In Hitler’s Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past 9780755625895, 9781850431466, 9781850431589, 9780755631223

Citation preview

LIST OF

MAPS

T h e Expansion of Germany 1936-1939

4

T h e G e r m a n a n d Russian Invasions of Poland 1939

25

G e r m a n Rule i n the East 1941-1944

48

Jewish Extermination 1941-1945

67

Flights and Expulsions 1939-1946

93

PREFACE

F i f t y y e a r s a f t e r t h e o u t b r e a k o f W o r l d W a r I I , is i t t i m e to forgive the Germans? N o w that most of those w h o carried out the crimes of N a z i s m are dead, should the younger West Germans w h o constitute the majority of the Federal Republic's p o p u l a t i o n today learn to be p r o u d of their c o u n t r y rather t h a n being ashamed of it? H a v e the m e m o r i e s of Germany's t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y misdeeds been distorted by the legacy o f w a r t i m e propaganda? H a s t h e m o m e n t a r r i v e d w h e n w e should take a broader and m o r e balanced view, and accept that the evil of Nazism, terrible t h o u g h it was, did not significantly diifer f r o m other evils w h i c h have plagued o u r t r o u b l e d t i m e , f r o m t h e G u l a g A r c h i p e l a g o t o t h e k i l l i n g fields o f C a m b o d i a ? O v e r t h e past f e w years, these questions h a v e aroused a n i m p a s s i o n e d d e b a t e b o t h w i t h i n W e s t G e r m a n y a n d o u t s i d e , as a substantial n u m b e r of W e s t G e r m a n historians have argued i n various ways that the answer to all of t h e m should be "yes." This b o o k is a n a t t e m p t t o l a y o u t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i s s u e s i n t h i s s o m e t i m e s a n g r y a n d c o n v o l u t e d d i s c u s s i o n , a n d t o r e a c h as b a l a n c e d a n a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e m as p o s s i b l e . I t is n o t a p o l e m i c a l book. Polemics, though they can have a useful function i n bringing a p r o b l e m to public attention, tend to obscure the central

viii • P R E F A C E

issues i n a c o n t r o v e r s y , a n d t h e a i m o f w i n n i n g d e b a t i n g p o i n t s t o o easily leads t o a lack o f fairness a n d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h e w e a p o n s u s e d . N o r is i t a n a c c o u n t o f p e r s o n a l i t i e s , t h o u g h a c e r t a i n a m o u n t o f b a c k g r o u n d d e t a i l has b e e n p r o v i d e d o n some of the principal antagonists i n the debate. T h e purpose of t h i s b o o k is t o d i s c u s s t h e i s s u e s i n t h e l i g h t o f w h a t w e k n o w about the historical events u p o n w h i c h they touch. T o help the r e a d e r u n f a m i l i a r w i t h this c o n t r o v e r s y , i t also a t t e m p t s t o g i v e a n account o f t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t i n w h i c h t h e d e b a t e has arisen, and to point to some of the implications for G e r m a n and E u r o p e a n p o l i t i c s as t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y d r a w s t o a c l o s e . W r i t i n g a b o o k s u c h as t h i s i n v o l v e s a m e a s u r e o f m o r a l j u d g m e n t w h i c h is d i f f i c u l t f o r a n a u t h o r b o r n , as I w a s , a f t e r t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , t o a p p l y . L i k e so m a n y E u r o p e a n s o f m y g e n e r a t i o n , a n d u n l i k e so m a n y p e o p l e i n t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f m y p a r e n t s , I h a v e l i v e d a p e a c e f u l l i f e t h a t so f a r h a s b e e n f r e e o f the curse of w a r and destruction that was visited w i t h such terrible intensity u p o n Europe i n the half century before m y birth. N o t h i n g w o u l d be m o r e arrogant or facile t h a n for m e to lay d o w n m o r a l i m p e r a t i v e s for people w h o faced decisions a n d situations w i t h w h i c h , thankfully, I have never been conf r o n t e d . F o r m e , as f o r t h e r e s t o f m y g e n e r a t i o n a n d i t s s u c c e s s o r s , t h i s is h i s t o r y r a t h e r t h a n l i v i n g m e m o r y o r e x p e r i e n c e . B u t o n e o f t h e h i s t o r i a n ' s m o s t i m p o r t a n t t o o l s is h i s t o r i c a l i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e ability to b r i d g e t h e gap b e t w e e n past a n d present, a n d to l o o k at historical events i n all t h e i r c o m p l e x i t y a n d w i t h a l l t h e i r t r o u b l i n g l a c k o f finality. I n t h e d e b a t e w h i c h is t h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s b o o k , t h e e x e r c i s e o f h i s t o r i c a l i m a g i n a t i o n also, i n e v i t a b l y , b e c o m e s a n exercise i n m o r a l j u d g m e n t . W i t h all d u e consideration for t h e situation of those i n v o l v e d , theref o r e , I h a v e n o t f e l t able t o a v o i d t h e issue o f w h a t w a s t h e morally right t h i n g to do i n the circumstances of the Second W o r l d War. I like to think that I w o u l d have done w h a t was morally right myself had I been faced w i t h these circumstances. B u t I c a n n e v e r b e s u r e . T h i s b o o k , t h e r e f o r e , is n o t w r i t t e n i n a c o m b a t i v e s p i r i t . I h a v e t r i e d as f a r as p o s s i b l e t o a v o i d e x p r e s sions o f o u t r a g e or anger, t o e s c h e w v i o l e n t d e n u n c i a t i o n s o f t h e v i e w s of those w i t h w h o m I disagree, to s u m m a r i z e a n d quote t h e h i s t o r i a n s c o n c e r n e d as f u l l y a n d f a i r l y as I c a n , a n d t o s t e e r c l e a r o f s p e c u l a t i o n s as t o t h e p e r s o n a l m o t i v e s o f t h e l e a d i n g

P R E F A C E • ix

figures i n t h e d e b a t e . T h i s has n o t a l w a y s b e e n easy. B u t i f h i s t o r i a n s c a n n o t r e s p e c t e a c h o t h e r , t h e r e is l i t t l e h o p e o f t h e i r b e i n g able to respect t h e past w h i c h is t h e i r chosen subject. T h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o t h i n k a b o u t t h e issues i n v o l v e d i n t h e present controversy c a m e i n January 1987, w h e n the editors of t h e Journal of Modern History a s k e d m e t o w r i t e a r e v i e w a r t i c l e o n t h e d e b a t e . T h e a r t i c l e a p p e a r e d as " T h e N e w N a tionalism and the O l d History: Perspectives o n the W e s t Germ a n Historikerstreit f i n v o l u m e 5 9 o f t h e Journal of Modern History ( D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 7 ) , p p . 7 6 1 - 9 7 . I a m g r a t e f u l t o t h e editors for h a v i n g asked m e to w r i t e it, a n d for the care w i t h w h i c h t h e y a n d t h e i r staff w e n t t h r o u g h t h e e d i t i n g a n d p r o d u c t i o n process. P o r t i o n s o f t h a t article appear i n t h e present book, a n d I a m i n d e b t e d t o t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago Press f o r a l l o w ing m e to reproduce them. I have not changed m y m i n d o n the c e n t r a l i s s u e s s i n c e finishing t h e a r t i c l e i n J u l y 1 9 8 7 , b u t i n e v i t a b l y t h e v a s t o u t p o u r i n g o f b o o k s a n d essays i n t h e d e b a t e since t h e n has a l t e r e d m y perspectives o n t h e p r o b l e m s u n d e r discussion, b r o a d e n e d m y v i e w o n some, a n d sharpened m y focus o n others. So w h e n Professor A r n o J. M a y e r o f P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r sity suggested I t u r n t h e article i n t o a book, I w e l c o m e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to t h i n k these questions t h r o u g h again. I w o u l d like h e r e to express m y t h a n k s to h i m , a n d to m y editor at P a n t h e o n B o o k s , André S c h i f f r i n , f o r h a v i n g e n c o u r a g e d m e t o u n d e r t a k e t h e task. I a m also g r a t e f u l t o t h e f r i e n d s a n d colleagues i n B r i t a i n , t h e U n i t e d States, a n d t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f G e r m a n y w h o have kept m e supplied w i t h references and m a t e r i als—in particular to Hans-Ulrich Wehler, whose bibliographical updates have (I hope) enabled m e to take account i n this book of e v e r y t h i n g that appeared i n t h e debate u p to t h e e n d o f 1988. A n u m b e r of audiences listened patiently to m y views o n the c o n t r o v e r s y as t h e y d e v e l o p e d , a n d p r o v i d e d v a l u a b l e c r i t i cisms a n d suggestions: I a m especially g r a t e f u l i n this connection t o the G e r m a n H i s t o r y Society, the Association for the Study of G e r m a n Politics, the M a x W e b e r C e n t r e for A p p l i e d G e r m a n Studies a tthe U n i v e r s i t y of L i v e r p o o l , the U n i v e r s i t y of Exeter, the Graduate Seminar i n G e r m a n History at the University of East Anglia, the M e l l o n Seminar o n Nationalism at P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y , a n d t h e G r a d u a t e S e m i n a r i n I n t e r n a tional H i s t o r y a t t h e L o n d o n School o fEconomics. A special

x•PREFACE

w o r d o f t h a n k s goes t o M a r i e M a c t a v i s h for t y p i n g t h e m a n u script u n d e r considerable pressure of t i m e . R i c h a r d Bessel, I a n Kershaw, A r n o Mayer, and Jeremy Noakes have put m e greatly in their debt by reading the typescript o n very short notice and suggesting n u m e r o u s i m p r o v e m e n t s . T h e sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e b o o k ' s c o n t e n t s is, o f c o u r s e , m i n e . R I C H A R D J. NORWICH,

EVANS

ENGLAND

FEBRUARY

1989

C H A P T E R

O

N

E

THE B U R D E N O F GUILT

I H a l f a c e n t u r y has n o w passed since t h e o u t b r e a k o f t h e m o s t d e s t r u c t i v e w a r t h e w o r l d has e v e r k n o w n . O n Sept e m b e r 1 , 1939, G e r m a n troops i n v a d e d Poland. T h e Second W o r l d W a r h a d b e g u n . Six years later, w h e n i t w a s o v e r , h u m a n i t y b e g a n t o c o u n t t h e c o s t . S o m e 5 0 m i l l i o n p e o p l e h a d d i e d as a direct consequence of the war. U n t o l d suffering and cruelty had been deliberately visited u p o n m a n y millions m o r e w h o survived. Vast areas o f E u r o p e a n d t h e F a r East h a d b e e n devastated. I n n u m e r a b l e cities h a d b e e n r e d u c e d t o r u b b l e . T h e face of global politics had been altered b e y o n d recognition. C o u n tries had shifted their boundaries; nationalities and ethnic m i n o r i t i e s h a d c h a n g e d t h e i r d o m i c i l e , dispersed, or lost t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e sheer scale o f t h e d e v a s t a t i o n w r o u g h t b y t h e c o n f l i c t w a s a l m o s t b e y o n d c o m p r e h e n s i o n . 1 Y e t as t h e v i c t o r i o u s t r o o p s o f t h e w a r t i m e A l l i e s p i c k e d t h e i r w a y across t h e r u i n s o f defeated G e r m a n y , t h e y w e r e still shocked b y w h a t they found. O n A p r i l 4 , 1 9 4 5 , f o r e x a m p l e , as t h e F o u r t h U . S . A r m o r e d Division entered the small t o w n of Ohrdruf, near Gotha (now

4 • IN H I T L E R ' S

SHADOW

THE

BURDEN

OF GUILT • 5

i n the G e r m a n Democratic Republic), some Polish refugees led t h e m to a N a z i labor camp located just outside the t o w n . T h e c a m p guards a n d officials h a d r e c e n t l y g o n e , b u t s o m e o f t h e 1 0 , 0 0 0 m e n t h e y h a d i n c a r c e r a t e d as s l a v e l a b o r e r s r e m a i n e d . 2 As General O m a r Bradley w a l k e d w i t h fellow generals George P a t t o n a n d D w i g h t D . E i s e n h o w e r t h r o u g h t h e c a m p , h e bec a m e n u m b w i t h shock. " T h e s m e l l o f d e a t h o v e r w h e l m e d us e v e n before w e passed t h r o u g h t h e stockade," h e recalled later. " M o r e t h a n 3 , 2 0 0 n a k e d , e m a c i a t e d b o d i e s h a d b e e n flung i n t o shallow graves. O t h e r s lay i n t h e streets w h e r e t h e y h a d fallen. Lice crawled over the y e l l o w e d skin o f their sharp, bony frames." F a r t h e r o n , t h e y c a m e to a shed piled w i t h bodies, a n d a n o t h e r c o n t a i n i n g i n s t r u m e n t s o f t o r t u r e . H a r d e n e d as t h e y w e r e to death, the generals w e r e u n p r e p a r e d for this experience. P a t t o n b e c a m e physically ill. E i s e n h o w e r subsequently o r d e r e d a l l n e a r b y u n i t s t o v i s i t t h e c a m p t o see f o r t h e m s e l v e s . 3 M e a n w h i l e , o t h e r U.S. forces w e r e discovering e v e n w o r s e conditions elsewhere. A sense o f outrage spread t h r o u g h t h e A r m y . As o n e G I , A u s t r i a n - b o r n , said later, " M y f e l l o w G T s , m o s t o f t h e m A m e r i c a n b o r n , h a d n o p a r t i c u l a r f e e l i n g f o r fighting t h e G e r m a n s . T h e y also t h o u g h t t h a t a n y stories t h e y h a d r e a d i n t h e p a p e r , o r t h a t I h a d t o l d t h e m o u t o f first-hand e x p e r i e n c e w e r e e i t h e r n o t t r u e o r at least exaggerated. A n d i t d i d n o t sink i n , w h a t t h i s w a s a l l a b o u t , " h e r e c a l l e d , d e s c r i b i n g t h e i r first encounter w i t h G e r m a n atrocities, " u n t i l w e got i n t o Nord¬ h a u s e n . " H e r e , i n a series o f c a m p s used t o house 12,000 slave laborers e n g a g e d i n b u i l d i n g rocket factories, t h e y f o u n d piles o f skeletal corpses, a m i d w h i c h t h e l i v i n g w e r e still lying, w e a k , lice-ridden, starving, and apathetic. " M a n y of the boys I a m talking about n o w , " recalled another G I present at t h e scene, " — t h e s e w e r e t o u g h soldiers, these w e r e c o m b a t m e n w h o h a d been all the w a y through o n the invasion—were i l land vomiting, just at the sight o f t h i s . " 4 If public o p i n i o n f o u n d such accounts h a r d to believe,5 the limits o funderstanding were pushed even further b y the revelations that soon came f r o m other, m u c h bigger camps. As c o n d i t i o n s i n c e n t e r s s u c h as A u s c h w i t z a n d B e l s e n , l i b e r a t e d by Allied troops, b e c a m e k n o w n , it g r e w clear that the Germans had been engaged i n a deliberate p r o g r a m of extermination, affecting t o some extent m a n y different groups, f r o m

