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In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s
 0300061110, 9780300061116

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
Preface
Prologue: War in American History
Part One. The Militarization of America
1 Emergence, 1933 - 1941
2 Triumph, 1941 - 1945
3 Consolidation, 1945 - 1953
4 The Uneasy Balance, 1953 - 1961
5 The Crisis of Militarization, 1961 - 1966
Part Two. The Reshaping of American Militarization
6 The War Mentality in Triumph, 1966 - 1974
7 Back to the Future, 1975 - 1981
8 The Illusory Remilitarization, 1981 - 1988
9 A Farewell to Militarization? 1988 - 1995
Conclusion
Endnotes
Essays on Sources
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

IN T H E S H A D O W OF W A R

IN THE SHADOW OF W AR The United States Since the 1930s

M IC H A E L S. S H E R R Y Yale University Press

New Haven and London

This publication has been supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency. Copyright © 1995 by Yale University. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole o r in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Designed by Sonia L. Scanlon. Set in Bembo type by The Composing Room of Michigan, Inc. Printed in the United States o f America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sherry, Michael S., 1945In the shadow of war Michael S. Sherry, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. I. United States— Politics and government— 19331945.2. United States— Politics and government— 1945-1989. 3. United States— Politics and government— 1989- 4. United States— History, Military— 20th century. 5. War— Social aspects— United States— History— 20th century. 6. National security— United States— History— 20th century. I. Title. E743.S53 1995 973.9— dc20 94-46849 CIP ISBN 0-300-06111-0 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. © T h e paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

To my parents, John and Pauline Sherry

CONTENTS

Illustrations follow pages 84 and 436 Acknowledgments Preface

viii

ix

Prologue: War in American History

I

I

THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA

1

Emergence, 1933-1941

2

Triumph, 1941-1945

3

Consolidation, 1945-1953

4

The Uneasy Balance, 1953-1961

5

The Crisis o f Militarization, 1961- 1966

II

15 64 123 188 237

THE RESHAPING OF AMERICAN MILITARIZATION

6

The W ar Mentality in Triumph, 1966-1974

7

Back to the Future, 1975-1981

8

The Illusory Remilitarization, 1981- 1988

9

A Farewell to Militarization? 1988-1995

Conclusion Endnotes

498 505

Essay on Sources Bibliography Index

569

556

543

283

337 391 431

A CK N OW LEDGM EN TS

My primary debts are to a small group of friends and readers. Three— Marilyn Young, Lane Fenrich, and Leo Ribuffo—worked through a huge and frustratingly paginated manuscript to provide the kind of advice an author considers ideal. They were sympathetic to this book's purposes, shrewd about where it failed to meet them, and constructive about how to remedy the prob­ lems, even though some inevitably remain. All three made suggestions incor­ porated here but inevitably not fully reflected in citations. Lane Fenrich pro­ vided not only criticism but a sounding board for my ideas and a source of new ones, meticulous help in editing and shaping the final manuscript, and sustain­ ing friendship. Laura Hein provided smart advice, important tips, and unfail­ ing encouragement. George Chauncey and I traded stories and advice about the difficulties of finishing long books. Numerous graduate and undergradu­ ate students responded helpfully to sections of this book or arguments in it de­ livered in other forums. Andrea Gregg provided prompt and precise research assistance at the final stage of this project. Charles Grench, the Yale University Press editor of all my books, provided the flexibility, quiet support, and timely advice for which he is rightly well known. While most granting agencies were not forthcoming (perhaps because re­ viewers thought the book too "ideological," as I was told early on, or because works of synthesis still rarely get funded). Northwestern University gave es­ sential support. A grant from its President's Fund for the Humanities provided a year's leave, an additional quarter's leave was given by the university, sym­ pathetic department chairs allowed me to arrange my schedule to maximize time for writing, and the College of Arts and Sciences provided further funds to finalize the manuscript. James Beal was once again indulgent of the absences, truncated vacations, and the like necessary for me to complete a book, and helpful in other ways as well. So too were other family members. I thank them all. Lake Ann, Michigan September 1994

PREFACE

Since the late 1930s, Americans have lived under the shadow of war. This is their history under that shadow and a reflection on its legacy—the story of America's militarization and how it changed the nation. To say that Americans lived in war's shadow is to indulge in a metaphor, but one appropriate to their sensibilities. A 1941 advertisement (see fig. 2) display­ ing a bomber's shadow darkening a suburban home offered a metaphor apt for a half-century of anxiety about the nation's safety. It showed both the ominous shadow cast by war and the still untouched scene beneath it—both hovering danger and lingering tranquility, external threat and domestic innocence. For that was how most Americans perceived the threat of war. To them, war came from outside America to intrude upon their lives and to wrest them from their pacific ways (War Comes to America was the title of a famous World War II propaganda film). And war itself seemed a murky phenomenon. Enemies were distant and elusive, and the proper response to them hard to define. Larger dangers— to life as the nuclear dilemma emerged, to liberty as the "garrison state" grew—defied measurement still more. Even films and photographs of­ ten left war in the shadows: Americans saw the mushroom clouds of nuclear explosions but rarely the destruction unleashed beneath them. And of course war's destruction almost never came to America. War's shadow hung over the nation, but its substance was hard to grasp. Both regrettable hypocrisy and laudable idealism were involved in Ameri­ cans' perceptions of war's sources. Regarding military vigilance and action as imperatives imposed upon them by external forces, they rarely acknowledged that their immersion in those imperatives arose also from their own values and ambitions. They talked about how war changed America, as if they were its passive victims, but less about how, deliberately or inadvertently, they changed themselves through war and changed war making itself. In the understandable but simple moral drama they saw, bad guys—Nazis, Japs, Commies, Russians—made them take up arms. But that outlook, by shoring up their selfimage as a pacific people, also granted only tenuous legitimacy to the vast ap­ paratus of national security they built, for if war's shadow receded, the appa­ ratus might itself wither. National myth thus provided space for other pursuits—of profit or equality or moral perfection— to persist, even as they were yoked to war's demands. Viewed as an imposition upon the nation, the demands of national security held compelling urgency but lacked fundamental legitimacy.

X

PREFACE

The metaphor of this book's title suggests how Americans perceived their transformative experience, and also how we might now interpret it, for its ef­ fects on our history were often as shadowy as they were far-reaching. Some results were trivial though telling: a French fashion designer designated his new women's bathing suit the bikini, after the Pacific island where the United States tested atomic bombs in 1946. (Scantily clad women were, after all, re­ garded as "bombshells.") Some results were grandly apparent though poorly reckoned with: once an intermittent and often unimportant concern, national security assumed permanent and paramount importance in American life, so that much of the nation's treasure was devoted to it, its armed forces spread over much of the globe, and its science and industry were profoundly reor­ iented. The fortunes of politicians also hinged on their relationship to war, as when Lyndon Johnson's 1964 campaign portrayed opponent Barry Goldwater as itching to start a nuclear war. And every social group found its fate altered or at least reconceived amid hot and cold war; it was no coincidence that at the end of this era one of the most esteemed black Americans was a general, Colin Powell. Other results were hard to pin down, in part because the weighty demands of war were in persistent tension with war's remoteness for most Americans. Nuclear weapons embodied that tension most dangerously, their cataclysmic potential paired with their virtual invisibility and total nonuse in war after 1945, but that tension cut through most of American life. Perhaps most insid­ ious and hard to pinpoint, war defined much of the American imagination, as the fear of war penetrated it and the achievements of war anchored it, to the point that Americans routinely declared "war" on all sorts of things that did not involve physical combat at all. Thus militarization reshaped every realm of American life—politics and for­ eign policy, economics and technology, culture and social relations—making America a profoundly different nation. To varying degrees, almost all groups were invested in it and attracted to it—rich and poor, whites and nonwhites, conservatives and liberals (the last more so than is usually recognized today). Certainly, all were changed by it. Any book analyzing broad patterns leaves out a great deal. This book em­ phasizes war as agent of and rationale for the nation's transformation, as the blank screen on which unrelated concerns were often projected, and as the paradigm in which Americans defined themselves, pursued change, or re­ sisted it. It is impossible to cite all instances of those phenomena, however, and foolish to suggest that militarization was determinative of all of this era's his­ tory. Divisions involving race, class, and gender, for example, like the nation's much-touted decline in economic vitality, all had autonomous dynamics as well as connections to the forces of militarization. As with terms for other pe­ riods, the label "Age of Militarization" is a creative oversimplification. Militar­ ization did not define or cause everything that happened. It simply loomed

PREFACE

xi

large and persistently enough to give unity to a half-century of history, to make of it something of a common piece, distinct from the history that preceded it and possibly from the next half-century. Other labels have been devised to describe aspects of that history: "the na­ tional security state" and "the warfare state," for institutions; the "Cold War," for the dominant conflict of this period; "hegemony" or "imperialism," for the global power that the United States exercised. But these terms, though un­ avoidable at times in a work like this, tend to posit a static condition and fail to capture both the breadth and the partiality of America's militarization. The fed­ eral government never became a "national security state" with the singlemin­ dedness that term implies, for it was too chronically in disarray and too chal­ lenged by other tasks to give national security sole priority. "National security" itself is a slippery term; it long ago acquired a neutral, timeless, objective qual­ ity, when in fact the term is a politically constructed artifact of the period under study. Nor did the nation quite become a "warfare state," for it never celebrated or entered war wholeheartedly enough for the term to do it justice. "Cold War" describes the great rivalry between the Soviet and American spheres of influ­ ence, but that rivalry flowed in part from a deeper revolution in international relations and American consciousness, and "Cold War" obscures the hot wars that occurred under its aegis. And while America's role in the world was often "imperial," the term hardly accounts for much else in American culture and politics. Hence I use the broader term "militarization" to capture the historical pro­ cess that the United States entered in the 1930s. Militarization bears a close rela­ tionship to an older term, "militarism," but the latter is more politically charged—evocative of Prussia, Nazi Germany, or imperial Japan—and it re­ fers more to a static condition than to a dynamic process. Militarization can be defined as "the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society or­ ganizes itself for the production of violence."11use the term more broadly to refer to the process by which war and national security became consuming anx­ ieties and provided the memories, models, and metaphors that shaped broad areas of national life. Caveats about this term are in order. First, militarization was not a uniquely American experience, nor was the United States alone responsible for its global scale in the twentieth century. Second, a militarized nation need not be domi­ nated by military institutions and elites: America's civilian leaders often pur­ sued national security and embraced military values more fervently than mili­ tary officers. Third, such a society need not be warlike, in the sense of relishing war; in the American case, countervailing emotions, like dread at the prospect of war and desire to enjoy affluence, prevented a war ethos from fully develop­ ing. Finally, though obviously expressed in the "production of violence," mil­ itarization may have sources and outlets far removed from violence and mili­ tary power. Although overlapping phenomena, war and militarization did not

xii

PREFACE

march in historical lockstep. In fact, intense involvement in war absorbed ener­ gies, while diminished involvement often released them into other outlets for militarization, as when metaphors of war spread widely in American politics and culture during the 1980s. Those caveats also suggest that the concept of militarization "is a little blurry around the edges."2 But what it lacks in precision it makes up for in breadth. Since militarization, like industrialization, was a varied and changing rather than uniform historical process, it makes sense that the term for it embraces varied, even discordant, phenomena. If not already clear to readers, it will become obvious that I view America's past half-century critically, but I seek no scapegoats among individuals or insti­ tutions. Presidents, and others who influenced or challenged them, receive much attention because their record is a common and plausible way to give coherence to a crowded history, because they did exercise much power, and because they shaped the moods and opinions of Americans. Their role in his­ tory was as much illustrative as determinative, however, and their respon­ sibility for its outcomes was shared with others. Criticism of individual leaders remains appropriate, but the United States and its leaders were not alone re­ sponsible for the Cold War, the arms race, or other evils of our time—or for their passing. The forces militarizing America were deeply embedded, as are those which will establish a different path. Regarding the methodological and theoretical issues that now vex histo­ rians, I have, through conscious choice and force of training and habit, taken an eclectic approach. Attentive to new approaches that "decenter" American his­ tory and dismantle its traditional narrative forms, I have nonetheless posited a center for this story, the national state and the political culture which it helped to construct and express. But I see that center as unstable, disrupted by tensions within and challenges from without, ones substantial enough to defy rigid no­ tions of "center" and "margins." And I see a narrative focused on that center as a compelling, though not the only, way to organize this history. In turn, this narrative usually follows but sometimes challenges the chronological divisions Americans generally see in their past. This book draws on my previous scholarship and teaching, on limited pri­ mary sources (generally of an accessible sort), and on the work of other scholars. Anyone in the field realizes that this scholarship is voluminous and ever-growing, and knows useful titles that I have not cited. At the same time, precisely because of its groaning volume, this scholarship now warrants a syn­ thesis, one other scholars will test, refine, or reject, since the task of making sense of America's age of militarization is just beginning.

PROLOGU E: W A R IN A M E R IC A N H ISTO R Y

War created the United States. Although many Americans professed genu­ ine hostility toward it, war was central to their history, the instrument by which they forged and expanded their nation and often defined themselves. The American Revolution was itself a war, often a nasty one. It broke out in part over military issues—the fiscal burdens, intrusive presence, and ideologi­ cal threat many Americans perceived in English military ambitions and institu­ tions. It presented the rebels with a dilemma that would persist in American history: How could they wage war against the evils of militarism without creat­ ing them in their own midst? And it left Americans in a tenuous military condi­ tion; despite their victory, reliable defense of the nation's borders was in doubt for three decades. Politics and folklore sustained the centrality of war for Americans long after the Revolution. No figures loomed larger in political mythology than George Washington, the warrior President, and Abraham Lincoln, the war President. From Washington through Teddy Roosevelt, former military officers seized the presidential nominations of their parties and often the presidency itself. The Revolution and the Civil War remained touchstones of national memory, their meanings repeatedly plumbed and refashioned. A nation bom in war, threat­ ened by invasion, expanded through conquest, and finally reconceived in civil war, owed much to Mars. True, it paid its debt grudgingly. Americans often celebrated what war gained them, but rarely war's institutions and burdens. Their distrust of profes­ sional "standing armies"—of their origins in a decadent Europe, of their power to corrupt or overawe the Republic—was deep. The new nation sanctioned only a bare-bones, decentralized military force. It relied on the voluntary en­ thusiasm of amateurs—men Washington described as "just dragged from the tender Scenes of domestick life" and all too "ready to fly from their own shadows"1—and hence also on the coercion of ideological fervor rather than the compulsion of the state to wage its wars. And although military service added attractive plumage to a political candidate, military officers as a class did not gain great social prestige or telling political clout. From the outset, then, a deep ambivalence pervaded American attitudes toward war and its institu­ tions: dependence on both matched distrust of each. The armed forces nonetheless played a telling role in defending, expanding.

2

PROLOGUE

and building the new nation. As if to resolve their ambivalence, Americans liked their military forces best when they undertook decidedly unmilitary functions. President Thomas Jefferson established the United States Military Academy at West Point less as a schoolhouse in destruction than as an academy of science and engineering, the role it played for decades in a nation hell-bent on internal development but lacking institutions with the requisite expertise. Army officers like Meriwether Lewis and William Clark surveyed the West and searched out its scientific secrets. Academy graduates, either in uniform or after entering private business, helped to build bridges, canals, harbors, and railroads. They were happy to do so, seeing in that role, rather than in war mak­ ing, their main hope for gaining social prestige and economic security. Their efforts forged a lasting link between the armed forces and the nation's eco­ nomic and technological development. That link went further. The army's Har­ pers Ferry and Springfield arsenals pioneered standardized mass production. In the 1840s, Congress debated how development of iron-clad warships might nourish the iron industry. Later, businessmen and technical experts gleaned the Civil War's record for lessons on how to rationalize the burgeoning corpo­ rate economy. During the nineteenth century, Americans also developed their particular, though not unique, style of imagining and waging war. American officers fa­ vored a "strategy of annihilation"2 entailing head-on assaults against an en­ emy's armed forces or productive capacity, rather than limited campaigns of movement, surprise, or attrition. It was a brutal style of war waged against Na­ tive Americans and in the Civil War, when many Americans embraced war's destructiveness as an instrument of higher causes and took "flight into unrea­ son: into visions of purgation and redemption, into anticipation and intuition and spiritual apotheosis, into bloodshed that was not only intentional pursuit of interests of state but was also sacramental, erotic, mystical, and strangely gratifying."3Wars of annihilation drew on such attitudes, and on the capacity to mass produce weapons and war materiel and the locomotives and ships to move them. The system was synergistic, if rarely seen as such: the armed forces spurred economic development, which in turn enhanced American military power. Some Americans carried this vision further. Developing the "cult of the su­ perweapon," they imagined stunning new weapons enabling the nation to usher in a Pax Americana by smashing its enemies or by making war too hellish to be waged, so that "war shall cease to desolate the world nor burning cities mark its dreadful track," as the inventor Robert Fulton hoped.4 By century's end, the notion was commonplace that submarines, airships, or other devices might deter or humanize war, despite doubts about what would happen if the magical weapon belonged instead to an enemy, or got used in a civil war among Americans, or made killing too easy rather than too horrific. Mark Twain savagely mocked the vision of American weapons making peace in A

PROLOGUE

3

Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court (1889), a comic nightmare of auto­ mated butchery in battle. But dreams of triumphal American technology con­ tinued to hold sway. They tapped Americans' ambivalence about war, promis­ ing that the nation could gain what it wanted from war through superior technology rather than through the dreadful leviathan of large standing armies. Imagining future wars, Americans also continued to plumb the meaning of past ones—above all the Civil War, which gripped the American imagination so long in part because a half-century went by before another major war. Amer­ icans judged politicians by their wartime heroism and waved the "bloody shirt" in political campaigns. They employed war as a metaphor for other struggles, as in one scholar's History of the Warfare of Science and Theology in Christendom. They compared the Civil War's attractive model of idealism, disci­ pline, and self-sacrifice to the rank materialism, squalid corruption, and corpo­ rate giantism of post-Civil War America. Few Civil War veterans wanted an­ other war or joined Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in urging Americans "to pray, not for comfort, but for combat." But many Americans joined Teddy Roosevelt in celebrating the strenuous and democratizing virtues of wartime service. Or they tried to extract the virtues of war from war itself. Champions of civil ser­ vice reform drew on an "ideal of military professionalism." Social reformers saw charity work as akin to enlisting in an army at war, now "with vice and poverty as the enemy." Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888) imagined a utopia at peace but operated by a disciplined army of workers. In 1910 came the crowning appeal to exploit war's virtues in peacetime, William James's "The Moral Equivalent of War." James proposed to rekindle the Civil War spirit by drafting youth into an "army against nature" whose soldiers would dig coal, wash dishes, erect skyscrapers, and generally "get the childishness knocked out of them"— a proposal often seen as a precursor to the New Deal's Civilian Conservation Corps and John Kennedy's Peace Corps. Views like James's, al­ though easily seen as opposed to the bellicose militarism of a Teddy Roosevelt, in fact only bent similar assumptions to different purposes. James, too, believed that "militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood."5 Reflections on the Civil War also emerged amid fears of a new war (for which the Paris Commune of 1871 served as a frightening model) that might pit the nation's social classes, racial or ethnic groups, or ideological factions against each other. Indeed, military forces repeatedly intervened on the side of the new corporate giants to subdue striking workers, just as embattled workers saw themselves as "industrial armies" and marched in 1894 as "Coxey's Army." Afraid of the enraged masses, prominent Americans proposed an expanded army to garrison cities—arguments more successfully used for modernizing state militias, or the National Guard, as collectively they came to be called. From a different vantage point, authors of apocalyptic visions—Twain in Con­ necticut Yankee, Ignatius Donnelly in Caesar's Column (1890)—cast war as a civil

4

PROLOGUE

conflict harnessing dreadful new weapons to internal passions. Although fear of class war abated after the century's turn, champions of preparedness claimed that universal military service would close the fissures of class and ethnicity by giving all boys a common discipline and training in democracy's virtues. For Americans fearing domestic strife, the Civil War had resonance. It loomed over succeeding generations just as World War II did over later genera­ tions fearing another international war. The great class war never erupted, just as World War III never broke out, but in both cases skirmishes in the imagined war—conflicts with labor in the late 1800s, the "limited wars" of Korea and Vietnam—kept the specter alive. In such ways, war occupied a central place in America's earlier history, as in our own times. But the similarities cannot be pushed very far. Above all, after the War of 1812 the new nation enjoyed remarkable immunity from attack, though not the "free security" that nostalgic Americans in the mid-twentieth century imag­ ined. Border disputes, threats to trade. Native Americans' resistance to con­ quest, and growing imperial ambitions offered real challenges. But it was with reason that young Abraham Lincoln could ask in 1837, "Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant to step the ocean and crush us at a blow?" and an­ swer boastfully, "Never! All the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined . . . could not by force take a drink from the Ohio or make a track on the Blue Ridge in a trial of a thousand years."6The only serious threat to the nation, Lin­ coln recognized, came from within it. A term like "national security," implying broad and continuous efforts to de­ fend a country, as yet had no place. The United States maintained a War Depart­ ment (and a Navy Department)—not yet a Defense Department and a National Security Council—a designation suggesting that war was an episodic event, not the object of sustained anxiety. War intruded only occasionally into the lives of Americans, and when it did occur, its circumstances (except for the Civil War) allowed leaders great latitude about whether to participate. The Civil War loomed over the American imagination, but as a site of contested memories about a bitter division, not as the touchstone of national unity against a foreign threat. It therefore lacked the resonance with world events that World War II would hold for Americans. Few nineteenth-century Americans saw their nation's fortunes as bound up with distant wars in a seamless world and as dependent on massive military power. What became war's constant shadow was then only a passing eclipse. By the same token, war and defense rarely dominated national politics. The Spanish-American War, the difficult war to conquer the Filipinos that followed, and the simultaneous modernization of the armed forces all reflected a higher priority on military force and more intense debate about it. But as late as the raucous debate on military preparedness in 1915-16, no credible, immediate threat to national safety could be invoked; bellicose advocates of preparedness

PROLOGUE

S

were "more interested in polishing the fire engines than finding the blaze."7 Instead, that debate pivoted on almost everything else: trade, national pride, the internal cohesion of a polyglot and class-riven nation. Too, the armed forces only slowly became a truly national instrument of power wielded by a centralized state. The navy's ships were dispersed among far-flung stations, only starting to join in a battleship navy in the 1890s. The army remained broken into small units long after major activity against Indians ended. The National Guard was largely a creature of state governments. War­ time recruitment of soldiers and sailors lay mostly in the hands of states and localities. The professional training of soldiers and officers remained in infancy. Except for the President, no central authority knit together this hodgepodge. Given its fragmented structure, most soldiers in the Spanish-American War, many even in World War I, marched as a unit from the same locality, which held their loyalties and scrutinized their progress for signs of local pride or grief. They were Milwaukee's finest or Ohio volunteers, not homogenized in­ struments of Washington's impersonal authority, which they often keenly re­ sisted. Above all, the armed forces lacked the size to drive the nation's economy and politics. In select areas, as with their technological contributions, their role was critical to the nation's development. And telling precedents for the future did emerge: the "very extensive and expensive old-age assistance program for [Civil War] veterans" constituted the first major federal welfare program, one that foreshadowed the powerful linkage between welfare and military service in the twentieth century. But that precedent was not immediately followed up. By century's end, universities had also displaced service academies as the pre­ mier engineering schools and "the day of the soldier-technologist, well versed in science and committed to its peacetime uses, had largely disappeared." Brit­ ain's "military-industrial complex" was already the unstable fulcrum for its economy and a leader in the global arms trade. In contrast, arms contracts were significant in tum-of-the-century America (President Grover Cleveland warned in 1894 that "if no new contracts are given out, contractors must dis­ band their workmen and their plants must lie idle"), but the nation had at most only the "keel of a navy-industrial complex."8 Spending on the armed forces reflected their modest place in the nation's po­ litical economy. Until well into the twentieth century, military expenditures in peacetime took 0.4 to 0.9 percent of gross national product annually. National defense did comprise 20 to 25 percent of federal spending from the 1880s through the 1920s, and far more if payments to veterans and on the federal debt—obligations largely acquired in war—are also counted. But the federal budget comprised so small a share of GNP (less than 3percent before the 1920s) that defense spending still commanded few national resources. Moreover, debt service and veterans' payments, primarily reflecting the episodic burdens of war rather than the ongoing costs of national defense, are often excluded in

«

PROLOGUE

broad chronological and cross-national comparisons. Judged by direct expen­ ditures on armed forces, peacetime military spending before the 1930s paled in comparison to the post-World War II era, when it seized about 10 percent of GNP (itself far larger than a half-century earlier).9 The armed forces did grow, not only in costs but in manpower. Contrary to Cold War mythology, which held that the nation had foolishly disbanded its armed forces after each war, those forces increased sharply in the wake of all wars after 1848, tripling after the Spanish-American War to some 150,000 per­ sonnel and nearly doubling again by the mid-1920s. Still, these forces were only 10 to 20 percent of what nations like France and Britain maintained at the turn of the century. Active-duty military forces comprised less than 0.1 percent of America's population in the 1890s, and under 0.2 percent in the 1920s, but from 1.3 to 1.8 percent of the total population in the 1950s and 1960s. The cadre of civilians working for the armed forces was also modest— less than 20 percent of total federal civilian employment through the 1920s (when such employ­ ment exceeded 500,000), but roughly half of that employment in the mid-1950s (when total employment reached 2.4 million). Only by one critical standard, death in war, did the nineteenth-century record eclipse that of the twentieth. No other American war matched the Civil War in casualties, especially as mea­ sured against total population— over 600,000 military dead (one in every five white males of military age in the South, one in sixteen in the North), plus thou­ sands of civilian dead—or in physical destruction to the nation.10 In sum, until well into the twentieth century national defense claimed only a minor part of the nation's resources. War imposed enormous burdens, but de­ fense as an ongoing activity did not. Despite blood-curdling expressions of mil­ itaristic sentiment from some Americans, militarization as a grand historical process was at most incipient, well behind the stage it had reached in Europe. The forces were nonetheless gathering to advance that process in America. War's democratization, industrialization, and professionalization were often seen in the nineteenth century as likely to make war more humane and less frequent, but those developments, tied as they were to that century's powerful nationalism and imperialism, only prepared the way for the titanic warfare of the twentieth century. Europe was caught up in an arms race bearing down on and sucking in the rest of the world. Americans responded to that arms race with a confused and limited expan­ sion of their own armed forces. Some chastised Old World militarism, but others were eager to join the race, especially its showy competition in battleship navies. No single ideological viewpoint or cluster of interest drove the growth of American arms. Because many anti-imperialists were also virulently antiBritish, for example, they supported a big American navy able to challenge the world's largest fleet or expand American commerce. While industrialists pressed for contracts and scientists like Thomas Edison promised amazing weapons, their efforts to secure defense monies had only limited results in the

PROLOGUE

7

absence of intense interservice rivalries or widespread alarms about the na­ tion's safety. What drove military modernization and expansion at its critical stage during the Roosevelt and Taft presidencies was a small coalition of patri­ cian civilians like Elihu Root, Henry L. Stimson, and Roosevelt himself, and re­ formers within the officer corps. Still, their calculations of interest did not alone propel modernization and expansion. Only occasionally, and then not very plausibly, did reformers cite territorial safety as justification. They also wanted military power in order to support American hegemony over a world-capitalist economy, but that argu­ ment too was strained and episodic. Military institutions were "organic growths developing, as do most great social institutions, out of complex soils of vested interests, political and economic ambitions, unanalyzed fears and un­ tested assumptions about historical causation." Like Roosevelt, many Ameri­ cans believed that military power expressed more than it underwrote the na­ tion's ascendancy: big nations needed big navies and the expansion that went with them, "or we are not great" and face only "stagnation and decay," so naval officers could argue. That view prevailed easily before World War I, when war, at least in its horrific forms, seemed remote, so that the nation's new engines of war "were thought of simply as beautiful pieces of machinery completely un­ connected with the destruction of human life"—symbols of national pride and technological achievement. The growth of American arms also proceeded be­ cause the resources to realize it were abundant, and because Progressive re­ formers admired effective national government and saw armed forces as an ex­ pression of it.11 The ease with which the armed forces expanded allowed for substantial con­ fusion about ultimate purposes. A convenient war, as with Spain in 1898, or a convenient war scare, as with Japan during Teddy Roosevelt's presidency, pro­ vided pretext but little compelling reason for the armed forces' growth. Eco­ nomic and territorial imperialism, strategic anxieties, nationalism and racism, elitist longings to enhance the nation's internal cohesion, attraction to darkly determinist notions— such impulses behind expansion thrived in a climate where none was severely tested and at force levels still so low that few Ameri­ cans needed to worry about joining Europe's powers in the abyss of war and militarism. Americans did peer into that abyss during World War I, which marked a wa­ tershed in their relationship to war. Mindful of Europe's methods of total war, American political, business, and military leaders constructed a national ma­ chinery for harnessing resources. Manpower, industry, science, food, trade, and opinion were conscripted into service, as war's democratization yielded its paradoxical results: war in the name of the people sanctioned their mobiliza­ tion and death at unimaginable levels. All too often, it is true, the machinery of American war making jammed, its gears only beginning to mesh when the war ended. American forces remained

8

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surprisingly dependent on the British and French for airplanes, artillery, and other implements of war. Complicating America's mobilization was a volatile mix of antiwar fervor, idealistic war aims, repressive impulses, sectional divi­ sion, and class conflict among Americans ("If you conscript men for war, con­ script wealth for war," one congressman demanded). Perhaps most important was the persistence amid the new approach to war of an older ethic of volun­ tary, decentralized mobilization for war, evident when President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed the new Selective Service Act, though surely an act of state compulsion, as only a "selection from a nation which has volunteered in m ass."12New federal agencies like the War Industries Board were as much the captives as the rulers of America's corporations. All too often, hesitancy about brandishing state power led only to its underhanded employment or to ugly vigilantism and popular hysteria to substitute for it. Voluntarism and compul­ sion, enthusiasm and efficiency, freedom and discipline—such dualisms, long familiar in American history, cut through the American war effort, framed how many Americans viewed it, and revealed their ambivalence about entering a world of mass slaughter and global power. American leaders nonetheless built the rudiments of a national security state. These included agencies of economic mobilization; a capricious appa­ ratus of internal security; organizations to enlist universities, scientists, and in­ tellectuals into the cause; the battle fleet "second to none" long sought by ar­ dent navalists; a mass and partially mechanized army; and a fledgling air force attracted to new doctrines of strategic bombing. In another way, too. World War I illuminated America's future: as a massive if disappointing experiment in using war to serve political and social agendas. The desire to extract constructive change from war was hardly new to Ameri­ cans in 1917, but no war exposed it so boldly, in part because the newly asser­ tive state promised riper opportunities for action. In his famous formulation of war's opportunities, John Dewey, speaking for progressive intellectuals reluc­ tant to enter the maelstrom, presented war as a "plastic juncture" in history that held out the possibility of securing "the supremacy of public need over private possessions."13 Diverse interests shared Dewey's sense of war's malleability, though not his interest in liberal reform: businessmen keen on expanding trade, controlling the embryonic apparatus of economic regulation, or smash­ ing organized labor; union leaders like Samuel Gompers, seeking to enhance labor's status and power; feminists and moral reformers, seizing the chance to push for woman's suffrage and prohibition; nationalists and nativists, yearning to purify a polyglot nation; blacks, hoping their contribution to victory would speed their full citizenship—and the list could go on. Many of these groups were to be bitterly disappointed because they either failed to get what they wanted (as with black leaders) or found the price too high (as with progressive intellectuals). World War I reworked the basic fissures of American society, but in ways few groups could anticipate or con-

PROLOGUE

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trol. Randolph Bourne's memorable barb at progressives applied to others as well: "If the war is too strong for you to prevent, how is it going to be weak enough for you to control and mould to your liberal purposes?"14The question would endure. Never again would Americans so brazenly champion the po­ tential of war abroad to unleash beneficent change at home. The lure of that potential would persist, however, muted in future rhetoric but if anything more powerful in actuality. Just as impressive as the speed with which Americans plunged into World War I and divined its meanings was the rapidity with which they discarded much of its legacy. As preparation for the age of national security, this war, in part because America's role in it was so brief, was a dress rehearsal after which the props were stored and even the stage sometimes abandoned. The jerrybuilt machinery to mobilize men and materiel soon was in shambles. As the Red Scare dwindled, the apparatus of internal security shrank, although lega­ cies like immigration restriction endured. Wartime visions of seizing world markets, though partly realized, faded before the lure of a robust market at home. The armed forces, it is true, were now enlarged, modernized, and innovative, developing some of the world's best weapons, studying the war's lessons about modem industrial warfare, and forging links to science and industry through new organizations like the National Advisory Committee on Aeronau­ tics and the Army Industrial College. And on the West Coast there emerged the embryo of a "metropolitan-military complex" shaped less by authorities in Washington than by fledgling entrepreneurs, ambitious scientists, and local boosters tapping the imperial dreams of the West's fast-growing cities. But no orderly system of militarization was yet in place. Thus Congress, steeped in antistatist and anticorporate ideology and fearing "a powerfully independent military-industrial clique that would fleece the taxpayer and foment war," im­ posed rules that pitted the pace-setting aircraft companies savagely against each other and against the armed services, their primary market. Presidential parsimony, popular antagonisms, interservice rivalries, and weak institutional linkages curbed long-range planning in strategy and logistics. Whatever the lessons of World War I, they were at best partially implemented.15 War also taught lessons in the necessity of avoiding it as well as the means to wage it. Americans had already experienced the horrors of modem war in their Civil War, but that war's predictive value was not widely recognized here or abroad, its ferocity instead being seen as anomalous, due to the nature of civil war. World War I, however, as an international war that erupted amid growing anxiety about technological and economic change, made apparent the destruc­ tive and dehumanizing nature of modem warfare. Tentatively during the war, savagely after it, some soldiers, reformers, politicians, and writers exposed the mechanized madness and excoriated the civilization that produced it. World War I taught Carrie Chapman Catt, for example, that "war is in the blood of

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men; they can't help it. They have been fighting ever since the days of the cave­ men" (such sentiments led the War Department to red-bait and harass antiwar feminists).16Indeed, war-borne visions of an armed American colossus fell vic­ tim in part to the ideological pacifism and diffuse antimilitarism of the 1920s. Yet the lessons touted by war's opponents triumphed no more clearly than those proclaimed by advocates of armed vigilance. War was rarely the main target of "disillusioned" postwar writers and artists, many of whom, like Er­ nest Hemingway, were not pacifists. Instead, World War I was "a fabulously useful, if expensively purchased, metaphor for the corruption of the culture they had under siege." Besides, what dismayed Americans was less the war itself—brief, triumphant, and relatively inexpensive for them (116,516 Ameri­ can personnel died, fewer than half in battle)—than its aftermath of revolution, greed, and stillborn treaties abroad, and inflation, hysteria, and squabbling at home. War's multiple legacies seemed less to coalesce than to cancel each other out.17 No simple retreat into isolation or "normalcy" accounted for the stalemate, for no such retreat was possible or even desired by most Americans. Wilson's Republican successors shared his vision of American leadership in a global capitalist system even as they shifted the tactics designed to achieve it. Despite the Senate's defeat of the Treaty of Versailles, the United States made vigorous diplomatic and financial efforts on the world stage. Those included arms con­ trol treaties which capped the size of the great powers' fleets while encouraging the technological innovation in which the United States was emerging as preeminent—in essence, carefully balancing the conflicting lessons drawn from the war experience. Meanwhile, diverse political forces— feminists and other pacifists opposed to any war, populists and progressives suspicious of eastern capitalists, unilateralists opposed to alliances, conservatives more wor­ ried about the domestic order—repeatedly assaulted the potent symbols of America's past or prospective involvement in world war. They defeated Amer­ ica's entry into the League of Nations and the World Court; railed against the evils of chemical warfare; denounced the financiers and militarists presumed to thrive on war and weapons; embraced the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war; and attacked plans for a mass American army capable of once again storming Europe's battlefronts. Their efforts were linked to a widespread de­ sire among Americans to gain the advantages of global economic power with­ out sustaining its costs, including those of wielding military power. In Warren Cohen's phrase, they sought "empire without tears." That desire, seen during World War II as lamentably weak and hypocritical, made sense in the 1920s, when no credible threat to American interests existed to justify a firmer em­ brace of military power. But the pacific aspirations and antimilitarist politics of this era also obscured the nation's deepening involvement in the world and the growing military power used to underwrite it. American culture, particularly in its fascination

PROLOGUE

I I

with new technologies, also masked these changes. Heroes like aviator Charles Lindbergh were celebrated as exemplars of an old pioneer spirit, paragons of a m odem scientific age, and creators of an international web of travel and com­ munication that would smother the provincial forces of nationalism and war. Crusaders for air power like Gen. Billy Mitchell were seen not as proponents of a deadly new technology but as populist rebels against the forces of militarism. And the technologies themselves, above all the bomber, were celebrated as in­ struments for preserving the nation's immunity from war, not as a new means to wage it. In that fashion, the progress of American armaments between the world wars seemed indicative more of bygone virtues and peace-loving im­ pulses than of new terrors and challenges. Even those thinking about such terrors still held out hope. Many Americans remembered the scientific butchery of the past war and feared its resumption. They penned horrifying tales of the carnage made possible by recent or antici­ pated inventions—gas and bacteriological weapons, long-range bombers, even an atomic device. They glimpsed nothing less than mankind's ability to "accomplish its own destruction," as Winston Churchill put it, or to carry out a military and ecological "holocaust" in a matter of hours, as the American social critic Stuart Chase worried.18 And yet such prophets offered a more hopeful message as well: precisely because another war was so horrific a prospect, na­ tions led by rational leaders either would never allow it to occur or would toler­ ate it so briefly that it would reach a mercifully quick end. In this dimension too, that of grand imaginings of the future, Americans did not yet have to anticipate constant peril to their safety and strenuous efforts to avert it. War's place in the nation's history was large, but its militarization—the large and sustained focus of anxieties and resources on military power—was evident only in teasing outline. Well into the 1930s, "the shadow of the future was already plain; but there was nothing with which to give it substance."19

PA R T O N E TH E M IL IT A R IZA T IO N OF A M E R IC A

I EM ERGENCE, 1933-1941

As If “Invaded by a Foreign Foe** On a gray and grim March 4,1933, in a city that seemed like "a beleaguered capital in war time," President Franklin Roosevelt invoked war as a metaphor for the nation's economic crisis and a model for its solution. He proposed to solve unemployment "by direct recruiting by the Government itself, treating the task as we would treat the emergency of a war"; to follow "lines of attack" on the financial crisis; to summon Americans to be "a trained and loyal army"; to urge on them "a unity of duty hitherto evoked only in time of armed strife"; to assume "unhesitatingly the leadership of this great army of our people." Near the conclusion of his First Inaugural Address came his boldest challenge. If Congress failed to take effective action, he would ask for "broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe." There followed the crowd's loudest cheer, a response Eleanor Roosevelt found "a little terrifying."1 On a day famous for his claim "that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself," the analogy to war was hardly Roosevelt's only theme, and too much can be made of it: he never explicitly asked Congress for "broad executive power." Still, war provided FDR his dominant metaphor, just as he explicitly rejected others ("We are stricken by no plague of locusts," he insisted). The war analogy addressed multiple purposes and audiences. It was de­ signed to revive the unity (exaggerated in memory) of World War I. Taking Americans back to 1917, it implicitly repudiated the 1920s, and with it the petty materialism and rigid economic dogma which many believed had caused the Depression. Treating the nation as if "invaded by a foreign foe," the war anal­ ogy vaguely imputed an external cause for economic disaster, diminishing American culpability for it. Invoking war, FDR also served notice that he would draw on the last war's models of bureaucratic and presidential action; its invocation was intended, and understood, to strengthen his legal and politi­ cal claim to power. FDR also used the analogy at a time of international insta­ bility, with dictators on the march and the First World War's sour legacy of rev­ olution, nationalism, and debt fresh to Americans. Above all, the war analogy

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reflected the felt gravity of the economic crisis and FDR's sense of what would best mobilize Americans behind his course of action. Hardly confined to political rhetoric, war-related models and metaphors also suffused culture in the early 1930s. Film and fiction displayed contempo­ rary fears (or hopes) that fascistic government, military measures like martial law, or war itself might be used to overcome the economic crisis or curb the predators and revolutionaries it bred. Released just after FDR's inauguration, Gabriel Over the White House had its cinematic president form an Army of Con­ struction "subject to military discipline," use military courts-martial to try and execute racketeers, and display America's air power to force the world's na­ tions to disarm.2Similar moods surfaced in nervous admiration of Mussolini's Italian fascism—far less often Hitler's version—and in recurrent speculation that FDR's New Deal or other forces (like Louisiana's senator Huey Long) might usher in fascism. There was no consensus that militaristic solutions were desirable—more Americans probably feared them than wanted them—but their mere mention indicated how hard it was to imagine solutions to the Great Depression that did not partake of war, revolution, or some mixture of the two. These uses of the idea and the institutions of war drew them closer to the center of American politics and revealed that their emerging centrality derived from dynamics internal to the nation as well as from challenges beyond its shores. In particular, those uses of war exposed how much the nation's coming militarization owed to uneasiness about the growing size and power of na­ tional government. Passionate calls for federal action to cope with the Great Depression collided with persistent distrust of a powerful state, a distrust in­ scribed in the Constitution and linked to faith in individual responsibility, which strong government would presumably undermine. Sometimes ex­ pressed by FDR himself, distrust of the state impeded its authority to take large, effective action. It required the sanction of war— as memory, model, metaphor, or menace— to sustain that authority. As William Leuchtenburg later commented, use of the "war analogue" during the 1930s exposed "both an impoverished tradition of reform and the reluctance of the nation to come to terms with the leviathan state," as if the nation could find no way "to organize collective action save in war or its surrogate."3Federal action to discipline corporations, employ the im­ poverished, or aid the elderly seemed of arguable necessity—useful, but rarely compelling to the nation's survival. The arena of war, on the other hand, pre­ sumably compelled action: nothing less than the nation's survival and honor were at stake. Borrowing from that arena, Roosevelt and others gained legit­ imacy for state action otherwise viewed suspiciously and tried to forge the unity that war presumably entailed—to override differences of class, ideology, race, and the like that supposedly hampered state action. Enhancing the state's legitimacy, the war analogy also served the New Deal's conservative purposes. War, as Americans increasingly understood it, required

EMERGENCE,

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centralized direction and executive supremacy. The New Dealers' "war ap­ proach," according to Leuchtenburg, "rejected both mass action and socialist planning" in favor of corporate-government cooperation. New Dealers most feared not "the opposition of the conservatives, who were discredited," but in­ stead "the menace of antiplutocratic movements. Yet in damping the fires of popular dissent, they also snuffed out support they would need to keep the reform spirit alive." To be sure, the "war approach" was not consistently fol­ lowed, FDR did sometimes stoke the "fires of popular dissent," and antistatism limited the New Deal's centralizing tendencies. But the war analogy, with all its connotations of emergency and peril, did presume entrusting national elites with extraordinary power.4 Although the metaphors and models of war enhanced the power and legit­ imacy of the state, few Americans consciously intended that result. The war analogy came too easily to require much calculation. Sometimes its use was simply trivial, a mere gloss on other rationales more deeply felt. And it did not lead directly to war or to the nation's militarization: only in concert with chang­ ing economics, politics, and technology on the international stage could those results occur. But use of war as metaphor and model did help prepare Ameri­ cans materially and psychologically for war. And by allowing them to avoid the central dilemma of the state's legitimacy, it eased political conflict in the 1930s at the price of strengthening the habit, destined to reappear over the next half-century, of harnessing politics and state initiatives to the imperatives and models of war. In those indirect but powerful ways, it furthered the transition to a militarized America. Roosevelt was ideally suited to preside over and speed along that transition. Few modem presidents had the background and temperament to move so comfortably in the arenas of both war and peace. His first major position, as assistant secretary of the navy during World War I, increased his knowledge of war abroad and politics at home. His gravest political crisis before his presidency—his 1919 investigation into homosexual behavior at the Newport Naval Training Station met a Senate subcommittee's harsh reprimand and a public outcry over his use of youthful sailors to entrap alleged offenders— came at the troubled intersection of military policy and domestic culture, where conflicts would arise repeatedly in the next decades. Rhetorically, FDR was gifted at employing the images of one arena in the other, as when domestic crisis led him to invoke the metaphors of war, and later when he translated war's demands back into the homefront's language of production. Most of all, he was comfortable with the demands of war and the power he exercised in it. He shared little of the era's fear of corporate-military institutions and their power to manipulate or corrupt the nation. He was instead in that tradition of elite easterners like Teddy Roosevelt and Henry L. Stimson, who championed preparedness and accepted the institutional demands that modem war seemed to make. At the same time, he was not awed by the romance of war or by the

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men and institutions that conducted it. He presented war's demands with a coolness appropriate to the modem temper and to a nation suspicious of the lofty idealism of 1917. It is true that his attitudes and talents did not always serve him well. It is also true that he alone did not guide the nation toward mil­ itarization, whose course he only partly intended and dimly foresaw. Lesser leaders might have taken that course. Roosevelt did so expertly. FDR drew on an old tradition of using war politically and rhetorically. Amid the prosperity of the 1920s, few found war a useful metaphor for domestic crisis simply because few perceived a crisis. But as a model of national unity and state control of a chaotic economy. World War I loomed large even in pros­ perous times among "more advanced Progressives," who "looked back fondly toward the war mobilization which seemed to have drawn a blueprint for America's future."5 The decade's bold initiative in prohibition also emerged out of wartime idealism, experimentation, and anti-immigrant feeling. Cau­ tious reformers like Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, who saw govern­ ment's role as catalytic rather than coercive, found wartime experience equally instructive. Just how instructive emerged sharply after 1929, when hard economic times crippled Hoover's presidency. The common phrase "fighting the Depression" itself drew on military imagery, and analogies to war now flowed freely. The New Deal, Stuart Chase's widely read 1932 analysis, called for a "general staff" to direct the forces of economic recovery. The Nation compared the crisis of the 1930s to the Civil War. At one point. Hoover proclaimed, the nation had fought its "battle of Chateau-Thierry" and now had to regroup for its "battle of Soissons," referring to two key battles of World War I. Keenly aware of the na­ tional mood if inept at altering it. Hoover drew on the Great War's uses of pro­ paganda in trying to lift the nation's spirits. He awkwardly compared the De­ pression to war: "We have the combats, if against an unseen foe of inestimable strength. We have our men and we have our casualties among them." Hoover saw himself as "the commanding officer at general headquarters," an aide re­ called. "We have all been saying to each other the situation is quite like war," Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson observed.6 Proposals for economic recovery during the Hoover years also drew on war­ time experience. General Electric's Gerald Swope urged a federal bond issue of wartime dimensions to finance public works. Economist Richard T. Ely sought an economic general staff to direct an army of the unemployed that would "re­ lieve distress with all the vigor and resources of brain and brawn that we em­ ployed in the World War." Favorite legacies from the last war were its War In­ dustries Board and War Finance Corporation, the latter a model for the new Reconstruction Finance Corporation.7 Remembered in different ways. World War I was inevitably used to diverse purposes in the 1930s. While some progressives saw in it a model for forceful action. Hoover used "the metaphor of war to serve a conservative function: that

EMERGENCE,

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of draining internal antagonisms onto a common national enemy." Such uses of war were problematical, as some critics recognized: war's organizational ma­ chinery was designed to swell production, whereas during the Depression pro­ duction far outstripped demand; and war sanctioned temporary improvisa­ tions, whereas many reformers sought long-term structural change. An effort to drain "internal antagonisms onto a common national enemy" was also risky, since war produced an identifiable enemy, but the foe now was an abstraction, the "Depression." For that reason among others, Hoover's effort to rally sup­ port did him little good. He did no better during the bleak summer of 1932, when the "Bonus Army" of World War veterans marched on Washington to demand early receipt of their service bonuses. Placards reading "Cheered in '17, Jeered in '32" symbolically linked the war and the Depression, but Hoover went far beyond symbols when he called in the army, under Gen. Douglas MacArthur, whose tanks and infantry expelled the veterans from Pennsylvania Av­ enue and torched their shacks at Anacostia flats.8 The problematic utility of the war analogy at such specific levels suggests that its appeal went deeper. War was invoked to sanction action itself as much as any specific action. Americans were told to "consider what would happen if the United States declared war today. Everybody knows what would happen. Congress would immediately stop this interminable talk and appropriate." As Roosevelt condemned Hoover in 1932: "Compare this panic-stricken policy of delay and improvisation with that devised to meet the emergency of war fif­ teen years ago." His claim that in 1917 "the whole Nation mobilized for war" also implied that a warlike unity against the Depression would override divi­ sions among Americans. Of course, the Democratic Party, having held the White House during the Great War, more easily laid claim to its legacy.9 That was quickly apparent in the parade of agencies and actions improvised by the administration and Congress in 1933. FDR's first major step was to in­ voke the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 to declare a national bank holi­ day. Days later, he drew on the authority Congress had given Wilson during the war to ask for emergency powers to balance the budget—supported by congressmen citing "a state of war" and the necessity to "follow the flag."10 "There was scarcely a New Deal act or agency that did not owe something to the experience of World War I." Major organizations owed a debt, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, whose anchor was a wartime government nitrate and power project at Muscle Shoals, and the Agricultural Adjustment Admin­ istration, inspired by the War Food Administration and headed by George Peek, for whom "this whole thing clicks into shape" because of "his war experi­ ence." Most New Deal agencies owed debts to the legal authority, program­ matic example, bureaucratic shell, key personnel, or rhetorical inspiration of the Great War, and collectively to two grand wartime legacies, bureaucratic im­ provisation and deficit financing. Meanwhile, New Dealers fondly cast their jobs and goals in military language, whether they "volunteered" or were

20

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MILITARIZATION

OF AMERI CA

"drafted," served at "general headquarters in Washington, D.C." or in "the front-line trenches," worked as generals or as "noncoms," marched in "divi­ sions" or as "shock troops." Indicating the grimness of their task, their meta­ phors invoked army duty, not more glamorous naval or air service. Implicitly, they also rendered the New Deal as men's work; women did not buy easily into military language.11 Few agencies revealed the debt to the last war more than the National Recov­ ery Administration, set up in 1933 to regulate production, prices, and wages. It was modeled on the War Industries Board, inspired by "the great cooperation of 1917 and 1918" (as FDR called it), headed by Gen. Hugh Johnson, a West Pointer involved in wartime mobilization, and promoted by propaganda tech­ niques borrowed from the World War.12 Those techniques exposed both the menacing and laughable possibilities la­ tent when war's models are harnessed to domestic crusades. Johnson figured that he could speed economic recovery with a patriotic campaign designed to pressure businesses into signing agreements on wages, prices, and production. Plastered on thousands of storefronts, the Blue Eagle (critics thought it distur­ bingly similar to Nazi icons) and its slogan "We Do Our Part" became symbols of compliance with NRA codes and support for the New Deal. Women will "save our country," Johnson proclaimed, and achieve "as great a victory as the Argonne. It is zero hour for housewives. Their battle cry is 'Buy now under the Blue Eagle!' " Johnson likened failure to join "this great army of the New Deal" to wartime treason and dubbed anyone disloyal to the effort a "slacker," a World War I term for those who evaded patriotic duty. Roosevelt, no slacker at rhetoric himself, said the same thing less harshly. "In war, in the gloom of night attack, soldiers wear a bright badge on their shoulders to be sure that comrades do not fire on comrades," he noted in urging Americans to display the Blue Eagle. "On that principle, those who cooperate in this program must know each other at a glance." The hoopla climaxed in September 1933 with the big­ gest parade in New York City's history.13 A different thrust of the New Deal— to link recovery with rearmament— was less important at the time but telling in its implications. Military spending fell in the early 1930s, reaching a historic low as a percentage of total budgets, but began a sharp rise in fiscal 1935. Meanwhile, the official defense budget excluded the use of Public Works Administration funds to build aircraft car­ riers, bombers, attack planes, military airports, aviation research facilities, and army barracks. Those funds, $824 million over several years, were large, about equal to the official defense budget in any one year, and such imaginative bud­ geting generated controversy: Congress forbade it in 1935.14 As with much else in the New Deal, the close connection between military programs and economic recovery was not unique to the United States during the depression. Critics as diverse as business conservatives and the Commu­ nist Party's Daily Worker, and even some New Deal sympathizers, compared

EMERGENCE,

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this a n d o th e r practices to those of N a zi G erm an y a n d o th er natio n s. M ilitary sp e n d in g to p ro m o te recovery, w o rk cam p s for th e u n e m p lo y ed , a n d th e sta te 's u se of m artia l rhetoric w ere am o n g the sim ilarities. C o m m o n to th em all w a s a m o re a ssertiv e sta te re sp o n d in g to crisis o r ex p lo itin g it. Too m u ch can b e m ad e of su c h co m p ariso n s, how ever. T hey in d icated less som e ideological affinity th a n th e m a n n e r in w h ic h econom ic crisis d ro v e d ifferent political sy stem s to ­ w a rd co m m o n responses (as often h a p p e n s in w a r as well). In th e A m erican case, th ey also in d icated a g ain the im p o v e rish ed tra d itio n of g o v e rn m e n ta l ac­ tion, in w h ic h th e m ilitary sto o d o u t as the o ldest, biggest, b est-train ed b u re a u ­ cracy for tak in g large actions, w ith its long record of b u ild in g d am s, co ping w ith n a tu ra l d isasters, m obilizing m en, a n d p ro cessin g p a p erw o rk . T he w a rlik e fren zy of 1932-1933 so o n su b sid e d , b u t som e u ses of w a r as m et­ a p h o r a n d m o d el su sta in ed p o p u la r N e w D eal p ro g ra m s th ro u g h o u t th e 1930s, m o st of all the C ivilian C o n serv atio n C o rp s (CCC). E nlisting th o u sa n d s of u n ­ e m p lo y ed y o u n g m e n (an d o ld er W orld W ar I veterans), "R oosevelt's Tree A rm y " w a g e d w a r o n forest fires, floods, a n d soil erosion. A lth o u g h C o n g ress scaled b ack FD R 's d e sig n for a m ore reg im en te d p ro g ram , m o b ilizatio n of " O u r Forest A rm y a t W ar" u n lea sh e d m em o ries of 1917, a n d th e U n ited States A rm y ra n th e co rp s (reluctantly, w h e n o th er agencies p ro v e d u n e q u a l to th e task). Boys received rig o ro u s physical train in g , lin ed u p for roll call b y p la ­ toons, a n d g o t "d ish o n o rab ly d isc h arg e d " if th ey left th e co rp s early. A d m irers saw in th e CCC v irtu e s lo n g a ttrib u te d to u n iv ersal m ilitary service— a n "A m erican izin g influence" p u llin g b o y s loose from th eir local ties, fam iliariz­ in g th em w ith the n a tio n 's w h o len ess a n d g ra n d e u r, a n d forg in g a sense of n a ­ tio n h o o d o u t of d iv erse ethnic, regional, a n d class id en tities.15 T he C C C a lso fo resh ad o w ed th e m ilita ry 's tro u b le d b u t p io n eerin g role in race relations, for C ongress in clu d ed a n ex tra o rd in a ry b a n o n racial d iscrim in a­ tio n in th e co rp s's o p eratio n . E nforcing th a t b a n w a s a n o th e r m atter. Especially in th e South, b u t n o t only there, a ch o ru s of p ro test, com p lete w ith shrill a larm s a b o u t d a n g e rs to w h ite w o m a n h o o d , arose a g ain st racial in te g ratio n o r th e en ­ c a m p m e n t of blacks nearby. R oosevelt, seein g "political d y n a m ite " in th e issue, d u c k e d it, a n d the CCC n e v e r effectively in te g rate d blacks o r p laced th em o n a n e q u al footing. T hey d id ev en tu ally achieve eq u al rep re se n ta tio n in th e corps, h o w ev er, a n d the C C C 's achievem ents in race relations, exceeding th o se of m o st N e w D eal agencies, w ere a reh earsal for th e tim e w h e n global crisis h itc h ed th e fo rtu n es of A frican-A m ericans to th e a rm e d forces.16 D espite its record in race relatio n s— or, for m in o rities, b ecau se of it— the CC C w a s the m o st p o p u la r N e w D eal agency. N o t th a t A m erican s em b raced it as a train in g g ro u n d for w ar. W h en the a ssistan t secretary of w a r lik en ed th e corps to "econom ic sto rm tro o p s" in 1934, o r its civilian d irecto r b o a sted in 1937 th a t CC C bo y s c o u ld be " tu rn e d into first-class fig h tin g m e n a t alm o st a n in ­ sta n t's notice," critics p o u n c e d h a rd , voicing w id e sp re a d fear th a t th e corps co u ld becom e a vehicle for fascistic o r bellicose im p u lses. Its p o p u la rity n o n e-

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theless rem a in e d o v erw h elm in g . T he co rp s w a s celeb rated as a w a y to c h an n el con structively th e explosive p o ten tial of th o u sa n d s of y o u n g m e n a n d to im ­ p a rt d irectio n to a n a tio n b a tte re d b y th e D epression. T h at celeb ratio n c o u ld u n fo ld d e sp ite th e d e c a d e 's in ten se a n tiw a r sp irit b ecau se th e C C C fulfilled a n o ld d ream . It p ro v id e d th e v irtu e s of m ilitary service w ith o u t th e vices of w ar, its attractiv e form s w ith o u t its u g ly substance. A m erican s c o u ld th in k of th eir a rm y as alm o st a social service agency, n o t a n in stru m e n t of w a r.17 T he CCC n o n e th e le ss p re p a re d A m erican s for w a r in w a y s m o stly ig n o red at th e tim e. It m a d e th e a rm e d forces seem essen tial to n a tio n a l vitality. It accus­ to m ed a g e n eratio n of y o u n g m e n to m ilitary service. A n d it g ave th e a rm y p o ­ litical resp ect a n d u sefu l experience in th e logistics of d e alin g w ith larg e n u m ­ b ers of m en. N o t su rp risin g ly , the CCC easily sh ifted fu n ctio n late in th e 1930s, w h e n p o lls sh o w e d o v e rw h elm in g a p p ro v a l for in tro d u c in g fo rm al m ilitary tra in in g into th e CCC. By 1940 "R oosevelt's Tree A rm y " h a d b ecom e a train in g g ro u n d for h is real arm y. T he CCC w a s o n ly a m o re p o in te d illu stra tio n of h o w th e N e w D eal p ro ­ v id e d w h a t R oosevelt w o u ld call "in te rn a l p re p a re d n e ss" for th e co m in g w o rld crisis. Recovery, n o t p re p a re d n e ss, w a s h is p rim a ry objective in 1933, b u t b y 1936, before th re a ts fro m ab ro a d d o m in a te d h is a g en d a , FDR b e g a n p u ttin g a d ifferent tw ist o n th e N e w Deal. "N a tio n a l d efen se a n d th e fu tu re of A m erica w ere in v o lv ed in 1917. N a tio n a l d efense a n d th e fu tu re of A m erica w ere also in v o lv ed in 1933," h e a n n o u n c e d .18 A s h e a n d o th e r N e w D ealers su g g ested , th e N e w D eal se rv ed n a tio n al d e ­ fense in w ay s b ro a d e r a n d m o re p ro fo u n d th a n its specific m ilitary p ro g ram s. It p ro tec te d a n d d e v e lo p e d n a tu ra l resources, fro m riv ers to forests to farm lan d , n e e d e d in w ar. T h ro u g h p ro g ra m s like ru ra l electrification a n d h ig h w a y d ev el­ o p m en t, a n d th ro u g h the a d m in istra tio n 's a d ro it u se of th e m ed ia, it p u lle d local co m m u n ities a n d iso lated A m ericans in to th e n a tio n al g rid of m ed ia sys­ tem s, p ro m o tin g n a tio n al consciousness a n d loyalties. It reo rie n te d c o rp o ra ­ tions, u n io n s, farm g ro u p s, a n d o th er p o w e rfu l in terests to w a rd W ash in g to n a n d accustom ed th e m to th e p o w e r th a t g o v e rn m e n t w o u ld h av e in w artim e. It m o d ern ize d th e p h y sical a n d o rg an izatio n al stru c tu re s of g o v e rn m e n t a t all levels a n d its ability to fu n ctio n decisively in crisis. It sp o n so re d artistic efforts th a t celebrated the n a tio n 's tra d itio n s a n d h e ig h te n e d n a tio n al consciousness. It stre n g th e n ed th e h e a lth a n d m o rale of y o u n g w o rk e rs w h o m ig h t carry w a r's b u rd en s. A bove all, it su sta in e d th e h o p e s of b e le ag u e red A m erican s a n d th eir tru st in g o v ern m en t. M any of these achievem en ts w e re intan g ib le, b u t Roose­ velt, n o in co n sid erab le stu d e n t of w arfare, so o n a p p re cia te d h o w th o se in ta n ­ gibles co n trib u te d to the n a tio n 's stre n g th in w ar. H e d id so v iv id ly in h is Ja n u ary 4,1939, A n n u a l M essage, a t a tim e w h e n th e global crisis w a s m u c h o n h is m in d . " O u r n a tio n 's p ro g ra m of social a n d eco­ nom ic refo rm is therefore a p a rt of defense, as basic as a rm a m e n ts th em selv es," h e a n n o u n ce d , offering illustrations. A lm ost co nflating th e N e w D eal w ith n a-

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tio n al defense, h e g ra n d ly proclaim ed: "N e v er h av e th ere b e e n six y ears of su c h far-flung in te rn a l p re p a re d n e ss in o u r h isto ry ."19 W artim e o b serv ers so o n echoed R oosevelt's them es. T he N e w D eal "sto o d u s in g o o d ste ad w h e n w a r cam e u p o n u s," o n e scholar a rg u e d , for " o u r A m eri­ can cities faced the call to w a r w ith g reater un ity , h ealth , skills, a n d p ro d u c tiv e p o w er, a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g of w h a t th ey are fig h tin g for a n d ag ain st, th a n co u ld p o ssib ly h a v e b e e n tru e o th erw ise." D ixon W ecter, h isto ria n a n d acute ju d g e of w a rtim e m o o d s, a rg u e d in 1944 " th a t A m erica's y o u n g le a d ersh ip believ ed coolly— as France's, for exam ple, h a d n o t— th a t th eir c o u n try h e ld so m eth in g v a lu a b le e n o u g h to be p a id for b y d e a th ." W ecter a sk ed " w h e th e r A m erica w o u ld h a v e lo o k ed w o rth d y in g f o r . . . if it h a d b e en th e n a tio n of th e H a rd in g scan d als, th e B onus A rm y, a n d th e so u p kitch en s of M r. H o o v e r's rep u b lic?" N o , h e a n sw e re d firm ly, for th e R oosevelt era " w e n t far to w a rd c u rin g th e cyni­ cism of y o u th g ro w in g u p in th e sh a d o w of m aterialism , d e p ressio n , a n d the b a n k ru p t peace of th e ir fath e rs."20 T h o u g h p a rtisa n a n d co n tested , su c h in ter­ p re ta tio n s of the N e w D eal c a p tu re d a n elem en t of its success a n d th e w a y m a n y A m ericans p erceived it. O th e r d e v elo p m e n ts b esid es th e N e w D eal, n o tab ly th e e ra 's d istin ctiv e n a ­ tionalism , also h e lp e d A m ericans to p re p a re m aterially a n d psychologically for w ar. T he d e c a d e 's d o m in a n t c u ltu ra l a n d intellectu al tre n d s im p a rte d a n acute sense of A m erican h isto ry a n d cu ltu re. P o p u la r n o v els like Gone with the Wind (1936), a m b itio u s projects like th a t a t W illiam sb u rg to reco n stru ct a p h y sical p ast, a n d th e artistic a n d h istorical e n d ea v o rs sp o n so red b y th e N e w D eal b u ilt a n e w consciousness of h isto ry a n d trad itio n . It w a s e v id en t, W arren S u sm an a rg u e d , in th e strik in g p o p u la rity of R u th B enedict's Patterns of Culture (1934) a n d , "fo r th e first tim e, freq u e n t reference to a n 'A m erican W ay of life.' " T his "effort to seek a n d to define A m erica as a c u ltu re" g ain ed en erg y from th e inse­ c u rity th a t th e D ep ressio n b re d a n d th e resu ltin g d esire to fin d a n an ch o r in a co m m o n p a st.21 T he d e v e lo p m e n t of n a tio n w id e m ed ia sy stem s e n h an c ed th is c u ltu ra l selfconsciousness. T he n e w a rt of o p in io n p o llin g sh o w ed A m erican s "th e core of v a lu e s a n d o p in io n s" th a t su p p o se d ly u n ite d them . R adio a n d m o v ies h e lp e d to m ak e for "th e sh a rin g of co m m o n experience, b e th ey of h u n g e r, d u stb o w ls, or w a r." 22 FDR a n d h is N e w D ealers p ro v e d a d e p t at lea d in g th e n e w m ed ia (less so the p rin t m edia) to p ro v id e sym bols of n a tio n al action. In p o p u la r cul­ tu re, these d e v elo p m e n ts w e re v iv id ly d e m o n stra te d o n O ctober 30,1938, in th e w a k e of th e M u n ich crisis, w h e n O rso n W elles's ra d io d ra m a tiz a tio n of H . G. W ells's The War of the Worlds trig g ered a n in fam o u s p an ic am o n g listeners co n v inced a M a rtia n in v asio n w a s actually tak in g place. T h o u g h a distinctive n a tio n alism resu lte d from these d ev elo p m en ts, it d ic­ ta te d n o one political stance. In stead , C harles A lex an d er arg u es, it c o u ld em ­ b race "in te rn atio n alism a n d isolationism , socialism a n d co n serv atism , n o t to m en tio n radicalism , liberalism , a n d e v en fascism ." A s S u sm an notes, "It w a s

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n o t. . .sim p ly th a t m a n y w rite rs a n d a rtists a n d critics b e g a n to sin g g lo w in g ly of A m erican life a n d its p a s t" — alth o u g h , significantly, th ey d id . M ore im p o r­ ta n t w a s a n acute th o u g h h a rd ly u n ifo rm sense of th e tra d itio n s a n d a ttitu d e s th a t p re su m a b ly u n ite d A m erican s— of n a tio n h o o d itself. T he c o n test o v er h o w to define n a tio n h o o d w a s sh a rp a n d u n reso lv ed , b u t th e c o n test itself d e ­ fin ed th e e ra 's n atio n alism m ore th a n p a rtic u la r stances taken. Its im p o rt lay n o t in m ak in g A m ericans m ore bellicose b u t in g iv in g th em a k een er sen se of w h a t th ey m ig h t d efe n d in w ar. It th u s m irro re d th e N e w D eal's ach iev em en ts in " in te rn a l p re p a re d n e ss." 23 T hose achievem ents in in tern al p re p a re d n e ss, a n d in d e e d th e cleverness of th e p h ra se itself, m a rk e d a final w a y in w h ic h R oosevelt b o rro w e d fro m th e aren a of w a r to confer legitim acy o n the sta te 's role a t hom e. Ju st b ecau se FDR w a s successful a t su c h b o rro w in g d id n o t, h o w ev er, g u a ra n te e h im control o v er th e n a tio n 's foreign a n d m ilitary policy. E xploiting w a r's m o d els a n d m et­ a p h o rs w a s one thing. C h a rtin g a p a th for th e n a tio n in a g ro w in g w o rld crisis w a s so m e th in g else. In th a t effort, FDR w a s m o re cau tio u s th a n h e w a s in fash ­ io n in g p ro g ram s of econom ic o rd e r a n d recovery. A n d for go o d reason. For one th in g , th e in te rn atio n al a ren a w a s far less p re ­ d ictable a n d controllable b y h im th a n the dom estic. For an o th er, h e w a s less su re a b o u t w h a t to d o abroad. Ja p a n 's ex p an sio n in C h in a, M u sso lin i's fascism . H itle r's rea rm am en t, th e sta g n a n t in te rn atio n al eco n o m y — su c h th re a ts to global stability FDR u n d e rs to o d fairly w ell, b u t far less so h o w to d e al w ith them . M oreover, th e forceful exercise of foreig n a n d m ilitary policy, w h a te v e r its co n tent, co u ld a g g ra v ate fears of sta te p o w e r a n d a d ictato rial p resid en c y a lre ad y h a rb o re d b y his o p p o n en ts. A lth o u g h these factors co m p elled caution, o th ers g ave FDR elb o w room . W ith th e line b e tw e e n dom estic a n d foreign p olicy m o re b lu rre d th a n ever, ac­ tio n in one sp h e re co u ld spill o v e r in to th e other, as u sin g re a rm a m e n t as a re­ covery m easu re alre ad y h a d show n. C onstitu tio n ally , th e p re sid e n t h a d a freer h a n d vis-à-vis C ongress a n d the c o u rts in fo reig n a n d m ilita ry affairs th a n in dom estic policy. Finally, m a n y A m ericans w ere g e n u in e ly a la rm e d a b o u t the w o rld crisis, if d iv id e d a b o u t h o w to d eal w ith it. If ex tern al th rea ts w ere p e r­ ceived to be sufficiently m enacing, m an y A m erican s w e re p re p a re d to reg a rd th e sta te 's action ab ro ad as com pelling. T hey w ere h a rd ly p re p a re d to d o so a t m id -d e ca d e, ho w ev er. M em ories of W orld W ar I w ere a m ajor reason. P articip atio n in th a t w a r w a s v iew ed su s­ picio u sly b y m a n y A m ericans a n d w a r itself w a s b itin g ly p o rtra y e d in p o p u la r cu ltu re, as in the A cadem y A w a rd -w in n in g All Quiet on the Western Front (1930), th e b est of a n e w g enre of a n tiw a r film s. A lread y v iew ed u n e asily in the 1920s, W orld W ar I only seem ed m ore tragic in th e 1930s, since th e econom ic d isru p tio n it h a d u n lea sh e d a n d the b u rd e n of d e b t it h a d left b e h in d w ere of­ ten seen as causes of the G reat D epression. The backlash a g ain st p a rticip a tio n in the w ar, in clu d in g a k een sense th a t th e

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n a tio n h a d b e e n sn o o k ered into it, clim axed a t m id -d e ca d e w ith a congres­ sional in q u iry h e a d e d b y Sen. G erald N ye. S en satio n ally c o n d u cted , sen sa­ tio n ally co vered b y th e m ed ia, sen satio n ally ech o ed in bestsellers like The Mer­ chants of Death, th a t in q u iry b u ilt o n a d e c a d e 's d e b ate a b o u t th e causes of th e w ar, a n d o n su sp icio n s of co rp o rate a n d m ilitary p o w e r lo n g felt b y p o p u lists, a n tib u sin ess progressives, socialists, a n d v a rio u s radicals. N y e 's co m m ittee fo u n d collusion o n a n a tio n al a n d in te rn atio n al scale am o n g financiers, arm s m ak ers, a n d g o v e rn m e n t officials. T he com m ittee g ra sp e d h o w th a t collusion arose o u t of th e com plex d e m a n d s of m o d e m w a r a n d m o d e m capitalism , b u t c o n d e m n e d h o w it h a d p u lle d the U n ited States in to w a r in 1917 a n d feared h o w it m ig h t d o so again. It also w a rn e d th a t e v en in p eacetim e su c h collusion fu rth e re d th é c o n cen tratio n of co rp o rate a n d g o v e rn m e n ta l p o w e r a n d th e reg ­ im e n ta tio n of A m erican lives. T he N y e com m ittee criticized the p a s t m ore effectively th a n it sh a p e d th e fu ­ ture. It w a s p a rtly responsible for th e series of n e u tra lity law s p a sse d b y C o n ­ gress b e g in n in g in 1935 a n d d e sig n ed to p ro h ib it th e econom ic en tan g lem en ts th a t m ig h t suck the n a tio n in to a n o th e r w ar, b u t its o th er p ro p o sa ls— to n a tio n ­ alize m u n itio n s in d u strie s a n d cu rb w a r p ro fite erin g — w ere n e v er serio u sly re­ alized. T he issues it raised w ere d e e m e d p e rip h e ra l to d e b ate o v er fo reig n p o l­ icy a t th e d e c a d e 's close a n d rem a in e d p e rip h e ra l u n til resu rrec te d in th e 1960s. C o n tro v ersy ov er th e in stitu tio n al u n d e rp in n in g s of m ilitarizatio n , it m ig h t b e said , th u s flared u p a n d th e n d ie d o u t in th e m id-1930s, ju st w h e n m ilitarizatio n w a s g ain in g m o m e n tu m , a n d th e N y e co m m ittee itself b ecam e th e object of snickers from so p h isticated q u a rte rs th a t rid ic u le d its sen satio n alism w h ile o v erlo o k in g its substance. Still, th e c o m m ittee 's d elib eratio n s w ere a reliable b a ro m e te r of p e rsistin g re­ v u lsio n a g ain st the last w a r a n d a m o u n tin g a n tiw a r sp irit. H isto rian s p ro v id e d a n o th e r m ea su re of th a t revulsion. In 1935, jo u rn alist-h isto rian W alter M illis offered Road to War: America, 1914-17, a d a m n in g bestseller. A m o n g p ro fes­ sional h isto rian s, a sh a rp co n test a b o u t th e orig in s of W orld W ar I h a d clim axed in th e 1920s, b u t th ey fo u n d a su rro g a te for it d u rin g th e 1930s w h e n th ey re­ h a sh e d th e causes a n d consequences of th e C ivil W ar, n o w lab eled th e "n e e d ­ less w a r," th e " w o rk of politicians a n d p io u s cran k s," th e p ro d u c t of a "b lu n ­ d e rin g g en eratio n ," a n d "th e gh astly scourg e."24 M an y college stu d e n ts sh a red th eir m o o d , a n d o n ly th e 1960s w o u ld see co m p arab le stu d e n t a n tiw a r activism . S tu d e n ts rallied a g ain st co n scrip tio n a n d w ar, e v en th o u g h th e U n ited States w as e n g ag e d in n e ith e r a t m id-d ecad e. O n som e cam p u ses, th ey succeeded in e n d in g req u ire m e n ts (still in force at m an y state schools) th a t m ale stu d e n ts take reserv e officer train in g . T hey also attack ed collegiate sp o rts for inculcating w arlik e a ttitu d e s a n d w ith d e a d ly h u m o r created m ock o rg an izatio n s like th e V eterans of F u tu re W ars, F uture C h ap lain s of F uture W ars, a n d F uture W ar P rofiteers.25 A n tiw a r stu d e n ts w ere p a rt of a q u arrelso m e alliance of o u trig h t pacifists.

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activists from le a d in g P ro te stan t d o m in a tio n s a n d from th e n a tio n al YM CA a n d YW CA, w o m e n 's g ro u p s, co m m u n ists a n d socialists a n d lab o r o rg an izers, a n d co nservatives fearful of the p o w e r th a t w a r w o u ld give R oosevelt a n d the D em ocrats. T h at alliance h a d n o stable ideological core, o n ly a n in ten se a n tiw a r spirit. It em braced som e p e o p le in d ig n a n t a b o u t th e h o rro rs of S talinist R ussia a n d o th ers m ore fearful of fascism , in clu d in g som e w h o jo in ed th e fig h t a g a in st it w h e n th e S p an ish C ivil W ar (1936-1939) p itte d F ranco's rebels, su p p o rte d b y N azi G erm an y a n d fascist Italy, a g ain st S p ain 's c o n stitu tio n al g o v ern m en t. It em b raced o th ers still searching for w a y s to u se th e L eague of N a tio n s o r p riv a te p h ila n th ro p ic o rg an izatio n s to m ak e peace p revail. But th is m o tley alliance w a s n o t far fro m th e m ain strea m of A m erican op in io n , w h ich , as p o llsters sh o w ed , o v e rw h elm in g ly re p u d ia te d e n try in to th e last w ar. N o less resp ectab le a figure th a n K ansas p u b lish er W illiam A llen W hite b e w ailed th e w a ste a n d fu tility of th e G reat W ar, w ritin g in 1933 th a t "th e b o y s w h o d ie d ju st w e n t o u t a n d d ied . To th eir o w n so u ls' g lory of co u rse,— b u t w h a t else? . . . Yet th e n e x t w a r w ill see th e sam e h u rra h a n d th e sam e b o w w o w of th e b ig d o g s to g et th e little d o g s to go o u t a n d follow the b lo o d scent a n d g e t th e ir e n trails ta n g le d in th e b a rb e d w ire."26 V iew s like W hite's, th o u g h h a rd ly u n iv ersal, w e re w id e sp re a d , e v en fashionable. T hose v iew s g e n erate d m u c h of th e s u p p o rt for a far-reaching ch allen g e to p resid en tia l po w er, a p ro p o se d c o n stitu tio n al a m e n d m e n t e m p o w e rin g C o n ­ gress, except in th e case of d irect attack a n d a few o th e r ev en tu alities, to call a p o p u la r refe ren d u m to d ecid e w h e th e r the n a tio n w o u ld d eclare o r e n g ag e in w ar. T he a m e n d m e n t n a rro w ly failed a key test in th e H o u se in 1938 after stre n ­ u o u s lobbying a g ain st it b y the a d m in istratio n , a n d its p ro p o n e n ts w ere d is­ m issed th ereafter as n a rro w -m in d e d pacifists a n d isolationists, p e o p le w ith "n o co nception of w h a t m o d e m w a r . . . involves," as R oosevelt p riv a te ly p u t it. T he charge w a s inaccurate. T he a m e n d m e n t d re w su p p o rt from d iv erse sources, in clu d in g a rd e n t in tern atio n alists a n d p re p a re d n e ss ad v o cates, all u n ite d b y a d e te rm in a tio n to d em o cratize w a r-m a k in g policy. T h at d e te rm in a ­ tio n d id n o t d isa p p e a r after 1938, b u t n o su c h b ro a d challenge to p resid en tia l p o w e r w o u ld re a p p e a r u n til the 1960s. A s w ith th e N y e co m m ittee's failure, th e a m e n d m e n t's d efeat m a rk e d th e crest of resistance to a co u rse o n ly sta rtin g to accelerate.27 The m o v em en t for the a m e n d m e n t also ex p o sed th e role of w o m e n a n d g e n ­ d e r in w a r a n d foreign policy. Its chief spo n so r, In d ian a D em o crat L ouis L udlow , h a d long c h am p io n e d w o m e n 's rig h ts a n d a p p e a le d for su p p o rt from w o m e n 's g ro u p s. O verw helm ingly, th ey p ro v id e d it, b u t th ey offered little d is­ tinctive fem inist rhetoric in p ressin g for th e a m e n d m e n t o r for o th e r p la n k s in th e peace m o v em en t's p latform . M an y w o m e n 's o rg an izatio n s felt forced to d e ­ v o te en erg y to th eir lo n g stan d in g in terest in social w elfare, n o w h e ig h te n e d b y the D epression. Fem ale professionals, like th e jo u rn alist D o ro th y T h o m p so n a n d Nation p u b lish er Freda K irchw ey, p la y e d a g ro w in g role as in d iv id u a ls in

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m ed ia d e b ate a n d in th e N e w D eal bureaucracy, b u t th e m o st visible w o m e n in p o litics— Secretary of L abor Frances P erkins a n d E leanor R oosevelt— b o th sy m p a th iz e d w ith th e P re sid e n t's o u tlook a n d w e re c o n strain ed fro m ch allen g ­ in g it. C u ltu ra l im ag es com plicated w o m e n 's efforts to a d d re ss issu es of w a r a n d peace. T he G reat W ar, w ith its m ass carn ag e a m o n g m e n p itte d a g ain st its lib eratin g effects for m a n y w o m en , h a d left a n u g ly im p licatio n in A ngloA m erican c u ltu re th a t w o m e n w ere w a r's beneficiaries a n d m e n its victim s; a P u litze r P riz e -w in n in g 1937 cartoon, for exam ple, d e p ic te d w a r as a "syphilitic w h o re " te m p tin g m e n to th eir d re a d fate (see fig.1]!).28 M o d e m w a rfare w as c h an g in g w o m e n 's place in politics a n d cu ltu re, b u t in c h arg ed w a y s th a t m ad e w o m e n 's voices b o th concerned a n d cautious. T h ro u g h all th e d e b ates o n w a r a n d foreig n policy, a k in d of "iso latio n ism " d id p ersist. In 1944, B ritish c o m m en ta to r D. W. B rogan rem em b ered St. L ouis o n th e eve of the w a r as "th e calm , d e a d cen ter of a to rn a d o w h o se o u te r b o u n d ­ aries w ere too far aw ay for c o m p re h en sio n o r ap p re h en sio n ." T he n a tio n 's lo­ calism s h u c k him . "T he U n ited States is n o t a n d w ill n o t b e a v a st M etro lan d ." B rogan recalled the m o o d sy m pathetically: "It to o k th e actu al sh a d o w [of w ar], re p e a te d a g ain a n d again, to a w ak e n S om erset [E ngland]; Illinois h a d to a w a k e n w ith far less h e lp from th e eye a n d ear." But th e iso latio n ism h e d e ­ scrib ed w a s m ore a m o o d th a n a political p ositio n , a lin g erin g , d e sp e ra te sen se of in su larity from th e w o rld 's ills. Its stra in of "b ellig eren t n a tio n alism " d id th re a te n FD R 's d e sig n s for collective security, b u t iso latio n ism d ic ta te d few p o ­ sitio n s o n o th er issues, like rea rm am en t.29 M ore telling w a s h o w A m ericans co n sid ered th e fu tu re of w a rfare a n d th eir n a tio n 's role in it. For th e m o st p a rt in the 1930s, th ey im a g in ed a b e n ig n A m eri­ can a rm e d force in a m alig n w o rld of m ilitarism a n d technological change. Jap­ an ese forces w a rre d in C hina a n d Italian s in E thiopia, a n d G e rm a n re a rm a m e n t w a s o ste n ta tio u sly d isp la y e d to th e w o rld . L u rid tales, g iv en credence e v en b y so b er co m m en tato rs, circulated in science fiction, p u lp literatu re, a n d th e p o p ­ u la r p ress a b o u t fu tu re w a rs in itiated su d d e n ly b y air attack w ith gas, bio lo g ­ ical, incendiary, o r atom ic w e ap o n s, d ecim atin g n a tio n s o r civ ilization itself in h o u rs. T hese fantasies of technological ap o caly p se m a d e a n o th e r w a r seem lo ath so m e b u t also im p lied th a t w a r h a d becom e too h o rrib le to occur, o r th a t A m erican technological su p e rio rity m ig h t prevail. A g ain st a b ack d ro p of ag g ressio n ab ro a d a n d fan tasy u n ch eck ed , A m erica's a rm e d forces seem ed m o d est, e v en stodgy, g eared to d efen se a n d u n lik ely to w a g e m ajor w ar. The a rm y w a s sm all. T he n a v y w a s p o w e rfu l— alarm in g ly so to critics— b u t its m issio n rem ain ed defensive. T he A rm y A ir C o rp s w a s d e v el­ o p in g n e w bom bers, b u t backers of air p o w e r p o rtra y e d th em as d efen siv e w e a p o n s d e sig n e d to b last a n y forces crossing th e oceans to in v a d e A m erica. W h en A m erican B-17s in tercep ted a n Italian lin er in th e A tlantic in a train in g exercise g iv en live ra d io coverage, n e w sp a p e rs c a p tu re d th e d efen siv e p a ra ­ digm : "FLYING FORTS, 630 MILES OUT, SPOT ENEM Y TRO O P SH IPS."30 In

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a n y event, th e A ir C o rp s's u g ly stru g g le for in d ep e n d en c e fro m th e a rm y g ain ed m ore a tten tio n th a n its capabilities in w arfare. M ean w h ile, u se of A m er­ ican m ilitary p o w e r in C en tral A m erica a n d th e C arib b ean w a s d eclining, a n d its co m m itm en t to d e fe n d in g th e P h ilip p in es w a s in d o u b t. A ll in all, A m erican m ilitary p o w e r in the m id-1930s seem ed lim ited in size a n d m ission, its p o te n ­ tial reach o b scu red b y th e p a ra d ig m of defense, b y th e sm o k e g e n erate d in in ­ terservice rivalries, a n d b y u n flatte rin g co m p ariso n s to m ore fo rm id ab le p o w ers. In su ch circum stances, th e fo u n d a tio n s for global A m erican m ilitary p o w e r co u ld b e stre n g th e n ed w ith o u t attractin g m u c h atten tio n . T h o u g h k e en to e n ­ large th a t po w er, m ilitary officers n e ith e r foresaw a n o th e r w o rld w a r n o r w a n te d to e n te r it; th ey p re se n te d re a rm a m e n t in m o d e st term s, as a defen siv e m easu re. The gains in A m erican m ilitary po w er, in stea d of in v o lv in g g ross in ­ creases in a rm a m e n ts a n d p erso n n el, w ere g en erally su b tle, low -key, o r o u t of p u b lic view . T he m ilita ry 's train in g a n d strategic p la n n in g becam e m o re so­ p h isticated , as d id its linkages w ith civilian au th o rity , p riv a te in d u stry , a n d sci­ ence. Technological d e v e lo p m e n t p ro ce ed e d all th e m o re easily in a field like aviation, w h e re key a d v an ces d re w o n o r b en efited a civilian tra n s p o rt in d u s­ try th a t seem ed to e p ito m ize peaceful progress. K een to g u a rd a g ain st a rep e ti­ tio n of 1917, politicians a n d jo u rn alists focused o n n e u tra lity leg islatio n a n d w a rn e d a g ain st a m ass g ro u n d arm y, b u t often o v erlo o k ed th e su b tler d e v elo p ­ m en ts o r sim p ly fo u n d th em n o t th rea te n in g to th e v a g u e p rem ises of isola­ tionism . A t least u n til 1937, R oosevelt offered n o sig n s th a t A m erican m ilitary p o w e r w o u ld b e u se d ab ro a d in a m ajor w ar, for h e h a d n o in te n tio n th a t it sh o u ld be, or p ressin g n e e d to ch an g e course. M u ch of W ash in g to n 's a tte n tio n w e n t to m atters of econom ic d ip lo m acy ra th e r th a n to p ro b lem s of w a r a n d strategy. T he in ten tio n s of p o ten tial enem ies rem a in e d m u rk y , th o u g h h a rd ly co m fo rt­ ing, a n d the ability of old-line p o w e rs like France a n d B ritain to resist su c h en e­ m ies still seem ed substantial. By 1937, FDR so u g h t to e x p a n d th e n a v y a n d to o k m o d e st step s to explore h o w G erm an, Italian, a n d Jap an ese a d v an ces m ig h t b e resisted, b u t n o sense of im p e n d in g crisis g rip p e d h im a n d n o forceful lea d er­ sh ip ensued. T he w a n in g m o n th s of 1937 a n d the o p e n in g ones of 1938 saw a sh ift b o th at h o m e a n d abroad. R oosevelt's ill-fated a tte m p t to "p ack " th e S u p rem e C o u rt b y en larg in g its m em bership, strikes led b y n e w in d u stria l u n io n s, a n d a sh a rp recession set off b y cutbacks in g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g in ten sified th e clash of econom ic interests, stra in e d the N e w D eal coalition, a n d e ro d e d FD R 's p re s­ tige. "M id d leto w n " (M u n d e , In d ian a) h a d earlier g reeted fed eral aid like "m a n n a d irect from heav en ," b u t b y 1936 it d isp la y e d "a m o o d of an x io u s re­ se n tm e n t to w a rd those o n relief," a n d to w a rd fed eral p o w e r as w ell.31 A b ro ad , Japan a n d C hina ren ew ed full-scale w a r in th e su m m e r of 1937 a n d G e rm a n y g o b bled u p A u stria the follow ing spring.

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A m id this "sea of tro u b les" for R oosevelt, issues o th erw ise of se co n d ary im ­ p o rtan c e b ecam e flash p o in ts at th e ju n ctu re of foreign a n d dom estic policy. FD R 's req u e st of C ongress for p o w e r to reorg an ize executive agencies, com ing after th e C o u rt-p ack in g ep iso d e a n d ju st w h e n H itler seized A u stria, u n lea sh e d w ild charges (from conservative R oosevelt-haters am o n g oth ers) of d ictato r­ ship, allegations th a t "intensified w o rry th a t R oosevelt w a s im p o rtin g E u­ ro p e a n to talitarian ism into the U n ited States." A t th e sam e tim e, rig h t-w in g co n g ressm en shrilly d e n o u n c e d the N e w D eal as a tool of th e c o m m u n ist m e n ­ ace a n d a trea su ry for fu n d in g it.32 FDR w a s in tro u b le a t h o m e ju st as tro u b le escalated ab ro ad , th e tw in crises m erg in g in political rhetoric w h e n o p p o n e n ts a p p lie d m o d els of to talitarian ism to R oosevelt a n d the N e w Deal. T here w a s a logic to these co n n ected crises, a n d in d e e d to the w h o le course of th e N e w D eal a n d th e D epression. Seen as a k in d of w a r a n d m o d eled o n efforts to w ag e the last w ar, th e N e w D eal stru g g le a g ain st th e D ep ressio n could logically b le n d in to p re p a ra tio n s to w a g e w ar. Ju st w h ere, after all, d id one " w a r" e n d a n d th e n ex t begin? G ain in g legitim acy th ro u g h the m e ta p h o rs a n d m o d els of w ar, th e state m ig h t g a in fuller legit­ im acy th ro u g h w a r itself o r th ro u g h p re p a ra tio n s to w a g e it. R oosevelt su rely d id n o t foresee su ch a tran sitio n , only m u d d lin g h is w a y th ro u g h it. H e su rely w a s n o t eag er to e x p an d the n a tio n 's defenses, th e effort to d o so carry in g p o lit­ ical risks. Ju st as surely, h ow ever, his n o tio n of th e N e w D eal as "in te rn al p re ­ p a re d n e ss" n e atly stra d d le d a n d conflated th e tw o sp h e res of n atio n al action.

The Construction of National Security A lth o u g h p la y e d o u t in E urope, the M u n ich crisis of S ep tem b er 1938 m a rk e d a tu rn in g p o in t for the U n ited States as w ell. H itle r's d e m a n d for C zechoslova­ k ia's S u d e ten lan d , a n d his th re a t to go to w a r to g et it, sh o o k E u ro p e's capitals, as p an ick ed g o v e rn m e n ts gave gas m ask s to th eir citizens a n d d e sp e ra te e n ­ vo y s d a rte d a b o u t try in g to a v ert w o rld w ar. B ritish a n d F rench lead ers felt th ey h a d a w e ak h a n d : th eir re a rm a m e n t w a s in d isarray , th eir frien d across the A tlantic seem ed d isen g ag ed , th eir o th er possible ally (the Soviet U nion) scared them , th eir em p ires taxed th eir stren g th , th eir citizens d re a d e d w ar. A bove all, th ey feared attack b y the G e rm a n L uftw affe o n th eir cities. "We cannot expose ourselves now to a German attack," one E nglish g en eral insisted. "We simply com­ mit suicide if we do." B ritish p rim e m in ister N eville C h am b erlain reso lv ed th e crisis b y g iv in g H itler the S u d eten lan d , a lth o u g h H itler, y e arn in g for m ilitary conquest, w a s d isa p p o in te d th a t G erm an s seem ed su llen a t th e p ro sp e ct of w ar. For h is p a rt, C h am b erlain to o k p rid e in g ain in g tim e for B ritish rea rm a ­ m ent. The evils of "a p p e a se m e n t" d ru m m e d in to later g en eratio n s as the lesson of M u nich w ere n o t im m ed iately a p p a re n t.33 R egardless, R oosevelt to o k in stru ctio n from G e rm a n victory. Secretive, som etim es m isinform ed, often v a g u e o r fatu o u s, a n d b u ffeted b y fast-changing

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cu rren ts, h e n o n eth eless saw h im self as fash io n in g a h a rd -h e a d e d v iew of th e w o rld a n d th e role of p o w e r in it. For h im , co n v en tio n al in d ices of m ilita ry stre n g th m a tte re d little— b y th a t sta n d a rd , B ritain a n d France m ig h t h a v e p re ­ v ailed in the M u n ich crisis. W h at m a tte re d m o re w a s H itle r's a d ro it m ix of v er­ b al in tim id atio n , p ro p a g a n d a , a n d th rea ts to u n le a sh h is air p o w er, all b ra n ­ d ish e d in a w o rld w h e re in sta n t c o m m u n icatio n s a n d d e a d ly technologies in ten sified b o th real d a n g e rs a n d p ercep tio n s of th em . A s FDR saw it, th ese n e w form s of p o w e r h e ig h te n e d th e p e ril to A m erica b u t also, th o u g h h e said less a b o u t it publicly, th e p o ssib ility for exercising A m erican p o w e r— if h e co u ld b e a t H itle r a t his o w n gam e. FDR w a n te d the tools of th a t pow er. In th e p ith y su m m a ry of M u n ich offered b y o n e of h is a m b a ssad o rs, "If y o u h av e e n o u g h a irp lan e s y o u d o n 't h av e to go to B erchtesgaden" (w h ere C h a m b e rla in p re su m a b ly cav ed in to th e L uftw affe's threat). Because of th eir p o w e r to in tim id a te a n d destroy, b o m b ers seem ed to R oosevelt the tru m p card in th e n e w gam e. " H a d w e h a d th is su m m e r 5,000 p lan e s a n d th e capacity im m ed iately to p ro d u c e 10,000 p e r y ear," FDR to ld h is a d v iso rs in N ovem ber, "H itle r w o u ld n o t h a v e d a re d to tak e th e sta n d h e d id ." G u n s a n d barrack s " w o u ld n o t scare H itle r o n e b lan k ety -b lan k -b lan k bit!" o n e g en eral p a ra p h ra s e d R oosevelt. "W h a t h e w a n te d w a s airp lan es!" H is a t­ te m p ts to get th em w ere slo w ed b y a co n serv ativ e m ilitary b u rea u cra cy a n d b y su sp icio n s th a t h is p la n to sell aircraft to B ritain a n d France w o u ld en sn are A m erican fo rtu n es w ith th o se of w eak -w illed , d u p lic ito u s allies (w h o se ste a d ­ fastn ess R oosevelt also d o u b ted ). M o d est b y later sta n d a rd s, th e aircraft h e so u g h t w ere too few a n d cam e too late to c arry off a n y M u n ich in rev erse o r to p ro v id e m u ch h e lp to allies. N onetheless, h e h a d tak e n a m o m e n to u s tu rn b y p ro m o tin g the n e w est m ilitary technologies, b y m ak in g n a tio n a l secu rity h is p rim a ry concern, a n d b y a d v an c in g a n e w co n cep tio n of it.34 F ond of p lay in g sch o o lm aster to th e n atio n , R oosevelt p re se n te d th a t con­ c ep tio n w ith vigor. In A u g u s t 1938, h e h a d w a rn e d th a t "w e in th e A m ericas h av e becom e a co n sid eratio n to ev ery p ro p a g a n d a office a n d to ev ery g en eral staff b e y o n d th e seas."35 By January, h e w a s u n fo ld in g h is n e w c o n cep tio n in d e p th a n d detail: the U n ited States n o w resid ed in a seam less w o rld of com ­ m erce, com m unication, ideology, a n d technology, all of w h ic h w ere tea rin g d o w n the b a rrie rs th a t once h a d in su la te d A m erica. A s alw ays, R oosevelt's p u rp o se s w ere m u ltip le — to challenge th e n e u tra lity law s, justify rearm am en t, a n d ou tlin e th e evils of p o ten tial enem ies a n d th e th rea t to A m erica of th eir econom ic n atio n alism . But as h e saw it, th e p e ril w a s less econom ic o r ideological th a n technological a n d strategic. A s h e said o n Jan­ u a ry 4,1939, "T he w o rld h a s g ro w n so sm all a n d w e a p o n s of a ttack so sw ift" th a t peace h a s becom e indivisible, w a r u n co n tain ab le, a n d "ev e n ts of th u n ­ d e ro u s im p o rt h av e m o v ed w ith lig h tn in g sp e ed ." T echnological change, e sp e­ cially in aviation, h a d so sh ru n k space th a t e v en d ista n t en em ies co u ld th re a te n A m erica. Ju st as im p o rtan t, it h a d sh ru n k tim e, so th a t "su rv iv al c an n o t b e

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g u a ra n te e d b y a rm in g after th e attack b e g in s /' n o t w h e n "th e h o u r-g lass m ay b e in th e h a n d s of o th er n a tio n s."36 A lth o u g h technological a n d strategic p e ril lay a t th e h e a rt of R oosevelt's n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security, h e d id n o t red u c e it to a m ere m a tte r of w e a p ­ onry. M agnifying the th re a t w ere d ictato rsh ip s w h ic h "co m m an d th e full stre n g th of a reg im en te d n a tio n ," c o n scrip t th e m a n y resources n e e d e d for to tal w ar, a n d w ie ld n e w tech n iq u es of psycholo g ical a n d econom ic in tim id atio n . C o n sequently, A m erican secu rity rested o n all co n stitu en ts of n a tio n al p o w er, n o t o n ly o n m ilitary force, a n d especially o n th e u n ity a n d m o rale of th e A m eri­ can p e o p le — hence his freq u e n t if futile inju n ctio n s to th e n a tio n 's n e w sp a p e rs to re p o rt o n ly the tru th (as h e saw it) a n d his recastin g of th e N e w D eal as "six y ears of su c h far-flung in te rn al p rep a red n e ss. " In d ee d , h is Ja n u ary 4 a d d re ss so w o v e to g e th e r h is dom estic a n d n a tio n al secu rity policies th a t th ey em erg ed as a lm o st in d istin g u ish ab le.37 M an y co n tem p o raries su sp ec ted th a t R oosevelt w a s p u rs u in g re a rm a m e n t in o rd e r to revive th e sag g in g fo rtu n es of the econom y, h is presid en cy , a n d th e N e w D eal. Privately, h e som etim es gave th a t im p ressio n . Foreign o rd ers for A m erican a irp lan es "m e a n p ro sp e rity in th e c o u n try a n d w e c a n 't elect a D em ­ ocratic P a rty u n less w e g et p ro sp erity ." E ven p u b licly h e p o in te d o u t th a t su c h o rd e rs "ca n give e m p lo y m en t to th o u sa n d s." 38 B ut R oosevelt p o o rly u n d e r­ sto o d th e econom ic stim u lu s of g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g a n d h a d n o t g iv en u p o n a d v a n c in g the N e w D eal further. W hile a m b itio n s for A m erican econom ic re­ co v ery a n d h eg em o n y d id sh a p e h is th in k in g (decisively so for th o se h isto ria n s w h o see h is co u rse largely as a m ean s to th e e n d of th a t h eg em o n y ),39 FDR h a d n e ith e r th e tem p e ra m e n t n o r the circum stan ces to so rt o u t m ean s a n d e n d s so neatly. W h atev er h is lo n g -term goals, th e strategic crisis of th e late 1930s, in w h ic h econom ic p o w e r lo o m ed m o re as w e a p o n th a n as goal, seem ed m o re im m ed iate, a n d it d e e p ly fascinated a n d w o rrie d R oosevelt. H e likely saw eco­ no m ic b en efits as only a b o n u s to b e p lu c k e d fro m th e n ecessary evil of rea rm a ­ m en t, a n d in d e e d th a t b o n u s w a s a t first m o d est. D efense sp e n d in g rose 50 p e r­ cen t b e tw e e n fiscal 1936 a n d fiscal 1940, b u t n o t u n til 1940 d id it increase e n o u g h to d riv e th e econom y. O n ly if h e foresaw in 1938 th e far larg er b u d g e ts of 1940-1941— for w h ic h th ere is little ev id en ce— co u ld h e h av e calculated g reat a d v a n ta g e to rearm am en t. C ritics' n a rro w re a d in g of FD R 's in te n tio n s m issed th e d e e p e r logic e m b e d ­ d e d in seeing the N e w D eal as "in te rn a l p re p a re d n e ss." R earm am en t m erely co n firm ed a n d am plified, albeit to g rea t effect, th e ex istin g im p u lse to legiti­ m ate th e sta te 's role a t h o m e b y lin k in g it to th e a ren a of w ar. E ven early in th e d ecad e, som e N e w D ealers h a d foreseen h o w agencies m o d eled o n m o b iliza­ tio n d u rin g th e last w a r co u ld b e reto o led for an o th er; o th e r N e w D ealers later em b raced m o b ilizatio n as a w a y to h e lp m ak e th e N e w D eal p e rm a n en t. W h en the D ep ressio n h a d b e en re n d e re d as a w ar, w a r c o u ld seem alm o st a logical outcom e of the D epression. "T his c o u n try in a sense e m b a rk ed u p o n som e of

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th e co n d itio n s of a w a r econom y w h e n w e first u n d e rto o k to fig h t th e d e p re s­ sion," one ob serv er n o te d in 1941. "N ow , in a v a stly in ten sified fashion, w e face in d u stria l m o b ilizatio n for a g reater w a r." 40 M o b ilizatio n for d efen se w a s less a w h o lly n e w e n te rp rise th a n a c o n tin u atio n of th e earlier stru g g le o n a d ifferen t front, one w ith a n identifiable en em y to replace th e faceless foe of th e D ep res­ sion. FDR co u ld link th e N e w D eal a n d d efen se m o b ilizatio n b ecau se of th a t logic, n o t ju st because of h is silver tongue. C ritics th e n a n d later also ch arg ed th a t FDR foresaw a n d so u g h t A m erica's e n try into a g en eral w ar. FDR, ho w ev er, a lth o u g h ru lin g n o th in g out, in stea d p ro b ab ly a ssu m e d a c o n tin u atio n of th e bluffs, in tim id a tio n , a n d lim ited w a r th a t ch aracterized E u ro p e a t the tim e of M u n ich a n d th e Far E ast u n til Pearl H arb o r. A fter M unich, h e so u g h t to w a g e a w a r of n erv es, n o t of w e ap o n s. "T here are m a n y m e th o d s sh o rt of w ar, b u t stro n g e r a n d m o re effective th a n m ere w o rd s," h e said o n Jan u ary 4,1939, "o f b rin g in g h o m e to ag g resso r gov­ e rn m e n ts th e ag g reg ate se n tim en ts of o u r o w n p eo p le." In M arch, h e lec tu re d rep o rte rs a b o u t A m erica's u n d e c la re d n a v al w a r w ith th e French in th e 1790s. "T his b u sin ess of carry in g o n a w a r w ith o u t d eclarin g a w ar, th a t w e th in k is new , is n o t n ew ." E ven if w a r e ru p te d , h e m u se d d u rin g th e M u n ich crisis. H itle r's en em ies-w o u ld reso rt to " p o u n d in g a w ay a t G e rm a n y from th e air," p e rh a p s w ith A m erican help, a co u rse "m o re likely to su cceed th a n a tra d i­ tio n al w a r b y la n d a n d sea." A fter E u ro p e's w a r b e g a n o n S ep tem b er 1,1939, h e still so u g h t to stre n g th e n B ritain a n d France as w ell as A m erica's d eterren ce a n d in d u stria l capacity. A lth o u g h it slow ly w a n e d , h is h o p e of k eep in g A m er­ ica's role in th e w a r lim ited w a s finally c ru sh e d o n ly b y P earl H arb o r.41 M oreover, R oosevelt's p u b lic statem en ts, th o u g h g e ared to th e im m e d ia te crisis, also im p lied a rev o lu tio n in n a tio n a l secu rity th a t w o u ld o u tla st it. H itle r's ag g ressio n exem plified th rea ts w h ic h FD R saw as ro o ted in lastin g ch an g es in tech n o lo g y a n d strategy, ones th a t strip p e d A m erica of its geo­ g rap h ic isolation a n d m a d e p re p a re d n e ss a p e rm a n e n t task d ra w in g o n all sin ew s of n a tio n al stren g th . W ar a n d defense, o ld er term s for m o re occasional a n d n a rro w ly m ilita ry activities, w ere y ield in g to th e ex p an siv e d e m a n d s of "n atio n al security," a te rm FDR b e g an using. T hose d e m a n d s w ere to becom e p a ra m o u n t a n d p e rm a n en t. It w a s a change th a t R oosevelt d ro v e h o m e a g ain a n d a g a in — o n ly reitera ­ tion, b y o th ers as w ell as FDR, co u ld effect th e c o n stru ctio n of n a tio n al security. G e rm a n y 's in v asio n of P o lan d p ro m p te d his re m in d e r th a t " w h e n peace h as b e e n b ro k e n an y w h ere, th e peace of all c o u n tries e v ery w h e re is in d a n g er." W h en G erm an arm ies rolled into W estern E u ro p e a n d N o rw a y in th e sp rin g of 1940, th e frequency a n d v iv id n e ss of FD R's fo rm u la tio n s increased. H e d ecried h o w "a false teaching of g e o g ra p h y " created th e illu sio n of "so m e form of m y s­ tic [A m erican] im m u n ity th a t could n e v er be v io la te d " — science's "an n ih ila ­ tio n of tim e a n d of space" d e stro y ed th a t illusion. To th e p o in t of ted iu m , h e rattled off th e flight tim es of b o m b ers o v er all so rts of ro u te s— from G re en lan d

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to N o v a Scotia, A frica to B razil— to e m p h asize "th e a m a zin g sp e ed w ith w h ic h m o d e m e q u ip m e n t c an reach a n d attack th e e n em y 's co u n try ." Such changes, h e a rg u e d o n A u g u s t 2, o b literated p arallels to earlier A m erican history: "W e w ere [in 1917] co m p letely free from a n y attack. N ow , th a t w ill n e v e r h a p p e n ag ain in th e h isto ry of th e U n ited S tates." In a w o rld w h e re "n o attack is so u n ­ likely o r im possible th a t it m ay b e ig n o red ," A m erica's secu rity w a s a global affair. It also p re se n te d lim itless d em an d s: "If th e U n ited States is to h a v e a n y defense, it m u s t h a v e to ta l defense. W e can n o t d e fe n d o u rselv es a little h e re a n d a little th ere." C o ld W arriors w o u ld n o t v iew n a tio n al secu rity m o re ex p an ­ sively.42 T h ro u g h o u t 1940, R oosevelt stressed th e n a tu re of m o d e m w a rfare m o re th a n th e evil o f fascism o r th e v irtu e of n a tio n s resistin g it. Issu in g little u p lift­ in g W ilsonian rhetoric, h e in stea d offered a d ru m b e a t a b o u t th e cold realities of th e w o rld . T h at w a s th e case a g ain a t su m m e r's e n d , w h e n C o n g ress en acted th e first p eacetim e draft: w ith o n ly a n o d to th e o ld er lan g u a g e of v o lu n ta rism a n d m ix in g "A m ericans from all w alk s of life," FDR fo cu sed o n th e h a rs h real­ ities th a t p ro m p te d selective service a n d th e com plex, ted io u s, d e m a n d in g tra in in g th a t m e n w o u ld u n d e rg o .43 T he d ru m b e a t c o n tin u e d d u rin g th e b itte r stru g g le b e tw e e n R oosevelt a n d W endell W illkie for th e presidency. D espite FD R 's n o to rio u s v o te-g ettin g p le d g e s— "Y our P re sid e n t says this c o u n try is n o t g o in g to w a r," h e p ro m ised o n N o v em b er 2, 1940— h e c o n tin u ed h is alarm s a b o u t sh rin k in g space a n d tim e, "to ta l d efense," a n d th e like. H e offered h o m ely d etails a b o u t th e com ­ plexities of m o d e m w a r p ro d u ctio n , d e p lo re d "th e fatal e rro rs of a p p e a se ­ m en t," a n d d e fe n d e d th e N e w D eal as a tool of n a tio n a l security. Som e em ­ p h a ses sh ifted in D ecem ber, w h e n h e h a m m e re d h a rd e r o n th e necessities of p ro d u c tio n a n d o p e n ed h is c am p aig n for L end-L ease a id to th e British. But e v en th o u g h telegram s "b eg g e d m e n o t to tell ag ain of th e ease w ith w h ic h o u r A m erican cities could b e b o m b ed ," as h e to ld th e n atio n , h e c o n tin u ed to d o so. S u m m ing u p th e historical changes h e h a d d escrib ed for tw o y ears, o n Ja n u ary 6,1941, h e sta rk ly co n tra sted th e c u rre n t p e ril to a long, earlier era w h e n " in n o case h a d a serio u s th re a t b e e n ra ise d a g ain st o u r n a tio n al safety o r o u r co n tin ­ u e d in d ep e n d en c e."44 O u tlin in g a n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security, R oosevelt p re se n te d it as reactive to b ro a d changes in the in te rn atio n al en v iro n m en t. A n d it p a rtly w as. But h e w a s sh a p in g p e rc ep tio n s as w ell as offering th em , seek in g to m o ld a n ew w o rld as w ell as to p o rtra y it. R arely d id h e m en tio n th a t in th e closed w o rld sy stem h e p o rtra y e d , A m erican in terests h a d b e e n e x p a n d in g o u tw a rd ju st as o th er n a tio n s w ere im p in g in g m ore o n A m erica. R arely d id h e ack n o w led g e th a t th e changes h e n o te d in com m erce a n d tech n o lo g y w ere as m u c h A m er­ ica's d o in g as th a t of o th e r n a tio n s. R arely d id h e su g g est th a t ju st as a n e n em y 's b o m b ers m ig h t so o n reach th e U n ited States, A m erica's b o m b ers m ig h t soon reach the enem y. R arely d id h e n o te th a t n e w in v en tio n s w h ic h ex te n d ed the

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reach of p o ten tial enem ies also p ro v id e d n e w m ean s to c o u n te r them : Facing A n g lo-A m erican n av al a n d a ir p o w e r in th e A tlantic, H itler co u ld on ly e n v y th e ease w ith w h ich B ritish a rm ies h a d reach ed A m erica in 1776. By m ak in g technology cen tral to a n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security, FDR sp o k e to A m erican preferences a n d p rio rities, for it w a s in tech n o lo g y th a t A m ericans excelled a n d perceiv ed m u c h th a t h a d tra n sfo rm e d th eir lives. Since A m ericans h a d p io n ee red so m u c h technology, h o w co u ld it n o t b e th e decisive elem en t of a c h an g in g w o rld ? To su g g e st o th erw ise d im in ish e d th e A m erican ach iev em ent a n d m a d e th e outcom e of th e w o rld stru g g le h in g e o n o th er form s of p o w er, in w h ich th e U n ited States m ig h t n o t excel. R oosevelt d id n o t m erely perceive the im p o rtan ce of tech n o lo g y in m o d e m w arfare, h e seized o n it as fitting the n a tio n 's stren g th s, a n d h e d e e p e n e d th e A m erican im p u lse to achieve global p o w e r th ro u g h technological suprem acy. In sh o rt, h is concep­ tio n of n atio n al security w a s a n ideological con stru ctio n , n o t m erely a p e rc ep ­ tu al reaction. T h at conception also d e riv e d fro m p a rtic u la r anxieties in A m erican cu ltu re. In m an y w ays, R oosevelt a n d o th ers to o k o ld e r v iew s of tech n o lo g y a n d in ­ v e rte d them . In th e 1920s, m a n y A m ericans h a d celeb rated h o w rad io , av iation, a n d o th er devices w ere k n ittin g to g eth er th e n a tio n a n d th e w o rld , lea d in g co u n tries a n d cu ltu res to m ix w ith a n d u n d e rs ta n d each other. In th e 1930s, h o w ev er, technologies once o ften v ie w e d b en ig n ly seem ed in creasin g ly m a ­ lign, a t least w h e n enem ies co n tro lled them . T h at shift w a s e v id e n t in A m erican s' n erv o u sn ess a b o u t tech n o lo g y 's p lace in th eir lives. In film s like F rank C a p ra 's It Happened One Night (1934), th e d o m i­ n a n t ico n o g rap h y alw ay s in v o lv ed tra n sp o rta tio n a n d c o m m u n ica tio n s— the railro ad station, th e W estern U n io n office, th e autom obile, th e p h o n e b o o th , the a irp la n e — a n d characters achieved h a p p in e ss on ly w h e n th ey e scap ed su ch contrivances. Such film s co nveyed u n easin ess a b o u t "th e in ab ility of in d iv id ­ u als to co m m u n icate p riv ately in th e w o rld of su ch aw esom e, c o n stan t, u n iv e r­ sal p u blic co m m u n icatio n s."45 A sim ilar u n easin ess arose a b o u t w a r a n d diplom acy. In its first se rio u s foray in to in tern atio n al n ew scasting, A m erican ra d io co v ered th e M u n ich crisis w ith a startlin g im m ediacy th a t d id n o t d im in ish b e w ild e rm e n t a t w h a t o ccu rred (or p anic w eeks later after the "W ar of th e W orld s" broadcast). R oosevelt's p u b lic statem en ts w ere p e p p e re d w ith references to tech n o lo g y — "th e flood of m ail a n d teleg ram s" h e h a d received, th e d ip lo m a t ju st d isp a tc h e d b y airp lan e, "th e first tra in press conference since G e rm a n y m o v ed in to D en m ark ," th e ra d io b ro ad c ast h e ju st m a d e to th e A m ericas, th e p h o n e call ju st c o m p leted w ith a n im p o rta n t p ersonage, a n d the like. T h o u g h so m etim es m a d e in a celeb rato ry v e in — as if to su g g est h o w the n a tio n 's lea d ers w ere ab reast of th e latest téch n o logy— such references also rev ealed a n a g g in g an x iety th a t tech n o lo g y w as in a d e q u a te for, ev en d a m a g in g to, a n u n d e rs ta n d in g of o n ru sh in g events. (O ne satirical novel featu red a "p h o n o sc o p e" th a t p e rm itte d m o v ieg o ers to

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w a tc h a w a r as it w a s tak in g place.) Ju st as C a p ra 's ch aracters liv ed in a w h irl of tech n o lo g y th a t im p e d e d real p riv a te com m u n icatio n , n a tio n al lea d ers seem ed to o p e ra te in a w h irl of in te rn atio n al contacts (all th e m ed ia e m p h a siz e d th a t C h a m b e rla in flew to G erm any) th a t left th em in d e sp a ir of real p u b lic c o m m u ­ nication. Such anxieties fu rth e r sh a p e d the n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n a l secu­ rity.46 R oosevelt, of course, h a rd ly co n stru cted th a t co n cep tio n sin g leh an d ed ly . O th e rs p a ra lle led his efforts. S urprisingly, h o w ev er, lead ers in g o v e rn m e n t a n d th e a rm e d forces d id n o t often d o so. M an y in th o se circles d id s u p p o rt h is policies, b u t few conceived n a tio n al security so b ro a d ly o r w ith su c h em p h asis o n technology. L eaders of key C ab in et ag en cies— State, W ar, N avy, a n d T reasu ry — te n d e d to sp e ak the o ld er lan g u a g e of p re p a re d n e ss a n d to focus o n th e specific aspects of policy for w h ich th ey w ere responsible. M ilitary officers in p a rtic u la r re sp o n d e d cau tio u sly to FD R 's co n cep tio n of n a tio n a l security. Like him , th ey e m p h a size d s te m n ecessities ra th e r th a n g lam o ro u s possibilities. "T here is n o th in g ro m an tic, d ram atic, o r satisfy in g in m o d e m conflict," G en. G eorge C. M arsh all to ld th e A m erican L egion. "It is all h o rrib le, p ro fo u n d ly d ep ressin g ; a n d n o w it carries w ith it a d re a d fu l th re a t to civil p o p u la tio n s." M ore b lu n tly th a n FDR, M arsh all c o n d em n ed A m erican s' alleg ed indifference to n a tio n a l defense. A ir C o rp s officers, im p re ssed like FDR b y air p o w e r's role in the M u n ich crisis, p o n d e re d its lessons of '" U n w a g e d W ar,' " foresaw "fu tu re 'M u n ic h s,' " a n d m u se d o n h o w a glo b e-g ird lin g A m er­ ican air force c o u ld "sto p th e ag g resso r n a tio n from e v en p la n n in g th e attack, th ro u g h fear of retaliatio n ." M arshall, th e a rm y 's n e w chief of staff in th e su m ­ m er of 1939, also co n sid ered su c h possibilities. B ut h e w o rrie d m o re a b o u t h o w air p o w e r "sta g g ers th e im ag in atio n ," se n satio n alized p u b lic d eb ate, a n d d is­ to rte d the allocation of n a tio n al resources (tem p tatio n s to w h ic h h e felt FDR so m etim es succum bed). T he caution of officers like M arsh all w a s d e ep ly rooted. T hey w ere inclined to v iew w a r 's causes in n a rro w econom ic term s, g iv en to seeing A m erican interests b e y o n d th e h em isp h e re as lim ited , w a ry a b o u t a fickle p u b lic o p in io n a n d its fads, p o sitio n e d still a t th e frin g es of p o w er, a n d co n strain ed from sp e ak in g lo u d ly in public. Skeptical a b o u t h o w m u c h tech n o lo g y w o u ld ch an g e w a rfa re — "W e expect too much of machines," M arsh all to ld th e n a tio n — m o st m ilitary lead ers e m p h a size d th e m less th a n the P resid ent. In all these w ays, th ey follow ed m o re th a n led R oosevelt in th e con­ stru c tio n of n a tio n al security, e v en as th ey lab o red to e d u ca te h im a n d th e p u b ­ lic in its m u n d a n e realities.47 O th e r voices w ere a t least as im p o rtan t. A cad em ician s seek in g a role in for­ e ig n policy b e g a n talk in g a b o u t "n atio n al security." T he te rm w a s n o t new , b u t its earlier m ea n in g h a d b e en n a rro w er, su g g estin g m ilitary p re p a re d n e ss o r (am o n g stru ttin g A m ericanists) d efense a g ain st alien influences w ith in th e n a ­ tion. Scholars n o w u se d the term to refer to th e sh rin k ag e of space a n d tim e a n d the c o n seq u e n t d e m a n d s th a t FDR also su m m o n e d up. Self-conscious "real-



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ists," th ey saw them selves as g ro u n d in g A m erican fo reig n policy in cold calcu­ latio n s of n a tio n al in terest a n d balances of p o w e r ra th e r th a n in m o ral id ealism or political ideology. Less inclined th a n FDR to e m p h a size technological change, th ey fo u n d m ore c o n tin u ity b e tw e e n p a s t a n d c u rre n t d ilem m as in th e n a tio n 's security, b u t th eir o utlook b ro a d ly p a ra lle led R oosevelt's. "R earm a­ m e n t is n o t sufficient," w ro te P rin ceto n 's E d w a rd M ead Earle: all sources of p o w e r m u st be h a rn e ssed to each o th er a n d to effective policy, a n d still w o u ld n o t b e u sefu l "u n less the iro n of d e te rm in a tio n en te rs o u r so u l." A t th e sam e tim e, th ey a g reed w ith R oosevelt th a t total w a r w a s n o t th e on ly option: "T he to ta litaria n states w ag e covert w a r a g ain st th e rest of th e w o rld ," E arle a rg u e d in th e w in te r of 1941, im p ly in g th a t th e U n ited States m ig h t d o likew ise. L argely b a sed a t elite in stitu tio n s in the N o rth ea st, th ey offered a k in d of aca­ dem ic cachet for R oosevelt's outlook, a n d in flu en ced co m m en tato rs like W alter L ip p m a n n w ith a w id e audience.48 T heir o u tlo o k co rre sp o n d e d w ith a b ro a d e r reo rie n ta tio n am o n g A m erican intellectuals, m a n y of w h o m "n o w ren o u n c ed pacifism w ith th e sam e ferv o r w ith w h ich th ey h a d p rev io u sly d e n o u n c e d w a r." Intellectu als attack ed m o ral relativ ism in th eir "effort to rea rm th e W est sp iritu a lly for th e b a ttle w ith th e to talitarian s," a rg u in g th a t su c h relativ ism " h a d m o rally d isa rm e d th e U n ited States for th e com ing stru g g le." N o t all intellectu als g ra sp e d th e cold calcula­ tio n s of p o w e r th a t attrac ted the n e w n a tio n al secu rity experts. In stead , som e d e fe n d e d th e "u ltim ate tru th of th e d e b ase d 'lib era lism ' of o u r recent p a st" or restated g ra n d ideological claim s a b o u t dem o cracy o r still g ra n d e r religious or p h ilo so p h ical values. But w h e th e r stressin g h a rs h realities o r lofty ideals, m an y w a rn e d of fascism 's inescapable m enace a n d lash ed o u t at o p p o sin g intellec­ tu als "for w e ak e n in g A m erican fiber in its stru g g les w ith to talitarian s." In 1938, C h arles B eard— th e e ra 's m o st p ro m in e n t h isto ria n a n d intellectu al o p p o n e n t of FD R 's foreign p olicy— fo u n d him self b e ra te d for h is " u n fo rtu n a te influence . . . from th e p o in t of v iew of k eep in g alive a n ecessary p atrio tic glo w in the ju v enile b reast." "Irresp o n sib le" intellectuals, as p o e t A rch ib ald M acLeish la­ b eled them , w ere too "scientific, n e u te r [w ith th a t w o rd 's c o n n o tatio n s of em as­ culation], skeptical, d e ta c h e d " to u n d e rs ta n d th e w o rld stru g g le, m u c h less w ag e it. In th a t vein, L ew is M u m fo rd d e n o u n c e d "th e a rid p ra g m a tism " th a t left A m erican liberals u n a b le to u n d e rs ta n d "th e basic issu es of g o o d a n d evil, of p o w e r a n d form , of force a n d grace, in th e actual w o rld ." T hese intellectuals, h elp in g to ch an g e n o tio n s of n a tio n al security, w ere also c h an g e d in th e p ro ­ cess, inevitably p riz in g m ore th e ir allegiance a n d service to th e state.49 A t first glance, intellectuals' su m m o n s to h ig h e r tru th s seem ed a t o d d s w ith th e th ru st of foreign policy "realists," w h o claim ed to esch ew id eo lo g y a n d id e ­ alism . But realists them selves laid claim to u n iv ersal tru th : th e h a rd realities of in tern atio n al relations. A n d the intellectuals' reo rie n ta tio n p aralleled th e n e w co n ception of n atio n al security b y em p h a sizin g th e v a lu e of w h a t w as to b e p ro tected from the fascist threat. It also replicated a k ey elem en t of th a t concep­ tion, for b y in sin u atin g links b e tw ee n the in sid io u s id eas of to ta litaria n sy stem s

EMERGENCE,

1 9 3 3 - 1 94

37

a n d th e o u tlo o k of "irresp o n sib le" A m ericans, it im p lied a n intellectual seam ­ lessness to th e w o rld : th rea te n in g id eas co u ld leap g reat d istan ces ju st as th rea t­ en in g w e a p o n s m ight. By the sam e token, in tellectuals e m p h a size d h o w b ro a d ly n a tio n al secu rity w a s n o w conceiv ed — like R oosevelt, th ey re g a rd e d id eas as e q u al to w e a p o n s in im portance. In d eed , M ax L em er en titled h is 1940 tract Ideas Are Weapons. T his in tellectual reo rie n ta tio n w a s com plex, resisted, a n d inco m p lete before Pearl H arbor. By n o m ean s d id it silence intellectu al o p p o sitio n to FD R 's policy. N o r d id it alw ay s single o u t N a zi G erm an y as th e o n ly enem y: th e co n cep t of to talitarian ism w a s also a p p lie d to the Soviet U n io n (an d Japan), especially af­ ter th e 1939 H itler-S talin p a ct d iv id in g E astern E u ro p e a n d again, m o re force­ fully, after th e w ar. P ro p o n e n ts of intellectual re a rm a m e n t also seem ed at tim es to a d m ire w h a t th ey claim ed to condem n. M acLeish, for one, feared th a t totalita ria n s "w ere stro n g e r in a rm s because th ey w ere stro n g e r in h e a rt."50 Intellec­ tu a ls' attacks o n m o ral decadence, o r th e effort of so m eo n e like M u m fo rd to restrict freed o m of ex p ressio n in th e n a m e of d e fe n d in g it, stru ck critics as d is­ tu rb in g ly sim ilar to to ta litaria n cru sad es, sp a rk e d b y d esire less to face enem ies ab ro a d th a n to cleanse c u ltu re a t hom e. D espite its d isso n an ces, h o w ev er, intel­ lectual reo rie n ta tio n w a s co h eren t e n o u g h to stre n g th e n th e n e w id ea of n a ­ tio n al security. In co n tra st to th e lea d in g role of intellectuals, b u sin e ssm e n p la y e d a lesser p a rt in th e co n stru ctio n of n atio n al security. To b e sure, b u sin e ss w as n o m o n o ­ lith. Som e of its c o sm o p o litan lead ers a n d m ed ia (like Fortune m agazine) saw g rav e econom ic a n d strategic issues a t stake in th e w o rld crisis, a n d p ro fits to be h a d from rearm am en t. But b u sin e ss's ties to g o v e rn m e n t rem a in e d tense, a n d n o cohesive "m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex" h a d y e t em erg ed , especially since C o n g ress ra th e r th a n the a rm e d forces still w ro te th e ru les for d efen se con­ tracts. T h u s the aircraft in d u stry , a lth o u g h technically a d v an c ed a n d d e p e n ­ d e n t o n m ilitary ord ers, w a s still so riv en b y co m p etitio n , so vio len tly antilabor, a n d so fru stra te d b y its losses o n g o v e rn m e n t o rd ers th a t it c o u ld forge n o close alliance w ith N e w D ealers reg a rd in g n a tio n al security. O th e r b u sin ess le a d e rs— som e auto in d u stry h e ad s, for ex am p le— feared th ey w o u ld lose ci­ v ilian m ark e ts a n d create excess p ro d u ctiv e capacity if th ey to o k d efen se con­ tracts. T hey also feared the a d m in istra tio n itself, u n til its ra p p ro c h e m e n t w ith R epublicans a n d b u sin e ss b e g a n in 1940. M an y b u sin e ssm e n jo in ed th e a n ti­ in te rv en tio n ist cause, w h ile o th ers w ere co m p ro m ised b y th e ir econom ic ties to G erm an y o r o th er countries. D ivisions in the b u sin ess co m m u n ity in h ib ited ar­ ticu latio n of a forceful m essage, as d id its relu ctan ce to w a d e in to a n y co n tro ­ v e rsy after th e b e atin g its p u b lic esteem h a d tak e n in th e D epression. Too, u n til 1941 th e econom y still h a d too m u c h "slack" to force a d e b ate o v er th e choice b e tw ee n " g u n s a n d b u tte r" th a t m ig h t en g ag e b u sin essm en . For su ch reasons, th ey offered n o clear lea d ersh ip collectively, h o w e v er p o w e rfu l som e in d iv id ­ u al voices w ere. W om en w ere also o n the m argins, th o u g h n o t for w a n t of try in g to p lay a

38

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role. W om en's g ro u p s p lu n g e d into p u b lic d e b a te — a n d sp lit b ad ly , ev en th o u g h w o m e n w ere m o re inclined th a n m e n to a n a n tiw a r stance. F em inist peace activism fell in m em b ersh ip , finances, a n d v isibility from its 1920s h ey ­ day, as aggression ab ro a d led m a n y w o m e n to re p u d ia te pacifism w h ile d e ­ p ressio n a t h o m e shifted energies to o th e r issues. Few w o m e n h a d th e p ro m i­ nence in public d eb ate th a t Jane A d d a m s h a d d u rin g W orld W ar I. A n exception w a s A nne M o rro w L in d b erg h , w h o w ro te of h e r fear th a t fascism w a s "th e w a v e of the fu tu re." H e r b o o k of th a t title, p u b lish e d in 1940, seem ed an ti-in terv en tio n ist in sp irit, a lth o u g h she ch afed a t h e r h u s b a n d 's iso latio n ist a n d anti-Sem itic sentim ents. T he lan g u a g e of n a tio n al secu rity w a s ill su ite d to lea d in g w o m e n , w h o se fem inism a t th is stag e stressed w o m e n 's role as h u m a n ­ ita ria n s a n d idealists. C o n cern s d o m in a n t in W orld W ar I— d em o cratic id eals a n d relief for w a r-to m p o p u la tio n s— h a d in v ite d w o m e n to p la y a le a d in g role, b u t in 1940 those concerns y ield ed to th e h a rd , m ascu lin e categories of tech n o l­ ogy, security, a n d n a tio n al in te rest th a t b o th FDR a n d h is o p p o n e n ts u se d . In n o n e of those areas w a s w o m e n 's com peten ce p re su m e d ; in n o n e d id w o m e n h av e m ore th a n a to eh o ld organizationally. "T he freq u en cy w ith w h ic h th e w o rd 'm o th e r' " a p p e a re d in th e n a m e s of w o m e n 's g ro u p s in d icates th a t th ey "o ften e x p re sse d v e ry tra d itio n a l a ttitu d e s to w a rd th e role of w o m en . . . . Sim ple av ersio n to w a r w a s o ften th e th ru s t of th eir m essag e."51 But "sim p le av ersio n " seem ed in a d e q u a te to a d d re ss th e issu es of th e d a y o r to u n ite w o m e n them selves. FDR's policies did, of course, face form idable opposition. A nti-interventionists o ften strid en tly ch am p io n e d th e necessity a n d practicality of in su la tin g th e U n ited States from the E u ro p ea n crisis (their v iew s o n th e F ar E ast w e re m o re com plicated). Yet in som e w a y s th e ir concep tio n of n a tio n al secu rity resem b led R oosevelt's. M any saw n o less m alig n a w o rld system , th o u g h d ifferin g o v er th e source of its evil (com m unism , m a n y th o u g h t, ra th e r th a n fascism ) a n d its th re a t to A m erica (let E u ro p e's b a rb a rian s d e stro y each oth er, so m e arg u ed ). L ikew ise, m a n y e m p h a siz e d technological ch an g e as m u c h as FDR, o n ly ta k in g its logic in different directions; th u s th ey focused n o t o n h o w e n em y b o m b ers m ig h t th rea te n the U n ited States, b u t o n h o w A m erican air p o w e r c o u ld k eep enem ies far from the h em isp h ere. E ven o n specific policies, th e ir differences w ith R oosevelt, w hile b itte rly arg u e d , w ere lim ited. W ith av iato r C h arles L in d ­ b erg h as a chief sp o k esm an , th ey w ere e v en m o re attrac ted to air p o w e r th a n FDR. To them , arm ies a n d b attlesh ip s, n o t bo m b ers, sy m b o lized m ilitarism a n d ad v en tu rism . T hus th ey g enerally s u p p o rte d re a rm a m e n t e v en th o u g h th e y fo u g h t R oosevelt ov er th e particu lars. In these w ays, his o p p o n e n ts also e n g ag e d in th e co n stru ctio n of n a tio n al security. If an y th in g , the m o st strik in g q u a lity of d eb ate befo re Pearl H a rb o r w as h o w few p e rsu asiv e altern ativ es to FD R 's o u tlo o k w ere a rticu lated . N o t th a t n o n e w as im aginable. A w o rld v ie w free of technological d e te rm in ism w o u ld h ave b e en a start, a n d critics like B eard d id e m p h a size A m erica's eco­ nom ic en tan g lem en ts a b ro a d a n d its econom ic n e e d s a t h o m e. But in a c u ltu re

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39

g eared to seeing tech n o lo g y as decisive in global affairs, critics like B eard seem ed to ignore n a tio n al secu rity ra th e r th a n offer a d ifferen t v ie w of it, w h ile o th ers like L in d b erg h em b raced th e technological d e te rm in ism th a t FD R artic­ u lated . In a n y ev en t, th e issu e raised b y R oosevelt's n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n a l secu­ rity w a s n e v e r fully jo in ed in th e y ears before P earl H arb o r. T he im m e d ia te crisis of w a r ab ro ad , n o t lo n g -term v iew s of n a tio n al security, u n d e rs ta n d a b ly d o m in a te d th e "G reat D ebate" of 1939-1941. C ertain facets of th a t d e b ate fu r­ th e r lim ited its d e p th , th o u g h n o t its b ittern ess. L ong fo cu sed o n p arallels b e ­ tw e e n 1917 a n d 1940, m u c h of it looked b a ck w a rd ra th e r th a n fo rw ard . Roose­ v e lt's gift for fin d in g co m m o n g ro u n d in th e d e b a te — h e m isp h e re defense, air p o w er, a n d in d u stria l p ro d u c tio n — sh ifted a tte n tio n from th e m o re co n tested e lem en ts in h is co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security. E ven th e a p p a re n t lag g ard n ess of A m erican p re p a re d n e ss— stories filled th e p ress of so ld iers m arch in g w ith ­ o u t g u n s, p ro d u c tio n foul-ups, fo o t-d rag g in g b u sin essm en , a n d d isru p tiv e la­ b o r strik e s— colored deb ate, for it created th e im p re ssio n th a t th e tim e w a s d is­ ta n t in d e e d w h e n th e n a tio n could b e a global m ilitary p o w er. P artisan politics clarified little, since W illkie sh a re d m u c h of FD R 's w o rld v ie w d u rin g th e 1940 p resid en tia l contest. Finally, th e v e ry sh rilln ess of th e d e b a te b ecam e as m u ch a n issu e as th e p o sitio n s taken, especially b y 1941, w h e n a lo n g reco rd of rich invective a n d b itte r n a m e calling h a d accu m u lated . A ll th ese facets of th e d e ­ b ate, typical of A m erican politics w h e n g re a t p a ssio n s are g e n erate d , m e a n t th a t it w a s o ften as superficial as it w a s ugly. M eanw hile, A m erican c u ltu re reflected R oosevelt's o u tlo o k in w ay s th a t tra n sc e n d e d th e p a rticu la rs of debate. C arto g ra p h ers, for exam ple, u rg e d A m erican s to re th in k th e ir rela tio n sh ip s in tim e a n d space to th e w o rld . Som e­ tim es in te rv en tio n ists, so m etim es a ttrac ted to th e tre n d y "geo p o litics" fash io n ­ able a m o n g N azis, m ap m ak e rs also h a d a p ro fessio n al n e e d to ch an g e th eir o u tp u t, once g eared to la n d a n d sea travel, to th e ag e of aviation. N e w m a p s a n d globes u rg e d A m ericans to see Jap an a n d th e U n ited States as far closer to each o th er th a n once th o u g h t; to realize th a t B uenos A ires w a s farth e r from th e A m erican h e a rtla n d th a n all E u ro p ea n capitals save M oscow ; to th in k of th e U n ited States a n d E u rope as jo in t m em b ers of a n A tlantic co m m u n ity ; to u n ­ d e rs ta n d A m erican p ro x im ity to p o ten tial ag g resso rs u sin g p o la r ro u tes of at­ tack; a n d to ask, "C an A m erica Be B om bed?" as a science m u se u m h e a d lin e d o n e exhibition. N o iv o ry to w e r exercise, c a rto g ra p h y in flu en ced ren d e rin g s of th e w o rld crisis offered b y th e m ed ia, like the p o w e rfu l Time-Life-Fortune chain. By d ram a tic u se of red lines, m en acin g arro w s, a n d concentric rings, th e p ress offered im ages of A m erica's "encirclem ent" in a "closed-space" w o rld system . C a rto g ra p h e rs' w o rk p a ra lle led th a t of av iatio n p ro m o te rs p u sh in g p ro g ram s of global "airm in d e d n e ss" to e d u ca te A m erican y o u th in h a rsh realities a n d tra in th em in a v iatio n technology. W ittingly o r n o t, su ch efforts b u ttre ssed th e co n stru ctio n of n a tio n al security u n d e rw a y .52 T he n e w m ed ia a b ette d th a t co nstruction, in p a rt b ecause of th eir bias to w a rd

40

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th e in terv en tio n ist position. R adio n e w scasters w ere "u n in h ib ite d b y a n y tra d i­ tio n of in d e p e n d e n t political advocacy o r of d ilig e n t n e w s-g a th e rin g ," as o n e h isto ria n p u ts it. A ccording to an o th er, th ey w ere v irtu a l "to o ls of th e a d m in is­ tratio n ," n o t least because ra d io (an d to a d eg ree H o lly w o o d ) d e p e n d e d o n th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t for v a rio u s k in d s of licensing a n d o v ersig h t. S uch b ias p u t a p re m iu m o n m ag n ify in g the th re a t to A m erica of w a r ab ro ad , a n d o n oblit­ e ra tin g a sense of psychic d istan ce b e tw ee n A m erican s a n d th eir p u ta tiv e allies u n d e r siege abroad. W ith g o o d reason, A rchib ald M acL eish celeb rated E d w a rd R. M u rro w 's fam o u s ra d io re p o rts o n the L uftw affe's b litz a g ain st Britain: "You b u rn e d th e city of L o n d o n in o u r h o m es a n d w e felt th e flam es th a t b u rn e d it. . . . You d e stro y ed the su p e rstitio n of d istan ce a n d tim e." O r, as o n e h isto ­ ria n p u t it, M u rro w "m a d e A m ericans th in k of th e B attle of B ritain as a p re lu d e to th e b o m b in g of N e w York o r W ash in g to n ."53 But th e m e d ia 's role in sh a p in g v iew s of n a tio n al secu rity w e n t b e y o n d im ­ m ed iate (and h a rd ly uniform ) sy m p ath ies. W h ereas n e w sp a p e rs reta in e d a lo­ cal id en tity a n d audience, n e tw o rk n ew scastin g h a d n o e v id e n t local affinities. It co u ld only p lau sib ly cover n a tio n al a n d in te rn atio n al ev en ts for a n a tio n al audience. R adio as w ell as n ew sreel th u s h a d a p o w e rfu l com m ercial in cen tiv e to trea t d ista n t ev en ts as im m ed iate a n d th rea te n in g to A m erican s a n d to o rien t th eir a tte n tio n o u tw a rd , e v en if o n ly superficially. O n ly b y d o in g so co u ld ra d io c o m m an d a n au d ien ce a n d a d v e rtisin g rev en u es, a n d th ereb y ch allen g e th e p rin t m ed ia as A m erican s' p rim a ry source of n ew s, w h ic h it d id w ith strik in g sp e ed b e tw ee n 1938 a n d 1941. T he u se of ra d io b y FDR a n d N e w D eal agencies p re p a re d th e w ay, b u t th e M u n ich crisis u sh e re d in m o d e m n ew scastin g ; one CBS co m m en ta to r d eliv ered 102 b ro ad casts in e ig h teen d ay s, a n d th e n e tw o rk s lea rn ed the com m ercial viability of n ew s. "For th e first tim e h isto ry h a s b e en m a d e in the h e arin g of its p a w n s," the Nation claim ed after M unich, a n d ob­ serv ers so o n no ticed th a t e v en in rem ote places "sh o e d ru m m e rs, gas sta tio n a tten d a n ts, tru ck d riv ers, co u n ty farm a g en ts— e v ery b o d y w a s listen in g ."54 T h u s rad io n ew scasters d elib erately conjured u p a p ictu re of a seam less w o rld , w h ile rad io itself d id so as a m e d iu m reg ard less of n ew scasters' in ten tio n s, sim ­ p ly th ro u g h the sp e ed a n d im m ediacy of its live coverage of ev en ts ab ro ad . The n e w e r m e d ia 's role in th e c o n stru ctio n of n a tio n a l secu rity w a s also con­ tin g e n t o n circum stances, n o t sim p ly o n the m e d ia 's in h ere n t qualities. In isola­ tio n from o th er influences, im ages of a seam less, w a r-m a d w o rld m ig h t h av e d e e p e n e d the d e te rm in a tio n of m a n y A m erican s to w ith d ra w in to isolation. But in concert w ith th e efforts of politician s a n d intellectuals, th e m ed ia stre n g th e n ed the m o o d a n d a rg u m e n ts u n d e rly in g th e n e w co n cep tio n of n a ­ tional security. T h at w a s all th e m ore so becau se th eir p o rtra y a ls of w a r a b ro ad w ere v iv id e n o u g h to be ala rm in g b u t n o t g o ry e n o u g h to b e d isillu sio n in g , as th ey carefully b alan ced th eir n e e d to exploit ev en ts ab ro a d a g ain st co n v en tio n s of reticence a n d the d a n g e rs of an ta g o n iz in g au d ien ces a n d ad v ertisers. Specific dep ictio n s of w a r 's o u tb reak fu rth e r b u ttre sse d th e co n cep tio n of

EMERGENCE,

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n a tio n a l security. "WAR! BOMB W A RSA W /' scream ed a Chicago Tribune h e a d ­ lin e a b o u t G e rm a n y 's in v asio n of P oland in 1939; th e Chicago Daily News sim p ly said , "W AR!" It w a s w a r in a n alm o st generic sense th a t seized a tte n tio n m o re th a n a n y o n e n a tio n 's specific threat. T he im m e d ia te m essag e in su c h coverage, p ara lle lin g th e a n tiw a r m o o d of th e 1930s, w a s "n o t th a t th e 1939 conflict w a s th e w ro n g w ar; it w a s th a t w a r itself w a s ru in o u sly w ro n g ," o n e h isto ria n h a s su g g ested . B ut to see th e evil as ab stract a n d g en eralized also g ave it a lastin g quality, su g g e stin g th a t th e d a n g e r to A m erica lay n o t o n ly in w h a t G erm an s o r Jap an ese m ig h t d o b u t in th e in sid io u s a n d in escapable n a tu re of m o d e m w a r itself. T h at m essage, if m o m e n tarily of u se to th e a n ti-in te rv en tio n ist forces— w h o , after all, w a n te d to e n te r su c h folly?— rein fo rced th e p rev a ilin g sense of p eril.55 O th e r c u rre n ts in m ed ia tre a tm e n t of the w a r flo w ed in to th e n e w concep­ tion. For one th in g , th e m ed ia h ig h lig h ted th e m o st technologically ad v an c ed fo rm s of w ar. G e rm a n y 's d ram atic c o n q u est of W estern E u ro p e a n d its aerial b o m b a rd m e n t of E n g lan d w e re th e aren as of w a r for w h ich A m erican jo u rn a l­ ists h a d a rin g sid e seat. E m p h asis o n "lig h tn in g " w a rfare m esh ed nicely w ith a p o p u la r c u ltu re th a t p rim e d A m ericans to focus o n technological w iz a rd ry a n d ap o calyptic d a n g e rs in w arfare. In contrast, th e g rin d in g ly im p o rta n t w a r in th e A tlantic a n d the N azi in v asio n of th e Soviet U nion, b o th less e v id e n tly o n th e c u ttin g e d g e of technology, w ere sp ra w lin g a n d inaccessible to n ew sm en , less subject to v iv id p resen tatio n . For so m e of th e sam e reasons, Ja p an 's w a r in C h in a a n d its a d v an c es o n S outheast A sia also lay at th e m arg in s of n e w s coverage. In d ee d , m e d ia coverage of the Far E ast rev ealed one w a y in w h ic h th e con­ stru c tio n of n a tio n al security w a s incom plete. D espite im ag es of a closed w o rld system , th e n e w v iew w a s heav ily a ttu n e d to E u ro p e a n d th e W estern H em i­ sphere. T h at focus reflected th e c u ltu ra l affinities of m o st A m erican s a n d th e a d m in istra tio n 's strategic p rio rities, as w ell as FD R 's fears a b o u t v o latile A m er­ ican a ttitu d e s to w a rd Japan; th e c o u n try seem ed "re a d y to p u ll th e trig g e r if th e Japs d o a n y th in g ," h e once rem a rk ed .56 But it also reflected th e p reo c cu p a tio n w ith technology a t the h e a rt of th e n e w conception: th e Jap an ese w ere w id e ly re g a rd e d as racial a n d technological inferiors; o n ly Pearl H a rb o r w o u ld p u ll th e Far E ast o n to A m erican s' m en tal g rid of a closed w o rld system . In m a n y w ays, h ow ever, the n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n al secu rity h a d tak en rem ark ab le h o ld before P earl H arbor. O f course, th a t h o ld is easier to m easu re am o n g elites a n d th eir in stitu tio n s th a n a t th e g rass roots. O p in io n polls sh o w e d o v e rw h elm in g a p p ro v a l of rearm am en t, su b sta n tia l satisfaction w ith h o w th e a d m in istra tio n h a n d le d it, d e te rm in a tio n to stay o u t of w ar, a n d g ra d ­ u al resig n atio n to th e likelihood of entry. But po lls w ere g eared to crises, n o t to b ro a d changes in sensibility a n d ap p reh en sio n . A m erican s d id d isp lay a n e n o r­ m o u s a p p e tite for n e w s a n d c o m m en ta ry a b o u t th e w o rld crisis, b u t c ru d e evi­ d en ce of th eir o rien tatio n to far-aw ay ev en ts reveals little a b o u t its content.

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T here is also teasin g ev id en ce in lan g u a g e of "h o w w id e ly th e w a r h a d p e n e ­ tra te d the consciousness of A m ericans," as term s like blitz— th e c o m m o n label for G e rm a n y 's sw ift m e th o d s of attack in 1940 a n d 1941— b ecam e p o p u lar. In C hicago, a c an d id a te for a n Elks office "saw h is 'b litz ' fizzle," citizens "o rg a­ n ize d a 'b litz ' o n rats," th e W o m an 's C h ristia n T em perance U n io n p la n n e d a "Blitzkrieg o n Booze," a n d a L eague of W om en V oters official u rg e d m em b ers n o t to b e "b litzk rieg ed o u t of th eir convictions." (R oosevelt once c o n d em n ed the "blitzkrieg of verb al in cen d iary b o m b s" h u rle d a t h im in th e 1940 cam ­ paign.) W h eth er su c h lan g u a g e rev ealed a su b lim in al in co rp o ra tio n of tech n o l­ o g y 's im pact o n w a rfa re — o r ju st the e n d less a p p e a l of w a r m e ta p h o rs— is im ­ p o ssible to say.57 P o p u la r c u ltu re p ro v id es a n o th e r clue to m ass o p in io n . T he cred ib ility so m e A m ericans fo u n d in th e "W ar of th e W orld s" b ro ad cast, w h ic h d elib erately m im icked new scasts a b o u t th e M unich crisis, o w e d to "th e p e n e tra tio n of ap o c­ alyptic expectation s," according to one histo rian . A s p o llste r H a d le y C an tril w ro te, "A m y sterio u s in v asio n fitted w ith th e m y sterio u s ev en ts of th e d e ­ cad e," a n d th e "psychological d ise q u ilib riu m " created b y th e D ep ressio n stre n g th e n ed read in ess to believe th a t the w o rs t m ig h t befall A m erica in w ar. T h at read in ess w a s also sh o w n b y A m erican s' ro b u st a p p e tite for a p u lp lite ra ­ tu re of technological a n d ecological ap o caly p se— h o rro r film s d e p ic tin g sci­ ence rim am ok, space-age fiction, a n d n o v els like L. R on H u b b a rd 's Final Black­ out (1940), w h ic h d e p ic te d global d ecim atio n u n le a sh e d b y atom ic a n d biological w eap o n s. H ig h -b ro w a rtists fo u n d a p o p u la r o u tle t for ap o caly p tic th em es as w ell. Jam es T h u rb e r's b itte r fable The Last Flower a p p e a re d in Life m ag azin e (N ovem ber 1939) a n d c o n clu d ed a b o u t a fu tu re w ar: "T his tim e th e d e stru ctio n w a s so com plete, th a t n o th in g a t all w a s left in th e w o rld , ex cep t for one m an, a n d one w o m a n , a n d one flow er." Such lite ra tu re w a s h a rd ly con­ su m e d on ly b y th e m asses; m ag azin es su c h as Astounding Science Fiction, like "a p ro b e su n k into th e back b ra in of A m erican technology," in flu en ced som e of th e scientists w h o conceived the atom ic bom b. M ost of all, su c h lite ra tu re re­ v ealed w id e ly felt anxieties a b o u t A m erican v u ln era b ility a n d lo n g in g s for technological m aste ry th a t b o th in flu en ced a n d w ere ta p p e d b y th e architects of n a tio n al security.58 In stitu tio n al change m ore o b v io u sly m a rk e d th e co n stru ctio n of n a tio n al se­ c u rity a n d d ro v e it h o m e to A m ericans. B etw een M u n ich a n d Pearl H arb o r, fed eral officials a n d th eir c o u n te rp a rts in o th er in stitu tio n s b u ilt a n a tio n a l se­ c u rity bureaucracy. To b e sure, the process w a s h a p h a z a rd , o v e rsee n b y FDR in h is u su a l confusing a n d casual w ay, a n d often b ack w ard -lo o k in g , b a se d p a rtly o n the im p ro v isatio n s of 1917 a n d 1933. Likew ise, chaos a n d conflict o ften d is­ ru p te d the n ew m ach in ery of m obilization, especially w h e n it faced tw o d i­ lem m as: h o w to b alance co m p etin g d e m a n d s o n resources, a n d h o w to w e ig h im m ed iate m ilitary stre n g th a g ain st its lo n g -term g ro w th . S h o u ld v e te ra n m ili­ tary m en be se n t ab ro ad to p ro tec t A m erican o u tp o sts, o r b e k e p t h o m e to tra in

EMERGENCE,

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43

still larg e r forces? S ho u ld aircraft factories ru sh to p ro d u c e a n ex istin g p ro to ­ ty p e so o n to b e obsolete, o r w a it for n e w d esig n s th a t m ig h t tak e y ears to e n te r p ro d u ctio n ? To m e n w e ig h in g su c h decisions, th ey p o ssessed a n u n p rec e ­ d e n te d com plexity a n d gravity. The crucial d ecisions w ere m ad e , h o w ev er, w ith a tolerable d e g re e of e rro r a n d w ith rem ark ab le con tro l b y R oosevelt o v er them . T he confusion a n d conflict in m o b ilizatio n o b scu red its n o v el elem en ts, in ­ c lu d in g its scale a n d com plexity a n d its creatio n w h ile th e n a tio n w a s tech n i­ cally still a t peace. A b e w ild e rin g strin g of ag en cies— am o n g th e m th e W ar R esources B oard, th e N a tio n a l D efense A d v iso ry C om m ission, th e Office of P ro d u c tio n M a n ag e m en t— ov ersaw th e m o b ilizatio n of in d u s try a n d labor, lin k ed th em to th e a rm e d services, financed n e w facilities, a n d g in g erly allo­ cated resources. L inkages b e tw e e n g o v e rn m e n t a n d science w e re m o re stable, agencies like th e N a tio n a l D efense R esearch C o m m ittee (1940) a n d th e Office of Scientific R esearch a n d D e v elo p m en t (1941) stay in g in tact for th e w h o le w ar. W hile th e a rm y a n d n a v y rem a in e d c o n stitu tio n ally a n d fu n ctio n ally sep arate, th eir ties w ith each o th er a n d w ith th e W hite H o u se grew . M u ch in th a t aren a still g o t tran sac te d a t a p e rso n al level— G eorge M arsh all for th e a rm e d forces a n d H a rry H o p k in s for th e W hite H o u se w ere k ey fig u res— b u t th e sto d g y Joint B oard so o n b ecam e th e w a rtim e Joint C hiefs of Staff. M ean w h ile, n e w agencies to o k charge of th e first p eacetim e d raft, p ro p a g a n d a efforts a t h o m e a n d a b ro a d , m ilitary intelligence a n d in te rn a l security, civil d efen se a n d eco­ no m ic w arfare, a n d o th e r activities of th e v ig ila n t state. C o m plex a n d a m b itio u s, th is a p p a ra tu s w a s also n o tab le for its so p h istica­ tio n in p la n n in g o v e r th e lo n g te rm a n d o n a global scale. S trategists w e ig h ed c o m p e tin g th rea ts in E u ro p e a n d the Far East, a ssig n ed decisive p rio rity to th e form er, a n d sk etch ed w ith som e accuracy th e h u g e req u ire m e n ts of w a g in g glo b al w a r sh o u ld th e U n ited States p lu n g e in to it. P la n n ers a d ju d ica ted com ­ p e tin g d e m a n d s o n resources from th e a rm e d forces, allies like B ritain, w a ry in d u stria lists, a n d co n su m ers eag er to enjoy a re tu rn in g p ro sp erity . M an y lo o k ed fu rth e r in to th e fu tu re, to th e political settlem en ts th a t m ig h t com e o u t of th e w ar, th e w e a p o n s th e n a tio n m ig h t th e n w a n t, th e econom ic clo u t it m ig h t th e n w ield. T he in stitu tio n al m ach in ery of n a tio n a l secu rity w a s n o v el in o n e o th er w ay: som e of its creators w ere d e te rm in e d th a t it o u tla st th e c u rre n t crisis— th a t th ey co n stru ct so m eth in g p e rm a n e n t. T he scale a n d specifics of th a t m ach in ery w o u ld , th ey knew , ch an g e after th e w ar, a n d th e ir o p p o rtu n itie s to p e e r in to th e fu tu re w ere lim ited. B ut for g en erals like M arshall, ex asp e rate d a t th e n a tio n 's a p p a re n t lack of p re p a re d n e ss in th e 1930s; o r for scientists, frig h te n ed ab o u t th e w e a p o n s o th e r n a tio n s m ig h t d ev elo p a n d attrac ted to th e b en efits of g ov­ e rn m e n t sp o n so rsh ip ; o r for c o rp o ra te leaders, g ettin g accu sto m ed to d efen se co n tracts a n d eag er to p ro te c t A m erican econom ic in terests a b ro a d — for su ch p eo p le, som e en larg ed , p e rm a n e n t m ach in ery of m o b ilizatio n seem ed neces-

44

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sary for self-interest a n d n a tio n al safety. To Jam es C o n an t, th e H a rv a rd U n iv er­ sity p re sid e n t d e ep ly in v o lv ed in scientific m o b ilizatio n , it seem ed in 1940 tim e "fo r a m ajority of the th in k in g p eo p le to b ecam e co n v in ced th a t w e m u s t b e a w o rld pow er, a n d the price of b ein g a w o rld p o w e r is.w illingness a n d a cap ac­ ity to fight w h e n necessary." A State D e p a rtm e n t official co n fid ed to h is d ia ry th a t y ear th a t "th e only possible effect of th is w a r w o u ld b e th a t th e U n ited States w o u ld em erge w ith a n im p erial p o w e r g reater th a n th e w o rld h a d e v er seen." A n o th e r ob serv er d isc u sse d p u b licly "th e m ain ten an ce of a p o w e rfu l m ilitary force as p a rt of th e n o rm al stru c tu re of o u r society."59 N o t all fed eral a n d p riv ate lead ers sh a red su c h view s, a n d th eir ability to im p o se th e m o n o th er A m ericans rem ain ed u n certain . To som e d egree, th e p e rm a n en c e of th eir creatio n w as su g g ested o n ly b y im plication: th e d e a rth of p led g e s b y R oosevelt a n d o th ers of a w a r to e n d all w a rs im p lied th a t th ere w o u ld be n o e n d to th e p erils the n a tio n n o w faced. W ith different em p h ases, h ow ever, the o u tlo o k of m an y elite figures echoed th a t of R oosevelt. By th e tim e of Pearl H arb o r, th e co n stru ctio n of n a tio n al secu­ rity, th o u g h n o t com plete, w a s w ell ad v an ced . It w o u ld p rev a il to a su b sta n tia l d eg ree for th e n e x t h alf-cen tu ry of A m erican history.

The Shadow of War "T he situ atio n to d ay is u tte rly different from th a t of 1917," G en. G eorge M ar­ shall to ld the n a tio n o n S eptem ber 16, 1940. "Then w e w ere at w a r— b u t w e foresaw sm all possibility of m ilitary d a n g e r to th is country. Today, th o u g h a t peace, su ch a possibility trem bles o n the verge of b eco m in g a pro b ab ility ." M ar­ shall a p tly characterized the n a tio n 's u n c ertain situ atio n a n d n e rv o u s m o o d . N e v er before h a d w a r 's sh a d o w h u n g so o m in o u sly a n d y e t so elu siv ely over th e n ation. W ar rag e d far a w ay in E urope a n d C h in a, b u t a p p a re n tly w ith u n ­ p rec ed e n ted p o ten tial to reach the W estern H em isp h ere. A m erican s w ere p re ­ p a rin g for it y e t h a d n o idea if o r w h e n th ey m ig h t e n te r it. T he n a tio n w a s slip ­ p in g into a tw ilig h t w o rld of neither-w ar-n o r-p eace, a t once a n o n c o m b a t bellig erent a n d n o n b ellig eren t in com bat. Yet th ere w as also w elcom e c h an g e — a p ro sp e rity long d e n ie d a n d a m ission lon g a p p a re n tly m issin g d u rin g the p rev io u s tw o "d ecad es of d iv id e d p u rp o se s," as o n e c o m m en ta to r called th em .60 T he p e rio d before Pearl H a rb o r w a s also a train in g g ro u n d for th e n e w age of n atio n al security, a n u n w ittin g reh earsal for th e C old W ar. O n th e eve of Pearl H arb o r, ju st as in the d a w n of th e C old W ar, p re p a re d n e ss seem ed a n o p en e n d e d challenge, enem ies lu rk ed a t h o m e a n d ab ro ad , th e p ro p e r m ean s to sto p th em w ere unclear, a n d g o v e rn m e n t a ssu m e d n e w p o w e rs in th e a tte m p t to d o so. A s the line b e tw ee n w a r a n d peace d isa p p e a re d , a w a r m en tality flo u rish ed ev en w ith n o fighting w a r to w age, tem p o ra ry m o b ilizatio n sh a d e d off in to p e r­ m a n e n t m ilitarizatio n in w ay s h a rd to recognize, a n d th e challenge y ield ed at-

EMERGENCE,

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tractiv e b u t seem ingly u n in te n d e d changes. M o bilization w a s re g a rd e d as a n e ­ cessity forced o n A m ericans, p ro sp e rity a n d p u rp o se its u n in te n d e d consequences. M e tap h o rs echoed th a t outlook. A t th e o u tb reak of w a r in E u ­ ro p e, FD R w ish e d h e co u ld "offer th e h o p e th a t the sh a d o w o v er th e w o rld m ig h t sw iftly pass. . . . T he d isa ster is n o t of o u r m aking; n o act of o u rs e n g e n ­ d e re d th e forces w h ich a ssa u lt the fo u n d atio n s of civilization."61 T he R oosevelt a d m in istra tio n 's g ra n d strateg y b o th cau sed a n d reflected this m o o d of u n c ertain ty a b o u t w h e th e r the n a tio n w a s a t w ar. N e ith e r p riv a te ly n o r p u b licly d id FDR ru le in or (w ith election-year exceptions) ru le o u t a p lu n g e in to full-scale w ar. The lin ch p in of h is strateg y w as g alv an izin g th e "a r­ sen al of dem ocracy," as h e p ro claim ed the U n ited States to be o n D ecem ber 29, 1940. A m erica's w a r p ro d u c tio n w o u ld succor its fig h tin g allies (p rim arily the B ritish a n d Soviets), p re p a re a n A m erican w a r m achine, d e te r enem ies, a n d ju st p o ssib ly k eep the n a tio n o u t of w ar. T here w as d u p lic ity in h is v a g u en e ss ab o u t w h e th e r A m ericans m ig h t fight, b u t th e resu ltin g "cred ib ility g a p w a s n o t sim ­ p ly a P resid en tial exercise, it w a s a n a tio n al project. E veryone h e lp e d o u t."62 A m erican s focused m ore read ily o n p ro d u c tio n itself, w ith th e p ro sp e rity it in ­ d u c e d a n d th e sym bols of p o w e r it y ield ed , th a n o n th e w a r m ak in g it m ig h t m ak e possible. D espite his v ag u en ess, R oosevelt d id signal certain preferences. H is d ra ­ m atic call in M ay 1940 for the n a tio n to m ak e fifty th o u sa n d p lan e s a year, h is p ro m o tio n of L end-L ease, h is efforts to tig h te n th e econom ic n o o se a ro u n d Ja­ p a n , a n d h is d e p lo y m e n t of A m erican n av al p o w e r in b o th oceans all co n v ey ed h is w ish to u se the n a tio n 's econom ic a n d technological resources, ra th e r th a n its g ro u n d forces, in th e w o rld struggle. T hey also co nveyed, for all FD R's talk of a sh ru n k e n w o rld , the lin g erin g h o p e to rem a in a t a rm 's len g th from it— to h av e allies b e a r th e b ru n t of an y fig h tin g o n lan d , as seem ed m o re likely after th e Soviet U n io n en te red the w a r in June 1941. O th e r a u th o rities s u p p o rte d th o se preferences. W h en C ongress b arely ren e w e d co n scrip tio n in A u g u st 1941, W alter L ip p m a n n a rg u e d th a t a large g ro u n d a rm y w a s "th e cancer w h ic h o b stru cts n a tio n al u n ity "; a n y A m erican w a r effort sh o u ld consist "b a ­ sically of N avy, A ir, a n d m an u fa ctu rin g ." O p in io n p o lls reflected sim ilar p ref­ erences.63 So d id R oosevelt in p riv ate. In Ju n e 1940, h e to ld m ilitary p la n n e rs h o w h e im a g in ed th e U n ited States a t w ar, " b u t w ith n av al a n d air forces only," alo n g w ith a id to its allies. A year later, H a rry H o p k in s fo u n d h im still "a b eliev er in b o m b in g as the o n ly m ean s of g a in in g a victory." "T here m u st be som e k in d of factory in ev ery [G erm an] to w n ," FDR a rg u e d , a n d b o m b in g ev ery to w n "is th e o n ly w a y to b reak the G e rm a n m orale." FDR, A verell H a rrim a n once o b serv ed , " h a d a h o rro r of A m erican tro o p s lan d in g ag ain o n th e c o n tin en t" a n d e n te rin g "tren c h w a rfare w ith all its a p p allin g losses." In effect, R oosevelt w as w ag in g a cold w a r a g ain st the A xis p o w ers, h o p in g th a t at m o st it w o u ld becom e a lim ­ ite d h o t w a r for th e U n ited States. M arshall, for one, k n ew h o w h a rd it w as for



THE

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A m ericans to m obilize w ith o u t a d e clara tio n of w ar, a n d u rg e d resistin g th e easy w a y out: "B ut must w e declare war in o rd e r to facilitate tra in in g a n d m o ­ rale? Must y o u bum down the b u ild in g in o rd e r to ju stify th e Fire D e p artm en t?" A m erican s' sense of b ein g in a tw ilig h t of n eith er-w ar-n o r-p eace reflected n a ­ tio n al policy.64 T he m o b ilizatio n of resources w a s FD R 's to p p riority. In line w ith n a tio n al strategy, m o b ilizatio n favored so p h isticated , cap ital-in ten siv e w e a p o n s— fifty th o u sa n d plan es; b attlesh ip s, aircraft carriers, su b m a rin e s, a n d o th e r craft for a tw o -o cean navy; a n d n e w devices p u rs u e d in secret (an d o ften in co n cert w ith th e B ritish, w h o reta in e d a technological ed g e in m a n y areas), su c h as ra d a r a n d th e ato m ic bom b. For a v a rie ty of reasons, p ro d u c tio n accelerated fitfully, b u t FDR u n d o u b te d ly re g a rd e d his p ro d u c tio n g oals as g alv an izin g objectives m o re th a n realistic quotas. T he resu ltin g econom ic b o o m w a s u n e v e n ly d istrib u te d . It fav o red reg io n s w h ere capital-intensive in d u strie s thrived: coastal cities, th e far W est w ith its aircraft com panies, a n d th e in d u stria l h e a rtla n d w h e n au to m o b ile co m p an ies b e g a n sh iftin g to th e p ro d u c tio n of tan k s a n d p lan es. In a d d itio n , th e b o o m fa­ v o red a n d in u n d a te d th e n e rv e center of it all, W ash in g to n , D.C. In th e lo n g ru n , it also re w a rd e d large co m p an ies w ie ld in g a m p le cap ital a n d expertise, a lth o u g h it m o m e n tarily stav ed off oblivio n for m arg in al co m p etito rs, like P ackard a n d S tu d e b ak e r in the a u to in d u stry , th a t ju m p e d m o re rea d ily o n to w a r co ntracts th a n th e lu m b e rin g giants. In g en eral, too, th e b o o m cam e later to blue-collar w o rk e rs a n d last to m arg in al g ro u p s like b lack A m ericans. In tu rn , su c h u n e v e n n e ss fostered in ten se lab o r-m an ag em en t conflict in 1940-1941, to th e p o in t th a t "th e in d u stria l w a r" o ften su cceed ed in "cro w d in g th e b attle a g ain st H itle r off th e h e a d lin e s."65 In som e w ay s, ho w ev er, the " in d u stria l w a r" m ask ed th e su b sta n tia l h a r­ m o n y e v id e n t d u rin g m obilization. C onflict e ru p te d sp ectacu larly in tw o sec­ to rs d o m in a te d b y tw o w illful leaders, th e a u to in d u s try 's H e n ry F ord a n d th e coal u n io n 's John L. L ew is, b o th vio len tly anti-R oosevelt a n d b o th sy m b o ls of a n older, p e rso n al style of leadership. E lsew here, b u sin e ss a n d u n io n lea d ers w ere g ro w in g accustom ed to th e in tricate co m p ro m ises in g o v e m m e n tin d u stry -la b o r relatio n s th a t th e N e w D eal p ro m o te d . C o rp o ra te lead ers d o m i­ n a te d those relations as w ell as g o v e rn m e n t's a p p a ra tu s of m obilizatio n , b u t less firm ly th a n in th e p rev io u s w a r o r in th e p o stw a r era. Because b u sin e ssm e n lacked expertise o r v isio n in critical areas, a n d for political reaso n s as w ell, FDR in clu d ed h o ld o v e r N e w D ealers a n d lab o r lea d ers in th e a p p a ra tu s; one in p a r­ ticular, th e U n ited A u to W orkers' W alter R euther, p la y e d a critical role in con­ v e rtin g the auto in d u stry to w a r p ro d u ctio n . D espite its technological e m p h asis, m o b ilizatio n p ro d u c e d w id e n a tio n al p ro sp e rity b y 1941, p a rtly because th e U n ited States w a s p io n ee rin g m ass p ro ­ d u c tio n b y low -skilled labor ev en of com plex item s like sh ip s a n d aircraft. M u n d a n e item s from foodstuffs to ten ts w ere also in h e av y d e m a n d b y allies

EMERGENCE,

1933-1941

47

a n d th e A m erican a rm e d forces, a n d , becau se of th e ir sim plicity, w ere often m o re rea d ily ru sh e d in to p ro d u ctio n . T h u s farm incom e, critical w h e n a lm o st h a lf th e p o p u la tio n still liv ed in ru ra l areas o r sm all to w n s, in creased sh a rp ly in 1941, th o u g h it also h e lp e d finance m ech an izatio n th a t w o rse n e d th e p lig h t of te n a n ts a n d laborers. W ith few controls y e t o n c o n su m p tio n a n d w ith p e n t-u p d e m a n d fro m th e D ep ressio n for civilian g o o d s, th a t sector also g rew briskly, w h ile o v erall G N P for 1941 ra n 25 p e rc en t h ig h e r th a n in 1940. U n e m p lo y m en t fin ally slip p e d b e lo w 10 p e rc en t late in 1941, While th o se a lre ad y w o rk in g often fo u n d th e ir h o u rs a n d w a g es increasing. For o n e m agic y e ar a t least, b o th g u n s a n d b u tte r seem ed a b u n d a n t. T here is n o d o u b t w h a t d ro v e the b u rg e o n in g econom y. In 1941, fed eral sp e n d in g w a s fo u r tim es its m id-1930s figures, a n d its 20 p e rc en t of G N P w a s d o u b le D ep ressio n -era levels, six tim es its sh are in th e 1920s. D efense sp e n d in g cau se d all th e increase, seizing 13.1 p e rc en t of G N P in 1941, u p from less th a n 1.5 p e rc e n t for m o st of th e 1930s. T he m ig h ty effects of w h a t cam e to b e called m ili­ ta ry K eynesianism w ere e v id en t, a n d w elcom e in d e e d to A m erican s sta rv e d of th e sy m b o ls of affluence a n d o ften th e su b stan ce of a to lerab le life. T he p ro x im ity of w ar-b o rn e affluence to recen t econom ic calam ity w as criti­ cal. H a d th e b o o m follow ed o n th e h eels of g en eral p ro sp erity , its b enefits w o u ld h av e seem ed m in o r a n d its d islocatio n s p ain fu l. A s it w as, th e n e w ­ fo u n d p ro sp erity , b y em erg in g in the w a k e of a terrib le d e p ressio n , fo rg ed a p o w e rfu l co n n ectio n b e tw e e n affluence a n d m ilitarizatio n , o n e th a t " w o u ld b e im p o ssible to forget," n o tes one h isto rian . Som e n o ticed it a t th e tim e. "T he N e w D eal fo u g h t a n u p h ill b a ttle in its efforts to resto re pro sp erity . N o w w e accept w ith little q u e stio n g o v e rn m e n ta l in te rv e n tio n in in d u stry o n b eh alf of a g rea t d efense p ro g ra m ." 66 But for th e m o m e n t th ere seem ed little n e e d to d w ell o n th a t shift: th e n e w p ro sp e rity a p p e a re d d riv e n b y th e n e e d to m obilize a g ain st d is ta n t enem ies, n o t b y d esig n s to rev iv e a sta g n a n t econom y. A s for th e co n cen tratio n of p o w e r in W ash in g to n th a t resu lted , it elicited b a rb s as it h a d in th e 1930s, b u t su rp risin g ly little su sta in e d o p p o sitio n . FD R's foes still su sp e c te d h is lu st for po w er, b u t th ey also h a rp e d o n h is failu re to cu rb strikes, control resources, a n d co n cen trate executive a u th o rity — th a t is, th ey "ag re ed th a t tim id ity w a s th e m o st p e rsiste n t sh o rtco m in g of th e R oosevelt A d ­ m in istra tio n ." FD R 's liberal su p p o rte rs gave sim ilar v iew s m o re p o sitiv e ex­ pression: "O n ly th ro u g h th e chief executive can w e fin d th e co n cen tratio n of p o w e r th a t is necessary."67 If p ro sp e rity seem ed th e u n in te n d e d b y -p ro d u c t of rea rm am en t, so m e rec­ o g n ized a different relationship, one e v id e n t in FD R 's d efen se of th e N e w D eal a n d a t th e core of m ilitarization. For m a n y liberals, p ro sp e rity w a s a p rec o n d i­ tion, e v en a tool, of rea rm am en t, n o t ju st its consequence. "To b e w o rth d y in g for, a political sy stem m u st m ake possible a society th a t is w o rth living in," the N a tio n a l R esources P lan n in g B oard m ain tain ed : dem o cracy h a d to o u tp erfo rm to ta litaria n ism to w in th e stru g g le a g ain st it. In th a t light, social w elfare pro-

48

THE

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OF AMERICA

g ram s w ere n o t "se n tim en ta l h u m a n ita ria n ism " b u t th e "first line of n a tio n al d efen se."68 Such co m m en ts su g g e ste d th e m a n y w ay s, b e y o n d m ere affluence, in w h ic h m o b ilization w a s w elco m ed , ju st as it h a d b e e n in 1917. W ords a n d em p h a se s h a d changed. In th e colder lan g u a g e of 1941, A m erican s ex tolled v a rio u s c h an g e s— the solidification of th e N e w D eal th a t liberals w a n te d , for exam ple, o r th e d ism a n tle m e n t of it th a t m a n y co n serv ativ es so u g h t— less as lofty goals in th em selv es th a n as in stru m e n ta l tasks su b o rd in a te to n a tio n al defense. M em ories of W orld W ar I w ere too acute for a sense of plastic p o ssib ilities to b e ex p ressed as lavishly as in 1917. B ut in tem p ere d fo rm it rea p p e a re d , th o u g h n o w o ften d e n u d e d of o v e rt "political ideology," w h ic h o n e c o n te m p o ra ry saw as u sefu l only "to th e ex ten t th a t it h e lp s o r h in d e rs . . . th e p u rp o s e of th e sta te ."69 T he U n ited States h a d to m obilize h u m a n as w ell as econom ic resources. The a rm y g rew eightfold in tw o years, to n e arly 1.5 m illio n m e n b y th e su m m e r of 1941. T his task m ig h t h a v e seem ed easy, g iv en th e larg e p o o l of u n e m p lo y ed , b u t n a tio n al lea d ers reco g n ized th a t w h ile sh eer n u m b e rs w e re n o p ro b lem , th eir d istrib u tio n am o n g m a n y claim an ts (of w h ic h th e a rm e d forces w ere only one) w as. For g o o d reason, the d ra ft law w a s called (as in 1917) th e Selective Service Act. Its m a n y ex em p tio n s in clu d ed critical o ccu p atio n s, a n d 12 m illion of th e 17 m illion m e n reg istered received d e fe rm en ts (alm o st 50 p e rc e n t of th e 1 m illio n first called for in d u c tio n w ere rejected as p h y sically unfit). T he m o st ch arg ed asp ect of conscription w a s its n o v e lty as th e n a tio n 's first p eacetim e d raft, p ro m p tin g fears of a coercive sta te a n d of A m erican b o y s d y in g in E urope. C o n sc rip tio n "w ill slit the th ro a t of th e last g rea t dem ocracy," th u n d e re d M o n tan a se n ato r B urton K. W heeler, o n e of FD R 's h a rsh e st foes.70 Yet th e su rp rise a b o u t co n scrip tio n w a s th e ease w ith w h ic h A m erican s ac­ cep ted it. Som e 86 p e rc en t of those p o lled in A u g u s t 1940 a p p ro v e d d ra ft legis­ lation, a n d w h ile m illions av o id e d service leg ally — th e ru s h of y o u n g m e n to m a rry w a s alm o st a n a tio n al e m b a rra ssm e n t— o n ly a few h u n d re d o p e n ly v io­ lated the 1940 act. A cceptance of the d ra ft o w e d to several factors: its rem o v al as a n issu e from p resid en tial politics (b o th W illkie a n d FDR su p p o rte d it), g o o d tim in g (the m ea su re reached C ongress in th e w a k e of F rance's fall), a n d a n o d to a n ti­ in te rv en tio n ists (a b a n b y C ongress o n u se of d raftees o u tsid e th e W estern H e m isp h ere or A m erican bases). T hen too, th e d ra ft's sh rillest o p p o n e n ts gave u p m u c h g ro u n d , u su a lly g ra n tin g the n e e d for larg er a rm e d forces a n d object­ in g o n ly to the m eth o d . M ost tellingly, th eir alarm s a b o u t d ictato rial g o v e rn ­ m e n t fell m o stly o n d e a f ears. Felt necessities w ere only one reason for acceptance, h o w ev er. The N e w D eal h a d accustom ed m an y A m ericans to a n activist state. Ju st as th e C iv ilian C o n ­ serv atio n C o rp s h a d ta u g h t the social a n d econom ic b en efits of a rm y life, backers of conscription n o w n o ted su ch ad v an tag es. S tatin g a n o ld ratio n ale.

EMERGENCE,

1933-194

49

M arsh all to u te d th e o p e n in g affo rd ed b y m ilitary service to b rid g e social d iv i­ sions a n d en h an ce "resp ec t for c o n stitu ted au th o rity ." W ritin g sh o rtly after Pearl H arb o r, John Steinbeck celebrated h o w m ilitary service g ave m e n a n es­ cape from "directionless d ep re ssio n " a n d a n "an tid o te for th e p o iso n s of this id len ess a n d in d irectio n ." T he in d u ctee w ill becom e a b e tte r m an , p ro claim ed o n e co n tem p o rary : "H e w ill e at sim p le foods a t reg u la r h o u r s . . . stra ig h te n h is p o stu re ," a n d , " w h e th e r h e likes it o r not, com m u n icate w ith n a tu re in all h e r m o o d s." A lth o u g h its a d v e n t w a s "n o t a m a tte r of choice," ra n a m o re ab stract 1941 com m entary, "th e d a y of th e positive state is u p o n u s." M o bilization of­ fered "v a st a n d larg ely u n e x p lo re d " chances for th e m ilitary to h e lp a tta in "d e ­ sirab le social a n d econom ic e n d s," e n d s w h ich m e a n t th a t m ilitary officers co u ld n o lo n g er rem a in " a p a rt from th e m ain c u rre n t of A m erican life," ju st as " a n ineffective a rm y " w as n o lo n g er "a sig n of g race."71 In th a t sp irit, p oliticians jo in ed experts o n h e a lth a n d social w elfare to stu d y th e d ra ft's evidence of a p p allin g physical a n d e d u ca tio n al co n d itio n s am o n g m a n y y o u n g m en, a n d to u se the n a tio n al em erg en cy to rem e d y th o se co n d i­ tions. R eform ers a n d ex p erts to o k u p specific challen g es— im p ro v in g literacy o r d e n ta l care, cu rb in g v en ereal d isease a n d p ro stitu tio n (to critics, each m ili­ ta ry cam p attrac ted a "v eritab le carnival of vice"). E leanor R oosevelt h o p e d th a t th e co n d itio n s rev ealed b y th e d ra ft w o u ld s p u r a n a tio n al h e a lth p ro g ram , a n d F ranklin took u p the cause, once ag ain fu sin g social w elfare a n d n a tio n al defense. "It is n 't a t this tim e a m a tte r so m u c h of a id in g im m ed iate n a tio n al d efen se for this year, o r th e n e x t year, as of g ettin g a stro n g e r race of A m erican s in th e d a y s to com e." H alf-jokingly h e su g g ested a "p erio d ic [m edical] ch eck u p o n ev ery b o d y " a n d th e g o v e rn m e n t's "rig h t to say to th a t fellow , 'N o w , look, d o n 't d i e . '. . . C onstitutionally, h e h as the rig h t to d o it [die]. But th e G o v ern ­ m e n t o u g h t to k n o w w h a t his a ttitu d e is." H is h u m o r nicely c a p tu re d p rev ail­ in g a ttitu d es: n a tio n al d efense a n d social w elfare, ra th e r th a n clashing objec­ tives, req u ire d each o th er.72 T he m o b ilizatio n of h u m a n resources also offered o p p o rtu n itie s for specific g ro u p s— at least m en in them , since the task w a s u n d e rs to o d in g e n d ered term s. A lth o u g h n o t d e sig n e d to ch an g e ineq u ities of class a n d race, m o b iliza­ tio n n o n eth eless m a d e som e ch an g e possible, especially for A fricanA m ericans. Blacks often felt indifferent to th e stru g g le in E u ro p e a n d su s­ p icio u s of th e racial d y n am ics in th e d e v elo p in g A sian conflict, b u t m o re vex in g w a s th e p a te n t d isc rim in atio n th ey faced in w a r p la n ts a n d th e a rm e d forces. U su ally p o o r a n d resid in g in a S outh w h ere Jim C ro w still ru led , black m en w ere a ttrac ted to m ilitary service, w ith its p ro m ise of incom e a n d a m easu re of statu s, o n ly to fin d th eir en tran ce often blocked w h e n th ey v o lu n te ere d or g ot d rafte d . E ven if allow ed in, th ey faced d iscrim in atio n a n d segregation; th o u g h a n im p o rta n t legal step, a b a n o n racial d iscrim in atio n in th e 1940 Selective Ser­ vice A ct c h an g e d little in practice. W riter L an g sto n H u g h e s cau g h t th e irony: "W e are elev ato r boys, janitors, red caps, m a id s— a race in u n ifo rm ," b u t n o t in

50

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the n a tio n 's u n ifo rm .73 P erh ap s m o st of all, th ere w a s th e in fu ria tin g p ro sp e c t of join ing a w a r for freed o m w ith o u t h av in g it a t ho m e, a d d e d to b itte r m em o ­ ries of d a sh e d expectations in the last w ar. In th e sp rin g of 1941, black lead ers w ru n g w h a t lev erag e th e y co u ld from this situ atio n , th rea te n in g a m arch o n W ash in g to n u n less FDR acted. F earin g p o liti­ cal tu rm oil, R oosevelt g ru d g in g ly offered ju st e n o u g h to g et th e m arch called off: a n executive order, w ith a w e a k enforcem en t m ech an ism , b a rrin g d iscrim i­ n a tio n b y em p lo y ers a n d lab o r u n io n s en g ag ed in d efen se b u sin ess, p lu s to k en ch an g es in the a rm e d forces. H is ratio n ale w a s clear: n a tio n al defen se, n o t so­ cial justice. A n a tio n facing "to ta litaria n ism " n e e d e d all its w o rk e rs a n d n e e d e d to stre n g th e n its " u n ity a n d m o rale b y refutin g a t h o m e th e v e ry th eo ries w h ic h w e are fighting a b ro a d ."74 T he ep iso d e w a s a tu rn in g p o in t in race relations. A n e w black m ilitan cy co­ in cid ed w ith th e sta te 's g ro w in g n e e d for resources a n d for ideological con­ sistency, y ield in g th e m ass-action tactics, rationales, a n d — in m e n like A. P h ilip R a n d o lp h — m u ch of th e le a d ersh ip th a t w o u ld sh a p e race relatio n s for d e ­ cades to com e. For blacks, the o p p o rtu n ity o p e n e d w a s a m ix ed blessing; offer­ in g th em n e w leverage, it also su b o rd in a te d racial justice to n a tio n al security; tactically em p o w erin g th em , it also ideologically circu m scrib ed th em . Still, FD R 's action ack n o w led g ed th a t n a tio n al secu rity co u ld o p e n th e w a y for so­ cial justice in ad m issib le to m o st w h ite A m erican s as a goal in its o w n right. The n e e d s of n a tio n al secu rity w ere ch allen g in g fears of activist g o v e rn m e n t in the aren a of race, ju st as th ey d id in th e field of social w elfare. A s a lever for social change, n a tio n al secu rity larg ely sto p p e d a t th e n a tio n 's b o rd ers. It could n o t o v errid e in g ra in e d p reju d ices a g ain st o u tsid e rs try in g to g e t in o r a g ain st others, su c h as H isp an ics a n d Japanese-A m ericans, still seen as aliens. The issue em erg ed forcefully reg a rd in g Jew ish refu g ees from E urope. By a n d large. C ongress a n d th e a d m in istra tio n b a rre d th e do o r, w ith s u p p o rt from m o st A m ericans, w h o se anti-Sem itic preju d ices w e re p ro b a b ly p e a k in g a t th is tim e. The a d m in istra tio n lacked th e w ill a n d th e political n e e d to ch allenge th o se prejudices, a n d som e Jew ish lead ers feared th a t a n y challenge b y th e m w o u ld only inflam e anti-Sem itism . P o w erfu l m em o ries of d isto rte d p ro p a ­ g a n d a a b o u t G e rm a n atrocities in W orld W ar I d im in ish e d th e cred ib ility of charges a g ain st th e N azis. A b o u t 150,000 Jew s d id e n te r th e U n ited States b y m id-1942— n o t a b a d record c o m p a red to th a t of o th er n atio n s, b u t a m ere frac­ tio n of those e n d an g e re d . T h at m a n y p ro m in e n t Jew ish refu g ees g o t in sh o w ed h o w celebrity, class, o r ability to serve n a tio n a l d efen se (as refu g ee Jew ish sci­ en tists d id in the atom ic b o m b project) created loopholes. T h at C h ristia n refu ­ gees also faced som e obstacles to ad m issio n , w h ile th e p lig h t of A sian refugees w a s b arely even a n issue, su g g ests th a t anti-S em itism also sh a d e d off in to dif­ fuse n a tiv ism a n d racism , a n d into an tirad icalism , g iv en th e e q u a tio n som e m ad e b e tw ee n Jew s a n d leftist conspiracies. In d eed , the refugee issue arose ju st w h e n a m o b ilizatio n of fear w a s ad v an c-

EMERGENCE,

19 3 3 - 1 94

SI

in g alo n g sid e th e m o b ilizatio n of econom ic a n d h u m a n resources. A lth o u g h ch allen g ed b y A frican-A m ericans, a m o n g o th ers, racism a n d n a tiv ism flow ed in o th e r d irections o p e n e d u p b y th e fear th a t im p e n d in g w a r b red . N a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t offered le a d ersh ip in th is fo rm of m o b ilizatio n as in o th ers, a n d w h ile racial a n d ethnic g ro u p s w ere rarely th e in te n d e d o r on ly targ et, th e fear of alien influences h a d p erm eab le b o u n d a rie s. Since W orld W ar I, W alter M illis later n o te d , "a quasi-religious n a tio n alism h a d b e en se d u lo u sly c u ltiv ated in th e U n ited States," so th a t p atrio tic ritu a ls a n d sym bols on ly lately in v en ted n o w seem ed tim eless (an d req u ired ) for A m ericans. W ith th eir help, a once u n ­ im ag in ab le "d eg re e of reg im en ta tio n a n d c en tralizatio n . . . h a d b y 1941 b e ­ com e n o m o re th a n a n o rm al a n d p a te n tly necessary o rd e r of affairs."75 E v id en t in m a n y sp h eres of A m erican life, th a t sp irit of reg im en tatio n sh a p e d th e m o­ b ilizatio n of fear in p articular. R oosevelt him self so u n d e d th e a la rm a b o u t sub v ersio n . It flo w ed logically fro m h is co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security, after all, th a t su b v e rsio n c o u ld leap th e oceans ju st as w e a p o n s m ig h t, a n d th a t "to ta l d efen se" req u ire d vigilance a g ain st enem ies at hom e. "W e k n o w of n e w m e th o d s of attack," h e a n n o u n ce d in M ay 1940. "T he Trojan H orse. T he Fifth C o lu m n th a t b e tra y s a n a tio n u n ­ p re p a re d for treachery. Spies, sa b o teu rs a n d traito rs are th e actors in th is n e w strateg y." So too m ig h t b e those w ith n o ties to a n enem y: ap o stles of "g ro u p h a tre d o r class tro u b le" w ere am o n g th e forces of " u n d ilu te d p o iso n ."76 E ven th o se w h o sim p ly o p p o se d his policies, h e su g g ested , m ig h t b e en em ies of th e natio n . Before R u ssia's e n try into th e w ar, FD R so m etim es w a rn e d of c o m m u n ist su b v ersio n , as h a d lu rid congressional in v estig atio n s (often a im ed a t h is a d ­ m in istratio n ) in th e late 1930s. M ore often, h e set h is sig h ts o n N a zi sab o teu rs, h o m e g ro w n (often G erm an-A m erican) sy m p ath izers, a n d rig h t-w in g ex trem ­ ists. T he far rig h t w a s a m otley b u n c h — u su a lly racists a n d anti-Sem ites, h eirs to v a rio u s C atholic a n d P ro te stan t anxieties, g en erally rab id foes of co m m u ­ nism . It in c lu d e d the R everend G erald L. K. S m ith (H u ey L o n g 's fo rm er ally), W illiam D u d le y Pelley (of th e Silver Legion), E lizabeth D illing (au th o r of The Red Network), a n d F ather C harles C o u g h lin (the fam o u s "rad io p riest"). A g ain st su c h people, R oosevelt a n d o th er po litician s h e lp e d to fo m en t a "B row n Scare" before a n d after Pearl H a rb o r.77 A lth o u g h d irected a t differen t targ ets a n d p racticed o n a lesser scale, it resem b led th e Red Scares a t th e close of W orld W ar I a n d a fter W orld W ar II in its slo p p y reg a rd for civil liberties, affin­ ity for conspiracy theories, m a n ip u la tio n of concerns for n a tio n al security, a n d in stitu tio n al m achinery. In d ee d , the B row n Scare w a s a n o th e r act in th e re­ h earsal for th e C old W ar, g oing far to g e n erate th e m en tality a n d th e a p p a ra tu s m o b ilized a g ain st th e left after W orld W ar II. L en d in g specific co n ten t to the B row n Scare w ere th e concerns a n d tactics of antifascist forces. A lread y in 1935, S tu art C h ase h a d co m p lain ed th a t h e co u ld "h a rd ly go o u t to d in n er, o p e n a n e w sp a p e r [or] tu rn o n th e rad io w ith o u t en-

52

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O F AMERl 'CA

co u n terin g the term 'fa s c is t/" T hat te rm w a s flu n g in m a n y d irectio n s— a t tim es at the N e w D eal itself— as if m an y A m erican s w ere m o re in terested in som e h o m e g ro w n fascism th a n in its G e rm a n a n d Italian p ro to ty p es. L iberals a n d leftists m o st often w ie ld e d the term , th eir ch arg es ech o in g th e c o u n te rsu b ­ v ersiv e th em es (less o ften the viciousness) of th e rad icals o n th e rig h t w h o m th ey attacked. B ehind th em lay a legacy of c o u n te rsu b v e rsiv e cru sad es, as w ell as fears set loose b y W orld W ar I of h o w c u n n in g p ractitio n ers of p ro p a g a n d a co u ld d u p e th e gullible m asses. P o p u la r c u ltu re fan n e d su c h fears w ith p s e u ­ d o d o c u m e n ta ry exposes, novels su ch as Sinclair L ew is's It Can't Happen Here (1935), film s like Black Legion (1936), a n d rad io c o m m en ta ry (W alter W inchell rep e ate d ly u rg in g th e a rre st of foes o n the right). S uch lite ra tu re ig n o red the rig h t's g en u in e A m erican roots a n d e x ag g erated its ties to en em ies a b ro a d — "Is L in d b erg h a N azi?" one in te rv en tio n ist p a m p h le t ask ed in 1941— ju st as few antifascists recognized th a t "th ere w a s n o n ecessary co n n ectio n b e tw e e n co n servative theology a n d far rig h t activism . . . a m ajo rity of d e v o u t fu n d a ­ m en talists, because th ey w ere poor, so u th e rn , or b o th , v o ted for R oosevelt."78 Liberals th ereb y conjured u p im ages of a closed w o rld of in sid io u s id eo lo g y a n d subversion. In th eir view , rig h t-w in g ers a t h o m e w ere im p o rtin g o r m im ­ icking th e id eas a n d tactics of fascist forces a b ro a d — a n d h a d to b e sto p p e d . R oger B aldw in a t th e A m erican C ivil L iberties U n io n accu rately d e te cted a m o n g liberals a n d rad icals a d rift to w a rd " 'L ib erty for O u r S id e' only." E ven th o se w h o w a rn e d a g ain st "m ass h y ste ria " also b eliev ed th a t "to leran ce for th e into lerance of alien sy stem s" could n o t b e accep ted b y tru e d em o crats. In th a t sp irit cam e L ew is M u m fo rd 's p ro p o sa l to o u tlaw as trea so n th e e sp o u sa l of fas­ cism , a n d M ax L e m e r's desire for a T ru th in O p in io n Act, w h o se co m m is­ sioners w o u ld ro o t o u t "p o iso n o u s" p ro p a g a n d a .79 C o n g ress a n d FDR w o u ld n o t go th a t far, b u t m a n y liberals s u p p o rte d ren ew al of th e H o u se C o m m ittee o n U n -A m erican A ctivities in 1938 a n d p assag e of th e A lien R egistration A ct (the S m ith Act) in 1940. A t th e sam e tim e, R oosevelt, rem o v in g earlier p ro h ib itio n s o n p o litical su r­ veillance, p ressed the Federal B ureau of In v estig atio n in to a w id e -ra n g in g p ro b e of "su b v ersiv e" g ro u p s o n th e far rig h t, as w ell as m ain strea m a n ti­ in te rv en tio n ist o rg an izatio n s like A m erica First a n d pu b lic fig u res like Joseph K ennedy, B urton W heeler, a n d C harles L indbergh. D espite h is a n im u s to w a rd th e left, FBI d irecto r J. E d g ar H oover, a m aste r e m p ire b u ild e r, c o m p lied w ith a zeal exceeding FD R 's intentions, offering a flood of re p o rts a b o u t rig h t-w in g e rs to a keenly in terested R oosevelt a n d m ak in g p la n s to d e ta in alleg ed en em ies of th e state. Legal p ro secu tio n g enerally a w aited form al e n try in to th e w ar, w h e n it rev ealed "scan t links b e tw ee n B erlin a n d e v en th e m o st vicio u s antiS em ites."80 P ro m o ted b y different forces, the fears m o b ilized o n th e eve of w a r d id n o t fully cohere. A nti-Sem itism sto o d b esid e fear of fascism , su sp icio n s of ItalianA m ericans jostled w ith su rp risin g tolerance to w a rd G erm an -A m erican s, racist

EMERGENCE,

1933-194

53

sen tim en ts to w a rd Japanese coexisted w ith sy m p a th y for b e leag u ered C hi­ nese, a g en eral n a tiv ism c o u n terb alan ced a sense of so lid arity w ith allies ab ro ad . M ost w id e sp re a d , h ow ever, w a s fear of th e fascist forces, sh a d in g off in to g en eral anxiety a b o u t th e n a tio n 's security. M obilization in d u c e d a n o th e r fear as w ell— of th e v e ry m ach in ery th a t p ro ­ d u c e d it. L iberal critics likened th e FBI to b o th th e G estap o a n d th e Soviet secret police w h e n it in tru d e d o n the politics a n d p riv acy of th eir political com ­ p atrio ts. A few o n the left, like th e red o u b tab leS o cialist N o rm a n T hom as, q u e s­ tio n e d FBI actions a g ain st th e fringe rig h t, ju st as som e co n serv ativ es rose to d e fe n d civil liberties for th eir political foes. In a m ore reflective fashion, intellectuals ru m in a te d o n ch anges th a t m ig h t o u tla st th e w ar. In 1941, political sociologist H a ro ld L assw ell a n n o u n c e d th e em erg ence of the "g arriso n state." T h o u g h w a rn in g of th e co m in g "su p re m a c y of th e soldier," h e in fact d e p ic te d a su b tler d e v elo p m e n t, th e em ergence of "sp ecialists o n violence" v ersed in m o d e m tech n o lo g y a n d m erg in g th e skills of th e soldier, the m anager, a n d the "p ro m o te r of large-scale civilian en ter­ p rise ." Such m en m ig h t m an ip u la te "u n iv ersa l fear" a n d ex p lo it "th e b o tto m layers of th e p o p u la tio n ." 81 L assw ell's a u d ien ce a n d in ten tio n s w ere largely scholarly, h ow ever, a n d m o st intellectuals w ere p reo c cu p ie d b y th e im m ed iate crisis, to w h ich fear of a "g arriso n state" to o k seco n d place. Sim ilarly, su sp i­ cions a b o u t state p o w e r voiced b y conservativ es like H e rb e rt H oover, w h a t­ ev er th eir lastin g validity, w ere for the m o m e n t d riv e n b y a n im u s to w a rd FDR a n d h is in te rv en tio n ist policy. In general, then, criticism of th e em erg in g n a tio n a l secu rity state d isp lay e d occasional insight b u t lim ited clout. A lth o u g h flo w in g from som e of th e sam e a n tistatist cu rren ts, it lacked the stin g a n d ideological coherence of earlier a t­ tacks o n th e N e w Deal. Like attacks o n co n scrip tio n o r econom ic m obilization, it also fell victim to th e in ten se factionalism a m o n g R oosevelt's o p p o n e n ts a n d to ala rm a b o u t the n a tio n 's safety. Ju st as the state m obilized, so too d id c u ltu re itself, a lth o u g h , g iv en its d ecen ­ tralized n a tu re , it d id so in a less sp e e d y a n d sy stem atic w ay. H o lly w o o d , for exam ple, w a s n o to rio u sly slow to id en tify w ith th e in te rv en tio n ist cause or to trea t th e w o rld crisis. W h atev er the sy m p a th ies of its m a n y Jew ish leaders, th ey w ere lo n g offset b y fears of alien atin g key seg m en ts of th e global m ark e t a n d b y th e vigilance of H o lly w o o d 's chief censor, w h o su sp ec ted th a t Jew s in H olly­ w o o d "w ere try in g to u se th e N a zis' trea tm e n t of Jew s to m ak e p ro p a g a n d a p ictu res." Confessions ofa Nazi Spy (1939) b reach ed th e d a m , w h ile d e e p e r forces e ro d e d it. N azi c o n q u est of E u ro p e e n d e d co n cern a b o u t m ak in g film s p a la t­ able for au d ien ces there, a n d B ritain's su rv iv a l m a d e it a b o o m m a rk e t for antiN azi film s. The sta te 's h e av y h a n d — the a d m in istra tio n 's th re a t of a n titru st actio n — also p la y e d a role in m o v in g H o lly w o o d to w a rd a n in terv en tio n ist stance. So too d id in fo rm al co o p eratio n am o n g a d m in istra tio n figures, in ter­ v e n tio n ist g ro u p s, a n d H o lly w o o d executives, w riters, a n d artists. In th e en d .

54

THE M ILITA RIZ ATIO N OF AMERICA

H o lly w o o d p re se n te d the in te rv en tio n ist v iew w ith far less n u a n ce a n d b alan ce th a n o th er m edia. M eanw hile, th e an ti-in te rv en tio n ist cause d id n o t len d itself to th e d ram atic u ses H o lly w o o d m a d e of re a rm am en t, w h ic h w a s easily glam ­ o rized in new sreels a n d film s a b o u t sp ectacu lar w a r g am es a n d d a re -d ev il p i­ lots. N o w o n d e r FDR p u b licly th a n k e d th e in d u s try for its " sp le n d id co o p era­ tio n ."82 C o o p e ratio n reached its z en ith in S ep tem b er 1941 w ith th e release of Sergeant York, th e m o st so p h isticated a n d influential in te rv en tio n ist film . FDR g reeted W orld W ar I hero A lvin York a t the W hite H o u se for a special screening, th e a rm y u se d th e occasion to recruit, a n d lu m in a rie s a tte n d e d th e lav ish N e w York p rem iere: E leanor R oosevelt, G en. John J. P ersh in g , W endell W illkie, a n d Tim e-Life's H e n ry Luce. S u p p o rtin g in te rv en tio n ism itself, k ey film s also d ro v e h o m e b ro a d e r m essages. Confessions of a Nazi Spy, for exam ple, d isp u te d o ld n o tio n s of w a r as so m eth in g form ally declared , as E d w a rd G. R obinson as­ se rted th a t G erm an y w a s a lre ad y a t w a r w ith th e U n ited States: "It's a n e w k in d of w a r b u t it's still w a r." 83 Sergeant York d id n o t d irectly a d d re ss th e issu es of 1941, b u t as a m o ral d ra m a of Y ork's p assag e fro m C h ristia n pacifism to m ili­ ta n t realism d u rin g W orld W ar I, it su g g e ste d th e fu tility of pacifism in 1917, 1941, a n d a n indefinable future. M ore im p o rta n t th a n su c h o v e rt m essages, h o w ev er, w a s H o lly w o o d 's p ro ­ m o tio n of a w a r m e n ta lity — a sense of the in ev itab ility of w a r a n d th e p e r­ v asiv eness of its n e e d s— th a t tra n sc e n d e d p a rtisa n p o sitio n s o n fo reig n policy. In ach ieving th a t effect, o th er m ed ia also p la y e d a role. "T he w a r w a s ev ery w h e re — th e m ovies, the songs, e v en th e term in o lo g y of sp o rts. O n e saw it in a su m m a ry of th e m atch b e tw ee n [Joe] L ouis a n d [Billy] C onn: 'A sp e e d y lig h t cru iser of the rin g failed to w ith sta n d th e h e a v y firin g of th e g reatest d re a d n o u g h t of m o d e m boxing." R adio c o n tin u e d its role, as d id cartoonists, n o v elists, a n d journalists, w h o sh o w ed th em selv es o r th eir h a rd b o ile d h ero es u n d e rg o in g a conversion experience in w h ic h th ey sh e d th e cynicism of th e in ­ te rw a r y ears to m ake th eir w e a ry b u t d e te rm in e d co m m itm en t to dem ocracy. M aking w a r " a n in stru m e n t of m erch an d isin g ," a d v e rtise rs w o rk e d defen se in to th eir m essag es— "A n y o n e b u y in g a n e w P ly m o u th to d ay ," ra n o n e ad , "h as th e satisfaction of n o t on ly o b tain in g the finest car in P ly m o u th h istory, b u t of k n o w in g h e h a s also g iv en su p p o rt to the d efen se p ro d u c tio n stru c tu re ."84 The sta te 's role in sh a p in g c u ltu re b ecam e m o re so p h isticated as w a r a p ­ pro ach ed. W hile m a n y fed eral officials fav o red d rac o n ian cen so rsh ip a n d h e av y -h an d e d p ro p a g a n d a , others, in clu d in g FDR h im self a t tim es, reco g n ized th a t a softer sell a n d in d irect p ressu re s o n th e m ed ia g a in e d th eir objectives at less political cost. T hey eschew ed m o st of the stro n g -arm m e th o d s of 1918— o r of 1941 in places like G e rm a n y — in favor of a n in fo rm al p u b lic -p riv a te co o p er­ atio n th a t w o u ld largely p rev a il for decad es after th e w ar. O ne m in o r in cid en t p ro v id e d a n o th e r foretaste of th e C o ld W ar. E x asp erated b y th e d rift of m ed ia preferences, a n ti-in te rv en tio n ist co n g ressm en lau n ch ed

EMERGENCE,

1933-1941

SS

a n in v estig atio n in to H o lly w o o d in th e fall of 1941, ju st w h e n Sergeant York a p ­ p e ared . T he effort w a s led b y Sen. G erald N ye, w h o "reassem b led th e cast of c o n sp irato rs h e flayed so effectively in h is 'm erc h an ts of d e a th ' h e arin g s of 1934-36," n o w fin d in g th e m in H o lly w o o d a n d its Jew ish lead ersh ip . T h o u g h d e a f to the su b tle r m e th o d s of c u ltu ra l control, N y e g ra sp e d th e in sid io u s san i­ tizatio n of w a r en d em ic to m o d e m culture: Film s sh o w ed n o m e n "cro u ch in g in th e m u d . . .b o y s d isem b o w eled , b lo w n to bits. You see th em m erely m arc h in g in th e ir b rig h t u n ifo rm s, firing th e b e au tifu l g u n s a t d ista n t targ ets." H olly­ w o o d 's defense, m o u n te d b y W endell W illkie, w a s slip p ery in w a y s th a t in­ v ite d th e in d u stry 's later cap itu la tio n to differen t p u rp o se s. W hile a d m ittin g th a t "w e m ak e n o p rete n se of frien d lin ess to N a zi G erm an y ," W illkie d e n ie d p re ssu re fro m th e W hite H ouse. "Frankly, th e m o tio n -p ictu re in d u stry w o u ld b e a sh a m e d if it w e re n o t d o in g v o lu n ta rily w h a t it is n o w d o in g in th is p atrio tic cause." T h o u g h ig n o rin g the sta te 's arm tw istin g , th a t sta te m e n t p o in te d to b o th th e larg e r ach iev em en t a n d the larg er problem : th a t th e sh a p e rs of cu ltu re w illin g ly se rv ed th e sta te 's p u rp o se s.85 N y e 's sally a g ain st H o lly w o o d w a s a n o th e r in cid en t in th e "G reat D ebate" o v er foreign policy. The fall of France in Ju n e 1940 h e lp e d th e in te rv en tio n ist cause b y sh a tte rin g analogies b e tw e e n 1917, w h e n France h a d stay ed the course, a n d th e n e w crisis. In the follow ing y e ar cam e th e fiercest d eb ate, from w h ich th e a d m in istra tio n w re ste d p u b lic su p p o rt for re a rm a m e n t a n d L endLease, b u t o n ly after th e accusations g o t nasty. A ssailing th e L end-L ease law. Sen. R obert Taft d eclared th a t "th e v e ry title of th e bill is a frau d . L en d in g w a r m ateriel is m u c h like len d in g ch ew in g g u m ," a n d "certain ly w e d o n o t w a n t th e sam e g u m b ack ."86 W hile a d m in istra tio n sp o k e sm e n im p lied th a t L in d b erg h a n d h is k in d w ere N azis, the av iato r re sp o n d e d in a fam o u s sp eech ch arg in g th a t Jew s, N e w D ealers, a n d the B ritish w ere d ra g g in g th e c o u n try in to w ar. T he final m o n th s before P earl H a rb o r saw th e e x h au stio n of d e b a te — n o t of its bittern ess, b u t of its capacity to g en erate n e w a rg u m e n ts a n d real dialo g u e. The d e b ate ex p o sed few clear d iv isio n s am o n g A m erican s b e y o n d th o se a b o u t in terv en tio n ism itself, a lth o u g h eth n icity w a s a factor. In o p p o sin g Roo­ sevelt, "Pacifists e n listed a lo n g w ith fo rm er m ilitary m en , social refo rm ers m arch ed b esid e e x -L ib e rty L eaguers, lab o r activists sh o w e d u n accu sto m ed so lid arity w ith b u sin essm en , a n d co m m u n ists [before Ju n e 1941] jo in ed ran k s w ith C h ristia n fu n d am e n ta lists." D espite accu satio n s th a t it h a rb o re d G e rm a n sy m p ath izers, A m erica First resem b led in te rv en tio n ist g ro u p s m o re th a n th e G erm an-A m erican B und in its ideology a n d class co m position. A lth o u g h d i­ v ersity m e a n t th a t "n o n in te rv en tio n ists could n e v e r achieve real u n ity ," it also d o g g ed in te rv en tio n ists, except th a t the W h ite H o u se w a s o n th eir sid e an d w o rsen in g w o rld crisis stre n g th e n ed th eir h a n d s.87 M ore im p o rta n t th a n th e co u rse a n d co n ten tio n s of th e d eb ate, ho w ev er, w ere its to n e a n d term s. M ark in g th e a d v e n t of a "realist" p a ra d ig m for foreign policy, d e b ate to a rem ark ab le d eg ree focused o n A m erican self-interest ra th e r

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th a n o n A m erican ideals o r the p lig h t of p eo p les ab ro ad . O th e r ratio n ales n e v er d isa p p ea red . In terv en tio n ists u rg e d a "F ight for F re e d o m /' as th e m o st d e te r­ m in ed lobby of liberals w a s called, a n d ex p ressed sh am e a n d d isg u st th a t th e U n ited States h a d tu rn e d its back o n the "g o ld en o p p o rtu n ity " for w o rld le a d ­ e rsh ip " h a n d e d to u s o n th e p ro v erb ial silver p la tte r" in 1919, as H e n ry Luce p u t it in Life. For th eir p a rt, FD R 's o p p o n e n ts w a rn e d th a t e n try in to w a r w o u ld u n d e rm in e A m erican dem ocracy a n d lead to o th e r d an g ers: to th e tu n e of "G o d Save A m erica," p ro p o se d one Irish-A m erican C o n g ressm an , sing, "G o d save A m erica, from B ritish ru le." But su c h ideals a n d fears w e re o ften h a zily a rticu ­ lated , seen as in a d e q u a te for co p in g w ith b ru ta l tim es, o r d ism isse d as a rtfu l p ro p a g a n d a glossing o v e r real interests. T hey to o k seco n d place in d e b ate b e ­ h in d v a rio u s calculations of n a tio n al security.88 O ften re g a rd e d as a sign of m a tu rity for th e n atio n , th e "realistic" te m p e r of d e b ate also h a d draw backs. It te n d e d to u n d e rc u t m o re p a ssio n a te a rg u m e n ts a n d to en co u rag e reliance o n co ol-headed elites for d ecisio n m ak in g , conse­ q u en ces th a t ex te n d ed b e y o n d W orld W ar II, c o n trib u tin g to th e illu sio n of a n " e n d to ideology" in p o stw a r A m erica. It fo resh ad o w ed th e m u te d , v a g u e sense of p u rp o se m o st A m ericans h a d d u rin g th e w ar. A n d it c o n trib u te d to the fram ew o rk in w h ic h A m ericans u n d e rs to o d th e w a r 's acts of in h u m a n ity . The b ru talities of N azis a n d o th ers w o u ld b e re g a rd e d as tragic, b u t e v en m o re as em blem atic of the generic h o rro rs of w a r fro m w h ic h th e U n ite d States h a d to sh ield itself— to p re v e n t or sto p su c h acts lay b e y o n d th e n a tio n 's g o al of self­ p rotection, except in so far as victo ry itself e n d e d them . T he realist p a ra d ig m , if n o t alone responsible for su ch consequences, m a d e it difficult to a p p ly an y sta n d a rd h ig h e r th a n n a tio n al security to th e c o u n try 's actions in w ar. T he te m p e r of d eb ate c o n trib u te d to one o th er co nsequence, th e te n d e n c y to reg ard the em erg in g d o m in a n ce of n a tio n al secu rity as im p o se d u p o n A m eri­ cans b y external forces. Because d eb ate fo cu sed o n A m erica's safety, m o st A m ericans av o id ed p o n d e rin g w h e th e r th eir n a tio n o r its lead ers also so u g h t p o w e r for reasons o th er th a n defense. In th e realist p a ra d ig m , "d efen se" w a s th e w o rd co n stan tly d e p lo y e d a n d in sisten tly sh o u te d — a n d accu rately reflect­ in g the sensibility of m o st A m ericans. The exhausting, en erv atin g q u a lity of the G reat D ebate h a d m u c h th e sam e effect, m ak in g A m erica's slide to w a rd w a r seem irresistible a n d b e y o n d its con­ trol. In 1940, tw o ob serv ers n o ted , A m erican s "seem ed to b e w a tc h in g th e e n ­ actm ent of a d ra m a in w h ic h th eir role h a d alre ad y b e e n fixed." "In a fu n d a ­ m en tal sense, th ere w as n o foreign policy d e b ate after len d -lease," a rg u e s a s tu d e n t of C hicago's n e w sp a p e rs, w h ich b y late 1941 " h a d ceased try in g to in ­ fluence policy or aro u se opinion. T hey settled b ack u n e asily to a w a it ev en ts." By th a t tim e, arg u es a n o th e r scholar, a " p ro p a g a n d a d in so p e rv a siv e a n d so d iv erse in its sources" w as telling. "Its effect, m u c h to th e d isa p p o in tm e n t of m ilitants, w as n o t to shock o r enrage, b u t to n u m b th e resistance to w ar." T h o u g h h a rd ly u n iv ersal, a p a lp a b le sense of h e lp lessn e ss— in th e face n o t o n ly

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of global ev en ts b u t also of a n u g ly a n d stalem ated p u b lic d e b a te — h a d set in, a m o o d b o th co n firm ed a n d am p lified b y pub lic o p in io n polls. Som e still a rg u e d o th erw ise, b u t foreign n a tio n s a n d forces, it seem ed , n o t A m erican choices, d ic­ ta te d th e n a tio n 's course. "B lindly, un in ten tio n ally , accidentally a n d really in sp ite of ourselves, w e are a lre ad y a w o rld p o w e r in all th e triv ial w ay s," a rg u e d H e n ry Luce in h is fam o u s "A m erican C e n tu ry " ed ito ria l u rg in g th e n a tio n to exercise th e p o w e r h e th o u g h t it h a d n o choice b u t to w ield . By th e tim e the G reat D ebate e n d ed , it seem ed less a n ep iso d e in n a tio n al decisio n m ak in g th a n a n o th e r p h a se in the process b y w h ic h A m erican s a cco m m o d ated them selv es to a m ilitarized course.89 S m oothing the p a th to w ar, th a t process also fo resh ad o w ed th e C old W ar. To b e sure, th e reh earsal differed from th e p ro d u c tio n to follow . W a r's w o rst h o r­ rors, genocide a n d n u c le ar w arfare, w ere b arely im ag in ab le in 1941. The d re a d sense in 1941 of slid in g in to a w a r already going on differed fro m th e later fear of a w a r that might happen. W h at w as novel in 1940, like a p eacetim e d raft, w a s less sta rtlin g w h e n rep e ate d d u rin g th e C old W ar. T he reh earsal w a s b rief a n d in ­ tense, th e C old W ar p ro trac te d a n d inconclusive. But like the C old W ar, the eve of W orld W ar II exh ib ited b o th th e u rg en cy a n d th e p a rtiality w ith w h ich m ilitarizatio n cam e in to A m erican life. A ffluence alo n g sid e anxiety, m o b ilizatio n w ith o u t w ar, a p o w e rfu l state b u t p e rsisten t an tistatism , acute d a n g e r am id lin g erin g safety, felt innocence a n d a fo rm id a­ ble d riv e for p o w e r— su ch d u a lism s w o u ld also m a rk th e C o ld W ar era. W ar rem ain ed elusive, R oosevelt p u b licly w o rrie d in July 1941. "P eople in th is c o u n try u n fo rtu n a te ly h a v e n 't g o t e n o u g h id ea of w h a t m o d e m w a r m ean s," h e co m p lain ed .90 Soon th ey w o u ld le a m m ore.

The Chip on the Shoulder The ev ents of 1941, a n d the m a n n e r in w h ich A m ericans sh a p e d a n d saw them , sealed th eir sense of an in ad v e rte n t, u n w illin g p lu n g e in to th e age of n a tio n al security. W riting sh o rtly after Pearl H arb o r, an th ro p o lo g ist M arg aret M ead p ro b e d th a t psycho logy of in advertence. "A g g ressio n in th e A m erican charac­ ter is seen as resp o n se ra th e r th a n as p rim a ry b eh av io r," sh e o b serv ed . "T he ch ip o n the sh o u ld e r . . . is the folk ex p ressio n of th is set of a ttitu d e s. In m an y p a rts of A m erica sm all b o y s d elib erately p u t ch ip s o n th e ir sh o u ld e rs a n d w alk a b o u t d a rin g a n y o n e to knock th e chips off." For M ead, th a t b o y ish folkw ay exem plified "a special A m erican form of agg ressiv en ess," o n e "so u n su re of itself th a t it h as to be p ro v e d ." W ith Pearl H arb o r, "Jap an cam e alo n g a n d p u sh e d the chip off o u r sh o u ld e r a n d left u s free to fig h t."91 She w a s right: in the A tlantic as w ell as th e Pacific, the U n ited States in d e e d p u t th e ch ip o n its shoulder. To be sure, as M e ad 's analysis su g g ested , a n y A m erican in te n tio n to p ro v o k e w a r w a s m u rk y a t best, a n d h a rd ly co m p arab le to th e v a u ltin g a m b itio n s of the

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A xis p ow ers. Japan, G erm any, a n d Italy, th o u g h less in co n cert strateg ically o r ideologically th a n m o st A m ericans th o u g h t, w e re reaching th e z e n ith of th o se am b itions in 1941. A fter a skillful c am p aig n of d ecep tio n . H itle r s p ru n g h is arm ies o n the Soviet U n io n in June 1941 a n d th ereb y fo rg ed th e u n lik ely A ngloA m erican-S oviet alliance a g ain st him . H e also escalated h is su b m a rin e w a r in the A tlantic ju st as L end-L ease a n d B ritish d e sp e ra tio n w e re accelerating the flow of A m erican supplies. A m o n g th e c o n te n d in g Jap an ese elites, th e convic­ tio n h a rd e n e d o v er th e su m m e r th a t Japan, a t w a r in C h in a since 1937, w o u ld h av e to strike before th e A nglo-D utch-A m erican econom ic n o o se a n d A m eri­ can re a rm am en t irrevocably tu rn e d th e o d d s a g ain st it. W ith th e Soviet U n io n in a d e a th stru g g le w ith G erm any, w ith all E u ro p ea n im p e ria l p o w e rs except B ritain c o n q u ered in th e ir h o m elan d s, a n d w ith th e B ritish a n d A m erican s scram bling to c o u n ter G erm any, a rare chance o p e n e d u p for Jap an to o v e rru n S o u th east A sia, the D utch E ast Indies, a n d m ore. T here seem ed n o w a y to p u r­ su e th a t course w ith o u t also strik in g a t A m erican forces. The A m erican g o v e rn m e n t perceiv ed Jap an 's in ten tio n s im perfectly, in p a rt b ecau se m a n y officials still clu n g to a m o d el of lim ited w ar: in th e sp rin g of 1941, som e th o u g h t G e rm a n p re p a ra tio n s to attack th e Soviet U n io n w e re a n ­ o th er H itle ria n bluff, a n d in th e fall som e d o u b te d Ja p an 's cap acity to m o u n t sev eral offensives a t once, h o p in g th e one th ey d id u n le a sh w o u ld com e a g ain st R ussia. Inevitably in a large a n d loose b u reau cratic system , A m erican officials d isag reed a b o u t en em y in ten tio n s a n d A m erican p rio rities. M oreover, A ngloA m erican intelligence, th a n k s to n e w m ean s for d eco d in g Jap an ese m essages, w a s in u n d a te d w ith a flood of in fo rm atio n it co u ld n o t rea d ily sift, w h ile Ja­ p a n 's dip lo m acy w as e v en m ore co n fu sed th a n A m erica's a n d ch arg ed racial im ages d isto rte d p ercep tio n s in b o th Tokyo a n d W ashington. In this confusing situ atio n , R oosevelt h a d th e a d v a n ta g e of a u n ifie d a d m in ­ istration. T here w ere n o d isse n ters left in it, on ly th o se like H e n ry L. Stim son, th e seventy-three-year-old secretary of w ar, w h o ch afed a t FD R 's d isin ­ g e n u o u sn ess a n d c h am p io n e d m ore o v e rt e n try in to th e w a r a g ain st G erm any. Stim son, U n d ersecretary of State S u m n e r W elles, a n d H a rry H o p k in s w ere R oosevelt's closest confidants, w h ile the navy, th e h a ir-trig g e r in co n fro n tin g G erm an y a n d Japan, w a s the a rm e d service h e m o st closely m o n ito red . A n in ­ form al W ar C ouncil— Stim son a n d Secretary of th e N a v y F ran k K nox, A dm . H a ro ld Stark a n d G eneral M arshall as m ilitary chiefs, a n d H o p k in s a n d Secre­ tary of State C ordell H u ll— also m et w ith R oosevelt to p ro v id e so m e sy stem to offset his h ig h ly p e rso n al style of co m m an d . In late su m m e r 1941, a t FD R 's d i­ rection, the a rm e d services fo rm u la te d a "V ictory P ro g ram ," a c o h eren t if u n ­ av o id ab ly c o n tin g en t sta te m e n t of strateg y a n d logistics. By then, A m erican global stra te g y w a s reaso n ab ly clear a n d co n sisten t in d e ­ sign. R oosevelt still so u g h t to w ag e lim ited, u n d e clare d w a r a g ain st th e Axis. If h e occasionally h in te d at d o in g m ore, it w a s p ro b ab ly to p lacate a n x io u s allies o r im p a tie n t su b o rd in ates, a n d if h e h e ld back fro m d o in g m ore, h is calcula-

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tio n s of n a tio n a l in terest, as m u c h as congressio n al a n d p u b lic o p in io n , w ere p ro b ab ly th e reason. H e certain ly k n ew h is co u rse co u ld lead to all-o u t w ar, a n e v e n tu a lity h e accepted a n d w ith som e c an d o r p u b licly a ck n o w le d g ed in 1941. B ut u n d e c la re d belligerence reta in e d p o w e rfu l a d v a n ta g e s as lo n g as it m ig h t last a n d its ten sio n s co u ld b e e n d u re d : m o re tim e to m obilize A m erican re­ sources, b ro a d p u b lic su p p o rt, a n d avoidan ce of th e b u rd e n s of fig h tin g — especially a w a r w ith Japan, for w h ic h the U n ited States w a s ill p re p a re d . "In p a rticu la r," one h isto ria n a d d s, R oosevelt feared th a t fo rm al e n try in to th e w a r m ig h t cause a "d isa stro u s cutback in su p p lies to th e A llies as A m erican s d e ­ m a n d e d to ta l c o n cen tratio n o n U.S. rea rm am en t, a n d th a t w a r w ith G e rm a n y w o u ld in ev itab ly m e a n w a r w ith G e rm a n y 's ally, Jap an ."92 W ith in th a t g en eral fram ew o rk , R oosevelt still re g a rd e d G e rm a n y as th e g rea ter th reat, p laced to p p rio rity o n e x te n d in g th e A tlantic lifeline to B ritain a n d later th e Soviet U nion, a n d h o p e d th a t m ilitary d e terren ce a n d H u ll's gift for fo o t-d rag g in g d ip lo m acy w o u ld keep Jap an a t bay. For sev eral reasons, h o w ev er, Ja p an n o w w e ig h ed m o re in his calculations. Its ex p an sio n th re a t­ e n e d A m erican interests, B ritain's ability to h a n g on, a n d h is o w n credibility. H a v in g d e n o u n c e d a p p e a se m e n t in E urope, h e co u ld n o t p ractice it in th e Far East, especially before a n a u d ien ce of A m ericans, in clu d in g som e in h is o w n a d m in istratio n , b o th in d ig n a n t a n d sn e erin g a b o u t Ja p an 's p rete n sio n s to p o w er. E xecuting g ra n d stra te g y w a s a n o th e r m a tte r a t a tim e w h e n co m b at-read y A m erican forces w ere few a n d w id e ly scattered , w h e n th e glo b al situ atio n seem ed to ch an g e w eekly, a n d w h e n th e p ressu re s o n R oosevelt, p a rtic u la rly fro m W in sto n C hurchill, w ere in ten se a n d conflicting. M o v in g g ra d u a lly — o u t of fear of p u b lic o p in io n b u t also to allow th e n a v y to becom e b a ttle -re a d y — R oosevelt increased th e A m erican presence in th e A tlan tic in stag es d u rin g 1941. T he fleet first p a tro lle d th e w e ste rn A tlantic, th e n co n v o y ed m erc h an t vessels, a n d finally assisted B ritish w a rsh ip s d irectly a n d g a in e d a u th o riz a tio n to fire o n G e rm a n subs, w h ile a d iv id e d C o n g ress a p p ro v e d th e a rm in g of A m erican m erc h an t ships. A g ain st Japan, th e a d m in istra tio n e m p lo y ed a v o l­ atile m ix of dip lo m acy a n d deterren ce, w ith th e o n e so m etim es a t cross­ p u rp o se s w ith th e o th er a n d th e c o m b in atio n stro n g e n o u g h to b e p ro v o cativ e b u t too w e a k to b e in tim id atin g . By late su m m er, after fu rth e r Jap an ese ex p an ­ sion in S outheast A sia, these m ea su re s in clu d ed a v irtu a l e m b arg o o n th e flow of oil to Jap an fro m th e U n ited States, its allies, a n d p lia n t L atin A m erican n a ­ tions. But th e a d m in istra tio n 's h o p e rested ab o v e all o n a ir po w er: b e la te d ef­ forts b e g a n in A u g u st to base lo n g -ran g e b o m b ers in th e P h ilip p in es, w h e re th ey m ig h t d e te r o r d is ru p t fu rth e r Japanese ex pansion. It w a s FD R 's last, d e s­ p e ra te a tte m p t to tu rn th e in tim id a tin g tactics of M u n ich a g ain st th e A xis po w ers. A lth o u g h these m easu res a d d re sse d m u ltip le p u rp o se s, th e y in effect p laced th e chip o n A m erica's sh o u ld e rs before its enem ies. "I a m n o t w illin g to fire the

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first shot," R oosevelt once to ld confidants; as a C ab in et m em b er a d d e d , "it seem s th a t h e is still w a itin g for th e G erm an s to create a n 'in c id e n t/ " (A t a n e m o tio n al level, p e rh a p s th a t in cid en t h a d a lre ad y o ccu rred , for in M ay FDR d re a m t of retreatin g to a b o m b -p ro o f cave w h ile G e rm a n b o m b ers p a sse d o v er N e w York City.)93 E nem y resp o n ses d id n o t p recisely p arallel A m erican ch allen g es— it w a s in th e A tlantic w h e re A m erican sh ip s first fired o n (an d w ere fired o n by) th e e n e m y — b u t it w a s Jap an th a t k n o ck ed th e ch ip off th e A m erican sh o u ld e r o n D ecem ber 7. A n d in th e larg er b alan ce of th in g s, the A xis p o w e rs offered th e u ltim ate pro v o catio n , th ro u g h m ilitary conquest. A m erican policy n o n eth eless h a d its p ro v o cativ e qualities. T he im p o rtan ce of this series of m u tu a l p ro v o catio n s a n d resp o n ses lay n o t in lea d in g the p a rties to w a r (d eep er forces p re su m a b ly a cco u n ted for th a t re­ sult) n o r in tarn ish in g th e rig h tn e ss of the A llied cause, b u t in su sta in in g th e A m erican p o stu re of aggressive innocence th a t M ead ex p lain ed . In tu rn , it w a s th e a p p a re n t h y p o crisy of th a t innocence th a t R oosevelt's o p p o n e n ts attacked. A lread y in N o v em b er 1940, C harles B eard, fearin g w a r w ith Jap an , h a d o b ­ serv ed th a t "w a rs are n o lo n g er declared. S itu atio n s exist or are created. A c­ tio n s are tak e n b y au th o rities in a p o sitio n to act. The p e o p le w a it for th e ir p o r­ tio n ."94 A n ti-in terv en tio n ists h a d lo n g a rg u e d th a t FDR w a s lea d in g th e n a tio n to w ar, w h ile th e a d m in istra tio n d e fe n d e d its co u rse as th e b e st w a y to k eep the U n ited States o u t of w ar, o r at least full belligerency. N o w o p p o n e n ts attack ed th e a d m in istra tio n for specific p ro v o catio n s to th e en em y in th e A tlan tic— A m erican m oves a g ain st Jap an w ere b o th m o re secret a n d less w o rriso m e to m o st o p p o n e n ts— a n d a d d e d th a t w ith G e rm a n y b a ttlin g th e Soviet U n io n (w hose defeat ferv en t an tico m m u n ists eag erly aw aited ). H itle r's credible th re a t to the U n ited States h a d d im in ish ed . W rong a b o u t m a n y p articu lars, m ore conv in ced th a n R oosevelt h im self th a t h e w a n te d all-out w ar, shrill in th eir attacks, so m etim es d ism issiv e of A xis p o w e r a n d som etim es ex ag g eratin g it, FD R 's o p p o n e n ts n o n eth eless m a d e a v alu ab le co n trib u tio n to debate. A bove all, th ey k e p t alive th e v iew th a t the U n ited States sh a red responsibility for its p lu n g e in to w o rld w a r a n d a n ag e of n atio n al security. Since th e late 1930s, R oosevelt a n d h is su p p o rte rs h a d p re ­ sen ted th eir policies as reactive to external th rea ts a n d forces— if th e n a tio n h a d a choice to m ake, it in v o lv ed o n ly h o w to react. A n ti-in terv en tio n ists in sisted th a t th e n a tio n h a d choices a n d th a t reaction itself w as a choice, o n e trig g ered n o t b y (or on ly by) the dictates of n a tio n al safety b u t b y co n n iv in g allies, im p e ­ rial am bitions, a m isplaced dem ocratic idealism , th e N e w D eal's failure to b rin g recovery, or a d e v io u s P resident. A m o n g th eir m a n y failures, a n ti­ in te rv en tio n ists could rarely agree o n w h ic h of th o se factors w a s g o v e rn in g th e d rift into w ar. T heir larger v irtu e lay in challen g in g th e p o stu re of h elp lessn ess th a t m o st A m ericans, a n d th eir leaders, h a d assu m ed . T hey m a d e a n o th e r co n trib u tio n as w ell b y criticizing th e e x tra o rd in a ry p o w e rs a ssu m e d b y the P re sid e n t w ith o u t a d eclaratio n of w a r a n d w a rn in g of

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th e p erils to dem ocratic process a n d ideals in a m ilitarized A m erica. "Foreign p o lic y /' C harles a n d M ary B eard h a d w o rrie d in 1939, "co u ld easily b e m ad e th e in stru m e n t to stifle dom estic w ro n g s u n d e r a b lan k e t of m ilitarist c h au v in ­ ism , p e rh a p s d isg u ise d b y th e h ig h -so u n d in g title of w o rld p eace." C h arles B eard, am o n g others, th o u g h su p p o rtin g th e objectives of L end-L ease, con­ d e m n e d th e specific legislation as "a bill for w a g in g a n u n d e clare d w a r," decry ­ in g th e w id e d iscretion it gave R oosevelt a n d foreseeing its futility u n less th e U n ited States p ro tec te d its convoys of treasu re from G e rm a n su b m arin es.95 T he o u tb reak of u n d e clare d w a r th a t a u tu m n p ro m p te d m o re criticism of exec­ u tiv e authority. B itterly offered, it w as w ell fo u n d ed , ev en if a d m in istra tio n b e ­ h a v io r d id n o t fulfill the d o o m sd a y p red ictio n s som e critics m ad e. FD R 's exer­ cise of p o w e r h a d its legal, constitutional, a n d h istorical p reced en ts, b u t h e stretch ed th em far a n d e stab lish ed a p re c e d e n t for successors to go ev en fu r­ ther. T h at w a s so n o t o n ly in his h a n d lin g of m ilitary force b u t in h is u se of th e FBI a n d o th er agencies a g ain st h is o p p o n en ts. Seeking to m ain tain a p o stu re of A m erican innocence, R oosevelt also stretch ed th e m ea n in g of p a rtic u la r events. O n S ep tem b er 4, th e d e stro y er Greer, o p e ra tin g n e a r Iceland, trailed a G erm an su b m a rin e w h ich , a g ain st sta n d in g G erm an o rd ers b u t o n the belief it w as u n d e r assau lt, in itiated a n u n ­ successful attack o n the A m erican ship. In p u b lic com m ents, FDR re p o rte d o n ly th e G erm an attack — "p iracy legally a n d m o ra lly "— n o t th e p u rs u it car­ ried o u t b y the Greer, a n d a n n o u n c e d o rd ers for w a rsh ip s to sh o o t o n sig h t w h e n en g ag in g G erm an subs. O n O ctober 27, after a G erm an su b to rp e d o e d th e d estro y er Kearny— w ith o u t sin k in g it, b u t w ith th e d e a th of elev en A m erican s— h e a n n o u n c e d th a t "h isto ry h a s reco rd ed w h o fired th e first sh o t." O n occasion FD R 's m etap h o rs su g g e ste d so m e th in g else, as if h e so u g h t to knock th e chip off G e rm a n y 's sh o u ld ers. F ollow ing th e Greer in cid en t, h e p ro ­ claim ed th a t "w e h ave so u g h t n o sh o o tin g w a r" (the p h ra se itself, im p ly in g a "n o n sh o o tin g " w ar, w a s aw kw ard). "B ut w h e n y o u see a rattlesn ak e p o ise d to strike, y o u d o n o t w a it u n til h e h a s stru ck before y o u cru sh h im ."96 But m o st pu b lic com m ents b y R oosevelt a n d o th er officials ju x ta p o se d g en eral ex h o rta­ tio n s to b e a t H itle r a g ain st professions of A m erican innocence in specific cir­ cum stances. M eanw hile, th e a u tu m n crisis in Japanese-A m erican relatio n s c a u g h t FD R's foes, a n d to a d eg ree h is o w n a d m in istratio n , off-guard. It h a d b e e n over­ sh a d o w e d b y the th rea t of w a r in th e A tlantic, b y th e com p licated b allet of Japanese-A m erican diplom acy, an d , w ith in official circles, b y g ro w in g confi­ dence in A m erican deterrence. Stim son, for one, w a s b u o y a n t in O ctober, after th e first B-17 b o m b ers a rriv e d in the P hilipp in es. "Far from b ein g im p o te n t to influence ev en ts in th a t area," h e w ro te R oosevelt, "w e su d d e n ly find o u rselv es v ested w ith th e p ossibility of g rea t p o w e r." The b o m b ers, h e m u se d o n a n o th e r occasion, m ig h t e v en h e lp "to shake th e Japanese o u t of th e A xis." A d m in istra ­ tio n lead ers still h o p e d to d e te r w a r w ith Japan, o r k eep it lim ited a n d u n d e -

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d a re d . "T here is w a r in C h in a a n d th ere is w a r in th e A tlantic a t th e p re se n t tim e, b u t in n e ith e r case it is d eclared w a r," M arsh all re m in d e d h is staff. G o in g fu rth er, FDR p o lled his C ab in et a b o u t " w h e th e r th e p e o p le w o u ld b ack u s u p in case w e stru ck a t Jap an d o w n there," h in tin g th a t th e U n ite d States m ig h t strik e first, p e rh a p s after a n in cid en t offered a p rete x t to d o so. O n N o v e m b er 15, M ar­ shall, tak in g jo u rn alists into confidence, ex p ressed h is h o p e th a t d eterren ce w o u ld w o rk — once th e Japanese le a rn ed of th e B-17s, h e su g g e ste d , th ey w o u ld conclude, "W e'd b e tte r go slo w " — b u t if d e terren ce failed, h e w o u ld "se t th e p a p e r cities of Jap an o n fire" w ith o u t "a n y h e sita tio n a b o u t b o m b in g civilians."97 T he a d m in istra tio n 's p la n for its n e w b o m b ers w a s unclear, since th ey lacked th e ran g e to strik e Jap an effectively, a lth o u g h so m e officials v ain ly h o p e d to a rra n g e for th em to refuel a t Soviet S iberian b ases close to Japan. W h atev e r th e p lan , it e n d e d literally in ashes. Jap an c a u g h t A m erican forces b y su rp rise n o t o n ly a t Pearl H a rb o r b u t in th e P h ilip p in es, w h e re th e B-17 force, n o t sc h ed u le d to reach full stre n g th u n til February, d isin te g rate d . T here fo llo w ed ra p id ly th e A m erican d eclaratio n of w a r o n Japan, a n d th e n G e rm a n y 's d e clara tio n o n th e U n ited S tates— a relief to m a n y in th e a d m in istratio n , for th e rea d in ess of A m ericans o p e n ly to e n te r w a r a g ain st G e rm a n y rem a in e d in d o u b t. T he d e p lo y m e n t of th e B-17s a n d th e h o p e s v e sted in th e m rev ealed A m eri­ can a ttitu d e s o n th e b rin k of w a r a n d d u rin g it: a chronic u n d e re stim a tio n , ro o ted in p a rt in racial stereotypes, of Japanese m ilita ry abilities a n d a p e rsis­ te n t o v erestim atio n of A m erican technology. In tu rn , so o p in io n p o lls sh o w ed , m o st A m ericans seem ed to view w a r w ith Ja p an — th o u g h n o t w ith G e rm a n y — eagerly, a lm o st cavalierly. "U.S. C h eerfu lly Faces W ar w ith Jap an ," Life claim ed o n the eve of Pearl H arb o r. A m erican s felt, "rig h tly o r w ro n g ly , th a t th e Japs w ere p u sh o v e rs," a schoolboy's w o rd c o n g ru e n t w ith M e ad 's m e t­ a p h o r of a n a tio n placing a chip o n its sh o u ld e r.98 T he h o p e of u n le a sh in g its b o m b ers a g ain st Japan, p e rh a p s in a su rp rise attack, also acco u n ted for m u c h of th e in d ig n a tio n felt a b o u t Ja p an 's act of "in fam y " (as FDR called it) o n D ecem ­ b e r 7. W h at galled A m erican lead ers w a s n o t sim p ly Ja p an 's treach ery b u t th eir fru stratio n a t h av in g it occur before th e U n ited States c o u ld m o u n t its o w n su r­ prise. M ost A m ericans accepted th e re n d itio n of Jap an ese treach ery offered b y FDR a n d o th er leaders, b rin g in g to a conclu sio n th e process M ead later d e ­ scribed. E ven the v iru le n tly anti-R oosevelt Chicago Tribune c o n clu d ed th a t w a r h a d com e " th ro u g h n o v o litio n of a n y A m erican ." O n e jo u rn alist, a n a rd e n t in ­ terv en tionist, d id p ro te st " o u r p o se of in ju red innocence" a n d th e belief " th a t w e w ere innocently m in d in g o u r o w n b u sin e ss w h e n th e d o o r o p e n e d a n d th ere w a s the A xis w ith a knife."99 But o n ly R oosevelt-haters, rig h t-w in g fa­ natics, a n d lonely h isto ria n s like B eard c o n tin u e d to challenge th e "p o se of in ­ ju red innocence," often d o in g so w ith u n su sta in ab le ch arg es of a R oosevelt conspiracy to p ro m o te th e Pearl H a rb o r attack; ev en th o se ch arg es sim p ly

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sh ifted "in ju re d innocence" from th e n a tio n as a w h o le to e v ery b o d y o u tsid e th e a d m in istratio n . Left intact w a s a sense of A m erica's help lessn ess, in a closed w o rld d o m in a te d b y m alig n forces, to resist its e n try in to w a r a n d th e m ilita riza tio n th a t w e n t w ith it. T here w ere re d e em in g v irtu e s in the p erfo rm an ce of th e n a tio n 's political cu ltu re. M ore th a n before the p rev io u s w a r o r th e o nes to follow , A m erican s d id a d d re ss the g rea t issues of w a r a n d peace in a su sta in e d fash io n a n d w ith w id e p u b lic p articip atio n . It m ay e v en be th a t th e "G reat D ebate" g ave th em a sense of p a rtic ip a tio n in n a tio n al decision m ak in g th a t e n h an c ed acceptance of its outcom e. T he n u m b n ess, futility, a n d b itte rn e ss of d e b ate b y th e a u tu m n o f 1941 cut th e o th e r w ay, how ever. By then, w a itin g anxiously, m o st A m ericans m u s t h av e felt scarcely m ore control ov er th eir o w n g o v e rn m e n t's co u rse th a n th ey d id o v e r th e global crisis in to w h ic h fate seem ed to h av e su ck ed them .

2 T R IU M PH , 1 9 4 1 -1 9 4 5

In Pearl Harbor*s Wake O n th e n ig h t of D ecem ber 8 -9 ,1 9 4 1 , G en. John D eW itt, h e a d of th e W estern D efense C o m m an d , b e ra te d a cro w d a t the San Francisco m a y o r's office. “Jap a­ nese p lan es w ere ov er this c o m m u n ity last n ig h t," h e in sisted , co n d em n in g city officials a n d resid en ts for "sh am efu l" a n d "crim in al" co n d u ct. "I can n o t p ro m ­ ise y o u to p re v e n t a n y b o m b in g of San Francisco, b u t d o n 't be jittery. L earn to take it. Y ou've got to take it, a n d if y o u c a n 't tak e it, g et th e hell o u t of San F ran ­ cisco before it com es."1 A cross the country. L ib rarian of C o n g ress A rchibald M acLeish p re p a re d to evacuate the cap ital's c u ltu ral treasu res. Ja p an 's attack o n Pearl H a rb o r n o t only b ro u g h t the U n ited States officially into th e w a r b u t seem ed to confirm A m ericans' g a th e rin g fears of a d a n g e ro u s w o rld a n d im m i­ n e n t attack. It th ereb y sh a p e d initial A m erican actions in th e w a r a n d u n d e r­ w ro te m ilitarizatio n in the long ru n , p ro v id in g th e m o st e n d u rin g sy m b o l of its a p p a re n t necessity. In D ecem ber 1941, it is true. Pearl H a rb o r w as n o t y et th e to u ch sto n e of alarm , anger, a n d v en eratio n th a t it w o u ld becom e. The full m easu re of catas­ tro p h e th e re — eig h teen sh ip s a n d n early tw o h u n d re d p lan es d e stro y ed or crip p led , som e tw en ty -fo u r h u n d re d A m erican s d e a d — w a s k e p t secret from A m ericans on the g ro u n d s of security, a lth o u g h Jap an m ea su re d A m erican losses w ith som e accuracy. In h ead lin es. Pearl H a rb o r co m p eted w ith Ja p an 's strik in g advances a g ain st A m erican forces in th e P h ilip p in es, cau g h t off-g u ard d e sp ite w o rd of the earlier Pearl H a rb o r attack, a n d a g ain st o th er A m erican, British, a n d D utch positions. M oreover, the official sta rt of G erm an -A m erican w a r c a p tu re d attention, w hile Jap an 's cu lp ab ility w as o ften o b scu red b y h in ts th at it h a d d o n e G erm an y 's b id d in g (the Pearl H a rb o r attack w as "th e m eth o d of H itler him self," FDR said). N o t yet d id Pearl H a rb o r c ro w d o u t o th er ev en ts of th a t caco p h o n o u s w in ter.2 N o r w ere first reactions to Pearl H a rb o r un ifo rm . Rage w as w id e sp re a d b u t n o t universal. "N o one sh o w ed m u ch in d ig n a tio n ," one jo u rn alist n o ticed a t the N avy D epartm ent. H ostile acts to w ard Japanese-A m ericans w ere few. Panic a b o u t Jap an 's m ilitary pro w ess d id n o t im m ed iately tak e hold: in M anila, W ashington, an d L ondon, officials for a few d a y s still h o p e d to carry o u t the

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im m e d ia te "b u rn in g of Japanese cities b y in cen d iary b o m b s," as W in sto n C h u rch ill p u t it. N a tio n a l u n ity w a s lo u d ly p ro claim ed b u t d id n o t go m u ch b e y o n d a v a g u e d e te rm in a tio n to w in the w ar.3 Political co n stru ctio n s as m u c h as visceral reactions, th e em o tio n s a ttrib u te d retro actively to D ecem ber 1941 took tim e a n d fu rth e r A m erican d efeats to b e sh a p ed . P erh ap s th e m o st co m m o n first resp o n ses, from th e P re sid e n t's in n er circle to o rd in a ry street co m ers, w ere sim p le relief th a t th e ag o n izin g ten sio n of recen t m o n th s h a d e n d ed , fatalistic resig n atio n to th e aw fu l task a h ea d , a n d a n u p b e a t em brace of th e p u rp o se fu ln e ss th a t w a r m ig h t brin g . Few m o u rn e d th e e n d of a n u g ly era m a rk e d b y a cynical b u sin e ss cu ltu re, th e "b etray al of th e p eace," g rin d in g d e p ressio n , a n d a b itte r d e b ate a b o u t foreign policy.4 T h o u g h w ith little of the w a r fever of 1917, A m erican s h a d reaso n s to accept w a r's onset. Still, th e P earl H a rb o r attack so o n serv ed as a p o w e rfu l sy m b o l of A m erican innocence, Japanese perfidy, a n d lastin g p e ril to th e U n ited States. Its sym bolic p o w e r d e riv e d n o t sim p ly from the e v en t b u t from th e w a y A m erican s fit it in to th e ir n e w conception of n a tio n al security. Pearl H a rb o r serv ed to co n firm th a t co n ception, as R oosevelt to ld th e n a tio n o n D ecem ber 9: The "terrib le lesson" lea rn ed in th e " p a st few y e ars" a n d the " p a s t th ree d a y s" w a s th a t "th ere is n o su c h th in g as im p reg n ab le defense a g ain st p o w e rfu l ag g resso rs w h o sn eak u p in th e d a rk a n d strike w ith o u t w a rn in g . . . . W e can n o t m ea su re o u r safety in term s of m iles o n a n y m a p a n y m o re." P lay in g sch o o lm aster to a rad io a u d i­ ence o n F eb ru ary 23, h e ask ed A m ericans to sp re a d th eir w o rld m ap s in fro n t of th e m w h ile h e e x p o u n d e d o n th e m ilitary g e o g ra p h y of A m erican v u l­ n erab ility a n d strategy.5 "Isolationists" p re su m a b ly b lin d to th a t v u ln erab ility w ere d e a lt a d e a th b lo w b y Pearl H arb o r, it w a s w id e ly assu m e d . A lth o u g h shocking, Ja p an 's attack w a s assim ilated in to ex istin g p ercep tio n s of a closed w o rld . C on sequently, too, p an ic m o u n te d after D ecem ber 7 a b o u t attack o n the U n ited S tates— panic u n fo u n d e d in retro sp ect b u t th e logical ou tco m e of y ears of talk a b o u t technological w iz ard ry , b litzk rieg w ar, a n d A m erican v u l­ nerability. FDR w a rn e d o n the n in th th a t "th e attack a t Pearl H a rb o r c an b e re­ p e a te d a t a n y one of m a n y points, p o in ts in b o th oceans a n d alo n g b o th o u r coast lines a n d a g ain st all the rest of th e h e m isp h e re." O rd in a ry citizens ab etted th e ala rm w ith claim s of sp o ttin g Japanese aircraft a n d w ith co u n tless ru m o rs (Japanese-A m erican farm ers, it w a s said, cu t th e ir cane fields in to v ecto rs to g u id e attacking en em y planes). If a n y th in g , h ig h officials felt th e p an ic m ore, at one p o in t fearing a G e rm a n attack o n the Sault Ste. M arie locks th ro u g h w h ic h m o st of the n a tio n 's iro n ore p assed . Few officials w ere as excitable as D eW itt, b u t A rm y C hief of Staff G eorge M arshall o rd ere d p recio u s m e n a n d m ateriel d iv e rte d to h o m e defense. A few in cid en ts gave th e alarm credibility. Japanese a n d G erm an su b m a rin e s sa n k sh ip s n e a r A m erican coasts, a n d in February, d ay s after FD R's w a rn in g th a t it w a s "perfectly po ssib le" for N e w York C ity o r



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D etro it to be b o m bed, a Japanese su b lobbed shells in to a Santa B arbara p e tro ­ leu m com plex. A s late as Ju n e 1942, w ith Jap an ese forces o n th e m o v e in A lask a's A leutian Islands, the W ar D e p a rtm e n t feared air ra id s o n th e W est C oast. A v a st a p p a ra tu s of civil d e fe n se — blackouts, block w a rd e n s, air ra id d rills— n o w s p ru n g into action th a t b o th d re w o n local anxieties a n d carried th e n a tio n al ala rm d o w n to the local level. E ven a sm all in la n d city co u ld "act as if it w ere im m ed iately b e h in d th e battlefron ts. M ore th a n one p a ir of eyes h a d looked into the h eav en s expecting to see a fleet of G e rm a n b o m b ers," a n d "th e g reat trial black o u t of A u g u st 1942" en co u rag e d "ev ery o n e in th e m id ­ co n tin en t h o m es of Jonesville to th in k of th e e n em y as a th re a t to th eir o w n se­ curity." C h ild re n c au g h t u p in air raid drills, o r g iv en I.D. tag s a n d fin g er­ p rin te d o n the chance th ey w o u ld be killed o r ev acu ated , faced fears a n d ritu a ls co m m only associated w ith th e atom ic age. In W ausau, W isconsin, as o n e a d u lt later recalled a ch ild h o o d scene, "h o w lin g sirens scream ed a cruel w a rn in g . T he w h o le scene filled m y im a g in atio n of a real attack." T he lessons of A m eri­ can v u ln era b ility w ere im p rin te d w ith special force o n y o u n g ste rs.6 Panic d id m ore th a n reveal fears of n a tio n al peril. It m a rk e d a w ild lu rc h — from d ism issal to e x ag g eratio n — in v iew s of en em y capabilities, a n d a lin g er­ in g in flation of w h a t the b o m b er co u ld do. M ost of all, it serv ed to m obilize th e n a tio n in th e absence of th e im m ed iate p e ril m o st co m b a ta n ts faced: in a w a r fo u g h t "o n im a g in atio n alone" b y m o st A m ericans, th e im a g in atio n search ed for som e real-w o rld co n firm atio n of d an g er. The p an ic th ereb y also co n firm ed A m erican s' u n d e rs ta n d in g of th e w a r 's stakes. In so far as P earl H a rb o r p re ­ sag ed attack o n the U n ited States, n a tio n al su rv iv a l a g ain st p re d a to ry enem ies seek in g "th e c o n q u est of the U n ited States" (as FD R p u t it) seem ed a t stake m o re th a n ideological o r m o ral m ean in g s to th e w ar. M an y A m erican s still saw su ch m eanings, b u t those w ere su b su m e d u n d e r a m o re diffuse fear of d a n ­ g ero u s enem ies.7 P articularly the Japanese enem y, w h o se th re a t a n d evil seem ed to m o st A m ericans confirm ed b y Pearl H arbor. T he a d m in istra tio n rem a in e d a t p a in s to d esig n ate G erm an y as the g reater en em y b u t rig h tly w o rrie d th a t m a n y A m ericans, a ttu n e d to the w a r's racial d im en sio n s, h a d d ifferen t preferences. Like o th er responses to P earl H arb o r, racist se n tim en t d id n o t em erg e full­ b lo w n o n D ecem ber 7. The m o v em en t to p u t 120,000 Jap an ese-A m erican s o n th e W est C oast into co n cen tratio n cam ps, for exam ple, crested on ly in th e sp rin g of 1942. It re sp o n d e d to n o real th reat, fed eral ag en ts h a v in g a lre a d y d e ­ tain ed those seen as d a n g ero u s, b u t officials a n d jo u rn alists re g a rd e d th e ab ­ sence of sabotage as a sig n of the clever d e v io u sn ess of Japanese-A m ericans. (In H aw aii the th rea t w as m ore plausible, b u t th eir n u m b e rs a n d econom ic v alu e p re c lu d e d system atic incarceration.) Incarceratio n also d re w o n c o n tin u in g A m erican h u m iliatio n in the Pacific (the last o u tp o st in th e P h ilip p in es fell in M ay), o n a desire to w re ak vengeance o n th e o n ly available v ersio n of th e en-

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em y, o n g re e d y schem es to seize Japanese-A m erican farm s a n d b u sin esses, a n d o n efforts b y officials to placate th o se e m o tio n s a n d act o n th eir o w n prejudices. B eyond th o se specific im p u lses w ere th e fears of su b v e rsio n a lre ad y risin g b e ­ fore P earl H a rb o r a n d a "m o re gen eralized x en o p h o b ia" sp re a d in g after it.8 T h o u sa n d s of G erm an - a n d Italian-A m erican s w ere also locked u p , som e of w h o m w e re p a te n tly d a n g ero u s, b u t far m ore n u m ero u s, p olitically stro n g , a n d econom ically v ital th a n Japanese-A m ericans, th ey m et far less severe trea t­ m ent. A n im o sity to w a rd th e Japanese also sh a p e d A m erican o p e ra tio n s a b ro a d in 1942. U n ite d States forces sto p p e d Ja p an 's n a v y a t th e B attle of M id w a y in Ju n e a n d to o k th e offensive b y in v a d in g G u a d alc an a l in A u g u st. In th e E u ro p ea n w ar, the g rim task of g e ttin g a id to B ritain a n d R ussia in th e teeth of G e rm a n su b m a rin e s w a s vital, b u t o n ly th e in v asio n of N o rth A frica in N o v e m b er m a rk e d a m ajor offensive effort. O p e ratio n s like A p ril's D oolittle b o m b in g ra id o n Tokyo, w h ich lacked m u ch tangible m ilitary p u rp o se , re sp o n d e d to p o p u la r ferv o r for action first a g ain st Jap an a n d p la y e d to th e "ex term in atio n ist sen ti­ m e n t" am o n g A m ericans, sh o w n in June w h e n a p atrio tic p a ra d e in N e w York d isp la y e d "a b ig A m erican eagle lea d in g a flight of b o m b ers d o w n o n a h e rd of y ello w ra ts."9 Fears of A m erican strategic v u ln era b ility a n d Jap an ese racial evil d o m in a te d initial A m erican p ercep tio n s of th e w a r b u t h a rd ly d efin ed all th e reactions of a d iv erse people. For som e, w a r w ith Ja p an raised tro u b leso m e racial issu es (one black sh arec ro p p er re p o rte d ly to ld h is b o ss after Pearl H arb o r, "By th e w ay. C ap tain , I h e a r th e Japanese d o n e d eclared w a r o n y o u w h ite folks"). C o n se rv a ­ tives saw a g o ld en chance to scuttle th e N e w D eal, w h ile liberals like Vice P resi­ d e n t H e n ry W allace so u g h t to cem en t loyalties to th e w a r effort b y sk etch in g e x p a n d e d social p ro g ra m s o r b y asse rtin g lib eral tru th s a b o u t "o n e w o rld ," th e title of heretic R epublican W endell W illkie's bestseller. For m o st A m erican s th e w a r m e a n t m ore specific things: th e an n o y an ce of ratio n in g o r th e p lea su re of risin g w ages, a d ra ft call to h e ed o r a so n to m o u rn , a sm all b u sin e ss to fold u p b ecau se m erch an d ise w a s scarce o r a d efense p la n t job to tak e in a d ista n t city. But th e m o o d of A m ericans in 1942 w a s m ercu rial a n d h a rd to identify. T hey seem ed to d isp la y confidence th a t th eir cause w a s ju st b u t p e rp le x ity a b o u t w h y it w as, a n d "a k in d of p u z z le d b o re d o m a b o u t th e w a r in g e n eral" th a t sh ifted into "talk of th e w a r b e in g o v e r in six m o n th s." 10 E ven less clear w a s th e lo n g -ran g e significance th ey saw in P earl H a rb o r's a p p a re n t lessons, for in 1942 A m ericans sa id little a b o u t th eir p o stw a r m ilita ry pow er. E xceptions to th e reticence d id little to challenge it: th e b o o k Victory through Air Power (1942), a n o to rio u s a p p e a l (later re n d e re d in a n im a te d fo rm b y W alt D isney) to incinerate Japanese cities, p o rtra y e d p o stw a r A m erican h e ­ g em o n y effortlessly achieved th ro u g h th e bom ber. Reticence o w e d little to im ­ m ersio n in the task a t h a n d , for sp e cu la tio n a b o u t w a r 's a fte rm a th in o th e r

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w ay s w as rife, o r to confidence th a t this w a r w o u ld b e th e last one, w h ic h few A m ericans had. In stead , it o w ed to o th er lim its o n the w a rtim e im ag in atio n . M an y liberals feared th a t m en tio n of the m ilita ry 's role in th e n a tio n 's fu tu re w o u ld sap the c u rre n t w ill to fight. "P ro p o sals in C ongress for a g reat sta n d in g a rm y after th e w a r are confessions of d efeat," M arg aret M ead a rg u e d , a n d "w e ak e n u s as a p eo p le." "M en fig h t b e tte r w h e n th ey k n o w for w h a t th ey a re fig h tin g ," S tu a rt C h ase w ro te, b u t the possible n e e d for "a larg er m ilitary m ach in e" after th e w a r w a s h a rd ly bracing; econom ic justice a n d secu rity w o u ld b e tte r g alv an ize A m ericans. M ore generally. C hase a n d M ead, like m a n y o th ers, h a d a cyclical v iew of h isto ry in w h ic h a recurrence of the G reat D ep ressio n w a s th e n ig h t­ m are. "W e c a n 't go back," C hase d eclared, b u t h e o b v io u sly feared th a t "w e " could. F ocusing o n cu ltu re, P hilip W ylie feared m u c h th e sa m e — th e re tu rn of a b o tch ed civilization (unless the w a r m a d e A m erican s realize th a t " h u n d re d s of th o u sa n d s of A m erican flow ers of w o m a n h o o d are w h o res. A n d th a t m illions of n o b le A m erican m e n get in b e d w ith them "). For a fu tu re im ag in ed as a rev er­ sio n to th e u g ly p ast, th ere w a s little n e e d to e x te n d th e v ecto rs of w a rtim e ch an g e into th e future. C o m m e n tato rs in stea d im ag in ed a bell cu rv e of h isto ri­ cal ch an g e rising d u rin g the w a r a n d th e n reced in g to p re w a r n o rm ality ; th ey foresaw w a r 's rip p le effects b u t n o lasting m ilitarizatio n . E ven W ylie, w h o d e ­ cried A m erica's p re w a r m ilitary w eak n ess, e n v isio n ed a pacific A m erican h e ­ g em o n y after th e w ar: "C o n v ersio n for w o rld reco n stru ctio n w o u ld o p e n u p th e o n e e v erlastin g frontier. W e can w in th e w a r a n d re-estab lish m a n ." 11 T h u s few A m ericans in 1942 e x tra p o la ted th e ir n e w lessons a b o u t n a tio n al secu rity in to the future. T hey w ere su rro u n d e d b y evid en ce of th eir m ilitary m ig h t, b u t it w a s o bviously g eared to this w a r's exigencies. M ilitarizatio n w a s re g a rd e d as so m eth in g d ifferen t— the evil w h ic h th e en em y p rac tic ed — a n d th u s lacked explicit sanction, rem a in in g c o n tin g en t o n a w a r y e t to be w o n a n d o n issues y et to b e faced, ev en as th e im plicit san ctio n offered b y Pearl H a rb o r g rew in sym bol a n d m em ory. P earl H a rb o r h a d m a d e its m ark , b u t h o w d e ep ly w a s n o t im m ed iately a p ­ p aren t. It becam e a n a ll-p u rp o se m e ta p h o r for disaster; A m erican s m ig h t "su f­ fer a n o th e r Pearl H arb o r," ra n one g loom y p red ic tio n of p o stw a r econom ic d e ­ pression. It sp a rk e d im ages of a w o rld sh ru n k b y aviation; n ew sreels a n d m orale-boosting film s m a d e M id w a y "n o t a speck in th e Pacific b u t 'o u r fro n t y a rd ' "; "W h at's C h u n g k in g d o in g in N ev ad a?," a sk ed a C o n so lid ated V ultee A ircraft a d (see fig. 3). Yet for A m ericans im ag in in g n e w p e ril b u t still safe fro m attack. Pearl H a rb o r w as also a n elusive sym bol, as a n E nglish v isito r realized w h ile flying over N ebraska. T he "ste w ard e ss d e p o site d m y lu n ch tray. . . .A s I reach ed av id ly to attack m y b u tte r p a t there, n e atly in scrib ed o n it, w a s th e in ­ ju n ctio n REMEMBER PEARL HARBOR. It n e e d e d th e b u tte r to rem in d o n e of th e g u n s." M a d iso n A venue tech n iq u es sh o u ld n o t b e e q u a te d w ith w a rtim e m o o d s, b u t the n e ed to use th em w a s revealin g .12

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69

The Business e l War A t th e h e ig h t of the A m erican w a r effort, th e B ritish o b serv er D. W. B rogan su m m e d u p "th e A m erican w a y of w a r," w h ic h h e th o u g h t "b o u n d to b e like th e A m erican w a y of life." It w a s "m ech an ized like th e A m erican farm a n d k itch en (the farm s a n d kitchens of a lazy p e o p le w h o w a n t w a sh in g m achines a n d b u lld o z ers to d o the job for them "). It w as practiced b y "a n a tio n of colossal b u sin e ss en terp rises, often w astefu lly ru n in detail, b u t w in n in g b y th eir m ere scale." To A m ericans, B rogan co ncluded, " w a r is a b u sin ess, n o t a n art; th ey are n o t in te reste d in m oral victories, b u t in victory. N o g reat c o rp o ra tio n ev er suc­ cessfully excused itself o n m o ral g ro u n d s to its sto ck h o ld ers for b ein g in the red; th e U n ited States is a great, a v e ry great, c o rp o ra tio n w h o se sto ck h o ld ers e x p e c t. . . th a t it w ill be in th e black.13 In d ee d th e g reat c o rp o ra tio n d id ru n "in th e black," p ro m o tin g victory ab ro ad , affluence a t h o m e, a n d m ilitarizatio n in th e lo n g run. H o w ev e r dusty, th e m easu res of A m erican p ro d u c tiv e triu m p h rem a in d a z ­ zling. M an u factu rin g o u tp u t d o u b le d b e tw e e n 1940 a n d 1943. A rm am e n ts p ro ­ d u c tio n increased eightfold b e tw e e n 1941 a n d 1943, to a level n e arly th a t of B ritain, the Soviet U nion, a n d G e rm a n y com bined. O u tp u t of sh ip s, o ften b y rem ark ab le assem bly-line m eth o d s, w a s staggering. M ost telling w a s success in technically a d v an c ed fields: aircraft p ro d u c tio n zo o m ed from 5,856 in 1939 to 96,318 in 1944— m ore th a n d o u b le w h a t a n y ally o r en em y p ro d u c e d , ev en th o u g h the U n ited States m a d e b ig g er planes. U n d e r Lend-Lease, it also s u p ­ p lie d its allies: 400,000 m o to r vehicles a n d 2,000 locom otives to th e Soviets, a n d o v er a fo u rth of B ritain's m ilitary e q u ip m e n t b y 1944. F rien d s a n d foes p e r­ fo rm ed ju st as im pressively, g iv en the b u rd e n of co m b at a n d d e stru c tio n u n d e r w h ic h th ey labored: the Soviet U n io n o u tp ro d u c e d A m erica in tan k s b y 1944, for exam ple, a n d G erm an y a n d Jap an reach ed p e a k p ro d u c tio n th a t y e ar d e ­ sp ite A llied b o m b in g a n d blockade. By th e sam e token, A m erica's in su latio n from attack a n d en o rm o u s reso u rces— h alf th e w o rld 's m a n u fa ctu rin g took place in the U n ited States b y 1945— p a rtly acco u n ted for its su p erio rity . But A m erican triu m p h w as n o t a sim p le one of "m ere scale," as B rogan p u t it. In av iatio n (despite G erm an b re a k th ro u g h s in jet aircraft a n d rockets), in elec­ tronics, a n d in atom ic w eap o n s, A m erican in v en tiv e su p rem acy (w ith A llied a n d refugee assistance) w a s u n riv aled . M ak in g th e A m erican triu m p h d o u b ly gratifying, the p ro d u c tio n of n o n w a r g o o d s also in creased — a lu x u ry n o o th er m ajor co m b atan t e n jo y ed — d e sp ite th e cessation of som e p ro d u c ts (auto­ m obiles) a n d the ratio n in g of o th ers (gasoline, for exam ple). R oosevelt facilitated this p ro d u c tiv e triu m p h . H e d id so th ro u g h key d ecisions— to p u s h aircraft p ro d u ctio n , for exam ple, a n d to au th o rize th e M an ­ h a tta n Project to b u ild atom ic bom bs. H e also d id so th ro u g h pu b lic oratory, d riv in g h o m e the cen trality of p ro d u c tio n in m o d e m w a r w ith m u n d a n e b u t telling illustrations: "E very Flying Fortress th a t b o m b ed h a rb o r in stallatio n s at

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N ap les," h e re m in d e d A m ericans in July 1943, "re q u ire d 1,110 g allo n s of g as­ oline for each single m ission," o r "th e eq u al of a b o u t 375 'A ' ra tio n tick ets— e n o u g h gas to d riv e y o u r car five tim es across th is c o n tin e n t."14 S uch o ra to ry serv ed several p u rp o ses: it reinforced th e n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n al security, lin k ed d e m a n d s ab ro ad to sacrifices a t ho m e, a n d sh ifted a tte n tio n a w ay from w a r's g rim m er dim en sio n s. R oosevelt a p p re cia te d th e fu n d a m e n ta ls of this w a r— w h a t it to o k to w in, to m in im ize A m erican sacrifice, a n d to m ax im ize A m erican o u tp u t. H is tran sla tio n of th a t a p p re cia tio n in to o rg an iz ed action, o n th e o th e r h a n d , seem ed w a n tin g , o r so m a n y co n te m p o ra rie s ju d g e d it. N o o n e ag en cy o r in d i­ v id u a l except FDR him self ev er co n tro lled th e v a st a p p a ra tu s of econom ic m o ­ bilization. The W ar P ro d u c tio n B oard (WPB) cam e closest b u t d e le g a te d m u c h of its a u th o rity to the a rm e d services a n d larg e co rp o ratio n s. Its coercive role w a s co nfined largely to issu in g o rd ers lim itin g p ro d u c tio n of fin ish ed p ro d u c ts a n d u se of ra w m aterials, each o rd e r fu n ctio n in g "like th e tu rn in g of a v alv e o r a th e th ro w in g of a sw itch," se n d in g "m ateria ls c o u rsin g th ro u g h th e m ach in e, so th a t th ey em erg ed as h elm ets o r p u p ten ts ra th e r th a n as b read b o x es a n d h a m ­ m o ck s."15 M oreover, m u c h in th e m o b ilizatio n effort lay b e y o n d th e W PB 's p u rv ie w — in the h a n d s of agencies like the Office of Scientific R esearch a n d D ev elopm ent, the Office of Price A d m in istratio n , a n d th e R eco n stru ctio n Fi­ n an ce C o rp o ratio n (a N e w D eal holdover). A su p e rag e n cy estab lish ed in 1943, th e Office of W ar M obilization, a d d e d little coherence to th e system , b u t it d id ex p lo it the talen ts of th e m a ste r political fixer w h o h e a d e d it, Jam es B yrnes, for­ m er S outh C arolina se n ato r a n d S u p rem e C o u rt justice. N o t su rp risin g ly , g iv en th e p le th o ra of c o m p etin g au th o rities, th e g ears of th e m achine som etim es jam m ed . E specially in 1942, critics ex co riated w aste, slu g g ishness, a n d co rp o rate profiteering. M o b ilizatio n w a s "b itch ed , b o tch e d a n d b u g g e re d from sta rt to finish," ch arg ed B ruce C atto n , w ritin g fro m h is v a n ­ tag e p o in t o n the WPB staff. C ostly m istak es w ere m ad e , like F ord M o to r C o m ­ p a n y 's tro u b le d effort to m ass-p ro d u ce b o m b ers, th e air force's ta rd y s u p p o rt for th e P-51 fig h ter n e e d e d to acco m p an y its b o m b ers, a n d th e ru s h to m ak e a n ill-designed B-26 b o m b er (to flyers, th e "Flying P ro stitu te — n o visible m ea n s of su p p o rt"). G iven th e "polycratic chaos" of N a z i m o b ilizatio n (d isg u ised a t th e tim e b y its to ta litaria n im age), w h y d id a p p a re n t A m erican chaos y ield vic­ to ry ?16 B esides favorable circum stances of g e o g ra p h y a n d resources, su p e rio r p re s­ cience w a s critical. By late 1941, A m erican, British, a n d Soviet lea d ers g ra sp e d th e likely len g th a n d d e m a n d s of the w a r a n d g e ared m o b ilizatio n accordingly, w h ereas H itle r a n d the N azis, o v erco n fid en t after in itial success w ith b litzk rieg tactics, d elay ed full m o b ilizatio n u n til 1942-1943, e v en th e n h e sita tin g in im ­ p o rta n t w ays. Fidelity to th eir ideological go als— as in k eep in g w o m e n a t h o m e ra th e r th a n em p lo y in g o n th e scale the A llies d id , o r sla u g h te rin g Jew s a n d o th ers ra th e r th a n exploiting th eir lab o r m ore fu lly — also h a m s tru n g th e N azis,

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7I

w h ile the A llies' ideological c au tio n allo w ed all en erg ies to flow in to th e p u r­ su it of victory, th e o n ly goal c o m m an d in g u n iv ersal su p p o rt. T he p e cu lia r "chaos" in A m erican m o b ilizatio n w a s ju st as im p o rta n t, for chaos also m e a n t flexibility. W h atev e r th e fo rm al b u reau cratic b o u n d a rie s, key g ro u p s a n d in d iv id u a ls co u ld p ress possibilities b lo ck ed in o n e ch an n el th ro u g h a n o th e r a n d su sta in elab o rate w eb s of co m m u n icatio n . T h u s th e atom ic b o m b project w a s p u sh e d b y scientists d e sp ite th e m ilita ry 's initial cool resp o n se, a n d resistance b y som e av iatio n firm s to assem bly-line p ro d u c tio n w a s likew ise overcom e (it w a s n o t in G erm any). F lu id ity across o v e rla p p in g realm s of a u th o rity d id trig g e r b itte r tu rf w a rs, b u t th ey w ere b y -p ro d u cts of a h e a lth y process. E ven in G erm any, skillful im p ro v isa tio n o u tsid e fo rm al stru c ­ tu res acco u n ted for m u c h of its b e la te d success at p ro d u ctio n , b u t in d iv id u a l fiefdom s w ith in th e N a z i econom ic k in g d o m w ere jealo u sly g u a rd e d a n d H itle r in te rv e n e d in th eir w o rk in g s capriciously. In co n trast, R oosevelt gave w id e la titu d e to e x p erts in th eir fields, w h ile th e p e rm e ab le b o u n d a rie s of A m erican elites a n d sta te o rg an izatio n s p ro m o te d m o v em en t a m o n g th em b y in d iv id u a ls a n d initiatives. In d ee d , one source of A m erica's success in th e p ro ­ d u c tio n w a r w a s the in tricate m esh in g of m ilitary a n d civilian elites, in c o n tra st to th e rig id su b o rd in a tio n to N a z i p o w e r faced b y su c h elites in G erm any. In tu rn , th a t success set in m o tio n v ital ch an g es in th e A m erican political econom y, in clu d in g th e regional re d istrib u tio n of p o w e r a n d w ealth . The w a r tra n sfo rm e d the A m erican W est, w h e re fed eral d efen se d o llars flo w ed because of its p ro x im ity to th e Pacific w ar, its p re su m a b ly favorable clim ate, a n d its sp a rse ly in h ab ited lan d s su itab le for testin g n e w technologies like jet aircraft a n d th e atom ic bom b. T he b ig w in n e r w a s th e W est C oast, especially C alifornia, w h ic h received 12 p e rc en t of all w a r o rd ers a n d saw its aircraft a n d sh ip b u ild ­ in g facilities reaching from San D iego to Los A ngeles b ecom e "th e n a tio n 's larg­ est u rb a n m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex." The in la n d W est w a s less fav o red b y th e b o o m in m a n u fa ctu rin g (alth o u g h D enver, o d d ly e n o u g h , c h u rn e d o u t su b m arin e-ch asin g ships), b u t it p ro sp e re d th ro u g h th e g ro w th of m ilitary bases a n d the e x p an sio n of ag ric u ltu ral a n d extractive in d u stries. T he w a r ef­ fo rt "tra n sfo rm e d a colonial econom y" into a "d iv ersified " econom ic p o w e r­ h o u se p a ce d b y a d v a n c e d technologies a n d elem en ts of w h a t cam e to b e called a "p o st-in d u stria l" system . D espite the W est's lin g erin g d e p e n d e n c e o n fed eral m onies, its su b o rd in a tio n to th e N o rth a n d th e E ast ra p id ly fad ed . In th e w ak e of th a t g ra n d change cam e others: a n e w im age, as co m p an ies like H u g h e s A ir­ craft a n d D ouglas A viation em erg ed as heroic e n te rp rises of technological vic­ tory; n a tio n al p reem in en ce for in stitu tio n s like th e U n iv ersity of C alifornia a n d th e C altech Jet P ro p u lsio n L aboratory, w h e re p ro m in e n t A m erican a n d ém igré scientists flocked; a h a sten e d , th o u g h h a rd ly co m p lete o r effortless, e n try into th e m a in strea m of A m erican life for H isp an ic A m ericans; a n d a m assiv e p o p u ­ latio n shift into p a rts of th e W est. "It w a s if so m eo n e h a d tilted th e country: p eo p le, m oney, a n d soldiers all sp illed w e st." 17

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The W est's g ain s w ere n o t necessarily o th er reg io n s' losses. T he S o u th 's coastal areas saw a "sta g g erin g " tran sfo rm atio n , in itiatin g th e "S u n b elt" p ro s­ p e rity no ticed in th e 1970s a n d 1980s; a n d for so u th e rn ers "th e w a r ch allen g ed th eir provincialism ," d ra w in g th em m ore fully in to a n A m erican id e n tity a n d b rin g in g fed eral p o w e r m o re forcefully to th e ir region. T hose sectors su fferin g econom ic o r p o p u la tio n loss b e lo n g e d to n o single reg io n b u t in stea d w e re scat­ tered am o n g ru ra l areas a n d sm all to w n s (in terio r n o rth e rn N e w E n g lan d , for exam ple). W artim e p ro sp e rity in o th e r sectors, h o w ev er, so m etim es m ask ed lo n g -term shifts a g g ra v ate d b y th e w ar. Farm o u tp u t a n d incom e so ared , b u t th e farm p o p u la tio n c o n tin u e d to shrink. In o ld er in d u stria l states like M ichi­ g a n (only N e w York exceeded its share of p rim e d efen se contracts), "th e sh ap e, if n o t the size, of [the] econom y e m e rg ed fro m th e w a r relativ ely u n c h a n g e d ." T hose states p ro sp e re d for th e m o m e n t b u t lacked th e n e w in d u strie s th a t w o u ld fuel c o n tin u ed p ro sp e rity .18 The w a r accelerated regional shifts of a g ra n d e r so rt as w ell, th o se o n a n in ­ tern atio n al scale. L arge A m erican c o rp o ra tio n s e m e rg ed fro m th e w a r flu sh w ith capital a n d expertise, eager to ex p lo it m ark e ts a b a n d o n e d b y w e a k e n e d E u ro p ea n com petitors, m ore m a n e u v era b le as a resu lt of n e w ly d ecen tralized stru ctu res, a n d backed b y the w o rld 's m o st p o w e rfu l g o v ern m en t. O nce m o re con cerned w ith d o m estic m arkets, those co rp o ratio n s b ecam e m u ltin atio n al firm s a n d reached th e z e n ith of th eir in te rn atio n al p o w e r in th e tw o d ecad es after 1945. A lth o u g h th a t d e v e lo p m e n t w as largely o n h o ld u n til th e w a r w a s over, it w a s assisted b y changes d u rin g th e w ar. A m erica's econom ic lev erag e allo w ed it to a rm -tw ist allies d e p e n d e n t o n A m erican assistan ce in to accepting tariff a n d m o n etary ag reem en ts th a t p rie d o p e n m u c h o f th e w o rld , especially E u ro p e's colonial em pires, to A m erican tra d e a n d in v estm en t. Soviet p o w er, rev o lu tio n a n d chaos in m u c h of the deco lo n izin g T h ird W orld, a n d o th e r fac­ to rs w o u ld lim it th e A m erican achievem ent. A n d it w as d u b io u s in d e e d to claim , as Secretary of State C ordell H u ll once d id , th a t A m erican p rin cip les of free tra d e a n d dem ocracy w ere "beneficial a n d a p p e a lin g to th e sen se of justice, of rig h t a n d of th e w ell-being of free p e o p le s e v e ry w h e re ."19 B ut H u ll a n d o th ers d id m u c h to realize a n old v isio n of a n o p e n econom ic w o rld d o m in a te d b y A m erican capitalism . M ost telling, h ow ever, w ere changes in tern al to th e A m erican p o litical econ­ om y. T he w a r effected a p a rtn e rsh ip b e tw e e n b ig g o v e rn m e n t a n d b ig b u sin ess, after d ecad es of erratic a n d som etim es stra in e d relatio n s, w h ic h larg ely h eld for th e h alf-century to follow. B oth conscious policy a n d in a d v e rte n t conse­ q u en ce forged the p a rtn e rsh ip , w h ic h "successively m o b ilized b ig b u sin ess, a g g ra n d iz e d it, a n d lin k ed it to the m ilitary estab lish m en t." N a tio n a l lead ers d e cid ed th a t only g en ero u s c o o p eratio n w ith co rp o rate g ian ts co u ld w in the w a r— in th e o ft-quoted co m m en t of Secretary of W ar Stim son, w h e n a cap italist co u n try goes to w ar, "y o u h av e to let b u sin ess m ak e m o n ey o u t o f th e process or b u sin ess w o n 't w o rk ."20 Since m en like Stim son d o m in a te d m o b ilizatio n —

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th ree-fo u rth s of the W PB executive staff w ere "d o llar-a-y ear" m e n w h o re­ m ain ed o n th e ir c o m p a n y p a y ro lls— th eir view s p rev ailed . A s a resu lt, m o b ilizatio n e n h an c ed b o th th e im m ed iate p ro fits a n d th e last­ in g p o w e r of larg er co rp o ratio n s. P ro cu rem en t flo w ed to them ; b y 1943, one h u n d re d co m p an ies h e ld contracts for 70 p e rc en t of d efen se p ro d u ctio n . W ar­ tim e policy g u a ra n te e d th e m profits, freed o m fro m co m p etitio n a n d a n titru st action in m o st cases, a n d g o v e rn m e n t capital o r o th er in cen tiv es for p la n t ex­ p an sio n . N e w e r in d u strie s like aviation, sy n th etic ru b b er, a n d atom ic en erg y w ere a lm o st w h o lly financed b y g o v e rn m e n t capital. For m a n y com p an ies, the b o n a n z a w e n t far b e y o n d w a rtim e profits: th ey g ain ed b y "sq u e ez in g o u t m ar­ g in al co m petitors, forging p e rm a n e n t links w ith th e n a tio n al g o v ern m en t, g a in in g th e in sid e track o n research in to n e w technologies, a n d ab so rb in g statefin an ced cap ital ex p an sio n a t h ig h ly favorable rate s after th e w a r." 21 A m o n g c o m p an ies n o t d o in g essential w a r w o rk , sm aller firm s o ften fo ld ed , b u t larg er ones w ith clout in W ash in g to n a n d m o n ey to ad v ertise o ften su cceed ed in id e n ­ tify in g w ith th e cause: C oca-C ola accom pan ied th e tro o p s o v erseas a n d a stick of W rigley's g u m w e n t in to each so ld ie r's K -ration package. T ough p ro p o sals to cap o r tax in d iv id u a l salaries a n d c o rp o ra te p ro fits w ere b e a te n b ack o r w a ­ tered d o w n , w h ile fed eral policies o n reco n v ersio n to a peacetim e econom y w ere also beneficial to th e in terests of b ig bu sin ess. To b e sture, the triu m p h of in stitu tio n al b ig n ess w a s u n ev en : som e u p sta rt co m p an ies blo sso m ed m agnificently, a n d a n o ld ru n t like th e P ackard M otor C o m p a n y saw e m p lo y m e n t z o o m from sev en h u n d re d to th irty -n in e th o u sa n d w o rk ers. N o r w a s th a t triu m p h confined to b u sin ess, e v id e n t as it also w a s am o n g ed u ca tio n al in stitu tio n s, lab o r u n io n s, ag ric u ltu ral in terests, a n d gov­ e rn m e n t itself. But o th e r in stitu tio n s lacked th e p o w er, th e w ill, th e u n ity — o r all th re e — to challenge co rp o rate d o m in an ce of th e political econom y. By th e sam e token, m a n y a lesser co m p a n y like P ackard flo u n d e re d a g ain after th e w ar. T he c o rp o ra te-g o v e rn m e n t p a rtn e rsh ip w a s p alatab le to m o st A m erican s b e ­ cause it seem ed to b e a tem p o ra ry e x p ed ien t a n d w a s acco m p an ied b y b ro ad p ro sp erity , ev en b y a sm all b u t n o tab le d o w n w a rd red istrib u tio n of incom e. (The rich g o t richer, b u t at a slightly slo w er ra te th a n o th e r A m ericans, a n d n o n ­ w h ite m ale w o rk e rs' share of incom e rose sharply.) W h en m ilita ry sp e n d in g p ro d u c e d a b u n d an c e, few A m ericans w e re in clined to q u a rre l o v er th e rela­ tio n sh ip s of p o w e r th a t resulted. In d eed , p o p u la r anim osities d u rin g th e w ar, sto k ed b y FD R 's en em ies b u t sh a re d b y m a n y in the a d m in istratio n , ra n far m o re a g ain st w o rk e rs a n d u n io n s th a n a g ain st co rp o rate giants. W h en u n io n lea d er John L. L ew is b ro k e la b o r's w a rtim e no -strik e p led g e in 1943— coal w o rk e rs faced sta g n a n t w ag es a n d a n a p p allin g casu alty rate ("ap p ro a ch in g th a t of com b at") of five h u n d re d m in ers killed o r h u r t w e ek ly — h e b ecam e p e rh a p s th e m o st h a te d A m erican, seen as a n en em y w h o sab o tag ed th e lives of servicem en, since coal w a s v ital to the

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en tire w a r econom y. FDR h a n d le d the d e v ilish issu es of labor, w ag es, a n d infla­ tio n a d ro itly a n d "sa v ed the u n io n m o v em en t w ith o u t co m p ro m isin g p ro d u c ­ tivity." But o n occasion h e th re a te n e d to d ra ft strik in g w o rk e rs o r seize stru ck in d u strie s, a n d h e s u p p o rte d a n a tio n al service law (n ev er p assed ) to "p re v e n t strik es" a n d "to m ake available for w a r p ro d u c tio n o r for a n y o th er essen tial services ev ery able-bodied a d u lt in this N a tio n ."22 M eanw hile, friction in v o lv in g g o v e rn m e n t a n d b u sin e ss d id n o t cease, b u t it u su a lly in v o lv ed th e p la y of co m p etin g interests, in clu d in g riv alries w ith in the a rm e d forces, ra th e r th a n a co h eren t " g o v e rn m e n t" p itte d a g ain st a cohesive b u sin ess com m unity. It co u ld h a rd ly b e o th erw ise w h e n b u sin e ssm e n w ere ru n n in g m u ch of th e g o v ern m en t. A ccordingly, re se n tm e n t a g ain st th e g o v e rn ­ m en tal discipline th a t w a r en tailed w a s lim ited. E xperience w ith a m o re p o w e r­ ful state d u rin g the last w a r a n d th e D epressio n , th e a d ro it m ix tu re of v o lu n ta r­ ism a n d coercion w ith w h ich g o v e rn m e n t m o b ilized th e econom y, a n d th e felt g rav ity of d a n g e r to n a tio n al security all k e p t th e lid o n a d v e rse reactions, if n o t o n g ru m b lin g a b o u t W ash in g to n 's follies, co rp o ra tio n s' g reed , o r la b o r's self­ ishness. T entative term s for a lastin g b u sin e ss-g o v e rn m e n t p a rtn e rsh ip w ere set b y th e w ar. G o v e rn m e n t (especially th e executive b ran ch ) a n d b u sin e ss (especially larg e co rp o ratio n s) w o u ld b e the sen io r p a rtn e rs in th e firm . C o n g ress w o u ld h e lp set policy a n d b ro k e r d isp u tes b u t w o u ld fu n ctio n m o re as a n aren a for conflict th a n as a decisive force itself. Ju n io r p a rtn e rs w o u ld b e o rg an iz ed labor, ag ric u ltu ral interests, a n d sm all b u sin ess, all of w h ic h g a in e d a m ea su re of se cu rity — u n io n m em b ersh ip so arin g to n e arly fifteen m illio n b y 1945— a t the p rice of a b an d o n in g am b itio n s for a d o m in a n t role. E ven th e ir sta tu s as ju n io r p a rtn e rs w a s often in d o u b t. T he aircraft in d u stry , for ex am p le, rem a in e d n o to ­ rio u sly antilabor, th a n k s to the illegal a n ti-u n io n tactics of so m e of its lead ers, to so u th e rn C alifornia's an tilab o r cu ltu re, a n d to th e a b u n d a n c e of "celery p ick ers" a n d " c o u n try b o y s" w h o , a t least as lo n g as th e D ep ressio n 's effects lin g ered, felt "n ig g er rich " o n eig h teen d o lla rs a w e ek a n d p ro v e d difficult to u n io n ize.23 O ccupying a m id d le p o sitio n in this h ierarch y w ere m ilita ry a n d scientific in stitu tio n s a n d th eir lead ersh ip . T hey lacked th e cap ital o r th e in sid e r p o w e r of co rp o rate a n d political leaders, b u t th e w a r d id en h an ce th eir im p o rtan c e a n d statu s, a n d th eir skills a n d v alu es w ere m erg in g w ith th o se of political a n d cor­ p o ra te lead ers in the com plex effort a t technological w arfare. W ith g en erals like G eorge M arshall a ssu m in g w e ig h ty d ip lo m atic a n d a d m in istra tiv e resp o n ­ sibilities, w ith co rp o rate executives d e ep ly im m e rsed in w a g in g w ar, w ith sci­ en tists reaching b e y o n d m ere in v en tio n to g u id e m ilitary a n d e v e n d ip lo m atic policy, once-clear d istin ctio n s am o n g these g ro u p s w ere fad in g . T heir roles in ­ creasingly o v e rla p p e d (one scientist, for exam ple, serv ed sim u lta n eo u sly as a vice p re sid e n t of A m erican T elephone a n d T elegraph, m em b er of th e N atio n al D efense R esearch C o m m ittee, a n d p re sid e n t of th e N a tio n a l A cad em y of Sci-

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ences). The m erg in g of roles w a s e v id e n t n o t o n ly a m o n g to p lea d ers b u t a m o n g o rd in a ry serv icem en w ith p riz e d technical skills, su c h as air force p ilo ts a n d technicians, w h o looked fo rw a rd to attractiv e jobs in civilian b u sin e ss after th e w ar. A t th e in stitu tio n a l level, g o v e rn m e n t sp o n so rsh ip of science a n d tech­ n o lo g y fo rg ed linkages am o n g th e a rm e d services, p riv a te c o rp o ratio n s, a n d ed u ca tio n al in stitu tio n s like th e M assachusetts In stitu te of Technology. W h at re su lte d w a s a triu m p h for n e ith e r "civ ilian " n o r "m ilita ry " v alu es b u t in stea d , as H a ro ld L assw ell h a d anticipated,*their su b sta n tia l fusion. A "civil­ ia n m ilitarism " e m e rg ed in w h ic h "civilians n o t o n ly h a d a n ticip a te d w a r m o re eag erly th a n th e professionals, b u t p la y e d a p rin c ip a l p a rt in m ak in g com bat, w h e n it cam e, m o re absolute, m o re terrib le th a n w a s th e c u rre n t m ilitary w o n t o r h a b it."24 T he fu sio n w a s reflected in w a rtim e cu ltu re, th e hero es of w h ic h ex te n d ed b e y o n d o ld -fash io n ed cap tain s of in d u stry a n d b lo o d -an d -g u ts g e n ­ erals to in clu d e c o rp o ra te w iz a rd s like sh ip b u ild e r H e n ry K aiser, m aste r "o rg a­ n iz e rs of v icto ry " like M arshall a n d G en. D w ig h t E isenhow er, a n d elite w a r­ rio rs w h o se skills lay as m u c h in technology as in com bat. P a rtn ersh ip in v o lv e d policy as w ell as relatio n s o f p o w er. In th is reg a rd too, w a r d e lin ea ted possibilities w ith o u t fixing th e m firm ly, ab o v e all su g g estin g h o w to reconcile conflicting visio n s of th e role of g o v e rn m e n t a n d b u sin e ss in se cu rin g th e n a tio n 's fu tu re p ro sp e rity a n d p o w er. A m o n g ch am p io n s of activ­ ist g o v e rn m e n t, the w a r m a rk e d a retre at fro m d esig n s for g o v e rn m e n t coer­ cion of econom ic e n te rp rise in favor of fed eral fiscal policy: th e sp ig o t of gov­ e rn m e n t sp e n d in g ra th e r th a n th e h a m m e r of th e sta te 's reg u la tio n w o u ld g u id e econom ic energies. T he a sto u n d in g p ro sp e rity p ro d u c e d b y w a rtim e sp e n d in g , c o rp o ra te c a p tu re of th e g o v e rn m e n ta l a p p a ra tu s of reg u la tio n a n d m obilization, a n d the b alefu l exam ple of to ta litaria n coercion all p ro m o te d th is sh ift am o n g liberals, w h o also b e g a n to a b a n d o n D ep ressio n -era a ssu m p tio n s of chronic econom ic stag n atio n . T hey c o u ld read ily see th e w a r as a triu m p h of Jo h n M a y n ard K eynes's p rin cip le s of g o v e rn m e n t in v estm en t a n d deficit fi­ nancing: on ly a b o u t h a lf of th e w a rtim e fed eral b u d g e t (w h ich rose from 9 bil­ lio n d o lla rs in 1939 to 100 billio n in 1945) cam e from taxes, th e rest from w a r b o n d s a n d o th er b o rro w in g . A s R obert L ek ach m an arch ly p u t it in th e 1960s, "T he w a r p o in te d a sh a rp K eynesian m oral. A s a p u b lic w o rk s project, all w a rs (before th e n u c le ar era) are ideal. Since all w a r p ro d u c tio n is sh eer econom ic w aste, th ere is n e v e r a d a n g e r of p ro d u c in g too m u c h ." 25 A t th e sam e tim e, cor­ p o ra te lead ers also increasingly se t a sid e th eir reflexive su sp icio n s of fed eral a u th o rity — som e h a d d o n e so lo n g before th e 1940s— to accept a m ajor role for fiscal policy in p ro m o tin g p rosperity. The c o m m o n g ro u n d of fiscal p olicy d e ­ fined th e m ea n s b y w h ic h g o v e rn m e n t co u ld stim u late th e econom y w ith o u t coercing its p riv a te institutions. To b e sure, th a t co m m o n g ro u n d rem a in e d ill d e fin e d a n d c o n te sted — ju st h o w m u c h g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g , focused o n w h a t activities, b ack ed b y w h a t tax a n d m o n e ta ry policies? L ooking b e y o n d th e w ar, so m e liberals fav o red a

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"social K eynesianism " em p h a sizin g social w elfare a n d p u b lic projects; co rp o ­ rate lead ers te n d e d to prefer a "b u sin ess K eynesianism " h a rn e ssin g p riv a te e n ­ terp rise b y lo w erin g its taxes o r b u y in g its goods; econom ic conservatives, still p o w e rfu l in b u sin e ss a n d b o th political p arties, fo u n d e ith e r a p p ro a c h offen­ sive, ev en im m oral. Less clearly a rticu lated w a s th e "m ilita ry K eynesianism " th a t w o u ld p a rtly prevail, in w h ic h defense sp e n d in g w o u ld b e a m ajor lev er of stability a n d g row th. Still, the w a r experience, co m b in ed w ith fear of re n e w e d d ep ressio n , d id ch art a b ro a d area of agreem en t, as w ell as specific possibilities a llu rin g to m a n y gro u p s. Federal sp o n so rsh ip of science a n d technology, for exam ple, p ro m ised rich benefits: for c o rp o ra tio n s seek in g sk illed p e rso n n el a n d n e w p ro d u cts; for scientists a n d u n iv ersities overco m in g o ld in h ib itio n s ag ain st g o v e rn m e n t p a tro n ag e; for m ilitary lead ers em b racin g technological w arfare; a n d for those liberals eag er to see A m erican s enjoy technological ab u n d an ce. Forging links am o n g g o v ern m en t, b u sin ess, science, a n d o th er p a rtn e rs, th e w a r effort d e m o n stra te d th e tem p o ra ry a ttractio n s of m ilitarizatio n — pro sp erity, po w er, v icto ry — a n d h in te d a t m o re p e rm a n e n t ones. B ut A m eri­ cans could h a rd ly b e fau lted for failing to d e b ate th o se a ttractio n s fully d u rin g th e w ar. T hey w ere, after all, o n a course only p a rtly o f th e ir choosing. E u ro p e h a d b e en "th e cen ter of th e process of m ilitarizatio n ," se ttin g in m o tio n "a m il­ ita riz a tio n of the w o rld " in w h ich E u ro p e itself b ecam e th e "first a n d m ain ca­ su alty ."26 A m ericans w ere relative new co m ers to th is h isto rical process. T heir fu tu re course w a s n e ith e r easily foreseen n o r fu lly set, co n tin g en t as it w a s o n decisions y et to be m a d e a n d o n a su sta in in g id eo lo g y y et to b e co m p leted . M ost A m ericans d id see som e connection b e tw e e n w a r sp e n d in g a n d th e re­ tu rn of prosperity. It w a s d riv e n h o m e to th em in th eir d aily lives, tru m p e te d in th e m ed ia, a n d a n aly zed b y econom ists. The necessity of g o v e rn m e n t action to a v ert a p o stw a r d e p re ssio n w a s a stap le of w a rtim e com m entary, w h ile a d v e r­ tising a n d political rhetoric in stru cted A m erican s to reg a rd p ro sp e rity a n d af­ fluence as n o t o n ly a re w a rd for victory b u t as th e core of th a t "A m erican w a y of life" for w h ic h th ey w ere fighting. W artim e affluence also raised ex p ectatio n s b y im p ro v in g living sta n d ard s: ev en w ith ratio n in g , p e r cap ita food c o n su m p ­ tio n increased (an n u al m e a t c o n su m p tio n rose from 134 p o u n d s to 162 p o u n d s). D espite the w a r-in d u c ed p rosperity, the u rg en c y to ex ten d it after th e w ar, a n d th e w id e sp re a d a ssu m p tio n th a t g o v e rn m e n t w o u ld be resp o n sib le for it, A m ericans rarely a d d re sse d the fu tu re relatio n sh ip b e tw ee n n a tio n al se cu rity a n d n a tio n al prosperity. In stead , d e b ate stalled larg ely at th e p o in t reach ed in 1942, stu ck o n the d a n g e r of a re tu rn to the 1930s a n d th e altern ativ es p o se d b y N e w D ealers a n d th eir o p p o n en ts. T he U.S. C h a m b e r of C om m erce sim p ly n o te d in 1944 th a t a p o stw a r d ep re ssio n "w o u ld b e ro o ted u ltim ately in th e ces­ satio n of g o v e rn m e n ta l d e m a n d for a rm a m e n ts." Its stan ce w a s ty p ical d u rin g a n d after the w ar, according to tw o h istorian s: "M issing from th e political dis-

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co u rse of th is p e rio d w a s su sta in e d d iscu ssio n of th e lo n g -ru n im p lications for b u sin e ss of these m o m e n to u s changes [w ro u g h t d u rin g th e w ar] in th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t's role in the econom y." E ven am o n g h e a d s of th e larg est c o rp o ra ­ tions, w h o h a d go n e farth est " to w a rd acco m m o d atio n w ith th e n e w ly e n larg ed n a tio n al state," su c h d iscu ssio n w a s slight, ju st as ex p ectations of a p o stw a r m ilitary m a rk e t w ere g enerally low .27 D iscussion w a s scarcely m ore b risk am o n g liberals. T hey so m etim es railed a g ain st c o rp o ra te c a p tu re of th e m a c h in e ry 'o f w a r m obilization; R oosevelt, th o u g h n o w w a ry of an tib u sin ess rhetoric, assailed th e "p ests w h o sw a rm th ro u g h th e lobbies of th e C ongress a n d th e cocktail b a rs of W ash in g to n " a n d "th e w h in in g d e m a n d s of selfish p ressu re g ro u p s w h o seek to feath er th eir n ests w h ile y o u n g A m ericans are d y in g ." But liberals rarely foresaw th a t n a ­ tio n al d efense w o u ld sh a p e the A m erican eco n o m y in som e lastin g fashion. T h u s S tu a rt C hase, w ritin g a t th e w a r's en d , extolled th e "five-year m iracle" of p ro d u c tio n trig g ered b y w a rtim e sp e n d in g , b u t a d d e d th a t "th e co nclusion h e re is n o t th a t chronic w a rfare is th e cure for chronic d ep ressio n ." T h u s Roose­ velt, in Ja n u ary 1945, a rg u e d th a t p riv a te "p u rc h a sin g p o w e r" m u st becom e "sufficiently h ig h to replace w a rtim e G o v e rn m e n t d e m a n d s." 28 Silence o n the econom ics of p o stw a r n a tio n al secu rity w a s n o t total. O n cer­ ta in specifics, a tte n tio n co u ld be intense. G en ero u s aid to v eteran s, for exam ple, received en o rm o u s d iscu ssio n a n d a p p ro v a l, its p o te n tia l for m itig atin g a p o st­ w a r d e p re ssio n b e in g one of its appeals. T he co n trib u tio n s of g o v ern m en tsp o n so red science a n d technology to p ro sp e rity a n d m ilitary p o w e r w ere also w id e ly recognized. G iven th e in terest-g ro u p focus of A m erican politics, h o w ­ ever, d e b ate a b o u t fu tu re m ilitary sp e n d in g d w e lt o n specific sectors a n d the co m p etin g in terests a t w o rk in th em ra th e r th a n o n m acroeconom ic effects, a n d it a d d re sse d p ro g ra m s tan g e n tia l to o r o u tsid e th e core b u d g e ts of th e a rm e d forces. It is tru e th a t b y 1944, a m b itio u s p la n s for p o stw a r d efen se h a d b een sk etch ed b y th e a rm e d forces a n d th eir allies am o n g scientists, scholars, a n d b u sin essm en . In 1944, for exam ple. Secretary of th e N a v y Jam es Forrestal, a for­ m er W all Street executive, d e te rm in e d th a t "A m erican b u sin e ss [w ould] re­ m ain close to th e Services," fo u n d e d the N a tio n a l Security In d u stria l A ssocia­ tion, w h ile G eneral Electric's C harles W ilson p reach ed "full p re p a re d n e ss" after the w a r b a se d o n a p a rtn e rsh ip of g o v ern m en t, in d u stry , a n d science.29 But th ese view s, confined to a m in o rity of b u sin e ssm e n anyw ay, w ere n o t the stu ff of w a rtim e h ead lin es, a n d th eir p ro p o n e n ts p a id little a tten tio n to th e m acroeconom ic effect of the p o stw a r m ilitary p ro g ra m s th ey sou g h t. In sh o rt, those w o rrie d a b o u t th e p o stw a r eco n o m y p a id little a tte n tio n to sp e n d in g o n n a tio n al security (except to a ssu m e its v irtu a l cessation), w h ile th o se w o rrie d a b o u t n a tio n al secu rity rarely p ro b e d th e econom ics in v o lv ed (except to w o rry a b o u t w h a t m o n ies th ey c o u ld get). Two stream s of w a rtim e im a g in atio n th u s ra n p arallel to b u t largely se p ara te from each other, one striv-

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ing for p o stw a r a b u n d a n c e a n d econom ic security, th e o th er for p o stw a r p o w e r a n d m ilitary security. Efforts to foresee the fu tu re w e re c o m p licated b y a w a rtim e celeb ratio n of "free e n te rp rise " a n d "free science" th a t o b scu red th e lin k ag es fo rm in g a m o n g th e a rm e d forces, b u sin ess, a n d science- In reality, g iv en g o v e rn m e n t's m assiv e sp e n d in g a n d its g u a ra n te e s of c o rp o ra te pro fits, "free e n te rp rise " triu m p h e d o n ly in so far as th e o rg an izin g talen ts of b u sin e ssm e n w ere su b stan tial. W en­ d ell W illkie, for one, c o n d e m n e d " p ro p a g a n d a o n th e p a rt of p o w e rfu l g ro u p s w h o h av e n o t p racticed real e n te rp rise in a g e n eratio n ." M ore p erv asiv e, h o w ­ ever, w a s p raise for " in d iv id u a l in itiativ e a n d free en te rp rise," as o n e co m p a n y p u t it, o r claim s th a t A m ericans w ere fig h tin g a g ain st "b ein g p u s h e d a ro u n d b y so m e b rig h t y o u n g b u re a u c ra t," as R epublic Steel m ain tain ed . " 'If Free E nter­ p rise h a d n o t flo u rish ed h e re ,' The Saturday Evening Post in fo rm ed a n im ag in ­ a ry h o u sew ife in H a m b u rg , 'th e cause of w o rld freed o m m ig h t n o w b e lo st for c en tu ries.' "30 Like p raise for "free science," su c h claim s w ere a d v a n c e d to in ­ flate th e rep u ta tio n s of th e in terests in v o lv ed , to fig h t g o v e rn m e n t restrictio n s o n th e largesse th ey received, a n d to reflect real b u t e x ag g erated differences b e tw e e n th e U n ited States a n d its en em ies in h o w th e y m o b ilized for w ar. W h atev er th e m otives, w a rtim e a d v e rtisin g a n d rh eto ric su sta in e d a n o ld er a n d in creasingly irrelev a n t p a ra d ig m of conflict b e tw e e n n a tio n al g o v e rn m e n t a n d p riv a te in terests a n d m ask ed th e th ick w e b of con n ectio n s b e tw e e n them . D u rin g th e w ar, a n d am o n g m a n y h isto ria n s after it, th e m o st significant stru g g le seem ed to h av e b e e n ov er th e fate of N e w D eal efforts a t social w elfare a n d econom ic regulation. T h at c o n test w a s in d e e d im p o rta n t, sh a rp ly fo u g h t, a n d su b stan tially w o n b y the N e w D eal's o p p o n e n ts, w h o se b itte rn e ss to w a rd FDR scarcely a b ated d u rin g the w ar. R epublicans w ere e m b o ld e n e d b y b ig g ain s in th e 1942 congressional elections, led b y th e in tellig en t co n serv ativ e se n ato r R obert Taft, a n d o ften jo in ed b y S o u th ern D em o crats u p s e t b y th e u r ­ b a n p rio rities a n d racial liberalism of m a n y N e w D ealers— th o se "social gain ers, do -g o o d ers, b lee d in g -h e arts a n d lo n g -h airs," as so u th e rn co n serv a­ tiv es re g a rd e d th em .31 T ogether, these forces scu ttled o r scaled b ack N e w D eal relief agencies, a lth o u g h in su ran ce p ro g ra m s like Social Security re m a in e d in ­ tact. R oosevelt p u t u p little fight, reg a rd in g so m e p ro g ra m s as te m p o ra ry o r m a d e u n n ecessary b y th e w ar, v iew in g v icto ry in w a r as m o re u rg e n t th a n d o ­ m estic legislation, a n d e n v isio n in g n e w initiativ es once th e w a r e n d ed . Lib­ erals, d isillu sio n ed as in 1918 th a t w a r failed to p ro m o te social reform , to o k som e h o p e from th o se initiatives a n d from FD R 's 1944 election v icto ry o v er T hom as D ew ey, w h o p ro m ised to k eep th e w elfare state b u t ru n it better. But the w a rtim e c am p aig n a g ain st th e N e w D eal th re w a sm o k escreen of sym bolic a n tistatism ov er d e ep e n in g g o v e rn m e n t resp o n sib ility for social w el­ fare a n d econom ic prosperity. A lo n g w ith o th e r forces, th a t c am p aig n d id n o t so m u c h d im in ish su c h responsibility as red irect it in to n e w ch an n els carv ed o u t b y th e p ree m in e n t concern w ith n a tio n a l security. T he failure to secure na-

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tio n al h e a lth in su ran ce, a n d the c o n tra stin g success of th e GI Bill for v e te ran s' a ssistan ce— certain ly a w elfare p ro g ram , a n d a n ex p en siv e o n e a t th a t— illu stra te d the shift. So to o d id R oosevelt, as h e c o n tin u e d to lin k a n o ld er lib eralism w ith n a tio n al security. U rg in g a n "econom ic bill of rig h ts" for A m ericans, h e su g g e ste d th a t w a rtim e m o rale a n d efficiency req u ire d n e w fed eral g u a ra n tee s of econom ic security: "O u r fig h tin g m en a b ro a d — a n d th e ir fam ilies a t h o m e — expect su ch a p ro g ra m a n d h a v e th e rig h t to insist u p o n if?" H e also im p lied th a t su c h g u a r­ an te es w o u ld serve A m erica in th e fu tu re, "fo r u n less th ere is secu rity h e re a t h o m e th ere can n o t b e lastin g peace in th e w o rld ." In d ee d , h is u se of "se c u rity " — a reso n an t w o rd for A m erican s in th e w a k e of d e p re ssio n a n d in th e m id s t of w a r— lin k ed its v a rio u s m eanin g s. "T he o n e su p re m e objective for th e fu tu re," h e a n n o u n ce d , is "Security. A n d th a t m ean s n o t o n ly p h y sical secu­ rity . . . from attacks b y aggressors. It m ea n s also econom ic security, social se­ curity, m o ral se cu rity — in a fam ily of N atio n s." H e fo llo w ed a sim ilar line o n specific m easu res like fed eral a id to im p o v e rish ed school districts: " N o th in g c an p ro v id e a stro n g e r b u lw a rk [against w ar] in th e y ears to com e th a n a n e d u ­ cated a n d en lig h ten e d a n d to le ra n t citizenry, e q u ip p e d w ith th e a rm e d force n ecessary to sto p ag g ressio n a n d w a rfare in th is w o rld ." Sim ilarly, h e s u p ­ p o rte d c o m p u lso ry service for y o u n g m e n after th e w a r as sim u lta n eo u sly se rv in g defense, social w elfare, a n d reform , goals lin k ed in h is 1944 cam p aig n rheto ric, in w h ic h FDR c o m p a red the w a r effort to th e N e w D eal ju st as h e h a d e arlier c o m p a red th e N e w D eal to m o b ilizatio n in W orld W ar I. Ju st as A m eri­ can s h a d "joined in a c o m m o n w a r a g ain st econom ic b re a k d o w n a n d d e p re s­ sio n ," th ey n o w "joined in a co m m o n w a r a g ain st th e Fascist ru th lessn ess," FDR p ro claim ed . N e w D eal p ro g ra m s w ere "fortifications . . . b u ilt to p ro tect th e p eo p le." T he "co m in g b a ttle for A m erica a n d for civ ilization" resem b led earlier "b attles a g ain st ty ra n n y [the fascists] a n d reaction [the N e w D eal's foes]." FD R 's rhetoric h a rd ly g a in e d h im all th e leg islatio n h e w a n te d , a n d it so a red above th e possibility of m ilitary -b u sin ess lin k ag es to su sta in p o w e r a n d p ro sp erity , b u t it sh o w e d h o w liberalism w a s d irected in to th e n e w ch an n els of n a tio n a l security.32 In su c h w ay s, th e politics a n d econom ics of w a rtim e m o b ilizatio n stre n g th ­ e n e d th e forces of m ilitarizatio n w ith o u t yet g u a ra n te e in g th e m victory. W ar ta u g h t A m erican s to associate defense sp e n d in g w ith p ro sp erity , e v en if th ey d id n o t th in k m u c h a b o u t h o w th e connectio n m ig h t be su sta in ed , a n d it ta u g h t th e m to reg a rd th e ir in d u stria l a n d technological m u scle as th e key to p ro sp e r­ ity a t h o m e a n d p o w e r ab ro ad , e v en if th ey co u ld n o t an ticip ate h o w m u c h th ey w o u ld flex it. It e n h an c ed th e p o w e r of larg e co rp o ratio n s, acco m m o d ated th e m to n a tio n al g o v ern m en t, a n d en co u rag e d th em to p io n eer a d v an c ed tech­ no lo g ies for m ilitary m arkets, e v en if few b u sin e ssm e n foresaw h o w th e w a r­ tim e b o n a n z a m ig h t be su sta in e d after the w ar. It red irected liberals, a n d key in tellectu al elites like scientists, to w a rd th e n e e d s a n d o p p o rtu n itie s of n a tio n al

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security, e v en if th ey d id n o t a b a n d o n o ld er visions. It co o p ted altern ativ e p o w e r b ases like o rg an ized labor, e v en as w a rtim e p ro sp e rity seem ed to m ak e th e b a rg a in acceptable. A n d am id all those changes, th e d ra m a of o ld er issu es— the d a n g e r of a re tu rn to th e D epression, th e v en erab le stru g g les am o n g capital a n d labor a n d g o v e rn m e n t, a n d th e d e m a n d s of w a r itself— o b scu red th e p ossibility th a t te m p o ra ry chan g es m ig h t b eco m e p e rm a n e n t fix­ tures. U p for election a g ain in 1944, R oosevelt "realized th a t th ere w a s n o m o re effective w a y for h im to ru n th a n ag ain to m ak e th e race a g ain st th e m em o ry of H e rb e rt H o o v er."33 S uch p a rd o n a b le political ex p ed ien cy h a rd ly d irected at­ ten tio n to th e critical changes u n d e rw a y d u rin g th e w ar.

