o q u e stio n th a t the ju d g m e n t of th e C o u rt w a s rig h t." A n d m o st A m ericans d id as b a d ly as Ike in foreseeing h o w th e ideological ferv o r ov er civil rig h ts w o u ld e m p o w e r o th e r m o v em en ts. W h en o n e re p o rte r a sk ed w h y h e w a s n o t "as active in try in g to w ip e o u t d isc rim in atio n b a se d o n sex" as o n race, the su rp rise d P re sid e n t jo k ed (as T ru m a n h a d ) a b o u t h o w h a rd it w a s "for a m ere m a n to believe th a t w o m a n d o e s n 't h a v e e q u al rig h ts." H e d id e n ­ d o rse a n eq u al rig h ts a m e n d m e n t, a n d (w ith in th e com fortable confines of n a ­ tio n al security) h e stru ck d o w n a policy restrictin g p ro m o tio n of a rm y n u rse s th a t "assu m es th a t ev ery w o m a n of fifty-five is d ecrep it," b u t w o m e n 's rig h ts g alv an ized h im n o m ore th a n m o st lead ers.57 For the style a n d su b stan ce of th e civil rig h ts m o v em en t, E isen h o w er h a d little affinity b y v irtu e of h is profession, cu ltu re, o r politics. H is h an d s-o ff a p ­ p ro ach clearly s p ra n g from m ore th a n ju st racism , h o w ev er, since h is resistance to m o u n tin g d e m a n d s o n th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t arose in o th e r areas of p o licy as w ell. By th e sam e token, the "p o licy of d e la y a n d o b fu scatio n " w h ic h failed h im in civil rig h ts w as, h is b io g ra p h e r p o in ts out, th e sam e o n e "h e h a d u se d so successfully in v a rio u s foreign crises." M oreover, th ere were real lim its to w h a t form al an tid iscrim in atio n efforts c o u ld achieve: su b u rb a n iz a tio n in th e 1950s "w as stre n g th e n in g th e d e facto basis for racial seg reg atio n e v e n as ju d icial ru l­ ings, m ilitan t p ro test, congressional action, a n d executive in te rv e n tio n w ere w eak en in g its d e ju re b a sis."58 M ore su rp risin g w a s E isen h o w er's failure to ad v an ce th e issu e forcefully as a m a tte r of n atio n al se cu rity — to sp e ak to th e d a n g e rs a b ro a d of A m erican rac­ ism o r to the w a r record of black A m ericans in o rd e r to ju stify fed eral p o w e r in b eh alf of civil rights. T h at context offered a com fortable w a y to seize th e in itia­ tive a n d p re e m p t b ro a d e r ratio n ales for racial justice. It lay o n a p a th w ell char­ ted b y the m id-1950s, one h e follow ed o n h ig h w a y s a n d o th er issues a n d , o n occasion, reg a rd in g racial d iscrim ination. In stead of follo w in g th a t p a th consis­ tently, h ow ever, h e g ro p e d a t th e em erg in g lan g u a g e of justice, b u t so te n ­ tativ ely th a t h e lacked force or e v id e n t conviction. If n o th in g else, h is reluctance to tak e ev en the com fortable p a th is a rem in d er of th e elasticity of n a tio n al secu ­ rity as ratio n ale for refo rm — of h o w little n atio n al secu rity w a s a m a tte r o f o b ­ jective need , h o w m u ch it w as a coin of th e realm to b e e m p lo y ed o r d isc ard e d d e p e n d in g o n o th er p u rp o se s. E isen h o w er's fu lm in atio n s a g ain st "co m p u lsio n " in racial m a tte rs w ere es­ pecially specious. True, h e d id som etim es o p p o se u se of fed eral p o w e r to im ­ p o se m o rality in o th er w ays: reg a rd in g a p ro p o se d b a n o n ra d io a n d telev isio n

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a d v e rtisin g for liq u o r a n d cigarettes, h e asked , "W h at are w e g o in g to tu rn o u t to b e — a police state?" But th a t stance w a s stra n g e from so m eo n e o u t of a m ili­ ta ry o rg an iz atio n n o tab le for coercing m o rality in all so rts of w a y s a n d sh o w in g a g o o d d e al of p ro g ress precisely in the realm of race. M oreover, h e d id im p o se m o rality w h e re h e d e e m e d fed eral a u th o rity legitim ate. H e w o rk e d h a rd to e n d d isc rim in atio n in W ashington, D .C /s fed eral facilities a n d to p e rs u a d e local b u sin esses th ere to d o likew ise. H e su p p o rte d d e seg re g atio n of th e a rm e d forces (th o u g h it p ro ce ed e d slow ly). H e p ro claim ed th e n e e d for eq u al o p p o r­ tu n ity in fed eral h irin g (if d o in g little in practice), a n d h e b ack ed a m o d e ra te civil rig h ts bill (w atered d o w n in C ongress b efore p a ssa g e in 1957) e m p o w e r­ in g th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t to enforce v o tin g rights. T hose actions left u n clear w h e th e r h is o u tlook w a s really sh a p e d b y h is sen se of th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t's in cap acity to legislate m orality, or ju st b y h is d o u b t th a t a n y th in g w a s d e ep ly w ro n g in race relations. N o r d id Ike's b lith e re p u d ia tio n of c o m p u lsio n a d d re ss th e a rg u m e n t K ing a n d o th ers m ad e, th a t law a n d force co u ld a t least g u a ra n te e rig h ts a n d ch an g e behavior. "A law m a y n o t m ak e a m a n love m e," as K ing p u t it, " b u t it can sto p h im from ly n ch in g m e." A n d of course, m a n y w h ites feared precisely th a t m o rality could b e leg islated — th a t fed eral p o w e r would m ak e a difference.59 M u ch of this E isen h o w er h a d to acknow led g e, g ru d g in g ly a n d im plicitly, in th e L ittle Rock crisis of 1957. By then, the S o u th 's resistance to school in teg ra­ tio n w a s o n ly stiffening, as w h ite citizens' councils m o b ilized a n d local officials u se d q u asileg al o r illegal w a y s to circu m v en t th e S u p rem e C o u rt's decision. E isen h o w er h a d publicly sta te d th a t h e co u ld n o t "im ag in e" u sin g fed eral tro o p s to enforce th e decision because the "co m m o n sense of A m erica w ill n e v e r req u ire it." In Septem ber, A rk an sas g o v e rn o r O rv al F au b u s activ ated th e N a tio n a l G u a rd in o rd e r to p re v e n t th e e n try of b lack stu d e n ts in to L ittle R ock's C e n tra l H ig h School, b u t after n eg o tiatio n s w ith E isenhow er, h e sim p ly w ith ­ d re w th e g u a rd , o p e n in g th e w a y for m ob violence a g ain st black stu d e n ts. Feel­ in g b e tra y e d b y F aubus, E isenhow er acted sw iftly, as if "h is o w n sense of th e m ilita ry code h a d b e e n breached: a lie u ten a n t (the g o v ern o r) h a d b e e n g u ilty of su b o rd in a tio n ." H e se n t elem en ts of th e a rm y 's 101st A irb o rn e D ivision to re­ store o rd er.60 T he d ra m a eerily resem b led C o ld W ar crises abroad: tro o p s d e p lo y e d , the m ed ia m obilized, a failed su m m it (betw een E isen h o w er a n d Faubus), a P resi­ d e n t's te st of n erves, a n d th e lan g u a g e of w ar. Ike m u se d o n h is crises as a g e n ­ eral a n d cast h is actions at L ittle Rock in m ilitary term s: "W ell, if w e h av e to d o th is," h e to ld h is a tto rn ey general, " th e n le t's a p p ly th e b e st m ilitary p rin cip les to it a n d see th a t th e force w e se n d th ere is stro n g e n o u g h th a t it w ill n o t b e ch allenged, a n d w ill n o t resu lt in a n y clash." A ccu sto m ed to Ik e's tem p o riz in g (or, as E m m et John H u g h e s p u t it, h is "d efin ite a n d explicit resolve t o . . . leave th in g s u n d o n e "), w h ite S o u th ern ers w ere su rp rise d a n d fu rio u s. F au b u s called A rk an sas "o ccu p ied territo ry "; Sen. R ichard R ussell "co m p a red th e in terv en -

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tio n a t Little Rock to H itle r's u se of sto rm tro o p ers"; L ouisiana political boss L ean d er Perez talk ed secession; o th ers p o in te d o u t " th a t th is tim e a ro u n d the Feds h a d atom ic w e a p o n s."61 E isenhow er him self n o w in v o k ed n a tio n al security, tellin g th e n a tio n th a t Little R ock's d iso rd e r d e n ig ra te d its im age ab ro a d a n d p la y e d in to c o m m u n ist p ro p ag a n d a: "O u r enem ies are g lo atin g o v e r th is in c id e n t a n d u sin g it ev ery ­ w h ere to m isrep resen t o u r w h o le nation. . . . W e are p o rtra y e d as a v io lato r of those sta n d a rd s of co n d u ct w h ich th e p e o p le s of th e w o rld u n ite d to p ro claim in th e C h a rte r of th e U n ited N atio n s." H u g h e s later g ave a forceful su m m a ry of th e C o ld W ar liberalism E isenhow er ex p ressed o n th is occasion. T he L ittle Rock sto ry "carried faster th a n d ru m signals across b lack A frica. It su m m o n e d cold gleam s of recognition to th e eyes of A sians . . . of th e racial en m ities th a t h a d h e lp e d to m ake colonialism . . . so o d io u s to th em . M ore th a n a few W est E u ro p ea n s— long since w e a ry of th e m oralistic ex h o rtatio n s o r p io u s in junc­ tio n s of A m erican po licy — co u ld sm irk com p lacen tly a t th e c ru d e p ractice of racism in the self-styled sa n ctu a ry of freedom : th e p rea ch e r n o w w a s b e in g ta u n te d a n d rid ic u le d b y h is o w n congregation. A n d to tell p e o p le s of all lan d s, th e tra in e d a n d in stru cted voice of Soviet p ro p a g a n d a co u ld relay, in alm o st affectionately fastid io u s d etail, the n e w s of L ittle R ock— b re a th in g sco rn as it sp o k e."62 But H u g h e s w a s also criticizing E isenhow er, w h o d id n o t su sta in th e a rg u ­ m e n t h e offered d u rin g th e L ittle Rock crisis o r th e actions th a t w e n t w ith it. T hose actions, he m a d e clear, set n o p re c e d e n t for him . T hey w ere ta k e n o n ly to p reserv e order, n o t to p ress in teg ratio n , w h ic h F au b u s so o n c irc u m v e n ted sim ­ p ly b y closing p u b lic schools. E isenhow er s u p p o rte d a n o th e r m o d e st legisla­ tive effort, the C ivil R ights A ct of 1960, e x p a n d in g fed eral p o w e r to enforce v o t­ in g rig h ts a n d in v estig ate violence in v o lv in g th e in te rstate tra n sp o rta tio n of explosives. O n occasion h e restated b o th th e m ajor ratio n ales for action: "T his p rim a ry w o rk o n civil rig h ts m u st go o n," h e n o te d in h is final State of th e U n io n A ddress. "N o t only because d isc rim in atio n is m o rally w ro n g , b u t also because its im p act is m ore th a n n a tio n a l— it is w o rld -w id e ." 63 But h is p resi­ d en cy e n d e d w ith school d eseg reg atio n b arely sta rte d in th e South, w h ite lead ers there in tran sig en t, black m ilitancy rising, a n d th e p e rc ep tio n of a d m in ­ istratio n failure w id e sp rea d . H e h a d ta p p e d fully n e ith e r th e w e llsp rin g s of concern a b o u t n a tio n al security n o r th e an g er a b o u t injustice of th e civil rig h ts m o v em ent. R acism a n d com placency w ere p a rt of th e failure, b u t also h is in ­ co m p reh en sio n a b o u t m ass-based m o v e m e n ts— th a t of w h ite resistance, a n d ev en m ore th a t of black m ilitancy. E isen h o w er's v iew s w ere firm er a b o u t co n serv atio n of A m erica's basic re­ sources, a concern h e tied loosely b u t forcefully to n a tio n al security. H is convic­ tio n th a t "som e d a y the w o rld w a s g oing to b e o u t of ex h au stib le reso u rces," as h e p u t it in 1955, o v erro d e his conservative v iew s of fed eral au th o rity . H e w a s

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eag er for th e g o v e rn m e n t to p u rch a se m arg in al la n d subject to ero sio n a n d d e ­ pletio n , a n d C ongress a p p ro v e d a m u ch -to u te d Soil Bank in 1956. G o v ern m en t, h e a rg u e d , w a s o b ligated to "p ro tec t th e soil of A m erica ju st as w e w a n t to p ro ­ tect o u r freed o m of speech, rig h t to w o rsh ip , etc." H is concern, as in h is defen se policy, w a s n a tio n al p o w e r in the d ista n t future. E yeing th e Soviet U n io n 's a p ­ p a re n t econom ic p o w er, h e u rg e d seizing "th e o p p o rtu n ity to p l a n . . . over the long term. " Seeking n e w fed eral h e a lth p ro g ram s, h e w a rn e d th a t w ith o u t th em "w e as a p e o p le are g u ilty n o t only of n eglect of h u m a n suffering b u t also of w a stin g o u r n a tio n al stre n g th ."64 In a sim ilar fashion, h e saw e d u ca tio n al resources as v ital to lo n g -term secu­ rity a n d p rosperity. Typically, h e w a n te d a m o d e st fed eral role, p ro p o sin g fed ­ eral g ran ts for school c o n stru ctio n in the n e ed iest d istricts a n d p o o rest states. Public schools enjoyed a long tra d itio n of local con tro l still d e fe n d e d b y seg­ reg atio n ists a n d conservatives, b u t b y th e 1950s th a t tra d itio n w a s colliding w ith efforts to increase fed eral a id to ed u catio n , efforts g ro u n d e d in th e b ab y b o o m 's financial im p act o n local b u d g e ts a n d b y d e m a n d s th a t schools h elp A m erica w in th e C old W ar. C onflict o v er w h e th e r fed eral a id sh o u ld flow to p aro ch ial schools also arose. C a u g h t in th e crossfire— especially c o n ten tio u s w a s a m ove to d e n y g ran ts to states d efy in g th e Brown d ecisio n — E isen h o w er's p ro p o sa l rep e ate d ly failed to clear C ongress. B eyond his p ro p o sa l lo o m ed a d e b ate a b o u t e d u ca tio n w h ich in v o lv ed q u e s­ tio n s of n a tio n al p o w e r a n d p e rsisted in one g u ise o r a n o th e r for th e rest of the century. In th e 1950s, it in clu d ed allegations th a t p ro g ressiv e e d u c a to rs in ter­ ested in a "life-ad ju stm en t" c u rric u lu m w ere d eb asin g th e in tellectu al rigor, m o ral fiber, o r practical skills of A m erican y o uth. Vice A d m iral H y m a n Ricko v er sh o w e d h o w these issues related to n a tio n al security. R ickover h a d ru th lessly d riv e n th e n a v y into th e n u c le ar age, o v erseein g c o n stru ctio n of n u c le ar-p o w e red a n d m issile-firing su b m arin es. By 1956 h e w a s a n a tio n al scold reg a rd in g th e state of A m erican ed u catio n . A b it like E isenhow er, h e "h a d th e e n g in e e r's d istaste for inefficiency a n d w a ste w h e rev e r th ey w ere fo u n d — th e w a ste of g o o d farm lan d , forests, oil, clean riv ers a n d lakes, a n d b rig h t m in d s, 'o u r m o st v a lu ab le n a tio n al asset.' " U nless A m erican y o u th con fro n ted "th e terrific req u ire m e n ts of this ra p id ly sp iralin g scientific a n d in d u stria l civi­ lization, w e are b o u n d to go d o w n ." T he Soviets, R ickover w a rn e d , h a d learn ed th a t lesson. "T here can b e n o second place in a co n test w ith R ussia a n d th ere w ill b e n o second chance if w e lose." O th e r au th o rities also lin k ed e d u ca tio n al refo rm to n a tio n al security. For Jam es C o n a n t— a key science official in W orld W ar II, fo rm er h ig h com m issioner to W est G erm any, a d v iser to sev eral Presi­ d e n ts, a n d p re sid e n t of H a rv a rd U n iv ersity — a t stak e in e d u ca tio n al reform "w a s the c u ltu ral a n d m ilitary conflict w ith th e Soviet U n io n ."65 For m illions of A m ericans, th a t conflict seem ed e v en sta rk e r after O ctober 1957. In e d u ca tio n al policy a n d o th er areas, th e w eb of co n nections to n a tio n al

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secu rity o n ly tig h te n ed as th e d ecad e w o re on, e v en as th e ratio n ale for refo rm w as m o v in g b e y o n d it. A n d E isenhow er fo u n d h is g oal of ach iev in g m o d e ra ­ tion, balance, a n d focus o n "th e lo n g te rm " m o re elu siv e th a n ever.

Sputnik and the Eroding Balance S p u tn ik a p p e a re d to knock th e n a tio n off-balance. A s G. M en n en W illiam s, M ich igan's D em ocratic g overnor, p u t it: O h L ittle S putnik, flying h ig h W ith m ad e -in M oscow beep. You tell the w o rld it's a C om m ie sky. A n d U ncle S am 's asleep.66 E arth 's first artificial satellite w e n t into o rb it o n O cto b er 4 ,1 9 5 7 , o n a Soviet rocket. W eighing less th a n tw o h u n d re d p o u n d s, it h a d n o p ractical utility, al­ th o u g h larger Soviet satellites a n d canine co sm o n au ts so o n follow ed, b u t its sym bolic im p o rt seem ed incalculable, as Soviet p re m ie r N ik ita K h ru sh ch ev a p ­ p reciated, so eag er w a s h e to ch an g e the p e rc ep tio n of Soviet b ack w ard n ess. If S p u tn ik w a s b a it in a p ro p a g a n d a w ar, lea d in g A m erican s sw allo w ed it w hole, naiv ely o r for calculated p u rp o se s. A cascade of d ire w a rn in g s, ex p res­ sions of h u m iliatio n , a n d calls for action flow ed. Sen. H e n ry Jackson called for a "n atio n al w eek of sh am e a n d d a n g e r." C o n g ressm an D aniel F lood, rejecting fiscal lim its o n n a tio n al action, cried, "I w o u ld ra th e r h av e re d in k in th e b o o k s th a n red b lo o d o n the streets of A m erica." Senate M ajority L ead er L y n d o n Johnson pro claim ed th a t "control of space m ean s control of th e w o rld ," w ith its p o ssessor able to im pose "ty ra n n y " o r "freed o m ." Foreseeing th e m ira cu lo u s d e v elo p m e n ts A m ericans often h av e expected of technological change, John­ son a rg u e d th a t th e w in n e rs in space w o u ld b e "m aste rs of in fin ity " able to "control the e a rth 's w ater, to cause d ro u th a n d flood, to ch an g e th e tid e s a n d raise the levels of the sea, to d iv e rt th e g u lf stre am a n d c h an g e th e clim ates to frigid." T hree years later, the strateg ist H e n ry K issinger, seeing Soviet a d ­ vances in space as one sign of a "d ec a d e a n d a h a lf" of A m erican decline, w o r­ ried th a t its co ntinu ance "w o u ld fin d u s re d u c e d to Fortress A m erica in a w o rld in w h ic h w e h a d becom e largely irrelev an t." The sense of ru p tu re d h isto ry — at the core of this p anic as in those o v er Pearl H a rb o r a n d th e atom ic b o m b — w a s acute. "L isten n o w for th e so u n d w h ic h forev erm o re se p ara tes th e o ld fro m the new ," u rg ed an NBC a n n o u n c e r d irectin g his a u d ien ce to S p u tn ik 's b leep s.67 A s u su al, A m ericans p o rtra y in g a n o m in o u s fu tu re in v o k ed w a r's d a rk b u t fam iliar past. Physicist E d w a rd Teller told a television a u d ien ce th a t th e n a tio n " h a d lost a b attle m ore im p o rta n t a n d g reater th a n Pearl H arb o r," o n e of m an y references to th a t e v en t a n d the w a r th a t follow ed it. Jo u rn alists Jo sep h an d S tew art A lsop h a u le d o u t p e re n n ial analogies to M u n ich a n d th e 1930s, accus­ ing the a d m in istratio n of th e sam e a p p e a se m e n t th a t led to W orld W ar II. N ew s

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stories a b o u t th e a rm e d forces' riv al rocket p ro g ra m s tra n sp o rte d rea d ers back to Pearl H arb o r, w h e n sim ilar rivalries p re su m a b ly h a d c rip p led A m erica (th o u g h n o w G e rm a n scientists like W em h er V on B raun led A m erica's effort). T hese co m p ariso n s scored p o in ts a g ain st E isenhow er, h e ig h te n e d th e panic, b o lstered the call for n a tio n al m o b ilizatio n — a n d h in te d a t a h a p p y outcom e: if th e terro rs of 1941 w ere back, so too m ig h t b e th e triu m p h s of 1945. It likew ise m a d e sense to cite, as b o th Ike a n d th e p ress d id , th e g reatest triu m p h of W orld W ar H, th e M a n h a tta n Project, as a m o d el för action. S uch c o m p ariso n s p laced a diffu se a n d in d e te rm in a te crisis of confidence o n th e fam iliar im ag in ativ e ter­ ra in of w a r.68 H a rd issues of p o w e r a n d su rv iv a l w e re o sten sib ly a t stake. If Soviet rockets w ere p o w e rfu l e n o u g h to lau n c h satellites, it w a s reaso n ed , th ey co u ld strik e th e U n ited States: m assiv e retaliatio n seem ed hollow , K h ru sh ch ev 's b o a sts a b o u t h is rockets irrefutable, E ise n h o w e r's d efen se policy b a n k ru p t. G iv en th a t d ire situ atio n , som e m em b ers of th e E isen h o w er-ap p o in ted G aith er com m ittee saw as th e o n ly reco u rse a n a ttack o n th e Soviet U n io n b efore its lead in rocke­ try b ecam e in su rm o u n ta b le. Less trig g e r-h a p p y C o ld W arriors rejected th a t o p ­ tion, o n ly to see a d ifferen t d an g er. T he Soviets, Jo h n K en n ed y w a rn e d , n o w h a d a "sh ie ld " of b o m b s a n d rockets " b e h in d w h ic h th ey w ill slow ly, b u t surely, a d v a n c e — th ro u g h S p u tn ik diplom acy, lim ited b ru sh -fire w a rs, in d irect n o n o v e rt aggression, in tim id a tio n a n d su b v ersio n , in te rn al rev o lu tio n , in creased p restig e o r influence, a n d th e v icious blackm ail of o u r allies. T he p e rip h e ry of th e Free W orld w ill slo w ly b e n ib b led aw ay. T he b alan ce of p o w e r w ill g ra d u ­ ally sh ift a g ain st u s." 69 T he U n ited States, a rg u e d p o litician s like K ennedy, co u ld on ly re tu rn to th e p rin cip les of NSC-68, b u ild in g u p b o th strategic forces a n d co n v en tio n al ones capable of "flexible resp o n se." Few d o u b te d th a t the stakes in space in v o lv ed p restig e as w ell as raw po w er. Ju st as w a v erin g T hird W orld p eo p les p re su m a b ly w a tc h e d A m erica's so rry reco rd in race relations, th e y scan n ed th e skies for signs of A m erica's triu m p h o r failure, for evidence th a t it co u ld live u p to its p ro m ise to b e m o re creative a n d p ro d u c tiv e th a n its to ta litaria n com petitor. T h at p ro m ise w a s also in d o u b t am o n g A m ericans. "G a p s" b e tw e e n A m erican s a n d Soviets in e d u c a tio n a n d science, in discipline a n d im ag in atio n , seem ed m o re a la rm in g th a n th e m is­ sile g ap itself because th e y th re a te n e d the p o ssib ility th a t th e Soviets' m ilitary lead c o u ld n o t b e overcom e, a n d e v en th a t A m erican s d id n o t d eserv e to over­ com e it. T h at fear seem ed b o rn e o u t in D ecem ber 1957, w h e n th e A m erican a n sw e r to S p u tn ik w a s to take to th e skies from C ape C an av eral in Florida. A s television sets across th e la n d tim e d in a n d m illions of ch ild ren c ro w d ed school a u d i­ to riu m s to w atch, a n a v y rocket w ith a tin y satellite lifted a few feet from its p a d , th e n sa n k back a n d e x p lo d ed , p ro m p tin g jokes a b o u t "S tay p u tn ik ," "Flopnik ," a n d "K a p u tn ik " th a t v e n te d n a tio n al h u m iliatio n . M eanw hile, Eisen­ h o w e r w a s briefly re d u c e d b y a stroke to u tte rin g literal gibberish.

