In Stalin's Shadow: The Career of "Sergo" Ordzhonikidze 1563245639, 9781563245633

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Editor's Introduction
Russian Terms and Abbreviations
Introduction
1. The Making of a "Party Professional"
2. At the Head of the Central Control Commission
3. The Lominadze Affair
4. The Head Manager
5. Ordzhonikidze and Kirov
6. Lominadze's Suicide
7. Stakhanovites and "Saboteurs"
8. Piatakov's Arrest
9. An Unhappy Birthday (Ordzhonikidze and Beria)
10. Rout of the Economic Cadres
11. Preparing for the Plenum
12. The Last Days
13. Murder or Suicide?
14. After the Funeral (Ordzhonikidze and Molotov)
Conclusion
Notes
Index
About the Author

Citation preview

IN STALIN'S SHADOVV

The New Russian History SeriesEditor: Donald]. Raleigh, University of North Carolina,ChapelHill This new seriesmakesexamplesof the finest work of the most eminent historiansin Russiatoday available to English-languagereaders.Each volume hasbeenspeciallypreparedby the authorwith an international audiencein mind, and each will be translatedand introduced by an outstandingWesternscholarin the samefield.

THE REFORMS OF PETER THE GREAT

ProgressThroughCoercionin Russia Evgenii V Anisimov Translatedwith an introduction byJohnT. Alexander

IN STAliN'S SHADOW The Careerof "Sergo"Ordzhonikidze Oleg V Khlevniuk Translatedby David Nordlander Edited with an introduction by DonaldJ Raleigh, with the assistanceofKathy S. Transchel

IN STALIN'S SHADOVV THE CAREER OF

"SERGO" ORDZHONIKIDZE

Oleg V. Khlevniuk Edited with an Introductionby Donald J. Raleigh with the assistanceof Kathy S. Transchel Translatedby David J. Nordlander

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~~

Routledge Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published1995 by M.E. Sharpe Published2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square,Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue,New York, NY 10017,USA

Routledgeis an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an infonna business Copyright © 1995 Taylor & Francis.All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprintedor reproducedor utilised in any fonn or by any electronic,mechanical,or other means,now known or hereafterinvented,including photocopyingand recording,or in any infonnationstorageor retrieval system,without pennissionin writing from the publishers. Notices No responsibilityis assumedby the publisherfor any injury and/or damageto personsor property as a matterof productsliability, negligenceor otherwise, or from any use of operationof any methods,products,instructionsor ideas containedin the material herein. Practitionersand researchersmust always rely on their own experienceand knowledgein evaluatingand using any information, methods,compounds,or experimentsdescribedherein. In using such information or methodsthey should be mindful of their own safety and the safetyof others,including partiesfor whom they have a professionalresponsibility. Productor corporatenamesmay be trademarksor registeredtrademarks,and are usedonly for identification and explanationwithout intent to infringe. First publishedin Russianin 1993 by "Rossiiamolodaia"underthe title Stalin i Ordzhonikidze:Konflikty v Politbiuro v 30-egody. © 1993 by O. V. Khlevniuk.

Library of CongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Khlevniuk. O. V. (Oleg Vital' evich) [Stalin i Ordzhonikidze.English] In Stalin's shadow:the careerof "Sergo" OrdzhonikidzeI by Oleg V. Khlevniuk: editedby Donald J. Raleigh: with the assistanceof Kathy S. Transchel: translatedby David J. Nordlander. p. cm. - (The new Russianhistory) Includesbibliographicalreferencesand index. ISBN 1-56324-562-0. ISBN 1-56324-563-9(pbk.) I. Soviet Union-History-1925-1953. 2. Stalin, Joseph,1879-1953. 3. Ordzhonikidze,Sergo, 1886-1937. I. Raleigh, Donald J. II. Transchel.Kathy S. Ill. Title. IV. Series. DK267.K437813 1995 947.084---lacement,Andrei A Zhdanov (1898-1948), departedon the morningof December2. Someaccountscontendthat Stalin had opposedthe inclusion of Ordzhonikidze.Apprehensivethat Ordzhonikidze'spresencein Leningradwould upset his plans, Stalin allegedly told him: "It's impossible for you to go with your weak heart...13 No documentaryevidence concerning discussion of Ordzhonikidze'strip has beenfound. If this matter had beenraised, then Ordzhonikidze'sillness surely might have been used as an excuseto preventhim from travelingto Leningrad. Ordzhonikidzetook Kirov's deathvery hard. According to SemenZ. Ginzburg (b. 1897), who at the time held a responsiblepost in the NKTP, Ordzhonikidzedid not show up at work for severaldays, and when he did, colleagues"did not recognizethe typically enthusiastic andvivaciousSergo.He had turnedgray and agednoticeably.He often seemedlost in thought, with a face heavyfrom grief."14 "Somethingin him hadclearly snapped;he becamewithdrawn, grew reticentand even more lost in concentration,"noted Ginzburgin later publications.15 In the words of anotherof Ordzhonikidze'scolleagues,AV. Ziskind (as recountedby LN. Kramov), Ordzhonikidzein thosedays "was seriously ill, deathly so. He collapsedfrom a heart attackwhen he learnedthat Kirov had been shot. . . . When I entered his Kremlin apartment, Pletnevwas examiningthe ill Sergo.He left Sergoin a sombermood, and said: 'It's serious-hisheartcan't take it ... his funeral might not be far off.' "16 Ordzhonikidze,however,graduallyimproved. ''He soonwas another

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person."17But he did not appearat the funeral servicein Red Square on December6. Did Ordzhonikidze have any doubts about the official version of Kirov's murder?Did he believe Stalin, who accusedthe Zinovievitesof this terrorist act? The questionswill never be answeredin full. But to categoricallyreject the possibility that Ordzhonikidzewonderedabout the real reasonsfor the eventsof December1 would be wrong. He was a sufficiently experiencedpolitician who had passedthrough the Stalinist school of power struggles.Yet this did not mean that he was prepared for what took place. Ordzhonikidzewas soon to receive yet another blow-the fall of Lominadze.

Chapter 6

Lominadze's Suicide

Mter Lominadze'sfall from grace at the end of 1930 (see chapter3), his political standingslowly but surely improved owing mostly to Ordzhonikidze'ssupport.At first, Lominadzeworked as headof the scientificresearchsectorof the People'sCommissariatof Supply. Ordzhonikidze then took him under his own wing and succeededin getting Lominadzeappointedsecretaryof the party committeeof Moscow FactoryNo. 24, a plant that madeairplane engines.This position had many advantages.Ordzhonikidzecould now directly supportLo-minadze.Nikita S. Khrushchev,working at the time as secretaryof the Moscow City Party Committee,recalled: Sergocalled me severaltimes at the Moscow committeewhen he had questions.One day, he asked:"ComradeKhrushchev"(he spokewith a strongGeorgianaccent),"why don'tyou evergive Lominadzepeace of mind instead of always criticizing him?" I answered:"Comrade Sergo,you know, after all, that Lominadzeis one of the most active oppositionists,even an organizerof the opposition.We demandprecise accountsfrom him, but he respondsvaguelyand invites criticism of himself. ""bat am I to do? Mter all, this is a fact." "Listen, Comrade Khrushchev,you just do whateverit takesto harasshim less."1 Moreover, rapid advancementin the aviation industry, which enjoyed the specialattentionand patronageof higher powers,allowed for more public exposureand more rapid careerpromotion than if one were engagedin the less prestigious "supply front." In August 1933, 69

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Lominadzewas awardedan Orderof Lenin andsoonreceiveda promotion-he left Moscow to becomethe secretaryof the city party committee in Magnitogorsk. Positionssuch as this were unique in the party hierarchy.Along with the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry, the Magnitogorskparty organizationwas responsiblefor developingand completinga gigantic metallurgical project that was the symbol of the nation's industrial might. It was a rare day when newspapersdid not write about the MagnitogorskCombine. The Kremlin followed his work closely, especially Stalin. Magnitogorskcity leadersalso watchedclosely. It was easy to fail under the burdenof such heavyresponsibilitiesand immediately lose everything.But then, every successfulor merely decisive move was noticed, too. Successin Magnitogorsk turned into national fame and glory, providing potentialcareeradvancement.Not manydisgracedoppositionists encounteredsuch a propitious change of fate, and Lominadzetried honestlyto take advantageof this secondchance. "In Magnitogorsk,the first day of his arrival," witnessedJohn Scott,* who laboredat the MagnitogorskCombinefor five years, "Lominadze worked like a beaver.An excellentorator, he madespeechafter speech to functionaries,engineers,and workers, explaining, persuading,cajoling, and encouraging.He demandedthe greatestsacrifices from his subordinates.These,incidentally, he tendedto choosefrom a circle of personalfriends, many of whom had, like himself, at one time or anotherbeenassociatedwith someoppositiongroup."2 At the end of January1934, Lominadze arrived in Moscow for the SeventeenthParty Congress.Like other disgraced oppositionists (Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, Bukharin, Tomskii, Karl Radek [18851939], and Evgenii A. Preobrazhenskii[1886-1937]), Lominadze had to standbefore the congresstribune to repentpast transgressionsand to glorify Stalin. Admitting his undeniableparticipation in the "rightleft bloc," he enumeratedand condemnedhis mistakesin detail while *John Scott. An American college studentwho during the GreatDepression left the University of Wisconsinin 1931 for the SovietUnion, where he worked as a welder in the new city of Magnitogorsk,known as the Soviet Union's Pittsburgh.Scott's memoirs of his experiencein Red Russiawere first publishedin 1942 and were later reissuedby IndianaUniversity Pressin 1973,andagain,with a new introductionby StephenKotkin, in 1990.-Ed.

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acknowledginghis failure to understandthe "brilliantly simple, profound, clear, and rich theoretical contentsof ComradeStalin's thesis that the destructionof classestakesplace in the processof fiercestclass struggle.... The right-left bloc," said Lominadze, compriseda variety of opportunisticoppositionsduring the new stage in the struggle and, like any opposition, inhibited the party from moving forward.... It was smashed,routed by the party'sprincipled irreconcilability that distinguishedits fight againstall deviationsfrom the Leninist line. In the strugglewith the "right-left bloc," Comrade Stalin evincedthe samesevereimpatiencethat had setLenin apartin his battle with oppositionists,an impatiencethat he-Stalin-inherited from Lenin.3 Despite the unpleasantriesof having to criticize and disparagehimself, Lominadze took the invitation to participate in the work of the congressas a reassuringsign. Unlike others, Lominadzewas invited to the congressnot simply to repent, as were Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Preobrazhenskii,but to serve as a delegate,albeit a nonvoting one. Lominadzespokenot only as a former oppositionist,but also as a representativeof one of the most important party organizations.He spoke confidentlyandat greatlength as he put forth severalproposals. Soon afterward, it appearedthat the congresshad been especially fortuitous for Lominadze. The successfulresolution of a conflict between Lominadze and the head of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine,Avraamii P. Zaveniagin(1901-1956),underscoredLominadze's fortunateturn of fate. Clashesin the provincesbetweenmanagersand party leaderswere commonin the 1930s.Both possessed real power. Managerscontrolled material resourcesand could provide or withhold money, personnel, and transportation.Party leadersclaimed power as "bosses,"utilizing the levers of party discipline. The resolution of such conflicts, which were often drawn-outand bitter, mainly dependedupon the direction of the general line. In the first years of the Great Change,when "spetsbaiting" flourished and every managerwas labeled a potential "wrecker," the power of party organsreachedtheir peak. Secretariesof party committeesoften took on the day-to-daymanagementof enterprises, and interfered in resolving key problems.The negative conse-

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quencesof this, as already mentioned,prompted the launching of a new campaign-"thestrengtheningof one-man management."From then on, Moscow usually sided with factory directors. Direct interferencein productioncostmore than one district or city secretaryhis post. In general, if Lominadze had been an "averageJoe" or if Stalin had wished to intervene,then the secretaryof the MagnitogorskCity Party Committee would have faced serious difficulties. But Ordzhonikidze onceagaingot involved in the affair. Hostility between Zaveniagin and Lominadze eruptedimmediately after the latter's arrival in Magnitogorsk. Impatient and thirsting for recognition,Lominadzefervently set to work and immediatelyviolated certain "limits" that Zaveniagin-withgood reason-considered within his own domain. Passionsflared. Zaveniagin complained to Ordzhonikidze, but his attemptsto squelchthe conflict were unsuccessful. At the endofJanuary1934, Zaveniaginagainwrote Ordzhonikidze: Lominadze wants to be completely in charge at Magnitka [Magnitogorsk], and isn't inhibited by any boundsor party instructions. My reportto you, your directives,my repeatedconversationswith him and my rebuffs, delicate but firm, achievednothing. Moreover, on theoreticalgroundshe is violating the principle of one-manmanagement. The questionhas beenraisedfor discussionat party meetings. It was also discussedat a party conferencein accordancewith the of the party organizasecretary'sinstructionsand the encouragement tion. As a result, in spite of my harsh remonstrations,reprimands, anddaily exhortations,discipline at the factory and constructionsites is not being strengthened,but is actually weakening.The threat of collapsegrows every day.... It's clear to me that you must remove both of us, or at least one of us. As far as I'm concerned,I would preferto be removedratherthan witnessthis kind of deterioration. Zaveniagin'sletter beganwith theseharshwords and provided many supporting facts. He wrote that without prior agreement,combine workerswere namedto positionsin the city's party committee,and that the leader of the city party control commission"literally harassedall shopsand administrativeemployeeswith dismissals,arraignments,reprimands, and affronts to party collegiality, etc." Furthermore,Lominadze encouragedmanagerswho did not get along with Zaveniagin to ally with him and interferewith drafting plans.

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Zaveniaginunderstoodthat his positionwas strong,and thereforetook the offensive. But also knowing about the special relationship between LominadzeandOrdzhonikidze,he craftedthe letter diplomatically: My letter to you might seem tendentiousand caustic, and even an exaggeratedaccountof the true situation. For this reason,I waited ten daysbeforesendingit to you. The facts aboutwhich I speakare of suchimportance,however,that it would be a big mistaketo downplay them or remain silent. I'm aware of your good relations with Lominadze, and it appearsthat you are close to Stalin also. This makesit more difficult to raise these concernswith you. It's worse, though,to let an illness go untreatedandruin things.4 Ordzhonikidzefound himself in difficult straits for the umpteenth time. He did not want to openly take sides.As the people'scommissar of heavy industry, he supportedthe directors in similar situations.To do otherwise now would demonstratebias and lack of principle. But Ordzhonikidzecould not condemnLominadzebecause,in contrastto Zaveniagin, he knew the real nature of Stalin's relationship with Lominadze.Cognizantof the fact that in the given situationLominadze should back down, Ordzhonikidzesummonedhim and appropriately reprimandedhim. Beso yielded, at least verbally, and upon returning to Magnitogorsk he attempted to amend his relationship with Zaveniagin."As a result of conversingwith him," Lominadzereported to Ordzhonikidze, I'm convincedthat all misunderstandings betweenus are settled.The next day I called a meeting of the key employeesof Magnitka (ten people), patiently waited two and a half hours for Zaveniaginto arrive, and informed those presentof my trip to Moscow and discussions with you and Kaganovich. I then raised the question of the improper activities of the city control commission[control commission of the party city committee-O.Kh.],the CPU, etc. Things went calmly andwell, and we left the meetingwith the impressionthat our relationshiphad beenput right.5 The truce, however, did not last long. Zaveniaginwent to Moscow and again complainedto Ordzhonikidze about Lominadze.Allies of Lominadze reported this in Magnitogorsk. Beso was outragedand

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wrote Ordzhonikidze a scathing letter. He reiterated his attemptsat reconciliation,deniedall charges,and describedZaveniaginin the following manner:"Nobody likes him becausehe'sa man in a shell, withdrawn, anti-social, and an armchair employee. Nobody respectshim becausehe'sweak.'06 Ordzhonikidzeansweredwith a letter that reproachedand needled Lominadze.He wrote that "the problem needsto be resolvedquickly." Lominadze agreed with these demands,although he once again revealedhis true self. He was polite after Zaveniagin'sreturn, but wrote in reply to Ordzhonikidze that if Zaveniagin behavedas before, and "it appearsthat he is about to disrupt things," then "it will be necessaryto appointa more pliable secretaryhere.,,7 In general,the tensionwas only slightly alleviatedand groundsfor a new quarrel quickly arose. Lominadze convenedthe regularly scheduled plenum of the city party committee,but severalmembers,including Zaveniagin, did not show up. Lominadze viewed this action as a violation of party discipline, and had Zaveniaginpenalized.The conflict was reportedin the press,and the Politburo's attention was drawn to the Magnitogorskaffair. Zaveniaginand Lominadzewere summonedto Moscow. OnJune9,1934,in the presenceof practically all membersof the Politburo-Stalin,Kliment E. Voroshilov (1881-1969),Kaganovich, Kalinin, Kuibyshev, Ordzhonikidze,and Mikoyan-they both reported on the situation at the combine. Each spoke about constructionprojects, as well as technical, financial, personnel,and social problems. They did not neglectthe conflict betweenthe city committeeand combine director, and listenedto eachother'sposition. From the beginning, Ordzhonikidze helped prepare this issue for the Politburo. He madea reportand proposedhis own draft resolution. Review of the conflict ended peacefully. The decree,confirmed two weekslater, read: [The Politburo] takesinto considerationthe statementsof Comrades Lominadzeand Zaveniaginthat they are endingthe outstandingfriction betweenthemselvesthroughfriendly cooperation,and that they ensurethe fulfillment of this Central Committeeresolution.Considering the city committee'sdecision to be correct, the Central Committee agreesthat a numberof party memberswho failed to appearat the plenum violated party discipline. The Central Committee takes

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into accountComradeZaveniagin'sstatementthat he could not attend the city committeemeetingdue to work-relatedpressuresat the factory. In connectionwith this, it also takesinto considerationComrade Lominadze'sstatementthat the city committee reconsiderits own resolutionin regardto ComradeZaveniagin. The Politburo resolution satisfied Lominadze'srequestto name as his assistantMazut, who had worked with Beso in the Comintern.Both of these points-thecooperationbetweenZaveniaginand Lominadze and the appointmentof Mazut-werewritten on the draft resolutionby Ordzhonikidze.8 Lominadze returnedto Magnitogorskand immersedhimself in his responsibilities.By involving himself in the affairs of the city party organization and combine, ~e maintained regular contact with Moscow. Judging Lominadzesent one of his last letters to Stalin and Ordzhonikidzeon November21, 1934. He wrote about financing industrial construction, housing, and other needsin Magnitogorskfor 1935. He complained that the Politburo estimateof 250 million rublesfor the main administration of the NKTP's metallurgical industry had been reducedto 220 million, and asked Stalin and Ordzhonikidze to restore the previous figure.9 Lominadze and Ordzhonikidzesoon becameconvinced, however, that Stalin neither forgot nor forgave anything. Following Kirov's murder, the NKVD, on Stalin's instructions, began to fabricate casesconcerning the participation of former oppositionistsin terrorist acts. Despite the lack of any proof, many arreststook place. "Evidence"was forced from those arrestedin an attempt to createan appearanceof conspiracyon the part of deviationists.Hundredsof peoplewere sacrificed in this operation-includingLominadze. Lominadze had found out earlier that the NKVD had received reports about his participation in a "counterrevolutionaryorganization" in 1932. He wrote Stalin a letter trying to prove his innocence.There was no reply. Repressionsbeganin Magnitogorsk.On December31, the wife of one of Lominadze'sclosestassociates,who had been expelled from the party and sentencedto exile for 'Trotskyism," committed suicide. On January16,1935,a specialsessionofthe NKVD sentencednineteen people accusedof conspiracyin the fabricated "Moscow Center"

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case to various terms of incarceration.Zinoviev, Kamenev,G.E. Evdokimov, J.P. Bakaev, and other long-term membersof the party received from five to ten years. On the sameday, the NKVD also handeddown sentencesfor the so-called "Leningrad CounterrevolutionaryZinovievite Group." Seventy-sevenpeople,amongwhom were such party luminaries as G.!. SafarovandP.A. Zalutskii, were sentencedto campsor exile.10 Mter thesepunishmentswere metedout, Lominadzeno longer harbored any illusions. On January 18, he left in his automobile for Cheliabinskupon a summonsfrom the local regional committeethere. Severalhours passedof agonizingvacillation. He had already traveled 120 kilometersfrom Magnitogorskwhen Lominadzeorderedthe driver to tum around. Lominadzeapparentlywrote his last letter in the vehicle, and then shot himself in the heartwith a Browning only sevenor eight kilometersfrom his home. The shot was not initially fatal. Lominadzewas still alive when they broughthim to his house.But on the night ofJanuary18, an operation failed to savehim and Lominadzedied the next morning.II Earlier, his deputy, Mazut, dictatedLominadze'sletter to Moscow by telephone.At 12:45 A.M. on January 19, Ordzhonikidze'sassistant,Semushkin, receivedthe following text from Magnitogorsk: ComradeMazut. I requestthat this messagebe passedon to Comrade Ordzhonikidze. I decidedlong ago to choosethis endingin the event that no one believedme. Scoundrelssuchas Safarovand othersapparentlyspread slanderagainstme. I was ready to prove the absurdityand complete lack of truth in this libel, to justifY myself and attempt to persuade others-buteventhen I wasn'tsure they would believeme. Pleaseconveyall this, as I now cannot. I did nothing wrong in 1932. I explainedmy actionsaccuratelyto ComradesStalin and Ryndin [secretaryof the Cheliabinskregional organization-O.I{h.]. Apparently, that wasn't enough. An ordeal awaits that I am in no condition to endure. In spite of all my mistakes,I have devotedmy entire adult life to the Communistcause,to the affairs of our party. I only regret that I didn't live to seea decisivestrugglein the internationalarena.It isn't far off. I die fully believing in the victory of our cause.

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Conveyto SergoOrdzhonikidzethe contentsof this letter. Pleasehelp my family. Beso.12 At first, there was no official reaction to Lominadze'sdeath. Local newspaperspublisheda short report on his suddendemiseand funeral. All waited for Moscow to decidehow the suicidewould be interpretedas the desperateact of a slanderedman or an attempt by an exposed enemy to shirk responsibility. An explanationcame at an emergency plenumof the Magnitogorskcity organization:Lominadzewas a traitor. At this plenum, Mazut was removed from his post, and repressions befell other Lominadze associates.Having beaten corroborative evidenceout of thosearrested,the NKVD fabricateda caseabout a counterrevolutionarygroup in Magnitogorskheadedby Lominadze.13 In killing himself, Lominadzeobviously tried not only to avoid arrest, but also to remove his wife and son from the threatof arrest.He wrote his final letter for this reason.But the subsequentchargesagainstthe dead Lominadzecompletelydashedthese hopes.Harsh repercussions awaited the family of the leader of this "counterrevolutionarygroup." Lominadze's family, however, remained untouchedwhile Ordzhonikidzestill lived. Moreover,the governmentgavehis wife a pension "for the revolutionaryservice of her husband."Nina A. Lominadzereceived this pension from 1935 to 1937. Following Ordzhonikidze's death, the pensionwas rescinded,and Lominadze'swife was arrested twice-in 1938 and again in 1950 as "a family memberof a national traitor."14

Chapter 7

Stakhanovitesand "Saboteurs"

The sharp turn in the political course after Kirov's murder did not bypassthe employeesof the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry. Many of them becamevictims of the "strengtheningof vigilance" policy, and were arrestedor expelledfrom the party. The Stakhanovitemovement* that beganin the fall of 1935 was accompaniedby a new campaign of persecutionand repressionin industry. These eventscaused conflicts betweenmanagersand politicians. There is a significant body of literature on the Stakhanovitemovement. In evaluatingthis phenomenonand its consequences, researchers have reacheda variety of conclusions that bear testimony to its complex character.1 But without doubt-andon this point specialists are in agreement-thiscampaign "intensified the class struggle," becamea root causeof numerousconflicts at the workplace,andwas used as a new method to purge cadres.It is also common knowledge that Ordzhonikidzewas behind the movement,while the NKTP constituted a distinctive experimentalfield upon which different types of Stakhanoviteinitiatives were "broken in." A logical questionpertaining to this topic therefore arises: To what extent did Ordzhonikidzetake *Stakhanovitemovement.Namedafter coal miner Alexei G. Stakhanov, who in August 1935 set a new record for hewing coal, launchinga nationwide campaignto rationalize and raise industrial production.The governmentintroducedan arrayof incentivesto increaseoutput.-Ed.

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part in organizing the new purge, and do his Stakhanoviteinitiatives signify an attempt to follow the distinct course, initiated after Kirov's murder, of preparingfor the GreatTerror, and to demonstrateloyalty to Stalinist tacticsof repression? In Ordzhonikidze'slarge commissariatthere were two especially complex and key subdivisions-ferrousmetallurgy and coal mining. Despitecountlessparty and stateresolutions,threateningwarnings,and the efforts of conscientiousmanagers,shortagesof coal and metal continued to plague the economy.But toward 1935 the situation in ferrous metallurgyimproved.Attemptsto revampthis industrial branch,including experimentationwith the widespreaduse of economicstimuli and the rejection of ambitious plans for smelting millions of tons of cast iron and steel, producedresults. The coal miners, however, could not boast of similar achievementsand once again thwarted fulfillment of the plan for the first half of 1935. Inspired by the successesin ferrous metallurgy, Ordzhonikidzedecided to assign a more active role for the Donbass-themain coal centerin the country. A typical exchangebetweenOrdzhonikidzeand the headof the DonetskArtem Trust Mines, Z.E. Zorin, at a conference of the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry on May 11, 1935, demonstratedwhich methodshe intendedto use in clamping down on the miners. Ordzhonikidze listened to Zorin's hackneyedcomplaints of poor supply, lack of mechanization,and so on, and then laid into him: You tell me you have fine workers at the mines who producethree, four, five times more than the Donbassaverage.What haveyou done here? Zorin: First, theseare the bestand most qualified workers. Ordzhonikidze:What do you meanby the bestworkers? Zorin: Workerswith excellentqualifications. Ordzhonikidze:Those like Telnykh. Zorin: He works in Kadievugol,not for me. He's a highly qualified worker. Ordzhonikidze:Murashko. Zorin: He's a qualified worker, and physicallyvery strong. Ordzhonikidze:Is Telnykh very strong? Zorin:Telnykhdoesn'twork for me. Second,theseare class-conscious workers. Ordzhonikidze:You haveonly one class-conscious Telnykh?

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IN STALIN'S SHADOW Zarin: They are brigade leaders-thesame Murashko and Riaboshapkoinstruct the otherworkers. Ordz.honikidze:There are probably hundreds, thousandsof such workersthat you only needto find and placein position.2

Ordzhonikidzewas possessedwith the idea of drawing to the coal mines a higher numberof "leading workers." He left for a vacation in Kislovodsk at the beginningof August 1935, and met with the secretary of the DonetskRegionalCommittee,S. Sarkisov,and Zorin en route in his train car. After hearing their complaintsof insufficient funds and materials, Ordzhonikidze promised to help, but once again ordered them to pay attention to the work of "leading" miners, and to identify "thousands"of suchoutstandingworkersin the Donbass.3 A month passed.On September5, while in Kislovodsk, Ordzhonikidze read a short notice on the last page of Pravda about the record set by a miner namedStakhanov,and immediatelyorderedthe centralnewspapers to organizea correspondingpropagandacampaign.On September6, he senta letter to the secretaryof the DonetskRegionalCommittee,Sarkisov, that shedslight on Ordzhonikidze'sintentions: The situation is bad, Sarkisov,with regardto coal and fuel in general. ... Today, the following becameclear to me: There'spoor economic leadershipat Main Coal and the trusts.The vastmajority of managers are of the old system.They will either be compelledto changetheir ways and adaptto modernmethods,as we did with the metallurgists, or we will replace them with youngermen.... After all, there'sno escapingthe fact that there are hundredsand thousandsof such heroesin the lower ranks of laborers in the Donbasswho do outstandingwork. It's necessaryto shift these heroesto jobs managing minesand trusts.We have to act boldly. The experienceof metallurgy fully justifies this.... We can'tget by without a large shake-upin the coal industry. We can't revamp salariesand repositionworkers without a shake-up.4 Thus, according to Ordzhonikidze'sthinking, it was necessaryto conducta "shake-up"of cadresin the coal industry, promoteyounger and more enthusiasticworkers, and clamp down on the "old timers." Simple and usuallyeffective, this methodwas utilized quite often during those years, including at the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry.

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But this time the reassigningof cadresfrom the very start threatenedto turn into a political purge. It seemsthat in preparingthis action, Ordzhonikidzedid not realizethe danger;but when it becamereal, he tried to neutralizeit. On September14, 1935, the newspaperspublished a telegram Ordzhonikidzesentto the secretaryof the DonetskRegionalPartyCommittee, Sarkisov,and the headof DonbassCoal, V.M. Bazhanov.Ordzhonikidze clearly wanted to make a point: "I won't hide the fact that I'm deeply worried that this campaignwill encounternarrowmindedskepticismon the part of severalbackwardleaders,which in this casewould amount to sabotage.Suchexcusesfor leadersneedto be dismissedquickly." But Pravda, in commentingon the telegramin its lead article, exaggerated Ordzhonikidze'scomparativelymoderatestatementto conform to the new turn in the generalline in politics: 'The first daysof the Stakhanovite movementhave already provided more than one example of the most malicious sabotageand wrecking." This situation was then repeated.Ordzhonikidzeremoved managersfor not fulfilling the plan and for not actively supporting the Stakhanovitemovement, and appealedto the "commanders"of industry to lead the initiative:' Meanwhile, Pravda periodicallystagedpolitical attacksagainstmanagersin its lead articles,and maintained:"Peoplewho don't help the Stakhanovites are not our people.,,6 It has already been noted in the literature that during the first monthsof the Stakhanovitemovement,the NKTP leadershipoccupied a specialposition regardingthe campaignagainst"saboteursandwreckers." The commissariat'snewspaper,For Industrialization, and numerous speechesby leadersof the department,consistentlydepictedresistance to Stakhanovitemethodsin an apolitical way, and examinedit primarily from a technicaland organizationalpoint of view. The sluggishnessand mistakes of engineersand managersgrew out of their conservatism, poor preparation,and, of course,laziness;but never out of any intentions to wreck things (it was characteristicthat Ordzhonikidze'sdeputy, G.L. Piatakov, used the word "resistance"[to the Stakhanovitemovement] in quotationmarks).All this differed significantly from the statementsof many other leadersof the country arousedby the "horrors of wrecking."7 Resolution of this conflict obviously dependedprimarily on Stalin.