Strategies for World Power Ju st as D. W. B rogan saw th e A m erican w a y of w a r as "m ech an ized like the A m erican farm a n d kitchen," A m erican m ilitary officers b eliev ed th a t "A m eri­ can p olicy is to e x p en d m achines ra th e r th a n m en ." The U n ited States, th e y ar­ g u ed , "m ay w ell h av e altered the d ic tu m to 'g e t th ere fu stest w ith th e m o stest m e n ' to a m ore sensible a n d m ore econom ic— 'g e t th ere last w ith th e m o st m a­ ch in es.' M achines are cheap in A m erica; m en are n o t."34 A m erican strategy, th ey knew , d e riv e d from the n a tio n 's econom ic a n d technological ab u n d an ce. T h at a b u n d a n c e su b stan tially allo w ed it to su b stitu te m ach in es for m en o r to p a y o th ers to fig h t— one reaso n th a t B ritain's losses of life w ere h e av ier p ro p o r­ tional to its p o p u la tio n th a n A m erica's (250,000 a n d n e a rly 300,000 co m b at d eath s, respectively), a n d the Soviet U n io n 's far h e av ier (at least 7 m illio n in com bat). R eliance o n A m erican a b u n d a n c e m a d e sense for sev eral reasons. It w a s p re ­ cisely th a t a b u n d an c e th a t allies, often skeptical a b o u t th e co m b at abilities of A m ericans, m o st w a n te d the U n ited States to p ro v id e. N a tio n s a t w a r u su a lly d ra w o n th eir stre n g th s a n d m in im ize th eir w eak n esses, a n d econom ic a b u n ­ d a n ce w a s A m erica's g reatest a sse t— bom b ers, b attlesh ip s, in fa n try -su p p o rt w eap o n s, ra d a r a n d co de-breaking m achines, p lu s th e in g en u ity a n d in d u stry to p ro d u c e them . It also p o ssessed a tra d itio n of d ra w in g o n th a t a b u n d a n c e — as w ell as o n its im m u n ity from attack a n d allies g en ero u sly e n d o w e d w ith m a n p o w e r— to p rev ail in w arfare. A preference for m ach in es o v e r m en like­ w ise re sp o n d e d to m em ories of the costs of g ro u n d w a rfare d u rin g W orld W ar I a n d to fears am o n g lead ers of h o w w ell A m erican s w o u ld to lerate su ch costs o n th e v a ster scale of W orld W ar II. It also reflected A m erican s' d e ep -ro o ted a n tista tism — it took considerable g o v ern m en tal coercion to tap A m erican a b u n d a n c e a n d conscript m illions of m en, b u t far less th a n if th e A m erican g ro u n d a rm y h a d b o rn e a h e av ier b u rd e n of fighting. R eliance o n A m erican a b u n d a n c e also flow ed from th e p e cu lia r c u rre n ts of A m erican m ilitarization, d o m in a te d as it w a s b y civilian elites a n d th eir values. T hose elites— b u sin essm en , scientists, law yers, econom ists, am o n g o th e rs— n a tu ra lly p rize d the technical, o rg anization al, a n d econom ic skills th ey pos-

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sessed, a n d th ey allied m o st easily w ith technically so p h isticated b ran c h es of th e m ilitary, especially th e A rm y A ir Forces (AAF). Like m o st A m ericans, th ey asso ciated co m b at zeal w ith th e c ru d itie s of m ilitarism , eith er th e atavistic k in d su p p o se d ly d isp la y e d b y su icid al Japanese so ld iers o r th e reg im en ted , to tal­ ita ria n v e rsio n d e m o n stra te d b y th e G erm an a rm e d forces. To A m erican elites, th e n a tio n 's technological v irtu o sity in w a rfare d id n o t seem like m ilitarism a t all: it d e riv e d fro m th e v a lu e s a n d expertise of civilians m o re th a n of m ilitary m en; it m in im iz ed th e sacrifice of A m erican lives; a n d it seem ed to free A m eri­ can s fro m th e b ru ta lity a n d bellicosity w h ic h its enem ies p racticed . A s G eneral E lectric's C harles W ilson a rg u e d , "W e can p o ssess th e m ig h tiest a n d d e ad lie st a rm a m e n t in th e w o rld w ith o u t b eco m in g ag g resso rs in o u r h earts, b ecause w e d o n o t h a v e th e intoxicating lu st for b lo o d w h ic h p erio d ically tran sfo rm s the G e rm a n m ilitary caste."35 A m ericans w ere to w a g e w a r coolly, th eir p a ssio n co n fin ed to th e g rim d e te rm in a tio n to p rev ail a t m in im u m cost. B ut w a r w ith o u t p a ssio n w a s im possible. A m erican w a r m ak in g d isp la y e d a "technological fan aticism "— a zeal to inflict technological d e stru c tio n o n its en em ie s— th a t co n tra sted w ith th e a p p a re n t h u m a n fan aticism of g en o cid al N azis a n d c razed Japanese. By v irtu e of th e ir econom ic a n d technological su p e ­ riority, A m ericans co u ld act o u t w a r's d e stru ctiv e im p u lses w h ile seeing th em ­ selves as different from th e ir enem ies. R arely w itn essin g th e h u m a n costs to the enem y, scientists could p ress n e w technologies o n th e a rm e d forces, air force crew s co u ld incinerate en em y cities, a n d b a ttlesh ip s co u ld p u m m e l Japaneseh e ld islan d s from m iles offshore. T he intricate tech nology of w a r p ro v id e d p h y sical a n d psychic d istan ce from the enem y. A n aircrew felt n o th in g ab o u t w h a t its b o m b s d id , C harles L in d b erg h co n clu d ed from firsth a n d experience in th e Pacific: "It is like listen in g to a rad io acco u n t of a b a ttle o n th e o th er side of th e earth. It is too far aw ay, too se p a ra te d to h o ld reality." T he e u p h em istic lan ­ g u ag e of technological w a r increased th e distance. T he d e stru c tio n of Japanese cities w a s only "p in -p o in t, in cen d iary b o m b in g ," th eir civilians sim p ly "d eh o u se d " a n d th e atom ic b o m b d ro p p e d n o t o n a city b u t o n "a m ilitary base," acco rd ing to P re sid e n t H a rry T rum an. The n a tu re of a ir p o w e r a g g ra v ate d b o th its d estru ctiv en ess a n d indifference to it. W hile th e g ain s m a d e b y arm ies a n d nav ies w ere easily m ea su ra b le (territo ry co n q u ered , sh ip s sunk), th e resu lts of b o m b in g w ere so h a rd to calculate th a t the A A F ro u tin ely ju d g e d th e effort m a d e — th e n u m b e r of sorties ru n o r bo m b s d ro p p e d , o r w h a t its o w n h isto ­ rian s called the "n u m b e rs ra c k e t"— ra th e r th a n th e effect ach iev ed .36 Technological w arfare, then, d id n o t so m u ch lim it A m erican fu ry as p ro v id e a n e w c o n d u it for it, p a rticu la rly for the racial p assio n s th a t e ru p te d in th e Pa­ cific w ar. It also allo w ed th e g ro w th of A m erican m ilitary p o w e r to p ro ceed w ith A m ericans d istin g u ish in g them selves from th eir m ilitarist en em ies a n d d isg u isin g th eir o w n visceral attractions to d estru ctio n . A n d for A m ericans alone, the attractio n s of technological w arfare w ere n o t ch allen g ed b y b ein g o n th e receiving e n d of it. C ertainly, too m u ch can b e m a d e of these distinctions. The w a r w as a h ig h ly

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technological stru g g le for all co m b atan ts, w h e th e r th e G erm an s w h o fired rockets a t L o n d o n o r the Soviets w h o shelled m u c h of B erlin in to rubble, ju st as it w a s b ru tal for all th o se w h o h a d to fight, in clu d in g A m ericans. H o m efro n t k n o w led g e of w a r 's h o rro rs h a rd ly p re v e n te d R ussians, British, G erm an s, a n d o th ers from m etin g th em o u t to enem ies. E u p h em ism s w ere so m etim es recog­ n ize d as such; th ey co u ld n o t alw ay s p ro tec t th e scientist w ith m o ral q u a lm s o r th e g en eral facing a difficult decision, m u c h less th e aircrew sh o t u p b y th e e n ­ em y o r the in fan try m a n in com bat. M oreover, econom ic a n d technological p ro w e ss sim p ly m a d e v icto ry p o s­ sible; only strateg y a n d co m b at could m ake it h a p p e n . A b u n d a n ce p ro v id e d o p tions; lead ers still h a d to sift a n d im p le m e n t them . B etw een 1940 a n d 1943, A m erican strateg ists d e cid ed h o w to d o so. T hey p laced first p rio rity o n d efeat­ in g G erm an y as the m o re fo rm id ab le foe. In line w ith a g e n eratio n 's faith in strategic bom bing, th ey e m p h a size d its u se a g ain st en em y factories, cities, a n d lines of su p p ly , in concert w ith econom ic stra n g u la tio n b y A ng lo -A m erican n a ­ v al pow er. H e d g in g th e ir bets, h ow ever, th ey also p re p a re d a larg e arm y, itself fo rm id ab ly e q u ip p e d for technological w ar, to in v a d e th e en em ies' h o m elan d s. In se ttin g a n d follow ing this course, A m erican strateg ists a n d so ld iers w ere largely eq u al to. th e ta sk — victory o v er Jap an w ith o u t in v asio n c a p p e d th eir success— b u t n o t before m eetin g fo rm id ab le obstacles. T he first of th o se arose w h e n A m ericans h a d to fight before th ey h a d fully m o b ilize d — less a p ro b lem in th e w a r a g ain st G erm an y a n d Italy, w h ere allies co u ld sh o u ld e r th e b u rd e n u n til A m erican forces w e re ready, th a n in th e Pacific, so m u c h a n A m erican w ar. Im p o sin g geo g rap h ic a n d strategic b a rrie rs also d e la y ed th e effort to b rin g A m erican technological su p e rio rity to bear: far-aw ay en em ies co u ld n o t b e b lo ck ad ed u n til th eir n a v al forces w ere su b d u e d , n o r b o m b e d u n til b ases n e a r th em w ere secured. H ere, too, the Pacific w ar, w ith its v a st d istan ces a n d its islan d o u tp o sts te n a ­ ciously d e fe n d e d b y the Japanese, often p re se n te d th e g rea ter challenge, one p o o rly an ticip ated because A m ericans h a d u n d e rra te d Ja p an 's m ilitary pro w ess. A m erican forces ap p ro a ch e d Jap an alo n g tw o lines: one cam p aig n , d o m in a te d b y the A m erican a rm y (w ith A u stra lia n h elp) a n d G en. D o u g las M acA rthur, p u sh e d n o rth w a rd from th e Solom ons a n d clim axed w ith th e in v a ­ sio n of the P h ilip p in es in 1944; the other, m o re a n a v al o p e ra tio n c o m m an d e d b y A dm . C hester N im itz, p ro ce ed e d w e stw a rd across th e cen tral Pacific th ro u g h T araw a, th e M arshalls, a n d the M arian as Islan d s, from w h ic h A m eri­ can B-29 bo m b ers co u ld strike Jap an itself (an effort to b o m b Jap an from C hi­ n ese b ases p ro v e d a logistical nightm are). E ven th o u g h som e Jap an ese-h eld is­ lan d s w ere b y p a sse d (critics a rg u e d th a t m ore co u ld h av e been), th e fig h tin g o n those in v a d e d w a s p e rh a p s th e m o st b ru tal of th e w a r for A m erican soldiers. In co n trast, from the sta rt G reat B ritain p ro v id e d air b ases (as w ell as its o w n h u g e B om ber C o m m an d ) for th e b o m b in g of co n tin en tal E urope, as so o n d id recon­ q u e re d N o rth A frica a n d so u th e rn Italy, a lth o u g h G e rm a n forces cau sed h o rri-

TRIUMPH,

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b le losses a m o n g A llied b o m b er crew s (British B om ber C o m m a n d lo st n early 50,000 m en), w h ic h g a in e d su p e rio rity a n d decisive resu lts o n ly in 1944. C onflicts am o n g th e A llies also sh a p e d strategy. A ll w a n te d to h a rn e ss A m erican a b u n d an c e, b u t th ey differed o v er h o w to ta p it a n d h o w m u c h to c o u n t o n it. Stalin b e littled th e A nglo-A m erican b o m b in g of G erm an y a n d in ­ v asio n s of N o rth A frica a n d Italy as p o o r su b stitu tes for a real seco n d fro n t— a n in v asio n of France a n d G e rm a n y — th a t w o u ld lo w er th e Soviet U n io n 's h o rri­ ble b u rd e n s in fig h tin g th e b u lk of G erm an forces. B ritish lead ers like C h u rch ill a b h o rre d th e costs of su c h a n invasion, p refe rrin g actio n in th e M ed iterran ean , w h e re B ritish in terests w ere large. G enerals E isen h o w er a n d M arsh all ap p reci­ a te d S talin's n eed s, d o u b te d th a t b o m b in g alone c o u ld d e fe at G erm any, a n d d isp u te d th e v a lu e of in v a d in g N o rth A frica a n d Italy (w here, d e sp ite Italy 's su rre n d e r a n d M u sso lin i's overthrow , a costly a n d larg ely p o in tless A llied c a m p a ig n d ra g g e d o n u n til 1945 th an k s to to u g h G e rm a n resistance). But th ey h e sita te d to in v a d e France u n til A m erican forces w ere fu lly m o b ilized a n d co m b at-tested. T h at cam e only in June 1944, carried o u t u n d e r E isen h o w er's c o m m an d b y B ritish, A m erican, C a n ad ian , Free French, a n d o th e r forces. The w a r a g ain st Ja p an p ro v o k ed less inter-A llied conflict, if o n ly b ecau se it w a s su c h a n A m erican effort. C onflict w ith in th e A m erican a rm e d forces, h o w ev er, w a s en d em ic re g a rd ­ in g b o th th eaters. A t stake w ere differing strategic visions, th e con tro l of w a r­ tim e resources, b ra g g in g rig h ts to victory, a n d in tu rn claim s o n p o stw a r b u d ­ g ets a n d statu s. FD R p ro v id e d som e g u id an ce, p a rticu la rly in g o a d in g A m erican c o m m an d e rs to b o m b Japan, b u t th e p rin cip al m ech an ism for resolv­ in g in tra m ilita ry conflict, the n e w Joint C hiefs of Staff, w a s c o m m itted to w o rk ­ in g b y c o n sen su s a n d o n ly cautiously reso lv ed its differences. T he A A F re­ se n te d still b e in g su b o rd in a te to th e a rm y a n d called o n to su p p o rt g ro u n d a n d n a v al c am p aig n s, d e e p ly b elieving its b o m b ers co u ld w in th e w a r if g iv en th e chance. T he n a v y ju st as a d a m a n tly m a in ta in e d th e v irtu e s of sea p o w er. In the Pacific, M a cA rth u r— "th e m o st p o m p o u s, g ran d io se, a n d m en d acio u s A m eri­ can c o m m a n d e r in W orld W ar II," a n d a th re a t to FDR as a p o ssib le c an d id ate for th e p resid en c y — p u rs u e d th e a rm y 's v isio n (at least h is v e rsio n of it) of vic­ tory. For g o o d reason, c o n tem p o raries a n d h isto ria n s h av e d escrib ed th e w a r am o n g th e A m erican a rm e d services as o ften m o re fierce th a n th e w a r ag ain st th e enem y. M arshall, th e a rm e d forces' p re e m in e n t stra te g ist a n d politician, h e lp e d to co m p ro m ise su c h conflicts. So, too, d id sh eer A m erican a b u n d an c e b y 1944, w h ic h allo w ed a re d u n d a n t stra te g y w h e reb y each service co u ld p u r­ su e its favored course. W asteful in m a n y w a y s— n ecessitatin g tw o ro u tes to Ja­ p a n in stea d of one a n d com pelling b o m b ers to b last factories th a t b lo ck ad e h a d a lread y c rip p le d — su c h red u n d a n cy , in line w ith a n A m erican tra d itio n of "strateg ies of an n ih ilatio n ," d id h av e th e strategic m erit of b rin g in g all forces to b e ar o n th e enem y.37 Political objectives also p re se n te d obstacles to stra te g y — o r m ore accurately

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sh a p e d it, since n o strateg y m a d e sense th a t d id n o t m eet su c h objectives. O ne objective w a s u n co n tro v ersial am o n g m o st A m erican s— th e "u n co n d itio n al su rre n d e r" of G erm an y a n d Japan. O th ers w ere m o re p roblem atic. It w a s one th in g , for exam ple, to h av e the Soviets b e a r th e b ru n t of th e w a r a g ain st G er­ m any, q u ite a n o th e r to let th em m ove too far in to C en tral E u ro p e in th e process. T h at p ro sp e ct a d d e d a n o th e r reaso n for the in v asio n of France a n d G e rm a n y b y th e W estern A llies a n d p ro v o k ed bick erin g am o n g A n g lo -A m erican lead ers a b o u t w h e th e r to co n q u er Berlin before th e Soviets d id (the costs of su c h a n o p eratio n , am o n g o th e r things, d issu a d e d E isen h o w er from th e attem p t). Polit­ ical objectives also led the U n ited States into a h a p le ss effort to assist C h in a in th e w a r a g ain st Jap an a n d allo w ed M acA rth u r to p rev a il in h is d e te rm in a tio n to liberate th e P h ilip p in es ev en th o u g h m a n y strateg ists d o u b te d th eir im p o r­ tance in th e w ar. P erh ap s m o st im p o rtan t, stra te g y w a s sh a p e d b y preferences e v id e n t in political culture. A m ericans' in d ig n a tio n o v e r Pearl H a rb o r a n d ra ­ cial fu ry to w a rd th e Japanese e ro d e d the E u ro p e-first stra te g y a n d h e lp e d sanc­ tio n th e final o n sla u g h t o n Japan, the firebo m b in g a n d atom ic b o m b in g of its cities in 1945. A lth o u g h n o t u n co m fo rtab le w ith su c h p references, R oosevelt a n d his m ilitary lea d ers som etim es felt h e m m e d in b y them . Finally, g ra n d strateg y w as com plicated b y o p e ra tio n a l obstacles w h ic h A m erican leaders, tru stin g th eir n a tio n 's technological p ro w ess, o ften u n d e r­ rated . T hey m isju d g ed h o w w ell strategic b o m b in g forces c o u ld assess, locate, a n d h it critical targ ets ("W e m a d e a m ajor a ssa u lt o n G e rm a n a g ric u ltu re" w a s th e w ry co m m en t of one b o m b er crew ), a n d th ey d isc o u n te d th e e n e m y 's abil­ ity to w ith sta n d su c h attack. T hey o v e rra ted th e ability of b o m b ers to strik e e n ­ em y forces close to A llied lines in France— tw o d isa stro u s attack s in Ju ly 1944 killed o r w o u n d e d h u n d re d s of A m erican s— a n d th e cap acity of n av al fire­ p o w e r to p u lv erize Japanese forces in th eir islan d o u tp o sts ("M aybe w e 'll w a lk ashore," one colonel m u se d before th e in v asio n of T araw a).38 Such m isju d g m e n ts p a le d in co m p a riso n to th o se m a d e b y th e enem y, h o w ­ ever, a n d b y 1943, A llied forces w ere o n the offensive in b o th theaters. By th e e n d of 1944, E isen h o w er's forces w ere n e a rin g G e rm a n y 's w e ste rn b o rd e rs as Soviet forces sw e p t e astw a rd , a n d o th er A m erican forces w ere b o m b in g Ja­ p a n 's cities a n d c rip p lin g its econom y th ro u g h a rem ark ab le su b m a rin e cam ­ paig n . By then, too, A m erican scientists w ere n early su re th a t atom ic b o m b s w o u ld b e rea d y w ith in several m o n th s. A llied u n ity seem ed to p e a k ju st w h e n th e w a r effort d id , as conferences of C hurchill, FDR, a n d Stalin a t T eh ran (N o­ v em b er 1943) a n d Yalta (F ebruary 1945) attested . By 1944, too, A m erican p la n n in g for the p o stw a r era w as in full sw ing. For d ecad es after 1945, m an y h isto rian s. C old W arriors, a n d R oosevelt-haters ar­ g u e d th a t the ad m in istratio n , fixated o n victo ry a n d o b livious to A m erican in ­ terests a n d Soviet intentions, failed in su ch p lan n in g . But th eir ch arg es w ere essen tially w ro n g , in sp ired b y fru stratio n th a t A m erica's p re e m in e n t p o w e r h a d failed to secure all its am bitions after W orld W ar II. G ran ted , w a rtim e p lan -

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“Corne on in, Vil treat you right. I used to know your Daddy." Fig. 1. At the start of their age of militarization, most Americans understood war as an external force bearing down on them. This 1937 Pulitzer Prize-winning cartoon by C. D. Batchelor indicated their anxiety that another European war might erupt and draw them in. Showing war as a diseased whore luring men to their death, it also revealed the strikingly— sometimes maliciously— gendered ways in which war was often portrayed in m odem American culture. (Reprinted by permission of Tribune Media Services)

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A# spring fallows winter, so fmmw **sii retttf«, »How*«g the work! to resume it» progress to Iteiter ways o f doing things. Far* sigh tesi men are thinking o f the future, keeping tomorrow in mimi tk tfe à è i g today's urgent task. Today we of Keasbey & Matti* mm wtlliitgfy give preei^hmec to ♦*rdcr* from defense industries, as vo*t wmild have os do. Onr piatita are running day and night, we are enlarging our working forre and adding to our machine capacity. liven so we are finding it diibridi at the present time to

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deliver some products to many of our customers. But, like you, w e are keeping one eye ou the future. When normal times return . . . when we are able to ship you everything you want, when y ou w ant i t . . . we expect to have found ways of doing things better, offering von asbestos prod* wets that wilt last longer, prove more economical atei serve your purposes better.

some specific problem that could he overcome by a new applica lion of asbestos ? We w ill give thor­ ough consideration to any sugges­ tion, in the hope that it will prove to be practical from a manufac­ turing standpoint. We’d greatly appreciate a letter from you.

* * * Amure made axftestm; Keuxbey & Matti »on ha» made it sen»* m an kin d. . . since 1873.

To that end, we need your help now. Can you, who use asbestos materials, give us some ideas for tomorrow ? Have you encountered

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Fig. 2. Appearing in the Dec. 8,1941, issue of Newsweek— one day after the Pearl Harbor attack— this corporate advertisement offered a simple visual statement of war as an external force that Americans were loathe to engage, rendering it as a set of menacing shadows hovering over a scene of domestic tranquility.

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CONSOLIDATED VULTEE AIRCRAFT Fig. 3. Wartime culture was rife with images of "a world shrunk so small" by technology, as this corporate advertisement in Life (Sept. 6,1943) put it, that there "can be no such thing as a hermit nation." Also common was the promise, as the ad continues, that wartime technology would yield postwar peace and bounty, with aviation "welding the peoples of the earth together in friendly trade and intercourse and mutual understanding." (Reprinted by permission; all rights reserved)

“Today Philco research is w o rk in g for v ic to r y , h elp in g to s p e e d th e a d v a n c e o f electron ic scien ce th r o u g h t h e r a d io m ir a c le s o f m o d ern co m b a t in th e air.



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Fig. 4. Wartime culture— corporate advertising in particular— promised that military inventions would yield postwar technological plenty, a promise that persisted largely unchallenged into the 1960s and reemerged in the 1980s. (Life, May 14,1944.; PHILCO is a registered trademark of Philips Electronics North America Corporation)

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Fig. 5. War suspended or altered existing restrictions on erotic images. Although perhaps not a conscious depiction of same-sex eroticism, this advertisement (Life, Aug. 16,1943) celebrated the joys and demands of an all-male military environ­ ment. While Cannon noted that Life's readers "might not enjoy the bathing facil­ ities of our boys in the service," the boys depicted seemed to be doing so. (By permission of Cannon Towels, a division of Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc.)

Fig. 6. This typical government poster caught several themes in wartime culture: the assurance of technological triumph through American air power, the sense of the enemy's bestial nature, and the belief that subhuman enemies deserved vindictive destruction. (Courtesy National Archives, Still Picture Branch, 44PA-978)

Fig. 7. World War II widened the opportunities for favorable depictions of African-Americans, as in this U.S. government poster of boxer Joe Louis in uniform, in a notably manly and aggressive pose. But the poster's caption also implied that blacks were to subordinate their interests to the grander cause of national safety and moral righteousness, and wartime culture rarely depicted blacks and whites serving together on an equal basis. (Courtesy George Roeder and National Archives, Still Picture Branch, 44-PA-87)

Fig. 8. One of the most enduring images of World War II— and adapted to count­ less political purposes after it—Joe Rosenthal's photograph of this semistaged scene on Iwo Jima in February 1945 was also a reassuring image, meshing indi­ vidual effort with collective will, excluding war's grislier aspects, reaffirming classical poses of heroism, and celebrating American victory. (Courtesy George Roeder and National Archives, Still Picture Branch, (W&C, no. 1221)

Fig. 9. As illustrated for Life (Aug. 20,1945), the destruction wrought on Hiro­ shima by the atomic attack was invisible beneath the explosion's giant cloud— a depiction that celebrated Americans' military might while obscuring its conse­ quences. At the war's end, as at its start, war for most Americans remained quite literally a shadowy phenomenon, its substance hard to grasp. (Rendering by A. Leydenfrost for Life magazine)

TRIUMPH,

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85

n in g for th e p o stw a r w a s chaotic, d e p riv e d of FD R 's close atten tio n , a n d u n ­ ev en ly a rticu la te d to th e A m erican p eo p le, b u t it h a rd ly lacked co n ten t a n d p u rp o sefu ln ess. It w a s sh a p e d in p a rt b y the v iew of recen t h isto ry n o w p rev a ilin g a m o n g A m erican leaders. In th a t view , th e calam ities of econom ic d e p re ssio n a n d w o rld w a r h a d b e en avoidable, cau sed b y th e ab d icatio n of lea d ersh ip b y th e U n ited States a n d b y the failures of th e w o rld 's dem ocracies. T he v icto rio u s p o w e rs of W orld W ar I, in this read in g , im p o sed a p u n itiv e peace th a t p o iso n e d G e rm a n politics, d is ru p te d th e global econom y, a n d h e lp e d to u sh e r in a global d ep ressio n , w h ich in tu rn b re d th e c o n d itio n s th a t d ictato rs exploited. T hey sq u a n d e re d th e chance to u se th e L eague of N atio n s to control econom ic chaos a n d m ilita ry aggression, in p a rt because the U n ited States h a d refu sed to jo in it. In ste ad , th e W estern dem ocracies trie d policies of a p p ea sem e n t, d isa rm a m e n t, a n d isolationism th a t e m b o ld en e d the ag g resso rs— " a n in v itatio n to M ussolini, H itle r a n d th e Japanese w a r lo rd s to ru n the w o rld ," according to N av y Secre­ tary F orrestal in 1944.39 A n d th ey failed to g ra sp th e d a n g e rs p o se d b y n e w technologies a n d ideologies o p e ra tin g in a closed w o rld system . For m an y A m ericans, th e V ersailles T reaty e n d in g W orld W ar I sy m b o lized th e sta rt of these follies, M unich th eir apogee. Pearl H a rb o r th e ir co n seq u en ces for A m eri­ cans, a n d G erm an V-2 rockets th e fu tu re th a t su ch foolishness co u ld b ring. Soon H iro sh im a a n d the H o lo cau st w o u ld jo in th e litan y of sym bols. It w a s a strik in g ly d a rk a n d self-castigating v iew of th e p a s t for a triu m p h a n t n a tio n to ad o p t. It w a s a p a st th a t m u s t n o t a n d n e e d n o t b e rep e ate d , A m erican s w ere told. N o w lo o m ed a "second chance" for th e m to lead th e w o rld . T his e m p h a sis o n a seco n d chance ob scu red a n y A m erican d riv e for p o w er. A m erican s w ere, it seem ed, looking b ack w ard m ore th a n fo rw ard , a to n in g for sin s of th e p a st m o re th a n seeking d o m in a tio n of th e future. Ju st as th ey saw w a r as forced u p o n th e m in 1941 b y aggressors (em b o ld en ed b y th e d em ocracies' w eakness), so th ey n o w saw p o stw a r p o w e r a n d respon sib ility as sim p le necessities. If a m ea su re of A m erican d o m in a tio n en su ed , it in v o lv ed n o lu st for p o w e r a n d w o u ld b e w elcom ed b y all n a tio n s seeking lib eratio n from th e tra u m a s of d e ­ p ressio n a n d w ar. "N o one charges u s w ith w a n tin g a n y th in g of a n y b o d y else's," M arsh all asserted , a n d "n o one is fearful of o u r m isu se" of m ilitary p o w er.40 Several versions of second-chance th in k in g e m e rg ed am o n g elites, in clu d in g p la n s for a n e w w o rld o rg an iz atio n to p ro m o te econom ic recovery a n d collec­ tive security, a n d u n ila tera l efforts to p ro m o te global cap italism u n d e r A m eri­ can auspices. A m o n g these versions, h ow ev er, th e id eo lo g y of n a tio n al p re ­ p a re d n e ss w a s especially influential. B rogan n o ticed th a t "A m erican s h av e lo n g b e en accustom ed to jest a t [their] re p e ate d state of m ilitary n ak ed n ess. 'G o d looks after children, d ru n k a rd s , a n d the U n ited States.' " T hose d a y s n o w seem ed gone. A s W alter L ip p m an n p u t it, A m erican s "h av e com e to th e e n d of

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o u r effortless secu rity " (and of "lim itless o p p o rtu n itie s," h e a d d ed ). A d vocates of p re p a re d n e ss stressed th e political a n d technological im p e rativ es for replac­ in g indifference to m ilitary p o w e r w ith a n e w "sta te of m in d , so firm ly im b e d ­ d e d in o u r so u ls as to becom e a n invincible p h ilo so p h y ," as o n e scien tist said. F u tu re ag g resso rs w o u ld only b e d e te rre d b y m ilitary force. A s o n e a d m ira l p u t th e co m m onplace a rg u m e n t, if th e U n ited States h a d sh o w n its m ilita ry m ig h t "before, and not after, a series of M u n ich c o n fe re n c e s,. . . th e p e rso n a l fo llow ing of a n y fu tu re H itle r w o u ld b e lim ited to a few w o u ld -b e su icid es." P re p a ra tio n to d e te r o r w a g e w a r c o u ld n o t a g ain a w ait th e o n se t of a crisis, n o t for "a n a tio n g ro w n so large in a w o rld th a t h a s sh ru n k so sm all," n o t for a n age w h e n a n en em y could strike w ith "a s u d d e n d e v asta tio n b e y o n d a n y 'P earl H a rb o r' ex­ p erien ce o r o u r p re se n t p o w e r of im a g in atio n to conceive." For th o se aw are of th e atom ic b o m b project, p e ril lo o m ed e v en larger: "E v ery cen ter of th e p o p u la ­ tio n in the w o rld in th e fu tu re is at the m ercy of th e e n em y th a t strik es first," a d v ise d the scientist V annevar Bush. A d v an cin g su c h a rg u m e n ts, ad v o cates of p re p a re d n e ss codified a n d projected fo rw a rd th e n e w co n cep tio n of n a tio n a l secu rity o u tlin e d o n th e eve of W orld W ar H.41 T he v a rio u s stra n d s of second-chance th in k in g co u ld b e h a rm o n iz e d in so m e w ay s. A dvocates of p re p a re d n e ss a rg u e d th a t A m erican forces m ig h t serv e in a U n ited N atio n s "In tern a tio n al Police Force," a n d som e p ro p o n e n ts of a n "o p en -d o o r" w o rld econom y ap p re cia te d th e m ilitary fo u n d a tio n s o n w h ic h it m ig h t rest. T here w ere n o n eth eless im p o rta n t ten sio n s a m o n g these sch em es— w o u ld p o w e rfu l A m erican a rm e d forces, critics a sk ed , ala rm o th e r co u n tries a n d u n d e rc u t the n e w U n ited N ations? T here w ere also tensions am o n g th o se p reach in g p re p a re d n e ss. Each m ili­ ta ry service p red ictab ly favored its o w n k in d of m ilitary p o w er. Fueling th e ten ­ sions w a s the services' b itte r stru g g le ov er w h e th e r th ey sh o u ld b e jo in ed in a single d e p a rtm e n t of defense, a goal u n d e rlin e d for m a n y A m erican s b y Pearl H arb o r, a n d th eir u n se em ly scram ble to lay claim to p o stw a r b u d g e ts. The q u a rre lin g services co m p ro m ised som e differences— th e a rm y 's M arsh all a g reed th a t "A ir P ow er w ill b e th e q uick rem e d y " for fu tu re aggression, all g ave lip service to u n iv ersal m ilitary train in g , a n d all so u g h t a m u c h larg er peacetim e estab lish m en t a n d tig h te r linkag es am o n g its m ilitary a n d civilian com p o nents. The air force, ho w ev er, g ain ed th e u p p e r h a n d in th is stru g g le. It ex ag g erated its role in victory, p ro m ise d m ax im u m p o w e r at m in im u m cost, a n d ta p p e d d e e p cu rre n ts of technological an x iety a n d o p tim ism . A erial tech­ n o lo g y loom ed as the u ltim ate source of b o th d a n g e r a n d d eliv eran ce for th e U n ited States. In the w ro n g h a n d s, it w o u ld leave th e n a tio n n a k e d to to tal d e ­ struction. In A m erican h a n d s, it m ig h t m ake p o ssible a Pax A ero n au tica for the w o rld . "The p eo p le are sold o n peace th ro u g h air p o w e r," Fortune co n clu d ed in Ju n e 1945.42 For his p a rt, R oosevelt seem ed to gloss ov er th e ten sio n s, h is v a g u en e ss cal­ cu lated to satisfy conflicting interests at h o m e a n d to h e d g e h is b ets in a n uncer-

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ta in w o rld . T h u s h e gave stu rd y s u p p o rt to th e n e w U n ited N a tio n s b u t sh ra n k fro m eg alitarian d e sig n s for it, h a p p y to see it d o m in a te d b y th e "F o u r P o licem en "— Britain, th e Soviet U nion, C hin a, a n d a U n ited States retain in g m ilita ry suprem acy. T h o u g h in atten tiv e to th e intricacies of p o stw a r m ilitary p la n n in g , h e s u p p o rte d its essentials, in clu d in g c o o p eratio n a m o n g m ilitary, in d u stria l, a n d scientific in stitu tio n s a n d rete n tio n of o v erseas b ases from w h ic h A m erican air forces co u ld o p e ra te globally. A bove all, h is atom ic policy, h o w e v e r d e v io u s a n d inconsistent, sh o w ed h is d e te rm in a tio n to m a in tain A m erican p o w e r w ith o u t ru lin g o u t loftier possibilities. H e in d ic ate d h is w ill­ in g n ess to use atom ic b o m b s a g ain st Jap an a n d h is in terest in w o rk in g w ith the Soviets a n d o th er p o w e rs to control th e n e w w e ap o n , b u t h e also d e cid ed to m a in ta in a n A nglo -A m erican m o n o p o ly o n atom ic w e a p o n s (an d A m erican d o m in a n ce of th a t p artn ersh ip ). H e u n d e rs to o d b o th th e com m ercial p o ten tial of ato m ic en erg y a n d its d ip lo m atic p o ten tial as a c o u n te rw e ig h t to Soviet p o w e r o r o th er threats. H e, too, h a d d ra w n th e fam iliar lesso n " th a t if w e d o n o t p u ll th e fangs of the p re d a to ry an im als of th is w o rld , th ey w ill m u ltip ly a n d g ro w in stre n g th — a n d th ey w ill b e at o u r th ro ats once m o re in a sh o rt g e n era ­ t i o n . '^ N u m e ro u s sources of friction a n d u n c ertain ty co m p licated an y effort to act o n th a t lesson. A nglo-A m erican relations d u rin g th e w a r w ere o ften fractious, for exam ple, w ith so m e A m ericans b o th a la rm e d at th e d eclin e of B ritish p o w e r a n d a n g ry a t th e B ritish for exercising w h a t rem a in e d of it. B ritish d eclin e w a s a t least ro u g h ly calculable. Far h a rd e r to p re d ic t w ere th e fo rtu n es of th a t v a st "T h ird W orld" (as it cam e to b e called), w h e re p o w e rfu l m o v em en ts so u g h t to o v e rth ro w im p e ria l ru le b y E u ro p ea n o v erseers o r b y Japan, o r to challenge less fo rm al W estern d o m in a tio n , in clu d in g th a t b y th e U n ited States. R eg ard in g th a t v ast, u n se ttle d aren a, A m erican lead ers d isp la y e d a certain sy m p a th y for th e forces of d ecolonization, a d e cid ed reluctan ce to give th e m a tte r h ig h p rio r­ ity, a n d a d istin ct am bivalence a b o u t w h e th e r d eco lo n izatio n w o u ld really w o rk to A m erican interests. Such p ro b lem s c o u ld n o t b e d iv o rced from th e tan g le of q u estio n s a b o u t So­ v iet intentions. B ritish leaders, for exam ple, h a d so m etim es b e e n w illin g d u r ­ in g th e w a r to acco m m o d ate Soviet p o w e r in E astern E urope, to th e c o n stern a­ tio n of A m erican d ip lo m ats. Soviet lead ers h a d lo n g sh o w ere d rh etorical su p p o rt, if less practical assistance, o n rev o lu tio n ary forces in th e colonial w o rld . T he w a r h a d d o n e little to abate A m erican d istru st of M oscow , ev en th o u g h political rhetoric a n d p o p u la r c u ltu re celeb rated th e Soviet U n io n as a n ally in the antifascist struggle. W artim e sy m p a th y for th e Soviets b arely ob­ scu red th e friction b e tw e e n Soviet a n d A m erican lead ers o v er strategy, o v er Stalin's policy as h is arm ies sw e p t th ro u g h E astern E urope, o v er Soviet esp io ­ n ag e (in A m erica's M a n h a tta n Project, for exam ple), a n d o v er th e d a ily g rin d of d ip lo m atic contact, w h ic h led d ip lo m a ts like G eorge K en n an to d e p lo re th e So­ viets' d u p lic ito u s w ays.

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Yet as the w a r d re w to a close, u n c ertain ty a b o u t Soviet in te n tio n s g o v e rn e d A m erican p la n n in g m o re th a n a fixed convictio n of th eir d an g er. T h at convic­ tio n g rip p e d som e factions in th e State D e p a rtm e n t a n d o th e r co n serv ativ es lo n g h o rrified b y co m m u n ist ideology a n d Soviet am b itio n s, b u t it h a d less of a h o ld o n the a rm e d forces' u n ifo rm e d a n d civilian lead ers (excepting N a v y Sec­ retary Forrestal). M any m ilitary lead ers h a d fo u n d th e ir Soviet c o u n te rp a rts m o re co operative th a n A m erican d ip lo m a ts h a d ; m a n y a p p re cia te d h o w th e sav ag e w a r w o u ld leave th e Soviet U n io n p reo c cu p ie d w ith its in te rn a l reco n ­ struction; som e h a d confidence in A m erican p o w e r to p rev a il an y w ay ; few a n ­ ticip ated a p ro tra c te d A m erican m ilitary presen ce, ex cep t p e rh a p s th ro u g h air p o w er, in E u rope after th e w ar. In th e ran k s as w ell, sim ilar a ttitu d e s m ay h av e p revailed: w ritin g in 1944, D ixon W ecter w a s aw are of Soviet-A m erican te n ­ sions a n d of the p o ten tial for "so m e k in d of R ed Scare" after th e w ar, b u t fo u n d th e A m erican G I "m o re likely to look to w a rd o u r p re se n t en em ies for th e n ex t w a r."44 C ertain ty a b o u t a Soviet th re a t w a s n o t necessary, h o w ev er, to m ak e th e case for p o stw a r p rep a red n e ss, for th a t case rested o n p ro p o sitio n s far b ro a d e r th a n an y th re a t from one pow er. T he w o rld rev o lu tio n in tech n o lo g y a n d p o litics a n d th e p e rm a n e n t d a n g e r it offered to A m erican secu rity seem ed sufficient alone to com pel p rep ared n ess. L ater p ro o f (as A m erican s saw it) of M o sco w 's h eg em onic d esig n s serv ed only to confirm th a t a rg u m e n t. P u t differently: a "cold w a r" m entality, c o n stru cted o u t of th e ex p erien ce of d e p re ssio n a n d w o rld w ar, p rec ed e d the C o ld W ar itself w ith th e Soviet U nion, a n d to a d eg ree it d efin ed h o w A m ericans cam e to u n d e rs ta n d th e Soviet th reat. T h at m en tality ex tra p o la ted the recent p a st in to th e future: a n o th e r H itle r le a d ­ in g a n o th e r to ta litaria n n a tio n m ig h t th rea te n a n ew ly v u ln era b le A m erica a n d cause a n o th e r w o rld w a r (no o th er k in d seem ed im aginable), a n d to sto p th a t th re a t req u ire d possessio n of the m ilitary p o w e r th a t co u ld h av e d e te rre d H itler a n d d id finally d e fe at him . T h at o u tlo o k also e x tra p o la ted cu rre n tly p re ­ d o m in a n t form s of technological pow er, especially av iatio n , in to th e future. A s w ith o th er d im e n sio n s of w a rtim e experience, th e effort to scrip t a fu tu re b a sed o n recent experience w a s still co n tin g en t a t th e w a r 's close a n d c lo u d e d b y old labels a n d issues. Just as R oosevelt ra n a g ain st H o o v er in th e 1944 cam ­ p aig n , politicians still d e b a te d the evils of "iso latio n ism ," th e d e sig n for th e U n ited N atio n s to replace th e old L eague of N atio n s, o r th e term s for u n ify in g th e a rm e d forces. M ilitarization p ro ceed ed , o b scu red b y th a t b ell-cu rv e m o d el of h isto ry in w h ich a re tu rn to p a st evils seem ed m o re likely th a n e n try in to a decisively n e w age.

Perceptions off War A s D ixon W ecter said in 1944, "T he consequ en ces of a n y b ig w a r sp re a d in cir­ cles to infinity."45 Soon, ig n o rin g th a t tru ism , m o st A m erican s rem e m b e red th e

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w a r as in v o lv in g a n alm o st u n iv ersal experience of u n ity a n d co m m o n p u r­ pose. L ater, critics assailed th a t m em ory, a rg u in g th a t b e n e a th th e surface of p u b lic cu ltu re, w ith its o m n ip re se n t talk of v icto ry a n d freedom , lay sh a rp ly v a rie d experiences sh a p e d b y g en d er, race, ethnicity, religion, region, age, a n d o th er factors. S om ew here b e tw ee n th o se tw o v iew s of w a rtim e ex p erien ce lies th e ro u g h if v ariab le tru th . N e ith e r e m p ty n o r u n ifo rm , public c u ltu re p ro v id e d o n e w a y for A m erican s to d iv in e m ea n in g in th e ir experiences. M oreover, alm o st all h a d some ex p eri­ ence of th e w ar, a n d a n aw aren ess th a t "th eirs w a s a w o rld su d d e n ly g ro w n sm all a n d com plicated." T his w a s "to ta l w a r " — in p ercep tio n at least, o n e w ell e v o k ed b y M arg aret M ead: "T he sim p lest m o u n ta in farm er m ay live o n a re­ m o te sp o t w h e re a p a ra ch u tist d r o p s . . . . Ju st as a n y tree or b u sh , a n y village o r su b u rb , is as possible a ta rg e t for a b o m b as a forest o r a city, so to tal w a r stretches o u t th e h u m a n b ein g s w h o fo rm a n a tio n in to a g reat strag g lin g chain, as stro n g as th eir ability to join h a n d s ra p id ly a g ain if o n e d ro p s o u t." M ore th a n a t a n y o th er tim e in th eir history, a consciousness of sh a re d experience gave A m ericans a n intangible b u t p o w e rfu l u n ity .46 For th e m o st p a rt, th ey sh a re d so m eth in g else: belief in th e A m erican cause a n d v a g u en e ss a b o u t w h a t m a d e it v irtu o u s. Polls a tteste d to th a t v ag u en ess, ju st as lead ers feared th a t it m ig h t u n d e rm in e m orale. A b u n d a n t c o m m en ta ry ex p o sed a v a p id , e v en b a n a l sense of p u rp o se . "By a n d large," W ecter n o ticed , "th e sym bols of this w a r h ave n o t c a u g h t on. T he V -for-V ictory is quick ly d e ­ b a sed to a m o n o g ram o n h a n d b ag s; a tru ss m a n u fa c tu re r in C alifornia lately a d v ertised . T o th e F our F reedom s A d d a Fifth: F reed o m from R u p tu re.' " Such triv ializatio n reflected reality, W ecter realized: "L acking a N a n k in g , o r a C ov­ entry, o r th e ab atto irs of K harkov, w e A m erican s h av e n o t felt th e sam e p a s­ sio n ate defense of o u r soil a n d skies th a t o u r A llies k n o w ."47 A b stractio n s— liberty, peace, p o w e r— m ig h t h av e d efin ed p u rp o se s, b u t th ey su ffered a re p u ­ tatio n for h av in g d u p e d A m ericans in W orld W ar I. In d ee d , m a n y saw m a tu rity in h o w A m ericans w a g e d w a r w ith o u t the idealistic ferv o r of 1917. True, a n elab o rate p u b lic-p riv ate m ach in ery fu n ctio n ed to cen so r th e p ress a n d en list the n a tio n in the cause. T he som etim es ten se relatio n sh ip b e tw e e n H o lly w o o d a n d W ashington y ield ed a flood of fictional, didactic, a n d n e w s film s, a n d skillful p ro p a g a n d a like th e Why We Fight series m a d e for th e a rm y b y d irecto r F rank C apra. T ogether these film s p o w e rfu lly sh a p e d p u b lic cul­ ture, h e lp in g to m ake it p e rh a p s m ore u n ifo rm th a n a t a n y p o in t in th e n a tio n 's h isto ry a n d to create a real d im e n sio n of w a rtim e unity. A h o d g e p o d g e of fed eral agencies c o m p e te d in sh a p in g th a t cu ltu re, h o w ­ ever. N o m in ally in charge. Office of W ar In fo rm atio n chief E lm er D avis "felt like a m a n w h o h a d m a rrie d a w a rtim e w id o w a n d w a s try in g to raise h e r chil­ d re n b y all h e r p rev io u s h u sb a n d s." H e m m e d in b y R oosevelt-haters, secrecym in d e d m ilitary officials, a n d p ro fit-h u n g ry b u sin essm en , agencies like OW I often c ap itu la te d to the p rev a ilin g v ag u en ess, p refe rrin g th a t w a r 's p u rp o se s

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em erge indirectly th ro u g h e n te rta in m e n t o r th e "u se of sacred a n d se n tim en ta l sym b o ls."48 A s a result, th e w a r w a s u b iq u ito u s in c u ltu re — th e flag w a s e v ery w h ere, a n d e v en T arzan "en listed for the A llies"— b u t its p u rp o se s w ere h a zily a rtic u ­ lated. Few A m ericans k n ew m u c h a b o u t th e A tlantic C h a rte r sig n ed b y FDR a n d C hurchill in 1941. Polls claim ed th a t th e p e o p le w ere m o re in te reste d in d om estic th a n in in tern atio n al affairs. A n d th e m essag es th ey g o t fro m g o v e rn ­ m en t, corporate, a n d m ed ia d e p ic tio n s of th e w a r's p u rp o s e s — p a in te r N o r­ m a n R ockw ell's ren d e rin g s of FD R 's "fo u r freed o m s," for ex am p le — g en erally in v ited th em "to join the w a r effort in o rd e r to d e fe n d private in terests a n d d is­ ch arg e private m o ral obligations," above all th o se in v o lv in g th e ir fam ilies. Like m o st peoples, D. W. B rogan n o te d , A m erican s v iew ed w a r parochially: "W e k n o w th a t the C hinese w ere fig h tin g th e Japanese lo n g before w e w ere, b u t w e d o n 't feel it. W e co u ld rem em ber, if w e tried , th a t th e Poles w ere fig h tin g th e G erm an s" before a n y o n e else, "b u t w e d o n 't feel a n y u rg en cy to recall it." For g o o d reason, then. T reasu ry Secretary H e n ry M o rg e n th au d e c id e d th a t w a r b o n d d riv es w o u ld h av e to instill ra th e r th a n reflect n a tio n al p u rp o s e — h e w o u ld "u se bonds to sell the war, ra th e r th a n vice versa/' U sin g M ad iso n A v en u e m e th o d s to sell the w ar, ho w ev er, o n ly c o m p o u n d e d th e triv ializa tio n th o se m e th o d s w ere su p p o se d to counter.49 For sure, e v en shallow slogans a n d im ages h a d content. T hey sp o k e to real concerns of A m ericans b a tte re d b y d e p re ssio n a n d b e w ild e re d b y w a r in p o r­ tray in g th em as fighting c u n n in g N azis a n d cross-eyed Jap an ese in d efen se of M om , a p p le pie, th e flag, a n d a su b u rb a n hom e. E xpressed in th e slo g an s a n d sym bols of a n a d v ertisin g cu ltu re, h ow ever, th o se concerns d id n o t easily con­ geal in to articu late p u rp o se s. T he satirical p o ste r fash io n ed b y o n e d isillu ­ sio n ed p ro p a g a n d ist " d isp la y e d a C oca-C ola b o ttle, w ra p p e d in th e A m erican flag, w ith a leg en d below : 'S tep rig h t u p a n d g e t y o u r fo u r delicio u s freedom s. It's a refreshing w a r.' "50 The o u tlook of m o st G Is seem ed to ty p ify b ro a d e r a ttitu d e s. T hey k n e w little m o re th a n " th a t p o w e r in th e h a n d s of the U n ited States a n d o u r A llies is p o w e r u se d less cruelly a n d b u lly in g ly th a n in A xis h a n d s." For th em , A m erica's ene­ m ies "w ere d ra g o n s to be slain, after w h ic h th e h e ro co u ld re tu rn to h is fair la d y in h e r fair lan d ." E ven th a t sim p le o u tlook fad e d for m e n in co m b at, w h o se "m icrocosm ic" w o rld ex te n d ed only a few y ard s. M an y also re g a rd e d A m erica's allies (R ussians excepted) " w ith to le ra n t co n tem p t." "E n g lan d ? M y God! You n e v er saw so m an y p e rv e rts in y o u r life," o n e so ld ier rep o rte d . "A n d France, I'd say, is a co u n try w ith o u t m o rals." Som e o b serv ers saw in su c h a ttitu d e s a h e alth y realism "far less likely to go so u r th a n th e h e a d y w in e tu rn e d to v in eg a r of a Lost G en eratio n " of W orld W ar I soldiers. Still, it w a s w o rriso m e th a t the av erag e v e te ran "saw the w a r as a v a g u e co n sp iracy conceived b y m e n of w h o m he k n ew n o th in g a n d m o tiv a te d b y forces of w h ic h h e h a d n o co m p re­ h en sio n ." Soldiers "k n ew w h a t the w a r w a s ag ain st," co n clu d ed o n e sociolo-

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gist, " b u t few . . . h a d a n y id ea of its p u rp o se ." B rogan, too, th o u g h t th a t the A m erican so ld ier k n o w s " w h a t he is fightin g against," b u t m u c h less " w h a t h e is fig h tin g for; the A m erican w a y of life d o es n o t seem to h im to b e in m u ch d a n g er," a lth o u g h B rogan d id n o t see th a t v a g u en e ss as a p e cu lia rly A m erican failing. T he so ld ie r's sense e v en of w h a t h e fo u g h t against w a s b e la te d ly in ­ stilled. A fter seeing a N a zi d e a th cam p a t th e close of th e w ar, E isen h o w er com ­ m en ted , "W e are to ld th a t th e A m erican so ld ier d o es n o t k n o w w h a t h e is fight­ in g for. N ow , a t least, h e w ill k n o w w h a t h e n s fig h tin g against." N ow , in th is case, w a s th e sp rin g of 1945.51 S om etim es p u rp o se s later a ttrib u te d to th e A m erican w a r effort failed ev en to reach o bvious audiences. A s Leslie E pstein recalled h is Jew ish ch ild h o o d , "In C alifornia, in su n sh in e, th e conflict w a s far m o re a m a tte r of th e Japanese th a n of th e G erm an s a n d th e Jew s . . . . T he G erm an s in m o v ies w e re sim p ly too a d u lt, . . . w itty, cu n n in g , p ro n e to u n d e rs ta te m e n t a n d reserv e" to elicit the fear o r h a tre d th a t th e Japanese d id . By th e sam e token, se n sitiv ity to th e w a r 's p u rp o se s m ay n o t h av e coincided w ith the a d v a n ta g e s of social class o ften as­ su m e d . W ecter fo u n d " th a t e n listed m e n attach g rea ter im p o rtan c e th a n d o of­ ficers to th e aim s of th e w a r," a n d "th e ideology-conscious classes of o u r b ig cities [p resu m ab ly w orking-class a n d eth n ic-id en tified A m ericans] p ro b ab ly com e n e arer th a n a n y o th er g ro u p to feeling th is w a r a c ru sa d e ."52 T hen, too, it said so m e th in g th a t th e sh allo w n ess of A m erican p u rp o se w a s itself re p e ate d ly criticized d u rin g th e w ar. It w a s co m m o n to la m e n t th a t "fas­ cism is still a n u n rea l th in g " to the A m erican soldier, w h o "ca n n o t really h a te it."53 L iberals like Vice P re sid e n t H e n ry W allace, a n d b lack lea d ers w ith a sh a rp eye for hypocritical claim s of a fight for freed o m , trie d to h a m m e r o u t m o re p o in te d w a r aim s. O th ers, m o re pessim istic, feared m alig n ra th e r th a n u n cer­ ta in p u rp o se , seein g in A m erican w a rtim e c o rp o ra te a n d m ilitary p o w e r th e so rt of fascism th a t N o rm a n M ailer claim ed to ex p o se in The Naked and the Dead (1948). If e x p o n en ts of sh a rp e r w a r aim s d id n o t m u c h succeed, it w a s in p a rt becau se R oosevelt calculated th a t A m erican s' u rg en cy to achieve v icto ry w a s sufficient a n d because h e feared th a t sh a rp e r d e b ate a b o u t w a r aim s, o r a b o u t ineq u alities a m o n g A m ericans, w o u ld ero d e th e u n ity n e e d e d to achieve it (one reaso n th a t FDR d u m p e d W allace as ru n n in g m ate, rep lacin g h im w ith Sen. H a rry T ru m a n in h is 1944 reelection bid). In th e process, h o w ev er, som e liberals ex p o sed a n u n se ttlin g d iv e rsity of o p in io n u n d e rn e a th th e freed o m -an d -ap p lep ie rhetoric. T here w a s little su c h d iv ersity reg a rd in g th e Japanese, ho w ev er. B eyond a b ro a d sense of A m erican v irtu e , w h a t u n ite d m o st A m erican s w a s racial h a ­ tred. It w a s sh a re d b y w h ite allies fighting Jap an a n d m irro re d b y Jap an itself, so th a t m u tu a l h a tre d s p la y e d off each other. Jap an ese racism w as different, ho w ev er, less vicious in its w o rd s a n d im ages, th o u g h n o t necessarily in action, as atrocities a g ain st w h ites a n d o th er A sians sh o w ed . Ja p an 's racism sp ra n g in p a rt from A sia's historic su b o rd in a tio n to th e W estern p o w ers. It m in g led

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c o n te m p t for the W est w ith aw e of its pow er, w h e rea s A m erican h a tre d d is­ p la y e d a far m ore u n ifo rm d isg u st. T hus, w h ile Jap an ese p ro p a g a n d a p o r­ tray ed W estern lead ers as su p e rh u m a n dev ils, d em o n s, a n d ogres, A m erican p ro p a g a n d a sh o w ed the Japanese as su b h u m a n — apes, insects, rats, reptiles, o r o cto p u ses— a lth o u g h it also b e tra y e d a lu rk in g fear of Ja p an 's pow er. A lm ost n o one d o u b te d th a t A m ericans d e sp ise d Jap an ese far m o re th a n G erm ans. "T he slo g an w a s co n sp icu o u sly Remember Pearl Harbor," Paul Fussell notes. "N o one ev er sh o u te d o r sa n g Remember Poland." Few also d o u b te d th a t Jap an w a s th e m ore fanatical foe, e v en th o u g h o n ly G e rm a n y practiced sy stem ­ atic g enocide a n d p e rsiste d in th e w a r u n til in v ad e d . Racial h a tre d fo u n d u g ly ex p ression in w a rtim e p ro p a g a n d a , tre a tm e n t of Japanese-A m ericans, a n d m il­ ita ry action, a n d m ore su b tly am o n g political a n d in tellectu al elites. "Exterm in atio n ist" im p u lse s e ru p te d am o n g A m ericans, as in th e M arch 1945 M a­ rin es Leatherneck m agazine, w h ich p ic tu re d a lo ath so m e, b u c k to o th ed Japanese insect a n d looked fo rw a rd to "th e gigantic task of e x term in atio n ." Im ages also sh a p e d action, in su ch atrocities as killing su rre n d e rin g Japanese so ld iers (or G erm an soldiers, too, b u t n o t in racial fury).54 M ore th a n tim eless racial an im o sity w a s in v o lv ed , h o w ev er, for th e w a r's course a n d official policy k e p t a lterin g it. T h at a n im o sity w a s sto k ed b y th e v i­ ciousness of fighting o n Pacific islan d s w h e re n o retre at w a s possible, b y revela­ tio n s carefully tim e d b y th e A m erican g o v e rn m e n t a b o u t Japanese atrocities a g ain st A m erican PO W s, a n d b y n e w technologies facilitating v en g ean ce a g ain st th e Japanese. By th e sam e token, h a tre d of th e Jap an ese w a s n o t u n iv er­ sal; som e A m ericans c h allen g ed it a n d su rp risin g ly , tro o p s fig h tin g th e G er­ m an s expressed th a t h a tre d m o re th a n those fig h tin g th e Japanese. T h at h a tre d also b e g a n b rea k in g d o w n late in the w ar, especially as rev elatio n s a b o u t N azi genocide h e lp e d d isc red it racist a ttitu d e s a m o n g A m ericans. T h at sh ift w a s too little a n d too late, h ow ever, to a rre st the d e stru c tio n of Japanese cities or to a lter a u n ity b a sed o n lo ath in g of th e Pacific enem y. A ssu m p tio n s a b o u t A m erican v irtu e a n d Jap an ese evil u n ite d m o st A m eri­ cans b ro ad ly b u t n o t e n o u g h to b rid g e a chasm , p e rh a p s th e w a r 's d eep est, b e ­ tw e en civilians a n d fighting m e n a n d w om en . T h o u g h h a rd ly o b livious to the so ld iers' p light, civilians w ere p e rh a p s less sen sitiv e to it sim p ly b ecau se of th eir o w n im p ro v e d chances to live longer: d u e to b e tte r econom ic a n d m ed ical conditions, life expectancy rose d u rin g the w a r d e sp ite o v e r 400,000 m ilitary d eath s. N o t su rprisingly, so ld iers a n d th eir sp o k e sm e n co n d em n ed th e casu al affluence a n d the indifference to w a r's b ru ta lity a m o n g A m erican s safe at hom e. M arshall a n d S tim son w o rrie d th a t civilians w o u ld n o t stay th e course a n d accept the sacrifices n e e d e d for victory. D o w n th e ran k s, m ore v isceral re­ se n tm e n ts arose. R eporter R obert S h erro d sp o k e for m a n y at T araw a w h e n h e co n d em n ed h o w the w a r w as san itized in th e m ed ia a n d h o w A m erican s a t h o m e w ere "w allo w in g in u n p re c e d e n te d p ro sp erity ." W ecter fo u n d re tu rn in g v e te ran s resentful of "p a u n c h y v acatio n ers a n d fat w iv es p u s h e d a ro u n d in

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b a th chairs. . . . R u m ors of chiseling, profiteerin g , indifference to th e w a r . . . set th e re tu rn in g so ld ie r's tee th o n ed g e." So too d id m ed ia coverage th a t m ad e th e w a r "a k in d of Rose Bowl gam e, w ith u s alw ay s m arch in g d o w n th e field." "C ivilians w ere different, m ore like 'fo re ig n e rs/ in d e e d ra th e r like th e enem y," P au l Fussell later recalled. T roops h a te d "th e com placent, u n im a g in ativ e in n o ­ cence of th eir h o m e fronts a n d rear echelon s" a b o u t th e disease, d ep riv atio n , a n d d e h u m a n iz a tio n th ey experienced.55 Yet, as th e m en tio n of "re a r echelons" sug g ests, m o re w a s in v o lv ed th a n a sim p le ch asm b e tw ee n soldiers a n d civilians. B itterness also arose am o n g com ­ b a t forces to w a rd tro o p s b e h in d th e lines, a n d am o n g en listed m e n to w a rd offi­ cers. M oreover, d a n g e r d id n o t alw ay s w e a r a uniform : th o u sa n d s of civilians d ie d in w ar-related w o rk , w h ile m a n y m ilitary p e rso n n el n e v e r left th e U n ited States o r faced d a n g e r abroad. In technological w arfare, th e b u rd e n of co m b at fell o n a few — p e rh a p s 20 p e rc en t of th e h u g e force asse m b le d — in c o n tra st to th o se servicem en "for w h o m th e w a r w a s m erely foreign trav el tem p ere d b y excessive reg im en ta tio n ."56 E ven those facing com bat differed d e p e n d in g o n w h e n a n d w h e re th ey serv ed , th e ir ra n k a n d b ra n c h of service, a n d o th er factors. T roops in E u ro p e e n d u re d long, d ra w n -o u t slu g g in g m atches, b u t th o se assau ltin g Pacific islan d s o ften saw action telescoped into a few h o rrib le d a y s o r w eeks, th e n lo n g p e ­ rio d s of excruciating b o re d o m a n d ex p o su re to disease. E ven w h e n co m b at cam e v e ry close, m e n could keep th e ir distance. W atching a k am ik aze raid o n a n e a rb y A m erican aircraft carrier. M arine av iato r Sam uel H y n es " d id n 't k n o w w h a t w a s h a p p e n in g to h u m a n lives w h ile w e w a tch e d , b u t e v en if w e h a d , I w o n d e r if it w o u ld h av e m attere d . . . p e rh a p s a m ile is too far to project the im a g in atio n to a n o th e r m a n 's d e a th ." M ost A m erican s w ere w ell train ed , b u t as m a n p o w e r a n d patien ce ra n sh o rt n e a r th e w a r 's en d , som e w ere ru sh e d into co m b at w ith ju st six w eek s' train in g (m an y qu ick ly p a id th e price). H ig h e r class o r e d u ca tio n al sta tu s offered little p ro tec tio n from service or d e a th in it, b u t it d id raise the o d d s of g ain in g officer ra n k a n d service in th e n a v y o r air force, a n d therefore of secu rin g sta tu s a n d am en ities th a t e n listed a rm y m e n co u ld on ly envy, especially g iven th e c o n te m p t th ey faced. (A rm y so ld iers "w ere called D oggies," H y n es recalled, "w h ich w a s sh o rt for D og-faces, a n d M arines d e sp ise d them , along w ith th eir c o m m an d e rs.")57 To a d d to th e com plexities, com bat w a s h a rd ly th e o n ly d a n g e r faced b y m en a t w ar. A lth o u g h this w a s the first A m erican w a r in w h ic h b a ttle d e ath s (291,557) o u tn u m b e re d o thers, 113,842 still d ie d o u t of co m b at (in clu d in g som e 36,000 airm en, c o m p a red to 52,000 in com bat), as d isease a n d accidents to o k a h eav y toll. E ven in com bat, d e a th o ften w a s n o t d u e to en em y guns: th o u sa n d s d ie d in accidents of a ssau lt as g lid ers crash ed , lan d in g craft stru ck reefs, a n d sh ip s fo u n d e re d at sea. T he e n em y acco u n ted o n ly for one-fifth of th e B-29s d o w n e d in b o m b in g Japan, the rest falling to n a v ig atio n al erro rs, fuel e x h au s­ tion, a n d e q u ip m e n t failure ov er th e trackless ocean, so th a t B-29 crew s "b eg an

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to fear th eir o w n aircraft a n d o u r field o rd e rs m o re th a n th e devices of th e e n ­ em y ."58 For these m en, th e enem y, a n d h a tre d of h im , seem ed a secondary, e v en irrelev an t m atter. G e n d er a n d m in o rity sta tu s sh a p e d experien ce as w ell. It o ften lim ite d expo­ su re to co m b at— alm o st entirely for w o m e n a n d o ften for blacks, lo n g d e e m e d in cap ab le of fighting. But b e in g fem ale, black, gay, o r eth n ic left m a n y v u ln e r­ able to in fo rm al ab u se a n d official d isc rim in atio n w ith in th e m ilitary, a n d offbase as w ell. The a rm e d forces also th riv e d o n in cu lcatin g a h a tre d of th e e n em y th a t o ften w a s d isp laced on to fellow A m erican s, ju st as h a tre d of th e "n ig g er," "p an sy ," "bitch," o r "k ik e" w a s so m etim es ex p lo ited b y officers as a k in d of w a rm -u p for the d e h u m a n iz a tio n of th e en em y w h ic h co m b at p re su m a b ly re­ q u ired . G iv en th a t w a r ju m b les p eacetim e categories e v e n as it reinforces th em , h o w ­ ever, m a n y o u tsid ers also fo u n d u n e x p ec te d o p p o rtu n ities. W orld W ar II jarre d o p e n th e d o o r to pro fessio n al careers in th e m ilita ry for so m e blacks a n d w o m en. N ativ e A m ericans, p ro fitin g from w h ite stereo ty p es of th e m as w a r­ riors, faced little seg reg atio n in m ilitary service, b ecam e v a lu e d for special skills (the N avajo lan g u a g e w a s a n u n b reak ab le m ilita ry code), fo u n d p raise for th e ir heroism , a n d enjoyed a n u n p re c e d e n te d "chance to in teract sim p ly as in ­ d iv id u a ls o n the b attlefield s a n d in th e factories." Jap an ese-A m erican s cu lled fro m incarceration cam p s c o m p iled a sp le n d id co m b at reco rd th a t ch allen g ed racial stereotypes. For gay m e n w ith a taste for d ra g , th e a rm e d forces sanc­ tio n ed tro u p e s of fem ale im p e rso n a to rs to e n te rta in so ld iers w h e re w o m e n w ere b a rre d . D esp erate for m an p o w er, d o cto rs a n d d ra ft b o a rd s w h isk e d o th er g ays into service d e sp ite p ro h ib itio n s a g ain st th em . In d ee d , w ith 16 m illio n A m ericans from alm o st all social categories serv in g , it w a s n o t alw ay s clear w h o w a s a n in sid er a n d w h o w a s not. A n d for all g ro u p s, th e so lv en t of w a r m ig h t su sp e n d n o rm al prejudices. A rriv in g a t a Pacific islan d , Sam H y n e s w a s b e m u se d to see the notice of a c o u rt m artial: so m eo n e " h a d b e e n fo u n d g u ilty of sodom y. H ow , I w o n d e re d , co u ld th ere be on ly o n e so d o m ist? A n d w h ic h one w a s h e?"59 A lso b lu rrin g the categories of w a rtim e experience w a s th e ch an g in g rela­ tio n sh ip b e tw ee n civilian a n d m ilita ry values. O ld -fash io n ed m ilitary b ru ta lity a n d "chickenshit" p ersisted . Yet th ey h a d lim its. S w am p e d w ith m illions of m en, p rofessional officers a n d N C O s— those " p ro n e to look u p o n th e so ld ier as a b u n d le of co n d itio n ed reflexes, a belly, genitalia, a n d a p a ir of fee t"— co u ld n o t tra in a fraction of th em , a n d th e task fell h eav ily to officers fresh from civil­ ian life. L eaders like M a rsh a ll— sy m p ath etic to th e m e n in service, w o rrie d a b o u t the m ilita ry 's p u b lic im age, aw are th a t m en cost m o re th a n m ach in es— so u g h t to curb m in d less p ractices a n d b e sto w th e b e st m ed ical care, train in g , a n d en tertain m en t, especially o n expensive m en, su c h as aircrew s. W hile th e m ilitary 's task w as to tra n sfo rm civilians, in th e p ro cess civilians "w ere tra n s­ fo rm in g the A rm y." M oreover, the technical skills n e e d e d b y th e a rm e d forces

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o ften resem b led th o se v a lu e d in civilian life. T here seem ed "little to d istin g u ish th e fu n ctio n s a n d p ro b lem s of m a n y of the so ld iers a n d civilians," o b serv ed o n e sociologist. In d ee d , m a n y task s w ere sim p ly p e rfo rm e d b y civilians; th e air force alone e m p lo y ed a half-m illion, in clu d in g m a n y w o m en . S tren g th en in g th e civ ilianizing forces w a s th e co n tractu al relatio n sh ip b e tw ee n so ld ier a n d co u n try: elite w a rrio rs like a irm e n often serv ed a specified n u m b e r of m issions ra th e r th a n "fo r th e d u ra tio n ," a n d all servicem en ex ch an g ed th e risks of ser­ vice for th e p ro m ise of b enefits a fte rw a rd .60 In th e face of su c h com plexities, the n o tio n disso lv es of a "real" w a r experi­ en ced o n ly b y so ld iers o r m e n in co m b at— th e w a r w a s "real" to all, so ld ier a n d civ ilian alike. T he sh a rp line often d ra w n b e tw e e n th o se w e n t to w a r a n d th o se w h o d id n o t illu m in a ted o n e tru th a b o u t th e w a r b u t d isg u ise d ano th er. In a w a r w h e re civilian a n d m ilitary roles o ften o v e rla p p e d a n d w h e re all A m eri­ can s w ere p re su m a b ly a sk ed to serve in som e fashion, th a t d istin ctio n often fad ed . For o th er c o u n tries a t w ar, it often collap sed a lto g e th e r— u n d e r a b a r­ rag e of e n em y b om bs, m a n y civilians rig h tly felt th a t th ey too w ere o n th e fro n t lines. W hile A m erican civilians c o u ld o n ly im ag in e su c h d a n g ers, th ey too of­ ten felt th ey w e re — o r m ig h t so o n b e — o n th e fro n t lines. Still, all the in fu sio n of civilian v alu es a n d efforts to h u m a n iz e m ilitary ser­ vice c o u ld n o t m itig ate th e d e p erso n a liz atio n a n d terro r m a n y service p e rso n ­ n el faced. "T he ex-soldier n e v e r forgets h is serial n u m b e r," Fussell w rites. "N o r, if h e h a d n o m id d le n a m e , th e w a y on e w a s su p p lie d , in th e a rm y N M I (N o M iddle Initial), in th e M arine C o rp s N O N E , so th a t h e e n d e d as John N M I Jones o r F rederick N O N E Sm ith, in n a m e as little d ifferen t as p o ssib le from o th er p eo p le." B rutal tra in in g seem ed d e sig n e d to m ak e m e n lo n g for com bat. Soldiers ex p ressed th e ir b e w ild e rm e n t a n d resen tm en t, in w ild gossip, for ex­ am ple; a ru m o r th a t E leanor R oosevelt w a n te d "all v en ereal cases [to] b e q u a r­ a n tin e d o n som e offshore isla n d " p ro v e d so b eliev ab le th a t "sh e felt ob lig ed to issue a d en ial," according to Fussell, w h o sees ru m o r as p referab le to a terrify­ in g "absence of n a rra tiv e ." O r soldiers re sp o n d e d w ith lite ra ry fran k n ess a n d foul lan g u ag e, y ield in g A m erican c u ltu re (to m en tio n th e m ild e st exam ple) ac­ ro n y m s like SN A FU (S ituation N o rm al, A ll Fucked U p). "In d isp en sab le b o th to those a d m in iste rin g chickenshit a n d to those receiving it, fucking h e lp e d ex­ p ress th e re se n tm e n t of b o th sid e s."61 It is, to b e sure, im possible to calculate h o w m u c h th e so ld ie r's p ercep tio n of W orld W ar II, m u c h less th e reality of it, differed from th a t in earlier w ars. C er­ tainly, d e sp ite expectations of a ra p id w a r of m o v em en t, m u ch action in b o th th eaters of W orld W ar II resem bled c o n d itio n s o n th e W estern F ront in W orld W ar I— a n e n g in e e r's w a r o v e r h ig h ly fortified lines a n d po sitio n s. O k in aw a w a s a "latter-d ay V erd u n ," w ith "a stin k in g c o m p o st p ile" of d e a d M arin es a n d Japanese, w h e re "fat m ag g o ts tu m b le d out. . . . W e d id n 't talk a b o u t su ch things. T hey w e re too h o rrib le a n d obscene e v en for h a rd e n e d v e te ran s," E u ­ gene Sledge, a M arine, recalled. E ven so lofty a figure as E isen h o w er n o ticed

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th a t in France it "w a s literally possible to w a lk for h u n d re d s of y a rd s a t a tim e, ste p p in g o n n o th in g b u t d e a d a n d d ecay in g flesh." N o t new , either, w a s th e excruciating ten sio n of w a itin g for com bat, th e h u m iliatio n of soiling oneself (the p h ra se "scared shitless" p o ssessed a "literal tru th "), th e p a in a t seein g a b u d d y d ism em b ered , a n d th e experience of it all b y th e v e ry y o u n g (conscrip­ tio n reached eighteen-year-old A m ericans, a n d y o u n g e r b o y s co u ld enlist).62 N o n etheless, A m ericans w h o w ro te a b o u t co m b at in W orld W ar II e x p ressed a k een er sense of th e m indless, a n o n y m o u s n a tu re of w a r th a n h a d th e so ld iers of W orld W ar I. W here th e la tter gave th e ir ch aracters a "p ersistin g in d iv id u ­ ality as th ey b u c k a g ain st th e forces o p p o se d to th e ir u n iq u en e ss," th e so ld iers of th e Second W orld W ar w ere re n d e re d " d e v o id of p e rso n a l id e n tity " — "th e ball tu rre t g u n n e r," "a p ilo t from the c a rrie r" — a n d b ereft of h o p e for p re se rv ­ in g th eir in d iv id u ality . "You are so m e th in g th ere are m illio n s of," p o e t R an d all Jarrell a d d re sse d a convalescent soldier.63 T he sh ift in to n e a n d su b stan ce w a s d u e in p a rt to fam iliarity w ith the lite ra ry th em es of W orld W ar I, w h ic h m a n y w rite rs so u g h t to ex ten d ra th e r th a n sim p ly replicate, a n d to a n e m p h a sis in A m erican c u ltu re d u rin g th e in te rw a r y ears o n m achine-age d e h u m a n iz a tio n a n d cosm ic p u rp o selessn ess. To a n in d efin ab le degree, it also o w e d to n e w technologies, w h ic h created n e w terrors. C rew s o n a irp lan es a n d su b m arin es, tra p p e d for h o u rs o r w eek s in fragile devices, w ere v u ln era b le to em o tio n al b re a k d o w n , all th e m o re so b e ­ cause th ere w a s n o ratio n al w a y to e x p lain w h y som e su rv iv e d a n d sta y ed san e a n d o th ers d id not: v e te ran s w ere as v u ln era b le to d e a th as novices a n d the "n eu ro tic" m ig h t resist b re a k d o w n b e tte r th a n th e "n o rm al." E ven m o re th a n in fan try soldiers, su c h m en also d e p e n d e d for su rv iv a l o n a h a n d fu l of fellow crew m en, w h o se loss co u ld be d ev astatin g : "th e 's u rv iv o r's g u ilt' h a u n ts the in d iv id u al; h e is 'g h o ste d ,' as one m a n p u t it, b y h is d e a d frien d s, w h o w ill n o t leave h im alone." P roblem s arose d u e to th e a p p a re n t m ean in g lessn ess a n d g rin d in g im p e rso n a lity of b o m b in g u n se e n targets. "T he sense of aim lessness of th e w a r ev er q u ite left m e," H y n es w ro te of h is experience d ro p p in g b o m b s o n O k inaw a. "O ccasionally w e d ro p p e d o n th e w ro n g troops. . . . B ut o u r o w n so ld iers w ere n o t m u c h m ore real to u s th a n th e enem y." G iv en su c h ex p eri­ ences, the w a r m o v ed the technologies of d e stru c tio n a n d th e q u estio n s th ey raised closer to th e center of c u ltu ra l anxiety, a n d it w id e n e d th e g a p b e tw e e n a n official c u ltu re m ore b la n d ly com forting a n d m a n ip u la tiv e th a n e v er a n d the lived experience of m a n y o rd in a ry A m erican s at w a r.64 N o t su rp risin g ly , the fig h tin g m a n 's tra u m a s w ere u n k n o w n to m o st civil­ ians, a lth o u g h n o t ju st because th ey w ere in h ere n tly inaccessible. The v e te ra n s' in ability to sp eak of those trau m as, the h o m efro n t's safety, a n d th e n a tu re of technological w a r w ere also reasons. Strategic b o m b in g w as n o to rio u sly diffi­ cu lt for jo u rn alists to cover, for exam ple; rarely c o u ld th ey rid e th e b o m b ers, m u ch less d ep ict the hell u n fo ld in g o n the g ro u n d . In a v isu al cu ltu re, th e w a r w as in som e w ay s a m ovie for m a n y A m ericans, o n e in w h ic h m u c h of th e w a r n e v er a p p ea re d .

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Inaccessibility w a s also co n stru cted b y political a n d c u ltu ra l a u th o rities w h o chose h o w to re n d e r com bat, a n d the w a r 's m an ifo ld o th e r aspects, to A m eri­ cans a t hom e. T hey fo rb ad e p u b licatio n of p h o to g ra p h s of d e a d A m erican sol­ d iers u n til th e fall of 1943, w h e n h o m efro n t com placency, m o u n tin g casualties, a n d d e m a n d s fro m o rd in a ry A m ericans for g reater fran k n ess p ro m p te d th em to c h an g e policy, e v e n th e n m ak in g su re th a t o n ly intact b o d ies of iso lated in d i­ v id u a ls w ere show n. T hey e n d o rse d H o lly w o o d 's escapist, heroic, a n d san i­ tiz e d film s. T hey censored th e v isu a l record of w a r 's h o rro rs ab ro a d a n d its im ­ ag es of u n se ttlin g changes am o n g A m erican s th em selv es— p h o to s of black so ld iers d an cin g w ith w h ite w o m en , o r A m erican G Is fig h tin g w ith A llied sol­ d iers, w ere taboo. T hey p re se n te d th e b o m b in g of cities as a process of surgical d e stru c tio n a d m in istere d b y cool-headed A m ericans. "T hey cen so red ab o v e all th e w a r 's com plexity," con clu d es one h isto ria n .65 Several c o n sid eratio n s g o v e rn e d su c h decisions, w h ic h w ere c o m m o n a m o n g all co m b atan ts th o u g h v a rie d in substance: a v a g u e sense of w h a t A m erican s w o u ld tolerate; a careful calculation n o t to u p se t fam ilies a n d tax­ p a y ers; a n d a b ro a d concern to av o id q u estio n s a b o u t th e m e th o d s a n d costs of A m erican w a r m aking. T hose co n sid eratio n s ex p ressed a u tilita rian concern for v icto ry a n d pow er. A less sa n itized a p p ro a c h m ig h t h av e m a d e little d iffer­ ence, a n d the one tak e n d id d a m p e n celebratio n of m artia l v irtu e s a n d b lo o d ­ th irsty actions. It n o n eth eless m a d e w o rse th e im p o v e rish m en t of civilian sen ­ sibilities ab o u t this w a r a n d m o d e m w arfare. T he conv en tio n s a n d tech n iq u es of A m erican c u ltu re also g o v e rn e d re p re ­ sen tatio n s of the w ar. F ighting m e n w ere re n d e re d as "ju st like u s," th ru st in to extrem e circum stances b u t u n c h a n g e d b y them . C o rp o rate a d v ertisin g p o r­ tra y e d w a rrio rs in h ig h ly sty lized w a y s reflecting d o m in a n t class a n d ethnic prejudices; m o st m e n a p p e a re d as "go o d -lo o k in g A ry an s, b lo n d a n d tall, b e ­ lo v ed b y slim b lo n d e w o m e n a n d s u rro u n d e d b y m u ch -d esired c o n su m er g o o d s," as if "all y o u n g m en are in th e A ir C o rp s, w h ere th ey are officers a lm o st b y d efin itio n ."66 O f co u rse the p u rp o se of su c h a d s w a s to sell p ro d u c ts o r su s­ tain a co m p a n y 's im age u n til it re su m e d civilian p ro d u ctio n , n o t to p o rtra y com bat, b u t th eir u b iq u ity m a d e th em a n im p o rta n t len s for A m erican s o n sol­ d ie rs' experiences. Sim ilar circum stances a n d co n v en tio n s lim ited u n d e rs ta n d in g of w a r's im ­ p act o n o th er peoples. The N a zi H o lo cau st w a s th e m o st fam o u s exam ple. D i­ m en sio n s of the A m erican resp o n se e v id e n t earlie r— th e tim id ity o r in d if­ ference of politicians, th e fear of som e Jew ish lead ers of in flam in g A m erican anti-Sem itism , the skepticism a b o u t claim s of G e rm a n atro cities— p ersisted . U ntil the w a r's last m o n th s, w o rd s a n d p ictu res w ere u n o b tain ab le, san itized , censored, o r sh u n te d off in to in co n sp icu o u s places. L an g u ag e a n d categories in h erite d from W orld W ar I also lim ited com prehension: "atrocities," th e d o m i­ n a n t term , im p lied specific acts of cru elty a n d m u rd er, n o t system atic "g en o ­ cide," as it w as later called. A n d w h ile th e fate of Jew s in E u ro p e received little m en tio n, th a t of o th e rs— gays a n d G ypsies in N azi cam ps, Japanese civilians in

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to rch ed cities, C hinese m u rd e re d o r sta rv e d in c o u n tless n u m b e rs— a lm o st n e v e r crossed the screen of w a rtim e im ag in atio n . It c o u ld h a rd ly b e o th erw ise, since ev en th eir o w n so ld iers' suffering w a s b e y o n d th e reach of m o st A m eri­ cans. A ll these factors re n d e re d th e experience of w a r b e n ig n for m o st A m ericans a t h o m e, except w h e n th e loss of loved ones in tru d e d . A ffluence, p ro m ises of m o re of it after the w ar, a n d a m ea su re of u p w a rd social m o b ility en h an c ed m a n y A m erican s' satisfaction. Ju st as im p o rta n t w a s th eir sen se of b e in g c au g h t u p in the excitem ent a n d p u rp o se (h o w ev er v ag u e) of a g ra n d event. M a n y — th e o rd in a ry w a r w orker, th e h o u sew ife salv ag in g scrap, th e scientist seek in g a n e w w e a p o n — felt w h a t one w o m a n later recalled: "D o y o u know , it w a s m o re lively d u rin g the w ar! It seem ed like th ere w a s life, a n d it w a s a m ix tu re of the e m o tio n al th in g a b o u t fighting a n d th e bo y s w ere g o n e." "In sim p le term s," a rg u e d one stu d e n t of w a rtim e m o o d s, m o st A m erican s " h a d m o re fu n in th e seco n d W orld W ar, ju st as th ey d id in the first, th a n th e y h a v e h a d at a n y o th er p e rio d of th eir lives." To th e ir e v e ry d a y satisfactions w a s a d d e d a g en eral sense of social harm ony. W ar in flam ed m a n y passio n s, b u t it also allo w ed "in te rn al an ta g o n ism s" to b e "d ra in e d o u t of the g ro u p o n to th e c o m m o n en em y ."67 E n h ancing acceptance of th e w a r w a s th e n a tu re of g o v e rn m e n ta l a u th o rity a n d a g ro w in g acco m m o d atio n to it. A lth o u g h m o re cen tralized th a n in W orld W ar I, th is w a r effort still p ro ce ed e d th ro u g h a la b y rin th of local a n d p riv a te a u th o ritie s— d ra ft b o a rd s a n d civil d efen se team s, c o rp o ra tio n s a n d ch arities— th a t p re se rv e d a n eth o s of v o lu n ta ry service to th e cause a n d local iden tification w ith it. D u rin g W orld W ar I, a co m b u stib le m ix of v o lu n ta rism a n d sta te a u th o rity ex p lo d e d in rep re ssio n a n d v ig ilan tism . In its o w n w ay. W orld W ar II w a s ju st as repressive, in so far as su c h c o m p ariso n s can e v e n b e m ad e, b u t few A m ericans ex p erien ced it th a t w ay, in p a rt b ecau se th e rep re s­ sio n w as focused m ore tig h tly b y th e sta te o n to few er a n d m o re m arg in al g ro u p s— "fascists," real a n d alleged G e rm a n sab o teu rs, Jeh o v ah 's W itnesses a n d o th er conscien tious objectors to m ilitary service, a n d ab o v e all JapaneseA m ericans. E specially in the m o n th s after P earl H arb o r, som e liberals a n d con­ serv atives w a n te d the n e t cast w id er, to in clu d e "d efe atists" o r "d iv isio n ists" o r c o m m u n ists o r Jew -baiters o r an ti-in terv en tio n ists like C h arles L in d b erg h , b u t th ey rarely g o t th eir w ay. T he FBI a n d m ilitary intelligence exercised far b ro a d e r surveillance th a n in th e p re v io u s w ar, a n d th e c o u rts o n ly b e la te d ly resisted the engines of in te rn al security, b u t sh a rp m em o ries of th e u g ly rep re s­ sio n of W orld W ar I h e lp e d cu rb its ra n d o m release in W orld W ar II. T hen, too, A m ericans e n te red W orld W ar II m o re accu sto m ed to W ashing­ to n 's authority, w h ich w a s in tu rn m ore p racticed a n d sure-footed. The sh e er len g th of W orld W ar II also m a d e a difference. M obilization, th e m ach in ery of state, a n d ideological consensus w ere far m o re in place b y D ecem ber 1941 th a n in A p ril 1917, a n d th e n h a d n early fo u r years, n o t n in etee n m o n th s, to b e finetu n ed . Finally, the m a g n itu d e of W orld W ar II p ro v id e d m o re extensive o u tlets

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for th e energies a n d fervor of A m ericans— in m ilitary service for som e 16 m il­ lion, in scrap a n d w a r b o n d cam paigns, o n ratio n in g b o a rd s a n d civil d efen se team s, in w a r jobs or charities. In th ese a n d o th er w ay s, th e w a r w as a stu d y in co n trasts for m o st A m eri­ cans. B o m b ard ed b y talk of d a n g e r to th e n a tio n 's v e ry su rv iv al a n d of im m i­ n e n t attack o n its soil, th ey su rv iv e d at h o m e w ith o u t th e d a n g e r ev er b eco m in g real. A nxious o r d e v a sta te d a b o u t the fate of lo v ed o n es far aw ay, th ey co u ld b a re ly im ag in e th a t fate. C onscious of a w o rld rip p e d u p b y w ar, th ey h a d little to h e lp th e m c o m p re h en d h o w o th er n a tio n s experien ced th e tragedy. T he 1941 a d sh o w in g a b o m b e r's o m in o u s sh a d o w ov er a m o d e st su b u rb a n h o m e h a d it a b o u t right: the sh a d o w w a s in d e e d o m in o u s, b u t th e su b stan ce of tra n q u ility a n d a b u n d a n c e rem ain ed . A m ericans h a d m a d e th eir e n tran ce in to a n e w w o rld of w a r a n d p e rp e tu a l d an g er, b u t for m o st, th e en tran ce w a s o n ly p artial, p ro v id in g a terrify in g g lim p se th a t d id n o t offset th e satisfactions of w ar. N e ith e r th a t a sp ect of w a rtim e experience n o r m o st o th ers d irectly h a ste n e d th e co urse of m ilitarization. C ertain ly m o st A m erican s d id n o t becom e fo n d of w ar: W ecter w a s rig h t th a t "th e intoxicant of w a r per se is n o lo n g er so co m p el­ lin g ."68 T heir experiences n o n eth eless co n trib u te d in d irectly to m ilitarizatio n . The relative ease a n d em o tio n al satisfaction of w a rtim e for m o st A m ericans m u te d d e b ate a b o u t th e w a r itself a n d a b o u t su b se q u e n t m ilitarizatio n . N o o ne said th a t w a r a n d m ilitary p o w e r w ere desirab le, b u t po licy o n b o th u n fo ld e d a g ain st a b ack d ro p of su b sta n tia l silence o r e q u an im ity a b o u t th e ir b u rd e n s. A sh a rp e r con fro n tatio n w ith w a r m ig h t n o t h av e altered th e o u tco m e— n atio n s th a t suffered m ore, like B ritain a n d th e Soviet U nion, still stro v e after the w a r to m a in ta in th eir m ilitary po w er, a n d A m erican co m b at v e te ran s u su a lly su p p o rte d th e ir n a tio n 's p o stw a r m ilita ry m ight. B ut A m erican experiences d id sh a p e h o w th e outcom e w o u ld b e u n d e rsto o d . In th is b ro a d realm of experience a n d m o o d , as in o th e r a re n as of th e w ar, th e p re su m p tio n of h isto ry 's cyclical n a tu re also m ask ed th e p o ten tial for m ilitariz­ ation. A m erican m orale, "fo rm e d a ro u n d a g o al of e x p ed ien t necessity, im plies th e su sp e n sio n of p rev io u s aim s a n d v a lu e s ra th e r th a n th eir tran sfo rm a tio n ," o n e scholar co m m en ted in 1943. "T he co m m o n ex p ressio n 'fo r th e d u ra tio n ' is m o re th a n a co n v en ien t circum locution. . . . It signifies th e th o u g h t a n d expec­ tatio n of ro u g h ly resu m in g from the p o in t of in te rru p tio n occasioned b y th e w a r." T here w o u ld occur, W ecter w ro te in 1944, a n "X -D ay for elev en m illion A m erican m e n n o w in u n ifo rm ," alm o st a m agical d a y w h e n u n ifo rm s w ere sh elv ed a n d the n a tio n jerk ed back, h o w e v e r aw k w ard ly , to norm ality. T he e n o rm o u s focus d u rin g th e w a r 's last y ears o n v e te ra n s' re a d ju stm e n t to civil­ ian life— in m a n y speeches a n d books, th a t seem ed th e o n ly issu e w o rth d isc u ssin g — ex p o sed th a t expectation. It su g g e ste d th a t o n ly m e n in u n ifo rm (fem ale v e te ran s w ere rarely m en tio n ed ) h a d b e en c h an g e d b y w a r a n d th a t th eir re a d ju stm e n t w o u ld co m p lete h isto ry 's cycle. It d isg u ise d h o w th e w a r h a d facilitated a "tran sfo rm a tio n " ra th e r th a n a m ere "su sp e n sio n " of A m eri-

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can aim s a n d values. E ven the acerbic W ecter closed h is acco u n t w ith assu ran ce a b o u t th e v eteran , a n d hence th e nation: "A s h e w e n t forth, so h e w ill retu rn : friendly, g enerous, easy-going, brave, th e citizen -so ld ier of A m erica."69 In this d e ep stru c tu re of m o o d a n d expectation. W orld W ar II retain ed a w a rm glow of p u rp o se fu ln e ss, satisfaction, a n d v iv id n e ss th a t o p e ra te d p o w ­ erfu lly for decades. T h o u g h few celebrated w a r itself. W orld W ar II b ecam e a baseline a g ain st w h ich to ju d g e in d iv id u a ls a n d th e n atio n , a n d a m o d el for w h a t th ey co u ld achieve a t th eir best. A m ericans rem em b ered , o r w ere to ld to recall, th a t th ey h a d b e en h a p p ie st in the "g o o d w a r," w h e n th eir n a tio n 's p u r­ p o se (so it seem ed) a n d p o w e r (w ith o u t a d o u b t) reach ed th eir zen ith . If m u ch in later d ecad es failed the test of co m p a riso n to W orld W ar II, th e co m p ariso n itself d id m u ch to define politics a n d culture, as d id th e u rg e to recreate th e lost m om ent. D ecades later, one v e te ra n nicely c a p tu re d h o w th e w a r o p e ra te d in m em ­ ory: "W h en I recall these difficult tim es, I a m alw ay s sta rtle d to realize h o w v iv id th ey still seem , h o w m u c h m ore alive w e w ere. . . . By co m p ariso n , m y c h ild h o o d seem s like a p a in te d lan d sca p e in a m u se u m , b u t m y d a te s as a sol­ d ier are carv ed in g ranite, a few incidents, som e of th em irrelev an t, still sta n d ­ in g in b o ld relief after the erosion of forty y e a rs."70 T h at th e v e te ra n w a s R alp h D av id A bernathy, the p ro m in e n t civil rig h t lea d er of th e 1960s w h o h a d serv ed in a seg reg ated arm y, su g g ests h o w b ro a d ly sp re a d w as th e glo w of W orld W ar II, ev en for those w ith reaso n to d e te st it.

The Militarization of Social Change In D ecem ber 1944, the su rp rise G erm an c o u n terattack th a t p ro m p te d th e fa­ m o u s B attle of the Bulge also p ro m p te d chan g e in A m erican race relations. Fac­ in g u n fo reseen casualties am o n g w h ite troops, o n e of E isen h o w er's com ­ m a n d e rs u rg e d giv ing black so ld iers in rear echelons "th e p riv ileg e of jo in in g o u r v e te ran u n its a t the fro n t" b y v o lu n te erin g for co m b at (w hich som e h a d a lre ad y seen in Italy a n d the Pacific).71 T hey g o t th a t p riv ileg e, in seg reg ated u n its th a t fo u g h t w ell alo n g sid e w h ite soldiers. T he in cid en t revealed the a m b ig u ities of social ch an g e ro o ted in a necessi­ ta ria n logic of w ar. Few w h ite m e n h a d th e lu x u ry of v o lu n te erin g for com bat, b u t "p riv ileg e" reeked of the d e m e an in g circu m stan ces of black so ld iers b ro u g h t into battle. W ar's exigencies carried th em p a rtw a y in to th e eg alitarian h o st of a rm e d A m ericans, b u t th e b lu rrie st line se p ara ted a n im p licit sta te m e n t of th eir e q u ality from a m o m e n tary e x p lo itatio n of th eir lives. D u rin g the w ar, black activists a n d w h ite allies u n easily w a lk ed th a t line, m ixing d e m a n d s for justice w ith u tilita rian arg u m en ts. W hile FDR som etim es a rg u e d th a t racial change w o u ld jeo p ard ize victo ry b y u n le a sh in g social con­ flict, civil rig h ts lead ers c o u n te red th a t the sta tu s q u o je o p a rd iz ed it ev en m ore b y d e n y in g the n a tio n the full co n trib u tio n of blacks to victory, th e ideological difference from racist enem ies it n e ed e d , a n d th e im age ab ro a d it w a n te d to

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cultivate. "O u r failures" in race relations, W alter W hite w a rn e d , "are b ein g w a tc h e d b y o th er colored peo p les, w h o con stitu te a m ajo rity of th e p e o p le s of th e e arth ." "A re y o u for H itle r's W ay or th e A m erican W ay?" ask ed a g ro u p p ro te stin g seg reg atio n in W ashington, D.C.. Black n e w sp a p e rs a n d o rg an iza­ tio n s e q u a te d "D eu tsch lan d a n d D ixieland." T he W ar D e p a rtm e n t's o w n film The Negro Soldier (1944) p o in te d ly sh o w e d a p reach er re a d in g "th e racist invec­ tiv e of Mein Kampf." A ssisting su c h stances w a s a scholarly a ssa u lt o n racism th a t filtered into th e p o p u la r press. Fascism , A sh ley M o n tag u arg u e d , sh o w ed "w h e re w e e n d u p if w e th in k th a t th e sh a p e of th e n o se o r th e color of th e skin h a s a n y th in g to d o w ith h u m a n v alu es a n d c u ltu re ."72 A frican-A m ericans h a d fo u g h t before, h o w ev er, o n ly to resu m e inferio r sta­ tu s in th e m ilitary o r be forced o u t of it altogether. The im p o rt of D ecem b er's in itiativ e w a s e v en less clear set a g ain st th e larger, tro u b le d reco rd of w artim e race relations. T h o u g h energetic, the Fair E m p lo y m en t Practice C o m m ittee (FEPC) "b y n o m ean s reflected the sen tim en ts of th e R oosevelt a d m in istratio n , w h ic h o p p o se d its creation, gave it lip service in stea d of su p p o rt, u se d it cal­ lo u sly to d efu se black p ro test, a n d blocked it w h e n political ex p ediency so dic­ tate d ." W hite a n d black w o rk e rs som etim es allied, b u t violence a g ain st blacks (especially b y ru ra l w h ites n e w to in d u stria l labor) o ften e ru p te d in th e w o rk ­ place a n d c o rp o ra te lead ers b ra n d e d th e FEPC th e "D ev il's W orkshop." La­ b o r's resp o n se to blacks' asp iratio n s v aried , b u t especially in th e South, n o w h ite u n io n ist d a re d "to b e called a n ig g er lo v er" a n d w h ite lab o r lead ers "faced th e co n tra d ic tio n b e tw ee n a n a rro w dem o cracy th a t p riv ileg ed th e in ter­ ests of the w h ite m ajority a n d a m o re inclusive v isio n th a t so u g h t eq u al rig h ts for w h ite a n d black alike." Blacks still e n d u re d legal a n d in fo rm al seg reg a­ tion, u g ly racial violence, a n d p a in fu l hum iliatio n s: th ey w a tch e d G erm an p riso n ers-o f-w ar d in e w h e re black soldiers w ere fo rb id d en , saw ch am p io n s of racial ch an g e labelled "co m m u n ist," a n d fo u n d sy m p a th ize rs like E leanor R oosevelt subjected to vicious ru m o rs. "Before v icto ry in E u ro p e a n d Japan, blacks k n ew th a t th ey h a d lost the b a ttle for v icto ry a t h o m e."73 Yet this w a r w a s different. Like o th er w ars, it p ro d u c e d im m en se tem p o rary ch an g e w ith rip p le effects long after, b u t m o re th a n th a t it also forged a lasting in teractio n b e tw e e n n a tio n al security a n d social ch an g e th a t w as h a rd to fore­ see in 1944. A s im p o rta n t as the gains a n d losses for p a rtic u la r g ro u p s in this n e w era w a s a basic ch an g e in the ru les of th e gam e: th e lan g u ag e a n d p e rc ep ­ tio n s of n a tio n al security increasingly set those rules. E ven if on ly g iv in g th em lip service, FDR e n u n ciated the n e w rules: "In som e co m m u n ities em p lo y ers dislik e to h ire w o m en . In o th ers th ey are relu c ta n t to h ire N egroes. We can n o lo n g er afford to in d u lg e su c h p rejudice." O r as one black w o m a n said , sp eak in g to b o th race a n d g en d er, "H itle r w a s the one th a t g o t u s o u t of th e w h ite folks' k itch en ."74 A p p eals for eq u ality g ro u n d e d in th e necessities of global p o w e r a n d im age only g ain ed force w h e n w o rld w a r gave w a y to cold w ar. T his w a r's a fte rm a th w o u ld be different. E ven tem p o ra ry social changes w ere m assive in race relations a n d o th er

02

THE

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OF AMERICA

spheres. R enew ing a n o ld m ig ratio n , blacks flo o d ed o u t of th e ru ra l S o u th into its cities or to those in th e N o rth a n d W est, w h e re lab o r sh o rtag es g ave th e m som e leverage in g ain in g jobs. T hey jo in ed w h ite s in a m ig ra tio n to w a rtim e jobs th a t o ften b re d sh a rp conflicts, in ten se e v en w h e n race w a s n o t a n issue, b e tw ee n a to w n 's n e w a n d o ld e r in h ab itan ts. D etro it's 1943 race riots, in w h ic h blacks suffered th e w o rst, w ere the m o st in fam o u s result. E ven in a so u th e rn city like B irm ingham , h ow ever, blacks' "daily, u n o rg a n iz e d , evasive, seem ­ in g ly sp o n ta n e o u s actions" a g ain st p e tty o r v io le n t in d ig n ities from w h ite b u s d riv e rs a n d p a sse n g ers sh o w ed h o w th e w a r b e g a n to u n d e rm in e Jim C ro w a n d h o w resistance to it w e n t b e y o n d m iddle-class b lack o rg an izatio n s. Black am b ition, w h ite racism , a n d w a rtim e n e e d so m etim es cu rio u sly w o rk e d to ­ gether. M ilitary lea d ers d e sp e ra te for m a n p o w e r lo o k ed to ill-ed u cated blacks p rev io u sly e x clu d ed fro m service, ju st w h e n black resen tm en t a t exclusion m o u n te d a n d M ississippi se n ato r T h eodore Bilbo v e n te d w h ite fu ry a t h o w th e d ra ft w a s "tak in g all th e w h ites to m eet th e q u o ta a n d leav in g th e g reat m ajo rity of th e N egroes a t h o m e." A s a result, "th e a rm y co m m itted itself to a m ajo r ef­ fo rt to u p g ra d e th e e d u c a tio n of black recru its," as w ell as p o o re r w h ites a n d no n -E n g lish -sp eak in g m em b ers of m in o rities.75 The e n try of w o m e n in to the w o rk force, p ro m o te d b y g o v e rn m e n t a n d b u si­ n ess as a n o th e r re q u ire m e n t for victory, w a s e q u ally visible. T he p a id fem ale w o rk force g rew o v er 50 p e rc en t b e tw e e n 1940 a n d 1945; th ree -fo u rth s of n e w fem ale w o rk e rs w ere m arried , th o u g h o n ly a m in o rity of m o th e rs w o rk ed . By 1945, w o m e n c o m p rise d 36.1 p e rc en t of th e civilian lab o r force. M ore strik in g w a s th e m o v em en t of a few h u n d re d th o u sa n d in to m ilita ry service, w h e re th ey n o w g ain ed form al m ilitary sta tu s ra th e r th a n serv in g , as w o m e n h a d p re v i­ ously, as m ere ad ju n cts to the a rm e d forces. M ost w o m e n in a n d o u t of th e m ili­ ta ry still h e ld sex -stereo ty p ed jobs in n u rsin g , clerical w o rk , lig h t assem bly, a n d th e like, b u t o th ers w o rk e d in h e a v y in d u stry , se rv ed as m ilitary d o cto rs, o r (for a b o u t one th o u sa n d w o m en ) teste d a n d ferried w a rp la n es. Real o r alleged co nvulsions in fam ily life w ere a n o th e r d im e n sio n of w a rtim e social change, attrib u ta b le in p a rt to accelerated g eo g rap h ic m obility, th e ab ­ sence of fathers, a n d the e n try of m o th e rs in to th e w o rk force. A la rm m o u n te d a b o u t the b re a k u p of ex te n d ed fam ilies, ju v en ile delin q u en cy , w ifely infi­ delities, a n d the th re a t to social stab ility a n d fam ily in te g rity th a t th ese ch an g es p resu m ab ly posed. T he w a r also d im in ish e d ethnic a n d religious cleavages, in p a rt b ecau se th ey w ere su b o rd in a te d , a t least in theory, to "th e id ea th a t w h a t u n ite d A m ericans w as a g reat deal m ore im p o rta n t th a n w h a t d iv id e d th em ." W artim e cu ltu re a n d m ilitary service w o rk e d p o w e rfu lly to assim ilate E u ro p ea n ethnics, e sp e­ cially the m en am o n g th em , a n d to forge th eir A m erican identity. T h at cine­ m atic staple, the m u lti-eth n ic a n d in te rd en o m in atio n al a rm y p la to o n o r b o m b er crew , only c ru d ely reflected reality b u t also re sh a p e d it, a n d H o lly ­ w o o d m ad e su re th a t "fo reig n ers w e re n o lo n g er fu n n y folk w ith rid ic u lo u s

TRIUMPH,

1941-1945

I 03

accents a n d in co n g ru o u s cu sto m s," w ith exceptions for G e rm a n s a n d Japanese. Som e g ro u p s also g ain ed from political initiatives. M ovies c h an g e d in p a rt u n ­ d e r p re ssu re fro m fed eral officials w h o feared alien atin g allies a b ro a d o r e th ­ nics a t ho m e. E yeing the b allo t box, FD R m in im iz ed restrictio n s o n G e rm a n a n d Italian aliens. Jew ish a n d H ispanic-A m erican s also m a d e gains, d e sp ite p e rsistin g h o stility to w a rd b o th g ro u p s (an d violence b y serv icem en ag ain st M exican-A m erican "zo o t-su iters" in Los A ngeles). O th e r factors d im in ish e d social divisions: w a rtim e m ig ra tio n loosened ties to eth n ic n e ig h b o rh o o d s; im ­ m ig ra tio n 's v irtu a l e n d sh ru n k th e p ro p o rtio n of n o n citizen s in th e p o p u latio n . S uch easin g of ethnic friction w o rk e d h a n d in h a n d w ith th e m u tin g of class lin es th a t w a rtim e affluence e n co u rag e d , a lth o u g h th ere w ere lim its: "W here eth n ic d istin ctio n s w ere m u te d a n d class lines b lu rre d , racial differences w ere e x acerb ated ."76 Italian-A m ericans illu stra te d h o w "th e w a r w a s th e fuel of th e m eltin g p o t." T hey b e g a n th e w a r in a n a w k w a rd p o sitio n — a w id e ly d isd a in e d m inority, o n e earlier inclined to reg a rd Benito M ussolini favorably, th eir h o m e la n d offi­ cially a t w a r w ith th e U n ited States u n til 1943. D espite th o se d isa d v an tag e s, th ey m a d e n o tab le g ain s after Pearl H arbor. It h e lp e d th a t th ey ex p ressed p a s­ sio n ately A m erican loyalties in w a y s th a t "flattered th e n a tio n 's ego," a n d y et felt little n e e d to forgo " tra d itio n a l Italian p a trio tism " since M u sso lin i w a s n o w v iew ed as its betray er, n o t its exem plar. It h e lp e d also th a t th e p ress n o w trea te d M ussolini as a joke ra th e r th a n a m enace (the "S a w d u st C aesar" full of "balco ny b rag g ad o cio "), th ereb y d ism issin g th e u g lin ess of h is fascist ru le a n d th e fact th a t m a n y A m ericans, WASP as w ell as h y p h e n a te d , once a d m ire d him . C o n tem p t, like fear, h a d a p ric e — FDR th o u g h t Italian s w ere "a lot of o p era sin g ers," w h ile G erm an s w ere " d a n g e ro u s" — b u t it let Italian -A m erican s off th e h o o k to a d egree. B aseball's D iM aggio b ro th ers, m u sic's A rtu ro Toscanini, H o lly w o o d 's F ran k C ap ra, a n d N e w Y ork's M ay o r Fiorello L aG u ard ia becam e icons of lo y alty a n d achievem ent, a n d Italian -A m erican m e n fo u n d m ilitary service, d u rin g a n d a fte r W orld W ar II, a vehicle of assim ilatio n , u p w a rd m o ­ bility, a n d in som e cases political electability. So d id o th er E u ro p ea n ethnics, especially C atholics: John K en n ed y 's w a rtim e heroics o n th e P T 109 w ere v ital for h im a t the b a llo t box in the late 1940s. For these eth n ic A m ericans, th e w a r w a s a m ajor reaso n for th e ir a ttac h m en t to p atrio tic c u ltu re in th e C old W ar a n d for th eir fu ry a t th o se w h o attack ed it d u rin g th e V ietn am W ar.77 If E u ro p ea n eth n ics b en efited , Filipinos in A m erica m e t m o re com plex cross­ c u rre n ts in w a r 's m eltin g pot. E leanor R oosevelt cau g h t th e id ealist w ave, p raisin g Filipinos w h o fo u g h t b esid e A m erican s a t B ataan as " a n excellent ex­ am p le of w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n tw o different races resp ect each o th er." C h a n g e cam e, b u t a t tim es in ironic w ays: Filipinos w ere u rg e d to b u y th e lan d of in ter­ n e d Japanese-A m ericans, w h o m m a n y Filipinos sco rn ed , sh o w in g h o w w a r re­ d irected social hostilities as m u ch as it am elio rated them . For A sian-A m ericans generally, as for blacks a n d ev en m ore so for E u ro p ea n ethnics, leverage w a s

I 04

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w ru n g from w a rtim e n e e d for th eir service a n d th e sp irit of u n ity a g ain st racist foes. A s one A sian In d ia n a rg u e d , g iven H itle r's claim for "th e rig h t of the m y th ically su p e rio r N o rd ic" race to c o n q u er "so-called in ferio r p e o p le s," th e U n ited States co u ld "ill afford to practice racial d isc rim in atio n " to w a rd "A sia­ tic c o u n tries" o r th e ir k in in A m erica. B arriers to im m ig ratio n a n d m ilita ry ser­ vice w ere low ered, to "silence th e d isto rte d Japanese p ro p a g a n d a ," as FD R p u t it. It m a d e all th e difference if a g ro u p id en tified w ith a c o u n try (like C h in a a n d th e P h ilippines) ra v a g e d b y the en em y o r resistin g its ad v an ce (as w ith In d ia, th o u g h u n d e r B ritish rule). W artim e leverag e h a d lim its, h o w ev er. D o m in an t v iew s co u ld still b e hostile, lu m p in g all A sian s w ith th e Japanese enem y, o r ca­ su ally condescending: th e w a r w as "a p e rso n al g ru d g e " for "th ese p in t-siz ed so ld iers," th e American Legion Magazine said of Filipinos in A m erican u n i­ fo rm .78 For o th er social g ro u p s, w a rtim e ch an g e w a s less a p p a re n t o r lasting. D is­ ab led A m ericans saw th e ir n e e d s a n d co n trib u tio n s h ig h lig h ted , as th ey p ro ­ v id e d a d ra ft-p ro o f po o l of w o rk e rs for lab o r-h u n g ry b u sin esses or re tu rn e d h o m e in ju red from w a r duty, b u t th ey rem a in e d m arg in al to m a in strea m A m er­ ica. E ven m ore a m b ig u o u s w ere th e changes for g ay a n d lesb ian A m ericans, w h o w ere barely ack now ledged. R are in d e e d w a s a p u b lic p red ic tio n like P h ilip W ylie's, th a t w a rtim e co n d itio n s "w ill in a u g u ra te a n e w sp re a d of h o m o ­ sexuality," m u c h less his a d m o n itio n th a t "to trea t it as a fien d ish m an ifesta­ tion, like a x -m u rd e rin g , is silly."79 Still, perceiv ed w a rtim e n e e d s d id m ak e for change. M ilitary officials often o n ly w in k e d a t th e b a n o n h om osexuals, a n d th eir p referen ce for th e y o u n g a n d th e u n m a rrie d — a p re g n a n t w o m a n w a s the last th in g th ey w a n te d — tilted re­ c ru itm e n t a n d c o n scrip tio n to w a rd gay m e n a n d w o m en . W ar jobs a n d m ilita ry service to o k gay p e o p le aw ay from fam ily a n d sm all-to w n c u ltu re in to cities w ith g ay b a rs a n d o th er elem ents of a n e w su b cu ltu re. M ilitary life b lu rre d b o u n d a rie s b e tw ee n h o m o sex u ality a n d hetero sex u ality ; sh a rin g a b u d d y 's b u n k or sh o u ld e r w a s so com m on th a t y o u "co u ld g e t a w ay w ith it in th a t at­ m o sp h ere," as one officer p u t it.80 For m a n y lesbians a n d g ay m en , th e w a r ex­ p erien ce m ad e it easier to realize a n d act o n th eir iden tities. E lem ents of th eir experience ev en surfaced to p o p u la r atten tio n , th o u g h n o o n e p u t a label o n th em . This Is the Army, replete w ith o u trag e o u s d ra g ro u tin es b y soldiers, to u re d the n a tio n as stage sh o w a n d m ovie. For g ay A m ericans, th e w a r m a rk e d a tran sitio n to a m ore cohesive sense of co m m u n ity a n d a n e w p u b lic profile. For them , how ever, as for w o m e n generally, w ith w h o m th eir fo rtu n es often w ere linked, the w a r cut in tw o sh a rp ly o p p o se d w ay s, y ield in g b o th h e ig h t­ e n ed pro g ress a n d h e ig h ten e d peril. G ro w in g v isibility w a s p a rt of the p ro b le m — a w o m a n in a n o n ste reo ty p ed job as w e ld e r o r d octor, o r a g ay sol­ d ier w h o se sexual id en tity w as revealed, w as also ex p o sed to d iscrim in atio n a n d ridicule. T here w ere su b tler p ro b lem s as w ell, in clu d in g ch an g es in p u b lic

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105

po licy a n d cu ltu re, the full effects of w h ic h o n ly e m e rg ed after th e w ar. The m ilitary, for exam ple, u rg e d o n b y p sy ch iatrists a n d o th e r ex p erts, fo rm alized a p ath o lo g ical concept of h o m o sex u ality a n d a p p lie d it p u n itiv e ly to g ays a n d lesbians, especially after th e w ar. The w a r th u s placed lib eratin g a n d rep ressiv e forces o n a collision course w ith each other, lea d in g "to a red efin itio n of h o m o ­ se x u ality as a political issu e."81 A sim ilar collision a w a ite d m a n y w om en. From th e start, th e call for th em to serv e th e cause w a s h a lfh e a rte d a n d contested j t w a s n e v e r as stro n g as in Brit­ ain, w h ic h u se d co n scrip tio n to ch an n el w o m e n w o rk ers. It w a s resisted b y m a le-d o m in ated u n io n s a n d com panies. A n d it w a s sh a rp ly lim ited reg a rd in g m ilita ry service; w ith fem ale soldiers o ften b ra n d e d as slu ts (or lesbians), re­ c ru itm e n t fell far sh o rt of G eneral M arsh all's goals. M oreover, p ro p a g a n d a a n d p o litical rhetoric insisted th a t w o m e n re tu rn to tra d itio n a l roles as w iv es a n d m o th e rs after v icto ry — the a p ro n w a s n earb y in m a n y w a rtim e ad v ertisem en ts p ic tu rin g w o m e n a t w o rk — o r in d e e d th a t th ey h a d n e v e r d e p a rte d from th o se roles. T he u b iq u ito u s te rm "h o m efro n t," w h ere m o st w o m e n p resu m ab ly serv ed , im p lied th a t th ey n e v e r really left the h o m e b u t o n ly e x te n d e d its reach. E ven in u n iform , th eir fem ale c o m m an d e rs m ain tain ed , th ey w ere "o n ly p e r­ fo rm in g the d u tie s th a t w o m e n w o u ld o rd in arily d o in civilian life" a n d w ere "as likely as o th er w o m e n to m ake m arriag e th eir p ro fessio n " after th e w ar. The p re ssu re o n w o rk in g w o m e n to re tu rn h o m e w a s all th e g reater g iv en th e b lam e th ey g o t for fam ily tu rm o il a n d child neglect: th e "latch k ey ch ild w as o n e of the m o st p itie d h o m efro n t figures of th e Second W orld W ar, a n d h is o r h e r w o rk in g m o th e r w a s n o t o n ly criticized b u t e v en rev iled ." Too, w o m e n w ere assig n ed resp o n sib ility for sm o o th in g m ale v e te ran s' re a d ju stm e n t to civilian life. Fed­ eral law gave force to su ch attitu d es; re tu rn in g v e te ran s (w ho w ere m o stly m en) h a d a claim o n jobs th a t civilians, in m a n y cases w o m en , h a d tak e n d u rin g th e w ar. A s a result, "th e b re a k d o w n of th e sex-segregated lab o r m a rk e t neces­ sita te d b y W orld W ar II d id n o t su rv iv e." T he w a r d id p ro m o te lastin g c h an g e s— d ra in in g w o m e n a w ay fro m ag ricu ltu re a n d dom estic service, lead ­ in g m a rrie d w o m e n to w o rk — b u t n o t in the sta tu s a n d sex-segregated n a tu re of m o st w o m e n 's w o rk .82 O ften sh a rin g p rev a ilin g a ttitu d e s, m a n y w o m e n fo u n d th e m reinforced b y practical circum stances: loneliness a n d d isru p tio n of fam ily life, w a rtim e scar­ cities, a n d th e absence of m e n m a d e p a id w o rk a b u rd e n for m any, especially g iv en a risin g b irth ra te (the v a u n te d p o stw a r "b ab y b o o m " b e g a n d u rin g the w ar). H ence som e w o m e n w o rk e d relu ctan tly o r briefly, eag er to go h o m e w h e n the w a r w as over. T hey h a d reaso n to em brace "th e id eo lo g y of 'fam ily to g eth ern e ss' " u su a lly associated w ith the p o stw a r y ears b u t sw ellin g d u rin g th e w a r.83 A s alw ays, m a n y w o m e n — w id o w e d , d iv o rced , p o o r, black— h a d n o su c h luxury, a n d w a rtim e su rv e y s sh o w ed th a t m o st w o rk in g w o m e n w a n te d to keep th eir jobs, b u t p rev a ilin g a ttitu d e s a n d law , w h ile n o t arrestin g w o m e n 's lo n g -term m o v em en t into p a id labor, co n stricted th e term s o n w h ich

I 06

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th ey w o u ld w o rk after the w ar. It could h a rd ly b e o th erw ise, g iv en th a t w o m e n 's role w as g ro u n d e d in calculations of n a tio n al ex p ed ien cy m o re th a n social justice. T hose calculations also lim ited w o m e n 's role in politics. S h o rtag es of m e n in g o v e rn m e n t a n d p a rty o rg an izatio n s o p e n ed so m e d o o rs for w o m e n — th eir sh are of g o v e rn m e n t jobs d o u b le d b e tw e e n 1940 a n d 1944— a n d th e visibility of a few w o m e n like E leanor R oosevelt a n d Frances P erk in s w a s strik in g . Still, political w o m e n d u rin g the w a r a n d early C old W ar y ears "e m p h a siz e d w o m e n 's responsibilities as citizens ra th e r th a n w o m e n 's rig h ts."84 T hus, w h ile w a r raised w o m e n 's im p o rtan ce to th e n atio n , it also su b o rd in a te d th e ir in te r­ ests to a p re su m e d collective urgency. M oreover, w a r sw elled in stitu tio n s of p o w e r th a t m en d o m in a ted , w hile su b o rd in a tin g o r sh rin k in g th e social w el­ fare bu reaucracies in w h ich p rofessional w o m e n earlier h a d g a in e d n u m b e rs a n d po w er. W artim e c u ltu ra l co n serv atism also lim ited ch an g es in g e n d e r a n d w o m e n 's roles. E specially early in the w ar, th e forces of sex u al re stra in t a n d cen so rsh ip w ere o n th e m arch. T he Post Office lau n c h ed a n e w c ru sa d e to elim in ate ob­ scene m aterial from th e m ails, a n d th e m ovie in d u stry reitera te d its b a n o n "il­ licit sex w ith o u t a d e q u a te c o m p e n sa tin g m o ral v alu es, offensive sex su g ­ g estiveness, n u d ity . . . sex p erv e rsio n ," a n d th e like.85 W hile su c h m ea su re s cu rb e d im ages d e g ra d in g to w o m e n , th ey also rested o n th e n o tio n th a t w o m e n w ere responsible for m a in tain in g sexual v irtu e, all th e m ore so since th e y p re ­ su m a b ly sta y ed b e h in d to m a in ta in th e hom e. M en in service, too, w e re u rg e d to practice sexual restrain t, b u t as a m a tte r of m ilita ry n ecessity ra th e r th a n m o ral duty. W artim e anxieties a b o u t sexual license, like th o se a b o u t fam ily in ­ stability, bore d o w n far m ore o n w om en. W om en's roles a n d d u tie s w ere a t least m atters of o p e n if n o t e d ify in g d e ­ bate. Less a p p a re n t w a s a n u n d e rc u rre n t of ch arg ed im ag es of w o m e n th a t sw elled in A nglo-A m erican c u ltu re d u rin g a n d after th e w ar. A t o n e level, these im ages w ere positive, o r so it m ig h t seem in th e w a rtim e id e a liz atio n of "M om " as a sym bolic rep o sito ry of the security for w h ic h so ld iers p re su m a b ly fo u g h t, o r in the fad of the far-aw ay so ld ie r's p in -u p girl, seen b y W ecter as " n o t on ly a sy m p to m of sex b u t a sym bol of h o m e ."86 A t an o th e r level, h ow ever, these im ages ex p o sed d a rk em o tio n s, like the u g ly insistence th a t w o m e n sacrifice sexually to m e n (even as th e y w ere also to u p h o ld sexual virtue). "Jokes ab o u t w o m e n g o in g 'a ll-o u t' for th e w a r effort w ere legion," one h isto ria n notes, w h ile th e T reasu ry D e p a rtm e n t once sold w a r b o n d s w ith a "d eta ch m en t of th irte e n N e w York ch orines w h o b o a rd e d th e W ashington-R ichm ond tra in w e arin g th e scan tiest of b a th in g su its, th e rest of th eir b o d ies covered w ith ten-cent d efense stam p s. . . . In v itin g p a sse n g ers to p u rch a se sta m p s a n d peel th em off, the chorin es b ro u g h t in five h u n d re d d o l­ lars to the U.S. T reasury in the space of n in e m in u tes." U rg ed to serv e m e n sex­ ually, w o m e n also e n d u re d m ale resen tm en ts o v er th e sacrifices m e n m a d e o r

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th e em ascu latio n , literal or figurative, m e n faced. John H ersey p o rtra y e d th e " w a r lo v er" as "a sadistic w o m an -h ater, w h o in b e d "m ak es h a te — attacks, rap es, m ilks h is g lan d ; a n d th in k s th a t m ak es h im a m a n ." 87 O th e r im ages b e tra y e d resen tm en t of th e au th o rity a n d co m fo rt w o m e n g a in e d a t hom e. "T he fat w ife com fortably sleep in g / Sighs a n d licks h e r lips a n d sm iles," one p o e m beg an . S oldiers' letters fo u n d som e of th em "b eg in n in g to w o n d e r a b o u t th eir h e n p ec k ed sta tu s after th e w ar, in re tu rn in g to th e m as­ terfu l w o m e n w h o se p ictu res th ey see d riv in g riv ets a n d lo ad in g tru ck s." W ith po etic license, w o m e n could e v en b e h e ld resp o n sib le for m e n 's aw fu l fate in w ar: O w a r is a casual m istress A n d th e w o rld is h e r d o u b le bed. She h a s few ch arm s in h e r m ech an ized arm s But y o u w a k e u p a n d fin d y o u rself d ead . M ovies so o n reflected m ale anxieties: p o rtra y a ls of fem ale com p eten ce gave w a y to im ages of "treach ery o r h elp lessn ess" (or "d o w n rig h t stu p id ity "). W o m en's m a n ip u la tiv e evil w a s p o w e rfu lly co n v ey ed b y B arbara S tan w y ck in Double Indemnity (1944), as she se d u ce d Fred M acM u rray in to killing h e r h u s ­ b a n d .88 T here w a s also fear th a t a fem in ized A m erica w o u ld b e u n e q u a l to th e task of w a r a n d w o rld pow er. E ven before P earl H arb o r, m a te rn a l o v e rp ro te ctio n — or d e p riv a tio n — w a s seen as u n d e rm in in g th e n a tio n 's m o ral fitness o r m ascu lin e fiber. "W h a t h a s becom e of th e m an h o o d of A m erica, th a t w e h av e to call o n o u r w o m e n to d o w h a t h a s ev er b e e n th e d u ty of m en ?" ra n a co m p lain t ag ain st a llo w in g w o m e n in to th e a rm e d forces. Jo n a th an D aniels p u t th e a rg u m e n t for m ascu lin e v irtu e m ore positively: "In a n A m erica g ro w n m agn ificen tly m ale a g ain w e h av e th e chance to fight for a h o m elan d . . . . [N ow ] a m a n can b e w h a t a n A m erican m ean s, can fight for w h a t A m erica h a s alw ay s m ea n t." P ain ter T h o m as H a rt B enton, in phallic im agery, h o p e d th a t " w h e n th is w a r is over, a n e w a n d b e tte r A m erica w h ip p e d into sh a p e b y sacrifice a n d h a rd e n e d b y a re b irth of m ale w ill is going to rise. If this d o es n o t occur th ere w ill b e n o A m er­ ica."89 N o w o n d e r, S u san G u b a r concludes, th a t w o m e n 's lite ra tu re a b o u t W orld W ar II d o c u m e n te d " w o m e n 's sense th a t th e w a r w a s a b litz o n th em ," o r th a t o n e h isto ria n offered th e a m b ig u o u s title Women at War with America. In tu rn , m e n 's alien atio n from w o m e n sa n ctio n ed th eir in te n se b o n d s am o n g each o th e r— th o u g h n o t sexual ones, "for h o m o sex u als are typ ically p re se n te d in W orld W ar II lite ra tu re as g u ilt-rid d en , p ath o lo g ically violent, a n d suicid al." O th e r im ag es— p ro p a g a n d a p o rtra y in g w o m e n infecting so ld iers w ith v e n e ­ real disease a n d n o v els p o rtra y in g N azis as d e p ra v e d h o m o sex u als— lin k ed w o m e n a n d gays w ith the enem y.90 O f course, c u ltu ra l im ages w ere h a rd ly u n ifo rm a n d h a rd ly reflected th e di-

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verse experiences of real m en a n d w om en. A n d it m a y be th a t a n y p ro tra c te d w a r ten d s to in sp ire su ch im ages, g iven th e p re m iu m it trad itio n a lly places o n m ascu line v irtu e, m ale sacrifice, a n d w o m e n 's s u p p o rt of th o se values. In m a n y c o u n tries b e sid es the U n ited States, n atio n alism a n d w a r h av e p ro m o te d d e ­ g ra d in g im ages of w o m e n a n d hom osexuals, th e rep re ssio n of sexual license u n lea sh e d b y w a r's dislocations, a n d "p ro -n ata list" ideo lo g ies a n d policies e n ­ sh rin in g th e fam ily a n d w o m e n 's role in servicing m e n a n d b re e d in g chil­ d ren .91 But W orld W ar II exacerbated th o se tendencies. M en en te red it w ith little of th e protective id ealism felt in W orld W ar I, a n d sen sed g rea ter em ascu ­ latio n a n d d e h u m a n iz a tio n a t the h a n d s of a d v an c in g technology. A n d w o m e n felt less of the cohesion a n d o p tim ism p ro v id e d b y fem in ism at its h ig h tid e in 1917, a n d a k een er se n se — in a n ticip atio n th o u g h n o t experience for A m erican s— th a t m o d e m technology m a d e th e h o m efro n t, a n d therefo re w o m en , v u ln erab le to d estruction. Ju st as w a r offered b o th h e ig h te n e d p ro m ise a n d h e ig h te n e d p e ril for w o m e n a n d hom osexuals, it d id so for all m arg in al social g ro u p s to som e d e ­ gree. Prejudices o v e rla p p e d in com plex o r seem in g ly b iza rre w ays: Jew s w ere som etim es lu m p e d w ith G erm an s as in itiato rs of E u ro p e's w ar; ru m o rs in th e S outh of "E leanor C lu b s" fu sed n o tio n s of g e n d e r a n d race in v isio n s of "col­ o red cooks a n d m a id s w h o h av e v o w e d to a b a n d o n d o m estic service as d e ­ g ra d in g ."92 Still, p ro m ise a n d p e ril w ere n o t c o n fro n ted e q u ally b y all g ro u p s. Som e enjoyed strik in g b u t tra n sie n t gains: th e in co m es of A m erican In d ian s a n d th eir contacts w ith w h ite society so ared d u rin g th e w ar, b u t th e g ain s o ften d id n o t o u tlast th e w a r a n d assim ilatio n d isru p te d th e ir in d iv id u a l a n d collec­ tive identities. G ro u p s h a d different experiences in p a rt b ecau se th ey h a d v a rie d access to th e ideological leverage the w a r p ro v id e d . E ven su p erficial acq u ain tan ce b y m o st A m ericans w ith N a zism te n d e d to d isc red it racial a n d eth n ic prejudice. N o com parable leverage existed for w o m e n a n d gays, a lth o u g h E leanor R oose­ velt d id d en o u n ce ru m o rs of im m o rality a n d lesb ian ism am o n g serv icew o m en as " 'N az i in sp ired ,' evidence of H itle r's desire to 'g e t all w o m e n b ack in to th e h o m e a n d o u t of the w a r e ffo rt.'" A n d leverage cam e b e la te d ly a t b e st to Japanese-A m ericans, o r to In d ian s, w h o se co n trib u tio n w a s o ften v a lu e d o n ly in w h ite term s ("A red m a n w ill risk h is life for a w h ite as d a u n tlessly as h is an cestor lifted a p aleface's scalp," ra n one jo u rn a list's p raise).93 W h atever the balance sh eet of gain s a n d losses fo r th ese d isp a ra te g ro u p s, h o w ev er, th ey h a d in co m m o n the linkage of th e ir fo rtu n es to th e in stitu tio n s, rationales, a n d c u ltu re of w ar. M em bers of each g ro u p trie d to w re st w h a t th ey co u ld from th a t lin k ag e— in tu rn o n ly tig h te n in g it. T h at w a s e v id e n t in the w a y som e w o m e n 's g ro u p s u se d the w a r to revitalize su p p o rt for an E q u al R ights A m en d m en t, n o w h alfh earted ly e n d o rse d b y b o th m ajo r political p a r­ ties, a n d to give w o m e n p e rm a n en t, reg u la r sta tu s in th e m ilitary. It w a s evi-

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d e n t in race rela tio n s— in the v e ry a ssu m p tio n th a t th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t h a d in d efense contracts the sanction it p resu m ab ly o th erw ise lacked to b a n d is­ crim in ation, a n d in the decision of black lead ers to m ak e in te g ratio n of th e a rm e d forces th eir p rem ier goal. E ven th e m o st m arg in al g ro u p s ev in ced the p attern : g ay v e te ran s in d ig n a n t ov er th e d en ial of benefits o r m ilitary careers fo rm ed th e first, fledgling gay rig h ts g roups. T he a ttac h m en t of social ch an g e to w a r a n d n a tio n al secu rity in tu rn m ad e th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t m ore th a n e v er the k ey force in social relations. W hile th e w a r w e ak e n ed N e w D eal liberalism a n d co n serv ativ es seized o n it to g et g o v e rn m e n t o u t of "social en g in eerin g ," in fact th e w a r d e e p e n e d g o v e rn ­ m e n t's im m ersio n in social w elfare a n d social change. It also sh ifted th e action, h o w ev er, from N e w D eal social service agencies to in stitu tio n s of w ar, above all th e a rm e d forcés, w h ic h relu ctan tly or resen tfu lly p io n ee red n e w roles for w o m e n a n d blacks. W hile th a t shift w a s anom alo u s, assig n in g refo rm to a n a u ­ th o rita ria n in stitu tio n , it also m a d e it h a rd to categorize th e m ilitary as a conser­ v a tiv e institution. E ven h id e b o u n d officers h a d to accept social change. T he GI Bill, p a sse d b y C ongress in 1944, w as th e c ro w n in g ex am p le of gov­ e rn m e n t's n e w role in social change. G a m e rin g e n o rm o u s atten tio n , it e m b o d ­ ied th e w a r 's co m p etin g forces of ch an g e a n d stasis. Som e of th o se w ere p a ro ­ chial: th e A m erican L egion w e ig h ed in heavily, as d id th e h o u sin g in d u stry a n d h ig h er ed u catio n , b o th h o p e fu l th a t GI benefits w o u ld h e lp th em recover from th e w ar, w h e n college a tten d a n ce a n d h o m e co n stru ctio n sh ran k . G ra n d e r d e ­ signs for n a tio n al p o w e r a n d p ro sp e rity also sh a p e d th e bill. S p eak in g to w a r­ tim e exigencies, FDR saw it as g iv in g "em p h atic notice to th e m en a n d w o m e n in th e a rm e d forces th a t th e A m erican p eo p le d o n o t in te n d to le t th em d o w n ." A s o n e official b lu n tly p u t it, "T he n e e d to u p h o ld th e m o rale of th e servicem en co m p elled th e A d m in istra tio n to act." R etrain in g v e te ran s in n e w specialties like av iatio n a n d electronics also w o u ld stre n g th e n A m erica's fu tu re m ilitary a n d econom ic po w er, ju st as re w a rd in g this g e n eratio n 's so ld iers w a s v ital for recru itin g th e next. O v er su ch specific calculations h u n g a g en eral sense of obli­ g a tio n to v eteran s, m a d e stro n g e r because m o st w ere d ra fte d .94 T he re su lt w as a sh a rp d e p a rtu re from p a st p ro g ram s for v eteran s, w h ich h a d b e e n n arro w , m iserly, a n d o ften co rru p t. For 16 m illion v eteran s, the Ser­ v icem en 's R eadjustm ent A ct of 1944 offered u n e m p lo y m e n t b en efits for u p to a year, aid a n d preference in g e ttin g jobs, tu itio n a n d living allow ances to p u rsu e ed u catio n , low -interest m o rtg ag es (som e 3.75 m illion v e te ran s b o u g h t h o m es u n d e r th e law , o ften w ith a to k en o n e-d o llar d o w n p ay m en t), loans to p u rch ase b u sin esses o r farm s, m edical care th ro u g h th e V eterans A d m in istra tio n (VA), su b sid ies a n d reh ab ilitatio n for th e d isab led , a n d special access to su rp lu s w a r p ro p erty . T here w ere lim its to th e generosity. S o u th ern w h ites fearful of losing su b serv ien t black labor trim m ed the law 's e d u ca tio n al pro v isio n s. D enied cov­ erag e w ere v e te ran s d ish o n o ra b ly d isch arg ed (w hich in clu d ed m a n y g ay m en

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a n d lesbians), convicted of crim in al acts, o r e n g ag e d in q u a sim ilita ry d u ty — M erch an t M arines, d e sp ite th e ir severe casu alty rate, a n d W o m en 's A irforce Service Pilots. T he m ea su re n a rro w e d a n d rech an n eled th e im p u lse to w a rd e x p a n d e d so­ cial w elfare th a t m a n y liberals ch am p io n ed . S hortly before p assag e, W ecter p red ic te d th a t aid to v e te ran s w o u ld b e fo ld ed in to " b ro a d e r id eas of social re­ sp o n sib ility " arisin g o u t of th e N e w D eal, w ith n a tio n al h e a lth a n d accid en t in su ran ce "o n th e cards." But as one h isto ria n n o tes, "N e w D eal a tte m p ts to lin k in d isso lu b ly v e te ra n s' benefits w ith g en eral n e ed s of th e p o p u la tio n failed: th e GI Bill of R ights e m e rg ed as a v e te ra n s' m easu re." T h at failu re sp lit th e n a ­ tio n 's w elfare sy stem into "o n e for th e g en eral p o p u la tio n , o n e for th e v e te ra n p o p u la tio n ," creating "a special w elfare state" for th o se " d e e m e d esp ecially d e ­ serv in g ." O utlays o n v e te ra n s' services a n d benefits, a v erag in g $7 b illio n in fis­ cal y ears 1947-1950, w ere m ore th a n trip le all o th er sp e n d in g o n social w elfare, h ealth , h o u sin g , a n d ed u catio n , a n d h a lf as larg e as th e d efen se b u d g e t, c u sh ­ io n in g its sh a rp d ecline in these years. By th e sam e to k en , th e GI Bill sh o w ed h o w w a r sa n ctio n ed initiatives in social w elfare o rd in arily u n accep tab le to m a n y A m ericans, a sanction th a t w o u ld e n d u re lo n g after th e w ar. N a tio n a l p o w er, n e v er a b sen t e v en in the 1930s as a ratio n ale, ju stified actio n m o re th a n social justice a n d econom ic stability.95 T he G I Bill also m irro re d d o m in a n t social a n d c u ltu ral v alu es, ab o v e all re­ g a rd in g gender. Fem ale v e te ran s d id u se the G I Bill, b u t th ere w ere few of th em , so th a t benefits flow ed o v e rw h elm in g ly to m en. T he resu lts w e re stu n n in g in h ig h e r education. V eterans flooding c am p u se s m a d e u p a lm o st h a lf of th e 2.3 m illio n college stu d e n ts b y 1947. Schools h a p p y to a d m it w o m e n d u rin g w a r 's lean y ears n o w scram b led to find places for su b sid iz ed m ale v eteran s. M ore w o m e n d id g ra d u a te (104,000 in 1950 a g ain st 77,000 in 1940), b u t a lth o u g h th ey co m p rised 40 p e rc en t of all g ra d u a te s in 1940, th e y w ere ju st 25 p e rc e n t in 1950. Sim ilar declines for w o m e n w ere e v id e n t in m ed ical a n d g ra d u a te p ro g ra m s a n d in the ran k s of college faculties. W ives d id b en efit in d irectly w h e n h u s ­ b a n d s raised th eir e d u ca tio n al sta tu s, g o t a lo w -in terest m o rtg ag e, a n d clim bed the socio-econom ic lad d er. A n d th e GI Bill w a s n o t solely resp o n sib le for su ch sh ifts— c u ltu ral im ages d isc o u rag e d w o m e n from p u rs u in g e d u c a tio n a n d careers— b u t its im p o rtan c e w a s im m ense. A n d pro tracted . It took y ears for all v e te ran s to tak e a d v a n ta g e of th e law , a n d th e K orean W ar created a n e w co h o rt g ra n te d sim ilar benefits. T he stick of federal p o w e r reinforced th e carrot of v e te ra n s' benefits: p o stw a r law u su a lly d eferred m en from the d ra ft w hile a tte n d in g college, a p o w e rfu l in d u c e m e n t for th em to d o so. E ven in 1959, w o m e n c o m p rised ju st o n e-th ird of all college g ra d u a te s— n o t y e t back to th eir sh are in 1940. A n d fed eral p olicy h a d su b tler effects. M en 's h u g e n u m b e rs o n cam p u ses, alo n g w ith h ig h fed eral sp e n d in g on technology a n d science, stre n g th e n ed technical fields to w h ic h m e n w ere

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attrac ted a n d o ften p a rtially tra in e d as a re su lt of w a rtim e service, a n d tilted the ed u ca tio n al sy stem a w ay from w o m e n 's interests. In tu rn , th e G I Bill h e lp e d b u ild a sy ste m th a t tra in e d p e o p le to staff th e co rp o ratio n s, lab o rato ries, a n d b u reau cracies of a m ilitarized A m erica. O th e r p ro v isio n s of th e GI Bill reinforced its effects o n gender. T he fin an cin g of v e te ra n s' m o rtg a g es sp e d su b u rb a n iza tio n , w hich, like th e re tu rn of m e n to colleges, also flo w ed from p e n t-u p w a rtim e d e m a n d . T he id eal of s u b u rb a n life p a ra lle le d th e id eal of h ig h er e d u c a tio n in p rescrib in g d o m estic roles for w o m en: m a rg in alize d in colleges, th e y w ere to fin d th eir n ich e as w iv es a n d m o th e rs in th e su b u rb a n hom e. C ertain ly th a t n ich e w a s h a rd to fin d in th e fed ­ eral C ivil Service. W hile th e GI Bill e x te n d ed p referen ce to fem ale v eteran s, w iv e s of d isa b le d v e te ran s a n d w id o w s of d eceased ones, o n e-h alf of all fed eral civilian em p lo y ées w ere v e te ra n s— u su a lly m ale — b y 1954. A s w ith g en d er, th e GI Bill reinforced d o m in a n t v alu es of class a n d race. Like m u c h N e w D eal legislation, it serv ed a b ro a d co n stitu en cy of m id d le-class a n d u p p e r w orking-class A m ericans. C ollege stip e n d s w ere of little u se to v eteran s, d isp ro p o rtio n a te ly p o o r a n d black, w h o h a d n o t c o m p leted h ig h school, al­ th o u g h the bill also m a d e pro v isio n s for vocatio n al ed u catio n . E ven u n d e r th e b ill's g en ero u s term s, h o m e b u y in g w a s o u t of reach for m a n y p o o re r v eteran s, a n d th e bill offered little to those w h o n e e d e d to rent. Som e of th e b ill's d iscrim i­ n a to ry effects w e re in ad v e rte n t, b u t also intractable: b a n k s co u ld h a rd ly w rite VA m o rtg a g es for In d ian s in tribal c o m m u n ities lacking in d iv id u a l la n d d eed s. O th e r su c h effects w ere m ore deliberate: fed eral agencies like th e VA favored th e p u rc h a se of n e w h o m es in su b u rb a n d ev elo p m e n ts w ith legal o r d e facto racial b a rrie rs few blacks c o u ld challenge, a n d th ey o ften "red -lin ed " poorer, in ner-city districts, co n trib u tin g to th e ir lo n g -ru n d eterio ratio n . Explicit racial d isc rim in atio n in allocating GI benefits c o m p o u n d e d these effects. G o v e rn m e n t's w a rtim e role in social w elfare ex te n d ed b e y o n d th e G I Bill. W hile n a tio n al h e a lth in su ran ce w a s a n a th e m a to m o st doctors, W ash in g to n u n d e rw ro te m edical care a n d research to a n u n p re c e d e n te d d egree. T he an tib i­ otic penicillin w as a d ram atic b rea k th ro u g h , w h ile n e w p ro g ra m s raised h e a lth care for m o th e rs a n d children, especially in m ilitary fam ilies (w ith th e m o rale of serv icem en ag ain a concern), a n d e n h an c ed th e sta tu s of em erging*m edical specialties, especially psychiatry. Som e w a rtim e policies ch allen g ed d o m in a n t in terests a n d values, b u t th ereb y also lacked w id e sp re a d o r a t least lastin g s u p ­ p o rt. H o p in g to b rin g m o th e rs in to th e w o rk force, th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t fu n d e d th o u sa n d s of day-care centers, o n ly to h av e w o m e n stay a w ay in d ro v es u n til late in the w ar. Likew ise, it e m b a rk ed o n a h o m e-b u ild in g p ro g ra m for w a r w o rk e rs flocking to places like H an fo rd , W ash in g to n , a n d H a rtfo rd , C o n ­ necticut, b u t h o m e b u ild in g , like child a n d h e a lth care, largely re tu rn e d to p ri­ v a te a u th o rities after th e w ar. Such p a tte rn s of social ch an g e a n d policy in w a rtim e A m erica co n trasted

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sh a rp ly to those in som e o th er nations. In B ritain, for exam ple, th e w a r sp a rk e d th e ascendancy of th e L abor P arty a n d a b ro a d co n sen su s to h av e th e w elfare state p ro v id e n e arly u n iv ersal coverage. O n th e o th e r h a n d , few n a tio n s m atch e d th e U n ited States in its ex pansio n , h o w e v e r g ru d g in g , of o p p o r­ tu n ities for w o m e n a n d m inorities, a n d of co u rse G e rm a n y o n ly m a d e rep re s­ sion m ore total. M an y A m ericans g ra sp e d th e specifics of w a rtim e social change. Far m o re elu siv e w a s the lo n g -term process w h e reb y social c h an g e b ecam e h a rn e sse d to n a tio n al security, in p a rt because th e process w a s d e p e n d e n t o n still u n se ttle d decisions a b o u t p o stw a r policies. In a d d itio n , th e in te rest-g ro u p focus of A m er­ ican politics zo o m ed in o n th e fate of p a rtic u la r g ro u p s, n o t th e b ro a d e r lin k ag e of social change to n a tio n al security. In tu rn , th a t lin k ag e w a s itself com plex. B oth liberals a n d co n serv ativ es becam e in v ested in m a n ip u la tin g th e w a r ex p e­ rience to achieve social goals, often forging alliances (as w ith th e G I Bill) h a rd ly red u cible to fam iliar political categories. M oreover, g o v e rn m e n ta l action w a s h ig h ly v aried , ran g in g fro m n e a r silence reg a rd in g g ay s to th e visible b u t a m ­ b iv alen t m essages a b o u t w o m e n to th e slow b u t g ro w in g effort o n b e h alf of civil rig h ts for racial m inorities. G iven su c h v ariatio n s, th e p a tte rn itself w a s h a rd to discern. T he p re su m p tio n of a re tu rn to th e sta tu s q u o also sh a p e d sp ecu latio n a b o u t social change. In d eed , one p u rp o se of th e GI Bill w a s to re tu rn v eteran s, a n d hen ce th e nation, to th e sta tu s q u o (an id ealized v ersio n of it, course, n o t its D epression-era form ). Som e a u th o rities d id p re d ic t change, b u t o ften e rro ­ neously: the early p o stw a r y ears failed to y ield a " fu rth e r rise in th è sta tu s of w o m e n ." Racial change w a s w id e ly a n ticip ated , b u t also h a rd to p red ict. Blacks h a d reaso n to d e sp a ir th a t it w o u ld com e; so u th e rn p oliticians, h a rd ly b o w in g to th e inevitable, w ere only e m b o ld en e d to fig h t it; a n d th e a fte rm a th of W orld W ar I a u g u re d b a d ly for th a t of W orld W ar II. A n d in d e e d th e racial ch an g e to com e b u ilt less o n th e w a r 's m eag er legal ach iev em en ts th a n o n th e lastin g ex­ p ectations it fostered a n d financed: m a n y blacks, especially so u th e rn v eteran s, e n d e d the w a r m ore w illin g to m igrate, b e tte r tra in e d to achieve success, m o re a d eq u a te ly p a id in th eir jobs, a n d m ore d e te rm in e d to b re a k racial b o n d s, ju st as m ilitary service lau n ch ed the careers of m a n y black leaders. But su c h d e ep ly stru c tu re d sources of change w ere n o t easily g lean ed in 1945.96 In a n y event, m o st A m ericans w ere p rim e d b y th e w a r to focus o n th e d a n g e r of n e w econom ic d isa ster a n d th e lu re of p o stw a r affluence, n o t o n social rela­ tions. The m ilitarizatio n of social ch an g e d u rin g th e w a r h a d b e en in ten se a n d p ro fo u n d — u n iq u e am o n g the n a tio n 's m o d e m w a rs b ecau se of th e sh eer n u m ­ b ers m obilized in the w a r effort a n d the political a n d ideological stak es in ­ v o lv ed in the global struggle. But as w ith o th er facets of A m erican life, its con­ tin u a tio n into th e p o stw a r era rem ain ed b o th obscure a n d co n tin g en t o n decisions yet to be m ade.

The C rossroads of Victory V ictory to o k m a n y form s in the sp rin g of 1945: th e A llies' triu m p h o v er G er­ m any, th eir success a g ain st Japan, a n d th eir effort at lastin g peace w h e n th e n e w U n ited N atio n s m e t at San Francisco. T hese victories offered A m ericans real satisfactions b u t only lim ited joy a n d little clarity a b o u t th e future. The Pa­ cific w a r w as m ore costly th a n ever. Rifts am o n g th e A llies w id en ed . A n d the sw eetn ess of victory w a s d im in ish e d b y a stu n n in g e n co u n ter w ith w a r 's h o r­ rors. R eactions to the w a r's final triu m p h s a n d trag ed ies ab ette d A m erica's m il­ itarizatio n , b u t th a t resu lt w as n e ith e r read ily e v id e n t n o r co h eren tly p u rs u e d in 1945— it could n o t be, g iven the flux at h o m e a n d in a w o rld to rn a su n d e r b y w ar. A b e w ild e rin g d isp lay of d e a th a n d d e stru ctio n u n fo ld e d in 1945. The d e ­ stru c tio n of en em y cities m o u n te d , in a to rre n t of R u ssian shells o n Berlin, in the last A nglo-A m erican b o m b in g of G erm any, a n d m o st n o tab ly in Japan. In M arch, one A m erican B-29 ra id alone killed a t least 85,000 p e o p le in Tokyo, leav in g b eh in d "a d ra b a n d m o n o to n o u s p a n o ra m a of h o p elessn ess,"97 a n d th e en su in g firebom bing to rch ed all of Jap an 's m ajor cities except th o se sav ed as targ ets for the atom ic bom b. Such b o m b in g c o n trav en ed ev ery sta n d a rd of w a r­ fare th a t A m erican lead ers h a d pro fessed in th e 1930s, b u t w ith few exceptions (p riv ate d o u b ts b y Secretary of W ar Stim son, for exam ple) it a ro u se d little con­ troversy. The long erosion of m o ral scruples d u rin g th e w ar, th e visible im p a ­ tience of m o st A m ericans to get the w a r d o n e (vacationing, inflation, job ab sen ­ teeism , a n d th e like w ere m o unting), the p ro m ise of v icto ry th a t b o m b in g seem ed to offer, a n d the desires for vengeance it satisfied all forestalled co n tro ­ versy. So too d id n ew evidence of the e n em y 's fanaticism : th e sig h t of em aci­ a te d A m erican PO W s freed d u rin g th e lib eratio n of th e P h ilip p in es; th e scale of Jap an ese k am ikaze attacks d u rin g the A m erican in v asio n of O k in aw a. In p a rt because A m ericans re g a rd e d the Japanese as th e m o re bestial enem y, h o w ev er, the m o st shocking revelations cam e w h e n A llied arm ies o v e rra n N azi d e a th cam ps before a n d after G erm an y 's su rre n d e r o n M ay 8. S tu n n ed A m erican co m m an d ers like E isenhow er o rd ere d th eir tro o p s, a n d G erm an s as w ell, to v iew these h orrors; b a ttle-h a rd e n e d soldiers, v isitin g congressm en, a n d jo u rn alists w ere left n a u se o u s or n u m b b y w h a t th ey saw . W ords, p ictures, a n d n ew sreels sw ep t back to th e U n ited S tates— "L est W e Forget," as an exhibi­ tio n m o u n te d b y p u b lish er Joseph P u litzer w as titled. A few critics at the tim e, a n d m ore later, fau lted A m erican s for indifference to th e fate of E u ro p ean Jew s a n d to the n a tu re of genocide. Yet b y a n d large, A m ericans w ere n o t insensitive. R ather, the categories a n d concerns of 1945 sh a p e d m ean in g s different from those th a t em erg ed later. T he term in o lo g y of "atro cities" still g o v e rn e d — "g en o cid e" a n d "H o lo cau st," ev o k in g system atic ex term ination, cam e later. In h eritin g an idio m of sp eech lessn ess a b o u t w a r's

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h o rro rs, rep o rte rs a n d officials a n n o u n c e d th a t "th ey h a d n o w o rd s to describe the cam p s . . . ev en as th ey d id so a t g reat len g th a n d in so m etim es g risly d e ­ tail," a n d insisted th a t a t b e st o n ly p ictu res, as in th e P u litze r ex hibition, co u ld convey the cam p s' m ean in g .98 T h at is, th ey e m p h a size d th eir o w n h o rro r m ore th a n th e evil d o n e, b u t th ey d id so as th eir w a y of g ra sp in g th a t evil. C o n cern ed w ith G e rm a n w ick ed n ess, th ey also rig h tly re g a rd e d it as em blem atic of th e g en eral sco u rg e of m o d e m w a r e v id e n t th a t sp rin g in o th e r w ays, su c h as th e p h y sical d e stru c tio n in E u­ ro p e a n d th e spectacle of som e 30 m illion d isp laced p e rso n s there. N o t su r­ p risin g ly a t th e e n d of a b ru ta l w ar, th ey d e p lo y e d th e sto ry of g en o cid e n o t ju st to w a rn of w h a t G erm an y co u ld d o o r Jew s co u ld suffer, b u t to sig n ify w h a t w a r itself en tails a n d to insist th a t it n e v e r a g ain o ccu r— th e m essag es of P u litz e r's "L est W e Forget." A s Time p u t it in so m e w h at d ifferen t term s: th e causes of N azi g enocide w ere " d e e p e r th a n a n y ten d e n cy to scientific b ru ta lity o n th e p a rt of th e G erm an people. T hey lay in th e p o litical p h ilo so p h y of to ta litaria n ­ ism , which is not the exclusive property of any people."99 H en ce A m erican s' focus o n th eir o w n h o rro r, w h ic h ex p ressed the fear th a t th ey too co u ld becom e the victim s of w a r a n d h a d n a rro w ly escaped b e in g so in th is w ar. P arochial in som e w ays, cosm o p o litan in others, those reactions w ere n o n e th e le ss p o w e r­ ful. M eanw hile, in secret, A m erican lead ers carried o n a ra g g e d d iscu ssio n ab o u t th e atom ic bom b. O bjections to its u se a g ain st Jap an ese cities w ere offered b y lea d in g m ilitary figures (M arshall, E isenhow er, A dm . W illiam L eahy) a n d sci­ en tists like Leo Szilard, b u t the fo rm er w e re d iffid e n t in th eir o p p o sitio n a n d th e latter o u tsid e of— a n d o u tm a n e u v e re d b y — th e in n e r circle of decisio n ­ m akers. A s a n e w p re sid e n t in h eritin g R oosevelt's decisions, H a rry T ru m an w a s d isinclined to e n te rta in d o u b ts o r resist th e lo n g -d ev e lo p in g b u reau cratic m o m e n tu m to u n le a sh th e n e w w eap o n . Several a rg u m e n ts su p p o rte d u se of th e b o m b o n a Japanese city. It w o u ld sp e ed v icto ry for im p a tie n t A m erican s a n d for lead ers fearing the costs of in v a d in g Jap an (alth o u g h th e ir ex p ectatio n s of A m erican losses w ere far b elo w th e figures of o n e m illio n a n d th e like later a ttrib u te d to them ). T he b o m b 's use m ig h t instill cau tio n in th e Soviet lead er­ sh ip a n d shock the w o rld into controlling th is aw fu l n e w technology. But n o n e of th o se a rg u m e n ts w as v e ry cogently o r con sisten tly ad v an ced . M ore decisive w as th e sense th a t re stra in t in A m erican b o m b in g h a d a lre ad y d isa p p e a re d , a n d th a t the Japanese d e serv e d n o th in g less a n d w o u ld su b m it to n o th in g else. Ju st as critics fau lted A m erican resp o n ses to th e H olocaust, som e d ecried th e in sen sitiv ity of A m erican lead ers to th e rad ical n o v elty a n d evil of atom ic w eap o n s. N o clear m o ral line, ho w ev er, se p a ra te d th e fireb o m b in g of Jap an ese cities from th eir atom ic incineration; the d e a th toll at H iro sh im a w a s n o t m u ch larger th a n a t Tokyo o n M arch 9. A n d so m e w h o ap p re cia te d th e b o m b 's th re a t to h u m a n k in d , like p h y sicist R obert O p p en h eim er, also e n d o rs e d its u se a g ain st Jap an as a w a y to d ra m a tiz e th a t th re a t to th e w o rld . O n A u g u s t 6, the

TRIUMPH,

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A m erican air force d e stro y e d m o st of H iro sh im a w ith o n e ato m ic b o m b , a n d on A u g u s t 9 m u c h of N ag asak i w ith a n o th e r (even m a n y d e fe n d ers of th e b o m b 's u se q u e stio n e d th e n e e d so so o n of this secon d attack). B etw een th o se d ates, the Soviet U n io n , fulfilling a n earlier p led g e, e n te red th e w a r a g ain st Japan, p lay ­ in g a role in Ja p an 's su rre n d e r th a t m o st A m ericans, tran sfix ed b y th e b o m b 's a p p a re n t decisiveness, so o n overlooked. A c aco p h o n y of reactions to th e b o m b 's a d v e n t arose sw iftly am o n g A m eri­ cans. Som e stressed p rid e in A m erican ach iev em en t a n d satisfaction in g ain in g v en g ean ce a g ain st th e Japanese. T ru m a n a n n o u n c e d th a t th e Japanese "h av e b e e n re p a id m an y -fo ld " for Pearl H arb o r; a m in o rity of A m erican s w ish e d th e w a r h a d go n e o n lo n g er so m ore atom ic b o m b s co u ld h av e b e e n u se d a g ain st Japan. O th e rs— especially soldiers w h o a ssu m e d th a t a n in v asio n of Jap an w a s th e o n ly a ltern a tiv e to th e b o m b 's u se — w elco m ed th e peace th a t th e b o m b h a d sp e e d e d , a n d th e b o m b itself as a tool for en forcing c o n tin u ed peace. O v e rla p ­ p in g th o se reactions w a s another: as in re sp o n d in g to th e H o locaust, m an y A m ericans saw the b o m b as ev id en ce of th e sco u rg e of m o d e m w a r— in th e face of w h ic h the w isd o m of A m erican u se seem ed a m in o r m atter. "[O ne] forgets th e effect o n Jap an ," according to th e New York Herald Tribune, "as one senses the fo u n d atio n s of o n e 's o w n u n iv erse trem b lin g ."100 D espite pro fessin g th e ir s u d d e n e n try in to a n e w w o rld , h o w ev er, A m eri­ cans h a d to em p lo y a n existing id io m to g ra sp th e n o v el, ju st as in co n fro n tin g th e H olocaust. So th ey c o m p a red th e b o m b 's effects to "co n v en tio n al" B-29 at­ tacks, a n d th ey d re w o n a tra d itio n of apocaly p tic p red ic tio n a b o u t w a r in o rd er to see th e atom ic fu tu re in sta rk term s, as a choice b e tw ee n d o o m sd a y a n d d e ­ liverance. One World or None w a s th e title of a 1946 bestseller b y th e F ed eratio n of A m erican Scientists. "Peace in th e w o rld , o r th e w o rld in p ieces" w a s the final line of th e c o u n try m usic so n g "O ld M a n A to m ." Jo u rn alists, scientists, a n d p reach ers d ro v e h o m e th is M an ich ean outlook: th ey w ere " h a u n te d b y fears of a n e v en g rea ter catastro p h e," w o rrie d th a t n a tio n s w ere "d o o m e d to fall in to the d itch ," o r afraid th a t h u m a n ity sto o d "o n a tin y led g e ab o v e the abyss of an n ih ilatio n ." H o w m u c h o th e r A m erican s sh a red su c h fears is less clear, b u t th ey w ere g iven d ire w a rn in g s of w h a t atom ic w a r w o u ld m ean , in ­ clu d in g ecological extinction ("a w o rld of tro g lo d y tes," "th e m am m alia n w o rld 's d e a th w a rran t"), a n d g rap h ic d e p ic tio n s of w h a t a n atom ic b o m b co u ld d o to N e w York o r C hicago. "Sole p o ssesso rs a n d u se rs" of th e n e w w e ap o n , Paul Boyer h as w ritte n , "A m ericans e n v isio n e d th em selv es n o t as a p o ten tial th rea t to o th er peo p les, b u t as p o te n tia l victim s." A s w ith th e H o locaust, so w ith the bom b: u n d e rstan d a b ly , A m erican s w o rrie d a b o u t th e im p licatio n s for their o w n safety a n d sanity, so n a rro w ly p re se rv e d in th e w a r ju st e n d e d .101 Those fears a b o u t th e fu tu re of w a r c o n tra sted w ith a n o th e r m o o d in 1945— p rid e, exuberance, e v en arrogance a b o u t A m erican p o w er. Few A m ericans co uld avoid som e aw aren ess of th eir n a tio n 's sin g u lar p o sitio n in p o ssessin g th e w o rld 's m o st p o w e rfu l econom ic system , fo rm id ab le m ilitary m ig h t, ad-

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v an ced science a n d technology, a n d a d a p ta b le (if q u arrelso m e) p o litical sy s­ tem . Few also d w e lle d o n the tem p o ra ry n a tu re of m a n y of th o se a d v an tag e s, w h ic h o w e d in p a rt to the d e m o litio n o r e x h au stio n of o th er n a tio n s in w ar. A m bition w as b o th the p a re n t a n d offsprin g of A m erican p o w er. N o t for th e first tim e, b u t m ore b o ld ly in 1945, lea d in g A m erican s sk etch ed g ra n d goals for th e n ation. It w o u ld reb u ild a w a r-to m w o rld . It w o u ld co n stru ct a w o rld econ­ o m y b a sed o n free tra d e a n d free en te rp rise th a t w o u ld b en efit th e U n ited States b u t also foster a b u n d an ce, a n d therefo re peace, for o th er n atio n s. A n d it w o u ld enforce th a t peace w ith its o w n m ilitary force or, so it seem ed p o ssib le in 1945, th ro u g h th e b e n ig n in stru m e n tality of th e U n ited N atio n s. B ritain 's global role in th e n in e te e n th cen tu ry w a s one m o d el for A m erican h eg em o n y , a m o d el th a t som e A m ericans (and B ritish a n d others) explicitly u rg e d th e n a tio n to fol­ low. The A m erican v isio n in 1945 in v o lv ed m o re th a n h egem ony, h o w ev er. It d re w also o n th e fear of v u ln era b ility d ru m m e d h o m e since th e late 1930s a n d d ra m a tiz e d b y genocide a n d atom ic w arfare. M ilitary p o w e r seem ed v ital less to score n e w triu m p h s of global d o m in an ce th a n to p re v e n t n e w d isa sters of d ep re ssio n a n d w ar. A n d som etim es it h e ld n o clear p u rp o se a t all, b u t w a s ch erished in its o w n rig h t a n d as a sym bol of A m erican ach iev em en t— as T ru­ m a n p u t it, the atom ic b o m b w a s "th e g reatest th in g in h isto ry ."102 A m bition, arrogance, a n d fear justified, a t least for m a n y A m ericans, th eir n a tio n 's c o n tin u ed po ssessio n of g reat m ilitary p o w er. But h o w m u c h p o w er, a n d of w h a t sort? N o co n sen su s existed in 1945, in p a rt b ecau se arro g an ce also u n d e rc u t the u rg en cy to a n sw e r su c h questio n s. So g rea t w a s A m erican p o w e r th a t its c o n tin u ed triu m p h seem ed inevitable to m a n y A m ericans; to som e, th e atom ic b o m b alone g u a ra n te e d it. L eaders d id foresee d a n g e rs— Soviet p o w er, a n u n controllable n u c le ar a rm s race, a fractu red w o rld econom y, a n d (th o u g h it d re w less scrutiny) rev o lu tio n in C h in a a n d E u ro p e's colonial em p ires. C onfi­ d e n t of th eir ability to m a ste r su ch challenges, h o w ev er, A m erican s to le rate d co n sid erable u n c e rta in ty a b o u t h o w th e ir v a u ltin g a m b itio n s w ere to b e m et. U n certain ty w a s m irro re d in a n d exacerbated b y p o litical instabilities. FDR h a d left b e h in d a com plex, a m b ig u o u s legacy of policies to w a rd th e p o stw a r w o rld — a n d n o one q u ite k n ew w h a t it w as, g iv en h is gift for secrecy a n d in d i­ rection. T ru m a n 's lea d ersh ip w a s m ore u n c ertain th a n com plex, m o re erratic th a n am biguous. Far from quickly b ecom in g a C o ld W arrior, "h e w a v e re d for alm o st tw o years, in fact."103 H is atom ic policy w as n o firm er, b u ffeted b y clashing d isp lay s of arrogance a n d d o u b t reg a rd in g th e b o m b 's u se a g ain st Ja­ p a n a n d its p o ten tial leverage in the p o stw a r w o rld . (Told h e h a d " a n atom ic b o m b u p [his] sleeves," T ru m an rep lied , "I a m n o t su re it can ev er b e u se d ." )104 The political flux ex te n d ed b e y o n d T rum an, ho w ev er. W h eth er b y h is choice o r th eir ow n, the to p w a rtim e lead ers n early all retired: g one b y th e fall w e re Stim son, M o rg en th au , M arshall (until T ru m a n called h im b ack for a m issio n to C hina), a n d a h o st of others. T he a rm e d forces w ere locked in b itte r stru g g le ov er the lessons of Pearl H a rb o r a n d the term s of a u n ified d efen se d e p a rtm e n t.

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w h ile C ongress, as it u su a lly d o es after a w ar, so u g h t to reassert its pow er. The in stitu tio n al flux w a s e v en g reater in the global arena. T he R oosevelt a d m in is­ tra tio n h a d c o n stru cted the a p p a ra tu s of in te rn atio n al c o o p eratio n it favored, b u t few A m ericans k n ew h o w o rg an izatio n s like th e U n ited N atio n s w o u ld function. N o r d id th ey agree o n h o w su c h o rg an izatio n s sh o u ld function. D espite a n en d -o f-w ar em brace of "in tern atio n alism ," natio n alistic m o o d s w ere ev id en t. A m in o rity railed a g ain st the U n ited N a tio n s ("a m o n stro u s crim e ag ain st A m erican liberties") a n d a g ain st alleged giv eaw ay s of A m erican m o n ey a n d in terests to th e Soviets (and the British). L iberals also so u n d e d n atio n alist th em es insofar as th ey so u g h t to project " o u r w a y of living, th e o n ly w a y w o r­ th y of a free m a n " (as Sen. J. W illiam F ulbrig h t p u t it) o n to th e rest of th e w o rld , ju st as n a tio n alism w as e v id e n t in the c o n tra stin g visio n s of th e "A m erican C e n tu ry " a n d the "ce n tu ry of the co m m o n m an " earlier p ro claim ed b y H e n ry Luce a n d H e n ry W allace. The "b rittle" in te rn atio n alism of A m erican s in 1945, G eoffrey P errett h as a rg u e d , w as "really little m o re th a n th e o ld -fash io n ed b o o sterism o n a global scale." M any A m ericans, n o tes R obert D allek, b eliev in g th a t technology a n d m ass co m m unications h a d k n it to g eth er th eir o w n n atio n , "a ssu m e d th a t the sam e state of affairs co u ld tak e h o ld ab ro ad ; one A m erica co u ld n o w becom e one w o rld ." H eartfelt b u t v ag u e, su c h a ssu m p tio n s w ere h a rd to tran slate in to concrete policies a n d left A m erican s ill p re p a re d for th e p o w e r politics th a t th e Soviet U n io n — a n d th e U n ited States a n d its allies— practiced a t the w a r 's close.105 P artisan politics d isp lay e d a n d co arsen ed th ese u n sta b le m o o d s. T he w a r h a d accelerated a long decline in th e p a rty system : g eo g rap h ic m o b ility w e a k ­ e n ed o ld loyalties, in terest g ro u p s often m ob ilized v o ters m o re effectively th a n p a rty structures, racial politics cut across p a rty lines, a n d th e R e p u b lic a n so u th e rn D em ocrat coalition c o n tin u ed to g ain p o w e r in C ongress. A m erican political p a rties rarely re p re se n t stro n g class o r ideological coalitions, b u t th e y d id so ev en less in the 1944 elections, w h ic h to o k a toll o n th e p ro n o u n c e d lib­ erals a n d conservatives of b o th parties. Yet th ere w a s n o e v id e n t a ltern ativ e to the p a rty system for sh a p in g a n a tio n al consen su s, a n d R epublicans a n d D em o­ crats co m p eted m ore ran co ro u sly th a n ev er as th e fiction of w a rtim e u n ity d is­ sipated. R ed-baiting in p a rtic u la r intensified , as w h e n D ew ey a sse rte d in 1944 th a t th e D em ocratic P arty "is subject to cap tu re, a n d th e forces of C o m m u n ism are, in fact, n o w c a p tu rin g it," a n d it e x te n d ed b e y o n d p a rty politics, a im ed at the civil rights m o v em en t, o rg an ized labor, a n d liberals generally. In July 1945, Life asserted th a t "th e fellow -traveler [of com m u n ism ] is everyw here: in H olly­ w o o d , o n college faculties, in g o v e rn m e n t b u r e a u s ,. . . e v en o n th e e d ito rial staffs of em in en tly c ap italist jo u rn als." H o lly w o o d stars rally in g for FDR re­ sp o n d e d in kind: "T he old red h e rrin g , the o ld red h e rrin g , it looks like H itler a n d it sm ells like G oering." Such charges in d icated h o w p o w e rfu l b u t a m o r­ p h o u s concerns a b o u t n a tio n al security w ere sh a p in g p o litics.106 D iscontent boiled u p from b elo w as w ell, am o n g in terest g ro u p s a n d m asses

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of A m ericans eag er to enjoy peace. O p e n challen g es to T ru m a n 's foreign p o licy w ere few, b u t his p la n s to cu rb inflation, c o n v ert th e eco n o m y to p eacetim e sta ­ tu s, a n d m ain tain lab o r peace w ere so o n in sh am b les, d ism a n tle d b y th e a d m in ­ istratio n itself o r d e stro y e d b y fears, real a n d m a n ip u la te d , of a n e n la rg ed fed ­ eral g o v ern m en t. P en t-u p c o n su m er d e m a n d a v e rte d th e lo n g -feared p o stw a r d e p ressio n , b u t n o t n e rv o u sn ess a n d conflict o v e r th e e co n o m y 's future. M ore d istu rb in g to A m ericans lea d ers w a s a fu ro r o v e r th e slo w p ace o f m ilitary d e ­ m o b ilizatio n (careful p la n s w ere ru in e d b y th e Pacific w a r's u n e x p ec te d ly a b ru p t end). "B ring Back D a d d y " clubs sp ru n g u p , b a b y shoes tag g e d "b rin g d a d d y h o m e" flo o d ed C ongress, one rep re se n ta tiv e w a ile d th a t "a g e n e ra tio n of fatherless ch ild ren w o u ld m ak e o u r c o u n try a seco n d rate p o w e r," a n d rio ts e ru p te d am o n g G Is a b ro a d d e m a n d in g a b o a t h o m e. N a v y Secretary Jam es Forrestal th o u g h t h e saw th e influence of left-w in g ers a n d co m m u n ists, b u t th e clam o r d re w from m a n y sources: co n serv ativ es extolling th e n e e d s of fam ilies d is ru p te d b y th e w ar; resen tm en ts of fed eral p o w er, m ilitary au th o rity , a n d th e b u rd e n s of occupying d e fe ate d enem ies; a n d R ep ublican b a sh in g of T rum an. T he clam or also ex p o sed th e n e rv o u sn e ss of lea d ers e v en a t th is m o m e n t of th eir n a tio n 's su p re m e pow er. R apid d em o b ilizatio n , T ru m a n feared, w a s cost­ in g A m erica th e p o w e r to p rev a il ab ro ad , w ith o u t w h ic h "w e are h e a d in g d i­ rectly for a th ird w o rld w a r." 107 In tru th , m o st A m ericans w ere n o t going to forfeit th a t p o w er, b u t th e u p ro a r o v er d e m o b ilizatio n d id reinforce w a rtim e p e rc ep tio n s of th e term s o n w h ic h th ey w o u ld accept its global use: th ey w a n te d to rely o n th e n a tio n 's econom ic a n d technological m uscle ra th e r th a n o n a m ass arm y. R eactions to th e atom ic b o m b stre n g th e n ed th a t fo rm ula, a n d the collapse of su p p o rt for u n iv ersal m ili­ ta ry tra in in g — n o t e v en th e e n o rm o u s esteem of M arsh all a n d E isen h o w er sal­ v a g e d th e a rm y 's p ro p o sa l— co n firm ed its p o litical w isd o m . It w a s n o t a n id eal fo rm u la in the eyes of m ilitary a n d political lead ers, since th ey h a d o n ly th e sketchiest id ea of h o w to u se th e atom ic b o m b in fu tu re crises a n d w o rrie d a b o u t the signal se n t to p o ten tial ag g resso rs b y th e n a tio n 's reluctance to k eep m asses of m en u n d e r arm s. But it w a s a tolerable fo rm u la. It still p ro v id e d far larg er forces (including the arm y) th a n before W orld W ar II. It d re w o n A m eri­ can econom ic a n d technological stren g th s a ssu m e d to b e e n d u rin g . Partic­ u larly for advocates of a globe-circling air force, it p ro m ise d to ex ten d A m eri­ can p o w e r ab ro ad w h ile p reserv in g a t least a n illu sio n of A m erican iso latio n a n d easy security. M ilitarization w o u ld p ro ceed , b u t in a p a rtia l fash io n accept­ able to m o st A m ericans. A s th a t form ula for A m erican p o w e r em erg ed in th e fall of 1945, th e m ea n ­ in g s of the H o lo cau st a n d H iro sh im a coalesced, to tak e th eir place a lo n g sid e th e w a r's o th er g reat sym bol. Pearl H arbor. T hose ev en ts d ictate d n o single course for A m ericans: pacifists, ad v o cates of w o rld g o v e rn m e n t, isolationists, c h am p io n s of p re p a re d n e ss, a n d o th ers co u ld d e p lo y th e m to th eir respective p u rp o se s. A s in te rp reted , th ey som etim es carried conflicting m e a n in g s— for

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so m e a t least. Pearl H a rb o r h a d justified racial v en g ean ce, w h ile th e H o lo cau st d e m o n stra te d its u ltim a te h o rro rs. T hey c o u ld also b e triv ialized : "By 1947, th e M a n h a tta n telep h o n e d irecto ry listed forty-give b u sin esses th a t a p p ro p ria te d th e m agic w o rd , in clu d in g th e A tom ic U n d e rg a rm e n t C o m p an y ."108 N o n e th e ­ less, th ey all su rg e d to n a tio n al a tte n tio n a t th e close of th e w ar, w h e n Pearl H a rb o r b ecam e th e object of a w id e ly no ticed co n g ressio n al investigation. A s m a n y A m ericans in te rp re te d these ev en ts, th e y h a d m u ch in com m on. A ll th ree w ere re a d as sig n s of th e rad ical d isc o n tin u ity of th is w a r fro m th e p a st. P reced en ts for th em , processes le a d in g to th em , th e histo rical b ack g ro u n d of th e m — earlier su rp rise attacks, earlier ep iso d es of genocide, th e lo n g escala­ tio n of aerial b o m b in g — w ere largely forgotten. H istory, it seem ed, h a d b een su n d e re d , h u m a n k in d h a d b e g u n a n e w era. T he sense of ru p tu re w a s m o st em p h atic in reactions to th e atom ic bom b. A s "a b lin d in g , sh a tte rin g force," its a d v e n t ra n k e d only " w ith th e d iscovery of fire, a n d th e d isco v ery of ag ricu l­ tu re," according to S tu a rt C hase. The "A tom ic A ge" h a d b e g u n , a n n o u n ce d Life. "T he final crisis in h u m a n h isto ry h a d com e," w ro te o n e m in ister.109 Pearl H a rb o r a n d N azi genocide elicited a sim ilar if less p o in te d sense of ru p tu re . Shock w a s h e ig h ten e d b y c o n te m p o ra ry focus o n technological novelty: o n th e stu n n in g d istan ce trav e le d a n d su rp rise ach iev ed b y Jap an ese aircraft, o n th e m ech an ized efficiency of N a zi d e a th cam ps, o n th e o th e rw o rld ly p o w e r of th e b o m b a n d its rad iatio n . U n d e rstan d a b le, th a t focus n o n e th e le ss slig h ted th e political, m oral, a n d in stitu tio n al forces b e h in d th ese acts— b o th their n o v elty a n d th eir historical roots. A m ericans also c o n tin u e d to re n d e r these ev en ts in a h ig h ly ab stract o r g e n ­ e ralized fashion, seeing th em as in d icativ e of th e evil of w a r in alm o st a generic sense, one tran sce n d in g a p a rtic u la r n a tio n 's ag en cy o r a p a rtic u la r p e o p le 's fate. E ven as h e took p rid e in A m erican achievem ent, T ru m a n d o w n p la y e d th e b o m b as a n A m erican invention: "P ro v id en ce" h a d d e n ie d it to th e G erm ans; "h av in g fo u n d th e b o m b [as if alm o st b y accident] w e h a v e u se d it." 110 H ence, too, d isp a ra te ev en ts w o u ld becom e lin k ed in lan g u ag e: "h o lo cau st," a term qu ick ly a p p lie d b y som e to H iro sh im a, later also b ecam e a te rm for N azi g en o ­ cide, su g g estin g th a t these different h o rro rs h a d so m e th in g fu n d a m e n ta l in com m on. Technology, too, seem ed to cut across n a tio n a l a n d ideological b o u n d a rie s, ev en to lie b e h in d h u m a n control. W h at stretch ed a h e a d w as "sci­ ence, th e e n d less fro n tier" (as V annevar B ush titled a n im p o rta n t 1945 report), as if th e d ise m b o d ied force of science w a s m o v in g n a tio n s to th e abyss of ex­ tin ctio n (or to p eak s of fulfillm ent). This abstract fo rm u la tio n of m ean in g s w a s in som e w a y s n a iv e o r ex p edient: it o b scured N azi anti-Sem itism , facilitated A m erican em b race of W est G er­ m an y in the C old W ar, a n d len t inevitability to A m erican d e v e lo p m e n t a n d u se of th e bom b. But it also e m p h a siz e d ju st w h a t FDR a n d o th ers h a d earlier as­ serted a b o u t n atio n al se cu rity — th a t th e p e ril to A m erican safety w as fu n d a ­ m en tal a n d p e rm a n en t, ro o ted in inescapable ch an g es in tech n o lo g y a n d w ar-

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fare to w h ich the U n ited States w a s com p elled to re sp o n d , n o t ju st in the tran sie n t th reats of p a rtic u la r nations. T he resu ltin g fear a n d in secu rity w ere e v id e n t in h o w A m erican s im a g in ed th e fu tu re of w ar. Few co u ld see w a r tak in g a n y fo rm b u t total, global conflict: th e n ex t w a r w o u ld b e a rep eat, if far m o re cataclysm ic, of W orld W ar II, as if th e e v o lu tio n of w a r h a d reached a conclusion. Im ag in in g a n y o th er w ar, a n y th in g b e tw e e n w o rld peace a n d w o rld d e stru ctio n , b ecam e difficult. T his o u tlo o k w a s e v id e n t in th e m ilita ry 's p o stw a r p lan s to reassem ble a m ass W orld W ar I I style arm y, w ag e epic n a v al cam p aig n s once ag ain , g ird le th e globe w ith b o m b ers carry in g atom ic w e ap o n s, a n d lau n ch a n u c le ar a ssa u lt o n Soviet cities in the e v en t th a t M oscow "in itiated ag g ressio n " o r in d ic ate d th a t it w a s " im m in e n t."111 O f course, a rm e d forces ro u tin ely m o d el th e fu tu re o n th eir c u rre n t ex p eri­ ence. M ore su rp risin g , th eir o p p o n e n ts o ften d id likew ise. T he n e w Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p u b lish e d b y scientists a n d intellectu als critical of th e n a ­ tio n 's p o stw a r n u c le ar policy, in tro d u c e d its fam o u s "d o o m sd a y " clock w ith its h a n d set a few m in u tes before th e m id n ig h t of n u c le ar d e stru ctio n , a sym bol (one critic later w rote) th a t v a lid a te d "th e p rem ise of th e th re a t— of n u c le ar h o ­ locaust, of W orld W ar III." (O ther voices also e m p lo y ed th e m etap h o r: o n e fu n ­ d a m e n ta list p erio d ical saw "th e h a n d s of th e clock of Bible p r o p h e c y . . . m o v ­ in g o n w a rd a n d u p w a rd to th e tim e w h e n it m u st strik e — th e m id n ig h t h o u r.") T he an xiety a b o u t a n o th e r w o rld w a r w as h a rd ly m isp laced , b u t it o v e rro d e aw aren ess of w a rfare 's possible ch an g es a n d d iv e rg e n t form s. N o r d id later ex­ perien ce m u c h a lter expectations. C olonial w a rs in A sia a n d civil w a r in C h in a late in th e 1940s, the K orean W ar in 1950, the b u sy reco rd of c o m m u n ist su b v e r­ sion: m o st A m ericans, p o licy m ak ers in p articu lar, te n d e d to re g a rd e d th em all as step s along, o r m in o r d iv ersio n s from , th e p a th to to tal w a r.112 N o tio n s of to tal w a r a n d im ages of its m o st shocking ev en ts h a d so m eth in g else in com m on: e v en as th ey e m p h a siz e d th e n a tio n 's n e w v u ln era b ility to a t­ tack, they also e v o k ed its lin g erin g rem o ten ess fro m w ar. Pearl H arb o r, H iro sh im a, a n d the H o lo cau st all h a p p e n e d far fro m co n tin en tal A m erica. T hey w ere k n o w n to m o st A m erican s only th ro u g h v erb al a n d v isu al im ages of w h a t h a p p e n e d th ere (those of atom ic d e stru ctio n h eav ily cen so red for d ecad es b y th e A m erican g o vernm ent), o r of w h a t might h a p p e n to th e U n ited States. Such im ages im p lied w h a t th e n a tio n h a d escap ed , th e u n iq u e c o n d itio n th a t A m ericans feared to lose a n d lo n g ed to retain. S tu art C h ase w a n te d A m erican a n d w o rld leaders to w itn ess first-h an d an atom ic blast, a n d all o th ers to see film s a n d p h o to g ra p h s of H iro sh im a a n d N agasaki: "W e m u st co n stan tly be shocked into aw aren ess— as w h e n lig h tn in g strikes close by." John H e rse y 's fa­ m o u s w ritte n account, Hiroshima (1946), w a s celeb rated for p ro v id in g "th e m ean s to see w h a t ev en p ictu res could n o t reveal," as one h isto ria n ex p lain s its im p act.113 Texts like H e rse y 's a n d sym bols like th e m u sh ro o m clo u d su b sti­ tu te d for realities w hich A m ericans could on ly u n d e rs ta n d seco n d -h an d . T hey

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o p e ra te d b o th to challenge a n d to reinforce a sense th a t th e n a tio n still w a s in ­ su la te d fro m th e d e v a sta tio n of m o d e m w ar. Im ages of p a s t a n d fu tu re m ass d e stru ctio n d id u n d e rw rite m ilitarizatio n , b u t g iv en th eir ab stract o r v icario u s quality, th ey gave it little specific sh ap e, o n ly a d d in g to th e flux a n d u n c e rta in ty in politics a n d in stitu tio n s. W ith m il­ ita riz a tio n g eared to g ra n d h istorical changes, to ch arg ed b u t w eig h tless sy m ­ bols, to d rastic altern ativ es of d o o m sd a y o r d eliverance, it w a s at once u rg e n t a n d directionless. T he resu ltin g confusion d id n o t p re v e n t c o n tin u ed m ilitariz­ a tio n b u t d id h e lp m ake it p artial, erratic, so m etim es secret, a n d h a rd to grasp. T h u s, w h ile A m erican lea d ers p laced a p re m iu m o n th eir atom ic clout a n d sci­ en tists w o rk e d to en h an ce it, m an u fa ctu re of atom ic b o m b s alm o st h a lted a n d th e air force d id little to p re p a re for d e liv erin g them . W hile u n iv ersal m ilitary tra in in g failed in C ongress, co n scrip tio n w as tem p o rarily (so it seem ed) re­ n ew ed . W hile the A m erican g o v e rn m e n t h e lp e d to p ro secu te N azi w a r crim i­ nals, the A m erican a rm e d forces secretly scram b led to c ap tu re N azi scientists a n d technology. T he list co u ld go o n — of secret a n d p u b lic initiatives tak en , of o th ers left to languish. T here w a s n o t m u c h coherence to it. Insofar as these u n ­ tid y in itiatives h e lp e d to m ak e A m erica a global p olicem an, th a t w a s n o t clear in 1945 a n d 1946, especially since lead ers cried o u t th a t d e m o b ilizatio n w a s tu rn in g the A m erican g ian t into a pygm y. It m ay w ell b e th a t A m ericans p refe r th eir g rea t ch an g es in w a r a n d foreign policy to em erge piecem eal, w ith th e g ra n d labels th a t g iv e th em coherence o n ly com ing later. R oosevelt a n n o u n c e d a "N e w D eal" e v en before h e k n ew its co n ten ts, b u t n o su c h label a tte n d e d th e m ilitarizatio n d e v elo p in g d u rin g a n d after W orld W ar II, e ith er fro m d e fe n d e rs o r detracto rs. E ven a co h eren t state­ m e n t of n a tio n al policy cam e on ly in 1950, its co n ten ts p a rtly secret lo n g after th a t year. In th e late 1940s, on ly the te rm "C o ld W ar" im p a rte d som e coherence to th e ch an g es u n d e rw ay , a n d "co n ta in m e n t" to th e specific policies u n d e r­ taken, a n d those term s h a rd ly c a p tu re d th e full b re a d th of th e changes. T he reluctance to spell o u t th e course th e U n ited States to o k after v ictory seem s u tte rly u n d e rsta n d a b le , g iven the flux a t h o m e a n d ab ro a d a n d th e shock felt in resp o n se to th e w a r's final events. A t th e sam e tim e, th a t h esitatio n , like m u ch else d u rin g th e 1940s, allo w ed m ilitarizatio n to p ro ce ed — p o o rly u n d e r­ sto o d , rag g e d ly d e b ated , in a d e q u ately ackn o w led g ed . A s John G illis describes A m erica's m ilitarization: if "th e old m ilitarism glorified w a r b u t o ften failed to p re p a re for it, th e em erg in g m ilitarizatio n process in ten sified th e p re p a ra tio n w h ile concealing its p u rp o se s a n d ob scu rin g its c o n seq u en ces."114 By the sam e token, h ow ever, the term s justify in g m ilitarizatio n left space for ch allenging it. Because it w as cast as a resp o n se to ex ternal th reats a n d global changes in technology a n d politics, th e p o ssib ility rem ain ed to rev erse its course. E ager m ilitarists w o u ld h av e g ra sp e d m ilitary p o w e r for its o w n sake or for the conquests it m ad e possible. R eluctant w a rrio rs— w h ich w as h o w m o st A m ericans saw th em selv es— p re su m a b ly w ish e d to shelve th eir a rm s if

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th reats co u ld b e su b d u e d , technology controlled, in te rn atio n al relatio n s stab i­ lized. If th ere w a s h y p o c risy in th a t v ie w — a d en ial of attractio n s to m ilitary p o w e r a n d h e g em o n y — it also left o p e n a differen t course. T he legitim acy g ra n te d A m erica's m ilitarizatio n w a s b o th p o w e rfu l a n d ten u o u s: A m erican s felt th ey had to accept it, b u t th ey p re su m a b ly w ish e d to a b a n d o n its b u rd e n s as so o n as possible. For d ecad es after 1945, A m erican lead ers rarely th o u g h t th a t m o m e n t w a s im m inent, b u t o th er A m erican s h a d san ctio n to search for it.

3 C O N SO L ID A T IO N , 1945-1953

Transition W ith the w a r over, "its back w ash sm ears ov er u s," w ro te jo u rn alist John G u n ­ th e r in 1946, as the n a tio n su ccu m b ed "to g reed , fear, in e p titu d e , fu m b lin g ." P o p u lar, prolific, a n d rarely p ro fo u n d , G u n th e r n o n eth eless cau g h t A m erican s' q u arrelso m e, anxious m o o d a n d asked b itin g q u estio n s a b o u t its m ean in g . D o the n a tio n 's strife a n d lack of v isio n "sh o w th at, to becom e efficient, th is co u n ­ try n e ed s the stim u lu s of w ar? D oes it m ea n th a t 295,000 A m erican s h av e to be killed in o rd e r to give u s tru e effectiveness as a n atio n ? W ere th e d e a d n o m o re th a n b ait?" T he n a tio n 's self-im age as the last b a stio n of freed o m w o u ld m ea n little, G u n th e r w o rrie d , "u n til the c o u n try [learned] b e tte r to m an ag e its o w n peacetim e affairs."1 N a tio n al lead ers gave h im cause to w orry. W h en strik es g rip p e d steel, au to ­ m o tiv e p lan ts, coal m ining, a n d railro ad s, w a rtim e reflexes jerk ed in to action. W ith in one year, T ru m an h a d the g o v e rn m e n t seize coal m in es, railro ad s, m eat-p acking p lan ts, oil refineries, e v en th e G reat L akes T ow ing C om pany. W h en railro ad w o rk e rs defied a g o v e rn m e n t o rd e r in M ay 1946, h e th rea te n ed to d ra ft th em into the arm y a n d p e n n e d a bellicose sp eech to C ongress. W ar­ tim e strikes h a d b e en "w o rse th a n b u llets in th e back to o u r so ld ie rs"— b y im ­ plication, so w ere the p o stw a r strik es— a n d T ru m an w a n te d h is "co m ra d es in arm s" w h o h a d " fo u g h t the b a ttles to save th e n a tio n ju st as I d id tw enty-five y ears ago" to join h im in d efeatin g "C o m m u n ist" labor lead ers "a n d th e R us­ sian sen ato rs a n d rep resen tativ es." It w as tim e to "h a n g a few traito rs . . ., tell R ussia w h ere to get off a n d m ake the U n ited N atio n s w o rk ."2 N o to rio u s for letting off ste am in letters n e v er m ailed a n d sp eech es n ev er u ttered , T ru m an b y no m ean s a lw ay s tu rn e d his invective in to policy. W ith the railro ad strike settled ju st as h e b e g an speak in g , his in flam m ato ry co m m en ts w ere n ev er d eliv ered a n d the bill to d ra ft w o rk ers n e v er p a sse d C ongress (am ong o th er things, co nservatives feared th a t it w o u ld also allow c o rp o ratio n executives to be drafted). Still, th e im p u lse to a p p ly w a rtim e reflexes to p o stw a r p roblem s w as w id e sp rea d . C lark C lifford, T ru m a n 's key aide, w o rrie d th a t a

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P resid en t w ith o u t the p o w e r to su b d u e labor co u ld h a rd ly sq u a re off ag ain st Stalin a n d "d ea l w ith the d a rk e n in g w o rld situ atio n ." T ru m a n 's en em ies co u ld p lay a sim ilar gam e. The A m erican M edical A ssociation b ra n d e d h is p la n for n a tio n al h e alth in su ran ce "th e k in d of reg im en tatio n th a t led to to talitarian ism in G erm any." W orried a b o u t su c h talk, E lean o r R oosevelt g en tly ch id e d T ru­ m a n a b o u t th e d a n g e r of slip p in g , "because of th e difficulties of o u r peace-tim e situ atio n , into a m ilitary w a y of th in k in g ." She m ig h t h av e cau tio n ed m a n y o th er A m ericans as w ell.3 Som e of the p in c h e d a n d b itte r m o o d of 1946 so o n d issip a te d , as th e g rea t strik es w ere settled (or crushed), as restless v e te ran s a n d w a r w o rk e rs fo u n d n e w niches, a n d as u n ex p ected p ro sp e rity b lessed th e n atio n . G u n th e r's q u e s­ tio n s n o n eth eless rem a in e d a p p ro p ria te , h in tin g at o n e reaso n w h y m ilitariza­ tio n w o u ld becom e co n so lid ated in th e co m in g years. In th e w a k e of th e v a p id m aterialism of th e 1920s a n d th e econom ic d e sp e ra tio n of th e 1930s, W orld W ar II had b ro u g h t A m ericans pro sp erity , p u rp o se , a n d v ig o ro u s n a tio n al g o v e rn ­ m ent. A t th e sam e tim e, h ow ever, it h a d left u n reso lv ed th e p ro b lem th a t Roo­ sevelt h a d a rtfu lly finessed: h o w g o v e rn m e n t co u ld achieve th e legitim acy to foster p ro sp e rity a n d p u rp o se in peacetim e. First as m o d el a n d m e ta p h o r u n ­ d e r th e N e w D eal, a n d th e n as aren a of action, w a r h a d p ro v id e d te m p o ra ry solutions. In 1946, altern ativ e so lu tio n s w ere u n c le ar a n d co n tested . T he so lu ­ tio n s finally chosen m a d e p e rm a n e n t m a n y of th e m ilitarized featu res of A m er­ ican life a n d politics im p ro v ised d u rin g th e 1930s a n d W orld W ar II. W ar— as d e e d o r state of m in d o r m odel, as h o rro r to b e co n tem p lated , d e te rred , o r w a g e d — m o v ed to th e cen ter of A m erican political c u ltu re in a m o re lastin g w ay. Several forces d ro v e this process: a chaotic in te rn atio n al sy stem th a t in v ited th e rise of Soviet a n d A m erican p o w e r a n d th e clash b e tw e e n th e tw o; th e sense of A m erican v u ln era b ility to th e p erils of m o d e m w ar; th e chronic in ab ility of n a tio n al g o v e rn m e n t to act "save in w a r o r its su rro g a te "; a n d th e legacy of W orld W ar II, in w h ic h th e n a tio n h a d fo u n d its g reatest triu m p h a n d a m o d el for its future. T he C old W ar, a n d the decisions b y A m erican lead ers to w a g e it, cataly zed these forces a n d d re w th em to g eth er in to a p o w e rfu l ideological con­ figuration. N atio n al lead ers set the pace b y offering a rhetoric of peril, b y con­ so lid atin g the w a rtim e a p p a ra tu s of n a tio n al security, b y p lu n g in g a h ea d in th e a rm s race, a n d b y co n fronting c o m m u n ism a n d Soviet p o w er. T heir lead in g role w a s u n d e rlin e d b y th eir p ersisten ce in th e face of e v id e n t relu ctan ce o r d is­ in terest am o n g w ar-w e ary A m ericans. The C old W ar d id n o t alone cause these d ev elo p m en ts. Because it so con­ su m e d n a tio n al energies a n d w e n t o n so long, h o w ev er, it o b scu red th e process of m ilitarizatio n , m ak in g th e latter seem a resp o n se to th e C o ld W ar ra th e r th a n its a n te ce d en t (and therefore d e stin e d to w ith e r aw ay sh o u ld th e C old W ar end). To be sure, the pace a n d scale of th a t process w ere o ften k ey ed to th e C old W ar's dynam ics: A m erican a rm e d forces sh ra n k d rastically after 1945, a n d

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on ly in 1950, in resp o n se to a p erceived escalation in Soviet p o w e r a n d p re s­ sure, d id force levels, d efense b u d g e ts, a n d th e a p p a ra tu s of n atio n al secu rity tak e o n th e ir full C o ld W ar dim en sio n s. From a n o th e r v a n ta g e p o in t, ho w ev er, th a t g ra d u a l co u rse m a rk e d th e inevitable g ro w in g p a in s of m ilitarizatio n as m u ch as th e C old W a r's dynam ics. (M uch th e sam e n o tio n of fitful a n d reactive a d v an ces can, after all, also be a p p lie d to Soviet behavior: S tabilization of E ast­ ern E u ro p e d id n o t em erge full-blow n in 1945, w h e n Soviet arm ies first p ro ­ v id e d th e o p p o rtu n ity , b u t in stages o v e r th e n ex t fo u r y ears lin k ed closely to the c o n so lid atio n of A m erican p o w e r in E urope, in a classic a c tio n /re a c tio n sy n d ro m e.) O f course, m ilitarizatio n req u ire d tim e to overcom e resistance, crystallize objectives, a n d id en tify threats. But five y ears to co n so lid ate the p ro cess— o r a decade, if one d a te s its s ta rt fro m 1940 or so — w a s a rem ark ab ly b rief tim e for a g reat n a tio n to com plete su c h a historic change. M oreover, m u c h th a t em erg ed b y 1950 h a d b e e n p la n n e d , d esired , o r fore­ seen b y 1945, before th e Soviet U n io n b ecam e th e g alv an izin g focus of A m eri­ can leaders. A lread y b y th e n th o se lea d ers so u g h t to d issem in ate a n id eo lo g y of p rep a red n e ss, to forge a p e rm a n e n t m ilitary-industrial-scientific estab lish ­ m en t, to reo rg an ize the a rm e d forces, to in stitu te a p e rm a n e n t sy stem of u n iv er­ sal train in g , to acquire far-flung m ilitary bases, to occu p y d efeated enem ies w ith A m erican forces, to reta in a m o n o p o ly of atom ic w e ap o n s, a n d to create a h ig h -tech A m erican Pax A eronautica. T h at th ey d id n o t k n o w q u ite h o w o r w h e n th ey w o u ld achieve these objectives, th a t th ey d id n o t achieve th em all, th a t th ey q u a rre led a b o u t h o w to d o so a n d a b o u t th e m erits of o th e r form s of p o w e r— all th a t seem s u n su rp risin g reg a rd in g th e fu lfillm en t of g ra n d b u t nec­ essarily inchoate designs. A m erican m ilitary p o w e r also h e lp e d to u n d e rw rite a n A m erican im p eriu m , b u t, u n d e rsta n d a b ly , em p ire w as as h a rd to recognize as m ilitarizatio n . A fter all, A m erica's p o stw a r em p ire rested little o n territo rial acquisition, p lu n d e r, or b ru te force, a lth o u g h m ore th a n m o st A m erican s cared to ad m it. In stead , it w a s m ain ta in e d th ro u g h co n sen su al a rra n g e m e n ts w ith allies a n d clients th a t often p ro d d e d th e U n ited States to exercise m ore p o w e r or so m etim es d efied th a t pow er. A bove all, m ea su re d a g ain st c ru d e Soviet aggression, A m erican policy seem ed reactive a n d A m erican ideals lofty. In sh o rt, it h a rd ly seem ed like em ­ pire, at least n o t of th e so rt th a t E u ro p ea n p o w e rs once am assed . P erh ap s, say h isto rian s fin e-tu n in g the lan g u ag e, it w as o n ly "co n sen su al h e g em o n y " o r "em p ire b y consent," at least in W estern E urope: "th e A m erican 'E m p ire ' in G erm an y w a s less im p erial th a n federal" a n d W est G erm an y w a s "m o re like a state su ch as C alifornia o r Illinois t h a n . . . a colony o r p ro tecto rate." T he "p re ­ p o n d e ra n ce of p o w e r" A m ericans so u g h t, a rg u es a n o th e r h isto rian , " d id n o t m ean d o m in a tio n ," only the creation of "a w o rld e n v iro n m en t h o sp itab le to U.S. in terests a n d v a lu e s."4 Even p u t th a t w ay, how ever, the a m b itio n w a s g ra n d , a n d th e resu lts of it resem bled o th er em p ires in strik in g w ays. "O f course, ev ery em p ire d efin es its

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role as d e fe n siv e /' C harles M aier h a s n o te d .5 In th a t w ay, in th e riches g en er­ a te d for the im p erial center, in th e u n iv ersalist claim s for A m erican ideals, in th e racial o r g e n d e re d lan g u ag e u se d to describe n o n w h ite p eo p les, in th e re­ se n tm e n ts it aro u sed , a n d above all in the reach of its m ilita ry p o w er, th e U n ited States after W orld W ar II achieved m u c h of th e reality a n d m a n y of the tra p p in g s of em pire. Precisely h o w m u c h seem s a m a tte r o n ly for qu ib b lin g . In th e late 1940s, A m ericans co u ld o n ly d im ly g ra sp th e m ilita riza tio n a n d em p ire b u ild in g a t w ork. For g o o d reason, th ey still o ften lo o k ed to th e p ast, w o rry in g a b o u t ren e w e d econom ic w o es a n d refig h tin g o ld b attles o v er th e N e w D eal, labor, a n d capital. T heir d o m in a n t c o d ew o rd s su g g e ste d m o d est, n o t m essianic, aspirations. "Security," econom ic a n d n atio n al, w a s th e w o rd m o st o ften e n sh rin e d in official p ro n o u n ce m en ts, its n e u tra l to n e a n d d efen siv e co n n o tatio n m a k in g it a p ro v e n "co n sen su s-b u ild e r" a n d b ely in g th e am b i­ tio u s th ru st of A m erican policies.6 N a tio n a l lea d ers d id also sp e a k of grav e challenge a n d p e rm a n e n t change, b u t th e d aily m o o d w a s o n e of crisis a n d im ­ p ro v isation. T h at m o o d w a s n o t o n ly h o w m o st A m erican s ex p erien ced th e p e ­ rio d b u t w h a t h e lp e d th em to e n d u re a n d to lerate th e ch an g es th ey w ere expe­ riencing. G iven a script, th ey m ig h t w ell h av e rejected it.

The Militarization of American Policy O n F eb ru ary 9,1946, Joseph Stalin d eliv ered a sp eech w h ic h set W ash in g to n abuzz. H e p ra ise d the w a rtim e antifascist alliance b u t also stressed d e v elo p ­ m e n t of h e av y in d u stry to su p p o rt Soviet reco n stru ctio n a n d a rm e d stren g th . G iv en its m ixed m essages, S talin's speech d re w a su rp risin g ly a la rm e d re­ sp o n se from A m erican p u n d its a n d officials. It w a s "th e d e clara tio n of W orld W ar HI," Justice W illiam D ouglas to ld N a v y Secretary Jam es F orrestal, a zealo u s C old W arrior w h o th o ro u g h ly agreed. W alter L ip p m a n n b eliev ed th a t since Stalin h a d d e cid ed "to m ake m ilitary p o w e r h is first objective, w e are forced to m ake a co rre sp o n d in g decision." O n ly C om m erce Secretary H e n ry W allace n o te d th at, given the n e a r global reach of A m erican m ilitary b ases, "w e w ere challenging h im a n d his sp eech w a s tak in g u p th e ch allen g e."7 The d ram atic m o n th after S talin's speech ex p o sed n e arly ev ery c o d ew o rd , reflex, concept, a n d p erso n ality th a t w o u ld d o m in a te th e A m erican o u tlo o k early in the C old W ar. D ays later, the sto ry b ro k e of Soviet esp io n ag e ag en ts seeking A m erican atom ic secrets. T ru m a n c o n d em n ed " a p p e a se m e n t" of th e Soviet U nion, w h ile G O P lead ers c o n d em n ed h im for a llo w in g it (as Sen. A r­ th u r V andenberg p u t it privately. Secretary of State Jim m y B yrnes h a d b een "lo itering a ro u n d M unich"). From M oscow , G eorge K en n an se n t h is in flu en tial "long teleg ram " o u tlin in g a ratio n ale a n d strateg y for co n ta in m e n t of th e Soviet U nion. O n M arch 5, C hurchill issu ed his fam o u s w a rn in g of a n "iro n c u rta in " d escen d in g o n E urope, asking the E nglish-sp eak in g p e o p le s to rev erse th e situ ­ atio n b y relying o n the b o m b th a t "G o d h as w ille d " them . Soviet p ressu re o n

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T urkey to sh are control of th e Black Sea straits led Forrestal to p ro p o se se n d in g th e b a ttle sh ip Missouri a n d a n a v al task force th ere.8 P e rh ap s th e C o ld W ar h a d n o t y e t b e g u n (h isto rian s d isag ree a b o u t th e key d a te , as if a com plex a n d in crem en tal stru g g le co u ld b e traced to o n e m om ent). T here w a s as y e t n o form al A m erican C o ld W ar "policy," n o n av al task force reach ed T urkey for a n o th e r six m o n th s, a n d T ru m a n still w a x ed h o t a n d cold o n th e Soviets. B ut th e essen tials of A m erican lea d ers' o u tlo o k w ere b eco m in g ev id en t. The n e w stru g g le w a s largely th e old one a g ain st to ta litaria n s in n e w g u ise — th e n o tio n of S talinism as " re d fascism " tig h te n e d th e im ag in ativ e linkage. "T he So­ v ie t U n io n 's a ssa u lt u p o n the W est," a rg u e d o n e State D e p a rtm e n t official in 1947, "is a t a b o u t th e stage of H itle r's m an e u v e rin g in to C zechoslovakia." A n d since it w as, the m istak es of th e 1930s h a d to b e a v erted a n d th e lessons of W orld W ar E acted u p o n . A m erican lead ers so o n re p e a te d m a n y of th e w o rd s a n d ac­ tio n s th a t p rec ed e d Pearl H a rb o r— w h a t w a s n o v el in 1940 w a s p rec ed e n t b y 1946— albeit w ith o u t b en efit of FD R 's m asterfu l rhetoric, a n d w ith th e ferv en t h o p e to a v ert th e final cataclysm . A lth o u g h all in stru m e n ts of p o w e r h a d to b e d e p lo y e d , m ilitary force seem ed critical, less b ecau se Stalin w a s a b o u t to u n ­ leash h is arm ies (privately, few W ash in g to n in sid ers th o u g h t so) th a n becau se h e alleg ed ly (like H itler) u n d e rs to o d n o o th e r fo rm of p o w er. "U n less R ussia is faced w ith a n iro n fist a n d stro n g lan g u a g e," T ru m a n th o u g h t, " a n o th e r w a r is in th e m ak in g ." If a n a rm e d A m erica resu lted , it h a rd ly seem ed b y A m erican choice; as L ip p m a n n said, "w e are forced to m ak e a co rre sp o n d in g d ecisio n ."9 To b e sure, th a t o u tlo o k w a s h a rd ly th e sole cau se of th e C o ld W ar. D rastic ch an g es in th e stru c tu re a n d m o d es of p o w e r w ith in th e in te rn atio n al sy stem p ro b ab ly m a d e S oviet-A m erican conflict in so m e form inevitable. So m u ch h a d th e w a r d a m a g e d o th er m ajor p o w e rs th a t th e resu ltin g "v a c u u m " of p o w e r (as co n tem p o raries o ften called it) in v ite d Soviet a n d A m erican p o w e r to flow o u t­ w ard . B oth h a d e n o rm o u s p o w e r— a lth o u g h o n b alan ce th e a d v a n ta g e lay w ith the U n ited S tates— as w ell as global asp iratio n s. B oth also p o ssessed the recen t h isto rical experience, a n d th e p lau sib ly th rea te n in g enem y, to cast th o se a sp iratio n s sincerely in d efensive term s, as Stalin d id in h is b ru ta l su b ju g atio n of E astern E u ro p e a n d T ru m a n d id in A m erica's m o re su b tle d e p lo y m e n t of pow er. N o r d id A m erican lea d ers focus o n ly o n th e Soviet th reat. T hey k n e w th a t d iv erse A m erican in terests h a rd ly all fit w ith in th e C o ld W ar fram ew o rk . T heir su p rem e ach iev em en t u n d e r T rum an, the M arsh all P lan to a id W estern E u ­ rope, w as sh a p e d in p a rt b y h u m a n ita ria n m otives, c u ltu ra l affinities, a n d eco­ nom ic anxieties— a p ro stra te E u ro p e d ra g g e d d o w n th e A m erican eco n o m y as w ell as in v itin g Soviet a g g ra n d ize m e n t. Likew ise, th eir intricate policy of " d u a l c o n tain m en t" in E u ro p e w a s "d e sig n e d to keep b o th th e Soviet U n io n a n d G er­ m an y from d o m in a tin g th e C o n tin en t." D istru st of b o th th o se p o w e rs led A m erican lead ers to p u s h for G e rm a n y 's d iv isio n a n d th e Federal R epublic's

I 28

THE

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in co rp o ra tio n in to the W estern alliance, w h ile a n tico m m u n ism led th e m "to a d ep lo rab le series of co m p ro m ises w ith th e legacies of N azism ," in clu d in g re­ p a tria tio n to the U n ited States of G e rm a n scientists asso ciated w ith th e N azi regim e. But ag ain th e m o tiv es w ere com plex: th o se scientists w e re sn a tch e d in o rd e r to b en efit A m erican scientific a n d c o rp o ra te in terests as w ell as A m erican m ilitary po w er, to d e n y G e rm a n y the capacity to rearm , to b e a t o u t frien d s w h o seem ed to b e g e ttin g the ju m p o n th e U n ited States (as o n e official co m p lain ed , "W e h av e c au g h t the French re d -h a n d e d ag ain stealin g scientists o u t of o u r zone."), a n d o n ly g ra d u a lly to w a g e th e C o ld W ar o n a n o th e r front. E ven w ith in th e C old W ar fram ew o rk , A m erican lea d ers reco g n ized differences of in te rest am o n g c o m m u n ist n a tio n s m ore th a n th eir p u b lic im ag es of a m o n o ­ lithic en em y a ck n o w le d g ed .10 Still, th e A m erican o u tlo o k d id m u c h to tu rn a n in ev itab le riv alry in to a b itte r C old W ar a n d to stre n g th e n th e forces of m ilitarizatio n . For all th e co m p lex ity w ith w h ic h A m erican lead ers p riv a te ly calcu lated A m erican in terests a n d e n ­ em y th reats, th e y chose to "scare hell o u t of th e A m erican p e o p le " in p re se n tin g th e T ru m an D octrine in 1947, to h ig h lig h t th e co m m u n ist m enace in d e fe n d in g th e M arshall Plan, to d ep lo y a lan g u a g e of M an ich ean stru g g le ("N early ev ery n a tio n m u s t choose b e tw ee n altern ativ e w a y s of life," a n n o u n c e d T rum an), a n d to p o u r o u t a stream of analogies to W orld W ar II a n d d ire w a rn in g s a b o u t im p e n d in g m ilitary cataclysm .11 T h at is, th ey su b su m e d d iv erse in terests a n d d iv erse m o d es of p o w e r u n d e r th e g ra n d th em es of C o ld W ar, co n tain m en t, a n d W orld W ar III— especially in public, b u t in p riv a te as w ell. M eanw hile, th e m ilitarizatio n of A m erican policy a n d th e escalatio n of the C old W ar p ro ceed ed in confusing fits a n d starts. T he p an ic sh o w n in th e late w in te r of 1946 so o n a b ated , th o u g h S oviet-A m erican n eg o tiatio n s o n E astern E u ro p e a n d control of atom ic w e a p o n s k e p t th e p o t boiling. Panic re tu rn e d a y e ar later, w h e n B ritish w ith d ra w a l from G reece a n d T u rk ey p ro m p te d th e T ru m an D octrine, w ith its o p e n -e n d ed p ro m ise "to s u p p o rt free p e o p le s w h o are resisting a tte m p te d su b ju g a tio n ."12 O v er th e follo w in g year, th e M arsh all P lan to ok sh ap e, sig n ed b y T ru m a n o n A p ril 3,1948, a n d p ro v id in g $12.4 b illio n to W estern E urope ov er th e n ex t fo u r years. By th en , th e d ru m b e a t of crises a n d in itiatives w a s relentless. In F eb ru ary 1948, a C o m m u n ist co u p in C zechoslova­ kia fu rth e re d the S tabilization of E astern E urope. A n e n su in g w a r scare in M arch, com plete w ith loose talk of a Soviet in v asio n of W estern E u ro p e, w a s in p a rt m an u fa ctu red b y W ashington officials in o rd e r to force C o n g ress to a p ­ p ro v e the M arshall Plan, rein state conscriptio n , a n d step u p d efen se sp en d in g . But th e co u p d id to u ch a raw A m erican nerv e, v a lid a tin g fears of to ta litaria n ag g ressio n a n d W estern w eak n ess e m b o d ied in p o w e rfu l im ag es of M u n ich a n d ap p easem en t: h a d n o t H itle r's triu m p h o v er th e C zechs ten y ears before led to w o rld w ar? A few m o n th s later, as W est G e rm a n y 's rev iv al p ro ceed ed u n d e r A m erican auspices, the Soviets lau n ch ed a b lo ck ad e of W est Berlin, the A nglo-French-A m erican zone d e e p w ith in C o m m u n ist E ast G erm any. A n e w

CONSOLIDATION,

I945-I9S3

29

w a r scare g av e w a y to the m ig h ty spectacle of th e A m erican airlift th a t n u r­ tu re d W est B erlin u n til th e Soviets lifted th e b lo ck ad e in M ay 1949. By th en , th e N o rth A tlantic T reaty O rg an izatio n , d e sig n ed to p ro v id e m ilitary a n d political secu rity to W estern E urope, w a s b e in g finalized. M o n th s later tw o m o re b lo w s struck: th e Soviets e x p lo d e d a n atom ic b o m b a n d C h in ese co m m u n ists com ­ p le te d th e ir ro u t of C h ian g K ai-shek's N ationalists. T he C o ld W ar in E urope offered A m erican s a clear a n d a p p a re n tly fam iliar sto ry line: once again, as in the 1930s, th e ir c u ltu ral co u sin s w ere in d e sp era te stra its facing a to ta litaria n enem y. The C old W ar in A sia offered few su c h satis­ factions. T he A m erican v isio n of Jap an 's place in th a t stru g g le d id becom e clear: it w a s to b e a n an tico m m u n ist bastion, d e m ilitariz ed (except for A m erican forces b a se d there) b u t an ch o rin g its o w n p ro sp e rity a n d th a t of E ast A sia th ro u g h m u tu a l tra d e a n d A m erican assistance. N o th in g else in A sia seem ed as obvious. M an y A m ericans sy m p a th iz e d w ith th e anticolonial revolts sw ee p in g A sia— in B ritish India, the D utch E ast Indies, French In d o ch in a, a n d elsew h ere— b u t since th ey w ere carried o u t a g ain st A m erica's W estern E u ­ ro p e a n allies, th ey raised to u g h questions. S h o u ld th e U n ited States h e lp its al­ lies cling to th e ir em p ires a n d th ereb y alienate th e subject p e o p le s w h o se alle­ giance in th e C old W ar it also sought? O r sh o u ld it o p p o se its allies' efforts a n d th ereb y risk in g alien atin g them? W ith reg a rd to In d o ch in a, W ash in g to n fo u n d n o satisfactory a n sw e r to those questions. C h in a co n fo u n d e d a n d d iv id e d A m ericans e v en m ore. W h en T ru m a n a n d Secretary of State M arsh all p r u ­ d e n tly lim ited A m erican a id to th e C hinese N a tio n alists fig h tin g co m m u n ists for control of the n atio n , th ey also d ilu te d the m o ral force of A m erican an tico m ­ m u n ism . D id it a p p ly o n ly w h e re v icto ry w a s relativ ely easy, as in E urope? D id th eir C h in a policy. R epublicans ch arg ed , con stitu te a p p e a se m e n t o r so m eth in g w o rse, traceable to trea so n o u s "g iv eaw ay s" b y R oosevelt a t Yalta? N o aren a of policy m a d e the a d m in istra tio n m o re v u ln erab le, a n d n o n e w a s m o re vexing, th a n th a t in v o lv in g A sia. Several factors a d d e d to th e ran co r a n d confusion. T he line b e tw e e n "co m m u n ist" a n d "n o n co m m u n ist" forces— fairly sh a rp in E urope, from w h ic h m o st A m erican s d re w th eir u n d e rs ta n d in g of th e C o ld W ar— w a s b lu rry a t b e st in A sia's stru g g les, w h e re n a tio n alism a n d an tico lonialism loom ed so large. A lliances b e tw ee n M oscow a n d A sian com ­ m u n ists w e re easily exaggerated; th e y w ere sh a k y e v en to th e c o m m u n ists in ­ v olved. Few A m ericans w ere of A sian b ack g ro u n d , a n d A m erican s' affinity to a n d experience of A sia w ere shallow , so th a t th ey read ily re d u c e d d iv erse p eo p les to a m onolithic, d e v io u s h o rd e. N o r h a d its m ilitary a n d political ac­ tions in W orld W ar II g iven th e U n ited States th e in tim ate k n o w led g e a n d p o w ­ erfu l p o sitio n s acq u ired in E urope: in the Pacific w ar, th e a p t n a m e for it from a n A m erican v a n ta g e p o in t, th e c o u n try 's m ajor o p e ra tio n s h a d b e e n confined largely to th e p e rim ete r of A sia. The T ru m an a d m in istra tio n re sp o n d e d to d ev elo p m e n ts th ere a n d to Soviet p o w e r in E urope w ith policies th a t h a rd ly seem ed th e stu ff of m ilitarizatio n to

30

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m o st observers. C ongress rein stitu te d m ilitary co n scription, b u t o n a y early basis a n d w ith o u t the sy stem of u n iv ersal train in g m a n y lead ers w a n te d . T he N a tio n al Security A ct of 1947 e la b o rated a n d co n so lid ated th e in stitu tio n al a p ­ p a ra tu s of m ilitarizatio n , b u t it w a s acco m p an ied b y b itte r conflict th a t e v en seem ed to d e v o u r its p rim a ry architect (Jam es Forrestal, th e first secretary of defense, c o m m itted suicide). W h at o ften g rab b e d h e ad lin e s w a s n o t th e scale of th is n e w a p p a ra tu s b u t in stea d the spectacle of a rm e d forces fig h tin g o v er b u d ­ gets, forces, a n d m issions. T he clim ax cam e in a "rev o lt of th e ad m irals," fu ­ rio u s w h e n D efense Secretary L ouis Johnson canceled a su p e rc a rrie r in favor of fu n d in g th e air force's B-36, a h u g e h a u le r of atom ic b o m b s p o w e re d b y sixp isto n m o to rs (w ith jets so o n ad d ed ). To jo u rn alists co v erin g th ese sq u ab b les a n d p o liticians w eig h in g in o n them , little of th is lo o k ed like th e fo rw a rd m arch of m ilitarizatio n , certainly n o t th e im p u lse of m ilitary m e n to cling to fam iliar b u reau cratic turf, o ld er form s of w eap o n ry , a n d p a s t w a rs as m odels. In stead , it ju st lo oked like a m ess. C o m p o u n d in g the im age of m ilitary d e b ilita tio n w a s th e sw ift sh rin k a g e of A m erican forces after V-J D ay a n d the d u b io u s m e th o d s u se d to m ea su re th eir stren g th. A m erican lead ers d ecried a n a p p a re n t collapse of u sab le p o w e r as th e 12 m illion p e rso n n el in u n ifo rm a t the w a r 's e n d sh ra n k to few er th a n 1.6 m il­ lion b y 1947. W ith m o st of th o se tied d o w n in o ccu p atio n , logistical, a n d tra in ­ in g d u ties, co m b at-read y forces w ere few. To in sid ers p riv y to secret in fo rm a ­ tion, ev en A m erica's u ltim ate w e a p o n seem ed frail: o n ly n in e atom ic b o m b s w ere available as of June 1946 a n d fifty-three tw o y ears later, th e air force w a s p o o rly e q u ip p e d a n d tra in e d to c arry th em , a n d n o clear stra te g y g o v e rn e d th eir use, m u ch less th e full sp e c tru m of A m erican m ilita ry p o w er. Fiscal w atch d o g s, w h o in clu d ed T ru m a n h im self a n d R epublicans frettin g a b o u t A m erican im potence, k e p t d efense b u d g e ts low , a t least in th e eyes of m ilitary officials. A m id all this, th e b ro a d e r course of m ilitarizatio n w a s h a rd to fath o m (or easy to ignore). R arely d id politicians o r p u n d its c o m p are A m erican d em o b iliz­ atio n to th e Soviet U n io n 's, w h ic h w a s only so m e w h a t less drastic. T heir b ase­ line w as the m a m m o th w a rtim e force, n o t p re w a r p eacetim e sta n d a rd s, as if h isto ry w ere irrelev an t u n less it y ield ed d ire w a rn in g s a b o u t th e fu tu re. E ven a force of 1.6 m illion p e rso n n el w a s five tim es larg er th a n its p re w a r c o u n te rp a rt of th e mid-1930s. D efense sp e n d in g , earlier a b o u t 15 p e rc en t of th e fed eral b u d ­ g et a n d 1.5 p e rc en t of G N P, n o w seized o n e-th ird of th e fo rm er a n d 5 p e rc en t of G N P — ex cluding sw ollen costs of d e b t service, v e te ra n s' p ro g ram s, a id to al­ lies, a n d the like. L ikew ise, th e d efense sy stem co u ld d o far m o re after W orld W ar II th a n before: assu m e o ccu p atio n d u tie s of u n p re c e d e n te d scale a n d geo­ g rap h ic range, m ain tain far-flung bases, p ro d u c e n u c le ar w eap o n s, c h u m o u t n e w b o m b ers a n d jet fighters, a n d d ev elo p m o re a d v an c ed w eap o n s. D esp ite a sh o rta g e of co m b at-read y forces, it c o u ld sw in g in to action w ith strik in g sp e ed a n d force, as it d id in the B erlin airlift in 1948 a n d K orea in 1950.

CONSOLIDATION,

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I3 I

It also h a d u n p re c e d e n te d legal a n d political u n d e rp in n in g s. W ith th e b rief ex cep tion of 1940, th e U n ited States n o w h a d its first p eacetim e d raft. N A TO m a rk e d a n e x tra o rd in a ry d e p a rtu re from A m erican trad itio n s: in fo rm al alli­ ances h a d p ro ce ed e d A m erican e n try in to b o th w o rld w a rs, b u t th is alliance in v o lv e d a legally b in d in g trea ty ratified b y th e Senate. T he C en tral Intelligence A gency, created in 1947, w a s g ra n te d co nstitu tio n ally d u b io u s p o w e rs of se­ crecy a n d action, a n d so o n exceeded th o se p o w ers. M ost im p o rta n t, h ere w a s a sy ste m th a t A m erican lea d ers w ere w illin g t a u se a n d in creasin g ly p refe rred o v e r diplom acy. T he U n ited States h a rd ly d isa rm e d after 1945. T he g ro w th of its m ilita ry p o w e r sim p ly lag g ed b e h in d a n e v en m o re strik in g escalatio n in th e m issio n s its lea d ers called o n it to fill. C o n ta in m e n t a n d m ilitarizatio n also m e t resistance, as th e clam o r for ra p id d em o b ilizatio n h a d m a d e clear. In O ctober 1945, o n ly 7 p e rc en t of A m erican s re g a rd e d foreign p ro b lem s as the "m o st v ital" o nes facing th e c o u n try (Forrestal th a t m o n th th o u g h t th e c o u n try w a s "g o in g b ack to b e d a t a frig h ten in g ra te " a n d th ereb y o p e n in g th e w a y for "th e co m in g of W orld W ar III"). Public o p in io n to w a rd th e Soviets, a n d to w a rd th e T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n for b ein g to o "so ft" o n them , so o n tu rn e d n egative, y e t in 1947 th e State D e p a rtm e n t still fo u n d th a t 67 p e rc en t of A m ericans th o u g h t th e U N "th e b e st chance for p eace" a n d o n ly 28 p e rc en t a p p ro v e d of "try in g to stay a h ea d of th e R u ssian s b y b u ild ­ in g atom ic b o m bs." O ne State D e p a rtm e n t official c o m p a red th e situ a tio n to th a t b efore Pearl H arbor: "p o w erlessn ess o n th e p a rt of th e g o v e rn m e n t to act b ecau se of C o ngressional o r p u b lic u n a w are n ess of th e d a n g e r o r cost of inac­ tio n ." By 1948, p o lls fo u n d m o st A m erican s w o rrie d a b o u t th e Soviets, b u t also 63 p e rc en t "w a n tin g a m eetin g w ith Stalin o r so m e o th er b o ld stro k e to red u c e th e d a n g e r of w a r." 13 A m ericans w ere n o u n ifo rm m ass; race, religion, a n d o th er factors so rte d th e m out. C atholics, for exam ple, especially th o se of E ast­ e rn E u ro p ea n b a c k g ro u n d , w ere k een o n a n anti-Soviet policy. Still, th a t m y ste­ rio u s entity, "p u b lic o p in io n ," rallied slow ly to th e cause. M an y A m erican s d is­ tru ste d th e Soviet U n io n a n d w a n te d to see it k n o ck ed a ro u n d b u t w e re u n w illin g to p a y a g rea t p rice to d o so. A d m in istra tio n officials, castin g th em selv es as c o sm o p o litan realists w h o g ra sp e d the e n e m y 's th re a t to A m erica, in te rp re te d indifference to th e ir C old W ar policies as signs of a parochial, u n e d u c a te d p u b lic opinion. A ccordingly, th ey so u g h t to m an ip u la te it— v iew in g th e T ru m an D octrine, for exam ple, as "th e o p e n in g g u n in a c am p aig n to b rin g p eo p le u p to [the] realizatio n th a t the w a r isn 't ov er b y a n y m ean s," in C lark C lifford's w o rd s. Ironically, th e y felt th ey could in stru ct A m ericans in global realities on ly b y d isto rtin g th em , al­ th o u g h th ey also so u g h t to b a n k th e fires of a n tico m m u n ism th ey sto k ed , lest "th e h ysterical so rt of an ti-C o m m u n ism " get o u t of control, as G eorge K ennan w o rried . T heir elitist a p p ro a c h to p u b lic o p in io n g ain ed credence from w riters a n d scholars w h o reacted to H itle r's m a n ip u la tio n of th e G e rm a n m asses b y em p h asizin g the gullibility a n d ignorance of o rd in a ry p eople. A s R ichard Bar-

I 32

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n e t h as su m m e d u p th eir outlook, "To en co u rag e h o p e b a se d o n th e cap acity of th e av erag e citizen to g o v e rn w a s to p ro m o te d a n g e ro u s illusions, for H itle r a n d Stalin d e m o n stra te d h o w easily p o p u list y e arn in g s tu rn in to n ig h t­ m a re s."14 T he n o tio n of lev el-h ead ed elites p itte d a g ain st volatile m asses w a s m isle ad ­ ing, h o w ever, for lead ers too w ere p re y to visceral in stin cts a n d a b ru p t ch an g es of m o o d. T hey co u ld p an ic a n d talk of in itiatin g atom ic w ar, o r (as w ith Forrestal) becom e p a ra n o id a b o u t Jew s, co m m unists, o r o th er alleg ed enem ies. H av ­ in g set one course, th ey co u ld re p u d ia te it: K en n an sp e n t m u c h of h is rem a in in g career d isp u tin g im plications in h is co n ta in m e n t policy th a t o th ers th o u g h t self-evident. T hen too, som e, like K ennan, w ere b u n d le s of eth n ic a n d class p reju d ice w h o lo ath ed m u c h of the society th ey p re su m a b ly d e fe n d ed . O n oc­ casion, th ey also d esce n d ed to cru d e rep ressio n a n d red -b aitin g . In tellig en t, ca­ p ab le m en, th ey n o n eth eless succeeded in sh a p in g p u b lic o p in io n b ecau se of th eir p o w e r m ore th a n th e ir su p e rio r rationality. In d eed , the v e ry claim of th a t ratio n ality rested o n n o tio n s of class, race, a n d g e n d e r d o m in a n t am o n g policy m ak ers a t this ju n ctu re. T hese lead ers te n d e d to reg a rd o rd in a ry A m ericans m u c h as th ey p erceiv ed w o m e n a n d n o n w h ite p e o p le s— as "em otional, irrational, irrespo n sib le, u n b u sin esslik e, u n stab le, a n d childlike," or, in th e case of H in d u m en , as passiv e, "effete," o r h o m o sex ­ ual. Secretary of State John Foster D ulles, for exam ple, b eliev ed th a t In d ia 's lead ers h a d "a n alm o st fem inine h y p ersen sitiv en ess w ith resp ect to th e p re s­ tige of th eir c o u n try " (w hereas W estern o b serv ers o ften th o u g h t " In d ia n w o m e n w ere heartless, d o m in eerin g , a n d em asculating"). W h eth er foreign o r A m erican, su c h peo p le, A m erican lead ers a ssu m e d , n e e d e d th e tu telag e of th eir p a triarc h al authority, th o u g h less so if th ey w ere stau n ch ly a n tic o m m u n ist— A sian lead ers in th a t m o ld w ere a ssig n ed a m ore virile, m asculine, ag gressive im ag e.15 T h at o utlook in tu rn ratio n alized th e le a d ers' au th o rity o v er p recisely th o se g ro u p s g en eratin g m u ch of th e o p p o sitio n to A m erican policy: fem in ist p eace o rg an izations, A frican-A m ericans like Paul R obeson, n e u tra l lead ers like In ­ d ia n p rim e m in ister Jaw aharlal N e h ru , a n d rebellious co lo n ized p o p u la tio n s ab ro ad challenging A m erica's alliance w ith E u ro p e's im p erial p o w ers. The cel­ eb ratio n in 1940s A m erican c u ltu re of m ale au th o rity , fam ily ord er, a n d " tra d i­ tio n al" w o m e n 's roles reinforced the policy elite's role as a w ise, fath erly o v er­ seer to d e p e n d e n t, unruly, a n d u n in fo rm e d p e o p le s at h o m e a n d ab ro ad . To b e sure, th eir p atriarc h al v iew w a s h a rd ly h e ld b y th em alone, since th e global ex­ perien ce of w a r in th e 1940s reinforced m ale au th o rity in m a n y settings; a m o n g A m ericans, peace activism a n d o p p o sitio n to p o licy m ak in g elites w ere p e rh a p s m ore m ale-d o m in ated early in th e C old W ar th a n a t a n y tim e in th e century, a n d n o m ore m ale a n d m ascu lin ist elite could b e fo u n d th a n th e Soviet U n io n 's. Still, p olicy m ak ers' sense of class, racial, a n d g e n d e r h ierarch ies h e lp e d to forge th eir p o stu re of su p e rio r w isd o m a n d authority.

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P o w er a n d m a n ip u la tio n d id not, ho w ev er, alone th ro ttle resistance to n a ­ tio n al policies, for the resistance itself w a s diffuse a n d d iv id e d . A s d u rin g 1940-41, it w a s su sta in ed b y tw o b ro a d political forces th a t sh a re d little b u t th eir resistance. T he conservative w in g , d o m in a te d b y R epublicans like Sen. R obert Taft, w a s n atio n alist, u nilateralist, a n d "iso latio n ist" in th e v iew of the foreign policy establishm ent. T he o th er source of resistance co n sisted of leftists a n d d isaffected liberal D em ocrats, led b y H e n ry W allace after T ru m an fired h im from the C ab in et in 1946 a n d th ro u g h h is q u ixotic P rogressive P arty cam ­ p a ig n for the p resid en c y in 1948. N o t o n ly could the o p p o sitio n cam p s co o p erate little w ith each other, b u t each w a s c o m p ro m ised o n its o w n term s. Taft stre n u o u sly criticized th e overex ten sio n a n d m ilitarizatio n of A m erican policy, th e g ro w th of e n ta n g lin g alli­ ances, th e P re sid e n t's u su rp a tio n of p o w e r in w a r a n d fo reig n policy, a n d , o n occasion, h o w all those tren d s w o rsen e d Soviet-A m erican conflict. M in d fu l of p la n s "to m ain tain a force so p re p o n d e ra n t th a t n o n e shall d a re attack u s," Taft w a rn e d th a t "p o ten tial p o w e r o v e r o th e r n atio n s, h o w e v er b e n ev o len t its p u r­ p o ses, lead s inevitably to im p erialism ." O n ly relu ctan tly d id h e v o te for N A TO after p ro m ises (soon re p u d ia te d ) from Secretary of State D ean A cheson th a t W est G erm an y w o u ld rem a in d isa rm e d a n d th a t n o "su b sta n tia l" A m erican force w o u ld go to E urope. B ut a n tico m m u n ism a n d political o p p o rtu n ism also te m p te d conservatives to b e a t u p o n the T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n for failing to d e fe n d A m erica a n d sto p c o m m u n ism in A sia— as n o te d pacifist A. J. M uste rem ark ed , "For isolationists these A m erican s d o certain ly g e t a ro u n d ." A n d as in 1940, conservatives also em braced the cen tral co m p o n e n t of A m erican p o w e r— a form idable a ir force, n o w carry in g atom ic w e a p o n s— since it a p ­ p e aled to th eir v isio n of A m erican p o w e r u n fettere d b y alliances a n d th e coer­ cive a p p a ra tu s of m ass arm ies. For the T ru m a n a d m in istratio n , co n servatives w ere a m ig h ty n u isan ce b u t n o t a serio u s obstacle.16 A m ong leftists, w h o offered m a n y of the sam e a rg u m e n ts m a d e b y co n serv a­ tives, the m ain p ro b lem w as th e ease w ith w h ic h C o ld W arrio rs co u ld lin k th em ideologically to co m m u n ism a n d the Soviet U n io n (the presen ce of real C o m ­ m u n ists in th e P rogressive p a rty d id n o t help). T heir p o sitio n n o w resem b led th a t of FD R 's rig h t-w in g foes before Pearl H arb o r, w h o h a d b e en c o m p ro m ised b y th eir alleged affinities to fascism . Subject to vicious red -b aitin g , leftists a n d pacifists q u a rre led am o n g th em selv es a n d m u ste re d little effective o p p o sitio n to a d m in istratio n policies after 1948. O p p o sitio n w eak n ess also testified to th e p o w e r of th e n a tio n al secu rity p a ra d ig m a n d th e m em o ry of W orld W ar II. C o n cep ts of "to talitarian ism " a n d " re d fascism " conflated th e em erg in g stru g g le w ith th e o n e ju st w o n , as d id th e d ru m b e a t of co m p ariso n s b e tw e e n Stalin a n d H itler, b e tw ee n "a p p e a se m e n t" in 1938 a n d "w eak n ess" in 1948, a n d b e tw ee n Pearl H a rb o rs p a st a n d p ro sp e c ­ tive. W ith defeat only n a rro w ly av erted in th e last w ar, w ith n e w w e ap o n s only w o rsen in g the n a tio n 's vulnerability, w ith th e n ex t w a r su re to allow n o tim e to

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m obilize, w ith a n e w en em y o n ly m ore in sid io u s th a n th e last one, w h a t A m e ri­ cans c o u ld resist th e ru s h to a rm th èir n a tio n a n d co n fro n t th e enem y? T hey co u ld , as som e d id eloquently, q u e stio n th e m ea n s a n d co n seq u en ces of d o in g so. Far few er c o u ld challenge th e reig n in g p a ra d ig m a n d its a n alo g ies to W orld W ar II, especially since those analogies h in te d a t a silv er lin in g in th e d a rk clo u d s of global struggle: if a d isp lay of force co u ld h a v e sto p p e d H itle r before W orld W ar n , th e n a d isp la y of w ill m ig h t n o w b rin g v icto ry a n d a v e rt w ar. Success req u ire d n o t a ra s h p lu n g e into w a r b u t a ste a d y cap acity a n d w illin g ­ n ess to risk w a r— o r e v en ju st th e ap p ea ra n c e thereof. A ll these c u rre n ts of m o o d a n d policy su rfaced in m o st h y p erb o lic fo rm in d eb ate o v er n u c le ar w eap o n s. T he sh eer scale a n d d e p th of th a t d e b a te testified to th e serio u sn ess w ith w h ich A m ericans to o k th e issu e (a stu n n in g 98 p e rc e n t of th e m k n e w of th e atom ic b o m b a fter H iroshim a). Ju st as strikingly, h o w ev er, th ey th o u g h t of th e b o m b as a n in stru m e n t of th e ir o w n p o te n tia l d estru ctio n . For all th e ir p rid e in A m erican achievem ent, for all th e ir n a tio n 's lead in th is n e w technology, th e y im ag in ed th eir im m in en t d oom . M em o ries of W orld W ar II, sto ries of c o m m u n ist espionage, g rap h ic p re se n ta tio n s of w h a t n u c le ar a t­ tack w o u ld d o to A m erican cities, a n d th e n n e w s th a t Stalin h a d h is o w n atom ic w e a p o n all reinforced th e im ag in ed p e ril a n d th e p a ra d ig m of n a tio n al security. O f course, th a t sense of p e ril also d ro v e A m erican s to c o n sid er altern a tiv e s to a n arm s race. P roposals em erg ed fro m c ru sa d in g w o rld fed eralists like N o r­ m a n C ousins, th o u g h tfu l intellectuals like S tu a rt C hase, a g o n iz e d scientists like R obert O p p en h eim er, h a rd -h e a d e d sta te sm en like H e n ry L. Stim son, a n d fro m th e a d m in istratio n , w h o se p la n for in te rn atio n al co n tro l o f atom ic en erg y w a s b o th b o ld a n d self-interested. Still, atom ic p e ril w a s also p araly zin g . T hose w h o w a rn e d d a rk ly of it w a n te d to p ro v o k e political activism , b u t th e ir b in a ry d ep ictio n of a ltern a tiv e s— "w o rld state o r w o rld d o o m ," as jo u rn a list M ax L em er p u t it— d id n o t c h art a n a p p a re n t practical co u rse b e tw e e n u to p ia n a n d u n th in k a b le outcom es. It fostered a fatalistic belief in technological d e te rm in ­ ism , as if th e b o m b ra th e r th a n p e o p le d e te rm in e d th e w o rld 's co u rse, a n d a d e e p fear w h o se focus co u ld b e tran sfe rred from th e b o m b to th e S oviets— w ith th e b o m b so horrific, h o w terrible w a s th e p ro sp e ct if M oscow p erfected it? W ith "fear of th e R ussians" replacing "fear of th e b o m b ," th e " d re a d d e stro y er of 1945 h a d becom e the shield of the R epublic b y 1950."17 T he b o m b w a s a lre ad y em erg in g as su ch a sh ield in n a tio n al stra te g y before 1950. M ilitary lead ers e n v isio n ed the n u c le ar o b literatio n of th e Soviet U n io n at th e sta rt of the n ex t w ar. A full sta te m e n t of strateg y w a s slo w to em erge, p rey to th e conflicts am o n g the a rm e d forces, a n d stra te g y w e n t b e y o n d th e b o m b , em bracing, as in W orld W ar II, a capacity to m o bilize quick ly for g e n eral w a r a n d to assist allies in b e a rin g th e b u rd e n of w a r as m u c h as possible. But the b o m b w a s the h e a rt of th e m atter, a n d w ith it in tractab le d ilem m as a b o u t h o w to base g ra n d strateg y o n it, as th e n a tio n 's n u c le ar o m n ip o ten ce co n stan tly seem ed to yield its n u c le ar im potence. A m erican a n d W estern Eu-

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ro p e a n lead ers recognized th a t actual u se of n u c le ar w e a p o n s m ig h t d e stro y m u c h th a t w a s to b e d e fe n d ed . A s a French p rem ier m em o rab ly p u t it, a lth o u g h th e U n ite d States m ig h t once a g ain liberate E urope, "th e n e x t tim e y o u p ro b a ­ b ly w o u ld b e lib eratin g a corpse." "O n e u se of it [the n u c le ar sanction] w ill b e fatally too m an y ," th e stra te g ist B ernard B rodie later n o te d .18 H ence, a lth o u g h u se of th e atom ic w e a p o n a n d e v en a "p rev e n tiv e " n u c le ar attack a g ain st th e Soviet U n io n te m p te d som e leaders, th eir stress w a s o n deterren ce. T he b o m b , like A m erica's w h o le sy stem of a rm s a n d alliances, w a s m e a n t to d issu a d e en e­ m ies fro m u n le a sh in g w a r a n d convince th e m of A m erica's w ill to resp o n d . D e­ terren ce h a rd ly reso lv ed m u ch , ho w ev er, especially once th e K rem lin acq u ired n u c le a r w eap o n s: w a s it credible to th re a te n it w ith n u c le ar reta lia tio n if th e e n su in g w a r m ig h t d estro y th e U n ited States o r its allies? Yet if th e th re a t w a s n o t credible, w h a t use d id A m erica's atom ic w e a p o n s h av e, a n d w h a t risk d id th e c o u n try ru n of co m m ittin g th e fatal e rro r of "ap p e a sem e n t"? H a u n te d b y su c h questio n s, A m erican lead ers k e p t lo o k in g to th e atom ic w e a p o n to m ak e a political o r psychological im p ressio n o n th e enem y, since its practical u se in w a r w a s so d o u b tfu l. D u rin g th e B erlin crisis, for exam ple, th e T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n leaked w o rd th a t sixty B-29s w ere b e in g se n t to En­ g lan d , h in tin g th a t th ey could w a g e n u c le ar w ar. T h o u g h th ey carried n o atom ic w e ap o n s, th e b lu ff w e n t fo rw a rd in o rd e r to in tim id a te M oscow a n d set a p re c e d e n t for a p e rm a n e n t A m erican n u c le ar force in E urope. In su c h w ay s, n u c le ar policy k e p t slip p in g d e e p e r in to th e m u rk y , u n m e a su ra b le realm of m o rale a n d im pressions. T h at realm g o v e rn e d the T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n 's decision, fin alized in Jan­ u a ry 1950, to m ake a h y d ro g e n bom b. It reco g n ized th e d a n g e r of fu rth e r esca­ latin g th e a rm s race a n d th e absence of an y co m p ellin g m ilitary reaso n for p lu n g in g a h ea d , since defense officials d o u b te d th a t H -b o m b s co u ld d o m u c h n o t a lre ad y possible w ith atom ic w e ap o n s. Less tan g ib le criteria o v e rru le d su c h reaso n s for caution. G iven th a t th e Soviets m ig h t d ev elo p th e n e w w e ap o n . Joint C hiefs C h a irm a n G en. O m a r B radley a rg u e d th a t "p o ssessio n of a th erm o n u cle ar w e a p o n b y th e USSR w ith o u t su c h p o ssessio n b y th e U n ited States w o u ld b e in to le ra b le"— " p ro fo u n d ly d em o ra liz in g " to A m erican s a n d a " tre m e n d o u s psychological b o o st" for the Soviet U n io n .19 T h u s th e a d m in is­ tra tio n took the n e x t step in th e a rm s race in o rd e r to reassu re A m erican s a n d allies a n d to avoid a p p e a rin g to a p p e a se th e Soviets b y lettin g th e m catch up. T he ratio n ale w a s as im p o rta n t as th e decisio n itself. Policies b a se d o n sp e ­ cific capabilities a n d situ a tio n s— th e p o w e r a n en em y co u ld am ass h ere, the a rm y to b e d e p lo y e d th e re — m ig h t h av e y ield ed large, costly forces, y e t o n es of m ea su ra b ly specific duties. Im p ressin g enem ies a n d rea ssu rin g frien d s, o n the o th er h a n d , w a s a n o p e n -e n d e d task d e v o id of m ea su ra b le criteria for ju d g in g its fulfillm ent: w o u ld it take fifty o r five th o u sa n d n u c le ar w e a p o n s to co m p lete th e job? To be sure, as C old W ar policym akers p o in te d out, m o rale a n d credibil­ ity w ere them selves realities of the global stru g g le, o nes th e state co u ld h a rd ly

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b a n ish from its calculations. Yet to base decisions p rim a rily o n th e m risk ed a n e n d less escalation in the a rm s race, thè fo rm atio n of alliances, a n d th e sp e n d in g of m oney. It m a d e sense o n ly in a w o rld sh a p e d b y M u n ich a n d th e tra g e d y of th e 1930s, w h e n precisely th e anti-Fascists' failure to d isp la y th e ir w ill seem ed to h av e led th em into w ar. T hese d y n am ics of m ilitarizatio n reached fuller ex p ressio n in th e w a k e of th e H -b o m b decision, in A p ril 1950, w h e n the N a tio n a l S ecurity C o u n cil a t last of­ fered a full statem en t, k n o w n as NSC-68, of n a tio n al strategy. NSC-68 ju stified "A m erica's a ssu m in g th e role of w o rld p o licem an a n d cam e close to say in g th a t all ch an g e w a s directed b y the C o m m u n ists a n d sh o u ld th erefo re b e resisted ." Its b rief for m ilitarizatio n w a s sta rtlin g — it p ro p o se d a v irtu a l treb lin g of the A m erican defense b u d g e t to $35 billion a year. E q u ally significant, w h ile its a u ­ th o rs h a rd ly ru le d o u t w o rld w ar, th ey e m p h a siz e d th e in tan g ib les of w ill, p a ­ tience, a n d coercion. A m erican secu rity n o w seem ed "to d e p e n d as m u c h o n perceptions of th e b alance of p o w e r as o n w h a t th a t b alan ce a ctu ally w a s," le a d ­ in g po licym akers "v astly to increase the n u m b e r a n d v a rie ty of in terests." T h at outlook, so expansive a n d so u n g ro u n d e d in th e calculable, g ave p o w e rfu l im ­ p e tu s to m ilitarizatio n .20 T ru m an o rd e re d NSC-68 k e p t secret, b u t d elib eratio n s o v er it w ith in th e a d ­ m in istra tio n gave one m ore clue to th e sources of m ilitarizatio n . A ttu n e d to K eynesian econom ics, im p re ssed b y th e econom ic lessons o f W orld W ar n , the a u th o rs of NSC-68 w ere o p tim istic th a t re a rm a m e n t w a s n o t on ly affordable b u t w o u ld foster econom ic g ro w th a n d "a h ig h e r sta n d a rd of liv in g ."21 N o m o re th a n FDR in 1940 d id these m e n justify re a rm a m e n t as a w a y for g o v e rn ­ m e n t to p ro m o te econom ic g ro w th . N a tio n a l secu rity w a s th e ratio n ale. B ut e v en m ore th a n R oosevelt, th ey w ere a w are of th e reciprocal relatio n sh ip th a t seem ed to exist b e tw e e n p ro sp e rity a n d arm am en ts. Like m o st A m ericans, th ey p re fe rre d th a t th e b a rg a in w h e reb y d efen se stim ­ u lated g ro w th rem a in tacit. To ack n o w led g e it w a s to a d m it to o n e of th e d e e p ­ e st m o tives for m ilitarization. Som e critics a n d jo u rn alists k n e w b etter. Business Week recognized th e p o te n t "co m b in atio n of co n cern o v e r ten se R u ssian rela­ tions, a n d a g ro w in g fear of a risin g level of u n e m p lo y m e n t h e re a t h o m e." U.S. News and World Report w ro te sh a rp ly th a t "g o v e rn m e n t p la n n e rs figure th a t th ey h av e fo u n d th e m agic fo rm u la for alm o st e n d less g o o d tim es . . . [the] C old W ar is an autom atic p u m p p rim e r."22 Such fo rth rig h t ch aracterizatio n w a s rare in 1950, how ever. R earm am en t w a s su p p o se d to m eet a g ro w in g peril. P ro sp erity seem ed only the in ad v e rte n t, th o u g h w elcom e, b y -p ro d u ct.

The Political Economy off Militarization "M r. P rim a D onna, Brass H at, Five Star M acA rth u r," T ru m an w ro te in h is d ia ry o n Ju n e 17,1945. G en. D ouglas M acA rth u r seem ed "w o rse th a n th e C ab o ts a n d th e L odges— th ey a t least talk ed w ith one an o th e r b efore th ey to ld G o d w h a t to

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do. M ac tells G o d rig h t off." It w a s one of m a n y fu lm in atio n s b y T ru m an a g ain st M acA rth u r th a t rev ealed n o t only h is feisty te m p e r b u t h is w a y of ac­ c o m m o d atin g him self to the m ilitarizatio n of in stitu tio n s— b y asse rtin g civil­ ian control ov er th e a rm e d forces. H a v in g k e p t th e g en erals a n d a d m irals in check, T rum an, like m o st A m ericans, d id n o t recognize h o w m u c h m ilitariza­ tio n itself p ro ceed ed . A fter all, h e w as, in Jam es F orrestal's view , "th e m o st rocklike ex am p le of civilian control th e w o rld h a s ev er w itn e sse d ."23 T he first stru g g le ov er civilian control in v o lv ed n u c le ar w e a p o n s a n d e n ­ ergy. T he W ar D e p a rtm e n t p ro p o se d th a t a co m m issio n d o m in a te d b y m ilitary m e n h o ld responsibility, b u t scientists fearin g restrictio n s o n th e ir w o rk , con­ g ressm en w a ry of m ilitary ag g ra n d ize m e n t, a n d T ru m a n h im self sw u n g b e­ h in d legislation p a sse d in 1946 settin g u p a civilian A tom ic E nergy C o m m is­ sion. It w a s n o t m u c h of a victory for civilian control, h o w ev er, b ecau se it still p ro v id e d for a p o w e rfu l M ilitary L iaison C o m m ittee a n d a w eb of secu rity reg ­ u latio n s, a n d e v en m o re because civilian lea d ers a n d ex p erts se rv ed m ilitary p u rp o se s. T ensions w ere a b u n d a n t in th is "loosely fed e rate d g o v e m m en tin d u stria l-m ilitary com plex,"24 a sp ra w lin g n e tw o rk of g o v e rn m e n t lab o ra to ­ ries, universities, a n d p ro d u c tio n p la n ts ru n b y p riv a te co rp o ratio n s, a n d th e m ilita ry 's in terest in b o m b s o ften clash ed w ith scientists' p u rs u it of research a n d co rp o ra tio n s' in te rest in n u c le ar energy. Still, b y th e 1950s m assiv e b u d g e ts p e rm itte d all p a rtie s to p u rs u e th eir goals. T he A EC b ecam e a p o w e rh o u se d e ­ v elo p er of n u c le ar w e a p o n s o p e ra tin g in d e e p secrecy, b a n ish in g d issen ters (R obert O p p e n h e im e r in 1954), a n d b ru sh in g a sid e p ro b lem s of e n v iro n m en t a n d h e a lth in th e testin g a n d p ro d u c tio n of n u c le ar devices. T he stru g g le o v er civilian control o b scu red h o w civilian elites m atch e d th e zeal of m ilitary offi­ cers in p u rs u in g n a tio n al security. A sim ilar outcom e em erg ed o n a larg e r scale from th e N a tio n a l Security A ct of 1947. U nification of th e a rm e d forces a n d civilian control o v e r th em p ro m p te d a p ro tra c te d political b attle, often fo cu sed o n w h e th e r a single m ili­ ta ry chief of staff w o u ld p re sid e o v e r the system . T ru m a n feared " th a t a chief of staff m ig h t a rro g a te too m u c h p o w e r to him self a n d becom e a 'm a n o n h o rse­ back,' a n o p in io n w id e ly h e ld in C o n g ress."25 T herefore th e n e w law req u ired th a t th e Joint C hiefs of Staff sim p ly serve as "p rin cip al m ilitary ad v isers to th e P re sid e n t a n d the Secretary of D efense." O n ly in 1949 d id C ongress e v en au th o ­ rize a ch airm a n for th e JCS, w h ic h in d e e d rem a in e d effectively u n d e r civilian control. H a v in g d isa rm e d a n y fu tu re "m a n o n horseb ack ," C ongress a n d th e a d m in ­ istratio n w ere free to estab lish a w id e -ra n g in g a p p a ra tu s of n a tio n al security. A t its core w ere the th ree a rm e d services (the air force n o w in d e p e n d e n t of the arm y) a n d th e Joint C hiefs, p re sid e d ov er b y th e secretary of defense. It w a s a n u n g a in ly stru c tu re resu ltin g from political com prom ise. The m u ch -h e rald ed unification of th e services in fact left each m u c h autonom y. A lth o u g h later re­ form s gave the secretary of defense m ore a u th o rity a n d staff, th e services' rival-

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ries w ith each o th er a n d in d ep e n d en c e from th e secretary 's (or Joint C hiefs') control rem ain ed endem ic, to the c o n stern a tio n of T ru m an a n d later P resi­ dents. In m a n y w ays, th e n e w law 's m o st sign ifican t p ro v isio n s in v o lv ed lessn o ticed agencies o u tsid e the D efense D ep artm en t: th e N a tio n a l Security Re­ sources B oard, to link the services w ith co rp o ratio n s a n d un iv ersities; th e N a ­ tional Security C ouncil, to ad v ise th e P resid en t; a n d th e C en tral Intelligence A gency, to "co o rd in ate" intelligence activities. O th e r key agencies w ere al­ read y long in place (the FBI, th e N a tio n a l A d v iso ry C o m m ittee o n A eronautics) o r se p ara tely a u th o rize d (the AEC). A n d b e y o n d th e g o v e rn m e n ta l a p p a ra tu s lay in stitu tio n s closely lin k ed to it: u n iv ersity a n d c o rp o ra te lab o rato ries; th in k tan k s like the R A N D corporation; tra d e a n d p ro fessio n al associations; a n d b u sin esses p ro v id in g p ro d u c ts a n d services, from w e a p o n s to w ireta p p in g . H o w ev e r com plex a n d evolving, the sy stem d e v e lo p e d b y 1949 w o u ld re­ m a in largely intact for several decades. Its significance lay less in specifics th a n in its scale a n d rationale. It e m b o d ied th e co n v ictio n th a t in a n ag e of in sta n t a n d to tal w arfare, th e v ig ilan t n a tio n m u s t b e co n stan tly p re p a re d b y h a rn e ss­ in g all its resources a n d linking its civilian a n d m ilita ry in stitu tio n s— in d ee d , o b literatin g the b o u n d a ry b e tw ee n those in stitu tio n s, ju st as th e line b e tw e e n w a r a n d peace seem ed to b e d isa p p ea rin g . So p o w e rfu l w a s th is co n v ictio n th a t it d re w little challenge in the late 1940s, e v en as co u n tless p a rtic u la rs a ro u sed stro n g debate. T he place of n a tio n al security in th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t sw elled accordingly. Federal em p lo y m en t grew m ore th a n fourfo ld from 1932 to 1952, w h e n it reached 2.6 m illion civilians (p lu s 3.6 m illio n in u niform ), of w h o m 1.3 m illion w o rk e d for the D efense D e p a rtm e n t a n d th o u sa n d s m o re for o th e r w ar-relate d agencies. Size alone d o es n o t alw ay s c o m m an d p o w e r (the P ost Office re­ m ain ed a h u g e bureaucracy, for exam ple), b u t th e sw ellin g a p p a ra tu s of n a ­ tional security slow ly m ad e a difference. For a w h ile, w ith stro n g secretaries of state p itte d a g ain st w e ak or sh o rt-term defen se secretaries, th e State D e p a rt­ m e n t h e ld its ow n, a b etted b y T ru m a n 's tru st in secretaries of sta te M arsh all a n d A cheson. In th e long ru n , S tate's place receded; e v en w h e n its lea d ers w e re strong, m ilitarized policies d e m a n d e d m ilita ry expertise. T he d efen se secre­ taries a ssu m e d g ro w in g p o w e r a n d , especially in th e 1950s, so d id agencies like th e CIA a n d AEC. A n d precisely because those agencies w ere too h u g e a n d lab y rin th in e for the W hite H o u se to oversee, th e co m p act N a tio n a l S ecurity C ouncil em erg ed as the P re sid e n t's m ajor in stru m e n t of adv ice a n d p o licy m ak ­ ing. N o r could C ongress often call th e shots o v er th is v a st system . A fter fierce b u d g e t b attles in the late 1940s, p rim a ry in itiativ e rested w ith th e W h ite H o u se a n d th e defense agencies, w hile m o st of the tim e C o n g ress (or its key co m m it­ tees) could only exact leverage b y b ro k erin g tu rf w a rs, service rivalries, a n d regional conflicts, n o t b y assessing a n d settin g th e ov erall b u d g e t. A n d d e sp ite co n stitutional p ro v isio n s for public accountability. C o n g ress w a s o ften in th e

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d a rk , especially a b o u t the finances a n d activities of th e AEC, th e CIA , a n d o th e r intelligence agencies. Ju st as e m p ire d id n o t look im p erial to m o st A m ericans, th e m ilita rize d state d id n o t look m ilitaristic. H ere w a s n o m o n o lith in w h ic h o rd ers cam e d o w n fro m a H itle r o r a P olitburo. In stead , th e A m erican sy stem w a s com plex a n d cu m b erso m e, its p a rts o ften b a ttlin g each other, its P re sid e n t a n d o th e r key p lay e rs som etim es baffled, its initiatives o ften flo w in g u p w a rd o r sid ew ay s ra th e r th a n d o w n from th e top. It o p e ra te d h o t b y sh eer c o m m an d alone (th o u g h taxes, conscription, repression, a n d secrecy d id p roceed) b u t b y con­ se n su s a n d b ro k erin g , b y contracts a n d law s, a n d in som e m ea su re b y th e con­ se n t of th e g o v ern ed . A t tim es, as in th e a rm e d forces' b ack stab b in g rivalries, it h a rd ly seem ed to o p erate a t all. In m a n y areas of th e ir lives, it to u ch e d A m eri­ cans lightly, a n d co n stitu tio n al a n d political trad itio n s, h o w e v e r fray ed , al­ lo w e d th e m to challenge it, as o n occasion som e d id . Its b u rd e n s w ere also k e p t lig h t b y th e n a tio n 's o v e rw h elm in g a b u n d an c e, w h ich su sta in e d u n p rec e ­ d e n te d g ro w th in b o th defense sp e n d in g a n d th e civilian econom y. A s in W orld W ar H, this p o te n t c o m b in atio n of political p lu ralism , in stitu tio n a l com plexity, a n d econom ic a b u n d a n c e p ro v e d m o re efficient th a n c ru d e c o m m an d system s. W h at gave th e sy stem m u c h of its cohesio n a n d success w a s its lea d ers' sh a re d outlooks, o v e rla p p in g roles, a n d class affinities, w h ic h o v e rro d e o ld d is­ tin ctio ns b e tw e e n "civilian" a n d "m ilita ry " in p o litical cu ltu re. A t th e cen ter w a s a c o h o rt of policy m ak ers in d e p a rtm e n ts a n d agencies like State, D efense, th e CIA , a n d th e AEC. T hey h a d a c o m m o n b a ck g ro u n d in elite e aste rn schools, law firm s, c o rp o ratio n s, a n d g o v ern m en t. T hey w ere so m etim es w e a lth y m en (N elson Rockefeller, A verell H arrim an ), o ften h e irs to H e n ry L. S tim so n 's tra d i­ tio n of p a tric ia n le a d ersh ip (R obert L ovett, John J. M cCloy), u su a lly v e te ran s of FD R 's a d m in istratio n , a n d o n ly rarely p ro d u c ts of elective politics. C o sm o p o li­ ta n b y v irtu e of b u sin e ss o r g o v e rn m e n t service, th ey w ere "a n e w tra n sn a ­ tio n al political elite," m e n "w h o se relatio n sh ip s a n d p e rsp ectiv es c u t across n a ­ tio n al lines," th o u g h A m erican in terests cam e first. P ragm atic, a d e p t a t b u ild ­ in g c o n sen su s w ith in A m erican g o v e rn m e n t a n d w ith allies, th ey w ere o ften d e af to th e ir o w n ideological im pulses. S om etim es, as w ith A cheson, th e ir elit­ ist style elicited " p o p u list en v y a n d rag e." A n d yet, th o u g h T ru m a n co u ld sn o rt a t su ch m e n him self, th ey w o rk e d sm o o th ly w ith h im .26 O u tsid e the in n e r circle, o th ers lesser in ra n k sh a re d m u c h of th e elite's back­ g ro u n d a n d o u tlo o k — d ip lo m a ts like G eorge K ennan, strateg ists like B ernard B rodie, a n d science a n d academ ic officials like Jam es C o n a n t a n d V an n ev ar Bush. O f these ju n io r p a rtn e rs, scientists w ere th e m o st p ro n e to d o u b ts. Fears a b o u t c o m p ro m isin g th e ir professional a u to n o m y a n d p a rticip a tin g in th e a rm s race e m e rg ed from e ld e r sta te sm an A lb ert E instein, y o u n g p h y sicist P h ilip M orrison, c o m p u ter g en iu s N o rb e rt W iener, a n d (am b ig u o u sly ) from R obert O p p en h eim er. T he d o u b ts w e re valid: th ey " w o u ld b e m o b ilized to s u p ­ p o rt th e existing o rd e r o n ly to the ex ten t th a t scientists d id n o t th em selv es

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q u e stio n th a t ord er." M ost scientists, how ev er, saw "n o reaso n for refu sin g " g o v e rn m e n t's h elp "in d o in g the scientific w o rk th a t o n e w o u ld h av e trie d to accom plish ev en w ith o u t su c h h elp ," as L ouis N . R id en o u r, a U n iv ersity of Illi­ no is d e a n a n d air force chief scientist, p u t it. A fter all, g o v e rn m e n t p a tro n a g e co u ld n o t be ju d g e d a g ain st a n earlier sta n d a rd o f p u rity . R esearch u n iv ersities a lre ad y relied o n p h ila n th ro p ie s a n d c o rp o ratio n s, th e la tter " a t b e st a fickle a n d d e m a n d in g p a rtn e r," w h e rea s th e federal p a tro n serv ed th e p u b lic w eal ra th e r th a n p riv a te g reed , a n d p ro v e d less fickle a n d m o re g en ero u s. M ost aca­ dem ic scientists a n d officials accepted th e p a ra m o u n t role th a t g o v e rn m e n t, m ain ly its d efense agencies, n o w p la y e d in fu n d in g a n d sh a p in g science. T h at role arose, it h as b e e n a rg u e d , "chiefly d u e to th e in d isp en sab ility of scienced riv e n technologies like atom ic en erg y a n d ra d a r," b u t scientists d id m u c h to defin e in d isp en sab ility in th e first place a n d b en efited e n o rm o u sly from its ef­ fects. In tu rn , th ey changed. The m ilitary -u n iv ersity -co rp o rate alliance " d e ­ fined the critical p ro b lem s" for them , in d e e d "v irtu a lly red efin ed w h a t it m e a n t to b e a scientist o r a n e n g in e e r"— a co m m itm en t to b ig science a n d to tech­ n iq u e.27 C ivilian lead ers sh a re d o utlooks a n d d u tie s w ith m ilita ry lead ers. Few offi­ cers w ere m ore a la rm e d a b o u t th e Soviets a n d th e n a tio n 's secu rity th a n Forrestal; few m atch e d p h y sicist E d w a rd T eller's zeal for n u c le ar w eap o n s; few c h am p io n e d air p o w e r b e tte r th a n Secretary of th e A ir Force S tu art S ym ington. T he ru sh of w a rtim e officers into civilian g o v ern m en t, co rp o rate, a n d research p o sts (Gen. W alter Bedell Sm ith as h e a d of th e CIA, G en. O m a r B radley as b o a rd ch airm a n of B ulova R esearch L aboratories, G en. Leslie G roves as vice p re sid e n t for research a t R em ington R and) also e ro d e d civil-m ilitary b a rrie rs of outlook, statu s, a n d experience. In "b u sin ess circles," Business Week n o te d in 1952, "th e w o rd h a s gone out: G et y o u rself a g e n eral."28 A s th a t co m m en t in d icated , th e in terests th ey d e fin e d g ave b a llast to th e id e ­ ology of n a tio n al secu rity sh a re d b y policy elites, m ilitary officers, c o rp o rate leaders, a n d scientists. A s th ey saw th o se interests, th ey ra n g e d from th e b ro a d goal of p reserv in g th e n a tio n 's safety, a b u n d an ce, a n d p o w e r to n a rro w ly cal­ c u lated m a tte rs— a p ro fessio n al's career, a u n iv e rsity 's fu n d in g , a n ag en cy 's p restig e, a co m p a n y 's profits. To m ost, n a tio n al in terests sh a d e d off in to in stitu ­ tional a n d in d iv id u a l ones w ith o u t clear distin ctio n s, trig g e rin g few q u alm s. The m o st fam ous, if often m isco n stru ed , sta te m e n t of th eir o u tlo o k cam e w h e n C h arles W ilson, fo rm er h e a d of G eneral M otors a n d d efen se secretary d esig ­ nate, said th a t " w h a t w a s g o o d for th e c o u n try w a s g o o d for G en eral M otors a n d vice v e rsa ."29 For m o st su c h m en, a n y clash of in terests in v o lv ed less a n in d iv id u a l's vertical relatio n sh ip to th e sy stem th a n h o riz o n ta l conflicts a m o n g in stitu tio n s a n d com panies fig h tin g for po w er, resources, a n d statu s. To be sure, w ith in each g ro u p calculations v aried , as b u sin ess illu strated . M an y com panies, still w e d d e d to free en te rp rise a n d g o v e rn m e n t retren ch ­ m en t, took little in terest in h o w defense m o n ies m ig h t su sta in th em o r th e econ-

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om y, b u t th ey also d id n o t o p p o se th e d rift in n a tio n al p olicy as lo n g as it a v o id e d N e w D e a l-ty p e initiatives. It h e lp e d th a t "in creased ex p en d itu re s for defense, h ig h w a y s, a n d space d id n o t displace existing p riv ate in v estm en t," th o u g h less no ticed w a s h o w "d efen se in d u strie s a b so rb ed larg e a m o u n ts of cap ital a n d large n u m b e rs of h ig h ly tra in e d technicians a t th e ex p en se of su ch basic in d u strie s as steel, autom obiles, a n d oil." The w a y w a s o p e n for firm s in n e w e r fields like electronics, aviation, a n d n u c le ar en erg y to forge tig h t links w ith W ashington. For co m p an ies like Boeing, D ü P ont, Bell Labs, a n d G eneral Electric, th e benefits in clu d ed p ro fits— in in d u strie s like electronics, "in d irect a n d d irec t m ilita ry d e m a n d acco u n ted for as m u c h as 70% of th e to tal o u tp u t" b y th e m id-1960s— p lu s d e v e lo p m e n t a t g o v e rn m e n t ex p en se of n e w technolo­ gies a d a p ta b le to civilian m ark ets, of in v en tiv e lab o rato ries, a n d of a p roficient w o rk force. G o v e rn m e n t's role in p ro m o tin g television, co m p u ters, a n d jet air­ craft for defense p u rp o se s u n lo ck ed h u g e civilian m ark ets, especially since th e fu n d s in v o lv ed "exceeded b y far the capacities of in d u stry , of un iv ersities, a n d of p riv a te fo u n d atio n s." N o r w ere benefits co nfined to lea d in g firm s; n e w tech­ n o lo g ies sp a w n e d n e w firm s a n d assisted o th ers w ith few ties to defense. "W e are liv ing u n d e r a c u rio u s k in d of m ilitary K eynesianism ," a rg u e d h isto ria n R ichard H o fstad ter, " in w h ic h M ars h a s ru sh e d in to fill th e g a p left b y th e d e ­ cline of th e m ark e t econom y."30 W h eth er th e resu lt w a s a " p o w e r elite" ru n n in g a " p e rm a n e n t w a r econ­ o m y " th a t C. W rig h t M ills excoriated in 1956 is d eb atab le. M ills h im self gave th e te rm power elite elasticity, seeing th e ten sio n s a n d g rad a tio n s of sta tu s w ith in it, a n d the " p e rm a n e n t w a r econom y " w a s h a rd ly a to tal w a r econom y. E ven a t its p o stw a r p e a k of ov er 10 p e rc en t of G N P d u rin g th e 1950s, defen se sp e n d in g p ro v id e d a technological c u ttin g ed g e a n d a su p p le m e n t to lag g in g p riv a te in v estm en t, b u t h a rd ly th e econom ic sy ste m 's sole su p p o rt. L ater h isto ­ rian s differ little from M ills, h o w ev er, a rg u in g th a t d efen se sp e n d in g " h a d farreaching im pacts o n the level of ag g reg ate b u sin ess activity a n d th e p a tte rn s of in v estm en t," e v en th o u g h "o th er ty p es of sp e n d in g m ig h t h av e p ro d u c e d g reater benefits for society o r a g rea ter m u ltip lie r effect in th e econom y." D e­ fense sp e n d in g also p ro v id e d n a tio n al g o v e rn m e n t a k ey tool of econom ic con­ trol. A n d since m o st p e o p le saw it "as a n ab so lu te n ecessity in a d a n g e ro u s age," it d id all this w h ile ig n itin g little "political controversy." In d eed , C harles M aier h a s a rg u e d , ju st as "th e c o m m itm en t to m o b ilizatio n h e lp e d overcom e d e e p conflicts b e tw ee n th e N e w D eal a n d its o p p o sitio n " o n th e eve of Pearl H arb o r, so too d id a sim ilar c o m m itm en t a d e ca d e later: "D isp u tes th a t w ere sh elv ed in 1940 w ere to b e sh elv ed a g ain before K orea." T his w as in d e e d a "p e r­ m a n e n t w a r econom y," if o n ly p a rtially so.31 W h at sp a w n e d this " p e rm a n e n t w a r eco n o m y "— or "m ilitary K eynesian­ ism ," "m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex," "g u n b elt," o r "m etro p o litan -m ilitary c o m p lex "— h a s co n fo u n d e d critics a n d h isto rian s, th eir m an y term s reflecting th e ir d isagreem ents. Its roots w e n t back to th e early tw e n tie th c en tu ry a n d

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W orld W ar II accelerated its d e v elo p m e n t, b u t th e post-1945 m o b ilizatio n of so m u c h of a n o m in a lly peacetim e econom y w a s n e w in scale a n d n a tu re . Econom ic interests p ro v id e a p a rtia l ex p lan atio n . Som e c o rp o ra te b e ­ h e m o th s certainly b en efited , b u t th e ir catalytic ro le w a s m in im a l— fled g lin g e n tre p re n e u rs like D o n ald D ouglas a n d n e w e r c o m p an ies like B oeing w e re of­ te n b ig g er beneficiaries, a lth o u g h of course th ey b ecam e g ian ts in th e process, w h ile m a n y big in d u strie s (steel, railro ad s, autos) so u g h t to fin d th eir p ro fits in a ro b u st civilian m ark e t after 1945. Scientists a n d u n iv ersities p la y e d k ey id eo ­ logical a n d technical roles in th e process b u t lacked th e p o w e r a n d co h esio n to set it in m otion. C ongress h a d th e fo rm al p o w e r to d o so, b u t its role w a s lim ­ ited , a im ed m ore a t d e fe n d in g estab lish ed tu rf th a n a t e x p a n d in g it. M oreover, a n y "th eo ry " of C o n gress's decisive role " w o u ld su g g e st b ro a d d isp e rsio n of d efen se contracts across th e states" ra th e r th a n th e rem ark ab le reg io n al con­ cen tratio n th a t d e v elo p ed , o ften a t th e exp en se of still-p o p u lo u s states w ith clout in C ongress.32 G reater influence seem ed to lie w ith alliances b e tw e e n d efen se b u re a u ­ cracies a n d local "b o o ste rs"— politicians, p u b lish ers, d ev elo p ers, a n d others. T hey w ere especially aggressive in W est C o ast cities, w h ic h h a rb o re d civic d rea m s of im p erial glory, h a d lo n g relied o n fed eral m o n ies a n d m ilita ry bases, faced a sh a rp d o w n tu rn after 1945 as w a rtim e sp e n d in g ceased, a n d rec ru ite d d efen se bases, in d u strie s, a n d lab o rato ries in lieu of th e in d u stria l b ase o ld er reg io n s possessed. B oosters w e re also im p o rta n t in o ld er reg io n s facing eco­ n om ic stag n atio n , su c h as N e w E n g lan d a n d m u c h of th e South. In d ee d , so p o w e rfu l w ere local a n d p riv a te interests th a t a tail-w ag s-d o g sto ry can easily b e to ld in w h ich th e " c e n te r"— n atio n al le a d e rsh ip — fades befo re th e p o w e r of a " p e rip h e ry " of d isp e rse d b u t aggressive interests. A ll of these in terests w ere im p o rtan t, b u t n o one w a s decisive. In d ee d , th ere w a s n o stable "sy stem " o r "com plex," insofar as su c h term s im p ly c o h eren t a n d cen tralized in te n tio n a n d direction, only a n accretion of in terests, forces, a n d objectives th a t later looked like a sy ste m — "a poly cen tric co n fig u ratio n th a t change[d] consistently o v e r tim e."33 T he v e ry m u ltip licity of forces a n d interests in v o lv ed in th e p eacetim e w a r econom y sh ield ed it from analysis a n d attack. O p p o n e n ts n a tu ra lly h o m e d in o n specifics— evil generals, g reed y capitalists, co n g ressio n al ex p erts in p o rk — b u t since n o one elem en t bo re p rim a ry responsibility, attack o n it p ro d u c e d n o p e rsu asiv e ex p lan atio n o r decisive change. T hose w h o trie d to see it w h o le — figures as d iverse as C. W rig h t M ills a n d D w ig h t E isen h o w er b y th e 1950s— rev ealed a system so com plex th a t o p p o n e n ts m ig h t d e sp a ir a b o u t w h e re to b eg in d ism an tlin g it, g iv in g th e im p ressio n of a sy stem b e y o n d control. A n d insofar as im pressions g o v e rn e d realities, it was b e y o n d control. Besides, it w a s ideological forces th a t u n d e rg ird e d the p eacetim e w a r eco n o m y — th e id eo lo g y of n atio n al p rep a red n e ss, a n d the sta te 's d e p e n d e n c e o n w a r a n d d efen se for its role in n atio n al life. O n ly a n a ssa u lt o n these ideological u n d e rp in n in g s co u ld

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a rre st m ilitarizatio n . N o assault, a t least of a b ro a d ly a p p e a lin g sort, arose in th e late 1940s a n d 1950s. W h y d id A m ericans p u t u p w ith this? T he v icto ry of "civ ilian " control, th e sen se of "ab so lu te necessity," the in crem en tal g ro w th of m ilitarizatio n , a n d th e d isp e rse d ch aracter of the in terests in v o lv e d w ere reasons. Ju st as im p o rtan t, th e w a r eco n o m y w a s also m a d e to a p p e a r a n d to a d eg ree fu n ctio n as c o n g ru ­ e n t w ith d o m in a n t asp iratio n s for p ro sp e rity a n d technological ab u n d an ce. "W h o c o u ld se rio u sly co m p lain a b o u t th e resu lts ach iev ed b y U.S. b u sin esses b e tw e e n 1945 a n d th e late 1960s?" tw o h isto ria n s h av e ask ed .34 B eyond sh eer p ro sp e rity , th ere w a s th e p ro m ise, first offered in w a rtim e ad v ertisin g , th a t w a r-b o m in g en u ity w o u ld y ield w o n d ro u s civilian devices. Television, air­ liners, a n d o th e r m arv els e m e rg ed from m ilitary research ("spin-off," as it w a s later d u b b ed ). A m ericans w ere to ld of th e co n n ectio n in a d v ertisin g , g o v e rn ­ m e n t p ro n o u n ce m en ts, p a ea n s to science, m ag azin es, a n d science fiction. N o y o u n g ste r re a d in g Popular Mechanics could m iss it, a n d it su ffu sed m aterial c u ltu re — in cars w ith rocketlike grills a n d space-age fins o r bicycles resem b lin g jet fig hters in m in iatu re. Far from a n obstacle to affluence, n a tio n al secu rity seem ed th e p a th to it, e v en in cid en tal in the face of its benefits. T hese p ro m ises flow ed m o st lavishly re g a rd in g n u c le ar energy. O n e n e w s­ p a p e r foresaw a n "ea rth ly p a ra d ise "; a n o th e r's c arto o n d e p ic te d "a ben eficen t g o d d e ss o p e n in g the locked chest of 'A TOM IC ENERGY' o n e tract. Almighty Atom, p re d ic te d cost-free p o w er, a n d atom ic a irp lan e s a n d cars. G iv en d re a d a b o u t th e b o m b a n d sk ep ticism a b o u t n u c le ar energy, it req u ire d a skillful gov­ e rn m e n t a n d p riv a te c a m p a ig n to su sta in th ese "fan tasies of a techno-atom ic u to p ia " — one w a g e d in p a rt to p u t a b e n ig n face o n th e a to m 's m ilita ry d e v el­ o p m en t. D espite silly talk of "ato m ic-en erg y v ita m in tab lets" a n d th e like, th e p ro m ises w ere h a rd ly confined to a lu n atic fringe. U n iv ersity of C hicago p re si­ d e n t R obert H u tc h in s b eliev ed th a t atom ic en erg y co u ld " u sh e r in a n e w d a y of peace a n d p le n ty " a n d d ev elo p "th e m o st b a ck w a rd places of th e e a rth ." The left-liberal d a ily PM im ag in ed "th e U to p ia th a t m e n h av e d re a m e d of th ro u g h c en tu ries of w ar, d e p ressio n , fam ine, a n d disease." A Nation w rite r w a n te d atom ic b o m b s u se d "to d ig canals, to b re a k o p e n m o u n ta in chains, to m elt ice b a rrie rs, a n d g enerally to tid y u p th e a w k w a rd p a rts of th e w o rld ." 35 Tellingly, the p ro m ised u to p ia w a s o ften p re se n te d n o t as a n a ltern a tiv e to th e b o m b 's d e v e lo p m e n t b u t as its p ro d u ct. "T h ro u g h m ed ical ad v an ces alo n e," Atlantic claim ed in 1946, "atom ic en erg y h a s a lre ad y sav ed m o re lives th a n w e re sn u ffed o u t a t H iro sh im a a n d N ag asak i." "O u t of th e ash es of H iro sh im a a n d N ag asak i," w ro te one doctor, "a b en eficen t ato m ic en erg y . . . w ill rise phoenix-like to b en efit the h e a lth a n d w elfare of o u r n a tio n ." In a n es­ p ecially tasteless exam ple of su c h linkage, o n e article o n rad io activ e isotopes d e p ic te d "a p ajam a-clad m an , o bviously a recently reco v ered in v alid , sta n d in g erect a n d sm iling in the m id st of a m u sh ro o m -sh a p e d clo u d , h is e m p ty w h e el­ ch air in th e b a ck g ro u n d ." The "sp littin g ato m ," a rg u e d a n AEC co m m issio n er

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in 1953, "h as b e en o u r m ain sh ield a g ain st th e B arb arian s— now , in a d d itio n , it is to becom e a G o d -g iv en in stru m e n t to d o th e co n stru ctiv e w o rk of m an k in d ." G iv en its prom ise, "atom ic en erg y is only incidentally a m ilita ry w e a p o n ," P h ilip W ylie a rg u e d in 1945. W ere w e a p o n s the e n d a n d civilian w o n d e rs o n ly th e b y ­ p ro d u c t— or th e reverse? P e rh ap s few A m erican s co u ld h av e said in th e late 1940s.36 Som e of these p ro m ises w ere th an k fu lly n e v e r realized: n o atom ic cars zo o m ed forth; n o p o la r icecaps m elted. O th ers reach ed b e la te d fru itio n , a n d to g eth er th e y fo rm ed the d e n se m ass of m essag es telling A m erican s n o t o n ly to to lerate th e m ilitarized sta te b u t to em brace it as th e source of w o n d e rs in th eir d a ily lives, focusing only "in cid en tally " o n its m ilitary d im en sio n s. T he sw o rd s, if n o t b e aten in to p lo w sh ares, w o u ld a t least g e n erate them . If th a t seem ed to m a n y a n acceptable b arg ain , it still w a s a c o n tin g en t one. It rested o n the p ro p o sitio n , d isp u te d a t th e tim e b y som e, th a t w a r (or p re p a ra ­ tio n s for it) stim u la te d econom ic progress. "T he role of w a r in p ro m o tin g in ­ d u stria l p ro g ress h a d b e e n sm all c o m p a red w ith th e role of in d u stria l p ro g ress in b rin g in g o n w ar," a rg u e d John N ef acidly in 1950. "W arfare is less a cause for in d u stria lism th a n its sh a d o w a n d its n e m e sis."37 It also rested o n su sta in in g p ro sp e rity a t h o m e a n d econom ic p o w e r ab ro ad , w ith o u t w h ich th e b a rg a in m ig h t unravel. E ven early on, som e A m ericans, in clu d in g T ru m a n fitfully a n d E isen h ow er forcefully, w o rrie d th a t defense sp e n d in g m ig h t u n d e rc u t p ro sp e r­ ity a n d pow er. In m ore tro u b le d econom ic tim es, th e d o u b ts d e ep e n ed .

Social Relations in a Militarizing Nation Isaac W o o d w ard , a black w a r v e te ra n still in u n ifo rm , m et th e S o u th a t its u g ­ liest w h e n h e took the b u s h o m e in 1946. A n g ry th a t W o o d w ard to o k so lo n g in a "co lo red" rest room , his d riv e r su m m o n e d local law officers, w h o a rre sted , beat, a n d b lin d e d W o o d w ard w ith a n ig h tstick jam m ed in to h is eyes. T he inci­ d e n t d rew e n o rm o u s atten tio n , th a n k s in p a rt to th e N a tio n a l A ssociation for th e A d v an cem en t of C olored People, a n d T ru m a n ex p ressed shock. "I h a d n o id ea it w a s as terrible as that. W e've go t to d o so m e th in g ."38 T he affair sh o w ed h o w social relations w o rk e d o u t in th e sh a d o w of w ar. It m a d e all th e difference th a t W o o d w ard w as a v eteran. T h o u g h g rad u a l, the m ilitarizatio n of policy a n d in stitu tio n s w a s to som e d e ­ gree calculable; w ars, w e ap o n s, a n d b u reau cracies p ro v id e d som e m easu re. T he m ilitarizatio n of social relations w a s m ore subtle. The refo rm s th a t flo w ed from it could entice leftists su sp icio u s of anti-Soviet policies a n d in fu riate reac­ tionaries w e d d e d to the C old W ar, b u t it co u ld also e n d a n g e r th e fo rm er a n d isolate th e latter. It inv o lv ed n o t only conscrip tio n of social resources b u t th e recasting of social relations in lig h t of n a tio n al security, a n d a com plex d e p lo y ­ m en t of the language, m odels, a n d m o d es of w arfare. W hile it o ften a d v a n c e d a centrist, liberal, assim ilationist a g e n d a — n o m ean feat in th e social clim ate of the 1940s— its significance w e n t m u ch further.

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T he m o st celeb rated exam ple of this process w as T ru m a n 's 1948 o rd e r d eseg ­ reg a tin g th e a rm e d forces. Racial segregatio n , d iscrim in atio n , a n d d ise n ­ fran c h isem e n t still ru le d legally in th e Jim C ro w S outh a n d in so m e n a tio n al in stitu tio n s like th e m ilitary, a n d inform ally in th e N o rth . If an y th in g , th e situ a ­ tio n for black servicem en a n d -w o m en w o rse n e d in 1946. T heir few w a rtim e g ain s seem ed to slip aw ay; m o st m ilitary lead ers stau n ch ly d e fe n d e d th e o ld w ay s; c ru d e violence a g ain st th e m e ru p te d . But a re tu rn to the p re w a r sta tu s q u o w a s im possible. U nlike th e a fte rm a th of W orld W ar I, th e forces p ro d u c in g ch an g e d u rin g th is w a r o u tlasted it because n a tio n a l secu rity p e rsiste d as a h ig h priority. M ilitary lead ers w o rrie d a b o u t rec ru itin g A frican-A m ericans a n d feared th a t C o n g ress m ig h t b a lk a t ren e w in g selective service if seg reg atio n a n d d isc rim in atio n p ersisted . C o n cern w a s g rea test in th e air force, th e service least b o u n d b y tra d itio n a n d a caste of S o u th ern w h ite officers a n d b e st connected to th e civilian w o rld , w h e re w a r­ tim e policy a n d p e rso n n el n e e d s a lre ad y h a d p ro m p te d som e d esegregation. Lt. G en. Jam es D oolittle, a Shell O il executive before a n d after th e w ar, w a rn e d a ir force colleagues th a t d eseg reg atio n w a s "b ein g forced o n in d u s tr y . . . a n d it is g o in g to b e forced o n th e m ilitary. You are m erely p o stp o n in g th e inev itab le a n d y o u m ig h t as w ell tak e it gracefully."39 Left alone, few in th e m ilitary w o u ld h av e acted, b u t th ey w ere h a rd ly left alone, especially b y those m in d fu l of the w a r 's racial crim es. W hite liberals like E leanor R oosevelt a n d lab o r lea d er W alter R eu th er p u s h e d for change, w h ile th e G O P flatly d eclared its o p p o sitio n to m ilitary segregation. M ore decisive w a s p ressu re from black A m ericans. A lrea d y m o b ilized b y th e w ar, th ey d efied m ilitary seg reg atio n from w ith in th e a rm e d forces a n d p ro teste d it th ro u g h th eir n a tio n al organizations. In 1947, A. P hilip R a n d o lp h rev iv ed th e stra te g y of h is 1941 M arch o n W ash in g to n M ovem ent. H e d e m a n d e d leg islatio n to en d m ilitary d isc rim in atio n a n d seg reg ated facilities for tro o p s crossing state lines, to p ro v id e federal p e n altie s for attacks o n servicem en, a n d to e x em p t en listed m e n from th e n o to rio u s p o ll tax in fed eral elections. W h en C ongress to o k n o action, h e d e m a n d e d a n executive o rd e r from T ru m a n a n d called o n black a n d w h ite y o u th to d efy the d ra ft in o rd e r to resist " p e rm a n e n t m ilitary slavery."40 T ru m a n h a d alre ad y a p p o in te d a C om m issio n o n C ivil R ights, w h ic h recom ­ m e n d e d a stu n n in g ran g e of racial reform s. O n Ju ly 26, 1948, h e acted. Re­ sp o n d in g to the v a rio u s p ressu res (the Berlin crisis th a t su m m e r a d d e d to them ), shocked b y w h a t h e h a d lea rn ed a b o u t racial p rejudice, aw are th a t C o n ­ gress w o u ld n o t act a n d h a p p y to em b a rrass it, h e w a s also d e sp e ra te for v o tes in th e u p c o m in g election. H e o rd e re d "eq u ality of tre a tm e n t a n d o p p o rtu n ity for all p e rso n s in th e a rm e d services w ith o u t reg a rd to race, color, religion, o r n a tio n al o rig in ."41 H is o rd e r h a rd ly sw e p t all before it. O n ly th e political p re s­ su res a n d p e rso n n el n e e d s p ro m p te d b y th e K orean W ar m a d e th e a rm e d forces im p le m e n t the o rd e r fully, few blacks g ain ed sen io r ra n k o r ad m issio n to th e service academ ies (legally lo n g o p e n to them ), a n d n e ith e r T ru m a n n o r C o n g ress d id m u ch else to achieve racial reform . N o n eth eless, his o rd e r w as a

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b o ld s te p — a n d a b o ld g am ble th a t p a id off. S o u th ern D em o crats b o lte d th e p arty , ra n S outh C aro lin a's Strom T h u rm o n d for th e presid en cy , seized th irty n in e electoral votes, a n d w o n as m a n y v o tes as W allace a n d th e P rogressives (over a m illion each), b u t T ru m a n g a in e d th e loyalties of n o rth e rn blacks a n d m o st liberals a n d w o n h is fam o u s triu m p h o v e r T h o m as D ew ey. W h atev er th e d iv erse m otives a n d p ressu re s b e h in d T ru m a n 's action, n a ­ tio n al security w as th e d o m in a n t a n d least co n testable ratio n ale for racial change. T h at w as e v id e n t in h o w h e d re w o n h is c o n stitu tio n al p o w e r as com ­ m a n d e r in chief a n d acted in the m ilita ry sp h e re ra th e r th a n so m e other. It w a s ju st as e v id e n t in th e lan g u a g e ju stify in g change, w h ic h e m p h a siz e d th e n e e d for a n efficient m ilitary force a n d th e n a tio n 's im ag e a n d alliances in th e C o ld W ar. A s E leanor R oosevelt p u t it, civil rig h ts " is n 't a n y lo n g er a d o m estic q u e stio n — it's a n in te rn atio n al q u estio n ," o n e th a t "m a y d ecid e w h e th e r d e ­ m ocracy o r co m m u n ism w in s o u t in the w o rld ." U n d e rse cre ta ry of State A cheson h a d w a rn e d in 1946 th a t "d isc rim in atio n a g ain st m in o rity g ro u p s in th is c o u n try h a s a n a d v erse effect o n o u r relatio n s w ith o th e r c o u n tries." Sim ­ ilarly, T ru m a n 's C ivil R ights C om m issio n d eclared: " A n A m erican d ip lo m a t c an n o t arg u e for free elections in foreign la n d s w ith o u t m ee tin g th e challenge th a t in sections of A m erica q u alified v o ters d o n o t h av e access to th e p o lls." T ru m an labeled racial d isc rim in atio n " a n in v ita tio n to co m m u n ism " a n d w a rn e d th a t "th e su p p o rt of d e sp e ra te p o p u la tio n s of b attle-rav a g e d c o u n ­ tries" w a s a t stake. "W e m u st h av e th em as allies" a n d "ca n n o lo n g er afford the lu x u ry of a leisurely attack u p o n p reju d ice a n d d iscrim in atio n ." A s h e to ld the black p ress in 1947: "W e are learn in g w h a t lo u d echoes b o th o u r success a n d o u r failures h av e in ev ery c o m e r of th e w o rld . T h at is o n e of th e p ressin g rea­ so n s w h y w e c an n o t afford failures. W h en w e fail to live to g eth er in peace, the failure touches n o t us, as A m ericans alone, b u t th e cause of d em o cracy itself in th e w h o le w o rld ." O r as h e once p u t it m ore crudely, "T he to p d o g in a w o rld w h ich is 90 p e rc en t colored o u g h t to clean h is o w n h o u se ."42 Black lead ers also e m p lo y ed this rationale. R a n d o lp h a rg u e d th a t seg reg a­ tio n "is th e g reatest single p ro p a g a n d a a n d political w e a p o n in th e h a n d s of R ussia a n d in te rn atio n al c o m m u n ism today," a n d in d e e d th e State D e p a rtm e n t estim ated th a t h a lf of all Soviet p ro p a g a n d a a g ain st th e U n ited States focused o n racial issues. Paul R obeson, the rad ical black actor, singer, a n d activist, also w o rk e d this rationale, in his o w n w ay: A m erican po licy to w a rd A fricans "is sim ilar to th a t of H itler a n d G oebbels," h e alleg ed ly d eclared , a n d A m erican blacks w o u ld n e v e r "go to w a r o n b eh alf of th o se w h o h av e o p p re sse d u s for g en eratio n s" a g ain st the USSR, w h ic h "h as raised o u r p e o p le t o . . . full h u m a n d ig n ity ."43 T he d e m a n d s of w a r a n d n a tio n al p o w e r sh a p e d th e stru g g le for racial ch an g e far b e y o n d T ru m a n 's order, in b o th tim e a n d th e issu es ad d re ssed . W h en Jackie R obinson b ro k e th e racial b a rrie r in m ajor-league b aseb all in 1949, th e H o u se U n-A m erican A ctivities C o m m ittee w a n te d h im to "g iv e th e lie to

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sta te m e n ts b y P au l R obeson th a t A m erican N eg ro es w o u ld n o t fig h t in case of a w a r a g ain st R ussia," a req u e st R obinson fulfilled. W h en civil rig h ts lead ers so u g h t a n e w Fair E m p lo y m en t Practices C o m m ittee after th e o u tb reak of the K orean W ar, th e y jo in ed co n sid eratio n s of efficiency a n d m orale: " O u r c o u n try can n o lo n g er enjoy th e lu x u ry of w a ste d in d u stria l m a n p o w e r" a n d " o u r m e n in K orea n e e d to k n o w in th eir h e a rts a n d m in d s th a t th ey are n o t fig h tin g in v a in ." W h en th e T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n filed a b rief in b eh alf of school d eseg ­ reg atio n, in cases le a d in g u p to the ep o ch al Brown v. Board of Education decision of 1954, it cited A ch eso n 's w a rn in g th a t d isc rim in atio n w a s "a source of con­ sta n t e m b a rra ssm e n t to this g o v e rn m e n t" a n d its "m o ral le a d e rsh ip " in th e free w o rld . N o o n e su m m e d u p these claim s b e tte r th a n D w ig h t E isen h o w er d u rin g h is 1952 cam paign: "In a tim e w h e n A m erica n e e d s all th e b rain s, all th e skills, all th e sp iritu a l stre n g th a n d d e d ic a te d services of its 157 m illio n p eo p le, d is­ crim in a tio n is crim inally stu p id ." 44 E ise n h o w e r's sta te m e n t c a u g h t th e ch an g in g n a tu re , force, a n d lim its of th e n a tio n a l secu rity rationale. D u rin g W orld W ar H, lea d ers like FDR h a d often in v o k ed w a rtim e n e e d to resist racial change, claim ing it m ig h t trig g e r reaction a n d violence im p e d in g n a tio n al m o rale a n d efficiency. N o w th e a rg u m e n t m o re a n d m o re cut th e o th er w ay. V iew ed b y lead ers in W ash in g to n p ressin g th e n a tio n 's m o b ilizatio n a n d c o n tain in g co m m u n ism , racial seg reg atio n seem ed a foolish w a ste of n a tio n al resources, a n o u td a te d p ractice fo u lin g th e m ach in ery of n a tio n al po w er. H o w e v e r reluctantly, th e a rm e d forces n o w w o u ld h av e to h e lp p io n ee r racial change. T his rew o rk ed n ecessitarian ratio n ale h a d sh a rp lim its, h o w ev er. "C rim i­ n ally stu p id " w a s n o t th e sam e as m o rally un ju st. C ivil rig h ts lead ers, a n d T ru­ m a n h im self o n occasion, d id also in voke m o rality a n d justice, b u t n a tio n al se­ c u rity w a s th e d o m in a n t ratio n ale, a n d th e m o st p e rsisten t, e v en in to th e 1960s, w h e n racial eq u ality w a s a d v an c ed m o re as a g oal th a n as a m ea n s to a d ifferen t en d . In the m ean tim e, it b o th forced a n d circu m scrib ed racial reform . Racial ch an g es g ro u n d e d in concerns a b o u t justice g e n erate d less e n th u sia sm , a t least am o n g w h ites. T he d o m in a n t th ru s t w a s assim ilationist: A frican-A m ericans w o u ld b e p riz e d for th eir ability to fad e into n a tio n al in stitu tio n s like th e a rm y a n d to su b o rd in a te th e ir in terests to th e g ra n d e r n a tio n a l cause; a n d th e a rm e d forces' co n serv ativ e officer co rp s w o u ld carry o u t th e g ra n d e x p erim e n t in in te ­ gration. M oreover, the g n a w in g w o rry of n a tio n al elites a b o u t A m erica's im age at h o m e a n d overseas m e a n t th a t m u c h action tak e n w a s little m o re th a n w in ­ d o w d ressin g d e sig n e d to p o lish th a t im age: th e Fair E m p lo y m en t Practices C om m ittee d u rin g the K orean W ar canceled n o t a single d efen se contract, a n d w ell into th e 1950s d e seg re g atio n of th e a rm e d forces p ro ceed as if "sta g e d for th e benefit of foreign a n d do m estic ob serv ers ra th e r th a n b en efitin g th e black serv icem an him self."45 P reo ccu p atio n w ith n a tio n al security, th en , m a d e the refo rm im p u lse b o th u rg e n t a n d lim ited. To b e su re, th a t im p u lse c o n tin u ed to su rg e in initiatives b y state a n d local g o v e rn m e n ts, courts, u n io n s, colleges.

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civil rig h ts g ro u p s, a n d m in o rity citizens them selves. Still, executive action w a s th e c u ttin g edge, a n d n a tio n al security the d o m in a n t fram ew o rk . T he lim its of th a t fram e w o rk w ere d o u b ly e v id e n t w h e n o p p o n e n ts of racial ch an g e exploited its m o st ch arg ed elem ent, h y sterical an tico m m u n ism . S o u th ­ e rn D em ocrats w ere th e m o st vicious a t th is gam e. W h en th e S u p rem e C o u rt in v alid ated restrictive h o u sin g covenants, one co n g ressm an to ld th e H ouse: "M r. Speaker, th ere m u st h av e b e e n a celebration in M oscow last n ig h t." C o m ­ m u n ists h a d " w o n th e ir g reatest victory." S trom T h u rm o n d d eclared th a t "th e radicals, the subversives, a n d th e red s" h a d c a p tu re d th e D em ocratic Party; the civil rig h ts a g en d a w a s d e sig n ed "to create th e chaos a n d co n fu sio n w h ic h lead s to co m m u n ism ."46 Foes of civil rights, w h e th e r so u th e rn b ig o ts o r offi­ cials of the FBI, p o in te d o u t th a t c o m m u n ists c h am p io n e d racial equality, w h ich allo w ed m a n y A m ericans to reg ard it as a n evil id ea im p o rte d fro m abroad. M o d erate g ro u p s like the N A A C P w ere said to b e led o r m a n ip u la te d b y co m m unists; in resp o n se th ey p u rg e d th eir ran k s, ex ch an g ed d o ssiers o n alleged subversives, a n d trim m e d th e ir ideological sails. T he te n u o u s w a rtim e alliance of w h ite a n d black w o rk e rs in C on g ress of In d u stria l O rg an izatio n s u n io n s w ilte d w h e n th e R ed Scare d ecim ated th o se u n io n s. Scholars d isag ree o n h o w m u c h an tico m m u n ism cu rb e d racial refo rm — m o st likely it p u s h e d re­ fo rm into n a rro w e r b u t faster-ru n n in g ch an n e ls— b u t n a tio n al secu rity cer­ tain ly cut b o th w ays. T he m o st v u ln era b le w ere rad icals like P au l R obeson. E xcept for sp o rts stars (an d R obeson h a d b e en a sta r college athlete), h e e n te red th e C old W ar th e m o st a d m ire d a n d in flu en tial black A m erican. D u rin g W orld W ar II, h is m ilita n t a n ­ tifascism h a d b e en u sefu l to A m erican lead ers, a n d h is close ties w ith (th o u g h n o t m em b ersh ip in o r subservience to) the C o m m u n ist P arty h a d b e en toler­ ated. B ut h is su p p o rt of H e n ry W allace in 1948, h is d efen se of th e Soviet U nion, a n d h is d e n u n ciatio n s at h o m e a n d ab ro a d of A m erican racism d e stro y e d h is political a n d artistic careers. The FBI h o u n d e d him ; th e e n te rta in m e n t in d u stry , alo n g w ith local officials a n d m obs, stra n g le d h is career; th e State D e p a rtm e n t (arg u in g th a t race relatio n s w ere a "fam ily affair" n o t to b e aired ab ro ad ) lifted his p a ssp o rt, a fatal b lo w to h is activities; E leanor R oosevelt d isa v o w ed him ; a w itn ess before C ongress b ra n d e d h im "th e black Stalin am o n g N eg ro es." M any A frican-A m ericans still d e fe n d e d R obeson, b u t th eir lead ers becam e w a ry of association w ith him ; e v e n th e m ilita n t B ayard R u stin a rg u e d , "W e h av e to p ro v e th a t w e 're p atrio tic." R obeson m a d e h is en em ies' task easier. Im ­ placable in c o n d em n in g A m erican racism a n d im p erialism , m y o p ic a b o u t Sta­ lin 's b rutalities, h e w a s incapable of the skillful m a n e u v e r th a t m ig h t leave h im in tact to c o n tin u e th e fight, e v en excoriating o th er p ro m in e n t blacks for th eir "craven, faw ning, d espicable lea d ersh ip ." T h at h is stru g g le to reg ain h is p a ss­ p o rt lasted u n til the late 1950s (he w a s a b ro k en m a n b y then) in d ic ate d h o w p e rsiste n t the u g ly m o o d w as, especially w h e n a b lack m a n w a s in v o lv e d — o r a black w o m an , as w ith e n te rta in er Josephine Baker, also h o u n d e d b y ag en ts of th e state for h e r view s o n race.47

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T h at m o o d also en co u rag e d a g en eral celeb ratio n of A m erican perfection. W h at, after all, w a s th e p o in t of w a g in g th e global stru g g le if n o t to d efe n d a su p e rio r system , a n d h o w could th a t sy stem w in if it w ere n o t su p erio r? A s R ichard P olenberg argues, "It w a s o n ly a sh o rt ste p from in sistin g th a t co m m u ­ n ists d id n o t w a n t to im p ro v e co n d itio n s to d e n y in g th a t co n d itio n s n e e d e d m u c h b e tterm e n t. T he C old W ar p ro d u c e d a c o n stan t ten sio n b e tw ee n a d esire to affirm th e fu n d a m e n ta l so u n d n e ss of A m erican in stitu tio n s a n d a recogni­ tio n th a t those in stitu tio n s . . . w ere in m a n y réspects defective." Social com ­ m e n ta ry b y scholars a n d th e m ed ia reflected th e ch an g ed m ood. A lth o u g h th e w a r 's m o d e st ten d e n cy to n a rro w incom e g a p s so o n e n d e d a n d th e co n cen tra­ tio n of co rp o rate w e a lth co n tin u ed , scholarly w o rk back ed aw ay fro m its p re ­ w a r em p h asis o n class differences, stressin g in stea d th e "fluidity, diversity, a n d freed o m " of A m erican society a n d th e absence of sh a rp conflicts w ith in it. In th is "C o ld W ar atm o sp h e re . . . a th o ro u g h g o in g critiq u e of social in stitu tio n s w a s fast g o in g o u t of style."48 N o t th a t a critical stance a lto g eth e r d isa p p e a re d . Som e critics a n d scholars fo u n d th e racial d iv id e in A m erica inescapable a n d tro u b lin g , a n d m an y m o re assailed the b la n d conform ity of m ass cu ltu re, su b u rb ia , a n d co rp o rate life. T heir categories of analysis w ere m o re o ften psychological th a n social, h o w ­ ever, a n d th eir lam en t w a s m ore for the b o rin g sam en ess of A m erican s th a n for th e d iv isio n s am o n g them . A long w ith m ore po liticized fo rm s of a n tico m m u ­ n ism , social co m m en tary h a d a n im p act th a t lea d ers co u ld n o t m iss. A s one T ru m an a id e p u t it in A p ril 1949, "T he c o n su m in g fear of co m m u n ism h a s led m a n y sincere p e rso n s into th e belief t h a t . . . ch an g e (be it civil rig h ts o r a com ­ p u lso ry n a tio n al h e a lth p ro g ram ) is su b v ersiv e a n d th o se w h o u rg e it are e ith er co m m u n ists o r fellow trav ellers."49 M ilitarizatio n d id n o t alo n e cause this m o o d , w h ic h also d re w o n co n serv ativ e reaction a g ain st N e w D eal liberalism a n d racial change, a n d o n th e triu m p h a l o u tlo o k th a t v icto ry in w a r p ro m o ted , b u t to g eth er these forces h e lp e d to keep th e refo rm im p u lse in ten se b u t n a r­ ro w ly channeled. N o n etheless, black A m ericans, m e a su re d b y th eir p re w a r sta tu s, b en efited from the c o u n try 's p u rs u it of n a tio n al security. D id o th er social g ro u p s g ain accordingly? M uch d e p e n d e d o n th eir political clout, place in th e C old W ar, a n d p rio r m o b ilizatio n a n d g ro u p consciousness. Blacks h a d sev eral a d v a n ­ tages, d e sp ite en o rm o u s obstacles: th e ir im p o rtan c e in th e a rm e d forces, th eir p o sitio n in the c o n test ov er th e loyalties of n o n w h ites in th e deco lo n izin g w o rld , a n d th eir ra p id m o v em en t in to n o rth e rn cities, w h e re th ey co u ld v o te a n d h av e it count. O th e r g ro u p s som etim es lacked su c h lev erag e a n d fo u n d th eir fo rtu n es w o rsen in g . T hat w as so for m a n y w o m en . T he W om en 's A rm e d Services In teg ratio n A ct of 1948, p a sse d ju st d a y s before T ru m a n 's o rd e r o n racial in teg ratio n , d id seem to subject w o m e n to the sam e m ilitarizin g forces th a t w ere resh ap in g th e black experience, b y giving th em p e rm a n e n t, reg u la r sta tu s in th e a rm e d forces. Rep. M argaret C hase Sm ith, w h o led the cause, d id in v o k e justice, b u t n a tio n al secu-

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rity w as ag ain th e d o m in a n t a rg u m e n t for change. A rm y C h ief of Staff D w ig h t E isen h ow er saw "p la in efficiency" a t stake, especially since a " p u sh -b u tto n w a r" w o u ld d ra w in all A m ericans. S hortag es of fem ale p erso n n el, ab o v e all n u rses, u n d e rlin e d th e case. T he cause of n a tio n al secu rity em b raced g e n d er e q u ality less easily th a n racial equality, h o w ev er. T he n e w law b a rre d w o m e n from com bat, lim ited th eir n u m b e rs, ran k , a n d a u th o rity o v e r m en , a n d left g e n d e r id eo lo g y intact: m o st fem ale enlistees, Ike p ro m ised , w o u ld serv e briefly a n d th e n " o rd in a rily — a n d th a n k G o d — th ey w ill g et m a rrie d ." G iven h o w few w o m e n w ere allo w ed to serve, "in te g ra tio n " also lacked th e q u a n tita ­ tiv e effect o n w o m e n th a t it h a d o n black m en , w h o e n listed o r w e re d ra fte d in large n u m b ers.50 In d eed , m ilitarizatio n constricted m ore th a n it e n la rg ed w o m e n 's rig h ts a n d o p p o rtu n ities. W artim e legislation o n v e te ra n s' b en efits a n d job p referen ce lim ­ ited w o m e n 's em p lo y m en t. T he fed eral b u rea u cra cy 's tilt to w a rd n a tio n al se­ cu rity c u rtailed job o p en in g s in social services, w h e re w o m e n h a d h a d g reatest success. N otably, th e few w o m e n to g a in hig h -lev el p o sts cam e from o r en te red in to th e n e w ly p o w e rfu l agencies of n a tio n a l security: A n n a R osenberg as assis­ ta n t secretary of d efense u n d e r T rum an; O v eta C u lp H obby, w a rtim e h e a d of th e W ACs, as th e first secretary of h e alth , e d u ca tio n , a n d w elfare u n d e r E isenhow er; a n d E leanor D ulles (sister to Jo h n Foster a n d A llen), h e a d of th e State D e p a rtm e n t's B erlin d e sk in the 1950s. W om en w h o p u rs u e d p o litical ca­ reers, in official p o sitio n s o r p riv a te lobbies, o ften faced red -b a itin g if th eir p o li­ tics w ere liberal, lesbian-baiting if th eir sta tu s w ere single, o r m o re com plex ch arg es— w h e n R ichard N ix o n called H e len G a h ag a n D o u g las a "P in k L ad y . . . rig h t d o w n to h e r u n d e rw e a r" d u rin g th eir 1950 Senate contest, h e lin k ed "lib erated w o m en , u n c h a in e d sexuality, a n d th e C o m m u n ist m enace." T ru m a n lau g h e d aw ay w o m e n 's issues: "It h a s b e e n m y ex p erien ce th a t th ere is n o e q u ality — m e n are ju st slaves a n d I su p p o se th e y w ill alw ay s c o n tin u e to b e ."51 B eyond g e n d e r politics lay ideological shifts p ro m p te d p a rtly b y anxieties a b o u t w a r a n d n a tio n al security. C u ltu ra l im ages o ften p re se n te d w o m e n as w a r's helpless victim s, o r altern ativ ely as its cause, lin k in g w o m e n 's sex u ality to w a r's d estru ctiv e forces (as in th e b ik in i sw im su it a n d "A tom ic Bom b [bur­ lesque] D ancers"). H o lly w o o d m irro re d th e bifu rcatio n , g iv in g v iew ers little choice b e tw ee n helpless or h o rre n d o u s fem ale characters. E njoined to av o id th o se extrem es, w o m e n w ere to p la y su p p o rtiv e, dom estic roles in th e atom ic age, especially since Soviet w o m e n w ere d e m o n iz e d as m a n n ish a n d a g g res­ sive. T hey w ere expected to m a in ta in th e b o m b shelter, or "G ra n d m a 's P a n try " as it w a s som etim es called; " A re n 't th ey ju st p erfect n a tu ra ls for o u r m ass feed­ ing g ro u p s?" a sk ed a fem ale civil d efense official. T hey w ere "to rear c h ild ren w h o w o u ld avoid juvenile delinquency, stay in school, a n d becom e fu tu re sci­ e n tists a n d ex p erts to d e fe at th e R ussians in th e cold w a r." In th e p o stw a r "id e­ ology of m ale resp o n sib ility " for th e in te rn atio n al a n d dom estic o rd er, w o m e n w ere to sh o w "p atrio tism b y co n form ing to a dom estic id eo lo g y of fem ale sub-

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o rd in atio n ." Fear th a t w a rtim e service h a d e m ascu lated m en , m ascu lin ized w o m e n , a n d a lien a ted th e tw o from each o th e r stre n g th e n e d th is ideology; sh a rp ly risin g m a rria g e a n d b irth rates reflected it; po litician s of m a n y strip es a rtic u la te d it. A s A dlai S tevenson a rg u e d in 1955, th e college g ra d u a te 's job w a s to k eep h e r h u sb a n d " tru ly p u rp o se fu l" a n d h e lp "d efe at to talitarian , a u th o ri­ ta ria n id eas." W ith th e n a tio n 's v e ry su rv iv a l a p p a re n tly a t stake, w o m e n 's claim s to e q u ality seem ed laughable, irrelev an t, o r ev en su b v ersiv e.52 T hese d y n am ics, m a n y e v id e n t in th e 1930s, d id n o t o w e o n ly to m ilitariza­ tion. N o r d id "d o m estic id eo lo g y " alw ay s serve to ju stify a m ilitarized course: b efo re a n d after W orld W ar II, "isolationists," o ften C h ristian fu n d am e n ta lists, in v o k ed a v e rsio n of it to fig h t co n scrip tio n a n d u n iv ersal service, a rg u in g th a t m ilita ry life w o u ld c o rru p t d rafte es' m o rals a n d d e p riv e th e m of th e ir m o th e rs' n u rtu ra n c e . M ilitarization d ic ta te d n o single g e n d e r regim e, a n d n o single su ch reg im e p ro m o te d it. C ircu m stan ces— h o w m ilitarized a g e n d a s in tersected a u ­ to n o m o u s anxieties a b o u t g e n d e r a n d sex u ality — m attere d . Still, in th e p o st­ w a r y ears a n ideo lo g y of stro n g m e n a n d su p p o rtiv e w o m e n w a s b e n t to serve th o se ag en d as, w h ile its role in c o u n te rin g th em d im in ish ed . E ven m o re telling as a m a rk e r of m ilitarizatio n , any id eo lo g y of sex a n d g en d er, like a n y of race a n d ethnicity, n o w h a d to a d d re ss its alleged effect o n n a tio n al p o w er. N e v er n e atly d e te rm in a tiv e, th a t sp h e re w a s n o n eth eless inescapable. To b e sure, black A m erican s w ru n g a d v a n ta g e from th is crisis a tm o sp h e re d e sp ite facing a n ideo lo g y a t least as im p riso n in g as th a t facing w o m en , b u t th a t su g g ests h o w ideo lo g y a n d politics differed in co n ten t a n d effects a m o n g v a rio u s g ro u p s. W om en also m e t a different fate b ecau se th ey lacked a co m m o n set of goals, leverage a t the polls, a n d a p erceiv ed place in th e global co n test of loyalties. H o w co u ld th e N a zi record u n d e rlin e th eir cau se in th e w a y th a t it illu stra te d the evils of racism ? W here w ere th e m asses of w o m e n w a itin g else­ w h ere, as n o n w h ite s (p resu m p tiv ely m ale) a p p a re n tly w ere, to choose b e ­ tw e en c o m m u n ism a n d th e free w o rld ? W ith th e evils of fascism a n d c o m m u ­ n ism seen in racial a n d religious term s, w ith th eir id eals a n d practices a b o u t g e n d e r largely ig n o red (p erh a p s because th ey w e re too sim ilar to w h a t gov­ e rn e d in th e U n ited States), w ith w o m e n 's a u to n o m o u s p o w e r h a rd to see in a m ilitarized w o rld , few co u ld arg u e th a t A m erica's global im age h in g e d o n its tre a tm e n t of w o m en . In stead , the C old W a r's outco m e seem ed to h in g e o n w o m e n 's loyal service. T he fate of g ay m e n a n d lesbians also illu stra te d th e p e rn ic io u s effects of m il­ itarization. A gain th e ir fate w a s e n tw in e d w ith th a t of w o m en , as o n e co n g ress­ m a n 's w a rn in g m a d e clear: "T he cycle of these in d iv id u a ls' h o m o sex u al d esires follow s the cycle closely p a tte rn e d to th e m e n stru a l p e rio d of w o m e n ," so th a t a few d a y s each m o n th "th e h o m o sex u al's in stincts b rea k d o w n a n d d riv e the in d iv id u a l into ab n o rm al fields of sexual practice," o nes th a t p resu m ab ly m a d e ho m o sexuals w h o serv ed the n a tio n 's d efen se u n reliab le o r v u ln era b le to blackm ail.53

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A recasting of stereo ty p es also je o p a rd iz ed g ay m e n a n d w o m en . In a n o ld e r g e n d e r sy stem categorizing p e o p le along m ale-fem ale ra th e r th a n g ay -straig h t lines, n o tio n s of "sissy" m e n a n d "m a n n ish " w o m e n h a d re n d e re d th e m reas­ su rin g ly identifiable, if som etim es lau g h ab le, a n d allo w ed o th ers g iv en to n o r­ m ativ e g e n d e r roles to e n g ag e th em sexually w ith o u t th e stig m a of h o m o se x u ­ ality. D u rin g W orld W ar II, h o w ev er, hom o sex u als serv ed in large n u m b e rs, in u n ifo rm s a n d w ith d u tie s th a t e ra se d visible d istin ctio n s b e tw e e n th e m a n d o th er A m ericans. A s a resu lt, n e w stereo ty p es stressed th e ir o rd in a ry a p p e a r­ ance a n d lu rk in g invisibility. "T he S apphic lover," w a rn e d tw o p u lp jo u rn a l­ ists, "is seld o m o b v io u s," a n d "u n so p h istica tes w h o th in k of q u eers as p ra n c ­ in g n an ces w ith ro u g e d lips a n d bleached h a ir" m u s t realize th a t "p an sies in th e State D e p a rtm e n t d o n o t w e a r skirts ov er th eir strip e d p a n ts," a n d th a t "fairies" in clu d e " to u g h y o u n g kids, college football p lay e rs, tru ck -d riv ers a n d w e ath e r-b itte n servicem en." By the sam e to k en , e v en stra ig h t-a p p e a rin g m e n a n d w o m e n n o lo n g er easily escap ed su sp icio n of b e in g gay. A n d as th e w a rn ­ in g a b o u t State D e p a rtm e n t "p an sies" in d icated , n e w n o tio n s of invisible gays w ere lin k ed to fears a b o u t n a tio n al safety, in clu d in g th o se a b o u t d eb ilitatin g , effete p riv ileg e in th e u p p e r reaches of essen tial in stitu tio n s.54 T rying to locate in im ag in atio n w h a t n o w seem ed invisible in a p p earan ce, politicians, jo u rn alists, film m akers, a n d d o c to rs lin k ed h o m o sex u als w ith com ­ m u n ism a n d fascism . A s a congressional re p o rt claim ed, th ey lack th e "o u t­ w a rd characteristics o r physical traits . . . of sex p erv e rsio n ," re n d e rin g th em a n in sid io u s th re a t ak in to, a n d d ra w n to, th e invisible co m m u n ist. A n e w sex p an ic lin k ed gay m en to ab u se of children, a n d p rescrip tiv e lite ra tu re v iew ed th em as im m a tu re m e n w h o failed to m a in ta in th e fam ilies a n d careers n e e d e d to w in th e C old W ar ("T hey can n o t com pete. T hey alw ay s s u rre n d e r in th e face of im p e n d in g com bat"). T hey w ere th u s re g a rd e d as a m enace to th e h o m efro n t a n d th e w a r fro n t as w ell. S traying fro m F re u d ian trad itio n , p sy ch o an aly sts, o ften refugees from N a z i E urope, freq u en tly ascribed th e u g lie st p a th o lo g y to h o m o sex u als (they w ere m u rd ere rs, tra p p e d in "th e h o lo cau st of illn ess" a n d "try in g to e x tin g u ish the race") a n d lin k ed th em to N azism . T he few ex p erts w h o su g g e ste d o th erw ise w ere co n d em n ed for p ro d u c in g claim s th a t "w ill b e politically a n d p ro p ag a n d istic ally u se d a g ain st th e U n ited States ab ro ad , stig ­ m atizin g the n a tio n as a w h o le in a w h isp e r cam p aig n ," as E d m u n d Bergler, th e e ra 's lead in g analytic th eo rist in th is arena, assailed A lfred K in sey 's rep o rts o n h u m a n sexuality.55 G ays re a p e d m a n y of the b u rd e n s a n d few of th e b en efits of m ilitarizatio n . "Sex p e rv e rts" w ere publicly vilified b y executive agencies a n d co n g ressio n al com m ittees, p u rg e d from g o v e rn m e n t a n d m ilitary service, a n d p u rs u e d a n d ex p o sed b y local police in vice raids. T he m o d e m a p p a ra tu s of a n tig ay id eo l­ ogy a n d rep ressio n n o w em erged, d e riv e d less from tim eless a n im u s th a n from historically specific anxieties. M ilitarization red efin ed a n tig ay h o stility a n d th e d a n g e r gays p resu m ab ly p o s e d — to n atio n al as w ell as m o ral safety, th e tw o

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in extricably joined. T ru m a n sh o w ed h o w early a n d easily th e lin k ag e em erg ed w h e n h e ju stified h is decision to fire C om m erce Secretary H e n ry W allace ("a pacifist 100%") for seeking frien d lier Soviet-A m erican relations. "A ll th e 'A rt­ ists' w ith a cap ital A, th e p a rlo r p in k s a n d th e so p ra n o voiced m e n are b a n d e d to g eth er," h e co m p lain e d p riv a te ly in 1946. "I a m afraid th e y are a sab o tag e fro n t for U ncle Joe Stalin."56 Form al resistance to h o m o p h o b ia w a s n early im possible. O n e a ttem p t, th e M attachine Society, fo u n d its initial lead ers (ex-C om m unists ironically p u rg e d fro m th e p a rty for th eir preferences) d riv e n o u t b y th e ir fearful follow ers. N o m a in stre a m g ro u p , n o r th e A m erican C ivil L iberties U nion, w o u ld d e fe n d th em , p reju d ice w a s ra m p a n t am o n g leftists (inclined to see h o m o sex u ality as a fo rm of cap italist decadence) as w ell as co nservatives, a n d h o m o sex u als in p o w e r like the FBI's H o o v er a n d Joe M cC arth y sidekick Roy C o h n w ere w o rse th a n u seless (an d them selves som etim es gay-baited). U nlike o th er g ro u p s, g ay p e o p le co u ld n o t g ain leverage b y to u tin g th eir w a rtim e co n trib u tio n s, since d o in g so risk ed c o n d em n atio n or jail. The fate of g ays u n d e r th e H o lo cau st w a s u n k n o w n , w h ile n o restive m ass of h o m o sex u als o verseas seek in g to choose b e tw ee n c o m m u n ism a n d dem ocracy w a s ev id en t. E ven vicious a tte n tio n offered lo n g -ru n a d v a n ta g e s to g ay p eople. T he lu rid m ag azin e article o r p u b licized vice ra id p ro v id e d th e novice a g u id e to th e b ars, c o d ew o rd s, a n d folkw ays of the g ay u n d e rw o rld . In 1957, w h e n San Francisco police seized copies of p o e t A llen G in sb erg 's Howl— w h ic h celeb rated m en w h o g e t "fu ck ed in th e ass b y sain tly m otorcyclists" a n d sav ag ed C o ld W ar­ rio rs w h o p ra y e d before "M oloch"— th ey se n t sales of Howl a n d k n o w le d g e of th a t city's gay co m m u n ity soaring. In d ee d , th e m o u n tin g a n tig ay c am p aig n h e lp e d forge a n e w gay id en tity th a t slow ly m a d e resistance possible, ju st as resistance, as in G in sb erg 's case, o ften w o u ld in clu d e challenges to m ilitariza­ tio n itself. Few could foresee th a t course of ev en ts in 1950, h ow ever. If blacks m a d e gain s a n d h o m o sex u als fared w o rst u n d e r m ilitarized social relations, E u ro p ea n ethnics p ro b ab ly b en efited th e m ost. U nlike th e case after W orld W ar I, "th e an ti-co m m u n ist im p u lse . . . d id n o t flow p rim a rily alo n g n a tiv ist channels"; in d ee d . E astern E u ro p ea n im m ig ran ts "w o u ld com e to be id en tified w ith th e far rig h t ra th e r th a n w ith th e far left."57 A m erican Jew s could id en tify w ith the victim s of N azism , a n d o ften of c o m m u n ism . E ast E u­ ro p ea n ethnics, a n d th e C atholic ch u rch w ith w h ich th ey w ere u su a lly associ­ ated , w ere seen as p atrio tic C o ld W arriors, easin g th eir task of assim ilation. G erm an-A m ericans, rarely the b ru n t of h o stility a n y w ay d u rin g th e w ar, saw W est G erm an y enlisted in the a n tico m m u n ist cause. The C old W ar h a rd ly d is­ solved all distinctions: an tico m m u n ism recast ethnic id en tities m o re th a n it ob literated them , as A m ericans of Polish, U k rain ian , o r o th e r b ack g ro u n d s as­ serted th eir ties to o p p resse d b re th re n b e h in d th e Iro n C u rtain . D ivisions alo n g religious lines rem ain ed e v en sh a rp er, as C atholics, P ro testan ts, a n d Jew s u s u ­ ally m ain tain ed th eir social a n d c u ltu ral distance. Still, th e m ach in ery of na-

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tional se cu rity — m o st o bviously c o m p u lso ry m ilitary service, less d irectly cor­ p o ratio n s, bureaucracies, a n d u n iv ersities— d id m in g le d iv erse g ro u p s. By the sam e token, the o u tlo o k resh a p in g race relatio n s w o rk e d e v en m o re read ily o n ethnic a n d religious divisions: b a rrie rs a g ain st Jew s, C atholics, or ethnic g ro u p s m ig h t p e rsist inform ally b u t seem ed o u t of place in a n a tio n seek in g to tap all of its resources a t h o m e a n d to p o lish its im ag e ab ro ad . Fear th a t A m eri­ cans w o u ld a p p e a r d iv id e d in facing the en em y d isco u rag ed , th o u g h h a rd ly e n d ed , in ten se ethnic a n d religious assertiv en ess, a n d A m erican lea d ers em ­ p h a size d th e n a tio n 's hom ogeneity. R arely in A m erican h isto ry d id th e m eltin g p o t seem to b u b b le so fiercely. A t least for eth n ics of a n assim ilatio n ist b e n t— p ro b ab ly a g reat m a n y after W orld W ar II— th e id eal of h o m o g en e ity se rv ed a u sefu l p u rp o se . O th e r g ro u p s fared less w ell. M exican-A m ericans w e re freq u en tly d e p o rte d as n a tio n al security risks o r for o th er reasons. O p p o n e n ts of N ativ e A m erican trib al co m m u n ity a n d la n d o w n e rsh ip labeled th o se p ractices as co m m u n istic, a n d th e federal g o v e rn m e n t m o v ed to w a rd "th e co m p lete m erg e r of all In d ia n g ro u p s into th e g en eral b o d y of o u r p o p u la tio n ," as T ru m a n p u t it. C hineseA m ericans d iv id e d am o n g th em selv es w h e n co m m u n ism triu m p h e d in th eir ancestral n atio n , a n d th ey cam e u n d e r m ore su sp icio n , acted o n b y th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t th ro u g h a n o to rio u s "C onfession P ro g ram ," w h e n C o m m u n ist C hinese forces e n te red th e K orean W ar.58 For n o n -E u ro p ean s, th e obstacles in ­ c lu d e d b o th lo n g stan d in g p rejudice a n d te m p o ra ry circum stance: th e C o ld W ar w a s too m u rk y a n d em bryonic in m u c h of A sia a n d L atin A m erica for these g ro u p s to tra d e easily o n th eir p o sitio n in th e global co n test for loyalties. T he C o ld W ar's g ro w in g in ten sity in those areas after 1950 d id m ak e for change, how ever: im m ig ratio n q u o tas, once w ild ly tilted to E u ro p ean s, w ere su sp e n d e d , relaxed, a n d finally a b a n d o n e d in 1965. A ll this su g g ests th a t m ilitarizatio n im p o sed n o o n e p a tte rn o n all social g ro u p s, b u t in one sense it d id . W h at m a tte re d as m u c h as th e fate of p a rtic u la r g ro u p s— a b alance sh eet of losses a n d g ain s for each — w a s th e m a n n e r in w h ich all fo u n d th eir sta tu s ju d g e d b y th eir p erceiv ed p o sitio n in h o t a n d cold w ar. O ld e r im p u lses still o p e ra te d — th a t b u n d le of p rejudices, asp iratio n s, a n d a d v an tag e s th a t d efines A m erican society— ju st as n a tio n al secu rity w a s often in v o k ed to legitim ize im p u lse s th a t lay e n tirely o u tsid e its arena. But th a t is also th e point. T hat arena w a s inescapable, a n d as m a n y co u ld a tte st— th e black of­ ficer w h o g a in e d authority, the w o m a n h e sita n t to choose a career, th e lesb ian WAC d ish o n o rab ly d isc h a rg e d — its d y n am ics w ere p o w erfu l. T hose d y n am ics p riv ileg ed a u tilita rian case for social ch an g e a n d circu m scrib ed claim s b a sed o n justice. T he d istin ctio n w a s n o t absolute, since justice o ften seem ed in th e in terests of n atio n al pow er, b u t it w a s p ersisten t. C o m p o u n d in g this m ilitarizatio n of social relatio n s w a s th e p a rtially m il­ itarized econom y, w h ic h re sh a p e d social relatio n s in w a y s larg ely b e y o n d the reach of form al a rg u m e n t a n d consciousness. O f these effects, th e reg io n al "re-

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m a p p in g " of th e U n ited States, creating a n e w "g u n b elt," w a s th e m o st ob­ v io u s.59 W orld W ar II, req u irin g m ass p ro d u c tio n of h ig h ly sta n d a rd iz e d p ro d ­ ucts, h a d sh o w e re d its econom ic benefits w id ely , since e stab lish ed in d u strie s like au to a n d steel in the N o rth e a st a n d M id w est w ere a d e p t a t m ass p ro d u c ­ tion. T he re d u c e d scale a n d m o u n tin g technological focus of p o stw a r m ilitary p ro cu re m en t, o n th e o th er h a n d , p riz e d m ass p ro d u c tio n far less. In ste ad of m illio ns of rifles o r th o u sa n d s of b o m b ers fro zen in d e sig n for lo n g p ro d u c tio n ru n s, th e P en tag o n so u g h t h a n d fu ls of aircraft carriers a n d h u n d re d s of n e w jet fig h ters a n d b o m b ers— all so com plex a n d fast-ch an g in g technically th a t d e ­ sig n s co u ld n o t b e fixed for h ig h -v o lu m e p ro d u c tio n , a n d skilled d e sig n team s a n d w o rk e rs w ere v a lu e d m ore th a n m asses of blu e-co llar laborers. To b e sure, th is sh ift w a s n o t to ta l— sm all-batch p ro d u c tio n h a d lo n g charac­ terize d n av al a rm a m e n ts a n d the K orean W ar b ro u g h t n e w d e m a n d s for h ig h v o lu m e o u tp u t— b u t it n o n eth eless accelerated reg io n al red istrib u tio n . O ld e r m a ss-p ro d u ctio n in d u strie s w ere n e ith e r w ell su ite d to m eet th e n e w d e m a n d s n o r k een ly in terested in th e m as lo n g as civilian m ark e ts w ere robust. T h u s w e a p o n s d e v e lo p m e n t a n d p ro d u c tio n g rav itate d so u th a n d w e st— to b u lg in g n o d e s in the n u c le ar w e a p o n s com plex like D u P o n t's v a st S av an n ah R iver p la n t in S outh C arolina; to aircraft co m p an ies in Los A n g eles a n d in Seattle; a n d later to rocket a n d space-exploration com plexes in G eorgia, F lorida, Texas, a n d th e W est. A s late as 1952, N e w York w a s still th e to p recip ien t of m ilitary con­ tracts, a n d m id w e s te m states to o k a h a n d so m e sh are of th em . Ju st six y ears later, C alifornia h a d far o u td ista n ce d N e w York, Texas a n d W ash in g to n h a d m o v e d in to th e to p ran k s, "th e M id w e st's sh are fell catastrophically, n e v er ag ain to recover," a n d th e to p te n m ilitary co n tracto rs w ere n o w all in elec­ tro n ics a n d aviation.60 T anks from D etro it w ere out, jets from C alifornia w ere in. Pockets of d efense w o rk rem ain ed in th e o ld h e a rtla n d , b u t th e sh ift w a s rap id . To its beneficiaries, it o w e d to th eir clim ate, o p e n lan d , strateg ic location, a n d e n tre p re n e u ria l spirit. T hose a ttrib u tes, h o w ev er, w ere p ro b ab ly n o t the decisive factors. In stead , com placency am o n g c o rp o ra te a n d p o litical lea d ers in th e o ld h e a rtla n d , th e h ig h -tech e m p h a sis of d efen se p ro cu re m en t, a n d ag g res­ sive p ro m o tio n b y bo o sters fig u red h e av ily in th e shift. T hese regional shifts, v ital in red istrib u tin g capital, expertise, a n d p o p u la ­ tion, also re sh a p e d p a tte rn s of race, class, a n d ideology. R esources flo w ed to co rp o ratio n s th a t h a d less n e e d for blue-co llar w o rk e rs a n d to areas w h e re u n io n s w ere u su a lly w eaker, u n d e rc u ttin g o rg an iz ed lab o r a n d th e b en efits for black w o rk e rs of th eir success in n o rth e rn cities a t g ain in g in d u stria l jobs a n d in te g ratin g in d u stria l unions. Like o th er A m ericans, blacks co u ld follow the econom ic tid e to C alifornia, C onnecticut, o r b ack so u th , b u t d o in g so m e a n t still a n o th er d isru p tio n , a n d som etim es relocation to areas w h e re A fricanA m erican in stitu tio n s h a d sh allo w roots a n d w h ite A m erican s w ere excep­ tionally hostile. Sim ilar results, th o u g h less d ram atic a n d h a rd e r to ascertain, m ay h av e u n fo ld e d for w o m en , w h o , like m o st black A m ericans, lacked the

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train in g n e e d e d for m an y technical jobs in d efen se in d u strie s, a lth o u g h th ey m ig h t join th e low -paid secretarial su p p o rt force also req u ire d in large n u m ­ bers. For gay people, the m aze of security clearances a n d req u ire m e n ts in the p riv a te a n d public sectors of d efense w o rk p re se n te d a special b arrier. In tu rn , the p a rtial w a r econom y w e ak e n ed th e N e w D eal coalition, liberal reform , a n d racial progress. U n d e rcu ttin g o rg an ized lab o r a n d job o p en in g s for black A m ericans, it sw elled o p p o rtu n itie s for w hite-co llar w o rk e rs w h o se eco­ nom ic sta tu s te n d e d to m ake th eir politics R epublican a n d conservative. A n d co rp o rate, political, a n d m ed ia lead ers in these p ro sp e rin g areas su sta in e d a n ex tra o rd in a ry rev u lsio n a g ain st fed eral p o w e r a n d "social e n g in e erin g " ev en as th ey em b raced C old W ar view s p ro m o tin g fed eral p o w er, c o n n iv ed for ev­ ery federal dollar, a n d fostered a m assive re-en g in eerin g of A m erica. C alifor­ n ia 's u rb a n bo o sters "w o u ld curse the fed eral g o v e rn m e n t for th e m ess in w h ic h th e w a r h a d left them , b u t each w o u ld p lain tiv ely b e g " — or skillfully lo b b y — "for m ore of th e econom ic resources th a t cam e w ith th e m ess."61 This in v o lv ed n o R epublican o r conserv ativ e conspiracy, h o w ev er, since D em ocratic p re sid e n ts a n d C ongresses w ere essential in creatin g th e peacetim e w a r econom y, a n d th e local coalitions th a t la n d e d m ilitary contracts a n d b ases tran sce n d ed p a rty a n d ideological distinctions. A n d regional a n d econom ic shifts h a d o th er sources b esid e the w o rk in g s of m ilitarizatio n . N o r w ere racial reform ers helpless in face of these ch an g es— th e civil rig h ts m o v em en t reach ed th e p e a k of its success in th e m id st of th em , in p a rt b y cap italizin g o n o th er facets of m ilitarization. But econom ic m ilitarizatio n e ro d e d th e g ro u n d b e n e a th th em . It "co n trib ­ u te d to the seg reg atio n of A m ericans b y class a n d race" (an d p ro b ab ly b y gender), a n d to th e g ro w th of "large p ools of a n u rb a n u n d erclass as w ell as d isp laced blue-collar w o rk ers." In a m a n n e r sim ilar to th e effects of su b u r­ b a n izatio n , th e econom ic a n d regional effects of m ilitarizatio n w o rk e d b e n e a th th e surface to u n d e rc u t form al efforts a t racial in te g ratio n a n d social equ ality .62 U n d erstan d ab ly , it w a s difficult to foresee a n d sh a p e m a n y of th e conse­ q u ences of m ilitarizatio n for social relations. A s h istorical process, m ilitariza­ tio n w as largely u n reco g n ized o r im plicitly d e n ie d b y th e lan g u a g e of crisis a n d im p ro visation, a n d in a n y ev en t of incalculable d u ra tio n as of 1948 or 1952. Its effects w ere com plex a n d long-term (m any n o te d h ere w ere o n ly in cip ien t in th e 1940s), far from u n ifo rm across all social g ro u p s, so m etim es c o n tra d ic to ry ev en for a single g roup, a n d useful e n o u g h for m a n y to be w elco m ed in a n u n ­ q u estio n in g fashion. All th a t su ch g ro u p s h a d in co m m o n — b u t th is w a s a g reat d e a l— w a s th eir inescapable p a rticip a tio n in an aren a of social relatio n s p ro ­ fo u n d ly sh a p e d b y m ilitarization.