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In a few w eeks, the b alance b e tw ee n c o n te n d in g forces— Soviets a n d A m e ri­ cans, R epublicans a n d D em ocrats, E isen h o w er a n d th e g ro an in g en g in es of m ilitarizatio n — seem ed d estro y ed . In tru th , it lo n g h a d b e en p recario u s, so d e ­ p e n d e n t o n Ike's p e rso n al authority, o r else o n e Soviet b all in space co u ld n o t h av e u p e n d e d it, ex posing th e fragility of E isen h o w er's co m p ro m ises a n d of A m ericans' sense of superiority. H e rig h tly p le a d e d th a t A m erican m ilita ry a n d scientific su p e rio rity rem a in e d intact. H is p leas fell o n d e a f e a rs— b ecau se h e w o u ld n o t reveal h is ev id en ce for th em , b u t e v en m o re b ecau se m o st A m eri­ cans d id n o t w a n t to believe. M u ch a b o u t th e S p u tn ik p an ic w a s in fact fam iliar. T he a la rm o v e r a m issile a n d space "g a p " h a d b e e n p re c e d e d b y a lesser o n e o v e r a "b o m b er g a p " a n d earlier b y reactions in 1949 to n e w s of th e Soviet ato m ic b om b. T he S p u tn ik p an ic w a s also a technological an alo g to th e R ed Scare, sh iftin g its sp irit of re­ crim in atio n a n d suspicions of n a tio n al flaccidity to th e are n a of science a n d to th e E isenhow er a d m in istra tio n itself. T he S p u tn ik scare also g a in e d e n erg y from th e crisis in race relations, clim axing in S ep tem b er a t L ittle Rock, th a t h a d a lre ad y challenged A m erican p rete n se s of su p e rio rity a n d m o b ilized g rass­ roots m o v em en ts b e y o n d elite control. A m p lify in g g ro w in g d o u b ts. S p u tn ik also d iv e rte d th em from th e racial aren a o n to a technological b a ttle g ro u n d w h o se scrip t of n a tio n al p e ril a n d ren ew al w a s b o th frig h te n in g a n d fam iliar. D em ocrats consciously ex p lo ited th e chance to sh ift a tte n tio n fro m racial is­ sues, w h ic h w ere d iv id in g th e ir party. O ld w o rries th a t th e U n ited States w a s b eco m in g a n em p ty , h ed o n istic n a ­ tio n also surfaced again, y ield in g calls to re c ap tu re th e fro n tier sp irit a n d jer­ em iad s a g ain st com placency a n d m aterialism th a t P u rita n d iv in e s m ig h t h av e ad m ired . O nce em blem s of its su p erio rity , th e n a tio n 's cars a n d telev isio n sets n o w seem ed to k en s of its rot. "If A m erica ev er crashes, it w ill b e in a tw o -to n e convertible," the v en erab le financier-politician B ernard B aruch p red icted ; th e U n ited States h a d to w o rry less a b o u t th e "h e ig h t of th e tail fin in th e n e w car a n d b e m ore p re p a re d to sh e d b lood, sw eat, a n d tears if th is c o u n try a n d the free w o rld are to su rv iv e," a rg u e d one sen ato r.70 A lth o u g h th e space p ro g ra m w a s later sold as a fo u n ta in h e a d of technological a b u n d an c e, u n e ase a b o u t th a t a b u n d an c e d e ep e n ed th e S p u tn ik panic. Like m o st panics, this one w a s n o t a reaction to a single ev en t b u t a sta te of m in d b u ilt ov er tim e. T hat w as e v id e n t in a n a rra y of p ro p o se d crash p ro g ra m s for fallout shelters, n e w w e ap o n s, a n d n e w strategies. Scientists a g g ra v ate d a n d exploited the panic, as w h e n one g ro u p a p p ro a ch e d E isen h o w er w ith a p la n to reach the m o o n b y u sin g "ele g an t little [nuclear] b o m b s to d riv e a n ele­ g a n t little spaceship a ro u n d th e so lar system ," as o n e scientist later p u t it. Re­ w o rk in g fears of a closed society a n d w o rld -sy ste m th a t h a d h a u n te d A m e ri­ cans for decades, scientists p ro m o tin g n e w v e n tu re s in space th o u g h t it "essen ­ tial to the g ro w th of an y n ew a n d h ig h civilizatio n th a t sm all g ro u p s of p e o p le can escape from th eir n eig h b o rs a n d from th e ir g o v ern m en ts, to go a n d live as

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th ey p lease in th e w ild ern e ss." Panic also san ctio n ed lav ish m ilitary schem es, as I. F. Stone d isco v ered in the congressional testim o n y of a n a ir force g en eral w h o p ro p o se d th a t w a rh e a d s "co u ld b e c a ta p u lte d from sh afts su n k d e e p into th e m o o n 's surface" a n d a rg u e d th a t if a lim a r b alan ce of terro r th e n d e v elo p ed b e tw e e n th e su p e rp o w e rs, statio n s c o u ld b e b u ilt " o n p lan e ts far m o re d istan t, fro m w h ic h co n tro l o v e r th e m o o n m ig h t th e n b e exercised." Such schem es h a rd ly enjoyed u n a n im o u s m ilitary su p p o rt, b u t Stone co u ld b e ex cused for co n cluding: "T hus, as the P en tag o n m a p s it, peace b y m u tu a l te rro r w o u ld sp re a d o u tw a rd to w a rd th e far stars." T he S p u tn ik p an ic seem ed to h av e n o b o u n d a rie s.71 E isen h o w er trie d m ig h tily to reestablish th em . T he p sy ch o lo g y of th e p an ic sh o u ld n o t h av e shocked h im , in so far as h is stra te g y of m assiv e retaliatio n al­ re a d y h a d rested o n the psychological m y steries of d eterren ce a n d th e sym bolic im p o rt of n e w technology. N onetheless, h e w a s baffled b y th e S p u tn ik scare, p a rtly becau se of h is a ttac h m en t to elite con tro l a n d h is relu ctan ce to a d m it its erosion. H is in ab ility to articu late a v isio n ary a ltern a tiv e to C old W ar a n d m il­ ita riz a tio n c o m p o u n d e d h is problem s. For all its b a n ality a n d h y steria, reac­ tio n s to S p u tn ik d id reveal a b ro a d y e a rn in g for so m e th in g m o re d a rin g th a n h e co u ld p ro v id e. For g o o d reasons, h e w o u ld n o t em brace a race to th e m o o n , ag reein g w ith h is first N a tio n a l A eronautics a n d Space A d m in istra tio n d irecto r th a t if th e n a tio n 's p restig e rested o n " 'W h e n d o w e g e t a m a n o n th e m o o n ?' " th e n "all sense of p ersp ectiv e h a s go n e o u t th e w in d o w ." B ut Ike offered n o su b stitu te. W ash in g to n d o g g erel in 1957 in d ic ate d th e problem : S p u tnik, S p u tn ik in th e sky E m ittin g b e ep s as y o u go by. H av e y o u ro o m in y o u r little b u lln ik For Ike a n d D ick a n d Foster D ullnik? F o u r y ears later, Ike w a s still u n c o m p re h e n d in g , c o n te m p tu o u s of JFK's deci­ sio n to stake n a tio n al p restig e o n a race to th e m o o n .72 U n c o m p re h en d in g h e m a y h av e been, u n c e rta in h e w a s not. H is effort to d a m p e n h y ste ria a n d restra in m ilita riza tio n d o m in a te d th e rest of h is p resi­ dency. H is p rim a ry asset w a s the e n o rm o u s a u th o rity in m ilitary m atters h e still co m m an d ed . A g en eral a b a n d o n e d b y m o st of h is lieu ten an ts (th o u g h n o t b y D ulles a n d the CIA), h e still g ain ed a tactical v icto ry in a lo sin g cam p aig n a g ain st th e forces of m ilitarization. "It w a s o n e of h is fin est h o u rs," w rites Ste­ p h e n A m brose. "T he d e m a n d s for shelters, for m o re b o m b ers, for m o re bom bs, for m o re research a n d d e v e lo p m e n t of m issiles a n d satellites, [w ere] n early ir­ resistible," b u t E isenhow er rejected them . "H e th ereb y sav ed h is c o u n try u n ­ to ld b illions of d o llars a n d n o one k n o w s h o w m a n y w a r scares."73 A cold calculation of strategic realities g u id e d him . K h ru sh ch ev m ig h t th rea te n th e U n ited States w ith extinction, b u t Ike k n ew it w a s a bluff. Secret flights b y A m erican U-2 aircraft— th e ev id en ce Ike w o u ld n o t m ak e public, lest

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it in fu riate the Soviets o r term in a te the reco n n aissan ce— rev ealed th a t th e So­ viets w ere d e p lo y in g few lo n g -ran g e rockets a n d co u ld n o t m atch A m erica's fo rm id able h eav y bom bers. K n ow ing that, E isen h o w er d e cid ed to leap fro g large-scale p ro d u c tio n of costly a n d co m b u stib le first-g en eratio n rockets in fa­ v o r of a d v an c ed solid-fuel rockets (lan d -b ased M in u tem an a n d su b -b a se d Po­ laris m issiles). T ied to th a t decision w a s a b ro a d e r acceptance sh a re d b y D ulles of ro u g h strategic p a rity w ith the Soviets, a h eresy th a t h e lp e d p ro m p t th e stri­ d e n t charges of ap p easem en t. H a rd ly n eg lectin g A m erica's m ilitary m ig h t, h e w as k een to m a in ta in its q u alitativ e lead, b u t n u m b e rs alone, n u c le ar "o v erk ill" as it w as n o w called, c o u n te d for little w ith h im as h e q u e stio n e d , " H o w m a n y tim es d o w e h av e to d e stro y R ussia?" T he a rm e d forces w ere g e ttin g "in to a n incredible p o sitio n — of h av in g e n o u g h to d e stro y e v ery conceivable ta rg e t all o v er th e w o rld , p lu s a three-fold reserve," h e co m p lain ed . E ven if th e U n ited States escap ed d irect attack a n d w o n a n u c le ar w ar, "th ere ju st m ig h t b e n o th ­ in g left of th e N o rth e rn H e m isp h ere " becau se of fallout (atm o sp h eric tests alone, h e w o rried , m ig h t p ro d u c e th a t result). In fo rm ed in 1960 th a t A m erica w as b u ild in g fo u r h u n d re d M in u tem an m issiles a year, Ike re s p o n d e d in d ig ­ n a n tly (if d isin g en u o u sly , for h e h a d a p p ro v e d th e p ro g ram ), "W h y d o n 't w e go co m pletely crazy a n d p la n o n a force of 10,000?" A s for th o se p e d d lin g fear of a m issile gap, Ike allegedly called th e m "san ctim o n io u s, h y p o critical b a s­ ta rd s."74 A g ain a n d again, h e ex p lo d ed a b o u t the p ressu re s o n him . T hose fro m h is g en erals a n d a d m irals w ere " d a m n n e a r treaso n ." P ro tectin g n a tio n a l secu rity w a s vital, h e to ld his ad v iso rs, b u t th a t d id n o t m e a n th e n a tio n sh o u ld try to b e b e st a t e v e ry th in g — precisely w h a t m a n y A m erican s felt th ey sh o u ld do . Re­ sp o n d in g to the G aith er com m ittee, h e fum ed: " I'm n o t g o in g to d a n ce a t th e e n d of the strin g o f . . . p eo p le w h o try to give m e . . . scare sto ries." W h en th e co m m ittee rec o m m e n d ed crash p ro g ra m s for fallo u t sh elters a n d n e w a rm a ­ m en ts to w age n u c le ar w ar, E isenhow er to ld th em , "Y ou c a n 't h a v e th is k in d of w a r . . . . T here ju st a re n 't e n o u g h b u lld o z e rs to scrap e th e b o d ies off the streets." H e scornfully d ism isse d the project for n u c le ar rockets, sp a rin g th e im iv erse "a filthy creatu re" leaving "its rad io activ e m ess b e h in d it w h e re v e r it goes," as one scientist later p u t it.75 H is public utteran ces h a d the sam e substance. H e u p h e ld d istin c tio n s fast d isa p p e a rin g a m id the panic: "T here is m u c h m o re to science th a n its fu n ctio n in stre n g th e n in g o u r defense, a n d m u c h m o re to o u r d efen se th a n th e p a rt p la y e d b y science." Science's "peaceful co n trib u tio n s" a n d th e n a tio n 's "sp iri­ tu a l p o w e rs" w ere "th e m o st im p o rta n t sto n es in a n y d efen se stru c tu re ." "W e face," Ike w ro te one concerned g ro u p , " n o t a te m p o ra ry em erg en cy . . . b u t a lo n g -term responsibility," a n d h e d e p lo re d h a sty actions d o n e " u n d e r th e im ­ p e tu s of s u d d e n fear." E litist condescension c o u ld also flare u p in p ublic. A t the sta rt of the S p u tn ik panic, Ike spoke sn eerin g ly to a ho stile p ress of th e Soviets' "o n e sm all ball in the air." D u rin g th e 1958 election cam p aig n , in "th e m o st

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h a rs h a n d graceless p a rtisa n speeches of h is political life," as E m m et John H u g h e s te rm e d th em , E isenhow er in sisted th a t th ere w o u ld b e "n o a p p e a sin g C o m m u n ist ag g ressio n ," th a t "th e so-called m issile g ap is b e in g ra p id ly filled" (u n w ittin g ly su g g e stin g it w a s real), a n d th a t "political rad icals" a n d "selfsty led liberals" h a d a n "irresistible im p u lse . . . to sq u a n d e r m o n ey — y o u r m o n ey ."76 H is flashes of a n g er rev ealed h is calculated c o m m itm en t to m a in tain in g a lo n g v iew of th e C old W ar, h o a rd in g n a tio n al resources, a n d restra in in g m il­ itarizatio n . H e e x p a n d e d h is fam iliar injunctio n s a g ain st th e g a rriso n state. D is­ a rm a m e n t w a s n ecessary because "n o c o u n try can ad v an ce in tellectu ally a n d in term s of c u ltu re a n d w ell-being if it h a s to d ev o te e v ery th in g to m ilitary b u ild u p ." O nce ag ain "aw fu lly sick of the lobbies b y th e m u n itio n s," h e lo oked o v er a d v ertisem en ts b y Boeing a n d D ouglas, g lim p sin g th e g a rriso n sta te 's cul­ tu ra l a n d econom ic u n d e rp in n in g s. N o r d id h e sh are th e w id e ly h e ld v iew th a t p ro sp e rity h in g e d o n d efense sp e n d in g a n d d isa rm a m e n t w o u ld m e a n d e p re s­ sion. "W e are n o w scratching a ro u n d to g e t m o n ey for su c h th in g s as school co n stru ctio n " a n d "ro a d b u ild in g " a n d "all so rts of th in g s," h e to ld rep o rte rs in 1960. "I see n o reaso n w h y th e su m s w h ic h n o w are g o in g in to th ese sterile, n e g ativ e m ech an ism s th a t w e call w a r m u n itio n s s h o u ld n 't go in to so m e th in g p o sitiv e ."77 Som etim es g ru d g in g ly , E isenhow er d id ag ree to changes: a n e w N atio n al A ero n autics a n d Space A d m in istra tio n (NASA); a p resid en tia l science a d v iso r (Jam es K illian a n d th e n G eorge K istiakow sky, w h o h e lp e d offset science h a w k s like Teller); m o d e st increases in w e a p o n s a n d space p ro g ram s; reo rg a n iza tio n of th e D e p a rtm e n t of D efense. But, as h e c o m m en ted o n o n e su p p le m e n ta l b u d ­ g et h e accepted, tw o -th ird s of it w e n t "m o re to stabilize p u b lic o p in io n th a n to m eet a n y real n e e d ." 78 A s before S putnik, h e s u p p o rte d space p ro g ra m s m ee t­ in g scientific cu rio sity a n d m ilitary n e e d s— th e reconnaissance capacities of satellites w ere especially a llu rin g — b u t sco rn ed th e p restig e -d riv e n race in space. D espite h is effort to restrain m ilita riza tio n — a n d b ecau se of th e exceptions h e allo w ed in o rd e r to placate p u b lic o p in io n a n d m eet h is o w n test of v ig ila n t d efen se— h is success w a s o n ly re a rg u a rd a n d tem p o rary . By o n e sta n d a rd it w a s considerable: defense b u d g e ts rose only m o d estly in Ik e's last years. P res­ su re k e p t b u ild in g for m o re m oney, p ro g ram s, a n d forceful action, h o w ev er, its p o w e r em erg in g m ore sh a rp ly u n d e r his successors. D efense-related sp e n d in g o n science a n d tech n o lo g y m e a su re d th o se forces. Such sp e n d in g rem a in e d h a rd to calculate b ecau se m u c h of it w a s b u rie d in n o n d e fe n se b u d g e ts, w e n t to technologies w ith b o th civilian a n d m ilitary uses, o r h a d little m ilitary payoff. M oreover, the sh are of fed eral research a n d d e v el­ o p m e n t sp e n d in g d e v o te d to d efense w a s declin in g (the N a tio n a l In stitu tes of H e a lth b u d g e t increased ten fo ld ov er the decade). But since to tal R&D b u d g e ts in creased d ram a tic ally (to 15.6 p e rc en t of th e b u d g e t b y 1965), d efen se-related

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sp e n d in g still sw elled: the D efense D e p a rtm e n t's R&D b u d g e t n e a rly d o u b le d b e tw ee n 1958 a n d 1961, w hile N A SA 's m u ltip lie d tenfold. The character of this sp e n d in g w a s as im p o rta n t as its size. A lth o u g h c h am ­ p io n e d b y m an y scientists, basic research g ain ed a tin y p o rtio n of th e fed eral b u d g e t. T he m o n ey flow ed in stea d to v a st e n g in e erin g p ro g ra m s like N A SA 's effort to get A m ericans into space a n d th e n to th e m oon. T hese w ere p u b lic w o rk s projects o n a n im p erial scale. O n ly th eir real o r im a g in ed lin k s to defen se a n d th e ir w hite-collar co n stitu en cy a n d a p p e a l iso lated th e m from th e ch arg es of socialism a n d w elfarism th a t h a d d o g g e d th e N e w D eal's far p u n ie r p ro ­ gram s. M oreover, d e sp ite d o m in a n t im ages of science m arch in g inex o rab ly in to th e fu tu re — pro g ress co u ld n o t b e sto p p e d , ra n th e p o p u la r in c a n ta tio n — th is w a s a forced m arch d irected b y the state in accordance w ith political p re s­ su res a n d perceiv ed n a tio n al need , one reaso n m a n y scientists d islik ed N A SA 's p ro g ram s. H ence physics a n d e n g in eerin g g rab b e d th e lio n 's sh are, a lth o u g h th e fro ntiers of scientific in q u iry o ften lay in o th er fields. A s one scientist com ­ p la in e d in 1958 (rom anticizing his p ro fessio n 's past), "W h a t h a s h a p p e n e d to th e o ld ivory to w e r!. . . th e w ise m en, once q u ietly g u id e d b y th e sta r of Bethle­ h em , n o w frantically c o u n t tim e b y the sta r of M oscow ." By th e sam e token, w h ile scientists a n d u n iv ersities w ere im p o rta n t, c o rp o ra te co n tracto rs a n d g o v e rn m e n t agencies w ere th e d o m in a n t play ers. A n d lo n g -term , capitalinten sive projects p re su p p o se d still larg er o u tlay s in th e fu tu re, u n less h u g e sta rt-u p costs w ere to be w ritte n off in ceasing w o rk o n h alf-b u ilt rockets o r su b m arin es. T he p a tte rn w a s n o t n e w — w h e th e r S p u tn ik u sh e re d in " a n age of technocracy" is d e b atab le — b u t the scale a n d so p h isticatio n of S p u tn ik -era p ro ­ jects greatly a g g ra v ate d it.79 A s h is policy o n n u c le ar w e a p o n s sh o w ed , Ike h a d difficulty g ra p p lin g w ith these forces. O ne of h is first reactions to S p u tn ik h a d b e e n to ren ew h is in terest in su sp en sio n of n u c le ar tests a n d in d isa rm a m e n t generally. H is m o tiv es w ere a fam iliar mix: to lock in A m erica's a d v a n ta g e in n u c le ar w e ap o n s, c u t defen se costs, c o u n ter th e p an ick y m o od, a n d score p ro p a g a n d a p o in ts to offset th e So­ v iets' success in space. Fam iliar forces stalled h is effort. Scientists like Teller n o m in ally subscribed to d isa rm a m e n t b u t offered a h o st of objections to an y m o ra to riu m o n testing: th e Soviets w o u ld cheat, steal " o u r secrets," a n d "su r­ p a ss u s"; pro g ress w o u ld sto p o n "clean" (radiation-free) n u c le ar w e a p o n s th a t w o u ld benefit h u m a n k in d ; atom ic scientists th em selv es " w o u ld lose tone, im ­ p e tu s, a n d p e rso n n el" d u rin g a m o ra to riu m .80 T hen, ju st w h e n n e w tech n o l­ o g y m a d e seism ic m o n ito rin g of a m o ra to riu m easier, science h a w k s co u n te red w ith n e w nightm ares: th e R ussians w o u ld reso rt to " d e c o u p lin g " — co n d u ctin g n u c le ar tests w ith in m a m m o th u n d e rg ro u n d caves in o rd e r to red u ce th eir seis­ m ic sh ock— o r e v en to testing bo m b s o n the back sid e of th e m oon. Som e p ro g ress in Soviet-A m erican n e g o tiatio n s w a s m ad e, b u t it w a s b e ­ d ev iled b y m an y obstacles. B ritain a n d France, eag er to d ev elo p th e ir o w n n u ­ clear w e a p o n s (and, in the French case, to a id Israel's d e v e lo p m e n t as w ell).