6 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

criminals and prostitutes to Gypsies and Jehovah's Witnesses, but applied most systematically and comprehensively to Europe's Jews. F r o m all over occupied E u r o p e , millions of J e w s h a d b e e n s h i p p e d off t o t h e camps a n d gassed t o d e a t h i n conditions of unspeakable brutality and i n h u m a n i t y . 6 Some had been subjected to cruel medical experiments by camp doctors, i n j e c t e d w i t h f a t a l diseases, f r o z e n , p u t i n t o p r e s s u r e c h a m b e r s , o r o t h e r w i s e u s e d as g u i n e a p i g s i n a c u t e l y p a i n f u l operations, w i t h o u t benefit of anaesthetics, a n d w i t h o u t any necessity for m e d i c a l research.7 O t h e r s h a d b e e n effectively w o r k e d t o d e a t h as s l a v e l a b o r e r s . 8 A l t o g e t h e r , w h e n r e c o r d s could be traced, it emerged that b e t w e e n 5 and 6 million Jews had been deliberately m u r d e r e d by the Nazis. Such was the e n o r m i t y o f this c r i m e t h a t m a n y refused t o believe i t at t h e t i m e . E v e n w h i l e i t w a s o c c u r r i n g , J e w i s h a g e n c i e s o u t s i d e occ u p i e d E u r o p e , d e s p i t e b e i n g p r e s e n t e d w i t h e y e w i t n e s s accounts, f o u n d it h a r d to accept.9 Gradually, over t h e years, t h e contours a n d dimensions of this massive history of cruelty, m u r d e r , a n d genocide have b e c o m e clearer. Those w h o s u r v i v e d h a v e been persuaded to r e c o r d t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s f o r p o s t e r i t y , o n t a p e , o n film, o r i n w r i t i n g . M a j o r collections o f this m a t e r i a l n o w exist i n several countries; s o m e o f i t has b e e n used i n C l a u d e L a n z m a n n ' s epic film Shoah. A g r e a t d e a l o f i t h a s b e e n m a d e a v a i l a b l e i n d o c u m e n t a r y c o l l e c t i o n s a n d c o m p i l a t i o n s . 1 0 J u s t as i m p o r t a n t , h o w e v e r , is t h e f a c t t h a t i n t h e final p h a s e s o f t h e w a r , A l l i e d f o r c e s m a n a g e d to secure vast collections of Nazi, G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t , a n d m i l i t a r y records. Several tons o f this official paperw o r k w e r e s h i p p e d t o t h e U n i t e d States. T e a m s o f researchers set t o w o r k t o t r y a n d d e l i n e a t e t h e o u t l i n e s a n d details o f N a z i crimes and identify those responsible for t h e m . I n the N u r e m berg Trials, h e l d i n 1946, shortly after the e n d of the w a r , t h e s u r v i v i n g l e a d i n g figures i n t h e r e g i m e w e r e c h a r g e d w i t h a w i d e range o f crimes against peace a n d h u m a n i t y . T h e evid e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e c o u r t s u b s e q u e n t l y filled m a n y s t o u t v o l u m e s . 1 1 S c o r e s o f s m a l l e r t r i a l s o f less p r o m i n e n t w a r c r i m i n a l s w e r e also h e l d . F i n a l l y , h i s t o r i a n s b e g a n t o g a i n access n o t o n l y t o t h e c a p t u r e d d o c u m e n t s , b u t also t o t h e v a s t l y g r e a t e r quantities of d o c u m e n t a t i o n lying i n G e r m a n archives, i n gove r n m e n t buildings, or i n p r i v a t e possession.12

THE

BURDEN

OF GUILT - 7

T h i s m a s s o f d o c u m e n t a r y a n d e y e w i t n e s s e v i d e n c e h a s est a b l i s h e d t h e n a t u r e a n d scale o f N a z i c r i m e s b e y o n d a n y reasonable doubt. These crimes had begun even before the w a r had started. Nazism's i m m e d i a t e roots lay i n the a f t e r m a t h of G e r m a n defeat i n the First W o r l d W a r . Widespread feelings of aggrieved national pride were nourished by the compromises a n d failures of t h e W e i m a r Republic, above all i n t h e chaos of the postwar inflation. Falling quickly under the dominance o f A d o l f H i t l e r , t h e N a t i o n a l Socialist, o r N a z i , m o v e m e n t attempted a violent takeover of the provincial government in Bavaria i n 1923. I t was repulsed. B u t t e n years later, o n January 30, 1933, H i t l e r was appointed chancellor a n d head of governm e n t i n Berlin. His m o v e m e n t had gained mass support d u r i n g t h e years of t h e economic Depression, starting i n 1929. B y 1932, w i t h 37 percent of the votes, representing the support of o v e r 13 m i l l i o n a d u l t G e r m a n s , i t w a s b y far t h e largest p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t i n the country. It differed f r o m aconventional political p a r t y i n several respects. I t w a n t e d t h e destruction of dem o c r a c y a n d its r e p l a c e m e n t b y a dictatorship u n d e r H i t l e r . I t p r e a c h e d a gospel o f h a t r e d against t h e republic, t h e trade u n i o n s , socialists, pacifists, C o m m u n i s t s , a n d J e w s . I t b a c k e d t h i s u p w i t h t h e s t r o n g - a r m tactics o f its p a r a m i l i t a r y w i n g , t h e uniformed, brown-shirted storm troopers w h o broke up opponents' meetings and attacked, and sometimes m u r d e r e d , political e n e m i e s . 1 3 H i t l e r m a y h a v e b e e n a p p o i n t e d chancellor legally i n 1933. B u t t h e processes by w h i c h t h e Nazis t h e n p r o c e e d e d to establish their p o w e r w e r e o f t e n h i g h l y illegal. W h e n t h e Nazis took p o w e r i n Prussia (the largest state i n Germ a n y , c o v e r i n g o v e r h a l f its area) b y a d e c r e e o f F e b r u a r y 6 , 1933, t h e y violated t h e r u l i n g of t h e G e r m a n S u p r e m e C o u r t over t h e legitimate c o n t r o l of the g o v e r n m e n t i n Prussia, w h i c h still f o r m a l l y b e l o n g e d to t h e l e f t - w i n g Social D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y , illegally r e m o v e d f r o m office b y a c o n s e r v a t i v e c o u p t h e p r e v i ous year. M a n y aspects of t h e Nazis' arrest a n d m a l t r e a t m e n t of t h e i r o p p o n e n t s i n e a r l y 1933 w e r e t h u s i l l e g a l i n m o r e senses than one.14 O n c e installed i n government, the Nazis quickly outmaneuv e r e d their conservative coalition partners and established a one-party dictatorship. T h e y called it the T h i r d Reich and pred i c t e d i t w o u l d last f o r a t h o u s a n d years, l i k e its m e d i e v a l p r e d e -

8 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

cessor. N o n - N a z i o r g a n i z a t i o n s (apart f r o m t h e churches) w e r e banned. Thousands of opponents of the Nazis were t h r o w n into concentration camps, w h e r e they w e r e brutally mishandled; m a n y w e r e s u m m a r i l y executed. T h e Nazis i m m e d i a t e l y set about i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e i r anti-Semitic policies. A boycott o f Jewish businesses was staged i n 1933. A c c o r d i n g to t h e 1935 N u r e m b e r g Laws, Jews w e r e not allowed t om a r r y Gentiles. T h e y w e r e effectively r e m o v e d f r o m their jobs and increasingly isolated f r o m t h e rest of G e r m a n society.15 A b o v e all, H i t l e r and his f e l l o w Nazis began p r e p a r i n g for w a r . T h e y t o o k G e r m a n y out of the League of Nations—the predecessor of the presentday U n i t e d N a t i o n s — a n d began t o r e a r m . I n 1936, t h e y r e m i l i t a r i z e d the R h i n e l a n d . I n 1938, G e r m a n troops m a r c h e d into Austria. T h e country was incorporated into the T h i r d Reich w i t h o u t resistance. L a t e r t h e s a m e year, i n t h e M u n i c h A g r e e m e n t , B r i t a i n and France, w h o w e r e n o w expressing concern about H i t l e r ' s plans, accepted t h e forcible cession of a large part of Czechoslovakia t o Germany. This was the Sudetenland, h o m e o f a substantial German-speaking population. I n the spring of 1939, t h e Nazis effectively took over t h e rest of Czechoslovakia. T h e r e had l o n g been international reservations about the failure of the T r e a t y of Versailles, after W o r l d W a r I , t o a g r e e t o n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r t h e G e r m a n s . So B r i t a i n a n d F r a n c e h a d so f a r a c c e p t e d N a z i e x p a n s i o n i s m b e c a u s e i t m a i n l y i n v o l v e d a n n e x i n g G e r m a n - s p e a k i n g areas w h i c h h a d at o n e stage or a n o t h e r s h o w n s o m e e n t h u s i a s m f o r this step. N o w , h o w e v e r , it was becoming clear that H i t l e r was after non-Germ a n l a n d s as w e l l . 1 6 W h e n t h e Nazis i n v a d e d P o l a n d i n September 1939, B r i t a i n a n d F r a n c e t h e r e f o r e d e c l a r e d w a r . T h e r e w a s , i t is t r u e , r e l a tively little t h e y could do to h e l p t h e Poles. S h o r t l y before, o n A u g u s t 23, H i t l e r h a d reached a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h Russian dictator Josef Stalin. This was the Nazi-Soviet Pact, a nonaggression treaty w h i c h p r o v i d e d that the Soviets w o u l d take over the eastern part of Poland w h i l e the Germans annexed the western p o r t i o n . B o t h sides n o w o c c u p i e d t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e parts o f t h e country, and an uneasy border b e t w e e n the t w o was agreed to. W i t h the East secure, the G e r m a n s n o w t u r n e d to the West, and i n a s e r i e s o f l i g h t n i n g a t t a c k s (Blitzkriege) i n 1 9 4 0 , c o n q u e r e d F r a n c e , B e l g i u m , H o l l a n d , D e n m a r k , a n d N o r w a y . H a v i n g es-

THE

BURDEN

OF GUILT - 9

tablished d o m i n a t i o n i n the West, Hitler t u r n e d again to the East. O n J u n e 2 2 , 1 9 4 1 , G e r m a n A r m y units l a u n c h e d a n all-out assault o n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , i n " O p e r a t i o n Barbarossa," w h i c h d r o v e b a c k t h e R u s s i a n s a n d i n f l i c t e d h e a v y losses. T h e t e r r a i n p r o v e d t o o vast, t h e Soviet resistance too s t u b b o r n , a n d Russian r e s o u r c e s t o o d e e p f o r t h e Blitzkrieg s t r a t e g y t o s u c c e e d t h i s time. I n the w i n t e r of 1941-42 and the following spring, Germ a n troops became bogged d o w n ; and b y the next winter, above all i n t h e battle of Stalingrad, t h e y began to suffer serious reverses. I n t h e W e s t , t h e B r i t i s h w e r e h o l d i n g o u t against N a z i b o m b i n g raids and, w i t h increasing U.S. help, increased t h e i r w a r p r o d u c t i o n a n d m a i n t a i n e d their supplies. I n D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 1 , H i t l e r d e c l a r e d w a r o n t h e U n i t e d States. B e f o r e l o n g , A m e r i c a n resources w e r e b e g i n n i n g t o tilt the balance decisively against t h e G e r m a n s a n d t h e i r allies, n o t a b l y t h e Italians, w h o defected i n 1943. A n d G e r m a n defeats i n N o r t h A f r i c a h a d n o w opened the w a y for the invasion of Sicily.17 T h e Nazis w e r e m e a n w h i l e i m p l e m e n t i n g increasingly radical policies o f genocide a n d e x t e r m i n a t i o n . F r o m January 1940, they had been engaged i n the mass m u r d e r of the inmates o f m e n t a l hospitals i n G e r m a n y itself. T h i s " e u t h a n a s i a p r o g r a m " was temporarily halted, reduced t o smaller dimensions, and forced u n d e r g r o u n d by the protests of the Catholic C h u r c h . I n Poland, following the Nazi invasion, Jews w e r e herded into ghettos, w h e r e conditions became increasingly harsh. W h e n G e r m a n troops e n t e r e d Russia i n 1941, t h e y w e r e f o l l o w e d by d e a t h squads, p a r t o f H i m m l e r ' s b l a c k - u n i f o r m e d SS. T h e s e w e r e t h e s o - c a l l e d Einsatzgruppen, u p t o o n e t h o u s a n d s t r o n g , w h o n o w e m b a r k e d u p o n mass executions of hundreds of t h o u s a n d s o f J e w s , p o s s i b l y a s m a n y as 2 m i l l i o n i n a l l . L a t e r o n i n the same year the " F i n a l Solution" was extended to the w h o l e o f G e r m a n - o c c u p i e d E u r o p e . P l a n s w e r e l a i d t o set u p t h e extermination machinery, and deportations began i n the a u t u m n . F r o m D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 1 , k i l l i n g operations began at C h e l m n o , i n P o l a n d , a n d b y t h e spring of 1942 a n u m b e r o f special e x t e r m i n a t i o n c a m p s w e r e i n f u l l s w i n g , systematically gassing t o d e a t h trainloads o fJews transported f r o m all over Europe, a m i d scenes o f appalling c r u e l t y a n d i n h u m a n i t y . T h e policy of genocide c o n t i n u e d u n i n t e r r u p t e d almost until the victorious Russians w e r e a t t h e c a m p gates. I n t h e chaos o f e v a c u a t i o n ,