Culture in W ar’ s Shadow Advancing American Art, a n overseas State D e p a rtm e n t exhibit of m o d e rn ist w o rk s, u n lea sh e d a fu ro r in 1947. T raditional artists issu ed a "W ar C ry " ag ain st

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rad ical tre n d s "n o t in d ig e n o u s to o u r soil." T he m ed ia lam b asted "left-w ing p a in te rs w h o are m em b ers of red Fascist o rg an izatio n s." Politicians saw "C om ­ m u n ist c a ric a tu re s. . .s e n t o u t to m islead th e rest of th e w o rld as to w h a t A m er­ ica is like." T he m a tte r d ra g g e d in T ru m an ("If th a t's art. I'm a H o tten to t") a n d C ongress, c au sin g the exhibit's p re m a tu re en d . In to th e 1950s th e ch arg e k e p t ech o in g th a t m o d e m a rt (or literatu re, o r m usic) w e ak e n ed A m erica, c o rru p t­ in g it at h o m e o r d e b asin g its im age abroad: C o n g ressm an G eorge D o n d ero in sin u a te d th e h o m o sex u ality of m o d ern ists, saw th em as p a rt of "a sin ister co n sp iracy conceived in the black h e a rt of R ussia," a n d declared m o d e m a rt c o m m u n ist (th o u g h Stalin also co n d em n ed it) "because it d o es n o t glorify o u r b e au tifu l country, o u r cheerful a n d sm ilin g peo p le, a n d o u r g rea t m aterial p ro g ress." Tellingly, d e fe n d ers of m o d e m a rt w o rk e d in a sim ilar fram ew o rk , h a ilin g it as sym bol of A m erican freed o m a n d p o w er: "T he m ain p rem ises of W estern a rt h av e a t last m ig ra te d to the U n ited States, alo n g w ith th e cen ter of g rav ity of in d u stria l p ro d u c tio n a n d political p o w e r."63 H a rd ly th e first tim e th a t a rt g e n erate d political conflict, th e d e b ate o v er m o d e rn ist a rt w as in stea d n o v el because of th e fram ew o rk of c o n tro v ersy sh a re d b y d e fe n d ers a n d detractors: th eir focus o n n a tio n al safety a n d p o w e r e v en in peacetim e. It w a s a sig n th a t in c u ltu re as in o th e r arenas, m ilitarizatio n w a s proceeding. It d id n o t sim p ly m e a n th e co n scrip tio n of c u ltu ra l resources to w ag e h o t o r cold w ar, o r a c u ltu re th a t celeb rated n a tio n al pow er. It m e a n t also th e m an ifo ld w a y s in w h ic h A m erican s co u ch ed th eir c u ltu ral anxieties a n d am bitions in term s of n a tio n al security, a n d in w h ic h anxieties a b o u t th e n a tio n 's safety su ffu sed culture. It m eant, th a t is, th e seem in g inescap ab ility of w a r in A m erican cu ltu re, b o th in its form al a p p a ra tu s of e n te rta in m e n t a n d th e arts, a n d in its b ro a d e r system s of lan g u ag e a n d sym bols. N o o ne ex p lan atio n p e rsu asiv e ly em braces large-scale c u ltu ral change, h o w ­ ever, a n d the b e st th e h isto ria n can d o is to ack n o w led g e th e com plexities in ­ v olved. To the ex ten t th a t c u ltu re b ecam e m ilitarized , th e ch an g e o ccu rred th ro u g h p riv a te a n d d ecen tralized initiatives a n d o u t of th e m o o d s a n d anxi­ eties of o rd in a ry peo p le, n o t ju st th ro u g h elite p ressu re s (them selves o ften con­ flicting). A lth o u g h h isto ria n s still w rite b ook s like The Culture of the Cold War,64 m u c h sp ra n g from w e ll-sp rin g s d e e p e r th a n th e C old W ar conflict: from ex p o ­ su re to global w ar, genocide, a n d frig h ten in g w eap o n s; from th e n a tio n 's a t­ te m p t to exercise global p o w er; from anxieties a b o u t w h a t A m erica itself w a s becom ing; an d , since n o c u ltu re rein v en ts itself o v ern ig h t, from o ld er c u ltu ral trad itio n s th a t sh a p e d reactions to all of these d ev elo p m en ts. D isparate in sources, c u ltu re 's m ilitarizatio n w a s also com plex in results. The p o stw a r y ears are easily rem em b ered as a n "ag e of anxiety." A n d p lau sib ly so, since reasons for anxiety existed a n d since p e o p le so self-consciously em ­ p lo y ed the label, as w h e n th e B ritish-A m erican p o e t W. H . A u d e n p u b lish ed "The A ge of A nxiety" in 1948 a n d L eonard B ernstein g ave a sy m p h o n y th e sam e title a few y ears later. Yet th e era also saw b u o y a n t o p tim ism a n d so arin g am b ition a b o u t A m erica as th e w o rld 's c u ltu ral capital, econom ic engine, reli-

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g io u s savior, or p ro tecto r a n d policem an. A m erican s co u ld im ag in e th e ir n a ­ tio n b o th in ru in s a n d in m u sc u la r h e g em o n y o v e r th e w o rld . T he p o in t is n o t th a t an xiety o r o p tim ism (or som e o th e r m oo d ) triu m p h e d . (O ne sch o lar fin d s a n am b iv alen t "cu ltu re of con tin g en cy " a sc e n d a n t in th e late 1940s.65) The p o in t is th a t b o th m o o d s w ere sh a p e d b y a n d fo cu sed u p o n th e ex p erien ce a n d th re a t of w a r a n d th e global struggle. G iven the d iv erse n a tu re of cu ltu re, the su b tle m ea n s of resistan ce it offered, a n d its resistance to a n y s u d d e n change, m ilita riza tio n in th is sp h e re w a s m o re p a rtia l a n d u n ev en . Still, b y certain gross if im precise sta n d a rd s, a m ilitarized c u ltu re w a s em erg in g in a n im p ressiv e ran g e of p h e n o m e n a. T he p o stw a r su b ­ u rb a n boom , for exam ple, d riv e n in p a rt b y p e n t-u p w a rtim e d e m a n d a n d g e n ­ ero u s financing for v eteran s, w a s also cast as a w e a p o n in th e C old W ar. "N o m a n w h o o w n s h is o w n h o u se a n d lo t c an b e a co m m u n ist. H e h a s too m u c h to d o ," p ro claim ed W illiam L evitt, th e m o g u l of su b u rb a n d e v elo p m e n t.66 E m ­ b o d y in g the m y th of a classless society, su b u rb ia se rv ed as sig n of A m erican su p e rio rity a n d as d efense a g ain st in sid io u s ideologies. T he sco u rg e of po lio w a s also cast w ith in the c u ltu re of w ar: fu n d ra isin g cam p aig n s a g ain st it d re w o n tech n iq u es of w a rtim e m obilization; M arch of D im es p o ste rs ech o ed w a r­ tim e p ro p a g a n d a (in 1952, "T his Fight Is Y ours" fea tu red a g rim so ld ier lo o m ­ in g o v er a c rip p led child); p o lio 's stealth y co n tag io n seem ed co m p arab le to c o m m u n ism 's in sid io u s w ays, a n d th e u n k n o w a b len e ss of its p e ril to th a t of n u c le ar attack.67 Film also reflected the c u ltu re of w ar. W ar m o v ies w ere a co n sp icu o u s genre, o n e v irtu a lly in v en ted d u rin g W orld W ar II, b u t o th e r g en res reflected sim ilar concerns. Science fiction film s projected w a r in to th e fu tu re o r p re se n te d it in th in ly veiled allegories. So too d id W esterns: High Noon (1952) offered G ary C o o p er as the retired la w m a n (the U n ited States after W orld W ar H) alo n e fac­ in g th e re tu rn e d en em y (totalitarianism ), h is fellow citizens (A m erica's allies) too w eak-w illed to fight, h is w o m e n (a fem in ized A m erican cu ltu re) p le a d in g for peace u n til G race Kelly (a Q u ak er) join s th e cause. Sim ilarly, Jo h n Ford tran sferred "th e ideological concerns of th e W orld W ar a n d its a fte rm a th from th e terra in of th e com bat film to th e m ythic lan d sca p e of th e W estern," a n d th ereb y created "th e m ythic basis for a n e w id eo lo g y " (resting " o n a d elib erate a n d co nsensual falsification of h isto ry ") u n itin g A m erican s a g ain st "th e th re a t­ en in g ad v an ce of Soviet C o m m u n ism ."68 R eligion generally a n d religious revival p articu larly , th o u g h sh a p e d b y m an y forces, also reflected c o n te m p o ra ry concerns a b o u t w ar, w e a p o n s, a n d w o rld pow er. W hen sev en ty th o u sa n d p e o p le p a ck e d C h icag o 's Soldier Field for a M em orial D ay 1945 "Y outh for C h rist" rally, th ey d e m o n stra te d h o w "W orld W ar II a n d the early stages of th e cold w a r en co u rag e d th e rein v ig o ratio n of evangelicalism ." D u rin g th e w a r itself, "p iety b ecam e m o re fash io n ab le alo n g th e Potom ac," religious novels so ared to th e to p of th e b estseller lists, a n d A m ericans sa n g "P raise the L ord a n d Pass th e A m m u n itio n ," e v en th o u g h one

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fu n d a m e n ta list co m p lain ed th a t "p a ssin g th e L ord a n d p ra isin g th e a m m u n i­ tio n " m ore a p tly c au g h t th e ir m ood. T he religious rev iv al of th e p o stw a r era in v o lv ed " n o t so m u c h religious belief as belief in th e value of re lig io n /' a rg u e s o n e h isto rian , above all "th e conviction th a t relig io n w a s v irtu a lly sy n o n y m o u s w ith A m erican n a tio n alism ."69 T here w a s m ore g o in g o n th a n th at, how ev er. A b la n d sense of " th e value of relig io n " d id o ften em erge in the p ro n o u n c e m e n ts of n a tio n al au th o rities, the ecum enical religiosity of m ovies, a n d th e im ag es of c o rp o ra te m ed ia outlets, b u t th ere w a s also th e com plex faith of th eo lo g ian s like R einhold N ieb u h r, th e in te n se convictions of m a n y P ro testan ts, th e apo caly p tic p red ic tio n s of a n en d tim e cen tered o n th e atom ic b o m b 's ad v en t, a n d a m o re g en eral sense of "n e w b e g in n in g s" p ro m p te d b y th e b o m b th a t sp illed across th e political a n d d e n o m ­ in atio n al lines of A m erican religion. Like m a n y A m ericans, relig io u s lead ers re g a rd e d th e b o m b 's ap p ea ra n c e as a sig n of u ltim ate evil o r as a call to g rea ter d e e d s in the w o rld . E arly in his ascent to evangelistic sta rd o m , Billy G ra h a m offered a p o te n t m ix of C h ristia n a n tico m m u n ism a n d ap o caly p tic p red ictio n , p re se n tin g A m erica v ario u sly as b o th called to p rev a il a n d d o o m ed to b e d e ­ stro y e d in th e global stru g g le (Los A ngeles w a s th e e n e m y 's to p choice for atom ic attack, since it w a s " k n o w n a ro u n d th e w o rld b ecau se of its sin, crim e, a n d im m orality"). M ore generally, "V isions of Pax Americana . . . p ro v o k e d a n e w global triu m p h a lism am o n g A m erican ev an g elical lea d ers" w h o so u g h t "g rea ter conquests for C h rist." Jo h n Foster D ulles w a n te d "A m erican s to ex­ te n d th eir conception of m o rality a n d sp iritu a lity to th e rest of th e w o rld ," as h is v iew s h av e b e e n su m m arize d ; P re sid e n t T ru m a n w a n te d th e n a tio n "to b rin g th e g o ld en ru le in to th e in te rn atio n al affairs of th e w o rld "; a n d o n e sen a­ to r a rg u e d th a t "A m erica m u s t m ove fo rw a rd w ith th e atom ic b o m b in one h a n d a n d th e cross in th e o th e r."70 R eligious id en tities a n d conflicts, too, w ere o ften d e fin e d in term s of th e global struggle. C atholics so u g h t legitim acy b y p o in tin g to th e c h u rc h 's resis­ tan ce to c o m m u n ism in E urope. "L ong the subject of n a tiv ist ta u n ts b y th e n a ­ tio n 's P ro te stan t m ajority, th ey co u ld a t last asse rt th e ir A m erican ism — a n d q u e stio n th e p a trio tism of o th e rs— th ro u g h th e vehicle of th e A n ti-C o m m u n ist C ru sa d e." Francis C a rd in a l Spellm an, unofficial "ch a p lain of th e C old W ar," led m u c h of the ch u rch in th a t c ru sad e , u rg in g follow ers to em b race Sen. Joe M cC arthy, attack "p e rv e rts," force p u b lic officials to b a n alleg ed ly obscene film s, a n d challenge th e "C o m m u n ist flo o d in g s of o u r o w n la n d ." M an y P ro t­ estan ts jo in ed th a t crusade. O thers, reflecting o ld relig io u s ten sio n s a n d n e w w a y s to express them , p o in te d to th e P o p e 's au th o rity o v er th e ch u rc h a n d saw C atholics "as b lin d follow ers of a to ta litaria n system , a p p a re n tly n o t u n lik e th e N azi o r Soviet reg im es."71 Pervasive anxieties a b o u t the atom ic b o m b w ere a t th e core of th is m ilitarized culture. A "cu ltu ral crisis" a n d a v irtu a l "n atio n al to w n m eetin g " e n su e d after H iro shim a, sp a rin g h a rd ly a n o o k o r cra n n y of A m erican culture. E ven w h e n

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political d eb ate a b o u t the b o m b w a n e d , c u ltu ra l an x iety a b o u t it p e rsiste d — in ch eap 1950s film s fea tu rin g irra d ia te d insects a n d m o n sters u n lea sh e d b y n u ­ clear explosions, creatu res th a t "filled a v acan t space w h e re th e p u b lic d eclin ed to see real w e ap o n s." A nxiety also p e rsiste d in citizen s' o rd in a ry decisions: co n sid erin g relocation, one scholar p o n d e re d "th e q u e stio n of relativ e loca­ tio n s a n d the a to m b o m b " a n d a n o th e r re tu rn e d fro m E u ro p e, w h e re " w a r a n d th e R ussians w ere too n ear." W h en p u b lic c o n tro v ersy re su m e d in th e m id-1950s, o v er fallout from h y d ro g e n bom b s, its th em es w ere c u ltu ra l as w ell as political, q u estio n in g scientific a u th o rity a n d p io n ee rin g a m o d e m ecologi­ cal consciousness.72 Political a u th o rities p la y e d a m ajor role in m ilitarizin g c u ltu re. T hey offered cues, a n d som etim es n o n e-to o -su b tle coercion— H o lly w o o d g o t th e m essag e to ch an g e its film s from congressional h e arin g s c o n d u cted in 1947. W hile m o st of th e N e w D eal a n d w a rtim e a p p a ra tu s for fu n d in g a n d d irec tin g c u ltu re h a d b e en d ism an tled , n e w g o v e rn m e n ta l m ech an ism s sp ru n g up: for in tellectuals, th e C o ngress for C u ltu ra l F reedom , secretly fu n d e d b y th e CIA; for th e m asses, a "Z eal for A m erican D em ocracy" p ro g ra m a n d a "F reed o m T rain " to u rin g the n a tio n in 1947, d isp lay in g the C o n stitu tio n a n d th e D eclaration of In d e p e n ­ d en ce for visitors to view ; for th e anxious, "A tom ic E n erg y W eek" a n d a m y r­ iad of o th er p ro g ram s from th e AEC d e sig n e d to offer b e n ig n c u ltu ra l im ag es of th e atom . R outine features of the n a tio n a l secu rity state, w ith n o in te n d e d cul­ tu ra l a g en d a , also h a d p ro fo u n d c u ltu ral effects: a g e n eratio n of y o u n g m ales faced conscription, lea d in g m a n y quickly into college, o th ers in to a m ilita ry ex­ p erien ce th a t d is ru p te d ties of fam ily a n d reg io n a n d race, a n d all to face som e v ersio n of a co m m o n rite of passage. State a n d local au th o rities p la y e d a v ital role as w ell, sh a p in g p u b lic e d u c a tio n to reflect C o ld W ar id eo lo g y a n d policy, o r w o rk in g w ith th e A m erican L egion to enact in 1950 a m ock C o m m u n ist co u p in M osinee, W isconsin, a n ev en t th a t " g a rn e re d v a st p u b lic ity — o n rad io , TV, new sreels, a n d th e p a g es of Life." M any efforts w o rk e d across co m plex lines of authority. T h ro u g h o u t th e 1950s, federal, state, local, a n d pu b lic-sch o o l a u th o r­ ities co o p erated to m o u n t civil defense d rills— c u ltu ral "p a g e a n ts in th eir o w n w ay ," as one h isto ria n rig h tly n o tes.73 In tu rn , the m ilitarizatio n of c u ltu re w as lin k ed to A m erica's im p e ria l role in th e w o rld . A lth o u g h n o t a n e w process, A m erican in tellectu al cu rren ts, c u ltu ral fads, a n d co n su m er p ro d u c ts n o w su rg e d o u tw a rd to a n u n p re c e d e n te d d e ­ gree, soon slip p in g p a st the Iron C u rta in w ith su rp risin g ease. T he global sp re a d of A m erican c u ltu re w as n o t alw ay s im p erial in in sp ira tio n o r result; red -b aitin g p ro p elled som e leftist A m erican scholars to flee a b ro a d a n d g ain influence there. Too, official efforts to e x p o rt cu ltu re, like Advancing American Art, m isfired if th ey challenged political a n d c u ltu ral n o rm s a t h o m e. A n d th e c u ltu re a t issue w as n o t ju st th e project of "A m erican s." From th e so u n d tra ck s of film s to rarefied w o rk in science a n d th e h u m an ities, it also relied o n refugee scholars a n d a rtists fleeing fascism o r com m u n ism .

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Still, im p e ria l n e e d s d id ch an g e the c u ltu ra l a n d intellectu al w o rk of A m eri­ cans. F ostering th e T h ird W o rld 's econom ic m o d ern iza tio n led eco n o m ists in n e w d irections; e x p o rtin g a rt a n d lite ra tu re c h an g e d au d ien ces a n d ex p eri­ ences for A m erican artists; ju stify in g A m erican m ilitary p o w e r red ire cted th e en erg ies of h u m a n ists a n d social scientists. In b ro a d w ay s, th e sw o rd w a s lash ed to th e Bible, th e slide-rule, a n d th e cinem a. A m erican arm ies of lib era­ tio n a n d o ccu p atio n cleared th e p a th for, o r d irectly em p lo y ed , th e m issio n ­ aries, p ro fessio n al experts, co rp o rate rep resen tativ es, a n d o th ers w h o follow ed in th e ir w ake. T he C IA covertly fu n d e d o r sp o n so re d th e w o rk ab ro ad of tra d e u n io n s a n d c u ltu ra l org an izatio n s, a n d it m o n ito red th e c u ltu ral a n d intellec­ tu a l w o rk th a t A m ericans d id overseas (an d so m etim es a t hom e). D efense agencies h ire d o r co n tracted professionals in n e arly ev ery line of c u ltu ra l a n d in tellectu al w o rk , a n d sh a p e d th e lines of in te rn atio n al intellectu al influence q u ite sharply. C u ltu re, ho w ev er, w a s too d iv erse a n d u n ru ly for political au th o rities, th e m ­ selves o ften at o d d s, to d ictate all of its m ilitarized fo rm s a n d content. N o r is it sufficient to a rg u e th a t A m ericans n a tu ra lly re sp o n d e d to w o rld w ar, atom ic w e ap o n s, a n d cold w a r w ith the a m b itio n s a n d anxieties th e y expressed: w h a t, after all, in stru c te d th e m th a t those w ere th e p ro p e r resp o n ses? O th e r forces m u s t also h av e b e en a t w ork. R eactions to p o stw a r affluence m ay h av e p la y e d a role. A s W arren S u sm an h a s su g g e ste d , affluence gave A m ericans a sen se of a v isio n fulfilled, b u t also a feeling of d re a d th a t th e a b u n d a n t society w a s h o llo w o r th a t affluence allo w ed d a rk forces to surface. "In H o lly w o o d a n d in th e A m erica of th e 1940s a n d early 1950s, th e fulfillm ent of o u r sw eetest d esires lead s in ev itab ly to th e b rin k of d a n g e r a n d d a m n a tio n ," a n d a " d u a l consciousness of a n ideal, co m p leted soci­ ety a n d in n er rebellion d e v elo p ed ." B rooding film noir m ovies, th e pessim istic w ritin g s of theo lo g ian s like R einhold N ieb u h r, ev en th e e x tra v ag a n t fantasies of com ic b ooks a n d science fiction, seem ed to ju x tap o se econom ic fu lfillm ent a n d sp iritu a l d a m n a tio n . T he d re a d seem ed b o rn e o u t b y p h e n o m e n a a b ro ad a n d a t hom e: th e capacity for evil revealed b y w o rld w ar, to ta litaria n g o v e rn ­ m en ts, a n d n e w w e ap o n s, o r b y rebellious y o u th , in sid io u s com m ies a n d q u eers, o r u n sc ru p u lo u s M cC arthyites. "W e h av e ev ery th in g ," w o rrie d th e e d ­ ito r of the Cleveland Press. "W e a b o u n d w ith all of th e th in g s th a t m ak e u s com ­ fortable." But "so m e th in g is n o t th ere th a t sh o u ld b e — so m eth in g w e once h a d ." E xam inations of to talitarian ism seem ed to sh o w w h e re th e resu ltin g sp ir­ itu a l d rift m ig h t lead: E rich From m in Escape from Freedom (1941) a n d T. W. A d o rn o in The Authoritarian Personality (1949) d ia g n o se d p ath o lo g ies in the m o d e m , alien ated p e rso n ality to w h ich A m erican s m ig h t fall victim , ju st as m asses elsew here h a d su ccu m b ed to N a zism a n d co m m u n ism . W ere the A m ericans w h o w ere d ra w n to c o m m u n ism o r M cC arthy n o t exam ples, social critics asked?74 In th a t fashion, anxiety a b o u t w h a t A m erica h a d becom e m esh ed w ith "dis-

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covery of the h o rro rs a n d h y p o c risy of the m o d e m w o rld ." 75 If th e n a tio n h a d m et its historic d e stin y to create the a b u n d a n t society, w h a t n o w w a s to b e its m ission a n d h o w w a s it to w a rd off th e evil a n d d ecay th a t m ig h t se t in? A t least as fash ioned b y C old W arriors in g o v e rn m e n t a n d o th er in stitu tio n s, th e con­ su m in g focus o n enem ies ab ro a d a n d safety im p e rile d m e t b o th n eed s. It p ro ­ v id e d a n e w m ission, one a t w h ic h A m erican s h a d a lre ad y p ro v e n a d e p t in w o rld w ar, a n d one so g ra n d th a t it ra n n o risk of q u ick fulfillm ent. W id e sp re ad n o tio n s of "m a tu rity " b u ttre ssed th e n e w outlook: th e tru ly m a tu re n atio n , like th e tru ly m a tu re in d iv id u a l, to o k o n n e w responsibilities, su c h as th o se for w o rld peace a n d order. A t th e sam e tim e, tho se n o tio n s rev ealed a n u n d e rly in g u n ease, as n a tio n al elites w o rrie d w h e th e r A m erican s w o u ld h av e th e m a tu rity to follow th em a n d sh o u ld e r n e w b u rd en s. Such a n ex p lan atio n of p o stw a r c u ltu re is n ecessarily sp ecu lativ e, b u t it h e lp s ex p lain the parad o x ical m ix of m o o d s ev ident: th e b rittle asse rtio n of A m erican su p e rio rity a n d th e g n a w in g sense of A m erican h o llo w n ess; th e ex­ tra o rd in a ry focus o n external th rea ts a n d th e d e e p fears of in te rn a l su b v e rsio n a n d sloth. O f course, a n u n a n sw e rab le chick en -an d -eg g q u e stio n rem ains: W ere certain v a lu e s u p h e ld to m a in ta in th e n a tio n 's stren g th , o r w a s n a tio n a l secu rity sim p ly in v o k ed to u p h o ld v alu es d e sired for o th e r reasons? T he p o in t is n o t th a t anxieties a b o u t n a tio n al safety caused certain c u ltu ra l p rescrip tio n s, b u t ra th e r th a t c u ltu re w a s in escapably colored b y th o se anxieties. W riters, intellectuals, a n d artists h e lp e d to give sh a p e a n d e x p ressio n to th e th em es th a t e n su e d in this m ilitarized cultu re. T hey h a d a lre ad y w o rk e d to fash io n m ean in g s for W orld W ar II, ju st as m a n y fo u n d it th e ir d u ty to serv e in th e C old W ar. A s in o th er professions, m o st h isto ria n s accep ted "A m erican ideological m obilization," as P eter N ovick h a s called it. "Total w ar, w h e th e r it be h o t o r cold, enlists ev ery o n e a n d calls u p o n ev ery o n e to assu m e h is p a rt," a n n o u n ce d the A m erican H istorical A ssociatio n 's p resid en t, C o n y ers R ead, in h is 1949 ad d ress. "T he h isto ria n is n o freer from th is o b lig atio n th a n th e p h y si­ cist." M erle C u rti fo u n d R ead's sp eech to be "really d re a d fu l fro m a p re sid e n t of th e A H A ," a n d m an y intellectuals resisted co n scrip tio n w h e n so b a ld ly p h rased . O th ers m a d e th eir co n trib u tio n , h o w ev er, as w h e n h isto ria n s em ­ b raced n e w W estern civilization co u rses in o rd e r to m obilize stu d e n ts a g ain st to talitarian d an g ers. W h en the M assachusetts In stitu te of T echnology b e g a n g o v ern m en t-sp o n so red w o rk o n political w a rfare (in a d d itio n to its far larg er w e ap o n s program s), h isto ria n E lting M oriso n offered a resp o n se ty pical am o n g liberal intellectuals: h e w o rrie d a b o u t th e secrecy in v o lv ed a n d th e p o w e r of "th e g a rriso n sta te " b u t d id n o t o p p o se th e project. A n d since th a t project w as secret, n o o p e n d e b ate a b o u t it em erg ed a t M IT (or a t m o st o th e r schools).76 It w a s the shift in focus— to m atters of w a r a n d w e a p o n s— m o re th a n id eo ­ logical changes p e r se th a t revealed the m ilitarizin g process. For sure, ideo lo g i­ cal co n serv atism m a rk e d a n d facilitated th a t shift. M an y a rtists a n d intellec-

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tu a is b ecam e d isillu sio n ed b y th e rig id b an alities of th e A m erican C o m m u n ist Party, b y th e m o n stro sities of S talin's regim e, o r b y th e p erils of a n y a v o w ed ly ideological system . Political p ressu re from college tru stees, g o v e rn m e n t ag en ts, o r fellow intellectuals a b ette d th e change. T he re su lt w a s th e m u c h n o ­ ticed flight of intellectuals from M arxist o r o th er rad ical politics, as th ey (iron­ ically) fash io n ed a n ideological defense of th eir p re su m a b ly n o n id eo lo g ical politics. T he sources a n d im p act of this fligh t can be ex ag g erated , h o w ev er. It d id n o t em brace all a rtists a n d intellectuals, a n d e v id e n t as it w a s before a n d d u rin g W orld W ar H, it d id sp rin g only from p o stw a r an tico m m u n ism . A focus o n th e rig h tw a rd d rift of h ig h c u ltu re also o bscures th e sh ift in a g en d a s ev en a m o n g those w h o o p p o se d n a tio n a l policies. P ro m in en t p o stw a r w rite rs traced th is g ra n d shift, a lth o u g h th e y h a rd ly al­ w a y s celebrated it, as th ey ex p lo red experiences a n d th em es in w a r a n d n a ­ tio n al security: John H ersey in n o n fictio n (Hiroshima, 1946); N o rm a n M ailer in The Naked and the Dead (1948); Irw in Shaw in The Young Lions (1948); Jam es Jones in From Here to Eternity (1951); a n d A rth u r M iller in The Crucible (1953). In one sense, this o u tp o u rin g of lite ra ry atten tio n , o ften p o rtra y in g A m erica o r its gov­ e rn m e n t savagely, w a s n o t su rp risin g , certain ly n o t to rea d ers of p o st-W o rld W ar I fiction, b u t its them es, like its sh eer b u lk a n d critical acclaim , w e re n o ta ­ ble. W riters in the 1920s h a d lo o k ed back o n a w a r th a t h a d com e a n d gone, o ften less in te reste d in th e w a r itself th a n in w h a t it sh o w e d a b o u t th e h y p o cri­ sies of A m erican c u ltu re o r tire frailties of h u m a n n a tu re . P o st-W o rld W ar II w rite rs h a rd ly m issed those th em es, b u t for th e m w a r w a s a n ev er-p resen t m enace, n o t ju st a b y g o n e rev e lato ry event. T hey lo o k ed n o t o n ly b ack o n th e last w a r b u t a h ea d to th e n e x t one, d re a d in g it a n d th e v a lu e s th a t w o u ld p ro ­ d u ce it. O f course, m a n y p o stw a r w rite rs— so u th e rn ers like T ennessee W illiam s a n d E u d o ra W elty, a n d chroniclers of m iddle-class life like John C h e ev e r— larg ely av o id e d w a r th em es a n d settings, stressin g in stea d th e in tim ate a n d th e p e r­ sonal. T h at focus, ho w ev er, m a y h av e reflected th e ir d esire to create a space b e y o n d th e reach of the state, th e b o m b, a n d th e c o m m u n ists— to p reserv e in d i­ v id u a l au to n o m y in a w a r-m a d w o rld . E ven in th o se p riv a te spaces, w a r co u ld in tru d e: C h e e v e r's "C o u n try H u s b a n d ," su d d e n ly flo o d ed w ith m em o ries of w a rtim e b rutality, sta red a t a ro o m of p eo p le " u n ite d in th eir tacit claim th a t th ere h a d b e e n n o p a st, n o w a r— th a t th ere w a s n o d a n g e r o r tro u b le in th e w o rld ." 77 A rth u r Schlesinger, Jr., th e y o u n g h isto ria n a n d D em ocratic liberal, ex p o sed th e sh ift in c u ltu ral e m p h a se s in The Vital Center (1949). A m ericans, h e a rg u e d , live in " a n age of an x iety " a n d "look back to to talitarian ism , to c o n cen tratio n cam ps, to m ass starv atio n , to atom ic w a r." T hey face "a p e rm a n e n t crisis w h ic h w ill test th e m oral, political a n d v e ry possib ly th e m ilitary stre n g th of each side." Schlesinger b eliev ed th a t "Soviet p o w e r w ill su rely sp re a d ev ery w h e re th a t it m eets n o firm resistan ce."78

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Schlesinger d e m o n stra te d h o w m a n y intellectuals, e v en w h ile co n su m ed b y issues of w a r a n d n atio n al security, ig n o red th e d e e p e r p ro cess of m ilitariza­ tion, th eir o w n c o u n try 's role in it, a n d the m a n n e r in w h ic h it w a s ch an g in g th e n atio n . "H isto ry h a s th ru st a w o rld d e stin y o n th e U n ited States. N o n atio n , p e rh a p s, h as becom e a m ore relu c ta n t g rea t p o w e r." D espite h is b leak concern a b o u t to talitarian m enace a n d atom ic peril, Schlesinger lo cated th e causes of m o d e m anxiety elsew here, in " in d u stria l o rg an iz atio n a n d th e p o st-in d u stria l state, w h a te v e r the sy stem of o w n ersh ip ," w h ic h "im p e rso n a liz e econom ic re­ latio n sh ip s." H e m a d e little allow ance for h o w th e C old W ar a n d th e p ro sp e ct of atom ic w a r m ig h t instill anxiety, in p a rt because h e saw th e e n e m y 's m enace as above all ideological a n d covert: "T he special Soviet a d v a n ta g e — th e w a rh e a d — lies in th e fifth co lu m n ." C onsequently, Schlesinger said n o th in g a b o u t h o w m ilitarized in stitu tio n s a n d folkw ays m ig h t sp rin g fro m th e n a tio n 's o w n im p u lse s a n d redefine life for A m ericans. To be su re, th a t w a s in p a rt b e ­ cause, a lth o u g h a n ticip atin g a possible test of "m ilitary stre n g th ," h e d istru ste d th e im p u lse to in tim id a te th e Soviet U n io n w ith a "flo u rish of g u id e d m issiles a n d atom ic b o m b s." Yet in sid e ste p p in g th e w o rld of w a r a n d w e a p o n s a n d locating "an x iety " o u tsid e of it, Schlesinger created a jarrin g , m y o p ic trac t of h is tim es.79 H e m a d e a p o te n t b rew b y a d d in g to C o ld W ar fears a b u n d le of c u ltu ral anxieties a b o u t the m o ral decay, im personality , a n d im m a tu rity of A m erican s in a tim e of peril. In d u strialism b ree d s a n o n y m ity a n d en n u i, h e asserted , a n d "d riv es the free in d iv id u a l to th e w all." In resp o n se, th e foolish a n d fain t­ h e arted , like th e "w ailer," g rasp a t sim plistic solutions: to ta litaria n ideologies, hysterical a n tico m m u n ism , o r the fra u d u le n t rad icalism of W allace's P ro g res­ sives, w h o serve "th e p u rp o se of those w h o w ish free society to fail." "C o n ser­ v atism in its crisis of d e sp a ir tu rn s to fascism : so p ro g ressiv ism in its crisis of d e sp a ir tu rn s to C o m m u n ism ." In strik in g ly p h allic lan g u ag e, Schlesinger saw th e psychic im m a tu rity of enem ies to the rig h t a n d left o f h im as u n d e rm in in g th e n a tio n al eq u an im ity n e e d e d for w in n in g th e C o ld W ar a n d c u rin g th e w o es of in d u strialism . P rogressives are "soft, n o t h a rd ," w ith a fatal "w eak n ess for im p o tence." T otalitarianism "p e rv e rts politics in to so m e th in g secret, sw ea ty a n d fu rtiv e like n o th in g so m u c h . . . as h o m o sex u ality in a b o y 's school: m an y p racticing it, b u t all those c au g h t to b e can ed b y th e h e ad m aste r." In d ee d , com ­ m u n ists resem ble hom osexuals, h e suggested : "T hey can id en tify each o th er . . . o n casual m eetin g b y the use of certain p h rases, th e n am es of certain friends, b y certain e n th u sia sm s a n d certain silences," in a w a y sim ilar to a "fa­ m o u s scene in P ro u st" (the h o m o sex u al French w riter) w h e n tw o ch aracters "su d d e n ly recognize th eir co m m o n co rru p tio n ." Schlesinger saw real rad icals (the liberals h e liked) as sm a rt a n d virile (an d p re su m a b ly m ale). T hey w o u ld o p p o se totalitarianism , p u rg e su b v ersiv es b y "co n stitu tio n al m e th o d s" (unless "a clear a n d p resen t d a n g e r" em erges), a n d p reserv e th e "lim ited state." Per­ h a p s radical as m ea su re d a g ain st p o stw a r co n serv atism , S ch lesin g er's blue-

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p rin t w a s q u ite lim ited b y o th er sta n d a rd s, b u t to u g h n ess a n d cool realism d e ­ fin ed h is rad icals m ore th a n th eir p ro g ram s. T hey h a d "rad ical n erv e," em b raced freed o m as "a fig h tin g faith," a n d k n ew th a t it w o u ld su rv iv e "o n ly if e n o u g h p e o p le b elieve in it d e e p ly e n o u g h to d ie for it." "T he cen ter is vital; th e cen ter m u s t h o ld ." 80 O th e r intellectuals sh a red m a n y of S chlesin g er's em p h ases. H isto rian D av id Potter, in People of Plenty (1954), b rillian tly e x p lo red th e im p act of econom ic a b u n d a n c e o n th e A m erican character, b u t h e sgw little role for w a r a n d m ili­ ta ry p o w e r in m ak in g o r p ro tectin g th a t a b u n d an c e, o r for a b u n d an c e in sh a p ­ in g a n A m erican m ilitary style. In American Life: Dream and Reality (1953), soci­ o lo g ist L loyd W arn er explored the satisfactions th a t w a r h a d for A m ericans, b u t in a n ah istorical m anner: h e m a d e w a r 's a p p ea ls seem tim eless, as if W orld W ar II a n d th e C old W ar created or ex p ressed n o th in g new . W ritin g a few y ears later, John K enneth G alb raith cam e closer to th e m a rk in The Affluent Society (1958). T he p ro b lem h e a d d re ss e d — of p riv ate w e a lth a n d p u b lic im p o v e rish ­ m e n t in a sy stem still g eared to insufficiency— w a s w o rsen e d , h e n o ted , b y the d e v o tio n of so m a n y fed eral resources to defense. Yet G alb raith 's d iscu ssio n of "th e illusion of n a tio n al secu rity " w a s so b rief a n d c o m p a rtm e n ta liz ed , a n d h is faith in the expansive capacity of th e A m erican eco n o m y so stro n g , th a t th e C o ld W ar a n d m ilitarizatio n slip p ed from h is view . E ven w h e n intellectuals v iew ed A m erica's global h eg em o n y a n d m ilitary p o w e r suspiciously, th ey c o u ld also see those d e v elo p m e n ts as signs of n a tio n al m atu rity , since, w ro te h isto ria n R ichard H o fstad ter, th ey also en tailed "th e final in v o lv e m en t of the n a tio n in all the realities it h a d so u g h t to avo id , for n o w it w a s n o t on ly m ech a­ n iz e d a n d u rb an iz ed , b u t in te rn atio n alize d as w e ll."81 W h at d istin g u ish ed liberal intellectuals w a s less a lack of critical edge, th e sin for w h ic h th ey h av e often b e en savaged, th a n th e focus of th eir critical a p titu d e. T hey som etim es d e a lt in sig h tfu lly w ith th e p ro b lem s of m ass c u ltu re a n d afflu­ ence a n d th e d a n g e rs th ey p o se d for A m erica in th e C old W ar, b u t th e tra n s­ fo rm in g capacity of m ilitarizatio n largely escap ed th eir atten tio n . W h en th ey d id notice it, th e ir im p u lse w a s to cau tio n a g ain st excesses— th e hy sterics of M cC arthyism , the te m p ta tio n to u n le a sh atom ic b o m b s— b u t n o t to criticize th é sy stem th a t u n d e rla y them . T hey ex am in ed h o w a n in a d e q u a te c u ltu re u n d e r­ m in ed n a tio n al security, n o t h o w n a tio n a l secu rity red efin ed cu ltu re. T h u s th eir critiques of A m erican "co n fo rm ity " ex p lain ed it as th e resu lt of alm o st ev ery th in g except the d e m a n d s of w a r a n d n a tio n al pow er. To be sure, th ere w a s p e rh a p s a su b tle resistance in v o lv ed in id en tify in g o th er agendas, like p ro b lem s of in d u stria lism a n d a b u n d a n c e — to d o so w as to stake a claim th a t n a tio n al secu rity w as n o t th e on ly concern. A t th e sam e tim e, h o w ev er, the intellectuals' m o rd a n t p o rtra it of a v acu o u s c o n su m er c u ltu re a n d its soft a n d soulless in h a b ita n ts su g g e ste d th eir fear th a t A m erican s w o u ld b e in a d e q u a te to the d e m a n d s of n a tio n al security. T he p ro b lem for th em , Schle­ sin g er believed, w as th a t "th e w o rld tra g e d y still h a s th e flickering u n rea lity of

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a m o tio n p ictu re." A nxiety "is n o t y et p a rt of o u r liv es— n o t of e n o u g h of o u r lives, anyw ay, to in form o u r n a tio n al d ecisio n s."82 N o w o n d e r so m a n y of this g e n eratio n of intellectuals w o u ld so o n b e a ttrac ted to th e m u sc u la r p o stu re s a n d policies of John K ennedy. W om en m ig h t h av e offered a d istin ctiv e voice o n th ese m atters, as th e y h a d before a n d w o u ld again, b u t in m a n y w a y s th is p e rio d m a rk e d th e n a d ir of th eir m o d e m political a n d c u ltu ral presence, in clu d in g a d ra m a tic sh rin k a g e in th eir re p re se n ta tio n in m a n y professions. E lean o r R oosevelt, p e rh a p s th e m o st p ro m in e n t p o stw a r fem ale figure, a d v a n c e d a n a ssertiv e lib eral a g en d a , b u t u su a lly w ith in a C o ld W ar context. T he lo n g tra d itio n of fem in ist c u ltu ra l criti­ cism largely fell silent o r w a s d e n ie d m u c h of a n audience. T here w ere, of course, th o se w h o saw m ilita riza tio n a n d resisted it. T hey of­ ten w o rk e d o u tsid e d o m in a n t in tellectual in stitu tio n s o r fo u n d th em selv es p u sh e d to th e m argins. T he rad ical jo u rn alist I. F. Stone p o u re d o u t a stre a m of topical com m entary. In 1956, th e jo u rn alist a n d h isto ria n W alter M illis, in Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History, c o n d e m n e d th e m ajo r p o w e rs' m ilitary policies for h a v in g "ex tin g u ish ed " freed o m for m u c h of th e w o rld a n d "p ressin g m ore heav ily u p o n [A m ericans] th a n is g en erally realized ." A l­ th o u g h " a d o p te d e v ery w h ere in th e n a m e of 'n a tio n a l security,' " M illis w ro te, th o se policies "h av e sp re a d a c o rro d in g sense of in secu rity th ro u g h all th e m o re a d v an c ed p eo p les of the e a rth " a n d b ro u g h t th em "w ith in p o ssib le d istan ce of th e extinction of civilization, if n o t of h u m a n ity itself. " In th e sam e year, C o lu m ­ b ia U n iv ersity sociologist C. W rig h t M ills p u b lish e d The Power Elite, c o n d e m n ­ in g a triu m p h a n t "m ilitary m etap h y sic s— th e cast of m in d th a t d efin es in te rn a ­ tio n al reality as basically m ilitary," for w h ic h h e h e ld civilian elites m o re resp o n sible th a n m ilitary m en .83 P erh ap s the m o st a n g ry a n d resp ected a m o n g th ese voices w a s L ew is M um ford. A public intellectual ra th e r th a n a n academ ic, e arlier a d o g m atic an tifas­ cist, h e w as largely in v u ln erab le to ty p ecastin g as left-w in g er o r fellow traveler. A lread y sh e d d in g his technological o p tim ism b efore W orld W ar II, h e re­ sp o n d e d to th a t w ar, his so n 's d e a th in it, a n d th e atom ic attack s th a t closed it b y a q u e st to sto p the w a rfare state th a t co n su m ed th e rest of h is lo n g life (18951990). T hat this w id e -ra n g in g intellect b ecam e so c o n su m e d w a s itself a m ark e r of m ilita riza tio n — it em b raced th o se w h o resisted as w ell as th o se w h o fol­ low ed. Ju st as telling w ere M u m fo rd 's m essage a n d its fate. H e so u g h t th e h e a rt of th e n e w m ilitarized sy stem a n d c o n d e m n e d it, n o t ju st th e excesses w h ic h o th er intellectuals u su a lly criticized, seeing those excesses as in h ere n t in th e system . The resu lt w as a n u n c o m p ro m isin g position: " A b a n d o n th e A tom ic Bomb! G ive it up! Stop it now ! T h at is th e only o rd e r of th e day ," h e p ro claim ed in 1946. A bove all, h e so u g h t to strip a w ay "th e w a rfare sta te 's v a u n te d v e n ee r of scien­ tific rationality." To th a t en d , h e sav ag ed reig n in g n o tio n s of th e political n e u ­ trality a n d intellectual objectivity of scientists, "b era tin g th em for th eir alliance

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w ith th e m ilita ry a n d cap italism " a n d an ta g o n iz in g a g rea t m a n y of them . M u m fo rd fo u n d a n audience, b u t n o t alw ay s a recep tiv e one. H e c o u ld n o t b e ig n o red , b u t rev iew ers a n d o p p o n e n ts ty p e d h im , e v en in a m o re sy m p ath etic p o litical clim ate d u rin g th e 1960s, as a n anti-intellectual, angry, d e sp a irin g o ld m an , d e sp ite h is effort to c h a rt a n optim istic co u rse a w ay fro m th e m a d n e ss h e p erceiv ed .84 P a rticu larly in h is attack o n science, M u m fo rd ra n in to a n intellectu al o u t­ lo o k d e v e lo p e d o n th e eve of W orld W ar II a n d ten acio u s after it. "T he d e n ig ra ­ tio n of ideology, one of th e m o st characteristic featu res of A m erican c u ltu re in th e cold w a r era, w as d irectly related to th e celeb ratio n of objectivity as th e h a ll­ m a rk of th o u g h t in th e Free W orld," arg u es P eter N ovick. Scientists, h isto rian s, sociologists, econom ists, a n d o th er intellectuals d isp a ra g e d th e claim s o f id eo ­ logical sy stem s a n d th e w isd o m of ideological d e b ate ("D em ocracy of th e A m erican b ra n d is anti-ideology," a rg u e d Jacques B arzun). T hey saw th e m ­ selves e n g ag e d in "th e d isin te reste d search for objective tru th ," w h e rea s sch o lars a n d scientists in to ta litaria n system s p racticed "g a n g ste r science" d o n e o n th e sta te 's orders. A m erican intellectu als stru c k th a t p o stu re ev en th o u g h , as N ovick acidly com m ents, " 'g a n g s te r scien ce'— h ig h ly o rg an ized , m issio n -o rien ted research — b ecam e th e d o m in a n t [A m erican] m o d e of scien­ tific o rg an iz atio n ."85 W h atev er its epistem ological validity, the p re s u m p tio n of in tellectu als' o b ­ jectivity w a s a revealing c u ltu ral n o rm . S hield in g th e m fro m criticism of th eir role in m ilitarizatio n , it also sh o w ed th e reach of m ilitarizatio n , as "o ld e r n o ­ tio n s of an a d v ersa ria l p o stu re b e tw e e n intellect a n d p o w e r w e re a b a n d o n e d as 'im m a tu re .' "86 It w a s also sh a re d b y m a n y p o licy m ak ers, w h o saw th em selv es as realists objectively assessing en em y th rea ts a n d A m erican interests. In b o th cases, th a t n o rm d isg u ise d m oralistic a n d ideological im p u lse s w h ile it legiti­ m a te d claim s to pow er. M oreover, the n o rm sp re a d far. A m erican s w ere to ld , p e rh a p s m ore th a n a t a n y o th e r tim e in th e ir history, to tru s t objective ex p erts to solve all so rts of p ro b lem s, from the rid d le s of n u c le ar stra te g y to ju v en ile p a ­ th o lo g y a n d fam ily conflict. Ju st as th e v alu es of intellectuals lim ited d isse n t in a m ilitarized cu ltu re, so d id o ld er p atrio tic v a lu e s th a t d efin ed th e o u tlo o k of m a n y A m erican s a n d of­ ten h a d the p o w e r of th e sta te b e h in d them . P atriotic c u ltu re w a s su sta in ed b y H o lly w o o d m ovies a b o u t W orld W ar II, b y th e activities of p atrio tic g ro u p s, a n d b y efforts to m em o rialize epic m o m e n ts of th e w a r like P earl H a rb o r a n d Iw o Jim a. A t th e w a r's close, Joe R osenthal's fam o u s p h o to g ra p h of M arines raisin g th e flag a t Iw o Jim a w a s p laste red o n n e w sp a p e rs, stam p s, w a r b o n d ads, recruiting p o sters, a n d trolley cars, so th a t it quick ly "becam e th e defin i­ tive, collective m em o ry of w ar: its classical, sc u lp tu ra l calm ; th e absence of b lo o d sh ed ; the triu m p h a n t lift of the Stars a n d Stripes all su ite d th e n a tio n al tem p er." T hat "classical calm " c o n trasted sh a rp ly w ith th e h ig h ly d iso rd e re d a n d an o n y m o u s im ages of d e stru c tio n asso ciated w ith d e a th cam p s a n d

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b o m b ed cities. It in d icated a w id e sp re a d a n d o ften sta te -su p p o rte d effort to re­ co n stru ct a belief in w a r 's o rd erlin ess a n d A m erica's p u rp o se fu ln e ss. T h at ef­ fo rt w a s c a p p e d a t A rlin g to n C em etery in 1954 b y th e u n v e ilin g of a n Iw o Jim a m em o rial (based o n R osenthal's photo), a n o u tsized piece of "heroic realism " (to a few critics, too m u c h like th e Stalinist v ersion) th a t seem ed to e m b o d y A m erican p a trio tism a n d p o w e r.87 T his p atrio tic c u ltu re w a s n o u n tro u b le d rep e titio n of earlier p ag ean try . Sands of Iwo Jima (1949) fe a tu red the stau n ch ly a n tico m m u n ist acto r John W ayne b u t p re se n te d h is ch aracter as " p u rs u e d b y p riv a te d e m o n s," ju st as m a n y w a r film s "re p re se n te d th e feelings of m e n a t w a r— n o t th e ir heroic d e ed s." H e rm a n W ouk's bestselling novel, play, a n d m o v ie The Caine Mutiny (1951) c au g h t the tensions, as it seem ed first to e n d o rse a n d th e n to c o n d e m n a n officers' rev o lt a g ain st a n irratio n a l n a v al co m m an d er. T he p o p u la rity of im ­ ag es like those a b o u t Iw o Jim a a n d th e e n d in g of W o u k 's d ra m a , h o w ev er, su g ­ g ested th e e n d u rin g a p p e a l of a heroic v iew of w ar, a celeb rato ry reg a rd for A m erican po w er, a n d deference to w a rd m ilita ry au th o rity . Significantly, g ov­ e rn m e n t p ro p a g a n d a sh o w e d h o w in d iv id u a l in itiativ e, m ilita ry rationality, a n d n atio n al triu m p h co u ld e n d u re e v e n in ato m ic w a r.88 D espite the reach of p atrio tic cu ltu re, resistance d id a p p e a r a m o n g o rd in a ry A m ericans, n o t ju st elite figures like M um fo rd . It cam e n o t o n ly in politicized w a y s— the w o rk of rad ical u n io n ists o r th e lyrics of p acifist songs, for ex am p le— b u t in less articu late c u ltu ra l form s su c h as tee n film s a n d ro ck 'n 'ro ll. So a t least som e a d u lts th o u g h t in th e 1950s, w h e n th ey p laced ro ck 'n 'ro ll o n a slip p ery slope (m ark ed also b y b a d g rad es, delin q u en cy , teen ­ age p regnancy, a n d su g g estiv e m ovies) th a t m ig h t e n d in th e abyss of c o m m u ­ n ism o r besm irch A m erica's im age abroad. S uch concerns p ro m p te d R epubli­ can C lare B ooth Luce, for exam ple, to w o rk w ith th e State D e p a rtm e n t to force th e w ith d ra w a l from th e V enice Film Festival of Blackboard Jungle (1955), a H o l­ ly w o o d film a b o u t u n ru ly big-city h ig h school stu d e n ts. A n d p e rh a p s th e fears w ere n o t baseless: If politics is d efin ed "as a n ab stract b o d y of th o u g h t," a rg u es G eorge L ipsitz, th e n rock songs "w ere apolitical," b u t if d e fin e d "as th e social stru g g le for a goo d life," rock "rep re se n te d politics of th e h ig h e st o rd e r."89 E ven the c u ltu re of c o n su m p tio n offered a su b tle resistance. W h en A m eri­ cans flocked to su b u rb ia , p u rc h a se d n e w p ro d u c ts, a n d g lu e d th em selv es to television sets, th ey sig n aled th a t th eir p rio rities lay w ith th e q u a lity a n d p ro s­ p e rity of th eir d aily lives, n o t w ith n a tio n al p o w e r a n d g ra n d c ru sad e s abro ad . To be sure, those d aily h a b its rarely in v o lv ed conscious resistance to n a tio n al p rio rities, w h ich m o st A m ericans tacitly a p p ro v e d in o p in io n p o lls a n d v o tin g b o o th s, a n d m ay h av e lu re d m a n y A m erican s in to a com placency th a t c o o p ted a n y resistance, as som e foes of C old W ar policy ch arg ed . Yet c u ltu ral resistance d o es n o t alw ays en tail conscious defiance, a n d cer­ tain ly intellectuals a n d politicians o ften w o rrie d th a t th e h a b its a n d v a lu e s of co n su m er c u ltu re u n d e rm in e d th e to u g h n ess n e e d e d to p rev a il in th e w o rld .

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T rue, c o n su m er c u ltu re a n d its fem ale h o m em ak e rs w ere d e p lo y e d as w e ap o n s in th e C o ld W ar, as w h e n Vice P re sid e n t N ixon, in h is fam o u s 1959 "k itch en d e b a te " w ith Soviet p re m ie r N ik ita K hrushchev, p o in te d to th e A m erican k itch en as a n em b lem of A m erican superiority . "W o u ld it n o t b e b e tte r to com ­ p e te in th e relative m erits of w a sh in g m achin es th a n in th e stre n g th of rockets?" ask ed N ixon. A lth o u g h " u n w ittin g soldiers," n o tes o n e h isto rian , "w o m en w h o m arc h ed off to th e n a tio n 's sh o p p in g cen ters to e q u ip th eir n e w h o m es jo in ed th e ran k s of A m erican cold w a rrio rs." But it w a s o n e th in g for A m eri­ cans to take p rid e in th eir affluence, a n o th e r to o v e rin d u lg e it, a n d K h ru sh ch e v 's b o a st th a t R ussian rockets w ere b ig g er w a s nerv e-w rack in g . A s h isto ria n Sam uel Flagg Bemis c h arg ed in 1962, in a co m p lain t c o m m o n after the S p u tn ik "crisis," A m ericans h a d b e en "ex perien cin g th e w o rld crisis from soft seats of com fort, d e b au c h ed b y [the] m ass m ed ia . . . , p a n d e rin g for selfish p ro fit to th e lo w est level of o u r easy ap p etites, fed full of to y s a n d g ew g aw s, o u r m ilita ry p re p a re d n e ss h e ld back b y in sid io u s strik es for less w o rk a n d m o re p o w er, o u r m a n p o w e r so ften ed in w ill a n d b o d y in a clim ate of a m u sem en t." A ffluence stirred p rid e, b u t also alarm for th e n a tio n 's safety.90 A lth o u g h political d isse n t w a s o ften silen ced b y d irect rep ressio n , c u ltu ral resistance w a s less subject to the sta te 's h e av y h a n d , for its m o d es w ere too dif­ fuse, h o n o rab ly A m erican, o r u n calcu lated , as w ith th e c u ltu re of c o n su m p tio n . In a n a tio n w a g in g a confusing global stru g g le a n d lacking th e clarity im p o sed b y full-scale w ar, it w a s o ften h a rd to agree o n w h a t c o n stitu ted su b v ersiv e, divisive, o r w ro n g h e a d e d values. W as m o d e m a rt c o rru p tin g o r a sy m b o l of A m erican su p erio rity ? D id c o n su m er c u ltu re e m b o d y th e A m erican W ay of Life o r u n d e rm in e th e w ill of a p e o p le a t w ar? W as a n g st o v e r n u c le ar w e ap o n s a logical reaction to th e m o r th e e n te rin g w e d g e of o p p o sitio n to n a tio n al p o li­ cies? G iv en those u n certain ties, one o p tio n w a s to c o n tain d u b io u s o r rebellious im p u lse s ra th e r th a n cru sh th em , m u c h as lea d ers so u g h t to c o n tain c o m m u ­ n ism itself. Political a n d professional a u th o rities relied h eav ily o n c u ltu ra l con­ tain m en t, Elaine Tyler M ay su g g ests in Homeward Bound. Too so p h isticated to believe in the w isd o m o r practicality of sta m p in g o u t th o se im p u lses, th ey trie d in stea d to c o n tain sexual liberalism , juvenile defiance, w o m e n 's co m p lain ts, m ale revolt, a n d escalating sp e n d in g h a b its w ith in th e h o m e a n d th e " tra d i­ tio n al" fam ily, a n id eal largely in v en ted in th e p o stw a r era. T h ro u g h early m a r­ riag e a n d freer sexual practices, for exam ple, y o u n g p e o p le w o u ld safely enjoy a n en lig h ten ed , e v en in d u lg e n t sexuality. M u ch th e sam e m ig h t b e said a b o u t d o m in a n t resp o n ses to artistic in n o v atio n o r to th e c u ltu ra l practices of ethnic, racial, a n d religious m inorities. A d d in g u rg en cy to this d riv e to c o n tain c u ltu re w a s n e w evid en ce of its p la s­ ticity. W artim e m o b ilizatio n h a d revealed th a t p re su m a b ly stable a rra n g e ­ m en ts of class, race, g e n d e r a n d th e like w ere m alleable: w o m e n could d riv e rivets; g ay m en could b a y o n e t enem ies; blacks could fly p lan es. Political a n d p ro -

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fessional elites re sp o n d e d to this plasticity b y assertin g th e p re s u m e d tim eless­ n ess of c u ltu ral n o rm s, th o u g h less so w h e n race w a s involved: th e id ealized fam ily was trad itio n al; w o m e n 's dom estic roles were n a tu ra l; th e h o m o sex u al's p a th o lo g y was im m utable. O f course, m an y of th eir actions w e n t far b e y o n d c o n ta in m e n t— h om osexuals co u ld b e locked u p , b o o k s censored, film d irecto rs b lack listed — a n d co n ta in m e n t all b u t co llap sed in th e 1960s, b u t it u sefu lly d e ­ scribes the p rin cip al achievem ent, if n o t alw ay s th e conscious in ten t, of c u ltu ral au th o rities early in the C old W ar. M eanw hile, political lead ers c o n tin u ed to sh a p e c u ltu ra l ritu als. O n Febru­ ary 7,1954, the R everend G eorge D ocherty w a rn e d h is co n g reg atio n of W ash­ in gton, D.C., P resb y terian s th a t the 1892 P led g e of A llegiance to th e Flag w a s in a d e q u a te — "in h is im ag in atio n , h e co u ld h e a r 'little M u sco v ites re p e a t a sim ­ ilar p led g e to th eir h am m er-an d -sick le flag,' for th e USSR also claim ed to b e a republic w ith justice a n d liberty." T he C o n stitu tio n m ig h t m a n d a te se p ara tio n of ch u rch a n d state, b u t " a n atheistic A m erican is a co n tra d ic tio n in term s." P re sid e n t E isenhow er, h a v in g h e a rd D ocherty 's serm o n , to ld a n a tio n al rad io a u d ien ce later th a t d a y th a t all A m ericans, w h a te v e r th eir "p erso n al creed ," b e ­ lieved in a h ig h er pow er. C ongress p a sse d a reso lu tio n in sertin g " u n d e r G o d " in to th e p led g e in tim e for Ike's sig n a tu re o n Flag Day, Ju n e 14.91 N a tio n a l secu­ rity, it seem s, d e m a n d e d th a t G od, too, en list in th e cause.

The Red Scare In 1947, the sam e y e ar th a t Advancing American Art a ro u se d su ch controversy. H o u se U n-A m erican A ctivities C o m m ittee (H U A C) c h airm a n J. P arnell T hom as a sk ed a q u e stio n en d lessly re p e ate d in th e co m in g years: "A re y o u now , o r h av e y o u ever been, a m em b er of th e C o m m u n ist P arty of th e U n ited States?" H is ta rg e t w a s screen w riter John H o w a rd L aw son, o n e of th e "H o lly ­ w o o d Ten," a g ro u p of w riters a n d d irecto rs so o n jailed for c o n te m p t of C o n ­ gress after refusing to c ooperate w ith th e com m ittee (tw o e n d e d u p in jail w ith T hom as, w h o w a s later convicted of accepting kickbacks). The H U A C in q u iry fed o n suspicions of H o lly w o o d as a n alien, Jew ish in d u stry th a t p ro p a g a te d th e co m m u n ist line a n d su b v e rte d c u ltu ral values. In fact, th e H o lly w o o d Ten w ere or h a d b e en p a rty m em bers; Screen A ctors G u ild p re sid e n t R onald Rea­ g an w as n o t w h o lly off-base in testifying a b o u t c o m m u n ist influence. T heir in ­ fluence o n film m aking w a s a n o th e r m atter, h o w ev er, since p ro d u c e rs a n d stu ­ d io h e ad s w ere n o m ore inclined to b u ck the political tid e in 1947 th a n in 1941. It stra in e d th in g s for w rite r A y n R and to cite Song of Russia (1943) as co m m u n istin sp ired because it sh o w ed sm iling R ussians (in reality th ey on ly sm ile " p ri­ vately a n d accidentally," she claim ed). But th e Red Scare n o w h a d its au d ien ce a n d stars; as laconic offscreen as on, G ary C o o p er testified th a t h e d islik ed com ­ m u n ism "because it is n 't o n the level."92 The Red Scare w as a h ig h ly p o liticized form of p o stw a r m ilitarizatio n , a form

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closely lin k ed to its c u ltu ral d im ensions. A s th e H o lly w o o d Ten case su g g ests, th e b o u n d a rie s b e tw ee n c u ltu re a n d politics w ere b lu rry a n d victim s w ere fo u n d in m a n y sectors of A m erican life. L ibraries, u n iv ersities, a n d p u b lic schools w a g e d o r suffered an tico m m u n ist w itch -h u n ts. M em bers of m an y tra d e s a n d pro fessio n s (including w restlers in In d ian a), w o rk e rs in m an y b u si­ nesses, e v en recipients of u n e m p lo y m e n t co m p e n sa tio n (in O hio) w ere re­ q u ire d to sig n lo y alty oaths, w h ile th e C incin n ati R eds w ere so lem n ly ren a m ed th e "R edlegs" for a tim e, lest a n y o n e q u e stio n th e b aseball p la y e rs' p atrio tic cred en tials. A lth o u g h m o st sen satio n al in W ashington, th e Red Scare also b u b ­ b le d u p in th e activities of sta te legislatures a n d m u n ic ip al g o v ern m en ts, creat­ in g a crazy q u ilt of law s a n d ru les b a n n in g in o n e locality w h a t w as legal in an o th er, a n d it w a s carried o n b y p riv a te o rg an izatio n s like th e A m erican Le­ gion, th e C atholic church, a n d countless sm aller a n d n o w fo rg o tten g ro u p s. Som e A m erican s w ere m ore v u ln era b le th a n others: political liberals a n d ra d i­ cals, especially if lin k ed w ith th e N e w D eal; h o m o sex u als in g o v e rn m e n t o r m ilitary service; fo reig n -b o m citizens a n d aliens (th o u g h th is R ed Scare w a s n o ta b ly less n a tiv ist th a n the first); o n occasion, e v en real co m m u n ists. So fickle w ere th e w in d s of suspicion, ho w ev er, th a t th ey cru sh ed m a n y w h o h a d n o reaso n to su sp ec t th eir vulnerability. A lth o u g h p re d a tin g R epublican se n ato r Joe M cC arth y 's sen satio n al career a n d n e v e r confined to it, "M cC arthyism ," as it cam e to b e called, w a s a t the h e a rt of th e R ed Scare. D efined th a t w ay, it w a s sh o rt-liv ed c o m p a red to th e b ro a d e r co u rse of m ilitarizatio n , lastin g u n til th e m id-1950s, b u t it also d re w d e e p ly from th e history, in stitu tio n s, a n d anxieties of m ilitarizatio n . Its p rece­ d e n ts lay in the first R ed Scare a t the close of W orld W ar I a n d th e B row n Scare of W orld W ar II; "T ru m a n d id n o t in v e n t so m u c h as codify, in stitu tio n alize, b ro ad e n , a n d tig h te n FD R 's ju ry -rig g ed w a rtim e p ro g ra m ." 93 Its a ssu m p tio n s w ere the sam e ones p o u n d e d h o m e before a n d after Pearl H arb o r: th a t o ld d is­ tin ctio ns b e tw e e n foreign a n d d om estic policy, b e tw ee n w a r a n d peace, b e ­ tw e e n d isse n t a n d treason, b e tw ee n ex tern al a n d in te rn al enem ies, h a d e v a p o ­ rated . It w a s n o t, th en , som e u n fo rtu n a te o r ex p en d ab le excess of m ilitarizatio n b u t so m eth in g n e a r its core, ju st as rep ressio n a n d su rv eillan ce o u tla sted it. A m o n g th e m a n y p a ra d o x e s of th e Red Scare w a s th e seem in g d isin te rest of its m o st in fam o u s lead ers in th e fu n d a m e n ta ls of n a tio n al p o w e r a n d th e global stru g g le. M en like M cC arthy cared little a b o u t th e intricacies of n u c le ar stra t­ egy, th e d e p lo y m e n t of A m erican p o w e r ab ro ad , o r th e w o rld b e y o n d A m eri­ can shores. In fact, th ey o ften sh o w e d d isd a in for su c h m atters. It w a s d o m estic en em ies th ey so u g h t (th o u g h offstage M cC arth y seem ed to b a re e v en th em n o ill-will). It w a s th e C o ld W ar a t h o m e th ey w a n te d to w in — ro o t o u t th e traito rs, ap p easers, a n d d e v ia n ts a t hom e, a n d triu m p h ab ro ad w o u ld n a tu ra lly follow. In d eed , in th a t sense th ey resisted th e b ro a d e r co u rse of m ilitarizatio n . T hey saw n o p e rm a n e n t crisis b u t in stea d w a n te d a q u ick victory. T em p eram en tally a n d politically, th eir k in w ere som e m ilitary officers a n d o th er A m erican s w h o

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w a n te d a p rev e n tiv e n u c le ar attack o n the Soviets th a t w o u ld e n d th e C o ld W ar w ith o u t th e fuss of large-scale m obilization, cu m b erso m e alliances, o r fru stra t­ ing com prom ises. P rovincial o r reactionary figures like M cC arth y h a rd ly alone cau sed the Red Scare, since m en of w e a lth a n d p o w e r (the K en n ed y fam ily) co u ld su p p o rt th em a n d T ru m a n D em ocrats h a d th e ir o w n fears for in te rn al security, b u t M cC arthy a n d h is k in d d id m u c h to set th e R ed Scare's tone. Fre­ quently, th eir attacks fell o n th e lead ers a n d sy m b o ls of th e v e ry in stitu tio n a l a p p a ra tu s — th e State D ep artm en t, th e P entag o n , a n d th e p resid en c y itself— erected to w a g e cold w a r a n d p ro tect n a tio n al security. By the sam e token, th eir ap p ea l cam e p a rtly fro m th eir attacks o n b ig g o v e rn ­ m en t, w h o se scale a n d a n o n y m o u s p o w e r a lien ated m a n y A m ericans g ro u n d e d in in d iv id u a list a n d a n tistatist trad itio n s. A fter all, M cC arth y a n d h is k in d leveled th eir m o st sen satio n al charges a g ain st th e m e n (an d o n occasion w o m en) w h o w ie ld e d th a t po w er, especially th o se w ith a p riv ileg e d social b ack g ro u n d (T ru m an 's p rovincial orig in s m a d e h im a less easy target). M cC ar­ th y revealed th a t th ru s t in h is first m ajor a d d re ss o n th e c o m m u n ist d a n g e r in F eb ru ary 1950: N e ith e r m in o rities n o r d isa d v a n ta g e d A m erican s "h av e b e en selling this n a tio n o u t," h e d eclared, " b u t ra th e r th o se w h o h av e h a d all th e b e n ­ efits . . . — th e finest hom es, th e finest college ed u catio n , a n d th e fin est jobs in G o v e rn m e n t w e can give." A lger H iss, th e fo rm er assista n t secretary of state convicted (after one h u n g jury) in 1950 of p e rju ry a b o u t h is c o m m u n ist connec­ tions d u rin g the 1930s, w a s a favorite target. A g ra d u a te of Johns H o p k in s a n d H a rv a rd L aw School, H iss e m b o d ied stereo ty p es of e aste rn e stab lish m en t p riv ­ ilege, a n d h is d e fe n d ers, so one jo u rn a l called th em , w ere "th e A m erican re­ spectables, the socially p e d ig re ed , th e c u ltu rally acceptable." Secretary of State A cheson, w ith his B ritish airs a n d lofty m an n er, w a s a n o th e r fav o rite ta rg e t— th e "R ed D ean of the State D e p artm en t," acco rd in g to M cC arthy, w ith h is "cane, spats, a n d tea -sip p in g little finger." If officials also seem ed effete, h in ts of h o m o sex u ality w ere a d d e d to d en u n ciatio n s of th em .94 P o w er a n d p riv ileg e m a d e o th ers v u ln era b le as w ell. " A d lai [Stevenson] the ap p easer," according to N ixon, w a s a "Ph.D . g ra d u a te of D ean A ch eso n 's cow ­ a rd ly college of C o m m u n ist co n tain m en t." T he "C h in a h a n d s" in th e State D e­ p a rtm e n t often fit the sam e bill. T h o u g h less a sy m b o l of p riv ileg e, n o o n e b e­ cam e the object of a m ore vicious attack th a n G en. G eorge M arshall, th e e ra 's su p re m e figure in n a tio n al security. In d ian a se n ato r W illiam Jen n er called h im "a living lie," "a fro n t m a n for traito rs," a n d "eith er a n u n su sp e c tin g sto o g e or a n actual co-conspirator w ith th e m o st treaso n ab le a rra y of political cu tth ro ats ev er tu rn e d loose in the E xecutive B ranch of G o v ern m en t." H e w as, sa id M c­ C arthy, p a rt of "a conspiracy so im m en se a n d a n in fam y so b lack as to d w a rf a n y p rev io u s su c h v e n tu re in the h isto ry of m an ." M cC arth y 's career clim axed in 1954 w ith attacks o n th e Pentagon. H o w ev e r w ild , th o se attacks d isp lay e d his co nsistent focus o n the u p p e r reaches of th e n a tio n a l secu rity state.95 T h o u g h less in the public eye th a n m en like M cC arthy, th e in stitu tio n al ap p a-

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ra tu s for policing d isse n t a n d su b v e rsio n su sta in ed th e Red Scare. T ru m a n 's L oyalty R eview B oard, the m ilitary services a n d th e AEC, th e C IA a n d J. E d g ar H o o v e r's FBI, a n d congressional com m ittees v ario u sly scru tin ized a n d h a ­ rasse d in d iv id u a ls, w a tch e d for spies, m a d e th e p u b lic case for rep ressio n , infil­ tra te d a n d sab o tag ed su sp ect org an izatio n s, ex ch an g ed a w e alth of in fo rm a­ tio n (often o u trag e o u sly inaccurate), a n d arrested , fired, o r d e p o rte d alleged o ffenders, w ith little interference from a co m p lian t c o u rt system . T heir av o w ed ta rg e t w a s co m m u n ists— spies a n d d u p e s d o in g th e K rem lin's b id d in g — a n d w h ile m e n like M cC arthy rarely p ro v e d th eir accusations, real en em y ag en ts d id seek A m erica's secrets, a n d th e C o m m u n ist P arty USA a n d allied g ro u p s d id follow M oscow 's h e av y -h an d e d d irectio n (th o u g h less slavishly th a n m o st A m erican s th o u g h t). To m a n y A m ericans, th e case of Julius a n d E thel R osenberg, executed in 1953 as "atom ic sp ies" for the Soviet U nion, gave co n v in cin g p ro o f of a c o m m u n ist d an g er. They, a t least Julius, likely d id p la y a role in p a ssin g in fo rm atio n ab o u t A m erica's n u c le ar w e a p o n s p ro g ram , b u t resp o n ses to th eir case also sh o w ed h o w au th o rities ex ag g erated th reats d u rin g th e Red Scare (an d h o w g e n d e r an d anti-S em itism c o u ld also p la y a role). G rossly d isto rtin g th e role of th e Rosenb erg s a n d atom ic esp io n ag e g enerally in th e Soviet n u c le ar p ro g ram , as if So­ v ie t scientists h a d n o ta le n t in su c h m atters. Ju d g e Irv in g K au fm an asserted th a t th e R osenbergs h a n d e d M oscow th e atom ic secret "y ears before o u r b est scientists p red ic te d R ussia w o u ld p erfect the b o m b ," a lth o u g h Soviet d e v elo p ­ m e n t of th e b o m b m atch e d th e p red ic tio n s o f m a n y of th o se scientists, a n d d e ­ clared th a t th eir esp io n ag e "h as a lre ad y c a u s e d . . . th e C o m m u n ist ag g ressio n in K orea" a n d p e rh a p s th e lives of "m illions m o re in n o cen t p eo p le" in th e fu ­ tu re.96 Still, su b v ersiv e activities or p a rty connectio n s w ere b y n o m ean s th e only ta rg e t of th e Red Scare: beliefs a n d b eh av io r of a w id e ran g e co u ld b rin g p eo p le u n d e r suspicion. O n e co u ld b e a "lo y alty " risk e v en if n o t a "secu rity " risk, or, as R obert O p p e n h e im e r fo u n d o u t in 1954 w h e n th e AEC d e n ie d h im a secu rity clearance, one c o u ld b e "a loyal citizen" b u t still a secu rity risk. N o r w ere beliefs th e o n ly sig n of p re su m e d d an g er, as th o u sa n d s of h o m o sex u als fo u n d o u t (their p re su m e d v u ln era b ility to blackm ail b y th e en em y w as a n e n d u rin g m y th of th e C old W ar), a n d as M cC arthy k e p t in sin u atin g : h e called D ean A ch eson "th e R ed D ean of fash io n " a n d so u g h t to ro o t o u t th e "C o m m u n ists a n d q u e e rs" a n d "p ran c in g m im ics of the M oscow p a rty line in th e State D e­ p a rtm e n t." T he looseness of su c h sta n d a rd s sh o w ed h o w th e Red Scare fed o n m o re th a n fear of com m unism . M ilitarizatio n in o th er form s co n scrip ted eco­ nom ic, social, a n d c u ltu ral resources; th e Red Scare em b o d ied a n a tte m p t to c o n scrip t th e m o st intangible resources of all: conscience a n d loyalty, a n allen co m p assin g b u t also h o p elessly v a g u e state of m in d a n d character.97 It is tru e th a t the state co n scrip ted th o se resources in a chaotic a n d capricious fash io n — th e "sta te " w as really a h o d g e -p o d g e of agencies a n d h ead lin e-

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g rab b in g in d iv id u a ls often a t o d d s w ith each oth er, n o t th e efficient m ach in e associated w ith to ta litaria n regim es. H ence o n e rea so n for th e ag o n y of A m eri­ cans w h o faced in q u isito rs in sistin g th a t th ey recan t a m u rk y p a st, n a m e u n ­ tru stw o rth y associates, o r o th erw ise e n list in th e cause: th e p ro cess w a s m a d e ev en m ore excruciating b y its v a g u e a n d ever-sh iftin g sta n d a rd s. C ap rice a n d chaos in d icated n o t th e absence of m ilita riza tio n b u t its characteristic A m erican form , how ever. Pluralistic, civil lib ertarian , a n d a n tista tist trad itio n s, like b u ­ reaucratic rivalries, ru le d o u t th e o p e ra tio n of a n y m o n o lith ic m achine. A p o lit­ ical sy stem th a t b o th p racticed rep ressio n a n d d e n ie d th e in te n t to d o so al­ lo w e d a u th o rity to scatter in all so rts of directio n s, w h ic h o n ly en co u rag e d its cap ricious use. T he R ed Scare also fed o n fru stratio n s o v e r A m erica's a p p a re n t failu re to " w in " th e C old W ar d e sp ite its ideological, econom ic, a n d n u c le ar su p erio rity . W orld W ar II h a d m a d e "to ta l v icto ry " th e A m erican goal in facing totalitarian s, y e t m a n y A m ericans d id n o t see th e ir g o v e rn m e n t p u rs u in g to ta l vic­ to ry in this n e w w a r (an d p ro b ab ly d id n o t w a n t it to). W h at c o u ld ex p lain A m erica's failure to w in w h e n it p o ssesse d th e m ea n s to achieve victory, if n o t c o rru p tio n o r sabotage of the w ill to w in? M en like M cC arth y h a d a n a sty a n ­ sw er to th a t n ag g in g question: traito rs in th e u p p e r reaches of g o v e rn m e n t a n d o th er in stitu tio n s w ere d e n y in g A m erica victo ry in th e C o ld W ar. H ence, too, th e close correlation b e tw ee n a p p a re n t A m erican d e fe at in th e C o ld W ar a n d th e m o u n tin g zeal of those cam paigns: th ey p e a k e d in th e late 1940s a n d early 1950s, w h e n c o m m u n ist ru le in E astern E u ro p e a n d C h in a w a s co n so lid ated , w h e n the Soviet U n io n acq u ired atom ic w e ap o n s, a n d w h e n th e K orean W ar reach ed a stalem ate. W ho ru led a t h o m e d ro v e th e R ed Scare as m u c h as w h o c o n q u ered ab ro ad , ho w ev er, so it w a s also d riv e n b y p a rtisa n politics. D em o crats w e re o ften ar­ d e n t p ractitioners, w h e th e r to b e ra te o p p o n e n ts in th e ir o w n p arty , to p ro tect th em selves from R epublican charges th a t th e y w e re "so ft" o n co m m u n ism , o r to act o n th eir o w n w o rries a b o u t n a tio n al security. In a m ajor step, T ru m a n in itiated a n e w loyalty p ro g ra m in F eb ru ary 1947, p ro v id in g a n a p p a ra tu s for d isch arg in g "d islo y al" fed eral em p lo y ees a n d fo rm alizin g th e a tto rn e y gen­ e ra l's listing of g ro u p s d e e m e d "to talitarian , fascist, c o m m u n ist, o r su b v er­ sive." D em ocrats also issu ed som e of th e m o st p u rp le rhetoric. A s J. H o w a rd M cG rath, T ru m a n 's a tto rn e y general, w a rn e d , "T here are to d a y m a n y co m m u ­ n ists in A m erica. T hey are e v ery w h e re — in factories, offices, b u tc h e r stores, o n street com ers, in p riv ate b u siness. A n d each carries in h im self th e d e a th of o u r society." O r as A dlai S tevenson d eclared d u rin g h is 1952 p re sid e n tia l cam ­ p aig n , "Soviet secret ag en ts a n d th eir d u p e s " h a d "b u rro w e d like m o les" into g o v e rn m e n ts ev ery w h ere, a n d "o n e b y one th e lam p s of civ ilization go o u t an d nam eless h o rro rs are p e rp e tra te d in d a rk n e ss." C e n trist D em o crats like T ru­ m a n d id try to restrain free-sw inging w itc h -h u n te rs like M cC arth y a n d to m ain tain d u e process in efforts to ro o t o u t su b v ersio n , b u t th ey also red -b aited

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W allace a n d th e P rogressives a n d sa n ctio n ed a w id e n in g n e t of fed eral efforts to w e e d o u t do m estic foes. M eanw hile, so u th e rn D em ocrats attack ed a d v o ­ cates of civil rights. "O ne of the m o st vicious m o v em en ts th a t h as y e t b e e n in sti­ tu te d b y th e crackpots, th e C o m m u n ists a n d th e p a rlo r p in k s in th is c o u n try is try in g to b ro w b e a t th e A m erican R ed C ross in to tak in g th e labels off th e b lo o d b a n k . . . so th a t it w ill n o t sh o w w h e th e r it is N eg ro b lo o d o r w h ite b lo o d ," ch arg ed C o n g re ssm a n John R ankin.98 D em o crats w ere u su a lly o n th e defensive, ho w ev er. Insofar as th ey b eliev ed th e y "stole th e R epublican th u n d e r" w ith T ru m a n 's loy alty p ro g ram , th ey w ere w ro n g — th e y o n ly fu rth e r v a lid a te d su sp icio n s so o n tu rn e d b ack a g ain st them . R ep u b licans sto o d to g ain th e m o st from the R ed Scare a n d p resse d it h a rd e st fo r political ad v an tag e . L ong o u t of th e W hite H o u se, fru stra te d a n ew b y D e w e y 's stu n n in g loss to T ru m a n in 1948, th ey so u g h t to d isc red it th e D em o­ cratic p a rty b y placin g N e w D eal liberalism o n a slip p ery slope th a t ra n d o w n to socialism a n d co m m unism . T he country, ch arg ed R ep ublican C o n g ressm an K arl M u n d t in a typical attack, "for eig h teen y ears h a d b e en ru n b y N ew D ealers, Fair D ealers, M isdealers a n d [Alger] H iss d ealers w h o h av e sh u ttle d b ack a n d fo rth b e tw e e n F reedom a n d R ed Fascism like a p e n d u lu m o n a k u k o o clock." In 1950 R ichard N ix o n d eclared th a t h is o p p o n e n t for th e Senate, H elen G a h ag a n D ouglas, "follow s the C o m m u n ist P arty line." D esp ite th e ir k n o w l­ ed g e of th e w itc h -h u n te rs' dishonesty, G O P lea d ers like S en ato r R obert Taft e g g ed o n M cC arthy, Jenner, a n d o th er R epublicans, Taft tellin g M cC arth y "if o n e case [alleging su b v e rsio n in the T ru m a n A d m in istratio n ] d id n 't w o rk , to b rin g u p a n o th e r." T he a fte rm a th of th e 1952 elections d e m o n stra te d a n ew the role of p a rtisa n politics in the Red Scare: w h e n M cC arthy c o n tin u e d h is accusa­ tio n s e v e n th o u g h th e G O P n o w controlled th e W hite H o u se, R epublican lea d ers m o v ed , slo w ly b u t effectively, to d riv e h im fro m p o w er, h e lp in g to e n ­ g in eer th e S enate's n a rro w ly crafted censure of M cC arth y in 1954. M eanw hile, a g e n eratio n of y o u n g e r R epublicans like N ix o n lau n c h ed th eir careers b y g o in g a fter alleged co m m u n ists a n d subversiv es.99 T he resu lt w a s a politics d o m in a te d b y th e rhetoric, sym bols, a n d issu es of n a tio n a l security. C itizens c o n tin u ed to v o te o n o th er issues a n d habits: th ere is little ev id en ce th a t M cC arthyite tactics alone sw u n g m a n y elections. "E v ery o n e w a s a g ain st c o m m u n ism ," R ichard Fried notes, "b u t th ere w ere lim its to the ex ertio ns th e av erag e citizen w a s w illin g to in v est in th a t sen tim en t." Still, e sp e­ cially in th e early 1950s, th e politics of fear d o m in a te d m a n y election cam ­ p a ig n s, scream ed o u t in the h ead lin es, seized C o n g ress's atten tio n , b u rd e n e d P resid en ts, a n d g u tte d lea d ersh ip in key agencies. In th a t en v iro n m en t, th ere w a s lim ited room for o th er issu e s— racial a n d econom ic reform , for ex am p le— ju st as o n e th ru st of th e Red Scare w a s to k eep su c h issues a t bay. E ven after th e fu ro r a b ated a t m id -d ecad e, m a n y of its a ttitu d e s a n d practices p e rsisted , ju st as th e c o n tin u in g use of the te rm McCarthyism in to th e 1990s, b y th e n u se d to d isc red it p e o p le a n d beliefs across th e full ran g e of political activity, sh o w ed

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h o w th e te rm c o n tin u ed to in form " o u r la n g u a g e — w ith a slo p p in ess w o rth y of its o rig in s."100 The fate of tw o in stitu tio n s illu strates th e R ed Scare's effects. O rg a n iz ed la­ b o r w a s sy stem atically p u rg e d of co m m u n ists a n d o th e r radicals. T he 1947 T aft-H artley A ct req u ire d u n io n officials to sw ea r th ey w ere n o t co m m u n ists, m a n a g em en t a n d co n serv ativ e u n io n lead ers u se d th e law as a tool for p u rg in g la b o r's ranks, a n d federal agencies like the AEC w o rk e d to d isc red it rad ical u n io n s like th e U n ited Electrical W orkers. T h o u g h la b o r's p o stw a r co n serv a­ tism h a d m a n y sources, the R ed Scare ab ette d a ch an g e th a t left u n io n s ill e q u ip p e d a n d d isin clin ed to challenge C old W ar policy a n d c o rp o ra te control of th e w o rk force. A sim ilar th o u g h less b ra w lin g change u n fo ld e d in academ ia. T eachers fired or d e n ie d jobs p ro b ab ly n u m b e re d o n ly in th e h u n d re d s , b u t, as P eter N o v ick notes, "th e scarcity of o v e rt in stan ces" of rep re ssio n w a s m erely a "m ea su re of its effectiveness." "Like th e a p o cry p h al sm all-to w n N azis w h o p e titio n e d Ber­ lin to se n d th e m a Jew ish sh o p k e ep e r so th ey co u ld b o y co tt h im , th ere m ay h av e b een the w ill w ith in the u n iv ersity a n d th e p ro fessio n to rep re ss d issid e n t h isto ria n s a n d h isto rio g rap h y , b u t th ere w a s n 't m u c h d issid en ce to rep ress." Publicly, elite schools p ro claim ed th eir defen se of academ ic freed o m a n d a u ­ tonom y. Privately, th ey co o p erated w ith th e FBI a n d o th er agencies, in a n effort n o u rish e d b y m u tu a l d e p e n d e n c y b e tw e e n th e acad em y a n d g o v e rn m e n t re­ g a rd in g defense-related m atters, a n d sh ro u d e d in a w eb of secrecy a n d d e ce p ­ tion. T he m o o d w a s c a p tu re d in 1949 b y Yale's p resid en t: "T here w ill b e n o w itch -h u n ts a t Yale because th ere w ill b e n o w itch es." H a rv a rd p re sid e n t Jam es C o n a n t a n n o u n c e d the sam e policy publicly, a n d p riv a te ly w ith a vengeance. A t its w o rst, it e x te n d e d to seeing a n y o p p o sitio n to d o m in a n t policies "as su b v e rsiv e — of n atio n , of fam ily, of social o rd e r itself; it w a s to b e h u n te d a n d u p ro o te d ." In response, som e intellectuals w ere w o rrie d o r d efiant. "W h a t is th e n e w loyalty?" a sk ed h isto ria n H e n ry Steele C om m ager. "It is, ab o v e all, conform ity. It is th e uncritical a n d u n q u e stio n in g acceptance of A m erica as it is." M any intellectuals, h ow ever, q u e stio n e d o n ly eg reg io u s ab u ses of sta te a u ­ thority, n o t the basic n e e d to exercise it a g ain st su b v e rsio n a n d dissen t. T he g o o d liberal state, th ey tru ste d , w o u ld o p e ra te b y fair m eth o d s. H en ce th eir shock w h e n O p p e n h e im e r w as b a n ish e d from th e AEC: h e fell victim n o t to rav in g co n g ressm en o r reactionary college tru stees b u t to "th e executive b ran c h of the fed eral g o v e rn m e n t— the v e ry in stitu tio n th e intellectu als h a d fancied as th eir sta u n ch e st ally." Intellectuals w ere h a rd ly " m o d e m Dr. F ran­ k en steins" n o w "h o rrified b y th e m o n ster th ey h a d created ," ch aracterizatio n s th a t o verstate th eir influence, b u t "liberals' o w n m ilita n t an ti-C o m m u n ism " d id co ntribute to th e Red Scare.101 T he Red Scare h a d m ig h ty effects. Som e w ere ironic o v er th e lo n g term : it fostered o p p o sitio n to m ilitarizatio n from a n g ry stu d e n ts, d isillu sio n ed lib­ erals, in d ig n a n t hom osexuals, m ilita n t A frican-A m ericans, a n d o th ers fu rio u s

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a t its w o rk in g s a n d its legacy. In the m ean tim e, h o w ev er, it h e lp e d to cru sh o p ­ p o sitio n to A m erica's m ilitarized course. The d ay -to -d ay d o m in an ce of its m o o d s a n d issues traced th e scale a n d d e p th of m ilitarizatio n . It is tru e th a t d riv in g th e R ed Scare, alo n g sid e fears for n a tio n al safety, w e re d isp a ra te con­ flicts ro o ted in region, ethnicity, g en d er, class, politics, a n d foreign policy. T hat, h o w ev er, is th e n a tu re of m ilitarization: it n e v e r arises solely o u t of m ilitary n e ed , real o r im ag in ed . Its force d e riv e d from th e m a n n e r in w h ic h all so rts of conflicts becom e su b su m e d u n d e r o r attach ed to d o m in a n t anxieties a b o u t n a ­ tio n a l security.

The Elusive War in Korea "T he average G I," co m m en ted Eric G o ld m an a few y ears after th e K orean W ar, " h a d n o t th e slig h test id ea w h y h e w a s b a ttlin g o n th ese far-off hills. T il fig h t for m y c o u n try / C o rp o ral S tep h en Z eg of C hicago p u t it, 'b u t I'll b e d a m n e d if I see w h y I'm fig h tin g to save this hell h o le .'" 102 P ro b ab ly m o st A m erican s felt like Z eg, th eir reflexive p a trio tism offsetting th eir co n sid erab le b ew ild erm en t. W hile th ey fretted, the w a r 's consequences— in m a n y w a y s th e co m p letio n of A m erica's m ilita riza tio n — settled in. T he w a r b roke o u t in circum stances few A m erican s u n d e rsto o d , a lth o u g h m a n y w ere chronic features of the C old W ar. Like m a n y o th er A sian n atio n s, K orea h a d b e en u n d e r im p erial rule, a lth o u g h Japan, n o t a W estern n atio n , h a d b e en its b ru ta l o v erseer u n til Ja p an 's d e fe at in 1945. A s w ith G erm an y a n d A u s­ tria, K orea's m ilita ry o ccu p atio n h a d b e e n d iv id e d , su p p o se d ly tem p o rarily ; Soviet forces a ssu m e d th e task in th e n o rth , A m erican in th e so u th . T he U n ited States g o v ern m en t, in o rd e r to c o n tain b o th c o m m u n ism a n d S o u th K orea's in ­ te rn a l d iso rd er, th re w its s u p p o rt— reluctantly, a t th e in stig atio n of A m erican a u th o rities in Seoul, b u t decisively— b e h in d co n serv ativ e political a n d social forces led b y S y n g m an Rhee, a P rin ceto n Ph.D ., K orean n atio n alist, foe of Japa­ n ese rule, a n d h e a d of a repressive a n d som etim es m u rd e ro u s g o v ern m en t. In th e n o rth , a co m m u n ist regim e u n d e r K im II S ung to o k p o w e r th ro u g h force, Soviet aid, a n d su b sta n tia l p o p u la r su p p o rt. T he situ atio n w a s u nstable: each sid e w a s a rm e d b y a p a tro n of u n c ertain reliability a n d each laid claim to th e w h o le n atio n , p ro m p tin g a civil w a r b e tw ee n th em in th e late 1940s. A m erican m ilitary leaders, p resse d b y c o m m itm en ts elsew here, m in im ized K orea's strategic significance. Like G en. D o uglas M acA rthur, c o m m an d e r of th e o ccu p atio n in Japan, the Joint C hiefs believ ed th a t "a n y c o m m itm en t to U n ited States use of m ilitary force in K orea w o u ld b e ill-ad v ised a n d im p racti­ cab le."103 T hey got A m erican forces w ith d ra w n in 1949, b u t th e State D e p art­ m e n t resisted full d isen g ag em en t, stressin g South K orea's sym bolic im p o r­ tance a n d th e psychological rep ercu ssio n s of its fall to co m m u n ism . Secretary of State A cheson w a lk ed th e fine line in a fam o u s Jan u ary 1950 a d d ress, later b lam ed for en co u rag in g N o rth K orea's attack, in w h ic h h e placed S outh K orea

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b e y o n d the A m erican d efense p e rim e te r b u t affirm ed th e h o p e it co u ld b e s u p ­ p o rte d w ith o u t m ilitary force. T h at h o p e seem ed reaso n ab le, since A m erican officials a n ticip a te d n o full-scale attack from th e n o rth . Then, o n June 25,1950, the lo n g civil w a r s u d d e n ly escalated w h e n th e N o rth K orean a rm y rolled across th e 38th p arallel, o v e rw h elm ed R hee's forces, a n d sw ep t th ro u g h h is cap ital of Seoul a n d b ey o n d . G iv en five y ears of su p e rp o w e r jockeying for p osition, this w a r w a s p ro b ab ly d o o m e d to b eco m e a C o ld W ar b attlefield, b u t A m erican reactions h e lp e d seal th a t outcom e. Reflexes co n d i­ tio n ed b y y ears of global crisis n o w sn a p p e d in to place. To b e su re, ev id en ce th a t Stalin d irected th e N o rth K orean attack w a s scant: th e absence fro m th e U n ited N atio n s of his a m b assad o r, w h o m ig h t h av e v e to e d A m ericansp o n so red action, su g g e ste d th a t a t least the tim in g of K im II S u n g 's offensive to o k the K rem lin b y su rp rise. T he p ress of A m erican co m m itm en ts elsew h ere a n d th e su sp icio u s logic of C o ld W arriors also m ig h t h av e sta y ed th e a d m in is­ tra tio n 's h a n d : it co u ld h av e a ssu m e d th a t "c u n n in g K rem lin stra te g ists . . . w ere try in g to e n tra p the U n ited States" in to a d iv e rsio n a ry conflict o r a k illing g ro u n d .104 T hat this w a s a civil w a r b e tw e e n rep ressiv e reg im es also a rg u e d for caution. O n th e o th er h a n d , Stalin likely p la y e d som e role, g iv in g th e attack a g reen lig h t if. n o t in stig atin g it, a n d in a n y e v e n t it w a s h a rd to k n o w w h a t h is role w a s (even th e C o ld W ar's e n d y ield ed o n ly teasin g e v id en ce th a t it w a s p a ra m o u n t). C onversely, the fact th a t M oscow d istan c ed itself po litically a n d m ilitarily from N o rth K orea a t th e w a r 's sta rt allo w ed W ash in g to n to e n te rta in in te rv en tio n w ith o u t g rea t fear of co n fro n tin g Soviet forces. W h atev er those com plexities, A m erican lea d ers in te rp re te d N o rth K orea's offensive as p a rt of S talin's m a ste r p la n for w o rld c o n q u est a n d p laced it o n the fam iliar g rid of recent history. T he A m erican a m b a ssa d o r in M oscow lab eled th e N o rth K orean attack a "clear-cut Soviet ch allen g e" a n d State D e p a rtm e n t ex p erts w ere certain th a t N o rth K orea's g o v e rn m e n t w a s "ab so lu tely u n d e r K rem lin control." A s T ru m a n later recalled, h e flew b ack to W ash in g to n m e d i­ tatin g o n "earlier instances" of aggression: "M an ch u ria, E th io p ia, A u stria. I re­ m em b ered h o w each tim e th a t th e dem ocracies failed to act it h a d e n co u rag e d th e ag gressors to k eep g o in g ah ead . C o m m u n ism w as acting in K orea ju st as H itler, M ussolini, a n d th e Japanese h a d acted ten, fifteen, a n d tw e n ty y ears ear­ lier." A t a key W ash in g to n conference, the v iew w a s u n a n im o u s th a t "refu sal to rep el the aggression w o u ld b e n o th in g b u t 'a p p e a se m e n t.' A n d a p p ea sem e n t, as h isto ry h a s sh o w n , w o u ld u ltim ately lead to w a r." By th a t reaso n in g , "w e h a d to m ake a sta n d som e tim e, o r else let all of A sia go b y th e b o a rd ," T ru m a n arg u ed . "If w e w ere to let A sia go, th e N e a r E ast w o u ld collapse a n d n o tellin g w h a t w o u ld h a p p e n in E u ro p e." Press a n d p o litician s so m etim es ech o ed th a t view : "Talk a b o u t parallels!" d eclared one D em o crat in referrin g to " th e actions w h ic h led to the Second W orld W ar." The 1930s d id n o t offer th e o n ly analogy, b u t o th ers (to G reece a n d C zechoslovakia in th e late 1940s) offered th e sam e lesson. T ru m a n quickly d e cid ed to se n d A m erican forces to K orea d e sp ite the reluctance, often sh o w n d u rin g the C o ld W ar, of m an y m ilitary officials.105

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T ied to th is sense of h isto ry w ere co n sid eratio n s of politics a n d policy. Few politicians o r p u n d its in th e d a y s after Ju n e 25 called for th e d isp a tc h of A m eri­ can forces to K orea, b u t for a n a d m in istra tio n alre ad y tak in g b lam e for th e loss of C h in a a n d E astern E u rope to com m unism , em b a rk in g o n n e w co m m itm en ts in A sia a n d E urope, a n d w eig h in g th e re a rm a m e n t p la n laid o u t in NSC-68, the o u tb rea k of w a r seem ed b o th tra p a n d o p p o rtu n ity . A m erican in te rv en tio n in K orea w o u ld o p e n the fiscal sp ig o ts for rea rm am en t, w h ile in action risk ed n e w a b u se fro m o p p o n e n ts a n d a fatal blo w to rea rm am en t, w h ic h w o u ld be h a rd to ju stify if T ru m a n seem ed u n w illin g to u se it. A n d , so p o licy m ak ers also w o r­ ried , if co m m u n ists triu m p h e d in K orea, a w id e r w a r in A sia m ig h t e n su e u n ­ d e r w o rse circum stances, d iv e rtin g ev en m o re resources from E u ro p e a n d je o p a rd iz in g Jap an 's p iv o ta l role in th e an tico m m u n ist alliance a n d its eco­ no m ic w ell-being. "T ru m an h a d to h av e a crisis to sell th e NSC 68 p ro g ra m ."106 H is reaso n in g resem bled FD R's in 1941: action w a s necessary in th e Far E ast in o rd e r to u p h o ld a E urope-first priority, e v en as it risk ed u n d e rm in in g th a t p ri­ ority. H o w co u ld h e p ro claim a global stru g g le a g ain st c o m m u n ism a n d th en elect to w a g e it o n ly in E urope? A s in 1941, a P re sid e n t's expansive v iew of h is p rero g ativ es also e n co u rag ed in terv ention. Taft a n d o th er R epublicans w a n te d T ru m an to c o n su lt C ongress o r seek a d eclaratio n of w ar, b u t T ru m an a n d A ch eso n m a in ta in e d b o th the rig h t a n d necessity of q uick executive action. A s T ru m a n co m m en ted w h e n h e o rd ere d in the first g ro u n d tro o p s o n June 30, "I ju st h a d to act as C o m m an d erin-C hief, a n d I d id ." 107 T h at conception of h is co n stitu tio n al p o w e rs conflated h is a u th o rity to c o m m an d forces in w a r w ith h is rig h t to co m m it th em to w a r (A rticle II m a d e h im c o m m an d e r in chief of A m erican forces " w h e n called in to th e actual service of the U n ited States"), m ak in g h im th e n a tio n 's c o m m an d e r in chief, n o t ju st the m ilita ry 's.108 T ru m a n h a d p re c e d e n t o n h is sid e b u t w e n t b e y o n d FD R's n otable exam ple in th e A tlantic in 1941: K orea w o u ld b e th e larg­ est w a r y e t w a g e d o n p resid en tia l authority. R ecourse to th e U n ited N atio n s Security C ouncil, w h ic h sa n ctio n ed "police action" a g ain st N o rth K orea's in v a ­ sion, assisted the e n d ru n a ro u n d C o n gress's p o w e r to declare w ar. Ironically, it seem ed easier to get the U N th a n C ongress to take action. The parallels w ith 1941 ra n b e y o n d h a rd policy to in tan g ib le m atters of m ood. A s th ey h a d after Pearl H arb o r, som e o b serv ers n o ticed h o w A m ericans w elco m ed the clarity of w a r after y ears of ten sio n a n d confusion. "N e v er b e ­ fore," n o te d Joseph H a rsc h a b o u t h is tw e n ty y ears in W ashington, "h av e I felt su ch a sense of relief a n d u n ity p ass th ro u g h th e city."109 In th a t sp irit, som e W ashington insiders seem ed to w elcom e po ssib le Soviet o r C h inese in te rv en ­ tion in Korea as the p rete x t n e e d e d to lau n ch a decisive n u c le ar attack o n th e Soviet U nion. A s in 1941, c u ltu ral a n d racial arro g an ce also m a d e reco u rse to w a r easier. The a d m in istratio n in itially c o m m itted on ly air a n d n av al forces, because it so u g h t to co n tain A m erican in v o lv e m en t b u t also because it u n d e r­ estim ated the e n em y 's m ilitary p o w e r a n d political a p p e a l to S outh K oreans. The u n lu ck y A m erican g ro u n d forces ru sh e d in to b a ttle in Ju ly — from Japan,

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w h ere th ey h a d suffered the ills of lax train in g , alcohol, a n d v en ereal disease en d em ic to an o ccu p atio n force— sh a red th a t o p tim ism b u t m e t a su p e rio r force a n d h u m iliatin g defeat. W ith th eir defeat, T ru m a n 's o n ly choices seem ed to be full-scale w a r o r total retreat. H e o p te d for th e form er, a n d a see-saw y e ar of w a r se n t A m erican s os­ cillating b e tw ee n exuberance a n d d esp air. A fter A m erican a n d S o u th K orean forces w ere d riv e n into a sm all enclave in K orea's so u th e aste rn co m er. G en eral M acA rth u r lau n ch ed a d a rin g counterattack : o n S ep tem b er 15, h is forces car­ ried o u t a n am p h ib io u s. W orld W ar II-s ty le la n d in g a t Inchon, o n th e w e ste rn sh o re far b e h in d N o rth K orean lines, a n d th e n quick ly re c a p tu re d Seoul a n d sw e p t n o rth b e y o n d th e 38th parallel. In a fateful d ecisio n sh a red b y M ac­ A rth u r, th e Joint C hiefs, th e W hite H o u se, a n d th e U N G en eral A ssem bly, allied forces th e n stru ck n o rth to w a rd th e b o rd e r w ith C h in a in o rd e r to reu n ite Ko­ rea. T hey also d isc o u n te d w a rn in g s of po ssib le C hinese in terv en tio n . T h at cam e in full force a t the e n d of N ovem ber, o v e rw h elm in g M a c A rth u r's overex­ te n d e d forces a n d se n d in g th em reeling back across th e 38th p arallel, alo n g w h ich the fro n t stabilized b y M arch 1951. A t th a t p o in t M acA rth u r trig g ered a sensatio n al crisis th a t laid b a re th e fru s­ tratio n s of co ntainm ent. A m id back-biting o v er resp o n sib ility for N o v e m b e r's d isa ster a n d talk of d ip lo m atic efforts to e n d th e w ar, h e se n t h is forces across th e 38th p arallel again, called for N a tio n a list C h in a (Form osa) to attack C hina, th rea te n ed to b om b C hina, a n d in sisted th a t A sia, n o t E u ro p e, w a s th e decisive C old W ar arena. M uch of th is differed little from th e o u tlo o k of W ash in g to n p o licy m ak ers a few m o n th s earlier: reunificatio n h a d b e en th eir goal; T ru m a n h im self h a d publicly su g g e ste d possible u se of atom ic b o m b s in K orea; v a rio u s officials h a d ev en d iscu ssed "th e atom ic b o m b a rd m e n t of Soviet R ussia itself" or sim ilar schem es if Peking o r M oscow c o n tin u ed to s u p p o rt N o rth Korea. But M acA rth u r h a d gone public, after y ears of ran co ro u s relatio n sh ip s w ith tw o P resid en ts, a n d a n in fu ria te d T ru m a n fired him . M u ch h o o p la e n su ed , as T ru­ m a n 's sta n d in g in o p in io n polls p lu n g e d a n d M a cA rth u r re tu rn e d to the U n ited States "to receive a w elcom e th a t w o u ld h av e m a d e C aesar en v io u s," b a sk in g in ticker-tape p a ra d e s a n d a d d re ssin g C ongress. O n e e x asp e rate d T ru­ m a n ad v iso r scrip ted a m ock v ersio n of M a c A rth u r's w elco m e in W ashington: "12:30, W ades asho re from Snorkel s u b m a r in e . . . 1:50, B u rn in g of th e C o n sti­ tution; 1:55, L ynching of Secretary A cheson; 3:00,21-a to m ic b o m b salute; 3:30; 300 n u d e D .A .R.'s leap from W ashington M o n u m e n t. . . ." T edious co n g res­ sional h e arin g s soon took the w in d o u t of the d ra m a a n d p ro d u c e d G en. O m a r B radley's fam o u s re p u d ia tio n of M a c A rth u r's stra te g y as o n e th a t "w o u ld in ­ volve u s in the w ro n g w a r a t the w ro n g place a t th e w ro n g tim e a n d w ith the w ro n g en em y ."110 T ru m an a n d m an y others, th en a n d later, c o n stru ed h is firin g of M acA rth u r as a triu m p h of civilian over m ilitary authority, b u t it w a s n e v e r p rim a rily that, as the Joint C hiefs' firm su p p o rt of h is decision m a d e clear. In stead , M acA rth u r

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h a d ta p p e d fru stra tio n ov er the am b ig u ities of c o n tain m en t, as th e a d m in istra ­ tio n p ro cla im e d a global struggle, p la y e d o n m em o ries of to tal v icto ry in W orld W ar II, briefly s o u g h t su ch victory in K orea— a n d th en , after C h in a en te red th e w ar, se ttled for m u c h less a n d for a n en d less C old W ar. By sh o w in g "u n re le n t­ in g h o stility to w a rd C h in a a n d R ussia, w ith o u t ev er d o in g a n y th in g to d estro y th e C o m m u n ist n a tio n s," th e a d m in istra tio n seem ed to "be accepting p e rm a ­ n e n t ten sio n , p e rm a n e n t risk, a n d a p e rm a n e n t p o stp o n e m e n t of th e social a n d econom ic p ro m ises of the N e w D eal."111 C ertain ly the c o n d u c t of th e K orean W ar d u rin g th e rest of T ru m a n 's p resi­ d e n c y p ro m ise d n o b e tte r outcom e. The w a r b ecam e a c o n test am o n g en ­ tren c h ed forces o n a scarred a n d cold lan d scap e, w ith th e en em y m ak in g futile ch arg es a n d allied forces u n a b le to g a in a decision. It w a s e v en u g lie r for W orld W ar II v e te ran s called back to com bat w h ile y o u n g e r A m erican s escap ed it (u n ­ til co n scrip tio n p u lle d th em in to the pipeline), a n d b y its e n d fifty-five th o u ­ s a n d A m ericans h a d d ie d in this "m ea t g rin d e r of A m erican m an h o o d ," as C o n g ressm an A lb ert G ore called it. Far m o re K oreans a n d C h in ese su c cu m b e d — p e rh a p s a m illion, e v en tw o m illio n civilians alone in o n e esti­ m ate. By 1951, m o st A m ericans, as ju d g e d b y o p in io n polls, w a n te d o u t of Ko­ rea a n d d islik ed T ru m a n 's h a n d lin g of th e w ar, b u t it d ra g g e d on, w ith a rm i­ stice talks d ead lo ck ed in d isag reem en ts ov er p riso n e rs of w a r.112 T ru m a n d id succeed in c o n tain in g b o th c o m m u n ism a n d th e im p u lse to w a g e w o rld w ar. Still, it w a s a n e a r m iss. K orea w a s a lim ited w a r o n ly in th a t it d id n o t see atom ic w e a p o n s u se d a n d d id n o t spill b e y o n d K orea's b o rd ers. W ith in those b o rd ers, it w a s as ferocious as a n y m o d e m w ar, ex p o sin g an ew th e n a tu re of A m erican w arm ak in g . In p articu lar, th e u se of A m erican air p o w e r rep rise d m a n y of the m otives, m eth o d s, a n d resu lts seen in th e w a r w ith Jap an (w ith Jap an n o w p ro v id in g th e air bases). M in d fu l of h o m efro n t re p u g ­ n an ce a t spillin g A m erican b lood, fru stra te d in th e g ro u n d w ar, a n d e n tra n ce d b y th e p ro m ise of air po w er, A m erican lead ers u n le a sh e d th e b o m b ers again. B-29s sp illed th e ir incendiaries o n P yo n g y an g , N o rth K orea's capital, in Jan u ­ ary 1951, a n d th e firebom bing c o n tin u ed u n til n e arly ev ery N o rth K orean city h a d b e e n su b sta n tia lly d e stro y ed a n d th o u sa n d s of civilians killed. Fighterb o m b ers u se d sim ilar tactics a g ain st sm aller to w n s a n d villages close to the g ro u n d com bat, sh o w erin g th eir in h ab itan ts w ith n ap alm ; re p o rts o n th e raid s, I. F. Stone th o u g h t, h a d "a k in d of gay m o ral im b e c ility . . . as if th e fliers w ere p lay in g in a b o w lin g alley, w ith villages for p in s." T he air force so u g h t to terro r­ ize th e p o p u lace in to su rre n d e r; as D efense Secretary R obert L o v ett p u t it in 1952, "If w e keep o n tearin g th e place a p art, w e can m ak e it a m o st u n p o p u la r affair for the N o rth K oreans."113 Strategic b o m b in g co u ld n ot, ho w ev er, force s u rre n d e r a g ain st a n en em y w ith lim ited in d u stry th a t d re w m u c h of its su p p lies from C h in a a n d R ussia. T he b o m b ers' o th er m a in goal, in te rd ic tin g en em y su p p ly lines ru n n in g d o w n to th e front, m et m ore success, b u t th e c o m m u n ists' a b u n d a n t m a n p o w e r com -

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pensateci for lost trucks a n d train s, w h ile the celeb rated A m erican b o m b in g of b rid g es across th e Yalu R iver m a d e less difference in w in ter, w h e n th e riv er froze anyw ay. T he m o st effective u se of A m erican air p o w e r w a s in close s u p ­ p o rt of g ro u n d forces. M eanw hile, th e b o m b in g effort w a s costly to th e U n ited States. C hinese fighters to o k a h e av y toll of A m erican aircraft a n d th e fireb o m b ­ in g p ro v id e d co m m u n ists a n o p p o rtu n ity to p ro te st alleg ed w a r crim es (com ­ m itte d also b y c o m m u n ist forces, a n d b y S ou th K orea's o n a scale e ith e r g rea ter in reality o r m o re easily do cu m en ted ). T he desire to d o m ore b o m b in g , th o u g h rid ic u le d w h e n M a cA rth u r d is­ p la y e d it, k e p t su rfacing am o n g T ru m a n a n d o th er officials. T h eir p u b lic th rea ts to attack C h in a o r th e Soviet U n io n co u ld b e seen as a tte m p ts to in tim i­ d a te th e en em y ra th e r th a n actually u n le a sh atom ic w e ap o n s, ex cep t th a t in p ri­ vate, too, th ey freq u en tly a n d serio u sly co n sid ered e m p lo y in g su c h w eap o n s. A s late as Jan u ary 27,1952, e v en th o u g h (or p recisely because) th e w a r h a d set­ tled in to a stalem ate, T ru m a n m u se d in h is d ia ry a b o u t issu in g th e Soviet U n io n a n u ltim a tu m w h o se rejection w o u ld m ea n n u c le ar w ar. "It m ean s th a t M os­ cow, St. P etersburg, M u k d en , V ladivostock, Peking, S h anghai, P o rt A rth u r, D airen, O dessa, S talingrad a n d ev ery m a n u fa c tu rin g p la n t in C h in a a n d th e Soviet U n io n w ill be e lim in a te d ."114 Public o p in io n h a rd ly seem ed to restra in him : p olls a n d political co m m en tary sh o w e d co n sisten t su p p o rt for u se of n u ­ clear w eap o n s. T ru m a n knew , ho w ev er, th a t A m erican allies o p p o se d su c h a d rastic step a n d th a t th e Soviet U n io n h a d atom ic b o m b s a n d th e cap acity to d eliv er th em o n th o se allies, th o u g h n o t y e t o n th e U n ite d States. H is fan tasy p ro b ab ly m e a su re d h is fru stra tio n as m u c h as h is inten tio n . The atom ic bo m b s d id n o t fall, b u t the K orean W ar activ ated , en larg ed , o r red irected m a n y facets of A m erica's m ilitarizatio n , a n d in g en eral co m p leted it. T h at w a s m o st e v id e n t in th e sh eer scale a n d am b itio n of n a tio n a l secu rity p o li­ cies after Ju n e 1950, as th e g ra n d p lan s of NSC-68 sp ru n g to life. T he w a r in sti­ g a te d o r crystallized c o m m itm en ts to a id th e F rench in th e ir w a r a g ain st in su r­ g en ts in Indochina; to assist th e Filipino g o v e rn m e n t a g ain st th e H u k insurgency; to p ro tect a n d a rm the N a tio n a list C hinese g o v e rn m e n t o n For­ m osa; a n d to re p u d ia te p rev io u s co n sid eratio n of d ip lo m atic reco g n itio n of C h in a's n e w c o m m u n ist g o v ern m en t. It tig h te n ed a n e w Jap an ese-A m erican alliance, as A m erican sp e n d in g in Jap an for th e w a r effort accelerated Ja p an 's econom ic recovery, w h ile a peace tre a ty g ra n te d th e U n ited States ex ten siv e m ilitary bases in Jap an a n d Jap an th e o p p o rtu n ity for lim ited re a rm a m e n t a n d e n o rm o u s in d u stria l expansion. T he w a r b ro u g h t to N A TO th e m em b ersh ip of G reece a n d Turkey, A m erican su p p o rt for W est G e rm a n rea rm am en t, a n d m o re A m erican forces to th e C ontinent. T he U n ited States also acq u ired n ew b ases in N o rth A frica a n d th e M id d le East, su b sta n tia lly c o m p letin g its aerial encirclem ent of the co m m u n ist bloc. A n d it in creased several-fold its m ilitary aid to allies, if only to assu ag e a fear a m o n g A m erican lead ers th a t inaction w o u ld w e ak e n "foreign resolve a n d A m erican reliability," a ratio n ale th a t w o u ld v irtu a lly forbid an y fu tu re cutbacks.115

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A v a st increase in d efense b u d g e ts w a s th e fo u n d a tio n of th e a d m in istra ­ tio n 's policy. E x p en d itu res o n n a tio n al secu rity (excluding v eteran s) m o re th a n trip led , reach in g fifty billio n d o llars in 1953 (tw o -th ird s of th e fed eral g o v e rn ­ m e n t's b u d g e t), a n d th e ir sh are of G N P sh o t u p from 4.6 to 13.8 percent. T he size of th e a rm e d forces m ore th a n d o u b led , p e a k in g a t 3.635 m illio n p erso n n el in u n ifo rm in 1952. M uch m a n p o w e r a n d m o n ey w e n t to K orea, b u t m u c h also to E u ro p e, to n e w b ases elsew here, a n d to sh a rp ly e x p a n d e d w e a p o n s p ro ­ g ram s. A n e w g e n eratio n of jet fighters a n d b o m b ers e n te red th e p ip elin e, in ­ c lu d in g n e a rly tw o th o u sa n d B-47 b o m b ers a n d th e lo n g er-ran g e B-52, alo n g w ith jet tan k ers, su p ercarriers, a n d n e w tactical w eap o n s, a n d w o rk accelerated o n lo n g -ran g e rockets a n d m issiles a n d o n a n e x p a n d e d n u c le ar arsenal. In O c­ to b er 1952, th e U n ited States teste d its first h y d ro g e n b o m b — in a su p re m e irony, its fallout m ay h av e g iv en Soviet scientists critical clues for d e sig n in g h y ­ d ro g e n b om bs, as O p p e n h e im e r a p p a re n tly feared in o p p o sin g a test.116 Ju st as tellin g w a s w o rk o n tactical n u c le ar w e a p o n s sm all e n o u g h in w e ig h t a n d ex­ p lo siv e p o w e r th a t tan k s a n d artillery c o u ld sh o o t them . T he goal, said th e A E C 's ch airm an , w a s "atom ic w e a p o n s in alm o st as co m p lete a v a rie ty as con­ v en tio n al ones, a n d a situ a tio n w h e re w e can u se th em in th e sam e w a y ."117 Sw elling resources also u n d e rw ro te n e w strateg ies for all-o u t w ar. M o st ex­ p e rts in th e late 1940s h a d c o u n te d o n n u c le ar w e a p o n s to d e te r th e Soviet U n io n 's in itiatio n of g en eral w ar, b u t th ey also h a d re g a rd e d su c h a Soviet ac­ tio n as unlikely. In th e 1950s, su c h a w a r seem ed m o re im ag in ab le a n d the A m erican resources to fig h t it m ore a b u n d a n t, a n d strateg ists co n te m p la te d w a g in g it b y n u c le ar a ssa u lt o n the Soviet U n io n a n d w ith n u c le ar a n d co n v en ­ tio n al forces in W estern E urope. True, a n y im a g in ed scenario for w a r still p re ­ se n ted fo rm id ab le difficulties. E xperts co u ld n o t figure o u t a sure-fire defen se a g ain st n u c le ar attack o n th e U n ited States, o r give p lau sib le a ssu ran ces to E u­ ro p e a n allies a b o u t h o w th ey co u ld e n d u re n u c le ar w ar, o r d isco v er h o w to w in lim ited w a rs w ith acceptable A m erican losses. C on seq u en tly , fierce d eb ates e ru p te d in the 1950s ov er w h ic h strateg ies to p u rs u e a n d w h ic h forces to e m ­ p h asize. Tw o factors d im in ish e d the significance of th ese d eb ates. E ven w a r: fig h tin g strateg ies fit in to d e te rren c e — re a rm a m e n t of N A TO allies, d isp a tc h to E u ro p e of m ore A m erican forces a n d w e a p o n s— a n d th e v e ry talk a b o u t th ese m atters w a s d e sig n e d to d e te r Soviet action. T hese strateg ies p re su m a b ly rein ­ forced A m erica's credibility, the p a ra ly z in g co n cern of its p o licy m ak ers a n d one so capacious th a t it sa n ctio n ed all m a n n e r of w e a p o n s a n d forces. A n d th e en o rm o u s ex p an sio n of resources m a d e all op tio n s, to a d eg ree at least, feasible. A s in W orld W ar II, the ten d e n cy w a s to cover all b ases, p u rs u e all strategies, favor all m ilitary services, e v en at g reat cost. It w a s p a rt of a n o u tlo o k th a t gave the T ru m an a d m in istra tio n "v e ry m u c h a sense of d irectio n w ith o u t d e stin a ­ tion," bereft of w ay s to lim it a n d c o o rd in ate th e m ean s a n d e n d s of A m erican policy.118 A telling m easu re of th e m ilitarizatio n of A m erican policy cam e from a le a d ­ ing figure w h o so u g h t to restra in it. By 1950, G eorge K en n an w as e n te rta in in g

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w ith d ra w a l of A m erican p o w e r fro m C en tral E u ro p e, G e rm a n y 's n e u tra liz a ­ tion, a n d A m erican re stra in t in th e n u c le ar a rm s race. "W e are n o t y e t re a d y to lead th e w o rld to salvation. W e h av e to save o u rselv es first," h e h a d w ritte n darkly. Yet h e s u p p o rte d A m erican in te rv e n tio n in th e K orean W ar a n d m u se d a t its o u tb reak o n th e possibility th a t "w e c o u ld . . .e v e n b o m b in M a n ch u ria " if C h in a e n te red the w ar. A lth o u g h w a rn in g a g ain st th e a tte m p t to reu n ify K orea a n d w illin g to co n sid er Ja p an 's n e u tra liz atio n as p a rt of a se ttlem e n t of th e Ko­ rea n W ar, this m a n su sp icio u s of a m ilitarized fo reig n p olicy felt co m p elled to e n d o rse it in K orea.119 T ru m a n 's exercise of executive a u th o rity also d isp la y e d ev id en ce of m ilitar­ ization. In 1948, h e a u th o riz e d th e CIA to e n g ag e in a w id e ran g e of co v ert activ­ ities (one of its first w a s to fu n d a n tico m m u n ists in a n Italian election), w h ic h w o u ld e x p an d u n d e r E isenhow er. In d ee d , in its "po litical a n d illegal u se s of intelligence a n d in v estig ativ e agencies," its actions ab ro a d "b a se d o n claim s of in h ere n t p o w e rs a n d executive p rivilege," a n d its resistance to "co n g ressio n al o v ersig h t of executive b ra n c h activities," T ru m a n 's a d m in istra tio n fore­ sh a d o w e d th e ab u ses of p o w e r associated w ith later p resid en cies.120 For several reasons, T ru m a n d isc o u n te d th e a rro g a tio n of executive p o w e r a n d th e b ro a d e r m ilitarizatio n tak in g place o n h is w atch . H e v iew ed h im self m odestly, after all— n o t for h im th e tra p p in g s of w h a t cam e to b e called th e "im p erial presidency." H e h a d rein ed in M acA rthur. H e saw c o n tain m en t, rear­ m am en t, a n d lim ited w a r n o t as a m ilitarized policy b u t as a sa feg u a rd a g ain st "a m u c h h ig h er level of m o b ilizatio n " th a t w o u ld b e req u ire d if th e n a tio n w ith ­ d re w from the w o rld a n d th e n faced a to ta litaria n o n slau g h t, as h e w a rn e d late in h is presidency. W ith d raw al " w o u ld req u ire u s to b ecom e a g a rriso n state, a n d to im pose u p o n o u rselv es a sy stem of cen tralized reg im en ta tio n u n lik e an y th in g w e h av e ev er k n o w n . . . . Its a d o p tio n w o u ld b e a m a n d a te for n a ­ tio n al su ic id e ."121 By h is reasoning, w a r a n d re a rm a m e n t w ere w a y s to av o id beco m ing "a g a rriso n state," n o t step s to w a rd its creation. H e w as h a rd ly alone resp o n sib le for the celeb ratio n of p resid en tia l p o w er. Liberals d e fe n d in g FD R 's legacy a n d C old W arriors fearful of co n gressional p aro ch ialism c h am p io n e d the cause. T he p ro sp e ct of " p u sh -b u tto n " w ar, a n d th e sense th a t only experts c o u ld u n d e rs ta n d th e d ile m m a s of n u c le ar strategy, seem ed to m ake congressional d eclaratio n s of w a r im possible, a lth o u g h T ru­ m a n b ru sh e d aside C ongress e v en w h e n tim e to d e lib erate w a s available, as a t th e o u tb reak of the K orean W ar. T he o p p o sin g v iew of p resid en tia l p o w e r cam e p rim a rily from M cC arthyites d e m a n d in g the secrets of executive b u reau cracies a n d conservatives fearing congressional im p o ten ce a n d p resid e n tia l u s u rp a ­ tion. The lim its of o p p o sitio n w ere rev ealed in Life's resp o n se to Taft's insis­ tence th a t T ru m an g e t congressional a p p ro v a l before co m m ittin g A m erican forces to NATO. Life could criticize T ru m a n savagely, b u t th e fu n d a m e n ta l m a t­ ter "is the d u ty a n d p o w e r of the P re sid e n t to act for th e U n ited States in foreign affairs. H is h a n d s are A m erica's h a n d s," it d eclared in a sw ee p in g co n flatio n of

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p e rs o n a n d nation. "T hey m u s t n o t b e tied ." A s co n serv ativ e p h ilo so p h e r C lin­ to n R ossiter m a in ta in e d in I960, "th e P re sid e n t is n o t a G ulliver, im m o b ilized b y te n th o u sa n d tin y cords," b u t in stea d "a k in d of m ag n ificen t lio n w h o can ro am freely a n d d o g rea t d e e d s so long as h e d o e s n o t try to b re a k loose fro m h is b ro a d re serv a tio n ."122 R oam h e o r h is d e p u tie s d id , especially in agencies like th e AEC a n d th e CIA. O nce, T ru m a n w a s corraled. W h en h e seized steel m ills facing a strik e in 1952, in v o k in g his p o w e r as c o m m an d e r in chief, th e S u p rem e C o u rt ru le d th a t h e h a d exceeded h is authority. In tru sio n o n co rp o rate in terests m ark e d o n e lim it, b u t o n e o u tw e ig h e d b y his ability to w a g e a lo n g w ar, a n d d o m u c h else, o n th e stre n g th of h is p o w e r as c o m m an d e r in chief. A t th e sam e tim e th a t th e K orean W ar allo w ed A m erican lead ers to co m plete th e ir m ilitarized policies, h ow ever, it also set lim its o n th eir am bitions. W h en M ac A r th u r 's forces m o v ed n o rth to w a rd th e Yalu R iver in th e fall of 1950, cen­ tris t a n d conservative C old W arriors, lo n g at o d d s w ith each other, h a d jo in ed in a v isio n of rolling back c o m m u n ism — of o v erth ro w in g , n o t m erely co n tain ­ ing, a c o m m u n ist regim e, K im II Sung's. C h in a 's in terv en tio n , raisin g th e costs of rollback to apocalyptic levels, sh a tte red th e ir alliance, so th a t "th e rollback stra te g y a n d its historic co n stitu en cy th e n d rifte d to w a rd th e o b livion of crack­ p o t s u rre a lis m . . . a n d co n ta in m e n t b ecam e th e m o d al choice of fo reig n policy elites." In som e policy circles, e v en m ore in election-tim e political rhetoric, a rm e d liberation of th e e n em y 's lan d s still a p p ea le d , b u t T ru m a n 's R epublican successors h a d little stom ach for it in practice. A s T reasu ry Secretary G eorge H u m p h re y to ld th e N a tio n a l Security C ouncil in 1954, " a n ag g ressiv e co u rse of action to roll back C o m m u n ism " w a s " n o t w o rth th e risk it e n ta ils."123 T he K orean W ar's effects e x te n d e d in to o th e r aren as of A m erican life as w ell, th o se b e y o n d m atters of g ra n d stra te g y a n d p resid en tia l policy. The fru stra ­ tio n s of th e w a r fed th e Red Scare. A lth o u g h so m e liberals a n d leftists criticized th e a d m in istratio n for n o t p u rs u in g d ip lo m atic o p tio n s to e n d th e w ar, th e g reat w e ig h t of criticism cam e from th e right. M cC arth y w a s q u ick to p o u n ce, alre ad y d eclarin g in July 1950 th a t "h ig h ly placed R ed C o u n selo rs" in th e State D e p a rtm e n t w ere "far m ore d e a d ly th a n Red m achine g u n n e rs in K orea."124 The in fam o u s charges a g ain st D efense Secretary M arsh all follow ed. So too d id n e w legislation, th e In tern a l Security A ct (the M cC arran Act), p a sse d o v er T ru­ m a n 's v eto w ith th e w id e sp re a d if g ru d g in g su p p o rt of liberal sen ato rs like M in n eso ta's H u b e rt H u m p h re y a n d Illinois's P au l D ouglas. In culture, too, the w a r 's effects w ere su b stan tial, a lth o u g h th a t sto ry re­ m ain s largely u n w ritte n b y h istorians. For y o u n g b o y s e n co u n terin g a n o n g o ­ ing w a r for th e first tim e, K orea m a y h av e m a d e a n ind elib le im p ressio n , as th ey p lay ed w ith w id e ly m ark e te d m o d els of A m erican Saber jets a n d Soviet M IG fighters, p e ru se d a w e a lth of com ic b o o k s o n th e w ar, a n d w a tch e d fiction film s a n d triu m p h a l television d o c u m e n ta rie s— b o th released in v o lu m e d u rin g the K orean W ar— o n W orld W ar II. T he K orean W ar h e lp e d to reco n fig u re racial

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im ages in culture, w ith o u t d o in g m u c h to ab ate th eir ferocity: S o u th K oreans, a n d a t g reater d istan ce Japanese, w ere n o w A m erica's allies, b u t im ag es of fa­ natical h o rd es of A sian foes once attach ed to th e Jap an ese n o w g o t a p p lie d to N o rth K oreans a n d C hinese. E x p lanations for th e n a tio n 's record in w a r also e m e rg ed as a m ajo r c u ltu ral them e. A m erican so ld iers' su p p o se d ly q u estio n ab le p e rfo rm a n c e — a n d ev en loyalty, since a few d o z e n A m erican PO W s refu sed re p a tria tio n b ack to th e U n ited States after the w a r— w ere som etim es b la m e d o n th e ir alleg ed h o m o ­ sexuality, o n th e stifling m o th e rs w h o p re su m a b ly in d u c e d it, a n d o n a m o re g en eral lack of m an ly fiber am o n g A m erican boys. T he tu rn c o a ts' "a p p a llin g g irl-lessness" before g o in g off to w a r seem ed a tellin g factor in th e ir treaso n . By m ak in g the tu rn co a ts in to c u ltu ra l o u tsid ers, su c h ex p lan atio n s d id offer h o p e a b o u t the v irtu e of m o st A m ericans, b u t th ey also rev ealed h o w failu re to achieve victo ry in K orea n o u rish e d d o u b ts a b o u t A m erican p o ten c y a n d p ro w ess, d o u b ts p e rsiste n t in tim e a n d voiced b y d iv erse social co m m en tato rs. In The Feminine Mystique (1963), Betty F riedan e n d o rse d th e v iew th a t th e tu rn ­ co ats' d islo y alty in d icated " 'a n e w softness' " am o n g y o u n g m e n a n d th e em er­ gence of "th e apathetic, d e p e n d e n t, infantile, p u rp o se le ss b ein g ." She im plic­ itly lin k ed th a t d e v e lo p m e n t to m ale hom osex u ality , seen b y h e r as " sp re a d in g like a m u rk y sm o g o v er the A m erican scene" b ecau se of "th e fem inine m y s­ tiq u e," w h ic h "h as glorified a n d p e rp e tu a te d in th e n a m e of fem in in ity a p a s ­ sive, childlike im m a tu rity w h ic h is p a sse d o n fro m m o th e rs to sons, as w ell as to d a u g h te rs." 125 Yet in o th er w a y s the K orean W ar rev ealed th e c u rio u s p a rtia lity of m ilitariz­ ation. It h a d only lim ited im p act o n th e d a ily lives a n d co n scio u sn ess of m an y A m ericans. W ith im p o rta n t excep tio n s— tho se d ra fte d o r called b ack in to m ili­ tary service, those scru tin ized for d islo y alty — th e y rarely felt th e h e a v y h a n d of a g o v e rn m e n t a t w ar, o r of w a r itself. T he e co n o m y 's m ig h ty cap acity fo r ex­ p a n sio n k e p t inflation in check, w ag e-p rice co ntrols a t a m in im u m , tax rev e­ n u e s grow ing, a n d c o n su m er g o o d s overflow ing. A n y o n e w h o p e ru s e d Life saw co nsiderable coverage of th e w ar, b u t m ain ly o n th e sta te sid e politics of h o w to w in it, a n d alm o st n o n e of th e w a r a d v e rtisin g u b iq u ito u s d u rin g W orld W ar II, o r of p h o to g rap h ic coverage of th e w a r 's g ru eso m e aspects. In th e p o p ­ u lar p ress, o th er m atters often b u lk e d larger, o n es th a t in v este d p u b lic cu ltu re w ith a so u r m ood: the recrim inations p ro m p te d b y th e R ed Scare a n d a d ru m ­ b e at of scandal in th e T ru m an a d m in istratio n , in college b ask etb all a n d W est P o in t football, a n d in volving o rg an iz ed crim e. W ild ru m o rs a b o u t th e c o m m u ­ n ist m enace at hom e, p anic a b o u t b e in g o n th e b rin k of W orld W ar IE, a n d stri­ d e n t calls to u n le a sh A m erica's n u c le ar arsen al w ere all ju x ta p o se d to th e re­ p o se a n d affluence of e v e ry d a y life. Little b rid g e d th e ch asm b e tw e e n th e tw o. W ar rem ain ed shadow y, its issues ag o n izin g b u t its p resen ce elusive. In p a rt because it seem ed so elusive, the K orean W ar d id little to d istu rb the p rev ailin g m o d el of total w ar. In som e w ay s, it ev en seem ed to fit th a t m odel: it

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w a s seen as a possible p re lu d e to a n o th e r w o rld w ar, ju st as o n e reaso n g iv en for w a g in g it w a s to sto p a course of ev en ts lea d in g to su c h a w ar. M eanw hile, m a n y of th e generals, w e ap o n s, strategies, a n d a ttitu d e s cam e rig h t o u t of W orld W ar n , ju st as once ag ain th ere w ere allies— Brits, T urks, a n d o th e rs— a lth o u g h A m erican s a n d S outh K oreans bo re th e b ru n t of th e effort. O th erw ise, K orea seem ed a n a n o m a ly — o u tsid e the m ain ch an n els of w a r 's h isto rical course, lacking an alo g s in A m erica's p a st o r in c o n te m p o ra ry experience (such as F rance's sim u lta n eo u s w a r in Indochina). W h at m o st A m erican s still feared a n d m o st e x p erts still co n tem p lated w as an o th er, m o re cataclysm ic w o rld w ar. T he v e ry fru stra tio n set loose b y th e K orean W ar seem ed to ru le o u t a n o th e r "lim ite d " w a r like it in th e future. A lth o u g h a rm y strateg ists co u ld n o t so cava­ lierly d ism iss th e w ar, since th eirs w a s the service th a t w o u ld m o st h av e to fig h t a n y sim ilar fu tu re w ar, strategic th in k in g rem ain ed fo cu sed o n n u c le ar w ar, o r o n a g en eral w a r in E u rope th a t m ig h t lead to it. T he ten d e n cy to reg ard K orea as a n a n o m a lo u s w a r reflected th e d o m in an ce of W orld W ar II in the A m erican im agination . K orea a p p a re n tly fit n o sc rip t left b e h in d b y th a t w ar. D w ig h t E isenhow er, th e g en eral w h o h a d d eclared th e in ­ v a sio n of France "th e g reat c ru sad e " a n d w ritte n Crusade in Europe, cap italized o n th a t d o m in an ce in his 1952 election cam p aig n . A s P resid en t, h e w o u ld h av e to com e to term s w ith it.

4 TH E U N EA SY B A LA N CE, 1953-1961

Politics in a Militarized Age M ickey Spillane's One Lonely Night w as a bestseller in 1951, w ith its h ero M ike H am m er: "I killed m ore p eo p le to n ig h t th a n I h av e fingers o n m y h an d s. I sh o t th em in cold b lo o d a n d enjoyed every m in u te of it. . . . T hey w ere C o m ­ m ies. . . . T hey w ere red sons-of-bitches w h o sh o u ld h av e d ied lo n g ago." A s Eric G o ld m an n o ted , "It w a s a d a y for M ike H am m erism , in b o o k s or in p o li­ tics."1 So it often w as in the 1952 p resid en tia l contest. True, early on Ike seem ed to say little, a n d th a t ra th e r b a d ly (" 'N o w h e 's crossing th e 38th p la titu d e ag ain ,' rep o rte rs w o u ld sigh.").2 N o r w a s h o t-b lo o d ed rhetoric his forte, since h e cast h im self as above the political fray. H e also h a d loftier them es, co n cern in g the n e ed to m atch the m ean s a n d e n d s of A m erican foreign policy to each o th er an d to th e n a tio n 's lim ited resources. The G O P cam p aig n , h o w ev er, relied heav ily o n c ru d e fo rm u la s— "K 1C 2," (Korea, co m m u n ism , a n d co rru p tio n ), evils w h ich R epublicans accused D em ocrats of ab ettin g o r ev en w elcom ing. T hat E isenhow er, as arm y chief of staff a n d N A TO su p re m e co m m an d er, h a d h e lp e d to sh ap e T ru m a n 's co n ta in m e n t policy d id n o t m u ch b o th e r h im (or T ru m a n w h e n he attacked Ike), in p a rt because he u su a lly left th e d irty w o rk of m ak in g these charges to others, su ch as his y o u n g ru n n in g m ate, R ichard N ixon. Still, Ike d id n o t alw ays rise above the nastiness, a n d c am p aig n in g in Sen. Joseph M cC arthy's h o m e state of W isconsin, h e acceded to ad v iso rs in sisten t th a t h e n o t d efen d G eorge M arshall a g ain st M cC arth y 's n o to rio u s charges. D riven in p a rt b y d e sp era tio n , his o p p o n e n t, A dlai Stevenson, som etim es tu rn e d n asty too. The o n e-term Illinois g o v e rn o r w as n o t w ell k n o w n ; h e h a d a q uick w it a n d m in d b u t lacked the co m m o n touch; K orea a n d th e T ru m an a d ­ m in istratio n w ere heavy crosses to bear. O n racial m atters, his p a rty sh elv ed its 1948 co m m itm en t to civil rights, w hile his ru n n in g m ate w as John S p ark m an of A labam a, w h ere all-w hite politics still ru le d — choices, o n e h isto ria n suggests, m atch in g Ike's "g reat sh am e of em bracing Joseph M cC arthy on th e cam p aig n

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trail." D em ocrats also w o rk e d the v e in of an tico m m u n ism m in e d b y th e G O P — albeit m ore defensively, a n d w ith d e n u n ciatio n s of M cC arthyism b y Stevenson. T ru m a n p re se n te d Stevenson as "o n e of th e first to w a rn th a t th e R u ssians w ere b eco m in g a th re a t to peace" a n d claim ed th a t Ik e's statem en ts a t th e close of W orld W ar II a b o u t Soviet-A m erican frien d sh ip " d id a g reat d eal of h a rm ." S tevenson traced b lam e fu rth e r back: c o m m u n ists " h a d b e g u n to m ak e h e a d w a y in th e U.S. only after th e R epublican regim es of th e 1920s h a d b u n g le d th e n a tio n a l econom y into collapse," h is charges h a v e b e en su m m arize d .3 A s u su a l in p resid en tia l elections, articu late differences b e tw ee n th e can d i­ d a te s m a tte re d less th a n th e ir abilities to explo it th e m o o d s a n d lan g u ag e of th e tim e. In w o rk in g th e m em o ry of W orld W ar II, th e fru stratio n s of Korea, a n d the fear of a final cataclysm , E isen h o w er's c am p aig n w a s m asterfu l, for all h is ob­ v io u s ad v an tag es. H e w a s General E isen h o w er— in c am p aig n literatu re, in p ress coverage, in d e tra cto rs' d a m n a tio n s— w ith all th a t th is label su m m e d u p a b o u t h is heroic sta tu s ("Ike" serv ed the sam e p u rp o se). H is o p p o n e n t w a s Gov­ ernor S tevenson— the im balance w a s obvious. References to w a r su ffu sed Ike's rhetoric. "I h ave en listed ," h e a n n o u n c e d before th e G O P convention. " I'm g o in g to C hicago— as a so ld ier in th e ran k s," a lth o u g h as W est P o in t g ra d u a te a n d senior officer, h e w a s h a rd ly a co m m o n soldier. H a v in g w o n n o m in atio n , h e w a s a g ain a co m m an d er, telling A m erican s to "realize th a t to d a y y o u are th e co m b at tro o p s" n e e d e d to w in th e election a n d p re su m a b ly to d e fe at tyranny. D em ocrats m ig h t fire "re d h o t salvos," b u t th a t d id n o t b o th e r him : "I'v e b e en sh o t a t b y real artillerists." Soldiers, h e claim ed, k n e w w a r b e st a n d h a te d it m ost. H e c ap p e d it off w ith a p le d g e to go to K orea if elected.4 T his ex ploitation of his career testified to n o c ru d e m an -o n -h o rseb ack m il­ itarism . A lth o u g h m ilitary service b ecam e a p rere q u isite for th e p resid en cy for n e arly a h alf-cen tu ry after 1945, ju st as it h a d after th e C ivil W ar, n o o th er officer cam e close to Ike's feat, n o t ev en th o se like M acA rth u r w h o w a n te d th e chance. T here w as n o b ro a d y e arn in g to see g en erals a n d a d m ira ls in politics, b u t E isen h o w er's triu m p h d id reflect th e p rim acy of W orld W ar II in political im ag ­ in atio n a n d the d e e p ly felt w ish to w re st the v irtu e s of w a r from w a r itself— t o , secure peace a n d p ro sp e rity after civilians seem in g ly h a d flo u n d ere d in th e at­ tem pt. U nlike M acA rthur, Ike e x u d e d little trace of th e warrior sp irit, p e rh a p s because h e p o ssessed little of it. Like M arshall, h e h a d b e en a g reat "o rg an izer of victory" in w ar. N o w h e w o u ld o rg an ize v icto ry for peace a n d p ro sp erity . In 1952, peace w as the big issue, a n d th e o n e E isen h o w er m o re read ily a d ­ dressed. L argely in su lated b y h is career from social issues, h e a rticu la te d h o p es for dom estic tran q u ility a n d p ro sp e rity in a g en eral w a y b u t w ith little feel for th e pro blem s of o rd in a ry A m ericans. A s P re sid e n t h e w o u ld b e b o th ere d m o re b y th e carp in g d e m a n d s a n d u g ly p aro ch ialism of h is o w n p a rty 's co n serv a­ tives th a n b y th e asp iratio n s of black o r p o o r A m ericans, to w h ich h e w as deaf. T he one social g ro u p w ith w h ic h h e felt a n affinity w a s b u sin essm en , to w h o m

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h e g ra n te d m a n y h igh-level a p p o in tm e n ts; e v en th a t affinity o ften seem ed shallow . But Ike w a s su p e rb ly p o sitio n e d to a d d re ss n a tio n al secu rity a n d to act o n h is convictions a b o u t it— to control th e sp ira lin g costs of n a tio n a l d efen se a n d to restore b alance (as h e saw it) b e tw e e n its claim s a n d th e n a tio n 's n e e d for a h e alth y econom y a n d u n fettere d polity. H e w as, th a t is, d e te rm in e d to lim it, th o u g h n o t reverse, th e course of m ilitarizatio n . In th e late 1940s, h e h a d u rg e d "stren g th e n in g th e econom ic a n d social d ik es a g ain st Soviet c o m m u n ism ra th e r t h a n . . . p re p a rin g for a p o ssib ly e v en tu al, b u t n o t y e t in ev itab le w a r," a n ap p ro a ch h e feared w o u ld o v e rb u rd e n th e A m erican econom y. H e h a d re­ p u d ia te d W orld W ar II as a m o d el for fu tu re w a r a n d th e fan tasy of v icto ry in a n o th e r w o rld w ar. "A fter the w o rld -w id e d e v a sta tio n th a t g ro w s d a ily m o re possible, n o n e m a y b e able to d istin g u ish b e tw e e n th e v icto r a n d th e v a n ­ q u ish e d of a fu tu re conflict," h e d eclared in 1950. A ll n a tio n s w e re " in th e sam e b o a t," w h ich w o u ld b e " sw a m p e d in a series of atom ic b lasts." A n d h e h a d lin k ed th e p ro b lem of w a r to the c h aracter of m o d e m civilization, p lacin g b o th w ith in a m o ral a n d ecological context. T he "sp e cte r as sin ister as th e atom ic b o m b ," th e "creep in g te rro r" faced b y "all p e o p les," w a s "th e w a stag e of th e w o rld 's n a tu ra l resources a n d . . . the crim in al e x p lo itatio n of th e soil. W h at w ill it p ro fit u s to achieve the H -b o m b a n d su rv iv e th a t tra g e d y o r triu m p h , if th e g en eratio n s th a t succeed u s m u s t sta rv e in a w o r l d . . . g ro w n b a rre n as th e m o u n ta in s of the m o o n ?"5 E isenhow er h a d fo rm id ab le resources for acting o n th ese convictions. H is heroic sta tu s a lre ad y fixed in th e n a tio n 's eyes a n d h is o w n , h e felt little n e e d to reinforce th a t sta tu s th ro u g h d ram a tic u se of A m erican p o w er. A m ilitary a n d in m a n y w a y s conservative m an , h e w a s u su a lly in v u ln e rab le to ch arg es of b e ­ in g w e a k o n n a tio n al d efense o r co m m u n ism ; later, co n serv ativ es in th e n o to ­ rio u s John Birch Society a n d a t th e National Review a d v a n c e d su c h charges, b u t to little effect. L ikew ise, h e c o m m an d e d th e a u th o rity to challenge claim s for m ore m en, m oney, a n d w e ap o n s, ju st as h e h a d a lifetim e's m em o ry of a n d ex­ a sp era tio n w ith th e m ilitary 's p aro ch ial a n d free-sp en d in g w ay s. A s h e once to ld congressm en, "I'v e serv ed w ith those p e o p le w h o k n o w all th e a n sw e rs— th ey ju st w o n 't g e t d o w n a n d face the d irty facts of life."6 C o n v en tio n al in his v iew s of the co m m u n ist m enace, h e still reta in e d fro m th e w a r a resp ect for the Soviet a rm e d forces, for som e of its leaders, a n d for th e legacy of SovietA m erican cooperation. H e also h a d th e v a g u e b u t p o w e rfu l m a n d a te th a t com es from a lan d slid e election victory. If h is p o p u la rity rare ly tra n sla te d into success for h is p arty , th a t failure h a m p e re d h im little, since co n serv ativ e Re­ p u b lican s gave h im fits anyw ay. E ven luck seem ed o n h is side: S talin's d e a th in 1953 a p p e a re d to o p en p ro sp ects for easing th e C o ld W ar. H is fo rm id ab le political resources for g ra p p lin g w ith m ilitarizatio n w ere m atch ed b y su b sta n tia l p e rso n al ones. E isen h o w er e n te red office co n v ersan t a n d com fortable w ith m a n y of th e w o rld 's lead ers, a p o sitio n m o st P resid en ts

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w o rk y ears to achieve. H e p o ssessed a b u n d a n t self-confidence a n d k e en a n a ­ lytical p o w e rs, if n o t a w id e -ra n g in g intellect. T he im ag e th a t later em erg ed of h im — as a w e ll-in te n tio n e d b u t b u m b lin g lea d er w h o let o th ers ru n th e sh o w — reflected n o t th e m a n b u t the celebratory v iew of th e p resid en c y th e n p o p u lar, w h ic h a ssu m e d th a t a n y strong P re sid e n t co u ld g e t w h a t h e w a n te d . Like all P resid en ts, h e h a d p ro b lem s m o v in g th e h u g e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t in d e sired directio ns; o ften h e d e cid ed n o t e v en to try. But h is te m p e r c o u ld b e explosive, h is ju d g m e n ts h a rsh , h is tre a tm e n t of su b o rd in a te s forceful— as N ix o n fo u n d o u t— a n d his m in d quick. O f his p a rty 's Senate m ajo rity lead er, W illiam K n o w la n d , h e fu m ed in h is d ia ry th a t "th ere seem s to b e n o final a n sw e r to the q u e stio n 'H o w stu p id can y o u g et?' " G eorge K ennan, w h o h a d h ig h sta n d a rd s in th ese m atters, th o u g h t E isenhow er " sh o w e d h is in tellectual ascen d an cy o v er ev ery m a n in the ro o m " a t one im p o rta n t m eeting. The larg e role h e ac­ c o rd e d su b o rd in a te s like Secretary of State John Foster D ulles reflected Ike's resp ect for e x p ert authority, b u t also h is sh re w d d ecisio n to let o th ers b e a r the p o litical heat. "A ll rig h t," h e later to ld one ad v iso r, "I k n o w w h a t th ey say a b o u t F oster— d u ll, d uller, D u lles— a n d all th at. But th e D em o crats love to h it h im ra th e r th a n m e." "I w o u ld g et h ell," h is p ress secretary p ro te ste d w h e n to ld to tak e p u b lic resp o n sib ility for a m istake. "M y boy, b e tte r y o u th a n m e," Ike rep lied . E ven his n o to rio u s m an g lin g of the E n g lish lan g u a g e in p ress confer­ ences w a s m isleading. E x tem p o ran eo u s sp e ak in g w a s n o t h is forte, b u t h e w a s a n exacting w rite r a n d n o t above u sin g h is re p u ta tio n for v erb al clu m sin ess to d u c k difficult issues: " D o n 't w o rry ," h e once to ld h is p ress secretary. "If th a t q u e stio n com es u p . I'll ju st confuse th e m ."7 H e w as, in one sc h o la r's p h rase, th e " h id d e n -h a n d " p resid en t. O r, as M u rra y K em p to n p u t in 1967, "h e w a s the tortoise u p o n w h o se b ack th e w o rld sa t for e ig h t years. W e la u g h e d a t him ; w e talk ed w istfu lly a b o u t m o ving; a n d all the w h ile w e n e v e r k n ew th e c u n n in g b e n e a th th e sh ell." S uch p raise concealed real w eaknesses. E isen h o w er's c u n n in g w a s erratically a n d so m etim es fool­ ishly d ep lo y ed . H e co u ld confuse sincere d istaste for p u b lic b o m b ast w ith sim p le cow ardice a b o u t tak in g stro n g stances. H e c o u ld eq u ate g o o d in ten tio n s w ith concrete progress. It w a s h is " p a tte rn of action, if n o t th e p u rp o se of th e m an , to h u sb a n d a n d to g u a rd " h is im m en se p e rso n al reso u rces "like savings e a rn e d b y th e sw e a t of a lifetim e," n o te d E m m et Jo h n H u g h e s, h is a d v iso r a n d speechw riter. H e sav ed th e m w ell to p ro tec t h is p e rso n al p o p u la rity b u t left m a n y u n sp e n t in b eh alf of th e causes h e em braced. Still, h e w a s in control of h is ad m in istratio n , at least as m u c h as a n y m o d e m P re sid e n t.8 H is in a u g u ra l a d d re ss barely h in te d at h is fears of m ilitarizatio n . H e d id m ak e h is "first task" n o t to w in th e C old W ar b u t to " d e te r th e forces of ag g res­ sio n a n d p ro m o te the co n d itio n s of peace," e v en b y n e g o tiatin g w ith a d v e r­ saries, a step an ath em a to T ru m a n 's a d m in istra tio n in its later stages. O th er­ w ise, h e offered stock C old W ar rhetoric. "F reed o m is p itte d a g ain st slavery; lightness a g ain st the d a rk ," ra n the fam iliar refrain. "T he faith w e h o ld belo n g s

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n o t to u s alone b u t to th e free of all the w o r ld /' ra n th e echo of c am p aig n p ro m ­ ises to liberate th e c o m m u n ist w o rld . Faith in freed o m "confers a c o m m o n d ig ­ n ity u p o n the French so ld ier w h o d ies in In d o ch in a, th e B ritish so ld ier k illed in M alaya, th e A m erican life g iven in K orea," ra n th e lin k ag e of th e A m erican cru ­ sa d e w ith B ritish a n d F rench im perialism . H e also d ra fte d th e en tire n a tio n to th e task of "w in n in g " the peace: "W e m u s t b e re a d y to d a re all for o u r co u n ­ try. . . . N o p erso n , n o ho m e, n o co m m u n ity can be b e y o n d th e reach of th is call." In 1962, E m m et John H u g h e s c o m p a red th o se w o rd s to K en n ed y 's m o re fam o u s in a u g u ra l— " in p h ra se s m ore felicitous b u t in su b stan ce n o d ifferen t"— a n d w o n d e re d if a n y th in g h a d c h an g ed .9 S o m ething h a d , a lth o u g h p e rh a p s for th e w o rse. A v o id in g w ar, co n tain in g m ilita riza tio n — ju st recognizing th eir p e rils— w ere Ik e's m ajor achievem ents. T hey also, h ow ever, m a d e possible a fu rth e r acco m m o d atio n to m ilitarizatio n , if o n ly b y lessening its b u rd e n s a bit. A n d to th o se w h o saw g ro w in g p e ril in th e 1950s, th ey only w e a k e n e d th e n a tio n further.

The Contending Forces E isen h ow er faced sh a rp ly different o p tio n s for n a tio n al security. T ru m a n 's am ­ b itio u s policy, laid o u t in NSC-68 a n d im p le m e n te d d u rin g th e K orean W ar, p re su m e d p ro trac te d stru g g le w ith co m m u n ism , p o site d a b u n d a n t A m erican resources to w a g e it, a n d p riz e d A m erican ability to re sp o n d sy m m etrically to a n y aggression. N u clear in tim id a tio n o r attack, co n v en tio n al w a r a n d co v ert action, econom ic a n d political p re ssu re — each w o u ld b e m et b y sim ilar fo rm s of A m erican p ow er. A n altern ativ e, ad v an c ed m o stly b y co n serv ativ e R epubli­ can s w h o recoiled a t the costs a n d co m p ro m ises of p ro tra c te d stru g g le, p riz e d asym m etry: the U n ited States sh o u ld n o t m eet th e en em y g u n for g u n b u t in ­ stead rely o n those form s of po w er, above all atom ic a n d aerial, a t w h ic h it ex­ celled a n d w h ich m ig h t p ro v id e q uick victory.10 A s in m a n y areas of policy, Ike chose a "m id d le w a y " b e tw e e n conflicting o p tio n s, g raftin g his lim ited v iew of resources to th e T ru m a n a d m in istra tio n 's a ssu m p tio n s a b o u t global struggle. For h im , too, th e C o ld W ar w a s a p ro trac te d conflict p ro m isin g n o q uick victo ry (cam paig n rh eto ric aside), b u t p recisely for th a t reaso n the U n ited States h a d to h o a rd its resources, lim it its efforts, a n d sp re ad its b u rd en s, o r else ex h au st itself ov er th e lo n g haul. "To am ass m ilitary p o w e r w ith o u t reg ard to o u r econom ic capacity w o u ld b e to d e fe n d o u rselv es a g ain st one k in d of d isa ster b y in v itin g a n o th er," h is 1953 State of th e U n io n m essage declared. "W e c a n 't afford to let th e n e g ativ e actions of th e C o m m u ­ n ists force u s into w o rld -w id e d e p lo y m en t," h e a rg u e d in 1954. "W e n e e d to be free to decide w h ere w e can strike m o st effectively."11 T he resu lt w as the m u ch -to u te d "N e w Look," a n effort to lim it d efen se sp e n d in g b y relying o n en h an ced n u c le ar forces, as w ell as alliances a n d co v ert action, rath e r th a n o n costly con v en tio n al forces to c o u n te r en em y initiatives.

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C o n fro n tatio n w ith the en em y w a s to b e selective, fo cu sed o n conflicts in w h ic h A m erican p o w e r w a s su p e rio r a n d available a t lim ited cost. A t tim es E isen h o w er still echoed th e p rev io u s a d m in istra tio n 's ex p an siv e view : "A s th ere is n o w e a p o n too sm all, n o aren a too rem ote, to b e ig n o red , th ere is n o free n a tio n to o h u m b le to b e forgotten." But the e m p h a sis w a s o n A m erican free­ d o m "to re sp o n d v ig o ro u sly a t places a n d w ith m ean s of its o w n choosing," in D u lles's fam o u s p h ra sin g , o r in th e N a tio n a l Security C o u n cil's w o rd s, it w a s " o n th e cap ab ility of inflicting m assiv e retaliato ry d a m a g e b y offensive strik in g p o w e r." T ru m a n 's p ro g ra m s to m ass-p ro d u ce n u c le ar w e a p o n s a n d b o m b ers created th e m ean s for th is stra te g y — so a b u n d a n tly " th a t th e m arg in of A m eri­ can su p e rio rity seem ed if a n y th in g g rea ter th a n it h a d b e e n in th e d a y s of the A m erican atom ic m o n o p o ly ."12 W h y d id E isen h o w er take th is ap p ro ach ? C ritics once sin g led o u t h is fear of d eficit sp e n d in g a n d b lo ated g o v ern m en t, b u t m a n y c o n sid eratio n s w ere at play, th e ir w e ig h t v a ry in g am o n g m em b ers of th e ad m in istratio n . For Ike, th o se co n sid eratio n s all reflected his anxiety a b o u t m ilitarizatio n , w h ic h d efin ed h is o u tlo o k as m u c h as the C o ld W ar itself. H e w a s p e rilo u sly alone in th a t anxiety. D ulles talk ed of C old W ar a n d diplom acy; T reasu ry Secretary G eorge H u m ­ p h re y of b u d g e ts a n d fiscal p ru d en ce; D efense Secretary C h arles W ilson of p re ­ p a re d n e ss a n d efficiency. E isenhow er too sp o k e in th o se term s, b u t also tra n ­ scen d ed them . N o u n b e n d in g av ersio n to w a r g u id e d h im — h e h a d w a g e d w a r a n d n e v e r ru le d o u t d o in g so a g a in — b u t a com plex av ersio n to m ilitarizatio n d id su sta in him . It in d e e d d e riv e d p a rtly from h is econom ic conservatism . H e w o rrie d th a t th e taxes, capital, a n d ex p ertise n e e d e d for a n ex p en siv e d efen se p ro g ra m , a n d th e in flation a n d g o v e rn m e n t d e b t th a t m ig h t flow from it, w o u ld stifle eco­ nom ic e n tre p re n e u rsh ip a n d g ro w th , in tu rn w e ak e n in g th e econom ic b ase n e e d e d to su sta in n a tio n al security. R ejecting d ire Joint C hiefs of Staff w a rn in g s of n a tio n a l p e ril if cuts in the d efense b u d g e t w ere m ain tain ed , Ike a n g rily p ro ­ p o se d th a t the N a tio n a l S ecurity C ouncil " sh o u ld h av e a re p o rt as to w h e th e r n a tio n al b a n k ru p tc y o r n a tio n al d e stru c tio n w o u ld g et u s first." T he sam e o u t­ look in fo rm ed his d en u n ciatio n s of "p atern alistic g o v e rn m e n t" a n d T ru m an 's Fair D eal, a n d h is n eo -H o o v erian v iew of g o v e rn m e n t's role as c o o rd in a to r a n d cataly st of n a tio n al energies, n o t re g u la to r o r financier. Because Ike's w o rry a b o u t m ilitarizatio n w a s sh a p e d in p a rt b y o rth o d o x R ep u b lican co n serv atism a n d linked to its v iew o n d om estic policies, liberals d e rid e d it as n a rro w ­ m in d e d p e n n y -p in c h in g oblivious to the ex p an siv e possibilities o u tlin ed in K eynesian econom ics.13 But n o t only w o u ld m a n y A m ericans later fin d E isen h o w er's econom ic rea­ so n in g m ore p ersu asiv e, h is w o rries w e n t far b e y o n d econom ic effects. T ru­ m a n 's p ro p o se d defense b u d g e t, h e a rg u e d , w o u ld lead to "a p e rm a n e n t state of m obilization" d estro y in g " o u r w h o le dem o cratic w a y of life." "If w e let d e ­ fense sp e n d in g ru n w ild ," h e to ld a confidan t, "y o u g et in fla tio n . . . th en con-

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trois . . . th e n a g arriso n state . . . a n d then w e 'v e lost th e v e ry v a lu e s w e w ere try in g to d e fe n d ." "S hould w e h av e to reso rt to a n y th in g resem b lin g a g a rriso n state," h e d eclared o n a n o th e r occasion, " th e n all th a t w e are striv in g to d e fe n d w o u ld be w e ak e n ed ." H is re p e a te d w a rn in g s of a "g a rriso n sta te " in d ic ate d concerns far b ro a d e r th a n rock-ribbed R epublican fears for free e n te rp rise .14 T hose concerns also d e riv e d from his cau tio u s g ra n d strategy, w h ic h h e feared th a t bellicose n a tio n al im p u lse s co u ld d isru p t. Like o th e r lead ers, E isen h ow er w o rrie d a b o u t th e im p atien ce a n d im m a tu rity of o rd in a ry A m e ri­ cans, b u t h e feared m ore the lu n g e for th e quick fix a n d th e p ro p e n sity to p an ic h e saw am o n g h a w k ish R epublicans, m o n ey -h u n g ry g en erals, a n d o th e r w ellplaced people. Facing claim s th a t 1953 w a s th e "y ea r of m ax im u m d a n g e r" for the n atio n , h e in sisted p riv ately th a t " w e 're n o t in a m o m e n t of d a n g er, w e 're in a n age of d a n g er," a n d p u b licly th a t " a n y b o d y w h o b ases h is d efen se o n h is ability to p red ic t the d a y a n d the h o u r of th e attack is crazy." Facing a G O P effort to legislate U n ited States w ith d ra w a l from th e U N if it seated R ed C h in a, h e issu e d a typical w a rn in g a g ain st sh o rtsig h ted n e ss, rem in d in g co n g ressm en th a t in 1945 "G erm an y w a s o u r d e a d ly enem y; w h o co u ld th e n h a v e fo reseen it w o u ld becom e a frien d ly associate?" H a v in g e m p lo y ed a g ain st th e G erm an s a p a tie n t strategy, h e saw p atien ce as a fo u n d a tio n n o w for successful strategy. For h im , th e "lo n g h a u l" p re c lu d e d the im p e tu o u s act o r th e b u d g e t-b u stin g p ro g ra m .15 E isenhow er feared strategic d isa ster less th ro u g h c o m m u n ist victory, a b o u t w h ich h is w a rn in g s w ere few, th a n th ro u g h n u c le ar w ar. N o P re sid e n t w o rrie d m o re a b o u t th e d a n g e rs of in itiatin g o r stu m b lin g in to n u c le ar conflict. H is con­ cern d re w in p a rt o n h is d o u b ts as a n a rm y m a n a b o u t air p o w er. A lread y " d a m n tire d of A ir Force sales p ro g ra m s" in h is first m o n th s in office, h e lec­ tu re d congressm en: "W e p u lv e riz e d G e rm a n y . . . b u t th eir actu al rate of p ro ­ d u c tio n w a s as b ig a t the e n d as a t th e b eg in n in g ." E ven if— especially if— b o m b ers could d e stro y the Soviet U nion, h e co u ld see n o real victory, as h e to ld sen io r officers: "G ain su c h a victory, a n d w h a t d o y o u d o w ith it? H ere w o u ld be a g reat area from the Elbe to V ladivostok a n d d o w n th ro u g h S o u th east A sia to m u p a n d d e stro y ed w ith o u t g o v e rn m e n t, w ith o u t its co m m u n icatio n s, ju st a n area of sta rv a tio n a n d disaster. I ask y o u w h a t w o u ld th e civilized w o rld d o a b o u t it? I rep e at th ere is n o v icto ry in a n y w a r except th ro u g h o u r im ag in a­ tions, th ro u g h o u r d ed ic atio n a n d th ro u g h o u r w o rk to av o id it." A s h e lectu red South K orean lea d er S y n g m an Rhee, "If the K rem lin a n d W ash in g to n ev er lock u p in a w ar, the resu lts are too h o rrib le to co n tem p late." R id icu lin g th e "n o tio n th a t 'th e b o m b ' is a cheap w a y to solve th in g s," h e to ld h is C ab in et th a t "it is cold com fort for a n y citizen of W estern E u ro p e to be a ssu re d th a t— after h is co u n try is o v e rru n a n d h e is p u sh in g u p d a isie s— so m eo n e still alive w ill d ro p a b o m b o n th e K rem lin." W arning th e U n ited N atio n s in 1953 a b o u t "tw o atom ic colossi" facing off "across a trem b lin g w o rld ," h e p le a d e d for tak in g th e b o m b from the soldiers a n d p u ttin g it into "th e h a n d of th o se w h o w ill k n o w h o w to strip its m ilitary casing a n d a d a p t it to th e a rts of p eace."16

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A d m in istra tio n lea d ers also said a n d d id m a n y th in g s th a t co n trad icted th ese e lo q u e n t ap p eals. Sim ply th rea te n in g "m assiv e reta lia tio n " to d e te r com ­ m u n is t ad v an c es seem ed to d o so, a n d Ike saw "n o reaso n " w h y atom ic w e a p o n s " s h o u ld n 't b e u se d ju st exactly as y o u w o u ld u se a b u lle t o r a n y th in g else" if e m p lo y e d " o n strictly m ilitary targ ets a n d for strictly m ilitary p u r­ p o ses." H o w d id su c h sta te m e n ts sq u a re w ith h is e lo q u e n t ap p eals? In p a rt th ey reflected a n effort to in tim id a te th e e n e m y — "T he ability to g e t to th e v erg e w ith o u t g e ttin g in to th e w a r is th e n ecessary a rt," D ulles to ld Life in 1956— a lth o u g h E isenhow er w ell k n ew th a t in tim id a tio n m e a n t n o th in g w ith ­ o u t a w illingness, a t least in th e e n e m y 's p ercep tio n , to p u ll th e trigger. It is also tru e th a t th e a d m in istra tio n confined specific th rea ts of n u c le ar retaliatio n larg ely to th e A sian theater, w h e re th e risk s of all-o u t w a r w ere a rg u a b ly less, a n d th a t d e sp ite talk of th e tactical u tility of n u c le ar w eap o n s, E isen h o w er n e v e r claim ed th a t a g en eral n u c le ar w a r w a s w in n a b le o r tolerable. N o t for h im th e fan tasy of n u c le ar triu m p h th a t T ru m a n h a d p riv a te ly in d u lg e d , o r the g aze into th e n u c le ar abyss th a t K en n ed y to o k in th e C u b a n m issile crisis. H e n e v e r flatly ren o u n c ed u se of n u c le ar w e ap o n s, b u t h is in to leran ce of ap o caly p ­ tic possibilities exceeded th a t of m a n y in h is o w n a d m in istratio n , e x p ert circles, a n d political life generally.17 Ik e's resistance to m ilitarizatio n p ro b ab ly d re w m o st o n h is fear of its conse­ q u en ces e v en if w a r w ere avoided. H e w a s reaso n ab ly co n fid en t th a t w a r w o u ld b e av o id ed , a t least o n h is w a tc h — h is v iew of h im self in su c h m a tte rs w a s n o t m o d est. H e w a s less co n fid en t of resistin g a b ro a d e r p o litical process th a t n u rtu re d anxiety, sw o llen b u d g e ts, econom ic stag n atio n , a n d co n strain ts o n freed o m — the evils of th e "g a rriso n state." H is re so u n d in g sta te m e n t of th o se d a n g e rs cam e in a n A p ril 16,1953, a d d ress. T h o u g h b lam in g co m m u n ists for th e C o ld W ar, h e w a rn e d th a t e v e n if atom ic w a r w ere av erted , th e a rm s race offered "a life of p e rp e tu a l fear a n d tension; a b u rd e n of a rm s d ra in in g the w e a lth a n d lab o r of all p eo p les . . . . E very g u n th a t is m ad e , ev ery w a rsh ip lau n ch ed , ev ery rocket fired, signifies, in th e final sense, a th eft fro m th o se w h o h u n g e r a n d are n o t fed, those w h o are cold a n d n o t clothed. T his w o rld in a rm s is n o t sp e n d in g m o n e y alone. It is sp e n d in g th e sw ea t of its laborers, th e g e n iu s of its scientists, th e h o p e s of its c h ild ren ." A s h e elo q u en tly co n clu d ed : "T his is n o t a w a y of life a t all, in a n y tru e sense. U n d e r th e clo u d of th rea te n in g w ar, it is h u m a n ity h a n g in g from a cross of iron." P ro p o sin g w h a t a p o s t-C o ld W ar g e n ­ e ra tio n w o u ld call a "peace d iv id e n d ," h e p ro m ised to d e v o te "a su b sta n tia l p ercen tag e of the sav in g s achieved b y d isa rm a m e n t to a fu n d for w o rld a id a n d reco n struction." T he sav in g s w o u ld b e u se d for "a n e w k in d of w a r . . . a d e ­ clared to tal w ar, n o t u p o n a n y h u m a n en em y b u t u p o n th e b ru te forces of p o v ­ erty a n d n e e d ." 18 C ritics o ften a p p la u d e d these b ro a d sen tim en ts b u t attack ed th e stra te g y th a t flow ed from them , above all its reliance o n th rea ts of m assive retaliation. T hey d ecried the creation of a technologically m u scle-b o u n d A m erica so d e p e n d e n t o n n u clear w e a p o n s th a t it h a d n o choice b e tw ee n c a p itu la tio n a n d catastro p h e

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in th e face of c o m m u n ist ag g ressio n — a stra te g y a t once h elp less a n d h o rrify ­ ing. A s the 1950s w o re on, th e N e w L ook seem ed a feeble b u lw a rk a g ain st the lim ited w a rs a n d su b v ersiv e efforts w a g e d b y c o m m u n ist a n d leftist forces in th e T h ird W orld. Ike him self a ck n o w le d g ed th e force of th is criticism e v en b e­ fore b ecom ing P resident. "W h at sh o u ld w e d o if Soviet political aggression, as in C zechoslovakia, successively ch ip s a w ay ex p o sed p o sitio n s in th e free w o rld ?" h e w ro te D ulles in 1952. "To m y m in d th is is th e case w h e re th e th eo ry of 're ta lia tio n ' falls d o w n ." 19 H e n e v e r d e v ised a satisfacto ry so lu tio n to the p roblem . Still, critics of the N e w Look also te n d e d to caricatu re it— it h a rd ly d e n ie d th e a d m in istra tio n a n o n -n u cle ar capability. B etw een 1954 a n d 1958, th e a rm y fell from 1,404,598 to 898,925 p erso n n el, b u t rem a in e d 50 p e rc en t larg er th a n a t its lo w p o in t in th e late 1940s. O th e r "co n v en tio n al" forces, th e n a v y a n d m a ­ rines, sh ra n k o n ly b y 10 percent, as d id th e air force. T he 2.6 m illio n p e rso n n el of 1958 m ark e d a 30 p e rc en t d ecline fro m th e K orean W ar p eak , b u t th e m ilitary reserv es h a d g ro w n a n d the n a tio n w a s n o lo n g er a t w ar. T his force w a s far m o re capable of lim ited w a r th a n a n y p rev io u s p eacetim e force. It w a s b ack ed u p b y th e C IA 's en h an ced capacity for p a ra m ilita ry a n d c o v ert action, a n d b y m ilitary resources g iven allies a n d clients (Ike in sisted o n foreign m ilitary a n d econom ic aid in the face of co nservatives fu rio u s a b o u t fiscal im p ru d e n c e a n d liberals su sp icio u s of a id in g despots). If E isenhow er n e v e r p lu n g e d co n v en tio n al forces in to m ajor co m b at after Korea, th a t w a s b y choice m ore th a n becau se h e d e n ie d h im self th e m eans. T here w a s v irtu e in self-denial— h e co u ld p le a d in cap acity to w a g e a n o th e r Ko­ rea n W ar— b u t the self-denial w a s m ore a p p a re n t th a n real. M ost im p o rtan t, critics a ssu m e d th a t th ere was som e w a y to challenge co m m u n ist ag g ressio n m ilitarily a t little cost— a successful stra te g y av o id in g b o th th e ag o n y of Korea a n d th e in san ity of n u c le ar w ar. H a n g in g ov er th e arcan e d e b ates of th e 1950s w a s a possibility few ack n o w le d g ed — th a t m ilitary p o w e r in a n y fo rm m ig h t b e of little use to A m erica, o r a n y g rea t pow er. E isen h o w er cam e as close as an y n a tio n al figure to a ck n o w led g in g th a t d ilem m a, a lth o u g h h e n e v er fu lly a d ­ d resse d the strategic a n d political consequen ces th a t flo w ed fro m it. In a d d itio n to force levels, b u d g e ts m e a su re d E isen h o w er's a p p ro a c h to n a ­ tional security. D efense sp e n d in g fell 20 p e rc en t b e tw e e n fiscal 1953 a n d 1955 a n d , th o u g h rising later in the 1950s, c o n tin u ed to m o v e w ith in a n a rro w range. It also d eclin ed as a fraction of the n a tio n al b u d g e t (from tw o -th ird s to one-half b y 1960) a n d as percen tag e of G N P (from 13.8 to 9.1 percent). Taft w a n te d sh a rp e r cuts, b u t E isenhow er d id n o t listen, " p a rtly b ecau se th e clam o r from th e o th er sid e — d e m a n d in g m ore sp e n d in g o n th e m ilita ry — w a s so m u ch lo u d er."20 In d eed , Ike su sta in ed his defense b u d g e ts in th e face of h e a te d p ro ­ tests from the a rm e d forces a n d , after 1957, w id e sp re a d p ressu re to sp e n d m ore. H is b u d g e ts w o u ld h av e b e en u n su sta in ab le if h e h a d failed to co n tain o r

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liq u id a te a series of crises a n d te m p tatio n s to action th a t p e p p e re d his first term . T he m o st ag o n izin g w a s th e w a r in Korea. D rag g in g o n since 1951, a rm i­ stice talks h a d fo u n d e re d o stensibly ov er th e c o m m u n ists' insistence th a t all th e ir PO W s in allied h a n d s be re p a tria te d (as p re c e d e n t a n d in te rn atio n al law req u ired), forcibly if necessary, w h ile th e allies p o stu re d a b o u t th e PO W s' rig h t to freed o m a n d choice. In fact, h o w ev er, T aiw anese a n d S outh K orean forces so m etim es in tim id a te d co m m u n ist p riso n ers, as d id th e c o m m u n ists theirs. B oth sides u se d PO W s as p a w n s in a n elab o rate gam e. O n th e S outh K orean a n d A m erican side, th e y earn in g for to tal victo ry re­ m a in e d strong. In D ecem ber 1952, M acA rth u r h a d ad v ised th rea te n in g to u se n u c le ar w eap o n s. Ike th o u g h t the th re a t m ig h t be useful, b u t a t b e st to achieve a co m p rom ise, n o t to ta l victory, w o rry in g th a t "if w e 're g o in g to ex ten d th e w a r w e h av e to m a k e .su re w e 're n o t o ffending th e w h o le w o rld ." T h ro u g h th e sp rin g a n d early su m m e r of 1953, S y n g m an Rhee, D ulles, R epublican conser­ vativ es, a n d som e D em ocrats m a d e d a rk noises a b o u t g o in g for broke, a n d m em b ers of the G O P o ld g u a rd w ere "h e a rd to m u tte r th a t if T ru m a n h a d sig n ed th e c o n d itio n s E isenhow er w a s w illin g to accept, th ey w o u ld hav e m o v ed to im p e ac h h im ." R hee trie d to to rp e d o a final ag reem en t b y releasing C h in ese a n d K orean PO W s w ith o u t rep a tria tio n , p ro v o k in g n e w hostilities costly to A m erican forces. C ab in et d iscu ssio n of assassin atin g h im , a n d stronga rm efforts to p u ll h im back into line.21 A n arm istice w a s finally achieved in July. In a p erc ep tio n w ith p ro fo u n d con­ seq u en ces for later A m erican policy, Ike's success w a s o ften a ttrib u te d to a th re a t to u se n u c le ar w e a p o n s se n t b y D ulles ind irectly to th e C hinese. But w h ile su ch th re a t w a s m ad e, it w a s n e ith e r n e e d e d n o r d e te rm in a tiv e of the o u tco m e— the real th re a t w a s " E ise n h o w e r's rep u ta tio n " from W orld W ar II "b ack ed b y A m erica's atom ic arsen al," a n d th e essen tial co m p ro m ises w ere al­ re a d y in place before D ulles's w a rn in g . O n e act rarely e n d s w ars, a n d th is w a r's e n d o w ed to m a n y factors: ex h au stio n o n b o th sides, n e w le a d ersh ip in M os­ cow a n d W ashington, a n d th e m ajor p o w e rs' g ru d g in g w illin g n ess to m ak e concessions. Still, E isen h o w er's role w a s critical, for h e "realized th a t u n lim ite d w a r in the n u c le ar age w a s u n im ag in ab le, a n d lim ited w a r u n w in n ab le. This w a s th e m o st basic of his strategic in sig h ts."22 In settling for so m e th in g far less th a n to tal victory, Ike im plicitly ch allen g ed th e stra n g le h o ld of W orld W ar II o n th e A m erican im ag in atio n , an ironic ach iev em en t for th a t w a r's hero. T rue to his n a tu re , h e failed to m ak e th e chal­ len g e p ublicly explicit, th o u g h it w a s e v id e n t in th e ten o r of h is pu b lic rem arks, as h e av o id ed triu m p h a l o r self-co n g ratu lato ry com m ents. In o th er w ay s, too, h e m ay h ave im p lied th e Second W orld W ar's irrelev an ce to th e 1950s. Begged in 1954 to sp eak a t a g litterin g cerem ony d e d ic atin g th e m assiv e m o n u m e n t to th e 1945 flag raising a t Iw o Jim a, E isenhow er all b u t d u c k e d th e occasion w ith ­ o u t u tte rin g a w o rd — eith er d istu rb e d b y the m y th ic falseh o o d s a b o u t th e o rig ­ in al in cid en t o r uncom fortable w ith the ro m an ticizatio n of w a r a n d v icto ry im-

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p licit in th e w h o le affair. Likew ise, once elected, h e d id little to ex p lo it th e m em o ries a n d sym bols of W orld W ar II (alth o u g h , th e cynic m ig h t arg u e, h is re p u ta tio n m a d e it u n n e ce ssa ry to d o so).23 E isenhow er co u ld settle K orea o n u n sa tisfy in g term s b ecau se it b e g a n o n T ru m a n 's w a tc h a n d because of h is p e rso n a l rep u ta tio n . O th e r situ atio n s b e­ lo n g ed m ore sq u arely to h is ad m in istratio n . By 1953, th e French w ere d e e p ly m ire d in a n u n w in n a b le w a r to reclaim In d o ch in a, w h ile th e U n ite d States gov­ e rn m e n t fu n d e d th e French effort, su p p lie d m ilita ry p e rso n n e l to assist it, a n d search ed h a lfh e arted ly am o n g d e p re ssin g op tio n s. T he F rench cause seem ed d o o m ed , b u t F rench w ith d ra w a l w o u ld d o o m V ietn am to c o m m u n ist takeover. T he tricky m id d le g ro u n d o n ly su ck ed the T ru m a n a n d E isen h o w er a d m in is­ tratio n s in deeper. T hey k n e w h o w offensive F ran ce's im p e ria l cause w a s to th e Ind o ch inese, b u t a tte m p ts to coerce France in to g ra n tin g in d e p e n d e n c e to its colonies o n ly trig g ered French th rea ts to w ith d ra w alto g eth er, a n d a n effort to d ev elo p a V ietnam ese "th ird force" b o th an ti-im p e ria list a n d a n tico m m u n ist fo u n d e re d o n its in h e re n t con trad ictio n s, p ro d u c in g h a p le ss fig u reh e ad s like E m p ero r Bao Dai. T he possibility th a t th e leftist V ietm in h forces fig h tin g France m ig h t b e sufficiently n a tio n alist to resist th e sw ay of P ek in g a n d M oscow w a s rare ly considered. E m b o d y in g all th e lessons of a p p e a se m e n t a n d th e 1930s, th e "falling d o m in o e s" principle, as E isenh o w er p u b licly fo rm u la te d it, as­ su m e d the u n ity of all c o m m u n ist forces a n d p rescrib ed th a t once th e y "k n o ck o v er" th e first n o n c o m m u n ist country, "th e last o n e " certain ly w o u ld "g o o v er v e ry quickly."24 Intellectually, E isenhow er d id n o t assu m e a m o n o lith ic c o m m u n ist enem y, m ak in g g estu res to T ito's Y ugoslavia a n d to y in g w ith o v e rtu re s to M ao's C hina. L ittle real feel for T h ird W orld n a tio n alism b ack ed u p h is ab stract p e r­ c ep tio n of diversity, ho w ev er, a n d little ro o m ex isted in A m erican politics to act o n it. The a d m in istra tio n 's strategic su p p le n e ss w a s u n m a tc h e d b y a sim ilar flexibility a b o u t politics a n d ideology. D espite this confining fram ew o rk , E isenh o w er m o v ed to lim it A m erican in ­ v o lv em en t in In d o ch in a d u rin g F rance's final crisis in th e sp rin g of 1954. A s V ietm inh forces encircled th e French b a stio n a t D ien Bien P h u , a p lea for A m er­ ican m ilitary in te rv en tio n cam e from the French g o v e rn m e n t, b ack ed b y con­ serv ative A m erican politicians a n d a d m in istra tio n lea d ers like N ixon, w h ile talk of atom ic b o m b s sp read . Ike blocked th e d e m a n d s to go w a r "b y p u ttin g co n d itio n s o n A m erican in v o lv em en t," ones "d elib era tely created to b e im p o s­ sible of fulfillm ent."25 T hey in c lu d e d C ong ress's assent, u n ite d s u p p o rt from A m erican allies, a n d a h o st of c o n d itio n s o n th e French, in clu d in g full in d e p e n ­ dence for th eir colonies. Forestalling m ilitary in te rv e n tio n w a s a collective— a n d a m b ig u o u s— achievem ent. C ertain ly others, like A rm y C hief of Staff G en eral M a tth e w R idgw ay, also d o u b te d th a t A m erican technolo g y co u ld prev ail. C ertain ly Ike's com plex policy still y ie ld e d — a n d w as d e sig n e d to y ie ld — a d e e p e r A m erican

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c o m m itm en t to th e area th a t p ro d u c e d th e S o u th east A sia T reaty O rg an izatio n , lav ish a id to N g o D in h D iem 's n e w S outh V ietnam ese regim e, a n d san ctio n for D iem 's refu sal to h o ld elections to reu n ify V ietnam . B ehind th a t effort lay ty p ical A m erican a sp iratio n s to b e a m u sc u la r "city o n a h ill" to th e w o rld , e x p o rtin g d em o cracy a n d cap italism a n d m ak in g S outh V ietn am "th e co rn er­ sto n e of th e Free W orld in S outheast A sia, th e k ey sto n e in th e arch, th e fin g er in th e d ik e," as Sen. John K en n ed y p u t it in 1956. T hese asp iratio n s, bitin g ly ex p o sed in G ra h a m G reene's 1955 n o v el The Quiet American, in flu en ced Ike. Still, h e c o n d em n ed u se of g ro u n d forces— "T his w a r in In d o ch in a w o u ld ab so rb o u r tro o p s b y div isio n s!"— a n d saw th a t th e n a tio n 's " tra d itio n of a n ti­ co lo n ialism " fo rm ed " a n asset of incalculable v a lu e to th e Free W orld." Talk of u sin g atom ic b o m b s en ra g ed him : "You boys m u st b e crazy. W e c a n 't u se th o se aw fu l th in g s a g ain st A sians for th e second tim e in less th a n te n years. M y G o d ."26 A s o th e r situ atio n s sh o w ed , n o refu sal to u se p o w e r g u id e d E isenhow er, o n ly a sh re w d d e te rm in a tio n to act w h e n the o d d s w ere favorable a n d th e costs lo w — u n less m isju d g ed . In the nail-biting crises of 1955 a n d 1958 o v er Q u e m o y a n d M a tsu — sm all islan d s n e a r C h in a's coast h e ld b y T aiw an 's N a tio n a list g o v e rn m e n t— th e a d m in istra tio n th re a te n e d a n u c le a r resp o n se if M ao 's gov­ e rn m e n t attacked, w h ile D ulles e q u a te d M ao's "ag g ressiv e fanaticism " w ith th a t of H itler. Ike g a in e d a p p a re n t v icto ry for b rin k m a n sh ip , b u t also "th o r­ o u g h ly d isc red ite d it in th e eyes of the A m erican p u b lic a n d allies o v erseas b y rev ealing h o w little it w o u ld take to p u s h th e a d m in istra tio n in to a w a r w ith C h in a," b y sh o w in g th e a d m in istra tio n 's " b la n d self-confidence th a t it co u ld u se n u c le ar w e a p o n s w ith o u t settin g off a n all-o u t n u c le ar w a r," a n d b y d o in g so in a crisis ov er real estate of p u re ly sym bolic v a lu e (alth o u g h D ulles later b o a sted th a t "h is m o st b rillian t" ach iev em en t h a d b e e n "to save Q u e m o y a n d M atsu .")27 M oreover, th e outcom e seem ed to rest o n o n e m a n w h o se ju d g m e n t, h o w ­ ev er assessed, w o u ld h av e to falter o n occasion. T he F orm osa crises sh o w e d the a d m in istra tio n 's p e n c h a n t for recklessness in sm all m atters as a g ain st restra in t in larg er ones. O n ly w h e n th e 1955 crisis th re a te n e d to ex p lo d e d id Ike sh o w caution. A fter th e Soviet foreign m in iste r sa id th a t n u c le ar w a r w o u ld n o t th rea te n " w o rld civilization" b u t only " th a t ro tte n social sy stem w ith its im p e ­ rialist basis so ak ed in b lo o d ," E isenhow er p u b licly rem in isced a b o u t h is 1945 frien d sh ip w ith M arsh al (now D efense M inister) Z hu k o v , w h o h a d g iv en h im a n "en o rm o u s b e a r h u g " o n h is b irth d ay . "It is necessary," co m m en ts P au l C ar­ ter, "to th in k a n d feel o n e 's w a y back in to th e m o o d of th e fifties to realize h o w rem arkable a sta te m e n t this w a s." 28 Ju st as d a n g e ro u s w ere th e a d m in istra tio n 's b arely co v ert in te rv en tio n s in Iran a n d G uatem ala. W ary of p lu n g in g A m erican forces in to w ar, E isen h o w er tu rn e d to the CIA as one alternative, sh a rin g G en. Jam es D oo little's view s: fac­ ing "a n im placable en em y " seeking "w o rld d o m in a tio n " in a g am e w ith "n o

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ru les," th e U n ited States m u s t "lea rn to su b v ert, sab o tag e, a n d d e stro y o u r e n e ­ m ies b y m ore clever, m ore so p h isticated , a n d m o re effective m e th o d s th a n th o se u se d a g ain st u s." W h en P rem ier M o h am m ed M o ssa d eg h n a tio n alize d Ira n 's oil fields a n d seem ed to th re a te n W estern in terests, A llen D u lles's C IA h e lp e d o rg an ize his o v e rth ro w a n d the sh a h 's re tu rn to th e th ro n e in 1953. W h en a sim ilar d ra m a u n fo ld e d the n ex t y e ar in G u a tem ala — its g o v e rn m e n t co o p erated w ith th e C o m m u n ist Party, carried o u t la n d reform , a n d e x p ro p ri­ a te d h o ld in g s of th e A m erican U n ited F ruit C o m p an y (to w h ic h th e D ulles b ro th e rs h a d close ties) th a t it left fallow — th e C IA su b v e rte d th e refo rm ist re­ g im e a n d replaced it w ith a reactio n ary clique. T he C IA h a d sco red tw o victo­ ries, a t least for co rp o rate interests, a t m in im al cost. T he d o m in o e s w o u ld n o t fall ("M y G o d ," Ike sa id reg a rd in g G u atem ala, "ju st th in k w h a t it w o u ld m ea n to u s if M exico w e n t C om m unist!"). But b y d e stro y in g refo rm ist regim es, th ese v ictories also forced b o th areas in to p a in fu l choices b e tw ee n reactio n ary a n d rev o lu tio n a ry alternatives: G u atem ala e x perien ced rec u rren t civil w a r in to th e 1990s; th e sh a h su c cu m b e d to a n Islam ic u p risin g in 1979. P erh ap s lo n g -term o u tco m es o u g h t n o t to b e p in n e d to E isenhow er: "Sufficient u n to th e d a y are th e crises thereof," n o tes C arter, a n d Ike liq u id a te d h is crises w ith o u t A m erican b lo o d . Still, h is u se of th e CIA m a y o n ly h av e p o stp o n e d th e reckoning, a n d it se t a telling p re c e d e n t for h is successors. C ertain ly h is im p u lse s— to av o id w ar, re stra in m ilitarizatio n , b u t su sta in A m erican h e g e m o n y — coexisted in u n sta ­ b le b alance.29 It w a s all th e m ore u n sta b le because enem ies, allies, a n d o th ers c o u ld u p se t it. T h at b ecam e clear in th e fall of 1956. A com plex crisis in th e M id east d e v el­ o p e d w h e n th e a d m in istra tio n m isju d g ed E g y p tian n a tio n alism a n d A ngloFrench foolishness: E g y p t's N asser seized th e Suez C an al from B ritain, E gyptian-Israeli ten sio n s sw elled, a n d B ritain, France, a n d Israel m o v ed to in ­ v a d e E gypt, w ith o u t in fo rm in g E isenhow er. Ju st as th a t crisis w o rse n e d in O c­ tober, H u n g a ria n s rebelled a g ain st Soviet rule, a n d ju st as th ey seem ed a b o u t to p revail, the Red A rm y cru sh ed th e revolt. G iven G O P talk of lib eratin g e n ­ slaved p eo p les a n d A m erican p ro p a g a n d a u rg in g "cap tiv e n a tio n s" to th ro w off th eir shackles, Ike's refusal to a id the rebels in H u n g a ry w a s em b arrassin g . In th e M iddle East, h is o u trag e forced France, Britain, a n d Israel to cease th eir in v asio n of E gypt a n d e a rn e d the g ra titu d e of m a n y sm aller n atio n s, b u t N A TO a n d A m erican M id east interests seem ed im periled. Relief a t th e avoidance of w a r h e lp e d E isen h o w er g ain a n election lan d slid e in N ovem ber, b u t av o id an ce seem ed to h in g e p erilo u sly o n one m an , a p e rc ep ­ tio n alre ad y u n d e rsco re d b y Ike's h e a rt attack in 1955. In th e Suez crisis E isenhow er sh o w ed "a k in d of goo d sense w e can n o w w ish h a d b e e n sh o w n b y m ore recent p re sid e n ts w h o w ere co n sid ered m o re w o rld ly -w ise th a n Ik e"30— or h a d b e en sh o w n a t the tim e b y A dlai Stevenson, w h o fav o red Israel a n d the im p erial p o w e rs in E gypt ra th e r th a n th e U N reso lu tio n o rd erin g a cease-fire. Still, m ilitarizatio n w as co n tain ed a n d w a r av o id e d b y a b alan ce of

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forces— b e tw e e n th e "free w o rld " a n d its enem ies, b e tw ee n E isen h o w er a n d h is critics, b e tw e e n th e a d m in istra tio n 's o w n conflicting ten d e n cies— th a t w as in d e e d uneasy. It w a s also u n ste a d y w h e n E isen h o w er d e a lt w ith a n o th e r facet of m ilitariza­ tion, the R ed S care's legacy. A t the least, his in flam m ato ry statem en ts o n the m a tte r w ere few , a n d p e rh a p s b o th his sta tu re a n d h is p u b lic sk epticism a b o u t m ilita riza tio n calm ed th e m o o d a bit. Insofar as rep ressio n w a n e d in th e 1950s, h o w e v e r— a n d civil rig h ts lead ers, a m o n g o th ers, h a d reaso n to d o u b t th a t it d id — c o u rt decisions a n d o th er changes w ere m o re resp o n sib le th a n E ise n h o w e r's a d m in istratio n . C o rralin g M cC arth y d id n o t silence o th ers in C o n g ress w h o b a d g e re d the W hite H o u se to ferret o u t co m m u n ists, h o m o sex ­ u als, a n d o th e r alleg ed subversives. E ven w h e n th e sto rm in C ongress ab ated , th e executive b ra n c h 's m ore ro u tin e a n d invisible m ach in ery of rep ressio n g ro an e d o n — in som e w a y s e n la rg ed u n d e r E isenhow er, th o u g h n e ith e r m o re efficient n o r m o re fair. Typically, h e vacillated a n d co m p lain ed , a b o u t th e p o lit­ ical p ressu re s in v o lv ed , a m o n g o th er things. "W h y th e hell sh o u ld w e take cred it for a n y of th ese firings [of fed eral em ployees]?" h e fu m ed ; it w o u ld o n ly m e a n "tak in g c re d it for w h a t w a s p lain ly o u r d u ty ."31 H is co m p lain t m a d e clear b o th his d istaste for th e p ro cess a n d h is c o m m itm en t to it. T he u n e a sy b alance w a s also e v id e n t in th e a d m in istra tio n 's d ealin g s w ith C ongress. T he 1950s w ere n o t th e g o ld e n ag e of b ip artisa n sh ip o ften rem em ­ b e re d later b y C old W arriors lam en tin g su b se q u e n t political divisions. S h arp differences arose b e tw e e n R epublicans a n d D em ocrats, co n serv ativ es a n d lib­ erals, C ongress a n d th e W hite H ouse. In th e en d , "o p p o sitio n forces failed to alter th e su b stan ce of n a tio n al secu rity policy a n d foreign p o lic y . . ., o r ev en to increase congressio nal influence in th e fo rm atio n of th o se policies," arg u es one h isto rian , b u t it w a s " n o t for w a n t of effort. "32 A t m ost, b ip a rtisa n sh ip o ccu rred b y d efau lt, n o t design. C onflict b e tw e e n the W hite H o u se a n d C o n g ress e ru p te d especially o v er a co n stitu tio n al a m e n d m e n t offered b y O h io R epublican se n ato r John Bricker (w ho h a d b e e n D ew ey 's ru n n in g m ate in 1944). B ricker w a n te d to b a n execu­ tive ag reem en ts w ith o th er n atio n s, leav in g th e P re sid e n t on ly th e o p tio n of m ak in g treaties, w h ic h req u ire th e S enate's consent. B ehind h im lay a lo n g tra ­ d itio n of p o p u la r a n d congressional d istru st of p resid en tia l p o w e r in w a r a n d foreign policy, b u t th a t tra d itio n h a d becom e ideologically constricted. Som e D em o crats a n d liberals assailed p resid en tia l arrogance, b u t th e a n im u s b e h in d B ricker's m o v e w a s rig h te o u s R epublican in d ig n a tio n o v er th o se "o u trag e o u s Yalta accords" (as one se n ato r te rm e d them ) a n d o th er executive ag reem en ts th a t p re su m a b ly h a d g iv en co m m u n ists effortless victories in th e 1940s.33 B ehind it, too, w ere fears th a t stark ly d e m o n stra te d th e in se p arab ility of for­ e ig n policy a n d do m estic politics. T he B ricker a m e n d m e n t so u g h t to b a n treaties a b rid g in g a n y in d iv id u a l rig h t o r freed o m u n d e r th e C o n stitu tio n o r affecting " a n y o th er m atters essentially w ith in th e d om estic ju risd ictio n of the

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U n ited States." B ricker's n ig h tm a re w as th e U n ited N atio n s, especially the d ra ft In tern a tio n al C o v e n an t o n H u m a n R ights w ritte n b y "glo b al d re a m e rs" a n d "in te rn atio n al d o -g o o d ers" like E leanor Roosevelt. H e feared th a t th e cov­ e n a n t m ig h t becom e the law of lan d , a n d w ith it liberalism , w elfarism , ev en socialism . S haring h is ala rm a b o u t th e coven an t, w h ite su p rem acists feared for racial seg reg atio n a n d "sta te s' rig h ts," d o cto rs foresaw "so cialized m edicine," a n d th e U.S. C h a m b e r of C om m erce p ro p h e sie d th e e n d of "free e n te rp rise ."34 By a long a n d a d ro it effort, E isenhow er w a rd e d off B ricker's th re a t to h is p re ­ rogatives. H is rec o rd — b e tte r th a n th a t of m o st p o stw a r P re sid e n ts— of con­ su ltin g C ongress h elp ed . So d id co operativ e D em ocrats; b ip a rtisa n sh ip d id so m etim es operate. But from Ike's p o in t of view , it w a s a n e a r m iss a n d a n ex­ h a u stin g nuisance. M ore th a n m o st P resid en ts, h e av o id e d n a m e calling a n d b u rn e d n o b rid g es w ith an y o n e in C ongress, b u t p riv a te ly h e n o ted : "If it's tru e th a t w h e n y o u d ie the th in g s th a t b o th e re d y o u m o st are e n g ra v e d o n y o u r skull. I'm su re I'll h ave th ere th e m u d a n d d irt of France d u rin g in v asio n a n d th e n a m e of S enator B ricker."35 E isenhow er also m ain tain ed , as public reactions co n firm ed , th a t th e U n ited States n o w v a lu e d d ip lo m acy w ith the enem y, th o u g h d ip lo m acy rarely y ield ed concrete results. A 1955 trea ty m a d e A u stria a p e rm a n e n t n e u tra l a n d req u ire d w ith d ra w a l of o ccupying Soviet a n d W estern forces, a sig n ifican t p re ­ ced en t n o t follow ed for solving the w e ig h tier p ro b lem of d iv id e d G erm any. The U n ited States d id n o t e v en sig n th e 1954 G en ev a A ccords o n Ind o ch in a. E isen h ow er offered a m u ch -to u te d "A tom s for Peace" p ro g ra m a n d later a n im ag inative "O p e n Skies" p ro p o sa l— fo resh ad o w in g th e sp irit of later m u tu a l su rv eillan ce— w h e reb y th e su p e rp o w e rs w o u ld g iv e each o th e r "a co m p lete b lu e p rin t of o u r m ilitary e stab lish m en ts" a n d allow each to p h o to g ra p h th e o th er from the air.36 E very su ch p ro p o sa l led to a n a sty ro u n d of p u b lic p o stu r­ ing, Soviet a n d A m erican lead ers b lam in g each o th e r for th e a rm s race. E ven m ore ballyhoo, b u t n o agreem ents, acco m p an ied th e 1955 G en ev a "Big F o u r" m eeting of Ike a n d the Soviet, French, a n d B ritish leaders. E isenhow er, a n d som etim es his c o u n te rp a rts elsew here, w ere d u ly criticized for p e rfo rm in g e m p ty ritu als th a t m ask ed g ro w in g perils. T here w as so m eth in g to be said for ritu al, ho w ev er. R em iniscent of FD R's su m m it diplom acy, E isen h o w er's version, u n d e rta k e n in th e face of shrill p ro p h ecies of "ap p e a sem e n t," e stab lish ed ex p ectations a n d processes for s u ­ p e rp o w e r co n su ltatio n th a t n o later P re sid e n t co u ld ignore. T he lav ish m ed ia a tten tio n given the G eneva su m m it reflected th e su b sta n tiv e sh a llo w n ess of the event, b u t also the h o p es it aro u sed . A s E isen h o w er aid e E m m et Jo h n H u g h e s said, G eneva "w as w id ely u n d e rsto o d to signalize, w ith o u t articu latin g , th e ac­ ceptance b y the m ajor p o w e rs of th e co m m o n n ecessity to sh u n reco u rse to n u ­ clear w ar." A sim ilar signal arose from lofty a n d n o w -fo rg o tten asp iratio n s, earn estly su p p o rte d b y E isenhow er am o n g o thers, th a t th e U n ited N a tio n s b e ­ com e an effective in stru m e n t of w o rld peace a n d p ro sp erity .37 N o netheless, b e n e a th the surface of in te rn atio n al crisis a n d c o n su lta tio n ra n

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c u rre n ts th a t u n d e rm in e d E isen h o w er's h o p e s to co n ta in m ilitarizatio n . In th e sp ra w lin g n a tio n al secu rity a p p a ra tu s , p re ssu re k e p t m o u n tin g to d e v elo p n e w w e a p o n s a n d to su b v e rt a rm s control. T h ro u g h th e b u d g e t process, Ike exercised g en eral control o v er d efense policy b u t n o t o v er its q u alitativ e sh ift to w a rd new , expensive w eap o n s. By b rin g in g scientists in to th e W h ite H o u se, h e g a in e d access to ex p erts skeptical a b o u t n e w p ro g ram s, b u t also subjected h im self to m ore d irect p re ssu re from scientists c h am p io n in g a n ag gressive course. T he a d m in istratio n , co m p lain e d ^T reasury Secretary H u m p h re y in 1957, h a d b e e n "led a stray b y scientists a n d b y v e sted in terests." By d e n u n c ia ­ tio n s of n u c le ar overkill o r sh eer explosions of tem p er, E isen h o w er c o u ld in ter­ ru p t th e m o m e n tu m . H e co u ld n o t o r w o u ld n o t sto p it. N u c lea r w a rh e a d s sw elled in n u m b e rs a n d po w er, th eir m eg a to n n a g e (d estru ctiv e p o w er) soar­ in g fro m 150 in 1953 to 19,000 in 1960, th e h isto ric peak. By m id -d e ca d e the U n ited States w a s p lu n g in g in to th e n e x t stage of th e a rm s race, in terco n tin en ­ ta l rockets for d e liv erin g n u c le ar w e ap o n s. A n u c le ar a rm s race w h o se logic h a d "n o connection to experience o r reality" w a s tak in g over. E isen h o w er a n d th e A m erican p e o p le in sisted o n "clear A m erican superio rity . H o w th ey w o u ld u se th a t le a d — except to in su re deterren ce, w h ic h co u ld b e a ssu re d w ith one h u n d re d b o m b s a n y w a y — th ey d id n o t k n o w ."38 H isto rian s h av e fau lted "th e in ad e q u ac y of [E isenhow er's] lead ersh ip , com ­ b in e d w ith the intractable p ro b lem s h e faced" a n d h is a d m in istra tio n 's "o v er­ b lo w n rhetoric," for creatin g " a n a tm o sp h e re in w h ic h c o n sid era tio n of defen se issu es b ecam e n e arly im p o ssib le."39 B eyond th a t w a s a d ilem m a th a t E isen h o w er b arely g rasp ed . The N e w L ook in v o lv e d a reso rt to tech n o lo g y to co n ta in m ilita riza tio n — n e w w e a p o n s w ere to cu t costs b y m in im izin g force levels a n d av ertin g lim ited w ars. D ra w in g o n a n A m erican tra d itio n of seeking technological so lu tio n s to p ro b lem s created in p a rt b y technology, it a g g ra­ v a te d th e v e ry m ilita riza tio n th a t Ike h o p e d to arrest. M ilitarizatio n w a s a q u a l­ itativ e p h e n o m e n o n , n o t ju st a q u a n tita tiv e o n e m ea su ra b le b y th e size of b u d ­ g ets o r arm ies. T he N e w L ook accelerated it a t its m o st technically exquisite, a n d ex quisitely d a n g ero u s, n u c le ar core. A n y o th er P re sid e n t m ig h t h av e d o n e w o rse in th a t reg ard , b u t th e h ig h e r sta n d a rd of success E isen h o w er set for h im ­ self m ak es th e ju d g m e n t o n h im m ore sev ere— as h e so o n felt. Since his successors rarely d id b e tte r in these m atters, h o w ev er, h e alone w a s o b v io u sly n o t th e p roblem . B eyond h im lay a political c u ltu re h a rd ly h is to con­ trol. H u m p h re y 's p riv a te co m p lain t a b o u t "scien tists" a n d "v ested in terests" su g g e ste d one facet of th e problem . Ike co u ld claim g reater w isd o m th a n g en ­ erals a n d ad m irals, b u t for h im to c o m p lain p u b licly a b o u t th e p ressu re s of sci­ en tists a n d o th er e x p erts w a s v irtu a lly im p o ssib le— it w o u ld h av e sm ack ed of th e an ti-in tellectu alism a n d c ra m p ed visio n alre ad y im p u te d to E isen h o w er a n d h is associates too often for th eir political com fort. To challenge G en. M ax­ w ell T aylor w a s one thing; to d isp u te E d w ard Teller w as a n o th e r a t a tim e w h e n so m u c h w isd o m a n d objectivity w ere a ttrib u te d to scientists. O n e c o n tro v ersy over n u c le ar w e a p o n s d id give Ike a chance to challenge the

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scientists' authority. A test in the Pacific of a n A m erican h y d ro g e n b o m b in 1954 stirred alarm a b o u t its sh eer explosive po w er, b u t e v en m o re a b o u t th e fallout th a t c o n tam in ated A m ericans, area natives, a n d n e a rb y Jap an ese fish erm en (their fate om in o u sly reso n an t w ith A u g u st 1945). E isen h o w er p u b licly d o u b te d scientists' infallibility, an n o u n cin g th a t "th is tim e so m e th in g m u st h av e h a p p e n e d th a t w e h av e n e v e r experien ced before, a n d m u s t h av e su r­ p rise d a n d asto n ish ed the scientists." P rivately, h e said th a t after th e c u rre n t A m erican tests h e w o u ld b e "w illin g to h ave a m o ra to riu m o n all fu rth e r ex p er­ im en tatio n " w ith n u c le ar w eap o n s.40 In stead h e vacillated, th e n d rifte d w ith the tid e of e x p erts seek in g m o re tests, m o re bom bs, a n d m ore vehicles to carry them . H is N e w L ook stra te g y w a s o n e reason, b u t also his desire for elite control, w h ich p u b lic d e b a te n o w th re a te n e d to erode. D issident scientists a n d grass-roo ts activists fo rm ed n e w o rg an iz a ­ tions. B ooks— N evil S hute's On the Beach (1957), W alter M ille r's A Canticle for Leibowitz (1959), M ordecai R o sh w ald 's Level 7(1959)— w id e n e d d eb ate. T he So­ viets g ra n d s ta n d e d w ith n e w p ro p o sa ls to e n d th e a rm s race. N e u tra ls like In­ d ia, h a rd ly w ish in g to b a th e in th e fallout of Soviet a n d A m erican tests, e n ­ liv en ed a global debate. C h a rg ed c u ltu ral sym bols w e re a t p la y — Strontium -90 w as en terin g the food chain, p o iso n in g th e m ilk m o th e rs fed babies. E isenhow er w a s n o t im m u n e to th e anxieties ex p ressed in th is w id e n in g d e ­ bate. H a d a stro n g challenge to n u c le ar policy e m e rg ed w ith in h is policy a p p a ­ ratu s, h e m ig h t h av e acted forcefully: in th a t aren a, sim ilar to th e o n e h e k n ew as a co m m an d er, h e co u ld be co n fid en t a n d co u rag eo u s. B ut in sid ers critical of th e arm s race w ere few — E isenhow er as m u c h as an y o n e, a n d h e d isc o u rag e d th e criticism h e also so u g h t b y his choice of scientific a d v iso rs a n d b y h is w ill­ in g n ess to see O p p e n h eim er forced out. A lifetim e's h a b its m a d e h im d istru st the u n p red ictab le anxieties of outsiders. R ep eated ly h e co n sid ered b lu n t efforts to in fo rm A m ericans of the n u c le ar danger. R ep eated ly h e b ack ed aw ay, sen ­ sin g th a t public ala rm w as as likely to u n d e rm in e efforts a t d isa rm a m e n t as to stre n g th e n them . A lread y in 1953, w h e n the scientist V an n ev ar B ush h a d tak e n u p "th e case for scaring the p eo p le into a b ig tax p ro g ra m to b u ild b o m b d e ­ fenses," Ike h a d seen "th e d a n g e rs in telling too m u c h of th e tru th ." 41 H is d is­ tru st of public can d o r w as n o t u n fo u n d e d , b u t h is ch o sen co u rse serv ed h im n o better. T here w ere alternatives to E isen h o w er's lea d ersh ip in su ch m atters, b u t as u su a l in A m erican politics, th ey w ere m u d d le d . A dlai Stevenson, in 1956 a g ain th e D em ocrats' nom inee, p ro p o se d c u ttin g back th e d ra ft a n d e n d in g n u c le ar w e a p o n s tests, b u t also assailed the a d m in istra tio n for n o t b u ild in g m o re m is­ siles faster. For his p a rt, "E isenhow er th o u g h t th a t testin g w a s far too com plex a n d d a n g ero u s a subject to be d iscu ssed in a political cam p aig n ,"42 th o u g h h e sk ew ered S tevenson on the issue w h e n it seem ed necessary. So e n d e d h is first term , fo u r y ears of p recario u s b alance in w h ich so m u ch seem ed to h in g e o n h im alone, a n d he n o t an ticip atin g h o w "com plex a n d d a n g e ro u s" subjects m ig h t resist elite control.

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H is b e st allies o n defense policy h a d b e en b u sin e ssm e n a n d conservatives, n o t liberals. A few m o n th s after th e election, I. F. Stone a p tly d escrib ed th e con­ te n d in g positions. N o tin g a w a rn in g b y G en eral Electric's p re sid e n t th a t "d e ­ fense e x p en d itu re s d ra in aw ay n atio n al resources," Stone th o u g h t it "stran g e w h e n o n ly a b ig b u sin e ssm a n talks as liberals u se d to." Stone su m m arize d a n ­ o th er d isse n te r's claim th a t "th e R ussian m ilitary m enace h a d b e e n b u ilt u p h ere b e y o n d all reasonable p ro p o rtio n s" a n d th a t "d efen se h a d becom e a g rav y train ." "W hose n a m e w a s sig n ed to this m o v in g a p p eal?" Stone asked. "N o t W alter R euther or U p to n Sinclair o r . . . R einhold N ie b u h r o r . . . A rth u r M. Schlesinger, Jr.," b u t "a D em ocratic co n g ressm an from b e n ig h te d M ississippi." L iberals' "silence," Stone co m p lain ed , "reflects th e v a st a n d in h ib itin g sh a d o w cast across A m erican life b y the sh eer size of th e m ilitary b u d g e t," w ith lab o r a n d cap ital a h d th e acad em y n o w living "off th e search for ev er m o re in g en io u s w e a p o n s." E isenhow er, of course, h a d n o t b e en silen t— S tone's w o rd s m ir­ ro red h is se n tim e n ts— b u t too often h e h a d b e en tim id a n d in co n sisten t.43

Reform in the Paradigm of War In M arch 1953, th e issu e of g e n erato rs for the C hief Joseph D am cam e before a n "u n su sp e c tin g C abinet." It seem ed a m in o r m a tte r of dom estic policy, except th a t foreign policy w as also a t stake: the W hite H o u se h a d p ro fessed its com ­ m itm e n t to free tra d e a n d o p e n e d b id d in g to B ritish firm s, b u t W estin g h o u se w a n te d (an d ev en tu ally got) the contract d e sp ite its h ig h e r bid. For w eek s th e " u n p le a sa n t so u n d of w h irrin g g e n erato rs" filled th e C ab in et room . E m m et Jo h n H u g h e s co m p lain ed .44 The ep iso d e sh o w ed m o re th a n th e a d m in istra ­ tio n 's capacity to get sid etrack ed from m ajor issues. It also sh o w ed th a t few issu es b e lo n g e d w h o lly an y lo n g er to "dom estic policy." G o v e rn m e n t's role in th e n a tio n 's life a n d the a g en d a of reform w a s m o re th a n ev er lo d g ed in the p a ra d ig m of w ar. T he te rra in su ite d E isenhow er in som e w ay s, alth o u g h , as H u g h e s later n o te d , reig n in g stereo ty p es a b o u t the tw o m ajor political p a rtie s— "th e D em o­ crats as 'th e P arty of W ar,' the R epublicans as 'th e P arty of D ep ressio n ' " — m a d e it h a rd to assess Ike's record, th e n a n d for lo n g after h is presidency. H is b io g ra p h e r cam e close to th e m ark. E isen h o w er's lib eralism reg a rd in g d o m es­ tic affairs w as real b u t "u su a lly connected w ith n atio n al security," a n d w ith o u t su c h a connection, it "fad e d ." In d eed , liberalism generally, n o t ju st Ike's ver­ sion, w a s connected to n a tio n al security, ju st as its d istin ctio n from co n serv a­ tism w a s b lu rry .45 O n occasion, E isenhow er reached b e y o n d a m ere p ro g ram m atic lin k ag e b e ­ tw e en refo rm a n d n atio n al security, as w h e n h e u rg e d a p p ly in g resources freed b y d isa rm a m e n t "to a n e w k in d of w a r . . . u p o n th e b ru te forces of p o v e rty a n d n e e d ." 46 T hat language, fo resh ad o w in g L yndon Jo h n so n 's W ar o n Poverty, re­ flected b o th e n tra p m e n t in a n d discom fo rt w ith th e p a ra d ig m of w ar: E isen h ow er w a n te d to reach o u tsid e it b u t co u ld n o t escape it.

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H is difficulty reflected a larger w eak n ess in h is c a m p a ig n a g ain st m ilitariza­ tion: h e offered n o com pelling m ission for A m erica b e y o n d n a tio n a l security. The evils of m ilitarizatio n h e con v ey ed precisely a n d elo q u en tly ; th e a ltern a ­ tives to it h e a rticu lated e arn estly b u t vaguely. T he w a r p a ra d ig m d id lea d h im to act o n a considerable refo rm a g en d a, b u t b y th e late 1950s refo rm ers w e re in creasingly couching th a t a g en d a in th e lan g u a g e of justice. E isen h o w er— ill a t ease w ith th a t lan g u a g e a n d th e g ro u p s e sp o u sin g it, b u t w a ry also of claim s m a d e in b eh alf of n a tio n al se cu rity — th e n o ften lo st h is g rip o n reform . W as h e b e h in d th e tim es o r a h e a d of them ? N o w recalled, h is w o rd s seem to belie the fatu o u s o p tim ism often later a ttrib u te d to th e 1950s a n d h is o w n le a d ­ ership. A t a tim e w h e n A m ericans co n su m ed n a tu ra l reso u rces w ith a b an d o n , h e w o rrie d a b o u t a w o rld "g ro w n b a rre n as th e m o u n ta in s of th e m o o n ," antici­ p a tin g later ecological concerns. In a n era of faith in m ateria l p ro g ress, h e w a rn e d of its in se p arab ility from m artia l d estru ctio n : "L ab o r sw eats to create, a n d tu rn s o u t devices to level n o t only m o u n ta in s b u t also cities."47 W h en m a te ­ rial v alu es a p p e a re d triu m p h a n t, h e in to n e d h ig h e r ideals. A s faith in th e p o w e r of law su ffu sed th e civil rig h ts m o v em en t, h e in sisted th a t o n ly h e a rts a n d h e a d s co u ld effect racial change. O f course, w h a t d e fin e d 1950s o p tim ism w as less a b elittlem en t of p ro b lem s th a n confidence th a t th e n a tio n co u ld solve them . Ike o ften sh a red th a t confidence, b u t h is o u tlo o k h a d a d a rk e r stra in as w ell. H e w a s also less in control of issues of refo rm th a n th o se of n a tio n al stra te g y a n d foreign policy. The latter e n g ag e d his g reatest exp ertise a n d sh a rp e st con­ victions, w h ereas h is ability to sh a p e do m estic po licy seem ed lim ite d — o ne reaso n th a t m o d e m P resid en ts h av e a tte n d e d m o re to n a tio n a l security, w h e re the constitutional a n d political c o n strain ts o n th e m seem ed few er. A s in te rest g ro u p s pro liferated , political p a rtie s w e ak e n ed , a n d m ed ia politics su p p la n te d them , p resid en tia l p o w e r in dom estic m a tte rs a p p e a re d to sh rin k . M aster b ro ­ kers like FDR or L yndon Johnson could overcom e th e obstacles o n occasion, as co u ld e v id e n t m ajority d e m a n d s. A n d E isen h o w er h a d successes: h e g en erally g o t w h a t h e w a n te d in th e w e ig h ty m a tte r of fed eral b u d g e ts a n d m o n e ta ry policy; h e g ain ed a m o d e st e x p an sio n of w elfare p ro g ra m s (increased Social Security benefits, e x p a n d e d u n e m p lo y m e n t co m p en satio n , a h ig h e r m in im u m w age); a n d h e secured m ajor p ro g ra m s of in te rn al d ev elo p m en t. But th e a d ­ m in istra tio n 's g rip o n o th er m atters w a s shaky, especially w h e n it faced g rass­ roots m o v em en ts th a t c ircu m v en ted p a rty stru c tu re s a n d elite control. Such m o v em en ts h a d little room , except as p re su m e d beneficiaries, in h is v isio n of a "co rp o rate c o m m o n w ealth " a d v a n c e d b y p a rtn e rsh ip b e tw e e n g o v e rn m e n t a n d "co rp o rate liberals," th o u g h e v en b u sin e ssm e n o ften ex asp e rate d h im ("They m ake crooks o u t of them selves," h e once co m p lain ed ).48 M eanw hile, E isen h o w er's favorite am o n g h is ach iev em en ts w e n t fo rw ard . The h u g e In terstate a n d D efense H ig h w a y System , a p p ro v e d b y C o n g ress in 1956 at his initiative, d e m o n stra te d the intricate m esh in g of n a tio n al secu rity

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w ith d om estic policy. In a few d ecad es trav elers w o u ld p a y little h e e d to the "D efense" in th e official title, b u t in the 1950s m o to rists co u ld n o t m iss (as Ike later p u t it) seeing the signs " sp ro u t u p alo n g sid e th e p av em en t: 'In th e e v e n t of a n e n em y a tta c k . . . " For E isenhow er, defen se w a s a m ajor reaso n for th e n e w sy stem of ro a d s (an d for th e Saint L aw rence Seaw ay). H e w o rrie d a b o u t h o w to ev acu ate cities in a n u c le ar w a r— th e p re se n t system , h e w a rn e d in 1955, "w o u ld b e th e b re e d e r of a d e a d ly congestio n w ith in h o u rs of a n a tta c k "— a n d h e rejected the o p tio n civil d efen se experte favored, a v a st sy stem of fallout shelters. W orried also a b o u t m ilitary tra n sp o rta tio n , h e v iv id ly recalled jo in in g a n a rm y co n v o y 's ago n izin g , six ty -tw o -d ay cro ss-co u n try trip in 1919 a n d re­ tu rn in g h o m e in 1945, after seeing G e rm a n y 's Autobahnen, to A m erican ro a d s in "sh o ck in g c o n d itio n ." S tretching b e h in d h im w a s th e m ilita ry 's lo n g role, e sp e­ cially th a t of the A rm y C o rp s of E ngineers, in th e n a tio n 's in te rn al d e v elo p ­ m en t. H is choice to h e a d a com m ittee stu d y in g th e issu e b ro u g h t to g eth er all these facets, p lu s th e h ig h w a y lobby: it w a s L ucius Clay, en g in eer, a rm y g en ­ eral, fo rm er h e a d of th e m ilita ry o ccu p atio n of G erm any, a n d m em b er of G en ­ eral M o to rs' b o a rd of directors.49 E isen h o w er's in itiativ e o n h ig h w a y s also reflected a m o d e ra te pro g ressiv ism th a t p riz e d a lim ited fed eral role in p ro m o tin g econom ic stab ility a n d a b u n d an c e. H e saw p u b lic w o rk s p ro g ra m s as a fiscal tool for sm o o th in g o u t th e b u sin e ss cycle w h ile a v o id in g the evils of o u trig h t w elfarism . H e sh a red the p rev a ilin g faith th a t g ra n d ly scaled technological d e v e lo p m e n t w o u ld b rin g "g re a te r c o n v e n ie n c e ,. . . g reater h a p p in e ss, a n d g reater s ta n d a rd s of liv in g ." In w o rd s to m ak e a later g e n eratio n sh u d d e r, h e so o n b o a ste d th a t h is h ig h w a y p ro g ra m u se d e n o u g h concrete to m ak e "six sid ew alk s to th e m o o n " a n d m o v e d e n o u g h rock a n d d irt "to b u ry all of C on n ecticu t tw o feet d e e p ."50 E isen h o w er's o u tlo o k m ay seem o d d to a later g en eratio n th a t sees th e d e ­ m a n d s of d efen se a n d p ro sp e rity as c o m p etin g a g ain st each other, a c o m p eti­ tio n w h ic h w o rrie d Ike him self, b u t a t the tim e th o se d e m a n d s seem ed to be m u tu a lly su p p o rtiv e ra th e r th a n c lash in g — n e w ro ad s, like o th e r p ro g ram s, w o u ld a d d re ss b o th n eed s. It w a s telling th a t th e h ig h w a y p ro g ra m received little criticism , a lth o u g h L ew is M u m fo rd c o n d em n ed it, a n d th a t w h a t d id e n ­ su e rarely a d d re sse d its defen se c o m p o n e n t b u t in stea d its capacity to h a ste n th e d e te rio ra tio n of in n er cities a n d in terstate rail tra n s p o rt (E isenhow er h a d seen th e n e w sy stem o p e ra tin g on ly b e tw ee n cities, fearin g th e m a m m o th costs of u rb a n construction). R evealingly, a d m irin g v iew s of th e n e w h ig h w a y sy s­ tem u se d w a r to m ea su re the triu m p h : it w a s to b e "th e g reatest m an -m ad e p h y sical e n te rp rise of all tim e w ith the exception of w a r."51 Race relations, a m ore c h arg ed issu e th a n h ig h w ay s, fit less com fortably into th e fram e w o rk of w a r a n d n a tio n al security, b u t n o t for w a n t of co n n ectio n s to it. If an y th in g , those connections w ere so m a n y a n d so volatile th a t in stea d of offering coherence to debate, th ey h e lp e d m ak e it sp in o u t of control. T he con­ n ectio ns w ere e v id e n t in h o w the civil rig h ts im p u lse still d re w o n th e leader-

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ship, tactics, a n d a rg u m e n ts set d u rin g th e 1940s. T hey w ere e v id e n t in th e a rm e d forces' visible, pace-setting role in racial in teg ratio n . T hey a p p e a re d in H o lly w ood films: m ovies a b o u t W orld W ar II w ere a m o n g th e first to eschew d e m e an in g stereo ty p es of blacks, w h ile Bad Day at Black Rock (1954) e x p lo red a sm all to w n 's m u rd e ro u s racism after Pearl H a rb o r a g a in st JapaneseA m ericans, w ith a o n e-arm ed w h ite w a r v e te ra n (Spencer Tracy) as th e hero . Since seg reg atio n a n d racism w ere still seen largely as so u th e rn p ro b lem s, th e C ivil W ar, w h o se h u n d re d th a n n iv e rsa ry lo o m ed , p ro v id e d a n o th e r fram e­ w o rk of u n d e rsta n d in g . U se of fed eral tro o p s to resto re o rd e r a n d enforce in te ­ g ratio n in th e S outh ev o k ed R econstruction, for exam ple, w h ile o n e se n ato r co m p lain ed early in the 1960s th a t "in this b a ttle o n th e Senate floor th e roles of G ra n t a n d Lee a t A p p o m a tto x h av e b e e n rev ersed ." In d eed , th e sense of racial w a r cu sto m arily im p u te d to th e 1960s w a s alre ad y e v id en t, o n ly w ith th e m e ta ­ p h o rs differently cast.52 The C old W ar offered a closely related context. L iberals re itera te d th eir calls to p ro tect n a tio n al p o w e r b y im p ro v in g race relations. "W ith th e C o m m u n ists reaching o u t to the u n c o m m itted p e o p le of th e M id d le E ast a n d A frica a n d S outheast A sia," Sen. P aul D ouglas re m in d e d h is colleagues, "each h o u sin g rio t in Illinois, each school rio t in K entucky, a n d each b o m b in g of a p a s to r's h o m e o r in tim id a tio n of a w o u ld -b e N eg ro v o ter in A lab am a o r M ississip p i b e ­ com es n o t only a n affront to h u m a n d ig n ity h ere in th is country, b u t a d e fe at for freed o m in its to u g h w o rld stru g g le for su rv iv al." Vice P re sid e n t N ixon, th o u g h illiberal in outlook a n d equivocal o n specifics, a rg u e d in 1960, "In th e w o rld -w id e stru g g le in w h ic h w e are en g ag ed , racial a n d relig io u s p reju d ice is a g u n w e p o in t at o u rselv es."53 A n d foes of civil rig h ts leg islatio n still a rg u e d th a t it em b o d ied th e h e av y -h an d e d m a n n e r of co m m u n ist g o v e rn m e n ts, a n d th a t th e civil rig h ts m o v em en t w a s in sp ired o r led b y c o m m u n ists, as th e FBI to ld th e W hite H ouse. The in tern atio n al scene fram ed the stru g g le o v er civil rig h ts in su b tler w a y s as w ell. C onnections real o r alleged b e tw e e n sex a n d politics, a stap le of C o ld W ar culture, d o g g ed the civil rig h ts m ovem en t: th e sexual liaisons of M a rtin L u th er K ing, Jr., w ere w o v e n into th e FBI's ta p e stry alleging h is co m m u n ism ; th e h o m osexuality of B ayard R ustin, a n o th e r p ro m in e n t black lead er, e n d a n ­ g ered h im w ith o th er blacks as w ell as th e FBI. T he stru g g le o v e r race relatio n s also p lay e d o u t o n a n in tern atio n al stage. K ing, failing to g ain a n a u d ien ce w ith N ixon, finally m et h im in G hana, w h e re b o th w ere a tte n d in g celebrations of th a t n a tio n 's in d ep en d en ce, a n d th eir su b seq u e n t m eetin g in W ash in g to n w a s d u b b e d , "in the p o p u la r p arlan ce of th e n e w n u c le ar age, th e first 's u m m it con­ ference' " b e tw ee n the tw o.54 K ing's m eetin g s w ith T h ird W orld lea d ers w ere su sp ec t a t a tim e w h e n "n eu tra lism " in the C old W ar w a s h a rd ly acceptable to n atio n al leaders, m u ch less to m a n y o th er A m ericans; h is talk of global n o n ­ violence a n d d isa rm a m e n t p o se d a sim ilar risk. O n d ie o th er h a n d , th e ru s h to in d ep e n d en c e of A frican nations, p re su m a b ly rip e for w o o in g b y th e co m m u ­ nists, sh o red u p fam iliar claim s a b o u t the d a n g e rs of A m erican racism .

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K ing w a s a ttu n e d to all these elem ents. H e k n ew h o w h is a p p e a l d e riv e d fro m a n d p la y e d o u t o n a global stage, a n d h e so u g h t to m obilize w o rld as w ell as n a tio n a l opinion. T he "b ru tality " so u th e rn w h ite officials v e n te d o n black d e m o n stra to rs, h e later w ro te, "w a s c a u g h t— as a fu g itiv e from a p e n ite n tia ry is o ften c a u g h t— in gigantic circling sp o tlig h ts . . . a lu m in o u s g lare rev ealin g th e n a k e d tru th to the w h o le w o rld ." H e d re w in sp ira tio n a n d tactics from th e rev o lt of n o n w h ite s a g ain st im p erial rule, especially G a n d h i's n o n v io le n t cam ­ p a ig n for In d ia n in d ep en d en ce. H is m o v em en t w a s also su ffu sed w ith m ilitary im agery. H is "n o n v io le n t a rm y " w ie ld e d "th e sw o rd th a t h eals," a n d a t th e 1960 sit-in of th e G reensboro, N o rth C arolina, W o o lw o rth 's, d e m o n stra to rs w o rk e d , it h a s b e e n w ritte n , from a " 'c o m m a n d c e n te r '" a n d o p e ra te d "w ith crisp, m ilitary efficiency— b riefin g n e w p ro teste rs o n nonviolence, q u a sh in g ru m o rs, d e sp a tc h in g fresh tro o p s as n e e d e d ." K ing c o n tin u e d in to th e early 1960s to p ress fam iliar a rg u m e n ts a b o u t th e C old W ar a n d th e m ea n in g of W orld W ar n , p o in tin g to th e sh am e of d isc rim in atio n a g ain st b lack A m erican s in u n ifo rm , to the fate of Jew s u n d e r H itler, to th e p e rv e rsio n of law in co m m u ­ n ist co untries, a n d to A m erican ideals in th e C old W ar: "T h ro u g h o u t th e u p ­ h eav als of c o ld -w ar politics, N egroes h a d seen th eir g o v e rn m e n t go to th e b rin k of n u c le ar conflict m ore th a n once. T he justificatio n for risk in g th e a n n ih ilatio n of th e h u m a n race w a s alw ay s ex p ressed in term s of A m erica's w illin g n ess to go to a n y len g th s to p reserv e freedom . To th e N e g r o . . . th ere is a certain b itte r iro n y in th e p ictu res of his c o u n try c h am p io n in g freed o m in foreign la n d s a n d failing to e n su re th a t freed o m to tw e n ty m illio n of its o w n ."55 Yet K ing also p resse d th is fam iliar a rg u m e n t b e y o n d th e sta n d a rd line of n a ­ tio n al expediency. For h im , th e C old W ar h ig h lig h ted th e m o ral issu e of racism , n o t th e o th er w a y a ro u n d . T he m o ral im plicatio n s of hypocrisy, n o t th e expe­ d ie n t d a n g e rs of inconsistency, w ere h is concern. In d eed , K ing, th o u g h n o t alone a n d n o t w ith o u t p o w e rfu l p reced en ts, recast th e m o v em en t in th e fram e­ w o rk of justice a n d m o rality ra th e r th a n of n a tio n al p o w er. E isenhow er a n d m o st m e n a ro u n d h im w ere u n e asy a b o u t th e ap p ea l to ju s­ tice, o r a t least a b o u t acting o n it. T h o u g h a ck n o w led g in g th e im m o rality of rac­ ism , Ike consistently voiced his d o u b t th a t "preju d ices, ev en p a lp a b ly u n ­ ju stified prejudices, w ill succum b to c o m p u lsio n ." S h ap ed b y Earl W arren, Ike's n o m in ee for chief justice of the S u p rem e C o u rt, th e 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision b a n n in g school seg reg atio n (still legal in tw en ty -o n e states a n d W ashington, D.C.) elicited sim ilar reactions fro m E isenhow er. T h o u g h af­ firm in g his o bligation to enforce th e decision, h e p o in te d ly refu sed to e n d o rse it. "W e c a n 't d e m a n d perfection in these m o ral q u estio n s," h e to ld h is staff. "A n d th e fellow w h o tries to tell m e th a t y o u can d o these th in g s b y force is ju st p la in nuts." H e often m ad e these v iew s public, seem in g to d e n ig ra te th e sp irit a n d su b stan ce of the civil rig h ts m ovem ent. E ven w h e n a ssertin g black A m erican s' rig h t to "first-class citizenship," h e in sisted th a t th ey "b e p a tie n t."56 In m an y w ay s h is stance w a s u n su rp risin g . It w as in tu n e w ith th e at b est g ra d u a list a p p ro ach to racial p ro g ress e sp o u se d b y m a n y w h ite A m ericans. It

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d id h im n o h a rm a t the polls: in 1956 h e im p ro v e d his tak e of b o th black a n d so u th e rn w h ite votes, a n d K ing h im self claim ed to h av e v o te d R epublican. N o r w as his stance attrib u ta b le to h is age. H is y o u n g successor w a s scarcely m o re sensitive to racial issues u n til ch an g in g tim es forced h is h a n d , ju st as in h is m em o irs E isenhow er later h in te d th a t h e reg re tte d h is earlier tim idity: A l­ th o u g h as P re sid e n t h e h a d n o t e n d o rse d th e Brown v. Board of Education deci­ sion, "th ere can b e n o q u e stio n th a t the ju d g m e n t of th e C o u rt w a s rig h t." A n d m o st A m ericans d id as b a d ly as Ike in foreseeing h o w th e ideological ferv o r ov er civil rig h ts w o u ld e m p o w e r o th e r m o v em en ts. W h en o n e re p o rte r a sk ed w h y h e w a s n o t "as active in try in g to w ip e o u t d isc rim in atio n b a se d o n sex" as o n race, the su rp rise d P re sid e n t jo k ed (as T ru m a n h a d ) a b o u t h o w h a rd it w a s "for a m ere m a n to believe th a t w o m a n d o e s n 't h a v e e q u al rig h ts." H e d id e n ­ d o rse a n eq u al rig h ts a m e n d m e n t, a n d (w ith in th e com fortable confines of n a ­ tio n al security) h e stru ck d o w n a policy restrictin g p ro m o tio n of a rm y n u rse s th a t "assu m es th a t ev ery w o m a n of fifty-five is d ecrep it," b u t w o m e n 's rig h ts g alv an ized h im n o m ore th a n m o st lead ers.57 For the style a n d su b stan ce of th e civil rig h ts m o v em en t, E isen h o w er h a d little affinity b y v irtu e of h is profession, cu ltu re, o r politics. H is h an d s-o ff a p ­ p ro ach clearly s p ra n g from m ore th a n ju st racism , h o w ev er, since h is resistance to m o u n tin g d e m a n d s o n th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t arose in o th e r areas of p o licy as w ell. By th e sam e token, the "p o licy of d e la y a n d o b fu scatio n " w h ic h failed h im in civil rig h ts w as, h is b io g ra p h e r p o in ts out, th e sam e o n e "h e h a d u se d so successfully in v a rio u s foreign crises." M oreover, th ere were real lim its to w h a t form al an tid iscrim in atio n efforts c o u ld achieve: su b u rb a n iz a tio n in th e 1950s "w as stre n g th e n in g th e d e facto basis for racial seg reg atio n e v e n as ju d icial ru l­ ings, m ilitan t p ro test, congressional action, a n d executive in te rv e n tio n w ere w eak en in g its d e ju re b a sis."58 M ore su rp risin g w a s E isen h o w er's failure to ad v an ce th e issu e forcefully as a m a tte r of n atio n al se cu rity — to sp e ak to th e d a n g e rs a b ro a d of A m erican rac­ ism o r to the w a r record of black A m ericans in o rd e r to ju stify fed eral p o w e r in b eh alf of civil rights. T h at context offered a com fortable w a y to seize th e in itia­ tive a n d p re e m p t b ro a d e r ratio n ales for racial justice. It lay o n a p a th w ell char­ ted b y the m id-1950s, one h e follow ed o n h ig h w a y s a n d o th er issues a n d , o n occasion, reg a rd in g racial d iscrim ination. In stead of follo w in g th a t p a th consis­ tently, h ow ever, h e g ro p e d a t th e em erg in g lan g u a g e of justice, b u t so te n ­ tativ ely th a t h e lacked force or e v id e n t conviction. If n o th in g else, h is reluctance to tak e ev en the com fortable p a th is a rem in d er of th e elasticity of n a tio n al secu ­ rity as ratio n ale for refo rm — of h o w little n atio n al secu rity w a s a m a tte r o f o b ­ jective need , h o w m u ch it w as a coin of th e realm to b e e m p lo y ed o r d isc ard e d d e p e n d in g o n o th er p u rp o se s. E isen h o w er's fu lm in atio n s a g ain st "co m p u lsio n " in racial m a tte rs w ere es­ pecially specious. True, h e d id som etim es o p p o se u se of fed eral p o w e r to im ­ p o se m o rality in o th er w ays: reg a rd in g a p ro p o se d b a n o n ra d io a n d telev isio n

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a d v e rtisin g for liq u o r a n d cigarettes, h e asked , "W h at are w e g o in g to tu rn o u t to b e — a police state?" But th a t stance w a s stra n g e from so m eo n e o u t of a m ili­ ta ry o rg an iz atio n n o tab le for coercing m o rality in all so rts of w a y s a n d sh o w in g a g o o d d e al of p ro g ress precisely in the realm of race. M oreover, h e d id im p o se m o rality w h e re h e d e e m e d fed eral a u th o rity legitim ate. H e w o rk e d h a rd to e n d d isc rim in atio n in W ashington, D .C /s fed eral facilities a n d to p e rs u a d e local b u sin esses th ere to d o likew ise. H e su p p o rte d d e seg re g atio n of th e a rm e d forces (th o u g h it p ro ce ed e d slow ly). H e p ro claim ed th e n e e d for eq u al o p p o r­ tu n ity in fed eral h irin g (if d o in g little in practice), a n d h e b ack ed a m o d e ra te civil rig h ts bill (w atered d o w n in C ongress b efore p a ssa g e in 1957) e m p o w e r­ in g th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t to enforce v o tin g rights. T hose actions left u n clear w h e th e r h is o u tlook w a s really sh a p e d b y h is sen se of th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t's in cap acity to legislate m orality, or ju st b y h is d o u b t th a t a n y th in g w a s d e ep ly w ro n g in race relations. N o r d id Ike's b lith e re p u d ia tio n of c o m p u lsio n a d d re ss th e a rg u m e n t K ing a n d o th ers m ad e, th a t law a n d force co u ld a t least g u a ra n te e rig h ts a n d ch an g e behavior. "A law m a y n o t m ak e a m a n love m e," as K ing p u t it, " b u t it can sto p h im from ly n ch in g m e." A n d of course, m a n y w h ites feared precisely th a t m o rality could b e leg islated — th a t fed eral p o w e r would m ak e a difference.59 M u ch of this E isen h o w er h a d to acknow led g e, g ru d g in g ly a n d im plicitly, in th e L ittle Rock crisis of 1957. By then, the S o u th 's resistance to school in teg ra­ tio n w a s o n ly stiffening, as w h ite citizens' councils m o b ilized a n d local officials u se d q u asileg al o r illegal w a y s to circu m v en t th e S u p rem e C o u rt's decision. E isen h o w er h a d publicly sta te d th a t h e co u ld n o t "im ag in e" u sin g fed eral tro o p s to enforce th e decision because the "co m m o n sense of A m erica w ill n e v e r req u ire it." In Septem ber, A rk an sas g o v e rn o r O rv al F au b u s activ ated th e N a tio n a l G u a rd in o rd e r to p re v e n t th e e n try of b lack stu d e n ts in to L ittle R ock's C e n tra l H ig h School, b u t after n eg o tiatio n s w ith E isenhow er, h e sim p ly w ith ­ d re w th e g u a rd , o p e n in g th e w a y for m ob violence a g ain st black stu d e n ts. Feel­ in g b e tra y e d b y F aubus, E isenhow er acted sw iftly, as if "h is o w n sense of th e m ilita ry code h a d b e e n breached: a lie u ten a n t (the g o v ern o r) h a d b e e n g u ilty of su b o rd in a tio n ." H e se n t elem en ts of th e a rm y 's 101st A irb o rn e D ivision to re­ store o rd er.60 T he d ra m a eerily resem b led C o ld W ar crises abroad: tro o p s d e p lo y e d , the m ed ia m obilized, a failed su m m it (betw een E isen h o w er a n d Faubus), a P resi­ d e n t's te st of n erves, a n d th e lan g u a g e of w ar. Ike m u se d o n h is crises as a g e n ­ eral a n d cast h is actions at L ittle Rock in m ilitary term s: "W ell, if w e h av e to d o th is," h e to ld h is a tto rn ey general, " th e n le t's a p p ly th e b e st m ilitary p rin cip les to it a n d see th a t th e force w e se n d th ere is stro n g e n o u g h th a t it w ill n o t b e ch allenged, a n d w ill n o t resu lt in a n y clash." A ccu sto m ed to Ik e's tem p o riz in g (or, as E m m et John H u g h e s p u t it, h is "d efin ite a n d explicit resolve t o . . . leave th in g s u n d o n e "), w h ite S o u th ern ers w ere su rp rise d a n d fu rio u s. F au b u s called A rk an sas "o ccu p ied territo ry "; Sen. R ichard R ussell "co m p a red th e in terv en -

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tio n a t Little Rock to H itle r's u se of sto rm tro o p ers"; L ouisiana political boss L ean d er Perez talk ed secession; o th ers p o in te d o u t " th a t th is tim e a ro u n d the Feds h a d atom ic w e a p o n s."61 E isenhow er him self n o w in v o k ed n a tio n al security, tellin g th e n a tio n th a t Little R ock's d iso rd e r d e n ig ra te d its im age ab ro a d a n d p la y e d in to c o m m u n ist p ro p ag a n d a: "O u r enem ies are g lo atin g o v e r th is in c id e n t a n d u sin g it ev ery ­ w h ere to m isrep resen t o u r w h o le nation. . . . W e are p o rtra y e d as a v io lato r of those sta n d a rd s of co n d u ct w h ich th e p e o p le s of th e w o rld u n ite d to p ro claim in th e C h a rte r of th e U n ited N atio n s." H u g h e s later g ave a forceful su m m a ry of th e C o ld W ar liberalism E isenhow er ex p ressed o n th is occasion. T he L ittle Rock sto ry "carried faster th a n d ru m signals across b lack A frica. It su m m o n e d cold gleam s of recognition to th e eyes of A sians . . . of th e racial en m ities th a t h a d h e lp e d to m ake colonialism . . . so o d io u s to th em . M ore th a n a few W est E u ro p ea n s— long since w e a ry of th e m oralistic ex h o rtatio n s o r p io u s in junc­ tio n s of A m erican po licy — co u ld sm irk com p lacen tly a t th e c ru d e p ractice of racism in the self-styled sa n ctu a ry of freedom : th e p rea ch e r n o w w a s b e in g ta u n te d a n d rid ic u le d b y h is o w n congregation. A n d to tell p e o p le s of all lan d s, th e tra in e d a n d in stru cted voice of Soviet p ro p a g a n d a co u ld relay, in alm o st affectionately fastid io u s d etail, the n e w s of L ittle R ock— b re a th in g sco rn as it sp o k e."62 But H u g h e s w a s also criticizing E isenhow er, w h o d id n o t su sta in th e a rg u ­ m e n t h e offered d u rin g th e L ittle Rock crisis o r th e actions th a t w e n t w ith it. T hose actions, he m a d e clear, set n o p re c e d e n t for him . T hey w ere ta k e n o n ly to p reserv e order, n o t to p ress in teg ratio n , w h ic h F au b u s so o n c irc u m v e n ted sim ­ p ly b y closing p u b lic schools. E isenhow er s u p p o rte d a n o th e r m o d e st legisla­ tive effort, the C ivil R ights A ct of 1960, e x p a n d in g fed eral p o w e r to enforce v o t­ in g rig h ts a n d in v estig ate violence in v o lv in g th e in te rstate tra n sp o rta tio n of explosives. O n occasion h e restated b o th th e m ajor ratio n ales for action: "T his p rim a ry w o rk o n civil rig h ts m u st go o n," h e n o te d in h is final State of th e U n io n A ddress. "N o t only because d isc rim in atio n is m o rally w ro n g , b u t also because its im p act is m ore th a n n a tio n a l— it is w o rld -w id e ." 63 But h is p resi­ d en cy e n d e d w ith school d eseg reg atio n b arely sta rte d in th e South, w h ite lead ers there in tran sig en t, black m ilitancy rising, a n d th e p e rc ep tio n of a d m in ­ istratio n failure w id e sp rea d . H e h a d ta p p e d fully n e ith e r th e w e llsp rin g s of concern a b o u t n a tio n al security n o r th e an g er a b o u t injustice of th e civil rig h ts m o v em ent. R acism a n d com placency w ere p a rt of th e failure, b u t also h is in ­ co m p reh en sio n a b o u t m ass-based m o v e m e n ts— th a t of w h ite resistance, a n d ev en m ore th a t of black m ilitancy. E isen h o w er's v iew s w ere firm er a b o u t co n serv atio n of A m erica's basic re­ sources, a concern h e tied loosely b u t forcefully to n a tio n al security. H is convic­ tio n th a t "som e d a y the w o rld w a s g oing to b e o u t of ex h au stib le reso u rces," as h e p u t it in 1955, o v erro d e his conservative v iew s of fed eral au th o rity . H e w a s

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eag er for th e g o v e rn m e n t to p u rch a se m arg in al la n d subject to ero sio n a n d d e ­ pletio n , a n d C ongress a p p ro v e d a m u ch -to u te d Soil Bank in 1956. G o v ern m en t, h e a rg u e d , w a s o b ligated to "p ro tec t th e soil of A m erica ju st as w e w a n t to p ro ­ tect o u r freed o m of speech, rig h t to w o rsh ip , etc." H is concern, as in h is defen se policy, w a s n a tio n al p o w e r in the d ista n t future. E yeing th e Soviet U n io n 's a p ­ p a re n t econom ic p o w er, h e u rg e d seizing "th e o p p o rtu n ity to p l a n . . . over the long term. " Seeking n e w fed eral h e a lth p ro g ram s, h e w a rn e d th a t w ith o u t th em "w e as a p e o p le are g u ilty n o t only of n eglect of h u m a n suffering b u t also of w a stin g o u r n a tio n al stre n g th ."64 In a sim ilar fashion, h e saw e d u ca tio n al resources as v ital to lo n g -term secu­ rity a n d p rosperity. Typically, h e w a n te d a m o d e st fed eral role, p ro p o sin g fed ­ eral g ran ts for school c o n stru ctio n in the n e ed iest d istricts a n d p o o rest states. Public schools enjoyed a long tra d itio n of local con tro l still d e fe n d e d b y seg­ reg atio n ists a n d conservatives, b u t b y th e 1950s th a t tra d itio n w a s colliding w ith efforts to increase fed eral a id to ed u catio n , efforts g ro u n d e d in th e b ab y b o o m 's financial im p act o n local b u d g e ts a n d b y d e m a n d s th a t schools h elp A m erica w in th e C old W ar. C onflict o v er w h e th e r fed eral a id sh o u ld flow to p aro ch ial schools also arose. C a u g h t in th e crossfire— especially c o n ten tio u s w a s a m ove to d e n y g ran ts to states d efy in g th e Brown d ecisio n — E isen h o w er's p ro p o sa l rep e ate d ly failed to clear C ongress. B eyond his p ro p o sa l lo o m ed a d e b ate a b o u t e d u ca tio n w h ich in v o lv ed q u e s­ tio n s of n a tio n al p o w e r a n d p e rsisted in one g u ise o r a n o th e r for th e rest of the century. In th e 1950s, it in clu d ed allegations th a t p ro g ressiv e e d u c a to rs in ter­ ested in a "life-ad ju stm en t" c u rric u lu m w ere d eb asin g th e in tellectu al rigor, m o ral fiber, o r practical skills of A m erican y o uth. Vice A d m iral H y m a n Ricko v er sh o w e d h o w these issues related to n a tio n al security. R ickover h a d ru th lessly d riv e n th e n a v y into th e n u c le ar age, o v erseein g c o n stru ctio n of n u c le ar-p o w e red a n d m issile-firing su b m arin es. By 1956 h e w a s a n a tio n al scold reg a rd in g th e state of A m erican ed u catio n . A b it like E isenhow er, h e "h a d th e e n g in e e r's d istaste for inefficiency a n d w a ste w h e rev e r th ey w ere fo u n d — th e w a ste of g o o d farm lan d , forests, oil, clean riv ers a n d lakes, a n d b rig h t m in d s, 'o u r m o st v a lu ab le n a tio n al asset.' " U nless A m erican y o u th con fro n ted "th e terrific req u ire m e n ts of this ra p id ly sp iralin g scientific a n d in d u stria l civi­ lization, w e are b o u n d to go d o w n ." T he Soviets, R ickover w a rn e d , h a d learn ed th a t lesson. "T here can b e n o second place in a co n test w ith R ussia a n d th ere w ill b e n o second chance if w e lose." O th e r au th o rities also lin k ed e d u ca tio n al refo rm to n a tio n al security. For Jam es C o n a n t— a key science official in W orld W ar II, fo rm er h ig h com m issioner to W est G erm any, a d v iser to sev eral Presi­ d e n ts, a n d p re sid e n t of H a rv a rd U n iv ersity — a t stak e in e d u ca tio n al reform "w a s the c u ltu ral a n d m ilitary conflict w ith th e Soviet U n io n ."65 For m illions of A m ericans, th a t conflict seem ed e v en sta rk e r after O ctober 1957. In e d u ca tio n al policy a n d o th er areas, th e w eb of co n nections to n a tio n al

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secu rity o n ly tig h te n ed as th e d ecad e w o re on, e v en as th e ratio n ale for refo rm w as m o v in g b e y o n d it. A n d E isenhow er fo u n d h is g oal of ach iev in g m o d e ra ­ tion, balance, a n d focus o n "th e lo n g te rm " m o re elu siv e th a n ever.

Sputnik and the Eroding Balance S p u tn ik a p p e a re d to knock th e n a tio n off-balance. A s G. M en n en W illiam s, M ich igan's D em ocratic g overnor, p u t it: O h L ittle S putnik, flying h ig h W ith m ad e -in M oscow beep. You tell the w o rld it's a C om m ie sky. A n d U ncle S am 's asleep.66 E arth 's first artificial satellite w e n t into o rb it o n O cto b er 4 ,1 9 5 7 , o n a Soviet rocket. W eighing less th a n tw o h u n d re d p o u n d s, it h a d n o p ractical utility, al­ th o u g h larger Soviet satellites a n d canine co sm o n au ts so o n follow ed, b u t its sym bolic im p o rt seem ed incalculable, as Soviet p re m ie r N ik ita K h ru sh ch ev a p ­ p reciated, so eag er w a s h e to ch an g e the p e rc ep tio n of Soviet b ack w ard n ess. If S p u tn ik w a s b a it in a p ro p a g a n d a w ar, lea d in g A m erican s sw allo w ed it w hole, naiv ely o r for calculated p u rp o se s. A cascade of d ire w a rn in g s, ex p res­ sions of h u m iliatio n , a n d calls for action flow ed. Sen. H e n ry Jackson called for a "n atio n al w eek of sh am e a n d d a n g e r." C o n g ressm an D aniel F lood, rejecting fiscal lim its o n n a tio n al action, cried, "I w o u ld ra th e r h av e re d in k in th e b o o k s th a n red b lo o d o n the streets of A m erica." Senate M ajority L ead er L y n d o n Johnson pro claim ed th a t "control of space m ean s control of th e w o rld ," w ith its p o ssessor able to im pose "ty ra n n y " o r "freed o m ." Foreseeing th e m ira cu lo u s d e v elo p m e n ts A m ericans often h av e expected of technological change, John­ son a rg u e d th a t th e w in n e rs in space w o u ld b e "m aste rs of in fin ity " able to "control the e a rth 's w ater, to cause d ro u th a n d flood, to ch an g e th e tid e s a n d raise the levels of the sea, to d iv e rt th e g u lf stre am a n d c h an g e th e clim ates to frigid." T hree years later, the strateg ist H e n ry K issinger, seeing Soviet a d ­ vances in space as one sign of a "d ec a d e a n d a h a lf" of A m erican decline, w o r­ ried th a t its co ntinu ance "w o u ld fin d u s re d u c e d to Fortress A m erica in a w o rld in w h ic h w e h a d becom e largely irrelev an t." The sense of ru p tu re d h isto ry — at the core of this p anic as in those o v er Pearl H a rb o r a n d th e atom ic b o m b — w a s acute. "L isten n o w for th e so u n d w h ic h forev erm o re se p ara tes th e o ld fro m the new ," u rg ed an NBC a n n o u n c e r d irectin g his a u d ien ce to S p u tn ik 's b leep s.67 A s u su al, A m ericans p o rtra y in g a n o m in o u s fu tu re in v o k ed w a r's d a rk b u t fam iliar past. Physicist E d w a rd Teller told a television a u d ien ce th a t th e n a tio n " h a d lost a b attle m ore im p o rta n t a n d g reater th a n Pearl H arb o r," o n e of m an y references to th a t e v en t a n d the w a r th a t follow ed it. Jo u rn alists Jo sep h an d S tew art A lsop h a u le d o u t p e re n n ial analogies to M u n ich a n d th e 1930s, accus­ ing the a d m in istratio n of th e sam e a p p e a se m e n t th a t led to W orld W ar II. N ew s

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stories a b o u t th e a rm e d forces' riv al rocket p ro g ra m s tra n sp o rte d rea d ers back to Pearl H arb o r, w h e n sim ilar rivalries p re su m a b ly h a d c rip p led A m erica (th o u g h n o w G e rm a n scientists like W em h er V on B raun led A m erica's effort). T hese co m p ariso n s scored p o in ts a g ain st E isenhow er, h e ig h te n e d th e panic, b o lstered the call for n a tio n al m o b ilizatio n — a n d h in te d a t a h a p p y outcom e: if th e terro rs of 1941 w ere back, so too m ig h t b e th e triu m p h s of 1945. It likew ise m a d e sense to cite, as b o th Ike a n d th e p ress d id , th e g reatest triu m p h of W orld W ar H, th e M a n h a tta n Project, as a m o d el för action. S uch c o m p ariso n s p laced a diffu se a n d in d e te rm in a te crisis of confidence o n th e fam iliar im ag in ativ e ter­ ra in of w a r.68 H a rd issues of p o w e r a n d su rv iv a l w e re o sten sib ly a t stake. If Soviet rockets w ere p o w e rfu l e n o u g h to lau n c h satellites, it w a s reaso n ed , th ey co u ld strik e th e U n ited States: m assiv e retaliatio n seem ed hollow , K h ru sh ch ev 's b o a sts a b o u t h is rockets irrefutable, E ise n h o w e r's d efen se policy b a n k ru p t. G iv en th a t d ire situ atio n , som e m em b ers of th e E isen h o w er-ap p o in ted G aith er com m ittee saw as th e o n ly reco u rse a n a ttack o n th e Soviet U n io n b efore its lead in rocke­ try b ecam e in su rm o u n ta b le. Less trig g e r-h a p p y C o ld W arriors rejected th a t o p ­ tion, o n ly to see a d ifferen t d an g er. T he Soviets, Jo h n K en n ed y w a rn e d , n o w h a d a "sh ie ld " of b o m b s a n d rockets " b e h in d w h ic h th ey w ill slow ly, b u t surely, a d v a n c e — th ro u g h S p u tn ik diplom acy, lim ited b ru sh -fire w a rs, in d irect n o n o v e rt aggression, in tim id a tio n a n d su b v ersio n , in te rn al rev o lu tio n , in creased p restig e o r influence, a n d th e v icious blackm ail of o u r allies. T he p e rip h e ry of th e Free W orld w ill slo w ly b e n ib b led aw ay. T he b alan ce of p o w e r w ill g ra d u ­ ally sh ift a g ain st u s." 69 T he U n ited States, a rg u e d p o litician s like K ennedy, co u ld on ly re tu rn to th e p rin cip les of NSC-68, b u ild in g u p b o th strategic forces a n d co n v en tio n al ones capable of "flexible resp o n se." Few d o u b te d th a t the stakes in space in v o lv ed p restig e as w ell as raw po w er. Ju st as w a v erin g T hird W orld p eo p les p re su m a b ly w a tc h e d A m erica's so rry reco rd in race relations, th e y scan n ed th e skies for signs of A m erica's triu m p h o r failure, for evidence th a t it co u ld live u p to its p ro m ise to b e m o re creative a n d p ro d u c tiv e th a n its to ta litaria n com petitor. T h at p ro m ise w a s also in d o u b t am o n g A m ericans. "G a p s" b e tw e e n A m erican s a n d Soviets in e d u c a tio n a n d science, in discipline a n d im ag in atio n , seem ed m o re a la rm in g th a n th e m is­ sile g ap itself because th e y th re a te n e d the p o ssib ility th a t th e Soviets' m ilitary lead c o u ld n o t b e overcom e, a n d e v en th a t A m erican s d id n o t d eserv e to over­ com e it. T h at fear seem ed b o rn e o u t in D ecem ber 1957, w h e n th e A m erican a n sw e r to S p u tn ik w a s to take to th e skies from C ape C an av eral in Florida. A s television sets across th e la n d tim e d in a n d m illions of ch ild ren c ro w d ed school a u d i­ to riu m s to w atch, a n a v y rocket w ith a tin y satellite lifted a few feet from its p a d , th e n sa n k back a n d e x p lo d ed , p ro m p tin g jokes a b o u t "S tay p u tn ik ," "Flopnik ," a n d "K a p u tn ik " th a t v e n te d n a tio n al h u m iliatio n . M eanw hile, Eisen­ h o w e r w a s briefly re d u c e d b y a stroke to u tte rin g literal gibberish.

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In a few w eeks, the b alance b e tw ee n c o n te n d in g forces— Soviets a n d A m e ri­ cans, R epublicans a n d D em ocrats, E isen h o w er a n d th e g ro an in g en g in es of m ilitarizatio n — seem ed d estro y ed . In tru th , it lo n g h a d b e en p recario u s, so d e ­ p e n d e n t o n Ike's p e rso n al authority, o r else o n e Soviet b all in space co u ld n o t h av e u p e n d e d it, ex posing th e fragility of E isen h o w er's co m p ro m ises a n d of A m ericans' sense of superiority. H e rig h tly p le a d e d th a t A m erican m ilita ry a n d scientific su p e rio rity rem a in e d intact. H is p leas fell o n d e a f e a rs— b ecau se h e w o u ld n o t reveal h is ev id en ce for th em , b u t e v en m o re b ecau se m o st A m eri­ cans d id n o t w a n t to believe. M u ch a b o u t th e S p u tn ik p an ic w a s in fact fam iliar. T he a la rm o v e r a m issile a n d space "g a p " h a d b e e n p re c e d e d b y a lesser o n e o v e r a "b o m b er g a p " a n d earlier b y reactions in 1949 to n e w s of th e Soviet ato m ic b om b. T he S p u tn ik p an ic w a s also a technological an alo g to th e R ed Scare, sh iftin g its sp irit of re­ crim in atio n a n d suspicions of n a tio n al flaccidity to th e are n a of science a n d to th e E isenhow er a d m in istra tio n itself. T he S p u tn ik scare also g a in e d e n erg y from th e crisis in race relations, clim axing in S ep tem b er a t L ittle Rock, th a t h a d a lre ad y challenged A m erican p rete n se s of su p e rio rity a n d m o b ilized g rass­ roots m o v em en ts b e y o n d elite control. A m p lify in g g ro w in g d o u b ts. S p u tn ik also d iv e rte d th em from th e racial aren a o n to a technological b a ttle g ro u n d w h o se scrip t of n a tio n al p e ril a n d ren ew al w a s b o th frig h te n in g a n d fam iliar. D em ocrats consciously ex p lo ited th e chance to sh ift a tte n tio n fro m racial is­ sues, w h ic h w ere d iv id in g th e ir party. O ld w o rries th a t th e U n ited States w a s b eco m in g a n em p ty , h ed o n istic n a ­ tio n also surfaced again, y ield in g calls to re c ap tu re th e fro n tier sp irit a n d jer­ em iad s a g ain st com placency a n d m aterialism th a t P u rita n d iv in e s m ig h t h av e ad m ired . O nce em blem s of its su p erio rity , th e n a tio n 's cars a n d telev isio n sets n o w seem ed to k en s of its rot. "If A m erica ev er crashes, it w ill b e in a tw o -to n e convertible," the v en erab le financier-politician B ernard B aruch p red icted ; th e U n ited States h a d to w o rry less a b o u t th e "h e ig h t of th e tail fin in th e n e w car a n d b e m ore p re p a re d to sh e d b lood, sw eat, a n d tears if th is c o u n try a n d the free w o rld are to su rv iv e," a rg u e d one sen ato r.70 A lth o u g h th e space p ro g ra m w a s later sold as a fo u n ta in h e a d of technological a b u n d an c e, u n e ase a b o u t th a t a b u n d an c e d e ep e n ed th e S p u tn ik panic. Like m o st panics, this one w a s n o t a reaction to a single ev en t b u t a sta te of m in d b u ilt ov er tim e. T hat w as e v id e n t in a n a rra y of p ro p o se d crash p ro g ra m s for fallout shelters, n e w w e ap o n s, a n d n e w strategies. Scientists a g g ra v ate d a n d exploited the panic, as w h e n one g ro u p a p p ro a ch e d E isen h o w er w ith a p la n to reach the m o o n b y u sin g "ele g an t little [nuclear] b o m b s to d riv e a n ele­ g a n t little spaceship a ro u n d th e so lar system ," as o n e scientist later p u t it. Re­ w o rk in g fears of a closed society a n d w o rld -sy ste m th a t h a d h a u n te d A m e ri­ cans for decades, scientists p ro m o tin g n e w v e n tu re s in space th o u g h t it "essen ­ tial to the g ro w th of an y n ew a n d h ig h civilizatio n th a t sm all g ro u p s of p e o p le can escape from th eir n eig h b o rs a n d from th e ir g o v ern m en ts, to go a n d live as

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th ey p lease in th e w ild ern e ss." Panic also san ctio n ed lav ish m ilitary schem es, as I. F. Stone d isco v ered in the congressional testim o n y of a n a ir force g en eral w h o p ro p o se d th a t w a rh e a d s "co u ld b e c a ta p u lte d from sh afts su n k d e e p into th e m o o n 's surface" a n d a rg u e d th a t if a lim a r b alan ce of terro r th e n d e v elo p ed b e tw e e n th e su p e rp o w e rs, statio n s c o u ld b e b u ilt " o n p lan e ts far m o re d istan t, fro m w h ic h co n tro l o v e r th e m o o n m ig h t th e n b e exercised." Such schem es h a rd ly enjoyed u n a n im o u s m ilitary su p p o rt, b u t Stone co u ld b e ex cused for co n cluding: "T hus, as the P en tag o n m a p s it, peace b y m u tu a l te rro r w o u ld sp re a d o u tw a rd to w a rd th e far stars." T he S p u tn ik p an ic seem ed to h av e n o b o u n d a rie s.71 E isen h o w er trie d m ig h tily to reestablish th em . T he p sy ch o lo g y of th e p an ic sh o u ld n o t h av e shocked h im , in so far as h is stra te g y of m assiv e retaliatio n al­ re a d y h a d rested o n the psychological m y steries of d eterren ce a n d th e sym bolic im p o rt of n e w technology. N onetheless, h e w a s baffled b y th e S p u tn ik scare, p a rtly becau se of h is a ttac h m en t to elite con tro l a n d h is relu ctan ce to a d m it its erosion. H is in ab ility to articu late a v isio n ary a ltern a tiv e to C old W ar a n d m il­ ita riz a tio n c o m p o u n d e d h is problem s. For all its b a n ality a n d h y steria, reac­ tio n s to S p u tn ik d id reveal a b ro a d y e a rn in g for so m e th in g m o re d a rin g th a n h e co u ld p ro v id e. For g o o d reasons, h e w o u ld n o t em brace a race to th e m o o n , ag reein g w ith h is first N a tio n a l A eronautics a n d Space A d m in istra tio n d irecto r th a t if th e n a tio n 's p restig e rested o n " 'W h e n d o w e g e t a m a n o n th e m o o n ?' " th e n "all sense of p ersp ectiv e h a s go n e o u t th e w in d o w ." B ut Ike offered n o su b stitu te. W ash in g to n d o g g erel in 1957 in d ic ate d th e problem : S p u tnik, S p u tn ik in th e sky E m ittin g b e ep s as y o u go by. H av e y o u ro o m in y o u r little b u lln ik For Ike a n d D ick a n d Foster D ullnik? F o u r y ears later, Ike w a s still u n c o m p re h e n d in g , c o n te m p tu o u s of JFK's deci­ sio n to stake n a tio n al p restig e o n a race to th e m o o n .72 U n c o m p re h en d in g h e m a y h av e been, u n c e rta in h e w a s not. H is effort to d a m p e n h y ste ria a n d restra in m ilita riza tio n d o m in a te d th e rest of h is p resi­ dency. H is p rim a ry asset w a s the e n o rm o u s a u th o rity in m ilitary m atters h e still co m m an d ed . A g en eral a b a n d o n e d b y m o st of h is lieu ten an ts (th o u g h n o t b y D ulles a n d the CIA), h e still g ain ed a tactical v icto ry in a lo sin g cam p aig n a g ain st th e forces of m ilitarization. "It w a s o n e of h is fin est h o u rs," w rites Ste­ p h e n A m brose. "T he d e m a n d s for shelters, for m o re b o m b ers, for m o re bom bs, for m o re research a n d d e v e lo p m e n t of m issiles a n d satellites, [w ere] n early ir­ resistible," b u t E isenhow er rejected them . "H e th ereb y sav ed h is c o u n try u n ­ to ld b illions of d o llars a n d n o one k n o w s h o w m a n y w a r scares."73 A cold calculation of strategic realities g u id e d him . K h ru sh ch ev m ig h t th rea te n th e U n ited States w ith extinction, b u t Ike k n ew it w a s a bluff. Secret flights b y A m erican U-2 aircraft— th e ev id en ce Ike w o u ld n o t m ak e public, lest

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it in fu riate the Soviets o r term in a te the reco n n aissan ce— rev ealed th a t th e So­ viets w ere d e p lo y in g few lo n g -ran g e rockets a n d co u ld n o t m atch A m erica's fo rm id able h eav y bom bers. K n ow ing that, E isen h o w er d e cid ed to leap fro g large-scale p ro d u c tio n of costly a n d co m b u stib le first-g en eratio n rockets in fa­ v o r of a d v an c ed solid-fuel rockets (lan d -b ased M in u tem an a n d su b -b a se d Po­ laris m issiles). T ied to th a t decision w a s a b ro a d e r acceptance sh a re d b y D ulles of ro u g h strategic p a rity w ith the Soviets, a h eresy th a t h e lp e d p ro m p t th e stri­ d e n t charges of ap p easem en t. H a rd ly n eg lectin g A m erica's m ilitary m ig h t, h e w as k een to m a in ta in its q u alitativ e lead, b u t n u m b e rs alone, n u c le ar "o v erk ill" as it w as n o w called, c o u n te d for little w ith h im as h e q u e stio n e d , " H o w m a n y tim es d o w e h av e to d e stro y R ussia?" T he a rm e d forces w ere g e ttin g "in to a n incredible p o sitio n — of h av in g e n o u g h to d e stro y e v ery conceivable ta rg e t all o v er th e w o rld , p lu s a three-fold reserve," h e co m p lain ed . E ven if th e U n ited States escap ed d irect attack a n d w o n a n u c le ar w ar, "th ere ju st m ig h t b e n o th ­ in g left of th e N o rth e rn H e m isp h ere " becau se of fallout (atm o sp h eric tests alone, h e w o rried , m ig h t p ro d u c e th a t result). In fo rm ed in 1960 th a t A m erica w as b u ild in g fo u r h u n d re d M in u tem an m issiles a year, Ike re s p o n d e d in d ig ­ n a n tly (if d isin g en u o u sly , for h e h a d a p p ro v e d th e p ro g ram ), "W h y d o n 't w e go co m pletely crazy a n d p la n o n a force of 10,000?" A s for th o se p e d d lin g fear of a m issile gap, Ike allegedly called th e m "san ctim o n io u s, h y p o critical b a s­ ta rd s."74 A g ain a n d again, h e ex p lo d ed a b o u t the p ressu re s o n him . T hose fro m h is g en erals a n d a d m irals w ere " d a m n n e a r treaso n ." P ro tectin g n a tio n a l secu rity w a s vital, h e to ld his ad v iso rs, b u t th a t d id n o t m e a n th e n a tio n sh o u ld try to b e b e st a t e v e ry th in g — precisely w h a t m a n y A m erican s felt th ey sh o u ld do . Re­ sp o n d in g to the G aith er com m ittee, h e fum ed: " I'm n o t g o in g to d a n ce a t th e e n d of the strin g o f . . . p eo p le w h o try to give m e . . . scare sto ries." W h en th e co m m ittee rec o m m e n d ed crash p ro g ra m s for fallo u t sh elters a n d n e w a rm a ­ m en ts to w age n u c le ar w ar, E isenhow er to ld th em , "Y ou c a n 't h a v e th is k in d of w a r . . . . T here ju st a re n 't e n o u g h b u lld o z e rs to scrap e th e b o d ies off the streets." H e scornfully d ism isse d the project for n u c le ar rockets, sp a rin g th e im iv erse "a filthy creatu re" leaving "its rad io activ e m ess b e h in d it w h e re v e r it goes," as one scientist later p u t it.75 H is public utteran ces h a d the sam e substance. H e u p h e ld d istin c tio n s fast d isa p p e a rin g a m id the panic: "T here is m u c h m o re to science th a n its fu n ctio n in stre n g th e n in g o u r defense, a n d m u c h m o re to o u r d efen se th a n th e p a rt p la y e d b y science." Science's "peaceful co n trib u tio n s" a n d th e n a tio n 's "sp iri­ tu a l p o w e rs" w ere "th e m o st im p o rta n t sto n es in a n y d efen se stru c tu re ." "W e face," Ike w ro te one concerned g ro u p , " n o t a te m p o ra ry em erg en cy . . . b u t a lo n g -term responsibility," a n d h e d e p lo re d h a sty actions d o n e " u n d e r th e im ­ p e tu s of s u d d e n fear." E litist condescension c o u ld also flare u p in p ublic. A t the sta rt of the S p u tn ik panic, Ike spoke sn eerin g ly to a ho stile p ress of th e Soviets' "o n e sm all ball in the air." D u rin g th e 1958 election cam p aig n , in "th e m o st

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h a rs h a n d graceless p a rtisa n speeches of h is political life," as E m m et John H u g h e s te rm e d th em , E isenhow er in sisted th a t th ere w o u ld b e "n o a p p e a sin g C o m m u n ist ag g ressio n ," th a t "th e so-called m issile g ap is b e in g ra p id ly filled" (u n w ittin g ly su g g e stin g it w a s real), a n d th a t "political rad icals" a n d "selfsty led liberals" h a d a n "irresistible im p u lse . . . to sq u a n d e r m o n ey — y o u r m o n ey ."76 H is flashes of a n g er rev ealed h is calculated c o m m itm en t to m a in tain in g a lo n g v iew of th e C old W ar, h o a rd in g n a tio n al resources, a n d restra in in g m il­ itarizatio n . H e e x p a n d e d h is fam iliar injunctio n s a g ain st th e g a rriso n state. D is­ a rm a m e n t w a s n ecessary because "n o c o u n try can ad v an ce in tellectu ally a n d in term s of c u ltu re a n d w ell-being if it h a s to d ev o te e v ery th in g to m ilitary b u ild u p ." O nce ag ain "aw fu lly sick of the lobbies b y th e m u n itio n s," h e lo oked o v er a d v ertisem en ts b y Boeing a n d D ouglas, g lim p sin g th e g a rriso n sta te 's cul­ tu ra l a n d econom ic u n d e rp in n in g s. N o r d id h e sh are th e w id e ly h e ld v iew th a t p ro sp e rity h in g e d o n d efense sp e n d in g a n d d isa rm a m e n t w o u ld m e a n d e p re s­ sion. "W e are n o w scratching a ro u n d to g e t m o n ey for su c h th in g s as school co n stru ctio n " a n d "ro a d b u ild in g " a n d "all so rts of th in g s," h e to ld rep o rte rs in 1960. "I see n o reaso n w h y th e su m s w h ic h n o w are g o in g in to th ese sterile, n e g ativ e m ech an ism s th a t w e call w a r m u n itio n s s h o u ld n 't go in to so m e th in g p o sitiv e ."77 Som etim es g ru d g in g ly , E isenhow er d id ag ree to changes: a n e w N atio n al A ero n autics a n d Space A d m in istra tio n (NASA); a p resid en tia l science a d v iso r (Jam es K illian a n d th e n G eorge K istiakow sky, w h o h e lp e d offset science h a w k s like Teller); m o d e st increases in w e a p o n s a n d space p ro g ram s; reo rg a n iza tio n of th e D e p a rtm e n t of D efense. But, as h e c o m m en ted o n o n e su p p le m e n ta l b u d ­ g et h e accepted, tw o -th ird s of it w e n t "m o re to stabilize p u b lic o p in io n th a n to m eet a n y real n e e d ." 78 A s before S putnik, h e s u p p o rte d space p ro g ra m s m ee t­ in g scientific cu rio sity a n d m ilitary n e e d s— th e reconnaissance capacities of satellites w ere especially a llu rin g — b u t sco rn ed th e p restig e -d riv e n race in space. D espite h is effort to restrain m ilita riza tio n — a n d b ecau se of th e exceptions h e allo w ed in o rd e r to placate p u b lic o p in io n a n d m eet h is o w n test of v ig ila n t d efen se— h is success w a s o n ly re a rg u a rd a n d tem p o rary . By o n e sta n d a rd it w a s considerable: defense b u d g e ts rose only m o d estly in Ik e's last years. P res­ su re k e p t b u ild in g for m o re m oney, p ro g ram s, a n d forceful action, h o w ev er, its p o w e r em erg in g m ore sh a rp ly u n d e r his successors. D efense-related sp e n d in g o n science a n d tech n o lo g y m e a su re d th o se forces. Such sp e n d in g rem a in e d h a rd to calculate b ecau se m u c h of it w a s b u rie d in n o n d e fe n se b u d g e ts, w e n t to technologies w ith b o th civilian a n d m ilitary uses, o r h a d little m ilitary payoff. M oreover, the sh are of fed eral research a n d d e v el­ o p m e n t sp e n d in g d e v o te d to d efense w a s declin in g (the N a tio n a l In stitu tes of H e a lth b u d g e t increased ten fo ld ov er the decade). But since to tal R&D b u d g e ts in creased d ram a tic ally (to 15.6 p e rc en t of th e b u d g e t b y 1965), d efen se-related

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sp e n d in g still sw elled: the D efense D e p a rtm e n t's R&D b u d g e t n e a rly d o u b le d b e tw ee n 1958 a n d 1961, w hile N A SA 's m u ltip lie d tenfold. The character of this sp e n d in g w a s as im p o rta n t as its size. A lth o u g h c h am ­ p io n e d b y m an y scientists, basic research g ain ed a tin y p o rtio n of th e fed eral b u d g e t. T he m o n ey flow ed in stea d to v a st e n g in e erin g p ro g ra m s like N A SA 's effort to get A m ericans into space a n d th e n to th e m oon. T hese w ere p u b lic w o rk s projects o n a n im p erial scale. O n ly th eir real o r im a g in ed lin k s to defen se a n d th e ir w hite-collar co n stitu en cy a n d a p p e a l iso lated th e m from th e ch arg es of socialism a n d w elfarism th a t h a d d o g g e d th e N e w D eal's far p u n ie r p ro ­ gram s. M oreover, d e sp ite d o m in a n t im ages of science m arch in g inex o rab ly in to th e fu tu re — pro g ress co u ld n o t b e sto p p e d , ra n th e p o p u la r in c a n ta tio n — th is w a s a forced m arch d irected b y the state in accordance w ith political p re s­ su res a n d perceiv ed n a tio n al need , one reaso n m a n y scientists d islik ed N A SA 's p ro g ram s. H ence physics a n d e n g in eerin g g rab b e d th e lio n 's sh are, a lth o u g h th e fro ntiers of scientific in q u iry o ften lay in o th er fields. A s one scientist com ­ p la in e d in 1958 (rom anticizing his p ro fessio n 's past), "W h a t h a s h a p p e n e d to th e o ld ivory to w e r!. . . th e w ise m en, once q u ietly g u id e d b y th e sta r of Bethle­ h em , n o w frantically c o u n t tim e b y the sta r of M oscow ." By th e sam e token, w h ile scientists a n d u n iv ersities w ere im p o rta n t, c o rp o ra te co n tracto rs a n d g o v e rn m e n t agencies w ere th e d o m in a n t play ers. A n d lo n g -term , capitalinten sive projects p re su p p o se d still larg er o u tlay s in th e fu tu re, u n less h u g e sta rt-u p costs w ere to be w ritte n off in ceasing w o rk o n h alf-b u ilt rockets o r su b m arin es. T he p a tte rn w a s n o t n e w — w h e th e r S p u tn ik u sh e re d in " a n age of technocracy" is d e b atab le — b u t the scale a n d so p h isticatio n of S p u tn ik -era p ro ­ jects greatly a g g ra v ate d it.79 A s h is policy o n n u c le ar w e a p o n s sh o w ed , Ike h a d difficulty g ra p p lin g w ith these forces. O ne of h is first reactions to S p u tn ik h a d b e e n to ren ew h is in terest in su sp en sio n of n u c le ar tests a n d in d isa rm a m e n t generally. H is m o tiv es w ere a fam iliar mix: to lock in A m erica's a d v a n ta g e in n u c le ar w e ap o n s, c u t defen se costs, c o u n ter th e p an ick y m o od, a n d score p ro p a g a n d a p o in ts to offset th e So­ v iets' success in space. Fam iliar forces stalled h is effort. Scientists like Teller n o m in ally subscribed to d isa rm a m e n t b u t offered a h o st of objections to an y m o ra to riu m o n testing: th e Soviets w o u ld cheat, steal " o u r secrets," a n d "su r­ p a ss u s"; pro g ress w o u ld sto p o n "clean" (radiation-free) n u c le ar w e a p o n s th a t w o u ld benefit h u m a n k in d ; atom ic scientists th em selv es " w o u ld lose tone, im ­ p e tu s, a n d p e rso n n el" d u rin g a m o ra to riu m .80 T hen, ju st w h e n n e w tech n o l­ o g y m a d e seism ic m o n ito rin g of a m o ra to riu m easier, science h a w k s co u n te red w ith n e w nightm ares: th e R ussians w o u ld reso rt to " d e c o u p lin g " — co n d u ctin g n u c le ar tests w ith in m a m m o th u n d e rg ro u n d caves in o rd e r to red u ce th eir seis­ m ic sh ock— o r e v en to testing bo m b s o n the back sid e of th e m oon. Som e p ro g ress in Soviet-A m erican n e g o tiatio n s w a s m ad e, b u t it w a s b e ­ d ev iled b y m an y obstacles. B ritain a n d France, eag er to d ev elo p th e ir o w n n u ­ clear w e a p o n s (and, in the French case, to a id Israel's d e v e lo p m e n t as w ell).

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th rew u p roadblocks. L eaders vacillated: E isen h o w er w o rrie d th a t a u n ilateral su sp e n sio n of A m erican tests w o u ld p ro m p t D em o crats to say, "T his is o u r M un ich"; K h ru sh ch ev w o rrie d th a t on-site in sp ectio n s w o u ld expose Soviet w eak n ess a n d bluster. P rogress w a s also slo w ed b y d e e p rifts in th e A m erican g o v e rn m e n t— a n obstacle to a rm s control often g rea ter th a n th e su p e rp o w e rs' differences— a n d b y th e p o iso n o u s atm o sp h e re of Soviet-A m erican relations. A s o n e h isto ria n later co m p lain ed , "E very R u ssian initiativ e w as h e ld to be a trap : if M oscow p ro p o se d a jo in t d eclaratio n in favor of m o th e rh o o d , this w o u ld h av e called fo rth p o sitio n p a p e rs from th e State D e p a rtm e n t's Policy P la n n in g C o u n c il. . . a n d ev en tu ally a d eclaratio n th a t w h ile th e U n ited States w elco m ed this reco g n itio n of th e sanctity of fam ily life . . . , it w o u ld req u ire clear in d icatio n th a t th e USSR d id n o t m e a n to d e ro g a te th e sta tu s of fath er­ h o o d ." S uch obstacles a n d Ike's conflicting a sp ira tio n s— to p u s h d isa rm a m e n t b u t also to reta in A m erican su p e rio rity — crip p led efforts to e n d th e d e ca d e's o rg y of tests a n d scale b ack m ilitarization. D ebate o n testin g h a d a n o th e r effect th a t few anticipated: b itte r conflicts am o n g scientists e ro d e d th e ir im ag e as n e u tra l ex p erts to w h o m n a tio n al policy co u ld b e e n tru ste d , lay in g o n e b asis for th e rev o lt a g ain st e x p ert a u th o rity a n d th e ecological activism of th e 1960s.81 T he forces sw irlin g a b o u t in th e n u c le ar are n a cam e to g eth er a t a n u n lik ely p o in t a t th e d e c a d e 's close— A laska. Teller a n d th e AEC, acting o n th e S putnikera fetish for bigness, p ro p o se d Project C hario t, a schem e to u se n u c le ar explo­ sives to create a n e w h a rb o r o n A lask a's n o rth coast. It w a s to in a u g u ra te the A E C 's b ro a d e r Project P low share, w ith its biblical im ag ery of tu rn in g n u clear sw o rd s in to tools of peaceful engineering. C h ario t w o u ld h e lp in p la n n in g the n u c le ar excavation of a n e w P an am a C an al o p e ra tin g w ith o u t locks a t sea level— a n d offer a chance to test w e a p o n s tech n o lo g y u n d e r th e g u ise of p eace­ ful pro gress. Jo u rn ey in g to A laska to sell th e p ro g ram . Teller "m ix ed flattery w ith fro n tier b rav a d o ," p ro m isin g to un lo ck th e w e a lth of A lask a's coalfields a n d "to resh ap e the e a rth to y o u r p leasu re." Q u e rie d a b o u t o th e r projects th e AEC m ig h t a ttem p t. Teller joked, "If y o u r m o u n ta in is n o t in th e rig h t place, ju st d ro p u s a card ." But th e project w a s lau g h ab le in econom ic term s, d a n g e ro u s in ecological ones, a n d d e stru ctiv e in h u m a n term s. A larm ed E skim os— som e of w h o m h a d p a rtic ip a te d in N a g asak i's clean u p a n d k n ew a b o u t th e d isa stro u s 1954 Bikini n u c le ar te st— jo in ed w ith skeptical b u sin essm en , local scientists, a n d B arry C om m oner, a scientist lea d in g the b u d d in g an tin u cle ar a n d e n v iro n ­ m en tal m ovem ents. A fter a n u g ly stru g g le in w h ic h th e AEC b ru sh e d asid e the d a ta of d isse n tin g scientists a n d m an e u v e re d to blacklist th em , th e co m m issio n gave u p in 1962. It "w as possibly th e first g o v e rn m e n t project ch allen g ed o n ecological g ro u n d s," n o tes its h isto rian .82 G iven the escalating a rm s race, the o p p o sitio n to C hariot, like th e cam p aig n to b a n n u c le ar tests, w a s n o n eth eless w id e of th e m ark , so m e h isto ria n s argue. Such efforts in v o lv ed a "d isp lac em e n t" w h e reb y p eo p le sh ifted th eir fears a w ay from the g rav e st d an g er, th a t of n u c le ar w ar. The test b a n serv ed as a

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"m agic talism an, a w a y th a t th e n a tio n co u ld co n fro n t a real a n d p re se n t d a n g e r w ith o u t com ing to g rip s w ith th e tru e reality of th e 1950s— th e p o ssib ility of to tal d e stru ctio n ."83 T h at po ssib ility w a s h a rd ly ig n o red in th e late 1950s, h o w ­ ever: H o lly w o o d film s, th e w a rn in g s of E isen h o w er a n d o th ers, a n d a m o u n t­ in g co n tro v ersy ov er civil d efen se all m a d e it visible. A less p sy c h o lo g iz ed ex­ p la n a tio n of n u c le ar politics w o u ld n o t n e atly d istin g u ish o n e " tru e reality " from o thers, w o u ld recognize th a t politics o ften b eg in s w ith im m e d ia te a n d lo­ cal d an g ers, a n d w o u ld p o in t to th e large obstacles a g ain st a n y d irec t ch allenge to n u clear w eap o n s. For d e sp ite th e b reach in political c u ltu re o n n u c le ar issues, th e clam o r for m o re w e a p o n s o n ly increased. Strategic d o c trin e m irro re d a n d ex acerb ated th e p ressu re s in v o lv ed , as theorists, officers, a n d p o licy m ak ers scram b led to im ­ p a rt ratio n ality a n d e q u ilib riu m to a system sp in n in g o u t of control. From one v a n ta g e p o in t, stability seem ed foreseeable. P rev ailin g A m erican d o c trin e as­ su m e d a b alance of te rro r in w h ic h each su p e rp o w e r d e te rre d th e o th e r's in itia­ tio n of n u c le ar w a r w ith its th re a t of a d e v a sta tin g resp o n se. R efined as " m u tu a l a ssu re d d e stru ctio n " (M AD), th is d o c trin e im p lied th a t once th e su p e rp o w e rs g a in e d ro u g h p arity, th ey w o u ld h a v e p o w e rfu l in cen tiv es to stabilize th e co m p etitio n — m o n ey w o u ld b e saved, w o rrie d con stitu en cies rea ssu red , a n d th e d a n g e rs of su rp rise m inim ized. S u p erio rity m ig h t e v en b e d a n g e ro u s if it led th e w e ak e r po w er, fearful it co u ld n e v e r su rv iv e a first strik e, to lau n c h su ch a strik e itself. D espite th a t finely s p u n a rg u m e n t, stability w a s u n attain ab le: ex tern al p re s­ su res d isru p te d it, logical inconsistencies arose w ith in it, a n d logic n e v e r fu lly g o v ern ed strateg y anyw ay. G iven the Soviet rocket cap ab ility su p p o s e d ly re­ v ealed b y S putnik, A m erican strateg ists a rg u e d for a "seco n d -strik e" force able to su rv iv e a n en em y first strike a n d still re sp o n d d ev astatin g ly . B u ild in g su c h a force, h ow ever, req u ire d m issiles o n su b m a rin e s a n d in h a rd e n e d silos, co st bil­ lions, d ro v e the Soviets to rep ly in k in d , a n d fu rth e r ratc h e te d u p th e a rm s race. C osts w e n t still h ig h e r as stra te g y shifted fro m "city -b u stin g " to d e stro y in g e n ­ em y m ilitary forces. It seem ed m ore h u m a n e a n d effective to ta rg e t th o se forces, b u t since th ey w ere far m ore n u m e ro u s, scattered , a n d p ro tec te d th a n cities, "counterforce" stra te g y req u ire d far m o re m issiles w ith far m o re so p h is­ ticated g u idance system s. T he n ew strategies a n d w e a p o n s m a d e th e d ilem m as of d e terren ce m o re vexing. If, som e m u se d , the Soviets stru ck first b y h ittin g A m erica's m ilitary forces in stead of its cities, the P re sid e n t w o u ld face a n ex cruciating choice— a co u n terattack o n Soviet rocket forces w o u ld fin d m a n y of th eir silos em p ty , y et a n attack o n Soviet cities w o u ld o n ly e n su re a n en em y resp o n se in cin eratin g A m erica's m etropolises. A n y claim th a t th e U n ited States w o u ld e n g ag e in global in cineration seem ed m ad , y e t an y h in t of re stra in t w o u ld u n d e rm in e its credibility. A s B ernard B rodie noticed, "T he ru b com es fro m th e fact th a t w h a t looks like th e m o st ratio n al deterrence policy in v o lv es c o m m itm en t to a stra te g y

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of resp o n se w hich, if w e ev er h a d to execute it, m ig h t th e n look v e ry foolish." T he p ro b lem s w e re so intractable a n d th e reaso n in g so circu lar th a t o n e th eo rist w o n d e re d if w a r m ig h t com e th ro u g h "successive cycles of 'H e th in k s w e th in k h e th in k s w e t h i n k . . . h e th in k s w e th in k h e 'll attack; so h e th in k s w e shall; so h e w ill; so w e m u st.' ',84 In o th e r w ay s, too, m ea su re s to en h an ce th e n a tio n 's safety th re a te n e d to u n ­ d e rm in e it fu rth er. It seem ed sensible to p ro tec t cities w ith anti-ballistic m issiles (ABMs) th a t co u ld in tercep t Soviet b o m b ers a n d rockets, b u t ABM s trig g e red a n u g ly deb ate. To e x p o n en ts of d eterrence, a n a tio n able to d e fe n d its cities w o u ld b e te m p te d to in itiate n u c le ar w ar, tru stin g th a t it co u ld b ru s h off its e n ­ e m y 's reta lia to ry attack. The w h o le effort to solve th e d ile m m a s created b y one tech n o lo g y w ith a n o th e r w a s d an g ero u s. A s retired g en eral O m a r B radley w a rn e d in 1957, "M issiles w ill b rin g anti-m issiles, a n d anti-m issiles w ill b rin g anti-anti-m issiles. B ut in ev itab ly this w h o le electronic co u rse of card s w ill a reach p o in t w h e re it can b e c o n stru cted n o h ig h er."85 P recario u s in d e e d seem ed "T he D elicate Balance of T error," as A lb ert W ohlstetter, a civilian th eo rist a t th e R A N D C o rp o ratio n , e n title d a n o tab le 1959 article. Like h im , o th e r strateg ists feared th a t e v e n a " m o d e ra te " technical a d v a n ta g e for one sid e m ig h t te m p t it in to a p ree m p tiv e strik e o r in to ex p lo it­ in g "n ew possibilities of th reats, u ltim a tu m s, b lackm ail." L ater w o rk b y Rob­ e rta W ohlstetter (also at R A N D ) o n th e P earl H a rb o r d isa ste r u n d e rlin e d th a t d a n g e r b y stressin g th e extrem e difficulty of an ticip atin g su rp rise attack. The p e rc ep tio n of p e rilo u s in stab ility su c h strateg ists offered w a s d riv e n b y a n "ex­ a g g erate d a p p re cia tio n of b o th th e ev o lv in g tech n o lo g y a n d its im p act o n th e strateg ic b alan ce." Y esterday's w e a p o n a p p e a re d certain to b e to m o rro w 's ju n k , m a d e obsolete b y the latest creatio n of m an iacal g en iu s o r c o m m an d tech­ nology. "E very c o u n try lives w ith th e n ig h tm a re ," w ro te K issinger, th a t ev en "its b e st efforts" a t su rv iv a l "m a y b e je o p a rd iz ed b y a technological b rea k ­ th ro u g h o n th e p a rt of its o p p o n e n t." G eorge K ennan, m o re a la rm e d a b o u t the a rm s race, ask ed , "A re w e to flee like h a u n te d creatu res from o n e d efen siv e device to an o th er, each m o re costly a n d h u m ilia tin g th a n th e o n e before, co w er­ in g u n d e rg ro u n d one day, b reak in g u p o u r cities th e next, a tte m p tin g to su r­ ro u n d o u rselv es w ith elab o rate sh ield s o n th e th ird . . . ?" T he acute sense of technological flux m ask ed real sources of stability: th e su b se q u e n t tu rn o v e r of w e a p o n ry o ften w a s slow (three d ecad es later, B-52s rem a in e d in th e A m erican arsenal), stra te g y c h an g e d on ly g rad u ally , a n d so m e n e w technologies, like sp y satellites, p ro v e d stab ilizin g to the in te rn atio n al system . Stability w a s n o t, h o w ­ ever, rea d ily a p p a re n t in th e 1950s.86 O th e r strateg ists saw a p a th o u t of th e cul-de-sac in d o ctrin es o f lim ited w ar. A la rm e d b y the Soviet U n io n 's a p p a re n t strategic su p erio rity , a p p a lle d b y the d a n g e rs of a g en eral n u c le ar w ar, convinced th a t "m assiv e retaliatio n " d id n o t d e te r aggression, th ey a d v a n c e d a "realist" critiq u e of th e A m erican tra d itio n of seeing "n o goal save to tal victory, a n d n o m o d e of w a r except all-o u t w ar," as

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K issinger p u t it. G iven a n im possible choice b e tw e e n A m erican p a ra ly sis a n d global holocaust, th ey a rg u e d th a t "th e o n ly ratio n al co u rse is to d e v e lo p a strateg y capable of lim itin g w a rfare a n d fig h tin g lim ited w a rs successfully." W ith v a ry in g em p h ases, civilians like K issinger a n d a rm y g en erals like M ax­ w ell T aylor a n d M a tth e w R id g w ay to u te d th e u tility of c o n v en tio n al forces a n d tactical n u c le ar w e a p o n s for en h an c in g d e terren ce a n d w a g in g lim ite d w ar. Still, th eir strateg y w a s h a rd ly stable o r convincing. K orea w a s a d isp iritin g ex­ am p le, ju st as A m erica's w a r in V ietnam , for w h ic h th ey laid o n e in tellectu al basis, w as th e tragic outcom e. A n d as B rodie a rg u e d , n o o n e c o u ld p ro m ise th a t n u c le ar w a r w o u ld stay lim ited, g iv en " th a t w a r alw ay s d e e p ly in v o lv es th e e m o tio n s" a n d often "th e collapse of in h ib itio n s."87 In a n y event, it w a s n e v e r clear h o w m u c h th ese exq u isite a n d conflicting calculations of stra te g y d e te rm in e d policy. C iv ilian stra te g ists lo o k ed to th e tech n iq u es a n d lan g u a g e of econom ics, phy sics, a n d m ath em atics (in clu d in g g am e theory). T heir m o d els of n u c le ar w a rfare w ere intellectu ally im p ressiv e b u t also strip p e d (as B rodie, a n d in h is o w n w a y E isenhow er, realized) of th o se em o tio n al co m p o n en ts of w a r n o t reducible to q u an tificatio n a n d c o m p u te r analysis. "It w as," ru n s o ne h isto ria n 's m o rd a n t co m m en t, "as if police officers w ere b e in g ta u g h t th e a rt of h o m icid e d etectio n in term s of o p p o rtu n ity a n d m u rd e r w eap o n , b u t n e v e r m o tiv e." T here co u ld b e n o reh earsal for A rm a g e d ­ d o n , o n ly w ar-g am in g a n d fray ed nerves. T he th eo rists' a p p a re n t co n fid en ce in th eir p red ictio n s a n d th e ir ability to m an a g e w a r c o n trasted to th e g rip p in g u n ­ p red ictab ility of w a r th a t m a n y A m ericans sensed. M oreover, tu ck e d a w ay a t R A N D a n d o th er in stitu tes flo u rish in g o n g o v e rn m e n t su p p o rt, th eo rists w e re iso lated fro m th e b ro a d c u rre n ts of A m erican life. T heir fo rb id d in g lan g u ag e, chilling scenarios, a n d p o se of objectivity a lien ated m a n y A m ericans, w h o c o u ld learn of th eir w o rk th ro u g h n o v els a n d film s th a t o ften p re se n te d th e m savagely. R eaction to On Thermonuclear War (1960) b y R A N D 's H e rm a n K ahn, w ith its "g rim jo cu larity " a b o u t su rv iv in g a n d w in n in g n u c le ar w a r, e x p o sed th e alienation, e v en if it caricatu red K ah n 's a m b ig u o u s p u rp o se s. C iv ilian stra t­ egists enjoyed a closer relatio n sh ip w ith m ilitary officers, b u t th ey o ften re­ sen ted or scorned the civilian expertise o n w h ic h th ey also d e p e n d e d .88 N o t su rprisingly, then, b ro a d e r im p u lse s d ro v e policy as m u c h as strategic theory. Like the d re a d n o u g h ts of p re -W o rld W ar I su p e rp o w e rs, b o m b ers a n d rockets w ere v a lu e d m ore as em blem s of n a tio n al p o w e r th a n as se rv an ts of d o ctrin e o r as practical in stru m e n ts of w ar. G reat p o w e rs a m a ssed th e m to sh o w th ey w ere g reat p o w e rs a n d to signal th eir resolve to w o rrie d allies a n d rash enem ies. T hey serv ed sym bolic fu nctio n s th a t n o ratio n al calcu latio n s c o u ld express a n d n o specific n u m b e rs fulfill. For different reasons, m an y of th e m en in ch arg e w ere also skeptical of elab o ­ rate d o ctrin es of deterrence. "If I see th a t th e R ussians are am assin g th eir p lan e s to attack," A ir Force G eneral C u rtis LeM ay rep o rte d ly said , " I'm g o in g to knock the sh it o u t of th em before th ey take off th e g ro u n d ." G iv en to ex ag g era­ tion, LeM ay non eth eless h a d , as h e a d of the Strategic A ir C o m m a n d a n d th en

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as th e A ir Force chief of staff, w id e la titu d e u n d e r th e A m erican sy stem of com ­ m a n d a n d control, one m u c h looser th a n th e Soviet U n io n 's. A n d h is a ttitu d e p e rsiste d after h is retirem en t in 1965. "If th ere is a n u c le ar w ar, th e U n ited States w ill b e th e one to sta rt it," said one A ir Force strateg ist y ears later. The influence of civilian strateg ists w a s su b stan tial, b u t th e d isju n ctio n b e tw ee n th e ir a rtfu l th eo ries a n d th e coarser o u tlo o k of co m m an d e rs w a s a n o th e r source of instability.89 Still, th e b alance of terro r h eld , a n d p e rh a p s u n d e rw ro te w h a t John G a d d is h a s called th e "lo n g peace" of the C old W ar. T he sym bolic v alu e of n u clear w e a p o n s certain ly im p lied a k in d of functio n al restraint: th ey w ere th ere for show , n o t for use, it often seem ed. D id peace e n d u re b ecau se of th e b alan ce of te rro r o r d e sp ite it? T he a n sw e r m ay b e both: th e terro r th a t stay ed th e n u clear p o w e rs from p lu n g in g into the abyss also d ro v e th e m to its edge. It also en co u r­ a g e d th e m to tolerate, p ro m o te, o r e n te r n o n -n u cle ar w a rs th a t scarred m an y o th e r nations; this w a s a "lo n g peace" o n ly b y th e essen tial b u t sin g u la r sta n ­ d a rd of a v o id in g n u c le ar w ar. A n d w h a t restra in ed th e su p e rp o w e rs w a s less so m e balance of te rro r th a n m u tu a l te rro r a t th e p ro sp e ct of n u c le ar w ar, reg a rd ­ less of w h e th e r one sid e h a d a n ed g e in it. T hey w ere, th a t is, d e te rre d as m u ch b y th e ir o w n w e a p o n s as b y th e en em y 's, n o t b ecause A m erican s w ere re­ stra in e d w h ile Soviets w ere reckless, o r becau se A m erican su p e rio rity forced a tru c u le n t en em y to back aw ay from w ar. A p sychological m o re th a n a m ilitary co n struct, th e b alance of terro r rested less o n forces th a n o n a ttitu d e s, ones sh a red b y su p e rp o w e r elites w h o p ro claim ed h a tre d of each other. A n d it barely d id h o ld , n e v e r m ore p rec ario u s th a n in th e late 1950s a n d early 1960s. N o ep iso d e d e m o n stra te d its fragility m o re th a n th e B erlin crisis of th e w in te r of 1958-1959. B erlin itself still sto o d o d d ly close to 1945: e v en in W est B erlin th e ru b b le of w a rtim e b o m b in g rem a in e d ev id en t; n o b o rd e r g u a rd s sto p p e d traffic b e tw ee n th e east a n d w e st sectors; a n d b o th sectors still seem ed "th e p e ts of th e o ccu p atio n p o w e rs." But th e d azzle of th e W est's K u rfu rsten d a m m m o ck ed th e d ra b n e ss of C o m m u n ist E ast Berlin, h o w e v e r p ro sp e ro u s it w a s b y E ast E u ro p ea n sta n d ard s. K hrushchev, for v a rio u s p o ssib le rea so n s— fru stra tio n a n d e m b a rra ssm e n t ov er the d ra in of p o p u la tio n a n d ta le n t o u t of E ast B erlin into th e W est, or fear th a t W est G erm an y m ig h t so o n g ain control of N A TO n u c le ar w e a p o n s— p rec ip ita te d the crisis, issu in g a stream of m en acin g m etap h o rs: "W est B erlin h as becom e a so rt of m alig n an t tu m o r" a n d "w e hav e d e cid ed to d o som e su rg ery "; B erlin w as "a b o n e in m y th ro at" a n d "th e testi­ cles of th e W est. E very tim e I give th em a yan k , th ey holler." M an y d id ho ller w h e n h e d e m a n d e d a n ag re em e n t to e n d th e A llied o ccu p atio n of Berlin, m ak e W est B erlin a d e m ilitariz ed free city, a n d estab lish E ast Berlin as E ast G er­ m a n y 's cap ital— a n d w h e n h e h in te d a t a n o th e r B erlin b lo ck ad e if h e d id n o t g et h is w ay.90 E isen h o w er's resp o n se w a s m e a su re d in th e face of fo rm id ab le p ressu res. M ost N A TO allies s u p p o rte d his cau tio u s resp o n se, b u t n o t so m a n y A m eri­ cans. A d y in g D ulles sp o k e b itte rly of sp e n d in g b illio n s o n d efen se o n ly to h av e

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"a p p e a se m e n t a n d p a rtia l su rre n d e r" th re a te n "to be o u r a ttitu d e ." T he a rm e d forces p ressed Ike to p la n a m ilitary effort to b rea k a n y blo ck ad e. C o n g ressio n al lead ers ren ew ed th eir calls to increase th e d efen se b u d g e t. Jo u rn alists ask ed a b o u t u sin g N A TO forces o r n u c le ar w e a p o n s in th e e v e n t of blo ck ad e. In all cases, E isenhow er rejected the p ressu re s o u trig h t o r sh a rp ly scaled b ack the p lan s u rg e d o n him . K een to ease " p re ssu re s a t h o m e for p rec ip ito u s action," h e re sp o n d e d to q u estio n s a b o u t lib eratin g B erlin w ith n u c le ar w e a p o n s in h is typically flat style: "W ell, I d o n 't k n o w h o w y o u co u ld free a n y th in g w ith n u ­ clear w e ap o n s." If C ongress forced fifty th o u sa n d m o re tro o p s o n h im , "W h ere w ill I p u t them ?" h e sn id e ly ask ed rep o rters. "W ell, ju st so m e p lace w h e re it's nice to keep th em o u t of the w ay, because I d o n 't k n o w w h a t else to d o w ith th em ." M oreover, h e " sp a re d n o effort to a ssu re K h ru sh ch ev a retre at w ith h o n o r." Publicly h e h e ld fast to A llied rig h ts a n d p riv a te ly h e w e ig h e d th e n u ­ clear o p tio n , b u t K h ru sh ch ev 's u ltim a tu m p a sse d w ith o u t in cid en t in M ay. Es­ sentially, E isenhow er talk ed his w a y o u t of th e crisis— in d e e d , refu sed to trea t it as a crisis— b u t n o t before m a n y A m erican s th o u g h t a n u c le ar w a r m ig h t b e ­ gin. Stability, a n d peace itself, ag ain seem ed to p iv o t o n h im .91 B erlin w a s only one tilt in th e see-saw of ev en ts th a t se n t h o p e s for d e te n te a ltern ately so arin g a n d sinking. N ix o n 's v isit to M oscow in Ju ly 1959 y ield ed th e K itchen D ebate a n d a stream of vulgarities: K h ru sh ch ev lik en ed o n e recen t congressional action to "fresh h o rse shit, a n d n o th in g sm ells w o rse th a n that!"; N ix o n reto rted th a t "th e C h a irm a n is m istak en . T here is so m e th in g th a t sm ells w o rse th a n h o rse sh it— a n d th a t is p ig sh it." A v isit b y K h ru sh ch ev to th e U n ited States p ro d u c e d th e celeb rated "sp irit of C a m p D av id ," p lu s fu ry o n th e A m erican rig h t (W illiam F. Buckley, Jr., c o n d em n ed h a v in g a v isito r w h o " p ro ­ fanes the n atio n ").92 E isenhow er e m b a rk e d o n g lo b e-tro ttin g d ip lo m acy to ro u n d u p allies for d e te n te , b u t ju st as h o p e s for a b re a k th ro u g h p e a k e d in th e sp rin g of 1960, the Soviets sh o t d o w n a n A m erican U-2 sp y p lan e. W h en K h ru shchev a n d E isenhow er b u n g le d in to a lo u d exchange of lies, accusations, a n d th reats a b o u t the incident, th e fragile p ro cess of su m m it d ip lo m acy sh a t­ tered. Failure o w ed to m ore th a n th e d e e d s of lead ers, h o w e v e r— it w a s th e p ro d ­ u ct of a larger process accelerating d u rin g th e S p u tn ik years. T he C o ld W ar a n d o th er g reat-p o w er rivalries h a d long b e en w a g e d as to tal stru g g les em b racin g all form s of pow er, b u t n o w th a t em brace seem ed b ig g er th a n e v e r —everything co u n te d in the global struggle, as E isen h o w er in d ic ate d in h is 1958 State of th e U n io n A ddress. A m ericans "co u ld m ak e n o m o re tragic m istak e th a n m erely to con centrate o n m ilitary stre n g th ," h e w a rn e d . For " w h a t m ak es th e Soviet th re a t u n iq u e in h isto ry is its all-inconclusiveness. E very h u m a n activity is p resse d into service as a w e a p o n of expansio n . T rade, econom ic d e v elo p m e n t, m ilitary pow er, arts, science, ed u catio n , th e w h o le w o rld of id e a s— all are h a r­ n essed to this sam e c h ario t of e x p an sio n ."93 A t th e sam e tim e, sym bols of p restig e — the shiny kitchen, the b e e p in g S putnik, th e m a n in o rb it— becam e d etach ed from w eap o n s, free-floating a n d in d eterm in ate. If few criteria estab-

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lish ed w h a t c o n stitu ted " e n o u g h " w eap o n ry , e v en few er d e te rm in e d w h a t m a d e for e n o u g h science, ed u catio n , c u ltu ra l p restig e, o r m o ral v irtu e. H o w m a n y A m ericans in space flying h o w h ig h for h o w lo n g w o u ld co n stitu te catch­ in g u p w ith th e Soviets? It w a s g ratify in g to h av e th e A m erican p ia n ist V an C lib u m w in th e 1958 T chaikovsky C o m p etitio n in M o sco w — victo ry b ro u g h t h im w ild acclaim in th e U n ited S tates— b u t d id it suffice to sh o w th a t A m erican artists w e re b e tte r th a n th e ir Soviet c o u n te rp arts? T he late 1950s in v o lv ed n o t ju st th e fam iliar p erc ep tio n th a t n a tio n al secu rity w a s all-em bracing b u t a shift in em phasis: in tan g ib le c o m p o n e n ts of p o w e r seem ed m o re im p o rta n t m o re th a n e v er in the C old W ar. T he m o st sen satio n al a n d o ften v u lg a r ex p ressio n of th a t o u tlo o k w a s the race to get m e n in space, e v o k ed w ell b y Tom W olfe. A m erica th e u n d e rd o g n e e d e d its heroes, th eir v e ry fo o lh ard in ess o n e m ea su re of th eir v irtu e. T he M ercu ry a stro n au ts " h a d v o lu n te e re d to sit o n to p of th e ro ck ets— w h ic h al­ ways blew up! T hey w ere k am ik azes g o in g fo rth to vie w ith th e R ussians!" T hey e m b o d ied A m erican v irtu e , a t least its w h ite m ale form s, h o w e v e r co n triv ed th e p u b lic relations effort to re p re se n t th a t v irtu e a n d associate it w ith lead ers like K en n ed y (E isenhow er k e p t his d istan ce fro m th e astronauts). T hey w ere to in sp ire the n a tio n 's y o u th , rally th e n a tio n 's sp irit, a n d show , m u ch like L in d b erg h in the 1920s, th a t n e w -fo u n d technological so p h isticatio n a n d oldfash io n ed in d iv id u a l h ero ism w ere still c o n g ru e n t, a t least am o n g A m ericans. Fam iliar g e n d e re d n o tio n s of w a rtim e v irtu e re a p p e a re d , w ith w o m e n con­ scrip ted in to su b o rd in a te roles: "SEVEN BRAVE W O M E N B EH IN D TH E AS­ TRONA UTS," ra n a 1959 Life h e ad lin e a b o u t th e w a rrio rs' w ives. A bove all, th e a stro n au ts w ere to b e a t th e Soviets. In th e process, as W olfe su g g ests, th e C old W ar ch anged. T he space race sh ifted a m ea su re of su p e rp o w e r conflict from th e d e a d ly aren a of real w e a p o n s o n to th e safer te rra in of sym bolic com bat. H o w ­ ev er w astefu l, the space race in v o lv ed n o sh o o tin g , n o h u rlin g of n u clear bom bs. W id en in g th e C o ld W ar, in ten sify in g its sym bolic d im en sio n s, the space race also gave it a cathartic o u tle t a n d m a d e it m o re d iffuse.94 A m o re diffuse stru g g le also rew o rk ed th e lin k s b e tw ee n n a tio n al secu rity a n d reform , as ed u ca tio n al policy sh o w ed . S p u tn ik gave critics of e d u ca tio n en o rm o u s visibility —Life d e v o te d a fiv e-p art series to e d u c a tio n in 1958— a n d sp a w n e d in v id io u s co m p ariso n s b e tw e e n Soviet a n d A m erican schools. E arlier p ro p o sa ls for school refo rm a n d fed eral a id to e d u c a tio n n o w fo u n d th e ir m o­ m e n t w h e n E isenhow er sig n e d th e N a tio n a l D efense E d u catio n A ct (NDEA). A cco rding to its en ab lin g lan g u ag e, "T he p re se n t em erg en cy " a n d "th e p re se n t e d u ca tio n al e m e rg en c y "— n e ith e r m u c h d efin ed , as if self-ev id en t— req u ire d action; "T he d efense of this N a tio n d e p e n d s u p o n th e m a ste ry of m o d e m tech­ n iq u es d ev elo p ed from com plex scientific p rin cip le s."95 The act a im ed to stre n g th e n e d u ca tio n in science, m athem atics, a n d fo reig n lan g u ag es (an d later o th er fields), p ro v id in g lo an s to u n d e rg ra d u a te s a n d fello w sh ip s to g ra d u a te stu d e n ts (if th ey sig n ed loyalty oaths). Sm aller fu n d s w e n t to stre n g th e n g u id ­ ance a n d testin g services in se co n d a ry schools, w h ile se p ara te N a tio n al Science

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F o u n d atio n m onies w e n t into a n o v e rh a u l of se co n d a ry science a n d m a th e m a t­ ics ed u cation. The N D EA , a n d e d u ca tio n generally, enjo y ed a b a lly h o o th a t o b scu red im ­ p o rta n t continuities, especially w ith the earlier GI Bill. Federal a id to e d u ca tio n h a d lo ng fo u n d e re d in th e face of d iv isio n s o v er a id to p riv a te a n d relig io u s schools, racial in teg ratio n , a n d th e v a lu e of local control. Like th e G I Bill, th e N D EA d id n o t so m u c h overcom e th o se obstacles as circu m v en t th e m — n atio n al security allo w ed a su sp en sio n of objections to fed eral aid w ith o u t th eir overth row . T h at ratio n ale also gave the legislation a n elitist th ru st, o n e stro n g er th a n th e G I Bill h ad . T h o u g h p u b lic anxiety fo cu sed o n p rim a ry a n d seco n d ary schools, m o st m o n ey w e n t to colleges a n d un iv ersities. T he ten sio n b e tw e e n d em o cratizin g im p u lses a n d elitist concerns w a s e v id e n t in c o n te m p o ra ry d e ­ bate. O n e N obel P riz e -w in n in g phy sicist co n tra sted th e intellectu al objectivity of Soviet e d u ca tio n w ith th e dem ocratic m ilieu th a t p re su m a b ly c rip p led th e A m erican school su p e rin te n d e n t, w h o d ecid es w h a t to teach b y fin d in g o u t "h o w m a n y v o ters in this to w n th in k th a t th e w o rld is ro u n d a n d h o w m an y th in k th a t it is sq u are." Life b e m o a n ed h o w A m erica's " s tu p id c h ild ren g et far b e tte r care th a n th e b rig h t. The g en iu ses of th e n ex t d ecad e are e v en n o w b ein g allo w ed to slip back into m ediocrity."96 The ten sio n em erg ed in th e act's w o rd in g . It u rg e d " th a t n o s tu d e n t of ability w ill b e d e n ie d a n o p p o rtu n ity for h ig h e r e d u c a tio n b ecau se of financial n e e d " — liberals h a d c h an g e d Ike's original p ro p o sa l for u n d e rg ra d u a te schol­ a rsh ip s b a sed o n m e rit to loans b a sed o n n e e d — b u t it also re w a rd e d stu d e n ts w ith "su p e rio r" academ ic b ack g ro u n d s o r abilities, u su a lly stu d e n ts from a d ­ v a n ta g e d b ack g ro u n d s a n d schools in p ro sp e ro u s districts. M ost likely, g iv en th e fields of stu d y targ eted , th ey also w o u ld b e m ale; in term s of g en d er, too, th e N D EA resem bled th e GI Bill. The N D EA w a s d e sig n ed to stre n g th e n e d u ca tio n a n d n a tio n al defense. A lo n g w ith sw ellin g S putnik-era technological p ro g ram s, it tig h te n ed th e link b e tw ee n the federal g o v e rn m e n t a n d e d u c a tio n a n d d e e p e n e d th e la tte r's d e ­ p e n d en c e o n the form er. It elicited little criticism for d o in g so. E isen h o w er h im ­ self m issed a n o p p o rtu n ity in th a t regard. W orried as ev er a b o u t th e "g arriso n state," h e d e sig n ed N D EA legislation " th a t serv ed h is re a rg u a rd v iew ag ain st th e p reten sio n s of technocracy," b u t h e co u ch ed th e d a n g e r of fed eral a id to e d u ca tio n in term s of "socialism ."97 T he w id e -ra n g in g d efin itio n s of n a tio n al secu rity th a t p ro m p te d th e N D EA d id n o t, h ow ever, forge g reater n a tio n al un ity , d e sp ite rh etorical a p p ea ls in ­ v o k in g Pearl H a rb o r a n d the like p resu m ab ly d e sig n e d to achieve it. In stead , th e fissures in political c u ltu re o n ly w id e n e d as th e d ecad e closed. E isen h o w er h im self re p u d ia te d the n e ed for unity, in th a t h e d e n ie d th ere w a s a n a tio n al em ergency. The sh eer len g th of tim e, ap p ro a ch in g tw o d ecad es, of real o r p re ­ su m e d n a tio n al em ergency also u n d e rc u t efforts to achieve unity, for each n ew p ro cla m a tio n of crisis cam e to A m ericans inclined b y n o w to reg a rd su ch decla­ ratio n s as alm o st routine. W hile A m ericans m ig h t o n occasion p o stp o n e o th er

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goals, as th ey p resu m ab ly h a d in 1942, p e rp e tu a l d e ferral w as less obtainable, especially in 1958 a n d 1959, w h e n racial issu es a n d a sh a rp recession g en erated m u c h conflict a n d attention. So w h ile ex p erts d w e lle d o n g a p s b e tw e e n the U n ited States a n d th e Soviet U nion, g a p s am o n g A m erican s th em selv es also w id e n ed . T hey a p p e a re d o n m a n y fronts b y th e d e c a d e 's e n d — in a co n tin u in g b attle ov er rock m usic a n d in h a n d w rin g in g a b o u t A m erican y o u th , for ex am ­ ple, a n d m o st b a ld ly in d e b ates o n race relatio n s a n d n u c le ar policy. In tu rn , those issues h e lp e d reenergize co n serv atism — n o t E isen h o w er's cau tio u s b ra n d b u t a strid e n t v ersio n d e m a n d in g d ism a n tlin g of th e w elfare state a n d v icto ry in the C old W ar. W illiam F. B uckley's National Review m ad e its d e b u t in 1955, w h ile The Conscience of a Conservative b y A rizo n a se n ato r B arry G o ld w a ter h it th e b ookstores in 1960. G o ld w a ter ex p lo ited th e d iscrep an cy b e­ tw e en strid e n t professions of irreconcilable Soviet-A m erican conflict a n d the m o re cautious practice of A m erican foreign policy. W ith W orld W ar II h is m o d el fo r th e C old W ar, h e cried th a t it w o u ld h av e m a d e n o sense, "m id w a y in th e Second W orld W ar, to p ro m o te a N azi-A m erican exchange p ro g ra m or to in v ite H itle r to m ak e a sta te v isit to the U n ited S tates." H e co n d em n ed th e "cra­ v e n fear of d e a th " th a t w a s "e n te rin g th e A m erican consciousness," to th e p o in t (referring to K h ru sh ch ev 's recent visit) " th a t m a n y recently felt th a t h o n o rin g th e chief d e sp o t h im self w as the price w e h a d to p a y to av o id n u c le ar d e stru c ­ tio n ." G o ld w a ter sh a re d w ith liberals a fear th a t A m erica w a s losing th e C old W ar b ecause its lead ersh ip , ev en its p eo p le, w ere flaccid. A n d h is rhetoric re­ sem b led w h a t the N e w Left w o u ld so o n say: g o v e rn m e n t h a d becom e "a Le­ v iath an , a v a st n a tio n al a u th o rity o u t of to u ch w ith th e p eo p le, a n d o u t of th eir co n tro l." W here liberals w a n te d to en erg ize th e state th ro u g h p ro g ra m s like the N D EA , ho w ev er, G o ld w a ter w a n te d to d isb a n d it, except for its h a rd core of a rm e d force a n d in te rn al security.98 C riticism also c o n tin u ed a m o n g liberal intellectuals. True, n o w h o lesale ch an g e w a s ev id en t. W h en scholars ex am in ed "p o w e r a n d dem o cracy in A m erica" in 1961, for exam ple, only th e idiosy n cratic Peter D ru ck er focused o n m ilitary institution s. O th e rs still offered critiq u es of m ass cu ltu re, stressin g h o w th e n a tio n n e e d e d to ch an g e to w ag e global stru g g le, in a sp irit sim ilar to th a t of D. W. B rogan, the B ritish observer. B rogan w as g lad th a t S p u tn ik w o k e "th e A m erican p u b lic from its u n d o g m atic slu m b ers (in m o st cases it w a s p la in slu m b er)," th o u g h t th a t it ra n k e d " w ith th e sh o ts a t L exington or Fort S um ter," a n d m a in ta in e d th a t "ev e ry th in g in th e in te rio r life of th e U n ited States th a t reinforces th e in te rio r o r exterior caricature of th e A m erican w a y of life— from rig g ed q u iz p ro g ra m s u p w a rd — is d a n g ero u s in th is w o rld ." 99 P au l G o o d m an , in Growing up Absurd (1960), offered a d ifferen t th ru st. H e lam en te d h o w society gave y o u th n o sense of w o rk , p u rp o se , a n d com m unity, a n d h e celebrated Beats, h ip sters, a n d d e lin q u en ts for ex p o sin g th e h o llo w n ess of A m erican culture. A lth o u g h later h a iled for ch artin g a co u rse to w a rd the rad ical 1960s, G o o d m a n also "reflected the d istaste for ideological lan g u ag e c o m m o n to the 1950s." H e took sw ip es a t C o ld W ar c u ltu re b u t gave n o sus-

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tain ed analysis of m ilitarizatio n a n d its role in y o u th 's ills. H is criticism of E isen h ow er w a s u tte rly co n v en tio n al— "H e h a s in v ite d n o real w riter, n o a rt­ ist, n o p h ilo so p h e r to th e W hite H o u se," a n d h a v in g Fred W arin g 's b a n d p la y a t th e W hite H o u se w a s "d isg rac e fu l"— a n d of th e so rt th a t K en n ed y co u ld easily d isarm . R eflecting 1950s n o rm s in a n o th e r w ay, h e ig n o red w o m en : "A g irl d o es n o t have to, she is n o t expected to, 'm a k e so m e th in g ' of herself. . . . She w ill h ave ch ildren, w h ich is absolutely self-justifying, like a n y o th er n a tu ra l o r creative act."100 Still, G o o d m a n 's e d g y to n e a n d m u c h of h is co n ten t a n ticip a te d b ro a d e r criticism of m ilitarized A m erica. W riting w h e n G o o d m a n 's b o o k a p p e a re d , a n ­ th ro p o lo g ist Jules H e n ry p o rtra y e d a "cu ltu re a g ain st m an ," o n e sick to its core. H e n ry saw th e C o ld W ar n o t as a relu c ta n t b u rd e n , b u t as a c ru sa d e fatally con­ g ru e n t w ith A m erica's c u ltu re a n d econom ic system . "T he anx iety late n t in o u r insecure a n d com petitive life h a s b e e n ra tio n alize d — m a d e real a n d specific— b y th e em ergence of th e Soviet U n io n as th e c o n te m p o ra ry In ca rn atio n of fear." W orse, the affluence acco m p an y in g m ilita riza tio n d isa rm e d o p p o sitio n to it, since w a r a n d w a r p re p a ra tio n s w ere seen as p ro m o tin g p ro sp erity . "T he fact th a t w a r -fear is p a rtly n arco tized b y c o n su m p tio n -euphoria h a b itu a te s u s to liv­ in g w ith T he G reat Fear." D efense sp e n d in g d riv e n b y th a t fear h a d o th e r b a le ­ ful effects, H e n ry claim ed: it d im in ish e d in v estm en t in th e n a tio n 's com m ercial p ro w ess, causing A m erica's "g ro w in g v u ln era b ility to im p o rts," a n d it re­ sh a p e d "th e ecological p a tte rn of in d u stria l d e v elo p m e n t," sh iftin g it ab o v e all to C alifornia. W h en econom ists e x p lain th a t d efen se sp e n d in g m a in ta in e d n a ­ tional prosperity, w ro te H enry, "w e m u st b e lie v e . . . D e ath h a s w o n p e c u n ia ry sanctification. It is lo n g ov erd u e. Saint D eath, I salu te you! H ere in th e U n ited States death sustains life." H e n ry 's tre a tm e n t of m ilitarizatio n w a s n o t fully in te ­ g rate d into h is analysis of A m erican culture, a n d h is an g er m a d e for slo p p y analysis. T hat anger, h o w ev er, also m ark e d a b rea k from th e p a llid social criti­ cism p rev alen t, w ith n o tab le exceptions, d u rin g th e 1950s.101 A sim ilar b rea k arose in o th e r scholarly disciplines. A m o n g h isto rian s, the 1950s "m o o d of affirm ation a n d co n sen su s" b e g a n d issolving. W illiam A p p lem a n W illiam s's The Tragedy of American Diplomacy a p p e a re d in 1959, a n d "th e new , left h isto rio g ra p h y a n d th e stu d e n t N e w Left," w h ic h h a d "co m m o n roots," w ere em erg in g b y 1960. Few h isto ria n s m a d e a clean b re a k from th eir earlier outlooks, b u t it w a s telling th a t John L ukacs, a co n serv ativ e C atholic w ith "u n d iv id e d " loyalties in the C o ld W ar, e m p h a size d in The History of the Cold War (1961) th a t "th e stru g g les of m e n a n d of n a tio n s d o n o t alw ay s clearly in carn ate the d iv isio n s of G ood a n d Evil." L ukacs criticized "a n e w k in d of n o t alw ay s conscious A m erican im p erial ex p an sio n " a n d th e n o tio n of irreconcil­ able Soviet-A m erican conflict: " O u r d a n g e r" com es fro m th o se "tellin g th e m ­ selves th a t a n A tom ic W ar is u n a v o id a b le ."102 R eg arding m ilitarization, the im m ed iate im p o rt of th e w o rk of these in tellectuals— or of o th ers like E d m u n d W ilson— w a s lim ited. In tone a n d con-

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ten t, th eir criticism d id n o t differ g reatly from w h a t L ew is M u m fo rd a n d C. W rig h t M ills h a d sa id a t m id -d ecad e. In the academ y, it w a s a m in o rity view . In im pact, it p e rh a p s d id n o t m atch th a t of the p o e t A llen G insberg, th e film m ak er Stanley K ubrick, o r th e m iddle-class critic B etty F riedan, o r e v en ro ck 'n 'ro ll singers. In audience, it p a le d in co m p ariso n to th e one E isen h o w er h a d for ex­ p re ssin g h is d o u b ts. O f course, h e u su a lly ex p ressed h is p u b lic d o u b ts in cir­ c u m sp ec t w ays: th e a n g e r voiced b y critics a t th e d e c a d e 's e n d w a s as im p o r­ ta n t as th e co n te n t of th e ir d o u b ts. Influence is h a rd to m easu re, b u t th o se d o u b ts w ere, in v o lu m e, tone, a n d content, significant a t least as m ark e rs of a ch an g in g m ood. P o p u la r c u ltu re also rev ealed a m ore co m p licated m o o d b y 1960. A s before, d e p ic tio n s of th e celebrated 1945 flag raisin g a t Iw o Jim a p ro v id e d o n e m ea su re of th a t culture. In 1954, Ira H ayes, the P im a In d ia n m arin e in th e fam o u s p h o to of th a t m o m en t, d ie d a d ru n k , c ru sh e d in p a rt b y th e heroic sta tu s fixed o n h im , th o u g h g iv en "th e m o st lavish m ilitary b u ria l since th e in te rn m e n t of th e U n ­ k n o w n Soldier." In 1960, NBC T elevision's The American offered " a n expose of d elib erate fra u d o n th e p a rt of th e [M arine] C o rp s, a schem e to d u p e th e A m eri­ c an p u b lic into believ in g th a t a b rav e a n d n o b le d e e d h a d tra n sp ire d a to p M o u n t Suribachi. . . .T h e R osenthal p ictu re w a s a 'p h o n e y .'T h e re w ere n o Iw o Jim a heroes, o n ly fakes a n d h u m b u g s. . . . H ayes, in h is rein c arn a tio n o n NBC, w a s d riv e n to a n e arly g rav e b y th e sh am e of tellin g lies a t th e b e h e st of h is m ilita ry su p e rio rs." T he e n su in g c o n tro v ersy w a s com plicated b y N B C 's o w n effort, ju st ex­ p o se d , to rig its q u iz show s, a n d The American d id n o t d irectly attack n a tio n al policies, y e t a sh o w q u e stio n in g th e sym bols of th o se policies a n d lin k in g th eir p re s u m e d frau d u le n ce to racism at h o m e w o u ld h av e b e e n u n lik ely a few y ears earlier. A m o re searin g (an d confused) v e rsio n of th e H ay es sto ry follow ed. H o lly w o o d 's The Outsider (1962) reso rte d to a classic fo rm u la of A m erican fiction— th e hom oerotic b o n d b e tw e e n a d a rk -sk in n e d m a n (H ayes) a n d a b lo n d , b lu e-ey ed all-A m erican— in o rd e r to u n d e rlin e th e film 's "lea st a m b ig ­ u o u s them e: th e sh a rp d iv isio n b e tw e e n w h ite a n d 'c o lo re d ' in A m erican soci­ ety." A critique of racism w a s n o t n e w to H o lly w o o d , b u t lin k in g it to a n u n se t­ tlin g p o rtra it of a m y th ic m o m e n t in A m erican m ilitary p ro w e ss w a s m o re novel. It su g g e ste d a connection b e tw ee n th e c o rru p tio n of A m erican p o w e r ab ro a d a n d th e flaw s of A m erican society a t h o m e .103 The Outsider b o m b ed a t the box office, b u t it w a s a n offbeat rep re se n ta tiv e of a clu ster of film s (an d th e novels p rec ed in g them ) th a t w a lk ed a fine line b e­ tw e en extolling fam iliar v alu es a n d q u e stio n in g d o m in a n t policies. On the Beach (1959) p re se n te d the w o rld 's th erm o n u cle ar death : if to som e it also "m a d e w o rld extinction a ro m an tic co n d itio n ," to o th ers it w a s frig h te n in g .104 O th e r film s so o n a p p e a re d exp o sin g the frailties of n u c le ar c o m m an d tech n o l­ og y a n d d e terren ce logic. O ften these film s so u g h t easy ta rg e ts— m ilitary offi­ cers o r scientists, ra th e r th a n the civilian lead ers w h o set basic policies. M ore-

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over, it w a s h a rd to tell w h e th e r th eir m essag es w ere com plex o r m erely confused: The Manchurian Candidate (1962), b a sed o n a 1959 n o v el, d e m o n ­ stra te d th a t "w h ile C o m m u n ism is fien d ish a n d still d a n g ero u s, th e far rig h t is hypocritical a n d foolish." In m ovie form . The Manchurian Candidate, b y p re se n t­ in g a m enacing h o m o sex u al assassin (L aw rence H arv ey ) p ro g ra m m e d b y h is Soviet-agent m o th e r (A ngela L ansbury), eith er rew o rk ed o r p illo rie d — it w a s h a rd to tell w h ic h — th e 1950s conflation of "M om m ies, C om m ies, a n d Q u e e rs."105 O n ly Stanley K ubrick, w h o se Paths of Glory (1957) h a d offered a p o w e rfu l a n tiw a r m essage in the safer contex t of W orld W ar I, d isc a rd e d care­ ful b alan cin g in a n all-out a ssa u lt o n the w arfare state. Doctor Strangelove (1964), w ith a b iza rre am a lg a m of W em h er v o n B raun, H e n ry K issinger, H e rm a n K ahn, a n d p e rh a p s o th ers as its title character. In a sim ilar v e in w a s Catch-22 (1961), a n o v el b y Joseph H eller, w h o set the action in W orld W ar II b u t d irected h is sav age w it a g ain st th e C o ld W ar's ab su rd ities. For all th e p u n c h es p u lle d in su c h film s, th ey w ere tro u b lin g , e n o u g h so in th e case of On the Beach th a t "E ise n h o w e r's cab in et d iscu ssed co n fid en tial ac­ tio n s th ey m ig h t take to u n d e rm in e the m o v ie ."106 E ven if th e y o ften accep ted C o ld W ar d o g m a s— th a t a c en trist liberalism sto o d stu rd ily a g ain st political ex­ trem es, th a t e x p erts a n d lea d ers m u s t be tru s te d — th ey also p u sh e d th o se d o g m as to the surface, exposing th em to a critical g aze less available a d ecad e earlier. Like m u c h else a t th e d e c a d e 's en d , p o p u la r c u ltu re sh o w e d th a t p ro ­ m o ters of th e S p u tn ik panic, for all th ey su cceed ed in beefin g u p A m erican p o w e r in th e sh o rt term , also a g g ra v a te d A m erican s' felt v u ln era b ility to n u ­ clear o b literatio n in w a y s th a t w o u ld ev en tu ally w o rk a g ain st th eir efforts. E ar­ lier, ala rm a t the b o m b h a d sh ifted to ala rm a t th e Soviets; b y 1960 th e process w a s ru n n in g in reverse for som e A m ericans. T h at w a s h a rd ly e v id e n t in th e 1960 p resid en tia l cam p aig n , h o w ev er. In ­ stead , N ix o n a n d K en n ed y c o m p e te d in p ro claim in g th e ir zeal a n d ex p ertise for w a g in g the C old W ar m ore aggressively. D em ocrats stressed th e feckless­ n ess a n d fatigue of a n old m a n 's presidency, offering th e "m issile g a p " a n d "space g a p " as ev id en ce of G O P failure. N ix o n w a lk ed a n a w k w a rd line b e ­ tw e en d e fe n d in g Ike a n d p ro m isin g his o w n fresh er a p p ro ach , ju st as Ike faced h is o w n conflicting im p u lse s— dislike of N ixon, fear of o v e rsh a d o w in g h im , a n d desire to c am p aig n for him . K en n ed y 's raz o r-th in v icto ry m e a su re d n o d e ­ cisive shift o n issues of w a r a n d foreign policy. N o o n e m u c h n o ticed E isen h o w er's h o p e, offered ironically a t the d ed icatio n of th e M arsh all Space F light C enter, th a t A m erican achievem ents b e "th e o u tg ro w th n o t of a soulless, b a rre n technology, n o r of a g ra sp in g state im p erialism ," b u t ra th e r of a " p ro b ­ in g for th e b e tterm e n t of h u m a n ity ." 107 Later, m o st A m ericans sen sed th a t the b re a k d o w n of n a tio n al co n sen su s to o k place in th e m id-1960s, in resp o n se in g o o d p a rt to th e V ietn am W ar. In m a n y w ays, th ey w ere right, y e t e v en in th e 1950s th e b alan ce of c o n te n d in g m o o d s a n d forces h a d b e e n uneasy. The tran sitio n to a n e w presid en cy , a n d

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w h a t E isen h o w er sa id d u rin g it, on ly fu rth e r rev ealed th e in stab ility a n d th e g ro w in g d o u b ts a b o u t m ilitarization.