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th rew u p roadblocks. L eaders vacillated: E isen h o w er w o rrie d th a t a u n ilateral su sp e n sio n of A m erican tests w o u ld p ro m p t D em o crats to say, "T his is o u r M un ich"; K h ru sh ch ev w o rrie d th a t on-site in sp ectio n s w o u ld expose Soviet w eak n ess a n d bluster. P rogress w a s also slo w ed b y d e e p rifts in th e A m erican g o v e rn m e n t— a n obstacle to a rm s control often g rea ter th a n th e su p e rp o w e rs' differences— a n d b y th e p o iso n o u s atm o sp h e re of Soviet-A m erican relations. A s o n e h isto ria n later co m p lain ed , "E very R u ssian initiativ e w as h e ld to be a trap : if M oscow p ro p o se d a jo in t d eclaratio n in favor of m o th e rh o o d , this w o u ld h av e called fo rth p o sitio n p a p e rs from th e State D e p a rtm e n t's Policy P la n n in g C o u n c il. . . a n d ev en tu ally a d eclaratio n th a t w h ile th e U n ited States w elco m ed this reco g n itio n of th e sanctity of fam ily life . . . , it w o u ld req u ire clear in d icatio n th a t th e USSR d id n o t m e a n to d e ro g a te th e sta tu s of fath er­ h o o d ." S uch obstacles a n d Ike's conflicting a sp ira tio n s— to p u s h d isa rm a m e n t b u t also to reta in A m erican su p e rio rity — crip p led efforts to e n d th e d e ca d e's o rg y of tests a n d scale b ack m ilitarization. D ebate o n testin g h a d a n o th e r effect th a t few anticipated: b itte r conflicts am o n g scientists e ro d e d th e ir im ag e as n e u tra l ex p erts to w h o m n a tio n al policy co u ld b e e n tru ste d , lay in g o n e b asis for th e rev o lt a g ain st e x p ert a u th o rity a n d th e ecological activism of th e 1960s.81 T he forces sw irlin g a b o u t in th e n u c le ar are n a cam e to g eth er a t a n u n lik ely p o in t a t th e d e c a d e 's close— A laska. Teller a n d th e AEC, acting o n th e S putnikera fetish for bigness, p ro p o se d Project C hario t, a schem e to u se n u c le ar explo­ sives to create a n e w h a rb o r o n A lask a's n o rth coast. It w a s to in a u g u ra te the A E C 's b ro a d e r Project P low share, w ith its biblical im ag ery of tu rn in g n u clear sw o rd s in to tools of peaceful engineering. C h ario t w o u ld h e lp in p la n n in g the n u c le ar excavation of a n e w P an am a C an al o p e ra tin g w ith o u t locks a t sea level— a n d offer a chance to test w e a p o n s tech n o lo g y u n d e r th e g u ise of p eace­ ful pro gress. Jo u rn ey in g to A laska to sell th e p ro g ram . Teller "m ix ed flattery w ith fro n tier b rav a d o ," p ro m isin g to un lo ck th e w e a lth of A lask a's coalfields a n d "to resh ap e the e a rth to y o u r p leasu re." Q u e rie d a b o u t o th e r projects th e AEC m ig h t a ttem p t. Teller joked, "If y o u r m o u n ta in is n o t in th e rig h t place, ju st d ro p u s a card ." But th e project w a s lau g h ab le in econom ic term s, d a n g e ro u s in ecological ones, a n d d e stru ctiv e in h u m a n term s. A larm ed E skim os— som e of w h o m h a d p a rtic ip a te d in N a g asak i's clean u p a n d k n ew a b o u t th e d isa stro u s 1954 Bikini n u c le ar te st— jo in ed w ith skeptical b u sin essm en , local scientists, a n d B arry C om m oner, a scientist lea d in g the b u d d in g an tin u cle ar a n d e n v iro n ­ m en tal m ovem ents. A fter a n u g ly stru g g le in w h ic h th e AEC b ru sh e d asid e the d a ta of d isse n tin g scientists a n d m an e u v e re d to blacklist th em , th e co m m issio n gave u p in 1962. It "w as possibly th e first g o v e rn m e n t project ch allen g ed o n ecological g ro u n d s," n o tes its h isto rian .82 G iven the escalating a rm s race, the o p p o sitio n to C hariot, like th e cam p aig n to b a n n u c le ar tests, w a s n o n eth eless w id e of th e m ark , so m e h isto ria n s argue. Such efforts in v o lv ed a "d isp lac em e n t" w h e reb y p eo p le sh ifted th eir fears a w ay from the g rav e st d an g er, th a t of n u c le ar w ar. The test b a n serv ed as a

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"m agic talism an, a w a y th a t th e n a tio n co u ld co n fro n t a real a n d p re se n t d a n g e r w ith o u t com ing to g rip s w ith th e tru e reality of th e 1950s— th e p o ssib ility of to tal d e stru ctio n ."83 T h at po ssib ility w a s h a rd ly ig n o red in th e late 1950s, h o w ­ ever: H o lly w o o d film s, th e w a rn in g s of E isen h o w er a n d o th ers, a n d a m o u n t­ in g co n tro v ersy ov er civil d efen se all m a d e it visible. A less p sy c h o lo g iz ed ex­ p la n a tio n of n u c le ar politics w o u ld n o t n e atly d istin g u ish o n e " tru e reality " from o thers, w o u ld recognize th a t politics o ften b eg in s w ith im m e d ia te a n d lo­ cal d an g ers, a n d w o u ld p o in t to th e large obstacles a g ain st a n y d irec t ch allenge to n u clear w eap o n s. For d e sp ite th e b reach in political c u ltu re o n n u c le ar issues, th e clam o r for m o re w e a p o n s o n ly increased. Strategic d o c trin e m irro re d a n d ex acerb ated th e p ressu re s in v o lv ed , as theorists, officers, a n d p o licy m ak ers scram b led to im ­ p a rt ratio n ality a n d e q u ilib riu m to a system sp in n in g o u t of control. From one v a n ta g e p o in t, stability seem ed foreseeable. P rev ailin g A m erican d o c trin e as­ su m e d a b alance of te rro r in w h ic h each su p e rp o w e r d e te rre d th e o th e r's in itia­ tio n of n u c le ar w a r w ith its th re a t of a d e v a sta tin g resp o n se. R efined as " m u tu a l a ssu re d d e stru ctio n " (M AD), th is d o c trin e im p lied th a t once th e su p e rp o w e rs g a in e d ro u g h p arity, th ey w o u ld h a v e p o w e rfu l in cen tiv es to stabilize th e co m p etitio n — m o n ey w o u ld b e saved, w o rrie d con stitu en cies rea ssu red , a n d th e d a n g e rs of su rp rise m inim ized. S u p erio rity m ig h t e v en b e d a n g e ro u s if it led th e w e ak e r po w er, fearful it co u ld n e v e r su rv iv e a first strik e, to lau n c h su ch a strik e itself. D espite th a t finely s p u n a rg u m e n t, stability w a s u n attain ab le: ex tern al p re s­ su res d isru p te d it, logical inconsistencies arose w ith in it, a n d logic n e v e r fu lly g o v ern ed strateg y anyw ay. G iven the Soviet rocket cap ab ility su p p o s e d ly re­ v ealed b y S putnik, A m erican strateg ists a rg u e d for a "seco n d -strik e" force able to su rv iv e a n en em y first strike a n d still re sp o n d d ev astatin g ly . B u ild in g su c h a force, h ow ever, req u ire d m issiles o n su b m a rin e s a n d in h a rd e n e d silos, co st bil­ lions, d ro v e the Soviets to rep ly in k in d , a n d fu rth e r ratc h e te d u p th e a rm s race. C osts w e n t still h ig h e r as stra te g y shifted fro m "city -b u stin g " to d e stro y in g e n ­ em y m ilitary forces. It seem ed m ore h u m a n e a n d effective to ta rg e t th o se forces, b u t since th ey w ere far m ore n u m e ro u s, scattered , a n d p ro tec te d th a n cities, "counterforce" stra te g y req u ire d far m o re m issiles w ith far m o re so p h is­ ticated g u idance system s. T he n ew strategies a n d w e a p o n s m a d e th e d ilem m as of d e terren ce m o re vexing. If, som e m u se d , the Soviets stru ck first b y h ittin g A m erica's m ilitary forces in stead of its cities, the P re sid e n t w o u ld face a n ex cruciating choice— a co u n terattack o n Soviet rocket forces w o u ld fin d m a n y of th eir silos em p ty , y et a n attack o n Soviet cities w o u ld o n ly e n su re a n en em y resp o n se in cin eratin g A m erica's m etropolises. A n y claim th a t th e U n ited States w o u ld e n g ag e in global in cineration seem ed m ad , y e t an y h in t of re stra in t w o u ld u n d e rm in e its credibility. A s B ernard B rodie noticed, "T he ru b com es fro m th e fact th a t w h a t looks like th e m o st ratio n al deterrence policy in v o lv es c o m m itm en t to a stra te g y

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of resp o n se w hich, if w e ev er h a d to execute it, m ig h t th e n look v e ry foolish." T he p ro b lem s w e re so intractable a n d th e reaso n in g so circu lar th a t o n e th eo rist w o n d e re d if w a r m ig h t com e th ro u g h "successive cycles of 'H e th in k s w e th in k h e th in k s w e t h i n k . . . h e th in k s w e th in k h e 'll attack; so h e th in k s w e shall; so h e w ill; so w e m u st.' ',84 In o th e r w ay s, too, m ea su re s to en h an ce th e n a tio n 's safety th re a te n e d to u n ­ d e rm in e it fu rth er. It seem ed sensible to p ro tec t cities w ith anti-ballistic m issiles (ABMs) th a t co u ld in tercep t Soviet b o m b ers a n d rockets, b u t ABM s trig g e red a n u g ly deb ate. To e x p o n en ts of d eterrence, a n a tio n able to d e fe n d its cities w o u ld b e te m p te d to in itiate n u c le ar w ar, tru stin g th a t it co u ld b ru s h off its e n ­ e m y 's reta lia to ry attack. The w h o le effort to solve th e d ile m m a s created b y one tech n o lo g y w ith a n o th e r w a s d an g ero u s. A s retired g en eral O m a r B radley w a rn e d in 1957, "M issiles w ill b rin g anti-m issiles, a n d anti-m issiles w ill b rin g anti-anti-m issiles. B ut in ev itab ly this w h o le electronic co u rse of card s w ill a reach p o in t w h e re it can b e c o n stru cted n o h ig h er."85 P recario u s in d e e d seem ed "T he D elicate Balance of T error," as A lb ert W ohlstetter, a civilian th eo rist a t th e R A N D C o rp o ratio n , e n title d a n o tab le 1959 article. Like h im , o th e r strateg ists feared th a t e v e n a " m o d e ra te " technical a d v a n ta g e for one sid e m ig h t te m p t it in to a p ree m p tiv e strik e o r in to ex p lo it­ in g "n ew possibilities of th reats, u ltim a tu m s, b lackm ail." L ater w o rk b y Rob­ e rta W ohlstetter (also at R A N D ) o n th e P earl H a rb o r d isa ste r u n d e rlin e d th a t d a n g e r b y stressin g th e extrem e difficulty of an ticip atin g su rp rise attack. The p e rc ep tio n of p e rilo u s in stab ility su c h strateg ists offered w a s d riv e n b y a n "ex­ a g g erate d a p p re cia tio n of b o th th e ev o lv in g tech n o lo g y a n d its im p act o n th e strateg ic b alan ce." Y esterday's w e a p o n a p p e a re d certain to b e to m o rro w 's ju n k , m a d e obsolete b y the latest creatio n of m an iacal g en iu s o r c o m m an d tech­ nology. "E very c o u n try lives w ith th e n ig h tm a re ," w ro te K issinger, th a t ev en "its b e st efforts" a t su rv iv a l "m a y b e je o p a rd iz ed b y a technological b rea k ­ th ro u g h o n th e p a rt of its o p p o n e n t." G eorge K ennan, m o re a la rm e d a b o u t the a rm s race, ask ed , "A re w e to flee like h a u n te d creatu res from o n e d efen siv e device to an o th er, each m o re costly a n d h u m ilia tin g th a n th e o n e before, co w er­ in g u n d e rg ro u n d one day, b reak in g u p o u r cities th e next, a tte m p tin g to su r­ ro u n d o u rselv es w ith elab o rate sh ield s o n th e th ird . . . ?" T he acute sense of technological flux m ask ed real sources of stability: th e su b se q u e n t tu rn o v e r of w e a p o n ry o ften w a s slow (three d ecad es later, B-52s rem a in e d in th e A m erican arsenal), stra te g y c h an g e d on ly g rad u ally , a n d so m e n e w technologies, like sp y satellites, p ro v e d stab ilizin g to the in te rn atio n al system . Stability w a s n o t, h o w ­ ever, rea d ily a p p a re n t in th e 1950s.86 O th e r strateg ists saw a p a th o u t of th e cul-de-sac in d o ctrin es o f lim ited w ar. A la rm e d b y the Soviet U n io n 's a p p a re n t strategic su p erio rity , a p p a lle d b y the d a n g e rs of a g en eral n u c le ar w ar, convinced th a t "m assiv e retaliatio n " d id n o t d e te r aggression, th ey a d v a n c e d a "realist" critiq u e of th e A m erican tra d itio n of seeing "n o goal save to tal victory, a n d n o m o d e of w a r except all-o u t w ar," as

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K issinger p u t it. G iven a n im possible choice b e tw e e n A m erican p a ra ly sis a n d global holocaust, th ey a rg u e d th a t "th e o n ly ratio n al co u rse is to d e v e lo p a strateg y capable of lim itin g w a rfare a n d fig h tin g lim ited w a rs successfully." W ith v a ry in g em p h ases, civilians like K issinger a n d a rm y g en erals like M ax­ w ell T aylor a n d M a tth e w R id g w ay to u te d th e u tility of c o n v en tio n al forces a n d tactical n u c le ar w e a p o n s for en h an c in g d e terren ce a n d w a g in g lim ite d w ar. Still, th eir strateg y w a s h a rd ly stable o r convincing. K orea w a s a d isp iritin g ex­ am p le, ju st as A m erica's w a r in V ietnam , for w h ic h th ey laid o n e in tellectu al basis, w as th e tragic outcom e. A n d as B rodie a rg u e d , n o o n e c o u ld p ro m ise th a t n u c le ar w a r w o u ld stay lim ited, g iv en " th a t w a r alw ay s d e e p ly in v o lv es th e e m o tio n s" a n d often "th e collapse of in h ib itio n s."87 In a n y event, it w a s n e v e r clear h o w m u c h th ese exq u isite a n d conflicting calculations of stra te g y d e te rm in e d policy. C iv ilian stra te g ists lo o k ed to th e tech n iq u es a n d lan g u a g e of econom ics, phy sics, a n d m ath em atics (in clu d in g g am e theory). T heir m o d els of n u c le ar w a rfare w ere intellectu ally im p ressiv e b u t also strip p e d (as B rodie, a n d in h is o w n w a y E isenhow er, realized) of th o se em o tio n al co m p o n en ts of w a r n o t reducible to q u an tificatio n a n d c o m p u te r analysis. "It w as," ru n s o ne h isto ria n 's m o rd a n t co m m en t, "as if police officers w ere b e in g ta u g h t th e a rt of h o m icid e d etectio n in term s of o p p o rtu n ity a n d m u rd e r w eap o n , b u t n e v e r m o tiv e." T here co u ld b e n o reh earsal for A rm a g e d ­ d o n , o n ly w ar-g am in g a n d fray ed nerves. T he th eo rists' a p p a re n t co n fid en ce in th eir p red ictio n s a n d th e ir ability to m an a g e w a r c o n trasted to th e g rip p in g u n ­ p red ictab ility of w a r th a t m a n y A m ericans sensed. M oreover, tu ck e d a w ay a t R A N D a n d o th er in stitu tes flo u rish in g o n g o v e rn m e n t su p p o rt, th eo rists w e re iso lated fro m th e b ro a d c u rre n ts of A m erican life. T heir fo rb id d in g lan g u ag e, chilling scenarios, a n d p o se of objectivity a lien ated m a n y A m ericans, w h o c o u ld learn of th eir w o rk th ro u g h n o v els a n d film s th a t o ften p re se n te d th e m savagely. R eaction to On Thermonuclear War (1960) b y R A N D 's H e rm a n K ahn, w ith its "g rim jo cu larity " a b o u t su rv iv in g a n d w in n in g n u c le ar w a r, e x p o sed th e alienation, e v en if it caricatu red K ah n 's a m b ig u o u s p u rp o se s. C iv ilian stra t­ egists enjoyed a closer relatio n sh ip w ith m ilitary officers, b u t th ey o ften re­ sen ted or scorned the civilian expertise o n w h ic h th ey also d e p e n d e d .88 N o t su rprisingly, then, b ro a d e r im p u lse s d ro v e policy as m u c h as strategic theory. Like the d re a d n o u g h ts of p re -W o rld W ar I su p e rp o w e rs, b o m b ers a n d rockets w ere v a lu e d m ore as em blem s of n a tio n al p o w e r th a n as se rv an ts of d o ctrin e o r as practical in stru m e n ts of w ar. G reat p o w e rs a m a ssed th e m to sh o w th ey w ere g reat p o w e rs a n d to signal th eir resolve to w o rrie d allies a n d rash enem ies. T hey serv ed sym bolic fu nctio n s th a t n o ratio n al calcu latio n s c o u ld express a n d n o specific n u m b e rs fulfill. For different reasons, m an y of th e m en in ch arg e w ere also skeptical of elab o ­ rate d o ctrin es of deterrence. "If I see th a t th e R ussians are am assin g th eir p lan e s to attack," A ir Force G eneral C u rtis LeM ay rep o rte d ly said , " I'm g o in g to knock the sh it o u t of th em before th ey take off th e g ro u n d ." G iv en to ex ag g era­ tion, LeM ay non eth eless h a d , as h e a d of the Strategic A ir C o m m a n d a n d th en

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as th e A ir Force chief of staff, w id e la titu d e u n d e r th e A m erican sy stem of com ­ m a n d a n d control, one m u c h looser th a n th e Soviet U n io n 's. A n d h is a ttitu d e p e rsiste d after h is retirem en t in 1965. "If th ere is a n u c le ar w ar, th e U n ited States w ill b e th e one to sta rt it," said one A ir Force strateg ist y ears later. The influence of civilian strateg ists w a s su b stan tial, b u t th e d isju n ctio n b e tw ee n th e ir a rtfu l th eo ries a n d th e coarser o u tlo o k of co m m an d e rs w a s a n o th e r source of instability.89 Still, th e b alance of terro r h eld , a n d p e rh a p s u n d e rw ro te w h a t John G a d d is h a s called th e "lo n g peace" of the C old W ar. T he sym bolic v alu e of n u clear w e a p o n s certain ly im p lied a k in d of functio n al restraint: th ey w ere th ere for show , n o t for use, it often seem ed. D id peace e n d u re b ecau se of th e b alan ce of te rro r o r d e sp ite it? T he a n sw e r m ay b e both: th e terro r th a t stay ed th e n u clear p o w e rs from p lu n g in g into the abyss also d ro v e th e m to its edge. It also en co u r­ a g e d th e m to tolerate, p ro m o te, o r e n te r n o n -n u cle ar w a rs th a t scarred m an y o th e r nations; this w a s a "lo n g peace" o n ly b y th e essen tial b u t sin g u la r sta n ­ d a rd of a v o id in g n u c le ar w ar. A n d w h a t restra in ed th e su p e rp o w e rs w a s less so m e balance of te rro r th a n m u tu a l te rro r a t th e p ro sp e ct of n u c le ar w ar, reg a rd ­ less of w h e th e r one sid e h a d a n ed g e in it. T hey w ere, th a t is, d e te rre d as m u ch b y th e ir o w n w e a p o n s as b y th e en em y 's, n o t b ecause A m erican s w ere re­ stra in e d w h ile Soviets w ere reckless, o r becau se A m erican su p e rio rity forced a tru c u le n t en em y to back aw ay from w ar. A p sychological m o re th a n a m ilitary co n struct, th e b alance of terro r rested less o n forces th a n o n a ttitu d e s, ones sh a red b y su p e rp o w e r elites w h o p ro claim ed h a tre d of each other. A n d it barely d id h o ld , n e v e r m ore p rec ario u s th a n in th e late 1950s a n d early 1960s. N o ep iso d e d e m o n stra te d its fragility m o re th a n th e B erlin crisis of th e w in te r of 1958-1959. B erlin itself still sto o d o d d ly close to 1945: e v en in W est B erlin th e ru b b le of w a rtim e b o m b in g rem a in e d ev id en t; n o b o rd e r g u a rd s sto p p e d traffic b e tw ee n th e east a n d w e st sectors; a n d b o th sectors still seem ed "th e p e ts of th e o ccu p atio n p o w e rs." But th e d azzle of th e W est's K u rfu rsten d a m m m o ck ed th e d ra b n e ss of C o m m u n ist E ast Berlin, h o w e v e r p ro sp e ro u s it w a s b y E ast E u ro p ea n sta n d ard s. K hrushchev, for v a rio u s p o ssib le rea so n s— fru stra tio n a n d e m b a rra ssm e n t ov er the d ra in of p o p u la tio n a n d ta le n t o u t of E ast B erlin into th e W est, or fear th a t W est G erm an y m ig h t so o n g ain control of N A TO n u c le ar w e a p o n s— p rec ip ita te d the crisis, issu in g a stream of m en acin g m etap h o rs: "W est B erlin h as becom e a so rt of m alig n an t tu m o r" a n d "w e hav e d e cid ed to d o som e su rg ery "; B erlin w as "a b o n e in m y th ro at" a n d "th e testi­ cles of th e W est. E very tim e I give th em a yan k , th ey holler." M an y d id ho ller w h e n h e d e m a n d e d a n ag re em e n t to e n d th e A llied o ccu p atio n of Berlin, m ak e W est B erlin a d e m ilitariz ed free city, a n d estab lish E ast Berlin as E ast G er­ m a n y 's cap ital— a n d w h e n h e h in te d a t a n o th e r B erlin b lo ck ad e if h e d id n o t g et h is w ay.90 E isen h o w er's resp o n se w a s m e a su re d in th e face of fo rm id ab le p ressu res. M ost N A TO allies s u p p o rte d his cau tio u s resp o n se, b u t n o t so m a n y A m eri­ cans. A d y in g D ulles sp o k e b itte rly of sp e n d in g b illio n s o n d efen se o n ly to h av e

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"a p p e a se m e n t a n d p a rtia l su rre n d e r" th re a te n "to be o u r a ttitu d e ." T he a rm e d forces p ressed Ike to p la n a m ilitary effort to b rea k a n y blo ck ad e. C o n g ressio n al lead ers ren ew ed th eir calls to increase th e d efen se b u d g e t. Jo u rn alists ask ed a b o u t u sin g N A TO forces o r n u c le ar w e a p o n s in th e e v e n t of blo ck ad e. In all cases, E isenhow er rejected the p ressu re s o u trig h t o r sh a rp ly scaled b ack the p lan s u rg e d o n him . K een to ease " p re ssu re s a t h o m e for p rec ip ito u s action," h e re sp o n d e d to q u estio n s a b o u t lib eratin g B erlin w ith n u c le ar w e a p o n s in h is typically flat style: "W ell, I d o n 't k n o w h o w y o u co u ld free a n y th in g w ith n u ­ clear w e ap o n s." If C ongress forced fifty th o u sa n d m o re tro o p s o n h im , "W h ere w ill I p u t them ?" h e sn id e ly ask ed rep o rters. "W ell, ju st so m e p lace w h e re it's nice to keep th em o u t of the w ay, because I d o n 't k n o w w h a t else to d o w ith th em ." M oreover, h e " sp a re d n o effort to a ssu re K h ru sh ch ev a retre at w ith h o n o r." Publicly h e h e ld fast to A llied rig h ts a n d p riv a te ly h e w e ig h e d th e n u ­ clear o p tio n , b u t K h ru sh ch ev 's u ltim a tu m p a sse d w ith o u t in cid en t in M ay. Es­ sentially, E isenhow er talk ed his w a y o u t of th e crisis— in d e e d , refu sed to trea t it as a crisis— b u t n o t before m a n y A m erican s th o u g h t a n u c le ar w a r m ig h t b e ­ gin. Stability, a n d peace itself, ag ain seem ed to p iv o t o n h im .91 B erlin w a s only one tilt in th e see-saw of ev en ts th a t se n t h o p e s for d e te n te a ltern ately so arin g a n d sinking. N ix o n 's v isit to M oscow in Ju ly 1959 y ield ed th e K itchen D ebate a n d a stream of vulgarities: K h ru sh ch ev lik en ed o n e recen t congressional action to "fresh h o rse shit, a n d n o th in g sm ells w o rse th a n that!"; N ix o n reto rted th a t "th e C h a irm a n is m istak en . T here is so m e th in g th a t sm ells w o rse th a n h o rse sh it— a n d th a t is p ig sh it." A v isit b y K h ru sh ch ev to th e U n ited States p ro d u c e d th e celeb rated "sp irit of C a m p D av id ," p lu s fu ry o n th e A m erican rig h t (W illiam F. Buckley, Jr., c o n d em n ed h a v in g a v isito r w h o " p ro ­ fanes the n atio n ").92 E isenhow er e m b a rk e d o n g lo b e-tro ttin g d ip lo m acy to ro u n d u p allies for d e te n te , b u t ju st as h o p e s for a b re a k th ro u g h p e a k e d in th e sp rin g of 1960, the Soviets sh o t d o w n a n A m erican U-2 sp y p lan e. W h en K h ru shchev a n d E isenhow er b u n g le d in to a lo u d exchange of lies, accusations, a n d th reats a b o u t the incident, th e fragile p ro cess of su m m it d ip lo m acy sh a t­ tered. Failure o w ed to m ore th a n th e d e e d s of lead ers, h o w e v e r— it w a s th e p ro d ­ u ct of a larger process accelerating d u rin g th e S p u tn ik years. T he C o ld W ar a n d o th er g reat-p o w er rivalries h a d long b e en w a g e d as to tal stru g g les em b racin g all form s of pow er, b u t n o w th a t em brace seem ed b ig g er th a n e v e r —everything co u n te d in the global struggle, as E isen h o w er in d ic ate d in h is 1958 State of th e U n io n A ddress. A m ericans "co u ld m ak e n o m o re tragic m istak e th a n m erely to con centrate o n m ilitary stre n g th ," h e w a rn e d . For " w h a t m ak es th e Soviet th re a t u n iq u e in h isto ry is its all-inconclusiveness. E very h u m a n activity is p resse d into service as a w e a p o n of expansio n . T rade, econom ic d e v elo p m e n t, m ilitary pow er, arts, science, ed u catio n , th e w h o le w o rld of id e a s— all are h a r­ n essed to this sam e c h ario t of e x p an sio n ."93 A t th e sam e tim e, sym bols of p restig e — the shiny kitchen, the b e e p in g S putnik, th e m a n in o rb it— becam e d etach ed from w eap o n s, free-floating a n d in d eterm in ate. If few criteria estab-