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He actively campaignedfor the new movement,causing it to spread widely and acquire state support. Stalin's reasonssoon becameapparent. The campaignwas consciouslyused to strengthenthe new direction embarkedupon after Kirov's murder. Contrastingthe Stakhanovites to "saboteur-wreckers"played an essentialpart in creating an atmosphereof vigilance in the struggle againstenemies.Meetings between leaders and the Stakhanoviteswere conductedon a scale previously unseenin order to demonstratethe unity betweenthe country'sleadership and common people. Addressing an All-Union Conferenceof Stakhanoviteson November 14, 1935, Stalin assumedthe role of defender of the workers againstbureaucratsand manager-saboteurs, and madeappealsthat were reminiscentof the ShakhtyShow Trials.* Maintaining that the Stakhanovitemovement"originatedand developedto a large extent despite the wishes of enterprisemanagers,and even in opposition to them," Stalin evoked the intensificationof classstruggle, called on engineersand techniciansto apprentice themselvesto the Stakhanovites,and promisedto give the obstinateones"a little slap on the face."8 The December(1935) plenum of the Central Committee,convened to examine the Stakhanovitemovement,continuedin this vein. It resolved "to break the remaining resistanceto the Stakhanovitesfrom conservativemanagers,engineers,and technicalpersonnel,"and to expose class enemies trying to "undermine the Stakhanovites."9It was characteristicthat the main report at the plenumwasgiven by a Central Committee secretary,Andrei A. Andreev, and not by any leader of administrativedepartments.Having received reports from the NKVD on counterrevolutionaryresistanceto the Stakhanoviteswhile preparing his presentation,10Andreev stated at the plenum: "Stakhanovite norms representthe victory of socialist labor over capitalist norms of production, and eradicationof the last remnantsof capitalism in our production. It is therefore clear that such a movementcannot avoid determinedresistancefrom our classenemies."11 Other plenarypartici*Shakhty Show Trials. In 1928 fifty-five engineersfrom the Donbass mines were accusedof sabotageand collusion with the forces of international capital. The affair triggered the widespreadarrestof ~wreckers" Judging and ~saboteurs," Judging in which manybourgeoisspecialistssuffered.-Ed.

STAKHANOVlTES AND "SABOTEURS"

Stalin and Ordzhonlkldza In 1935.

83

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pants pepperedtheir speecheswith accountsof the intensification of classstruggle.Stalin also repeatedhis earlierdirectivesconcerningresistanceto the Stakhanovitemovement.12 The politics of a "total Stakhanovization"to overcomesabotagehad destructive socioeconomicconsequences.Fearing accusations,industrial bossesbeganto falsify statisticsand createa semblanceof efficiency by makinga fuss over the recordsof individual Stakhanovites.Rushjobs involving all workers were practicedextensively,providing a temporary illusory effect which inevitably endedin failure. Feverishattemptsto set new recordsviolated technicalregulations,led to wear and tear on the machinery,worsenedquality, and increasedthe numberof accidents. Productionrecordswere attainedby producingsimple items. The resultant lack of a wide selectionof goodsbecamea seriousproblem, as did growing shortagesof materials neededto complete partially finished products. Blame for the failures fell upon the managers,while hysterical statementsin the presstriggerednumerousrepressions.Stigmatizingindustrial bosseswhile extolling the innovation of the working classbecame mandatory.As usual, violence againstengineersand techniciansled to a weakeningof discipline, a decline in responsibility,and the desire to play it safe. The payoff from such a high price for successturned out to be ephemeral.From the beginningof 1936, administrativedisorganization and neglectof mining drifts resultedin a decline of coal extractionsin the Donbass.A spurt in production of ferrous metalswas achievedat the expenseof numerousfurnace explosionsand massproduction of an unnecessaryamount of metal good only for the attainment of a record gross tonnage. The situation was similar in other industrial branches. Such overt breakdownsgave the headsof economicdepartmentsadditional groundsto challengethe new course.13 One of the signalsfor a temporaryretreatwas a lead Pravda article, "Lesson of the Donbass," publishedon June 7, 1936. The newspaperwrote that the averagedaily extractionof coal in May had declinedsignificantly from that of December 1935, and for the first time in many months, openly acknowledgedthe reasonsfor this-"rushedwork," the blind pursuit of records, and the persecutionof engineersand technicians."If one is to believe

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the Donetskpressand numerousspeechesdelivered in the Donbass," the editorial stated,"then one can get the impressionthat theJudging m~ority of engineersand techniciansare saboteursand conservatives .... There are many good specialistsin the Donbasswhom we must patiently help liberate from their conservatism.Instead, they are cursed at and 'worked over.' Dozensof engineers,shaft managers,and party workers receivedreprimands.... Their spirits have beenbroken,and they walk with their tails betweentheir legs." In view of the natureof politics in the 1930s,it is all but certain that the statementin Pravda was sanctionedat the highestlevels of power. Inasmuchas the questionconcernedthe NKTP, Ordzhonikidzewould have had to have beeninvolved in the matter.Stalin apparentlyyielded to him and agreedto restrainorganizersin the struggleagainst"saboteurs." Another piece of evidencesupportingsuch a col1iectureis the materialsof a conferenceof the People'sCommissariatof HeavyIndustry, which met soon after the appearanceof Pravdaslead article, from June25 through29,1936. Representinga sort of supremecollective leadershiporgan of heavy industry, the conferencesignaleda retreatfrom official encouragement of record-settingandcameto the defenseof the managers. It was already clear on the first day of the conferencethat there would not be any frank discussionsaboutthe difficult situation of engineers.Orators spoke carefully, dropping only a few hints. The deputy head of Main Coal and head of DonbassCoal, V.M. Bazhanov,stated that "the core of engineeringand technicalpersonnelin the Donbassis strongand is in a position to cope successfullywith the taskspresented to it." Further, he held that only 8 percent of shaft engineersand technicians,in accordwith investigationsalreadycarriedout, were to be removed and demoted."14The chief administrator of Kadiev Coal Trust, L.la. Vysotskii, reportedon the high turnover of shaft management and the sharp decline in wagesof engineersresulting from the introduction of a new systemof remuneration-inthe eventof nonfulfillment of the plan, bossesdid not receivetheir full salaries.To a leading questionfrom Ordzhonikidze,'Tell us, how do you explain the high turnover of engineers?"Vysotskii answeredcarefully: "My views are as follows: We neededto teachpeople,but teachingpeopleto work is more difficult than firing them. In most cases,the trusts and mines continueas before

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by replacingold peoplewith young ones,apparentlyon the assumption that we didn't needto teachthe newerones."15The chief administrator of ShaktantratsitTrust, A.M. Nepomniashchii,was also cautious: "I will touch in passingupon one mistakein our trust: enthusiasm.The technical staff of our trust wasn't sufficiently preparedto accept the Stakhanovitemovement,and fell behind.Unfair attemptswere madeto charge the engineersand technicianswith sabotage.This made them uncertaintoo. Now we are immediatelyrectifYing the situation.,,16 The conferencecontinuedalong theselines until the chief administrator of the Stalin Coal Trust, A.M. Khachaturiants,rose to the tribune. Mter a brief introduction, he got to the point: 'The main reasonfor our trust'sfailures to fulfill the productionprogramis the unsatisfactory work of management."Khachaturiantsmaintained that Stalin's and Ordzhonikidze'sinstructionson the slack paceof engineersconformed to the situation during the early period of the Stakhanovitemovement, but a mistake was committed and the leaders' instructions were extended to the entire administration. "Instead of patiently helping to introduceStakhanovitemethodsof work and therebyhelping management to understandthese methods,as ComradeStalin instructed,we declaredany mistake or misunderstandingan act of sabotage."In the heatof passion,Khachaturiantsaccusedthe pressof "compoundingthis by severaldegrees." Khachaturiantsharshlycriticized the consequences of suchpolicies: Why did the systembreak down, and why did so many obstructions occur? This is the result of poor inspection. Managementdoesn't work intensively, as a result of the charges that have been made againstit for a long time.... Insteadof thinking how to introducean innovation or Stakhanovitemethod, engineersare afraid of being accusedof sabotageor conservatismand try to do everythingby the letter of the law: "Saboshkov'ssystem?Please,hereyou haveSaboshkov'ssystem." "Do you needindividual piecework?Please,hereyou have individual piecework."And so on.... Most managersreasonas follows: If I don't extract coal from the mines, don't lower costs, and don't complete preparatoryworkthey'll remove me. But if I don't introduce Stakhanovitemethods, they won't just removeme, but arraign me on chargesof sabotageas well. They'vebureaucratizedthe movementP

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In spite of his reservations,Khachaturiantsin fact criticized policies that were initiated, as everyoneknew, by Stalin. Concludingthe conference, Ordzhonikidzegave high marks to the commentsof the chief managerof Stalin Coal. "I think that ComradeKhachaturiantsmore accurately than anyone else explained all that happenedin the Donbass,"Ordzhonikidzestated.But he tried nonetheless"to smooth over" Khachaturiants'sspeech by overemphasizingthe mistakes the same Donbassleadersmade at the start.18 Ordzhonikidze,moreover, made known his attitude toward the chargesof sabotageagainstengineersand technicalworkers.Dismissingthem as trifling, he exclaimed: Saboteurs!In the nineteenyears Soviet power has existed, we have educatedmore than one hundredthousandengineersin our schools and colleges, and an equal number of technical workers. If all of them, including the old engineerswhom we retrained,turnedout to be saboteursin 1936, then we should congratulateourselveson our success.Saboteurs!They aren't saboteurs,but good people-our sons,our brothers,our comrades,who back Soviet power. They will die on the fronts for Sovietpowerif necessary[stormy and prolonged applause].19 Ordzhonikidzethen proposeda new, apolitical way of explainingthe nonsense-but their lack specialists'mistakes:"It's not sabotage-that's of skills that impedesfulfillment [of the plan] ... Now therecan be no talk that the engineeringand technicalpersonnelview the Stakhanovite movementnegatively.Their problemis that they still haven'tlearnedto work in the Stakhanoviteway."w Judging from similar statementsfrom leaders of other economic commissariatson the needto maintain cadrestability at this time, such as those of People'sCommissarof CommunicationsLazar M. Kaganovich,21 the Politburo must haveagreedwith this in oneway or another. This conclusion is supportedby the fact that, in spite of the drastic worseningof the political situation, Ordzhonikidzesucceededin pushing through a resolutiondefendingthe employeesof his commissariat. (On July 9, 1936, the Central Committeeadopteda secretresolution "On the TerroristActivities of the Trotskyist-ZinovieviteCounterrevolutionary Bloc," demandinga more active struggle againstenemies.Furthermore,during August 19-24, a show trial transpiredin Moscow at

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which a large group of former oppositionists,including Kamenevand Zinoviev, weresentencedto be shot.) On August 28, 1936, Ordzhonikidzeread a letter from the director of the Kyshtymskii Electrolyte Factory (Cheliabinsk Oblast), V.P. Kurchavyi, who askedto be reinstatedin the party and for help against persecutionfrom local party organizations.He also reported that the newspaper,Cheliabinsk Worker, had played an active role in this campaign, accusing him of sympathizingwith the Trotskyists. Kurchavyi appendedto his letter an article from the newspaper.Ordzhonikidze respondedpositively to this complaint: "Comrade Ezhov [Nikolai I. Ezhovwas then involved in party expulsions-O.Kh.].I requestthat you look into this."22 OrdzhonikidzeundoubtedlyrecalledKurchavyi'sletter the next day, when he read a piece in Izvestiafrom August 29, "An ExposedEnemy," by the Cheliabinsk correspondentof the newspaper,Dubinskii. The notice describedan analogoussituation: the director of the Satkinskii factory Magnezit, Tabakov,was expelledfrom the party for aiding and abettingTrotskyism. A quick check showedthat CheliabinskWorker had played a decisive role in Tabakov'sfate, since it provided information about the Magnezit director upon which the Izvestia correspondent hastily preparedhis article. The TabakovAffair was addressedat breakneckspeedas a matter of exceptionalsignificance.On August 31, the Politburo reversedthe resolution of the Magnezitfactory party organizationthat expelledTabakov from the party, informed the editor of CheliabinskWorker that he had committeda mistakein publishing the decision to expel Tabakovwithout verification, and approvedthe Izvestiaeditorial board'sdismissalof the Cheliabinsk correspondentwho had written the article on Tabakov.23 The newspaperspublished reports the next day, "In the CentralCommittee,"which presentedthe Politburo'sdecisions. On August 31, the Politburo also adopted a resolution on the Dnepropetrovskregional organization in Ukraine. One of its clauses concernedthe fate of the director of the ZaporozheMetallurgical Combine, la.I. Vesnik, whosenamehad often appearedrecentlyin the newspapers,and who was now accusedof conspiring with Trotskyists and expelled from the party. The Politburo repealedthis decision. The secretaryof the Krivoi Rog city party organization,who had expelled

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Vesnik from the party, was himself fired. 24 On September5, Pravda publishedinformation on the plenum of the Dnepropetrovskregional party organization,which examinedquestionsraised in the Politburo resolution. The plenum made necessarystatementsabout intensifying the strugglewith enemiesand "decisivelywarned""againsttaking things too far in the future, . . . againstunfairly accusingparty membersof being Trotskyists or their accompliceswithout sufficient and serious grounds." While membersof the Politburo voted on a decision regardingthe Satkinskii factory and the Dnepropetrovskregional party organization on August 31, Ordzhonikidzewas still trying to make senseout of a letter from the director of the MagnitogorskMetallurgical Factory,A.P. Zaveniagin.He reportedthat an accidenthad occurredon May 26 in the machineroom of the coke shop,which resultedin twenty-six people receiving burns, of whom four died. In Zaveniagin'sopinion, those guilty of the accidentincluded the head of the machineroom, Babin (who died that day), and the skilled craftsmanPanov.The procurator, however, arraigned other employees-thehead of the coke shop, Shevchenko,his equipmentdeputy, Farberov,the chief machineroom engineer, Bulgakov, and the engineer for technical safety, Bykov. Zaveniaginwrote that they were not involved in the accident. "I consider it my obligation to appealto you to supportour petition-notto implicate those not responsiblefor the accident, ComradesBulgakov and Bykov, and especiallythe departmenthead,ComradeShevchenko, and his equipmentdeputy, ComradeFarberov."Ordzhonikidzesent a letter to the procurator of the USSR, Vyshinskii, with the following instructions:"I backComradeZaveniagin'srequest,and ask you to handle it accordingly.,,25Vyshinskii carried out Ordzhonikidze'sorder. On October16, Vyshinskii reportedthat he had examinedeventsinvolving the workers of the coke shop at the Magnitogorsk Combine and stoppedthe criminal investigationagainstShevchenkoand Farberov."I don't think it is possibleto curtail the caseagainstBykov and Bulgakov. Consideringthe characterizationZaveniagingave of their recentwork, I instructedthe procuratorto seek punishmentthat wouldn't prevent Bykov and Bulgakov from remaining at the factory." Vyshinskii, who adjudicatedthis case,reportedthe resultsof thejudicial review to Ordzhonikidze on December16: "Bulgakov is sentencedto one year of

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corrective labor at his workplace, while Bykov will serve six months. Thus, both can remain at their posts.,,26 Apart from all this, in August 1936 Ordzhonikidzehelpedto prevent the arrestsof the constructionchiefs at the Nizhnii TagH CoachFactory, L.M. Mariasin and Sh.S.Okudzhava,which will be discussedlater in more detail. In general, available documentsallow us to conclude that Ordzhonikidze tried to block repressionsconnectedwith the preparation and implementationof the firstJudging m~or Moscow Show Trial. There is no exact data on how he viewed the caseagainstKamenevand Zinoviev. What is known is only that in the fall of 1937, M.D. Orakhelashvili,who had once befriendedOrdzhonikidzeand was later arrested,gave the following deposition: From the beginning,I slanderedStalin as a party dictator, and considered his policy to be excessivelyharsh. Sergo Ordzhonikidzegreatly influencedme in this regard.Speakingwith me in 1936aboutStalin's attitude toward the leadersof the Leningrad Opposition (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov, and Zalutskii), Ordzhonikidze argued that Stalin's excessivecruelty was causing a split in the party and was leadingthe countryinto a deadend.27 It is impossible to verify how much of Orakhelashvili'stestimony was

true. There are serious groundsfor asserting,however, that relations betweenStalin and Ordzhonikidzeworsenedprecisely at this time, in August 1936. As is well known, the first accusationsof enemyactivity were officially levied at the AugustMoscow trial againstthe former "right"-Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii. Trying to defendhimself and enlist somesupport, Bukharin wrote to Stalin and other membersof the Politburo to deny the charges,arguing they were absurd.Although Bukharin soughtan official reply, none came. Stalin acted more subtly: Voroshilov spoke out againstBukharin, and gave his "own" unofficial response.Bukharin sent a personalletter to Voroshilov on September1, 1936. Voroshilov immediatelypublicized it, circulating it to Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze,Andreev,VIas la. Chubar (1891-1939),and Ezhov. On September3, undoubtedlyat Stalin's prompting, Voroshilov drafted a crude responseto Bukharin that included the following: "If in your

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letter you wish to charge me with your completeinnocence[the text readsas such-O.Kh.],then convinceme of that: restrainyourselfhereafter, regardlessof the resultsof the investigationinto your case;if you don't refrain from writing vile epithetsin addressingthe party leadership [Bukharin's letter does not contain any "vile epithets," yet Voroshilov undoubtedly"discerned"them with Stalin's help-O.Kh.], then I'll consideryou a scoundrel."That day, September3, Voroshilov 28 circulatedhis retort to the samegroup of associates. Voroshilov'sreply revealedthat Stalin was not absolutelycertain that his actionsagainstthe "rightists" had the full supportof all membersof the leadership.Hiding behindVoroshilov's "opinion," Stalin remained on the sidelines,stayedimpartial, and did not make any official promises. Of course, he had also formed his own opinion of Bukharin's statements.Mter receiving Voroshilov's response,Stalin wrote on the accompanyingletter: "ComradeMolotov. Voroshilov's answeris good. If Sergo had done the same and rebuked Mr. Lominadze,who had written him evenmore scurrilouslettersagainstthe CentralCommittee, then Lominadzewould still be alive, and possiblya good man to boot. I. Stalin."29 As with all suchobservationsmadeby the leader,Stalin'sremarkwas clearly intended not only for Molotov, but for others as well. It was aimed at Ordzhonikidze.But it is unclearwhat promptedStalin. Had OrdzhonikidzedefendedBukharin?Or was Stalin awareof Sergo'sconversationsregarding the trial of Kamenev and Zinoviev? Or, was it Stalin's reaction to Ordzhonikidze'sattemptsto preventarrestsin his commissariat?In any event, one thing is certain: Stalin was dissatisfied with Ordzhonikidze.The cunningnatureof Stalin'sattackagainstOrdzhonikidzecapturesour attention.Stalin did not blame him for defending enemies,but for his unprincipledintercession,which destroyed"his own" by not giving them the chanceto rectify themselves.This was a clear hint: nobodyplannedto annihilateBukharin, but rather to savea lost soul. Moreover, the attackson Ordzhonikidzewere linked with preparations to arrest the first deputy of the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry, G.L. Piatakov.

Chapter 8

Piatakov's Arrest

Georgii (Iurii) Leonidovich Piatakov belongedto that group of party activistswhom Lenin felt compelledto characterizein his famous "Letter to the Congress[Last Testament]."*Lenin consideredPiatakovone of the "most outstandingof our youngestmembers,"and referred to him as a man of "outstandingwill and outstandingability," but too easily carried away with "administratingand the administrativeside of work to be relied upon in a seriouspolitical matter."1 Of course,Lenin had good causefor theseevaluations.Piatakovhad actively spreadthe "sicknessof leftism" amongrevolutionaries.2 Piatakovwas born to the family of the director of a sugarfactory in the Kiev region. He was repeatedlyexpelledfrom school,andgravitated toward the anarchists.He then joined a Kiev terrorist group planning the murderof the governor-general,Sukhomlinov.Still later, hejoined the Marxist camp. He was arrested,and fled abroadfrom exile. It was there that he learnedof the FebruaryRevolution. During the October Revolution, he was chairmanof the Kiev RevolutionaryCommittee.He *Letter to the Congress[Last Testament].First publishedin the aftermath of Khrushchev'sSecret Speechin 1956, the document refers to Lenin's attemptto evaluatethe qualificationsof the most prominentparty membersmost likely to succeedhim. Lenin dictated the first part of his testamenton December23, 1922, and a few weekslater addeda postscript in which he urged the party to remove Stalin from the post of general secretary.For a post-Sovietexaminationof the political intrigue surrounding the writing and suppressionof the document,seeYuri Buranov'sLenins Win: Falsified andForbidden (Amherst,N.Y., 1994}.-Ed. 92

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did not agreewith Lenin on the question of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, however,and left to fight in Ukraine. Piatakovhad a particularscoreto settle with Bolshevik opponents:In the very first months of the Civil War in Kiev, his brother was brutally murdered. 'The corpse was in horrible condition-it was obvious that they had tortured him terribly before his death; suffice it to say that in place of his heartwas a deep hole, apparentlymade by a saber.His handswere also completelycut off; as the doctors explained,his heart had been evisceratedwhile he was still alive, and he convulsively clutched the gnawing blade of the sword,,,3 Piatakov later wrote. While serving on various fronts of the Civil War, Piatakovdrew close to Trotsky. At the Fifteenth Party Congressin December1927,Piatakovwasexpelledalongwith otheropposition leaders.But he soon madean official breakwith Trotsky, and was readmittedto the party. Piatakov, however,was not allowed back into politics, but was appointedchairmanof the Gosbank[State Bank] and a memberof the presidiumofVSNKh. In 1931, PiatakovbecameOrdzhonikidze'sdeputy, in which capacityhe remaineduntil his arrestin 1936. Piatakov,whom Stalin never forgave becauseof his former opposition, sawin Ordzhonikidzenot only a boss,but also a patroncapableof defendinghim in difficult times. In dealingwith Sergo,Piatakovtherefore alwaysemphasizedhis respectand diligently demonstratedhis devotion to Ordzhonikidze. "It is becauseyou are not only a boss and senivrcomrade,but also a man whom I have always regardedwith the deepestlove and respect,that your leadershipwas, and is, for me not only the formal tutelage of a superior, but also the leadershipof a comradewhom I personallyrespectdeeply.All this causesmy blunder to distressme greatly." This is a typical excerptfrom a letter of Piatakov to Ordzhonikidzethat eloquentlyreflectstheir relations.4 Ordzhonikidzeacceptedthe role of patron as his due. He valued Piatakov's intelligence and organizationalabilities, and well understood, even if he did not demonstratethis understandingopenly, that his own successas commissarof heavy industry owed much to his first deputycommissar.In general,their mutual affection was strengthened by an interestin one another.Piatakovwas Ordzhonikidze'sright-hand man in the commissariat,and often stood in for him or acted on his behalf.

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By Stalin's order, the NKVD began collecting evidence against Piatakov in the summerof 1936. Those arrestedin the caseof the so-called Unified Trotskyist-Zinovievite Center, L.B. Kamenev, G.E. Evdokimov, I.I. Reingold, and E.A. Dreitser, "confessed"to the alleged existenceof anotherParallel Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center,led by Piatakov. Piatakov'swife was arrestedon the evening of July 27, 1936, and quickly forced to sign a confessionregardingher tie with Trotskyists. At the time, Piatakovwas on vacation and knew nothing about his wife's arrest.He apparentlyreceivedword from Ordzhonikidzeonly at the very beginning of August. Piatakov replied by telegram from Sukhumi on August 3: ''Your notification struck me hard. I tried to recall details fromthe last nine years.I can'tunderstanda thing. If they disclosed some connections [with] counterrevolutionaryTrotskyism (that I'm unawareof), then the authoritiesacted properly. In view of my total incomprehension,I'll get a ticket and leavefor Moscow on the next availabletrain. I'll let you know when I leave."5 Severaldayslater, he read the classifiedletter of the CentralCommittee "On the TerroristActivity of the Trotskyist-ZinovieviteCounterrevolutionary Bloc" and the affidavit of his wife Ditiatevaia. He wrote Ordzhonikidzeon August 7: Sergo! I read the confessionand classifiedletter. The baseand heinous behaviorof these people is unprecedented.I am outragedbeyond belief. I am unbearablyashamedthat such despicablethings took place right undermy own nose.I'm not speakingof the leaders of this gang [as Piatakov referred to Kamenev, Zinoviev, and the others arrested-O.Kh.]-theirrole and physiognomy have long beenclear to me. But it was terribly unbearablefor me to readabout Ditiatevaia. After all, this is a triple or quadruplebetrayal of me. If suchheinousactsare possible,then we haveno future. I'm personallyaggrieved.But I assureyou that all thesedirty tricks instill in me only hatredtoward thesescoundrels,and compel me to fight evenharderandwith greater determination for the concernsof Stalin and the party.6 Chargeswere not levied againstPiatakovhimself, in spite of the fact that the NKVD alreadyhad at its disposalReingold'stestimonyon the

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"counterrevolutionaryactivity" of lurii Leonidovich in the Parallel Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center.Stalin, who knew about theseaffidavits, apparentlyfelt that they were insufficient. But when a telegrapharrived from Kiev on August 10, reporting that the arrested N .V. Golubenko "acknowledged"that Piatakov had headeda "Ukrainian Trotskyist Center," Stalin immediately gave the order that the case be spedup. Ezhov summonedPiatakovthe next day, read him the affidavits of Reingold and Golubenko, and informed him of the Central Committee'sdecision to remove him from the post of deputy commissar and appoint him head of Chirchik Construction.Judging from Ezhov's report to Stalin, Piatakov denied these depositionsas the libel of Trotskyists. He acknowledgedthat he was only guilty of not paying attention to the counterrevolutionarywork of his wife. He agreed with the decision to remove him from the post of deputy commissar,and statedthat he shouldhave beenpunishedeven more harshly. In trying to prove his innocenceand loyalty, Piatakov, according to Ezhov, asked"to grant him any form (at the discretionof the Central Committee)of rehabilitation.In particular,he proposed that he be personallyallowed to shootall thosesentencedto deathat the trial, including his former wife, and to publish this in the press." "Despite the fact that I pointed out to him the absurdityof his proposal," reported Ezhov to Stalin, "he insistently requestedthat the CentralCommitteebe informed of this."7 Ezhov's report, publishedin connectionwith Piatakov'srehabilitation in 1989, substantiallyimpairs the historical reputation of lurii Leonidovich.Willingness to becomean executioner,all the more so of one's own wife, testifies to the complete breakdownof his character. While acknowledginga grain of truth in such an evaluation,however, we should not rush to makejudgments.I do not think that Piatakov intendedto pick up a revolver (which is exactlywhatEzhovmeantwhen he mentionedthe absurdityof Piatakov'ssuggestion).His insaneproposalsand oathsof fealty fully meshwith the rules of the crazygameof "life anddeath"Stalin proposedto Piatakov.To stigmatizeenemieswith whateverwords, and to humiliate them by making them demonstrate absoluteobedienceto the supremeleader,were part of the rules, and under certain conditions could save one's life. This was illusory, but

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representeda chance, nonetheless.Not everyone could refuse or proudly passup sucha chance.In any event,Piatakovcould not. Piatakov apparentlywas left alone after his first interrogation by Ezhov. It is possiblethat the leaderyielded becauseof interferenceby Ordzhonikidze,who might have usedPiatakov'sdesperaterefutation as an argumentin conversationwith Stalin. The resolution on Piatakov's removalas deputycommissarmentionedby Ezhovhad not yet beenput in motion. It becameclear severaldays later, however, that Piatakov's fate was sealed.At the trial of the Unified Trotskyist-ZinovieviteCenter on August 22, Vyshinskii statedthat in consideringthe affidavits of the accused,he would begin an investigationof anothergroup of people, including Piatakov. Everyone in the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry continuedto hope that Ordzhonikidzewould defendhis deputy. The following fact, for example,testifiesto this mood. Mter Vyshinskii's statementat the show trial in Moscow, leadersof the Bliavinskii Copper Smelting Combine in OrenburgOblast organized a meeting of workers who demandedthe removal of Piatakov's namefrom the enterprise.This initiative was consonantwith the spirit of the times and suggeststhat ordinary workers well understoodthe essenceof "routine politics." This time, however,the casewas impeded. At the end of August, A.P. Serebrovskii,headof nonferrousmetallurgy in the NKTP Central Directorate, arrived at the combine. He summoned the mine director, Tsivin, who had initiated the measure,and reprimandedhim: ''You're the ringleaderin the movementto remove Piatakov'sname and portrait, but did you know that only the Central Committeecan do this?" Serebrovskiiconveneda meetingof the engineering and technical staff, where he said that an investigation was underway, that Piatakovmight tum out to be innocent,and that Trotskyists might have entangled him in this case. In fact, Serebrovskii added,Piatakovhimself had explainedthe situation to him when they met recentlyin Sverdlovsk.Piatakov,accordingto Serebrovskii,had said "he'll arrive in Moscow, and give them [the Trotskyists-O.Kh.] a real fight."s Piatakovwas actually on a work-relatedtrip in the Urals at this time, and apparentlystill hoped that this casewould be resolved.He wrote Ordzhonikidzea letter on September9. Piatakovreportedto the commissar about the results of his inspectionof the copper industry, and

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complainedto him that political accusationsraisedat the Moscow trial were interfering with his normal routine: "I can't deny the fact that in comparisonwith past trips, my work has suffered significantly. . . . I encountereda greatamountof warinessand confusionin party organizations.... The shadowof suspicionthat fell after ComradeVyshinskii's pronouncementhas greatlyweakenedall my efforts." At the end of his letter, Piatakovappealedfor help: Of courseI'll continueto work. But if a short notice were to appear that these scoundrels,traitors, and rogues had slanderedme (as is indeedthe case),then my work in the Urals would undoubtedlybe enhanced. Sergo.Imagineall thoseparty comradeswith whom I have had to meet both one-on-oneand at meetings. After all, they don't know that these counterrevolutionarymurderersare slanderingme in a final maliciousstrike. Theseparty comradessimply don't know what to do with my instructions,statements,demands,etc. I perfectly understandthat once a declarationof this sort was made at the trial, ComradeVyshinskii had to announcea forthcoming investigation.... But inasmuchas this is actually a despicablelie, and insofar as I was and am a person devoted to the leadershipof our party and our country . . . and since the shadowof suspicionliterally constrainsthe party organizationsfrom helping raise the output of the copperindustry,somethingmustbe doneto diffuse the tensesuspicion.... You're not only a memberof the Politburo anda people'scommissarto me, but also a comradeto whom I am personallyattachedwith all my heart,andwith whom I alwaysshareeverything.Therefore,I've allowed myself to write about the difficult position I'm in. If I'm wrong-tell me. After all, there'sno one to advise me exceptyou. lurii. 9

But Ordzhonikidzewas no longer able to help, and in fact turned Piatakovover to Stalin. On September10-11, the Central Committee memberspolled agreedwith a Politburo proposal to expel Piatakov from both the Central Committeeand party. While on vacation,Ordzhonikidzesentthe following codedmessageon September11: "I fully agreewith andvote for the Politburo resolutionto expel Piatakovfrom the CentralCommitteeand the party. Ordzhonikidze."l0On September 11, the Politburo resolvedto remove Piatakovfrom the post of deputy

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commissarof heavyindustry; he was arrestedon the night of September 12. The wording of the Politburo's resolution is worth noting: 'To remove Piatakov,Iu.L., from the postof deputycommissarof heavyindustry of the USSR (without mentionin the pressuntil further notice)."11 For the first thirty-three days of his arrest, Piatakovcategoricallydenied his guilt. Recentresearchrevealshow thosearrestedin the caseof the Parallel Trotskyist Center were subjectedto cruel interrogations: the so-calledconveyorbelt [continual interrogationfor hours and days at a time-Ed.]' endless hours "standing at attention," and physical tortures.NKVD investigatorstried any methodsto get confessions.They often fabricated "affidavits" themselvesand forced prisoners to sign them.12 Like many other unfortunate comrades,Piatakov could not endurethe torture andmadethe required"confessions." Mter this, copies of the transcripts of Piatakov's interrogations were routinely sent to Ordzhonikidze.Two of them are preservedin Sergo'spersonalpapers-fromNovember 14 andJanuary4. 13 What could Ordzhonikidzehave learnedfrom thesedocuments?They indicate that wrecking over the course of many years was responsible for the numerousproblems besettingheavy industry and the economy in general.Piatakovconfessedthat under his leadership,managers improperly estimatedoutput, commissionedincompleteprojects, allowed worker social servicesto decay, damagedthe meansof production, organized"work delays," and impaired the developmentof various branchesof industry, such as coppersmelting. It is unlikely that Ordzhonikidze,who knew all too well the real stateof the economy and reasonsfor the collapsesand mix-ups, could take this testimony seriously.Mter all, in his many speecheshe himself addressed these problems and gave them a completely "materialistic" explanation. Ordzhonikidze often signed off on impossible plans that he knew required the employmentof projects yet to be completed.He himself strove for quantity, while closing his eyes to quality. He himself askedpeople to put off improving living conditions until better times and to build temporary barracks. Ordzhonikidze could not help but understandthat the numerous"consequences of wrecking" enumeratedby Piatakov were the results of actual economic practices. In general,Ordzhonikidzecould every bit as much see himself and other leadersof the countryas saboteurs.