1 0 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

thousands m o r e prisoners died, or w e r e killed, o n the "death marches" of the surviving c a m p inmates away f r o m the advancing Red A r m y . As British, American, and other Allied troops c a m e f r o m the W e s t following the N o r m a n d y landings i n 1944, a n d t h e i r S o v i e t allies e n t e r e d G e r m a n y f r o m t h e East, i t was above all the discovery of the concentration camps that d a m n e d the G e r m a n s i n their eyes a n d convinced t h e m that this was n o o r d i n a r y w a r that t h e y h a d b e e n fighting.18

II I n t h e l a s t m o n t h s o f t h e w a r a n d t h e first m o n t h s o f peace, the A m e r i c a n , British, a n d Soviet leaders m e t w i t h their allies t o discuss w h a t s h o u l d b e d o n e t o r e a c h a l a s t i n g p e a c e settlement. T h e y decided that the eastern boundary of Germ a n y should be m o v e d westward, and the G e r m a n population l e f t b e h i n d i t i n t h e E a s t s h o u l d b e d e p o r t e d t o t h e o t h e r side. Millions of ethnic Germans were t h r o w n out of their homes and f o r c i b l y d e p o r t e d f r o m R u s s i a a n d P o l a n d , as w e l l as f r o m Y u g o slavia, Czechoslovakia, a n d o t h e r parts o f E a s t e r n E u r o p e ; large numbers of t h e m w e r e maltreated, mishandled, or m u r d e r e d i n the process.19 W h a t r e m a i n e d of G e r m a n y was divided into four zones of occupation. B y 1949, the Soviet zone h a d b e c o m e the G e r m a n D e m o c r a t i c Republic (East G e r m a n y ) a n d t h e t h r e e western zones the Federal Republic of G e r m a n y (West Germany). T h e old capital, Berlin, w h i c h was situated r o u g h l y i n t h e c e n t e r of t h e Soviet zone, was d i v i d e d i n t o f o u r sectors. A n a t t e m p t by the Soviets to force the W e s t e r n Allies out i n 1948 was foiled by t h e " B e r l i n airlift," i n w h i c h essential supplies w e r e flown i n b y p l a n e . I n 1 9 6 1 , t h e E a s t G e r m a n s w a l l e d o f f West Berlin, thus completing the isolation of the G e r m a n D e m ocratic R e p u b l i c b e g u n b y t h e sealing o f its b o r d e r w i t h t h e W e s t i n 1 9 5 2 . S o m e 2 . 2 m i l l i o n E a s t G e r m a n s h a d fled t o t h e W e s t b e f o r e t h i s e v e n t ; n o w t h e flow w a s r e d u c e d t o a t r i c k l e . East G e r m a n s w h o c o n t i n u e d to t r y to escape the C o m m u n i s t dictatorship n o w faced bullets and minefields i f they attempted t o cross t h e b o r d e r i l l e g a l l y . 2 0 I n the i m m e d i a t e postwar years, G e r m a n s w e r e c o n s u m e d by the needs of survival and reconstruction. But the rift i n

THE

BURDEN

OF GUILT

-11

r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d i t s former W e s t e r n a l l i e s i n t h e fight a g a i n s t H i t l e r , w h i c h r e a c h e d a p e a k i n t h e B e r l i n a i r l i f t a n d q u i c k l y s p r e a d t o o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l flashpoints, began to change W e s t e r n policy. A f t e r the war, extensive trials of w a r criminals, denazification, a n d reeducation h a d a i m e d t o e l i m i n a t e t h e e v i l o f N a z i s m a n d its a d h e r e n t s f r o m p u b l i c l i f e i n t h e w e s t e r n z o n e s as w e l l as i n t h e E a s t . A s t h e emerging Cold W a r began to m a k e it m o r e important to prop u p W e s t G e r m a n y a n d t u r n i t i n t o a b u l w a r k against t h e perceived threat o f Soviet C o m m u n i s m , priorities started t o change. M o n e y was poured into West G e r m a n y under the Marshall Plan. F o r m e r Nazis a n d w a r criminals w e r e n o w g i v e n remittance o n their sentences or let off prosecution altogether. A t t e m p t s to pursue N a z i criminals not yet brought to justice w e r e abandoned or shelved.21 T h e W e s t e r n Allies gave strong support to the policies of the elected W e s t G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t led b y Christian Democratic politician Konrad Adenauer, w h i c h h e l d office t h r o u g h t h e 1950s a n d , u n d e r A d e n a u e r ' s successors L u d w i g E r h a r d a n d K u r t G e o r g K i e s i n g e r , all t h e w a y u p to 1969. D u r i n g these years, W e s t G e r m a n y n o t o n l y recovered f r o m w a r t i m e d a m a g e a n d t h e p o s t w a r crisis, b u t b e c a m e o n e o f t h e world's richest and most prosperous nations. T h e "economic miracle" gave the W e s t G e r m a n economy an enviable stability a n d s t r e n g t h . Y e t this w a s a c h i e v e d n o t least o n t h e basis o f t r y i n g t o f o r g e t a b o u t t h e past. V e r y l i t t l e w a s said a b o u t N a z i s m . N e x t t o n o t h i n g w a s t a u g h t a b o u t i t i n t h e schools. T h e N a z i a f f i l i a t i o n s o f m a j o r figures i n t h e e c o n o m y w e r e n e v e r m e n t i o n e d . E v e n i n politics, there was n o great stigma attached t o a N a z i b a c k g r o u n d , so l o n g as t h i s d i d n o t b e c o m e t h e e m b a r rassing object of public debate. T h e C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c heg e m o n y of the A d e n a u e r years sought to u n i t e W e s t G e r m a n s o n t h e basis o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l , C h r i s t i a n , c o n s e r v a t i v e v a l u e s w h i c h it believed the Nazis had overturned. Critical enquiry i n t o t h e G e r m a n past was discouraged.22 N a z i s m was r e g a r d e d as a n a c c i d e n t , a c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e w e a k n e s s e s o f m o d e r n d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e i r e x p l o i t a t i o n b y t h e u n i q u e , d e m o n i c gen i u s o f H i t l e r . H i t l e r w a s p o r t r a y e d as a d e t e r m i n e d f a n a t i c , w h o s e ideas w e r e m o r e A u s t r i a n or E u r o p e a n t h a n G e r m a n , and w h o p l a n n e d f r o m the start to launch a w o r l d w a r and

1 2 • IN H I T L E R ' S

SHADOW

exterminate the Jews. T h e enormities of Nazism's crimes w e r e admitted, and denounced, but they w e r e attributed mainly to H i t l e r h i m s e l f , w h o i n t u r n w a s p r e s e n t e d as t h e e s s e n c e o f a thoroughly m o d e r n dictator. Extensive reparations w e r e m a d e t o I s r a e l a s p a r t o f t h e Wiedergutmachung ( " p u t t i n g t h i n g s r i g h t " ) p r o c e s s , b u t t h i s s e r v e d m o r e as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r G e r m a n s e l f - e x a m i n a t i o n t h a n as a s p u r t o i t . 2 3 I f H i t l e r ' s r e g i m e w a s c o m p a r a b l e i n this v i e w t o a n y t h i n g at all, i t w a s t o t h a t o t h e r " t o t a l i t a r i a n " state, Stalinist Russia.24 B u t opinions w e r e divided o n this point. O n e of the central problems of maintaining the theory that Nazism and Stalinism were t w o sides o f t h e s a m e " t o t a l i t a r i a n " c o i n l a y i n t h e fact t h a t n o serious c o m m e n t a t o r a tthis t i m e was p r e p a r e d to argue that Hitler's genocidal anti-Semitism had any real counterpart anyw h e r e else i n t h e w o r l d . W e s t G e r m a n s w e r e p r e p a r e d t o denounce the attempted extermination of the Jews, and all the horrors that w e n t w i t h the n a m e " A u s c h w i t z . " B u t this served t o s o m e e x t e n t as a m e a n s o f p u t t i n g o f f c o n t e m p l a t i n g N a z i s m ' s lesser crimes, w h i c h h a d e i t h e r b e e n c o m m i t t e d , o f t e n w i t h c o n s e r v a t i v e c o m p l i c i t y , t h r o u g h o u t t h e T h i r d Reich's existence, or been carried o n outside the e x t e r m i n a t i o n camps, i n the rest o f occupied E u r o p e , d u r i n g t h e w a r . T h e r e was little m e n t i o n of the "euthanasia program," for example, while the G e r m a n A r m y was portrayed i n the writings of the t i m e mostly as a n h o n o r a b l e m i l i t a r y f o r c e c o m p o s e d o f d e c e n t s o l d i e r s w h o had had little to do w i t h N a z i s m . 2 5 I n this w a y , conservatives i n t h e p o s t w a r y e a r s s o u g h t t o r e s c u e a d e g r e e o f n a t i o n a l selfrespect w h i c h t h e G e r m a n s c o u l d use i n t h e process o f reconstruction. M e a n w h i l e , East Germany's C o m m u n i s t r e g i m e and its historians faced u p t o t h e N a z i past b y i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h t h e C o m m u n i s t resistance to N a z i s m , w h o s e dimensions a n d i m p o r tance, t h o u g h considerable, they greatly overestimated. W a r memorials and m u s e u m s i n the East and literature published t h e r e t e n d e d t o suggest t h a t N a z i s m ' s c r i m e s h a d b e e n c o m m i t t e d b y t h o s e w h o l i v e d i n t h e w e s t , o r h a d fled t h e r e d u r i n g t h e period before the building of the Berlin Wall i n 1961. B y t h e second h a l f o f t h e 1960s, t h e r e w e r e signs t h a t t h i s p o s t w a r e r a w a s c o m i n g t o a close. A n e w g e n e r a t i o n o f W e s t G e r m a n s was g r o w i n g up. C o n f r o n t e d w i t h a w a l l o f silence f r o m t h e i r e l d e r s , t h e y w a n t e d t o find o u t f o r t h e m s e l v e s t h e

THE

BURDEN

OF GUILT - 1 3

t r u t h a b o u t t h e N a z i past. N e i t h e r t h e y n o r t h e y o u n g u n i v e r sity historians a n d teachers w h o s y m p a t h i z e d w i t h t h e m w e r e willing to be fobbed off w i t h references to the demonic genius of Hitler, or by morally v e h e m e n t but intellectually vacuous denunciations of A u s c h w i t z . T h i s was one of the sources o f t e n s i o n t h a t f u e l e d t h e s t u d e n t r a d i c a l i s m o f 1968. B u t i t also reflected a m o r e general change of m o o d i n West G e r m a n y . Already i n 1966 the conservative g o v e r n m e n t had been replaced b y a " G r a n d C o a l i t i o n " i n w h i c h t h e Social D e m o c r a t s c a m e i n t o o f f i c e f o r t h e first t i m e . F r o m 1 9 6 9 o n w a r d , u n d e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p first o f W i l l y B r a n d t a n d t h e n o f H e l m u t S c h m i d t , t h e Social D e m o c r a t s r u l e d t h e F e d e r a l Republic i n coalition w i t h the small, liberal F r e e D e m o c r a t i c Party, a n d the conservative Christian Democrats w e r e i n opposition. This change of p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p w a s a c c o m p a n i e d , as s o m e t i m e s h a p p e n s , b y f a r - r e a c h i n g c h a n g e s i n i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e as w e l l . F o l l o w i n g W i l l y Brandt's plea that t h e G e r m a n s should "dare m o r e democracy," historians, publicists, a n d teachers began to take the business o f m a s t e r i n g t h e past m u c h m o r e seriously.26 T h e signal for a m o r e d e t e r m i n e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the G e r m a n p a s t h a d a l r e a d y b e e n g i v e n a t t h e t r i a l o f l e a d i n g SS m a n A d o l f E i c h m a n n i n Israel i n 1960 a n d at t h e A u s c h w i t z Trials i n G e r m a n y i n 1964. N e w sources w e r e b e c o m i n g available i n c l u d i n g the captured N a z i documents, n o w r e t u r n e d to G e r m a n y , thus m a k i n g g e n u i n e a n d serious research m u c h easier t h a n i n t h e i m m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h o f t h e w a r . B y the 1970s, n u m e r o u s m a j o r scholarly studies w e r e appearing w h i c h left n o d o u b t a b o u t t h e scale a n d scope o f N a z i c r i m e s : studies of N a z i foreign policy and of the e x t e r m i n a t i o n camps, the seizure of power, the suppression of opposition, and the complicity of t h e conservative elites i n t h e early years of t h e T h i r d Reich. Younger historians vigorously attacked the previous conc e n t r a t i o n o n H i t l e r as a u n i q u e , d e m o n i c i n d i v i d u a l w h o h a d p l a n n e d e v e r y t h i n g f r o m t h e start. Instead, t h e historians generally associated w i t h this "Social-liberal" W e s t G e r m a n r e g i m e i n the 1970s traced back the origins of N a z i s m deep i n t o the G e r m a n past, t o t h e m i l i t a r i s m o f Prussia, t h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m of Bismarck, the adventurism of W i l h e l m I I ; to the anti-Semitic political parties of pre-1914 years; to the absence of democracy i n G e r m a n y before 1918. " M o r e d e m o c r a c y " i n G e r m a n his-