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lish ed w h a t c o n stitu ted " e n o u g h " w eap o n ry , e v en few er d e te rm in e d w h a t m a d e for e n o u g h science, ed u catio n , c u ltu ra l p restig e, o r m o ral v irtu e. H o w m a n y A m ericans in space flying h o w h ig h for h o w lo n g w o u ld co n stitu te catch­ in g u p w ith th e Soviets? It w a s g ratify in g to h av e th e A m erican p ia n ist V an C lib u m w in th e 1958 T chaikovsky C o m p etitio n in M o sco w — victo ry b ro u g h t h im w ild acclaim in th e U n ited S tates— b u t d id it suffice to sh o w th a t A m erican artists w e re b e tte r th a n th e ir Soviet c o u n te rp arts? T he late 1950s in v o lv ed n o t ju st th e fam iliar p erc ep tio n th a t n a tio n al secu rity w a s all-em bracing b u t a shift in em phasis: in tan g ib le c o m p o n e n ts of p o w e r seem ed m o re im p o rta n t m o re th a n e v er in the C old W ar. T he m o st sen satio n al a n d o ften v u lg a r ex p ressio n of th a t o u tlo o k w a s the race to get m e n in space, e v o k ed w ell b y Tom W olfe. A m erica th e u n d e rd o g n e e d e d its heroes, th eir v e ry fo o lh ard in ess o n e m ea su re of th eir v irtu e. T he M ercu ry a stro n au ts " h a d v o lu n te e re d to sit o n to p of th e ro ck ets— w h ic h al­ ways blew up! T hey w ere k am ik azes g o in g fo rth to vie w ith th e R ussians!" T hey e m b o d ied A m erican v irtu e , a t least its w h ite m ale form s, h o w e v e r co n triv ed th e p u b lic relations effort to re p re se n t th a t v irtu e a n d associate it w ith lead ers like K en n ed y (E isenhow er k e p t his d istan ce fro m th e astronauts). T hey w ere to in sp ire the n a tio n 's y o u th , rally th e n a tio n 's sp irit, a n d show , m u ch like L in d b erg h in the 1920s, th a t n e w -fo u n d technological so p h isticatio n a n d oldfash io n ed in d iv id u a l h ero ism w ere still c o n g ru e n t, a t least am o n g A m ericans. Fam iliar g e n d e re d n o tio n s of w a rtim e v irtu e re a p p e a re d , w ith w o m e n con­ scrip ted in to su b o rd in a te roles: "SEVEN BRAVE W O M E N B EH IN D TH E AS­ TRONA UTS," ra n a 1959 Life h e ad lin e a b o u t th e w a rrio rs' w ives. A bove all, th e a stro n au ts w ere to b e a t th e Soviets. In th e process, as W olfe su g g ests, th e C old W ar ch anged. T he space race sh ifted a m ea su re of su p e rp o w e r conflict from th e d e a d ly aren a of real w e a p o n s o n to th e safer te rra in of sym bolic com bat. H o w ­ ev er w astefu l, the space race in v o lv ed n o sh o o tin g , n o h u rlin g of n u clear bom bs. W id en in g th e C o ld W ar, in ten sify in g its sym bolic d im en sio n s, the space race also gave it a cathartic o u tle t a n d m a d e it m o re d iffuse.94 A m o re diffuse stru g g le also rew o rk ed th e lin k s b e tw ee n n a tio n al secu rity a n d reform , as ed u ca tio n al policy sh o w ed . S p u tn ik gave critics of e d u ca tio n en o rm o u s visibility —Life d e v o te d a fiv e-p art series to e d u c a tio n in 1958— a n d sp a w n e d in v id io u s co m p ariso n s b e tw e e n Soviet a n d A m erican schools. E arlier p ro p o sa ls for school refo rm a n d fed eral a id to e d u c a tio n n o w fo u n d th e ir m o­ m e n t w h e n E isenhow er sig n e d th e N a tio n a l D efense E d u catio n A ct (NDEA). A cco rding to its en ab lin g lan g u ag e, "T he p re se n t em erg en cy " a n d "th e p re se n t e d u ca tio n al e m e rg en c y "— n e ith e r m u c h d efin ed , as if self-ev id en t— req u ire d action; "T he d efense of this N a tio n d e p e n d s u p o n th e m a ste ry of m o d e m tech­ n iq u es d ev elo p ed from com plex scientific p rin cip le s."95 The act a im ed to stre n g th e n e d u ca tio n in science, m athem atics, a n d fo reig n lan g u ag es (an d later o th er fields), p ro v id in g lo an s to u n d e rg ra d u a te s a n d fello w sh ip s to g ra d u a te stu d e n ts (if th ey sig n ed loyalty oaths). Sm aller fu n d s w e n t to stre n g th e n g u id ­ ance a n d testin g services in se co n d a ry schools, w h ile se p ara te N a tio n al Science

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F o u n d atio n m onies w e n t into a n o v e rh a u l of se co n d a ry science a n d m a th e m a t­ ics ed u cation. The N D EA , a n d e d u ca tio n generally, enjo y ed a b a lly h o o th a t o b scu red im ­ p o rta n t continuities, especially w ith the earlier GI Bill. Federal a id to e d u ca tio n h a d lo ng fo u n d e re d in th e face of d iv isio n s o v er a id to p riv a te a n d relig io u s schools, racial in teg ratio n , a n d th e v a lu e of local control. Like th e G I Bill, th e N D EA d id n o t so m u c h overcom e th o se obstacles as circu m v en t th e m — n atio n al security allo w ed a su sp en sio n of objections to fed eral aid w ith o u t th eir overth row . T h at ratio n ale also gave the legislation a n elitist th ru st, o n e stro n g er th a n th e G I Bill h ad . T h o u g h p u b lic anxiety fo cu sed o n p rim a ry a n d seco n d ary schools, m o st m o n ey w e n t to colleges a n d un iv ersities. T he ten sio n b e tw e e n d em o cratizin g im p u lses a n d elitist concerns w a s e v id e n t in c o n te m p o ra ry d e ­ bate. O n e N obel P riz e -w in n in g phy sicist co n tra sted th e intellectu al objectivity of Soviet e d u ca tio n w ith th e dem ocratic m ilieu th a t p re su m a b ly c rip p led th e A m erican school su p e rin te n d e n t, w h o d ecid es w h a t to teach b y fin d in g o u t "h o w m a n y v o ters in this to w n th in k th a t th e w o rld is ro u n d a n d h o w m an y th in k th a t it is sq u are." Life b e m o a n ed h o w A m erica's " s tu p id c h ild ren g et far b e tte r care th a n th e b rig h t. The g en iu ses of th e n ex t d ecad e are e v en n o w b ein g allo w ed to slip back into m ediocrity."96 The ten sio n em erg ed in th e act's w o rd in g . It u rg e d " th a t n o s tu d e n t of ability w ill b e d e n ie d a n o p p o rtu n ity for h ig h e r e d u c a tio n b ecau se of financial n e e d " — liberals h a d c h an g e d Ike's original p ro p o sa l for u n d e rg ra d u a te schol­ a rsh ip s b a sed o n m e rit to loans b a sed o n n e e d — b u t it also re w a rd e d stu d e n ts w ith "su p e rio r" academ ic b ack g ro u n d s o r abilities, u su a lly stu d e n ts from a d ­ v a n ta g e d b ack g ro u n d s a n d schools in p ro sp e ro u s districts. M ost likely, g iv en th e fields of stu d y targ eted , th ey also w o u ld b e m ale; in term s of g en d er, too, th e N D EA resem bled th e GI Bill. The N D EA w a s d e sig n ed to stre n g th e n e d u ca tio n a n d n a tio n al defense. A lo n g w ith sw ellin g S putnik-era technological p ro g ram s, it tig h te n ed th e link b e tw ee n the federal g o v e rn m e n t a n d e d u c a tio n a n d d e e p e n e d th e la tte r's d e ­ p e n d en c e o n the form er. It elicited little criticism for d o in g so. E isen h o w er h im ­ self m issed a n o p p o rtu n ity in th a t regard. W orried as ev er a b o u t th e "g arriso n state," h e d e sig n ed N D EA legislation " th a t serv ed h is re a rg u a rd v iew ag ain st th e p reten sio n s of technocracy," b u t h e co u ch ed th e d a n g e r of fed eral a id to e d u ca tio n in term s of "socialism ."97 T he w id e -ra n g in g d efin itio n s of n a tio n al secu rity th a t p ro m p te d th e N D EA d id n o t, h ow ever, forge g reater n a tio n al un ity , d e sp ite rh etorical a p p ea ls in ­ v o k in g Pearl H a rb o r a n d the like p resu m ab ly d e sig n e d to achieve it. In stead , th e fissures in political c u ltu re o n ly w id e n e d as th e d ecad e closed. E isen h o w er h im self re p u d ia te d the n e ed for unity, in th a t h e d e n ie d th ere w a s a n a tio n al em ergency. The sh eer len g th of tim e, ap p ro a ch in g tw o d ecad es, of real o r p re ­ su m e d n a tio n al em ergency also u n d e rc u t efforts to achieve unity, for each n ew p ro cla m a tio n of crisis cam e to A m ericans inclined b y n o w to reg a rd su ch decla­ ratio n s as alm o st routine. W hile A m ericans m ig h t o n occasion p o stp o n e o th er

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goals, as th ey p resu m ab ly h a d in 1942, p e rp e tu a l d e ferral w as less obtainable, especially in 1958 a n d 1959, w h e n racial issu es a n d a sh a rp recession g en erated m u c h conflict a n d attention. So w h ile ex p erts d w e lle d o n g a p s b e tw e e n the U n ited States a n d th e Soviet U nion, g a p s am o n g A m erican s th em selv es also w id e n ed . T hey a p p e a re d o n m a n y fronts b y th e d e c a d e 's e n d — in a co n tin u in g b attle ov er rock m usic a n d in h a n d w rin g in g a b o u t A m erican y o u th , for ex am ­ ple, a n d m o st b a ld ly in d e b ates o n race relatio n s a n d n u c le ar policy. In tu rn , those issues h e lp e d reenergize co n serv atism — n o t E isen h o w er's cau tio u s b ra n d b u t a strid e n t v ersio n d e m a n d in g d ism a n tlin g of th e w elfare state a n d v icto ry in the C old W ar. W illiam F. B uckley's National Review m ad e its d e b u t in 1955, w h ile The Conscience of a Conservative b y A rizo n a se n ato r B arry G o ld w a ter h it th e b ookstores in 1960. G o ld w a ter ex p lo ited th e d iscrep an cy b e­ tw e en strid e n t professions of irreconcilable Soviet-A m erican conflict a n d the m o re cautious practice of A m erican foreign policy. W ith W orld W ar II h is m o d el fo r th e C old W ar, h e cried th a t it w o u ld h av e m a d e n o sense, "m id w a y in th e Second W orld W ar, to p ro m o te a N azi-A m erican exchange p ro g ra m or to in v ite H itle r to m ak e a sta te v isit to the U n ited S tates." H e co n d em n ed th e "cra­ v e n fear of d e a th " th a t w a s "e n te rin g th e A m erican consciousness," to th e p o in t (referring to K h ru sh ch ev 's recent visit) " th a t m a n y recently felt th a t h o n o rin g th e chief d e sp o t h im self w as the price w e h a d to p a y to av o id n u c le ar d e stru c ­ tio n ." G o ld w a ter sh a re d w ith liberals a fear th a t A m erica w a s losing th e C old W ar b ecause its lead ersh ip , ev en its p eo p le, w ere flaccid. A n d h is rhetoric re­ sem b led w h a t the N e w Left w o u ld so o n say: g o v e rn m e n t h a d becom e "a Le­ v iath an , a v a st n a tio n al a u th o rity o u t of to u ch w ith th e p eo p le, a n d o u t of th eir co n tro l." W here liberals w a n te d to en erg ize th e state th ro u g h p ro g ra m s like the N D EA , ho w ev er, G o ld w a ter w a n te d to d isb a n d it, except for its h a rd core of a rm e d force a n d in te rn al security.98 C riticism also c o n tin u ed a m o n g liberal intellectuals. True, n o w h o lesale ch an g e w a s ev id en t. W h en scholars ex am in ed "p o w e r a n d dem o cracy in A m erica" in 1961, for exam ple, only th e idiosy n cratic Peter D ru ck er focused o n m ilitary institution s. O th e rs still offered critiq u es of m ass cu ltu re, stressin g h o w th e n a tio n n e e d e d to ch an g e to w ag e global stru g g le, in a sp irit sim ilar to th a t of D. W. B rogan, the B ritish observer. B rogan w as g lad th a t S p u tn ik w o k e "th e A m erican p u b lic from its u n d o g m atic slu m b ers (in m o st cases it w a s p la in slu m b er)," th o u g h t th a t it ra n k e d " w ith th e sh o ts a t L exington or Fort S um ter," a n d m a in ta in e d th a t "ev e ry th in g in th e in te rio r life of th e U n ited States th a t reinforces th e in te rio r o r exterior caricature of th e A m erican w a y of life— from rig g ed q u iz p ro g ra m s u p w a rd — is d a n g ero u s in th is w o rld ." 99 P au l G o o d m an , in Growing up Absurd (1960), offered a d ifferen t th ru st. H e lam en te d h o w society gave y o u th n o sense of w o rk , p u rp o se , a n d com m unity, a n d h e celebrated Beats, h ip sters, a n d d e lin q u en ts for ex p o sin g th e h o llo w n ess of A m erican culture. A lth o u g h later h a iled for ch artin g a co u rse to w a rd the rad ical 1960s, G o o d m a n also "reflected the d istaste for ideological lan g u ag e c o m m o n to the 1950s." H e took sw ip es a t C o ld W ar c u ltu re b u t gave n o sus-

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tain ed analysis of m ilitarizatio n a n d its role in y o u th 's ills. H is criticism of E isen h ow er w a s u tte rly co n v en tio n al— "H e h a s in v ite d n o real w riter, n o a rt­ ist, n o p h ilo so p h e r to th e W hite H o u se," a n d h a v in g Fred W arin g 's b a n d p la y a t th e W hite H o u se w a s "d isg rac e fu l"— a n d of th e so rt th a t K en n ed y co u ld easily d isarm . R eflecting 1950s n o rm s in a n o th e r w ay, h e ig n o red w o m en : "A g irl d o es n o t have to, she is n o t expected to, 'm a k e so m e th in g ' of herself. . . . She w ill h ave ch ildren, w h ich is absolutely self-justifying, like a n y o th er n a tu ra l o r creative act."100 Still, G o o d m a n 's e d g y to n e a n d m u c h of h is co n ten t a n ticip a te d b ro a d e r criticism of m ilitarized A m erica. W riting w h e n G o o d m a n 's b o o k a p p e a re d , a n ­ th ro p o lo g ist Jules H e n ry p o rtra y e d a "cu ltu re a g ain st m an ," o n e sick to its core. H e n ry saw th e C o ld W ar n o t as a relu c ta n t b u rd e n , b u t as a c ru sa d e fatally con­ g ru e n t w ith A m erica's c u ltu re a n d econom ic system . "T he anx iety late n t in o u r insecure a n d com petitive life h a s b e e n ra tio n alize d — m a d e real a n d specific— b y th e em ergence of th e Soviet U n io n as th e c o n te m p o ra ry In ca rn atio n of fear." W orse, the affluence acco m p an y in g m ilita riza tio n d isa rm e d o p p o sitio n to it, since w a r a n d w a r p re p a ra tio n s w ere seen as p ro m o tin g p ro sp erity . "T he fact th a t w a r -fear is p a rtly n arco tized b y c o n su m p tio n -euphoria h a b itu a te s u s to liv­ in g w ith T he G reat Fear." D efense sp e n d in g d riv e n b y th a t fear h a d o th e r b a le ­ ful effects, H e n ry claim ed: it d im in ish e d in v estm en t in th e n a tio n 's com m ercial p ro w ess, causing A m erica's "g ro w in g v u ln era b ility to im p o rts," a n d it re­ sh a p e d "th e ecological p a tte rn of in d u stria l d e v elo p m e n t," sh iftin g it ab o v e all to C alifornia. W h en econom ists e x p lain th a t d efen se sp e n d in g m a in ta in e d n a ­ tional prosperity, w ro te H enry, "w e m u st b e lie v e . . . D e ath h a s w o n p e c u n ia ry sanctification. It is lo n g ov erd u e. Saint D eath, I salu te you! H ere in th e U n ited States death sustains life." H e n ry 's tre a tm e n t of m ilitarizatio n w a s n o t fully in te ­ g rate d into h is analysis of A m erican culture, a n d h is an g er m a d e for slo p p y analysis. T hat anger, h o w ev er, also m ark e d a b rea k from th e p a llid social criti­ cism p rev alen t, w ith n o tab le exceptions, d u rin g th e 1950s.101 A sim ilar b rea k arose in o th e r scholarly disciplines. A m o n g h isto rian s, the 1950s "m o o d of affirm ation a n d co n sen su s" b e g a n d issolving. W illiam A p p lem a n W illiam s's The Tragedy of American Diplomacy a p p e a re d in 1959, a n d "th e new , left h isto rio g ra p h y a n d th e stu d e n t N e w Left," w h ic h h a d "co m m o n roots," w ere em erg in g b y 1960. Few h isto ria n s m a d e a clean b re a k from th eir earlier outlooks, b u t it w a s telling th a t John L ukacs, a co n serv ativ e C atholic w ith "u n d iv id e d " loyalties in the C o ld W ar, e m p h a size d in The History of the Cold War (1961) th a t "th e stru g g les of m e n a n d of n a tio n s d o n o t alw ay s clearly in carn ate the d iv isio n s of G ood a n d Evil." L ukacs criticized "a n e w k in d of n o t alw ay s conscious A m erican im p erial ex p an sio n " a n d th e n o tio n of irreconcil­ able Soviet-A m erican conflict: " O u r d a n g e r" com es fro m th o se "tellin g th e m ­ selves th a t a n A tom ic W ar is u n a v o id a b le ."102 R eg arding m ilitarization, the im m ed iate im p o rt of th e w o rk of these in tellectuals— or of o th ers like E d m u n d W ilson— w a s lim ited. In tone a n d con-

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ten t, th eir criticism d id n o t differ g reatly from w h a t L ew is M u m fo rd a n d C. W rig h t M ills h a d sa id a t m id -d ecad e. In the academ y, it w a s a m in o rity view . In im pact, it p e rh a p s d id n o t m atch th a t of the p o e t A llen G insberg, th e film m ak er Stanley K ubrick, o r th e m iddle-class critic B etty F riedan, o r e v en ro ck 'n 'ro ll singers. In audience, it p a le d in co m p ariso n to th e one E isen h o w er h a d for ex­ p re ssin g h is d o u b ts. O f course, h e u su a lly ex p ressed h is p u b lic d o u b ts in cir­ c u m sp ec t w ays: th e a n g e r voiced b y critics a t th e d e c a d e 's e n d w a s as im p o r­ ta n t as th e co n te n t of th e ir d o u b ts. Influence is h a rd to m easu re, b u t th o se d o u b ts w ere, in v o lu m e, tone, a n d content, significant a t least as m ark e rs of a ch an g in g m ood. P o p u la r c u ltu re also rev ealed a m ore co m p licated m o o d b y 1960. A s before, d e p ic tio n s of th e celebrated 1945 flag raisin g a t Iw o Jim a p ro v id e d o n e m ea su re of th a t culture. In 1954, Ira H ayes, the P im a In d ia n m arin e in th e fam o u s p h o to of th a t m o m en t, d ie d a d ru n k , c ru sh e d in p a rt b y th e heroic sta tu s fixed o n h im , th o u g h g iv en "th e m o st lavish m ilitary b u ria l since th e in te rn m e n t of th e U n ­ k n o w n Soldier." In 1960, NBC T elevision's The American offered " a n expose of d elib erate fra u d o n th e p a rt of th e [M arine] C o rp s, a schem e to d u p e th e A m eri­ c an p u b lic into believ in g th a t a b rav e a n d n o b le d e e d h a d tra n sp ire d a to p M o u n t Suribachi. . . .T h e R osenthal p ictu re w a s a 'p h o n e y .'T h e re w ere n o Iw o Jim a heroes, o n ly fakes a n d h u m b u g s. . . . H ayes, in h is rein c arn a tio n o n NBC, w a s d riv e n to a n e arly g rav e b y th e sh am e of tellin g lies a t th e b e h e st of h is m ilita ry su p e rio rs." T he e n su in g c o n tro v ersy w a s com plicated b y N B C 's o w n effort, ju st ex­ p o se d , to rig its q u iz show s, a n d The American d id n o t d irectly attack n a tio n al policies, y e t a sh o w q u e stio n in g th e sym bols of th o se policies a n d lin k in g th eir p re s u m e d frau d u le n ce to racism at h o m e w o u ld h av e b e e n u n lik ely a few y ears earlier. A m o re searin g (an d confused) v e rsio n of th e H ay es sto ry follow ed. H o lly w o o d 's The Outsider (1962) reso rte d to a classic fo rm u la of A m erican fiction— th e hom oerotic b o n d b e tw e e n a d a rk -sk in n e d m a n (H ayes) a n d a b lo n d , b lu e-ey ed all-A m erican— in o rd e r to u n d e rlin e th e film 's "lea st a m b ig ­ u o u s them e: th e sh a rp d iv isio n b e tw e e n w h ite a n d 'c o lo re d ' in A m erican soci­ ety." A critique of racism w a s n o t n e w to H o lly w o o d , b u t lin k in g it to a n u n se t­ tlin g p o rtra it of a m y th ic m o m e n t in A m erican m ilitary p ro w e ss w a s m o re novel. It su g g e ste d a connection b e tw ee n th e c o rru p tio n of A m erican p o w e r ab ro a d a n d th e flaw s of A m erican society a t h o m e .103 The Outsider b o m b ed a t the box office, b u t it w a s a n offbeat rep re se n ta tiv e of a clu ster of film s (an d th e novels p rec ed in g them ) th a t w a lk ed a fine line b e­ tw e en extolling fam iliar v alu es a n d q u e stio n in g d o m in a n t policies. On the Beach (1959) p re se n te d the w o rld 's th erm o n u cle ar death : if to som e it also "m a d e w o rld extinction a ro m an tic co n d itio n ," to o th ers it w a s frig h te n in g .104 O th e r film s so o n a p p e a re d exp o sin g the frailties of n u c le ar c o m m an d tech n o l­ og y a n d d e terren ce logic. O ften these film s so u g h t easy ta rg e ts— m ilitary offi­ cers o r scientists, ra th e r th a n the civilian lead ers w h o set basic policies. M ore-