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It cannot be ruled out that Piatakov hoped that Ordzhonikidze would see things this way. In any event, it was as if he sent Ordzhonikidzefaint signalsof his innocence,in placesgiving contradictory testimony.This is especiallydearin the transcriptsfrom November14 (Piatakov had only just begun to give evidence,and the investigators apparentlywere still not on top of things). Piatakov acknowledged wrecking activities and suddenlystated:"But I must say in the majority of casesthat I was unsuccessful.... Projectsand planswere fulfilled and all our so-called'intentions'crumbledlike a houseof cards."14To the investigator'squestion: "But why didn't you say anything about the wreckingactivitiesyou personallyconductedat the People'sCommissariat of Heavy Industry," Piatakovreplied: "I can'tsayanythingaboutthis, because1 wasn'table to do anything.The situationin our commissariat and my type of activities didn't give me the opportunity to do anything of the sort."15 It turned out that the "consequencesof wrecking" were present, while the "intentions" to wreck never amountedto anything. The man was a deputycommissar,and for severalmonthson end was completely in chargeof the commissariat,but he could not "do harm." It is possible that Ordzhonikidzepaid attention to thesepassages.In any event, they are highlightedin the preservedcopiesof the transcripts. One of the most importantquestionsis whetherOrdzhonikidzebelieved in Piatakov'sguilt. As in manyother instances,it is not possibleto answer this question with assurance.Circumstantial evidence exists, however, that allows us to assumethat Ordzhonikidzemost likely waveredand did not take a definite stancein the matter. While speakingin the commissariatat a meetingof workers from the synthetic rubber industry on December3, Ordzhonikidzerambled on, dearly not speakingfrom preparednotes: "Moreover, in spite of all the unpleasantries,major unpleasantriescausedus by Piatakov, Rataichik, and other scoundrels,1 personallyspent many sleeplessnights after this took place, wondering how this could happen. After all, this person worked with me, was a member of the Central Committee, and was my deputy. We gave him a chanceto work as he pleased,and everythingelse he wanted.Yet in the end, he turned out to be a scoundrel...16 In this "unpolished" and, incidentally, unpublishedspeech,it seemsthat doubt was presentin equal

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measurewith condemnationof the "scoundrels."How could this have happened? On the next day, December4, Bukharin recountedhis conversation with Ordzhonikidzeat a Central Committeeplenum: "Sergo askedme at his apartment,tell me, please,what is your opinion of Piatakov?I literally told him that Piatakov impressedme as a man who was so tactful that he didn't realize that he spoke the truth out of tactical considerations."Ordzhonikidze retorted from the hall: ''That's correct."17 This fact can be attributed to Ordzhonikidze'swavering. How can it otherwisebe explainedthat he suddenlyaskedBukharin about Piatakov? The confrontationbetweenBukharin and Piatakovthat took placein January 1937 in the presenceof Politburo membersmay have reinforced doubts. Bukharin'swife, Anna M. Larina, had this to say about Nikolai Ivanovich'sversionof the event: Piatakov'sappearancestunnedN.!. more than his preposterousslander. Thesewere the living remains,as N.I. expressed,"not of Piatakov, but of his shadow, a skeleton with its teeth knocked out." Piatakovspokewith his headlowered,trying to cover his eyeswith his palms. N.!. thought that bitternesscould be felt in Piatakov'stone against those who listened to him without interrupting the absurd spectacleor stoppingthe unheard-ofarbitrariness. "Iurii Leonidovich, explain," asked Bukharin, "What compelled you to slanderyourself?" There was a pause.At this point, Sergo Ordzhonikidzelooked intenselyandwith astonishmentat Piatakov,shakenby the exhausted appearanceand testimony of his accomplishedassistant.Ordzhonikidze placedhis palm to his ear ... andaskedhim: "Is your testimonyvoluntary?" "My testimonyis voluntary," answeredPiatakov. "Absolutely voluntary?"askedOrdzhonikidzeagain with greatsurprise. But therewas no answerto his repeatedquestion.IS In general, there were substantialgrounds for Ordzhonikidze to doubt the confession.His long associationwith Piatakov,ample knowledgeof the actualsituationin industry,and experienceover manyyears of conflicts with the OGPU-NKVD regardingunfoundedaccusationsof wrecking againstmanagersmade it difficult for him to believe in the

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sincerity of the NKVD materials. Disagreeingwith the charges,however, would be tantamountto entering into an open conflict with Stalin and other Politburo memberswho fully supportedStalin's intentions ("Yes ... your deputy turned out to be a swine of the first class. You must already know what he told us, the pig, the son-of-abitch!" wrote K1im E. Voroshilov to Ordzhonikidzeon October 16, 1936).19 Apart from this, numerous testimonies about Piatakov's "treason" actually existed from which it was not always easy to separate the truth from half-truths and lies. It is also the case that Ordzhonikidze renouncedPiatakov. In turning over Piatakov and a numberof other NKTP leadersto Stalin, Ordzhonikidzetried to save remainingcadresand, of course,himself. In conclusion, it is appropriate to examine the account of Piatakov'sfall put forth in the well-known book by a former NKVD officer, Alexander Orlov. In this version, Ordzhonikidzeconvinced Piatakov,who had remainedsilent, to give Stalin the necessarydepositions. Ordzhonikidze allegedly twice visited Piatakov in prison, where he told him that in exchangefor his repentance,Stalin promised to spare his life. Ordzhonikidzewas the odd guaranteeof this promise. Piatakovbelievedthis and fulfilled all conditions.But Stalin deceived both Piatakov and Ordzhonikidze. Piatakov was shot, and this became the main reason for the bitter conflict between Stalin and Ordzhonikidze.2o Orlov's assertionsare often repeatedin scholarly accountsas immutable fact, without any reservations.In reality, much of Orlov's book is basedon rumors and second-handreports.To date, no concrete data exist that would even indirectly back his version about Piatakovand Ordzhonikidze.Anna M. Larina's reminiscenceson the behavior of Ordzhonikidze at the confrontation betweenBukharin and Piatakovcontradict Orlov's evidence.It also seemsthat Orlov's data do not match the context of the well-known facts of the relationship between Stalin and Ordzhonikidze after Piatakov's arrest. Clearly preparing a strike against Ordzhonikidze (soon after Piatakovbeganto provide testimony,Sergo'sbrotherwas arrested-a bit more on this later), it is unlikely that Stalin would have ordered him to try to persuadePiatakovto repent.In essence,such an order would imply that the investigationlacked sufficient evidence.More-

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over, Stalin had numerousother meansto get Piatakovto talk. Mter all, defendantswho were as strongas Piatakovalso gave evidence.As subsequent eventsrevealed,Piatakovwas not simply a target of Stalinist intrigue, but was simultaneouslya card in the leader's game with Ordzhonikidze.It is thereforedifficult to believe that Stalin decidedto play this cardwith the help of Ordzhonikidzehimself. Finally, there is one more circumstanceworth mentioning. At the time of Piatakov'sarrest, and for the thirty-three days after his arrest when Piatakovrefusedto acknowledgehis guilt, Ordzhonikidzewas on vacation in Kislovodsk. There is not even circumstantialevidencethat he returnedto Moscowat somepoint during this period.

Chapter 9

An Unhappy Birthday (Ordzhonikidze and Beria)

On September4, 1936, the Politburo grantedOrdzhonikidzea vacation from September5 to November5. I On the first day of his break, Ordzhonikidzemanagedto read a letter from the headof the blast furnace shop at ZaporozheSteel who had been expelled from the party, M.la. Gorlov. "I entreatyou, ComradeOrdzhonikidze,"wrote Gorlov, "to personally, or through ComradeEzhov, clarify my immunity from such a serious charge as Trotskyism." Ordzhonikidzeleft instructions: "Comrade Ezhov, pleaselook into this.,,2 Ordzhonikidzeapparentlyleft for Kislovodsk that very day. He continued to work there, constantly receiving information on the commissariat'swork, issuingdepartmentalorders,resolvingcontentious issues,and handlingcomplaints.3 On September25, Stalin and Zhdanov, while vacationing not far from Ordzhonikidze in Sochi, sent a telegram to Moscow for Kaganovich, Molotov, and other Politburo membersattending to the "economy" in the capital: ''We considerit absolutelynecessaryand urgent to appoint ComradeEzhov to the post of people'scommissarof internal affairs. Iagoda is clearly not up to the task of exposing the Trotskyist-Zinovievite Bloc. The OGPU was four years behind on this case.All party workers and the majority of NKVD regional representatives concur." On September26, the Politburo approved Ezhov's appointment,and on September29 adopteda resolution "On Treatment of the CounterrevolutionaryTrotskyist-Zinovievite Elements," which 103

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containeda directive bolstering the strugglewith "enemies"by dealing expedientlywith the arrestedand previouslyexiled ''Trotskyist-Zinovievite scoundrels.'>4 Stalin informed Ordzhonikidze of these decisions. Ordzhonikidze then most likely went to Sochi for the purposeof discussingthem with Stalin. We have no details on their conversations.The only evidencewe have about them is a sentencein a letter from Kaganovich.which he sent from Moscow to Ordzhonikidzein Kislovodsk on September30: ''I'm not writing you in regard to the counterrevolutionaryaffairs. because you were with the boss and read and discussedeverything. There'snothing new to add to what you already know."5 We can conclude from these words that at the time when Politburo membersremaining in Moscow appointed Ezhov, Stalin most likely showed Ordzhonikidze recent transcripts from the interrogations and explained to him the thinking behind the changein the NKVD leadership. It is not known whether Ordzhonikidzeobjectedto Stalin at this point. But the following circumstanceis worth noting: In the previously mentionedletter from September30, Kaganovichinsistently. even a bit too enthusiastically.supportedStalin's telegram, not sparing plaudits andwords of praise:"Our main news," he wrote. is Ezhov'sappointment.This remarkable,wise decisionby our father matchedthe attitude of the party and country. Iagodaturned out to be unquestionablyweak for this role. To be an organizerof construction-that'sone thing. But to be politically matureand uncoverenemies in good time-that'sanother.The OGPU was alreadybehind on this caseby many years, and didn't warn of the heinous murder of Kirov. Ezhov will certainly handle things well. According to my information, the majority of Chekists [membersof the NKVD-Ed.] have welcomed the change of leadership. Iagoda himself is apparently deeply upsetabout his dismissal,but that can't bother us where matters of stateare concerned.1i

It thus appearsthat Kaganovich purposelydemonstratedhis unconditional supportfor thesedecisionsto Ordzhonikidze.as if to convince him not to arguewith the "boss." Soon afterward.in a letter from October12. Kaganovichonce again informed Ordzhonikidze of his strong approval of the actions of the new NKVD leadership."I can reiteratethat ComradeEzhov is handling

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things well. He's taken care of the situation in a Stalinist manner. He's dispensedwith the banditsof the counterrevolutionaryTrotskyistsin Bolshevik fashion. HistOlY hasn'tknown such basedouble-dealingand deceit from provocateurs,and therefore revolutionary punishmentmust correspond to the crime."7 While hearing this, Ordzhonikidze continued to defend "his" people.For example,he twice sent telegramson October13 and 15 to the SupremeCourt chairmanof the RSFSR: "I requestthat you familiarize yourself with the case of the former director of the Kalinin Factory,ComradeDanilenko,andinform me of your fmdings."8 Ordzhonikidzecelebratedhis fiftieth birthday on October24, 1936, in Kislovodsk amid a masscampaignof congratulationsand reports.He also received news at this time that his older brother Papulia (Pavel) had beenarrestedin Georgia. When Beria was shot following Stalin's death in 1953, rumors circulated that Beria himself had been responsible for Ordzhonikidze's death.Beria allegedlyslanderedSergoin front of Stalin and organized his brother'sarrest. "Several days before his own death, Sergo." stated AnastasI. Mikoyan at theJuly 1953 plenum, "twice said in conversation with me: "I don't understandwhy Stalin doesn'ttrust me. 1 believe in him 100 percent;1 don't want to fight with him, but rathersupporthim, yethe doesn'ttrust me. Beria'sintrigues playa major role here,for he feeds Stalin lies, and Stalin believes him." "I recall," corroboratedKE. Voroshilov in his speechat the sameplenum, "how it was well known at the time to ComradesMolotov, Kaganovich, and especially the Tbilisi Georgians,in particularthosepresenthere,that Beria playeda despicablerole in the life of the outstandingCommunist,SergoOrdzhonikidze. He did everythingto slanderand ruin the reputation,in Stalin's eyes, of this truly innocent person and Bolshevik. Seeing Beria as the real enemy, Sergo Ordzhonikidze said terrible things about him to me and other comrades.He stated that Beria was an insolent enemywho has yet to reveal his true self." "Beria set ComradesStalin and Ordzhonikidzeat loggerheads,and the noble heart of ComradeSergo didn't hold up; this is how Beria disabledone of the bestleadersof the party and friends of ComradeStalin," saidA.A. Andreevat the plenumY In the investigation that followed, Beria was chargedwith arresting

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Ordzhonikidze'srelatives and those TranscaucasianCommunistsclose to him. The fact that Beria had used torture to garnertestimonycompromising Sergo was highlighted.1O This version dating from 1953 was concoctedby a political order-to move Stalin out from under attack and transferall blamefor the so-called"cult of personality"to Beria. To what extentdo the known facts allow us to castBeria as the main culprit for the clashbetweenStalin and Ordzhonikidze? For a long time, the relationshipbetweenOrdzhonikidzeand Beria was the kind one would expect betweenone of the top "leaders" and the head of a union republic who had only recently made his career. They held altogether different positions in the party-statehierarchy. And Beria secured the patronageof Ordzhonikidze becauseof this. Beria's situation was complicatedby the fact that many old Caucasian Bolshevikswere well receivedat Ordzhonikidze'shousein Moscow, and they did not like the "upstart" Beria and used any opportunemoment to discredit him in Ordzhonikidze'seyes. Beria tried quite earnestlyto demonstratehis devotion to Ordzhonikidzeand refute the slanderof his enemies.Beria's letters to Ordzhonikidze,which are preservedin Ordzhonikidze'spersonalpapersat RTsKhIDNI, testify to this. "Sergo," he said in one of theselettersdatedDecember18, 1932, you have known me more than ten years.You know all my faults and all my abilities. I never tried to undermineeither the Central Committee or you, and I am sureI will not do so in the future. I devoteall my time to work, hoping to justify the party's and the Central Committee'sfuith in me.... I ask you only one thing-don'tbelieve anyone.... Verify all thesestoriesso as to put an end to the incessant provocations.I I Judging from well-known facts, Ordzhonikidze actively protected Beria and maintainedgood relationswith him right up to the middle of the 1930s.12 Even if we assumethat Ordzhonikidze'spatronagewas a burdenon Beria and that he wanted to dispensewith it, it is possibleto maintain that Beria would not have begun to "dig" at Sergo of his own volition. Feelings of self-preservationwould have preventedBeria from doing this: The hot-temperedSergo was not to be trifled with; neither was Stalin, who might not have reacted benevolently to them if he had

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really thought well of Ordzhonikidze before Beria's intrigues. Beria likely understoodthis. It was another matter, however, if Stalin had instructedBeria to do so (which cannotbe ruled out) or had given even a hint or slight signal. Only in this casecould Beria have risked arresting friends and relativesof a powerful Politburo member. The supposition that Beria had shown the initiative in Ordzhonikidze's case is not persuasive,becauseStalin in the future turned the arrestsof close relatives into a traditional methodof "educating" his comrades-in-arms.This was a way of verifying their absoluteloyalty. As a rule, Stalin's circle successfullyenduredthis test without protest, and often-asa manifestationof their utter devotion-actively assistedin the reprisals. This did not happen in Ordzhonikidze'scase. He reacted painfully to his brother's arrest and tried to protecthim from harm. According to the 1953 testimonyof Mir D. Bagirov, who was the first secretaryof the Central Committee of the AzerbaidzhanCommunist Party in 1936, Ordzhonikidze summonedhim by telephone to Kislovodsk when he learnedabout his brother'sarrest."Ordzhonikidze drilled me aboutBeria, and spokeof him very negatively.In particular, Ordzhonikidzesaid that he couldn't believe in the guilt of his brother Papulia,recently arrestedby Beria.... Beria learnedthrough his own people that Ordzhonikidzehad summonedme to Kislovodsk, and he asked me the reasonsfor it over the telephone.I answeredthat Ordzhonikidze was interestedin issuesconcerningoil drilling. "13 Bagirov most likely did not accuratelydescribehis role in this affair. But Ordzhonikidze'sbehavior testifies to the fact that he searchedfor a way to help his brother and tried to learn something of the case through roundaboutways. According to contemporaryaccountslater collected by Anton Antonov-Ovseenko,Ordzhonikidze repeatedlyappealedto Stalin on his brother's behalf, tried to prove his innocence,and proposedsummoningPapuliafor questioningin Moscow. Stalin categorically refused.14 TheseeventsaffectedOrdzhonikidze'shealth in a critical way. After a period of relative improvement,associatedwith the visit of Professor Noorden from Austria, Ordzhonikidze'scondition deteriorated.Iii On November9, 1936, he suffereda bout of cardiovascularfailure, accompaniedby a brief loss of consciousness. 16

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How much did Ordzhonikidzehimself believe that Papulia'sarrest was a result of Beria's intrigues?On the one hand,it was convenientto believe this. In conversing with Stalin, for example, Ordzhonikidze could refer to Beria's machinationswithout leading to a seriousargument by transferring the blame to Stalin himself. But on the other hand, it is difficult to believe that at the bottom of his heart, Ordzhonikidze did not understandStalin's true role and the degree of Beria'sindependence. The conflict that soon flared up in Tbilisi involving .Ordzhonikidze'sother brother,Valiko, indirectly supportsthis view and servesas groundsfor speculatingabout the relationship between OrdzhonikidzeandBeria during this period. Valiko (Ivan) Ordzhonikidzeworked as a budgetaryinspectorin the financial departmentof the Tbilisi Soviet. At the beginningof November 1936, one of his colleaguesfiled a statementwith the party committee chargingthat Ivan Konstantinovichinsisted upon the innocenceof PapuliaOrdzhonikidzeand deniedhe fraternizedwith Trotskyists.The party committeeof the Tbilisi Soviet issueda denunciation.Valiko was called "on the carpet,"and not only confirmedeverythingwritten in the statement,but added: "Papulia Ordzhonikidzecouldn't go againsthis brother, ComradeSergoOrdzhonikidze,nor the leaderof our people, ComradeStalin, whom he personallyknows.... It's impossible to believe such accusationsagainst Papulia Ordzhonikidze-they'reall untrue." To the membersof the party committee,Valiko protested:"You can be sure of the innocencenot only of my brother,but of otherswho will be freed in a short time." For such impertinence,they expelledhim from the group of party sympathizers,and fired him. Sergo then got involved in the case.In the middle of Decemberhe phoned Beria and asked for help. Beria showed remarkableconcern this time: He spoke with the accusedand soughtan explanationfrom the chairman of the Tbilisi Soviet. Sergo received a packagewithin a week that contained an explanatoryletter from the same chairman, Nioradze, and a cover letter from Beria. Beria wrote: "Dear Comrade Sergo! Mter your call I quickly summonedValiko; he told me the story of his dismissaland roughly confirmed that which is expoundedupon in the enclosedexplanationfrom the chairman of the Tbilisi Soviet, Comrade Nioradze. Today, Valiko was restored to his job. Yours. L. Beria."17

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This event merits close attention. Sergo, who apparentlybelieved that the repressionsagainsthis friends and relativeswere affairs exclusively of Beria's making, nonethelesscalled his enemyand asked him for help. Is this becausehe understoodthat Beria actedon orders,and that if he had none regardingValiko Ordzhonikidze,he would have to help? Beria'sreactionwas curious. It was as if he signaledthrough such quick and unambiguousactions, "I'm always ready to serve you, Comrade Sergo. I have nothing againstyour family; and if I have to cause you grief, I'm not to blame." It is important to note Valiko Ordzhonikidze'sbehavior, of course, and his assurancethat Papulia and "others" "will be freed in a short time." Could he have heard these promisesfrom Sergo? Conflict over the arrest of PapuJiaOrdzhonikidzeand other Georgian Communistsclose to Sergo strained his relationship with Stalin. The leader'smarginaliain a book, Sergo Ordzhonikidze:Biographical Outline, preservedin Stalin's library, testifies to the growth of his enmity toward Ordzhonikidze.Compiled by the former secretaryof the TranscaucasianRegional Party Committee and deputy director of the Institute of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, Mamia (Ivan) D. Orakhelashvili (1881-1937),this work was publishedon Ordzhonikidze'sfiftieth birthday (typeseton October20, 1936, publishedon October27). It represents a typical analysis by an old party memberwho knew the history well and preferredsilence to outright falsification. In contrastto other works, dedicatedalmostexclusivelyto Stalin, Orakhelashvili's,while not forgetting the leader, dealt extensivelywith Ordzhonikidzein glowing terms. EulogizingOrdzhonikidzedispleasedStalin greatly. He madenumerous notationsin the book. For example,Stalin highlighted the following passageon eventsin Persiafrom 1909: 'The authority of Comrade Ordzhonikidzeamong the local Persiandemocraticpopulationwas immeasurable.They named him 'Mushtekhidom,' which means 'holy,' 'omnipotent.' "18 He also underlined Orakhelashvili'sassertionabout Ordzhonikidze'ssystematic correspondencewith Lenin, Ordzhonikidze's key role in conveningthe PragueConference,and his contributions during the OctoberRevolution and Civil War, and so on.19 In the marginsoppositestatementson Ordzhonikidze'sdedicatedservice under Stalin'sleadershipin the period of theJuly Crisis of 1917, Stalin

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wrote: "What about the Central Committee?The party?" "Where's the Central Committee?"2oStalin also paid attention to a quote from Ordhzhonikidze'sreport to the Sixteenth Party Congress:'Today we lavish ComradeStalin with trust, and boldly move forward with him, knowing that he'sleading the party along a Leninist path." Stalin highlighted this quote and underlined the word "lavish."21 In Ordzhonikidze'sreport to the SixteenthCongress,there were other, more "correct" pronouncementsabout Stalin, such as: "In ComradeStalin, the party hasa steadfastdefenderof the generalparty line and the best pupil of Vladimir Ilich [applause].Our party and working class therefore correctlyidentif)' Comrade Stalin with the general line of our party, which leads the USSR from victory to victory. "22 Bu t Orakhelashvili had selected the most provocative quotation, reminding readers that Stalin had become leader thanks to the support of his It seemsthat Stalin understoodthis hint. comrades-in-arms. On the last page, Stalin underlinedthe book's pressrun: "First edition-one hundred thousandcopies." Such a circulation for a biography of only one of Stalin'sassociateswas inordinatelylarge. Stalin's displeasurewith Orakhelashvili'sbook (the author, by the way, was soon to be repressed)once again shows that Stalin was threatened by the group of Old Bolsheviks who did not wish to forget the actual history of the party and acknowledgeStalin as the first among equals. The desire to get rid of them was one of the reasonsfor the organizationof the GreatTerror.

Chapter 10

Rout of the Economic Cadres

Mter his return to Moscow from Kislovodsk, numerousproblemsand unpleasantriesbefell Ordzhonikidze.Stalin's plans becameeven more definite-andOrdzhonikidze'sposition more precarious.The so-called KemerovoTrial was a new blow inflicted on the People'sCommissariat of HeavyIndustry. This open trial was conducted at the end of November 1936 in Novosibirsk, and widely publicized in the press.For severaldays, newspapers published trial records along with commentary."Theoretical" articles followed with general lessonson "sabotage."Careful study of this case readily shows that it was in fact a rehearsalfor the second Moscow Show Trial-againstPiatakov and his comrades-whichtook place two months later, in January1937. The reasonfor the organization of this trial in Kemerovo was an explosion at the Kuzbassmine Centralon September23, 1936, in which ten minersdied and fourteen others were seriously injured. At the time, mine accidentsoccurred frequently, causedby poor equipmentin the coal enterprises,rushed work, and the violation of safetyrules. On December28, 1935, at Central, for example,therewas a terrible catastrophein which, thanksonly to a fortunatecoincidence,two peopledied ratherthan dozens. As a rule, such accidentswere thoroughly concealed,and unhappy miners were forced to remain silent. The Septembertragedy at Kemerovo,however,was not coveredup. A specialcommissionwas sent to the Kuzbass.Its membersspent two weeks in the local NKVD building, but never even visited the mines. By dictate of the Chekists, the

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experts did not investigate the crux of the matter (as a review of the caseat the end of the 1950slater revealed),but characterizedthe accident as an act of sabotage,rejecting all other accounts.In turn, NKVD agentsquickly carriedout arrests.It provedmore than coincidentalthat the main engineerof the Kemerovo mine was Peshekhonov,who had been sentencedin 1928 to three years of exile in the ShakhtyMfair. Engineerswho formerly belonged to the Trotskyist opposition were linked to him. They even found a German specialist, Shtikling, at a neighboringshaft who had vacationedin Germany,which meant that he was a "German spy." NKVD agentsarrestedseveralother local economic managers,and concoctedan "organization"that allegedly operated under the directives of the Unified Trotskyist-Zinovievite Center and receivedordersfrom Piatakov. The Kemerovo "spies" and "wreckers" were chargedwith artificially lowering the extraction of coal, poisoningworkerswith toxic gases,organizingthe explosionof September 23 on ordersof Germanfascistsand, finally, attemptingto murder the Sovnarkom chairman, Molotov, who had come to Kemerovo in 1934. All of these were fabrications, woven as usual only on "confessions" beatenout of people.Nevertheless,all nine of the accusedwere shot.' The wave of state terror stimulatedthe strengtheningof "vigilance" and a streamof denunciations,an exampleof which was the report of a rubber trust administrator sent to Ordzhonikidze on November 13, 1936. "I considerit my duty to report to you," it reads, that the systematicwork stoppagesin the rubber industry are rooted, aboveall, in the anti-Soviettechnicalleadershipof the main engineer and deputy head of the Central Directorate,Mr. L.M. Gorbunov. 1 becameconvincedof this as a result of my observationsof his work over three years. Unfortunately, I don't have any factual evidenceto exposethis evil. But on November10, 1936, in an eveninggathering with ComradeBitker [head of the rubber industry in the NKTP Central Directorate-O.Kh.],... Mr. Gorbunovmadea typical anti-Soviet statementthat revealedhis true classnature.He said: "A healthypissimism [wording in the text-O.Kh.] makesfor technical progress." From today's perspectiveit is clear that, guided by just such an anti-Soviet principle, Gorbunovstifled any new innovation in the rubber industry, causingrubber factories to producea huge numberof defective

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products,which has repeatedlycome to light and is coming to light now."

Reporting to Ordzhonikidzeabout the other "sins" of Gorbunov, the managercontinued: I was outragedby Gorbunov'snegativestatements,which were contrary to a Communist'sconvictions,but characteristicallythey weren't rebuffed by ComradeBitker, who intimated with an unfriendly smile that one mustn't speak in such a way. I don't know how the other comradespresentat this meeting will react, ... but they all noticed the harmful attackagainstour party'spolicies, foundedupon a positive optimism,on a firm assuranceofour strengths,on a firm assurancein victory. I entreatyou, ComradeSergo, to pay attention to this note. The matter is more serious than it might appear at first. Producedin duplicate,I typed it myself, and retainedthe copy.2 This denunciationwas such an obvious settling of accountsby an ignorant newcomerwith his insufficiently "proletarian" boss that Ordzhonikidzeappearsto have simply ignored it. But he did not always act this way. Reacting to numerous"signals," Ordzhonikidze,more often than before, behavedcautiouslyand madecompromises.In November 1936, for example,he receiveda letter from two employeesof his commissariat,B. Levin and I. Gorskii, which reads: In connectionwith Piatakov'sexposureas a Trotskyist scoundreland counterrevolutionarywrecker, we considerit necessaryto report to you the following facts. At the end of 1932 or the beginningof 1933, I, B. Levin, then the director of ChemicalFactoryNo.1 (PoisonGas), in my regular report to Piatakov... was given the task at Chemical Factory No. 1 to producea gas so highly toxic that even the smallest dosewould kill a personwithout leaving any noticeabletracesin the body. This [gas] is supposedlyneededfor our struggle with enemies abroad.This work at ChemicalFactoryNo.1 was not carriedout, but was limited to a study of the appropriatescholarlyliterature. In 1935 or the beginningof 1936, Piatakov,during our report ... talked at length aboutmethodsand meanshe readabout,usedin the Middle Ages, by which peoplewere poisonedwith a highly toxic gas (by putting on gloves, turning pagesof a book, etc.) that went undetected. The point of all this was that the chemical factory had to producesucha gasif it hadn'talreadydoneso.