1 4 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

tory, it was argued, might have helped prevent the reversion to a dictatorship i n 1933.27 I n t h e process o f c o m i n g t o t e r m s w i t h t h e N a z i past, G e r m a n p o l i t i c i a n s also b e g a n t o o v e r c o m e o l d h e s i t a t i o n s a n d taboos. D u r i n g t h e C o l d W a r o f t h e 1950s a n d early 1960s, t h e conservatives, encouraged by Washington, had been adamant i n refusing to recognize the legitimacy either of the division of G e r m a n y or o f t h e b o u n d a r y changes b r o u g h t about at t h e e n d of t h e w a r . N o w , h o w e v e r , Social D e m o c r a t i c Chancellor W i l l y B r a n d t signed a series o f a g r e e m e n t s w i t h t h e Soviet-bloc c o u n tries w h i c h helped reduce tension i n C e n t r a l E u r o p e a n d eased the pressure o n W e s t Berlin. T h e price w h i c h he paid lay not o n l y i n a tacit a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e n e w m a p o f E u r o p e ; i t l a y also in an explicit acknowledgment of the b u r d e n of Germany's guilt. I n a f a m o u s gesture, B r a n d t fell t o his knees at t h e m e m o r i a l t o t h e J e w i s h v i c t i m s o f t h e W a r s a w g h e t t o i n P o l a n d , a n act w h i c h was w i d e l y understood to symbolize Germany's obeisance b e f o r e its historical v i c t i m s . 2 8 B a c k i n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b lic, n e w s p a p e r s , m a g a z i n e s , r a d i o , a n d t e l e v i s i o n , a l l c o m p e t e d to b r i n g the crimes of N a z i s m before their audience. As the students o f 1968 b e c a m e t h e teachers o f t h e 1970s, serious a n d h o n e s t t r e a t m e n t o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h i n G e r m a n schools a n d u n i v e r s i t i e s b e c a m e m o r e usual. O f course, this process h a d its l i m i t s . M a n y w a r c r i m i n a l s still w e n t u n p u n i s h e d . M a n y exNazis r e m a i n e d i n positions of p o w e r and authority. M a n y w r i t ers a n d historians resisted t h e n e w m o o d o f ruthless c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e G e r m a n past. B u t o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f such a m o o d at t h e t i m e , t h e r e can be n o serious d o u b t . 2 9

Ill I n 1 9 8 3 , G e r m a n s m a r k e d t h e fiftieth a n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e N a z i s e i z u r e o f p o w e r w i t h a n o v e r w h e l m i n g flood o f b o o k s , n e w s p a p e r articles, m a g a z i n e series, t e l e v i s i o n p r o g r a m s , e x h i bitions, and conferences.30 Rarely can a historical event of such negative significance h a v e b e e n g i v e n such widespread publicity. Y e t voices w e r e n o w b e g i n n i n g to be raised d o u b t i n g t h e w i s d o m o f a l l t h i s . A s so o f t e n , i s o l a t e d f o r e r u n n e r s h a d a l r e a d y m a d e themselves heard. I n 1978, a m a j o r controversy h a d been

THE

BURDEN

OF GUILT

-15

c a u s e d b y t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f History of the Germans b y H e l l ¬ m u t D i w a l d , professor of m e d i e v a l h i s t o r y at E r l a n g e n U n i v e r sity.31 D i w a l d a r g u e d t h a t t h e G e r m a n s ' past h a d b e e n " m o r a l l y disqualified" since 1945, "devalued, destroyed, a n d t a k e n a w a y f r o m t h e m . " 3 2 H e sought to restore i ti n a massive, popular h i s t o r y t h a t b e g a n w i t h t h e p r e s e n t a n d w o r k e d its w a y back t h r o u g h t h e past, e n d i n g w i t h t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e H o l y R o m a n E m p i r e of the G e r m a n Nation, the original "thousandyear Reich," i n 919. T h a t the book w o r k e d back f r o m w h a t was, implicitly, a defeated and disgraced present to a glorious and f a m o u s past, w a s n o t t h e least o f its p r o b l e m s . H o s t i l e c o m m e n t was aroused above all by t h e fact that w h i l e D i w a l d w r o t e a great deal about the brutal expulsion of the G e r m a n population f r o m E a s t e r n E u r o p e at t h e e n d o f t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , h e wasted little m o r e t h a n t w o pages o n t h e crimes and atrocities p e r p e t r a t e d b y t h e Nazis, above all against t h e Jews. A m i d w i d e s p r e a d calls f o r t h e b o o k t o b e p u l p e d , t h e p u b l i s h e r s p e r s u a d e d D i w a l d t o r e w r i t e t h e o f f e n d i n g p a g e s . T h e b o o k is s t i l l i n p r i n t , b u t i t s r e p u t a t i o n a m o n g s e r i o u s h i s t o r i a n s is n i l . E v e n conservatives w e r e shocked by the attempt to m i n i m i z e the significance of A u s c h w i t z , a n d t h e conservative daily newspap e r Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung p r i n t e d a r e v i e w b y K a r l O t m a r v o n A r e t i n , a historian n o t k n o w n for his political radic a l i s m , w h i c h d e s c r i b e d t h e b o o k as " c o n f u s e d a n d s t u p i d . " 3 3 D i w a l d was u n f o r t u n a t e i n his t i m i n g . A f e w years later, his r e c e p t i o n m i g h t h a v e b e e n v e r y d i f f e r e n t . F o r i n 1 9 8 2 t h e Social-liberal era c a m e to an end. T h e F r e e Democratic Party switched back to f o r m a coalition w i t h the conservative Christ i a n D e m o c r a t s , a n d H e l m u t S c h m i d t w a s r e p l a c e d as c h a n c e l l o r b y H e l m u t K o h l . W i t h t h e electorate's seal o f a p p r o v a l i n 1983, c o n f i r m e d i n t h e elections of 1987, t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t settled d o w n to a prolonged period i n power, backed by the defeat o f t h e Social D e m o c r a t s i n a n u m b e r o f p r o v i n c i a l elections. As h a d h a p p e n e d a decade and a half before, t h e n e w change i n political climate was accompanied by a change o f i n t e l l e c t u a l m o o d . E n c o u r a g e d b y t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t , its p u b l i c i t y m a c h i n e , a n d its a p p o i n t m e n t s p o l i c y , c o n s e r v a t i v e intellectuals n o w began to seize t h e i n i t i a t i v e back f r o m the l i b e r a l s a n d S o c i a l D e m o c r a t s . T h i s w a s t h e s o - c a l l e d Tendenz¬ wende, t h e " c h a n g e o f t a c k " i n w h i c h t h e a c h i e v e m e n t s o f t h e

1 6 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

1970s w e r e to be denied and reversed o n all fronts. S p u r r e d o n by the n e w note of patriotism struck by the Reagan presidency i n t h e U n i t e d States, C h a n c e l l o r K o h l ' s g o v e r n m e n t n o w b e g a n to strike a p a t r i o t i c c h o r d itself. T h e m o m e n t for a renewal of G e r m a n patriotism was opport u n e . T h e s h a r p d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n E a s t - W e s t r e l a t i o n s w h i c h accompanied the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the "evil e m p i r e " speech of President Ronald Reagan meant that, for the N A T O allies, s t r e n g t h e n i n g W e s t G e r m a n y ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o stand u p to the East became m o r e important. T h e W e s t Germ a n A r m y h a d to be g i v e n back p r i d e i n its t r a d i t i o n a n d confid e n c e i n its m i s s i o n i n o r d e r t o h e l p i t c o n f r o n t t h e East G e r m a n forces across t h e C o m m u n i s t b o r d e r . T h e W e s t G e r m a n s n o w h a d t o b e assured t h a t t h e y w e r e t r u s t e d allies. F o r b o t h the A m e r i c a n and the W e s t G e r m a n governments, this m e a n t d r a w i n g a l i n e b e t w e e n t h e p r e s e n t a n d t h e past. A s t h e U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic c o m m e n t e d , it was time for the West Germans to free themselves f r o m the "tragedy of the p e r i o d 1 9 3 3 - 4 5 " a n d gain self-confidence t h r o u g h a greater c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n t h e m o r e positive aspects o f t h e G e r m a n past. A suitable m o m e n t s e e m e d t o p r e s e n t itself i n 1985 o n t h e occasion o f t h e f o r t i e t h anniversary of G e r m a n y ' s u n c o n ditional s u r r e n d e r t o A l l i e d forces at t h e e n d o f t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r . Plans w e r e accordingly laid to t u r n the event into a celebration of the Western Alliance; and President Reagan agreed t o m a r k t h e occasion b y visiting W e s t G e r m a n y a n d h o l d i n g a special c e r e m o n y t o c o m m e m o r a t e t h e e n d o f t h e w a r in the small southern G e r m a n t o w n of Bitburg, i n the vicinity o f a m a j o r A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y base. Reagan's i n t e n t i o n was t o lay a w r e a t h at t h e t o w n ' s m i l i tary cemetery " i n a spirit of reconciliation, i n a spirit of forty years of peace, i n a spirit of economic a n d military compatibili t y . " Reacting to protests that there w e r e n u m e r o u s graves of H i m m l e r ' s W a f f e n - S S m e n as w e l l as o f o r d i n a r y s o l d i e r s a t Bitburg, Reagan declared that "those y o u n g m e n are victims o f N a z i s m a l s o . . . . T h e y w e r e v i c t i m s , j u s t as s u r e l y as t h e victims i n the concentration camps." H e refused e v e n to balance the visit by going to a concentration camp, o n the g r o u n d s t h a t , as h e s a i d , t h e G e r m a n s " h a v e a g u i l t f e e l i n g that's b e e n i m p o s e d o n t h e m , a n d I just t h i n k it's unneces-

THE

BURDEN

OF GUILT - 1 7

sary." " I feel v e r y strongly," h e added, "that . . . instead o f r e - a w a k e n i n g t h e m e m o r i e s . . . w e s h o u l d o b s e r v e t h i s d a y as t h e day w h e n , f o r t y years ago, peace b e g a n . " O n l y i n t h e face of m o u n t i n g protests f r o m m a n y ethnic, religious, and political groups i n the U n i t e d States—expressed most dramatically by Elie Wiesel's impassioned personal plea t o Reagan ("That place, M r . President, is n o t y o u r place. Y o u r place is w i t h t h e victims o f t h e S S " ) — d i d t h e president agree to go to t h e Berg e n - B e l s e n c o n c e n t r a t i o n c a m p as w e l l as t o B i t b u r g c e m e tery. But the wreath-laying w e n t ahead.34 Reagan e a r n e d a good deal o f ridicule for his statements d u r i n g t h e B i t b u r g affair: a F r e n c h n e w s p a p e r gave h i m a n " F i n h i s t o r y , " 3 5 w h i l e A r t h u r S c h l e s i n g e r , Jr., c o m m e n t e d a c i d l y t h a t " M r . R e a g a n i n fact is t h e o n l y A m e r i c a n president w h o was o f m i l i t a r y age d u r i n g t h e Second W o r l d W a r a n d saw n o s e r v i c e o v e r s e a s . H e f o u g h t t h e w a r o n t h e film l o t s o f H o l l y w o o d , slept i n his o w n bed e v e r y n i g h t a n d apparently got m a n y of his ideas o f w h a t h a p p e n e d f r o m subsequent study o f t h e Reader's Digest. " 3 6 B u t t h e t r u t h a b o u t t h e v i s i t is n o t so s i m p l e . I n fact, i t was W e s t G e r m a n C h a n c e l l o r K o h l , at a m e e t i n g w i t h t h e p r e s i d e n t i n W a s h i n g t o n o n N o v e m b e r 30, 1984, w h o suggested that Reagan visit a G e r m a n military cemetery. As journalist T i m o t h y G a r t o n A s h c o m m e n t e d , " T h e B i t b u r g debacle was essentially of his m a k i n g ; a n d i t was certainly K o h l w h o k e p t t h e President to his foolish p r o m i s e . " Subsequently, K o h l l e n t his s u p p o r t t o t h e e t h n i c G e r m a n expellees f r o m Silesia b y attending their congress a n d publicly endorsing the G e r m a n state boundaries o f 1937, w h i c h o f course i n c l u d e about a t h i r d of Poland. As h espoke, banners w e r e u n f o l d e d i n the auditor i u m saying "Silesia Stays G e r m a n . " 3 7 W i t h characteristic opp o r t u n i s m , Chancellor K o h l s h o w e d a different face, d u r i n g a state visit b y t h e president o f Israel, w h e n h e declared t h a t t h e N a z i " g e n o c i d e i n its cold, i n h u m a n p l a n n i n g a n d d e a t h l y efficiency was unique i n the history of m a n k i n d . . . . W e never w a n t t o f o r g e t t h e N a z i c r i m e s . W e s h a l l also resist e v e r y a t t e m p t t o suppress or play t h e m d o w n . " I n a m u c h - d e b a t e d n a t i o n a l add r e s s , W e s t G e r m a n P r e s i d e n t R i c h a r d v o n Weizsäcker d i d h i s best to repair the damage and r i g h t l y earned widespread respect, n a t i o n a l l y a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , b y u r g i n g G e r m a n s t o "face u p t othe t r u t h . " 3 8 But although a conservative, W e i z -