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over, it w a s h a rd to tell w h e th e r th eir m essag es w ere com plex o r m erely confused: The Manchurian Candidate (1962), b a sed o n a 1959 n o v el, d e m o n ­ stra te d th a t "w h ile C o m m u n ism is fien d ish a n d still d a n g ero u s, th e far rig h t is hypocritical a n d foolish." In m ovie form . The Manchurian Candidate, b y p re se n t­ in g a m enacing h o m o sex u al assassin (L aw rence H arv ey ) p ro g ra m m e d b y h is Soviet-agent m o th e r (A ngela L ansbury), eith er rew o rk ed o r p illo rie d — it w a s h a rd to tell w h ic h — th e 1950s conflation of "M om m ies, C om m ies, a n d Q u e e rs."105 O n ly Stanley K ubrick, w h o se Paths of Glory (1957) h a d offered a p o w e rfu l a n tiw a r m essage in the safer contex t of W orld W ar I, d isc a rd e d care­ ful b alan cin g in a n all-out a ssa u lt o n the w arfare state. Doctor Strangelove (1964), w ith a b iza rre am a lg a m of W em h er v o n B raun, H e n ry K issinger, H e rm a n K ahn, a n d p e rh a p s o th ers as its title character. In a sim ilar v e in w a s Catch-22 (1961), a n o v el b y Joseph H eller, w h o set the action in W orld W ar II b u t d irected h is sav age w it a g ain st th e C o ld W ar's ab su rd ities. For all th e p u n c h es p u lle d in su c h film s, th ey w ere tro u b lin g , e n o u g h so in th e case of On the Beach th a t "E ise n h o w e r's cab in et d iscu ssed co n fid en tial ac­ tio n s th ey m ig h t take to u n d e rm in e the m o v ie ."106 E ven if th e y o ften accep ted C o ld W ar d o g m a s— th a t a c en trist liberalism sto o d stu rd ily a g ain st political ex­ trem es, th a t e x p erts a n d lea d ers m u s t be tru s te d — th ey also p u sh e d th o se d o g m as to the surface, exposing th em to a critical g aze less available a d ecad e earlier. Like m u c h else a t th e d e c a d e 's en d , p o p u la r c u ltu re sh o w e d th a t p ro ­ m o ters of th e S p u tn ik panic, for all th ey su cceed ed in beefin g u p A m erican p o w e r in th e sh o rt term , also a g g ra v a te d A m erican s' felt v u ln era b ility to n u ­ clear o b literatio n in w a y s th a t w o u ld ev en tu ally w o rk a g ain st th eir efforts. E ar­ lier, ala rm a t the b o m b h a d sh ifted to ala rm a t th e Soviets; b y 1960 th e process w a s ru n n in g in reverse for som e A m ericans. T h at w a s h a rd ly e v id e n t in th e 1960 p resid en tia l cam p aig n , h o w ev er. In ­ stead , N ix o n a n d K en n ed y c o m p e te d in p ro claim in g th e ir zeal a n d ex p ertise for w a g in g the C old W ar m ore aggressively. D em ocrats stressed th e feckless­ n ess a n d fatigue of a n old m a n 's presidency, offering th e "m issile g a p " a n d "space g a p " as ev id en ce of G O P failure. N ix o n w a lk ed a n a w k w a rd line b e ­ tw e en d e fe n d in g Ike a n d p ro m isin g his o w n fresh er a p p ro ach , ju st as Ike faced h is o w n conflicting im p u lse s— dislike of N ixon, fear of o v e rsh a d o w in g h im , a n d desire to c am p aig n for him . K en n ed y 's raz o r-th in v icto ry m e a su re d n o d e ­ cisive shift o n issues of w a r a n d foreign policy. N o o n e m u c h n o ticed E isen h o w er's h o p e, offered ironically a t the d ed icatio n of th e M arsh all Space F light C enter, th a t A m erican achievem ents b e "th e o u tg ro w th n o t of a soulless, b a rre n technology, n o r of a g ra sp in g state im p erialism ," b u t ra th e r of a " p ro b ­ in g for th e b e tterm e n t of h u m a n ity ." 107 Later, m o st A m ericans sen sed th a t the b re a k d o w n of n a tio n al co n sen su s to o k place in th e m id-1960s, in resp o n se in g o o d p a rt to th e V ietn am W ar. In m a n y w ays, th ey w ere right, y e t e v en in th e 1950s th e b alan ce of c o n te n d in g m o o d s a n d forces h a d b e e n uneasy. The tran sitio n to a n e w presid en cy , a n d

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w h a t E isen h o w er sa id d u rin g it, on ly fu rth e r rev ealed th e in stab ility a n d th e g ro w in g d o u b ts a b o u t m ilitarization.

“An Insidious Penetration of Our Own Minds” W ith h is in au g u ra tio n , John K ennedy said, th e torch "p a sse d to a n e w g e n era ­ tio n of A m ericans," those "tem p ere d b y w a r" a n d "d iscip lin ed b y a h a rd a n d b itte r p e ac e."108 But the g en eratio n al change JFK p ro claim ed w a s unclear. H is y o u th w a s striking, b u t h e also d re w for advice o n e ld e rs like John M cC loy a n d D ean A cheson. B oth g en eratio n s h a d ex perien ced W orld W ar II, b u t o ld er m en like E isen h o w er h a d h e ld h ig h ra n k in it a n d w ere fam iliar w ith p re w a r su sp i­ cions of m ilitarism , w h ile m e n like K enned y k n ew little of th o se suspicions, w a g e d w a r from lesser po sitio n s, a n d h a d th e ir o u tlo o k m o re decisively sh a p e d b y th e w ar. P ro u d of th eir ability to b rea k from th eir eld ers, th ey w ere n o n e th e ­ less m o re the p riso n e rs of W orld W ar II th a n E isen h o w er's gen eratio n . M oreover, th e v e ry n o tio n of a torch p a sse d also p re su m e d co n tin u ity : the n ew co m ers sto o d in E isen h o w er's sh a d o w a n d so u g h t h is blessing. W h en E isen h o w er a n d K en n ed y d iscu ssed S outheast A sia o n Jan u ary 19, com plex p o litical a n d g en eratio n al relatio n sh ip s w ere a t play. K en n ed y in sid ers later re­ called th a t E isen h o w er's insistence o n Laos as "th e m o st im p o rta n t p ro b lem facing the U n ited States" h a d d o n e "a disservice to th e in co m in g A d m in istra ­ tio n ," in C lark C lifford's sum m ary. "You m ig h t h av e to go in th ere a n d fig h t it o u t," p e rh a p s " 'u n ilaterally ,' " Ike w a rn e d , according to Ted S orensen a n d A r­ th u r Schlesinger, Jr. But o th er accounts sh o w th a t E isen h o w er u se d su ch p h ra se s to m ore a m b ig u o u s effect. U n ilateral in terv en tio n , w h ile n o t ru le d out, " w o u ld b e v e ry b a d for o u r relatio n s" in A sia, h e said, at b e st "a last d e sp era te effort" in a reg io n w h e re c o m m u n ists h a d m an y ad v an tag es. W orried a b o u t S o u th east A sia, E isenhow er w a s ste p p in g u p A m erican a id a n d co v ert in ter­ v e n tio n there. But K ennedy a n d som e of his aid es ex ag g erated th e force of h is adv ice because of th eir u n fam iliarity w ith his style of lay in g o u t all c o n tin g en ­ cies, th eir desire for h is sanction to policies th ey w ere co n sid erin g , a n d later th eir eag ern ess to h a v e h im sh are responsib ility for th eir d e e p e n in g in v o lv e­ m e n t in the V ietnam W ar. D espite th eir im p ressio n s, Ike w a s relu c ta n t to p u sh th em in to w a r— a n d also, h e so o n sh o w ed , to p u ll th em aw ay from it. E arly in th e 1960s, d ra ftin g a section of his m em o irs o n th e D ien Bien P h u crisis, h e ar­ g u e d p o in te d ly th a t the presence of large A m erican forces in V ietn am " w o u ld h av e p ro b ab ly a g g ra v ate d . . . th e resen tm en ts h e ld b y A siatics." E ven h a d th ey occupied "all of In d o ch in a . . . , th eir e v en tu al rem o v al w o u ld h av e re­ su lted only in a rev ersio n to the situ atio n w h ic h h a d existed b efore." Lest h e e m b a rrass h is successors, ho w ev er, w h o h a d tak en ju st th a t course, h e d eleted th e passage, ju st as h e s u p p o rte d v ig o ro u s u se of A m erican forces once Johnson co m m itted th em .109 W h atev er the th ru st of E isen h o w er's adv ice o n th e 19th, h is televised fare-

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w ell a d d re ss to the n a tio n tw o d a y s earlier h a d a differen t focus. Ike to ld A m er­ icans they w ere in a global conflict th a t "ab so rb s o u r v e ry b e in g s" a n d — ag ain u rg in g the long v ie w — "p ro m ises to b e of in d efin ite d u ra tio n ." A s a resu lt, the U n ited States h a d b e en "co m p elled to create a p e rm a n e n t a rm a m e n ts in d u stry of v a st p ro p o rtio n s," a lo n g w ith h u g e , costly a rm e d forces. "T he to ta l in flu ­ ence" of this n e w sy ste m — "econom ic, political, e v en sp iritu a l— is felt in e v ery city, ev ery State h o u se, ev ery office of th e Federal g o v e rn m e n t." H e enjo in ed A m ericans to " g u a rd a g ain st the acquisitio n of u n w a rra n te d influence, w h e th e r so u g h t or u n so u g h t, b y th e m ilitary -in d u strial com plex. T he p o ten tial for th e d isa stro u s rise of m isp laced p o w e r exists a n d w ill p ersist." A larm in g also w a s "th e p ro sp e ct of d o m in a tio n of the n a tio n 's sch o lars b y F ed eral em ­ p lo y m en t, project allocations, a n d th e p o w e r of m o n ey " a n d "th e eq u al a n d o p ­ p o site d a n g e r th a t p u b lic policy c o u ld itself b eco m e th e cap tiv e of a scientifictechnological elite." A n d as h e h a d before, h e lin k ed these d a n g e rs to ecological perils, w a rn in g a g ain st "th e im p u lse to live on ly for today, p lu n d e rin g , fo r o u r o w n ease a n d convenience, th e p recio u s resources of to m o rro w ."110 W h at d id h e m ean? In one w ay, his co m m en ts w ere sh re w d ly exculpatory. M ilitarization h a d b e e n forced o n A m erica b y d a n g e ro u s en em ies a n d tech n o logies— it w a s n o t his n a tio n 's fault. W h at h a p p e n e d o n h is w a tc h w a s "co m p elled ," w h ile av o id ab le d a n g e rs (the "potential for th e d isa stro u s rise of m isp laced p o w e r") lay ah ead . He h a d h e ld th e line; lesser m e n m ig h t not. Yet h is farew ell a d d re ss also h e ld a d a rk e r v iew of m ilita riza tio n a n d h is o w n role in it. By d escrib in g its influence as "econom ic, political, e v en sp iritu a l," h e su g g e ste d th a t w h a te v e r its origins, m ilitarizatio n w a s tak in g o n a life of its o w n a p a rt from th e w o rld scene, b ecom ing w o v e n in to th e fabric of A m erican life. M oreover, "th e conjunction of a n im m en se m ilitary estab lish m en t a n d a larg e a rm s in d u stry " h a d a lre ad y o ccurred, w h ile he w a s P resid en t, w h a te v e r ab u ses lay in the future. A n d reg a rd in g d isa rm a m e n t, ack n o w led g ed E isenhow er, "I confess th a t I lay d o w n m y official resp o n sib ilities in th is field w ith a d efinite sense of d isa p p o in tm e n t." Ju st as strik in g w ere th e o m issio n s in th e a d d re ss— n o su m m o n s to g rea ter vigilance a g ain st th e enem y, n o recitatio n of tro u b le sp o ts in the w o rld , a n d little talk of th e e n em y 's evil. T he a d d re ss w a s rem ark ab ly in w ard -lo o k in g , calling for A m erican s to b e v ig ila n t n o t a g ain st e n ­ em ies b u t them selves. Ju st as th e C o ld W ar w a s reach in g a n e w intensity, h e d irected a tten tio n a w ay from it. E isenhow er h a d left b e h in d a m em o rab le ch aracterizatio n of m ilitarizatio n . H e a d d e d to it the n ex t d a y a t h is final p ress conference, w h e n a sk ed h o w to c o u n ter "th e d a n g e r th a t p u b lic policy co u ld becom e th e cap tiv e of a scientific technological elite." H is first resp o n se seem ed lam e— h e n a m e d n o specific steps, o n ly u rg in g " a n ale rt a n d in fo rm ed c itize n ry "— y et it w a s a p p ro p ria te g iv en h is large v iew of th e p roblem , for "th is m isu se of influence a n d p o w e r co u ld com e a b o u t u n w ittin g ly . . . ju st b y th e n a tu re of th e th in g ," a g a in st w h ich a n y single step w o u ld be puny. "W h en y o u see alm o st ev ery o n e of y o u r

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m ag azines, n o m a tte r w h a t th ey are a d v ertisin g , h a s a p ictu re of th e T itan m is­ sile o r th e A tlas [m issile] o r solid fuel o r o th er things, th ere is b eco m in g a g rea t influence, a lm o st a n in sid io u s p e n e tra tio n of o u r o w n m in d s th a t th e on ly th in g th is c o u n try is e n g ag e d in is w e a p o n ry a n d m issiles." The sy n tax w a s g a rb le d b u t th e in sig h t p e n e tra tin g , a n d m ore su b tle th a n his earlier tira d es a g ain st m il­ ita rism ("W e are n o t g o in g to b e in u n ifo rm s g o in g a ro u n d yellin g 'H e il' a n y ­ th in g ," h e said in 1953). T he p ro b lem , Ike realized , w a s n o t sim p ly o n e of p u b lic po licy b u t of c u ltu re a n d the n a tio n 's sense of p u rp o se — its loss of a w a y to defin e itself except b y m ilitary pow er. N o o th e r n a tio n al lea d er d efin ed th e p ro b lem so b ro ad ly .111 Yet u n w ittin g ly E isenhow er h a d also a g g ra v ate d th a t p ro b lem . By skillfully b a la n cin g conflicting n e e d s a n d b y k eep in g cold w a r from e ru p tin g in to h o t w ar, h e h a d m a d e th e p u rs u it of n a tio n al secu rity c o n g ru e n t w ith d o m in a n t a sp iratio n s for peace a n d pro sp erity . H is successors co u ld tu rn h is success a g ain st him : if p o w e r ab ro a d a n d p ro sp e rity at h o m e w ere com patible, h o w m u c h m o re co u ld b e — h a d to b e — achieved reg a rd in g b o th if g reater efforts w ere m ad e? T he K en n ed y a d m in istra tio n w a s ju st as k een to b alan ce "th e d e ­ fense effort a g ain st th e o th er d e m a n d s of th e econom y," w ro te Schlesinger in 1965, b u t like m a n y liberals w h o saw n atio n al resources as expansive, "it b e lie v e d — correctly— th a t the b alance c o u ld be achieved a t a m u c h h ig h e r lev el."112 Ike's m essage a b o u t lim ited resources a n d b alan cin g goals ("balance" a p p e a re d sev en tim es in one sentence of his farew ell) w a s u n d e rc u t b y h is o w n success in ju g g lin g peace, pro sp erity , a n d po w er. N o t su rp risin g ly , e v en as E ise n h o w e r's farew ell g o t a ro u sin g reception, its m essage o ften g o t lost. L iberals d ism isse d it as b elated , ig n o rin g its consistency w ith a d e c a d e 's w a rn in g s b y him . "For e ig h t y ears, M r. E isen h o w er h a s d e ­ p re sse d h is fellow A m ericans b y a seem ing inab ility to g ra sp th e m ajor p ro b ­ lem s of h is era," according to th e Nation, b u t n o w "h e sp o k e like th e sta te sm an a n d d em ocratic lea d er w e h a d so lo n g h u n g e re d for h im to becom e." T. R. B. in th e New Republic th o u g h t it "a stra n g e final w arn in g . . . . W e c o u ld n 't h av e a g re ed m ore a n d y e t (com ically en o u g h ) a m a n 's a g reem en t rarely irrita te d u s so m u ch. H e h a d e ig h t y ears to give this w a rn in g ; w h y w a it till a m in u te before m id n ig h t?" E n tran ced b y JFK's p ro m ise of activism , liberals ig n o red th e g e n ­ e ra l's m essag e b y b e littlin g th e m essenger. The K en n ed y m en ask ed n e ith er E isen h o w er n o r th em selv es a n y q u estio n s a b o u t it— it g ave th em n o m essage a t all. Five y ears later, Schlesinger still expressed th eir sn eerin g attitu d e: "A fter e ig h t y ears in the W hite H ouse, e v en E isenh o w er cam e to feel th a t so m eth in g w a s w ro n g a n d issu ed h is u n e x p ec te d w a rn in g ": even E isenhow er, as if h e w ere th e last p e rs o n to h av e su c h fears. B esides, Schlesinger a d d e d , "th e m ilitaryin d u stria l com plex w a s m o re a consequence th a n a cause of th e p ro b lem ," w h ic h "lay in the feebleness of civilian control of th e m ilitary e stab lish m en t"— a n o u td a te d co n cep tio n of the p ro b lem , as Ike h a d ju st p o in te d o u t in his fare­ w ell. For its p a rt, th e G O P 's rig h t w in g , th o u g h fearin g b ig g o v ern m en t, d id n o t

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sh are Ike's alarm a b o u t the b lo ated a p p a ra tu s of n atio n al defense. H e n e v er h a d m an y allies in his cam p aig n a g ain st th e g a rriso n state. H e left office w ith a p p la u se b u t ev en few er allies.113 Still h u sb a n d in g h is p e rso n al resources, h e m a d e little effort later to su sta in th e m essage of his farew ell. E ven a t h is final p ress conference, h e h a d id en tified "th e g reatest p ro b lem " facing K ennedy as "th e in tran sig en t, u n reaso n ab le a tti­ tu d e of the C o m m u n ist bloc . . . .— this terrib le p ro b lem th a t is n o n e of o u r m ak in g ." T he th em es of his farew ell d id a p p e a r in h is m em oirs, b u t b la n d ly expressed. P erh ap s h is diffidence m a d e little difference, since h e so o n "becam e a c u ltu ral an ach ro n ism ," h is p o p u la rity e n o rm o u s b u t h is v a lu e s seem in g ly "q u ain t, curious, o r— th e u ltim ate p u t-d o w n of th e d e c a d e — irrelev an t." H is fam o u s p h rase, th e "m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex," w a s later recovered b y th e a n tiw a r m o v em en t, b u t largely because it w a s con v en ien t, n o t b ecau se it seem ed to c ap tu re a co n sisten t stance o n Ik e's p a rt, o n e so o n h a rd to see an y ­ w a y g iv en h is public calls for escalating th e A m erican w a r in V ietn am a n d h is scorn for "k o o k s" a n d " h ip p ie s." 114 Ig n o rin g the E isenhow er of th e farew ell a d d re ss, K en n ed y 's in a u g u ra l a d ­ d ress in stea d echoed Ike's in a u g u ra l e ig h t y ears earlier. K en n ed y d e a lt solely w ith w a r a n d foreign policy, ig n o rin g "d o m estic" issu es like race relations. (C o m pared to "foreign affairs," h e allegedly to ld N ix o n a few m o n th s later, "w h o gives a sh it if th e m in im u m w ag e is $1.15 o r $1.25 . . . ?") M ore eleg an tly th a n E isenhow er, K en n ed y b alan ced conflicting im p u lses ("Let u s n e v e r n eg o ­ tiate o u t of fear. But let u s n e v e r fear to negotiate.") N o m o re e leg an tly th a n Ike, h e referred to " th a t u n c ertain b alance of te rro r th a t stay s th e h a n d of m a n k in d 's final w ar." If a n y th in g , K en n ed y o u tb id h is p re d e c e sso r's in a u g u ra l in calling for n a tio n al sacrifice, u rg in g A m ericans to " p a y a n y price, b e a r a n y b u rd e n , m eet a n y h a rd sh ip , su p p o rt a n y friend, o p p o se a n y foe to assu re th e su rv iv al a n d th e success of liberty." A n d b y p ro claim in g a n " h o u r of m ax im u m d a n g er," h e sig n aled a crisis m en tality th a t E isenhow er alw ay s rep u d ia te d . "C rises th ere w ill co n tin u e to be," Ike a d m itte d in his farew ell a d d re ss, b u t h e a d m o n ish e d a g ain st "a rec u rrin g te m p ta tio n to feel th a t som e sp ectacu lar o r costly actio n co u ld becom e the m iracu lo u s so lu tio n to all c u rre n t difficulties." N o one co u ld p red ic t the "y ear of m ax im u m d a n g er," m u c h less th e h o u r, Ike h a d in sisted in 1953, for "w e 're n o t in a m o m e n t of d an g er, w e 're in a n age of d a n g er." In p u b ­ lic at least, K ennedy a rg u e d th a t th e m o m e n t h a d a rriv e d .115

s TH E CR ISIS OF M ILITA R IZA TIO N , 1961-1966

“Impressive t o Mankind“ "I h av e b e en g u id e d b y the sta n d a rd John W in th ro p s e t . . . 331 years ago," John K ennedy explained before h is in au g u ratio n : " 'W e shall be a city u p o n a h ill— the eyes of all p eo p le are u p o n u s / " F am ous for to u g h rhetoric, JFK g ain ed less notice w h e n h e in to n ed fam iliar ideals, but, as I. F. Stone realized, he "seem s to be a ra th e r cautious p e rh a p s even conventio n al m a n ." 1 W in th ro p 's w o rd s h a d lo n g b e en u se d to justify (and som etim es to contest) th e ex p an sio n of A m erican p o w er. K ennedy w a s a n n o u n cin g th a t h e w o u ld co n tin u e th a t trad itio n . In d o ­ in g so, h e also b ro a d e n e d the scope of A m erica's m ilitarizatio n a n d th e fissures it w as p ro d u cin g . H e d id so in his o w n w ay, how ever, one th a t o ften m ask ed th e n a tu re a n d consequences of early-1960s m ilitarization. M ore th a n his pred ecesso rs, JFK lin k ed the h a rd im p erativ es of m ilitarizatio n to th e in tan g ib le n e ed s of im a g e — his, his a d m in istratio n 's, his n a tio n 's— calculating n o t on ly th e raw p o w e r ac­ cru ed th ro u g h rockets, satellites, or G reen Berets b u t th eir im age in "th e eyes of all p eo p le." H e h a rd ly in v en ted the concern for im age: b o th th e lessons of a p ­ p e ase m en t a n d the calculations of n u c le ar d eterren ce p riz e d th e ap p ea ra n c e of p o w e r as m u ch as the reality. But h e carried th a t concern literally a n d figu­ rativ ely to n e w heights. H is policy o n space ex p lo ratio n revealed these tendencies. M any scholars say little a b o u t th a t policy, as if it w ere a superficial asp ect of his presidency, o r o n e th a t o w ed m ore to L yndon Johnson, w h o seized o n it after S p u tn ik a n d a d ­ v an ced it as Vice P resid en t a n d P resident. K ennedy e n tered th e W hite H o u se carin g a n d k n o w in g little a b o u t space policy, b u t p erso n al in v estm en t p o o rly m easu res the im p o rtan ce of p resid en tial action (o th erw ise h isto rian s w o u ld say little ab o u t JFK's civil rights record). M easu red by m ed ia atten tio n , fiscal