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On November26, OrdzhonikidzefOlwarded this letter to Ezhov at the NKVD.3 On January21, 1937, the Dnepropetrovskregional committeesecretary, Mendel Khataevich, sent a letter to Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Ezhov in which he maintained: "For several years now, all revelations regardingan array of spy and saboteurgroupsin our region, especially in Zaporozhe,point to the technical director of the factory combine Kommunar,and award-holder,P.1. Dik." Khatae\;chwrote that Dik finished engineeringschool in Germany in 1908. He began work in Zaporozhebefore the revolution and remainedat the factory after it was nationalized.In the 1920she went to Germanyto purchaseequipment. Khataevich assertedthat a number of arrested "counterrevolutionaries" fingered Dik as the organizerof an undergroundgroup at Kommunar in 1931-33. "According to sources,he is one of the main organizersof spy and espionagegroupsfor the Germanfascists.But the People'sCommissariatof HeavyIndustry has not sanctionedhis arrest." 'The NKVD organs,"concludedKhataevich,"have insistedon arresting Dik as a spy-saboteurfor five years, but up until now have not received permission.... I requestthat you order the appropriateagenciesto arrestDik and strip him of his awards."Having familiarized himselfwith the letter, Ordzhonikidzedid not defendDik directly. but tried to stall for time. "Not once have the NKVD organsraisedthe questionof Dik's arrestbefore the NKTP," he wrote.4 Even in thosecaseswhen Ordzhonikidzetried to help his employees, he was not nearly as successfulas he had been earlier. Leadersof the punitive organs,such as the procuracy,no longer respondedas before to Ordzhonikidze'srequests.Following the new trend, Vyshinskii orderedin November1936 that all criminal casesconcerningmajor fires, accidents,and productionof shoddygoodsbe reviewedwithin a month. His goal was to reveal their true counterrevolutionary,wrecking nature, and he acted in the spirit of this directive." The case regarding the production of defective motor chambersat tlle Yaroslavl Rubber-Asbestos Combineservesas a characteristicexample. It began in September1936, when Vyshinskii orderedan investigation following the publication of critical articles in the central press. Procuratorialinvestigatorsrevealedthat the Yaroslavl factory, "as a result of the criminal negligence"of responsiblepeople, shippedworth-

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lessproductsto consumers.Chargeswere levied againstthe headof tire production, P.N. Borodavkin, the main engineer,la.K. Vecherkovskii, and other enterprisechiefs. Vecherkovskiiappealedto Ordzhonikidze, maintainingthat "production mistakeswere inevitable becausewe were learning to handle new kinds of raw materials." Ordzhonikidzeasked Vyshinskii to close the case. On December9, 1936. Vyshinskii, who previously had honoredsimilar requestsby Ordzhonikidze,refused.Wishing to somewhatsoften his negativeresponse,Vyshinskii wrote: Taking into consideration.however,your indication of objective difficulties at the combinein attempting100 percentmasteryin handling Sovietrubberat the combine.I have instructedthe Yaroslavl regional procuratorto carry out the mostobjectiveand thoroughexamination of this caseby taking stock of the peculiaritiesanddifficulties facedby factory workersaccusedin this affair. Following a thoroughreview of this case in court. I'll once again check on this and report back to you.6 Ordzhonikidzewas unhappywith this reply, and personallytalked it over with Vyshinskii. The procuratoryielded and promisednot to bring the case to court. A bit later, however, he wrote again to retract this promise: 'Today I have receivedword that the NKVD organs have arrestedthe director of tire production,Borodavkin, as a Trotskyist. The combine director, ComradeVasilev, reportedto the Yaroslavl regional procuratorthat the main engineerof tire production at the rubberasbestoscombine,Vecherkovskii,was dismissedfor poor leadership.In view of thesefacts, and by virtue of considerationsset forth in the letter of December9, 1936, I consider it impossible to stop this case from proceeding.Please,ComradeSergo,don't object." Ordzhonikidzeread this letter on December21, and respondedto Vyshinskii the next day: "I don't object.,,7 That it was the political aspectsof the case that servedas obstacles Vyshinskii could not overcomeis evidencedby the fact that severaldays later he refused,on his own initiative, to launcha criminal investigation in an analogoussituation. On January9, 1937, he sentOrdzhonikidzea letter, in which he reportedthat the Leningradregional procuratorhad forwarded materialsto Moscow that apparentlyimplicated a numberof

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enterprisessubordinateto the NKTP for shippingsubstandardproducts to the Red Nailmaker Factory throughout1936. "Believing it expedient to initiate a criminal investigation againstthe headsof these factories (Red October, Elektrosteel, Makeevsk, Magnitogorsk, Petrovsk, and Izhevsk factories, etc.), I'm placing these materials at your disposal," wrote Vyshinskii. Ordzhonikidzeordered his associatesto resolve the problem.8 In spite of Ordzhonikidze'sefforts. the NKTP. like other commissariats, lost a critical number of cadresby the end of 1936. Some of the resultsof this purge concerningthe numberof nomenklaturaemployees dismissedfrom work, expelled from the party. and arrestedwere summedup by the Information Departmentof the Central Committee. According to that department,out of 823 peopleclassifiedas belonging to the NKTP nomenklatura(deputy commissars,chiefs of major divisions. trust administrators,enterprise directors, construction bosses, and party organizersat defenseplants), 56 peoplewere dismissedfrom work in 1935-36. Of them, only one nomenklaturaemployee of the NKTP was fired, expelledfrom the party, or arrestedduring the verification of party cards from the end of 1934 to the end of 1935, whereas 11 were fired (9 of whom were expelled from the party and arrested) during the exchangeof party cardsin the spring and summerof 1936, and 44 were fired (37 of whom were expelled from the party and 34 arrested)after the exchangeof party cardsin the last monthsof 1936.9 Among thosedismissedand arrestedwere well-known and deserving administratorswho received numerousawards and were in Ordzhonikidze'sspecialfavor. Apart from Piatakov,thosearrestedincluded the headof the ChemicalIndustryAdministration,SA Rataichak;the headof Siberian Machine Construction, M.S. Boguslavskii; the director of the Rostov Electric Machine Factory, N.P. Glebov-Avilov; the director of the Slavianskii Isolator Factory in the Donetsk region, I.P. Khrenov (whi, indicentally, is the hero of the famous poem by Mayakovskii, "Khrenov's Tale of the Kuznetsk ConstructionSite and the People of Kuznetsk"); the headof constructionat the Orsk-Khalilovskii Combine, S.M. Frankfurt, who not long before this was the chief of Kuznetsk Constructionand authorof well-known memoirson the constructionof the KuznetskCombine,and many others. In the previously mentionedfiles of the Information Department,

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the Central Committee also kept a list of nomenklaturaworkers of the NKTP "who in the past had taken part in the opposition and had wavered." Among them were the Deputy Commissarof Heavy Industry, A.1. Gurevich (who during the tradeunion controversyof 1921 had sidedwith Trotsky'splatform); the celebrateddirector of the MakeevskMetallurgical Factory and a favorite of Ordzhonikidze,G.V. Gvakharia (who, in 1928, had beenexpelledfrom the party and sentto Kazakhstanfor belongingto the Trotskyist Opposition,but thanksto Ordzhonikidze'sefforts, was reinstatedin the party in 1930); the head of the Chemical-PlasticTrust, M.1. Frumkin (describedin one documentas, "one of the leadersof the Right Opposition"); the director of FactoryNo. 12 (Moscowregion), S.1. Syrtsov, and many others-sixty-sixpeoplein all. '0 All were subsequentvictims of the purges,which Ordzhonikidzecould not havefailed to realize.He quite possiblyhaddiscussedmanyof the arrests. Ordzhonikidzecould also have known about the impendingarrests in his commissariat,judging by other materials preservedin his personal papers. One such documentwas entitled "Information on the PersonalCompositionof the Central Apparatusof the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry as of December1, 1936," and was signedby the headof the AdministrativeDepartmentof ManagerialMfairs of the NKTP, Bobrov. Bobrov reported that of the 743 full and candidate members of the party who worked in the central apparatusof the NKTP, 42 had incurred party penalties(including 12 for participating in the Trotskyist Opposition), while 80 had once belonged to other parties(former Mensheviks,SRs,Bundists,andAnarchists).Of the nonparty employees,160 had been expelled at one time from the party, and 169 had belongedto other political parties.Among those employeesin the commissariat'scentral apparatus,there were 71 former officers of the White Army. 287 officers of the tsarist army, 31 peoplewho had worked in various institutions on the territory occupied by the Whites during the Civil War, 94 convictedof counterrevolutionaryactivities, and 41 convictedof malfeasancein office. Therewere 131 individuals who had beenborn to families of merchantsand industrialists,133 to the nobility, and 73 to clerical families." The trial of the so-calledParallel Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center,held in Moscow during January 23-30, 1937 (the second major Moscow ShowTrial), spedup the repressionof managers.In fact. this was a trial

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Ordzhonlkldze with his economic cadres In the mld-1930s.

of the NKT P. Ten of the seventeendefendantswere top officials in the NKTP-G.L. Piatakov; the head of Siberian Machine Constructionin Novosibi rsk, M.S. Boguslavskii; the head of the NKT P's Main Chemical Industry, S.A. Rataichak;the head of the KemerovoChemical Combine Construction,B.D. Norkin, and his deputy, la.N. Drobnis; the administrator of the Salairsk Zi nc Mines in KemerevoOblast,A.A. Shestov; the chief engineerof the KuzbassCoal trust, M.S. Stroilov; the senior economist of the Production-TechnicalDcpanmentof the NKTP's Main Chemical In dustry, 1.1. Grashc; t he deputy chief engineer of the Main Chemical Industry and chief construction engineerof the Rionskii Ni-

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trogen Fertilizer Combinein Georgia,G.E. Pushin;and the managerof the SupplyDepartmentat the Prokopevskiiand Anzherskii Mines in the Kuzbass,V.V. Arnold. The press regularly publishedtrial reports. The defendants'confessionsconcerning"wrecking" bred further suspicion and encouragedthe searchfor new "wreckers." Trying to protecthis commissariatfrom attackin such difficult times, Ordzhonikidzecompromised.He argued that there actually were and will be enemies,but the secret police had for the most part already exposedthem. In keeping its honestemployees,the commissariathad to overcomethe negativeconsequences of sabotagethrough conscientious efforts. Ordzhonikidzeconsistentlyrepeatedthis messagein one form or anotherduring the last monthsof his life. The new director of the RostovElectric Machine Factory,D. Kartashov,rememberedhow at the time of his appointment,Ordzhonikidzeencouragedhim "to review managementcadrescarefully, preventingwholesaledisparagementof them, expelling only true enemiesof the people." "In order to fire people," Kartashovsaid, repeatingOrdzhonikidze, "no special skill is necessary.But to find real enemiesand expel them requiresBolshevik vigilance and Bolshevik tact.,,12On February1, 1937, in one of his last speeches,madeat a receptionfor employeesof the oil-refining plants, Ordzhonikidze once again publicly disagreedwith the assertionsof widespreadwrecking, reasoningas he had since the June 1936 conferenceat the People'sCommissariatof HeavyIndustry: Our engineer... is building his own home in his own Soviet Union. He devotesall his energiesand knowledge to the construction of socialism.... I dare statewe have such individuals in our country; at least90 percentof the enormousnumberof engineersbelong to this category [applause].It can't be otherwise.These are our own sons and brotherswhom we raised.During the last ten years,our institutes of higher learning trained about one hundred thousandengineers and technicianswho are the flesh of our flesh, our blood, our sons, our friends, our comrades,[I repeat] our sons.13 Incidentally, those presentunderstoodthe real intention of this statement, made a day after the trial againstPiatakov and other leadersof industry ended, and showed their support by applauding Ordzhonikidze's attempt to set up a distinct quantitative limit beyond which the repressionsmustnot extend.

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It cannotbe ruled out that Ordzhonikidzemade similar arguments in quarrelswith Stalin over the devotion to socialismof the overwhelming majority of specialists. In defending the cadresof his commissariat,Ordzhonikidzerelied not only on his powersas a Politburo memberbackedby a sufficiently influential economicnomenklatura,but also on the supportof a significant number of local party leaders.Stable cohorts of the ruling elite, joined together by common interests,formed in the provinces.Apart from party and soviet officials, they included the directorsof large industrial establishmentswho had significant financial power as well as connectionsin Moscow. The main concernof the regional bosseswas maintaining stability locally, keeping the peace between rival chiefs. Conflicts and squabbles,especiallythose reachingthe center, had the most unfortunateconsequences that led to cadrereshuffiingand "resolution by the punitive organs." Each regional party secretarytried to surround himself with "his own" people. A general desire to preserve their position and avoid unpleasantriestendedto unite all leadersinto a comparativelyfriendly association. Living under the continuousthreatof purgesand arrests,local leaders tried their best to limit "exposures"and restrain the most zealous NKVD agents.Becauseeach arrestentailed new accusations,or at best chargesof "political short-sightedness" and "lack of vigilance," they reacted negatively to repressionsagainst their "own" in the provinces. Regional party secretariesoften formed united fronts with the leaders of economicdepartment"to defendenterprisedirectorslocatedwithin their region. The most open attempts by local leaders to resist the repressionstook place at the end of 1936 and the beginningof 1937, during active preparationfor the GreatTerror. Eventsin Nizhnii Tagil also involving Ordzhonikidzecan serveas a characteristicexample. Nizhnii Tagil was the site of one of the most ambitiousprojectsof the SecondFive-Year Plan, the Ural Coach ConstructionFactory, built and operatedby the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry. Its building involved the usual feverish haste,enthusiasm,use of repressionand lack of sufficient preparation.The enterprisebegan operation in 1936, but soon the leadershipof the factory was chargedwith sabotageand destroyed. This was yet another blow againstOrdzhonikidze,who in this casetried to defendhis employeesto the very end.

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The head of construction,L.M. Mariasin, was appointedat Nizhnii Tagil in June 1933 after successfullybuilding the MagnitogorskCoke Combine.Like other "captainsof industry," Mariasinwas a dynamicand coarsemanwho ruled without indulgenceand soughtto fulfill an order from aboveat any price. Like other managers,he often receivedpenalties for not meeting goals that were frequently unobtainable.These unpleasantrieswere insignificant, however, in comparisonwith the attacks he periodically enduredfor his "Trotskyist past," that is, for his supportfor Trotsky's position in 1923. Although Mariasin had repeatedly repentedsince then, the stigmaof political unreliability continued to haunthim. The samewas true for the secretaryof the Nizhnii Tagil City Party Committee,Shalvy StepanovichOkudzhava.He hadjoined a group of young Social Democratsunder the leadershipof the Kutaiss Bolsheviks when he was sixteen, immediately after the February Revolution in 1917. He then held the post as managerof the OrganizationalDepartment in the Central Committeeof the GeorgianKomsomol, studiedin Moscow, and once again returnedto carry out party work in his native land. In 1932, Okudzhavaleft the post of secretaryof the Tiflis City Party Committee to becomesecretaryof the party committee at the Ural CoachConstructionFactory (there is evidencethat he did not get along with Beria). In 1935, he was selectedsecretaryof the Tagil City Party Committee. But while in Moscow back in 1923, as he himself wrote in his autobiography,his loyalty to the party line "wavered."14 Besidesthis, two brothersof Shalvy Stepanovichwere Trotsky supporters. The older one was a memberof the party, and from 1903 to 1923 worked as a secretaryof the Central Committeeof the GeorgianCommunist Party. He was then expelledfrom the party; after repenting,his membershipto the party was restored and he remained in Tiflis. Okudzhava'sother brother refused to repent, and was exiled in the 1930s. This kinship magnified his own "sins" and causedOkudzhava constanttrouble,from which Ordzhonikidzerepeatedlysavedhim. At the end of 1935 and the beginning of 1936, for example, Okudzhavawas beset by problems stemming from statementsmade againsthim by a certain Klekovkin. Klekovkin reportedthat while vacationing in Sukhumi, he learned from the head of the regional party committee'sDepartmentof Culture and Propagandaof Abkhazia that

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Okudzhavawas an oppositionist in the Caucasus,and that his brother even led "anti-party groups." Mter receiving this denunciation, the secretaryof the SverdlovskRegional Party Committee,LD. Kabakov, set eventsin motion. The Tiflis city committeewas askedto provide a copy of Okudzhava'sregistrationform, and excerptsfrom meetingsof party colleaguesof the Transcaucasian Regional Control Commission. No new compromising evidence turned up against Okudzhava.Ordzhonikidze'sinterferencealso played a role, and the casewas closed.I!> Enjoying somesupport,Okudzhava,in turn, tried to impederepressions in the Nizhnii Tagil party organization.He defendedthose expelled from the party, and toned down accusatorycampaigns.16This soongot him in deeptrouble. As the political course grew more severe,the situation of Mariasin and Okudzhavaworsened.The next flare-up of "exposing" campaigns took place in August 1936 in connectionwith a discussionin the party organization of a secret Central Committee letter "On the Terrorist Activities of the Trotskyist-ZinovieviteCounterrevolutionaryBloc." Fulfilling CentralCommitteeinstructions,the Nizhnii Tagil city committee also held a meetingof party activists. Okudzhavawas worked over at this gathering,which recalled his Trotskyist past. The questionof his party membershiphung by a thread.Okudzhava'sexpulsionfrom the party, however,was preventedby a memberof the SverdlovskRegional Committee Party Bureau,Uziukov, who was presentby order of the regional leadership.Addressingthe tribune, Uziukov statedthat regional party committeemembersknew Okudzhavaas an irreproachableCommunist and trustedhim. This resolvedthe problem.17 (Incidentally, this speech together with other faults soon got Uziukov himself in trouble. Not waiting for the inevitablearrest,he committedsuicide.) Roughly at the sametime, the leadershipof the SverdlovskRegional Party Committeeadmirably managedto ward off a blow to Mariasin. It happenedas follows: The instructor of the regional party committee, Maslennikov,visited the Ural CoachConstructionFactoryon an inspection trip. Upon returning, he submitted a report consistentwith the spirit of the times that chargedMariasin with wrecking. The regional party bureauexaminedthis memorandum,and thanksto the efforts of Kabakov and the party committee'ssecondsecretary,Pshenitsyn,re-

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jected demandsto expel Mariasin from the party and arrest him. 18 (Pshenitsynwould also soon be chargedwith abetting enemies,and committedsuicide.Kabakovwasshot.) Moscow played its own gamesat this time. The NKVD fabricated evidenceof Mariasin's 'Trotskyist" activities, and in September1936 received permission to arrest him. At the end of January 1937, chargeswere levied against Mariasin at an open trial in the case of the Parallel Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center. Interrogatedat the very beginning of the judicial session,Piatakov said that "in the Urals, there were two main establishmentswhere wrecking activities were concentrated.One was the copperindustry, and the other-theUral Coach Construction Factory."19 In the words of Piatakov, Mariasin was a participantin the Ural Trotskyist group, and personallycarried out sabotage:He wastedfunds on materialsand equipmentunnecessarily, draggedout construction,and made it difficult to get enterprises operating. The defendant,J.D. Turok, who before his arrest had worked as the deputy head of the Sverdlovsk Railway, maintained that Mariasin'not only recruited him into the organization, but ordered wrecking on the railroad lines.20 On April 1, 1937, Mariasin was sentencedto be shot (his legal and party rehabilitation cametwenty yearslater, in April-May 1957). Mariasin'sarrestput Okudzhavain an extremelydifficult position. Trying to save the life both of himself and his family, Okudzhava repented,recognizedhis mistakes,and swore allegianceto the general line. "The guilt of the Tagil city committee is tremendous,"he said, for example,at a meetingof party activists in Nizhnii TagH not long before his arrest. We didn't exposeMariasin'sheinousgangof banditsand others,who causedharm to the peopleand plannedto murderleaderswho came to help us in our work. As leader of the party organization, I was instructedto direct and organizethe massesto be vigilant. I failed to carry out this responsibility,and admit my grave mistake.This is especially difficult for me. I must take into accountthe fact that I have madeTrotskyist mistakesin the past, and that my brothersare coun21 terrevolutionaries. The previouslymentionedparty activists of the Nizhnii TagH organi-

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zation met on February 9-10, 1937. In spite of the fact that two months had passedsince Mariasin's arrest, the Sverdlovsk Regional Party Committee leadership did not touch Okudzhava. As before, Kabakov waited for the Central Committeeto decide. Lacking a Central Committee decision, Stalin and Ordzhonikidze apparently held conversationsabout Okudzhava'sfate. At the beginning of February, Ordzhonikidzesenthis own inspectorsto the Ural CoachConstruction Factory, responsibleNKTP employees,S.Z. Ginzburg and I.P. Pavlunovskii, and orderedthem to investigatethe chargesof sabotage (more detail on this will be provided in the next chapter). The denouementcame not long before Ordzhonikidze'sdeath. On February 15, the Sverdlovsk Regional Party Committee decided to dismiss Okudzhavafrom his responsibilitiesas city party committeefirst secretary, initially "in connection with a transfer to anotherjob." Okudzhavawas soon arrested,however,and expelledfrom the party as a Trotskyist.22 At the imminent February-Marchplenum of the Central Committee, statementswould be heard that assailedOrdzhonikidzefor actively interfering in the OkudzhavaAffair. Reportingon wrecking in heavyindustry, Molotov said (quotedfrom the publishedaccount): Other examplesof sabotagethat were not fully exposedcan be found at the Ural Coach Construction Factory. This is a matter concerningthe largestcoachfactory, which in the nearfuture is to produce the lion's share of modern cars. A most active wrecker, Mariasin, has headedconstruction for several years, while the wrecker-TrotskyistShaliko Okudzhavahas been the secretaryof the party committee at the Ural Coach Construction Factory. Thesesaboteurswere exposedseveralmonthsago.23 Thus, the official accountmaintainedthat Okudzhavawas "uncovered" "several months" before the plenum. It is unlikely that this was simply a slip of the tongue, since Molotov left this assertionin the widely published version of his report. Most likely, he made this claim to hide the fact that several months had passed between Mariasin's arrestand the Okudzhavacase.Stalin explained how this had happenedto plenum participants (granted, this section was never published). In his aforementionedclosing speechat the ple-

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num, Stalin said about Ordzhonikidze: "How many times has he annoyed us by defending all those scoundrels,as is now apparent,like Vardanian,Gogoberidze,Meliksetov, and Okudzhava?The casein the Urals is now closed.How many times has he causedunpleasantness for himselfand how many times hashe causedunpleasantness for us?"24 The attention devotedat the plenum to the Nizhnii Tagil affair was not accidental.Arrests at the Ural Coach Construction Factory while preparationsfor the plenum were being made causedargumentsbetween Stalin and Ordzhonikidze,and becamea special matter for the NKTP leadership.

Chapter 11

Preparing for the Plenum

During his last days, Ordzhonikidze'smain concernwas preparingfor the Central Committeeplenum that would take placewithout him and go down in Soviet history as the sinister "February-MarchPlenum of 1937." Hovering over the plenum-asif all the problems tormenting Ordzhonikdizefor many long months had come together-washis estrangementfrom Stalin. For Ordzhonikidze,the plenumwas one of the last chances,more illusory than real, to apply the brakes to Stalinist policy. For Stalin, it was perhapsthe last plenum for which he had to preparethoroughly and expectattacks that in all probability would be weak, but nonethelesswould be aimedat him. On January28, 1937, the Politburo membersdecidedto convenethe plenum. They proposed that it open on February 20 and that the agendainclude the caseof Bukharin and Rykov, preparingparty organizationsfor a new election systemto the SupremeSoviet of the USSR, and discussionof the sabotage,diversion,and spying of the Trotskyists.I On January31, the Politburo confirmed the speakers:on the first matter-Ezhov; on the second-Zhdanov;and on the third-Ordzhonikidze, Kaganovich, Ezhov, and Andreev, each of whom had to address"wrecking" in his respectivedepartment(the People'sCommissariats of Heavy Industry, Communications,Internal Affairs, and the party). All speakershad to submit their draft proposalsby February5.2 Ordzhonikidze received this directive and began to prepare. He basedhis draft resolution on the previous premise that enemieshad beenuncoveredfor the most part, so the main taskwas to liquidate the 126

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consequencesof sabotage.He fashioned the document in a relaxed tone. While formally alluding to wrecking, he devoted his primary attention to politically neutral technical and economic problems. He beganhis draft report referring to the successesthat were-hereOrdzhonikidzerepeatedhis favorite line-"achievedthanksto our cadresof engineers,technicians,and administrators,promotedby the party from Judging One of the points in his the sonsof the working classand peasantry."~ Judging draft resolution stipulatedthat "the NKTP report to the Central Committee within ten days about conditions at the Kemerovo Chemical Combine, the Ural Coach ConstructionFactory, and the Middle Ural Copper ConstructionPlant, after indicating specific measuresto liquidate the consequences of sabotageand diversion at thesesites in order thereby to guaranteethe starting up of theseenterprisesaccording to the fixed date."4As further eventsrevealed,this point had vital significance,for Ordzhonikidzetried to legalize the NKTP's right to independently verify secretpolice materials that "exposed"so-calledwrecking organizationsin the placesenumeratedabove. Ordzhonikidzemost likely wrote this draft resolution by February5, as had been stipulated by the Politburo decision of January 31. On February5, the Politburo confirmed the final order of speakersat the plenum. Ezhov would speak on the Bukharin and Rykov case; Ordzhonikidze,Kaganovich,and Ezhovwould speakon the "lessonsof the sabotage,diversion, and spying by Japanese-German-Trotskyist agents"; Stalin would speakon the third point of the agenda,"concerningthe political educationof party cadresand measurestaken in the struggle against Trotskyists and other double-dealersin party organizations;" and Zhdanovwould speakon the fourth, concerningpreparationfor the elections.5 The matter, however,was apparentlynot limited to formally adopting a resolution.It seemsthat on February5 itself, Ordzhonikidzeand Stalin held a conversationaboutsabotagein industry and how to preparethis issue for the plenum. Stalin'snoteson Ordzhonikidze'sdraft resolution reveal the true nature of this discussion.Judging from them, Stalin remainedunhappy.He scribbledcommentsand retorts all over the document, expressingirritation with Ordzhonikidze'sattempts to soften things by limiting himself to streamlinedverifications. Stalin highlighted the following point, [or example,in Ordzhonikidze'sdocument:

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The manager,engineer,and technician,whethera party memberor not, can't be apolitical and concernedonly with his own "technology," but along with masteringtechnology... should be concerned with politics and clearly aware of who the friends and enemiesof Soviet power are [here Stalin insertedthat "he himselfshouldalso be a political worker"]. But party organizationswith all their meansmust aid the political [Stalin correctedthis word to "Bolshevik"] education of the economic,engineering,and technicalcadres. Oppositethis point, Stalin added:"State this more directly and make it a central issue." Stalin also "politicized" the neutral point about substituting 75 percent of employeesin crucial and dangerouslyexplosive units with people having special secondarytechnical educations,and added that these must be workers "who are proven friends of Soviet power," and so forth. Stalin'sgeneralinstructionsran as follows: "(1) statewith facts which branchesare affected by sabotageand exactly how they are affected; and (2) mention reasonsfor idlers (the apolitical, narrowmindedselection of cadres,and absenceof politically educatedcadres)."6 One other document,which to a certain extent allows us to characterize Ordzhonikidze'smood and the nature of his conversationswith Stalin, is the unabridgedstenogramof Ordzhonikidze'sspeechat the conferenceof the headsof the NKTP Central Directorateon the same day, February 5. As is clear from his introductory remarks, Ordzhonikidzewas very late for the conference(the reasonfor being late to such an importantgatheringcould only be a delay at a still higher level, such as the Central Committee). In spite of this, Ordzhonikidzegave his subordinatesa "dressing-down."Clearly agitated,he spoke incoherently,jumpingfrom topic to topic. Ordzhonikidzealso reportedthat he would addressthe issue of sabotagein heavy industry at the plenum scheduledfor February20. Ordzhonikidze began with reproachesfor the serious situation in industry and for nonfulfillment of the plan, and dedicateda significant part of his speechto chargesof not struggling sufficiently enoughwith wrecking: We've learned nothing from this trial [the Januarytrial of Piatakov and others-O.Kh.].Here you sit, headsof the Central Directorate.

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You should have bombardedme with proposalsaboutwhat to do in variousindustrial branches.But I've receivednothing from you. None of you believes this matter concernshim. The only reason that it doesn't concern you is that you didn't get involved as you should have.You'd think that if I had a first deputy, a man like Piatakov,who worked for a decadeand a half in industry and had vast contacts,that he couldn't slip one or two people on us? Of course,he could and did slip someon us. We found severalof them, but not all.7 Must I answeralone for all of you? There is sabotageat the factories-Ordzhonikidzeis guilty-nobody else. Do you tell me how you'll end the wrecking and which measuresyou'll adopt?You don't tell me anything.... No, comrades,search everywhere,for we certainly have large and small party cells that have been spoiled.... A curious question has been nagging me-How could this have happened?We've worked together so many years, and indeed not so badly. The results have been quite good, and we even fulfilled the Five-Year Plan in four. How could it be that Piatakovwas in our midst and nobodynoticeda thing? You'll reply that he was my deputy, that I didn't notice, and that you have nothing to do with it. That's not right. If a Kemerovoworker were to say this, he would be correct,but if you say it, it's wrong, becausemany of you worked with Piatakovfor more years than with me, and many of you regardedhim with open sympathy.This isn't a reproach,but stemsfrom the fact that a man worked among us as if he were helping. That's how it was. Why did this happen?Were we really so blind to it all? You must askyourselves this question. Even if we aren't taken to court, we must ask our own consciencehow this could happen. That's becausewe didn't pay enough attention to what was going on around us. Apparently, it's becausemany of us restedon our laurels.s The accursedPiatakov,Rataichak,etc. played many dirty tricks on us. But their downfall came. We caught them, arrested them, and forced them to tell everything that happened.This should open our eyes.... Apparently we have enteredinto a period when it's once again necessaryto rebuild our ranks, our leadership,and run things in a new fashion. The hell with it, but without any shake-up,we'll begin to rustY Ordzhonikidze'sspeech, never previously published, provides groundsfor severalobservations.It definitely shows that by February5, at the latest, he was not in a mood to quarrel with Stalin on :he question of exposingsabotagebut, on the contrary,demonstratedhis loyalty

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and answeredStalin's criticism regarding his lack of vigilance. That Ordzhonikidze'sspeechwas promptedby his conversationswith Stalin is clear by Ordzhonikidze'suse of Stalin's slogansconcerningthe tranquillity bred by successand the necessityof shake-upsand restructuring the ranks and leadership. Stalin would develop these ideas in detail at the upcoming February-Marchplenum. It seems that Stalin also chargedOrdzhonikidzewith packing the NKTP with saboteurs,and reminded him of Piatakov. This was the origin of Ordzhonikidze'sremark that he was not alone to blame for the lack of vigilance. Mter reacting to Stalin's criticism, Ordzhonikidze nonethelessreminded the headsof the Central Directorateabout the needto defend employeesfrom unfair accusationsand ensurea peacefulstateof affairs at enterprises: There are directorsat severalfactories todaywho, in connectionwith the trial of the scoundrels,feel that they themselvesare under attack as if they are criminals, and everyonemust answerfor Piatakov and the others. Nothing of the sort. They must be told directly that they're not criminals. they're our cadres.We caught the criminals, shot them, and we'll catchfuture criminals and shootall the scumwe find. We're not talking about them, but about the enormousmassof cadres,fine ones trained by us. This is what we need to say to them. We must not ignore the gossipamongworkers at the factories [linked to the strengtheningof the specialist-baitingcampaign-O.Kh.],but raiselabor productivity and regulateaffairs at the factories.IO When you go to the directors and help them, they'll respectyou more and take you more seriously. But if you only curse them, nothing will comeof this. They'releft to their own devices.They'reput on the spot and harassedby the party organizationbecauseof the trial. It's necessaryto approachthem, to talk with the workers, to talk with the directors,and to help and encouragethem.!! These words were not simply a repetition of those already spoken repeatedly.Real deedsstood behind them. That very day, February5, Ordzhonikidze ordered one of his employees,ProfessorGalperin, to investigatechargesof wrecking at Kemerovo. The directives Galperin receivedfrom Ordzhonikidzedid not leave any doubt as to the goal of the mission. According to Galperin,Ordzhonikidzesaid:

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Take into accountthat you're going to a place that was one of the more active centers of sabotage.All honest workers there-and they're the overwhelming majority-are very upset by what happened.You yourself were probably also affected by the most recent trial. Rememberthat the faintheartedor insufficiently conscientious peoplemight wish to blame everythingon sabotagein order to hide their own mistakesin the trial on wrecking. We simply can't allow this. We wouldn't get an exactpicture of what happened,and consequently we wouldn't know how to correct it. You must approachthe matter as a technician,trying to distinguish conscioussabotagefrom involuntarymistakes-thisis your main task.12 Similar instructions-tomake an objective financial and technical examination of evidence fabricated by the NKVD-were seditious in and of themselves.After all, official agenciesunanimouslydemanded that all economicproblemsand breakdownsbe evaluatedfrom a political point of view, as a result of wrecking. Galperin'scommissioncarried out its mission in complete conformity with Ordzhonikidze'swishes.Molotov addressedthe commission's findings in his concludi"ng remarksat the February-Marchplenum on March 2, 1937: the commission"led by ProfessorGalperin and members Lubov, Rodionov, and Olkhov went to Kemerovo and submitteda forty-five-page report on the results of their work. Could one possibly expectnot to read the words 'sabotage'or 'saboteur'in this report?But the commission submittedjust such a report, where, in spite of the well-known confessionsof wreckerssuch as Norkin, Drobnis, and others, the commissionpresentedthe usualsort of conclusionaboutshortcomingsin construction,but missedone point-sabotage."13 We learn aboutanotherNKTP commissionfrom Molotov: This commission, led by the deputy commissar,Comrade OsipovShmidt, and comprisedof engineersIvanov, Shneerson,Abramovich, and Solovev, investigated the case in the Donbasscoke industry, where the Trotskyist gangled by the infamousLogunov was active. It also submitteda written report on the resultsof its work. Its findings detailed the great lossesof ammoniaand benzol last year that were equipmentand prematurely causedby neglectof chemical-processing startingup chemicalworks at a numberof factories.But there'snot a word concerningsabotageor saboteursin this report.14