1 8 • IN H I T L E R ' S

SHADOW

s a c k e r h a s a f a i r l y n e u t r a l r o l e as t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c ' s h e a d of state, a n d stands t o a large e x t e n t aloof f r o m t h e daily realities of t h e political scene.39 His voice, that of a m o d e r a t e a n d self-critical G e r m a n consciousness, has b e e n increasingly d r o w n e d b y a g r o u n d s w e l l o f s t r i d e n t n a t i o n a l i s m o n t h e r i g h t . C h a n c e l l o r K o h l has reflected this tide of o p i n i o n i n a variety of ways. H e aroused a good deal of c o m m e n t , f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n h e said t h a t h e considered himself freed f r o m guilt by v i r t u e of his y o u t h , being t h e "first Federal Chancellor of the post-Hitler generation." His belief i n the similarity of C o m m u n i s m and N a z i s m caused am i n o r international s t o r m w h e n it f o u n d expression i n his comparison of Soviet C o m m u n i s t Party General Secretary Gorbachev and N a z i propaganda chief Josef Goebbels i n a notorious i n t e r v i e w p r i n t e d i n Newsweek.40 T h e interest of the Kohl government i n lightening the burd e n o f G e r m a n g u i l t has b e e n reflected i n m a n y statements b y its s u p p o r t e r s i n t h e press, w h o h a v e ( a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s ) d e fended Austrian President K u r t W a l d h e i m and urged Jews to be tactful i n their dealings w i t h G e r m a n s . 4 1 T h e K o h l governm e n t has decided t o encourage greater a n d m o r e positive historical consciousness b y b u i l d i n g a G e r m a n Historical M u s e u m i n Berlin and a House of the History of the Federal Republic i n B o n n . T h e B e r l i n m u s e u m will, i t seems, concentrate o n pres e n t i n g a n a t i o n a l past i n basically chronological f o r m , t h o u g h t h e o r i g i n a l c o n c e p t i o n has r e p o r t e d l y b e e n s o m e w h a t w a t e r e d d o w n i n the planning process.42 T h e B o n n m u s e u m will present the history of West G e r m a n y according to political principles (the A d e n a u e r years, t h e G r a n d C o a l i t i o n , etc.), l a r g e l y i g n o r i n g social a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s , w h i c h o u g h t i n a n y case t o be periodized according t orather different criteria. Appare n t l y , t h e T h i r d R e i c h w i l l m o r e o r less b e o m i t t e d f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 4 3 C o n s e r v a t i v e historians p r e d o m i n a t e o n t h e official c o m m i s s i o n s set u p t o establish t h e s e m u s e u m s . A s M a r t i n Broszat, director of W e s t G e r m a n y ' s Munich-based Institute of C o n t e m p o r a r y H i s t o r y , has c o m m e n t e d , t h e F e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t s e l e c t e d as its advisers " a s m a l l g r o u p o f h i s t o r i a n s . . . w h o c e r t a i n l y c a n n o t b e s e e n as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f h i s t o r i c a l s c h o l a r ship a n d research o n c o n t e m p o r a r y history i n the Federal Republic either f r o m their political o r f r o m their scholarly

THE

BURDEN

O F G U I L T - 19

standpoint."44

I t remains to be seen h o w far the m u s e u m s will try a n d use t h e past to b u i l d a n e w a n d positive sense o f G e r m a n national identity. S o m e of the objections to the m u s e u m s have undoubtedly been exaggerated, and a few have been d o w n r i g h t s i l l y . 4 5 B u t i t is t o b e f e a r e d t h a t t h e p i c t u r e t h e y p r e s e n t o f W e s t G e r m a n y ' s l o n g - t e r m a n d s h o r t - t e r m past w i l l b e a partial picture—a picture w i t h m a n y or most of the problems left out. A l l this has b e e n b a c k e d u p b y a g r o w i n g c h o r u s o f o p i n i o n o n t h e p o l i t i c a l r i g h t , d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e t i m e has c o m e f o r t h e W e s t G e r m a n s to stop feeling g u i l t y about t h e past a n d start feeling p r o u d of themselves once m o r e . I n the words of the late B a v a r i a n M i n i s t e r - P r e s i d e n t F r a n z Josef Strauss, t h e G e r m a n s should get off their knees a n d l e a r n to " w a l k t a l l " again. " T h a t m e a n s , " h e added, "saying yes t o t h e idea t h a t w e h a v e b e e n b o r n G e r m a n , a n d n o t l e t t i n g t h e vision of a great G e r m a n past be blocked by the sight-screens of those accursed t w e l v e years b e t w e e n 1933 a n d 1 9 4 5 . " I n Strauss's v i e w , i t w a s at last t i m e for G e r m a n y to " e m e r g e f r o m t h e shadow o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h " and "become a n o r m a l nation again." " G e r m a n history," h e w a r n e d , " c a n n o t b e p r e s e n t e d as a n e n d l e s s c h a i n o f m i s t a k e s and crimes."46 F o r m e r West G e r m a n President and Head o f State K a r l Carstens added his voice t o the chorus calling for m o r e "patriotism." H e urged ar e t u r n to "the old patriotic tradit i o n , " cleansed o f its d e f o r m a t i o n b y t h e Nazis. H e r e g r e t t e d t h a t — i n h i s w o r d s — " t h e g e n e r a t i o n t h a t is n o w r e a c h i n g a d u l t h o o d simply doesn't w a n t to believe that m a n y of the N a t i o n a l Socialist r e g i m e ' s t e r r i b l e deeds w e r e n o t k n o w n t o t h e m a j o r ity of Germans of that t i m e . " 4 7 Christian Democratic federal p a r l i a m e n t a r y floor l e a d e r A l f r e d D r e g g e r h a s a l s o b e e n o u t spoken i n arguing that the G e r m a n s should n o t be ashamed of t h e i r past. A n d these v i e w s h a v e r e c e i v e d s t r o n g b a c k i n g f r o m t h e l e a d i n g c o n s e r v a t i v e d a i l y n e w s p a p e r , t h e Frankfurter All¬ gemeine Zeitung, w h i c h i n t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s b e g a n p r i n t i n g a l o n g series o f articles q u e s t i o n i n g t h e thesis o f G e r m a n g u i l t . 4 8 As this political campaign gathered m o m e n t u m , privately f u n d e d right-wing, "research" institutions outside the m a i n s t r e a m o f G e r m a n a c a d e m i c l i f e , s u c h as A l f r e d S c h i c k e l ' s " C o n t e m p o r a r y History Research C e n t e r " i n Ingolstadt, began t o gain a n e w , m o r e respectable audience through the columns of

20 • IN H I T L E R ' S

SHADOW

t h e Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.49 M a r g i n a l , i s o l a t e d r i g h t w i n g researchers similarly f o u n d themselves n o w i n v i t e dt o contribute to the newspaper's columns.50 B u t w h a t lent these calls f o r a n e w n a t i o n a l consciousness b a s e d o n a m o r e p o s i t i v e v i e w o f t h e G e r m a n past t h e i r r e a l w e i g h t w a s t h e fact t h a t serious u n i v e r s i t y historians w i t h m a j o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l reputat i o n s n o w b e g a n t o a d d t h e i r v o i c e s as w e l l . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l historian E r n s t N o l t e , best k n o w n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y for his book Three Faces of Fascism, j o i n e d i n w i t h a n a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung o n J u n e 6 , 1 9 8 6 , u n d e r t h e t i t l e " T h e Past T h a t W i l l N o t Pass A w a y . " 5 1 W i t h t h e passage o f t i m e , h e said, m o s t e v e n t s t e n d e d t o lose t h e i r u r g e n c y a n d became the object of quiet and scholarly study by historians. N o t so t h e e v e n t s o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h , w h i c h c o n t i n u e d t o h a n g over the G e r m a n present like a n executioner's sword. T h e T h i r d R e i c h w a s , h e s a i d , c o n s t a n t l y h e l d u p as a n e g a t i v e e x a m ple of militarism, even though i n the Federal Republic everyo n e n o w a t l e a s t claimed t o b e a p a c i f i s t ; o f a u s t e r i t y , e v e n t h o u g h t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c w a s n o w a h i g h l y p r o s p e r o u s society; of male chauvinism, even t h o u g h n o one was n o w openly male supremacist; of great-power imperialism, e v e n t h o u g h the role of the Federal Republic i n w o r l d politics was n o w o n l y that o f a m e d i u m - s i z e d state; o f state-inspired mass m u r d e r , e v e n t h o u g h W e s t G e r m a n y n o w e n s h r i n e d h u m a n r i g h t s i n its legislation. Yet the m e m o r y of Nazism, Nolte complained, awakened the constant fear that the old A d a m w o u l d break t h r o u g h t h e surface o f W e s t G e r m a n society i n all these respects. N o l t e i m p l i e d that this p r e v e n t e d W e s t G e r m a n s f r o m ident i f y i n g positively w i t h t h e state i n w h i c h t h e y l i v e d . H e sought to r e m o v e this obstacle w i t h a variety of arguments. I t was t i m e , h e s a i d , t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y o f N a z i s m w a s as c o m p l e x as a n y o t h e r h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y : t i m e t o p u t a w a y t h e black a n d w h i t e a n d start p a i n t i n g i n shades of gray. I t was, h e insisted, a b s u r d t o r e g a r d t h i s as p o l i t i c a l l y d a n g e r o u s o r as threatening to result i n the Germans' identifying once again w i t h the T h i r d Reich. Hitler's scorched-earth policy of M a r c h 1 9 4 5 as w e l l as t h e w h o l l y n e g a t i v e effects o f N a z i s m o n G e r many's place i n the w o r l d w o u l dbe e n o u g h to p r e v e n t this f r o m happening. Fascism was e x t r e m e l y u n l i k e l y to gain any signific a n t s u p p o r t i n G e r m a n y , h o w e v e r m u c h t h e G e r m a n s sue-

THE

BURDEN

O F G U I L T • 21

c e e d e d i n escaping t h e legacy o f N a z i s m . I t w a s deplorable, said N o l t e , t h a t t h e G e r m a n obsession w i t h t h e " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " d i v e r t e d a t t e n t i o n f r o m u r g e n t issues o f t h e p r e s e n t s u c h as abortion i n G e r m a n y or "genocide" i n Afghanistan. A t t h e s a m e t i m e , M i c h a e l Stürmer, p r o f e s s o r o f h i s t o r y a t Erlangen University, frequent columnist for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, a n d " h i s t o r i c a l a d v i s e r " t o C h a n c e l l o r K o h l , also b e g a n t o w r i t e a series o f articles c a l l i n g f o r a n e w sense o f n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y . H e c o m p l a i n e d o f a "loss o f o r i e n t a t i o n " a m o n g the Germans. T h e absence of a positive historical c o n s c i o u s n e s s m e a n t a " s e a r c h f o r i d e n t i t y " w h i c h , i n Stürmer's v i e w , c o u l d o n l y be fulfilled b y a n e w v i s i o n o f G e r m a n y ' s past, b y a historically based sense o f n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y a n d p a t r i o t i s m . 5 2 G e r m a n y , h e said, w a s " n o w o n c e m o r e a focal p o i n t i n t h e global civil w a r w a g e d against democracy b y t h e Soviet U n i o n . " 5 3 Y e t G e r m a n y was i n his v i e w ill-equipped to stand u p to the " c a m p a i g n o f fear and hate carried i n t o the Federal Republic f r o m the East and w e l c o m e d w i t h i n like a d r u g . " 5 4 Those w h o u n d e r m i n e d G e r m a n national self-confidence b y d e p r i v i n g t h e G e r m a n s o f a positive consciousness o f t h e i r history u p to 1945 w e r e , he i m p l i e d , w o r k i n g i n Moscow's interest. Adenauer, h ewrote, had been wise not t o try and bring the guilty collaborators and fellow travelers of N a z i s m to book. H e i m p l i e d t h a t A d e n a u e r ' s successors i n t h e 1970s h a d b e e n u n w i s e t o a b a n d o n t h i s p o l i c y . O p i n i o n p o l l s , s a i d Stürmer, showed that while 8 0 percent o fAmericans were proud o f being Americans and some 5 0percent of Britons were proud of being British, only 2 0percent o fGermans were proud o f being Germans. O n l y by restoring their history to themselves could G e r m a n s recover their pride again, a n d thus b e c o m e r e l i a b l e a l l i e s i n t h e fight a g a i n s t C o m m u n i s m . 5 5 Stürmer's a n d N o l t e ' s v i e w s w e r e r e i n f o r c e d b y a c o n f e r e n c e of conservative West G e r m a n historians held i n B e r l i n o n October 6 , 1986. T h e m e e t i n g was f u n d e d b y t h e H a n n s - M a r t i n ¬ Schleyer Foundation, n a m e d after t h epresident o f t h e Employers' Association kidnapped and m u r d e r e d b y far-left terrorists i n 1977. T h e t h e m e was " T o W h o m Does G e r m a n History Belong?" and the speakers w e r e agreed that it was t i m e for the West Germans t oreclaim G e r m a n history for t h e m selves. A n d r e a s H i l l g r u b e r , professor o f h i s t o r y at C o l o g n e U n i -

22

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

versity, w a r n e d the participants that the C o m m u n i s t regime i n East G e r m a n y was n o w busily recapturing a positive relationship to G e r m a n y ' s older historical traditions, and that there was a danger t h a t i t w o u l d a p p r o p r i a t e t h e sense o f G e r m a n national i d e n t i t y f o r itself. T h i s o p e n e d u p t h e t h r e a t o f reunificat i o n u n d e r t e r m s set b y t h e G D R , w h i c h H i l l g r u b e r , a l l u d i n g t o t h e state w h i c h h a d t a k e n t h e lead i n b r i n g i n g about I t a l i a n unification i n the n i n e t e e n t h century, called " t h e G e r m a n Piedm o n t . " W e s t G e r m a n y , h e said, h a d t o c o u n t e r this t h r e a t b y b u i l d i n g its o w n positive relationship t o t h e G e r m a n past a n d German nationhood.56 Such views, and even m o r e , perhaps, the detailed historical arguments that have been deployed to lend t h e m intellectual substance, have aroused heated debate i n W e s t G e r m a n y . 5 7 L i b e r a l a n d Social D e m o c r a t i c historians h a v e m o u n t e d a det e r m i n e d defense o f t h e i r achievements o f t h e 1960s a n d 1970s. L e a d i n g w e e k l y magazines h a v e d e v o t e d w h o l e series o f articles t o t h e debate; t e l e v i s i o n stations h a v e broadcast special p r o g r a m s o n it; t h e correspondence c o l u m n s of t h e daily press h a v e b e e n filled w i t h a n g r y l e t t e r s , r e b u t t a l s , a n d c o u n t e r c h a r g e s . F o r t h e first t i m e s i n c e t h e " F i s c h e r c o n t r o v e r s y , " fought out i n the early 1960s over G e r m a n y ' s responsibility for the outbreak of W o r l d W a r I, professional academic historians— as n o l e s s a p e r s o n t h a n t h e p r e s i d e n t o f t h e G e r m a n H i s t o r i a n s ' Association has c o m p l a i n e d — a r e r e f u s i n g t o shake h a n d s w i t h o n e a n o t h e r i n p u b l i c . A s t h e d e b a t e has g o n e o n , i t has b e c o m e p r o g r e s s i v e l y m o r e p e r s o n a l a n d a b u s i v e , a n d p r o g r e s s i v e l y less s c h o l a r l y . I t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a d i s t i n g u i s h e d A m e r i c a n observer o f t h e G e r m a n historical scene has v o i c e d t h e s u s p i c i o n t h a t i t m i g h t m e r e l y b e a " f l u t t e r i n g i n t h e academic dovecotes," another example of the peculiarly contentious style of G e r m a n academic l i f e . 5 8 S h o u l d i t be a cause for c o n c e r n , o n e m i g h t ask, t h a t t h o s e c a n t a n k e r o u s a n d s e l f - i m p o r t a n t G e r m a n professors are at each others' throats y e t again? O r a r e t h e r e w i d e r issues i n v o l v e d t h a t s h o u l d b e o f c o n c e r n n o t o n l y t o e v e r y t h i n k i n g p e r s o n i n G e r m a n y b u t also t o a l l t h o s e w h o are concerned about Germany's f u t u r e — i n d e e d , to everyo n e w h o cares about t h e historical record, about political m o r a l i t y , a b o u t j u s t i c e a n d p e a c e ? A n s w e r i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n is n o t a s i m p l e b u s i n e s s — n o t least b e c a u s e t h e c o n t r o v e r s y i n v o l v e s is-