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scale, role in w o rld conflict, a n d place in m ilitarizatio n , h is space policy w a s vital. It w a s b o m in p a rt of h u m iliatio n a n d d e sp era tio n . K en n ed y p ro ce ed e d cau ­ tio u sly at first, in p a rt because m a n y scientists, in a rg u m e n ts th e y re p e a te d th ro u g h o u t the decade, o p p o se d a crash p ro g ra m to p u t A m erican s in space o r o n th e m oon, lest it d is ru p t m ilitary, com m ercial, a n d scientific initiatives. W h en H a m b ecam e the first A m erican "astro c h im p " in F eb ru ary 1961, Life p ro ­ claim ed h im a "real h e ro " — a su re if silly sig n th a t S p u tn ik -era p an ic co n tin u ed am o n g som e A m ericans.2 K en n ed y d id n o t y e t feel it. By A pril, h e d id . W h en a Soviet rocket lifted Y uri G ag arin in to space, it seem ed like S p u tn ik all ov er again, as politician s a n d p u n d its b e w a ile d th e n e w evid en ce of Soviet su p e rio rity in rocketry, p restig e, a n d sh eer gall. A t th e sam e tim e, Soviet-A m erican ten sio n ov er B erlin a n d S o u th east A sia w a s increasing. T hen th e A p ril 15 lan d in g of C u b a n exiles a t th e Bay in Pigs in C u b a, w h e re Fidel C astro w as tig h te n in g h is m ie a n d c o u rtin g Soviet su p p o rt, e n d e d d isa s­ tro u sly a n d exposed its A m erican sp o n so rsh ip . K en n ed y h a d fulfilled h is p ro m ise to replace Ike's cau tio n w ith activism b u t h a d w o rse th a n n o th in g to sh o w for it. "Is th ere a n y place w e can catch th em ?" K en n ed y a sk ed h is a d v iso rs o n A p ril 14, w ith a Life re p o rte r p re se n t to convey his w o rd s to th e n atio n . T he q u e stio n referred n o m in a lly to the arena of sp ace— "W h a t can w e do? C a n w e go a ro u n d th e m o o n before them ? C a n w e p u t a m a n o n th e m o o n before th e m ? " — b u t im plicitly to the w h o le aren a of Soviet-A m erican co m p etitio n . "If so m eb o d y can ju st tell m e h o w to catch up. . . . T here's n o th in g m o re im p o rta n t." K en­ n e d y d efin ed im p o rtan ce above all in term s of th e n a tio n 's im ag e a n d a global "b attle for m in d s a n d souls as w ell as lives a n d territo ries," as h e to ld C o n g ress o n M ay 25, w h e n h e called for a n A m erican m o o n la n d in g a m o n g a b a tte ry of p ro g ram s to m eet "u rg e n t n a tio n al n e ed s." "N o single project in th is p e rio d w ill be m ore im p ressiv e to m a n k in d ," h e a n n o u n ce d , "o r m o re im p o rta n t for th e lon g-range ex p lo ratio n of space," a n d "so difficult o r ex p en siv e to accom ­ p lish ." "D ifficult" d e e d s projected a n im age to th e w o rld , for th e "v ery risk e n ­ hances o u r sta tu re w h e n w e are successful." "W e choose to go to th e m o o n in this decade, a n d d o the o th er th in g s," h e a d d e d in 1962, " n o t b ecau se th ey are easy, b u t because th ey are h a rd ." 3 A nxiety a b o u t im age d ro v e K en n ed y 's decisio n to "g o to th e m o o n ," b u t this w as "th a t m o st vexing of historical p ro b lem s, th e 'o v e rd e te rm in e d ev en t,' " since so m an y forces cam e into p la y a n d so little resistance em erg ed . T here w a s th e challenge of K h ru sh ch ev 's space spectacu lars (alth o u g h as Ik e's N A SA d i­ rector h a d sp ecu lated to K hrushchev in January, th e Soviet lea d er m ig h t con­ tin u e "u n til h e h a d the U.S. c o m m itted to a costly p ro g ra m " a n d th e n "w ith ­ d ra w from the 'ra c e '" ).4 In th a t reg ard , K en n ed y 's sense of w h a t w a s "im p ressive to m a n k in d " w a s keen, for h is space p ro g ra m did c a p tu re a tten tio n (carefully cultivated) ab ro ad a n d a sense of d a rin g a n d a d v e n tu re am o n g m an y

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A m erican s (if m ore o ften m e n th a n w om en), a n d d id so th ro u g h o u t th e 1960s, e v e n as th e im age of the n a tio n a b ro a d a n d of lead ers a t h o m e su ffered in m an y o th e r w ays. K en n ed y 's o w n b a c k g ro u n d a n d te m p e ra m e n t w ere also im p o rtan t. H e w a s in clin ed to p e rso n al a n d geopolitical risk tak in g , p e rh a p s to d e fy h is p h y sical frailty, a n d certain ly to g ain the heroic cred en tials th a t Ike enjoyed. A n d h e e m ­ b rac ed th e p u rp o rte d lessons of W orld W ar II a b o u t th e d a n g e rs of n a tio n al flaccidity a n d th e v irtu e s of b ig science. ' M a n y of his key a d v iso rs h a d sim ilar b a ck g ro u n d s a n d outlooks. T hey b e ­ liev ed in "a far g rea ter role for g o v e rn m e n t in p la n n in g a n d executing social ch an g e," b u t less to solve th e p ro b lem s th a t v ex ed social-w elfare liberals.5 T hey w e re in ste a d technocratic liberals c a p tiv a te d b y p ro b lem s of n a tio n al security, a lth o u g h th e y also h o p e d th a t social, econom ic, a n d technological ben efits w o u ld flow fro m the n a tio n 's m obilization, as th e y b eliev ed h a d o ccu rred o v er th e p re v io u s tw o decades. T hey saw th em selv es as to u g h p ra g m a tists— th e id eo lo g u es w ere w o o lly -h ead ed rig h t-w in g e rs o r starry -ey ed leftists. A n d in space a n d d efense p ro g ram s, th ey h a d a w a y to m obilize th e activist sta te th a t few co n serv ativ es co u ld challenge. T h u s, u n lik e efforts to tackle racism o r po v erty , th ese p ro g ra m s m et th e test of secu rin g consensus. T hey also m a rk e d a n a tte m p t to sh o re it u p , h o w ev er, in th e face of a n erosion alre ad y e v id e n t b y th e e n d of th e 1950s. A g ra n d in itiativ e in space allo w ed K ennedy, elected b y a raz o r-th in m arg in , to rise ab o v e th e sim ­ m e rin g divisions. A s such, h is space p ro g ra m cam e to in d icate th e b a n k ru p tc y of liberalism , critics th o u g h t— its preference for g im m icks a n d global m uscle flexing o v e r efforts to foster e q u ality a n d p ro sp e rity a t ho m e. Since m a n y lib­ erals m a d e th a t criticism , h o w ev er, it m a rk e d th e ir d iv isio n s as m u c h as th eir b an k ru p tcy . N o r d id o n ly liberals criticize. T rue to h is earlier v iew s, a n d h a v in g th e gall to se n d th e m to a n astro n au t, E isen h o w er w ro te F rank B orm an th a t K en n ed y "d rastically revised a n d e x p a n d e d " th e m o o n effort "ju st after th e Bay of Pigs fiasco" a n d "gave th e h ig h e st p rio rity — u n fo rtu n a te in m y o p in io n — to a race, in o th er w o rd s, a s tu n t." 6 In m a n y w ay s, th e g ia n t A pollo p ro g ra m h a rd ly seem ed a m ilitarized affair. It w a s e n tru ste d to N A SA , a civilian agency; its g o al of m e n o n th e m o o n h eld n o likely m ilita ry payoff; its task of p ro d u c in g a few sp ectacu lar feats m esh ed p o o rly w ith th e m ilita ry 's in terest in v o lu m e p ro d u c tio n of satellites a n d o th e r space vehicles (m any officers d islik ed A pollo). A n d m u c h of its a p p e a l lay p re ­ cisely in its capacity to lift Soviet-A m erican conflict o u t of th e m ilitary sp h ere in to p eaceful com p etition, w ith a stro n au ts fig h tin g a sym bolic b attle, a n alter­ n ativ e to n u c le ar w ar. In th e "single com bat" of space, "th e m ig h tiest so ld ier of one a rm y w o u ld fig h t th e m ig h tiest so ld ier of th e o th e r a rm y as a su b stitu te for a p itc h e d b a ttle b e tw e e n th e en tire forces."7 From a n o th e r p ersp ectiv e, h ow ever, K en n ed y 's space p ro g ra m ex p ressed a su b tle m ilita riza tio n th a t E isenhow er h a d resisted. N A SA fo u n d its org an iza-

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tio n al m o d el a n d in sp iratio n in th e w a rtim e M a n h a tta n Project. It "rec ru ite d p e o p le as if it w ere b u ild in g a n a rm y for a w a r." 8 It d re w h e av ily o n th e a rm e d forces' w o rk in rocketry a n d space technology. It d e v e lo p e d tech n o lo g ies vital to th e m ilitary b u t off th eir b u d g e t. A s D efense Secretary R obert M cN am ara knew , it e x p a n d e d a n aerospace in d u stry essen tial to th e a rm e d forces a n d in ­ flu en tial in its o w n right. A n d its a stro n au ts w ere m ilita ry m en , a facet of th eir b a ck g ro u n d celebrated in th e 1960s. O n ly N A SA 's carefully crafted im age b elied its m ilita rize d n atu re: in o rd e r "to d ifferentiate U.S. efforts in space fro m th o se of th e Soviets," th e space p ro ­ g ra m h a d to " p o rtra y A m erican u se of techn o lo g y as b en ig n , eleg an t, b e y o n d th e e a rth b o u n d concerns of m ilitary a n d d ip lo m atic strateg y ," a n d "project a n im ag e d irectly co n tra d ic tin g its o rigins." A s "th e g rea test o p e n -e n d e d p eace­ tim e co m m itm en t b y C ongress in h isto ry " (a $20 b illio n p ro g ra m in 1961 esti­ m ates), the m a n n e d space p ro g ra m d w a rfe d a n y o th e r n o n d e fe n se p ro g ra m of K en n ed y 's liberal state, sh o w in g ag ain h o w h a rd it w a s to ju stify sta te activism ex cep t th ro u g h " w a r o r its su rro g a te ."9 B lurring fu rth e r a n y d istin c tio n b e ­ tw e e n "m ilita ry " a n d "civilian" sp h e res of action, it co n v ey ed th e m essag e th a t th e global stru g g le m ore th a n ev er em b raced b o th , a n d th u s raised th e v e ry anxieties it so u g h t to steer in to safer channels. Finally, it p ro v id e d a sh ield for th e n a tio n 's b ig g est peacetim e m ilitary b u ild u p to d ate. T h at b u ild u p h a rd ly w e n t u n n o ticed , b u t th e m e d ia 's gaze ra n u p in to space, a n d JFK's a d m in istra ­ tio n p re se n te d itself th ro u g h the space p ro g ra m as v isio n ary in its d e e p e st a sp i­ ratio n s, im p ly in g th a t o n ly its p re d e c e sso r's failure a n d its e n e m y 's ru th le ss­ n ess forced its relu ctan t q u e st for m ore b o m b s a n d rockets. A t levels largely b e y o n d th e conscious g ra sp of p o licy m ak ers, th e space p ro ­ g ram also e x u d e d v alu es of race, class, a n d g e n d e r so o n c h allen g ed b y m a n y A m ericans. The a stro n au ts (like th e n o n fly in g e x p erts a n d officials in v olved) w ere strik in g ly w h ite, m ale, a n d m iddle-class in id en tity a n d v alu es, w ith th eir w ives cast (in w a y s som etim es em b a rrassin g to them ) as self-sacrificing w o m e n w h o te n d e d to h o m e, in d e e d to th e h o m efro n t. T he a stro n a u ts' m a ­ chism o as m ilitary pilots a n d racecar d riv e rs w a s tem p ere d , in line w ith c u rre n t v alu es, b y m en tio n of th eir roles as fath ers a n d co m p an io n s (Life sh o w e d John G len n w e arin g his w ife's a p ro n a n d flip p in g b u rg ers).10 But little in th e lav ish a tten tio n g iven th em su g g e ste d a n eg alitarian sense of w h o m ig h t serv e th e n a ­ tio n in peril. O th e r d efense p ro g ram s like co n scrip tio n pro jected a m o re in clu ­ sive sense of service. The space p ro g ram , like o th er technological efforts, d id not. T he m ean in g s a n d im ages ascribed to th e space p ro g ra m also ex acerb ated th e difficulties A m ericans h a d in g rasp in g th e elu siv e n a tu re of w ar. D id th e space p ro g ra m d ev elo p m ilitary technology? P erh ap s, b u t it also ta p p e d fan ta ­ sies of co n su m er a b u n d an ce, ju st as th e auto in d u stry m im ick ed its ap p eals: "A [space] cap su le is b it like a n autom obile," o b serv ed a stro n a u t A lan S h ep ard , w h o "so rt of w a n te d to kick the tires" w h e n h e saw th e R edstone ro ck et b e in g

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rea d ied for h is flight.11 W as the space race a S oviet-A m erican w ar? Yes, b u t th e co m b at w a s sym bolic a n d th e battlefield far from A m erican soil. M ig h t w a r com e to th a t soil? A t n o o th er tim e in the C old W ar d id A m erican s w o rry m o re a b o u t th a t possibility, yet p e rh a p s n e v e r w a s it so difficult to co m p reh en d .

Militarization at High Tide T he n e w a d m in istra tio n so u g h t to b rea k from E isen h o w er's a p p a re n t all-orn o th in g strategy: "W e in te n d to h av e a w id e r choice," K en n ed y a n n o u n c e d in Ju ly 1961, " th a n h u m iliatio n o r all-out n u c le ar action." A ccordingly, h e p ro ­ m o te d th e a rm y 's G reen Berets, backed n e w p ro g ra m s of civil d efen se ag ain st n u c le ar attack, a n d rev ersed E isen h o w er's cuts in c o n v en tio n al forces. Billions also w e n t in to strategic forces (m issiles, n o t th e b o m b ers co v eted b y flying g en ­ erals): b y 1967, 1000 ICBM s c o m p a red to 200 in h e rite d fro m E isenhow er, 41 m issile-carrying Polaris su b m arin es, a n d 32,500 n u c le ar w a rh e a d s (the all-tim e h ig h for them ). It w a s tru e th at, m ore th a n th ey a d m itte d , th e n e w lead ers " sh a re d a w o rld v iew sim ilar to th e one th ey rid icu led . T he N e w F ro n tiersm en w ere only connecting th e d o ts Ike left th em ." C o n n ectin g th e d o ts w a s ex p en ­ sive, how ever: d efense o utlays stay ed stable as a sh are of G N P (ab o u t 9 percent) b ecau se of ra p id econom ic g ro w th b u t increased 13 p e rc en t u n d e r JFK, a n d far m o re once A m erican forces p lu n g e d into th e V ietn am W ar a n d n e w w e a p o n s b ecam e fully fu n d ed . By m a n y m easu res, th e 1960s m ark e d th e ap o g ee of A m erica's post-1945 m ilita riza tio n .12 A s D em ocrats saw it, the ap o g ee cam e th e n b ecau se th ey faced g reater p eril at h o m e a n d ab ro a d th a n E isenhow er h a d co n fro n ted , or at least a d m itte d . T hey w o rrie d a b o u t th e th in n e ss of K en n ed y 's election victory, th e b e atin g T ru­ m a n h a d tak e n for alleged w eak n ess a g ain st co m m u n ism , th eir p ro m ises to re­ place R epublican w eak n ess w ith D em ocratic vigor, th e sp re a d of global stru g g le to n e w aren as like space a n d the T h ird W orld, a n d th e d a n g e r th a t So­ v iet lead ers w o u ld b e e m b o ld en e d b y g ain in g n u c le ar p a rity w ith th e W est. Yet those d a n g e rs d id n o t account for A m erica's co u rse in th e 1960s, for it p e rsiste d d e sp ite co u n terv ailin g c o n sid eratio n s a n d ch an g in g circum stances. For all h is b lu ster, K hrushchev a p p e a re d less ty ran n ical a n d rig id , th o u g h m o re resourceful, th a n Stalin. The "m issile g ap " o n w h ic h K en n ed y h a d cam p aig n ed w a s qu ickly d eclared a n illusion b y D efense Secretary M cN am ara, a n d a stable b alan ce of terro r w a s n o w foreseeable. Soviet su p e rio rity in space a n d tech n o l­ ogy w a s q u estio n ab le e v en in 1961, m ore so b y m id -d ecad e. D eep fissures e m e rg ed in the c o m m u n ist bloc, above all b e tw ee n Beijing a n d M oscow , w h ile th e econom ic, political, a n d m ilitary vitality of A m erica's E u ro p ea n allies o u t­ s trip p e d th e fo n d est h o p e s W estern lead ers earlier h ad . C o m m u n ist ad v an ces in th e T hird W orld w ere lim ited: S outheast A sia w as a m ess b y W ash in g to n 's sta n d a rd s, b u t h a d b een for fifteen years; few p o p u lo u s o r resource-rich c o u n ­ tries w ere a b o u t to "fall" to com m unism ; only C u b a w as a clear-cut (an d h u m il-

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iating) co m m u n ist victory. A t ho m e, JFK's m arg in of v icto ry h a d b e e n tiny, b u t LBJ's in 1964 w a s th u n d ero u s. The w o rst M cC arthy-era excesses h a d p a sse d , m ilitarizatio n received ren e w e d criticism , a n d d o m estic p rio rities g ain ed s u p ­ po rt. In th e face of these changes, the K ennedy a n d Jo h n so n a d m in istra tio n s g e n ­ erally stay ed o n the sam e course. A rg u m en ts a b o u t th e c o m m u n ist m enace w ere sim p ly retailo red to fit co n d itio n s of th e m om en t: M oscow w a s seen as m en acing w h e th e r h a v in g fallen b e h in d , cau g h t u p , o r g o tte n ah ead , w h ile th e sp lit b e tw ee n it a n d Beijing w a s re g a rd e d as sh a rp e n in g th e co m p etitio n b e ­ tw e en th em to act aggressively. In th e en d , e n em y th re a ts scarcely sh a p e d p o l­ icy u n d e r K ennedy a n d Johnson, w h o m o st feared " n o t co m m u n ism , w h ic h w a s to o frag m en ted , o r th e Soviet U nion, w h ic h w a s too co m m itted to d eten te, o r ev en C hina, w h ic h w a s too im p o te n t, b u t ra th e r th e th re a t of e m b a rrass­ m en t, of h u m iliatio n , of a p p e a rin g to b e w e a k ." 13 B eyond th a t threat, the K ennedy a d m in istra tio n 's v iew of alleg ed extrem ists a t h o m e also lu red it o n to a m ilitarized course. It saw its p ra g m a tic policy chal­ len g ed b y radicals o n the far rig h t a n d far left w h o v iew ed n a tio n al secu rity in apocalyptic term s. L iberals w o rrie d m o st— w ro n g ly , it tu rn e d o u t— a b o u t a re­ su rg e n t "rad ical rig h t." A n aly zin g the John Birch Society a n d m ilita ry officers "d isp o ssesse d " b y the rise of civilian expertise, sociologist D aniel Bell th o u g h t th a t p e rh a p s o n ly "rig h t-w in g R epublicans h av e a n id eo lo g y " in 1960s A m er­ ica. B eing "ill-eq u ip p e d to g rasp m o d e m con cep tio n s of politics," th ey fo u g h t " 'm o d e rn ity ,' " th a t is, "th e belief in ratio n al assessm en t, ra th e r th a n e stab ­ lish ed cu sto m ." P rone to "p a ra n o id view s," rig h t-w in g e rs saw g ra n d co n sp ir­ acies d e n y in g victo ry to A m erica a n d ig n o red th e C old W a r's realities in th eir belief th a t "a p rev e n tiv e w a r o r a first strik e" co u ld d e fe at co m m u n ism . H o lly ­ w o o d so o n p o p u la riz e d these liberals' p ercep tio n s of th e far R ight in th ree 1964 d o o m sd a y film s (one a id e d b y the JFK W hite H o u se) a b o u t c razed o r p o w erh u n g ry m ilitary officers w h o schem e to b lo w u p th e w o rld (Fail-Safe a n d Doctor Strangelove) o r o v e rth ro w th e g o v e rn m e n t (Seven Days in May). Jo h n S to rm e r's rig h t-w in g tract None Dare Call It Treason (1964) co n firm ed Bell's analysis. D eem p h asizin g m ilitary po w er. S tornier in stea d saw th e n a tio n 's m o ral a n d ideological p u rity as decisive, in d e e d all it w o u ld tak e to w in , b u t so u n d e r­ m in ed b y n aiv e or su b v ersiv e liberals th a t p e rh a p s it w a s a lre ad y "to o late" in "th e c o m m u n ist tim etable for w o rld d o m in a tio n " to sto p it.14 C en trists p a id less a tte n tio n to th e Left in th e e arly 1960s, in p a rt b ecau se it w as sm aller a n d less co n sp icu o u s th a n the far R ight, b u t it to o h a d a n a p o ca ly p ­ tic outlook. A ccording to th e y o u n g radicals w h o p e n n e d th e P o rt H u ro n State­ m e n t in 1962, "th e B om b" m a d e th em aw are th a t th ey "m ig h t d ie a t an y tim e" a n d "m ay b e the last g e n eratio n in th e e x p erim e n t w ith liv in g ." For th em , too, th e en em y w a s largely internal, in d ee d m u c h th e sam e liberal e stab lish m en t excoriated b y S to rm er— g u ilty n o t of selling o u t to co m m u n ism b u t of p ro m o t­ ing "th e g en eral m ilitarizatio n of A m erican society," in p a rt to p ro m o te a frau d -

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u le n t p ro sp erity . A sim ilar a p p re h e n sio n of im m in en t p e ril w a s risin g a m o n g a n tin u c le a r a n d en v iro n m en ta l activists.15 C e n trists accurately saw apocalyptic strain s am o n g th e ir ideological en e­ m ies b u t failed to see th em am o n g th e ir o w n k in d . Bell's a ssu m p tio n th a t cen tr­ ists p riz e d "ratio n al assessm en t" o v er "estab lish ed cu sto m " w a s po lem ically u sefu l b u t deceptive. K ennedy id en tified the early 1960s as "th e h o u r of m axi­ m u m d a n g e r /' w h ile Johnson a rg u e d in 1961 th a t "w e m u s t d ecid e w h e th e r to h e lp th ese c o u n tries" in S outheast A sia "oisth ro w in th e to w el in th e area a n d p u ll b ack o u r d efenses to San Francisco." Politicians offered su c h rhetoric n o t o n ly in public, to m obilize su p p o rt, b u t in th eir secret d elib eratio n s. In 1961, "K en n ed y officials a n d A m erican strategic intellectu als w ere p u b licly sk etch ­ in g scenarios in w h ic h th e U n ited States w o u ld strik e first," n o tes S tep h en A m ­ brose; JFK a n d LBJ p riv a te ly w e ig h ed p la n s to destroy, p e rh a p s in con cert w ith M oscow , the em bryonic n u c le ar force of C o m m u n ist C h in a, w h o se lead ers w ere p re s u m e d n o t to fear n u c le ar w a r o r v a lu e h u m a n life. S uch schem es sh o w e d a n apocalyptic o u tlo o k a t the h ig h est level. C e n trists also w ere a la rm ist a b o u t enem ies w ith in . The far R ight m ig h t "q u ick ly w e a r itself o u t," Bell sen sed , b u t if th e "in te rn atio n al situ atio n " w o rsen e d , it m ig h t "b eg in to rally s u p p o rt a ro u n d a d riv e for 'im m e d ia te action,' for a d e clara tio n of w a r in th ese areas, for a p re-e m p tiv e strik e." G ro u p s like th e B irchers w ere, after all, "w ill­ in g to te a r a p a rt th e fabric of A m erican society," ju st as w a r-m a d g en erals w ere w illin g to te a r a p a rt w o rld society.16 W ith th a t th re a t in m in d , th e K en n ed y a d m in istra tio n a sse rte d "civilian" co n tro l ov er th e u n ifo rm e d a rm e d forces— to th e fu ry of m a n y officers— th ro u g h the n e w m an a g erial tech n iq u es of D efense Secretary M cN am ara. M u ch like T ru m a n a n d his a d v iso rs (som e of w h o m serv ed K en n ed y as w ell), h o w ev er, th e K enn edy team th o u g h t th a t su b d u in g th e officers su b d u e d m il­ ita riz a tio n itself, m ak in g th eir a p p ro a c h to n a tio n al secu rity ratio n al, safe, a n d effective. "U n d e r these circum stances," one c o n te m p o ra ry n o te d , "th e task of th e n e w a d m in istra tio n becam e the parad o x ical o n e of try in g to cu rb th e v e ry p o w e r w h o se g ro w th it w a s fostering. " 17 T heir a p p ro ach , th e y h o p e d , m ig h t g ain th e C old W ar v icto ry th a t h a d e lu d e d E isenhow er. T h at a sp iratio n above all d ro v e m ilita riza tio n fo rw ard . A w aren ess th a t som e in te rn atio n al circum stances stre n g th e n e d th e A m erican h a n d in sp ired th eir h o p e s to deescalate th e C old W ar b u t also th eir am b itio n s to w in it— o r a d u a l track seeking b o th goals. T rue, m o st D em o crats re g a rd e d talk of v icto ry as th e p ro v in ce of c razed generals a n d reactio n ary zealots, b u t in d is­ d a in in g su c h talk th ey d id n o t reject th e goal. Seeing a global c o n test of w ill a n d p restig e, releg atin g com bat to a lim ited if critical role in T h ird W orld contests, p ro u d of k eep in g th e ir generals o n a sh o rt leash, th ey saw triu m p h e n su in g n o t from th e b a rre l of a g u n o r th e b elly of a b o m b er b u t from th e d isp la y of su p e ­ rio r A m erican n e rv e a n d resolve. T h at o u tlo o k m ig h t en tail th e v e ry b rin k m a n sh ip D em o crats h a d ex co riated