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Information about the work of the third commission,comprisedof the headofNKTP's Main ConstructionIndustry, S.Z. Ginzburg,and the NKTP deputy commissar,J.P. Pavlunovskii (apart from that previously mentionedin Molotov's report), is preservedin the testimonyof Ginzburg, the only participantof thoseeventsalive today. Ginzburgrecalled: In the beginningof February1937 Sergo told me abouteventsat the Ural Coach ConstmctionFactory at Nizhnii Tagil.... He proposed that Pavlunovskii, who was in charge of the NKTP defenseindustry, and I go there as soon as possible in a commissariattrain car and conduct a detailed investigation of the nature of the arrested builders' wrecking activities.... Upon arrival in Tagil, I immediately went to the constructionsite in order to look into the situation in detail. ... I studiedthe shopsand buildings for severaldays, and then with utmost attention checkedconstructionestimatesand expenses for each item. As a result, I was convinced that constructionwas in good shapeand the quality of work was much higher than at other constructionsites in the Urals, although there were a few expenditures that exceededestimates. In the middle of February, Sergo called from Moscow and asked about conditions at the constructionsite and what crimes had been discovered.I replied that the factory was well built and was complete, although there were a few expendituresthat exceededestimates.But at present,constructionhas sloweddown and the workers don't know what to do.... To Sergo'squestion:Had I beenat other constmction sites?-I answeredthat I had been, and in comparisonwith other sites, the one in Nizhnii Tagil had a number of advantages.Sergo asked me again if this were possible. I observed that I always tell everythingas it is. If that's the case,said Sergo,find Pavlunovskiiand quickly return to Moscow. Dictate a short note in the train car to the stenographer,in my name, about conditionsat the Ural Coach ConstructionFactory,and upon arrival immediatelydrop by my place.l !> At the February-Marchplenum, Molotov subjectedGinzburg and Pavlunovskii to harshcriticism. The commission,in his words, "failed to take into accountthe lessonsof sabotage,and had adoptedan all too reassuringmanner" in maintaining that "the activity of wreckersat the constructionsite hadn'tbeenwidespread."16 According to the recently published memoirs of one of the NKTP colleagues,Ziskind (as recounted by I.N. Kramov), Ordzhonikidze,

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while preparinga report on sabotagein heavy industry, sent "eleven of his deputies"to the factories "in order to checkon the situation in the provinces." Material preparedon the basis of the inspections,in Ziskind's words, "was divided into two categories:testimony of the defendantson trial addressingsabotagein heavy industry, and the reports of commissariatdeputieswho verified that testimony in the provinces,as well as reportsconcerningmeetingsat Sergo'splace by leaders of several large metallurgical, chemical, and aviation factories. All theseaccountsproved that the defendantson trial had lied. "17 At the February-Marchplenum, however, Molotov maintainedthat there were only three commissions:the Ginzburg-Pavlunovskiione, the Osipov-Shmidtone, and the Galperin commission.Considering that the commission materials were not well known (it is possible that someof them were stashedaway in archivesthat remain closed), it is impossibleto checkon the accuracyof anyonesource. It is worth noting. however. that in the previously mentioned speechof February5. Ordzhonikidzereported that he had sent his deputiesto the provincesand demandedthat the headsof the Central Directorate "lock up their directorates,and send all who are appropriateand capableof doing anything to the factories.... It's necessaryto leave for the factories. since no one needsyour reports here.... Try to give me better reports from there in the future...."18 "Sergo got preparedfor his comprehensiveand crucial report. He sent many of his aides to the factories and mines in order to closely examinethem and verify data. The aideswho returnedfrom the provinces reported to the commissarin detail on the materials collected. Attentively evaluating the reports. Sergo drew some conclusionsand shared his thoughts," wrote Ordzho-nikidze'sdeputy, O.P. OsipovShmidt. in Pravdaon February21. 1937.19This confirms Ziskind's assertions concerning numerous commissions.But it is impossible to exclude the possibility that Ordzhonikidze himself might have informed the Politburo aboutonly the three reportsof the most authoritative commissions.Therewere groundsfor hiding the true scaleof the investigationconductedby the NKTP, evenfrom Molotov. Irrespectiveof the numberof NKTP commissions,however,we can say with assurancethat Ordzhonikidzeseriously preparedfor the ple-

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num and gatheredfacts refuting the secretpolice'sassertions.Organizing an independentverification concerning"sabotage"was the strongest move Ordzhonikidzecould undertakein these circumstances.The gatheredevidenceconstituted the basis of an important argumentin his quarrelwith Stalin. Taking into account that one of the central issuesof the previous plenum was the case of Bukharin and Rykov, there were groundsfor also examining Ordzhonikidze'srelations with leaders of the "Right Deviation." Being Control Commission chairman, Ordzhonikidze, as already mentioned, played a major role in Stalin's victory over the Bukharin group. Moreover, passionsin this strugglebecameso heatedthat opponents often forgot about rival political programsand made personal attacks, not sparing scathing words and nasty epithets. Such an exchangeoccurred,for example, betweenBukharin and Ordzhonikidze at the April 1929 plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission,at which the Stalinist majority succeededin decisively crushingthe "right": Ordzhonikidze:Is it [the so-calledtheory of the "peaceful transition of the kulaks to socialism," in a proclamation that accused Bukharin-O.Kh.] corrector incorrect? Bukharin: Just a minute! I'll speak as I wish! I think the Central Control Commission chairman is obliged to demonstratemaximum patiencein spiteof his southerntemperament!(laughter) Ordzhonikidze:I think the generalsecretaryof the Comintern can be questioned,evenifhe is politically bankrupt. Bukharin: Submit questionsin writing, and I'll answerlater if they let me. Ordzhonikidze:Up until now, we thought we could ask questions orally. Bukharin: You simply keep me from speaking, interrupting my speech,as do your friends-neighbors!... Why do you interrupt me? You laugh at me and interrupt! Ordzhonikidze:Well then, is laughterforbidden? The law does not forbid this. Bukharin: I know that nobodyforbadeyou to beatyour chauffeurs in the face. What in fact is going on here?2o

In principle, similar "discussions"could fully ruin, and in many in-

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stancesactuallyspoiled,personalrelationsbetweenpolitical opponents. In the caseof Ordzhonikidzeand Bukharin, however, it appearsthat this did not happen.Their relations remained friendly enough. This became even easier when their political disagreementssoon disappeared:Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomskii, having lost the battle, acknowledgedthe correctnessof the Stalinistmajority. It is also worth noting that for Ordzhonikidzeand other members of the Politburo who supportedStalin, Bukharin'sgroup was not the same as the previous oppositionists,such as Trotsky and Zinoviev. Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii, even in the period of greatestconfrontation, remained more "theirs" than, for example, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.The "right" spoke less bitterly, tried to maneuverwithin the confinesof an extremelynarrow party legality, did not make categorical demandsto replace individuals in the Politburo, and thus earnedthe label of a "deviation" and not an "opposition." They acknowledgedthe very power of the Stalinist Politburo after their defeat and constantlyrepented.While not fully absolved, they receivedsecondaryleadershippositions. Bukharin was the most solidly "rehabilitated."Alternating betweenperiodsof confrontation and neutrality in his relationship to Stalin, Bukharin finally adopted the leader'sposition. Joint work improved relations between Bukharin and Ordzhonikidze. During 1929-34,Bukharin was a memberof the VSNKh Presidium and a colleagueof the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry, as he headeda centcr for scientific researchin Ordzhonikdize'sdepartment. Only a few documentshave been preservedthat throw light on their relationship.Judging from them, Bukharin viewed his boss as a potential guardianfrom numerousunplcasantries,and possiblyeven as a patron. To what extentwas Ordzhonikidzepreparedto play this role? Undoubtedly,he regardedBukharinwith sympathy.But he could translate this sympathyinto concreteaction only so far as it did not contradict Stalin's intentions. Ordzhonikidzedid not plan to clash with the "boss" on Bukharin'sbehalf,especially"over trivialities." The history of Bukharin'spurgein November1933 provesthis point. According to the establishedrules for CentralCommitteemembersthat were in place when Bukharin joined the party, memberscould be purgedonly in the event that one or more party gatheringsor a group

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of party memberssubmittedjustification. It is clear that in 1933 such an initiative could no longer come from below. If it did, as everyonewell knew, it was inspired by the party leadership.This was a signal of disfavor, a harbingerof new remonstrations.The news that they intendedto purgeBukharinwasjust so perceivedin November1933. On November 5, the party collective of the NKTP's Scientific Research(NIS) and TechnicalPropagandaSector (Tekhprop),headedby Bukharin, resolved: It is especiallynecessaryin our collective during the upcomingpurge, on the basisof Bolshevik self-criticism, to check the work of the party collective and each party member individually to determinethe extent to which each membermaintainedthe party's generalline. The party collective bureau therefore raises before the commission involved in purging the commissariat'sparty cells the question of the removal of the former leader of the right deviation, Comrade Bukharin, head of the NIS and Tekhprop and a member of our collective.21 Naturally, Bukharin took this "initiative" of his subordinatesvery painfully. He learned of the impending purge and rushed to Ordzhonikidze that day. But Bukharin was told that Ordzhonikidze was asleep.He went to the apartmentof Molotov, who said that no decision abouta purge had yet beenmade,but even if one took place, therewas nothing to get terribly worried about as it was nothing unusual. Not having metwith Ordzhonikidze,Bukharin wrote him a short, emotional letter: Today there was universal commotion and gossip about me in the apparatusoffice; everybodyspeaksabout my forthcoming purge. Everyone was convinced until today that I would be sparedthis bitter cup.... Meanwhile, it is precisely becausepeople thought until today that there wouldn't be a purge, that the leadership'smistrust toward me took a tum for the worse. This realistically meansthat the acts of semi-sabotageaimed againstme will only intensity.... I can't grasp what this is all about. If it's necessarynot to elect me to the Central Committee at the next congress[the upcoming SeventeenthParty Congressat the beginningof 1934-0.Kh.J.then so be it. In general, a purge makessenseonly to verity whethera personis qualified to be

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a party member,or whetherit's necessaryto expel him. All of you who have known me for decadescould make such an evaluation much better than any commission.Everyoneknows that I don't work like a bureaucrat.What did I do to have my party membershipplaced in doubt now? If this isn't the case,then what'sthe point of torturing me and complicatingall my affairs? I earnestlyentreatyou-if you can do something-todo it They've already done enough to me without this. And after the purge-I won't be able to live. Greetings and apologies.Your Bukharin.22 Whether Ordzhonikidze tried to help Bukharin is not known. He probablyfelt, like Molotov, that the problemdid not merit his intervention. In fact, the decision had alreadybeenmade,and Bukharin understood this. But while trying somehow to improve his situation, he turnedto Ordzhonikidzewith a new request: Dear Sergo, excuseme for God's sake for pesteringyou. I have one requestif they purge me ... come to the hearing so that it will be done in your presence. People don't understandthings. Mter all, I don't have a whole commissariat,but only a handful of Communists who are forced to turn in statementsagainstme. I have to work with them the next day.... It's a hellish situation.... I'm alreadyforty-five years old. I must define a future path for my life so that some good will come of this. Help me, Sergo. I'm very grateful to you for your kindness.I'm sure that if they hadn'tset Koba on me, he would have seeneverything differently. I understandall too well that things are difficult for him, and that he doesn'twant to complicatethe situation on my behalf, especiallyas the stateof affairs is terribly complex and will becomeeven more so. But perhapsyou could forbid them from tripping me up, and stop the gamebegunfive yearsago, for old times' sake, and do all that's possible to give me the opportunity to work now. Oncemore, forgive me. Your Nikolai. 23 This time, however, Ordzhonikidzedid not respondto Bukharin's request,and did not come to his purge hearing.The purge followed all the rules. Bukharin had to drink from the cup of humiliation in full measure,to confess,and to speakof Stalin's greatness,while denouncing his own mistakes.24 In spite of the purge,Bukharin, one of the former oppositionists,was heard at the SeventeenthParty Congresswithout pejorative cries and

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reprimands.He was selecteda candidatememberof the Central Committee, and soon appointedto the post of editor of Izvestia. For a former memberof the Politburo and one of the country'sleaders,this was of coursenot much. But it gave hope to a disgracedoppositionistwho had repeatedlybeenbrandedand hunted. Aleksei I. Rykov was also chosena candidatememberof the Central Committeeat the SeventeenthCongress.Stalin clearly regardedhim as worse than Bukharin, and this predeterminedthe ill will of other Politburo members.In this case, however, Ordzhonikidzekept to his own opinion. A telltale fact is cited in the reminiscencesof Rykov's daughter, NataliaAlekseevna: Late in the spring of 1935, there was a play in honor of KE. Voroshilov in a schoolclub ofVTsIK [the All-Russian ExecutiveCommittee-Ed.].In one row, alongsideus, satIagodawith his wife. Both pretendednot to see us, and didn't greet us. Father noticed this. When Politburo membersenteredthe half-lit hall and took up their placesin the first row, Ordzhonikidzeleft the group, separatedfrom us by sevenor eight rows, approachedus and embracedus, shookmy parents'hands, and asked about their health and affairs. This was evensomewhatdemonstrativefor the time.25 One and a half yearsafter this, however, Ordzhonikidzehad to take more courageousmeasuresto support Bukharin and Rykov than appearing at a purge hearing or shaking hands in a crowded hall. In August 1936, newspaperspublished the confessionsof Kamenev and Zinoviev made at the show trial in Moscow. Among other things, they "acknowledged"their connectionswith former leadersof the "right." On August 21, 1936, the procuratorof the USSR,Andrei Ia. Vyshinskii, stated in court: "I consider it necessaryto report to the court that yesterdayI ordered an investigation of these statementsregarding Tomskii, Rykov, Bukharin, Nikolai A. Uglanov (1886-1940),Radek,and Piatakov.Dependingupon the resultsof the investigation,the procurator will start legal proceedingsfor this case." Tomskii understoodall that was happeningand committed suicide the next day. In a letter to Stalin written before his death, Tomskii categoricallydenied his guilt and accusedZinoviev of slander.Soon after this, the NKVD receiveda confessionfrom the arrestedGrigorii Ia. Sokolnikov (1888-1939).He

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was also forced "to acknowledge"that the "right" had formed a bloc with the underground"Unified Trotskyist-ZinovieviteCenter." On September8, Kaganovich, Ezhov, and Vyshinskii confronted Sokolnikov,Bukharin, and Rykov in the CentralCommittee.Sokolnikov stood by his confession,but stated that he did not have any direct evidence.The accusationsincreased,and Stalin made the next maneuver with his assistants:On September10, the newspaperspublishedthe procurator'sstatementthat evidenceexistedfor institutingjudicial proceedingsagainstBukharin andRykov.26 This respite was temporary. Stalin demonstrated"objectivity" and demandedthat the NKVD work with redoubledenergyand obtain new, more damagingconfessionsagainstthe "right" than the Chekistshad. Bukharin and Rykov undoubtedlyunderstoodthat the casewould not be closedwith the statementfrom September10. Bukharin onceagain turned to Ordzhonikidzefor help and support.In particular, in one of his preservedlettersfrom October19, 1936,he wrote: My dear, kind, warmly beloved Sergo! I just now sent a letter to ComradeA.A. Andreevrequestingthat I be relieved from my responsibilities as editor of thejournal SocialistReconstrndionand the Sciences. I put forward thesereasons:(1) You now need a scientific-technical journal for the commissariatand I have not worked for you in a long time; (2) I presentlydon't have the nerve to defend myself from a new wave of attackthat beganin the pressagainstthejournal (that is, againstme). The small thread that connectedme with your commissariat, where I once worked, has beenbroken. I'm telling you this becauseI want you to know aboutit. Don't be surprisedif my article doesn'tappearfor your birthday. [He had in mind the article for Ordzhonikidze'sfiftieth birthday, forthcoming on October28, 1936, in the newspaperIzvestia.-O.Kh.] Although I'm editor in chief, I was intentionally not asked to write aboutyou, as if I hadjust come to work for the paper.I'm writing not to complain, but so that you don't draw the wrong conclusions.The slandererstried to eatme alive. Even now there are thosewho harass and tormentme. I want only to conveyto you my most sincereand heartfeltcongratulations,upon which my deeplove for you is based.My heartachesas I write you this letter. Stayhealthy,strong,and happy.27

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The tragic premonitionswith which Bukharin'sletter was filled were soon confirmed. In the fall of 1936, the NKVD tried its best to collect compromisingmaterial on the "right." Using various meansand methods, they beat confessionsout of the arrestedformer oppositionists about the undergroundcounterrevolutionaryactivities of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii. They took supportersof Bukharin sentencedearlier from jail, brought new chargesagainstthem, and demandedthey acknowledgethe terrorist activities of the "counterrevolutionaryorganization of the right." Stalin obtainednew evidencethis way, and decided to submit the questionof Bukharin and Rykov to a Central Committee plenumfor review. Nothing was known aboutthis plenum,which lastedfrom December 4 to December7, 1936, until very recently. Referenceto it was forbidden by Stalin'sorder at the plenum itself. Suchsecrecywas not accidental. The main point on the plenum'sagendawas discussionof Ezhov's report, "On Anti-Soviet, Trotskyist, and Right Oppositionists,"which presented"fresh facts" obtained through coercion by the NKVD after attempts to compromise Bukharin and Rykov on the confessionsof Zinoviev, Kamenev,and Sokolnikov had beenset aside.This time Ezhov preparedmuch more carefully. It was clear nonethelessthat the NKVD did not have enoughevidence.Bukharin and Rykov were equally active at the plenum.They picked up on the contradictionsof their accusers, and proved that from the very beginningthe affair was conductedwithout their participation, that they had been denied a face-to-faceconfrontation, that Zinoviev and Kamenevhad beenshot beforehand,and that the procuracyon September10 had alreadyadmitted the lack of facts for institutingjudicial proceedingsagainstthe "right." "There isn't a word of truth in anything that was said againstme here.I had my only face-to-faceconfrontationwith Sokolnikov.... At the end, I askedthat it be recordedthat he didn't have any political conversationswith me, that he was passing on what Tomskii had said, but Tomskii was no longer alive," said Bukharin. "I maintain that all chargesagainst me from beginning to end are lies.... Kamenevstatedat the trial that he met with me every year, right up to 1936. I asked Ezhov to find out where and when I met with Kamenevso that I could somehowrefute this lie. They told me that Kamenevwasn't askedabout this, and now 28 it's impossibleto ask him." "They shothim," Rykov repeated.

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It is also worth noting that only a relatively small group of Central Committeemembersparticipatedin the attackon Rykov and Bukharin. Apart from the report of Ezhov and Stalin, mention of which was deleted from the stenogram,Beria, Kaganovich, Molotov, Eikhe, Kosior, Sarkisov,and severalother supportersof the measurecamedown upon the "right" both from their seatsand in their speeches.The majority of Central Committeemembers,in spite of the clear invitation to back the position of the party leadership,remainedsilent. Ordzhonikidze'sbehavior, in particular, was very revealing. His "speech"was recordedin the stenogramonly once,underthe following circumstances: Bukharin: Sergoaskedme at his apartment,Tell me, please,what is your opinion of Piatakov?I literally told him that he struck me as a man who's so tactful that he doesn'tknow that he is telling the truth or acting out of tactical considerations. Ordzhonikidze:That'scorrect. Bukhann:There,Sergoagrees.So I had to recommendmyaccomplice and leader? Beria: You could also havedone this out of tactical considerations.

It is not difficult to see that Ordzhonikidze'srejoinder looked more like supportfor Bukharin. Ordzhonikidzedid not say anotherword at the plenum. Mterward, like other Central Committee memberswho had spoken,he receivedthe stenogramwith a standardaccompanying note from AleksandrN. Poskrebyshev(1891-1965):*"Pleaseverify your enclosedremarks at the plenum and return them today if possible." Ordzhonikidze'sreactionto this requestwas revealing.The paperswere returnedto the Central Committeetogetherwith Poskrebyshev's cover letter, uponwhich one of Ordzhonikidze'sassistantshad written: "Comrade Sergowon't correctthem."29 It cannot be excluded that the relative restraint of the plenum forced Stalin to retreattemporarily.At his prompting, conferencedele-

*AleksandrN. Poskrebyshev.CommunistParty memberwho in 1928was appointed to head Stalin's chancerywithin the Secret Department, the "Special Sector" (Osolryi sektor). In this capacity Poskrebyshevserved as Stalin's chief assistant,for the Special Sector was the true seat of power. Poskrebyshevremained at this post for twenty-eight years, that is, until Stalin'sdeathin 1953.

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gatesadjournedaheadof scheduleand agreedto return to the matter after further investigation. At the very end of 1936 and the beginning of 1937, new arrests ensuedin which the NKVD quickly fabricated fresh evidence against Bukharin and Rykov. Not long before their arrests,Ordzhonikidzegave a hopeful sign. "Approachingthe house,"rememberedBukharin'swife Anna Mikhailovna, I saw Ordzhonikidzecoming out of the entrancenext to ours, the one closer to Troitsky Gates.As he headedfor his car, he noticed me and stopped.But what could I say to him at that moment?We stood silent for severalseconds.Sergolooked at me with eyesso full of grief it is impossiblefor me to forget that gazeto the presentday. Then he squeezedmy handand said two words: "Standfirm." He got in his car and left. 30 While this squeezeand appeal to stand firm did not promise too much, Bukharin nonethelessperceivedit as a good sign. He learned about the meetingwith Ordzhonikidzefrom his wife and immediately sat down to write him a letter. He askedOrdzhonikidzeto believe in his innocence,and to take careof his family if he were arrested. Rykov's family also countedon Ordzhonikidze'shelp. "On February 18," recalledhis daughter, The newspaperscameout quite late. Upon her arrival, the maid told us that funeral flags hung at the House of Unions and that they weren'tallowing traffic through Hunter'sRow. Apparently, a government leaderhad died. My parentswere surprised,becauseno one, it seemed,was seriouslyill. Finally, newspapersturned up in the mailbox. I saw that Sergo Ordzhonikidze had passedaway. Mother grabbedthe paperand cried out "Our last hope... ,.. and fell to the floor unconscious.Shedidn't get up for severalmonths.31

In general,Ordzhonikdizemost likely did not believe the assertions of Stalin and Ezhov about the existenceof an undergroundorganization of the "right," although this of course did not mean that he was preparedto defend Bukharin and Rykov decisively at the upcoming plenum.

Chapter 12

The Last Days

The tension causedby the argumentsand conflicts betweenStalin and Ordzhonikidzeover many months peakedjust before the opening of the FebruaryCentralCommitteeplenum. On February15 and 16, Ordzhonikidzeworked on materialsfor the plenumand on official dutiesat the commissariat.He soon finished the draft resolution orderedby the Politburo concerningsabotagein industry, and readieda report-"outlining theseson little sheetsand in a notebook," as Zinaida G. Ordzhonikidze recalled two years later.' Okudzhava'sfate was decidedin Moscow at this time. This circumstance,togetherwith thoughtsabout the impending plenum, was apparently the impetus for Ordzhonikidze'squestioningof Ginzburg,after Ordzhonikidzepressedhim to return to Moscow to preparethe report. We can learn a great deal about Ordzhonikidze'swork habits on February17 from information compiledby his secretary,as well as from 2 the testimonyand reminiscencesof eyewitnesses. Ordzhonikidzearrived at the commissariatfrom his home that day at 12:10 P.M., althoughhe usually appearedat ten in the morning, according to A.P. Zaveniagin (who at this time worked in the commissariat's central apparatusin Moscow).3Any numberof things, of course,could have delayedOrdzhonikidze.But it indirectly confirms an account,apparently from Ordzhonikidze'swife, cited in a book by I. DubovskiiMukhadze,that on the morning of the seventeenth,Sergohad a private conversationwith Stalin that lastedfor severalhours.4 We will never find out the exact nature of this talk. But several 143

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assumptionsabout Ordzhonikidze'sfinal argumentswith Stalin can be made by drawing on well-known facts. Taking into accountthat Stalin preparedthoroughly for the Central Committee plenum, and that a Politburo meetingdedicatedto the discussionof documentsfrom the plenum was scheduledfor 3:00 P.M. that very day, it is logical to assume they discussedthose same issues. It is possible that Ordzhonikidze spoke about arrests in the NKTP and Bukharin's fate. The next day, February 18, Ordzhonikidze and Gvakharia, the director of the MakeevskMetallurgical Factory who enjoyed the special patronageof Ordzhonikidze,were supposedto meet. Gvakharia had recently been accusedof having Trotskyist connectionsand he most likely came to Moscow to seekOrdzhonikidze'shelp:'i Ordzhonikidzecould well have spokenwith Stalin about Gvakharia'sfate, (Gvakhariawas arrestedsoon after Ordzhonikidze'sdeath.) It cannot be dismissedthat Sergo mentioned PapuliaOrdzhonikidzeand Okudzhava,whose fate he was concerned with at the time. The discussionprobably touched upon the resultsof Ginzburg'sinspectionand thoseof other NKTP commissions. (Ginzburg had returnedto Moscow early on the morning of February 18, whereuponPoskrebyshevreported to him by telephonethat "I.V. Stalin askedthat you senda note aboutthe stateof affairs at Ural Coach Construction,which Sergohad told him about.")6 In prevailing upon Stalin, Ordzhonikidzecould quite likely have utilized letters of managersconcerningthe difficult situation in the provinces. He must have transmittedone of theseletters from the director of the DnepropetrovskMetallurgical Factory,S.P. Birman, to either Stalin or Molotov, becauseit was cited in Molotov's speechat the February-March plenum.7 Birman wrote (the original is lost, but the letter is cited here as it was readby Molotov to the participantsof the FebruaryMarch plenum): The situation, especiallyof late here in Dnepropetrovsk,compelsme to appeal to you, as to an old comradeand Politburo member,for instructions and assistance.I think that the directive of the higher party organsaboutthe full developmentof criticism and self-criticism here in Dnepropetrovskhas beenmisunderstoodin severalways. The foreign word "criticism" here is often confusedwith the Russianword "to blather" (trepat'sia). It seemsto me that the party directive is aimed at uncoveringreal enemiesand disclosing real shortcomings,

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by meansof conscientiouscriticism. But many here understandit as meaning that it's necessaryat any cost to sling mud at each other, especiallyat a certaincategoryof leadingworkers. Above all it is the managersand directors of large factories who make up this certain categoryof leading workers, as if by waving a secretmagic wand they becamethe primary target in this round of self-criticism. It has beendeterminedthat the attackon party work by the party organizationswas one of the key reasonsfor everythingthat happened.Insteadof turning into real self-criticism, however, many speechesby party workers during the recent three-daymeeting of 8 regionalparty membersblamedall misfortuneon the managers. But whateverStalin and Ordzhonikdizespokeabouton the morning of February 17, the conversationhad to have ended relatively peacefully. On the eve of the Politburo meeting, Stalin would not have brought affairs to a head, but would rather have tried to instill some hope in Ordzhonikidze.Indeed,Ordzhonikidze'sworkday on February 17 followed his usual routine, without any sign of excessiveedginessor apprehension. Ordzhonikidzestayeda little more than two hours at the commissariat, then left at 2:30 P.M. to see Molotov in the Kremlin. He apparently intended to resolve some problemswith the Sovnarkomchairman on the way to the Politburo meeting.The sessionbeganat 3:00 P.M. in the Kremlin and was well attended.Apart from all the Politburo members-Andreev,Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Mikoyan, Molotov, membersZhdanovand Ordzhonikidze,Stalin, and Chubar-candidate Petrovskii were present,as well as a large group of Central Committee members-Antipov,Bauman, Bubnov, Vareikis, Gamarnik, Ezhov, Krupskaia, Litvinov, Mezhlauk, Piatnitskii, Khrushchev,Shvernik, and others; Central Committeecandidatemembers;membersof the Party Control Commissionbureau,membersof the Soviet Control Commission bureau (including Zemliachka and Ulianova); and leaders of groups from within the Party Control Commission.They considered one question-thedraft decreesof the impending plenum. Following discussion,the draft resolutionsof Zhdanov'sreporton upcomingelections, Stalin's on the shortcomingsin party work, and Ezhov's on the "lessonsof sabotage,diversion,and spying" were on the whole affirmed. But the draft resolutions on the reports of Ordzhonikidze and

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Kaganovichwere approvedwith reservations,and they were orderedto draft a final text on the basis of adoptedPolitburo amendmentsand 9 addenda. At first glance, this fact in some measure corroboratesrumors Ziskind repeatedto I. Kramov: "Then I found out that Ordzhonikidze had said at the Politburo meeting that there's no sabotagein heavy industry. Stalin interrupted him: 'You don't understandanything, or pretend that you don't understandanything. Get out of here.' Ordzhonikidzeleft without finishing his report."10 Of course,Ordzhonikidzemight have madesomeinnuendosat the meetingcomprehensibleonly to Stalin but nobody else. In any event, noneof the numerousparticipantsof this Politburo meeting(including Khrushchev,who, as will be shown later, knew nothing of the conflict betweenStalin and Ordzhonikidzefor many years) recalled anything special that caught their attention or seemedunusual.This is understandable.In the presenceof others, Ordzhonikidzeand Stalin acted with restraint, and most likely to assurethis restraint, Stalin met with Sergothe previousevening. An hour and a half later, at 4:30 P.M., Ordzhonikidze went with Kaganovich to Poskrebyshev's, where they spenttwo and a half hours. Judgingfrom the time, they probablyworked on the draft of the resolutions agreed to, and included in the text criticisms raised by the Politburo. At 7:00 P.M., Ordzhonikidze and Kaganovich left Poskrebyshev's, walked around the Kremlin, said goodbye when they reached Ordzhonikidze'sapartment,and went home. Sergocamein at 7:15 P.M. He likely ate dinner ("He ate dinner at various times, sometimesat six or seveno'clock in the evening, but occasionallyat two in the morning," later recalledOrdzhonikidze'swife about the last monthsof his life.) II At 9:30 P.M. he left for the commissariat. The Kremlin was very close to the commissariatbuilding on Nogin Square,and OrdzhonikidzereceivedProfessorGalperin in his office at 10:00 P.M. Galperin had returnedonly that afternoonfrom the inspection trip to Kemerovo.Judgingfrom the hastewith which this meeting was organized,the commissarwas keenlyinterestedin facts gatheredby the commission.According to Galperin'smemoirs, Ordzhonikidzelistenedto his findings, askedquestionsconcerningconstructionwork and