THE

BURDEN

OF GUILT - 2 3

s u e s o f c o n t e m p o r a r y p o l i t i c s a n d m o r a l i t y as m u c h as, o r p o s sibly e v e n m o r e t h a n , p r o b l e m s of historical m e t h o d a n d u n derstanding.59 B u t major questions are indeed involved. A d e t e r m i n e d a t t e m p t is u n d e r w a y t o p e r s u a d e t h e w o r l d t h a t i t is t i m e t o s t o p b l a m i n g t h e G e r m a n s f o r t h e c r i m e s o f N a z i s m . T h e arguments raised d e m a n d detailed consideration. I n the following chapters, therefore, w e t u r n to the substantive points a t i s s u e . F o r w h a t is g o i n g o n is n o m e r e d e n i a l o f t h e G e r m a n p a s t — t h a t w o u l d be t o o s i m p l e , a n d t o o easily disposed o f b y reference to the historical record. T h e campaign n o w being w a g e d t o r e a s s e r t G e r m a n n a t i o n a l p r i d e is f a r m o r e s u b t l e a n d s o p h i s t i c a t e d , as w e s h a l l n o w see.

C H A P T E R

"ASIATIC

T

W

O

DEEDS"

i T h e most determined attempts t o get around the obstacle of A u s c h w i t z have b e e n m a d e recently by W e s t B e r l i n professor of history E r n s t N o l t e . 1 B o r n i n 1923, h e established h i s r e p u t a t i o n a t t h e a g e o f f o r t y w i t h a b o o k c a l l e d Three Faces of Fascism, w h i c h i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e i d e o l o g i e s o f M u s s o l i n i ' s F a s c i s t s , H i t l e r ' s N a z i s , a n d C h a r l e s M a u r r a s ' s A c t i o n Française. 2 Nolte's book was one of a n u m b e r of publications by historians a n d p o l i t i c a l scientists i n t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s w h i c h p l a c e d fascism o n t h e m a p as a s e r i o u s o b j e c t o f s t u d y . 3 T h e s e w o r k s m o v e d t h e focus of scholarly a t t e n t i o n a w a y f r o m t h e concept of "totalitaria n i s m , " d o m i n a n t i n the 1950s, according to w h i c h N a z i Germ a n y a n d S o v i e t Russia w e r e t w o sides o f t h e s a m e coin. T h e y t u r n e d it instead t o w a r d the comparative study of "fascism" i n E u r o p e a n d e l s e w h e r e . F a s c i s m w a s n o w s e e n as a p h e n o m e n o n fundamentally different f r o m that of Soviet C o m m u n i s m . This w a s possible n o t least b e c a u s e , as N o l t e ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s h o w e d , f a s c i s t i d e o l o g y w a s m o r e t h a n t h e m e r e r h e t o r i c as w h i c h i t h a d o f t e n p r e v i o u s l y b e e n discussed; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , i t was i m p o r t a n t t o t a k e i t s e r i o u s l y , as a set o f i d e a s i n its o w n r i g h t .

"ASIATIC The destruction of Poland was primarily a German action, 1,700,000 German troops soon defeated the 600,000 Poish soldiers. German air attacks destroyed the centres of the main Poish cities. The Poles hoped to make a final stand in the Pripet Marshes, but the U S S R advances destroyed al chance of further Polish resistance against either Germany or the U S S R

D E E D S " • 25

THE GERMAN AND RUSSIAN INVASIONS OF POLAND 1939

. Dividing line between the German and U S S R | zones of occupation, agreed between Germany and the U S S R in August 1939. * German advances commencing 1 September 1939.

L A T V I A

R U M A N I A

Russian advances commencing 17 September 1939. | Annexed to the U S S R October 1939. I Annexed to Germany. Annexed to Lithuania.

Miles

100 _J

2 6 • IN H I T L E R ' S

SHADOW

Three Faces of Fascism g a i n e d i t s a u t h o r a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e p u t a t i o n n o t least because its p u b l i c a t i o n fell squarely i n t o t h e context o f this shift i n scholarly u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Europe's hist o r y i n t h e first h a l f o f t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . I t w a s t a k e n as a n i m p o r t a n t piece of support for the idea that it was the conflict b e t w e e n fascism a n d C o m m u n i s m , and n o t t h e general, rather vaguely defined phenomenon of totalitarianism, that dominated E u r o p e i n this p e r i o d of u p h e a v a l a n d w a r . T h e s e ideas w e r e w i d e l y t a k e n u p i n t h e f o l l o w i n g years b y h i s t o r i a n s , sociologists, a n d political scientists i n m a n y c o u n t r i e s . 4 Y e t i n m a n y ways Nolte's w o r k stood outside the m a i n s t r e a m of research i n t o t h e history of fascism. T h e original G e r m a n title, i n literal translation, was "Fascism i n Its E p o c h , " suggesting that fascism w a s a t h i n g o f t h e past. T h i s perspective w a s n o t shared b y m o s t other w r i t e r s o n t h e subject. Nolte's m a i n interest lay i n fascism as a n i d e o l o g y , n o t i n i t s s o c i a l , e c o n o m i c , o r p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y . W h a t he offered was a " p h e n o m e n o l o g y " of fascism, or i n o t h e r w o r d s , a n account, a n d a n a t t e m p t e d classification, o f its ideas.5 T h i s a p p r o a c h r e f l e c t e d t h e f a c t t h a t N o l t e h a d t r a i n e d n o t as a h i s t o r i a n b u t as a p h i l o s o p h e r , a n d a p p r o a c h e d h i s s u b j e c t f r o m the viewpoint, and with the methods, of a historian o f ideas.6 W h i l e this background p r o v e d useful i n tackling ideology, it soon became evident that it could be something of a drawback w h e n it came to writing m o r e conventional forms of political h i s t o r y . 7 I n h i s n e x t b o o k , Germany and the Cold War, p u b lished i n 1974,8 Nolte approached the question of postwar Germ a n y i n a w a y t h a t s e e m e d t o a t least o n e distinguished reviewer both myopically Germanocentric and, w h e n it came to major points of interpretation, disturbingly vague and unsupported by hard evidence.9 Peter Gay, indeed, considered the book " a massive and sophisticated apology for m o d e r n Germ a n y . " 1 0 G a y w a s n e i t h e r t h e first n o r t h e l a s t c r i t i c t o find t h a t Nolte's " t o r t u o u s syntax, his evasive conditional phrasing, his irresponsible thought experiments, m a k e it nearly impossible to p e n e t r a t e to his o w n c o n v i c t i o n s . " H o w e v e r , e n o u g h was o b v i ous for G a y to accuse h i m of " c o m p a r a t i v e t r i v i a l i z a t i o n , " i n w h i c h N o l t e " h u m a n i z e d " N a z i atrocities " b y pointing, indignantly, a t crimes c o m m i t t e d by others." F o r instance, N o l t e claimed that i n the 1960s there was a" w o r l d w i d ereproach that

"ASIATIC

DEEDS"

• 27

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s a f t e r alJ p u t t i n g i n t o p r a c t i c e , i n V i e t n a m , n o t h i n g less t h a n its b a s i c a l l y e v e n c r u e l e r v e r s i o n o f A u s c h w i t z . " Gay felt i m p e l l e d to r e m i n d h i m that " t h e r e isa w o r l d of difference b e t w e e n N a z i Germany's calculated policy of mass e x t e r m i n a t i o n and America's ill-conceived, persistent, often callous prosecution o f a f o r e i g n w a r . " I n t h e s a m e book, N o l t e also s p e c u l a t e d t h a t F r a n k l i n D . R o o s e v e l t m i g h t h a v e s y m p a t h i z e d w i t h a n anti-Semitic m o v e m e n t i n the U n i t e d States h a d he been confronted by a p o w e r f u l C o m m u n i s t Party. As Gay says, " s u c h s p e c u l a t i o n s e v e n t r a n s c e n d c o m p a r a t i v e t r i v i a l i z a tion; t h e y are a w a y of d r a i n i n g real experience, real policies, in a word, real murders, of their terror."11 B y t h e t i m e N o l t e ' s t h i r d b o o k , Marxism and the Industrial Revolution, a p p e a r e d i n 1 9 8 3 , 1 2 h e w a s a r g u i n g n o t m e r e l y t h a t fascism was a response to C o m m u n i s m , b u t that C o m m u n i s m — indeed, Marxism—provided both the motive and the method f o r t h e fascist r e s p o n s e . I n a n u m b e r o f articles p u b l i s h e d i n t h e l a t e 1 9 7 0 s , h e p o r t r a y e d G e r m a n N a z i s m as a " m i r r o r - i m a g e " of C o m m u n i s m . 1 3 W h a t this m e a n t i n concrete historical terms b e c a m e c l e a r i n f u r t h e r essays, a n d i n a n o t h e r s u b s t a n t i a l b o o k , The European Civil War, p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 8 7 . 1 4 N o l t e ' s c e n t r a l theses w e r e c o n v e n i e n t l y e n c a p s u l a t e d i n a n essay w h i c h app e a r e d , l i k e a n u m b e r o f h i s s h o r t e r p u b l i c a t i o n s , i n t h e Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, i n 1 9 8 6 . T h i s b e c a m e t h e i n i t i a l focus of t h e present controversy over G e r m a n s ' attitudes to t h e past.15 H e r e he began by arguing that the c o m m o n l y accepted stress o n t h e u n i q u e n e s s o f H i t l e r ' s " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " c o n s t i t u t e d a major, and unnecessary, obstacle to the e m e r g e n c e of W e s t G e r m a n national self-confidence. F o r A u s c h w i t z , h e argued, w a s n o t u n i q u e . A p r e v i o u s , c o m p a r a b l e act o f g e n o c i d e , h e claimed, h a d t a k e n place i n 1915, w h e n the T u r k s h a d b r u t a l l y m u r d e r e d some one and ahalf million Armenians. A prominent early Nazi, M a x E r w i n v o n Scheubner-Richter, w h o was pres e n t i n A r m e n i a a t t h e t i m e , d e s c r i b e d t h i s a c t , s a y s N o l t e , as "Asiatic" barbarism. Yet little m o r e than a quarter of a century later, t h e N a z i s w e r e c o m m i t t i n g s i m i l a r acts t h e m s e l v e s . H o w had this c o m e about? N o l t e ' s a n s w e r is t h a t t h e N a z i s ' c h a n g e o f a t t i t u d e r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e fact t h a t b e t w e e n 1915 a n d 1933 t h e " G u l a g A r c h i p e l a g o " was e r e c t e d i n Russia. F o l l o w i n g t h e a r g u m e n t o f

28

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

t h e R u s s i a n n o v e l i s t A l e x a n d e r S o l z h e n i t s y n , N o l t e says t h a t t h e Soviet system of death camps, mass deportations and shootings, tortures, and the extermination o fw h o l e groups o f people, backed by public demands for the physical destruction of millions of innocent individuals w h o w e r e regarded by the Soviet r e g i m e as h o s t i l e t o i t , b e g a n a l r e a d y i n Russia i n t h e 1920s. E v e r y t h i n g w h i c h the Nazis subsequently did i n this line t h e m selves, w i t h t h e sole e x c e p t i o n o f t h e t e c h n i c a l p r o c e d u r e o f gassing, h a d a l r e a d y h a p p e n e d years b e f o r e i n t h e Soviet U n i o n . T h e s e considerations b r i n g N o l t e t o his c e n t r a l thesis, w h i c h h e puts i n t h e f o r m o f a series o f r h e t o r i c a l questions. " D i d t h e Nazis, d i d H i t l e r o n l y c o m m i t a n 'Asiatic' deed, perhaps, because t h e y t h o u g h t that t h e y a n d those l i k e t h e m w e r e p o t e n t i a l or real victims of an 'Asiatic' deed themselves? Was not the G u l a g A r c h i p e l a g o p r i o r i n h i s t o r y t o A u s c h w i t z ? W a s n ' t 'class m u r d e r ' by the Bolsheviks the logical and real precondition of 'race m u r d e r ' by t h e N a z i s ? " 1 6 T h e s e i d e a s a r e d e v e l o p e d f u r t h e r i n The European Civil War. H e r e i t is a l s o a r g u e d t h a t N a z i s m w a s a c o p y o f a n d a r e p l y to Soviet C o m m u n i s m . T h e essence of N a z i s m lay " n e i t h e r i n c r i m i n a l t e n d e n c i e s n o r i n a n t i - S e m i t i c obsessions as such. T h e essence of N a t i o n a l Socialism," according to N o l t e , w a s t o b e f o u n d " i n its r e l a t i o n t o M a r x i s m a n d especially t o C o m m u n i s m i n the f o r m w h i c h this had taken o n t h r o u g h the Bolshevik victory i n the Russian R e v o l u t i o n . " These events had t o be s e e n against t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e social e x t e r m i n i s m o f t h e Bolsheviks. B o t h w e r e e n m e s h e d i n t h e s a m e causal nexus. B o t h represented attempts to solve " p r o b l e m s w h i c h w e r e connected w i t h industrialization, b y r e m o v i n g a large group o f people." T h e crimes of the Bolsheviks, h o w e v e r , took o n such dimensions i n the 1920s that t h e y called f o r t h a defensive reaction o n the part of the bourgeoisie. This took the f o r m of Nazism, a v a r i e t y o f fascism. T h e reaction was strongest i n G e r m a n y because " t h e m i g h t y shadow of events i n Russia fell more powerfully" on Germany than on any other European c o u n t r y . T h u s H i t l e r ' s a n t i c o m m u n i s m w a s , as N o l t e p u t s i t , "understandable, and up to a certain point, indeed, justified." T h e Nazis needed an ideology t odefend G e r m a n y and the bourgeoisie against t h e C o m m u n i s t threat. A n t i - S e m i t i s m p r o v i d e d such a counterideology. I t was thus essentially a product