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w h e n D ulles em p lo y ed it; b u t their b rin k m a n sh ip , th ey a ssu m e d , w o u ld b e ra ­ tionally exercised a n d c o u n terb alan ced b y d ip lo m atic flexibility, d isp lay s of A m erican vitality in space a n d technology, a n d a id to stru g g lin g natio n s. N o r d id th ey d o u b t th a t the n a tio n h a d th e resources to p u rs u e victory. K eynesians w h o scorned E isen h o w er's p e n n y -p in ch in g , th ey fo resaw (correctly, in th e sh o rt ru n ) increased d efense sp e n d in g as trig g e rin g a n econom ic ex p an sio n , w h ich w o u ld in tu rn fu n d m ore am b itio u s fed eral in itiativ es a t h o m e a n d abroad. T heirs w o u ld b e a victory n o t of apocaly p tic n u c le ar fu ry o r th e e n ­ em y 's form al su rre n d e r b u t of a ch an g ed co rrelatio n of forces th a t w o u ld im ­ p ress w a v erin g n a tio n s a n d place the m o m e n tu m of v icto ry o n th eir side. The h o p e for victory w a s im plicit in K en n ed y 's lan g u a g e a n d m etap h o rs, w h ich reflected h is belief th a t the "lo n g tw ilig h t stru g g le" w a s n e a rin g its en d . H e w a s "convinced ," h e said after th e Bay of Pigs, " th a t h isto ry w ill reco rd th e fact th a t this b itte r stru g g le reached its clim ax in th e late 1950s a n d th e early 1960s," th o u g h it m ig h t e n d "w ith o u t th e firing of a single m issile o r th e cross­ in g of a single b o rd er," since th e losers w o u ld be "th e self-in d u lg en t, th e soft societies," w h e th e r o r n o t th ey h a d the b ig g er g u n s. T he logic of a "clim ax" to h isto ry w a s th a t it w o u ld y ield w in n e rs a n d losers. K e n n ed y d id elo q u e n tly allow for a different outcom e in w h ic h th e su p e rp o w e rs b o th w o u ld recognize th e folly of th eir conflict, a n d Johnson sk etch ed a sim ilar outcom e. Yet since A m erican lead ers re g a rd e d th e Soviet U n io n as th e m ajor cause of conflict in th e first place, ev en th a t outcom e w o u ld m eet th eir test of A m erican victory. In a n y event, it w a s a n ab stract v iew th a t K en n ed y d id n o t a p p ly to specific crises— those, h e felt, h a d to p ro d u c e a w in n er, after w h ic h fru itfu l n e g o tia ­ tio n s m ig h t ensue. H is freq u e n t W orld W ar E analo g ies (w h ich E isen h o w er h a d av o id ed) also in d icated h o w m u ch v icto ry w a s h is goal, a n d in d ic ate d as w ell his tim etable for victory: in 1958, his references w ere to "P earl H arb o r, " D u n ­ kirk ," "C alais," b attles a t the s ta rt of W orld W ar E th a t h a d g a lv a n iz ed th e a n ti­ fascist p o w ers. By 1961, in the m id st of the Berlin crisis, th ey w ere to "Basto g n e" a n d "S talin g rad ," b attles th a t h a d d ecid ed th e ou tco m e of W orld W ar 11.18 M ilitarization w a s a b ro a d historical process JFK in h erite d , b u t also one su s­ tain ed o n ly insofar as lea d ers gave it n e w life. K en n ed y w a s n o t its p rim e m over, b u t his p u rs u it of victo ry in th e C o ld W ar, a goal E isen h o w er all b u t rejected, accelerated its pace, as d id h is em p h asis o n in tan g ib le d efin itio n s of p o w e r— w ill, resolve, a n d th eir p e rc e p tio n — w h ic h offered few criteria for ju d g in g w h a t co n stitu ted sufficient pow er. A b o ld e r (or m ore d esp erate) Soviet lead ersh ip , fo cu sed like A m erican lead ers o n sym bols a n d prestige, p ro v id e d p rete x t for A m erica's fu rth e r m il­ itarization. First, Soviet lead ers p ro v o k e d a n o th e r crisis o v er Berlin. K h ru sh ch e v — assessing K ennedy as w e a k a n d n aiv e, fearin g K en n ed y 's d e ­ fense p ro g ram , or d etestin g the h u m iliatin g h e m o rrh a g e of E ast G erm an s into W est B erlin— d e m a n d e d th a t the W estern allies term in a te th eir rig h ts o f access

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to Berlin, w h ich h e th rea te n ed to tu rn ov er to th e C o m m u n ist E ast G e rm a n gov­ ern m en t. In sim ilar circum stances E isen h o w er h a d refu sed to allow K h ru sh ch ev o r the m ed ia to define a "crisis" a n d talk ed th e situ atio n th ro u g h to a n in conclusive end. K ennedy rejected su ch a cau tio u s co u rse a n d talk ed of crisis in d ire term s. H e w o rrie d , h e to ld o n e rep o rter, " th a t K h ru sh ch ev m ig h t in te rp re t h is reluctance to w a g e n u c le ar w a r as a sy m p to m of a n A m erican loss of nerv e. Som e day, h e said, the tim e m ig h t com e w h e n h e w o u ld h av e to ru n th e su p re m e risk to convince K h ru sh ch ev th a t conciliation d id n o t m ea n h u m il­ iation." H e a n d the Soviet P rem ier h a d a lre ad y tra d e d th in ly v eiled th rea ts of w a r a t th e ir su m m it conference in V ienna. N ow , K en n ed y m a y h av e c o n clu d ed , "th e U.S. could n o lo n g er afford to b e b o u n d b y th e tra d itio n a l po licy of ex clu d ­ in g a p ree m p tiv e first strike." H is p u b lic stance w as also to u g h . H e to o k to th e a irw av es in July to invoke th e d a n g e rs of a p p e a se m e n t a n d m em o ries of W orld W ar II, a n d to an n o u n ce a trip lin g of d ra ft calls, a call-up of 150,000 reservists, a n d a n e x p a n d e d civil d efense p ro g ra m w ith fu tu re m easu res "to let ev ery citi­ z e n k n o w w h a t step s h e can tak e w ith o u t d elay to p ro tec t h is fam ily in case of attack ." A b itte r tu rn of ev en ts o n A u g u st 13— c o m m u n ist a u th o rities b e g an erecting th e B erlin W all to sta u n c h the flow of refu g ees from th e e a st— e n d e d th e crisis, b u t JFK w e n t a h e a d w ith se n d in g 1,500 A m erican so ld iers d o w n th e au to b ah n , a p rovocative if "e m p ty g e stu re" (as N ix o n d e n o u n c e d it) th a t d id n o t in su late h im from criticism for b e in g w e ak in allo w in g th e w a ll to s ta n d .19 T he co n test ov er B erlin b ecam e th e p a ra d ig m a tic C o ld W ar crisis, p e rh a p s b rin g in g th e U n ited States a n d the Soviet U n io n as close to w a r as th e ir later, m o re celebrated collision ov er C uba. T hese crises w ere ju d g e d larg ely in term s of w h o "w o n " o r "lo st" th em a n d h o w th ey sh a p e d th e im m e d ia te ebb a n d flow of th e C old W ar. But lead ers a n d crises d isa p p e a r fast— K en n ed y a n d K h ru sh ch ev w ere gone in a few years, a n d B erlin n e v e r ag ain b ecam e su c h a h o t spot. A m ore im p o rta n t m ea n in g of these crises w a s th eir role in reinforcing A m erican s' sense of w a r 's elusiveness. T he B erlin crisis h a d created a su rre al atm o sp h e re in w h ic h w a r a p p e a re d b o th a g o n izin g ly p ro x im ate a n d p u z zlin g ly rem ote. T he stak es in v o lv ed seem ed a t once m o n u m e n ta l (G erm any, E urope, h u m an k in d ), in tan g ib le (the p restig e a n d credib ility of lea d ers a n d nations), a n d triv ial (w h e th e r E ast G er­ m an s o r R ussians w o u ld check credentials a t B erlin checkpoints). N o one co u ld d istin g u ish th e sh ad o w -b o x in g b y lead ers from th e ir w illin g n ess actu ally to p lu n g e into w ar. N o one seem ed to know , o r at least m ak e clear, w h a t a w a r o v er B erlin w o u ld b e like: certainly W orld W ar II w a s a n o u td a te d historical m o d el, e v en th o u g h K en n ed y som etim es offered it. A m ed ia b litz o n th e v irtu e s of fallout sh elters se n t c o n trad icto ry m essages. O n th e d u b io u s p rem ise of a n u c le ar w a r lim ited to "m ilita ry " targets. Life a ssu re d A m erican s th a t if ready, "y o u a n d y o u r fam ily co u ld h av e 97 chances o u t of 100 to su rv iv e ." ("W here d id Life get th a t 97 p ercen t?" w o n d e re d I. F. Stone. "W as it a c o p y w rite r's b rig h t flash? Ju st as Iv ory Soap is so ld as 99 p e rc en t p u re , is th erm o n u cle ar w a r to be

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so ld as 97 p e rc en t safe?") B ut Life also n o te d th a t in p o lls "40% of A m erican s still rate th eir su rv iv a l chances as 'p o o r ' in a n all-o u t n u c le ar attack ." T he g u lf w a s n o w h u g e b e tw e e n th e form al re p u d ia tio n b y lea d ers of w a r as a n in stru ­ m e n t of policy a n d th e reality of m ea su re s tak e n b y th e m th a t c o u ld lead to w ar. T he in san ity of w a r w a s n o w u n iv ersally p ro claim ed , y e t th e ab ility of n a tio n s to e n te r w a r seem ed g rea ter th a n ever.20 Because its possible outcom e w a s n o t o n ly a p p a llin g b u t im p o n d e rab le , th e B erlin crisis h e lp e d sp a w n a n e w ro u n d of d o o m sd a y fiction w h ic h m a d e th e u n im ag in ab le real a n d offered b leak reassuran ce. In Fail-Safe (book, 1962; film , 1964), A m ericans co u ld lea rn a b o u t system s for n u c le ar w a r in rem ark ab le d e ­ tail, see th eir failure u n le a sh a n u n a u th o riz e d A m erican attack o n M oscow , a n d w a tc h a steely P re sid e n t (H en ry F onda in th e m ovie) a v e rt glo b al h o lo ca u st b y n u k in g N e w York C ity in co m p e n sa tio n for M o sco w 's ob literatio n . In m a n y w ay s, Fail-Safe p ro v id e d a fuller sense of n u c le ar p erils th a n a n y th in g A m eri­ can lead ers offered. A t th e sam e tim e, it rea sserted th e m y sterio u s n a tu re of th o se p erils, sh o w in g lea d ers w h o " h a d lost all co n tact w ith reality, w e re free flo atin g in som e exotic w o rld of th e ir o w n ."21 T he C u b a n m issile crisis u n fo ld e d a g ain st th e apocaly p tic fears sto k e d b y th e B erlin crisis. O nce again, K h ru sh ch ev p ro m p te d co n fro n tatio n , a lth o u g h th e Bay of P igs in v asio n a n d su b se q u e n t A m erican efforts to assassin ate C astro a n d sab o tag e h is regim e gave th e c o m m u n ist lead ers reaso n to see th em selv es as th e e n d a n g e re d p arties. K h ru sh ch e v 's decisio n to in stall m e d iu m -ra n g e m is­ siles in C u b a w a s also a d e sp e ra te b id to d e liv er o n h is o w n b lu ste ry p ro m ises of n u c le ar p a rity w ith th e W est— h e d id n o t h av e it, a n d A m erican officials h a d recklessly b o a sted th a t h e d id n o t, b u t m issiles in C u b a m ig h t a t least g iv e th e ap p ea ra n c e of it. (K h ru sh ch ev 's ren ew al of n u c le ar tests in 1961— o n e a fiftyeig h t-m eg ato n m o n ster th o u sa n d s of tim es m o re d e stru ctiv e th a n th e H iro sh im a w e a p o n — p ro b ab ly se rv ed th e sam e p u rp o se.) By early O ctober 1962, K ennedy, realizing th a t th e m issile b u ild u p w a s u n ­ d erw ay , faced severe political p ressu re to tak e action, a n d in h is v iew p o ssib le im p each m en t if h e d id not. H e w e ig h ed m a n y o p tio n s, in clu d in g in v asio n of C u b a a n d a n u c le ar o r co n v en tio n al air strik e a g ain st th e m issiles, b u t first h e trie d a n aval b lockade of C u b a to force the m issiles' rem o v al, p u b licly w a rn in g th a t th e w o rld sto o d n e a r "th e abyss of d e stru ctio n ." S oviet-A m erican n e g o tia ­ tio n s en su ed , w ith A tto rn ey G eneral R obert K en n ed y w a rn in g th e Soviet a m ­ b a ssa d o r o n O ctober 27 th a t u n less th e m issiles w ere rem o v e d b y th e n e x t day, "w e w o u ld rem ove th e m ."22 Few K ennedy in sid ers re g a rd e d the m issiles in C u b a as a m ajor strateg ic th re a t to the U n ited States. T hey co u ld only h it cities a lre ad y w ith in ra n g e of o th er Soviet rockets, th o u g h w ith less w a rn in g a n d a d d e d "th ro w -w e ig h t." "W h at difference," K ennedy a sk ed o n the 16th, "d o es it m ake? T h ey 'v e g o t e n o u g h to b lo w u s u p an y w ay ." P ublicly h e d id w a rn of "a n u c le ar strik e c ap a ­ b ility a g ain st th e W estern H em isp h ere," b u t h e e m p h a siz e d less tan g ib le con-

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sid érations: K h ru sh ch ev 's secrecy, deceit, a n d b e tra y a l of h is e arlier p ro m ises, a n d th e "clear lesso n " a b o u t a p p e a se m e n t ta u g h t b y th e 1930s. P riv ately a d ­ m in istra tio n officials d w e lt o n th e psychological u p p e r h a n d th e m issiles w o u ld give K hrushchev: h e m ig h t so o n m o v e a g ain st Berlin; th e W est g en er­ ally a n d K en n ed y p erso n ally w o u ld b e h u m iliated ; a n d th e g lobal b alan ce of p o w e r w o u ld tilt in M oscow 's favor. W hile th e m issiles " d id n o t su b sta n tia lly alter th e strategic b alance infact," o ne a d v iso r so o n w ro te, "th a t b alan ce w o u ld h av e b e e n su b sta n tia lly altere d in appearafice; a n d in m a tte rs of n a tio n al w ill a n d w o rld lea d ersh ip . . . su c h a p p ea ra n c es c o n trib u te to reality ."23 T h at rea­ so n in g w a s h a rd ly baseless: sym bols did m atter, o r else K h ru sh ch ev w o u ld n o t h av e se n t m issiles to C uba. B ut th ey m a tte re d in p a rt b ecau se lea d ers said th e y d id , a n d th eir stance d u rin g th e C u b a n m issile crisis left u n c le ar w h y this sy m b o l— n o t the B erlin W all or Soviet satellites— w a rra n te d A m erican reac­ tio n s risking n u c le ar w ar. Soviet m issiles in C u b a m a tte re d so m u c h m o re b ecau se th eir p ro x im ity v io ­ lated A m erican s' lin g erin g sense of in v u ln erab ility a n d m a d e p a lp a b le th eir free-floating fears of d estru ctio n . A s U n d e rse cre ta ry of State G eorge Ball later no ted : "A fter all, A m erica h a d fo u g h t tw o w o rld w a rs w ith o u t d a m a g e to its o w n territory. T he A m erican p e o p le h a d g ro w n accu sto m ed to th in k in g th a t th e m o at of tw o oceans w a s a n effective b a rrie r to ex tern al aggression. . . .If the A m erican p e o p le h a d p a in fu lly a d ju ste d to th e th o u g h t of ICBM s cap ab le of reach ing o u r cities, it w a s largely because th o se m issiles w ere still th o u sa n d s of m iles aw ay a n d the d a n g e r seem ed u nreal. T he p ro sp e ct of Soviet m issiles n in ety m iles off o u r b o rd e rs w a s so m e th in g a lto g eth er different; it w o u ld b e a n affro n t to o u r h istory." A m erican s' reactions to th o se m issiles su g g e ste d w a r's p e rsistin g rem o ten ess to them . R ockets in Siberia a n d crises in B erlin rem a in e d d ista n t a n d u n re a l d e sp ite d e ca d es of talk of a seam less w o rld . It to o k a n e arb y th re a t to stir th e u ltim ate alarm . A t the sam e tim e, th o se reactions rev ealed a d en ial of c h an g e d strategic co n d itio n s, as if th e ocean b a rrie rs w o u ld rem ain stu rd y once th e m issiles n e a rb y w ere rem o v ed . In d ee d , w h e th e r A m erican s h a d "p ain fu lly a d ju ste d " to Soviet m issiles located elsew h ere w a s d o u b tfu l. In ­ sistence o n th eir rem o v al from C u b a su g g e ste d a n im p u lse to b a n ish th e th rea t ra th e r th a n a d ju st to it.24 O f course, th e C u b a n m issile crisis h a d n o single m ea n in g for all A m ericans. Still, m a n y resp o n ses to th e crisis su g g e ste d it g ave su b stan ce to th e sh a d o w of w a r lo n g h o v e rin g o v e r th e country. C IA D irector John M cC one ch aracterized th e C u b a n m issiles as " p o in te d a t o u r h e art," as if o th e r Soviet m issiles w ere not. S peaking to the n a tio n o n O ctober 22, K en n ed y listed th e cities in th e W est­ e rn H e m isp h ere w ith in ran g e of the n e w m issiles in C uba, e v en th o u g h ac­ k n o w le d g in g th a t those places w ere a lre ad y "o n th e b u ll's eye of Soviet m issiles located in sid e the U.S.S.R. o r in su b m a rin e s." Life fo u n d " th a t n early ev ery city fro m Lim a, P eru, to H u d s o n Bay in C a n a d a w o u ld lie w ith in p u sh -b u tto n ran g e of th erm o n u cle ar b o m b s in C u b a." U.S. News and World Report d re w red con-

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centric rin g s of d e stru c tio n ra d ia tin g from C u b a o n its m a p of th e W estern H em isphere; its co lu m n ist D av id L aw rence a sse rte d th a t "th e A m erican p eo p le can n o t live in peace as lo n g as lo ad e d m issiles are p o in te d a t th e m fro m a field 90 m iles aw ay." W hile h a rd ly new , air-raid d rills co n v ey ed a sen se of special m enace, since n o w th ey to o k place n o t as a ro u tin e exercise b u t in p re p a ­ ra tio n for possible o u tb rea k of w ar. T he far R ight saw th e outco m e of th e crisis as a sell-out to co m m u n ism a n d rid ic u le d claim s th a t th e m issiles w ere re­ m o v ed , b u t th a t ridicule, too, im p u te d special m ea n in g to m issiles in C u b a, as o p p o se d to elsew here.25 T he n o tio n th a t the crisis sh o w ed A m erican s th e ir v u ln era b ility to attack w a s sh a red a n d sh a p e d ov erseas as w ell. A fter v iew in g th e C IA 's p h o to g ra p h s of th e m issiles sites, B ritish p rim e m in iste r H a ro ld M acM illan d eclared , "N o w th e A m ericans w ill realize w h a t w e here in E n g lan d h av e liv ed th ro u g h fo r th is p a s t m a n y years." K h ru sh ch ev h im self u se d th e crisis to rem in d K e n n ed y th a t " w ith th e a d v e n t of m o d e m ty p es of arm a m e n t, th e U.S.A. h a s fu lly lo st its in ­ v u ln erab ility ."26 In th e e n d , K en n ed y a n d K h ru sh ch ev com p ro m ised : M oscow w o u ld rem o v e th e m issiles; in retu rn , W ash in g to n p ro m ise d n o t to in v a d e C u b a a n d to rem o v e A m erican m issiles fro m T urkey a n d Italy, w h o se p ro x im ity to Soviet soil m a d e th em seem a n alo g o u s to rockets in C uba. E ven so. A ir Force C hief of Staff G en. C u rtis L eM ay to ld a d u m b fo u n d e d K ennedy, "We should invade [C uba] today."27 T hen a n d later, m a n y saw the outcom e as a triu m p h for K ennedy, w h o p re ­ su m a b ly sta red K h ru sh ch ev d o w n a n d g o t w h a t h e w a n te d w ith o u t w a r b e ­ cause of his d ete rm in a tio n , h is tig h t control of th e a rm e d forces, a n d h is n a ­ tio n 's strategic superiority. But M oscow d id n o t retre at before A m erican p o w e r so m u ch as b o th sid es sh ra n k a t th e p ro sp e ct of a n u c le ar w a r in w h ic h e ith e r's su p e rio rity w o u ld h av e b e e n m eaningless. A n d K en n ed y 's co n tro l of th e situ a ­ tio n w as m ore p rec ario u s th a n A m ericans, e v en th e K en n ed y m e n th em selv es, realized a t the tim e. The m issile crisis in creased th e u rg en cy of m a n y A m erican s to con tro l th e a rm s race, a n urg en cy co nveyed b y g ro u p s like th e W o m en 's Strike for Peace a n d SANE (N ational C om m ittee for a Sane N u clear Policy) a n d th eir p u b lic protests. O n June 10, 1963, K en n ed y elo q u en tly a p p e a le d to th a t e n d , n o w u sin g W orld W ar II to d ifferen t p u rp o se s b y citing R u ssia's d e v a sta tin g losses in it. W ith su rp risin g sp eed , the L im ited Test Ban Treaty, lo n g in n e g o tiatio n , w a s finalized a n d sig n ed in A u g u st (th o u g h n o t b y C h in a o r France), a b o lish in g atm o sp h eric b u t n o t u n d e rg ro u n d tests. H ailed initially as a first ste p to w a rd h a ltin g th e a rm s race, th e tre a ty in stea d u sh e re d in th e "Big Sleep" in a tte n tio n to th e n u c le ar issue. "A fter 1963," w rites Paul Boyer, "th e m u sh ro o m -sh a p e d clo u d , th e co rp o rate logo of th e n u c le a r age, becam e a tire d v isu al cliche."28 W ith testin g n o w u n d e rg ro u n d , th e n u ­ clear th re a t becam e less visible th a n ev er a n d th e challenge to it seem ed to ex­ h a u st itself, as if o u t of sig h t m e a n t o u t of m in d . The a n tin u cle ar m o v e m e n t a n d