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the stateof equipment,and requestedthat he composea written report and prepareall orders that were to be given in connectionwith the inspection that had taken place in the commissar'sname. Ordzhonikidze scheduleda new meeting with Galperin at 10:00 AM. on February19.12 Taking into accountthat the headof Main Nitrogen, E. Brodov, was slated to report to Ordzhonikidzethat very hour, a chemical indusu)'conferencemust have taken place on the morning of February 19.13 In and of itself, the time frame for thesemeetingsis quite revealing. The other concernsthat Ordzhonikidzedealt with in the commissariat the night of February17 were ordinary, and did not suggestanything unusual.As always, he signeda large numberof papers,and listenedto somereports.Ordzhonikidze'slast threeorderswere datedFebruary17 (granted,it is not known which oneshe reviewed in the morning, and which in the evening). They concernedfulfilling the demandsof the Commissariatof Defense forportablefunicular railways; cadreappointments (a new administrator of the Coke Chemical Installation, the main engineerof Rostov Agricultural Machinery and the Donsod Factory, the director of the Novo-Tulskii Metallurgical Combine,etc.); and the importantorder "On Measuresto Ensurethe Introduction of New Capacitiesin 1937 by the Regional Electric Power Stations of Main Energy."14 Around midnight, Ordzhonikidzemet and conversedwith his deputy who managedthe chemical indusU)', O.P. Osipov-Shmidt.15 OsipovShmidt,as mentioned,severaldaysbeforethis headeda commissionSergo had sentto the DonbassCoke Enterprise.Their conversationprobablywas about that very trip. Not long before he left the commissariat,Ordzhonikidzesigneda telegram:"Stalino (Donbass).Riazanov.Shipmentof the pipe procurementin January-February was unsatisfactory.Guarantee the rolling and shipmentof the pipe procurementin full, without delays. Henceforth,roll and ship the pipe procurementin the first half of each month. Report fulfillment. Ordzhonikidze."16This telegram was dispatchedfrom the commissariatat one in the morning, not long before which, at 12:20AM., Ordzhonikidzehadleft his office for home. All of the events that took place up to this time testify that Ordzhonikidze'swork followed a normal routine, and that nothing presageda tragic outcome.In any case,would a man who had decidedto

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commit suicide senda telegramaboutpipe procurementsand schedule meetings the next day with his associates?Undoubtedly, some key events occurred after Ordzhonikidze'sreturn home. Unfortunately, however,our knowledgeabout the last hours of Ordzhonikidze'slife is extremelylimited. According to Dubinskii-Mukhadze,Ordzhonikidze spoke by telephonewith Stalin after returning to his apartment.A quarrel erupted with mutual insults and cursingboth in Russianand in Georgian.17 S.Z. Ginzburg assertsthat Ordzhonikidze'swife told him the following: Not long before Ordzhonikidze'sarrival, NKVD agentssearchedhis apartment. Ordzhonikidze returned and immediately phonedStalin, who calmly told him, "Sergo, why are you upset?This body can at any moment conducta searchat my place as well. "Ill Ordzhonikidzeallegedly answered,"Does this mean that the statesecurityapparatusstandsover the governmentand Politburo, and rules us?" (We can observein passing that if such a conversationtook place, Ordzhonikidzewould not have used the word "state security," which is of a later provenance.) Stalin invited Ordzhonikidzeto his place to talk. Sergorushedinto the streetwithout his coat, and Zinaida Gavrilovna hurried after him with her husband'sovercoat and Caucasian fur cap. She waited outside Stalin's home for nearly one and a half hours. "Sergo sprang out of Stalin's place in a very agitatedstate,didn't put on his coat or hat, and ran home."19 Regardlessof how this evidenceis viewed, somethingactually did take place on the night of February17. The whole course of previous and subsequentevents suggeststhis. Most likely, Stalin, after calming Ordzhonikidzeon the eve of what was to be a well-attended Politburo meeting,madesomeprovocationthat evening (such as the search),in order to put Sergo "in his place" and intimidate him just in case. This was fully consonantwith Stalin's behavior. And the conversationthat took place in connectionwith this hastenedthe outcome. There is of courseno documentaryevidenceconcerningthe details of the last quarrel, whether by telephoneor in private, betweenStalin and Ordzhonikidze. It is possible that the conversationresembledthat portrayed in AleksandrBek'snovel, TheNew AplJOintment

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Sergo spoke loudly and without restraint. His conversationpartner answeredsoftly even perhaps,in a deliberatelyslow pace. . . . The discussionwas in Georgian.... Sergo continuedto speakheatedly, almostshouting.His pale face turnedan unhealthyshadeof crimson. He waved both hands,prevailing upon Stalin and reproachinghim. But the latter stood in his customarysoldier'suniform, with his arms folded in front ofhim.2o The hot-temperedand unrestrainedOrdzhonikidzebecameagitatedin tensemoments.According to the memoirsof the well-known contemporaryjournalistS.R. Gershberg.Ordzhonikidze"would go into a frenzy, leap around,gesticulate,speakincoherently,and hiss and becometongue-tied. It seemedas if he might suffer a stroke.'>21We can only guesshow he spoke with Stalin. Ordzhonikidzelikely did not stay at Stalin's for long. Underneath his outer composure,which much of the time was simply for show. he was a man of extremeharshnessandcrudeness. Further events,at which quite a few witnesseswere present,are depicted almostidentically in all the sources.On the morning of February 18, Ordzhonikidzedid not get out of bed and have breakfastas usual. He askedthat no one disturb him, and did somewriting while remaining in his bedroom. Gvakhariashowedup in the afternoon, but Ordzhonikidzedid not let him in. At dusk, Zinaida Gavrilovna hearda shot in the bedroom,rushedin, and saw her dead husbandon the bed. A short time later, Stalin and other Politburo membersarrived. Stalin rudely cut off Zinaida Gavrilovna'slamentations:"Shut up, you fool!" and statedthat Sergodied from a heartattack.No one daredcontradict the leader,and this accountwas releasedas the official one. According to some evidence.the sister of Ordzhonikidze'swife ran into the room and took some sheetsof paper from the table. Stalin seized them from her. Whether this was a suicide note is not known. Roy Medvedev, who heard this story from Ordzhonikidze'srelatives, reportedonly that the sheetswere written in "Sergo'sminute handwriting."22 But in fact, Ordzhonikidze wrote in a large, bold hand. Of course,this doesnot meanthat therewere no papers.Moreover,like all typical suicides, Ordzhonikidzesimply must have left a suicide note. While one may be disclosedsomeday,until then it will be difficult to hope for conclusiveproof to resolve the controversythat continuesup to the present.Was Ordzhonikidzekilled or did he commit suicide?

Chapter 13

Murder or Suicide?

On February19, 1937, Soviet newspapersreportedon Ordzhonikidze's death.The official version had it that the commissarof heavy industry died suddenlyfrom a heartattackon February18 at 5:30 P.M. during his daily restat his apartment. The majority of the country'spopulation,accustomedto believe the most incredible reports, likely harboredno doubts. But rumors circulated, as usual. They were circulated only among trusted friends, and arosenot from facts that contradictedthose publishedin newspapers, but more from the growing premonitionof the GreatTerror, which led everyoneto suspectthe worst. Moreover, Ordzhonikidze'sdeath was cause for such suspicions. Mter all, the fifty-year-old commissar,a middle-agedman, had died suddenly. Wide-scalearrestswere conductedin his departmentjust prior to this, and severalleading comrades,including his first deputy, Piatakov, had been sentencedto be shot. The entire country read the trial proceedingsin newspapersin January1937. Insofar as reliable information was unavailable, the rumors were quite varied and contradictory. "Flags of mourning unexpectedlycaughtour eyes," recalledthe wife of a famous Georgianpoet, Titian Tabidze (1895-1937),who was visiting Moscowwith her husbandat this time. 150

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Pilniak* stoppedthe first policemanhe met and askedthe reasonsfor the official period of mourning.The policemanreplied: "Sergodied." In photographspublishedin the newspapers,Ordzhonikidze'swidow and Stalin's political entouragesurroundedthe coffin-Stalin himself, Ezhov, Molotov, Zhdanov,Kaganovich,Mikoyan, andVoroshilov. Sinister rumors spreadthroughoutMoscow that Ordzhonikidzehad been driven to suicide. Peoplespoke about this in a whisper at Peredelkino.1 The Menshevikjournal in Paris, Socialist Herald, painstakingly collected information from the USSR and respondedimmediatelyto Ordzhonikidze'sdeathwith the following "Letter from Moscow": The suddendeathof Ordzhonikidzehassparkeda barrageof rumors here. These rumors were so persistentthat the authorities had to indirectly refute them in official reports.Readattentivelythe "government reports"from February19, and all other official statementsand reportsfrom the 20th, 21st, etc., and you will see how insistent they are that Ordzhonikidzedied in his own aparlmen~ Judging and that for a long time he had suffered from heart ailments, etc. The problem is that after the trial [against Piatakov and other "Trotskyists" in January 1937-0.Kh.],the statusof Kaganovichand Ordzhonikidzewas seriously compromised.Extremely harsh attackswere inflicted upon the latter in connectionwith the upcoming trial in the Caucasus.Almost all the Old GeorgianBolshevikswere arrestedthere.... Otherswere also arrested-hisrelatives (a male cousin),old friends, and acquaintances.Ordzhonikidze thus found himself in a tough bind. A Politburo memberwas not supposedto haveso many intimate friends and relatives among those subjectedto prosecutionand execution for "Trotskyism." On the other hand, Ordzhonikidzeapparentlycould *Boris Pilniak. A writer who neveracceptedthe revolution or the party's controls over literature. Most accountssuggestthat Stalin had a bone to pick with Pilniak. Back in 1925, the authorpublishedhis "Tale of the UnextinguishedMoon," aboutan army commanderwho was forced by "No. One" to undergounnecessarysurgery,as a result of which the commanderdied. That very year Mikhail Frunze,who headedthe Red Army, had died on the operatingtable and was replacedby a Stalin protege,Klim Voroshilov, during the height of the conflict between Stalin and the Zinoviev-Kamenev faction. Dismissedfrom the Union of Writers in 1929, Pilniak later disappeared into the Stalinist purges after he was declared an enemy of the peopleduring the GreatTerror.-Ed.

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not reconcile himself to his friends' massacre.In any event-asa reliable sourcetells us-eitherhe died at the very meetingof the Politburo on February 18, the day of his death, or he collapsedat the meetingand this provedfatal.2 Trotsky, in his book Stalin, offers yet anotheraccount of this event: 'They said that Ordzhonikidzemight have died from poisoning, as did Maxim Gorky. Both had defendedOld Bolsheviksfrom extermination.":! The oveIWhelmingmajority of the populationof the USSR, however, undoubtedlydid not draw such conclusions.The powerful grip of state terror and widespreaddenunciationscould easily cut off any rumors and conversationsunfavorable to the authorities. In any event, what could a Soviet citizen have done if he or she had heard something aboutOrdzhonikidze'ssuicide?In the bestcase,he would have tried to forget about it in order not to let the cat out of the bag accidentally somewhere.In the worst case,he would hurry to inform on the source of his information so as to avoid being denouncedhimself. For its part, the governmentdid everythingpossibleto bolster the official version of Ordzhonikidze'sdeath. He was increasinglydepictedas a faithful supporter of Stalin, the anniversariesof his deathwere solemnlyobserved, and numerouseyewitnessmemoirsaboutthe commissar'slast dayswere published,from which one could only draw a single conclusion:that his deathwas suddenand natural. Sergo had beenin a greatmood, full of plans and ideas. Any information that cast the smallestdoubt on this versionwas categoricallydenied. A bizarre conflict eruptedover this subjectbetweentwo of Stalin's closestassociates,Beria and Lev Z. Mekhlis (1889-1953),in regard to the publication of Ordzhonikidze'sselectedarticles and speechesin 1938. The book had already been typeset and was about to be published under the editorship of A.I. Mikoyan, L.Z. Mekhlis, L.P. Beria, and Z.G. Ordzhonikidze,when an argumentflared up over the introduction written by Mekhlis. Many years later, Ordzhonikidze'swidow wrote about what troubled Beria, in particular, Mekhlis's concluding passage: As is well known from the medical diagnosis,Sergo suffered from

"serioussclerosisof the heart musclesand vessels."But, as the party andworking classknew, the contemptiblePiatakovandotherTrotsky-

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ists finished him off. Working in the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry, Piatakovand his gang playeda vicious doublegame,betraying this highly idealistic Bolshevik and great proletarianrevolutionary.... The betrayal,which Sergodidn't expect,affectedhis health terribly andaggravatedhis poor condition. The despicableand thrice-damnedTrotskyistgangof double-dealers, traitors. spies,and heinousrestorersof capitalismare responsiblefor the prematuredeathof our belovedSergo,favorite of the entire party and the working class. Piatakov and Bukharin-all these agents of fascist intelligence preparedto murder Sergo.They did not succeed, and the band of criminals was caught. But all the wrecking, vile. double-dealing, traitorous work of Piatakovand his despicablecompany wore on Ordzhonikidze'shealth.They shatteredhis nerves,and irreparablydamagedhis heart.This hastenedthe fateful denouement. At first glance, there is nothing in this text that sets it apart from a numberof verbosepublicationsthat uncovered"enemies"and "spies." But it was no accidentthat Beria demandedit be deleted.Undoubtedly, hejudgedit inappropriateand even dangerousto make any references connectingOrdzhonikidze'sdeathwith the repressionsagainsthis former colleaguesand the shocks that the commissarof heavy industry lived through in the last daysof his life. The lessdetailsabouthis death, the better. Beria was apparentlynot the only one to think this way. Publication of the book was delayed, and the "seditious" paragraphs removed.The recraftedintroduction was matter-of-factlybrief on Ordzhonikidze'sdeath: "Sergo gave all his strength, all of himself to the party cause,to the working classcause.He worked feverishly. The revolutionary underground,tsarist hard labor and exile, and combat on variousfronts of the Civil War, in which he did not sparehimself-all of this stressfulactivity affectedhis health. Sergodied at his postas a great son of a greatparty."4 The veil of complete silence over the circumstancesof Ordzhonikidze'sdeathwas not removeduntil Khrushchev'sfamousspeech at the Twentieth Party Congress, * in which he all but openly statedthat *Khrushchev's speech at the Twentieth Party Congress.Khrushchev stunnedcongressdelegatesby reading a detailed report on the crimes of the Stalin era.Although Khrushchevleft many issuesuntouched,his speech promoted sweepingreexaminationof the Stalin years both at home and abroad.-Ed.

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the commissarof heavy industry committed suicide, becausehe could not endure Stalin's persecutions.Afterward, eyewitnessesspoke up. Many of them, including doctorswho had signed official medical diagnoses, and Ordzhonikidze'sclosest associates,had been killed in the years of repression.Those still alive, above all Ordzhonikidze'swife Zinaida Gavrilovna and several other surviving relatives, left memoirs that became the foundation for the most widespreadcontemporary accounts of Ordzhonikidze'sJudging suicide:~ Judging From time to time, however, there are thosewho maintain that Ordzhonikidzehad been murdered. Several Old Bolsheviks who survived the Great Terror, for example, insist on this and cite information that circulatedin 1937. The recollections of one of these,Fedor N. Petrov (1876-1973),were written down by Iu. Semenov.Petrov tried to demonstratethat Ordzhonikidzewas preparedto speakout againstStalin at the upcomingFebruaryplenum of the CentralCommittee,and might have beenable to stop the terror. In a word, they said that Stalin ordered the security chief, Ezhov, to kill Sergo. Sergo was then shot in his own apartment.... The most trustedsaid that Sergohad committedsuicide-thathe had beentoo friendly with Bukharin, Rykov, and Piatakov.But the evidenceafter all could not be concealed:Those who were the first to enter Ordzhonikidze'sapartmentsignedtheir own deathsentencesby compiling a documentstating that there were sevencartridgesin Sergo's Mauser (pistol), but no smell of powder in the chamber.... They shot these impertinent investigators-withina week! Do you understand?!And we learnedthe truth." Analogousevidencecan be found in the well-known book by Aleksandr Orlov, The Secret History of Stalins Crimes. One of the NKVD officials who arrived in Spain in the fall of 1937 allegedly told Orlov: 'They even finishedoff Ordzhonikidze!... I know the detailsof this case.Ordzhonikidze also had Caucasianblood flowing in his veins-hethus quarreledwith the boss.He met his match,all on accountof Piatakov."7 Another piece of evidencehas recentlycome to light. An engineerat the CheliabinskTractor Factory,L.S. Komarov, recordedthe accountof a former high-level employeeof the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry, V.N. Sidorova, who in turn had heard it from Z.G. Ordzhonikidze. These memoirs were published verbatim, although thirdhand, by S.Z. Ginzburg:

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During the day on February18, 1937 (in the first half of the day), an unknown man arrived at Ordzhonikidze'sapartment(in the Kremlin) who identified himself as a driver who neededto hand over a folder of documentsfrom the Politburo to Grigorii Konstantinovich. Zinaida Gavrilovna asked: "But where is Sergo'spersonalchauffeur, Nikolai Ivanovich?"The man answeredthat Nikolai Ivanovich was off that day. This person then went up to Sergo'soffice on the secondfloor. Within severalminutesa shot rang out. The man emergedfrom the office, carnedownstairs,and askedZinaida Gavrilovna: "Did you hear a shot?" When Zinaida Gavrilovna entered the office, she saw Sergo slumped in an armchair with his right arm hanging over it, and a pistol lying on the floor to his right. Before the man's arrival, Sergo had had a heated exchangein Georgianover the telephone(likely with Stalin).H

It seemsthat Sidorova'smemoirs (or their recounting) were apparently usedin the acclaimednovel Fear (sequelto Children of the Arbat) by Anatoly N. Rybakov, which undoubtedlyspreadthe accountthat Ordzhonikidzehad beenmurdered.9 None of this evidencecan be verified, and someof it gives rise to questions(for example,how could the NKVD employeeshave made such a crude mistake with Ordzhonikidze'spistol, and would NKVD officials have allowed an investigation to be conductedin this case) that contradict other information. Further, the Old Bolshevik E.P. Frolov, whose notes Roy Medvedev used, also thought that Ordzhonikidzewas murdered,but he put forth an argumentthat directly refutes Petrov's version of the inquiry: "No investigation into the circumstancesof Ordzhonikidze'sdeath took place, and there was not even an examinationof the bullet hole."lo This is also the case with Z.G. Ordzhonikidze'srecollections,which playa key role in this instance.According to accountstaken down by V.N. Sidorova (which we must use cautiously as she was far removed from the actual events),Zinaida Gavrilovna felt that Sergo had been murdered.(We are speakinghere of the questionof a two-story apartmentin which Ordzhonikidze'swife and his assassinmight have easily missedeach other). Ordzhonikidze'swidow told historian Roy Medvedeva completely different version:

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It was dark. Zinaida Gavrilovna decidedto check in on her husband in the bedroom once more, and turned on the light while passing through the living room. At that moment, a shot rang out in the bedroom.She rushedthereand saw her husbandon the bed. He was already dead. According to Zinaida Gavrilovna, in addition to the backdoor to the apartmentthat everyoneused,therewas also a front door. However, this was not only closed,but blockedby bookshelves. That entranceled into the living room, andcould not havebeenused by the murderersince Ordzhonikidze'swife was in the room at the time of the shot.II

There are other, logical argumentsapart from the various testimonies by advocatesof the Ordzhonikidze-was-murdered account. Ordzhonikidze, they maintain, was not the type of man who would have committedsuicide.He was preparedto challengeStalin to the very end, and intended to give him a fight at the February-Marchplenum, thereby signing his own death sentence.Stalin was afraid of Ordzhonikidze, and secretly sent an assassin."All who were close to Ordzhonikidze and knew him well, to whom his actions, intentions, and thoughtswere known, in particularwhile he preparedfor the impending Central Committeeplenum thoselast days," wrote Ginzburg, "were unable to acceptthe idea of his suicide. This was a tenaciousfighter of the Leninist type. He was thoroughly preparedto rebuff Stalin's exaggeratedthesis that the class strugglewould inevitably escalateas socialism succeeded,and to decisivelyspeakout againstthe massslaughterof party comradesand leadersof industryand construction...12 While sharing this very viewpoint and greatlycontributingto its currency,Rybakov included in his novel the following dialogue betweenStalin and Ordzhonikidze: "Have you preparedthe thesesof your speechfor the plenum?" "No! ... "

"When will they be ready?" "I don't know." "The plenum opensin two days, and you can't delay becauseall the other speakershave turnedin their theses." "I'll submit them when they'reready,ifI considerit necessary.I'm a member of the Politburo and have the right to decide what I'll speakabout.1 don't needEzhov'sapproval."

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Stalin fell silent, and then said: "Yes, you're a memberof the Politburo, and can voice your own opinion to it. But at a Central Committeeplenum, you must present the viewpoint of the Politburo and the party leadership.Otherwise, you'll place yourself in opposition to the Politburo and the party leadership.You'll pit yourselfagainstthe party. Think about the consequencesof such a decision. Rememberwhat happenedto those who tried to opposethe party earlier. Think aboutit! Go home,calm down, and think aboutit. Onceyou'vecalmeddown, we'll talk. Ordzhonikidzegot up, noisily pushinghis chair aside. "We'll talk at the plenum." He then left, slammingthe door.13 Is Ordzhonikidze'sdeterminationto speakout againstStalin so evident?At first glance, the above facts about the numerousquarrelsbetween Stalin and Ordzhonikidzesupportthe suppositionsof Ginzburg and Rybakov. Several argumentsexist, however, that place them in doubt. Ordzhonikidze'spolitical career clearly demonstratesthat he was a Stalinist. Even if he waveredand was capableof independentacts and opinions (within strictly defined limits, of course),he remaineda Stalinist. In order to challengeStalin, he neededsomethingmore than just the hope of gaining supportin the Politburo, or if worse came to worst, the Central Committee.Above all, he neededtremendousinner strength,a clear idea of how and againstwhom to act, and a senseof the prospectsof such actions.Stalin did not agreewith Ordzhonikidze. What came next? Removing Stalin? Inciting the Central Committee against Stalin and inducing a split that would inevitably end in the destructionof one of the opposingcamps?Ordzhonikidzewas not capable of eitherof thesepossibilities.He also understoodall too well the real alignmentof power in the party leadership,becausehe himselfhad a hand in the incredible consolidationof Stalin's authoritarianpower that rested on the omnipotent NKVD. Finally, what could Ordzhonikidze say at the plenum? Expresshis lack of trust in the NKVD and Ezhov? From the mouth of Ordzhonikidze, whose closest colleaguesand even relatives had been arrestedone after another, this would only look like an attempt to justify himself, a step taken out of desperation. Ordzhonikidze must have understoodthat he could not count on

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support at the plenum for even the mildest, most inoffensive suggestions and appeals.All his efforts before the plenum, viewed today as preparationfor an attackon Stalin, most likely were merely attemptson the eve of the plenum to make Stalin changehis mind again, by proving the innocenceof the managers,and to renouncehis intentions of continuing the terror. Otherwiseit is simply impossibleto explain why Ordzhonikidze,in preparing a strike, showed Stalin all his cards up front by reporting on the commissionsand their findings. Incidentally, Ordzhonikidzeturned in the thesesof his report on time. Stalin reprimandedhim, as alreadynoted,and Ordzhonikidzetook this to heart. In general,Ordzhonikidze'sactions before the plenum suggestthat he was only trying to make Stalin changehis mind. The very possibility of this, incidentally, was a logical and widespreadillusion in a system where almost everythingwas decidedby one leader.All that thosewho disagreedcould do was to try to win over the leader. In hypothesizingaboutOrdzhonikidze'smood and intentionson the eve of the plenum, one must considerthe importantfactor of the state of his health. Getting embroiled in a struggle required great strength and nerves of steel. At one time Ordzhonikidze had these. "He was young and strong and seemedas if he had been born in his long military overcoatand Red Army helmet.With his legs in high boots, he treadedfirmly, assuredly,but at the same time lightly on the wooden floor of the train."14 This is how E.M. Bogdatevarecalled Ordzhonikidze in 1920. But the years had passed.Ordzhonikidzebecame ill, endured a serious operation and lost one kidney, worked long hours, and grew older. "Sergo Ordzhonikidzein thoseyearswas heavy, and his bushymustacheand curly, thick headof hair were coveredwith gray," as the famouspilot Georgii F. Baidukovdescribedhim in 1935.15 Ordzhonikidze often took ill in 1936. Becauseof his health, the Politburo had resolvedin Januarythat "ComradeOrdzhonikidzemust leave for his dachaoutside Moscow on the morning of January9, and thereafterseeonly a limited numberof people (not more than one or two people a day)." At the end of January,Ordzhonikidzereturnedto work. But the Politburo arrangeda mercifully light schedulefor him: threeworkdaysevery six, with a mandatoryrest outside the city for the remaining three days, and a sharp curtailment of his responsibilities. On March 25, Ordzhonikidzeonce again was granted vacation leave

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until May 1. Severalparticipantsof the People'sCommissariatof Heavy Industry's council, which took place on June 20, rememberedOrdzhonikidze's poor health: "He was unrecognizable,as if he suffered from a seriousillness," recalled1.1. Gudov many decadeslater.16 "As his speechcameto a close,we observedwith alarm how very tired he grew," related the director of the DnepropetrovskMetallurgical Factory, S. Birman.17 At that very time, the end of June,it was decidedto invite to Moscow from abroad the famous specialist, ProfessorNoorden, who examinedOrdzhonikidze.18 The difficulties enduredin connectionwith the arrestswithin the commissariatand of his brother also took their toll on his health. In November, Ordzhonikidze suffered a heart attack. In general, Ordzhonikidze'sphysicalcondition also suggeststhat he committedsuicide. Would suicide mean that Ordzhonikidze had resigned himself to Stalin's intentions and had given up? Judging from everything, it is precisely this circumstancethat most disturbs thosewho contendthat he was murdered.But in fact, such a conclusiondoes not at all follow from suicide. Politically motivatedsuicideswere a widespreadphenomenonin the party. The wave of suicidesamongthose hostile to the introduction of the NEP, for example,readily comesto mind. One of Trotsky'sleading supporters,the diplomatAdolf A. Ioffe (1883-1927),consciouslychose suicide in 1927 during an inner-partystruggle.The increaseof political terror in the 1930s was also accompaniedby a rise in suicides. While condemned,suicidewas typically viewed for a long time as proof of the victim's innocence,and a protestagainstinjustice. This complicated implementation of the politics of terror, and by order from above anotherevaluationof suicide beganto take hold: shootingoneself meant that one was guilty and had gotten entangledin criminal activities. Not long before Ordzhonikidze'sdeath, two well-broadcastsuicides took place in Moscow. On August 22, 1936, following court testimony againstKamenevand Zinoviev concerningconnectionsof the former "right" with the Trotskyist-ZinovieviteCenter, Mikhail P. Tomskii shot himself. This suicidewas a protest,an attemptat the costof his own life to prove his innocence.In a final letter to Stalin, Tomskii wrote: "I appeal to you not only as party leader, but also as an old comrade-in-

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arms, to respectmy last request: Don't believe Zinoviev's impudent slander.I neverjoined any bloc, and did not take part in any conversations against the party.,,19 This suicide did not enter into Stalin's calculations,and in order to preventits undesirableeffect and stop the rumors, the party leadershipquickly offered an official account. On August 23, Pravda already published the following report: "The Central Committee reports that candidate member of the Central Committee, M.P. Tomskii, involved with the counterrevolutionary Trotskyist-Zinovievite terrorists, committed suicide at his dacha in Bolshevoon August 22." But it was anothersimilar event-thedeath of a well-known member of the Moscow City Party Committee, V.la. Furer-which shows that suicide continued "to disturb minds," and cast a shadowon the new turn in the "generalline," generatingsympathyfor its victims even from hard-line Stalinists. Furer shot himself after the arrest of the deputy commissarof communicationsin the USSR, Livshits, whom he had befriended.This suicide was also an appeal, an attempt to convince the party leadership of the destructivenessof the adopted course.In a long letter to Stalin, Furer soughtto demonstratethat the arrestof Livshits and other Communistswas a mistake.The letter was full of praisefor Stalin and other Politburo members.Stalin was not in Moscow and Furer's last letter fell into Khrushchev's hands, who brought it to Kaganovich. "Kaganovichread it aloud in my presence," Khrushchevrecalled, "and he cried, simply sobbed,while reading. He finished and couldn't calm down for a long time." By Kaganovich's order, Khrushchevcirculated a copy of the letter to Politburo members. Furer receivedan official funeral, in which the Moscow City Party Committeeparticipated,assertinghis innocenceand praising him for his service.When Stalin returnedin the fall, however,he gave the case a different interpretation.He summonedKhrushchevand told him: "Furer shot himself, that worthless man. . . . He took the liberty of characterizingPolitburo members,and wrote all sorts of complimentary words about them. But he was really trying to disguise himself. He's a Trotskyist who sharesLivshits's ideas.I summonedyou in order to tell you this. He's a dishonestperson,and there isn't any need to feel sorry for him."20 The fact that thesesuicidesseriouslyalarmedStalin is made clear

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by his speechesat the Central Committee plenum in December 1936. Ordzhonikidzeand other Central Committeememberslistened to Stalin's reasoningon the meaning of the suicides. The deathsof Tomskii, Lominadze,and Furer, said Stalin, are attemptsby enemiesto evaderesponsibilityand inflict a blow on the party. 'Tomskii's suicide," Molotov statedat this plenum while developingStalin's thought, "is a premeditatedconspiracy,in which Tomskii arrangedwith not one, but severalpeople to commit suicide and once again strike a blow at the CentralCommittee."21 Mter the Decemberplenum, theseassessments, despite their being classified,circulatedwithin the party. Andrei A. Andreev, for example, who went to Rostov-on-Donto fire leadersof the party organizationat the beginning of January 1937, repeatedStalin's interpretation of Furer'ssuicide at the plenum of the Azov-Black Sea party committee: "Furer, a member of the Moscow committee," he said, "shot himself and left a long letter of almostfifteen pages.This letter readsas if it's a cry from the soul of an innocentman. How did things actually turn out? It turned out that he was a memberof the Ukrainian Centerof terrorists.... Seewhat thesesuicidescost. From now on we'll view them only as confirmationthat an enemyshothimself."22 The party leadership'snegative reaction to political suicides demonstratesthat this problem seriously upset, if not frightened, the organizersof the GreatTerror. But the public viewed suicide as a protest againstarbitrarinessand sawit as evidenceof governmentinjustice. Back then, suicide remainedthe only meansfor an individual citizen to fight against an all-powerful state. For just that reason, the wave of suicidesdid not taperoff. 23 Undoubtedly, Ordzhonikidze'ssuicide was also a protest. Having failed to changeStalin's mind, Ordzhonikidzedecidedon this desperate step, on the one hand, to escapenew humiliations, not wishing to participatein organizingmore repressions.On the other hand,in demonstrating his innocence,he may even have sought revenge against Stalin. Incidentally, this is how Ordzhonikidze'ssuicidewas understood by thosewho were sworn to secrecyaboutthe causeof his death: He found an easy way. He thought about himself. Some leader! You merely put Stalin in a very difficult position. And he was such

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a devotedStalinistwho defendedStalin in everything.He had served time at hard labor, which also elevatedhis authority.... But this last step of his showed that he wavered.Against Stalin, of course. And againstthe party line, yes, againstthe line. It was a very bad step. It's impossibleto interpretthis otherwise. This was Molotov's evaluation many years after Ordzhonikidze'ssuicide.24 So thought Stalin as well. This becameclear several days after Ordzhonikidze'sdeath.