“An Insidious Penetration of Our Own Minds” W ith h is in au g u ra tio n , John K ennedy said, th e torch "p a sse d to a n e w g e n era ­ tio n of A m ericans," those "tem p ere d b y w a r" a n d "d iscip lin ed b y a h a rd a n d b itte r p e ac e."108 But the g en eratio n al change JFK p ro claim ed w a s unclear. H is y o u th w a s striking, b u t h e also d re w for advice o n e ld e rs like John M cC loy a n d D ean A cheson. B oth g en eratio n s h a d ex perien ced W orld W ar II, b u t o ld er m en like E isen h o w er h a d h e ld h ig h ra n k in it a n d w ere fam iliar w ith p re w a r su sp i­ cions of m ilitarism , w h ile m e n like K enned y k n ew little of th o se suspicions, w a g e d w a r from lesser po sitio n s, a n d h a d th e ir o u tlo o k m o re decisively sh a p e d b y th e w ar. P ro u d of th eir ability to b rea k from th eir eld ers, th ey w ere n o n e th e ­ less m o re the p riso n e rs of W orld W ar II th a n E isen h o w er's gen eratio n . M oreover, th e v e ry n o tio n of a torch p a sse d also p re su m e d co n tin u ity : the n ew co m ers sto o d in E isen h o w er's sh a d o w a n d so u g h t h is blessing. W h en E isen h o w er a n d K en n ed y d iscu ssed S outheast A sia o n Jan u ary 19, com plex p o litical a n d g en eratio n al relatio n sh ip s w ere a t play. K en n ed y in sid ers later re­ called th a t E isen h o w er's insistence o n Laos as "th e m o st im p o rta n t p ro b lem facing the U n ited States" h a d d o n e "a disservice to th e in co m in g A d m in istra ­ tio n ," in C lark C lifford's sum m ary. "You m ig h t h av e to go in th ere a n d fig h t it o u t," p e rh a p s " 'u n ilaterally ,' " Ike w a rn e d , according to Ted S orensen a n d A r­ th u r Schlesinger, Jr. But o th er accounts sh o w th a t E isen h o w er u se d su ch p h ra se s to m ore a m b ig u o u s effect. U n ilateral in terv en tio n , w h ile n o t ru le d out, " w o u ld b e v e ry b a d for o u r relatio n s" in A sia, h e said, at b e st "a last d e sp era te effort" in a reg io n w h e re c o m m u n ists h a d m an y ad v an tag es. W orried a b o u t S o u th east A sia, E isenhow er w a s ste p p in g u p A m erican a id a n d co v ert in ter­ v e n tio n there. But K ennedy a n d som e of his aid es ex ag g erated th e force of h is adv ice because of th eir u n fam iliarity w ith his style of lay in g o u t all c o n tin g en ­ cies, th eir desire for h is sanction to policies th ey w ere co n sid erin g , a n d later th eir eag ern ess to h a v e h im sh are responsib ility for th eir d e e p e n in g in v o lv e­ m e n t in the V ietnam W ar. D espite th eir im p ressio n s, Ike w a s relu c ta n t to p u sh th em in to w a r— a n d also, h e so o n sh o w ed , to p u ll th em aw ay from it. E arly in th e 1960s, d ra ftin g a section of his m em o irs o n th e D ien Bien P h u crisis, h e ar­ g u e d p o in te d ly th a t the presence of large A m erican forces in V ietn am " w o u ld h av e p ro b ab ly a g g ra v ate d . . . th e resen tm en ts h e ld b y A siatics." E ven h a d th ey occupied "all of In d o ch in a . . . , th eir e v en tu al rem o v al w o u ld h av e re­ su lted only in a rev ersio n to the situ atio n w h ic h h a d existed b efore." Lest h e e m b a rrass h is successors, ho w ev er, w h o h a d tak en ju st th a t course, h e d eleted th e passage, ju st as h e s u p p o rte d v ig o ro u s u se of A m erican forces once Johnson co m m itted th em .109 W h atev er the th ru st of E isen h o w er's adv ice o n th e 19th, h is televised fare-

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w ell a d d re ss to the n a tio n tw o d a y s earlier h a d a differen t focus. Ike to ld A m er­ icans they w ere in a global conflict th a t "ab so rb s o u r v e ry b e in g s" a n d — ag ain u rg in g the long v ie w — "p ro m ises to b e of in d efin ite d u ra tio n ." A s a resu lt, the U n ited States h a d b e en "co m p elled to create a p e rm a n e n t a rm a m e n ts in d u stry of v a st p ro p o rtio n s," a lo n g w ith h u g e , costly a rm e d forces. "T he to ta l in flu ­ ence" of this n e w sy ste m — "econom ic, political, e v en sp iritu a l— is felt in e v ery city, ev ery State h o u se, ev ery office of th e Federal g o v e rn m e n t." H e enjo in ed A m ericans to " g u a rd a g ain st the acquisitio n of u n w a rra n te d influence, w h e th e r so u g h t or u n so u g h t, b y th e m ilitary -in d u strial com plex. T he p o ten tial for th e d isa stro u s rise of m isp laced p o w e r exists a n d w ill p ersist." A larm in g also w a s "th e p ro sp e ct of d o m in a tio n of the n a tio n 's sch o lars b y F ed eral em ­ p lo y m en t, project allocations, a n d th e p o w e r of m o n ey " a n d "th e eq u al a n d o p ­ p o site d a n g e r th a t p u b lic policy c o u ld itself b eco m e th e cap tiv e of a scientifictechnological elite." A n d as h e h a d before, h e lin k ed these d a n g e rs to ecological perils, w a rn in g a g ain st "th e im p u lse to live on ly for today, p lu n d e rin g , fo r o u r o w n ease a n d convenience, th e p recio u s resources of to m o rro w ."110 W h at d id h e m ean? In one w ay, his co m m en ts w ere sh re w d ly exculpatory. M ilitarization h a d b e e n forced o n A m erica b y d a n g e ro u s en em ies a n d tech n o logies— it w a s n o t his n a tio n 's fault. W h at h a p p e n e d o n h is w a tc h w a s "co m p elled ," w h ile av o id ab le d a n g e rs (the "potential for th e d isa stro u s rise of m isp laced p o w e r") lay ah ead . He h a d h e ld th e line; lesser m e n m ig h t not. Yet h is farew ell a d d re ss also h e ld a d a rk e r v iew of m ilita riza tio n a n d h is o w n role in it. By d escrib in g its influence as "econom ic, political, e v en sp iritu a l," h e su g g e ste d th a t w h a te v e r its origins, m ilitarizatio n w a s tak in g o n a life of its o w n a p a rt from th e w o rld scene, b ecom ing w o v e n in to th e fabric of A m erican life. M oreover, "th e conjunction of a n im m en se m ilitary estab lish m en t a n d a larg e a rm s in d u stry " h a d a lre ad y o ccurred, w h ile he w a s P resid en t, w h a te v e r ab u ses lay in the future. A n d reg a rd in g d isa rm a m e n t, ack n o w led g ed E isenhow er, "I confess th a t I lay d o w n m y official resp o n sib ilities in th is field w ith a d efinite sense of d isa p p o in tm e n t." Ju st as strik in g w ere th e o m issio n s in th e a d d re ss— n o su m m o n s to g rea ter vigilance a g ain st th e enem y, n o recitatio n of tro u b le sp o ts in the w o rld , a n d little talk of th e e n em y 's evil. T he a d d re ss w a s rem ark ab ly in w ard -lo o k in g , calling for A m erican s to b e v ig ila n t n o t a g ain st e n ­ em ies b u t them selves. Ju st as th e C o ld W ar w a s reach in g a n e w intensity, h e d irected a tten tio n a w ay from it. E isenhow er h a d left b e h in d a m em o rab le ch aracterizatio n of m ilitarizatio n . H e a d d e d to it the n ex t d a y a t h is final p ress conference, w h e n a sk ed h o w to c o u n ter "th e d a n g e r th a t p u b lic policy co u ld becom e th e cap tiv e of a scientific technological elite." H is first resp o n se seem ed lam e— h e n a m e d n o specific steps, o n ly u rg in g " a n ale rt a n d in fo rm ed c itize n ry "— y et it w a s a p p ro p ria te g iv en h is large v iew of th e p roblem , for "th is m isu se of influence a n d p o w e r co u ld com e a b o u t u n w ittin g ly . . . ju st b y th e n a tu re of th e th in g ," a g a in st w h ich a n y single step w o u ld be puny. "W h en y o u see alm o st ev ery o n e of y o u r

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m ag azines, n o m a tte r w h a t th ey are a d v ertisin g , h a s a p ictu re of th e T itan m is­ sile o r th e A tlas [m issile] o r solid fuel o r o th er things, th ere is b eco m in g a g rea t influence, a lm o st a n in sid io u s p e n e tra tio n of o u r o w n m in d s th a t th e on ly th in g th is c o u n try is e n g ag e d in is w e a p o n ry a n d m issiles." The sy n tax w a s g a rb le d b u t th e in sig h t p e n e tra tin g , a n d m ore su b tle th a n his earlier tira d es a g ain st m il­ ita rism ("W e are n o t g o in g to b e in u n ifo rm s g o in g a ro u n d yellin g 'H e il' a n y ­ th in g ," h e said in 1953). T he p ro b lem , Ike realized , w a s n o t sim p ly o n e of p u b lic po licy b u t of c u ltu re a n d the n a tio n 's sense of p u rp o se — its loss of a w a y to defin e itself except b y m ilitary pow er. N o o th e r n a tio n al lea d er d efin ed th e p ro b lem so b ro ad ly .111 Yet u n w ittin g ly E isenhow er h a d also a g g ra v ate d th a t p ro b lem . By skillfully b a la n cin g conflicting n e e d s a n d b y k eep in g cold w a r from e ru p tin g in to h o t w ar, h e h a d m a d e th e p u rs u it of n a tio n al secu rity c o n g ru e n t w ith d o m in a n t a sp iratio n s for peace a n d pro sp erity . H is successors co u ld tu rn h is success a g ain st him : if p o w e r ab ro a d a n d p ro sp e rity at h o m e w ere com patible, h o w m u c h m o re co u ld b e — h a d to b e — achieved reg a rd in g b o th if g reater efforts w ere m ad e? T he K en n ed y a d m in istra tio n w a s ju st as k een to b alan ce "th e d e ­ fense effort a g ain st th e o th er d e m a n d s of th e econom y," w ro te Schlesinger in 1965, b u t like m a n y liberals w h o saw n atio n al resources as expansive, "it b e lie v e d — correctly— th a t the b alance c o u ld be achieved a t a m u c h h ig h e r lev el."112 Ike's m essage a b o u t lim ited resources a n d b alan cin g goals ("balance" a p p e a re d sev en tim es in one sentence of his farew ell) w a s u n d e rc u t b y h is o w n success in ju g g lin g peace, pro sp erity , a n d po w er. N o t su rp risin g ly , e v en as E ise n h o w e r's farew ell g o t a ro u sin g reception, its m essage o ften g o t lost. L iberals d ism isse d it as b elated , ig n o rin g its consistency w ith a d e c a d e 's w a rn in g s b y him . "For e ig h t y ears, M r. E isen h o w er h a s d e ­ p re sse d h is fellow A m ericans b y a seem ing inab ility to g ra sp th e m ajor p ro b ­ lem s of h is era," according to th e Nation, b u t n o w "h e sp o k e like th e sta te sm an a n d d em ocratic lea d er w e h a d so lo n g h u n g e re d for h im to becom e." T. R. B. in th e New Republic th o u g h t it "a stra n g e final w arn in g . . . . W e c o u ld n 't h av e a g re ed m ore a n d y e t (com ically en o u g h ) a m a n 's a g reem en t rarely irrita te d u s so m u ch. H e h a d e ig h t y ears to give this w a rn in g ; w h y w a it till a m in u te before m id n ig h t?" E n tran ced b y JFK's p ro m ise of activism , liberals ig n o red th e g e n ­ e ra l's m essag e b y b e littlin g th e m essenger. The K en n ed y m en ask ed n e ith er E isen h o w er n o r th em selv es a n y q u estio n s a b o u t it— it g ave th em n o m essage a t all. Five y ears later, Schlesinger still expressed th eir sn eerin g attitu d e: "A fter e ig h t y ears in the W hite H ouse, e v en E isenh o w er cam e to feel th a t so m eth in g w a s w ro n g a n d issu ed h is u n e x p ec te d w a rn in g ": even E isenhow er, as if h e w ere th e last p e rs o n to h av e su c h fears. B esides, Schlesinger a d d e d , "th e m ilitaryin d u stria l com plex w a s m o re a consequence th a n a cause of th e p ro b lem ," w h ic h "lay in the feebleness of civilian control of th e m ilitary e stab lish m en t"— a n o u td a te d co n cep tio n of the p ro b lem , as Ike h a d ju st p o in te d o u t in his fare­ w ell. For its p a rt, th e G O P 's rig h t w in g , th o u g h fearin g b ig g o v ern m en t, d id n o t

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sh are Ike's alarm a b o u t the b lo ated a p p a ra tu s of n atio n al defense. H e n e v er h a d m an y allies in his cam p aig n a g ain st th e g a rriso n state. H e left office w ith a p p la u se b u t ev en few er allies.113 Still h u sb a n d in g h is p e rso n al resources, h e m a d e little effort later to su sta in th e m essage of his farew ell. E ven a t h is final p ress conference, h e h a d id en tified "th e g reatest p ro b lem " facing K ennedy as "th e in tran sig en t, u n reaso n ab le a tti­ tu d e of the C o m m u n ist bloc . . . .— this terrib le p ro b lem th a t is n o n e of o u r m ak in g ." T he th em es of his farew ell d id a p p e a r in h is m em oirs, b u t b la n d ly expressed. P erh ap s h is diffidence m a d e little difference, since h e so o n "becam e a c u ltu ral an ach ro n ism ," h is p o p u la rity e n o rm o u s b u t h is v a lu e s seem in g ly "q u ain t, curious, o r— th e u ltim ate p u t-d o w n of th e d e c a d e — irrelev an t." H is fam o u s p h rase, th e "m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex," w a s later recovered b y th e a n tiw a r m o v em en t, b u t largely because it w a s con v en ien t, n o t b ecau se it seem ed to c ap tu re a co n sisten t stance o n Ik e's p a rt, o n e so o n h a rd to see an y ­ w a y g iv en h is public calls for escalating th e A m erican w a r in V ietn am a n d h is scorn for "k o o k s" a n d " h ip p ie s." 114 Ig n o rin g the E isenhow er of th e farew ell a d d re ss, K en n ed y 's in a u g u ra l a d ­ d ress in stea d echoed Ike's in a u g u ra l e ig h t y ears earlier. K en n ed y d e a lt solely w ith w a r a n d foreign policy, ig n o rin g "d o m estic" issu es like race relations. (C o m pared to "foreign affairs," h e allegedly to ld N ix o n a few m o n th s later, "w h o gives a sh it if th e m in im u m w ag e is $1.15 o r $1.25 . . . ?") M ore eleg an tly th a n E isenhow er, K en n ed y b alan ced conflicting im p u lses ("Let u s n e v e r n eg o ­ tiate o u t of fear. But let u s n e v e r fear to negotiate.") N o m o re e leg an tly th a n Ike, h e referred to " th a t u n c ertain b alance of te rro r th a t stay s th e h a n d of m a n k in d 's final w ar." If a n y th in g , K en n ed y o u tb id h is p re d e c e sso r's in a u g u ra l in calling for n a tio n al sacrifice, u rg in g A m ericans to " p a y a n y price, b e a r a n y b u rd e n , m eet a n y h a rd sh ip , su p p o rt a n y friend, o p p o se a n y foe to assu re th e su rv iv al a n d th e success of liberty." A n d b y p ro claim in g a n " h o u r of m ax im u m d a n g er," h e sig n aled a crisis m en tality th a t E isenhow er alw ay s rep u d ia te d . "C rises th ere w ill co n tin u e to be," Ike a d m itte d in his farew ell a d d re ss, b u t h e a d m o n ish e d a g ain st "a rec u rrin g te m p ta tio n to feel th a t som e sp ectacu lar o r costly actio n co u ld becom e the m iracu lo u s so lu tio n to all c u rre n t difficulties." N o one co u ld p red ic t the "y ear of m ax im u m d a n g er," m u c h less th e h o u r, Ike h a d in sisted in 1953, for "w e 're n o t in a m o m e n t of d an g er, w e 're in a n age of d a n g er." In p u b ­ lic at least, K ennedy a rg u e d th a t th e m o m e n t h a d a rriv e d .115

s TH E CR ISIS OF M ILITA R IZA TIO N , 1961-1966

“Impressive t o Mankind“ "I h av e b e en g u id e d b y the sta n d a rd John W in th ro p s e t . . . 331 years ago," John K ennedy explained before h is in au g u ratio n : " 'W e shall be a city u p o n a h ill— the eyes of all p eo p le are u p o n u s / " F am ous for to u g h rhetoric, JFK g ain ed less notice w h e n h e in to n ed fam iliar ideals, but, as I. F. Stone realized, he "seem s to be a ra th e r cautious p e rh a p s even conventio n al m a n ." 1 W in th ro p 's w o rd s h a d lo n g b e en u se d to justify (and som etim es to contest) th e ex p an sio n of A m erican p o w er. K ennedy w a s a n n o u n cin g th a t h e w o u ld co n tin u e th a t trad itio n . In d o ­ in g so, h e also b ro a d e n e d the scope of A m erica's m ilitarizatio n a n d th e fissures it w as p ro d u cin g . H e d id so in his o w n w ay, how ever, one th a t o ften m ask ed th e n a tu re a n d consequences of early-1960s m ilitarization. M ore th a n his pred ecesso rs, JFK lin k ed the h a rd im p erativ es of m ilitarizatio n to th e in tan g ib le n e ed s of im a g e — his, his a d m in istratio n 's, his n a tio n 's— calculating n o t on ly th e raw p o w e r ac­ cru ed th ro u g h rockets, satellites, or G reen Berets b u t th eir im age in "th e eyes of all p eo p le." H e h a rd ly in v en ted the concern for im age: b o th th e lessons of a p ­ p e ase m en t a n d the calculations of n u c le ar d eterren ce p riz e d th e ap p ea ra n c e of p o w e r as m u ch as the reality. But h e carried th a t concern literally a n d figu­ rativ ely to n e w heights. H is policy o n space ex p lo ratio n revealed these tendencies. M any scholars say little a b o u t th a t policy, as if it w ere a superficial asp ect of his presidency, o r o n e th a t o w ed m ore to L yndon Johnson, w h o seized o n it after S p u tn ik a n d a d ­ v an ced it as Vice P resid en t a n d P resident. K ennedy e n tered th e W hite H o u se carin g a n d k n o w in g little a b o u t space policy, b u t p erso n al in v estm en t p o o rly m easu res the im p o rtan ce of p resid en tial action (o th erw ise h isto rian s w o u ld say little ab o u t JFK's civil rights record). M easu red by m ed ia atten tio n , fiscal

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scale, role in w o rld conflict, a n d place in m ilitarizatio n , h is space policy w a s vital. It w a s b o m in p a rt of h u m iliatio n a n d d e sp era tio n . K en n ed y p ro ce ed e d cau ­ tio u sly at first, in p a rt because m a n y scientists, in a rg u m e n ts th e y re p e a te d th ro u g h o u t the decade, o p p o se d a crash p ro g ra m to p u t A m erican s in space o r o n th e m oon, lest it d is ru p t m ilitary, com m ercial, a n d scientific initiatives. W h en H a m b ecam e the first A m erican "astro c h im p " in F eb ru ary 1961, Life p ro ­ claim ed h im a "real h e ro " — a su re if silly sig n th a t S p u tn ik -era p an ic co n tin u ed am o n g som e A m ericans.2 K en n ed y d id n o t y e t feel it. By A pril, h e d id . W h en a Soviet rocket lifted Y uri G ag arin in to space, it seem ed like S p u tn ik all ov er again, as politician s a n d p u n d its b e w a ile d th e n e w evid en ce of Soviet su p e rio rity in rocketry, p restig e, a n d sh eer gall. A t th e sam e tim e, Soviet-A m erican ten sio n ov er B erlin a n d S o u th east A sia w a s increasing. T hen th e A p ril 15 lan d in g of C u b a n exiles a t th e Bay in Pigs in C u b a, w h e re Fidel C astro w as tig h te n in g h is m ie a n d c o u rtin g Soviet su p p o rt, e n d e d d isa s­ tro u sly a n d exposed its A m erican sp o n so rsh ip . K en n ed y h a d fulfilled h is p ro m ise to replace Ike's cau tio n w ith activism b u t h a d w o rse th a n n o th in g to sh o w for it. "Is th ere a n y place w e can catch th em ?" K en n ed y a sk ed h is a d v iso rs o n A p ril 14, w ith a Life re p o rte r p re se n t to convey his w o rd s to th e n atio n . T he q u e stio n referred n o m in a lly to the arena of sp ace— "W h a t can w e do? C a n w e go a ro u n d th e m o o n before them ? C a n w e p u t a m a n o n th e m o o n before th e m ? " — b u t im plicitly to the w h o le aren a of Soviet-A m erican co m p etitio n . "If so m eb o d y can ju st tell m e h o w to catch up. . . . T here's n o th in g m o re im p o rta n t." K en­ n e d y d efin ed im p o rtan ce above all in term s of th e n a tio n 's im ag e a n d a global "b attle for m in d s a n d souls as w ell as lives a n d territo ries," as h e to ld C o n g ress o n M ay 25, w h e n h e called for a n A m erican m o o n la n d in g a m o n g a b a tte ry of p ro g ram s to m eet "u rg e n t n a tio n al n e ed s." "N o single project in th is p e rio d w ill be m ore im p ressiv e to m a n k in d ," h e a n n o u n ce d , "o r m o re im p o rta n t for th e lon g-range ex p lo ratio n of space," a n d "so difficult o r ex p en siv e to accom ­ p lish ." "D ifficult" d e e d s projected a n im age to th e w o rld , for th e "v ery risk e n ­ hances o u r sta tu re w h e n w e are successful." "W e choose to go to th e m o o n in this decade, a n d d o the o th er th in g s," h e a d d e d in 1962, " n o t b ecau se th ey are easy, b u t because th ey are h a rd ." 3 A nxiety a b o u t im age d ro v e K en n ed y 's decisio n to "g o to th e m o o n ," b u t this w as "th a t m o st vexing of historical p ro b lem s, th e 'o v e rd e te rm in e d ev en t,' " since so m an y forces cam e into p la y a n d so little resistance em erg ed . T here w a s th e challenge of K h ru sh ch ev 's space spectacu lars (alth o u g h as Ik e's N A SA d i­ rector h a d sp ecu lated to K hrushchev in January, th e Soviet lea d er m ig h t con­ tin u e "u n til h e h a d the U.S. c o m m itted to a costly p ro g ra m " a n d th e n "w ith ­ d ra w from the 'ra c e '" ).4 In th a t reg ard , K en n ed y 's sense of w h a t w a s "im p ressive to m a n k in d " w a s keen, for h is space p ro g ra m did c a p tu re a tten tio n (carefully cultivated) ab ro ad a n d a sense of d a rin g a n d a d v e n tu re am o n g m an y

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A m erican s (if m ore o ften m e n th a n w om en), a n d d id so th ro u g h o u t th e 1960s, e v e n as th e im age of the n a tio n a b ro a d a n d of lead ers a t h o m e su ffered in m an y o th e r w ays. K en n ed y 's o w n b a c k g ro u n d a n d te m p e ra m e n t w ere also im p o rtan t. H e w a s in clin ed to p e rso n al a n d geopolitical risk tak in g , p e rh a p s to d e fy h is p h y sical frailty, a n d certain ly to g ain the heroic cred en tials th a t Ike enjoyed. A n d h e e m ­ b rac ed th e p u rp o rte d lessons of W orld W ar II a b o u t th e d a n g e rs of n a tio n al flaccidity a n d th e v irtu e s of b ig science. ' M a n y of his key a d v iso rs h a d sim ilar b a ck g ro u n d s a n d outlooks. T hey b e ­ liev ed in "a far g rea ter role for g o v e rn m e n t in p la n n in g a n d executing social ch an g e," b u t less to solve th e p ro b lem s th a t v ex ed social-w elfare liberals.5 T hey w e re in ste a d technocratic liberals c a p tiv a te d b y p ro b lem s of n a tio n al security, a lth o u g h th e y also h o p e d th a t social, econom ic, a n d technological ben efits w o u ld flow fro m the n a tio n 's m obilization, as th e y b eliev ed h a d o ccu rred o v er th e p re v io u s tw o decades. T hey saw th em selv es as to u g h p ra g m a tists— th e id eo lo g u es w ere w o o lly -h ead ed rig h t-w in g e rs o r starry -ey ed leftists. A n d in space a n d d efense p ro g ram s, th ey h a d a w a y to m obilize th e activist sta te th a t few co n serv ativ es co u ld challenge. T h u s, u n lik e efforts to tackle racism o r po v erty , th ese p ro g ra m s m et th e test of secu rin g consensus. T hey also m a rk e d a n a tte m p t to sh o re it u p , h o w ev er, in th e face of a n erosion alre ad y e v id e n t b y th e e n d of th e 1950s. A g ra n d in itiativ e in space allo w ed K ennedy, elected b y a raz o r-th in m arg in , to rise ab o v e th e sim ­ m e rin g divisions. A s such, h is space p ro g ra m cam e to in d icate th e b a n k ru p tc y of liberalism , critics th o u g h t— its preference for g im m icks a n d global m uscle flexing o v e r efforts to foster e q u ality a n d p ro sp e rity a t ho m e. Since m a n y lib­ erals m a d e th a t criticism , h o w ev er, it m a rk e d th e ir d iv isio n s as m u c h as th eir b an k ru p tcy . N o r d id o n ly liberals criticize. T rue to h is earlier v iew s, a n d h a v in g th e gall to se n d th e m to a n astro n au t, E isen h o w er w ro te F rank B orm an th a t K en n ed y "d rastically revised a n d e x p a n d e d " th e m o o n effort "ju st after th e Bay of Pigs fiasco" a n d "gave th e h ig h e st p rio rity — u n fo rtu n a te in m y o p in io n — to a race, in o th er w o rd s, a s tu n t." 6 In m a n y w ay s, th e g ia n t A pollo p ro g ra m h a rd ly seem ed a m ilitarized affair. It w a s e n tru ste d to N A SA , a civilian agency; its g o al of m e n o n th e m o o n h eld n o likely m ilita ry payoff; its task of p ro d u c in g a few sp ectacu lar feats m esh ed p o o rly w ith th e m ilita ry 's in terest in v o lu m e p ro d u c tio n of satellites a n d o th e r space vehicles (m any officers d islik ed A pollo). A n d m u c h of its a p p e a l lay p re ­ cisely in its capacity to lift Soviet-A m erican conflict o u t of th e m ilitary sp h ere in to p eaceful com p etition, w ith a stro n au ts fig h tin g a sym bolic b attle, a n alter­ n ativ e to n u c le ar w ar. In th e "single com bat" of space, "th e m ig h tiest so ld ier of one a rm y w o u ld fig h t th e m ig h tiest so ld ier of th e o th e r a rm y as a su b stitu te for a p itc h e d b a ttle b e tw e e n th e en tire forces."7 From a n o th e r p ersp ectiv e, h ow ever, K en n ed y 's space p ro g ra m ex p ressed a su b tle m ilita riza tio n th a t E isenhow er h a d resisted. N A SA fo u n d its org an iza-

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tio n al m o d el a n d in sp iratio n in th e w a rtim e M a n h a tta n Project. It "rec ru ite d p e o p le as if it w ere b u ild in g a n a rm y for a w a r." 8 It d re w h e av ily o n th e a rm e d forces' w o rk in rocketry a n d space technology. It d e v e lo p e d tech n o lo g ies vital to th e m ilitary b u t off th eir b u d g e t. A s D efense Secretary R obert M cN am ara knew , it e x p a n d e d a n aerospace in d u stry essen tial to th e a rm e d forces a n d in ­ flu en tial in its o w n right. A n d its a stro n au ts w ere m ilita ry m en , a facet of th eir b a ck g ro u n d celebrated in th e 1960s. O n ly N A SA 's carefully crafted im age b elied its m ilita rize d n atu re: in o rd e r "to d ifferentiate U.S. efforts in space fro m th o se of th e Soviets," th e space p ro ­ g ra m h a d to " p o rtra y A m erican u se of techn o lo g y as b en ig n , eleg an t, b e y o n d th e e a rth b o u n d concerns of m ilitary a n d d ip lo m atic strateg y ," a n d "project a n im ag e d irectly co n tra d ic tin g its o rigins." A s "th e g rea test o p e n -e n d e d p eace­ tim e co m m itm en t b y C ongress in h isto ry " (a $20 b illio n p ro g ra m in 1961 esti­ m ates), the m a n n e d space p ro g ra m d w a rfe d a n y o th e r n o n d e fe n se p ro g ra m of K en n ed y 's liberal state, sh o w in g ag ain h o w h a rd it w a s to ju stify sta te activism ex cep t th ro u g h " w a r o r its su rro g a te ."9 B lurring fu rth e r a n y d istin c tio n b e ­ tw e e n "m ilita ry " a n d "civilian" sp h e res of action, it co n v ey ed th e m essag e th a t th e global stru g g le m ore th a n ev er em b raced b o th , a n d th u s raised th e v e ry anxieties it so u g h t to steer in to safer channels. Finally, it p ro v id e d a sh ield for th e n a tio n 's b ig g est peacetim e m ilitary b u ild u p to d ate. T h at b u ild u p h a rd ly w e n t u n n o ticed , b u t th e m e d ia 's gaze ra n u p in to space, a n d JFK's a d m in istra ­ tio n p re se n te d itself th ro u g h the space p ro g ra m as v isio n ary in its d e e p e st a sp i­ ratio n s, im p ly in g th a t o n ly its p re d e c e sso r's failure a n d its e n e m y 's ru th le ss­ n ess forced its relu ctan t q u e st for m ore b o m b s a n d rockets. A t levels largely b e y o n d th e conscious g ra sp of p o licy m ak ers, th e space p ro ­ g ram also e x u d e d v alu es of race, class, a n d g e n d e r so o n c h allen g ed b y m a n y A m ericans. The a stro n au ts (like th e n o n fly in g e x p erts a n d officials in v olved) w ere strik in g ly w h ite, m ale, a n d m iddle-class in id en tity a n d v alu es, w ith th eir w ives cast (in w a y s som etim es em b a rrassin g to them ) as self-sacrificing w o m e n w h o te n d e d to h o m e, in d e e d to th e h o m efro n t. T he a stro n a u ts' m a ­ chism o as m ilitary pilots a n d racecar d riv e rs w a s tem p ere d , in line w ith c u rre n t v alu es, b y m en tio n of th eir roles as fath ers a n d co m p an io n s (Life sh o w e d John G len n w e arin g his w ife's a p ro n a n d flip p in g b u rg ers).10 But little in th e lav ish a tten tio n g iven th em su g g e ste d a n eg alitarian sense of w h o m ig h t serv e th e n a ­ tio n in peril. O th e r d efense p ro g ram s like co n scrip tio n pro jected a m o re in clu ­ sive sense of service. The space p ro g ram , like o th er technological efforts, d id not. T he m ean in g s a n d im ages ascribed to th e space p ro g ra m also ex acerb ated th e difficulties A m ericans h a d in g rasp in g th e elu siv e n a tu re of w ar. D id th e space p ro g ra m d ev elo p m ilitary technology? P erh ap s, b u t it also ta p p e d fan ta ­ sies of co n su m er a b u n d an ce, ju st as th e auto in d u stry m im ick ed its ap p eals: "A [space] cap su le is b it like a n autom obile," o b serv ed a stro n a u t A lan S h ep ard , w h o "so rt of w a n te d to kick the tires" w h e n h e saw th e R edstone ro ck et b e in g

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rea d ied for h is flight.11 W as the space race a S oviet-A m erican w ar? Yes, b u t th e co m b at w a s sym bolic a n d th e battlefield far from A m erican soil. M ig h t w a r com e to th a t soil? A t n o o th er tim e in the C old W ar d id A m erican s w o rry m o re a b o u t th a t possibility, yet p e rh a p s n e v e r w a s it so difficult to co m p reh en d .

Militarization at High Tide T he n e w a d m in istra tio n so u g h t to b rea k from E isen h o w er's a p p a re n t all-orn o th in g strategy: "W e in te n d to h av e a w id e r choice," K en n ed y a n n o u n c e d in Ju ly 1961, " th a n h u m iliatio n o r all-out n u c le ar action." A ccordingly, h e p ro ­ m o te d th e a rm y 's G reen Berets, backed n e w p ro g ra m s of civil d efen se ag ain st n u c le ar attack, a n d rev ersed E isen h o w er's cuts in c o n v en tio n al forces. Billions also w e n t in to strategic forces (m issiles, n o t th e b o m b ers co v eted b y flying g en ­ erals): b y 1967, 1000 ICBM s c o m p a red to 200 in h e rite d fro m E isenhow er, 41 m issile-carrying Polaris su b m arin es, a n d 32,500 n u c le ar w a rh e a d s (the all-tim e h ig h for them ). It w a s tru e th at, m ore th a n th ey a d m itte d , th e n e w lead ers " sh a re d a w o rld v iew sim ilar to th e one th ey rid icu led . T he N e w F ro n tiersm en w ere only connecting th e d o ts Ike left th em ." C o n n ectin g th e d o ts w a s ex p en ­ sive, how ever: d efense o utlays stay ed stable as a sh are of G N P (ab o u t 9 percent) b ecau se of ra p id econom ic g ro w th b u t increased 13 p e rc en t u n d e r JFK, a n d far m o re once A m erican forces p lu n g e d into th e V ietn am W ar a n d n e w w e a p o n s b ecam e fully fu n d ed . By m a n y m easu res, th e 1960s m ark e d th e ap o g ee of A m erica's post-1945 m ilita riza tio n .12 A s D em ocrats saw it, the ap o g ee cam e th e n b ecau se th ey faced g reater p eril at h o m e a n d ab ro a d th a n E isenhow er h a d co n fro n ted , or at least a d m itte d . T hey w o rrie d a b o u t th e th in n e ss of K en n ed y 's election victory, th e b e atin g T ru­ m a n h a d tak e n for alleged w eak n ess a g ain st co m m u n ism , th eir p ro m ises to re­ place R epublican w eak n ess w ith D em ocratic vigor, th e sp re a d of global stru g g le to n e w aren as like space a n d the T h ird W orld, a n d th e d a n g e r th a t So­ v iet lead ers w o u ld b e e m b o ld en e d b y g ain in g n u c le ar p a rity w ith th e W est. Yet those d a n g e rs d id n o t account for A m erica's co u rse in th e 1960s, for it p e rsiste d d e sp ite co u n terv ailin g c o n sid eratio n s a n d ch an g in g circum stances. For all h is b lu ster, K hrushchev a p p e a re d less ty ran n ical a n d rig id , th o u g h m o re resourceful, th a n Stalin. The "m issile g ap " o n w h ic h K en n ed y h a d cam p aig n ed w a s qu ickly d eclared a n illusion b y D efense Secretary M cN am ara, a n d a stable b alan ce of terro r w a s n o w foreseeable. Soviet su p e rio rity in space a n d tech n o l­ ogy w a s q u estio n ab le e v en in 1961, m ore so b y m id -d ecad e. D eep fissures e m e rg ed in the c o m m u n ist bloc, above all b e tw ee n Beijing a n d M oscow , w h ile th e econom ic, political, a n d m ilitary vitality of A m erica's E u ro p ea n allies o u t­ s trip p e d th e fo n d est h o p e s W estern lead ers earlier h ad . C o m m u n ist ad v an ces in th e T hird W orld w ere lim ited: S outheast A sia w as a m ess b y W ash in g to n 's sta n d a rd s, b u t h a d b een for fifteen years; few p o p u lo u s o r resource-rich c o u n ­ tries w ere a b o u t to "fall" to com m unism ; only C u b a w as a clear-cut (an d h u m il-

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iating) co m m u n ist victory. A t ho m e, JFK's m arg in of v icto ry h a d b e e n tiny, b u t LBJ's in 1964 w a s th u n d ero u s. The w o rst M cC arthy-era excesses h a d p a sse d , m ilitarizatio n received ren e w e d criticism , a n d d o m estic p rio rities g ain ed s u p ­ po rt. In th e face of these changes, the K ennedy a n d Jo h n so n a d m in istra tio n s g e n ­ erally stay ed o n the sam e course. A rg u m en ts a b o u t th e c o m m u n ist m enace w ere sim p ly retailo red to fit co n d itio n s of th e m om en t: M oscow w a s seen as m en acing w h e th e r h a v in g fallen b e h in d , cau g h t u p , o r g o tte n ah ead , w h ile th e sp lit b e tw ee n it a n d Beijing w a s re g a rd e d as sh a rp e n in g th e co m p etitio n b e ­ tw e en th em to act aggressively. In th e en d , e n em y th re a ts scarcely sh a p e d p o l­ icy u n d e r K ennedy a n d Johnson, w h o m o st feared " n o t co m m u n ism , w h ic h w a s to o frag m en ted , o r th e Soviet U nion, w h ic h w a s too co m m itted to d eten te, o r ev en C hina, w h ic h w a s too im p o te n t, b u t ra th e r th e th re a t of e m b a rrass­ m en t, of h u m iliatio n , of a p p e a rin g to b e w e a k ." 13 B eyond th a t threat, the K ennedy a d m in istra tio n 's v iew of alleg ed extrem ists a t h o m e also lu red it o n to a m ilitarized course. It saw its p ra g m a tic policy chal­ len g ed b y radicals o n the far rig h t a n d far left w h o v iew ed n a tio n al secu rity in apocalyptic term s. L iberals w o rrie d m o st— w ro n g ly , it tu rn e d o u t— a b o u t a re­ su rg e n t "rad ical rig h t." A n aly zin g the John Birch Society a n d m ilita ry officers "d isp o ssesse d " b y the rise of civilian expertise, sociologist D aniel Bell th o u g h t th a t p e rh a p s o n ly "rig h t-w in g R epublicans h av e a n id eo lo g y " in 1960s A m er­ ica. B eing "ill-eq u ip p e d to g rasp m o d e m con cep tio n s of politics," th ey fo u g h t " 'm o d e rn ity ,' " th a t is, "th e belief in ratio n al assessm en t, ra th e r th a n e stab ­ lish ed cu sto m ." P rone to "p a ra n o id view s," rig h t-w in g e rs saw g ra n d co n sp ir­ acies d e n y in g victo ry to A m erica a n d ig n o red th e C old W a r's realities in th eir belief th a t "a p rev e n tiv e w a r o r a first strik e" co u ld d e fe at co m m u n ism . H o lly ­ w o o d so o n p o p u la riz e d these liberals' p ercep tio n s of th e far R ight in th ree 1964 d o o m sd a y film s (one a id e d b y the JFK W hite H o u se) a b o u t c razed o r p o w erh u n g ry m ilitary officers w h o schem e to b lo w u p th e w o rld (Fail-Safe a n d Doctor Strangelove) o r o v e rth ro w th e g o v e rn m e n t (Seven Days in May). Jo h n S to rm e r's rig h t-w in g tract None Dare Call It Treason (1964) co n firm ed Bell's analysis. D eem p h asizin g m ilitary po w er. S tornier in stea d saw th e n a tio n 's m o ral a n d ideological p u rity as decisive, in d e e d all it w o u ld tak e to w in , b u t so u n d e r­ m in ed b y n aiv e or su b v ersiv e liberals th a t p e rh a p s it w a s a lre ad y "to o late" in "th e c o m m u n ist tim etable for w o rld d o m in a tio n " to sto p it.14 C en trists p a id less a tte n tio n to th e Left in th e e arly 1960s, in p a rt b ecau se it w as sm aller a n d less co n sp icu o u s th a n the far R ight, b u t it to o h a d a n a p o ca ly p ­ tic outlook. A ccording to th e y o u n g radicals w h o p e n n e d th e P o rt H u ro n State­ m e n t in 1962, "th e B om b" m a d e th em aw are th a t th ey "m ig h t d ie a t an y tim e" a n d "m ay b e the last g e n eratio n in th e e x p erim e n t w ith liv in g ." For th em , too, th e en em y w a s largely internal, in d ee d m u c h th e sam e liberal e stab lish m en t excoriated b y S to rm er— g u ilty n o t of selling o u t to co m m u n ism b u t of p ro m o t­ ing "th e g en eral m ilitarizatio n of A m erican society," in p a rt to p ro m o te a frau d -

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u le n t p ro sp erity . A sim ilar a p p re h e n sio n of im m in en t p e ril w a s risin g a m o n g a n tin u c le a r a n d en v iro n m en ta l activists.15 C e n trists accurately saw apocalyptic strain s am o n g th e ir ideological en e­ m ies b u t failed to see th em am o n g th e ir o w n k in d . Bell's a ssu m p tio n th a t cen tr­ ists p riz e d "ratio n al assessm en t" o v er "estab lish ed cu sto m " w a s po lem ically u sefu l b u t deceptive. K ennedy id en tified the early 1960s as "th e h o u r of m axi­ m u m d a n g e r /' w h ile Johnson a rg u e d in 1961 th a t "w e m u s t d ecid e w h e th e r to h e lp th ese c o u n tries" in S outheast A sia "oisth ro w in th e to w el in th e area a n d p u ll b ack o u r d efenses to San Francisco." Politicians offered su c h rhetoric n o t o n ly in public, to m obilize su p p o rt, b u t in th eir secret d elib eratio n s. In 1961, "K en n ed y officials a n d A m erican strategic intellectu als w ere p u b licly sk etch ­ in g scenarios in w h ic h th e U n ited States w o u ld strik e first," n o tes S tep h en A m ­ brose; JFK a n d LBJ p riv a te ly w e ig h ed p la n s to destroy, p e rh a p s in con cert w ith M oscow , the em bryonic n u c le ar force of C o m m u n ist C h in a, w h o se lead ers w ere p re s u m e d n o t to fear n u c le ar w a r o r v a lu e h u m a n life. S uch schem es sh o w e d a n apocalyptic o u tlo o k a t the h ig h est level. C e n trists also w ere a la rm ist a b o u t enem ies w ith in . The far R ight m ig h t "q u ick ly w e a r itself o u t," Bell sen sed , b u t if th e "in te rn atio n al situ atio n " w o rsen e d , it m ig h t "b eg in to rally s u p p o rt a ro u n d a d riv e for 'im m e d ia te action,' for a d e clara tio n of w a r in th ese areas, for a p re-e m p tiv e strik e." G ro u p s like th e B irchers w ere, after all, "w ill­ in g to te a r a p a rt th e fabric of A m erican society," ju st as w a r-m a d g en erals w ere w illin g to te a r a p a rt w o rld society.16 W ith th a t th re a t in m in d , th e K en n ed y a d m in istra tio n a sse rte d "civilian" co n tro l ov er th e u n ifo rm e d a rm e d forces— to th e fu ry of m a n y officers— th ro u g h the n e w m an a g erial tech n iq u es of D efense Secretary M cN am ara. M u ch like T ru m a n a n d his a d v iso rs (som e of w h o m serv ed K en n ed y as w ell), h o w ev er, th e K enn edy team th o u g h t th a t su b d u in g th e officers su b d u e d m il­ ita riz a tio n itself, m ak in g th eir a p p ro a c h to n a tio n al secu rity ratio n al, safe, a n d effective. "U n d e r these circum stances," one c o n te m p o ra ry n o te d , "th e task of th e n e w a d m in istra tio n becam e the parad o x ical o n e of try in g to cu rb th e v e ry p o w e r w h o se g ro w th it w a s fostering. " 17 T heir a p p ro ach , th e y h o p e d , m ig h t g ain th e C old W ar v icto ry th a t h a d e lu d e d E isenhow er. T h at a sp iratio n above all d ro v e m ilita riza tio n fo rw ard . A w aren ess th a t som e in te rn atio n al circum stances stre n g th e n e d th e A m erican h a n d in sp ired th eir h o p e s to deescalate th e C old W ar b u t also th eir am b itio n s to w in it— o r a d u a l track seeking b o th goals. T rue, m o st D em o crats re g a rd e d talk of v icto ry as th e p ro v in ce of c razed generals a n d reactio n ary zealots, b u t in d is­ d a in in g su c h talk th ey d id n o t reject th e goal. Seeing a global c o n test of w ill a n d p restig e, releg atin g com bat to a lim ited if critical role in T h ird W orld contests, p ro u d of k eep in g th e ir generals o n a sh o rt leash, th ey saw triu m p h e n su in g n o t from th e b a rre l of a g u n o r th e b elly of a b o m b er b u t from th e d isp la y of su p e ­ rio r A m erican n e rv e a n d resolve. T h at o u tlo o k m ig h t en tail th e v e ry b rin k m a n sh ip D em o crats h a d ex co riated

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w h e n D ulles em p lo y ed it; b u t their b rin k m a n sh ip , th ey a ssu m e d , w o u ld b e ra ­ tionally exercised a n d c o u n terb alan ced b y d ip lo m atic flexibility, d isp lay s of A m erican vitality in space a n d technology, a n d a id to stru g g lin g natio n s. N o r d id th ey d o u b t th a t the n a tio n h a d th e resources to p u rs u e victory. K eynesians w h o scorned E isen h o w er's p e n n y -p in ch in g , th ey fo resaw (correctly, in th e sh o rt ru n ) increased d efense sp e n d in g as trig g e rin g a n econom ic ex p an sio n , w h ich w o u ld in tu rn fu n d m ore am b itio u s fed eral in itiativ es a t h o m e a n d abroad. T heirs w o u ld b e a victory n o t of apocaly p tic n u c le ar fu ry o r th e e n ­ em y 's form al su rre n d e r b u t of a ch an g ed co rrelatio n of forces th a t w o u ld im ­ p ress w a v erin g n a tio n s a n d place the m o m e n tu m of v icto ry o n th eir side. The h o p e for victory w a s im plicit in K en n ed y 's lan g u a g e a n d m etap h o rs, w h ich reflected h is belief th a t the "lo n g tw ilig h t stru g g le" w a s n e a rin g its en d . H e w a s "convinced ," h e said after th e Bay of Pigs, " th a t h isto ry w ill reco rd th e fact th a t this b itte r stru g g le reached its clim ax in th e late 1950s a n d th e early 1960s," th o u g h it m ig h t e n d "w ith o u t th e firing of a single m issile o r th e cross­ in g of a single b o rd er," since th e losers w o u ld be "th e self-in d u lg en t, th e soft societies," w h e th e r o r n o t th ey h a d the b ig g er g u n s. T he logic of a "clim ax" to h isto ry w a s th a t it w o u ld y ield w in n e rs a n d losers. K e n n ed y d id elo q u e n tly allow for a different outcom e in w h ic h th e su p e rp o w e rs b o th w o u ld recognize th e folly of th eir conflict, a n d Johnson sk etch ed a sim ilar outcom e. Yet since A m erican lead ers re g a rd e d th e Soviet U n io n as th e m ajor cause of conflict in th e first place, ev en th a t outcom e w o u ld m eet th eir test of A m erican victory. In a n y event, it w a s a n ab stract v iew th a t K en n ed y d id n o t a p p ly to specific crises— those, h e felt, h a d to p ro d u c e a w in n er, after w h ic h fru itfu l n e g o tia ­ tio n s m ig h t ensue. H is freq u e n t W orld W ar E analo g ies (w h ich E isen h o w er h a d av o id ed) also in d icated h o w m u ch v icto ry w a s h is goal, a n d in d ic ate d as w ell his tim etable for victory: in 1958, his references w ere to "P earl H arb o r, " D u n ­ kirk ," "C alais," b attles a t the s ta rt of W orld W ar E th a t h a d g a lv a n iz ed th e a n ti­ fascist p o w ers. By 1961, in the m id st of the Berlin crisis, th ey w ere to "Basto g n e" a n d "S talin g rad ," b attles th a t h a d d ecid ed th e ou tco m e of W orld W ar 11.18 M ilitarization w a s a b ro a d historical process JFK in h erite d , b u t also one su s­ tain ed o n ly insofar as lea d ers gave it n e w life. K en n ed y w a s n o t its p rim e m over, b u t his p u rs u it of victo ry in th e C o ld W ar, a goal E isen h o w er all b u t rejected, accelerated its pace, as d id h is em p h asis o n in tan g ib le d efin itio n s of p o w e r— w ill, resolve, a n d th eir p e rc e p tio n — w h ic h offered few criteria for ju d g in g w h a t co n stitu ted sufficient pow er. A b o ld e r (or m ore d esp erate) Soviet lead ersh ip , fo cu sed like A m erican lead ers o n sym bols a n d prestige, p ro v id e d p rete x t for A m erica's fu rth e r m il­ itarization. First, Soviet lead ers p ro v o k e d a n o th e r crisis o v er Berlin. K h ru sh ch e v — assessing K ennedy as w e a k a n d n aiv e, fearin g K en n ed y 's d e ­ fense p ro g ram , or d etestin g the h u m iliatin g h e m o rrh a g e of E ast G erm an s into W est B erlin— d e m a n d e d th a t the W estern allies term in a te th eir rig h ts o f access

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to Berlin, w h ich h e th rea te n ed to tu rn ov er to th e C o m m u n ist E ast G e rm a n gov­ ern m en t. In sim ilar circum stances E isen h o w er h a d refu sed to allow K h ru sh ch ev o r the m ed ia to define a "crisis" a n d talk ed th e situ atio n th ro u g h to a n in conclusive end. K ennedy rejected su ch a cau tio u s co u rse a n d talk ed of crisis in d ire term s. H e w o rrie d , h e to ld o n e rep o rter, " th a t K h ru sh ch ev m ig h t in te rp re t h is reluctance to w a g e n u c le ar w a r as a sy m p to m of a n A m erican loss of nerv e. Som e day, h e said, the tim e m ig h t com e w h e n h e w o u ld h av e to ru n th e su p re m e risk to convince K h ru sh ch ev th a t conciliation d id n o t m ea n h u m il­ iation." H e a n d the Soviet P rem ier h a d a lre ad y tra d e d th in ly v eiled th rea ts of w a r a t th e ir su m m it conference in V ienna. N ow , K en n ed y m a y h av e c o n clu d ed , "th e U.S. could n o lo n g er afford to b e b o u n d b y th e tra d itio n a l po licy of ex clu d ­ in g a p ree m p tiv e first strike." H is p u b lic stance w as also to u g h . H e to o k to th e a irw av es in July to invoke th e d a n g e rs of a p p e a se m e n t a n d m em o ries of W orld W ar II, a n d to an n o u n ce a trip lin g of d ra ft calls, a call-up of 150,000 reservists, a n d a n e x p a n d e d civil d efense p ro g ra m w ith fu tu re m easu res "to let ev ery citi­ z e n k n o w w h a t step s h e can tak e w ith o u t d elay to p ro tec t h is fam ily in case of attack ." A b itte r tu rn of ev en ts o n A u g u st 13— c o m m u n ist a u th o rities b e g an erecting th e B erlin W all to sta u n c h the flow of refu g ees from th e e a st— e n d e d th e crisis, b u t JFK w e n t a h e a d w ith se n d in g 1,500 A m erican so ld iers d o w n th e au to b ah n , a p rovocative if "e m p ty g e stu re" (as N ix o n d e n o u n c e d it) th a t d id n o t in su late h im from criticism for b e in g w e ak in allo w in g th e w a ll to s ta n d .19 T he co n test ov er B erlin b ecam e th e p a ra d ig m a tic C o ld W ar crisis, p e rh a p s b rin g in g th e U n ited States a n d the Soviet U n io n as close to w a r as th e ir later, m o re celebrated collision ov er C uba. T hese crises w ere ju d g e d larg ely in term s of w h o "w o n " o r "lo st" th em a n d h o w th ey sh a p e d th e im m e d ia te ebb a n d flow of th e C old W ar. But lead ers a n d crises d isa p p e a r fast— K en n ed y a n d K h ru sh ch ev w ere gone in a few years, a n d B erlin n e v e r ag ain b ecam e su c h a h o t spot. A m ore im p o rta n t m ea n in g of these crises w a s th eir role in reinforcing A m erican s' sense of w a r 's elusiveness. T he B erlin crisis h a d created a su rre al atm o sp h e re in w h ic h w a r a p p e a re d b o th a g o n izin g ly p ro x im ate a n d p u z zlin g ly rem ote. T he stak es in v o lv ed seem ed a t once m o n u m e n ta l (G erm any, E urope, h u m an k in d ), in tan g ib le (the p restig e a n d credib ility of lea d ers a n d nations), a n d triv ial (w h e th e r E ast G er­ m an s o r R ussians w o u ld check credentials a t B erlin checkpoints). N o one co u ld d istin g u ish th e sh ad o w -b o x in g b y lead ers from th e ir w illin g n ess actu ally to p lu n g e into w ar. N o one seem ed to know , o r at least m ak e clear, w h a t a w a r o v er B erlin w o u ld b e like: certainly W orld W ar II w a s a n o u td a te d historical m o d el, e v en th o u g h K en n ed y som etim es offered it. A m ed ia b litz o n th e v irtu e s of fallout sh elters se n t c o n trad icto ry m essages. O n th e d u b io u s p rem ise of a n u c le ar w a r lim ited to "m ilita ry " targets. Life a ssu re d A m erican s th a t if ready, "y o u a n d y o u r fam ily co u ld h av e 97 chances o u t of 100 to su rv iv e ." ("W here d id Life get th a t 97 p ercen t?" w o n d e re d I. F. Stone. "W as it a c o p y w rite r's b rig h t flash? Ju st as Iv ory Soap is so ld as 99 p e rc en t p u re , is th erm o n u cle ar w a r to be

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so ld as 97 p e rc en t safe?") B ut Life also n o te d th a t in p o lls "40% of A m erican s still rate th eir su rv iv a l chances as 'p o o r ' in a n all-o u t n u c le ar attack ." T he g u lf w a s n o w h u g e b e tw e e n th e form al re p u d ia tio n b y lea d ers of w a r as a n in stru ­ m e n t of policy a n d th e reality of m ea su re s tak e n b y th e m th a t c o u ld lead to w ar. T he in san ity of w a r w a s n o w u n iv ersally p ro claim ed , y e t th e ab ility of n a tio n s to e n te r w a r seem ed g rea ter th a n ever.20 Because its possible outcom e w a s n o t o n ly a p p a llin g b u t im p o n d e rab le , th e B erlin crisis h e lp e d sp a w n a n e w ro u n d of d o o m sd a y fiction w h ic h m a d e th e u n im ag in ab le real a n d offered b leak reassuran ce. In Fail-Safe (book, 1962; film , 1964), A m ericans co u ld lea rn a b o u t system s for n u c le ar w a r in rem ark ab le d e ­ tail, see th eir failure u n le a sh a n u n a u th o riz e d A m erican attack o n M oscow , a n d w a tc h a steely P re sid e n t (H en ry F onda in th e m ovie) a v e rt glo b al h o lo ca u st b y n u k in g N e w York C ity in co m p e n sa tio n for M o sco w 's ob literatio n . In m a n y w ay s, Fail-Safe p ro v id e d a fuller sense of n u c le ar p erils th a n a n y th in g A m eri­ can lead ers offered. A t th e sam e tim e, it rea sserted th e m y sterio u s n a tu re of th o se p erils, sh o w in g lea d ers w h o " h a d lost all co n tact w ith reality, w e re free flo atin g in som e exotic w o rld of th e ir o w n ."21 T he C u b a n m issile crisis u n fo ld e d a g ain st th e apocaly p tic fears sto k e d b y th e B erlin crisis. O nce again, K h ru sh ch ev p ro m p te d co n fro n tatio n , a lth o u g h th e Bay of P igs in v asio n a n d su b se q u e n t A m erican efforts to assassin ate C astro a n d sab o tag e h is regim e gave th e c o m m u n ist lead ers reaso n to see th em selv es as th e e n d a n g e re d p arties. K h ru sh ch e v 's decisio n to in stall m e d iu m -ra n g e m is­ siles in C u b a w a s also a d e sp e ra te b id to d e liv er o n h is o w n b lu ste ry p ro m ises of n u c le ar p a rity w ith th e W est— h e d id n o t h av e it, a n d A m erican officials h a d recklessly b o a sted th a t h e d id n o t, b u t m issiles in C u b a m ig h t a t least g iv e th e ap p ea ra n c e of it. (K h ru sh ch ev 's ren ew al of n u c le ar tests in 1961— o n e a fiftyeig h t-m eg ato n m o n ster th o u sa n d s of tim es m o re d e stru ctiv e th a n th e H iro sh im a w e a p o n — p ro b ab ly se rv ed th e sam e p u rp o se.) By early O ctober 1962, K ennedy, realizing th a t th e m issile b u ild u p w a s u n ­ d erw ay , faced severe political p ressu re to tak e action, a n d in h is v iew p o ssib le im p each m en t if h e d id not. H e w e ig h ed m a n y o p tio n s, in clu d in g in v asio n of C u b a a n d a n u c le ar o r co n v en tio n al air strik e a g ain st th e m issiles, b u t first h e trie d a n aval b lockade of C u b a to force the m issiles' rem o v al, p u b licly w a rn in g th a t th e w o rld sto o d n e a r "th e abyss of d e stru ctio n ." S oviet-A m erican n e g o tia ­ tio n s en su ed , w ith A tto rn ey G eneral R obert K en n ed y w a rn in g th e Soviet a m ­ b a ssa d o r o n O ctober 27 th a t u n less th e m issiles w ere rem o v e d b y th e n e x t day, "w e w o u ld rem ove th e m ."22 Few K ennedy in sid ers re g a rd e d the m issiles in C u b a as a m ajor strateg ic th re a t to the U n ited States. T hey co u ld only h it cities a lre ad y w ith in ra n g e of o th er Soviet rockets, th o u g h w ith less w a rn in g a n d a d d e d "th ro w -w e ig h t." "W h at difference," K ennedy a sk ed o n the 16th, "d o es it m ake? T h ey 'v e g o t e n o u g h to b lo w u s u p an y w ay ." P ublicly h e d id w a rn of "a n u c le ar strik e c ap a ­ b ility a g ain st th e W estern H em isp h ere," b u t h e e m p h a siz e d less tan g ib le con-

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sid érations: K h ru sh ch ev 's secrecy, deceit, a n d b e tra y a l of h is e arlier p ro m ises, a n d th e "clear lesso n " a b o u t a p p e a se m e n t ta u g h t b y th e 1930s. P riv ately a d ­ m in istra tio n officials d w e lt o n th e psychological u p p e r h a n d th e m issiles w o u ld give K hrushchev: h e m ig h t so o n m o v e a g ain st Berlin; th e W est g en er­ ally a n d K en n ed y p erso n ally w o u ld b e h u m iliated ; a n d th e g lobal b alan ce of p o w e r w o u ld tilt in M oscow 's favor. W hile th e m issiles " d id n o t su b sta n tia lly alter th e strategic b alance infact," o ne a d v iso r so o n w ro te, "th a t b alan ce w o u ld h av e b e e n su b sta n tia lly altere d in appearafice; a n d in m a tte rs of n a tio n al w ill a n d w o rld lea d ersh ip . . . su c h a p p ea ra n c es c o n trib u te to reality ."23 T h at rea­ so n in g w a s h a rd ly baseless: sym bols did m atter, o r else K h ru sh ch ev w o u ld n o t h av e se n t m issiles to C uba. B ut th ey m a tte re d in p a rt b ecau se lea d ers said th e y d id , a n d th eir stance d u rin g th e C u b a n m issile crisis left u n c le ar w h y this sy m b o l— n o t the B erlin W all or Soviet satellites— w a rra n te d A m erican reac­ tio n s risking n u c le ar w ar. Soviet m issiles in C u b a m a tte re d so m u c h m o re b ecau se th eir p ro x im ity v io ­ lated A m erican s' lin g erin g sense of in v u ln erab ility a n d m a d e p a lp a b le th eir free-floating fears of d estru ctio n . A s U n d e rse cre ta ry of State G eorge Ball later no ted : "A fter all, A m erica h a d fo u g h t tw o w o rld w a rs w ith o u t d a m a g e to its o w n territory. T he A m erican p e o p le h a d g ro w n accu sto m ed to th in k in g th a t th e m o at of tw o oceans w a s a n effective b a rrie r to ex tern al aggression. . . .If the A m erican p e o p le h a d p a in fu lly a d ju ste d to th e th o u g h t of ICBM s cap ab le of reach ing o u r cities, it w a s largely because th o se m issiles w ere still th o u sa n d s of m iles aw ay a n d the d a n g e r seem ed u nreal. T he p ro sp e ct of Soviet m issiles n in ety m iles off o u r b o rd e rs w a s so m e th in g a lto g eth er different; it w o u ld b e a n affro n t to o u r h istory." A m erican s' reactions to th o se m issiles su g g e ste d w a r's p e rsistin g rem o ten ess to them . R ockets in Siberia a n d crises in B erlin rem a in e d d ista n t a n d u n re a l d e sp ite d e ca d es of talk of a seam less w o rld . It to o k a n e arb y th re a t to stir th e u ltim ate alarm . A t the sam e tim e, th o se reactions rev ealed a d en ial of c h an g e d strategic co n d itio n s, as if th e ocean b a rrie rs w o u ld rem ain stu rd y once th e m issiles n e a rb y w ere rem o v ed . In d ee d , w h e th e r A m erican s h a d "p ain fu lly a d ju ste d " to Soviet m issiles located elsew h ere w a s d o u b tfu l. In ­ sistence o n th eir rem o v al from C u b a su g g e ste d a n im p u lse to b a n ish th e th rea t ra th e r th a n a d ju st to it.24 O f course, th e C u b a n m issile crisis h a d n o single m ea n in g for all A m ericans. Still, m a n y resp o n ses to th e crisis su g g e ste d it g ave su b stan ce to th e sh a d o w of w a r lo n g h o v e rin g o v e r th e country. C IA D irector John M cC one ch aracterized th e C u b a n m issiles as " p o in te d a t o u r h e art," as if o th e r Soviet m issiles w ere not. S peaking to the n a tio n o n O ctober 22, K en n ed y listed th e cities in th e W est­ e rn H e m isp h ere w ith in ran g e of the n e w m issiles in C uba, e v en th o u g h ac­ k n o w le d g in g th a t those places w ere a lre ad y "o n th e b u ll's eye of Soviet m issiles located in sid e the U.S.S.R. o r in su b m a rin e s." Life fo u n d " th a t n early ev ery city fro m Lim a, P eru, to H u d s o n Bay in C a n a d a w o u ld lie w ith in p u sh -b u tto n ran g e of th erm o n u cle ar b o m b s in C u b a." U.S. News and World Report d re w red con-

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centric rin g s of d e stru c tio n ra d ia tin g from C u b a o n its m a p of th e W estern H em isphere; its co lu m n ist D av id L aw rence a sse rte d th a t "th e A m erican p eo p le can n o t live in peace as lo n g as lo ad e d m issiles are p o in te d a t th e m fro m a field 90 m iles aw ay." W hile h a rd ly new , air-raid d rills co n v ey ed a sen se of special m enace, since n o w th ey to o k place n o t as a ro u tin e exercise b u t in p re p a ­ ra tio n for possible o u tb rea k of w ar. T he far R ight saw th e outco m e of th e crisis as a sell-out to co m m u n ism a n d rid ic u le d claim s th a t th e m issiles w ere re­ m o v ed , b u t th a t ridicule, too, im p u te d special m ea n in g to m issiles in C u b a, as o p p o se d to elsew here.25 T he n o tio n th a t the crisis sh o w ed A m erican s th e ir v u ln era b ility to attack w a s sh a red a n d sh a p e d ov erseas as w ell. A fter v iew in g th e C IA 's p h o to g ra p h s of th e m issiles sites, B ritish p rim e m in iste r H a ro ld M acM illan d eclared , "N o w th e A m ericans w ill realize w h a t w e here in E n g lan d h av e liv ed th ro u g h fo r th is p a s t m a n y years." K h ru sh ch ev h im self u se d th e crisis to rem in d K e n n ed y th a t " w ith th e a d v e n t of m o d e m ty p es of arm a m e n t, th e U.S.A. h a s fu lly lo st its in ­ v u ln erab ility ."26 In th e e n d , K en n ed y a n d K h ru sh ch ev com p ro m ised : M oscow w o u ld rem o v e th e m issiles; in retu rn , W ash in g to n p ro m ise d n o t to in v a d e C u b a a n d to rem o v e A m erican m issiles fro m T urkey a n d Italy, w h o se p ro x im ity to Soviet soil m a d e th em seem a n alo g o u s to rockets in C uba. E ven so. A ir Force C hief of Staff G en. C u rtis L eM ay to ld a d u m b fo u n d e d K ennedy, "We should invade [C uba] today."27 T hen a n d later, m a n y saw the outcom e as a triu m p h for K ennedy, w h o p re ­ su m a b ly sta red K h ru sh ch ev d o w n a n d g o t w h a t h e w a n te d w ith o u t w a r b e ­ cause of his d ete rm in a tio n , h is tig h t control of th e a rm e d forces, a n d h is n a ­ tio n 's strategic superiority. But M oscow d id n o t retre at before A m erican p o w e r so m u ch as b o th sid es sh ra n k a t th e p ro sp e ct of a n u c le ar w a r in w h ic h e ith e r's su p e rio rity w o u ld h av e b e e n m eaningless. A n d K en n ed y 's co n tro l of th e situ a ­ tio n w as m ore p rec ario u s th a n A m ericans, e v en th e K en n ed y m e n th em selv es, realized a t the tim e. The m issile crisis in creased th e u rg en cy of m a n y A m erican s to con tro l th e a rm s race, a n urg en cy co nveyed b y g ro u p s like th e W o m en 's Strike for Peace a n d SANE (N ational C om m ittee for a Sane N u clear Policy) a n d th eir p u b lic protests. O n June 10, 1963, K en n ed y elo q u en tly a p p e a le d to th a t e n d , n o w u sin g W orld W ar II to d ifferen t p u rp o se s b y citing R u ssia's d e v a sta tin g losses in it. W ith su rp risin g sp eed , the L im ited Test Ban Treaty, lo n g in n e g o tiatio n , w a s finalized a n d sig n ed in A u g u st (th o u g h n o t b y C h in a o r France), a b o lish in g atm o sp h eric b u t n o t u n d e rg ro u n d tests. H ailed initially as a first ste p to w a rd h a ltin g th e a rm s race, th e tre a ty in stea d u sh e re d in th e "Big Sleep" in a tte n tio n to th e n u c le ar issue. "A fter 1963," w rites Paul Boyer, "th e m u sh ro o m -sh a p e d clo u d , th e co rp o rate logo of th e n u c le a r age, becam e a tire d v isu al cliche."28 W ith testin g n o w u n d e rg ro u n d , th e n u ­ clear th re a t becam e less visible th a n ev er a n d th e challenge to it seem ed to ex­ h a u st itself, as if o u t of sig h t m e a n t o u t of m in d . The a n tin u cle ar m o v e m e n t a n d

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th e su p e rp o w e rs w ere later fau lted for sto p p in g a t a sym bolic v icto ry o v e r th e n u c le ar d ra g o n , since th e e n g in es p ro d u c in g w e a p o n s g ro an e d m o re fu rio u sly in th e 1960s, especially as Soviet lea d ers re d o u b le d th eir efforts to g a in p a rity w ith th e U n ited States. In 1963, as in later arm s lim itation talks, Soviet-A m erican n eg o tiatio n s seem ed d e sig n e d — p e rh a p s in tacit b u t cynical collu sio n b e tw ee n th e su p e rp o w e rs th em se lv e s— to reg u la te (an d , in term s of technical refine­ m en t, e v e n h asten ) ra th e r th a n cu rtail w e a p o n s d e v elo p m e n t, to ex clude lesser p o w e rs from th e n u c le ar arena, a n d to deflect th e o p p o sitio n of m ass m o v e­ m e n ts to the g rea t p o w e rs' a rm s b u ild in g . Such criticism w a s accurate b u t narrow . It d o w n p la y e d th e obstacles to g rea ter ach iev em en ts— th e technical com plexities, th e d istru st b e tw ee n g ov­ ern m e n ts, th e d iv isio n s w ith in each, a n d th e d e m a n d s of o th er issues o n p o liti­ cians, activists, a n d p o p u latio n s. K en n ed y h a d tak e n a political risk ju st b y p u sh in g for a m o d e st step. A n d th e sym bolic ach iev em en t h a d value: th e 1963 tre a ty d id h e lp estab lish th a t su p e rp o w e r conflicts w ere n egotiable, th a t th e a rm s race w a s a b h o rre n t, th a t n u c le ar w a rfare w a s intolerable. E ven lip service to th ese p rin cip les k e p t th e m alive a t a tim e w h e n th ey w ere w id e ly d isb eliev ed o r d isd ain ed . T he C u b a n m issile crisis left K en n ed y a m o re cau tio u s lead er, skillful in h is p u b lic case for m o re n u a n c e d v iew s of th e C old W ar a n d K h ru sh ch e v 's b e h av ­ ior, a n d d e te rm in e d th a t the su p e rp o w e rs av o id n u c le ar conflict. A q u arterc e n tu ry later, tw o key a d v iso rs reflected th a t th e lesso n of th e crisis "is n o t to h av e a crisis, because th ere 's n o telling w h a t w ill h a p p e n once y o u 're in o n e," a n d th a t " 'm a n a g in g ' crises is th e w ro n g term . You d o n 't 'm a n a g e ' th em b e ­ cause y o u c a n 't 'm a n a g e ' th e m ."29 K h ru sh ch ev co m m u n icated a sim ilar m es­ sage to K ennedy a t th e tim e, a n d th e a d m in istra tio n b ack ed a w ay fro m a "co u n ­ terforce" strategy, w ith its fan tasy th a t "sp a sm " n u c le ar w a r co u ld b e av o id e d th ro u g h sh re w d m an ag em en t. But w h ile the m issile crisis m o d e ra te d K en n ed y 's ap p ro a ch to su p e rp o w e r co n fro ntation, it d id n o t a lte r th e basic policies th a t h a d b ro u g h t o n crisis in th e first place. A sked in D ecem ber a b o u t E ise n h o w e r's w a rn in g "o f th e d a n g e rs of a p o ssible m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex" a n d w h e th e r h e "felt th is th reat," K en­ n e d y d id w a rn of re d u n d a n t w e a p o n s p ro g ra m s a n d n u c le ar overkill b u t largely d u c k e d th e chance to echo h is predecessor. R eg ard in g d e m a n d s from C o n g ress o r a rm s b u ild e rs for n e w w e ap o n s, "I m u s t say as of to d a y I d o n 't feel th a t th e p ressu re o n u s is excessive." A ccordingly, A m erica's n u c le ar arsen al c o n tin u ed to sw ell (in th e "stra n g e st a n d least d efen sib le b u ild u p ," its w a r­ h e a d s in E u ro p e m u ltip lie d from 2,500 to 7,200 b e tw ee n 1961 a n d 1966), w h ile JFK's anxiety a b o u t C h in a grew , as if fears calm ed in o n e aren a m o v ed in to a n ­ other. M oreover, the fear of n u c le ar w a r in d u c e d b y th e crisis m in g led u n easily w ith th e h e a d y sense th a t K ennedy a n d A m erica h a d triu m p h e d , a n d m ig h t d o so again. T h o u g h w a ry of p u b lic g lo atin g a b o u t victory, w h ich m ig h t look h o l­ low g iv en th e com prom ise th a t e n d e d the crisis, p riv a te ly K en n ed y b o a sted

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th a t "I cut h is balls o ff" (referring to K hrushchev), w h ile k ey a d v iso rs cited th e crisis as sh o w in g th e "d e te rm in a tio n a n d sta y in g p o w e r" th a t w o u ld b rin g vic­ to ry in V ietnam . T he A m erican stance " b ro u g h t a b o u t K h ru sh ch e v 's b ack ­ d o w n ," Life o p in ed . "It in d ic ate d a d isp o sitio n o n th e p a rt of th e A m erican s to win th e C old W ar." Life d id n o t m e n tio n av o id an ce of n u c le ar w a r as a m ea n in g of th e crisis.30 A n d th a t m ea n in g d id n o t a p p ly to tro u b leso m e situ atio n s, like th e o n e in S o u th east A sia, th a t ev o lv ed in crem en tally a n d req u ire d n o n a il-b itin g m o ­ m e n t of decision. In th a t reg a rd V ietnam offered in sid io u s tem p tatio n : it seem ed to b e a n aren a w h e re th e U n ited States co u ld tak e th e in itiativ e w ith o u t risk in g n u c le ar b lo o d b ath . A s one N e w F ro n tiersm an m o ck in g ly recalled, "W e w ere n o t g oing to b e in th e aw fu l b u sin e ss of creatin g H iro sh im as a n d N ag asak is in su p p o rt of o u r foreign policy objectives," b u t w o u ld in stea d "se n d one of o u r G reen Berets . . . to d o b a ttle w ith o n e of th eir crack g u erilla fig h ters a n d th ey w o u ld h av e a clean fight, a n d th e b e st m a n w o u ld w in a n d th ey b o th get to g eth er a n d s ta rt c u rin g all th e v illag ers of sm allp o x ."31 T he C u ­ b a n crisis d id n o t so m u c h ease the C o ld W ar as d irect it in to d ifferen t channels, ones less likely to p ro d u c e n u c le ar conflict. So A m erica's in v o lv e m en t in th e V ietnam W ar in d icated . There, V iet Cong* in th e S outh a n d C o m m u n ist N o rth V ietnam , m iscalcu latin g th e sp e e d a n d scale of fo rthcom ing A m erican in terv en tio n , w ere accelerating th e ir effort to reu n ite the n a tio n a n d o v e rth ro w the Saigon regim e of N g o D in h D iem before A m ericans cam e in g rea ter force. A C atholic in a larg ely B u d d h ist lan d . D iem w a s m ore th a n ev er rep ressiv e a n d m ercu rial, a t once d e m a n d in g g rea ter A m erican aid a n d fu lm in atin g a g ain st A m erica's im p erial role. H is regim e "to o k o n m ore a n d m ore of th e p ro p e rtie s of a sp o n g e. M oney, p lan s, a n d p ro ­ g ram s p o u re d into it a n d n o th in g cam e o u t th e o th er e n d ." 32 T he K ennedy a d m in istra tio n av o id e d th e a p p a re n t ex trem es— d ra m a tic m il­ itary in te rv en tio n o r a b a n d o n m e n t of th e cau se— settlin g o n g ra d u a l escalatio n of A m erican aid, advice, a n d co m b at su p p o rt. A m erican m ilita ry p e rso n n el a n d ad v iso rs increased from one th o u sa n d to six teen th o u sa n d u n d e r K en­ nedy, a n o th e r h a p less p ro g ra m w a s lau n c h ed to reg ain control of th e c o u n try ­ side, a n d A m erican officials c o llu d ed in a n d h e lp e d in stig ate D iem 's o v e rth ro w a n d m u rd e r in 1963, a lth o u g h succeeding reg im es p ro v e d scarcely m o re reli­ able. Johnson a g o n ized a b o u t in te rv e n tio n — arg u a b ly h e m a d e a b e tte r case p riv ately a g ain st it th a n K e n n ed y h a d — b u t a g reed to it. In A u g u st 1964, h is a d m in istratio n b o th m isu n d e rsto o d a n d m isrep re se n te d in cid en ts b e tw e e n A m erican a n d N o rth V ietnam ese n a v al vessels in th e T onkin G u lf in o rd e r to take actions alre ad y d e cid ed on: b o m b in g raid s a g ain st N o rth V ietn am a n d

*This is the derogatory term for the N ational Liberation Front invented by Diem and com m only used by A m erican officials, soldiers, and reporters; because it is the term familiar to m any Am erican readers, its use is retained here.

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p assag e b y C o n g ress of a n o p e n -e n d e d reso lu tio n au th o rizin g fu rth e r action. "I d id n 't ju st screw H o C hi M inh," LBJ alleg ed ly b o asted , "I cu t h is p eck er off."33 A fter th e 1964 election cam p aig n , in w h ic h LBJ successfully p o rtra y e d B arry G o ld w a te r as trig g er-h ap p y , h is a d m in istra tio n a w aited th e e n em y in cid en ts th a t w o u ld ju stify su sta in e d b o m b in g of th e N o rth , b e g u n b y A m erican B-52 b o m b ers a n d o th e r aircraft in th e sp rin g . In tu rn , A m erican air p o w er, fiercely u se d b y n o w in th e S outh as w ell as a g ain st th e N o rth , req u ire d A m erican g ro u n d tro o p s to p ro tec t a ir bases, ju st as th e tro o p s n e e d e d m ore air co v er— so w e n t th e circular reasoning, w h ic h reflected v a lid tactical concerns b u t also ra ­ tio n alized d e e p e r im p u lse s to e n te r th e g ro u n d w a r in th e South. By th e su m ­ m er of 1965, the p a tte rn of escalation w a s set. A n o th e r "o v e rd e te rm in e d " act of th e C o ld W ar, escalation in V ietn am h a d m any, e v e n c o n tra d ic to ry sources. The a d m in istra tio n 's acq u isitio n of e n ­ h a n ce d m ean s to w a g e su c h a w a r en co u rag e d it to w a d e in a n d ex p o sed it to criticism sh o u ld it hesitate. W h at w e re th e G reen Berets, CIA ag en ts, n a tio n ­ b u ild in g experts, a n d h elico p ter g u n sh ip s for, after all, if n o t to h e lp w in th e C old W ar? "In K nute R ockne's old p h rase, w e are n o t sav in g th e m for th e ju n io r p ro m ," W alt W h itm an R ostow to ld K en n ed y in 1961.34 T he reaction of m ilitary chiefs to initial co u n te rin su rg en c y tactics gave fu rth e r im p e tu s to escalation: th ey resen te d th e d e p lo y m e n t of low -tech forces o u tsid e th eir control, d o u b te d th eir efficacy, a n d p u s h e d for a conventional, full-scale m ilita ry effort. T he "arro g an ce of A m erican p o w e r" (as Sen. J. W illiam F u lb rig h t later p u t it) w a s also a factor, th o u g h in n o sim p le w ay. It is h a rd ly su rp risin g , g iv en th e p o w e r of th e U n ited States a t th is ju n ctu re, th a t A m erican lead ers w ere over­ co n fid en t th a t th ey co u ld sh a p e th e w o rld in th eir im age, in sen sitiv e to local realities ab ro ad , a n d o v e rb e arin g in th e ir "g u id an c e of th ese y o u n g a n d u n so ­ p h istic ate d n a tio n s," as LBJ once characterized th e o ld societies of S o u th east A sia. A s R ostow w ro te in 1964, th e A m erican chance for v icto ry in V ietn am "flo w s fro m th e sim p le fact th a t a t this stag e in h isto ry w e are th e g reatest p o w e r in th e w o rld — if w e b e h av e like it." B ut d ecisio n m ak ers d id n o t n aiv ely stu m b le in to the "q u ag m ire" of V ietnam obliv io u s to th e d a n g e rs there. R epeat­ edly, e v en tiresom ely, th ey issu e d o r received rem in d ers of F rance's failu re in V ietnam , th e frailties of th e S outh V ietn am regim e, th e a p p e a l of th e V iet C ong, a n d th e p e rils of escalation. W arnings cam e fro m liberals a t th e fringes of p o w e r like C h ester Bow les, John K enneth G albraith , a n d Vice P re sid e n t H u b e rt H u m ­ p h rey , b u t also fro m resp ected in sid ers like U n d e rse cre ta ry of State G eorge Ball a n d Sen. M ike M ansfield. K en n ed y h im self w o rrie d th a t each escalato ry step w o u ld b e "like tak in g a d rin k . . . . The effect w e a rs off, a n d y o u h av e to tak e an o th er." "T he 30% chance is th a t w e w o u ld w in d u p like th e F rench in 1954," w o rrie d W illiam B u n d y in th e D efense D ep artm en t; "w h ite m e n c a n 't w in th is k in d of fight." G en. M axw ell T aylor gave a typ ical w a rn in g in 1964: "N o t only d o th e V iet-C ong u n its h a v e th e recu p erativ e p o w e rs of th e ph o en ix , b u t th ey h a v e a n a m a zin g ability to m a in ta in m o rale." T h o u g h n o t alw ay s serio u sly re­ g a rd e d , su c h w a rn in g s w ere legion.35

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W h at d efin ed the arrogance of lead ers w as n o t b lin d n e ss to su c h d ifficulties b u t confidence th a t th ey co u ld overcom e th em a n d co n v ictio n th a t th e v e ry d if­ ficulties w o u ld m ag n ify th eir triu m p h . T hey w ere b o th d e sp e ra te a n d a rro g a n t— b u t n o t a b o u t the sam e things: fearfu l a b o u t S o u th V ietnam , b u t su re a b o u t A m erican pow er. In d ee d , a d e sp e ra te cause w a s seductive: o n ly if th e U n ited States fo u g h t to u g h battles, n o t ju st easy ones, c o u ld it sh o w th a t it w o u ld p rev ail ov er com m unism . W in w h e re th e o d d s w ere b a d a n d it w o u ld p ro v e it co u ld w in an y w h ere, ju st as it trie d to go to th e m oon, K en n ed y h a d said, b ecause it w a s so h a rd to do. M eanw hile, th e ten d e n cy of lea d ers to v iew th e stak es in V ietn am as political a n d psychological— th e loss of A m erican credibility, th e p ro sp e c t of falling d o m in o e s— left th e m in a sh a d o w y w o rld of p ercep tio n s w h e re g ain s a n d losses defied m easu rem en t. T he lessons of a p p e a se m e n t w ere re p e a te d m o re reflexively th a n ever, a lth o u g h the an alo g y to 1938 w a s d e e p ly flaw ed: th e n th e g reat p o w e rs' resolve, n o t C zechoslovakia's, w a s in d o u b t a n d ag g ressio n across a clear in te rn atio n al b o rd e r w a s at issue, b u t in 1964 S aigon's resolve seem ed ho p eless a n d a civil w a r w a s raging. " S u rre n d e r a n y w h ere th rea te n s d efeat ev ery w h ere," LBJ said in 1964, a lth o u g h th e CIA d o u b te d th a t th e d o m i­ n oes w o u ld fall if S outh V ietnam w a s lost. A s th e Joint C hiefs m a in ta in e d (if n o t w h o leh earted ly ) in 1964, "T he w a r m u s t certain ly b e fo u g h t a n d w o n p rim a rily in th e m in d s of the V ietnam ese p eo p le." In th a t vein. Secretary of State D ean R usk su p p o rte d u se of g ro u n d forces a n d th e b o m b in g of N o rth V ietn am in 1965 as "a signal to H a n o i a n d P eip in g th a t th ey th em selv es can n o t h o p e to su c­ ceed w ith o u t a su b sta n tia l escalation o n th eir p a rt, w ith all th e risk s th ey w o u ld h av e to face." For "m u sc u la r realists," these m e n p a id rem ark ab ly little a tte n ­ tio n to tangible m atters of resources, trad e , a n d m ilitary p o w er. T heir foolish belief th a t enem ies a n d allies w o u ld see "sig n als" like b o m b in g as signs of A m erican stren g th , ra th e r th a n of th e d e sp e ra tio n th a t p ro m p te d th em , m a d e escalation m ore tem p tin g .36 N o r d id liberals m o n o p o lize su c h th in k in g . C o n serv ativ es sh a re d th e p reo c­ c u p atio n w ith percep tio n s, differing only a b o u t th e m ean s n e e d e d to sh a p e them . D em ocrats' "failures," th u n d e re d B arry G o ld w a ter in accepting the G O P 's 1964 n o m in atio n , "p ro claim lost lead ersh ip , o bscure p u rp o se , w e ak e n ­ in g w ills a n d th e risk of inciting o u r sw o rn enem ies to n e w ag g ressio n s." T h o u g h later th ey scoffed at civilians' focus o n p ercep tio n s a n d th e co u rse of g ra d u a l escalation th a t w e n t w ith it, m ilitary lead ers sh a re d th a t focus, h a g ­ g lin g p rim a rily ov er th e d etails a n d pace of escalation. G en. W illiam W estm ore­ lan d , for exam ple, sim p ly issu ed p iecem eal p leas to a d d a b a ttalio n h ere a n d a b rig a d e there, a n d accepted as " o u r strategy ," as h e later p u t it, one d e sig n ed "to p u t p ressu re o n the en em y w h ic h w o u ld tra n sm it a m essag e to th e lead er­ sh ip in H an o i." The Joint C hiefs s u p p o rte d d e p lo y m e n t of A m erican tro o p s to V ietnam in 1961 in o rd er to "in d icate the firm ness of o u r in te n t to all A sian n a ­ tions." Brig. G en. E d w ard L ansdale saw su c h forces as "th e sy m b o l of o u r na-

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tio n al po w er. If a n en em y engages one of o u r co m b at u n its, h e is fully aw are th a t h e autom atically h a s e n g ag e d the en tire p o w e r of th e U.S." E ven th a t m o st sh a rp -b ea k ed h aw k . G eneral LeM ay, stra y ed in to th is lan d of perceptions: The U n ited States sh o u ld tell th e N o rth V ietnam ese "fran k ly th a t th e y 'v e g o t to d ra w in th e ir h o r n s . . . o r w e 're g oing to b o m b th em b ack in to th e Stone A ge." It m u st "convince th e m th a t if th ey c o n tin u e th eir aggression, th ey w ill h av e to p a y a n econom ic p e n a lty w h ic h th ey can n o t affo rd ."37 P ro m p te d b y su c h v a g u e a n d d u b io u s co n sid eratio n s, A m erica's escalatin g effort in tu rn w a s obscure a n d p u z z lin g to A m ericans. For a w h ile, it w a s h a rd ly e v en noticeable (D avid H a lb ersta m fo u n d h im self "th e on ly full-tim e staff cor­ re sp o n d e n t of a n A m erican d a ily n e w sp a p e r" in V ietnam in th e early 1960s). A n d rare ly h a d w a r m ak in g seem ed so civilian a n d so u n w arlik e. In 1941 a n d 1950, m ilitary lead ers h a d visibly led th e charg e a n d th e line b e tw e e n w a r a n d peace h a d becom e sh a rp ly d ra w n . The A m erican effort in V ietnam , ho w ev er, seem ed initially so m u c h a civilian affair— d e sig n ed , co ntrolled, som etim es e v e n fo u g h t b y civilians— th a t it h a rd ly c o n stitu ted w ar. E ven th e m o st visible m ilitary figure in V ietn am policy h a rd ly ra n to type. G en. M axw ell T aylor— JFK's p e rso n al m ilitary ad v iso r, th e n ch airm a n of th e Joint C hiefs, th e n am b as­ sa d o r to S outh V ietn am — w a s "th e K enned y -ty p e g en eral . . . cool, correct, h a n d so m e a n d athletic," a stu d io u s critic of Ike's sabre rattlin g , a fo rm er p resi­ d e n t of th e Lincoln C e n te r for th e P erfo rm in g A rts ("th e cultured w a r hero"), h a rd ly a g en eral a t all w h e n h e cut a strik in g figure in civilian clothes. W ith su ch m e n in charge, w a r d id n o t seem im m in en t.38 W ar also a p p e a re d u n lik ely because m ean s a n d e n d s w ere calcu lated in su ch in tan g ible te rm s— less enem ies killed a n d territo ry c a p tu re d th a n sig n als of re­ solve se n t a n d p ressu re o n H a n o i raised. A s lo n g as th e sh o w ra th e r th a n the su b stance of A m erican p o w e r w a s re g a rd e d as the key to victory, co m b at seem ed avoidable, o r a t least secondary: the U n ited States d id n o t actu ally h av e to d e fe at its enem y, o n ly sh o w th a t it could. E ven w h e n th e carn ag e sw elled, the Jo h n so n a n d N ix o n a d m in istratio n s rem ain ed g eared to th e sh a d o w y realm of p ercep tio n s, rarely seeking o r ex p o sed to the b lu n t acco u n tin g of th e d e a th toll th a t G eneral M arshall exchanged w ith P resid en t R oosevelt in W orld W ar II. Initially, those a p p ea ra n c es w ere n o t baseless: few A m erican s did d ie in V iet­ n a m before 1965, civilian lea d ers were at p a in s to exercise control, a n d e n try into full-scale com bat was still avoidable. N o r w ere th ese a p p ea ra n c es sh a p e d only b y A m ericans. T hey w e re ro o ted also in th e politics of S outh V ietnam , w h ere th e m a n ip u la tio n of ap p ea ra n c es, a n d of A m erican officials, w a s a w elld ev elo p ed art. D iem 's regim e w a s "beset b y a n ex tra o rd in a ry d re a m w o rld m en tality," e v id e n t in "th e p a ra d e D iem stag ed to co m m em o rate th e an n iv e r­ sary of h is ascent to p o w e r— a p a ra d e th a t w o u n d its w a y th ro u g h th e e m p ty streets of d o w n to w n Saigon because n o sp ectato rs w ere allo w ed to w a tc h it." M cN am ara's faith in n u m b e rs led one V ietnam ese g en eral to com m ent, "Ah, les statistiques! Y our Secretary of D efense loves statistics. W e V ietnam ese can give

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h im all h e w ants. If y o u w a n t th e m to go u p , th ey w ill go up. If y o u w a n t th e m to go d o w n , th ey w ill go d o w n ." 39 A ppearances, how ever, w ere m isleading. C ivilians like K ennedy, M cN am ara, a n d Johnson, b y seeing m ilitarizatio n as d riv e n b y red-faced g en erals a n d g reed y a rm s b u ild e rs, c o n fu sed restra in t of th o se m e n w ith self-restraint. A s LBJ su p p o se d ly b o a ste d re g a rd in g h is air c o m m an d e rs, "T h ey c a n 't e v e n b o m b a n o u th o u se w ith o u t m y a p p ro v a l." O r as h e m a d e th e p o in t p u b licly in 1966, "W e h av e u se d o u r p o w e r n o t w illin g ly a n d recklessly ever, b u t relu c ta n tly a n d w ith restraint. . . . W e h a v e n o t b e e n d riv e n b y b lin d m ilita rism d o w n co u rses of d e v a sta tin g ag g ressio n ."40 N a tio n a l lea d ers a ssu m e d th a t k eep in g th e g en ­ erals o n a sh o rt leash also k e p t th e d o g s of w a r in check. In stead , th e ir control m a d e th em , ra th e r th a n th e generals, th e p rim a ry w a r m akers. A p p ro p riately , once A m erican s p lu n g e d fu lly in to co m b at in 1965, th e fau lt fin d in g focused o n civilian m o re th a n m ilitary lead ers. T he effort to u se m ili­ ta ry m ean s to se n d political m essag es to th e en em y a g g ra v a te d th e fau lt fin d ­ ing, for (as is alw ay s a d a n g e r in su c h efforts) it also se n t m essag es to A m eri­ cans, w h o u n d e rs ta n d a b ly expected th a t b o m b s a n d b u lle ts w o u ld kill enem ies a n d y ield m ilitary progress. E scalation raised h o p e s of m ilita ry v icto ry — m a n y A m ericans felt b e tra y e d w h e n it w a s n o t fo rth co m in g o r d id n o t e v e n seem to b e th e p u rp o se . T he crises of K en n ed y 's p resid en c y a n d th e m o o d s th ey e n g e n d e re d left A m ericans ill p re p a re d to w o rry a b o u t w a r in V ietnam . A nxieties h a d focused o n a cataclysm ic n u c le ar w ar, o r a n acciden tal n u c le ar conflict, o r a w arfare state lu rch in g to w a rd w ar, o r th e su rre n d e r of a soft n a tio n to co m m u n ism . V ietn am could n o t b e placed o n this g rid of ap o caly p tic scenarios. It seem ed to sn eak u p o n A m ericans, lead ers a n d citizens alike. A rem ark ab le am n esia a b o u t th e K orean W ar a b ette d th e deceptio n . So d id in itial success in h id in g A m erican in v o lv e m en t in S outheast A sia, as if W ash in g to n " h a d m o re faith in th e ability of the N o rth V ietnam ese to b eh av e w isely (by su ccu m b in g , h o w e v er g ru d g in g ly ) th a n it h a d in th e A m erican p u b lic to s u p p o rt its actio n s."41 N o th ­ in g a b o u t th e V ietnam W ar— its location far from th e n o tab le h o t sp o ts of th e C old W ar, the slow pace of A m erican escalation, th e m u rk y n a tu re of rev o lu ­ tio n ary w a r— reso n ated w ith d o m in a n t anxieties. T h u s e v en w h e n g en u in e ly feared, d isa ster th ere p a le d in co m p a riso n to th e scenarios of d o o m so w id e ly sh ared .

Reform as War By th e 1960s, th e civil rig h ts m o v em en t w a s changing: g ain in g a w id e r b a se th a t in clu d ed w h ite clergy, scholars, a n d stu d e n ts; m o re o p en ly d efy in g w h ite law a n d c u sto m in the S outh a n d d ra w in g a v io le n t resp o n se from w h ite au th o rities there; a n d p ressin g its claim s as a m a tte r of justice. Still, th e fam iliar a rg u m e n t p e rsisted th a t A m erica's security a n d global p restig e req u ire d racial progress.

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It w a s stre n g th e n e d b y th e lib eratio n of m o re A frican n a tio n s fro m E u ro p ea n ru le a n d b y th e cau tio n a b o u t racial issues of John K ennedy, w h o in v o k ed n a ­ tio n al secu rity m ore read ily th a n justice. N a tio n a l secu rity w a s also a p p lie d to o th er efforts: w h e n JFK forced "Big Steel" co m p an ies to roll b ack p rice in ­ creases, h e co n tra sted th eir g reed to th e sacrifices of so ld iers in B erlin a n d V iet­ n a m a n d a rg u e d th a t n a tio n al safety w a s th reaten ed . So it rem a in e d p e rsu asiv e for th e N A A C P 's Roy W ilkins to a rg u e in 1961 th a t "th e c o n tin u in g m istre atm en t of N eg ro citizens is h u rtin g o u r c o u n try " a n d h a s "e m b a rra sse d " th e P re sid e n t " in h is exchanges w ith C h a irm a n K hrushchev, for h o w can M r. K ennedy p le a d for dem ocracy in Laos w h e n a t th e v ery m o ­ m en t, K h ru sh ch ev is re a d in g a b o u t d iscrim in atio n , seg reg atio n a n d m o b action in A lab am a." It rem a in e d a p p ro p ria te for M artin L u th er K ing, Jr., to n o te tw o y ears later th a t w h ile g o v e rn m e n t's resolve to d e fe n d freed o m ab ro ad to o k it "tò th e b rin k of n u c le ar conflict," it "d isa p p e a re d o r b ecam e trag ically w e ak w h e n th e t h r e a t . . . w a s co n cern ed w ith th e N e g ro 's liberty." Sim ilarly, K en­ ned y , u sin g fed eral tro o p s w h e n Gov. G eorge W allace b a rre d th e d o o rs to blacks a t the U n iv ersity of A labam a, to ld A m erican s in Ju n e 1963 th a t th ey w ere "co m m itted to a w o rld -w id e stru g g le to p ro m o te a n d p ro tec t th e rig h ts of all w h o w ish to b e free. A n d w h e n A m ericans are se n t to V ietnam o r W est Berlin w e d o n o t ask for W hites only."42 S uch a p p ea ls to th e n a tio n 's in terests a n d g lobal im age w ere n o t th e on ly rea­ so n th a t politicians acted o n civil rig h ts— th e ir fear of e m b a rra ssm e n t at h o m e a n d th e p re ssu re o n th e m from civil rig h ts activists w ere m o re d ecisiv e— b u t th o se a p p ea ls d id express th e p a ra m o u n t fram e w o rk th a t lead ers fo u n d accept­ able for them selves a n d p e rsu a siv e to m a n y w h ite A m ericans. A s a result, a m ajor a n tid iscrim in a tio n m easu re, th e C ivil R ights A ct of 1964, w as en acted , th e n fu rth e r stre n g th e n e d — after m arches at Selm a, A labam a, a n d elsew h ere ex p o sed w h ite in tran sig en ce a n e w — b y a 1965 law e x p a n d in g fed eral p ro tec ­ tio n of v o tin g rights. L egalized d iscrim in atio n , segregation, a n d d ise n ­ fran ch isem en t w ere n o w d ead . W ar h a d lo n g g iv en black A m ericans leverag e to cap italize o n th eir service to th e n a tio n a n d to co n tra st ideals p ro claim ed ab ro a d to realities su sta in e d at hom e. A n d it still d id d u rin g th e V ietnam era, th o u g h th e term s w ere changing. M an y n o w c o n tra sted in eq u alities at h o m e to th e eg alitarian m ilitary force ab ro ad , ra th e r th a n assailing racial in eq u alities in th e arm y. A s W h itn ey Y oung n o te d in 1967, "In th is w a r th ere is a d eg ree of in te g ratio n am o n g b lack a n d w h ite A m ericans far exceeding th a t of a n y o th er w a r in o u r h isto ry as w ell as an y o th e r tim e o r place in o u r dom estic life." If a n y th in g , racial in te g ratio n of th e a rm e d forces n o w v ictim ized A frican-A m ericans: once d e e m e d u n fit to fight, blacks bo re a n u n d u e share of com b at a n d d e a th in V ietn am u n til, p ressed b y civil rig h ts g ro u p s, the D efense D e p artm en t c h an g e d p e rso n n el p o l­ icies in the late 1960s (overall, A frican-A m ericans d ie d in V ietn am in n u m b e rs th a t closely m atch e d th eir sh are of the m ale d raft-ag e p o p u la tio n a n d slightly

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exceeded th eir sh are of the overall p o p u latio n ). "T he N e g ro /' n o te d Ebony, "h as fo u n d in h is n a tio n 's m o st to ta litaria n society— th e m ilita ry — th e g rea test d e ­ gree of functional dem ocracy th a t this n a tio n h a s g ra n te d to b lack p eo p le." Such co m m en ts in d icated d iv id e d sentim ents: b o th p rid e in a n d re se n tm e n t o f th e role blacks n o w p la y e d in w ar.43 H o w ev e r ch an g ed , those term s still tied racial issu es to w ar. M an y black lead ers c o n tin u ed to w re st leverage from A frican-A m ericans' service in th e a rm e d forces, a n d co n d em n ed black a n d w h ite a n tiw a r lea d ers w h o th re a te n e d "th is ideological w e a p o n " b y o p p o sin g th e w a r itself. N e w chances to u se th e w e a p o n also arose: in 1967, w h e n P re sid e n t Jo h n so n sen t o b serv ers to V ietn am to in su re th a t its elections w ere "free a n d d em o cratic," civil rig h ts lea d ers to ld h im "it w o u ld m ea n m u c h m o re" to se n d o b serv ers to M ississip p i "to m ak e certain N egroes a n d N eg ro c a n d id ates are a ssu re d justice a n d fair p la y in all elections." A s LBJ, p ro p o sin g n e w civil rig h ts m easu res, to ld C o n g ress in 1967, "T he b u llets a t th e b a ttlefro n t d o n o t d isc rim in ate — b u t th e la n d lo rd s a t h o m e do. The p ack of the N eg ro so ld ier is as h e av y as th e w h ite s o ld ie r's — b u t th e b u rd e n h is fam ily a t h o m e b ears is far h eav ier."44 O th e r g ro u p s also so u g h t leverage in th e C o ld W ar, th o u g h as y e t lacking m ass-action tactics a n d a recognized place in th e global stru g g le. F ran k lin Kam eny, a H a rv a rd Ph.D . in astronom y, w e n t to w o rk for th e U.S. A rm y M ap Ser­ vice in 1957, o n ly to b e d isch arg ed for h o m o sex u ality e v e n th o u g h th e S p u tn ik crisis p u t a p re m iu m o n h is services. F indin g h im self " in th e p e cu lia rly ironic p o sitio n of b e in g in excessively g reat d e m a n d . . . a n d y e t totally u n a b le to g e t a job b ecause of secu rity p ro b lem s," h e ch allen g ed fed eral policies in th e co u rts a n d led pick etin g b y gay m e n a n d lesbians of th e W hite H o u se a n d o th e r g ov­ e rn m e n t agencies in 1965.45 Soviet-A m erican co m p etitio n p ro v id e d su re r lev erag e for w o m en . T he N a ­ tio n al M a n p o w e r C ouncil's 1957 stu d y Womanpower h a d d e p lo re d "th e n a tio n 's failure to utilize w o m e n 's talen ts fully" a n d u rg e d th eir tra in in g " in subjects lo n g ste reo ty p ed as m asculine, especially m a th a n d science," e v en if o n ly to release m en from school-teaching to e n te r h ig h -p o w ere d research. E d u ca to r M ary B unting "ta u n te d h e r colleagues" b y n o tin g h o w th e Soviet U n io n "to o k w o m e n 's abilities m ore seriously th a n A m erica d id ." In th a t vein, th e fed eral W om en's B ureau " a rg u e d th a t ju st as the c o u n try w a s p re p a rin g to sto ckpile w e ap o n s, so, too, sh o u ld it stockpile expertise in th e fo rm of b rig h t w o m e n ." K en n ed y 's su m m o n s for all A m ericans to "b ea r a n y b u rd e n " a d d e d force to th is a rg u m e n t, h e lp in g to p ro d u ce the E qual Pay A ct of 1963 a n d th e Title VH p ro v isio n of the 1964 C ivil R ights A ct th a t in clu d ed sex w ith race a n d e th n icity in b a rrin g d iscrim in atio n in em p lo y m en t.46 Yet ev en as m ore g ro u p s in v o k ed n a tio n al security, th a t fram e w o rk for re­ form w a s losing its prim acy. Efforts to ad v an ce w o m e n 's legal eq u ality focused m ore o n w o m e n 's rig h ts a n d fam ily n e ed s th a n o n C o ld W ar im p erativ es, ju st

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as th e n e w fem inism a t m id -d e ca d e w a s sp a rk e d b y th e c o n te m p t sh o w n b y fed eral a n d co rp o rate officials to w a rd the leg islatio n of 1963-1964. C o ld W ar im p e rativ es en tirely d isa p p e a re d in M artin L u th er K ing's fam o u s a d d re ss "I H av e a D ream " in A u g u s t 1963. M ore su rp risin g . P re sid e n t Jo h n so n p itc h ed h is re p e a te d calls for civil rig h ts legislation far m o re to th e d e m a n d s of justice a n d d o m estic peace th a n to th e C old W ar o r th e V ietnam W ar. By m id -d ecad e, o th ers like K ing to o k a fu rth e r step, a rg u in g th a t n a tio n al secu rity w a s n o t only a n insufficient ratio n ale for racial refo rm b u t an tag o n istic to it, d ra in in g th e e n ­ ergies, m oney, a n d sp irit n e e d e d for change at h o m e. A m erica's record in w a r a n d g lobal stru g g le w a s still c ited — in 1963 th e U rb a n L eag u e called for a M ar­ shall P lan for A m erican cities— b u t m ore as a m o d el th a n as a reaso n for reform . E x p o n ents of black p o w e r like Stokely C arm ichael w e n t fu rth er, su g g estin g th a t a real w a r w ith in th e U n ited States h a d to b e w a g e d like th e rev o lu tio n a ry w a rs b y T hird W orld p e o p le s a g ain st im p erial ru le, for th e b lack g h etto es of A m erica w ere "colonies" th a t " m u st b e lib erated ." O th e rs reso rted to a m o re diffu se lan g u a g e of w a r u n re la te d to n a tio n al se cu rity — "th e B attle of B irm ing­ h a m " w a s h o w B ayard R u stin d u b b e d racial stru g g le th ere in 1963, w ith "to tal v icto ry " th e d e sired outcom e.47 T he o ld e r fram e w o rk w a s e ro d in g in p a rt b ecau se it su ccu m b ed to g ro w in g black im patience. It h a d m a d e civil rig h ts u rg e n t b u t su b o rd in a te to n a tio n al n eed s, a n d p riz e d action in a re n as su ch as m ilitary service th a t w ere ex p o sed to th e w o rld a n d controlled b y th e presidency. It d id less to a d d re ss zeal for m o ral reform , inequalities b e y o n d th e reach of p resid en tia l action, a n d a n g e r a m o n g b lack A m ericans w h e n legal change failed to e n d th eir p o w erlessn ess. M any h a d to le rate d th e old ratio n ale only as a n e x p ed ien t basis for th eir cause. M ost blacks, Jam es B aldw in w ro te in 1963, d o u b te d th a t e v en th e p a s t d e ca d e's lim ­ ite d ch anges "w o u ld ev er h av e b e e n m a d e if it h a d n o t b e e n for th e c o m p etitio n of th e C old W ar, a n d th e fact th a t A frica w as clearly lib eratin g h erself a n d th ere ­ fore h a d . . . to b e w o o e d b y th e d e sce n d an ts of h e r fo rm er m aste rs."48 In th e early 1960s, few black lead ers explicitly ch allen g ed th e o ld fram e w o rk — hence it lin g ered w ith som e force. M ore often, th ey ju st m o v ed it to th e m arg in s of th eir cause. O d d ly, it w a s m o v in g to th e m arg in s ju st w h e n m ilitarizatio n w a s intensify­ ing. P e rh ap s "th e easin g of C o ld W ar hostilities" n o w "cleared a p a th for re­ fo rm ,"49 b u t it is d o u b tfu l th a t su c h hostilities really eased a t m id -d ecad e. T here likely w a s n o sim p le relatio n sh ip b e tw ee n th e ch an g e in th e refo rm im p u lse a n d th e course of the C o ld W ar. In stead , a su b tler p rocess to o k place: co m p eti­ tio n b e tw ee n reform initiatives a n d C old W ar im p e rativ es in ten sified u n d e r the stra in of th e V ietnam W ar, n a tio n al secu rity b ecam e a less p e rsu asiv e b asis for refo rm for A frican-A m ericans im p a tie n t a b o u t th eir cause, a n d a m o re charged, a m o rp h o u s lan g u ag e of w a r replaced it. By 1966 so m a n y g ro u p s h a d re­ d e p lo y e d th a t lan g u ag e to m ore rad ical p u rp o se s, a n d it reso n ate d so d istu r-

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b in g ly w ith the w a r in V ietnam , th a t a co h eren t fram e w o rk for refo rm all b u t d isa p p ea red . M ilitarizatio n a n d reform rem a in e d tie d to each other, b u t in m o re volatile, confusing w ays. P ro m in en t reform tracts of the early 1960s fo re sh a d o w e d th o se shifts b y a d ­ v an cin g n ew a g en d a s e v en w h e n th ey d id n o t explicitly re p u d ia te o ld er ones. M ichael H a rrin g to n 's The Other America (1962) u rg e d th a t "th e w elfare p ro v i­ sions of A m erican society th a t n o w h e lp th e u p p e r tw o -th ird s . . . b e e x te n d e d to th e p o or," im plicitly u n d e rc u ttin g m ilita rize d p rio rities b y d e m a n d in g a tte n ­ tio n to social inequalities.50 A y e ar later, in The Feminine Mystique, Betty F ried an seem ed to leave th o se p rio rities intact. A s she n o te d irritably: "C o n cern ed o v er th e Soviet U n io n 's lead in th e space race, scientists n o te d th a t A m erica's g rea test source of u n u s e d b ra in p o w e r w as w o m en . But girls w o u ld n o t stu d y physics; it w a s 'u n fe m in in e .'" She accepted th e u g ly a rg u m e n t th a t stifled m o th e rs tu rn e d sons in to sissies w h o failed the n a tio n in Korea. Yet m o re th a n sh e realized , F ried an u n d e rc u t C old W ar priorities. W om en's service to a m o b ilized A m erica w a s o n ly a m in o r th em e in h e r call for lib eratio n from th e "h o u se w ife's tra p ." W om en's o w n n eed s, th eir "search for id en tity ," h a rd ly fit th e fram e w o rk of n a tio n al secu rity a t all. O th e r claim s w ere also im p licitly su b v ersiv e. F ried an id en tified th e 1940s as th e m o m e n t w h e n the fem in in e m y stiq u e, p ro m p te d b y "th e loneliness of th e w a r a n d the u n sp e ak a b len e ss of th e b o m b ," to o k h o ld — sh e d id n o t rem em b er th a t d ecad e as A m erica's finest h o u r, a t least n o t for w o m en . A n d h e r d istu rb in g co m p ariso n of th e s u b u rb a n h o m e — "th e co m fo rt­ able c o n cen tratio n c a m p " — to N a zi d e a th cam p s u n d e rc u t co m p lacen t d istin c ­ tio n s u su a lly m a d e b e tw e e n A m ericans a n d th eir en em ies.51 A m o n g academ ic intellectuals, too, challen g es to m ilita rize d p rio rities w e re u su a lly im plicit. M ost intellectuals re m a in e d cau tio u s, in clin ed to an aly ze how th e n a tio n sh o u ld m eet its p rio rities m o re th a n whether th o se p rio rities w ere correct. N u c lea r w e a p o n s strategy, "n a tio n b u ild in g " in th e T h ird W orld, racial p ro b lem s in th e U n ited States— su c h m a tte rs w ere th e object of im m en se, tech ­ nically proficient (and o ften b o ring) sch o larsh ip th a t left fu n d a m e n ta l a ssu m p ­ tio n s in v o lv in g m ilitarizatio n intact. A cadem ic h isto ria n s reflected these p a ttern s. D espite th e faultline o p e n in g a m o n g th e m in the early 1960s, m a n y rem a in e d com fortable w ith th e con­ sen su s v iew of h isto ry fo rm u la te d in th e 1950s a n d w ith a n "au stere p o stu re of d e ta ch m en t" from im m ed iate issues. A s on e h isto ria n to ld stu d e n ts w o rrie d th a t th e C u b a n m issile crisis w o u ld blo w th e m u p , "T here is also m e rit in k e ep ­ in g th e lig h t of sch o larsh ip b u rn in g as long as po ssib le." A lth o u g h th e " a n tise p ­ tic ch aracter" of th a t p o stu re g ra te d o n som e h isto rian s, e v en th o se w ith a m o re rad ical o u tlo o k as y et rarely focused o n m ilitarizatio n a n d w a r m ak in g , in stea d ex am in in g d ip lo m acy a n d ideology, w h ile m ilitary h isto ry larg ely rem a in e d in th e d ru m -a n d -tru m p e ts m old. C astin g a w id e r n et, C. V ann W o o d w ard w ro te in 1960, "T he e n d of th e era of free secu rity h a s o v e rta k en A m erican s so su d -

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d e n ly a n d sw iftly th a t th e y h av e n o t b ro u g h t th em selv es to face its p ractical im p lications, m u c h less its b e a rin g u p o n th e ir histo ry ." P o in ted ly d e e m p h a siz ­ in g th e C o ld W ar, h e sk etch ed th e b ro a d e r ram ificatio n s of m ilita riza tio n a n d u rg e d h isto ria n s to stu d y them . H is call w e n t u n h e e d e d for th e m o m en t. W ood­ w a rd him self, like m a n y o th ers, focused m o re read ily o n social a n d political history, of race relations above all. (G ender w a s n o t a focus in p a rt b ecau se "th e p e rc en ta g e of w o m e n in th e p ro fessio n fell p recip ito u sly " after W orld W ar II.) C ollectively, h isto ria n s' w o rk u n d e rc u t m ilitarizatio n o n ly indirectly, b y offer­ in g a ltern a tiv e ag en d as. M ost w e re too e n am o red of K ennedy-era activism a n d too co n fid en t in a b u n d a n t resources to see m ilita riza tio n as a b a rrie r to th eir a g en d a s.52 C ritiq u es of th e m ilita rize d state rem a in e d u n u su a l o u tsid e th e acad em y as in it. T he P o rt H u ro n S tatem en t of th e S tu d e n ts for a D em ocratic Society w a s a n o bscure d o c u m e n t a t th e tim e. D o o m sd a y fiction h a d a w id e r a u d ien ce b u t rare ly a d d re sse d the u n d e rp in n in g s of m ilitarizatio n . Fred J. C o o k 's The Warfare State (1962) cam e closer to th e m ark . W orking in th e tra d itio n of p re -W o rld W ar E ex p o sés of m ilitarism , jo u rn alistic in style, d ra w in g o n voices as d iv erse as C. W rig h t M ills a n d D w ig h t E isenhow er, C ook id en tified "th e tw in th em e of th e W arfare State" as "m o re g u n s a n d b o m b ers, yes; b e tte r e d u ca tio n , m ed ical care, d isa rm a m e n t, d e cid ed ly n o." T he state su sta in e d a n eco n o m y "h itc h ed to w a r p ro d u c tio n " a n d d isd a in e d "all th a t w elfare state n o n se n se like a id to e d u ca ­ tio n a n d m ed ical care fo r th e a g e d ." (As I. F. Stone co m p lain ed . D em ocrats w e re "co m m itted to th e a rm s r a c e . . . as a g ran d io se W PA for p e rp e tu a l p ro s­ p e rity u n til th e b o m b s go off.") W h at C ook lacked in so p h isticatio n h e m a d e u p for in p o in te d n ess, b u t w ritin g ju st w h e n K en n ed y a n d Jo h n so n m a n a g e d briefly to fu n d b o th "m o re g u n s" a n d m ore "w elfare state," h e p o se d a lte rn a ­ tiv es th a t to m a n y o th ers seem ed reconcilable.53 L y n d o n Jo h n so n m o v ed to cen ter stage a t th is m o m e n t of flux, w h e n o ld a g en d a s a n d ratio n ales w e re b e g in n in g to lose force b u t n e w o n es w ere b arely a rticu lated . H e p la y e d a p iv o ta l role in resh ap in g th e relatio n sh ip b e tw e e n w a r a n d reform . P assionate a b o u t refo rm a n d h is place in h isto ry reg a rd in g it, John­ so n largely d isc a rd e d th e C old W ar ratio n ale for it. A lth o u g h h e d id u rg e re­ fo rm to h e lp u n ify th e n a tio n in w a g in g th e C old W ar, it w a s justice, equality, a n d th e perfectibility of A m erica th a t p rim a rily d ro v e h is v isio n of th e G reat Society. B ut ste ep e d in R oosevelt's achievem ents, LBJ m a d e w a r h is chief m o d el a n d m e ta p h o r for th e process th a t w o u ld realize h is v ision, carry in g FD R 's h e ri­ tag e fu rth e r th a n his m e n to r ev er d a re d . R eform , p re se n te d in th e p re v io u s tw o d ecad es as a w a y to stre n g th e n a n a tio n a t w ar, n o w reem erg ed as itself a k in d of "w a r." In a few b rea th le ss years, Johnson d eclared " w a r" o n co u n tless p ro b ­ lem s a t h o m e a n d ab ro ad . H is m o st fam o u s u se of th e w a r m e ta p h o r cam e in h is first State of th e U n io n m essage in Ja n u ary 1964: "T his a d m in istra tio n to d ay , h ere a n d now , declares u n c o n d itio n al w a r o n p o v e rty in A m erica." O n M arch 16, u rg in g C o n g ress to

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enact the E conom ic O p p o rtu n ity Act, h e ag ain d eclared "a n a tio n al w a r o n p o v ­ erty. O u r objective: total victory." N o in cid en tal m etap h o r, it receiv ed th e fulld ress tre a tm e n t LBJ gave a n y th in g h e d e e p ly cared about: "If w e can n o w m o v e fo rw a rd a g ain st this e n em y — if w e can b rin g to th e challenge of peace th e sam e d e te rm in a tio n a n d stre n g th w h ich h a s b ro u g h t u s v icto ry in w a r— th e n th is d a y a n d C ongress w ill h av e w o n a secure a n d h o n o rab le place in th e h isto ry of th e n a tio n ." "T his w a r o n p o v e rty w ill enlist m a n y recru its," in clu d in g "m en a n d w o m e n of b o th p a rties," th e " u n d e rp riv ile g e d " th em selv es, a n d "ev ery A m erican co m m u n ity ." W om en sh o u ld b e "th e first to e n list in th is w a r for the b en efit of th eir c h ild ren ," h e a d d e d . "W e w o n th e first A m erican rev o lu tio n b e­ cause w e w ere a p e o p le in a rm s," h e proclaim ed . "T he b a ttle w ill n o t b e spec­ tacu lar," consisting of " th o u sa n d s of sm all efforts th a t a d d u p to a v a st n a tio n al effort," a n d victo ry w o u ld n o t com e " in a few m o n th s o r a few y ears." But it seem ed w ith in grasp .54 O th e rs jo in ed th e rhetorical b attle, h e lp in g to m ak e " w a r o n p o v e rty " o n e of th e d e c a d e 's b est-k n o w n p h rases. L abor lea d er W alter R eu th er a ssu re d John­ so n th a t "w e e n list w ith h im in th e w a r a g ain st p o v e rty for th e d u ra tio n ." The m a y o r of St. L ouis sp o k e of "w e a p o n s" a n d " a m m u n itio n " a n d "a co o rd in ated , co ncerted, m u ltifro n t offensive" in w h ic h m ay o rs w o u ld enlist. Backers of LBJ's a n tip o v e rty p ro g ra m s u se d th e w a r m e ta p h o r to d efin e n o t o n ly th e sp irit b u t th e su b stan ce of th e a n tip o v e rty effort. "If y o u are g o in g to d eclare w ar," ar­ g u e d H ealth , E d ucation, a n d W elfare Secretary A n th o n y C elebrezze, "y o u h av e to h ave o ne g en eral of th e A rm y. You c an n o t h av e six g en erals." O n e con­ g ressm an su g g e ste d th a t "in recognizing th is as D -day, w e are ju st settin g u p a g en eral ju st like w e se t u p G eneral E isenhow er" in W orld W ar H. Foes also u se d w a r rhetoric, albeit to d ifferen t p u rp o se s, o ften teasin g o u t its h id d e n , tro u b le ­ som e im plications. Fearing W ash in g to n 's po w er. Sen. Jo h n T ow er called local con tro l a n d rep re se n ta tiv e g o v e rn m e n t "th e first casu a lty of th e w a r o n p o v ­ erty." By 1966, as LBJ's p ro g ra m s faced m o u n tin g o p p o sitio n , o n e critic th o u g h t th a t "th e w a r o n cities" m ig h t "all w o rk out, if h u m a n e w e a p o n s are u se d a n d w e evacuate th e w o u n d e d . But I su sp ec t th a t in th e co n fu sio n th e real e n em ies— poverty, ignorance, d e sp a ir— m ay slip aw ay, to live a n d strik e a g ain ."55 A cascade of legislation to achieve victo ry issu ed forth. T he E conom ic O p ­ p o rtu n ity A ct of 1964 e stab lish ed th e Office of E conom ic O p p o rtu n ity (OEO), first h e a d e d b y S argent Shriver, w h o m o v ed o v e r from th e Peace C orps. O E O p re sid e d o v er a n e w Job C o rp s (heir to th e o ld C ivilian C o n se rv atio n C orps) a n d th e C o m m u n ity A ction P ro g ram , w h ic h in tu rn fu n d e d legal services for th e p o or. Project H e a d S tart for u n d e rp riv ile g e d p reschoolers. U p w a rd B ound to ad v an ce p o o r ch ild ren to college, a n d N e ig h b o rh o o d H e alth C enters. Since th e loose rhetoric of a " w a r o n p o v e rty " easily m erg ed w ith LBJ's b ro a d e r v i­ sio n of a G reat Society, it often seem ed to em b race oth er, g en erally m o re ex p en ­ sive p ro g ra m s in stitu ted a t m id-decade: th e A p p a lac h ia n D ev elo p m en t Act,

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lav ish n e w fed eral aid to p u b lic schools, M edicaid for th e p o o r a n d M edicare for th e elderly, a n d the Food S tam ps p ro g ram . In in ten t, resu lt, o r ju st m istak en p u b lic im age, m a n y of these p ro g ram s a im ed especially a t u rb a n black yo u th , all th e m o re so once th e u rb a n riots of m id -d e ca d e m a d e po litician s d e sp era te to fin d a w a y to calm the storm . W h y d id th e w a r m e ta p h o r seem com pellin g in ju stify in g these p ro g ram s? It serv ed m u c h the sam e p u rp o se it h a d for FDR in 1933. It p riz e d fed eral action a n d p resid en tia l lead ersh ip , since w a r w a s a su p re m ely n a tio n al en terp rise. "It iso lated th e o p p o sitio n a n d m a d e o p p o n e n ts seem alm o st treaso n o u s," n o tes o n e h isto rian , or, as Johnson later p u t it, "th e W ar o n P o v erty w a s n o t a p a rtisa n effort. It w a s a m o ral o b lig atio n a n d its success rested o n ev ery one of u s." It o b scu red div isio n s of race a n d class, since w a r w a s p re su m e d to u n ify th e n a ­ tion, e v en th o u g h this w a r w a s d e sig n ed precisely to a d d re ss su c h divisions. It p re s u m e d th a t refo rm w a s largely m e n 's w o rk , since th a t w a s h o w w a r w a s u su a lly u n d e rsto o d . A n d e v en m ore th a n for FDR, it rev ealed , as h isto ria n W il­ liam L eu ch ten b u rg w ro te a t this tim e reg a rd in g R oosevelt, th a t A m erican s still c o u ld fin d n o w a y "to o rg an ize collective action save in w a r o r its su rro g ate." Ju st as N e w D ealers in v o k ed W orld W ar I, liberals n o w in v o k ed W orld W ar E .56

If a n y th in g , d e p e n d e n c e o n w a r as m o d el a n d m e ta p h o r w a s g reater for LBJ in 1964 th a n for FD R in 1933. Far fro m facing a n econom ic crisis, Jo h n so n took th e in itiativ e o n refo rm a m id b ro a d p ro sp e rity (accelerated b y tax cuts h e p ro ­ m o ted ), w ith n o ag g riev ed m id d le class d e m a n d in g fed eral p ro g ram s, th e p o o r as y et h a rd ly m obilized, a n d n o m a n d a te a t th e b a llo t box u n til th e fall of 1964. W h ereas FDR to o k o n a w id e ly sh a red econom ic d ep ressio n , LBJ to o k o n p ro b ­ lem s of race a n d class th a t d iv id e d A m ericans, a n d d id so a t a tim e w h e n liber­ alism w a s d e e p ly in v este d in th e C old W ar a n d cau tio u s in its a p p ro a c h to d o ­ m estic problem s. A n d m ore so th a n for FDR in 1933, n a tio n al g o v e rn m e n t's re­ m em b ered record of ach iev em en t lay largely in n atio n al security: tw o m ajor w a rs, stu n n in g acco m p lish m en ts in w e ap o n s, a n d m y ria d efforts to p ro m o te h ealth , ed u catio n , science, en g ineering, a n d tra n s p o rt in th e n a m e of n a tio n al defense. It m a d e sense to base n e w efforts o n th e k in d of ach iev em en ts alread y so w ell executed. "W e w ere a g en eratio n of p eo p le w h o h a d b e e n in W orld W ar S h river recalled y ears later. "So w h e n a w a r a g ain st p o v e rty w a s lau n ch ed , it w a s typical of all of u s a t th a t tim e to th in k of th is w ar, th e w a r a g ain st p o v ­ erty, in term s ju st like th e w a r a g ain st H itler." O f course, u sin g th a t w a r as a m o d el set u p to tal victory as th e payoff.57 D oing so, h o w ev er, so o n backfired. P rom ises of to tal v icto ry raised expecta­ tio n s th a t co u ld n o t b e satisfied, especially since th e core O E O p ro g ra m w a s o n ly m o d estly fu n d e d (at less th a n 1 p e rc en t of th e fed eral b u d g e t, it "w as only a p ale re m in d e r of th e n e arly $5 billion relief bill of 1935"), a n d h o p e s to en larg e it fell victim to b u d g e ta ry restra in ts Johnson a n d C o n g ress im p o sed because of th e V ietnam W ar. Far m ore fu n d in g w e n t in to b ro a d e n title m e n t a n d reform

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p ro g ra m s w h ic h se rv ed m iddle-class a n d w o rk in g -class co n stitu en cies as m u c h as th e poor, b u t since these p ro g ra m s w ere o ften p erceiv ed as a im ed a t th e po o r, w h o se lot seem ed to im p ro v e so little (th o u g h m o re th a n critics a d m it­ ted), th e w a r o n p o v e rty w a s rea d ily d e e m e d a failure. E ven if it d id h elp , th e p o o r seem ed u n g ra te fu l once in n e r cities w e n t u p in flam es. A n d since civil rig h ts p ro g ra m s w ere also conflated w ith th e w a r o n p o v e rty (Shriver said th ey "are all p a rt of th e sam e b a ttle") w h ile black A m erican s b ecam e a n g rie r th a n ever, w h ite critics co u ld re g a rd th e w a r as h a v in g failed blacks (or vice versa). T he g u lf b e tw e e n p ro m ise a n d resu lt in th e w a r o n p o v e rty e m b o ld en e d lo n g ­ tim e o p p o n e n ts a n d d ish e a rte n e d once-loyal liberals.58 Process in th a t w a r accorded w ith rhetoric n o b e tte r th a n results. S h riv er b e­ cam e n o "g en eral of th e a rm y " a n d W ash in g to n h a rd ly to o k exclusive c o m m a n d — it w a s n o t e v en su p p o s e d to, in so far as m a n y refo rm ers p riz e d lo­ cal au to n o m y a n d p a rtic ip a tio n b y p o o r p e o p le th em selv es in th e cause. O E O p ro g ra m s o v e rla p p e d o th ers a t th e n a tio n al level a n d c h allen g ed local political m achines, w h ic h eith er fo u g h t th e m o r to o k th e m u n d e r control, su b v e rtin g o rig in al p u rp o se s. T he resu ltin g confusion of a u th o rity m a d e sense in o n e re­ gard: A m erican w a r m ak in g h a d alw ay s m ix ed cen tralized d irectio n a n d d is­ p e rse d authority, reg im en ta tio n a n d v o lu n tarism . B ut im ag es of E isen h o w er a t D -D ay h a rd ly p re p a re d A m ericans for th a t outcom e. In d e e d , th e en tire concep­ tio n of reform as w a r rested o n th e fau lty p rem ise th a t g o v e rn m e n t a n d th e n a ­ tio n becom e m ore d iscip lin ed a n d efficient in w ar, w h e n in reality th e ir efforts in w a r a re often chaotic. S u b tler p ro b lem s arose, ones in h e re n t in th e w a r m e ta p h o r b u t a g g ra v ate d b y LBJ's p a rtic u la r u se of it. W ars req u ire enem ies, b u t th e "p o v e rty " th a t John­ so n d e fin e d w a s abstract. A s h e n o te d in 1967 (a d m ittin g n o w th a t th e w a r "w ill n o t b e w o n in a g en eratio n "), th ere w e re "to o m a n y enem ies: lack of jobs, b a d h o u sin g , p o o r schools, lack of skills, d iscrim in atio n ." H e m ig h t h a v e n a m e d g ree d y capitalists, h id e -b o u n d conservatives, c o rru p t p o liticians, o r o th ers as th e cu lp rits, b u t, seeking co n sen su s a n d av o id in g "class rh eto ric like th e p lag u e ," h e stu ck to abstractions th a t p re v e n te d sp ellin g o u t su c h things. G iven u rb a n riots a n d black resen tm en t, it b ecam e easy for som e to see th e e n em y as p o o r a n d black p eo p le them selves (the tw o o ften conflated). A s o n e co n g ress­ m a n a rg u e d , "W e o u g h t to d ra ft o u r N a tio n 's p u n k s a n d h o o d s in stea d of co d ­ d lin g a n d p a y in g th em in th e Job C o rp s." "Yeah, I h e lp e d th e W ar o n P overty," ra n a co n te m p o ra ry joke: "I th re w a h a n d g ren a d e a t a b u m ." A s a critic of B erkeley's efforts to d em o lish a p o o r n eig h b o rh o o d sen sed , "W e are c o n d u ct­ in g a War on Poverty w ith one h a n d a n d a War on the Poor w ith a n o th e r." T he rhetoric of reform as w ar, offered to tran sce n d d iv isio n s of race a n d class, so o n o p e n ed th em w id e r.59 A gain, th e p rem ise w as faulty: w a r m ay u n ify a n a tio n in som e w ay s, b u t it also stirs p assio n s a n d h a tre d s. L abor Secretary W illard W irtz u n w ittin g ly ex­ p o se d th e tensions: "T his w a r o n p o v e rty is n o t g o in g to be fo u g h t in th e trad i-

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tio n of em o tio n al c ru sad e s" b u t th ro u g h "a carefully w o rk e d o u t b a ttle p la n b a se d less o n p ra isin g th e L ord th a n o n p a ssin g th e a m m u n itio n ."60 T he w h o le n o tio n of a n u n e m o tio n al w a r w a s contradicto ry , th o u g h ex p ressiv e of liberal faith, o n trial in V ietnam a t th e sam e tim e, th a t th e ratio n al tech n iq u e of w a r c o u ld b e d isasso ciated from its passions. T he w a r o n p o v e rty fo u n d e re d o n in te rn al c o n trad ictio n s of rhetoric a n d p o l­ itics, b u t also o n its in tersectio n w ith th e w a r in V ietnam . LBJ e x p o u n d e d th e w a r m e ta p h o r before h e m a d e h is decisions to e x p a n d m ilitary in te rv en tio n in V ietnam , b u t h e k e p t h a m m e rin g aw ay at th a t m e ta p h o r lo n g after escalatio n in V ietn am , offering a d izz y in g collage of w a rs a t h o m e a n d ab ro ad . T h o u g h w ith d e clin in g frequency, h e talk ed of his " w a r o n p o v e rty " for th e rest of h is p resi­ dency. In 1966 h e describ ed Peace C o rp s v o lu n te ers (oddly, g iv en th e ir official d e sig n atio n ) as "really w a g in g th e o n ly w a r th a t w e in A m erica w a n t to w a g e — th e w a r a g a in st th e in h u m a n ity of m a n to h is n e ig h b o r a n d th e injustice of n a ­ tu re to h e r c h ild ren ." By 1966 h e w a s also w a g in g a " w a r a g ain st crim e," com ­ p lete w ith a " three-stage national strategy" a n d "th e front-line so ld ier," th o u g h h e c o n d e m n e d "tre a tin g d ru g ad d icts, once a p p re h e n d e d , as crim in als."61 By th e n Jo h n so n h a d also lau n c h ed a w a r o n disease. W ar h a d lo n g p ro v id e d im ag es u se d in im a g in in g disease, b u t the C o ld W ar p ro v id e d n e w o p p o r­ tu n ities in th a t reg ard . C o m p a rin g Soviet science to A m erican in 1959, LBJ p re ­ se n ted the U n ited States as facing a "m ed ical S p u tn ik ." For y ears M ary Lasker, a p ro m in e n t b u sin e ssw o m a n a n d lobbyist o n h e a lth issues, h a d e m p lo y ed w a r im a g ery in h e r cam paigns; in 1964, she c o n tra sted th e "$51.2 b illio n [spent] to d e fe n d o u rselv es a g ain st possible en em y attack " to th e "$911.4 m illio n [spent] to d e fe n d o u rselv es a g ain st disease enemies within our own bodies." T h at y ear Jo h n so n h e ra ld e d h is fo rth co m in g w a r o n disease: "T his n a tio n a n d th e w h o le w o rld cries [sic] o u t for this victory." C o n q u e st w o u ld com e "n o t in a m illen ­ n iu m , n o t in a century, b u t in th e n ex t few o n ru sh in g d ecad es." "LBJ DE­ CLARES W AR O N 3 KILLER DISEASES," o n e n e w sp a p e r h e a d lin e a n ­ n o u n c ed . In 1965, Johnson a n n o u n c e d "a w o rld w id e w a r o n disease," d eclared b y h im o n th e "q u ie t b a ttle g ro u n d " of th e N a tio n a l In stitu tes of H ealth , w ith p ro m ises th a t A m ericans w o u ld "successfully co n clu d e th a t w a r y o u [scien­ tists] h a v e d eclared o n th o se a n cien t diseases." A p p ro p riately , th e N atio n al C an cer In stitu te 's d irecto r in 1967 d eclared th a t "w e sh o u ld p ro b ab ly em u late th e M a n h a tta n Project." W h en the V ietnam W ar co m p eted for m o n ey a n d vic­ to ry p ro v e d elu siv e o n the m edical front, Joh n so n sim p ly a n n o u n c e d "a rev iew of th e targ ets a n d th e t i m e t a b l e . . . set for w in n in g victories in th e w a r." 62 In d eed , w ar-related im ag ery w a s p ro b ab ly as w id e sp re a d in v o lv in g disease in th e 1960s as it w a s reg a rd in g poverty, th o u g h less co n tro v ersial b ecau se it d id n o t seem to to u c h o n d iv isiv e m atters of race a n d class. Less controversial, it in tu rn w a s m ore lasting: N ix o n w o u ld d eclare a " w a r o n cancer," a n d th e "w a rs" of th e 1980s o n AIDS, sm oking, a n d d ru g s follow ed in th a t trad itio n . T he " w o rld w id e w a r o n d isease" also fo resh ad o w ed LBJ's effort to go global

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in a n o th e r h u m a n ita ria n effort. "7 propose that the United States lead the world in a war against hunger," h e a n n o u n c e d in 1966, ask in g C o n g ress for n e w legislation. In h is last y ears in office, h e gave n o " w a r" m o re a tte n tio n in rh eto ric th a n th is one, save th e w a r in V ietnam , w h ic h h e rep e ate d ly ju x ta p o se d to th e o n e o n h u n g er. Like his o th er favored w a rs, the w a r o n h u n g e r, h e m ain ta in e d , w a s th e o n e h e w a n te d to w a g e — "th e o n ly w a r th a t w e really seek to escalate"— w h e rea s h is h a n d w a s forced in V ietnam . "T here can on ly b e victo rs in th is w ar," h e said, co n trastin g it to his alleged w illin g n ess to co m p ro m ise in V iet­ n a m .63 S uch claim s sh o w e d th e strain s in his rhetoric: w a rs u su a lly leave b e h in d d e ­ feated as w ell as v icto rio u s parties. H is linguistic te rra in w a s also easily in ­ v a d e d b y others: critics o n th e rig h t d e rid e d LBJ for seek in g to tal v icto ry a g ain st p o v e rty a n d h u n g e r b u t n o t com m u n ism ; a n tiw a r activists su sp ec ted th a t th e u n c o n d itio n al su rre n d e r h e really w a n te d w a s N o rth V ietnam 's. Jo h n so n 's a w k w a rd rhetoric su g g e ste d h o w difficult it w a s b y 1966 to so rt o u t h is m a n y w ars. T he co n su m m a te po litician w h o w a n te d to satisfy ev ery ­ one, "Big D a d d y from th e P e d e m a le s" also h a d a w a r for ev ery o n e. C ertain ly th o se w a rs w ere cognitively d istin g u ish ab le. Yet th e lin es a m o n g th e m b lu rre d as all received a sim ilar rhetorical trea tm e n t, as Jo h n so n w a g e d o n e w a r to p la ­ cate o p p o n e n ts o f an o th er, as h e in sisten tly if v a g u e ly p re se n te d each as rela te d to th e o th ers in h is q u e st for a p erfect A m erica a n d a p erfect w o rld , a n d each as cap ab le of b e in g w o n e v en as victo ry rem a in e d elusive. T he co n fu sio n w a s h e ig h te n e d b y h o w th e stru g g le in V ietnam itself em erg ed as m a n y d ifferen t w a rs — g u errilla a n d conventional, political a n d m ilita ry — w ith m a n y d ifferen t objectives: to save S outh V ietnam o r A m erican credibility, to sto p H an o i, o r Bei­ jing, o r M oscow . W h en w a r also seem ed to e ru p t o n A m erican streets a n d cam ­ p u ses, it to o k still a n o th e r form . H eir to a v en erab le trad itio n , Jo h n so n trie d h a rd to w re st th e v irtu e s of w a r— its energy, un ity , p u rp o se fu ln e ss— fro m w a r itself. The effort, p e rilo u s in a n y circum stances, w a s d o o m e d w h e n e n m e sh e d w ith a real w ar. W here d id one w a r e n d a n d a n o th e r begin? D id LBJ h im self ev en k now ? W hat, in d ee d , d id " w a r" a n y lo n g er m ean? H is w a rs sp illed into each o th er n o t only rheto rically b u t su b stan tiv ely , since refo rm ers u se d th e m ilitary as a n o th e r w e a p o n in th e w a r o n poverty. A ssistan t L abor Secretary D aniel Patrick M o y n ih an a rg u e d in 1964 th a t th e a rm e d forces sh o u ld lo w er th eir en tran ce req u irem en ts a n d p ro v id e special tra in in g for p o o r, especially black m ales: because of th eir "d iso rg an iz ed a n d m atrifocal fam ily life," black y o u th "d e sp era tely n e e d e d . . . a w o rld a w ay fro m w o m e n , a w o rld ru n b y stro n g m en a n d u n q u e stio n e d au th o rity ." S u rg in g d ra ft calls fo r th e V ietnam W ar, g ro w in g resistance to the d ra ft from afflu en t y o u th , a n d u r­ b a n rebellion am o n g black y o u th soon m a d e M o y n ih a n 's re c o m m e n d atio n m esh w ith w a rtim e expediency, since it p ro v id e d a w a y b o th to fu n n el m e n in to th e a rm y a n d to curb u rb a n unrest. U n d e r Project 100,000, D efense Secretary M cN am ara p ro m ised to a d m it m en w h o failed th e m ilita ry 's q u alify in g ex am

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so th a t "th e y can b e g iv en a n o p p o rtu n ity to re tu rn to civilian life w ith skills a n d a p titu d e s w h ic h . . . w ill reverse th e d o w n w a rd sp ira l of decay." In reality, th o se m e n (40 p e rc e n t of w h o m w e re black) received little a d d itio n a l train in g ; assig n e d a t a h ig h rate to co m b at d u tie s in V ietn am for w h ic h th ey w ere ill p re ­ p a re d , th ey in tu rn ex p erien ced a h ig h ra te of casu alties a n d c o u rts-m artial a n d , if th ey su rv iv e d , left th e a rm y w ith o u t th e skills p ro m ise d to th e m u n d e r th e p ro g ram . D espite its failures, ho w ev er, Project 100,000 certain ly "w a s con­ ceived . . . as a significant c o m p o n e n t of. th e a d m in istra tio n 's 'w a r o n p o v ­ e rty .'" * 1 "Jo h nson ta lk ed a b o u t a perfect A m erica," a b io g ra p h e r n o tes.65 But th ere w a s so m e th in g ja rrin g a b o u t achieving perfectio n th ro u g h a series of w a rs a t h o m e a n d ab ro ad , especially w h e n th e en em ies d e fin e d w e re so ab strac t— h u n g e r, p o v erty , falterin g A m erican cred ib ility — th a t v icto ry w a s u n m e a su r­ able a n d seem ed obtainable only th ro u g h p e rp e tu a l w ar. It w a s n o less con­ fu sin g g iv en h o w each w a r w a s p re se n te d as b o th a m o ral cru sad e a n d a p assio n less exercise in tech n iq u e, m iracu lo u sly p o ssessin g all th e ferv o r a n d y e t n o n e of th e h a tre d u su a lly associated w ith w ar. It all m a d e sen se o n ly if th e m o d el of w a r w a s W orld W ar E, th e o n e w a r th a t cam e n e arest to p erfection, a t lea st in A m erican m em ory. Jo h nson a n d o th e r A m ericans saw refo rm as w a r in p a rt b ecau se th ey re­ m em b ere d w a r as pro cess of reform . W orld W ar II, K orea, a n d th e C old W ar p ro v id e d a basis for th a t m em ory: a t th eir b est, th ey h a d p ro m o te d racial change, b e tte r h e alth , technological ad v an ces, m o re accessible h ig h e r e d u c a ­ tion, a ro b u st econom y, briefly a m o d e st d o w n w a rd red istrib u tio n of incom e, a n d in g en eral a m o re resourceful fed eral g o v ern m en t. T he V ietn am W ar, h o w ­ ever, seem ed to d e p a rt from th a t p a ttern : initially p ro m o tin g econom ic g ro w th , it so o n d is ru p te d th e econom y; fo u g h t m o stly w ith technologies in h a n d , it p ro ­ d u c e d few n e w w o n d e rs; w a g e d b y racially in te g ra te d forces, it u n lea sh e d ra ­ cial tu rm o il a t h o m e a n d am o n g A m ericans in V ietnam . W h atev er g o o d flo w ed fro m th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t in th e 1960s cam e larg ely in p ro g ra m s a p a rt from th e w a r ra th e r th a n a tte n d a n t u p o n it. It w a s LBJ's m isfo rtu n e to d ra w o n w a r as a m o d el fo r refo rm ju st w h e n the m o d el itself tu rn e d sour. P e rh ap s th a t w a s b ecau se V ietnam w a s a losing w ar; victory m ig h t h av e e n h an c ed its sa lu ta ry effects. But su c h effects w e re scarcely e v id e n t e v en in 1965, w h e n v icto ry still seem ed possible to m any. O f course, th e failure (m uch e x ag g erated since th e 1960s) of Jo h n so n 's p ro ­ g ram s h a d m a n y so urces b e sid es th e rhetoric of w a r u se d to ju stify them . S u p ­ p o rt for th em w a s o ften w e a k from th e sta rt— th e E conom ic O p p o rtu n ity A ct w a s a p p ro v e d b y th e H o u se 226-185, a n o m in o u sly n a rro w m a rg in for a d ecla­ ra tio n of w ar. For m a n y p ro g ra m s— in ed u catio n , h e a lth care, u rb a n ren ew al, co n su m er p rotectio n, the arts, a n d the e n v iro n m e n t— LBJ offered little w a r rhetoric, fo n d ly talk in g in stea d a b o u t the G reat Society. M an y also b ecam e fix­ tu res of fed eral policy, su rv iv in g th e V ietnam era o r e v en p ro sp e rin g a m id it.

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N o r w a s Johnson p ecu liarly a rro g a n t in b e liev in g th a t A m erica co u ld w a g e all th e w a rs it w a n ted . "W e are a rich n a tio n a n d can afford to m ak e p ro g ress a t h o m e w hile m eetin g obligations a b ro ad ," h e a n n o u n c e d in 1966, b u t th a t belief w as w id e ly shared. In M o y n ih a n 's fo rm u latio n , "th e im m e d ia te supply of re­ sources available for social p u rp o se s m ig h t actu ally o u tru n th e im m e d ia te de­ mand of e stab lish ed p ro g ra m s."66 A n d it w a s n o t u n fo u n d e d — th e issu e w a s less w h a t the U n ited States could "affo rd " th a n w h o w o u ld p a y for it. A d ecen t s tu d e n t of econom ics, Johnson saw a n e e d for tax increases b u t faced d iv isio n am o n g h is a d v iso rs a n d resistance from D em ocratic lea d ers in C ongress. Still, w hile th e g a p b e tw ee n p ro m ise a n d re su lt in Jo h n so n 's p ro g ra m s h a d m a n y sources, h is w a r m e ta p h o r a n d the V ietn am W ar w id e n e d it, as d id h is ten d en cy to see enem ies, n o t ju st o p p o n e n ts, w h e n h e ra n in to trouble. Johnson, w h o " h a d little sense of irony," co u ld n o t g ra sp th e u n in te n d e d resu lts of h is rh eto rical style o r the m otives of h is o p p o n e n ts. A s early as Ju n e 1965, h e saw o p p o sitio n to th e V ietn am W ar as d irected from foes ab ro ad : "I w ill see a line from Peking, H an o i, a n d M oscow . . . a b o u t a m o n th a h ea d of th e tim e I see it h ere," h e to ld th e C abinet. O u t of p a ra n o ia o r a life-long h a b it of o v e rd ra m a tiz ­ in g h is p lig h t, h e cam e to see "en em ies" a m o n g K en n ed y loyalists. Ivy L eague intellectuals, resen tfu l blacks, u n ru ly w a r p ro testers, o b n o x io u s jo u rn alists, a n d d isloyal sen ato rs (all of w h o m o n occasion re tu rn e d th e favor).67 T h at cast of m in d , th o u g h th e p ro d u c t of m a n y forces, e m e rg ed n a tu ra lly o u t of h is h a b it of w a g in g w ars. A t least h is successor sh o w e d it w a s h a rd ly u n iq u e to Johnson. Jo h n so n 's n o tio n of refo rm as w a r m a rk e d a h isto rical h alf-w ay sta tio n b e ­ tw e e n a p rev io u s refo rm ratio n ale tied to n a tio n al secu rity a n d a n e w o n e free of it— as if, th o u g h n a tio n al secu rity n o lo n g er co m p elled reform , its legacy still p ro v id e d the lan g u ag e a n d m odels. For Johnson, ev er seek in g co n sen su s (at least as h e saw it), it m a d e sense to seek o u t th is m id d le g ro u n d . Briefly, h e su c­ ceeded. A lrea d y b y 1966, success w a s in d o u b t. H is effort fo u n d e re d o n m an y th in g s, am o n g th em the c o n trad ictio n s in h is w a r rhetoric, th e unfu lfillab le h o p e s it stirred , a n d the cognitive d isso n an ce it se t u p w ith th e V ietn am W ar. N o n etheless, it left b e h in d a lan g u ag e for e x p lain in g g o v e rn m e n ta l c ru sad es u se d later b y o th ers w h o often h a d q u ite differen t politics. Because of th a t leg­ acy, m ilitarizatio n p e rsisted in political c u ltu re e v en w h e n it reced ed in b attles, b u d g e ts, a n d arm am en ts.

Vietnam as War Late in 1966, A m erican forces in S outh V ietnam b e g a n p la n n in g O p e ra tio n C e d ar Falls, w h o se goal w as to d e n y to th e V iet C o n g th e "Iro n T riangle" n e a r Saigon, a region rich in a g ric u ltu re a n d m an p o w er. Lest th ey leak w o rd to the enem y, n o South V ietnam ese officials w ere to ld of th e o p e ra tio n in ad v an ce. It w as n o w an A m erican -ru n w ar, w ith m a n y A m erican s c o n te m p tu o u s of A RV N (A rm y of the R epublic of V ietnam ) forces. "It's th e A sian m in d ," a n A m erican

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officer co m m en ted . "L ook— th e y 're a th o u sa n d y ears b e h in d u s in th is place, a n d w e 're try in g to e d u ca te th e m u p to o u r level." So A m erican s tig h te n e d th eir g rip o n a w a r a n d a c o u n try th ey officially so u g h t to relin q u ish , p racticin g "a stran g e, c rip p le d so rt of im p erialism ," one " in w h ic h th e colony is su p p o se d , in a m a n n e r of sp eak in g , to colonize itself."68 C e d ar Falls sh o w ed one face of this im perialism . First, A m erican forces shelled a n d b o m b e d th e Iro n T riangle— B-52 b o m b ers d e sig n e d to attack th e Soviet U n io n n o w d e v a sta te d a n ally 's countryside?— a n d b lo ck ed th e p e rim e te r of th e area, h o p in g to tra p th e en em y w ith in it. Later, g ia n t C h in o o k h elico p ters flew in b u lld o z e rs to cut h u g e sw ath es th ro u g h th e ju n g le, so th a t fu tu re tro o p m o v em en ts b y th e V iet C o n g c o u ld b e d etected . "If th e U.S. h a s its w ay ," Time co m m en te d , "ev e n a crow flying across th e T riangle w ill h av e to carry lu n ch fro m n o w o h ." O n Ja n u ary 8, 1967, A m erican forces m o v ed o n th e p rin cip al v illag e of Ben Sue. A s c h o p p e rs b ro u g h t in A m erican so ld iers, th e ir lo u d sp e a k ­ e rs w a rn e d to w n sp e o p le n o t to flee. "T he m etallic voice, flo atin g d o w n o v e r th e fields, h u ts, a n d trees, w a s as calm as if it w e re a n n o u n c in g a flight d e p a rtu re a t a n a ir term in a l," o b serv ed Jo n a th an Schell, catch in g A m erican s' fo n d n ess for cool tec h n iq u e in w ar. Since few A m ericans sp o k e V ietnam ese, A RV N forces n o w e n te red th e scene to so rt frien d fro m foe— a th an k less task o p e n to b ru ta l­ ities b y all p arties, g iv en th e m a n y g ra d a tio n s of co llab o ratio n a n d a p a th y a m o n g S outh V ietnam ese. A m erican co m m an d e rs saw th e ir job as th e "m ili­ ta ry " w a r w h ile th e Saigon g o v e rn m e n t w a g e d th e "o th e r w a r," th e o n e for th e " h e a rts a n d m in d s of the p eo p le," a lth o u g h A m erican tro o p s offered v illag ers "a lu n c h of h o t d o g s. Spam , a n d crackers, se rv ed w ith a fru it-flav o red b ev erag e called K een."69 T h en A m erican tru ck s carried th e villagers to a resettle m en t cam p, a n in sta n t to w n safe fro m th e V iet C ong. "W ELCOM E TO THE RECEPTIO N CEN TER FOR REFUGEES FLEEING C O M M U N ISM ," re a d o n e sig n g reetin g them , th o u g h th e y h a rd ly h a d fled w illingly. T hey h a d lived, ex p lain ed a n A m erican officer, "a life of f e a r . . . fear of the V ietcong, fear of th e b o m b s. T h at w a s n 't a n a tu ra l life at all." B ut n e ith e r w a s life in th e n e w cam p. C u t off from th e re­ so u rces a n d tra d itio n s th a t h a d su sta in e d th em , th e relo cated p e a sa n ts "b eg a n a life of sittin g a n d w a itin g ," failing to a p p reciate th a t th ey h a d b e e n liberated. T h o u g h som e tried , th ey co u ld n o t re tu rn to Ben Sue. A m erican forces h a d set fire to it, u p ro o te d it w ith b u lld o z ers, th e n b o m b ed it— "as th o u g h , h a v in g once d e c id e d to d e stro y it, w e w ere n o w b e n t o n a n n ih ilatin g ev ery p o ssib le in d ica­ tio n th a t th e village of Ben Sue h a d ev er existed ," as Schell e n d e d h is account.70 It w a s a n o th e r step in a process b y w h ic h U n ited States forces d e stro y ed a n d d e p o p u la te d m u c h of S outh V ietn am in o rd e r to d e n y th e V iet C o n g u se of it a n d to create free-fire zones to b o m b a n d shell w ith o u t scru p les a b o u t killing p easan ts. B ulldozers a n d high-explosives rip p e d th e lan d , b o m b ers fired it w ith n a p alm , a n d forces of O p e ra tio n R anch H a n d ("O n ly You C a n P rev en t Forests," ra n th eir sard o n ic m otto) d efo liated it. B etw een 1964 a n d 1969, per-

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h a p s 20 p e rc en t of S outh V ietnam ese becam e p e rm a n e n t refu g ees (m illions m o re w ere tem p o rarily displaced) because of A m erican, A RV N, a n d less often V iet C o n g tactics. T he resu lt w a s the d e m o ra liz atio n a n d d e v a sta tio n of m u ch of a la n d p resu m ab ly u n d e r A m erican p rotectio n , as th e "h e a rts-a n d -m in d s" ap p ro a ch to the w a r m et sh a rp lim its: in the g allo w s h u m o r of A m erican sol­ d iers, "Just g rab th e gooks b y th e balls a n d th e ir h e a rts a n d m in d s w ill follow ." The w a rrin g p a rtie s differed, of course, n o t in in n ate cap acity for cru elty a n d d e stru c tio n b u t in th eir m ean s to act o n it a n d th e ir stak es in th e w ar. Increas­ in g ly su p p lie d b y C h in a a n d th e Soviet U nion, th e forces of C o m m u n ist N o rth V ietn am a n d th e V iet C ong w ere h a rd ly th e p rim itiv e p e a sa n t a rm y A m erican s so m etim es im agined; th ey w ere m o ld e d b y d ecad es of w a r for co n tro l of th eir la n d a n d d riv e n b y ideological a n d n a tio n alist zeal. P o ssessin g aw eso m e eco­ nom ic a n d technological resources, A m erican forces c o u ld carry o u t d e stru c ­ tio n w ith a k in d of cool ab an d o n . C u ltu ra lly rem o te fro m th e V ietnam ese, u n in ­ terested in seizing la n d a n d resources for th eir o w n sake, o ften p h y sically a n d em o tio nally d ista n t from th e d e stru c tio n as th ey lo b b ed shells a n d d ro p p e d b o m b s, th ey w ere p reo ccu p ied w ith tec h n iq u e — w ith th e p ro cess ra th e r th a n th e resu lts of d e liv erin g d estru ctio n . T h at o u tlo o k h e ig h te n e d in se n sitiv ity n o t o n ly to th e d e stru ctio n b u t to th e m a n y fo rm s of its futility (from th e d u d s a m o n g th e tons of A m erican o rd n an ce stre w n o v e r th e la n d th e en em y sal­ v a g ed m ateriel for its o w n b o o b y trap s, m ines, a n d o th e r explosives). S earch-and-destroy o p eratio n s, th e centerp iece of th e A m erican g ro u n d w ar, also p ro v e d futile. T hey w ere d e sig n e d to fin d th e e n e m y 's m a in forces a n d p ro ­ v oke b a ttle w ith th em , in w h ic h case A m erican s u su a lly p rev a ile d , b u t th e e n ­ em y w o u ld rarely en g ag e in b a ttle except o n term s favorable to itself. T he W ag­ n e ria n crescendo of ro arin g helicopters a n d ex p lo d in g b o m b s te le g ra p h e d to th e en em y th e im p e n d in g arriv al of A m erican o r A R V N forces, so th at, as o ne jo u rn alist o bserved, each o p e ra tio n "w a s like a sle d g eh a m m e r o n a floating cork." S uch o p e ra tio n s also d a m a g e d the m o rale a n d d iscip lin e of A m erican g ro u n d forces because th ey rarely y ield ed decisive battle. M en se n t o n too m a n y m ean in g less m issions, in w h ic h m in es a n d a m b u sh (or clim ate a n d d is­ ease) p o se d b ig g er th rea ts th a n a n y m asse d enem y, so m etim es v e n te d th eir fru stra tio n o n w h a te v e r village th ey stu m b le d u p o n , u n d e r a c o n fu sed a n d hypocritical "m ilitary policy th a t m a d e the killing a n d w o u n d in g of civilians ro u tin e." For g ro u n d tro o p s b ein g u se d as "b ait" to a ttrac t en em y forces— th e latter th e n p resu m ab ly to be c ru sh e d b y A m erican firep o w e r— th e sense of p o w erlessn ess w as especially acute. S uch co n d itio n s, reflecting th e m u rk y ideological a n d m ilitary ratio n ale for the A m erican effort, led A m erican sol­ d iers in V ietnam to d o u b t the w a r's p u rp o se far m o re th a n h a d th eir W orld W ar II c o u n te rp arts.71 In d eed , th e cru elty a n d futility of th eir m e th o d s w ere h a rd ly invisible to A m ericans w h o em p lo y ed them . T heir h u m o r in d ic ate d th eir cynicism ab o u t su ch m eth o d s, a n d g ro u n d troops, u n lik e b o m b e r p ilo ts o r artillery m en , w ere

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h a rd ly rem ote from the d estru ctio n . But th e ra p id ro tatio n of co m b at p erso n n el in a n d o u t of V ietnam , th eir n o to rio u s iso latio n from co m m an d ers, a n d W ash’ in g to n 's control o v er the w a r d isc o u rag e d g rass-ro o ts efforts to alter A m erican m ilitary m eth o d s. Som e retired gen erals also criticized th o se m e th o d s b u t, n o lo n g er in the system , th ey h a d little im p act o n it. A m erica's co u rse in V ietnam w a s sh a p e d b y its p rev io u s experience in w ar, ab o v e all W orld W ar H. M ore th a n h e u su a lly g o t c re d it for, it is tru e, LBJ d id try to go b e y o n d con v en tio n al v iew s of the C o ld W ar. H e "g lad ly b u ilt u p o n th e th aw in Soviet-A m erican relations th a t follow ed th e C u b a n m issile crisis,"72 a b a n d o n in g his strid e n t rhetoric a n d p u rs u in g m ajor n eg o tiatio n s w ith M os­ cow a n d (less fru itfu lly a n d o u t of p u b lic view ) w ith C hina. N ix o n w o u ld p u r­ su e d e te n te m ore forcefully. W h at w a s strik in g w a s th eir p ersisten ce in V iet­ n a m e v en as th e u n d e rly in g C o ld W ar ratio n ale w e a k e n e d — a t least in so far as it p e rta in e d to su p e rp o w e r conflict— finally to b e d e stro y e d b y N ixon. T hese m e n co u ld overcom e th e ir con v en tio n al view s of th e C old W ar, b u t n o t th eir W orld W ar E - b o m sense of w h a t w a r itself m u st e n ta il— of th e w a y to fig h t it a n d th e v icto ry it m u s t yield. Johnson, according to P aul C onkin, "w a s far less bellicose a n d a d v e n tu ro u s th a n R oosevelt a n d T ru m an , let alone K ennedy," a n d h e "w a n te d , above all else, to c o n ta in the V ietnam conflict, to p re v e n t it from tu rn in g in to th e o p e n in g p h a se s of W orld W ar E l." 73 In th a t re g a rd h e su cceed ed , a n d m e a su re d ag ain st w h a t h e k n ew b e st— W orld W ar E a n d th e th rea t of n u c le ar w a r— h is success w a s p ro fo u n d ly im p o rtan t. T h at s ta n d a rd of m e a su re m e n t w a s also p ro ­ fo u n d ly m islead in g , h ow ever. In V ietnam , d a n g e r lay n o t in h o rro rs alre ad y ex p erienced or feared b u t in n e w o nes m arg in al to A m erica's rem em b ered h is­ tory. T he closest analogies w ere to th e K orean W ar a n d th e French In d o ch in a w ar, n e ith e r fully scru tin ized b y LBJ o r m o st o th er leaders. T hey co u ld n e v er ex am ine the V ietnam W ar o n its o w n term s, o u tsid e th eir p reco n ceiv ed fram e­ w o rk s. A lth o u g h th ey lab o red to p re v e n t the V ietnam W ar from b eco m in g W orld W ar E o r W orld W ar IE, th ey also saw it as a sm all-scale p ro to ty p e of bo th . LBJ's tireless analogies to 1930s a p p e a se m e n t p u t V ietn am in th e fam iliar fram e­ w o rk , as d id his reference as Vice P re sid e n t to D iem as "th e W in sto n C h u rch ill of th e O rien t." So too d id reso rt to th e w eap o n ry , tactics, a n d sy stem s d ev el­ o p e d to w ag e w o rld w a r— th e m ass arm y, b ig -u n it tactics, a n d bom b in g . Since m o st lead ers d e riv e d th eir sense of w a r from W orld W ar II, th e ir focus o n tech­ n o lo g y a n d tech n iq u e cam e easily. A fter all, th e JCS ch airm a n ex p lain ed , "N o o n e ev er w o n a b a ttle sittin g o n h is ass." A s G en. W illiam W estm o relan d , com ­ m a n d e r of A m erican forces in the South, describ ed h is strateg y in 1967, "W e'll ju st go o n b lee d in g th em u n til H an o i w ak es u p to th e fact th a t th ey h av e b led th eir c o u n try to th e p o in t of n a tio n al d isa ster for g en eratio n s." T he stra in e d analo g ies of W estm o relan d 's m em o irs in d icated h is d e b t to W orld W ar II: h e d escrib ed th e Tet O ffensive of 1968 rem ark ab ly as b o th "a Pearl H a rb o r" for

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South V ietnam (alth o u g h th e w a r w a s y ears o ld b y 1968) a n d a d e fe at for th e en em y (w hich Pearl H a rb o r h a rd ly h a d been), w h o "c o u ld h a v e b e e n in d u c e d to en g ag e in serio u s a n d m ea n in g fu l n e g o tiatio n s" (Pearl H a rb o r b o re n o su c h result). Tet w a s also so m e h o w co m p arab le, h e th o u g h t in 1968, to th e B attle of th e Bulge, th e final G e rm a n co u n te rattac k of W orld W ar H; h e claim ed th a t after Tet th e en em y w a s o n its last legs.74 T he b o m b in g of N o rth V ietnam (even m o re to n n a g e fell o n th e S outh, Laos, a n d later C am bodia) rev ealed th e e n tra p m e n t of lea d ers in th e p a ra d ig m of W orld W ar H W alt Rostow , a m ajo r p ro p o n e n t of b o m b in g , d re w o n h is ex p eri­ ence as a n E ig h th A ir Force targ e tin g officer d u rin g th a t w ar. T he a ir com ­ m a n d e rs' effort to strike th e N o rth 's oil, steel, a n d electric p o w e r in d u strie s in­ accu rately p re su p p o se d a n eco n o m y ak in to G e rm a n y 's o r Ja p a n 's in 1944, ju st as th e h o p e to b re a k H a n o i's w ill p re s u m e d p o litical co n d itio n s ak in to 1945. Such h o p e s w ere d isp u te d b y som e in sid ers a n d h e d g e d b y o th ers g iv en to cau ­ tio u s rhetoric, b u t th e y p e rsisted . A s in W orld W ar n , once fru stra tio n m o u n te d , so too d id p ressu re to erase d istin c tio n s b e tw e e n civilian a n d m ili­ ta ry objectives: claim ing th a t civilians h a d left H a n o i a n d H a ip h o n g (h ard ly all h ad ), th e Joint C hiefs a rg u e d in 1968 th a t " a ir strik es in a n d a ro u n d th ese cities e n d a n g e r p e rso n n el p rim a rily e n g ag e d d irectly o r in d irectly in s u p p o rt of th e w a r effort."75 U sin g system s a n d strategies d e sig n e d for to tal w a r, lea d ers a n d strateg ists th o u g h t " th a t th e ir b o m b in g d o ctrin e su ite d th e n a tu re of th e w ar. In fact, a ir co m m an d e rs h a d m o ld e d the w a r to su it th eir d o c trin e." In so far as W orld W ar II w a s a n insufficient m odel. C o ld W ar crises w ere a n altern ativ e. "T he P resi­ d e n t's a d v isers," n o tes one h isto ria n , "lo o k ed to th e ex am p le of th e C u b a n m is­ sile crisis, in w h ic h th ey h a d coerced a n en em y far m o re p o w e rfu l th a n N o rth V ietn am in to b acking d o w n ." The co m p a riso n w a s n o t apt: C u b a w a s h a rd ly as im p o rta n t to M oscow as S outh V ietn am w a s to H an o i, since b o th w e re p a rts of th e sam e country, a n d h o w m u c h M oscow h a d "b ack ed d o w n " in 1962 w a s d isp u tab le.76 M u ch as in W orld W ar II, air p o w e r, im b u e d w ith m agical stre n g th a n d a d ­ v an ced b y p o w e rfu l b ureaucracies, w a s sim p ly red ire cted to n e w targ ets w h e n o ld o n es p ro v e d u n y ield in g . Initial failure to in tim id a te th e N o rth led policy­ m ak ers to focus o n the N o rth 's econom y o r th e su p p ly lines o v e r w h ic h allies su p p o rte d it a n d H an o i n o u rish e d its forces in th e South. A s in W orld W ar II, th e A m erican a rm e d forces "aim ed to w reck th e en em y eco n o m y to p ro d u c e a p ro stra te foe," b u t far from lim itin g th e N o rth 's im p o rts, "th e air c am p aig n fos­ tered th eir grow th. H a n o i's lea d ers p o in te d to th e b o m b in g to ex tract g rea ter su p p o rt from th e C hinese a n d Soviets." A s in K orea, aerial in te rd ic tio n of s u p ­ p ly ro utes im p o sed h ig h costs o n th e N o rth b u t d id n o t sto p th e flow so u th ­ w ard . A s th e b o m b in g b ecam e ro u tin iz e d a n d co m p o n en ts of th e n a v y a n d air force co m p eted for its spoils, it so m etim es b ecam e b iza rrely c o u n te rp ro d u c ­ tive. O n occasion, co m m an d e rs se n t m ore so rties th a n n ecessary b ecau se "if

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y o u d o n o t fly th em , y o u c an m ak e a case th a t y o u d id n o t really n e e d th a t m an y a n y w ay ." A s one air force colonel ack n o w led g ed , "B om bs o r n o b o m b s, y o u 'v e g o t to h av e m ore A ir Force ov er th e ta rg e t th a n N avy." T h at m en tality also se n t th e b o m b ers to th e in filtratio n ro u tes o n su c h a ro u tin e sc h ed u le th a t th e e n ­ e m y 's tru ck s w o u ld m ove off th e ro ad , sit o u t th e attacks, a n d th e n resu m e th eir trav els u n h a rm e d . W hile o ld p ro p e lle r aircraft w ere o ften m o re effective for m issio n s in th e South, th e air force in sisted o n u sin g , a n d th ereb y justify in g , its b ig B-52s a n d jet fighters.77 C ritics later saw th e b o m b in g as c rip p le d b y Jo h n so n 's m eticu lo u s o v e rsig h t of it a n d his fear th a t u n lea sh in g it risk e d w a r w ith C h in a o r th e Soviet U nion. In su b stan ce if n o t degree, ho w ev er, o v e rsig h t w a s h a rd ly new . E ven in W orld W ar H, w ith all w ra p s p re su m a b ly off, civilian lea d ers ru le d places like Rom e a n d K yoto o û t of b o u n d s for th e bom bers. D efeat in V ietn am sim p ly m a d e re­ strictio n s co n tro v ersial th a t h a d seem ed u n e v e n tfu l in a v icto rio u s w ar, ju st as m a n y of th is w a r 's follies w ere n o t u n iq u e to it, o n ly u n iq u e ly ex p o sed b y it. In a n y ev ent. W hite H o u se restra in ts so o n relax ed — "T he p e n c h a n t of n ig g lin g officials in W ashington for q u ib b lin g o v e r B-52 b o m b targ ets h a d p a sse d ," W estm o relan d later a d m itte d , a n d Jo h n so n a n d M cN am ara "affo rd ed m e m a rk e d in d e p e n d e n c e in h o w I ra n th e w a r w ith in th e b o rd e rs of S outh V iet­ n a m ," th e lim its of h is authority. T he "a ir chiefs' co n v ictio n th a t th ey w o u ld h av e g a in e d victo ry h a d Johnson g iv en th e m a free h a n d ," o n e h isto ria n sy m ­ p a th e tic to th e ir cause b lu n tly co n clu d ed , "lack ed su b stan ce." A m erican b o m b ­ in g d id escalate in a g ra d u a l fashion th a t d ilu te d its shock v alu e, b u t so h a d b o m b in g in v icto rio u s A m erican w a rs, a n d th ere is n o ev id en ce th a t sh a rp e r escalation w o u ld h av e m a d e H a n o i a su b m issiv e n eg o tiato r.78 M ore likely, b o m b in g the N o rth w a s d e stin e d to h av e lim ited utility, a n d its m o n u m e n ta l scale w a s a b ig g er p ro b lem th a n a n y restrain t. T he b o m b in g a n ­ tag o n ize d w o rld o p in io n w h ile achieving lim ited effect, a n d d id so a t g rea t cost in A m erican p lan es, m oney, a n d lives; in 1967 alone, o v e r 300 aircraft w ere lost in o p e ra tio n s a g ain st the N o rth , a n d H a n o i seized h u n d re d s of A m erican PO W s w h o se fate en ticed th e N ix o n a d m in istra tio n in to p ro lo n g in g th e w ar. N o r w a s a crip p lin g re stra in t e v id e n t to th e N o rth : th e A m erican -estim ated d e a th toll of 52,000 civilians a m o n g 18 m illio n N o rth V ietnam ese d u rin g th e 1965-1968 b o m b in g p ro p o rtio n a te ly w a s little less th a n civilian losses in G er­ m a n y a n d Jap an d u rin g W orld W ar II. T hose d e a th s w ere n o t evid en ce of g en o ­ cide, in so far as th ey failed th e test of in te n tio n a lity u su a lly acco rd ed th a t te rm (perversely, A m erica's d e stru c tio n of its n o m in a l ally. S o u th V ietnam , m o re p lau sib ly m e t th a t test). N or, h o w ev er, w ere th ey ev id en ce of severe scru p les in th e W hite H ouse. But scru p les m e a su re d b y w h a t sta n d a rd s? Like m u c h else, th e h a w k s' c ritiq u e of lim its o n the b o m b in g in d ic ate d th e ir d e p e n d e n c e o n W orld W ar II as th e s ta n d a rd of m ea su re m e n t, o n e th a t d ic ta te d to tal aerial w ar, in clu d in g use of n u c le ar w e a p o n s— the w e a p o n of choice in 1945— as w a s a d ­ v o cated increasingly after 1965 (by W estm o relan d , am o n g others).

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M ore th a n a n y o th er facet of th e w a r effort, th e b o m b in g also d iv id e d A m eri­ cans, p ro m p tin g b o th s te m o p p o sitio n a n d sh a rp p re ssu re to escalate it. W h en O p e ra tio n R olling T h u n d e r b e g a n in 1965, m ail to th e W h ite H o u se ra n a g ain st it, sen ato rs criticized it, a n d c a m p u s teach-ins s p ru n g u p to p ro te st it. T here w a s as y e t n o n e of th e violence a n d little of th e tu rm o il o v e r th e w a r th a t w ere to com e. In M ay, Secretary of State D ean R usk co u ld sp e ak to th e Soviet a m b a s­ sa d o r dism issiv ely of th e "v e ry sm all d o m estic p re ssu re " a g ain st a d m in istra ­ tio n policy, in p a rt because h e w a n te d to triv ialize th a t p ressu re .79 Still, th e p o r­ ten ts w ere om inous. W h y th e b o m b in g trig g e red m o re c o n tro v ersy in 1965 th a n th e d isp a tc h of g ro u n d forces m ay seem p u z z lin g ; th e a ir w ar, w a g e d b y v o lu n te ers, carried few o bvious risks of e n ta n g lin g conscripts in b attle. B ut escalatio n of th e g ro u n d w a r w a s less su d d e n , a n d it w a s s h ro u d e d in o b fu scatio n im p o ssib le in h a n d lin g th e air w a r— th a t w a s to o n o isy a n affair to k eep q u iet, a n d since its p u rp o se w a s to se n d signals, it h a d to b e tru m p e te d loudly. In tu rn , its a d v e n t ale rte d m a n y A m ericans, especially th o se sk eptical of its efficacy, th a t a m ajo r g ro u n d w a r m ig h t follow . It also ta p p e d d e e p fears a b o u t w ar. H o w e v e r grisly, a g ro u n d w a r h a d too little technological d a zz le to trig g e r d o o m sd a y n ig h t­ m ares, b u t air w a r d id , especially since it fe a tu red b o m b ers o rig in ally d e sig n e d to w a g e n u c le ar w ar. M oreover, th e air w a r in 1965 clash ed w ith Jo h n so n 's re a ssu rin g w o rd s a b o u t it. W hile stressin g th e "g rea t stakes in th e b alan ce" a n d h is w illin g n ess to d o "e v e ry th in g n ecessary " to p ro tec t S outh V ietnam , Jo h n so n d e n ie d th a t th e b o m b in g in v o lv ed a n y "ch an g e of p u rp o se ," h o p e d o n ly "to slo w d o w n d ie ag g ression" a n d "convince" H a n o i of A m erican resolve, a d m itte d th a t "a ir a t­ tacks alone w ill n o t accom plish all of th ese p u rp o se s," a n d re itera te d h is d esire for peace. H is cau tio u s w o rd s seem ed o u t of ste p w ith a choice of w e a p o n ry associated w ith A rm ag e d d o n .80 LBJ w as of course try in g to d a m p e n th e p a ssio n s w a r arouses. A s h e com ­ m en ted in 1967, "If h isto ry in d icts u s for V ietnam , I th in k it w ill b e for fig h tin g a w a r w ith o u t try in g to stir u p p a trio tism ." It w a s a d isin g e n u o u s p o stu re , over­ lo o k in g h is a d m in istra tio n 's efforts (often co v ert o r illegal) to sh a p e o p in io n o n th e w ar, a n d im p ly in g m an ly self-restraint w h e n , as Johnson sen sed , h e w a s u n a b le to "stir u p p a trio tism " e v en if h e tried . In a n y ev en t, w a r stirre d p a ssio n w h a te v e r his w ishes, a n d LBJ him self o o zed p a ssio n fro m ev ery p o re. A ll h e co u ld d o w as p le a d im m o d e ra tely for m o d era tio n , p a ssio n a te ly d eclaim in g th e v irtu e s of dispassio n. N o w o n d e r A m ericans w ere co n fu sed .81 T heir confusion w as e v id e n t in th e ju m b le d alig n m en ts of p u b lic o p in io n a t m id -d ecad e. It w as n o t ju st th a t A m ericans d iv id e d , b u t th a t th ey d id so in w ay s th a t defied categorization. E xperts a n d o rd in a ry citizens trie d to im p o se clarity o n those d iv isio n s— b in a ry classifications of h a w k v e rsu s d o v e. R ight v e rsu s Left, conservative v e rsu s radical, a n d o ld v e rsu s y o u n g w ere com m on-

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place b y th e late 1960s— a n d to fin d a trajectory in th em , ab o v e all sw elling o p ­ p o sitio n to th e w ar. W hile n o t w ith o u t m erit, those efforts failed to c a p tu re h o w fam iliar lines d iv id in g p u b lic o p in io n h a d becom e b a d ly scram bled. B oth o p p o sitio n to and s u p p o rt for th e w a r g rew in 1966 a n d 1967. M oreover, o p p o sitio n em b raced d isp a ra te o u tlo o k s— a h a rd core o p p o sin g th e w a r o n a n y term s, o th ers of a fish-or-cut-bait m en tality ("W in o r get o u t," o n e co n g ressm an a d v ise d Jo h n so n in early 1966), a n d elite skeptics o n th e w a r like d ip lo m a ts G eorge Ball a n d G eorge K ennan w h o h a d o n ly c o n te m p t for a n g ry y o u n g leftists, "th o se p e r­ v e rte d a n d w illful a n d sto n y -h earted y o u th ," as K en n an called them . D espite stereo types, "y o u th " to o k n o u n ita ry tu rn a g ain st th e w ar, b u t like o th e r A m eri­ can s d iv id e d along com plex lines of region, race, religion, a n d class. Ideological d iv isio n s werfe also confusing. In B erkeley in 1966, o p p o sitio n to th e d ra ft " d re w su p p o rt fro m th e R ight" as w ell as th e Left, b o th acco m m o d atin g "each o th er to m ak e b itte r a n d a n g ry attacks a g ain st th e liberal, an ti-co m m u n ist gov­ e rn m e n t th ey b eliev ed o p p resse d th em ." In rhetoric, too, th e w a r p ro d u c e d stra n g e affinities: w h ile som e A m ericans w ere w illin g to d e stro y V ietn am in o rd e r to save it, som e rad icals a t B erkeley w ere proclaim in g , "W e'v e g o t to sta rt o v er a n d w reck e v ery th in g before w e can sav e it."82 T here w ere, of course, p a tte rn s in this m ae lstro m — th e challenge fro m m an y d irections to liberal a n tico m m u n ism — b u t th o se p a tte rn s w ere n o t alw ay s clear, conclusive, o r th e m o st im p o rtan t. L iberal a n tico m m u n ism b o re the b ru n t of attack becau se its e x p o n en ts w e re in p o w er, b u t o th er b a stio n s of id eo l­ o g y w ere also challenged. G o ld w a ter co n serv atism rem a in e d sh a tte re d b y th e 1964 election, w h ile n e w form s of co n serv atism (w ith w h ic h G o ld w a ter w a s n o t alw ay s sym pathetic) took shape. T he attack o n accepted n o rm s of sex, g en ­ der, a n d c u ltu re — m o st associated w ith a n em erg in g "co u n te rcu ltu re " b u t h a rd ly confined to it— h a d n o single targ et, rilin g liberal an tico m m u n ists as w ell as conservativ e d e fe n d ers of fam ily a n d p atriarc h al authority. C o n tag io u s as it w as, th e challenge to a u th o rity racked th e ch allen g ers them selves. L eftist rad icals tra in e d th eir sig h ts o n "th e e sta b lish m e n t"— th e e n tre n ch e d m ach in ­ ery of racism , im p erialism , m ilitarism , a n d c o rp o ra te cap italism — b u t also m e t rebellion in th eir o w n ranks. So confusing w ere th ese p a tte rn s th a t b y th e late 1960s A m erican society seem ed "to be u n rav e lin g ," n o tes h isto ria n W illiam R orabaugh, b u t in fact "it w a s o n ly cen tralized au th o rity th a t w a s in decline. A t th e local level, those o n th e b o tto m saw less a d isin te g ratio n of society th a n a reb irth of c o m m u n ity sp irit a n d in d iv id u a l lib erty in o p p o sitio n to a co rru p t, b u reau cratic social o rd e r."83 T h o u g h m o st associated w ith leftist radicalism , th a t sense of reb irth sw ay ed m o v em en ts o n th e rig h t as w ell. W hy d id the w a r u n le a sh su c h d iv erse reactions? A lth o u g h o ften e m p h a ­ sized, failure to w in th e w a r w a s on ly one cataly st to th e convulsions. C ertain ly d efeat in w a r w a s sh a tte rin g to m a n y A m erican s— it seem ed to d efy th eir his-

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tory, to m ock decad es of m ig h ty e x p e n d itu re s in b e h alf of m ilitary p o w er, a n d to be d o u b ly galling com ing a t the h a n d s of a n o n w h ite, technologically in ferio r o p p o n en t. D efeat w a s n o t the o n ly factor, ho w ev er, since A m erican s' d iv isio n s em erg ed before d e fe at seem ed certain a n d in som e w a y s w ere d eclin in g b y 1975, w h e n defeat b ecam e final. A m ericans d iv id e d o v e r th e V ietnam W ar for m a n y reasons. M ost obviously, n atio n al lead ers n e v er p e rsu asiv e ly d e fin e d th e A m erican in terests o r id eals a t stake in the V ietnam W ar, m eetin g p ro b lem s e v id e n t o n a lesser scale in th e K orean W ar. A t the tim e, th eir inability o ften seem ed d u e to p a rtic u la r p ro b ­ lem s, like LBJ's fam o u s "cred ib ility g a p ." The failu re to e x p lain th e w a r c o n tin ­ u e d u n d e r th ree P resid en ts from tw o po litical p a rtie s a n d d e sp ite sh a rp ch an g es in m ilitary strategy, h o w ev er, w h ic h su g g e sts th a t th e w a r d efied an y convincing rationale, as m a n y lea d in g C o ld W arriors in d e e d co n clu d ed b y 1968. The co nvulsions set loose b y the w a r w e re also resp o n ses to a q u a rte rc en tu ry 's m ilitarization, a n d to a sp iratio n s a n d anxieties lo n g su p p re sse d b y it. A s G odfrey H o d g so n later a rg u e d , "T he w a r b ecam e th e o rg an iz in g p rin cip le a ro u n d w h ic h all th e d o u b ts a n d d isillu sio n m en ts of th e y ears of crisis since 1963, a n d all th e d e e p e r d isco n ten ts h id d e n u n d e r th e g lossy surface of th e con­ fid en t years, coalesced into g reat rebellion."84 T he w a r w a s h a rd ly th e sole cause of th o se d isc o n te n ts— th e tro u b le d sta te of race relatio n s, for exam ple, p rec ed e d John so n 's escalatio n — b u t to m a n y of its o p p o n e n ts th e w a r rev ealed h o w th e sam e evil sy stem lu rk e d b e h in d d isp a ra te ills in A m erican life. M ost of all, A m erica's w a r in V ietnam v io la ted th e tacit b a rg a in w h ic h s u p ­ p o rte d the n a tio n 's m ilitarizatio n after 1945. M ilitarizatio n h a d b e e n to le rate d as lo n g as it h a d seem ed c o n g ru e n t w ith affluence a n d p ro g ress at h o m e, a n d o n th e p ro m ise th a t th e p o ssessio n a n d d isp la y of A m erican p o w er, n o t its ac­ tu a l use, w o u ld largely suffice. T he K orean W ar h a d b o th sealed th a t b a rg a in a n d n early u p se t it. V ietnam d e stro y e d it b y w e ak e n in g th e A m erican econ­ om y, b y jeo p a rd iz in g refo rm a t ho m e, a n d b y sh o w in g th a t th e m ere d isp la y of p o w e r w o u ld n o t suffice. M ilitarization sh a p e d n o t o n ly th e n a tu re of reactions to th e V ietn am W ar b u t th e lan g u ag e u se d to express them . A n y w a r p ro d u c e s su p e rh e a te d rhetoric, b u t political rhetoric h a d lo n g b e en m ilitarized for A m erican s in th e ir age of p e rp e tu a l crisis, all the m ore so as Johnson escalated h is w a rs o n v a rio u s social a n d econom ic ills. W ith w a r n o w a n in d efin ab ly b ro a d p h e n o m e n o n a n d its lan g u ag e n o w u se d to d iv erse p u rp o se s, it w a s p e rh a p s inev itab le th a t th e d iv i­ sions a g g ra v ate d b y the w a r— ov er race a n d p o v erty , g e n d e r a n d cu ltu re, a n d th e w a r itself— w o u ld b e ex p ressed in w a r's rhetoric. H ence Jo h n so n saw trai­ to rs a n d enem ies, black m ilitan ts foresaw rev o lu tio n a ry w ar, rad ical o p p o n e n ts of th e w a r saw a fascist "A m erika," a n d m a n y A m erican s felt th ey w ere p lu n g ­ in g into a w a r a t hom e. "For ten years," ex p lain s one h isto rian , "A m erican s w a g e d o v er V ietnam a w a r b y m e ta p h o r for th e sake of sym bols of m ea n in g to

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th em selv es."85 T h at " w a r b y m e ta p h o r" d id n o t cause d iv isio n s am o n g A m eri­ cans, b u t it m a d e th em m ore u n b rid g eab le, th e stak es in th em m o re absolute. A lth o u g h th e " w a r b y m e ta p h o r" ra g e d in d isp e rse d a n d localized form s, b y 1966 its e ru p tio n s w ere e v id e n t in n a tio n al politics. T he Senate Foreign Rela­ tio n s C o m m itte e 's telev ised h e arin g s o n th e w a r w ere o n e sign. O d d ly e n o u g h for th e m a n in charge of foreign policy. Secretary of State D ean R u sk saw th e U n ited States as losing control of its destiny: it w a s in a w a r "w h e re th e in itia­ tiv e is n o t o u rs, w h ere w e d id n o t sta rt it, a n 4 w h e re w e d id n 't w a n t it to b eg in w ith " — a n d w h e re d e fe at m e a n t the rollback of A m erican p o w e r ev ery w h ere. In co n trast. S enato r F u lb rig h t ex p ressed confidence in A m erican p o w er. H e d o u b te d th a t "if w e sh o u ld m ak e a com prom ise, th e n all th e w o rld w ill collapse b ecau se w e h av e b e e n defeated. This c o u n try is m u c h too stro n g . . . th a t it w o u ld suffer a n y g reat setback." O th e rs attack ed th e official claim th a t H a n o i w a s w a g in g w a r across a n in te rn atio n al b o u n d a ry . V ietn am w a s a civil a n d rev­ o lu tio n a ry w ar, m a in ta in e d Sen. F rank C h u rch , w h o c o u ld n o t "rem e m b e r m a n y rev o lu tio n s th a t h av e b e e n fo u g h t in sp le n d id isolation. T here w ere as m a n y F renchm en a t Y orktow n w h e n C o rn w allis su rre n d e re d as th ere w ere A m erican C o n tin en tals." Tw o w id e ly a d m ire d retired g en erals, Jam es G avin a n d M a tth e w R idgw ay, criticized escalation in th e A m erican effort, th o u g h n o t its p u rp o se s. Form er M arine C o rp s C o m m a n d a n t D av id S h o u p so o n w e n t fu r­ ther. S teeped in a p re -W o rld W ar II tra d itio n of an tim ilita rism a n d a n ti­ im p erialism (the latter so m etim es co u ch ed in racist term s), S h o u p u rg e d A m er­ ican w ith d ra w a l a n d excoriated th e a rm e d forces a n d th e n a tio n for em b racin g " o u r m ilitaristic cu ltu re." A s p u b lic atio n of F u lb rig h t's The Arrogance of Power in d icated , 1966 w a s th e y e ar w h e n th e so lid arity of political elites o n th e w a r b e g a n to dissolve.86 T he political a g en d a of black A m erican s also crossed th e th resh o ld th a t year. K ing, a p acifist lo n g o p p o se d to th e V ietn am W ar, n o w sh a rp e n e d h is critique. O n A p ril 4,1967, h e la m en te d h o w th e stru g g le a g ain st racism a n d p o v e rty h a d b e e n "b ro k en a n d ev iscerated as if it w ere so m e id le p la y th in g of a society go n e m a d o n w a r." "W e w e re," h e rec o u n ted h is th o u g h ts, "tak in g th e black y o u n g m e n w h o h a d b e e n c rip p led b y o u r society a n d se n d in g th e m 8,000 m iles aw ay to g u a ra n te e liberties in S outheast A sia w h ic h th ey h a d n o t fo u n d in South­ w e ste rn G eorgia a n d E ast H a rle m ." H e feared th a t w a r ab ro a d sa n ctio n ed w a r at h o m e b y a rm e d black m e n w h o "ask ed if o u r o w n n a tio n w a s n 't u sin g m a s­ sive d o ses of violence to solve its p ro b lem s." By th e n too. K ing a n d o th ers, like lea d ers of the S tu d e n t N o n v io len t C o o rd in atin g C o m m ittee, w ere su p p o rtin g resistance to th e d ra ft— a m ajor challenge, g iv en th e m ilita ry 's d e p e n d e n c e o n recru itin g a n d c o n scrip tin g black m en. O n occasion K ing still w re ste d lev erag e fro m C o ld W ar hypocrisies: " N o th in g p ro v id e s th e C o m m u n ists w ith a b e tte r clim ate for e x p an sio n a n d in filtratio n ," h e w a rn e d , " th a n th e c o n tin u ed alli­ ance of o u r n a tio n w ith racism a n d e x p lo itatio n th ro u g h o u t th e w o rld ." A ny­ th in g A frican-A m ericans m ig h t g a in from su ch leverage, h o w ev er, p a le d for

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h im in co m p ariso n to th e w a r 's costs for A m erican s a n d V ietnam ese. "Som e­ h o w this m ad n e ss m u st cease." T h o u g h o ften re g a rd e d as "black" ra th e r th a n " a n tiw a r" leaders, figures like K ing w ere a key ele m e n t in a g ro w in g , chaotic resistance w h ich also in clu d ed pacifists, m a n y in th e o ld Left, a n d rad ical s tu ­ d e n ts.87 The faultlines am o n g A m ericans also ex te n d ed b e y o n d issu es of th e w a r it­ self. T he estab lish m en t in 1966 of th e N a tio n a l O rg a n iz atio n of W o m en a n d a m ore m ilita n t gay rig h ts m o v em en t in d ic ate d w id e n in g d iv isio n s o v e r g e n d e r a n d sexual preference. T hese g ro u p s som etim es d re w o n th e c o n tag io u s ex am ­ p le set b y th e a n tiw a r a n d civil rig h ts m o v em en ts, b u t th e y also sh o w e d m o re com plex relatio n sh ip s to th e w a r 's politics. Ju st as o n e w o m a n co m p lain ed in 1964 th a t a fem ale in the S tu d e n t N o n v io len t C o o rd in atin g C o m m ittee "is o ften in th e sam e p o sitio n as th a t to k en N eg ro h ired in a c o rp o ra tio n ," w o m e n in th e a n tiw a r m o v em en t fo u n d th e ir political a n d sex u al su b serv ien ce to m ale le a d ­ e rsh ip galling. T h o u g h w o m e n h a d lo n g h a d a m ajor role in a n tiw a r o rg an iz­ ing, m o u n tin g m ale resistance to the V ietn am W ar te n d e d to sq u eeze th e m out; b y 1965, one m a n later o b serv ed , "w o m e n m a d e p e a n u t b u tte r, w a ite d o n ta ­ bles, cleaned u p , g o t laid. T h at w a s th e ir role." By 1967, g e n d e r issu es sp lit th e a n tiw a r m o v em en t, th o u g h n o t alw ay s alo n g sim p le m ale-fem ale lines. "C a u g h t u p in o u trag e a b o u t th e w a r a n d e m p a th iz in g w ith th eir m ale frien d s," m a n y w o m en , like m o st m en in the m o v em en t, "p erceiv ed 'w o m e n 's issu e s' as secondary, selfish, divisive, a n d th re a te n in g ."88 A n em erg in g critique of scientific expertise g ave intellectu al b a llast to v a r­ io u s challenges to authority, lin k in g th e m to o ld er d o u b ts a b o u t m ilitarizatio n . Science and Survival (1966), b y W ashington U n iv ersity b o ta n ist B arry C o m ­ m oner, m o v ed h im from h is earlier an tin u cle ar activism in to a larg e r e n v iro n ­ m en tal crusade. C iting th e sen satio n al electric p o w e r b lack o u t of th e N o rth e a st in N o v em b er 1965, h e ask ed , "Is science g e ttin g o u t of h a n d ? " T he affirm ative an sw e r em erg ed in his d iscu ssio n of th e "g ree n h o u se effect" a n d th e conse­ quences of a n u c le ar w ar. C o m m o n er im p lied th a t w h a t e n d a n g e re d n a tio n al secu rity w as n o lo n g er A m erica's enem ies b u t th e v e ry m ean s u se d to u p h o ld it. The w a rn in g w a s all the m ore telling for its so m b er caution. N o se n satio n al diatrib e, it cam e from a scientist w h o saw "th e e n o rm o u s b en efits" b e sto w e d b y science as w ell as "its frig h tfu l th reats," th e k n o w le d g e of w h ic h w a s g e n e ra t­ in g "political crisis." "Science can reveal the d e p th of th is crisis, b u t o n ly social action can resolve it."89 M ore fam o u s intellectuals w ere a lre ad y calling for su c h action. T he p o e t R obert L ow ell led th em b y his p u b lic refusal to a tte n d th e W hite H o u se Festival of th e A rts in June 1965, w h e re John H ersey p ro te ste d th e b o m b in g b y rea d in g excerpts from Hiroshima. O v er th e n ex t few y ears, w rite rs like N o rm a n M ailer, S usan Sontag, D w ig h t M acdonald, H a n n a h A re n d t, a n d lin g u ist N o a m C h o m sk y a rg u e d , as th eir v iew s h av e b e e n su m m arize d , th a t "A m erica a p ­ p e ared to b e in the h a n d s of a technological elite th a t w a s d e b au c h in g th e

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A m erican lan d sca p e a n d lu stin g after w o rld d o m in io n ." Som e ev en e n d o rse d a rm e d resistance to the elite: "M orality, like politics, sta rts a t th e b a rre l of a g u n ," ra n A n d re w K o p k in d 's co n tro v ersial o b serv atio n in 1967. To m a n y leftist critics, e v en q u estio n s a b o u t w h y th e U n ited States w a s losing th e w a r w ere in fu riatin g , insofar as th ey im p lied v a lid ity to th e A m erican cause o r a n A m eri­ can d e stin y to w in w a rs.90 A su sta in ed a ssa u lt o n m ilitarizatio n b y intellectu als w as slo w er to em erge. M oral o u trag e, focused o n evil lead ers a n d im m ed iate d a n g ers, p re c lu d e d sy s­ tem atic analysis am o n g m o st intellectuals, w h o o ften still g ave m ilitarizatio n sh o rt shrift. The "m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex is n o t o n e b u t m a n y com plexes," w ro te G ra n t M cC onnell, seem ing to d im in ish its p o w er, ju st as h e dism issiv ely ch aracterized "p reo c cu p a tio n w ith w a r" as "o n e of th e u n p le a sa n t realities of g o v e rn m e n t." H isto rian C h risto p h e r Lasch, a lead in g rad ical critic, also said little a b o u t m ilitarizatio n , focusing in stea d o n flaw s in th e A m erican intellec­ tu a l trad itio n ; p reo c cu p a tio n w ith th e ir o w n sin s w a s o n e reaso n in tellectu als w ere slow to e n g ag e m ilitarization. Scholars of a M arx ist b e n t w ere rea d ier to tackle it h e a d on. A m erican m ilitarizatio n , th ey a rg u e d , flo w ed from th e n e e d to ab sorb su rp lu s cap ital a n d the A m erican o lig arch y 's "im p lacab le h a tre d of socialism ," a n d it enjoyed "m ajestic u n ity " in C o n g ress d e sp ite E isen h o w er's "p o ig n a n t Farew ell A d d ress." But M arxists' e x p lan atio n s w e re n o t alw ay s s u p ­ ple, certain ly n o t th e a ssertio n th a t "a socialist society co n tain s n o class o r g ro u p w hich, like th e b ig capitalists of th e im p erialist co u n tries, sta n d s to g ain from a policy of su b ju g atin g o th er n a tio n s a n d p e o p les." A n d th eir claim s w ere n o t w id e ly p e rsu asiv e a m o n g y o u n g e r leftists. M eanw hile, m o st liberal in tel­ lectuals w ere w a ry of seeing system ic failure a t w o rk in th e w ar. T hey e ith er relu ctan tly em b raced th e w a r o r saw it as a tragic m istak e b o m of o u td a te d as­ su m p tio n s a b o u t a m onolithic c o m m u n ist enem y, th o u g h F u lbright, a bell­ w e th e r of th e em erg in g liberal critique, saw a m o re fu n d a m e n ta l im p erial a rro ­ gance at w ork. O n the w hole, in tellectu als' e x am in atio n s of m ilitarizatio n w ere m o re th e p ro d u c t of V ietnam -era crisis th a n its catalyst.91 Still, d iv erse form s of ferm en t w e re strik in g ly e v id e n t b y 1966. A t th e sam e tim e, th e stru c tu ra l u n d e rp in n in g s of A m erican m ilitarizatio n w ere ero d in g , a lth o u g h su c h erosion w a s slow a n d less e v id e n t a t th e tim e. T he b ip o la r in ter­ n a tio n al system , once d o m in a te d b y W ashin g to n a n d M oscow , fu rth e r sp lin ­ tered. N o t o n ly w a s Sino-Soviet riv alry n o w u n m istak ab le, th e W estern bloc w as also fraying. D eG aulle w ith d re w French m ilitary forces fro m N A TO a n d th e V ietnam W ar taxed the W estern alliance: E u ro p ea n lead ers resen ted A m eri­ can d e m a n d s for th eir su p p o rt of a losing v e n tu re (as th ey saw it) a n d th e fact th a t th e w a r d istrac te d W ashington from a tte n d in g to E u ro p e's needs. T hose frictions, th eir im p o rtan c e o ften e x ag g erated a t th e tim e b y A m erican lead ers, w ere survivable. M ore tro u b leso m e w ere econom ic changes. P ro sp er­ ity, rev v ed u p fu rth e r b y w a r sp e n d in g , still flow ed, a lth o u g h in flatio n a n d o th er effects of the w a r h it som e sectors like th e h o u sin g in d u stry . L o ng-term

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tre n d s w ere m o re om inous. M ost W estern in d u stria l n a tio n s p a sse d th e U n ited States in the 1960s in g ro w th rates for p e rso n al in co m es— as d id a few, b y so m e sta n d a rd s, in ab so lu te incom e levels— a n d th e U n ited States w a s slid in g to ­ w a rd its first n e g ativ e tra d e b alance in a century. M o to r vehicle p ro d u c tio n in th e U n ited States p e a k e d a t m id -d e ca d e, th e n a b ru p tly slid, ju st w h e n sales in th e U n ited States of the V olksw agen Beetle so ared a n d Jap an ese a u to p ro d u c ­ tio n rose e x p o n en tially (exceeding A m erica's b y th e m id-1970s). Such shifts, b arely e v id e n t in 1966 a n d h a rd ly traceable o n ly to m ilitariza­ tion, h a d little im m e d ia te political effect. T hey n o n eth eless jeo p a rd iz e d th e tacit b a rg a in b y w h ic h A m ericans accepted m ilitarizatio n in re tu rn for th e affluence it p re su m a b ly en g en d e re d . T he regional fo u n d a tio n of th a t b a rg a in w a s also sagging. D efense d o lla rs h a d lo n g flo w ed h eav ily to th e " g u n b e lt" (coastal N e w E n g lan d a n d th e S outh, a n d th e Far W est). "V ietnam , u n lik e K orea, d id n o t rev erse this sh ift in th e cen ter of gravity ," a n d m a m m o th sp e n d in g o n th e space race a g g ra v a te d it.92 W orld W ar II a n d K orea h a d sh o w ere d th e ir eco­ nom ic b enefits w idely. Because th e V ietnam W ar d id n o t, it a g g ra v a te d re­ gional rivalries o v e r th e w isd o m a n d d istrib u tio n of d efen se s p e n d in g — it w a s n o t en tirely coincidental th a t m a n y lea d in g a n tiw a r co n g ressm en cam e fro m states w h ic h se n t th e ir sons off to w a r a n d g o t few d o lla rs back. T here w as, of course, n o g u a ra n te e th a t th e w a r 's b alefu l effects w o u ld foster a b ro a d challenge to m ilita riza tio n itself. T hose effects led som e to red o u b le th e effort to w in th e w ar: victo ry w o u ld e rase th e p ain . O th e rs saw th e w a r as th e w a rp e d p ro d u c t of a fu n d a m e n ta lly h e a lth y system , w h ic h m ig h t b e resto re d once the w o u n d of th e w a r w a s cauterized. E specially for som e w o rrie d m ili­ tary officers, ra p id extrication from V ietnam w a s a w a y to p reserv e th e m il­ itarized system , n o t the first ste p in d ism a n tlin g it. Still, e v en th o se p o sitio n s o p e n ed th e d o o r to d e e p e r in q u iry a b o u t A m erica's co u rse in a m ilita rize d age. W as 1966, th en , th e w a te rsh e d y e ar of th e V ietn am W ar a n d th e ag e of m il­ itarization? It w a s in 1968, after all, th a t A m erican forces in V ietn am n e ared th eir p e a k of o v e r a half-m illion p erso n n el; th a t reactions to th e Tet O ffensive forced A m erica's slow re tre a t from V ietn am to begin; th a t Jo h n so n sh ra n k fro m ru n n in g for reelection; th a t a ssassin atio n s a n d police violence tro u b le d so m an y A m ericans. S uch d ram a tic sig n p o sts w ere lacking in 1966. P erh aps the w h o le V ietnam e ra lacked su ch signposts. W orld W ar II h a d h a d D ecem ber 7, D -D ay, V-E Day, a n d V-J Day. N o single d a y m a rk e d th e V ietn am W ar; e v en 1968 em braced a co n fu sin g ru s h of ev en ts ra th e r th a n a single com ­ m a n d in g m om ent. In d ee d , w h a t m a rk e d the era w a s a seem in g loss of th e d e fin ­ in g m o m ent, a n d therefore of a w ell-anchored , w id e ly sh a red sense of h isto ry itself. A t least since Pearl H arb o r, A m ericans p lau sib ly h a d seen th em selv es as u n d e rg o in g com m on, n a tio n al experiences reflected in a u n ifo rm m ed ia a n d political culture. But after th e m id-1960s, co m m o n ex p erien ces seem ed to b e a r d o w n o n differen t g ro u p s o n n o co m m o n tim etable, as th e w a r a n d th e stru g g les ov er it w a sh e d u n e v en ly ov er the U n ited States. F u rth e r d isto rtin g

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th ese m a tte rs w a s th e ten d e n cy later to consig n to "th e sixties" all so rts of tu r­ m o il th a t sp illed o v e r in to th e 1970s o r o n ly b e g a n then. T he d isso lu tio n of a u n ifo rm sense of h isto ry w a s d u e n o t to so m e inexplica­ b le fra g m e n ta tio n b u t to th e n a tu re of the V ietn am W ar a n d its c o n d u c t b y A m erican leaders. T he w a r lacked the precise sta rt a n d e n d th at, a t least in ret­ ro sp ect, m a rk e d W orld W ar II a n d Korea. N a tio n a l lead ers, far fro m a n n o u n c ­ in g a m o m e n t w h e n th e w a r b eg an , m in im iz ed th e im p o rtan c e of each ste p in to it a n d d e clin e d to cra n k u p a co n sp icu o u s m ach in ery to m obilize o p in io n , lest sp o tlig h tin g th e w a r aro u se p a ssio n s th a t w o u ld tra p th em . C o n scrip tio n b ro u g h t th e w a r h o m e to A m ericans in a far m o re g ra d u a l a n d u n e v e n fash io n th a n it h a d in W orld W ar II, com ing in itially to m id d lin g A m erican s, w h ile af­ flu en t y o u th m obilized first a g ain st th e w a r a n d a g itatio n a g ain st it reached hig h -school-age y o u th o n ly in its last years. O n college cam p u ses, so m e schools w ere a lre a d y racked b y tu rm o il in 1966 (an d so m e of th o se a lm o st p lacid b y 1972), w h ile o th ers o n ly b ecam e co n v u lsed at d e c a d e 's en d . A lim ited , g ra d u ­ ally escalating w a r also lacked th e a b ru p t econom ic effects e v id e n t in 1941 a n d 1950 a n d th e im p act m a d e possible earlier b y ra tio n in g a n d w a g e a n d p rice con­ trols. A ll w a rs affect v a rio u s g ro u p s differently, b u t in th e V ietn am W ar th o se d ifferential im pacts w e re sp re a d o u t ov er tim e as w ell. O f course, th ere is n o d efin itiv e w a y to id en tify a " w a te rsh e d " in history, in p a rt b ecause one g ro u p 's w a te rsh e d m a y b e a n o th e r's u n e v e n tfu l year, b u t in th is c lu ttered d ecad e, 1966 w a s th e d iv id in g p o in t as m u c h as a n y o th er year. By th en , th e A m erican w a r effort w a s n e a r its p eak , th e d iv isio n s o v e r it w ere evi­ d e n t, th e stru c tu re s u n d e rp in n in g m ilitarizatio n w ere e ro d in g , a n d — th o u g h su rely this is th e m o st elu siv e sta n d a rd to a p p ly — a n o rd ere d , a g re e d -u p o n sense of h isto ry w a s a lre ad y in tatters.

PA R T TW O TH E R E SH A P IN G OF A M E R IC A N M IL IT A R IZA T IO N

6 TH E W A R M ENTALITY IN TR IU M PH , 1966-1974

Turning Point "B om b, b om b, bom b, th a t's all y o u know ," LBJ rep o rte d ly ex p lo d ed to th e Joint C hiefs o n o ne occasion.1 The A m erican b o m b in g in S o u th east A sia, like th e in ­ ten sify ing A m erican w a r effort generally, b o th h a sten e d a n d o b scu red a tu rn ­ in g p o in t in A m erica's m ilitarizatio n as im p o rta n t as th e one o n th e eve of W orld W ar II. T he outcom e of th is one w a s m ore am b ig u o u s, h o w ev er. In its quan tifiab le fo rm s— the size of b u d g e ts a n d arm ies, the g eo g rap h ical reach of A m erican p o w e r— m ilitarizatio n d id ab ate so m ew h at, albeit too little for its critics an d too m u c h for its cham pions. In its su b tler m an ifestatio n s— th e h o ld th a t w a r h a d o n the politics a n d im ag in atio n s of A m erican s— it c o n tin u ed to sw ell, in a fash io n th a t few d e n o u n ce d , d e fe n d ed , o r e v en recognized. R ichard N ixon, seeing countless enem ies at h o m e to attack a n d m an y w a rs o n th em to w age, d id n o t alone cause th a t in w a rd tu rn , b ut, ev en m o re th a n Johnson, h e ab etted it, ex in p ressed it, e v en e m b o d ied it.

The American Way of War N o one o p e ra tio n typified th e d iv erse w a r in V ietnam , b u t th e e n g ag em en ts a ro u n d D ak To late in 1967 illu stra te d the w a r G en. W illiam W estm oreland w a n ted . W hen a defector from the N o rth V ietnam ese A rm y (NVA) rev ealed p lan s to attack a U.S. Special Forces cam p, W estm o relan d seized o n th e infor­ m atio n, p o u rin g in A m erican a n d ARVN forces. "E n g in eers d y n a m ite d the to p s off a d o z e n m o u n ta in s to b u ild level artillery p latfo rm s, a n d chem ical u n its b a th e d the steep slopes w ith h erbicides to strip th e foliage." U n d e r aerial a n d artillery assault, "th e g reen ju n g le can o p y trem b led , sp lit op en , a n d finally h u n g in b lackened tatters." It w a s "th e closest th in g to Big W ar th a t W estm ore­ lan d co u ld d ev ise." T he fighting killed 287 A m ericans, b u t w ith a c o u n t of 1,200 en em y d e a d , the U.S. A rm y p ro claim ed an "o v erw h elm in g success." T here

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w ere skeptics on W estm o relan d 's staff, ho w ev er, a n d o n e jo u rn a list p o in te d to th e p ro b lem so o n exposed in th e Tet O ffensive: "T he NVA is su ck in g large A m erican forces a w ay from p o p u la tio n centers a n d b o g g in g th em d o w n i n . . . m o u n ta in fig h tin g ."2 W estm oreland w a g e d w a r this w a y becau se of th e A m erican strateg ic tra d i­ tio n h e in h erite d a n d the im m e d ia te p ressu re s h e faced: Jo h n so n 's fo n d n ess for m assive g o v e rn m e n ta l effort a n d m an ag erial lib erals' faith in tech n iq u e; con­ serv ativ es' d e m a n d s for v ig o ro u s w a r m ak in g a n d th e m ilita ry 's d istru st of co u n terin su rg en cy tactics. A ll these p ressu re s en co u rag e d reliance o n aw e­ som e firepow er, aerial m obility, a n d big-scale o rg an izatio n . So too d id a ho m efro n t av ersio n to casualties th a t h a d lo n g sh a p e d th e A m erican w a y of w a r a n d w as sh a rp e n e d b y the m u rk y A m erican stak es in th is w ar. W h atev er h is d e ­ fects, W estm oreland skillfully tra n sla te d th ese p ressu re s in to action. W hile th ere w a s little co n sen su s a b o u t h o w to w a g e th e w a r (there rarely h a s been, e v en in A m erica's victo rio u s w ars), h e fo u n d th e m id d le g ro u n d w h e re v a rio u s v iew s of strateg y c o n v erg ed — ju st w h a t a g en eral d eferen tial to civil a u th o rity in a dem ocracy sh o u ld do. But h e w a s n o m ere cip h er th ro u g h w h ic h v a rio u s p ressu re s p a sse d u n m e d i­ ated. W ith in South V ietnam 's b o rd ers, h e h a d ex cep tio n al freed o m to sh a p e th e w ar. N e ith e r his p red ecesso r n o r h is successor fully sh a red h is e m p h a sis o n search -an d -d estro y o perations. A p ro d u c t of th e H a rv a rd G ra d u a te B usiness School as w ell as W est Point, a n d a v e te ra n of W orld W ar II, W estm o relan d w a s u n u su a lly a ttu n e d , e v en for th e a rm y a t this p o in t in its history, to w a r 's logis­ tics a n d m an ag em en t. H e w a s n o t unreflectiv e a b o u t stra te g y (he re a d th e clas­ sic texts o n g u errilla w a rfare a n d F rance's failu re in V ietnam ), b u t h e tre a te d it unim aginatively, as a n o th e r asp ect of w a r to be m an a g ed , ju st as h e gave d is­ se n tin g view s in h is staff h is d u tifu l b u t u n im a g in a tiv e atten tio n . W estm ore­ lan d p u t h is im p rin t o n A m erican w a r m ak in g b y reflecting its basic im p u lses so faithfully a n d believing in th em so deeply. M assive firepow er, ex tra o rd in a ry m obility, a n d a ssa u lt o n th e e n e m y 's m a in forces w ere the core of h is w a r m aking. For h im , one re p o rte r o b serv ed , "killing sixteen-year-old g u errillas tw o o r th ree a t a tim e o n th e m u d p a th s of tin y h a m ­ lets w a s p e n n y a n te stu ff for a n A rm y p re p a re d to d o b a ttle w ith th e legions of L enin." A s one architect of h is strateg y p u t it, "T he so lu tio n in V ietn am is m o re b o m b s, m ore shells, m ore n a p a lm . . . till th e o th er sid e cracks a n d g ives u p ." H is em p h asis o n o rg an izatio n a n d tech n o lo g y e x te n d ed far b e y o n d th e b a ttle ­ field. H e w o rk e d h a rd to p ro v id e th e b e st in m ed ical care a n d recreational facil­ ities for A m erican forces, acres of air-co n d itio n ed space to escape th e o p p re s­ sive clim ate, a n d a co rn u co p ia of fresh a n d fro zen foods. A d d e d to th e cru sh in g v o lu m e of m u n itio n s a n d o th e r w a r m ateriel h a u le d in to V ietnam , th is consti­ tu te d the m o st im pressive logistical ach iev em en t in th e an n als of A m erican w a r m aking. H e also fo u n d novel u ses for A m erican technology. O ld C-47 cargo p lan es (m ilitary v ersio n s of the DC-3) w ere retro fitted w ith m u rd e ro u s electric

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G atlin g guns. "W estm oreland e v en h a u n te d th e d rea m s of en em y so ld iers w ith airb o rn e tap e reco rd in g s of ch ild ren crying for th eir fathers, a n d th e ineffably m o u rn fu l son g s of V ietnam ese w a r w id o w s." 3 M ost m o d e m m ilitary forces covet th e latest a n d m o st in firep o w er a n d logis­ tics. France, w ith A m erican help, m a d e n o m ea n effort in th a t reg a rd fifteen y ears earlier, a n d th e NVA, a id e d b y C hina a n d th e Soviet U nion, d e p lo y e d tan k s in the S outh a n d surface-to-air m issiles in th e N o rth . T he difference w a s th a t A m ericans p o ssessed su ch th in g s in o v e rw h elm in g n u m b ers, co u n te d o n th em m ore to b rin g victory, a n d ig n o red alm o st e v ery th in g else. "If v icto ry w o u ld b e inevitably p ro d u c e d th ro u g h technological w arfare, th e n e v en lea rn ­ in g a b o u t V ietnam ese history, cu ltu re, a n d social stru c tu re d id n o t seem w o rth ­ w h ile to the w a r-m an ag ers," n o tes Jam es G ibson.4 N o r w a s th e firep o w er all for n a u g h t, a t least b y W estm o relan d 's sta n d ard s. H a n o i h a d n o t a n ticip a te d its h u g e losses, estim ate d (p ro b ab ly o n th e h ig h side) b y A m erican officials a t u p to 220,000 b y late 1967, c o m p a red to 13,000 A m eri­ can d e a d b y th a t y e a r (ARVN losses ra n higher). T h at fall, W estm o relan d is­ su e d h is fam o u s co m m en t th a t "th e e n d b eg in s to com e in to v iew " a n d "th e e n em y 's h o p e s are b a n k ru p t" (th o u g h John so n h a d rejected m o st of h is d e ­ m a n d s to increase th e A m erican effort).5 W estm o relan d h e d g e d h is bets, h o w ­ ever: if h is p la n for victo ry fell sh o rt, h e w a n te d to in v a d e th e N o rth a n d u se n u c le ar w e a p o n s a g ain st it. H is stra te g y stav ed off d e fe at b u t d id n o t b rin g victory, above all because th ere w a s n o real S outh V ietnam to d efen d . By 1967, Jo h n so n a n d D efense Sec­ reta ry M cN am ara sen sed th e po ssib ility of d efeat. O u t of d e sp era tio n , b u t also to d isa rm his critics, Johnson c o n tin u ed a fam iliar ritu a l of b o m b in g halts, p ro ­ fessions of w illin g n ess to negotiate, a n d secret feelers to th a t e n d , b u t th e d ip lo ­ m atic efforts w ere h a lf-h e arted a t best, decep tiv e a t w o rst. Both sid es g ave a little, b u t it m a d e n o difference because n e ith e r w o u ld forsake its basic objective— th e stu m b lin g block th a t liberal d o v e s ig n o red in p io u sly calling for diplom acy, a n d th a t rad ical foes of th e w a r ack n o w led g ed in th eir w illin g n ess to see H an o i triu m p h . Jo hnson w a s n o t g o in g to b e the first A m erican P resid en t to lose a w ar, h e m ad e clear. "W hy not, h e n e v e r said, n o r d id th e A m erican p e o p le ask," Ste­ p h e n A m brose h a s p o in te d out. "D oves a n d h a w k s alike accep ted Jo h n so n 's sim p le m in d e d p ro p o sitio n as if th e logic b e h in d it w ere obvious. N e v er d id A m erican h u b ris sh o w itself m ore clearly, or m o re d estru ctiv ely ."6 P erh ap s m o re th a n h u b ris w a s a t w ork. LBJ's p ro p o sitio n rested o n a d eep er, u n sta te d logic. W ar p ro v id e d the ratio n ale a n d im p e tu s for th e m o d e m A m erican state a n d m o st of w h a t it accom plished. D efeat in w a r je o p a rd iz ed n o t ju st A m erican in terests a n d LBJ's fo rtu n es b u t th e p ro m ise of successful collective action b y A m ericans. If th ey could n o t w in a w ar, w h a t else m ig h t th ey b e u n ab le to ac­ com plish? Few A m ericans w o u ld p e e r in to th a t abyss, a n d m a n y c o n tin u ed to p ress

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Jo h n son to achieve victory. Less im ag in ativ e th a n th e d o v es, th e h a w k s w e re n o n eth eless m ore h o m o g en eo u s, b e tte r a ttu n e d to d o m in a n t A m erican v alu es, a n d led b y a fo rm id ab le politician, R ichard N ixon. N ix o n h a d seem ed to tak e him self o u t of politics w h e n h e to ld th e p ress after h is 1962 d e fe at for C alifor­ n ia 's g o v ern o rsh ip , "Y ou w o n 't h a v e N ix o n to kick a ro u n d a n y m o re ," b u t in fact h e "h a d ju st m a d e th e p ress a n issu e" in w a y s th a t reso n ate d th ro u g h o u t th e rest of h is career a n d th e V ietnam W ar. N ix o n criticized K en n ed y for h is h a n d lin g of th e C u b a n m issile crisis a n d b y 1964 w a s u rg in g w a r d irectly a g ain st N o rth V ietnam , b u t a t b o tto m h is view s o n V ietn am d iffered little from Johnson's. H e w a rn e d a g ain st try in g to "reach a n ag re em e n t w ith o u r a d v e rsa rie s— as C h a m b e rla in reach ed a n ag re em e n t w ith H itle r a t M u n ich in 1938." For h im too, V ietn am lay in th e m ystical realm of resolve a n d p ercep tio n ; it w a s a test of o u r "w ill to w in — a n d th e co u rag e to u se o u r p o w e r— now." But h e k e p t a step a h e a d of LBJ, h is criticism s u n c an n ily an ticip a tin g w h a t Jo h n so n w o u ld so o n do. "W h en N ix o n said, in 1969, th a t h e h a d in h e rite d a w a r n o t of h is m aking, h e w a s b e in g to o m o d est," since h e h a d " s p u rre d Jo h n so n to e v er g reater in v o lv e m en t in V ietnam " a n d m a d e it clear th a t th e G O P " w o u ld n e v e r criticize Johnson for d o in g m o re in V ietn am " (th o u g h , b e in g N ixon, h e crit­ icized nonetheless). M eanw hile, h e a d ro itly th re a d e d h is w a y th ro u g h th e m in e ­ field of G O P politics, s u p p o rtin g G o ld w a ter in 1964, th e n o u tfla n k in g N elso n Rockefeller a n d R onald R eagan to secure th e 1968 p re sid e n tia l n o m in a tio n .7 N ix o n 's co n trib u tio n to th e w a r w e n t b e y o n d h is p re s sin e o n Jo h n so n to es­ calate. H e also h e lp e d sh a p e th e u g ly politics a t h o m e a b o u t th e w ar, o ften p u b ­ licly u tte rin g w h a t LBJ felt h e h a d to keep p riv a te as P resid en t. Since A m erican "w ill" w a s a t issue, N ix o n lash ed o u t a t d isse n ters w h o u n d e rm in e d it. T he U n ited States "is a t w a r," h e a rg u e d in 1965, a n d "if a n y o n e h a d w elco m ed a N a zi victory d u rin g W orld W ar II th ere w o u ld h av e b e e n n o q u e stio n w h a t to d o ." N eg o tiatin g w ith th e e n em y "w o u ld be like n e g o tiatin g w ith H itle r before th e G erm an arm ies h a d b e e n d riv e n from France." F u lb rig h t a n d o th e r d is­ sen ters w ere "a p p e a se rs" w h o se co u rse w o u ld lead to W orld W ar m in "fo u r o r five y ears."8 In an alo g izin g V ietnam to W orld W ar H, N ix o n w a s in ste p w ith p o litical cul­ tu re generally. (Scholars o p p o sin g the w a r in sisted th a t th e y "w o u ld n o t b e like th e silent professors in N a zi G erm an y w h o d id n o t criticize H itle r's ag gressive foreign policy," w h ile o th ers c o n d em n ed A m erica's "fascist state.") B oth John­ so n a n d N ix o n also resisted th e logic of the analogy: to d eclare w ar. W orld W ar II w a s th eir to u ch sto n e — except w h e n it seem ed p o litically d a n g ero u s. It w a s all in consistent a n d d a n g ero u s, settin g u p h o p e s for to tal w a r a n d to ta l v icto ry w h e n th ey d id n o t w a n t th e form er, d id n o t expect th e latter, a n d h a d n o real p la n for either. By 1967, LBJ h a d th ro w n in to th e w a r alm o st e v ery th in g N ix o n h a d d e m a n d e d , b u t to little avail. "T hese resu lts m ig h t w ell h a v e p ro m p te d N ixon to th in k th ro u g h th e w h o le situ atio n again, b u t th ere is n o ev id en ce th a t he ev er d id so." B oth c o n tin u ed th e analogies to W orld W ar E, w h ic h w o rk e d

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for th e m a n d th eir su p p o rte rs because th ey w ere so au to m atic a n d th o u g h t­ less.9 But w h a t categ o ry d id c ap tu re th is w ar? T he m o st c o m m o n o n e w a s b la n d a n d generic: V ietnam w a s a "lim ited w a r." T h at label stu ck e v en as th e w a r c o n tin u ed to escalate. W hile th e A m erican d e a th toll in V ietn am w a s far less th a n in W orld W ar II, it ev en tu ally exceeded fifty-eight th o u sa n d , m o re th a n in K orea a n d alm o st h a lf th e A m erican toll in W orld W ar I. M e asu red b y th e feroc­ ity of th e fighting, the A m erican b o m b in g ^ w h ic h b y 1967 exceed ed all th a t A m erican forces h a d let loose in W orld W ar II), th e d e stru c tio n to th e lan d , a n d th e casualties am o n g Indochinese, th ere w a s n o th in g lim ited a b o u t th e w ar. A s th e n o tio n of "lim ite d " w a r p e rsiste d w h ile th e w a r inten sified , m o st A m eri­ can s lacked a realistic w a y to categorize th is w ar, m u c h less g rasp th e issu es b e h in d it. T hey w ere n o t so m u c h p o larize d b y th e w a r as sim p ly p e rp le x ed b y it (so m eth in g h a rd e r for p o llsters to m easure). N e v er h a d a n A m erican w a r b e e n so h a rd to conceptualize. M any, LBJ a n d N ix o n in th e first ran k , b la m e d th e m ed ia for A m erican s' con­ fu sio n a n d perplexity. W ar coverage in d e e d w a s rem a rk ab ly u n c en so re d a n d so m etim es stu n n in g ly q u ick a n d vivid. A n g ry politicians, fru stra te d g enerals, a n d b e w ild e re d p a trio ts attack ed it for u n d e rm in in g p o p u la r co m m itm en t to th e w a r b y e x ag g eratin g its ugliness, its futility, a n d its u n p o p u larity . T h at v iew sw elled after th e Tet O ffensive a n d re m a in e d in to th e 1990s a sta p le in p o p u la r m y th o lo g y (stu d e n ts still e n te r college b eliev in g it, m u c h as m a n y still w o n d e r if FDR k n e w in ad v an ce a b o u t Ja p an 's attack a t P earl H arbor). "T he w a r w a s literally p ip e d in to th e living room , b e d ro o m , a n d k itch en of m o st A m erican s," a retired officer later a rg u ed ; th e "co n stan t force of d estru ctio n , suffering, a n d b lo o d b ro u g h t into A m erican living room s h o rrified a n d d ism a y e d th e A m eri­ can p eo p le." By sh o w in g "th e terrib le h u m a n su fferin g a n d sacrifice of w a r," N ix o n later w ro te, television cau sed "a se rio u s d e m o ra liz atio n of th e h o m e fro n t." T his w a r w a s n o m o re b ru ta l th a n oth ers, th e a rg u m e n t ran , b u t th e m e­ d ia led A m ericans to th in k o th erw ise.10 T h at charge reflected A m erican s' self-flattering p e n c h a n t for m ak in g h isto ry p iv o t o n technological change, b u t little in th e m e d ia 's ability to cover w a r h a d ch an g ed since W orld W ar II, w h e n it p re su m a b ly h a d m o b ilized A m erican s b e ­ h in d w ar. T h at w a r h a d b e e n su p e rb ly a n d sy stem atically p h o to g ra p h e d a n d film ed b y all p arties, in g rap h ic color n e a r its en d . T elevision on ly m a d e im ages available m ore q u ick ly — a lth o u g h the process still o ften to o k d ay s, since film u su a lly h a d to be flow n o u t of V ietnam for tran sm issio n a n d e d itin g — a n d placed th em in living room s in stea d of m ov ie h o u ses, w h ile its cu m b erso m e tech n o logy w a s p ro b ab ly less m obile in the field th a n th e n ew sreel v e rsio n of 1944. T here w a s n o com pelling evidence th a t m arg in al g ain s in th e sp e ed a n d p riv acy w ith w h ic h A m ericans v iew ed these im ages g reatly c h an g e d h o w th ey perceived w ar. E ven th e co n te n t of those im ages p ro b ab ly sw ay e d few A m erican s ag ain st

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th e w ar, according to the a rm y 's h isto ria n of th e issue. O p in io n a b o u t th e w a r w a s sh a p e d b y m a n y factors a n d co rrelated p o o rly w ith ex p o su re to m ed ia cov­ erage, w h ich m o st A m ericans took as co n firm atio n of w h a te v e r v iew s th ey al­ rea d y h ad . Few er th a n h alf of A m erican h o u se h o ld s ev en tu n e d in reg u la rly to n e tw o rk new scasts, w h ile the m o st d a m n in g c o m m en ta ry o n th e w a r g en erally em erg ed in obscure o r elite p ublications, as w ith Jo n ath an Schell's coverage for th e New Yorker. C o n stra in e d b y m ilitary rules, b y fear of o ffen d in g p o litical offi­ cials a n d public tastes, a n d b y th e th re a t of losing au d ien ces to th eir co m p eti­ tion, n e tw o rk executives w ere lo ath e to sh o w v io len t scenes o r (as in co v erag e of W orld W ar II) p ictu res of A m erican d e ad . "In fact, th e action scenes fro m an y ep iso d e of th e p o p u la r television d ra m a s 'G u n sm o k e ' a n d 'K ojak' . . . w ere p ro b ab ly m ore b ru ta l th a n all b u t a few of th e m o st explicit film s fro m V iet­ n a m ." By contrast, d e sp ite c en so rsh ip in W orld W ar II, " Life's im p act c o u ld b e sh atterin g ," im p ressin g "th e h o rro rs of w a r" especially o n th e y o u n g , w h ile th e d eclin e of still-photo jo u rn alism after W orld W ar II d e p riv e d A m erican s of ar­ g u ab ly m ore searin g im ages. T he V ietnam -era im ag e o ften cited as m o st shockin g a p p e a re d in 1968, sh o w in g S outh V ietn am 's N a tio n a l Police chief executing a n a p p a re n t civilian (in fact a V iet C o n g w h o alleg ed ly h a d sh o t o n e of th e c h ie f's relatives) w ith a p isto l o n th e streets of Saigon. E ven th en , film e d ito rs cu t th e footage before it sh o w e d b lo o d sp u rtin g fro m th e v ictim 's h e a d .11 Such im ages w ere v iv id ly received a n d rem e m b e red p recisely b ecau se th ey w ere so a ty p ical— th ey lea p t o u t from the g en erally b la n d a n d careful reco rd of th e w a r offered A m ericans. A n d , in tim e w ith jo u rn alistic co n v en tio n s, th e con­ tro v ersial im ages g enerally fea tu red in d iv id u a l trag ed ies o r b ru talities, con­ v ey in g little of the w a r 's scale a n d carnage. T he b o m b in g , tool of th e w a r's g reatest d estru ctio n , p ro b ab ly received less v isu al coverage th a n in W orld W ar II: H an o i w a s alm o st as off-lim its to jo u rn alists as B erlin h a d been; th e b o m b in g of Laos u n d e r Johnson a n d of C am b o d ia u n d e r N ix o n w a s lo n g k e p t secret; a n d th e victim s' view of b o m b in g in h ere n tly resists close v isu al coverage. The b o m b in g in S outh V ietnam w as m o re accessible— b u t th en , d e sp ite th e b o m b s u n lo a d e d b y b o th sides o n occupied allies, n o th in g in W orld W ar II c o m p ared to th e to rre n t p o u re d d o w n o n A m erica's ally in th e V ietn am W ar. Jo u rnalists h a d th eir p eculiarities a n d th eir p ro d u c t h a d its flaw s. T hey w ere o ften a cynical lot, th o u g h so too w ere earlier w a r c o rresp o n d en ts. M oreover, for th em , or at least th eir ed ito rs a n d p ro d u ce rs, "it w a s a n A m erican w ar," a n d th ey p o o rly p re se n te d the p e rsp ectiv es of In d o ch in ese a n d th e w a r 's im p a ct o n them . The m ed ia d id give a tten tio n to th e a n tiw a r o p p o sitio n , b u t its im ag es of radical, fo u l-m o u th ed , lo n g-haired p ro teste rs d id as m u c h to alien ate A m eri­ cans from the a n tiw a r m o v em en t as to m ak e it respectable. In d eed , th e w a r's o p p o n e n ts h a d a stro n g case th a t the m ed ia m alig n ed their cause. L ong reflect­ in g th e official v iew of the w ar, p ress coverage d id becom e m o re pessim istic after the Tet O ffensive, b u t th a t shift follow ed m o re th a n led pu b lic o p in io n a n d em erg ed "n o t because television n ew s p ro d u c e rs h a d m a d e som e a rb itra ry de-

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cision to p ro m o te th e o p p o sitio n b u t because th e sources in g o v e rn m e n t th ey h a d c u e d to fo r n e w s h a d b e g u n to sw itch sid es." D ivisions am o n g political a n d b u sin e ss elites, n o t ju st u n ru ly m obs in th e streets, acco u n ted for th e tilt, ju st as elite th rea ts a n d o th e r factors led m a n y jo u rn alists to sh y aw ay from n eg ativ e assessm en ts of th e w a r in th e N ix o n y e ars.12 If n e w s coverage u n d e rm in e d c o m m itm en t to th e w a r at all, it d id so u n in ­ tentionally, th ro u g h m e th o d ra th e r th a n con ten t, b y n u m b in g m o re o ften th a n in fu ria tin g A m ericans. A s in o th er w a rs, ro u tin e official b riefings g o t tu rn e d in to p u rp le p ro se ("H u rtlin g o u t of a n overcast sky, w a rp la n e s of th e U n ited States S eventh Fleet d eliv ered a n o th e r m assiv e a ir strik e a g ain st th e p o rt city of H a ip h o n g "). R eporters a n d e d ito rs still im p a rte d a lin ear p a tte rn to w a r— "a consecutive, activist, piecem eal, the next-day-th e-F irst-A rm y -fo rg ed -o n w ard to w ard -A ach en ap p ro a ch to a w a r th a t e v en th e jo u rn alists covering it k n o w to b e n o n -consecutive, non-activist," o b serv ed M ichael A rien. Such jo u rn alistic c o n v en tio n s h a d an g ered m a n y soldiers, rep o rters, a n d citizens e v en in W orld W ar E. C overage of th e V ietn am W ar, A rien sp ecu lated , g ave a citizen — "after th ree y ears in w h ic h h e h a s re a d 725,000 w o rd s a b o u t V ietn am — th e feeling th a t h e c o u ld n 't w rite th ree intelligible sentences a b o u t th e subject o n a p o st­ card to h is m o th e r."13 The w a r 's grisly im ag es a n d p o in te d critiques sto o d o u t b ecau se th e y d is ru p te d th e p rev a ilin g sense of disconnection from th e w a r 's "re­ alities." T he "liv in g ro o m w a r" d id n o t b a n ish w a r 's elusiveness, b u t on ly re­ flected it. T h at elu siv en ess d e riv e d from th e n a tu re of th e w a r itself— th o u sa n d s of m iles aw ay, w ith rig h t a n d w ro n g h a rd to ascertain, w ith clim actic b attles few a n d fro n t lines alm o st nil. It w a s also co n stru cted o u t of th e policies of d o m i­ n a n t a u th o rities a n d th e m o o d s of th e A m erican p eople. L ead ers co u ld n o t ar­ ticu late th e stakes a n d d id n o t w a n t th e d eb ate o v er a d e clara tio n of w a r th a t m ig h t h a v e sh a rp e n e d v a rio u s m ean in g s to th e w ar. T hey d isg u ise d o r d issem ­ b led a b o u t m a n y aspects of th e A m erican w a r effort, less to deceive th e en em y th a n to d isa rm th e A m erican people, u n til u n d e r N ix o n w h o le th ea te rs of com ­ b a t w ere k e p t secret e v en from m a n y to p officials. T he m ed ia rarely challen g ed su c h a ttitu d e s a n d practices. M ost o th er A m erican s— b lessed w ith p ro sp erity , ta u g h t to fear n u c le ar cataclysm , d eceiv ed b y th eir leaders, u n in te re ste d in d is­ ta n t p e o p le s— w ere n e ith e r able n o r inclined to g rasp th is w ar. E ven th e w a r's o p p o sitio n tra in e d its sig h ts largely o n the im m o rality of A m erican lead ers o r th e futility of th eir policies— a n u n d e rsta n d a b le focus th a t still te n d e d to p u s h th e co m b at a n d politics in In d o ch in a to the m arg in s. By th e sam e token, d e ­ fen d e rs of the w a r like Johnson a n d N ixon w o rk e d h a rd e r a t d iscred itin g th eir o p p o sitio n a t h o m e th a n a t m ak in g th e w a r co m p reh en sib le to A m ericans. N o w o n d e r th a t th e w a r in V ietnam a n d th e n a tio n 's w a y s of w a g in g it em erg ed o n ly slow ly to them . T he Tet O ffensive a n d the reactions it g e n erate d p a rte d th e clo u d s of co n fu ­ sion, if o n ly briefly. T he co m m u n ist offensive e ru p te d a t th e e n d of Jan u ary

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1968, after W estm o relan d 's rea ssu rin g w o rd s a b o u t p ro g ress a n d after h e p u l­ led A m erican forces aw ay from p o p u la te d areas in th e S outh in h is q u e st for decisive battle. C o m m u n ists stru ck in S aigon— e v en b lastin g th e A m erican em b assy — a n d all ov er th e South. T he b lo o d ie st p h a ses o ccu rred at th e A m eri­ can b astio n a t K he Sanh, w h e re the com bat seem ed like a th ro w b ack to tren ch w arfare in W orld W ar I, a n d in H u e, the large a n d lovely city w h e re c o m m u ­ n ists executed th o u sa n d s of local citizens. A s a t H u e , A m erican a n d ARV N forces successfully resisted o r rev ersed m o st of th e en em y attacks, inflicting h u g e losses o n NVA a n d V iet C ong forces, b u t th e co st in clu d e d elev en h u n ­ d re d A m erican d e a d , tw ice as m a n y ARV N forces, a n d m u c h else. "W h a t th e hell is going on?" ask ed CBS's W alter C ronkite. "I th o u g h t w e w ere w in n in g the w ar!" O ne officer's co m m en t u p o n re c ap tu rin g o n e to w n — "W e h a d to d e stro y th e to w n to save it" — a p p e a re d to su m u p A m erica's w a r m ak in g all too aptly. D ism ay am o n g A m ericans a t hom e, th o u g h h a rd ly u n iv ersal, m o u n te d , as th ey co n fro n ted n o t only th e difficulties in w in n in g th is w a r b u t its v e ry n a tu re .14 A lm ost im m ediately, th e co n test b ro k e o u t to defin e T et's m ean in g . C o n v en ­ tio n al w isd o m so o n b ecam e th a t Tet m ark e d a m ilitary victo ry for th e U n ited States a n d S outh V ietnam , b u t a political defeat b ecau se th e p ress a n d th e d o v es ex ag g erated c o m m u n ist achievem ents, m issin g th e chance Tet p ro v id e d to d e ­ liver a final b lo w to th e enem y. W estm orelan d a n d lea d in g h a w k s a rg u e d th a t v iew stren u o u sly ; later scholars often d id so g u a rd e d ly , ag reein g th a t th e m e­ dia, h a v in g long to ed the official line, n o w o v erracted a g ain st it. E ven o n e of Tet's p lan n e rs later reg re tte d th a t "w e d id n o t correctly assess th e concrete b al­ ance of forces b e tw ee n ou rselv es a n d th e en em y ."15 But th e b in ary categories— victory or defeat, m ilitary o r p sy ch o lo g ical— w ere in a d e q u a te to ex p lain Tet's m eaning. T he efforts of all sid es to im p o se th em reflected ex asp eratio n w ith the w a r ra th e r th a n th e o utcom e in V ietnam . Like m an y b attles in w ar, Tet m a rk e d n o clear tu rn in th e m ilitary struggle. W h atev er th eir later view s, th e A m erican m ilitary chiefs co n v ey ed u n c ertain ty a t th e tim e, a t once p ro m isin g th a t increased efforts w o u ld b rin g v icto ry w h ile h in tin g a t defeat w ith o u t them . G eneral E arle W heeler w a s closer to th e m a rk w h e n h e ack n o w led g ed th a t Tet w a s a "v ery n e a r th in g ." 16 The d istin ctio n b e tw ee n "m ilitary " a n d "p o litical" w a s eq u ally su sp ect, as if th e tw o categories w ere u n rela te d to each other, w h ic h th ey n e v e r are in w ar. It stru ck m an y A m ericans as d e ep ly u n fa ir th a t th eir m ilitary v icto ry a t Tet d id n o t y ield political success, as if th e latter h a d b e e n sto len from th em b y th e w a r's o p p o n en ts. A ctually, A m ericans h a d experience w ith w a r 's p arad o x ical term s— D u n k irk in 1940 a n d the D oolittle R aid a g ain st Jap an in 1942 w ere m ili­ tary failures b u t psychological victories for th e A llied cause. T he p ro b lem in 1968 w a s th e difficulty in seeing a n y final victory d o w n th e line. In a n y ev en t, the w a r's d e fe n d ers sh o u ld n o t h ave b e en su rp rise d th a t Tet w a s re a d in p sy ch o lo g i­ cal term s, since th ey h a d long justified the A m erican effort for its psychological im p act o n the en em y (and o n allies) : to claim n o w th a t psychological d im en sio n s sh o u ld be d o w n p la y e d ra n a g ain st th eir w h o le p resen ta tio n of th e w ar.

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T he co m m u n ists w o n at Tet " n o t b y w in n in g a n y b a ttle b u t b y lau n c h in g th e attack in th e first p la c e /' Jo n ath an Schell later p o in te d out. "T he fact th a t it lost th e b a ttle w a s n o th in g n e w — it h a d lost all th e b attles of th e w a r since th e A m ericans h a d a rriv e d ," b u t its ability d e sp ite m assiv e A m erican p o w e r still to "lau n c h a n offensive o n the scale of Tet was new . . . .I t sh o w ed th a t b y w in n in g b attles w e h a d n o t b e en w in n in g th e w ar." A m erican s "n o w u n d e rs to o d th a t th e w a r in its p re se n t fo rm w o u ld p ro b ab ly last indefin itely a n d p o ssib ly ex­ p a n d greatly," a n d th ey " h a d n e v er accepted, o r e v en b e en a sk ed to accept, su c h a p ro sp e c t."17 For all th e confusion ov er it, Tet m a rk e d a clear if lim ited tu rn in g p o in t in politics, in th e w ar, a n d in th e larg er course of m ilitarizatio n . Jo h n so n a n d h is sen io r a d v ise rs— incom ing D efense Secretary C lark C lifford a n d "W ise M en" like D ean A cheson a n d retired gen erals O m a r B radley a n d M atth ew R id g w a y — rejected W estm o relan d 's p la n to m obilize th e reserves, b rin g tw o h u n d re d th o u sa n d m o re A m ericans to In do ch in a, a n d sw eep in to Laos, C am ­ b o d ia, a n d N o rth V ietnam . In stead , Jo h n so n recalled W estm o relan d (b u m p in g h im u p sta irs to b e a rm y chief of staff), q u e stio n e d search -an d -d estro y tactics, m a d e a s ta rt a t w h a t N ix o n w o u ld call V ietn am izatio n (increased reliance o n A R V N forces), a n d trie d a n o th e r p a rtia l h a lt of b o m b in g a g ain st N o rth V iet­ n a m in h o p e s of in d u c in g n eg o tiatio n s, a lth o u g h th e w a r in th e S o u th ra g e d on. A m erican losses in V ietnam , rad ical p ro test, a n d p o p u la r d isa rra y at h o m e w ere factors in h is decisions, b u t critical w a s th e " tre m e n d o u s ero sio n of s u p ­ p o rt" (as C lifford p u t it) am o n g b u sin e ss a n d o th er elites, alb eit in p a rt becau se th ey feared th e g ro w in g tu rm o il a t hom e. "T he estab lish m en t b a sta rd s h av e b a iled o u t," Johnson rep o rte d ly fu m e d .18 A d m in istra tio n lead ers d id n o t give u p o n v icto ry — for a tim e LBJ th o u g h t th a t Tet h a d stre n g th e n e d h is n e g o tiatin g h a n d . B ut th ey a b a n d o n e d fu rth e r escalation as a m ea n s to it (w ith o u t com ing u p w ith a n y alternative). A s a result, th ey c a p p e d a n d b e g a n to reverse th e long g ro w th in A m erica's m ilita ry p re s­ ence in A sia a n d th e d ra ft calls u se d to su sta in th e w a r effort. T h at th e y h a d acted to reverse m ilitarizatio n a n d lim it th e w a r effort w a s h a rd ly clear early in 1968, ho w ev er, in p a rt b ecause th e political lan d sca p e w a s h a rd to read. Sen. E ugene M cC arth y 's n e a r d e fe at of Jo h n so n in N e w H a m p ­ sh ire's F eb ru ary p rim a ry w a s a case in p o in t. M cC arth y w a s a n in tellig en t if quixotic o p p o n e n t of th e w a r a n d th e "im p erial p resid en cy " w h ic h w a r h a d n o u rish e d , rid ic u lin g LBJ for sp e ak in g of "m y c o u n try " a n d "m y cab in et" a n d "m y tro o p s." T he p resid en c y "belongs n o t to th e m a n w h o h o ld s it b u t to th e p e o p le of th is n a tio n ." 19 B ut since h e g o t vo tes from m a n y h a w k s ex asp erated w ith b o th th e w a r and th e a n tiw a r m o vem en t, h is N e w H a m p sh ire success h a d little clear m eaning. Jo h n so n 's decision, a n n o u n c e d o n M arch 31, n o t to ru n a g ain for the p resid en c y a n d to o rd e r a b o m b in g h a lt also d id little to in d icate a histo ric reversal of A m erica's course. Insofar as A m erica b e g an d ise n g ag in g from m ilitarizatio n , it d id so in su c h a h a ltin g w ay, so b ereft of clear a n d convincin g n a tio n al lead ersh ip , a m id su ch

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con fu sing cross-currents of public opin io n , th a t d ise n g ag e m e n t w a s b o u n d to be lim ited a n d contested, w ith ree n g ag e m en t a possibility. Ju st as escalatio n in th e w a r h a d b e en in crem ental a n d d isg u ise d , so n o w w ere d eescalatio n a n d d ise n g ag e m e n t from m ilitarization. LBJ a n d h is p o licy m ak ers m a d e n o g ra n d p ro n o u n ce m en ts alo n g those lines— th ey w ere too u n c e rta in of th e ir course a n d too w a ry of the Joint C hiefs a n d its political allies to d o so. N o th in g like FD R 's eloquence in lau n ch in g m ilitarizatio n o r E isen h o w er's in sig h t in to its consequences e m e rg ed from P resid en ts o r th eir chief allies in th e late 1960s. Still, b y e d g in g aw ay from a fam iliar p a th , th ey m a d e th e choice of a differen t ro ad possible. Tet w a s responsible for th a t u n c ertain reorien tatio n . N o t alone, of c o u rse — it cam e after y ears of g ro w in g inflation, civil d iso rd e r a t h o m e, casu alties ab ro ad , a n d fatu o u s p ro m ises of success. But Tet set su c h p ro b lem s in b o ld e r relief. Too, it w a s sh a tte rin g because it w a s so ev id e n tly w a r in its ra w e st form , cu ttin g th ro u g h y ears of official obfuscation a n d n u m b in g m ed ia coverage. N o th in g ev er fu lly d isp e ls w a r 's elusiveness for those n o t in it (or e v en for th o se in it). To m a n y A m ericans, the V ietnam W ar so o n ag ain seem ed in co m p reh en sib le o r irrelevant. Tet, h ow ever, h a d challenged a n d d isru p te d su c h sensibilities.

The “Wars”at Home The M arch o n th e P en tag o n o n O ctober 21,1967, a n d N o rm a n M a ile r's acco u n t of it fo u n d th e a n tiw a r m o v em en t a t its m o st o u trag eo u s. It w a s a m o tley g ro u p : long-tim e pacifists, disaffected liberals like Yale ch ap lain W illiam Sloane C of­ fin, N e w Left revolutionaries, freak ed -o u t h ip p ies. T hey first assem b led a t the Lincoln M em orial, th en fifty th o u sa n d m arc h ed o n th e P entagon, w h ic h a few so u g h t to levitate a n d o th ers to sh u t d o w n , a t least lo n g e n o u g h to sh o w th eir fu ry a g ain st the w a r a n d the v u ln era b ility of its m achinery. O n ly a m in o rity (m edia a n d officials ex ag g erated th e ir n u m b ers) sh o v e d o r ta u n te d th e d e fe n d ­ in g so ldiers a n d m arsh als, b u t m an y p ro te ste rs' m o o d w a s bellicose. "W e're g o in g to try to stick it u p th e g o v e rn m e n t's ass," M ailer earlier e x h o rte d one crow d, " rig h t into th e sp h in c te r of the P e n tag o n ."20 T hey chose the P e n tag o n — ra th e r th a n the C ongress th a t fu n d e d th e w a r or th e W hite H o u se th a t directed it— because th ey saw it as th e sym bol a n d cap ital of "co rp o ratio n lan d ," as M ailer p u t it. T he P en tag o n "lo o k ed like a five-sided tip o n the sp o u t of a sp ra y can to be u se d u n d e r th e arm , yes, th e P en tag o n w a s sp ra y in g th e d e o d o ra n t of its presence all ov er th e fields of V irginia." Like the rest of m ilitarized A m erica— its soulless co rp o ratio n s a n d u n iv e rsitie s— it "w as as u n d ifferen tiated as a jellyfish o r a clu ster of barnacles. O n e co u ld chip aw ay a t a n y p a rt of the in terio r w ith o u t locating a n e rv o u s center. . . . E very asp ect of the b u ild in g w as a n o n y m o u s, m o n o to n o u s, m assive, in terch an g e­ able." In th a t view , the en em y w a s co rp o rate-m ilitary A m erica, its victim s o p ­ p ressed p eo p les everyw here. Precisely w h e re it cam e from in th e p a st a n d w h a t m ig h t replace it in the future w ere. M ailer su g g ested , u n clear to m a n y y o u n g

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p ro testers, w h o se "rad icalism w a s in th eir h a te for th e au th o rity " a n d w h o se o u tlo o k em b raced "th e idea of a rev o lu tio n w h ich p reced ed ideology." G iven th a t diffuse outlook, th ey fo u g h t each o th er ov er id eology as b itterly as th ey fo u g h t the enem y, b u t in O ctober 1967 th ey k n ew w h ere to strike.21 D e m o n strato rs d id n o t ju st p ro test, th ey w e n t to w ar, a t least in M ailer's so m etim es p lay fu l v iew of things. T he o ld n o tio n of a "m arch " o n W ash in g to n — the B onus A rm y 's of 1932 o r K ing's of 1963— alw ay s h a d m ili­ tary co nnotations, b u t M ailer, a W orld W ar II v eteran , m ea n t w a r itself, n o t ju st its tra p p in g s. "T hey w ere p ran c in g p a st this hill, th ey w ere stream in g to battle. G oing to battle!" It w as, h e knew , a rag -tag arm y, especially w ith th e h ip p ie s ("th e d ress ball w a s going into battle"). Still, as h e m e d ita te d o n th e violence (w o m en especially. M ailer n o ted , g o t club b ed b y th e d e fe n d in g troops), h e th o u g h t th a t c o m p a re d to V alley Forge o r N o rm a n d y o r P u san , "th e en g ag e­ m e n t a t the P en tag o n w a s a p ale rite of passag e, a n d y e t it w a s p ro b ab ly a tru e o n e " for these "sp o iled ch ild ren of a d e a d d e-an im alized m id d le class." M ailer g ave th em com bat ribbons for serv in g in "th e arm ies of th e n ig h t," as h e called h is account, ju st as R obert L ow ell saw th em as "like g reen U n io n recru its / for th e first Bull R u n ."22 T heirs w a s an o th e r in a series of seem ing sk irm ish es across A m erica in th e late 1960s a n d early 1970s. Racial violence— b e tw ee n blacks a n d w h ites, b e ­ tw e e n blacks a n d police o r the a rm e d forces, b y blacks in th eir o w n n e ig h b o rh o o d s— h a d b e en e ru p tin g for y ears a n d reach ed a n e w clim ax in the sp rin g of 1968 follow ing M artin L u th er K ing's assassin atio n , y ield in g a p a lp a ­ ble sense of race w ar. "D o w h a t John B row n d id ," th e black rad ical H . R ap B row n a d v ise d o p p o n e n ts of im perialism , "p ick u p a g u n a n d go o u t a n d sh o o t o u r en em y ."23 M ore th a n o th e r social conflicts, th is o n e also o v e rla p p e d th e d i­ visio n s ov er th e w ar, since blacks (especially w o m en ) o p p o se d o r d e sp aire d of th e w a r m ore th a n o th er social g ro u p s, a n d black lead ers like M artin a n d C orreta Scott K ing a n d b oxer M u h a m m a d A li w ere co n sp icu o u s in a n tiw a r p ro test. T he sam e y e ar also saw m ore p ro te st a g ain st th e w ar, m ore violence b y som e p ro teste rs in d u lg in g a fan tasy of g u errilla w ar, a n d (to th e a p p ro v a l of m an y A m ericans) m ore violence a g ain st them . E ven a v io len t act w h o se m otives w ere obscure, as w ith th e a ssassin atio n of R obert K ennedy, seem ed connected to th e V ietn am W ar because it a d d e d to th e g en eral sense of tu rm o il a n d because K en­ n e d y w a s em erg in g as a critic of the w ar, foe of LBJ, a n d possible D em ocratic n o m in ee for th e presidency. T hese cross-curren ts cam e to a h e a d a t th e D em o­ cratic c o n v en tio n in C hicago, w h e re M ayor R ichard D aley's police to o k th eir clu b s to p ro teste rs a n d u g ly echoes of W orld W ar II w ere heard : Sen. A b ra h am Ribicoff d e n o u n c e d D aley's "G estap o tactics" a n d D aley allegedly resp o n d ed , "Fuck you. You Jew son of a b itch ."24 T he stru g g le ov er the w a r seem ed to yield a w a r at h o m e across m u ch of A m erica. P ro m in en t s u p p o rte rs— the P re sid e n t a n d his key ad v iso rs, or fig­ u res like N e w York C ity 's Francis C a rd in a l S p ellm an — ra n th e risk of v erbal ab u se (or w orse) w ith a n y p u b lic a p p earan ce, a n d p ro test a g ain st th e w a r took

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o n m y ria d form s, som e stately, som e bellicose, som e play fu l. N ix o n reflected b o th a w id e sp re a d m o o d a n d th e d o m in a n t term in o lo g y w h e n h e a sse rte d in 1967 th a t "th e w a r in A sia is a lim ited one w ith lim ited m ea n s a n d lim ited goals. T he w a r a t h o m e is a w a r for su rv iv a l of a free society." In a sim ilar vein, refer­ rin g to s tu d e n t activism a t Berkeley, rad ical lea d er Jerry R u b in w ro te th a t "th e w a r a g ain st A m erik a" (the sp ellin g co n n o tin g its fascist qualities), w a g e d "b y w h ite m iddle-class k id s," h a d "co m m en ced ." Like th e w a r in V ietn am , th e a p ­ p a re n t one a t h o m e d ra g g e d o n inconclusively in to th e 1970s.25 O th e r social a n d political d iv isio n s y ield ed less violence b u t still seem ed to p a rta k e of w ar. C o u n terc u ltu re h ip p ie s talk ed of "p eace" a n d "love," b u t th eir g oal of "lib eratio n for all A m erican s" h a d a coercive e d g e (even as th e y re p u d i­ a te d "m issio n ary aggressiveness"), a n d th e fu ry th e y p ro v o k e d o ften g o t ex­ p resse d in w a r's w o rd s. "F re u d ian w a rs of th e su b u rb s" seem ed to e ru p t b e ­ tw e en y o u n g c u ltu ra l rebels a n d in d ig n a n t m id d le-class p a re n ts, as G o d frey H o d g so n p u t it. C o m p o u n d in g th e a n ta g o n ism w a s a n o v e rla p b e tw e e n cu l­ tu ra l a n d political rebellion w h ic h " a t its silliest," H o d g so n n o te d , "led to th e sa d d e lu sio n th a t y o u ch an g e society b y sm o k in g m ariju a n a a n d listen in g to am p lified g u ita rs." T he c o u n te rcu ltu re so o n d iv erg e d from th e p o litical revolt, d eg en e ra tin g seem ingly "in to a m ere y o u th cult"; as rock sin g er Janis Joplin d eclared, "M y m usic is n 't su p p o se d to m ak e y o u riot. It's su p p o s e d to m ak e y o u fuck." But before th a t h a p p e n e d , th e c u ltu ral rev o lt w a s p ro m o te d a n d feared as if one p h a se of a rev o lu tio n ary w ar, one th a t in tu rn trig g e red w h a t th e Atlantic called "th e w a r a g ain st th e y o u n g " — a "real" w ar, it asserted , th o u g h "fo rtu n a tely still confined to co n v en tio n al w e ap o n s, ra n g in g fro m th e p o p g u n to th e five-syllable h o w itze r."26 W h at congealed the im age of rebellious y o u th w a s its role in a n tiw a r p ro te st a n d resistance to the d raft, b u t th a t im age b elied m a n y com plexities. Y oung A m ericans (including those in college) w ere, as ju d g e d b y polls, in fact slig h tly less inclined th a n o ld er ones to o p p o se th e w ar; o ld er p e o p le like B enjam in Spock a n d the K ings d id m u c h to lead the a n tiw a r cause; a n d m a n y m id d le ag ed a n d m iddle-class A m ericans joined its m o d e ra te w in g . A n tiw a r activ ism w as associated w ith elite in stitu tio n s like the U n iv ersity of C alifornia a t B erke­ ley a n d C olum bia, in p a rt because th ey easily c au g h t th e m e d ia 's searchlight, b u t it also flo u rish ed a t seco n d -tier state schools like M ichigan State a n d th e State U niversity of N e w York at Buffalo, w h ic h h a d recently b o a rd e d th e fed ­ eral g rav y tra in of d efen se-related research, lea d in g a n tiw a r faculty a n d stu ­ d e n ts to see th em as critical n o d e s in th e defen se com plex. A n d d e sp ite a p p e a r­ ances, n o u n ifo rm activism sw e p t ov er cam p u ses. O n som e, faculty o r relig io u s g ro u p s, n o t stu d e n ts, g e n erate d m o st of th e activism . A t others, m o st faculty su p p o rte d o r acquiesced in th e w ar. A t state schools, a d m in istra to rs o ften faced th e h eav y h a n d a n d tig h t p u rse -strin g s of co n serv ativ e legislators a n d tru stees, h a d close ties to d efense agencies, a n d w o rk e d w ith p u b lic a u th o rities w h o sh ared w ith th em the c o u n tersu b v ersiv e eth o s of th e M cC arth y era. P en n State officials "ro u tin e ly " w a rn e d p a re n ts of th eir o ffsp rin g s' rad ical activities a n d

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fed in fo rm a tio n to th e FBI, w h ile K ent S tate's p re sid e n t sid e d w ith stu d e n ts w h o attack ed c a m p u s radicals, w h o m h e lab eled " h u m a n d e b ris" after th e N a ­ tio n al G u a rd killed fo u r p e o p le th ere in 1970.27 A ctivists th em selv es d iv id e d alo n g class, ideological, a n d e th n o c u ltu ra l lines. T hese circum stances m o ­ b ilized n o t only a n tiw a r legions b u t also p ro w a r g ro u p s like Y oung A m erican s for F reedom . Still, because rebellious y o u th lo o m ed large in th e a n tiw a r m o v e­ m en t, th e g en eratio n al ch asm seem ed h u g e a n d u n b rid g eab le. C lass w a r also seem ed to th reaten . Som e rad icals assailed w o rk in g -class sol­ d ie rs a n d cops as tools of the "estab lish m en t." M iddle-class a n d w o rk in g -class A m erican s— especially if th ey w ere w h ite, co n serv ativ e C atholics o r P ro tes­ tan ts, a n d in d e b te d to the p atrio tic c u ltu re of W orld W ar II— g rew resen tfu l a n d so m etim es v io len t to w a rd p riv ileg e d rad ical y o u th , a n d N ix o n so u g h t to e n list th is "Silent M ajority" a g ain st th e p ro testers. E xplicit talk of class w a r w a s rare b ecause d o m in a n t co n v en tio n s d isc o u rag e d it a n d th e d iv isio n s in v o lv ed w ere com plex, b u t class div isio n s w ere real. T hey w ere d riv e n in p a rt b y official policy o n conscription. M ore th a n in A m erica's o th er m o d e m w a rs, m o st V ietnam -era forces, especially th o se in g ro u n d com bat, cam e from poor, w orking-class, ru ral, o r lo w er m id d le-class b ack g ro u n d s. M ore p riv ileg e d o r sav v y y o u n g m e n co u ld u su a lly escape service— a lth o u g h n o t all succeeded o r trie d to — th ro u g h d e fe rm en ts for a t­ te n d in g college, for certain w hite-collar vocations, for d isab ilities th ey co u ld b e tte r d o c u m e n t, o r for service in th e G u a rd o r R eserves th a t th ey co u ld m o re easily w angle. In d o in g so, how ever, th ey o n ly ex p lo ited a sy stem ex p ressly d e sig n e d to ch an n el less p riv ileg e d m e n in to m ilitary service a n d m o re affluent ones in to careers (as scientists, co rp o rate m an ag ers, a n d th e like) th a t p re su m ­ ably b en efited n a tio n al security in o th er w ays. D raft refo rm s late in th e 1960s raised the sh are of p e rso n n el in V ietnam w h o h a d fo u r y ears of college, b u t on ly to 10.5 percent. M oreover, th ere w a s n o w a y to im p o se V ietn am 's b u rd e n o n all y o u n g m e n since the a rm e d forces d id n o t seek m o st of th e m — o n ly 40 p e rc en t saw service, on ly a fraction of th e m in com bat. Still, th e w a y ch o sen to d istrib u te the b u rd e n placed it o n less affluen t a n d m in o rity A m erican s— a n d o n y o u n g ones: m a n y w ere eig h teen o r n in etee n w h e n th ey reach ed V ietnam . A s a result, class ten sio n s sm o ld ere d a n d m an y less a d v a n ta g e d A m ericans h a te d "th e a n tiw a r m o v em en t as a n elitist attack o n A m erican tro o p s b y p e o p le w h o co u ld avoid th e w a r." T hose tensions w ere o v e rd ra m atiz e d , o v ersim ­ plified, a n d e v en to a d eg ree in v erted , especially b y th e N ix o n ad m in istratio n . In tru th , black, fem ale, a n d p o o r A m ericans w ere m o re o p p o se d to th e w a r th a n o th er social gro u p s: black v e te ran s v iew ed a n tiw a r p ro te st m o re fav o rab ly th a n w h ite veterans; a n tiw a r se n tim en t g rew am o n g v e te ran s late in th e w ar; a n d som e a n tiw a r lead ers w o rk e d h a rd to b rid g e th e class chasm . Still, w o rk in g class resen tm en t p ersisted . A s a firefighter w h o lo st a so n in V ietn am com ­ p lain ed , "You b e t y o u r g o d d a m d o lla r I'm bitter. It's p eo p le like u s w h o give u p o u r sons for th e country." The sons of the afflu en t " d o n 't e n d u p in th e sw am p s ov er there." C o m m o n in h is social g ro u p , his co n clu sio n — "I th in k w e o u g h t to

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w in th a t w a r o r p u ll o u t" — w a s n o t classifiable as "p ro -" o r " a n tiw a r" b u t con­ v e y ed a d e sp era te desire to h av e th e w a r 's b u rd e n s lifted.28 By th e late 1960s, then, th e stru g g le ov er m ilitarizatio n w a s escalatin g a n d e n tw in in g w ith o th e r conflicts, to w h ic h th e te rm war w a s w id e ly a n d literally a p p lied , e v en b y later historians. In a h y d rau lic m o d el of h istory, th ese stru g g les n o w p e ak e d because p ressu re to a d d re ss p ro b lem s a t h o m e h a d m o u n te d for decad es b e h in d the d a m of m ilitarizatio n , w h ic h th e n w a s b reach ed b y a n u n p o p u la r w ar. T h at co n cep tu ally n e a t e x p la n atio n is in a d e ­ q u ate, ho w ev er, for m ilitarizatio n h a d n o t b lo ck ed refo rm b u t p ro v id e d a n e w if lim ited aren a for its p u rsu it, a n d som e of th o se d isillu sio n ed w ith th e w a r w ere h a rd ly in terested in refo rm a t hom e. M ost likely, the V ietnam -era stru g g les arose for a m o re specific reaso n , th e co n junction of a failing w a r w ith a flo u n d erin g refo rm effort. H a d th e w a r d e ­ v elo p e d in isolation fro m dom estic reform , its critics m ig h t h av e p o in te d to re­ fo rm as a n alternative, b u t a d istin ctio n b e tw ee n w a r a n d refo rm w a s n o t p o s­ sible b ecause th e activist sta te of K ennedy a n d Jo h n so n em b raced b o th in w a y s th a t m a d e th em inseparable. T h u s d ism a y e d A m erican s h a d little choice b u t to assail the sy stem th a t p ro d u c e d b o th w a r a n d reform , a n d h en ce to ad v an ce a th o ro u g h g o in g critique of th e A m erican system . For m a n y co n serv ativ es, th a t m ea n t scaling back th e activist state a n d secu rin g q u ick v icto ry in th e w ar. For m a n y radicals, it m e a n t th e d e stru c tio n of th a t state, its rep lacem en t b y so m e e g alitarian a n d d e cen tralized system , a n d a q u ick (th o u g h failed) e n d to th e w ar. For liberals, it m e a n t g ro w in g fru stratio n o r a b a n d o n m e n t of th e liberal faith a lto g eth e r a n d a m ove elsew h ere— into leftist rad icalism , o r m o re often "n eo co n serv atism ." T he c o n testan ts in these stru g g les also d rew o n v a rio u s tra d itio n s of p ro te st a n d p atrio tism . T he w a r 's o p p o n e n ts in h erite d fem in ist peace ag itatio n , reli­ g io u s pacifism , stu d e n t a n tiw a r agitation, ru ra l d istru st of c o rp o ra te m ilitar­ ism , b lack p ro te st a g ain st w a r a n d im perialism , th e fu ry of Beat w rite rs like A l­ len G insberg, a n d the m ercu rial b u t p e rsiste n t a n tin u cle ar m o v em en t. T hey also d re w o n the civil rig h ts m o v em en t a n d o n th e g en eral sp irit of social activ­ ism a n d o p p o sitio n to au th o rity a lre ad y g ro w in g before th e w a r b ecam e a m a ­ jor issue. Such d iv erse sources h e lp e d to acco u n t for th e m o v em en t's n o to rio u s in tern al divisions, b u t th ey also len t it stren g th , for w h e n o n e c o m p o n e n t w a n e d , a n o th e r su rg e d fo rw ard. M ost a rg u m e n ts a g ain st m ilita riza tio n w ere n o t new . M ailer's "co rp o ra tio n lan d ," for exam ple, fu sed E ise n h o w e r's m ilitary -in d u strial com plex, C. W rig h t M ills's p o w e r elite, a n d th e v a cu o u s cor­ p o rate c u ltu re critiq u ed in th e 1950s. But old a rg u m e n ts ach iev ed n e w ideo lo g i­ cal force, political im m ediacy, a n d em o tio n al in ten sity in lig h t of th e V ietn am W ar. O ld e r w a r o p p o n e n ts— M ailer, Low ell, S p o tk , F u lb rig h t— d re w o n th o se an tecedents. Y outhful activists, o n th e o th er h a n d , h a d n o sense of th e p a st, o r so it w a s often claim ed at the tim e, th eir o u tlo o k a ttrib u te d in stea d to a m yste-

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rio u s alchem y of rage, egocentricity, nihilism , a n d idealism . To a Jo h n so n o r a R usk, a n tiw a r y o u th h a d n o id ea of w h a t a p p e a se m e n t a n d W orld W ar II m e a n t for th eir tim es, b u t it w a s n o t o n ly th e w a r 's d e fe n d ers w h o e m p h a siz e d th eir ig n o ran ce of history: lite ra ry critic Leslie Fiedler saw y o u n g c am p u s rad icals as " n e w m u ta n ts" re p u d ia tin g "th e v e ry id ea of th e p a st." 29 E ven to M ailer, th eir u su a lly sy m p ath etic m u se, su c h radicals seem ed ig n o ra n t of th e p a s t— h e in ­ v o k ed a sense of h isto ry for them , b u t h e n e v e r claim ed they h a d th a t sense. Som e— h a rd ly all— y o u n g radicals le n t w e ig h t to th a t v iew in th eir d isd a in for th e ir elders, for old C old W ar n o stru m s, for th e "O ld Left," a n d for earlier a n tiw a r activism . A b o u t th e lo n g h isto ry of w o m e n 's peace activism , for ex am ­ ple, m o st m ale rad icals w ere ap p allin g ly ig n o ran t, e v en th o u g h it w a s ren e w e d in th e 1960s b y th e v en erab le W om en's In tern a tio n al L eag u e for Peace a n d Free­ d o m a n d th e n e w W om en's Strike for Peace. A s som e m ale p ro teste rs en ticed th e so ld iers g u a rd in g th e Pentagon: "W e h av e p o t, w e h av e food w e share, w e h av e girls. C om e ov er to us, a n d share o u r girls," som e of w h o m " u n b u tto n e d th eir blouses, gave a real h in t of cleavage, [and] sm iled in th e so ld ie r's ey e."30 But th e n o tio n of rebels w ith o u t a p a st to o k th eir claim of su n d e rin g h isto ry a t face v alue, conflated political radicals w ith h ip p ie d ro p -o u ts, a n d b e tra y e d th e trem b lin g of all before the ch asm o p e n in g in A m erican society. Y outhful radicals, m a n y w ell e d u ca te d , h a d n o less histo rical sensibility th a n y o u n g p e o p le w h o su p p o rte d o r fo u g h t in th e w ar, o r in d e e d th a n m o st A m erican s a d rift in a c o n su m er c u ltu re th a t seem ed to cu t th e m off from th e p ast. P o w er­ fully b u t vaguely. W orld W ar II h u n g ov er all of them . T hey ta p p e d it to v a ry in g p u rp o se s, b u t those w h o saw in it the lessons of g en o cid e a n d th e an teced en ts of fascist "A m erik a" p ro b ab ly k n ew h isto ry as w ell as th o se w h o cited th e les­ so n s of M u n ich o r w a n te d H a n o i to suffer H iro sh im a's fate. A s th eir keen est s tu d e n t saw them , m a n y y o u n g a n tiw a r activists, far fro m c u t off from fam ily a n d ^tradition, w ere in fact "co n cern ed w ith living out expressed but unimple­ mented parental values."31 O f course, y o u n g rebels w ere o ften u n a w a re of th eir roots, b u t historical trad itio n s u su a lly trav el b e n e a th th e ra d a r of selfconsciousness: th e rebels em erg ed from (an d altered) tra d itio n s of p ro test, h o w e v er m u c h th ey k n e w it. Few w h o w a v e d th e flag k n ew th eir d e b t to h is­ to ry a n d to p atrio tic trad itio n s a n y better. N o t th a t patrio tic c u ltu re w a s a static entity, ho w ev er. So m u c h a tten tio n fixed o n th e rad ical b attalio n s in the w a r a t h o m e th a t th e o p p o sin g arm ies of p a trio ts w ere tak e n for g ran te d , b u t th ey w ere su sta in ed b y a d e n se w eb of v et­ e ra n s' a n d religious g ro u p s, n e w sp a p e rs a n d u n iv ersity officials, a n d o th er in ­ stitu tio n s a n d authorities. M ichigan S tate's p resid en t, for exam ple, fo u n d th a t "letters a n d teleg ram s from alu m n i, D ow C hem ical executives, a n d A m erican L egionnaires sw a m p e d h is d e sk ."32 In m a n y schoolroom s, th e P led g e of A lle­ giance w a s still recited. In m a n y to w n s, occasions like M em orial D ay w ere still solem nly h o n o red . Yet p a trio tism w a s losing the alm o st u n c o n te sted h o ld o n p u b lic c u ltu re it

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h a d enjoyed in p rev io u s decades, a n d th e effort to rein v ig o rate it m et little suc­ cess. A sm all sig n of tro u b le em erg ed w h e n F lorida b u sin e ssm e n erected a n e w Iw o Jim a m o n u m e n t in th e "G a rd en of P atrio ts." "A n y tru e, red -b lo o d e d A m erican — o r so th e d ev elo p ers e arn estly b e lie v e d — w o u ld b e h elp less to res­ ist th e p itc h to b u y a trac t h o u se w ith in sig h t of th e sta tu e ." T he n e w m o n u m e n t w as d e d ic ated o n June 14,1965, w ith heroes of th e g rea t w a r in a tten d a n ce a n d a m essage read from Vice P re sid e n t H u m p h rey , a n d Bob H o p e a n d Roy R ogers w ere later h o n o re d there. But th e v e n tu re w a s a com m ercial flop; b y 1970 the g a rd e n w a s carv ed u p for a n e w d e v e lo p m e n t a n d its Iw o Jim a m o n u m e n t cru m b led. By th en , e v e n th e original m o n u m e n t w a s b eco m in g "W ash in g to n 's h o tte st h o m o sex u al p ic k u p sp o t," as "stra n g e rs m e t for assig n atio n s u n d e r one o r a n o th e r of th e g ian t b ro n z e b o o ts." The m alleab ility of su c h sy m b o ls w a s e v id e n t in 1969, w h e n sc u lp to r E d w a rd K ienholz to o k th e fo rm of th e o ld Iw o Jim a m o n u m e n t to create his Portable War Memorial, w h ic h m o ck ed w a r a n d p a ­ triotism . "Sym bols like U ncle Sam a n d Iw o Jim a [or th e flag] n o lo n g er u n ite d th e country. N o w th ey e m p o w ered one g ro u p a t th e ex p en se of a n o th e r," n o te th e h isto rian s of Iw o Jim a iconography. P atrio ts w ere h a rd ly co m p lacen t in th e face of the a ssa u lts— th ey railed a g ain st K ien h o lz's in su lt— b u t th ey co u ld n o t sto p th em .33 N o r co u ld th ey revitalize p atrio tic c u ltu re o n film. Jo h n W ayne, a celebrity h a w k p u b licly eag er to "p u ll the trig g e r" o n a n tiw a r p ro teste rs,34 sta rre d in a n d d irected the o n ly effort in th a t reg ard . The Green Berets (1968), m a d e w ith W hite H o u se help. But th e stock devices of o ld w a r m ovies w ere m ech an ically re­ cycled in th is long, d u ll film . It w a s W orld W ar II u n c o n v in cin g ly w a rm e d over, ju st as W ayne w a s recycling his o w n career as W orld W ar II film h ero , w ith o u t a trace of the m o ral am b ig u ity of som e of his earlier screen characters. Fat a n d o v erag e for th eir roles, W ayne a n d o th er actors created th e im p re ssio n th a t few so ld iers w ere y o u n g a n d th a t th e A m erican w a r effort in V ietn am w a s itself tired. Ideologically, th e film w a s slack, offering n o w a y to achieve v icto ry ex­ cep t b y co n tin u in g to fight, a n d little reaso n to fight except for its th in d e p ic tio n of a cruel, sadistic en em y (ren d ered m u c h as th e Jap an ese in W orld W ar II h a d b e en show n). T h o u g h it d id w ell a t th e box office. The Green Berets in d ic ate d th a t p atrio tic c u ltu re h a d lost resolve a n d confidence. N atio n al lead ers could d o little better. O u t of th e p u b lic eye, th e Jo h n so n a n d N ix o n ad m in istratio n s trie d to stir p a trio tism b y p ro m o tin g p riv a te lobbies su p p o rtin g the w ar, b y a id in g visits to the tro o p s b y celebrities, b y e n listin g th e political su p p o rt of H o lly w o o d stars, a n d u n d e r N ix o n b y e n co u rag in g h a rd h a t w o rk ers to b e a t u p w a r protesters. Fearful of o v e rt m ach in ery to m obilize pu b lic opin io n , h ow ever, n e ith e r Johnson n o r N ix o n m o u n te d th e b o n d d riv es, civil defense drills, or scrap -an d -salv ag e cam p aig n s th a t u n d e rw ro te p atrio tic c u ltu re d u rin g W orld W ar II. T hose efforts h a d m esh ed in d iv id u a l self-interest a n d self-sacrifice w ith the w a r effort. T h at n o w p ro v e d im possible. Public ef­ forts to rally p a trio tism seem ed abstract o r hollow , like a n o th e r telev isio n

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show . D isconnected fro m the e v e ry d a y lives of A m ericans, su c h efforts h e lp e d to give th e w a r its "cu rio u s d etach ed quality ," as if "m erely o n e m o re artificial, m a n u fa c tu re d p ro d u c t of the C o rp o rate S tate." O ld e r actors a n d celebrities of­ te n rallied to th e cau se— in 1967 Bob H o p e w a rn e d of seeing co m m u n ists "off th e coast of S anta M onica" if A m ericans d id n o t fig h t— b u t th eir efforts seem ed form ulaic. T he w a r 's com plex politics also je o p a rd iz ed alliances b e tw ee n the W hite H o u se a n d its p atrio tic allies: w h e n N ix o n b e g a n h is o p e n in g to C h in a in 1971, a fu rio u s John W ayne w ro te h im to c o m p lain of th is "real shocker," e n ­ closing "a h a te piece 'fact sh e e t' o n 'th a t Jew, [N ational Security A d v iso r H en ry ] K issin g e r.'"35 M oreover, p atrio tic c u ltu re w a s n e v e r w h o lly in su lated fro m th e anxieties a b o u t m o d e m w a rfare felt in th e a n tiw a r m o v em en t. H o w ev e r m u c h th ey y e a rn e d to h e a p d e stru c tio n a n d revenge o n th e enem y, m a n y p a trio ts still h esi­ ta te d th e u n le a sh th e u ltim ate w e a p o n , ju st as th e w a r 's occasional fictional h e ro lacked convincing confidence in th e cause. N o t u n til th e w a r w a s o v e r d id fan tasies of v en g ean ce a n d d e stru c tio n seem safe a n d acceptable; o n ly th e n w a s p a trio tic c u ltu re reco n stitu ted in H o lly w o o d a n d W ashington. M ean w h ile, like m a n y stra n d s of A m erican life, it seem ed defensive, an g ry , u n certain . T h at it collided w ith the a n tiw a r m o v em en t w a s obv io u s, ju st as th e e ra 's d iv isio n s o v e r issues lo n g u n reso lv ed a n d a w a r lo n g w a g e d w e re h a rd ly su r­ p risin g . W h y su c h collisions w ere felt to b e "w a rs" is less o b v io u s, h o w ev er, especially because th e rhetoric of w a r cam e so effortlessly th a t few b o th e re d to e x p lain th e ir choice of it. T h at sense d e v elo p ed m o st easily reg a rd in g racial conflict, g iv en th e n a tio n 's reco rd of racial strife, its C ivil W ar o v e r racial issues, a n d a level of civil strife a n d use of a rm e d force in th e 1960s n o t seen in sev eral d ecad es. P e rh ap s it m e a su re d A m erica's relativ e freed o m fro m in te rn al strife th a t w h e n it d id e ru p t, it seem ed like "w a r." N o th in g else reg istered th e shock felt a t these e ru p tio n s, ones A m ericans asso ciated w ith a n id eo logically-riven E u ro p e o r n a tio n s in th e th ro es of decolon izatio n , b u t n o t w ith th e U n ited States. V arious g ro u p s a n d lead ers a d d e d to th e seem in g a p tn e ss of " w a r" as a d efin in g category, as P resid en ts talk ed of enem ies a t h o m e a n d rad icals of revo­ lu tio n a ry w ar. T h at Johnson, N ixon, in d e e d m o st A m erican s h a d little ex p eri­ ence w ith com bat m a d e it easier to u se w a r 's language: th ey co u ld facilely in ­ v o k e w h a t th e y d id n o t really u n d e rsta n d . Yet th e ir talk of w a r w a s also p u z z lin g ly b ro a d a n d generic. T hey sp o k e less of "civil w a r," referrin g to the o b v io u s p rec ed e n t in th e ir h istory, th a n sim p ly of "w a r," as if th e ir conflicts w e re a k in to in te rn atio n al w a rs b e tw ee n n atio n s, reli­ gions, o r alliances (to Vice P re sid e n t Spiro A gnew , th ere rag e d a t h o m e "a h o ly w a r" ov er V ietnam ).36 N o r d o ideological stru g g le, civil violence, a n d w a r ab ro a d inevitably com bine to p ro d u c e talk of w a r a t hom e. A m id th e K orean W ar, blacks m e t w h ite violence, leftists faced m o b action, strik es tu rn e d nasty, a n d officials ch ased alleged traito rs, b u t n o " w a r" am o n g A m erican s w a s p ro ­ claim ed.

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T he differences b e tw ee n the K orean a n d V ietn am eras w ere of co u rse m ajor. The stakes in Korea co n fu sed m a n y A m ericans, b u t th e m ilitary action a b ro a d w a s clear-cut if fru stratin g , a n d the g ra n d A m erican ach iev em en ts of W orld W ar II w ere recent e n o u g h to instill lin g erin g confidence. V iolence a t h o m e w as less visible th a n in th e V ietnam era a n d m ore e v id e n tly d irected a t o u t-g ro u p s ra th e r th a n in itiated b y them . A n d co m p ared to V ietnam , K orea w a s a sh o rt w a r w ith a m in im ally tolerable outcom e. In contrast, the 1960s in v ited linkage b e tw e e n w a r a b ro a d a n d conflict a t hom e. O n e connection d ev elo p ed o u t of th e insistence b y n e arly all p a rtie s to th e w ar, from P resid en ts a n d th e ir foes to lead ers in Saigon a n d H an o i, th a t its o utcom e h in g e d o n th e w ill a n d resolve of th e A m erican p e o p le e v e n m o re th a n o n th e stru g g le in Indochina. T h at belief, m o re p e rv a siv e a n d explicit th a n in th e K orean W ar, all b u t fu sed th e h o m efro n t a n d th e w a rfro n t in to th e sam e w ar. " N o rth V ietnam can n o t defeat o r h u m iliate th e U n ited States," N ix o n said in 1969. "O nly A m ericans can d o th a t." 37 If th e decisive stru g g le w a s a t ho m e, it m ad e sense to see w a r rag in g there. A perceiv ed stru c tu ra l sim ilarity b e tw e e n conflicts at h o m e a n d ab ro a d also lin k ed them . In so far as th e V ietn am W ar w a s seen b y o p p o n e n ts as a racial w a r— a n d so o n also as o n e of m ale ag g ressio n a g ain st w o m e n a n d c h ild ren — it seem ed to m irro r conflicts w ith in A m erica. A n o th e r link o w e d to th e long A m erican tra d itio n of en n o b lin g a lm o st an y cause as a "w a r," a n d John so n 's rhetorical e n m e sh m e n t of h is w a rs a t h o m e a n d ab ro ad . It w a s a rem ark ab le d ev elo p m en t. In m o st w ay s, th e V ietn am W ar affected A m ericans far less th a n h a d W orld W ar II, y et " w a r" e ru p te d a m o n g th em to a d eg ree u n im ag in ab le in the b ig w ar, as if th ey c o m p e n sa te d for th is w a r 's re­ m o ten ess b y fighting it a t hom e. T h at the U n ited States w a s losing this w a r also cau sed b ittern ess. Since n ei­ th er Jo hnson n o r N ix o n w o u ld a d m it defeat, m u c h less e x p lain w h y it w a s su ch a h o rrid p rospect, th e politics of accountin g for it w ere su rreal, w ith d e b ate en d less b u t n e v er fully engaged. Still, A m erican s co n fro n ted , th o u g h n e v e r sat­ isfactorily, a n e e d to account for defeat. T he o b v io u s scap eg o ats w e re th e w a r's o p p o n en ts, th o u g h v e n o m w a s also h e a p e d o n th e m ed ia a n d o n un iv ersities. In th eir o w n w ay, the w a r's o p p o n e n ts w ere alm o st as to n g u e-tie d in th e face of d efeat as its d efen d ers. T hey co u ld n o t e x p lain d e fe at as th e fate of n a tio n s— it h a d to be the p ro d u c t of m alig n forces, a scene in th e m o st ap o caly p tic of sce­ narios. T hus b o th o p p o n e n ts a n d d e fe n d ers of th e w a r em b raced A m erican exceptionalism : th e fate of o th e r n atio n s, d e fe at w a s a histo rical in su lt to the U n ited States. T h at is a g en eralized ex p lan atio n of " w a r" a t h o m e, ho w ev er. D ivisions o v er g e n d e r a n d sexual preference su g g e st h o w each aren a of conflict h a d its o w n sto ry along w ith its place in th e g ra n d e r one. T he reem erg en ce of fem in ism in th e 1960s a n d the rise of g ay liberation all h a d links to m ilita riza tio n a n d its convulsions. Som e links are w ell know n: m a n y fem inists a n d g ay rig h ts a d v o ­ cates took in sp iratio n from the civil rig h ts a n d a n tiw a r m o v em en ts, as w ell as

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u m b ra g e from the d isc rim in atio n th ey faced in th o se m o v em en ts. O th erw ise, th e V ietn am W ar is o ften releg ated to a m in o r role in th e h isto ry of w o m e n a n d gender. W rongly, because the w a r p ro v id e d a ch arg ed settin g for g e n d e r issues, w h o se reem ergence am id th e w a r w a s h a rd ly coincidental. A bove all, V ietn am w a s m ore a men's w a r th a n W orld W ar II, in p a rt because lim ited w a r d id n o t d e m a n d full m o b ilizatio n a n d because th e C old W ar h a d d efin ed w o m e n 's role far m o re n a rro w ly th a n h a d W orld W ar IE1T h o u g h C o n g ress h a d b a n n e d q u o tas o n fem ale m ilitary officers, w o m e n c o m p rised o n ly 1 p e rc en t of actived u ty p e rso n n el in 1967> c o m p a red to ov er 2 p e rc en t in 1945 (265,000 th a t year, o n ly 35,000 in 1967). W om en w ere rarely no ticed for su c h service o r a sk ed to v o lu n te e r for it, a n d n e v e r called to sacrifice a t h o m e, tak e w a r jobs, o r c o n d u ct air ra id drills. L eaders trea te d th eir service far m o re tritely th a n in W orld W ar II. A sk ed if th ere w a s a chance to d o so m eth in g for m ilitary w o m e n "d istressed b ecause th e y are n o t b e in g called u p o n to serve in V ietnam ," Jo hnson rep lied jokingly, "W ell th ere is alw ay s a chance of a n y th in g tak in g place w h e n o u r w o m e n are sufficiently d istressed ," a n d the assem b led jo u rn alists lau g h e d .38 T h at th e V iet C ong m a d e u se of w o m en , e v en in com bat, w a s tak e n as a sig n of th eir p e cu lia r b eastlin ess o r ideological p erv ersio n . N o w o m a n em erg ed in the w a r effort as p ro m in e n tly as E leanor R oosevelt o r O v eta C u lp H o b b y h a d in W orld W ar II. Few, b e sid es caricatu red figures like actress Jane Fonda, e v en d id in th e a n tiw a r m o v em en t. T hese p a tte rn s also coincided w ith g ro w in g h o m o ­ p h o b ia a n d exclusion of gays from n a tio n a l institu tio n s. Yet e v en as w o m e n a n d hom o sex u als w ere largely ex clu d ed from th e n a ­ tio n 's w a r effort, th e y w ere d ra g g e d back in th ro u g h sym bols a n d im ages. T hose o ften w ere off-hand ra th e r th a n consciously d elib erated , a n d lin k ed to n o single political p o sitio n (th o u g h offered far m ore b y m en th a n b y w om en), b u t collectively th e y p o in te d to a tro u b lin g sh ift in relations b e tw ee n g e n d er a n d w ar. N a tio n a l lead ers d id n o t alone cause th a t shift, b u t th ey ex p ressed it. In M ay 1964, B arry G o ld w a ter rep o rte d ly w a n te d to "lob o n e in to th e m e n 's ro o m in th e K rem lin." T h at seem ed a sim p le sta te m e n t of aggression, b u t it cam e a m id a g e n eratio n 's e q u a tio n of m ale h o m o sex u ality w ith b a th ro o m sex a n d c o m m u ­ n ist su bversion. W eeks later a Life article b eg an , "D o th e ho m o sex u als, like the C o m m u n ists, in te n d to b u ry us?" In O ctober cam e a stu n n in g political scandal, th e a rre st of key Johnson aid e W alter Jenkins for sexual activities in a YM CA m e n 's room n e a r th e W hite H ouse, follow ed b y ala rm th a t state secrets m ig h t h av e b e e n co m p ro m ised b y his h o m o sex u ality a n d jokes a b o u t n e w m ea n in g to th e c am p aig n slogan, "A ll th e w a y w ith LBJ." LBJ's reaction to Jenkins's a rre st w a s strik in g ly gen d ered : "I w a s as shocked as if so m eo n e h a d to ld m e m y w ife h a d m u rd e re d h e r d a u g h te r." T his series of statem en ts a n d ev en ts carried the im p licatio n th a t hom osexuality, m o th erin g , a n d c o m m u n ism w ere loosely linked, a n d th a t all (except p resu m ab ly th e m o th er) d e serv e d extin ctio n — b y th e b o m b according to G oldw ater, b y m u rd e r according to LBJ. Jo h n so n later

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m a d e those connections tra n s p a re n t in a fam o u s attack o n th e w a r 's d o u b ters. "T here w ill b e som e 'N e rv o u s N ellies' a n d so m e w h o w ill b ecom e fru stra te d a n d b o th ere d a n d b re a k ran k s u n d e r th e stra in ," h e m a in ta in e d — "N ellies" b e­ in g fam iliar slang for n e rv o u s, effem inate g ay m en. P rivately, h e lik en ed o p p o ­ sitio n to th e w a r to effem inacy— of one d o v e, h e jo k ed , "H ell, h e h a s to sq u a t to piss," a n d as for F ulbright, h e w a s a " fru stra te d o ld w o m a n ." H e also c o m p a red it to h is o w n em ascu latio n th ro u g h h o m o sex u al assault: W h en CBS N e w s of­ fered u n flatte rin g coverage of th e w ar, h e railed a t its h e a d , F ran k Stanton: "F rank, are y o u try in g to fuck m e? Frank, th is is y o u r p re s id e n t a n d y e sterd a y y o u r b o y s sh a t o n th e A m erican flag."39 O th e r lea d ers w o rk e d sim ilar them es, as d id Vice P re sid e n t A g n e w in assail­ in g th e O ctober 1969 V ietn am M o rato riu m . T h at b u rs t of a n tiw a r p ro te st h a d fea tu red (to the W hite H o u se 's chagrin) little violence a n d m u c h m id d le-class respectability, b u t A g n ew assailed it in w o rd s th a t e v o k ed c o n te m p o ra ry im ­ ag es of gay m en. H e c o n d em n ed p ro teste rs w h o in d u lg e d in "stree t carn iv al," ra n a "carousel," a n d w ere "cav o rtin g in th e streets." T heir " ta n tru m s " (p re­ su m a b ly a m a rk of childlike im m atu rity ) w e re "in sid io u sly d e stro y in g th e fab­ ric of A m erican dem ocracy," a n d th e ir allies am o n g p o litician s w e re "id eo lo g i­ cal e u n u ch s." H is m e ta p h o rs ru n n in g riot, A g n ew also d e n o u n c e d d e m o n stra to rs as "sn o b s" a n d " ro tte n a p p le s," b u t th e g e n d e re d ch aracter of h is attack cam e th ro u g h : "T his is w h a t is h a p p e n in g in th is n atio n . W e are a n effete society if w e let it h a p p e n h ere." A s h e h a d w o rrie d a lo u d earlier, "A soci­ ety w h ic h com es to fear its ch ild ren is effete. A sn iveling, h a n d -w rin g in g p o w e r stru c tu re d eserv es th e v io len t rebellion it en co u rag es." A p p aren tly , effem inate w eak n ess lu rk e d n o t o n ly in the a n tiw a r m o v em en t b u t w ith in g o v e rn m e n t it­ self.40 N ix o n offered a m ore com plicated case of g e n d e re d lan g u ag e. H e o ften u se d social class ra th e r th a n g e n d e r to assail th e w a r 's foes: th ey w ere "th e luck iest p eo p le in th e w o rld , g o in g to th e g reatest u n iv ersities," u n lik e less p riv ileg e d y o u th w h o fo u g h t the w ar. H e also, ho w ev er, let loose m ale fu ry a n d a strin g of g e n d ered im ages (describing h is o w n d a u g h te rs as "fro n t-lin e tro o p s in th e b a t­ tle to re-establish th e tra d itio n a l virtues."). P ro -w ar co n g ressm en w ere "b all­ sy," h is foes d e serv e d "cold steel." "A ttack," "fig h t," "sm a sh ," "c ru sh " filled h is co m m ents o n w h a t to d o to h is enem ies. W h en h is p u b lic im ag e a p p e a re d w eak , one a id e su g g ested , to N ix o n 's a p p ro v al, th a t h e "sto p d isp la y in g th e P re sid e n t as if h e h a d a stick u p h is ass." D esp airin g of p u b lic su p p o rt for th e w a r in 1972, N ixon w o rrie d th a t A m ericans "em p h a size th e m ateria l to th e ex­ clu sio n of the sp iritu a l a n d th e S p a rtan life, a n d it m a y b e th a t w e so ften th em u p ra th e r th a n h a rd e n th em u p for th e b attle." T he p h allic a n d g e n d e re d ch ar­ acter of N ix o n 's lan g u ag e w a s u b iq u ito u s.41 Less o bvious w a s its intent, since h o m o p h o b ic a n d m iso g y n ist w o rd s w ere stap les of m ale lan g u ag e often sp o k e n thoughtlessly. Still, n a tio n a l lead ers lin k ed o p p o sitio n to th e w a r w ith h o m o sex u ality a n d fem in in ity co n sisten tly en o u g h to su g g est th a t th ey re g a rd e d failure in th e w a r as d u e to so m e triu m p h

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of th e v a lu e s of w o m e n a n d fem ininity. Since th ey offered n o e x p la n atio n for w h y th o se v a lu e s w ere m align, only a v a g u e in sin u a tio n th a t th ey m a d e the n a tio n w eak , th eir attacks clearly a p p e a le d to th e m a n d th e ir au d ien ces for less th a n conscious reasons. T h at a p p e a l d e riv e d p a rtly from W estern tra d itio n s of e q u a tin g pacifism w ith w e ak n e ss a n d A sian p eo p les w ith effem inacy. Jo h n so n o ften cast A sian c o m m u n ists as w o m en , ch aracterizing th e escalatin g b o m b in g of th em as con­ stitu tin g "sed u ctio n , n o t rap e ," th o u g h , as one h isto ria n n o tes, " ra p e so m e­ tim es follow s rejected se d u ctio n ." G e n d er politics a t h o m e fig u red e v en m ore in th e a p p e a l of these attacks. W om en h a d a tra d itio n of peace activism , m o re w o m e n th a n m e n o p p o se d th is w ar, lea d in g fem inists (Betty F riedan, G loria Steinern, Bella A b zu g , Shirley C hisholm ) d id so in p articu lar, a n d th ey so m e­ tim es co u ch ed their o p p o sitio n to this w a r in g e n d e re d term s: "O n ly a m ale ori­ e n ta tio n w o u ld keep u s in V ietnam ," a rg u e d th eo lo g ian M ary D aly in 1971. Since m e n d o m in a te d th e p u b licly visible a n tiw a r m o v em en t, w o m e n 's peace activism m ay n o t h av e fig u red consciously in th e rhetoric of n a tio n al lead ers, b u t it o v e rla p p e d a m ore g en eral im age of m ale-fem ale conflict o v e r w o m e n 's rig h ts th a t w a s c o n sp icu o u s a n d often expressed in w a r 's lan g u ag e. "T his is n o t a b e d ro o m w ar," N a tio n a l O rg a n iz atio n of W om en fo u n d e r B etty F ried an to ld a cro w d in 1970, it is "a political m o v em en t," b u t th e d en ial p a id h o m ag e to a w a r rh etoric th a t in filtrated p u b lic a n d p riv a te d e b ate (never m o re th a n in th e silly "b attle of th e sexes" th a t fo u n d Billy Jean K ing b e atin g fellow ten n is p lay e r B obby R iggs in 1973). T h u s in assailing th e fem inine a n d effem inate ch aracter of o p p o sitio n to th e w ar, n a tio n al lea d ers w ere ta p p in g associations allo w in g th em to lin k enem ies a t h o m e a n d a b ro a d th ro u g h a co m m o n g e n d e re d im ag ­ ery.42 T he a p p e a l of th a t im ag ery w as h e ig h te n e d b y th e blockage of o ld er o u tlets for w a rtim e fru stratio n s. Black le a d ers' resistance to th e w a r p riv a te ly in fu ri­ a te d Johnson, b u t h e c o u ld h a rd ly go p u b lic w ith h is fu ry g iv en th e p re ssu re to av o id ag g ra v atin g racial divisions. A n d n o A m erican eth n ic g ro u p w a s closely asso ciated w ith the enem y, w h o in an y e v en t h a d th e sam e ethnic id en tity as A m erica's ally. G e n d er offered th e p a th of least resistance. A n y su c h ex p la n atio n for the o u tlook of n a tio n al lea d ers e n co u n ters co m p li­ cations, ho w ev er, for som e of the w a r's o p p o n e n ts sh a red elem en ts of th a t o u t­ look. T hey saw signs of h o m o sex u ality am o n g a lien ated y o u th , sco rn ed th e a n ­ d ro g y n o u s style of som e p ro testers, em braced sym bols of m ale potency, o r lin k ed victo ry in th eir cause to the rape, em ascu latio n , or fem in izatio n of th eir enem ies. M ailer h a d w a n te d to "stick it u p th e g o v e rn m e n t's ass" a n d lik en ed th e A m erica o u t of control in V ietnam to his w ife ("h is love for h is w ife w h ile n o t at all eq u al or co n g ru e n t to h is love for A m erica w a s d a m n a b ly p arallel," h e a d d ed ), w h ile th e final c h ap ter of Armies of the Night, "T he M e tap h o r D eliv­ ered ," fo u n d h im self-consciously tak in g ov er th e b irth in g of a n e w A m erica. O th e r expressions of this te m p e ra m e n t w ere less artful. "Fuck Julie, fuck D av id ," a cro w d of B oston a n tiw a r p ro teste rs rep o rte d ly ch an ted , referrin g to

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N ix o n 's d a u g h te r a n d h e r h u sb a n d , D avid E isenhow er. T he p o p u la r slo g an "W om en Say Yes to M en W ho Say N o " — th a t is, sexually serv e m e n w h o resist th e d ra ft— also linked o p p o sitio n to the w a r to m ale potency. So too d id th e sarto rial style of so m e a n tiw a r p ro teste rs late in th e w ar: w h e n th e m o v e m e n t's rad ical w in g b ecam e em b ittered a n d re tu rn in g v e te ran s sw elled its ran k s, its d e m o n stra tio n s often fea tu red m e n in m ilitary fatig u es o r p se u d o m ilita ry d re ss— offering a p u b lic face of "m ach o strid en c y a n d m ilitarist fan tasy ," as Sara E vans p u t it.43 G en der, th en , w a s th e p lay th in g of all sid es (if larg ely th e ir m ale p ro p o n en ts) in th e w ar. It is in m o st w ars, how ever. W as its role in th is w a r n ew ? T he w a r "d isc re d ite d th e style of aggressive m ascu lin ity k e p t ferv en tly alive b y tw o d e ­ cad es of C old W ar an tico m m u n ism ," B arbara E h ren reich later claim ed, b u t in fact su c h m ascu lin ity w a s n o t decisively "d isc re d ite d ." A p ro cess of "rem ascu lin izatio n ," o n e scholar argues, w e n t o n in d isco u rse a b o u t th e w a r re­ g ard less of its id eo lo g y — from N ix o n to a v o w ed foes of th e w a r— y ield in g "a rev iv al of th e im ages, abilities, a n d ev alu atio n s of m e n a n d m ascu lin ity in d o m ­ in a n t U.S. c u ltu re."44 To b e sure, m o st w a rs featu re su c h m ascu lin izin g im ­ p u lses, b u t in th is w a r those im p u lse s also faced su rg in g fem in ist a n d g ay m o v em ents. T h o u g h n o t p e cu lia r to this w ar, ten sio n s o v er g e n d e r w e re p e c u ­ liarly sh a rp e n e d a n d stru c tu re d b y th e c o m b in atio n of w o m e n 's in v isib ility in th e w ar, m e n 's failure to w in it, a n d th e arriv al of g e n d er-b ased m o v em en ts. A s a resu lt, im ages of g e n d e r a n d sexuality e n te red political d isco u rse w ith a coarseness a n d v o lu m e u n im a g in ab le in W orld W ar H. M ilitarization w o rk e d a t a n o th e r level as w ell, b y sh a p in g th e fem in ist a n d g ay m ovem ents. T hey m a d e cen tral to th eir politics a n d sch o larsh ip th e p ro p o ­ sition th a t "th e p e rso n al is political": p e rso n al lives a n d g e n d e r roles are p o liti­ cal entities, ones historically co n stru cted (an d therefore changeable) ra th e r th a n ro o ted in th e biological d e stin y of m e n a n d w o m en . T h at o u tlo o k fo stered a n o isy a ssertio n of th e ir p e rso n al id en tities in th e p u b lic realm th a t o p p o n e n ts fo u n d in a p p ro p ria te a n d vu lg ar: W h y d o they m ak e a political sh o w of p e rso n al identities? T hey d id so because it h a d a lre ad y b e e n d o n e to them . T hey reacted to th e p rev io u s politicization of p e rso n al id en tities th a t h a d circu m scrib ed th eir roles a n d in v ested th eir id en tities w ith often m alig n m ea n in g in a n a tio n w a g ­ in g h o t a n d cold w ar. (M en's lives, too, w ere in v ested w ith political m ean in g , b u t of a m ore favorable if som etim es b u rd e n so m e sort.) R adicals d id n o t in v e n t linkages b e tw ee n p e rso n al id en tity a n d politics. In stead , th ey trie d to expose a n d a lter those linkages. T heir efforts to d o so, a n d th e tu m u ltu o u s politics th a t follow ed in the 1970s, o w e d m u ch to the m ilitarizatio n of g e n d e r roles th a t h a d a lread y tak e n place. T heir m eth o d s for challenging su ch roles also o w e d so m eth in g to th e e ra 's m ilitarization. T here "o n the cover of the c o n v en tio n issue of New Left Notes in June 1967 w a s a y o u n g w o m a n w ith a rifle— 'T h e N e w A m erican W om an,' " n o ticed Sara Evans. SCUM , th e Society for C u ttin g U p M en o rg an iz ed b y a few

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rad ical fem inists, enjoyed a b rief existence th a t year. "Im p erialism b eg in s at h o m e," in sisted rad ical lesbian R ita M ae B row n a few y ears later. "L et's stab th e m o n ster in its h e a rt ra th e r th a n sla p p in g its fin g ertip s . . . . T he real g lo ry is in sh ittin g o n o th er m en. To fig h t T he M an w e d o n 't n e e d to go to H an o i, w e fig h t h im rig h t h ere." U se of "lib eratio n " in fem in ist a n d g ay id eo lo g y lin k ed th eir causes to rev o lu tio n a ry stru g g les abroad. This p o stu re of a rm e d stru g g le w a s largely reactive a n d tran sien t, how ever. A s m a n y activists realized, th eir en e­ m ies h a d far m ore a rm e d pow er. Since a critiq u e of m ascu lin ity d efin ed th ese m o v e m e n ts— since m ascu lin ity " tra n sla te d in to possessions, force, d o m in a ­ tion, a n d u ltim ately m ilitarism a n d im p e ria lism "— a n y em brace of its charac­ teristics w a s suspect. In stead , th e v alu es th ey ch erish ed w ere "intim acy, s u p ­ p o rt, a n d v irtu a l stru ctu relessn ess."45 T he tro u b lin g " w a rs" over race, g en d er, co rp o rate p o w er, V ietn am — in m a n y w ay s o v er A m erica's m ea n in g a n d d e stin y — m ark e d th e co n v u lsio n s of m ilitarization. So too d id a rtists a n d au th o rs. K u rt V o n n eg u t's SlaughterhouseFive (1968) d e a lt w ith the a u th o r's experience as a PO W in 1945 d u rin g th e D res­ d e n firesto rm u n le a sh e d b y B ritish a n d A m erican b o m b ers, b u t it w a s ju st as m u c h a b o u t th e w a r d u rin g w h ich h e w rote. V o n n eg u t's h allu cinogenic n a rra ­ tive seem ed to reflect h is psychedelic tim es, as w ell as h is d e b t to M ark Tw ain, w h o eig h ty y ears earlier h a d w re a k e d havoc w ith tim e in h is sav ag e satire a b o u t m ech an ized w ar, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court. N o m ere lite ra ry trick, V o n n eg u t's tim e w a rp s con v ey ed th e a b su rd ity of h isto ry 's co u rse in a m ilitarized age a n d a lo n g in g to rev erse it, as Billy P ilg rim im a g in ed m ig h t h a p p e n for D resden: "A m erican planes, full of h o les a n d w o u n d e d m e n a n d corpses, to o k off b ack w a rd s from a n airfield in E n g lan d . O v er France, a few G e rm a n fighter p lan e s flew a t th e m b ack w ard s, su ck ed b u llets a n d shell frag­ m en ts fro m som e of the p lan e s a n d c rew m en ." T hen A m erican b o m b ers flying "b ac k w a rd s" over D resd en "sh ru n k the fires, g a th e red th e m in to cy lindrical steel containers," a n d re tu rn e d th em to th e U n ited States, "w h e re factories w ere o p e ra tin g n ig h t a n d d a y " to d ism an tle th em , "so th ey w o u ld n e v e r h u rt an y b o d y ev er a g ain ."46 Far fro m offering a knee-jerk a ssau lt o n w ar, V o n negut c ap tu re d the intricate process of technological w ar. V onnegut w a s a literary star, h is w o rd s av id ly c o n su m ed b y college stu ­ d en ts, h is n o v el o n D resd en tu rn e d into a m ovie. Bruce C a tto n 's Waitingfor the Morning Train: An American Boyhood (1972) h a rd ly seized th e lim elight. D ean of m ilitary h isto rian s, C a tto n h a d w ritte n a sh a rp account of m o b ilizatio n in W orld W ar II, b u t h is p o p u la r C ivil W ar h isto ries h a d sh o w ed n o fu n d a m e n ta l d istaste for h is n a tio n o r its m ilitary record. N o r a t first glance d id h is m o d est m em o ir a b o u t g ro w in g u p before W orld W ar I in a sm all M ichigan to w n . H e said little a b o u t the d iv isio n s n o w w rack in g A m erica, av o id ed bellicose o r ob­ scene language, a n d esch ew ed th e confusio n of fact a n d fiction n o w p o p u la r (History as a Novel, The Novel as History, as M ailer su b title d Armies of the Night). H e seem ed to tell a n o ld -fash io n ed sto ry in a n o ld -fash io n ed w ay.