"ASIATIC

DEEDS"

• 29

of a n t i c o m m u n i s m , and Hitler's " F i n a l Solution" was a copy of the Gulag Archipelago i n e v e r y t h i n g except the detailed proced u r e o f gassing. I t w a s "as t h e a t t e m p t at t h e c o m p l e t e d e s t r u c tion of a universal race ... the exact counterpart of the a t t e m p t a t t h e c o m p l e t e d e s t r u c t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l class, a n d t h u s t h e biologically transposed copy o f t h e social o r i g i n a l . " 1 7 T h u s N o l t e seeks t o r e h a b i l i t a t e , o r a t least t o excuse, t h e G e r m a n s , the Nazis, the bourgeoisie, and fascism i n general by p o r t r a y i n g H i t l e r ' s p o l i c i e s as a d e f e n s i v e r e a c t i o n t o t h e S o v i e t and C o m m u n i s t threat. Violence, h e is saying, always comes first f r o m t h e l e f t . N a z i s m w a s b a s i c a l l y a " j u s t i f i e d r e a c t i o n " t o C o m m u n i s m ; i t simply overshot the mark. T h e right-wing paramilitaries w h o killed leading G e r m a n Communists Karl L i e b k n e c h t a n d Rosa L u x e m b u r g i n 1 9 1 9 — N o l t e refuses to use t h e w o r d " m u r d e r e d " — d i d so o u t o f f e a r t h a t t h e c r i m e s o f t h e Bolsheviks i n Russia w o u l d be repeated i n G e r m a n y i f t h e C o m munists came to power. Similarly, Hitler was (Nolte implies) b r o a d l y j u s t i f i e d i n l a u n c h i n g a c o u p d'état i n 1 9 2 3 , i n t h e socalled beer-hall putsch. N o l t e compares the trial of H i t l e r for this failed a t t e m p t to seize p o w e r i n Bavaria a n d o v e r t h r o w t h e W e i m a r Republic b y force w i t h the simultaneous trial o fa g r o u p of C o m m u n i s t s for p l a n n i n g a n u p r i s i n g against t h e Republic the same year. T h e uprising was called off i n the end, t h o u g h it w e n t ahead, probably o w i n g to a b r e a k d o w n i n communications, i nthe n o r t h e r n G e r m a n seaport o f H a m b u r g . Nevertheless, the Communists were condemned to death by t h e courts, w h i l e H i t l e r a n d his accomplices w e r e let off w i t h a s h o r t p r i s o n s e n t e n c e u n d e r v e r y l i g h t c o n d i t i o n s , c o n d i t i o n s so easy t h a t H i t l e r was able t o use t h e p e r i o d o f e n f o r c e d leisure to compose a n d dictate his personal m e m o i r a n d political tract Mein Kampf. T h i s h a s u s u a l l y b e e n s e e n b y h i s t o r i a n s as e v i d e n c e o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e bias o f W e i m a r ' s judges, m o s t o f w h o m , appointed before the revolution,were deeply unsympat h e t i c t o t h e R e p u b l i c ' s i n s t i t u t i o n s . B u t , says N o l t e , One must go on to ask whether at any time in world history a beleagured system has dealt with its enemies and with those who wanted to help it, according to the same criteria; and whether one is not robbing the Communists of the honour which they may be permitted to claim, if one denies that the violent overthrow of the

3 0 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

capitalist, or in other words the European-industrial system, must have been a far more serious and revolutionary event than the establishment of an anti-parliamentary dictator in order to repulse this attack.

I n a n y case, h e p o i n t s o u t , t h e a c c u s e d w e r e n o t a c t u a l l y executed. So i n t h e e n d t h e C o m m u n i s t s w e r e n o t t r e a t e d m u c h worse than the Nazis w e r e . 1 8 T i m e and again, N o l t e comes back to the idea that the C o m m u n i s t t h r e a t t o G e r m a n y w a s n o t so d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t o f t h e Nazis. Leading C o m m u n i s t W a l t e r Ulbricht, for example, was anti-Semitic i n Nolte's v i e w because h e w a n t e d i n 1932 " t o d r i v e o u t " t h e b o u r g e o i s i e , a n d m o s t G e r m a n J e w s , says N o l t e , w e r e bourgeois. L e f t - w i n g w r i t e r K u r t Tucholsky, h e points o u t , e v e n suggested t h e bourgeoisie s h o u l d be gassed. N a z i a n d C o m m u n i s t rhetoric, h e argues, was v e r y similar, a l t h o u g h t h e C o m m u n i s t s w e r e p e r h a p s m o r e v i o l e n t . T h e social basis o f t h e t w o m o v e m e n t s was similar, and they cooperated o n m o r e than one occasion. B o t h w e r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y proletarian, a n d b o t h i d e n t i f i e d t h e b o u r g e o i s i e as t h e e n e m y , o n l y i n d i f f e r e n t w a y s . I n 1 9 3 2 - 3 3 , t h e r e w a s , says N o l t e , a r e a l d a n g e r o f a C o m m u n i s t revolution i n G e r m a n y . W h i l e the Nazis only w a n t e d to r e m o v e G e r m a n citizenship f r o m arelatively small n u m b e r of people— t h e J e w s — t h e C o m m u n i s t s w a n t e d the "social destruction o f the w h o l e bourgeoisie" and o w e d allegiance t o a state—the Soviet U n i o n — w h i c h h a d "physically exterminated these c l a s s e s . " T h e C o m m u n i s t s w a n t e d t o d e s t r o y t h e c a p i t a l i s t syst e m ; the Nazis only w a n t e d to destroy the "Versailles system." N a z i s m was a k i n d o f n a r r o w e d - d o w n socialism: for t h e Nazis, C o m m u n i s m was both something to b efeared and something t o b e i m i t a t e d (Schreckbild und Vorbild). I n a l e n g t h y c o m p a r ative account of the t w o , Nolte brings out their similarities and suggests t h a t t h e y w e r e i n m a n y w a y s t w o sides o f t h e s a m e coin. T h i s a r g u m e n t culminates i n the assertion that the exterm i n a t i o n o f t h e J e w s w a s itself a biological c o p y o f t h e social e x t e r m i n i s m of the Bolsheviks. A t t h e s a m e t i m e , h e says, t h e N a z i s e q u a t e d t h e B o l s h e v i k s w i t h t h e J e w s a n d so t r a n s f e r r e d t h e i r f e a r o f d e s t r u c t i o n o n t o t h e latter. N o l t e suggests t h a t H i t l e r ' s fear t h a t t h e Jews w o u l d destroy h i m was given credence by Jewish leader C h a i m W e i z -

"ASIATIC

DEEDS"

• 31

m a n n ' s d e c l a r a t i o n at t h e Z i o n i s t W o r l d C o n g r e s s o f 1939 t h a t J e w s a l l o v e r t h e w o r l d w o u l d fight o n B r i t a i n ' s s i d e a g a i n s t G e r m a n y . T h i s , says N o l t e , m i g h t w e l l h a v e b e e n j u s t i f i c a t i o n e n o u g h f o r t h e N a z i s t o i n t e r n a l l G e r m a n J e w s as p r i s o n e r s o f w a r , rather i n the same w a y that the A m e r i c a n s i n t e r n e d U.S. citizens of Japanese origin after Pearl Harbor. Indeed, N o l t e suggests t h a t W e i z m a n n ' s declaration m a y e v e n h a v e b e e n i n t e n d e d t o b r i n g a b o u t t h e i n t e r n m e n t o f t h e G e r m a n J e w s as a w a y of discrediting the regime. T h e G e r m a n attack o n the Soviet U n i o n i n June 1941, according t o Nolte, was i n part " p r e v e n t i v e " ; i t f o l l o w e d o n " m e n t a l acts o f w a r " against G e r m a n y by Stalin. A n d Hitler's mass m u r d e r of millions of Jews i n t h e e x t e r m i n a t i o n c a m p s w a s a r e p l y t o S o v i e t acts o f g e n o c i d e against G e r m a n s . " A u s c h w i t z , " h e concludes, " w a s a b o v e all a reaction born out of the anxiety of the annihilating occurrences of the Russian R e v o l u t i o n . " It was a "copy"—still m o r e horrifying t h a n the original, but a copy all the same.19 N o l t e backs u p his a r g u m e n t that m u r d e r o u s violence c a m e first f r o m t h e l e f t b y t r y i n g t o d r a w p a r a l l e l s b e t w e e n t h e N a z i s ' a t t e m p t e d g e n o c i d e o f t h e J e w s , a n d w h a t h e sees as a l o n g t r a d i t i o n , g o i n g b a c k as f a r as t h e M i d d l e A g e s , o f c a l l s b y agrarian a n d o t h e r radicals for t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of l a n d o w n e r s a n d o t h e r d o m i n a n t g r o u p s . E x t e r m i n i s m , h e says, d i d n o t begin w i t h H i t l e r . I n d e e d , t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y i n his v i e w displays m a n y parallels to A u s c h w i t z , f r o m t h e genocide of the A r m e n i a n s b y t h e T u r k s i n 1 9 1 5 , a n d g e n o c i d e (Völkermord) i n V i e t n a m i n the 1960s and 1970s and i n Afghanistan i n the 1980s, to the m u r d e r of m i l l i o n s of Cambodians by t h e P o l P o t r e g i m e . As for the G e r m a n s , N o l t e r e m i n d s his readers that " t h e m o v i n g d o c u m e n t a r y film Shoah, b y a J e w i s h d i r e c t o r , makes it seem probable that the SS units i n the death camps w e r e v i c t i m s i n t h e i r w a y t o o , a n d t h a t o n t h e o t h e r side t h e r e was virulent anti-Semitism a m o n g the Polish victims o f Nat i o n a l S o c i a l i s m . " H i t l e r h i m s e l f , i n d e e d , says N o l t e , k n e w o f t h e t o r t u r e s i n f l i c t e d u p o n t h e i r o p p o n e n t s b y t h e R u s s i a n sec r e t p o l i c e s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e r e v o l u t i o n , as a r e f e r e n c e m a d e by h i m i n 1943 to the "rat-cage," a m e t h o d of t e r r o r i z i n g opp o n e n t s , also r e f e r r e d t o s u b s e q u e n t l y i n G e o r g e O r w e l l ' s n o v e l 1984, w o u l d s e e m t o s u g g e s t . T h a t t h i s m e t h o d o r i g i nally, according to Nolte, had b e e n practised by the Chinese,

3 2 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

further underlines the "Asiatic" character of the barbarism to which Hitler was reacting.20 Thus Nolte, i n a n u m b e r of publications ranging f r o m brief n e w s p a p e r articles t o substantial historical t o m e s , seeks t o p r o vide t h e W e s t G e r m a n s w i t h a n escape f r o m Hitler's shadow, or a t least, since h e realizes this is t o o tall a n o r d e r a t t h e m o m e n t , 2 1 to u n b u r d e n themselves of the oppressive w e i g h t of the alleged uniqueness and gratuity of Hitler's crimes. O n l y by freeing ourselves, h e argues, f r o m collectivist generalizations about " t h e " G e r m a n s , " t h e " Jews, " t h e " Russians, " t h e " p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e , a n d so o n , c a n w e r e a c h a m o r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , less m y t h o l o g i z i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g of these events. O n l y i n this w a y w i l l w e cease t o r e g a r d e v e r y tactless r e m a r k o f a local p o l i t i c i a n i n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c as e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e G e r m a n s h a v e n o t c h a n g e d s i n c e t h e T h i r d R e i c h . I t is t i m e t o s t o p t a l k i n g a b o u t t h e g u i l t o f " t h e " G e r m a n s , n o t least because this c o n t i n u e s t h e same kind of thinking by w h i c h the Nazis convinced themselves o f t h e g u i l t o f " t h e " J e w s . 2 2 I n a n e s s a y p u b l i s h e d i n Aspects of the Third Reich, a c o l l e c t i o n (as t h e t i t l e s u g g e s t s ) o f r a t h e r arbitrarily chosen contributions edited by H . W . K o c h and published i n 1985, N o l t e m a k e s i t clear that i n his v i e w " t h e a n n i h i l a t i o n o f several m i l l i o n E u r o p e a n Jews, m a n y Slavs, t h e m e n t a l l y i n s a n e , a n d G y p s i e s is w i t h o u t p r e c e d e n t i n i t s m o t i v a tion a n d execution." " T h e i n n e r m o s t core o f t h e negative pict u r e o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h , " h e goes o n , "needs n o r e v i s i o n . " B u t at t h e same t i m e h e r e p e a t e d l y suggests t h a t i t h a d so m a n y p a r a l l e l s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s t h a t i t c a n b e r e g a r d e d as a n o r m a l twentieth-century barbarity.23 O f c o u r s e , says N o l t e i n h i s o w n d e f e n s e , i f I s r a e l h a d b e e n a n n i h i l a t e d b y t h e P L O a n d its h i s t o r y w r i t t e n b y t h e Palestinians, n o b o d y w o u l d d a r e t o p o r t r a y t h e state's f o u n d a t i o n as a response t o E u r o p e a n anti-Semitism. T h i s speculation is evid e n t l y i n t e n d e d to suggest a d i r e c t parallel t o t h e historiograp h y o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h . I t is s u r p r i s i n g t h a t a s c h o l a r o f N o l t e ' s experience could seriously believe that the history of G e r m a n y had been w r i t t e n o n l y by those w h o conquered it i n 1945 and not by the G e r m a n s themselves. T h e r e is n o t a shred of evid e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h i s , i f t h i s is w h a t h e m e a n s . S t i l l , h i s c h o i c e o f this particular analogy, o u t o f a w h o l e host o f o t h e r possible analogies, does raise t h e suspicion t h a t h e m e a n s t o i m p l y t h a t