Chapter 14

Mter the Funeral (Ordzhonikidze and Molotov)

Ordzhonikidzewas given a funeral with "full state honors,"just like those of top party and state leaders for many years. The coffin was placed on display in the Hall of Columns at the House of Unions, through which hundredsof thousandsof people passed.With Stalin himself in the lead, Politburo memberssolemnly carried out the urn containingthe ashesto Red Square.The memorialservicetook placeat Lenin'smausoleum,after which the urn was setin the Kremlin wall. Over the next several days, all the newspapersprinted obituaries, condolences,touchingreminiscences,and numerousphotosof grieving comrades-in-arms-Stalinand Politburo members at Ordzhonikidze's apartment,in an honor guard by the bier, and at the mausoleum.The leaders'facial expressionscapturedin these photos reveal their reactions-sadbut determined-befittingthe eventsand their own status. Many people attendedthe lengthy funeral service on Red Square, despite a bitter frost-the newspaperphotographsshow people bundled up, with upturnedcollars, while Stalin, as usualin such situations, lowered the "ears" of his fur cap. Governmentofficials spoke,as well as of labor collectives.Molotov beganthe fuworkers and representatives neral proceedings."Comrades,"he intonedwith "deepemotion,"as the Pravdacorrespondent reported, we have lost one of the best leadersof the Bolshevik party and the Sovietstate,one of the mostardentandfearlessfighters for the Com163

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munist cause,one of the brightest,most beloved,and sincerestcomrades,SergoOrdzhonikidze.... Under his leadership,our heavy industry turned into one of the world's mightiest and becamethe Bolsheviks' base for the technical reconstructionof the entire national economy. Under his leadership,not only the First, but the SecondFive-Year Plan in heavyindustry was triumphantlyfulfilled in four years. Severaldayslater, however,at the CentralCommitteeplenum,which the Politburo postponedfrom February20 to February23 at 6:00 P.M. becauseof Ordzhonikidze'sdeath,the party leadershiprevealedits true attitude toward the deadcommissar.! Insteadof Ordzhonikidze,Molotov reportedat the plenumon sabotage in heavy industry. Quoting in detail from the confessionsof arrested "wreckers," he assailedcolleaguesin the People'sCommissariat of Heavy Industry with numerouschargesof "self-complacency,""selfsatisfaction,""political blindness,"and defending"dangerouspeople." As alreadymentioned,Molotov sharplyattackedthe report of the commissariatcommission,which on Ordzhonikidze'sorder had verified information concerning sabotageat Ural Coach Construction, in the Donbass,and at Kemerovo.Molotov promisedto checkon the commissions themselves,and condemnedBirman's letter to Ordzhonikidzeas the manifestationof a knee-jerkdefenseof his department.The irritable tone of Molotov's report and his harshwording suggestthe seriousness of his conflict with Ordzhonikidze. Attacks on Ordzhonikidze's departmentwere published as well-Molotov's report, partially abridgedand reworked,was one of the few materialsfrom the plenum to appear in the press. The published text was sufficiently transparentto reveal the essenceof the managers'position, and the reasonsfor their political failure: "Our managersdidn't help to exposewrecking,andsometimes even hinderedour efforts";2 "now one often encountersclaims that talk of sabotageis vastly exaggerated,and that if wrecking has been so of which we widespread,then we would not have had the accomplishments are so proud. They say the successof our industry demonstratesthat [chargesof] sabotagewere inflated by someone,"andso on.3 Molotov's harsh speechagainst the NKTP at the February-March plenumprovided the basisfor severalstudiesthat focus on the conflicts betweenMolotov and Ordzhonikidze,portraying them as representing

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two opposingpolitical lines.J. Arch Getty has presentedand developed this view most fully. One of the sections of his well-known book is entitled "Ordzhonikidze and Molotov, Radicals and Moderates." In Getty's opinion, Ordzhonikidze and Molotov headedtwo conflicting factions in the party leadership-thesupportersof radical politics, and the "moderates,"who supported,in particular, more balancedratesof industrialization. Maneuvering between these two camps, Stalin supported the radicalsduring the First Five-Year Plan, took the side of the moderatesat the beginning of the second, and inclined even more toward radicalismin the middle of the 1930s.The rout of the economic cadres, Piatakov's arrest, and the circumstancesthat drove Ordzhonikidze to suicide, in Getty's opinion, were the result of the efforts of Molotov, who had allied himself with Ezhov. In the final analysis, they reflectedthe victory of the radical policy of high growth rates.4 Publicationswith similar hypotheses,howeverdebatablethey might be, undoubtedlyhave stimulatedstudy of statepower in the USSR, and have compelledscholarsto seeknew argumentsto confirm traditional conceptsand widen the parametersof discussion.But there are reasons to reexaminethe relationshipand conflicts betweenMolotov and Ordzhonikidze.Like Beria, Molotov took part in the tragic tum of eventsin Ordzhonikidze'sfate; the degreeof his participationis of prime importancefor the topic underreview. As leader of a commissariat,Ordzhonikidze was subordinateto Molotov, who held the post of Sovnarkomchairman.Like the other commissariatleaders, Ordzhonikidze had to deal with Molotov through the appropriatechannelson a variety of vital mattersrequiring resolution by Sovnarkom.Molotov's job was to unite numerous and often contradictoryinterestsof the various departments,settle conflicts between them, and guard "common state interests." This happenedespeciallyoften when ratifying production plans and distributing material and financial resources.Departmentalchiefs literally bombardedSovnarkomwith requestsconcerningallocation of supplementarymeansand funding, itemized lists of the most important new construction sites, and amendmentsfor lowering target plans. Molotov and his deputies, as a rule, were uncompromising, and in most casesrefusedthe supplicants. Molotov's colorful notes to the Commissarof Agriculture (USSR),

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Iakov A. Iakovlev, are instructive in showing Molotov's style of relating to his commissars,and open a window on the Sovnarkomchairmanin general.On December26, 1932, Iakovlev appealedto Molotov to reexamine a resolution just adopted concerning the sharp reduction in financing his commissariat'sscientific-researchinstitutes. He received the following reply: I'm surprisedat your mannerof dealingwith Sovnarkom.Despitethe fact that you're aware of Sovnarkom'sfinal decisions,reachedonly yesterday,December25 (granted,you were absent,since your "being busyH preventedyou from staying until the end of the conference), you have the guts to write a letter like this to Sovnarkom. SinceI can'ttake such attitudesseriously,I'm returning this paper to you for you to decidewhat to do with it ..5 Since Ordzhonikidzewas a Politburo member, Molotov could not have reprimandedhim in such a fashion. Argumentsand clashes,however, between leaders of the NKTP and Sovnarkom,including those betweenMolotov and Ordzhonikidze,occurredquite frequently. The most serious of the well-known conflicts, examinedby the Politburo, took place at the end of 1931. On December23, the Politburo considered reorganizing the economic commissariats,in particular the Supreme Council of the National Economy. The adopted resolution (stamped"specialfile") reads: (a) Adopt the draft resolution proposedby Comrade Stalin on restructuringthe work of the economiccommissariatsand transmit for final editing to the commissioncomprisedof ComradesStalin, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze,and Kaganovich. Convocationof the commissionby ComradeStalin. (b) RejectComradeOrdzhonikidze'sproposedresignation. (c) Schedulea specialmeetingof the Politburo to review Comrade Ordzhonikidze'sstatementconcerninghis relationshipwith Comrade Molotov. Since the materialsrelatedto the Politburo protocolsremain closed, it is difficult to say exactly why the conflict betweenMolotov and Ordzhonikidze occurred. On the basis of other documents,however, it is possibleto makeseveralsuppositionsaboutit.

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The reorganizationof industrial administration,examinedat a Politburo meeting on December23, envisagedthe liquidation of VSNKh and its replacementby severalcommissariats:heavy, light, and timber industries.Such a decisionwas eventuallyadopted.6 Ordzhonikidze,as already mentioned,headedthe Commissariatof Heavy Industry, but initially opposedreorganizingVSNKh. The following note, written by Ordzhonikidze,is preservedin Valerian V. Kuibyshev'spersonalpapers at RTsKhIDNI: "I heardabouttheseconversations,but personallythink they are wrong. The separatebranchesof industry are so tightly interconnectedthat their immediateinclusion into STO [Council of Labor and Defense-Ed.]would greatly hamperand complicatethe situation. I'm categoricallyagainstit." Kuibyshev added a postscripton the first page: "Sergo'snote from October 1 [apparently1931-0.Kh.] regarding the liquidation of VSNKh.,,7 Most likely, this was the cause of the conflict betweenOrdzhonikidzeand Molotov, as well as Ordzhonikidze's proposalto resign. Whetherthe Politburo further discussedthe relationship betweenOrdzhonikidzeandMolotov is unknown. Especially serious conflicts arose between the economic departments,on the one hand, and on the other, the Sovnarkomleadership, Gosplan, and the Commissariatof Finance,which distributed the resources,during preparationof the national economicplan (by quarter, year, or five-year period). Here we seeone constanttendency:the commissarssoughtmaximum capital investmentand lower production targets. Gosplan and the Commissariatof Finance,while supporting the Sovnarkomleadership,tried to cut capital investmentand demanded greaterreturn from currentfunding levels. This happenedyet again as the SecondFive-YearPlanwas beingapproved. In carrying out the decisionof theJanuary1933 Central Committee plenum to sharply lower the pace of economicgrowth in the Second Five-Year Plan, Gosplanprepareda draft five-year plan in the summer of 1933 that calculatedan averageannualincreasein industrial production of 14 percentand 97 million rubles of capital investmentfor the five-year plan. As usual, the departmentsbegan to protest and demandedan increasein capital investmentof up to 135 million rubles. Gosplanyielded and agreedto raise the level of capital investmentto almost 113 million rubles. During the discussionof the draft five-year plan in the Politburo at the end of 1933, however,important changes

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Ordzhonlkldze addressing a Communist Party gathering In 1935.

were made in the documem.To all appearances.the pany leadership decided to acceleratethe rate of industrial production and raise the level of capital investmentalong the lines of Stalin's proposal for a significam increase in the production of Group ~B~ industries.1I As a result, a draft five-year plan was submilted to the SevemeemhPany Congressthat envisagedan averageannual growth of 18.9 percentin industrial production and the volume of capital work at 133.4 billion rublesfor five years. On February3, 1934, congressdelegateslistened to reporlS by Molotov and Kuibyshev on the tasksof the SecondFive-Year Plan, basedon thesefigures. But alreadyon the following day, Ordzhonik.idzereponed to the congressthat in agreement with other Politburo members,he proposeda reduction in the annual growth of industrial production from 18.9 percent.as originally planned, to 16.5 percent.At the same time, it is wonh noting that Ordzhonikidzeemphasized that plans for 9 capital investmentduring the five-year plan remainedunchanged. This episode hasattractedthe altention of specialistsfor a long time.

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and allows them to advancevarious hypotheses. J. Arch Getty, for example, seesthis as proof of the existenceof a conflict betweenMolotov and Ordzhonikidze,headsof the radicalsand moderates,respectively.IO At first glance, this incident at the congressactually suggestssuch a conclusion.It is apparentthat Ordzhonikidzepublicized his proposals for lowering rates,while it follows from Molotov's concludingremarks that he was not very happywith this decisionand insteadproposedthat the goals of the five-year plan be over-fulfilled.l1 So far, no documents have surfacedthat allow us to elucidatewhy "Ordzhonikidze'samendment" appeared.But available evidencedoes not support the contention that the decision to decreasethe pacewas the result of a struggle betweentwo political groups,a political confrontationbetweenMolotov and Ordzhonikidze. Drawing on the facts presentedaboveconcerningthe drafting of the five-year plan, the incident that took place at the congresscan be viewed only as the continuationof the interdepartmentalstruggleover the balanceof production ratesand capital investment.Broken by the dramatic increaseof rates before the congress,the compromise between Gosplan and the economic commissarswas reestablished.The commissariatsreceived higher limits on capital investment,for which they had always fought, and lower targetsfor manufacturedproducts. In otherwords, the departmentscould producelesswhile receiving the very sameamountof money. It is difficult to say what played a greater role in underminingthe intendedshift to a more moderateeconomic policy: attemptsto raise economicgrowth ratesduring higher levels of capital investment,which Sovnarkomand Gosplan advocated,or the approachof the departmentsthat had triumphed-loweringgrowth rates while maintaining enormous capital investment. In any event, thesecompetingviewpoints could not be attributedsimply to either a moderateor a radical policy, let alonebe given political significance. Thus, documentsavailable today corroborateonly the existenceof departmentalconflicts between Ordzhonikidze and Molotov. Such clashes,which in one way or anotherwere a featureof any stateapparatus, occurred betweenMolotov and other commissariatleaders.They inevitably croppedup all the time and were a normal feature of economic administration. Speaking about his relations with Molotov, Kaganovichrecalledmanydecadeslater:

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When we worked in the CentralCommittee,we cooperated;but when he becameSovnarkomchairman,and I the minister of communications, we argued over business.I demandedmore rails and more capital investment.Mezhlauk, the Gosplanchairman,didn't provide them, and Molotov supportedhim. Therefore,I quarreledwith Molotov and Mezhlaukover this, and complainedto Stalin.... Ordzhonikidzehad the sameconcernsas I-they say that he also argued and fought with Molotov. But Sergo quarreledwith him as well on the basisof capital investmentand attitude toward industry. He argued.We complainedto Stalin. Molotov was offended that we complainedabout Sovnarkom.But we consideredthe Politburo the highestauthority.12 Molotov, always faithful to Stalin, undoubtedlysupportedthe mass repressions,including those in the NKTP. Facts that allow one to call Molotov the initiator of the rout of Ordzhonikidze'sdepartment,however, are hard to come by. The only such evidence to come to light concerningthe conflict betweenthe NKTP and the Sovnarkomleadership regardingthe arraignmentof a group of employeesof the People's Commissariatof Heavy Industry actually showsthat Molotov could help Ordzhonikidze. The conflict underconsiderationthat flared up at the endof November-December1936-following the Kemerovo trial, which sparkedrepressionsagainst managersafter the arrests of Piatakov and Papulia Ordzhonikidze-clearlymarked a confrontation between Ordzhonikidzeand Stalin. In September-October 1936, the Soviet Control Commission proposed an examination, conductedjointly with the NKVD, of the activities of the Dzerzhinskii Construction trust, which revealed numerousfinancial violations-a rise in construction costs, salary fund overdrafts,and so on. Sovnarkomrecommendedthat the NKTP adoptmeasuresagainstthe trust leader.On November11, Ordzhonikidze'sdeputy, Rukhimovich, issueda correspondingorder. Apparently taking into considerationthat the violations with which the trust chief was chargedwere quite common,Rukhimovich limited himself to relatively mild sanctions:the trust headwas given a severereprimand with a warning, the main accountantof the trust was fired, and severalother employeeswere fined. The leadersof the Soviet Control Commission,however,felt that this action was insufficient, all the more

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so becauseit was not published and circulated to other construction organizations,and complained to Sovnarkom. On November 25, on Molotov's instructions, Sovnarkomresolved that the NKTP prosecute the trust chief, Poznanskii,the main engineer,Raizer, and the head accountant,Gorbatsevich.Despite the fact that he was already under attack, Ordzhonikidzeappealedto Molotov to repealthis decision.On November27, he sent Molotov a new draft order from the NKTP with the following accompanyingnote: ''I'm sendingthe draft of an order concerningDzerzhinskii Construction,about which I spoke to you by telephone.I ask you to stop at this and refrain from prosecutingComradesPoznanskii,Raizer,and others."13 While Ordzhonikidze'snew order dismissed the one signed by Rukhimovich "as an insufficient" command, it differed from Rukhimovich'sonly in its strongerwording, and not in its essence."Considering that ComradesPoznanskii and Raizer deserve the strictest condemnationand prosecutionfor similar behavior, but taking into accounttheir previous workon the constructionof MagnitogorskConstruction and the Dzerzhinskii Factory," the harshestreprimand that Ordzhonikidzeproposedcame"with a warning to ComradesPoznanskii and Raizer that in the eventof the slightestrepetitionof such behavior, they'll be removed from their positions and prosecuted."Previous forms of punishmentawaitedother trust employees. In spite of this, Molotov yielded to Ordzhonikidze.He madea minor correction to the draft order, and attachedinstructions: 'To publish (with amendments).,,14 The order was publishedin such form on December3 in the newspaperFor Industrialization. Molotov's highly critical addressat the February-Marchplenum once againfollowed Stalin'slead. Settingthe tone of the plenum,Stalin made several speechesand repeatedlyheckled others from his chair. Molotov's accusationsagainstthe managerspracticallyrepeatedStalin's remarksat the plenum (there was undoubtedlyagreementbefore the plenum). But only Stalin, and not Molotov, rained brutal and basically unexpectedcriticism on Ordzhonikidzehimself. "And take Comrade Ordzhonikidze," Stalin stated abruptly in his concluding remarks on March 5. "He was one of the first and best Politburo membersamong us, a top-notch economicleader, I would say. But he also suffered from becomingattachedto others, from de-

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daring people to be personallydevotedto him and fussing over them, in spite of warnings from the party and the Central Committee."Mter making such a significant remark, Stalin, as already mentioned, told participants at the plenum about Ordzhonikidze'srole in the LominadzeAffair and the deadcommissar'sdefenseof other arrested "enemies,"illustrating with these examplesthe fallaciousnessof spinelessnessand liberalism. In preparinghis speechesfor publication,Stalin deletedall passages concerning Ordzhonikidze. Departing Central Committee members, however,did not receive any instructionsregardingStalin'sspeechand they informed party organizationsin detail about everything that happenedat the plenum, not sparingcriticism for the deadcommissarof heavy industry: "And then ComradeStalin dwelled on one mistake of ComradeSergoOrdzhonikidze,"stated,for example,the first secretary of the Gorkii RegionalPartyCommittee,E.K. Pramnek,at the plenum, ComradeStalin criticized ComradeSergoseveraltimes. Stalin often emphasizedthat Sergo was the best Politburo memberand that he liked him as much as anyone.... Despite this, ComradeStalin told the plenum aboutone of ComradeSergo'smistakes,citing Comrade Sergo'srelationswith Lominadze.In 1926-27,ComradeSergo knew about Lominadze'sserious political mistakes, yet at that time still carried out a lengthy correspondencewith him. Lominadze wrote Comrade Sergo letters of an anti-party nature, but becauseof his kindness,as ComradeStalin said, ComradeSergodidn't report them to us, and we didn't know about them. If we had known, we wouldn't have promoted Lominadze so readily. If we had known about Lominadze'swaverings,we would have treated him differently and possibly could have warned him and set him straight. I told Sergo, "See,you madetoo much of a fuss over Lominadzeand wouldn't do him in. If you don't correctsmall mistakes,you'll invite bigger oneswhich can ruin you." Sergo,said ComradeStalin, had an aristocratic attitude toward people. Sergo, who trained thousandsof managers, had relatedimproperly to manyof them.15 Emphasizing the dasheshe had had with Ordzhonikidze over Lominadze,Stalin avertedpotentialrumorsaboutthe conflicts in 193637 that led to the tragic outcome.The impressionwas createdthat in the last years of his life, Ordzhonikidzein general supportedStalin's

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undertakings.It was conveyedat the plenum that Ordzhonikidze actively participatedin the strugglewith ''wrecking.''In the following days, thesevery ideaswere repeatedin the press. As subsequentevents revealed, however,Stalin's real attitude toward Ordzhonikidzewas much worse than could have been surmisedafter hearing the relatively moderatecriticism at the February-Marchplenum. Even before the plenum ended, a wave of repressionscrashed down on the employeesof the Commissariatof Heavy Industry. In a short time, almost all of Ordzhonikidze'scomrades-in-arms,assistants, and managerswhom the commissarhad supportedwere destroyed. Papulia Ordzhonikidzewas shot in November 1937; his wife was then arrested,and Ordzhonikidze'syounger brother Konstantin wound up in the labor campsbefore the war. In spite of the fact that Ordzhonikidzewas dead,the NKVD understood Stalin'sattitudetoward him and continuedto beattestimonyout of people that compromisedthe deadman. On September9, 1937, the arrestedLD. Orakhelashviliwas forced to sign a statementwith thesewords: I'm personallyvery much obliged to Sergo Ordzhonikidze,but my feeling of gratitude and devotion to him won't prevent me from throwing light on his actual role in eventsassociatedwith the rise of factions and counterrevolutionaryorganizationshostile to the party and Soviet power. ... In general,I mustsay that in the living room of Sergo Ordzhonikidze'sapartmentand on days off at his dacha (in Volynsk, and then in Sosnovka),our counterrevolutionaryorganizations met frequently and conductedthe most candid counterrevolutionary discussionswhile awaiting SergoOrdzhonikidze.They didn't abatein anyway evenafter Ordzhonikidzeshowedup.16 For Stalin, Ordzhonikidzealways remainedif not an enemy then a troublesomeannoyance.Stalin, of course, did not intend to speak about this openly-only the absolutelydedicatedcould know that one of the most respectedpoliticians in the country had spokenout against the leader.But from time to time, Stalin'strue attitude toward the dead man manifesteditself. In his memoirs, Khrushchevwrote about a typical episode: One day (I think this was already after the war), I arrived from Ukraine. We were at Stalin's place,just shootingthe breezeand kill-

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ing time. I said: "Sergo-nowthere was a man! He died prematurely, while still young. What a pity to lose him." Beria then made an unfriendly retort aboutSergo,and nobodysaid anythingelse. I felt that I'd said somethingamissin this company.Dinner ended,and we left. Then Malenkov said to me, "Listen, why'd you talk so carelesslyabout Sergo?""What do you mean,carelessly?Sergowas a respectedpolitical figure." "But after all, he shot himself. Don't you know about this?" I said, "No. I buried him, and back then they told us that Sergo (who apparentlyhad kidney illness) died suddenlyon his day off." "No, he shot himself. Didn't you notice how awkward it was after you said his name?"I said that I had noticedandwas surprised.17 After the war, according to S.Z. Ginzburg, Stalin personally expunged Ordzhonikidze'sname from a list of Soviet officials to whom monumentswere to be raisedin Moscow.

Conclusion

The facts presentedin this book allow us to arguewith confidencethat seriousconflicts existedbetweenStalin and Ordzhonikidze.Stalin had preparedthe so-calledGreat Terror with singlemindeddetermination. Although Ordzhonikidzenever spoke out against the purges as such and took a hand in organizingmany acts of state terror, he considered some of the repressionsexcessiveand actively tried to defend his friends and comrades.Overall, Ordzhonikidze'sposition can be called one of "soft Stalinism," oriented toward the Stalinist generalline, but rejectingextremesof terror, mainly in relation to "his own people."Was sucha political line viable? Many think not. Stalinists,after all, are thosewho believed that the policy of masspurgeswas the only option, owing to the growing threat of war and the existenceof a potential "fifth column." Someanti-Stalinists view the mass repressionsas an essentialelementof the system,as its very trademark,and believethat the only way to avoid them would have been to destroy the system itself. But another line of reasoningalso exists: real Stalinism was "excessively" terroristic, and gave rise to extremes,superfluouseven from the point of view of its own laws and strategies.An "underlying network of fear" fortified by terror was a fundamentaland necessaryfeatureof Stalinism.They went so far, however, that they often weakeneddespoticpower. It follows from this that differences of opinion even within the framework of the strategy worked out by the Stalinist leadershipat the end of the 1920sincluded less terroristic alternativesand more realistic policies.I In some ways, 175

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what took place immediatelyafter Stalin's death supportsthis point of view: His successors,without encroachingupon the foundationsof the system,quickly repudiatedmanyof the exU"emesof stateterror. But this does not mean that the nation'sdevelopmentin the 1930s could have unfolded differently. The spectrumof possibleoptions was limited by the existenceof a rigid political regime, by the need to implement an industrialization long overdue, and by the social and cultural realities of a relatively backwardcountry. Nevertheless,the socalled command-administrative policy clearly is not the sameas Stalinism. Even in the 1930s, preconditions existed in society for the successfulimplementationof a more moderate,less arbitrary, and less terroristic command-administrativesystem.It is sufficient to note that the greatestsuccesses of the 1930swere registeredduring periodsof a relatively moderateand balancedeconomic policy and somewhatrestrainedrepression. But wheneverwe speakof historical alternatives,the questioninevitably arisesof whether there were forces, including those at the highest levels of power, capableof implementingthem. The facts presentedin this book, it would seem. allow one to maintain that Ordzhonikidze would havesupporteda "softer" strategy. One of the basesfor the relative "softening" of the general line might have beenstrengtheningvarious party and statestructuresaswell as the authority of their leaders. Only in this case might a weak but neverthelessreal counterforceto the authoritarianpower of the leader have emerged.As little Stalinsin their own turfs, eachof theseleaders to some extent adhered to the general rules of the game and was preparedto compromiseand submit to the ultimate arbiter-Stalin. But even Stalin, who saw himself as boss, had to reckon with the existence of "petty fiefdoms." This, despite the well-known costs and conflicts, might have held together a more balancedand less arbitrary system.The formation of such a balanceof forces, destroyedafter the defeatof the oppositionat the end of the 1920s,took placegraduallyin the first half of the 1930s. The Commissariatof Heavy Industry played no small role in this process.In the 1930s,it was transformedinto one of the most powerful and influential agencies,capableof declaringand fighting for its interests.The claim commissariatemployeesmadefor a degreeof indepen-

CONCLUSION

Or dzhonlkldze In Stalin 's shadow , 1935.

177

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dence was one of the most important among these interests,as was their desire to protect themselvesfrom the interferenceof party and state controllers and the punitive organs. Ordzhonikidzefully shared theseintentions. Running his commissariatwith a firm hand, he preferred to determine the fate of his subordinateshimself. The NKTP leader'sposition, characteristicof that of leadersof other departments as well, in some sensestabilized the political situation and restrained the organizationof massrepressions. Stalin's attempts to upset the complex political balance that had taken shapeand his designsto take away the remainingindependence from his old colleaguesaroused Ordzhonikidze'sresistance.Unlike other Politburo members (who also merit special investigation), he took action. Ordzhonikidze'spersonal qualities and the fact that he could rely on the support of a sufficiently cohesive economic nomenklaturain operationfor some time also played their role. To a certainextent,Ordzhonikidzeexpressedthe interestsof party members who had good reasonto fear a new round of terror. In the provinces, economicand party leadersoften presenteda united front. At the sametime, it is unlikely that Ordzhonikidzewas ready to get involved in a seriousstruggle with Stalin. He was too much a Stalinist and too dependentas a political figure. Comparedto the poorly educated Ordzhonikidze (and also Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and others), Stalin appearedas a great theoretician and a prominent politician. Ordzhonikidzehimself must have understoodthis. It is not surprising, therefore,that the availablefacts suggestthat Ordzhonikidzeonly tried to make Stalin changehis mind, although he did so insistently, and, it can be said, fearlessly. Mter his death,Stalin's comrades-in-arms,many of whom, like Ordzhonikidze, were "soft Stalinists," partially dismantledthe system and rejected the extremesof state terrorism. They opted for a variant that had germinatedback in the 1930sandwas in somemeasureconnected with Ordzhonikidze.

Notes

Introduction 1. !stochnik (1993/0),9-22. 2. See,for example,the repentantletter from Bukharin to Stalin before the former'sdeath,'extractedfrom the Kremlin Archive. Ibid., 23-25. 3. R.A. Medvedev,Let HistoryJudge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (New York, 1989); R. Conquest, The Great Terror: A. Reassessment (New York, 1990); and R. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolutionfrom Above, 19281941 (New York-London, 1992). 4. JA. Getty, "The Politics of RepressionRevisited," Stalinist Terror: New Perspective!>; ed. J. Arch Getty and Roberta Manning (Cambridge, 1993), 55-56.

Chapter 1 1. V.S. Kirillov, A.Ia. Sverdlov, Grigo1ii Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze (Sergo):Biografiia (Moscow, 1986),24. 2. Ibid., 130-31. 3. Quoted in 0 Sergo Ordzhonikidze: Vospominaniia, ocherki. stat'i 1981), 109-10. sovremmenikov(Moscow, 4. V.V. Zhuravlev,A.P. Nenarokov,"V.1. Lenin: 'Vmestei naravne'... ," UTak daet istoriia (Moscow, 1989), 112-34. 5. V.I, Lenin, Polnoe sobmniesochinenii,5th ed. (Moscow, 1964), vol. 45: 358. 6. Ibid., vol. 54: 329. 7. Ibid.,330. 8. L.D. Trotskii. Stalin, vol. 2 (New York, 1985),196-97. 9. /zvestiiaTsKKPSS.no. 4 (1991). 198. 179

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10. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 246, vyp. IV, 11. Ibid.,1. 90.

n. 57-58.

Chapter2 1. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 246, vyp. IV, 1. 28. 2. Similarly, see V. Nadtocheev," Triumvirat'iIi 'semerka'?"Trudnye voprosyistarii (Moscow, 1991),68-70. 3. RTsKhIDNI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 3259. 4. Ibid., f. 85, op. 26, d. 5. 5. IzvestiiaTsKKPSS,no. 7 (1991), 130-31. 6. V.S. Kirillov, A.la. Sverdiov. G.K 01dzlwnikidze(Sergo): Biografiia, 199. (RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 586, n. 4, 5.) 7. Izvestiia TsKKPSS,no. 7 (1991), 132-33. 8. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 257, 1. 10; XV konferentsiia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi/)artii (b): Stenograficheskiiotchet (Moscow and Leningrad, 1927), 765-66. 9. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 1/c, d. 52, II. 1-2. 10. M.V. Rosiiakov, Ubiistvo Kirova: Politicheskiei ugolovnyeprestupleniiav 1930-xgodakh(Leningrad,1991), 108. 11. RTsKhIDNI, f.l7, op. 3, d. 768,1.5. 12. Rosiiakov, Ubiistvo Kirova, 109-10. 13. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3a, d. 86, II. 7-11.

Chapter3 1. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 1/c, d. 59, I. 28. 2. S. Cohen, Bukharin: Politicheskaia biogmfiia, 1888-1938 (Moscow, 1988),515. 3. RTsKhIDNI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 2891, 1. 12. 4. Ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 750, II. 2, 5; d. 752, 1. 3; d. 753, 1. 4. 5. Ibid., f. 85, op. 1/c, d. 115, n. 6-10. 6. Ibid., II. 1-5. 7. Kommunist,no. 13 (1991),56-57.(RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 607, II. 267-69.) 8. See J.P. Ikonnikova, A.P. Ugrovatov, "Stalinskaia repetitsiianastupleniiana krest'ianstvo,"Vaprosyistarii KPSS,no. 1 (1991),68-81. 9. R.w. Davies, "The Syrtsov-LominadzeAfIair," Soviet Studies,vol. 33 Oanuary 1981); B.A. Starkov, "Pravo-Ievye fraktsionery," Oni ne molchali (Moscow, 1991); SA Kislitsyn, Variant Syrtsova(Iz istarii fonnirovaniia antistalinskogosaprotivleniia v sovetskomobshchestvev 20-3O-e gg.) (Rostov-on-theDon, 1992). 10. RTsKhIDNI, f. 589, op. 3, d. 9251,ll. 187-202,310-14. 11. Ibid., II. 246-59. 12. Ibid., f. 17, op. 2, d. 607, n. 270-71.

NOTES

181

13. S.A. Kislitsyn, "Pravo-'levatskii' blok Syrtsova-Lominadze,"Kentavr, no. 1 (1993),119. 14. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, 1. 57 15. Pravda, 2 December,1930. Chapter4 1. For further details, see R.W. Davies, The Soviet Economy in Turmoil,

1929-1930 (London, 1989).