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Yet he w as in d ig n an t. H e lovingly ev o k ed th e p e o p le a n d v a lu e s of h is ch ild ­ h o o d b u t d isd a in e d "seeing in the irrecoverab le p a s t a c h arm a n d a co m fo rt w h ich it d id n o t h av e," for th e p a st of h is y o u th h a d b e e n b u ilt o n th e d e stru c ­ tio n of In d ia n c u ltu re a n d a m o n stro u s e n v iro n m en tà l d e sp o lia tio n w ro u g h t b y th e lu m b er in d u stry . T um -of-the c e n tu ry A m erica n o w seem ed to sh are w ith his o w n tim e th e sp irit lea d in g m e n "to crack th e force th a t b in d s th e infected p la n e t's cells together, so th a t the globe lies in d a n g e r of g o in g u p in o n e stu p e n ­ d o u s flam ing lifeless clo u d ," a n d m a n 's "w a ste p ro d u c ts arisin g fro m all of th is lie u p o n the p la n e t's flesh like a n intolerable scurf." W h at e m e rg e d — "d im ly " to th e y o u n g C atton, stark ly to th e old m a n — w a s "th e o n e d ism ay in g fact th a t g o v ern s o u r p ro g ress across th e Sinai d e se rt of th e m o d e m w o rld ; w e h a v e . . . e n tru ste d ou rselv es e n tirely to o u r m echanical in g en u ity ," o n ly to be " m a d e help less b y o u r o w n o m n ip o ten ce." T he "rich est fru its" of th a t tru s t cam e in w h a t C a tto n k n ew best, w ar, w h o se record in h is c en tu ry led h im to m u se darkly: T he w o rld h a d sim p ly gone a w h o rin g after false gods. H a v in g co m m itted itself to th em it h a d to go w h e re th ey took, a n d th is w a s b o u n d to lead to confusion, because of all the g o d s m a n h a s ev er w o rs h ip p e d th e m o st com ­ p letely inscrutable are the ones th a t sta n d b e h in d th e altars in th e ag e of a p p lied technology. . . . W h at p ro tec te d m a n in th e o ld d a y s w a s h is aw areness th a t th ere w ere th in g s h e ju st co u ld n o t do. . . . By th e u n fo rm u ­ lated tenets of h is n e w religion, w h a t h e can d o h e m u s t do. T he o n e im p o s­ sibility n o w is to tu rn back, o r to go at h a lf sp eed . This m ach in e . . . o p er­ ates only a t full speed. U nfortunately, it c an n o t be steered. C atto n barely m en tio n ed V ietnam , n o tin g on ly th a t th e sam e w o rld -sa v in g im ­ p u lse " th a t led u s to d estro y H itle r's obscenely co n triv ed N ib e lu n g e n R e ic h . . . led u s a few y ears later into so u th e rn A sia w h ere w e m a d e obscene co n triv ­ ances of o u r o w n ." H is an g er tran sce n d ed th e follies of th e m o m en t. B ut it also reflected them . "W ar d o es one th in g pitilessly," h e no ted : "it h o ld s u p , before th e eyes of the society th a t is w a g in g it, the essen tial reality o n w h ic h th a t soci­ ety b ased ," a n d th a t reality w o rrie d h im .47 The d isillu sio n m en t w ith w h a t the U n ited States h a d b eco m e— w ith m ilitar­ izatio n a n d the u ncontrollable forces to w h ic h it w a s lin k e d — reach ed b e y o n d th e y o u n g , the radical, th e' o bviously alien ated . In fact, it h a d lo n g b e en n o u rish e d b y som e o ld er A m ericans, like V onnegut a n d C atton. N o r w o u ld it sto p w ith a m ythical "sixties": C a tto n 's 1972 m em o ir in d ic ate d h o w it ro lled on. By then, a d e te rm in a tio n to e n d th e V ietnam W ar a n d a m o re co n tested in ter­ e st in d em ilitarizatio n h a d set in. T hose im p u lses sto o d in jarrin g relatio n sh ip to th e "w a rs" am o n g A m ericans them selves, ho w ev er. T hose w a rs left a lastin g legacy, as A m ericans feverishly em braced " w a r" to characterize a h o st of c ru ­ sad es a n d conflicts over the n ex t q u arter-cen tu ry . T hey also in d ic ate d h o w co m plicated the politics of m ilitarizatio n n o w w ere. Earlier, q u estio n s a b o u t it

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u su a lly h a d b e e n stra ig h tfo rw a rd , e v en if th e an sw ers difficult: H o w m u c h p ri­ o rity sh o u ld b e g iv en to n a tio n al security? W h at m easu res w o u ld m o st en ­ h an ce it? T hose q u estio n s p e rsisted after 1965, b u t th e a p p a re n t arriv a l of w a r among A m ericans a d d e d p u z z lin g q u estio n s less w ith in th e reach of state policy: co u ld A m erica d em ilitarize its role in the w o rld w h ile its o w n c u ltu re a n d p o li­ tics b ecam e m ore d e e p ly m ilitarized? C o u ld A m erican s in d u lg e a w a r m e n tal­ ity in fig h tin g each o th er w ith o u t acting it o u t E lsew here? W as w a r to b e a last­ in g state of m in d am o n g A m ericans? M ore th a n a n y o th er p erso n , R ichard N ix o n n o w faced those questions, a n d offered d istu rb in g a n sw e rs to them .

Nixon’ s Wars W h eth er N ixon w o u ld restra in A m erica's m ilitarizatio n , o r h a d a n y m a n d a te to d o so, w a s u n clear w h e n h e to o k office. H is m arg in of v icto ry w a s slim (43.4 p e rc en t of the v o ters in a p o o r tu rn -o u t, v e rsu s 42.7 p e rc en t for D em o crat H u b e rt H u m p h rey ), d e sp ite earlier p ro sp ects for a lan d slid e; n o t since 1848 h a d th e w in n e r's p a rty failed to control e ith er th e H o u se o r Senate. H u m p h re y co n d em n ed N ix o n for seeking " a n increasing m ilitarizatio n [a te rm rarely u se d in politics] of A m erican life a n d A m erican foreign policy," b u t h e a n d N ix o n o u tlin e d few differences o n w a r a n d foreign policy, th o se in stea d b ein g d efin ed b y th ird -p a rty c an d id a te G eorge W allace a n d ru n n in g m ate C u rtis LeM ay, th e g en eral w h o h a d carried o u t Jap an 's d e stru c tio n a n d n o w so u g h t N o rth V iet­ n am 's. C o n tra ry to rep o rts, N ix o n n e v e r said h e h a d "a secret p la n to e n d th e w a r," b u t w h a te v e r p la n h e d id h av e w a s u n c le ar to v o ters a n d in ch o ate for him . (Publicly h e claim ed h e w o u ld n o t u n d e rc u t LBJ's diplom acy, b u t p ri­ v a te ly h e co n tacted S outh V ietn am 's P re sid e n t T hieu " in a n effort to scuttle th e peace p ro sp ects," as LBJ k n ew from illegal w ireta p s h e co u ld h a rd ly reveal.) C ertain ly m o st A m ericans w a n te d th e w a r over, b u t p e rh a p s o n ly to resu m e th e p re -w a r sta tu s qu o , m o d ified so th a t n o V ietnam h a p p e n e d again. It w a s less clear th a t th ey so u g h t to cu rb th e b ro a d e r process of m ilitarizatio n o r its su b tler m an ifestatio n s in c u ltu re a n d politics.48 A s if the historical situ a tio n w ere n o t a w k w a rd e n o u g h , N ix o n w a s a n aw k ­ w a rd figure to face it: sh re w d a n d b lin d , secretive a n d self-revealing, flexible a n d d o gm atic, idealistic (in h is o w n w ay) a n d m ean -sp irited . A C old W arrior w h o se en tire career h a d b e e n in v este d in m ilitarizatio n a n d foreign policy, h e seem ed b a d ly e q u ip p e d to lead the n a tio n 's reo rien tatio n . H is b rief tim e in C ongress, sta rtin g w ith h is success a g ain st A lger H iss, focused o n n a tio n al se­ curity. A s Vice P resid en t, his job h a d b e en to cru sad e a g ain st co m m u n ism , a p ­ p ease th e p a rty 's rig h t w in g , a n d ste p in as c o m m an d e r in chief w h e n E isen h ow er w a s sick. H is considerable effort as Vice P re sid e n t to im p ro v e race relations o w e d m u c h to C old W ar needs. H is one stab at a p o st o u tsid e th e n a ­ tional secu rity a re n a — his 1962 c am p aig n for C alifo rn ia's g o v e rn o rsh ip —

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ex p o sed a tin e ar for local, largely "d o m estic" issues, w h ic h b arely ra te d m en ­ tio n in his 1962 m em o ir Six Crises. A ttu n e d to w o rld issues, h e w a s also m o re com fortable ab ro ad , w h ere h e often fo u n d th e resp ect a n d ra p p o rt w ith cro w d s th a t h e craved at hom e. H e trav eled overseas in cessan tly as Vice P resid en t, in th e m id-1960s w h e n h e w a s resto rin g h is political cred en tials, a n d ag ain as P resid ent, e v en d u rin g his last d re a d fu l y e ar in office. H is 1968 a n d 1972 cam ­ p aig n s, tig h tly c h o re o g rap h e d e v e n b y m o d e m sta n d a rd s, k e p t h im a t a rm 's len g th from the ro u g h -an d -tu m b le of politics a n d jou rn alistic scrutiny. O n ly h is p ro d ig io u s travels o n the G O P 's rubber-chicken circuit to o k h im to th e g rass­ roots. N ix on w as d e e p ly in v ested in w a r a n d fo reig n policy, b u t in a n a rro w w ay. U ntil h e b ecam e P resident, h is career m ain ly co n sisted of n o n sto p cam p aig n ­ ing, w ith little experience in fo rm u la tin g policies o r ru n n in g o rg an izatio n s. H e h a d little in terest in m ilitary history, in th e d etails of th e V ietn am W ar, or in th e g en erals a n d a d m irals in charge of it, m a n y of w h o m in tu rn d istru ste d him . H e n e v er cared m u ch a b o u t th e sinew s of A m erican m ilitary stre n g th o r th e d etails a n d im plications of a rm s control. To th e ex ten t su c h m atters m o v ed h im , it w a s often in a juvenile, self-referential fashion. E arly in 1970, h e m a y h av e sp e n t m o re tim e w atch in g th e m ovie Patton th a n a tte n d in g to th e co m in g in v asio n of C a m b o d ia — n o t because h e w a n te d to u n d e rs ta n d w a r b u t b ecau se th a t W orld W ar II saga n o u rish e d h is "heroic fantasies," o nes h e sh a re d w ith m a n y m en, except th a t N ixon "w as th e P resid en t, a n d it w a s d a n g e ro u s in th e extrem e, as w ell as in a p p ro p ria te , for h im to id en tify w ith P a tto n a n d th e D u k e [John W ayne]." C ertain ly h e lacked Ike's g rasp of th e su b tle r d im e n sio n s of m ilitariz­ atio n o r LBJ's ag o n y a b o u t the conflict b e tw ee n w a r a n d refo rm .49 T h o u g h often d u p licito u s, h e w a s reaso n ab ly h o n e st a b o u t h is p rio rities (ones K ennedy also largely had). A s h e to ld a jo u rn alist b efore b eco m in g P resi­ d e n t, "I'v e alw ays th o u g h t this c o u n try co u ld r u n itself d o m estically w ith o u t a P resident; all y o u n e ed is a co m p eten t C ab in et to ru n th e c o u n try a t hom e. You n e ed a P re sid e n t for foreign policy." H is v a u n te d in terest in w elfare refo rm — D aniel M oy n ih an 's b o ld p la n for a "n eg ativ e incom e tax " e n su rin g a m in im u m incom e for all A m ericans— seem ed hollow . "W h at N ix o n w a n te d m o st w a s cred it for b o ld n ess a n d in n o v atio n " in dom estic policy " w ith o u t th e cost," Ste­ p h e n A m brose notes. H e felt u n e n c u m b e re d a n d able to m ak e a difference in foreign policy a n d global affairs, b u t fo u n d it v ex in g to h ag g le o v er d o m estic policy w ith C ongress a n d federal bureaucracies, in stitu tio n s h e h e ld in con­ tem pt. H e h a d the skills to w o rk w ith C ong ress b u t d id so " w ith o u t e n th u si­ asm , w ith o u t conviction, w ith o u t joy, a n d th u s w ith o u t success." C am p a ig n in g in 1970, h e offered few achievem ents in reform . "In stead , h e ra n a g ain st po t, perm issiveness, protest, p o rn o g rap h y , a n d d w in d lin g p a trio tism " (but D em o­ crats h e ld C ongress a n d g ain ed eleven g o v ern o rsh ip s).50 A s th a t cam p aig n in d icated , N ixon d id d e n o u n ce v a rio u s evils in A m erican life. P o rnography, h e a n n o u n ce d in co n d em n in g th e "m o rally b a n k ru p t con-

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elu sio ns" of a n L B J-appointed com m ission, "co u ld p o iso n the w ellsp rin g s of A m erican a n d W estern c u ltu re a n d civilization. . . . S m u t . . . sh o u ld b e o u t­ law ed in ev ery State in th e U n io n ." Like Johnson, N ix o n also saw w a r as a m o d el for action in su c h m atters. H e d id once b e m o a n "o v erb lo w n rh e to ric . . . in w h ic h th e w o rd 'w a r ' h as p e rh a p s too often b e e n u s e d — th e w a r o n pov erty , th e w a r o n m isery, the w a r o n disease, th e w a r o n h u n g e r" — b u t th e n im m e­ d iately fo u n d the w o rd " a p p ro p ria te " for th e "fig h t a g ain st crim e. W e m u s t d e ­ clare a n d w in th e w a r a g ain st th e crim inal elem en ts." Since LBJ h a d d eclared w a r o n crim e, N ix o n 's differences from h im in th is reg ard w ere fuzzy, except th a t N ixon e m p h a size d su c h w a rs less a n d lin k ed th em m ore to h is fear th a t in te rn al ro t w o u ld sap n a tio n al energies in th e global aren a.51 H e w o rk e d h a rd o n dom estic policy becau se h e w o rk e d h a rd a t ev ery th in g , a n d som e achievem ents d id issue. H e w a n te d to " sta rt p o w e r a n d resources flow ing back from W ashington to th e States a n d co m m u n ities," a goal m e t b y sh a rin g fed eral rev e n u es w ith state go v ern m en ts. T h ro u g h a n e w E n v iro n m en ­ tal P ro tection A gency, o n th e o th er h a n d , W ash in g to n to o k o n m ajor resp o n ­ sibility for a n em erg in g concern, th o u g h N ix o n w a s fu rio u s w h e n e n v iro n m en ­ talists h e lp e d to scuttle a su p erso n ic airlin er ("th e number one Technological T rag ed y of o u r tim e," h e to ld h is staff). H is b o ld e st in itiativ es in econom ic p o l­ icy w ere k ey ed to th e w ar, h o w e v e r— h is w ag e-p rice freeze in 1971 a d d re ssed th e in flation it h a d g e n e ra te d — a n d h e c o n tin u ed to fin d issues of dom estic p o l­ icy b o rin g a n d his p ro g ress o n th em m eager, so th a t in 1972 h e " h a d n o t cam ­ p a ig n e d o n [them ] a n d th u s h a d n o t created a co n stitu en cy for th em ."52 N ix o n 's p e rso n al a n d political style c o m p o u n d e d h is iso latio n fro m o rd in a ry A m ericans a n d th e issues a t h o m e th ey faced, for all h e co u rte d th e "Silent M a­ jority." In a p erip atetic life, h e h a d few roots, few friends, a n d in th e W hite H o u se stu n n in g ly few close associates. H is differences from E isen h o w er w ere telling. Ike's w id e circle of friends, instincts to m ed iate, a tten tio n to d iv erse v iew s, a n d w a rin e ss a b o u t co n cen trated p o w e r baffled N ixon, w h o (like K en­ n ed y ) m istook th e m for w eakness, d isav o w in g all th a t " 'to g e th e rn e ss ' b u ll­ shit." A s N ix o n o b serv ed in p u z z le d a d m iratio n , Ike " d id n 't th in k of p eo p le w h o d isa g ree d w ith h im as b ein g th e 'en em y .' H e ju st th o u g h t: 'T h ey d o n 't agree w ith m e.' " H ere lay "th e b ig g est single difference b e tw ee n th em . . . . E isen h ow er w a s a m a n full of love, for life a n d for peo p le, w h ile N i x o n . . . all too o ften gave in to a n im p u lse to h a te ." A t tim es c o n te m p tu o u s of " th a t senile o ld b a sta rd ," N ix o n also lacked Ike's h o p e s to h eal th e w o u n d s of w a r a n d curb th e forces of m ilitarizatio n .53 A ll this b o d e d ill for a n y effort to restrain th o se forces. H o w ev e r stro n g th a t effort, N ix o n h a d n o o th er m issio n for the n atio n , h a rd ly e v en th e v a g u e sen ti­ m e n ts of E isenhow er a n d K en n ed y in this reg ard . C o n trad icto ry as th e m a n w as, h e som etim es said otherw ise. "If w e can g et th is c o u n try th in k in g n o t of h o w to fight a w a r," h e w ro te in 1971, "b u t h o w to w in a p eace— . . . th in k in g of clean air, clean w ater, o p e n spaces, of a w elfare refo rm p ro g ra m th a t w ill p ro-

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v id e a floor u n d e r th e incom e of ev ery fa m ily . . . th e n w e w ill h a v e th e lift of a d riv in g d rea m ." But h e a d d e d th a t "it takes so m e tim e to g e t rid of th e n ig h t­ m ares" associated w ith th e w ar. "You c a n 't b e h a v in g a d riv in g d re a m w h e n y o u are in the m id st of a n ig h tm a re ."54 The " d re a m " m ig h t h av e h e lp e d e n d th e "n ig h tm a re ." N ix o n th o u g h t otherw ise. Yet in co n fro n tin g m ilitarizatio n N ix o n h a d m ajo r assets, in clu d in g fo rm id a ­ ble political skills a n d experience. W ho b e tte r to challen g e m ilita riza tio n th a n o n e w h o k n ew its w o rk in g s so w ell a n d h a d th e C o ld W ar c red en tials to in su ­ late h im from charges of b e in g "soft" o n co m m u n ism a n d defense? T hose cre­ d en tials in d e e d se rv ed h im w ell (as th ey h a d E isenhow er) w h e n N ix o n p u r­ su e d d e te n te w ith th e Soviet U n io n a n d C h in a a n d re tre n c h m e n t in defense. D em o crats like H u m p h re y o r G eorge M cG overn, h e knew , w o u ld h a v e b e en sla u g h te red (by N ixon, am o n g others) for su c h initiatives. N ix o n 's b ig g est asset w a s h is ap p reciatio n , ab stract b u t keen, of th e n e e d a n d th e m ean s to ch an g e course. T he w a r w a s tea rin g A m erica a p art. If th e 1968 election gave h im n o m a n d a te a b o u t how to e n d it, it still m a d e clear th e y e arn ­ in g to d o so (E isenhow er, w ith N ix o n w atch in g , h a d e a rn e d e n o rm o u s g o o d w ill b y e n d in g th e K orean W ar). W ar, m ilitarizatio n , a n d h e g em o n y w ere ex­ p en siv e a t a tim e w h e n n e e d s a t h o m e w ere p erceiv ed as m o u n tin g . N o r to N ixon, a t least in his abstract calculus, d id th e stre n u o u s ex ertio n s of recen t d e ­ cades a n y lo n g er seem so necessary. H e k n ew th a t h is earlier rhetoric a b o u t m o n o lithic c o m m u n ism w a s o u td a te d — th a t d iv isio n s a m o n g a n d stra in s w ith in c o m m u n ist n a tio n s w ere g ro w in g , w h ile a rev iv ed E u ro p e a n d Jap an p ro v id e d c o u n te rw eig h ts to them . T hose ch an g es in tu rn offered lev erag e for e n d in g th e V ietnam W ar o n term s acceptable to him : d e te n te w ith th e Soviet U n io n a n d C hina w o u ld in d u ce th eir p re ssu re o n H an o i to settle; p lay in g Bei­ jin g a n d M oscow a g ain st each o th e r w o u ld k eep b o th fro m ex p lo itin g th e con­ tractio n of A m erican p o w e r N ix o n envisioned . N ix o n also k n e w th a t th e V ietnam W ar co u ld n o t b e "w o n " (w h a te v er th a t m ig h t m ean). A s h e to ld one sp e ec h w riter in M arch 1968, "T h ere's n o w a y to w in th e w ar. But w e c a n 't say th a t of course. In fact, w e h av e to seem to sa y th e o p p o site." B ack-pedaling from w h a t h e once h a d a rg u e d , in 1968 h e e m p h a ­ sized "h o n o rab le peace" ra th e r th a n victory, stressed th a t success h in g e d m o re o n S outh V ietnam ese efforts th a n o n A m erican, a n d ceased id en tify in g V iet­ n a m as essential to A m erican interests. H e p le d g e d to "w in th e peace," m e a n ­ in g th a t the w a r " m u st b e e n d e d h o n orably, co n sisten t w ith A m erica's lim ited aim s a n d w ith th e long-term req u ire m e n ts of peace in A sia." A ll this, sim ilar to w h a t LBJ n o w th o u g h t, w a s d a n g ero u sly fuzzy. H e realized th e w a r w a s lo st "ev en if h e w o u ld n o t a d m it it," A m brose arg u es, b u t p u b lic a d m issio n w a s th e n u b of the m atter: w ith o u t it, N ixon risk ed co n fu sio n a n d b e w ild e rm e n t in h is a d m in istra tio n a n d in the nation. Still, in his se rp en tin e w ay, N ix o n w a s sh ift­ in g g ro u n d . H e still so u g h t v icto ry of som e sort, b u t it w o u ld b e n o battlefield ro u t of the enem y, th o u g h w e a p o n s m ig h t a ssist it.55

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H a rd ly a "secret p la n " to e n d th e w ar, since it w a s n o t q u ite a secret in 1968 a n d n o t q u ite a p lan , this w a s o n ly a sketch of a g ra n d design. It also h in g ed d a n g e ro u sly on, am o n g o th e r things, a n e x ag g erated n o tio n of H a n o i's d e p e n ­ d en ce o n its co m m u n ist p a tro n s a n d th e ir lev erag e o v e r it. A lth o u g h N ix o n said little o n th e c am p aig n trail, th ro u g h h is w ritin g s a n d o th e r m ean s h e h in te d a t d e te n te , a n o p e n in g to C hina, a n e w im p o rtan c e for Japan, a n d th eir relatio n sh ip to e n d in g th e w ar. (A m ericans w ere stu n n e d b y th e o p e n in g to C h in a in 1971 only because N ix o n w a s secretive a b o u t th e step s th a t m a d e it h a p p e n , n o t a b o u t th e im p u lse b e h in d it.) N o r d id h is g ra n d d e sig n m e a n full retre at from m ilitarizatio n a n d h eg e­ m ony. N ix o n so u g h t to p reserv e th e core of b o th b y p ru n in g th em of th eir m o st d a n g ero u s, costly, o r politically o n ero u s elem ents. H e p u t it clearly in S eptem ­ b e r 1969: h e w a n te d "d efen se forces stro n g e n o u g h to k eep th e peace" b u t w ith ­ o u t "w a stefu l e x p e n d itu re s" th a t w o u ld sap n a tio n al stren g th , a n d assistance to "free n a tio n s" w ith o u t " ru sh in g in to d o for th em w h a t th ey can a n d sh o u ld d o for th em selv es."56 T h u s th e U n ited States w o u ld exit V ietn am b u t p reserv e a n illu sio n of success b y u sin g A m erican air p o w e r a n d ru sh in g a id to Saigon. T h u s th e defense estab lish m en t w o u ld rem a in larg ely as it w as, b u t p u rg e d of th e co n scrip tio n w h ic h o ffen d ed m a n y A m ericans. T h u s th e C old W ar w o u ld still b e w a g e d , b u t w ith m ore focus o n key allies a n d less o n p e rip h e ra l areas b e y o n d th e reach of A m erican pow er. T h u s th e w e a p o n s race w o u ld con tin u e, b u t w ith a rm s ag reem en ts to m ak e it m o re p alatab le, p red ictab le, a n d am e n ­ able to A m erican technological superiority. T h u s th e p o w e r w o u ld rem ain to u p h o ld A m erican econom ic m ig h t, b u t m o d ified b y risin g co m p etito rs like Ja­ p an . A n o v erex ten d ed em p ire w o u ld sh u c k off its less essen tial c o m m itm en ts a n d practices. B udgets, force levels, a n d a rm s accords reflected N ix o n 's goal of p ru d e n t contraction. From 1969 to 1973, d efense b u d g e ts d eclin ed sh a rp ly (about oneth ird ) w h e n a d ju ste d for inflation a n d in term s of sh are of G N P. M ilitary p e r­ so n n el d ro p p e d from o v er 3.5 m illion in 1968 to ju st o v e r 2.1 m illio n in 1975. T he 1972 SALT I a g reem en t d id n o t restra in th e n u c le ar arm s race b u t seem ed to steer it in to safer channels: a n a cco m p an y in g trea ty b a n n e d m o st an tim issile w e ap o n s, w h ic h m a n y saw as the m o st d a n g e ro u s form of th e a rm s race; al­ lo w an ce to d ev elo p m u ltip le -w a rh ea d m issiles seem ed (w rongly, as som e rec­ o g n ized a t th e tim e) to favor A m erica's technological su p erio rity ; SALT II talks h e ld o u t p ro m ise for actual cuts in n u c le ar arsenals. M ean w h ile, n o n d efen se sp e n d in g rose u n d e r th e p ressu re of en title m e n t g u aran tees, b ecau se C o n g ress c o n tin u e d m a n y G reat Society p ro g ra m s w h ic h N ix o n eith er w a n te d o r h a d n o sto m ach to fight, a n d because e v en N ixon d e sired som e n e w p ro g ram s. M in d ­ ful of m o u n tin g n a tio n al d eb t, h ow ever, a n d for o th e r reaso n s as w ell, N ix o n resisted tran sfe r of federal fu n d s from defen se to o th e r arenas. "D ream s of u n ­ lim ited billions" loosed b y the e n d of the V ietnam W ar "are ju st th a t— d rea m s," h e said , d e n o u n cin g "illu sio n s th a t w h a t som e call th e 'p eace a n d g ro w th divi-

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d e n d ' [a sim ilar term e m e rg ed in th e 1980s] w ill au to m atically solve o u r n a ­ tio n al p ro b lem s."57 Fuller d ise n g ag e m e n t from m ilitarizatio n seem ed too risk y to th e U n ited States' interests, credibility ab ro ad , a n d self-im age a s a su p e rp o w e r, a n d n o m a n d a te to u n d e rta k e it existed. R adical p ro te st seem ed p o w e rfu l, b u t in p o liti­ cal in stitu tio n s d o v ish liberals w ere far m ore n u m ero u s, a n d th ey h a rd ly re p u ­ d ia te d A m erican interests ab ro ad . T hey o ften saw th e U n ited States as stu m ­ b lin g h o n o rab ly into a "q u ag m ire" in V ietnam , in w h a t A rth u r Schlesinger, Jr., re g a rd e d in 1969 as "a triu m p h of th e politics of in ad v e rte n ce " a n d "a tra g e d y w ith o u t v illains," n o t a failure of basic A m erican policies.58 In C o n g ress th e y in flu enced N ix o n 's course a n d d re w h is fury, b u t few so u g h t im m ed iate, u n i­ lateral w ith d ra w a l from V ietnam . T hey too w a n te d p ru d e n c e in th e exercise of A m erican po w er, n o t its cessation, a n d th u s b ro a d ly sh a re d N ix o n 's outlook. H aw k s w ith apocalyptic scenarios for N o rth V ietnam , n u m e ro u s in b o th p a r­ ties, d islik ed th e global do -g o o d ism , e n ta n g lin g alliances, a n d elitist to n e th ey associated w ith the foreign policy e stab lish m en t, b u t h a rd ly u rg e d d e m ilitariz ­ ation. N ix o n b o rro w e d th eir favorite m ean s of p o w er, th e b o m b er, to serv e h is g o al of a p ru d e n t contraction of m ilitarizatio n , w h ile u n d e rm in in g th e Left b y p h a sin g o u t the d ra ft a n d slow ly w ith d ra w in g g ro u n d forces fro m V ietnam . In a n y event, N ix o n w o u ld n o t d o m ore, n o m a tte r w h a t th e p o p u la r m a n ­ d ate. E ven w h a t h e d id d o stu ck in h is craw . H is fate w a s "to p resid e o v e r th e retre at of A m erican po w er. H e h a te d it. E very in stin ct in h im reb elled a g ain st it. For tw e n ty years, in ev ery crisis, a t ev ery tu rn in g p o in t, h is adv ice h a d b e e n to tak e th e offensive a g ain st the com m unists. A ttack, w ith m o re firep o w er, n o w ." But n o w "he h a d to retreat." H is old instin ct d id n o t go aw ay, h o w ev er: h e co u ld attack e v en in retreat.59 A ll these strategic, political, a n d p e rso n a l im p u lse s cam e to g eth er in N ix o n 's fam o u s "M a d m a n T heory" for e n d in g th e w ar, th e p h ra se in d icatin g h o w cru d e im p u lses to d e stro y e n tw in e d w ith cold calculations of h o w to retreat. N ix o n w a n te d to a p p ly E isen h o w er's m e th o d of e n d in g th e K orean W ar to V ietn am — w ith o u t a th o u g h tfu l sense of w h a t Ike h a d d o n e a n d h o w th e n e w situ atio n differed. A s h e p riv ately ex p lain ed "th e M a d m a n T h eo ry " in 1968, "I w a n t the N o rth V ietnam ese to believe . . . I m ig h t d o anything. . . . W e'll ju st slip th e w o rd to th em th at, 'fo r G o d 's sake, y o u k n o w N ix o n is o b sessed a b o u t C o m m unism . We c a n 't restra in h im w h e n h e 's a n g ry — a n d h e h a s h is h a n d o n th e n u clear b u tto n ' a n d H o C hi M in h him self w ill b e in Paris in tw o d a y s b eg ­ gin g for peace." In office N ix o n trie d to act o n h is theory. In M arch 1969, h e b e g an (then soon e x p an d ed ) the secret b o m b in g of C am b o d ia, a n e u tra l n a tio n th ro u g h w h ic h N o rth V ietnam fu n n eled som e of its m e n a n d m u n itio n s. T h at su m m er, as h e later p u t it, h e d e cid ed to "go for b ro k e" a n d h a d H e n ry K issin­ ger, his n atio n al security advisor, convey to th e N o rth V ietnam ese th a t if a n acceptable com prom ise w ere n o t reached, h e w o u ld "tak e m easu res of th e greatest consequences," a e u p h em ism for u se of n u c le ar w eap o n s. A ir p o w er, its u se or its threat, w as once ag ain a t the cen ter of A m erican policy.60

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N ix o n 's choice ra n risks alm o st too n u m e ro u s too m en tio n . B om bing h a d lo n g in fu ria te d th e w a r's o p p o n e n ts a n d seem ed , for all th e g ro u n d tro o p s h e w ith d rew , like th e a p o th eo sis ra th e r th a n th e con tractio n of m ilitarizatio n . It m a d e h im look like a real m ad m an . It co u ld h a rd ly p lacate air p o w e r h a w k s w h e n k e p t secret (as it often w as), a n d w h e n rev ealed it co u ld on ly in fu riate doves. T h at w a s especially so since secrecy (from A m erican s— C am b o d ian s k n e w w h o w a s b o m b in g them ) req u ire d m easu res w ith in g o v e rn m e n t a n d a g ain st N ix o n 's o p p o n e n ts th a t w ere legally d u b io u s a n d p o ssib ly g ro u n d s for im p each m en t. Too, th ere w a s N ix o n 's c u rio u s indecisiveness, d e sp ite h is ob­ sessive efforts to p re se n t h im self as decisive. Far fro m ru sh in g to im p le m e n t his M a d m a n T heory, h e w a ite d m o n th s to d o so a n d th e n trie d it episo d ically for th e n e x t fo u r years. "W e n e e d a p la n to e n d th e w ar, n o t o n ly to w ith d ra w tro o p s," K issinger to ld N ix o n a n d the N a tio n a l S ecurity C ou n cil— e ig h t m o n th s after th ey e n te red office p resu m ab ly w ith a plan . N ix o n in th e sp rin g of 1970 "enjoyed talk in g to u g h ; h e enjoyed p re te n d in g th a t h e w a s m ak in g a deci­ sio n a b o u t e q u iv a le n t to C a e sa r's to cross th e R ubicon o r W illiam th e C o n ­ q u e ro r's to set off fo r E n g lan d o r E isen h o w er's to lau n ch D -D ay; h e w a n te d to th in k of h im self as a n all-or-nothing k in d of guy. But N ix o n sh ra n k fro m the 'b ig play,' from w h a t h e som etim es called th e 'N ix o n Big C h arg e.' "61 In d e ­ cisiveness w a s a v irtu e in the n u c le ar age if it m e a n t cau tio n a n d a tte n tio n to conflicting view s, b u t of th o se N ix o n w a s c o n te m p tu o u s. H is indecisiveness w a s characterological ra th e r th a n calculated. C o m b in ed w ith h is secretiveness, it m a d e h is efforts to e n d th e w a r erratic a n d im pulsive. A bove all, th e M a d m a n T heory, a t least as N ix o n p racticed it, d id n o t w o rk . It w as, after all, only a m ore d e stru ctiv e a n d cap ricio u s v ersio n of w h a t Jo h n so n h a d a lre ad y tried . It rem a in e d n o su b stitu te for success o n th e g ro u n d in the so u th . In 1969 a t least, it d id n o t m ak e H a n o i b u d g e . Like o th er elem en ts of N ix o n 's p o licy — increased reliance o n A RV N tro o p s, slow extrication of A m er­ ican g ro u n d forces, d ip lo m acy to b rin g th e Soviet U n io n a n d C h in a in to p la y — it w a s d o o m e d to w o rk slow ly if at all, a n d d e p e n d e d o n w h a t o th ers (Saigon, H an o i, Beijing, a n d M oscow ) w o u ld do, m ak in g N ix o n 's fo rtu n e h o stag e to them . "T he p h a se d , slow -m otion d e fe at w as th e w o rst m istak e of his P resi­ dency," A m brose h a s concluded. "B ecause th e w a r w e n t on, ten sio n a n d d iv i­ sio n filled th e lan d , a n d the N ixon h a te rs w e n t in to a fren zy ."62 N ixon, of course, h a d im ag in ed it w o u ld all go sw iftly (H o " in tw o d a y s b eg ­ g in g for peace"). A n y P re sid e n t m akes m istakes, b u t th is w a s a colossal one, from a m a n w h o p re se n te d h im self as su p re m ely g ifted in su c h m atters. H e b lam ed o p p o n e n ts for ty in g his h a n d s a n d for e m b o ld en in g H an o i to h o ld o u t (in 1970 the Senate n e arly a p p ro v e d a G eorge M c G o v e m -M a rk H atfield m ea ­ su re forcing w ith d ra w a l of all A m erican forces b y th e e n d of 1971), b u t N ix o n 's job as P re sid e n t w a s to d eal w ith o p p o sitio n , n o t ju st b ew ail it. If h e really h a d h a d confidence in him self a n d h is theory, h e w o u ld h av e acted before h is o p p o ­ n e n ts c o u ld act. Q uicker action m ig h t n o t h av e w o rk e d , b u t failure a t least w o u ld h av e d em o lish ed th e d e lu sio n th a t b o m b in g w o u ld y et b rin g peace.

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In stead, N ixon clu n g to the d e lu sio n for fo u r y ears, strin g in g o u t th e a t­ tem p ts to m ake it w o rk a n d the w a r itself. A series of te m p o ra ry ex p ed ien ts, m in o r successes, en em y m istakes, a n d sh eer d e cep tio n s su sta in e d th e p ro sp e ct of an acceptable e n d to th e w ar. T he e n em y 's recovery from th e Tet O ffensive w as slow , the Saigon regim e seem ed m in im ally m o re efficient a n d less obnox­ ious, d ra ft calls p lu n g e d , a n d A m erican forces sh ie d a w ay fro m costly searcha n d -d e stro y o p e ra tio n s— w ith im p o rta n t exceptions like th e in v asio n of C am ­ b o d ia in the sp rin g of 1970. T he m o st d isa stro u s allied in itiativ e w a s a n ARV N in v asio n of Laos in 1971, w h ich N ix o n trie d to to u t as a g rea t success. H e rep e at­ e d ly ste p p e d u p the air w ar, se n d in g b o m b ers to H an o i a n d H a ip h o n g o n th e eve of his su m m it trip to M oscow in th e sp rin g of 1972. P erh ap s th e b o m b in g h a d som e effect. In peace accords d ra fte d th a t fall, H an o i d ro p p e d (am o n g o th er things) its insistence o n im m ed iate ex p u lsio n of th e Saigon reg im e a n d o n reunification of V ietnam u n d e r c o m m u n ist auspices. H an o i, h o w ev er, y ield ed n o m o re th a n N ixon a n d K issinger, w h o , in re tu rn for H a n o i's p le d g e to re p a tri­ ate A m erican p riso n e rs of w ar, n o w accepted a co alition g o v e rn m e n t in th e S outh a n d allow ed a h u g e c h u n k of th e N o rth 's forces to rem a in there. T he stu m b lin g block to final A m erican w ith d ra w a l w a s th e Saigon regim e, w h ich b alk ed a t th e sell-out it saw in th e fall 1972 accords. R eelected b y a la n d ­ slide, N ixon u n lea sh e d th e b o m b ers o n the N o rth for one final a n d ferocious assault. "I d o n 't w a n t a n y m ore of th is crap a b o u t th e fact y o u c o u ld n 't h it th is targ e t o r th a t one," h e to ld the JCS ch airm an , b u t in a tw ist o n p o p u la r n o tio n s of civil-m ilitary differences, the air force sid e ste p p e d N ix o n a n d lim ited attacks risk in g civilian casualties. In a n y event, N ix o n 's rag e w a s n o t really a g ain st the N o rth . H e b o m b ed n o t to b u d g e H an o i, w h o se term s c h an g e d little, b u t to in ­ d u ce Saigon to sig n b y g iv in g it a d o w n p a y m e n t o n h is secret p ro m ise to ren ew b o m b in g after A m erican w ith d ra w a l if H a n o i v io lated th e accords. T his w a s " w a r b y ta n tru m ," a rg u e d c o lu m n ist Jam es R eston. "W e b o m b ed th e N o rth V ietnam ese into accepting o u r concession," n o te d o n e K issinger a id e ruefully. N o t on ly Saigon sm elled a sell-out, b u t m a n y A m erican s— su sp icio u s h a w k s a n d e m b ittered m ilitary co m m an d ers, a n d w a r o p p o n e n ts w h o m a d e a g o o d case th a t the final term s could h ave b e e n achieved y ears earlier. Still, th e fig leaf of peace w ith h o n o r w a s m o m e n tarily in place.63 The cost of g ettin g it in place w a s en o rm o u s. T he stag g erin g toll a m o n g In d o ­ chinese co n tin u ed . N ix o n 's b o m b in g of C am b o d ia u n d e rm in e d th e slip p ery n e u tra lity of Prince S ih an o u k 's regim e, w h o se collapse, alo n g w ith th e A m eri­ can in vasion, p a v e d the w a y for precisely w h a t h e p resu m ab ly w a s try in g to p rev en t, the co m m u n ist tak eo v er of a n o th e r country, in th is case b y K hm er R ouge w h o se genocide far exceeded th e H an o i reg im e's bru talities. T he toll of A m erican w a r d e a th s c o n tin u ed to m o u n t, a n d th e A m erican a rm e d forces' m o rale a n d efficiency p lu m m e te d , as th ey becam e rack ed b y d ru g use, racial tu rm o il, atrocities, c o rru p t a n d inefficient co m m an d ers, a n d e n listed m e n 's v i­ olence to w a rd them .

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T hose p ro b lem s w ere ro o ted p a rtly in th e w a r's u g ly n a tu re a n d p a rtly in circum stances p rec ed in g N ix o n 's presidency. T he officer c o rp s' careerist m e n ­ tality, criticized b y m a n y officers them selves, to o k sen io r officers aw ay from field lead ersh ip . ("W h at's th e difference b e tw e e n th e M arin e C o rp s a n d th e Boy Scouts?" ra n one joke. "T he Boy Scouts h av e a d u lt lea d ersh ip ."64) T he toph e av y c o m m a n d a n d logistical stru c tu re im p o sed th e b u rd e n of co m b at o n a sm all p o rtio n of th e to tal forces. T he ra p id ro tatio n of forces in a n d o u t of V iet­ n a m d im in ish e d th e cohesion of fighting u n its. N ixon, h o w ev er, m a d e these p ro b lem s w orse, w h ile co v erin g th em u p a n d sh iftin g b lam e for th em else­ w h ere. H e sh ie ld e d th e a rm e d forces fro m th e stin g of rea p p raisa l b y releasin g Lt. W illiam Calley, the officer p a rtly resp o n sib le for th e M y Lai m assacre of V ietnam ese civilians, from h is sentence of life im p riso n m e n t a n d b y b lam in g jo u rn alists a n d liberals for th e m ilita ry 's troubles. M ilitary officers th em selv es w ere som etim es d isg u ste d b y his actions. T he g en eral in ch arg e of th e M y Lai in q u iry accused N ix o n of try in g "to a p p e a se th o se m isg u id e d p e o p le w h o ei­ th e r v ie w e d C alley as a n in n o ce n t scap eg o at o r o p p o se d th e w h o le id ea of w arcrim es p ro secu tio n s of A m erican s." The c a p tain in ch arg e of C alley's p ro secu ­ tio n c o m p lain ed to N ix o n a b o u t "political lead ers w h o h av e failed to see th e m o ral issu e."65 It m e a su re d th e p e rv e rse n a tu re of N ix o n 's in v estm en t in m ilitarizatio n th a t h e w e a k e n e d th e a rm e d forces as h e p u rs u e d th e ap p ea ra n c e of a v icto ry h e k n e w to b e im possible in a w a r w h ic h h a d lo st a n y strategic im p o rtan ce. Ex­ ch an g in g to asts in M oscow a n d Beijing w ith th e b ig enem ies, as h e d id in h is fam o u s su m m it conferences, h e so u g h t d e stru c tio n of th eir m in o r su rro g a te s (as h e saw them ). D eterm in ed to p reserv e th e core of A m erican p o w er, h e g u t­ te d it b y tieing A m erican forces d o w n in a n area b e y o n d th e effective reach of th e ir p o w er. R efusing to a d m it defeat, h e d e n ie d A m erican s th e fo rth rig h t con­ fro n tatio n w ith it th a t m ig h t h av e d e e p e n e d rea p p raisa l o f m ilitarizatio n . E ven th a t course h a d its m erits a n d s u p p o rte rs— in 1972 v o ters d id give N ix o n his lan d slid e, after all, e v en if affection for h im w a s slig h t a n d th e m o o d sour. O n its o w n , h is co u rse a b ro a d m ig h t h av e h e lp e d to h eal th e w a r 's w o u n d s a n d secure the p ru d e n t co ntraction of A m erican p o w e r N ix o n d id g e n ­ u in ely w an t. But it d id n o t sta n d o n its ow n. Ju st as Jo h n so n 's w a r in V ietn am co u ld n o t b e se p a ra te d from h is o th er w a rs, N ix o n 's w a r to w in th e peace co u ld n o t b e se p a ra te d from th e "w a rs" h e w a g e d a t hom e. N o P re sid e n t m o re firm ly em b raced th e w a r m e n ta lity — th e d e e p ly felt a n d p ro m iscu o u sly a p p lie d sense th a t ev ery stru g g le w ith in th e b o d y politic co u ld b e u n d e rs to o d a n d w a g e d as if it w ere a w ar. O n th a t score, N ix o n su rp a sse d Jo h n so n — n o m e a n feat— if o n ly becau se Jo h n so n 's w a rs w ere som etim es in sp ired b y g en ero u s im p u lses, N ix o n 's a lm o st alw ay s b y m e a n ones. W h atev er h is success in co n strain in g the fo rm al processes of m ilitarizatio n , h e so in flam ed its political a n d im ag in ativ e d im e n sio n s th a t h e canceled o u t th a t success. N ix o n 's w a rs w e re n u m ero u s, sta rtin g w ith th e 1968 cam p aig n . H e "to ld h is

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staff to co n d u ct th e c am p aig n as if it w ere a n all-out w a r," filled h is staff w ith m en e q u ally "v indictive," a n d u rg e d th e Secret Service a n d local g o o n sq u a d s to h a ra ss hecklers o n the c am p aig n trail.66 For th o se actions h e h a d co n sid er­ able p rec ed e n t a n d p ro v o catio n in th e illegal sp y in g a n d h a ra ssm e n t b y police a n d intelligence agencies u n d e r K en n ed y a n d Johnson, a n d in th e d isru p tiv e b e h av io r (directed, h ow ever, m ore a t H u m p h re y th a n a t N ixon) of so m e w a r o p p o n en ts; e v en th e in a u g u ra l p a ra d e , for th e first tim e in history, w a s m a rre d in 1969 b y violence. T he 1968 c am p aig n m elted in to N ix o n 's w a r a g ain st th e p ress after h e to o k office. A s h e w ro te, h e w a s "p re p a re d to h av e to d o co m b at w ith th e m ed ia," w h ic h h e stu p id ly a n d self-pityingly saw as "far m o re p o w e rfu l th a n th e P resi­ d e n t." T he tone w as set a t th e sta rt b y a p p o in tm e n t of th e y o u n g a n d illp re p a re d R on Z iegler as his p ress secretary, p ractically a calcu lated "in su lt" to th e p ress. N o th in g seized m o re of N ix o n 's tim e a n d em o tio n s th a n h is stru g g le w ith th e m ed ia u n til th e W atergate cover-up co n su m ed h im — a n d th a t in m an y w ay s w a s ju st a n o th e r p h a se of th e struggle. E very d a y h e rev iew ed w h a t th e p ress h a d d o n e, fired off o rd ers to p u n is h th is jo u rn alist o r c o u n teract th a t story, trie d to p ro m o te a c o n g ra tu la to ry v iew of him self, a n d filled h is n o tes a n d co nversations w ith w o rd s of attack. H is staff sh a re d h is outlook: "H o w can w e u se th e available fed eral m ach in ery to screw o u r political en em ies?" ask ed John D ean in a 1971 m em o. "T he p ress is th e enem y," N ix o n said "d o zen s, if n o t h u n d re d s , of tim es."67 T he w a r a g ain st the p ress w a s one p a th in to th e lab y rin th of m isd ee d s collec­ tively k n o w n as "W atergate." Leaks (except w h e n h e a u th o riz e d them ) to th e m ed ia of official in fo rm atio n o r in sid e scu ttleb u tt in fu ria te d N ix o n ev en m o re th a n o th er P residents, a n d h e set o u t to w iretap , h arass, o r p u n is h officials, re­ p o rters, a n d o th e r enem ies real o r p resu m ed . H is b elief th a t rad ical foes of th e w a r w ere fu n d e d , in sp ired , o r controlled b y M oscow fed N ix o n 's w ra th , b u t h e lash ed o u t at p e o p le of all so rts of ideological, political, a n d p ro fessio n al p o si­ tions. N o r w a s a real leak req u ire d to p ro m p t action: one New York Times sto ry d u rin g the C am b o d ian in v asio n w a s p ick ed u p from H an o i rad io , b u t th e W hite H o u se so u g h t w ire ta p s to finger th o se it su sp ec ted as th e b e tra y ers of the story. D efense Secretary M elvin L aird a n d Secretary of State W illiam Rogers. Fearing legal jeopardy, h ow ever, police a n d sp y agencies like J. E d g ar H o o v e r's FBI w o u ld n o t alw ay s d o N ix o n 's b id d in g , a t least o n h is term s. So N ix o n in ­ creasingly tu rn e d to his o w n devices, jerry-b u ilt o p e ra tio n s d irected fro m the W hite H ouse: the n o to rio u s "P lu m b ers" u n it a n d th e "E nem ies Project." N ix o n 's w a rs k e p t escalating. R eaction to th e sp rin g 1970 A m erican in v asio n of C am b o d ia, w h ich in clu d ed w id e sp re a d p ro te st a n d police violence, u n ­ h in g e d N ixon (it w a s th e n h e h a d a fam o u s p o stm id n ig h t talk w ith p ro teste rs in W ashington, listening to th em little, p le a d in g th a t h e w a n te d peace, a n d ra m ­ b lin g o n a b o u t subjects from football to th e C o ld W ar). T h at sp rin g , a k ey aid e th o u g h t, saw the "b eg in n in g of h is d o w n h ill slide," w h e n N ix o n gave u p o n

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u sin g official agencies "in h is b a ttle to quell th e n a tio n al u p ro a r." A p u blic w a rn in g from C hief Justice W arren B urger (N ixon's o w n ap p o in tee) ag ain st su sp e n d in g "basic g u a ra n tee s of th e in d iv id u a l in tim es of g reat n a tio n al stress" h a d n o effect o n him . In 1971, p u b licatio n of th e P en tag o n P ap ers, a cache of secret d o c u m e n ts o n the w a r leak ed b y D efense D e p artm en t official D aniel Ellsberg, se n t N ixon o v er a n o th e r th resh o ld , especially after th e Su­ p rem e C o u rt u p h e ld the New York Times's rig h t to p rin t them . A m o n g o th er th in g s, h e w e n t after E llsberg a n d his p sy ch iatrist.68 N ix o n 's 1972 c am p aig n m a rk e d a n o th e r stage in h is effort to ro o t o u t en e­ m ies. B ypassing the tra d itio n a l p a rty m ach in ery in favor of th e C om m ittee to Re-elect th e P resid en t (CREEP), lacking confidence in h is o w n chances a n d con­ v in ced th a t an y th in g w a s perm issible to en h an ce th em , N ix o n a llo w e d — th o u g h p e rh a p s n o t specifically d ire c te d — h is o p erativ es to u n d e rta k e breakins at D em ocratic P arty h e a d q u a rte rs in the W atergate H o tel a n d o th e r "d irty trick s" ov er w h ic h his recently resig n ed a tto rn ey general, John M itchell, p re ­ sid ed . O nce th e W atergate b u rg la rs w ere cau g h t, N ix o n b ecam e a n active con­ sp ira to r in w id e -ra n g in g efforts to block in v estig atio n s, lest th ey expose th e W hite H o u se role in n o t o n ly th e b u rg la ry b u t a h o st of o th er d u b io u s o p e ra ­ tions. D iscussing the cover-up a n d the c am p aig n th a t fall, a ram b lin g N ix o n in sisted th a t his co co n sp irato rs "recognize this, th is is, a g a in ,. . . w a r." 69 B ehind these sen tim en ts a n d actions lay cold am b itio n , b u t so m eth in g m ore as w ell. E n d in g th e w a r a n d achieving d e te n te req u ire d , in N ix o n 's eyes, ex­ tra o rd in a ry secrecy, lest leaks fo m en t d isab lin g criticism a t h o m e, u p se t su s­ p icio u s c o m m u n ist lead ers ab ro ad , o r p e rm it th e m to exploit d iv isio n s am o n g A m ericans. For a q u arter-cen tu ry . R epublicans h a d ru n a cottage in d u stry con­ d e m n in g secret d ip lo m acy b y D em ocrats, b u t th is w as p resu m ab ly different. N ix o n d ip p e d into th a t bo tto m less w ell of W orld W ar II analogies to ju stify se­ crecy: "L ook a t th e M a n h a tta n Project th a t b u ilt th e ato m bom b. Secrecy w a s necessary, a n d th e project w a s successful." A s h e saw it, e n d in g th e w a r also req u ire d th a t the N o rth V ietnam ese see h im as n o t on ly ru th less to w a rd th em b u t also in u n c o n te sted c o m m an d of h is o w n n atio n , a n im age th a t leaks w o u ld destroy. A s K issinger rep o rte d ly to ld h im , release of th e P en tag o n P ap ers "sh o w s y o u 're a w eak lin g " a n d d a m a g es "y o u r im age," a n d if o th er g o v e rn ­ m en ts "feel th a t w e c a n 't control in te rn al leaks, th ey w ill n e v e r agree to secret n eg o tiatio n s." N ixon, ev er fearful of a p p e a rin g a "w eak lin g ," h a rd ly n e e d e d th e ex planation. D issenters a n d leakers h a d to be cru sh ed in th e g ra n d e r cause of e n d in g the w a r honorably. H is v iew of th e p resid en c y — th o u g h h e assailed liberals, h e to o k th eir v iew of th e m ag isterial p resid en cy to n e w h e ig h ts— m ad e th a t co urse all the m ore legitim ate in h is eyes.70 A s h is difficulty u sin g th e FBI in d icated , h e also d e cid ed to take o n th e fed ­ eral bureaucracy, o n w h ic h h e h e a p e d contem p t. H is d isd a in for th e State D e­ p a rtm e n t a n d Secretary R ogers w a s infam ous: in n e arly ev ery d ip lo m atic ini­ tiative of N ix o n 's presidency, th ey w ere o u t of th e loop, w h ile N ix o n a n d

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K issinger reso rted to "back ch an n els" to c arry o n th e affairs of state. B ureau­ crats g enerally h e re g a rd e d as d islo y al D em ocrats. "If w e d o n 't g e t rid of th o se p eo p le," h e to ld the C abinet, " th e y w ill eith er sab o tag e u s fro m w ith in , o r th ey 'll ju st sit back o n th eir w e ll-p a id asses a n d w a it for th e n e x t election to b rin g back th e ir o ld bosses." A t the sam e tim e, N ix o n h a d n o in te rest in m ak in g bu reau cracies fu n ctio n better. H e sim p ly w a n te d to b y p a ss a n d u n d e rc u t th em , w h e th e r R epublicans o r D em ocrats w ere in charge. A s h e fu m e d in 1972, "th e w h o le d a m n b u n c h " h a d to resig n after th e election, a n d it w a s tim e to say, "'L o o k , y o u 're out, y o u 're out, y o u 're finish ed , y o u 're d o n e, d o n e, fin ish ed .' K nock th em the hell o u t of h ere." A s Tom H u sto n , th e a id e ch arg ed w ith d ev el­ o p in g a p la n to ro o t o u t enem ies, p u t it, "th e b u reau cracy m u s t b e tre a te d as th e en em y ."71 W hy d id N ix o n re g a rd these cam p aig n s as w ars? N ix o n e x p la in e d h is term i­ n o lo g y e v en less th a n Johnson. H e d id leave b e h in d a m o n u m e n ta l reco rd ex­ p lain in g w h y h e h a te d h is enem ies, a n d h is d islik es w ere h a rd ly su rp risin g o r indefensible. B ureaucracies were o ften stu b b o rn o r self-serving; so m e w a r p ro ­ testers were u n c o u th a n d violent; rep o rte rs did o ften g ive N ix o n a h a rd tim e (th o u g h h e w a s e n d o rse d in 1972 b y 753 d a ily p a p e rs, M cG o v ern b y 56).72 T hose tru th s h e lp e x p la in his p assions, w h ic h differed little fro m th o se of m an y o th er P residents, b u t n o t h is u n b e n d in g desire to cast th o se p a ssio n s in th e la n ­ g u ag e a n d e m o tio n s of w ar. N o ex p lan atio n seem s convincing, b u t th ere are clues. O n e of N ix o n 's strik in g characteristics w a s th a t h e n e v e r really seem ed to h a te co m m u n ists, a t least th o se w h o ru le d ab ro ad . P e rh ap s h e h a te d co m m u ­ n ism in th e abstract, b u t in d iv id u a l lead ers rarely in cu rre d h is fury. E ven m o re th a n w ith m o st politicians, his an tico m m u n ism seem ed po litically calcu lated ra th e r th a n heartfelt. H e rarely relished th e e n e m y 's d estru ctio n , th o u g h h e of­ te n called for it. H e rarely sh o w e d the p e rso n al sense of a g g ressio n th a t LBJ d isp la y e d w h e n sp e ak in g of H o C hi M inh. H e rarely su m m o n e d u p th e m o ral ferv o r a b o u t the en em y th a t R oosevelt m a rsh aled a b o u t N a zism a n d o th e r P resid en ts a b o u t com m unism . For c o m m u n ist lead ers like Soviet p rem ier L eonid B rezhnev a n d C h in a's M ao T se-tung a n d C h o u En-lai, h e felt a n a d m ira ­ tio n a n d ra p p o rt b o rd e rin g o n affection, a n d h e o ften m u se d o n th e sim ilarities of tem p era m en t, style, a n d sta tu re h e saw b e tw e e n th em a n d him self. N o r d id h e g u sh h u m a n ita ria n sy m p a th y for his o w n ally in th e V ietn am W ar. Yet w a r inevitably aro u ses p assio n s e v e n — o r p e rh a p s especially— a m o n g lead ers w h o claim th ey coldly calculate geopolitical realities. A fru stra tin g w a r on ly e x ten d ed a n d d iste n d e d th o se passion s. A n d m u c h in N ix o n 's life— th e tro u b le d relatio n sh ip w ith E isenhow er, the sh a d o w of Ik e's rep u ta tio n , the ch ild ish id en tity w ith G en. G eorge P a tto n — led h im to seek n o t ju st a successful p resid en cy b u t heroic m ilitary status. But if h is p a ssio n s d id n o t ru n a g ain st th e en em y ab ro ad , w h e re w a s h e to d irect them ? If h e w as to b e a heroic g en eral c ru sh in g enem ies, w h a t enem y? H isto rian s rig h tly d istru st h y d rau lic m o d els of energies flow ing in one d irectio n after b ein g b lo ck ed in an o th er, y et su ch

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d isp lac em e n t d o e s seem to occur. N ixon, as h e h a d since h is c am p aig n ag ain st A lg er H iss, to o k th e fu ry u su a lly a im ed a t enem ies o verseas a n d d irec te d it a g ain st foes a t ho m e. H e "co u ld forgive a n d ev en em brace h is enem ies ab ro a d ," A m b ro se observes, b u t h e "co u ld n o t fin d it in h im self to forgive h is en em ies a t h o m e ." 73 D u rin g th e V ietnam W ar, m o st A m erican s seem ed to h a te each o th er m ore th a n th e enem y. In this, N ix o n w a s n o t alone. A s P resid en t, h o w ev er, h e offered a p ecu liarly d a n g e ro u s exam ple. N ix o n 's w a rs o v e rla p p e d eerily w ith th e V ietn am W ar itself, e ro d in g fu rth e r a n y line b e tw e e n w a r elsew here a n d " w a r" a t h o m e, a n d th ey p o iso n e d A m eri­ can politics, b rin g in g a w a r m en tality to th e O v al Office. T rue, n o t all of those w a rs d id h e expressly label as such, w h ile th e W hite H o u se d eclared so m an y p e o p le "en em ies" th a t th e term m ig h t seem d ra in e d of significant m eaning. A n d in sofar as N ix o n 's w a rs w ere secret u n til rev ealed in th e W atergate crisis, th eir v e n o m d id n o t p o iso n th e p u b lic m o o d u n til 1973. But N ixon did o ften u se term s like "w a r," a n d d e sp ite secrecy, h is w a rs h a d th eir im p act lo n g before th ey w ere fully revealed. T hey set th e to n e for th e a d ­ m in istra tio n 's d ealin g s w ith th e p u b lic o n th e V ietn am W ar. T hey tu rn e d a tte n ­ tio n a w a y from su b sta n tiv e issues of w a r to p ro c e d u ra l conflicts o v e r h o w th o se issues got raised , ag g ra v atin g a lo n g stan d in g featu re of d e b ate o n the w ar. T hey sh a rp e n e d th e an ta g o n ism b e tw ee n N ix o n a n d th e m ed ia, n o t o n ly in g e n eral m o o d b u t because in d iv id u a l jo u rn alists a n d m ed ia co m p an ies often g o t w in d th ey w ere targ eted . T hey d e m o ra liz ed officials a n d agencies a n d jeo p ­ a rd iz e d th e ir s u p p o rt for N ix o n 's policies, m ak in g a reality of w h a t N ix o n h a d feared from th e start. T hey e x p a n d e d th e rep ressiv e a n d illegal w o rk of fed eral intelligence a n d police agencies (an d indirectly th o se at th e sta te a n d local level, w h o se " re d sq u a d s" a n d the like fo rm a n o th e r c h a p te r in th is sto ry )— a n d since N ix o n co u ld n o t tru s t those agencies, h is a d m in istra tio n fo rm ed its o w n a p p a ­ ratu s, u n d e rc u ttin g th e co n stitu ted bodies. A m o o d m a n y felt as a k in to w a r— am o n g th e P re sid e n t a n d C ongress a n d the co u rts, in th e b o d y politic, in th e W hite H o u se — arose before th e W atergate crisis e ru p te d . In th e 1972 cam p aig n , it w a s e v id e n t n o t o n ly in CREEP'S m e th o d s a n d N ix o n 's actions b u t in th e c am p aig n of G eorge M cG overn, th e D em ocratic can ­ d id ate. M cG overn w a s in m a n y w a y s a classic liberal a n d do v e, a lth o u g h cau­ tio u s o n som e issues, su ch as a b o rtio n rights. A b o m b er p ilo t in E u ro p e d u rin g W orld W ar II, h e h a d cred en tials in w a r th a t N ix o n co u ld n o t m atch. H e p ro m ­ ised "a to u g h , lean m ilitary " b u t d isa v o w ed "m ajo r revisions in A m erican com ­ m itm en ts, o r a m ajor scaling d o w n in real A m erican secu rity in te re sts"— an o u tlo o k b ro a d ly sim ilar to N ixon's. E choing R oosevelt a n d E isen h o w er (w h o m h e q u o te d liberally), h e p ro p o se d to redefine n a tio n al secu rity to in clu d e "schools for o u r ch ild ren as w ell as silos for o u r m issiles, th e h e a lth of o u r fam i­ lies as m u c h as the size of o u r bom bs, the safety of o u r streets a n d th e c o n d itio n of o u r cities a n d n o t ju st th e e n g in es of w a r." S arg en t Shriver, h e said of h is ru n n in g m ate, "co m m an d e d the w a r o n p o v erty ; a n d in th e n ex t a d m in istra-

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tion, th a t is the w a r A m erica w ill w a g e a n d w in ." T hus M cG overn sp o k e o u t of a lo n g liberal tra d itio n of p e o p le tro u b le d b y m ilita riza tio n b u t n o t q u ite re p u ­ d iatin g it, seared b y w a r b u t clinging to it as a m o d el fo r n e w actions. Still, h e w as p illo ried as a pacifist, isolationist, a n d social rad ical (his w a s "th e cam ­ p a ig n of th e th ree A's: acid, abortion, a n d am n esty ," claim ed R ep u b lican sen a­ to r H u g h Scott). H is rhetoric a n d politics often reinforced th a t im ag e.74 M cG overn also exacerbated th e sense of a w a r rag in g w ith in A m erica— in d ee d , th e sense th a t W orld W ar II, in a tw isted n e w versio n , h a d re tu rn e d to th e lan d. H e c o m p a red N ix o n 's b o m b in g in S o u th east A sia "to H itle r's cam ­ p a ig n to exterm in ate Jew s" a n d su g g e ste d th a t th e W atergate b reak -in "w a s th e k in d of th in g y o u expect u n d e r a p e rs o n like H itler."75 O th e r D em o crats h in te d th a t N ix o n w a s a w a r crim inal. Such c o m p ariso n s w ere h a rd ly th e b u lk of M cG o vern's case. H a rsh w o rd s, n o t illegal acts, th ey w ere a logical resp o n se to d ecad es of claim s th a t a n y o n e o p p o sin g C o ld W ar policies w a s a n a p p e a se r a n d th a t th e stakes in th e C o ld W ar w ere like th o se in W orld W ar E. Still, com ­ p a rin g N ixon to H itle r h a d th e resu lt, if n o t th e in ten tio n , of fu rth e r ag g ra v atin g th e " w a r" a t hom e. A fter all, g iv en h o w m o st A m erican s recalled W orld W ar E, th e im plication w a s th a t N ix o n sh o u ld be forcibly o v e rth ro w n : w a s th a t n o t w h a t th e G erm an s sh o u ld h av e d o n e to H itler? Such rhetoric, n o t su rprisingly, in fu ria te d N ixon. M ore su rp risin g , a triu m ­ p h a n t reelection— ov er 60 p e rc en t of th e p o p u la r tally — g ave h im n o joy. "I th in k as th e w a r recedes as a n issue," h e w ro te in h is diary , "so m e of these p eo p le are g o in g to b e lost souls. T hey basically are h a te rs, th ey are fru strate d , th ey are a lie n a te d — th ey d o n 't k n o w w h a t to d o w ith th e ir lives." N ix o n h a d in m in d a n tiw a r p ro testers, b u t as o ften h is h a rsh e st o b serv atio n s also a p p lie d to him self. A s the A m erican w a r effort in V ietn am e n d ed , h e seem ed lo st w ith o u t th a t w a r a n d eager to fin d replacem ents. In h is m in d , h is en em ies w ere n o w n u m e ro u s a n d diverse, em bracing p e o p le in all of th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t, in all w alk s of life (blacks, Jew s, intellectuals, a n d b u sin e ssm e n a m o n g them ), a n d in b o th political parties. T hose enem ies w ere "ask in g for it," h e to ld h is a d v i­ sors, " a n d th ey are going to g et it." H is c o n te m p t ex te n d ed to A m erican s g en er­ ally. "The average A m erican is ju st like th e ch ild in th e fam ily," h e to ld th e Washington Star. "You give h im som e resp o n sib ility a n d h e is g o in g to a m o u n t to so m eth in g ," b u t if "y o u m ak e h im com pletely d e p e n d e n t a n d p a m p e r h im . . . , y o u are going to m ak e h im soft, sp o iled a n d ev en tu ally a v e ry w e ak in d i­ v id u a l." H e " so u n d e d ," A m brose notes, "like a lea d er rally in g h is p e o p le for a p ro trac te d w a r." 76 V ictory in the 1972 elections left h im restless. E arlier h e said of h is enem ies, "W e'll stick o u r heels in, step o n th em h a rd a n d tw ist." K issinger "k n o w s w h a t I m ean ," h e a d d e d . "G et th em o n the floor a n d step o n th em , cru sh th em , sh o w n o m ercy." H is h a tre d d e e p e n e d after th e election, as if, K issinger sen sed , "vic­ to ry w as n o t a n occasion for reconciliation b u t a n o p p o rtu n ity to settle th e scores of a lifetim e." N ix o n 's "N e w A m erican R evolution" to stream lin e the

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fed eral g o v e rn m e n t w a s h is o ld w a r o n the b u reau cracy in n e w guise. It ev en a p p lie d to his o w n a p p o in tees, all o rd ere d to su b m it resignations. T hey "ex­ p e cted to b e th an k e d ; in stea d th ey g o t sla p p e d ." O n e ad v iso r th o u g h t th e o rd e r "th e m o st d ish e arten in g , m o st su rp risin g , a n d m o st cru el [act] of all." N o w o n ­ d e r N ix o n fo u n d C h ristm as 1972, w ith th e final b o m b in g of N o rth V ietnam g o in g on, "th e loneliest a n d sa d d e s t C h ristm as I can ev er rem em ber, m u c h sa d ­ d e r a n d m u c h m ore lonely th a n the one in th e Pacific d u rin g th e w ar." T h at strik in g co m p ariso n w a s one m ore sig n th a tN ix o n , th o u g h e n d in g A m erica's w a r in V ietnam , could n o t let go of w a r.77 A n u g ly a fte rm a th to w a r w a s n o t u n iq u e to V ietnam , to d e fe at in w a r (or, in 1973, th e w id e sp re a d su sp icio n th a t the peace accords m e a n t it w a s fo rth co m ­ ing), or to N ix o n 's presidency. Social strife, econom ic conflict, a n d congres­ sional resurgence h a d m a rk e d the a fte rm a th of m o st A m erican w ars. T he V iet­ n a m W ar, in w h ic h tu rm o il lo n g p rec ed e d th e w a r 's en d , p resen te d special pro b lem s. For h is p a rt, N ixon, facing b o th the fam iliar p ro b lem s a n d th e n e w ones, m a d e th em all w orse.

The Limits of Disengagement D u rin g N ix o n 's presidency, th e U n ited States h a d a chance to d isen g ag e from m ilitarization. It w a s largely p a sse d up. T h at political o u tsid ers failed in th eir efforts to p ress it w a s h a rd ly su rp risin g , since m ajor ch an g e in A m erican policy rarely com es from them . M ore striking, insid ers, th o se b est p o sitio n ed to m ak e change, failed to a lter a co u rse th a t g en u in ely tro u b le d them . A case for ch an g e d id n o w em erge from m ain strea m ex p erts a n d politicians. W ritin g n e a r the e n d of the V ietnam W ar, h isto ria n R ussell W eigley co n clu d ed , "A t n o p o in t o n the sp e ctru m of violence d o es th e u se of co m b at offer m u ch p ro m ise for the U n ited States today." V ietnam a u g u re d b a d ly for n o n -n u clear w ar: lim ited force h a d failed to achieve A m erican goals a n d later reso rt to " u n ­ lim ited, a n n ih ilativ e aim s" h a d b e en c o u n terp ro d u ctiv e. E xcept for d eterren ce, n u c le ar w e a p o n s h e ld n o m ore prom ise. E ven lim ited n u clear w a r w o u ld " d e ­ stro y m u c h o r m o st" of th e su p e rp o w e rs a n d b e e ith er b rief a n d indecisive, "if th e w o rld w ere v e ry lucky, o r th e p re lu d e to g en eral w ar." Schem es b y defen se intellectuals to lim it a n d w in a n u c le ar w a r left W eigley du b io u s: "W ar creates a m o m e n tu m of its o w n " a n d "can n o t be nicely co n tro lled a n d restra in ed as strateg ists . . . w o u ld h av e it." G enerally, W eigley th o u g h t th a t "th e h isto ry of u sab le com bat m ay at last be reaching its e n d ." 78 B ernard B rodie, his g e n eratio n 's p ree m in e n t strateg ist, offered sim ilar con­ clusions. H e w a s in d ig n a n t at h o w the U n ited States w a s finishing its p a rt in the V ietnam W ar. "T he idea," h e w ro te in 1972, "th a t all th is tragic d e v asta tio n " w as ju stified because it k e p t "a G eneral T hieu in p o w e r" a n d b ecau se "th e P res­ id e n t of th e U n ited States 'm u s t b e resp ec ted ' " b o rd e re d "o n th e obscene."

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Shaken b y the w a r a n d b y n u c le ar strateg ies h e h a d h e lp e d to sh ap e, B rodie sp ecu lated th a t w ar, like th e "p erso n al d u e l," m ig h t b ecom e "o ld fash io n ed a n d rid icu lo u s." O rg a n iz ed violence w o u ld co n tin u e, b u t it m ig h t n o t "co n ­ tin u e indefinitely to take th e specific in stitu tio n al fo rm k n o w n as w a r." 79 B rodie a n d W eigley su m m arize d a lo n g -d ev elo p in g critiq u e of w a r a n d m il­ itarization, one also n o w a d v a n c e d b y intellectuals, officers, activists, artists, a n d politicians. "D oes W ar H av e a F uture?" a sk ed a co n trib u to r to th e p re s­ tigious jo u rn al Foreign Affairs. N o t m u c h in a n y o rg an iz ed fo rm w a s th e an sw er, th o u g h "g u errilla w a r" a n d "b arb a rism " w o u ld p ersist. W ar seem ed u sefu l only for rev o lu tio n ary g ro u p s u n e n cu m b ere d b y th e su p e rp o w e rs' p o n d e ro u s forces. E ven for th em its u tility w a s lim ited; W estern g o v e rn m e n ts h a d too m u ch p o w e r a n d consent to b e o v e rth ro w n , h o w e v e r h a rd it w a s for th e m to w ag e w a r b e y o n d th eir b o rd ers.80 The critique of w a r 's u tility w a s n o tab le in to n e as w ell as su bstance. Its b est e x p o n en ts w ere som ber, av o id in g th e n aiv e o p tim ism a b o u t w a r 's e n d som e p u n d its once h a d show n. W orking in th e m a in strea m of A m erican th o u g h t ra th e r th a n its pacifist tributaries, h a u n te d b y th e c e n tu ry 's reco rd of w ar, a n d sensitive to w a r 's irratio n al sources, th ey k n e w th a t w a r m ig h t occur ev en th o u g h it serv ed n o ratio n al ends. Few favored d isa rm a m e n t, a t least of a u n i­ lateral sort, b u t a co n tractio n of the a rm s race, th e a rm e d forces, a n d m ilitary in te rv e n tio n — a su b sta n tia l d ise n g ag e m e n t from m ilita riza tio n — seem ed b o th possible a n d w ise. T he case for co n tractio n w a s b o lstered b y scholarly stu d ie s a n d p o p u la r ex­ p o sés a b o u t th e "m ilitary -in d u strial com plex," a te rm n o w m o re in v o g u e th a n w h e n E isenhow er u se d it. Sen. W illiam P roxm ire offered Reportfrom Wasteland: America's Military-Industrial Complex in 1970. E n g in eer a n d P en tag o n official A. E rn est F itzgerald d e n o u n c e d "th e h ig h p riests of w a ste " (1972) w ith th e rig h ­ teo u sn ess of a patrio tic p o p u lis t (he w a s ju st a " c o u n try b o y in th e aerospace business"). S eym our M elm an p e n n e d su b tler critiques. Pentagon Capitalism (1970) a n d The Permanent War Economy (1974), e x p lain in g h o w th e P en tag o n fed o n th e a rm s race a n d cau sed "th e decline of th e U n ited States as a n econom ic a n d in d u stria l system ." Scientists a n d o th er ex p erts, d isillu sio n e d b y th e a rm s race th ey h a d h e lp e d to w age, a rg u e d th a t A m erican a rm s b u ild in g w a s d riv e n b y in d ig e n o u s p ressu res m ore th a n Soviet th reats, w ith w e a p o n s in v e n te d first a n d m issions only fo u n d for th em later. A s Jerom e W iesn er said , "W e are ru n ­ n in g a n a rm s race w ith o u rselv es."81 By the early 1970s, n e w p ro p o sa ls to im p le m e n t d ise n g a g e m e n t also em erg ed. Som e ex p o n en ts of a rm s control w a n te d a b are-b o n es strateg ic force sufficient only to d e te r the Soviets; a n y th in g m o re w as re d u n d a n t, since th e su ­ p e rp o w e rs' m issiles "d o n o th in g b u t d e te r th e u se of each o th er b y m ak in g it su icid al."82 C o m p lem en tary cuts in w a rh e a d s a n d d eliv ery sy stem s w e re also p ro p o sed . G iven the w e a lth of A m erican allies, th e red u c tio n o r o u trig h t w ith ­ d ra w a l of A m erican forces in E urope a n d E ast A sia— a n e x p en siv e item in th e

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d efen se b u d g e t— seem ed feasible to m any, a n d in 1971 th e Senate n e arly a p ­ p ro v e d M ike M an sfield 's p la n to cut th e A m erican c o m m itm en t to N A TO in half. Too, sh a rp cuts in overall b u d g e ts a n d forces levels w ere p ro p o se d , b y M cG overn a n d th e liberal B rookings In stitu tio n a m o n g others. A s th ey h a d for g en eratio n s, p ro p o sa ls issu ed ag ain to e n d th e costly d u p lic a tio n in m issio n s a n d w e a p o n s am o n g b ran ch es of th e A m erican forces, w h ile refo rm -m in d ed officers trie d to p u rg e the m ilitary of c o rru p t a n d inefficient p ractices a n d stream lin e it for h a rd e r tim es a n d lea n er b u d g e ts. A ll su c h p la n s risk ed political su icid e a n d econom ic h a rm w ith o u t n e w roles for d efen se in d u strie s, th in k tan k s, laboratories, a n d b u reau cracies th a t th riv e d o n m ilitary sp en d in g . En­ erg y sh o rtag es su g g e ste d one possibility: d efen se in d u strie s m ig h t tu rn to m ass tra n sit (at w h ic h B oeing m a d e a n un su ccessfu l stab) a n d in o th e r w a y s solve ecological a n d en erg y problem s. Few of th ese p ro p o sa ls w ere en tirely n e w o r p a rticu la rly p o p u la r, b u t th ey n o w c o m m a n d e d g rea ter respect, p la y in th e m ed ia, a n d su p p o rt in c o n te m p o ra ry scholarship. D isen g ag em en t fro m m ilitarizatio n d id n o t b y a n d larg e en su e, h ow ever. Ju st as m ilitarizatio n o riginally h a d m a n y sources, so d id its p ersisten ce, a m o n g th e m th e lack of effective n a tio n al lead ersh ip . T he D em ocratic C o n g ress d id n o t o ften p ro v id e th a t leadership. C o n g ress u su a lly m eets lo n g -term ch an g e b y fashioning concrete legislation ra th e r th a n p ro p o u n d in g b ro a d o u t­ looks. Its m o st n o tab le actions w ere sh o rt-term (cutting off fu n d s for th e air w a r in In d o ch in a in 1973) o r p ro c e d u ra l (the 1973 W ar P o w ers Act), a n d it rep e at­ e d ly trim m e d W hite H o u se defense b u d g e ts. B ut as it lo n g h a d , it resisted d ra s­ tic cu ts in d efense th a t m ig h t h a rm local d istricts a n d fav o red interests. A n d th o u g h d o m in a tin g C ongress, D em ocrats after M cG o v ern 's fiasco w ere d e ep ly d iv id e d , th eir conservative w in g ascen d an t. M ost fam o u s w a s Sen. H e n ry Jack­ so n 's successful effort to stall g ra n tin g th e Soviet U n io n m o st-fav o red -n atio n tra d e sta tu s u n til it loosened control o n Jew ish e m ig ratio n (w hich in fact h a d b e e n sh a rp ly risin g d u rin g detente). Jackson sab o tag ed d e te n te a n d a rm s con­ tro l (as w ell as Jew ish em igration, it tu rn e d out) a n d assisted a n e w d em o n izatio n of th e Soviet U n io n e v id e n t b y m id -d ecad e. C o ld W ar D em ocrats n o w d ish e d o u t to N ix o n th e charges of a p p e a se m e n t a n d g iv e-aw ay th a t N ix o n h a d lo n g h u rle d . "I p ra y e v ery n ig h t th a t H e n ry K issinger w o n 't give th e R ussians th e W ash in g to n M o n u m e n t," q u ip p e d lab o r lea d er G eorge M eany, " h e 's g iv en th e m ev ery g o d d a m n th in g else."83 For its p a rt, th e a n tiw a r m o v em en t, frac­ tio u s e v en a t its peak , w a s n o w to m a p a rt b y in tern al squabbles, d e p riv e d of its o b v io u s cause b y the re tu rn of A m erican tro o p s from V ietnam , d ish e a rte n e d b y M cG overn's defeat, a n d e x h au ste d b y th e len g th of th e w a r a n d th e effort to sto p it. It h a rd ly d isa p p e a re d , b u t it only re g ro u p e d a t d e ca d e's e n d in a n e w a n tin u cle ar m ovem ent. T h at left N ixon, w h o d id h av e a v isio n of d ise n g ag e m e n t a n d w o rld peace. "D o w e w a n t to go back to a p e rio d w h e n th e U n ited States a n d th e Soviet U n io n sto o d in a co n fro n tatio n a g ain st each o th er a n d risk a ru n a w a y n u clear

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a rm s race," h e ask ed in 1974, "o r d o w e w a n t t o . . . re c o g n iz e . . . th a t w e m u st eith er live to g eth er o r w e w ill all die together?" T h o u g h p o o rly a rticu lated , h is em brace (echoing Ike in th e late 1950s) of n u c le ar "sufficiency" ra th e r th a n su ­ p e rio rity p ro v id e d a strategic ratio n ale for h is visio n .84 N ixon, h ow ever, w a n te d th a t vision im p le m e n te d o n h is o w n term s, re­ ta in ed a d iv id e d m in d a b o u t it, rem a in e d secretive a b o u t h o w to realize it, a n d p ro v e d u n w illin g to b u ild a coalition o n its behalf, still trea tin g th e State D e­ p a rtm e n t a n d th e defense agencies w ith c o n tem p t, th e n in cu rrin g th eir w ra th w h e n his p resid en c y w eak en ed . H e so u g h t to p reserv e h is "v icto ry " in V iet­ n a m e v en as fellow R epublicans a b a n d o n e d th e cause (w h en S o u th V ietn am 's P re sid e n t T hieu cam e to W ashington in the sp rin g of 1973, all b u t o n e C ab in et m em b er " fo u n d a n excuse to sk ip th e arriv al cerem ony"). H e b a lk e d in 1973 a t m o re cuts in defense sp e n d in g lest th ey w e ak e n h is h a n d in n eg o tiatio n s to cap n u clear w e a p o n s a n d red u c e co n v en tio n al forces in E urope, a rg u in g th a t "an y in centive for o th er n a tio n s to cut th eirs w ill go rig h t o u t th e w in d o w ."85 A lth o u g h fam iliar a n d plausible, th a t reaso n in g also lash ed A m erican w e ap o n s policy to a d ip lo m atic treadm ill: th e U n ited States w o u ld b u ild u p its m ilitary forces on ly to cut th em later. A n d g iv en th e glacial p ace of n eg o tiatio n s (am o n g W estern allies a n d A m erican in terests as w ell as w ith th e Soviets), th e b u ild -u p m ig h t p roceed so lo n g th a t w h e n a cut-back finally cam e, it w o u ld on ly re tu rn force levels back to w h e re th e w h o le process started . T h at w a s su b ­ stan tially the p a tte m in the 1970s, th o u g h n o t solely b ecau se of N ix o n 's p o li­ cies. The a rm s race co n tin u ed , th o u g h n o t in sy m m etrical fashion: th e U n ited States excelled in th e precision of d e liv ery system s, w h ich e n co u rag e d it to sta­ bilize th e n u m b e r of w a rh e a d s (at u n d e r tw en ty -n in e th o u sa n d in th e 1970s) a n d red u ce th eir m eg atonnage; th e Soviet U nion, still b y a n d large p lay in g catch-up, e m p h a size d n u m b e rs of w a rh e a d s a n d b e h e m o th rockets to d e liv er th em , m atch in g th e U.S. in w a rh e a d s a t the d e c a d e 's end. By th en , m o re w a s o n th e d ra w in g boards. A m erican defense sp e n d in g , d eclin in g early in th e d ecad e, rose in fiscal 1974 a n d m ore sh a rp ly thereafter, th o u g h c o n tin u in g to slip as a p ercen tag e of to tal g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g a n d G N P, a n d n o m ajor red u c tio n s in forces ab ro a d w ere in stitu ted . By th o se sta n d a rd s, d ise n g ag e m e n t w a s real b u t d istin ctly lim ited, n o t the " d is m a n tlin g . . . of th e A m erican m ilitary m ach in e" th a t a h isto rian , like m a n y critics in the 1970s, so o n called it.86 W h eth er Soviet d efen se sp e n d in g a n d capabilities w ere sw elling, as w id e ly alleg ed b y som e ex p erts a n d h o tly d isp u te d b y o th ers a t m id -d ecad e, n o w seem s less likely; in a n y event, M oscow w a s n o t recovering from a costly w a r— its retre n ch m en t cam e in the 1980s, after its costly v e n tu re in A fg h an istan . For N ixon, d ise n g ag e m e n t w a s to be lim ited to w h a t h e a n d o th er w o rld lead ers achieved. W ith the n o tab le exception of q u estio n in g m in d le ss su sp i­ cion of the co m m u n ist enem y, h e offered n o critiq u e of th e v a lu e s a n d in stitu ­ tio n s th a t h a d led the n a tio n th ro u g h the C old W ar a n d in to V ietnam . Far from su p p o rtin g refo rm -m in d ed officers, he u n d e rm in e d th em b y su g g e stin g th a t

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th e m ilitary h a d b e en sta b b ed in the back b y liberals a n d th e press. In 1973, em ­ b racin g the re tu rn e d PO W s a n d th eir "rheto ric of victo rio u s arm ies a n d h e ­ roes," h e to o k a m ajor step to w a rd reco n stru ctin g p atrio tic c u ltu re a n d fu rth e r­ in g th e n a tio n 's "am n esia" a b o u t the w a r's d istu rb in g co n d u ct a n d m eaning. A t th e sam e tim e, scorning a m n e sty for w a r resisters (som e of w h o m scorned receiving it fro m N ixon), h e m a d e it clear th a t a ltern ativ e v iew s of th e w a r h a d n o place in p u b lic debate. (Later, N ix o n w a s a n u n re p e n ta n t recip ien t of a p resi­ d e n tial p a rd o n fro m G erald Ford.) H is "u n w illin g n ess to co n sid er am n esty serv ed o n ly to intensify the w o u n d s of w ar," as N ix o n ag ain p racticed th e p o li­ tics of d iv isio n w h ile p reach in g the politics of unity. "By d e n y in g th e v alid ity of reconciliation— to forgive a n d to fo rg et— th e a d m in istra tio n e n co u rag ed A m ericans o n ly to forget. In ste ad of th erap eu tic am nesty, N ix o n in v ited am n e ­ sia." N o t th a t am nesia w a s u n p o p u la r o r w h o lly h is d oing. "M o ral d eb ate a b o u t V ietnam ," n o tes P eter C arroll, w a s "a n in creasingly a w k w a rd subject for h a w k a n d d o v e alike," a n d N ix o n 's p o sitio n "sh ie ld e d th e pu b lic from its com ­ plicity in the u n p o p u la r w a r." N o r w o u ld m o re d eb ate necessarily h av e stre n g th e n ed a consensus to dem ilitarize. Still, N ix o n 's p o sitio n h e lp e d k eep d ise n g ag e m e n t u n d e r his control, p ro tected from n atio n al d e b ate a b o u t basic v alu es a n d in stitu tio n s.87 N ix on gave a n o th e r reaso n w h y d ise n g ag e m e n t w o u ld b e slow w h e n h e w a rn e d in 1973 th a t "th e p a g es of h isto ry are stre w n w ith th e w reck ag e of n a ­ tio n s w h ic h fell b y th e w a y sid e at the h e ig h t of th eir stre n g th a n d w e a lth b e­ cause th eir p e o p le becam e w eak, soft, a n d se lf-in d u lg en t a n d lost th e ch aracter a n d th e sp irit w h ic h h a d led to th eir g reatness." T hose w o rd s, echoing h is 1970 p lea a g ain st b ecom ing "a pitiful, h elp less g ian t," ev o k ed lessons a b o u t a p ­ p e ase m en t th a t N ixon, like m a n y others, h a d lo n g p ro p o u n d e d : w eak n ess w o u ld te m p t aggressors, lead to w ar, a n d d estro y w o rld peace. Yet th e p h ra s­ in g also su g g e ste d h o w m u c h A m ericans' self-im age, n o t ju st global strategy, w a s a t play. N ixon feared loss of A m erican "g reatn ess" a n d m o ral fiber. (H e w o rrie d a b o u t th e selfishness of y o u th raised after th e rig o rs of d ep re ssio n a n d w o rld w ar, th o u g h , as a b io g ra p h e r notes, h e "w a s th e u ltim ate 'm e ' p erso n .") Like m a n y A m ericans for generations, h e d efin ed greatn ess as m ilitary p o w e r a n d b elieved th a t decline in m o ral fiber w o u ld b e p re v e n te d o r at least offset b y m ilitary strength. H u m ilia tio n in V ietnam a n d th e m o ral ro t a t h o m e b lam ed for it m a d e th a t d efin itio n ev en m ore com pelling for N ix o n a n d his follow ers. A s lo n g as it h eld , d em ilitarizatio n c ould n o t p ro ceed v ery far.88 N ix o n 's co m m en t illu m in a ted h o w m u ch d efen se policy rem ain ed in a w o rld a p a rt from calculations of m ilitary o r d ip lo m atic n eed . W orried strate­ gists a rg u e d convincingly th a t far few er n u clear w e ap o n s w o u ld suffice to d e ­ ter a n enem y, the o n ly th in g they c ould d o anyw ay. For others, h o w ev er, those w e ap o n s rem ain ed to tem s of n a tio n al greatn ess a n d resolve. T hey h a d th eir strategic a rg u m en ts, of course, often s p u n as finely as th o se offered b y a d v o ­ cates of sh a rp reductions, b u t the case for the n u c le ar arsen al really lay in an-

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o th er realm , one m a d e p e rv e rse ly m ore c h arg ed b y n e w g eo p olitical chal­ lenges. In the form m o st obnoxious to A m ericans, th o se n o w cam e fro m forces o u tsid e th e C old W ar fram ew o rk , above all from M id d le E astern co u n tries filled w ith A rab n atio n alism , Islam ic fervor, h a tre d of Israel, o r d e te rm in a tio n to exploit th eir riches of oil. T he reflex resp o n se of m a n y A m ericans, h o w ev er, w a s to cling to C old W ar sym bols of p o w e r a n d greatness: to b u ild m o re n u ­ clear w e ap o n s, ev en if th ey could n o t sto p th e n e w challenges. S uspicion th a t M oscow w a s b e h in d those challenges w a s n e v e r a lto g eth e r co n v in cin g — d e sp ite its tro u b lem ak in g , th e K rem lin also h a d m a n y d isa sters a b ro a d — b u t it g ave th e resp o n se a n a p p ea ra n c e of strategic logic. Econom ic difficulties p ro v id e d m ore te m p ta tio n to reb u ild A m erican m ili­ ta ry pow er. C o n sen t for m ilitarizatio n h a d lo n g rested o n th e affluence it seem ed to yield, protect, o r a t least p erm it, ju st as th e econom ic strain s b ro u g h t o n b y the V ietnam W ar h a d h e lp e d to u n d e rm in e th a t consent. In 1973 a n d 1974, h o w ev er, econom ic co n d itio n s d e te rio ra te d fu rth e r a n d to o k sta rtlin g n e w form s ju st w h e n th e retre at of A m erican p o w e r seem ed ev id en t. If th e price of retreat w as a flo u n d erin g econom y, few p o litician s co u ld w elco m e it. To be sure, th ere w ere o th er w a y s to re a d th e econom ic w o e s— as a sp illo v er from th e V ietnam W ar a n d from n eg lect of th e n a tio n 's econom ic co m p etitiv en ess— ju st as th ere w ere o th e r so lu tio n s su g g e ste d , b y N ix o n o n occasion am o n g others, su c h as increased in v e stm e n t in th a t co m p etitiv en ess. N o r w a s there a n y w id e sp re a d taste o r foreseeable w a y for u sin g m ilita ry p o w e r to achieve econom ic goals. Still, it d a m a g e d th e fo rtu n es of d ise n g ag e ­ m e n t th a t its sta rt coincided w ith econom ic trouble. Social ch an g e also activ ated th e b rak e o n d isen g ag em en t. S uch change, far from d im in ish in g as the w a r e n d ed , o n ly accelerated in tire 1970s. E m b o ld en ed in p a rt b y C ongress's a p p ro v a l of th e E qual R ights A m e n d m e n t in 1972 a n d the S u p rem e C o u rt's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade g ra n tin g liberal access to ab o r­ tion, th e fem inist m o v em en t w a s reaching its z e n ith of zeal a n d influence, ev en as it d iv id e d b e tw ee n radical a n d m o d e ra te factions. G ay liberation, th o u g h o rien ted to local co m m u n ities a n d lacking n a tio n al o rg an izatio n , w a s at its m o st ideologically d a rin g stage. Such m o v em en ts reflected a p a tte rn m u c h n o ­ ticed in the 1970s: th e d im in ish in g attac h m en t o f social g ro u p s to a n o v erarch ­ in g A m erican id en tity in favor of a p articu laristic o n e — class, racial, ethnic, reli­ gious, regional, o r g en d ered . T he U n ited States h a d becom e (or reem erg ed as being) "a seg m en ted society," h isto ria n s claim ed .89 The sh ift rarely en ta ile d a rejection of A m erican identity, b u t it d id p e rm it g reater em p h asis o n o n e 's so­ cial g ro u p a n d o n e 's historical "ro o ts," as A lex H a ley 's p o p u la r 1976 b o o k a n d 1977 m ovie tracing a black fam ily's h isto ry w a s titled. T hese com plex social changes offered n o collective challenge to m ilitariza­ tion, th o u g h som e c o m p o n en ts d id . T hey w ere too ideologically d iv e rse — ran g in g from b o rn -ag a in C h ristian s to ad v o cates of sexual lib eratio n to cele­ b ran ts of N ative A m erican culture or Polish-A m erican h eritag e— a n d too focused

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o n th e v a rio u s com pelling a g en d a s of th e g ro u p s in v olved. T herein, ho w ev er, lay p a rt of th e ru b . O n e im p u lse to th eir em erg en ce h a d b e en th e collapse d u rin g th e V ietn am e ra of a w id e ly sh a red sense of n a tio n al m issio n in th e w o rld a n d of A m erican s' w illin g n ess to su b m erg e th eir p a rtic u la r id en tities in a co m m o n cause led b y n a tio n al elites. E ven m o v em en ts th a t d id n o t re p u d ia te m ilitariza­ tio n a n d th e C o ld W ar— a n d lead ers of the n e w C h ristian R ight c lu n g fu rio u sly to th o se c au ses— in m a n y w ay s tu rn e d aw ay fro m th em b y th eir focus o n th eir o w n g ro u p a n d its m ission. Each, according to one of th eir chroniclers, offered a h e a d y sense of m ission, ta p p in g th e id eal of fo rm in g a "city u p o n a h ill" felt b y th e first P u rita n settlers a n d su sta in e d am o n g A m erican s ev er since.90 N ow , h o w ev er, th a t m issio n less often in v o lv ed A m erica's role in th e w o rld b u t ra th e r th e g ro u p s' v a rio u s visions of c h an g in g A m erica. T heir collective im p act u p o n A m erican s w a s also b e w ild e rin g precisely b ecau se of th e sh eer p ro liferatio n of m issio ns a n d identities. The V ietnam W ar h a d allo w ed a k in d of coherence, a ro u n d th e sim p le po les of o p p o sitio n to o r su p p o rt for th e w ar, d u rin g th e first stag e of th is proliferation. By 1973, coherence w a s fast fading. A n old te m p ta tio n — to sto p o r conceal social seg m en tatio n b y stressin g a n ti­ co m m u n ism , p a trio tism , a n d m ilitary p o w e r— resu rfaced in th e 1970s. It o p er­ a te d w ith p a rtic u la r force insofar as som e m o v em en ts, especially w o m e n 's a n d g ay liberation, seem ed to express the "w eak , soft, a n d self-in d u lg en t" sid e of A m erican life, as N ix o n h a d p u t it, a t a tim e w h e n th e A m erican effort in V iet­ n a m h a d a lre ad y rek in d led fears of in te rn al w eakness. In line w ith lo n g sta n d ­ in g G O P policy, N ix o n s u p p o rte d the E qual R ights A m e n d m e n t, b u t h is d is­ co m fo rt w ith w o m e n 's lib eratio n w a s palpable: "L et m e m ak e o n e th in g perfectly clear," h e rep o rte d ly said, "I w o u ld n 't w a n t to w ak e u p n e x t to a lad y p ip e fitter."91 It w a s less a n y p a rtic u la r m o v em en t th a t d isco n certed m e n like N ixon, h o w ­ ever, th a n the b ro a d e r p a n o ra m a of discord. Such d isco rd rarely p ro v o k ed a n explicit call to rem ilitarize. In fact, N ix o n a n d th e G O P co n sig n ed social a n d political div isio n s to th e 1960s, a rg u in g th a t th ey w ere n o w h e aled b y h is p resi­ dency. "It is so easy to forget h o w frig h tfu l it w a s" back th en , rea d th e G O P 's 1972 p latfo rm , since "a n e w lea d ersh ip w ith n e w policies a n d n e w p ro g ra m s h a s resto red reaso n a n d o rd e r a n d h o p e ."92 T hose d iv isio n s w ere n o t in th e p a st, h o w ev er, as N ix o n 's p riv a te fu ry a b o u t th em attested . T hey fired anxieties a b o u t A m erican u n ity a n d "g rea tn ess" a n d efforts to foster b o th b y a m assin g m ilitary pow er. T he p iv o ta l y e ar in this sto ry w a s 1973. A t its start, it seem ed th a t th e V iet­ n a m W ar, m ilitarization, a n d the w a r m en tality m ig h t all recede from th eir d o m in a n t place in A m erican life; th a t sum m er, th e last A m erican w a r effort in In d o ch in a ceased after C ongress m a n d a te d a n e n d to b o m b in g there. But si­ m u lta n eo u sly A m ericans e n te red o th er "w ars," as th ey w ere called. N ix o n h a d b e g u n the y ear b y p riv ately d eclarin g w a r o n h is enem ies in th e V ietnam W ar: it w as tim e for "a to tal attack basis. W e sh o u ld h it those w h o sab o tag ed a n d jeop-

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a rd iz e d th e peace all th e w ay," h e in stru cted h is a id e Bob H a ld em an . "A t all costs give n o q u a rte r w h a te v e r to th e d o v es," h e re p e a te d a few w eek s later. "H itle r w o u ld h av e B ritain a n d th e w o rld if th ey h a d b e e n in C h u rch ill's place," h e so o n a d d e d . "H e w as," claim s A m brose, "th e an g rie st A m erican P resid en t." A n o th e r w ar, one N ix o n d id n o t w a n t, so o n o p e n e d u p as h is W aterg ate coveru p a n d o th er illegalities b e g an u n ra v e lin g in th e face of co n g ressio n al a n d legal in q u iries a n d revelations b y officials u n w illin g to d o jail tim e silently. By su m ­ m er, the efforts of Sen. Sam E rv in 's Select C o m m ittee o n W aterg ate a n d th e W a­ terg ate special p ro secu to r to g e t access to W h ite H o u se a u d io ta p e s p ro d u c e d w h a t Newsweek d u b b e d "th e w a r for th e N ix o n ta p e s."93 T h en a crisis ov er Israel a n d W estern access to M id east oil d e v elo p ed . For m o n th s, ten sio n h a d b e en b u ild in g b e tw ee n Israel a n d its n e ig h b o rs o v er th e v a st lan d s Israel h a d seized in th e 1967 w ar, w h ile th e Soviet U n io n a n d th e U n ited States jockeyed for positio n , a lth o u g h K issinger failed to ex p lo it th e stu n n in g C old W ar co u p of E g y p t's decision to sev er its d e p e n d e n c e o n Soviet aid. O n O ctober 6 cam e a n E gyptian-S yrian in v asio n of Israeli-held la n d s w h o se force a n d n e a r success shocked Israel a n d its allies; th e e n su in g ta n k b a t­ tles riv aled in scale those of W orld W ar H. T he W h ite H o u se first trie d to re­ stra in Israel in o rd e r to avoid fu rth e r a n ta g o n iz in g its n eig h b o rs, th e n rev ersed itself to ru s h w a r m ateriel to Israel lest its b e le ag u e red forces lose. A d d in g to the ten sio n w a s a n alert to A m erican n u c le ar forces foolishly issu ed (pro b ab ly b y K issinger, b u t N ix o n w a s b lam ed for it) in o rd e r to w a rn th e Soviets, w h o w ere alre ad y su p p ly in g Israel's foes a n d n o w seem ed re a d y to airlift tro o p s to th e M ideast, to stay out. A ll th is cam e o n th e heels of th e fam o u s "S a tu rd a y N ig h t M assacre," w h e n N ix o n fired Special P rosecu to r A rch ib ald C ox (an d th e a tto r­ n ey g en eral a n d d e p u ty a tto rn ey g en eral for refu sin g to fire Cox), as a p p a re n t co n stitutional w a r raged. Israeli forces finally p rev a ile d a n d a cease-fire w a s im p o sed , b u t th ro u g h the O rg an izatio n of P etro leu m E xporting C o u n trie s (OPEC), A rab n a tio n s (an d n o n -A rab p ro d u c e rs like Iran) im p o sed a n em bargo, lastin g from O cto b er 16 u n til M arch 1974, o n sales of oil th a t m a d e its p rice q u a d ru p le a n d trig g ered th e first g reat energy crisis. A rab countries, seen b y m o st A m erican officials as in ­ capable of co o p eratin g w ith each other, n o w h a d a stra n g le h o ld o n th e eco­ nom ic lifeblood of th e U n ited States a n d its allies. Oil w a s the "A rab s' final w e a p o n ," Time h a d w a rn e d in Septem ber, a n d w ith the em bargo the lan g u ag e of w a r sp read . A s Jam es B u rn h am a rg u e d in th e Na­ tional Review, A rabs h a d acquired in oil a n "u ltim ate w e a p o n " th a t su p e rse d e d th e n u clear bom b, since the latter w a s u n u sa b le w h ereas th e A ra b s' "fo rm id a ­ ble n e w w e a p o n " p o ssessed "a global ran g e." B u rn h am a d d e d , "T his is n o t m etap hor. A rab oil rig h t n o w is literally a weapon," o n e "co n sid erab ly m o re u l­ tim ate th a n n u clear bom bs: T he n u c le ar w e a p o n is p o w e rle ss to c o u n te r th e oil w e ap o n ." It w as m ore frightful because "M oscow w a s b a ck sto p p in g " th e A rabs, a n d in th e u ltim ate Soviet-A m erican "clash of w ills," A m ericans, B um h a m su sp ected , w o u ld n o t p rev ail.94

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M any c o m m en ta to rs d id n o t see M oscow 's sin ister h a n d o r p o rtra y oil as a "w e ap o n ," b u t B u rn h a m 's analysis su g g e ste d w h y A m erican s fo u n d th e 1973 en erg y crisis so ja rrin g a n d so ak in to w ar. It b ro k e o u t w h e n A m erican p o w e r w a s in retreat, after a w a r in V ietnam in w h ic h its n u c le ar m ig h t h a d p ro v e n u seless (or a t least u n u se d ) a n d w h e n the critiq u e of w a r a n d w e a p o n s w a s gro w ing. O il n o t only gave A rab states leverag e in its o w n rig h t, it seem ed to disp lace m ilitary w e a p o n s in th e tid e of history. N o r co u ld n u c le ar w e a p o n s b e u se d to c o u n te r the A rab s' n e w -fo u n d m ight^for oil w a s literally a n d politically volatile: th e U n ited States a n d its allies h a rd ly d a re d set fire to it in so m e effort to club A rab states in to subm ission; th ey seem ed h o g -tied , u n a b le to u se the v e ry w e a p o n s in w h ich th ey w ere su p erio r. To boot, once th ey re o p e n e d th e oil sp ig o t, oil-rich n a tio n s w o u ld rak e in billion s w ith w h ic h to b u y real w eap o n s. M e tap h o rs of th e oil " w e a p o n " a n d "oil w a r" h a d o th er so u rces as w ell. O il h a d lo n g b e e n th e fuel for n a tio n s a t w a r a n d one of th e m ajor spoils of w ar. E u ­ ro p ea n s som etim es e m p lo y ed the sam e m etap h o r. A n d in th e M ideast, oil w a s d e e p ly en m e sh e d w ith th e th re a t a n d o u tb rea k of w ar. A s it o ften does, talk of w a r also reflected th e shock of co n fro n tin g a n o v el pro b lem . In 1973, th e oil em b arg o clim axed a b a d ru n of econom ic new s. T h o u g h recession a n d in flatio n w e re th o u g h t irreconcilable— recessions p re ­ su m a b ly lo w er prices b y c u ttin g d e m a n d for g o o d s a n d services— n o w th ey co m b ined in "stagflation." S hortages of sta p le fo o d s a n d o th e r p ro d u c ts in a d ­ d itio n to oil, co m bined w ith a su rg in g ecological sensibility, p ro d u c e d a sh a rp sense am o n g m a n y A m ericans th a t th ey a n d th e w o rld w ere e n te rin g a n e w age of lim its o n resources a n d g ro w th , o n e th a t ch allen g ed th e A m erican g e n iu s for sid e step p in g conflict ov er th e d istrib u tio n of th e econom ic p ie b y in creasin g its overall size. Econom ic co m p etitio n fro m ab ro a d a d d e d to th e w orry . A s sales of A m erican cars p lu n g e d w h ile lo w -p ay in g service jobs p ro liferated , "a n a tio n of h a m b u rg e r sta n d s" loom ed, co m p lain ed th e AFL-CIO in w o rd s re p e ate d al­ m o st v e rb a tim lo n g after, "a c o u n try strip p e d of in d u stria l capacity a n d m e a n ­ in g fu l w o rk . . . of citizens b u sily b u y in g a n d selling ch eeseb u rg ers a n d ro o t b e er floats."95 S uch changes d id n o t catch A m ericans en tirely u n a w a re s in 1973. T heir first tra d e deficit in eig h ty y ears a p p e a re d in 1971. E x p erts h a d w a rn e d a b o u t risin g c o n su m p tio n a n d declin in g dom estic p ro d u c tio n of oil, so m e sh o rtag es h a d al­ re a d y occurred, a n d C ongress a n d the W hite H o u se h a d co n sid ered action. But th e e m b arg o forced a sh a rp e r realizatio n of these difficulties. O v er th e w in ter, as A m ericans w ere forced to tu rn d o w n th erm o stats, d riv e slow ly, face e m p ty gas stations, a n d m eet d e facto gas ratio n in g , tre a su re d ritu a ls of A m erican con­ su m e r c u ltu re seem ed in jeopardy. T h at m a n y of th ese em erg en cy m easu res h a d p rec ed e n t o n ly in W orld W ar II reinforced th e felt co n nections am o n g the oil crisis, so a rin g prices, a n d w ar, p e rh a p s w h y one co n cern ed Illinois g ro u p called itself "W om en W ar o n P rices." T he m o o d w a s dism al: "T H IN G S W ILL GET W ORSE," according to one n e w sp a p e r h ead lin e, "BEFORE THEY GET W ORSE."96 Talk of w a r reflected shock over d e stru c tio n of lo n g stan d in g as-

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su m p tio n s a b o u t e n d less A m erican p rosperity . It also m ask ed conflict am o n g A m erican econom ic in terests a n d social grou p s: in a n "oil w a r" w ith th e M id ­ east, the en em y w as far aw ay a n d A m erican s p re su m a b ly u n ite d in th e ir m is­ ery a n d in d ig n atio n . A p p ly in g th e lan g u ag e of w a r to these d e v elo p m e n ts h a rd ly m e a n t A m eri­ cans w ere re a d y to go to w ar, d e sp ite loose talk a n d coarse h u m o r a b o u t " n u k ­ in g " th e A rabs th a t b o u n c ed a ro u n d d u rin g th e 1970s. Still, th eir so lu tio n s often d re w o n the sp irit a n d p rec ed e n ts of w ar: a d d re ssin g a n a tio n al telev isio n a u d i­ ence, N ixon co m p ared th e oil crisis to W orld W ar II a n d p ro p o se d th e M a n h at­ ta n Project (citing th e "d e te rm in a tio n ," unity, a n d w illin g n ess to sp e n d m o n ey it in volved) as a m o d el for "Project In d ep e n d en c e ," h is en erg y p la n .97 It w a s as if A m ericans c o u ld n o t let go of w a r e v en if th e y h a d n o taste for w a g in g it. T heir forces h a d left In dochina, b u t " w a r" c o n tin u e d for th e m — o v e r N ixon, oil, trad e, the e n v iro n m en t. T h o u g h of a differen t n a tu re , th e a rra y of " w a rs" seem ed as d izz y in g u n d e r N ixon as th ey h a d b e e n u n d e r Johnson. M eanw hile, N ix o n 's capacity to define su c h th in g s fad ed . H e n o lo n g er d o m ­ in ated politics, th o u g h h is fate d id . H is futile effort to w ith h o ld th e W hite H o u se tap e s sh o w in g h is g u ilt d ra g g e d o n in to 1974. In 1973 cam e th e in d ig n ity of Vice P re sid e n t A g n e w 's resig n atio n am id ch arg es th a t h e h a d ta k e n b rib es as M a ry lan d 's g o v e rn o r (Rep. G erald F ord su cceed ed him ). D em o crats scen ted b lo o d , th o u g h it w a s co m m o n w isd o m th a t th ey w ere in n o h u rry to see N ixon resig n — a w o u n d e d N ix o n p ro m ised m ore political re tu rn s th a n a G O P suc­ cessor w ith a clean slate— a n d , in p a rt for tactical reasons, liberals d id n o t sp e arh e ad the anti-N ixon cause; the m o st effective D em o crat w a s Sam E rvin, a co n servative so u th e rn senator. M ore su rp risin g th a n liberal sp leen w a s d isa rra y w ith in th e GOP. N ix o n p rid e d h im self o n ru n n in g a tig h t ship, b u t th e W h ite H o u se sp ra n g leaks a n d his staff ra n for cover in 1973. "It w ill b e each m a n for him self, a n d o n e w ill n o t be afraid to ra t o n the other," h e n o te d accu rately in h is diary, b u t in p a rt th a t w a s b ecause of h o w h e trea te d those a ro u n d him . H e lied to h is aides, law yers, a n d fam ily a b o u t h is role in th e cover-up a n d o th er m atters, p itte d su b o rd in a te s a g ain st each other, asserted u n d y in g loyalty to th em u n til castin g th em off, a n d , ev en as w o rd leaked a b o u t earlier payoffs, d a n g le d m o n ey b efore th o se h e feared m ig h t expose h im ("Is th ere a n y w a y y o u c an u se cash?" h e a sk ed John E hrlichm an a n d Bob H a ld e m a n ju st before th ey resigned). H is efforts p ro d u c e d sh o rt-term gains b u t also long-term ex p o su re to an g er a n d p ro secution. H a d h e tak e n R epublican p o ten tate s into h is confidence, a t least early o n in th e crisis, he m ig h t h av e h a d the vo tes to block im p e ac h m en t in th e H o u se, a n d certain ly conviction in the Senate. In stead h e e n ra g e d G O P stalw arts. "T here are on ly so m an y lies y o u can take," Senator G o ld w a ter d eclared in A u g u s t 1974 in a n o th e r fu lm in atio n a b o u t N ixon. "N ixon sh o u ld g et his ass o u t of th e W hite H o u se — to d ay !"98 R epublicans, after all, h a d the m o st to lose fro m a d isc red ite d N ix o n still in

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office— th eir p a rty w o u ld sin k w ith h im in th e 1974 a n d 1976 electio n s— a n d a lre a d y resen te d h o w N ix o n h a d d istan c ed h im self from th e p a rty a n d d ra in e d m o n ey a w ay from its c a n d id ates to su p p o rt h is o w n p resid en tia l b id . In c ru d e political term s, th e y w ere th e ones w h o forced h is resig n atio n . M eanw hile, N ix o n 's o w n ap p o in tees, especially Secretary of State K issinger a n d D efense Secretary Jam es Schlesinger, sa n ctim o n io u sly b y p a sse d h im o r b o ld ly d efied h im in crucial m atters of n a tio n al se cu rity — in th e M id east crisis of 1973-1974 a n d w h e n N ix o n so u g h t to w o rk o u t a SALT II ag re em e n t w ith B rezhnev in 1974. N ix o n 's b e st defense w a s th a t h is p red ecesso rs h a d c o m m itted sim ilar m is­ d e ed s, b u t th a t defense w a s h a rd to press. T he claim w a s p a rtly accurate, since p rev io u s p re sid e n ts h a d sa n ctio n ed illegal w ireta p s, se n t th e In tern a l R evenue Service a g ain st enem ies, a n d d o n e m u c h else. B ut if o n ly b ecau se th ey h a d n o t b e e n c a u g h t o r ch allen g ed for su c h acts, th ey h a d n o t e n g ag e d in th e su sta in ed o b stru c tio n of justice th a t co n su m ed N ixon, a n d it w a s N ix o n 's cover-up th a t a la rm e d frien d s as w ell as foes m o re th a n th e o rig in al acts h e trie d to conceal. In a n y ev ent, a d efense th a t p o in te d to p red e ce sso rs' crim es req u ire d N ix o n to a d ­ m it h is o w n , w h ic h h e w o u ld n e v e r do. T h o u g h th e W atergate crisis h a d m a n y d im en sio n s, it also h a d com p ellin g lin k s to th e h isto ry of w a r a n d m ilitarizatio n . N ix o n p ra ise d h is to u g h n ess in w a r a n d foreign policy, b u t in h a n d lin g W atergate h e d isp la y e d a m acabre v er­ sio n of th e indecisiveness th a t also d o g g e d h im in th e V ietn am W ar. H e com ­ p a re d th e excruciating choices n o w before h im to h is earlier w a rtim e decisions to in v a d e C am b o d ia in 1970 a n d to b o m b H a ip h o n g in D ecem ber 1972: "It's to u g h e r th a n C am b o d ia a n d D ecem ber 18th p u t to g eth er," h e said in A p ril 1 9 7 3 ." But tim e a n d ag ain h e sid led u p to choices o n W aterg ate— to com e clean o r h id e com pletely, to b u m th e W hite H o u se tap e s o r release th em , to cast asid e a c o co n sp irato r o r d efe n d h im — on ly to w affle. H e h a d a n ab stract m o d el of the to u g h w a rtim e P resid en t, b u t also an te n n ae so keen ly a ttu n e d to conflicting c o n sid eratio n s th a t th ey c rip p led him . T h at m o d el also m a d e acceptable a n d legal to h im a n y action tak e n in th e n a m e of n a tio n al security, b u t since th e lat­ te r w a s in d istin g u ish a b le for h im from h is o w n in terests, h e h a d n o con v in cin g ratio n ale g ro u n d e d in n a tio n al security for h is actions. H is foes often failed to d o m u c h b e tte r o n th is score. Som e reso rte d to u n d e r­ h a n d e d actions, as leaks (often inaccurate) sp ra n g in to rren ts fro m th e Senate Select C om m ittee a n d th e Special P ro sec u to r's Office. T hose in d ig n a n t a b o u t N ix o n seem ed bereft of w o rd s to describe h im , reso rtin g to clichés a n d co m p ar­ isons d ra w n from W orld W ar II. The W hite H o u se d isp lay e d a "G estap o m e n ­ tality," according to S enator E rvin; N ix o n 's firing of Cox w a s a "B ro w n sh irt o p ­ era tio n " em p lo y in g "G estap o tactics," a rg u e d a n o th e r D em ocratic senator; a m em b er of C ox's staff in d icated h e w a s "g o in g h o m e to rea d a b o u t th e Reich­ stag fire."100 O beisance to W orld W ar II as A m erica's d e fin in g m o m e n t still ru led ; th irty y ears in th e p ast, it still n o u rish e d th e lexicon of political invective.

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Less noticed in the ru ck u s w a s h o w m u c h W atergate fit a p a tte rn of crises after A m erica's w ars. C o m p ariso n of W atergate to P re sid e n t A n d re w Jo h n so n 's im p each m en t after the C ivil W ar w a s inescapable, b u t W ilson's c rip p led p resi­ d en cy after 1918 also w a s w o rth p o n d erin g : his g ra n d v isio n for w o rld peace h a d b e en sh a tte re d e v en m ore th a n N ix o n 's, a n d w ild ru m o rs h a d a risen ab o u t h is m en tal a n d physical h ealth , as th ey d id a b o u t N ix o n 's b y 1974. T ru m a n faced a congressional challenge a b o u t the in te g rity of k ey associates a n d a b o u t h is refusal to h a n d o v er executive d o c u m e n ts to co n g ressm en (in clu d in g R ich­ a rd N ixon) p u rs u in g A lger H iss. P re sid e n t N ixon, for one, trie d to learn from th e H iss case— it w a s a confused, self-defeating effort, b u t a t least h e g lim p se d som ething. Still, N ixon u su a lly fo u n d his w o rd s a n d an alo g s for W atergate in th e cer­ tain ties of w a r ra th e r th a n th e a m b ig u ities of w a r 's afterm ath . "T his is a battle, it's a fight, it's w ar," h e ad v ised h is a id e C harles C olso n early in th e W atergate crisis. A few w eek s later, fu rio u s a t a leak from th e FBI a b o u t W atergate, h e w a n te d th e agency p u rg ed . "T he w h o le d a m n p lace o u g h t to b e fired," h e fu m ed . "I th in k y o u 'v e g o t to d o it like th ey d id in th e w ar, y o u rem e m b e r in W orld W ar II th e G erm ans, if th ey w e n t th ro u g h th ese to w n s a n d th e n a sn ip e r h it o n e of them , th e y 'd line u p th e w h o le g o d d a m n e d to w n a n d say u n til y o u talk y o u 're all going to b e sh o t." H is p riv a te d efen se of h is m isd ee d s in v o lv e d a telling com parison: "It is n 't s o m e th in g . . . like H iss, for exam ple, G o d -d a m n e d tre a so n ."101 T he W atergate crisis reso n ated w ith w a r in o th e r w a y s b e sid es th e lan g u a g e a n d em otions a ttac h ed to it. It w o rse n e d in th e su m m e r of 1973 as A m erican b o m b ers still p o u n d e d C am bodia. NixOn trie d to d iv e rt a tten tio n fro m th e crisis b y w ra p p in g h im self in the flag a n d em b racin g re tu rn in g V ietn am PO W s, for w h o m h e h e ld w h a t h e called "th e larg est a n d m o st sp ectacu lar W h ite H o u se gala in h isto ry ."102 Passage ov er his v eto of th e W ar P o w ers Act, a w e ak effort to restrict the P re sid e n t's p o w e r to w a g e w a r w ith o u t co n g ressio n al a p ­ p ro v al, reflected N ix o n 's faltering g rip o n C o n g ress a n d its g ro w in g d istru st of p resid en tia l pow er. N ixon also faced charges a b o u t th e b o m b in g of C am b o d ia a n d th e m eth o d s b y w h ic h h e k e p t it secret, a lth o u g h th e H o u se Ju d iciary C o m ­ m ittee d id n o t v o te to im p each o n those g ro u n d s. In in v o k in g executive p riv i­ lege to shield th e tap e s a n d o th er d o c u m e n ts fro m C o n g ress a n d th e special prosecutor, h e relied alm o st exclusively o n n a tio n al secu rity as h is defense: w ith o u t confidentiality for h is conversation s, h e claim ed, a n y P re sid e n t's ef­ forts in d ip lo m acy a n d defense w o u ld b e crip p led . D efen d in g to A tto rn ey G en­ eral Elliot R ichardson his rig h t to fire the special pro secu to r, N ix o n p le d th a t "B rezhnev w o u ld n e v er u n d e rs ta n d if I let Cox d efy m y in stru ctio n s."103 D e­ fen d in g his presidency, h e in sisted th a t o n it h in g e d th e chance to h o ld o n to victo ry in V ietnam , keep A m erica strong, a n d b rin g w o rld peace. M ore diffuse anxieties also arose a b o u t w h a t w a s called th e "im p e ria l p resi­ d en cy " b u t m ig h t b e tte r h av e b e en n a m e d th e " w a r p resid en cy ." The Presi-

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d e n t's p o w e r in w a r h a d b e en a n issue all th ro u g h A m erican history. T he C o n ­ stitu tio n m a d e the P re sid e n t "C o m m a n d er in C h ie f" on ly "o f th e A rm y a n d N a v y . . . a n d of th e M ilitia of the several States, w h e n called in to th e actu al service of the U n ited States." In th e tw e n tieth century, h o w ev er, th e p h ra se w a s c o n stru ed so th a t th e P re sid e n t w as, as G a rry W ills p u ts it, "w id e ly co n sid ered to b e th e C o m m a n d e r in C hief of th e A m erican p eo p le" in peace as w ell as w ar, as if "th e p re sid e n t h a s the p o w e r to com m it th e w h o le citizen ry to follow ing h is lead ." P resid en ts w ere in tro d u c e d o r offered th em selv es as th e c o m m an d e r in chief to C ongress, fed eral agencies, a n d all A m ericans. "T he p h ra se 'c o m m a n d er-in -ch ief' ra n trip p in g ly off th e to n g u e " of N ixon, o n e o b serv er c o m p lain ed before W atergate surfaced. "It seem ed to please h im n o t o n ly to u se th e p o w e rs a n d p ro b ab ly to stretch th em b u t also to u tte r th e w o rd s o v er a n d o v er agairt in public. N o o th er P re sid e n t of recent m em o ry h a s u se d th e p h ra se a n y th in g like so often a n d w ith su ch o b v io u s gratification." It also p lea se d o th ers to u se it: carry in g o u t N ix o n 's o rd e r to fire Cox, A lex an d er H aig (him self a m ilitary officer) to ld a n official, "Y our C o m m a n d er in C hief h a s g iv en y o u a n order. You h a v e n o altern ativ e." Few in C ongress tackled th e con­ stitu tio n al a n d political q u estio n s raised b y th is loose u se of th e term , b u t it h o v ­ ered in th e b a ck g ro u n d of W atergate: it h a d e m b o ld en e d N ixon, a la rm e d o th ers, a n d fu rth e r sm u d g e d th e b o u n d a rie s b e tw ee n w a r a n d peace.104 M ore generally, W atergate w a s inconceivable w ith o u t th e V ietnam W ar, so in tim ately w ere th e m isd ee d s a n d th e reactions to th em b o u n d u p w ith th e w a r 's politics a n d p a ra n o ia. N ixon w a s self-p ity in g in 1977 w h e n h e affirm ed a n in te rv ie w e r's d e scrip tio n of h im as "th e last A m erican casu alty of th e V iet­ n a m W ar."105 H e w a s rig h t, ho w ev er, to see h is fate as tied to th e w ar. W ith N ix o n 's d ecline seem ed to go m u c h of th e im p e tu s to d isen g ag e from m ilitarizatio n a n d in v est in the n a tio n 's n e e d s a t h om e. H e c o n tin u ed to p u s h d e te n te a n d arm s control, en erg y a n d m ass tran sit p ro g ram s, a n e w w elfare system , a n d u n iv ersal h e a lth in su ran ce (th ro u g h a m a n d a te to em p lo y ers to p ro v id e it, w ith g o v e rn m e n t h e lp in g to in su re others). But m o st d o m estic re­ form s lan g u ish e d (m any to resurface in th e late 1980s a n d early 1990s), a n d o th ers initiated, like rev e n u e sh a rin g w ith state a n d local g o v ern m en ts, w ere cu t back, w h ile th e G O P m o v ed sh a rp ly to th e right. F ord a n d C arter co n tin u ed N ix o n 's efforts a t arm s co n tro l a n d d eten te, b u t m e t risin g o p p o sitio n a n d th eir o w n d o u b ts. D id W atergate a n d N ix o n 's resig n atio n d e stro y a historic o p p o rtu n ity to e n d th e C old W ar, d em ilitarize, a n d enhance th e n a tio n 's dom estic vitality? So N ix o n 's b e st b io g ra p h e r su ggests, d e sp ite his ste m ju d g m e n ts o n N ix o n 's ch ar­ acter a n d presidency. "W h en N ixon resigned , w e lo st m o re th a n w e g a in e d ."106 Yet W atergate w a s n o t a d iv ersio n from N ix o n 's g ra n d design; it w as a n o u t­ com e of h o w h e chose to p u rs u e it, one th a t ex p o sed h o w te n u o u s reo rien tatio n h a d b e en in th e first place. E ven before h e becam e e n sn are d in it, N ix o n h a d d o n e little to d ev elo p su p p o rt for his p ro g ram s in g o v ern m en t, his party , the

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m ed ia, o r th e n a tio n generally. H is c o n te m p t for all a n d h is secrecy w ith each m ea n t th a t his initiatives cam e to p u b lic a tte n tio n (an d th a t of allies ab ro ad ) as joltin g su rp rise s, as if the n a tio n sh o u ld tak e th e m o n faith b ecau se N ix o n p ro ­ p o se d th em , n o t because h e a rg u e d th e case for th em . It is a co m m o n c o m p lain t th a t p oliticians d o n o t set b o ld a g en d a s for A m ericans, b u t so m e P resid en ts h av e d o n e so. N ix o n 's case is so vex in g becau se h e h a d th e in tellectu al stre n g th to ad v an ce public u n d e rs ta n d in g of d em ilitarizatio n , yet, d e sp ite occasional el­ oquence, h e sq u a n d e re d th e chance. H e n e v e r su m m o n e d — c o u ld n o t to lerate— real debate. O nce the W atergate crisis d e e p e n e d , N ix o n 's in itiativ es faced w id e sp re a d su sp icio n (liberals "accused N ix o n of seekin g peace in o rd e r to d iv e rt a tte n ­ tio n " from W atergate), a n d to p a ss C ongress th ey n e e d e d th e s u p p o rt of D em o­ cratic liberals sy m p ath etic to th em b u t in n o m o o d to d o N ix o n favors. In for­ eig n policy, h ow ev er, N ix o n w a s sab o tag ed as m u c h b y fellow R epublicans. T h at fact su g g ests th a t ten sio n s in h is o w n p a rty a n d a d m in istra tio n w o u ld h av e im p e d e d h im e v en if W atergate h a d n o t s p u n o u t of control. F u rio u s a t risin g o p p o sitio n to a rm s control in the P en tag o n a n d a m o n g c o n serv ativ e p o li­ ticians, K issinger co m p lain ed b itte rly a t th e 1974 M oscow su m m it: "W h at, in th e n a m e of G od, is strategic su p erio rity ? W h at is th e significance of it, p o liti­ cally, m ilitarily, operationally, a t these levels of n u m b ers? W h a t d o y o u d o w ith it?" W atergate e m b o ld en e d b u t d id n o t create th a t o p p o sitio n . A n u n d istra c te d N ix o n still w o u ld h av e faced it, since it cam e fro m h is n a tu ra l p o litical b a se a n d since h e h a d forged n o alliance w ith liberals o n a rm s control. R onald R eagan still w o u ld h av e offered a v e rsio n of h is 1976 ch arg e th a t K issinger a n d Ford h a d m a d e A m erica "N u m b e r Tw o in a w o rld w h e re it is d a n g e ro u s— if n o t fatal— to b e second b e st" a n d h a d b ro u g h t a b o u t th e "collapse of th e A m erican w ill a n d th e retre at of A m erican p o w e r." 107 M oreover, N ix o n on ly h a d a lim ited g rasp of m ilita riza tio n in th e first place, a n d a n a rro w a p p ro a c h to rev ersin g it. H e w o rk e d a t it fro m th e to p d o w n : h is focus w a s o n ag reem en ts am o n g g rea t lea d ers like him self, w h o w o u ld en ­ h an ce his o w n statu re, n o t o n th e econom ic, ideological, a n d political stru c tu re s ov er w h ich su c h m e n p resid ed . E ven in d e alin g w ith M oscow , th e "p a tro n iz ­ in g " idea to o k h o ld in th e a d m in istra tio n " th a t o n e co u ld 'tra in ' th e Soviet U nion, like som e lab o ra to ry anim al, to re sp o n d in p red ictab le w a y s to a succes­ sion of positive a n d n e g ativ e stim u li."108 T h at p e rso n al a p p ro a c h certain ly h a d h o n o rab le p reced en ts, b u t it left p ro g ress h in g in g o n p e rso n al d ip lo m acy w h e n in d iv id u a ls inevitably d e p a rt o r ch an g e th eir m in d s, a n d w h e n V ietn am h a d fu rth e r e ro d e d faith in secret diplom acy. N ix o n 's failure to co n fro n t d efeat in V ietnam a n d to recognize w h e re m ilitarizatio n h a d led A m erica c o m p o u n d e d th e problem . H is c o n tin u ed le a d ersh ip (only tw o a n d o ne-half m o re y ears an y ­ w ay) w o u ld n o t h av e in su re d success for d e te n te a n d d em ilitarizatio n , e sp e­ cially since (like E isenhow er) h e h a d failed to refash io n h is p a rty in h is im ag e so as to co n tin u e his policies u n d e r a successor. To arg u e o th erw ise is to give N ixon too m u c h credit, b u t also too g rea t a b u rd en .

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N ix on so o n u n d e rlin e d h o w frail h is c o m m itm en t to reo rie n ta tio n w as. H is 1980 tract The Real War offered " a n apocalyptic, a la rm ist m essage, m ore su it­ able to th e early fifties." N ix o n focused less o n c o m m u n ism 's ideological th re a t (he still w a rm e d to the R ed C hinese) th a n o n th e Soviet reg im e's heg em o n ic am bitions. It w a s tim e to w in W orld W ar III (w hich h a d b e en rag in g , h e a rg u e d , since 1945). A m ericans faced "a choice b e tw e e n su rre n d e r a n d su icid e— red o r d e a d ." "W e can afford a v a stly increased d efen se effort," a n d "can p o stp o n e d esirab le social goals in o rd e r to en su re su rv iv al," a n d "ca n c arry th e tw ilig h t w a r to th e e n em y — if w e decide to ." 109 N ix o n b e in g N ixon, th ere is n o w a y to k n o w if h e w o u ld h av e ta k e n this tu rn h a d h e fin ish ed h is p resid en c y suc­ cessfully. N ix o n b e in g N ixon, th ere is n o d e n y in g th e possibility. N ix o n b ein g N ixon, h e w a s a t once a b o ld ly idealistic a n d a d ev ilish ly fickle in stru m e n t for th e n a tio n 's reorientation. H is successor p ro v id e d it e v en less direction. Ford rejected th e critiq u e of w a r 's utility. It w a s "fashionable in so m e q u a rte rs," h e n o ted , "to ch arg e th a t m ilitary force is o u tm o d e d in th e m o d e m w o rld " a n d th a t n u c le ar w e a p o n s "are to o d e stru ctiv e to u se " a n d " w o n 't ev er b e u se d ." E rro n eo u sly e q u atin g th o se v iew s w ith pacifism a n d isolationism . F ord c o n d em n ed them : "W e can ­ n o t tu rn o u r back o n th e rest of th e w o rld as w e foolishly so u g h t to d o in th e 1930s." H e d id n o t challenge p red ictio n s of th e C o ld W ar's im m in en t e n d bu t, like G eorge B ush late in th e 1980s, w a rn e d th a t "w eak n ess is m o st d a n g e ro u s w h e n the w o rld w id e m ilitary b alance th rea te n s to d e terio rate," a n d in fact " a t a n y tim e . . . w o u ld b e folly." T h at is, e v en w h e n th in g s g o t b etter, th ey also g ot w o rse, a n d th e U n ited States h a d to stay a rm e d to th e teeth. H e th ereb y su g ­ g ested th a t d e te n te w o u ld ch an g e A m erica's m ilitary n e e d s little, a p o sitio n th a t h a rd ly m a d e d e te n te a p p e a lin g .110 F o rd 's com m ents o n the V ietnam W ar c o n tin u ed th e "p erv a siv e politics of am n esia." Briefly, h e w a s w illin g to cast b lam e, like N ix o n p lacin g it o n foes a t h o m e ra th e r th a n abroad: a sk ed a b o u t C hinese a n d Soviet a id to N o rth V iet­ n a m 's final c o n q u est of th e S outh in th e sp rin g of 1975, h e re sp o n d ed , "I d o n 't th in k w e can b lam e the Soviet U n io n a n d the P eo p le's R epublic of C h in a in th is case." Blam e lay w ith C ongress: h e w a s "ab so lu tely co n v in ced " th a t if it h a d p ro v id e d the S outh the a id h e d e m a n d e d , Saigon "co u ld stabilize th e m ilitary situ a tio n in S outh V ietnam today." O nce th e N o rth h a d triu m p h e d , h o w ev er. Ford w a n te d A m ericans to forget th e w a r altogether. "T he lessons of th e p a st in V ietn am ," h e said in M ay (and m a n y o th er tim es), "h av e a lre ad y b een le a rn e d — lea rn ed b y P residents, lea rn ed b y C ongress, lea rn ed b y th e A m eri­ can p e o p le — a n d w e sh o u ld h av e o u r focus o n th e fu tu re." Since Ford d id n o t say w h a t those lessons w ere a n d A m ericans h a d differed b itte rly a b o u t them , on ly th e lo w est co m m o n d e n o m in a to r am o n g th e m — th a t th ere b e n o m ore V ietn am s— w a s left as F o rd 's im plicit m essage. N o m ore th a n N ix o n w a s h e alone responsible for this m ood, echoed w ith m arv e lo u s b ip artisan sh ip . "T here is n o p ro fit a t a n y tim e in h a sh in g over th e m ig h t-h av e-b een s of th e p ast," ar­ g u e d D em ocrat M ike M ansfield, n o r "a n y v alu e in fin g er-p o in tin g ." A n d the

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m o o d d id n o t go u n d e te cted , g iv en th e h a b it of A m erican s of c o m m en tin g lo u d ly o n th eir silences. "T oday it is alm o st as th o u g h th e w a r n e v e r h a p ­ p e n e d ," co lu m n ist Joseph H a rsc h n o ted . Still, Ford h e lp e d to red u c e reflection o n th e w a r to little m ore th a n "a ran cid after-taste th a t clings to alm o st ev ery m en tio n of d irec t m ilitary in terv en tio n ," as c o lu m n ist D av id B roder p u t it.111 D em ilitarization w a s a rre sted b y b ro a d political forces, n o t ju st N ixon-Ford politics o r am n esia a b o u t the w ar. S u p p o rt for it h a d b e en ra g g e d e v en w h e n A m erica's w a r in V ietnam rag ed . T h at w a r 's e n d d isso lv ed th e th in g lu e th a t h a d co nnected d isp a ra te m o v em en ts o n the left: m a n y p e rsiste d o r e v en g a in e d stre n g th after 1973, b u t th ey d e ta ch e d from each o th er as th e co m m o n foe, th e h a te d w a r in V ietnam , fa d e d aw ay, a n d th e ir a g en d a s w ere so n o isy a n d v a rie d th a t th e y sh ifted a tte n tio n from th e w a r's legacy. T herefore, n o L eft-liberal co­ alitio n to p ress for d e m ilitariz atio n em erg ed , especially once C old W arriors like H e n ry Jackson g a th e red n e w stre n g th in th e D em ocratic p arty , w h ile N ix o n 's efforts in its behalf, am b iv alen t from th e start, w ere n o w in ruins. Yet th e U n ited States, if h a rd ly d e m ilitariz ed after 1973, w a s e n te rin g a n e w p h a se — tìie "ran c id after-taste" m e a n t som eth in g . The p re v io u s th ree d ecad es h a d seen it w a g e th ree m ajor w ars. The follow ing tw o saw m a n y m ilitary ac­ tio n s b u t n o p ro tra c te d w ar. E ven V ietn am 's sim p le st lesso n — th a t th e n a tio n n o t ag ain go to w a r w ith o u t p o p u la r c o n sen t a n d clear objectives— h a d a con­ stra in in g effect. C ritics assailed its hollow ness: p o p u la r co n sen t m ig h t n o t m ak e a fu tu re w a r m ore v a lid o r w in n ab le th a n V ietnam , a rg u e d som e; th e U n ited States m u s t n o t b e h o stag e to a p a ra ly z in g "V ietn am m en tality ," a rg u e d others. T he critics w ere right: little strategic w isd o m o r m o ral co u rag e in h ere d in th e p e tu la n t d e m a n d for "n o m ore V ietnam s." H ow , after all, w a s a n a tio n to k n o w if a w a r w a s w in n a b le a n d p o p u la r u n til it h a d p lu n g e d in to it? Few A m ericans faced the fu n d a m e n ta l question: W as w a r still a u sefu l tool of n a ­ tio n al policy, w h a te v e r p o p u la rity o r clarity of objectives m ig h t a tte n d to it? Failure to face th a t q u e stio n left n a tio n al policy o n w a r ru d d e rle ss a n d ex p en ­ sive. Yet the sh allo w er lesson of V ietnam h a d v irtu e. A losing w a r d o es co rro d e a n atio n , ev en if the corollary— th a t a p o p u la r, w in n in g w a r w ill u n ite it— d o es n o t alw ays hold. In th e com ing years, d e te rm in a tio n to av o id a rep e titio n of V ietnam d id keep lead ers from w ar. M an y A m erican s lam en te d th e so u r m o o d V ietnam left in its w ake, b u t one of its co m p o n en ts w a s a lau d a b le desire to av o id w ar, o r a t least som e of its follies.

7 B A C K T O TH E FUTURE, 1975-1981

Mayaguez and Militarism In M ay 1975, only w eeks after S aigon's collapse, forces of C a m b o d ia's n e w K h m er R ouge regim e seized a U.S. m erc h an t ship, th e Mayaguez. P resid en t Ford, im p a tie n t w ith d ip lo m acy a n d w ith co n su ltin g C o n g ress as th e W ar P ow ers A ct req u ired , sen t w a rp la n e s a n d m arin es to th e rescue, a n action th a t cost forty-one A m erican lives. By then, the C am b o d ian s h a d alre ad y released the sailors (their only w o u n d s w ere from A m erican strafing), b u t ev en if Ford h a d k n o w n of th eir release h e m ig h t h av e sen t A m ericans to b attle, since the rescue of A m erican p rid e a n d credibility, n o t sailors, w as th e h e a rt of th e m is­ sion anyw ay. Ford a n d Secretary of State K issinger h a d alre ad y m a d e clear th eir fear th a t A m erica looked d a n g ero u sly w eak; th e P resid en t, Time n o ted , " h a d b e en h o p in g for w eeks to find a d ram a tic w a y to d e m o n stra te to th e w o rld th a t th e C o m m u n ist victories in In dochina h a d n o t tu rn e d th e U.S. in to a p a p e r tig er."1 The Mayaguez offered the w ay, u n d e r near-p erfect circu m stan ces— a g ain st c o m m u n ists linked to the victoriou s H an o i regim e (alth o u g h it soon fo u g h t the K hm er R ouge in a g rim w ar), w h ere q uick e n try a n d exit w ere p o s­ sible a n d the stakes lim ited. R enew ed p rid e a n d confidence in A m erican credibility quickly g u sh e d forth. "It sh o w s w e 'v e still g ot balls in this country ," exclaim ed Senator G oldw ater. It w a s "a d a rin g sh o w of n e rv e a n d steel," a rg u e d Newsweek. It "rea ssu red som e d isc o u rag e d a n d m istru stfu l allies th a t the U.S. in te n d s to d efen d v ig o ro u sly its o verseas interests," a d d e d Time. Few allied lead ers w ere q u o te d to th a t effect, ho w ev er, a n d Ford m ad e it clear th a t m ore im p o rta n t w a s th e statesid e a u d i­ ence, w h ich sh o w ed " a n electrifying reaction" to th e event. T hose n eed in g reas­ su ran ce a b o u t A m erican credibility tu rn e d o u t to be A m ericans th em selv es.2 In d eed , it w as h a rd to take the in cid en t seriously. It h a d a com ic-opera q u a l­ ity th a t ev en observers en d o rsin g F ord's action co u ld n o t ignore. As Time's m o stly a d u la to ry account n o ted , it "h a d m an y of the g u n g -h o elem en ts of a John W ayne m ovie," cau sed a n em b arrassin g loss of A m erican life, a n d grew o u t of a n in cid en t th a t b e g an n e a r "H o rsesh it Islan d " (as Time tran sla te d a

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C am b o d ian nam e). C o lu m n ist H u g h S id e y w a lk ed a n u n e a sy line b e tw ee n cel­ eb ratio n a n d satire. "T he c ris is . . . w a s th e o ld -fash io n ed variety, th e k in d th a t m en of p o w e r in W ashington, m o st of w h o m are g ra d u a te s of th e cold w ar, co u ld u n d e rs ta n d a n d relish." Sidey th o u g h t it "a lovely b it of rascality. . . . T he W hite H o u se . . . looked like a H o lly w o o d set. W ith so m b er v isag es a n d firm jaw s, the actors h u rrie d th o u g h th e m ello w n ig h t in th eir sleek lim o u sin es." K issinger "flashed th e V sign o u t th e w in d o w " of h is office. D efense Secretary Jam es Schlesinger " q u o te d S hakespeare a n d w o re a m elan ch o ly m ask ." The crisis over. Ford looked a t "w h e re w o rk m e n h a d ju st b e g u n to b u ild a n e w sw im m in g pool. 'B o y / said the P resident, T w ish th a t p o o l w a s re a d y n o w / " H ere w a s the ap p ea ra n c e of crisis w ith o u t th e substance. O fficials stru ck g rav e p o ses too a rtfu lly to convey real seriousness. T his w a s n o t B erlin in 1958 o r C u b a in 1962. T his w a s near-farce. M en m ig h t "relish " th e m o m e n t b u t co u ld n o t h id e th a t th ey w ere acting.3 The in cid en t w as illu strativ e of m u c h th a t follow ed, th o u g h too m in o r to b e d e te rm in a tiv e of it. It revealed n o stalg ia for a p re su m a b ly b y g o n e era of A m eri­ can m uscle, reluctance to em p lo y th a t p o w e r in a serio u s w ay, a n d b e w ild e r­ m en t a b o u t its utility. O v er th e n e x t fifteen years. P resid en ts re p e a te d ly p u t A m erican forces in h a rm 's w a y — largely o r w h o lly o n th eir o w n in itiative, d e ­ sp ite the W ar P ow ers A ct a n d V ietn am 's p re su m e d lessons a b o u t o b tain in g n a ­ tio n al co n sen t— b u t alw ay s in aren as o n th e p e rip h e ry o f g reat p o w e r conflict, w h ere n u c le ar co n fro n tatio n or serio u s co n v en tio n al co m b at w a s unlikely, a n d w h ere the stakes for th e U n ited States w ere lim ited , o ften larg ely sym bolic. W here the risks seem ed large. P resid en ts eith er k e p t su b sta n tia l A m erican forces o u t of action, as in N icarag u a in th e 1980s, o r w ith d re w th em , as after th e m arin es' barrack s in B eirut w ere b o m b ed in 1983. O n ly th e G u lf W ar in 1991 d e p a rte d from th a t p a tte rn , a n d e v en th e n o n ly briefly. The u se of m ilitary force is o n ly one im p e tu s to a n d m ea su re of m ilitariza­ tion, b u t a n im p o rta n t one. P attern s of u se after 1974 su g g e ste d th e n a tio n 's e n ­ try into a n e w era of m ilitarization, one m o re c o n fu sed in so u rces a n d result. A lready b ro ad , th e ch asm w id e n e d fu rth e r b e tw ee n th e p re su m e d p u rp o se of d efen se policy a n d the actual uses of force. A s ex p lain ed b y A m erican lead ers, th a t p u rp o se rem ain ed largely u n ch an g ed : to d e te r n u c le ar w ar, w in if it still b ro k e out, co n tain the Soviet U n io n a n d its allies, a n d u p h o ld A m erican cred i­ bility. In a corollary to th e lessons of V ietnam , m ilitary force w a s to d e fe n d the n a tio n 's v ital interests, to w h ich th e m ajor th rea t w a s th e Soviet U nion, ra th e r th a n be frittered aw ay in b eh alf of m in o r stak es in p e rip h e ra l areas. In reality, the use of A m erican p o w e r rarely accorded w ith th o se d efinitions. T he g u n s fired along the p e rip h e ry ra th e r th a n a t th e core— in th e G ulf of Siam , L ebanon, Libya, G renada, the P ersian G ulf. N o n u c le ar co n fro n tatio n c o m p a ra ­ ble to those of the 1950s a n d 1960s occurred. The enem ies firing o r fired u p o n w ere a t b e st rem otely plausible as ag en ts of Soviet p o w e r— K h m er R ouge al­ lied w ith Beijing, M ideast fanatics, a ju n ta in G re n a d a — a n d all n o tab ly be-

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lo n g ed to th a t loose category of "T h ird W orld" p eo p les, as if it w ere e ith er eas­ ier o r m o re necessary to d o b a ttle w ith n on-W estem ers. A g ain st th e only serio u s u se of Soviet m ilitary force, in A fghan istan , A m erican g u n s rem a in e d in th eir holsters. N onetheless, ala rm a b o u t Soviet p o w e r rem a in e d th e to u ch sto n e of le a d e rs' rhetoric a n d p ro claim ed policy. T here w ere m a n y w a y s to ex p lain the a p p a re n t g u lf b e tw e e n th e p ro claim ed p u rp o se a n d th e actual use of A m erican p o w er. O n ly b ecause n u c le ar d e te r­ rence w o rk e d so w ell, it co u ld b e said, d id it o ften recede from v iew a n d free u p forces for o th er tasks. C on fro n tin g Soviet p o w e r h a d n e v er b e e n th e sole p u r­ p o se of A m erican po w er, it m ig h t b e a d d e d , o n ly th e p ree m in e n t one. M ean­ w h ile, interests once p e rip h e ra l o r tak e n for g ra n te d , like M id east oil, h a d b een a d d e d to the core b y th e 1970s a n d w ere th rea te n ed in p a rt b y Soviet m ach in a­ tions. B esides, ih o st lead ers su g g e ste d , e v en w h e n M oscow 's h a n d w a s n o t v is­ ible, it w o u ld com e in to p la y u n less A m erican p o w e r w a s d ep lo y ed , a n d th e cred ib ility of th a t p o w e r w a s a t stake e v en w h e n th e tan g ib le in terests in v o lv ed w ere m inor, confused, o r u n re la te d to th e C o ld W ar. A less sy m p ath etic w a y to e x p lain th e g u lf w a s later offered b y Jo n ath an Schell, w h o (like m a n y others) e m p h a size d th e absence of serio u s reflection a b o u t the policies th a t h a d led the U n ited States in to V ietnam . W ith M cG o vern's d e fe at a n d W atergate's distractio n , th o se policies rem ain ed in place, leav in g m o st A m ericans "rep elled b y th e tan g ib le p ro sp e ct of an y m o re V ietnam s, y et still attrac ted to th e policies th a t h a d led th e U n ited States into V ietnam ." F ord in th e Mayaguez in cid en t fo resh ad o w ed th e p a tte rn to com e. C a rte r largely p u t it o n h o ld , b u t R eagan fo u n d th e fo rm u la th a t satisfied th e conflicting im p u lse s left b e h in d b y V ietnam : "h e g ave th e p u b lic M cG ovem ite d ecisions acco m p an ied b y N ix o n ian talk," as th e U n ited States "em b a rk ed o n th e b ifu rcated course of rhetorical to u g h n ess a n d practical restra in t."4 R eagan's d ecisions (and C a rte r's) w e re h a rd ly "M cG o v em ite"; a m ore p lau sib le p rece­ d e n t for h is course w a s Ike's presidency, a lth o u g h R eagan o u tstrip p e d th e g en ­ eral in bellicose rhetoric a n d lav ish sp e n d in g o n a rm a m e n ts n e v e r to b e u sed . Still, Schell correctly saw the d isju n ctio n b e tw ee n "rh eto rical to u g h n ess a n d p ractical restrain t." In th e n e w era of A m erica's m ilitarizatio n , th e p u rp o se of A m erican arm s w a s m ore self-reflective th a n e v e r— to b o lster h o w A m erican s (at least m a n y of them ) felt a b o u t them selves, ra th e r th a n to sh a p e th e w o rld . T he U n ited States w o u ld still go to b attle, b u t in G ilbert-and-S u lliv an w ars. To u se su c h p h rases risks triv ializin g in cid en ts in w h ic h the lives lost w ere real a n d th e in terests in ­ v o lv ed som etim es substantial. But su ch p h rases c ap tu re so m eth in g of th e e ra 's flavor a n d substance. M ilitarization d id n o t cease. T he C old W ar so o n seem ed too serio u s ag ain for th a t to h a p p e n , a n d ev en p se u d o -w a r d e p e n d e d o n th e p ercep tio n of p eril to A m erican interests, a p e rc ep tio n b u ttre ssed b y th e realities of a d iso rd e rly w o rld a n d a d d re sse d b y still fo rm id ab le A m erican m ilitary pow er. A sh a rp in-

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crease in A m erican (an d o th er n atio n s') arm s sales, u su a lly financed in som e w a y b y the U n ited States g o v ern m en t, w a s a special characteristic of th is phase. A t th e sam e tim e, m ilitarizatio n to o k o n a quixotic, u n c ertain quality, as if its fo u n d a tio n w a s c ru m b lin g ev en as the su p e rstru c tu re rem ain ed intact. A m erica's m ilitarizatio n (an d the Soviet U n io n 's as w ell) w a s n o w e n te rin g a m ore ad v an c ed o r (p u t m ore pejoratively) d e c a d e n t stage, o n e sim ilar to th e stage reached b y E u ro p e's g reat p o w e rs o n th e eve of W orld W ar I. By th en , those p o w e rs h a d p ro claim ed th e m o st d ire d an g er, refrain ed from w a r except in p e rip h e ra l areas, p ro m o te d sales of a rm a m e n ts ab ro a d to sh o re u p m assiv e d efen se in d u strie s a t hom e, a n d co n sp icu o u sly d isp lay e d w e a p o n s of d u b io u s u tility — the colossal b a ttlesh ip s th a t p resu m ab ly m e a su re d th eir m ig h t a n d in ­ tim id ated th eir enem ies b u t h a d n o convincin g ratio n ale an d , in W orld W ar I, little utility. By th e sam e token, th e U n ited States a n d th e Soviet U n io n n o w scram bled to b u ild m ore com plex, im pressiv e, or sim p ly b ig g er rockets, b o m b ers, a n d su b m arin es, e v en as th eir u tility in w ar, o r in d e te rrin g it, becam e m o re questionable. N o historical p arallel is absolute. The w o rld of 1975 w as h a rd ly th e sam e as E u ro p e in 1905. The difference in d e stru ctiv e p o w e r alone is obvious. Still, it m ig h t be said th a t m ilitarizatio n in A m erica w a s d e g en e ra tin g in to — or com ing full circle back to — sim ple m ilitarism , as d efin ed lo n g ago b y its p re e m in e n t h isto rian. A rm ies, w ro te A lfred Vagts, often "fo rg et th eir tru e p u rp o se , w ar, a n d th e m ain ten an ce of th e state to w h ich th ey belong. B ecom ing narcissistic, th ey d re a m th a t th ey exist for them selves alone. A n a rm y so b u ilt th a t it serv es m ilitary m en, n o t w ar, is m ilitaristic; so is e v ery th in g in a n a rm y w h ic h is n o t p re p a ra tio n for fighting, b u t m erely exists for d iv ersio n o r to satisfy p eacetim e w h im s like the long-anachronistic cavalry. T his w a s w ell ex p ressed b y th e R us­ sian g ra n d d u k e w h o a d m itte d th a t h e h a te d w a r 'b ecau se it spoils th e arm ies.' "5 The m u ch -n o ted reluctance of A m erican m ilitary lea d ers after 1973 to en ter com bat conform ed to V agts's definition. A m erican m ilitarism after V ietn am also d e p a rte d from th a t definition, h o w ev er. The state a n d its lead ers w ere n o w so long a n d fully id en tified w ith m ilitary force th a t they, m o re th a n th e arm ies them selves, w ere "becom ing narcissistic" a n d so u g h t "to satisfy p eacetim e w h im s." Such elem ents h a d long b e e n p re se n t in A m erica's m ilitar­ ization, b u t n o w th ey su rg e d to the forefront. B oth m o n stro u s costs a n d possible a d v a n ta g e s w ere in v o lv ed in th is h isto ri­ cal tu rn . The costs— in d o llars sq u a n d ere d , n erv es rattled , politics e m b itte red — are obvious. The a d v a n ta g e w a s th a t a c o u n try th a t p re e n e d o n its w eap o n ry , rattle d its sabers, a n d p la y e d a t w a r w a s less in clined actu ally to w ag e it th a n a n a tio n th a t took su ch m atters seriously. A s th e o u tb rea k of w a r in 1914 sh o w ed , play-acting can tu rn serio u s— or som e p lay e rs tu rn o u t to h av e b e en serious all along. L ikew ise, how ever, th e n a tio n 's h isto ry after 1975 gave h o p e th a t co m p ariso n s b e tw ee n m ilitarizatio n a t th e sta rt a n d a t th e e n d of this cen tu ry o u g h t n o t be p resse d too far.

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Carter and Militarization N o P re sid e n t since th e 1920s cam e to the W hite H o u se w ith su ch sh allo w roots in m ilitarization. Jim m y C a rte r h a d g ra d u a te d fro m th e N av al A cad em y a t A n ­ n a p o lis a n d as a n u c le ar en g in eer h a d sto o d in aw e of A dm . H y m a n R ickover, th e p io n ee r of atom ic su b m arin es, b u t his service in clu d ed n o com bat, w a s far b ack in h is life (he re tu rn e d to G eorgia in 1953 to p u rs u e farm in g a n d business), a n d of u n c e rta in influence u p o n him . H e w as.th e first P re sid e n t since F ranklin R oosevelt to m ove from a g o v e rn o rsh ip to th e W hite H o u se, b arely fam iliar w ith n a tio n al institu tio n s, a n d lacking w ell-d efin ed v iew s o n th e C old W ar a n d fo reig n policy. H e w as, then, b o th p o ise d to d eem p h asize m ilitarizatio n a n d ill e q u ip p e d to challenge it. T he 1976 election cam p aig n d id little to clarify w h a t h e m ig h t d o in office. Issues of ethnicity, religion, a n d g e n d er d o m in a te d th e cam p aig n ; th o u g h th ey o v e rla p p e d issues of w a r a n d diplom acy, th e latter o ften seem ed seco n d ary o r o u t of focus u n til th ey all cam e to g eth er in "o n e of th e g reat p resid en tia l gaffes of th e p a s t century." D ebating C a rte r o n television. Ford asserted , th e n con­ fu sin g ly d efe n d ed , th e claim th a t "th ere is n o Soviet d o m in a tio n of E astern E u­ ro p e." T h at n o tio n h a d h o n o rab le roots in A m erica's lo n g sta n d in g refusal to recognize Soviet d o m in a tio n th ere a n d in th e politics of d etente: th e Ford a d ­ m in istra tio n h o p e d th a t the recent H elsinki accords g u a ra n tee in g h u m a n rig h ts in E astern E u ro p e w o u ld e m b a rrass the Soviet U n io n a n d foster a u to n o m y for its satellites there. F ord's assen t to th o se accords h a d en ra g ed E astern E u ro p ean eth n ics a n d R epublican conservatives, h ow ev er, w h o u n le a sh e d fu ll-th ro ated cries of secret d ip lo m acy a n d sell-out to co m m u n ism once h u rle d a t D em ocrats. E choing old p leas to roll back ra th e r th a n m erely co n tain Soviet aggression, R onald R eagan h a d lam en ted th a t the accords " p u t th e A m erican seal of a p ­ p ro v al o n the R ed A rm y 's W orld W ar II co n q u ests." C a rte r u n d e rsto o d a n d largely sh a red F ord's p osition, b u t cap italized m asterfu lly o n F o rd 's ill-chosen w o rd s, the savage resp o n se to w h ich sh o w ed h o w alm o st an y o n e co u ld n o w be accused of b e in g soft o n com m unism . C a rte r's o w n v iew s w ere less clear. H e c am p aig n ed "as a fiscally conservative ad v o cate of full em p lo y m en t, a d e ­ fen d er of 'tra d itio n a l' fam ily v alu es w h o n o n eth eless su p p o rte d th e E qual R ights A m e n d m e n t, a foe of m ilitary in te rv en tio n w h o w o u ld sta n d u p to th e Soviets." M ore generally, h e p ro m ised n o m ore V ietn am s o r W atergates. H e w as "L on C haney, th e m a n of a th o u sa n d faces," ch arg ed o n e jo u rn alist, refer­ rin g to a fam ous actor.6 C a rte r's view s, how ever, w ere often less a t issue in 1976 th a n F o rd 's alleged foibles. Ford w as p illo ried as b e h o ld e n to N ix o n for h is p o sitio n a n d to K issin­ g er for his foreign policy; as stu p id (LBJ h a d jo ked th a t "Ford h a d p la y e d foot­ ball too often w ith o u t a h e lm e t"7); a n d as accid en t-p ro n e (actor C h ev y C hase im p e rso n a te d h im to d e v a sta tin g effect o n telev isio n 's Saturday Night Live). F o rd 's im age reflected a p o st-V ie tn a m -a n d -W a terg ate u rg e — so o n aim ed a t

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C arter as w ell— to cut the im p erial p resid en c y d o w n to size. B ut h e d id h a v e real w eaknesses: a Yale L aw School g ra d u a te in th e to p th ird of h is class. Ford w a s n o t d u m b , b u t h e lacked im ag in atio n a n d v erb al dexterity, h e in h e rite d a d isc o rd an t team of N ix o n h o ld o v ers, h e carried th e h e av y b u rd e n of h a v in g quick ly p a rd o n e d N ixon, a n d h e faced a political lan d sca p e w h e re th e fam iliar ru les seem ed u p for grabs. T h at h e b arely b e a t R eagan for h is p a rty 's n o m in a ­ tio n g a in e d h im n o luster. T h at h e n e arly ov ercam e a h u g e d eficit in th e p o lls su g g e ste d th a t C a rte r's m a n d a te w a s h a rd ly clearer th a n N ix o n 's in 1968. C ar­ te r's m arg in w a s o n ly 2 p e rc en t in the p o p u la r v o te a n d 297-241 in th e E lectoral C ollege, th o u g h D em ocrats k e p t h u g e m ajorities in C ongress. N o n etheless, in a stu n n in g ly b rief in a u g u ra l a d d re ss C a rte r sig n aled h is d e ­ term in a tio n to b re a k fro m A m erica's m ilitarized p ast. In ste ad of ask in g A m eri­ cans to forget V ietnam (th o u g h h e said little a b o u t it as a cam p aig n er), h e to ld th em to lea rn from " o u r recent m istak es." In ste ad of p ro m isin g to resto re p a st p o w e r a n d p restige, h e a rg u e d th a t "w e can n o t d w e ll u p o n rem em b ered glory." In ste ad of seeing a m u sc u la r city o n a hill resh a p in g th e w o rld , h e w a n te d a n ex em p lary A m erica seeking its o w n perfection: " o u r n a tio n c an b e stro n g a b ro a d only if it is stro n g a t h o m e," p ro m o tin g "free d o m in o th e r lan d s" b y sh o w in g " th a t o u r dem ocratic sy stem is w o rth y of e m u latio n ." In ste ad of u sin g m ilitary po w er, h e w a n te d to "m a in ta in stre n g th so sufficient th a t it n e e d n o t b e p ro v e n in co m b at— a q u iet stre n g th b a se d n o t m erely o n th e size of a n arsen al b u t o n th e n o b ility of id eas." In ste ad of a n e n d less a rm s race, h e p ro m ­ ised im m ed iate step s " to w a rd o u r u ltim ate g o al— th e elim in atio n of all n u c le a r w e a p o n s fro m th is E arth ."8 C arter h a d n o t set a sid e all th e h e a v y b ag g ag e of A m erican history. H e d id n o t re p u d ia te w a r as a n in stru m e n t of A m erican policy o r th e sp re a d of A m eri­ can w a y s a n d ideals. E ven a n e x em p lary A m erica w o u ld b e "stro n g a b ro a d ," a n d C a rte r u p d a te d a n old tra d itio n of th e U n ited States as m o raliz in g p reach er to th e w o rld . If h e seem ed an o m alo u s, o u tsid e th e m a in strea m of h is n a tio n 's history, it w a s p a rtly because of h is rhetorical style, o ften religious in cadence a n d sources. A P re sid e n t w illin g to q u o te th e Bible, p re se n t h im self as a b o rn ag ain C hristian, a n d co n fro n t issues of p rid e a n d h u m ility seem ed stra n g e to lead in g politicians a n d co m m en tato rs, accu sto m ed to a secu lar style a n d con­ sig n in g religion to th e b ack w aters of A m erican life. C arter w as p la g u e d b y th e "w eird o factor," his a id e H a m ilto n Jo rd an said, b u t in fact h is religiosity w a s in th e m ain strea m of A m erican life.9 N o n etheless, h e differed from h is p redecesso rs, if less in goals th a n in h is a p p a re n t fervor in p u rs u in g them . Style w a s n o t w h o lly sep arab le fro m su b ­ stance. In 1976, "citing Jesus' teachings. C a rte r o ften d eclared th a t 'a ll of u s are sin fu l' w ith o u t p ru d e n tly a d d in g th a t A m erican s in th e ag g reg ate w ere less sin ­ ful th a n o th ers." D istu rb in g too to som e A m ericans, th o u g h it ech o ed N ixon, w a s h is assertio n in 1977 th a t A m ericans w ere n o w free of th eir "in o rd in a te fear of C o m m u n ism ."10 Follow ing o n th e u n c ertain sta rt m a d e b y N ix o n a n d Ford,

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C a rte r w a n te d to reverse th e n a tio n 's, a n d m o re g ra n d ly th e w o rld 's, m ilitariz­ atio n , a n d h e sp o k e to m a n y of its co m p o n en ts, especially th e a rm s race, w ith its k n o tty p ro b lem s of arm s sales, w e a p o n s testin g , a n d n u c le ar proliferatio n . Be­ fore h is in a u g u ra tio n , h e e v en sp ecu lated to th e Joint C hiefs th a t tw o h u n d re d strategic w e a p o n s o n each side m ig h t suffice to d e te r n u c le ar w ar. Publicly, h e c h allen g ed m ilitarizatio n w ith a force u n m a tc h e d since E isenhow er. N o tab le too, especially c o m p a red to N ixon, w a s h is g rasp of th e th o rn y d etails of th ese m atters, the n o n co m b ativ e m a n n e r in w h ic h h e d iscu ssed th em , a n d h is w ife's role in h e lp in g h im assess them . C a rte r also differed from his p red ecesso rs— again, especially N ix o n — in lay­ in g o u t a n a ltern ativ e a g e n d a for A m ericans. A b ro ad h e w o u ld focus o n p ro b ­ lem s of p o v e rty a n d resource m a n a g e m e n t— in th e p arlan ce of th e d ecad e, o n N o rth -S o u th ra th e r th a n East-W est problem s. H is "d o m estic ag en d a " w a s d e sig n e d "to p ro v id e m ore efficiently for th e n e ed s of o u r p eo p le, to d e m o n stra te — a g ain st the d a rk faith of o u r tim e s— th a t o u r G o v e rn m e n t can be b o th co m p e te n t a n d h u m a n e ." T he en erg y crisis lo o m ed larg est for h im in 1977, b u t th e p ro m o tio n of h u m a n rig h ts a b ro a d a n d a t h o m e w a s n e a re r to h is h eart. Like p rec ed in g P residents, h e lin k ed th e aren as of action at h o m e a n d ab ro ad , as h e h a d in h is in a u g u ra l in a g en eral w ay, a lth o u g h h is lin k ag e w a s loose a n d less cen tral to his reasoning. In M arch 1977, for exam ple, citing the Soviet a m b a ss a d o r's co m p lain t a b o u t w o m e n 's rig h ts in A m erica in resp o n se to C a rte r's m essage o n h u m a n rig h ts, h e to ld th e N a tio n a l W o m en 's Political C au cu s th a t " o u r failure to p a ss th e eq u al rig h ts a m e n d m e n t h u rts u s as w e try to set a sta n d a rd of c o m m itm en t to h u m a n rig h ts th ro u g h o u t th e w o rld ." H e also in v o k ed w a r as a m o d el for action a g ain st p ro b lem s a t hom e. "W e w ill fig h t o u r w a rs a g ain st po v erty , ignorance, a n d injustice," h e a n n o u n c e d in h is in au ­ g u ral. W orried a b o u t the en erg y crisis, h e u rg e d A m erican s in F eb ru ary 1977 to rem e m b e r th a t " d u rin g W orld W ar II w e faced a terrib le crisis— b u t th e chal­ lenge of fig h tin g N a zism d re w u s to g eth er." H e d id n o t give su c h fo rm u latio n s th e su sta in e d rhetorical tre a tm e n t Johnson h a d offered, ho w ev er. A s in his sta te m e n ts o n w a r a n d a rm a m e n ts, h e set fo rth h is visio n of p ro g ress a t h o m e in a diffu se a n d disjointed fashion, b u t h e m a d e h is g oals clear.11 N o t, h o w ev er, his u n d e rs ta n d in g of them . C arter d id n o t ex p lain w h a t forces p u s h e d n a tio n s into w ar, w h a t d ro v e th e a rm s race, w h a t m ilitarizatio n lo oked like, o r w h e re it cam e from historically a n d politically. H e offered bare-bones, alm o st ap h o ristic statem ents. P erhaps, m o ralist th a t h e w as, h e a ssu m e d th a t a n u n d e rs ta n d in g of th e p ro b lem s w as e m b e d d e d in reactions to th e V ietn am W ar, in v o lv in g d ilem m as alm o st self-evident. P erh ap s, tech n o crat th a t h e also w as, h e h u rrie d to w o rk o n solutions ra th e r th a n lin g erin g to defin e th e p ro b ­ lem . O r m ay b e h e sim p ly d id n o t g rasp the p ro b le m — h e k n ew th e evils th a t m ilitarizatio n caused, n o t the evils th a t gave rise to it. W h atev er th e case, his p resid en c y h a d a c u rio u s sta rt in w h ich an a g en d a w a s set b u t n o t m u ch ex­ p lain ed , actions sig n aled b u t th e reaso n s for th em n o t o ften ex p o u n d ed . N or,

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asid e from his firm g rasp of the N ixon-K issinger reco rd o n d e te n te , d id h e cite p red ecesso rs like E isenhow er w h o h a d q u e stio n e d m ilita riza tio n — p e rh a p s b ecau se h e k n ew little a b o u t them , certain ly b ecau se h e w a s d e te rm in e d to b rea k from them . W ith o u t ex p lain in g the sources of m ilitarizatio n , h o w ev er, h e d id little to p re p a re A m ericans for the obstacles ah ead ; w ith o u t in v o k in g h is pred ecessors, h e seem ed a m averick u n a n c h o re d in A m erican p o litical tra d i­ tions; w ith o u t establishing th e term s of deb ate, h e left con tro l of it su b stan tially to others. A s alw ay s in su c h m atters, these p a tte rn s w ere n o t o n ly of h is m aking: little d e m a n d o n h im to spell th in g s o u t arose w h e n h e to o k office. C arter qu ick ly e m b a rk ed o n a n effort, so different from N ixon, to talk w ith A m erican s in q u e stio n -a n d -an sw er sessions— w ith p e rso n n el from ev ery C ab in et d e p a rt­ m en t, o rd in a ry citizens in to w n m eetin g s a n d o n telev isio n call-in sh o w s, a n d th e p re ss— in w h ic h a strik in g d iv ersity of issu es (if n o t o p in io n s o n th em ) cam e before him . Insofar as q u estio n s a b o u t w a r a n d n a tio n al secu rity arose d u rin g these first m on th s, th ey d e alt less w ith a rm s co n tro l o r d efen se b u d g e ts th a n w ith his q uick decision to p a rd o n V ietn am w a r d ra ft resisters. C a rte r d is­ a p p o in te d the a n tiw a r Left b y refu sin g to p a rd o n th o se w h o h a d resisted o r d e serte d once in u n iform , a n d in fu ria te d th e R ight— "T he m o st disg racefu l th in g a P re sid e n t h as ever do n e," G o ld w a ter sa id w ith ty p ical h y p e rb o le 12— th o u g h C arter th o u g h tfu lly in v o k ed his S o u th e rn e r's k n o w le d g e of th e C ivil W ar to stress the im p o rtan ce of a m n e sty a n d h ealing. M ore o ften th a n n o t, th e q u estio n s spoke to o th er m atters, like th e en erg y sh o rtag e of th a t b itte r w in ter. C arter can b e fau lted for p lu n g in g in to aren as b o u n d to expose h im to a d iscor­ d a n t m ess of co m p lain ts— h is p o se of p a tie n t a n d still-learn in g sch oolteacher w as n o t the b e st w a y to control a n a tio n 's ag en d a. T hat a g e n d a w a s n o t solely his to control, how ever, o r clearly focused o n th e issues of w a r a n d a rm a m e n ts h e e m p h a size d in his in au g u ral. Fuller sh a p e to h is id eas em erg ed in the sp rin g of 1977. H e co n fro n ted th e V ietnam W ar's u g ly residue, m ak in g n o rm aliz a tio n of relatio n s w ith V ietn am his goal a n d in d icatin g satisfaction w ith V ietn am 's efforts to acco u n t for m iss­ in g A m erican servicem en. T h at issue w a s y e t to y ield its full fury, b u t C a rte r p u t it in p erspective, n o tin g th a t in W orld W ar II a n d K orea "w e still d id n o t acco u n t for 22 p ercen t" of the m issing b u t in V ietnam "all except a b o u t 4 p e rc en t" w e re traced. H e d rew clear, careful distin ctio n s a b o u t resp o n sib ility for th a t w ar. H e w o u ld n o t pile blam e solely o n the U n ited States: "th e d e stru c tio n w a s m u ­ tual. . . . I d o n 't feel th a t w e o u g h t to apolog ize o r castigate o u rselv es" (or p a y th e c o m m u n ists the rep aratio n s N ixon h a d prom ised). But h e w o u ld h av e h is n a tio n share blam e, unlike h is p red ecesso rs (th o u g h C a rte r h a d th e lu x u ry of b earin g n o p erso n al responsibility). T he U n ited States h a d a d o p te d "th e flaw ed a n d erro n eo u s p rinciples a n d tactics of o u r ad v ersa rie s" a n d h a d " fo u g h t fire w ith fire, n e v er th in k in g th a t fire is b e tte r q u e n ch e d w ith w ater. T his a p p ro a ch failed, w ith V ietnam the b est exam ple of its in tellectu al a n d m o ral p o v erty ."

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T hose w o rd s, sp o k e n a t N o tre D am e U n iv ersity o n M ay 22, w ere stro n g ones for a n A m erican P resident, e v en if som etim es m islead in g . (G iven th e e n o rm ity of A m erica's technological w a r in V ietnam , th e d e stru c tio n th ere w a s h a rd ly "m u tu a l.") M ore generally. C a rte r a rg u e d th a t th e C old W ar "h as becom e less in te n siv e" e v en if also "m ore extensive," a n d th a t its e n d w as w ith in grasp. H e h a rd ly re p u d ia te d "m ilitary p o w e r," b u t h e saw in te rn atio n al co o p eratio n as " a n excellent altern ativ e to w a r." 13 Fresh th o u g h th e N o tre D am e speech w as, it rev ealed ten sio n s w ith in C ar­ te r's o u tlo o k th a t so o n sh a rp en e d . In m a n y w a y s h e ch allen g ed lo n g stan d in g d istin ctio n s b e tw e e n the U n ited States a n d its foes, b u t reg a rd in g " h u m a n rig h ts" h e k e p t th e line sh a rp b e tw ee n "free" a n d "to ta litaria n " natio n s. The d istin ctio n w a s n o t inaccurate, o r absolute; h e a ck n o w led g ed " o u r o w n sh o rt­ com ings a n d fau lts."14 Still, it concerned th e v e ry m a tte r C a rte r ju d g e d m o st im p o rta n t, as if in ev ery lesser w a y h e saw c o m m o n g ro u n d w ith th e foe, b u t in th e m o st v ital one h e d id not. By th e tim e of h is N o tre D am e speech. C a rte r w a s also sh o w in g signs th a t h is skill in resistin g m ilitarizatio n w a s as lim ited b e h in d th e scenes as it w a s in p u b ­ lic. H is p o sitio n o n p rev io u s SALT ag reem en ts w a s b lu n t, accurate, a n d sen si­ tive to th e y e arn in g s of m a n y A m ericans: T hey set lim its "so h ig h th a t th ey w ere, in effect, ju st g ro u n d ru les for intensified co m p etitio n a n d a co n tin u ed m assiv e arm s g ro w th in n u c le ar w e a p o n s." 15 But h e ru sh e d in to a n a rm s con­ trol effort th a t m o st ex p erts ju d g e d ra s h a n d co u n te rp ro d u ctiv e (th o u g h cau ­ tio u s g rad u a lism . C a rte r p o in te d out, h a d h a rd ly y ield ed m uch). First h e or­ d e re d A m erican n u c le ar a rm s w ith d ra w n fro m Korea, th e n h e p re se n te d the Soviets w ith a n a rm s control p ro p o sa l far m o re lim itin g th a n th e o n e Ford h a d b e e n w o rk in g on. In n e ith e r case d id h e explore h is actions w ith th e K rem lin b efore g oing public, d isp lay in g insensitivity to its p lo d d in g a n d su sp icio u s w a y s (and to th o se of h is Pentagon). Soviet P arty C h a irm an L eonid B rezhnev p ro b ab ly sen sed b o th g ra tu ito u s p ressu re a n d u n d e rly in g w eak n ess in C a rte r's actions o n a rm s control, a n d in h is p reach m en ts o n h u m a n rights. T ensions es­ calated, n e g o tiatio n s w ilted , a n d C a rte r e n d e d u p d e m a n d in g "m o re a rm s for th e U n ited States, a n d less for the Soviets, th a n K issinger a n d N ix o n h a d b een w illin g to accept."16 In th e en d , it took u n til 1979 to h a m m e r o u t a SALT II Treaty, w h ic h differed little from the ag reem en t Ford h a d ten tativ ely n e g o ti­ a te d a n d w a s flaw ed in precisely th e w ay s th a t C arter h a d id en tified reg a rd in g SALT I. It lim ited lau n ch ers b u t n o t w a rh ea d s, w h ich co uld b e m u ltip lie d e n d ­ lessly b y m o u n tin g m ore o n existing rockets, a n d froze o ld technologies w h ile leaving n e w ones free for d ev elo p m en t. M eanw hile, the pace of d e v elo p in g n e w m issiles, w a rh ea d s, a n d space tech­ nolo g y u n d e r C a rte r follow ed th a t of his predecessors. H e d id kill tw o ex p en ­ sive p ro g ram s, one for a B -l b o m b er to replace th e B-52, an o th e r for a n e u tro n b o m b ("m ocked . . . as th e 'R ep u b lican b o m b ' " because it featu red e n h an c ed sh o rt-term ra d ia tio n to take lives a n d d im in ish e d b last to sp are p ro p erty ).17

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Both decisions d rew the w ra th of conservativ es, w h ile liberals offered C a rte r on ly lu k ew arm su p p o rt for h is w e a p o n s a n d a rm s control policies. H is m u ch to u te d effort to red u ce global a rm s sales also failed; A m erican sales, like th o se of m a n y n atio n s, increased u n d e r C arter, th o u g h far less ra p id ly th a n u n d e r N ix o n a n d Ford. Stalled too w a s h is effort to g e t a treaty b a n n in g tests of n u ­ clear w eap o n s, th o u g h th e K rem lin w a s n o t th e m ajor obstacle: n e w tech n o lo g y d em o lish ed the old claim th a t Soviet ch eatin g o n a b a n of u n d e rg ro u n d testin g w o u ld go u n d e te cted , b u t d efense h a w k s a n d w e a p o n s lab o rato ries raised a fresh objection, a rg u in g th a t only c o n tin u ed testin g w o u ld en su re th a t w a r­ h e a d s w e re safe a n d reliable. O n e w a y to d eem p h asiz e th e C o ld W ar a n d m ilita riza tio n w as to d o a n e n d ru n a ro u n d th em ra th e r th a n tackling th e m h ead -o n . H ig h lig h tin g o th er issu es m ig h t shift a g e n d a s a n d forestall n e w threats, w h ile in tractab le p ro b lem s in the Soviet-A m erican relatio n sh ip co u ld a w ait a calm er m o m e n t for solution. In th a t reg ard , far m ore th a n in his h e a d -o n attack. C a rte r m et success. H e g ave m u c h m ore a tten tio n to A m erica's relatio n sh ip w ith A frica, L atin A m erica, a n d th e M id east th a n his predecessors. H is effort to h a m m e r o u t th e 1979 peace ag ree­ m en t b e tw ee n E g y p t a n d Israel w a s as strik in g for its en erg y as for th e m o d e st d im in u tio n of M id east ten sio n s it afforded. To be sure, n o issu e seem ed en tirely o u tsid e th e C old W ar fram e w o rk — a d m in istra tio n h a w k s saw v a lu e in b ro k er­ in g ag reem en ts th a t m ig h t forestall Soviet a d v e n tu rism in th ese regions. Still, a P resid en t w illin g to p o u r g reat c h u n k s of tim e a n d p o litical cap ital in to settlin g in tractable p ro b lem s in those areas, o r in to th e b itte r stru g g le w h ic h saw th e Senate n a rro w ly ratify the P an am a C anal Treaty, sig n aled a p o ssib le b re a k fro m C old W ar priorities. A s leverage a g ain st m ilitarizatio n , h o w ev er, th o se efforts h e lp e d C a rte r little. T hey w ere u n d e rv a lu e d b y m a n y A m ericans, resen te d b y som e precisely because th ey th rea te n ed the cen trality of fam iliar issues, a n d c o m p ro m ised b y C arter him self a n d th e A m erican go v ern m en t. H o w ev e r lau d a b le th e effort to sto p T hird W orld c o u n tries from g e ttin g n u c le ar w e ap o n s, for ex am p le, it cast N o rth -S o u th relations in to a n u g ly stru g g le b e tw e e n h av e a n d h a v e-n o t n a ­ tions, one fu rth e r em b ittered b y "th e c o n tin u in g h y p o c risy of b o th th e W hite H o u se a n d C ongress w ith reg a rd to Israel's [nuclear] p ro g ra m s." 18 In an y event. C arter g ra d u a lly sh o v ed N o rth -S o u th p ro b lem s b ack in to th e E ast-W est context. By 1979, h e v iew ed Soviet a n d C u b a n a d v e n tu rism in A frica, th e d e a th rattle of reactionary regim es in C en tral A m erica, a n d th e attractio n s of C hineseA m erican co operation all w ith in th a t context, like N ix o n seein g Beijing as c o u n te rw eig h t to M oscow . W h at h a d gone w rong? C arter g o t little h e lp fro m B rezhnev's reg im e in M os­ cow. It d id n o t constitute the d o o m sd a y th re a t to A m erica m a n y co n serv ativ es n o w saw. Brittle, sclerotic, defensive, it offered, in th e g ra n d R u ssian trad itio n , m ore sh o w th a n su b stan ce— n e w rockets of n o p ractical u tility a n d strateg ic

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c o o p eratio n w ith m o stly m in o r a n d d e sp e ra te T h ird W orld regim es. L ong gone w a s th e ideological a p p e a l to stru g g lin g n a tio n s o r th e technological razzled a zz le of th e K h ru sh ch ev years. But the sh o w still a p p e a re d m enacing. If th e reg im e's b rittlen ess m ask ed its hollow ness, it also d e p riv e d M oscow of th e d ip ­ lom atic b o ld n ess a n d su p p le n e ss occasionally e v id e n t u n d e r K hrushchev. Fearful th a t a n y com prom ise o n its p a rt w o u ld d a m a g e its g reat p o w e r statu s, M oscow p ro v e d tru c u le n t in n e g o tiatio n s a n d p u b lic statem en ts. C arter g o t little m ore h e lp from h is E u ro p ea n allies, w h o c o n tin u ed a n o ften tw o-faced criticism of the U n ited States as b o th trig g e r-h ap p y a n d flaccid in its w illin g ­ n e ss to d e fe n d W estern E urope. E loquent o n th ese issues. W est G e rm a n ch an ­ cellor H e lm u t S chm idt p u t en o rm o u s p ressu re o n C a rte r to su p p o rt n e w n u ­ clear w e a p o n s for N A TO forces. C a rte r's excessive id ealism a n d deficient political skill w ere m o re o ften cited, h o w ev er, to e x p lain h is political failure a n d h is re tu rn to C old W ar orthodoxy. Yet C a rte r's id ealism differed little from E isen h o w er's o r R eagan's, w h o also w a x e d e lo q u e n t a b o u t e n d in g th e th rea t of n u c le ar w e a p o n s a n d d isp la y e d a m o ral fervor in w a g in g th e C o ld W ar co m p arab le to C a rte r's in scale if n o t focus. If C a rte r w a s different, it w a s because h e seem ed to mean th e idealistic in te n tio n s o th ers o n ly m o u th e d , to couch th em in itially o u tsid e th e C o ld W ar fram ew o rk , to express th e m in a different style, a n d to w o rk h a rd e r a t achieving th em . M oreover, C a rte r w a s fau lted as m u c h for cynically ig n o rin g h is id eals as for p u rs u in g them , as if a deficiency ra th e r th a n a n excess of id ealism w ere h is pro b lem . N or, as h e recognized, w ere ideals a n d p o w e r u n related : h is p ro m o ­ tio n of h u m a n rig h ts in th e Soviet sp h ere e m b o ld en e d d issid e n ts there, h e lp in g to u n d e rm in e th e old regim e, th o u g h R eagan w o u ld rea p th e cred it for co m m u ­ n ism 's fall. "Id ealism ," so difficult to m easu re, is a tro u b leso m e criterio n for e v alu atin g P residents. So is in e p titu d e , o ften a ttrib u te d to C arter. By tak in g th e in itiativ e o n m an y issu es a t once, it w a s often n o ted . C arter o v e rw h elm ed C ongress, co n fu sed frien d s a n d foes, scattered h is energies, a n d lo st track of h is p rio rities. N o r d id h e lea rn to a p p reciate th e error: h e c o n tin u ed to p ro claim so m a n y p ro b lem s as th e m o st serio u s faced b y th e n a tio n (m uch as Jo h n so n h a d acco rd ed all h is w a rs eq u al im portance) th a t h is rhetoric b ecam e n u m b in g a n d b ew ild erin g . O n th e o th er h a n d , his m u ch -n o ted inability to settle b e tw ee n th e differing policies of N a tio n a l S ecurity A d v iso r Z b ig n iew B rzezinski a n d Secretary of State C y ru s Vance reflected in stitu tio n al tensions th a t h av e p la g u e d m o st p o stw a r Presi­ d en ts. "T he d isa rra y of th e C arter years," Joh n N e w h o u se later n o te d , "seem s a b it tam e w h e n c o m p a red to th e foreign policy b ab b le th a t fo llo w ed ."19 P erh ap s th e m o st n o to rio u s exam ple of C a rte r's h a m -h a n d e d n e ss w a s h is sh o w casin g th e Iran h o stag e crisis a n d th e n failing to resolve it, a lth o u g h h e h a rd ly co u ld h av e sid e ste p p e d it altogether. N o d o u b t his co u rse w a s p olitically d isastro u s, b u t C a rte r's d ip lo m atic record o n th e h o stag e issu e w a s b e tte r th a n th a t of his

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successor, w h o differed only in h a v in g the sav v y n o t to h ig h lig h t h is o w n w eak n ess (even th o u g h R eagan's h o stag e crises o ften in v o lv ed A m erican sol­ d iers a n d d ip lo m a ts a n d d ra g g e d o n for years). C a rte r's m isstep s d id n o t o u tra n k a n experien ced E isen h o w er's w ith th e U-2 incid ent, the d isa stro u s slide in to the V ietn am W ar b y th e cool realists of the K ennedy-Johnson era, o r the inability of N ix o n a n d K issinger, su p p o s e d m as­ ters of realpolitik, to b rin g a tim ely e n d to th e V ietn am W ar. D eten te w a s al­ rea d y in d e e p tro u b le u n d e r N ix o n a n d Ford, w h o , h a d th e y seen SALT II to com pletion, m ig h t h av e e n co u n tere d o p p o sitio n as ferocious as th a t faced b y C arter. A lread y b y 1975, SALT'S o p p o n e n ts w ere circu latin g "creative d isto r­ tio n s a n d o u trig h t lies." By 1979, Sen. D aniel M o y n ih an ch allen g ed th e SALT II T reaty w ith th e claim , so b lith ely dism issive of A m erica's p o sitio n in th e w o rld in 1914 o r 1941, th a t "w e h av e n e v e r— since 1812. . . h a d to live w ith th e id ea of a n o th e r po w er, n o t friendly, a n d h a v in g a larg er m ilitary capacity." T h at su ch a n o u trag e o u s assertio n cam e from su ch a sm a rt D em o crat su g g e ste d h o w m u ch larger forces w ere at w o rk u n d e rm in in g C arter, w h o se com p eten ce b e ­ cam e alm o st irrelevant.20 C arter succeeded b e tte r th a n m o st m o d e m P re sid e n ts a t m a n a g in g th e af­ fairs of state so as to keep the n a tio n o u t of w ar. T he b o ilerp late criticism s of h im reflected th e h ig h er sta n d a rd s h e se t for h im self a n d th e tim es se t for him . T hey also reflected, am id ren e w e d C old W ar fervor, a d e n ig ra tio n of successes o u t­ sid e th e fam iliar aren a of su p e rp o w e r conflict. O f course, w h e n C a rte r him self retre ated into a con v en tio n al C old W ar p o stu re , h e in v ite d e v a lu atio n b y con­ v en tio n al C old W ar sta n d ard s. W h at w e n t w ro n g for C a rte r h a d less to d o w ith som e excess of id ealism o r deficiency of skill th a n w ith specific ten sio n s in h is v iew s a n d w ith th e volatile politics of the 1970s. E ven a t his idealistic sta rt as P resid en t, h e n e v e r p ro p o se d cuts in the d efense b u d g e t, th u s leaving th e en g in e of m ilitarizatio n ru n n in g at full sp e ed ev en as h e trie d to control its p ro d u cts. R eg ard in g d efen se sp e n d in g . C arter w as a classic tran sitio n al figure, relu c ta n t eith er to accept o r to reject th e ex p an sive v iew of resources a n d n e e d s long asso ciated w ith liberal D em ocratic C old W arriors. (D efense sp e n d in g as a d ju ste d for in flatio n rose slo w ly u n d e r C arter, m ore sh a rp ly in his last b u d g e t, a n d flu ctu ated a ro u n d 5 p e rc en t of G N P.) By 1979 h e em braced th a t expansive view , b u t b y th e n R epublicans h a d rejected th eir o w n p a rty 's fiscal co n serv atism o n d efen se a n d d e m a n d e d far m o re m ilitary sp en d in g . N o t on ly d id C a rte r's co u rse look u n certain , it w a s w h ip -sa w e d as the tw o m ajor p a rties tra d e d p o sitio n s o n th is critical m atter. H e co n tin u ed to d o little to ex p lain the roo ts of m ilitarizatio n . In a n e lo q u e n t O ctober 1977 speech a b o u t n u c le ar arm s, h e to ld th e U n ited N a tio n s th a t "w e h av e learn ed in D u rre n m a tt's chilling w o rd s th a t 'w h a t h a s once b e e n th o u g h t can n e v e r b e u n -th o u g h t.' " T hat observation , su m m a riz in g co m m o n w isd o m a b o u t the irreversibility of scientific p rog ress, left u n e x p lo re d w h e re the th o u g h t cam e from in the first place a n d h o w k n o w le d g e alone d o e s n o t dictate

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in stitu tions. (As one scholar later p o in te d out, slav ery w a s b a n ish e d e v en as k n o w le d g e of h o w to practice it rem ained.) M y sterio u s a b o u t th e causes o f the arm s race. C arter, like m o st A m ericans in terested in a rm s control, w a s left to flail a t its consequences.21 A p u z z lin g g ap also o p e n ed b e tw e e n the id ealism of h is goals a n d th e rea­ so n in g w h ic h som etim es g u id e d h is decisions, su c h as th o se to ax th e B -l b o m b er a n d p ro m o te the MX (m obile experim en tal) m issile. T hose decisions w ere fram e d in term s of cost-efficiency: m o re b o m b s co u ld b e b e tte r d eliv ered (or d e p lo y e d to d e te r the Soviets) a t less cost w ith o n e w e ap o n s sy stem th a n an o th er. A sensible basis for d ecisions— after all. C a rte r n o ted , th e Bible gave n o in stru ctio n a b o u t "w h e th e r y o u sh o u ld h av e a B -l b o m b er o r th e airlau n c h ed cruise m issile"— it still seem ed u n re la te d to h is v isio n ary q u e st to sta u n ch m ilitarization. O r w o rse, it co u ld seem to critics g ro ssly a t o d d s w ith th a t q u est, as w h e n h e s u p p o rte d th e MX— albeit to w a rd off h a w k s o p p o sin g th e SALT II T reaty— a lth o u g h h e fo u n d it "a n a u se a tin g p ro sp e ct to con­ fro n t."22 N o r d id h e consistently follow it: rejecting th e n e u tro n b om b, h e b ro u g h t m o ral ferv o r back in to play. A p ro p h e t's v isio n seem ed serv ed b y a n a cco u n tan t's m eth o d s, a n d in a n u n p red ic ta b le fash io n at th at. C a rte r's p ro b ­ lem w as n o t th a t h e w a s too idealistic o r too practical, b u t ra th e r th a t h is tw o m o d es seem ed disconnected, floating in se p ara te w o rld s. D isconnected, too, w e re h is c am p aig n s for h u m a n rig h ts a n d d isarm am en t. H e m istak en ly th o u g h t h e could coerce M oscow a b o u t th e fo rm er a n d cooper­ ate w ith it a b o u t th e latter. (H e h a d m ore leverage o n h u m a n rig h ts o v er d es­ potic allies like F e rd in an d M arcos in the P h ilip p in es a n d th e sh a h in Iran, b u t w ith th em C arter u su a lly v a lu e d A m erican strategic in terests higher.) H e also failed to foresee h o w the m o ral fervor of a h u m a n rig h ts cam p aig n w o u ld p la y a t h o m e, stoking the v e ry "in o rd in a te fear of co m m u n ism " h e w a n te d to d a m p e n . T he p u rs u it of scarcely less th a n M oscow 's u n c o n d itio n al su rre n d e r in th e m o ral aren a reso n ate d w ith h o p e s for a sim ilar su rre n d e r in th e m ilitary aren a, h o p e s ren e w e d in th e 1970s a n d in d u lg e d b y in sid ers like B rzezinski. A K rem lin castigated for gross ab u se of p eo p le w a s easily m a d e to seem eag er also for w a r a n d w o rld conquest. A fter all, h a d n o t precisely th a t co m b in atio n of evils characterized N a zi G erm any? T hat C a rte r's d ru m b e a t o n h u m a n rig h ts so u n d e d a m id h e ig h ten e d in terest in the H o lo cau st (an d th e K h m er R ouge's g enocide in C am bodia) stre n g th e n ed th e im p u lse to cast p ro b lem s w ith th e So­ v iet U n io n back in to the realm of w a r a n d w eap o n s. To am ass th e latter seem ed for m an y the a p p ro p ria te response. Soon e v en C a rte r agreed. The u n d e rto w of W orld W ar II w a s e v id e n t in a n o th e r arena. In A p ril 1977 C arter said th a t h is en erg y policy req u ire d a n effort th a t "w ill b e th e 'm o ral eq u iv alen t of w a r,' " a p h ra se h e re p e a te d in O ctober. C a rte r's p u rp o se w a s to rally p o p u la r su p p o rt b e h in d sacrifices necessary to av ert "n atio n al catastro ­ p h e " a n d a g ain st en erg y interests th a t m ig h t en g ag e in " w a r p ro fiteerin g ." This w a s w ar, "except th a t w e w ill b e u n itin g o u r efforts to b u ild a n d n o t to de-

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stroy."23 C a rte r's u se of W illiam Jam es's fam o u s p h ra se w a s brief, b u t it c a u g h t a tten tio n a n d h e lp e d m ove en erg y issues o n to th e slip p ery te rra in of w ar. W h en b u sin e ss in terests assailed h is p ro p o sals, it seem ed "lik e it w a s th e d a y after Pearl H arb o r," n o te d Rep. M orris U d all in d efen se of th e P resid en t, " a n d y o u in te rv ie w e d the C o n g ressm an from D etro it a n d h e said, 'T h e Jap an ese a t­ tack w a s o u trag eo u s, b u t before w e ru sh in to w ar, let's see h o w it w o u ld affect th e [auto] in d u stry ." Seeking w a r 's m o ral e q u iv a le n t se t loose talk of w a r a n d analogies to it th a t C arter co u ld n o t control a n d th a t w o rse n e d h is im ag e of in ­ e p titu d e. W h en his en erg y p la n s stu m b le d in C ongress, o n e W hite H o u se aid e foresaw "th e m o ral e q u iv a le n t of the V ietn am w a r"; th e Boston Globe tea se d C a rte r for offering "th e m o ral eq u iv a le n t of Som inex"; a n d w a g s n o te d th a t th e acro n y m for "m o ral e q u iv a le n t of w a r" w a s M EOW .24 C arter h a d w a n d e re d o n to d a n g e ro u s im ag in ativ e terrain . If w a r w a s a m o d el, V ietnam w a s a d isc o u rag in g preced en t. If W orld W ar II w a s th e to u ch stone, it p ro m ised m ore u n ity a n d action th a n h e co u ld deliver. A n d if th e "m o ral eq u iv a le n t of w a r" w a s attractive, p re su m a b ly th ere w a s so m e th in g at­ tractive a b o u t w a r itself, in w h ic h case a m ere su b stitu te m ig h t b e u n satisfy in g . Few A m ericans w a n te d o r expected w a r in 1977, b u t in p ro p o sin g a n a ltern a ­ tive to m ilitarizatio n th a t left w a r as a m od el. C a rte r se n t a m b ig u o u s sig n als a b o u t w a r's place in A m erican life. By 1980 h is d istin ctio n b e tw e e n w a r a n d its m o ral eq u iv a le n t n e arly co llap sed as th e en erg y crisis b ecam e b o u n d u p w ith M id east turm oil: it w a s necessary, h e arg u e d , to eq u ate "en e rg y secu rity w ith o u r N a tio n 's m ilitary security; th ere 's n o w a y to se p ara te th e tw o ." A s G a d d is S m ith h a s co m m en ted . C a rte r's "m o ral e q u iv a le n t of w a r h a d tu rn e d in to so m eth in g v e ry close to p re p a rin g for w a r itself."25 C a rte r's failures w ere so g larin g th a t h is successes a n d th e obstacles before h im easily escap ed co n tem p o raries a n d histo rian s. H is challenge to m ilitariza­ tio n d id su b stan tially fail, b u t so h a d challenges b y h is p red ecesso rs, w h e n th e y ev en m a d e th e attem p t. A t least his effort h e lp e d to k eep th e n a tio n o u t of w a r a n d to n o u rish h o p e s th a t p ro v e d resilient d u rin g R eag an 's presidency. M ean ­ w hile, as reactions to his "m o ral e q u iv a le n t of w a r" sh o w ed , h e w a s trip p e d u p n o t on ly b y his o w n failings b u t b y sw irlin g c u rre n ts in p o litical c u ltu re su b ­ stan tially b ey o n d h is control.

Clashing Cultures of War In 1976, A m erican b o m b ers a g ain attack ed H iro sh im a — th is tim e in sim u la ­ tio n s a ro u n d the U n ited States stag ed b y th e C o n fed erate A ir Force, a g ro u p of m ilitary aviators d e d ic ated to resto rin g W orld W ar II aircraft. P au l T ibbets, the Enola Gay's p ilo t in 1945, re tu rn e d to th e controls as a B-29 m a d e its b o m b in g ru n , w hile sp ectato rs w ere to ld th a t o u t of th e ashes of Pearl H a rb o r h a d arisen "th e p h o en ix of fu tu re victory," th e atom ic b o m b w h o se u se e n d e d "so m e of th e d a rk e st d a y s of A m erica's history." A lth o u g h th e CA F p ra is e d th e "co u ra-

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g e o u s" Japanese soldier, its reen actm en t sp a rk e d criticism , especially in Japan, a n d th e CA F d ro p p e d H iro sh im a fro m later ed itio n s of its show . Still, it com ­ p lain ed , "th e Japanese seem to h av e fo rg o tten w h o sta rte d th e w a r" a n d n e v er "ap o lo g ize d " for P earl H a rb o r "o r o th er atrocities," w h e rea s A m erica's atom ic b o m b h a d b e e n redem ptive: it d eliv ered the n a tio n from its o w n folly a n d m ad e "all fu tu re w a rs u n th in k a b le." By im plication, a reb irth of A m erican p o w er, if n o t its actual use, w a s also in o rd e r in the 1970s.26 T he C A F's activities m a rk e d a n o th e r step -in th e reco n stru ctio n of p atrio tic cu ltu re. A s reaction to th e H iro sh im a reen actm en t sh o w ed , reco n stru ctio n d id n o t p ro ceed easily: b e g u n u n d e r N ix o n a n d Ford, it lacked a p a tro n w h e n C a rte r cam e to office; it so o n co n fro n ted a re su rg e n t a n tiw a r cu ltu re; a n d it e m e rg ed in th e sh a d o w s of th e V ietnam W ar, w h ic h e v en a v o w ed p a trio ts h esi­ ta te d to celebrate. N otably, the 1976 B icentennial celebrations, th o u g h p atrio tic in tone, w ere largely n o n m a rtia l in content. B ut reco n stru ctio n d id proceed. Its p ro p o n e n ts celebrated p a trio tism , th e u tility a n d n o b ility of A m erica's p a st w ars, a n d , im plicitly, w a r 's utility in th e n a tio n 's fu tu re. T hey also reco n n ected tra d itio n a l (as th ey saw them ) ideals of p atrio tism , in d iv id u a lism , a n d n a tio n al self-sufficiency to visions of fu tu ristic technology. C ritics a rg u e d th a t tech n o l­ o g y h a d u n d e rc u t those ideals, m o st reçently in V ietnam . T hose w h o th o u g h t th a t th e atom ic b o m b h a d red e em e d A m erica a n d th e w o rld in 1945 believed o therw ise. A t b o tto m th e y offered a m o ral p ro p o sitio n : o n occasion A m erican a rm s h a d b e en fatally neglected, frittered aw ay, o r foolishly u se d , b u t th ey h a d n e v e r b e e n e m p lo y ed in a n im m o ral w a y o r to im m o ral en d s. A m ericans h a d lo n g clashed a b o u t these m atters. But d e sp ite th e in ten se d e ­ b a te it g e n erate d , th e V ietnam W ar, especially its d isp irite d final p h a se, h a d ob­ scu red th e c u ltu ra l d iv id e o v e r h o w w a r w a s to b e u n d e rsto o d : a v a g u e d istaste for w a r h a d settled in a m o n g m o st A m ericans, sa p p e d th e stre n g th of p atrio tic cu ltu re, a n d led to fatig u e w ith the subject itself. But w ith th e w a r over, it w a s safe ag ain for im ag in atio n s to ru n rio t— n o w th a t th ey p lay e d o u t o n th e im ag ­ in ed te rra in of p a s t a n d fu tu re w a rs ra th e r th a n o n th e scorched e a rth of real w ar. A s b o th place a n d sym bol. Pearl H a rb o r w as o n e focus of p atrio tic cu ltu re. U nlike m o st A m erican w a r d e a d , th e b o d ies of th o se w h o d ie d o n th e Arizona w ere n e v e r recovered; in stead , th ey w ere "p ro tected from a n y fo rm of defile­ m en t" a n d trea te d as the sacred relics of m e n " d e n ie d e v en th e ex h ilaratio n of b a ttle a n d th e sense of d u ty faithfully d isch arg ed ," as a N a tio n a l P ark Service su p e rin te n d e n t p u t it. In the 1970s, one of th e b a ttle sh ip 's an ch o rs w a s re­ triev ed a n d m a d e the centerpiece of a USS Arizona A n ch o r M em orial in its h o m e sta te 's capital, w h e re P earl H a rb o r D ay services b ecam e "celeb ratio n s of p atrio tic rev italizatio n ." M eanw hile, A m erican s c o n tin u ed to see links o r dif­ ferences b e tw e e n Pearl H a rb o r a n d H iroshim a. Som e p erceiv ed a co n test b e ­ tw e en A m erica's Pearl H a rb o r m em o rial a n d Ja p an 's H iro sh im a m em o rial o v er th e w a r's m ea n in g a n d th e tw o n a tio n s' virtu es. M an y resen te d th e p resence at

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Pearl H a rb o r of Japanese to u rists, v eteran s, a n d p a ra p h e rn a lia fo r sale. O th e rs d istin g u ish ed a d a sta rd ly Japanese carrier attack in 1941 from a re d e m p tiv e A m erican n u c le ar a ssau lt in 1945, the "terrib le sw ift sw o rd th a t e n d e d a b lo o d y w ar," as one citizen w ro te in 1980. L ong p resen t, su c h e m o tio n s sw elled in th e 1970s as Japanese-A m erican econom ic conflict in ten sified a n d Jap an ese a u th o r­ ities d e fe n d e d th eir n a tio n 's role in W orld W ar II. T hose e m o tio n s also in d i­ cated th a t for a reco n stru cted p atrio tic cu ltu re. W orld W ar II w a s th e cor­ n ersto n e.27 Fittingly, sym bols of A m erican victory a t Iw o Jim a in 1945, n eg lected o r b e n t to u n c o n v en tio n a l p u rp o se s in th e V ietnam era, w ere also resu rrected . In 1976, th e P ark Service cleared aw ay th e u n d e rb ru s h a ro u n d th e M arin e C o rp s Iw o Jim a M em orial in A rlington, V irginia. A t th e e n d of th e d ecad e, a m id th e Ira n h o stag e crisis, "A m erica w a s u rg e d to fight b ack — w ith a p o p u la r p o ste r sh o w ­ in g th e tw o Iw o Jim a M arines m o u n tin g th e ir flag in th e rea r e n d of a p ro stra te A y ato llah [K hom eini, Ira n 's Islam ic leader]," c ru d ely restatin g o ld connections b e tw e e n p a trio tism a n d sexual aggression. In 1980, w h e n th e U n ited States O lym pic hockey team u p s e t the Soviet sq u a d , o n e ed ito ria l c arto o n ist re­ w o rk e d th e Iw o Jim a im ag ery b y sh o w in g "th e v icto rio u s A m erican tea m raisin g the flag o n a hockey stick." In Florida, in a n effort to ren e w "p atrio tic fervor," a n Iw o Jim a sta tu e in ru in s w a s resto re d a n d Felix d e W eldon, its longfo rg o tten sculptor, located to h e lp w ith th e task. O nce R eagan to o k office, Iw o Jim a ag ain h a d a p resid en tia l p a tro n , w h ile in 1988 Vice P re sid e n t B ush sto o d a t th e foot of A rlin g to n 's M arine C o rp s M em orial to declare h is s u p p o rt for a con­ stitu tio n al a m e n d m e n t a g ain st desecratio n of th e flag. A s w ith Pearl H arb o r, Iw o Jim a som etim es serv ed o th e r p u rp o se s— as a site for ritu a ls of JapaneseA m erican reconciliation a n d as a n im age to m ock A m erican w eak n ess as w ell as to sym bolize A m erican resolve. N onetheless, b y 1980 Iw o Jim a h a d b e e n re­ sto re d as sym bol of A m erican p o w e r a n d p a trio tism — o r g o a d to th eir re­ n ew al.28 Pearl H arb o r, Iw o Jim a, a n d H iro sh im a elicited effusive, o ften h a rd -e d g e d ex p ressions of p atrio tic culture. O th e r v ersio n s w ere m o re com plex, as in th a t of th e C om m ittee o n the P resen t D an g er (CPD), a g ro u p of n eo co n serv ativ es a n d C old W ar liberals " c o n te m p tu o u s of th e M cG o v em ite triu m p h of 1972," w h o clothed "th e visceral a n tico m m u n ism of th e N e w R ight w ith intellectu al respectability." Its lead ers in clu d ed P aul N itze, a m ajor stra te g ist since th e 1940s, Soviet e x p ert R ichard P ipes from H a rv a rd , a n d Commentary e d ito r N o r­ m a n P odhoretz. C losely tied to the Ford a d m in istratio n , th e co m m ittee h e lp e d sh ap e a key 1976 w a rn in g b y the CIA (w hose d irecto r w a s G eorge Bush) of Soviet su p e rio rity in arm s a n d resolve, a n d o p p o se d th e SALT II Treaty. P o d ­ h o retz feared A m erica's "sp iritu a l F in lan d izatio n ," referrin g to F in lan d 's n o m i­ n ally au to n o m o u s b u t su p p o se d ly sub m issiv e stance vis-à-vis its g ia n t n e ig h ­ bor. Because Soviet lead ers w ere "ev en m ore am b itio u s th a n H itler," th e C PD ad v o ca te d an a rra y of strategic w e a p o n s (like th e B -l b o m b er C arter h a d can-

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celed) to g u a rd a g ain st them . It stressed the d a n g e r of Soviet political blackm ail w ith its n u c le ar m ig h t, b u t since th e K rem lin "th in k s it co u ld fig h t a n d w in a n u c le ar w a r," as P ipes a rg u e d , th e C PD also so u g h t w e a p o n s a n d strateg ies to p re e m p t th e Soviet U n io n before su c h a w a r sta rte d o r to w in if it b ro k e out. D espite "rh eto rical d en ials th a t A m ericans w ere a t all w arlik e," C PD m em b ers in d u lg e d "m illennialist fantasies" in w h ic h n u c le ar w a r w as "p o ten tially deci­ sive a n d p u rify in g ." A m erican s' fears of n u c le ar w ar, th o u g h t Pipes, reflected d e g ra d a tio n of th eir w ill a n d serv ed Soviet designs. A lth o u g h u n w elco m e, n u ­ clear w a r m ig h t still b e necessary, C PD m em b ers asserted , a n d it differed only in d eg ree from w a rs alre ad y fought. M oral M ajority lea d er Jerry Falw ell p u t th e p o in t m o re e m p h atically th a n C PD m em bers: "A political leader, as a m in ister of G od, is a rev en g er to execute w ra th u p o n th o se w h o d o evil. O u r g o v e rn m e n t h a s th e rig h t to u se its a rm a m e n ts to b rin g w ra th u p o n those w h o w o u ld d o evil."29 T h o u g h d e e p into politics, th e C PD also explicitly so u g h t a c u ltu ral revival. T he Soviet U n io n w a s d a n g ero u s, b u t the real en em y w a s in te rn al rot; w e ap o n s w ere im p o rtan t, b u t th e w ill to u se th em e v en m ore so. E m p lo y in g a secu­ larized v e rsio n of C h ristia n a n d Jew ish them es, th e C PD issu ed "rev iv alist dec­ laratio n s of decline a n d d o o m as w ell as expressions of rev italizatio n a n d resto ­ ratio n ," seeking a "resu scitatio n of A m erican p atrio tic w ill," in th e w o rd s of its h isto rian. T he U n ited States, according to th e C PD , w a s in a "fallen state," suf­ ferin g fro m a sense of "in ju red innocence" after V ietnam , w h e re victo ry h a d b e e n d e n ie d because A m erica's o w n g o o d n ess h a d tied its h a n d s. The n a tio n h a d n u rtu re d a "cu ltu re of a p p ea sem e n t," a rg u e d P o d h o retz, a "n atio n al m o o d of self-d o u b t a n d self-disgust" w h ic h h e c o m p a red to th e one th a t h a d p re ­ v ailed in th e 1930s in th e face of fascism . A s in o th e r ex p ressio n s of p atrio tic cu ltu re. W orld W ar II w a s th e to u ch sto n e for th e C PD , b u t so too w ere the tw e n ty y ears after it, a tim e as th e C PD recalled it w h e n A m erican h eg em o n y h a d b e e n alm o st to tal a n d A m ericans w illing to " p a y th e p rice in b lo o d to fight C o m m u n ism ." A m id this "n ew n o stalg ia," as C y ru s V ance scornfully called it in 1980, it w a s easy for C PD m em b ers to forget th a t in th o se y ears th e U n ited States h a d o ften lu rch ed in fear m ore th a n it sw ag g ered from confidence. Such n o stalgia m a d e it possible to arg u e th a t the n a tio n n o w faced a "long, lo n g age of d a rk n e ss" d u rin g w h ich "A m erican society m ay b e sw allo w ed u p ." T he re­ b irth of A m erica— a n e n d to the " d a rk n ig h t of th e so u l," Jeane K irkpatrick called it— to o k p recedence over, th o u g h also m a d e possible, d e fe at of th e So­ v iet U nion.30 H o lly w o o d also p la y e d a p a rt in rev iv in g p atrio tic cu ltu re, a lth o u g h as u su al it gen erally sh u n n e d explicit m essages in favor of fu zzy im ages a n d them es. Star Wars (1977), set far a h e a d (ostensibly "a lo n g tim e ago") in tim e a n d far aw ay in space, m en tio n ed n o e arth ly conflict, b u t it w a s easy to see the "evil G alactic E m pire" w ith its "u ltim ate w e a p o n " a n d "im p erial sto rm tro o p ers" as ak in to N azi a n d Soviet to talitarian s a n d D a rth V ader to th eir ty ran ts, w hile

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Princess Leia so u g h t to "resto re freed o m to th e galaxy." Star Wars, n o tes one scholar, offered "a w a r a g ain st a n evil, b u reau cratic e m p ire rev ealed to u s . . .a s a t once the p o m p o u s m onarchy, the faceless co rp o ratio n , th e d a rk ly m ystical N azi totalitarianism , the p alely ru th less Soviet p re s id iu m — a E u ro p e th a t con­ serv ative a n d liberal A m ericans can once a g ain join in lo ath in g as th e tru e O th er." F ilm m aker G eorge L ucas deftly reco m b in ed fam iliar elem en ts of W est­ ern, w ar, a n d science-fiction film s; old -fash io n ed g u n fig h ts ag ain b laz ed , th o u g h n o w v iew ers c o u ld see th e bullets, a n d th e te rra in o n d ista n t p lan e ts looked suspiciously like the b a rre n tracts in o ld W estern film s. In tu rn , h e cele­ b ra te d A m ericans' essential innocence in w a r a n d su g g e ste d , e v en for a fu tu ris­ tic w ar, the v irtu e of frontier in d iv id u a lism , loy alty to clan a n d co u n try , a n d d ev ilish w e a p o n s w h e n w ie ld e d b y th e rig h t side. W ith ro b o ts th e film 's m o st e n d ea rin g characters a n d freedom -loving p ilo ts e m b o d y in g (as L in d b erg h p re ­ su m a b ly had ) b o th p re -in d u stria l d a rin g a n d p o st-in d u stria l d iscipline, longfelt conflicts b e tw ee n m e n a n d m achines, a n d long-felt fears of w h a t m e n m ig h t d o w ith them , dissolved. L ater in stallm en ts in L ucas's space trilo g y su g g e ste d a d a rk e r ren d e rin g of A m erican m ythology. Star Wars d id n o t.31 A reco n stru cted patrio tic c u ltu re faced a n d in som e w a y s rev italized a n o p ­ p o sitio n al c u ltu re of w a r's h o rro rs— o r "a n tiw a r cu ltu re," except th a t th e term m ay be too lim itin g — w ith th e resu lt th a t a "fierce ideological civil w a r in A m erica" rag ed , as o n e h isto ria n p u ts it. T he o p p o sitio n a l c u ltu re b o re sim ­ ilarities to p atrio tic culture. W ith C arter, it h a d so m eth in g of a p a tro n in the W hite H ouse, as p a trio ts w o u ld w ith R eagan. It too h a d difficulty e n g ag in g the V ietnam W ar, also fin d in g its to u ch sto n e in W orld W ar II, especially th e n u c le ar a n d N azi holocausts. A n d it to o offered religio u s th em es of sin a n d red em p tio n . W hile p a trio ts asked A m ericans to re p e n t for th e sin of a b a n d o n in g n a tio n al p rid e, p ro p h e ts a g ain st w a r d e m a n d e d rep en tan ce b y A m erican s (an d o th ers too) for the sin of d e v elo p in g n u c le ar w e a p o n s a n d risk in g n u c le ar w ar. Few could read Jo n ath an Schell's The Fate of the Earth (1982), th e acclaim ed sta te m e n t of an tin u clear activism , a n d m iss th a t d e m a n d . "Political rev iv alism " d efin e d b o th p a rties to the c u ltu ral conflict, a n d w ith it p o rtra y a ls of apo caly p tic d a n ­ gers a n d m illennial solutions.32 T here w ere differences, h o w ev er, b e sid es th e o b v io u s ones in m essage. W here p a trio ts saw con tin u ities in the n a tu re a n d u tility of w ar, p ro p h e ts of w a r's h o rro rs saw radical d isc o n tin u ity w ith th e a d v e n t of n u c le ar w e a p o n s in 1945. W here patriotic c u ltu re h a d to b e reb u ilt alm o st from scratch after th e V ietnam W ar, a n tiw a r a n d an tin u cle ar activism h a d b e en su sta in e d alm o st con­ tin u o u sly for decad es, albeit w ith sh a rp u p s a n d d o w n s. A n d w h ile b o th m o v e­ m en ts h a d th eir experts, th e forces m ob ilizin g a g ain st th e n u c le ar d a n g e r d re w m o re heavily from scientific a n d m edical au th o rities, w h o se w o rk seem ed to b u ttress th eir outlook. A larm a b o u t the n u clear d a n g e r sh a p e d th e c u ltu re of w a r 's h o rro rs. Like th e C PD , the Physicians for Social R esponsibility (PSR) w a s a n o ld er g ro u p reb o rn .

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sta rte d in 1960 a n d reen erg ized in 1978. It w a s sp a rk e d in to action b y th e C P D itself, b y g ro w in g official acceptance of strateg ies for w in n in g n u c le ar w ar, a n d b y th e d e c a d e 's su rg in g ecological sensibility, w h ic h e m p h a size d th e lim its of th e e a rth 's resources a n d th e fragility of its ecosystem . F u rth e r g alv an izin g g ro u p s like th e PSR w a s a d isa ster a t th e T hree M ile Islan d (Pennsylvania) n u ­ clear p lan t, w h e re a n o v e rh e ate d reactor core in 1979 th re a te n e d to b a th e th e area in rad ia tio n . A t first, th a t d ram a tic in cid en t seem ed to ta p fear of civilian n u c le ar energy, co rp o rate g reed , a n d en v iro n m en ta l disaster, fear also raised in th e film The China Syndrome (1979) in w h ic h a sta r-stu d d e d cast d e a lt w ith a fictitious b u t sim ilar incident. But fear of n u c le ar en erg y h a d lo n g b e en in sep ar­ able fro m fear of n u c le ar w e a p o n s— th e tw o h a d m erg e d ag ain in a 1977 televi­ sio n m ovie. Red Alert, fea tu rin g the "sim u lta n eo u s exp lo sio n of ev ery reactor in th e U n ite d S tates," a d isa ster co m p arab le to to tal n u c le ar w a r.33 In retro sp ect, w id e sp re a d activism in th e 1970s a g ain st civilian n u c le ar p o w e r w a s a w a rm ­ u p for the a n tiw e ap o n s activism b lo sso m in g a t th e e n d of th e decade. By th en , scientists a n d o th e r activists, m o st n o tab ly th e A u stra lia n p h y sician H e len C aldicott, h a d p o rtra y e d th e p ro b ab le effects of n u c le ar w a rfare in chill­ in g detail. W h at lo o m ed w a s n o t o n ly th e d e stru c tio n of th e su p e rp o w e rs, ev en of civilization, b u t of all a d v an c ed life a n d th e eco sp h ere itself, y ield in g , as Schell so o n p u t it, "a republic of insects a n d g rass." Ju st as a la rm in g w a s th e p ro sp e c t of su b sta n tia lly th a t resu lt e v en in a lim ited n u c le ar w ar, w h o se ra d ia ­ tio n a n d fallout m ig h t p lu n g e th e w o rld in to "n u cle ar w in ter." Som e of th ese fin d in g s w ere less n o v e l th a n th ey a p p e a re d , th e ir shock v a lu e a m ea su re m o re of th e lo n g p e rio d of indifference to th e n u c le ar d an g er. A n y o n e w h o h a d w a tc h e d (as C ald ico tt h a d ) th e p o iso n in g of A u stralia a n d th e w o rld in th e 1959 m o v ie On the Beach w o u ld n o t h av e b e e n su rp rise d to lea rn in 1979 th a t ra d ia ­ tion, fallout, a n d th e d e stru c tio n of econom ic a n d p o litical sy stem s w o u ld b e as d e v a sta tin g as a n u c le ar w a r 's initial b la st a n d fire. It w a s n o t n o v el to arg u e, as o n e e x p ert n o w d id , th a t su c h effects w ere "so catastro p h ic th a t th ey re n d e r an y n o tio n of 'v icto ry m ean in g less,' " a lth o u g h th e claim of th a t resu lt for a lim ited n u c le ar w a r b ro k e n e w e r g ro u n d .34 T herein, ho w ev er, lay th e th ru s t of th e c u ltu re of w a r 's h o rro rs— n o t ju st to ad v an ce scientific k n o w le d g e b u t to rea w a k en th e n a tio n a n d th e w o rld to d a n ­ g ers lo n g k n o w n b u t long neglected. W here p ro p o n e n ts of p atrio tic rev iv al saw in te rn al ro t as th e key to th e Soviet th reat, p ro p h e ts of n u c le ar d o o m saw a p a ­ th y a n d "technological arro g an ce" as th e ro o t of evil. T he g oal w a s th e re d e m p ­ tio n of h u m a n k in d , w h ic h req u ire d the tran sfo rm a tio n of c u ltu re itself, A m er­ ica's a n d the w o rld 's. W ith o u t it, n u c le ar w a r seem ed "a m ath em atical certain ty " to C aldicott, a choice of " d e a th " o v e r "life" acco rd in g to Schell, ju st as Soviet triu m p h seem ed a foregone conclu sio n to o th ers w ith o u t a rev iv al of p a trio tism .35 A larm a b o u t th e n u c le ar d a n g e r p e a k e d in th e early 1980s, w h e n R eagan's rhetoric a n d policies a n d a v ig o ro u s a n tin u cle ar m o v em en t in W estern E u ro p e

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fu rth e r fueled it. By th e n it h a d all th e features of a c u ltu ra l as w ell as political p h en o m en o n . R eligious g ro u p s p la y e d a m ajo r role. G rass-roots activism ra th e r th a n to p -d o w n o rg an izin g w a s a m ajor characteristic. T he full sp e ctru m of c u ltu ral p h e n o m e n a — h ig h -b ro w fiction a n d criticism , H o lly w o o d a n d tele­ vision, advice co lu m n ists a n d rock g ro u p s— reflected its them es. For televi­ sio n 's audiences, the m o st co m p ellin g m o m e n t w a s The Day After (1983), in w h ic h K ansas C ity su ccu m b ed to n u c le ar d e stru c tio n (as earlier, A m ericans w ere a sk ed to im agine th e ir o w n d estru ctio n , rarely th a t of a n o th e r n a tio n at th eir h ands). R esp o n d in g to su c h p ro g ram s. Senator G o ld w a ter co m p lain ed th a t television sh o w ed o n ly "th e n eg ativ e sid e of n u c le ar w e a p o n s."36 In to n e a n d substance, d e b ate h a d su b sta n tia lly circled b ack to earlier p h a ses of anx iety a b o u t m o d e m w eap o n s. A lth o u g h th e ap o calyptic stra in s seem ed fresh, in fact n e arly "ev ery th em e a n d im ag e" in th e n e w d e b ate a b o u t n u clear w e a p o n s h a d "its c o u n te rp a rt in the im m ed iate p o st-H iro sh im a p e rio d ." 37 A s earlier, th ere w a s little room in eith er cu ltu re, o r in th e conflict b e tw e e n th em , for com prom ise, u n c ertain outcom es, o r m u d d lin g th ro u g h : o n ly th e m o st d ire consequences, avoidable only th ro u g h th e m o st d rac o n ian efforts, w e re u su a lly im agined. A s before, the sole choices seem ed to b e d o o m sd a y o r d eliverance, ju st as the c o n te n d in g voices ag ain d iv id e d sta rk ly o v er w h e th e r enem ies ab ro a d o r n u clear w e a p o n s them selves p re se n te d th e g rea ter th re a t to h u m a n ­ kind. Yet th e cyclical n a tu re of these ap ocalyptic strain s d o e s n o t fully e x p lain th eir ren ew al in th e 1970s. T he feverish a rm s race, th e Soviets' a p p a re n t acq u isitio n of p a rity in it, the sto d g y a n d d isa p p o in tin g co u rse of a rm s con tro l talks, a n d C a rte r's so u n d in g of the n u c le ar ala rm w ere factors. B ut a b ro a d c u ltu ral p h e ­ n o m e n o n h a d d e e p e r sources. A pocalyptic p red ictio n s a b o u t w a r h a d u su a lly su rg e d in peace a n d d im in ish e d in w ar: d a n g e r lo o m ed larg est w h e n w a r w as im ag in ed , n o t w h e n it w a s w ag ed . A n d since, in th e n e w p h a se of m ilitariza­ tion, it w as w id e ly a ssu m e d th a t A m erica w o u ld n o t a g ain w a g e lim ited w ar, a t least n o t o n th e scale seen in V ietnam , n u c le ar w a r w a s th e o n ly g am e in to w n for im ag in atio n s to play, ju st as the im ag in atio n w a s th e o n ly o u tlet for a n a tio n aw ash in w a r's w e a p o n s a n d anxieties b u t av erse to w a r itself. Skepticism a b o u t political a n d scientific leaders, risin g d u rin g th e V ietn am era a n d d e e p ­ e n ed b y the crises in en erg y a n d e n v iro n m en t th a t p o c k m a rk ed th e 1970s, stre n g th e n ed the im p u lse for d ire speculation: few er A m erican s believ ed lead ers' reassu rin g w o rd s a b o u t the benefits of d eten te, th e tru stw o rth in e ss of th e R ussians, or the m an ag eab ility of w a r a n d w eap o n s. Like p atrio tic culture, the c u ltu re of w a r's h o rro rs lin k ed its sense of th e fu tu re to a v iew of the past. H isto rian s a n d o th er sch o lars critically reex am in ed , in w h a t w as d u b b e d a "rev isio n ist" m o d e, A m erica's d e v e lo p m e n t a n d u se of th e atom ic bom b, its role in the C old W ar, a n d its p a rt in th e V ietnam W ar. U n ­ d e r h eav y assau lt w ere o ld n o tio n s of A m erican innocence a n d exceptionalism — of th e necessity of u sin g atom ic bo m b s to e n d W orld W ar II, a n d th e v a lid ity

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of elites' e x p lan atio n s for th eir policies in W orld W ar II a n d th e C old W ar. Such n o tio n s w ere also q u e stio n e d in h ig h -b ro w c u ltu re a n d in p o p u la r rep re se n ta ­ tio n s of th e A m erican p ast. Disturbing the Universe (1979), th e acclaim ed m em ­ oir of scientist Freem an D yson, for exam ple, offered a n idiosyncratic w o rld of w ar, w e ap o n s, a n d science in w h ic h w him sical caprice a n d d e a d e n in g ro u tin e ru le d a n d technology "m a d e evil a n o n y m o u s."38 M eanw hile, V ietnam also b e ­ g a n to y ield a stre am of fiction, m em oir, a n d oral history. T elevision a n d m ovies reflected the shift to w a rd a d a rk e r v iew of w a r a n d A m erica's role in it. W orld W ar II co m b at film s, still a H o lly w o o d stap le in the late 1960s, h a d v irtu a lly d isa p p e a re d b y 1975. T he few still m a d e e ith er seem ed le a d e n (Midway in 1976, MacArthur in 1978) o r (as w ith A Bridge Too Far in 1977) u se d th e epic style a n d sta r-stu d d e d cast to d e p ic t "th e futility of w a r a n d the w re tc h ed n e ss of a specific m ilitary debacle."39 M eanw hile, a n am b itio u s, som ­ b e r B ritish d o c u m e n ta ry series. The World at War (1973), reflected th e w o rk of rev isionist h isto rian s, offered a grisly p a n o ra m a of m ass d e stru ctio n in W orld W ar E, a n d fo u n d acclaim a n d a large television a u d ien ce in th e U n ited States d u rin g th e 1970s. T hese scholarly a n d c u ltu ral p h e n o m e n a accelerated tren d s e v id e n t in th e 1960s. M ore a b ru p t a n d a rre stin g w a s redisco v ery of N azi genocide. It h a rd ly h a d b e en u n k n o w n to A m ericans a n d h a d lo n g b e en lin k ed to n u clear h o lo ­ cau st b y the id io m a n d m en tality u se d to u n d e rs ta n d b o th g enocide a n d n u ­ clear w eap o n s. A fter the 1940s, h o w ev er, its trea tm e n t in p o p u la r c u ltu re h a d b e e n o n ly occasional a n d the cen trality of th e fate of Jew s in it h a d o ften b een obscured. A rchival film h a d b e e n slow to surface or lo n g fo rg o tten (as w as th e case w ith footage of H iro sh im a a n d N ag asak i d u e to cen so rsh ip b y A m erican officials), a n d h isto ria n s h a d b e en slow to tackle th e lab y rin th of archival re­ co rd s a n d th e tangle of m o ral a n d political questions. E ven th e co m m o n p h rase for N a zi genocide, "th e H olocaust," w a s n o t w id e ly u se d u n til th e 1970s. A ll th a t n o w ch an g ed , fo r com plex reasons. Israel's 1967 a n d 1973 w a rs sh a rp e n e d fear of its v u ln era b ility to d e stru ctio n am o n g Israelis a n d m an y A m erican Jew s, em p h asis o n th e N a zi H olo cau st serv ed Israel in lev erag in g assistance from th e U n ited States, a n d m an y Jew s increasingly chafed a t th eir difficulty in com ing to term s w ith th eir fate u n d e r N azism . O th e r im p u lses fed red isco v ery of the H olocaust, in clu d in g sensitiv ity to A m erican atrocities in the V ietnam W ar a n d n e w s of the K hm er R ouge's g enocide in C am b o d ia. D evelop­ m en ts there, o ccurring ju st w h e n the N azi H o lo cau st g ain ed n e w atten tio n , u n ­ d e rlin e d b o th th e specificity of genocide— it h a p p e n s to specific g ro u p s, n o t to v ag u ely d efin ed v ictim s— a n d its diversity: n o one g ro u p co u ld claim o r fear victim ization. R ediscovery of the H o lo cau st reflected a n d accen tu ated a larg er c u ltu ral ef­ fo rt to im agine th e d a n g e r of m o d e m w ar. N e w sch o larsh ip a b o u t the H o lo cau st— an d , p o in te d ly for A m ericans, ab o u t th eir g o v e rn m e n t's w artim e indifference to it— offered one m ea su re of rediscovery. Official reco g n itio n oc-

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c u rre d in the C arter a n d R eagan presidencies w ith in itial w o rk o n a U n ited States H olocaust M em orial M useum . R ediscovery w a s also e v id e n t in a m o re diffuse p h e n o m e n o n , the g ro w in g frequency w ith w h ic h artists, w riters, a n d p oliticians referred to the N azi H olocaust. For m o st A m ericans, rediscovery occurred th ro u g h film . A s u su a l, th e m o v ie in d u stry w as slow to take o n a controversial a n d u g ly subject, b u t th e telev isio n m ini-series Holocaust (NBC, 1978) crossed a th resh o ld . S h o w n o n a d a y "u n o f­ ficially p ro claim ed 'H o lo cau st S u n d a y /" g iv en m assiv e m ed ia atten tio n , w o rk e d into n u m e ro u s school curricula, a n d seen b y som e 50 p e rc en t of all A m ericans (an d m a n y W estern E uropeans), th e series p lau sib ly m a rk e d th e p o in t w h e n th e H o lo cau st e n te red "in to th e consciousness of m ain strea m A m erica" a n d b ecam e "in stitu tio n alized into A m erican life." S u m m in g u p th e am bivalence m a n y felt a b o u t th e series, on e ed ito ria list n o ted , "T he w a r is over. . . . The sw astik a is recycled as a ju n k b u tto n ; A u sch w itz is a m etap h o r. A n d 'H o lo c au st' is a television series." But th ere in lay th e p oint: th e H o lo cau st co u ld n o t b e reexperienced, b u t the m e ta p h o r w a s a b u n d a n tly clear.40 M ore th a n ever, genocide seem ed th e accom plice of m o d e m w ar, w h ile n u ­ clear w a r loom ed as the u ltim ate act of genocide. A s im ag in ed , th e relatio n sh ip b e tw ee n genocide a n d n u c le ar w a r w a s n o t fu lly sym m etrical: after all, g en o ­ cide d id n o t req u ire m o d e m technology, as th e K h m er R ouge h a d sh o w n ; a n d th e d re a d trig g ered b y th e N azi H o lo cau st in v o lv e d a p a st ev en t, w h ile th a t in d u c e d b y n u clear w e ap o n s focused o n th e fu tu re. Still, th e tw o w ere closely lin k ed in th e c u ltu re of w a r's h o rro rs— b y W orld W ar H, w h e n b o th N a z i g en o ­ cide a n d atom ic w a r occurred; b y a rg u m e n ts th a t th e sam e m en talities lay b e­ h in d b o th form s of d e stru ctio n a n d th e sam e th em es of sin a n d re d e m p tio n w ere a p p ro p ria te to both; b y th e sim u ltan eity w ith w h ic h tire film in d u stry p o p u la riz e d b o th in th e late 1970s a n d early 1980s; a n d b y u se of sam e term , holocaust, to refer to both. R ediscovery of th e H o lo cau st also sh o w e d h o w m u c h p atrio tic a n d a n tiw a r cu ltu re h a d in com m on. T heir th em es a n d th eir choices of h istorical b en ch ­ m ark s o v erlap p ed . Television's Holocaust d id n o t clearly serve eith er cause: it sh o w ed w a r 's h o rro rs b u t also the necessity of w a r a g ain st H itle r an d , as som e saw it, a quick trig g er finger in th e face of c u rre n t b arb arian s. In d eed , w h a t d ro v e a tten tio n to th e H o lo cau st m o re th a n w o rry a b o u t Israel, shock at the K hm er R ouge, o r fo reb o d in g a b o u t n u c le ar w a r w a s a d esire to reassert sh a rp lines b e tw ee n goo d a n d evil in w a r after th e a m b ig u ities of V iet­ nam . R eturning to the to u ch sto n e of W orld W ar II b a n ish e d th o se am b ig u ities a n d rein stated the v alid ity of w ar, a t least w h e n g rav e m o ral issues, as in the H olocaust, seem ed at stake. A s a genre, co m b at m ovies, a b o u t W orld W ar II a n d ev en m ore a b o u t V ietnam , n o lo n g er easily m a d e th a t case, b u t film s a n d co m m en tary a b o u t the H o lo cau st w ere fresh, v irtu a lly a n e w genre. Like m o st c u ltu ral projects, this one o w ed to n o single political force, certain ly n o t to p a ­ triotic fervor alone, b u t it d id at tim es co n trib u te to th a t fervor.41

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A ccordingly, p ro p o n e n ts of patrio tic ren ew al reg u la rly d ip p e d in to the ch am b ers of w a r's h o rro rs to m ak e th eir case. Jerry Falw ell b e g an Listen Amer­ ica! (1980) w ith a n account of genocide in C am b o d ia, ty in g it to th e co m m u n ist m enace as p a rt of his call for m o ral a n d m ilitary re a rm a m e n t a g ain st th e Soviet U nion, w h o se p o w e r n o w m a d e it able to " d e m a n d o u r cap itu la tio n ." M ean ­ w h ile, so g rea t w ere anxieties a b o u t n u c le ar w a r th a t p a trio ts so m etim es gave a n o d to them , as w h e n the C o n fed erate A ir Force asserted th a t H iro sh im a m ad e "all fu tu re w a rs u n th in k a b le." T h at claim u p d a te d th e o ld "cu lt of th e su p e r­ w e a p o n " in a ttrib u tin g beneficent resu lts to horrific w e ap o n s, allo w in g p a ­ trio ts to steal the th u n d e r of a n tiw a r culture. T hose stressin g w a r 's h o rro rs co u ld n o t so easily ta p th eir o p p o n e n ts' them es, b u t th ey d id su g g e st th a t tru e p a trio tism n e e d n o t b e a b a n d o n e d b u t ra th e r redefined: it n o w req u ire d aboli­ tio n of w a r a n d a b ro a d e r lo y alty — to th e w o rld , th e ecosphere, a n d fu tu re g en ­ eratio n s.42 To som e extent, the tw o conflicting cu ltu res sim p ly ren e w e d a n o ld d e b ate a b o u t w h e th e r m ilitary p o w e r w o u ld w a rd off w a r 's h o rro rs o r p lu n g e the w o rld in to them . N ow , h ow ever, d eb ate h a d th e fatalistic, u n re a l q u a lity of th e aw fu l fu tu res each sid e sketched. N e ith e r sid e h a d m u c h confidence th a t it co u ld sh a p e n a tio n al policy, a n d b o th offered v iew s of a p a st a n d a fu tu re d e ­ tach ed from im m ed iate realities, say in g little a b o u t V ietnam , th e w a r A m eri­ cans n o w k n e w best, a n d reaching in stea d b ack to W orld W ar II a n d fo rw a rd to a d a n g e ro u s future. A b e n ch m ark for b o th sides, H iro sh im a rem a in e d w h a t it h a d b e e n for m o st A m ericans since 1945— sym bol, n o t c o m p re h en d e d event. Soviet n u c le ar attack o n the U n ited States, A m erican c ap itu la tio n to its black­ m ail, w o rld -e n d in g n u c le ar w a r— su ch outcom es w ere ferv en tly asserted , b u t n o lo n g er a g ain st the b ack g ro u n d of th e n u c le ar crises th a t earlier h a d p e p ­ p e re d the C o ld W ar. It w a s n o t th a t su c h outcom es w ere, as o ften claim ed, in ­ h e re n tly u n th in k a b le because too aw fu l for th e m in d to grasp: n u c le ar w a r h a d alre ad y b e e n fo u g h t in 1945 a n d h a d g e n erate d a n a b u n d a n t record. But for m a n y reasons th a t record w a s rarely exam in ed , a n d d e b ate o n w a r 's n a tu re sta y ed w h e re it h a d long been, "ab o v e th e b a ttle."43 If it h a d a w eig h tless q u al­ ity, so too d id th e h o p e for c u ltu ral tran sfo rm a tio n o n w h ic h each sid e m a d e the fu tu re hinge. Such tran sfo rm a tio n is b y n a tu re a lo n g -term process, y e t each e m p h a size d d a n g e rs so im m ed iate th a t th eir reso lu tio n co u ld h a rd ly a w ait the alw ay s p red ic te d b u t ev er elusive re d e m p tio n of A m erican (or w o rld ) culture. Since th e cu ltu res of p a trio tism a n d of w a r's h o rro rs w ere n o t sealed off from each other, m a n y im p u lse s d id n o t clearly fit e ith er category. A side from the Bible, th e d e c a d e 's bestselling nonfiction b o o k w as H al L in d sey 's The Late Great Planet Earth (1970), a "p rem illen n ial view ," b a se d o n L in d sey 's rea d in g of Bibli­ cal p rophecy, of the fu tu re "e n d tim es." L indsey h a d m u ch to say a b o u t w ar, w eap o n s, a n d the Soviets, often placing th em in th e w e ll-w o rn grooves of rightw in g ideology. T he p ro sp e ct of n u clear w a r d ro v e h im alm o st to ecstasy: "Im agine, cities like L ondon, Paris, Tokyo, N e w York, Los A ngeles, C hicago—

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o b literated!" T h o u g h L indsey w a rn e d a g ain st ceasing to live in th e e arth ly w o rld , his p ro m ise th a t C h ristian s w o u ld escape th e final cataclysm b y b ein g lifted u p in th e "R a p tu re " m a d e it seem alm o st w elcom e.44 P rophecies like L in d sey 's— a n d m a n y v a ria n ts w a sh e d o v er A m erica in th e 1970s a n d 1980s— w ere a n o th e r m ea su re of an x iety a b o u t n u c le ar w a r a n d a n ­ o th er im p u lse b e h in d rearm am en t. A s P aul B oyer n o tes, " m a n y p ro p h ec y w riters, increasingly m obilized in to th e ran k s of th e N e w R ight, n o w trea te d G o d 's p ro p h etic p la n a n d R eagan's m ilitary b u ild u p as in d istin g u ish ab le." R eagan a n d key officials in his a d m in istra tio n seem ed to echo L in d sey 's o u t­ look; as N an cy R eagan "g ro a n e d 'O h , n o ' off cam era," R eagan a d m itte d h is " 'p h ilo so p h ic a l' in terest in A rm a g e d d o n " d u rin g th e 1984 p resid en tia l d e ­ b ates, w h ile L indsey b o a sted of sp e ak in g to officers a t th e A ir W ar C ollege a n d th e Pentagon. T hose w h o em braced h is o u tlo o k te n d e d to su p p o rt o r acquiesce in A m erican n u c le ar rea rm am en t, seeing it as step m a n d a te d b y G o d 's p lan . C ritics, revealing th eir o w n apocalyptic outlook, w o rrie d " th a t apocaly p tic b e ­ lief m ig h t inspire som e fu tu re p re sid e n t or m ilitary to t r y . . . 'to m ak e th e in ev i­ table, paradoxically, e v en m ore certain.' "45 Yet as th a t p a ra d o x suggests, belief in the en d -tim e d ic ta te d n o single p o si­ tio n o n w a r a n d arm am en ts. T he inevitable, after all, req u ire d n o h u m a n in te r­ vention. Som e p rem illen n ialists d e n ie d th a t n u c le ar w a r w a s inevitable, o r a t least k n o w ab le in its tim in g a n d circum stances. Rev. P at R obertson, h a v in g "p red ic te d the u ltim ate h o lo cau st b y 1982," b ack ed a w ay from su c h asser­ tio n s once 1982 p a sse d a n d his political a m b itio n s sw elled. E vangelicals co u ld d ism iss L in d sey 's "science fiction fan tasy " a n d c o n d em n h im as "th e G erald o R ivera of th e C h ristian w o rld ." Rev. Billy G ra h am 's su rp risin g rev isio n of h is "p rem illen n ial fatalism " m a rk e d a n o th e r path : b y 1982 G ra h am w a s in M os­ cow p reach in g th a t th e a rm s race w a s "a m o ral a n d sp iritu a l issu e th a t m u st concern u s all" a n d offering a p la n to abo lish nuclear, biological, a n d laser w eap o n s. A n d it w a s "th e logic of p rem illen n ialism " th a t C h ristia n "en erg ies" w ere "b etter sp e n t in w in n in g souls for C h rist th a n in faying to sh a p e w o rld ev en ts." W hile the cause of m o ral reaw ak en in g o ften stre n g th e n e d th e c ru sad e for m ilitary rearm am en t, it also c o m p rised a sep arab le, so m etim es co m p etin g ag en d a.46 Film s a b o u t the V ietnam W ar, d e sp ite th e a n tiw a r label so m etim es p in n e d o n th em , also lay in the n o -m a n 's lan d b e tw e e n clashing cultures. Like m u c h s u p ­ p o sed ly a n tiw a r literatu re of th e 1920s, th eir focus w a s less o n w a r p e r se th a n o n w a r as a lens into the co rru p tio n s of A m erica a t hom e. N o n e said m u c h a b o u t A m erican e n try into the V ietnam W ar, leav in g it b e y o n d v iew ers' com ­ p reh en sion. A s u su a lly p o rtra y e d , th e trau m a for V ietnam v e te ran s w a s n o t th a t th ey h a d gone to w a r b u t th a t th ey h a d d o n e so in a losing a n d u n a p p re c i­ a te d effort, in a n alien la n d p e o p le d b y u n tru stw o rth y A sians, o r for th e w ro n g reaso n s (or good ones n o t sufficiently acted u pon). C o m b at w a s u su a lly sec­ o n d a ry in these film s, as in Coming Home (1978), o r treated in its m o st exotic

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aspects, as in Apocalypse Now (1978). A sense of w o u n d e d n atio n alism also lu rk e d in film s like The Deerhunter (1978): th e p ro b lem w a s n o t p atrio tic v irtu e b u t its b e tra y al b y cynical politicians w h o w e n t to w ar, peacen ik s w h o o p p o se d it, o r a n A sia n p e o p le "so irred eem ab ly m ire d in m o ral c o rru p tio n th a t it h a rd ly d e se rv e d to b e sav ed ." By th e 1980s m a n y film s "p o rtra y e d th e m ajor tra g e d y of V ietn am as a loss of A m erican innocence ra th e r th a n th e loss of b o th Viet­ n a m e se a n d A m erican lives."47 Few V ietnam W ar film s fell clearly in to a " p ro w a r" o r "a n tiw a r" category: for com m ercial reasons, film m ak ers u su a lly av o id ed categorical stances; for ar­ tistic reasons, th ey m ig h t seek g reater com plexity. W hile m o st V ietn am film s w ere n o t "ab o u t co m b at a t all, b u t a b o u t th e d e stru ctiv e effect it h a d o n A m eri­ can society," th a t effect co u ld b e seen as a p o w e rfu l reaso n n o t to go to w ar. A n d w h ile it w as possible to see th e w a r p o rtra y e d in th ese film s as o n ly a "m eta ­ p h o r for chaos," o th ers saw the m o ra l chaos as o n e of th ese film s' "m etap h o rs for th e w a r." Still, as the babble of conflicting co m m en ts o n V ietn am W ar film s in d icated , n o n e offered th e certain voice a g ain st w a r e v id e n t in All Quiet on the Western Front in 1930, o r in occasional film s after W orld W ar II. O n ly a h a n d fu l of film s a b o u t V ietnam e v en a p p e a re d in th e 1970s. T he m o st telling V ietn am W ar film , claim s John H ellm an n , w a s Star Wars, osten sib ly n o t a b o u t V ietnam a t all.48 T he style a n d scale of these film s w ere as tellin g as an y o v e rt m essage. W hile far fro m g lam o rizin g w ar, th ey som etim es p re se n te d it as a W ag n erian sp ecta­ cle o d d ly d isp ro p o rtio n a te to the m in o r action a n d technocratic ro u tin e th a t ch aracterized m u c h of the w a r itself. P o rtray in g V ietn am as m y sterio u s, m o st film s m a d e th e w a r th ere in c o n g ru o u s— disco n n ected from trad itio n s of A m er­ ican w a r m ak in g in A sia a n d offering n o larg er lesso n a b o u t w a r 's m ea n in g a n d utility. W h at in stru ctio n , after all, co u ld a n aty p ical w a r offer a b o u t w a r gen er­ ally? A few less g ra n d ly scaled film s, su ch as Go Tell the Spartans (1978), focused m o re o n com bat a n d offered a m o d e st sta te m e n t of w a r's futility, b u t th o se film s d id n o t d ra w large audiences a n d lavish com m entaries. T he a m b ig u ities of V ietnam film s in the 1970s seem ed reso lv ed b y th e 1980s, especially in First Blood (1982) a n d Rambo: First Blood Part II (1985), in w h ich actor Sylvester Stallone, p ro m o te d as "th is g e n eratio n 's John W ayne," asks, "D o w e get to w in this tim e?" P re sid e n t R eagan, su g g estin g h o w h e m ig h t m eet th e th re a t of L ibyan terrorists, "w a s q u o te d w o rld w id e as say in g T saw R am bo last n ig h t a n d n o w I k n o w w h a t to d o .' " P atrio tism seem ed in full flow er b o th o n screen a n d in the W hite H o u se, w h e re a n actor-politician fu sed th e tw o w o rld s. Yet the R am bo film s h a rd ly su g g e ste d th a t w a r w a s useful. "T he im ­ p lau sib le circum stances a n d convolutions of p lo t u se d b y these m o v ies," n o tes one analyst, su g g e ste d the film m ak ers' extrem e d isco m fo rt "ab o u t A m erica in th e role of the technologically a d v an c ed in v ad in g su p e rp o w e r" a n d co n veyed th eir lo n g in g "for o u r tra d itio n a l p o stu re of th e u n d e rd o g ju n g le fighter," a p o stu re h a rd ly suitable for w a g in g w a r o n a m ajor scale. T he m essag e of the

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R am bo film s seem ed to be th a t "th e U n ited States m ilitary co u ld h av e w o n th e w a r if the g o v e rn m e n t a n d A m erican public h a d let th em ." Yet R am bo h im self d id n o t really go to w ar, b u t to a k in d of co m p e n sa to ry su b stitu te for it as h e trie d to rescue A m erican PO W s left b e h in d in V ietnam .49 In d eed , these film s e x u d e d su c h in d ig n a tio n a t th e sta te — it p re su m a b ly cov­ ered u p th e presence in S outheast A sia of A m erican PO W s— th a t it w a s h a rd ly to b e tru ste d to lead the n a tio n in a n o th e r w ar, o r to a d m in iste r th e v a st sy stem of m ilitarizatio n th a t m a d e m o d e m w a r possible. In fact, th e faceless, cynical, n e u te red b u rea u cra ts w h o p resu m ab ly m ie d th a t sy stem w ere as m u ch R am b o 's en em y as th e b estial co m m u n ists h e en co u n tere d in V ietnam . The R am bo film s d id celebrate w a r of a n in d iv id u alistic, atavistic, p re m o d e m sort, a d d in g a glitzy ov erlay of hig h -tech w e a p o n s to a n o ld m y th o lo g y a b o u t no b le In d ia n savages (or a b o u t w h ite m e n fig h tin g them : it w a s h a rd to tell). T hey also stirred th e w a r-lu st a n d p a trio tism of som e v iew ers. It w a s difficult, ho w ev er, to tak e th e m seriously, especially as a b rief for rem ilitarizatio n . N o r d id th ey h av e a n u n c o n te sted h o ld o n V ietn am 's cinem atic terra in .50 Ju st as V ietnam W ar film s rested u n e asily b e tw ee n th e tw o cu ltu res, so too d id th e sm o ld erin g c o n tro v ersy a n d flam b o y an t m y th o lo g y a b o u t PO W / M IA s w h ich the R am bo film s exploited. A s Jim m y C a rte r h a d p o in te d out, far few er A m ericans w ere u n acc o u n te d for after V ietn am th a n after earlier w ars; if an y lin g ered in S outheast A sia, captive o r o th erw ise, th ey m u s t h av e b e e n few. Poli­ tics a n d culture, n o t th e n u m b ers, d ro v e th is issue. Its o rig in s lay in th e N ix o n ad m in istratio n . W ith b ip a rtisa n h e lp a n d a id from figures like b u sin e ssm a n H . Ross Perot, N ixon h a d h ig h lig h ted th e issue of A m erican PO W s in o rd e r to su s­ ta in su p p o rt for h is w a r effort a n d to co u n te r d o u b ts a b o u t th e atrocities a n d d e stru ctio n in V ietnam it sanctioned. Still, th is w as a n u n ru ly b e ast for politician s to ride. N ix o n sw o re in 1973 th a t h e h a d achieved "th e re tu rn of all o u r p riso n e rs of w ar," b u t som e A m ericans, lo n g to ld of co m m u n ist duplicity, th o u g h t oth erw ise. By th e late 1970s, POW /M IA flags, b u m p e r stickers, a n d bracelets p ro liferated , po litician s m a n ­ d a te d th e d isp lay of PO W /M IA flags o n g o v e rn m e n t b u ild in g s a n d o th er rit­ uals, a n d The Deerhunter tran sfo rm e d "PO W s in to crucial sym bols of A m erican m an h o o d ," p resen tin g "A m erican w h ite w o rk in g -class m e n as crucified p ris­ o n ers of the V ietnam ese." By th e 1980s, w ith a P re sid e n t a p p a re n tly b eliev in g the m ythology, H o lly w o o d v ig o ro u sly p resen tin g it, a n d lobbies ag g ressiv ely p u b licizin g it, co n troversy intensified, as d id th e n o tio n of "a v a st g o v e rn m e n t cover-up a n d conspiracy." R eagan h im self w a s u su a lly ex em p t fro m blam e: th e w ro n g d o e rs w ere the faceless b u rea u cra ts w h o h a d lo n g p e o p le d th e co n serv a­ tive im a g in atio n — a n d of course R eagan h a te d b u reau cracy .51 For go o d reason, critics ch arg ed th a t the PO W /M IA m y th o lo g y w a s in sti­ g ated b y conservative forces h y in g to restore a p atrio tic c u ltu re a n d a h a w k ish foreign policy. It d id h av e th o se results: it b lo ck ed d ip lo m atic relatio n s b e tw e e n th e U n ited States a n d V ietnam ; e m p h a size d th e evil a n d b a rb a rism of cornim i-

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nists; b u rie d q u estio n s a b o u t w a rtim e atrocities b y A m erican a n d ARV N forces; rea sserted A m erican s' essential innocence a n d g o o d n ess in w ar; k e p t th e V ietnam W ar alive as a n issu e ("TH E W AR'S N O T OVER U N TIL THE LAST M A N COM ES H O M E!" sh o u te d a 1984 m o v ie ad); a n d allo w ed p o liti­ cians to strik e p atrio tic p o ses.52 Yet its th em es of b u reau cratic conspiracy a n d elite m a n ip u la tio n also sa tu ­ ra te d th e c u ltu re of w a r 's h o rro rs. A g g riev ed frien d s a n d fam ilies of m issin g A m erican s h a d d iv erse politics, som e d istru stin g co n serv ativ e R epublicans. T he resonance of th e m y th o lo g y w ith the p lig h t of A m erican cap tiv es in B eirut in th e 1980s also m a d e tro u b le for th e R eagan W hite H o u se. A bove all, th e PO W c o n tro v ersy lo o k ed back to o ld w ro n g s ra th e r th a n fo rw a rd to n e w d e ed s, a n d sto k ed d istru st of w h a t g o v e rn m e n t m ig h t d o in w ar. Its place in p atrio tic cul­ tu re w a s a n u n è a sy o n e — its e m p h a sis o n o ld sins ta rn ish e d p ro sp ects of n e w glories. T he P O W /M IA m y th o lo g y w a s also the p e rv e rse offshoot of a lo n g c u ltu ral tra d itio n reg a rd in g w a r's victim s. S tartin g w ith th e A m erican C ivil W ar a n d sw elling d u rin g W orld W ar I, th e w o rk of recovering, n am in g , a n d m em o rializ­ in g th e d e a d in w a r (an d in o th e r catastro p h es, as resp o n ses to AIDS w o u ld show ) b ecam e a n e n o rm o u s project in m a n y n atio n s. It o ften sa n ctio n ed a n d san ctified w a r m aking: tre a tin g b o d ies as sacred relics g ave m ea n in g to th e loss felt b y su rv iv o rs a n d seem ed necessary becau se m o d e m w a r m ak in g rested o n d em o cratic c o n sen t (even if fabricated); it w o u ld n o t d o to h o n o r o n ly th e g en ­ erals w h e n all w ere ask ed to sacrifice. The V ietn am V eterans M em orial in W ash ington, D.C., em erg ed o u t of th a t trad itio n , b u t it, a n d e v en m o re W ash­ in g to n 's H o lo cau st M em orial M u seu m , also "m a d e m an ifest th e fact of stu p e n ­ d o u s m o rta lity " in w ar. T he im p o rtan c e ascribed to su c h projects m o u n te d in th e 1970s a n d 1980s, e v en th o u g h th e n u m b e rs of A m erican d e a d o r m issin g in V ietn am w ere far sm aller th a n in th e w o rld w a rs (rem arkably, efforts to id e n ­ tify A m erican d e a d from W orld W ar II a n d K orea also c o n tin u ed in th e 1980s). S uch projects h a d n o single o r stable m ean in g , b u t A m erican s w ere m em o ri­ alizin g th eir w a r d e a d m o re elab o rately as th ey b ecam e m o re relu c ta n t to go to w ar, as if m em o rializatio n took th e place of w a r itself. To n a m e m eticu lo u sly ev ery A m erican w h o d ie d in V ietnam , as th e V ietn am V eterans M em orial d id , o r to d e m a n d th e id entification o r re tu rn of ev ery m issin g A m erican th ere, as th e PO W / M IA forces d id , w a s to in sist o n th e p recio u sn ess of ev ery life lo st in w ar. D espite its p a rtisa n a n d bellicose p u rp o se s, th e P O W /M IA m o v em en t, k eep in g the m em o ry of sacrifice alive, also d eclared su c h sacrifice to b e ex­ trem e, w a rra n te d only in th e g rav e st circum stances, if a t all.53 A m o re diffuse c u ltu ra l p h e n o m e n o n , co m m en tary o n th e "m e" gen eratio n , h a d a less p o in te d b u t v ita l place in the clash of cu ltu res. W riter Tom W olfe a n ­ n o u n c ed , "It's th e M e-D ecade" in 1976, h e lp in g to sta rt a co ttag e in d u stry a m o n g p o p u la r a n d elite p u n d its w h o saw g rav e flaw s in th e p e rso n ality of A m erican s— th eir loss of connection to th e p a s t a n d to each o th er a n d th eir p u r-

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su it of e m p ty se lf-ag g ran d izem en t $nd self-aw areness. "H e d o n ism ," "n arciss­ ism ," "cu lt of th e s e lf" — so h isto ria n C h risto p h e r L asch su m m a riz e d A m eri­ can s' sp iritu a l ills in 1976. In Haven in a Heartless World (1977) a n d The Culture of Narcissism (1978), L asch fu rth e r explored th o se ills. H is goals w ere a v o w ed ly rad ic al— to e x p lain h o w m o d e m bureaucracy, p ro fessio n al elites, a n d cap ital­ ism sa p p e d A m erican s' vitality a n d self-reliance a n d to challenge a c u ltu ral rad icalism "so fashionable, a n d so p e rn icio u s in th e s u p p o rt it u n w ittin g ly p ro ­ v id es for th e sta tu s q u o ."54 L asch's o bservations, if n o t h is e x p lan atio n s for th em , seem ed b o rn e o u t b y m a n y p h e n o m e n a in th e 1970s. A m ericans a p p a re n tly w ere p u rs u in g a p re e n ­ in g so rt of self-fulfillm ent, ju d g e d b y th e ir attractio n to jo g g in g a n d o th er form s of fitness, to p o p u la r self-help th erap ies, a n d to m ag azin es like People (w here L asch him self a p p e a re d in 1979) a n d Self. E ven w h e n th ey w o rk e d w ith o th ers politically, th ey often a b a n d o n e d b ro a d a g en d a s a n d co n stitu en cies in fav o r of sin g le-interest lobbies a tte n d in g to n a rro w causes o r specific g ro u p s. A few ob­ serv ers saw these p h e n o m e n a as signs of g rass-ro o ts rev italizatio n . M ost, like Lasch, saw political disarray, psychological selfishness, a n d c u ltu ra l b a rre n ­ ness. The a p p a re n t aim lessness of th e C a rte r p resid en c y seem ed b o th cause a n d p ro d u c t of these d e e p e r ills. C a rte r h im self co n firm ed th a t d iag n o sis in h is m o st fam o u s a d d ress, offered in July 1979 in th e b a ck w a sh of c o n stern a tio n a b o u t h is en erg y policies a n d c o m m en ta ry a b o u t L asch's book. A m erican s w ere h av in g a "crisis of confidence." Politicians h a d failed th e n atio n , h e a d m it­ ted, b u t h e also b la m e d the crisis o n A m erican s g e n erally — th ey p re fe rre d "to w o rsh ip self-indulgence a n d c o n su m p tio n " in a failed effort to "fill th e e m p ti­ n ess of lives w h ic h h av e n o confidence o r p u rp o se ." A m erican s seem ed to h av e lost a sense of service to the n a tio n o r to a n y e n tity b e y o n d th eir o w n selfish interests.55 W h eth er A m ericans h a d becom e m ore m aterialistic, selfish, a n d p aro ch ial w a s im provable, b u t the claim w a s h a rd ly new . It u p d a te d o ld w o rries sta te d b y p atrician s like T eddy R oosevelt, ren e w e d o n th e eve of W orld W ar II b y critics fearful th a t A m ericans lacked th e w ill to fight, a n d rew o rk ed in co u n tless w ay s d u rin g the C old W ar. A s in th e 1970s, su c h co m p lain ts h a d b e e n tied to social change a t hom e, w hich, it w a s feared, u n d e rc u t A m erica's stre n g th a n d lead ersh ip in the w o rld . In th e 1970s, those co m p lain ts also coin cid ed w ith th e e n d of conscription (the m o st o bvious m ea su re co m p ellin g service to th e n a ­ tion), of confidence in A m erica's m ilitary p ro w ess, a n d , so it seem ed p o ssib le at m id -d ecad e, of th e C old W ar th a t lo n g h a d g iv en A m erican s a n a tio n a l m ission. C riticism of A m ericans' self-centeredness cam e from sources too ideologi­ cally d iv erg e n t to y ield a sin g u lar political resu lt, a n d L asch h a rd ly w a n te d to b e a t th e d ru m s of p a trio tism a n d m ilitarism . T he Left co u ld n o t co n tro l th is d is­ course, h ow ever, especially since it w a s m ore frag m e n te d th a n ever, a n d Lasch, in h is nostalgia for p atriarc h al c u ltu re a n d scorn for th e n e w g e n d e r politics, u n w ittin g ly lin k ed arm s w ith conservatives (Falw ell p ick ed u p h is key w o rd s.

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th o u g h n o t h is historical argum ents). L esbianism attrac ted "w o m e n w h o re­ p e a te d ly fail to find a u n io n of sexuality a n d ten d e rn ess in th e ir relatio n s w ith m e n /' L asch a rg u e d , reh ash in g a n old v iew of h o m o sex u ality as failed h e te ro ­ sexuality. "A fter the tu rm o il of th e sixties," h e co n clu d ed , A m erican s "re­ trea te d to p u re ly p e rso n al p reo ccu p atio n s." H is dism issal of n e w form s of ra d i­ calism a n d his d istin ctio n b e tw ee n 1960s "tu rm o il" a n d 1970s "n arcissism " carried , like m u c h else in the decade, " a n essentially co n serv ativ e m essag e," n o tes P eter C arro ll— a b o u t "th e futility of seeking c h an g e."56 T herefore, d e sp ite its com plex politics, th e d isco u rse o n "n arcissism " d rifte d to w a rd re in sta tin g th e tattere d v alu es of p a trio tism a n d m ilitarizatio n . Lasch h im self seem ed to p re su m e th a t th e A m erican character, once stu rd y d u rin g th e age of im p erial ex p an sio n a n d m ilitary glory, h a d collap sed d u rin g the V ietn am era. Few A m ericans b a ld ly su g g e ste d th a t rem ilitarizatio n w a s d esir­ able as a w a y to overcom e in te rn al d isa rra y — in stea d it w a s n e e d e d , th e fam il­ iar a rg u m e n t ran , to d eal w ith a d iso rd e rly w o rld . For C a rte r in 1979, it w a s " o n th e b attlefield of en erg y [that] w e can w in for o u r N a tio n a n e w confidence," b u t th e m ilitary m e ta p h o r w a s slippery, a n d it w a s p o ssible to a rg u e b y 1980, as one g en eral d id a m id crises over Iran a n d A fg h an istan , th a t "crisis revives the sp irit of th is n a tio n ."57 If the p rice of d ise n g ag e m e n t from m ilitarizatio n w a s c u ltu ra l a n d m o ral d isarray, o n to p of econom ic dislo catio n a n d stag n atio n , it in d e e d seem ed high. Precisely h o w th e clash of cu ltu res sh a p e d politics is h a rd to d eterm in e. C u l­ tu ra l p h e n o m e n a evolve g rad u ally , a t the p e rip h e ry of v isio n for politicians. But in th e late 1970s, the clash of c u ltu res w a s m ore b itte r in tone, ap o calyptic in con ten t, a n d en g ag ed b y politicians th a n a t an y tim e in th e C old W ar. In tu rn , th a t conflict p ro v id e d a stru c tu ra l u n d e rp in n in g for th e stag e of m ilitarizatio n th e n a tio n w a s n o w entering. H o w w ere su ch p o larize d m o o d s a n d stances to b e satisfied b y n a tio n al leaders? A sh o w of w a r m ak in g , m ilitary m ig h t, a n d p atrio tic zeal w ith o u t th eir substance co n stitu ted a com prom ise. T he w eap o n s, w o rd s, a n d sym bols of w a r satisfied th o se y e arn in g for p atrio tic cu ltu re; inac­ tio n in practice h e ld a t b a y those fearing th e final cataclysm . A ren e w e d b u t o d d ly hollow C o ld W ar gave fo rm to the com prom ise. C a rte r p resen te d th e co m p rom ise b elated ly a n d aw kw ardly. R eagan w o u ld d o it better.

The Social Dimensions of Conflict C u ltu ra l conflict am o n g A m ericans a b o u t w a r a n d m ilitary policy w a s tied to th eir social conflicts. S truggles ov er the social sources of n atio n al p o w e r w ere h a rd ly n e w in the 1970s, b u t th eir context a n d co n fig u ratio n w ere changing. C h allenges arose from g ro u p s heretofore of m in o r co n cern to m ilitary leaders, w h ile a sh rin k in g a rm y w a s less acco m m o d atin g to d em o cratizin g p ressu re s th a n o ne h u n g ry for p erso n n el, a lth o u g h th e m o v e to a n all-v o lu n teer force co m p licated m atters. T he n ecessitarian ratio n ale for a n e g alitarian m ilitary

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force— th a t it w a s essential for A m erica's global im ag e a n d its efficient u se of reso u rces— c o n tin u ed to d im in ish in cogency. A b o v e all, th e im p ro b ab ility of m ajor w a r— except possibly a n u c le ar w a r in w h ic h th e m ilita ry 's social m ak e ­ u p m ig h t m a tte r little— altered th e social conflicts a n d anxieties of A m ericans. T h o u g h th e shift w a s su b tle a n d o n ly p artial, m o re a t issu e n o w w a s th e co m p o ­ sitio n of A m erica's society ra th e r th a n its ability to exert p o w e r ab ro ad . O f all these stru g g les, those o v e r th e racial co m p o sitio n a n d ch em istry of th e a rm e d forces, th o u g h h a rd ly th e least im p o rta n t, w ere th e m o st fam iliar. Still, racial issues rem a in e d vex in g because m ilitary lea d ers to o k th em m o re seri­ o u sly a n d because th ey follow ed w id e sp re a d racial strife a n d racial n a tio n al­ ism am o n g A m erican forces in V ietn am — on e 1970 p o ll fo u n d th a t o v e r h a lf of b lack e n listed m e n "objected to ta k in g p a rt in th e w a r b ecau se th e y b eliev e it is a race w a r p ittin g w h ites a g ain st n o n w h ite s."58 M oreover, a t a tim e of sh rin k ­ in g fed eral efforts to foster racial equality, th e m ilita ry lo o m ed as a lonely b a s­ tio n of p rogress, e v en th o u g h inequalities p e rsiste d (blacks co m p rise d a h ig h sh are of th e m ilita ry 's p riso n p o p u la tio n a n d its tro u b le d V ietn am v e te ra n s b u t a m in u scu le sh are of its officers). T he a d v e n t of a n a ll-v o lu n teer force in 1973 sh a rp e n e d th ese issues. M an y m ale a n d fem ale A frican-A m ericans c o n tin u e d to lo o k to m ilita ry service for ed u catio n , h e ig h ten e d statu s, a n d u p w a rd job m obility, w h ile y o u n g w h ites, in p a rt b ecause the d e c a d e 's econom ic dislocatio n s h it th e m later, w e re less in ­ clined to sign u p . Blacks' sh are of th e m ilita ry 's en listed ra n k s rose to 18.4 p e r­ cen t b y 1978, 27.5 p e rc en t of th e a rm y 's (33.2 p e rc en t b y 1981), e v e n m o re of co m b at branches. In response, n e rv o u s politicians, co m m an d e rs, a n d jo u rn a l­ ists w o rrie d a b o u t th e a rm e d forces reachin g a racial " tip p in g p o in t" b e y o n d w h ich w h ites w o u ld stay aw ay in dro v es, as th ey d id in u rb a n n e ig h b o rh o o d s w h e n blacks m o v ed in, th o u g h if a tip p in g p o in t o p e ra te d , it "se rv e d m ain ly to p u rg e th e service of m a n y w h ites w h o se preju d ices k e p t th e m fro m to leratin g b lack s."59 The c o n ten t of those w o rries w a s com plicated. O sten sib ly th ey o ften in ­ v o lv ed n o t race b u t th e low e d u ca tio n al levels of recruits. For m u c h of th e 1970s, few er th a n h a lf of m ale a rm y v o lu n te ers h a d h ig h school d ip lo m as; o n ly recession a n d th e m ilita ry 's im p ro v in g sta tu s in th e early 1980s p ro m p te d b e tter-ed u cated y o u th to sign u p ; e v en th e n re te n tio n rem a in e d a p ro b lem in co m b at branches. In d eed , social class w a s a t issue, as n o tio n s of th e ig n o ran t, u n train ab le p o o r w ere co m m o n in d e b ates o n m ilitary sociology: "I W A N T YOU FOR [THE] U.S. ARMY," ra n one n e w sp a p e r c arto o n — "E v en If You C a n 't R ead," it a d d e d in sm aller ty p e.60 But issues of race m ixed w ith those of class a n d ed u ca tio n al sta tu s in w a y s difficult to confront openly. H a n g in g ov er th e controversy, u su a lly u n sp o k e n , w as a d isto rte d im age of real racial a n d class ten sio n s th a t im p e d e d th e a rm e d forces d u rin g the V ietnam W a r's later stages: w o u ld a n e v e n p o o rer a n d blacker a rm e d force fare e v en w o rse in a fu tu re w ar? S u sp ectin g th a t it w o u ld .

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som e m ilita ry lead ers a n d th eir civilian allies d islik ed th e a rm e d forces' n e w d em o g rap h ics, b u t th ey co u ld h a rd ly c o n d em n th e m o p e n ly w ith o u t a lien atin g m in o rity g ro u p s su p p ly in g m u c h of th e v o lu n te er force. R eform ers in a n d o u t of th e a rm e d forces saw th e challenge differen tly — as o n e n o t of race a n d class p e r se b u t of retra in in g officers to d e a l w ith th e ten sio n s in v o lv e d a n d to enforce ru les of eq u al o p p o rtu n ity — b u t su p p o rt fro m th e W hite H o u se for th eir efforts w a s o ften w e a k before C a rte r's presidency. L iberal critics c o n d em n ed th e u n ­ fairn ess of leaving co m b at to p o o r a n d m in o rity A m erican s b u t d e te sted efforts to lim it th eir n u m b e rs, o r c o n scrip tio n to sp re a d th e b u rd e n s m o re evenly. M eanw hile, im ages offered b y b o th co nserv ativ es a n d liberals of th e m ilitary as a fo reign legion for A m erica reek ed of n a rro w n a tio n a lism — as if p o o r a n d m in o rity so ld iers w ere so m eh o w less A m erican. It w a s certain ly fair to ask, as o n e e x p ert d id , "W h a t k in d of society excuses its p riv ileg ed from serv in g in th e ra n k s of its A rm y ?" B ut th e answ er, u su a lly ig n o red , w a s th a t A m erican society lo n g h ad: th e m ilitary, n e v e r a cross-section of society, h a d o ften b e e n a refu g e for m arg in al A m ericans, o n w h o m it d re w (because of lo o p h o les in th e d raft) in a b o u t th e sam e p ro p o rtio n s in th e d ra ft's final y ears as it d id after 1973 as a v o lu n te e r force. It w a s the racial (an d g en d er) co m p o sitio n of th e a rm e d forces th a t sh ifted m o st in th e 1970s, n o t th e econom ic a n d ed u ca tio n al sta tu s of re­ cruits. M oreover, because black recru its m o re o ften h e ld h ig h school d ip lo m as, th e y saw g rea ter pay-off in m ilita ry service a n d w ere m o re likely "to fulfill th eir v o lu n ta ry oblig atio n " b y reenlisting. In tu rn , th o se p a tte rn s su g g e st th a t focus o n th e recru its' class a n d e d u ca tio n al sta tu s w a s on ly a m o re acceptable w a y to exercise anxieties a b o u t th e ir racial m ak e-u p .61 T here w ere lim its, h o w ev er, o n h o w m u c h th e m ilita ry 's racial m ak e-u p co u ld still g en erate controversy. T he g rea t issu es of law a n d p olicy h a d alre ad y b e e n settled , e v en th o u g h th e resu ltin g ru les w ere n o t alw ay s enforced. T he m ilita ry 's social c o m p o sitio n w a s d riv e n b y econom ic a n d d e m o g ra p h ic forces larg ely b e y o n d a n y o n e's control, except b y d rastic actions like co n scrip tio n th a t few w a n te d to take. Ideological d iv isio n s b ro k e d o w n o n these issues: a lth o u g h for d ifferen t reasons, liberals w ere as sq u e am ish as rig h t-w in g ers a b o u t th e m il­ ita ry 's social profile, a n d a b o u t th e fact th a t th e a rm e d forces m ain ta in e d a b e t­ ter record of racial p ro g ress th a n m o st in stitu tio n s in A m erica. The C o ld W ar p rism for v iew in g these issu es— w o u ld th e m ilitary sh o w case A m erica's egali­ ta ria n id eals o r its en d em ic failings?— h a d w eak en ed . A n d d e sp ite th e u g lin ess of th e racial clim ate in the 1970s, few w h ites n o w o p e n ly a rg u e d th a t racial m i­ n o rities w ere u n fit to serve. N o t so, h o w ev er, reg a rd in g th e place in th e m ilitary of w o m e n a n d h o m o sex ­ uals. W om en's sh are of th e ran k s rose sh a rp ly — from less th a n 1 p e rc en t of th e a rm y in 1964 to 10 p e rc en t b y th e early 1980s, th eir n u m b e rs in all b ran ch es trip lin g in th e 1970s to 150,000. M ore a t issu e w as th eir e n try in to th e h a llo w e d acad em ies a t W est Point, A nnapolis, a n d C o lo rad o Springs. In th e en d , th e req­ u isite legislation p a sse d C ongress b y w id e m arg in s in 1975, in p a rt for w h a t

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tu rn e d o u t to b e a n u n fo u n d e d reason: p ro p o n e n ts a rg u e d th a t im m in e n t ra t­ ification of the E qual R ights A m e n d m e n t w o u ld m a n d a te su c h a n o u tco m e anyw ay. D ifficult d eb ates a n d h e arin g s p rec ed e d p assag e, h o w ev er. M ale m ili­ tary lea d ers— sen io r m ilitary w o m e n w ere n o t called to testify— a rg u e d th a t since th e academ ies w ere d e sig n ed to tra in officers for com bat, w h ic h w o m e n w ere fo rb id d en b y law to enter, w o m e n h a d to b e b a rre d fro m th em . T h at a rg u ­ m e n t w a s d isin g en u o u s, b arely d isg u isin g a belief th a t w o m e n sim p ly w e re u n ­ fit for h ig h ra n k a n d co m b at responsibility. T he acad em ies a d m itte d m ale ca­ d e ts th ey k n ew m ig h t n e v er see com bat, w h ile th e technical com plexities of m o d e m w a r h a d b lu rre d th e line b e tw ee n co m b at a n d n o n c o m b a t service— b u lle ts m ig h t fell n u rse s, technicians in air-co n d itio n ed b u n k e rs m ig h t lau n c h m issiles, a n d tru ck d riv e rs m ig h t d e te rm in e th e fate of a m ission. Still, th e d e ­ b a te d id expose w h a t w a s u n k n o w a b le to all parties: H o w w o u ld w o m e n p e r­ fo rm in com bat? T h at q u e stio n c a p tu re d a m ajor difference b e tw e e n g e n d e r a n d race as issues in th e a rm e d forces: a lon g co m b at reco rd ex isted for racial m inorities, alm o st n o n e for w om en. R evealing also w a s th e n e rv o u s a tten tio n g iv en th e first w o m e n a t th e aca­ dem ies. T heir p ro b lem s a n d p ro g ress, follow ed as if a v e rsio n of th e 1973 ten n is m atch b e tw e e n Billie Jean K ing a n d B obby R iggs, o ften g o t sn ick erin g trea t­ m ent: it w a s a m a tte r of "B eauties a n d th e Beast," a Time h e ad lin e ran; "A t W est P o in t th ere is e v en m ore concern th a n u su a l th ese d a y s a b o u t certain p o rtio n s of th e fem ale b o d y ," began a Newsweek article. Som e a d ju stm en ts in p h y sical tra in in g a n d few er in c u rricu la p ro v e d n ecessary to acco m m o d ate w o m e n b u t, u n su rp risin g ly , "th e g reatest obstacle" for fem ale cad ets w a s "th e a ttitu d e s of m e n — faculty m em b ers a n d stu d e n ts." W o m en 's actu al e n try in to th e aca­ d em ies ren e w e d th e feverish d e b ate a b o u t w h e th e r— in reality, h o w m u c h — th ey m ig h t e n te r com bat, alo n g w ith w ild sp ecu latio n a b o u t th e sexual m o rals o r d ay -to -d ay com fort level for m e n a n d w o m e n th ro w n to g eth er in close q u a r­ ters. Little no ticed "w h ile th e m ig h ty N a v y a n g u ish e d o v er fem ale sailors" w a s th e fact th a t th e low ly C oast G u a rd p u t m ix ed crew s to sea q u ietly a n d w ith little incident.62 In 1975, ju st as th e issu e of w o m e n in th e acad em ies p e ak e d . A ir Force Tech­ nical S ergeant L eonard M atlovich, a d e co rate d v e te ra n of co m b at in V ietnam , ch allenged the m ilita ry 's b a n o n hom osexuals. H is w a s n o t th e first su ch chal­ lenge, b u t it w a s the first to b a sk in the m e d ia 's glare: h e graced th e cover of Time, w h ic h d u b b e d h im a "celebrity in th e a rm e d forces." M oreover, sim ilar cases w ere b u b b lin g u p in the courts, som e officers ev in ced a m o re to le ra n t a tti­ tu d e, a n d a gay su b cu ltu re w a s surfacing in m ilitary culture: in fo rm al g ro u p s p ro v id e d su p p o rt a n d circulated n ew sletters, g ay discos b u stle d o n aircraft car­ riers, a n d th e h it so n g "It's R aining M en," its title alone a p p e a lin g to som e gay m en, ra n g o u t ev en a t rem ote bases. C ases like M atlo v ich 's also c h ip p e d aw ay a t one old ratio n ale for exclusion— the claim th a t h o m o sex u als w ere v u ln e r­ able to blackm ail d isin te g rate d w h e n th ey w ere n o t closeted. T h at M atlovich

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w a s p ro b ab ly the b e st-k n o w n (to th e stra ig h t w o rld a t least) g ay m a n a t m id ­ d e ca d e d e m o n stra te d ag ain th e close n ex u s of social conflict w ith m ilitary m a t­ ters.63 T h o u g h M atlovich ev en tu ally w o n b ack -p ay a n d a n h o n o rab le discharge, m ilitary policy on ly b ecam e m ore em p h atic a n d en co m p assin g as C old W ar fer­ v o r a n d m o ral co n serv atism g a in e d in C a rte r's a d m in istra tio n a n d triu m p h e d in R eagan's. "H o m o sex u ality is incom patible w ith m ilitary service," th e P en ta­ g o n d ecreed in 1982.64 A s alw ays, gay m e n a n d w o m e n c o n tin u ed to serve, b u t th e pace of vicious w itch -h u n ts, gross v iolatio n s of d u e process, a n d cavalier e x p u lsio n s (som etim es of stra ig h t p e rso n n el m isid en tified as gay) accelerated. T he case for gay p e rso n n el w as b a d ly h u r t b y th e D efense D e p artm en t's v ig o r in su p p re ssin g in te rn al stu d ie s th a t u n d e rc u t its claim s. E ven m ore, th eir cause w a s n o t y e t clearly lin k ed w ith th a t of w o m e n a n d racial m in o rities, a n d th u s d id n o t locate m ilitary h o m o p h o b ia in a b ro a d e r sy stem of w h ite m ale d o m i­ nance. In fact, h o w ev er, an ti-g ay policies w ere v alu ab le to m ale au th o rities seek in g to cu rb th e e x p a n d in g roles of w o m e n in u n ifo rm a n d to co u n teract w o m e n 's freq u e n t charges of sexual a b u se a n d h a ra ssm e n t b y m ale p erso n n el. For th ose p u rp o se s, lesbian-baiting w a s a fav o red tactic: P en tag o n policy gave m e n a p o w e rfu l tool for in tim id a tin g w o m en . H o stility to w o m e n w a s a n im ­ p o rta n t factor b e h in d th e tig h te n in g of an ti-g ay policies. T he p ro g ress in m ilitary in stitu tio n s m a d e b y w o m e n a n d so u g h t b y gays w a s all th e m ore rem ark ab le g iv en h o w little su p p o rt th ey g o t from th e m o v e­ m en ts th ey seem ed to sym bolize. Still influen ced b y th e rad ical politics of th e V ietn am era, m o st fem inist a n d g ay g ro u p s looked askance a t acceptance b y an in stitu tio n re g a rd e d as u n c h an g e ab ly racist, sexist, m ilitarist, a n d im perialist. W h y h e lp it w a g e w ar? E n try in to th e o p p re s so r's in stitu tio n s w a s all th e m o re su sp ect n o w th a t fem inist a n d gay th o u g h t e m p h a size d fu n d a m e n ta l differ­ ences (w h eth er ro o ted in biology, history, o r cu ltu re) b e tw ee n m e n a n d w o m e n a n d b e tw ee n gay a n d stra ig h t people. T he m id d le-class co m p o sitio n of m o st fem in ist a n d gay g ro u p s also d im in ish e d interest: th ey w ere ill a ttu n e d to p o o r a n d m in o rity c o n stitu en ts w h o h a d k een er a sp iratio n s for m ilitary service. To b e sure, g en d er-b ased m o v em en ts w ere sp lit b e tw e e n assim ilatio n ist a n d o p p o sitio n al stan ces— sh o u ld th ey d e stro y heg em o n ic w h ite m ale society o r striv e to e n te r it o n a eq u al basis? G ra d u a lly a m id d le g ro u n d w as stak ed out: e n try m ig h t b e a m ean s to tran sfo rm , ra th e r th a n acquiesce in, d o m in a n t soci­ ety, a n d m eth o d s once sco rn ed as a cco m m o d atio n ist— th e p u rs u it of legal equality, elective office, m ed ia coverage, resp ect in m ain strea m in stitu tio n s— b ecam e m ore attractive. The E qual R ights A m e n d m e n t h a d th a t th ru st for m a n y p ro p o n en ts, as politicians like Rep. Patricia S chroeder p resse d for w o m e n 's a d m issio n to th e service academ ies. A t th e sam e tim e, gay rig h ts g ro u p s recast h o m o sex u ality as a m in o rity id en tity ra th e r th a n a rev o lu tio n ary sensibility; th a t th ru st e m e rg ed in H a rv e y M ilk's successful efforts to w in elec­ tio n in 1977 as a San Francisco su p e rv iso r a n d to d e fe at th e Briggs initiative

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(w hich w o u ld h av e b a n n e d h o m o sex u als from p ublic-school teach in g in C ali­ fornia), a n d in the b ro a d e r effort of g ay activists to m eet th e political challenge of th e N e w R ight. Still, m ilitary in stitu tio n s rem a in e d se co n d a ry for these m o v em en ts in the 1970s. T h at offered n o com fort to th eir o p p o n e n ts, w h o feared p recisely w h a t som e g e n d e r activists so u g h t— th e d isso lu tio n of d o m in a n t society a n d of th e a rm e d stre n g th it p resu m ab ly p ro v id ed . In d eed , th o se activists u p se t older, g e n d ered n o tio n s of n a tio n al stre n g th in m a n y w ays. T h at w a s th e case w h e n th o u sa n d s of g ay m en a n d lesbians silently m arc h ed th ro u g h San Francisco after th e assas­ sin atio n of H a rv e y M ilk a n d M ayor G eorge M oscone, a n d later fo u g h t a n u g ly b attle w ith police follow ing n e w s th a t the assassin h a d g o tte n a lig h t sentence. Like th e Stonew all riots in 1969, th o se scenes e ro d e d stereo ty p es of lim pw riste d hom osexuals. So too d id th e to u g h , m u scled a p p ea ra n c e p o p u la r am o n g gay m en in the late 1970s, w h ic h em erg ed ju st as p o p u la r c u ltu re u rg e d stra ig h t m e n to d ev elo p a softer dem ean o r. "It is n o w in stra ig h t discos th a t one fin d s the soft-looking a n d lo n g -h aired m ales," o n e g ay w rite r so o n o b serv ed ; "g ay s are too b u sy strik in g m ascu lin e poses a n d flexing th eir p ecto rals."65 M asculinity a n d aggressiveness, once e q u a te d w ith h etero sex u al a u th o rity a n d e m b o d ied in m ilitary institutions, h a d slip p ed th eir traces, at a tim e, p a trio ts alleged, w h e n th e m ilitary itself h a d becom e d a n g e ro u sly w eak . W ho n o w w ere the m ore sold ierly A m ericans? W om en's peace a n d an tin u cle ar activism offered a related challenge. By the e n d of the 1970s, w o m e n h a d a p ro m in en ce a n d au to n o m y in peace activism u n a ttain a b le d u rin g the V ietnam W ar. In m a n y w a y s th ey co m p rised the d o m i­ n a n t force in m o v in g the c u ltu re of w a r 's h o rro rs in to practical activism . T hey fig u red p ro m in e n tly in g en d er-in te g rated efforts (H elen C ald ico tt in activist circles. R epresentative S chroeder in m ain strea m politics), g e n erate d m u c h of th e critical sch o larsh ip a n d polem ics, a n d d e v elo p ed th eir o w n se p ara te cam ­ paigns. In the process, th ey often "co n tra sted w o m e n 's in trin sically peaceloving, life-preserving, n o n -v io len t m a n n e r a g ain st m e n 's violent, ex p lo itativ e a n d p lu n d e rin g n a tu re ," as one h isto ria n su m m arize s th eir outlook. "Take the Toys A w ay from the Boys," rea d a p lac ard p o p u la r in th e W o m en 's P en tag o n A ction, w h ich declared th a t "a fem inist w o rld is a n u c le ar free zo n e." T h at o u t­ look linked to g eth er m ale p ro p e n sity to go to w ar, to u se violence ag ain st w o m e n in rap e a n d in p o rn o g ra p h y ("RAPE IS W AR!" d eclared one 1976 poster), to d e sp o il the en v iro n m en t, a n d to ex p lo it T h ird W orld n a tio n s.66 It w as a n ideological stance m o st associated w ith (th o u g h n o t co nfined to) rad ical lesbians a n d fem inist sep aratists, w h e rea s m a n y m a in strea m fem inists feared th a t su ch a stance u n d e rc u t th eir cause (if m en w ere u n c h an g e ab ly violent, w h y b o th e r to reform them ?). But w h a te v e r th e stance, w o m e n 's p ro m in en ce in the peace m o v em en t w as striking, especially since few w o m e n sto o d o u t in th e forces of rearm am en t. A n tiw a r sen tim en t, castig ated b y its en em ies in th e 1960s as v ag u ely fem inine, n o w w as em braced b y its p ro p o n e n ts as fem inist.

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N o w o n d e r, th en , th a t th e forces of m o ral a n d m ilitary re a rm a m e n t saw th eir tw in causes as in se p ara b le — successful d efen se of th e n a tio n req u ire d b e atin g back fem inists, h o m osexuals, leftists, black lead ers, a n d others. O ften th e lin k ­ age b e tw e e n m ilita ry a n d m o ral re a rm a m e n t w a s o n ly im p licit in th in ly co d ed lan g u ag e. To co lu m n ist G eorge W ill, efforts to g a in m u n icip al o rd in an ces p ro ­ tecting gays fro m d isc rim in atio n w ere "w e ap o n s in a b a ttle" a n d th rea te n ed "th e m o ral d isa rm a m e n t of society"— b u t "d isa rm a m e n t" w a s a lo a d e d w o rd in th e context of co n te m p o ra ry d eb ate, co n n o tin g m artia l w eak n ess as w ell. Jerry Falw ell a rg u e d th a t "h o m o sex u ality reaches a p a n d em ic level in societies in crisis o r in a state of collapse," im p ly in g A m erica's defenselessness, m ad e w o rse because lesbians d efied m ale a u th o rity ("In th e C h ristia n h o m e th e w o m a n is to b e subm issive") a n d because h o m o sex u als, w h o " m u st recru it" b ecau se th ey "ca n n o t rep ro d u c e," e ro d e d th e ra m p a rts of society b y targ etin g its y o u th . A g ain st su c h enem ies, "th e ch u rch sh o u ld b e a d iscip lin ed , ch arg in g arm y," a rg u e d Falw ell, w h o issu e d m ilitary m e ta p h o rs in p ro fu sio n . "C h ris­ tians, like slaves a n d soldiers, ask n o q u e stio n s."67 N o rm a n P o d h o retz, for one, d id n o t leave th in g s im plicit: th e "cu ltu re of a p ­ p e ase m en t" in clu d ed th e "k in d of w o m e n w h o d o n o t w a n t to b e w o m e n a n d . . .m e n w h o d o n o t w a n t to b e m en ." H e recalled th e a b a n d o n m e n t in E n g lan d of " p ro p e r m a n h o o d am o n g h o m o sex u al w rite rs of th e 1920s," w h o p re su m ­ ab ly p a v e d th e w a y for B ritain to ap p ea se th e N azis. M eanw hile, P o d h o re tz's sp o u se, w rite r M id g e D ecter, a tte n d e d to th e h o m efro n t, excoriating g ay m e n for b ein g in "flig h t from w o m e n ," p u ttin g " o u r v e ry existence as w o m e n o n th e line," a n d living lives of " d ru g s, sado-m asoch ism , a n d su icid e." D ecter u tte red n o t a w o rd a b o u t n a tio n a l defense, b u t she w a s billed as "executive d irecto r of th e C om m ittee for th e Free W orld," a n d th e p o rtra it sh e sk etch ed of g ay m e n w o u ld h av e m a d e a n y p a trio t sh u d d e r. F urio u s re sp o n d e n ts to h e r d iatrib e fu r­ th er ex p o sed c u ltu ra l div isio n s o n these m atters b y calling u p th e H olocaust, accusing D ecter (w ritin g in a m ag a zin e sp o n so red b y th e A m erican Jew ish C om m ittee) of "rep licatin g th e historical p a tte rn s of m o d e m anti-S em itism " in h e r attack o n h o m osexuals.68 A ttacks like D ecter's no n eth eless b e tra y e d a sh ift in th e faultlines o v er issues of g e n d er a n d w ar. A m o n g th o se w h o assailed h om osexuality, a n o ld er d e ro g a ­ to ry lan g u ag e ("p erv e rts," "faggots") d im in ish e d , a t least in pu b lic forum s, a n d psychological a n d sociological e x p lan atio n s (h o w ev er frau d u le n t) for h o m o sex u ality n o w jostled alo n g sid e m o ral ones. T he m ere fact th a t th e task of p u rg in g this contagion, once p e rfo rm e d b y p u b lic au th o rities, n o w fell to m o ral reform ers in d ic ate d th a t fo rw a rd p o sitio n s h a d b e en a b a n d o n e d a n d a rear­ g u a rd action w a s tak in g place. So too d id th e refo rm ers' coalescence b e h in d the can d id acy of R onald R eagan— a d iv o rced m a n fro m th e flesh p o ts of H olly­ w o o d w as n o t the id eal lea d er (he e v en o p p o se d th e Briggs initiative). In th e 1980s, revelations th a t som e le a d in g m o ral co n serv ativ es w ere th em selv es h o ­ m osexual com plicated m atters further. A n d th e b ro a d claim of m oralists, th a t

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h o m o sex u ality u n d e rm in e d n a tio n al v ig o r a n d safety, p ro v e d h a rd to p in d o w n . It w as left as a sin ister in sin u atio n ra th e r th a n sp elled o u t in co n vincing detail, a n d old eq u atio n s b e tw ee n c o m m u n ism a n d h o m o sex u ality o r fem i­ nism , w h ile h a rd ly extinct, b ecam e fu zzier in th e co n serv ativ e critique. P erhaps th a t w a s because m o ralists cared less a b o u t h o m o sex u ality th a n ab o u t u sin g it as a sym bol of forces th a t exercised th em m ore. W hile D ecter m o v ed in circles w h ere she e n co u n tere d g ay m en (n o t lesbians, b y h e r account), for p eo p le like Falw ell's follow ers, h o m o sex u ality seem ed a n abstraction, a scourge of d ista n t cities o r stra n g e n eig h b o rh o o d s. Far m o re w o v e n in to th eir d aily lives w e re changes in m ale-fem ale a n d black -w h ite relatio n s, b u t becau se h o m o sex u ality w as less acceptable to m o st A m erican s a n d m o re o p en ly stig ­ m atized , it b e tte r m obilized the troops, o p e n ed p o cketbooks, a n d sy m b o lized th e cause. T he successful c am p aig n a g ain st ratificatio n of th e E q u al R ights A m e n d ­ m en t, p a sse d b y C ongress in 1972 a n d facing state leg islatu res for a d e ca d e af­ ter, revealed the central focus of m o ral conserv atism , a n d th e ten sio n s in its ef­ fo rt to link m o ral a n d m ilitary rearm am en t. W hile ERA o p p o n e n ts w a rn e d of unisex b ath ro o m s, flam b o y an t lesbianism , a n d g ay m arriag e, th ey focused m ore o n h o w the ERA w o u ld affect h etero sex u al b e h av io r for th e w o rse. For Phyllis Schlafly, th e p e rso n m o st responsible for th e ERA'S d efeat, th e w o rries of som e w o m e n — th a t the ERA w o u ld abo lish law s p ro tec tin g w o m e n from o n ero u s w o rk practices, for ex am p le— in v o lv ed "m in o r ram ificatio n s" com ­ p a re d to the d a n g e rs p o se d for n a tio n al defense. Schlafly's ro o ts lay in h a rd rig h t co n serv atism of th e 1960s, w h e n she assailed c o m m u n ism 's m ilitary a n d m o ral threat, a n d she claim ed expertise in arcane m atters of m eg a to n n a g e a n d deterrence, excoriating Ford a n d K issinger for th eir SALT diplom acy. M ore­ over, she a n d h e r allies d re w o n the ideals a n d forces of p atrio tic ren e w a l— g ro u p s like the D au g h ters of th e A m erican R evolution a n d FLAG (Family, Lib­ erty, a n d G od).69 Schlafly h a m m ere d aw ay at th e ERA'S im p act o n co n scrip tio n a n d m ilitary service, a n issue for w h ic h ERA su p p o rte rs w ere b a d ly p re p a re d b ecau se th e e n d of the d ra ft in 1973 seem ed to p e rm it th em to d u c k it. Schlafly, h o w ev er, correctly asserted th a t a ratified ERA w o u ld in v alid ate a n y fu tu re legislation o bligating only m en to serve. She objected m ightily. W om en w ere ph y sically w eaker, she n o ted , a n d th eir presence in th e a rm e d forces w o u ld u n d e rm in e n atio n al security. "T he Soviet A rm y, she said om inously, is less th a n 1 p e rc en t fem ale a n d its com bat tro o p s are exclusively m ale." Schlafly fo u n d th e d ra ft issue g reat for gain in g recruits, especially am o n g y o u n g e r w om en: it "h as low ­ ered the average age of o u r m o v em en t b y a b o u t 20 y ears," sh e b o asted . It also fu rth e re d h e r am bitions to b e a n a u th o rity o n d efen se issu es a n d to m obilize w o m e n b e h in d rearm am en t, as she d id w ith co n sid erab le success. W h en C ar­ ter p ro p o se d c o m p u lso ry d ra ft reg istra tio n in 1980, sh e h e lp e d m ak e su re th a t w o m e n w ere exem pted. "T he p h o n e s h ave b e en rin g in g off th e h o o k ev er since

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Jim m y C a rte r sta b b ed th e w o m e n of this co u n try in th e back," sh e a n n o u n ce d , tak in g p rid e in lau n c h in g D ad s A g ain st D raftin g O u r D au g h ters in a sh re w d effort to ta p p ro tectiv e sen tim en ts am o n g m e n to w a rd w o m en . T hose h a d b een voiced in th e ERA d e b ate since th e early 1970s, w h e n Sen. Sam E rvin, a n ERA o p p o n e n t, b e g g ed C ongress to " p re v e n t se n d in g th e d a u g h te rs of A m erica in to co m b at to b e sla u g h te red o r m aim ed b y the b ay o n ets, th e b o m b s, th e bu llets, th e g ren ad es, th e n a p alm , th e p o iso n gas, a n d th e shells of th e en em y ."70 Such rhetoric, h o w ev er, exposed tensions in th e ou tlo o k of ERA o p p o n en ts. If th e p e ril to A m erica w a s as g rea t as Schlafly claim ed, th e case for ex em p tin g w o m e n from th e task of m eetin g it w as sh a k y — in d ee d , som e p a trio ts h in te d th a t all A m ericans sh o u ld accept th e u ltim ate sacrifice of w a g in g n u c le ar w a r sh o u ld it b e n ecessary — ju st as a n a p p ea l to w o m e n 's selfish in terests w a s aw k ­ w a rd w h e n offèred b y a p atrio t. M oreover, th e focus of Schlafly a n d h e r allies o n n u c le ar w e a p o n s a n d n u c le ar w a r w a s o d d ly o u t of sy n ch w ith th eir antiERA im ages of w o m e n tra p p e d in foxholes o r b u rn e d b y n a p a lm — im ages ech o in g the V ietnam W ar, the so rt of w a r Schlafly w as d e te rm in e d th a t th e n a ­ tio n n e v e r a g ain fight. Schlafly p ro b ab ly w o rrie d less th a t w o m e n w o u ld fig h t b a d ly th a n th a t m en , if let off th e hook, w o u ld n o t fight at all. Fem ale co m petence h e ld n o terro rs for her; she e m b o d ied it in a tireless a n d successful political career th a t an y liber­ a te d w o m a n m ig h t envy. D espite im p ressio n s to th e contrary, sh e w a s d riv e n n o t b y a n im u s to w a rd w o m e n b u t b y a conviction th a t m e n w ere sh u ck in g th eir responsibilities to w o m e n a n d th e n atio n , a n d w o u ld d o so ev en m o re cava­ lierly if the ERA w ere ratified. Fem inists w h o tru s t m e n to su p p o rt w o m e n "be­ cause of love, n o t because of the law ," w ere foolish, Schlafly arg u ed ; th e "ERA w o u ld elim inate th a t obligation." "From th e v a n ta g e p o in t of th e an tifem i­ n ists," B arbara E hrenreich o bserved, "th e crim e of fem inism lay n o t in h a tin g m en, b u t in tru stin g th em too w ell." T he N e w R ig h t's o u tlo o k exh ib ited "a p ro ­ fo u n d c o n te m p t for m e n " a n d , in v ertin g n in etee n th -ce n tu ry g e n d e r ideology, saw m e n as " 'p assiv e, fragile," w h ile w o m e n w ere " 'a ctiv e' a n d 'c a n d o every­ th in g .'" 71 Schlafly d id n o t explicitly ta p th a t reaso n in g in arg u in g a g ain st th e ERA o n n a tio n al security g ro u n d s, b u t it w a s im plicit in th e o u tlo o k of conservatives, w h o se p a triarc h al m o d el of th e g o o d society p laced a h eav y b u rd e n o n m e n to d efe n d fam ily, G od, a n d country. "In the calculus of th e rig h t, flag a n d fam ily h av e n e v er b e e n in d e p e n d e n t variables: A th re a t to o n e is a th re a t to th e oth er." If th e ERA allo w ed m e n to flee th eir d u tie s to w o m en , th ey w o u ld flee th eir d u tie s to the n a tio n as w ell. In d eed , th e w h o le p o in t of d e fe n d in g th e n a tio n w o u ld be lost. C o n g ressm an John Schm itz su g g ested , for "d efen se of o u r w o m e n a n d girls is one of the m o st basic reaso n s w h y w e m en are p re p a re d to fight. . . . If w e are w illin g to see th em [w om en] killed, m u tilated , o r c ap tu red because th ey are 'e q u a l,' w e m ig h t as w ell say, 'co m e a n d g et th em !' " K orea a n d V ietnam h a d alre ad y stirred fear of m e n too soft o r d ru g g e d to d efe n d A m erica.