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th e su p e rp o w e rs w ere later fau lted for sto p p in g a t a sym bolic v icto ry o v e r th e n u c le ar d ra g o n , since th e e n g in es p ro d u c in g w e a p o n s g ro an e d m o re fu rio u sly in th e 1960s, especially as Soviet lea d ers re d o u b le d th eir efforts to g a in p a rity w ith th e U n ited States. In 1963, as in later arm s lim itation talks, Soviet-A m erican n eg o tiatio n s seem ed d e sig n e d — p e rh a p s in tacit b u t cynical collu sio n b e tw ee n th e su p e rp o w e rs th em se lv e s— to reg u la te (an d , in term s of technical refine­ m en t, e v e n h asten ) ra th e r th a n cu rtail w e a p o n s d e v elo p m e n t, to ex clude lesser p o w e rs from th e n u c le ar arena, a n d to deflect th e o p p o sitio n of m ass m o v e­ m e n ts to the g rea t p o w e rs' a rm s b u ild in g . Such criticism w a s accurate b u t narrow . It d o w n p la y e d th e obstacles to g rea ter ach iev em en ts— th e technical com plexities, th e d istru st b e tw ee n g ov­ ern m e n ts, th e d iv isio n s w ith in each, a n d th e d e m a n d s of o th er issues o n p o liti­ cians, activists, a n d p o p u latio n s. K en n ed y h a d tak e n a political risk ju st b y p u sh in g for a m o d e st step. A n d th e sym bolic ach iev em en t h a d value: th e 1963 tre a ty d id h e lp estab lish th a t su p e rp o w e r conflicts w ere n egotiable, th a t th e a rm s race w a s a b h o rre n t, th a t n u c le ar w a rfare w a s intolerable. E ven lip service to th ese p rin cip les k e p t th e m alive a t a tim e w h e n th ey w ere w id e ly d isb eliev ed o r d isd ain ed . T he C u b a n m issile crisis left K en n ed y a m o re cau tio u s lead er, skillful in h is p u b lic case for m o re n u a n c e d v iew s of th e C old W ar a n d K h ru sh ch e v 's b e h av ­ ior, a n d d e te rm in e d th a t the su p e rp o w e rs av o id n u c le ar conflict. A q u arterc e n tu ry later, tw o key a d v iso rs reflected th a t th e lesso n of th e crisis "is n o t to h av e a crisis, because th ere 's n o telling w h a t w ill h a p p e n once y o u 're in o n e," a n d th a t " 'm a n a g in g ' crises is th e w ro n g term . You d o n 't 'm a n a g e ' th em b e ­ cause y o u c a n 't 'm a n a g e ' th e m ."29 K h ru sh ch ev co m m u n icated a sim ilar m es­ sage to K ennedy a t th e tim e, a n d th e a d m in istra tio n b ack ed a w ay fro m a "co u n ­ terforce" strategy, w ith its fan tasy th a t "sp a sm " n u c le ar w a r co u ld b e av o id e d th ro u g h sh re w d m an ag em en t. But w h ile the m issile crisis m o d e ra te d K en n ed y 's ap p ro a ch to su p e rp o w e r co n fro ntation, it d id n o t a lte r th e basic policies th a t h a d b ro u g h t o n crisis in th e first place. A sked in D ecem ber a b o u t E ise n h o w e r's w a rn in g "o f th e d a n g e rs of a p o ssible m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex" a n d w h e th e r h e "felt th is th reat," K en­ n e d y d id w a rn of re d u n d a n t w e a p o n s p ro g ra m s a n d n u c le ar overkill b u t largely d u c k e d th e chance to echo h is predecessor. R eg ard in g d e m a n d s from C o n g ress o r a rm s b u ild e rs for n e w w e ap o n s, "I m u s t say as of to d a y I d o n 't feel th a t th e p ressu re o n u s is excessive." A ccordingly, A m erica's n u c le ar arsen al c o n tin u ed to sw ell (in th e "stra n g e st a n d least d efen sib le b u ild u p ," its w a r­ h e a d s in E u ro p e m u ltip lie d from 2,500 to 7,200 b e tw ee n 1961 a n d 1966), w h ile JFK's anxiety a b o u t C h in a grew , as if fears calm ed in o n e aren a m o v ed in to a n ­ other. M oreover, the fear of n u c le ar w a r in d u c e d b y th e crisis m in g led u n easily w ith th e h e a d y sense th a t K ennedy a n d A m erica h a d triu m p h e d , a n d m ig h t d o so again. T h o u g h w a ry of p u b lic g lo atin g a b o u t victory, w h ich m ig h t look h o l­ low g iv en th e com prom ise th a t e n d e d the crisis, p riv a te ly K en n ed y b o a sted

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th a t "I cut h is balls o ff" (referring to K hrushchev), w h ile k ey a d v iso rs cited th e crisis as sh o w in g th e "d e te rm in a tio n a n d sta y in g p o w e r" th a t w o u ld b rin g vic­ to ry in V ietnam . T he A m erican stance " b ro u g h t a b o u t K h ru sh ch e v 's b ack ­ d o w n ," Life o p in ed . "It in d ic ate d a d isp o sitio n o n th e p a rt of th e A m erican s to win th e C old W ar." Life d id n o t m e n tio n av o id an ce of n u c le ar w a r as a m ea n in g of th e crisis.30 A n d th a t m ea n in g d id n o t a p p ly to tro u b leso m e situ atio n s, like th e o n e in S o u th east A sia, th a t ev o lv ed in crem en tally a n d req u ire d n o n a il-b itin g m o ­ m e n t of decision. In th a t reg a rd V ietnam offered in sid io u s tem p tatio n : it seem ed to b e a n aren a w h e re th e U n ited States co u ld tak e th e in itiativ e w ith o u t risk in g n u c le ar b lo o d b ath . A s one N e w F ro n tiersm an m o ck in g ly recalled, "W e w ere n o t g oing to b e in th e aw fu l b u sin e ss of creatin g H iro sh im as a n d N ag asak is in su p p o rt of o u r foreign policy objectives," b u t w o u ld in stea d "se n d one of o u r G reen Berets . . . to d o b a ttle w ith o n e of th eir crack g u erilla fig h ters a n d th ey w o u ld h av e a clean fight, a n d th e b e st m a n w o u ld w in a n d th ey b o th get to g eth er a n d s ta rt c u rin g all th e v illag ers of sm allp o x ."31 T he C u ­ b a n crisis d id n o t so m u c h ease the C o ld W ar as d irect it in to d ifferen t channels, ones less likely to p ro d u c e n u c le ar conflict. So A m erica's in v o lv e m en t in th e V ietnam W ar in d icated . There, V iet Cong* in th e S outh a n d C o m m u n ist N o rth V ietnam , m iscalcu latin g th e sp e e d a n d scale of fo rthcom ing A m erican in terv en tio n , w ere accelerating th e ir effort to reu n ite the n a tio n a n d o v e rth ro w the Saigon regim e of N g o D in h D iem before A m ericans cam e in g rea ter force. A C atholic in a larg ely B u d d h ist lan d . D iem w a s m ore th a n ev er rep ressiv e a n d m ercu rial, a t once d e m a n d in g g rea ter A m erican aid a n d fu lm in atin g a g ain st A m erica's im p erial role. H is regim e "to o k o n m ore a n d m ore of th e p ro p e rtie s of a sp o n g e. M oney, p lan s, a n d p ro ­ g ram s p o u re d into it a n d n o th in g cam e o u t th e o th er e n d ." 32 T he K ennedy a d m in istra tio n av o id e d th e a p p a re n t ex trem es— d ra m a tic m il­ itary in te rv en tio n o r a b a n d o n m e n t of th e cau se— settlin g o n g ra d u a l escalatio n of A m erican aid, advice, a n d co m b at su p p o rt. A m erican m ilita ry p e rso n n el a n d ad v iso rs increased from one th o u sa n d to six teen th o u sa n d u n d e r K en­ nedy, a n o th e r h a p less p ro g ra m w a s lau n c h ed to reg ain control of th e c o u n try ­ side, a n d A m erican officials c o llu d ed in a n d h e lp e d in stig ate D iem 's o v e rth ro w a n d m u rd e r in 1963, a lth o u g h succeeding reg im es p ro v e d scarcely m o re reli­ able. Johnson a g o n ized a b o u t in te rv e n tio n — arg u a b ly h e m a d e a b e tte r case p riv ately a g ain st it th a n K e n n ed y h a d — b u t a g reed to it. In A u g u st 1964, h is a d m in istratio n b o th m isu n d e rsto o d a n d m isrep re se n te d in cid en ts b e tw e e n A m erican a n d N o rth V ietnam ese n a v al vessels in th e T onkin G u lf in o rd e r to take actions alre ad y d e cid ed on: b o m b in g raid s a g ain st N o rth V ietn am a n d

*This is the derogatory term for the N ational Liberation Front invented by Diem and com m only used by A m erican officials, soldiers, and reporters; because it is the term familiar to m any Am erican readers, its use is retained here.

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p assag e b y C o n g ress of a n o p e n -e n d e d reso lu tio n au th o rizin g fu rth e r action. "I d id n 't ju st screw H o C hi M inh," LBJ alleg ed ly b o asted , "I cu t h is p eck er off."33 A fter th e 1964 election cam p aig n , in w h ic h LBJ successfully p o rtra y e d B arry G o ld w a te r as trig g er-h ap p y , h is a d m in istra tio n a w aited th e e n em y in cid en ts th a t w o u ld ju stify su sta in e d b o m b in g of th e N o rth , b e g u n b y A m erican B-52 b o m b ers a n d o th e r aircraft in th e sp rin g . In tu rn , A m erican air p o w er, fiercely u se d b y n o w in th e S outh as w ell as a g ain st th e N o rth , req u ire d A m erican g ro u n d tro o p s to p ro tec t a ir bases, ju st as th e tro o p s n e e d e d m ore air co v er— so w e n t th e circular reasoning, w h ic h reflected v a lid tactical concerns b u t also ra ­ tio n alized d e e p e r im p u lse s to e n te r th e g ro u n d w a r in th e South. By th e su m ­ m er of 1965, the p a tte rn of escalation w a s set. A n o th e r "o v e rd e te rm in e d " act of th e C o ld W ar, escalation in V ietn am h a d m any, e v e n c o n tra d ic to ry sources. The a d m in istra tio n 's acq u isitio n of e n ­ h a n ce d m ean s to w a g e su c h a w a r en co u rag e d it to w a d e in a n d ex p o sed it to criticism sh o u ld it hesitate. W h at w e re th e G reen Berets, CIA ag en ts, n a tio n ­ b u ild in g experts, a n d h elico p ter g u n sh ip s for, after all, if n o t to h e lp w in th e C old W ar? "In K nute R ockne's old p h rase, w e are n o t sav in g th e m for th e ju n io r p ro m ," W alt W h itm an R ostow to ld K en n ed y in 1961.34 T he reaction of m ilitary chiefs to initial co u n te rin su rg en c y tactics gave fu rth e r im p e tu s to escalation: th ey resen te d th e d e p lo y m e n t of low -tech forces o u tsid e th eir control, d o u b te d th eir efficacy, a n d p u s h e d for a conventional, full-scale m ilita ry effort. T he "arro g an ce of A m erican p o w e r" (as Sen. J. W illiam F u lb rig h t later p u t it) w a s also a factor, th o u g h in n o sim p le w ay. It is h a rd ly su rp risin g , g iv en th e p o w e r of th e U n ited States a t th is ju n ctu re, th a t A m erican lead ers w ere over­ co n fid en t th a t th ey co u ld sh a p e th e w o rld in th eir im age, in sen sitiv e to local realities ab ro ad , a n d o v e rb e arin g in th e ir "g u id an c e of th ese y o u n g a n d u n so ­ p h istic ate d n a tio n s," as LBJ once characterized th e o ld societies of S o u th east A sia. A s R ostow w ro te in 1964, th e A m erican chance for v icto ry in V ietn am "flo w s fro m th e sim p le fact th a t a t this stag e in h isto ry w e are th e g reatest p o w e r in th e w o rld — if w e b e h av e like it." B ut d ecisio n m ak ers d id n o t n aiv ely stu m b le in to the "q u ag m ire" of V ietnam obliv io u s to th e d a n g e rs there. R epeat­ edly, e v en tiresom ely, th ey issu e d o r received rem in d ers of F rance's failu re in V ietnam , th e frailties of th e S outh V ietn am regim e, th e a p p e a l of th e V iet C ong, a n d th e p e rils of escalation. W arnings cam e fro m liberals a t th e fringes of p o w e r like C h ester Bow les, John K enneth G albraith , a n d Vice P re sid e n t H u b e rt H u m ­ p h rey , b u t also fro m resp ected in sid ers like U n d e rse cre ta ry of State G eorge Ball a n d Sen. M ike M ansfield. K en n ed y h im self w o rrie d th a t each escalato ry step w o u ld b e "like tak in g a d rin k . . . . The effect w e a rs off, a n d y o u h av e to tak e an o th er." "T he 30% chance is th a t w e w o u ld w in d u p like th e F rench in 1954," w o rrie d W illiam B u n d y in th e D efense D ep artm en t; "w h ite m e n c a n 't w in th is k in d of fight." G en. M axw ell T aylor gave a typ ical w a rn in g in 1964: "N o t only d o th e V iet-C ong u n its h a v e th e recu p erativ e p o w e rs of th e ph o en ix , b u t th ey h a v e a n a m a zin g ability to m a in ta in m o rale." T h o u g h n o t alw ay s serio u sly re­ g a rd e d , su c h w a rn in g s w ere legion.35

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W h at d efin ed the arrogance of lead ers w as n o t b lin d n e ss to su c h d ifficulties b u t confidence th a t th ey co u ld overcom e th em a n d co n v ictio n th a t th e v e ry d if­ ficulties w o u ld m ag n ify th eir triu m p h . T hey w ere b o th d e sp e ra te a n d a rro g a n t— b u t n o t a b o u t the sam e things: fearfu l a b o u t S o u th V ietnam , b u t su re a b o u t A m erican pow er. In d ee d , a d e sp e ra te cause w a s seductive: o n ly if th e U n ited States fo u g h t to u g h battles, n o t ju st easy ones, c o u ld it sh o w th a t it w o u ld p rev ail ov er com m unism . W in w h e re th e o d d s w ere b a d a n d it w o u ld p ro v e it co u ld w in an y w h ere, ju st as it trie d to go to th e m oon, K en n ed y h a d said, b ecause it w a s so h a rd to do. M eanw hile, th e ten d e n cy of lea d ers to v iew th e stak es in V ietn am as political a n d psychological— th e loss of A m erican credibility, th e p ro sp e c t of falling d o m in o e s— left th e m in a sh a d o w y w o rld of p ercep tio n s w h e re g ain s a n d losses defied m easu rem en t. T he lessons of a p p e a se m e n t w ere re p e a te d m o re reflexively th a n ever, a lth o u g h the an alo g y to 1938 w a s d e e p ly flaw ed: th e n th e g reat p o w e rs' resolve, n o t C zechoslovakia's, w a s in d o u b t a n d ag g ressio n across a clear in te rn atio n al b o rd e r w a s at issue, b u t in 1964 S aigon's resolve seem ed ho p eless a n d a civil w a r w a s raging. " S u rre n d e r a n y w h ere th rea te n s d efeat ev ery w h ere," LBJ said in 1964, a lth o u g h th e CIA d o u b te d th a t th e d o m i­ n oes w o u ld fall if S outh V ietnam w a s lost. A s th e Joint C hiefs m a in ta in e d (if n o t w h o leh earted ly ) in 1964, "T he w a r m u s t certain ly b e fo u g h t a n d w o n p rim a rily in th e m in d s of the V ietnam ese p eo p le." In th a t vein. Secretary of State D ean R usk su p p o rte d u se of g ro u n d forces a n d th e b o m b in g of N o rth V ietn am in 1965 as "a signal to H a n o i a n d P eip in g th a t th ey th em selv es can n o t h o p e to su c­ ceed w ith o u t a su b sta n tia l escalation o n th eir p a rt, w ith all th e risk s th ey w o u ld h av e to face." For "m u sc u la r realists," these m e n p a id rem ark ab ly little a tte n ­ tio n to tangible m atters of resources, trad e , a n d m ilitary p o w er. T heir foolish belief th a t enem ies a n d allies w o u ld see "sig n als" like b o m b in g as signs of A m erican stren g th , ra th e r th a n of th e d e sp e ra tio n th a t p ro m p te d th em , m a d e escalation m ore tem p tin g .36 N o r d id liberals m o n o p o lize su c h th in k in g . C o n serv ativ es sh a re d th e p reo c­ c u p atio n w ith percep tio n s, differing only a b o u t th e m ean s n e e d e d to sh a p e them . D em ocrats' "failures," th u n d e re d B arry G o ld w a ter in accepting the G O P 's 1964 n o m in atio n , "p ro claim lost lead ersh ip , o bscure p u rp o se , w e ak e n ­ in g w ills a n d th e risk of inciting o u r sw o rn enem ies to n e w ag g ressio n s." T h o u g h later th ey scoffed at civilians' focus o n p ercep tio n s a n d th e co u rse of g ra d u a l escalation th a t w e n t w ith it, m ilitary lead ers sh a re d th a t focus, h a g ­ g lin g p rim a rily ov er th e d etails a n d pace of escalation. G en. W illiam W estm ore­ lan d , for exam ple, sim p ly issu ed p iecem eal p leas to a d d a b a ttalio n h ere a n d a b rig a d e there, a n d accepted as " o u r strategy ," as h e later p u t it, one d e sig n ed "to p u t p ressu re o n the en em y w h ic h w o u ld tra n sm it a m essag e to th e lead er­ sh ip in H an o i." The Joint C hiefs s u p p o rte d d e p lo y m e n t of A m erican tro o p s to V ietnam in 1961 in o rd er to "in d icate the firm ness of o u r in te n t to all A sian n a ­ tions." Brig. G en. E d w ard L ansdale saw su c h forces as "th e sy m b o l of o u r na-

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tio n al po w er. If a n en em y engages one of o u r co m b at u n its, h e is fully aw are th a t h e autom atically h a s e n g ag e d the en tire p o w e r of th e U.S." E ven th a t m o st sh a rp -b ea k ed h aw k . G eneral LeM ay, stra y ed in to th is lan d of perceptions: The U n ited States sh o u ld tell th e N o rth V ietnam ese "fran k ly th a t th e y 'v e g o t to d ra w in th e ir h o r n s . . . o r w e 're g oing to b o m b th em b ack in to th e Stone A ge." It m u st "convince th e m th a t if th ey c o n tin u e th eir aggression, th ey w ill h av e to p a y a n econom ic p e n a lty w h ic h th ey can n o t affo rd ."37 P ro m p te d b y su c h v a g u e a n d d u b io u s co n sid eratio n s, A m erica's escalatin g effort in tu rn w a s obscure a n d p u z z lin g to A m ericans. For a w h ile, it w a s h a rd ly e v en noticeable (D avid H a lb ersta m fo u n d h im self "th e on ly full-tim e staff cor­ re sp o n d e n t of a n A m erican d a ily n e w sp a p e r" in V ietnam in th e early 1960s). A n d rare ly h a d w a r m ak in g seem ed so civilian a n d so u n w arlik e. In 1941 a n d 1950, m ilitary lead ers h a d visibly led th e charg e a n d th e line b e tw e e n w a r a n d peace h a d becom e sh a rp ly d ra w n . The A m erican effort in V ietnam , ho w ev er, seem ed initially so m u c h a civilian affair— d e sig n ed , co ntrolled, som etim es e v e n fo u g h t b y civilians— th a t it h a rd ly c o n stitu ted w ar. E ven th e m o st visible m ilitary figure in V ietn am policy h a rd ly ra n to type. G en. M axw ell T aylor— JFK's p e rso n al m ilitary ad v iso r, th e n ch airm a n of th e Joint C hiefs, th e n am b as­ sa d o r to S outh V ietn am — w a s "th e K enned y -ty p e g en eral . . . cool, correct, h a n d so m e a n d athletic," a stu d io u s critic of Ike's sabre rattlin g , a fo rm er p resi­ d e n t of th e Lincoln C e n te r for th e P erfo rm in g A rts ("th e cultured w a r hero"), h a rd ly a g en eral a t all w h e n h e cut a strik in g figure in civilian clothes. W ith su ch m e n in charge, w a r d id n o t seem im m in en t.38 W ar also a p p e a re d u n lik ely because m ean s a n d e n d s w ere calcu lated in su ch in tan g ible te rm s— less enem ies killed a n d territo ry c a p tu re d th a n sig n als of re­ solve se n t a n d p ressu re o n H a n o i raised. A s lo n g as th e sh o w ra th e r th a n the su b stance of A m erican p o w e r w a s re g a rd e d as the key to victory, co m b at seem ed avoidable, o r a t least secondary: the U n ited States d id n o t actu ally h av e to d e fe at its enem y, o n ly sh o w th a t it could. E ven w h e n th e carn ag e sw elled, the Jo h n so n a n d N ix o n a d m in istratio n s rem ain ed g eared to th e sh a d o w y realm of p ercep tio n s, rarely seeking o r ex p o sed to the b lu n t acco u n tin g of th e d e a th toll th a t G eneral M arshall exchanged w ith P resid en t R oosevelt in W orld W ar II. Initially, those a p p ea ra n c es w ere n o t baseless: few A m erican s did d ie in V iet­ n a m before 1965, civilian lea d ers were at p a in s to exercise control, a n d e n try into full-scale com bat was still avoidable. N o r w ere th ese a p p ea ra n c es sh a p e d only b y A m ericans. T hey w e re ro o ted also in th e politics of S outh V ietnam , w h ere th e m a n ip u la tio n of ap p ea ra n c es, a n d of A m erican officials, w a s a w elld ev elo p ed art. D iem 's regim e w a s "beset b y a n ex tra o rd in a ry d re a m w o rld m en tality," e v id e n t in "th e p a ra d e D iem stag ed to co m m em o rate th e an n iv e r­ sary of h is ascent to p o w e r— a p a ra d e th a t w o u n d its w a y th ro u g h th e e m p ty streets of d o w n to w n Saigon because n o sp ectato rs w ere allo w ed to w a tc h it." M cN am ara's faith in n u m b e rs led one V ietnam ese g en eral to com m ent, "Ah, les statistiques! Y our Secretary of D efense loves statistics. W e V ietnam ese can give

2 S4

THE

MILITARIZATION

OF

AMERICA

h im all h e w ants. If y o u w a n t th e m to go u p , th ey w ill go up. If y o u w a n t th e m to go d o w n , th ey w ill go d o w n ." 39 A ppearances, how ever, w ere m isleading. C ivilians like K ennedy, M cN am ara, a n d Johnson, b y seeing m ilitarizatio n as d riv e n b y red-faced g en erals a n d g reed y a rm s b u ild e rs, c o n fu sed restra in t of th o se m e n w ith self-restraint. A s LBJ su p p o se d ly b o a ste d re g a rd in g h is air c o m m an d e rs, "T h ey c a n 't e v e n b o m b a n o u th o u se w ith o u t m y a p p ro v a l." O r as h e m a d e th e p o in t p u b licly in 1966, "W e h av e u se d o u r p o w e r n o t w illin g ly a n d recklessly ever, b u t relu c ta n tly a n d w ith restraint. . . . W e h a v e n o t b e e n d riv e n b y b lin d m ilita rism d o w n co u rses of d e v a sta tin g ag g ressio n ."40 N a tio n a l lea d ers a ssu m e d th a t k eep in g th e g en ­ erals o n a sh o rt leash also k e p t th e d o g s of w a r in check. In stead , th e ir control m a d e th em , ra th e r th a n th e generals, th e p rim a ry w a r m akers. A p p ro p riately , once A m erican s p lu n g e d fu lly in to co m b at in 1965, th e fau lt fin d in g focused o n civilian m o re th a n m ilitary lead ers. T he effort to u se m ili­ ta ry m ean s to se n d political m essag es to th e en em y a g g ra v a te d th e fau lt fin d ­ ing, for (as is alw ay s a d a n g e r in su c h efforts) it also se n t m essag es to A m eri­ cans, w h o u n d e rs ta n d a b ly expected th a t b o m b s a n d b u lle ts w o u ld kill enem ies a n d y ield m ilitary progress. E scalation raised h o p e s of m ilita ry v icto ry — m a n y A m ericans felt b e tra y e d w h e n it w a s n o t fo rth co m in g o r d id n o t e v e n seem to b e th e p u rp o se . T he crises of K en n ed y 's p resid en c y a n d th e m o o d s th ey e n g e n d e re d left A m ericans ill p re p a re d to w o rry a b o u t w a r in V ietnam . A nxieties h a d focused o n a cataclysm ic n u c le ar w ar, o r a n acciden tal n u c le ar conflict, o r a w arfare state lu rch in g to w a rd w ar, o r th e su rre n d e r of a soft n a tio n to co m m u n ism . V ietn am could n o t b e placed o n this g rid of ap o caly p tic scenarios. It seem ed to sn eak u p o n A m ericans, lead ers a n d citizens alike. A rem ark ab le am n esia a b o u t th e K orean W ar a b ette d th e deceptio n . So d id in itial success in h id in g A m erican in v o lv e m en t in S outheast A sia, as if W ash in g to n " h a d m o re faith in th e ability of the N o rth V ietnam ese to b