2. See "Pis'maStalinaMolotovu," Kommunist,no. 11 (1990),95-106. 3. R.W. Davies, "Some Soviet Economic Controllers-III. Kuibyshev," SovietStudies,vol. 12, no. 1 (July 1960),32. 4. EA Rees,StateControl in SovietRussia(London, 1987), 170. 5. R.W. Davies, "Some Soviet Economic Controllers-III. Ordzhonikidze," Soviet Studies,vol. XII (1960); A.F. Khavin, Kratkii ocherk istorii industrializatsii SSSR(Moscow, 1962) and U rulia industrii: Dokumental'nye ocherki (Moscow, 1968); V.S. LeI' chuk, Industrializatsiia SSSRIstoriia, opyt, problemy (Moscow, 1984); Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Ordzhonikidze'sTakeoverof VESENKHA: A CaseStudy in Soviet BureaucraticPolitics," SovietStudies,vol. 37, no. 2 (April 1985). 6. RTsKhIDNI. Zapis' besedy s A.S. Tochinskim (newly declassified documents). 7. Voprosy istorii, no. 2 (1990), 107. 8. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 29, d. 442, n. 1-2. 9. Ibid., d. 445, 11. 1-2. For the causes of still another of Ordzhonikidze'sclasheswith Molotov's apparatus,seed. 444, n. 1-4. 10. For severalepisodesin the struggle of Ordzhonikidze'sdepartment to distribute capital investment,seeR.W. Davies and D. Khlevniuk, "Vtoraia piatiletka: Mekhanizm smeny ekonomicheskoipolitiki," Otechestrennaia Istoriia, no. 3 (1994),95-97. 11. For further details, see R.W. Davies, "Sovetskaiaekonomikav period krizisa, 1930-1933gody," lstoriia SSSR,no. 4 (1991), 202-3. 12. Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin's Industrial Revolution:Politics and Workers, 1928-1932(Cambridge,1988),28-35,272-76. 13. G.K. Ordzhonikidze, Stat'i i rechi, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1957), 268-69, 277-81. 14. Kendall E. Bailes, TechnofiJgyand Society Under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the TechnicalIntelligentsia, 1917-1941(Princeton,1978), 144-51; Fitzpatrick, "Ordzhonikidze'sTakeover,"164. 15. RTsKhIDNI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 5243, 1. 4. 16. Ibid., 1. 1. 17. Ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 811,1. 9. 18. Ibid., f. 558, op. I, d. 2960, n. 7,9,23. 19. Ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 816, 1. 10, and d. 824, 1. 9. 20. Ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 826,1. 2.

182

IN STALIN'S SHADOW

21. Ibid., d. 828, n. 32-33. 22. Ibid., f. 85, op. 28, d. 7, l. 8. 23. Ibid., l. 38. This fact from Rumiantsev'sspeechis inaccuratelydepicted in the literature. Scholarlyconventionis wrong to hold that half of all engineersand techniciansin the Donbasswere arrestedby 1931. Arrest andsentencingto hard labor are not analogous. 24. Ibid., f. 85, op. 28, d. 8, n. 160, 192. 25. Ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 835, l. 25. 26. Ibid., f. 17, op. 114, d. 285,n. 28-35. 27. Ibid., n. 1-2. 28. Spravochnikpartiinogo rabotnika,vyp. 8 (Moscow, 1934),475. 29. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 114, d. 332, 11. 150-51. 30. Ibid., n. 4, 20. 31. Ibid., d. 353, l. 37; d. 351, l. 14. 32. GARF, f. 5446, op. 82, d. 26, n. 34-36. 33. Ibid., l. 37. 34. Ibid., n. 18-20. 35. Ibid., n. 21-22. 36. Pravda, 23 August, 1933. 37. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 929, l. 21. 38. Kommunist,no. 11 (1990),105. 39. Ibid., 105-6. 40. RTsKhIDINI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 930, l. 13. See also, R.w. Davies, "RancorousLuminaries,"LondonReuiel.ll ofBooks,vol. 16, no. 8 (April 20, 1994), 7. 41. Sovetskaiaiustitsiia, no. 15 (1934), 18. 42. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 935, n. 24, 26. 43. Sovetskaiaiustitsiia, no. 23 (1934), 2. 44. RGAE, f. 7297,op. 38, d. 113,n. 3-4. 45. RTsKhIDNI, newly declassifiedmaterials. 46. GARF, f. 5446, op. 22, d. 81, n. 108-11. 47. Ibid., f. 5446, op. 24/13, d. 3, II. 269-70. 48. Ibid., l. 262. 49. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 935, l. 29. 50. Ibid., f. 17, op. 114, d. 391, l. 27.

Chapter5 1. R.A. Medvedev, 0 Stalin i stalinizme (Moscow, 1990), 294-96; A.V. Antonov-Oveseenko,"Stalin i ego vremia," Voprosy istorii, no. 4 (1989),9394; "MemuaryN.S. Khrushcheva,"Voprosyistorii, no. 9 (1990),77-78. 2. A.N. Iakovlev, "0 dekabr'skoitragedii 1934 goda," Pravda, 28 January, 1991, 1. 3. Krasnikov, St., Sergei Mironovich Kirov. Zhizn' i deiatel'nose' (Moscow, 1964),19B.

4. For example,in the memoirsof one of Ordzhonikidze'sclosestcol-

NOTES

183

leaguespublishedrecently in a scholarlyjournal, Ginzburg maintains: "On the eve of Kirov's departurefor his last trip to Moscow, Ordzhonikidze,as if foreseeingtragedy,detainedKirov for a long time, and entreatedhim to be careful." See S.Z. Ginzburg, "0 gibeli Sergo Ordzhonikidze."Vaprosy istorii KPSS,no. 3 (1991),89.This fact clearly showshow doubtful the testimony of contemporariesis who did not witnessthe eventsthemselves. 5. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 1, d. 164, 1. 32 ob. 6. Seethe notesof Z.G. Ordzhonikidzeon the manuscriptof the memoirs of the Tbilisi doctor, I.S. Frangulian, compiled on January15, 1958 (RTsKhIDNI, newly declassifiedmaterials). 7. RGAE, f. 6884,op. 1, d. 130,1. 158. 8. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85. op. 1, d. 164,1.32 ob. 9. RGAE, f. 6884,op. 1, d. 130,1. 138. 10. Kommunist,no. 13 (1991),55 (RTsKhIDNI, newly declassifieddocuments). For the Politburo decision "On Comrade Ordzhonikidze," see RTsKhIDNI, f. 17. op. 3, d. 955. 11. Ibid. 12. Izvestiia, 18 February1939, 4. 13. Ginzburg, "0 gibeli SergoOrdzhonikidze,"89. 14. Ginzburg, 0 proshlom-dlialntdushchego(Moscow, 1984), 192. 15. Ginzburg, "0 gibeli SergoOrdzhonikidze,"89. 16. I. Kramov, "Iz rasskazovZiskinda," Kontinent,no. 2 (1992),228-29. 17. Ibid.

Chapter6 1. Voprosyistorii, no. 4 (1990),80. 2. J. Scott, Za Uralorn: Amerikanskiirabochii v russkomgorode stali (Moscow, Sverdlovsk,1991),102. 3. XVII s"ezdVKP(b). Stenograficheskiiolchet (Moscow, 1934), 118-20. 4. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. lie, d. 162, n. 30-34. 5. Ibid., n. 22-23. 6. Ibid., 1. 28. 7. Ibid., n. 8-15. 8. Ibid., f. 17, op. 3. d. 947.11.2, 41-44; f. 85, op. lie, d. 162, n. 7-70b. 9. Ibid., f. 85, op. 29, d. 454. 10. Izvestiia TsK KPSS,no. 7 (1989),65-85;no. 1 (1990),36-58. 11. RTsKhIDNI, f. 589, op. 3, d. 9251, 1. 35. 12. Kommunist,no. 13 (1991), 58 (RTsKhIDNI, newly declassifiedmaterials) . 13. RTsKhIDNI, f. 589, op. 3, d. 9251, 1. 333. 14. Ibid.,l. 343.

Chapter7 1. For a detailed review of the literature and a more complete summary of the history of the Stakhanovitemovement,see L.R. Siegelbaum,

184 IN STALIN'S SHADOW Stakhanovismand the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge, 1988). 2. RGAE, f. 7297,op. 38, d. 177, n. 46-47. 3. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 29,1. 119,1. 114. 4. Ibid., d. 460, n. 2-3. 5. Pravda, 11 October, 1935. 6. Pravda, 13 October, 1935 7. For more details,seeSiegelbaum,Stakhanovism,82-84. 8. V.1. Stalin, Vuprosy Leninizma (Moscow, 1952),535. 9.vol. KPSS rezoliutsiiakh, vol. 6: 286. 16,vno. 1/2 (1992), 10. RTsKhIDNI, f. 73, op. 1, d. 141, n. 201-50. 11. A.A. Andreev, dvizheniei nashi zadachi (Moscow, 1935), vol.Stakhanovskoe 16, no. 1/2 (1992), 28. 12. Stalin, VuprosyLeninizma,542. 13. FrancescoBenvenuti, "Stakhanovismand Stalinism, 1934-1938" (Centrefor Russianand East EuropeanStudies,University of Birmingham [CREES], DiscussionPapers,1989),42-45. 14. Sovetpri narodnomkomissaretiazheloi frromyshlennostiSSSR,25-29iiunia 1936g.: Stenograficheskii otcket(Moscow, 1936),37-38. 15. Ibid., 81-82. 16. Ibid., 89. 17. Ibid., 92-93. 18. Ibid., 399. 19. Ibid., 390. 20. Ibid., 390, 395. 21. E.A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41 (London, 1995), pp. 147-48. 22. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 29, d. 722, l. 1. 23. Ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 980, I. 79. 24. Ibid., I. 75. 25. Ibid., newly declassifiedmaterials. 26. Ibid. 27. V.S. Popov and V.T. Oppokov. "Berievshchina (po materialam sledstviia),"Beriia:Konefs kar'ery (Moscow, 1991).378. Judging 28. D. Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia: Politicheskii portret I V. Stalina, bk. I, pt. 2, 48;Judging Istochnik, no. 2 (1993), 16. Judging 29. Istochnik, no. 2 (1993), 16. Judging

ChapterS 1. Lenin, Polnoe sobraniesochinenii, Judging Judging vol. 45: 345. 2. For interesting observationson Piatakov'sformative years and the evolution of his views in connectionwith the developmentof the Russian Revolution, seeA. Graziosi, "G.L. Piatakov(1890-1937):A Mirror of Soviet vol.(1992), 16, no. 1/2 16, no. 1/2 Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol.(1992), 16, no. 1/2 (1992), 102-66. History,"vol.

NOTES

185

3. "Deiateli SSSR i revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia Rossii," Entsiklopedicheskiislovar' Granat (Moscow, 1989),593. 4. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 1/c, d. 136, I. 46. 5. Ibid., I. 47. 6. Ibid., I. 48. 7. Izvesliia TsK KPSS,no. 9 (1989),37. 8. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 189, II. 39-40. 9. Ibid., f. 85, op. lie, d. 136, II. 59-65. 10. J. Arch Getty, "The Politics of RepressionRevisited," Stalinist Terror, 55 (RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 573, I. 33). 11. Ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 981, I. 26. 12. Izvestiia TsK KPSS,no. 9 (1989),40. 13. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. lie, d. 186. 14. Ibid., I. 16. 15. Ibid., I. 18. 16. Ibid., f. 85, op. 29, d. 150, I. 53. 17. Ibid., f. 17, op. 2, d. 576, 1. 61. 18. A.M. Larina (Bukharina),Nezaflyvaemoe(Moscow, 1989), 327-28. 19. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 29, d. 422, I. 2. 20. A. Orlov, Tainaia istoriia stalinskikhprestuplenii(New York-JerusalemParis, 1983), 179-81.

Chapter9 1. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 981, I. 7. 2. Ibid., f. 85, op. 29, d. 710, I. 1. 3. For Ordzhonikidze'sbusinesscorrespondencein this period, see RGAE, f. 6884, op. 1, d. 38, 130. 4. Izvestiia TsKKPSS,no. 9 (1989),39. 5. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 27, d. 93, I. 22. 6. Ibid., ll. 12-13. 7. Ibid., op. 29, d. 435,1. 11. 8. RGAE, f. 6884, op. 1, d. 38, ll. 68-69, 160-160ob. 9. Izvestiia TsKKPSS,no. 2 (1991),150,175,183. 10. Popovand Oppokov, "Berievshchina,"267-81. 11. Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin'sFirst Lieutenant(Princeton,1993),51. 12. Ibid., 38-40, 51. 13. Popovand Oppokov, "Berievshchina,"368. 14. A. Antonov-Ovseenko,"Put' naverkh,"Beria: KonetshaTery,42. 15. Ordzhonikidze'sdoctor, Levin, reported to him on his favorable impressionsof Noorden in a letter from October 17 (RTsKhIDNI, newly declassifiedmaterials). 16. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 1, d. 144,1.51. 17. Kommunist, no. 13 (1991), 62-63 (RTsKhIDNI. newly declassified materials).

186

IN STALIN'S SHADOW

18. RTsKhIDNI, f. 558, op 3, d. 317, I. 21. 19. Ibid., II. 25-27, 33-36, 38-46,65,70,74,etc. 20. Ibid., 33, 34. (For the meaningof Stalin'stypical methodof placing leading associatesin opposition to the "collective leadership,"the Central Committee, see L. Maksimenkov, "Kul't. Zametki 0 slovakh-simvolakhv sovetskoipoliticheskoikul'ture," SvobodnaiamysL', no. 10 [1993], 27-28.) 21. Ibid., 109. 22. XVI s"ez.dVKP(b): Stenograficheskiiotchet, (Moscow, 1935),vol. 1: 578.

Chapter 10 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Pmvda,23 November,1936. RTsKhIDNI, newly declassifiedmaterials. Ibid. Ibid. See Sovetskoegosudarstvoi pravo, no. 3 (1965), 24. RTsKhIDNI, newlydeclassifiedmaterials. Ibid. Ibid., f. 85, op. I/c, d. 152, I. 1. Ibid., f. 17, op. 71, d. 43, I. 1. Ibid., II. 50-58. Ibid., newly declassifiedmaterials. Za industrializatsiiu, 22 February,1937, 8. Pravda, 8 March, 1937,2. 1937-i na UraZe (Sverdlovsk,1990), 185. Ibid., 187. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3952, I. 58. Ibid., d. 3951, I. 390. RTsKhIDNI, d. 3952, I. 121. Pravda, 25january,1937,2. Ibid., 28January,1937, 3. Quotedfrom 1937-i na UraZe, 191. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3981, I. 40 ob. Bolshevik,no. 8 (1937), 31. Kammunist,no. 13 (1991),56.

Chapter 11 1. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 983, I. 51. 2. Ibid., I. 54. 3. Ibid., f. 558, op. 1, d. 3350, I. 1. 4. Ibid., I. 16. 5. Ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 983, I. 64. 6. Kommunist,no. 13 (1991),60(RTsKhIDNI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 3350). 7. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 29, d. 156, I. 6.

NOTES

187

8. Ibid., ll. 9-10. 9. Ibid., 1. 12. 10. Ibid., ll. 5-6. 11. Ibid., 1. 14. 12. Za industrializatsiiu, 21 February, 1937, 8. Galperin'sfrank reminiscences,written "hot on the heels" of events,must be consideredfortunate for the historian. The material managed"to slip" into print during a narrow opening in a period of relative uncertainty from the time of Ordzhonikidze's death to the devastatingappraisal of NKTP activities, including thoseof Galperinhimself, at the February-Marchplenum. 13. Voprosyistorii, no. 8 (1993), 18. 14. Ibid. 15. Ginzburg, 0 gibeli SergoOrdzhonikidze,91-92. 16. Kommunist, no. 13 (1991), 61 (RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 591, 11. 53-54). 17. I. Kramov, "Iz rasskazovZiskinda," Knntinent, no. 2 (1992),229. 18. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 29, d. 156, ll. 2, 14. 19. Vospominania, ocherki, stat'i sovremmenikav(Moscow, 1981), 277. 0 SergoOrdzhonikidze,277. 20. N.I. Bukharin, Probl.emy teorii i praktiki sotsializma (Moscow, 1989), 271,278. 21. Voprosyistorii KPSS,no. 1 (1991),83. 22. Voprosyistorii KPSS,no. 11 (1988),47-48. 23. Ibid., 48-49. 24. For the record of Bukharin'sspeechat the purge hearing,see ibid., nos. 1 and 3 [sic] (1991). 25. Quotedin D. Shelestov.Vremia AlekseiaRykova(Moscow. 1990).285. 26. For more detail about these events, see Izvestiia TsK KPSS, no. 5 (1989),70-72. 27. Voprosyistorii KPSS,no. 11 (1988),49. 28. Izvestiia TsK KPSS,no. 5 (1989), 75. 29. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 576, 1. 61. 30. A.M. Larina (Bukharina),Nezallyvaemoe(Moscow, 1989),333. 31. Quotedin Shelestov.Vremia AlekseiaRykova,288.

Chapter12. The Last Days 1. (Z.G.) Ordzhonikidze,0 SergoOrdzhonikidze,275. 2. RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 1, d. 143,1. 1. 3. Za industrializatsiiu,21 February,1937, 6. 4. I. Dubinskii-Mukhadze,Ordzhonikidze(Moscow. 1963), 6. 5. FrancescoBenvenuti, "Industry and Purge in the Donbass,193637," Europe-AsiaStudies,vol. 45, no. 1 (1993),61-63. 6. S.Z. Ginzburg. 0 proshlom-dliabudushchego(Moscow, 1984). 195. 7. F. Benvenuti thinks that this letter might have been discoveredin

188

IN STALIN'S SHADOW

the papersof Ordzhonikidzeby the commissioncreatedafter his death to establisha personalarchive of the deceased(such commissions,by the way, were createdafter the death of all Politburo members).See F. Benvenuti, Stakhanovismand Stalinism, 72. It is unlikely, however, that Molotov (and thus Stalin) would have attachedsuch great significance to an ordinary letter from a factory director if Ordzhonikidzehimselfhad not usedit as an argumentin his quarrelswith Stalin. 8. Bolshevik,no. 8 (1937),38-39. 9. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 983, I. 1. lO. Kontinent, no. 2 (1992),229. 11. (Z.G.) Ordzhonikidze,0 SergoOrdzhnnikidze,274. 12. Za industrializatsiiu, 21 February,1937,8. 13. Ibid., 20 February,1937,7. 14. RGAE, f. 7297, d. 211, 11.147-57 15. (Z.G.) Ordzhonikidze,0 SergoOrdzhonikidze,278-79. 16. Za industrializatsiiu, 21 February,1937, 6. 17. Dubinskii-Mukhadze,Ordzhonikidze,6. 18. Roy Medvedev provides similar evidence in his book. See Roy Medvedev,0 Stalinei stalinizme(Moscow, 1990),357. 19. Ginzburg, 0 gibeli SergoOrdzhonikidze,92-93. 20. A. Bek, Novoenaznachenie(Moscow, 1988), 35. 21. (Z.G.) Ordzhonikidze,0 SergoOrdzhonikidze,181. 22. Medvedev,0 Stalinei stalinizme,358.

Chapter 13 1. Quotedin B. Pi!' niak, Rasplesnutoevremia (Moscow, 1990), 582. Sotsialisticheskiivestnik, no. 5 (1937), 16. 3. L.D. Trotsky, Stalin, vol. 2: 252. 4. For Z.G. Ordzhonikidze'snote concerningthe circumstancesof preparing the selectedarticles and speechesof G.K. Ordzhonikidzefor publication, and galley-proofs of the various introductions, see RTsKhIDNI, newly declassifiedmaterials. 5. See Dubinskii-Mukhadze, Ordzhonikidze, 6; Medvedev, 0 Staline i stalinizme,356-60. 6. Iu. Semenov,Nenapisannyeromany (Moscow, 1989),23,26. 7. A. Orlov, Tainaia istoriia stalinskikh prestuplenii (New York, 1983), 180-81, 187-89. 8. Ginzburg, 0 gibeli SergoOrdzhonikidze,96-97. 9. A.N. Rybakov, Strakh, bk. 2 (Moscow, 1990), 116. lO. Medvedev,0 Staline i stalinizme,357. 11. Ibid., 358. 12. Ginzburg, 0 gibeli Ordzhonikidze,96. 13. Rybakov, Strakh, 113-14. 14. (Z.G.) Ordzhonikidze,0 SergoOrdzhonikidze,68. 2. 3.

NOTES

189

15. Ibid., 194. 16. Ibid., 259. 17. Za industrializatsiiu, 20 February,1937, 5. 18. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 978, 1. 75. 19. Izvestiia TsKKPSS,no. 5 (1989),71. 20. Voprosyistorii, no. 5 (1990),54. 21. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 575, 1. 122. 22. Ibid., f. 17, op. 21, d. 2196,1.33. 23. For more information, see O. Khlevniuk, 1937-i: Stalin, NKVD i sovetskoeobshchestvo(Moscow, 1992), 196-206. 24. Sto sarok besed s Molotovym: Iz dnevnikaF. Chueva (Moscow, 1991), 191-92.

Chapter 14 1. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 984, 1. 4. 2. Bolshevik,no. 8 (1937),29. 3. Ibid., 23. 4. JA Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The SovietCommunistParly Reconsidered, 1933-1938(Cambridge,1985), 128-35. 5. GARF, f. 5446, op. 27, d. 4, 11. 135-36. 6. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 867, 11. 11-12. 7. Ibid., f. 79, op. I, d. 570, 11. 1-2. 8. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 92, d. 17, 18; GARF, f. 5446, op. 22, d. 27, 11. 230-34. For more detail, seeo. Khlevniuk and R.W. Davies, "The Role of Gosplan in Economic Decision-Making in the 1930s," Centre for Russian and EastEuropeanStudies,University of Birmingham [CREES], Discussion Papers,1993, 33-43. 9. XVII s"ezdVKP(b): Stenograficheskiiotchet (Moscow, 1934),435. 10. Getty, Origins of the Great Purges, 16-17. 11. XVII s"ezdVKP(b), 523. 12. F. Chuev, Tak govoril Kaganovich(Moscow, 1992),61. 13. GARF, f. 5446,op. 18, d. 90, 1. 6. 14. Ibid., 1. 7. 15. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 21, d. 878, 11.93,94-ob. 16. Beriia: konetskar'ery, 377-78. 17. Voprosyistorii, no. 4 (1990),81.

Conclusion 1. Alec Nove was one of the first to proposeand substantiatethis point of view. For more detail, see his latestwork, the introduction to the anthology, The Stalin Phenomenon,ed. Alec Nove (New York, 1993), 24-29.

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Index

Akulov, Ivan Alekseevich,51, 58-60 All-Union Conferenceof Managers, 46--48 Beria, Lavrenti Pavlovich,65, 105-8, 152-53 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich, 18-19, 153 repressionof, 4, 25-26 n., 31, 34 n., 40 n., 41, 70,90-91, 126-27,134-41 relationshipwith Ordzhonikidze, 100, 134-35, 137, 139, 141-42. SeealsoRight Opposition. CentralControl Commission,21, 25,28,35-37,39,42,51,58, 60 Ordzhonikidze'sactivities in, 7, 22,24,27,44,48,134 Cohen,Stephen,31 CommunistPartyof Georgia,16, 30, 121 Seealso GeorgianAffair. Conquest,Robert,7 Davies,R.W., 44, 53 Desov,GA, 27-29 Dzerzhinskii,Feliks Edmundovich, 15-17,22

Ezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 49-50, 88, 103-4 reporton enemies,95,104-5, 114,126--27,139-40 implicatedin murderof Ordzhonikidze,154 February-MarchPlenum attackson Orzhonikidzeat,34, 38, 124, 131, 133, 156, 164, 171-73 agendaof, 126--27,130, 144 For Industrialization, 58-60, 81, 171 First Five-YearPlan, 4 n., 41 n., 54, 129, 165 GeorgianAffair, 16--17,20 Getty,]. Arch, 7, 165, 169 Ginzburg,SemenZakharovich,67, 148, 154-57 Gosplan,41, 43,47,167,169 GreatChange,35, 40, 50, 71 Izvestia,64, 88, 138-39

Kaganovich,Lazar Moiseevich,20, 50,52-53,74,87,104,126--27, 139,146,151,160 Kamenev,Lev Borisovich, 22,135 relationswith Stalin and Zinoviev, 15, 18-19 191

192

INDEX

Kamenev,Lev Borisovich (continued) repressionof, 70-71, 76, 88,90, 138, 140

Nizhnii Tagil CoachFactory,90, 120-25, 132 Seealso Mariasin and Okudzhava. North CaucasusRegionalParty Committee,22-23, 46 Nusinov, I.S., 37-38 SeealsoSyrtsov.

KemerovoTrial, 111-12,129-130, 131,146,164,170 Khrushchev,Nikita Sergeevich,6, 14 n., 43, 62, 69,92 n., 146, 153-54,160,173-74 OGPU, 46-49 Kirov, SergeiMironovich, 4, 62-63, SeealsoNKVD. Okudzhava,ShalvyStepanovich,90, 66 activities in Leningrad,19, 27-29 121-24,143 relationshipwith Ordzhonikidze, SeealsoNizhnii Tagil Coach 62-67 Factory. murderof, 67 Kuibyshev,ValerianVladimirovich, ParallelAnti-SovietTrotskyist 21-22,28,41-42,47,58,74,167 Center,94-95,98,117-18,123 Party Congresses Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 10-11, 6th PartyCongress,11 14-17,20,25,28,71,92, 8th PartyCongress,18 n. 109-10 10th Party Congress,14, 39 Lominadze,Vissarion 15th Party Congress,25 n., 39,93 Vissarionovich 16th PartyCongress,19,40, 110 relationshipwith Ordzhonikidze, 17th PartyCongress,42, 62, 73, 30,69,73,172 136-38, 168 conflict with party, 31-34, 36-39 20th Party Congress,62 n., 153 repressionof, 40, 76-77 People'sCommissariatof Heavy conflict with Zaveniagin,71-75 Industry (NKTP), 8, 42, 51,58, suicideof, 76 120,133,176,178 conflicts surrounding,43, 50, 56, Magnitogorsk,70-77, 89 73,85,166 Mariasin, L.M., 90, 121-24. repressionsin, 58, 61, 78-80, 96, Seealso Nizhnii Tagil Coach Ill, 116-19,126-31,164, Factory. 173 Medvedev,Roy A., 7, 62,149, Piatakov,Georgii (Iurii) Leonidovich,7, 92-93, 123, 155-56 141,154 Mikoyan, AnastasIvanovich, 14, 20, 22,74, 105 repressionof94-101, 111-13, Molotov, ViacheslavMikhailovich 118,128-29,150 implicatedin Ordzhonikidze's as Sovnarkomchairman,41, 51, 112,165-66 death,152-53 criticism of Ordzhonikidze,47, Politburo, 4, 20-21, 23, 28, 41, 43, 52-53,91,131-32,162-64, 53-54,56,60.74,97.103,120. 166, 167, 169-70 158 moderateeconomicpolicies of, N~,56, N~,56, N~,56, 75-76, 77,82,94,98,104, 45-48,50,52,60,88-89 112,115,123,140,142,148 February-Marchplenumand, SeealsoOGPU. 126-27,145

INDEX Pravda, 58, 80-81,84-85, 89, 133,

160, 163-64

Right Deviation. Sf'eRight Opposition. Right Opposition,25-26 n., 31, 38,

40,117,134-35,138-42

Seealso Bukharin, Rykov, Syrtsov, and Tomskii. Rudzutak,Ian E., 20, 42, 58-59 Rybakov,Anatoly N., 63-64, 155-

57

Rykov, Aleksei Ivanovich, 24. 34 n., 35,40n., 41, 138-39 repessionof, 70,90,126-27,135,

140, 142

Seealso Right Opposition.

Scott,John,70 SecondFive-YearPlan, 54,120,

167-68

ShakhtyMfair, 82, 112 Shatskin,LazarAbramovich, 31-33,

36,39

ShowTrials, 41, 87, 90, 96, Ill,

117-18,138

spetsbaitingpolicy, 44, 47,71 StakhanoviteMovement,8, 78,

80

politicization of, 81-82,84, 86-

87

Stalin, IosifVissarionovich,4, 6, 18,

193

Stalin, IosifVissarionovich (continued)

conflict with Ordzhonikidze,8,

29,50,52-53,68,90-91,101, 109-11,120,125-28,130, 134-35,143-44,148-49,154, 156-58,170-73,175 and Ordzhonikidze'sdeath,149, 151, 154, 163

SupremeCouncil of the National Economy(VSNKh), 7, 22, 41,

43,46-48,135,167

Syrtsov,SergeiIvanovich, 35-37,

39,40,117.

Seealso Right Opposition.

Tomskii, Mikhail Pavlovich,41 repressionof, 40 n., 70,90, 135,

138, 140, 159-61

.SeealsoRight Opposition. Transcaucasian RegionalParty Committee,16,22-23,34-35 Trotsky, Lev Davidovich, 15-17,

19-21,93,135,152

SeealsoTrotskyist-ZinovieviteBloc. Trotskyist-ZinovieviteBloc, 25, 68,

75-76,87,94,96,103,112, 122, 139, 159

Tucker, Robert,7

Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich, 67,74,90-91,151 n. Vyshinskii, Andrei Ianuarevich,

51-54,57-58,89,96-97, 21,28,37-39,63,73,93-5,97, 114-15,138-39 101 relationshipwith Lenin, 16, 71, Zaveniagin,Avraamii Pavlovich, 110 71-75,89,143 as sole leaderof party, 18 n., Zhdanov,Andrei Aleksandrovich, 31-32,40,44-46,48-49, 58,67,103,126-27,145,151 54,75,79,94,157-58, Zinoviev, Grigorii Evseevich,16, 199 18-20,21,135 supportfor Ordzhonikidze,6-8, repressionof, 25,70-71,76,88, 90, 138 12,14-15,17-19,22,57

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Oleg V. Khlevniuk, born in 1959 and educatedat the Institute of Russian History of the RussianAcademy of Sciences,is an editor of the public affairs journal Svobodnaiamysl' (Free Thought), which supersededKommunist(Communist).the theoreticaljournal of the Communist Party. Khlevniuk is well known outsideRussiafor his book The Year 1937: Stalin, the NKVD, and SovietSociety,publishedin 1992. The author is currently revising this work for publication in The New RussianHistory Series,incorporatingnewly declassifieddocumentsmade available since its first appearance.The presentvolume is based on his study Stalin and Ordzhonikidze:Conflicts in the Politburo in the 1930s,published in Moscow in 1993. Khlevniuk is also co-editor (with Oleg V. Naumov and Lars T. Lih) of the secondvolume in Yale'sAnnals of Communism series,Stalin'sLettersto Molotov, 1925-1936(New Haven,1995). TranslatorDavid Nordlanderis a Ph.D. candidate atthe University of North Carolina, ChapelHill, where he is writing a dissertation,"Stalinism in the Soviet Far East: A History of Magadanand the Gulag, 19291941." His articles have appearedin the Russian Review and Pacific Historical Review. Serieseditor DonaldJ. Raleigh is professorof history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He is the author of Revolutionon the Volga: 1917in Saratov,and is now at work on a sequel,'The Experience of Civil War: Politics, Society, and Revolutionary Culture in Saratov, 1918-1922."ProfessorRaleigh is also editor of SovietHistorians and Perestroika: TheFirst Phase,editor and translatorof A RussianCivil War Diary: Alexis V. Babine in Saratov, and translatorand editor of E.N. Burdzhalov's RUssi(Lj. SecondRevolution:TheFebruary 1917Uprising in Petrograd. Editorial assistantKathy S. Transchelis a visiting lecturer at East Carolina University. She is completingher Ph.D. dissertationat the University of North Carolina,ChapelHill, a studyentitled "Under the Influence: Drinking, Temperance,andCultural Revolutionin Russia,1900-1932."