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Fear of lost p atrio tic m an h o o d also m a d e g ay m e n seem scary: o n th e ir o w n th ey m ig h t be h arm less, b u t n o t if " p a rt of a co n sp iracy to sissify th e last rem ­ n a n ts of A m erican m ilitary m an h o o d ," as E h ren reich su m m e d u p N e w R ight fears, o r if (in a n in v ersio n of su c h fears) th e ir h y p e rm a sc u lin ity c o n tra sted d ep ressin g ly w ith stra ig h t m e n 's lassitu d e in d e fe n d in g h o m e a n d fam ily. A s Falw ell ask ed in a rad io tira d e a g ain st hom osex u ality , "Is it a n y w o n d e r th a t w e are th e lau g h in g stock of th e w o rld ? Is it a n y w o n d e r th a t n a tio n s a n d terro rists th u m b th eir noses a t this once p ro u d la n d ? "72 Fears of m o ral d isa rm a m e n t a t h o m e a n d m ilitary d isa rm a m e n t ab ro a d w ere so e n tw in e d in th e anti-ER A a n d allied m o v em en ts th a t it is h a rd to sa y w h ic h lo o m ed larger, b u t anxieties a b o u t m o ral decline w ere o ften p a ra m o u n t. A t th is stage of m ilitarizatio n , w ith scenarios of Soviet attack ev er m o re fanciful, th e d riv e to m obilize A m erican m ilitary stre n g th h a d a h o llo w quality. A serio u s effort to m obilize m ig h t h av e allo w ed fo r— in a b u lly in g w a y e v e n d e m a n d e d — in clu sio n of w o m e n a n d gays in the cause, as in d e e d h a p p e n e d (on d ifferen t term s) in W orld W ar II. S tren u o u s m o ralizin g b y m a n y co n serv ativ es (an d som e liberals) a b o u t th ese g ro u p s su g g e ste d th a t th ey w ere m o st exercised b y th rea ts n o t to n a tio n al d efen se b u t to th e social o rd e r th ey c h erish e d — to th e p ro tec te d p o sitio n of m iddle-class h o u se w iv es w h o m Schlafly c o u rted , to tire m ale a u th o rity she b o th d e fe n d e d a n d m ock ed , to th e " tra d itio n a l" fam ily th a t seem ed in disarray. To b e sure, m o ral co nserv ativ es p a ra d e d th e ir p atrio tic v irtu e — F alw ell's b ro ad casts b e g a n w ith th e A m erican flag a n d e n d e d w ith the L iberty Bell— a n d lab o red to fen d off th e strateg ic p e ril seen in C a rte r's P an ­ a m a C an al a n d SALT II treaties. B ut C h ristia n evangelicals o ften "d iv id e d o v er V ie tn a m ,. . . race relations, n a tio n al defense, social w elfare, a n d a h o st of o th er issu es," w h ile exhibiting " v irtu a l co n sen su s o n q u e stio n s of m orality," anxi­ eties a b o u t w h ic h loom ed larg er a n d m ore salable.73 T hose anxieties m a rk e d a d e p a rtu re from th e o ld e r c o n serv atism of m e n like B arry G o ld w ater, w h o h a d e m p h a size d m artia l stre n g th a b ro a d m o re th a n m o ral co n sen su s a t hom e. T hey also offered a relig io u s sensibility alien to co sm opolitan calculators of n atio n al a d v an tag e , w h o n o w fad e d from p ro m in en ce— am o n g P resid en ts after Ford, o n ly B ush cam e fully from th eir trad ition. For the m o m en t, religious resu rg en ce fo stered rem ilitarizatio n . In th e long ru n , h ow ever, th e a g en d a of m o ral reg e n era tio n rested u n easily a sid e the cause of m artial revitalization, a n d som etim es o v e rw h elm ed it. Falw ell a d m it­ ted as m uch: "If G od is o n o u r side, n o m a tte r h o w m ilitarily su p e rio r th e Soviet U n io n is, th ey could n e v er to u ch u s." If so, m o ral re a rm a m e n t w a s m o re u rg e n t th a n m ilitary p o w e r.74

The New Cold War P ro testing th e Soviet in v asio n of A fg h an istan , P re sid e n t C a rte r canceled A m er­ ican p a rticip a tio n in the 1980 M oscow S u m m er O lym pics. T he U n ited States

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d id go a h e a d w ith the W in ter O lym pics a t Lake Placid, N e w York, w h e re its d e fe at of th e Soviet ho ck ey tea m w a s h e ra ld e d as a v icto ry b y th e D av id of d e m ­ ocratic a m a te u rism o v e r th e G o liath of to ta litaria n athletics, in d ee d , a sym bolic v icto ry in th e C old W ar. Time th o u g h t it "a b it foolish, e v en sad , to sav o r the v icto ry as a n act of geopolitical sym bolism ," b u t p ro ceed ed to d o so. Newsweek w a s less apologetic. "T his w a s n o t ju st a sp o rts story. It w a s a m o rality p lay o n ice." D espite c ap italist w e a lth a n d c o m m u n ist h a rd sh ip , it saw th e A m ericans as "th e w orking-class scufflers a g ain st the lo rd ly elitists w ith th e full g o v e rn ­ m e n t sch o larsh ip s." "W e ty p ify th e A m erican p u b lic in h o w w e feel a b o u t the R u ssian situ atio n ," a rg u e d a n A m erican player. "T he on ly difference is th a t w e can d o so m eth in g a b o u t it o n th e ice." E ven th e to n ier New Yorker, th o u g h h e w ­ in g to its a n tin u cle ar line, d e fe n d e d "th is c o u n try 's d elirio u s resp o n se to the O ly m p ic victory," n o tin g th a t sp o rts a n d w a r are "closely related ." Still, it su g ­ g ested A m erican s' sk ittish m o o d th a t th e ir lead ers chose to retire from th is field of b a ttle ra th e r th a n risk expected d e fe at in th e su m m e r g am es.75 W ith d raw al from those g am es w a s n o t C a rte r's m o st im p o rta n t resp o n se to th e Soviet invasion, b u t it w a s a rev ealin g one. Its p u rp o se w a s to se n d a "p o w ­ e rfu l signal of w o rld o u trag e " ov er th e aggressio n a n d to p ressu re M oscow to e n d it, o r else lose th e o p p o rtu n ity offered b y th e g am es to sh o w case itself to th e w o rld . But the h o p e for su c h w e ig h ty resu lts from a sym bolic action also in d i­ cated C a rte r's difficulty in fin d in g effective m easu res a n d e n listin g n a tio n al sacrifice to w ie ld them . So too d id g ru m b lin g b y m a n y A m erican s a b o u t m o re su b sta n tiv e actions, su c h as a cut in A m erican g rain sales to th e Soviets, in v o lv ­ in g real sacrifice o n th eir p a rt a n d real econom ic p ressu re o n Soviet leaders. E ven as th e w ill to sacrifice seem ed fickle, h o w ev er, m a n y A m erican s trea te d th e ev en ts of 1980 as a rep lay of th e 1930s, m ak in g th e O ly m p ics carry h eav y sym bolic freight. Secretary Vance, th o u g h still c o m m itted to d e te n te , offered th e fam iliar analogy: "I look back to th e 1936 [Berlin] g am es, w h e n I w a s in col­ lege, a n d I th in k in h in d sig h t it w as a m istak e for u s to a tte n d ." Vice P re sid e n t W alter M o n d ale e la b o rated th e analogy. O ly m p ian s in 1980, th o u g h " b o m a full g e n eratio n after th e B erlin O lym pics," m u st sh are in "lin k in g th a t h is ­ to ry to th eir d u ty ." H itle r's course w a s "a chronicle of th e free w o rld 's failu re— of o p p o rtu n itie s n o t seized, ag g ressio n n o t o p p o se d , a p p e a se m e n t n o t con­ d e m n e d ." 76 G iv en th a t outlook. C a rte r's efforts to stre n g th e n d e te n te , d eem p h asiz e th e C o ld W ar, a n d restra in m ilitarizatio n collap sed d u rin g h is last tw o y ears as P resid ent. T he final b lo w to h is efforts w a s th e seizu re in N o v em b er 1979 of A m erican h o sta g es in T ehran b y A y ato llah K h o m ein i's rev o lu tio n ary regim e, a n d th e in v asio n of A fg h a n istan in D ecem ber b y Soviet forces try in g to p ro p u p a client M arxist regim e. B oth ev en ts h a d com p licated an teced en ts, in clu d in g m iscalculations b y th e C arter a d m in istratio n . T h o u g h less eag erly th a n its p re ­ decessors, it h a d en co u rag e d the sh a h of Iran to b u y w e a p o n s (m ostly from th e U n ited States) " w ith the a b a n d o n of a n alcoholic u sin g a c red it card in a liq u o r

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store." A n d it h a d b e en oblivions to signs of h is im p e n d in g dem ise. Ju st as tell­ in g w a s the resp o n se to these ev en ts of m a n y A m ericans, w h o felt k een ly th a t A m erican p o w e r w a s collapsing, th a t the Soviets (as o n e jo u rn alist to ld C arter) " d o n 't believe th a t y o u o r th e A m erican p e o p le w ill fig h t," a n d th a t th e n ex t w o rld w a r loom ed. A ccording to defense a n aly st E d w a rd L u ttw ak , "A fg h an i­ sta n w a s m erely th e w eak est" of m a n y possib le victim s. "N o w th e o th ers w a it th eir tu rn , facing a Soviet m ilitary e m p ire once a g ain o n th e m o v e" a n d b rim ­ m in g w ith "o p era tio n a l confidence," a q u a lity w h o se "em erg en ce n o w com ­ p letes th e m atrix th a t w ill lea d to w a r u n less w e are v e ry m u c h luck ier th a n w e d e serv e to b e." T he Chicago Tribune, ru n n in g a len g th y series e n title d "U.S. M il­ itary: Too W eak for W ar?" a n sw e red th a t q u estion: "If th e R ussians w a n t to sta rt a w a r w ith tire U n ited States, th e ir chances of w in n in g it m a y n e v e r b e b e tte r th a n n o w ."77 C arter m a d e th e tw in ev en ts in the M id east th e focal p o in t of h is rem a in in g m o n th s in office, b ecom ing h o stag e to th em a n d em b racin g th e n e w C o ld W ar. Soviet action in A fg h an istan c o n stitu ted "th e m o st serio u s th re a t to w o rld peace since th e Second W orld W ar," h e a n n o u n c e d o n Ja n u ary 20,1980. D espite su c h rhetoric, his ala rm a n d his policies fell sh o rt of w h a t h a w k s like H e n ry Jackson in h is o w n p a rty o r R onald R eagan in th e G O P w a n te d , b u t th ey w ere e n o u g h to h av e h im all b u t a b a n d o n h is a lre ad y falterin g efforts to re stra in m il­ itarization. C arter w ith d re w th e SALT II T reaty from c o n sid era tio n b y th e Sen­ ate, th o u g h h o p in g th a t his reelection w o u ld allow h im to revive it. H e also cu r­ tailed hig h -tech n o lo g y sales to the Soviets, b ack ed th e MX m issile a n d o th e r costly p ro g ram s (including fo reru n n e rs of R eagan's Strategic D efense In itia­ tive), so u g h t g reater increases (5 p e rc en t a n n u a lly in real term s) in th e defen se b u d g e t th a n those (3 percent) alre ad y m ad e , a n d stre n g th e n e d h is call for com ­ p u lso ry d ra ft registration. T h o u g h w obbly, h is reaction to w a rd tu rm o il in C en ­ tral A m erica su g g e ste d a sim ilar stance: h e first o p p o se d , th e n trie d to h elp , a n d th e n tu rn e d cold o n N ic arag u a 's rev o lu tio n ary S an d in ista regim e; a n d in o n e of h is last actions, h e d e cid ed to su p p o rt El S a lv a d o r's b ru ta l m ilitary regim e. R hetorically, C arter d id try to e n d his p resid en cy o n a d ifferen t note: h is fare­ w ell a d d re ss w a rn e d th a t the "d a n g e r" of n u c le ar w a r "is b eco m in g greater." But those w o rd s, m ore earn est th a n m em orab le, d id n o t rev erse th e policies h e h a d em braced.78 C a rte r's role in the C old W ar's ren ew al w a s b o th co n sid erab le a n d d ifficult to assess. Like T ru m an in th e late 1940s, h e lacked a p o p u la r m an d a te , g o o d relatio ns w ith C ongress, success w ith h is "d o m estic" p ro g ram s, a n d econom ic sta b ility — soaring en erg y prices a n d u n p re c e d e n te d in flatio n c o n tin u in g to p lag u e C a rte r— a n d h e m e t the te m p ta tio n of red eem in g h is p resid en cy th ro u g h forceful foreign policy (notably. C a rte r co n su lted C lark C lifford, w h o h a d h e lp e d to sh a p e T ru m a n 's policy). N e ith e r m a n a d m itte d to su c h te m p ta ­ tion, h ow ever, a n d since acting o n it d id n o t re d o u n d to th eir lastin g political benefit, th ey eith er m iscalculated in listen in g to its siren so u n d o r m o re likely

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m a d e n o co ncerted calculation a t all, in stea d sh iftin g g ro u n d in a n in crem en tal a n d m u d d le d fashion. W h at is clearer is th a t political c u ltu re ex erted e n o rm o u s p re ssu re o n b o th m e n to so u n d the ala rm a b o u t th e Soviets. For C arter, th a t p re ssu re to o k th e fo rm of d e m a n d s for p atrio tic ren ew al, fears for A m erican safety, a n d a diffuse anxiety th a t n o n a tio n al a g en d a except th e C old W ar gave A m erican s a sense of u n ity a n d p u rp o se a n d th a t c o m p etin g issues w ere ev en trick ier to d e al w ith. T he C old W ar re tu rn e d to th e forefront of politics in p a rt b ecau se o th e r a g e n d a s— race, g en d er, a n d en erg y for C a rte r— seem ed to en tail e v en m o re ran co r a n d fru stratio n . T he Soviet U n io n 's resp o n sib ility for the C o ld W ar's ren ew al is also unclear. It is u n lik ely th a t its lea d ers saw in v asio n of A fg h an istan as a ste p to w a rd g lobal hegem ony, w h ich so o n becam e rem ote a n y w a y as th eir effort in A fg h an ­ ista n b o g g e d d o w n , o r th a t th ey w a n te d to c ru sh d eten te, w h ich th ey p ro b ab ly saw as alm o st d e a d anyw ay. O n th e o th er h a n d , th e K rem lin w a s b lin d to the fu ry th e in v asio n u n le a sh e d (as w h e n it in te rv en e d in H u n g a ry in 1956 a n d C zechoslovakia in 1968, it em b a rrassed e v en m a n y c o m m u n ists o u tsid e th e So­ v iet U nion) a n d d id little to calm it (the Soviet g o v e rn m e n t's claim th a t th e A f­ g h a n g o v e rn m e n t h a d in v ite d it in resem bled th e claim m a d e b y th e U n ited States w h e n it e n te red V ietn am 's w ar). A n d it h a d h a rd ly b e en averse to seek­ in g strategic a n d political a d v a n ta g e ab ro ad , ev en if its recent efforts, m o stly in v o lv in g im p o v e rish ed regim es (in Som alia a n d th e n E thiopia, in V ietnam a n d C uba, am o n g o th e r places), h a d y ield ed little payoff. A t a d e e p e r level, m o u n tin g p e ril a t h o m e to th e socialist v isio n a n d th e B rezhnev reg im e— sag g in g econom ic g ro w th , tenacious d issid en ts, eth n ic tensions, a tro u b leso m e u rb a n c o u n te rcu ltu re — p ro v id e d p ressu re to fin d re d e m p tio n ab ro a d or a t least p re v e n t fu rth e r losses there. T he U n ited States a n d th e Soviet U n io n w ere h a rd ly the m irro r im ages of each o th er som e p u n d its glibly p o site d — th eir stre n g th s a n d w eak n esses w ere too different. Yet if th eir lead ers w ere fru s­ tra te d a b o u t q u ite different problem s, th ey b o th resp o n d ed , as g reat p o w e rs in tro u b le a t h o m e o ften have, b y ree m p h asiz in g o ld visio n s of th eir tran sce n d en t role in the w o rld . T hey n o w e n te red w h a t w a s som etim es d u b b e d th e "N e w C old W ar," b u t th e p h ra se h a d the c ru d e n ess of all su c h term s. In th e su llen core of SovietA m erican relations, it w a s too m u c h like th e o ld C old W ar, w h ich h a d n ev er q u ite e n d e d anyw ay, to b e new . O nce ag ain n u c le ar policy, A m erica's ex p o su re to d e stru ctio n b y th e Soviets, a n d im p ro b ab le d a n g e rs of N A T O 's collapse o r w a r in W estern E urope g e n erate d en o rm o u s atten tio n , w h ile th e actu al firing of g u n s a n d jockeying for p o sitio n took place in th e T h ird W orld (now less in A sia, m o re in A frica a n d the M ideast). G eopolitically, th e m o st d ram a tic ch an g e from th e early C old W ar w a s A m erica's tacit alliance w ith C o m m u n ist C h in a, b u t th a t d id little to ch an g e the ideological to n e of th e charges th a t A m erican s a n d Soviets h u rle d a t each o th er o r the strategic anxieties th ey expressed. A t the sam e tim e, ho w ev er, a g reem en t am o n g A m erican s to co nfront th e Soviet en-

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em y (and p ro b ab ly of th e latter to confront A m erica) o n fields of fire d id n o t m atch w h a t it h a d b e en earlier: th ere w o u ld b e n o K orea o r V ietnam , o r policies of th e historical n o v elty th a t h a d m ark e d N A TO o r th e space race. T he n e w C old W ar resem bled the o ld one so often in w o rd s th a t it w a s h a rd to see h o w it differed in d eed s. It also differed because th e d ra m a s th a t m o st c o n v u lsed A m ericans in 1980, the tw in crises ov er en erg y a n d h o stag es, w ere a t b e st th e C old W ar's b a sta rd offspring, so p o o rly d id th ey fit its fram ew o rk . To see a "N e w C old W ar" reflected real continuity, b u t also com fo rtin g ly o v er­ em p h a size d it, offering h o p e th a t old reflexes a n d fo rm u las w o u ld fit n e w situ ­ ations. T hose reflexes w ere e v id e n t in references to W orld W ar II a n d a p p e a se m e n t th a t w ere m ore w id e sp re a d a n d p ro m iscu o u sly a p p lie d th a n a t a n y tim e since A m erica's e n try into th e V ietnam W ar. T he SALT II T reaty w as a freq u e n t ta r­ get. To sig n on to it, a rg u e d D em ocratic se n ato r H e n ry Jackson, w o u ld b e " a p ­ p e ase m en t in its p u re s t form . . . . It is all o m in o u sly rem in iscen t of G reat Brit­ ain in the 1930s, w h e n one g o v e rn m e n t p ro n o u n c e m e n t after a n o th e r w a s issu ed to assu re th e B ritish p u b lic th a t H itle r's G erm an y w o u ld n e v er achieve m ilitary e q u a lity — let alone superiority. The failure to face reality today, like th e failure to d o so then, th a t is th e m a rk of a p p ea sem e n t." Less w e ig h ty p o li­ cies received sim ilar treatm en t. A s C arter m o v ed to fo rm alize d ip lo m atic rela­ tio n s w ith C o m m u n ist C hina, backers of T aiw an, w h o se g o v e rn m e n t W ash in g ­ to n h a d earlier recognized as C h in a's leg itim ate au th o rity , saw C a rte r as " o u r A m erican C h am b erlain ," as one co m p lain ed to Time; "O n ly th e u m b rella is m issing." C a rte r's resp o n se to aggression rem in d e d R o n ald R eagan of C h a m ­ b erlain "ta p p in g the cobblestones of M unich ," w h ile c o lu m n ist G eorge W ill q u o ted the Economist a b o u t " 'a p p e a se m e n t' " b y C arter, w h o "m ay b e th e m o st d a n g ero u s P resid en t since Jam es B uchanan " (w hose " a ttitu d e w a s a n in v ita­ tio n " to the C ivil W ar). It w as as if, c o m p lain ed th e New Yorker, " o u r h isto ry books co n tain ed accounts of b u t one e v en t— th e M u n ich ag re em e n t in 1938. . . from w h ic h w e d rew b u t one lesson; nam ely, th a t th e u se of force is alw ay s the b est solution to intractable difficulties in o u r foreign affairs." A m erican s seem ed "to h av e a p p lie d th e M u n ich lesson to ev ery in te rn atio n al crisis b u t th e o n e it tru ly fitte d — M unich itself." In v ok in g th a t b e n c h m a rk tra n sp o rte d A m ericans back p a st the m u d d le d y ears of V ietn am a n d its a fterm ath , w ip in g th em off the slate of historically in stru ctiv e events, a n d rein sta te d th e cen trality of W orld W ar II in n a tio n al policy a n d n a tio n al m y th . C arter, th o u g h less stri­ d e n t th a n m an y in inv o k in g th e 1930s, d e p lo re d "iso latio n ism " a n d asse rte d V ietn am 's receding relevance, a rg u in g "th a t n o t ev ery in stan ce of th e firm a p ­ p licatio n of the p o w e r of the U n ited States is a p o ten tial V ietn am ."79 The m u ch -n o ted "C a rte r d o c trin e" em erg ed logically fro m th is rev ised v iew of w h a t w a s relev an t from the p ast, as w ell as from fears of h o w th e situ atio n s in A fg h an istan a n d Iran m ig h t join. "D isco u n tin g th e A y ato llah 's rab id h a tre d of C o m m u n ism , C arter [like m a n y W estern leaders] te n d e d to h e a r o n ly K ho-

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m ein i's vicious a ssa u lt o n th e U n ited States w h ic h h e called 'th e g reat S a ta n / " a n d su sp ec ted " th a t K hom eini w o u ld allow a Soviet p e n e tra tio n of I r a n /' w h ic h w o u ld h a v e th re a te n e d the W est's oil sources. To p re v e n t th at, A m erican lea d ers reaso n ed , req u ire d conveying to M oscow p recisely th a t an tito ta litarian reso lu tio n lacking in the 1930s. C arter m a d e it "ab so lu tely clear" th a t a n y effort b y a n "o u tsid e force to g ain control of th e P ersian G u lf w ill b e re g a rd e d as a n a ssa u lt o n th e v ital interests of th e U n ited States of A m erica," o n e to "b e re­ p e lled b y a n y m ean s necessary." In d ip lo m atic p arlan ce, " a n y m ea n s" m e a n t n u c le ar w e a p o n s.80 H is th re a t raised a d ilem m a o bvious as so o n as C arter u tte re d it. To u se n u ­ clear w e a p o n s in th e M id east risk ed to rch in g th e v e ry in terests th a t th e U n ited States so u g h t to protect, w h ile to u se those w e a p o n s a g ain st th e Soviet U n io n itself w a s scarcely m o re credible, since a w id e r w a r w o u ld e n g u lf th e M id east as w ell. T he d ilem m as of n u c le ar d eterren ce w ere h a rd ly new , b u t th ey w ere sta rk er in 1980, w h e n fear of n u c le ar w a r w a s reach in g a n e w peak. C a rte r's th re a t w a s th u s easily lik en ed to D ulles's in th e 1950s, a t once d a n g e ro u s a n d em p ty , a n d especially cavalier if re a d as a W estern th re a t to co n sid er th e n u ­ clear d e stru c tio n of n o n -W estem peo p les, in a reg io n w h e re n o reg im e except Israel h a d n u c le ar w e a p o n s o r a n a p p a re n t role in A m erican d ecisionm aking. In p a rt because his n u c le ar sab er ra ttlin g p ro v o k e d su c h anxieties, m o re m o d ­ e st m ean s w e re in stea d u se d to c o n fo u n d th e Soviets— th e U n ited States th ro u g h th e CIA , a n d o th e r countries, fu n n ele d a rm s to A fg h an resistance forces. N o n etheless, C a rte r's th re a t w a s a n o th e r in d ic atio n th a t n u c le ar w e a p o n s a n d stra te g y g e n erate d m u c h of the anxiety a t loose in th e n e w C o ld W ar. A m o n g A m ericans, d e b ate w a s d riv e n abo v e all b y th e w id e ly sh a red a n d h o tly d isp u te d p e rc ep tio n th a t th e Soviet U n io n w a s g ain in g th e strategic u p ­ p e r h a n d : its rockets a n d w a rh e a d s m ig h t so o n h av e th e n u m b e rs a n d p recisio n to kn o ck o u t A m erica's lan d -b a se d ICBM s a n d b o m b ers, a n d therefore to lau n c h a p ree m p tiv e strike g ain in g it victo ry w ith few losses, o r (ju st as b ad ) sim p ly to th re a te n to d o so in a w a y th a t w o u ld force th e W est to capitu late. A s R eagan, c am p aig n in g in 1980, ex p lain ed th e d an g er, A m erica w a s b eco m in g so w e a k th a t "th e R ussians co u ld ju st take u s w ith a p h o n e call."81 M an y A m eri­ can n u c le ar forces w o u ld su rv iv e a Soviet first strike, b u t in th is scenario th ey w o u ld b e h o stag e to Soviet su p e rio rity — a P re sid e n t w o u ld h esitate to retali­ ate, k n o w in g th a t Soviet forces could th e n d e stro y A m erican cities. T he K rem ­ lin, it seem ed, also h e ld a n o th e r tru m p c a rd — a rem ark ab le a p p a ra tu s of civil defense, w h ic h w o u ld m in im ize its losses in a n u c le ar exchange. T h at scenario w a s w ild ly im probable, as critics p o in te d out. E vidence for a v a st Soviet civil defense sy stem w a s sketch y a t b e st (later k n o w le d g e of the B rezhnev reg im e's gross inefficiencies m a d e it ev en less plausible). E ven if real, su ch a sy stem d e p e n d e d o n g iv in g Soviets d a y s of a d v an c e w a rn in g of w ar, un lik ely (am ong o th er reasons) because su ch w a rn in g w o u ld ale rt A m erican

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a n d N A TO intelligence to th e K rem lin's designs. A Soviet p ree m p tiv e strike w as also im probable. T he slightest m iscalcu latio n in rocket trajectories w o u ld d is ru p t th e p in p o in t attacks req u ired , a n d Soviet rockets w o u ld h av e to tra ­ v erse u n p red ic ta b le a tm o sp h eric co n d itio n s a n d b e ex q u isitely tim e d so th a t initial explosions d id n o t knock o u t later w a rh e a d s (com m itting w h a t ex p erts te rm e d "fratricide"). Soviet lead ers w o u ld also h av e to assu m e th a t A m erican forces w o u ld n o t u n le a sh a "sp a sm " resp o n se — a t eith er th e first sig n of a So­ v iet attack o r after su c h a n attack b y the su rv iv in g forces— d e stro y in g th e So­ v iet U n io n e v en if it d id th e U n ited States n o good. The A m erican co m m an d system , m ore o n a h air-trig g er th a n th e Soviets', m ig h t n o t w a it to see if th e Soviet attack w a s "lim ited " to m issile sites, o r d ecid e th a t it m a d e n o difference th a t it w as, o r sim p ly m isread the "lim ite d " attack as a n all-o u t one. A s a n a rm y chief of staff h a d a rg u e d in c o n d em n in g fantasies of lim ited n u c le ar w ar, "O n e m u sh ro o m cloud w ill b e re p o rte d as one h u n d re d , a n d th a t w ill p ro b ab ly b e the e n d of the w o rld ." A n d sh o u ld su rv iv in g A m erican forces re sp o n d , Soviet lead ers could n o t d o u b t th eir fury: A m erica's v a st su b m a rin e force, larg ely in ­ v u ln erab le to a p ree m p tiv e strike, alone c o u ld d e stro y th e Soviet e m p ire m a n y tim es over. E ven if its p re su m e d p la n seem ed w o rk ab le, th e K rem lin w o u ld h av e to p o n d e r w h e th e r its em p ire co u ld to lerate th e in d irect effects— rad io active fallout g ird lin g th e globe a n d d u s t cooling its clim ate— e v e n of a o n e-sid ed n u c le ar w ar. A larm ists reto rted th a t Soviet lead ers w ere to o d u m b o r a rro g a n t to w o rry ab o u t su c h p ro b lem s— a n d th erefo re w illin g to try w h a t Sec­ reta ry H a ro ld B row n rid ic u le d as a "cosm ic th ro w of th e d ic e "— b u t th eir re to rt w as a t o d d s w ith th eir im age of coldly calcu latin g Soviet lead ers.82 Baseless o r not, th e specter of im p e n d in g d e fe at w a s c a p tu re d in th e n o tio n th a t th e U n ited States faced a "w in d o w of vu ln erab ility ." It w a s a c u rio u s m e ta ­ p h o r, in p a rt because of the slip p ery w a y it referred to b o th tim e a n d sp ace— to b o th a physical g ap in A m erican defenses a n d a p e rio d of tim e w h e n v u l­ n erab ility p resu m ab ly w o u ld be acute. T he m e ta p h o r e v o k ed a stu rd y A m eri­ can h o m e w ith a w in d o w in a d v e rte n tly left o p e n a n d p re y e d o n fears of b o th crim e a n d Soviet d u p lic ity (D em ocrats b e in g "so ft" o n both): w ily R u ssian s w o u ld sn eak in to the h o m es of com placen t citizens. T he im ag e of v io lated A m erican d om esticity h a d o th er resonances. It ta p p e d o ld n o tio n s of a fortress A m erica a n d it exposed n o rm s a b o u t g en d er, since it w a s to u te d ab o v e all b y p atrio tic conservatives: if the c o u n try w a s a h o m e, it w a s m e n 's job to d e fe n d it. The d om estic im ag ery reached a logical clim ax in advice offered in 1981 b y D ep u ty U nd ersecretary of D efense T hom as K. Jones a b o u t h o w A m erican s m ig h t close the w in d o w a n d resist n u c le ar attack: "D ig a hole, cover it u p w ith a co u p le of d o o rs a n d th e n th ro w th ree feet of d irt o n top. . . . If th ere are e n o u g h shovels to go a ro u n d , e v ery b o d y 's g o in g to m ak e it."83 N o tio n s so fanciful w ere d riv e n b y so m eth in g m o re th a n fear of Soviet a t­ tack. T he w in d o w of v u ln era b ility h a d p reced en ts in th e b o m b e r a n d m issile "g ap s" of the 1950s (and the "th ro w -w e ig h t g a p " of th e mid-1970s). Like th em .

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it serv ed p a rtisa n e n d s — to d iscred it the p a rty in p o w er. D em ocrats n o w in ­ stead of R epublicans— a n d b ro a d e r p u rp o ses: to rein state th e cen trality of m ili­ ta ry m ig h t in A m erican policy a n d of th e C old W ar in A m erican life. N ig h t­ m ares of Soviet triu m p h also in v erted d rea m s of A m erican victory. E ver since Billy M itchell in th e 1920s, sketches of w h a t th e en em y m ig h t d o b y air ag ain st A m erica th in ly d isg u ise d w h a t som e A m ericans w a n te d to d o to others. W h at th e y n o w w a n te d , or a t least th o u g h t u sefu l to p re te n d th ey d id , w a s victory, po litical o r m ilitary, o v er th e Soviets. N o t su rp risin g ly , th e re tu rn of th e C old W ar b ro u g h t ren e w e d visions of w in n in g it. A m o n g o th er w ay s, those visions surfaced in th e C arter a d m in istratio n 's fi­ n a l strategic plans. P resid en tial D irective 59, in B rzezinski's w o rd s, allo w ed for u se of n u c le ar w e a p o n s " a t levels ran g in g from tactical to th e strategic, selec­ tiv ely a t a large v a rie ty of targ ets o v er p ro trac te d p e rio d s of tim e." In sh o rt, it offered the o p tio n of w a g in g lim ited a n d victo rio u s n u c le ar w ar. In p articu lar, it stressed " d e c a p ita tio n "— d e stru c tio n of th e Soviets' c o m m an d system . Since A m erican w a r p la n s h a d long p o sited a v a rie ty of o p tio n s, PD-59 in v o lv ed m o re a sh ift in e m p h a sis th a n a rev o lu tio n in strategy, b u t it w a s a n o tab le shift. H o w m u c h C arter a n d h is tea m em braced w a s n e v e r clear (R eagan's ad m in is­ tra tio n g ra sp e d it m ore firm ly). M any strateg ists in a n d o u t of g o v e rn m e n t d o u b te d the likelihood of k eep in g n u c le ar w a r lim ited a n d th e w isd o m of " d e ­ cap itatin g " the v e ry g o v e rn m e n t w ith w h ich th e U n ited States w o u ld h av e to d e al to keep su c h a w a r lim ited. A s Secretary B row n conceded, "W h at m ig h t sta rt as a su p p o se d ly controlled, lim ited strike . . . w o u ld v e ry lik e ly . . . esca­ late to a full-scale n u c le ar w a r." Since the a d m in istratio n leak ed w o rd of PD-59, o n e of its p u rp o se s m a y h av e b e en th e fam iliar o n e of sh o rin g u p d eterren ce; as John N e w h o u se p u ts it, "If th e Soviets d id see lim ited n u c le ar w a r as a n op tio n , B rzezinski w a n te d th em o n notice th a t it w o u ld be a tw o -p a rty gam e." But in w a r p lan n in g , th e g am e p lay in g w e n t o n a t so m a n y levels th a t in te n tio n s b e ­ cam e im possible to u n rav el, especially since k eep in g th e en em y g u essin g w a s o n e p o in t of th e gam e.84 W h atev er th e inten tio n s, talk of w in n in g a n u c le ar w a r w a s n o w b ack in fash­ ion, in th e C a rte r a d m in istra tio n in a h e sita n t w ay, a n d m o re forcefully a m o n g o th e r strateg ists a n d p re te n d e rs to the throne. T he m o st n o to rio u s instance of th a t talk cam e in Ja n u ary 1980 a t the h e ig h t of crisis in th e M ideast, in co m m en ts b y G eorge Bush, w h o so u g h t the G O P 's p resid en tia l n o m in atio n . B ush rejected th e id ea th a t "th ere is n o su ch th in g as a w in n e r in a n u c le ar exchange," a n d a rg u e d th a t if "co m m an d a n d control" system s, " in d u stria l p o ten tial," a n d "a p ercen tag e of y o u r citizens" w ere in su re d "surv iv ab ility ," a n d if o n e sid e "in ­ flicts m ore d a m a g e o n th e o p p o sitio n ," th e n "y o u can h av e a w in n er." R onald R eagan echoed B ush's outlook, th o u g h h e w a s m o re careful to couch it in term s of w h a t th e Soviets believed: "W e h av e a different reg a rd for h u m a n life th an those m o n sters d o ," h e a rg u e d , a n d th ey "d ec id ed som e tim e ago th a t a n u clear w a r w as possible a n d w in n ab le." T h o u g h it retain ed its d efen d ers, th e n o tio n of

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w a r's disutility, alm o st accepted w isd o m e arly in th e 1970s, w a s n o w severely challenged.85 Victory, w h e th e r in th e g am e of strategic d eterren ce o r in w ar, req u ire d n e w w e a p o n s like th e MX. C a rte r to lerated th a t m issile as a d istaste fu l concession to foes of h is SALT II T reaty a n d to th e n e e d to close th e w in d o w of v u ln era b ility — th e MX w o u ld p re su m a b ly b e im m u n e to a p re e m p tiv e strik e b y th e Soviets. O th ers saw th e MX as a w a r-w in n in g w e a p o n — its m a n y w a r­ h e a d s w o u ld b e so accurate th a t they co u ld c arry o u t a p re e m p tiv e strike, o n e d e v asta tin g to th e Soviets because th ey d e p e n d e d m o re th a n th e U n ited States o n lan d -b a se d m issiles, th e only k in d v u ln era b le to su c h a strike. Still, d e b ate o n th e MX— a n d n o w e a p o n ev er g e n e ra te d m o re fu rio u s a n d foolish d e b a te — sh o w ed h o w h a rd it w a s to achieve su c h a m illen n ial goal, o r e v en th e m o d e st aim of rearm am en t. The forces of re a rm a m e n t w ere as strid e n t as ever, b u t o p p o n e n ts a n d skeptics w e re b e tte r m o b ilized th a n in th e 1950s a n d 1960s. T he long MX d e b a te h a d m a n y facets, b u t like a v u ltu re h o v e rin g o v e r a d e a d carcass, it k e p t circling back to th e v exin g q u e stio n of h o w to b a se th e in ­ fernal m ach in es— th e y h a d to b e invisible to th e Soviets for th e ir safety a n d y et co u n table b y th e Soviets in o rd e r to verify com p lian ce w ith SALT II, w h ile h a v ­ in g th e capacity for u tte r precisio n possible o n ly b y o p e ra tin g fro m fixed silos. W h en th e d ile m m a a b o u t b a sin g th e MX arose, d e b ate "e n te re d its rococo p e rio d ." C o u n tless schem es em erged: one for "co n cealin g each MX in a fiftym ile covered tren ch th ro u g h w h ic h it w o u ld ra n d o m ly trav el"; a n o th e r for a shell g am e in w h ic h tw o h u n d re d m issiles w o u ld b e sh u ffled a m o n g forty-six h u n d re d shelters w h o se p o rts co u ld b e o p e n e d for Soviet aerial inspection; a n d o th ers to sh u ttle th e m issiles a m o n g o p a q u e w a te r po o ls, to m o u n t th e m o n tru ck s o r railro ad s o r dirigibles o r seaplanes, a n d to p u t th e m in th e oceans o r th e G reat Lakes. T hose p ro p o sa ls n o t technically lu d ic ro u s in v o lv ed o u tra ­ g eo u s econom ic a n d ecological costs, th rea te n in g to m ak e th e MX (as th e a ir force allegedly b o asted ) "m a n 's larg est project." O r th ey jeo p a rd iz e d one b ra n c h 's p rero g a tiv e s— the air force reactio n to p u ttin g th e MX o n d iesel su b ­ m arin es seem ed to be: "P u t som e of o u r m issiles u n d e rw a te r? Y ou've g o t to b e o u t of y o u r mind." The v a rio u s p la n s p ro m p te d "sn ick erin g a n d g ig g lin g " am o n g experts, w hile p o p u la r m ag azin es h a d a field d a y d e p ic tin g th em . By 1982, "d en sep ack " w a s in v o g u e — b u n c h in g th e m issiles w o u ld p re su m a b ly force incom ing Soviet w a rh e a d s to com m it "fratricid e" a g ain st each other. T h en the R eagan a d m in istra tio n gave u p , settlin g for h a lf th e o rig in al n u m b er, p lu n k in g th em in old M in u tem an silos, a n d p ro m o tin g a n e w sin g le-w arh ead M id g etm an .86 The MX w a s n o t the first w e a p o n c au g h t in a p o litical crossfire, b u t n o p re ­ v io u s sy stem g e n erate d su c h public rancor, b e w ild e rin g technical d eb ate, a n d d e sp a ir th a t n o a ltern ativ e w a s a n y good. T he spectacle of a g rea t n a tio n o sten ­ sibly rea rm in g b u t d isa rm e d b y its in te rn al bick erin g w a s n o t a p re tty one. It seem ed to se n d signals eerily like th o se arisin g in th e d e b ate o n w o m e n in com -

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b at. C a rte r's h o p e th a t d ra ft reg istra tio n w o u ld co n v ey "th e c o u n try 's u n ity a n d resolve to the Soviet U n io n " d isso lv ed in to "a m u rk y altercatio n a b o u t the influence of w o m e n o n m e n in tren ch w a rfare ," th e New Yorker n o te d , so th a t "a so m b er d e clara tio n of n atio n al p u rp o se to th e w o rld h a s d e g e n e ra te d in to a h ig h ly visible dom estic q u arrel." T h at q u arrel, like th e o n e o v er th e MX, su g ­ g ested th a t A m ericans lacked th e k een sense of n a tio n al p e ril a n d u n ity e v id e n t earlier in the C old W ar. In d eed , d en u n ciatio n s of A m erican s alo n g th o se lines w e re a n o th e r ritu a l of th e p erio d . E ven R epublicans, co m p lain ed con serv ativ e c o lu m n ist G eorge W ill, w o u ld n o t o p p o se g rain sales to th e Soviet U n io n lest th e y lose th e farm vote: "T hey u su a lly are th rillin g ly fierce a b o u t R ussia, b u t n o w say: L et's be to u g h as n ails w ith th e R u ssian b e a r b u t, golly, let's n o t sto p feed in g it." M ore lu g u b rio u sly , exiled Soviet w rite r A lex an d er S olzh en itsy n m o a n e d th a t "th e W est sim p ly d o es n o t believe th a t th e tim e for sacrifices h a s a rriv e d "; its "sleek g o d of affluence" h a d rep laced its " h ig h -m in d e d v iew of th e w o rld ." 87 T he p ro b lem w a s n o t A m erican s' d isu n ity o r lack of w ill, h o w ev er, b u t th e im p lau sib ility of th e th re a t th ey w ere su m m o n e d to m eet a n d th e m e th o d s b y w h ic h th e y w ere ask ed to m eet it. D ebate w a s u n reso lv ab le o n th e MX a n d u g ly o n d ra ft reg istra tio n because n e ith e r w a s n eed ed : m assiv e A m erican arm ies w e re u n lik ely to m arch, Soviet rockets w ere n o t a b o u t to o v e rw h elm A m erican defenses. R eagan's su rre n d e r o n th e MX in 1983 w a s telling: "A m erica's d e te r­ re n t w a s n 't b ro k e n a n d R eagan d id n 't fix it," John N e w h o u se later co n clu d ed . A t m o st, d e b ate o n the MX sh o w ed th a t lan d -b a se d m issiles w ere n o w obso­ lete; it w a s tim e to cut off o n e leg of th e n u c le ar tria d (bom bers, su b m arin es, a n d lan d -b a se d rockets). M ore b a ld ly th a n m o st w e ap o n s, th e MX se rv ed political m o re th a n strategic n e e d s (if th e tw o can b e d ise n ta n g le d )— to placate p o liti­ cians w h o claim ed th a t SALT II w o u ld d isa rm A m erica a n d to offer signals of A m erican resolve, lest forgoing th e MX give " a n im p o rta n t p e rc ep tu a l a d v a n ­ tag e to th e Soviets" a n d offer "a d a n g e ro u sly m islead in g sig n al," as D efense Secretary B row n a rg u e d .88 O nce again, in tan g ib le criteria justified a decision. By th eir logic, th e costlier a w e a p o n s p ro g ra m the g rea ter its "p erc ep tu a l" ad v an tag e: it sh o w e d th a t A m erica w o u ld sto p at n o th in g to fight its ad v ersary . T h at ratio n ale also d ro v e d ra ft reg istra tio n — n e ed e d . C a rte r said, "to increase o u r p re p a re d n e ss," d e m ­ o n stra te " o u r resolve as a n a tio n ," a n d " d e te r Soviet ag g ressio n ." Such reaso n ­ in g h a d lo n g d riv e n defense policy, b u t it w a s n o w fu rth e r d iv o rced from a real w o rld of th re a t a n d c om bat a n d m o re self-referential, as if it in v o lv ed less w h a t Soviets th o u g h t of A m ericans, o r ev en w h a t A m erican s th o u g h t th ey th o u g h t, th a n w h a t A m ericans th o u g h t of them selves. C a rte r said as m u c h in telling n e w s executives " th a t a stro n g A m erica, w illin g to exert its stre n g th w h e n nec­ essary, is a n in teg ral p a rt of th e psy ch e of o u r co u n try a n d also a leg itim ate role for A m erica to play," m ak in g defense so u n d seco n d ary a n d in ad v e rte n t. The "narcissistic" q u ality of m ilitarizatio n n o w sw elled .89

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O th e r u n se ttlin g cu rren ts sw irle d in strategic d eb ate. Strategic jarg o n m a d e w e ap o n s seem to b e cu rio u sly h u m a n a n d p e o p le cu rio u sly in an im ate. A s th e New Yorker n o ted , "W h en one n u c le ar m issile is lo st in th e ex p lo sio n of an o th er, th e ex p erts call it 'fra tric id e ,'" w h ile n u c le ar w e a p o n s w e re said to " 'p ro lif­ erate,' a n d to b rin g fo rth one 'g e n e ra tio n ' after an o th er, as th o u g h d e a th itself h a d g a in e d th e p o w e r to give b irth a n d m u ltip ly ." M oreover, Soviet a n d A m eri­ can cities w e re left o p e n to attack, lest th e n a tio n able to d e fe n d its cities w o u ld b e te m p te d to sta rt a w ar. "O nce, m ilitary forces w ere d e p lo y e d to p ro tec t th e civilian p o p u latio n , b u t n o w th e civilian p o p u la tio n is d e p lo y e d to p ro tec t th e m ilitary forces."90 T he excruciating focus o n n u c le ar w e a p o n s a n d w a r w a s all th e m o re re­ m ark ab le because it w a s irrelev an t to th e challenges m o st gallin g to A m erican s in 1980, th e p lig h t of A m erican h o stag es in Iran a n d th e n a tio n 's sag g in g eco­ nom ic p o sitio n in th e w o rld . Few th o u g h t th a t th e MX w o u ld rescue th e h o s­ tages o r signal A m erican resolve to Tehran: in d ee d , in p rev a ilin g A m erican im ­ ages, crazed Islam ic fanatics w ere oblivious to su c h o rd in a ry m easu res. Yet th e sense p e rsisted th a t A m erica's h u m ilia tio n th ere resu lte d from th e flabbiness of its n u c le ar m uscle, a n d th a t to u g h e n in g it w o u ld c o m m an d th e resp ect th a t w o u ld p re v e n t fu rth e r indignities. T h at reaso n in g flo w ed fro m a n ostalgic d e ­ sire to rec ap tu re a rem em b ered age of sim p le issu es a n d u n d is p u te d glory, a n d to escape the baffling challenges A m erican s n o w faced. D efin in g p o w e r bro ad ly, as th e p ro d u c t of th e h e a lth of all its system s, w a s fru stra tin g w h e n th o se system s seem ed in d isarray ; it h a d n o t b e en v e ry p o p u la r e v e n w h e n p ressed , albeit haltingly, b y a p o p u la r P re sid e n t E isenhow er. D efining A m eri­ can p o w e r in m ilitary term s offered th e p ro m ise, if a ra th e r w istfu l one, of sw eep in g asid e su c h com plexities. If old terro rs re tu rn e d w ith th e n e w C o ld W ar, so d id a n illusion of fam iliarity a n d decisive pow er. A m erica w a s re a d y to p lu n g e "back to the fu tu re," as a 1985 m o v ie w a s titled , a n d so o n elected a lea d er w h o e m b o d ied th a t oxym oronic aspiratio n . M eanw hile, C a rte r's effort to free th e A m erican h o stag es in T eh ran raised q u estio n s a b o u t the u tility of m ore m o d e st m ilitary forces. C o m p lex n e g o tia ­ tio n s w ith Iran y ield ed little in the o p e n in g m o n th s of 1980, a n d D em o crats like Sen. Ted K ennedy scented b lood, h o p in g to d e n y C a rte r ren o m in atio n . A g a in st h is b e tte r instincts. C a rte r o rd e re d a rescue m issio n in A p ril, b u t A m erican h eli­ co p ters fo u n d ere d in th e d esert, a g g ra v atin g A m erica's h u m ilia tio n (alth o u g h th eir fate m ig h t h av e b e en w o rse if th ey h a d reach ed Tehran). Secretary of State V ance o p p o se d th e m ission a n d resig n ed (as G a d d is S m ith later n o te d , "a rare act in A m erican h istory") to p ro te st it a n d th e w h o le d rift of C a rte r's policy.91 T he failed m issio n w a s stre n u o u sly a n aly zed , as if it e m b o d ied all th e ills of a flo u n d erin g m ilitary m achine. It w as too m in o r a n d im p ro b ab le a m issio n to b e a r su ch freight, b u t as the o n ly field-test of A m erican p o w er, it h a d to d o so, b ein g u se d , as one co lu m n ist sh re w d ly n o te d , "to d isc red it w h a te v e r" A m eri­ cans "w ere alre ad y of a m in d to d iscred it." C a rte r w a s " a t th e to p of th e list,"

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w ith A m erican defenses c o m p etin g for th a t spot. C a rte r w a s "talk in g loudly, w ith a sm all s tic k /' a n n o u n c e d Newsweek, w h ic h u se d th e occasion to co m p are ev ery a sp ect of A m erica's com bat p o stu re u n flatte rin g ly to th e Soviets'. T he Ira n m issio n w a s "a p o p g u n sh o t h e a rd a ro u n d th e w o rld ," it claim ed, a d d in g th a t A m erica's allies w ere o u tra g e d b ecause su ch actions "co u ld d riv e th e Ira­ n ia n s d irec tly in to the Soviet c a m p — o r e v en p lu n g e th e su p e rp o w e rs in to a co n fro n tatio n ." Business Week, like m a n y o b serv ers a n d a g ro w in g ch o ru s in C ongress, w o n d e re d if the failure p ro v e d " th a t th e P en tag o n h a s com e to ex­ p e ct too m u c h from its com plex h a rd w a re ," w h ich m ig h t b e "d istu rb in g ly p ro n e to failure." In d ee d , for y ears critics h a d w a n te d th e P en tag o n to focus less o n w e ap o n s, m o re o n read in ess a n d tra in in g — advice C arter seem ed to e n ­ d o rse in 1979, am id m u c h talk of d e v elo p in g a "R ap id D ep lo y m en t Force." But th a t o p in io n w a s a t once fashionable a n d larg ely u n im p le m e n te d am id d e ­ m a n d s for m o re arm a m e n ts.92 In th e m ean tim e, a w ith e rin g a ssa u lt o n th e policies g u id in g rea rm am en t w a s m o u n te d . F aulting th e m ilitary for m an ag erial a n d technological to p ­ heav in ess, a rm y officers R ichard G abriel a n d Paul Savage assailed th e loss of a w a rrio r sp irit in Crisis in Command (1978), a m u ch -d iscu ssed a n d d isp u te d cri­ tique. Far fro m assigning th e m ilita ry 's tro u b les in V ietnam to fam iliar cu lp rits like m e d d lin g civilian su p erio rs, th ey fo u n d th a t th e a rm y " h a d literally d e ­ stro y e d itself" because its lead ers h a d lost to u ch w ith co m b at a n d em b raced th e career-b u ild in g v alu es of th e co rp o rate w o rld . T he cohesion of co m b at forces w a s u n d e rm in e d b y officers w h o p riz e d career a d v an c em en t o v e r lead ­ e rsh ip in b attle, b y m e th o d s of tra in in g d e sig n ed to "p ro d u c e tro o p s like sau ­ sages," a n d b y a sy stem of ro tatio n th a t severed b o n d s am o n g so ld iers a n d sen t th e m h o m e as soon as th ey lea rn ed to fight. T he a rm y h a d becom e a n in v erted p y ra m id to p -h eav y w ith officers "literally trip p in g ov er each o th er" in V iet­ n am . The "successful a rm y centers itself o n th e v alu es a n d experiences associ­ a te d w ith com bat," p le a d e d G abriel a n d Savage, b u t th ey d o u b te d th a t th e offi­ cer co rp s w o u ld take th a t v ie w — it " sh o u ld h av e b e e n a p p a lle d " b y the d isin te g ratio n of u n it cohesion in V ietnam , b u t "w e fin d n o ev idence th a t it w a s."93 Jam es Fallow s w o rk e d th a t p e ssim ism o n to a larg er can v as in National De­ fense (1981). H e too so u g h t "to restore the m ilitary sp irit," b u t also saw a system a n d c u ltu re of d efense d e e p ly resistan t to resto ratio n . P en tag o n officials w ere o b livious to th e ineffable n a tu re of w a rfare a n d o bsessed w ith a quixotic " p u r­ su it of th e m agic w e a p o n ." A s a result, w e a p o n s w ere too few, costly, a n d frag­ ile to p e rm it o n g o in g u se in tra in in g o r b attle, co n ferrin g theoretical su p e rio rity b u t b attlefield im potence. T he P entagon, "in b u sin ess to sp e n d m oney," h a d created a technologically m u sc le b o u n d giant. T he "b aro q u e arsen al" (as a n ­ o th er critic called it) also im p o sed su ch m o n stro u s d e sig n a n d d e v elo p m e n t costs th a t m a n y co rp o ratio n s w ere fleeing th e w e a p o n s b u sin ess, lead in g to a "th in n in g o u t o f th e co n tracto r b ase" th a t m a d e it d o u b tfu l th a t "th e U n ited

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States could quickly g ear u p for w a r p ro d u c tio n if th e n e e d arose." A n d w e ap o n s p ro g ram s rested o n p ercep tio n s of th e Soviet th re a t a n d n u c le ar w a r th a t h a d little basis in reality.94 Fallow s saw th e m ilitary as a h o u se of card s in a d e q u a te for n a tio n a l defense; those p eerin g d e e p e r into th e sh a d o w y realm of strateg ic w e a p o n s saw so m e­ th in g w orse. A fter n e w s in 1980 th a t the c o m p u ter sy stem s co n tro llin g A m er­ ica's n u clear w e a p o n s h a d g o tte n fo u led u p a n d se n t a n a le rt of im p e n d in g Soviet attack, one n e w sp a p e r p o se d the m o rb id q u estio n , "D o o m sd a y b y a short-circuit?" a n d the New Yorker issu e d a n o th e r m o rd a n t com m ent: "N u c le a r fantasy, it seem ed, restless after so m a n y y ears of b e in g c o o p ed u p in th e spec­ tral w o rld of the com puters, w a s seeking rev en g e a g ain st h u m a n reality b y try ­ in g to s u p p la n t it altogether." T he sp ecter of accid en tal n u c le ar w a r n o w received m ore a tten tio n th a n a t a n y tim e since th e early 1960s; th e co m m u n ica­ tio n s a n d c o m m an d system s for A m erica's arsen al seem ed m o re fragile a n d ju m p y th a n ever. E vidence also m o u n te d th a t th o se sy stem s w ere o p e ra te d so th a t "if th e U n ited States d o es n o t strike first in a crisis th a t d e v elo p s in to a n u ­ clear w ar, it m ay be u n ab le to strike b ack a t all in a n y o rg an iz ed w ay ." In 1985, D aniel Ford su m m arize d evidence th a t h a d b e en g a th e rin g since th e late 1970s. A lth o u g h strategic p la n s w ere p re su m a b ly d e sig n ed to d e te r o r lim it w ar, "try ­ in g to in d o ctrin ate th e Strategic A ir C o m m a n d a b o u t co n tro llin g escalatio n is like th in k in g a D utch uncle talk can k eep a h o t ro d d e r from flooring it w h e n th e red lig h t yields to green." In F ord's p o rtra it, th e sy stem w a s h o t-w ire d for A r­ m a g e d d o n .95 Reflecting th eir tim es, su ch critiques w ere so m etim es c o n fu sed a n d g en er­ ally m ore cautious th a n co m p arab le ones early in th e 1970s. T heir stance w a s critical b u t th eir politics v ag u ely cen trist— Fallow s, w h o h a d "d elib erately av o id ed m ilitary service" in V ietnam , sn ip e d a t b o th p atrio tic co n serv ativ es w h o d e m a n d e d " 'm o r e ' defense [but] n e v er th em selv es w o re th e u n ifo rm " a n d "p oliticians of the left" w h o em braced "th e sam e m echanical, technological v iew of w a rfare " as the d efense h aw k s.96 C ritics u p d a te d o ld c o m p lain ts a b o u t th e m ilitary -in d u strial com plex a n d reflected th e m o u n tin g se n tim en t of th e 1970s th a t the federal g o v e rn m e n t could n o t d o a n y th in g w ell. But th e y es­ ch ew ed the p red ictio n s a b o u t w a r 's e n d m a d e earlier in th e d ecad e a n d often im p lied th a t a leaner, m ea n er m ilitary m ig h t h av e w o n in S o u th east A sia. T hey assem bled som e of the evidence u se d b y an tin u cle ar activists b u t a v o id e d th eir do g m atic stances. W hile th ey d id n o t g reatly slow o r alter rea rm am en t, th eir w o rk , w id e ly d iscu ssed a n d echoed b y the m ass m ed ia (CBS N ew s, for ex am ­ ple, in a m ajor 1981 d o cu m en tary ) h e lp e d su sta in o p p o sitio n to re a rm a m e n t d u rin g th e R eagan years a n d to su g g est it rested o n a fragile fo u n d atio n . T heir critiques also reflected the stage of m ilitarizatio n th e U n ited States w a s en tering. D espite anxiety a b o u t technological change, w e a p o n s d e v e lo p m e n t w as n o w cautious a n d increm ental. M ost w e ap o n s of 1980 w ere d e v elo p ed o r foreseen b y 1950: B-52 b o m b ers still flew as o n e leg of th e n u c le ar triad ; ICBMs

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h a d th e ir p re c u rso rs in G e rm a n rockets of W orld W ar H; th e tan k , th e h elicop­ ter, th e jet fighter, a n d th e aircraft carrier d o m in a te d co n v en tio n al forces in 1980 as th e y h a d in 1950. A ll these w e a p o n s d id exist in ev er n e w e r o r retro fitted v ersio ns, w ith stu n n in g e n h an c em en t of th e ir precision, p o w er, sp eed , o r n u m ­ b ers, a n d c ram m ed w ith m in ia tu riz e d c o m p u ters a n d electronics b arely g lim p se d th irty y ears earlier. But decad es of sp e n d in g h a d g e n erate d in g en io u s refin em en ts of old id eas m ore th a n rev o lu tio n ary n e w w e a p o n s— little o n th e scale of ch an g e seen b e tw ee n 1915 a n d 1945. Soon th e w e ap o n s of W orld W ar II th em selv es sp ra n g to life again, as old b a ttlesh ip s b ristlin g w ith n e w g ear ste am ed back to sea. It w a s a n era of e la b o ratio n a n d o rn am e n ta tio n , a b it like th e trills a n d arp eg g io s th a t e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry co m p o sers p ile d o n to sim ple m u sical form s. N o w o n d e r ob serv ers th o u g h t th a t th e arsen al h a d e n te red its "b aro q u e " o r "rococo" age a n d ex p ressed a n a w e d c o n te m p t for th e elab o rate stru c tu re s created. C e n trist critics q u e stio n e d w h e th e r th e U n ited States w a s rea rm in g effec­ tively, o th ers w h e th e r it sh o u ld a t all. R ichard B arnet, th e m o st tre n c h a n t of th ese critics, su m m a riz e d th eir a rg u m e n ts in Real Security (1981). B arnet ac­ k n o w le d g e d th a t "th e decline of A m erican p o w e r is real," b u t a ttrib u te d it to forces ov er w h ic h the U n ited States h a d little co n tro l— "d eco lo n izatio n " a n d global "financial a n d econom ic in te rd e p e n d e n c e "— a n d to th e a rm s race, in w h ic h A m erican (and Soviet) lea d ers co m m itted "self-inflicted w o u n d s ." Barn e t d isp u te d th e alarm ists' p o rtra y a l of Soviet d efen se policy, a rg u in g th a t th e h ig h p o rtio n of Soviet G N P sp e n t o n defense reflected econom ic w eak n ess a n d inefficiency, n o t g reater real o u tp u t. "B eing 'o u ts p e n t' b y th e Soviets o u g h t to b e seen m ore as a b a d g e of th e ir w e ak n e ss th a n a th reat." In a n y ev en t, w h a t d ro v e th e a rm s race w as n o t tan g ib le criteria of p o w e r b u t a fo o lh ard y q u e st to en h an ce "p erc ep tio n s" of p ow er. "O nce th e p u rp o se o f m ilitary sp e n d in g is to create 'p e rc e p tio n s/ a n d w e a p o n s are p ro c u re d p rim a rily as sym bols, th ere is n e v e r e n o u g h ." M oreover, th e p o w e r p ro c u re d w a s g en erally u seless because it w a s grossly d e stru ctiv e a n d because m ilitary a n d econom ic p o w e r w ere " d e ­ co u p lin g ." F ru stra ted ov er h o stag e taking, en erg y sh o rtag es, a n d th e "o ften p u z z lin g b eh av io r of th e Soviet U n io n ," A m erican s h a d a n u n d e rsta n d a b le "im p u lse to reach for the g u n . Yet w h e n w e d o reach for th e g u n , it d o es n o t seem to w o rk the w a y it u se d to w o rk ." T he e ro d in g econom ic p o sitio n of th e U n ited States m o st w o rrie d B arnet, w h o w a rn e d th a t re a rm a m e n t w a s h a ste n ­ in g th a t erosion, w h ic h in tu rn u n d e rm in e d th e n a tio n 's m ilitary stren g th . N o r d id h e see th e Soviet U n io n as a serio u s threat. L ong before M ikhail G or­ b ach ev 's a d v e n t to p o w e r m a d e it fashionable to say so, h e a rg u e d th a t th e So­ v iet "econom y is stalled, a n d th e v e ry legitim acy of th e sy stem is in q u estio n ." B arnet d id n o t d eclare th e C old W ar ov er o r w a r a th in g of th e p a st, b u t for the su p e rp o w e rs, " w a r is n o t a natio n al-secu rity o p tio n in th e n u c le ar age." In ­ d eed , a rg u in g th a t "th e a rm s race is th e g reatest th re a t w e face," h e d e co u p led n a tio n al security a n d m ilitary stre n g th .97

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A s w ith c en trist critics, o r for th a t m a tte r bellicose e x p o n en ts of rea rm am en t, B arnet offered few sta rtlin g a rg u m e n ts— E isen h o w er h a d a sse rte d th a t n a ­ tio n al security rested o n econom ic a n d sp iritu a l as m u c h as o n m ilitary stren g th. T he lack of n o v elty o w ed less to a failure of im a g in atio n th a n to a k in d of historical gridlock: too little h a d y e t c h an g e d in th e w o rld sy stem a n d in h o w A m ericans saw th eir place in it to alter g reatly h o w th ey d e b a te d m ilitarizatio n . But w h ile th e a rg u m e n ts w ere fam iliar, a sh ift in e m p h a se s w a s ev id en t. The econom ic d a n g e rs of m ilitarizatio n n o w w ere risin g to th e to p of th e ag en d a. In th eir o w n w ay, ev en advocates of m ilitary ren ew al a ck n o w le d g ed th e d an g ers: th e n e w R eagan team d e cid ed th a t re a rm a m e n t w o u ld b e fu n d e d b y cap s o n o r cuts in th e g ro w in g n o n d e fe n se sector of fed eral b u d g e ts. T he a ssu m p tio n th a t m ilitary p o w e r a n d econom ic affluence w o rk e d in b e n ig n sy n erg y w ith each o th er w a s n o t w h o lly in ru in s, in p a rt because its d em ise w a s p a in fu l to ad m it. It w as, h ow ever, n o w q u estio n ab le e n o u g h th a t re a rm a m e n t p ro v o k e d sh a rp d e ­ b a te a n d a w id e sp re a d sense th a t its econom ic fo u n d a tio n w a s a t b e st un stab le. In d ee d it w as. The n a tio n 's com petitiveness, especially in fields it lo n g h a d d o m in a te d (autom obiles) o r recently p io n ee red (co m p u ters a n d electronics), c o n tin u ed to slip, a n d a y a w n in g deficit in m erc h an d ise tra d e em erg ed (a su r­ p lu s in services g o t little notice). W ash in g to n 's b a ilo u t of C h ry sler C o rp o ratio n in 1980 (a sim ilar lifeline h a d b e en th ro w n to L ockheed) d ra m a tiz e d th e p ro b ­ lem: A m erica's global econom ic su p rem acy w a s ero d in g . N o r w a s th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t im ag in ativ e o r concerted in response. It flailed a w ay a t sto p -g a p actions (as w ith C hrysler) b u t offered n o g u id an ce of th e so rt p re su m a b ly g iv en b y Jap an 's cen tral p la n n in g agency, b o th feared a n d a d m ire d b y w o rrie d A m er­ ican experts. P articularly in th e 1980s, fed eral p olicy offset econom ic slu g g ish ­ n ess b y deficit sp e n d in g a n d b y en co u rag in g in d iv id u a ls a n d co rp o ratio n s to b orrow , b u t th a t too w as a sto p -g a p m ea su re w h o se leverage d eclin ed as fi­ n an cin g the d e b t seized m ore of th e fed eral b u d g e t. T hose tre n d s also u n d e rc u t fed eral efforts to p ro v id e econom ic security for A m erican s a n d to m ak e in v est­ m en ts in science, ed u catio n , a n d "in fra stru c tu re " th a t m ig h t resto re A m erican com petitiveness. Poorer w o m e n a n d th eir ch ild ren b o re th e b ru n t of econom ic decline, b u t m a n y o th er A m ericans, d e sp ite im p ressiv e job creatio n in th e 1970s, faced sta g n a n t o r falling real incom es. T hose g en eral tren d s h a d m a n y causes, b u t also m a n y links to m ilitarizatio n . W h eth er m ilitarizatio n h a d m a d e for a n e t g ain o r loss in A m erica's econom ic h e alth w a s n o t easily reducible to su m m a ry ju d g m e n t, ho w ev er. C o m m o n w is­ d o m w as th a t it sta rv ed b u sin ess of th e cap ital a n d ex p ertise n e e d e d to rem a in com petitive, w hile rivals like W est G e rm a n y a n d Japan, freelo ad in g off of A m erican defense, p o u re d th eir treasu re into efforts to w re st m ark e ts fro m the U n ited States. But n o autom atic m ech an ism in su re d th a t cuts in d efen se w o u ld se n d d o llars a n d scientists into o th er fields. C ertain ly th e P en tag o n h a d u n d e r­ w ritte n A m erican su p rem acy in som e m ark e ts— aviation, space co m m u n ica­ tions, n u clear p o w e r— w h e re th e ov erlap b e tw ee n civilian a n d m ilitary tech-

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no lo g ies w a s h ig h a n d th e cap ital req u ire d so h u g e th a t few co m p an ies co u ld su rv iv e w ith o u t recourse to b o th civilian a n d m ilitary m ark ets. M ilitary m ar­ kets, h ow ever, w ere also n o w "m o re n a rro w ly specialized, w ith less spin-off for th e decisive c o n su m er in d u strie s."98 The en g in es a n d airfram es of A m eri­ can b o m b ers in th e 1940s a n d 1950s h a d b e en a d ap ta b le to d e v elo p m e n t of com m ercial airliners, a v a st m ark e t in w h ic h A m erican co m p an ies triu m p h e d . B ut in the "b aro q u e " era of w eap o n ry , w a rp la n e s w ere b u ilt to p erfo rm an ce sta n d a rd s a n d c ram m ed w ith electronic g e a r useless o r too costly for th e p a s­ sen g er jet: to take a n extrem e case, 1980s "ste alth " tech n o lo g y su p p o se d ly m a d e w a rp la n e s invisible to en em y rad a r, b u t airlin ers d e p e n d e d for th eir su r­ v iv al in c ro w d ed skies precisely o n th eir visibility. In sh o rt, th e econom ic benefits of m ilitarizatio n w ere p ro b ab ly declining. W orse, for those w o rrie d a b o u t defense, its econom ic b ase seem ed in jeopardy: a con tracting in d u stria l sy stem m ig h t m ake th e P en tag o n d e p e n d e n t o n foreign sources, w h ich in tu rn m ig h t g ain a w h ip -h a n d o v er A m erican defense, esp e­ cially if th ey also fu n d e d A m erica's m o u n tin g deb t. A m erica w o u ld resem ble B ritain in 1940, still technically su p re m e in m a n y fields b u t so d e p e n d e n t o n o th ers' capital, resources, a n d factories th a t its su p rem acy in practical w ay s d is­ solved. M an y of the co m p lain ts a n d fears reg a rd in g these m atters w ere ex ag g erated , m isp laced, or d e v o id of sufficient context. The U n ited States in 1980 w as only loosely co m p arab le to B ritain in 1940, ju st as th e role of m ilitary force in d ecid ­ in g th e fate of n a tio n s w as p ro b ab ly n o t in 1980 w h a t it h a d b e e n fo rty y ears earlier. H a n d w rin g in g a b o u t A m erica's d eclin in g p ro sp ects in the m ilitary aren a also slig h ted sim ilar difficulties (ad m itte d ly h a rd to k n o w in th e Soviet U n io n 's case) th a t o th er m ilitary p o w e rs experienced. In so far as a " 'm ilitariza­ tio n of the w o rld eco n o m y ' " w a s "n o w ad v an c in g faster th a n it [had] for a g e n ­ eratio n ," th e ills of m ilitarizatio n w ere also n o w w id e ly sh ared .99 A n d the com ­ p la in t th a t allies let the U n ited States b e ar th e b u rd e n of th eir defense o v erlo oked h o w A m erican lead ers h a d w a n te d th a t b u rd e n a n d th e p o w e r th a t flo w ed from it, a n d ex p o sed a reversal in n o tio n s of w h a t m a d e th e U n ited States v irtu o u s: before 1940, m o st A m ericans h a d d e p lo re d th e life-draining, econom ically profligate h a b its of m ilitaristic states; now , m a n y em b raced those h a b its a n d reg retted th a t Japanese a n d W estern E u ro p ean s h a d a b a n d o n e d them . Ju st as strategic policy looked b ack w ard at th is critical ju n ctu re, so too d id econom ic policy, as "th e lu re of m ilitary K eynesianism " e n d u re d . In effect, or b y d efault, n atio n al lead ers d ecid ed th a t ren e w e d m ilitarizatio n w o u ld red ress o r a t least forestall the ills th a t m ilitarizatio n itself h a d b red . Such reaso n in g em erg ed b a ld ly in th e R eagan ad m in istratio n , as D efense Secretary C asp ar W einberger p ra ise d th e "su b stan tially beneficial effect o n th e eco n o m y " of its d efen se p ro g ram s. M ost m em b ers of C ongress, reg ard less of th eir party , g lad ly jo in ed the effort to m ake "th e defense bill a jobs bill," as one sen ato r p u t it. O nce

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again, air a n d n av al p o w e r rem a in e d th e p o p u la r ro u te, p ro m isin g stre n g th w ith o u t m ass sacrifice a n d re w a rd in g p o w e rfu l econom ic a n d p o litical in ter­ ests. M eanw hile, public-sector in v estm en t w a s n o t a b o u t to b e u p g ra d e d , g iv en w id e sp re a d o p p o sitio n to increased taxes a n d th e illu sio n th a t A m erican s su f­ fered u n d u ly u n d e r th e m (com pared to th eir econom ic co m p etito rs, th ey d id no t).100 U n d e r C a rte r a n d th e n R eagan, m ilitary rev italizatio n rested o n sh a k y fo u n ­ datio n s. T h o u g h its n o isiest advocates, m a n y co n serv ativ es a t h e a rt p riz e d it less th a n m o ral regeneration. Its strategic logic w a s flaw ed o r frig h te n in g (or both). T he geopolitical a ssu m p tio n u n d e rly in g it— a Soviet m en ace im m ed iate, titanic, a n d g ro w in g — w a s d eb atab le a t best. T he nostalgic, p atrio tic ferv o r fu elin g it w a s in fo rm ed b y A m erican self-d o u b t m o re th a n ex tern al realities. T he econom ic stre n g th n e e d e d for re a rm a m e n t w a s q u estio n ab le a n d th e eco­ nom ic w isd o m of re a rm a m e n t e v en m ore so. T he n e w C o ld W ar, as in ten se o n th e surface as th e o ld one, lacked th e o ld fo u n d atio n s. It g a in e d n e w life (as B arnet im plied) as a co n v en ien t w a y for b e le ag u e red su p e rp o w e r lead ers to package, su b su m e, o r avoid d iso rd e r in th e ir in te rn al po lities a n d th e w o rld sy stem — a fam iliar fu n ctio n b u t a fragile b asis for rem ilitarizatio n . A n d th e h a n d s a t the ru d d e r w e re u n s te a d y — C arter, in fo rm ed b u t relu ctan t; R eagan, co n fid en t b u t u n in fo rm ed . M ost A m ericans d id n o t closely follow the en d -o f-th e-d ecad e d e b ates ab o u t d efen se policy, in p a rt because those d eb ates w ere m o re arcan e th a n ever. N o n etheless, th eir sense of d e sp a ir a n d p o w erlessn ess, a cco rd in g to o n e a d e p t chronicler of th eir m o o d s, resem b led in m ore diffuse fo rm w h a t w o rrie d p o li­ cym akers. "R u n n in g o u t of gas," th o u g h t R abbit A n g stro m , tire Jo h n U p d ik e character w h o re tu rn e d in Rabbit Is Rich (1981). "T he fu ck in g w o rld is ru n n in g o u t of gas." R abbit him self, m o v in g agilely to sell Toyotas a t S p rin g er M otors, w a s g ettin g rich, b u t all a ro u n d h im w ere signs of a n a tio n ru n n in g o n e m p ty a n d im p o te n t in w a y s u n im a g in ab le for th e g en eratio n , a t least as it w a s re­ m em b ered , th a t h a d d e fe ate d fascism . "In th e p a rk a W orld W ar II tan k , m a d e in to a m o n u m e n t, p o in ts its g u n s a t ten n is c o u rts w h e re th e n e ts . . . k eep g et­ tin g rip p e d aw ay." R abbit's o u tlook o n th e w o rld 's co n v u lsio n s w a s volatile. H e "p u lls for the R am s the w a y h e d o es for th e A fg h an rebels a g ain st th e Soviet m ilitary m achine." But h e also felt, "W ho n e e d s K hom eini a n d h is oil? W ho n e ed s A fghanistan? Fuck th e R usskis. Fuck th e Japs, for th a t m atter. W e'll go it alone, from sea to sh in in g sea." To su c h sen tim en ts, R onald R eagan w a s finely a ttu n e d .101

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R estoration R onald R eagan's good luck as P resid en t seem ed to b e g in o n his first d a y in of­ fice. O n the m o rn in g of Jan u ary 20,1981, th e w o rd finally cam e th ro u g h th a t Iran w o u ld release the A m erican h ostages it h eld , in re tu rn for a p led g e to arb i­ trate the fate of the h u g e Iran ia n assets the U n ited States h a d frozen, b u t Iran d id n o t release the p lan e carry in g the h o stag es u n til m o m en ts after R eagan h a d tak en office. R eagan h a d n o th in g to d o w ith th e a rra n g e m e n t (unless, as som e in sid ers later ch arg ed , h is op erativ es h a d con n iv ed w ith Iran to p o stp o n e it u n ­ til after the 1980 elections), b u t in public im age a n d m em o ry h e w o u ld g et cred it for it, ju st as he long escap ed m u ch b lam e for his a d m in istratio n 's failure to g ain the release of h o stag es in L ebanon w h o h a d b een tak en o n his w atch. H e w o u ld also claim cred it for resto rin g A m erican pow er: w ith its h o stag es freed a n d n ew a rm a m e n ts accrued, the U n ited States itself seem ed freed from th e h u m ilia ­ tions of the 1970s, from the ap p allin g spectacle of b ein g h e ld h o stag e to g rim Soviet designs, oil-rich n a tio n s' blackm ail, a n d crazed k id n a p p e rs of A m eri­ cans. A s n o t only his backers b u t often his critics saw him , R eagan seem ed to h ave resto red n atio n al security as A m erica's su p re m e p riority, a n d to h av e re­ n ew ed the m ilitary p o w e r h e saw as its core. T hat achievem ent, how ever, w as largely an illusion, as ev en som e a d m in is­ tratio n in sid ers com plained. T he n ew w eap o n s, sw o llen defense b u d g e ts, an d m artial poses w ere real, of course, a n d th ey h a d th e capacity to m ak e real ch anges in policy a n d a rm e d action occur, as d id h a p p e n at tim es. H is g reatest achievem ents a n d his political success rested largely elsew here, h o w ev er, in h is "sh re w d co n centration o n domestic policy," as G arry W ills w rote. "T h at is the m eat a n d p o tato es of o u r politics, the th in g o n w h ich m o st elections hinge. Yet m o d e m P resid en ts forget o r su p p re ss this basic in fo rm a tio n ."1 Reagan, u su ally at least, d id not. In his presidency, stu n n in g g ro w th in w e ap o n s a n d b u d g e ts

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d isg u ise d th e g ro w in g fragility of A m erica's m ilitarizatio n a n d th e c o n tin u in g in w a rd tu rn of its energies.

Reagan and Rem ilitarization N o m o d e m P re sid e n t u n d e rs to o d th e su b stan ce of m ilitarizatio n m o re poorly, p resen te d its ap p ea ls m ore beguilingly, a n d d im in ish e d its p rim a cy m o re deci­ sively th a n R onald R eagan. R egarding it, his histo ric role w a s th u s o b v io u sly p arad o xical, like his role g en erally as b o th th e d o m in a tin g figure a n d th e in su b ­ stan tial presence of the 1980s. H e v ig o ro u sly ch am p io n e d ren ew al of th e n a ­ tio n 's m ilitary stren g th , y et th e ren ew al w a s cu rio u sly hollow . M ilitarizatio n co n tin u ed , b u t g eared less to the w id e r w o rld a n d m o re to A m erican s' sense of th eir o w n n eeds, to th e p o in t th a t th ey w a g e d " w a r" m o re w ith in th e ir o w n b o rd ers th a n a g ain st ex tern al enem ies. T h at in w a rd tu rn , d e v elo p in g since th e 1960s, m a rk e d th e 1980s e v en m ore. In d eed , m ilitarizatio n c h an g e d co u rse m ore th a n it h a d a t a n y tim e since th e 1930s. R eagan fo resh ad o w ed th a t course in h is 1981 in a u g u ra l a d d ress. D espite h is w ell-earn ed rep u ta tio n as a C old W arrior, h e tu rn e d m o st of h is a tte n tio n to the m ajor source of h is election victory, a n "econom ic affliction of g rea t p ro p o r­ tio n s" (regarding w h ich "g o v e rn m e n t is n o t th e so lu tio n " b u t "th e p roblem "). H e d id call for "sufficient [m ilitary] stre n g th to p rev a il if n e e d b e," a n d w a rn e d th a t "w e w ill act" if n ecessary to p reserv e n a tio n al security, b u t a d d e d th a t h av ­ in g a rm e d stre n g th offers "th e b e st chance of n e v e r h a v in g to u se th a t stren g th ." In d eed , use h a rd ly seem ed n ecessary g iv en th a t "n o w e a p o n in th e arsen als of the w o rld is so fo rm id ab le as th e w ill a n d m o ral co u rag e of free m e n a n d w o m e n ," w h ich c o m p rised th e " w e a p o n o u r a d v ersa rie s" lack a n d th e one "w e as A m ericans d o h av e." Like C arter, R eagan w a n te d th e U n ited States to p rev ail ab ro ad b y force of exam ple, n o t arm s: "W e w ill ag ain b e th e ex em p lar of freed o m a n d a beacon of h o p e for those w h o d o n o t n o w h av e freed o m ." In­ stead of d e n o u n cin g to d a y 's enem y, R eagan p lu n g e d in to a m isty p a s t of longago A m erican b attles a n d th eir heroes. E ven th a t p a s t offered o n ly h a z y in ­ stru c tio n in 1981: "T he crisis w e are facing to d a y d o es n o t req u ire of u s th e k in d of sacrifice t h a t . . . so m a n y th o u sa n d s of o th ers w ere called u p o n to m ak e" in th e w o rld w ars. A ll th a t it req u ire d w as " o u r b e st effort, a n d o u r w illin g n ess to believe in o u r selves." Faith m ore th a n w o rk s w o u ld suffice.2 R eagan's in au g u ra l reflected h is m em ories a n d experiences of W orld W ar II a n d th e C old W ar. Because p o o r eyesight b a rre d h im from com bat, R eagan h a d serv ed in H o lly w o o d as a n A rm y A ir Forces officer m ak in g tra in in g film s a n d m orale-boosting m ovies, th o u g h h e later claim ed p e rso n al m em o ry of ev en ts ab ro a d th a t h e could n o t h av e w itnessed. For h im , it w a s a sto ry b o o k w a r of easy triu m p h over b a d g u y s ab ro ad (and o v er p ro b lem s like racial seg reg atio n at h o m e)— a w a r w o n b y faith a n d goo d a ttitu d e s, n o t b y grisly sacrifice. E arlier P resid en ts h a d su m m o n e d the sp irit of heroic sacrifice a n d th e su b stan ce of

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b o ld in n o v atio n in W orld W ar II to u rg e A m erican s to accept n e w d em an d s. R eagan, n e v e r experiencing a n d n o t n o w recalling th e sacrifice o r th e in n o v a­ tion, in v o k ed the w a r as a p le a sa n t m em ory. C ritics fo u n d h is u se of W orld W ar II sh allow o r d ish o n est, as it som etim es w a s ("R epresentative g o v e rn m e n t d e ­ feated sta tism " in W orld W ar H, h e said in 1986, b a n ish in g th e Soviet U n io n fro m th e A llied coalition), to th e p o in t th a t it g o t h im in tro u b le, as in h is 1985 v isit to a G e rm a n cem etery w h e re N a zi SS tro o p s w ere b u rie d .3 But h e w a s in to u ch w ith h o w m o st A m ericans h a d k n o w n 'o r n o w rem em b ered th e w ar; like R eagan, th ey h a d sp e n t th e w a r a t h o m e im m u n e fro m its d estru ctio n , fo u n d salv atio n in it from faltering fo rtu n es, a n d enjoyed it in m a n y w ays. Sacrifice a n d d e a th h a d b e e n less c o m m o n experiences. R eagan's sense of th e C o ld W ar w a s n o t th a t different: a m a tte r of p ro p e r a ttitu d e a n d faith, a n d of say in g th e rig h t w o rd s in b eh alf of bo th . H e h a d h is b ru isin g m o m e n ts as p re sid e n t of the Screen A ctors G u ild from 1947 to 1952, h e lp in g to p u rg e H o lly w o o d of c o m m u n ists a n d o th er tro u b leso m e folk, b u t th e p u rg e h a d n o t b e en h a rd to carry o u t— in d u s try m o g u ls qu ick ly trim m e d th eir sails to th e n e w w in d s — a n d R eagan's m em o ries of it seem ed soft, u n e n ­ cu m b ered b y a sense of conflict o r peril. H is experience of th e re st of th e C o ld W ar w a s m ain ly a m a tte r of w o rd s: "T he Speech" p raisin g free en te rp rise a n d d e n o u n cin g the c o m m u n ist m enace th a t h e offered for years, first as a sp o k es­ m a n for G eneral Electric, th e n as a n a sp irin g p o litician cam p aig n in g for G oldw a te r in 1964, a n d later o n his o w n behalf. H e cam e to th e W hite H o u se inex­ p e rie n ce d a n d u n in te re ste d in th e difficult calcu latio n s th a t n a tio n al lead ers m a d e a b o u t b u d g e ts, w eap o n s, w a rs, alliances, a n d crises. G iv en h is co n serv a­ tism a n d h is ties in C alifornia to c o rp o ra te lead ers a n d lobbyists in its a ir-p o w er w in g , it is n o t su rp risin g th a t d u rin g h is 1966 c am p aig n for C alifo rn ia's gover­ n o rsh ip h e p ro p o se d to "level V ietnam , p a v e it, p a in t strip es o n it, a n d m ak e a p a rk in g lot of it."4 But su c h im p u lsiv e co m m en ts w ere th e p ro d u c t of n o coher­ e n t v iew a b o u t h o w to u se m ilitary force. A s g o v e rn o r for eig h t y ears, h e lea rn ed little m ore a b o u t the realities of n a tio n al secu rity (or of C alifornia), b u t p ro v e d effective at in sp iratio n al m essages a n d flexible in co m p ro m isin g h is d o ctrin aire conservatism . H is 1980 c am p aig n h a rd ly b ro u g h t h im u p to sp eed , since th e Iran h o stag e crisis often eclipsed larg er issues a b o u t n a tio n al security. In an y ev en t, it w as the rig h t w o rd s a n d a ttitu d e s— a b e n ig n p e rso n a th a t d u lle d the sh a rp e d g e of R epublican c o n serv atism — m o re th a n h is p ro g ra m ­ m atic a g en d a th a t g o t h im elected. The im p erial style of the R eagan W hite H o u se reflected its lack of serio u sn ess a b o u t ask in g th e n a tio n to sacrifice in b eh alf of victory. Like th eir close associates— w e alth y b u sin essm en , over-the-hill en tertain ers, th e d e s ig n e r/ d o y en n e D iana V reelan d — th e R eagans b a sk ed in a n im p erial g lory cru d ely a d a p te d from the g reat m o n arch ies a n d aristocracies of th e p ast. H e "p referred to reig n ra th e r th a n ru le," n o te d one journalist. O th e r p resid en tia l co u p les h a d stru ck im p erial poses, b u t n o n e so lavishly as th e R eagans, or w ith such d esire

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to project a n im age of "o pulence, privilege, a n d h istorical fantasy." T heir p e n ­ ch an t for "decorative, aristocratic fem ininity " d ro v e h o m e th e m essag e— tru e sacrifice w o u ld h av e e n listed w o m e n into th e cause, b u t for th e R eagans, n o n atio n al a u sterity w as req u ire d to g ain victory. W ith w e a p o n s serv in g p ree n in g p u rp o se s, it m a d e sense th a t n a tio n al lead ers also p re e n e d b efore th e public. The R eagans acted as if th ey w ere a lre ad y celeb ratin g th e n a tio n 's im p erial vic­ tory, a p o stu re th a t re n d e re d m o o t real efforts to achieve it.5 C h a m p io n in g m artia l renew al, R eagan d id w rin g v a st fu n d s from th e n a ­ tional trea su ry in its behalf. Yet from the start, th e ren ew al, w h ic h C a rte r h a d in fact started , seem ed hollow . It w a s accom p an ied b y n o co h eren t policy for u sin g the increased p o w e r (or for d o in g m u c h else abroad), o r e v e n m u c h in ter­ est in u sin g it. A lth o u g h C a rte r's a d m in istra tio n w a s fau lted for incoherence, th e R eagan team stu m b le d e v en m o re in th is reg ard , th o u g h it w a s m o re a rtfu l in pu b lic relations. A s A lex an d er H aig, R eagan's first secretary of state, later m o an ed , th e W hite H o u se w a s "as m y sterio u s as a g h o st sh ip ." O n e h e a rd "th e creak of the rigging a n d th e g ro an of th e tim b ers a n d so m etim es e v en g lim p se d th e crew o n deck," b u t w h o w a s steerin g it "w a s im p o ssib le to k n o w ." H aig w ro te in anger, a n d th e sh ip of state sailed m o re sm o o th ly u n d e r h is successor, G eorge Shultz, w h ile C a sp a r W einberger, a w ily b u reau cratic p lay er, p ro v id e d co n tin u ity as secretary of defense. Still, these lead ers a n d th eir agencies rarely h a m m e re d o u t co m m o n policies, n o r d id th e in ep tly led N a tio n a l Security C ouncil. In d eed , it w a s "th is inability to m ak e th e n o rm al ch an n els w o rk " th a t h e lp e d p u ll th e NSC staff into th e ro g u e o p e ra tio n s ex p o sed in th e Iran -C o n tra affair. R eagan w a s n o help: in sid ers d isp lay e d rem ark ab le ag re em e n t a b o u t h is lack of in terest in m o st aspects of policy a n d th e ru d d e rle ss co u rse h e o ften fol­ low ed. "W h at R eagan actually d id ," Frances F itzG erald later w ro te, is "im p o s­ sible to disco v er" in these in sid e rs' m em oirs. R eagan c o m p o u n d e d th e p ro b lem b y choosing key p e o p le — like W illiam C lark as d e p u ty secretary of sta te a n d n atio n al secu rity a d v iso r— w h o w ere a p p allin g ly in ex p erien ced in fo reig n p o l­ icy, in p a rt because h e h a d ru n against g o v e rn m e n t so lo n g th a t h e k n e w few in sid ers v e rsed in th a t field. M ost officials rarely saw R eagan, w h o sh o w ed th em (if he recalled w h o th ey w ere) a cool indifference th a t belied h is w a rm th before the cam era.6 R eagan d id h av e his preferences: to b u ild A m erican m ilitary stren g th , p u r­ su e th e Strategic D efense Initiative (SDI), c o n d em n th e evils of Soviet co m m u ­ nism , a n d take a n u n b e n d in g line o n arm s control. But th o se preferences seem ed sufficient u n to th em selv es— w h a t to d o w ith th e resu ltin g p o w e r a sec­ o n d a ry m atter. In general, "th e a d m in istra tio n seem ed u n a b le to tran sla te A m erica's v a st m ilitary p o w e r in to concrete d ip lo m atic g ain s," a critic later n o te d .7 M ore likely, it rarely tried. E ven a t th e D efense D ep artm en t, W ein­ b erg er a n d the Joint C hiefs, th o u g h critical of a c rip p lin g "p o st-V ietn am " m en ­ tality am o n g o th er A m ericans, seem ed g rip p e d b y it th em selv es, relu c ta n t to p u t A m erican forces in h a rm 's w a y except w h ere easy v icto ry w a s assu red .

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W h at c o u n te d m o st— if n o t alw ay s for R eagan o r for ev ery o n e in h is a d m in ­ istratio n , th e n in th e collective im p ressio n th ey m a d e — w a s th e p ro p e r p o stu re. M ilitary stre n g th w a s a m a ssed to b e a r w itn ess to, ra th e r th a n to act on, A m eri­ can su p e rio rity a n d m o ral resolve. Som e R eagan in sid ers talk ed of w in n in g a n u c le ar w a r a g ain st th e Soviet U nion, b u t p ro b ab ly re g a rd e d th e talk as essen ­ tial, n o t th e act. Like m a n y A m ericans in th e 1980s, th ey " w a n te d to b e re­ sp ected as a su p e rp o w e r w ith o u t p a y in g th e p rice," a n d th ey " re g a rd e d m ili­ ta ry p o w e r as so m eth in g to b e v a lu e d in itself, in d e p e n d e n t of a n y actu al u se s."8 T heir a ttitu d e h a d d e e p ro o ts in A m erican C old W ar p o licy — in th e les­ so n s of W orld W ar II a n d in th e logic of d e te rren c e — a n d w a s sim ilar to th e E isen h o w er a d m in istra tio n 's p o stu re of rheto rical b lu ste r a n d practical cau­ tion. B ut th a t p o stu re h a d b e e n a calculated o n e for E isenhow er. U n d e r R eagan, it seem ed m ore a m a tte r of h a z y faith, one u n a cc o m p a n ie d b y Ik e's fear of m il­ ita riz a tio n 's costs. It also ex p ressed a stage of m ilita riza tio n in w h ic h m ak in g A m erican s feel g o o d w a s m o re im p o rta n t th a n sh a p in g th e w o rld . A s Stanley H o ffm an n n o ­ ticed in 1984, "T his m o o d w a s perfectly ex p ressed b y th e su m m e r O ly m p ics in Los A ngeles, w h o se so m e w h a t m in d less, ra th e r th a n aggressive, c h au v in ism th o ro u g h ly shocked E u ro p ea n co m m en tato rs. W h at A m erican s celebrate is th eir reg a in ed success; th e focus is o n them selv es, n o t o n th e o u tsid e w o rld ." It h e lp e d A m ericans to feel th a t "W e're n u m b e r one!" as cro w d s c h a n te d a m id th e O lym pics in a "p a g e a n t of n a tio n al n arcissism ," a n d th a t it w a s "m o rn in g in A m erica," as R eagan p u t it in 1984. W h eth er it w a s d a w n o r m id n ig h t else­ w h e re w a s of less interest.9 T he ten o r of R epublican conservatism , a n d fissures w ith in it, also acco u n ted for th is lack of interest. M an y co nservatives w a n te d m o re m ilitary p o w e r a n d w a n te d to u se it, b u t o th ers m istru ste d su sta in e d e n g ag e m e n t w ith th e o u ter w o rld , re g a rd e d m o ral revival a t h o m e as a h ig h e r prio rity , a n d b eliev ed it th e k ey to triu m p h ov er co m m u n ism . R eagan a n d h is sp eech w riters k n e w th eir m o o d : h e a sse rte d in 1983 th a t th e w o rld stru g g le "w ill n e v er b e d e cid ed b y b o m b s o r rockets, b y arm ies o r m ilita ry m ight. T he real crisis w e face to d a y is a sp iritu a l one; a t root, it is a test of m o ral w ill a n d faith ."10 Such w o rd s serv ed calcu lated p u rp o se s— th ey w ere a d d re sse d to th e N a tio n a l A ssociation of E vangelicals a n d d e sig n ed also to c o u n te r th e n u c le ar freeze m o v em en t a n d fears th a t R eagan w a s trig g er-h ap p y . But th e w o rd s also ra n g tru e w ith the co u rse of th e a d m in istra tio n a n d R eagan's o w n beliefs. In o th er w ay s, too, th e ren ew al of n atio n al secu rity rested o n a n insecure fo u n d atio n . E ven its p rio rity w a s unclear: th e a d m in istra tio n initially gave m o re a tte n tio n to its d om estic a g en d a of tax reform , cuts in n o n d e fe n se sp e n d ­ ing, a n d d e reg u latio n . N o r d id ren ew al a d d re ss th e challenges th a t o ften vexed R eagan a n d o th er A m ericans in th e early 1980s: it p ro v e d u seless in c o u n te rin g th e S o viet-inspired crack d o w n b y Polish a u th o rities a g ain st th e Solidarity m o v em ent; of little u tility for co p in g w ith terro rism a n d h o stag e taking; largely

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u n n e e d e d for tw o initiatives the W hite H o u se d id co n sisten tly p u rs u e (arm in g A fg h an rebels a n d N ic arag u a n "C o n tras" req u ire d on ly a trickle of easily avail­ able arm am ents); a n d irrelev a n t for sto p p in g th e ero sio n of A m erica's eco­ nom ic p o sitio n a n d w a g in g the " tra d e w a r" a n n o u n c e d d u rin g th e 1980s. The co m m o n critique th a t em erg ed óf R eag an 's p resid en c y w a s th a t it su b sti­ tu te d illusion for substance, ig n o red the la tte r's tro u b lin g con ten t, a n d w as g u ilty of "sleep w alk in g th ro u g h history," as one acco u n t p u t it. T his critiq u e m u s t b e v iew ed cautiously, h ow ever. It w a s n o t th e one th a t o p p o n e n ts initially offered: th ey feared th a t th e R eagan team b eliev ed its illu sio n s a n d m ig h t act o n th em b y u n lea sh in g n u c le ar w ar. T he d ich o to m y b e tw e e n illu sio n a n d su b ­ stance h a s b e e n su ch a sta p le critique of m o d e m p resid en cies th a t th e h isto ria n h a rd ly k n o w s h o w to a p p ly it to R eagan a n d m a y w o n d e r if it sim p ly m isses h is p resid en c y 's substance. A fter all, h is victories in fo reig n policy "w ere in th e areas th a t m a tte re d m o st to liberals: R eagan k e p t th e c o u n try o u t of w ar; h e g ru d g in g ly accepted th e inevitability of th e arm s-co n tro l p ro cess a n d n eg o ti­ a te d . . . th e first tru e d isa rm a m e n t trea ty of th e n u c le ar era; h e u se d m ilitary force sp a rin g ly . . . a n d h e lp e d rem ove u n d em o cratic reg im es in th e P h ilip ­ p in es a n d K orea." It w a s correct to p o in t o u t th a t su c h ach iev em en ts w ere often accidental o r " g ru d g in g ly accepted," b u t so are m a n y ach iev em en ts of an y P resident. R eagan, John N e w h o u se n o ted , h a d th e "g o o d lu ck " of n e v e r h a v in g "to co nfront a foreign policy crisis," b u t a crisis is o ften w h a t lea d ers choose to defin e as such. R eagan faced few crises becau se h e reco g n ized few .11 Yet n o law of h isto ry p re v e n te d R eagan from b e in g more c a u g h t in illusions th a n o th er p resid en ts, as his su b o rd in a te s o ften co m p lain ed . P erh ap s th e p ro b ­ lem w as h is rootlessness: "th e A m erican M id w e st w a s h is cred en tial ra th e r th a n h is essence," w h ich d e riv e d from th e fan tasy w o rld of so u th e rn C alifornia a n d its m ovie in d u stry , a n d h e "ev id en ced n o sense of g eo g rap h ical id en tity o r fam ily trad itio n ." M ore likely, w h a t gave h im e n o rm o u s a p p e a l— h is ability to em b o d y the n a tio n 's m y th s— also lim ited him , for h e b eliev ed in th o se m y th s so stro ngly th a t h e saw little n e e d to p u t th e m in to action. T hey d id th e w o rk them selves; o n ly th eir rep etitiv e in to n e m en t w a s u su a lly n e ed e d ; e v en th e oc­ casional act w a s d e sig n ed less to m ake th e m w o rk th a n sim p ly to d e m o n stra te th eir m agic. A s G a rry W ills n o ted , "R eagan w a s alw ay s R eagan, tru stin g m o re to w o rd s th a n actions, to w e a p o n s b o u g h t th a n to w e a p o n s u sed . H e actu ally believ ed th a t if one ju st to o k a to u g h stance, th e n b u llies w o u ld scatter. W h en th ey failed to, h e b o u g h t a b ig g er b o m b a n d a ssu m e d it w o u ld w o rk th e n ex t tim e ."12 From the v a n ta g e p o in t of a n ev o lv in g m ilitarizatio n , th e g rip of th o se illu ­ sions o n R eagan seem s less h is d o in g th a n th e p ro d u c t of d e e p e r stru ctu res. H e reig n ed a t a tim e w h e n m an y A m ericans felt d e e p ly w o u n d e d b y failure in V ietnam , p ro fo u n d ly afraid of risks th a t m ig h t rep e at it, y e t still d e te rm in e d th a t th eir n a tio n police the w o rld 's bullies. R eagan offered th e n a tio n 's p a st greatness, ex trap o lated effortlessly into th e future. "T he p o w e r of h is a p p e a l is

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th e g reat jo in t confession th a t w e can n o t live w ith o u r real p ast, th a t w e n o t only p refe r b u t n e e d a substitute. Because of th at, w e will a belief in all h is sto ries."13 O ffering illusions of g reatness at little cost in A m erican lives, R eagan satisfied b ro a d a n d c o n trad icto ry yearnings. D o ing so, h o w ev er, m a d e rem ilitarizatio n rest o n a fo u n d a tio n of ferv en t b u t fickle p u b lic m o o d s a n d req u ire d k eep in g th e illu sio n s afloat, n o easy task in th e lo n g ru n . In o th er w ay s, too, ren ew al rested o n a b ro a d b u t sh allo w b ase of p o p u la r, political, a n d ex p ert su p p o rt. R eag an 's first-term d efen se b u d g e ts sailed th ro u g h C ongress, b u t specific p ro g ra m s like th e MX m issile a n d the Strategic D efense Initiative m et stiff o p positio n . T he sense o f m an y A m ericans th a t econom ic n e e d s d e serv e d g rea ter p rio rity g e n erate d specific critiques of R eag an's course as w ell as a general, in articu late u n e ase a b o u t it. A n d since R eagan m a d e n o call for n a tio n al sacrifice, h e offered n o fram ew o rk in w h ich A m ericans m ig h t w e ig h co m p etin g priorities. N o r d id R eagan R epublicans achieve a lastin g rev o lu tio n in political loy­ alties. R eagan's p e rso n al a p p e a l a n d the p a rty 's m ach in ery w ere form idable, b u t th ey y ield ed o n ly m o d e st gain s for th e p a rty o u tsid e of p resid en tia l electio ns— in C ongress, stateh o u ses, a n d m u n icip al g o v ern m en ts, w h e re D em ­ ocrats o ften reta in e d po w er, a lth o u g h the a p p o in tm e n t b y R eagan a n d B ush of a m ajo rity of fed eral ju d g es a n d S u p rem e C o u rt justices h a d a p ro fo u n d a n d lastin g effect. M ere co m p ariso n of p a rty stre n g th s d o es o bscure th e co n serv a­ tiv e d rift— p a rtly u n d e r th e p ressu re of R epublican success— of th e D em o­ cratic Party, a n d th e lim its set b y tw o R epublican P resid en ts o n w h a t D em o­ crats could d o once back in p ow er. But o p in io n p o lls a n d v o tes in C ongress also sh o w e d th a t R eagan c o n serv atism lacked b re a d th a n d consistency of app eal. A m ericans re sp o n d e d p o sitiv ely to R eagan's rh eto rical a ssau lt o n fed eral activ­ ism a n d Soviet evil, b u t less ferv en tly to th e p ro g ram m atic su b stan ce of th a t assault, like cuts in en v iro n m en tal p ro g ra m s o r c ru sad e s a g ain st N ic arag u a n S andinistas. G iven R eagan's ballot-box a n d legislative success, it w a s easy to see h im as u sh e rin g in a political sea-change, a n d im p o rta n t shifts d id o ccu r— th e sh ift from C arter to R eagan of m a n y w h ite P ro testan ts in 1980, for exam ple, a n d R eagan's h e a rty em brace of far-right C hristians. Yet G O P co n serv atism of som e so rt w a s a lre ad y long in the to o th b y th e 1980s, a sce n d an t since N ix o n 's election in 1968, albeit in te rru p te d b y his fall. W hile it w a s co m p ared to the "R oosevelt R evolution," th e m u ch -to u te d R eagan rev o lu tio n — "th is p h e n o m e ­ n a l u p h e a v a l," a re p o rte r g u sh e d in 1983— w a s m o re like E isen h o w er's suc­ cess: decisive a t the top b u t shallow b e n e a th it, w ith B ush's m o d e st v icto ry o v er a w e a k foe in 1988 c o m p arab le to N ix o n 's raz o r-th in loss to a stro n g o p p o n e n t in I960.14 N o r h a d R eagan "cataly zed a d e e p c u ltu ral o u tp o u rin g sim ilar to th a t of the N e w D eal era, w h ich w a s in teg ral to the tran sfo rm atio n s th e N e w D eal w ro u g h t in A m erican life." H is p resid en cy em b o ld en ed c u ltu ral conservatives, b u t th ey a d d e d little to the co m p lain ts alread y assem b led in th e 1970s, m et

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sh a rp o p p o sitio n ra th e r th a n tran sfo rm in g A m erica, a n d b ecam e u n e a sy a b o u t th e glib a tte n tio n R eagan gave them . Since u n d e r R eaganism "th e artistic im ag ­ in atio n , along w ith e v ery th in g else, w a s to b e p riv a tiz e d , a m a tte r for th e G lo­ rio u s Free M ark et to so rt out," th ere w ere lim its o n th e a d m in istra tio n 's p o w e r to resh ap e c u ltu ral life. To b e sure, p u b lic a u th o rities c o u ld still c o n d em n o r b less v a rio u s c u ltu ra l currents. T h u s R eagan em b raced th e m u sc u la r h ero ics of H o lly w o o d 's R am bo a n d d in e d w ith a u th o r Tom C lancy, w h o se th rillers d e ­ m o n iz in g the Soviet U n io n a n d celebrating A m erican w a r tech n o lo g y w e re tire d e c a d e 's m o st p o p u la r fiction, w h ile Sen. D an Q u ay le, d isp la y in g C lan cy 's Red Storm Rising, to ld h is colleagues, "H av e y o u re a d th is book? AS AT [Star W ars] tech n o logy is w h a t w in s this w ar!" Such actions m attered : if R eaganism d id n o t in itiate a "d e e p c u ltu ra l o u tp o u rin g ," it d id give resp ect a n d p o w e r to o n e al­ re a d y d ev elo p in g . E ven in p o p u la r cu ltu re, h o w ev er, co n serv ativ es reinforced o ld er th em es ra th e r th a n cu ltiv atin g fresh o n es.15 A ll these co n sid eratio n s m a d e th e ren ew al of n a tio n al secu rity lav ish b u t sh o rt-lived, energetic b u t em pty. In th e en d , so too d id th e e n em y a g ain st w h ic h ren ew al w a s directed. A b it like R eagan him self, th e Soviet th re a t a p p e a re d b y th e e n d of th e 1980s to h av e b e e n b o th fo rm id ab le a n d in su b stan tial, im p ressiv e w h e n v iew ed fro m afar b u t h o llo w w h e n seen close up . M ilitarizatio n d id n o t h alt, b ecause it w a s a historical process n e v e r d riv e n alone b y th e Soviet th re a t in eith er its real o r im ag in ed form s. But its scope co n tracted a n d its th ru s t shifted.

The Perils of Rem ilitarization If m o ral v irtu e w o u ld triu m p h , as R eagan arg u e d , w h y b o th e r w ith m ilita ry m ig h t? T he a n sw e r w a s th a t faith still d e m a n d e d ex p ressio n in w o rk s, a n d fa­ m iliar forces p u sh e d for action: p o w e rfu l interests; real o r im a g in ed econom ic benefits; w ell-h o n ed geopolitical a n d strategic do ctrin es; a n d w ell-reh earsed anxieties a b o u t the d a n g e rs p o se d b y the Soviet U n io n a n d o th er regim es. The d a n g e rs of a p p e a se m e n t a n d the lessons of W orld W ar II fo rm ed Rea­ g a n 's m ajor ratio n ale for re a rm a m e n t in 1981, o n e h e offered easily w h e n P rim e M in ister M arg aret T hatcher w a s a ro u n d , g iv en th e ir ideological a n d p e rso n al affinity. "O u r challenge today," a rg u e d R eagan after n o tin g A n g lo -A m erican sacrifices in W orld W ar II, "is to en su re th a t belligerence is n o t a tte m p te d ag ain " as a resu lt of "th e false p e rc ep tio n of w eak n ess." T he U n ited States, h av ­ in g "u n ilaterally d isa rm e d , y o u m ig h t say " d u rin g th e 1970s, h a d fo stered th a t p ercep tio n a n d th ereb y lu re d M oscow o n to a reckless co u rse in A fg h an istan , P oland, C en tral A m erica, a n d elsew here. R eagan w a s fo n d of q u o tin g C h u r­ chill on the d a n g e rs of a p p e a se m e n t a n d of "castin g asid e . . . th e p a n o p ly of w arlik e stre n g th ," th o u g h like m o st A m erican s h e ig n o red C h u rch ill's o th er th o u g h ts o n th is subject ("A p p e asem en t fro m stre n g th is m a g n a n im o u s a n d n oble a n d m ig h t b e the su re st a n d p e rh a p s th e o n ly p a th to w o rld peace"). H is-

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to ry 's lessons d ictate d re a rm a m e n t a n d cast R eagan in a C h u rch illian m ode. For h is p a rt. D efense Secretary W einberger "fancied h im self a n a m a te u r h isto ­ ria n a n d b eliev ed th a t A m erica's p o sitio n in 1981, in relatio n to th e Soviet U nion, w a s e q u iv a le n t to B ritain's in the 1930s in relatio n to th e N azis. H is hero, W in sto n C hurchill, h a d sav ed B ritain th ro u g h re a rm a m e n t."16 In a sense, this w a s all th a t co n stitu ted R eagan's o u tlo o k in 1981, p lu s h is b e­ lief th at, as h e a rg u e d in 1980, "th e Soviet U n io n u n d e rlie s all th e u n re st th a t is g o in g on. If th e y w e re n 't e n g ag e d in this g am e of d o m in o es, th ere w o u ld n 't b e a n y h o t sp o ts in th e w o rld ." 17 C ab in et secretaries o r policy e x p erts m ig h t see a m o re com plex w o rld , one th a t R eagan so o n co nfronted. In 1981 h e d id n o t b u r­ d e n h im self w ith com plexities. N o t fo r sev eral m ore y ears d id th e Soviet U n io n 's ch an g in g fo rtu n es m u ch affect W ash in g to n 's basic calculations. Soviet w eak n esses w ere n o t u n k n o w n : slu g g ish econom ic g ro w th relative to th a t of th e W estern p o w e rs (an d C hina) a n d a n inability to m atch th em in a d v a n c e d technologies, n o t to m en tio n civil­ ia n goods; a clum sy, aging, if still rep ressiv e lead ersh ip ; disaffection w ith in its b o rd e rs a n d in its satellites; h o stility from C h in ese lead ers, w h o also a p p e a re d m o re a d e p t a t tran sfo rm in g th eir co u n try ; th e ro ilin g forces of Islam ic fu n d a ­ m en talism n e a r th e Soviets' o w n M uslim p o p u latio n ; a n d m ilitary fru stra tio n a n d d ip lo m atic isolation resu ltin g from in te rv en tio n in A fg h an istan . T he R eagan a d m in istra tio n v a rio u sly d en ied , ig n o red , o r b e n t to p reco n ­ ceived p u rp o se s these w eaknesses. P articularly reg a rd in g space defenses, it of­ fered clashing a rg u m e n ts— th a t th e Soviet U n io n w a s a h ea d a n d th a t it co u ld n o t really com pete, w h ile a h ig h -stak es g am e of forcing it to d o so w o u ld ex­ p o se its w eaknesses. M ore generally, the Soviets' w eak n esses p resu m ab ly m a d e th e m d e sp e ra te to triu m p h in th e m ilitary aren a, since n o o th er realm offered the rem o test chance of victory. Islam ic fu n d a m e n ta lism w a s seen as M o sco w 's stalk in g horse, a n d p e rv e rse ly as a th re a t g rea ter to th e U n ited States, far from its locus, th a n to th e Soviet U nion, w h o se b o rd e rs it h u g g e d . T he b ro a d p a tte rn of Soviet d ecline w a s h a rd to a d d ress, especially since it m ig h t also raise q u estio n s a b o u t A m erican decline, w h ic h R eagan w a s riot a b o u t to a d m it. In general, the Soviet U n io n w a s seen as ev er m o re m en acin g w h e th e r in decline o r in ascen d an ce— a n old g am e a m o n g A m erican lead ers, b u t n o w m o re exposed as ev id en ce of Soviet d e cre p itu d e m o u n te d . H isto ry 's lessons a n d M oscow 's m enace d id little, h o w ev er, to d e te rm in e h o w m u c h a n d w h a t k in d of re a rm a m e n t to striv e for. O f course, it h a d to be m o re th a n w h a t h a d C a rte r so u g h t, b u t b e y o n d that? P rev ailin g strategic doc­ trin es filled in the blanks. A d o p tin g the "sy m m etrical" v iew of d efen se once asso ciated w ith D em ocrats, th e a d m in istra tio n d e cid ed to m atch M oscow g u n for g u n a n d sh ip for ship. Since lan d -b ased rockets w ere th e e n em y 's forte, thè MX m issile w o u ld go fo rw ard. Since the Soviet n a v y h a d e x p an d e d , so w o u ld th e A m erican fleet. Since th e U n ited States sh o u ld p re p a re to w ag e a n d w in n u clear w ar, m ore efforts to " h a rd e n " A m erica's strategic w e a p o n s a n d sys-

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terns of c o m m an d a n d control w ere in order. Since th e P en tag o n d e cid ed th a t th e U n ited States sh o u ld b e able to w a g e th ree a n d a h a lf w a rs (w h atev er th a t m ig h t m ean) a ro u n d th e globe (N ixon h a d settled for a o n e-an d -a-h alf-w ar ca­ pability), e x p an sio n in a h o st of m u n d a n e a re as— tra n sp o rt, a m m u n itio n a n d su p p lies, train in g a n d logistics— also seem ed in ord er. O n ly in p e rso n n el levels w ere th e goals m odest: h av in g p o o h -p o o h e d C a rte r's schem e for d ra ft reg istra­ tion, R eagan co u ld h a rd ly a d d m illions to th e a rm e d forces, a n d a n y w a y b e­ lieved, like o th er officials, th a t n e w technologies c o u ld replace h o rd e s of m e n u n d e r arm s. R eagan also m a d e it clear th a t h is su b o rd in a te s w ere n o t to w o rry a b o u t costs— "D efense is n o t a b u d g e t item ," h e to ld th em , "y o u sp e n d w h a t y o u n e e d ." 18 Still, th e a d m in istra tio n co u ld n o t rem a in p u b licly cavalier a b o u t th e eco­ n om ic consequences of its d efense p ro g ram . So it also d e fe n d e d th a t p ro g ra m 's m acroeconom ic im pact, w h ic h in d e e d h e lp e d to e n d th e recession of th e early 1980s. K eynesian p u m p p rim in g w a s h a rd for R eaganites to to u t, h o w e v e r— it sm ack ed of w h a t b a d D em ocrats p resu m ab ly h a d d o n e a n d d id n o t a d d re ss co n te m p o ra ry concerns focused o n th e e co n o m y 's lo n g -term co m p etitiv en ess as m u c h as o n its m o m e n tary robustness. T herefore th e a d m in istra tio n ju stified p ro g ram s like its "strategic c o m p u tin g initiativ e," d e sig n ed to im p ro v e b a ttle ­ field m a n a g em en t a n d b e a t th e Japanese in d e v elo p in g su p e rco m p u ters, as e n ­ h an cin g b o th "n atio n al secu rity a n d econom ic stre n g th ." L ikew ise, p ro p o n e n ts of th e Star W ars p ro g ra m p ro m ised it w o u ld secure a "ren aissan ce for the A m erican lab o r force, p a rticu la rly th e u n e m p lo y e d in th e 'sm o k estack in d u s­ trie s .'" 19 It m a d e political sense to d efe n d w e a p o n s p ro g ra m s as e n h an c in g co m petitiveness, e v e n if the co n seq u en t d e facto "in d u stria l" policy, w h ich su b sid iz ed th e scale a n d sh a p e d the c o n to u rs of A m erica's econom y, v io lated p io u s claim s a b o u t lib eratin g free e n te rp rise from W ash in g to n 's d e a d h a n d . In tu rn , th e defense b u d g e t reflected a n d re w a rd e d th e p o litical stre n g th of technically a d v an c ed d efense in d u strie s, lab o rato ries, a n d reg io n al lobbies, p rim a rily in the "g u n b elt" th a t stretch ed fro m N e w E n g lan d th ro u g h th e S o u th east a n d S o u th w est a n d u p th e W est C oast. T h o u g h h a rd ly u n itary , th ese in terests w ere b e tte r p o sitio n ed th a n ev er to sh a p e th e d efen se b u d g e t. In th e 1940s a n d 1950s, w h e n defense d o llars w ere w id e ly scattered a n d few er con­ g ressional districts liv ed o r d ie d o n m ilitary m o n ies alone, th e b en efits to a p o li­ tician of secu rin g n e w contracts o r facilities o r blo ck in g th e loss of o ld ones w ere lim ited. The increasing regional m ald istrib u tio n of d efen se o u tlay s h a d c h an g e d th a t p a ttern . N o w a m in o rity of districts d e p e n d e d p a in fu lly o n th o se outlays, consisted heav ily of skilled d efense w o rk e rs a ttu n e d to th e ideological a n d econom ic claim s of rem ilitarization, a n d elected p oliticians able to stak e th o se claim s. T heir stake w as m ag n ified b y th e com plex n a tu re of d efen se p ro ­ jects: w e a p o n s w ith long lead tim es for d ev elo p m en t, len g th y p ro d u c tio n ru n s, a n d ex pensive facilities p ro m ised long-term econom ic benefits; th ey also im ­ p o se d en o rm o u s sta rt-u p costs th a t m a d e early term in a tio n difficult. U n like

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m o n ies to p a tc h a ro a d h ere o r b u ild a p o st office there, d efen se o u tlay s w ere n o t a sp ig o t rea d ily tu rn e d o n a n d off: th ey e n g ag e d p oliticians in a m o re p e r­ m a n e n t fashion. The c o n so lid ated regional basis of m ilitarizatio n th u s gave a m o re lim ited se t of interests a g rea ter stake in its future. G iv en h o w C ongress a n d its com m ittee sy stem w o rk — a n ag g ressiv e m in o r­ ity o ften m ore decisive th a n a p a llid m ajo rity — k ey po litician s h a d g reat p o w e r o v er th e scale a n d c o n ten t of defense sp en d in g . T heir clo u t w a s stre n g th e n ed b y th e close ties th a t R eagan a n d m a n y of h is su b o rd in a te s h a d to th e c o rp o ra ­ tions, cu ltu re, a n d political n e tw o rk s d o m in a n t in th e g u n b elt, especially C ali­ fornia. A dvocates of space defenses like the scientist E d w ard Teller co u ld get p a s t the W hite H o u se gatek eep ers a n d reach R eagan far m o re rea d ily th a n lead ers of o ld er o r less defen se-o rien ted firm s. G O P control of th e Senate from 1981 to 1987 a n d th e ren e w e d coalition b e tw ee n R epublicans a n d so u th e rn D em o crats— w h o se "boll w eev ils" often rep re se n te d b u ck les in th e g u n b e lt— also h elp ed . L iberal D em ocrats w o u ld b e co m p lian t if th eir d istricts e m b raced places like H a rtfo rd , C onnecticut (hom e to P ra tt a n d W hitney) o r L ong Islan d (hom e to G ru m m a n A ircraft), w h ich w ere re w a rd e d in th e logrolling th a t sh a p e d a p p ro p ria tio n bills. N o m ore th a n railro ad s in th e n in e te e n th c en tu ry o r auto m obiles in th e m id -tw e n tie th c o u ld these in terests forever resist th e forces resh a p in g the political econom y. But in the 1980s th e y reta in e d th e stre n g th to b e n d th o se forces to th eir p u rp o se s. T hey h e lp e d to account for the co n te n t of rem ilitarizatio n in th e 1980s. Rea­ g a n so u g h t a 10 p e rc en t increase o v e r C a rte r's last b u d g e t, su sta in ed m o re in ­ creases u n til D efense D e p a rtm e n t sp e n d in g exceeded $300 billio n in 1986, a n d d ro v e th e sh are of G N P officially d e v o te d to d efen se from 5.1 in 1979 to 6.6 in 1983. M ore likely, defen se's share of G N P w a s n e arer 10 percen t, for m o re th a n ev er d efense sp e n d in g w a s tu ck e d aw ay, o ften b y d ecep tio n , elsew h ere in W ash in g to n 's d e n se b u reau cratic jungle. M ost of th e E nergy D e p artm en t's larg e b u d g e t w e n t to n u clear w e a p o n s a n d research o n space defenses, for ex­ am ple. A n d th e Federal E m ergency Relief A d m in istratio n , osten sib ly fu n d e d to cope w ith n a tu ra l d isasters, b e g a n "a top-secret m u ltib illio n -d o llar p ro g ra m to h e lp th e g o v e rn m e n t su rv iv e a n u c le ar w a r," its fu n d in g h id d e n u n d e r the ru b ric "su b m itte d u n d e r a se p ara te package" a n d o v erseen by, am o n g oth ers, th e N a tio n a l Security C ouncil's O liver N o rth .20 In d o lla r term s, th e d efen se b u d g e t n e arly d o u b le d b e tw ee n 1979 a n d 1983; after inflation, it in creased n e a rly o n e -th ird — a g ro w th rate far larger th a n w o rld w id e totals a n d th o se of th e Soviet U n io n a n d the W arsaw Pact, w h o se sp e n d in g h a d risen sh a rp ly d u r­ in g th e 1970s. This w a s the fastest g ro w th in "p eacetim e" d efen se sp e n d in g since the eve of Pearl H arbor, a n d all the m ore n o tab le b ecau se it w a s accom ­ p a n ie d b y n o g reat increase in m ilitary d e p lo y m en t a n d action, w h ic h h a d so ak ed u p earlier sp u rts in d efense outlays. T he sp e n d in g sp lu rg e w as w e ig h te d to big-ticket w eap o n s. T he B -l (w hich C arter h a d canceled) a n d B-2 (Stealth) bo m b ers a n d T rid en t su b m a rin e s w e n t

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fo rw ard , as d id n e w cruise m issiles, first d e p lo y e d in W estern E u ro p e in 1983 a n d m o u n te d also o n w a rp la n e s a n d surface ships. So too d id MX m issiles, e v en w ith o u t a p lausible schem e for b a sin g them . T he b u ild -u p in aerial w e a p ­ o n ry a n d e x p a n d e d research o n space defenses d re w th e g rea test a tte n tio n a n d criticism . Ju st as striking, h ow ever, w a s R eagan's am b itio u s p la n for a sixh u n d re d -sh ip navy, in clu d in g the T rid en t su b s, n e w carriers, sm aller surface ships, a n d fo u r W orld W ar II b a ttlesh ip s, sym bols of p a st g lo ry refitted a t a cost of billions. W hile th e m eg a to n n a g e of A m erican n u c le ar w e a p o n s c o n tin u e d to decline a n d th eir n u m b e rs (su rp a ssed b y R u ssia's o n R eag an 's w atch) re­ m ain ed static, a n expensive effort to m ake n e w a n d rep lacem en t w a rh e a d s con­ tin u ed . M any of these w e a p o n s o w e d th e ir c o n cep tu al genesis, initial research, o r p ro d u c tio n sta rt-u p to the C arter, N ix o n (w ith T rident), o r ev en E isen h o w er (w ith the B -l) eras. W h at m a rk e d the R eagan a d m in istra tio n w as th e sh eer scale of its sp e n d in g o n th em a n d its refusal to m ak e choices am o n g them . W h at the U n ited States g ain ed in m ilitary stre n g th w a s h a rd to m easu re, since th ere w as n o m ajor b a ttle test, b u t it w a s p ro b ab ly little c o m p a red to th e costs. T he v a lu e of n e w strategic w e a p o n s p resu m ab ly lay in sh o rin g u p d e te r­ rence a n d R eagan's d ip lo m atic leverage, th o u g h som e e n te red co n v en tio n al com bat, a role for th e m so u g h t b y m ilitary lead ers m ore th a n th ey ack n o w l­ ed g ed . A s P aul K ennedy soon n o te d , "T he fact th a t th e R eagan a d m in istra tio n in its first te rm sp e n t over 75 p e rc en t m ore o n n e w aircraft th a n th e C a rte r re­ gim e b u t acquired only 9 p e rc en t m ore p lan es p o in ts to the a p p allin g m ilitaryp ro cu re m en t p ro b lem of th e late tw e n tie th cen tu ry ." T h at p ro b lem in clu d ed a d riv e for technological exquisiteness w h ich m a d e each w e a p o n so com plex a n d expensive th a t few co u ld b e p u rch a se d , p lu s th e sh eer w a ste a n d frau d p o ssib le w h e n a few m an u fa ctu rers a n d one b u y e r w ere in collusion w ith each o th e r a n d to le ran t of w h a te v e r ab u ses resu lted . T he m o st g larin g ex am p le of th a t p ro b ­ lem w as th e B -l b o m b er— ru sh e d to p ro d u c tio n lest th e n e w e r S tealth b o m b er p re e m p t justification for it, sa d d le d w ith m u ltip le fu n ctio n s th a t h e lp e d d riv e its cost to a half-billion d o llars apiece, y et so d eficient in its electronics th a t refit­ ted o ld B-52s w ere "in som e w a y s m ore a d v an c ed th a n th e B -ls," a n d so v u ln er­ able to elem ental p ro b lem s like "m u ltip le b ird strik es" (as o n e c re w m an called them ) th a t m o st of the b o m b ers h a d to b e g ro u n d e d for y ears to g et th em fixed.21 T he record w as m ixed in o th er w ays, too. A ctiv e-d u ty p e rso n n e l in creased o n ly a b o u t 5 percent, a n d com bat train in g , tran sp o rt, a n d logistics, th o u g h im ­ p ro v ed , rem ain ed step ch ild ren in P en tag o n p rio rities. T h at u n m e a su ra b le ele­ m e n t of m ilitary capability, th e m orale a n d fitness of p erso n n el, p ro b ab ly d id rise, for reasons for w h ic h R eagan co u ld claim credit, if in so m e cases of a p e r­ v erse sort: b u rg eo n in g defense b u d g e ts a n d p atrio tic p rid e m a d e m ilitary m e n a n d w o m e n feel m ore v a lu e d , w hile th e R eagan recession of th e early 1980s h e lp e d to channel b e tter-e d u ca ted recru its in to th e a rm e d forces. But failures in th e A m erican intelligence system , o ften the lin ch p in of successful o p eratio n s.

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so m etim es re n d e re d m o o t a n y gain s in capabilities: M arin es in B eirut w ere c a u g h t to tally o ffg u ard b y a car-bom b d riv e n in to th eir h e a d q u a rte rs o n O cto­ b e r 23,1983, killing 250 A m ericans; in th e P ersian G ulf, w h ere A m erican forces e n d u re d a n ill-defined m ission a m id th e Iran -Iraq w ar, th e USS Stark w a s h it b y a m issile fired from a n Iraqi p la n e in 1987, a n d th e USS Vincennes m istak en ly sh o t d o w n a n Iran ia n civilian jetlin er in 1988. E ven th e easy in v asio n of th e tin y C arib b ean islan d of G re n ad a o n O ctober 25, 1983, p ro d u c e d e m b a rrassin g glitches in co m m u n icatio n s a n d intelligence. N o n e of th ese tests w a s b ig e n o u g h to p ro v e m u ch , a n d all w ere accom p an ied b y cen so rsh ip th a t m ad e ju d g m e n t difficult, b u t th e R eagan record w a s at b e st a m ix ed one. T h at h u g e ex p en d itu re s p ro d u c e d few o p e ra tio n a l g ains m attere d little to R eagan. T he B eirut fiasco a n d th e rem o v al of A m erican forces after R eagan's so lem n p ro m ises to k eep th em th e re — a h u m iliatin g if sensible retre at for A m erican p o w e r— w e re fo rg o tten like a b a d m ovie: h is a c to r's in stin cts ta u g h t h im " th a t one d o e s n o t try to go o n w ith a ro u tin e th a t is flopping; m o v e to th e n e x t o ne if th e first is n o t reaching th e a u d ien ce."22 T he n e w show , a n in v asio n of G re n ad a to o v e rth ro w a b a n d of eccentric M arxists, cam e d a y s after Beirut a n d eclipsed its b a d notices. T he read in ess of A m erican forces a n d th eir u se in m u rk y contests like L ebanon's n e v e r m u c h e n g ag e d th e W h ite H ouse. In stead , its a tte n tio n fixed o n co n frontin g th e Soviet U nion, a n d in w a y s w h ic h d id n o t involve d irec t com bat o r e v en M oscow 's g reatest m isd eed s. T h o u g h assailing Soviet in te rv e n tio n in A fg h an istan a n d influence in C en tral A m erica, th e a d m in istra tio n sh o w e d its g reatest o u trag e o v er th e c u rio u s affair of A u g u st 31,1983, w h e n a Soviet fig h ter sh o t d o w n K orean A ir L ines civilian flight 007, w h ic h h a d stra y ed into Soviet a ir space e n ro u te to Seoul. T he W hite H o u se quickly h a d som e evidence (m ore em erg ed later) th a t th e Soviet actio n w a s a colossal e rro r (as A m ericans later c o m m itted in sh o o tin g d o w n a n Ira­ n ia n airbus), b u t R eagan p o rtra y e d it as a calcu lated act o f in h u m a n ity rev eal­ in g th e fu n d a m e n ta l n a tu re of th e "evil em p ire," as h e h a d lab eled th e Soviet U n io n earlier in 1983. P erh ap s n o o th e r m o m e n t in h is p resid en c y saw R eagan, u su a lly k e p t o n a tig h t leash b y h is h a n d le rs, tak e to th e a irw av es so often. H e sp o k e alm o st daily, com plete w ith alleged tap e reco rd in g s of Soviet p ilo ts in th e incid ent, to c o n d e m n "th is b arb aric act," to assail th o se w h o "flag ran tly lie ab o u t su c h a h e in o u s act," to th re a te n a n e n d to d ip lo m acy ("W h at can b e th e h o p e of legitim ate a n d m o ral d isco u rse w ith a state w h o se v alu es p e rm it su ch atrocities?"), to su g g e st th a t the Soviets w o u ld n e v er h o n o r a n y ag reem en ts th ey sig n ed , a n d to u rg e m ore A m erican rearm am en t, w h ic h th e KAL in cid en t sp u rre d . In this o u trage, "to ta litaria n ism h a s sh o w n its g h astly face once again," h e m ain tain ed . "T his w a s th e Soviet U n io n a g ain st th e w o rld . . . .I t w a s a n act of b a rb a rism ." It w a s also a n in cid en t for w h ich th ere co u ld be n o e q u iv a ­ len t A m erican response, ho w ev er, a n d w h e re th e Soviets inflicted a m o re d elib ­ erate evil, in A fghanistan, R eagan confined h is resp o n se to assistin g rebel forces. In d eed , th e p a tte rn of h is p resid en cy w a s to assail Soviet evil lo u d ly b u t

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tak e a rm e d action a g ain st lesser foes. The goal of re a rm a m e n t vis-à-vis th e So­ viets w as to a p p e a r stronger, n o t to u se the stre n g th .23 If en h an ced m ilitary p o w e r h a d a su sta in ed , p ractical p u rp o se for th e a d m in ­ istration, it w as in the diplom atic, n o t the m ilitary a re n a — as th e lever to force cap s o n Soviet m ilitary p o w e r a n d achieve d isa rm a m e n t. To b e su re, th a t for­ m u la tio n gives a coherence to R eagan's a rm s control policy th a t it rare ly h ad . E ven b y the A m erican p resid en c y 's u n tid y sta n d a rd s, th is o n e w a s p la g u e d b y "rem ark ab ly shrill policy d isp u te s b e tw ee n agencies," in atten tio n o r cap ricio u s direction from the top, a n d w a rrin g a ssu m p tio n s: if th e Soviets co u ld n o t b e tru ste d to h o n o r any agreem ent, it w a s h a rd ly clear w h y th ey w o u ld a b id e b y one forced o n th em b y A m erica's su p e rio r p o w e r.24 C o n fu sio n w a s e v id e n t rig h t from the start, w h e n the a d m in istra tio n g ru d g in g ly a g reed to ab id e b y the term s of C a rte r's SALT II Treaty, e v en th o u g h R eagan h a d ro u n d ly c o n d em n ed it a n d still d id n o t w a n t it ratified. T he Joint C hiefs, m ore fearful th a n ev er of a n u n re g u la te d strategic e n v iro n ­ m en t, em erg ed as the m o st co n sisten t if cautio u s s u p p o rte r of arm s co n tro l a n d critic of civilian officials' o u trag e o u s statem en ts a b o u t w in n in g a n u c le ar w ar. JCS c h airm an G en. D avid C. Jones w a s th e m o st n o tab le voice in th is reg ard , especially because h e w a s a n air force officer. R etiring in Ju n e 1982, Jones w a rn e d th a t "it w o u ld b e th ro w in g m o n ey in a b o tto m less p it to try to p re p a re the U n ited States for a long n u c le ar w a r w ith th e Soviet U n io n ."25 By then, ho w ever, the Joint C hiefs' clout in th e W hite H o u se w a s d isa p p ea rin g . D iscordant voices, bellicose p o stu rin g , a n d top-level in d irectio n c rip p led R eagan's initial efforts (insofar as th ere w ere any) a t a rm s control, baffling allies in W estern E urope a n d ad v ersaries in M oscow . By m o st accounts, th e K rem lin ex pected from R eagan ro u g h ly w h a t it p resu m ab ly g o t from N ixon: a to u g h b u t co n sistent lead ersh ip w h o se realpolitik M oscow co u ld co n stru ctiv ely engage. In stead, it h a d difficulty fin d in g a n y consisten t m essag e a n d a n y discern ib le set of A m erican n e g o tiato rs in charge, w h ile it faced A m erican sab er ra ttlin g th a t serv ed som e Soviet officials jockeying for p o sitio n a n d p ro g ram s. O n occasion, a b rea k th ro u g h th reaten ed . In N o v em b er 1981, R eagan a sto u n d e d m o st d ip lo ­ m ats b y offering the "zero o p tio n " o n m id -ra n g e m issiles in E u ro p e — th e So­ viets w o u ld d ism an tle theirs a n d the U n ited States w o u ld n o t d e p lo y its n e w ones in the w o rk s— b u t this o n e-sided d eal w a s d e a d as so o n as offered (no one, John N ew h o u se later n o ted , foresaw h o w M ikhail G orbachev "w o u ld h av e the w it to take N A TO u p o n th e zero offer a n d th e n p o ck et th e larg er p a rt of th e cred it for m ak in g it h a p p e n " 26). The n ex t su m m er, v e te ra n n e g o tiato r P aul N itze concocted a sim ilar d eal d u rin g his fam o u s "w a lk in th e w o o d s" a t G eneva w ith his Soviet co u n te rp art, b u t d e sp ite JCS a p p ro v a l, R ichard Perle a n d C a sp a r W einberger a t D efense scotched th e deal. In fact, few civilian lead ers w a n te d any ag reem en t early in th e 1980s, p refe rrin g to stall o n n eg o tia­ tio n s u n til A m erica's a rm s b u ild -u p p u t it in a c o m m an d in g positio n . T he few noises a n d p ro p o sals offered w ere insincere a n d defensive, o ften m a d e to outm an e u v er the n u c le ar freeze m ovem ent.

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In d eed , th a t m o v em en t a n d related political c u rre n ts in flu en ced th e cu ltu re a n d d ip lo m acy of n u c le ar w e a p o n s far m ore th a n th e a d m in istra tio n a d m itte d , o r p e rh a p s w a s ev en able to grasp. P ro p o sin g to cap n u c le ar arsen als at c u rre n t levels, freeze advocates g e n erate d w id e sp re a d su p p o rt a t th e g rass-ro o ts (a 1982 d e m o n stra tio n in N e w York g a th e red 750,000 p eo p le b y police estim ates) a n d secu red b ro a d su p p o rt in C o n g ress— o n ly b y a n a rro w 204-202 v o te d id th e H o u se of R epresentatives reject a n "im m e d ia te freeze." A lth o u g h b ra n d e d as rad ical b y its foes, a freeze itself w a s a m o d e st m ea su re g iv en th e existing size of n u c le ar forces. It w as in stea d the d iv erse base, evangelical fervor, a n d p o liti­ cal c ritiq u e of the m o v em en t th a t a la rm e d ad v o cates of rearm am en t, p lu s its in te rn atio n al reach. The A m erican freeze m o v em en t o w e d m u c h to a d ram atic m o b ilizatio n ab ro a d in 1981. "E v ery w h ere in W estern E u ro p e (except France), th e im p e n d in g arriv al of the n e w [A m erican] m issiles h a d sw elled th e ran k s of a n tin u cle ar g ro u p s," d ra w in g in th e church es a n d "m id d le-class p e o p le of all ag es a n d political tendencies." In th e U n ited States, C atholic b ish o p s also w e ig h ed in, c o n d em n in g th e su p e rp o w e rs' reliance o n n u c le ar w e a p o n s as d e ­ terre n ts a n d influencing A dm . Jam es W atkins, a C atholic a n d chief of n av al o p ­ eratio ns, w h o saw th e n a v y losing p e rso n n el if th ey th o u g h t th eir service to A m erica's n u clear force w a s "in co m p atib le" w ith th e b ish o p s' p a sto ra l letter. Soon tru ste d allies o n re a rm a m e n t w avered : " I'm n o t o n e of those freeze-then u k e s n u ts, b u t I th in k w e h av e e n o u g h ," ex p lain ed G o ld w a ter in a n n o u n cin g his o p p o sitio n to th e MX p ro g ram , w h ic h h a w k ish w e ste rn sen ato rs q u e s­ tio n ed o n g ro u n d s of its costs a n d en v iro n m en tal d a m a g e to th eir region.27 A lth o u g h R eagan a n d W einberger in sin u a te d th a t foreign ag en ts h a d h e lp e d "in stig ate" th e n u c le ar freeze m o v em en t,28 it h e lp e d p u s h R eagan to w a rd h is p ro b lem atical b re a k th ro u g h o n arm am en ts, th e Strategic D efense Initiativ e a n ­ n o u n c ed o n M arch 23, 1983. T he id eas a n d technologies for d efen se ag ain st rocket attack w ere m ore fam iliar th a n R eagan's sta rtlin g sp eech a n d th e sta rtled reaction to it allo w ed for. T hey d e riv e d from o ld er efforts (effectively b a n n e d b y th e 1972 A ntiballistic M issile Treaty) to b u ild g ro u n d -b ased , n u c le ar-tip p e d in tercep to r rockets a n d from p ro g ress in the 1970s o n laser a n d particle-b eäm w e ap o n s to sh o o t d o w n Soviet rockets after lau n ch o r d u rin g ree n try in to the atm o sp h ere. In 1978, th e New York Times a n n o u n ce d , "W eap o n T h at Fights M is­ siles C o u ld A lter W orld D efense Focus," a n d p ro m ised th a t "d e sp ite th e costs a n d p ro b lem s, b e a m w e a p o n s offer h o p e th a t a n all-out m issile attack c o u ld be infallibly th w a rte d ." 29 Before a n d after R eagan to o k office, a g ro u p of retired d efen se officials, c o rp o ra te leaders, a n d scien tists— Teller first m et R eagan in 1967— took th eir case to h im a n d p ressed it th ro u g h th eir lobby, th e H ig h Fron­ tier Panel, e v en as th ey sq u a b b led ov er w h ich tech n o lo g y sh o u ld g e t th e g reen light. T hey also circu m v en ted a n d alien ated m o st science a n d d efen se agencies, w h ich looked askance a t th eir p la n s for technical or political reaso n s (the air force feared an expensive project th a t m ig h t steal d o llars fro m its b o m b er a n d m issile program s). SD I's p ro p o n e n ts a p p e a le d to R eagan's h eartfelt faith th a t A m erica (an d the

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w o rld ) c ould be d eliv ered from th e th re a t of n u c le ar d estru ctio n . W h en h is m il­ ita ry chiefs su g g ested , "W o u ld n 't it b e b e tte r to p ro te c t th e A m erican p e o p le ra th e r th a n avenge th em [th ro u g h n u c le ar retaliation]?" R eagan p o u n c e d o n th e w o rd s, w h ic h h e w o rk e d into h is M arch 1983 a d d re ss o n SDI (soon d u b b e d "Star W ars" after th e m ovie of th a t nam e). R eagan w a s id eally su ite d to reflect in a n u n m e d ia te d fashion th e c u ltu ral fantasies b e h in d space defenses. F o u r d ecad es earlier, h e h a d sta rre d as Brass B ancroft in th e m o v ie Murder in the Air, b lo w in g u p a n e n e m y 's p lan e w ith "a n e w su p e r-w e ap o n ," a n "in ertia projec­ to r" w h o se ray s w ere to "m ak e A m erican invincible in w a r" a n d "th e g rea test force for w o rld peace ev er disco v ered ." H e sh a re d th e belief of m a n y A m eri­ cans, especially th o se e n am o red of air p o w er, th a t A m erica's e x p o su re to d e ­ stru c tio n v io lated a n a tio n al b irth rig h t, one th a t n e w tech n o lo g y c o u ld restore. T heir outlook, w h ich y o k ed n o tio n s of a n iso lated Fortress A m erica to v isio n s of global h eg em o n y a n d technological u to p ian ism , h a d n e v er d isa p p e a re d d u r­ in g th e decad es w h e n m u tu a l a ssu re d d e stru c tio n m a d e th e w o rld 's safety h o s­ tag e to th e th rea t of its obliteration. It c re p t n e arer th e surface in th e 1970s in fantasies like Star Wars a n d in w o rk o n space-b ased w eap o n s. R eagan b ro u g h t it fully to th e surface, im a g in in g d eliveran ce from th e th re a t of o b literatio n th ro u g h exotic w e ap o n s th at, like the cin em a's in ertia projector, "co u ld in ter­ cep t a n d d e stro y strategic ballistic m issiles before th ey reach ed o u r o w n soil o r th a t of o u r allies," as R eagan p u t it. T hey w o u ld fo rm "a sh ie ld th a t co u ld p ro ­ tect u s from n u c le ar m issiles ju st as a roof p ro tects a fam ily from rain ," accord­ in g to R eagan, linking futuristic technolog y to fam iliar id ea liz atio n of th e A m erican h o m e.30 H is 1983 speech u n v e ilin g th a t v isio n w a s a stra n g e affair. It c a u g h t m an y in sid ers b y su rp rise, w ith Secretary of State S h u ltz a n d h is aid es re p o rte d ly "stu n n e d , flabbergasted." It sh o w ed R eagan's o d d k n ack for m ak in g th e u tte rly fam iliar seem like a sta rtlin g rev elatio n — h e w a rn e d th a t th e Soviets h av e "w e ap o n s th a t can strike d irectly a t the U n ited S tates," as if th ey h a d n o t h a d su ch w e ap o n s for decades. It offered n o strategic ratio n ale for a rad ical ch an g e in d efense policy; in d eed , R eagan n o te d th a t th e existing "a p p ro a c h to stab ility th ro u g h offensive th re a t h a s w o rk e d ." N o r d id h e co m p lain a b o u t th e eco­ nom ic a n d political b u rd e n s of th e a rm s race. In stead , h is g ra n d b u t v a g u e goals w ere to d e m o n stra te " o u r peaceful in ten tio n s," forge "a tru ly lastin g sta­ bility," reclaim "th e v e ry stren g th s in technolo g y th a t sp a w n e d o u r g reat in d u s­ trial base," a n d "achieve o u r u ltim ate goal of elim in atin g th e th re a t p o se d b y strategic n u clear m issiles."31 R eagan's SDI speech u n le a sh e d a fu rio u s d e b ate a n d sp a rk e d "a ch o ru s of in sta n t rejection a n d ridicule," as the National Review, a su p p o rte r, accurately p u t it. M ost ex p erts d o u b te d th e feasibility of space defenses, less b ecau se in d i­ v id u a l w e ap o n s w o u ld n o t w o rk th a n b ecau se o n ly a p erfect sy ste m — attainable, if a t all, a t intolerable cost— m a d e a n y sense: o n e th a t allo w ed som e w a rh e a d s to get th ro u g h w o u ld b e n e u tra liz ed if th e Soviets m u ltip lie d th eir

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w a rh e a d s o r lau n c h ed low -flying cruise m issiles fro m su b m arin es. C ritics w a rn e d d a rk ly a n d w ith som e justification th a t SD I's b ack ers really w a n te d th e U n ite d States to w in a n u c le ar w a r— w ith SDI, it m ig h t lau n c h a first strike, co n fid en t th a t its space defenses co u ld block w h a te v e r Soviet rockets su rv iv e d th e initial blow . (As R eagan ack n o w led g ed , "If p a ire d w ith offensive sy stem s," h is p ro p o se d w e a p o n s co u ld "be v iew ed as fo sterin g a n ag g ressiv e policy.") In tu rn , critics p red ic te d a hostile Soviet reaction a n d a n a rm s race ratc h eted u p , literally a n d figuratively, to still h ig h e r levels, a p red ic tio n v a lid a te d b y Rea­ g a n 's a d m issio n th a t "p ro b ab ly d e cad es" w o u ld elap se b efore SDI w o u ld b e in place. R eagan's vision, fu m ed a fo rm er D efense D e p a rtm e n t scientist, w a s "cru el a n d irresponsible, like a p h y sician offering laetrile to p a tie n ts afflicted w ith cancer." R eagan w a s p re se n te d in political carto o n s as a dunce: satirist A rt B u ch w ald " p o rtra y e d R eagan's o ld m ovie frien d . B onzo th e ch im p an zee, in ­ stru c tin g a gullible p re sid e n t in th e w o n d e rs of m issile d efen se." O ffering a m o re n u a n c e d ju d g m e n t a few y ears later, G a rry W ills saw R eagan's p re se n ta ­ tio n of SDI as a n o th e r reaso n to see h im as " th a t m o st d isa rm in g of political a p p aritio n s, the k in d ly f a n a tic . . . the d e m a g o g u e as rab b le-so o th er."32 T he criticism s of SDI h e lp e d e ro d e its political ap p eal. N o t th a t its im m ed iate im p act w a s negligible. It o p e n e d a g u sh e r of fu n d s for c o o p eratin g u n iv ersity scientists, defense laboratories, m ilitary agencies, a n d co rp o rate contractors, w h o foresaw "th e b u sin e ss o p p o rtu n ity of a g e n eratio n " a n d p u rs u e d it in "a fish-feeding frenzy." It a la rm e d Soviet lead ers, w h o " p la y e d in to R eagan's h a n d s b y im p a rtin g a credibility to S.D.I. it w o u ld n o t o th erw ise h av e h a d ." It fu rth e r p o iso n e d a rm s control talks.33 But SD I's im p act so o n d im in ish ed . Since a w o rk ab le space d efen se w a s d e ­ cades aw ay, initial w o rk o n SDI h a d n o effect o n strateg ies of d eterrence. The P en tag o n still d id n o t w a rm to SDI, q u estio n s a b o u t its costs a n d feasibility m o u n te d , th e Challenger space sh u ttle d isa ster a n d th e Soviet reactor explosion a t C h ern o b y l raised m ore d o u b ts in 1986 a b o u t th e reliability of b ig technology, a n d C ongress trim m e d R eagan's req u ests for fu n d in g . SDI so o n b ecam e ju st a n o th e r w e a p o n s p ro g ram : costly, still a la rm in g to critics a n d p ro m isin g to su p p o rte rs, b u t bereft of th e tran sfo rm ativ e p o w e rs for g o o d o r ill initially as­ cribed to it. T he critics m issed a n essential p o in t, ho w ev er: th e d e b ate o n SDI tra n s­ fo rm ed political c u ltu re e v en th o u g h ev ery specific claim R eagan m a d e w as shaky. P articularly as h e p re se n te d it, "SDI so u g h t to save tech n o lo g y 's v irtu e from , as it w ere, vio latio n b y th e n u c le ar m o n ster," a n o b serv er later n o ted . SDI "w as o ften criticized as a technological 'fix,' m ea n in g a b elief th a t tech n o lo g y can fix things; b u t in fact it w a s m e a n t to fix technology itself," th a t is, to restore faith in its red e m p tiv e p o ten tial a n d to overcom e th e d re a d asso ciated w ith it in the n u clear era. R eagan's analogies b e tw ee n SDI a n d th e w e a p o n s of W orld W ar II reinforced this effort to "fix technology"; space w eap o n s, h e su g g ested , w o u ld b e like ra d a r in 1940, w h ic h h a d h e lp e d th e B ritish b e a t back G erm an

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b o m b ers (he d id n o t n o te h o w ra d a r later g u id e d A llied b o m b ers to th eir tar­ gets). W h eth er SDI w a s w o rk ab le o r w ise m a tte re d less th a n w h e th e r th e e n su ­ in g d e b ate rein v ig o rated A m erican s' technological optim ism . To a d eg ree it d id , as p a rt of a g en eral m o o d in th e 1980s th a t celeb rated A m erican technologi­ cal p ro w e ss in w ar, c ap p e d b y a n e x u ltan t fascin atio n w ith A m erican a rm s d u r­ in g th e G u lf W ar. W ith SDI cam e visions of "a resto red a n d ren e w e d A m erica" a n d a safe " re tu rn to p ren u c lea r secu rity b y c o n q u erin g th e final fro n tier of sp ace."34 In a closely related a n d m ore p e rso n al ach iev em en t, R eagan realig n ed con­ serv ativ e a n d liberal o p in io n o n th e n u c le ar issue. C o n serv ativ es u su a lly h a d reg a rd ed th e Soviet U n io n as A m erica's g reatest th re a t a n d n u c le a r w e a p o n s as A m erica's p ro tectio n from it. R eagan ju m p e d th e co n serv ativ e sh ip b y p o rtra y ­ in g th e th re a t as less R ussia th a n n u c le ar a rm s th em selv es, p ro m isin g to d e liv er th e U n ited States a n d th e w o rld from it, e v en to sh are SDI tech n o lo g y w ith th e Soviets once it w a s d ev elo p ed . H e th ereb y stole th e th u n d e r of d isa rm a m e n t's liberal advocates a n d em braced th eir u to p ian ism , so lo n g ex co riated b y conser­ vatives, a b o u t solving the n u c le ar problem . SD I's foes fo u n d th em selv es aw k ­ w a rd ly c o n d em n in g a v isio n ary so lu tio n to th e n u c le ar m enace. If th ey w o n th e d e b ate o n SD I's practicality, R eagan n o n eth eless fo rg ed a "strik in g tran sfo rm a ­ tio n in conservative rh eto ric" a b o u t n u c le ar w e ap o n s, alig n in g it w ith th e h o s­ tility to n u c le ar w e a p o n s d o m in a n t am o n g A m erican s a n d lin k in g th e u to p ia n goal of d isa rm a m e n t to old A m erican fantasies of technological m astery. " Isn 't it tim e to p u t o u r su rv iv al back u n d e r o u r o w n control?" ask ed R eagan in 1986.35 M ore th a n a n y o th er A m erican in the 1980s, a lth o u g h p e rh a p s n o m o re th a n G orbachev in M oscow , h e sh a tte re d th e a ssu m p tio n th a t th e w o rld w a s forever stu ck w ith e x p an d in g a rsen als of n u c le ar w eap o n s. W h eth er R eagan in te n d e d th is "strik in g tran sfo rm a tio n " w a s d o u b tfu l: after all, h e really w a n te d th e SDI w e ap o n s a n d could im agine th em g ird lin g th e globe, a n d for m a n y SDI s u p ­ p o rters the u to p ia n visions w ere p ro b ab ly a h y p o critical gloss o n a schem e d e ­ sig n ed to gain the u p p e r h a n d a g ain st the Soviets. But confusion, hypocrisy, a n d u n in te n d e d consequence are u su a lly h a llm ark s of g reat h isto rical change: the achievem ent still stood. By instinct m ore th a n in ten tio n , R eagan h a d stu m b le d o n to th e te rra in — th a t of cu ltu re, b ro ad ly c o n stru e d — w h e re the C old W ar w a s above all w a g e d in its w a n in g days. A lm ost n o o th er terrain , b esid es p ro x y w a rs, w a s left. E xcept th ro u g h gross m iscalculation, n o n u c le ar o r co n v en tio n al w a r b e tw e e n th e s u ­ p e rp o w e rs w as plausible. T heir race for su p rem acy in strategic w e a p o n s h a d long becom e m ore sym bolic th a n su b stan tiv e, a n d b o th p a rtie s faced resistance to its fu rth er acceleration. The Soviet U nion a n d th e U n ited States h a d n e v er b een econom ic com petitors, b o th confronted econom ic challenges for w h ic h th e o th er w as n o t responsible, a n d the R eagan W hite H o u se w a s lo ath e to im ­ p ose econom ic sanctions o n the Soviets th a t w o u ld h u rt key A m erican in terests (alth o ugh "m o st of the public c o n tin u ed to reg a rd Jim m y C a rte r as 'so ft o n

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409

C o m m u n is m / R onald R eagan as 'h a rd ' "). C u ltu re, lo n g co n tested b y th e su ­ p e rp o w e rs, w a s th e rem a in in g b a ttle g ro u n d , o n w h ic h c o n tin u ed "th e febrile c o m p etitio n b e tw e e n W ashington a n d M oscow for th e m o ral h ig h g ro u n d ." W h at w a s critical w a s th e ability of each to m obilize its p o p u la tio n b e h in d sh a re d c u ltu ra l values, to project those v alu es to th e w o rld , a n d to w in th e b a t­ tles o v e r those values. H ence tire im p o rtan c e a ssig n ed to th e 1980 a n d 1984 O lym pics, to th e co n test ov er th e m ea n in g of th e K orean A ir L ines incid en t, to th e stru g g le for th e m o ral h ig h g ro u n d o n n u c le ar issues, a n d to th e ritu a ls of s u p e rp o w e r diplom acy. By th e sam e token, R eagan's g reatest ach iev em en t lay n o t in ch an g in g th e tangible correlation of forces b e tw ee n th e Soviet U n io n a n d th e W est, b u t in m obilizing A m erican a n d w o rld o p in io n a g ain st M oscow .36 T he Soviet U n io n w a s losing th e c u ltu ra l stru g g le, th o u g h for reaso n s th a t w e n t b e y o n d R eagan's success in it. Its p a ra d e of in firm lea d ers— th e reins of p o w e r p a sse d quickly in the early 1980s fro m B rezhnev to Y uri A n d ro p o v to K o n stan tin C h e rn en k o — d ish e a rte n e d its o w n p o p u la tio n a n d p re se n te d a d re a ry im age to the w o rld . M oreover, W estern c u ltu ral v a lu e s w ere p e n e tra t­ in g th e n a tio n in a process th a t Soviet leaders, for all th eir h e av y -h an d e d ru le — o r b ecause of it— c o u ld n o t stop. T h at process sp e e d e d u p as econom ic sta g n a ­ tion, u rb a n decay, political isolation, a n d d ism ay o v er th e A fg h an w a r e ro d e d w h a te v e r v isio n ary a p p e a l th e Soviet sy stem once h a d , a n d as th e black -m ark et econom y e n h an c ed access to W estern g oods, p o p u la r m usic, a n d culture. G en erational ch an g e sp e ed e d the process. T he g rea t claim of Soviet ru lers to th eir subjects' loyalties w a s victo ry in W orld W ar n , b u t y o u n g e r Soviets h a d n o t experienced th a t w a r a n d its peril. W hile intellectu al d issen t, ch eered o n in th e W est, m o u n te d , th e a p p e a l of A m erican a n d B ritish rock m u sic a n d th e p a r­ allel g ro w th of a n u rb a n g a n g c u ltu re w ere also strik in g , as graffiti d o tte d th e u rb a n landscape. H e w in g n o single ideological line, u rb a n su b c u ltu re s w ere v ario u sly fascistic (hailing H itler), pacifist ("G O RBACHEV— M URDERER O F A F G H A N C H ILD R EN ," in m id-1980s graffiti), o u trag e o u s (rock g ro u p s w ith n am es like E n rag ed C litorises a n d th e M en stru al Pads), a n d p lay fu l (deliber­ ately confusing Beatle John L ennon w ith L enin h im self in a p u n o n th e o ld So­ viet slogan, th ey scribbled in 1981, "L en n o n liv ed , L en n o n lives, L en n o n w ill live"). W h at th e v a rio u s y o u th cu ltu res h a d in co m m o n , h o w ev er, w a s a fas­ cination w ith W estern p o p u la r cu ltu re, a relish for u sin g th e E nglish lan g u ag e, a n d a proclivity to m ock official Soviet culture. Soviet a u th o rities fo u g h t back, first b y fiat, th e n b y a su b tler c u ltu ral c o n ta in m e n t in th e 1970s— sp o n so rin g a safer, official Soviet rock a n d visits b y select W estern a rtists (B ritain's E lton John a n d A m erica's B. B. K ing in 1979, for exam ple). T hese m easu res a t b e st m et p a rtial success, how ever. L ittle o v e rt challenge to C o m m u n ist ru le em erg ed , b u t th e regim e w a s b ein g h o llo w ed o u t from w ith in . A s o n e h isto ria n con­ cludes, the u p h e av a l th a t cam e w ith G orbachev "co u ld n o t h av e o ccu rred h a d there n o t b e en for som e tim e a v ib ra n t u n d e rg ro u n d c u ltu re w a itin g to go p u b ­ lic."37 This subtle process, h a rd to d iscern in the early 1980s, w as n o t one th a t ad-

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m in istratio n lead ers g ra sp e d or d irectly ad v an ced . R eagan p re d ic te d free­ d o m 's inevitable triu m p h ov er to talitarian ism b u t h a rd ly saw it as im m in en t (th o u g h in 1983 h e asserted th a t th e "last p a g e s" of c o m m u n ism 's "sa d , b iza rre ch ap ter in h u m a n h isto ry " w ere "ev e n n o w . . .b e in g w ritten "). A n d h e d id n o t connect it to the co u n tercu ltu re arisin g in the Soviet U nion, since co n serv ativ es h a d long reviled c u ltu ral p h e n o m e n a like ro ck 'n 'ro ll a n d a sse rte d th a t A m er­ ica's m o ral a n d m ilitary m ig h t w o u ld u sh e r in victory. T he stag e w a s set for th e C old W ar's en d , a n d R eagan, a d e p t at theater, h a d , alm o st u n w ittin g ly , h e lp e d to set it.38 The decisive m oves o n th a t stage cam e from Soviet actors, b u t th e fo rtu n es of R eagan's a d m in istratio n also p la y e d a role. By th e sta rt of h is seco n d term , Rea­ g a n co uld p o in t to th e n a tio n 's m ilitary a n d m o ral rea rm am en t, as h e saw it, b u t to few gains in w o rld affairs as a result. In stead , h is fo reig n p olicy w a s in tro u ­ ble. R earm am ent h a d n o t m a d e M oscow b u d g e m u c h o n a rm s control, a n d R eagan refu sed to cash in Star W ars for n e g o tiatin g lev erag e o n th e Soviets. W estern -su p p lied rebels blocked Soviet success in A fg h an istan , b u t th e stale­ m ate th ere h a d n o foreseeable end. In C en tral A m erica, R eag an 's s u p p o rt of an ti-S andinista rebels in N icarag u a (the "m o ral e q u al of o u r F o u n d in g Fa­ th ers," h e called th e m 39) a n d desp o tic rig h t-w in g reg im es elsew h ere g ratified an tico m m u n ist conservatives b u t elicited little w id e r su p p o rt, a n d in O ctober 1984, C ongress p a sse d the B oland A m e n d m e n t, blo ck in g for tw o y ears m ilitary a id to N ic arag u a n "freed o m fighters." Som e d isp lay s of A m erican a rm e d m ig h t— in G ren ad a in 1983, a g ain st Q a d d a fi's L ibyan reg im e (accused of sp o n ­ so rin g terrorism ) in 1981 a n d 1986— w ere ch eerin g b u t in su b stan tial; o th ers, as in th e L ebanese civil w ar, w ere feckless; n o n e altered th e p lig h t of A m erican h o stag es in Beirut. M eanw hile, th e a p p a llin g Iran -Iraq w ar, b e g u n in 1980, th rea te n ed W estern oil interests, w h ile th e stru g g le b e tw e e n Israel a n d its Pal­ e stin ian subjects a n d A rab n eig h b o rs c o n tin u ed u n reso lv ed . R em ilitarizatio n itself w as a b o u t to ru n its course: it w a s reach in g th e levels R eagan h a d earlier so u g h t, it n o lo n g er sailed effortlessly th ro u g h C ongress, it c o n trib u te d to a n a larm in g federal debt, a n d it p ro m p te d concern from ex p erts, allies, a n d fin an ­ cial m ark ets a b o u t the n a tio n 's econom ic course. P o stu rin g a b o u t A m erican m ig h t a n d Soviet evil h e lp e d w in th e 1984 election b u t co u ld n o t silence com ­ p lain ts th a t p o stu rin g w as a b o u t all th a t c o n stitu ted A m erican foreign policy. W ith in the W hite H ouse, d e sp e ra tio n grew to d o so m e th in g historic. It w o u ld so o n sm o o th the p a th to w a rd the C old W ar's en d , b u t it first su rfaced in the Iran -C ontra affair. T h at affair h a d tan g led roots. C o m p etin g M uslim a n d C h ristian factions, each w ith o u tsid e su p p o rt, h a d sta rte d te a rin g L eb an o n a p a rt in th e 1970s, a n d th e P alestine L iberation O rg an izatio n h a d u se d it for o p e ra tio n s a g ain st Israel. A t first, the R eagan a d m in istra tio n saw the m ess th ere in C old W ar term s, e sp e­ cially fearing in terv en tio n b y Syria, p re su m a b ly a Soviet client. In 1982, Secre­ tary of State H aig gave the g reen lig h t to a n Israeli in v asio n of L ebanon, a m ove

ILLUSORY

REMILITARIZATION,

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th a t o n ly w o rse n e d L eb an o n 's civil w a r a n d e n sn a re d th e U n ited States m o re deeply, especially w h e n the Israelis allo w ed C h ristia n m ilitiam en to m assacre P alestinians in refugee cam ps. In terv e n tio n b y A m erican, French, a n d Italian forces fared n o b etter, y ield in g d isa ster for A m erican m arin es. A m erican forces ev en tu ally w ith d rew , as d id the Israelis from m o st of th e country, b u t A m eri­ can s (an d others), in clu d in g th e C IA sta tio n chief, b ecam e h o sta g es in B eirut of rad ical M u slim s a p p a re n tly d o in g the b id d in g of Iran 's A y ato llah K hom eini. R eagan h a d excoriated C arter for softness o n terro rism a n d p u b licly stru ck a defian t, n o -d eals stance, b u t th a t stance, "calm a n d co n fid en t, concealed a terri­ b le in n e r an x iety a b o u t the fate of th e h o stag es."40 It w a s a c u rio u s obsession for a m a n p re su m a b ly b e n t o n d efeatin g co m m u n ism , a n d h is m a n n e r of acting o n it w a s w h o lly p u t of sy n ch w ith h is p u b lic p o stu re , w ith m in im al sta n d a rd s of o rd erly governance, a n d w ith th e law as it a p p lie d to d e alin g w ith terro rism , to a id for th e C ontras, a n d to accountability before C ongress. N o n eth eless, th e W h ite H o u se lau n ch ed a n e w o p eratio n , w ith tw o m ilitary officers. N atio n al S ecurity A d v iso r John P oindexter a n d h is d ep u ty , O liv er N o rth , tak in g charge, w ith C IA d irecto r W illiam C asey h e lp in g o u t— a n d w ith R eagan, Vice Presi­ d e n t Bush, a n d o th ers a p p ro v in g to a d eg ree difficult to p in p o in t. T he schem e in v o lv ed selling a rm s (generally th ro u g h th e Israelis) to Ira n (h u n g ry for w e a p o n s for its w a r w ith Iraq) in re tu rn for th e freeing of A m erican h o stages. It also sip h o n e d off p ro fits fro m these a rm s d eals (to w h ic h it a d d e d fu n d s solic­ ited from w e a lth y A rab ru lers a n d rig h t-w in g A m ericans) to fu n n el su p p o rt, b a n n e d u n d e r th e B oland A m e n d m e n t, to th e C ontras. It w as a n illegal o p e ra tio n th a t sh o w e d ag ain h o w n a tio n a l lead ers u se d th e p re su m e d n e e d s— in th is case, n o t v e ry u rg e n t o n e s— of n a tio n al secu rity to justify illegal acts. It w a s also a stu p id o p eratio n . M en w h o flattered th em selv es o n d iffering fro m C a rte r b y h a v in g a clear sense of p rio rities a n d a coldly realis­ tic v iew of th e w o rld risk ed th eir re p u ta tio n a n d legal sta tu s o n a v ex in g b u t m in o r issue, a n d th ey n a iv ely tru ste d Ira n 's stro n g -w illed ru lers, w h o g o t th e b e tte r of th e deal: releasing alm o st n o hostag es, th ey g o t th e ir w e ap o n s, p lu s th e satisfaction of seeing S atan A m erica em b a rrassed w h e n th e affair pu b licly u n rav e led late in 1986. E xposure in tu rn left R eagan w ith u n p le a sa n t choices: to tak e responsibility for th e m isd ee d s a n d assu m e th e political a n d legal risks in v o lv ed, o r to p le a d forgetfulness a n d a p p e a r a n am iable fool u n a b le to con­ trol h is su b o rd in ates. M ostly h e o p te d for th e latter course, w ith a m ea su re of sh eer cover-up th ro w n in, b u t it w as n o t a p re tty sight. The Iran -C o n tra affair a n d th e failure of policy th a t u n d e rla y it fu rth e r lu b ri­ cated th e p a th a w ay from R eagan's m ilitarized policies. H o w m u c h it d id so is h a rd to judge; N an cy R eagan's desire to see "h e r h u sb a n d rem em b ered for h a v ­ in g lo w ered the risk of n u c le ar w a r" rep o rte d ly d a te d to 1984, th e y e ar R onald b e g an h in tin g at a ch an g e of course.41 But in ta n d e m w ith o th er changes, in ­ c lu d in g R eagan's insistence th a t n u c le ar w e a p o n s w ere n o w th e g reat th re a t to A m ericans, Iran-C ontra h e lp e d set a n e w course.

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M eanw hile, M ikhail G orbachev to o k ov er as Soviet p a rty c h airm a n in the sp rin g of 1985. In a series of increm ental b u t b rea th ta k in g changes, h e a n d o th e r officials set o u t to rev am p the Soviet system , in sp ired in p a rt b y K h ru sh ch ev 's a b o rted fling w ith reform a n d the anti-S talinist m o o d h e h a d instilled. R eagan a n d m a n y of his political allies later to o k cred it for forcing th e ch an g e — a n o d d stance since m a n y of th em , in clu d in g Bush, in itially h a d in sisted th a t n o real ch an g e w a s tak in g place, o n ly a cosm etic facelift th a t m a d e th e Soviets a m o re fo rm idable m enace. In a n y event, the Soviet rev o lu tio n of th e 1980s, like m o st g reat changes, w a s m u ltid eterm in ed . To th e ex ten t th e K rem lin trie d to m atch it, th e C arter-R eagan a rm s b u ild u p d id increase th e strain s o n th e Soviet econ­ om y; G orbachev rep o rte d ly c o m p lain ed " th a t R eagan w a s u sin g S.D.I. to w ag e econom ic w a rfare a g ain st h im ." It is d o u b tfu l, h o w ev er, th a t SDI "co n trib u te d significantly to th e W est's triu m p h in th e C o ld W ar," as o n e h isto ria n later claim ed. R ather, it w a s one m ore w av e in th a t sea of tro u b les, m a n y a p p a re n t before SDI w a s lau n ch ed , into w h ic h G orbachev saw th e Soviet sy stem sinking. H a d K rem lin lead ers b e en co n fid en t a b o u t th eir system , th ey w o u ld h av e ru sh e d to m atch R eagan's rearm am en t, o r a t least to co n stru ct a co n v in cin g fa­ cade o f d o in g so, b u t th eir confidence w a s p lu m m e tin g . T hey d id n o t d esire to th ro w o u t th e old sy stem — it w a s to be refo rm ed in o rd e r to h a rn e ss th e en er­ gies p resu m ab ly laten t in it— b u t G o rbachev 's refo rm s w ere sufficient, alo n g w ith o th er changes, to e n d the C old W ar.42 P articularly stu n n in g , a n d n o t alw ay s w elcom e in W ash in g to n , w as G or­ b ach ev 's d a rin g d ip lo m acy o n a rm s control a n d o th e r m atters a n d h is ab ility to stru t th e stage of a global m ed ia culture. Soviet d e sp e ra tio n a n d A m erican rear­ m a m e n t gave th e R eagan a d m in istra tio n n e g o tiatin g clout, especially since the K rem lin ex ag g erated p ro sp ects for w o rk ab le A m erican space defenses, b u t at m id -d ecad e the a d m in istra tio n w a s still a d rift o n a rm s control. It w a s G or­ b ach ev w h o seized the m o m e n t a n d g rab b e d m u c h of th e cred it for th e ag ree­ m en ts th a t en su ed . T hose "w ere largely the re su lt of ag g ressiv e Soviet d ip lo ­ m acy ra th e r th a n A m erican efforts," n o tes o n e co m m en tato r, w h ile a n o th e r co n clu d ed th a t "M oscow , n o t W ashington, h e ld th e initiativ e d u rin g m o st of R eagan's second term . W ashington reacted, o ften slu g g ish ly ."43 It d id so for several reasons. S uspicion of th e Soviets, c u ltiv ated for g e n era ­ tions, w as a h e av y d ra g o n the a d m in istratio n , b o th in its ran k s a n d in its b ro a d e r conservative constituency, w h ic h h a d little n o tio n of a cause to replace th e o n e th a t h a d serv ed it so lo n g a n d w ell. The a d m in istra tio n 's in te rn al d isa r­ ray co n tin u ed . "T he real p ro b lem is th a t w e h av e n o co n sen su s in th e sy stem ," co m p lain ed Les A spin, a lead in g D em ocrat o n th ese m a tte rs— a n o ld p ro b lem th a t h a d only g ro w n w o rse u n d e r R eagan a n d th a t in sid ers a ck n o w le d g ed as m u c h as point-scoring D em ocrats. If the Soviets "cam e to u s a n d said , 'Y ou w rite it, w e 'll sign it,' w e still c o u ld n 't d o it," lam en te d one State D e p artm en t official in 1988. R eagan still d id little to forge co n sen su s w ith in th e system . Key p lay e rs like the Joint C hiefs su p p o rte d a rm s control, b u t h e rarely to u ch e d base

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w ith them . H is m o st fam o u s m o m e n t in th a t reg a rd cam e a t th e R eykjavik su m ­ m it w ith G orbachev late in 1986, w h e n R eagan, w ith o u t co n su ltin g h is o w n g o v e rn m e n t o r A m erican allies, seem ed to ag ree o n a schem e to elim in ate in te n y ears all n u c le ar w e a p o n s a n d th e rockets carry in g them . R eagan's in stin ct— to b y p a ss e n tre n ch e d in terests— w as so u n d , b u t o n ly if h e h a d th e resolve to fol­ lo w it u p w ith p e rsiste n t efforts to rally th eir su p p o rt. H e d id not. H e h a d n o id ea of h o w to g et w h e re h e w a n te d to go, co n fu sed g ra n d in ten tio n s w ith th eir realization, th e n su ccu m b ed to th e advice o f h is h an d lers. H is "arm s control p o sitio n w a s in ad v e rte n t. H e g o t to it one ste p a t a tim e, w ith little, if a n y fore­ th o u g h t a b o u t w h e re h e w a s h e a d e d ." G orbachev a n d R eagan "trie d to d o too m u c h too soon. In p lay in g a t o n e -u p m a n sh ip w ith th e m ajor tran sactio n th a t lay before them , th ey o v e rstra in ed the tolerances of th eir sy stem s— a t least, A m erica's."44 R eagan " w a s n 't a n a d v e n tu re r w h o saw n u c le ar a rm s as u sab le w eap o n s; in stead , h e w a s a n ab o litio n ist— a far m ore convinced d isa rm e r th a n C arter," John N e w h o u se claim ed. H e w a s "n o a d m ire r of a rm s co n tro l a n d its w orks. H e w a n te d to h av e the a d v a n ta g e in n u c le ar w eap o n s, o r else to rid th e w o rld of th em ." But th a t stance, n o t so o u t of step w ith h is p red ecesso rs', w as a w ish , n o t a p lan , one inexorably tied to h is n aiv e v isio n of SDI. "In re tu rn for a sm all a n d p ro b ab ly m ean in g less concession o n Star W ars," R eagan co u ld h av e g o tten "a strateg ic arm s ag reem en t of a scale th a t n o p red ecesso r w o u ld h av e ev er tried for." But h e refu sed to b a rg a in w ith SDI, p ro b ab ly sen sin g " th a t a d re a m like Star W ars, once in te rru p te d , can n o t b e resu m ed . To th e e n d , h e ig n o red th e su b ­ stance of pro g ress in o rd e r to k eep faith w ith its sh a d o w ."45 A s a result, h e a n d G orbachev settled for a m o d est achievem ent. E arlier the K rem lin h a d rejected the "zero o p tio n " a n d " in tru siv e " m easu res to verify a rm s agreem ents, b u t G orbachev stu n n e d W ash in g to n b y ag reein g to b o th , m ak in g A m erican d ip lo m a ts, w h o h a d long m a d e p ro p a g a n d a h a y o u t of So­ v iet resistance to on-site verification, "choke o n o u r o w n v o m it," a n d leaving P en tag o n officials a g h ast a t th e p ro sp e ct th a t Soviet c o u n te rp a rts m ig h t ro am A m erican facilities.46 Still, th e a d m in istra tio n h a d to em brace th e In term ed iate N u clear Force T reaty since it in co rp o ra te d so m u c h th a t W ash in g to n h a d long d e m a n d e d . Signed in D ecem ber 1987, it m a n d a te d e lim in atio n of m issiles w ith a ran g e of u p to th ree th o u sa n d m iles. T h o u g h it left arsen als of lo n g -ran g e rockets in tact— Strategic A rm s R eduction talk s (START) w ere d ra g g in g o n in conclusively— it m a rk e d th e first su p e rp o w e r a g reem en t to d ism an tle, ra th e r th a n m erely cap, a su b sta n tia l class of w e a p o n s carry in g n u c le ar w a r­ h ead s. T h at w a s sufficient, along w ith o th er step s tak e n b e tw ee n 1986 a n d 1988, to liq u id a te th e C old W ar. W hy h a d th e C o ld W ar e n d e d , a n d so ab ru p tly , w h e n d e te n te in th e 1970s h a d failed? In m a n y w ays, of course, the ap p ea ra n c e of a n a b ru p t e n d w a s m is­ leading. "C o ld W ar" w a s alw ay s a stu b b o rn ly sim plistic term for a v ariety of shifting conflicts, m a n y o n b attlefield s n o t th e least b it "cold," a n d m an y dis-

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g u isin g clashes of interests a n d id eo lo g y th a t h a d little to d o w ith its p re su m e d content. M any of the stru g g les associated w ith th e C o ld W ar also e n d e d lo n g before th e late 1980s. T he U n ited States' conflict w ith C h in a, a t tim es re g a rd e d as a n en em y b ig g er or a t least m ore bellicose th a n th e Soviet U nion, larg ely e n d e d w ith N ix o n 's o p e n in g to C hina. The d iv isio n of E u ro p e p e rsisted , b u t fears th a t w a r w a s im m in en t th ere o r th a t W estern E u ro p ean s w o u ld su ccu m b to in tim id a tio n fad e d g ra d u a lly if u n e v en ly after th e last crisis o v e r B erlin in 1961. N e w conflicts d id e ru p t as o ld er ones a b ated , especially in th e "T h ird W orld " (a grossly loose te rm of convenience th a t itself o w es to th e C o ld W ar), b u t th e p ro x y w a rs in A frica a n d A sia w ere for th e m o st p a rt d w in d lin g b y th e early 1980s, o r sim p ly n o lo n g er of g reat in terest to A m erican leaders. M ean­ w hile, conflict w ith leftists in C en tral A m erica, a n d w ith V ietnam , N o rth Korea, a n d C u b a o u tlasted th e C old W ar's n o m in a l e n d , w h ic h su g g e ste d th a t m a n y of th e ir d y n am ics h a d little to d o w ith th e C old W ar. The C old W ar a t h o m e, too, w o u n d d o w n after th e m id-1950s; m u c h of its legacy a n d c o u n te rsu b v e rsiv e id eology p ersisted , e v en g ain ed n e w life in th e 1980s, b u t th ey th riv e d in differ­ e n t contexts. T hus m a n y facets of th e C o ld W ar h a d d w in d le d a w ay o r e n d e d alto g eth er before R eagan a n d G orbachev sh o o k h a n d s. W h at e n d e d th e n w a s th e Soviet-A m erican conflict— to b e sure, th e C o ld W a r's m o st d e fin in g a n d d a n g ero u s feature, b u t h a rd ly its su m a n d substance. Like a n y b ig change, this one h a d m a n y causes. From th e s ta n d p o in t of lead ers a n d policies, R eagan, largely in ad v erten tly , h a d p re p a re d th e w ay, a n d G orbachev a n d h is allies, b y th eir d ip lo m acy a n d in te rn al reform s, tra n sla te d th e p o ssibility into reality. N o change in th e co m petence o r v isio n of A m erican lea d ersh ip h a d in terv en ed , b u t R eagan's in stin ct to w ag e th e C o ld W ar o n th e b a ttle g ro u n d of cu ltu re, a n d G o rb ach ev 's su rp risin g agility o n th a t terrain , d id alter th e struggle. From the v a n ta g e p o in t of its history, m ilitarizatio n h a d reach ed a stag e w h ere its b u rd e n s w ere so im m ense a n d its b en efits so m ea g er th a t lead ers w ere forced to alter its course. O f course, in its "objective" co n d itio n s, it h a d reach ed th a t stage lo n g before, in the m aelstro m of tw o w o rld w ars. O n th e o th er h a n d , those w a rs h a d also c a ta p u lte d th e Soviet U n io n a n d th e U n ited States to su p e rp o w e r statu s, a n d after the w o rst b lo o d le ttin g e n d e d in 1945, th e sh o rt-term benefits of m ilitarizatio n h a d seem ed large, its im m ed iate d e m a n d s u n av o idable, a n d its long-term b u rd e n s debatab le. T hose b u rd e n s sa n k in d u r­ in g th e 1980s, m ore sh a rp ly in M oscow becau se it co u ld n o t so read ily b e a r th em a n d because W ashington w a s relu c ta n t to a d m it them . Soviet a n d A m eri­ can lead ers th u s a rriv e d b y different routes a t th e co n clu sio n th a t th e contrac­ tion, if n o t the cessation, of m ilitarizatio n w a s in order. By conventional sta n d a rd s of ideology, it w as o d d th a t R onald R eagan p re ­ sid ed over this historic change, b u t the iro n y w a s explicable. H e w a s alw ay s a n id eo lo gue m ore in w o rd s th a n in action; b y tem p e ra m e n t h e w a s flexible a n d easy-going, an d , b y long experience in co rp o rate A m erica, m o re a c o m p a n y

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m a n th a n a b o ld in n o v ato r; as P resid en t, h e su rro u n d e d h im self w ith p ra g ­ m atic co n serv ativ es m ore th a n tru e believers. E ven a t th e h e ig h t of rem ilitariza­ tion, h e w a s m o re in terested in its sh o w th a n its su b stan ce an d , th o u g h w illin g to sp e n d a g rea t treasu re in its behalf, u n in te re ste d in costly sacrifices a n d b o ld in itiativ es to tran sla te m ilitary p o w e r into leverage o n th e w o rld scene. P u sh in g rem ilitarizatio n , h e exposed its h o llo w n ess in ad v erten tly . So too, m ore self­ consciously, d id his o p p o n e n ts, w ith o u t w h o se p ressu res R eagan m ig h t n o t h av e ta k e n th e step s h e d id . A n d m ore th a n R eägan g rasp ed , th e fo u n d atio n s of m ilita riza tio n w ere e ro d in g in th e U n ited States, ju st as in th e Soviet em pire. By 1986, th a t erosion, coinciding w ith G orbachev 's m oves, w as tak in g its toll.

Eroding Foundations A tten tio n to th e econom ic fo u n d atio n s of rem ilitarizatio n em erg ed slow ly in th e 1980s. R eagan's policies w ere controversial from th e start: h e w a s su re to "becom e k in g of th e deficit-m akers a n d u n d isp u te d m aste r of th e n atio n al d e b t m o u n ta in ," co m p lain ed th e New Leader in 1982.47 Initially, h o w ev er, h is p o p u ­ larity, the jolting "R eagan recession," a n d th e C old W ar's strid en cy te n d e d to m ask lo n g -term trends. By m id -d ecad e, w ith R eagan lacking a stro n g ag en d a for h is second term a n d C o ld W ar tensions easing, critics saw th e tre n d s com ing into focus. The critics fau lted R eagan's a d m in istra tio n for n eg lectin g d isa d v a n ta g e d A m ericans, ig n o rin g th e "fem inization of p o v erty ," a n d d e sp o ilin g th e en v i­ ro n m ent. M o u n tin g fed eral sp e n d in g a n d d e b t b elied R eagan's p ro m ise to sh rin k g o v e rn m e n t (sp en d in g a t all levels of g o v e rn m e n t as a p ercen tag e of G N P increased early in th e 1980s after a slig h t decline u n d e r C arter). Instead, R eagan only shifted its priorities, as h e favored n atio n al secu rity a n d n eg lected social w elfare, econom ic renew al, a n d a n "in fra stru c tu re " alleg ed ly so d ecay ed th a t th e n a tio n h a d becom e a n "u n d e rd e v e lo p in g [country], a m o d e m econ­ o m y in reverse gear." A n e a r collapse of the b a n k in g sy stem raised q u estio n s a b o u t d e re g u latio n a n d left a n a d m in istratio n p resu m ab ly averse to b ig g er g o v e rn m e n t tak in g o n the e n o rm o u s task of b a ilin g o u t th a t system . C ritics also assailed th e lead ers in charge, w h o (like In terio r Secretary Jam es W att) w ere so m etim es c o n te m p tu o u s of the v e ry functions th e law en joined th em to p e r­ form . Scandals in th e a d m in istra tio n h e ig h ten e d th a t suspicion, as d id Rea­ g a n 's d isd a in for public service. A s Federal R eserve C h a irm an Paul Volcker p u t it in 1987 (w ith o u t m en tio n in g Reagan), "M ediocrity in o u r pu b lic services w o u ld , in tim e, becom e a n in v itatio n to m ed io crity as a n a tio n ." M ediocrity w as precisely w h a t critics saw em erging.48 A bove all, th ey p o in te d to the n a tio n 's slide from b ein g th e w o rld 's greatest cred ito r to its g reatest d ebtor, from enjoying a tra d e su rp lu s to g ro an in g u n d e r h u g e tra d e deficits, a n d from b eing the w o rld 's richest n a tio n in p e r capita term s to one ch allen g ed b y several W estern E u ro p ean n a tio n s a n d Japan. Soar-

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ing federal, p erso n al, a n d co rp o rate d e b t seem ed a m ajor cu lp rit. " O u r fiscal policy since 1981," co m p lain ed the New Republic in 1987, "h as allo w ed p e o p le living to d a y to enjoy h ig h e r c o n su m p tio n a t th e ex p en se of th o se w h o w ill b e living tom orrow ." T he R eagan boom , th ey ch arg ed , w a s tran sien t, d riv e n b y d efen se sp e n d in g a n d b y d e b t— b y w ritin g "200 billio n d o lla rs' w o rth of h o t checks every year," said vice p resid en tia l c an d id ate L loyd B entsen in o n e of the 1988 c am p aig n 's few m em o rab le lines— ra th e r th a n b y g ro w th in sav in g s a n d in v estm en t th a t w o u ld en su re lo n g -term co m petitiveness. "T here is n o th in g w ro n g w ith im p o rtin g capital," th e New Republic n o te d , b u t th e U n ited States u se d it "to increase o u r c o n su m p tio n a n d g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g , n o t o u r in ­ v e stm e n t."49 R eagan, critics ch arg ed , h a d fostered a " d e m a n d -sid e " ra th e r th a n "su p p ly -sid e " b o o m th a t p ro d u c e d a w id e n in g g a p b e tw ee n rich a n d po o r, a n d sta g n a n t o r declin in g incom e levels for m o st A m erican s (tw o tre n d s w id e ly d o c u m e n te d in th e 1980s). T h at g ap je o p a rd iz ed n o t o n ly social justice a n d stability b u t econom ic com petitiveness, w h ic h w a s b a d ly serv ed b y a n illtrain ed , d e sp a irin g w o rk force a n d b y co rp o rate lead ers w h o seem ed m o re b e n t o n sh o rt-term p lu n d e r th a n o n lastin g co m p etitiv e zeal. The econom ic b lig h t of th e old m an u fa ctu rin g "R u stb elt" in th e M id w e st a n d N o rth e a st u n ­ d erlin ed the failure of R eagan's policies, as d id th e d escen t of blue-collar fac­ to ry w o rk e rs in to m in im u m -w ag e service-sector e m p lo y m en t, w h ile jobs in th e rev italized defense sector favored w hite-collar (an d g en erally w h ite a n d m ale) w orkers. The a d m in istra tio n h a d its defense. Federal sp e n d in g a n d d e b t w ere rising, th ey resp o n d ed , because C ongress a n d the D em o crats refu sed to p a re back g iv e-aw ay p ro g ra m s (alth o u g h th e b u d g e ts R eagan su b m itte d differed little fro m those C ongress passed). D efense sp e n d in g , th ey p o in te d out, w a s g ro w ­ in g n o faster a n d som etim es slo w er th a n p ro g ra m s like M edicare a n d su b sid ies like farm -price su p p o rts, a lth o u g h social w elfare sp e n d in g b y all levels of gov­ e rn m e n t declined slightly as a percen tag e of G N P d u rin g th e 1980s. S u pplysid e econom ics h a d n o t y et fully w o rk e d becau se it h a d n o t y et b e en fully tried. The R ustbelt's travails w ere a ttrib u te d to stru c tu ra l ch an g es in th e global econ­ om y, n o t to R eagan's policies (but C a rte r's w ere ro u tin ely blam ed). M eanw hile, job creation w as ro b u st (m ore so th a n in m u c h of W estern E urope) a n d a d ra ­ m atic d ro p in in flatio n — in tu rn a stim u lu s to th e h o u sin g a n d o th er in d u strie s— w a s a n otable achievem ent. R eag an 's b e st d efen se w a s p ro sp e rity (or a t least, easy m oney) after 1983, w h a te v e r its u n ev en n ess. Incom e g a p s b e­ tw e en rich a n d poor, w h ite a n d n o n w h ite, m en a n d w o m en , o r th e U n ited States a n d o th er n a tio n s w ere d en ied , trea te d as statistical flukes, or d ism issed as o p p o n e n ts' p ro p ag a n d a. For b o th critics a n d d e fe n d ers at m id -d ecad e, th e relatio n sh ip b e tw ee n re­ m ilitarizatio n a n d econom ic vitality rem a in e d o p aq u e. T he ch arg e th a t rearm a­ m e n t caused m o u n tin g federal d e b t w a s on ly half-valid: o th e r sp e n d in g w a s also p lau sib ly responsible. M ore th a n th at, it w as th e b alan ce b e tw ee n rev e n u e

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a n d sp e n d in g , n o t ju st th e latter, th a t w a s at issue. M ean w h ile, th o u g h defense to o k a risin g sh are of G N P a n d th e federal b u d g e t, it still b u lk e d less larg e in the eco n o m y th a n a few d ecad es earlier, so th a t a n y cuts in it w o u ld n o w h av e less m acroeconom ic effect. In a n y event, few of R eagan's political ch allen g ers p ro ­ p o se d b ig d efen se cuts. N o n eth eless, the relatio n sh ip b e tw e e n d efen se a n d th e econom y seem ed tro u b lin g . To so p h isticated critics, the n u b of th e m a tte r w a s th e in v estm en t of h u g e resources in to a n arena of in n o v atio n arid p ro d u c tio n in creasingly irrele­ v a n t to global co m p etitio n in civilian g o o d s a n d services. W hile th e p a tte rn w a s h a rd ly new , A m ericans w e re re m in d e d th a t th eir to u g h e st co m p etito rs, e sp e­ cially th e Japanese, sp e n t far less o n d efense a n d th u s h a d m o re cap ital to in v est in civilian en terp rise. N o r w a s cap ital alone th e issue. C ritical w a s th e d e v o tio n of scientific resources to d efense a n d th e decline in "sp in -o ff" from d efen se to th e civilian sphere. In d ee d , so m e critics n o w saw "sp in -o ff" reversing: n e w ci­ v ilian technologies w ere m o re likely to m eet m ilitary n e e d s th a n th e o th er w a y a ro u n d . M oreover, alterin g p rio rities, e v en if a g reem en t e m e rg ed to d o so, seem ed likely to b e p ain fu l. C o rp o rate contractors, p riv ate a n d pu b lic defense labs, a n d scientists a n d en g in eers w o rk in g o n d efen se projects enjoyed a sys­ tem w ith little com petition. It w a s h a rd ly clear th a t th ey co u ld sh ift from creat­ in g w e a p o n s for a g u a ra n te e d b u y e r to d e sig n in g cars for a co m p etitiv e m ark et, o r th a t c o rp o ra tio n s w o u ld w a n t to d o so, since p ro fits in d efen se w o rk w ere o ften h ig h e r th a n in th e civilian m ark et. " O u r in d u stry 's reco rd a t d efen se con­ v e rsio n is u n b le m ish e d b y success," th e h e a d of M a rtin M arietta later n o ted .50 In su m , e v en if A m ericans co u ld afford re a rm a m e n t in a fiscal sen se— after all, h ig h e r taxes o r cuts in o th e r sp e n d in g co u ld p a y th e b ills— th eir n a tio n 's eco­ nom ic h e a lth w a s in jeopardy. A t issue, b esid es w h a t m ilitarizatio n cost in deficits accru ed o r p ro d u c ts n e ­ glected, w a s w h a t it p u rch a se d . If A m ericans h a d h a d co n v in cin g evid en ce th a t m ilitary p o w e r still en ab led th em to p ro tec t th eir econom ic v itality o r carve o u t n e w econom ic frontiers, th e case for rem ilitarizatio n m ig h t h av e b e en irrefu ta­ ble. R earm am ent, ho w ev er, w a s n o t convincingly d e p lo y e d to th o se en d s. In ­ stead it w a s k ey ed to a n increasingly h o llo w Soviet th re a t a n d to u te d as e n ­ h an cin g A m erican p rid e. W h at it p u rc h a se d in tan g ib le term s w a s unclear. O nce th e fo u n d a tio n of a n A m erican econom ic im p eriu m , it n o w seem ed a w o b b ly su p e rstru c tu re a strid e a cru m b lin g econom ic base. W h eth er R eagan's in v estm en t in m ilitary p o w e r w a s w a ste d in th e sense th a t it serv ed little p u rp o se w a s a possibility rarely h ig h lig h ted in th e m id-1980s. In stead , A m ericans u su a lly rea d a b o u t m ore h u m d ru m th o u g h real form s of w a ste — P en tag o n scan d als th a t rev ealed c o rru p tio n in d efen se p ro cu re m en t a n d o u trag e o u s prices for item s as m u n d a n e as h a m m e rs a n d as h u g e as bom bers. "W e stole it fair a n d sq u a re" seem ed th e a ttitu d e of th e co m p an ies involved, according to a n in sid er.51 Left u n clear w a s w h e th e r those item s w ere useful e v en if fairly a n d p a rsim o n io u sly p u rch ased .

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N o netheless, d eb ate h a d p ro ce ed e d far e n o u g h b y 1986 to su b v e rt th e lin k ­ age b e tw ee n m ilitary m ig h t a n d econom ic p ro sp e rity th a t h a d su sta in e d m il­ itarization. The latter h a d long seem ed a stim u lu s to p ro sp e rity a n d a w a y to p ro tect it. W hen lim ited d e m ilitariz atio n coin cid ed w ith econom ic w o es in the 1970s, the old linkage h a d b e en reaffirm ed, a t least in a n e g ativ e w ay. But re­ m ilitarizatio n in the 1980s, th o u g h it stim u la te d m o m e n ta ry p ro sp e rity for som e, n o lo n g er p ro m ised lastin g econom ic stren g th . E ven th e a d m in istra tio n m a d e only a h a lf-h earted case th a t it did: a lth o u g h it d e fe n d e d p ro g ra m s like Star W ars as stak in g o u t a n e w econom ic frontier, b y a n d large it a rg u e d th a t p ro sp e rity w o u ld sw ell for o th er reasons, like th e m agic of su p p ly -sid e econom ics— im plicitly, despite rem ilitarizatio n ra th e r th a n b ecau se of it. N e a r the e n d of R eagan's presidency, all these elem en ts of econom ic anxiety, criticism , a n d p red ic tio n cam e to g eth er in P au l K en n ed y 's to m e The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987), a n d in the su rp risin g reactio n it g en erated . A s K en­ n e d y ack now ledged, few of his a rg u m e n ts w ere novel: h e d re w o n sch o larsh ip lo n g a ccu m u latin g a n d w o rries lo n g voiced. T his w a s a w o rk of "h au te v u lg a r­ izatio n ," one critic sniffed, "rem ed ial rea d in g for th e ill-in fo rm ed ."52 Still, K en­ n e d y su m m arize d d iv erse critiques in a single v o lu m e of d a u n tin g h eft a n d d is­ p assio n ate tone, w e av in g th em in to a sto ry lin e a b o u t th e ascen t a n d decline of im p erial p o w e rs th a t m a n y A m ericans v ag u ely k n e w from d u s ty textbooks a b o u t Rom e, Persia, a n d G reat Britain. H is tim ing, w ith th e C old W ar th aw in g a n d d eb ate a b o u t A m erica's fo rtu n es g row in g , w a s perfect. It h e lp e d th a t as a B ritish scholar (relocated to Yale) h e eschew ed o b v io u s p olem ics a n d u n d e r­ sto o d im p erial decline as only a n E n g lish m an p resu m ab ly co u ld . H e a p ­ p ro ach ed A m ericans as a n uncle w h o w o rried ly , if a ta d con d escen d in g ly , re­ m in d e d his y o u n g e r nieces a n d n e p h e w s of th eir k in 's earlier fate. The fact th a t th e U n ited States seem ed to h ave in h erited B ritain's h eg em o n ic role m a d e K en­ n e d y 's a v u n cu lar m e d itatio n all th e m ore a p p ro p ria te . K ennedy offered n o ra n t a g ain st m ilitarizatio n . H e g ra sp e d th e role of m ili­ tary m ig h t in th e rise of g reat p o w e rs a n d refu sed to attrib u te A m erica's falter­ ing econom ic fo rtu n es solely to its q u e st for m ilitary pow er. Jap an h a d excelled econom ically because it b a sk ed " u n d e r th e A m erican strateg ic um b rella, b u t p e rh a p s e v en m ore because of fiscal a n d tax atio n policies w h ich e n co u rag e d a n u n u su a lly h ig h d eg ree of p e rso n al sav in g s" a n d o th e r sta tist policies "to tally d ifferent from the A m erican laissez-faire ap p ro ach ." M oreover, A m erican p o li­ cies h a d su sta in ed "dom estic p ro sp erity ," a rre sted "Soviet ex p an sio n ism ," h e lp e d to in teg rate E u ro p e's fo rm er colonies into th e w o rld system , w o rk e d to restore "th e econom ies— a n d th e dem ocratic tra d itio n s— of w e ste rn E u ro p e" a n d Japan, a n d "m ain tain ed the liberal in te rn atio n al o rd er." U nlike m an y critics of the A m erican im p e riu m , K enned y h a d little q u a rre l w ith th ese achievem ents.53 Still, the costs in cu rre d a n d the failure to face th em tro u b le d him . H e g ra n te d the inevitability of relative A m erican econom ic decline once n a tio n s to m u p b y

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W orld W ar II recovered, b u t h e su m m e d u p c o n te m p o ra ry anxieties precisely: "T he real q u e stio n w a s n o t 'D id tire U n ited States h av e to decline relatively?' b u t 'D id it h av e to decline sofast?' " H e d id n o t th in k so. A m erican lead ers h a d o v e rv a lu e d m ilitary stren g th , neglected the econom ic sin ew s of p o w er, clu n g to a m yopic v iew of the Soviet th rea t, a n d p lu n g e d in to a self-defeating arm s race. "T he difficulties ex perienced b y co n te m p o ra ry societies w h ich are m il­ itarily to p -h eav y m erely rep e at those w hich , in th eir tim e, affected P hilip II's S pain, N icholas D's R ussia, a n d H itle r's G erm any. A large m ilitary estab lish ­ m e n t m ay, like a g reat m o n u m e n t, look im p o sin g to th e im p ressio n ab le ob­ server; b u t if it is n o t restin g u p o n a firm fo u n d a tio n (in this case, a p ro d u ctiv e n a tio n a l econom y), it ru n s th e risk of a fu tu re collapse." The A m erican state (and, h e su g g ested , th e K rem lin) h a d failed to b alan ce "th e sh o rt-term security affo rd ed b y large defense forces a g ain st the lo n g er-term secu rity of risin g p ro ­ d u c tio n a n d incom e," precisely th e b alance E isen h o w er v ain ly h a d so u g h t.54 A s a result, the U n ited States faced the d ilem m a of "im p erial ov erstretch ," th e ten d e n cy to take o n m ore global obligations th a n it co u ld m eet a n d to sa p its econom ic h e a lth in the process, w h ile o th er n a tio n s seized econom ic lead er­ ship. "G reat P ow ers in relative decline instin ctiv ely re sp o n d b y sp e n d in g m o re o n 'secu rity ,' a n d th ereb y d iv e rt p o ten tial resources from 'in v e stm e n t' a n d c o m p o u n d th eir lo n g -te rm d ilem m a." To m ak e th e d ilem m a w o rse, it co u ld n o t b e so lved b y a s u d d e n retreat from pow er: A s "the global su p e rp o w e r," th e U n ited States "req u ires m u ch larg er defense forces," w ith o u t w h ich its h eg e­ m onic p o sitio n w o u ld crum ble. K ennedy p red ic te d n o sw ift o r to tal collapse of A m erican p o w e r— th e n a tio n w a s too big a n d rich for that. Still, h e e n d e d o n a n o te b o th e arn estly pessim istic a n d p o in te d ly sardonic: "O n e is tem p ted to p a ra p h ra se S h aw 's d e a d ly se rio u s q u ip a n d say: 'R om e fell; B abylon fell; S carsdale's tu rn w ill com e.' "55 T here w ere lim its to K en n ed y 's analysis. G ra p p lin g as m u c h w ith B ritain's decline as A m erica's, h e te n d e d to rea d th e fo rm er in to th e latter. H is choice of B ritain as p rim a ry m o d e l— ra th e r th a n G erm any, France, o r Japan, m ajor p o w e rs w h ich rem ain ed m ore econom ically v ita l— g u a ra n te e d a glo o m y o u t­ look a n d serv ed as a measure of h is p e ssim ism m ore th a n evidence for it. Ken­ n e d y reg retted the casual arrogance of earlier B ritish lead ers a n d c u rre n t A m er­ ican elites, w h o b lith ely a ssu m e d th a t m in o r ad ju stm en ts w o u ld suffice to d eal w ith im p erial overstretch, a n d h e a d m ired n a tio n s like Jap an w h ich p u rsu e d state p ro g ram s of econom ic g ro w th , b u t like m a n y W esterners h e te n d e d to ex­ aggerate Jap an 's m y sterio u s h a rm o n y a n d statist strateg izin g . By th e sam e to­ ken, to see A m erican lead ers as tak in g a "laissez-faire ap p ro a ch " to econom ic challenges co n fu sed id eo lo g y w ith practice: th o u g h a rg u ab ly w ith less coher­ ence a n d success th a n its com petitors, th e A m erican state h a d d o n e m u ch to fashion the n a tio n 's econom y. P erh ap s because K en n ed y v iew ed th e A m erican state as ru d d erle ss, h e in tu rn offered little g u id an ce a b o u t h o w it m ig h t balance m ilitary a n d econom ic goals. H e v ag u ely enjoined A m ericans to m an ag e de-

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cline m ore p ru d e n tly b u t fell silent a b o u t the h a rd choices in v o lv e d in d o in g so, as if th ey w ere stuck in a historical d ilem m a for w h ic h th ere w ere few solutions. M issing also w as a clear sense of w h e th e r m ilitary su p rem acy w a s essential an y lo n g er for global h e g em o n y (or global order). Jerem iads a b o u t its decline w ere as old as A m erica: offered b y N e w E n g lan d P u ritan s, b y p a trio ts fearing the early R epublic's c o rru p tio n , b y A m erican s fearin g racial m o n g relizatio n o r the fro n tie r's e n d , b y o th ers sh a k e n b y th e G reat D epression, a n d b y C old W arriors. For A m erican s g ra p p lin g w ith th eir fu tu re, the jerem iad h a d b e en a favorite g en re (one essen tial to ad v o cates of m artia l a n d m o ral rev italizatio n in th e 1970s). N e ith e r K en n ed y n o r m o st com ­ m en tato rs o n h is w o rk p laced it w ith in th a t trad itio n . N o n etheless, his b o o k h e lp e d to con so lid ate a co n sen su s th a t A m erica w a s in decline. It confirm ed th e g a th e rin g su sp icio n th a t m ilitarizatio n w a s e ro d in g th e n a tio n 's econom ic vitality. It also h e lp e d to tak e th a t su sp icio n a step fu rth e r b y arg u in g the reverse proposition: g ra d u a l econom ic decline w o u ld in tu rn e ro d e m ilitary hegem ony. W ith o u t factories to p ro d u c e w e a p o n s a n d in v en ­ tiv en ess to create th em , th e U n ited States w o u ld h av e to d e p e n d o n foreign sources o r o n its o w n su b sid iz ed d efense in d u stries. W ith o u t econom ic g ro w th , it w o u ld lack th e capital to p lo w b ack in to m ilitary stre n g th a n d , th o u g h K en n ed y d id n o t say so, a co n ten ted p o p u la tio n w illin g to p u t u p w ith m ilitary d e m a n d s. S urprisingly, this lo n g a n d o ften lab o rio u s academ ic b o o k g e n erate d m u ch atten tion. The review s p o u re d o u t in th e first h a lf of 1988 in th e m ass m a rk e t as w ell as the e x p ert press, sales soared, a n d K en n ed y h im self attrac ted m u c h m e­ d ia attention. "Is It T w ilight for A m erica?" a sk ed a ty p ical h ead lin e. V aguely cen trist in its politics, K en n ed y 's b o o k h a d so m eth in g for everyone: for d efen se h aw k s, a n a ssu m p tio n th a t m ilitary stre n g th rem a in e d essential; for skeptics a b o u t A m erica's course, evidence th a t th e q u e st for su c h stre n g th h a d g o tte n o u t of h a n d . C ritical resp o n ses w ere n o t alw ay s favorable, b u t e v en h o stile re­ v iew ers seem ed com pelled to en g ag e K en n ed y 's book. O th ers saw it as rele­ v a n t to th e fo rthcom ing election cam paign. "T he p resid en tia l c a n d id ates h av e y et to d irectly a d d re ss th e issues the bo o k raises," w ro te Newsweek's John Barry, b u t th ey "are n o t u n a w are of polls sh o w in g w id e sp re a d pu b lic u n ease o v er econom ic decline a t h o m e a n d co m p etitio n fro m a b ro ad ." A m erican s "co u ld b e rip e for a d eb ate over A m erica's role in the w o rld ." 56 Little su c h d eb ate h a d occurred in 1984 o r w o u ld arise in 1988, h o w ev er, for reaso n s th a t th e National Review in a d v e rte n tly illu m in ated . A m erica w a s in d e ­ cline all rig h t, Sam uel Francis ag reed in rev iew in g K en n ed y 's book, e v en as th e c o m m u n ist th re a t h a d w o rsen ed : h e c o m p a red E isen h o w er's success in c ru sh ­ ing G u a tem ala's left-w ing regim e in 1954 to R eagan's ineffectual resp o n se to "th e m u c h m ore tangible th re a t to U.S. in te re s ts . . . rep re se n te d b y C u b a, N ica­ rag u a , a n d the v a rio u s insurgencies th ey su p p o rt." But th e failure th ere a n d earlier in V ietnam su g g e ste d " th a t it is n o t th e ero sio n of A m erica's 'p ro d u c tiv e

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b a se ' th a t is th e p ro b lem , b u t th e lack of w ill o r capacity o n th e p a rt of A m erica's elite to u n d e rs ta n d a n d m ak e u se of p o w e r." K en n ed y failed to exp lain A m er­ ica's d ecline because h e h a d "little to say a b o u t th e c u ltu ra l fo u n d atio n s o f this w e ak n e ss" a n d d id n o t "believe th em p a rticu la rly im p o rtan t, a n y m o re th a n m o st of his elite rea d ers" d id . F rancis's shrill rev iew rev ealed p e rsiste n t fissures a m o n g conservatives, m an y fru stra te d th a t c u ltu ral ren ew al h a d n o t y et ar­ riv ed , th a t R eagan h a d n o t exercised A m erican p o w e r forcefully, a n d th a t b y 1988 h e e v en seem ed w illin g to call off the C old W ar.57 D espite his e x asp e ratio n w ith G O P lead ers, Francis c a p tu re d th e basic stance of R eagan in 1984 a n d B ush in 1988 in b e atin g b ack th e d o u b ts K ennedy voiced. Facing th e charge th a t th e m aterial fo u n d atio n s of p o w e r w ere e ro d in g , th ey sh o re d u p its "cu ltu ral fo u n d atio n s," d e n ie d th a t its "p ro d u ctiv e b ase" h a d d e ­ clined, accused D em ocrats of lacking "th e w ill o r capacity" to u se A m erican p o w er, a n d h a iled p atrio tic culture. Som e co n serv ativ es d isag reed : "R eagan's th e b ig g est deficit sp e n d e r in history," the Chicago Tribune's financial ed ito r co m p lained; "h e cau sed m o st of the deficit p ro b lem today, n o t C ongress. People love R eagan because h e 's a closet liberal w h o p reach es c o n serv atism ."58 T h at v iew d id n o t p rev a il in R epublican P arty councils, h ow ever. T he G O P 's em brace of th e religious R ight at its 1984 D allas co n v en tio n — w h e re th e c am p aig n b u tto n s re a d "C h ristian s for R eagan" a n d "C u t O u t A ll N o n -D efense S p en d in g N o w !"— in d icated h o w it e m p h a size d m o ral rev italiz­ atio n , b u t its n e atest trick w a s to tu rn criticism of its policies in to criticism of A m erica itself. A s U N A m b a ssa d o r Jeane K irk p atrick p u t it in 1984, th e D em o­ cratic n o m in ee w as "b a d n e w s Fritz [W alter] M o n d ale," one of th e "b lam e A m erica first cro w d ." T h at accusation w a s a lre ad y co m m o n in co n serv ativ e in­ tellectual circles (w hich in c lu d e d K irkpatrick): as Joseph E p stein co m p lain ed , "th e co n te m p o ra ry literary scene is rife w ith w rite rs" w h o evince "a fairly c ru d e so rt of anti-A m ericanism ." M o n d ale w a s e q u a te d w ith th e w eak n ess of w ill a n d p e n ch a n t for h a n d w rin g in g a b o u t A m erica's faults th a t h a d p re s u m ­ ab ly p a ra ly z e d C a rte r's presidency. H is ru n n in g m ate. Rep. G erald in e Ferraro, w a s labeled "u n te ste d ," w ith all the resonance of su c h a n o tio n in th e n u clear a g e — because she w a s only a th ree-term co n g ressw o m an , o r because sh e w a s o n ly a w o m an . R eagan him self "p ro m o te d th em es of red e m p tio n , p atrio tism , a n d fam ily," seeing a n A m erica "w h ere ev ery d ay is in d ep e n d en c e day, th e F o u rth of July," g ro w in g tearfu l u p o n visitin g th e N o rm a n d y battlefield of W orld W ar II, a n d , in a n o th e r television ad , "em b racin g O lym pic ch am p io n s, w h ile a voice p ro claim ed 'A m erica is C om in g Back!' " "T he c o u n try is o n a p a ­ triotic ego trip ," John M cL aughlin n o te d ap p ro v in g ly , " p ro u d of itself a n d unself-consciously enjoying the nationalistic b in g e." T he m essag e w a s th a t A m erican p o w e r w as robust, th a t D em ocrats lacked th e w ill to u se it, a n d th a t p a trio tism w o u ld cem en t its "cu ltu ral fo u n d atio n s." It w a s a m essage th at M o n d ale co u n tered e arn estly b u t ineffectually. H is m o st fam o u s lin e— R eagan w ill "raise taxes, so w ill I. H e w o n 't tell you, I ju st d id " — a d d re sse d m o u n tin g

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econom ic w orries, b u t to n o avail. H is a tte m p t to " a p p ro p ria te th e [national] secu rity issu e" a n d th a t of liberals g en erally to in sist " th a t th e flag b elo n g s to ev ery o n e" left th em clinging to a p a llid m e-too v e rsio n of R eaganism . W h at R eagan d id confidently, in soft focus in 1984, B ush d id in a m o re b rittle fash io n in 1988, asse rtin g the c u ltu ra l b ases of n a tio n al p o w e r in th e face o f fears a b o u t A m erica's m aterial decline.59 T h at asse rtio n re a p e d political d iv id e n d s, b u t it also sh ifted p o litical d e b ate to territo ry as sh a k y as th e econom ic terrain , w h e re d isu n ity seem ed to jeo p ar­ d ize n a tio n al p o w e r a n d w h e re e v e n co nserv ativ es d iv id e d a m o n g them selves. A m ericans u su a lly u n d e rs to o d th eir c u ltu ral d iv isio n s in th e 1980s in term s of co m p etin g conservative a n d liberal visions, th e fo rm er (the "affirm ers" o n e h is­ to ria n calls them ) reach in g to u n ite A m erican s b e h in d " tra d itio n a l" a n d p a tri­ otic v alues, th e la tter w a n tin g A m ericans to jo in in a co m m o n celeb ratio n of th eir diversity.60 T he line b e tw e e n these visio n s w a s sm u d g e d , h o w ev er, a n d u g ly d iv isio n s d is ru p te d each cam p, ones th a t o p e n e d to p u b lic v iew a t th e sta rt of th e 1980s, w h e n Sen. B arry G o ld w a ter excoriated th e relig io u s R ight. G o ld w a ter w a s h a p p y in 1981 to celebrate R eagan's victory, to see th e p e n ­ d u lu m sw in g " to th e conservative, m o ral e n d of th e sp e ctru m ," a n d to em brace m a n y v a lu e s of th e religious Right. But h e w a s also stu n g b y its o p p o sitio n to th e S u p rem e C o u rt n o m in a tio n of fellow A rizo n a n S an d ra D ay O 'C o n n o r b e­ cause of h e r p re su m e d v iew s o n abortion, in sistin g th a t "m a n y fine co n serv a­ tives" accept "re g u la te d ab o rtio n s," th o u g h h e d id n o t sh are h is w ife's b elief in "freed o m of choice." D isassociating h is co n serv atism from '" th e n e w rig h t,'" h e d eclared " th a t th e religious issues of these g ro u p s h av e little o r n o th in g to d o w ith conservative o r liberal politics." R eligion h a s a role in politics, b u t "th e m o ral m ajority, pro-life a n d o th e r religious g ro u p s," h e co m p lain ed , "cajole" a n d "co m p lain " a n d "th re a te n y o u w ith loss of m o n ey o r v o tes o r b o th ." H e w a s "sick a n d tire d of the political p reach ers" a n d "th e th rea ts of ev ery reli­ g io u s g ro u p w h o th in k it h a s som e G o d -g ra n te d rig h t to control m y v o te o n ev ery rollcall in the S enate." T hey jeo p ard ize " o u r political sy stem " a n d d iv e rt "u s aw ay from th e v ital issu e s" — "th e serio u s econom ic a n d m ilitary d a n g e rs in th is co u n try to d a y " — o n w h ich A m erican s sh o u ld focus. "C an a n y o n e look a t th e carnage of Iran, th e b lo o d sh e d in N o rth e rn Irelan d , o r th e b o m b s b u rs t­ ing in L ebanon a n d y e t q u e stio n the d a n g e rs of injecting religious issu es in to th e affairs of state?"61 G o ld w a te r's o u tb u rst g o t only lim ited play. "T here is less h ere th a n m eets th e eye," a co m m en tato r soon claim ed; "n o n e of th e n a stin ess b e to k en s a n y m a ­ jor ideological sp lit w ith in A m erican c o n serv atism ."62 G o ld w a ter n o w seem ed a ro g u e figure, c o m m itted to c o n serv atism 's v isio n of geopolitics a n d political econom y, n o t to its m oralistic c u ltu ral a g en d a (he h a d e n d o rse d F ord o v er Rea­ g an in 1976). But w h ile R eagan's b e n ig n p resen ce k e p t an tag o n ism s am o n g co n servatives from boilin g over, th eir "ideological sp lit" p e rsiste d in th e 1980s, w id e n in g as th e co m m u n ist m enace sh ru n k .

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A s in th e S oviet-A m erican rivalry, c u ltu re seem ed th e aren a of co n test am o n g A m ericans in th e 1980s, w ith the m ea n in g of w a r 's h isto ry o ften w h a t th ey fo u g h t over. Struggles c o n tin u ed ov er p atrio tic sites a t Pearl H arb o r, a t th e A lam o, a t L ittle Big H o rn , a n d o th er "sacred cen ters." In Texas, th e L eague of U n ited L atin A m erican C itizens ch allen g ed th e control of th e A lam o site exer­ cised b y the D a u g h ters of th e R epublic of Texas, th e la tte r's backers m o u n tin g a n A lam o-like last sta n d a g ain st risin g L atino p o w er. F u rth e r w est. N a tiv e A m erican s ch allen g ed d o m in a n t m y th o lo g y a b o u t w h ites "o p en in g " th e W est to p ro g ress, seeking to h av e th e b attlefield w h e re C u ste r h a d fallen sta n d as a m em o ria l to In d ian s w h o h a d p e rish e d there. To h o n o r C u ste r in th e m id d le of th e ir h o m elan d , c h arg ed In d ia n activist R ussell M eans, w a s like erecting a "H itle r n a tio n al m o n u m e n t" in Jeru salem (or, as h e h a d earlier su g g ested , "a Lt. C alley N a tio n a l M o n u m e n t in V ietnam "). M ean s's co m p ariso n w a s a tellin g re m in d e r of th e in stab ility of th e p atrio tic past: W orld W ar II co u ld b e b e n t to d ifferen t p u rp o se s, a n d in d e e d one of h is o p p o n e n ts su g g e ste d th a t m em o ri­ alizin g In d ian s "w h o killed 261 A m erican so ld iers" w o u ld b e like Jew s erecting "a m o n u m e n t to th e N a zi SS." T h at these stru g g les o v e r h o w to rem em b er A m erica's m ilitary p a s t o ften e n d e d inconclusively o r su rp risin g ly — b y 1991, "C u ste r" h a d d isa p p e a re d fro m the official d e sig n atio n "L ittle Big H o rn Battle­ field N a tio n a l M o n u m e n t" a n d th e su p e rin te n d e n t w a s a N ativ e A m erican w o m a n — in d ic ate d p a rtia l failure b y th e forces of p atrio tic ren ew al.63 T he stru g g les o v e r p atrio tic sites o v e rla p p e d co ntests o v e r A m erican e d u ca ­ tion, as th o se w h o saw a stable p a s t w ith a fixed m ea n in g c o n te n d ed w ith th o se w h o re g a rd e d conflict o v er th a t m ea n in g as w elcom e in a dem ocracy. T he for­ m er v iew w a s e m p h a size d b y conservative in tellectuals w h o "led th e fight in th e 1980s to re in te rp re t V ietnam as a noble w a r," b y E d u ca tio n Secretary W il­ liam B ennett a n d o th ers stressin g fu n d am e n ta ls in ed u catio n , a n d b y tw o su r­ p risin g b estsellers of 1987, A llan B loom 's The Closing of the American Mind a n d E. D. H irsc h 's Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know (alth o u g h H irsch id en tified h im self as a liberal). T hese au th o rities, n o tes o n e h isto rian , w ere p a rt of a tre n d w h ich saw p u b lic schools a n d th eir critics lo o k to "th e su c­ cess of th e p aro ch ial schools, especially th eir em p h asis o n reg u larity , u n ifo r­ m ity, d iscipline, a n d control," a n d "m o v e to w a rd a m u c h m o re d elib erately ec­ clesiastical m o d el." B ehind th eir efforts, o b serv ed a n o th e r h isto rian , lay "th e sam e sense of A m erica's c u ltu ra l d e te rio ra tio n " th a t h a d b e e n a p p a re n t in the jerem iad p o p u la r at th e close of the p rev io u s cen tu ry , w ith a sim ilar conviction " th a t c u ltu re is less so m eth in g th a t is th a n so m eth in g th a t was. " A s Bloom p u t it, "T o d ay's select stu d e n ts k n o w so m u c h less, are so m u ch m o re c u t off from the trad itio n , are so m u c h slacker intellectually, th a t th ey m ak e th eir p red ecesso rs look like p ro d ig ie s of c u ltu re ."64 C onflict ov er e d u c a tio n in th e 1980s h a d m u c h in co m m o n w ith S pu tn ik -era debate: a fear of d eclining A m erican pow er, of y o u th b eco m in g "slacker," a n d of a riv al's a p p a re n t su p e rio rity in the schoolhouse. T his d eb ate, h o w ev er, also

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m a rk e d g reat changes since S p u tn ik 's ala rm in g beep-beep. T he fact th a t Japan, n o t th e Soviet U nion, p ro m p te d th e a la rm w a s a n o th e r sig n of th e C o ld W ar's im m in en t d em ise a n d of a shift in th e focus of anxieties fro m m ilitary p o w e r to econom ic v itality ("cu ltu ral literacy" w o u ld en h an ce A m erica's "econom ic p ro sp erity ," H irsch e m p h asized ).65 D ifferent, too, w a s n erv o u sn ess a m o n g som e A m ericans a b o u t th e success of A sian s a n d A sian -A m erican s in e d u c a ­ tio n 's scientific a n d technological a re n a — th ere h a d b e e n n o su c h ch allenge within A m erican e d u ca tio n in the S p u tn ik era, o n ly th e ex tern al th re a t of a p p a r­ e n t Soviet superiority. Social div isio n s u n d e rly in g d e b ate o n e d u c a tio n also seem ed sh a rp e r in th e 1980s. M any o ld er A m erican s resen te d th e d e m a n d s, es­ pecially from p ro p e rty taxes, m a d e b y a n y in v estm en t in e d u c a tio n c o m p a ra ­ ble to th a t of th e S p u tn ik era. A s th e q u a lity of p u b lic e d u c a tio n seem ed to d e ­ cline, as the p ro p o rtio n of p o o r a n d m in o rity stu d e n ts increased, o r as its c u rric u lu m o ffen d ed h e ig h te n e d religious sensibilities, m a n y m id d le-class p a r­ e n ts d e se rte d the p u b lic sy stem in fav o r of p riv a te schools (an d d e m a n d e d tax ­ p a y e r su p p o rt of th e ir efforts to d o so). M eanw hile, co n serv ativ es' v iew s o n e d u c a tio n a n d its role in n a tio n al stre n g th w ere telling. E d u catio n Secretary Terrel Bell fo u g h t a d m in istra tio n ef­ forts to a b o lish h is d e p a rtm e n t, s u p p o rte d fed eral a id to ed u catio n , w a rn e d of "a n a tio n a t risk," as h is 1983 stu d y w a s title d — a n d w a s d ro p p e d from th e C ab­ in et after R eagan's reelection in 1984. A d m in istra tio n co n serv ativ es, as th ey d id reg a rd in g th e A m erican econom y, g en erally d e n ie d th a t A m erican s' technical a n d m aterial capacities w ere in je o p a rd y o r th a t fed eral m o n ies to en h an ce th em w ere in order. In stead th ey saw c u ltu re as th e k ey to e d u ca tio n al success— stu d e n ts sh o u ld learn a co m m o n a n d g lo rio u s p a st a n d em b race the v alu es of p a trio tism a n d self-discipline th a t p resu m ab ly flo w ed fro m it. T h at co n servative tracts like B loom 's d e m a n d e d c u ltu ra l ren ew al, w h ile K en n ed y 's to m e called for econom ic revitalization, sh o w e d th e fau lt lines. D ebates o n e d u ca tio n w ere m irro re d in th e h ig h e r reaches of academ e. O n e d iv isio n w a s o p e n ed b y som e scholars' "assa u lts" o n th e a ssu m p tio n th a t tru th is stable, objective, a n d know able. T hese assau lts, fierce in d iscip lin es like liter­ ary stu d ies, w ere often v iew ed as c o n stitu tin g a u n ita ry p o stm o d e rn sensi­ bility, a lth o u g h in fact th ere w a s a d izz y in g "fo rest of . . . 'p o s ts '" in p o st­ m o d e rn intellectual life. P ro p o n e n ts of objectivity c o n d em n ed th e assau lts, as if "d efe n d in g the life of th e m in d a g ain st enem ies w h o h a d in filtrated th e fortress a n d w ere attacking from w ith in ." N o r d id political id eo lo g y give coherence to in tellectual d e b ates as it h a d in the 1960s; the d issid e n ts w ere ideologically d i­ verse, a n d M arxists or o th er leftists often d e fe n d e d objectivity. E arlier, m o st in ­ tellectuals h a d b e en in ro u g h a g reem en t a b o u t th e objectivity (an d value) of th eir w ork. By the 1980s, a g reem en t w as im possible: collectively, a t least, th ey co u ld n o t define a com m on c u ltu re for A m ericans. It w a s n o t ju st th a t th ey d isa g re e d — th ey long h a d — b u t th a t n o w th eir a ttitu d e s "o n th e objectivity

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q u e stio n w ere so h e te ro g en e o u s th a t it w a s im possible to id en tify a n y th in g re­ sem b lin g a d o m in a n t sensibility."66 T heir frag m e n ta tio n to o k o th er form s as w ell. W om en, gays a n d lesbians, A frican-A m ericans, a n d o th er m inorities c o n tin u ed to attack th e social m ak e­ u p of academ ic d isciplines a n d to fight for p o w e r in them . A t least as d iscon­ certing, especially in fields like h isto ry th a t h a d lo n g p riz e d b re a d th o f k n o w l­ ed g e, w a s th e sp lin te rin g of each discipline in to su b field s a lien ated from each other. T he p ro b lem in history, n o te d P eter N ovick, w as " n o t ju st th a t th e w h o le w a s less th a n th e su m of its p a rts, b u t th a t th ere w a s n o w h o le — o n ly p a rts." C. V ann W o o d w ard h a d once d escribed th e pro fessio n of h isto ry as "a h a b itatio n of m a n y m an sio n s," b u t b y 1982 h e th o u g h t it m o re like "scattered su b u rb s, traile r cam p s a n d a d e te rio ra tin g cen tral city." T his form of frag m e n ta tio n also p re d a te d th e 1980s, b u t th e sense of c u ltu ra l incoherence w a s n o w m o re acute, leav in g N ovick g ra sp in g a t Biblical verse to characterize h is profession: "In th o se d a y s th ere w a s n o k in g in Israel; every m a n d id th a t w h ich w a s rig h t in h is o w n eyes." In the acad em y th en , too, the c u ltu ral fo u n d a tio n of n atio n al p o w e r seem ed, if n o t cru m b led , th e n b ad ly sp lin tered , each block w ell crafted b u t th e stru c tu re itself b e w ild e rin g a n d its architects a t o d d s a b o u t w h a t it sh o u ld look like. A m ore p o sitiv e v ie w — th a t su c h stru g g les w ere w h a t gave stre n g th to th e edifice— w a s one few intellectuals took.67 A n o th e r d iv isio n w id e n e d in th e 1980s u n d e r th e im p act of AIDS. It testified to h o w sexual o rien tatio n w a s n o w a fau lt line in c u ltu re th a t th e d isease w a s b ra n d e d a "g a y p la g u e " early in th e decade. By 1985, AIDS a n d th e fed eral re­ sp o n se to it w ere objects of a b itte r struggle. D espite early ex p ectations th a t th e d isease w o u ld d e stro y the gay m o v em en t, AIDS m o b ilized it fu rth e r a n d ex­ te n d e d its focus, once largely local, to n a tio n al politics, as g ay activists d e ­ m a n d e d fed eral efforts to cope w ith th e disease. In 1985, th e d e a th from AIDS of acto r Rock H u d so n , exposing as g ay a p ree m in e n t celluloid icon of h eterosex­ u a l m asculinity, d e e p e n e d old fears of a n invisible h o m o sex u al m enace b u t also rev ealed su ch m ascu lin ity as a n u n sta b le pose. Initial im ages of AIDS as a g ay d isease a n d h o m o sex u ality as a p a th o lo g y p e rsisted , b u t also becam e co n tested as o th er social g ro u p s jo in ed the ran k s of reco g n ized victim s, a n d as g ay m e n w ere occasionally celebrated for com ing to g rip s w ith d e a th a n d d y in g in w ay s in stru ctiv e to o th er A m ericans. B eneath th e u g ly stru g g le o v er AIDS ra n less e v id e n t them es. T he triu m p h a l v iew of A m erican science, d isp u te d since the 1960s, fu rth e r e ro d e d as it seem ed u n ab le to cu rb th e p la g u e a n d as AIDS activ­ ists ch allenged scientists p ro n o u n c in g o n th e disease. AIDS, like o th e r p ro b ­ lem s in h e a lth care, also sto k ed m ore concern a b o u t w h e th e r n atio n al secu rity sh o u ld (or e v en could) rem ain a d o m in a n t p rio rity a n d w h e th e r g o v e rn m e n t co u ld a d a p t to o th er challenges. Too, the AIDS d e b ate h ig h lig h ted differences, su rp risin g ly sh a rp a m o n g conservatives, b e tw ee n inclusive a n d exclusive im p u lses in A m erican culture.

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M any conservatives, especially rig h t-w in g C h ristia n s a n d th e R om an C atholic hierarchy, reg a rd ed AIDS as G o d 's o r n a tu re 's p u n ish m e n t of ho m o sex u als. But after a len g th y silence. S urgeon G eneral C. E v erett K oop— in im ag e "a n ultra-conservative fu n d a m e n ta list w h o lo o k ed like a n O ld T estam ent p ro p h e t" — in fu ria te d m a n y conservatives in 1986 b y sh u n n in g m oralistic ju d g m e n t o n p eo p le w ith AIDS, en d o rsin g "safe sex" p ro g ram s, a n d u rg in g fed eral m obilization a g ain st th e disease. T he fissure a m o n g co n serv ativ es th a t G o ld w ater identified in 1981 ag ain o p e n ed .68 By 1987, th e c u ltu ral div isio n s h ig h lig h ted b y AIDS w ere n o n e arer reso lu ­ tio n th a n those e ru p tin g o v er patrio tic rituals, ed u catio n , a n d intellectu al life. G ays a n d lesbians carried o u t th a t y e ar the b ig g est m arc h o n W ash in g to n since K ing's in 1963, n e w activist o rg an izatio n s like ACT-UP (AIDS C oalitio n to U n ­ leash Pow er) sp ra n g u p , a n d politicians in n a tio n al g o v e rn m e n t n o w id en tified th em selves as gay. C losely related w a s the strik in g c u ltu ra l presence, s h a p e d p a rtly b y th e d e m a n d s of the AIDS crisis, of g ays a n d (to a lesser extent) lesb ians— tennis p la y e r M artina N av ratilo v a, o r figures in th e arts like w rite r L arry K ram er a n d p h o to g ra p h e r R obert M a p p leth o rp e. A n o th e r co n serv ativ e co u n terattack em erg ed late in the d ecad e b u t, like earlier efforts, th is o n e su c­ ceed ed m ore a t preach in g to th e co n v erted th a n a t alterin g lo n g -term tre n d s— in d eed , the effort to stigm atize hom o sex u als as a g ro u p stre n g th e n e d th e p e r­ c ep tio n of th em as a n identifiable m in o rity ra th e r th a n a collection of ra n d o m m o ral perv erts. T h at stra ig h t A m ericans w ere b eco m in g m o re "to le ra n t" of h o ­ m osexuals w a s o ften asserted, p ro b ab ly unlikely, a n d su rely u n p ro v ab le. T h at th ey w ere com pelled to acknow ledge a c h an g in g reality w a s certain. C o n cu rren t stru g g les ov er g e n d e r a n d ab o rtio n follow ed a ro u g h ly sim ilar course: a "backlash" (as B arbara E hrenreich called it) early in th e d ecad e a g ain st the fem inist a g en d a,69 th e n a rein v ig o rated fem inist politics, a n d stale­ m ate b y the e n d of the R eagan years. D efeat of th e E qual R ights A m e n d m e n t w as the g reat antifem inist triu m p h , m a d e p o ssible in p a rt b y th e G O P 's em brace (unim aginable a d ecad e earlier) of a n anti-ER A a n d a n ti-ab o rtio n agenda. A s in confronting g ay rights, conserv ativ es also scored ju d icial vic­ to ries— ju st as the S uprem e C o u rt's Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) d ecision left states free to crim inalize sodom y, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) allo w ed states to restrict a b o rtio n rig h ts— w h ile C ongress a n d th e R eagan a d ­ m in istratio n e n d e d federal policies su p p o rtiv e of ab o rtio n rights. T h ro u g h m u ch of the decade, the m o m e n tu m lay w ith th e an ti-ab o rtio n m o v em en t, s u p ­ p o rte d (as in th e anti-gay cause) b y a once-unlikely alliance am o n g th e C atholic ch u rch a n d conservative C h ristian (and Jew ish) d e n o m in atio n s. M eanw hile, th e m ass m ed ia often p o rtra y e d fem inist asp iratio n s as p assé a n d pro fessio n al w o m e n as d o o m ed o r d an g ero u s. By late in th e d ecad e, c o u n term o b ilizatio n b y fem inists a n d th eir allies h a d b ro u g h t the stru g g les to a n inconclusive p oint. A s in o th er cu ltu ral b attles of the decade, th e fam iliar sto ry of co n serv ativ e

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resu rg ence m ask ed shifts in th e c u ltu ral politics of gender. G ay a n d fem inist lead ers n o w stressed the n e e d s of fam ilies a n d stable relatio n sh ip s, p a rtly b e­ cause "th e conservative em p h asis o n th e fam ily in ev itab ly left a m ark ," b u t also b ecau se of ch an g ed priorities. AIDS w a s on e cataly st for g ay m en , as a sh a rp rise in c h ild rearin g w a s for lesbians, a n d g ay fiction, like A rm istead M a u p in 's su rp risin g ly p o p u la r series Tales of the City, o ften p laced th e fam ily (albeit n o t a "tra d itio n a l" one) a t its center. Fem inists faced sev eral p ressu res. A s it becam e e v id e n t th a t "m en, n o t w o m e n , w ere th e p rin cip al beneficiaries of [the] em anci­ p a to ry tre n d " of th e 1970s, th e y trie d to shore u p b en efits a n d p ro tectio n s for w o m e n . T hose w ere b e in g d ecim ated b y R eagan, w h o a rg u e d th a t p ro g ram s for p o o re r w o m e n fostered "indolence, prom iscuity, casual a ttitu d e s to w a rd m a rria g e a n d divorce, a n d m a te rn a l indifference to ch ild -rearin g resp o n ­ sibilities." M eanw hile, y o u n g e r w o m e n facing th e m u ltip le claim s of w o rk a n d fam ily a n d o ld er ones reeling fro m divorce faced a job m ark e t in w h ic h w o m e n 's incom e re m a in e d stu b b o rn ly stag n an t. O n e th ru st of th is d riv e to p ro ­ tect w o m e n y ield ed a n u n lik ely alliance: fem inist a n tip o m o g ra p h e rs jo ined co n serv ativ e m o ralists in efforts to sto p p o rn o g ra p h y th a t p re su m a b ly en co u r­ a g ed m ale violence to w a rd w o m en . A n e w v iew of g e n d e r acco m p an ied these shifts: m a n y fem inists, especially m in o rity w o m en , n o w a rg u e d th a t "eq u a l­ ity d id n o t n ecessarily m e a n th e e ra su re of difference" b e tw e e n m e n a n d w o m e n .70 Few of these shifting im p u lses fell easily in to "co n serv ativ e" a n d "lib eral" categories, b u t th e ir n e t effect w a s to com plicate co n serv ativ es' efforts to achieve c u ltu ral cohesion u n d e r th e ir auspices. W h atev er it m ean t, "fam ily " h a d b e e n th eir d o m a in a t th e d e c a d e 's start. By th e late 1980s, "fam ily " w a s c o n tested g ro u n d to w h ich m a n y voices, som e once im p ro b ab le, n o w sta k ed a claim . Ju st as im p o rtan t, a n d largely u n n o tic ed a t th e tim e, th ese d e b ates m o v ed fu rth e r aw ay from q u estio n s of n a tio n al a n d m ilitary p o w er. In th e 1970s, m o ral rev italizatio n h a d b e en p e rsisten tly if loosely lin k ed to resto red A m eri­ can p o w er, b u t b y th e late 1980s co n serv ativ es' m o ral a g en d a w a s n o w m o re o b v io u sly a n e n d in itself: d a n g e ro u s fem inists, d ise ased h o m osexuals, single m o th ers, p ro m iscu o u s teenagers, a n g ry blacks, a n d v a rio u s o th ers h a d to b e p u rg e d from the n a tio n because th ey je o p a rd iz ed its m o ral fitness m o re th a n its p o w er. The lin k b e tw ee n th e tw o h a rd ly d isa p p e a re d , b u t th e tilt to w a rd th e fo rm er co n tin u ed . By the e n d of R eagan's presidency, conservatives, d e sp ite n o tab le successes, h a d failed to reg en erate the n a tio n 's c u ltu ral fo u n d atio n s to th eir satisfaction. T hey p ro claim ed w h a t R eagan h a d achieved in th a t reg ard , y e t saw a len g th en ­ in g list of c u ltu ra l ills, p lu s th e e m b a rrassin g ex p o su re of m o ral a n d financial tu rp itu d e b y televangelists like Jim Bakker a n d Jim m y S w aggart. T heir fru stra ­ tio n m o u n te d d u rin g B ush's presidency. By its en d , W illiam B ennett w a s devis-

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in g an "in d ex of lead in g c u ltu ral in d icato rs" d e sig n ed to c h a rt "A m erica's cul­ tu ra l d eclin e"— after tw elve y ears of G O P ru le d e sig n ed to rev erse su ch decline.71 W h eth er or n o t a "decline" h a d occurred, it w a s clear th a t A m erican society a n d c u ltu re w ere as "se g m en ted " in the 1980s as th ey h a d b e e n in th e 1970s. T he g reatest d iv id e rem ain ed racial, especially for inner-city b lack s— m o re im p o v ­ e rish ed a n d , so m o st c o m m en tato rs believed, m o re c u ltu rally iso lated from A m erican life. A m erica seem ed a n a tio n of enclaves a t b e st coexisting a n d a t w o rst b a ttlin g w ith each other, d iv id e d alon g lines of class, race, ethnicity, reli­ gion, g ender, sexuality, a n d o th er factors: h a rd ly th e "L eb an o n " G o ld w a ter h a d p o in te d to, b u t p ro n e to h o stility a n d violence o n a w o rriso m e scale. N o r d id a fiction of u s-ag ain st-th em give coherence to th e seg m entation: rich ag ain st poor, m inorities a g ain st w h ite, g ay v e rsu s stra ig h t— b in a ry categories w ere p o p u la r b u t u n co n v in cin g since th ey rep e ate d ly g o t ju m b led . W h ite a n d black g ay co m m u n ities d ecim ated b y AIDS v iew ed each o th er w arily, som e lesbians resen ted h o w AIDS d o m in a te d the g ay a g en d a, ten sio n s b e tw ee n blacks a n d H isp anics ex p lo d ed , a n d class div isio n s am o n g A frican-A m ericans d e ep e n ed . T he cross-cutting divisions w ere m any, the ta p e stry of social a n d c u ltu ral d iv i­ sio n dense. W ere c u ltu ral u n ity a n d the c u ltu ral fo u n d atio n s of n a tio n al p o w e r in fact in decline? T h at w a s far h a rd e r to m ea su re th a n econom ic vitality, w h ic h w a s at least subject to q uantifiable m ea su re m e n ts (h o w ev er d isp u ted ). In so far as cul­ tu ral cohesion is in th e eyes of its beh o ld ers, h o w ev er, it p ro b ab ly w a s in d e ­ cline: m a n y A m ericans, b y n o m ean s ju st conservatives, b eliev ed th a t th eir d i­ visions w ere sh arp en in g . T heir percep tio n s h a d a b asis in social a n d c u ltu ral conditions. "N e w " im m ig ran ts o ften fo u n d it difficult to assim ilate in to a d o m i­ n a n t c u ltu re (or could n o t ev en b e certain w h a t th a t c u ltu re w as), a lth o u g h th a t w a s a fam iliar p ro b lem for im m ig ran ts, for w h o m ch ild ren u su a lly co m p lete th e task. Racial, ethnic, a n d g e n d e r g ro u p s e m p h a size d th eir a u to n o m o u s cul­ tures. P erhaps the b ig g est c u ltu ra l shift cam e from th e relig io u s rev iv al am o n g ch am p io n s of "trad itio n a l" values. C o rp o ratio n s reflected a n d m ag n ified th e shifts, as th ey n o w aim ed th e ir p ro d u c ts to "n ich e" m ark ets ra th e r th a n a g en er­ alized n atio n al audience. C h anges in A m erica's social co m p o sitio n d id n o t ju st h a p p e n , h o w ev er; th ey w ere p a rtly d riv e n b y the n a tio n 's m ilitarized history, a t tim es b y th e v ery p eo p le w h o n o w b ew ailed the resu ltin g social changes. Im m ig ratio n in to the U n ited States, for exam ple, w as stirred b y h o t a n d cold w a rs ab ro ad , w ith A m erican responses to th em serv in g as the sieve ex clu d in g som e a n d in v itin g others. T hose responses w ere u n d e rta k e n for strategic, political, a n d h u m a n ­ ita ria n (or g u ilt-rid d en ) reasons, b u t w a r a n d A m erica's p erceiv ed n e ed s in it w ere often p a ra m o u n t. Johnson h a d m a d e th a t clear w h e n h e sig n ed th e 1965 Im m ig ratio n A ct abolishing m o st old racial quotas: in th e V ietnam W ar m e n w ere d y in g "n am e d F ernandez a n d Zajac a n d Z elinko a n d M arian o a n d Me-

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C orm ick. N e ith e r the en em y w h o killed th em n o r th e p eo p le w h o se in d e p e n ­ d en ce th ey h av e fo u g h t to save ev er a sk ed th em w h ere th ey o r th eir p a re n ts cam e from . T hey w ere all A m erican s."72 E u ro p ean s fleeing rep ressio n a n d W orld W ar II co n stitu ted the first g reat w av e, clim axed b y th e e n try of H u n ­ g arian s after th e ir abortive rev o lt a g ain st Soviet ru le in 1956, w ith a slo w er trickle of Soviet Jew s follow ing in the 1970s a n d 1980s. W h en cen ter stage in th e C old W ar m o v ed to L atin A m erica a n d A sia, sources of im m ig ratio n also sh ifte d — C u b an s leaving C astro 's regim e, K oreans after th eir w a r cem en ted S outh K orea's b o n d w ith th e U n ited States, a tid e of S o u th east A sian refugees, a n d in th e 1980s C en tral A m ericans fleeing th a t reg io n 's b lo o d y struggles. M u ch im m ig ratio n — m a n y L atinos, Pakistanis, a n d A sian In d ian s, for ex am p le— sp ra n g from o th er sources, a n d m u c h of it w as illegal o r u n w a n te d b y A m ericans a lre ad y h ere (even b y som e recen t im m igrants). But in d irect con­ n ectio ns b e tw ee n im m ig ratio n a n d A m erica's m ilitarized p a st w ere also p o w ­ erful: m a n y em ig ratin g Filipinos h a d lived in th e sh a d o w of A m erican m ilitary b ases, serv ed as m essboys in th e A m erican navy, g iv en b irth to th e o ffsp rin g of A m erican servicem en, o r o th erw ise experienced th e in ten se Filipino-A m erican bond. T heir influx d id h e lp to change A m erica, b u t m ea su re d a g ain st a lo n g er slice of A m erica's tu rb u le n t past, cu ltu ral d isa rra y in th e 1980s w a s less a n e w p h e ­ n o m e n o n th a n a re tu rn to a n old one o b scu red b y w a r a n d m ilitarizatio n . In th e 1940s, 1950s, a n d 1960s, political, professional, a n d co rp o rate elites h a d ch am ­ p io n e d u n ifo rm v alu es a n d system s in th eir q u e st to m obilize n a tio n al po w er, ask in g A m ericans to su b o rd in a te th eir p a rtic u la r iden tities, asp iratio n s, a n d grievances to th a t quest. A lth o u g h in retro sp ect th e jag g ed ed g es of a p o ly g lo t c u ltu re rem ain ed b e n e a th the surface of tho se v alu es a n d system s, th e latter w ere n o n eth eless p erv asiv e e n o u g h to sh a p e a w id e sp re a d sense of a co m m o n n a tio n al culture. W h en a g reem en t a b o u t th a t c u ltu re b e g an ero d in g in th e 1960s, th e resu ltin g d isa rra y w a s less so m eth in g n e w th a n a re tu rn to th e rich, seeth in g clu ster of c u ltu res e v id e n t early in th e century. For su re, som e fau lt lines in th e 1980s w ere new , a n d e v en fam iliar ones g o t ex p ressed in n e w w ays, rew o rk ed as th ey h a d b e en in p a rt b y d ecad es of m ilitarization. T he fact of cul­ tu ral d iscord, how ever, as o p p o se d to its p articu lars, w a s n o t new . W h at a d v o ­ cates of "trad itio n a l" valu es so u g h t to reconstitu te w a s n o t a tim eless A m erican c u ltu re b u t b y a n d large one in v en ted in the 1940s a n d 1950s, as th ey som etim es m a d e clear in th eir nostalgia for th a t era. H ence, too, th ey trie d to reco n stitu te th e m ilitarized policies th a t h a d b u ttre ssed th a t in v en ted culture. D espite th eir efforts, the fo u n d atio n s of rem ilitarizatio n w ere c ru m b lin g b y 1988. Shaky e v en a t the sta rt of the decade, th ey w e ak e n ed fu rth e r as R eagan em erg ed as m ore in terested in its form s th a n its substance, as w o rries d e e p e n e d a b o u t its cu ltu ral a n d econom ic fo u n d atio n s, a n d as th e a g en d a s of v ario u s A m ericans b ecam e increasingly d etach ed from th e q u e st for m ilitary m ight. A l­ th o u g h conservatives h a d forged the ideological fo u n d a tio n for rem ilitariza-

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tion, th ey d iv id e d over c o m p etin g agendas: as fig u res like G o ld w a ter m o v e d to th e m arg in s, the a sce n d an t w in g sim u lta n eo u sly p ra ise d th e c u ltu ra l co h esio n th ey p resu m ab ly h a d achieved, b e m o a n ed its a p p a re n t d isso lu tio n , a n d p u r­ su e d it as a goal in itself, one a p a rt from th e n a tio n 's m ilitary p o w e r in the w o rld . The C old W ar's e n d sp e e d e d th e ero sio n of th ese fo u n d a tio n s b u t d id n o t cause it; the fissures am o n g A m ericans w o u ld h av e c o n tin u e d to w id e n ev en w ith o u t its end. By th e sam e token, th e C o ld W a r's e n d w a s n o t th e d e a th k nell of m ilitariza­ tion. C u ltu ra l cohesion h a d earlier b e e n su sta in ed in p a rt b y p o in tin g to exter­ n al en em ies h a rd to id en tify after th e m id-1980s, y e t th e h a b it of seein g th in g s in m ilitarized term s w a s in g rain ed , a n d n o t o n ly a m o n g conservatives. O ld e n ­ em ies w ere fading, b u t n e w ones co u ld b e located o u tsid e o r w ith in th e natio n . A bove all, m a n y A m ericans, as th ey h a d in te rm itten tly since th e 1960s, fo u n d th o se enem ies a m o n g each o th er a n d th u s c o n tin u e d to reconceive w a r in a fu n ­ d a m e n ta l fash io n — as so m eth in g w a g e d w ith in A m erica ra th e r th a n as in ter­ n a tio n al struggle.

9 A FAREWELL TO m il it a r iz a t io n

:

1988-1995

Declaring New Wars S o u n d in g a b it like a n o th e r Texan— LBJ w ag in g w a r o n p o v e rty a q u arterc en tu ry earlie r— P re sid e n t G eorge B ush d e p lo y e d th e full arsen al of m ilitary m etap h o rs w h e n h e declared his d ru g w ar. H e a n n o u n ce d a "co m p reh en siv e strategy," w a rn e d th a t "if w e fight th e w a r as a d iv id e d n atio n , th en th e w a r is lost," asserted th a t "victory over d ru g s is o u r cause," a n d seem ed to m ak e all A m ericans su sp ect as the enem y. "W h o 's resp o n sib le?" h e asked. "E veryone w h o u ses d ru g s. E veryone w h o sells d ru g s. A n d ev ery o n e w h o looks th e o th er w a y ."1 W h en he spoke in 1989, the "w a r o n d ru g s" w as b eco m in g a u b iq u ito u s m et­ a p h o r, u se d b y the m edia, politicians, a n d citizens in e v e ry d a y talk a n d elabo­ ra te d floridly in references to "b attle p lan s," "fro n ts," a n d "en em ies." Such lan ­ g u ag e w a s typical of the tim es: A m ericans w ere fin d in g "w a rs" to w ag e all o v er th eir political a n d cu ltu ral agenda. A s th ey d id so, th ey m a rk e d th e co m p letio n of th e in w a rd tu rn of m ilitarization, th o u g h also p e rh a p s its im p e n d in g d e a d ­ en d . By the sam e token, th ey w a g e d an o th e r w a r ab ro ad th a t ironically u n d e r­ cu t th e sta te 's m ilitarized policies. T hose d e v elo p m e n ts m o v ed m ilitarizatio n into a n o th e r p h ase, one of notable, if also co n tin g en t, contraction.

Pyrrhic Victories The 1980s closed w ith a p p a re n t v ictories— for cap italist dem o cracy ov er Soviet co m m unism , for peace over the m ilitarizatio n th a t h a d d o m in a te d th e century, for G eorge B ush over his political o p p o n en ts. T hose victories p ro v e d sh o rt­ lived, unsatisfying, or contested, h o w e v e r— sufficient to shake th e old o rd er b u t n o t to define a n ew one. The C old W ar's e n d d id n o t h a lt m ilitarizatio n , n e v e r caused in the first place b y the C old W ar alone, b u t it d id d estro y th e m o st

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p ro m in e n t ratio n ale for m ilitarization, a n d n o su re rep lacem en t em erg ed . L ooking o u tw a rd , A m ericans saw a n u n tid y w o rld w h ic h p ro v id e d o n ly flick­ erin g p o in ts of reference. L ooking in w a rd , th ey saw w a r 's p assio n s su rg in g a t hom e, b u t th ere too the reference p o in ts w ere u n stab le. T he ag e of m ilitariza­ tio n w a s en d in g , b u t in a d istin ctly fitful, ran co ro u s, u n c e rta in fashion. G eorge B ush d id n o t in v e n t th a t fashion, ro o ted as it w a s in d e e p e r forces, b u t h e revealed it a n d o n occasion sham elessly a b ette d it. It w a s fine b y h im to m ak e the P ledge of A llegiance a centerpiece of h is 1988 c am p aig n a n d to p a ­ ra d e his g ran d c h ild before the G O P co n v en tio n to lea d its recitation. R eagan h a d exploited the sym bols of A m erica's m ilitarized age in a guileless, alm o st b e n ig n fashion. B ush tu rn e d to th em w ith a vengeance. P re p are d to b e A m erica's co m m an d e r in chief in th e C o ld W ar, B ush lacked th e train in g a n d tem p e ra m e n t to reth in k his role a n d th e n a tio n 's. H e g rew u p in a n affluent fam ily isolated from th e realities of d e p re ssio n a n d fascism in th e 1930s, som eone w h o "n ev e r rocked a n y b o a ts" in p re p school, a teach er recalled— tra in e d to serve th e n atio n , n o t to scru tin ize its m ission. T he resu m é h e b o a sted w a s extensive b u t, like th e m an , o d d ly u n fo cu sed . Texas co n g ress­ m an , failed senatorial c an d id a te in the 1960s, a m b a ssad o r to th e U n ited N a ­ tions, en v o y to Beijing, CIA d irec to r— each of th ese d u tie s w a s b rief a n d n o n e q u ite in the in n er circles of p o w er; to g eth er th ey co m p rised alm o st ra n d o m as­ sig n m en ts ra th e r th a n a co h eren t package. A s R eag an 's vice p re sid e n t h e w a s ag ain the executor of o th ers' w ills. N e v er h a d h e ach iev ed a n intellectu al o r p o ­ litical b rea k th ro u g h in n a tio n al policy. H e h a d th e sam e v irtu e th a t h is 1988 o p ­ p o n e n t, M assachusetts g o v e rn o r M ichael D ukakis, cla im e d — com petence. "T he vision th in g ," as B ush called it b y 1988, p u z z le d h im .2 W orld W ar H, in w h ich h e serv ed as a y o u n g n a v y pilot, im p rin te d o n h im w h a t w a r sh o u ld be, a g ra n d allied effort a g ain st evil. N o P re sid e n t after FDR so ably forged a coalition for w ar. V ietnam , h o w ev er, s h a p e d h is sense of w a r's d om estic politics. G O P N a tio n al C om m ittee ch airm a n d u rin g th e W atergate crisis, h e stay ed loyal to N ixon a n d lea rn ed from him . D espite d ifferen t social b ack g ro u n d s. B ush resem bled N ixon in his in stin ct (sh a rp en e d b y ro u g h -an d tu m b le Texas politics) to exploit th e div isio n s th a t w a r p ro d u ces, a n d in h is a b ru p t rhetorical shifts— one m o m e n t reach in g u n co n v in cin g ly for a n u p lift­ ing v ision ("a kinder, g en tler A m erica" w a s his fam o u s p h rasin g ), a t a n o th e r b earin g d o w n viciously o n p re su m e d enem ies at h o m e, w ith th e tw o styles o d d ly ju x tap o sed , joined only b y B ush's "celeb rated n o -su b ject-p ro n o u n ca­ dences." B ush co m m ented early in the 1988 cam p aig n , "It'll b e like th e N ixonM cG o vem race in '72 as far as the b re a d th of differences o n issues." In fact, those differences w ere m u rk y in 1988. H is co m m en t on ly rev ealed th a t h e w o u ld reprise N ix o n 's focus o n sym bols of c u ltu ral a n d social d iv isio n ra th e r th a n o n policy issues. Both N ixon a n d B ush also e q u a te d stro n g lea d ersh ip w ith bellicose m ean -sp irited n ess. W h en B ush "tries to sh o w th a t h e is to u g h ," re p o rte r E lizabeth D rew noticed in 1988, "h e o ften gets it w ro n g ," n o t realizin g

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" th a t in m o st cases to u g h eq u als calm : C lin t E astw o o d , G ary C ooper, R onald R eagan." M oreover, Bush, like N ixon, lacked a n y v isio n for th e n a tio n o u t of th e g rooves c u t b y d ecad es of h o t a n d cold w ar. "Frankly," co m m en te d B ush's chief of staff John S u n u n u in 1990, "th is P re sid e n t d o e s n 't n e e d a n o th e r single piece of legislation, u n less it's absolutely righ t. . . . In fact, if C o n g ress w a n ts to com e together, a d jo u rn , a n d leave, it's all rig h t w ith u s." B ush sh a re d N ix o n 's c o n te m p t for "d o m estic" issues a n d for C ongress, w ith w h ic h h e h a d to w o rk to a d d re ss them . W h at v iew s h e d id h a v e o n su c h issues w ere o ften quixotic— as vice p re sid e n t h e em b raced th e "v o o d o o econom ics" a n d an ti-ab o rtio n o rth o ­ d o x y h e h a d co n d em n ed in ru n n in g for th e 1980 G O P n o m in a tio n .3 N o r d id h e h av e a settled, co h eren t identity : N e w E n g lan d p atrician , Texas p lu n g e r, able b u re a u c ra t— h is ju g g lin g of th ese roles w a s tra n sp a re n tly aw k ­ w a rd , especially w h e n h e p la y e d p o p u lis t o u tsid e r a g ain st a rro g a n t e aste rn in ­ tellectuals. D uk ak is's alleg ed ly soft-on-defense v iew s w ere " b o m in H a rv a rd Y ard's b o u tiq u e ," h e claim ed in 1988;4 in 1992 h e trie d to m ak e Bill C lin to n 's tim e a t E n g la n d 's O xford U n iv ersity so u n d m enacing. From a Yale m a n w ith im peccable p a tric ia n credentials. B ush's in sin u atio n s of h is o p p o n e n ts ' effete p riv ileg e rarely ra n g true. Like a ch aracter in a K u rt V onnegut novel. B ush h a d flo ated o u t of tim e. H a d h e e n te red th e O v al Office in 1981, w h e n rem ilitarizatio n w a s in h ig h gear, h e m ig h t h av e se rv ed ably, if n o t inspirationally. In stead , h e h a d to p resid e o v er m ilitary retre n ch m en t a n d the C old W ar's e n d , less o p p o se d to th em th a n sim ­ p ly baffled b y th em , lacking a m o ral o r ideological co m p ass b y w h ic h to track th e ir course. U nlike E isenhow er, C arter, e v en R eagan in h is w ay. B ush h a d n o g ra s p — o r n o w a y to articu late it— of m ilita riza tio n 's h istorical co u rse a n d d a n ­ gers. H is a tte m p t to cope w ith ch an g e w a s p ru d e n t— a real v irtu e , as B ush b o asted ; "M u st be p ru d e n t!" ra n co m ed ian D an a C arv ey 's d e a d -o n im p e rso n a tio n — b u t also g ru d g in g , as h e a p p lie d a lifetim e's u n q u e stio n e d m em o ries, view s, a n d h ab its to a n e w era. T rain ed to b e a w a r P resid en t, n o t becau se h e relished w a r b u t because it seem ed h is d u ty a n d h is aren a, h e search ed for th e real th in g o r its su b stitu te, b u t "h is n a tu ra l state w ith o u t w a r w a s political collapse," w h ich h e m et repeated ly , th e n catastrophically.5 B ush failed to a d a p t to ch an g e in A m erica's m ilitarizatio n . H is ro o ts lay in th e o ld er fo rm of m ilitarizatio n b a se d o n A m erica's a rm e d p reem in en ce in the w o rld . Politics p u sh e d h im to exploit th e n e w e r fo rm in w h ic h A m erican s w e n t to " w a r" w ith each other. H e trie d his h a n d at b o th , b u t g a in e d o n ly te m p o ra ry successes a n d lost to u ch w ith th e econom ic issues n o w d o m in an t. B ush's 1988 c am p aig n fo resh ad o w ed his choices a n d difficulties as P resi­ d en t. R eporters sen sed v o ters' "lu rk in g fear th a t A m erica w a s slip p in g " — th e O ctober 1987 stock m ark e t crash a n d m ore talk of e d u ca tio n al a n d scientific decline sto k ed th a t fear— a n d b eliev ed th a t "th e pu b lic w a n te d to h e a r th ese th em es a d d re sse d ." T hey w ere "th e c a m p aig n 's h id d e n issue," according to o n e account, th o u g h less h id d e n th a n p o o rly a d d re ssed . D u k ak is m a d e a stab

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at tackling th em , u rg in g th a t several w e a p o n s p ro g ra m s b e axed, b u t h e seem ed p a ra ly ze d b y B ush's attacks a n d b y the exam p le of M o n d a le's failed liberalism in 1984. Lacking conviction o n o th er issues a n d facing m o u n tin g an x iety a b o u t th e econom ic fo u n d atio n s of n a tio n al po w er. B ush reasserted its c u ltu ra l fo u n ­ dations. H e w a s follow ing R eagan's ex am p le— " sp iritu a l v alu es alone are es­ sential to o u r n a tio n 's h e a lth a n d vigor," R eagan a n n o u n c e d in Ja n u ary 1988— b u t in an e d g ier fashion sh a p e d b y h is insecu rities a n d th e g u tte r tactics of a id es like Lee A tw ater. "W e h av e to ch an g e this w h o le c u ltu re," B ush said , a n d sto p the "d ete rio ra tio n of v alu es." By "ch an g e" B ush larg ely m e a n t rev iv in g th e rit­ uals, like p ra y e r in p u b lic schools, of a v ag u ely d efin ed p ast. W h at h e m e a n t b y "cu ltu re" w as less strik in g th a n h is em p h asis o n it.6 B ush m a d e p a trio tism th e fo u n d a tio n of h is cam p aig n . H e assailed D u ­ kakis's veto elev en y ears earlier of a M assach u setts law req u irin g stu d e n ts to recite th e P ledge of A llegiance, recited it h im self "co n stan tly ," a n d v isited a fac­ to ry m ak in g A m erican flags, m o n ster v ersio n s of w h ich fram e d h is p u b lic a p ­ p earan ces (an d so o n D u k ak is's as w ell), e v en if c am p aig n w o rk e rs h a d to "scratch th e 'M ad e in T aiw an' im p rin t off the h a n d le s." U n d e r C arter, o n e sen a­ to r to ld the G O P convention, "th e A m erican flag d ro o p e d in sh a m e," b u t flag sales. B ush b o asted , flo u rish ed u n d e r R eagan. B ush a n d h is c am p aig n a d s con­ d e m n e d D ukakis as a "card -carry in g m em b er of th e ACLU [A m erican C ivil L iberties U nion]," p h ra sin g th a t e q u a te d m em b ersh ip in th a t g ro u p w ith join­ in g th e C o m m u n ist Party. A p h o to g ra p h of D u k ak is a w k w a rd ly rid in g a ta n k w a s re n d e re d as a n im age of h is lau g h ab le d isco m fo rt w ith m ilita ry issu es a n d w eap o n s. Im p lied , too, w a s h is u n fitn ess as a m ere g o v e rn o r to g ra sp su ch issu es— like a n o th e r g overnor. C a rte r (R eagan w a s a n o th e r m a tte r)— w h ile B ush b o a sted a lo n g record o n them . C laim in g th a t D u k ak is w o u ld im p eril n a ­ tional defense. B ush m a d e h im seem a m a n of failed m o ral character, lacking p a trio tism itself. W ra p p in g sex, disloyalty, V ietnam , a n d in co m p eten ce into one sm a rm y package. B ush su g g e ste d th a t D u k ak is "th in k s a n a v al exercise is so m eth in g y o u find in Jane F o n d a 's w o rk o u t b o o k ," lin k in g D u k ak is to th e an ti-V ietn am -W ar-activ ist-tu m ed -ex ercise-g u ru . H is choice of ru n n in g m a te — In d ian a se n ato r D an Q uayle, v iew ed w ith in his o w n p a rty as a lig h tw e ig h t— co m p ro m ised h is claim to tak e th e n a tio n 's issues serio u sly b u t d id n o fatal d am age. G O P strateg ists fe n d e d off attacks o n Q u a y le's p atrio tic a rd o r— fam ily connections h a d h e lp e d h im g e t in to th e N a tio n a l G u a rd a n d avoid d u ty in V ietnam — b y e q u a tin g th em w ith attack s o n th e G u a rd itself. So w e n t the p a rty 's general stra te g y as w ell, as in 1984. Q u e stio n in g th e n a tio n 's econom ic stre n g th a n d global d e stin y w a s p o rtra y e d as A m erica-bashing. "A m erica sta n d s tall again," B ush a n n o u n c e d in a d eb ate, re p e atin g a R eagan line.7 O nce again, the G O P line h a d b e en fo resh ad o w ed b y co n serv ativ e intellec­ tuals. The C om m ittee for the Free W orld co m p lain ed in 1987 th a t "n e v e r h av e w e b een m ore b eset b y te m p ters" (like the "sh re w d a n d fo rm id ab le" G or-

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bachev), a n d w a rn e d a g ain st those w h o "b lam e o u rselv es for w h a te v e r goes w ro n g in th e w o rld . . . . W e m u s t m o re th a n a n y th in g else lea rn n o t to listen to th em ." T heir w a rn in g a d d e d m ore p re ssu re o n B ush to em brace strid e n t n a ­ tionalism . C o n serv ativ es w ere clashing ov er R eag an 's em b race of G orbachev, th eir d o m in a n t voices w a rn in g B ush n o t to b e fooled: R eagan's v isit to M oscow in June 1988 m a rk e d "a sad w e ek for th e free w o rld " in w h ich "th e chief th u g " (G orbachev) g o t th e u p p e r h a n d , a d m o n ish e d th e Manchester Union Leader; W illiam Buckley, th o u g h a d m ittin g th a t "so m e th in g w ild ly exciting is g o in g o n in th e Soviet U nion ," w a rn e d th a t "to g reet it [the USSR] as if it w e re n o lo n g er evil is o n th e o rd e r of ch an g in g o u r entire p o sitio n to w a rd A d o lf H itle r o n re­ ceiving th e n e w s th a t h e h a s ab o lish ed one ex te rm in a tio n cam p ."8 By te m p e ra m e n t cautious a n d b y experience a C old W arrior, B ush w a s n o t g o in g to rock the co n serv ativ e b o a t b y co n testin g su c h claim s o r ad v an c in g a n e w ag en d a. N o r d id political forces com p el h im to d o so. T he n a tio n 's eco­ no m ic challenges p ro m p te d g n a w in g anxiety, n o t co n sen su s o n h o w to tackle them . T he C old W a r's e n d w a s a p p a re n t b u t p o o rly a c k n o w le d g ed — m o re b y R eag an th a n b y those a ro u n d h im in 1988: B ush "to o k issu e w ith R eagan's g e n ­ e ro u s n e w v iew of th e Soviet U nion"; D efense Secretary F ran k C ariucci a rg u e d " th a t h e lp in g the Soviet U n io n m o d ern ize m ay b e 'a n en o rm o u s m iscalcula­ tio n ,' a n d w a rn e d a g ain st e m u latin g th e d e te n te of th e n in eteen -sev en ties."9 O b servers, w o n d e rin g if th e w in n e r c o u ld e v en g o v e rn effectively, n o te d th e v a p id n e ss of th e 1988 c am p aig n a n d th e m ean n ess of B u sh 's a ssa u lt o n liberal­ ism . T h o u g h w in n in g a n a m p le 54 p e rc en t of th e p o p u la r vote, h e h a d b arely a d d re sse d the p ro b lem s th a t p u n d its th o u g h t im p o rta n t (G oldw ater, ag ain the G O P m averick, h a d u rg e d h im p u b licly "to sta rt talk in g a b o u t th e issu es") a n d so m etim es m an g le d h is th o u g h ts w h e n h e d id ("I sta n d for anti-bigotry, antiSem itism , anti-racism ," h e once a n n o u n ce d ).10 A lth o u g h the c a m p aig n 's v a p id n e ss w a s real, from a n o th e r p e rsp ectiv e B ush's effort m ark e d a final defense of A m erica's m ilitarized course. It w a s a c u rio u s defense, how ever, since B ush laid o u t n o co h eren t m ilita ry o r econom ic stra te g y for the n a tio n a n d cited n o credible foreign th re a t (M anuel N o rieg a, P a n a m a 's d ru g -ru n n in g ruler, w a s a p a le su b stitu te in c am p aig n politics). H e e m p h a siz e d sym bols of m o ral rev iv al a n d c u ltu ra l u n ity b u t m a d e th e m seem d e ta ch e d from th e m aterial c o n d itio n s of p o w er, as if flag w a v in g alo n e m a d e th e n a tio n strong. B ush c am p aig n ed a m id th e tw ilig h t's last g leam in g of R eagan-era m ilitarization, w h ic h led A m erican s to expect m ilitary d isp lay s d o n e o n the c h e a p — the g lam o r of arm s, the h e a rt tu g g in g of th e flag, n o t b o d y b a g s a n d to u g h decisions. T here w a s d istu rb in g irony, too, in h o w th e G O P p rie d o p e n th e v e ry d iv i­ sions of race a n d c u ltu re it claim ed w ere o u t of place in th e u n ified n a tio n it celeb rated, as if u n ity rested o n n o firm basis, o r w a s n o t e v en w h a t it w a n ted . T he G O P u se d a fu rlo u g h th a t M assachusetts h a d g ra n te d W illie H o rto n (a con­ v icted black m u rd ere r) as ev id en ce th a t D uk ak is w a s soft o n crim e (an d b y im -

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plication, o n co m m u n ism a n d defense). M an y c o n serv ativ es h a d lo n g in sisted th a t n atio n al p o w e r rested o n sh a red values, a n d once h a d seem ed c o n fid en t th a t th eir v alu es w ere triu m p h in g : "W e are th e d o m in a n t faction w ith in th e w o rld of id e a s— the m o st in flu en tial— the m o st p o w e rfu l," N o rm a n P o d h o retz p ro claim ed in 1983.11 In 1988, ho w ev er, th eir confidence in c u ltu ra l u n ity sag g ed ev en as th ey p ro claim ed it, th e c u ltu ral b a se of p o w e r seem in g as d e ­ cay ed to th e m as its econom ic fo u n d atio n s d id to th e ir critics. The sta rt of B ush's p resid en c y sh o w e d it a d rift w ith o u t a crisis, a t least o n e it recognized. B ush's in au g u ra l, b rief a n d v isio n ary in h is " k in d e r" m o d e, o n ly h in te d th a t h e m ig h t use m ilitary force. H e offered "a ren e w e d v o w " to th e w o rld "to p ro tec t the peace," a d d in g th a t "th e offered h a n d is a relu c ta n t fist; once m a d e — strong, a n d can b e u se d w ith g rea t effect." H is n o m in a tio n of Sen­ a to r John T ow er as d efense secretary fo u n d R epublicans d iv id in g b a d ly w ith ­ o u t th e C old W ar— conservatives to rp e d o e d th e n o m in a tio n , a rg u in g m o ral tu rp itu d e o n T o w er's p a rt— a n d sh o w e d th e a d m in istra tio n resistan t to re­ th in k in g d efense policies. R ichard C h e n ey 's ascen sio n to th e d efen se p o st m ark e d n o changes in policy. M eanw hile, th e a d m in istra tio n lab o red lo n g to p ro d u c e a n e w n a tio n al secu rity policy, th e n a n n o u n c e d one th a t a sp o k e sm a n p ro u d ly d e fe n d e d as "sta tu s q u o p lu s." 12 Such caution reflected a n d reinforced th e o ften joyless a n d u n c e rta in re­ sp o n se of A m ericans to the C o ld W a r's conclusion. A n a p p a re n tly triu m p h a l e n d to this titanic stru g g le m ig h t h av e seem ed b o u n d to u n le a sh p atrio tism , self-satisfaction, a n d optim ism . A t m o m e n ts su c h e m o tio n s d id surge: a t Rea­ g a n 's v isit to M oscow in 1988; in w av es of "G o rb y -m an ia" a b o u t th e n e w Soviet leader; w h e n the E ast G erm an regim e co llap sed in 1989 a n d th e B erlin w all, one of th e C old W ar's m o st o d io u s sym bols, cru m b led ; a n d ag ain in 1991, w h e n Boris Y eltsin's forces d efeated a co u n terco u p a n d th e Soviet U n io n itself d is­ solved. Yet n o su sta in e d e u p h o ria seem ed to co nnect th e d o ts of th ese discrete m om ents. C ircum stances accounted p a rtly for the u n c e rta in m oods. T he e n d of th e S oviet-A m erican C old W ar w a s m a rk e d b y a series of m oves, so m e in itially a m ­ b ig u o u s in im p o rt a n d to g eth er stru n g o u t o v er sev eral y ears, ra th e r th a n one cathartic m om ent. A s the en slav ed g ain ed freed o m , th ey o ften failed to em ­ brace w h a t m o st A m ericans u n d e rs to o d freed o m to m ean. In stead of p lu n g in g in to A m erican-style capitalism , m a n y lo o k ed elsew h ere for m o d els of political econom y, m e t resistance from fo rm er co m m u n ist a u th o rities still in key p o si­ tions, o r lam en ted th e loss of the o ld sy stem 's th rea d b are b u t reliable social w el­ fare p ro g ram s. T heir n e w politics p ro v e d chaotic, th eir in te rn al an tag o n ism s ugly, th eir m ilitary forces d a n g ero u sly u n sta b le (as w h e n th e Soviet U n io n 's collapse scattered its n u c le ar w e a p o n s in to th e co n tro l of several n e w c o u n ­ tries), th eir n e w lead ers tin -eared (as G orbachev seem ed to becom e), b u lly in g (as Boris Yeltsin w a s often p o rtray e d ), o r o v e rw h elm ed (as P o la n d 's Lech W al­ esa seem ed to be). A fam iliar p a te rn alism d id let A m erican s m ak e allow ances

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Fig. 10. While earlier them es in Am erica's m ilitarization lingered, em phases shifted: by the 1980s, w ar w as depicted less as an external threat, m ore as a reference point for Am ericans' anxieties and conflicts w ith each other. This 1989 political cartoon used the anniversary of Pearl H arbor to highlight their fears for their economic future— and to suggest, by use of nearly identical w ording, type­ face, and layout for both putative headlines, that W orld War II and the "trade w ar" were parts of the same timeless conflict w ith Japan. (By perm ission of Mike Luckovich and Creators Syndicate)

Fig. 11. A lthough m any "w ars" of the 1980s were short-lived, the "trade w ars" persisted, restoked in im agination by fiftieth-year anniversaries of W orld War II events. Like the preceding cartoon, this one (appearing in the Chicago Tribune, Jan. 9,1992) conveyed both the sense of a timeless conflict w ith Japan and the fear that the United States w as losing its current version. It also appealed to older Am ericans— few younger ones likely recognized this as show ing the battleship Missouri on w hich Japanese officials surrendered in 1945. (Reprinted by perm is­ sion of Tribune M edia Services)

It's always been dumb

Now it's illegal too!

Anabolic steroids p ose serious health risks to users. In addition, p ossession of even personal use quantities of steroids not validly prescribed by a doctor is now a federal crime. Maximum penalty for first offense: on e year in a federal prison ana $1,000 fine. tmmmi

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A&mm&tmtem, Washington, O.C.2ÖS37

Fig. 12. In the "wars" of the Reagan-Bush era, government propaganda never achieved the visibility and volume that it had in World War II, but it still appeared, sometimes in strange forms. The "drug war" yielded this 1991 Drug Enforcement Administration poster (the original in a mix of lurid greens and reds), which bizarrely conflated drug use with male homosexuality as the caricatured athletes inject each other in the buttocks.

Fig. 13. Even amid euphoria about the Gulf War, doubt set in that the triumph of America's war machine (shown here as huge and lumbering) would suffice to jumpstart the nation's economy and Americans' confidence in it, or that Bush (here rendered as a bit befuddled) had the strength to make the connection. The cartoon's internally referential content is also notable: focus on enemies abroad was fleeting, attention to the nation's internal sense of self and destiny more sustained. (Chicago Tribune, March 17,1991; reprinted by permission of Tribune Media Services)

Fig. 14. The dense web of connections among war, gender, sexuality, and citizenship surfaced in the 1993 debate over lesbians and gay men in the armed forces. As suggested by this political cartoon, appearing after an April 1993 gay rights march in Washington and depicting the Vietnam War memorial there, war figured in that debate more as a reference point from the past than as an ongoing threat. Political cartoonists highlighted what political leaders in the end refused to acknowledge— that gay men and women had long served and sacrificed. (By permission of Chris Britt and Copley N ew s Service)

Fig. 15. In the wake of the gays-in-the-military debate, this October 1993 political cartoon rendered a feminized, big-bosomed President Clinton feyly and fecklessly leading the troops, implying that his effort to change the military's gay "ban" revealed his womanly nature and his incapacity to lead the nation in war. But it also suggests that what troubled Americans most was not crises abroad— noted only in the background—but their sense of themselves. (Reprinted by permission of Tribune Media Services)

Fig. 16. Although the paradigm of war weakened in debates on public policy in the 1990s, it persisted in the so-called culture wars. It appears obliquely in this July 1994 political cartoon about the role of Catholic bishops in debate on Clinton's health care program, whose provisions for coverage of abortion services were much at issue. (Reprinted by permission of Tribune Media Services)

Fig. 17. Seen by millions of motorists traveling interstate highways during the autumn of 1994, billboards like this one tersely summarized an era's felt connec­ tions between war abroad and challenges at home. Although weakening at mid­ decade, the pursuit of war's moral equivalents still possessed emotive and political power. (By permission of Robert Kwait for the Elizabeth Taylor AIDS Foundation; photo by James M. Beal)

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for g ro w in g pains; like G erm an y a n d Jap an after 1945, ex-co m m u n ist n atio n s w ere seen as ch ild ren stru g g lin g to lea rn the m a tu re w ay s of capitalist d em o c­ racy. But the g ro w in g p a in s seem ed m a d d e n in g ly p ro tracted . A n d u n lik e th e case in 1945, A m ericans lacked th e ability, w ill, a n d circum stances to control the process. A s u su al, social factors also sh a p e d the v a rie d reactions th a t p u n d its sh am e­ lessly lu m p into a "public o p in io n ." A frican-A m ericans, less in v ested ideologi­ cally in th e C old W ar in th e first place, w ere n o w less in v ested in victo ry (those w h o saw m ilitary service as a n a v en u e of u p w a rd m o bility w o n d e re d w h e th e r a d o w n siz e d m ilitary w o u ld becom e a n o th e r d ead -en d ). A m ericans of Soviet a n d E astern E u ro p ean extraction u su a lly ch eered co m m u n ism 's fall b u t also jo stled a g ain st each other, reflecting risin g ethnic a n d religious ten sio n s w ith in a n d am o n g th eir h o m elan d s. T he rise of C atholic au th o rity in P o lan d , th e m ostw a tc h e d form er Soviet satellite, ala rm e d ab o rtio n -rig h ts fem inists a n d g ay ac­ tivists, w h o w o n d e re d if th e c h u rc h 's u g ly h o stility w a s p referab le to th e com ­ m u n is t sta te 's g ray rep ressio n th a t h a d n o n eth eless g u a ra n te e d som e rights. C u ltu ra l conservatives co u ld cheer the c h u rch 's role th ere b u t rem ain ed m ore in clin ed to w o rry a b o u t m o ral ro t a t hom e. P artisan a n d ideological politics also k e p t th e b rak es o n celebration. C old W ar conservatives, th o u g h inclined to glo at b ecau se th e ir m a n w a s in p o w e r at th e decisive m o m en t, w ere also c a n d id a b o u t feeling b ereft of th e an tico m m u ­ n ist cause th a t h a d serv ed th em so w ell. D em ocrats a n d liberals n a g g ed B ush to recognize the C old W ar's e n d b u t ex erted little p ressu re o n h im , rem em b erin g D u k ak is's fate in 1988, a n d p u sh e d lam ely for a "peace d iv id e n d " th a t w o u ld reap v ictory's re w a rd s a n d tu rn resources to o th e r en d s. L eftists rem ain ed scat­ tered , som e excited a n d som e b e w ild e red b y c o m m u n ism 's collapse, m an y m o re a ttu n e d to race a n d g e n d e r politics a t hom e, a n d collectively a m arg in al force. N o r d id the B ush a d m in istra tio n so u n d m u c h of a celeb rato ry note. T h o u g h it h a n d le d d ip lo m acy efficiently, its a tte m p ts to tak e cred it for victo ry som e­ tim es so u n d e d p rovincial o r m e a n — D em ocrats w a n te d to sh are th e g lory a n d E u ro p ean s w h o h a d stru g g led a g ain st co m m u n ist ru le w ere in cre d u lo u s— ra th e r th a n triu m p h al. R eporters sen sed so m eth in g m issing: as th e B erlin w all fell, one n o te d th a t in B ush's talk "of g rea t victo ry for o u r sid e in th e b ig EastW est b a ttle ,. . . y o u d o n 't seem elated. A n d I'm w o n d e rin g if y o u 're th in k in g of th e pro blem s." "I a m n o t a n em otional k in d of guy," B ush ack n o w led g ed , m a k ­ in g a n o th e r p itch for p ru d e n c e .13 Soon B ush a n d o th ers w a rn e d so often of new , p e rh a p s w o rse, d a n g e rs com ­ in g after the C old W ar th a t th ey offered little reaso n for A m ericans to savor the m o m ent. "G lobal co n d itio n s," a rg u e d G O P sen ato r John M cC ain in Jan u ary 1990, m ad e use of m ilitary force "likely to b e ev en m ore im p o rta n t in th e fu ­ tu re," A m erican p o w e r rem ain in g "th e free w o rld 's in su ran ce policy." The U n ited States, a rg u e d the a rm y chief of staff in A p ril, faced " a n increasingly

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tu rb u le n t w o rld " a n d m u st rem a in able "to d e fe at p o te n tia l th re a ts w h e re v e r th ey occur." " N o tw ith sta n d in g th e a ltera tio n in th e Soviet th rea t," B ush a d d e d o n th e eve of th e G u lf crisis, "th e w o rld rem ain s a d a n g e ro u s place w ith serio u s th reats to im p o rta n t U.S. in terests." V ictory's sp o ils a lre ad y seem ed so u r.14 O th e r struggles, certain ly W orld W ar II, h a d e n d e d w ith m essy resu lts, om i­ n o u s im plications, a n d u n in sp ire d P resid en ts, y et also allo w ed e u p h o ria to m in g le w ith ap p reh en sio n . N e ith e r the com plex circu m stan ces n o r th e m o d est p resid en tia l lea d ersh ip a t th e e n d of th e C o ld W ar alone acco u n ted for th e m u te d reactions. T hey w ere also ro o ted in A m erican s' u n d e rs ta n d in g s of w h a t w a r a n d victo ry sh o u ld m ean. T he g rea t stru g g le h a d b e e n called th e C o ld War, a n d th o u g h A m ericans k n e w th a t th is " w a r" w a s d ifferent, th e te rm sh a p e d ex p ectations ro o ted in th e exam ple of W orld W ar E: th e e n e m y 's b ru ta l d efeat a t A m erican h a n d s, p u n ish m e n t of its w a r crim inals, p rid e in A m erican accom ­ p lish m en t, a n d visions of a b e tte r tom orrow . E o n ly b y co u n terex am p le, th e V ietnam W ar re m in d e d y o u n g e r A m ericans of th o se expectations: v icto ry h a d b e en d e n ie d , retu rn in g tro o p s h a d n o t p a ra d e d , a n d th e en em y (at least in P O W /M IA m yth) c o n tin u ed to h u m iliate th e U n ited States. A m erican s w ere su p p o se d to h u m iliate their e n em ies— th o u g h a fte rw ard s to act generously. In m u te d form s, h in ts of A m erica's triu m p h a n d th e e n e m y 's h u m ilia tio n oc­ casionally surfaced. In 1987, th e m ed ia p re se n te d th e d ram a tic spectacle of a y o u n g G erm an, M atthias R ust, outfoxing Soviet air d efen ses to la n d h is tin y airp lan e o n R ed S q u are— a h u m b lin g m o m e n t for th e Soviets if th ere ev er w a s one. For a few seasons, com m ercial a d v ertisem en ts fea tu red clever scenes in w h ich w id e-ey ed R ussian p e a sa n ts o r b lo ck h e ad e d c o m m u n ist b u re a u c ra ts— th e to talitarian g en iu s tu rn e d into d u m b b ru te — en co u n tere d w o n d ro u s W est­ ern p ro d u cts. D isenchanted Soviets a n d W estern re p o rte rs ex p o sed th e o ld re­ g im e's b ru talities a n d follies. A n d th e o u tstretch e d h a n d of G orb ach ev a n d Yeltsin seeking W estern a id rev ealed the m o m e n to u s fall tak e n b y A m erica's archenem y. Yet the pity-the-poor-R ussians m o o d w as rarely th e triu m p h a lism associ­ a te d w ith victory, a n d th e u n c e rta in resp o n se of A m erican (an d o th e r W estern) lead ers to the old en em y 's e d g y b e g g in g — its lead ers all b u t th re a te n e d a re­ n e w ed C old W ar if th eir n e e d s w ere n o t m e t— also lacked th e triu m p h a l ele­ N o in v asio n , n o atom ic b o m b , n o w a r m en t e v id e n t a t the e n d of W orld W ar crim es trials, n o M arshall Plan, n o M acA rth u r— g ra titu d e th a t su c h th in g s w ere n o t req u ire d m in g led w ith regret a b o u t w h a t th eir absence m ean t. The C old W ar's e n d b ro u g h t few chances to inflict th e final p u n ish in g blow , ev en im aginatively or sym bolically. A m erican resp o n sib ility for v icto ry w a s it­ self in d o u b t, since it cam e a t the h a n d s of restiv e forces w ith in th e Soviet em ­ pire, catching m o st A m ericans b y su rp rise. T hey m ig h t tak e p rid e in m ak in g th e u p h e av a l possible, in som e ab stract w a y — th e W est h a d p re se rv e d freedom , h e ld u p a m odel, a n d e x h au ste d the en em y b y its v e ry stay in g p o w er. But th e d irty w o rk of change h a d b e en carried o u t b y o th e rs— Sakharov, G orbachev,

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H avel, W alesa, a n d th o u sa n d s m ore. In a n y ev en t, Soviet politics w ere so d eli­ cate after 1987 th a t A m erican lead ers h a rd ly d a re d h e a p sco rn o n th e failed So­ v ie t ex perim ent. A w a r e n d in g w ith a w h im p e r d id n o t p ro v id e a fu lly satisfy­ in g conclusion, one th a t m a n y A m ericans m a y h av e so u g h t in stea d in M id d le E astern deserts. W a r's m ea n in g h a d lo n g b e e n m e d ia te d for A m erican s th ro u g h th e ritu a ls of c o n su m er c u ltu re a n d econom ic progress. In 1941, b o o m in g factories a n d fat­ ten e d p aychecks sig n aled e n try into a m ilitarized age as m u c h as h e ad lin e s a b o u t P o lan d o r m a p s w ith m enacing arrow s; in th e 1970s, d e fe at in V ietnam seem ed lin k ed to gasoline lines. T he correlatio n s w ere less clear at th e C old W ar's close. V ictory initially b ro u g h t few tan g ib le c h an g es— n o flood of tro o p s h o m e, n o su rg e of inflation o r geyser of c o n su m er g o o d s— on ly u p h e av a ls in far-off lan d s to v iew o n the screen. T angible signs of v icto ry e m e rg ed slow ly. By th e early 1990s, sh u tte re d factories, closed b ases, m o th b alled sh ip s, a n d re­ gional econom ic troubles, especially C alifornia's, offered d e la y ed sig n als th a t v icto ry w as real a n d a n e ra w a s passing. E ven th en , it w a s h a rd to see h o w th e u n d e rly in g econom ic changes w ere "co n n ected to w h e th e r th e m in i-m all a t th e c o m e r m a d e it o r w e n t u n d e r." 15 The signals w ere n o t only v iv id b u t dep ressin g . V ictory's b o u n ty seem ed th in , if th ere a t all. A "peace d iv id e n d " m ig h t sh o w it, b u t th e m e ta p h o r w a s a w k w a rd — if th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t w a s a n e arly b a n k ru p t en terp rise, as m a n y ch arg ed , h o w co u ld it d eclare a d iv id e n d ? — a n d it sp o k e to fiscal issues, n o t to c o n su m ers' d a ily pleasures. C laim s w ere m a d e — n o w in d a ily n e w s­ p a p ers, n o t ju st lea rn ed jo u rn a ls— th a t the C o ld W ar h a d inflicted econom ic h a rm o n the U n ited States, a n d th o u g h d e b a te d th ey w ere sufficiently p lau sib le to steal m ore of v icto ry 's pleasures. F in d ing victo ry h a rd to savor, A m ericans also h a d tro u b le im ag in in g w h a t w a s to follow. W orld W ar II h a d excited h o p e s o r fears of re tu rn in g to a recent p ast. T h at bell-curve m o d el of h isto ry d id n o t alw ay s aid foresight, b u t a t least it p ro v id e d a fram e w o rk in w h ic h to im agine, a sense of a p a s t to reach b ack for, o r to av o id in th e case of the D epression. E ven in th e V ietnam W ar's w ak e, con­ serv atives y e a rn e d n ostalgically for the 1950s. N o rem em b ered p a st se rv ed as b e n c h m a rk o r foil for im ag in in g th e p o s tC old W ar w o rld , h o w e v e r— p e rh a p s o ne reaso n th a t State D e p a rtm e n t official Francis F u k u y am a w ro n g ly foresaw "th e e n d of h isto ry " in a m u ch -d iscu ssed 1989 essay.16 T he C old W ar co m p rised too big a n arc of history. It h a d lasted so lo n g th a t it d efin ed "n o rm alcy " for m o st A m ericans, a n d a t its e n d th e A m eri­ can a g en d a w as too c h an g e d to see the relevance of som e p re -C o ld W ar p ast. In an y event, since the 1940s a n d 1950s m ark e d th e p e a k of A m erican p o w e r a n d affluence, there sim p ly w as n o b e tte r era p rio r to it to invoke. E arlier A m erican w a rs h a d involved a sh o rt effort, after w h ic h a n im ag in ed p a st w as readily available. The C old W ar h a d m a d e obsolete th a t w a y of fin d in g m ea n in g in w a r's end.

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N o r w a s th e im ag in ativ e p ro b lem confined to Joe Six-Pack, p lo d d in g p o liti­ cians, o r ev en t-o rien ted journalists. A ssem b lin g essay s b y tw enty-six d istin ­ g u ish e d figures (only one a w om an), th e ed ito rs of Rethinking America's Security w ere "stru ck . . . b y ju st h o w u n co m fo rtab le A m erican s fin d th e challen g e of reth in king. . . . T his a p p lies to foreign policy ex p erts a n d estab lish m en tarian s, p e rh a p s especially so." T he e n su in g essays larg ely co n firm ed th a t ju d g m e n t. T h o u g h v a rie d a n d intelligent, th ey te n d e d to v iew fu tu re policies as u p d a te d v ersio n s of fam iliar ones, o n ly w ith th e C o ld W ar su b tra cted a n d econom ic challenges a d d e d . C om m erce, affluence, a n d social justice seem ed less like goals in them selves th a n m ean s to en h an ce a fam iliar "n a tio n al security," w h o se d o m in an ce as te rm p a id h o m ag e to th e p a s t half-century. A fter all, ar­ g u e d o ne academ ic, "th ere h av e b e e n n o fu n d a m e n ta l ch an g es in th e n a tu re of in te rn atio n al politics since 1945." By co m p ariso n , sp ecu lativ e lite ra tu re a t th e close of W orld W ar II w a s b o ld , sh a p e d as it w a s b y sh a rp m em o ries of th e p re ­ w a r p ast, sh a rp reactions to th e w a r 's clim actic revelations, a n d th e su d d e n n e ss of its e n d .17 T his stru c tu re of m em ory, experience, a n d im a g in atio n acco u n ted in p a rt for th e shifting, d y sp e p tic m o o d a p p a re n t in e v ery th in g fro m carto o n s to n o v els to lea rn ed co m m entaries o n th e p u b lic p u lse. C om ic-strip C o n g ressm an Bob F orehead gave his w ife so m u c h tro u b le th a t she to o k h im to a "p erestro ich iatrist," w h o o p in ed , "T he fad in g of th e C old W ar h a s left a terrib le v o id in sid e him . H e 'll n e ed a lot of care u n til h e fin d s a n e w enem y," o n e th e New Yorker saw m a n y A m ericans fin d in g in d ru g s. N o v elist Jo h n U p d ik e p u t h is long-tim e character R abbit to rest in 1990, h a v in g h im m u se, "T he cold w ar. It gave y o u a reaso n to get u p in th e m o rn in g ," a n d lam ent, "W ith o u t th e cold w ar, w h a t's th e p o in t of b e in g a n A m erican?" U p d ik e ex p lain ed th a t R abbit's "sen se of b ein g u seless" h a d "th is political d im ension. . . .L ik e m e, h e h a s liv ed h is a d u lt life in th e co ntext of th e cold w a r," a n d R abbit h a d a "co n cep t of freed o m , of A m erica, th a t to o k sh a rp n ess from c o n tra st w ith C o m m u n ism ."18 The ren e w e d p o p u la rity in 1990 of a p red ictiv e lite ra tu re of A m erican d e ­ cline also m ea su re d the so u r m o od. To b e sure, n o te d P au l K ennedy, a "rev iv al­ ist" lite ra tu re also blo sso m ed b u t, as h e o b serv ed , its creato rs seem ed to b e p a d ­ d lin g u p stream . For th o se conservatives clin g in g to th e c u ltu ra l a g en d a a n d to astin g C o ld W ar victory, d a rk m u sin g s from th e ir o w n ran k s w e re especially startling. In te rru p tin g h is c u ltu ra l jerem iads, c o lu m n ist G eorge W ill u n lea sh e d a b a rra g e of d ep re ssin g statistics a b o u t A m erica's econom ic a n d m ed ical s ta tu s— "a b o y b o m in H a rle m to d a y h a s a lo w e r life expectancy th a n a b o y b o m in B angladesh." In a 1990 bestseller. The Politics of Rich and Poor, K evin P hillips w a rn e d th a t "th e triu m p h of u p p e r A m erica" in th e R eagan era p o se d g rav e d a n g e r to th e R epublican P arty a n d to th e n atio n , b la m e d g ro w in g social ineq u alities in p a rt o n R eagan's d efense sp e n d in g , a n d p o in te d o u t th a t " h u ­ m a n resources" sp en d in g , as o p p o se d to th e m id d le-class en titlem en ts u su a lly cited, h a d declined sh a rp ly relative to defen se in th e 1980s.19

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From a d ifferen t v a n ta g e p o in t, fo rm er C om m erce Secretary P eter P eterso n co m p lain ed in 1991 th a t A m ericans "sleep w alk ed , choicelessly, th ro u g h critical y ears," ju st as jo u rn a list H a y n es Johnson th o u g h t th a t "sleep w alk in g th ro u g h h isto ry " d efin ed th e R eagan era. A m ericans, P eterso n claim ed, h a d clu n g g reed ily to e n titlem en ts, fo u g h t th e taxes to p a y for th em , d ead lo ck ed o n m ak ­ in g decisive changes, an d , th ro u g h m o n stro u s p u b lic a n d p riv a te d eb t, sq u a n ­ d e re d th e ir econom ic legacy to th eir children. "N o g en eratio n in living m em o ry h a s com e of age sen sin g h o w little a d u lts care a b o u t th eir fate," h e charged. Political gridlock, econom y folly, social frag m e n ta tio n — h is list of ills w as long, a n d co m m o n to th em all w a s a " 'h ave-it-all-to d ay m en tality ," a rg u e d Peterson, rep risin g th e lam en t a b o u t "narcissism " in th e 1970s, th a t earlier m o m e n t w h e n th e C o ld W ar h a d seem ed a b o u t to e n d .20 Such co m p lain ts revealed A m erican s' u n c ertain ty m o re th a n th e ir failures. E ven if real, th e ills d escribed h a d causes. In so far as A m ericans "ro se" to chal­ lenges in th e 1940s in a u n ite d a n d self-sacrificing sp irit, it w as b ecau se th e th rea ts th e y faced h a d b e en sufficiently big, p lau sib le, a n d ex tern al to m obilize th em , n o t because th e y h a d b e e n a m ore v irtu o u s peo p le. If th ey n o w seem ed crab b y a n d greedy, th e y h a d n o t forfeited v irtu e b u t faced challenges th a t seem ed m ore com plex, diffuse, a n d internal. A n d if th ey d id n o t m arch b o ld ly in to th e future, o r e v en see one into w h ic h to m arch, it w a s b ecau se th e age of m ilitarizatio n h a d d ra in e d th e reservoirs of im a g in atio n a n d resources. T hese constrictions o n im ag in atio n p la y e d in to th e cau tio n w ith w h ic h A m ericans ap p ro a ch e d the v a st in stitu tio n al a n d a ttitu d in a l a p p a ra tu s ac­ q u ired o v er th e p re v io u s half-century. Bold p ro p o sa ls to d ism an tle th a t a p p a ­ ra tu s w ere few, u su a lly a t th e m arg in s of n a tio n al d ebate. E ven o ld foes of d o m ­ in an t policies w ere often careful; in 1990, th e Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists fea tu red defense a n aly st W illiam K au fm an n 's p la n to cu t d efen se fu n d s b y ju st 3 p e rc en t p e r y e ar in th e early 1990s (but in h a lf b y 2000). O th e rs offered faster b u t still carefully g ra d u a te d tim etables. T he sh a rp increases of 1941,1950,1961, a n d 1981— one m o d el for w h a t m ig h t n o w b e d o n e — w ere n o t to b e m atch e d in reverse. The n a tio n 's sp y a n d police agencies h a d a d istu rb in g record of in e p t forecasting, in filtratin g political g ro u p s, h o u n d in g h o m o sex u als in th e m ili­ tary, a n d w o rk in g in a secrecy inim ical to dem ocracy. Yet th e su m m o n s to d is­ m an tle these in stitu tio n s w ere few. N e w m issio n s for th e m w ere im ag in ed , al­ th o u g h th e Chicago Tribune, in a critique of th e C o ld W ar legacy n o tab ly h a rs h for th e m ain strea m m ed ia, d o u b te d th a t task s like m o n ito rin g enem ies in th e tra d e w a r w ere " w o rth th e scru tin y of a m assive sp y sy stem o r th e p ro p a g a n d a of a v a st g o v e rn m e n t in fo rm atio n sy stem ."21 P art of the p ro b lem w a s th a t A m ericans h a d lo n g a ssu m e d th a t th e C old W ar alone h a d given rise to m ilitarized in stitu tio n s, so th a t th e fo rm e r's d em ise so m eh o w g u a ra n te e d the la tte r's. T he o th er ro o ts of th o se in stitu tio n s, less of­ ten g rasp ed , w ere less easily rip p e d out. T hose ro o ts in v o lv ed o ld p ercep tio n s, co n firm ed m ore th a n cau sed b y fascism a n d co m m u n ism , th a t ev o lv in g tech-

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nological, econom ic, a n d political system s created a closed w o rld p o sin g p e r­ m a n e n t p eril for th e U n ited States. The "C o ld W ar," h isto ria n W alter LaFeber n o ted , in clu d ed "co n fro n tatio n s th a t w ere at tim es o n ly faintly, if a t all, related to th e U.S.-Soviet stru g g le." It h a d also su b su m e d im p u lse s— to c o n tain G er­ m an y a n d Japan as w ell as R ussia, to control th e global econom y, to tu r n A m er­ ica "in to a consensual, secret, m ilitaristic, in te rn atio n al force" (as LaFeber p u t it)— th a t h a d su sta in ed m ilitarizatio n .22 H ence th ere w a s a certain logic in ar­ g u in g , as a d m in istratio n officials d id , th a t Soviet decline d id n o t w a rra n t a cor­ resp o n d in g decrease in A m erican vigilance. A s th e C old W ar's su p e rstru c tu re cru m b led, a less visible su b stru c tu re surfaced in calls to resist d em ilitarizatio n . U n fortunately, the su b stru c tu re d a te d to th e w o rld of th e 1930s a n d 1940s, a n d clinging to it a rrested efforts to a d a p t to a n e w era. O th e r obstacles to faster liq u id a tio n of m ilitarizatio n loom ed: fear of th e eco­ n om ic d am ag e th a t m ig h t result; resid u al anxieties a b o u t th e Soviets a n d n e w ones a b o u t o th er threats; desires to b e n d o ld in stitu tio n s to n e w p u rp o se s— often n e w ly im ag in ed "w a rs" of d ru g s, trad e, a n d crim e— a n d th e in terests th a t sto o d b e h in d those desires. P u t a n o th e r w ay, th o se obstacles rev ealed th a t m ilitarized in stitu tio n s w ere so fam iliar th a t fo reseein g — o r rem e m b e rin g — a n A m erica w ith o u t th em w as n early im possible. N o w o n d e r G eorge B ush h a d problem s. The b est h e could d o w a s find n e w w a rs to w age. It w a s strik in g th a t h is first televised a d d re ss to the n atio n , ju st after L abor D ay 1989, w a s h is occasion to declare a w ar, this tim e o n d ru g s. H e a n d R eagan h a d a lre ad y m a d e sim ilar declarations, a n d a G allu p poll e stab lish ed th a t A m erican s w ere in "a w a r­ tim e m o d e" reg a rd in g d ru g s (w hile n o tin g th a t "fear of w a r" h a d d eclin ed sharply, as if the d ru g w a r replaced it). "A ll of u s agree th a t th e g rav e st d o m es­ tic th re a t facing o u r n a tio n to d a y is d ru g s," B ush a n n o u n ce d , th o u g h m a n y A m ericans rate d o th er th reats higher. D ru g s alone d id n o t o ccu p y B ush th a t au tu m n ; h e c o n tin u ed his cautious efforts to s u p p o rt G orbachev a n d n u d g e along arm s control. But ev en th o se efforts w ere so m etim es d re n c h e d in w a r's sym bols. In D ecem ber, the tw o lead ers m e t a t M alta, site of a m ajor A ngloA m erican m eeting d u rin g W orld W ar II (p rep a rato ry to th e Yalta C onference), a n d co nvened o n w a rsh ip s of each country, w ith a s tu d ie d effort to m a in tain w a rsh ip "p arity " b e tw ee n the tw o su p e rp o w e rs. S ecretary of State Jam es B aker h a d acknow ledged th a t "th e w o rld h a s clearly o u tg ro w n th e clash b e tw ee n the su p e rp o w e rs th a t d o m in a te d w o rld politics after W orld W ar II." Still, th e M alta su m m it's sym bolism looked back to th a t w ar, n o t fo rw a rd .23 B ush quickly follow ed m etap h o rical w a r w ith a real one, a n in v asio n of P an­ am a in D ecem ber 1989, w ith the d e ath s of likely h u n d re d s of P an am an ian s, fol­ lo w ed b y antics w o rth y of a G ilbert-and-S ulliv an w a r to secure th e k id n a p p in g of M anuel N oriega a n d h is incarceration in th e U n ited States o n d ru g charges. T h at w as the logical outcom e of B ush's S ep tem b er declaration: g iv en a w a r o n

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d ru g s, sh o u ld n o t m ilitary action follow ? It d id , n o t o n ly in P an am a b u t in S outh A m erica, along th e M exican b o rd er, a n d elsew here, as th e a d m in istra ­ tio n e x p a n d e d m ilitary assistance to g o v e rn m e n ts facing th e d ru g tra d e a n d d ra fte d a relu c ta n t P en tag o n in to th e cause. Fam iliar n o tio n s of th e u n b o u n d e d n a tu re of n a tio n a l security w ere also reapplied : th rea ts ab ro a d a n d a t h o m e are in d istin g u ish ab le, the tools to m eet one can a d d re ss th e other, a n d A m erican law ap p lies to a foreign lea d er (N oriega, w ith w h o m th e R eagan a d m in istratio n h a d p ro b ab ly c o llu d ed in illegal activities in re tu rn for h is h e lp a g ain st th e Sandinistas). T his w as n o t the C o ld W ar red u x , h o w e v e r— th e ep iso d e in P an ­ am a w a s too farcical a n d fleeting, too rem iniscen t of R eagan-era m ilitarizatio n , w ith its fo n d n ess for big g u n s in little w ars. N o r d id it e x tin g u ish B ush's " w im p " im age, as "h is first real w a r w a s fol­ lo w e d ra p id ly b y his first [political] collapse— a h a rb in g e r of h is fate after th e G u lf W ar." C ollapse w a s d u e in p a rt to ren e w e d anxieties a b o u t econom ic a n d fiscal problem s. B ush c o m p o u n d e d th o se p ro b lem s b y em b racin g R eagan's leg­ acy, p le d g in g to fight n e w taxes a n d declin in g serio u sly to e n g ag e C ongress, itself sq u e am ish a b o u t b o ld action. N o r w o u ld h e o r C o n g ress w rin g savings fro m d efense sp en d in g , w h ich declined o n ly a t th e l-to-2-percent-a-year pace set in R eagan's last years. V ast b u reau cracies a n d o verseas d e p lo y m en ts stay ed in tact a n d big-ticket w e a p o n s p ro g ra m s c o n tin u ed , th o u g h n u c le ar arsen als co n tracted to 10,500 A m erican a n d 15,000 S o v ie t/R u s sia n w a rh e a d s b y early 1993 (th o u sa n d s m ore a w aited dism antlem en t). By a u tu m n . B ush d id accept a b u d g e t d e al th a t in c lu d e d n e w taxes, b u t h e d id so "alm o st p assiv ely ('L ooks O.K. to m e')," so o n "rep e ate d ly calling it all a 'm istak e .' " O n ly w a r seem ed to offer a w a y o u t of this m u d d le , a lth o u g h a n e arn est B ush m ay n o t h av e calcu­ lated th e political payoff.24 H is resistance to d e m ilitariz atio n p la y e d o u t a g ain st a n o th e r critiq u e of w ar, one in fo rm ed b y a n end-of-the-C old-W ar sense of h o w d a m a g in g m ilitariza­ tio n h a d b e en b u t focused o n th e futility of w a r itself. "W ar h a s fallen u p o n h a rd tim es," an n o u n ce d R obert O 'C onnell, a h isto ria n a n d civilian a n aly st for a rm y intelligence. T he "v en erab le in stitu tio n " of w a r h a d becom e "v irtu a lly in cap a­ ble of p erfo rm in g a n y of th e roles classically assig n ed to it." John M ueller m a d e a b racin g case th a t m ajor w a r am o n g "d e v e lo p e d " p o w e rs w a s m o v in g , like d u e lin g a n d slav ery h a d , "to w a rd term in a l d isre p u te ," in p a rt "because of its perceived rep u lsiv en ess a n d futility." W ar, h e claim ed, h a d n o t tro u b le d E u­ ro p e since the 1940s, a n d m a n y d e v elo p in g n a tio n s w e re also w ith d ra w in g from the " w a r system ." "C o n v en tio n al w a r" b e tw ee n m assiv ely a rm e d states "m ay b e at its last g asp," M a rtin v a n C reveld su g g ested . T he "u tility of fig h tin g w a rs h a s sh a rp ly d eclin ed ," a rg u e d R ichard Barnet. Like earlier critics, th e n e w o nes h a rd ly ru le d o u t w a r 's ren e w e d eruptio n : "T here is still accid en t a n d m a d ­ n ess" to cause it, O 'C o n n ell n o ted ; p a n d em ic terro rism w o u ld elicit a m ilitary resp o n se from m ajor p o w ers, v a n C reveld o bserved; "Politicians are still

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te m p ted to u se a sp le n d id little w a r as a piece of political th e a tre /' n o te d B arnet after P an a m a 's invasion, " p ro v id e d th e risks a p p e a r m in o r"; M u eller saw "th e obsolescence of m ajor w ar," n o t of lesser versions. O ffering th e m o st so m b er p red iction, v a n C reveld th o u g h t th a t n a tio n al states a n d th eir w a rs w o u ld "w ith e r aw ay," d isp laced b y "low -intensity conflict" w a g e d b y terro rist g ro u p s, p riv a te security forces, a n d ro g u e go v ern m en ts: "It w ill be a w a r of lis­ ten in g devices a n d of car-bom bs, of m en killing each o th er a t close q u a rte rs, a n d of w o m e n u sin g th eir p u rse s to c arry explosives a n d th e d ru g s to p a y for them . It w ill b e p ro trac te d , bloody, a n d h o rrib le." But e v en th a t so rt of w ar, h e su g g ested , m a d e A m erica's technologically to p -h eav y m ilitary estab lish m en t obsolete— or co u n terp ro d u ctiv e. In an y even t, as a ratio n al act of th e state car­ ried o u t o n a large scale— "A m ere c o n tin u atio n of policy b y o th e r m ean s," as C lau sew itz p u t it— w a r w a s folly.25 This o u tlo o k h a rd ly g e n erate d u n iv ersal acceptance. Its rea p p ea ran c e coin­ cid ed w ith fiftieth-year observances of th e sta rt of W orld W ar II a n d w ith p u b ­ lication of P aul Fussell's caustic m em o ir / h isto ry of th a t stru g g le. Wartime. Both ev en ts elicited defenses of A m erican efforts in W orld W ar H: it w a s "th e g o o d w a r," the New York Times asserted , if on ly becau se it " h a d to be fo u g h t a n d h a d to b e w o n ." Fussell th o u g h t "an y o n e w h o h a d fo u g h t in th e w a r sh o u ld b e ash am e d ," n o te d the Nation's review er, b u t "m o st of th e A llied p a rticip a n ts h av e b e en cagey a b o u t th eir lunacy" a n d "rem a in p e rv e rse ly co n v in ced th a t th ey d id so m eth in g significant."26 B ush a rticu lated th a t u n su rp risin g view , w h ich served, n o t alw ays intentionally, to reaffirm w a r's utility, o r a t least its occasional necessity. Still, W orld W ar II w a s lo n g in th e p ast, a n d recalling it w a s n o w a n act of nostalgia. A sense of w a r's obsolescence, w h a te v e r its p a st necessity, w as w id e sp rea d . It w a s ev en echoed b y m ilitary leaders. D uty, self-interest, p resid en tia l p o l­ icy, a n d in stitu tio n al sto d g in ess k e p t th em from re p u d ia tin g w a r's utility, m u ch less its inevitability. Still, the cau tio n e v id e n t since V ietnam p e rsisted , d e ­ sp ite th eir d e m a n d s to shore u p m ilitary b u d g e ts. E ven a m id R eag an 's rea rm a ­ m en t, D efense Secretary W einberger h a d lo u d ly a n n o u n ce d so m a n y p rec o n d i­ tio n s to use of A m erican a rm e d force as v irtu a lly to p rec lu d e it. A t least b a d w ars, if n o t all w a rs, w ere to b e av o id ed , th e m essage ran. Strategic d o ctrin e also sh a p e d caution: d e te rrin g ra th e r th a n w a g in g w a r lo n g h a d b e e n th e m ili­ tary 's priority, th o u g h som e chafed u n d e r it. C au tio n w a s e v id e n t before b o th P an a m a 's in v asio n a n d the G ulf W ar. "Patience," retired JCS c h airm a n A dm . W illiam C row e re p o rte d ly believed o n the eve of th e G u lf W ar, "h a d p a id off h a n d so m ely in the C old W ar. W aiting o u t th e Soviet U n io n for 40 y ears w o u ld b e m a rk e d as one of the g reat victories of all tim e. W h y c a n 't w e th in k in the lo n g term ?" H is successor, G en. C olin Pow ell, a p p a re n tly ag reed .27 P ru d en ce w as a v irtu e G eorge B ush often claim ed; p atien ce, it seem s, w a s a n o th e r m atter. W ar's obsolescence w a s a d eb atab le theory; h e w o u ld test it. D em ilitarization h a d barely b egun; its course rem ain ed fitful in d eed .

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Moral Equivalents of War W h en G eorge B ush d eclared a d ru g w ar, h e w as n o in novator. T he Jam esian search for a m o ral eq u iv a le n t of w a r w a s a n o ld tra d itio n in A m erica, o n e re­ n e w e d b y R eagan am o n g others, especially w h e n h e a d d re sse d d ru g s a n d crim e. In 1981, R eagan p ra ise d police chiefs "w h o c o m m an d th e fro n t lines in A m erica's b a ttle for p u b lic o rd er" a n d "th e th in b lu e line th a t h o ld s back a ju n ­ gle w h ic h th rea te n s to reclaim the clearing w e call civilization," lan g u ag e ev o k ­ in g fro n tier m y th o lo g y a b o u t w h ites co n q u erin g a n d civilizing th e A m erican W est. "T his a d m in istra tio n h ereb y declares a n all-out w a r o n big-tim e o rg a­ n iz e d crim e a n d th e d ru g racketeers," h e a n n o u n ce d in h is 1983 State of th e U n io n ad d ress. "T he w a r a g ain st d ru g s is a w a r of in d iv id u a l b attles," he a d d e d in 1988.28 In d eed , b y th e tim e of B ush's 1989 an n o u n cem en t, th e d ru g w a r h a d b e en so often a n d lo u d ly d eclared th a t citizens m ig h t w o n d e r w h e n it b e g a n o r m ig h t end. T he search for w a r's eq u iv a le n t th u s p rec ed e d B ush's presidency, b u t clim axed d u rin g it in p a rt because of h is m ore acerbic a n d u n ­ e v en lea d ersh ip a n d because of th e C o ld W ar's end. U se of th e w a r m e ta p h o r w a s also n o w m ore d iv erse in sources a n d p ro m is­ cu o u s in ap p licatio n th a n in th e 1960s, w h e n it h a d e m a n ated p rim a rily from th e W hite H ouse. P resid en ts n o w h a d lim ited con tro l o v er it. T hey m ig h t ju m p sta rt it in specific cases, as w ith d ru g s, b u t ignore it in o th ers, as in th e "w a r o n AID S," o r fin d it tu rn e d a g ain st them . N o single political force conceived it; R eagan a n d B ush sim p ly revealed one w a y to ex p lo it it. A lth o u g h th e rhetoric som etim es p ro claim ed a c am p aig n by A m erican s a g ain st som e n a tio n al p ro b ­ lem , it m o re often signaled, som etim es intentionally, conflict among A m ericans. A s su c h it traced a n d p ro p e lle d the co n tin u in g in w a rd tu rn of m ilitarizatio n , as its energies a n d in stitu tio n s shifted to w a rd A m erican s' conflicts w ith each o th er a n d aw ay from th e S oviet-A m erican struggle. To be sure, th a t fo rm u la­ tio n is m a d d e n in g ly v a g u e a b o u t cau sa tio n — n o se n tie n t being, m ilitarizatio n co u ld n o t " tu rn " an y w h ere. A s a t its start, so too now : m an y forces a n d circum ­ stances red irected it. A m o n g th o se w a s the o utlook of m a n y con serv ativ es in th e R eagan era. Since th ey p resen te d the sources of n a tio n al stre n g th as m o re c u ltu ral th a n m ilitary a n d econom ic— a m atter of in te rn al cohesion m o re th a n p o w e r a b ro a d — th ey raised the p re m iu m o n fighting o u t a n d overco m in g in te rn al divisions. T he d e ­ cisive w a r w a s a t hom e; once w o n , victory ab ro ad w o u ld follow. By th e sam e token, as p ro sp ects for serio u s w a r ab ro a d reced ed , th e search for a su b stitu te at h o m e intensified am o n g a p e o p le so accusto m ed to w a r of som e so rt th a t its cessation seem ed alm o st u n im ag in ab le, to co n serv ativ es a n d to m an y o th er A m ericans. The "w a rs" th a t e n su e d w ere v aried , fascinating, a n d o ften b aleful in th eir consequences. O n e w a g ed early in the d ecad e w a s a g ain st terrorism . T he Iran h o stag e affair h a d h ig h lig h ted it; o th er incidents, u su a lly in th e M id d le East, follow ed. This

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w a r p ro v e d h a rd for R eagan to d eclare a n d su stain , h o w ev er, d e sp ite lik en in g h im self to cinem a's R am bo. In 1981, h e c o m p a red th e stru g g le a g ain st terro rism to th e A llied effort a g ain st N a zi genocide b u t a d m itte d th a t terro rism , "scat­ tered th ro u g h th e w o rld ," w a s " n o t q u ite large e n o u g h in d im e n sio n for u s to rally b e h in d as w e once d id in th a t w ar!"29 Lack of victo ry w a s also a reaso n n o t to tru m p e t this w ar. In stead it b ecam e a secret w a r w a g e d b y th e illegal m eth o d s exposed as th e Iran -C o n tra affair. In th e en d , R eagan su rre n d e re d ra th e r th a n w ag e this w ar; b rib e ry to g e t h o stag es released w a s n o t a bellicose policy. T here w a s a n o th e r reaso n th is w a r w a s a n o n starter: it d re w too little o n th e p a ssio n s A m ericans felt a b o u t each other. T his feckless w ar, like the lo n g w a r o n d ru g s, in d icated th a t th e line b e tw e e n real a n d m etap h o rical w a rs w a s b lurry, since th e latter d id em b race elem en ts of real w ar: g u n s w ere fired, tro o p s d ep lo y e d , a n d p eo p le k illed in su c h causes, in ala rm in g n u m b e rs as th e d ru g w a r w e n t on. Blurry, th e line w a s still reco g n iz­ able. Few p e o p le a rg u e d (alth o u g h R eagan d id try) th a t th ese w a rs w e re the literal eq u iv a le n t of o th ers the U n ited States h a d w a g e d — W orld W ar H, for ex am p le— o r c u rre n t w a rs rag in g elsew here, as in A fg h an istan , w h e re th o u ­ sa n d s d ie d in com bat. A t th e sam e tim e, ho w ev er, m etap h o rical w a rs w ith sta y in g p o w e r h a d to p a rta k e something of w a r 's d e a th a n d passio n . N o t ev ery p u b lic issu e w o u ld qualify. N o w a r w a s d eclared in b eh alf of ed u catio n , a lth o u g h E d u ca tio n Secre­ ta ry Terrel Bell a rg u e d th a t "if a n u n frie n d ly foreign p o w e r h a d a tte m p te d to im p o se o n A m erica th e m ediocre e d u ca tio n al p erfo rm an ce th a t exists today, w e m ig h t h av e v iew ed it as a n act of w a r." R eagan p resu m ab ly w a g e d a " w a r o n w a ste " in g o v ern m en t, as a p resid en tia l com m ission ch aired b y P eter G race titled its rep o rt, b u t th e en em y w a s too abstract.30 Too, th e n o tio n w a s a n oxy­ m oron: since b y n a tu re w a r is a w a stefu l activity th a t en larg es g o v ern m en t, to w ag e w a r o n g o v ern m en tal w a ste w a s silly. By th e sam e token, n o " w a r o n the fed eral deficit" em erged, a lth o u g h politicians of all strip es lab eled th e deficit a m ajor problem . N o t only w a s th e en em y ag ain abstract, few politician s seri­ o u sly so u g h t to defeat it. M etaphorical w a rs req u ire d political p ay o ff if p o liti­ cians w ere to declare them . A t first glance, A m erica's " tra d e w a r" co n fro n ted sim ilar obstacles: " tra d e " w as an abstraction, a n d th e d u ll com plexities of econom ics d id n o t easily gen er­ ate pu blic passion. Still, this label stuck; the m e ta p h o r w a s u b iq u ito u s, its im p li­ cations a n d im ag ery w id e ly elaborated. In p a rt it stu ck b ecau se A m erica's tra d e deficit seem ed to h av e m ore o b v io u s resu lts th a n th e fiscal deficit: sh u ttere d factories, ru in e d cities, d isc ard e d w o rk ers, a n d foreign g o o d s w ere th e visible casualties a n d w eap o n s. M ore th a n th at, it w a s closely asso ciated w ith Japan, A m erica's old war en em y a n d racial com petitor. T rad e w ith m a n y c o u n tries— in clu d in g W est G erm any, a n o th e r w a rtim e e n e m y — sw elled th e tra d e deficit, ju st as o th er n a tio n s' investors, B ritish a n d D u tch for exam ple, b o u g h t u p

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A m erican p ro p e rtie s as aggressively, if m ore quietly. But Ja p an lo o m ed larg est in th a t d eficit— th e sin g u lar en em y in m o st ren d e rin g s of th e " tra d e w ar." G iv en its resonance w ith W orld W ar II a n d th a t w a r's racial a n tag o n ism s, the tra d e w a r rea d ily to o k p a ssio n a te form . In political rhetoric, e v e ry d a y com ­ p lain ts, a n d m ed ia cu ltu re, a n acute sense em erg ed th a t th e U n ited States a n d Jap an really were a t w ar, e v en if n o g u n s w ere y et fired. T h u s H o w a rd Baker, a lea d in g R epublican, u se d th e fo rtieth a n n iv e rsa ry of th e e n d of W orld W ar II to in sist th a t " w e 're still a t w a r w ith Jap an " a n d " w e 're losing"; a se n ato r charac­ terize d Ja p an 's ex p o rt of cars to the U n ited States as " a n econom ic Pearl H a r­ b o r"; a n d a W hite H o u se staffer u rg e d th a t "th e n e x t tim e B-52s fly o v e r Tokyo . . . w e b e tte r m ak e su re th e y carry b o m b s." D esp erate A m erican c o m p etito rs ex p lo ited th a t outlook. B uick featu red a p h o to g ra p h of M ac A rth u r's receip t of Ja p an 's su rre n d e r o n th e b a ttlesh ip Missouri ab o v e th e w o rd s: "O N C E A G A IN , TH E JAPANESE M UST CO M E TO TERMS W IT H A N A M ER IC A N LEADER." (The im a g ery p ro b ab ly m e a n t little to y o u n g e r A m ericans, b u t th ey w ere n o t B uick's ta rg e t m arket.) A fter 1989, a strin g of fiftieth-year an n iv ersaries of W orld W ar II ev en ts su p p lie d n e w o p p o rtu n itie s to attach w a r 's im ag ery a n d u g lin ess to Japanese-A m erican econom ic relations, g iv in g th e tra d e w a r life in to th e 1990s w h e n o th e r m etap h o rical w a rs fad e d aw ay. Freer in form a n d co n ten t, political cartoons ex p o sed th is o u tlo o k baldly. The Atlanta Constitution e q u a te d "Jap an B om bs Pearl H a rb o r" w ith "Jap an B uys Pearl H a rb o r" b y k eep ­ in g th e typeface a n d w o rd s of its m ock 1941 a n d 1989 fro n t p a g es alm o st id e n ti­ cal, as if W orld W ar II still rag ed , w ith o n ly a m in o r ch an g e in w o rd in g (see fig. 10). Such cartoons su g g e ste d th a t Jap an w a s a n u n c h an g in g enem y, th a t o n ly its d e v io u s tactics h a d altered, a n d th a t it ag ain e a rn e d A m erican vengeance, th o u g h h o w to inflict it rem a in e d elusive. T hey set u p rea ssu rin g expecta­ tio n s— A m erica w o u ld triu m p h in this w a r as in th e last o n e — b u t also u n d e r­ cu t them : m ay b e th is tim e th e U n ited States w a s su rre n d e rin g .31 A s in W orld W ar II, A m ericans d id n o t alone set th e to n e of th e interchange. For m a n y Japanese, too, talk of tra d e w a r rea w a k en e d im ag es of real w ar, p ro m p te d ren e w e d claim s a b o u t A m erica's slo th a n d racial im p u rity , a n d stirred d rea m s of red e em in g Jap an 's h u m iliatio n in 1945. Jap an ese co m p eted b etter, a rg u e d one official in 1982, because th ey "are a race of co m p letely p u re b lo o d , n o t a m o n g relized race as in the U n ited States." T he m ilitary balance b e tw ee n the tw o n a tio n s w a s far different th a n in 1941, to th e p o in t th a t d u rin g th e G ulf W ar one A m erican e x p ert d e rid e d Jap an 's "in fan tile fear of w a r " — a rem ark ab le criticism g iv en A m erican insistence o n Ja p an 's d e m ilitariz atio n af­ ter 1945— a n d Japanese conservatives p ra ise d "A m erican s for p o ssessin g a 's a m u ra i sp irit' lacking in Japan." But su c h lan g u ag e still d re w o n th e im ages of W orld W ar II, sim p ly in v ertin g th e m — Jap an n o w soft a n d sq u e am ish ab o u t w ar, the U n ited States "a w ar-loving, sloganeering, extrem ist c o u n try " fitting, John D ow er n o ted , A m erica's "W orld W ar II im ag es of Jap an ." N o w o n d er.

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Jam es Fallow s rep o rte d , th a t "Japan's o p in io n -m ak in g class," ey ein g Pearl H a r­ b o r's fiftieth an n iv ersary , " p re p a re d th e pub lic to cringe in d re a d o f U.S. o u t­ b u rsts this m o n th ." 32 T he o ld w a r e n tw in e d w ith the n e w one in o th e r w ays. In H aw aii, som e A m ericans (usually to u rists, n o t H aw aiian s) c o n tin u ed to resen t th e p resen ce of n u m e ro u s Japanese in v esto rs a n d to u rists, reg a rd in g it as a sig n th a t Jap an h a d w o n th e w a r b y o th er m ea n s o r th re a te n e d th e "p h y sical d efilem en t" of th e sacred site of Pearl H arbor. O th e r A m erican s m e t Jap an ese th ere in a sp irit of reconciliation b u t, sen sin g u g ly feelings, th e N a tio n a l P ark Service's acting d irecto r th o u g h t a n official in v ita tio n for Ja p an 's p a rtic ip a tio n in th e fiftietha n n iv e rsa ry c o m m em o ratio n of th e Pearl H a rb o r attack w o u ld b e " in a p p ro p ri­ ate, p o ssib ly offensive, a n d fra u g h t w ith p ro b lem s a n d incalculable in d eli­ cacies." T he p re sid e n t of th e Pearl H a rb o r S u rv iv o rs A ssociation h a d a c ru d e r response: "W ould y o u expect the Jew s to in v ite th e N azis to a n ev en t w h e re th ey w ere talk in g a b o u t th e H olocaust?" T h at a n n iv e rsa ry stirred u p m o re im ­ ag es lin k in g th e o ld w a r of com bat w ith th e n e w o n e of trad e. T he Chicago Tri­ bune's d isso n a n t trea tm e n t c au g h t th e conflicting em otions: o n D ecem ber 7, 1991, it fea tu red a carto o n of a su n k e n b a ttlesh ip a t P earl H a rb o r w ith th e w o rd s "w e re m e m b e r"— above a n ed ito ria l c ap tio n e d "L o o k in g B eyond P earl H arb o r." M onths later, fifty y ears after in te rn m e n t cam p s for JapaneseA m ericans o p e n ed , one c arto o n ist c o m p a red Jap an -b ash in g in 1992 to w a rtim e A m erican a ttitu d e s.33 This w as su c h volatile stuff th a t n a tio n al lead ers u su a lly tip to e d a ro u n d the w a r m etap h o r, lest th ey d is ru p t th e delicate b allet of Japan ese-A m erican n eg o ­ tiatio n s o n a h o st of m atters. In th e d ru g w ar. P re sid e n ts issu ed rin g in g calls to arm s. In th e tra d e w ar, th e m e ta p h o r b u b b le d u p m o re fro m b e lo w — fro m asp i­ ra n ts to ra th e r th a n h o ld ers of h ig h office (d esp ite som e ind elicate rem arks), from m id d lin g politicians exploiting th e p lig h t of co n g ressio n al d istricts losin g th e w ar, from a d agencies a n d cartoonists w h o sen sed th e p o p u la r p a ssio n s in ­ v o lv ed , from o rd in a ry A m ericans, h o w e v er m a n y Japanese p ro d u c ts th ey b o u g h t. The tra d e w a r revealed an o th e r source of th e m etap h o rical w ars: th e c o n tin ­ u in g h o ld of W orld W ar II o n A m erican s' im ag in atio n s. O n ly th e C ivil W a r's g rip h a d lin g ered so long, u n til w e a k e n e d b y W orld W ar I. N o co m p arab le ev en t (alth o u g h the C old W ar's e n d cam e close) cam e fifty y ears after Pearl H arbor. O verw helm ingly, th e im ages, reference p o in ts, a n d m o d els cited for w a r's m o ral eq u iv alen ts of the 1980s ra n back to W orld W ar II, o r to its afterm a th a n d its legacy of n u c le ar w eap o n s. It w a s as if A m erican s h a d n o o th e r b e n ch m ark a g ain st w h ic h to m ea su re them selv es a n d th eir challenges, th eir m ilitarized c u ltu re looking m ore to p a st triu m p h s th a n to fu tu re glories. W orld W ar II d id n o t alone account for Japanese a n d A m erican im ag es of each other. "W hy," a n A m erican once asked, " d o so m a n y A m ericans, after w it­ n essin g the d e v asta tio n a n d futility of w ar, co n tin u e to th in k of Jap an a n d the

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Jap an ese in term s of w ar? W h y h av e so m a n y Japanese a sim ilar m en tal a ttitu d e to w a rd th e U n ited States?" F ranklin R oosevelt raised th o se q u estio n s in 1923. "It is n a tu ra l for th e lan g u a g e of w a r to b e a p p lie d to th e b attlefield s of com ­ m erce," Jo h n D o w er h a s arg u ed . "T here is n o t, after all, a n infinite v a rie ty of lively w o rd s to go a ro u n d ." In fact, o th ers w ere im ag in ab le— from sp o rts, for ex am p le, w h ic h h a d long su p p lie d A m erican s' m etap h o rs for w a r— b u t the tra d e w a r 's lan g u a g e w a s "historically specific . . . th e rh eto ric of W orld W ar E ," alb eit set in a lo n g er record of Japanese-A m erican hostility.34 T h at w a r 's h o ld , rem ark ab le in longevity, w a s in o th er w a y s u n su rp risin g . W orld W ar E u sh e re d in th e p e a k of A m erica's global p o w e r a n d d o m estic af­ fluence. Since A m erica's e n su in g w a rs in K orea a n d V ietn am w ere h a rd ly at­ tractiv e rep lacem en ts— a n d since a n y im agin ab le b ig w a r in th e fu tu re w o u ld b e a n u c le ar conflict— W orld W ar E w a s left as "th e o n ly a p p ro p ria te m o d el for 'aU -out' w a r m eta p h o rs." A m o n g p a s t a n d p ro sp ectiv e w ars, it alone offered th e a ttractiv e c o m b in atio n of g ian t scale, m o ral clarity, A m erican un ity , a n d to­ tal A m erican victory. B eneath th e surface of 1980s rhetoric, o th e r w a rs d id ru ­ m ble. Like V ietnam , th e d ru g w a r lacked clear battlefro n ts, b led A m erica slow ly, a n d saw victo ry p ro m ised b u t n e v e r achieved. A s th e Nation n o ted , "S en d in g ad v isers to P eru recalls w id e n in g th e w a r in to C am b o d ia; stressin g th e n u m b e r of p e o p le p u t b e h in d b a rs so u n d s like b o d y co u n ts." O r in th e d if­ feren t co m p ariso n to the V ietnam W ar offered b y Soldier of Fortune m ag azin e, th e d ru g w a r is one "in w h ich B leeding H e a rts p ity th e d ru g d ealers a n d g a n g m em bers. . . . It's a w a r w h e re th e police, as th e so ld iers of th e streets, a re n 't g iv en the o p p o rtu n ity to w in ." V ietn am 's u n d e rto w w a s o n e reaso n th a t th e m etap h o rical w a rs of th e 1980s, especially th o se p ro claim ed b y P resid en ts, of­ ten cam e to seem d isp iritin g a n d divisive. It w a s also a reaso n to k eep d ra w in g fro m the d e e p w ells of W orld W ar E.35 D espite th e tra d e w ar, th e g reatest p assio n s w ere u su a lly reserv ed for "w a rs" th a t e n g ag e d A m erican s' feelings a b o u t each oth er, n o t d ista n t enem ies. T he d ru g w a r d id so. It d id occasionally featu re ex tern al foes like C u b a 's C as­ tro, P a n a m a 's N oriega, a n d m y sterio u s C o lu m b ian cartels. B ut m o re alarm in g for m a n y A m ericans w ere th e enem ies in th eir m idst: briefly in th e 1980s, cocaine-snorting w h ite "y u p p ies"; m ore often, inner-city b lack a n d H isp an ic m en, th e u rb a n g an g s th ey joined, a n d th e a d d ic te d m o th e rs th ey failed to m arry, w ith th eir d ru g -c rip p le d o r A ID S-infected babies. O n occasion, conser­ vativ es d re w w id e r circles en co m p assin g all those d efeatists w h o d id n o t see a ro sy fu tu re em erg in g from A m erica's m ilitary a n d m o ral revival. "T he sam e p eo p le w h o w in k e d a t u s a b o u t d ru g s also to ld u s th a t A m erica's fu tu re w a s bleak," R eagan to ld A m ericans in 1988, a n d "sa id th a t th e trad itio n a l v alu es of fam ily a n d c o m m u n ity w ere old fash io n ed a n d o u t of date. It w a s as if th e y 'd lost faith in the fu tu re a n d w a n te d the rest of u s to lose it, to o ."36 T he h a rd e r d ivisions, ho w ev er, inv o lv ed race, ethnicity, a n d social class. A s w ith the w a r m eta p h o r generally, d ru g w a r rhetoric w as osten sib ly de-

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sig n ed to u n ite A m ericans. "A s in W orld W ar II, I a m co n v in ced th a t th e w a r o n d ru g s w ill n o t be w o n u n til w e m obilize the A m erican p u b lic," a rg u e d o n e con­ g ressm an w a n tin g " d ru g w a r b o n d s" to finance th e cause (the B ush W hite H o u se d e m u rre d ).37 T h at reaso n in g d re w o n p o w e rfu l m em o ries of w a r as a u n ify in g force, b u t th e m em ories w ere rose-tinted: A m erican s h a d h a d som e of th eir u g liest in tern al conflicts, especially racial ones, d u rin g a n d rig h t after th eir w ars, ev en W orld W ar II. The u n ify in g p u rp o se s of w a r m e ta p h o rs co u ld n e v er stick a n y w a y w h e n the en em y in clu d ed fellow A m ericans. A ll w ere to u n ite a g ain st d ru g s a n d "ju st sa y n o ," as N an cy a n d R onald R eagan p u t it, b u t B ush d efin ed the en em y as "ev ery o n e w h o u ses d ru g s" o r "sells d ru g s" o r ju st "looks the o th er w ay." T h at in clu d ed m a n y A m ericans. A n d w a r req u ire d visi­ ble enem ies. So th e im p u lse to u n ify th a t stim u la te d p u rs u it of w a r 's m o ral eq u iv alen t y ield ed divisive consequences— in th e d ru g w ar, ab o v e all of w h ite a g ain st black. T hose consequences w ere e n h an ced b y th e rep ressiv e co u rse th a t a w arlik e stance sanctioned. Insofar as it arises, w a rtim e u n ity d e riv e s n o t o n ly from sh a red p u rp o se b u t from clubbing w a r's d issid e n ts a n d o u tsid ers in to confor­ m ity o r invisibility; m a n y A m ericans d id p riso n o r co n cen tratio n -cam p tim e in th e tw o w o rld w ars. W ar sanctions th e su sp e n sio n of civil liberties in o rd e r to achieve unity, ju st as th e C o ld W ar d id a m id n o m in a l peace. In th e d ru g w ar, lead ers h ig h lig h ted the w a r m e ta p h o r's u n ify in g th ru s t m o re th a n its rep res­ sive im plications, b u t those surfaced in police actions, c o u rt decisions, legisla­ tive changes, p ro p e rty seizures, sen ten cin g ru les, th e record n u m b e r of m en (especially A frican-A m ericans) in p riso n , th e ro u tin e d ru g -te stin g of m ilitary p erso n n el a n d m u ch of the lab o r force, a n d th e m o th e rs of crack bab ies e m ­ b raced b y the law 's long arm . T hey also em erg ed in schem es for "priso n er-o fw a r c am p s" (to b e located in "large tracts of fed eral p ro p e rtie s in th e W est" w h ere Japanese-A m ericans w ere in te rn ed , p ro p o se d o n e p rofessor; A m erican s can "m ak e all the n ecessary a d ju stm en ts. . . . W e d id it after Pearl H arb o r"). N o r w as a w a r m en tality lim ited to official agencies, a n y m o re th a n in w artim e. P riv ate in stitu tio n s also enlisted in this w ar. T he cover of th e Yale Alumni Maga­ zine p ro claim ed "Y ale's w a r o n d r u g s " — a " w a r o n a n u m b e r of fro n ts" a n d in v o lv ing "battlefield" con d itio n s.38 C riticism of these repressive consequences, a n d h o w th e w a r m e ta p h o r serv ed them , d id ensue. B ush's "w a r o n d ru g s h a s b ecom e a w a r a g ain st th e p o o r," co m p lain ed co lu m n ist C larence Page, " a n e v er-m o u n tin g a ssa u lt o n th o se "— largely black— "easiest to a rre st a n d p ro secu te," ev en th o u g h m o st cocaine u sers w ere w hite. A n "incredible p ressu re o n th e m ilitary " to w a g e th e d ru g w a r m ark s "th e ro ad of m ilitarizatio n ," w o rrie d a n o th e r co m m en tato r: "It's likely to fail of a solu tio n " a n d "to corrod e a p illa r of o u r d em o cratic w a y of life." S tephen C h ap m an , conservative c o lu m n ist a n d d o g g e d critic of th e d ru g w ar, arg u e d th a t "th e first casu alty of w a r . . . is th e tru th . . . . The o m in o u s im ages of w a r a n d p lag u e obscure the essen tial fact: D ru g use, u n lik e m o st

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crim es, is n o t a fo rm of a g g ressio n a g ain st o th ers." B ush's "m ilitary m o d el," the New Yorker lam en ted , "identifies m a n y m illions of A m erican s as th e enem y, d ism issin g th em in fu n d a m e n ta l w a y s from o u r n a tio n al life." "Bellicose rh eto ­ ric," a d d e d the Nation, lead s to a " d e h u m a n iz a tio n of th e enem y," w ith d ru g d e alers p o rtra y e d as "su b h u m a n life form s," as th e Japanese w ere in w a rtim e p ro p a g a n d a . B etty F ord reg re tte d th a t p h ra sin g " o u r n u m b e r o n e p u b lic h e a lth p ro b lem as a 'w a r o n d ru g s ' h a s allo w ed a re tu rn to th e strictly p u n itiv e a p ­ p ro ac h to d e alin g w ith p eo p le w h o are, in fact, sick." W ith a w a r p resu m ab ly on, h o w ev er, su c h criticism w e n t m o stly u n h e e d e d .39 T he contests in the 1980s o v er w o m e n a n d a b o rtio n rev ealed m a n y of th e d y n am ics e v id e n t in th e d ru g w ar. T hose co n tests h a d b e e n p h ra se d in w a r's term in o lo g y long before th e eighties, b u t its u se n o w intensified. R eagan a n d B ush rare ly e m p lo y ed it. In ste ad it em erg ed from an ti-ab o rtio n forces, a n d th en , p a rtly in reaction, from th eir pro-choice o p p o n en ts. G ro u p s like O p e ra ­ tio n Rescue, fo u n d e d in 1986 b y ex-car salesm an R an d all Terry, to o k th e rh eto r­ ical offensive in these m atters. In these m ale-d o m in ated o rg an izatio n s— w o m e n in O p e ra tio n Rescue seem ed to co m p rise a su b m issiv e "fem ale au x iliary "— m em b ers o ften saw them selves as "w a rrio rs" a n d s p u n o u t m ili­ ta ry analogies. P la n n ed P aren th o o d , in th eir view , w a s " a n in stitu tio n th a t d w a rfs the P en tag o n ." A ctivist F ather N o rm a n W eslin h a d once b e e n a "com ­ m a n d e r in charge of n u c le ar w e a p o n s" b u t th o u g h t "th a t w a s b u s h leag u e" c o m p a red to the enem ies h e n o w faced. T erry saw fem inists as "d ie h a rd en em ies" a n d o p e ra te d from "co m m an d -cen tral" in u p sta te N e w York. A n ti­ ab o rtio n ists' im agery, w ro te critic S u san Faludi, lay in a "w a r-to m p sy ch o lo g i­ cal lan d sca p e" o n w h ic h "th e en em y w a s fem inism , th e w e a p o n w a s ag g res­ sively m oralistic rhetoric, a n d the stra te g y for reclaim ing th e offensive w a s larg ely sem antic."40 Pro-choice fem inists so m etim es d ip p e d in to th e sam e linguistic w ell. Re­ sp o n d in g to th e S u p rem e C o u rt's 1989 decisio n allo w in g restrictio n s o n abor­ tio n services, a n g ry e d ito rs of Ms. m ag azin e offered a cover e m b lazo n ed , "IT'S WAR!" F aludi herself, in a w id e ly d iscu ssed book, w a s u n su re w h e th e r to reject o r em brace th e w a r m etap h o r. She criticized "im a g in in g th e conflict as tw o b a t­ talio n s n e atly a rra y e d o n eith er sid e of th e line," b u t th o u g h t "th e m e ta p h o r of co m b at is n o t w ith o u t its m erits" a n d titled h e r acco u n t Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women. O th e rs echoed th is lan g u ag e in o th er causes: les­ b ia n activist Susie B right lectu red o n "sex w a rs" in w h ich officials sq u a sh e d free speech rig h ts to sell a n d b u y p o rn o g ra p h y ; h isto ria n Lillian F a d e rm a n su r­ v ey ed the "lesbian sex w a rs" of th e 1980s; a n tip o m fem in ist A n d re a D w o rk in p e n n e d Letters from a War Zone. In m atters of g en d er, th e w a r m e ta p h o r k n e w few political b o u n d a rie s.41 T hese rhetorical p a rrie s w ere less telling a n d im ag in ativ e, h o w ev er, th a n a n e w e r o n e — th e an tifem in ists' claim th a t ab o rtio n co n stitu ted a crim e co m p a­ rab le to the N azi H olocaust, its m u rd e re d m illions eq u iv a le n t to th e Jew s a n d

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o th ers sla u g h te red u n d e r H itler. W hile c o m p ariso n s b e tw ee n a b o rtio n clinics a n d "N azi ov en s" w ere a p p a re n tly "com m on p lace" from 1960 on, th ey sw elled in v o lu m e a n d au th o rity d u rin g th e 1980s, sp u rre d p a rtly b y th e a b o rtio n p o li­ tics sw irlin g a ro u n d G erald in e F erraro's n o m in a tio n for th e vice p resid en cy in 1984. T h at year N e w York C ity Archbiishop John J. O 'C o n n o r co m m en ted , "I alw ay s com pare th e killing of 4,000 babies a d a y in th e U n ited States to th e H o ­ locaust." O th e r b ish o p s saw su ch killing as fo resh ad o w in g a n u c le ar holocaust. In 1983, In terio r Secretary Jam es W att, v iew in g p h o to g ra p h s of d e a th cam p co rp ses sh o w n a t a H o lo cau st conference, ex p lain ed h o w th ey re m in d e d h im of a b o rte d fetuses.42 T hese co m p ariso n s seem ed bizarre: a b o rtio n w a s a tim eless if v a rie d p rac­ tice, n o t a d iscrete a n d concerted e v e n t like th e H olocaust, a n d it u su a lly arose from in d iv id u a l decisions, n o t g o v e rn m e n t m an d a te . M oreover, th e ab o rtio n as-genocide claim arose from elem ents of th e religious R ight a n d th e C atholic ch u rch n o t n o te d for th e ir concern a b o u t the fate of Jew s in th e H o lo cau st, p e r­ h a p s one reaso n w h y Christian Century objected th a t th e claim risk ed th e "trivialization" of the H olocaust itself.43 A n ti-ab o rtio n ists h a d th eir o w n reaso n in g , h o w e v e r —Roe v. Wade a n d fed eral policy m a d e g o v e rn m e n t a t th e least com p licit in g enocide— a n d th e w a r m e ta p h o r rarely rested o n u se rs' co m p ellin g logic. A n d an ti-abortionists w ere in d e e d u sin g a w a r m etap h o r, if a n u n u su a l one. To b e sure, g enocide som etim es o ccurred o u tsid e of w a r (as u n d e r Stalin in th e 1930s), a n d an ti-abortionists saw them selves n o t as d a b b lin g in m e ta p h o r b u t as sp e ak in g th e literal tru th . Still, it w a s th e N a zi H o locaust, n o t o th er in cid en ts of genocide, th a t th ey u su a lly cited. A n d th a t H o lo cau st w a s a n inextricable p a rt of W orld W ar n , b o th w h e n it o ccu rred a n d as A m ericans, w ith th eir flick­ erin g cinem atic im ages of th a t w ar, n o w recalled it. Its u se in d ic ate d a g ain h o w W orld W ar II rem ain ed th e to u ch sto n e of political im a g in atio n — a still e x p a n d ­ in g one in th a t H o lo cau st im ag ery w as relatively n e w to political culture. The fu rth e r A m ericans g o t from W orld W ar II, th e m o re m ea n in g th ey seem ed to see in it. D oing so in the a n ti-ab o rtio n c ru sad e exp o sed an ew th e corrosive p o ten tial of th e w a r m e ta p h o r— the vehicle it p ro v id e d to express u g ly em otions. A n ti­ ab o rtionists d id ta p the u rg e to unify; all A m erican s w ere to ld to d e fe at a n evil eq u iv alen t to th a t faced in W orld W ar II, w h e n th ey h a d also u n ite d in c o m m o n cause. But w ith the casualties so "in n o cen t" a n d "h u m a n ," th e en em y so v isi­ ble, a n d th e divisions over g e n d e r so lo n g stan d in g , th e H o lo cau st m e ta p h o r for ab o rtio n only d iv id e d p eo p le further. N o w o n d e r th a t th e p o p u la r ra d io com ­ m en tato r R u sh L im baugh fu lm in ated a g ain st pro-choice "fem i-N azis"— if ab o rtio n w a s like the H olocaust, pro-choice fem inists lo o m ed as latter-d ay N azis (anti-abortionists w ere them selves occasionally c o n d em n ed as latter-d ay fascists). O f course, G erm an N azis m o stly h a d b e en m en. L im b au g h 's ja u n ty tira d es

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ex p o sed n o t o n ly the o bvious g e n d e r politics of th e a b o rtio n issu e b u t th e su b ­ tle r ones of the w a r m etap h o r. Seeing fem inists as w a g in g w a r o n fetuses, a n d o n m e n — m a n y an ti-ab o rtio n ists in sisted th a t w o m e n w ere tra m p lin g o n m ale p riv ileg e — in v erted sta n d a rd n o tio n s of g e n d e r roles in w arfare. It also sanc­ tio n ed som e m e n to a d o p t m ilitary poses a n d , o n occasion in v o lv in g abo rtio n , v io le n t m eth o d s. Fem inists d id e m p lo y th e w a r m etap h o r, b u t less often, a n d u su a lly from a defensive p o stu re , as if re sp o n d in g to a w a r alre ad y w a g e d o n them . It w a s n o coincidence th a t the w a r m e ta p h o r su rg e d in th e 1980s, w h e n a n ti­ fem in ism also flourished. D espite w o m e n 's g ro w in g role in th e a rm e d forces, w a r w a s still w ith reaso n re g a rd e d as a m ale activity. M ost m etap h o rical w a rs w ere m ale-d efin ed in in sp iratio n a n d m ale-led in action. To fram e causes as "w a rs," especially if w o m e n w ere b lam ed for sta rtin g th em , w a s to see th em in m ale term s a n d to place th em u n d e r m e n 's control. M an y m en to o k th a t logic a step fu rth e r in th e flo u rish in g p a ra m ilita ry c u ltu re of th e 1980s, im ag in in g a "N e w W ar" to reverse A m erica's h u m iliatio n in V ietn am a n d red e em its m a n ­ h o o d . In fan tasy o r sim ulation, p a ra m ilita ry w a rrio rs fo u g h t "th e b attles of V ietn am a th o u sa n d tim es, each tim e w in n in g decisively," saw "terro rists a n d d ru g d ealers . . . b laste d into oblivion," p u t illegal aliens a t h o m e a n d n o n ­ w h ites ab ro ad in "th eir p ro p e r place," g o t Jew s " h e rd e d in to can y o n s a n d sh o t," fo u n d th a t w o m e n h a d "to be m astered , av o id ed , o r te rm in a ted ," o r w ip e d o u t hom osexuals. P aram ilitary c u ltu re w a s u n d e rsta n d a b ly seen as o n th e lu natic fringe, g iv en the apocalyptic visions, h a te fu l view s, g u n -lo v in g m entality, a n d m ass-m u rd er b in g es acco m p an y in g it, b u t it o v e rla p p e d m ain ­ stream c u ltu re in im ag ery a n d ideology. R esto ratio n of "w a rrio r d rea m s" a n d re p u d ia tio n of p o st-V ietnam self-d o u b t w ere cen tral to R eagan-B ush politics, to th e a d u la tio n g iv en O liver N o rth , a n d to H o lly w o o d film s of th e R am bo v a ri­ ety th a t so u g h t to replace th e "so ft b o d ies" of th e 1970s (Jim m y C arter w a s "a 'w o m a n ' p re sid e n t" according to th e Wall Street Journal) w ith " h a rd b o d ies" p e rfo rm in g w a rrio r deeds. (By th e sam e token, H o lly w o o d so m etim es p o r­ tray e d single career w o m e n as knife-w ieldin g m u rd e re rs com p ellin g m ale re­ so rt to violence, as in Fatal Attraction [1987].) P aram ilitary cu ltu re, like u rb a n g an g culture, sim p ly offered a m ore strik in g ex am p le of h o w m ilitarizatio n w a s tu rn in g in w a rd , in its case in a q u ite literal w a y th a t sh o w ed h o w th e e ru p tio n of " w a r" am o n g A m ericans w as a g e n d e re d p h e n o m e n o n .44 G en d er w as at issue in a n o th e r " w a r" at th e e n d of th e 1980s, o v er cu ltu re a n d th e federal g o v e rn m e n t's fu n d in g of it. Backed b y p riv ate lobbies, congres­ sional conservatives like Sen. Jesse H elm s in v eig h ed a g ain st fu n d in g b y the N a tio n a l E n d o w m en t for th e A rts of a rtists like p h o to g ra p h e r R obert M ap ­ p le th o rp e a n d exhibits th ey d e em ed p o rn o g rap h ic o r obscene. In m an y w ays, th is w a s a n o th er v a ria n t in th e long stru g g le to c o n tain th e fem inist a n d gay presence; m o st artists singled o u t w ere w o m e n (often lesbians) o r g ay m en. C ritics, a n d som etim es conservatives them selves, in d icated th a t th e R ight h a d

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ju st d iscovered su c h p e o p le as n e w en em ies to replace d isa p p e a rin g c o m m u ­ n ists, b u t w hile cynical calculation w a s in d e e d in v o lv ed , n o n e w d isco v ery w a s a t w ork. H o m o sex u ality a n d fem inism lo n g h a d b e e n lin k ed to c o m m u n ism , w h ic h w a s one reaso n w h y the n e w a ssa u lt o n th em w o rk e d to th e d eg ree it d id , a lth o u g h it w o rk e d in th e ironic w a y s th a t h a d lo n g m a rk e d su c h cam ­ paigns: to h ig h lig h t fu rth e r the p resen ce of gay s in th e a rts (an d to m ak e sales of M a p p le th o rp e 's p h o to g ra p h s soar). A gain, co m m o n p h ra sin g of th e stru g g le w a s as tellin g as th e stru g g le itself. T his w a s "a full-scale w a r b e tw ee n religious fu n d a m e n ta lists a n d th e a rts a n d m u se u m co m m u n ities," one o b serv er n o ted . John F ro h n m ay er, th e N E A ch air w h o e n d u re d the w ra th of artists for d e fe n d in g th e m w e ak ly a n d of th e W h ite H o u se for attack in g th e m h alfh earted ly , su b title d h is m em o irs Confessions of an Arts Warrior. A m ericans w ere to ld th ey w ere w a g in g "c u ltu re w a rs" w h o se fronts ex te n d ed far b e y o n d N E A policies. E ven sch o lars like Jam es D av iso n H u n te r u se d th e term in o lo g y literally, th o u g h a d m ittin g th a t A m erica "is n ei­ th e r Belfast n o r Beirut. (N o t y e t anyw ay.)" Ju st as th e N E A fu ro r p e a k e d in 1989, a n o th e r e ru p te d o v e r a S u p rem e C o u rt d ecisio n (as it w a s o v ersim p lified ) p ro tectin g flag b u rn in g . N o w a r w a s p ro c la im e d — th e flag w a s to o m u c h a w a r sy m b o l to w a rra n t su c h a d eclara tio n — b u t th e p assio n s, politics, a n d p o stu r­ ings w ere lin k ed to those in the N E A stru g g le a n d th e 1988 cam p aig n : w ere n o t som e a rtists exploiting th e flag o r tra m p lin g it in th e ir exhibits?45 M ost th em es in th e d e c a d e 's m etap h o rical w a rs e m e rg ed in th e m o st com ­ plex " w a r" of all, th e one on, by, over, o r a g ain st (it w a s h a rd to tell w hich) AIDS. W ar w a s n o t th e sole fram e w o rk en fo ld in g AIDS, a n d disease h a d lo n g b e e n d escribed in m ilitary m etap h o rs, ju st as n o w th e infectious a g en t H IV w a s seen as a n " in v a d e r" w h ich "attack s" th e b o d y 's "d efen ses," as if a w a r by AIDS w a s o ngoing.46 But m a n y u ses of th e w a r m e ta p h o r w e re n o v el a n d in flam m a­ tory. T hey d e riv e d in p a rt from the h ig h rate of AIDS am o n g g ay m e n w h e n th e disease a p p e a re d in th e early 1980s. In d eed , m ed ical e x p erts in itially d u b b e d it "G ay R elated Im m u n e D eficiency" a n d th e n o tio n of it as a "g ay p la g u e " stu ck d e sp ite its ap p ea ra n c e am o n g d ru g u sers, h em o p h iliacs, h etero sex u als, a n d others. A d ecad e later, the M anchester, N e w H a m p sh ire, Union Leader still in ­ sisted th a t "h o m osexual in tercourse is th e genesis of ev ery single case of A ID S" a n d th a t "an al in tercourse b y so d o m ites is th e fu n d a m e n ta l p o in t of o rig in ."47 T hat n o tio n stuck because m o ral conserv ativ es saw in A ID S a chance to re­ su m e the anti-gay offensive b e g u n in th e 1970s. G ay m en, h o w ev er, also ex­ p ressed a keen sense of v u ln era b ility to — a n d , as som e saw it, resp o n sib ility fo r— the disease, a n d th eir stre n u o u s efforts to rally th e ir o w n c o m m u n ities a n d th e n a tio n tig h te n ed the association b e tw ee n th em a n d AIDS, o n e th a t re­ v iv ed o ld er n o tio n s of h o m o sex u ality as a m ed ical p ro b lem . M ean w h ile, o th er affected gro u p s, m illions of A fricans for exam ple, o ften lacked th e political clout or ev en m in im al respectability to c o m m an d atten tio n . A fam iliar A m eri-

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can h a b it of fin d in g p e o p le resp o n sib le for th eir o w n h e a lth p ro b lem s also p la y e d a role in efforts to stig m atize p e o p le w ith AIDS; th e 1970s h a d seen m u c h sp e cu la tio n a b o u t h o w "T ype A " p erso n alities o r "lifestyle" h ab its cau sed cancer o r h e a rt trouble. A stu b b o rn d istin ctio n b e tw ee n A ID S' "in n o ­ cen t" a n d o th e r victim s fu rth e r fasten ed o n g ay m e n th e stig m a of culpability. T hey o ccu p ied ex p o sed g ro u n d — politically stro n g e n o u g h to call a tten tio n to th e ir p lig h t b u t n o t to control the form s th a t a tte n tio n took. G iv en th e d re a d a n d th e politics in v o lv ed , w a r's m etap h o rs issu e d easily, fro m co nservatives in p a rtic u la r a t first. A s P at B u ch an an railed in 1983: "T he p o o r h o m o sex u als— th ey h av e d eclared w a r u p o n N a tu re , a n d n o w N a tu re is exacting a n aw fu l retrib u tio n ." T h at w a r m e ta p h o r im p lied an o th er: a lth o u g h "N a tu re " p re su m a b ly h a d th e u p p e r h a n d an y w ay , A m erican s sh o u ld tak e u p a rm s a g ain st hom osexuals. W illiam F. B uckley called for tatto o in g infected p e o p le o n the b u tto c k s— rem in d in g som e of h o w d e ath -ca m p in m ates w ere m a rk e d in W orld W ar II— a n d o th ers for locking th e m up. R esp o n d in g to th o se calls, som e gay m e n w o n d e re d if th e y w o u ld be in carcerated like JapaneseA m ericans in 1942 o r w o rrie d a b o u t th e "D ach au scenario," a n d "it w a s vir­ tu ally a n article of faith am o n g hom o sex u als th a t th ey w o u ld so m eh o w e n d u p in c o n cen tratio n cam p s." "O u t of the B aths, In to th e O v en s," re a d a 1984 San Francisco p ro te st sign; a g ay re p o rte r ask ed if officials w ere "p re p a rin g th e b o x ­ cars for relocation."48 W orld W ar H, th e H o lo cau st p articu larly , h a d fo u n d a n o th e r lo d g m e n t in p o ­ litical cu ltu re, in a strik in g d e m o n stra tio n of h o w its u se tra n sc e n d e d political categories. D esp erate g ay m e n a n d rig h te o u s an ti-ab o rtio n ists h a d n o th in g in co m m o n politically— th e y h a te d each o th er for th e m o st p a rt— b u t th e y n o w d re w from the c o m m o n w ell of th e H o lo cau st's ex am p le a n d its risin g v isibility in A m erican culture. For gay m en, the w a y h a d b e e n p re p a re d in th e 1970s w ith th e red isco v ery of th e m ass d e a th of gays u n d e r N a zi rule; th e p in k trian g le w o rn b y th e N a zis' g ay p riso n e rs th e n em erg ed as a sy m b o l of g ay m ilitancy. A s m e ta p h o r o r analogy, th e H o lo cau st carried o m in o u s a n d d iv erse im plica­ tions, in clu d in g prolific u se b y g ay activists of "fascist" a n d "N a z i" to ch arac­ terize m alig n politicians, h e a lth officials, o r co rp o rate lea d ers w h o p re su m a b ly p e rm itte d AIDS to w o rk its genocide, b u t also to assail as "sex u al fascists" those g ay m e n w h o s u p p o rte d closing San F rancisco's b a th h o u se s as a w a y to cu rb th e d isease.49 T he m o st su sta in e d u se of the H o lo cau st cam e from w rite r L arry K ram er, the d e c a d e 's b e st-k n o w n AIDS polem icist. K ram er cited th e H o lo c au st occasion­ ally early in the 1980s a n d sy stem atically b y its close— a trajectory m atch in g the in creasing scale of the disease a n d d e sp a ir o v er it. G ay a n d Jew ish, h e u se d th e H o lo cau st v ario u sly as m etap h o r, m odel, analog, a n d p ro p h ecy , in a rich a n d strid e n t fashion, b u t above all to describe w h a t w a s d o n e to g ay m e n b y a hom oph o b ic society a n d its genocidal leaders. "AID S is o u r h o lo cau st a n d R eagan is o u r H itler. N e w York C ity is o u r A u sch w itz," h e a sse rte d in 1987. T he H olo-

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cau st also illu m in a ted for K ram er w h a t w a s d o n e by g ay m en , as h e d e cried a "p a rticip a tio n in y o u r o w n g en o cid e" a n alo g o u s to Jew s' p re su m e d co m plicity in th eir o w n d estru ctio n . H e p u lle d these th o u g h ts to g eth er in Reports from the Holocaust. O thers, som e influenced b y K ram er, offered a sim ilar o utlook. ACTU P h e lp e d p o p u la riz e th e logo "Silence = D eath ," o n e of m a n y references to th e H o locaust.50 K ra m e r's a n g ry polem ics in d icated h o w richly g ay m e n d e v e lo p e d w a r 's m etap h o rs for AIDS. In contrast, th e m a n y lesbians in th is stru g g le rare ly d id , in d icatin g g e n d e r differences again, w h ile co n serv ativ es, less in v en tiv e a n d p erso n ally in v ested in th e stru g g le (th o u g h clo seted b re th re n like T erry D olan a n d Roy C o h n d ie d of AIDS), relied o n rheto rical stock-in-trade. T he N a z i H o ­ lo cau st w a s on ly th e m o st c o n sp icu o u s am o n g w a r 's h o rro rs th a t g ay m e n cited, how ever. O ne u se d n u c le ar h o lo ca u st— AIDS w a s like a n ato m ic b o m b th a t fell a t th e " g ro u n d zero" of M an h attan , w h e re m a n y g ay m e n lived. A n ­ o th er elaborately c o m p a red "th e experience of th e g ay co m m u n ity to th a t of su rv iv o rs of H iro sh im a" in a n essay "A ID S a n d A -Bom b D isease." M o st w riters ev o k ed W orld W ar II, the H olocaust, n u c le ar attack o r o th e r form s of aerial w ar, o r a p o te n t m ix tu re of th e m all— th o se fo rm s of w a r m o st associated in th e m o d e m im ag in atio n w ith m ass carnage. T he film Longtime Companion (1990) e n d e d b y e q u a tin g th e joy im ag in ed w h e n a cu re for A ID S a rriv e d w ith th e em otions felt a t the e n d of W orld W ar II; th e fittin g title of o n e rev iew w a s "A People a t W ar." O r som etim es w a r in a generic sense w a s s u m m o n e d u p — R an d y Shilts's account of the d isease describ ed "b attle lines" a n d "th e b u tc h e r's b ill"— o r W orld W ar I, o r a th ird w o rld w ar. Too, w a r lan g u a g e w a s n o t co nfined to gay m en o r w ritin g a b o u t them : "Fear in th e F oxholes" w a s a n article a b o u t th e b u rd e n s o n h e a lth w o rk e rs.51 Such lan g u ag e also a p p e a re d in m em o ir a n d fiction as w ell as p o litical p o ­ lem ics, in d icatin g h o w th e w a r m en tality w a s a c u ltu ra l as w ell as p o litical p h e ­ n o m en o n (if th a t d istin ctio n h e ld reg a rd in g AIDS). Its u se b y g ay w rite rs con­ fro n tin g AIDS w a s seem ingly casual b u t in fact p o in te d . So P au l M o n ette n o te d in p assin g th a t "in a jerkoff scene it w a s v e ry b a d fo rm to b rin g u p o n e 's [dead] lover, let alone the holocaust." Prefacing h is p o em s, h e w ro te of "a w a rrio r b u r­ y in g a w arrio r." D escribing a d y in g lover, h e ask ed , "Is th is h o w a Jew feels w h e n h e h ears 'h o lo ca u st' a p p ro p ria te d to som e o th er calam ity ?" a n d sp e cu ­ lated th a t "if AIDS h a d stru ck b o y scouts first ra th e r th a n g ay m en , o r St. L ouis ra th e r th a n K inshasha, it w o u ld h av e b e en co v ered like n u c le ar w a r." 52 A s w ith o th er u ses of the w a r m etap h o r, th o se a b o u t AIDS h a d th e ir sh a re of in te rn al contradictions, u n fo reseen results, a n d p u re silliness. To w rite th a t "th e b o m b " of AIDS "fell w ith o u t a n y o n e's k n o w in g th e b o m b h a d fallen" w a s a w k w a rd a t b e st (few bom b explosions go unnoticed!). K ra m e r's asse rtio n th a t "R eagan is o u r H itler" d id n o t w ork: R eagan lacked th e n ecessary m enace a n d control ov er h is o w n gov ern m en t. K ra m e r's b ack track in g — h e so o n sp o k e of " u n in te n tio n a l" holocausts for w h ic h it w a s "n o t p ossible to locate one

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H itle r" — o n ly b lu rre d h is an alo g y to th e N a zi H olocaust. O f course, m e ta p h o rs rare ly m eet rig id tests of historical accuracy. T heir u se testified to th e g rief a n d th e stakes in v o lv ed for gay m en, a n d to a political c u ltu re w hich, d e sp ite th eir m arg in ality a n d radicalism , th ey sh ared , on e in w h ic h w a r m etap h o rs w e re n o w p ro m iscu o u sly u sed. T he m o st p e rv a siv e m e ta p h o r reg a rd in g th e d isease— of a " w a r o n A ID S"— e m e rg ed a t m id -d e ca d e in efforts to galv an ize fed eral action a n d sp re a d as th o se efforts m e t a cold sh o u ld e r from the R eagan a n d B ush a d m in istratio n s. N e a re r th e m a in strea m of A m erican rhetoric, it b ecam e co m m onplace in m ed ia rep o rtin g a n d com m entary, am o n g politician s a n d m ed ical officials, a n d am o n g m a n y gay activists. "Finally to n ig h t," C h arlay n e H u n te r-G au lt b e g an th e last se g m en t of a MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour in N o v em b er 1986, "w e look a t th e latest d e v e lo p m e n t in th e w a r o n AID S." T h at m e ta p h o r seem ed especially in v itin g in m ed ia trea tm e n t of u n ifo rm e d officials: S u rg eo n G eneral K oop "m ak es w av es in h is w a r o n AID S," a n n o u n ce d Newsweek; retired A dm . Jam es W atkins, ch air of a p resid en tia l com m ission o n AIDS, w a s " d ra w in g th e b attle lines o n AID S," according to a n o th e r m ag azin e.53 Such lan g u a g e reflected the p ressu re o n g o v e rn m e n t to m obilize w ith th e en ­ erg y a n d fiscal a b a n d o n it p resu m ab ly sh o w ed in w artim e. A gain, W orld W ar H, a n d som etim es th e C old W ar, d efin ed th e im ag in atio n . L arry K ram er, echo­ in g scientist D avid B altim ore, p ro p o se d "a M a n h a tta n Project to d eal w ith AID S." Two sociologists, sid e step p in g th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t's lo n g record o n h e a lth problem s, offered th e 1950s crash d e v e lo p m e n t of Polaris n u c le ar su b ­ m arin es as a m o d el.54 R eagan recognized th a t w a r rhetoric san ctio n ed fed eral action o n AID S— b y refu sin g to use it. To h im , "p rim a ry responsib ility for a v o id in g AIDS lies w ith th e in d iv id u a l," w h o se d u ty w a s "to a b stain from sex u n til m arriag e " (as if g ay m e n sh o u ld n o w m arry, a lth o u g h legally th ey co u ld not). Since R eagan w a n te d g o v e rn m e n t's role in AIDS to b e m inim al, w a r rh eto ric to m obilize it m ad e n o sense. A d d re ssin g th e U n ited N atio n s in 1988, R eagan m a d e th a t clear. H e saw AIDS as a "g rav e crisis," b u t reg a rd in g d ru g s: "W e w ill n o t to lerate th e d ru g traffickers. W e m ea n to m ake w a r o n them , a n d w e believe th is is o n e w a r the U n ited N a tio n s can en d o rse a n d p a rticip a te in." H is choices a b o u t w h e n to u se a n d n o t u se the w a r m e ta p h o r clearly reflected h is p rio rities.55 R eagan's com m ents, the a rg u m e n ts a b o u t th e "w a r o n AID S," a n d th e larg er p u rs u it of w a r 's m o ral eq u iv alen ts all reflected th e a n tistatist tra d itio n of h o s­ tility to w a rd p o w e rfu l g o v e rn m e n t a n d concerted social action. A s so o ften b e­ fore, w a r as an alo g a n d m eta p h o r serv ed to ju stify g o v ern m en tal efforts. Reluc­ ta n t to d efe n d forceful g o v e rn m e n t in th e in terest of social o r econom ic w elfare— as if th a t w o u ld co d d le the d ru g u ser, b u rd e n th e taxpayer, rew ard th e AIDS carrier, th ro ttle free e n te rp rise — A m ericans w ra p p e d th eir d e m a n d s for action in w a r rhetoric. D oing so, th ey m a d e viable a n o th erw ise politically u n ten a b le claim o n resources a n d placed th eir d e m a n d s in th e o n e arena of na-

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tional action w h ere expense w a s d e em ed incidental, politics su sp e n d e d , u n ity com pelled, a n d hostility to tax atio n a n d central a u th o rity o v e rrid d e n . T heir p o ­ litical c u ltu re rem ain ed rem ark ab ly like the o n e d u rin g th e N e w D eal th a t " h a d y et to find a w a y to organize collective action save in w a r o r its su rro g a te ."56 In d eed , th a t w as especially so in the 1980s, since R eaganism fu rth e r u n d e rc u t a p p eals for federal action g ro u n d e d in social justice a n d econom ic w elfare. If, after all, g o v e rn m e n t w a s the p roblem , n o t th e solution, as R eagan a rg u e d , w h a t could justify m obilizing it into action? O n ly w ar, w h ic h p re su m a b ly su s­ p e n d e d R eagan's rule, ju st as n a tio n al security w as o n e item for w h ich h e re­ fu sed to recognize lim its. R eagan him self p a id h o m ag e to th a t reaso n in g b y h is d ru g w a r rhetoric. A s critic S usan Sontag noted: The tran sfo rm atio n of w ar-m ak in g into a n occasion for m ass ideological m o bilization h as m a d e th e n o tio n of w a r u sefu l as a m e ta p h o r for all so rts of am eliorative cam paigns. . . .A b u se of th e m ilitary m e ta p h o r m a y b e in ­ evitable in a capitalist s o c ie ty . . . th a t increasingly restricts th e scope a n d credibility of ap p ea ls to ethical principle, in w h ich it is th o u g h t foolish n o t to subject on e's actions to the calculus of self-interest a n d profitability. W ar-m aking is one of the few activities th a t p e o p le are n o t su p p o se d to v iew 'realistically'; th a t is, w ith a n eye to ex pense a n d p ractical outcom e. In all-out w ar, e x p en d itu re is all-out, im p ru d e n t— w a r b e in g d e fin e d as a n em ergency in w h ic h n o sacrifice is excessive.57 A fter all, in the p rev io u s half-century, m o st su sta in ed , successful actions b y n a ­ tional g o v e rn m e n t w ere w ar-related. It m a d e sense th e n th a t n e w cam p aig n s ag ain st AIDS, d ru g s, o r o th er perceived th rea ts w ere ju stified in th e lan g u a g e of th e only cru sad es th at h a d p ro v e d en d u rin g . H ence ad v o cates o f th o se cam ­ p aig n s in v o k ed n o t only w a r g en erally b u t specific m o d els of A m erica's m o st sh in in g success in w ar, like the M a n h a tta n Project. A n d if m o d els of success w ere d ra w n from w ar, m o d els of catastro p h e also h a d to b e — h en ce th e H o lo ­ cau st as a m odel for gay m e n 's fate. To be sure, su ch uses of "w a r" p ro v id e d cosm etic cover for p o litical a g en d a s q u ite divorced from w a r a n d n a tio n al security, b u t th eir p ersisten ce w a s n o n e ­ theless telling. For liberals, conservatives, radicals, a n d reactionaries, w a r serv ed to legitim ate the p o w e rfu l g o v e rn m e n t A m erican s feared to a d m it th ey w a n te d a n d the h u g e b ureaucracies th ey claim ed to h ate. Ju st h o w p o w e rfu lly th is d istru st of g o v e rn m e n t o p e ra ted w as su g g e ste d b y K ra m e r's accusation th a t th e N atio n al In stitu tes of H e alth "is d ro w n in g in w aste, frau d , c o rru p tio n a n d m ism anagem ent. T hey are, in fact, p issin g one billion d o llars d o w n th e toi­ let."58 A side from "p issin g ," his rhetoric w a s sim ilar to d ecad es of con serv ativ e d e n u n ciatio n s of n atio n al governm ent. The im p u lse to invoke w a r o p e ra te d w ith special force for g ays a n d lesbians. T heir politics h a d b een localized in the 1970s, a n d th ey lacked close ties to (m uch less tru st in) n atio n al g o v e rn m e n t a n d a lo n g political tra d itio n of th eir

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ow n. T heir w a r m e ta p h o rs th u s serv ed to m obilize b o th g o v e rn m e n t a n d th eir o w n com m unity, a n d likew ise to express d istru st of th e b u reau cratic resu lts at b o th levels. K ram er h u rle d the sam e invective of sp in elessn ess a n d w a ste a t agencies fo rm ed b y h is b reth ren , like the G ay M en 's H e a lth C risis, as h e d id a g ain st th e fed eral g o v ern m en t, w h ile g ro u p s like A CT-UP th riv e d o n a n antib u reau cratic a n d antihierarchical ethos. U se of w a r to su m m o n "collective ac­ tio n " o p e ra te d b o th externally vis-à-vis g o v e rn m e n t a n d in tern ally w ith in the g ay com m unity. H o w m u c h it g alv an ized action w a s h a rd to m easu re, since it w a s n o t th e o n ly im p e tu s to collective effort. It also h a d n o g u a ra n te e d effect. R eagan, v eto ­ in g a 1983 bill p ro v id in g a " d ru g czar," sh o w ed h o w th e w a r m e ta p h o r co u ld serve different p u rp o ses: "T he w a r o n crim e a n d d ru g s d o e s n o t n e e d m o re b u ­ reau cracy in W ash in g to n " b u t in stea d "m o re action in th e field."59 Still, fed eral fu n d s for AIDS research, ed u catio n , a n d treatm en t, like m o n ies for th e d ru g w ar, d id rise sh a rp ly in the late 1980s, as d id rep ressiv e actions, especially a t th e state level, w h e re law s w ere p a sse d o r p ro p o se d to m a n d a te tracin g of sexual p a rtn e rs, sh u t gay b ath h o u ses, p e rm it do cto rs to test p a tie n ts w ith o u t th e ir p e r­ m ission, a n d pro secu te u n d e r crim inal charg es th o se w h o tra n sm itte d th e d is­ ease. A lively debate, like th a t d u rin g w ar, e n su e d a b o u t w h e th e r to restrict in ­ d iv id u a l civil liberties in o rd e r to sto p th e sp re a d of AIDS. D espite th e ir w a r rhetoric, m o st gay activists a n d m edical ex p erts rejected su c h restrictio n s as d o o m e d to m ake H IV -infected p e o p le h id e th eir d isease a n d th ereb y im p e d e efforts to sta u n c h its sp read . A t th e fed eral level, th e tre n d w a s less coercive. S u rg eo n G eneral K oop d e n o u n c e d p u n itiv e m easures. C o n g ress a n d th e co u rts g ra d u a lly a p p lie d to p eo p le w ith AIDS th e law s a n d ru les p ro tec tin g h a n d ­ ic a p p e d p e rso n s in h o u sin g , e m p lo y m en t, a n d h e a lth insurance. N o n eth eless, coercive m easures, like m a n d a to ry testin g of m ilitary recruits, d id em erge, as p red ictab ly d id the im p u lse to fin d enem ies in w ar. G ay activists o ften fo u n d th em in th e h ig h e r reaches of go v ern m en t; h o m o p h o b es like S en ato r H elm s re­ g a rd e d g ay m e n as the enem y. T h o u g h d e sig n ed in p a rt to c o u n te r d istru st of g o v ern m en t, w a r m e ta p h o rs also sh o w ed this d istru st to b e d eep e n in g in th e 1980s. T he u ses m a d e of th e H o lo cau st su g g e ste d th a t th e w a r m e ta p h o r w a s b eco m in g " a p p ro p ria te d b y th o se w h o v iew them selves as victim s of th e state in stea d of its beneficiaries." N o lo n g er serv in g only those w h o w a n te d to m obilize th e state, it n o w also ac­ q u ire d a "counter-hegem onic function." P ro p ellin g th a t sh ift w ere m u ch o b serv ed tre n d s— a "victim " c u ltu re a n d a loss of faith in n a tio n al g o v ern m en t. B ut m o re m ay h av e b e en involved. For d ecad es A m erican s h a d seen th eir gov­ e rn m e n t accrue in secrecy th e u ltim ate m ean s of d e stru ctio n a n d h a d lea rn ed to fear a n u c le ar w a r in w h ich victim izatio n a w aited th e w h o le w o rld . In th e V iet­ n a m W ar, m a n y cam e to see them selves as suffering from secretive, d ish o n e st lead ersh ip , a th em e first n o u rish e d o n the left b u t su sta in ed b y th e R ight, esp e­ cially b y those w h o saw a conspiracy to cover u p th e p lig h t of PO W s in Viet-

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n am . "It is n o t su rp risin g , therefore, th a t A m erican s w h o feel th a t th ey are n o t b ein g serv ed b y th eir g o v e rn m e n t h av e d e te rm in e d th e state h a s secretly d e ­ clared w a r a g ain st th em ." T he b itte r legacy of a m ilitarized age sh a p e d th e apocalyptic u ses of th e w a r m e ta p h o r n o w ev id e n t.60 R evealing g ro w in g d istru st of g o v ern m en t, th e search for w a r 's m o ral eq u iv ­ alen t also d e e p e n e d th a t d istru st. "W ar o n A ID S," for exam ple, p ro v id e d a frail basis for m obilizing g o v e rn m e n t o r the g ay com m unity. C ru sa d es g ro u n d e d in w a r's m etap h o rs a n d m odels, w h e th e r a g ain st p o v e rty in th e 1960s o r d ru g s in th e 1980s, te n d e d to h av e lim ited life. Like w a rs them selves, th e y b ristled w ith activity a n d th e n flam ed out, leaving b e h in d a su b sta n tia l a n d o ften rep ressiv e b u reau cratic a n d legal resid u e, a n d fru stratio n th a t lofty goals w ere n o t m et. Talk of w ar, after all, p re su m e d th a t victory (or defeat) w o u ld follow , a n d in fairly sh o rt order. By 1990 K ram er w a s givin g a lectu re called "AIDS: T he W ar Is Lost." G iven h is m o d el of AIDS as w a r a n d h o lo cau st its outcom e, h e h a d to m ak e the sto ry e n d like W orld W ar II, w h e n victo ry o r d efeat w ere th e o n ly alternatives; h e could h a rd ly claim victory. A s Sontag n o ted , th e "end-of-thew o rld rhetoric" a b o u t AIDS "offers a stoic, finally n u m b in g co n te m p la tio n of c atastro p h e," ju st as sim ilar rhetoric after th e atom ic b o m b 's a d v e n t h a d n u m b e d the citizens th a t it w a s su p p o se d to arouse. T h at a " w a r o n AID S" m ig h t h ave a different outcom e (the stalem ate of K orea? th e futility of V iet­ nam ?), o r m ig h t ju st b e a b a d m etap h o r, w a s h a rd to conceive.61 The search for w a r's m o ral eq u iv alen t h a d in v ited g o v e rn m e n t to p u rsu e q uick solutions to chronic pro b lem s resisten t to sp e e d y resolution. W h en the inevitable failure, w aste, a n d rep ressio n surfaced, m a n y A m erican s b ew ailed g o v e rn m e n t's ineffectiveness, fin d in g confirm atio n of th e v e ry w eak n esses th a t h a d initially in sp ired th e ir rhetoric. It w a s a cycle of raised h o p es, calls for action, a n d e n su in g d isa p p o in tm e n t th a t acco u n ted for m u c h of th e cynicism a b o u t politics expressed b y A m ericans in th e B ush years. For sure, b y th en w a r m etap h o rs d isp lay e d su c h a ran g e of sources, m ean in g , a n d gravity, how ever, th a t th ey seem ed d ra in e d of real co n ten t, m o re th o u g h tlessly h a b itu al th a n m eaningful. A n account of th e d efeat of R obert B ork's n o m in a tio n to th e S uprem e C o u rt w as titled Battlefor Justice; Bork h im ­ self referred to "th e w a r to control the legal cu ltu re." C hicago m ay o r R ichard D aley pro claim ed a " w a r o n rats," a n d N e w York m ay o r D av id D in k in s p ro ­ claim ed a "w a r o n fe a r"— a n o d d n otion, since w a r u su a lly stokes fear. In th a t vein, the Chicago Tribune claim ed th a t P re sid e n t Bush, after a w av e of b o m b in g s a g ain st civil rights leaders, "v o w s w a r o n h ate," a lth o u g h it n e v e r q u o te d B ush u sin g such w ords. H ealth -related w a r m e ta p h o rs also c o n tin u ed to sp read : col­ u m n ist A nna Q u in d len scoffed a t h o w B ush's h e alth a n d h u m a n services secre­ tary w as "w a g in g his w a r" o n tobacco a n d declared h erself "in favor of a W ar o n Cigs, b u t a real one, w ith teeth." N o w o n d e r th a t G arriso n K eillor im ag in ed th e arrest of A m erica's last five cigarette sm okers b y fed eral ag en ts w h o call in "m em b ers of a crack anti-sm okers jogging u n it." W ar m e ta p h o rs w ere a p p lie d

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to a d izz y in g ran g e of issues a n d occasions: o n its five h u n d re d th anniversary, C o lu m b u s's lan d in g in the A m ericas seem ed co m p arab le to th e d e to n a tio n of th e first atom ic b o m b a n d a ste p p in g sto n e o n "th e ro ad to A u sch w itz," accord­ in g to h isto ria n D avid S tan n ard in American Holocaust. In econom ic affairs, too, ex p erts fo u n d th eir b en ch m ark s in w a r itself or its afterm ath: th ey p ro p o se d a n e w M arshall P lan to reb u ild E ast E u ro p ean n a tio n s freed from Soviet rule, or a rg u e d th a t in stea d "th e U.S. n e ed s a dom estic M arsh all P lan first."62 E ven su s­ ta in e d m e ta p h o rs lost clarity: W ere A m ericans w a g in g w a r o n AIDS, o r AIDS o n them ? W as the en em y th e v iru s, the politicians, th e doctors, th e d ru g co m p a­ nies, o r th e p eo p le w ith th e disease? Still, ev en th o u g h tle ss or in te rn ally co n trad icto ry u ses of th e w a r m e ta p h o r in d icated h o w in g rain ed th e h a b it h a d becom e of seeing all so rts of causes a n d c ru sad e s as w ars. Its use c o u ld b e th o u g h tle ss b ecau se n o th o u g h t seem ed nec­ essary to m ak e it w o rk — because the a ssu m p tio n w a s autom atic th a t "w a r" w a s th e b e st w a y to m obilize A m ericans a n d to c ap tu re th eir p ro b lem s a n d con­ flicts. A t the least, su c h lan g u ag e expressed a n in ten sity (or a lo n g in g for it) th a t critics overlooked w h e n th ey reg re tte d the stale character of politics: m an y A m ericans still cared fiercely a b o u t politics a n d g o v ern m en t. A politics strip p e d of m e ta p h o r w o u ld h av e expressed little of th a t intensity. Yet political c u ltu re w a s h a rd ly so u n ifo rm th a t altern ativ es to w a r rhetoric w ere u n im a g in ab le — the q u ilt stitch ed to m em orialize victim s of AIDS ev o k ed im ­ ag es of fam ily a n d folk c u ltu re q u ite differen t from th o se e m b e d d e d in talk of w ar. Facing th eir problem s, A m ericans d id h av e recourse to m o re th a n th e w a r m etap h o r. T h at it stuck revealed h o w political c u ltu re rem ain ed m ilitarized ev en as w a r itself seem ed to recede. In d eed , w a r 's rem o ten ess to A m erican s w a s p ro b ab ly o n e reaso n th ey talk ed glibly of fin d in g a su b stitu te for it. T hey h a d little k n o w l­ e d g e of the real th in g an d , as Soviet-A m erican conflict d im in ish e d , less reaso n to fear it. The slip p ag e of " w a r" in d isc o u rse — signifying in tern atio n al conflict less a n d less, dom estic stru g g le m ore a n d m o re — w as also m irro re d in th e re­ lu ctance of A m erican lead ersh ip a n d m ed ia to d esig n ate m ilitary action ab ro ad as w ar. In terv en tio n in L ebanon, in v asio n of G ren ad a, n av al action in th e Per­ sian G ulf, in v asio n of P anam a, a n d th e G u lf W ar itself u su a lly received o th er lab els— D esert Shield / Storm for th e b ig g est of those actions. A lm o st a n y th in g w a s called a "w ar," it seem ed, except w a r itself. Yet e v en as the w a r m e ta p h o r reflected w a r's rem oteness, it h a d th e p o ten tial to m ak e w a r real a n d viable again. T he search for w a r's m o ral eq u iv alen t p riv i­ leg ed the aren a of w a r itself. It p o sited so m eth in g g o o d in w a r to b e extracted from it a n d a p p lied to o th er endeavors. It p re su m e d th a t A m ericans fo u n d p u r­ p o se only in w ar, th a t th eir state fu n ctio n ed effectively on ly in a w arlik e m ode, a n d th a t the n a tio n k n ew triu m p h o n ly in w arfare, w ith W orld W ar II still th eir m o d el in th a t regard. But if th ere w a s so m eth in g g o o d a b o u t w ar, w h y sh o u ld A m ericans settle for a su b stitu te — w h y n o t th e real th in g , w h ich w o u ld m obil-

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ize a n d rejuvenate A m ericans e v en m ore? T h at w a s th e im p licit logic of th e w a r m etap h o r, one th a t w o rk e d p o w e rfu lly becau se it w a s u n sp o k e n . Soon, A m eri­ cans w o u ld h av e a real w ar.

War's Last Hurraht P resid en t B ush d id n o t articu late th e w a r m e ta p h o r's logic, b u t in stea d the m ore fam iliar ru les of dom estic a n d in te rn atio n al politics. Facing th e 1990 M id ­ east crisis, h e th o u g h t th a t a m ilitary so lu tio n to it w o u ld red ress a g riev o u s w ro n g , reaffirm A m erica's global hegem ony, rein state w a r 's u tility for th e U n ited States, a n d rescue h is political fortunes. A s a p a tric ia n p a trio t, h e p ro b a ­ b ly th o u g h t less a b o u t h is o w n fo rtu n es, b u t "a sh o rt, successful w a r w o u ld b e p u re political g old," his aid e John S u n u n u rep o rte d ly b elieved; it "w o u ld g u a r­ an tee h is reelection."63 In th e en d , h o w ev er, th e G ulf W ar se rv ed B u sh 's for­ tu n es b a d ly a n d h is o th er goals a t b e st partially. H a rd ly h is d o in g alone, th a t w a r arose o u t of th e M id e ast's com plex politics a n d th e m a n y A m erican interests th ere th a t W ash in g to n 's lead ers p erceiv ed . Iraq i ru le r S a d d a m H u sse in w a s a ty ran t, ru th less in su p p re ssin g m in o rities like th e rebellious K urds. Still, u n d e r R eagan a n d Bush, th e U n ited States (and others, in clu d in g B ritain a n d W est G erm any) h a d allo w ed econom ic a n d m ili­ tary resources to be g iv en o r sold to H u sse in in o rd e r to reap th e econom ic re­ w a rd s in v o lv ed a n d to h av e Iraq offset Syria a n d Iran. T he B ush a d m in istra tio n also se n t H u sse in am b ig u o u s signals a b o u t h is d esig n s o n th e oil-rich k in g d o m of K uw ait, n o t foreseeing the form those d esig n s w o u ld tak e a n d n o t w a n tin g to a n tag o n ize a skittish ally. Iraq 's in v asio n of K u w ait o n A u g u s t 2,1990, cam e as a shock b u t also in d icated th a t m isju d g m e n ts w ere w id e sp rea d : K u w ait h a d n o t g ra sp e d the d an g er; H u sse in d id n o t foresee th e reaction h is c o n q u est w o u ld elicit. Such m isjudgm ents, the fam iliar p re lu d e to w ar, led to a crisis in v o lv in g fa­ m iliar elem ents of p o w e r a n d interest. Iraq 's th rea t to th e flow of M id east oil w as real th o u g h exaggerated: to capitalize o n h is b o o ty H u sse in w o u ld h av e to sell K u w ait's oil, a n d only if h e a d v an c ed in to S audi A rab ia (a rem o te p o ssi­ bility) w o u ld h e really control the reg io n 's oil. K u w ait's rich a n d w ell-placed refugee ru lers a n d th eir oil-state allies lean ed h a rd o n W ash in g to n to act. So d id Israel's gov ern m en t, long fearful of H ussein. K u w ait's reg im e h a rd ly d e serv e d rescue as a m ean s to d efe n d dem ocracy, A m erican s' favorite reaso n to act, b u t Iraq h a d com m itted aggression across in te rn atio n al b o rd ers, p lu s real a n d al­ leged atrocities in K uw ait th a t stirred B ush's in d ig n atio n . These fam iliar interests a n d a rg u m e n ts em erg ed , h o w ev er, in a n e w en v iro n ­ m ent. Islam ic fu n d am en talism , th o u g h n e v e r a u n ita ry force, m a d e o th e r A rab lead ers n e rv o u s a b o u t confronting H u ssein , w h o su d d e n ly laid claim to Islam ic v irtu e, a n d n e rv o u s a b o u t n o t confronting him . T he C o ld W a r's e n d n e u ­ tralized the Soviet U nion, long a p lay e r in th e M ideast, freeing both H u sse in

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a n d B ush to act in w a y s th a t w o u ld h av e b e en u n lik ely a few y ears earlier. The Israeli-P alestinian conflict seem ed to d e m a n d resolution, w h ich A m erican offi­ cials a rg u e d w o u ld be a d v an c ed b y h u m b lin g H u ssein . O f all those factors, th e im plications of the C old W a r's e n d m o st influ en ced W ash in g to n 's leaders. T hey feared th e loss of A m erican h eg em o n y n o w th a t econom ic p o w e r seem ed m ore decisive th a n m ilitary m ig h t a n d th a t Soviet re­ tre a t u n d e rc u t A m erica's a p p a re n t n e e d to lead its allies a n d to su sta in its m ili­ ta ry superiority. A s JCS ch airm a n G en. C olin Pow ell rep o rte d ly a rg u e d in 1989, "W e h av e to p u t a shingle o u tsid e o u r d o o r say in g 'S u p e rp o w e r Lives H ere,' n o m a tte r w h a t the Soviets do, ev en if th ey evacu ate from E astern E u ro p e." A s D em ocratic se n ato r D avid B oren w o rrie d in A p ril 1990, "I d o n 't th in k th a t w e fu lly u n d e rs ta n d [that] th e decline of th e Soviet U n io n m ig h t lead to o u r decline as w ell," because o th er n a tio n s n o lo n g er d e p e n d e d o n th e U n ited States to p ro ­ tect th em . T h at d a n g e r seem ed especially g rav e for B ush since h e lacked a p la n to rev ive A m erican econom ic pow er. "I w o u ld n o t call [the U n ited States] th e w o rld 's policem an," h e said after th e G ulf crisis b eg an , a n d it w o u ld n o t b e able "to act o r w a n t to act" everyw here. "B ut w e h av e a d isp ro p o rtio n a te resp o n ­ sibility for the freedom a n d the security of v a rio u s co u n tries." In fact. B ush w a n te d h is n a tio n to rem ain "th e w o rld 's policem an ," a lth o u g h h e w a s w a ry of th e term . T hus w h ile A m erican in terests trig g ered ala rm a b o u t H u ssein , a d e e p e r concern w a s to reassert A m erica's role as m ilitary su p e rp o w e r— p e rh a p s w h y B ush o ffh an d ed ly to ld rep o rters, in a rem a rk n o o n e p u rsu e d , th a t h e w a n te d th e m ilitary d ra ft ren e w e d .64 B ush's concern for A m erica's sta tu s ab ro ad w a s stre n g th e n e d b y h is w o b b ly p o litical fortunes a t hom e, w h e re p o llsters still d etected p essim ism a b o u t th e fu tu re, a n d b y his in tu itiv e sense th a t h is d e stin y lay ab ro a d as A m e ric a's— in d e e d all good n a tio n s'— co m m an d e r in chief. H e qu ick ly d e cid ed to con fro n t H u sse in w ith m ilitary force. "T his [the in v asio n of K uw ait] w ill n o t sta n d ," h e a n n o u n ce d o n A u g u st 5, reaching th a t conclusion after little co n su ltatio n (ap­ p a re n tly Pow ell lea rn ed of it b y w a tch in g C N N new s). D ep lo y m en t of A m eri­ can forces to the M id east w e n t fo rw ard , th o u g h its objectives rem a in e d unclear: p e rh a p s, in concert w ith econom ic sanctions a g ain st Iraq, it alone w o u ld force H u sse in to retreat; p e rh a p s w a r to d islo d g e h im w o u ld b e necessary. A rg u ­ m en ts over w h ich scenario sh o u ld em erge d o m in a te d d eb ate in th e fall, b u t so too d id fear th a t w a r w a s inevitable. B ush's "ad v isers say th a t h e h a s n 't m a d e a d ecision to go to w a r," one jo u rn alist rep o rte d , "b u t, of course, th a t is w h a t th ey w o u ld say." In sid ers leaked w o rd th a t "som e officials saw sanctions a n d d ip lo ­ m acy as the necessary p rec u rso rs of w a r," w ith each on ly " 'a box to check.' "65 B ush h a d a n n o u n ce d o n A u g u st 20 th a t "peace is m ore th a n ju st th e absence of w a r." H e d id n o t spell o u t the " m o re " — th e "v isio n th in g " still e lu d e d h im — b u t a p p a re n tly peace itself m ig h t req u ire w ar. H is b o ast after th e w a r— "By G od, w e 'v e kicked the V ietnam sy n d ro m e once a n d for a ll"— cam e closer to the m ark . H e m ea n t th a t A m ericans w ere n o long er afraid of g o in g to w a r a n d m ili-

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tary p ro w ess m ig h t ag ain b e th e c o u n try 's d e fin in g feature. H e also h in te d a t a n o th e r v alu e in w a r in his m a n y hom ilies a n d an ecd o tes (echoed in m ed ia cov­ erage) a b o u t th e n a tio n 's troops: w a r revealed th e v irtu e a n d a d v an c ed th e u n ity of A m ericans. To b e sure, u n ity w a s u su a lly tre a te d b y po litician s a n d th e m ed ia as a m ean s ra th e r th a n a n e n d — n e e d e d so th a t A m erican s n o t ag ain b e d iv id e d in w ar. "It's tim e for A m erica to sta n d to g eth er," d eclared Sen. Sam N u n n in January, th o u g h h e o p p o se d C o n gress's g ra n t of a u th o rity to B ush to go to w ar. But m ean s a n d e n d s are h a rd to d istin g u ish in w ar: so o n B ush cele­ b ra te d u n ity as v icto ry 's p ro d u ct, n o t ju st its in stru m e n t.66 M ore strik in g th a n h is decision to sq u are off a g ain st H u sse in w a s h is u se of W orld W ar II analogies to justify it. W ith P rim e M in ister T hatch er u rg in g h im to b e C hurchillian, B ush insisted th a t H u sse in 's regim e, character, a n d th re a t w ere sim ilar to those of H itler before a n d d u rin g W orld W ar H. H e o ften d e ­ scribed Iraq 's forces as e n g ag e d in "blitzkrieg " w a rfare a n d rep e ate d ly cited th e lessons of the 1930s: "A p p e asem en t d o es n o t w o rk ," h e to ld th e n atio n ; "A s w a s th e case in th e 1930s, w e see in S a d d a m H u sse in a n ag g ressiv e d ictato r th rea te n in g h is n eig h b o rs," h e claim ed; "W e're n o t a b o u t to m ak e th a t sam e m istak e tw ice," h e a d d e d o n A u g u st 15. Im plicitly citing H itler, h e saw th e w o rld facing "an o th e r th re a t m ad e b y . . .a m a n of evil sta n d in g a g ain st h u m a n life itself." By N o v em b er h e w a s explicit: Iraq i forces d id th in g s " th a t ev en A d ­ olf H itler d id n 't d o ," h e said, a d d in g d a y s later th a t "w e d o n o t n e e d a n o th e r H itler in this tim e of o u r century." H u sse in 's fu lm in atio n s a b o u t Jew s a d d e d p lau sib ility to co m p ariso n s of h im to H itler, ones also m a d e b y colum nists. "If w e d o n 't check this aggression," B ush said in D ecem ber, "a chance for lastin g peace a n d for stability a n d security in the G u lf a n d a n e w w o rld o rd e r w ill h av e b e e n . . . forgone. It's th a t big. It's th a t im p o rtan t. N o th in g like th is since W orld W ar n . N o th in g of this m o ral im p o rtan ce since W orld W ar H."67 O v erestim ates of H u sse in 's m ilitary m ig h t— especially h is p ro sp ects for d e ­ v elo p in g n u clear w e a p o n s— flow ed logically from B ush's W orld W ar II a n al­ ogy, a lth o u g h B ush's a n tiw a r o p p o n e n ts also ex ag g erated H u sse in 's m ilitary p ro w ess (and A m erica's w eakness). The an alo g y seem ed to foreclose a p eace­ ful e n d to the crisis— w a r h a d b e e n n ecessary to sto p H itler. It also o b scu red th e role of o th er n a tio n s in m ak in g H u sse in a m enace. H is efforts to acq u ire n u clear w eap o n s, like those of o th er n atio n s, w o u ld h av e b e en im p o ssib le if n u clear p o w e rs h a d n o t p ro d u c e d su ch w e ap o n s in obscene v o lu m e a n d so ld o r giv en aw ay m u ch of the technology involved. B ush's historical analogy w a s stra in e d a t best. It m a d e h im seem o d d ly n a iv e — if H u ssein w as like H itler, w h y h a d B ush failed to recognize earlier h is m o n stro u s evil? It clashed w ith indications th a t B ush m ig h t n o t seek to d e stro y H u sse in 's regim e lest Syria or Iran ru sh into th e v a c u u m — a co m p ro m ise peace w ith H itler w as unim aginable. It d id violence to th e M id east's com plex politics. A n d it g ra n te d H u ssein a h istorical sta tu re th a t h e d id n o t w a rra n t. M ussolini, a n o th e r serious b u t second-rate m enace w ith a b lu stery style, w as a m o re cred ­ ible analogy.

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P a rt of th e p ro b lem w a s th a t H u sse in 's in v asio n w a s aty p ical of th e post-1945 w o rld , in w h ic h ag g ressio n across in te rn atio n al b o u n d a rie s (alth o u g h n o t civil w ar) h a d b e e n rare, leaving W orld W ar II a p lau sib le to u ch sto n e. E ven N o rth K orea's in v asio n of th e S outh in 1950, w h ich B ush also m en tio n ed , o ccu rred in a d iv id e d nation. C loser in n a tu re , politics, a n d g e o g ra p h y to H u sse in 's action w ere th e v a rio u s w a rs in v o lv in g Israel o r th e Iran -Iraq w ar, b u t th o se lacked th e m o ral o r m ilitary g rav ity B ush w a n te d to see, a n d analogies to th em w ere p o lit­ ically im possible since m a n y of th e n a tio n s in v o lv ed n o w w illin g ly o r reluc­ ta n tly jo in ed B ush's coalition. P ast w a rs b y C h in a a g ain st T ibet a n d th e Soviet U n io n a g ain st A fg h an istan w ere also o u t of b o u n d s, since B ush so u g h t to en list Beijing a n d M oscow in h is cause a n d G orbach ev 's g o v e rn m e n t w a s too fragile to p la y gam es w ith h is c o u n try 's history. For a m a n w h o w a n te d h isto ry 's sanc­ tio n a n d felt h is d e stin y g u id e d b y it, it offered few o p tio n s o th er th a n H itler a n d W orld W ar H. S train ed as it w as. B ush's H itle r an alo g y w a s u n p e rsu a siv e to m a n y A m eri­ cans. H is n o tio n th a t "S a d d am H u sse in is w o rse th a n H itler," rep o rte d Eliz­ a b e th D rew , "gave a n u m b e r of his o w n ad v iso rs a h eadache. T h at Bush, a v et­ e ra n of th e Second W orld W ar, d o e s n 't g e t it a b o u t H itler a n d th e feelings h e still causes is p u z z lin g ."68 Still, th e an alo g y g u id e d Bush, rev ealed h is w o rld ­ view , a n d a d h e re d to the h isto ry of A m erican m ilitarizatio n , so tied to W orld W ar II. W ith th e C old W ar's a d d e d layers p eeled aw ay, a re tu rn to th e fo u n d in g m o m e n t m ad e sense. T rying to recreate the g ra n d alliance of W orld W ar E, B ush d isp lay e d h is g rea test skill in assem bling a coalition to challenge H u ssein . N o t o n ly d id N A TO allies join u p , b u t a t g rea ter political risk E gypt, S audi A rabia, a n d o th ers, m a n y se n d in g m ajor co n tin g en ts to th e allied force. (Israel, w h o se m ili­ ta ry in v o lv em en t w o u ld h av e in flam ed its n eig h b o rs, h a d to b e k e p t o n a sh o rt leash.) E ven th e Soviet U n io n a n d C hina said th e rig h t th in g s, o r av o id ed say­ in g th e w ro n g ones. K nitting th em to g eth er w a s B ush him self, tireless o n th e telep h o n e a n d in Air Force One, a n d Secretary of State Jam es Baker, d o in g w h a t h e k n e w best, calm ing te m p e rs a n d b ro k erin g deals. T he U n ited N atio n s a d d e d legal a n d political sta tu re to th e coalition, a lth o u g h it co u ld n o t elim in ate re­ se n tm e n t a b o u t A m erica p lay in g cop o n th e w o rld beat. B ut this w a s n o t a re p e a t of th e g ra n d coalition of W orld W ar II, w h e n th e U n ited States h a d footed m u c h of th e bill. B ush k n ew th a t few A m ericans, a m id th eir n a tio n 's b u d g e t crisis, w elcom ed sp e n d in g billions o n w ar. Rich allies (G erm any, Japan, exiled K uw aitis) w ere ta p p e d for th e costs, w h ich in th e en d th ey m o stly covered, b u t the u n d e rto n e of these d eals w a s sour. A llies w ere trea te d as if cash w ere the p rice th ey p a id for b ein g m ilitarily tim id o r in co m p e­ tent, w h ile A m erica's a rm e d forces seem ed like m ercenaries w h o m ig h t ev en accrue a p ro fit for A m erica's e m p ty treasury. B ush's success in m o n ey raisin g u n d e rlin e d A m erica's econom ic w eakness. Its g u n w a s to its sh o u ld er, b u t its h a t w a s in h a n d . B ush p ressed on, d e sp ite problem s. P ersu asiv e w ith allied leaders, a t h o m e

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he erratically articu lated h is policy for sto p p in g H u ssein . "T he p ro b lem is n 't th a t h e h a s n 't sta te d som e reasons," D rew co m m en ted ; "th e p ro b lem is th a t h e ju m p s a b o u t am o n g the re a so n s"— oil, agg ressio n . H itler, a n d , from Baker, "jobs." " H e 's d e alt in slogans; h e 's c am p aig n ed ra th e r th a n ex p lain ed ." H is im ­ age of b ein g "ste ad y " in in te rn atio n al m atters seem ed b elied , a n d in h is cam ­ p a ig n m o d e for th e 1990 elections, h e w a s ag ain "sh rill a n d silly," w h ile m an y G O P can d id ates k e p t th eir d istan ce from him . C ru d e o u tb u rsts— H u sse in is "g o in g to g e t his ass k ick e d "— d im in ish e d h is dig n ity , feed in g sp e cu la tio n th a t h e p e rso n alize d grave issues a n d still w o rrie d a b o u t h is " w im p " im age. T he criticism w a s p re m a tu re — B ush g o t th e action a g ain st H u sse in h e w a n te d a n d h e w a s "a d o g g e d , resilient fig u re "— b u t it d id sp e a k to a b rittle sid e of B ush th at, d oggedly, k e p t reem erging.69 H e also p ressed o n d e sp ite the reluctance of seem in g ly n a tu ra l allies. T h o u g h m o st conservatives rallied a ro u n d Bush, th ey d iv id e d sharply. T hey sp lit o v er Israel— it w a s "g o a d in g u s to attack," fu m ed P at B uchanan. T he C old W a r's e n d rev ealed a b ig g er division, as p e o p le like B u ch an an lo st th eir taste for global in terv en tio n ism a n d d ecried it in som e of th e term s th e a n tiw a r Left a g en eratio n earlier h a d used. T hey also seem ed to rev e rt to a p re -C o ld W ar "iso­ latio n ism ," th o u g h as alw ays the term w a s sim plistic. M an y w ere m o re u n i­ lateralist th a n isolationist, w a ry of the e n ta n g lin g alliances B ush assem bled. B uchanan h e a rd "th e W ilsonian gob b led y g o o k w e fo llo w ed in to th e tren ch es of W orld W ar I— w h e n , all th e tim e, th e h id d e n a g en d a w a s to p u ll B ritain's ch estn u ts o u t of the fire." Too, m a n y conserv ativ es d o u b te d B ush's fid elity to th eir c u ltu ral a g en d a, w h o se w a rs th ey w ere m o re eag er to w a g e.70 O th e r conservatives assailed n o t only th e w a r 's necessity b u t its politics. C ol­ u m n ist S tep h en C h a p m a n c o n d em n ed th e co n flatio n of "p a trio tism " w ith "m ilitarism ," the coercive belief " th a t th e o n ly w a y to s u p p o rt o u r tro o p s is to en d o rse the policies th a t p u t th em there," a n d th e insistence th a t d isse n t sto p once w a r starts: "A w a r th a t w a s stu p id the d a y b efore it sta rte d h a s n o t becom e su d d e n ly w ise th ro u g h the d ro p p in g of b o m b s a n d th e sh e d d in g of blood. A ny o n e in search of the m iracle of tra n su b sta n tia tio n sh o u ld look in th e C ath o ­ lic m ass, n o t the P entagon. . . . F ighting the V ietn am W ar w o u ld h av e b e en eas­ ier, too, w ith o u t critics. W ith o u t the critics, w e m ig h t still b e fig h tin g it."71 Sim i­ lar se n tim en ts w ere expressed b y liberals a n d leftists, b u t th eir em erg en ce a t the o th er e n d of the political sp e ctru m sh o w e d h o w political alig n m en ts of th e C old W ar era w ere shifting. In liberal a n d leftist circles, o p p o sitio n w a s q u ick to em erg e a n d su b sta n tia l b u t also politically isolated (few could see lin k in g a rm s w ith th e likes of P at B uchanan), offset b y the fear som e felt for Israel's fate, a n d lim ited b y th e ru sh of events. Its th ru st w a s also som etim es w obbly. In th eir peace m arches, stu ­ d e n ts a n d o ld er citizens (the latter b u lk e d larg er th a n in V ietn am p ro tests) d e ­ n o u n c ed w a r o n Iraq a n d u rg e d in stea d " w a r" o n AIDS, h o m elessn ess, a n d poverty, u n w ittin g ly reaffirm ing w a r's utility. AIDS seem ed "th e fo rg o tten

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w a r" to the Village Voice in February; "h o w can th e silent, g ray w a r in th e clinic co m p ete w ith TV cam eras b u ilt into the h e a d s of m issiles?"72 T hat, h o w ev er, w a s n o t th e line u su a lly tak e n b y m a in strea m po litician s w h o s u p p o rte d sanctions b u t criticized th e ru sh to w ar. For som e, th e Iraq -K u w ait conflict lacked m o ral clarity — "A n a sty little c o u n try in v a d e d a littler b u t ju st as n a sty co u n try ," said Sen. D aniel Patrick M o y n ih a n — a n d th e benefits of a n A m erican v icto ry seem ed m urky. M o y n ih an also d etected a su b tle reg ressio n to C o ld W ar th in k in g , as if " o u r in stitu tio n s" w ere saying, " 'O h , m y G od, w e m issed W orld W ar IE. M aybe w e can h av e it n o w h e re / . . . Dr. Strangelove, w h e re are y o u n o w th a t w e n e e d y o u ?" In co n trast, c o lu m n ist B arbara E h ren reich foresaw n o t the C old W ar re d u x b u t a P an am a in v asio n w rit larg e— w h ich "co u ld b e in th e lo n g te rm ju st a b o u t as b a d ," sh e a d d e d , n o tin g h o w th e P an am a o p e ra tio n h a d failed to d e n t th e d ru g tra d e o r d em o cratize th e liber­ a te d la n d .73 E ven those su p p o rtin g m ilitary action often c o n d em n ed B ush's m eth o d s a n d sense of p ro p o rtio n . For strateg ist E d w a rd L u ttw ak , H u sse in w a s a "v illage ru f­ fian" a n d "M afia b o ss" typical of his reg io n 's ru lers, n o t d e serv in g "th e w ild h y p e rb o le " of B ush's "H itle r co m p ariso n ." Bush, eag er to forget m o u n tin g fis­ cal a n d b a n k in g w oes, o p e ra te d "v e ry m u c h in th e m a n n e r of th e aristo crat still d isd a in fu l of the tra d e sm e n p le a d in g bills a t h is d o o r as h e sells y e t m o re of the fam ily's b ro a d acres." H u sse in 's c o n q u est of K uw ait, L u ttw ak a rg u e d , p o se d a m o d est p ro b lem th a t B ush sh o u ld h av e liq u id a te d b y a n u ltim a tu m to w ith ­ d raw , follow ed b y b o m b in g Iraq, ra th e r th a n b y assem b lin g " a n a rm y of recon­ q u e st."74 L u ttw ak a d d e d his voice to th e d o u b t m o st co n sisten tly ex p ressed a b o u t B ush's course— n o t th a t h is effort to corral H u sse in w a s w ro n g b u t th a t h is ob­ session w ith it, h is m o ralizin g a b o u t it, a n d h is d e te rm in a tio n to settle it b y a b ig w a r w ere grossly o u t of p ro p o rtio n to th e issu es in v o lv ed a n d d a n g e ro u sly n e ­ glectful of econom ic p ro b lem s the n a tio n faced. "W ar a g ain st Iraq w ill be th e m o st u n n ecessary w a r in A m erican history," o p in e d A rth u r Schlesinger, Jr.75 O th ers saw a different sig n of B ush's d isp ro p o rtio n a te , o r h ypocritical, policy: h e claim ed to o p e ra te u n d e r U n ited N atio n s m a n d a te b u t ig n o red th e m an ­ d ates th a t a p p lie d to Israel's o ccu p atio n of territo ry it h a d seized in w ar. A m o n g m ilitary officials, d o u b ts a b o u t B ush's co u rse w ere m o re m u te d , ex­ p ressed in the m e a su re d w ay s expected of them . Still, b y o n e account, th e P en­ tag o n w as "th e m o st cautious p la y e r in the G u lf policy m ix" a n d B ush "th e m o st h ard -lin e." In O ctober, JCS C h a irm a n Pow ell re p o rte d ly w a n te d a "con­ tain m en t o r stra n g u la tio n policy," b u t B ush resp o n d ed , "I d o n 't th in k th ere 's tim e politically for th a t strategy." W ar w o u ld resolve th e m atter; "stra n g u la ­ tion" of Iraq m ig h t take years, a lth o u g h as it tu rn e d out, "stra n g u la tio n " re­ su m e d once w a r e n d ed . N early ev ery recent d efen se secretary a n d a p a ra d e of retired officers— in clu d in g fo rm er JCS chairs A dm . W illiam C ro w e a n d G en. D avid Jones— voiced reluctance to go to w ar. A n d G en. N o rm a n S chw arzkopf,

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w h o w o u ld lead the troops, publicly castig ated th e ru sh to w ar: g iv en "evi­ dence th a t the sanctions are p in c h in g ,. . . w h y sh o u ld w e say, 'O kay, gave 'e m tw o m on th s, d id n 't w ork. L et's g e t o n w ith it a n d kill a w h o le b u n c h of p eo p le?' T h at's crazy."76 To b e sure, officers' reluctance w a s in p a rt a tactic to lev erag e a large a rm e d force a n d a stro n g political m a n d a te so th a t th ey co u ld av o id V ietn am 's tra p a n d g ain a su re victory. R esistance to w a r m ak in g o ften arises from specific con­ sid eratio n s as w ell as flat-out principles, h o w ev er, a n d w ith th e m ilitary it also w e n t b e y o n d the m om ent. Pow ell rep u te d ly a d m ire d E isen h o w er's cau tio n as P resid en t a b o u t m ak in g w ar. In p o in te d w o rd s for a n officer w h o h a d serv ed R eagan a n d Bush, C row e p u b licly d o u b te d th a t th e q u e stio n to ask w a s "w h e th e r S ad d am H u sse in is b ru tal, deceitful, o r as B arbara B ush w o u ld p u t it, a d re a d fu l m an ," a n d th o u g h t "it w o u ld b e a sa d co m m en ta ry if S a d d a m H u s­ sein, a tw o-bit ty r a n t,. . . p ro v e d to b e m ore p a tie n t th a n th e U n ited States, th e w o rld 's m o st affluent a n d p o w e rfu l n a tio n ." 77 T here w as also a g en eratio n al difference. W orld W ar IT sh a p e d B ush's v iew of w ar. For m o st m ilitary officials, V ietnam loom ed larger. It also loom ed large in D ecem ber a n d Jan u ary as d e b ate in ten sified a b o u t a w a r th a t n o w seem ed inevitable. P articularly in C ongress, d e b ate w as b o th in ­ sig h tful a n d irrelevant. It cam e too late, after w a r 's en g in es alre ad y h a d b e en fueled, to affect the outcom e, especially since B ush m a d e it clear th a t h e so u g h t C ongress's sanction for political rea so n s— to av o id a rep e titio n of V ietn am 's d iv isio n s— ra th e r th a n co n stitu tio n al ones, feeling free to w av e a sid e th e m u ch -d isp u ted W ar P ow ers A ct a n d to m ak e w a r w ith o u t C ongress. For th eir p a rt, m an y C o n g ressm en w ere relu c ta n t to b e co u n ted , ch id in g B ush for n o t "co n su ltin g " th em b u t eag er to h av e h im b e a r th e d ecisio n -m ak in g b u rd e n . M oreover, th eir d e b ate often focused o n w h e th e r th e circum stances for w a g in g w a r a g ain st Iraq resem bled those in V ietnam — "T his w ill n o t b e a n o th e r V iet­ n am ," B ush h a d p ro m ised o n N o v em b er 3078— b u t th o se circum stances w ere so d ifferent th a t this focus m a d e it h a rd to a d d re ss w h a t n o w w a s a t stake. A n d as in the V ietnam era, d eb ate focused o n w h e th e r th is w a r c o u ld be, ra th e r th a n n e e d e d to be, w on. E ven the strik in g rhetorical a n d su b sta n tiv e flair of C o n ­ gress's d eb ate seem ed to lubricate the p a th to w ar, as if b y b ein g h ig h -to n e d a n d tro u b le d ab o u t it, A m ericans p ro v e d th eir m atu rity , th eir read in ess to tak e o n th is serious b u rd en . The u n su rp risin g outcom e w a s a reso lu tio n (n o t a d e clara tio n of w ar) a u th o r­ izing B ush to use force. It p a sse d b y sm all m arg in s o n Ja n u ary 12, w ith C on­ gress d iv id in g largely o n p a rtisa n lines, b u t w ith D em o crats like Les A sp in a n d Al G ore p ro v id in g key su p p o rt. Still, n o co n g ressio n al d eb ate a b o u t g o in g to w a r of this d e p th a n d d iv isio n h a d tak en place since 1917, in d icatin g th a t the P resid en t n o lo n g er h a d q u ite th e free h a n d h is p red ecesso rs h a d w ie ld e d a n d th a t w a r w a s too serio u s for th e n a tio n to inch its w a y in to it. M ore often th a n not, how ever. B ush seem ed sim p ly to ig n o re th e d o u b ts

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raised , p e rh a p s in p a rt because th e objection m o st p e rsu asiv e to a p o litician — th a t h e risk ed political p e ril— w a s h a rd ly offered. A lm o st ev ery o n e ag reed th a t h e w o u ld p ro fit politically from w ar, a t least from a quick, victo rio u s one (a fo rg o tten voice, G eorge M cG overn's, w a rn e d th a t C h u rch ill's electoral d efeat a t th e e n d of W orld W ar II "co u ld h a p p e n to B ush").79 It w a s a cu rio u s a ssu m p ­ tio n g iv en th e fate of m o d e m w a r P residents, n o t one of w h o m su rv iv e d p o liti­ cally th e w a g in g of m ajor w a r (FDR, of course, d ie d before w a r's su rly afterm a th set in). It w a s tied to an o th e r d a te d a ssu m p tio n — th a t "a P resid en t h as a b e tte r chance of influencing ev en ts ab ro ad th a n a t h o m e," w h ereas (so tw o p o ­ litical scientists a rg u e d after the G ulf W ar) declin in g "A m erican h eg em o n y " n o w m e a n t th a t "o th er n a tio n s h av e the capacity to exchange influence w ith the W hite H o u se ."80 But of course it w a s su ch decline th a t B ush h o p e d to arrest. O n Jan u ary 16,1991, allied w a rp la n e s b e g an attack in g Iraq a n d its p o sitio n s in K uw ait, b eg in n in g w h a t H u sse in called "th e m o th e r of all b attles." "T he lib­ era tio n of K u w ait h a s b e g u n ," a n n o u n ce d th e P re sid e n t's p ress secretary; this w a s n o t ev en to b e called a "w ar," th o u g h if it w as. B ush in sisted it "sta rte d A u g u st 2," since h e to o k n o responsibility for in itiatin g it.81 A llied — p rim a rily A m erican — aerial action d o m in a te d th e w a r's o p e n in g w eeks, a n d its sensational firew orks, as p o rtra y e d for a n d p erceiv ed b y A m eri­ cans a t hom e, d id m u c h to erase the g rave m o o d felt o n w a r 's eve. The spectacle o n television of em ise m issiles racing to w a rd B aghdad, of "sm a rt" b o m b s w ith n ose cam eras h o m in g in o n th eir targets, of Stealth b o m b ers g o in g in to action, im p a rte d a glitzy, hig h -tech d im e n sio n to th e w ar; th e fo rm id ab le d estru ctio n u n le a sh e d b y o ld er B-52s rarely m a d e it to th e screen. The a d v e n t of Iraq i Scud m issile attacks o n Israel a n d S audi A rabia w as w o rriso m e since allied forces h a d tro u b le sto p p in g them , b u t th ey a d d e d to th e v id eo sp ectacu lar a n d p ro ­ v id e d a w elcom e to u ch of p a rity to the aerial co n test— it w o u ld n o t be so one­ sid e d as to re n d e r victo ry m eaningless. The Scud attacks (an d Iraq 's firing a n d d u m p in g of oil in a n d offshore K uw ait) also seem ed to rig h t th e m o ral scales ju st w h e n th ey th rea te n ed to tip over, offsetting criticism th a t allied b o m b in g w a s inflicting h e av y casualties o n Iraqi civilians. So too d id m ed ia a n d official com p laints, recalling W orld W ar II n o tio n s of Japanese trickery, th a t H u sse in p la y e d n a sty g am es— p ilin g b o d ies before th e cam eras, d isg u isin g a strategic factory as "B aby M ilk P lan t," billeting c o m m an d e rs in schools— as if p ro p a ­ g a n d a a n d d ecep tio n w ere o u tsid e w a r's ru les a n d u n k n o w n to A m erican w a r m aking. L ong th e first re so rt for th e U n ited States in w ar, air p o w e r's u se reaw ak en ed fam iliar them es: it w o u ld elim inate th e costly g ro u n d w a r m an y feared, d isp lay an ew A m erica's su p e rio r technology, a n d reveal its m o ral su p e rio rity b y secur­ in g q uick victory w ith m in im al d am age. B ush stirred m a n y of these th em es in a flag-bedecked ap p ea ra n c e before R aytheon w o rk e rs w h o m ad e th e P atrio t m is­ siles th a t in tercep ted S cu d s— p atrio tism , d iv in e blessing, a n d technological p ro w e ss w ere p a rts of the sam e w hole: "T h an k G o d for th e P atrio t m issile.

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T h an k G od for th a t m issile."82 Star W ars w a s v in d icated , h e a d d e d (a ju d g m e n t few ex p erts shared). A ir p o w e r also k e p t w a r a t a satisfying psychic d istan ce for A m ericans, b u t th a t distance w as tro u b lin g if A m ericans felt n o sense of risk a n d in v olvem ent: w a r th a t w as too easy a n d m echanical w o u ld be d ra in e d of th e p e ril a n d p a ssio n th a t m a d e it m eaningful. H ere, too, th e Scud attacks p la y e d a v ita l role. A s th ey rain e d d o w n o n Israel, m o st of th e m traced b y telev isio n cam eras, m a n y A m eri­ cans evinced a sense of v icario u s p a rticip a tio n in w ar, as if th ey w ere o n th e fro n t lines— Tel A viv p lay in g in 1991 the role L o n d o n h a d p la y e d in 1941. S tate­ sid e A m ericans co u ld erase the d istan ce a n d still m a in ta in it: w a r 's e n d u rin g rem o ten ess w a s overcom e in im a g in atio n e v en as it w a s su sta in e d in reality. N o t o n ly w a s television coverage of the w a r extensive, so w a s th e talk a b o u t it, com plete w ith claim s th a t this w a s th e first telev isio n w ar. Since sim ilar claim s h a d b e e n m a d e a b o u t th e V ietnam W ar, th ey rev e ale d — as in th a t w a r— a n e ed to express a closeness to w a r th a t in fact w a s eerily m e d ia te d b y telev isio n a n d m a d e stran g ely e p h em eral b y it. The old d re a m of sw ift, sanitary, satisfyin g v icto ry th ro u g h air p o w e r w a s v in d icated , according to m a n y observers. V engeance w a s w re a k e d o n th e e n em y — y et n o t so brutally, th e y th o u g h t, th a t consciences h a d to b e tro u b led , a n d w ith stu n n in g ly little loss of A m erican lives. A t tim es, it h a rd ly seem ed to be w a r b u t in stead , as the Chicago Tribune describ ed th e o p e n in g aerial assaults, "th e largest m ilitary air sh o w ev er d isp lay e d ." "H ig h technology," claim ed re­ p o rte r R. W. A pple, "sets this w a r a p a rt from V ietnam ," e v en th o u g h su c h tech­ n o lo g y h a d b e en celebrated in th a t w ar. W h en allied g ro u n d forces g ain ed a q u ick victory, the stock of air p o w e r so ared still h igher. It w a s n o w "th e determi­ nant of victory in w a r," one ch eerlead in g h isto ria n so o n a rg u e d .83 But final p ro n o u n ce m en ts o n its v in d ic atio n w ere u n w a rra n te d . A llied air forces o p e ra ted ably b u t in id eal circum stan ces— w ith o v e rw h elm in g su p e ri­ ority, in desirable clim atic a n d strategic cond itio n s, a g ain st a p olitically iso lated seco n d-rate pow er, n o t a g ain st the W arsaw Pact a rm a d a once im ag in ed as the enem y. For all h is b lu ster, H u sse in m ay n e v e r in te n d e d to w a g e a d o -o r-d ie w a r b u t to p u t u p a go o d sh o w a n d p o sitio n him self as A rab m arty r, a lth o u g h , to b e sure, th a t m ay h ave b e e n because allied sanctio n s a n d m ilitary p o w e r k e p t h im from w a g in g e x ten d ed w ar. L avish assessm en ts of b o m b in g 's surgical accuracy d im in ish e d u n d e r later scrutiny, th e su p e rio rity of n e w e r w e a p o n s like th e B-l b o m b er over o ld er ones like the B-52 receded , a n d th e toll for Iraqi civilians— from direct d estru ctio n , a n d e v en m ore becau se th e b o m b in g d e g ra d e d th eir econom ic, m edical, a n d sa n ita ry sy stem s— w a s larg e d e sp ite th e w a r 's brevity. Too, a g ro u n d w a r still h a d to be fo u g h t a n d H u sse in stay ed in p o w e r— because the allies h esita te d to to p p le him , b u t also b ecau se th e b o m b s d id n o t scare h im aw ay o r set m o st of h is p eo p le after him . O ne w a r p ro v e d relatively little fo r— o r for th a t m a tte r a g a in st— air po w er. Still, p u n d its so o n pro claim ed the a d v e n t of "p o stm o d e rn " w a r in w h ich h ig h -

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tech w e a p o n ry "co u ld m in im ize the sh e d d in g of A m erican b lo o d w h ile m axi­ m izin g th e d e stru c tio n o n th e o th er side"; w a r "n o w consists of sh o rt, qu ick actions th a t tak e d a y s to com plete, n o t m o n th s or y e ars."84 Such p red ictio n s reflected the old d re a m th a t A m erican h eg em o n y co u ld p ro ceed effortlessly. Soon, Y ugoslavia's w a r sh o w e d d istressin g ly few " p o stm o d e rn " features. T he G u lf W ar could b e a m o d el for fu tu re A m erican m ilitary action on ly if th e n a ­ tio n av o id e d m o st w ars. M ore a sto n ish in g th a n th e air w a r w a s th e triu m p h of allied g ro u n d forces at th e e n d of F eb ru ary (th o u g h n o one claim ed th a t g ro u n d w a r w a s n o w ascen­ dant). T hey rolled th ro u g h Iraq i defenses in a n d n e a r K u w ait w ith stu n n in g ease, a n d A m erican casualties, n u m b e rin g in th e d o zen s, h a d n o t b e en so lig h t since the S panish-A m erican W ar. In d eed , th e w a r th rea te n ed to becom e a n u n ­ seem ly m assacre of Iraq is— A m erican so ld iers' d e scrip tio n s of a " tu rk e y sh o o t" a n d "sh o o tin g fish in a b a rre l" (p h rases u se d to d escribe A m erican ac­ tio n a g ain st the Japanese late in W orld W ar II) also ex p ressed th eir u n ease.85 T he skill of S ch w arzk o p f a n d h is forces, a n d th e u se of tactical air p o w e r— o v erlo oked a t the tim e, b u t m ore critical to v icto ry th a n b o m b s o n B ag h d ad — d id m u c h to account for success. So d id the state of th e Iraqi arm y, b attle-tested b u t also b a d ly b led after its long w a r w ith Iran; th e a d m in istra tio n 's d e sig n a­ tio n of it as th e w o rld 's fo u rth -larg est h a d b e en m islead in g (size alone h a rd ly d e te rm in e s fighting ability). H igh-level decisions o n b o th sid es also k e p t th e g ro u n d w a r short: H u sse in chose n o t to let his a rm y b leed long, a n d B ush chose n o t to p u rs u e it far. P rid e, relief, a n d ju b ila tio n — sincere, m ed ia-sto k ed , a n d com m ercially e x p lo ited — w a sh e d ov er A m erica after th e " h u n d re d -h o u r w a r" o n th e g ro u n d , as it w a s often called. M u ch of th e m o o d in v o lv ed sh eer rev elin g in w a r a n d victory; "D esert S torm " w a s a lre ad y beco m in g "D esert P arty " before it w a s over, w o rrie d one colum nist. O ccasionally th a t in clu d e d c ru d e sen tim en ts a b o u t the enem y; one political c arto o n featu red "S to rm in ' N o rm a n 's 4 Star Ex­ term in a tio n " truck, w ith G eneral S ch w arzk o p f d e p o sitin g a ra t in to a g arb ag e can. But th e w a r w a s too sh o rt, a n d p e rh a p s th e m em o ry of u g ly se n tim en ts in earlier w a rs too keen, to foster m a n y d e h u m a n iz in g p o rtra y a ls of th e enem y.86 The d o m in a n t m o o d w a s m o re diffuse a n d u p b eat. "B ush w a s C aesar," Sidney B lum enthal later n o ted ; "h is p o p u la rity ra tin g h it n in ety p e r cent, the h ig h est ev er rec o rd ed for a P resid en t." In W ash in g to n h e sa lu ted G eneral Schw arzkopf, "m arch in g before th o u sa n d s of lo ck step p in g tro o p s," w h ile "In­ d e p en d en ce M all w a s a th em e p a rk of m ilitary technology." A corollary to the celebration of m ilitary p ro w ess w a s its ex trap o latio n in to th e future. W ith the g h o st of V ietnam v a n q u ish e d ("It's V ietnam rev isited as it sh o u ld h av e b e en — V ietnam : The M ovie, P a rt II, a n d this tim e it com es o u t rig h t," c o m m en ted one historian), A m ericans w o u ld resu m e th eir rig h tfu l place as th e w o rld 's su ­ p rem e w arriors. C onfusingly, B ush b o th con firm ed a n d ch allen g ed th a t expec­ tation. A m erica's "reestab lish ed credibility " w o u ld d e te r fu tu re w ars, h e

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claim ed, b u t a d d e d th a t it w a s "tim e to tu rn aw ay from th e te m p ta tio n to p ro ­ tect u n n e e d e d w e a p o n s system s a n d obsolete b ases" a n d n o te d th a t "ev e n th e n e w w o rld o rd er can n o t g u a ra n te e a n e ra of p e rp e tu a l p eace."87 A m ericans, h ow ever, rarely h a d glo ried in m ilitary p ro w e ss as a n e n d in it­ self, in sisting in stead th a t it serve h ig h er p u rp o se s. Tw o seem ed o b v io u s to th e w a r's c h am p io n s in M arch 1991. A m ericans h a d " fo u g h t for th e ju st a n d m o ral cause of freeing th e enslaved, b ru taliz e d p eo p le of a h elp less co u n try ," a rg u e d o n e colum nist. "W e cam e h ere," a serv icem an w ro te fro m S au d i A rabia, "to p ro tect the freed o m of th e p e o p le of K u w ait a n d S audi A rabia. F reed o m is for ev ery o n e a ro u n d the w o rld , n o t ju st A m erican s." "W ho says w a rs n e v er solve a n y th in g ?" a sk ed a n o th e r co lu m n ist— n o t th o se w h o n o w foresee "a new , S addam -free Iraq," a "n ew M id d le E ast ord er," a n d "real peace b e tw e e n Israel a n d h e r n eig h b o rs."88 M ore insistently, h ow ever, celebrants cheered w h a t th e w a r rev ealed for a n d a b o u t A m ericans ra th e r th a n its benefits for o th er peo p le. "In 100 h o u rs," claim ed co lu m n ist A n n M cFeatters, "G eorge B ush a n d h is b a n d of able assis­ tan ts," a n d the "y o u n g m en a n d w o m e n " ab ro a d sh e a p p la u d e d , "resto re d A m erica's can-do spirit. . . . It felt g o o d to w in ." "It is as if all th e co n fu sio n a n d p a in of recent decad es h ave m elted ," n o te d th e New York Times, "leav in g th e n a tio n w ith its reassu rin g im ages from W orld W ar II intact." C o n serv ativ es w h o em braced the w a r felt vindicated: it p ro v e d th e w isd o m of R eagan's w e ap o n s p ro g ram s. "T he m o ral ch asm b e tw ee n u s a n d o u r e n em y c o u ld n 't b e a w id e r," a co lu m n ist a d d e d , a n d m o ral re a rm a m e n t h a d succeeded: "W e su re are d o in g so m eth in g v e ry rig h t in th e m o ral e d u ca tio n d e p a rtm e n t. W e are rais­ ing m en a n d w o m e n w h o are n o t too soft to fight w h e n necessary, b u t w h o d o n o t take u n seem ly p lea su re in th e suffering th ey m u s t inflict."89 It spoke v o lu m es a b o u t th e ir m o o d s th a t m a n y A m erican s th o u g h t it took w a r to restore a n d reveal "A m erica's can-do sp irit." It ex p o sed a n ew th e d riv ­ ing elem en t of A m erican w a r m ak in g since th e V ietnam e ra — to a d d re ss A m er­ icans' sense of them selves m ore th a n th eir place in th e w o rld o r th e evils in it th ey so u g h t to com bat. A n d it revealed a g ain h o w th ey saw th eir n a tio n as able to act p u rp o se fu lly a n d effectively o n ly in w ar. To b e sure, p o licy m ak ers also calculated p o w e r a n d interest, b u t th ere w a s n o m ista k in g B ush's sincerity w h e n h e pro claim ed o n M arch 6 th a t "th e b rav e m en a n d w o m e n of D esert S t o r m . . . set o u t to confront a n en em y ab ro ad , a n d in th e process, th ey tra n s­ fo rm ed a n a tio n a t hom e. . . . T hink a b o u t th eir sense of du ty , a b o u t all th ey ta u g h t u s a b o u t o u r values, a b o u t o u rselv es."90 A long w ith critics' m arginalization, the w a r's rem o ten ess facilitated th e ru sh of su c h claim s. Since "w e d o n 't h av e direct experience" of w ar, h isto ria n R obert D allek rem ark ed , "th ere 's an o p en n ess a b o u t th e m ean in g s w e give to it," m a k ­ in g it "a b la n k slate." "W e h av e lost som e sense of th e tru e reality of w a r," a n ­ o th er ex p ert n o ted , so A m ericans can "talk v e ry b lith ely a b o u t w a r."91 O f course, w a r's "tru e reality" is n o t n ecessarily co m b at b u t w h a te v e r p e o p le

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ex p erience— for m o st A m ericans, th e G ulf W ar's reality h a d b e en th e ch arg ed em o tio n s a n d im ages it elicited. T h at w a s so less for th e reaso n s o ften n o te d a t th e tim e — th e a d v an c e of m ed ia technology o r th e vise of official cen so rsh ip — th a n b ecause of th e w a r 's b rev ity a n d ease. N o n e w taxes o r w a r-b o n d d riv es, n o v ex in g inflation o r shortages, n o w eariso m e political d eb ate o r tro u b leso m e n e w s in te rv e n e d to connect statesid e experience to ev en ts ab ro ad . O n ly w o rd s a n d im ag es rem ain ed , w ith w h ic h th e im a g in atio n h a d free play. Since w a r h a d sh o w n A m erica's "can -d o " sp irit, th e process of ta p p in g th a t sp irit for p eacetim e p u rp o se s resu m ed . C hicago m ay o r R ichard D aley ask ed P re sid e n t B ush to p u t G eneral S chw arzkop f in charge of a ren e w e d w a r o n d ru g s: "T he g en eral w o u ld b rin g a n a ttitu d e of 'F orget all th e p oliticians b e­ cause w e 're going to p ro tec t A m ericans first,' " D aley arg u ed . O th ers so o n p ro ­ p o se d u sin g th e d em obilized tro o p s in c am p aig n s a g ain st crim e, d ru g s, illit­ eracy, o r poverty. D em ocratic se n ato r Tom D aschle h a d "th is d rea m ," as th e New York Times p a ra p h ra s e d it: "N o w th a t th e w a r is over, th e G o v e rn m e n t a n d th e n e w s m ed ia b e g in to focus o n dom estic p ro b lem s w ith th e sam e in ten sity th ey gave the P ersian G ulf." E conom ist R obert Reich, so o n to jo in Bill C lin to n 's C abinet, u rg e d a "v a st in v estm en t" in A m erica's w o rk force: "It n e e d s th e p o lit­ ical eq u iv a le n t of a w a rrio r like G en. N o rm a n S ch w arzk o p f to p ro p o se a p la n for reb u ild in g A m erica, as G en. G eorge M arsh all d id 44 y ears ago for reb u ild ­ in g W estern E u ro p e."92 B ush seized this line of reaso n in g as av id ly as an y o n e, th o u g h b e n d in g it to different p u rp o se s. N o tin g th e G ulf W a r's "clear-cut objectives" a n d "o v e rrid ­ in g im p erativ e to achieve resu lts," o n M arch 6 h e lectu red th e ch eerin g lu m i­ n a rie s assem bled in C ongress a n d th e m illions of A m ericans w a tch in g o n tele­ vision: "W e m u st b rin g th a t sam e sense of self-discipline, th a t sam e sense of urgency, to th e w a y w e m eet challenges here a t h o m e." H e u rg e d p assag e of h is m ajor d om estic initiatives, a crim e bill a n d fu n d in g for ro a d construction: "If o u r forces could w in th e g ro u n d w a r in 100 h o u rs, th e n su rely th e C ongress can p a ss th is legislation in 100 d a y s." If A m erican s co u ld "selflessly co n fro n t evil" ab ro ad , h e a d d e d , " th e n su rely w e can m ake th is lan d all it sh o u ld b e."93 Yet b y A pril the e u p h o ria — a n d B ush's p o p u la rity — w ere d issip atin g . E ven a t th e m o m e n t of victory. B ush h a d seem ed o u t of focus— eag er to celebrate b u t also a t loose e n d s, as h e h a d b e en a t th e e n d of th e C old W ar. R eporters ag ain n o ticed th a t h e seem ed "so m b er," a n d B ush a d m itte d , "I h a v e n 't y et felt this w o n d e rfu lly e u p h o ric feeling th a t m a n y of th e A m erican p eo p le feel." H e w as p leased b y "a new , w o n d e rfu l sense of p a trio tism " a n d h a p p y th a t "th ere is n 't a n y a n tiw a r m o v em en t o u t th ere." B ut sensin g so m eth in g m issing, h e p o in te d to "W orld W ar II; th ere w a s a definitive e n d to th a t conflict."94 H e h a d in m in d th e M id east's u n reso lv ed p ro b lem s b u t also seem ed restless w ith o u t a w a r to w age. H is im m ed iate p ro b lem w a s th a t w a r 's ach iev em en ts tu rn e d o u t to be lim ­ ited a n d h is lea d ersh ip a g ain lackluster. H is d ecision to let H u sse in stay in

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p o w e r a n d to b ack p ed al from noisily u rg in g Iraqis to o v e rth ro w h im m ocked his earlier claim th a t H u sse in w a s H itle r's m o ral equal. H is relu ctan ce to in ter­ v ene o n b eh alf of Shiites a n d K urds, w h o h a d rebelled a g ain st H u sse in a n d su f­ fered m ig h tily a t the h a n d s of his arm y, raised th e sam e p ro b lem (sim ilar to E isen h o w er's w h e n h e sa t o u t th e 1956 H u n g a ria n revolution). B ush's inaction u n lea sh e d a to rre n t of m o ral in d ig n a tio n a g ain st h im a n d su g g e ste d th a t th e m a n w h o h a d "kicked the V ietnam sy n d ro m e " n o w w a s g rip p e d b y it him self. T he spectacle of K u w ait's re tu rn in g ru lers castin g o u t th o u sa n d s of P alestin ian a n d o th er g u e st w o rk e rs ta rn ish e d h is claim to h av e lib erated th a t country. N o "n ew w o rld o rd e r" took sh a p e a n d it w a s u n c le ar w h e th e r B ush h a d a n y id ea w h a t it w o u ld entail, b e y o n d c o n tin u ed A m erican heg em o n y ; h e so o n d is­ c ard ed the ph rase. T he p ro m ise th a t victory w o u ld h e lp resolve Israeli-A rab conflict also seem ed exaggerated. The Iraqis h a d b e en th ro w n o u t of K uw ait, b u t o th er th a n th a t this m o ral e q u iv a le n t of W orld W ar II h a d a m b ig u o u s re­ sults. T he e n su in g le td o w n w a s in goo d p a rt B ush's fault. H is W orld W ar II an al­ ogy set u p A m ericans to expect to tal victory, so m eth in g h e w a s u n a b le o r u n ­ w illin g to deliver. P erh ap s a d m irab le b y o th er criteria, h is cau tio n reg a rd in g fu rth er in te rv en tio n in Ira q — so o n c o n tin u ed u n d e r U n ited N atio n s aegis, b u t only to p ro tec t K u rd s in a n o rth e rn enclave— failed th e test of h is o w n rhetoric. The p re su m e d m oral a n d m ilitary efficacy o f A m erica's w a r m ak in g also re­ ced ed in th e spring. B ush's p re -A u g u st policy of a p p e a sin g H u sse in m e t to u g h criticism . R eassessm ent also focused o n th e n ecessity of sla u g h te rin g so m a n y Iraqi so ld iers— one h u n d re d th o u sa n d d e a d a n d th ree h u n d re d th o u sa n d w o u n d e d b y D efense Intelligence A gency estim ates— a n d o n th e d a m a g e to co n d itions for Iraqi civilians (it w a s clear th ey w ere n o t liberated). P raise for A m erican w e a p o n ry also b ecam e m ore m u ted . M ost of th e b o m b s, it tu rn e d out, h a d n o t b een the p rec isio n -g u id ed o rd n an ce fea tu red in m ed ia coverage, a n d som e glitzy w e a p o n s like th e P atrio t (actually a n o ld er technology) h a d p erfo rm ed less ably th a n th o u g h t. T his w a s n o "an tisep tic N in te n d o g am e" o r "surgical w ar," co n clu d ed one early review ; "it w a s a slau g h ter." M eanw hile, som e of H u sse in 's atrocities w ere v erified b u t o th ers tu rn e d o u t to b e tru m p e d up , b y the p ro p a g a n d a m achine of K u w ait's exiled ru lers, am o n g others. N o r d id th e c arp in g com e only from the a n tiw a r Left. T he w a r 's co n serv ativ e o p p o ­ n e n ts w eig h ed in again, a n d N B C 's low -key John C hancellor, w ritin g in th e New York Times, acidly c o m m en ted o n earlier p red ictio n s th a t "Iraq m ig h t actu ­ ally u se fuel-air explosives, a h o rrib le w e a p o n of alm o st n u clear potency. W h en th e fig hting began, the co u n try th a t d id use fuel-air explosives w a s th e U.S., a n d n o b o d y co m p lain ed ."95 R eassessm ent u su a lly follow s w ars; w h e th e r it d iscred ited th is w a r w a s in th e eye of the beholder. But because p raise of A m erican w a r m ak in g h a d so ared so h ig h a n d th e n the w a r e n d e d so quickly, rea p p raisa l ru b b e d th e lu ste r off this victo ry m ore quickly th a n after m o st w ars. A sq u ab b le b e tw ee n B ush a n d h is

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g en erals d u lle d it m ore. B ush w a s rep o rte d ly p o u n d in g th e table in fu ry at re­ p o rts th a t th e y h a d resisted h is recourse to w a r a n d th a t h e h a d h a lte d th eir m arch th ro u g h Iraq sh o rt of th e final b lo w to H u sse in 's forces. S chw arzkopf, in a celeb rated television interview , claim ed th a t h is "rec o m m e n d atio n h a d b een . . . co n tin u e th e m arch. I m ean, w e h a d th em in a ro u t," th o u g h in F eb ru ary Pow ell h a d a p p a re n tly re g a rd e d a fu rth e r ro u t as "u n ch iv alro u s."96 V ietnam still echoed: once m ore, it seem ed, a civilian h a d d e n ie d th e g en erals victory. In d ee d , th e d em ise of th e "V ietnam sy n d ro m e " seem ed p re m a tu re ly d e ­ clared. T he P O W /M IA m y th o lo g y c o n tin u ed to fester, w ith B ush h im self ac­ cu sed b y a n a n g ry c ro w d of n o t d o in g e n o u g h to find A m ericans in V ietnam (an d , as CIA director, of p a rticip a tin g in th e alleged cover-up). M ore th a n th at, th e G u lf W ar h a d b e e n too u n lik e th e V ietnam W ar to p ro v e m uch; b rev ity w a s b o th its v irtu e a n d its lim itatio n in th a t regard . B ush him self h a d n o te d before it b e g a n th a t if it w ere long, "I th in k su p p o rt w o u ld ero d e, as it d id in th e V ietn am c o n q u est— I m ean , conflict."97 A side from th a t n o tab le slip of th e to n g u e. B ush in d ic ate d th e lim its of b u ry in g V ietn am — w h a t if p ro trac te d w a r o ccu rred again? Ju st su c h a w a r seem ed to loom w ith H u sse in still d e alin g o u t m isery to K u rd s a n d others, a n d so o n w h e n A m ericans co n sid ered in te rv en tio n in Y ugoslavia's civil w ar. Like m o st of them . B ush w as gun-shy. T here w a s m ore to B ush's p ro b lem s th a n w a r 's m u rk y a fte rm a th a n d h is in ­ e p titu d e d e alin g w ith it, how ever. The v e ry elem en ts of th is w a r th a t elicited ju b ilatio n also ro b b ed it of lasting satisfaction a n d significance. T he ease of vic­ tory, a g ain st a n en em y seem ingly re lu c ta n t to fig h t a n d in co m p ete n t w h e n it d id , strip p e d th e w a r of th a t g rav ity of sacrifice a n d ach iev em en t th a t em b e d s a w a r in lan g u ag e a n d m em o ry a n d establishes it as a m o d el of con certed n a ­ tio n al action. T he w a r so o n seem ed tran sien t, fo rg ettab le— n o t substantial e n o u g h to ch an g e th e course of th e n a tio n a n d th e w o rld . B ush h a d ask ed A m ericans to see it like W orld W ar II, b u t it lacked su c h m ea n in g for them . It w a s a fan tasy w a r seen o n television, w ith all th e sta y in g p o w e r of a television sh o w — v iv id as long as th e screen flickered, g one once th e television sets w ere tu rn e d off. It lacked leg s— in politics, diplom acy, econom ics, e v en th e im ag in a­ tion. So the lan g u a g e a n d analogies it sp a w n e d tu rn e d o u t to b e few a n d fleeting. H u sse in 's p h ra se "th e m o th e r of all b attles" sp a rk e d a flood o f jokes, th e n v a n ­ ished. O ne of m a n y p ro d u c ts k ey ed to th e w ar. D esert Shield C o n d o m s ("d e­ sig n ed w ith the h a rd e n e d v e te ra n in m in d ") lacked com m ercial stay in g p o w er.98 By th e su m m e r of 1991, the calls (never n u m e ro u s an y w ay ) to tu rn the G u lf W ar's sp irit to w a rd sta te sid e p ro b lem s fad ed , a lth o u g h B ush p e rsisted w ith them . The w a r m e ta p h o r itself w as o d d ly absent, a t least its in sp iratio n al form calling for g o v e rn m e n ta l action, n o t so m u ch d isp elled as b a n k ru p te d b y real w ar. T he G ulf W ar w a s sufficient to d eb ase its o ld cu rren cy b u t insufficient to issu e a n e w one. T he w a r's un ify in g effects also p ro v e d tran sien t. B ush a n d o th ers celebrated

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th o se effects, especially am o n g A m erican soldiers, b u t u n ity d isso lv ed as so o n as w a r e n d ed . B ush him self w as d e af to the social issues in v olved. A sk ed in D ecem ber 1990 w h e th e r "a d isp ro p o rtio n a te n u m b e r of U.S. tro o p s sta tio n ed o n th e fro n t line h ail from m inorities a n d th e w o rk in g class," h e h a d g iv en a n angry, incom prehensible answ er.99 E ven b u o y e d b y victory, h e on ly u tte red p latitu d e s ab o u t n o t h a tin g each other. A gain, the fault w a s n o t his alone: w a r is a b a d healer. In th is case, c o n serv a­ tives took th e lead in ru b b in g old w o u n d s, eith er resen tin g h o w th e w a r h a d set asid e th eir c u ltu ral a g en d a o r e m b o ld en e d b y th e w a r to ad v an ce it anew . They resu m ed th eir attack o n abortion, the N EA , g ay rig h ts, a n d "p olitical correct­ n ess." In A pril, co lu m n ist G eorge W ill c ap tu re d th e th ru st of this attack w h e n h e lin k ed the G ulf W ar to the "lo w visibility, h ig h -in ten sity w a r" a g ain st th e Left w a g e d b y Lynne C heney, the N E A chair a n d d efen se secretary 's sp o u se. She "is secretary of d om estic defense. T he foreign a d v ersa rie s h e r h u sb a n d , Dick, m u st keep at b a y are less d an g ero u s, in th e lo n g ru n , th a n th e do m estic forces w ith w h ich she m u s t deal. T hose forces are fig h tin g a g ain st th e co n serv a­ tio n of the com m on c u ltu re th a t is th e n a tio n 's social c em en t."100 P recisely the a ttitu d e th a t B arry G old w a te r h a d long feared seem ed m o re b a ld ly th a n ev er a t th e surface of A m erican life. The n e w fu ry o v e r political correctness w a s rich w ith history, irony, a n d ob­ fuscation. A stru g g le o v er "PC " activism h a d g one o n for years, a n o th e r skir­ m ish in the su p p o se d "cu ltu re w a rs" of th e 1980s. If political correctness h a d a n y m eaning, it in v o lv ed efforts to d ev elo p m u ltic u ltu ra l c u rricu la in schools a n d to b a n "h ate speech" a t som e college cam puses. To its critics, it co m p rised th e sw eep in g a g en d a of a m onolithic, fem in ist-d o m in ated Left, a lth o u g h in few places w a s it a decisive force, since those d e em ed to b e o n th e left d isag reed m ig h tily w ith each other. N o n etheless, B ush co n d em n ed th e Left's "b o rin g politics of d iv isio n a n d d e ­ rision," the v e ry politics h e h a d p racticed, a n d co n serv ativ es saw th eir backs to th e w all after a d ecad e of R epublican ru le a n d a w a r m an y h a d ch am p io n ed . T hey in v eig h ed a g ain st the Left's ideological rig id ity after y ears of h a rd e n in g th eir o w n test of politicians' view s o n a b o rtio n a n d o th er issues, a n d ju st w h e n th e Left w as in disarray. T h o u g h "really a m arg in al m o v em en t," political cor­ rectness w a s "trea te d as if it's w h a t un iv ersities are all ab o u t," one u n iv ersity official correctly n o ted , a n d d e sp ite its alleged p o w er, it m et attack from m ain ­ stream m ed ia a n d liberal intellectuals as w ell as conservatives. C ritics w ere also h u m o rless, failing to recognize th a t "political correctness" w a s a n in-joke u se d b y liberals a n d leftists to chide each o th er a n d lam en t th eir differences.101 But this stru g g le h a d long co n fo u n d e d all parties. Few in 1991 recognized th a t its ren ew al w as p a rtly linked to th e G ulf W ar: to its p assio n s a n d so u r afterm ath; to the re tu rn of ritu als like flag w a v in g a n d h o m eco m in g p a ra d e s ev o k ­ in g a n earlier era of w h ite m ale dom inance; to victo ry o v er a n A rab en em y a n d b y im plication over non-W estern values; a n d to th e L eft's m arg in ality d u rin g

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th e w ar. O p e ratio n D esert Storm p rec ed e d "O p e ratio n C a m p u s S to rm /' n o ted one of th e few astu te observers of the controversy, arg u in g th a t th e W estern c u ltu re d e fe n d e d b y conservatives as tim eless a n d apolitical w a s in p a rt a p ro d ­ u ct of ideological m obilization d u rin g th e w o rld w ars. Failing to see su ch th in g s, all p a rties p a id h o m ag e to the G ulf W ar's c u rio u s tran sien ce— th ey talk ed as if th e w a r h a d n e v er h a p p e n e d , b u t acted v e ry m u ch as if it h a d .102 To b e sure, w a r 's satisfactions d id n o t im m ed iately vanish. In Ju n e 1991, vic­ to rio u s tro o p s m arch ed d o w n M a n h attan 's streets, g reeted b y "a m agnificent b liz z a rd of ticker tape, p a trio tism a n d affection." Time to o k th a t occasion to re­ affirm th a t ev en if "th e g u lf still b u m s ," w h a t w a s im p o rta n t w a s n o t h o w th e w a r ch an g ed th e M id east b u t h o w it ch an g ed "th e w a y A m ericans th in k ab o u t th em selves a n d w h a t th eir co u n try h a s achieved b y w ar." P erh ap s "th e great p o stw a r p a rty n o w in pro g ress is m ore a m a rk of n a tio n al m a tu rity th a n of sm u g n ess a n d jingoism ." A s Time d efin ed it, "m a tu rity " in clu d ed A m erican s' w illin g n ess to go to w ar, leav en ed b y th eir "h ea lth y cynicism a b o u t th e chance of b rin g in g lastin g peace to a n ancient w a r zo n e." A bove all, th e celebrants ch eered "th e re tu rn of A m erican com petence." The w ar, according to one p u b ­ lic o p in io n expert, b a n ish e d A m ericans' d o u b t a b o u t th eir econom ic a n d tech­ nological p ro w ess " in a p ro fo u n d w a y th a t w ill be lo n g lasting, w ell p a s t th e y e ar 2000." Yet coverage of the "p o stw a r p a rty " w a s strain ed . Time's ed ito rs felt en joined to ex p lain w h y the p a rty lasted lo n g er th a n th e w a r itself, w h ich " d id n 't a m o u n t to a b a d w e ek e n d in V ietnam ," one v e te ra n of th a t w a r n o ted . C o v erin g his city's p a ra d e , a New York Times rep o rte r a ltern a ted p u rp le p ro se a b o u t th e ex u ltatio n w ith acid c o m m en ts— th at, for exam ple, "m a n y A m eri­ cans co u ld n o t fin d triu m p h in the c o n q u est of a n a tio n w ith th e gross n a tio n al p ro d u c t of K entucky."103 Ju n e 's celebrations w ere fad e d m em ories w h e n th e n e x t fu ro r b ro k e out, this one p ittin g tw o black Yale Law School g ra d u a te s a g ain st each other. B ush's n o m in a tio n of C larence T hom as to the S uprem e C o u rt w as u n d e r fire b u t a p ­ p a re n tly d e stin e d to p rev ail u n til T hom as's fo rm er su b o rd in ate, A nita H ill, re­ lu ctan tly b ro u g h t charges of sexual h a ra ssm e n t a g ain st him . T he Senate Judici­ ary C o m m ittee's h e arin g s in O ctober stirred a p o te n t b rew of racial, gen d er, a n d sexual issues. The follow ing sp rin g saw m u ch of Los A ngeles aflam e in a rio t trig g ered b y the acquittal of policem en accused of assau ltin g black m o to rist R odney King. T he riots raised th e sp ecter of "race w ar," th o u g h m o st A m eri­ cans, h av in g u se d w a r as a m e ta p h o r for o th er issues, av o id ed it w ith reg ard to th eir d eep est social division. M oreover, th a t d iv isio n seem ed m o re com plex, n o lo n g er a sim ple black-w hite fissure as rioters d isp lay e d m a n y colors a n d blacks a n d Latinos took after A sian-A m ericans as w ell as w hites. Both u g ly m o m en ts w ere treated , w rongly, as d etach ed from th e G ulf W ar a n d m ilitarizatio n 's course. The w a r h a d colored g e n d e r relations, y ield in g fa­ m iliar ren d erin g s of w a r as a m ale arena. D u rin g a u tu m n 's b u ild -u p of forces, th e m ed ia h a d n o ted the role of w o m e n in th e a rm e d forces a n d as e x p ert com -

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m en tato rs, b u t once "th e serio u s b u sin ess of co m b at h a d b e g u n ," w o m e n "slid fu rth e r off th e page; o n ly th eir yellow rib b o n s c a u g h t th e p u b lic eye." (In a b ig Chicago Tribune p h o to w ra p -u p o n the w ar, o n ly th ree m ilitary w o m e n , o n e cra­ d lin g a te d d y bear, a p p e a re d am o n g the p ictu res of heroic m en, a n d n o w o m e n o n th e en em y 's side.) T he victory celebrations w ere larg ely a m ale affair, fo­ cu sed o n the A m erican p o ten cy p resu m ab ly sh o w n in th e w ar. N o d irect line ra n b e tw ee n those m o o d s a n d ev en ts to follo w — th e H ill-T hom as h e arin g s a n d th e T ailhook affair, in w h ich m ale n a v y p e rso n n el a ssa u lte d fellow servicew o­ m en. Yet ev ery m o d e m A m erican w a r h a d stre n g th e n ed p ro sc rip tio n s o n o r h ostilities to w o m en . It seem s u n lik ely th a t th is w a r w a s a n exception, th o u g h its b rev ity lim ited its force in th a t regard. T he w a r d id lead to a n o th e r ex p an ­ sio n of w o m e n 's roles in th e a rm e d forces, b u t th e m ilita ry 's g oal seem in g ly w a s "to ab sorb ju st e n o u g h of th e changes in w o m e n 's ex p ectatio n s a n d influence to p e rm it it to use w o m e n w ith o u t d rastically alterin g its o w n political m issio n "— o r g e n d e r inequalities generally.104 C o n nections to the G ulf W ar w ere m ore o b v io u s in th e case of th e Los A n ­ geles riots. The area w a s reeling from defense cutbacks th a t so u re d th e o u tlo o k of m an y social g roups. L ak ew o o d 's w h ite m id d le-class resid en ts h a d rested th eir livelihoods a n d th eir sense of p u rp o se a n d place o n M cD onnell D o u g las ("It's a to w n o n th e p la n ta tio n m o d el," one local n o ted , "D o u g las b e in g th e b ig house"). In the sh a d o w of co rp o rate "ca th ed ra ls of th e C o ld W ar," th e y "b e­ lieved th eir com panies to b e consecrated to w h a t th ey c o n stru ed as th e n a tio n al interest, a n d to deserve, in tu rn , th e n a tio n 's u n eq u iv o cal su p p o rt." W h en th e d efen se b o o m w e n t b u st, "it w a s th e ir ad o lescen t m ales, o n ly recently th e com ­ m u n ity 's m o st v a lu e d asset, w h o w ere m o st visibly left w ith n o w h e re to go" a n d fo u n d a su b stitu te in th e S p u r Posse g a n g th a t terro rize d local c h ild ren a n d ab u sed girls sexually.105 M ost black A ngelenos h a d less far to fall b u t also less to cu sh io n th e blow , a n d ev en m ore reason to co n tra st th eir p lig h t to th e triu m p h a l m o o d u n le a sh e d b y th e w ar. True, G eneral Pow ell w as h a iled as sh o w in g w h a t black m e n co u ld achieve. P resid en t B ush asked W est P oint cad ets to lo o k a ro u n d them : "People d iv id e d b y race a n d religion? N o." In fact "th e m ilitary," Pow ell sh o w ed , w a s "th e g reatest equal o p p o rtu n ity em p lo y er a ro u n d ." 106 But b e y o n d th e h in t of to k en ism in th a t statem ent, as th e m ilitary sh ran k , it offered few er o p p o r­ tu n ities for p o o r a n d m in o rity m e n a n d w o m en , a n d its ex am p le n o lo n g er g u id e d o th er in stitu tio n s— w h a t h a d once b e e n a m ig h ty b e ac h h ea d for racial p ro g ress n o w seem ed a rem ote ou tp o st. T h at A m erican lead ers extolled racial eq u ality in the m ilitary still se n t th e d istu rb in g m essag e th a t e q u ality c o u n te d th ere because it serv ed n atio n al po w er, a n d elsew h ere w a s less im p o rtan t. A n d of course race riots h a d accom panied m o st A m erican w ars, each h e ig h ten in g the tension b e tw ee n the declared p u rs u it of freed o m ab ro a d a n d tolerance of inequalities a t hom e. N ow , how ever, th a t ten sio n arose in stra iten e d fiscal a n d political circum stances, w h ereas p o st-W o rld W ar II a b u n d a n c e h a d u n d e r-

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w ritte n racial reform . The fo rtu n es of A frican-A m ericans w ere tro u b le d for m a n y reasons, b u t am o n g th em w a s th e d isso lu tio n of th e C old W ar th a t h a d p ro v id e d th e m political a n d ideological leverage. T he re su lt w a s th e spectacle of b illions sp e n t to free K u w ait's ru lers from exile, w h ile p o ck ets w ere d eclared e m p ty for A m erican s' m o u n tin g p ro b lem s— a co n trast p o in te d o u t b y som e Los A ngeles rio ters a n d victim s (and ag ain w h e n H u rrica n e A n d re w d e v a ­ sta te d F lorida in 1992 a n d floods sw e p t the u p p e r M ississippi v alley in 1993). Yet th e connections b e tw ee n w a r a n d A m erican s' in te rn al difficulties w ere few er, th in n er, a n d briefer after the G ulf W ar th a n in th e a fte rm a th of earlier w a rs, a n d n o t o n ly because of its brevity. D espite th e w ar, m ilita riza tio n — as state policy if n o t state of m in d — w a s slow ly contracting, n o lo n g er p ro v id in g a n arena of th e size it once h a d for m ak in g su c h linkages. The G ulf W a r's afterm a th th u s exposed th e a u to n o m y of issues of race, g en d er, a n d o th er social d iv isio n s— as issues in them selves, n o t ju st as m atters to settle in o rd e r to stre n g th e n n a tio n al pow er. T hose issues alw ay s h a d th a t autonom y, of course, ju st as th eir connections— b ein g ones of p e rc ep tio n as m u ch as reality — to m il­ ita riz a tio n h a rd ly d isa p p e a re d in 1991. Still, th e o v e rrid in g fram e w o rk th a t n a ­ tio n al secu rity once p ro v id e d — for T ru m a n 's o rd e r d eseg reg atin g th e a rm e d forces, for exam ple, o r e v en for conflict o v e r fem inism in th e 1970s— w a s n o t there. Insofar as m ilitarizatio n still d efin ed A m erican s' in tern al conflicts, it d id so less because of its d o m in a tin g presence th a n b ecau se of its d istastefu l re sid u e — of em otions, w o rd s, an d , especially for reg io n s th a t once th riv e d o n m ilitarizatio n , econom ic w oes. T he G u lf W ar also exposed B ush's political w eakness: H e "w as a w a r Presi­ d e n t u n lik e a n y o th e r since Polk; all th e rest, from L incoln th ro u g h N ixon, h a d con sistently believed in the efficacy of g o v e rn m e n t." B ush's R eaganesque d e ­ n ial of th a t efficacy a t h o m e "after d e p lo y in g th e m ilitary ab ro a d w a s th e v e ry so u l of co n trad ictio n ," a n d one reaso n th a t th e w a r b ro u g h t h im "a v icto ry from w h ic h h e n e v e r recovered." H is p o p u la rity collapsed w h e n h e seem ed to h av e n o id ea w h a t to d o w ith o u t a w ar. A m ission w a s n o t h a rd for m a n y A m ericans to en v isio n — solutions to p ro b lem s of d eb t, co m petitiveness, a n d h e alth care w ere o ften m e n tio n e d — b u t B ush could n o t en g ag e th ese issues. A s recession c o n tin u ed a n d tra d e a n d b u d g e t deficits sw elled, h e flo u n d ered . Since th e w a r h a d e stab lish ed h im as a stro n g leader, critics a sk ed w h y h e d id n o t lead a t hom e. A s a n a d m in istratio n official said after th e 1992 election: "V oters th o u g h t h e w a s v e ry effective" in foreign policy. "If h e w a n te d to, h e co u ld solve th eir problem s. W hen h e d id n 't, it m a d e th em resen tfu l." B ush cam e across as cal­ lous; clearly h e h a d th e capacity to lead (look a t th e w ar!) b u t d id n o t care to d o so at hom e. W ar h a d "in flated the illusion of o m n ip o ten ce— a n d th e n p u n c ­ tu re d it." 107 H e k e p t trying, b u t h is State of th e U n io n a d d re ss in Jan u ary 1992, billed as th e occasion to restart h is presidency, failed to d o so. H e issu ed fam iliar injunc­ tio n s to rem ain strong: "W e can n o t rep e at the m istak es m a d e tw ice in th is cen-

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tury, w h e n arm istice w a s follow ed b y recklessness a n d d efen se w a s p u rg e d as if th e w o rld w ere p e rm a n e n tly safe." C o n tin u e d if m o re p ru d e n t m ilitarizatio n w a s his o p e n in g them e. T hen, in a n o d d ly in d ifferen t w a y — "A n d n o w to o u r troubles a t h o m e " — h e sh ifted to th e n a tio n 's econom ic tro u b les b u t co u ld n o t leave w a r b ehind: "I k n o w w e 're in h a rd tim es. But I k n o w so m e th in g else. T his w ill n o t sta n d ," th e last p h ra se b ein g h is line after Iraq 's in v asio n of K u w ait (he rep e ate d it n e a r th e e n d of th e address). H e trie d to u se th e G u lf W ar to b u ild su p p o rt for h is econom ic p rogram s: "W e can b rin g th e sam e co u rag e a n d sense of co m m on p u rp o se to th e econom y th a t w e b ro u g h t to D esert Storm . A n d w e can d efeat h a rd tim es to g eth er." If C ongress failed to p a ss h is leg islatio n b y M arch 20, th e n "th e b a ttle is jo in ed ." But in v o k in g th e G u lf W ar d id n o t w o rk . T h at w a r seem ed alm o st forgotten, a n d m a n y A m ericans, accu rately o r no t, th o u g h t B ush h a d n o p ro g ra m for d e alin g w ith econom ic p ro b lem s.108 T hose troubles in v o lv ed a m ild , m ea n d e rin g recession w h ic h th e w a r's confid ence-building victory d id n o t halt. In th e lo n g ru n , th ey w ere also g lo b al— o th er W estern econom ies w ere faltering, m a n y m o re th a n A m e ric a's— a n d stru ctu ral, tied to ebbing defense outlays. T he w a r stre n g th e n e d th e P en tag o n 's claim o n the d efense b u d g e t, w h o se decline after th e m id-1980s w a s slo w er th a n after the Second, K orean, a n d V ietnam W ars, b u t d e p e n d e n c e o n d efen se m o n ies w a s n o w m ore en tren ch ed a n d regio n ally co n cen trated , so th a t th e cu ­ m u lativ e effects of e v en m o d e st d eclines m o u n te d , ab o v e all in C alifornia. Poli­ ticians a n d regional in terests accepted th e b ro a d d rift of d e m ilitariz atio n b u t so u g h t d a m a g e control for th eir districts, so th a t politics fo cu sed o n re d istrib u t­ in g th e p ain , n o t o n u n d e rly in g dynam ics. In 1992, Bill C lin to n a n d b illionaire in d e p e n d e n t c an d id ate Ross Perot a d d re sse d th o se dy n am ics, b u t cau tio u sly in C lin to n 's case, erratically in Perot's. B ush a d d e d to h is p ro b lem s b y p re te n d in g there w as n o issue, leaving h im in a political n o -m a n 's land: h e c o u ld h a rd ly blam e econom ic w o es w h o se existence h e d e n ie d o n a co u rse of d e m ilitariz a ­ tio n h e refused to a d m it w a s b ein g taken. A ll h e could d o w as assail D em ocrats for fiscal im p ru d e n ce a n d failure to p a ss his legislation, a n d re tu rn to th e "cu ltu re w ar." T h at m e a n t a n a w k w a rd alliance w ith P at B uchanan, his foe in the G O P p rim aries. "A ll th e in stitu tio n s of th e C old W ar," B uchanan h a d said in a n n o u n cin g h is candidacy, " m u st b e reex am ined," a b o ld er d eclaratio n th a n a n y D em ocrat m ad e. A s for Bush, "H e is yesterday." But B uchanan w a n te d to red ep lo y those in stitu tio n s to th e cul­ tu re w a r as m u ch as d ism an tle them . In M ay h e h e a rd th e so u n d s of th e Los A ngeles rioters as "th e authentic la u g h ter of th e b a rb a ria n " — co m p arab le to noises once m ad e b y N a zi "B row n S hirts" a n d c o m m u n ist "R ed G u a rd s " — a n d ch arg ed th a t p riv ileg ed forces so u g h t to d e stro y "Ju d eo -C h ristian cu ltu re." H e ad m ired G eneral S chw arzkopf a n d h is tro o p s, b u t "as A m erica's im p erial tro o p s g u a rd frontiers all o v er the w o rld , o u r o w n frontiers are o p en , a n d th e b a rb a ria n is inside th e gates." A t th e G O P c o n v en tio n in A u g u st, B ush o p e ra ­ tives d e sp era te for allies gave B uchanan a n a tio n al stage. H e p ro claim ed "a reli-

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g io u s w a r" a n d "a c u ltu ral w ar, as critical to th e k in d of n a tio n w e shall b e as the C old W ar itself, for this w a r is for th e soul of A m erica." In it. Bill a n d H illary C lin to n "are o n th e o th e r side, a n d G eorge B ush is o n o u r side." Ju st as tro o p s h a d reta k en Los A ngeles's streets a fter the riots, "w e m u s t tak e b ack our cities, a n d take b ack our c u ltu re a n d take back our co u n try ." O th ers w ere n o less p o in ted : k e y n o te r P hil G ra m m a n d ev an g elist P at R obertson co m p ared C lin to n a n d th e D em ocrats to com m unists; d en u n ciatio n s of g ay rig h ts a n d p aean s to "fam ily v a lu e s" w ere ro u tin e (but m usic from B ro ad w ay 's g ay -th em ed La Cage aux Folles sw elled as the B ush a n d Q uayle fam ilies m arch ed to th e p o d iu m ).109 "By v irtu e of h is political w eak n ess," B ush " fo u n d h im self w a g in g a K u ltu rk a m p f th a t a u tu m n ," d e sp ite evidence th a t it h a d backfired a t th e con­ ven tio n. Since B uchanan w a s a p o iso n o u s figure. B ush m a d e D an a n d M arily n Q u ay le h is d e p u ty co m m anders. "T he o n ly co m b at D an Q u ay le ev er experi­ en ced w a s in the K u ltu rk am p f," b u t in it "he p ro v e d a h ero ." Like o th er R epub­ licans, the Q uayles w o rk e d a v ag u e b u t ch arg ed divide: foes of th e V ietnam W ar, g ays a n d fem inists a n d single m others, a n d th e "cu ltu ral elite" (th o u g h Q u a y le's p u b lish in g fam ily b elo n g ed to it) w e re resp o n sib le for e v ery th in g from econom ic decline to the p o v e rty of ch ild ren to Los A ngeles's racial caul­ d ro n . D espite h is o w n office a n d tw elv e y ears of G O P rule, Q u ay le saw him self as "p lay in g D avid to th e G oliath of th e d o m in a n t c u ltu ral elite." T he th ru st of co n serv atism w a s n e v e r m ore evident: w a r ab ro a d w a s for show , w a r a t h o m e w as serious; enem ies a b ro a d w ere secondary, th o se a t h o m e m o re d a n g ero u s; A m erican decline w a s a fiction p e d a le d b y A m erica-bashers, th o u g h th ey w ere also responsible for it; n e e d e d w a s "n o t ju st econom ic, n o t ju st political, b u t c u ltu ral change," as Q u ay le p u t it. In retirem en t, B arry G o ld w ater, back in g a gay -rights law for Phoenix a n d w o m e n 's rig h t to a b o rtio n s (they h av e "b een g o in g o n ev er since m a n a n d w o m a n h av e liv ed to g eth er"), saw h is e stran g e­ m e n t from c o n serv atism 's d o m in a n t w in g d e e p e n .110 A s p a rt of th e ir "K u ltu rk am p f," B ush a n d h is allies "w a g e d g en eratio n al w ar." H e "u se d th e Second W orld W ar a n d th e C old W ar as h is reserv o irs of experience for attacking C lin to n as d ra ft d o d g e r a n d M oscow to u rist." O n oc­ casion h e p u lle d fro m those w a rs so m eth in g positive, offering a "G.I. bill for k id s" to h e lp fam ilies p a y for ch ild ren to a tte n d p riv a te schools, a w k w a rd ly co m p arin g it to the 1944 G I Bill (only if k id s w ere v e te ran s of th e "cu ltu re w a r" co u ld this an alo g y w ork). M ore often those reserv o irs sp e w e d poison. O n e B ush frien d o n th e c am p aig n trail, ta p p in g C old W ar im ag es of h o m o sex u ality (an d canceling o u t C lin to n 's im age as w om an izer), called C lin to n "a sissy. . . . You can tell h o w h e w alks. . . . W atch as h e k in d of sw ish es h is rea r e n d ." 111 B ush raised th e sp ecter of a fu tu re w a r— th o u g h all c a n d id ates d e a lt gin g erly w ith the o ngoing one in Y ugoslavia— to charg e th a t C lin to n lacked th e ex p eri­ ence a n d m anliness to b e p resid en t. Finally, B ush ra n as c o m m an d e r in chief. H is television a d s late in O ctober featu red scenes from the G ulf W ar a n d his lea d ersh ip in it, a n d e n d ed , in w h ite

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letters ag ain st a n o m in o u s d a rk backgroun d : "President Bush, Commander in Chief." But co m m an d er in chief of w h at? The a d d id n o t specify th e a rm e d forces, as if he w ere co m m an d e r in chief of all A m ericans, w h o w ere o b lig ated to follow his orders. A n d a g ain st w hom ? W ith n o en em y ab ro ad , at least n o n e he w a n te d to engage, this w a s a hollow im age. H e h a d n o w a r to w a g e except ag ain st C linton a n d all h e p resu m ab ly sto o d fo r— a n d a g ain st Perot, w h o m B ush h a te d even m ore. B ush g o t 38 p e rc en t of th e p o p u la r vote, less th a n an y sittin g P resid en t since Taft, th o u g h w ith P erot seizing a b ig c h u n k , C lin to n fell far sh o rt of a m ajority. "Fam ily v a lu e s" som etim es d id b e tte r— O reg o n n e arly ratified an anti-gay a m e n d m e n t a n d C o lo rad o ratified a m ild e r one, a lth o u g h ev en the G O P w as d iv id e d o n these m atters. The election over. B ush trie d a g ain to be co m m an d e r in chief. In D ecem ber h e sen t A m erican tro o p s as p a rt of a U n ited N atio n s force to feed a n d im p o se o rd er o n Som alia, rav ag ed b y fam ine a n d civil w ar. Billed as a h u m a n ita ria n action, this w a s n o t q u ite w a r (th o u g h it soo n tu rn e d ugly), b u t it w a s no tab le th a t B ush's final act as P re sid e n t w a s to call A m erican forces in to action again, a n d th a t his first m ajor ap p ea ra n c e as ex-P resid en t w as a trip to K u w ait, th e scene of his g reatest glory. E ven in retirem en t, h e rem a in e d th e w a r P resid en t. N o o th er W estern p o w e r h a d su ch a n extensive recen t record of m ilitary action— four w a rs in five decades, p lu s coun tless d e p lo y m en ts, in cu rsio n s, in ­ terv en tions, a n d confrontations. W ould B ush's retirem en t b rea k th e p a ttern ? H a d th e G ulf W ar's fickle im p act a lre ad y d o n e so?

The Persisting Primacy off War T aking office. Bill C lin to n p ro m ised to "force th e sp rin g " of "A m erican re­ n ew al." The m e ta p h o r w a s notable: in v o k in g th e n a tu ra l rh y th m s of th e sea­ sons ra th e r th a n the h a rsh logic of w a r m ark e d a m ajor ch an g e in p resid en tia l rhetoric. U nfortunately, sp rin g 's ren ew al soo n seem ed stu ck in M arch 's tu rb u ­ len t w in d s. C lin to n 's challenge to m ilitarizatio n seem ed obvious. T he first P re sid e n t since FDR to h av e d o n e n o m ilitary service, as w ell as th e first to h av e b e e n b o m after W orld W ar II a n d to h av e significant ro o ts in a n tiw a r politics a n d cu ltu re, h e h a d p led g e d econom ic renew al. T h o u g h ch id in g B ush for failing to h a lt th e b lo o d sh ed am o n g Y ugoslavia's w a rrin g rem n an ts, h e h a d m a d e it clear th a t foreign policy a n d the projection of m ilitary p o w e r ab ro a d w ere n o t h is m ajor interests. O th e r P resid en ts h a d seen A m erica as an e x em p lary ra th e r th a n m u s­ cu lar city o n a hill to the w o rld , b u t, like C arter, C lin to n seem ed to m e a n it m o re ("O u r greatest stre n g th is the p o w e r of o u r ideas, w h ic h are still n e w in m an y lan d s," h e announced), a n d h e in d icated th a t h e w o u ld d iscard a t least som e relics of m ilitarization. A lth o u g h h e h e a rd "a call to service" a n d "th e tru m p e ts" so u n d in g it, this w as m artial rheto ric in soft focus. H is p la n for n a ­ tional service, giving y o u n g ste rs e d u ca tio n al b en efits in re tu rn for c o m m u n ity

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service, d re w o n th e sy ste m of d u ty a n d re w a rd s available for m ilitary service b u t reco g n ized th a t th e latter n o w offered su c h re w a rd s to few er A m ericans. Like h is su b sta n tiv e positions, h is style m a rk e d a change. A s h is seaso n al m e ta p h o r in d icated , it w a s n o n com bative, d isp lay in g little m artia l to u g h n ess, ideological rigidity, p e rso n al m eanness, o r p a rtisa n sh arp n ess. H e seem ed the n a tio n 's p a tie n t schoolteacher, n o t its stru ttin g c o m m an d e r in chief. T h o u g h u n d o u b te d ly a t tim es g ru d g in g , h is w illin g n ess to w o rk w ith — e v e n to b e over­ sh a d o w e d b y — R epublican m o d era te s, co n serv ativ e D em ocrats, a n d exP re sid e n t C a rte r in d icated a lack of p e rso n al v a n ity o r a g rasp of th e p resi­ d e n c y 's sc ale d -d o w n n a tu re in th e absence of w ar. M ost n otably, h e d e p a rte d fro m h is p red ecesso rs in choosing n o t to p re se n t w ar, eith er in th e ab stract o r in specific instance, as a m o d el for tackling th e n a tio n 's p roblem s. H e d id n o t re­ p u d ia te th a t m odel; like m o st politicians in 1993, h e sim p ly ig n o red it. But if obvious, C lin to n 's challenge to m ilitarizatio n w a s also largely im plicit, a n effort to ou tflan k it ra th e r th a n attack it h ead -o n . H e h a d a n a g e n d a of "re­ n e w al," b u t n e ith e r h e n o r m o st o th e r n a tio n al figures firm ly p ro p o se d to d is­ card th e o ld a g en d a , p e rh a p s a ssu m in g it w o u ld w ith e r o n its o w n o r u n d e r th e p re ssu re of m o u n tin g fiscal a n d econom ic p ro b lem s. It d id n o t w ith e r o n its o w n , h o w ev er, a t least n o t rapidly. T he d isa d v a n ta g e of C lin to n 's a tte m p t to o u tflan k it w a s th a t h e m o b ilized n o c o n stitu en cy a n d ferv o r th a t w o u ld a rre st th e historical m o m e n tu m of m ilitarizatio n . O f course, to tak e o n its en tire leg­ acy w a s a d a u n tin g task in a political sy stem th a t w o rk s increm entally, issu e b y issue, ag en cy b y agency— especially fo r C linton, w h o , g iv en h is beliefs a n d ex­ p erien ce as g o v e rn o r of A rk an sas, h a d little feel for th e politics a n d a p p a ra tu s of m ilitarization. Yet to strike o n ly a t a few p a rts left th e legacy larg ely intact a n d allo w ed its ad v o cates to con cen trate th e ir defenses, as C lin to n im m e­ d iately fo u n d out. T here w e re a d v a n ta g e s to ig n o rin g it— let th e b e a st slu m b er a n d slip aw ay ra th e r th a n p ro v o k e it— b u t th ey h in g e d in p a rt o n th e v ig o r a n d savvy, n e ith er in itially notable, w ith w h ic h C lin to n p u rs u e d th e altern ativ es. P erh ap s A m eri­ can s w e re so o u t of practice articu la tin g a n y m issio n d isco n n ected fro m w a r o r n a tio n al secu rity th a t they, in clu d in g C linton , lacked th e v o c ab u lary a n d v alu es for d o in g so. "D om estic refo rm w ith o u t a b a ck g ro u n d of o v e rw h elm in g for­ eig n crisis h a s n o t b e e n a tte m p te d in sixty y ears," n o te d S id n ey B lum enthal, b u t "w a r can n o t b e C lin to n 's p a ra d ig m ." 112 Like C arter, C lin to n w a s o ften ac­ c u sed of lacking focus— of tak in g o n too m a n y causes a n d failing to m obilize su p p o rt for a few h e p riz e d h ig h ly — b u t as w ith C a rte r th is w a s sh allo w criti­ cism . O ften it cam e from o p p o n e n ts w h o sim p ly d islik ed th e focus C lin to n d id hav e, as w h e n th ey sco rn ed h im for a d d re ssin g th e "b a n " o n g ays in th e a rm e d forces, m u c h as th ey h a d C a rte r for g ra n tin g a m n e sty to d raft-resisters. Both also g o v ern ed a t tran sitio n al, p o stw a r m o m en ts w h e n o ld er a g en d a s w ere re­ ced in g a n d n e w e r ones co n tested , a n d w h e n th e p resid en c y 's p o w e r u su a lly recedes a n d C ongress's surges. A p p ro p riately , C lin to n rarely trie d to b u lly

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C ongress, y ield ed to its b y z an tin e law -m akin g processes, a n d a v o id e d th e veto, w h ile R epublicans increased th eir u se of o ld devices like th e filibuster. H is p ro b lem w as less lack of focus th a n the fact th a t h e e n te red office w ith "n o m a n ­ d ate, n o w ar, n o p a rty ." 113 C ritics assailed h is low -key lead ersh ip , as if th ey lo n g ed for the w a r y ears w h e n P resid en ts b o ld ly exercised p o w er. T hey m ig h t b e tte r h av e w elcom ed th e in v ig o ra te d roles n o w p la y e d b y C o n g ress a n d o th er in stitu tio n s— a n d C lin to n 's deference to them . T he "focus" charge bore d o w n especially o n C lin to n 's fo reig n a n d m ilita ry policy, said to b e tra y "a g en eral b a n k ru p tc y . . . u n p a ra lle le d in recen t A m eri­ can history." R ichard N ix o n 's d e a th in A p ril 1994 p ro v id e d o n e of m a n y occa­ sions for su c h charges. N ixon w as h a iled as a m a ste r "realist" a n d a "fo reig n policy g en iu s," in a p p a re n t co n trast to a feckless C lin to n .114 S uch p raise testi­ fied m ore to a so u r no stalg ia for a m ythic m u sc u la r A m erica th a n to C lin to n 's failures: the "g en iu s" h a d tak e n five y ears to extricate h is n a tio n fro m a d isa s­ tro u s w ar, failed to b u ild a lastin g co n sen su s for d e te n te , a n d p o iso n e d th e p o ­ litical c u ltu re o n w h ic h n a tio n al stre n g th rests. N o r d id C lin to n 's m e a n d e rin g course look b a d co m p ared to B ush's v a p id g en eralities a n d foolish em b race of S a d d a m H u sse in 's regim e before th e G u lf W ar. C lin to n 's p rio rities w ere consis­ te n t if u n in sp ire d , a n d p lau sib ly in tim e w ith th e preferences of m o st A m eri­ cans: A m erica's econom ic revival a n d a p ru d e n t co n tractio n in its m ilita ry p o w er, its u se confined to low -risk actions w h o se b u rd e n s w o u ld b e sp re a d am o n g m a n y nations. If C lin to n acted o n his p rio rities u n stead ily , so h av e m o st A m erican P residents. C lin to n 's p ro b lem w a s less one of focus th a n of lea d ersh ip o n th o se issu es h e d id a d d re ss, a b o u t w h ich h e said little of a g ra n d , p u b lic n a tu re . D eference to o th er in stitu tio n s w a s one thing, failure to clarify w h a t h e w a n te d fro m th e m w as so m eth in g else. A ble in p ress conferences, h e h e ld alm o st no n e. Skilled to a fau lt in the arts of com prom ise, h e lacked a sense of w h ic h p ro b lem s d e serv e d co m p rom ise a n d w h ic h req u ire d to u g h e r p o sitio n s for political, m o ral, o r o th e r reasons. H e seem ed to reg a rd m atters of m o ral im p o rt— th e fate of B osnian M uslim s, the rig h ts of gay soldiers, the a p p o in tm e n t of b lack officials, th e th u g ­ gery of H a iti's reg im e— as subject to th e sam e p ro cess of co m p ro m ise th a t gov­ e rn e d fiscal policy o r p o rk -b arre l legislation, as if co m p ro m ise w ere a v irtu e in itself. "T he m a n is like a b ig fat cu sh io n ," one critic co m p lain ed . "H e b e ars th e im p ressio n of w h o e v er last sa t u p o n h im ." 115 T h at a p p ro a c h to g o v ern an ce d is­ tin g u ish e d h im from C arter, a n o tab ly if inco n sisten tly stu b b o rn leader. It still left m a n y A m ericans u n su re w h a t, if an y th in g , C lin to n really believed. T heir u n c ertain ty sp ra n g as m u c h from th eir o w n confusion, h o w ev er, as fro m C lin to n 's lead ership, b earin g d o w n o n h im in so m e w h a t th e sam e w a y it h a d o n Bush, a n d o n C arter a t a n earlier tran sitio n al m o m en t. H is h a rsh e st critics, u su a lly b u t n o t alw ays zealo u s conservatives, p o rtra y e d h im as b o th a rig id liberal id eo lo g u e a n d a spineless c o m p ro m iser— it w a s h a rd to see h o w h e co u ld b e both. O n h e alth care, th ey assailed h im for g ra sp in g for too m u c h a n d

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se ttlin g for too little. W h en m ilitary in te rv en tio n ab ro a d lo o m ed , th ey con­ d e m n e d h im for c o n sid erin g action a n d th e n for back in g aw ay fro m it— a n d th e n for in v o k in g p resid en tia l w ar-m ak in g p o w e rs th a t m a n y of th e sam e critics h a d e ag erly y ield ed to R eagan a n d Bush. W hile C lin to n w a s ineffectual in ch allenging th em , these criticism s— a n d th eir co n trad ictio n s— seem ed m o re in ten se th a n th e u su a l ro u tin e c arp in g of A m erican politics, reflecting th e state of p o litical c u ltu re as m u c h as th e v ag aries of C lin to n 's lead ersh ip . T hat w a s th e case, too, w ith th e e x trao rd in arily vicious attacks o n H illary R o d h am C linton. D espite C lin to n 's caution. C o n gress's div isio n s, a n d A m erican s' u n c ertain ­ ties, h is p resid en c y d id see ste p s a w ay fro m a m ilitarized ag en d a. N e w social in itiatives em erg ed (as th ey h a d u n d e r Bush, in clu d in g legislation p ro tectin g A m ericans w ith disabilities). C ongress p a sse d a Fam ily Leave A ct g iv in g m a n y w o rk e rs lim ited rig h ts to take leave of th eir jobs to d e al w ith c h ild rearin g o r illness am o n g fam ily m em bers. C linton a n d C o n g ress scaled b ack restrictio n s o n fed eral s u p p o rt of abortion. T he C lintons fo rm u la te d reform s for a tro u b le d h ealth -care system . C lin to n a n d congressional D em ocrats also d e v ised a fed ­ eral b u d g e t d e sig n ed to cu rb th e sw elling deficit accu m u lated in p a rt becau se of R eagan's rem ilitarization. T h o u g h n o t m u c h b o ld e r th a n th e 1990 b u d g e t d e a l— a m ix of m o d e st tax increases a n d cuts in p rojected sp e n d in g in creases— th e 1993 d e al differed b y rev ersin g a b it the regressive tilt of th e tax sy stem u n ­ d e r R eagan a n d B ush a n d b y receiving C lin to n 's full-scale su p p o rt, w h e rea s B ush h a d o bviously looked for b u rd e n a n d g lo ry ab ro ad . C lin to n 's a p p ro a c h to h is first m ajor o p p o rtu n ity for m ilitary in te rv en tio n in d icated the v irtu e s a n d d raw b ack s of h is a m b ig u o u s challenge to m ilitariza­ tion. D u rin g the sp rin g of 1993, Serbs a n d C ro ats b o re d o w n ru th lessly o n b e­ leag u ered B osnian M uslim s, w h ile in W ashin g to n th e o p e n in g of th e H o lo cau st M em orial M u seu m p ro m p te d ren e w e d analogies b e tw ee n Y ugoslavia's h o r­ ro rs a n d those of the N a zi era. A gain, th e analogies w ere stra in e d — m issin g w a s th e p o p u lo u s, p o w e rfu l n atio n -state th a t carried o u t th e N a zi H o lo cau st— a n d h o w m u c h th ey m o v ed C lin to n w a s unclear. In a n y ev en t, h is resp o n se ech o ed E isen h o w er's to th e D ien Bien P h u 1954 crisis— a b o ld call for m ilitary in terv en tio n , h e d g e d b y so m a n y c o n d itio n s (again of a sse n t b y E u ro p e's m ajor p o w ers) th a t action w a s d e stin e d to be lim ited, if it o ccu rred at all. Like Ike, C lin to n w a s fau lted for tem p o riz in g lead ersh ip , b u t w h e th e r b ecau se h e fu m b led o r calculated shrew dly, h e av o id e d a risk y initiativ e a n d follow ed p re ­ cisely the oft-proclaim ed lessons of the V ietn am W ar (as Ike h a d follow ed the K orean W ar's sim ilar lessons): m ilitary action ab ro a d w a s o u t of b o u n d s w ith ­ o u t re so u n d in g su p p o rt from allies a n d A m ericans, w h o w ere d iv id e d o r in d if­ feren t a b o u t Bosnia. L ater co ntroversies— ov er B osnia's carnage, A m erican d e a th s in Som alia, in ­ terv e n tio n in H a iti's civil w ar. N o rth K orea's alleg ed n u c le ar th re a t— so m etim es fo u n d the a d m in istratio n echoin g C old W ar rhetoric a b o u t A m er­ ica's credibility abroad. But th ey also fo u n d m ilitary lead ers sq u e am ish ab o u t

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action a n d C ongress sk ittish a b o u t A m erican d e a th s a b ro a d — as if m ilita ry in ­ terv e n tio n co u ld b e cost-free. W ith th e u n ila tera list m o o d in C o n g ress also in ­ tense, th e chance d im in ish e d th a t th e U n ited N a tio n s w o u ld p ro v id e p re te x t o r g en u in e reaso n for th e A m erican cop to go back o n th e w o rld b eat. "G lobo-C op: D oes A m erica H av e th e W ill to Fight?" ask ed Newsweek o n its A u g u s t 23,1993, cover. A m erican s' differences a b o u t th e a n sw e r seem ed less sig n ifican t th a n th eir lack of in te rest in th e question. G iven all th o se co n strain ts, C lin to n 's m o d ­ est success in the sp rin g of 1994— in concert w ith th e U N a n d N A TO a n d M oscow — in c u rb in g th e B osnian w a r b y th rea te n in g Serb forces w ith N A TO a ir p o w e r w a s notable. By th e sam e token, w h a t lo o k ed to so m e like h o p eless w affling o v er H aiti a n d N o rth K orea— the la tter saw strid e n t talk of w a r com ­ in g from h is critics— m ore likely in d ic ate d C lin to n 's inclin atio n , like th a t of E isen h ow er a n d C arter, to refuse to see a n d defin e "crises" a n d go to w a r o v er them . But C lin to n w a s as cau tio u s a b o u t d ism a n tlin g m ilita riza tio n as h e w a s a b o u t acting o n its claim s. D efense Secretary Les A sp in 's in itial m ilita ry b u d g e t o n ly accelerated slig h tly the m o d e st cuts B ush p ro p o se d a n d p re se rv e d m o st w e a p o n s system s B ush b e q u ea th e d . In fact, d efen se b u d g e ts w ere sh rin k in g on ly relative tQ th e p e a k levels of th e 1980s— sim p ly re tu rn in g to th eir late-1970s levels, a n d projected b y th e a d m in istra tio n to rise ag ain late in th e 1990s. A sp in w as, in h is w o rd s, "v ery cautio u s," a n d " tre a d in g w a te r o n tw o accounts: research a n d d e v e lo p m e n t a n d p ro cu re m en t." T h at b u reau cratic m u m b o -ju m b o m e a n t th a t a n old p a tte rn co n tin u ed : w h e n b u d g e ts w ere sq u eezed , p e rso n n el w e n t first, w e a p o n s last. T he n u m b e r of A m erican tro o p s in E u ro p e w a s sch ed u led to slide from 304,000 in fiscal 1990 to 133,700 in th e 1994 b u d g e t, a n d of forces overall to 1.4 m illio n a t th e d e c a d e 's e n d , b u t costly, tro u b le d p ro g ram s like th e C-17 tra n s p o rt a n d th e B -l b o m b er lu m b e red along. The a rm e d forces w ere slow ly sh rin k in g , b u t th e ir technological to p -h eav in ess e n d u re d . N o r d id C lin to n 's caution re su lt o n ly from econom ic a n d co n g res­ sional p ressu res, th o u g h m en like Senate A rm e d Services C o m m ittee C h air Sam N u n n w o rk e d h a rd to re ta rd d em ilitarizatio n . N e ith e r C lin to n n o r A sp in issu ed a b o ld call for change in th e first place.116 M ore diffuse form s of m ilitarizatio n also p ersisted . The su m m o n s to tak e u p arm s in v a rio u s "cu ltu re w a rs" w a s still h e a rd , u n lea sh e d , as earlier, n o t o n ly b y m o ral conservatives. "W e are to d a y in d e e d e n g ag e d in a c u ltu ra l w a r," a n ­ n o u n ced E ugene G enovese, once a lea d in g leftist h isto rian . T ro u b led b y "th e d e ep e n in g racial crisis in A m erica," h e to o k tim e to c o n d em n "th e a rro g a n t p re ­ ten sio ns to n ew ly in v en ted co n stitu tio n al p ro tectio n s as en v isag ed , for exam ­ ple, in the p ro g ra m of the gay a n d lesbian m o v em en t." A s u su a l, d eclaratio n of a "cu ltu ral w a r" fit o d d ly w ith the search for u n ity — w ith " o u r co m m o n w ill­ in g n ess to overcom e ancient hostilities a n d h e a r each o th e r's voices," as G e­ n o v ese p u t it. H is w a r rhetoric, if n o t h is politics, w a s ech o ed in tira d es b y fig­ u res like conservative rad io h o st R ush L im baugh, in academ ic stru g g les over

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cu rricu lu m , a n d in local a n d state conflicts o v er im m ig ratio n , race, ab o rtio n , a n d g ay rights. "W e are k eep ers of w h a t is rig h t a n d w h a t is w ro n g ," asserted L ou S h eld o n of th e T raditional V alues C oalition, one of m a n y g ro u p s for w h o m , w ro te a critic accurately c a p tu rin g its rhetoric, politics w a s n o w "a p o stm illen n ialist b a ttle for u ltim ate d o m in io n o v er A m erica." It w a s u n clear w h e th e r th a t rhetoric w a s only a resid u e of a n earlier style for ex p ressin g conflict— as its failure in th e 1992 election a n d C lin to n 's av o id an ce of it as P resi­ d e n t m ig h t in d ic ate — o r a sig n of th a t style's c o n tin u ed vitality.117 But a n o th e r issue m o st v iv id ly illu stra te d th e p e rsistin g p rim acy of w a r— n o t as a n activity A m ericans so u g h t b u t as a fram e w o rk in w h ic h th ey d efin ed them selves. A s cam p aig n er, C lin to n h a d p ro m ised to e n d th e m ilita ry 's "b an " o n g ay m e n a n d lesbians in th e a rm e d forces, as if h e co u ld d o so w ith th e stroke of a p e n (since the b a n w a s on ly a P en tag o n policy, it in d e e d w a s revocable b y executive o rd e r— u n less C ongress ste p p e d in). T h at b a n h a d d o n e little to p re ­ v e n t g ay p e o p le 's presence, b u t it h a d subjected th em to in tim id a tio n a n d ex­ p u lsio n . T he m a in strea m m ed ia p a id little a tten tio n to C lin to n 's p ro m ise b e ­ fore th e election, b u t d u rin g the in te rre g n u m it co n su m ed m ed ia atten tio n . By Jan u ary 1993, television n e w s fea tu red sen satio n al footage, w ith so ft-p o m ov erto nes, of n a k e d m e n in b arrack s sh o w ers p resu m ab ly subject to tire lu st­ fu l g aze a n d p re d a to ry in te n tio n s of soon-to -lib erated g ay soldiers. A n u n c o m m o n ly ferocious a n d silly d eb ate e n su e d a b o u t w h e th e r to "let" g ays a n d lesbians in to th e a rm e d forces, as if th ey w ere n o t a lre ad y there. M ili­ ta ry leaders, rep o rte d th e New York Times, "concede th a t th ere are n o w a n d al­ w a y s h av e b e e n th o u sa n d s of h o m o sex u als in th e m ilitary. But th ey say th a t to ack n o w led g e th a t fact w o u ld inject a n e lem en t of sexual ten sio n a n d anxiety," so th ey d e fe n d e d a policy th a t d e n ie d th e reality th ey conceded. Few m ilitary a u th o rities tro tte d o u t the old reaso n s for ex pelling h o m o sex u als— reaso n s in ­ v o lv in g com petence to serve th a t ev ery su p p re sse d P en tag o n stu d y of th e m a t­ ter h a d u n d e rc u t— in stea d em p h a sizin g th eir su p p o se d th re a t to o rd e r a n d d is­ cipline, th a t is, th e d iso rd e r stra ig h t serv icem en w o u ld m an ifest if faced w ith id en tifiably g ay personnel. T he m ilitary, a R A N D C o rp o ratio n stu d y solem nly d eclared, "is n o place to fla u n t one sex u al's id e n tity o r o rien tatio n ," th o u g h it w a s h a rd to th in k of a n in stitu tio n w h e re sexual b ra v a d o a n d b o a stin g w ere m o re en d em ic a n d h o n o red , a t least am o n g stra ig h t m en. M an y a rg u m e n ts w ere b iza rrely contradictory: o p e n h o m o sex u ality w a s into lerab le because m e n h av e n o p riv acy in barracks, a rg u e d th e b a n 's d efen d ers, w h o th e n as­ se rted stra ig h t so ld iers' rig h t to precisely su c h p riv acy vis-à-vis g ay m en. A s­ se rted too w a s th e m ilita ry 's rig h t to define its o w n values: C lin to n 's p ro p o se d ch an g e "th rea te n s the strong, conservative, m oralistic tra d itio n of th e tro o p s," a rg u e d a retired m arin e general. T h at trad itio n , R ussell Baker w ry ly n o ted , h a d in clu d e d d u rin g his W orld W ar II service "m an ly v o m itin g " a n d "sex u al b o ast­ in g rites" th a t could n o t "possibly . . . h av e h e lp e d w re st th e Pacific from the Jap an ese."118

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G ender, m ale privilege, a n d th eir place in th e a rm e d forces w e re as m u c h a t issu e as sexual orientation. S traig h t m en d o m in a te d th e d eb ate. T he voices of g ay p eo p le w ere c u rio u sly silenced, w h ile Sen. Sam N u n n , C olin Pow ell, a n d Les A sp in su d d e n ly b ecam e ex p erts o n them . W om en, w h o in a n d o u t of th e a rm e d forces w ere less o p p o se d to th e change, rare ly su rfaced as ex p erts, p o ­ ten tial victim s of gay lu st if th e b a n w ere lifted, o r real victim s o f stra ig h t m ale lust. H o v e rin g o m in o u sly in th e b a ck g ro u n d w a s th e 1991 T ailhook in cid en t, in w h ic h m ale n a v y p e rso n n el celebrating victo ry in th e G u lf W ar sex u ally h a ­ rassed fem ale p erso n n el, p ro d u c in g a scan d al n o t ju st a b o u t th e ev en t, w h e re to p b rass h a d b e e n in a tten d an ce, b u t a b o u t th e n a v y 's b o tc h e d in v estig atio n in to it. W hile g iv en m u c h a tte n tio n as a w o m e n 's issue (u n lik e o th e r ev id en ce of violence a n d sex ual a ssa u lt a g ain st m ilitary w o m en ), T ailhook w e n t m o stly u n m e n tio n e d in th e d e b ate o n g ay s in tire m ilitary, a lth o u g h C lin to n b riefly raised it. N o n etheless, w o m e n 's su rg in g p resen ce in th e a rm e d forces d id m u c h to d riv e th e debate. T heir presence w a s far m o re n o v e l a n d d istu rb in g to m ilitary trad itio n a lists th a n th e o ld if officially taboo p resen ce of g ay m en , ju st as tra d i­ tio n alists u se d lesbian-baiting to cu rb w o m e n 's p o w e r a n d b e a t b ack accusa­ tio n s of sexual h a ra ssm e n t a n d e x p lo itatio n b y m en. E n d in g th e " b a n " jeo p ar­ d iz e d th a t tool of control. T he resu lt w a s the seem in g "co n tra d ic tio n " w h e re b y "th e m ilitary acts as if lesbians are the chief th re a t to its cu ltu re, w h e rea s m ili­ ta ry a n d civilian policy m ak ers talk as if lesbians a re n 't a n issu e a n d g ay m e n are th e th reat." A c ru d e rem a rk b y a key a d v iso r to N u n n a n d th e P e n tag o n re­ v ealed h o w m u c h m ale-fem ale ra th e r th a n g ay -straig h t relatio n s w ere a t issue: stra ig h t soldiers sh o u ld n o t h av e to e n d u re g ay m e n 's "sex u al b a rb a ries" in th e sh o w ers, N o rth w e ste rn U n iv ersity p ro fesso r C h arles M oskos said , " u n til I g et to sh o w er w ith H illary C lin to n ."119 A lso h e a rd in m ilita ry circles w a s th e n o ­ tio n th a t H illary C lin to n h a d to b e a lesbian if h e r h u sb a n d w a s p ro m o tin g this change. Such w ere th e d efenses of th e m ilitary as a b a stio n of m ale privilege. A n d as a sacred in stitu tio n w h ic h civilian a u th o rity d a re d n o t challenge. Ex­ tra o rd in a ry criticism of C lin to n arose, as if, h av in g d o n e n o m ilitary service, h e h a d n o rig h t to b e c o m m an d e r in chief (alth o u g h lifelong civilians W o o d ro w W ilson a n d F ranklin R oosevelt h a d c o m m an d e d th e a rm e d forces in tw o g rea t w ars). U sually off the record, officers m u tte re d th rea ts to resig n o r m u tin o u s rem ark s a b o u t C linton, w hile sailors o p e n ly m o ck ed C lin to n in h is presence. In tu rn , h is diffid en t resp o n se seem ed to invite m o re defiance: H e "m u st," p le d th e Chicago Tribune, b a n ish the ap p ea ra n c e of b e in g "a m arsh m a llo w ."120 O b ­ scene rem ark s b y m ale p e rso n n el m a d e a b o u t— o r faxed rig h t to — Rep. P at Schroeder, a lead in g voice in C ongress o n these m atters, jo in ed tw o them es: defiance of civilian a u th o rity a n d d isg u st w ith w o m e n 's pow er. N o netheless, b e n e a th the surface of this u g ly d eb ate, ch an g e w a s ev id en t. H o w ev e r lu rid , the sp ecter of p re d a to ry g ay m en fu rth e r b u rie d stereo ty p es of lim p -w risted sissies (an d asexual lesbians), a n d d e b a te p iv o te d less o n th e fail-

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in g s of g a y m e n th a n o n th e fears of stra ig h t soldiers, re n d e re d as in a n e rv o u s p an ic a t the m ere th o u g h t th ey m ig h t sh o w er w ith h o m osexuals. "T here are p red ic tio n s of off-d uty M arines in p e arls a n d p u m p s, a n d red -b lo o d ed b o y s b e ­ in g im p o rtu n e d for p erv ersio n s," n o te d A n n a Q u in d len , w h o ad v ised : "Just sa y no , g u y s— fem ale soldiers h av e h a d to d o it for y ears." Fearful stra ig h t m en , n o te d A llan B érubé, seem ed e n g ag e d in a n act of "fem ale im p e rso n a ­ tio n ," p resen tin g them selves as like w o m e n — subject to th e sexual d esire of m e n a n d n e e d in g p ro tectio n fro m them . H o w ev e r d isin g e n u o u s th a t p o stu re , it s trip p e d o ld im ages of m ilitary m an h o o d of th e ir stru ttin g , m acho character, as if m e n w ere b ein g "fem in ized " w h ile m ilitary w o m e n sh o w ed "m ascu lin e" characteristics. "B eing th e oglee in stea d of, say, th e o g ler" u p se t th e m e n w h o w ro te to co lu m n ist E llen G o o d m an ; su d d e n ly th ey w ere "w o rry in g a b o u t m ale sex u al ag g ressio n ."121 C o n tests o v e r g en d er, rarely confined to relatio n s b e tw ee n m e n a n d w o m en , also in volve stru g g les ov er w h a t it m ean s to b e a m a n o r a w o m an . In th e stru g g les of 1993, m ilitary m a n h o o d seem ed fragile in th e im ag es p u rv e y e d b y th e b a n 's d e fe n d ers (behavioral reality in th e a rm e d forces b ein g a n o th e r m a t­ ter). T h u s th e d e b ate reflected crazily th e chan g es in g e n d e r relatio n s a t w o rk in th e m ilitary a n d in A m erican life generally. In a d d itio n , as C lin to n ineffectually b u t rig h tly n o te d , the m ere fact th a t n a tio n al lea d ers e n g ag e d in su sta in e d d e ­ b a te a b o u t h o m o sex u ality m ark e d a ch an g e— less th e m u ch -to u te d p o w e r of g ay lobbies th a n th e u n d e rly in g social d y n am ics th a t m a d e th o se lobbies p o s­ sible. C lin to n him self fu m b led th e issue, n e v e r m ak in g a case for th e ch an g e h e p ro p o se d a n d try in g to placate o p p o n e n ts, w h o o n ly seized o n h is tem p o riz in g to sco rn h im m ore. H e a n d g ay C o n g ressm an B arney F ran k rea so n e d th a t C o n ­ gress w o u ld o v e rrid e a n y b o ld o rd e r a n d rejected th e a rg u m e n t th a t a n over­ rid e w o u ld a t least leave h im o n h ig h m o ral g ro u n d . So h e co m p ro m ised , o n ly to h av e C ongress o v e rrid e h im anyw ay. H is later d ecision to fight c o u rt o rd ers o v e rtu rn in g anti-g ay policies su g g e ste d th a t h is tem p o riz in g reflected his m u sh y beliefs, n o t ju st C o n gress's pow er. T he resu ltin g " d o n 't ask, d o n 't tell" policy e n d e d q u e stio n in g a b o u t a re­ c ru it's sexuality, b u t o th erw ise rein sta te d th e m ilitary closet, albeit o n m u rk ie r term s: g ay m e n a n d w o m e n m ig h t serve, b u t o n ly if th ey k e p t th eir id en tity secret, precisely the c o n d itio n u n d e r w h ich m a n y h a d lo n g tacitly served. The P en tag o n n o longer e v en offered reasons for ex pelling h o m o sex u als, as if h o ­ m o p h o b ia n e e d e d n o justification. C lin to n p resen te d th e n e w policy as a n "h o n o rab le com prom ise," a n d p u n d its saw it as a n inev itab le one b e tw ee n "lib­ erals" a n d "co n serv ativ es" o n this issue. But as B arry G old w a te r's th u n d e rin g call for abolition of th e b a n in d icated , C lin to n h a d elbow ro o m o n th is issue th a t h e refu sed to exercise. S u p p o rt for decisive action h a d su rg e d in th e sp rin g , from th e gay co m m u n ity b u t also from m id d le-o f-th e-ro ad m ed ia like th e Chi­ cago Tribune. "Is it too m u ch to h o p e," asked one co lu m n ist aw are of th e m ili-

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ta ry 's m an y closeted gay officers, " th a t th e m ilitary w ill re th in k its obsolete code before som e g en eral is fo u n d try in g to sq u eeze in to a size 14 a t S aks?"122 The u g ly d eb ate revealed h o w resistan t m a n y A m erican s w e re to ch an g e in th eir m ilitary in stitu tio n s, exposed a n ew th e b elief th a t th e m ilitary reta in e d p rid e of place am o n g th e ir in stitu tio n s, a n d reaffirm ed th a t citizen sh ip w a s se­ cu red above all b y m ilitary service. G ay o rg an izatio n s h a d n o t e v en m a d e ab o ­ lition of the m ilita ry 's policies a h ig h priority. T hey d id so o n ly after b e in g cau g h t in a com plex political p rocess th a t m a d e m ilitary service th e test of citi­ zenship. W in this test a n d the full citizen sh ip of g ay A m erican s w o u ld b e a ssu re d — th a t b ecam e th e rally in g cry for g ay g ro u p s a n d th e evil th a t th eir o p p o n e n ts feared. A t a tim e w h e n h o m o sex u ality w a s a t issue in m a n y facets of A m erican life, its place in th e a rm e d forces seized atten tio n . Ju st w h e n p o liti­ cians ag reed th a t econom ic challenges w ere to p prio rity , th ey e x p e n d e d en o r­ m o u s en erg y o n the place of g ay m e n a n d lesb ian s in th e m ilitary. M an y A m eri­ cans a p p a re n tly still reg a rd ed th e a rm e d forces as th e in stitu tio n o n w h o se co m p o sitio n a n d policies h in g ed m u c h of th e n a tio n 's fate. Real a n d a p p a re n t analogies to the fate of black A m erican s in th e 1940s also rev ealed the back w ard -lo o k in g focus. Sen. S trom T h u rm o n d , w h o h a d b o lte d th e D em ocratic P arty w h e n T ru m a n o rd ere d in te g ratio n of th e a rm e d forces, n o w th u n d e re d th a t h o m o sex u ality w a s n o t "n o rm a l" (n eith er w a s it n o rm al to h av e a ninety-year-old se n ato r w h o h a d m a rrie d tw o d ifferen t M iss S o u th C ar­ olinas h alf h is age) a n d jo in ed the congressional charge, in w h ic h S o u th ern ers p ro v id e d m u ch of th e m uscle, a g ain st C linton. E x p o n en ts of ch an g e sp o tte d preju d ice in 1993 sim ilar to w h a t T ru m a n h a d tackled in 1948, w h e n m o st m ili­ tary lead ers h a d resisted racial in te g ratio n a n d o p e n d efiance h a d ru m b le d th ro u g h the ranks. T raditionalists p re se n te d C olin Pow ell, w h o o p p o se d lettin g g ays "in," to reb u t th a t ch arg e— h o w c o u ld a b lack g en eral b e accused of p reju ­ dice? C o m m o n to d e b ate in b o th 1948 a n d 1993 w a s th e a ssu m p tio n th a t m ili­ tary service v a lid ate d a n d e x p a n d e d citizenship, a n d in d e e d T ru m a n 's 1948 or­ d e r h a d e m b o ld en ed th e civil rig h ts m ov em en t. M eanw hile, som e black A m ericans d e b a te d w h e th e r gays faced a n o p p ressio n co m p arab le to w h a t th ey h a d experienced before 1948, as if one form of o p p ressio n h a d to b e like a n o th e r to w a rra n t co n dem nation. T he o d d claim also em erg ed th a t d iscrim i­ n a tio n w a s b a d only if it in v o lv ed in h erite d traits like color o r g en d er, as if th e law n e v er b a rre d it w h e n b a sed o n chosen attrib u tes like relig io u s affiliation. But th e 1948 d eb ate h a d e ru p te d w h e n th e m ilitary w a s a n ascen d an t, ex­ p a n d in g institution. The C old W ar h a d m a d e it essential to n a tio n al lead ers th a t th e a rm e d forces n o t a p p e a r d iscrim in ato ry to m illions ab ro a d o r to m in o rity A m ericans forced to share freed o m 's b u rd e n s u n d e r conscription. Racial in te­ g ratio n h a d facilitated the m ilita ry 's role as sh o w case of A m erican lib erty a n d p ro tecto r of freedom . In d eed , T ru m a n could n o t h av e in te rv e n e d as forcefully in th e K orean W ar w ith seg reg ated forces— th e political back lash from A frican-

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A m ericans w o u ld h av e b e en intense, a n d d e sp era te c o m m an d e rs in Korea n e e d e d a u th o rity to u se forces of w h a te v e r color in w h a te v e r com bination. Too b la ta n tly u n rep re se n ta tiv e of the A m erican peo p le, th e m ilitary becam e a n alien in stitu tio n u n fit to enforce th e p e o p le 's w ill. A s a rep resen tativ e in stitu ­ tion, it w a s e m p o w ered to act. C hange in its social m ak e-u p h a d lo n g se rv e d — in th e 1940s reg a rd in g race, in the 1970s a n d 1980s reg a rd in g g e n d e r— to legiti­ m ate th e m ilitary w h e n its m ission w a s in qu estio n . M arginal p eo p le g ain ed fu ller citizenship; in retu rn , the m ilita ry 's ch arter as th e p e o p le 's force w a s re­ n ew ed . A g ain st th a t b a ck g ro u n d , the failure to m ak e a decisive ch an g e in th e "b an " in d ic ate d so m eth in g besides, a lth o u g h lin k ed to, th e p e rsistin g h o m o p h o b ia. P e rh ap s the m ilitary w a s n o lo n g er im p o rta n t e n o u g h as a n in stru m e n t of p o w e r ab ro a d to req u ire th a t its social ch arter b e ren ew ed . N o global stru g g le fram ed this d e b ate a n d justified refo rm — n o m illions of h o m o sex u als else­ w h e re w h o w o u ld ju d g e A m erica's fitness to lead th e w o rld (th o u g h th e P en ta­ g o n policy received considerable m ockery abroad); n o g ra n d b a ttle lo o m in g to ju stify m ore e q u itab le use of m ilitary person n el. A n d in so far as action a b ro a d w a s a n ticip a te d as p a rt of U n ited N atio n s p eacek eep in g forces, th o se forces w ere o ften rev iled as w e ak -k n eed a n d incap ab le of real w a r m ak in g — seen as v a g u ely fem inine b y A m erican skeptics, o ften th e sam e p e o p le w h o saw w o m e n a n d hom o sex u als as w eak en in g th e U n ited States a rm e d forces. Serious p ro p o n e n ts of m ilitary p o w e r a n d m artia l v irtu e , o n th e o th er h a n d , m ig h t h a v e w elco m ed th e form al inclu sio n of a n o th e r g ro u p , so th a t th ey co u ld re tu rn to th e m ain b u sin ess of p re p a rin g to fight w ars. A n d so som e voices arg u ed . "T he stre n g th of o u r m ilitary d e p e n d s u ltim ately u p o n its b o n d s to th e p eo p le," w ro te m ilitary h isto ria n R ichard K ohn, w h o h a d close ties to th e a rm e d forces; "th e a rm e d forces w ill b e stro n g e r th e m o re th ey reflect th e v alu es a n d ideals of th e society th ey serve." "G ay rig h ts m e a n a b o lsterin g of th e m ilita ry 's legitim acy," a rg u e d th e New Yorker, "n o t a n u n d e rm in in g of th eir m orale: n o t a w eakness, b u t a n e w stren g th ." O r, as G o ld w a ter p u t it in h is p ith ie r fashion, "You d o n 't h av e to be stra ig h t to sh o o t straig h t"; th e retired air force g en eral w o u ld h a p p ily fly w ith a g ay a irm a n "as lo n g as th e so n of a bitch co u ld fly." In fact, fear of e n h an cin g "th e m ilita ry 's legitim acy" led m a n y g ay activists, often steep ed in the a n tiw a r c u ltu re of th e 1970s, to lo o k askance at th e effort to lift th e "b a n " o n gays. But C lin to n 's "co m p ro m ise" left th e b a n larg ely in place. O nly if the c o u rts o v e rtu rn e d it (its p ro scrip tio n s o n speech m a d e it vulnerable) w o u ld the m ilita ry 's ch arter b e ren e w e d .123 T he m ilitary w o u ld rem ain a n im p o rta n t in stitu tio n , b u t m o re as a fu n -h o u se m irro r of A m erican society th a n as a fo rw ard -lo o k in g force. G iv en th e a ssu m p ­ tio n th a t th e n a tio n 's fate h in g ed o n its outcom e, th e 1993 d e b ate a tteste d to the p e rsistin g p rim acy of m ilitary institutio n s, b u t also to th eir eclipse— d im in ish in g as in stru m e n ts of A m erican p o w e r ab ro ad , th ey n o lo n g er w ar-

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ra n te d the social ren ew al u n d e rg o n e earlier. N in e te en n in ety -th ree w o u ld n o t recap itu late 1948, w h e n the im p erativ es of A m erican h eg em o n y seem ed to d e ­ m a n d change. T his tim e, th e inefficiencies a n d h y p o crisies of d iscrim in atio n w o u ld sta n d , ev en m ore easily because a sh rin k in g m ilitary sy stem h a d th e lux­ u ry of b ein g choosier, b y its lights, a b o u t w h o m it p u rp o rte d ly allo w ed to serve. It w a s e n o u g h th a t th e a rm e d forces replicate ra th e r th a n co n test w id e ly felt prejudices, since few an ticip ated th eir u se in som e m ajor a ssig n m en t ab ro ad . The u g ly outcom e of th is u g ly d eb ate revealed th a t m ilita riza tio n — a t least as it h a d o p e ra te d over th e p rev io u s h a lf-c en tu ry — w a s in decline. A g itation a b o u t im m ig ratio n in 1993 rev ealed m u c h th e sam e. T h o u g h long voiced, th e d e m a n d — from P at B uchan an a n d C alifornia g o v e rn o r Pete W ilson, am o n g o th e rs— m o u n te d th a t th e U n ited States literally fence off its b o rders, p a tro l th em w ith troops, a n d (W ilson p ro p o se d ) ch an g e th e C o n ­ stitu tio n to d e n y autom atic citizenship to a n y o n e b o m o n A m erican soil. T hese p ro p o sals d id a d d re ss a risin g p ro b le m — th e m o v em en t of m illions of p e o p le across b o rd e rs— to w h ich few co u n tries w ere fin d in g solutions. T hey also h a d ironic a n d u g ly d im ensions, how ever. A fter d ecad es of m o ralizin g a b o u t h o w th e "Iro n C u rtain " blocked th e m o v em en t of p e o p le across b o rd ers, m an y A m ericans n o w w a n te d th eir o w n b arriers, v e n tin g n a tiv ist im p u lses w ith d e ep roots in A m erican history. N o one serio u sly a rg u e d th a t C alifornia, al­ rea d y irrevocably polyglot, could a tta in som e eth n ically p u rifie d statu s, b u t th e m ove to fence off so u th e rn b o rd e rs sh o w ed sh a rp lines of class, color, a n d cul­ tu re still o p e ra tin g — it w a s a im ed largely a t L atin A m ericans, especially if p o o r a n d d ark -sk in n ed . In th e N o rth east, w h e re Irish a n d Italian s c o m p rised th e b ig ­ g est g ro u p s of illegal im m ig ran ts, n o c o m parab le a g itatio n arose. T hese p ro p o sals w ere also tied to m ilitarizatio n 's ch an g in g fortunes. T hey arose m o st vig o ro u sly in C alifornia, reeling from d efen se cutbacks. A n d th ey echoed a concept of security th a t p re d a te d th e m ilitarized era, one focused o n contin ental defense ra th e r th a n global hegem ony, o n A m erica as islan d fortress ra th e r th a n w o rld cop, o n its p u rity a t h o m e ra th e r th a n its p o w e r ab ro ad . The n o tio n th a t A m erica's b o rd e rs w ere key to its su rv iv al h a d a q u a in t rin g to it. In th e g reat age of m ilitarization, lead ers h a d a sk ed A m ericans to im agine a b o r­ derless globe on w h ich g eo g ra p h y m ea n t n o th in g a n d th reats to A m erica co u ld arise from the rem o test places. E m an atin g from m a n y of th e folks w h o d e ­ m a n d e d exclusion of h om osexuals from th e a rm e d forces, th e n a tiv ists' call to a rm A m erican b o rd ers c o n stitu ted a n o th e r im plicit rejection of th e a ssu m p ­ tions th a t h a d g u id e d A m erica's m ilitarization. To be sure, lead ers c o n tin u ed to see a n u n b o u n d e d w o rld , b u t n o w in eco­ nom ic m ore th a n m ilitary term s. C lin to n m a d e th e sh ift clear, em p h a sizin g th a t " o u r place in th e w o rld w ill b e d e te rm in e d as m u c h b y th e skills of o u r w o rk e rs as b y the stre n g th of o u r w eap o n s, as m u ch b y o u r ability to p u ll d o w n foreign tra d e b a rrie rs as o u r ability to breach d ista n t ram p a rts." T hose w ere finely b a l­ an ced w ords. "T he n e w w o rld ord er," the New York Times n o te d a b o u t C lin to n 's

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vision, "seam lessly in teg rates security a n d econom ics." The "ability to b reach d ista n t ra m p a rts" w a s h a rd ly re p u d ia te d , a n d th e ability "to p u ll d o w n foreign tra d e b a rrie rs" h a d a fam iliar aggressive rin g .124 Still, a t least for th e m o m en t, co v eted jobs a n d com petitive p ro d u cts, ra th e r th a n d a n g ero u s w e a p o n s a n d su b v ersiv e ideas, filled this P re sid e n t's visio n of a w o rld w ith o u t b o rd ers. T he am b ig u ities of a contracting m ilitarizatio n surfaced a g ain w h e n th e a d ­ m in istra tio n in te rv en e d in H aiti in th e a u tu m n of 1994. A con tin en tal ra th e r th a n global v iew of b o rd ers a n d d efense n e ed s d efin ed C lin to n 's case for in ter­ v e n tio n — n e ed e d , h e said, to keep H aitian s o u t of th e U n ited States. T he o p e ra ­ tio n sm acked of g u n b o a t d ip lo m acy before th e 1930s— of a tim e w h e n A m eri­ can in te rv en tio n w a s im p erialist b u t n o t fully m ilitarized , regional ra th e r th a n global in focus, a n d ov ertly racist in m otive. A s th en , racism in fo rm ed n o t ju st im p erialism b u t often the resistance to it— Perot d ecried "H aitian s as a p eo p le th a t practices voodoo, likes dictators, is too illiterate to p articip ate in a m ea n ­ in g fu l dem ocracy a n d lacks the 'S p irit of '7 6 ' n ecessary to achieve th eir o w n freed o m fro m a sm all arm y," as h is view s w ere su m m arized . "Is H aiti w o rth fig h tin g a n d d y in g for?" P erot asked. "N o!" h is au d ien ce rep lied .125 W h atev er th eir v iew s o n H aiti, m o st A m ericans, after tw o d ecad es of m em o rializin g th eir d e a d a n d m issing in w ar, seem ed to reg ard n o foreseeable m ess ab ro ad as w o rth th e loss of A m erican lives. C linton, w h o p ro b ab ly felt th e sam e w ay, sen sed th eir m ood, u sin g Jim m y C arter, Sam N u n n , a n d C olin Pow ell to b ro k er a d e al w ith H a iti's regim e th a t o b v iated a co n tested invasion; th e H a itian a rm y co u ld h a rd ly h ave resisted anyw ay, b u t n o t one A m erican life w a s to b e lost if conflict w a s avoidable. For his p a rt, C lin to n 's case for in te rv en tio n echoed th em es from A m erica's m ilitarized age. Like som e of his predecesso rs, h e seem ed to seek red e m p tio n ab ro a d for h is failures in dom estic policy, as if th e H aiti o p e ra tio n co u ld resto re (or create) a n im age of h im as a decisive leader, at a tim e w h e n his (an d ev ery ­ one else's) p ro p o sa l o n h e a lth care w a s in sham bles. By A u g u st 3,1994, h e w a s citing earlier w a r P resid en ts to asse rt his rig h t to in v ad e H aiti w ith o u t C orn g ress's assent. H aiti m a rk e d the th ird tim e h e h a d sp o k e n to A m erican s ab o u t m a tte rs of "n atio n al secu rity " from the O val O ffice— th e p lace h e rarely u se d in a d d re ssin g his p resu m ab ly w e ig h tier goals of health -care refo rm a n d econom ic revitalization. It w a s if the p resid en cy rem ain ed ab o v e all "S u p rem e H e a d q u a r­ ters," as D avid B roder co m m en ted , ra th e r th a n th e "less g ran d io se office" it h a d becom e (m erely " p a rt of a g o v ern m en tal sy stem th a t is b arely able to cope"). H is w o rd s o n th e eve of H a iti's in v asio n w ere u n c an n ily like B ush's o n th e eve of the G ulf W ar: "I k n o w th a t the U n ited States can n o t, in d e e d w e sh o u ld n o t be, the w o rld 's policem an," h e said in th e sh o p -w o rn m a n n e r b y w h ic h P resid en ts ren o u n ce a course a b o u t to b e tak en anyw ay, " b u t w h e n b ru ­ tality occurs close to o u r shores, it affects o u r n a tio n al in te rests."126 Yet h is cav eat— "close to o u r sh o re s"— w a s as im p o rta n t as th e fam iliar claim . U nlike B ush, C lin to n still h e sita te d to see a global w rit for A m erican

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p o w er. In d eed , h e seem ed tra p p e d . W h en h e trie d to act as c o m m a n d e r in chief a t "S u p rem e H e a d q u a rte rs," h e w a s assailed as a n im p o ste r d e fy in g th e w ish es of C ongress a n d m o st A m ericans. W h en h e trie d to d o n a d ifferen t h at, h e w a s assailed for neglecting h is d u tie s as com m an d er. T h at p a tte rn o f criticism su g ­ g ested h o w m u ch p u n d its a n d critics c o n tin u ed to ju d g e P resid en ts o n th eir p erceived perfo rm an ce in the arena of w ar, ev en in a n a tio n w ith little e v id e n t taste for going to w a r— as if th e aren a still h e ld p rim acy e v en th o u g h th e act of w a r m ak in g d id not. P art of C lin to n 's p ro b lem w a s h is relu ctan ce to sta te h is reaso n s for settin g a sid e o ld er visions of a m u scu lar, m ilitarized A m erica— as in th e gays-in-the-m ilitary debate, h e w ro n g ly th o u g h t h e co u ld a p p e a se th e forces of p atrio tic ard o r, w h o in tu rn on ly rid ic u le d h im each tim e h e b o w e d to them . M oreover, p h ra se s like A m erica's "sacred m issio n " a b ro a d — u se d b y C lin to n before the U n ited N atio n s o n S eptem b er 26— w ere fra u g h t w ith W il­ so n ian peril. Still, w h e n h e d id state h is vision, his in tellig en t a tte n tio n to th e com plexities of th e p o s t-C o ld W ar w o rld go t lo st in b lith e m ed ia su m m aries. C learly, n o t all of this w as C lin to n 's doing. The fact th a t q u estio n s of stead i­ ness, resolve, a n d m anliness h a d also d o g g e d B ush (the " w im p " factor)— a v e ry different politician a n d p erso n ality — su g g e ste d th a t su c h q u estio n s re­ flected less the in d iv id u a l th a n th e state of political culture. In th a t cu ltu re, d e ­ sire to p u t aside A m erica's m ilitarized p a st clash ed w ith b e w ild e rm e n t ab o u t w h a t w o u ld replace it. The resu ltin g frictions to re a w ay a t C lin to n as th ey h a d at Bush, ev en th o u g h C linton could b o a st a reaso n ab le econom ic recovery, long reg a rd ed as the necessary p rec o n d itio n for a n y P re sid e n t's reelection. In b o th cases, feckless lea d ersh ip a g g ra v ate d the frictions b u t d id n o t create them . The cliché— th a t A m ericans deserv e th e P resid en ts th ey g e t— m ay w ell apply. In ­ decisive A m ericans— o r m ore accurately, a political c u ltu re w h o se in tern al ten ­ sions p ro d u c e d in d ecisio n — go t indecisive leaders. The outcom e of the g ays-in-the-m ilitary d eb ate, like H aiti a n d o th er d e v el­ o p m en ts in C lin to n 's presidency, w a s a m b ig u o u s e n o u g h to d efeat firm conclu­ sions a b o u t its m eaning. O n th eir ow n, su ch m o m en ts d id n o t set th e pace of A m erica's exit from its m ilitarized age, w h ich w o u ld b e d e te rm in e d also b y C lin to n 's success w ith a ltern ativ e agendas. The m ere fact th a t A m erican s vig o r­ o u sly d e b ated h e alth care a n d the N o rth A m erican Free T rade A g reem en t h in te d a t success in th a t re g a rd — the d u ll if v ital m a tte r of tariff a n d tra d e legis­ latio n (as o p p o se d to the h e ated b u t su b stan tiv ely th in " tra d e w a r" talk of the 1980s) h a d n o t stirred m a n y A m ericans since th e m u sty d a y s of th e Sm ootH aw ley tariff d eb ate sixty y ears earlier. Yet p ro g ress o n m an y of those m atters w as rem ote, a n d n o issue a t the sta rt of C lin to n 's p resid en cy g e n erate d th e fire of gays-in-the-m ilitary. The ep iso d e su g g ested h o w h e a te d ly th e con tractio n of m ilitarizatio n w o u ld b e c o n te sted — b u t, ironically, a d v an c ed as w e ll— b y p re ­ su m e d d efen d ers of A m erican m artial pow er. Politics at m id -d ecad e revealed an ew h o w rag g ed a n d u g ly co ntraction w o u ld be. C linton, refashioning him self as d ip lo m atic a n d m ilitary lead er, of-

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ten sim p ly d isa p p e a re d from the scene of dom estic policy d e b a te — a n d from th e n a tio n itself— late in 1994. T h at m ove sh o red u p h is p e rso n al p o p u la rity a b it a n d y ield ed som e specific accom plishm en ts— in places like H aiti, w h ere the U n ited States o p e ra te d w ith a free h a n d , a n d in b ip a rtisa n initiatives like th e G en eral A g reem en t o n Tariffs a n d T rade (GATT), th o u g h n o t in Bosnia, w h e re th e d ecisions w ere tougher. But it also left h im offering a p ale im itatio n of the o ld e r m o d el of P re sid e n t as co m m an d e r in ch ief— o n e insufficient to q u ell con­ serv ativ e fu ro r at h im b u t a d e q u a te to liq u id ate a n y challenge o n h is p a rt to the n a tio n 's m ilitarized legacy. For th eir p a rt, m a n y R epublicans, gloatin g a b o u t retak in g C ongress a n d of­ ferin g an tistatist rhetoric scarcely ch an g ed from a h alf-cen tu ry earlier, said little a b o u t w h a t g o v e rn m e n t m ig h t do, except k eep th e n a tio n m ilitarily stro n g a n d m o rally v irtu o u s. T hey— a n d som etim es C lin to n a d m in istra tio n lead ers as w e ll— spoke a n d acted as if the fed eral go v ern m en t, in th e absence of w a r as a n im m e d ia te th re a t or a com pelling p a ra d ig m , sh o u ld sim p ly sh u t d o w n : th ere w a s little o th er b u sin ess it co u ld legitim ately o r co m p eten tly p erfo rm . Ele­ m e n ts of th e far-right fringe to o k th a t prem ise to b iza rre extrem es in th e g ru e ­ som e A p ril 1995 b o m b in g of a federal b u ild in g in O k lah o m a City. For its p a rt. C o n g ress trie d to act o n th a t p rem ise as it w as em b o d ied in th e G O P 's "C o n tract w ith A m erica," b y cu ttin g p ro g ram s th a t b en efited p o o rer o r politically m ar­ g in al A m ericans. Fittingly, m easu res like fed eral fu n d in g of school lunches, ini­ tia te d in the 1940s to m ake p o o r y o u th m ore fit to serve th e n a tio n in a n age of peril, w ere am o n g those u n d e r assault, e v en as d isp arities of w e a lth a n d in ­ com e am o n g A m ericans reached levels u n m a tc h e d in o th er W estern n atio n s. T he d isso lu tio n of n a tio n al security as a d o m in a n t fram ew o rk rev ealed h o w m u c h social w elfare p ro g ram s, like m u c h else th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t d id , h a d o w e d to th a t fram ew ork. M id-1990s politics also rev ealed h o w m u ch th e p resid en cy itself o w e d to th a t fram ew ork. N o t since early in th e cen tu ry h a d C ongress a p p e a re d so d o m i­ n a n t, w ith Speaker of th e H o u se N e w t G ingrich trea te d alm o st like a rival P resi­ d en t. A t tim es C linton seem ed alm o st irrelev an t, b u t a lth o u g h h is low profile w a s a ttrib u te d to failings in his o w n lead ersh ip , it o w e d m ore, as B ush's fate after th e G ulf W ar h a d alre ad y su g g ested , to th e sh rin k ag e of n a tio n al secu rity as a n arena for vig o ro u s p resid en tia l leadersh ip . By th e sam e token, C lin to n seem ed m o st p a ssio n ate a n d significant w h e n h e co u ld redefine th a t aren a b y se rv in g as th e n a tio n 's "co m m an d e r in ch ief" for d om estic d isaster a n d v io­ lence. H e p u sh e d a crim e bill th ro u g h C ongress in 1994, p le d for g u n control, en erg ized federal relief efforts in the w ak e of n a tu ra l a n d m an -m ad e disasters, a n d , especially after th e O k lah o m a C ity bom b in g , seized th e m ed ia b u lly p u lp it to in sist th a t n atio n al g o v e rn m e n t still h a d a role to p lay in th e realm of d o m es­ tic security. In d eed , one form of g ro w th in fed eral action th a t m o st politicians s u p p o rte d w as efforts to curb violence a n d terro rism a t h o m e a n d overseas, w ith th e U n ited States ex p o rtin g its crim e-fighting a p p a ra tu s w h ile its w ar-

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fig h tin g a p p a ra tu s ab ro ad contracted. T hose efforts in d icated b o th th e co n tin ­ u e d salience of n atio n al security as ratio n ale for fed eral activism a n d its m u ch altered te rm s— in its new , m ore in w a rd form , crim inals a n d terro rists a t h o m e su p p la n te d c o m m u n ists a n d o th e r th reats ab ro ad . G iven th a t shift in term s, w h a t g o v e rn m e n t m ig h t d o in a m o re co n v en tio n al m ilitary m o d e seem ed unclear. R epublicans' calls for increased d efen se sp e n d ­ in g ra n g hollow , p ro b ab ly irrelev an t to th e ir success in th e 1994 elections. C lin­ to n h a d barely b e en c u ttin g su ch sp e n d in g a n y w a y — a n d m o v ed after th e elec­ tio n s to raise it— a n d lea d in g R epublicans o p p o se d ev ery m o v e o n h is p a rt to u se A m erican forces ab ro ad , leaving th em to c h am p io n a larg er d efen se force for w h ich th ey o u tlin ed alm o st n o practical p u rp o se . The risin g tid e of a n ti­ im m ig ran t sentim ent, sh a red b y som e D em ocrats a n d d isa v o w ed b y som e Re­ pu b licans, in d icated th a t n a tio n al security c o n tin u ed to be reconceived as a m atter of g u a rd in g A m erica's b o rd e rs ra th e r th a n p a tro llin g far-flung ou tp o sts. The p rio rities of patrio tic conservatives also em erg ed in th e ir d e fe at of th e N atio n al A ir a n d Space M u se u m 's p la n to d isp lay th e Enola Gay b o m b er th a t h a d attacked H iroshim a. In th a t fracas, th ey stressed th a t th e atom ic b o m b s of 1945 h a d saved A m erican so ld iers' lives, ju st as th ey d e m a n d e d th a t n o su ch lives b e lost ab ro a d in 1995. In te n t o n celebratin g p a s t m ilitary glory, th ey also in d icated th a t su ch glory b elo n g ed in a m u se u m ra th e r th a n in fu tu re b attle­ fields. Patriotic poses, th a t is, serv ed to d isg u ise ra th e r th a n to a rre st m artia l decline. Som e R epublicans e v en w o rk e d to d isc red it tire v e ry a u th o rity th e y d e em ed necessary for the m u sc u la r n a tio n th ey claim ed to esp o u se. N o rth C aro lin a G O P sen ato r Jesse H elm s d eclared th a t C lin to n w a s u n fit to b e c o m m a n d e r in chief a n d th a t h e h a d "b etter h av e a b o d y g u a rd " if h e v isited H elm s's state b e­ cause th e P resid en t h a d "serio u s p ro b lem s w ith h is reco rd of d ra ft av o id an ce, w ith h is sta n d o n hom o sex u als in th e m ilita ry a n d w ith th e d e clin in g defen se cap ab ility of A m erica's a rm e d forces."127 T hose c o m m en ts— close to in v itin g C linton's resignation, or violence against h im — su g g ested th a t A m erica's p o w e r in th e w o rld n o w w a s h a rd ly e v en a t issue. In stead , as H elm s's reference to " h o ­ m osexuals" m a d e clear, c u ltu ra l politics, th o u g h n e v e r in sep arab le fro m q u e s­ tio n s of p o w e r ab ro ad , ruled. In d eed , m an y conservatives so u g h t to rev iv e a n d in ten sify th e "cu ltu ral w a rs" of the 1980s. A s Irv in g K ristol, one of th eir intellectu al g o d fath ers, p u t it in 1993: "T here is n o 'a fte r the C old W a r' for m e. So far fro m h a v in g e n d e d , m y cold w a r h a s increased in intensity, as sector after sector of A m erican life h as b e en ru th lessly c o rru p te d b y the liberal eth o s . . . . N o w th a t th e o th e r 'C o ld W ar,' is over, the real cold w a r h a s b e g u n ," one for w h ic h "w e are far less p re ­ p a re d " a n d in w h ich w e are "far m ore v u ln e ra b le ."128 Such sta te m e n ts m a d e clear th a t raising th e defense b u d g e t w a s irrelev an t to th e a g en d a of m an y co n serv ativ es— except as a n o th e r m ean s to w a g e th e "real cold w ar," a tellin g

FAREWELL TO MILITARIZATION?

1988-1995

497

p h ra s e th a t called in to q u e stio n h o w m u c h th e C o ld W ar of th e p a s t h a d actu­ ally h a d to d o w ith th e global clash of a rm a m e n ts a n d ideologies. C lear, too, w a s h o w m u c h th e apocalyptic o u tlo o k of a m ilitarized era n o w d e fin e d A m erican s' v iew s of each o th er ra th e r th a n th eir sen se of th rea ts ab ro ad . T he real " w a r" ra g e d a t ho m e, a t least in th e sensibilities of m a n y A m ericans. In it, co n servatives n o w so u n d e d th e triu m p h a l n o te th a t h a d seem ed so feeble a t th e e n d of th e C o ld W ar ab ro a d in th e 1980s— for n o w th ey sen sed real v icto ry in th e "rea l cold w a r," a g ain st th e ir p re su m e d dom estic foes. L iberals, a lth o u g h th ey to o m o stly h a d b e en C old W arriors (often m o re z ealo u s o nes th a n p ro ­ fessed conservatives), w ere tre a te d — a n d o ften seem ed to act— like d efeated enem ies, d riv e n from the b attlefield of politics. H o w lo n g th a t p a rtic u la r p o li­ tical outcom e w o u ld last w a s u n c ertain a t m id -d e c a d e — A m erican politics seem ed m o re m ercu rial th a n ever, a n d C lin to n w a s a resilient if n o t alw ay s p u r­ p o sefu l figure. Still, a t m id -d e ca d e th e m o st in tractab le legacy of th e age of m il­ ita riz a tio n w a s n o t so m u c h arm ies a n d defen se b u d g e ts b u t th e w arlik e states of m in d th a t m a n y A m ericans in d u lg e d a b o u t o n e another.

C O N C L U S IO N

The fu tu re of A m erica's m ilitarizatio n h in g ed o n th e politics of C lin to n 's p resi­ dency, b u t ev en m ore o n p a tte rn s set o v er a m u ch lo n g er arc of history. A s w ith in d u strializatio n , the U n ited States ro d e the h istorical w av e of m ilitarizatio n ra th e r th a n settin g it in m otion, b u t b ecam e b y th e m id -tw e n tie th c en tu ry its p rim a ry m otor, triu m p h a n t practitioner, a n d chief beneficiary, as m u ch as one n a tio n could be. Its m o st u n su llie d success cam e in W orld W ar II, w h e n it d id m u ch , if w ith m ore A llied h elp th a n m o st A m ericans a ck n o w led g ed , to secure victo ry over the A xis pow ers. A m ore a m b ig u o u s ach iev em en t e m e rg ed o u t of th e C o ld W ar. It w a s u n clear h o w m u ch the m ilitary p o w e r of the U n ited States a n d its allies co n tain ed or, conversely, p ro v o k ed th eir C old W ar o p p o n en ts. M ost likely, it d id bo th . By the sam e token, it p ro b ab ly h e lp e d b o th to p e rp e tu a te th e Soviet reg im e (w hich d e p e n d e d ev en m ore th a n the A m erican v ersio n o n h av in g a n en em y to legiti­ m ate it) a n d to increase the strain s o n it th a t cau sed its dem ise. It w a s also likely th a t victory o w ed m ore to A m erica's econom ic, ideological, a n d c u ltu ral stre n g th th a n to its technological a n d m ilitary su p re m a c y — a lth o u g h those form s of p o w e r are closely lin k e d — in p a rt b ecau se w a r as a u sab le tool of p o w e r for g reat n a tio n s w as in decline. T he am b ig u ity of victo ry w a s com ­ p o u n d e d b y h o w m u c h it cost the U n ited States: m ilitarizatio n sa p p e d its eco­ nom ic po w er, its political sy stem 's responsiv en ess, its freed o m fro m coercive state p ow er, a n d its ability to resolve or finesse in te rn al conflicts. H o w ev er the necessity a n d efficacy of A m erica's m ilitary p o w e r in th e C old W ar are a ssessed — m atters a b o u t w h ich h isto ria n s a p p e a r d o o m ed to d isag ree for a long tim e— it is also clearer n o w th a t ex tern al th rea ts w ere n o t th e only p rec ip ita n t to A m erica's m ilitarization. O th erw ise, its m ilitary p o w e r m ig h t n o t h av e a ssu m e d su ch g a rg a n tu an , baro q u e, m enacing, a n d o ften useless d im e n ­ sions. A m erica's m ilitarizatio n d e riv e d as m u ch from im p u lses w ith in th e n a ­ tio n as from forces im p in g in g o n it (insofar as th e tw o can be d istin g u ish ed , since each sh a p e d p ercep tio n s of the o th er a n d b o th w ere g en erally su b su m e d u n d e r, th o u g h n o t alw ay s b e h o ld e n to, the fram ew o rk of th e C old War). H isto rian s are, it is true, rig h tly w a ry of g ra n d g en eralizin g a b o u t su ch im ­ p u lses, lest th ey obscure A m ericans' m an y differences w ith each o th e r— a n d th eir m a n y sim ilarities to o th er nations. Still, A m erican political c u ltu re fea­ tu re d p e rsisten t if n o t u n iq u e m o o d s— d istru st of p o w e rfu l g o v e rn m e n t except w h e n w a r v a lid ates it, lo nging for the u n ity a n d p ro g ress th a t w a r seem s to entail, a sp iratio n s for m ilitary p o w e r a n d global h egem ony, a n d anxieties

CON CLU SION

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a b o u t th e costs in c u rre d in a tta in in g them . To h ig h lig h t th o se im p u lse s n e e d n o t o b scure differences a m o n g A m ericans. In stead , it su g g ests h o w th o se d if­ ferences w e re acco m m o d ated , ch an n eled , o r o n occasion cru sh ed . In d ee d , su b ­ o rd in ate g ro u p s o ften (if reluctantly) h itc h ed th eir fo rtu n es to w a r specifically o r m ilita riza tio n g en erally — m o st strik in g ly am o n g A frican-A m ericans in the 1940s a n d 1950s, in a process still o n g o in g ju d g e d b y th e sta tu re of so m eo n e like G en. C olin Pow ell. To b e sure, co rp o rate a n d p o litical elites a n d th e ir ju n io r p a rtn e rs g en erally controlled su c h processes, b u t th ey co u ld d o so in p a rt b e­ cause those processes also ta p p e d th e a sp iratio n s a n d anxieties of m o st A m eri­ cans. A risin g from m a n y sources, the u rg e to m a rsh a l a n effective state, in d ee d a p ro sp e ro u s a n d p o w e rfu l n atio n , im p a rte d m u c h of th e en erg y a n d ch aracter of A m erica's m ilitarization. T he resu lt w a s the p e cu lia rly rag g e d , quixotic co u rse of its m ilitarizatio n . L arge c h u n k s of th e n a tio n 's ecology, econom y, politics, c u ltu ra l life, a n d social relatio n s— ev ery th in g th a t defines a n a tio n — b ecam e a n n ex e d to th is histo rical process. Yet A m erica's m ilita riza tio n n e v e r to o k th e to talizing, sin g lem in d ed co u rse associated w ith N a z i G erm any, Im p erial Japan, o r Stalinist Soviet U nion. Lacking to tal co n tro l (or e v en co h eren t direction) a t th e top, th e tool m o re th a n the objective of d iv erse interests, th e m ean s for m arsh alin g th e state m o re th a n its o v e rrid in g goal, m ilitarizatio n in th e A m erican in stance w a s a diffuse p h en o m en o n . T here w ere o th e r reasons, too, th a t th e A m erican v e rsio n w o rk e d o u t in p a r­ tial a n d u n e v e n w ays. By n a tu re , m ilitarizatio n , like in d u stria liz atio n , w a s com plex a n d m ultifaceted: in d iv id u a ls a n d in terests co u ld g rasp o n e asp ect of it a n d resist another. Ju st as n in etee n th -ce n tu ry w o rk e rs c o u ld flock to factory jobs a n d cling to p re -in d u stria l w o rk rh y th m s, o r b u sin e ss m o g u ls c o u ld forge o rg an izatio n al discipline a n d celebrate heroic in d iv id u a lism , so in th e tw e n ­ tie th c en tu ry liberals co u ld y e a rn for th e triu m p h of A m erica's m ech an ized a rm y over fascist enem ies a n d b ew ail its racist a n d d e h u m a n iz in g w ay s, so u th ­ e rn po liticians c o u ld em brace th e C o ld W ar b u t tu rn a b lin d eye to its im p lica­ tio n s for th eir o w n racial ideology, a n d L y n d o n Jo h n so n co u ld d eclare h is com ­ m itm e n t to peace a n d w a g e " w a r" at h o m e a n d ab ro ad . If a m ea su re of m y o p ia o r h y p o crisy w a s in v o lv ed in these d isc o rd a n t p o stu res, so too w a s th e sh eer com plexity of th e h isto rical process. T here n e v e r w a s a single, u n ita ry "m ilitar­ izatio n " e ith er to em brace o r reject. T hen too, A m ericans rarely a d m itte d th a t th ey w ere e n g ag e d in m ilitarizin g th eir n atio n , T hey d efin ed o r re sp o n d e d to crises a t h o m e a n d ab ro ad , b u t few co n ceptualized a g ra n d h isto rical process. A rth u r Schlesinger, Jr.'s 1949 n o tio n of a "p e rm a n e n t crisis" c a p tu re d th eir u ncertain ty : "crisis" su g g e ste d a n em er­ gency d e m a n d in g s u d d e n im p ro v isatio n , " p e rm a n e n t" so m eth in g else in ­ d e e d .1 In th e d o m in a n t A m erican view , m ilitarizatio n w a s so m e th in g th a t w a r­ like or to ta litaria n n a tio n s em b raced , n o t th e U n ited States. By d e n y in g th eir n a tio n 's e n g ag em en t in it, A m ericans im p a rte d to it m u c h of its feverish, capri-

500

CON CLU SION

cious n a tu re — the s u d d e n p lu n g e into action ab ro ad , th e crash p ro g ra m to b u ild a n e w w eap o n , th e hysterical w itch -h u n t, th e em erg en cy effort to tackle p o v e rty o r AIDS o r d ru g s. A t th e sam e tim e, h o w ev er, th ey c u rtailed th e p ro ­ cess. Insofar as th ey d e n ie d its existence, it lacked a p e rm a n e n t ideological fo u n d atio n . Seen as a n em ergency resp o n se to o th ers' th reats, it h a d legitim acy on ly as long as su ch th rea ts rem a in e d plausible. E specially after th e m id-1960s, a n o d d a sso rtm en t of g ro u p s— m o ral conserv ativ es, tro u b le d liberals, im p a s­ sio n ed radicals, w o rrie d ecologists, p ro p h e ts of econom ic d o o m — ch allen g ed (not alw ay s consciously) th a t p lau sib ility a n d c h am p io n e d , albeit o ften in w a r­ like term s, a g en d a s of dom estic ren ew al th a t p u sh e d ex tern al th rea ts to th e side. The n a tio n 's econom ic a n d political characteristics also lim ited th e scale a n d d isru p te d the co u rse of its m ilitarization. W h en A m erican a b u n d a n c e seem ed alm o st lim itless, as in th e 1940s a n d 1950s, m ilitarizatio n h a d seem ed alm o st p ain lessly affordable, e v en econom ically beneficial, w ith b o th g u n s a n d b u tte r read ily attainable. W h en a b u n d a n c e a p p e a re d im p e rile d after th e m id-1960s, g ro w in g n u m b e rs of A m ericans q u e stio n e d m ilitarizatio n . T olerance for its e n ­ croachm ents o n A m erican s' liberties w a s also lim ite d — sufficient to p e rm it gross ab u ses b u t h a rd ly to d e stro y all c o n strain ts o n th e sta te 's po w er. P erh aps m o st of all, b u t h a rd e st to p ro v e, m ilitarizatio n w a s quixotic, cap ri­ cious, a n d c o n tin g en t because w a r itself, in th e sense of b o m b s a n d b u llets a n d d estru ctio n , rem ain ed a sh a d o w y presence in th e lives of m o st A m ericans. T hey im ag in ed w a r floridly, th ey tra n sp o se d its w o rd s a n d im ag es a n d em o­ tio n s to th eir o w n stru g g les in strik in g w ay s, a n d th ey w o rrie d g reatly a n d sin ­ cerely a b o u t its o u tb rea k in th e final cataclysm . But w a r rem a in e d largely a n aren a n o t of experience b u t of im ag in atio n , w h e re it co u ld b e p la y e d o u t a n d acted o n in lavish w ays. In th eir h e arts, A m erican s lo n g ed for w a r 's sp irit m o re th a n its substance, ev en th o u g h th e line b e tw ee n real a n d im a g in ary w a rs often b lu rred . T h at longing c o n trib u te d in tu rn to th eir difficulty in e x p lain in g th e in te rn al q u arrels th a t increasingly b eset them . T hey d id h av e exp lan atio n s. By the 1990s, v a rio u s A m ericans p o in te d to th e a sp iratio n s, o ften co u ch ed in a lan ­ g u ag e of victim hoo d, of m arg in al social g ro u p s, o r to th e resistance th o se asp i­ ratio n s m et; to the rise of in terest-g ro u p politics a n d th e d ecay of a co m m o n culture; to the c ru m b lin g fo u n d atio n s of A m erican p ro sp erity , a n d to th e social conflict th a t h a rd tim es p resu m ab ly yield. A ll th ese e x p lan atio n s h a d validity, b u t som e describ ed sy m p to m s m ore th a n causes a n d m o st g o t co u ch ed in a p e r­ sisten t b u t m islead in g lan g u ag e of w ar. The h isto ry of m ilitarizatio n offered a n o th e r ex p lan atio n for A m erican s' in ­ tern a l quarrels. W orld W ar II a n d the C old W ar h a d g iv en m o st A m ericans co m m o n sym bols, enem ies, a n d p u rp o se s, a u n ity b o th real a n d fictive b u t su f­ ficient to obscure o r co n tain m a n y of the conflicts sim m erin g am o n g th em . A f­ ter th e 1960s, the U n ited States w e n t th ro u g h th e th ro es of a p o stw a r era, of th e

CONCLUSION

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so rt th a t com m o n ly o p e n s the floodgates of in te rn al conflict for natio n s, ju st as it en co u rag es challenges to cen tralized au th o rity a n d a m o re d iso rd e rly p o li­ tics. B ut because th e decline of w arlik e unity, like th e process of d em ilitariza­ tio n itself, w a s so rag g ed , p artial, a n d p ro tra c te d — a tw enty-five y ear p ro cess— it lacked the clarity, th e preciseness of m o m en t, e v id e n t in th e afterm a th of earlier w ars, m ak in g it h a rd to see A m erican s' in tern al stru g g les as, a t least in p a rt, th e d o w n sid e of w a r 's end. O n ly w ith th e final d em ise of th e C old W ar in th e 1980s d id th a t ex p lan atio n g a in som e credence, a n d ev en th e n o th er ex p lan atio n s p lau sib ly co m p eted w ith it, w h ile th e recu rren ce of real w a r a b ro a d in th e G u lf a n d su p p o se d w a rs a t h o m e fu rth e r co n fu sed th e m atter. But it w a s n o w o n d e r th a t A m ericans set a b o u t red efin in g w h a t th e n a tio n w a s a n d q u a rre le d o v e r th e c o m p etin g d efin itio n s offered— a su p e rp o w e r, a q u e e r n a ­ tion, a m u ltic u ltu ra l n atio n , a C h ristian n a tio n (p erh ap s u n d e r "th e C h ristian flag" to w h ic h D an Q u ay le p le d g e d allegiance in 1994)?2 Such q u a rre ls a lw ay s seem ra w a n d fresh, a n d in d ee d th e ir term s h a d ch an g ed , b u t th ey w ere h a rd ly n e w — th ey e ru p te d after all of A m erica's w ars. G ra sp in g th e historical b re a d th a n d d e p th of m ilitarizatio n also en co u rag es cau tio n a b o u t ju d g in g A m ericans h a rsh ly for th eir p u z z le d resp o n ses to th eir q u arrels. T h at process d o m in a te d A m erican life for a half-century, a n d p lay e d a m ajor role in it for e v en longer. D isengaging from it— or, m ore m odestly, m o v ­ in g it from th e center to the p e rip h e ry of A m erican life— w o u ld p lau sib ly tak e as lo n g as e n g ag in g it d id , especially in a still strife-to m w o rld . To expect th a t A m ericans w o u ld d isen g ag e w ith few co n v u lsio n s a n d little con fu sio n w a s silly. W e m ay lam en t feverish m o m en ts like th e G ulf W ar w h e n lead ers clu n g d e sp era tely to the p a s t a n d lu rch ed b lin d ly in to th e fu tu re, b u t w e n e e d n o t b e su rp rise d b y th em o r th in k th a t th ey indicate th a t ch an g e is sim p ly n o t h a p p e n ­ in g a t all. W h eth er th e g rea t age of m ilitarizatio n w as e n d in g for th e U n ited States in th e m id-1990s also d e p e n d e d o n forces o v er w h ich it h a d seem in g ly d eclin in g control: n atio n al, ethnic, a n d religious conflict ab ro ad , a n d th e m ig ratio n s set loose b y it; th e c o n tin u in g sp re a d of m ilitary technologies, n o w fu rth e re d b y exco m m u n ist c o u n tries d e sp e ra te to sell th e few w o rth w h ile p ro d u c ts th ey h ad ; th e p la n e ta ry reach of co rp o ratio n s a n d com m u n icatio n s; a n d global ecological pro b lem s, econom ic rivalries, a n d d isp a rities b e tw ee n "h av e" a n d "h av e-n o t" n atio n s. In d ee d , so im m en se w e re these forces a n d p ro b lem s th at, as stap le c o m m en ta ry h a d it, n a tio n s a n d g o v e rn m e n ts n o lo n g er h a d m u c h control o v er them . "T he balance of p o w e r in w o rld politics h a s sh ifted in recen t y ears from territo rially b o u n d g o v e rn m e n ts to com panies th a n can ro am th e w o rld ," Rich­ a rd B arnet asserted . "T he n e x t w o rld w ar, if th ere is on e," p red ic te d scholar Sam uel P. H u n tin g to n , "w ill b e a w a r b e tw ee n civilizations," n o t n atio n s.3 P red ictions a b o u t the decline of n a tio n s a n d th eir w a rs h a d a p p e a re d th ro u g h o u t the century, h o w e v e r— along w ith th e ritu a l claim th a t "th e w o rld is b eco m in g sm aller," as H u n tin g to n p u t it— o n ly to recede before th e forces of

502

CONCLUSION

n atio n al p o w e r a n d identity. Likew ise, the c e n tu ry 's n a tio n al w a rs h a d alw ay s featu red tran sn atio n a l elem en ts of cu ltu ral, racial, ideological, a n d econom ic hostility. N o d efinitive ch an g e in th a t m ix w a s likely in th e n e x t century: n a ­ tio n s w o u ld rem a in im p o rta n t a n d A m erican s co u ld still try to defin e th e m ­ selves in a tro u b le d w o rld . T hey w e re n o t d o in g so im ag in ativ ely in th e 1990s. P re sid e n t C lin to n , Sena­ to r M o y n ih an co m p lain ed in 1993, " h a s n 't go n e n e a r th o se in stitu tio n s" like th e CIA th a t arose u n d e r m ilitarization. W ith th e C o ld W a r's e n d h e sh o u ld ask, " 'w h a t d o I n e e d th is for? A n d w h a t d o I n e e d th a t for?' " By a n d large, m o st lead ers w e re n o t asking. R eactions to v a rio u s fiftieth an n iv e rsa rie s of th e m o ­ m en to u s ev en ts of W orld W ar II b o th d isp la y e d a n d exacerb ated th e b a c k w a rd ­ lo o k in g focus. U n d e rsta n d a b ly p ro u d a n d p atrio tic, th e celeb ratio n of D -D ay's fiftieth an n iv e rsa ry in 1994 w a s also d istu rb in g ly n o stalg ic— a n d p ro v in cial as w ell, carried o n as if th e Soviet U n io n h a d h a rd ly e v e n p a rtic ip a te d in G er­ m a n y 's defeat. A ch o ru s of p ro te st arose a g ain st a n effort b y th e N a tio n a l A ir a n d Space M u seu m to p re se n t A m erica's u se of th e atom ic b o m b a g ain st Jap an as so m eth in g m ore com plex th a n a n act of rig h te o u s a n d n ecessary ven g ean ce. N o w o n d e r P aul K ennedy w o rrie d th a t A m ericans, like th e B ritish in d eclin e a c en tu ry earlier, th o u g h t it "b e tte r to 'm u d d le ' th ro u g h ' " th a n to c h art a n e w course.4 A m ericans w o u ld likely d rift aw ay from th eir m ilita rize d p ast. By som e m ea­ sures, th ey h a d b e e n d o in g so since the e n d of th e V ietn am W ar, a n d b y th e 1990s the forces p u llin g th e m a w ay w ere substan tial: th e absence of a fo rm id a ­ ble enem y, the d u b io u s u tility of reso rtin g to w ar, th e rise of econom ic chal­ lenges, the sw elling b u rd e n of o th er respo n sib ilities (h ealth care alone n o w seized 14 p e rc en t of G N P, o v e r tw ice th a t d e v o te d to defense), a n d th e u n h a p p y outcom e of the m a n y " w a rs" th ey h a d w a g e d am o n g each other. B ut th ey w o u ld d rift aw ay from th a t p a s t fitfully, w ith o u t re p u d ia tin g it, o r e v e n m u c h ack n o w led g in g th a t it h a d existed. In the take-off p h a se of m ilitarizatio n , F ranklin R oosevelt h a d offered a g ra n d ly rea so n e d if n o t alw ay s h o n e st ratio ­ n ale in its behalf. In its w a n in g h o u rs, few lead ers sp o k e in b eh alf of its liq u id a ­ tion. T here w ere goo d reaso n s for th e difference: w ar. W orld W ar II in FD R's case, concentrates the m in d ; peace rarely does, especially w h e n it em erg es ra g ­ g ed ly a n d partially. Still, one h o p e d for m ore celeb ratio n of peace alo n g sid e the w arin ess a b o u t its stay in g po w er, a n d for m o re d e lib era tio n a b o u t th e o p p o r­ tu n ities it offered to w rig g le free of a m ilita rize d p ast. T hose o p p o rtu n itie s co u ld take several form s. N o n e in v o lv ed a co m p lete b rea k from the p ast, b u t th e U n ited States m ig h t b ecom e a resid u ally m il­ itarized n atio n , u sin g a sc ale d -d o w n m ilitary force in circu m sp ect fashion. It m ig h t keep m ilitarized in stitu tio n s b u t b e n d th e m to n e w p u rp o se s, as in efforts of th e 1990s to red ep lo y w e ap o n s labs a n d p ro c u re m e n t agencies to the stru g g le for econom ic vitality, to u se P en tag o n m o n ey to "co n v ert" d efen se in ­ d u strie s to civilian p ro d u c tio n (an d th ereb y re ta in a n in d u stria l b ase for p ro -

CON CLU SION

503

d u c in g w eap o n s), to en larg e th e m ilita ry 's role in th e " w a r" a g ain st d ru g s, to sw ell police forces w ith ex-soldiers, a n d to d isp a tc h m ilitary officers to innercity schools in o rd e r to teach "at-risk " y o u th (u su ally n o n w h ite) "discip lin e a n d life skills."5 W ar a n d m ilitarizatio n th em selv es m ig h t d iv erg e fu rth e r fro m each o th er, as th ey a lre ad y h a d in th e 1970s a n d 1980s. N a tio n s can, after all, b e w a r­ like b u t n o t v e ry m ilita rize d — like th e U n ited States w h e n it ru sh e d in to the M exican-A m erican W ar— o r b e m ilitarized b u tn o t v e ry w arlik e, like th e Soviet U n io n after 1945. P red ictin g th e fate of A m erica's m ilitarizatio n is difficult, h o w ev er, n o t only for th e o bvious reaso n th a t h isto ria n s are p o o r a t p red ictio n , b u t b ecau se of th e p a u city of in stru ctiv e exam ples am o n g o th er natio n s. W h en o th er m o d e m n a ­ tio n s h av e re p u d ia te d o r d rifte d aw ay from a m ilitarized course, w ar, in tern al d isso lu tio n , o r b o th h a s u su a lly cataly zed th e change. France, G reat Britain, G erm any, a n d o th er W estern E u ro p ea n p o w e rs u n d e rw e n t th a t ch an g e after 1945, in goo d p a rt because tw o w o rld w a rs, reg ard less of w h e th e r th ey w ere victo rious, left th e m ex h au ste d a n d p a rtially d estro y ed , d im in ish in g th eir w ill a n d capacity to su sta in th eir a rm e d m ig h t a n d im p erial am bitions. T he Soviet U n io n 's course w a s d is ru p te d b y different circu m stan ces— th e d isso lu tio n of its political o rd e r— b u t also h a ste n e d b y w a r (in A fg h an istan in its case) a n d acco m panied b y th e collapse of em pire. N o co m p arab le tra u m a befell th e U n ited States (at least n o t after th e V ietn am W ar), leaving the record of o th er n a tio n s a p o o r g u id e to its fate in th is reg ard , a n d m ak in g q u estio n ab le w h e th e r th e force of circu m stan ces in its case w as sufficient to com pel g rea t change. To b e sure, as P au l K en n ed y a rg u e d , eco­ nom ic decline also sh a p e d th e fate of m ilitarizatio n in th ese n atio n s, b u t its role in A m erica's fate is u n c ertain because th e ex te n t of its econom ic decline is a rg u ­ able a n d because su c h decline does n o t alw ay s (an d certain ly n o t quickly) com ­ p e l a n a tio n to d em ilitarize. Facing n o sta rk econom ic crisis, n o large-scale d i­ saster in w ar, a n d n o s u d d e n d em ise of the in terests a n d politics th a t lo n g h a d su sta in ed m ilitarizatio n , th e U n ited States likely w o u ld c o n tin u e to d rift o n ly fitfully a n d p a rtially aw ay from its m ilitarized p ast, as actu al a n d pro jected d e ­ fense b u d g e ts for th e 1990s indicated. T he strategic, ideological, a n d econom ic fo u n d atio n s of m ilita riza tio n — n e v e r as solid a n y w a y as its c h am p io n s h a d m a in ta in e d — h a d e ro d e d to the p o in t of d isa p p ea rin g , b u t its histo rical m o ­ m e n tu m p ersisted. W h at w o u ld m o st likely trace th e p a th tak e n w ere A m erican s' a ttitu d e s to ­ w a rd n atio n al g o v e rn m e n t a n d g o v ernance itself. A side from th eir en g ag e­ m en t w ith the global process of m ilitarizatio n , th e m o st p e rsiste n t im p u lse b e­ h in d m ilitarizatio n in the U n ited States w as its le a d ers' a n d citizen s' in ab ility to tru st a n d justify collective n a tio n al action except w h e n it o ccu rred in w a r o r a w arlik e m ode. U su ally w a n tin g th eir g o v e rn m e n t to d o m ore, w h ile claim ing th ey d id not, they rep e ate d ly looked to w a r or its su rro g a te to overcom e th eir o w n d istru st of g o v ern m en tal action.

504

CON CLU SION

T he w o b b ly sta rt of C lin to n 's presidency, th o u g h explain ab le in m a n y w ay s, su g g e ste d th a t this o ld p ro b lem e n d u re d . Setting asid e w a r as m etap h o r, p a ra ­ d ig m , a n d course of action, h e o ften seem ed b ereft of a n y altern a tiv e fram e­ w o rk for justifying his initiatives. M eanw hile, efforts like h e a lth care refo rm w ere assailed as socialism in strid e n tly a n tistatist rh eto ric — as if a n y th in g th e state d id o u tsid e a m ilitarized aren a w a s su sp ec t a n d b o u n d to b e b u n g led . T he e n d u rin g p ro b lem w a s also e v id e n t in talk b y th e m ed ia late in 1993, a m id a w av e of sen satio n al m u rd e rs a n d legislative initiativ es to co m b a t violence, of a n e w " w a r o n crim e," in w h ic h A m ericans w ere n e a rin g th eir "P earl H a rb o r," as one official claim ed. S u b seq u en t p assag e in 1994 of a crim e b ill w a s accom ­ p a n ie d b y sim ilar talk. By th en , C lin to n h im self h a d b e g u n slip p in g in to th e fam iliar m o d e, rejecting fu rth e r cuts in defen se a n d ju stify in g h is h e a lth care p la n b y a rg u in g th a t risin g m edical costs d ra in e d m o n ey from th e d efen se b u d ­ get, co n stitu ted "th e b ig g est lo n g -term th re a t to d efen se read in ess," a n d jeo p a r­ d iz e d n a tio n al security.6 T he p e rsiste n t d istru st of sta te action w a s flam m ab le k in d lin g th a t m ig h t restoke th e fires of m ilitarizatio n . The iro n y w a s th a t if m ilitarizatio n h a d m a d e p o ssib le a n e n d -ru n a ro u n d an tistatism , it also a g g ra v ate d d istru st of the state. D ecades of colossal sp e n d ­ in g o n useless arm am en ts, lav ish su b sid ies to c o rp o ratio n s, failed o r fickle m ili­ tary actions, capricious state repression, in a tten tio n to n a g g in g p ro b lem s o r w arlik e ferv o r w h e n a d d re ssin g th e m — th a t tro u b le d h isto ry left m a n y A m eri­ cans fu rth e r su sp icio u s ab o u t, o r sim p ly in d ifferen t to, th e sta te 's w isd o m a n d efficacy. T h at p o in t w a s little n o te d in political d e b ates of th e 1990s. A m erican s in stea d located th eir d istru st of the state elsew h ere— in e v ery th in g from th e inefficiencies of th e p o st office, to the o u trag es of th e N a tio n a l E n d o w m e n t for th e A rts, to th e failures of w elfare p ro g ram s, to th e follies of politicians, to th e b u rd e n s of taxes, a n d so on. But m o st likely, th eir d istru s t also arose from ex p erien cin g w h a t th e sta te h a d d o n e in A m erica's g rea t age of m ilitarization .

E N D N O TE S

M ost sources cited here are given in abbreviated form, w ith full inform ation about them appearing in the bibliography. A small num ber of sources— those less helpful or cited only a few times in one chapter— appear only in citations. Citations are used prim arily to indicate sources for quotations. W here a single endnote gives cita­ tions for several quotations, brief parenthetical indications link the citations to spe­ cific passages in m y text. Citations to new spapers usually do not include page n u m ­ bers, since the new sstand editions I often used differ in pagination from the official record on microfilm. O nly rarely do I offer citations to indicate sources for statistics (most used here can readily be found in sources like Statistical Abstracts of the United States) or to engage scholarly debates. The following abbreviations are frequently used: FDRPP

P u b lic P apers a n d A d d re sse s o f F ranklin D . R o o sevelt. N e w Y o r k , 1 9 3 8 - 1 9 5 0 .

HSTPP

P u b lic P apers o f th e P re sid e n ts o f th e U n ite d

S tates: H a r r y S.

T ru m an .

W a s h in g to n , 1 9 6 1 -1 9 6 6 .

IkePP

P u b lic P apers o f th e P re sid e n ts o f th e U n ite d S ta tes: D w ig h t D . E isenhow er. W a s h in g to n , 1 9 5 8 -1 9 6 1 .

JFK PR

P u b lic P apers o f th e P re sid e n ts o f the U n ite d S ta tes: John F. K en n ed y. W a s h i n g t o n , 1 9 6 2 -1 9 6 4 .

LBJPP

P u b lic P apers o f th e P re sid e n ts o f th e U n ite d S ta tes: L yn d o n B. Johnson. W a s h in g to n , 1 9 6 5 -1 9 7 0 .

Nixon PP

P u b lic P apers o f th e P re sid e n ts o f th e U n ite d S ta tes: R ich a rd N ix o n . W a s h i n g t o n , 1 9 7 1 -1 9 7 5 .

Ford PP

P u b lic P apers o f th e P re sid e n ts o f th e U n ite d S tates: G erald R. Ford. W a s h i n g t o n , 1 9 7 5 -1 9 7 9 .

C arter PP

P u b lic P apers o f the P re sid e n ts o f the U n ite d S ta tes: J im m y C arter. W a s h i n g t o n , 1 9 7 7 -1 9 8 2 .

Reagan PP

P u b lic P apers o f the P re sid e n ts o f th e U n ite d S tates: R o n a ld R eagan. W a s h i n g t o n , 1 9 8 2 -1 9 9 1 .

Bush PP

P u b lic P apers o f th e P re sid e n ts o f the U n ite d S tates: G eorge B ush. W a s h i n g t o n , 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 3 .

Preface 1. John R. Gillis, em ploying Michael G eyer's definition, in Gillis, Militarization of the 'Western World, 1. 2 . Ibid., 3 (Gillis's words).

506

NOTES

TO

PAGES

1-17

Prologue 1. 2. j. 4. s.

e.

7. 8.

9.

10.

it. 12 .

is. 14. If . i6. it .

18.

19.

Weigley, American Way, 5. See ibid. Royster, Destructive War, 241. Franklin, War Stars, 5,13. Peter Karsten, "M ilitarization and Rationalization in the U nited States, 18701914," in Gillis, Militarization, 33 (Holmes), 36 ("m ilitarism "); Frederickson, In­ ner Civil War, 209 (on "the ideal"), 215 (on "vice an d poverty"), 235 ("arm y of," "get the"). O n the w ar m etaphor regarding science an d religion, see George M. M arsden, Religion and American Culture (New York, 1990), 126. Lincoln quoted in Smith, Thinking the Unthinkable, 110. Leonard, Above the Battle, 148. Vinovskis, "H ave Social H istorians Lost the Civil W ar?" 53 (on veterans' aid). M erritt Roe Smith, "M ilitary A rsenals and Industry Before W orld W ar I," in Cooling, War, 41 ("the day"). McNeill, Pursuit, 269f., applies the term "m ilitaryindustrial complex" to Britain; "keel" from Karsten, "M ilitarization," 31. Millis, Arms and Men, 148 (Cleveland). Calculations from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (W ashington, D.C., 1975), 224,1114-16, and M. S. Kendrick, A Century and a Half of Federal Expenditures (New York, 1955). O n force levels, see Historical Statistics, 8,1140-42, and Kendrick, Century and a Half, 43-44; for com parisons to E uropean forces, Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 203; on deaths, Vinovskis, "H ave Social H istorians Lost the Civil W ar?" Millis, Arms and Men, 166 ("organic"); Challener, Admirals, 12 ("or we"); Leonard, Above the Battle, 91 ("w ere thought"). Kennedy, Over Here, 22 ("If you"), 150. Ib id .,50. Ibid., 52. See Lotchin, Fortress California (on "m etropolitan-m ilitary complex"), an d Vander M eulen, Politics, 6. Alonso, Peace, 86. Kennedy, Over Here, 227; see also 222 for com m ents by Alfred Kazin p ara­ phrased here. Q uoted in Sherry, Rise, 28,44. Millis, Arms and Men, 239.

Chapter I 1. A rthur Krock, New York Times, M arch 5,1933, in Leuchtenburg, "N ew Deal," 104. FDR inaugural: FDR PP, 2 (1933): 11-16. For crow d reaction and Eleanor Roosevelt's comm ents, see Garraty, Great Depression, 205. 2 . Levine, "H ollyw ood's W ashington," 236. 3 . Leuchtenburg, "N ew Deal," 143. 4. Ibid., 130.

NOTES

TO

PAGES

18-29

507

s. Ibid., 90. e. For Chase and the Nation, see Richard Pells, Radical Visions and American Dreams (New York, 1973), 73, 78. O ther quotations from Leuchtenburg, "N ew Deal," 82-83. r. See Leuchtenburg, "N ew Deal," 92-100. 8. Ibid., 100 (on Hoover); see also 100,127-28. ». Ibid., 96-97,101. 10. Ibid., 107-09. ■I. Ibid., 109-13,123-24. 11. Ibid., 118 (for quotation); see generally 117-21. is. Ibid., 121 (Johnson); see generally 120-21. O ther quotations and m aterial from A rthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1958), 116-18. 14. The $824 m illion figure is from Garraty, Great Depression, 188; U.S. Public W orks A dm inistration, America Builds: The Record of the PWA (W ashington, D.C., 1939), 290-91, suggests a low er figure. is. See John A. Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942 (Durham , 1967), generally, and for "A m ericanizing influence," 130. io. Ibid., chap. 5 on the corps and race relations; for "political dynam ite," 98. i t . Ibid., 117,193. is. FDR PP, 5 (1936): 407. I». FDRPP, 8 (1939): 5-6. io. Louis W irth, "The U rban C om m unity," in O gbum , American Society, 66; Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 481. 2 1. Susm an, Culture as History, 153,154,157. 22 . Ibid., 158,159. 2 s. Ibid., 157; Alexander, Nationalism, 23. 24 . See Novick, That Noble Dream, 237-38. 2 s. See Eileen Eagan, Class, Culture and the Classroom: The Student Peace Movement of the 1930s (Philadelphia, 1981). 26 . W hite, quoted in W ittner, Rebels Against War, 3. 27 . O n the Ludlow A m endm ent, see Kyle Smith, "W ar and the Ballot Box: The De­ bate over the Ludlow A m endm ent," M.A. thesis, N orthw estern University, 1988; FDR quotation in Elliot Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 19281945 (New York, 1947-50), 2:751. 28 . Susan Gubar, " 'This Is M y Rifle, This Is M y G un': W orld W ar II an d the Blitz on W omen," in H igonnet et al.. Behind the Lines, 240. 2 *. Brogan, American Character, xiv, 91, xv; W ittner, Rebels Against War, 26 ("bellig­ erent"). j o . Sherry, Rise, 62. i t. Robert and H elen Lynd, Middletown in Transition (1937; N ew York, 1965), 120, 142. J 2 . "Sea of troubles" is the title of chap. 10, W illiam E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York, 1963); characterization of the reorganization struggle is Leuchtenburg's, 279.

SOS

NOTES

TO

PAGES

29-42

Q uotation from Sherry, Rise, 76-77 (em phasis in original). See also D onald C am eron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (New York, 1989), 30. 3 4 . Sherry, Rise, 76,89-80. ss. FDR PP, 7 (1938): 492. 3«. FDR PP, 8 (1939): 2 ,4 ,3 ,7 . 3 7 . FDRPP, 8 (1939): 5 , 6 . ss. Sherry, Rise, 81; FDR PP, 8 (1939): 516. 3 » . See McCormick, America's Half-Century, 28-33, an d H earden, Roosevelt Con­ fronts Hitler, 159, w hich argues flatly that "the Roosevelt adm inistration re­ garded N azi G erm any as a form idable economic threat rather th an a dangerous m ilitary menace." 40. H erring, Impact of War, 239. 41. FDR PP, 8 (1939): 3,156; Sherry, Rise, 78-79. 42. FDR PP, 8 (1939): 461-62; 9 (1940): 186,199,319-20,198,289. 4 3 . FDR PP, 9 (1940): 434; see also 387-90,431-34. 44. Ibid., 543,546,636,663. 4s. Susman, Culture as History, 266. 40. FDR PP, 9 (1940): 241,375. O n "phonoscope," see M urphy, "Lonely Battle," 92. 4 7 . Bland, Marshall Papers, 1:644,621 and 2:309 (em phasis in original). O ther quota­ tions from Sherry, Rise, 88-89. 48. Q uotations from E dw ard M ead Earle, "N ational Security and Foreign Policy," Yale Review 29 (March 1940): 458; Against This Torrent (Princeton, 1941), 4; "The Threat to Am erican Security," Yale Review 30 (March 1941): 455. For a sim ilar outlook, see H erring, Impact of War, esp. chap. 1 . See also Robert O sgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations (Chicago, 1953), 391-400. 4». W ittner, Rebels Against War, 16 ("now renounced"); A lexander, Nationalism, 180 (Mumford); see Novick, That Noble Dream, 281-82, 287, for other quotations from the period and his characterizations. so. Q uoted in Novick, That Noble Dream, 287. si. Schneider, Should America Go to War? 105. 52 . Henrikson, "M ap," 28,30,31-32,38-39,50; nn. 22,29,47. See also Joseph C om , The Winged Gospel: America's Romance with Aviation, 1900-1950 (New York, 1983), 122-24. 5 3 . Characterizations of radio journalists by Steele, in Propaganda, 135, an d Culbert, in Newsfor Everyman, 206. MacLeish quoted in Culbert, 194; characterization of M urrow by Culbert, 207. s4. Culbert, Newsfor Everyman, 73,24. ss. N ew spapers as quoted in Schneider, Should America Go to War? 1 ; Schneider's characterization, 13. so. Q uoted in Steele, Propaganda, 122. S7. Schneider, Should America Go to War? 8 8 (em phasis in original), 98; Roosevelt, in FDRPP, 9 (1940):487-88. ss. M urphy, "Lonely Battle," 114-16 ("penetration of"), 83 (Thurber). For other quotations on "War of the W orlds" and his speculations at the time, H adley 33 .

NOTES

so. so.

ei. 62. 63. 64. 6*. 66.

67. 68. 69. to .

71.

72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

so.

8 1.

82. 83. 84.

ss. so. 87.

88.

so. 90. 91. 92. 93.

TO

PAGES

44-60

509

Cantril, The Invasion from Mars (Princeton, 1940), esp. 189-205. W eart, Nuclear Fear, 81 ("a probe"). H earden, Roosevelt Confronts Hitler, 243,244; H erring, Impact of War, 12. Bland, Marshall Papers, 2: 308-09 (em phasis in the original); H erring, Impact of War, title of chap. 8. FDRPP, 8 (1939): 521. G ardner, Covenant with Power, 48. Sherry, Rise, 98. Ibid., 97-98,143; Bland, Marshall Papers, 2:609 (em phasis in original). Gregory, America 1941,55. Ibid., 80; H erring, Impact of War, 251. Gregory, America 1941,81; H erring, Impact of War, 9. See Gregory, America 1941,81. H erring, Impact of War, 273. Gregory, America 1941,27. Bland, Marshall Papers, 2: 387; Sherry, Rise, 134 (Steinbeck); Gregory, America 1941,32; H erring, Impact of War, 22-23,19,21. Gregory, America 1941,43 ("carnival"); FDR PP, 10 (1941): 416. Gregory, America 1941,218. FDR PP, 10 (1941): 216; see also 233-37. Millis, Arms and Men, 268-69. FDRPP, 9 (1940): 238,239. Ribuffo, Old Christian Right, chap. 5, and Ribuffo, "Brown Scare." Ribuffo, "Brown Scare," 9 (Chase); Old Christian Right, 181 ("there w as no"). Ribuffo, Old Christian Right, 183,184; H erring, Impact of War, 236 ("m ass hyste­ ria," etc.). Ribuffo, "Brown Scare," 41. See also A than G. Theoharis an d John Stuart Cox, The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition (Philadelphia, 1988), chaps. 8-9. H arold Lasswell, "The G arrison State," American Journal of Sociology 46 (January 1941): 455-68; quotations on 455,458,459,461. Koppes and Black, Hollywood, 22,36. Ibid., 29. Gregory, America 1941,264,77. Koppes and Black, Hollywood, 40,43. Gregory, America 1941,20. Schneider, Should America Go to War? 103. H enry Luce, "The A m erican Century," Life, Feb. 19,1941:61-65; Gregory, Amer­ ica 1941,20. Alexander, Nationalism, 177; Schneider, Should America Go to War? 153 ("In a"), 154 ("had ceased"); Steele, Propaganda, 172; Luce, "Am erican Century." FDR PP, 10 (1941): 278. M ead, And Keep Your Powder Dry, 139,150-51,157. Reynolds, Creation, 288. H arold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, voi. 3 (New York, 1954), 523. Heinrichs, Threshold of War, 68 (on FDR's dream).

NOTES

TO

PAGES

60-75

*4 . Q uoted in Ellen Nore, Charles A. Beard: An Intellectual Biography (Carbondale, 1983), 186. 9 5 . Beard and Beard, America in Midpassage, 455. C harles Beard on lend-lease, quoted in Nore, Beard, 185. 9«. FDR PP, 10 (1941): 385,390 (on Greer); 438 (on Kearny). 97. See Sherry, Rise, 107-09. 98. O n polls and Life, see O 'N eill, Democracy at War, 73. 9 9 . Schneider, Should America Go to War? 216 (Tribune); Sam uel Grafton, An Ameri­ can Diary (G arden City, 1943), 144 (entry of Dec. 31,1941). Chapter 2 I. Kennett, For the Duration, 59. i. FDR PP, 11 (1942): 32 (Jan. 6 State of the U nion Address). j. I. F. Stone, Nation, Dec. 13,1941, repr. in Stone, The War Years, 1939-1945 (Bos­ ton, 1988), 92; Sherry, Rise, 116. 4. "Betrayal of the peace": M ead, And Keep Your Powder Dry, 119. s. FDR PP, 10 (1941): 528-29 (Dec. 9,1941, Fireside Chat); see also 1 1:105ff. «. FDR PP, 10:526; 11:103; see also 11:40. W arner, Democracy in fonesville, 268-69; Tuttle, "Daddy's Gone to War," 7. 7. Blum, V Wasfor Victory, 16 ("im agination"); FDR PP, 11:35. 8 . Kennett, For the Duration, 81. 9. Dower, War Without Mercy, 92. 10. Ibid., 176 ("By the"); Isaiah Berlin, Washington Despatches, 1941-1946, ed. H. G. Nicholas (Chicago, 1981), 67,108. 11. M ead, And Keep Your Powder Dry, 213; Stuart Chase, The Road We Are Traveling, 1914-1942 (New York, 1942), 5,100; Wylie, Generation, 75,315. il. T. R. B., New Republic, Aug. 2,1943, as quoted in Ross, Preparing for Ulysses, 34 ("suffer"); Doherty, Projections of War, 73 ("not a"); C onsolidated ad. Life, Sept. 6, 1943,74; Blum, V Wasfor Victory, 16. is. Brogan, American Character, 163-64. 14. FDR PP, 12 (1943): 329. I f. Kennett, For the Duration, 107. io. Ibid., 104 (Catton); Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 350 ("polycratic"). i7. N ash, American West, 25, vii, 17; W hite, "It's Your Misfortune," 496. is. Peter Daniel, "Going A m ong Strangers: Southern Reactions to W orld W ar II," Journal of American History 77 (December 1990): 909, 886; A llan Clive, State of War: Michigan in World War II (Ann Arbor, 1979), 237. 19. Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 361. 2 0 . Blum, V Wasfor Victory, 120,122 (Stimson). 2 1 . My characterization in Rise, 192. 2 2 . O'Neill, A Democracy at War, 209 ("approaching"), 202 ("saved"); FDR PP, 13 (1944-45): 37. 23. Vander M eulen, Politics of Aircraft, 211,215. 24. Vagts, History of Militarism, 463.

NOTES

TO

PAGES

7S-92

5 I I

is. Lekachm an, Age of Keynes, 153. 2 d.

it. 28 . 2 ».

so. si. 32.

33. 34.

3s. 36. 37 .

38.

3 ». 40. 41.

42. 43. 44.

4s. 46.

47. 48.

4».

so. s I.

52 .

53. 54.

M ichael Geyer, "The M ilitarization of Europe, 1914-1945," in Gillis, Militariza­ tion, 71. U.S. C ham ber of Commerce, Bulletin 8: Deficit Spending and Private Enterprise (1944), 12-13. Galam bos and Pratt, Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth, 131,157. FDR PP, 13 (1944-45): 34,42,503; Stuart Chase, For This We Fought (New York, 1946), 49. Polenberg, War and Society, 219,236. Blum, V Wasfor Victory, 276,115. Polenberg, War and Society, 86. FDR PP, 13 (1944-45): 42,41, 33, 317; on com pulsory service, see 228-231; on cam paign rhetoric, see 396,400,406. Blum, V Wasfor Victory, 256. Sherry, Rise, 192. Sherry, Preparing, 129. Q uotations from Sherry, Rise, 210,290,350,162; on "technological fanaticism," see chap. 8. O'N eill, Democracy at War, 114 (on M acArthur). O n "strategies of annihilation," see Weigley, American Way of War. Fussell, Wartime, 16; Sherrod, Tarawa, 40. Sherry, Preparing, 86. Ibid., 88. Brogan, American Character, 156. W alter L ippm ann, U.S. War Aims (Boston, 1944), 197. O ther quotations: Sherry, Preparing, 133,55,56-57,47,131. Sherry, Preparing, 51; Sherry, Rise, 185. Divine, Second Chance, 84. Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 553. Ibid., 6. A rt Gallaher, Plainville: Fifteen Years Later (New York, 1961), 227; M ead, And Keep Your Powder Dry, 16-17. Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 485,482. Koppes and Black, Hollywood Goes to War, 59,71. Ibid., 61 (Tarzan); W estbrook, "Fighting for the A m erican Family," 198 (West­ brook's em phasis); Brogan, American Character, 147; Blum, V Wasfor Victory, 17 (Morgenthau). Blum, V Wasfor Victory, 39. Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 482 ("that pow er"), 493 ("far less"); Blum, V Was for Victory, 70 ("were dragons"); Ellis, Sharp End, 315 ("microcosmic"); W arner, Democracy, 282-84 (on allies, "saw," "knew "); Brogan, Ameri­ can Character, 168; Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart, 30 (Eisenhower). Leslie Epstein, "Blue Skies: Reflections on H ollyw ood and the Holocaust," Tikkun Sept.-Oct. 1989:11-14,84-90; Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 484-85; Ralph Ingersoll, quoted in Sherry, Rise, 118. Fussell, Wartime, 138; Dower, War Without Mercy, 185.

SI2

NOTES

TO

PAGES

93-107

ss. Sherrod, Tarawa, 151; Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 505; Fussell, Wartime, 116,270. so. Ellis, Sharp End, 53. s t . H ynes, Flights of Passage, 180,209. ss. Q uoted in Sherry, Rise, 211. so. Bernstein, American Indians, 175; H ynes, Flights of Passage, 162. 00. Fussell, Wartime, chap. 7 ("Chickenshit, A n A natom y"); Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 482 ("prone to"); Kennett, For the Duration, 96; Sam uel Stouffer, in O gbum , American Society, 105. 01. Fussell, Wartime, 70,38,36,95. oi. Ibid., 294 (Fussell's characterization and Sledge quotation), 285 (Eisenhower). Ellis, Sharp End, 103 ("literal truth"), os. See Fussell, Wartime, esp. 66-67. oo. "Survivor's guilt" quoted in Sherry, Rise, 206; H ynes, Flights of Passage, 208,209. os. As George Roeder phrased it in the m anuscript, used w ith his perm ission, for The Censored War; see p. 3 of that book for different phrasing, oo. Fussell, Wartime, 127. or. Miller, Irony, 195; W arner, Democracy, 287,288 ("In sim ple," etc.). os. Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 483. oo. H erbert Blumer, in O gbum , American Society, 229-30; Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 19,558. 70. Ralph D avid Abernathy, And the Walls Came Tumbling Doxvn: An Autobiography 71. 72.

73.

7*.

7s. 70.

77.

78. 79.

so. si. 82.

ss. 84.

ss. so. 87.

(New York, 1989), 49. Q uoted in Nalty, Strengthfor the Fight, 176. Blum, V Wasfor Victory, 210,217-18; Doherty, Projections of War, 206 ("D eutsch­ land"), 214 ("the racist"); Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 70. Reed, Seedtime, 345; Norrell, "Caste in Steel," 680 ("Devil's," "be called"); Nelson, "O rganized Labor," 955 ("faced"); Blum, V Was for Victory, 220. W hite, "It's Your Misfortune," 504 (FDR C olum bus Day 1942 speech); 506. Kelley, " 'We Are N ot W hat We Seem,' " 76; Fass, Outside In, 144. Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 53 ("the idea"), 78 ("W here"); Doherty, Projec­ tions, 50 ("foreigners"). Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, 352,351,366; Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 60 ("a lot"). Takaki, Strangers, 358,368-69,377,359-60. Wylie, Generation of Vipers, 68,61. D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 26. Bérubé, Coming Out Under Fire, 253. H artm ann, Home Front, 42 (quotations from female com m anders), 24 (on job segregation); Tuttle, "Daddy's Gone to War," 69 ("latchkey"), Tuttle, "Daddy's Gone to War," 26. H artm ann, Home Front, 157. Kennett, For the Duration, 162. Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 498. Kennett, For the Duration, 127,187; Susan Gubar, " 'This Is My Rifle, This Is My G u n / " in H igonnet et al.. Behind the Lines, 251 (on Hersey).

NOTES

TO

PAGES

107-123

ss. Gubar, " 'This Is M y R ifle/ " 248 ("The fat wife"), 250 ("O w ar"); Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 497 ("beginning to"); H artm ann, Home Front, 202. 8*. H artm ann, Home Front, 36; Richard Polenberg, ed., America at War: The Home Front, 1941-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, 1969), 2 -3 (Daniels); Thomas H art Benton, "D eath of G rant W ood," University Review Spring 1942:148. oo. G ubar, " 'This Is My Rifle,' " 258,253; Cam pbell, Women at War. »I. See George Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modem Europe (M adison, 1985), a n d H igonnet et al.. Behind the Lines. *2 . Journalist Virginius Dabney, quoted in Tuttle, "Daddy's Gone to War," 175. os. Janann Sherm an, " 'They either need these w om en or they do not': M argaret C hase Sm ith and the Fight for Regular Status for W omen in the Military," Journal of Military History 54 (January 1990): 61; Bernstein, American Indians, 54. 94. FDR PP, 13 (1944-1945): 181; Ross, Preparingfor Ulysses, 70. 9s. Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 522,523; Ross, Preparingfor Ulysses, 123 ("N ew Deal"); Vatter, US. Economy, 136; A m enta an d Skocpol, "Redefining the N ew Deal," 94 ("a special"). 9«. Prediction on w om en by Ernest W. Burgess, in O gbum , American Society, 31. See also M odell et al., "W orld W ar II in the Lives of Black A m ericans" an d Reed, Seedtime, esp. Epilogue. 97. M asuo Kato, quoted in Sherry, Rise, 281. 98. Fenrich, "Im agining Holocaust," xii. 9 9 . Time, June 11,1945 (em phasis in original), quoted in Perfett, Days of Sadness, 421. 100. Sherry, Rise, 349 (Truman); Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 6 (Herald Tribune). toi. Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 76 (One World), 68 (song), 5 ("m am m alian"), 14 ("sole"); W uthnow, Restructuring, 39 ("haunted," etc.); Sherry, Rise, 353 ("w orld of"), toi. Q uoted in Sherry, Rise, 349. 103. G ardner, Covenant with Power, 73. loo. Sherry, Preparing, 210. Ios. Perrett, Days of Sadness, 416,418; Dallek, American Style, 129. io«. Polenberg, War and Society, 208; Life, July 30,1945, quoted in Perrett, Days of Sadness, 423; Fried, Nightmare in Red, 57. lor. Ross, Preparingfor Ulysses, 176-77,187. los. Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 11. loo. Chase, For This We Fought, 117; Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 9,3. n o . Sherry, Rise, 349. i n . Sherry, Preparing, 213. 112 . M ark Pricem an, "N o W orld W ar in to Stop," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists De­ cem ber 1989:49-50 ("the prem ise"); W uthnow , Restructuring, 46. I is. Fenrich, "Im agining Holocaust," 103 (quoting Chase, For This We Fought), 109. 1 14. Gillis, Militarization, 7. C h a p te r 3 1. John G unther, Inside US.A (New York, 1947), xii. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 212-13.

2.

NOTES

TO

PAGES

124-140

i. G arry Wills, "Keeper of the Seal," New York Review of Books July 18,1991: 19 (Clifford); D onovan, Conflict and Crisis, 125 (AMA), 216 (Roosevelt). 4. Charles S. Maier, "Alliance and Autonom y: E uropean Identity an d U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in the Trum an Years," in Lacey, Truman Presidency, 276; the first term is M aier's, the second is John Lewis G addis's. O n the A m erican-W est G erm an relationship, see Schwartz, America's Germany, 305. Leffler, Prepon­ derance, 19. j. Maier, "Alliance and Autonom y," 274, n. 2. 6. Rosenberg, "Cold War," 281. 7. W alter Millis, ed.. The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), 134; D onovan, Conflict and Crisis, 187. s. D onovan, Conflict and Crisis, 189 (Vandenberg); Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 73 (Churchill). ». Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 80; May, "Lessons " of the Past, 37 (Truman). 10. Schwartz, America's Germany, 299 ("dual," etc,), 308 ("to a deplorable"); Gimbel, "Project Paperclip," 355 ("we have"). 11 . Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 85,78. il. Ibid., 78. 13. Barnet, By the Rockets' Red Glare, 252 (poll and Forrestal); 267 (State D epartm ent); 276 (Barnet sum m arizing 1948 poll). 14. Ibid., 269 (Barnet's brackets), 271,288. is. Emily S. Rosenberg, "G ender," Journal of American History T7 (June 1990): 119 ("emotional"); on Dulles and im ages of Indians, A ndrew Rotter, "G ender, For­ eign Relations: The U nited States and South Asia, 1947-1964," Journal of Ameri­ can History 81 (September 1994): 525,532. 16. McCormick, America's Half-Century, 70 (Taft); Paterson, On Every Front, 119 (Muste). 17. Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 34 (Lemer), 339,349. 18. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 105; Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 272. I». Herken, Winning Weapon, 316-17. 2 0 . Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 113 ("America's"); G addis, Strategies of Containment, 92 ("to depend"). 2 1 . G addis, Strategies of Containment, 93. 2 2 . DuBoff, Accumulation and Power, 99. 2 3 . Robert Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York, 1980), 47; Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 143 (Forrestal). 2 4 . H ughes, American Genesis, 425. 2 s . D onovan, Conflict and Crisis, 201. 2 6 . Schwartz, America's Germany, 302 (quoting Charles M aier on "transnational"), 303 ("whose"); Barnet, By the Rockets' Red Glare, 255 ("populist"). 2 7 . Paul K. Hoch, "The C rystallization of a Strategic Alliance: The A m erican Physics Elite and the M ilitary in the 1940s," in M endelsohn et al.. Science, Tech­ nology, and the Military, 1:88 ("w ould"); Greenberg, Politics of Pure Science, 13435 (Ridenour); Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge, 332 ("chiefly"); Leslie, Cold War and American Science, 5 ("at best"), 9 ("defined," etc).

NOTES

TO

PAGES

140-147

S IS

as. Mills, Power Elite, 214. 2 ». Q uoted in Pach, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 35. so. Galam bos and Pratt, Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth, 137 ("increased"), 140 ("defense"); DuBoff, Accumulation and Power, 102 ("indirect"); I. Bernard Cohen, "The Com puter: A Case Study of Support by G overnm ent, Especially the Mili­ tary, of a N ew Science and Technology," in M endelsohn et al.. Science, Technol­ ogy, and the Military, 1: 199 ("exceeded"); W ittner, Cold War America, 117 (Hofstadter). 31. Galam bos and Pratt, Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth, 139-39; Charles S. M aier, "Am erican Visions and British Interests: H ogan's M arshall Plan," Re­ views in American History 18 (March 1990): 109. 32. M arkusen et al.. Rise of the Gunbelt, 40. 3 3 . Lotchin, Fortress California, 353. 3 4 . Galam bos and Pratt, Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth, 180-82. 3 5 . Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 109, 111, 107 (chapter title), 112 (Hutchins), 113 (PM and Nation). 3 «. Ibid., 123,127 (Boyer's description of illustration), 124 (em phasis in original); H ughes, American Genesis, 441 (AEC commissioner). 3 7 . Nef, Western Civilization, 377. For a brief, u p d ated challenge to the claim that "m ilitary needs stim ulate and inspire technological grow th," see Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (New York, 1990) , 183-86. 38. Nalty, Strengthfor the Fight, 204-05. 3». Ibid., 233. 40. Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 112. 41. Nalty, Strengthfor the Fight, 242. 42. Roosevelt quoted in Joanna Schneider Z angrando an d Robert L. Zangrando, "ER and Black Civil Rights," in Joan-Hoff W ilson an d M arjorie Lightm an, eds.. Without Precedent: The Life and Career of Eleanor Roosevelt (Bloomington, 1984), 102; Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 108 (Acheson); Stephen Lawson, Running for Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in America since 1941 (Philadelphia, 1991) , 34 (President's Commission); D onovan, Conflict and Crisis, 334 (Truman); Dalfiume, Desegregation, 139 (Truman); Pem berton, Harry S. Truman, 114 ("top dog"). 4 3 . Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 112; D uberm an, Robeson, 342. 44. Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 113,114; Berman, Politics, 232. Regarding the Eisenhow er quotation, I m ust beg the read er's indulgence: I have long h ad it in lecture notes b u t cannot retrieve the published source from w hich it came. But in tone and substance it sounds like Eisenhower, w ho said m uch the sam e thing, if in more pallid form, several tim es in 1952, as in South Carolina: "A nd neither at hom e nor in the eyes of the w orld can Am ericans risk the w eakness w hich inev­ itably results w hen any group of people are ranked— politically and economically— as second-class citizens." See "Text of E isenhow er's A ddress in South Carolina," New York Times Oct. 1,1952. 45. Burk, Eisenhower Administration, 24.

5 I6

4«. 47.

48. 4».

so.

si. si.

ss. S4.

ss. S6.

s t.

ss. s». 60. 61.

6i.

6i.

64. 65. 66. 67.

68.

69.

70.

NOTES

TO

PAGES

148-159

Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 109,110. Ibid., 113 ("Stalin"); D uberm an, Robeson, 389,344,357. See also M ary L. D udziak, "Josephine Baker, Racial Protest, and the C old War," Journal of American History 81 (September 1994): 543-70. Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 101,103,107. Ibid., 107. Janann Sherm an, " 'They Either N eed These W omen or They Do N ot': M argaret Chase Smith and the Fight for Regular Status for W omen in the Military," Journal of Military History 54 (January 1990): 68,71. Smith, "Com m entary," 86, n. 16; H artm ann, Home Front, 155 (Truman). Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 11-12; Elaine Tyler May, "Explosive Issues: Sex, W omen, and the Bomb," in May, Recasting America, 160,161,163; Rosenberg, " 'Foreign Affairs' After W orld W ar II," 66 ("ideology"), 69 ("patriotism "); Car­ ter, Another Part of the 50s, 86,91 (Stevenson). Jack Lait and Lee M ortimer, Washington Confidential (New York, 1951), 96. Jack Lait and Lee M ortimer, U.S.A. Confidential (New York, 1952), 42,44-45. D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 43 ("outw ard"); Ehrenreich, Hearts of Men, 24 ("They cannot"); Lewes, Psychoanalytic Theory, 151,115,136-37. Q uoted in Robert Griffith, "H arry S Trum an an d the Burden of M odernity," Re­ views in American History 9 (September 1981): 298 (my thanks to David Johnson for bringing this to m y attention). Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 120,121. Pem berton, Harry S. Truman, 148; Takaki, Strangers, 416. For "rem apping" and "gunbelt," see M arkusen et al.. Rise of the Gunbelt. Ibid., chap. 2; quotation, p. 4 Lotchin, Fortress California, 156. M arkusen et al.. Rise of the Gunbelt, 7. See also Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 163. Jane De H art M athews, "A rt and Politics in C old W ar Am erica," American His­ torical Review 81 (October 1976): 777,772; Fried, Nightmare in Red, 31 ("because"); Erika Doss, "The A rt of C ultural Politics: From Regionalism to A bstract Expres­ sionism," in May, Recasting America, 216. W hitfield, Culture of the Cold War. See Graebner, Age of Doubt, esp. chap. 3. Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 127. See Jane Smith, Patenting the Sun: Polio and the Salk Vaccine (New York, 1990), esp. 158-60 and the posters opposite 256. This is m y reading of High Noon; W hitfield, Culture of the Cold War, 146-49, sees a m ore subversive m essage in it. O n Ford, see Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 334,343. Joel C arpenter, "Youth for C hrist and the N ew Evangelicals' Place in the Life of the N ation," in Sherrill, Religion and the Life of the Nation, 129,133; W hitfield, Cul­ ture of the Cold War, 86-87 ("not so much"). Carpenter, "Youth for Christ," 139 ("Visions"); W uthnow , Restructuring, 38 ("new beginnings," Dulles, Truman); W hitfield, Culture of the Cold War, T7 (Graham), 87 ("America must").

NOTES

TO

PAGES

159-173

5 I7

71. W hitfield, Culture of the Cold War, 92-99 (on Spellm an and the church); W ittner, Cold War America, 89 ("Long the," "C om m unist floodings"); W uthnow , Restruc­ turing, 75 ("as blind"). 72. Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 25,31; W eart, Nuclear Fear, 192 ("filled a"); N ovick. That Noble Dream, 314,315. 7 3 . Fried, Nightmare in Red, 98 ("garnered"), 99 ("pageants"). 74. W arren Susm an, "D id Success Spoil the U nited States? D ual R epresentations in Postw ar A m erica," in M ay, Recasting America, 30; G oldm an, Crucial Decade, 218 ("W e have"). 7s. Susm an, "D id Success Spoil the U nited States?" 26. 7«. N ovick, That Noble Dream, 314,318, see also 312. O n MIT and M orison, see A lan N eedell, "'T ruth Is O ur W eapon': Project TROY, Political W arfare, and G overnm ent-A cadem ic R elations in the N ational Security State," Diplomatic History 17 (Sum m er 1993): 418-19. 77. In D ouglas and Sylvia A ngus, eds.. Contemporary American Short Stories (N ew York, 1967), 254. 78. Schlesinger, Vital Center, 1 ,2 ,9 ,9 8 . 7» . Ibid., 219,3,4,100,9,236. so. Ibid., 4 ,1 6 0 ,5 0 ,3 6 ,4 0 ,1 5 1 ("perverts politics"), 127,210,150, titles of chaps. 7 and 11,245,255. 8 1. H ofstadter, Age of Reform (1955), as quoted in D avid W. N oble, "The R econstruc­ tion of Progress: C harles Beard, R ichard H ofstadter, and Postw ar H istorical T hought," in M ay, Recasting America, 72. sa. Schlesinger, Vital Center, 2. 83. M illis, Arms and Men, 307. M ills, Power Elite, 222. 84. Thom as P. H ughes and A gatha C. H ughes, eds., Lewis Mumford: Public Intellec­ tual (N ew York, 1990); see H ughes's introduction and essays by E verett M en­ delsohn and M ichael Z uckerm an. Q uotations: 343 (from "G entlem en: You are M ad!" in Saturday Review of Literature M arch 2,1946), 372 (Z uckerm an's w ords), 8 (H ughes's). ss. N ovick, That Noble Dream, 299,300,295,294. 8 «. Ibid., 304. 87. M arling and W etenhall, Iwo Jima, 125,160. 88. Ibid., 136,137. O n The Caine Mutiny, see W hitfield, Culture of the Cold War, 60-62. 8*. Lipsitz, Class and Culture, 218; L ipsitz's context for this com m ent is prim arily class relations rath er than foreign and m ilitary policy. 90. May, Homeward Bound, 16-18 (on N ixon), 168; N ovick, That Noble Dream, 307 (Bemis). 9 1. C arter, Another Part of the Fifties, 114-16. 92. Fried, Nightmare in Red, 76,75,76. 9 3 . Ibid., 67. 9 4 . Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 124-25. 9 5 . W ittner, Cold War America, 108 ("A dlai"); G riffith, Politics of Fear, 115-16,145. 9 «. Fried, Nightmare in Red, 115-116. 9 7 . C arter, Another Part of the Fifties, 272; Fried, Nightmare in Red, 167 ("the Red"); G riffith, Politics of Fear, 89 ("C om m unists," "prancing m im ics").

5 I8

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PAGES

175-186

»8 . Fried, Nightmare in Red, 68; W ittner, Cold War America, 86-87 (M cG rath), 90 (Rankin); C arter, Another Part of the Fifties, 13 (Stevenson). 9 9 . Fried, Nightmare in Red, 69,22; W hitfield, The Culture of the Cold War, 19 (N ixon); G riffith, Politics of Fear, 73. 100. Fried, Nightmare in Red, 99,198. 101. N ovick, That Noble Dream, 331, 332; Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 111 (Yale's C harles Seym our; C onant); D iam ond, Compromised Campus, 25; W ittner, Cold War America, 122 (Com m ager); Pells, Liberal Mind, 343 (on O ppenheim er, etc.), 339. 102 . G oldm an, Crucial Decade, 177. los. M ay, "Lessons" of the Past, 62. too. Ibid., 79. Ios. B arton B ernstein, "The T rum an A dm inistration an d the K orean W ar," in Lacey, Truman Presidency, 420 ("clear-cut" and "absolutely"), 423 ("W e h ad to"); other quotations from M ay, "Lessons" of the Past, 81-83. too. A m brose, Rise to Globalism, 118. 107. B ernstein, "T rum an A dm inistration and the K orean W ar," 425. tos. O n this poin t generally, see G arry W ills, "K eeper of the Seal," The New York Review of Books July 18,1991:19-22. 109. K aufm an, Korean War, 37. n o . B ernstein, "T rum an A dm inistration," 434 ("atom ic bom bardm ent"), 436 ("12:30"); A m brose, Rise to Globalism, 129 ("to receive"); W eigley, American Way of War, 390 (Bradley), i n . A m brose, Rise to Globalism, 129. 112 . C um ings, Origins of the Korean War, 2:750 (Gore); 748 (estim ate of tw o m illion), n s . I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (N ew York, 1952), 258; C um ings, Origins of the Korean War, 2:755. I io. Q uoted in "T rum an, in 1952 M em os, C onsidered N uclear Strike," New York Times A ug. 3,1980. See also Pem berton, Harry S. Truman, 158; C um ings, Origins of the Korean War, 2:747-53. II s. Pach, Arming the Free World, 231. n o . D aniel H irsch and W illiam G. M athew s, "The H-Bomb: W ho Really G ave A w ay the Secret?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January-F ebruary 1990: 22-30. u z . Freedm an, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 69. I is. G addis, Strategies of Containment, 126. II o. H ixson, George F. Kennan, 101 ; B ernstein, "T rum an A dm inistration," 424 (quot­ ing a paraphrase of com m ents by K ennan). 120 . Pem berton, Harry S. Truman, 151. 121 . HSTPP, 1952-1953:189. 122 . Life editorial, Jan. 15,1951:24; H odgson, America in Our Time, 103. 123. C um ings, Origins of the Korean War, 2: 760,763. 124. K aufm an, Korean War, 50 i 2 s. Friedan, Feminine Mystique, 286, 275-76. M y analysis, and "appalling girllessness," are taken from Lane Fenrich, "T heir M others' Sons: M aternal Pathol-

NOTES

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PAGES

188-198

S I9

ogy an d the Problem of D efection, 1953-63," p ap er delivered at the 1993 Berk­ shire C onference on the H istory of W omen. Chapter 4 I. G oldm an, Crucial Decade, 212. i. Ibid., 221. 3. C arter, Another Part of the Fifties, 15 (C arter), 12 (Trum an, C arter sum m arizing Stevenson). 4 . E isenhow er speeches, July 3 and Oct. 29,1952, both in D.D.E Papers as P resident 1953-61 (Speech Series), Boxes 1 and 2, respectively, D w ight D. E isenhow er Li­ brary, as quoted in M atthew O lson, "D w ight D. E isenhow er's 1952 C am paign Strategy" (unpublished senior thesis, N orthw estern U niversity, 1991); G old­ m an, Crucial Decade, 234 ("red hot," etc). s. Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 12 ("strengthening"); Peace with Justice: Selected Addresses of Dwight D. Eisenhower (N ew York, 1961), 11,12 (1950 rem arks). 6. A m brose, Eisenhower, 89. 7. Ibid., 118 (on K now land), 114 (K ennan), 240 ("D on't w orry); H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 218 (on D ulles); M urray K em pton, "The U nderestim ation of D w ight D. E isenhow er," Esquire Septem ber 1967:108 ("I w ould"). 8 . Fred G reenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (N ew York, 1982); K em pton, "U nderestim ation," 156; H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 279. o. Ike PP, 1953:4-5,7; H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 51. 10. See G addis, Strategies of Containment, esp. chaps. 4 -5 . 11 . Ike PP, 1953:34,17; G addis, Strategies of Containment, 146. il. G addis, Strategies of Containment, 130 (Ike), 147 (Dulles); Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 80 (NSC); W eigley, American Way of War, 400 (W eigley's w ords). 13. Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 77,31. 14. Ibid., 76 ("perm anent state"); H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 217 ("If w e"); G addis, Strategies of Containment, 136 ("Should w e"). is. A m brose, Eisenhower, 89,100. 16. Ibid., 88-89 ("dam n tired," "We pulverized"); G addis, Strategies of Containment, 135 ("G ain such"), 173 ("If the"); H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 88 ("notion that"); Ike PP, 1953:817,820 (UN speech). 17. G addis, Strategies of Containment, 149,151. is. Ike PP, 1953:182,186. I*. G addis, Strategies of Containment, 128. 20 . A m brose, Eisenhower, 87. 2 1. Ibid., 35,99. 22 . Ibid., 52,107. 23. See M arling and W etenhall, Iwo Jima, 10-16. 24. A m brose, Eisenhower, 180. 2 s. Ibid., 177. But E isenhow er's role in this crisis is m uch contested. For a different view , see G eorge C. H erring and R ichard H. Im m erm an, 'E isenhow er, D ulles, and D ienbienphu: 'T he D ay We D id n 't Go to W ar' R evisited," Journal of Ameri­ can History 71 (Septem ber 1984): 343-63.

S20

26 .

it. 28. 2 ».

so. si. 32.

33. 34.

ss. so. 37. ss. 3*. 40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 4s.

46. 47. 48. 49.

so. si. 52 . 53.

54.

ss.

so.

NOTES

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PAGES

199-209

H erring, America's Longest War, 43 (K ennedy); A m brose, Eisenhower, 176 (para­ phrase of E isenhow er com m ents), 177 ("tradition," etc.), 184. A m brose, Eisenhower, 240 ("aggressive fanaticism "); G addis, Strategies of Con­ tainment, 170,173; H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 182 (D ulles's boast). C arter, Another Part of the Fifties, 72,73. A m brose, Eisenhower, 227 (D oolittle), 197; C arter, Another Part of the Fifties, 287. C arter, Another Part of the Fifties, 79. B roadw ater,Eisenhower, 106. G ary W. R eichard, "The D om estic Politics of N ational Security," in N orm an G raebner, ed.. The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960 (N ew York, 1986), 267. Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 59. Ibid., 59-60. Ibid., 62. A m brose, Eisenhower, 264. Ibid., 260 ("appeasem ent"); H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 148. B rands, "A ge of V ulnerability," 987 (H um phrey); A m brose, Eisenhower, 150. O n m egatonnage, see Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists D ecem ber 1989:52. B rands, "A ge of V ulnerability," 989. A m brose, Eisenhower, 168,170. Ibid., 135. Ibid., 348. Stone, "The Liberals and the M ilitary B udget," M ay 27,1957, in Stone, Haunted Fifties, 210-14. H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 122-24. Ibid., 165; A m brose, Eisenhower, 115,116. IkePP, 1953:186. Peace with Justice (cited in n. 5), 12; Ike PP, 1953:2. See G riffith, "D w ight D. E isenhow er"; for E isenhow er quotation, see p. 105. Eisenhow er, Mandatefor Change, 549 ("sprout up"); Ike PP, 1955:276; Pach, Presi­ dency of Eisenhower, 123. Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 123; Eisenhow er, Mandatefor Change, 548. Architectural Forum July 1957, quoted in M ark G elfand, A Nation of Cities (N ew York, 1975), 227. W illiam H. Chafe, "The C ivil R ights R evolution, 1945-1960," in B rem ner and R eichard, Reshaping America, 85. Congressional Digest 36 (A pril 1957): 116,118. Burk, Eisenhower Administration, 257 (Nixon). Branch, Parting the Waters, 218. M artin L uther King, Jr., Why We Can't Wait (N ew York, 1964), 39 ("brutality," etc.; "nonviolent arm y"); "The Sw ord T hat H eals," title of chap. 2; 21 ("T hroughout the"); see also pp. x, 84. Branch, Parting the Waters, 273 (on W oolw o rth 's dem onstrations), Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 140 ("prejudices"), 137 ("first-class"); H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 176 ("We can't").

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PAGES

210-223

52

Eisenhow er, Mandatefor Change, 230; A m brose, Eisenhower, 412,274. ss. A m brose, Eisenhower, 426 ("policy of"); Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 153. 5 9 . A m brose, Eisenhower, 200; Branch, Parting the Waters, 213 (King). •o. Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 150; C hafe, "C ivil R ights R evolution," 87 (on "m ilitary code"). 61. Branch, Parting the Waters, 224 ("W ell, if"); H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 213; Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 154 ("occupied," "com pared"); A m brose, Eisenhower, 421. See also A m brose, 417. 6 2 . Ike PP, 1957:694; H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 213. 6i. Ike PP, 1960-1961:927. 64. A m brose, Eisenhower, 171,278,283 (em phasis in A m brose); Ike PP, 1955:55. 65. R onald Lora, "Education: Schools as C rucible in C old W ar A m erica," in B rem ner an d R eichard, eds.. Reshaping America, 243 (characterizing and quoting Rickover), 245 (on C onant). 66. Q uoted in K enneth Jones, "The G overnm ent-Science C om plex," in Brem ner and R eichard, eds.. Reshaping America, 330. 67. Beschloss, Mayday, 148 (Jackson, NBC); Congressional Digest, February 1958,36 (LBJ); A liano, American Defense Policy, 210 (Flood), 193 (Kissinger). 68. N ew house, War and Peace, 118 (Teller); on M anhattan Project, see A m brose, Eisenhower, 438, an d Jones, "G overnm ent-Science C om plex," 331. 69. 1958 speech, quoted in M iroff, Pragmatic Illusions, 37. 70. M acD ougall, Heavens, 137,142. 71. D yson, Disturbing the Universe, 109, 111; Stone, Haunted Fifties, 255-56. 7 i. K oppes, JPL, 111 (" 'W hen d o ' "); N ew house, War and Peace, 117. 7 3 . A m brose, Eisenhower, 435. 74. Ibid., 495 "how m any"), 493 ("into an"), 494 ("there just"), 568 ("W hy d o n 't"); Beschloss, Mayday, 154 ("sanctim onious"). 7 5 . A m brose, Eisenhower, 561 ("dam n near"); N ew house, War and Peace, 120 ("I'm not," "you can't"); D yson, Disturbing the Universe, 115. 76. Ike PP, 1957:229-30 ("there is"); A m brose, Eisenhower, 433 ("W e face," etc); Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 171; H ughes, Ordeal of Power, 235. 77. A m brose, Eisenhower, 491,516,567. 78. Ibid., 433. 7 9 . A rthur von H ippel, quoted in Leslie, Cold War and American Science, 211 ("W hat"). M acD ougall, Heavens, 140, argues th at S putnik ushered in an "age of technocracy." so. A m brose, Eisenhower, 432,450. 8 1. Ibid., 451 ("This"); A dam U lam , The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II (New York, 1971), 230 ("Every R ussian"). 8 2 . D an O 'N eill, "Project C hariot: H ow A laska Escaped N uclear Excavation," Bulle­ tin of the Atomic Scientists D ecem ber 1989:28-37. 83. W eart, Nuclear Fear, 212; D ivine, Blowing in the Wind, 323. 84. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 292; Thom as Schelling, quoted in Freedm an, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 164. 85. Stone, Haunted Fifties, 320-21. st.

522

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PAGES

223-236

W eigley, American Way of War, 430; Freedm an, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 156 (Freedm an on "exaggerated"), 162-63 (K issinger). 8 7 . W eigley, American Way of War, 414 (K issinger), 412 ("the only"), 434-35 (Brodie). 88. Freedm an, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 180-81 ("It w as"); W eigley, American Way of War, 440 ("grim jocularity"). 8 ». K aplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 134 (LeM ay); Ford, Button, 107 ("If there"). 90. Stone, Haunted Fifties, 273 ("the pets"); Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 200 ("W est," etc.). 9 1. Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 200-204; A m brose, Eisenhower, 519 ("W here"). 9 i. Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 207,208. 9 3 . Ike PP, 1958:2,3. 9 4 . W olfe, Right Stuff, 120,157. 9 s. See United States at Large, 1958 (W ashington 1959), voi. 72, p a rt 1,1580-1605. 9 «. G oldm an, Rendezvous with Destiny, 314. 97 . M acD ougall, Heavens, 161 (on technocracy); A m brose, Eisenhower, 459. 98. Barry G oldw ater, The Conscience of a Conservative (N ew York, 1960), 108,90,20. 9 9 . Peter D rucker, D elbert C. M iller, an d R obert A. D ahl, Power and Democracy in America (N otre D am e, 1961); D. W. Brogan, America in the Modem World (Rutgers, 1960), 74,112. 100. Pells, Liberal Mind, 213 (characterizing G oodm an); Paul G oodm an, Growing up Absurd: Problems of Youth in the Organized System (N ew York, 1960), 109,13. 101. Jules H enry, Culture Against Man (N ew York, 1963,1965), 123,102,103,104, 110. loi. N ovick, That Noble Dream, 415, 418. John Lukacs, The History of the Cold War (N ew York, 1961,1962), xi, 272,339. tos. M arling and W etenhall, Iwo Jima, chap. 9; quotations: 172,176-77,184. io«. W eart, Nuclear Fear, 218. •os. W hitfield, Culture of the Cold War, 213 (on The Manchurian Candidate). See also Lane Fenrich, "M om m ies, C om m ies, and Q ueers," p ap er delivered a t the Les­ bian and G ay Studies C onference, R utgers U niversity, N ovem ber 1991. io«. W eart, Nuclear Fear, 218. 107. Ike PP, 1960-1961:690. ■os. JFK PP, 1961:1. loo. Fred I. G reenstein and R ichard H . Im m erm an, "W hat D id E isenhow er Tell K ennedy about Indochina? The Politics of M isperception," Journal of American History 79 (Septem ber 1992): 568-87. See also A m brose, Eisenhower, 614-15. I io. Ike PP, 1960-1961:1035-40. h i . Ibid., 1045. C om m ents from 1953 quoted in A liano, American Defense Policy, 34-35. M 2 . Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 317n. 11 3. Nation, quoted in Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 230; New Republic Jan. 30,1961: 2; Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 312. 114. Ike PP, 1960-1961:1047; Pach, Presidency of Eisenhower, 233 (Pach's characteriza­ tions), 235 (Eisenhow er). II s. Richard M. N ixon, RN: The Memoirs ofRichard Nixon (N ew York, 1978), 235; JFK 8 «.

NOTES

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PAGES

237-247

523

PP, 1961: 1-2; Ike PP, 1960-1961: 1037; A m brose, Eisenhower, 89 (1953 state­ m ent). Chapter 5 1. K ennedy before M assachusetts state legislature, quoted in Time Jan. 20,1961:15; Stone, Haunted Fifties, 313. 2 . Life Feb. 10:1961,17,21. 3 . O n the A pril 14 m eeting, see H ugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President (N ew York, 1964), 120-23; Sidey, "H ow the N ew s H it W ashington—W ith Some Reactions O verseas," Life A p ril2 1 ,1961:26-27, an d Life editorial, 35. JFKPP, 1961:397,404; 1962:669. 4 . M acD ougall, Heavens, 322; K oppes, JPL and the American Space Program, 111 (T. K eith G lennan on K hrushchev). s. M acD ougall, Heavens, 323. «. Beschloss, Crisis Years, 166. 7 . W olfe, Right Stuff, 122-23. 8 . H enry W. C ooper, "A nnals of Space," New Yorker Sept. 2,1991:63. ». Sm ith, "Selling the M oon," 178 ("to differentiate," etc.); M acD ougall, Heavens, 305 ("the greatest"). O n W illiam L euchtenburg's phrase "save w ar or its surro­ gate," see C hap. 1 above. 10. Life M arch 3,1961:26. 11 . Sm ith, "Selling the M oon," 200. il. JFK PP, 1961:535; B aritz, Backfire, 117 ("shared"). 1 3. G addis, Strategies of Containment, 2 1 2 . 14. D aniel Bell, "The D ispossessed" (1962), in Bell, ed.. The Radical Right: The New American Right, Expanded and Updated (1963; G arden City, 1964), 1,32,16,15,40. John A. Stornier, None Dare Call It Treason (Florissant, M o., 1964), 10. is. S tudents for a D em ocratic Society, "The P ort H uron Statem ent," excerpts in W illiam H . Chafe and H arvard Sitkoff, eds., A History of Our Time, 3d ed. (N ew York, 1991), 345-50. io. M em orandum , LBJ to JFK, M ay 23,1961, in N ew York Tim es, Pentagon Papers, 129; A m brose, Rise to Globalism, 191; Bell, "D ispossessed," 44,45. it. Cook, Warfare State, 15. is. JFKPP, 1961:306 ("convinced"), 534 ("B astogne"); M iroff, Pragmatic Illusions, 14 (1958). I*. M iroff, Pragmatic Illusions, 75 ("th at K hrushchev"); Parm et, JFK, 196 ("the U.S.," P arm et's w ords); JFKPP, 1961:536-37; B urner, John F. Kennedy, T7 ("em pty ges­ ture"). 20 . Life Sept. 15,1961:96; Sept. 29,1961,57. Stone, Haunted Fifties, 317. 2 1. E ugene B urdick and H arvey W heeler, Fail-Safe (N ew York, 1962), 151. 22 . JFK PP, 1962:808 ; R obert F. K ennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Mis­ sile Crisis (N ew York, 1969), 108. 23. N ew house, War and Peace, 172 ("W hat difference"); JFKPP, 1962:806,807; The­ odore Sorensen, Kennedy (N ew York, 1965), 678 (Sorensen's em phasis).

524

24 .

is.

26 . 27.

28 . 29.

so.

si. 32 . 33.

34 . 35 .

36.

37.

38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

45. 46. 47.

NOTES

TO

PAGES

247-257

G eorge Ball, "JFK's Big M om ent," New York Review of Books Feb. 13,1992:18. Beschloss, Crisis Years, 509. JFKPP, 1962:807. Life Nov. 2,1962:35, for quotation; Nov. 9, 38-39, for air-raid drills. U.S. News and World Report Nov. 5,1962: 41 (m ap), 120 (Lawrence). Beschloss, Crisis Years, 477,501. Ibid., 544 (em phasis in Beschloss). Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 357. N ew house, War and Peace, 184. JFKPP, 1962:895. N ew house, War and Peace, 198 ("strangest"). Beschloss, Crisis Years, 549 ("I cut"). M em orandum , W alt W hitm an Rostow to Secretary of State D ean Rusk, Nov. 23,1964, in N ew York Tim es, Pentagon Papers, 421. "C om ing Tests and O pportunity in C old W ar," editorial. Life Nov. 9 ,1 9 6 2 ,4 (Life's em ­ phasis). A dam Yarm olinsky, quoted in C harlton an d M oncrieff, Many Reasons Why, 60-61. FitzG erald, Fire in the Lake, 124. H alberstam , Best and Brightest, 503. H erring, America's Longest War, 79. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 547 (JFK); B aritz, Backfire, 103 (Bundy). O ther quo­ tations from N ew York Tim es, Pentagon Papers, 129 (M em orandum , LBJ to JFK, M ay 23,1961), 422 (M em orandum , Rostow to R usk, M ay 23,1964), 372 (Taylor, briefing a t W ashington m eeting, Nov. 27,1964). G addis, Strategies of Containment, 211 (LBJ), 248 (Rusk); N ew York Tim es, Penta­ gon Papers, 276 (JCS); Baritz, Backfire, 89 ("m uscular realists," B aritz's phrase). H enry Steele C om m ager, ed.. Documents in American History, voi. 2 (N ew York, 1968), 711; C harlton and M oncrieff, Many Reasons Why, 136 (W estm oreland); G addis, Strategies of Containment, 244 (JCS and Lansdale); C urtis E. LeM ay, w ith M acKinlay K antor, Mission with LeMay (G arden City, 1965), 565. D avid H alberstam , The Making of a Quagmire: American and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era, rev. by D aniel J. Singal (N ew York, 1988), 155; H alberstam , Best and Brightest, 200-201 (H alberstam 's em phasis). Singal, xix, in H alberstam , Making of a Quagmire; Baritz, Backfire, 104. W estm oreland, Soldier Reports, 119; LBJ PP, 1966 (I): 496. Baritz, Backfire, 126. A ugust M eier, Elliot R udw ick, and Francis L. Broderick, eds.. Black Protest Thought in the Twentieth Century, 2d ed. (Indianapolis, 1971), 319 (em phasis in original); King, Why We Can’ t Wait, 21; JFKPP, 1963:488. A ppy, Working-Class War, 21. Stephen Law son, "C ivil R ights," in D ivine, ed., Johnson Years, 1:109,122 (n. 51); LBJ PP, 1967 (voi. 1): 194. D 'Em ilio, Sexual Politics, 151. Rosenberg, Divided Lives, 162-67 (quotations are R osenberg's paraphrases). R ustin, "The M eaning of B irm ingham " (1963), in M eier e t al.. Black Protest Thought, 339,340. C arm ichael, "W hat We W ant," New York Review of Books Sept. 22,1966, excerpted in R ichard H ofstadter, Great Issues in American History: From Reconstruction to the Present Day, 1864-1969 (N ew York, 1969), 499.

NOTES

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PAGES

257-270

525

48. B aldw in, from The Fire Next Time (1963), excerpts in H ow ard, Sixties, 115. **. Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 175. so. M ichael H arrington, The Other America: Poverty in America (1962; Baltim ore, 1971), 179. s I. Friedan, Feminine Mystique, 17,338,339,182; on cam ps, see chap. 1 2 . s i. N ovick, That Noble Dream, 377, 375, 376, 366; W oodw ard, "The A ge of Rein­ terpretation," 3. ss. Cook, Warfare State, 19,65,16; Stone, Haunted Fifties, 323. S4 . LBJ PP, 1963-1964 (I): 114 ("This adm inistration"), 376 ("a national w ar"), 380 ("If w e now ," "in a few m onths"). O ther quotations from Lyndon B. Johnson, My Hopefor America (N ew York, 1964), 41,42,44. ss. Zarefsky, President Johnson's War on Poverty, 29,31; Jam es Q. W ilson, "The W ar on C ities" (1966), repr. in Thom as R. Dye, American Public Policy (C olum bus, 1969), 373. se. Zarefsky, President Johnson's War on Poverty, 36; Lyndon Baines Johnson, Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-69 (N ew York, 1971), 79; L euchtenburg, "N ew D eal," 143. s t . Film, The American Experience: LBJ (PBS, 1991). ss. C onkin, Big Daddy, 222 ("w as only"); Zarefsky, President Johnson's War on Pov­ erty, 43 (Shriver). ss. LBJ PP, 1967 (I): 517; C onkin, Big Daddy, 214 (C onkin on "class rhetoric"); Zarefsky, President Johnson's War on Poverty, 98 (congressm an); R osenberg and R osenberg, In Our Times, 129; R orabaugh, Berkeley at War, 61 (em phasis in R orabaugh). eo. Zarefsky, President Johnson's War on Poverty, 29. 6 i. LBJ PP, 1966 (I): 232 (Peace C orps), 291,293,296 (em phasis in original). e t. A ll quotations an d m uch of the analysis here are from C larence G. Lasby, "The W ar on D isease," in D ivine, Johnson Years, 2:183-216. 63. LBJ PP, 1966 (I): 163 ("I propose," em phasis in original; "There can"); LBJ PP, 1966 (II): 1266. 64. A ppy, Working-Class War, 31-33. 6 x. C onkin, Big Daddy, 209. 66. LBJ PP, 1966 (I): 48; Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 175. 67. C onkin, Big Daddy, 237; Sm all, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, 46. For an early de­ piction of LBJ's outlook, see D oris K earns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (N ew York, 1976), esp. chap. 11. 68. Schell, Village of Ben Sue, 56; Schell, Real War, 9-10. 6 ». Time, quoted in Pisor, End of the Line, 43; Schell, Village of Ben Sue, 31,46,47. 70. Schell, Village of Ben Sue, 94,103,86,132. 7 1. H erring, America's Longest War, 156 ("w as like"); A ppy, Working-Class War, 197 ("m ilitary policy"). 72. C onkin, Big Daddy, 196. 7 3 . Ibid., 243-44. 74. Berm an, Planning a Tragedy, 20 (LBJ); H erring, America's Longest War, 137; G uenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (N ew York, 1978), 73 ("W e'll"); W estm oreland, Sol­ dier Reports, 334.

S 26

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PAGES

270-288

ys. G alluci, Neither Peace Nor Honor, 94. y«. C lodfelter, Limits of Air Power, 100,65. 77. Ibid., 101,135; G alluci, Neither Peace Nor Honor, 83 ("if you"), 84. 78. W estm oreland, Soldier Reports, 261; C lodfelter, Limits of Air Power, 145. 79. H odgson, America in Our Time, 27A. so. LBJPP, 1965 (I): 395-96. s i . LBJ quoted in R obert D ivine, "The Johnson R evival," in D ivine, Johnson Years, 2: 18. si. H erring, America's Longest War, 170 ("W in"); H ixson, George F. Kennan, 247; R orabaugh, Berkeley at War, 115,110. 83. R orabaugh, Berkeley at War, x. 84. H odgson, America in Our Time, 275. ss. C harles D eB enedetti, "Lyndon Johnson and the A ntiw ar O pposition," in Di­ vine, Johnson Years, 2:23. se. W illiam A pplem an W illiam s et al., eds., America in Vietnam: A Documentary His­ tory (G arden City, 1985), 256, 258-59; D avid M. Shoup, "The N ew A m erican M ilitarism ," Atlantic A pril 1969:56. 87. K ing, "Beyond V ietnam ," in Joanne G rant, ed.. Black Protest: History, Documents, and Analyses (N ew York, 1968), 418-25; M artin L uther K ing, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (N ew York, 1967), 174 ("N othing"). 8 8 . R osenberg, Divided Lives, 197 ("is often"); Sara Evans, Personal Politics, 160,185. so. Barry C om m oner, Science and Survival (N ew York, 1966), chap. 1 title; 10 ("greenhouse"); 132. 90. M atusow , Unraveling of America, 386,387. 9 1. G rant M cConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (N ew York, 1966), 337, 255; Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order (N ew York, 1966), 187,211,210,186. See also C hristo­ p h er Lasch, The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963 (N ew York, 1965); The Ag­ ony of the American Left (N ew York, 1966-68). 92. M arkusen et al.. Rise of the Gunbelt, 14. Chapter 6 1. 2. 3. 4.

s. 8.

y. 8. 9. 10. 11.

H erring, America's Longest War, 178. Pisor, End of the Line, 56-58. Ibid., 47,41; H erring, America's Longest War, 151 ("The solution"). G ibson, Perfect War, 99. Pisor, End of the Line, 59. A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 195. Ibid., 11,12,48,49,61. Ibid., 73,77,81. H einem an, Campus Wars, 49,251; A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 104. Lt. Gen. Philip B. D avidson (U.S. A rm y, Ret.), Vietnam at War (1988), quoted in H am m ond, "Press in V ietnam ," 312; H allin, "Uncensored War," 3 (Nixon). H am m ond, "Press in V ietnam ," 316; Tuttle, "Daddy's Gone to War," 153 (on Life). See also A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 135.

NOTES

TO

PAGES

289-304

527

I a. H am m ond, "Press in V ietnam ," 317,319. 13 . M ichael A rien, Living Room War (1969), as excerpted in H ow ard, Sixties, 435-36, 438, 14. H erring, America's Longest War, 191,192. is. Q uoted in Young, Vietnam Wars, 223. is. H erring, America's Longest War, 194. i t . Schell, Real War, 37,39. is. Ibid., 205,206. I». K utler, Wars of Watergate, 29. io. M ailer, Armies of the Night, 38. 2 1 . Ibid., 117,228,86,88. 22. Ibid., 90,92,280; M atusow , Unraveling, 388 (Lowell). 23. M atusow , Unraveling, 328. 24. Ibid., 421. 2s. Ibid., 318 (Rubin); A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 126. 26. Reich, Greening, 295; H odgson, America in Our Time, 349-51,341; Atlantic O cto­ ber 1968:56 and February 1969:450. 27. H einem an, Campus Wars, 30,38. 28. A ppy, Working-Class War, 41,42. 2». H odgson, America in Our Time, 311. 30. M ailer, Armies of the Night, 270,271. si. K enneth K enniston, Youth and Dissent: The Rise of a New Opposition (N ew York, 1971), 154 (K enniston's em phasis). 32. H einem an, Campus Wars, 25. 3 3 . M arling and W etenhall, Iwo Jima, 199-204. 34 . Levy, Debate Over Vietnam, 117. 3s. Reich, Greening, 213 ("curious," etc.); Levy, Debate Over Vietnam, 119 (H ope); A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 480. 36. A ddress, Oct. 30,1969, "Im pudence in the Streets," in Spiro T. A gnew , Frankly Speaking: A Collection of Extraordinary Speeches (W ashington, 1970), 44. 3 7 . A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 310. 38. LBJPP, 1966 (I): 20 (Jan. 13,1966). 3 9 . For 1964 quotations and analysis of them , see Lee E delm an, "Tearoom s and Sym pathy, or. The E pistem ology of the W ater C loset," in A ndrew Parker, M ary R usso, D oris Som m er, and Patricia Yaeger, eds.. Nationalisms and Sexualities (N ew York, 1991), 263-84. LBJ PP, 1966 (I): 519 ("N ervous"); Sm ith, "C om m en­ tary," 87 ("H ell"); H erring, America's Longest War, 181 ("frustrated"); Sm all, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, 65. 40. A gnew , Frankly Speaking, "Im pudence," 44-51 (A gnew 's em phasis) and "R atio­ nality and Effetism ," 18. 41. A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 348,317,496,529. 42. G ibson, Perfect War, 329 (LBJ); Levy, Debate Over Vietnam, 109 (Daly); C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, 34 (Friedan). 4 3 . M ailer, Armies of the Night, 38,171; A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 334; Evans, Per­ sonal Politics, 200. See also Jeffords, Remasculinization, esp. 47. 44. E hrenreich, Hearts of Men, 105; Jeffords, Remasculinization, xii.

528

NOTES

TO

PAGES

305-322

«s. Evans, Personal Politics, 189-90 ("on the cover"), 215 ("intim acy"); K arla Jay and A llen Young, Out of the Closets: Voices of Gay Liberation (1972; N ew York, 1992), 4 «. 4 ». 48. 4».

so. si. 52.

s i. 54. 55.

5 «. 57. 58.

so. «0 . «I. 6 i. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67. 68.

69. 70.

71. 72. 73. 74.

75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

197 (Brown), 253 ("translated"). V onnegut, Slaughterhouse-Five, 74-75, C atton, Waitingfor the Morning Train, 232,176,220,222,245-46,219. A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 203,142,207. Ibid., 323. Ibid., 150,292,406,394. Nixon PP, 1970:940-41 (onpornography); 12 ("overblow n," etc.). A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 432,433,657. Ibid., 267,27; K utler, Wars of Watergate, 46 (" 'togetherness' "). A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 404-05. K utler, Wars of Watergate, 69 ("T here's"); A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 144,168,167, 195. Nixon PP, 1969:696-97. Ibid., 699. G ibson, Perfect War, 434. A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 252. Ibid., 224,281,282. Ibid., 299,342. Ibid., 278. A m brose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 42,41,50. D. M ichael Schafer, "The V ietnam C om bat Experience," in Schafer, Legacy, 89. Gen. W illiam R. Peers, The May Lai Inquiry (N ew York, 1979), 254-55; A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 429. A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 186,172. Ibid., 229,409,250. Ibid., 361. Ibid., 609. W illiam Safire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House (G arden City, 1975), 377; H . R. H aldem an, The Ends of Power (N ew York, 1978), 110 ("show s"). For sources and analysis here, I also benefited from G ary Fried­ m an, "N ixon, the M adm an Theory, and the Roots of W atergate" (M. A. thesis, N orthw estern U niversity, 1988). A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 239,611; K utler, Wars of Watergate, 97 (H uston). See A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 659. A m brose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 58. G eorge M cG overn, An American Journey: The Presidential Campaign Speeches of George McGovern (N ew York, 1974), 103, 8 6 , 21, 26; A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 605 (Scott). A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 556,588. Ibid., 623,624,637; A m brose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 12. A m brose, Nixon: Triumph, 660; Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 14,15,44. W eigley, American Way of War, 476-77. B ernard Brodie, War and Politics (N ew York, 1973), 222,275.

NOTES

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PAGES

122-336

529

so. Louis J. H alle, "D oes W ar H ave a Future?" Foreign Affairs 52 (O ctober 1973): 34. For view s of guerrilla w arfare, see W alter L aqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study (Boston, 1976). si. A. E rnest Fitzgerald, The High Priests of Waste (N ew York, 1972), chap. 1 title; Seym our M elm an, The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline (N ew York, 1974), 1 1 ; W iesner, quoted in Freedm an, Evolution of Nuclear Strat­ egy, 338. si. Q uoted in Freedm an, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 360. 83. A m brose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 320. 84. Ibid., 303; on "sufficiency," see Freedm an, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 341. ss. A m brose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 99,95. 8 «. G addis, Strategies of Containment, 321. 87. C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, 97,99. 8 8 . A m brose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 95,380; on "pitiful, helpless giant," see Am ­ brose, Nixon: Triumph, 345. 8 ». Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, chap. 7 title; R obert W iebe, The Segmented Soci­ ety: An Introduction to the Meaning of America (N ew York, 1975). »0 . See FitzG erald, Cities on a Hill. »I. C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, 31. »2 . Ibid., 81.

93. A m brose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 55-56,587 (A m brose on N ixon); Newsweek Sept. 10,1973:18. »♦. "A rabs' Final W eapon," Time Sept. 17,1973:29; Jam es B urnham , "C hoose Your W eapons, G entlem en," National Review Dec. 21, 1973: 1401 (B urnham 's em ­ phasis). 95. C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, 129. 98. Ibid., 131 ("W om en"), 118. 97. Nixon PP, 1973:920. 98. A m brose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 84,127,419. 99. Ibid., 106. 100. Ibid., 157,250. toi. Ib id .,48,68,88. 102 . Ibid., 149. 103. Ibid., 248. too. This p arag rap h draw s on G arry W ills, "K eeper of the Seal," New York Review of Books July 18,1991:19-22, w hich includes the H aig quotation. The characteri­ zation of N ixon is B ernard B rodie's, in War and Politics (cited in n. 79), 216. ■os. A m brose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 507. loo. Ibid., 597. 107. Ibid., 323; N ew house, War and Peace, 245; G addis, Strategies of Containment, 321 (Reagan). los. G addis, Strategies of Containment, 320. 109. A m brose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 530-32 (em phasis in A m brose), no. Ford PP, 1975:482-83. h i . C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, x ("pervasive"); Ford PP, 1975: 498, 641; H erring, America's Longest War, 273-74.

530

NOTES

TO

PAGES

337-354

Chapter 7 I. "A Strong b u t Risky Show of F orce/' Time M ay 26,1975:9. i. Ibid. O ther quotations: C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, 168. I . Time M ay 26,1975:10; Sidey, "A n O ld-Fashioned K ind of C risis," 18. 4. See Schell, Observing the Nixon Years, 268-72. s. Vagts, History of Militarism, 15. «. Ribuffo, Right, Center, Left, 190,189 (Ford), 200 (Reagan), 204 (on C arter "as a"); C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, 189 ("Lon C haney"). 7. Ribuffo, Right, Center, Left, 201 (paraphrasing LBJ). a. Carter PP, 1977 (I): 2-3. ». Ribuffo, Right, Center, Left, 2 2 2 ("w eirdo"); see also chap. 10 generally. 10. Ibid., 217; Carter PP, 1977 (I): 956. 11. Carter PP, 1977 (I): 955,545,3,77. 12 . C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, 213. is. Carter PP, 1977 (I): 500 ("w e still"), 501 ("the destruction"); other quotations from N otre Dam e speech, 954-62. 14. Ibid., 958. is. Ib id .,498. i6. A m brose, Rise to Globalism, 298. it. N ew house, War and Peace, 310. is. Ibid., 278. I». Ibid., 332. io. Ibid., 258. M oynihan on CBS N ew s, Face the Nation, June 17,1979 (CBS tran ­ script). 21. Carter PP, 1977 (II): 1716. O n com paring slavery and nuclear w eapons, see Sm ith, Thinking the Unthinkable. 22. Ribuffo, Right, Center, Left, 246; C arter m em oirs, as quoted in Sm ith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 83. 23. Carter PP, 1977 (I): 656; (II): 1783. 24. C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, 216 (brackets in C arroll), 217. 2s. Sm ith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 57,58. 26. L inenthal, Sacred Ground, 185-86; "courageous" and "m ake all" quotations from C onfederate A ir Force, "N arration of the W orld W ar II A ir Pow er D em on­ stration" [n.d.], provided courtesy Linenthal. 27. L inenthal, Sacred Ground, 189,182,188,185. 28. M arling and W etenhall, Iwo Jima, 207; m ore generally, see chaps. 10-11. 2». L inenthal, "W ar and Sacrifice," 23, 25, 28-29; R ichard Pipes, "W hy the Soviet U nion Thinks It C ould Fight and W in a N uclear W ar," Commentary July 1977: 21-34; Falw ell, Listen America! 98. so. L inenthal, "W ar and Sacrifice," 22, 24, 25,27; Vance in New York Times June 6 , 1980. 3 1. Star Wars (George Lucas, 1977); H ellm ann, American Myth, 214; see also H ellm ann's discussion of the rest of the trilogy. 32. See generally L inenthal, "R estoring A m erica: Political R evivalism in the N u­ clear A ge," in Sherrill, Religion; for "fierce," see p. 42.

NOTES

TO

PAGES

355-366

53

W eart, Nuclear Fear, 320. 3 4 . "A Republic of Insects and G rass," title of section 1, Schell, Fate of the Earth; K evin Lew is, "The Prom pt an d D elayed Effects of N uclear W ar," Scientific American July 1979:47. ss. L inenthal, "R estoring A m erica," in Sherrill, Religion, 36 (L inenthal's w ords), 37 (C aldicott); Schell, Fate of the Earth, 359. 36. Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, 362; see m ore generally B oyer's epilogue. 37. Ibid. 364. 38. D yson, Disturbing the Universe, 30. s». Jeanine Basinger, The World War Two Combat Film: Anatomy ofa Genre (N ew York, 1986), 332. 40. Judith E. D oneson, The Holocaust in American Film (N ew York, 1987), 188,196. 41. H ere I draw loosely, w ith no claim to hold them accountable for the results, on com m ents by Lane Fenrich an d M arilyn Young. 42. Falw ell, Listen America! 11. O n the "cult of the superw eapon," see Franklin, War 33 .

Stars.

See L eonard, Above the Battle, for this them e at earlier points in A m erican his­ tory. 44. H al Lindsey, The Late Great Planet Earth (1970; N ew York, 1973), 165,170,155. 4 s. Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More, 145,142,144. 46. Ibid., 138,128,139 (G raham ), 148. 47. Bruce Taylor, "The V ietnam W ar M ovie," in Shafer, Legacy, 191 (quoting G ilbert A dair), 198. 48. Basinger, World War II Combat Film, 212 ("about com bat"); Taylor, "V ietnam W ar M ovie," 192 ("m etaphor," etc.). See also H ellm ann, American Myth, chap. 7. 4 *. Taylor, "V ietnam W ar M ovie," 194-96. so. I draw here on Taylor, as cited in preceding notes, on m y ow n reading of these film s, and on suggestions by Leo Ribuffo. si. F ran k lin ,M.I.A., 75,133,136,156. si. Ibid., 142. 53 . The quotation and som e of the analysis here com e from Thom as L aqueur, "Bodies, N am es, M em ory," p ap er delivered a t N orthw estern U niversity, M ay 1993. 54. C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, 250; Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (N ew York, 1978), xv. ss. Carter PP, 1979 (II): 1237. 56. Lasch, Culture of Narcissism, 199,4; C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, x. See also Falw ell, Listen America! 57. 57. Carter PP, 1979 (II): 1239; general, q uoted in E dw ard L inenthal, " 'A R eservoir of Spiritual Faith': Patriotic Faith at the A lam o in the T w entieth C entury," South­ western Historical Quarterly 91 (A pril 1988): 517. ss. Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 236. s*. N alty, Strengthfor the Fight, 340-41. 60. G raphic accom panying R aym ond Coffey, "U.S. Youth: Farew ell to A rm s," Chi­ cago Tribune Dec. 17,1978.

43.

532

NOTES

TO

PAGES

367-382

e I. Sociologist C harles M oskos, quoted in ibid.; N alty, Strengthfor the Fight, 343 ("to fulfill"). 02. Time July 19,1976: 74; "O f A rm s an d the W om an," Newsweek Jan. 26,1976: 60; H olm , Women in the Military, 311,333. es. Time cover. Sept. 8,1975; "H om osexual Sergeant," Time June 9,1975:18. See also Shilts, Conduct Unbecoming. 04. Pentagon 1982 policy, in M ary A nn H um phrey, My Country, My Right to Serve: Experiences ofGay Men and Women in the Military, World War II to the Present (N ew York, 1990), 262. 0s. D ennis A ltm an (1982), quoted in Ehrenreich, Hearts ofMen, 130. 00. R uth Rosen, "The D ay They B uried T raditional W om anhood: W om en and the V ietnam Experience," in Shafer, Legacy, 246-47,249. 07. G eorge F. W ill, "H ow Far out of the C loset?" Newsweek M ay 30,1977:92; Falw ell, Listen America! 181,183,185; FitzG erald, Cities on a Hill, 164 ("the church"). 0 8 . L inenthal, "W ar and Sacrifice," 24-25; M idge D ecter, "The Boys on the Beach," Commentary Septem ber 1980:43,37,46; letters. Commentary D ecem ber 1980:12, 13. 09. Felsenthal, Sweetheart, 237. See also Phyllis Schlafly and C hester W ard, Ambush at Vladivostok (A lton, HI., 1976). to . Felsenthal, Sweetheart, 238 (paraphrasing Schlafly), 317-18; H olm , Women in the Military, 264 (Ervin). 7 i. Ehrenreich, Hearts of Men, 148 (Schlafly), 152,162,163. 7 i. Ibid., 156,157 (Schm itz), 157; W uthnow , Restructuring, 203 (Falwell). 73. W uthnow , Restructuring, 201. 74. Falw ell, Listen America! 106. 7 s. "A Stunning Show, A fter A ll," Time M arch 3,1980: 30; "U.S. Skaters P ut the G old on Ice," Newsweek M arch 3, 1980: 81, 85; "The Talk of the Tow n," New Yorker M arch 10,1980:37. 74. Carter PP, 1980-1981 (I): 106 ("pow erful"); Sm ith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 226 (Vance), 227-28 (M ondale). 7 7 . Sm ith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 182 (on shah); Carter PP, 1980-1981 (I): 109; E dw ard L uttw ak, "A fter A fghanistan, W hat?" Commentary A pril 1980:49; Ray­ m ond Coffey, "U.S. M ilitary," Chicago Tribune A ug. 24,1980. 7 «. Carter PP, 1980-1981 (I): 108; (III): 2891. 79. Sm ith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 209,90; C arroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Hap­ pened, 343 (Reagan); G eorge W ill, "R eaping the W hirlw ind," Newsweek Jan. 21, 1980: 92; "Talk of the Tow n," New Yorker A pril 28,1980: 33; Carter PP, 1979 (II): 2233. so. A m brose, Rise to Globalism, 308 (bracketed com m ents Sherry's); Carter PP, 19801981 (I): 197. si. Scheer, With Enough Shovels, 66. 82. N ew house, War and Peace, 291; Sm ith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 82. 83. Scheer, With Enough Shovels, 21,23. 84. N ew house, War and Peace, 286,289,286. ss. Scheer, With Enough Shovels, 29,31.

N O T E S TO PAGES 3 8 2 - 3 9 5

533

N ew house, War and Peace, 321,322; Jam es C oates, "Lake M ichigan M issile Subs Eyed," Chicago Tribune A pril 6,1980 ("m an's"); Bill Keller, "A ttack of the A tom ic Tidal W ave," Washington Monthly M ay 1980:55 ("Put"). 87. "The Talk of the Tow n," New Yorker, Feb. 25,1980; G eorge W ill, "R eaping the W hirlw ind," 92; A lexander Solzhenitsyn, "M isconceptions about R ussia A re a T hreat to A m erica," Foreign Affairs Spring 1980:833. 88. N ew house, War and Peace, 359; G regg H erken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Sci­ ence Advisingfrom the Atomic Bomb to SDI (N ew York, 1992), 195. 89. Carter PP, 1980-1981 (I): 289 ("to increase"); 1979 (II): 2240 ("th at a"). 90. "The Talk of the Tow n," New Yorker M arch 10,1980:37 and Feb. 25,1980:31. 9 1. Sm ith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 204-05. 92. M eg G reenfield, "L et's A void Scapegoats," Newsweek M ay 5,1980:104; "Talking Loudly, w ith a Sm all Stick," Newsweek M ay 12,1980:47; "V aliant Try— or Bad Faith?" Newsweek M ay 5,1980:40; "C an U.S. W eapons Take the H eat?" Business Week M ay 12,1980:27. 9 3 . R ichard A. G abriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (N ew York, 1978), 7,131,9,118,9. 94. Jam es Fallow s, National Defense (New York, 1981), 171,35,62,68. See also M ary K aldor, The Baroque Arsenal (N ew York, 1981). 95. Len A ckland, "D oom sday by a Short-C ircuit?" Chicago Tribune June 20,1980; "The Talk of the Tow n," New Yorker June 30,1980:26; Ford, Button, 15,240. 96. Fallow s, National Defense, xvi, xvii, 73. 9 7 . R ichard J. Barnet, Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade (N ew York, 1981), 11-12,19,39,97,90,109, 111. 98. D uboff, Accumulation and Power, 117. 9 9 . K ennedy, Rise and Fall, 443 (quoting the W orldw atch Institute). too. D uboff, Accumulation and Power, 117,118. loi. John U pdike, Rabbit Is Rich (1981; N ew York, 1982), 1,31,435,436. 8 «.

Chapter 8 I. l. 3. 4. *.

W ills, Reagan's America, 406. Reagan PP, 1981:2-4. Reagan PP, 1986 (I): 808. Schaller, Reckoning with Reagan, 14. Johnson, Sleepwalking, 50 ("preferred"); D eborah Silverm an, Selling Culture:

Bloomingdale's, Diana Vreeland, and the New Aristocracy of Taste in Reagan's Amer­ ica (New York, 1986), 158,9. o. Frances FitzG erald, "A C ritic at Large," New Yorker Jan. 16,1989: 75 (H aig), 8 8 ; 7. 8.

o. io.

Ignatius, "R eagan's Foreign Policy," 180 ("this inability"). Ignatius, "R eagan's Foreign Policy," 174. Ibid., 174,183. Ibid., 174-75; Stanley H offm ann, "Sem idetached Politics," New York Review of Books Nov. 8,1984:36. Reagan PP, 1983 (I): 364.

S3 4

NOTES

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PAGES

396-412

Ignatius, "R eagan's Foreign Policy," 177; N ew house, War and Peace, 334. 12 . Johnson, Sleepwalking, 45,49; W ilis, Reagan's America, 420. 13. W ills, Reagan's America, 489. 14. Q uotations from Jam es J. K ilpatrick, Nation's Business January 1983, repr. in Boyer, Reagan as President, 43. Is. B lum enthal, "R eaganism an d the N eokitsch A esthetic," 288,289. O n Clancy, see H ixson, "Red Storm R ising," 613. is. Reagan PP, 1981:164,194,168. O n C hurchill, see L inenthal, "R estoring A m er­ ica," 41; on W einberger, Schaller, Reckoning, 48. it. Q uoted in Lafeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 302. is. Schaller, Reckoning with Reagan, 47. I ». A nn M arkusen, "C old W ar Econom ics," Bulletin of theAtomic Scientists Jan u ary February 1989:42; B rands, The Devil We Knew, 176. io. "D isaster A gency Focus: Plan for Surviving N uclear W ar," Chicago Tribune Feb. 24,1993. 21. K ennedy, Rise and Fall, 522; N ick Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder: Money, Politics, and the B-l Bomber (Princeton, 1989), 229,227. 22. W ills, Reagan's America, 423. 23. Reagan PP, 1983 (I): 384 ("evil em pire"); (H): 1223-25. 24. N ew house, War and Peace, 335. 2s. Ibid., 348. 2 «. Ibid., 355. 27. Ibid., 343,344,375. 28. Ibid., 351. 2». M alcolm W. Browne, New York Times D ec.4,1978. so. Baucom, Origins ofSDI, 192 ("W ouldn't"); Franklin, War Stars, 202 ("a new "); Reagan PP, 1983 (I): 443 ("could"), an d 1986 (I): 810. si. N ew house, War and Peace, 361 ("stunned"); Reagan PP, 1983 (I): 438,442-43. 32 . Boyer, Reagan as President, 212 (National Review A pril 15,1983); Reagan PP, 1983 (I): 443; L inenthal, Symbolic Defense, 13 ("cruel"), 14 (on B uchw ald); W ills, Rea­ gan's America, 447. 33. B rands, The Devil We Knew, 177; N ew house, War and Peace, 363. 34 . Sm ith, Unthinking the Unthinkable, 116 ("SDI sought," etc.; em phasis in Sm ith); L inenthal, Symbolic Defense, 67 ("a restored"). 3s. Linenthal, Symbolic Defense, 65 ("striking"); Reagan PP, 1986 (II): 950. 30. A m brose, Rise to Globalism, 337 ("m ost"); N ew house, War and Peace, 367 ("fe­ brile"). 3 7 . B ushnell, Moscow Graffiti, 120-21,231. 38. Reagan PP, 1983 (I): 364. 3 *. Reagan PP, 1985 (I): 229. 40. A m brose, Rise to Globalism, 339. 4 1. N ew house, War and Peace, 373. 42. Ibid., 381 ("that Reagan"); Baucom, Origins of SDI, 200. 4 3 . Ignatius, "R eagan's Foreign Policy," 177; N ew house, War and Peace, 376 ("M os­ cow"). 11 .

NOTES

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PAGES

413-429

S3 5

N ew house, War and Peace, 408,405,408,409. 45. Ibid., 339,382. 4« . Ibid., 401. 47. Sidney W eintraub, "The Budget: G uns U p, People D ow n," New Leader Feb. 22, 1982, in Boyer, Reagan as President, 116. 48. A m itai E tzioni quoted in Joseph Finkelstein, The American Economy: From the Great Crash to the Third Industrial Revolution (A rlington H eights, 111., 1992), 172 (brackets in Finkelstein); Johnson, Sleepwalking, 192 (Volcker). 4 *. E lizabeth Drew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker Oct. 31,1988:92 (Bentsen); U w e E. R einhardt, "Reaganom ics, R.I.P.," New Republic A pril 20,1987, in Boyer, Reagan as President, 122,125. so. D idion, "Trouble in L akew ood," 62. s I. Q uoted in DuBoff, Accumulation and Power, 118. » . Christian Science Monitor Feb. 26,1988:20. 53. K ennedy, Rise and Fall, 417,435. 54. Ibid., 432,444,445. 55. Ibid., 515, xxiii, 532,533. se. John Barry, "Is It T w ilight for A m erica?" Newsweek Jan. 25,1988:21. 5 7 . Sam uel T. Francis, "M anaging D ecline," National Review A pril 1,1988:47-48. ss. W illiam N ekirk, "R eagan's a Liberal in R ight-w ing G arb," Chicago Tribune Sept. 11,1988. so. Johnson, Sleepwalking, 209 ("C hristians"); Schaller, Reckoning with Reagan, 61 ("bad new s," "blam e," "untested," "prom oted," etc., "raise taxes"); Jum onville, Critical Crossings, 231 (Epstein); John M cLaughlin, "The N ew N ationalism ," Na­ tional Review Sept. 21,1984, in Boyer, Reagan as President, 89; A ndrew K opkind, "The A ge of R eaganism ," Nation Nov. 3,1984, in Boyer, Reagan as President, 94 ("appropriate," etc.). 40. O n "affirm ers," see Jum onville, Critical Crossings, chap. 6 . 41. G oldw ater, "To Be C onservative," Sept. 15,1981, Congressional Record, 97th C on­ gress, 1st sess., 20589-90. 42. Jerom e H im m elstein, in Liebm an an d W uthnow , New Christian Right, 20 (n. 4). 43. L inenthal, Sacred Ground, 215,159,144,161. 44. Jum onville, Critical Crossings, 233 ("led"); Fass, Outside In, 235 ("the success," etc.); Law rence W. Levine, Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hier­ archy in America (C am bridge, M ass., 1988), 250-51 ("the sam e"); A llan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (N ew York, 1987), 51. 45. E. D. H irsch, Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know (Boston, 1987), 3. 44. N ovick, That Noble Dream, 523,565,593. 47. Ibid., 577,584 (W oodw ard), 628. 48. Koop characterized by Shilts in And the Band Played On, 588. 49. "Backlash," title of chap. 10, Ehrenreich, Hearts of Men. to . Rosenberg, Divided Lives, 233,242,232,235. 71. "N ew C onservative Index W ill C hart M oral D ecline," Chicago Tribune M arch 3, 1993. 72. Polenberg, One Nation Divisible, 207. 44.

536

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PAGES

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Chapter 9 I. Bush PP, 1989 (II): 136-40. a. PBS Frontline, "The C hoice" (1988), w ith com m entary by G arry W ills (teacher's recollection); Drew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker July 4,1988:75. 3 . Joan D idion, "Insider Baseball," New York Review of Books Oct. 27,1988:25 (on B ush's cadences); Drew, "L etter," 71 (Bush), 76 (D rew on Bush); B lum enthal, "L etter from W ashington," 68-69 (Sununu). 4 . Drew, "L etter," 76. s. B lum enthal, "L etter," 63. e. Johnson, Sleepwalking, 392,393 ("linking," etc.); Benjam in Friedm an, "The C am ­ p a ig n 's H idden Issue," New York Review of Books Oct. 13,1988:26-38; Reagan PP, 1988 (I): 8 8 (em phasis added); D idion, "Insider Baseball," 25 (Bush). 7 . Johnson, Sleepwalking, 398 ("constantly," "card-carrying"); Drew , "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker Oct.lO, 1988:97 ("scratch," D ukakis "thinks"); D rew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker Sept. 12,1988:102 ("the A m erican flag"); Drew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker Oct. 31, 1988: 100 ("A m erica stands"). 8 . Jum onville, Critical Crossings, 233 ("never," etc.); "N o M ore Evil," Manchester Union Leader June 5,1988, and W illiam F. Buckley, "So Long, Evil E m pire," Na­ tional Review July 8,1988, both in Boyer, Reagan as President, 249,251. 9 . Drew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker July 4,1988:77. 10. Drew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker Oct.lO, 1988:100 (G oldw ater), 96 (Bush). 11. Jum onville, Critical Crossings, 231. il. Bush PP, 1989 (I): 3; B lum enthal, "L etter," 6 6 . 13. Bush PP, 1989 (II): 1489 (Nov. 9). 14. All quotations from M ichael T. K lare, "Policing the G ulf— and the W orld," Na­ tion Oct. 15,1990:416-18,418,420. I s. D idion, "Trouble in Lakew ood," 60. io. Francis Fukuyam a, "The End of H istory?" National Interest Sum m er 1989:3-18. it. G raham A llison and G regory F. Treverton, eds.. Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order (N ew York, 1992), 31 (the editors), 214 (John M earsheim er). is. "The Talk of the Town," New Yorker Jan. 1,1990:21; John U pdike, Rabbit at Rest (N ew York, 1990), 353,442-43; John U pdike, "W hy R abbit H ad to G o," New York Times Book Review A ug. 5,1990:27. 19. Paul K ennedy, "Fin-de-Siècle A m erica," New York Review of Books June 28,1990: 31-38; G eorge F. W ill, "W ho W ill Stoke the Fires?" Newsweek A pril 9, 1990, quoted in K ennedy's piece, 31; Kevin Phillips, The Politics of Rich and Poor (1990; N ew York, 1991), xvii, 87. io. Peter Peterson, "The Prim acy of the D om estic A genda," in A llison and Trever­ ton, Rethinking America's Security, 92,85. 2 i. W illiam K aufm ann, "A Plan to C ut M ilitary Spending in H alf," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists M arch 1990:35-39; N icholas M. H orrock, "A s C old W ar Ebbs, a C risis of Peace A rises," Chicago Tribune July 30,1989:1,14.

NOTES

TO

PAGES

442-451

537

W alter LaFeber, "A n End to Which C old W ar?" in H ogan, End of the Cold War, 13, 17-18. 2 j. Chicago Tribune A ug. 15,1989: 6 (G allup); Bush PP, 1989 (II): 136-40; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 327 (Baker). 2 4 . B lum enthal, "L etter," 67,68. O n nuclear arsenals, see Bulletin of the Atomic Scien­ tists M ay 1993:48. 2s. R obert O 'C onnell, Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression (N ew York, 1989), 3; John M ueller, Retreatfrom Doomsday: The Obsolescence ofMa­ jor War (N ew York, 1989), 3 -4 ,2 4 5 ; M artin van C reveld, The Transformation of War (N ew York 1991), 205,207,212; R ichard Barnet, "Reflections (A fter the C old W ar)," New Yorker Jan. 1,1990:72. 2 «. New York Times editorial, A ug. 31,1990; Frederic Paul Sm oler, "Fighting the Bad Fight," Nation O ct. 23,1989:464. 2 7 . W oodw ard, Commanders, 37. 2 8 . Reagan PP, 1981:839,846; 1983 (I): 107; 1988 (I): 88. 2 *. Reagan PP, 1981:396 (A pril 30). so. Schaller, Reckoning with Reagan, 89 (Bell); P resident's P rivate Sector Survey on C ost C ontrol, War on Waste (N ew York,1984). s I. D ow er, War Without Mercy, 314 (Baker, etc.); Buick ad in Chicago Tribune Feb. 23, 1990; Atlanta Constitution political cartoon by M ike Lukovich, repr. Chicago Tri­ bune Nov. 9,1989. 3 2 . D ow er, War Without Mercy, 315 (1982 quotation); John D ow er, "Japan an d the U.S. Sam urai Spirit," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists June 1991: 29-30; Jam es Fallow s, "Rem em ber Pearl H arbor H ow ?" Atlantic D ecem ber 1991:22. 33. L inenthal, Sacred Ground, chap. 5 (quotations: 192,204); Ian B urum a, "G hosts of Pearl H arbor," New York Review of Books Dec. 19,1991:9 ("W ould you"); Chicago Tribune Dec. 7,1991, an d M arch 12,1992 (on cam ps, a cartoon originally appear­ ing in the Cincinnati Enquirer). 34. FDR, in the m agazine Asia, as quoted in B urum a, "G hosts of Pearl H arbor," 9; D ow er, War Without Mercy, 313-14. 3s. Bruce Boyden, sem inar paper, N orthw estern U niversity, June 1992 ("the only"); R obert Brauer, "The D rug W ar of W ords," Nation M ay 21,1990: 706; G ibson, Warrior Dreams, 290. 3«. Reagan PP, 1988 (I): 47. 37. " 'D rug w ar b o n d ' proposal for kids m eets resistance," Chicago Tribune A pril 26, 1990. 3 8 . Joseph Sm all, "POW C am ps for the D rug W ar of '89," Chicago Tribune, M ay 17, 1989; Yale Alumni Magazine N ovem ber 1989: cover, table of contents, 46. 39. Clarence Page, "A m erica's W ar on Those E asiest to B ust for D rugs," Chicago Tri­ bune M ay 2,1990; K enneth E. Sharpe, "W hat If Soldiers Become A ntidrug C ops in the U.S.?" Chicago Tribune Jan. 16,1990; Stephen C hapm an, "The D ishonesty of B ush's W ar on D rugs," Chicago Tribune Sept. 7,1989; "The Talk of the Tow n," New Yorker Sept. 18,1989:34; R alph Brauer, "The D rug W ar of W ords," Nation M ay 21,1990:705; "Betty Ford: A lcoholism O verlooked," Chicago Tribune M arch 26,1991. 22 .

538

N O T E S TO PAGES 4 5 1 - 4 5 7

40. Faludi, Backlash, 400,405,408,405 (Faludi). 4 1. Ms. Ju ly -A u g u st 1989 cover; Faludi, Backlash, xx-xxi; Susie B right lecturing at the Fourth A nnual Lesbian, Bisexual, and G ay Studies C onference, H arvard U niversity, Oct. 27,1990; Lillian Faderm an, Odd Girls and Twilight Lovers (N ew York, 1991), chap. 10 title; A ndrew D w orkin, Letters from a War Zone: Writings, 1976-1989 (N ew York, 1989). 4 2 . C eleste M ichelle C ondit, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric: Communicating Social Change (U rbana, 1990) offers the "com m onplace" characterization b u t does not explore this rhetoric a t length. O n O 'C onnor and W att, see R obert McAfee Brown, "A bortion and the H olocaust," Christian Century Oct. 31,1984:1004. 43. Brown, "A bortion and the H olocaust," 1005. 44. G ibson, Warrior Dreams, 11-12,223; Jeffords, Hard Bodies, 10. 4 5 . M ichael K illian, "C ulture's Costs: NEA C hief Fights for F unding in 'O bscenity B attle,' " Chicago Tribune A pril 15,1990, A rts Section: 14; John Frohnm ayer, Leav­ ing Town Alive: Confessions of an Arts Warrior (Boston, 1993); H unter, Culture Wars, 316. 4«. See Sontag, AIDS and Its Metaphors, esp. 16-19. 47 . Q uoted in Lee E delm an, "The M irror and the Tank," in M urphy an d Poirier, Writing AIDS, 14. 48. B uchanan's syndicated colum n. M ay 1983, quoted in R obert A. Padgug, "G ay V illain, G ay H ero: H om osexuality and the Social C onstruction of AIDS," in Ka­ thy Peiss and C hristine Sim m ons, w ith R obert A. Padgug, Passion and Power: Sexuality in History (Philadelphia, 1989), 297. O ther quotations from Shilts, And the Band Played On, 220,228,442,447. 4*. Shilts, And the Band Played On, 305. so. K ram er, Reportsfrom the Holocaust, 173,163. si. A ndrew H olleran, Ground Zero (N ew York, 1988); C hris G laser, "AIDS an d the A-Bomb D isease," original in Christianity and Crisis, as sum m arized in G eorge S. Buse, "C hris G laser Talks A bout G ays, Lesbians and Presbyterians," Windy City Times Nov. 8,1990:20; R. W oodw ard, "A People a t W ar," Cleveland Edition June 28,1990:16; Shilts, And the Band Played On, 217,505; L. Scott, "Fear in the Fox­ holes: H ealth W orkers' A larm A bout Telling AIDS Patients," New York Jan. 4, 1988: 30-38. See also M ike H ippier, "B attlefields Revisited: AIDS and W orld W ar I," Windy City Times M archiò, 1989: 10; M ichael Bronski, "B etw een the Lines," Guide O ctober 1990:18; Em m anuel D reuilhe, Mortal Embrace: Living with AIDS (New York, 1988. 5 i . Paul M onette, Afterlife (N ew York, 1990), 51; M onette quoted in Padgug, "G ay V illain, G ay H ero," 310; M onette, Borrowed Time: An AIDS Memoir (N ew York, 1988), 85,110. 5 3 . PBS, MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour Nov. 21, 1986; Newsweek M arch 2, 1987: 31; "D raw ing the Battle Lines on AIDS," Saturday Evening Post M ay-June 1988: 50-57. 54 . K ram er, Reportsfrom the Holocaust, 189, and K ram er, "A 'M anhattan Project' for AIDS," New York Times July 16,1990; C harles Perrow an d M auro F. G uillen, The AIDS Disaster: The Failure of Organizations in New York and the Nation (N ew H a­ ven, 1990), 181-83.

NOTES

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PAGES

457-467

539

s i. Reagan PP, 1988-89 (I): 109; (II): 1225. se. L euchtenburg, "N ew D eal," 143. s t . Sontag, AIDS and Its Metaphors, 10-11. ss. K ram er, " A C all to Riot: P art II," Outlines M ay 1990:38. se. Reagan PP, 1983 (I): 49-50. eo. D erek Johnson, "M etaphors and T heir V ictim s," graduate sem inar paper, N orthw estern U niversity, June 1991. e I. L arry K ram er, "A C all to Riot: P art II," Outlines M ay 1990:38; Sontag, AIDS and Its Metaphors, 8 6 . 6 2 . O n Bork, see Stanley K utler review ing Battlefor Justice, Chicago Tribune Sunday Book Review, Oct. 22,1989; "D aley L atest to D eclare W ar on R ats," Chicago Tri­ bune A pril 4,1990; "N.Y. M ayor Plans 'W ar on F ear/ " Chicago Tribune Oct. 3, 1990; "Bush Praises K ing, Vows W ar on H ate," Chicago Tribune Jan. 10,1990; A nna Q uindlen, "A W ar on Cigs: Better C ensure T han C ancer," Chicago Tribune M ay 6,1990 (original in New York Times); C larence Petersen, review of Keillor, We Are Still Married, Chicago Tribune S unday Book Review, M arch 25,1990. O n Stannard, see Rockwell G ray review , Chicago Tribune Sunday Book Review, M ay 2, 1993: 5; "The U.S. N eeds a D om estic M arshall Plan First" (title given three letters to the editor). New York Times, M ay 27,1990. •3. Drew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker Feb. 4, 1991: 83 (paraphrasing Sununu). «4. Pow ell and Boren quoted in M ichael T. K lare, "Policing the G ulf— an d the W orld," Nation Oct. 15,1990: 401,416 (K lare's brackets); Bush quoted in "The Talk of the Tow n," New Yorker Jan. 21,1991:23. O n draft, see Bush PP, 1990 (H): 1725. «5 . Bush PP, 1990 (II): 1102; Drew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker Dec. 3, 1990:176 an d Feb. 4,1991:82. 6 6 . Bush PP, 1990 (II): 1154; 1991 (I): 197; N unn, as quoted in Stephen C hapm an, "The W ar and Its Critics: Should We A ll Close Ranks?" Chicago Tribune Jan. 31, 1991. 67. Bush PP, 1990 (II): 1107,1113 (on "blitzkrieg"), 1107,1108,1137 (on "appease­ m ent"), 1155 ("another"), 1509,1541 (on H itler); Bush quoted in "The Talk of the Tow n," New Yorker Jan. 21,1991:23. 6 8 . Drew , "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker Dec. 3,1990:180. 6 ». Ibid., 182,187; Bush, quoted in Drew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker Feb. 4,1991:83. 70. Pat B uchanan, "H ave the N eocons T hought This T hrough?" A ug. 25,1990, as in Sifry and Cerf, Gulf War Reader, 213-15. 7 1. C hapm an, "W ar and Its C ritics." 72. Robert M assa, "The Forgotten W ar," Village Voice Feb. 12,1991, as in Sifry and Cerf, Gulf War Reader, 323-25. 7 i. M oynihan, Jan. 10,1991, speech, as in Sifry and Cerf, Gulf War Reader, 284-86; Ehrenreich, Time essay, Jan. 21,1991, as in Gulf War Reader, 299-301. 7 *. E dw ard L uttw ak, "A gencies of D isorder," Times Literary Supplement Jan. 18, 1991, as in Sifry and Cerf, Gulf War Reader, 290-98.

540

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PAGES

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A rthur Schlesinger, Jr., "W hite Slaves in the Persian G ulf," Wall Street Journal Jan. 7,1991, as in Sifry and Cerf, Gulf War Reader, 265-68. 70 . Drew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker Dec. 3,1990:178 ("the m ost," etc.). O ther quotations: W oodw ard, Commanders, 42,313. 7 7 . C row e's testim ony before the Senate A rm ed Services C om m ittee, Nov. 28,1990, as in Sifry and Cerf, Gulf War Reader, 236,237. 78. Bush PP, 1990 (II): 1720. 7». Q uoted in A lan Pell C raw ford, "A R epublican Vote for M cG overn," Chicago Tri­ bune M arch 15,1991. so. Richard Rose and R obert J. Thom son, "The P resident in a C hanging Interna­ tional System ," Presidential Studies Quarterly Fall 1991:751. si. Bush PP, 1991 (I): 42. si. Bush PP, 1991 (I): 150. 83. Chicago Tribune Jan. 20,1991, sec. 1:4; R. W. A pple, "H ueys and Scuds: V ietnam and G ulf A re W ars A part," New York Times Jan. 23,1991; H allion, Storm Over Iraq, 264 (his em phasis). 84. M arkusen and Y udken, Dismantling the Cold War Economy, 14,31. ss. Drew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker M ay 6,1991:101. so. C olm an M cCarthy, "Top G un W ar," Washington Post Feb. 17,1991, as in Sifry and Cerf, Gulf War Reader, 334; cartoon in Chicago Tribune M arch 5,1991. 87. B lum enthal, "L etter," 6 8 ; Peter A pplebom e, "Sense of Pride O utw eighs Fears of W ar," New York Times Feb. 25,1991, sec. 4:3 ("It's"); Bush PP, 1991 (I): 201,220, 221. 88. A nn M cFeatters, "The G ood G uys W on, and A m erica's C an-do Spirit W as Re­ stored," Chicago Tribune M arch 1,1991 ("fought for," "In 100"); letter to the edi­ tor, "Thanks, A m erica," Chicago Tribune M arch 5,1991; M ona C haren, "M ixed w ith Fear, a D eep Sense of P ride," Chicago Tribune Jan. 21,1991 ("W ho"). 89. M cFeatters ("In 100") and C haren ("the m oral") as cited in n. 8 8 ; A pplebom e, "Sense of Pride," New York Times Feb. 24,1991, sec. 4 : 1 . 90. Bush PP, 1991 (I): 221. 9 1. Q uoted in A pplebom e, "Sense of P ride," 1 ,3 . 9i. "Let Schw arzkopf R un D rug W ar, D aley Suggests," Chicago Tribune M arch 29, 1991; on D aschle, see D avid E. R osenbaum , "W anted in H om e A genda: U nity the U.S. H ad in W ar," New York Times M arch 20,1991; R obert B. Reich, "W ho C ham pions the W orking C lass?" New York Times M ay 26,1991. 9i. Bush PP, 1991 (I): 221. 94 . Bush PP, 1991 (I): 201 (M arch 1 new s conference). 9 *. Paul F. W alker and Eric Stam bler, " . . . A nd the D irty L ittle W eapons," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists M ay 1991: 24; John C hancellor, "W ar Stories," New York Times A pril 1,1991. 9«. Drew, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker M ay 6,1991:101. 9 7 . Bush PP, 1990 (II): 1805. 98. G ibson, Warrior Dreams, 295. 9 9 . BushPP, 1990 (II): 1808. 100. G eorge W ill, "L iterary Politics," Newsweek A pril 22,1991: 72. 7 s.

NOTES TO

PAGES 4 7 4 - 4 8 8

54 I

toi. Bush PP, 1991 (I): 471; university official quoted in "Reeling from H arsh A t­ tacks, E ducators W eigh H ow to R espond to 'Politically C orrect' Label," Chroni­ cle of Higher Education June 12,1991. 102 .

For "O peration C am pus Storm " and fine analysis of the PC debate, see Evan C arton, "The Self Besieged: A m erican Identity on C am pus and in the G ulf," Tikkun Ju ly -A u g u st 1991:40-47. los. "M illions on B roadw ay Roar a 'W ell D one' to G ulf V eterans, New York Times June 11,1991 ("a m agnificent," "m any A m ericans"); "Sense of the Storm ," Time June 17,1991:24-26. too. C ynthia Enloe, "The G endered G ulf," in Peters, Collateral Damage, 95, 110; "Storm in the D esert," Chicago Tribune M arch 20,1991. Ios. D idion, "Trouble in Lakew ood," 65,60,64. loo. Bush PP, 1991 (I): 590. 107. B lum enthal, "L etter," 68,70. ■os. Bush PP, 1992-93 (I): 158,160. loo. B lum enthal, "L etter," 70 ("A ll the"). For other quotations and a shrew d anal­ ysis, see G arry W ills, "The B orn-A gain R epublicans," New York Review of Books Sept. 24,1992:9-14 (W ills's em phases). I io. B lum enthal, "L etter," 70, 71 (on Bush and Q uayle); Q uayle, "Prepared Re­ m arks by the Vice P resident for the N ational R ight to Life C onvention," June 11,1992, press release from the vice p resid en t's office; G oldw ater quoted in Washington Post July 7,1992:12, as cited in M ax H eerm an, "The C hanging C on­ science of a C onservative," senior thesis, N orthw estern U niversity, M ay 1993. i n . B lum enthal, "L etter," 71,72; "B ush Slam s M edia, D raw s C loser in Polls," Chi­ cago Tribune Oct. 25,1992 ("sissy"). 112 . Sidney B lum enthal, "R endezvous w ith D estiny," New Yorker M arch 8,1993:44. 11 3. A lan Brinkley, "The 43% P resident," New York Times Magazine July 4,1993:22. 1 14. See Chicago Tribune M ay 1,1994, for Ray M oseley, "U.S. Foreign Policy Fails w ith C linton" ("a general"), and for the perceptive dissents from the praise of N ixon in colum ns by Stephen C hapm an, W illiam Pfaff, an d Steve Daley. I is. C hristopher H itchens, "M inority R eport," Nation July 5,1993:6. it«. "A spin: 'V ery C autious' D efense C uts forl994," Chicago Tribune M arch 28, 1993. For long-term trends in the defense budget, see "Tim es H ave C hanged; Pentagon B udget H asn 't," Detroit Free Press A ug. 16,1993. n r . Eugene D. G enovese, "Voices U nite for V ictory in the C ultural W ar," Chicago Tribune Dec. 22,1993; Sidney B lum enthal, "L etter from W ashington: C hristian Soldiers," New Yorker July 18,1994:31 (quoting Sheldon in 1993; B lum enthal's com m ent). I is. New York Times: "M ilitary C ites W ide Range of Reasons for Its G ay Ban," Jan. 27.1993 ("concede"); "Pentagon Rem ains Silent on Rejected G ay Troop Plan," July 23,1993 (RAND); "The O dd Place of H om osexuality in the M ilitary," A pril 18.1993 ("threatens"); R ussell Baker, "By Sex O bsessed," Nov. 17,1992. I is. Enloe, Morning After, 93 (her em phasis); M oskos quoted in Summer North­ western, "N U Prof Plays M ajor Role in Lift of G ay Ban," July 22,1993. 120 . E ditorial, "Let the C hief C om m and," Chicago Tribune M arch 29,1993.

542

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PAGES

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m . A nna Q uindlen, "Phone D em ocracy Is T yranny of the S tereo ty p e/' Chicago Tri­ bune Feb. 2,1993 (original in New York Times); A llan Bérubé discussed "fem ale im personation" on N ational Public R adio, Fresh Air M arch 31, 1993; Ellen G oodm an, "N ow It's M en W orrying A bout M ale Sexual A ggression," Chicago Tribune Jan. 31,1993. 122. Frank Rich, "M en in U niform ," New York Times Magazine A pril 11,1993:54. 123 . R ichard H. Kohn, "W om en in C om bat, H om osexuals in U niform : The C hal­ lenge of M ilitary L eadership," Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College 23 (Spring 1993): 2-4; "C om m ent: A D em ocratic A rm y," New Yorker June 28, 1993:6; C hris Bull, "R ight Turn," Advocate Sept. 7,1993:35 (G oldw ater). 124. D avid E. Sanger, "C linton Puts a Foot in the O pening D oor of the G lobal M ar­ ket," New York Times Nov. 21,1993, sec. 4:1. i 2 s. "Perot Still Preaching, But Does H e Pack Same Punch?" Chicago Tribune Sept. 23,1994. 12 «. D avid Broder, "Boom ers Bungle W hite H ouse T ru st F actor/ " Chicago Tribune Sept. 14,1994; "C linton Steps to Brink of Invasion," ibid.. Sept. 16,1994. 127. "H elm s Is a t C enter of Storm A fter N ew C linton C riticism ," New York Times, Nov. 23,1994. 128. Q uoted in D avid Remnick, "Lost in Space," New Yorker, Dec. 5,1994:86. Conclusion 1. Schlesinger, Vital Center, 9. 2 . Sidney B lum enthal, "L etter from W ashington: C hristian Soldiers," New Yorker July 18,1994:37. I. R ichard J. B arnet and John C avanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order, as quoted in R. C. L ongw orth, "M ultinational Firm s Forge A head w ith the N ew W orld O rder," Chicago Tribune M arch 27,1994; Sam uel P. H untington, "The C om ing C lash of C ivilizations— O r, the W est A gainst the Rest," New York Times June 6,1993. 4. M oynihan quoted in Sidney B lum enthal, "L etter from W ashington," New Yorker July 5,1993: 38; Paul K ennedy, "The A m erican Prospect," New York Review of Books M arch 4,1993:52. s. O n the last of these possibilities, see Linda Rocawich, "E ducation Infiltration: The Pentagon Targets H igh Schools," Progressive February 1994:24. 4. NBC Evening News Dec. 9, 1993 (on crim e); "C linton H ails D efense, Raises Funds," Chicago Tribune M ay 22,1994.

ESSAY O N SOU RCES

A lth o u g h g en erally key ed to so u rces for m y q u o tatio n s, m an y citatio n s also re­ flect m y d e b ts to a w o rk as a w h o le as w ell. For th e m o st p a rt, I h av e av o id ed u sin g n o tes to engage o r refer to d isp u te s am o n g scholars, since su ch d isp u te s are n o t m y m ajor focus; citatio n s a n d th is essay in d ic ate m o st of m y p referen ces am o n g so u rces th a t inv o lv e d isp u te d m atters. R egarding q u o tatio n s, m y u su a l ru le h as b een to cite th e so u rces w h ere I first fo u n d th em , since th e co n tex t th o se so u rces p ro v id e is im p o rtan t. T hus, w h e n I fo u n d a p rim a ry source q u o ted in a seco n d ary source, I h ave u su a lly cited th e latter. T his d iscu ssio n a n d th e acco m p an y in g b ib lio g rap h y d o n o t p ro v id e a com ­ p reh e n siv e g u id e to all sch o larsh ip o n recen t U n ited S tates h isto ry , o r all th a t m ay be rele v an t to m y focus, o r all th e "b est" sch o larsh ip o n th a t histo ry . T he sch o larsh ip o n w a r a n d fo reig n p o licy alo n e is far too im m ense to d iscu ss in d e ta il here. M uch fine sch o larsh ip goes u n m en tio n ed h ere b ecau se its focus lies elsew h ere, b ecau se it is re d u n d a n t of w o rk s I h av e cited , o r b ecau se I h av e n o t read it, esp ecially if it a p p e a re d in th e la st y ears of th is b o o k 's p re p a ra tio n . T his, th en , is a g u id e to th o se so u rces I fin d m o st u sefu l. M oreover, h isto ria n s of re­ cen t A m erica also d ra w — m ore th a n th ey u su a lly ack n o w led g e— on m em o­ ries, w o rd s, im ages, a n d em o tio n s th a t th ey h av e ex p erien ced o r a ccu m u lated . I c an n o t rec o n stru ct th e often u n co n scio u s p ro cess b y w h ich I filtered o u t som e of th o se a n d called u p o n o th ers in w ritin g th is book, b u t it seem s rig h t to ac­ k n o w led g e th a t process. M y preface d iscu sses in a g en eral w ay h o w I u n d e rsta n d m y w o rk in relatio n to o th er sch o larsh ip . M ost of th a t sch o larsh ip is o v erly co n fin ed , as I see it, by th e b o u n d a rie s of th e C old W ar a n d th u s b e a rs o n ly im p licitly o r in d irectly o n m ilita riza tio n , w h ich I reg a rd as th e m ore fu n d am e n ta l, u n d e rly in g d y n am ic of th is era. O ften th a t d istin c tio n in v o lv es h a ir-sp littin g , h o w ev er, an d sch o lar­ sh ip m ay lack m y c o n cep tu al a p p a ra tu s b u t be rich o n its o w n term s an d in ­ v alu ab le for m y w o rk . In g en eral, I h av e relied o n seco n d ary sources w h ere th ey cover subjects w ell, an d h av e so u g h t to su p p le m e n t th em w ith p rim a ry sources w h ere th ey d o not. For th e sake of convenience, sch o larsh ip can b e d iv id e d in to fam iliar catego­ ries, a lth o u g h m o st w o rk s in one categ o ry sp eak to o th ers as w ell. F ollow ing a review of sch o larsh ip in th o se c ateg o ries is a su rv e y of sources p e rtin e n t to sp e­ cific p erio d s. I first read a few g ra n d , o ld er acco u n ts of th e h isto ry of w arfare so long ago, an d have rev isited th em so o ften, th a t th ey h ave in flu en ced th is book m ore th an

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citatio n s w ill in d icate. A lth o u g h in v a ry in g w ay s a n g ry a b o u t th e co u rse th a t w arfare h a d tak en , th e a u th o rs o f th ese acco u n ts an ch o red th e ir d ism ay in b ro ad sch o larsh ip a n d sh re w d an aly sis, a n d each acco u n t p la y s a d o u b le role as b o th p rim a ry a n d seco n d ary so u rce fo r m y w o rk . N ef, War and Human Progress (1950)— la te r re p rin te d u n d e r th e title Western Civilization, th e v e rsio n cited h e re — a n d V agts, A History of Militarism (1937, 1959) h av e en o rm o u s scope. M illis, Arms and Men (1956) rem ain s th e b e st in tro d u c tio n to A m erican m ilita ry h isto ry . A lth o u g h lacking th e le n g th a n d reach of th o se w o rk s, L eu c h te n b u rg 's 1964 essay "T he N ew D eal a n d th e A n alo g u e of W ar," p ro v id e d in sig h ts th a t I h av e a p p lie d , w ith su b sta n tia l m o d ificatio n s, to th e w h o le p e rio d . A lth o u g h n ecessarily b rie f a n d sketchy, G illis, e d .. The Militarization of the Western World is th e b e st sin g le in tro d u c tio n to th e subject a n d co n cep t o f m il­ ita riz a tio n , a n d to th e larg e lite ra tu re o n it. M ark u sen e t al.. The Rise of the Gunbelt is th e b e st sin g le g u id e to th e econom ic a n d in stitu tio n a l b ases of A m erica's m ilitarizatio n . L otchin, Fortress California is a q u irk ie r th o u g h m ore im ag in ativ e a ltern ativ e. B road su rv ey s of th is p e rio d , a lth o u g h o ften fine o n th e ir o w n term s, d e al little w ith m y th em es— on e reaso n I w ro te th is book. A lth o u g h n o w d a te d in coverage a n d sch o larsh ip , W ittn er, Cold War America, P olenberg, One Nation Di­ visible, a n d H o d g so n , America in Our Time w ere v e ry v a lu ab le, m ore so th a n m o st recen t su rv ey s, am o n g w h ich I fo u n d th e m o st u se fu l to b e R osenberg a n d R osenberg, In Our Times. O n th e o th e r h a n d , m an y b ro a d stu d ie s w ith a th e ­ m atic o r to p ical ap p ro a ch w ere essen tial. S cholarship o n P re sid e n ts a n d p resid en cies, d e sp ite its re p u ta tio n am o n g som e h isto ria n s for b ein g o ld -fash io n ed in to p ic a n d m eth o d o lo g y , is esse n tia l to a stu d y like th is, a n d o ften of h ig h q u ality . Its p e rtin en c e to m y in te re sts v aries w idely, h o w ev er, so th a t w ith som e P re sid e n ts I co u ld rely h eav ily o n it, b u t w ith o th ers I fo u n d p rim a ry sources, esp ecially th e Public Papers series, m y m ain b ase; w ith all P resid en ts, th a t series w as essen tial a t lea st to su p p le m e n t th e sch o larsh ip . P artly b ecause of th e ir q u ality , p a rtly b ecau se o f th e ir p ro x ­ im ity to m y them es, S tep h en A m b ro se's m ag isterial stu d ie s of E isen h o w er a n d N ixon w ere th e m o st im p o rta n t to m e. O n R oosevelt, I relied h e av ily o n m y o w n p rev io u s sch o larsh ip , a v a rie ty of seco n d ary sources, a n d ex ten siv e u se of th e Public Papers. O n T rum an, K ennedy, a n d Johnson, I h av e relied o n a n eclec­ tic m ix of p rim a ry a n d seco n d ary sources. A fter N ixon, th e seco n d ary sch o lar­ sh ip trails off a n d I d e p e n d e d m ore o n th e Public Papers series a n d o n jo u rn a lis­ tic com m ent. A lth o u g h in freq u e n tly cited , G arry W ills's sev eral stu d ie s of recen t P re sid e n ts h av e stro n g ly in flu en ced m e. O n w a r a n d foreign policy, in a d d itio n to sources a lre ad y n o te d , th e sch o lar­ sh ip is rich d e sp ite co m p lain ts am o n g h isto ria n s in recen t y e ars a b o u t its lim its. N u m ero u s a n d fash io n ab le, critiq u es of th e h isto rio g ra p h y of A m erican for­ e ig n relatio n s as p aro ch ial in m eth o d o lo g y a n d p e rsp ec tiv e w ere w ell su m m a­ rize d , ex p lo red , a n d th em selv es som etim es criticized in th ree fo ru m s a t th e

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close o f th e decad e: "W ritin g th e H isto ry o f U.S. F oreign R elations: A Sym po­ siu m ," Diplomatic History 14 (Fall 1990): 553-605; "A R ound Table: E x plaining th e H isto ry o f A m erican F oreign R elations," Journal ofAmerican History T7( June 1990): 93-180; a n d "C u ltu re , G en d er, a n d F oreign Policy: A S ym posium ," Dip­ lomatic History 18 (W inter 1994): 47-124. R osenberg, "T he C old W ar a n d th e D isco u rse o f N a tio n a l S ecurity," is a v alu a b le s ta rt a t h isto ric izin g a critical term . A s fo r th e sch o larsh ip itself, A m brose, Rise to Globalism a n d L aFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War a re th e b e st su rv ey s, d e sp ite th e ir o rig in s in th e ir earlie r e d itio n s as stu d ie s of th e C old W ar. G ad d is, Strategies of Containment rig o ro u sly traces th e g ra n d stra te g ie s o f successive p resid en cies, ev en if it fin d s m ore o r­ d e r a n d logic to th e ir sh ifts th a n m an y h isto ria n s see; h is la te r account. The Long Peace, p ro v o cativ ely ex p lo res so u rces o f sta b ility d u rin g th e C o ld W ar. T h o u g h a p p e a rin g a fte r m o st of th is b o o k w a s w ritte n . B ran d s's sm art, b reezy survey. The Devil We Knew, p a ra lle ls th is stu d y in som e o f its to n e a n d a rg u m en ts. D allek. The American Style ofForeign Policy is a p io n ee rin g a tte m p t to trace th e in te r­ n a l, o ften psy ch o lo g ical im p u lses b e h in d A m erican fo reig n a n d m ilita ry policy. M ay, "Lessons" of the Past is a d a te d , sh o rt, b u t essen tial stu d y o f h o w policy­ m ak ers u se d h isto ry . A lth o u g h p rim a rily a b o u t W orld W ar n . D ow er, War Without Mercy is far b ro a d e r in its u tility . O n in te rn a tio n a l d im en sio n s a n d p er­ sp ectiv es, see esp ecially M cN eill, The Pursuit of Power a n d K ennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. O n th e forces p ro m o tin g A m erican h eg em o n y in th e w o rld econom ic o rd er, T hom as J. M cC orm ick, America's Half-Century offers a co g en t a rg u m e n t p u llin g to g e th e r m u ch lite ra tu re . A lth o u g h d a te d , W eigley, The American Way of War rem ain s th e b e st g u id e to a n d in te rp re ta tio n o f A m eri­ can m ilita ry stra te g y a n d w a r m aking; m y u se of h is title a n d h is acco u n t in m an y o th e r w ay s in d ic ate s m y d eb t. F reedm an, The Evolution ofNuclear Strategy e x p ertly c h arts th e o ften h y p erb o lic o r arcan e co u rse of th a t story. N ew h o u se, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age is b ro a d e r a n d b e tte r th a n m an y sch o larly ac­ co u n ts co n cern in g n u c le ar w e ap o n s a n d diplom acy. A lth o u g h m u ch o f th e sch o larsh ip n o te d elsew h ere in th is essay sp eak s to p o litical h isto ry , m an y w ay s in w h ich th a t h isto ry p e rta in s to m ilita riz a tio n are as y et p o o rly ex am in ed b y h isto ria n s. T he tre a tm e n t of C ongress, th e co u rts, a n d p o litical p a rtie s, as o p p o se d to th e p resid en cy , is th in in th e lite ra tu re , a n d v a rio u s m ilesto n es h av e b e en neglected : sch o lars o f A m erica's "w elfare sta te " g en erally h av e little to sa y a b o u t th e G I Bill, V eterans A d m in istra tio n p ro ­ g ram s, a n d th e b ro a d e r p o ssib ility th a t defen se sp e n d in g h a s p ro v id e d a w el­ fare sy stem for m an y — h a rd ly a ll— A m ericans. T he lite ra tu re o n specific in sti­ tu tio n s of th e "n atio n al se cu rity sta te " te n d s to be d u ll, a lth o u g h rich e r on rela tio n sh ip s am o n g science, u n iv ersities, c o rp o ratio n s, a n d th e state; for th e D efense D e p artm en t a n d m an y o th e r g o v ern m en tal agencies, I fo u n d p olicy a n d p re sid e n tia l stu d ie s m ore u sefu l. In th e h isto ry of p o litical c u ltu re, o n th e o th e r h a n d , th e lite ra tu re is rich.

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th o u g h n o t y et sy n th esized . M arlin g a n d W etenhall, Iwo Jima w as th e single m o st u sefu l source in th is category. A lth o u g h it cam e to m y a tte n tio n too late for fu ll u se in th is book, S lotkin, Gunfighter Nation is v alu ab le. F ran k lin , War Stars, W eart, Nuclear Fear, a n d S herry, The Rise of American Air Power exam ine fan tasies am o n g A m ericans (an d o th ers) o f technological m aste ry a n d th e rela­ tio n sh ip s b etw een fan tasy a n d w e ap o n s d ev elo p m en t. W h itfield , The Culture of the Cold War, a lth o u g h u sin g th e "co ld w a r" fram ew o rk , is sm a rt a n d in fo rm a­ tive. S everal essay s in M ay, e d .. Recasting America are u se fu l o n th e 1940s a n d 1950s. For th e 1970s a n d 1980s, esp ecially fo r th e re tu rn o f o v e rtly relig io u s th em es in p o litical d isco u rse, th e bo o k s a n d essay s b y E d w ard L in en th al th a t I cite w ere essen tial. M uch o th e r w o rk in c u ltu ra l a n d in te lle ctu al h isto ry b e a rs o n p o litical cul­ tu re in a m ilita rize d age ev en w h e n n o t specifically b ille d as d o in g so. N ovick, That Noble Dream, th o u g h fo cused o n th e e v o lu tio n a n d ag o n ies o f th e h isto ric al p ro fessio n , is also a fine g u id e to recen t in te lle ctu al h isto ry g enerally. A d d i­ tio n al sources o n relig io n in clu d e W uthnow , The Restructuring of American Reli­ gion a n d B oyer, When Time Shall Be No More, o n ap o caly p tic th o u g h t. A h o st o f recen t w o rk o n w o m en , g en d er, a n d sex u ality b e a rs o n p o litical cu ltu re a n d in d e e d o n m o st of th e categ o ries u se d h ere, a lth o u g h m u ch of th a t w o rk com es in th e form of m o n o g rap h ic articles a n d bo o k s to o n u m ero u s to m en tio n h ere. H ig o n n et e t al.. Behind the Lines is a p io n ee rin g in tro d u c tio n to th e field. A lth o u g h d a te d a n d essay istic, E hrenreich, The Hearts of Men effec­ tiv ely a d d re sses th e an x ieties a b o u t g e n d e r I em p h asize. R osenberg, Divided Lives is a recen t su rv e y w ith m u ch u se fu l b ack g ro u n d a n d in fo rm atio n . Since lesb ian a n d gay h isto ry a n d th e m o d e m gay id e n tity itself are b o u n d u p w ith m ilitarizatio n , m u ch w o rk in th a t field h as b een useful: see, in a d d itio n to n u ­ m ero u s articles, B erube, Coming Out Under Fire, D 'E m ilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities, a n d S hilts, Conduct Unbecoming. In th e closely rela te d field s of social, racial, a n d eth n ic h isto ry , th e re le v a n t sch o larsh ip h a s b een less fo rthcom ing. P olenberg, One Nation Divisible is a valuable overview necessarily lacking d e p th on m an y specifics. U sually screech­ in g to a h a lt before W orld W ar II, m o st h isto rie s o f e th n icity a n d im m ig ratio n d o n o t engage in a b ro ad w a y th e sto ry I tell h ere, b u t som e a re v a lu a b le on p a rtic u la r elem en ts of it: T akaki, Strangersfrom a Different Shore is rich o n A sianA m ericans; N alty, Strengthfor the Fight is colorless b u t in fo rm ativ e o n th e place of A frican-A m ericans in th e a rm e d forces; Fass, Outside In is v a lu a b le o n e d u ca ­ tio n a n d m in o rities. M uch of m y m ateria l a n d o b serv atio n s a b o u t th ese field s, h o w ev er, is teased o u t of sch o larsh ip n o t p rim a rily fo cu sed o n th o se fields. O n econom ic histo ry , a n d th e in tim ately re la te d field s o f science, technology, a n d ed u ca tio n , th e sch o larsh ip is m u ch richer. M ark u sen e t al.. The Rise of the Gunbelt, an d L otchin, Fortress America are essen tial sta rtin g p o in ts. W hile sta n ­ d a rd su rv e y s of A m erican econom ic h isto ry o ften n eg lect m ilita riza tio n , tw o are v ery u seful: G alam bos a n d P ra tt, The Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth a n d

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D uboff, Accumulation and Power. O n science a n d its rela tio n sh ip to o th e r m il­ ita riz e d in stitu tio n s, see sev eral of th e essay s in M en d elso h n , S m ith, a n d W eingart, ed s.. Science, Technology, and the Military; H u g h es, American Genesis; G eiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge; a n d L eslie, The Cold War and American Science, a fine sy n th esis. R egional stu d ie s are also v a lu a b le in th is field , esp e­ cially N ash , The American West Transformed. V ander M eulen, The Politics of Air­ craft is p ro v o cativ e o n a critical in d u stry . In a d d itio n to th e sch o larsh ip n o te d above, o th e r sources o n p a rtic u la r p e ­ rio d s o f th is stu d y w ere im p o rtan t. For m y P ro lo g u e, I also relied o n R oyster, A Revolutionary People at War; on R oyster, The Destructive War, fo r th e C ivil W ar a n d its afterm ath ; a n d o n a larg e lite ra tu re in m ilita ry h isto ry n o t sp ecifically cited fo r th is section. O n th e "m ilita ry -in d u stria l com plex" (the m u ch -d isp u ted term D w ig h t E isenhow er u se d in 1961), see m an y of th e b ro a d stu d ie s cited above. O n d em o g rap h ic a n d o th e r consequences o f th e C ivil W ar, V inovskis, "H av e Social H isto rian s L ost th e C ivil W ar?" is v e ry u sefu l. O n c u ltu ra l a n d im ag in ativ e a n ticip a tio n s o f a n d resp o n se s to w ar, see also L eo n ard , Above the Battle a n d F rederickson, The Inner Civil War. C h allen er, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, is u se fu l o n its subject. O n W orld W ar I a n d its a fte rm a th , K ennedy, Over Here a n d C ohen, Empire Without Tears, a re v alu ab le. O n th e 1930s a n d th e com in g o f W orld W ar H, L evine, "H o lly w o o d 's W ash­ in g to n " h e lp e d m e to e x ten d th e th em es in L eu ch ten b u rg , "T he N ew D eal a n d th e A n alo g u e of W ar." K arl, The Uneasy State is b a ck g ro u n d fo r in te rp re ta tio n . G arraty , The Great Depression h e lp s place A m erican d e v elo p m e n ts w ith in a w o rld context. C h arles a n d M ary B eard, America in Midpassage (1939) is m ar­ v e lo u s as b o th co n te m p o ra ry so u rce a n d h isto ric al com m entary. T he n o tio n o f a "co n stru c tio n of n a tio n a l se cu rity " is m ine. M ost sch o larsh ip o n th is p e rio d focuses less o n th a t lo n g er-term d e v elo p m e n t th a n o n d e b ate ab o u t A m erican in te rv e n tio n in th e w o rld crisis. O n m ilita ry a n d fo reig n p o l­ icy, I h av e relied h eav ily o n m y e a rlie r stu d y . The Rise of American Air Power, on R eynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, a n d o n m y o w n re a d in g of R oosevelt. T he econom ic w e llsp rin g s o f A m erican p o licy are effectively a rg u e d in M cC orm ick, America's Half-Century a n d H eard e n , Roosevelt Confronts Hitler. H ein rich s, Threshold of War is a v iv id n a rra tiv e of 1941 sy m p ath etic to R oose­ v elt. G regory, America 1941 sen sitiv ely p re se n ts a w e a lth o f in fo rm atio n . O n p o litical c u ltu re, th e re le v a n t essay s in S usm an, Culture as History are su g ­ gestive, w h ile A lex an d er, Nationalism in American Thought, a n d W ittn er, Rebels Against War tra v e rse m ore specific c u rre n ts o f in te lle ct a n d o p in io n . H en rik so n , "T he M ap as a n 'Id e a ' " is far m o re v a lu a b le th a n its b re v ity w o u ld su g g est. The m o st sy m p ath etic tre a tm e n t o f th e N ye C om m ittee can b e fo u n d in P aul Koistin e n , "T ow ard a W arfare State: M ilitarizatio n in A m erica D u rin g th e P eriod of th e W orld W ars," in G illis, e d .. The Militarization of the Western World a n d in K oistinen, The Military-Industrial Complex. M u rphy, "T he L onely B attle" an-

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aly zes c o n tem p o rary an x ieties a b o u t w ar. O n rela tio n sh ip s am o n g o p in io n , th e m ed ia, a n d th e R oosevelt a d m in istra tio n , th e fo llo w in g a re v alu a b le a n d su g ­ g est sim ilar conclusions: K oppes a n d Black, Hollywood Goes to War; C u lb ert, News for Everyman, Steele, Propaganda in an Open Society, a n d S chneider, Should America Go to War?. R ibuffo, The Old Christian Right is th e b e st so u rce o n its su b ­ ject a n d m an y re la te d ones, a n d o n w h a t R ibuffo calls th e "B row n Scare." In th e v a st lite ra tu re o n W orld W ar II, in a d d itio n to w h ich m o st o f th e sources a lre a d y n o te d also ap p ly , th ree o ld er g en eral acco u n ts rem a in rem ark ­ ably fresh a n d rich: B lum , V Was for Victory; P errett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph; a n d P olenberg, War and Society. D ow er, War Without Mercy w as th e m o st in flu e n tia l am o n g m ore recen t sources; in th a t category, O 'N eill, A Democ­ racy at War offers n o g ra n d re in te rp re ta tio n b u t m an y fresh (an d occasionally w ro n g h ead ed ) in sig h ts. O nce ag ain , I h av e relied h eav ily o n m y e arlie r w o rk s. Preparingfor the Next War a n d The Rise ofAmerican Air Power, a n d o n FD R 's p u b ­ lic statem en ts. A m ong m an y w a rtim e co m m en taries, sev eral re ta in sp ecial v i­ tality : W ylie, A Generation of Vipers; M ead, And Keep Your Powder Dry; W ecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, far b ro a d e r th a n its a p p a re n t focus o n v e t­ e ra n s w o u ld su g g est; S h erro d , Tarawa, a classic o f w a r rep o rtin g ; a n d B rogan,

The American Character. For early reactio n s to P earl F larb o r a n d A m erican e n try in to th e w ar, K enn e tt, For the Duration is rich a n d com pact. In a larg e lite ra tu re o n econom ic m o­ b ilizatio n , th e b ro a d e r sources n o te d above m et m o st o f m y n eed s. V aluable on lib eral th o u g h t is B rinkley, "T he N ew D eal a n d th e Id ea of th e S tate"; see also L ekachm an, The Age of Keynes, a n d A m enta a n d S kocpol, "R ed efin in g th e N ew D eal." A goo d su rv e y is V atter, The U.S. Economy in World War II. M any sources to u ch o n o rg an ized labor, b u t see O 'N eill, A Democracy at War fo r a v a lu ab le overview . O n w a rtim e strateg iës, a n excellent in tro d u c tio n can be fo u n d in W eigley, The American Way of War. O n th e p la n s a n d objectives of A m erican elites for th e p o stw a r w o rld , see also M cC orm ick, America's Half-Century, w h ich em p h asizes hegem onic desig n s; D allek, The American Style of Foreign Policy, w h ich e m p h a ­ sizes th e o u tw a rd p ro jectio n of A m erican id ea ls a n d anxieties; a n d D ivine, Second Chance. W alker, "T he D ecision to U se th e B om b," is a fair-m in d ed re­ view of th e sch o larsh ip o n th a t issue. O n w artim e exp erien ces o f civ ilian s, I relied h eav ily o n o th e r so u rces n o te d here. O n th o se in u n ifo rm , E llis, The Sharp End is in sig h tfu l a n d b alan ced , w h ile Fussell, Wartime is jau n d ice d b u t p ro v o cativ e. B oth larg ely ig n o re m in o rity a n d w o m e n 's experience. S everal fine recen t stu d ie s g en erally u p h o ld , b u t refine a n d alter, B lum 's e arlie r tre a tm e n t of h o w A m ericans w ere ask ed to v iew th e w ar. W estbrook, "F ig h tin g for th e A m erican F am ily" is in sig h tfu l. K oppes a n d Black, Hollywood Goes to War is co m prehensive. D oherty, Projections of War sh o w s co nvincingly h o w film sh a p e d a com m on w a rtim e cu ltu re. R oeder, The Censored War sh re w d ly ex p lain s h o w w artim e circum stances a n d cen so rsh ip

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n a rro w e d A m erican 's v isu a l g rasp of th e w ar. For reactio n s to th e carn ag e of W orld W ar U, I rely h eav ily o n F enrich, "Im ag in in g H o lo cau st." O n social change, in a d d itio n to P o len b erg 's One Nation Divisible a n d N a lty 's Strengthfor the Fight, th ere is a g ro w in g lite ra tu re o n race a n d labor: R eed, Seed­ timefor the Modem Civil Rights Movement is a carefu l in stitu tio n a l stu d y ; N o rrell, "C aste in S teel," a n d N elso n , "O rg an ized L abor a n d th e S tru g g le fo r Black E q u ality in M obile D u rin g W orld W ar H" p ro b e c o n d itio n s in th e South. M odell e t al., "W orld W ar II in th e L ives of Black A m ericans," a n d K elley, " 'W e A re N o t W h at W e S eem ' " are h ig h ly su g g estiv e. B ernstein, American Indians and World War II traces a reco rd su b sta n tia lly d ifferen t from th a t o f b lack A m ericans. Tut­ tle, " Daddy's Gone to War" is a rich social a n d p o litical h isto ry of c h ild ren a n d m u ch else in th e w ar. O n w o m en , H a rtm a n n , The Home Front and Beyond, a n d C am pbell, Women at War with America are im p o rta n t g en eral stu d ies; in H igonn e t e t al.. Behind the Lines, see esp ecially th e essay b y S u san G ubar. B érubé, Com­ ing Out Under Fire a n d D 'E m ilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities are essen tial o n gays a n d lesb ian s. O n v e te ra n s a n d th e G I Bill, a n o ld er stu d y , R oss, Prepar­ ingfor Ulysses rem ain s th e b e st so u rce, alo n g w ith W ecter's c o n te m p o ra ry a n al­ ysis. M iller, The Irony of Victory is th e m o st recen t o f sev eral local a n d sta te stu d ies. A rich b o d y of sch o larsh ip h a s also d ev elo p ed for th e T ru m an era, to w h ich m an y of th e b ro a d stu d ie s n o te d ab o v e p ro v id e v a lu a b le in tro d u c tio n s. Pem ­ b e rto n , Harry S. Truman is a b rief, sav ag e sy n th esis; Lacey, e d .. The Truman Pres­ idency offers p ro v o cativ e essay s reflectin g recen t sch o larsh ip o n a w id e ran g e of subjects. C. W rig h t M ills, The Power Elite (1956) is v ita l as b o th p rim a ry a n d sec­ o n d a ry source. T he e arly C o ld W ar h a s d ra w n m u ch a tte n tio n from h isto ria n s. B road th eo ­ retical a n d in te rp re tiv e issu es are a b ly rev iew ed in Leffler, "N a tio n a l S ecurity." B arnet, The Rockets' Red Glare v iew s p olicy elites critically. P aterso n , On Every Front, is a fine, b rief sy n th esis th a t m oves b ey o n d th e u su a l categories. Leffler, Preponderance of Power is m ore ex h au stiv e an d u p -to -d a te o n th e T ru m an a d ­ m in istra tio n , b u t n o t fu lly convincing. In a d d itio n to th e b ro a d e r stu d ie s o n stra te g y a n d n u c le a r w e ap o n s a lre a d y n o te d , H erk en , The Winning Weapon fo­ cuses o n th is p e rio d . O n th e m u ch -ex am in ed fig u re of G eorge K ennan, H ixson, George F. Kennan is excellent. A n u a n ce d stu d y o f b o th p olicy a n d a n elite fig u re g u id in g it is S ch w artz, America's Germany, o n John J. M cCloy. O n th e K orean W ar, th e m o st co m p ellin g a n d d e b a te d acco u n t is C u m ings, The Origins of the Korean War, w ith v a lu a b le in sig h ts as w ell in to th e b ro a d e r co u rse of A m erican policy an d th e in te rn a tio n a l system . N o g en eral stu d y o f th e "h o m efro n t" d u r­ in g th e K orean W ar h a s a p p e a re d , b u t G oldm an, The Crucial Decade and After offers th e flavor of th e p e rio d . O n social relatio n s. P olenberg, One Nation Divisible rem ain s v alu ab le, th o u g h it te n d s to a ttrib u te to th e C old W ar w h a t I a ttrib u te to b ro a d e r processes. D ub erm an , Paul Robeson su p e rb ly illu m in a tes rela tio n sh ip s am o n g race, politics,

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an d c u ltu re. For fed eral p o licy o n race relatio n s, D alfium e, Desegregation of the Armed Forces is a rich o ld er source; B erm an, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Tru­ man Administration is also u sefu l. In a sw ellin g lite ra tu re o n w o m en , g en d er, a n d sex u ality , see, in a d d itio n to sources a lre ad y n o te d . M ay, Homeward Bound, a n im p o rta n t stu d y . D esp ite its title, L ew es, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Male Homosexuality offers m u ch a b o u t in te lle ctu al c u rre n ts d u rin g th is p e rio d . R u p p a n d T aylor, Survival in the Dol­ drums sh a p e d m y sen se of w o m e n 's ex periences. O n ch an g in g "sex u al re ­ gim es," C hauncey, Gay New York, in tro d u c es a rg u m e n ts b e a rin g o n th e 1940s a n d 1950s. O n c u ltu re a n d in te lle ctu al life, I relied h eav ily o n th e b ro a d stu d ie s liste d above, b u t B oyer, By the Bomb's Early Light is also essen tial, a n d G raebner, The Age of Doubt is a ric h sy n th esis e m p lo y in g a fram ew o rk v e ry d ifferen t from m ine. Pells, The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age is b ro a d b u t less u se fu l to m y p u rp o se s. M any o th e r stu d ie s n o te d h e re to u ch o n scien tists, b u t see also th e affecting m em oir, D yson, Disturbing the Universe. M ost sources n o te d above d e al w ith th e R ed Scare. In a d d itio n . F ried, Night­ mare in Red is a b alan ced sy n th esis. S chrecker, No Ivory Tower is v alu ab le. D ia­ m o n d , Compromised Campus is p e rso n al a n d a n g ry b u t rev ealin g . G riffith , The Politics of Fear rem ain s th e b e st stu d y of th e R ed S care's po litics. In term s of th e p resid en cy , in som e w ay s E isen h o w er h a s y ie ld e d a rich er seco n d ary lite ra tu re th a n h is p red ecesso r. A m brose, Eisenhower: The President is m asterfu l an d d e ep ly in fo rm ed . P ach a n d R ich ard so n , The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, m ore com pact a n d c u rre n t, a d d s a d d itio n a l in sig h ts. C arter, An­ other Part of the Fifties, offers acute, id io sy n cratic o b serv atio n s o n E isen h o w er a n d th e w hole d ecad e, th e m y th s a b o u t w h ich C a rte r effectively challenges. B eschloss's accounts of su p e rp o w e r c o n fro n tatio n . Mayday a n d The Crisis Years, are rich ly in fo rm ativ e o n d etails. H u g h es, The Ordeal of Power w a s a n in s id e r's sh a rp account th a t a n tic ip a te d th e "p o strev isio n ist" sy n th e sis o n Ike em erg in g in th e 1980s a n d 1990s. C ritical co n te m p o ra ry co m m en tary is in S tone, The

Haunted Fifties. O n m ore sp ecialized issu es of n a tio n a l secu rity , see th e so b er stu d y o f Ko­ rean W ar arm istice talk s. Foot, A Substitute for Victory. T he s ta rt of A m erican in te rv en tio n in In d o ch in a is th e object o f a w h o le co ttag e in d u stry , b u t for in tro ­ d u ctio n s see B aritz, Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Viet­ nam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did, h is su b title in d ic atin g h is ap p ro ach ; th e m ore d isp a ssio n a te b u t also d a m n in g sy n th esis. H e rrin g , America's Longest War; a n d Y oung, The Vietnam Wars, a su rv e y esp ecially a ttu n e d to V ietnam ese a n d A sian history. N u clear stra te g y an d p o licy h av e p ro d u c e d a rich h isto ­ rio g rap h y m irro rin g th e co m plexities of th e o rig in a l d eb ates. In a d d itio n to th e b ro a d e r accounts a lre ad y n o ted , K aplan, The Wizards of Armageddon is a sh a rp acco u n t of civ ilian th eo rists, w h ile T rach ten b erg , History and Strategy offers a m ore sy m p ath etic a n d sch o larly ex am in atio n of th em a n d o th e r issu es. Ford,

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The Button: The Pentagon's Command and Control System is b ro a d e r th a n its title in d icates. D ivine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 a n d A lian o , American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy are so lid a n d in fo rm ativ e. O n S p u tn ik a n d th e space race, M acD ougall, . . . The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age is te n d e n tio u s b u t m o n u m en tal; K oppes, JPL and the American Space Program focuses p recisely o n on e in stitu tio n . W olfe, The Right Stuff is in sig h tfu l p o p u la r histo ry . S m ith, "S elling th e M oon" sh re w d ly rev eals th e v a lu e s ascrib ed to a n d m a n ip u la te d in th e space p ro g ram . O n c u ltu ra l, in tellectu al, a n d social h isto ry in th e 1950s, I h av e g en erally re­ lie d o n so u rces a lre a d y n o te d , b u t o n race relatio n s, see also B ranch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, w h ich is sh re w d a n d m o n u m en tal. M orris, in The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, recovers th e m o v em en t's h e te ro g en e ity a n d in d ig e n o u s ro o ts. B urk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights is d e ta ile d , p recise, o ften d am n in g . T he b e st g e n eral in te rp re ta tio n s of th e 1960s are tw o o ld e r ones: H o d g so n , American In Our Time a n d M atusow , The Unraveling ofAmerica. Tw o o ld e r rev is­ io n ist acco u n ts are fine o n th e real a n d p erceiv ed differences b e tw ee n K ennedy a n d E isen h o w er a n d o n th e im p u lse s b e h in d K e n n ed y 's C o ld W ar policies: M iroff, Pragmatic Illusions a n d W ills, The Kennedy Imprisonment. P arm et, JFK is so lid a n d in fo rm ativ e; B urner, John F. Kennedy and a New Generation is sh o rt a n d u n in sp ire d . A m ong m an y bo o k s o n Johnson, C onkin, Big Daddyfrom the Pedernales is sin g u la rly b rief, b ala n ce d , y e t ju d g m e n tal. Z arefsky, President Johnson's War on Poverty: Rhetoric and History is e sse n tia l o n its subject, th o u g h som e of th e co n clu sio n s I d ra w from th e sto ry a re n o t Z arefsk y 's. Tw o v o lu m es e d ite d b y D ivine, Exploring the Johnson Years a n d The Johnson Years, co n ta in v a lu ab le essays. M uch of th e b e st in sig h t in to th e V ietnam W ar em erg ed d u rin g th e early, a n ­ g ry p h a se of re tro sp e c tio n — m ore recen t sc h o larsh ip h a s te n d e d to recycle ear­ lie r in sig h ts in p a llid w ay s. I h av e relied o n sev eral so u rces in a d d itio n to th o se b y B aritz, H e rrin g , a n d Y oung. T he m o st p ro b in g c o n te m p o ra ry jo u rn alism w as b y Jo n ath an Schell, esp ecially in The Village of Ben Sue; eq u ally v a lu a b le are h is la te r reflectio n s th a t in tro d u c e The Real War. B erm an, Planning a Tragedy, is u se fu l o n Jo h n so n 's a d m in istra tio n . G alluci, Neither Peace Nor Honor is a n o ld e r stu d y effectively ex p o sin g th e irra tio n a litie s of A m erican w a r m ak in g . A m ong m ore recen t stu d ie s, G ibson, The Perfect War is co n v in cin g ly d am n in g ; H ess, Vietnam and the United States is b la n d b u t a tte n tiv e to recen t sch o larsh ip , e sp e­ cially a b o u t th e A sian a n d in te rn a tio n a l d im en sio n s o f th e sto ry ; C lo d felter, The Limits of Air Power is th e b e st sin g le boo k o n its subject. Sm all, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves offers m o re com m on sense th a n m an y stu d ie s of th e a n tiw a r m o v em en t a n d its rela tio n sh ip to p re sid e n tia l policy. Levy, The Debate Over Vietnam is u n in sp ire d in a n aly sis b u t in fo rm ativ e. O n th e m e d ia 's role, H am ­ m o n d , "T he P ress in V ietnam as A g en t o f D efeat: A C ritical E x am in atio n " su m ­ m arizes a w e a lth of o th e r stu d ie s, in clu d in g a le n g th ie r on e b y H am m o n d ,

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w h ile H allin , The "Uncensored War" is b alan ced . A ppy, Working-Class War relies h eav ily o n d isg ru n tle d v e te ran s fo r its so u rces b u t se n sitiv e ly b o th co n firm s a n d c o n tests sta n d a rd m y th s a b o u t th e w ar, as d o es H ein em an , Campus Wars o n its subject. Shafer, e d .. The Legacy: The Vietnam War in the American Imagina­ tion is th e b e st o f m an y sch o larly an th o lo g ies, a n d C h a rlto n a n d M oncrieff, Many Reasons Why is on e of th e b e st o ral h isto rie s. P isor, The End of the Line, is excellent jo u rn alistic h isto ry of th e w a r a t its p eak . O n w om en, g en d er, sex u ality , a n d th e V ietnam W ar, I fo u n d th e ex istin g sch o larsh ip larg ely in a d e q u a te to m y p u rp o se s a n d a rriv e d a t m y o w n ju d g ­ m en ts, b u t E vans, Personal Politics is v alu ab le. Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America offers a b o ld if stra in e d a rg u m en t; E hrenreich, The Hearts of Men cap ­ tu re s som e o f th e p e rio d 's m o o d a n d a rg u m e n ts. A fin e s tu d y w ith b ro a d u tility d e sp ite th e c o m m u n ity 's u n iq u en e ss is R orabough, Berkeley at War. T he late 1960s a n d e arly 1970s— b e tte r th o u g h t o f as one p e rio d , ra th e r th a n se p a ra tin g th e "six ties" from th e "se v e n tie s"— h a v e y ie ld e d su rp risin g ly rich sch o larsh ip in p o litical h isto ry b ecau se th e leg al a n d p o litica l tu rm o il o v er th e w a r a n d N ix o n 's p resid en c y forced e arly d eclassificatio n o r e x p o su re of official d o c u m e n ta tio n a n d e n co u rag ed p a rtic ip a n ts to ru sh ra p id ly in to p rin t. M ost o f th e sources p rev io u sly n o te d for V ietn am rem ain ap p licab le to th is p e rio d . A m ong g en eral trea tm e n ts, th e b e st rem ain s on e w ritte n v e ry close to th e 1970s, C arro ll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened. O n N ix o n a n d p o litics p rec ed ­ in g , d u rin g , a n d a fte r h is p resid en cy , th e tw o v o lu m es o f A m brose, Nixon are su p erb . K utler, The Wars of Watergate p ro v id e s m o re d e ta il a n d a d ifferen t a n al­ ysis o n th a t subject. Still, for N ix o n th ere is n o su b stitu te fo r h is o w n w o rd s, ev en w h e n p u b lic u tteran ces, w h ich I d ra w from h is Public Papers as w ell as seco n d ary sources. T he p o litics a n d c u ltu re o f o p p o sitio n to th e w a r a re rev e ale d in m an y sources cited h ere a n d for th e p rev io u s a n d fo llo w in g c h ap ters. A m ong p ri­ m ary sources rev ealin g rad ical ferm en t, m o st u se d h e re a re w ell know n: M ailer, The Armies of the Night; R eich, The Greening of America; V onnegut, Slaughter-House Five. U n k n o w n b u t e q u ally rev ealin g is th e m em o ir b y C atto n , Waiting for the Morning Train. T he trav a ils of p a trio tic c u ltu re h a v e received m u ch less a tte n tio n b u t can b e g lim p sed in M arlin g a n d W etenhall, Iwo Jima; A n d ereg g , ed .. Inventing Vietnam: The War in Film and Television; a n d Shafer, ed ..

The Legacy. T he late 1970s h av e b een n eg lected b y h isto ria n s w ith b ig re p u ta tio n s a n d a sy n th etic ap p ro ach , d e sp ite rich sch o larsh ip o n m an y p a rtic u la rs, a n d fo r th a t reaso n th e in te rp re ta tio n s offered h ere a re m ore p a rtic u la rly m in e th a n fo r ear­ lier c h ap ters in th is stu d y . T he p e rio d iz a tio n h e re is also looser: I see m an y h is­ to rical c u rre n ts slid in g o v er th e d iv id e th a t R eag an 's ascen t to th e p resid en cy p resu m ab ly m ark ed , a n d th u s C h a p te r 7, a lth o u g h m o stly o n th e 1970s, traces som e of th o se c u rre n ts in to th e 1980s. T he b e st g en eral source rem ain s C arro ll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened.

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F o rd 's p resid en c y h a s received n o stro n g g en eral trea tm e n t, w h ile C a rte r h a s seem ed su ch a n a n o m aly th a t h isto ria n s h av e larg ely d isc a rd e d h im , ju st as vo­ te rs d id in 1980. S till, tw o sh re w d essay s b y L eo R ibuffo, d o n e in p re p a ra tio n fo r a fu ll stu d y b y h im , p ro v id e excellent sta rtin g p o in ts: b o th a re in R ibuffo, Right, Center, Left. A n d S m ith, Morality, Reason, and Power is co m p reh en siv e a n d in sig h tfu l o n C arter-era fo reig n policy. T he A fterw o rd to Schell, Observing the Nixon Years offers a b ro a d u n d e rsta n d in g o f h o w th e V ietnam W ar affected p o l­ itics a n d fo reig n p o licy in th e 1970s a n d 1980s. O n n u c le ar w eap o n s, strateg y , a n d a rm s co n tro l, th e b e st g en eral so u rce rem ain s N ew h o u se, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age. Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War is a b itin g co n te m p o ra ry account. B ut fo r C a rte r m o re th a n h is p red ecesso rs, I re­ lie d o n h is p u b lic p a p e rs a n d o th e r p rim a ry sources. A m ong th o se, th e New Yorker w as a t its m o st p ercep tiv e d u rin g th ese y ears. For A m erican s' conflictin g u n d e rsta n d in g s o f w a r in th e 1970s, E d w ard L ine n th a l h a s p ro v id e d p ro b in g in sig h ts; see "W ar a n d Sacrifice in th e N u clear A ge"; "R esto rin g A m erica: P olitical R evivalism in th e N u c lea r A ge," in S herrill, ed .. Religion and the Life of the Nation; a n d Sacred Ground. E q u ally v a lu a b le are H ellm an n , American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam; F ran k lin , M.I.A.; essay s in Shafer, e d .. The Legacy; B oyer, When Time Shall Be No More; a n d b ro a d tre a t­ m en ts o f c u ltu ra l h isto ry a lre ad y n o ted . In co n tra st, h isto ria n s' w o rk is w eak o n th e o v e rla p p in g conflicts o v er social rela tio n s a n d th e arm e d fo rces' d em o g rap h ics. T he fin al c h a p te r o f W eigley, History of the United States Army d o es, h o w ev er, p ro v id e a su p e rb overview , w h ile N alty, Strengthfor the Fight rem ain s u sefu l. F ocusing o n w o m e n 's o p p o si­ tio n to n a tio n a l p o licies o n w a r a n d fo reig n relatio n s, th e lite ra tu re of w o m en 's h isto ry is a sto n ish in g ly sile n t o n w o m e n 's place in th e arm ed forces in th e 1970s a n d th e b a ttle s o v er it, b u t see H olm , Women in the Military. O n lesb ian s a n d gay s in th e m ilitary , S hilts, Conduct Unbecoming, p ro v id e s a n im p assio n ed , p er­ su a siv e c ritiq u e of official policies. O n o p p o sitio n to ERA a n d g ay rig h ts, E hrenreich, The Hearts of Men is th e b e st sin g le stu d y . F elsenthal, The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority is u se fu l jo u r­ n alism . O n m o ral co n serv atism . Y oung, God's Bullies p ro v id e s rich if u n fla tte r­ in g d etail; sch o larly a p p ra isa ls in clu d e W uthnow , The Restructuring ofAmerican Religion a n d W u thnow a n d L iebm an, ed s.. The New Christian Right. S hilts, The Mayor of Castro Street c ap tu res C alifo rn ia's stru g g les o v er hom osexuality. F itzG erald, Cities on a Hill in fo rm s m y b ro a d e r sen se o f c u ltu ra l p o litics a n d social seg m en tatio n . For th e 1980s a n d 1990s, I h av e relied h eav ily o n th e ra th e r ra n d o m g lean in g of p o p u la r m ed ia, in sta n t in te lle ctu al an aly sis, a n d o th e r co n tem p o rary sources o n w h ich an y h isto ria n of recen t ev en ts d e p e n d s, a n d h eav ily as w ell o n th e Public Papers o f th e P re sid e n ts in v o lv ed as av ailab le th ro u g h th e tim e of th is w ritin g (the fin al v o lu m e of B u sh 's p a p e rs o n ly becam e av ailab le as th is b o o k w e n t to p ress), a lth o u g h , as w ith o th e r P re sid en ts, som e off-hand state-

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m en ts b y B ush a n d R eagan n e v er m ad e it to th ese official v o lu m es a n d a re c ited in stead to c o n tem p o rary rep o rtin g . B ut R eagan a n d h is p resid en cy , ev en before th e la tte r e n d ed , y ield ed a rich e r b o d y of co m m en tary a n d sc h o larsh ip th a n h a d Jim m y C arter. M oreover, co n te m p o ra ry re p o rtin g a n d co m m en tary a re al­ w ays h isto ry 's first d ra ft, a n d for th e p è rio d co v ered h ere, m u ch of it w as sh a rp a n d energetic, an d w ittin g ly o r u n w ittin g ly rev ealin g . O n R eagan, W ills, Reagan's America is th e b e st sin g le account. S challer, Reck­ oning with Reagan is a b rief, less im ag in ativ e, b u t u se fu l survey. Johnson, Sleep­ walking through History is so lid jo u rn alism . N ew h o u se, War and Peace in the Nu­ clear Age is ev en m ore essen tial for th is p e rio d since sch o lars p ro v id e less coverage, b u t L in en th al, Symbolic Defense is a m arv e lo u s stu d y o f reactio n s to SDI; S m ith, Thinking the Unthinkable is also in sig h tfu l o n SDI; w h ile B aucom , The Origins of SDI is in fo rm ativ e ab o u t b u t o v erly e n am o red w ith SDI. B oyer, ed ., Reagan as President, is a u sefu l collection. For B ush, especially for th e 1988 cam p aig n a n d th e G u lf W ar, I fo u n d th e ex­ ten siv e re p o rtin g for th e New Yorker b y E lizab eth D rew , th o u g h o ften ted io u s, also d e ta ile d , in fo rm ativ e, a n d reliable. T h o u g h b rief, th e b e st sin g le p o rtra it of B ush p e rtin e n t to m y th em es is B lum enthal, "L etter from W ashington: A ll th e P re sid e n t's W ars." Sifry a n d C erf, ed s.. The Gulf War Reader is a v a lu a b le collec­ tio n of c o n tem p o rary rep o rtin g , com m entary, a n d testim o n y , a n d P eters, ed .. Collateral Damage a d d s la te r ev id en ce a n d reflections. H allio n , Storm Over Iraq celebrates th e R eagan a n d B ush a d m in istra tio n s a n d a ir p o w e r's role in th e G ulf W ar. W oodw ard, The Commanders, a lth o u g h w eak ly d o cu m e n te d , is a u se ­ fu l account of m ilita ry lea d ers in th e B ush a d m in istra tio n . E nloe, The Morning After is v alu ab le o n a w id e ran g e of issu es in v o lv in g g e n d e r a n d n a tio n a l d e ­ fense. A m ong m an y w o rk s o n th is subject, H o g an , ed .. The End of the Cold War is a stro n g collection. In a d d itio n to th e sta n d a rd lite ra tu re a lre ad y n o te d o n S oviet-A m erican relatio n s, B ushnell, Moscow Graffiti esp ecially in fo rm ed m y in te rp re ta tio n of d ev elo p m en ts w ith in th e S oviet U nion. T he u n c ertain econom ic fo u n d atio n s for rem ilitariza tio n a re rev iew ed in m any p rim a ry a n d seco n d ary sources, th o u g h o ften w ith little a tte n tio n to rela­ tio n sh ip s b etw een econom ic p a tte rn s a n d defen se policy. I h av e relied p a rtic ­ u la rly o n D uboff, Accumulation and Power a n d K ennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, w h ich a t th is p o in t in m y sto ry serv es as b o th a p rim a ry a n d a seco n d ary account. D idion, "T rouble in L akew ood" b e au tifu lly chronicles so u th e rn C alifo rn ia's d efen se-b ased c u ltu re a n d its b e w ild e red resp o n se to d e ­ fense retren ch m en t. O n p o p u la r cu ltu re a n d its rela tio n sh ip to p o litics, see esp ecially Jeffords, Hard Bodies; G ibson, Warrior Dreams; an d H ixson, " 'R ed S torm R isin g .' " O n in­ tellectu al c u rren ts, Jum onville, Critical Crossings is p a rtic u la rly u se fu l fo r th is p erio d . O n th e su p p o sed "cu ltu re w a rs," H u n te r, Culture Wars is in su fficien tly sen sitiv e to lan g u ag e b u t a so lid chronicle o f its subject. M ost of th e an aly sis of w a r's m etap h o rs an d m o ral e q u iv a le n ts is m ine, d e riv e d in p a rt from a n earlie r

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essay of m in e, "T he L anguage of W ar in A ID S D isco u rse," in M u rp h y a n d Poi­ rier, ed s.. Writing AIDS, a v o lu m e of rich critical reflections. A lso o n AID S, S hilts, And the Band Played On is th e sta n d a rd jo u rn alistic account. S ontag, AIDS and Its Metaphors, d iffers from m y a n aly sis in m an y w ay s b u t is u sefu l o n con­ te m p o ra ry a ttitu d e s to w a rd th e state. O n th e d e b ate o n lesb ian s a n d gays in th e m ilitary , I larg ely d rew m y o w n co n clu sio n s b a sed o n fo llo w in g th e m ed ia circus th a t acco m p an ied it, b u t I also g ain ed from ad v ice from A llan B érubé, G eorge C hauncey, L ane F enrich, a n d L eisa M eyer.

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IN D E X

A b e r n a th y , R a lp h D a v id , 1 0 0

A ls o p , S te w a r t, 2 1 4

A b o r tio n , 4 2 2 ,4 2 6 ,4 5 1 - 5 3 ,4 8 5

A m b r o s e , S te p h e n , 2 1 7 ,2 4 3 ,2 8 5 ; o n N ix o n , 3 0 8 ,3 1 0 ,3 1 3 ,3 1 9 ,3 2 0 ,3 2 8

A b z u g , B e lla , 3 0 3 A c h e s o n , D e a n G ., 1 3 3 , 1 3 8 ,2 3 3 , 2 9 1 ; a n d

A m e r ic a F ir s t, 5 5

r a c ia l d is c r im in a t io n , 1 4 6 ,1 4 7 ; M c C a r ­

A m erican , The

t h y 's a tta c k s o n , 1 7 2 ,1 7 3 ; a n d K o r e a n

A m e r ic a n C iv il L ib e r tie s U n io n (A C L U ),

(T V s h o w ) , 2 3 1

1 5 3 ,4 3 4

W ar, 1 7 7 -7 9 A C T -U P (A I D S C o a litio n to U n le a s h

A m e r ic a n c u ltu r e .

See

C u ltu r e

A m e r ic a n H is to r ic a l A s s o c ia tio n , 1 6 2

P o w e r ), 4 2 6 ,4 5 6 ,4 5 9 A d d a m s, Jane, 38

A m e r ic a n h is t o r y , x iv , 1 ,2 3

A d o r n o , T . W ., 1 6 1

A m erican H olocaust

A d va n cin g Am erican A r t ,

1 5 6 - 5 7 ,1 6 0

(S ta n n a r d ), 4 6 1

A m e r ic a n I n d ia n s , 2 ,9 4 ,1 0 8 , 1 1 1 , 1 5 4 , 423

A d v e r tis in g , 9 0 ,9 7 ,2 1 0 - 1 1 A e r o s p a c e in d u s tr y , 2 4 0

A m e r ic a n L e g io n , 1 0 9 ,1 6 0 ,1 7 1

A ffluent Society

Am erican Legion M agazine, 1 0 4 Am erican Life ( W a r n e r ) , 1 6 5

(G a lb r a ith ), 1 6 5

A fg h a n is ta n , 3 3 9 ; S o v ie t in v a s io n o f, 3 7 4 , 3 7 5 , 3 7 6 , 3 7 7 , 3 9 9 ; U .S . i n t e r v e n t i o n in ,

A m e r ic a n M e d ic a l A s s o c ia tio n , 1 2 4 A m e r ic a n R e v o lu tio n , 1

3 7 9 ,3 9 6 ,4 0 3 ,4 1 0

A n d r o p o v , Y u r i V ., 4 0 9

A F L -C IO , 3 2 9 A fr ic a , 3 4 6 ,4 1 4

A n n ih ila tio n , s tr a te g y o f, 2

" A g e o f A n x ie ty " (A u d e n ), 1 5 7

A n ti-a b o r tio n m o v e m e n t, 4 2 6 ,4 5 1 - 5 3

A g n e w , S p ir o T , 2 9 9 ,3 0 2 ,3 3 0

A n ti-A m e r ic a n is m , 4 2 1

A g r ic u ltu r a l A d j u s tm e n t A d m in is t r a ­

A n ti-b a llis tic m is s ile s (A B M ), 2 2 3 A n tib a llis tic M is s ile (A B M ) T r e a ty

tio n , 19 A ID S : c u ltu r a l c o n f lic ts o v e r , 4 2 5 - 2 8 ; w a r m e ta p h o r s e v o k e d b y, 4 4 5 ,4 5 4 -

(1 9 7 2 ), 3 1 1 ,4 0 5 A n tic o m m u n is m : p o s t- W o r ld W a r I R ed

5 7 ,4 6 0 ,4 6 1 ,4 6 6 - 6 7 ; fe d e r a l r e s p o n s e

S c a r e , 9; p o lit ic a l r e d -b a itin g , 1 1 7 ,1 3 3 ,

to , 4 5 7 ,4 5 9 ,4 6 0

1 4 8 ,1 5 0 ,1 7 4 - 7 5 ; T rüm ern a n d , 1 2 3 ,

A ir c r a ft in d u s t r y , 9 , 3 7 ,6 9 , 7 4 ,1 5 5

1 2 9 ,1 5 3 ,1 7 8 ,1 9 2 ,2 4 1 ; a n d p o s tw a r

A ir p o w e r : a n d M u n ic h c r is is , 2 9 ,3 0 ,3 5 ;

G e r m a n y , 1 2 7 -2 8 ; a n d C h in e s e r e v o ­

R o o s e v e lt a n d , 3 0 ,3 5 ,5 9 ; b o m b in g o f

lu tio n , 1 2 9 ; a n d C o ld W a r c o n flic t, 1 2 9 ,

J a p a n , 6 7 ,8 1 ,8 2 ,8 3 ,9 3 - 9 4 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 4 ;

1 3 1 ,1 3 2 ,1 3 3 ; a n d r a c ia l d iv is io n s , 1 4 6 -

r o l e i n W o r l d W a r II, 8 1 , 8 2 , 8 4 , 8 6 ;

49; M c C a rth y -er a R ed S ca re, 1 4 8 ,1 7 0 -

b o m b in g o f G e r m a n y , 8 2 - 8 4 ,1 1 3 ,1 9 4 ;

7 7 ,1 8 5 ,2 0 1 ; e m p lo y e d a g a in s t w o m e n

in K o r e a n W a r, 1 8 1 -8 2 ; E is e n h o w e r

a n d g a y s , 1 5 0 ,1 6 4 ,1 7 3 ,4 5 4 ; e th n ic im ­

a n d , 1 9 4 ; in V ie tn a m W a r, 2 5 1 ,2 7 0 - 7 2 ,

m ig r a n ts a n d , 153; C a th o lic c h u r c h

3 1 2 - 1 4 ; R e a g a n a n d , 4 0 2 ; in P e r s ia n

a n d , 15 9 ; a n d K o r e a n W a r, 1 7 7 ,1 7 8 , 1 7 9 ,1 8 5 ; D e m o c r a t ic a n d lib e r a l, 1 8 9 ,

G u lf W a r, 4 6 9 - 7 0 A la m o h is to r ic s ite , 4 2 3

2 7 3 ; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 9 0 ,1 9 2 ; V ie t ­

A la s k a n u c le a r b o m b p la n , 2 2 1

n a m W ar a n d , 304; N ix o n a n d , 3 1 0 ,

A le x a n d e r , C h a r le s , 2 3

31 8 ; C a r te r a n d , 3 4 2 ,3 4 9 ,4 0 8 - 9 ; n e o ­

A li, M u h a m m a d , 2 9 3

c o n s e r v a tis m a n d , 3 52; R e a g a n a n d ,

A lie n R e g is tr a tio n A c t (1 9 4 0 ), 5 2

4 1 0 ; C o ld W a r 's d e m is e a n d , 4 3 7

A ll Q u iet on the Western Front 361 A ls o p , J o se p h , 2 1 4

(film ), 2 4 ,

A n tin u c le a r m o v e m e n t, 2 4 8 - 4 9 ,3 5 4 - 5 6 , 405 A n ti-S e m itis m , 5 0 ,5 2 ,9 7 ,1 1 9

S70

INDEX

A n tis ta tis m , 7 8 ,8 0 ,4 9 5 ,5 0 4

(A R V N ), 2 6 6 ,2 6 7 ,2 6 8 ,2 8 5 ,2 9 0 ,2 9 1 ,

A n t iw a r a c tiv is m : p o s t - W o r ld W a r 1 ,1 0 ,

314

2 5 - 2 6 ; W o r ld W a r II a n t i - i n t e r v e n ­

A n o g a n ce o f P ow er ( F u lb r ig h t ) , 2 7 5

tio n is m , 3 8 ,4 1 ,5 4 - 5 6 ,6 0 ; w o m e n a n d ,

A r ts, 1 5 6 - 5 7 ,4 5 3 - 5 4

3 8 ,2 7 6 ,2 9 7 ,3 7 0 ; V ie tn a m W a r, 2 7 6 ,

A s ia , 2 3 3 ; C o ld W a r c o n flic t in , 1 2 9 ,1 3 2 ,

2 8 8 ,2 9 2 - 9 7 ,3 0 2 - 4 ,3 2 3 ; p a tr io tic r e s is ­

1 5 4 ,1 8 0 ,4 1 4 ; K o r e a n W a r a n d , 1 7 8 ,

ta n c e to , 2 9 7 - 9 9 ,3 5 1 ,3 5 4 ,3 5 9 ; c u ltu r e

1 7 9 ,1 8 0 ; U .S . t r o o p s in , 3 2 2 - 2 3 ; i m m i ­

o f w a r 's h o r r o r s, 3 5 4 - 5 9 ,3 7 0

A p o c a ly p se N o w ( f i l m ) , 3 6 0 - 6 1

g r a tio n fr o m , 4 2 9 A s ia n -A m e r ic a n s , 1 0 3 - 4 ,4 2 4

A p o llo sp a c e p r o g r a m , 2 3 9

A s p in , L e s, 4 1 2 ,4 6 8 ,4 8 6 ,4 8 8

A p p e a s e m e n t, 29; R o o s e v e lt a n d , 59 ;

A tla n ta C o n s titu tio n , 4 4 7

C o ld W a r in v o c a t io n s o f, 1 2 6 ,1 3 3 ,1 3 5 ;

A tla n tic , 1 4 3 , 2 9 4

a n d K o r e a n W a r, 1 7 8 ; a n d V ie tn a m

A tla n tic C h a r te r (1 9 4 1 ), 9 0

W a r, 25 2 ; C a rter a c c u s e d o f, 37 8 ; a n d

A to m ic b o m b .

R e a g a n r e a r m a m e n t, 3 9 8

A to m ic E n e r g y C o m m is s io n (A E C ), 1 3 8 -

See N u c l e a r w e a p o n s

A p p le , R .W ., 4 7 0

3 9 ,1 6 0 ,1 8 5 ; fir in g o f O p p e n h e im e r ,

A r e n d t, H a n n a h , 2 7 6

1 3 7 ,1 7 3 ; d e v e lo p m e n t o f n u c le a r

A r ie n , M ic h a e l, 2 8 9

w e a p o n s , 1 3 7 ,1 8 3 ,2 2 1 ; r e d - b a it in g in ,

A r m e d fo r c e s: h is to r ic a l r o le o f, 1 - 2 , 4 - 5 ,

1 7 3 ,1 7 6

6 - 7 ,2 7 - 2 8 ; s o c ia l fu n c t io n o f m ilita r y

A t w a t e r , L e e H ., 4 3 4

s e r v ic e , 4 ,5 ,2 2 ,4 8 - 4 9 ,2 6 4 - 6 5 ,4 9 0 ;

A u d e n , W .H ., 1 5 7

p e r s o n n e l le v e ls , 6 ,1 2 4 - 2 5 ,1 3 0 ,1 3 8 ,

A u s tr ia , 2 8 ,2 0 2

1 8 3 ,1 9 6 ,2 7 8 ,3 1 1 ,4 0 2 ,4 8 6 ; in te r s e r v ic e

A u th o rita ria n P e rs o n a lity ( A d o r n o ) , 1 6 1

r iv a lr ie s , 8 3 ,8 6 ) 1 3 7 - 3 8 ; w o m e n in , 9 4 ,

A u t o m o b ile in d u s tr y , 4 6 ,2 7 8

9 5 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 5 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 0 ,1 4 9 - 5 1 ,3 0 1 ,3 6 7 6 8 ,3 7 2 -7 3 ,3 8 2 - 8 3 ,4 5 3 ,4 7 7 - 7 8 ,4 8 8 , 4 8 9 ; h o m o s e x u a ls in , 9 4 ,1 0 4 - 5 ,1 0 9 , 1 5 2 ,3 6 9 ,4 8 7 ; b a n o n h o m o s e x u a ls , 1 0 4 ,3 6 9 ,4 8 7 ; r o le in e f f e c tin g s o c ia l c h a n g e , 1 0 9 ,1 4 7 ,2 6 5 ; c o n s o lid a t io n u n d e r D e fe n se D ep a rtm e n t, 1 1 6 -1 7 , 1 3 7 -3 8 ; c iv ilia n c o n tr o l o f, 1 3 7 ,1 4 3 , 4 8 8 ; d e s e g r e g a tio n o f, 1 4 5 - 4 7 ,2 0 8 , 2 5 5 ,4 9 0 - 9 1 ; e n tr a n c e r e q u ir e m e n ts , 2 6 4 - 6 5 ,3 6 6 ; r a c ia l a n d c la s s c o m p o s i­ tio n , 2 6 5 ,2 9 5 ,3 6 5 - 6 7 ; a ll- v o lu n t e e r , 3 6 5 ,3 6 6 ; tr a in in g a c a d e m ie s , 3 6 7 - 6 8 ; c o n flic ts o v e r g a y b a n , 3 6 8 - 6 9 ,4 8 3 , 4 8 7 - 9 0 ,4 9 1 - 9 2 A r m ie s , 3 4 0

A n n ie s o f th e N ig h t ( M a i l e r ) , 3 0 3 , 3 0 5 A r m s c o n tr o l, 10; C o ld W a r m e n ta lity a n d , 2 2 1 ,2 4 9 ; N ix o n a n d , 3 1 1 ,3 3 4 ; C a r te r a n d , 3 4 5 ; R e a g a n a n d , 3 9 4 ,3 9 6 , 4 0 4 ,4 1 2 -1 3

A n n s and M en (M illis ) , 1 6 6 A r m s r a c e , 2 2 2 ,2 5 9 ,3 2 2 ,3 8 7 ; h y d r o g e n b o m b a n d , 1 3 5 -3 6 ; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 9 5 ,2 0 3 ,2 0 4 ; n u c le a r te s t b a n a n d , 2 4 8 -4 9 ; N ix o n a n d , 3 1 1 ,3 2 3 -2 4 ; C a r­ te r a n d , 3 4 3 ,3 5 6 A r m s s a le s , 3 4 0 ,3 4 6 A r m y C o r p s o f E n g in e e r s , 2 0 7 A r m y o f th e R e p u b lic o f V ie tn a m

B aby b oom , 213

Backlash ( F a l u d i ) , 4 5 1 B ad D a y a t B lack R ock ( f i l m ) , 2 0 8 B a k e r , H o w a r d H . , J r ., 4 4 7 B a k e r , J a m e s A ., I ll, 4 4 2 ,4 6 5 B a k e r , J o s e p h in e , 1 4 8 B a k er , R u s s e ll, 4 8 7 B a k k e r , R e v . J im , 4 2 7 B a ld w in , J a m e s, 2 5 7 B a ld w in , R o g e r , 5 2 B a ll, G e o r g e W „ 2 4 7 , 2 5 1 ,2 7 3 B a ltim o r e , D a v id , 4 5 7 B a o D a i (e m p e r o r o f V ie tn a m ), 1 9 8 B a r n e t, R ic h a r d , 1 3 1 - 3 2 ,3 8 7 - 8 8 ,3 9 0 , 4 4 3 - 4 4 ,5 0 1 B arry, J o h n , 4 2 0 B aruch, B ern ard , 216 B a rzu n , J acq u es, 167

B a ttle f o r Ju stice, 4 6 0 B a y o f P ig s in v a s io n , 2 3 8 ,2 4 6 B e a r d , C h a r le s A ., 3 6 , 3 8 - 3 9 , 6 0 , 6 1 , 6 2 B eard , M a ry , 61 B e ir u t, L e b a n o n : m a r in e b a r r a c k s b o m b ­ in g , 3 3 8 ,4 0 3 ; h o s t a g e c r is is , 3 6 3 ,4 1 0 , 411 B e ll, D a n ie l, 2 4 2 ,2 4 3 B e ll, T e r r e l, 4 2 4 , 4 4 6 B e lla m y , E d w a r d , 3 B e m is , S a m u e l F la g g , 1 6 9

INDEX

57 1

B e n e d ic t, R u th , 2 3

B r ig h t, S u s ie , 4 5 1

B e n n e t t , W i l l i a m J ., 4 2 3 , 4 2 7 - 2 8

B r ita in , B a t t le o f , 4 0

B e n to n , T h o m a s H a r t, 1 0 7

B r o d e r , D a v id , 3 3 6 ,4 9 3

B e n t s e n , L l o y d M . , J r ., 4 1 6

B r o d ie , B e r n a r d , 1 3 5 ,1 3 9 ,2 2 2 ,2 2 4 ,3 2 1 -

B e r g le r , E d m u n d , 1 5 2 B e r lin , G e r m a n y , 1 2 8 - 2 9 ,1 3 0 , 1 3 5 ,2 2 5 2 6 ,2 4 4 -4 5

22 B ro g a n , D . W „ 2 7 ,6 9 ,8 0 ,8 5 ,9 0 ,9 1 ,2 2 9 B r o o k in g s I n s titu tio n , 3 2 3

B e r lin W a ll, 2 4 5 ,4 3 7

B row n, H . R ap, 293

B e r n s te in , L e o n a r d , 1 5 7

B r o w n , H a r o ld , 3 8 0 ,3 8 1 ,3 8 3

B é r u b é , A lla n , 4 8 9

B row n, John, 293

B -5 2 b o m b e r , 3 8 6

B r o w n , R ita M a e , 3 0 5

B ic e n te n n ia l c e le b r a tio n , 3 5 1

B row n v. B oard o f E d u ca tio n ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 1 4 7 ,

B ik in i n u c le a r t e s t, 2 2 1 B ilb o , T h e o d o r e , 1 0 2

2 0 9 ,2 1 0 ,2 1 3 B ro w n S care, 5 1 -5 2

B lackboard J u n gle ( f i l m ) , 1 6 8

B r z e z in s k i, Z b ig n ie w , 3 4 7 ,3 4 9 ,3 8 1

B lack L egion ( f i l m ) , 5 2

B -2 b o m b e r , 4 0 1

B la c k s , 4 2 8 ; R o o s e v e lt a n d in te g r a tio n o f,

B -2 6 b o m b e r , 7 0

2 1 , 4 9 - 5 0 ; e f f e c t s o f W o r ld W a r II a n d ,

B -2 9 b o m b e r , 8 2 ,9 3 - 9 4

9 4 ,1 0 0 - 1 0 2 ,1 0 9 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 2 ; in W o r ld

B u ch a n a n , Jam es, 378

W a r H , 1 0 0 ,1 0 2 ; m ilit a r y d e s e g r e g a ­

B u c h a n a n , P a t r i c k J ., 4 5 5 , 4 6 6 , 4 8 0 - 8 1 ,

tio n a n d , 1 4 5 ,1 4 6 ,1 4 7 ,1 4 9 ,1 5 1 ,1 6 9 ,

492

2 5 5 ,4 9 0 - 9 1 ; a n tic o m m u n is m a n d ,

B u c h w a ld , A r t, 4 0 7

1 4 6 -4 8 ; m ilita r iz a tio n a n d , 1 5 5 - 5 6 ,

B u c k l e y , W i l l i a m F ., J r ., 2 2 6 , 2 2 9 , 4 3 5 , 4 5 5

4 9 9 ; c iv il r ig h ts m o v e m e n t a n d , 2 0 9 ,

B u d g e t d e fic its , 3 8 8 ,4 2 1 ,4 4 6 ,4 8 5

2 5 5 ,2 5 6 ,2 5 7 ; in V ie tn a m W a r, 2 5 5 - 5 6 ,

B u lg e , B a ttle o f t h e , 1 0 0

2 6 4 ,2 7 5 ,2 9 5 ,3 6 6 - 6 7 ; w a r o n p o v e r ty

B u lle tin o f th e A to m ic S c ie n tists, 1 2 0 , 4 4 1

a n d , 2 6 2 ; o p p o s it io n to V ie tn a m W a r,

B u n d y , W illia m , 2 5 1

2 7 5 - 7 6 ,2 9 3 ,2 9 5 ,3 0 3 ,3 6 6 ; a n d C o ld

B u n tin g , M a r y , 2 5 6

W a r c o n flic t, 4 3 7 ,4 7 8 - 7 9 ; w a r o n

B u r g e r , W a r r e n E ., 3 1 7

d r u g s a n d , 4 5 0 ; a n d m ilita r y b a n o n

B u rn h a m , J am es, 3 2 8 -2 9

g ays, 490

B u sh , B arbara, 468

B lo o m , A lla n , 4 2 3 ,4 2 4 B lu e E a g le , 2 0

B u s h , G e o r g e , 3 3 5 ,3 7 4 ,4 7 8 ,4 8 5 ; a s v ic e p r e s id e n t , 3 5 2 ,4 1 1 ,4 3 2 ; e m p lo y m e n t

B lu m e n th a l, S id n e y , 4 7 1 ,4 8 3

o f p a tr io tic s y m b o ls , 3 5 2 ,4 3 2 ,4 3 4 ; o n

B o e in g C o m p a n y , 2 1 9 ,3 2 3

n u c le a r w a r , 3 8 1 ; ju d ic ia l a p p o in t ­

B o la n d A m e n d m e n t (1 9 8 4 ), 4 1 0 ,4 1 1

m e n ts , 3 9 7 ; a n d S o v ie t U n io n , 4 1 2 ,4 3 5 ,

" B o m b e r g a p ," 2 1 6

4 3 8 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

B -l b o m b e r , 3 4 5 ,3 4 9 ,4 0 1 ,4 0 2 ,4 8 6

4 2 1 ,4 2 2 ,4 3 2 - 3 6 ; w a r o n d r u g s , 4 3 1 ,

B o n u s A r m y , 1 9 ,2 9 2

4 4 2 - 4 3 ,4 4 5 ,4 5 0 - 5 1 ; a n d C o ld W a r 's

1988,

B o r e n , D a v i d L ., 4 6 3

d e m is e , 4 3 2 ,4 3 5 ,4 3 7 ,4 3 8 ,4 6 2 - 6 3 ; a n d

B o r k , R o b e r t H ., 4 6 0

W o r ld W a r H , 4 3 2 ,4 4 4 ,4 6 4 ,4 6 8 ,4 7 4 ;

B orm an , F rank, 23 9

a n d m ilita r iz a tio n , 4 3 3 ,4 4 2 ,4 4 3 ; in v a ­

B o s n ia n c iv il w a r , 4 8 5 ,4 8 6 ,4 9 5

s io n o f P a n a m a , 4 4 2 -4 3 ; a n d d e fe n s e

B oston G lobe, 3 5 0

s p e n d in g , 4 4 3 ; a n d w a r o n h a te , 4 6 0 ;

B o u r n e , R a n d o lp h , 9

a n d Ir a q i in v a s io n o f K u w a it, 4 6 2 - 6 7 ,

B ow ers v. H a rd w ic k ( 1 9 8 6 ) , 4 2 6

4 8 4 ; a n d P e r s ia n G u lf W a r, 4 6 8 - 6 9 ,

B o w le s , C h e s te r , 2 5 1

4 7 1 - 7 6 ,4 7 9 ,4 8 0 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m ­

B o y e r , P a u l, 1 1 5 ,2 4 8 ,3 6 0

p a ig n o f

1 9 9 2 ,4 7 9 - 8 2 , 4 9 4

B r a d le y , O m a r N ., 1 3 5 ,1 4 0 ,1 8 0 ,2 2 3 ,2 9 1

B u sh , V a n n e v a r , 8 6 ,1 1 9 ,1 3 9 ,2 0 4

B raun, W em h er v o n , 215

B u s in e s s e s : in W o r ld W a r 1 ,8; W o r ld

B r e z h n e v , L e o n i d I ., 3 1 8 , 3 3 1 , 3 4 5 , 3 4 6 , 3 7 7 ,3 7 9 ,4 0 9

W a r II a n d , 3 7 , 7 2 , 7 3 , 7 9 , 1 4 3 ; m ilit a r y in d u s tr ia l c o m p le x , 7 1 ,1 4 1 - 4 2 ; a lli­

B r ic k e r , J o h n , 2 0 1 ,2 0 2

a n c e w it h g o v e r n m e n t, 7 2 - 7 7 ,1 4 0 - 4 1 ;

B r ic k e r A m e n d m e n t , 2 0 1 - 2

E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 8 9 - 9 0 ; " n ic h e " m a r ­ k e tin g , 4 2 8

572

INDEX

B u sin ess W eek, 1 3 6 , 1 4 0 , 3 8 5

W o r ld W a r II, 8 0 ,9 3 ; K o r e a n W a r , 1 8 1 ;

B y r n e s , J a m e s F ., 7 0 , 1 2 6

V ie t n a m W a r, 2 7 1 ,2 8 5 ,2 8 7 ; P e r s ia n G u lf W ar, 4 7 1 ,4 7 4

C aesar's C o lu m n ( D o n n e l l y ) , 3 - 4 C ain e M u tin y ( f i l m ) , 1 6 8 C a ld ic o tt, H e le n , 3 5 5 ,3 7 0 C a lifo r n ia : d e f e n s e in d u s t r ie s , 7 1 ,7 4 , 1 5 5 ,1 5 6 ,2 3 0 ,4 0 1 ; a n ti-g a y r e fe r e n ­ d u m , 3 6 9 -7 0 ; R e a g a n g o v e r n o r s h ip , 3 9 3 ; e c o n o m ic tr o u b le s , 4 3 9 ,4 8 0 ; a n ti­ im m ig r a n t s e n t im e n t in , 4 9 2 C a lle y , W illia m , 3 1 5 ,4 2 3 C a lte c h J et P r o p u ls io n L a b o r a to r y , 71 C a m b o d ia : U .S . b o m b i n g o f , 2 8 8 ,3 1 2 , 3 1 3 , 3 1 4 ,3 3 2 ; U .S . i n v a s i o n o f , 3 1 4 , 3 1 6 ; K h m e r R o u g e g e n o c id e , 3 1 4 ,3 4 9 , 3 5 7 ,3 5 8 ,3 5 9 ;

M ayaguez in c id e n t , 3 3 7 -

38 C ancer, w a r o n , 2 6 3 -6 4

C a n ticle f o r L e ib o w itz ( M i l l e r ) , 2 0 4 C a n titi, H a d le y , 4 2 C a p ita lis m , 8 5 ,4 3 6 ,4 5 8 C a p r a , F ra n k , 3 4 ,3 5 ,8 9 ,1 0 3 C a r iu c c i, F r a n k V , 4 3 5 C a r m ic h a e l, S to k e ly , 2 5 7 C a r r o ll, P e te r , 3 2 5 ,3 6 5 C a r te r , J im m y , 3 3 3 ,3 3 9 ,4 5 3 ,4 8 3 ,4 8 4 ; a n d m ilita r iz a tio n , 3 4 1 - 4 4 ,3 4 6 ,3 4 8 , 3 5 0 ,3 9 0 ,3 9 4 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1 9 7 6 ,3 4 1 - 4 2 ; a n d a n t i c o m m u n i s m , 3 4 2 ,3 4 9 ,4 0 8 - 9 ; a n d E q u a l R ig h ts A m e n d m e n t, 3 4 3 ; a n d h u m a n r ig h ts , 3 4 3 ,3 4 5 ,3 4 7 ,3 4 9 ; a n d e n e r g y c r is is , 3 4 3 ,3 4 9 - 5 0 ,3 6 4 ,3 6 5 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 3 4 4 - 4 5 ,3 6 2 ; a n d C o ld W a r c o n ­ flic t, 3 4 5 ,3 4 6 ,3 4 7 ,3 4 8 ,3 7 6 - 7 7 ; a n d S A L T a g r e e m e n ts , 3 4 5 ,3 4 8 ,3 4 9 ,3 7 6 , 3 8 2 ; a n d n u c le a r w e a p o n s p o lic y , 3 4 5 4 6 ,3 4 9 ,3 8 2 ,4 0 2 ; a n d Ir a n h o s ta g e c r is is , 3 4 7 - 4 8 ,3 7 5 ,3 8 4 - 8 5 ; a n d d e ­ f e n s e s p e n d in g , 3 4 8 ,3 7 6 ; a n d a n tiw a r c u ltu r e , 3 5 4 ; a n d n u c le a r w a r , 3 5 6 ,3 7 6 , 3 7 8 - 7 9 ,3 8 1 ; d r a ft r e g is tr a tio n p r o ­ p o s a l, 3 7 2 - 7 3 ,3 8 3 ,4 0 0 ; a n d S o v ie t in ­ v a s io n o f A fg h a n is ta n , 3 7 4 ,3 7 5 ,3 7 6 ; a n d r e la tio n s w it h C h in a , 3 7 8 ; a n d te r ­ r o r is m , 4 1 1 ; in H a iti c r is is , 4 9 3 C a r te r , P a u l, 1 9 9 ,2 0 0 C a rter D o c tr in e , 3 7 8 C arvey, D an a, 433 C a s e y , W i l l i a m J ., 4 1 1 C a s tr o , F id e l, 2 3 8 ,2 4 6 ,4 4 9 C a s u a ltie s : C iv il W a r, 6; W o r ld W a r 1 ,10;

C a tch -2 2 ( f i l m ) , 2 3 2 C a th o lic c h u r c h , 1 5 3 ,1 5 9 ,1 7 1 ,4 2 6 ,4 3 7 , 452 C a th o lic s , 1 3 1 ,1 5 9 C a tt, C a r r ie C h a p m a n , 9 - 1 0 C a tio n , B r u c e, 7 0 ,3 0 5 - 6 C B S -T V , 3 8 6 C e le b r e z z e , A n th o n y , 2 6 0 C e n s o r s h ip , 9 7 ,2 8 8 ,3 5 7 ,4 0 3 ,4 7 3 C e n tr a l A m e r ic a n r e fu g e e s , 4 2 9 C e n tr a l I n te llig e n c e A g e n c y (C IA ), 1 3 8 3 9 ,1 8 5 ,3 5 2 ; e s ta b lis h m e n t o f, 1 3 1 ; c o ­ v e r t o p e r a tio n s , 1 6 0 ,1 6 1 ,1 8 4 ,3 7 9 ; in K o r ea n W a r, 196; o v e r th r o w o f Iran a n d G u a te m a la g o v e r n m e n ts , 1 9 9 2 0 0 ; a n d V ie tn a m W ar, 2 5 2 ; C o ld W a r 's d e m is e a n d , 5 0 2 C -4 7 c a r g o p la n e s , 2 8 4 - 8 5

C h a llen g er s p a c e s h u t t l e e x p l o s i o n , 4 0 7 C h a m b e r o f C o m m e r c e , 7 6 ,2 0 2 C h a m b e r la in , N e v ille , 2 9 ,3 5 ,3 7 8 C h a n c e llo r , J o h n , 4 7 4 C h a p m a n , S te p h e n , 4 5 0 ,4 6 6 C h ase, C h ev y , 341 C h a s e , S tu a r t, 5 1 - 5 2 ; o n a to m ic b o m b , 1 1 ,1 1 9 ,1 2 0 ,1 3 4 ; a n d G r e a t D e p r e s ­ s io n , 1 8 ,6 8 ; o n W o r ld W a r II, 6 8 ,7 7 C h eever, John, 163 C heney, L ynne, 476 C h e n e y , R i c h a r d B ., 4 3 6 C h e r n e n k o , K o n s t a n t in U ., 4 0 9 C h e r n o b y l n u c le a r a c c id e n t, 4 0 7 C h ia n g K a i-s h e k , 1 2 9

C h icago D a ily N e w s , 4 1 C hicago T ribu n e, 4 1 , 6 2 , 3 7 6 , 4 4 1 , 4 4 8 , 4 6 0 , 4 7 0 ,4 7 8 ,4 8 8 ,4 8 9 C h ie f J o se p h D a m , 2 0 5 C h in a , 2 4 2 ,4 6 5 ; w a r w it h J a p a n , 2 8 ,4 1 , 5 8 ,8 4 ; in U n ite d N a tio n s , 8 7; c iv il w a r , 1 2 0 ,1 2 9 ; c o m m u n is t r e v o lu t io n , 1 5 4 , 1 7 4 ,1 8 2 ; in K o r e a n W a r, 1 5 4 , 1 8 0 ,1 8 1 8 2 ,1 8 5 ; Q u e m o y a n d M a ts u c o n flic t, 1 99; n u c le a r w e a p o n s , 2 4 3 ; a n d V ie t­ n a m W a r, 2 8 5 ,3 3 5 ; N ix o n a n d , 2 9 9 , 3 1 0 ,3 1 1 ,4 1 4 ; S o v ie t r iv a lr y , 3 7 7 ,3 9 9 ; C a rter a n d , 3 7 8

C h in a S y n d ro m e ( f i l m ) , 3 5 5 C h in e s e -A m e r ic a n s , 1 5 4 C h is h o lm , S h ir le y , 3 0 3 C h om sk y, N o a m , 276

INDEX

C h o u E n -la i, 3 1 8

5 4; T r u m a n a n d , 1 1 6 ,1 2 6 ,1 2 7 ,1 2 8 ,

C h ristia n C e n tu ry , 4 5 2

1 9 2 ; A m e r ic a n m ilita r iz a tio n a n d , 1 2 1 ,

C h r is tia n fu n d a m e n ta lis m , 1 5 1 ,3 7 4 ,3 9 7

1 2 4 - 2 5 ,1 2 8 ,2 4 3 ,2 4 4 ,3 3 9 ,4 3 0 - 3 2 ,

C h r y s le r C o r p o r a tio n , 3 8 8

4 4 1 - 4 2 ,4 9 8 ,5 0 2 ; B e r lin b lo c k a d e a n d ,

C h u rch , F ran k, 275

1 2 8 - 2 9 ,2 4 5 ; a n tic o m m u n is m a n d , 1 2 9 ,

C h u r c h i ll, W i n s t o n S ., 1 1 , 5 9 , 6 5 , 8 3 , 8 4 ,

1 3 1 ,1 3 2 ,1 3 3 ; a n d A s ia , 1 2 9 ,1 3 2 ,1 5 4 ,

1 2 6 ,3 9 8 - 9 9 ,4 6 9

1 8 0 ,4 1 4 ; i n f l u e n c e o f W o r l d W a r II i n ,

C h u r c h -s ta te s e p a r a tio n , 1 7 0

1 3 3 - 3 4 ,1 3 6 ,1 7 4 ,4 3 8 ; a n d e c o n o m ic

C iv il d e f e n s e , 6 6 ,2 0 7

g r o w th , 136; a n d r a c e r e la tio n s , 1 4 8 ,

C iv ilia n C o n s e r v a tio n C o r p s (C C C ), 3 , 2 1 - 2 2 ,4 8

1 5 1 ,2 0 8 ,2 0 9 ,2 5 7 ,3 0 7 ,4 3 7 ,4 7 8 - 7 9 ; a n d c e le b r a tio n o f A m e r ic a n p e r fe c ­

C iv ilia n c o n tr o l, 1 3 7 ,1 4 3 ,2 3 5 ,2 4 3 ,4 8 8

tio n , 1 4 9 ; a n d w o m e n , 1 5 0 - 5 1 ,2 5 6 - 5 8 ;

C iv il R ig h ts A c t (1 9 6 0 ), 2 1 2

c u ltu r a l in flu e n c e o f, 1 5 7 ,1 6 0 ,1 6 2 ,1 6 4 ,

C iv il R ig h ts A c t (1 9 6 4 ), 2 5 5 ,2 5 6

2 2 9 - 3 0 ,4 4 0 ; a n d R e d S c a r e , 1 7 1 - 7 2 ,

C iv il R ig h ts C o m m is s io n , 1 4 5 ,1 4 6

1 7 4 ; a n d K o r e a n W a r, 1 7 7 ,1 7 8 ,1 8 1 ,

C iv il r ig h ts m o v e m e n t, 1 5 6 ,2 0 7 - 1 2 ,2 5 4 -

184; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 9 1 - 9 2 ,1 9 5 ,2 4 4 ;

5 5 ,2 6 2 ; in te g r a tio n o f a r m e d fo r c e s

T h ir d W o r ld in , 1 9 6 ,2 1 5 ,2 4 1 ,3 3 8 - 3 9 ,

a n d , 1 4 7 - 4 8 ,4 9 0 ; a n tic o m m u n is m

3 4 6 - 4 7 ,3 7 7 ,4 1 4 ; a n d s p a c e r a c e , 2 2 6 -

a n d , 1 4 8 ,1 7 5 ,2 0 8 ; E is e n h o w e r a n d ,

2 7 ; G o ld w a te r a n d , 2 2 9 ,3 0 1 ; K e n n e d y

2 0 6 ,2 0 9 -1 2 ; J o h n s o n a n d , 2 5 7

a n d , 2 4 3 ,2 4 4 ,2 4 9 ; C u b a n m is s ile c r is is

C iv il W a r, 2 , 3 ,4 , 6 ,9 , 2 5 ,2 0 8

a n d , 2 5 0 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 2 5 1 ,2 5 4 ,

C la n c y , T o m , 3 9 8

2 6 9 ; N ix o n a n d , 2 6 9 ,3 0 7 ,3 1 1 ,3 2 0 ;

C la r k , W illia m ( e x p lo r e r ) , 2

J o h n s o n a n d , 2 6 9 ,4 9 9 ; C a r te r a n d , 3 4 5 ,

C la r k , W illia m ( n a t io n a l s e c u r it y a d v i­

3 4 6 ,3 4 7 ,3 4 8 ,3 7 6 - 7 7 ; fo u g h t o v e r s p o r ts, 37 5 ; " n e w " 1 9 8 0 s v e r s io n o f,

so r ), 3 9 4 C la s s d iv is io n s , 4 ,2 9 5 ,3 6 6 ,4 2 8

3 7 7 - 7 9 ,3 8 1 ,3 8 4 ,3 9 0 ; R e a g a n a n d , 3 9 3 ,

C la u s e w itz , C a r l v o n , 4 4 4

3 9 5 ,4 0 8 - 1 0 ,4 1 2 ,4 1 4 ; c u ltu r a l b a ttle ­

C la y , L u c iu s D ., 2 0 7

g r o u n d o f, 4 0 8 - 1 0 ,4 1 4 ; G o r b a c h e v

C le v e la n d , G r o v e r , 5

a n d , 4 1 2 ,4 1 3 ,4 1 4 ,4 1 5 ,4 3 8 - 3 9 ; d e m is e

C levela n d P ress, 1 6 1

o f, 4 1 2 - 1 4 ,4 2 4 ,4 3 0 ,4 3 5 - 3 9 ,5 0 1 ,5 0 2 ;

C lib u m , V a n , 2 2 6

B u s h a n d , 4 3 2 ,4 3 5 ,4 3 7 ,4 3 8 ,4 6 2 - 6 3 ;

C lif f o r d , C la r k M ., 1 2 3 - 2 4 ,1 3 1 , 2 3 3 ,2 9 1 ,

a n d P e r s ia n G u lf W a r, 4 6 2 - 6 3 ,4 6 6 ; r e ­ f o c u s e d o n d o m e s t ic lib e r a l e n e m ie s ,

376 C lin t o n , B ill, 4 9 4 - 9 5 ,4 9 7 ; p r e s id e n t ia l c a m p a ig n o f

1 9 9 2 ,4 3 3 , 4 8 0 , 4 8 1 , 4 8 2 ;

4 8 0 - 8 1 ,4 9 6 - 9 7 ; s y m b o lis m o f, 5 0 0 C o lo r a d o , a n ti-g a y r e fe r e n d u m , 4 8 2

r ig h t -w in g a tta c k s o n , 4 8 1 ,4 8 8 ,4 9 6 ;

C o l s o n , C h a r le s W ., 3 3 2

a n d m ilita r iz a tio n , 4 8 2 - 8 3 ,4 8 6 ,4 9 2 -

C o lu m b u s , C h r is to p h e r , 4 6 1

9 4 ,4 9 8 ,5 0 2 ; a n d g a y s in a r m e d fo r c e s ,

C o m in g H o m e ( f i l m ) , 3 6 0 - 6 1

4 8 3 ,4 8 7 ,4 8 8 ,4 8 9 ,4 9 1 ,4 9 4 ; a n d C o n ­

C o m m a g e r , H e n r y S te e le , 1 7 6

g r e s s , 4 8 3 - 8 6 ,4 9 5 ; a n d h e a lth -c a r e re­

C o m m itte e fo r th e F r e e W o r ld , 4 3 4 - 3 5

fo r m , 4 8 4 - 8 5 ,5 0 4 ; a n d Y u g o s la v c iv il

C o m m itte e o n th e P r e s e n t D a n g e r

w a r , 4 85; a n d d e fe n s e s p e n d in g , 4 8 6 , 4 9 6 ,5 0 4 ; a n d H a iti c r is is , 4 9 3 C lin to n , H illa r y R o d h a m , 4 8 5 ,4 8 8

(C P D ), 3 5 2 - 5 5 C o m m o n e r , B a rry , 2 2 1 ,2 7 6 C o m m u n is m : C u b a n , 2 4 1 - 4 2 ; E a s te r n

C lo sin g o f th e A m eric a n M in d ( B l o o m ) , 4 2 3

E u r o p e a n , c o lla p s e o f, 4 3 6 - 3 7 .

C o ffin , W illia m S lo a n e , 2 9 2

A n tic o m m u n is m

See also

C o h en , W arren, 10

C o m m u n is t P a r ty U S A , 1 6 2 - 6 3 ,1 7 3

C o h n , R o y , 1 5 3 ,4 5 6

C o m m u n ity A c tio n P r o g r a m , 2 6 0

C o ld W a r, x iii, 1 2 7 ; m y t h o lo g y o f , 6 ,2 0 1 ; p r e f i g u r e d i n W o r l d W a r II, 4 4 , 5 4 - 5 5 , 5 7 ,8 8 ; A m e r ic a n a n d S o v ie t r e s p o n ­ s ib ility fo r, 8 8 ,1 2 4 - 2 5 ,1 2 7 - 2 8 ,3 7 7 - 7 9 , 4 9 8 ; e th n ic A m e r ic a n s a n d , 1 0 3 ,1 5 3 -

C o n a n t , J a m e s B ., 4 4 , 1 3 9 , 1 7 6 , 2 1 3 C o n fe d e r a te A ir F o r c e (C A F ), 3 5 0 - 5 1 , 359

C on fession s o f an A r ts W arrior (F r o h n m a y e r ), 4 5 4

573

574

N D EX

C on fessions o f a N a z i S p y ( f i l m ) , 5 3 , 5 4

1 6 5 - 6 6 ,1 6 8 - 6 9 ; p a tr io tis m a n d , 1 6 7 -

C o n g r e s s fo r C u ltu r a l F r e e d o m , 1 6 0

6 8 ,2 3 1 ,2 9 7 - 9 9 ,3 5 1 ,3 5 3 - 5 4 ,3 5 8 - 5 9 ;

C o n g r e s s o f I n d u s tr ia l O r g a n iz a t io n s ,

a n d p o litic s , 1 7 1 ; K o r e a n W a r a n d , 1 8 5 - 8 7 ,2 9 9 - 3 0 0 ; e d u c a t io n a la r m s ,

148 C o n k in , P a u l, 2 6 9

2 2 7 - 2 8 ,4 2 3 - 2 5 ; c o u n te r c u ltu r e , 2 7 3 ,

C o n n , B illy , 5 4

2 9 4 ; V ie tn a m W a r a n d , 3 5 1 ,3 6 0 ,4 2 3 ;

C o n n e cticu t Yankee in K in g A r th u r 's C o u rt (T w a in ), 2 - 3 , 3 0 5

C on scien ce o f a C o n se rv a tiv e ( G o l d w a t e r ) ,

" c u lt u r e o f w a r ' s h o r r o r s ," 3 5 4 - 5 9 , 3 7 0 ; " m e " g e n e r a tio n , 3 6 3 - 6 5 ; m o r a l a la r m s , 3 7 1 - 7 4 ,4 2 7 - 2 8 ,4 3 4 ; a s fin a l C o ld W a r b a ttle g r o u n d , 4 0 8 - 1 0 ,4 1 4 ;

229 C o n s c r ip tio n : W o r ld W a r H , 3 3 , 4 5 , 4 8 -

a b s e n c e o f u n it y in , 4 2 4 - 3 0 ,4 3 5 - 3 6 ;

4 9 ,1 0 2 ; W o r ld W a r II d e m o b i l i z a t i o n ,

" c u ltu r e w a r s ," 4 5 3 - 5 4 ,4 7 6 , 4 8 0 - 8 1 ,

1 2 1 ,1 3 0 ,1 3 1 ; V ie tn a m W a r, 2 6 4 - 6 5 ,

4 8 6 - 8 7 ,4 9 6 - 9 7

2 7 5 ,2 7 9 ,2 9 5 ; d r a ft r e s is te r s , 3 4 4 ; e n d

C u ltu re o f N a rc issism ( L a s c h ) , 3 6 4

o f, 3 6 4 ; C a rter a n d , 3 7 2 - 7 3 ,3 8 3 ,4 0 0

C u r ti, M e r le , 1 6 2

C o n s u m e r c u ltu r e , 1 6 5 ,1 6 8 - 6 9

C u s te r , G e o r g e A ., 4 2 3

C o n ta in m e n t, 1 21; K e n n a n th e o r y , 1 2 6 ,

C z e c h o s lo v a k ia , 2 9 ,1 2 7 ,1 2 8

13 2 ; T r u m a n a d m in is tr a tio n p o lic y , 1 2 7 ,1 3 1 ,1 8 0 - 8 1 ,1 8 5 ,1 8 8 " C o n tr a c t w i t h A m e r ic a ," 4 9 5 C o o k , F r e d J ., 2 5 9 C o o p e r , G a r y , 1 5 8 ,1 7 0 C o r p o r a tio n s .

See B u s i n e s s e s

C o u g h l i n , R e v . C h a r l e s E ., 5 1 C o u n te r c u ltu r e , 2 7 3 ,2 9 4 " C o u n te r fo r c e " str a te g y , 2 2 2 ,2 4 9 C o u s in s , N o r m a n , 1 3 4 C o x , A r c h ib a ld , 3 2 8 ,3 3 1 ,3 3 3 C o x e y 's A r m y , 3 C r im e , w a r a g a in s t , 2 6 3 ,3 0 9 ,4 4 5 ,4 9 5 9 6 ,5 0 4

C r isis in C o m m a n d ( G a b r i e l a n d S a v a g e ) , 385 C r o n k ite , W a lte r , 2 9 0 C r o w e , W i l l i a m J ., 4 4 4 , 4 6 7 , 4 6 8

C ru cib le ( M i l l e r ) , 1 6 3 C ru sa d e in E urope ( E i s e n h o w e r ) , 1 8 7 C -1 7 tr a n s p o r t p la n e s , 4 8 6 C u b a , 2 4 5 ,3 4 6 ,4 2 9 ; B a y o f P ig s in v a s io n , 2 3 8 ,2 4 6 ; c o m m u n is t r e v o lu tio n , 2 4 1 42 C u b a n m is s ile c r is is , 1 9 5 ,2 4 6 - 5 0 ,2 5 8 , 2 6 9 ,2 7 0 ,2 8 6

C u ltu ra l L itera cy ( H i r s c h ) , 4 2 3 , 4 2 4 C u ltu r e : fa s c in a tio n w it h t e c h n o lo g y , 1 0 - 1 1 ,3 4 - 3 5 ,3 8 - 3 9 ; p r e p a r a tio n fo r W o r l d W a r II, 2 3 - 2 4 , 3 9 - 4 2 , 5 2 , 5 3 ; e f ­ f e c t s o f W o r ld W a r II, 8 8 - 9 1 , 9 7 - 9 9 ; p a tr ia r c h a lis m , 1 3 2 ; m ilita r iz a tio n o f, 1 5 6 - 6 2 ,1 6 4 ,1 6 5 ,1 6 6 ,1 6 7 ,2 3 0 ,2 4 2 - 4 3 , 4 5 3 ; C o ld W a r a n d , 1 5 7 ,1 6 0 ,1 6 2 ,1 6 4 , 2 2 9 - 3 0 ,4 4 0 ; fe a r o f n u c le a r w a r , 1 5 9 6 0 ,2 3 2 ,2 4 2 ,2 4 6 ; in te lle c tu a ls a n d , 1 6 2 - 6 7 ,2 3 0 - 3 1 ,4 2 4 ; c o n s u m e r is m .

D a l e y , R i c h a r d J ., 2 9 3 D a le y , R ic h a r d M ., 4 6 0 ,4 7 3 D a lle k , R o b e r t, 1 1 7 ,4 7 2 D a ly , M a r y , 3 0 3 D a n ie ls , J o n a th a n , 1 0 7 D a s c h le , T o m , 4 7 3 D a v is , E lm e r , 8 9

D a y A fte r ( T V f i l m ) , 3 5 6 D -D a y , fiftie th a n n iv e r s a r y , 5 0 2 D e a n , J o h n W ., IH , 3 1 6 D e b t, fe d e r a l, 3 8 8 ,4 1 0 ,4 1 5 - 1 7 " D e c a p ita tio n " s tr a te g y , 3 8 1 D e c o lo n iz a tio n , 8 7 ,1 2 9 ,3 8 7 " D e c o u p lin g ," 2 2 0 ,3 8 7 D e c te r , M id g e , 3 7 1 ,3 7 2

D e e rh u n te r ( f i l m ) , 3 6 1 , 3 6 2 D e fe n s e c o n tr a c to r s.

See I n d u s t r i e s

D e f e n s e I n te llig e n c e A g e n c y , 4 7 4 D e fe n s e s p e n d in g , 4 4 1 ; p e r c e n ta g e o f G N P , 5 - 6 ,4 7 ,1 3 0 ,1 4 1 ,1 8 3 ,1 9 6 ,2 4 1 , 3 1 1 ,4 0 1 ; N e w D e a l a n d , 2 0 ,3 1 ; R o o s e ­ v e lt a n d , 31; a n d e c o n o m ic g r o w th , 3 1 , 4 7 ,7 6 ,7 7 ,7 9 ,1 4 0 - 4 1 ,2 4 4 ; W o r ld W a r II a n d , 4 7 , 7 1 , 7 3 , 7 9 ; r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u ­ tio n o f, 7 1 ,2 7 8 ,4 0 0 - 4 0 1 ,4 8 0 ; T r u m a n a n d , 1 3 0 ,1 3 6 ,1 4 4 ; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 4 4 ,1 9 3 - 9 4 ,1 9 6 - 9 7 ,2 0 5 ,2 1 9 ,2 4 4 ; K o ­ rea n W ar a n d , 183; re se a rch a n d d e v e l­ o p m e n t, 2 1 9 - 2 0 ; C o ld W a r fe a r s a n d , 2 3 0 ; K e n n e d y a n d , 2 4 1 ; V ie tn a m W a r a n d , 2 7 8 ,3 1 1 - 1 2 ,3 2 4 ; N ix o n a n d , 3 1 1 1 2 ,3 2 4 ,4 0 0 ; C o n g r e s s a n d , 3 2 2 - 2 3 ,4 0 1 , 4 1 6 ,4 4 3 ; C a r te r a n d , 3 4 8 ,3 7 6 ; R e p u b li­ c a n P a r ty a n d , 3 4 8 ,4 9 6 ; R e a g a n a n d , 3 9 1 ,3 9 7 ,4 0 0 - 4 0 1 ,4 0 2 ,4 0 7 ,4 1 6 ,4 1 7 ,

N D EX

4 4 0 ; B u s h a n d , 4 4 3 ; P e r s ia n G u lf W a r

D o w e r , J o h n , 4 4 7 ,4 4 9

a n d , 4 8 0 ; C lin to n a n d , 4 8 6 ,4 9 6 ,5 0 4

D r e w , E liz a b e th , 4 3 2 - 3 3 ,4 6 5 ,4 6 6

575

D e G a u lle , C h a r le s , 2 7 7

D r u c k e r , P eter , 2 2 9

" D e lic a te B a la n c e o f T erro r" (W o h ls te t-

D r u g s , w a r o n , 4 3 1 ,4 4 2 - 4 3 ,4 4 5 ,4 4 9 - 5 1 ,

te r ), 2 2 3

4 5 7 ,4 5 8 ,4 7 3

D e m o c r a c y , 1 4 6 ,1 6 7 D e m o c r a tic P a r ty : a n d W o r ld W a r II, 1 9 ,

D u k a k i s , M i c h a e l S ., 4 3 2 - 3 7 D u lle s , A lle n , 2 0 0

3 1 ,1 1 7 ; r e d -b a itin g a tta c k s o n , 1 1 7 ,

D u lle s , E le a n o r , 1 5 0

1 4 8 ,1 7 5 ,4 8 1 ; c o n t r ib u t io n s to m ilita r ­

D u lle s , J o h n F o ste r , 1 3 2 ,1 5 9 ,1 9 1 ,1 9 3 ,

iz a tio n , 1 5 6 ,2 4 1 ,2 4 3 - 4 4 ,3 8 0 - 8 1 ,4 0 1 ,

2 2 5 ,2 4 3 - 4 4 ; a n d n u c le a r w a r th r e a ts ,

4 1 6 ; r e d -b a itin g e m p lo y e d b y , 1 7 4 - 7 5 ,

1 9 5 ,1 9 7 ,1 9 9 ,2 1 8 ,3 7 9 ; a n d K o r e a n

1 8 9 ; a n d E is e n h o w e r a d m in is tr a tio n ,

W a r, 197; in Q u e m o y a n d M a ts u c o n ­

2 0 2 ; W a te r g a te h e a d q u a r te r s b r e a k -in ,

flic t, 1 9 9

3 1 7 ; a n d N ix o n a d m in is tr a tio n , 3 2 3 ,

D u n k ir k e v a c u a tio n , 2 9 0

3 3 0 ; c o n s e r v a t is m in , 3 2 3 ,3 9 7 ,4 0 1

D w o r k in , A n d r e a , 4 5 1

D e te n te , 4 1 3 ; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 2 2 6 ;

D y so n , F reem an, 357

N ix o n a n d , 2 6 9 ,3 1 0 ,3 1 1 ,3 3 4 ; F o r d a n d , 3 3 5 ,3 4 1 ; C a r te r a n d , 3 4 3 - 4 4 ,3 4 8 , 375

E a s te r n E u r o p e , 1 2 5 ,1 7 4 ,3 4 1

D e te r r e n c e , 1 3 5 ,2 0 3 ,2 2 2 - 2 5 ,3 2 1 ,3 3 9 , 3 4 3 ,3 7 9

E bon y, 2 5 6 E c o n o m ic b ill o f r ig h ts , 7 9

D e tr o it r a c e r io ts , 1 0 2 D ew ey , John, 8

E c o n o m ic O p p o r tu n ity A c t (1 9 6 4 ), 2 5 9 6 0 ,2 6 5

D e w e y , T h o m a s E ., 7 8 , 1 1 7 , 1 4 6 , 1 7 5 D e W itt, J o h n , 6 4 ,6 5 D ie m , N g o D in h .

E a r le , E d w a r d M e a d , 3 6

See N g o D i n h D i e m

D ie n B ie n P h u , B a ttle o f , 1 9 8 ,2 3 3 D illin g , E liz a b e th , 5 1 D in k in s , D a v id N ., 4 6 0 D ip lo m a c y , 2 0 2 ,3 1 7 D is a b le d , 1 0 4 D is a r m a m e n t: E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 9 5 ,2 0 5 , 2 1 9 ,2 2 0 ,2 2 1 ,2 3 4 ; C a r te r a n d , 3 4 9 ; R eagan an d , 408 D is e a s e , w a r a g a in s t, 2 6 3 D is n e y , W a lt, 6 7 D is p la c e d p e r s o n s , 1 1 4

D is tu r b in g th e U n iv e rse ( D y s o n ) , 3 5 7 D o c h e r ty , R ev . G e o r g e , 1 7 0

D o c to r S tra n g e lo v e ( f i l m ) , 2 3 2 , 2 4 2 D o la n , T erry , 4 5 6 D o m e s tic id e o lo g y , 1 5 0 -5 1 D o m in o th e o r y , 1 9 8 D on d ero, G eorge, 157 D o n n e lly , I g n a tiu s , 3 - 4 D o o little , J a m e s, 1 4 5 ,1 9 9 - 2 0 0 D o o lit t le b o m b in g r a id , 6 7 ,2 9 0

D o u b le I n d e m n ity ( f i l m ) , 1 0 7 D o u g la s , D o n a ld , 142 D o u g la s , H e le n G a h a g a n , 1 5 0 ,1 7 5 D o u g la s , P a u l, 1 8 5 ,2 0 8 D o u g l a s , W ill ia m O ., 1 2 6 D o u g la s A v ia tio n , 7 1 ,2 1 9

E c o n o m y : N e w D e a l a n d , 3 1 ,4 6 ,4 7 ; d e ­ fe n s e s p e n d in g a n d , 3 1 ,4 7 ,7 6 ,7 7 ,7 9 , 1 4 0 - 4 1 ,2 4 4 ; m o b iliz a t io n fo r W o r ld W a r n , 3 1 - 3 2 ,4 3 ,4 5 - 4 7 ,6 9 - 7 4 ; m ili­ ta r y K e y n e s ia n is m , 4 7 ,7 6 ,1 3 6 ,1 4 1 , 2 4 4 , 3 8 9 , 4 0 0 ; e f f e c t s o f W o r l d W a r II o n , 7 6 - 7 7 ,7 9 - 8 0 ,1 3 6 ; C o ld W a r a n d , 1 3 6 ,4 3 9 ; m ilit a r iz a t io n o f , 1 4 1 - 4 3 ,1 5 6 , 2 7 8 ,3 8 8 - 8 9 ,4 1 5 - 1 8 ,4 2 0 ,5 0 3 ; K o rea n W a r a n d , 1 8 6 ; V ie tn a m W a r a n d , 2 6 1 , 2 6 5 ,2 7 7 -7 8 ,3 2 6 ; N ix o n p o lic ie s a n d , 3 0 9 ; e c o n o m ic d iffic u ltie s , 3 2 6 ,3 2 9 , 3 8 4 ,3 8 7 ,3 8 8 ,4 1 5 - 1 6 ,4 1 8 - 2 1 ,4 3 9 ,4 8 0 , 5 0 3 ; " s t a g f l a t i o n ," 3 2 9 ; R e a g a n p o l i ­ c ie s a n d , 3 9 2 ,4 0 0 ,4 1 5 ,4 1 6 .

See also

G N P E d is o n , T h o m a s A ., 6 E d u c a t io n , 2 1 3 , 4 2 3 - 2 4 , 4 4 6 ; G I B ill a n d , 1 1 0 -1 1 ; s c h o o l d e s e g r e g a tio n , 2 0 9 - 1 2 , 2 1 6 ; S p u tn ik p a n ic a n d , 2 2 7 - 2 8 ; m ili­ ta r y r e c r u itin g a n d , 3 6 6 E g y p t, 2 0 0 ,3 2 8 ,3 4 6 ,4 6 5 E h r e n r e ic h , B a r b a r a , 3 0 4 ,3 7 3 ,3 7 4 ,4 2 6 , 467 E h r lic h m a n , J o h n D ., 3 3 0 E in s te in , A lb e r t, 1 3 9 E is e n h o w e r , D a v id , 3 0 3 - 4 E is e n h o w e r , D w ig h t D ., 1 1 8 , 1 4 2 ,2 2 9 3 0 ,2 3 1 ; in W o r ld W a r II, 7 5 , 8 3 , 8 4 , 9 1 , 9 5 - 9 6 ,1 1 3 ; a n d d e f e n s e s p e n d in g , 1 4 4 ,

S76

INDEX

E i s e n h o w e r ( c o n tin u e d )

w o m e n 's , 1 0 2 ,1 5 0 ,2 5 6 ; fe d e r a l g o v ­

1 9 3 - 9 4 ,1 9 6 - 9 7 ,2 0 5 ,2 1 9 ,2 4 4 ; p r e s i­ d e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1 9 5 2 ,1 4 7 , 1 8 7 - 8 9 ;

e r n m e n t, 138; d e f e n s e in d u s tr ie s , 1 5 5 56

a n d r a c ia l d is c r im in a t io n , 1 4 7 ,2 0 6 ,

E n e r g y c r is is , 3 2 8 ,3 2 9 ,3 4 3 ,3 4 9 - 5 0

2 0 9 -1 2 ; a n d w o m e n in a r m e d fo r c e s,

E rn ia G a y ( b o m b e r ) , 3 5 0 , 4 9 6

1 5 0 ; a s A r m y c h ie f o f s ta ff, 1 5 0 ,1 8 8 ; o n

E n v ir o n m e n ta l P r o te c tio n A g e n c y , 3 0 9

r e lig io n , 1 7 0 ; a n d C I A c o v e r t a c tiv itie s ,

E p s te in , J o s e p h , 4 2 1

1 8 4 ,1 9 9 - 2 0 0 ,4 2 0 ; a n d U .S .- S o v ie t c o ­

E p s te in , L e s lie , 9 1

o p e r a tio n , 1 8 9 ,1 9 0 ,1 9 9 ,2 0 2 ; a n d

E q u a l P a y A c t (1 9 6 3 ), 2 5 6

W o r l d W a r II im a g e r y , 1 8 9 , 1 9 7 - 9 8 ;

E q u a l R ig h ts A m e n d m e n t, 1 0 8 ,3 6 7 - 6 8 ,

a n d R e p u b lic a n P a r ty , 1 9 0 ,1 9 4 ,1 9 7 ,

3 69; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 2 10; c o n g r e s­

2 0 0 ,2 0 5 ; a n d m ilita r iz a tio n , 1 9 0 - 9 3 ,

s io n a l p a s s a g e o f, 3 2 6 ,3 7 2 ; N ix o n a n d ,

2 0 0 - 2 0 3 ,2 0 6 ,2 1 7 ,2 3 4 - 3 6 ,3 0 8 ,3 4 3 ;

3 2 7 ; C a rter a n d , 3 4 3 ; o p p o n e n ts o f,

p r e s id e n tia l s t y le , 1 9 1 ,2 4 5 ,3 9 5 ,3 9 7 ;

3 7 2 ,3 7 3 ,4 2 6

a n d C o ld W a r c o n flic t, 1 9 1 - 9 2 ,1 9 5 ,

E r v i n , S a m J ., 3 2 8 , 3 3 0 , 3 3 1 , 3 7 3

2 4 4 ; n a tio n a l s e c u r ity p o lic y , 1 9 2 - 9 4 ,

E scape fr o m F reedom ( F r o m m ) , 1 6 1

2 0 6 - 7 ,2 1 8 ,3 8 4 ,3 8 8 ; w a r n in g s a g a in s t

E s k im o s , 2 2 1

" g a r r is o n s t a t e ," 1 9 4 , 1 9 5 ,2 2 8 , 2 3 6 ;

E s p io n a g e , 8 7 ,1 2 6 ,1 7 3

a n d n u c le a r w a r , 1 9 4 - 9 5 ,1 9 7 ,2 1 8 ; a n d

E th n ic ity , 1 0 2 - 3 ,1 5 3 - 5 4 ,4 2 8 - 2 9

d is a r m a m e n t, 1 9 5 ,2 0 5 ,2 1 9 ,2 2 0 ,2 2 1 ,

E u r o p e , 1 8 7 ; m ilit a r iz a t io n in , 6 ,7 ,7 6 ;

2 3 4 ; n u c le a r w e a p o n s p o lic y , 1 9 5 - 9 7 ,

U .S . f o r c e s in , 8 8 , 1 3 5 ,3 2 2 - 2 3 ,4 8 6 ;

1 9 9 ,2 0 3 - 4 ,2 1 7 - 1 9 ,2 2 0 ,2 2 1 ; a n d K o ­

a n tin u c le a r m o v e m e n t in , 3 5 5 - 5 6 ,4 0 5 ;

r e a n W a r, 1 9 7 ,3 1 0 ,3 1 2 ; a n d F r e n c h I n d o c h in a w a r , 1 9 8 -9 9 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

im m ig r a tio n fr o m , 4 2 9 E v a n s, S ara, 304

1 9 5 6 ,2 0 0 , 2 0 4 ; a n d R e d

S ca re, 2 0 1 ; a n d C o n g r e s s , 2 0 2 ,2 2 5 -2 6 ; a n d n a tio n a l h ig h w a y s y s t e m , 2 0 6 - 7 ;

F a d e r m a n , L illia n , 4 5 1

Fail-Safe ( f i l m ) , 2 4 2 , 2 4 6

a n d r e s o u r c e c o n s e r v a tio n , 2 1 2 -1 3 ; F a ir E m p l o y m e n t P r a c t ic e s C o m m it t e e a n d e d u c a tio n , 2 1 3 ,2 2 7 ,2 2 8 ; a n d S p u t­ (F E P C ), 1 0 1 ,1 4 7 n ik p a n ic , 2 1 5 ,2 1 6 ,2 1 7 ,2 1 8 ,2 2 0 ; a n d

F a llo w s , J a m e s, 3 8 5 - 8 6 ,4 4 7 - 4 8

s p a c e p r o g r a m , 2 1 7 ,2 1 9 ,2 2 7 ,2 3 9 ; a n d F a lu d i, S u s a n , 4 5 1 B e r lin c r is is , 2 2 5 - 2 6 ; a n d N ix o n , 2 3 2 , F a lw e ll, R ev . J erry , 3 5 3 ,3 5 9 ,3 6 4 - 6 5 ,3 7 1 , 3 0 9 ,3 1 8 ; K e n n e d y a d m in is tr a tio n a n d ,

374

2 3 3 ,2 3 5 ,2 4 1 ,2 4 9 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, F a m ilie s , 1 7 0 ,4 2 7 2 3 3 ,2 3 6 ; p r e s id e n tia l fa r e w e ll a d d r e s s , F a m ily a n d M e d ic a l L e a v e A c t (1 9 9 3 ), 2 3 3 - 3 6 ,2 7 7 ; a n d m ilita r y -in d u s tr ia l 485 c o m p le x , 2 3 4 - 3 6 ,2 4 9 ,2 9 6

" F a m ily v a lu e s ," 4 8 1 ,4 8 2

E is e n h o w e r , J u lie N ix o n , 3 0 3 - 4 E le c tio n s : c o n g r e s s io n a l, o f p r e s id e n tia l, o f tia l, o f

1 9 4 2 ,7 8 ;

1 9 4 4 ,8 0 , 1 1 7 ; p r e s i d e n ­

1 9 4 8 ,1 4 5 - 4 6 ; p r e s i d e n t i a l , o f

1 9 5 2 ,1 7 5 , 1 8 8 - 8 9 ; p r e s i d e n t i a l , o f 1 9 5 6 ,2 0 0 ; p r e s i d e n t i a l , o f 1 9 6 0 ,2 3 2 ; p r e s id e n tia l, o f

1 9 6 8 ,2 9 1 , 3 0 7 , 3 1 0 ,

3 1 5 - 1 6 ; p r e s id e n tia l, o f 2 0; p r e s id e n tia l, o f id e n tia l, o f of

1 9 7 2 ,3 1 5 , 3 1 7 -

1 9 7 6 ,3 4 1 , 3 4 2 ; p r e s ­

1 9 8 4 ,4 2 1 - 2 2 ; p r e s i d e n t i a l ,

1 9 8 8 , 4 3 2 - 3 5 ; p r e s i d e n t i a l , o f 19 9 2 ,

4 7 9 , 4 8 0 - 8 2 ; c o n g r e s s i o n a l , o f 19 9 4 ,

F a s c is m , 3 8 ,1 0 1 ,1 6 4 ; in U n ite d S ta te s , 1 6 , 5 2 ; W o r l d W a r II a n d , 3 3 , 9 1 ; B r o w n S care, 5 1 -5 2

F atal A ttr a c tio n ( f i l m ) , 4 5 3 F ate o f th e E arth ( S c h e l l ) , 3 5 4 F a u b u s , O r v a i E ., 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 F e d e r a l B u r e a u o f I n v e s t ig a t io n (F B I), 9 8 , 138; h a r a s s m e n t o f r ig h t-w in g s u b v e r ­ s iv e s , 5 2 ,5 3 ; a n tic o m m u n is t h a r a s s ­ m e n t , 1 4 8 ,1 7 6 ; a n d c iv il r ig h ts m o v e m e n t , 2 0 8 ; a n d N ix o n d ir ty tr ic k s , 3 1 6 ,3 1 7 ,3 3 2

496 F e d e r a l E m e r g e n c y R e lie f A d m in is tr a ­ E lls b e r g , D a n ie l, 3 1 7 tio n , 4 0 1 E l S a lv a d o r , 3 7 6 F e d e r a tio n o f A m e r ic a n S c ie n tis ts , 1 1 5 E l y , R i c h a r d T ., 1 8 E m p lo y m e n t: a r m e d fo r c e s , 6 ,9 5 ,1 3 8 ;

F em in in e M y s tiq u e ( F r i e d a n ) , 1 8 6 , 2 5 8

INDEX

F e m in is m , 1 6 6 ,3 2 6 ; a n tiw a r a c tiv is m , 3 8 , 1 3 2 ,3 7 0 ; W o r l d W a r II a n d , 1 0 8 ; C o l d W a r c o n flic t a n d , 2 5 6 - 5 7 ; m ilita r iz a ­

S77

F u k u y a m a , F r a n c is, 4 3 9 F u l b r i g h t , J. W i l l i a m , 1 1 7 , 2 5 1 , 2 7 5 , 2 7 7 , 2 8 6 ,3 0 2

t io n a n d , 3 0 0 ,3 0 4 - 5 ,3 6 9 ; m o r a lis tic

F u lto n , R o b e r t, 2

o p p o s itio n to , 3 7 2 - 7 4 ,4 2 6 - 2 7 ,4 5 1 - 5 3 ;

F u s s e ll, P a u l, 9 2 ,9 3 ,9 5 ,4 4 4

a n tic o m m u n is t a tta c k s o n , 4 5 4 F e r r a r o , G e r a ld in e A ., 4 2 1 ,4 5 2

G a b r ie l, R ic h a r d , 3 8 5

F ie d le r , L e s lie , 2 9 6

G abriel O v e r th e W h ite H o u se ( f i l m ) , 1 6

F ilip in o -A m e r ic a n s , 1 0 3

G a g a r in , Y u r i V , 2 3 8

F ilm in d u s t r y : a n d W o r ld W a r II, 5 3 - 5 4 ,

G a ith e r c o m m it te e , 2 1 5 ,2 1 8

8 9 ,1 0 2 - 3 ,3 5 7 ; a n tic o m m u n is t h a r a s s ­

G a lb r a ith , J o h n K e n n e t h , 1 6 5 ,2 5 1

m e n t in , 5 4 - 5 5 ,1 7 0 ,3 9 3 ; a n d C o ld W a r

G a n d h i , M o h a n d a s K ., 2 0 9

c o n flic t, 1 5 8 ,2 3 1 - 3 2 ; a n d n u c le a r w a r ,

" G a r r is o n s t a t e ," x i, 5 3 , 1 6 2 , 1 8 4 , 1 9 4 ,

2 3 1 ,2 4 2 ,2 4 6 ,3 5 8 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 3 6 0 -6 2

1 9 5 ,2 1 9 ,2 2 8 ,2 3 6 G a v in , J a m e s, 2 7 5

F in al B lackou t ( H u b b a r d ) , 4 2

G a y M e n 's H e a lt h C r is is , 4 5 9

F in la n d , 3 5 2

G a y r ig h ts m o v e m e n t, 3 2 6 ,3 6 9 - 7 0 ; m ili­

F irst B lood ( f i l m ) , 3 6 1

ta r y v e te r a n s a n d , 1 0 9 ; V ie tn a m W a r

F itz g e r a ld , A . E r n e s t, 3 2 2

a n d , 2 7 6 ,3 0 0 ,3 0 4 ,3 6 9 ; a n d A ID S , 4 2 5 ,

F itz G e r a ld , F r a n c e s , 3 9 4

4 2 6 ,4 2 8

" F le x ib le r e s p o n s e " d o c t r in e , 2 1 5

G e n d e r p o litic s : w o m e n 's m ilita r y se r ­

F lo o d , D a n ie l, 2 1 4

v ic e , 1 4 9 - 5 1 ,3 0 1 ,4 7 7 - 7 8 ,4 8 8 ,4 8 9 ;

F o n d a , Jan e, 301

V ie tn a m W a r a n d , 2 7 6 ,3 0 0 -3 0 4 ; b a c k ­

F o r d , B e tty , 4 5 1

la s h a g a in s t fe m in is m , 4 2 6 - 2 7 ,4 5 1 ;

F o rd , D a n ie l, 3 8 6

w a r m e t a p h o r s in , 4 5 1 - 5 3 ; a b o r tio n

F o r d , G e r a l d R .: p a r d o n o f N i x o n , 3 2 5 , 3 4 2 ; a s v ic e p r e s id e n t, 3 3 0 ; a n d a r m s c o n tr o l a n d d e te n te , 3 3 3 ,3 3 4 ,3 3 5 , 3 4 1 ,3 4 5 ,3 4 8 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 3 3 5 36; a n d

M ayaguez in c id e n t , 3 3 7 ,3 3 8 ,

3 3 9 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1976,

3 4 1 -4 2 F ord, H en ry , 46

c o n flic t, 4 5 1 - 5 3 G e n e r a l A g r e e m e n t o n T a r iffs a n d T r a d e (G A T T ), 4 9 5 G e n e r a l M o to r s C o r p o r a tio n , 1 4 0 G e n e v a A c c o r d s (1 9 5 4 ), 2 0 2 G e n e v a C o n fe r e n c e (1 9 5 5 ), 2 0 2 G e n o c id e , 9 7 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 4 ,3 5 7 ,3 5 8 ,4 5 2 G en ovese, E u gen e, 486

F ord , John, 158

G e r m a n -A m e r ic a n s , 5 2 - 5 3 ,6 7 ,1 5 3

F ord M o to r C o m p a n y , 70

G e r m a n y , N a z i, 112; a n n e x a tio n o f A u s ­

F oreign A ffa irs, 3 2 2

tr ia , 2 8 ; a n n e x a t io n o f S u d e t e n la n d , 2 9 ;

F o r r e s ta l, J a m e s V , 8 5 ,1 3 7 ; a n d p o s t w a r

i n v a s i o n o f P o la n d , 3 2 ,4 1 ; U .S . r e a r m a ­

s e c u r ity , 7 7 ,8 8 ,1 1 8 ,1 2 6 - 2 7 ,1 3 1 ,1 3 2 ,

m e n t a n d , 3 7 ,4 1 ,4 2 ,5 9 ,6 6 ,8 2 ; in ­

140; s u ic id e o f, 1 3 0

v a s io n o f S o v ie t U n io n , 4 1 ,5 8 ,6 0 ,8 4 ;

F ortun e, 3 7 , 8 6

A m e r ic a n p o p u la r a ttitu d e s to w a r d ,

F r a n c e , 5 0 3 ; a n d a p p e a s e m e n t o f H itle r ,

5 3 ,9 1 ,9 2 ; s u b m a r in e w a r fa r e , 5 8 ,6 1 ;

2 9 ,3 0 ; N a z i c o n q u e s t o f, 5 5 ; A llie d in ­

d e c la r a tio n o f w a r o n U n ite d S ta te s ,

v a s io n o f, 8 3 ,8 4 ,9 0 ; I n d o c h in e s e w a r ,

6 2; w a r p r o d u c tio n , 6 9 - 7 1 ; m ilita r is m

1 8 2 ,1 9 8 ,2 5 1 ,2 8 5 ; in S u e z c r is is , 2 0 0 ;

in , 8 1 ,4 9 9 ; A llie d b o m b in g o f , 8 2 - 8 4 ,

n u c le a r w e a p o n s , 2 2 0 - 2 1 ; a n d N A T O ,

1 1 3 ,1 9 4 ; T r e a ty o f V e r s a ille s a n d , 8 5 ;

277

su rren d er o f, 113; d e a th c a m p s a n d

F r a n c is, S a m u e l, 4 2 0 - 2 1

g e n o c id e , 1 1 3 -1 4 ; d iv is io n o f, 1 2 7 -2 8 ;

F rank, B arn ey, 4 8 9

R eagan an d , 393.

" F r a t r ic id e ," 3 8 0 , 3 8 2 , 3 8 4

m any

F r ie d , R ic h a r d , 1 7 5 F r ie d a n , B e tty , 1 8 6 ,2 3 0 - 3 1 ,2 5 8 ,3 0 3

G I B ill.

See a lso W e s t G e r ­

See S e r v i c e m e n ' s R e a d j u s t m e n t

A ct

F r o h n m a y e r , J o h n E ., 4 5 4

G ib s o n , J a m e s, 2 8 5

From Fiere to E te r n ity ( J o n e s ) , 1 6 3

G illis , J o h n , 121

F r o m m , E r ic h , 1 6 1

G in g r ic h , N e w t , 4 9 5

578

INDEX

G in s b e r g , A lle n , 1 5 3 ,2 3 0 ,2 9 6

G ro w in g u p A b s u r d ( G o o d m a n ) , 2 2 9

G le n n , J o h n , 2 4 0

G u a d a lc a n a l in v a s io n , 6 7

G N P (g r o s s n a tio n a l p r o d u c t): m ilita r y -

G u a te m a la , 1 9 9 ,2 0 0 ,4 2 0

s p e n d in g p o r tio n o f, 5 - 6 ,4 7 ,1 3 0 ,1 4 1 ,

G u bar, S u sa n , 107

1 8 3 , 1 9 6 , 2 4 1 , 3 1 1 , 4 0 1 ; W o r ld W a r II

" G u n b e lt ," 1 5 4 - 5 5 , 2 7 8 , 4 0 0 , 4 0 1

m o b iliz a tio n a n d , 4 7 ; g o v e r n m e n t-

G u n b o a t d ip lo m a c y , 4 9 3

s p e n d in g p o r tio n o f, 4 1 5 ; h e a lth -c a r e

G u n th e r , J o h n , 1 2 3 ,1 2 4

p o r tio n o f, 5 0 2 .

See a lso E c o n o m y

G o l d m a n , E r ic , 1 7 7 ,1 8 8

H a i g , A l e x a n d e r M . , J r ., 3 3 3 , 3 9 4 , 4 1 0 - 1 1

G o ld w a t e r , B a r r y M ., 4 2 8 ,4 3 5 ; p r e s id e n ­ tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1964, x ii, 2 5 1 ,2 5 2 ,

2 7 3 ; a n d C o ld W a r c o n flic t, 2 2 9 ,3 0 1 ; o n N ix o n p r e s id e n c y , 3 3 0 ; o n

M aya-

gu ez in c id e n t , 3 3 7 ; o n C a r te r , 3 4 4 ; o n n u c le a r w e a p o n s , 3 5 6 ,4 0 5 ; e s tr a n g e ­ m e n t fr o m m o d e m c o n s e r v a tis m , 3 7 4 , 4 2 2 ,4 2 9 - 3 0 ,4 7 6 ,4 8 1 ; o n r e lig io u s r ig h t w in g , 4 2 2 ,4 2 6 ; o p p o s it io n to m il­ ita r y g a y b a n , 4 8 9 ,4 9 1

G on e w ith th e W in d ( M i t c h e l l ) , 2 3 G o o d m a n , E lle n , 4 8 9 G o o d m a n , P a u l, 2 2 9 - 3 0 G o r b a c h e v , M i k h a i l S ., 3 8 7 , 4 0 9 , 4 3 4 - 3 6 , 4 6 5 ; a n d a r m s c o n tr o l, 4 0 4 ,4 1 2 ,4 1 3 , 4 4 2 ; a n d C o ld W a r 's d e m is e , 4 1 2 ,4 1 3 , 4 1 4 ,4 1 5 ,4 3 8 - 3 9 ; in te r n a l r e fo r m s , 4 1 2 , 4 1 4 ; R e a g a n a n d , 4 1 2 ,4 1 4 ,4 3 5 G o r e , A l b e r t , S r ., 1 8 1 G o r e , A l b e r t A . , J r ., 4 6 8

G o Tell the S p a rta n s ( f i l m ) , 3 6 1 G r a c e , J. P e t e r , 4 4 6 G r a h a m , R e v . B illy , 1 5 9 ,3 6 0 G r a m m , P h il, 4 8 1 G r e a t B r ita in , 9 9 ,1 2 8 ,5 0 3 ; m ilit a r y in d u s tr ia l c o m p le x , 5; a p p e a s e m e n t o f H itle r , 2 9 ,3 0 ; L e n d -L e a s e a id to , 3 3 , 5 8 , 5 9 , 6 9 ; W o r ld W a r II c a s u a l t i e s , 8 0 , 8 2 -8 3 ; in U n ite d N a tio n s , 87; w o m e n w a r w o r k e r s in , 1 0 5 ; w e lf a r e s t a t e , 1 1 2 ; d e c lin e o f im p e r ia l p o w e r , 1 1 6 ,4 1 8 , 4 1 9 ; in S u e z c r is is , 2 0 0 ; a n d n u c le a r w ea p o n s, 2 2 0 -2 1 G r e a t D e p r e s s io n , 2 3 ,2 4 ,4 2 ,7 4 ; w a r m e t ­ a p h o r s a n d , 1 5 - 1 6 ,1 8 - 1 9 ,2 9 ,3 1 - 3 2 , 7 9 ; W o r ld W a r II m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d , 3 1 3 2 ,3 7 ; fe a r e d p o s tw a r r e tu r n o f, 6 8 ,8 0 G r e a t S o c ie ty , 2 5 9 ,2 6 0 ,2 6 5 ,3 1 1 G reece, 182 G r e e n B e r e ts, 2 4 1

G reen B erets ( f i l m ) , 2 9 8

H a iti, 4 8 5 ,4 8 6 ,4 9 3 H a lb e r s ta m , D a v id , 2 5 3 H a ld e m a n , H . R . (" B o b " ), 3 3 0 H a le y , A le x , 3 2 6 H a r r im a n , W . A v e r e ll, 4 5 ,1 3 9 H a r r in g to n , M ic h a e l, 2 5 8 H a r s c h , J o se p h , 1 7 9 ,3 3 6 H a t f i e ld , M a r k O ., 3 1 3 H a v e l, V a c la v , 4 3 8 - 3 9

H a v en in a H e a rtle ss W o rld ( L a s c h ) , 3 6 4 H a y e s , Ira , 2 3 1 H e a d S ta r t, 2 6 0 H e a lth in s u r a n c e , 4 9 ,7 8 - 7 9 , 1 1 1 , 1 2 4 , 3 3 3 ,4 8 4 -8 5 ,5 0 4 H e lle r , J o s e p h , 2 3 2 H e llm a n n , J o h n , 3 6 1 H e lm s , J e s s e A ., 4 5 3 ,4 5 9 ,4 9 6 H e ls in k i a c c o r d s (1 9 7 5 ), 3 4 1 H e m in g w a y , E r n e st, 1 0 H e n r y , J u le s , 2 3 0 H e r s e y , J o h n , 1 0 7 ,1 2 0 ,1 6 3 ,2 7 6 H i g h F r o n tie r P a n e l, 4 0 5

H ig h N o o n ( f i l m ) , 1 5 8 H ig h w a y c o n s tr u c tio n , 2 0 6 - 7 H ill, A n ita F „ 4 7 7 H ir o s h im a , a to m ic b o m b in g o f, 1 1 4 - 1 5 , 1 1 8 ,1 2 0 ,1 4 3 ,3 5 7 ; h is to r ic a l c o m m e m ­ o r a tio n o f, 3 5 0 - 5 1 ,3 5 9 ,4 9 6

H iro sh im a ( H e r s e y ) , 1 2 0 , 1 6 3 , 2 7 6 H ir s c h , E . D ., 4 2 3 ,4 2 4 H is p a n ic -A m e r ic a n s , 7 1 ,1 0 3 ,4 9 2 H is s , A lg e r , 1 7 2 ,3 0 7 ,3 1 9 ,3 3 2 H is to r ic a l r e v is io n is m , 3 5 6 - 5 7 H i s t o r y , 4 2 5 ; " e n d o f ," 4 3 9

H is to r y o f th e C o ld W a r ( L u k a c s ) , 2 3 0 H itle r , A d o lf, 8 8 ,1 3 4 ,3 2 8 ,3 7 5 ,4 1 9 ; A m e r ic a n p o p u la r o p in io n a n d , 16; a p p e a s e m e n t o f, 2 9 ,3 0 ,8 5 ,1 2 8 ; R o o s e ­ v e lt a n d , 3 0 ,3 2 ; in v a s io n o f S o v ie t U n io n , 5 8 ,6 0 ; a n d w a r p r o d u c tio n , 7 0 , 7 1 ; r a c ia l t h e o r ie s , 1 0 4 ; S ta lin c o m ­

G reen e, G rah am , 199

G reer ( d e s t r o y e r ) , 6 1

p a r e d to , 1 2 7 ,1 3 2 ,1 3 3 ; p o p u lis t d e m a ­ g o g u e r y , 1 3 1 -3 2 ; N ix o n c o m p a r e d to ,

G r e n a d a , U .S . i n v a s i o n o f , 4 0 3 ,4 1 0 3 2 0 ; R e a g a n c o m p a r e d to , 4 5 5 ,4 5 6 ; G r o v e s , L e s l i e R ., 1 4 0

INDEX

579

H u s s e in c o m p a r e d to , 4 6 4 ,4 6 5 ,4 6 7 ,

H u t c h in s , R o b e r t M ., 1 4 3

4 7 3 -7 4

H y d r o g e n b o m b , 1 3 5 ,1 3 6 ,1 6 0 ,1 8 3 ,2 0 4

H o b b y , O v e ta C u lp , 1 5 0

H y n e s , S a m u e l, 9 3 ,9 4 ,9 6

H o C h i M in h , 3 1 8 H o d g s o n , G o d fr e y , 2 7 4 ,2 9 4

IC B M (in te r c o n tin e n ta l b a llis tic m is s ile ),

H o f fm a n n , S ta n le y , 3 9 5

2 4 1 ,2 4 7 ,3 8 6 - 8 7

H o f s t a d t e r , R ic h a r d , 1 4 1 ,1 6 5 H o ll y w o o d T e n , 1 7 0 ,1 7 1

I m m ig r a tio n , 4 2 8 - 2 9 ; r e s tr ic tio n s o n , 9 ,

H o l m e s , O l i v e r W e n d e l l , J r ., 3 H o lo c a u s t, 9 7 ,1 1 3 - 1 4 ,1 2 0 ,1 5 3 ,3 4 9 ,3 5 7 58; a s sy m b o l o f m o d e m w ar, 115, 1 1 8 - 1 9 ; a b o r tio n c o m p a r e d to , 4 5 1 - 5 2 ; A ID S c o m p a r e d to , 4 5 5 - 5 7 ,4 5 8

H o lo c a u st ( T V s e r i e s ) , 3 5 8

9 4 ,1 0 4 - 5 ,1 0 9 ,1 5 2 ; m ilita r y b a n o n , 1 0 4 ,3 6 9 ,4 8 7 ; c u ltu r a l o p p r e s s io n o f, 1 0 7 ,1 5 1 -5 3 ,1 5 6 ,1 7 0 ,1 8 6 ,3 0 1 ,3 6 5 , 3 6 9 - 7 0 ; r e d -b a itin g a tta c k s o n , 1 6 4 , 1 7 1 ,1 7 3 ,3 0 1 - 2 ,4 5 4 ; c o n flic ts o v e r m il­ ita r y b a n , 3 6 8 - 6 9 ,4 8 3 ,4 8 7 - 9 2 ; m o r ­ a lis tic d e n u n c ia t io n s o f, 3 7 1 - 7 2 ,3 7 4 , 4 2 6 ,4 5 3 - 5 5 ,4 5 9 ; a n d A I D S c r is is , 4 2 5 ,

See a lso G a y r i g h t s

m ovem en t

I m p e r ia lis m , 1 3 3 ,3 0 5 ; A m e r ic a n , 1 2 5 - 2 6 , 1 6 0 - 6 1 ,2 6 7 ,2 9 3 ,4 9 3 ; " im p e r ia l o v e r ­

I n d ia , 1 3 2 ,2 0 4 I n d o c h in a , 2 0 2 ; F r e n c h w a r in , 1 8 2 ,1 9 8 , 2 5 1 ,2 8 5 I n d u s tr ie s : d e f e n s e c o n tr a c to r s , 5 ,7 3 , 1 5 5 ,4 1 7 ; a ir c r a ft, 9 , 3 7 , 6 9 , 7 4 , 1 5 5 ; w a r p r o d u c tio n , 4 6 ,6 9 - 7 3 ,7 5 ,1 5 5 ; re­ g io n a l c o n c e n tr a tio n s , 4 6 , 7 2 ,1 4 2 ,1 5 4 5 5 ,2 7 8 ,4 0 0 - 4 0 1 ; a u to m o b ile , 4 6 ,2 7 8 ; m ilita r y -in d u s tr ia l c o m p le x , 7 1 ,1 4 1 4 2 ; T r u m a n 's n a t io n a liz a t io n o f , 1 2 3 2 4 ,1 8 5 ; m ilit a r y " s p in -o ffe ," 1 4 3 ,3 8 9 ,

H o o v e r , H e rb er t C , 1 8 - 1 9 ,5 3 ,8 0 ,8 8 H o o v e r , J. E d g a r , 5 2 , 1 5 3

4 1 7 ; e m p lo y m e n t in , 1 5 5 - 5 6 ; e n e r g y c r is is a n d , 3 2 3 ; d e f e n s e p r o c u r e m e n t

H o p e, B ob, 2 9 8 -9 9

c o r r u p tio n , 4 1 7

H o p k i n s , H a r r y L ., 4 3 , 4 5 , 5 8 H o r to n , W illie , 4 3 5 - 3 6

I n te lle c tu a ls : a n d W o r ld W a r H , 3 6 - 3 7 , 5 3 ; a n d c o m m u n is m , 1 6 2 - 6 3 ,1 7 6 ; a n d

H ow l (G in s b e r g ), 1 5 3

m ilita r iz a tio n , 1 6 4 - 6 7 ,2 3 0 ,2 5 8 - 5 9 ,

H u b b ard , L. R on, 42

2 7 7 ; a n d M c C a r th y is m , 17 6 ; a n d V ie t­

H u d so n , R ock, 425

n a m W a r, 2 7 6 - 7 7 ; a n d c u ltu r a l d iv i­

H u g h e s , E m m e t J o h n , 1 9 1 ,1 9 2 ,2 0 2 ,2 0 5 , 2 1 1 ,2 1 2 ,2 1 8 - 1 9

s io n s , 4 2 4 - 2 5 I n te llig e n c e g a th e r in g , 4 0 2 - 3

H u g h e s, L a n g sto n , 4 9 -5 0

I n te r m e d ia te N u c le a r F o r c e T r e a ty

H u g h e s A ir c r a ft, 7 1

(1 9 8 7 ), 4 1 3

H u ll, C o r d e ll, 5 8 ,5 9 ,7 2

In te r n a l R e v e n u e S e r v ic e , 3 3 1

H u m a n r ig h ts , 3 4 1 ,3 4 3 ,3 4 5 ,3 4 7 ,3 4 9 H u m p h r e y , G e o r g e , 1 8 5 ,1 9 3 ,2 0 3 H u m p h r e y , H u b e r t H ., 1 8 5 ,2 5 1 ,2 9 8 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1 9 6 8 ,3 0 7 ,

3 1 0 ,3 1 6

In te r n a tio n a l C o v e n a n t o n H u m a n R ig h ts , 2 0 2 I n te r n a tio n a lis m , 1 1 7 In te r sta te a n d D e fe n s e H ig h w a y S y ste m , 2 0 6 -7

1 9 5 6 ,2 0 0 , 4 2 9

H u n g e r , w a r a g a in s t, 2 6 4 H u n te r , J a m e s D a v is o n , 4 5 4 H u n te r -G a u lt, C h a r la y n e , 4 5 7 H u n t i n g t o n , S a m u e l P ., 5 0 1 H u s s e in , S a d d a m , 4 6 8 ,4 8 4 ; in v a s io n o f K u w a it, 4 6 2 - 6 6 ; c o m p a r e d t o H itle r , 4 6 4 ,4 6 5 ,4 6 7 ,4 7 3 - 7 4 ; in P e r s ia n G u lf W ar, 4 6 9 ,4 7 0 ,4 7 1 ,4 7 3 - 7 5 H u sto n , T om , 318

I m m ig r a tio n A c t (1 9 6 5 ), 4 2 8

In c h o n la n d in g , 1 8 0

H o m o s e x u a ls , 1 1 2 ,1 6 9 ; in W o r ld W a r n ,

H u n g a r y , r e v o lt o f

1 0 3 ,1 5 4 ; n a t iv is t h o s t ilit y t o w a r d , 4 9 2 , 496

s tr e tc h ," 4 1 9

H o m e w a rd B o u n d ( M a y ) , 1 6 9

4 2 6 ,4 2 7 ,4 5 4 - 5 9 .

Ideas A r e W eapons ( L e m e r ) , 3 7

Iran : C IA o v e r t h r o w o f M o s s a d e g h , 1 9 9 , 2 0 0 ; I s la m ic r e v o lu tio n , 2 0 0 ; h o s t a g e c r is is , 3 4 7 - 4 8 ,3 7 5 ,3 8 4 - 8 5 ,3 9 1 ,3 9 3 , 445 I r a n - C o n t r a a ffa ir , 3 9 4 , 4 1 0 - 1 1 , 4 4 6 Ir a n -Ir a q w a r , 4 0 3 ,4 1 0 ,4 1 1 ,4 7 1 Iraq : in v a s io n o f K u w a it, 4 6 2 ,4 6 3 ,4 6 4 , 4 6 7 ,4 8 0 ; U .S . i n v a s i o n o f , 4 6 9 , 4 7 0 - 7 1 , 474

580

NDEX

I r o n -c la d w a r s h ip s , 2

J o h n s o n , L y n d o n B ., 2 8 4 , 3 0 8 , 3 1 8 ; p r e s i ­

1964, x ii, 2 4 2 ,2 5 1 ;

I s la m ic f u n d a m e n ta lis m , 3 8 4 ,3 9 9 ,4 6 2

d e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

I s o la tio n is m , 2 7 ,6 5 ,8 8 ,1 5 1 ,3 3 5 ,4 6 6

w a r o n p o v e r ty , 2 0 5 ,2 5 9 -6 3 ,4 3 1 ; a s

I s r a e l, 3 5 7 ; in S u e z c r is is , 2 0 0 ; Y o m K ip -

S e n a te m a jo r ity le a d e r , 2 1 4 ; a n d s p a c e

p u r W a r, 3 2 8 ; E g y p tia n p e a c e a g r e e ­

p r o g r a m , 2 1 4 ,2 3 7 ; n a tio n a l s e c u r ity

m e n t, 3 4 6 ; n u c le a r w e a p o n s

r h e to r ic , 2 4 3 ,2 4 4 ,2 5 2 ; a n d V ie t n a m

d e v e lo p m e n t, 3 4 6 ; in v a s io n o f

W ar, 2 5 0 ,2 5 1 ,2 6 3 ,2 6 6 ,2 6 9 ,2 7 1 ,2 7 2 ,

L e b a n o n , 4 1 0 - 1 1 ; a n d P e r s ia n G u lf

2 8 5 - 8 6 ,2 9 0 - 9 1 ,2 9 8 ; a n d b o m b in g in

W a r, 4 6 2 ,4 6 5 ,4 6 6 ,4 6 7 ,4 6 9 ,4 7 0 ; A r a b

V ie tn a m , 2 5 1 ,2 5 4 ,2 7 1 ,2 7 2 ,2 8 3 ; a n d

c o n flic t, 4 6 3 ,4 7 4

c iv il r ig h ts le g is la t io n , 2 5 6 ,2 5 7 ; e m ­

I ta lia n -A m e r ic a n s , 5 2 - 5 3 ,6 7 ,1 0 3

p lo y m e n t o f w a r m e ta p h o r s, 2 5 9 ,2 6 4 -

I ta ly , 8 3 ,1 8 4

6 6 ,2 9 9 ,3 0 0 ,3 1 5 ,4 9 9 ; w a r o n c r im e ,

It C a n 't H appen H ere ( L e w i s ) , 5 2

2 6 3 ,3 0 9 ; w a r o n d is e a s e , 2 6 3 - 6 4 ; w a r

It H a p p en ed O n e N ig h t ( f i l m ) , 3 4

o n h u n g er, 264; a n d o p p o n e n ts o f

I w o J im a la n d in g : R o s e n t h a l p h o t o ­

V ie tn a m W a r, 2 6 6 ,2 8 7 ,2 8 9 ,2 9 6 ,3 0 1 -

g r a p h , 1 6 7 - 6 8 ,2 3 1 ; A r lin g t o n m o n u ­

2; a n d C o ld W a r c o n flic t, 2 6 9 ,4 9 9 ;

m e n t , 1 6 8 ,1 9 7 ,2 9 8 ,3 5 2 ; F lo r id a

" c r e d ib ilit y g a p ," 2 7 4 ; w i t h d r a w a l

m o n u m e n t, 2 9 7 -9 8

fr o m 1 9 6 8 e le c tio n , 2 7 8 ,2 9 1 ; a n d d e ­ fe a t in V ie tn a m , 2 8 5 - 8 7 ,3 1 0 ; s e x u a l

J a c k s o n , H e n r y M ., 2 1 4 , 3 2 3 ,3 3 6 , 3 7 6 ,3 7 8 J a m e s, W illia m , 3 ,3 5 0 J a p a n , 4 2 4 ; w a r in C h in a , 2 8 ,4 1 ,5 8 ,8 4 ; in W o r ld W a r II, 3 7 , 5 9 , 6 1 - 6 2 ; A m e r i c a n r a c is m t o w a r d , 4 1 , 6 2 , 6 6 , 6 7 , 8 4 , 9 1 92; a tta c k o n P e a r l H a r b o r , 5 7 - 5 8 ,6 0 , 6 2 ,6 4 - 6 5 ,6 8 ,3 5 1 - 5 2 ; A m e r ic a n fe a r s o f i n v a s i o n b y , 6 4 - 6 6 ; U .S . f ir e b o m b ­ in g o f, 6 7 ,8 1 ,8 2 ,8 3 ,9 3 - 9 4 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 4 ; w a r p r o d u c tio n , 6 9 ; m ilita r is m in , 8 1 , 8 5 ,4 9 9 ; U .S . a t o m ic b o m b i n g o f , 8 7 , 1 1 4 - 1 5 ,1 1 6 ,3 5 0 - 5 1 ,4 9 6 ,5 0 2 ; in C o ld

r h e to r ic , 3 0 1 - 3 ; ille g a l w ir e t a p s , 3 0 7 ; o n F o r d , 3 4 1 ; a n d im m ig r a tio n , 4 2 8 J o in t C h i e f s o f S ta f f, 1 9 3 ; i n W o r ld W a r II, 4 3 ,8 3 ; c iv ilia n c o n t r o l o f, 1 3 7 ,1 8 0 ; a n d K o r e a n W a r, 177; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 2 5 2 ,2 7 0 ,2 8 3 ,2 9 1 ; a n d n u c le a r w a r , 404; R eagan an d , 4 1 2 -1 3 J o n e s, D a v id C , 4 0 4 ,4 6 7 Jon es, J am es, 163 J o n e s , T h o m a s K ., 3 8 0 J o p lin , J a n is , 2 9 4 J o rd a n , H a m ilto n , 3 4 2

W a r c o n f lic t, 1 2 9 ,1 7 9 ; r u le in K o r e a , 1 7 7 ; U .S . a ir b a s e s in , 1 8 1 ,1 8 2 ; K o r e a n

K ahn, H erm an, 224

W a r a n d , 1 8 2 ,1 8 4 ; a u to in d u s t r y , 2 7 8 ;

K a is e r , H e n r y , 7 5

e c o n o m ic s u c c e s s , 3 1 1 ,3 5 2 ,3 8 8 ,4 1 7 ,

K a m e n y , F r a n k lin , 2 5 6

4 1 8 ,4 1 9 ; U .S . t r a d e w a r w i t h , 4 4 6 - 4 9

K a u fm a n , I r v in g , 1 7 3

J a p a n e s e -A m e r ic a n s , 6 4 ,6 5 ,9 8 ,1 0 8 ; in ­ c a r c e r a tio n o f, 6 6 - 6 7 ,9 2 ,9 4 ,4 4 8

K a u fm a n n , W illia m , 4 4 1

K e a rn y ( d e s t r o y e r ) , 6 1

J a r r e ll, R a n d a l l , 9 6

K e illo r , G a r r is o n , 4 6 0

J effer so n , T h o m a s, 2

K e m p to n , M u rra y , 191

J e n k in s , W a lte r , 3 0 1

K e n n a n , G e o r g e F ., 8 7 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 9 , 2 7 3 ; c o n ­

J e n n e r , W illia m , 1 7 2 ,1 7 5

t a in m e n t th e o r y , 1 2 6 ,1 3 2 ; a n d m ilita r ­

J e w s, 153; r e fu g e e s fro m E u r o p e , 50;

iz a tio n , 1 8 3 - 8 4 ,2 2 3 ; o n E is e n h o w e r ,

A m e r ic a n p r e ju d ic e a g a in s t, 5 0 ,1 0 3 ,

191

10 8 ; N a z i g e n o c id e , 1 1 3 - 1 4 ,3 5 7 ; S o ­

K e n n e d y , E d w a r d M ., 3 8 4

v ie t e m ig r a tio n , 3 2 3 ,4 2 9

K e n n e d y , J o h n F ., 1 6 6 , 3 0 8 ; i n W o r l d W a r

Job C o r p s , 2 6 0 ,2 6 2

II, 1 0 3 ; in a u g u r a l a d d r e s s , 1 9 2 ,2 3 3 ,

J o h n , E lto n , 4 0 9

2 3 6 ,2 3 7 ; a n d F r e n c h I n d o c h in a w a r ,

J o h n B ir c h S o c ie t y , 1 9 0 ,2 4 2

199; a n d s u p e r p o w e r c o n fr o n ta tio n ,

J o h n so n , A n d rew , 332

2 1 5 ,2 3 8 ,2 4 1 - 4 5 ,2 4 9 ; a n d n u c le a r ar­

J o h n son , H a y n es, 441

s e n a l, 2 1 5 ,2 4 1 ,2 4 9 ; a n d s p a c e p r o ­

J o h n son , H u g h , 20

g r a m , 2 1 7 ,2 2 7 ,2 3 7 - 4 0 ; p r e s id e n tia l

J o h n s o n , L o u is , 1 3 0

c a m p a ig n o f

I 9 6 0 ,2 3 2 ,2 4 2 ; a n d

INDEX

58

0 0 7 ,4 0 3 , 4 0 9

E is e n h o w e r , 2 3 3 ,2 3 5 ,2 4 1 ; a n d W o r ld

K o r e a n A ir L in e s flig h t

W a r II i m a g e r y , 2 3 3 , 2 3 9 ,2 4 4 ; a n d m i l ­

K o r e a n W a r, 1 2 0 ,1 3 0 ,2 2 4 ,2 5 4 ; v e te r a n s ,

ita r iz a tio n , 2 3 5 ,2 3 7 ,2 4 3 ,2 4 4 ,2 4 9 ; a n d

110; a n d in te g r a tio n o f a r m e d fo r c e s ,

B a y o f P ig s in v a s io n , 2 3 8 ,2 4 4 ; a n d d e ­

1 4 5 ,1 4 7 ,4 9 0 - 9 1 ; a n d c iv il r ig h ts

fe n s e s p e n d in g , 24 1 ; a n d C u b a n m is ­

m o v e m e n t, 147; C h in a in , 1 5 4 ,1 8 0 - 8 2 ,

s ile c r is is , 2 4 6 - 5 0 ,2 8 6 ; a n d V ie tn a m

1 8 5 ; a r m s p r o d u c tio n , 1 5 5 ; a n d a n ti­

W a r, 2 5 0 ,2 5 1 ; a n d c iv il r ig h ts le g is la ­

c o m m u n i s t f e v e r , 1 7 4 ,1 8 5 ; U .S . t r o o p s

tio n , 2 5 5 ,2 5 6

in , 1 7 7 ,1 7 9 - 8 0 ; c o n f u s io n o f a im s in , 1 7 7 - 7 8 ,2 9 9 ; N o r t h K o r e a n in v a s io n o f

K en n ed y , Josep h , 52 K e n n e d y , P a u l, 4 0 2 ,4 4 0 ,5 0 2 ,5 0 3 ;

R ise

a n d Fall o f th e G reat P o w e rs, 4 1 8 - 2 1 , 4 2 4

S o u t h K o r e a , 1 7 7 - 7 8 ,4 6 5 ; T r u m a n 's c o n d u c t o f, 1 7 8 - 8 1 ,1 8 4 ; th r e a ts o f n u ­

K e n n e d y , R o b e r t F ., 2 4 6 , 2 9 3

c le a r b o m b in g , 1 8 0 ,1 8 2 ,1 9 7 ; T r u m a n -

K e n t S ta te U n iv e r s ity , 2 9 4

M a c A r th u r c o n flic t, 1 8 0 -8 1 ; c a s u ­

K eyn es, John M ayn ard , 75

a lt ie s , 1 8 1 ; U .S . b o m b i n g in , 1 8 1 - 8 2 ;

K e y n e s i a n i s m , 7 5 - 7 6 , 1 9 3 ; " m ilit a r y ," 4 7 ,

a n d A m e r ic a n m ilita r iz a tio n , 1 8 2 - 8 5 , 2 7 4 ; c u ltu r a l e ffe c ts o f, 1 8 5 - 8 7 ,2 9 9 -

7 6 ,1 3 6 ,1 4 1 ,2 4 4 ,3 8 9 ,4 0 0 K h m e r R o u g e , 3 1 4 ,3 3 7 ,3 4 9 ,3 5 7 ,3 5 8

3 0 0 ; A m e r ic a n p r is o n e r s o f w a r , 1 8 6 ,

K h o m e in i, A y a to lla h R u h o lla h , 3 5 2 ,3 7 5 ,

1 9 7 ; a r m is tic e a g r e e m e n t, 197; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 9 7 ,3 1 0 ,3 1 2

3 7 8 - 7 9 ,4 1 1 K h r u s h c h e v , N i k i t a S ., 2 2 9 , 2 4 1 , 2 5 5 , 3 4 7 ,

K ra m er, L arry, 4 2 6 ,4 5 5 -6 0

4 1 2 ; " k it c h e n d e b a t e ," 1 6 9 ,2 2 6 ; a n d

K r is to l, I r v in g , 4 9 6

s p a c e r a c e , 2 1 4 ,2 1 5 ,2 3 8 ; a n d n u c le a r

K u b r ic k , S ta n le y , 2 3 0 - 3 2

w e a p o n s , 2 1 7 ,2 2 1 ; p r o v o c a t io n o f B er­

K u rd s, 4 7 4

lin c r is e s , 2 2 5 ,2 2 6 ,2 4 4 - 4 5 ; a n d C u b a n

K u w a it: Ir a q i in v a s io n o f , 4 6 2 ,4 6 3 ,4 6 4 , 4 6 7 ,4 8 0 ; P e r s ia n G u lf W a r a n d , 4 6 9 ,

m is s ile c r is is , 2 4 6 - 5 0

4 7 2 ,4 7 9

K ie n h o lz , E d w a r d , 2 9 8 K illia n , J a m e s , 2 1 9 K i m II S u n g , 1 7 7 , 1 7 8 , 1 8 5

L a b o r P a r ty (B r ita in ), 1 1 2

K i n g , B . B ., 4 0 9

L a b o r s tr ik e s , 1 2 3 ,1 2 4

K in g , B illy J e a n , 3 0 3 ,3 6 8

L a b o r u n io n s , 7 3 - 7 4 ,1 0 1 ,1 4 8 ,1 5 5 ,1 7 6

K in g , C o r e tta S c o tt, 2 9 3

L a F e b e r , W a lte r , 4 4 2

K i n g , R e v . M a r t i n L u t h e r , J r.: a s c i v i l r ig h ts le a d e r , 2 0 8 - 1 1 ,2 5 5 ,2 5 7 ,2 9 2 ; o p ­ p o s it io n to V ie tn a m W a r, 2 7 5 -7 6 ; a s ­ s a s s in a tio n o f, 2 9 3

L ask er, M ary, 2 63

K ir c h w e y , F r e d a , 2 6 - 2 7

L a s s w e ll, H a r o ld , 5 3 ,7 5

K i r k p a t r i c k , J e a n e J ., 3 5 3 , 4 2 1

L a st F lo w er ( T h u r b e r ) , 4 2

K is s in g e r , H e n r y A ., 2 1 4 ,2 9 9 ,3 2 3 ,3 2 8 ; a n d n u c le a r w a r , 2 2 3 - 2 4 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 3 1 2 ,3 1 3 ,3 1 4 ; a n d N ix o n p r e s i­ d e n c y , 3 1 7 - 1 8 ,3 2 0 ,3 3 1 ; a n d a r m s c o n ­

M ayaguez in c id e n t , 3 3 7 ,

3 3 8 ; in F o r d a d m in is tr a tio n , 3 4 1 K is tia k o w s k y , G e o r g e , 2 1 9

L ate G reat P la n e t E arth ( L i n d s e y ) , 3 5 9 - 6 0 L a tin A m e r ic a , 1 5 4 .

See a lso H i s p a n i c -

A m e r ic a n s L a w r e n c e , D a v id , 2 4 8 L a w son , John H o w a rd , 170 L e a g u e o f N a tio n s , 2 6 ,8 5 L e a g u e o f W o m e n V o te r s, 4 2

" K itc h e n d e b a t e ," 1 6 9 ,2 2 6

Leatherneck, 9 2

K n o w la n d , W illia m , 191

L e b a n e s e c iv il w a r , 4 1 0 - 1 1

K n o x , F rank, 58

L e k a c h m a n , R o b ert, 7 5

K o h n , R ic h a r d , 4 9 1

L e M a y , C u r t i s E ., 2 4 8 , 2 5 3 , 3 0 7

K o o p , C . E v e r e tt, 4 2 6 ,4 5 7 ,4 5 9 K o p k in d , A n d r e w , 2 7 7

N o r th K orea; S o u th K orea

L a n s d a le , E d w a r d G ., 2 5 2 - 5 3

L a s c h , C h r is to p h e r , 2 7 7 ,3 6 4 - 6 5

K in s e y , A lfr e d , 1 5 2

K o r e a , J a p a n e s e r u le in , 1 7 7 .

L a ir d , M e lv in , 3 1 6

L a o s , 2 3 3 ; in V ie tn a m W a r, 2 8 8 ,3 1 4

K in g , R o d n e y , 4 7 7

tr o l, 3 3 4 ; a n d

L a G u a r d ia , F io r e llo H ., 1 0 3

L e n d -L e a s e A c t (1 9 4 1 ), 3 3 ,5 5 ,5 8 ,6 1 ,6 9 L e n i n , V . I ., 4 0 9

See also

L enn on, John, 409

5S 2

NDEX

L e m e r , M a x , 3 7 ,5 2 ,1 3 4

L etters fr o m a W a r Z o n e ( D w o r k i n ) , 4 5 1

M c C a r r a n In te r n a l S e c u r ity A c t (1 9 5 0 ), 185

L e u c h t e n b u r g , W i l l i a m E ., 1 6 , 1 7 , 2 6 1

M c C a r t h y , E u g e n e J ., 2 9 1

L evel 7 ( R o s h w a l d ) , 2 0 4

M c C a r t h y , J o s e p h R ., 1 5 9 , 1 6 1 ; r o l e i n

L e v itt, W illia m , 1 5 8

R e d S c a r e , 1 7 1 - 7 4 ,1 8 5 ; d o w n fa ll o f,

L e w i s , J o h n L ., 4 6 , 7 3

1 7 5 ,2 0 1 ; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 8 8

L e w is , M e r iw e th e r , 2

M c C a r th y is m , 1 6 5 ,1 7 1 ,1 7 5 - 7 6 ,1 8 9

L e w is , S in c la ir , 5 2

M c C l o y , J o h n J ., 1 3 9 , 2 3 3

L ib y a , 4 1 0

M cC one, John, 247

Life : o n W o r l d W a r H , 6 2 , 2 8 8 ; o n a n t i ­

M c C o n n e ll, G r a n t, 2 7 7

c o m m u n is m , 1 1 7 ,1 6 0 ; o n a t o m ic

M a c d o n a ld , D w ig h t , 2 7 6

b o m b , 119; o n K o rea n W ar, 1 8 4 -8 6 ; o n

M c D o n n e ll D o u g la s C o r p o r a tio n , 4 7 8

e d u c a t io n , 2 2 7 ,2 2 8 ; o n s p a c e p r o g r a m ,

M c F e a tte r s, A n n , 4 7 2

2 2 7 ,2 3 8 ; o n n u c le a r w a r , 2 4 5 - 4 7 ,2 5 0 ;

M c G o v e r n , G e o r g e S ., 3 1 0 , 3 1 3 ,3 2 3 , 4 6 9 ;

o n h o m o s e x u a lity , 301 L im b a u g h , R u sh , 4 5 2 - 5 3 ,4 8 6 - 8 7

p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1 9 7 2 ,3 1 8 - 2 0 ,

339

L im ite d T e s t B a n T r e a ty (1 9 6 3 ), 2 4 8 - 4 9

M c G r a t h , J. H o w a r d , 1 7 4

L in c o ln , A b r a h a m , 1 ,4

M c L a u g h lin , J o h n , 4 2 1

L in d b e r g h , A n n e M o r r o w , 3 8

M a c L e is h , A r c h ib a ld , 3 6 ,3 7 ,4 0 ,6 4

L in d b e r g h , C h a r le s A ., 1 1 , 3 8 ,5 2 , 5 5 ,8 1 ,

M a c M illa n , H a r o ld , 2 4 8

98 L in d s e y , H a l, 3 5 9 - 6 0 L ip p m a n n , W a lte r , 3 6 , 4 5 , 8 5 - 8 6 , 1 2 6 , 1 2 7

M acM u rray, F red, 107 M c N a m a r a , R o b e r t S ., 2 4 0 , 2 4 1 , 2 4 3 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 2 5 3 - 5 4 ,2 6 4 - 6 5 ,2 7 1 ,2 8 5

L ip s itz , G e o r g e , 1 6 8

M ad m an T h eory, 3 1 2 -1 3

L isten A m erica ! ( F a l w e l l ) , 3 5 9

M a ie r , C h a r le s , 1 2 5 - 2 6 ,1 4 1

L ite r a tu r e , 1 6 3

M a ile r , N o r m a n , 2 7 6 ;

L ittle B ig H o r n B a t t le f ie ld N a t io n a l M o n u m e n t, 4 2 3 L it t le R o c k , A r k ., s c h o o l i n t e g r a t io n c o n ­ flic t, 2 1 1 - 1 2 ,2 1 6

N a k e d a n d th e D ea d ,

9 1 ,1 6 3 ; in V ie tn a m a n tiw a r m o v e ­ m e n t, 2 9 2 - 9 3 ,2 9 6 - 9 7 ,3 0 3 ;

A r m ie s o f

th e N ig h t, 3 0 3 , 3 0 5 M a n c h e ste r U n io n Leader, 4 3 5 , 4 5 4

L o n g , H u e y P ., 1 6

M a n ch u ria n C a n d id a te ( f i l m ) , 2 3 1 - 3 2

L o n g tim e C o m p a n io n ( f i l m ) , 4 5 6

M a n h a tta n P r o je c t, 6 9 ,8 7 ,2 1 5 ,3 1 7 ,4 5 7 ,

L ooking B ackw ard ( B e l l a m y ) , 3 L o s A n g e le s r io ts (1 9 9 2 ), 4 7 7 ,4 7 8 ,4 7 9 , 480 L o u is , J o e, 5 4

458 M a n s fie ld , M ik e , 2 5 1 ,3 2 3 ,3 3 5 M a n u fa c tu r in g .

See I n d u s t r i e s

M a o T s e -tu n g , 1 9 9 ,3 1 8

L o v e tt, R o b e r t, 1 3 9 ,1 8 1

M a p p le th o r p e , R o b e r t, 4 2 6 ,4 5 3 ,4 5 4

L o w e ll, R o b e r t, 2 7 6 ,2 9 3

M a r c h o f D im e s , 1 5 8

L o y a lty o a th s , 1 7 1 ,2 2 7

M a rch o n th e P e n ta g o n , 2 9 2 -9 3

L o y a lty R e v ie w B o a r d , 1 7 3

M a r c o s , F e r d i n a n d E ., 3 4 9

L u cas, G eo rg e, 354

M a r s h a ll, G e o r g e C , 1 1 6 ,1 1 8 ; a s a r m y

L u c e , C la r e B o o t h , 1 6 8

c h ie f o f sta ff, 3 5 ,5 8 ; a n d m o b iliz a tio n

L u c e , H e n r y R ., 5 4 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 1 1 7

fo r W o r ld W a r II, 4 3 - 4 6 , 4 8 - 4 9 ; in c o n ­

L u d lo w , L o u is , 2 6

d u c t o f W o r ld W a r II, 6 2 , 6 5 , 7 4 , 7 5 , 8 3 ,

L u k acs, Joh n , 2 3 0

9 2 ,9 4 ; a n d p la n n in g fo r p o s tw a r s e c u ­

L u ttw a k , E d w a r d , 3 7 6 ,4 6 7

r ity , 8 5 ,8 6 ; a n d w o m e n ' s m ilit a r y r e ­ c r u itm e n t, 105; a s s e c r e ta r y o f s ta te ,

M a c A r th u r , D o u g la s : a tta c k o n B o n u s A r m y , 1 9 ; in W o r ld W a r II, 8 2 , 8 3 ,8 4 , 1 8 9 ,4 4 7 ; c o n f lic ts w it h T r u m a n , 1 3 6 3 7 ,1 8 0 - 8 1 ,1 8 4 ; in K o r e a n W a r, 1 7 7 , 1 8 0 ,1 8 2 ,1 8 5 ,1 9 7 M c C a in , J o h n , 4 3 7

1 2 9 ,1 3 8 ; r e d - b a itin g a tta c k s o n , 1 7 2 , 1 8 5 ,1 8 8 M a r s h a ll P la n , 1 2 7 ,1 2 8 ,4 6 1 M a r x is m , 1 6 3 ,2 7 7 M a s s a c h u s e tts I n s titu te o f T e c h n o lo g y , 7 5 ,1 6 2

INDEX

" M a s s iv e r e ta lia tio n " s tr a te g y , 1 9 5 ,2 1 5 , 2 1 7 ,2 2 3 -2 4

583

3 0 0 ,3 0 4 -5 ,3 6 9 ; N ix o n a n d , 3 0 7 ,3 0 9 1 0 ,3 1 1 ,3 1 5 ,3 3 3 - 3 5 ; p o s t-V ie tn a m o p ­

M a tlo v ic h , L e o n a r d , 3 6 8 - 6 9

p o r tu n ity fo r d is e n g a g e m e n t fr o m ,

M a ts u Isla n d , 1 9 9

3 2 1 - 2 6 ,3 3 3 - 3 4 ,3 3 6 ; a d v a n c e d (d e c a ­

M a tta c h in e S o c ie ty , 1 5 3

d e n t) s ta g e o f, 3 4 0 ; C a rter a n d , 3 4 1 - 4 4 ,

M a u p in , A r m is te a d , 4 2 7

3 4 6 ,3 4 8 ,3 5 0 ,3 9 0 ,3 9 4 ; p a tr io tis m a n d ,

M a y , E la in e T y le r , 1 6 9

3 6 5 ,4 6 6 ,4 9 6 ; R e a g a n m ilita r y b u ild u p

M ayaguez in c id e n t , 3 3 7 - 3 9

a n d , 3 9 0 - 9 2 ,3 9 4 ,3 9 7 ,3 9 8 - 4 0 3 ,4 1 0 ,

M e a d , M a r g a r e t, 5 7 ,6 0 ,6 2 ,6 8 ,8 9

4 1 4 - 1 5 ,4 1 7 ,4 2 9 ; in w a r d tu r n o f, 4 3 1 ,

M e a n s , R u s s e ll, 4 2 3

4 4 5 ,4 5 3 ,4 7 9 ,4 9 2 ; B u s h a n d , 4 3 3 ,4 4 2 ,

M eany, G eorge, 323

4 4 3 ; " c u ltu r e w a r s ," 4 5 3 - 5 4 , 4 7 6 , 4 8 0 -

M e d ia , 2 3 ,3 8 6 ; a n d W o r ld W a r II, 3 9 - 4 1 ,

8 1 ,4 8 6 - 8 7 ,4 9 6 - 9 7 ; o f p o litic s , 4 6 1 ,

5 4 ,9 2 - 9 3 ,2 8 8 ; N ix o n 's h o s tility to ­

4 9 4 - 9 5 ; C lin to n a n d , 4 8 2 - 8 3 ,4 8 5 ,4 8 6 ,

w a r d , 2 8 7 ,3 1 6 ,3 1 9 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r,

4 9 2 - 9 4 ,4 9 8 ,5 0 2 ; o f S o v ie t U n io n , 4 9 9 ,

2 8 7 -8 9 ; n ew sp a p er en d o rsem en ts o f N ix o n , 3 1 8 ; P e r s ia n G u lf W a r c o v e r ­ a g e , 4 7 0 ,4 7 3 ,4 7 4

503 M ilita r y -in d u s tr ia l c o m p le x , 3 7 ,2 7 7 , 3 2 2 ; B r it is h , 5 ; W o r l d W a r II a n d , 7 1 ,

M e lm a n , S e y m o u r , 3 2 2

1 4 1 -4 2 ; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 2 3 4 - 3 6 ,2 4 9 ,

M e x ic a n -A m e r ic a n s , 1 0 3 ,1 5 4

2 9 6 ; V ie tn a m a n tiw a r m o v e m e n t a n d ,

M e x ic a n -A m e r ic a n W a r, 5 0 3 M id d le E a st, 3 2 6 ,3 4 6 ,3 7 9 ,4 4 5 ,4 6 2 ,4 6 4

236 M ilita r y r e s e a r c h , 1 4 3 ,2 1 9 - 2 0

M id g e tm a n m is s ile , 3 8 2

M ilk , H a r v e y , 3 6 9 - 7 0

M id w a y , B a ttle o f , 6 7

M ille n n ia lis m , 3 5 3 ,3 6 0

M ilita r is m , x iii, 3 ,7 5 ,8 1 ,3 4 0 ,4 6 6

M ille r , A r th u r , 1 6 3

M ilita r iz a tio n , x ii- x iv , 6 ,1 1 ,2 5 ,4 9 8 - 5 0 1 ,

M ille r , W a lte r , 2 0 4

5 0 3 ,5 0 4 ; r e la tio n t o w a r , x iii - x i v , 1 1 ,

M illis , W a lte r , 2 5 , 5 1 ,1 6 6

5 0 0 ,5 0 3 ; R o o s e v e lt a n d , 1 7 ,1 2 4 ,5 0 2 ;

M ü ls , C . W r ig h t, 1 4 1 ,1 4 2 ,1 6 6 ,2 3 0 ,2 9 6

m ilita r y K e y n e s ia n is m , 4 7 ,7 6 ,1 3 6 ,

M in u te m a n m is s ile s , 2 1 8

1 4 1 , 2 4 4 , 3 8 9 , 4 0 0 ; W o r l d W a r II a n d ,

" M is s U e g a p ," 2 1 5 ,2 1 6 ,2 1 9 , 2 3 2 ,2 4 1

5 7 ,6 8 ,7 6 ,9 9 ,1 2 1 ,1 2 4 ,1 4 1 - 4 2 ,4 9 8 ;

M it c h e ll, B illy , 1 1 ,3 8 1

a n d C o ld W a r, 1 2 1 ,1 2 4 - 2 5 ,1 2 8 ,2 4 3 ,

M itc h e ll, J o h n N ., 3 1 7

2 4 4 ,3 3 9 ,4 3 0 - 3 2 ,4 4 1 - 4 2 ,4 9 8 ,5 0 2 ; p e r ­

M o d e m a rt, 1 5 6 - 5 7

c e iv e d S o v ie t th r e a t a n d , 1 2 4 - 2 5 ,1 2 9 -

M o h a m m a d R e z a P a h la v i (s h a h o f Ir a n ),

3 0 ,3 3 8 - 3 9 ,3 7 4 ,3 9 0 ,4 4 2 ; N S C -6 8 str a t­

2 0 0 ,3 4 9 ,3 7 5 - 7 6

e g y , 1 3 6 ; T r u m a n a n d , 1 3 6 - 3 8 ,1 8 4 ; o f

M o n d a l e , W a l t e r F ., 3 7 5 , 4 2 1 - 2 2 , 4 3 4

th e e c o n o m y , 1 4 1 - 4 3 ,1 5 6 ,2 7 8 ,3 8 8 - 8 9 ,

M o n e t t e , P a u l, 4 5 6

4 1 5 - 1 8 ,4 2 0 ,5 0 3 ; o f s o c ia l r e la tio n s ,

M o n ta g u , A s h le y , 101

1 4 4 ,1 5 1 ,1 5 4 ,1 5 6 ; a n d h o m o p h o b ia ,

" M o r a l E q u iv a le n t o f W ar" (J a m e s), 3

1 5 2 - 5 3 ; a n d b la c k s , 1 5 5 - 5 6 ,4 9 9 ; R e ­

" M o r a l r e v iv a l," 3 7 1 - 7 2 ,3 7 4 , 3 9 5 ,3 9 8 ,

p u b lic a n P a r ty a n d , 1 5 6 ,2 3 5 - 3 6 ,4 0 1 ;

4 2 1 ,4 2 7

D e m o c r a tic P a rty a n d , 1 5 6 ,2 4 1 ,2 4 3 -

M o r g e n th a u , H e n r y , 9 0 ,1 1 6

4 4 ,3 8 0 - 8 1 ,4 0 1 ,4 1 6 ; o f c u ltu r e , 1 5 6 -

M o r is o n , E ltin g , 1 6 2

6 2 ,1 6 4 ,1 6 5 ,1 6 6 ,1 6 7 ,2 3 0 ,2 4 2 - 4 3 ,4 5 3 ;

M o r r is o n , P h ilip , 1 3 9

in te lle c tu a ls a n d , 1 6 4 - 6 7 ,2 3 0 ,2 5 8 - 5 9 ,

M oscon e, G eorge, 370

2 7 7 ; a n d R e d S ca re , 1 7 0 - 7 1 ,1 7 6 - 7 7 ;

M o s k o s , C h a r le s , 4 8 8

K o r e a n W a r a n d , 1 8 2 - 8 5 ,2 7 4 ;

M o ssa d eg h , M oh am m ed , 200

E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 9 0 - 9 3 ,2 0 0 - 2 0 3 ,

M o y n ih a n , D a n ie l P a tr ic k , 2 6 4 ,2 6 6 ,3 0 8 ,

2 0 6 ,2 1 7 ,2 3 4 - 3 6 ,3 0 8 ,3 4 3 ; te c h n o lo g y a n d , 2 0 3 ; S p u tn ik p a n ic a n d , 2 1 6 ,2 1 7 ,

3 4 8 ,4 6 7 ,5 0 2 M s ., 4 5 1

2 1 8 ,2 2 0 ,2 3 2 ; K e n n e d y a n d , 2 3 5 ,2 3 7 ,

M u e lle r , J o h n , 4 4 3 - 4 4

2 4 3 ,2 4 4 ,2 4 9 ; V ie tn a m W a r a n d , 2 7 4 -

M u m fo r d , L e w is , 3 6 ,3 7 ,5 2 ,1 6 6 - 6 7 ,2 0 7 ,

7 5 ,2 7 7 ,2 7 8 ,2 8 3 ,2 9 1 ,2 9 5 - 9 6 ,3 0 6 - 7 , 3 3 6 ; J o h n s o n a n d , 2 9 1 ; a n d fe m in is m .

230 M u n d t , K a r l, 1 7 5

5S4

N D EX

M u n ic h c r is is , 2 9 - 3 0 ,3 2 , 3 5 ,4 0 , 8 5 ,1 3 6 ,

tio n a l b u r e a u c r a c y o f, 4 2 - 4 4 ,1 3 8 - 3 9 ; a s r a tio n a le fo r s o c ia l r e fo r m , 4 7 - 4 8 ,

378

M u r d e r in th e A i r ( f i l m ) , 4 0 6

5 0 ,7 9 ,1 1 2 ,2 0 6 ,4 9 5 ; a n d r a c e r e la tio n s ,

M u r r o w , E d w a r d R ., 4 0

5 0 ,1 4 7 - 4 8 ,2 0 7 - 8 ,2 5 7 ; a n d e c o n o m ic

M u s s o lin i, B e n ito , 1 6 ,8 3 ,8 5 ,1 0 3 ,4 6 4

p r o s p e r ity , 7 6 - 7 8 ; a n d m ilita r iz a tio n ,

M u ste, A .

1 3 6 ,1 3 8 ,2 0 6 ,3 9 8 ; a n d w o m e n 's r ig h ts ,

133

M u tu a l a s s u r e d d e s tr u c tio n (M A D ), 2 2 2

1 4 9 - 5 0 ; r o le o f c u ltu r e in , 1 6 5 ;

M X (m o b ile e x p e r im e n ta l) m is s ile , 3 4 9 ,

E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 9 2 - 9 4 ,2 0 6 - 7 ,2 1 8 ,

3 7 6 ,3 8 2 ,3 8 3 ,3 8 4 ,3 9 7 ,3 9 9 ,4 0 2 M y L ai m a ssa cre, 315

3 8 4 ,3 8 8 ; e d u c a t io n a n d , 2 1 3 - 1 4 ; R e a ­ g a n a n d , 3 9 1 ,3 9 5 ,3 9 8 ; C o ld W a r 's d e ­ m is e a n d , 4 4 0 ; C lin to n a n d , 4 9 3 ,4 9 5 -

N a g a s a k i, a to m ic b o m b in g o f, 1 1 5 ,1 4 3 , 357

N a k ed a n d th e D ea d ( M a i l e r ) , 9 1 , 1 6 3 N a s s e r , G a m a l A b d e l, 2 0 0

N a tio n , 1 8 , 4 0 , 2 3 5 , 4 4 4 , 4 4 9 , 4 5 1 N a tio n a l A d v is o r y C o m m itte e o n A e r o ­ n a u tic s , 1 3 8 N a tio n a l A e r o n a u tic s a n d S p a c e A d m in ­ is tr a tio n (N A S A ) , 2 1 9 - 2 0 ,2 3 9 - 4 0 N a tio n a l A ir a n d S p a c e M u s e u m , 4 9 6 , 502 N a tio n a l A s s o c ia tio n fo r th e A d v a n c e ­ m e n t o f C o lo r e d P e o p le (N A A C P ), 1 4 4 ,1 4 8 N a tio n a l A s s o c ia tio n o f E v a n g e lic a ls , 395

N a tio n a l D efen se ( F a l l o w s ) , 3 8 5 N a tio n a l D e f e n s e E d u c a tio n A c t (N D E A , 1 9 5 8 ), 2 2 7 - 2 8 ,2 2 9 N a tio n a l D e fe n s e R e se a r c h C o m m itte e , 43 N a tio n a l E n d o w m e n t fo r th e A r ts (N E A ), 4 5 3 - 5 4 ,4 7 6 ,5 0 4 N a tio n a l G u a r d , 3 ,5 ,2 9 4 N a tio n a l I n s titu te s o f H e a lth , 2 1 9 ,2 6 3 , 458 N a tio n a lis m : A m e r ic a n , 2 3 - 2 4 ,2 7 ,5 1 , 1 1 7 ,1 5 9 ,3 6 7 ; A s ia n , 1 2 9 ; T h ir d W o r ld , 198 N a tio n a l M a n p o w e r C o u n c il, 2 5 6 N a tio n a l O r g a n iz a tio n o f W o m e n , 2 7 6 N a tio n a l R e c o v e r y A d m in is tr a tio n (N R A ), 2 0 N a tio n a l R e s o u r c e s P la n n in g B o a r d , 4 7

N a tio n a l R e view , 1 9 0 , 2 2 9 , 4 0 6 , 4 2 0 N a tio n a l S c ie n c e F o u n d a tio n , 2 2 7 N a t io n a l s e c u r ity , x iii, 4 ,4 4 3 ; v ie w e d a s e x t e r n a lly im p o s e d , x i, 5 6 ; N e w D e a l a n d , 2 2 - 2 3 ; R o o s e v e lt's c o n c e p t io n o f, 3 0 - 3 4 ,3 5 - 3 6 ,4 4 ,5 0 ,7 9 ,1 1 9 - 2 0 ; b u s i­ n e s s a n d , 37; a n ti-in te r v e n tio n is ts a n d , 3 8 - 3 9 ,5 6 ; m e d ia a n d , 4 0 - 4 1 ; in s titu ­

96 N a tio n a l S e c u r ity A c t (1 9 4 7 ), 1 3 0 ,1 3 7 N a tio n a l S e c u r ity C o u n c il, 1 3 8 ,1 9 3 ,3 9 4 ; N S C -6 8 d ir e c tiv e , 1 3 6 ,1 7 9 ,1 8 2 ,1 9 2 , 215 N a tio n a l S e c u r ity I n d u s tr ia l A s s o c ia tio n , 77 N a tio n a l S e c u r ity R e s o u r c e s B o a r d , 1 3 8 " N a t io n a l s e c u r i t y s t a t e ," x iii , 8 , 5 3 N a tio n a l W o m e n 's P o litic a l C a u c u s , 3 4 3 N a tio n s , 5 0 1 - 3 N a tiv is m , 5 1 - 5 3 ,1 5 9 ,4 9 2 N a v r a t ilo v a , M a r tin a , 4 2 6 N a z is m : R o o s e v e lt a n d , 5 1 ,3 1 8 ; B r o w n S c a r e , 5 1 - 5 2 ; r a c ia l p r e j u d ic e s , 1 0 8 , 119; a n d h o m o s e x u a lity , 1 5 2 .

See also

G erm any, N a zi N a z i- S o v ie t N o n a g g r e s s io n P a c t (1 9 3 9 ), 37 N B C -T V , 2 31 N ef, John, 144

N e g ro S o ld ier ( f i l m ) , 1 0 1 N e h r u , J a w a h a r la l, 1 3 2 N e ig h b o r h o o d H e a lth C e n te r s , 2 6 0 N e o c o n s e r v a tis m , 2 9 6 N e u tr a lity la w s , 2 5 N e u tr o n b o m b , 3 4 5 ,3 4 9 N e w D e a l, 4 8 ,1 2 1 ,2 2 0 ; w a r m e ta p h o r s in , 1 6 - 1 7 ,1 9 - 2 1 ,2 9 , 3 1 - 3 2 , 7 9 ,1 2 4 ; a s p r e p a r a t io n f o r W o r ld W a r II, 2 2 - 2 3 4 , 3 1 - 3 3 ,1 4 1 ; o p p o n e n ts o f, 2 9 ,5 3 ,6 7 ; a n d e c o n o m ic g r o w th , 3 1 ,4 6 ,4 7 ; a n d s o c ia l w e lfa r e , 7 8 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 0 ; a n tic o m ­ m u n is t w itc h -h u n ts a n d , 171

N e w D ea l ( C h a s e ) , 1 8 N e w h o u s e , J o h n , 3 4 7 ,3 8 1 ,3 8 3 ,3 9 6 ,4 0 4 , 413

N e w Leader, 4 1 5 N e w L eft N o te s, 3 0 4 " N e w L o o k ," 1 9 2 - 9 3 , 1 9 6 , 2 0 3 , 2 0 4

N e w R e p u b lic, 2 3 5 , 4 1 6 N e w sw e e k , 3 2 8 , 3 3 7 , 3 6 8 , 3 7 5 , 3 8 5 , 4 5 7 , 486

INDEX

sas

" N e w w o r l d o r d e r ," 4 7 2 , 4 7 4 , 4 9 2 - 9 3

3 1 5 ,3 1 7 - 2 0 ; a n d W a te r g a te s c a n d a l,

N e w Y ork , d e fe n s e c o n tr a c ts, 1 5 5

3 1 6 - 1 7 ,3 2 8 ,3 3 0 - 3 4 ; d is d a in fo r S ta te

N e w Yorker, 2 8 8 , 3 7 5 , 3 7 8 , 3 8 3 , 3 8 4 , 3 8 6 , 4 4 0 ,4 5 1 ,4 9 1

D e p a r tm e n t, 3 1 7 - 1 8 ,3 2 4 ; a n d V ie t­ n a m p r is o n e r s o f w a r , 3 2 5 ,3 3 2 ,3 6 2 ;

N e w Y ork H era ld T ribu n e, 1 1 5

F o r d 's p a r d o n o f , 3 2 5 ,3 4 2 ; a n d

N e w Y ork T im es, 3 1 6 , 3 1 7 , 4 0 5 , 4 4 4 , 4 7 2 , 4 7 7 ,4 8 7 ,4 9 2 - 9 3

w o m e n 's r ig h ts , 3 2 7 ; S a tu r d a y N ig h t M a s s a c r e , 3 2 8 ; r e s ig n a tio n o f, 3 3 3 ; o n

N g o D in h D ie m , 1 9 9 ,2 5 0 ,2 5 3 ,2 6 9

W o r ld W a r H I, 3 3 5 ; B u s h a n d , 4 3 2 - 3 3 ;

N g u y e n V a n T h ie u , 3 0 7 ,3 2 1 ,3 2 4

d e a th o f, 4 8 4

N ic a r a g u a , 3 3 8 ,3 7 6 ; U .S .- s u p p o r t e d C o n tr a w a r , 3 9 5 - 9 7 ,4 1 0 ,4 1 1

N o n e D a re C a ll It T reason ( S t o r m e r ) , 2 4 2 N o r ie g a , M a n u e l, 4 3 5 ,4 4 2 ,4 4 3 ,4 4 9

N i c h o l a s II ( t s a r o f R u s s ia ) , 4 1 9

N o r t h , O l i v e r L ., 4 0 1 , 4 1 1 , 4 5 3

N ie b u h r , R e in h o ld , 1 5 9 ,1 6 1

N o r t h A fr ic a , 6 7 ,8 3

N i m i t z , C h e s t e r W ., 8 2

N o r th A m e r ic a n F ree T r a d e A g r e e m e n t,

N it z e , P a u l H ., 3 5 2 ,4 0 4

494

N ix o n , R ic h a r d M ., 2 8 3 ,3 4 1 ,3 4 3 ; r e d ­

N o r t h A tla n tic T r e a ty O r g a n iz a tio n

b a itin g ta c tic s , 1 5 0 ,1 7 2 ,1 7 5 ,1 8 8 ; a s

(N A T O ), 2 2 5 ,3 2 3 ,3 7 7 ; e s ta b lis h m e n t

v ic e p r e s id e n t, 1 6 9 ,2 0 8 ,3 0 7 ,3 0 8 ;

o f, 1 2 9 ,1 3 1 ,1 3 3 ; K o r e a n W a r a n d , 1 8 2 ;

" k itc h e n d e b a te " w it h K h r u s h c h e v ,

n u c le a r w e a p o n s , 3 4 7 ; in P e r s ia n G u lf

1 6 9 ,2 2 6 ; a n d F r e n c h I n d o c h in a w a r ,

W a r, 4 6 5 ; in B o s n ia n c iv il w a r , 4 8 6

19 8 ; a n d c iv il r ig h ts le g is la tio n , 2 0 8 ,

N o r th K o rea : in v a s io n o f S o u th K o rea ,

3 0 7 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1960,

2 3 2 ; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 2 3 2 ,3 0 9 ,3 1 8 ; w a r o n c a n c e r , 2 6 3 ; a n d C o ld W a r c o n ­

1 7 7 - 7 8 ,4 6 5 ; U .S . b o m b i n g o f , 1 8 1 - 8 2 ; n u c le a r d e v e lo p m e n t , 4 8 5 ,4 8 6 N o r t h V ie t n a m : U .S . b o m b i n g o f , 2 5 0 -

flic t, 2 6 9 ,3 0 7 ,3 1 1 ,3 2 0 ; a n d d e t e n te ,

5 1 , 2 7 0 - 7 1 , 2 9 1 , 3 1 4 , 3 2 1 ; U .S . n u c le a r

2 6 9 ,3 1 0 ,3 1 1 ,3 3 4 ,3 4 8 ; c r itic is m s o f

th r e a t to , 3 1 2 ; c o n q u e s t o f S o u th V ie t­

J o h n s o n , 2 8 6 ; a n d o p p o n e n t s o f V ie t­ n a m W a r, 2 8 6 ,2 8 9 ,2 9 5 ,2 9 8 ,3 0 2 ,3 0 4 , 3 1 6 ,3 2 5 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 2 8 6 ,2 9 1 , 3 0 7 ,3 1 0 - 1 5 ,3 1 7 ,3 1 9 ,3 2 1 ,3 2 4 - 2 5 ,3 3 3 , 3 6 2 ; g u b e r n a to r ia l c a m p a ig n o f 2 8 6 .3 0 7 -

1962,

8; p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1 9 6 8 .2 8 6 . 3 0 7 -

9 ,3 1 5 - 1 6 ; a n d W o r ld

W a r II im a g e r y , 2 8 6 - 8 7 ,3 0 8 , 3 1 7 ; h o s ­

nam , 335 N o r th V ie tn a m e s e A r m y (N V A ), 2 8 3 , 2 8 4 ,2 8 5 ,2 9 0 N o v ic k , P e te r , 1 6 2 ,1 6 7 ,1 7 6 ,4 2 5 N u c le a r e n e r g y , 1 3 7 ,1 4 3 - 4 4 ,3 5 5 N u c le a r fr e e z e m o v e m e n t, 4 0 4 - 5 N u c le a r w a r: E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 9 4 -9 5 , 1 9 7 ,2 1 8 ; d e t e r r e n c e o f , 2 2 2 - 2 3 ,2 2 5 ;

t ility to w a r d th e p r e s s , 2 8 7 ,3 1 6 ,3 1 9 ;

" lim ite d ," 2 2 4 ,3 2 1 ,3 8 0 ,3 8 1 ; c h a n c e s

o b s e s s io n w it h s e c r e c y , 2 8 9 ,3 3 4 ; e m ­

o f s u r v iv a l, 2 4 5 - 4 6 ,3 8 0 ; p u b lic o p in ­

p lo y m e n t o f w a r m e ta p h o r s , 2 9 3 ,3 0 0 ,

io n o n , 2 4 6 ; C u b a n m is s ile c r is is a n d ,

3 0 9 ,3 1 5 - 1 6 ,3 1 8 - 1 9 ,3 3 0 ,3 3 2 ; a n d

2 4 6 -4 8 ; e n th u s ia s ts o f, 3 5 3 ,3 5 9 -6 0 ;

C h in a , 2 9 9 ,3 1 0 ,3 1 1 ,4 1 4 ; a n d d e f e a t in

p r o je c te d e ffe c ts o f, 3 5 5 ,3 5 6 ,3 5 8 ; C a r­

V ie tn a m , 3 0 0 ,3 1 0 ,3 1 2 ; s e x u a l a n d v io ­

te r a n d , 3 5 6 ,3 7 6 ,3 7 8 - 7 9 ,3 8 1 ; R e a g a n

le n t r h e to r ic o f , 3 0 2 ; a n d m ilit a r iz a ­

a d m in is tr a tio n p la n s fo r w in n in g ,

tio n , 3 0 7 ,3 0 9 - 1 0 ,3 1 1 ,3 1 5 ,3 3 3 - 3 5 ;

3 7 9 - 8 1 ,3 9 5 ,3 9 9 - 4 0 1 ,4 0 4 ,4 0 7 ; " w in ­

p la n s to e n d V ie tn a m W a r, 3 0 7 ,3 1 0 -

d o w o f v u ln e r a b ilit y ," 3 8 0 - 8 2 ; " d e c a p ­

13; la c k o f in te r e s t in d o m e s t ic is s u e s , 3 0 8 ,3 0 9 ; a n d C o n g r e s s , 3 0 8 ,3 1 2 ,3 3 2 ; e c o n o m ic p o lic ie s , 3 0 9 ; p r e o c c u p a tio n

ita tio n " s tr a te g y , 3 8 1 ; a c c id e n ta l, 3 8 6 N u c l e a r w e a p o n s , x ii; d e v e l o p m e n t o f a to m ic b o m b , 6 9 ,7 1 ,8 6 ; a to m ic b o m b ­

w it h " e n e m ie s ," 3 0 9 ,3 1 9 - 2 1 ,3 2 7 - 2 8 ;

in g o f Ja p a n , 8 1 ,1 1 4 - 1 5 ,3 5 0 - 5 1 ,4 9 6 ,

a n d a n tic o m m u n is m , 3 1 0 ,3 1 8 ; a n d

5 0 2 ; d e c is io n to b o m b J a p a n , 8 7 ,1 1 4 ,

a r m s r a c e , 3 1 1 ,3 2 3 -2 4 ; a n d d e fe n s e

1 1 6 ; fe a r s o f d e s tr u c tio n b y , 1 1 5 ,2 3 2 ,

s p e n d i n g , 3 1 1 , 3 2 4 ,4 0 0 ; a n d S A L T II,

2 4 8 ,3 5 4 ,3 5 6 ; s y m b o lis m o f, 1 1 6 ,1 1 8 ,

3 1 1 ,3 3 1 ; a n d b o m b in g o f C a m b o d ia ,

1 1 9 - 2 1 ,2 2 4 - 2 5 ,2 4 8 ; S o v ie t d e v e lo p ­

3 1 2 , 3 1 3 ,3 1 4 , 3 3 2 ; " M a d m a n T h e o r y ,"

m e n t o f a t o m ic b o m b , 1 2 9 ,1 3 4 ; U .S . a r ­

3 1 2 - 1 3 ; a n d b o m b in g in V ie t n a m , 3 1 4 ,

s e n a l, 1 3 0 ,2 0 3 ,2 4 1 ,2 4 9 ,3 2 4 ,3 2 5 - 2 6 ,

3 2 1 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

19 7 2 ,

3 8 3 ,3 8 6 - 8 7 ,4 0 2 ,4 4 3 ; p u b lic o p in io n

S8 6

INDEX

N u c le a r w e a p o n s

(c o n tin u e d )

O p e r a tio n R e sc u e , 4 5 1

a n d , 1 3 4 ,1 5 9 - 6 0 ,1 8 2 ; p ie in n in g fo r u s e

O p e r a tio n R o llin g T h u n d e r , 2 7 2

o f, 1 3 4 - 3 5 ,1 4 3 ,1 8 3 ,1 9 5 - 9 6 ,2 2 1 ,2 2 4 ,

O p p e n h e i m e r , J. R o b e r t , 2 0 4 ; a n d a t o m i c

3 3 5 ,3 8 1 ; d e v e lo p m e n t o f h y d r o g e n

b o m b in g o f J a p a n , 1 14; a n d n u c le a r

b o m b , 1 3 5 - 3 6 ,1 8 3 ,2 0 3 - 4 ; a r m s ra c e,

w e a p o n s d e v e lo p m e n t , 1 3 4 ,1 3 9 ,1 8 3 ;

1 3 5 - 3 6 ,1 9 5 ,2 0 3 ,2 2 2 ,2 4 8 - 4 9 ,2 5 9 ,

A E C d e n ia l o f s e c u r ity c le a r a n c e , 1 3 7 ,

3 2 2 - 2 4 ,3 5 6 ; c iv ilia n c o n tr o l o f, 137;

1 7 3 ,1 7 6

th r e a te n e d u s e in K o r e a , 1 8 0 ,1 8 2 ,1 9 7 ;

O r e g o n , a n ti-g a y r e fe r e n d u m , 4 8 2

" m a s s iv e r e ta lia tio n " s t r a t e g y , 1 9 5 ,

O r g a n iz a tio n o f P e tr o le u m E x p o r tin g

2 1 5 ,2 1 7 ,2 2 3 - 2 4 ; th r e a te n e d u s e in

C o u n tr ie s (O P E C ), 3 2 8

V ie t n a m , 1 9 9 ,3 1 2 ; " fle x ib le r e s p o n s e "

O th e r A m e ric a ( H a r r i n g t o n ) , 2 5 8

d o c t r in e , 2 1 5 ; " m is s ile g a p ," 2 1 5 ,2 1 6 ,

O u ts id e r ( f i l m ) , 2 3 1

2 1 9 ,2 3 2 ,2 4 1 ; " o v e r k ill" p o t e n t ia l, 2 1 8 ; a rm s co n tro l a g r e e m e n ts a n d , 2 2 0 -2 2 , 3 4 5 ,4 1 3 ; " m u tu a l a s s u r e d d e s tr u c tio n " d o c tr in e , 2 2 2 ; " c o u n te r fo r c e " s tr a te g y , 2 2 2 ,2 4 9 ; d e te r r e n c e d ile m m a , 2 2 2 - 2 5 , 3 2 1 ,3 7 9 ; in C u b a n m is s ile c r is is , 2 4 6 4 7 ; te s t b a n tr e a ty a n d , 2 4 8 - 4 9 ,3 4 6 ; " fr a tr ic id e " e x p lo s i o n s , 3 8 0 ,3 8 2 ,3 8 4 ; c o m p u te r c o n tr o ls , 3 8 6 ; R e a g a n a n d , 4 0 2 ,4 0 5 ,4 0 8 ,4 1 3 ; " z e r o o p t io n ," 4 0 4 , 4 1 3 ; Ira q i d e v e lo p m e n t o f, 4 6 4 N u c le a r w in te r , 3 5 5 N u n n , S a m , 4 6 4 ,4 8 6 ,4 8 8 ,4 9 3 N y e , G e r a l d P ., 2 5 , 5 5 N y e C o m m itte e , 2 5

P a c ifis m , 1 0 ,3 6 ,3 8 ,5 4 ,5 5 ,3 0 3 ,3 3 5 P ack ard M o to r C o m p a n y , 73 P a g e , C la r e n c e , 4 5 0 P a le s tin e L ib e r a tio n O r g a n iz a tio n , 4 1 0 P a n a m a , U .S . i n v a s i o n o f , 4 4 2 - 4 3 , 4 6 7 P a n a m a C a n a l T r e a ty (1 9 7 7 ), 3 4 6 P a r a m ilita r y c u ltu r e , 4 5 3

P a th s o f G lo ry ( f i l m ) , 2 3 2 P a t r io t is m , 3 5 8 - 5 9 ; W o r ld W a r II a n d , 1 0 3 , 1 6 7 ,2 9 8 , 3 5 2 ,3 5 8 ; I w o J im a s y m ­ b o lis m , 1 6 7 - 6 8 ,2 9 7 - 9 8 ,3 5 2 ; m o v ie s a n d , 1 6 8 ,2 9 8 ,3 5 3 - 5 4 ,3 6 1 - 6 2 ; a n d K o ­ r e a n W a r, 1 7 7 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 2 7 2 , 2 9 7 - 9 9 ,3 5 1 ,3 6 1 ; B u s h c a m p a ig n a n d , 3 5 2 ,4 3 4 ; a n d m ilita r iz a tio n , 3 6 5 ,4 6 6 ,

O 'C o n n e ll, R o b e r t, 4 4 3 - 4 4 O ' C o n n o r , J o h n J. ( a r c h b i s h o p o f N e w Y o r k ), 4 5 2

496

P a tte rn s o f C u ltu re ( B e n e d i c t ) , 2 3 P a t t o n , G e o r g e S ., 3 1 8

O 'C o n n o r , S a n d r a D a y , 4 2 2

P a tto n ( f i l m ) , 3 0 8

O ffic e o f E c o n o m ic O p p o r tu n ity (O E O ),

P a x A m e r ic a n a , 2 ,1 2 5 ,1 5 9

2 6 0 ,2 6 1 ,2 6 2

P e a c e C o r p s, 3 ,2 6 3

O ffic e o f P r ic e A d m in is tr a tio n , 7 0

" P e a c e d iv id e n d ," 1 9 5 ,3 1 1 - 1 2 ,4 3 7 ,4 3 9

O ffic e r s , 1 ,5 ,9 3 ,1 4 0 ,3 1 5 ,4 8 9 - 9 0

P e a r l H a r b o r a tta c k : A m e r ic a n r e a c tio n s

O ffic e o f S c ie n tific R e s e a r c h a n d D e v e l­ o p m e n t, 4 3 ,7 0

t o , 3 2 , 5 7 ,6 2 , 6 4 - 6 7 , 8 4 ; d e s t r u c t io n in , 6 2 ,6 4 ; s y m b o lic u s e s o f, 6 5 ,6 8 ,8 5 ,8 6 ,

O ffic e o f W a r I n fo r m a tio n , 8 9

1 1 8 - 2 0 ,3 5 1 ; f o r e k n o w le d g e m y th ,

O ffic e o f W a r M o b iliz a tio n , 7 0

2 8 7 ; m e m o r ia l to , 3 5 1 - 5 2 ; fiftie th a n n i­

O il e m b a r g o , 3 2 8 - 3 0

versa ry , 4 4 7 -4 8

O k in a w a in v a s io n , 1 1 3

P eek , G eo rg e, 19

O k la h o m a C ity b o m b in g (1 9 9 5 ), 4 9 5

P e lle y , W illia m D u d le y , 51

O ly m p ic G a m e s , 3 5 2 ,3 7 4 - 7 5 ,3 9 5 ,4 0 9

P e n n s y lv a n ia S ta te U n iv e r s ity , 2 9 4

O n e L on ely N ig h t ( S p i l l a n e ) , 1 8 8

P en ta g o n C a p ita lism ( M e l m a n ) , 3 2 2

O n e W orld o r N o n e ( F e d e r a t i o n o f A m e r i ­

P e n ta g o n P a p ers, 3 1 7

c a n S c ie n tis ts ), 1 1 5

P eople o f P le n ty ( P o t t e r ) , 1 6 5

O n the Beach ( f i l m ) , 2 3 1 , 2 3 2 , 3 5 5

P erez, L eand er, 212

O n th e Beach ( S h u t e ) , 2 0 4

P e r k in s , F r a n c e s, 2 7 ,1 0 6

O n T herm on uclear W ar ( K a h n ) , 2 2 4

P e r le , R ic h a r d , 4 0 4

" O p e n S k ie s " p r o p o s a l, 2 0 2

P erm a n e n t W ar E c o n o m y ( M e l m a n ) , 3 2 2

O p e r a t io n C e d a r F a lls , 2 6 6 ,2 6 7

P e r o t, H . R o ss, 3 6 2 ,4 8 0 ,4 8 2 ,4 9 3

O p e r a tio n R a n c h H a n d , 2 6 7

P e r r e tt, G e o ffr e y , 1 1 7

NDEX

P e r s h in g , J o h n

}., 5 4

P r o je c t

1 0 0 ,0 0 0 , 2 6 4 - 6 5

P e r s ia n G u lf W a r, 3 3 8 ,4 6 2 ,4 6 9 - 8 0 ,5 0 1

P r o je c t C h a r io t, 2 2 1

P e te r so n , P eter , 4 4 1

P r o je c t P lo w s h a r e , 2 2 1

P -5 1 f ig h t e r p la n e , 7 0

P r o p a g a n d a , 5 0 ,5 2 ,8 9 ,9 2 ,1 0 7 ,1 4 6

P h i l i p p i n e s , 2 8 ,3 9 6 ; U .S . b o m b e r s in , 6 1 ,

5S7

P r o x m ir e , W illia m , 3 2 2

6 2 ; in W o r ld W a r II, 6 2 , 6 6 ,8 2 ,8 4 ,1 1 3 ;

P s y c h o a n a ly s is , 1 5 2

in K o r e a n W a r, 1 8 2 ; im m ig r a tio n fr o m ,

P u b lic o p in io n , 2 3 ,1 3 1 ,2 7 2 - 7 3 ,2 8 8 - 8 9

429

P u b lic W o r k s A d m in is tr a tio n , 2 0

P h i lip II ( k in g o f S p a in ) , 4 1 9

P u litz e r , J o s e p h , 1 1 3 ,1 1 4

P h illip s , K e v in , 4 4 0 P h y s ic ia n s fo r S o c ia l R e s p o n s ib ility (P S R ), 3 5 4 - 5 5 P ip e s , R ic h a r d , 3 5 2 ,3 5 3 P la n n e d P a r e n th o o d , 4 5 1 P le d g e o f A lle g ia n c e , 1 7 0 ,4 3 2 ,4 3 4

Q u a y le , D a n , 3 9 8 ,4 3 4 ,4 8 1 ,5 0 1 Q u a y le , M a r ily n , 4 8 1 Q u e m o y I s la n d , 1 9 9

Q u ie t A m e ric a n ( G r e e n e ) , 1 9 9 Q u in d le n , A n n a , 4 6 0 ,4 8 9

P M , 143 P o d h o r e tz , N o r m a n , 3 5 2 ,3 5 3 ,3 7 1 ,4 3 6 P o in d e x t e r , J o h n M ., 4 1 1

R a b b it Is R ich ( U p d i k e ) , 3 9 0

P o la n d , 3 9 5 ,4 3 7 ; G e r m a n in v a s io n o f, 3 2 ,

R a c e r e la tio n s : N e w D e a l a n d , 2 1 ; R o o s e ­

41 P o le n b e r g , R ic h a r d , 1 4 9

v e lt a n d , 2 1 ,5 0 ,1 0 0 ,1 0 1 ,1 0 3 ,1 0 4 ,1 4 7 ; W o r ld W a r II a n d , 4 9 - 5 0 , 1 0 0 - 1 0 2 ,

P o litic a l c o r r e c tn e s s , 4 7 6

1 0 8 - 9 ,1 1 2 ,1 4 7 ; n a tio n a l s e c u r ity a n d ,

P o litic a l p a r tie s , 1 1 7 ,2 0 5

5 0 ,1 4 7 -4 9 ,2 0 7 -8 ,2 5 7 ; T ru m a n a n d ,

P o lit ic s , 3 9 ,4 9 8 - 9 9 ; w o m e n in , 2 6 - 2 7 ,

1 4 4 ,1 4 6 ; d e s e g r e g a tio n o f a r m e d

1 0 6 ,1 5 0 ; r e lig io n in , 3 4 2 ,4 2 2 ; c y n ic is m

fo r c e s, 1 4 5 - 4 7 ,2 0 8 ,2 5 5 ,4 9 0 - 9 1 ;

in , 4 6 0 ; m ilit a r iz a t io n o f , 4 6 1 ,4 9 4 - 9 5 ;

E is e n h o w e r a n d , 1 4 7 ,2 0 6 ,2 0 9 - 1 2 ;

m o r a lis ts a n d , 4 8 7

C o ld W a r a n d , 1 4 8 ,1 5 1 ,2 0 8 ,2 0 9 ,2 5 7 ,

P o litic s o f R ich a n d P o o r ( P h i l l i p s ) , 4 4 0

3 0 7 ,4 3 7 ,4 7 8 - 7 9 ; s c h o o l d e s e g r e g a ­

P o p u la r M ech a n ics, 1 4 3

tio n , 2 0 9 - 1 2 ,2 1 6 ; V ie tn a m W a r a n d ,

P o r n o g r a p h y , 3 0 8 - 9 ,4 2 7

2 5 5 - 5 6 ,3 6 6 - 6 7 ; R e p u b lic a n P a r ty a n d ,

P o rta b le W a r M e m o ria l ( K i e n h o l z ) , 2 9 8

4 3 5 -3 6

P o r t H u r o n S ta te m e n t, 2 4 2 ,2 5 9

R a c e r io ts , 1 0 2 ,2 9 3 ,4 7 8

P o s tm o d e r n is m , 4 2 4 ,4 7 0 - 7 1

R a c is m , 5 1 ,4 9 3 ; a g a in s t J a p a n e s e , 4 1 , 5 2 -

P o tte r , D a v id , 1 6 5

5 3 ,6 6 - 6 7 ,8 4 ,9 1 - 9 2 ; a g a in s t b la c k s ,

P o v e r ty : w a r o n , 2 0 5 ,2 5 9 - 6 3 ,2 6 5 ,3 1 9 -

1 0 1 ,1 4 8 ,2 0 8 ,2 0 9 ,2 1 0 ,2 1 2 ,2 3 1 ,2 7 5 ;

2 0; fe m in iz a tio n o f, 4 1 5 P o w e l l , C o l i n L ., 4 6 3 , 4 9 3 ; p u b l i c e s t e e m o f, x ii, 4 7 8 ,4 9 9 ; a n d P e r s ia n G u lf W a r,

N a z i, 1 0 8 ,1 1 9 R a d a r te c h n o lo g y , 4 0 7 - 8 R a d ic a l r ig h t w in g , 2 4 2 ,4 5 3 ,4 9 5

4 4 4 ,4 6 7 ,4 6 8 ,4 7 5 ; a n d m ilita r y g a y

R a d io , 4 0

b a n , 4 8 8 ,4 9 0

Ram bo f i l m s , 3 6 1 - 6 2

P o w e r E lite ( M i l l s ) , 1 4 1 , 1 6 6

R and, A y n , 170

P r e s id e n tia l D ir e c tiv e 5 9 ,3 8 1

R A N D C o r p o r a tio n , 1 3 8 ,2 2 4 ,4 8 7

P r e s id e n t ia l p o w e r w a r - m a k in g a u th o r it y ,

R a n d o lp h , A . P h ilip , 5 0 ,1 4 5 ,1 4 6

2 6 ,1 7 9 ,1 8 4 - 8 5 ,3 3 2 - 3 3 ,3 3 8 ; " im p e r ia l

R a n k in , J o h n , 1 7 5

p r e s id e n c y ," 1 8 4 ,2 9 1 ,3 3 2 ,3 4 1 - 4 2 ;

R a p id D e p lo y m e n t F o rc e, 3 8 5

B r ic k e r A m e n d m e n t a n d , 2 0 1 ; W a te r ­

R ead , C on yers, 162

g a te a n d , 3 3 2

R e a g a n , N a n c y , 3 6 0 ,4 1 1 ,4 5 0

P r i s o n e r s o f w a r (P O W s ): W o r ld W a r II, 1 1 3 ; K o r e a n W a r, 1 8 6 ,1 9 7 ; V ie t n a m W ar, 2 7 1 ,3 2 5 ,3 3 2 ,3 6 2 - 6 3 ,4 5 9 - 6 0 ,4 7 5 P r o g r e s s iv e m o v e m e n t, 7 ,1 6 4 ,1 7 4 - 7 5 P r o g r e s s iv e P a rty , 1 3 3 P r o h ib itio n , 1 8

R e a g a n , R o n a ld , 3 3 9 ,4 2 0 ; a s S c r e e n A c ­ to r s G u ild p r e s id e n t , 1 7 0 ,3 9 3 ; p r e s i­ d e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1 9 6 8 ,2 8 6 ;

p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1 9 7 6 ,3 3 4 ,

3 4 2 ; a n ti- S o v ie t r h e to r ic , 3 4 1 ,3 7 9 ,3 8 1 , 3 9 4 ,3 9 9 ,4 0 3 - 4 ,4 0 9 ; a n d c o lla p s e o f

S8 8

N D EX

R e a g a n ( c o n tin u e d )

R e ic h , R o b e r t B ., 4 7 3

c o m m u n is m , 3 4 7 ,4 1 0 ; a n d h o s t a g e

R e lig io n , 1 5 3 ,1 5 8 - 5 9 ; in p o lit ic s , 3 4 2 ,4 2 2

c r is e s , 3 4 8 ,3 9 1 ,3 9 3 ; a n d p a tr io tic c u l­

R e lig io u s R ig h t, 4 2 1 ,4 2 2 ,4 5 2

tu r e , 3 5 4 ,4 3 2 ; a n d a n tin u c le a r m o v e ­

" R e lig io u s w a r ," 4 8 0 - 8 1

m e n t, 3 5 5 - 5 6 ,4 0 5 ; a n d n u c le a r w a r ,

R e p o rt fr o m W a stela n d ( P r o x m i r e ) , 3 2 2

3 6 0 ,3 8 1 ,3 9 5 ,3 9 9 - 4 0 1 ,4 0 4 ,4 0 7 ; tr u st

R e p o rts fr o m th e H o lo c a u st ( K r a m e r ) , 4 5 6

in r e a lity o f m o v ie s , 3 6 1 ,3 6 2 ,3 9 8 ,4 4 5 -

R e p u b lic a n P a rty : a n d R o o s e v e lt a d m in ­

4 6; a n d te r r o r is m , 3 6 1 ,4 1 1 ,4 4 5 - 4 6 ; a s

is tr a tio n , 3 7 ,7 8 ; a n tic o m m u n is t a t­

c h a m p io n o f m o r a l r e v iv a l, 3 7 1 ,3 9 5 ,

ta c k s , 1 1 7 ,1 2 6 ,1 7 5 ; a n d m ilita r y

3 9 7 - 9 8 ,4 3 4 ; c r itic is m s o f C a r te r , 3 7 6 ,

d e s e g r e g a tio n , 1 4 5 ; a n d m ilita r iz a tio n ,

3 7 8 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1980,

1 5 6 ,2 3 5 - 3 6 ,4 0 1 ; in

1952 e l e c t i o n s , 1 8 8 ;

3 7 9 ; a n d M X m is s ile , 3 8 3 ,3 9 9 ; a n d m il­

a n d E is e n h o w e r , 1 9 0 ,1 9 4 ,1 9 7 ,2 0 0 ,

ita r iz a tio n , 3 9 0 ,3 9 2 ,3 9 7 ,4 0 1 - 2 ,4 1 0 ,

2 0 5 ; r a d ic a l r ig h t w in g , 2 4 2 ; a n d V ie t ­

4 1 4 - 1 5 ,4 1 7 ,4 2 9 ; a n d d o m e s tic p o lic y ,

n a m W a r, 2 8 6 ,3 2 7 ; a n d s e c r e t d ip lo ­

3 9 1 ,3 9 5 ; m ilita r y b u ild u p u n d e r , 3 9 1 -

m a c y , 3 1 7 ; a n d E q u a l R ig h ts

9 2 ,3 9 4 ,3 9 8 - 4 0 3 ,4 1 0 ,4 7 2 ; a n d e c o ­

A m e n d m e n t, 3 2 7 ,4 2 6 ; W a te r g a te a n d ,

n o m ic p o lic y , 3 9 2 ,4 0 0 ,4 1 5 ,4 1 6 ; a n d

3 3 0 - 3 1 ,3 3 3 ,3 3 4 ; a n d m ilita r y s p e n d ­

W o r l d W a r II im a g e r y , 3 9 2 - 9 3 ; a s g o v ­

in g , 3 4 8 ,4 9 6 ; R e a g a n a n d , 3 9 5 ,3 9 7 ,

e r n o r o f C a lifo r n ia , 3 9 3 ; a n d C o ld W a r

4 2 1 ,4 4 0 ; a n d d o m e s tic m o r a lity , 3 9 5 ,

c o n flic t, 3 9 3 ,3 9 5 ,4 0 8 - 9 ,4 1 0 ,4 1 2 ,4 1 4 ;

4 2 1 ,4 2 8 ,4 8 1 ; S e n a te m a jo r ity u n d e r

im p e r ia l s t y le o f, 3 9 3 - 9 5 ; a n d a r m s

R e a g a n , 4 0 1 ; r e lig io u s r ig h t w in g in ,

c o n tr o l, 3 9 4 ,3 9 6 ,4 0 4 ,4 1 2 - 1 3 ; a n d

4 21; in

S tr a te g ic D e f e n s e I n itia tiv e , 3 9 4 ,4 0 5 -

t a t io n o f r a c ia l d iv is io n s , 4 3 5 - 3 6 ; in

1988 e le c t io n s , 4 3 4 - 3 5 ; e x p lo i­

8 ,4 1 2 ,4 1 3 ; a n d R e p u b lic a n P a r ty , 3 9 5 ,

1990 e l e c t i o n s , 4 6 6 ; i n 1992 e l e c t i o n s ,

3 9 7 ,4 2 1 ,4 4 0 ; p o p u la r a p p e a l o f, 3 9 6 -

4 8 0 - 8 2 ; in

1994 e le c t io n s , 4 9 5 ,4 9 6

97; a n d d e fe n s e s p e n d in g , 3 9 7 ,4 0 0 -

R e p u b lic S te e l, 7 8

4 0 2 ,4 0 7 ,4 1 6 ,4 1 7 ,4 4 0 ; a n d r e lig io u s

R e se a r c h a n d d e v e lo p m e n t, 1 4 3 ,2 1 9 -2 0

r ig h t w in g , 3 9 7 ,4 2 1 ; a n d n u c le a r

R e s o u r c e c o n s e r v a tio n , 2 1 2 - 1 3

w e a p o n s p o lic y , 4 0 2 ,4 0 5 ,4 0 8 ,4 1 3 ; a n d

R e s to n , Jeu n es, 3 1 4

A fg h a n w a r , 4 0 3 ; in v a s io n o f G r e n a d a ,

R e th in k in g A m e ric a 's S e c u rity , 4 4 0

4 0 3 ; a n d U .S .- S o v ie t r e la t io n s , 4 0 4 ,

R e u th e r , W a lte r , 4 6 , 1 4 5 ,2 6 0

4 0 8 - 9 ,4 1 2 - 1 4 ,4 3 5 ; s u p p o r t o f N ic a r a ­

R e y k ja v ik s u m m it (1 9 8 6 ), 4 1 3

g u a n C o n tr a w a r , 4 1 0 ; in c r e a s e s in fe d ­

R h e e , S y n g m a n , 1 7 7 ,1 9 4 ,1 9 7

e r a l d e b t, 4 1 0 ,4 1 5 ,4 1 6 ,4 2 1 ,4 8 5 ; a n d

R ib ic o ff, A b r a h a m A ., 2 9 3

I r a n - C o n t r a a ffa ir , 4 1 1 ,4 4 6 ; p r e s i d e n ­

R i c h a r d s o n , E l l i o t L ., 3 3 2

tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1 9 8 4 ,4 2 1 - 2 2 ; h o s t i l i t y

to s o c ia l w e lfa r e , 4 2 7 ,4 5 8 ; a n d w a r o n

R ic k o v e r , H y m a n G ., 2 1 3 ,3 4 1 R id e n o u r , L o u is N ., 1 4 0

d r u g s , 4 4 2 ,4 4 5 ,4 4 9 ,4 5 0 ,4 5 7 ,4 5 8 ,4 5 9 ;

R i d g w a y , M a t t h e w B ., 1 9 8 , 2 2 4 , 2 7 5 , 2 9 1

a n d w a r o n c r im e , 4 4 5 ; a n d w a r o n

R ig g s , B o b b y , 3 0 3 ,3 6 8

w a s t e , 4 4 6 ; a n d A I D S c r is is , 4 5 5 ,4 5 6 ,

R ise a n d F all o f th e G rea t P o w e rs ( K e n ­

457

n e d y ), 4 1 8 - 2 1 ,4 2 4

R eal S e c u rity ( B a r n e t ) , 3 8 7

R o a d to W ar: A m e ric a , 1 9 1 4 - 1 7 ( M i l l i s ) , 2 5

R eal W ar ( N i x o n ) , 3 3 5

R o b e r t s o n , R e v . M a r io n G . (" P a t" ), 3 6 0 ,

R e c o n s t r u c t io n F in a n c e C o r p o r a t io n , 1 8 , 70

R e d A le r t ( T V f i l m ) , 3 5 5

481 R o b e s o n , P a u l, 1 3 2 ,1 4 6 - 4 7 ,1 4 8 R o b in s o n , E d w a r d G ., 5 4

R e d -b a itin g , 1 1 7 ,1 3 3 ,1 4 8 ,1 5 0 ,1 7 4 - 7 5

R o b in s o n , J a c k ie , 1 4 6 - 4 7

R e d S ca re: p o s t- W o r ld W a r 1 ,9; M c C a r ­

R o c k e f e lle r , N e l s o n A ., 1 3 9 ,2 8 6

th y e r a , 1 4 8 ,1 7 0 - 7 7 ,1 8 5 ,2 0 1

R o c k 'n 'r o ll, 1 6 8

R ed S to rm R is in g ( C l a n c y ) , 3 9 8

R o c k w e ll, N o r m a n , 9 0

R e g io n a l in d u s tr ia l c o n c e n tr a tio n , 4 6 ;

R oe v. W ade ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 3 2 6 , 4 5 2

d e f e n s e in d u s tr ie s , 7 2 ,1 4 2 ,1 5 4 - 5 5 ,

R ogers, R oy, 298

2 7 8 ,4 0 0 - 4 0 1

R o g e r s , W i l l i a m P ., 3 1 6 , 3 1 7

INDEX

R o o s e v e lt , E le a n o r , 1 5 ,2 7 ,5 4 ,1 4 8 ,1 6 6 ;

S89

S A L T B (1 9 7 9 ): N ix o n a n d , 3 1 1 ,3 3 1 ; C a r ­

a n d n a tio n a l h e a lt h in s u r a n c e , 4 9 ,1 2 4 ;

te r a n d , 3 4 5 ,3 4 8 ,3 4 9 ,3 7 6 ,3 8 2 ; o p p o s i­

r u m o r s a n d a tta c k s o n , 9 5 ,1 0 1 ,2 0 2 ;

t io n to , 3 4 8 ,3 5 2 ,3 7 8 ; a n d M X m is s ile ,

a n d W o r ld W a r II, 1 0 3 ,1 0 6 ,1 0 8 ; a n d m ilita r y d e s e g r e g a tio n , 1 4 5 ,1 4 6 R o o s e v e lt , F r a n k lin D ., 1 2 7 ,1 8 4 ,4 4 9 ; in ­ v o c a tio n o f w a r a g a in s t d e p r e s s io n , 1 5 -2 0 ; a s a s s is ta n t se c r e ta r y o f n a v y ,

3 4 9 ,3 8 2 ,3 8 3 ; R e a g a n a n d , 4 0 4

S a n d s o f lw o Jim a ( f i l m ) , 1 6 8 S A N E (N a tio n a l C o m m itte e fo r a S a n e N u c le a r P o lic y ), 2 4 8

S a tu rd a y E v e n in g P o st, 7 8

17; a n d m ilita r iz a tio n , 1 7 ,1 2 4 ,5 0 2 ; a n d

S a tu r d a y N ig h t M a ssa c r e , 3 2 8

r a c ia l d is c r im in a t io n , 2 1 ,5 0 ,1 0 0 ,1 0 1 ,

S a u d i A r a b ia , 4 6 2 ; in P e r s ia n G u lf W a r,

1 0 3 ,1 0 4 ,1 4 7 ; a n d p a s s a g e o f N e w

4 6 5 ,4 6 9 ,4 7 2

D e a l le g is la tio n , 2 1 ,7 8 - 7 9 ,1 2 1 ; o n

S a v a g e , P a u l, 3 8 5

N e w D e a l a s p r e p a r a tio n fo r w a r , 2 2 -

S c h e ll, J o n a th a n , 2 6 7 ,2 8 8 ,2 9 0 ,3 3 9 ,3 5 4 ,

2 4 ,3 1 ; a n d p r e s id e n tia l w a r -m a k in g

355

p o w e r , 2 6 ,6 0 - 6 1 ; d o m e s tic d iffi­

S c h la fly , P h y llis , 3 7 2 - 7 3 ,3 7 4

c u lt ie s , 2 8 - 2 9 ; a n d M u n ic h c r is is , 2 9 -

S c h l e s i n g e r , A r t h u r M . , J r ., 1 6 3 - 6 6 , 2 3 3 ,

3 0 ; a n d t e c h n o lo g y o f w a r , 3 0 ,3 4 ,3 8 ;

2 3 5 ,3 1 2 ,4 6 7 ,4 9 9

n a tio n a l s e c u r ity d e fin itio n , 3 0 - 3 6 ,4 4 ,

S c h l e s i n g e r , J a m e s R ., 3 3 1 , 3 3 8

5 0 ,7 9 ,1 1 9 - 2 0 ; a n d e c o n o m ic m o b iliz ­

S c h m id t, H e lm u t , 3 4 7

a tio n fo r w a r , 3 1 - 3 2 ,4 3 ,4 5 - 4 6 ,6 9 - 7 1 ,

S c h m itz , J o h n , 3 7 3

7 4 ,7 7 ,1 3 6 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

S c h r o e d e r , P a tr ic ia , 3 6 9 , 3 7 0 ,4 8 8

1 9 4 0 ,3 3 , 4 2 ; a n d c o n s c r i p t i o n , 3 3 , 4 8 ;

S c h w a r z k o p f, N o r m a n , 4 6 7 - 6 8 ,4 7 1 ,4 7 3 ,

a n d " G r e a t D e b a te " o n in te r v e n t io n , 3 8 - 3 9 ,4 1 ,5 4 ,5 7 - 6 1 ; a n d c e n tr a liz a ­

4 7 5 ,4 8 0 S c ie n c e a n d s c ie n tis ts , 7 8 ,1 1 9 ; a n d n u ­

t io n o f f e d e r a l a u th o r ity , 4 7 ,1 2 4 ; a n d

c le a r p o lic y , 1 3 7 ,2 0 3 - 4 ,2 2 1 ; a llia n c e

s o c ia l w e lfa r e p r o g r a m s , 4 9 ,5 0 ,7 9 ;

w it h g o v e r n m e n t, 1 3 9 - 4 0 ,1 6 6 - 6 7 ;

a n d th r e a ts o f s u b v e r s io n , 5 1 ,5 2 ; a n d

p o p u la r m is tr u s t o f, 1 6 6 - 6 7 ,2 0 3 ,2 2 1 ,

P e a r l H a r b o r a tta c k , 6 2 ,6 4 ,6 5 ,2 8 7 ;

2 7 6 ; a n d s p a c e p r o g r a m , 2 1 6 ,2 1 8 ,2 2 0 ;

p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

1 9 4 4 ,7 8 , 8 0 ,

a n d d is e a s e , 2 6 3 ,4 2 5

8 8 ,9 1 ; a s w a r le a d e r , 8 3 ,8 4 ,9 0 ,9 1 ,1 0 0 ,

S cience a n d S u r v iv a l ( C o m m o n e r ) , 2 7 6

3 1 8 ,4 8 8 ; a n d p la n n in g fo r p o s tw a r

S c o tt, H u g h , 3 2 0

e r a , 8 4 - 8 5 , 8 6 - 8 7 , 1 1 6 ; a n d G I B ill, 1 0 9

S c r e e n A c to r s G u ild , 3 9 3

R o o s e v e lt, T h e o d o r e , 1 ,3 ,1 7 ,3 6 4

" S e c o n d -s tr ik e " fo r c e , 2 2 2

" R o o s e v e lt 's T r e e A r m y ," 2 1 , 2 2

S e le c tiv e S e r v ic e A c t (1 9 1 7 ), 8

R o o t, E lih u , 7

S e le c tiv e S e r v ic e A c t (1 9 4 0 ), 4 8 ,4 9

R o o ts ( H a l e y ) , 3 2 6

S erg ea n t Y ork ( f i l m ) , 5 4

R o r a b a u g h , W illia m , 2 7 3

S e r v ic e m e n 's R e a d j u s t m e n t A c t (G I B ill,

R o sen b erg , A n n a , 150

1 9 4 4 ), 7 8 - 7 9 ,1 0 9 - 1 1 ,1 1 2 ,2 2 7 - 2 8 ,4 8 1

R o s e n b e r g , J u liu s a n d E th e l, 1 7 3

S even D a y s in M a y ( f i l m ) , 2 4 2

R o s e n th a l, J o e, 1 6 7 ,1 6 8 ,2 3 1

S e x u a lity , 1 6 9

R o s h w a ld , M o r d e c a i, 2 0 4

S h a w , I r w in , 1 6 3

R o s s ite r , C lin to n , 1 8 5

S h e ld o n , L o u , 4 8 7

R o s t o w , W a lt W ., 2 5 1 , 2 7 0

S h e p a r d , A la n , 2 4 0 - 4 1

R u b in , J erry , 2 9 3

S h e r r o d , R o b ert, 9 2

R u sk , D e a n , 2 5 2 ,2 7 2 ,2 7 5 ,2 9 6

S h ilts , R a n d y , 4 5 6

R u s s e l l , R i c h a r d B ., 2 1 1 - 1 2

S h o u p , D a v id , 2 7 5

R u s t, M a tth ia s , 4 3 8

S h r iv e r , S a r g e n t, 2 6 0 ,2 6 1 ,3 1 9 - 2 0

R u s tin , B a y a r d , 1 4 8 ,2 0 8 ,2 5 7

S h u l t z , G e o r g e P ., 3 9 4 , 4 0 6 S h u te , N e v il, 2 0 4

S a k h a r o v , A n d r e i D ., 4 3 8 - 3 9 S A L T I (S tr a te g ic A r m s L im ita tio n T r ea ty , 1 9 7 2 ), 3 1 1 ,3 4 5

S id e y , H u g h , 3 3 8 S ih a n o u k , N o r o d o m , 3 1 4

S ix C rises ( N i x o n ) , 3 0 8 S la u g h terh o u se-F ive ( V o n n e g u t ) , 3 0 5

S 90

INDEX

S le d g e , E u g e n e , 9 5

1 8 3 ,2 2 2 - 2 4 ; a n d A m e r ic a n r a c e r e la ­

S m ith , G a d d is , 3 5 0 ,3 8 4

t io n s , 1 4 6 - 4 7 ; in R e d S c a r e r h e to r ic ,

S m it h , R e v . G e r a ld L . K ., 5 1

1 7 0 ,1 7 3 ,1 7 4 ; a n d K o r e a n W a r, 1 7 8 ,

S m ith , M a r g a r e t C h a s e , 1 4 9 - 5 0

1 7 9 ,1 8 1 - 8 2 ; d e v e lo p m e n t o f h y d r o ­

S m it h , W a lte r B e d e ll, 1 4 0

g e n b o m b , 183; E is e n h o w e r a n d c o o p ­

S m ith A c t (1 9 4 0 ), 5 2

e r a tio n w it h , 1 8 9 ,1 9 0 ,1 9 9 ,2 0 2 ;

S o c ia lis m , 5 0 4

e c o n o m ic p o w e r , 2 1 3 ; S p u tn ik la u n c h ,

S o c ia l w e lfa r e p r o g r a m s : C iv il W a r p e n ­

2 1 4 - 1 6 ,2 2 0 ; s u p p o s e d m ilita r y s u p e r i­

s io n s , 5; n a tio n a l s e c u r ity r a tio n a le fo r ,

o r ity o f, 2 1 5 - 1 9 ,2 2 2 ,2 4 1 ,3 5 9 ,3 7 6 ,3 7 9 ;

4 7 - 4 8 ,5 0 ,7 9 ,1 1 2 ,2 0 6 ,4 9 5 ; N e w D e a l

U .S . s p y i n g o n , 2 1 7 - 1 8 ,2 2 6 ; a n d a r m s

a n d , 7 8 - 7 9 ; W o r ld W a r H a n d , 1 0 9 - 1 2

c o n tr o l, 2 2 0 - 2 1 ,3 4 5 ,3 4 6 ,3 8 2 ,4 0 4 ,4 1 3 ;

S o il B a n k , 2 1 3

a n d a r m s r a c e , 2 2 2 ,3 2 4 ,3 4 0 ,3 5 6 ,3 8 7 ,

S o ld ier o f F ortun e, 4 4 9

4 0 8 ; K e n n e d y a n d c o n fr o n ta tio n w ith ,

S o ld ie r s : t r a in in g o f , 5 ; i n W o r ld W a r II,

2 3 8 ,2 3 9 ,2 4 1 ,2 4 4 - 4 5 ; s p a c e p r o g r a m ,

9 0 - 9 1 ,9 3 - 9 7 ,1 0 0 ; h o m o s e x u a ls a s, 9 4 ,

2 3 8 ,2 5 8 ; a n d d e t e n te , 2 4 2 ,3 2 3 ,3 7 7 ;

1 0 4 ,4 8 8 - 8 9 ; in W o r ld W a r 1 ,96 ;

a n d C u b a n m is s ile c r is is , 2 4 6 - 4 7 ,2 6 9 ;

w o m e n a s , 1 0 5 ; a n d a to m ic b o m b in g

a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 2 8 5 ,3 3 5 ; N ix o n a n d

o f J a p a n , 11 5 ; in K o r e a n W a r, 186; in V ie tn a m W a r, 2 6 8 - 6 9 .

See a lso A r m e d

fo r c e s; O ffic e r s ; V e te r a n s

d e te n te w ith , 3 1 0 ,3 2 3 - 2 4 ,3 3 4 - 3 5 ; J e w is h e m ig r a tio n fr o m , 3 2 3 ,4 2 9 ; a n d Y o m K ip p u r W a r, 3 2 8 ; w a r in A fg h a n i­

S o lz h e n its y n , A le x a n d e r , 3 8 3

s ta n , 3 3 9 ,3 7 4 ,3 7 5 ,3 7 6 ,3 7 7 ,3 9 9 ,4 0 3 ;

S o m a lia , 4 8 2

R e a g a n 's h o s t ile r h e to r ic t o w a r d , 3 4 1 ,

S o n g o f R u ssia ( f i l m ) , 1 7 0

3 7 9 ,3 8 1 ,3 9 4 ,3 9 9 ,4 0 3 - 4 ,4 0 9 ; C a r te r

S o n ta g , S u s a n , 2 7 6 ,4 5 8 ,4 6 0

a n d , 3 4 5 ,3 4 6 - 4 7 ,3 4 9 ,3 7 4 - 7 5 ,3 7 6 ; a n d

S oren sen , T h eod ore, 233

n u c l e a r w a r , 3 5 3 , 3 7 9 - 8 1 , 4 0 4 ; U .S .

S o u th e a s t A s ia T r e a ty O r g a n iz a tio n ,

g r a in s a le s to , 3 7 5 ,3 8 3 ; r iv a lr y w it h

1 9 8 -9 9 S o u th K o r e a , 3 4 5 ,3 9 6 ; in K o r e a n W a r, 1 7 7 - 7 8 ,1 8 2 ,1 9 7 ,4 6 5 ; im m ig r a tio n fro m , 4 2 9 S o u th V ie tn a m , 2 8 5 ,3 1 4 ; D ie m r e g im e ,

C h in a , 3 7 7 ,3 9 9 ; e c o n o m ic w e a k n e s s , 3 8 7 ,3 9 9 ; R e a g a n a n d U .S . r e la t io n s w it h , 4 0 4 ,4 0 8 - 9 ,4 1 2 - 1 4 ,4 3 5 ; S tr a te g ic D e f e n s e I n itia tiv e a n d , 4 0 6 - 8 ,4 1 2 ; W e s te r n c u ltu r a l in v a s io n o f, 4 0 9 - 1 0 ;

1 9 9 ,2 5 0 ,2 5 3 ; U .S . b o m b i n g in , 2 6 7 - 6 8 ,

G o r b a c h e v r e fo r m s , 4 1 2 ,4 1 4 ; c o lla p s e

2 8 8 ; N o r th V ie tn a m e s e c o n q u e s t o f,

o f , 4 3 6 ,4 3 8 - 3 9 ,4 4 2 ,4 6 3 ; a n d P e r s ia n

335

G u lf W a r, 4 6 2 - 6 3 ,4 6 5 ; m ilita r iz a tio n

S o v ie t U n io n : N a z i n o n a g g r e s s io n p a c t,

o f, 4 9 9 ,5 0 3

3 7 ; t o t a lit a r ia n is m in , 3 7 ; G e r m a n in ­

S p a c e ra ce, 2 1 4 - 1 7 ,2 1 9 ,2 2 7 ,2 3 7 - 4 1 ,2 5 8

v a s io n o f, 4 1 ,5 8 ,6 0 ,8 4 ; r o le in w a r

S p a n is h -A m e r ic a n W a r, 4 , 5 , 6

a g a in s t G e r m a n y , 4 5 ,8 3 ,8 4 ,9 9 ; L e n d -

S p a n is h C iv il W a r, 2 6

L e a s e a i d t o , 6 9 ; W o r l d W a r II c a s u ­

Sparkm an, John, 188

a ltie s , 8 0 ; in U n ite d N a tio n s , 8 7 ; e s p io ­

S p e llm a n , F r a n c is , C a r d in a l, 1 5 9 ,2 9 3

n a g e b y , 8 7 ,1 2 6 ,1 7 3 ; w a r tim e a llia n c e

S p illa n e , M ic k e y , 1 8 8

w ith , 8 7 - 8 8 ,3 9 3 ,5 0 2 ; a n d C o ld W a r

" S p in -o ff" t e c h n o lo g ie s , 1 4 3 ,3 8 9 ,4 1 7

c o n flic t, 8 8 ,1 2 4 - 2 7 ,2 2 6 ,2 4 5 ,3 7 5 ,3 7 7 -

S p o c k , B e n ja m in , 2 9 4

7 9 ,4 1 2 ,4 9 8 ; a n d w a r a g a in s t J a p a n ,

S p u tn ik p a n ic , 1 6 9 ,2 2 9 ; a n d s p a c e r a c e ,

1 1 5 ; U .S . p l a n s f o r n u c l e a r a t t a c k o n ,

2 1 4 ,2 1 7 ; a n d m ilita r iz a tio n , 2 1 6 ,2 1 7 ,

1 2 0 ,1 3 4 - 3 5 ,1 7 9 ,1 8 2 ,1 8 3 ,1 9 4 ,2 4 5 ,

2 1 8 ,2 2 0 ,2 3 2 ; a n d e d u c a t io n , 2 2 7 ,4 2 3 -

3 8 1 ; a n d A m e r ic a n m ilita r iz a tio n , 1 2 5 ,

24

1 2 9 - 3 0 ,3 3 8 - 3 9 ,3 7 4 ,3 9 0 ,4 4 2 ; a n d

" S t a g fla t io n ," 3 2 9

E a s te r n E u r o p e a n r e g im e s , 1 2 5 ,3 4 1 ;

S ta lin , J o s e p h V , 1 5 7 ,1 6 2 - 6 3 ,4 5 2 ; in

" c o n ta in m e n t" o f, 1 2 6 ,1 2 7 ; b lo c k a d e

W o r ld W a r n , 8 3 ,8 4 ,8 7 ; T r u m a n a n d ,

o f B e r lin , 1 2 8 - 2 9 ,2 4 4 - 4 5 ; d e v e l o p ­

1 2 3 -2 4 ; A m e r ic a n fe a r o f, 1 2 6 ,1 2 7 ,

m e n t o f a t o m ic b o m b , 1 2 9 ,1 3 4 ,1 7 3 ;

1 3 1 ; c o m p a r e d to H itle r , 1 3 2 ,1 3 3 ; a n d

A m e r ic a n fe a r o f, 1 3 1 ,1 3 4 ,1 6 4 ,2 2 1 , 3 5 2 - 5 3 ; a n d n u c le a r d e te r r e n c e , 1 3 5 ,

K o rea n W ar, 178; d e a th o f, 1 90 S ta lin is m , 1 2 7

INDEX

S9

S ta llo n e , S y lv e s te r , 3 6 1

8 0 - 8 2 ,9 6 ; m ilit a r y " s p in - o f f s ," 1 4 3 ,

S ta n n a r d , D a v id , 4 6 1

3 8 9 ,4 1 7 ; a n d m ilita r iz a tio n , 2 0 3 ; S tr a ­

S ta n to n , F ra n k , 3 0 2

t e g ic D e f e n s e I n itia tiv e a n d , 4 0 7 - 8

S ta n w y c k , B arb ara, 1 0 7

T e h r a n C o n fe r e n c e (1 9 4 3 ), 8 4

S ta r k , H a r o ld , 5 8

T e le v is io n : V ie t n a m W a r c o v e r a g e , 2 8 7 ,

S ta rk , U S S , 4 0 3

2 8 8 - 8 9 ; P e r s ia n G u lf W a r c o v e r a g e ,

S ta r W ars ( f i l m ) , 3 5 3 - 5 4 , 3 6 1 , 4 0 6

470

S te a lth t e c h n o lo g y , 3 8 9 S te in b e c k , J o h n , 4 9

T e lle r , E d w a r d , 1 4 0 , 2 0 3 ,2 1 4 , 2 2 0 ,2 2 1 , 4 0 1 ,-4 0 5

S te in e r n , G lo r ia , 3 0 3

T e n n e s s e e V a lle y A u th o r ity , 1 9

S t e v e n s o n , A d l a i E ., 1 5 1 , 1 7 2 , 2 0 0 ; p r e s i ­

T e r r o r is m , 4 1 1 , 4 4 5 - 4 6

d e n tia l c a m p a ig n s , 1 7 4 ,1 8 8 - 8 9 ,2 0 4 S t i m s o n , H e n r y L ., 7 , 1 7 , 1 1 6 , 1 3 9 ; a n d N e w D e a l, 1 8 ; a n d W o r ld W a r II, 5 8 ,

T erry , R a n d a ll, 4 5 1 T et O ffe n s iv e , 2 6 9 - 7 0 ,2 7 8 ,2 8 4 ,2 8 7 - 9 2 , 314

6 1 ,7 2 - 7 3 ,9 2 ,1 1 3 ; a n d n u c le a r a r m s

T h a tc h e r , M a r g a r e t, 3 9 8 ,4 6 4

race, 134

T h ie u , N g u y e n V a n .

S t o n e , I. R , 1 6 6 , 1 8 1 , 2 0 5 , 2 1 7 , 2 3 7 , 2 4 5 , 259

See N g u y e n V a n

T h ie u T h ir d W o r ld : d e c o lo n iz a t io n , 8 7 ; e c o ­

S to r m e r , J o h n , 2 4 2

n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t, 1 6 1 ; C o ld W a r

S tr a te g ic A ir C o m m a n d , 3 8 6

c o n flic t in , 1 9 6 ,2 1 5 ,2 4 1 ,3 3 8 - 3 9 ,3 4 6 -

S tr a te g ic A r m s R e d u c tio n t a lk s (S T A R T ), 413 S tr a te g ic D e f e n s e I n itia tiv e (S D I), 3 9 4 , 3 9 7 ,4 0 0 ,4 0 5 - 8 ,4 1 2 ,4 1 3 S tu d e n t N o n v io le n t C o o r d in a tin g C o m ­ m itte e , 2 7 5 ,2 7 6

4 7 ,3 7 7 ,4 1 4 ; n a tio n a lis m , 1 9 8

T h is Is th e A r m y , 1 0 4 T h o m a s , C la r e n c e , 4 7 7 T h o m a s , J. P a r n e l l , 1 7 0 T h om as, N o rm a n , 53 T h o m p so n , D o ro th y , 2 6 -2 7

S tu d e n t s fo r a D e m o c r a tic S o c ie ty , 2 5 9

T h r e e M ile I s la n d n u c le a r a c c id e n t, 3 5 5

S u b u r b a n iz a tio n , 1 1 1 , 1 5 8 ,2 1 0

T h u rb er, Jam es, 4 2

S u e z C a n a l c r is is , 2 0 0

T h u r m o n d , J. S t r o m , 1 4 6 , 1 4 8 , 4 9 0

S u n b e lt s ta te s , 7 2

T ib b e ts , P a u l, 3 5 0

S u n u n u , J o h n H ., 4 3 3 ,4 6 2

T im e, 1 1 4 , 2 6 7 , 3 2 8 , 3 3 7 - 3 8 , 3 6 8 , 3 7 5 , 4 7 7

S u p e r c o m p u te r s, 4 0 0

T o k y o , b o m b in g o f, 6 7 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 4

S u p e r w e a p o n , c u lt o f, 2 ,3 5 9

T o n k in G u lf r e s o lu tio n (1 9 6 4 ), 2 5 0 - 5 1

S u p p ly - s id e e c o n o m ic s , 4 1 6 ,4 1 8

T o s c a n in i, A r tu r o , 1 0 3

S u s m a n , W a rr en , 2 3 - 2 4 ,1 6 1

T o ta lita r ia n is m , 3 6 - 3 7 ,1 1 4 ,1 2 4 ,1 3 3 ,1 6 1 ,

S w a g g a r t , R e v . J im m y , 4 2 7

164

S w o p e , G e r a ld , 1 8

T o w e r , J o h n G ., 2 6 0 ,4 3 6

S y m in g to n , S tu a r t, 1 4 0

T r a d e d e fic its , 3 2 9

S y r ia , 4 1 0

T rade w ar, 4 4 6 -4 9

S z ila r d , L e o , 1 1 4

T r a d in g w it h th e E n e m y A c t (1 9 1 7 ), 1 9 " T r a d itio n a l" v a lu e s , 4 2 8 , 4 2 9 ,4 4 9

T a ft, R o b e r t A ., 5 5 ,7 8 ,1 3 3 , 1 7 5 ,1 7 9 , 1 8 4 , 196 T a ft-H a r tle y A c t (1 9 4 7 ), 1 7 6 T a ilh o o k a ffa ir , 4 7 8 , 4 8 8 T a iw a n , 1 9 7 ,1 9 9 ,3 7 8

Tales o f th e C i ty ( M a u p i n ) , 4 2 7 T a y lo r , M a x w e ll D ., 2 0 3 ,2 2 4 ,2 5 1 ,2 5 3 " T e c h n o c r a c y ," 2 2 0 T e c h n o lo g y : A m e r ic a n fa s c in a tio n w it h , 1 0 - 1 1 ,3 4 - 3 5 ,3 8 - 3 9 ; in R o o s e v e lt's c o n c e p t io n o f n a tio n a l s e c u r ity , 3 0 ,3 4 , 3 5 , 3 8 , 1 1 9 - 2 0 ; r o le in W o r ld W a r II, 4 1 ,

T r a d itio n a l V a lu e s C o a lit io n , 4 8 7

T ra g e d y o f A m e ric a n D ip lo m a c y ( W i l ­ lia m s ), 2 3 0 T r id e n t s u b m a r in e s , 4 0 1 - 2 T r u m a n , H a r r y S ., 1 3 9 , 1 5 7 , 1 5 9 , 3 3 2 ; a n d a to m ic b o m b in g o f J a p a n , 8 1 ,1 1 4 ,1 1 5 , 1 1 6 ,1 1 9 ; s e le c t e d a s R o o s e v e lt 's r u n ­ n in g m a te , 9 1; a n d C o ld W a r c o n flic t, 1 1 6 ,1 2 6 ,1 2 7 ,1 2 8 ,1 9 2 ; a n d p o s tw a r d e m o b iliz a tio n , 1 18; a n d a n tic o m m u ­ n is m , 1 2 3 ,1 2 9 ,1 5 3 ,1 7 8 ,1 9 2 ,2 4 1 ; n a ­ tio n a liz a tio n o f in d u s tr ie s , 1 2 3 - 2 4 , 185; a n d C h in e s e c iv il w a r , 129; a n d

592

T rum an

INDEX

(c o n tin u e d )

a n d W o r ld W a r II, 5 9 , 6 8 , 7 4 ; p a s s a g e

d e f e n s e s p e n d in g , 1 3 0 ,1 3 6 ,1 4 4 ; fir in g

o f G I B ill, 1 0 9 ; a n d c o n t r o l o f a r m e d

o f W a lla c e , 1 3 3 ,1 5 3 ; a n d m ilit a r iz a ­

f o r c e s , 1 1 6 - 1 7 ,1 3 7 ; a n d M a r s h a ll P la n ,

tio n , 1 3 6 - 3 8 ,1 8 4 ; c o n flic ts w it h M a c -

1 2 8 ; c r e a tio n o f n a tio n a l s e c u r it y s y s ­

A r th u r , 1 3 6 - 3 7 ,1 8 0 - 8 1 ,1 8 4 ; a n d

te m , 1 3 7 -3 9 ; a n d d e s e g r e g a tio n o f

n u c le a r p o lic y , 1 3 7 ,1 9 3 ; a n d r a c e r e la ­

a r m e d fo r c e s, 145; a n d P le d g e o f A lle ­

t io n s , 1 4 4 ,1 4 6 ; d e s e g r e g a t io n o f a r m e d

g ia n c e , 17 0 ; a n tic o m m u n is t a g ita tio n

fo r c e s, 1 4 5 - 4 6 ,4 9 0 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m ­

in , 1 7 5 ,2 0 1 ; a n d K o r e a n W a r , 1 7 9 ,1 8 4 ;

p a ig n o f

1948,1 4 6 ; a n d w o m e n ' s

S e n a te tr e a ty r a tific a tio n p o w e r , 2 0 1 ;

r ig h ts , 1 5 0 ; a n d A m e r ic a n I n d ia n s ,

E is e n h o w e r a n d , 2 0 2 ,2 2 5 -2 6 ; a n d n a ­

1 5 4 ; a n d R e d S c a r e , 1 7 1 ,1 7 2 ,1 7 4 ,1 7 5 ;

tio n a l h ig h w a y s y s te m , 2 0 6 - 7 ; c iv il

c o n d u c t o f K o r e a n W a r, 1 7 8 - 8 1 ,1 8 4 ,

r ig h ts le g is la tio n , 2 1 1 ; a n d e n v ir o n ­

197; a n d p r e s id e n tia l w a r -m a k in g

m e n ta l p r o te c tio n , 2 1 3 ; a n d s p a c e p r o ­

p o w e r , 1 7 9 ,1 8 4 - 8 5 ; th r e a ts o f n u c le a r

g r a m , 2 4 0 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 2 5 0 - 5 1 ,

w e a p o n u s e , 1 8 0 ,1 8 2 ,1 9 5 ; a n d p r e s i­

2 6 1 ,3 1 2 ,3 2 7 ,3 3 5 ; a n d w a r o n p o v e r ty ,

d e n tia l e le c tio n o f

1952, 1 8 8 , 1 8 9

T r u m a n D o c t r in e , 1 2 8 ,1 3 1

2 6 1 ,2 6 5 ,2 6 6 ,3 1 1 ; S e n a te h e a r in g s o n V ie tn a m , 2 7 5 ; a n d w o m e n in a r m e d

T u rk ey , 1 2 6 - 2 7 ,1 8 2

fo r c e s, 3 0 1 ,3 6 7 -6 8 ; N ix o n a n d , 3 0 8 ,

T w a in , M a r k , 2 - 3 ,3 0 5

3 1 2 ,3 3 2 ; a n d d e f e n s e s p e n d in g , 3 2 3 , 4 0 1 ,4 1 6 ,4 4 3 ; p a s s a g e o f E q u a l R ig h ts

U d a l l , M o r r i s K ., 3 5 0 U n e m p lo y m e n t, 1 5 ,4 7 U n it e d E le c tr ic a l W o r k e r s , 1 7 6 U n i t e d F r u it C o m p a n y , 2 0 0 U n ite d N a tio n s , 8 6 ,8 8 ,1 1 6 ,1 2 3 ,1 3 1 ; R o o s e v e lt a n d , 87; e s ta b lis h m e n t o f, 1 1 3 ; A m e r ic a n o p p o s it io n to , 1 1 7 ,2 0 2 ; i n K o r e a n W a r , 1 7 9 ; a n d U .S . d r u g w a r , 4 5 7 ; in P e r s ia n G u lf W a r, 4 6 5 ,4 6 7 , 4 7 4 ; S o m a lia o p e r a tio n , 4 8 2 ; in B o s ­ n ia n c iv il w a r , 4 8 6 U .S . A ir F o r c e , 8 6 ; e m p l o y m e n t , 9 5 ; a n d a to m ic w e a p o n s , 1 1 4 - 1 5 ,1 3 0 ,1 3 3 ; in ­ d e p e n d e n c e fr o m a rm y , 137; a n d d e ­ s e g r e g a tio n , 145; in K o r e a n W a r, 181; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 19 4 ; in V ie tn a m W a r, 2 7 1 ,3 1 4 U .S . A r m y , 5 ,2 7 ; o p e r a t i o n o f C C C , 2 1 ; A r m y A ir F o r c e s (A A F ), 2 7 - 2 8 ,8 0 - 8 1 , 8 3 ; in W o r ld W a r II, 4 8 ,9 3 ; b la c k s in , 102; p e r s o n n e l, 196; e n fo r c e m e n t o f L ittle R o c k d e s e g r e g a t io n , 2 1 1 ; V ie t ­ n am W ar an d , 385 U .S . C o a s t G u a r d , 3 6 8 U .S . C o n g r e s s : p r o m o t i o n o f w a r - r e la t e d in d u s t r ie s , 2 ,1 4 2 ,3 8 9 ; a n d m ilita r iz a tio n , 9 ,3 7 ,2 7 7 ,3 2 3 ; a n d N e w D e a l le g is la tio n , 1 9 ,2 1 ; a n d r a c ia l d is c r im in a t io n , 2 1 ; n e u tr a lity la w s , 25 ; a n d w a r -m a k in g p o w e r , 2 6 ,1 7 9 ,1 8 4 ,3 3 2 ,3 3 7 ,4 6 8 ; a n d c o n s c r ip tio n , 3 3 ,4 5 ,4 8 ,1 2 1 ,1 2 3 ,1 3 0 ; H o u s e C o m m itte e o n U n -A m e r ic a n A c tiv itie s (H U A C ), 5 2 ,1 4 6 - 4 7 ,1 7 0 ;

A m e n d m e n t, 3 2 6 ,3 7 2 ; a n d W a te r g a te c r is is , 3 3 4 ; C a r te r a n d , 3 4 7 ,3 5 0 ; a n d R e a g a n m ilita r y b u ild u p , 3 9 7 ,4 0 1 ,4 0 7 , 4 1 0 ; a n d n u c le a r fr e e z e , 4 0 5 ; a n d N ic a ­ r a g u a n C o n tr a w a r , 4 1 0 ; a n d b u d g e t d e fic its , 4 1 6 ,4 2 1 ; a b o r tio n r ig h ts r e ­ s tr ic tio n s , 4 2 6 ; B u s h a n d , 4 3 3 ,4 6 8 ; a n d A I D S c r is is , 4 5 9 ; a n d P e r s ia n G u lf W a r, 4 6 4 ,4 6 8 ; S e n a te T h o m a s -H ill h e a r in g s , 4 7 7 ; C lin to n a n d , 4 8 3 - 8 6 , 4 9 5 ; a n d g a y s in a r m e d fo r c e s, 4 8 9 ; a n d C o n tr a c t w it h A m e r ic a , 4 9 5 U .S . C o n s t it u t io n , 1 6 ,1 7 0 ,3 3 3 U .S . D e f e n s e D e p a r t m e n t : e m p l o y m e n t , 138; M c C a r th y 's a tta c k s o n , 1 7 2 ; r e ­ se a rc h a n d d e v e lo p m e n t b u d g e ts , 2 1 9 - 2 0 ; a n d V ie tn a m W a r, 2 5 5 ; a n d g a y s in a r m e d fo r c e s , 3 6 9 ,4 8 7 ,4 8 9 ; a n d m ilita r iz a tio n , 3 8 5 ,3 8 8 - 8 9 ; a n d R e a g a n m ilita r y b u ild u p , 4 0 0 ,4 0 1 ,4 0 7 ; c o r r u p tio n s c a n d a ls , 4 1 7 U .S . E n e r g y D e p a r t m e n t , 4 0 1 U .S . H o l o c a u s t M e m o r i a l M u s e u m , 3 5 7 5 8 ,3 6 3 ,4 8 5 U .S . M ilit a r y A c a d e m y , 2 U .S . N a v y , 5 , 6 , 2 7 ; in W o r ld W a r II, 5 9 , 83; w o m e n in , 3 6 8 ; R e a g a n a n d , 4 0 2 ; T a ilh o o k a ffa ir , 4 7 8 ,4 8 8 U .S . N a v y D e p a r t m e n t , 6 4

U .S . N e w s a n d W o rld R e p o rt , 1 3 6 , 2 4 7 - 4 8 U .S . P o s t O f f i c e , 1 0 6 , 1 3 8 U .S . S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , 8 8 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 8 , 1 6 8 ; a n d r a c e r e la t io n s , 1 4 6 ,1 4 8 ; m o d e m a rt e x h ib it, 1 5 6 -5 7 ; M c C a r th y 's a tta c k s

INDEX

o n , 1 7 2 ,1 7 3 ,1 8 5 ; a n d K o r e a n W a r, 1 7 7 , 178; N ix o n a n d , 3 1 7 - 1 8 ,3 2 4 U .S . S u p r e m e C o u r t , 2 8 , 1 4 8 ,1 8 5 , 3 2 6 ,

593

3 0 7 ; a n d A m e r ic a n m ilita r iz a tio n , 2 7 4 7 5 ,2 7 7 ,2 7 8 ,2 8 3 ,2 9 1 ,2 9 5 - 9 6 ,3 0 7 ; S e n ­ a te h e a r in g s o n , 2 7 5 ; a n tiw a r m o v e ­ m e n t, 2 7 6 ,2 8 8 ,2 9 2 - 9 7 ,3 0 2 - 4 ,3 2 3 ;

4 5 1 ,4 5 4 U .S . W a r D e p a r t m e n t , 4 , 1 0 , 6 6 , 1 0 1 , 1 3 7

a n d d e fe n s e s p e n d in g , 2 7 8 ,3 1 1 -1 2 ,

U n iv e r s itie s , 1 4 0 ,1 7 6 ,2 9 4 ,4 7 6

3 2 4 ; b o m b in g h a lts , 2 8 5 ,2 9 1 ; N ix o n

U n iv e r s it y o f C a lifo r n ia , 7 1

a n d , 2 8 6 ,2 9 1 ,3 0 7 ,3 1 0 - 1 5 ,3 1 7 ,3 1 9 ,

U p d ik e , J o h n , 3 9 0 ,4 4 0

3 2 1 ,3 2 4 - 2 5 ,3 3 3 ,3 6 2 ; m e d ia c o v e r a g e

U p w ard B ound, 260

o f, 2 8 7 -8 9 ; b o m b in g o f L a o s, 2 8 8 ;

U rban L eague, 257

b o m b in g o f C a m b o d ia , 2 8 8 ,3 1 2 ,3 1 3 ,

U SS

A r iz o n a A n c h o r M e m o r i a l , 3 5 1

U -2 s p y p la n e s , 2 1 7 - 1 8 ,2 2 6

3 1 4 ,3 3 2 ; " V ie tn a m iz a tio n " s tr a te g y , 2 9 1 ; w o m e n in , 3 0 1 ; a n d A m e r ic a n d e ­ m ilita r iz a tio n , 3 0 6 - 7 ,3 3 6 ; p e a c e a c ­ c o r d s , 3 1 4 ; in v a s io n s o f C a m b o d ia a n d

V a g ts , A lfr e d , 3 4 0 V a n c e , C y r u s R ., 3 4 7 , 3 5 3 , 3 7 5 , 3 8 4 V a n C r e v e ld , M a r tin , 4 4 3 - 4 4 V a n d e n b e r g , A r t h u r H ., 1 2 6 V e r s a ille s , T r e a ty o f (1 9 1 9 ), 1 0 ,8 5 V eter a n s: C iv il W a r p e n s io n s , 5; B o n u s A r m y m a r c h , 19; W o r ld W a r H , 7 7 ,9 0 , 9 2 - 9 3 , 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 1 2 4 ; G l B ill a n d , 1 0 9 12; K o r e a n W a r c a llu p , 1 8 1 ; o p p o s it io n

L a o s , 3 1 4 ,3 1 6 ; W a te r g a te s c a n d a l a n d , 3 3 3 ; N o r th V ie tn a m e s e c o n q u e s t, 3 3 5 ; F o r d a n d , 3 3 5 - 3 6 ; d r a ft r e s is te r s , 3 4 4 ; C a r te r a n d , 3 4 4 - 4 5 ,3 6 2 ; m o v ie s o n , 3 6 0 -6 2

V illage Voice, 4 6 6 - 6 7 V in cen n es, U S S , 4 0 3 V ita l C e n te r ( S c h l e s i n g e r ) , 1 6 3 V o lc k e r , P a u l R ., 4 1 5

to V ie tn a m W ar, 2 9 5 V e te r a n s A d m in is tr a tio n (V A ), 1 11

V ic to ry th rough A i r P ow er, 6 7

V o n n e g u t , K u r t , J r ., 3 0 5 , 4 3 3 V r e e la n d , D ia n a , 3 9 3

V ie t C o n g , 2 5 0 ,2 5 1 ,2 6 7 ,2 9 0 ,3 0 1 V ie tn a m , 1 9 8 - 9 9 ,3 4 4 ,3 6 2 .

See a lso N o r t h

V ie tn a m ; S o u th V ie tn a m

W a itin g f o r th e M o r n in g T rain ( C a t t o n ) , 3 0 5 -6

" V ie tn a m s y n d r o m e ," 4 6 3 - 6 4 ,4 7 4 , 4 7 5

W a le s a , L e c h , 4 3 6 ,4 3 8 - 3 9

V ie tn a m V e te r a n s M e m o r ia l, 3 6 3

W a lla c e , G e o r g e C , 2 5 5 ,3 0 7

V ie t n a m W a r, 3 3 9 ,4 4 9 ; e t h n ic A m e r ic a n s

W a lla c e , H e n r y A ., 1 1 7 ,1 6 4 ,1 7 4 - 7 5 ; a s

a n d , 1 0 3 ,4 2 8 - 2 9 ; s o c ia l e ffe c ts o f, 2 3 2 ,

v ic e p r e s id e n t, 6 7 ,9 1 ; d u m p e d b y R o o ­

2 7 9 ,2 9 9 - 3 0 1 ,3 1 9 ,3 2 7 ,3 5 7 ,3 9 6 ,4 5 9 -

s e v e lt, 9 1; a s se c r e ta r y o f c o m m e r c e ,

6 0 ; E is e n h o w e r a n d , 2 3 3 ,2 3 6 ; K e n ­

12 6 ; p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

n e d y a n d , 2 5 0 ,2 5 1 ; J o h n s o n a n d , 2 5 0 ,

1 3 3 ,1 4 6 ,1 4 8 ; fir e d b y T r u m a n , 1 3 3 ,

2 5 1 ,2 6 3 ,2 6 6 ,2 6 9 ,2 7 1 ,2 7 2 ,2 8 5 - 8 6 ,

153

1948,

2 9 0 - 9 1 ; b o m b in g o f N o r t h V ie tn a m ,

W all S tree t Journal, 4 5 3

2 5 0 - 5 1 , 2 7 0 - 7 1 , 2 9 1 , 3 1 4 , 3 2 1 ; U .S . e s ­

W ar: in A m e r ic a n h is to r y , x i - x i i , 1 ,1 1 ;

c a la tio n in , 2 5 0 - 5 4 ,2 6 6 - 6 7 ,2 7 2 ; W e s t­

r e la tio n to m ilita r iz a tio n , x iii- x iv , 1 1 ,

m o r e la n d a n d , 2 5 2 ,2 6 9 - 7 1 ,2 8 3 - 8 5 ,

5 0 0 ,5 0 3 ; a s " p la s t ic j u n c t u r e ," 8; in

2 9 0 - 9 1 ; b la c k s in , 2 5 5 - 5 6 ,2 6 4 ,2 7 5 ,

b lo o d o f m a le s , 9 - 1 0 ; p r e s id e n tia l

2 9 5 ,3 6 6 - 6 7 ; e c o n o m ic e ffe c ts o f, 2 6 1 ,

p o w e r o f w a g in g , 2 6 ,1 7 9 ,1 8 4 - 8 5 ,

2 6 5 ,2 7 7 - 7 8 ,3 2 6 ; c o n s c r ip tio n , 2 6 4 - 6 5 ,

3 3 2 - 3 3 ,3 3 8 ; m o d e m , d e s tr u c tiv e n e s s

2 7 5 ,2 7 9 ,2 9 5 ; b o m b in g in S o u th V ie t­

o f, 1 1 4 ,1 1 5 ,1 2 0 - 2 1 ,3 5 7 - 5 8 ; p r o ­

n a m , 2 6 7 - 6 8 ,2 8 8 ; s e a r c h -a n d -d e s tr o y

c la im e d o b s o le s c e n c e o f, 3 2 2 ,3 3 6 ,4 4 3 -

o p e r a t io n s , 2 6 8 ,2 8 4 ,3 1 4 ; s o ld ie r s in ,

4 4 ,5 0 1 - 2 ; r e la tio n to p r e s id e n tia l c o l­

2 6 8 - 6 9 ; T et O ffe n s iv e , 2 6 9 - 7 0 ,2 7 8 ,

la p s e s , 3 3 2 .

2 8 4 ,2 8 7 - 9 2 ,3 1 4 ; in flu e n c e o f W o r ld

See a lso N u c l e a r w a r

W a r, m e ta p h o r ic a l, 3 - 4 ,4 6 0 - 6 2 ; " m o r a l

W a r II a n d , 2 6 9 - 7 1 , 2 8 6 - 8 7 ; c a s u a l t i e s ,

e q u i v a l e n t o f ," 3 , 3 4 9 - 5 0 , 4 4 5 ; N e w

2 7 1 ,2 8 5 ,2 8 7 ; p r is o n e r s o f w a r , 2 7 1 ,

D e a l s tr u g g le w it h G r e a t D e p r e s s io n ,

3 2 5 ,3 3 2 ,3 6 2 - 6 3 ,4 5 9 - 6 0 ,4 7 5 ; p a tr io tic

1 5 - 2 0 ,2 1 ,2 9 ,3 1 - 3 2 ,7 9 ,1 2 4 ; a n d le g it­

c u ltu r e a n d , 2 7 2 ,2 9 7 - 9 9 ,3 5 1 ,3 6 1 ;

im a c y o f fe d e r a l a u th o r ity , 1 6 - 1 7 ,2 4 ,

p u b lic o p in io n a n d , 2 7 2 - 7 4 ,2 8 7 - 8 9 ,

2 9 ,4 5 7 - 5 8 ; a g a in s t p o v e r ty , 2 0 5 ,2 5 9 -

594

INDEX

W a r , m e t a p h o r i c a l ( c o n tin u e d )

W e lle s , S u m n e r , 5 8

6 3 ,2 6 5 ,3 1 9 - 2 0 ; J o h n s o n 's u s e s o f, 2 5 9 ,

W e lty , E u d o r a , 1 6 3

2 6 4 - 6 6 ,2 9 9 ,3 0 0 ,3 1 5 ,4 9 9 ; a g a in s t d is ­

W e s lin , R e v . N o r m a n , 4 5 1

e a s e , 2 6 3 ; a g a in s t c r im e , 2 6 3 ,3 0 9 ,4 4 5 ,

W e s t G e r m a n y , 1 3 3 ,5 0 3 ; U .S . a l l i a n c e

4 9 5 - 9 6 ,5 0 4 ; a g a in s t c a n c e r , 2 6 3 - 6 4 ;

w ith , 1 1 9 ,1 2 5 ,1 2 7 - 2 8 ,1 5 3 ; e c o n o m ic

a g a in s t h u n g e r , 2 6 4 ; o v e r V ie tn a m

s u c c e s s , 1 2 8 ,3 8 8 ,4 4 6 ; r e a r m a m e n t,

W ar, 2 7 4 - 7 5 ,2 9 9 - 3 0 0 ,3 0 7 ; N ix o n 's

182

u s e s o f, 2 9 3 ,3 0 0 ,3 0 9 ,3 1 5 - 1 6 ,3 1 8 - 1 9 ,

W e s t in g h o u s e E le c tr ic C o r p o r a t io n , 2 0 5

3 3 0 ,3 3 2 ; C a r te r a n d , 3 4 9 - 5 0 ,4 8 3 ; " c u l­

W e s tm o r e la n d , W illia m C , 2 5 2 ,2 6 9 - 7 1 ,

t u r e o f w a r ' s h o r r o r s ," 3 5 4 - 5 9 ,3 7 0 ;

2 8 3 - 8 5 ,2 9 0 - 9 1

a g a in s t d r u g s , 4 3 1 ,4 4 2 - 4 3 ,4 4 5 ,4 4 9 -

W h e e l e r , B u r t o n K ., 4 8 , 5 2

5 1 ,4 5 7 ,4 5 8 ,4 7 3 ; a n d A I D S c r is is , 4 4 5 ,

W h e e le r , E a r le G ., 2 9 0

4 5 4 - 5 7 ,4 6 0 ,4 6 1 ,4 6 6 - 6 7 ; a g a in s t te r ­

W h it e , W a lte r , 1 0 1

r o r is m , 4 4 5 - 4 6 ; a g a in s t w a s t e , 4 4 6 ;

W h ite , W illia m A lle n , 2 6

" tr a d e w a r ," 4 4 6 - 4 9 ; in g e n d e r p o l i ­

W h y W e F ig h t ( f i l m s ) , 8 9

t ic s , 4 5 1 - 5 3 ; " c u ltu r e w a r s ," 4 5 3 - 5 4 ,

W ie n e r , N o r b e r t, 1 3 9

4 7 6 ,4 8 0 - 8 1 ,4 8 6 - 8 7 ,4 9 6 - 9 7 ; c a p ita l­

W ie s n e r , J e r o m e , 3 2 2

is m a n d , 4 5 8

W ilk in s , R o y , 2 5 5 W U 1 , G e o r g e F ., 3 7 1 , 3 7 8 , 3 8 3 , 4 4 0 , 4 7 6

W a r b o n d s , 9 0 ,1 0 6

W ar C om es to A m eric a ( f i l m ) , x i

W illia m s , G . M e n n e n , 2 1 4

W a r C o u n c il, 5 8

W illia m s , T e n n e s s e e , 1 6 3

W a r c r im e s , 1 2 1 ,1 8 2

W illia m s , W illia m A p p le m a n , 2 3 0

W ar o f

1812, 4

W i l l k i e , W e n d e l l L ., 4 8 , 5 4 , 5 5 , 6 7 , 7 8 ;

1 9 4 0 ,3 3 , 3 9

" W a r fa r e s t a t e ," x iii , 1 6 6

p r e s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n o f

W arfare S ta te ( C o o k ) , 2 5 9

W ills , G a rry , 3 3 3 ,3 9 1 ,3 9 6 ,4 0 7

W a r F in a n c e C o r p o r a tio n , 1 8

W ils o n , C h a r le s , 7 7 ,8 1 ,1 4 0 ,1 9 3

W a r I n d u s tr ie s B o a r d , 8 ,1 8 ,2 0

W ils o n , E d m u n d , 2 3 0

W a r in g , F r e d , 2 2 9 - 3 0

W ils o n , P e te , 4 9 2

W a rn er, L lo y d , 1 6 5

W ils o n , W o o d r o w , 8 ,3 3 2 ,4 8 8

W a r P o w e r s A c t (1 9 7 3 ), 3 2 3 ,3 3 2 ,3 3 7 ,

W in c h e ll, W a lte r , 5 2

3 3 8 ,4 6 8

" W in d o w o f v u ln e r a b ilit y ," 3 8 0 - 8 2

W a r P r o d u c tio n B o a r d (W P B ), 7 0 ,7 2 - 7 3

W in th r o p , J o h n , 2 3 7

W a r r e n , E a r l, 2 0 9

W ir tz , W illa r d , 2 6 2 - 6 3

" W a r o f th e W o r ld s " b r o a d c a s t, 2 3 ,4 2

W o h ls te tte r , A lb e r t, 2 2 3

W a rtim e ( F u s s e l l ) , 4 4 4

W o h ls te tte r , R o b e r ta , 2 2 3

W a s h in g to n , G e o r g e , 1

W o lfe , T o m , 2 2 7 ,3 6 3

W a ste, w a r o n , 4 4 6

W om anpow er ( N a t i o n a l M a n p o w e r

W a te r g a te s c a n d a l, 3 1 6 - 1 7 ,3 2 0 ,3 2 8 , 3 3 0 - 3 4 ,3 3 9

C o u n c il), 2 5 6 W o m a n 's C h r is tia n T e m p e r a n c e U n io n ,

W a tk in s , J a m e s D ., 4 0 5 ,4 5 7 W a tt, J a m e s G „ 4 1 5 ,4 5 2

42 W o m e n , 1 6 6 ,1 7 0 ,3 6 5 ,4 2 7 ; a n d N e w

W a y n e , J o h n , 1 6 8 ,2 9 8 ,2 9 9

D e a l, 2 0 ,2 6 - 2 7 ; in p o litic s , 2 6 - 2 7 ,1 0 6 ,

W ebster v. R e p ro d u ctiv e H ealth S ervices

15 0 ; in a n tiw a r m o v e m e n ts , 3 7 - 3 8 ,

(1 9 8 9 ), 4 2 6

2 7 6 , 2 9 7 , 3 0 3 , 3 7 0 ; W o r l d W a r II m i l i ­

W e c te r , D ix o n , 2 3 ,8 8 ,8 9 ,9 1 - 9 3 ,9 9 ,1 0 0 , 1 0 6 ,1 1 0 W e ig le y , R u s s e ll, 3 2 1 ,3 2 2 W e in b e r g e r , C a s p a r W ., 3 8 9 , 3 9 4 , 3 9 9 , 4 0 4 ,4 0 5 ,4 4 4

w e lfa r e p r o g r a m s W e lle s , O r s o n , 2 3

1 6 9 ,2 5 6 ; W o r ld W a r II h o m e f r o n t , 1 0 5 - 8 , 1 1 1 , 1 12; e d u c a tio n , 1 1 0 -1 1 ; m ilita r y s e r v ic e c o n tr o v e r s ie s , 1 4 9 - 5 1 ,

W e ld o n , F e lix d e , 3 5 2 W e lfa r e s ta te , 1 1 2 ,2 5 9 .

ta r y s e r v ic e , 9 4 ,9 5 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 5 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 0 ; e m p lo y m e n t, 1 0 2 ,1 0 5 - 6 ,1 5 0 ,1 5 5 - 5 6 ,

3 6 7 - 6 8 ,3 7 2 - 7 3 ,3 8 2 - 8 3 ,4 5 3 ; C o ld W a r

See also S o c i a l

c o n flic t a n d , 1 5 0 - 5 1 ,2 5 6 - 5 7 ,2 5 8 ; V ie t­ n a m W a r a n d , 3 0 0 -3 0 1 ; V ie tn a m W a r m ilita r y s e r v ic e , 3 0 1 ; a n tife m in is ts

INDEX

595

a n d , 3 7 2 - 7 4 ,4 5 3 ; P e r s ia n G u lf W a r

6 6 - 6 7 , 8 4 , 9 1 - 9 2 ; f ir e b o m b in g o f Ja­

m ilita r y s e r v ic e , 4 7 7 - 7 8 ; a n d m ilita r y

p a n , 6 7 ,8 1 ,8 2 ,8 3 ,9 3 - 9 4 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 4 ;

g a y -b a n c o n flic t, 4 8 8

p la n n in g fo r p o s tw a r d e fe n s e , 6 7 - 6 8 ,

W o m e n 's A r m e d S e r v ic e s I n te g r a tio n A c t (1 9 4 8 ), 1 4 9 W o m e n 's B u r e a u , 2 5 6 W o m e n 's In te r n a tio n a l L e a g u e fo r P e a c e an d F reedom , 297

7 7 - 7 8 ,8 4 - 8 8 ,1 2 0 ; v e te r a n s, 7 7 ,9 0 ,9 2 9 3 ,9 9 - 1 0 0 ,1 0 9 - 1 2 ,1 2 4 ; c a s u a ltie s , 8 0 , 9 3; b o m b in g o f G e r m a n y , 8 2 - 8 4 ,1 1 3 , 1 94; c o n flic ts a m o n g a r m e d s e r v ic e s , 8 3 ,8 6 ; c o n flic ts a m o n g A llie s , 8 3 ,1 1 3 ;

W o m e n 's P e n ta g o n A c tio n , 3 7 0

p o litic a l o b je c tiv e s , 8 3 - 8 4 ; a to m ic

W o m e n 's S tr ik e fo r P e a c e , 2 4 8 ,2 9 7

b o m b in g o f J a p a n , 8 7 ,1 1 4 - 1 6 ,3 5 0 - 5 1 ,

W o o d w a r d , C . V a n n , 2 5 8 - 5 9 ,4 2 5

5 0 2 ; c u ltu r a l e ffe c ts o f, 8 8 - 9 1 ,9 7 - 9 9 ;

W o o d w a r d , Isa a c, 144

s y m b o lis m o f, 8 9 ,1 9 7 - 9 8 ,2 7 8 ,3 3 1 ,

W o rld a t W ar ( T V s e r i e s ) , 3 5 7

3 5 8 ,4 2 3 ,4 5 2 ,5 0 0 ; s o ld ie r s in , 9 0 - 9 1 ,

W o r ld W a r 1 ,7 - 1 0 ,9 8 ,1 1 2 ,3 4 0 ; c a s u ­

9 3 - 9 7 ,1 0 0 ; w o m e n in , 9 4 ,9 5 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 5 ,

a ltie s , 10; m e ta p h o r ic a l u s e s in N e w

1 0 9 ,1 1 0 ; h o m o s e x u a ls in , 9 4 ,1 0 4 - 5 ,

D e a l, 1 5 ,1 8 ,1 9 ,2 0 ; v e te r a n s , 19; p o s t ­

1 0 9 ,1 5 2 ; c e n s o r s h ip in , 9 7 ,2 8 8 ,3 5 7 ; e f ­

w a r b a c k la s h a g a in s t, 2 4 - 2 6 ,8 9 ; a n d

fe c ts o n g o v e r n m e n t a u th o r ity , 9 8 ,1 2 4 ;

w o m e n , 2 7 ,3 8 ; in flu e n c e in W o r ld W a r

b la c k s in , 1 0 0 ,1 0 2 ; e t h n ic A m e r ic a n s

n, 4 8 , 8 0 , 8 5 , 8 9 , 9 0 ; s o l d i e r s i n , 9 6

a n d , 1 0 2 - 4 ; p a tr io tic c u ltu r e in , 1 0 3 ,

W o r ld W a r H , 4; N e w D e a l a s p r e p a r a ­

1 6 7 ,2 9 8 ,3 5 2 ,3 5 8 ; p r is o n e r s o f w a r ,

tio n fo r , 2 2 - 2 4 ,3 1 - 3 3 ,1 4 1 ; p r e w a r

1 1 3 ; d e m o b iliz a t io n , 1 1 8 ,1 3 0 ,1 3 1 ;

r e a r m a m e n t, 3 0 - 3 1 ; G e r m a n in v a s io n

fe a r s o f n e x t w o r ld w a r , 1 2 0 ,1 3 1 ,1 3 3 -

o f P o la n d , 3 2 ,4 1 ; m o b iliz a t io n fo r , 3 2 ,

3 4 ; in flu e n c e in C o ld W a r, 1 3 3 - 3 4 ,1 3 6 ,

4 3 - 4 4 ,4 5 - 5 1 ,5 3 ,6 9 - 7 3 ,7 9 ; c o n s c r ip ­

1 7 4 ,4 3 8 ; in f lu e n c e in K o r e a n W a r , 1 8 7 ,

tio n , 3 3 ,4 5 ,4 8 - 4 9 ,1 0 2 ; L e n d -L e a s e a id

1 9 7 ; K e n n e d y a n d , 2 3 3 ,2 3 9 ,2 4 4 ; in flu ­

t o B r ita in , 3 3 , 5 5 , 5 8 , 6 1 , 6 9 ; a n t i­

e n c e in V ie tn a m W a r, 2 6 9 - 7 1 ,2 8 6 - 8 7 ;

in te r v e n tio n is m , 3 8 ,4 1 ,5 4 - 5 6 ,6 0 ;

R ea g a n a n d , 3 9 2 -9 3 ; B u sh a n d , 4 3 2 ,

" G r e a t D e b a te " o v e r in te r v e n tio n , 3 9 -

4 4 4 ,4 6 4 ,4 6 8 ,4 7 4 ; fift ie th - a n n iv e r s a r y

4 0 ,5 5 - 5 7 ,6 3 ; m e d ia c o v e r a g e , 3 9 - 4 1 , 5 4 ,9 2 - 9 3 ,2 8 8 ; G e r m a n in v a s io n o f S o ­ v ie t U n io n , 4 1 ,5 8 ,6 0 ,8 4 ; r o le o f te c h ­

o b se r v a n c e s, 4 4 4 ,4 4 7 -4 9 ,5 0 2 W o r ld W a r m , 1 1 8 ,1 2 0 ,1 2 6 ,1 3 1 ,2 6 9 , 2 8 6 ,3 3 5 ,5 0 1

n o lo g y in , 4 1 ,8 0 - 8 2 ,9 6 ; p u b lic

W ou k, H erm an , 168

o p in io n a n d , 4 1 - 4 2 ; a r m s p r o d u c tio n ,

W y lie , P h ilip , 6 8 ,1 0 4 ,1 4 4

4 5 ,6 9 - 7 0 ,7 1 ,7 5 ,1 5 5 ; e c o n o m ic e ffe c ts o f, 4 6 - 4 7 ,7 1 - 7 7 ,7 9 - 8 0 ,1 3 6 ; a n d d e ­ fe n s e s p e n d in g , 4 7 ,7 1 ,7 3 ,7 9 ; a n d s o ­ c ia l w e lfa r e p r o g r a m s , 4 7 - 4 8 ,5 0 , 7 8 7 9 ,1 0 9 - 1 2 ; in flu e n c e o f W o r ld W a r I in , 4 8 ,8 0 ,8 5 ,8 9 ,9 0 ; a n d r a c e r e la tio n s , 4 9 - 5 0 ,1 0 0 - 1 0 2 ,1 0 8 - 9 ,1 1 2 ,1 4 7 ; E u ­ r o p e a n r e fu g e e s , 5 0 - 5 1 ,4 2 9 ; m o v ie s o n , 5 3 - 5 5 ,8 9 ,1 0 2 - 3 ,3 5 7 ; J a p a n e s e a t­ ta ck o n P ea rl H a r b o r , 5 7 ,6 0 ,6 2 ,6 4 - 6 6 ;

Y ale A lu m n i M a g a zin e , 4 5 0 Y a lta C o n f e r e n c e ( 1 9 4 5 ), 8 4 , 1 2 9 ,2 0 1 Y e lt s in , B o r is N ., 4 3 6 ,4 3 8 Y o m K ip p u r W a r, 3 2 8 Y o rk , A lv in , 5 4 Y o u n g , W h itn e y , 2 5 5 Y o u n g A m e r ic a n s fo r F r e e d o m , 2 9 4

Y o u n g L ion s ( S h a w ) , 1 6 3 Y u g o s la v c iv il w a r , 4 7 1 ,4 8 2 ,4 8 5

a n d A m e r ic a n m ilita r iz a tio n , 5 7 ,6 8 , 7 6 ,9 9 ,1 2 1 ,1 2 4 ,1 4 1 - 4 2 ,4 9 8 ; s u b m a ­ r in e w a r f a r e , 5 8 , 6 1 , 6 5 - 6 6 ; U .S . d e c l a ­

Z e g , S te p h e n , 1 7 7

r a tio n o f w a r , 6 2 ,6 4 ; c iv il d e f e n s e

Z h u k o v , G e o r g i K ., 1 9 9

p la n n in g , 6 6 ; a n ti-J a p a n e s e r a c is m in .

Z i e g l e r , R o n a l d L ., 3 1 6