"ASIATIC

D E E D S " • 33

t h e h i s t o r i o g r a p h y o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h h a s b e e n w r i t t e n / r o m the perspective o f t h e v i c t o r s , u n d e r t h e i n s p i r a t i o n o f t h e s u r v i v i n g v i c t i m s . T h i s s u s p i c i o n is s t r e n g t h e n e d i n The European Civil War, w h e r e N o l t e g o e s o u t o f t h e w a y t o s a y t h a t " t h e l i t e r a t u r e on the 'Final Solution' comes to an o v e r w h e l m i n g degree f r o m J e w i s h a u t h o r s , " w h i c h has g i v e n i t a s i m p l e " p e r p e t r a t o r - v i c t i m " p a t t e r n . I n Nolte's v i e w this u n d e r p l a y s t h e " f a c t " (for w h i c h h e p r o v i d e s n o e v i d e n c e at all) t h a t m o r e " A r y a n s " t h a n Jews w e r e k i l l e d at A u s c h w i t z , a n d i t suppresses e v i d e n c e that Poles and Rumanians w e r e anti-Semitic, that m a n y Jews w e r e C o m m u n i s t s , a n d t h a t m a n y J e w s resisted. N o l t e suggests t h a t m u c h of the e v i d e n c e about the " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " is questionable, because t h e basic rules o f i n t e r v i e w i n g h a v e n o t b e e n observed, and statements are j u d g e d by political criteria, not o b j e c t i v e o n e s . I f H i t l e r h a d w o n , h e says, n o n - G e r m a n h i s t o r i ans w o u l d p r o b a b l y n o t h a v e b e e n a n y m o r e critical o f A u s c h w i t z t h a n t h e y are n o w o f t h e Gulag; i t is only, h e implies, because Nazism was vanquished, and C o m m u n i s m survived, t h a t t h e r e has b e e n a d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e s e v e r i t y w i t h w h i c h t h e i r respective crimes have been condemned b yw o r l d opinion. M o r e generally, N o l t e intends these historiographical strictures t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e g e n e r a l p o i n t t h a t h i s t o r i c a l m y t h s c a n act as state ideologies. F r o m t h e c o n t e x t h e a p p a r e n t l y w a n t s t o suggest t h a t t h e idea t h a t G e r m a n y was u n i q u e l y or e v e n p r i m a r i l y responsible f o r its o w n d e s t r u c t i o n i n 1945 a n d f o r t h e c r i m e s o f N a z i s m is a m y t h t h a t h a s b e c o m e a s t a t e i d e o l o g y s i n c e 1 9 4 5 . T h i s , h e s u g g e s t s , is h a v i n g a n u n f o r t u n a t e e f f e c t o n c o n t e m p o r a r y p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c , a n d so i t is t i m e it was done away w i t h . 2 4 These and other views have been put forward by Nolte i n a m a n n e r t h a t is o f t e n obscure, s o m e t i m e s confused, a n d occasionally d o w n r i g h t c o n t r a d i c t o r y . T h i s fact has i n t u r n a l l o w e d N o l t e ' s d e f e n d e r s s u c h as t h e B r e m e n h i s t o r i a n I m a n u e l G e i s s to argue that Nolte's statements appear to justify Nazism only if they are " t a k e n i n isolation" by a "hasty reader." A f t e r all, he says, N o l t e r e p e a t e d l y c o n d e m n s N a z i s m a n d states e x p l i c i t l y his v i e w t h a t its c r i m e s w e r e u n i q u e . Geiss regards these cond e m n a t i o n s a n d s t a t e m e n t s as t h e c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h N o l t e ' s other arguments must b e viewed. I n a similar way, H e l m u t M i i l l e r declares t h a t it w o u l d be " a b s u r d , " i n v i e w o f such state-

34

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

m e n t s , t o suggest t h a t N o l t e was e v e n a t t e m p t i n g to r e l a t i v i z e Nazism, let alone justifying it.25 B u t i n reality writers are being t a k e n i n by Nolte's m e t h o d . N o l t e makes ritual obeisances to c u r r e n t m o r a l orthodoxies, w h i l e d e v o t i n g t h e larger p a r t of his energies to developing, o f t e n by i n n u e n d o a n d suggestion, a series o f a r g u m e n t s i n t e n d e d t o s u b v e r t t h e m a n d t o p u t forward an alternative view. I t is a t e c h n i q u e r e m i n i s c e n t o f t h e g r e a t e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y rationalist historian E d w a r d Gibbon's account of t h e rise of C h r i s t i a n i t y . G i b b o n s e c u r e d h i s r e a r , as i t w e r e , b y s t a t i n g a t t h e outset that t h e "first cause" o f the rise o f C h r i s t i a n i t y was indeed Divine Providence; but Providence w o r k e d i n mysterious ways, w h i c h i t w o u l d be u n b e c o m i n g o f a m e r e m o r t a l such as h i m s e l f t o i n q u i r e i n t o f u r t h e r . T h e h i s t o r i a n , h e a r g u e d , h a d to be c o n t e n t w i t h investigating t h e "secondary causes"; a n d thus h e was able to go o n to devote a w h o l e chapter to a l e n g t h y a n d devastating account that explained t h e rise of C h r i s t i a n i t y in terms of moral degeneracy, greed, ignorance, fanaticism, and o t h e r vices. A l l t h i s cast a n i r o n i c l i g h t o n t h e " f i r s t c a u s e " h e had initially cited i n such a deceptive m a n n e r . A s a h i s t o r i a n , N o l t e is h a r d l y c o m p a r a b l e t o G i b b o n ; b u t t h e inclusion i n his w o r k o f isolated affirmations o f t h e uniqueness of Auschwitz, condemnations of Nazism, and the like, w h i c h are t h e n completely u n d e r m i n e d by the n u m e r o u s claims, hints, a n d suggestions t o t h e opposite effect, does b e a r at least a superficial r e s e m b l a n c e t o G i b b o n ' s t e c h n i q u e . A s a r e s u l t , t h e c r i t i c a l r e a d e r is f o r c e d i n e v i t a b l y t o d i s c o u n t s o m e o f N o l t e ' s statements i n t h e interest of p r e s e n t i n g t h e m a i n t h r u s t of his v i e w s i n a r e a s o n a b l y c o h e r e n t m a n n e r . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t , i t s e e m s c l e a r , is t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n w h a t i t is t h a t h e is s a y i n g t h a t is r e a l l y n e w . I t is s c a r c e l y s u r p r i s i n g t h e s e c o n f u s i o n s h a v e a l l o w e d N o l t e ' s d e f e n d e r s t o a d v a n c e t h e c l a i m t h a t h e has b e e n m i s r e p r e s e n t e d . B u t has he?

II I n t h e c o n t r o v e r s y w h i c h has r a g e d a r o u n d these a r g u m e n t s , N o l t e has h a d his d e f e n d e r s . 2 6 B u t t h e y h a v e b e e n f e w i n n u m b e r , a n d e v e n his m o s t ardent sympathizers h a v e

"ASIATIC

DEEDS"

• 35

seldom followed h i m all the way. Joachim Fest, for example, the author of a major biography of H i t l e r and one of the editors of t h e Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, t h e n e w s p a p e r i n w h i c h a n u m b e r o f N o l t e ' s articles o n this subject h a v e a p p e a r e d , has pointed out that Hitler was i n M u n i c h i n 1918-19 at a time w h e n successive revolutions i n the city c u l m i n a t e d i n t h e "chaos and terror" w h i c h f o r m e d a "real background" to Hitler's " e x t e r m i n a t i o n c o m p l e x e s . " M o r e o v e r , H i t l e r ' s anti-Sem i t i c obsessions w e r e c o n f i r m e d b y t h e fact t h a t a n u m b e r o f t h e l e a d i n g figures i n t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y r e g i m e s t h a t r u l e d M u n i c h a t t h a t t i m e w e r e J e w s . B u t e v e n F e s t is f o r c e d t o a d m i t that H i t l e r ' s central ideas a n d purposes w e r e all i n place w e l l b e f o r e t h e Bolshevik r e v o l u t i o n . 2 7 H i t l e r got his a n t i - S e m i t i s m i n p r e - 1 9 1 4 V i e n n a , n o t i n post-1917 M u n i c h . I t was socialism, n o t B o l s h e v i s m , t h a t h e i n i t i a l l y i d e n t i f i e d as " J e w i s h . " H i s v i r u l e n t h a t r e d o fsocialism was a p r o d u c t o f his experiences i n Austria, w h e r e he c a m e to believe that socialism was a "Jewish" conspiracy to alienate the German-speaking workers of V i e n n a f r o m t h e i r t r u e racial allegiance. N o w h e r e i n his autobiographi c a l p o l i t i c a l t r a c t Mein Kampf o r a n y w h e r e e l s e is t h e r e a h i n t t h a t H i t l e r ' s ideas or purposes w e r e f o r m e d b y his observation of the Bolshevik revolution o r t h eCommunist regime i n Russia.28 T h e suggestion by N o l t e that H i t l e r a n d his k i n d regarded m a s s e x t e r m i n a t i o n as " A s i a t i c " i n 1 9 1 5 is n o t r e a l l y s u s t a i n a b l e in the light of the evidence. E v e n o n Nolte's o w n evidence, the w o r d " A s i a t i c " was used n o t b y S c h e u b n e r - R i c h t e r i n 1915, b u t by h i s biographer, w r i t i n g long after Scheubner-Richter's d e a t h , i n 1 9 3 8 . E v e n i f S c h e u b n e r - R i c h t e r had u s e d t h e t e r m " A s i a t i c " i n 1915, f o r w h i c h N o l t e has n o t p r e s e n t e d a n y e v i dence, this i n itself w o u l d not demonstrate that H i t l e r thought the same w a y , since the t w o h a d n o t e v e n m e t a tthe t i m e . I n the absence of any other evidence pointing i n the direction of Hitler's aversion to e x t e r m i n i s m i n 1915, Nolte's a r g u m e n t cann o t b e sustained o n this point. N o l t e is o n m u c h safer g r o u n d w h e n h e suggests t h a t H i t l e r ' s a n t i - S e m i t i s m was s t r e n g t h e n e d b y t h e experiences o f defeat a n d r e v o l u t i o n i n 1918, a n d i n fluenced by A l f r e d Rosenberg, the Baltic G e r m a n w h o joined t h e N a z i P a r t y i n 1 9 2 0 a f t e r fleeing R u s s i a d u r i n g t h e r e v o l u tion. B u t N o l t e greatly overemphasizes the degree to w h i c h this

3 6 • IN H I T L E R ' S

SHADOW

represented something decisively n e w i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f H i t l e r ' s i d e a s . H i t l e r h i m s e l f , i n Mein Kampf, is q u i t e u n e q u i v o cal o n t h e p o i n t . H e b e c a m e a n a n t i - S e m i t e w e l l b e f o r e 1914, and h e does n o t s e e m to have regarded his p r e w a r anti-Semit i s m as e i t h e r w e a k o r h a l f h e a r t e d . 2 9 H i t l e r left a substantial body o f speeches and writings, b a c k e d u p b y n u m e r o u s records of his p r i v a t e opinions by intim a t e s s u c h as G o e b b e l s , S p e e r , a n d B o r m a n n . N o w h e r e i n a n y o f t h e s e w r i t i n g s is t h e r e t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t H i t l e r ' s a n t i - S e m i tism was the product o f e v e n a pathological fear o f C o m m u n i s m , let alone a justified o n e . 3 0 C e r t a i n l y , h e l e a r n e d f r o m his o p p o n e n t s , as w e l l as r e a c t i n g a g a i n s t t h e m . B u t t h e p a s s a g e s i n Mein Kampf w h i c h d e a l w i t h t h i s l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s r e f e r t o p r o p a g a n d a , n o t t o v i o l e n c e , s t i l l less t o e x t e r m i n i s m , a n d t h e y refer t o t h e Social D e m o c r a t s , n o t t o t h e Russian Bolsheviks. M o r e o v e r , such was t h e i r r a t i o n a l i t yof H i t l e r ' s beliefs that w h a t h e t h o u g h t h e s a w i n t h e m e t h o d s o f t h e s o c i a l i s t s w a s as m u c h t h e p r o d u c t o f h i s o w n i m a g i n a t i o n as t h e r e s u l t o f o b j e c t i v e o b s e r v a t i o n . 3 1 T h e s a m e c a n b e s a i d a fortiori o f t h e b e l i e f s o f the paramilitaries w h o m u r d e r e d the C o m m u n i s t leaders K a r l L i e b k n e c h t a n d Rosa L u x e m b u r g i n B e r l i n early i n 1919. T h e m u r d e r e r s ' actions, a n d t h e b r u t a l language accompanying t h e i r deed, suggest that it was n o t fear, b u t l o a t h i n g a n d cont e m p t , w h i c h m o t i v a t e d t h e m . N o r is t h e r e a n y e v i d e n c e , j u d g ing f r o m w h a t w e k n o w of their personalities and their previous careers, that L u x e m b u r g and Liebknecht w o u l d have instituted a reign o f terror i nthe unlikely event o f their coming t o p o w e r . 3 2 E v e n i f , as N o l t e says, t h e m u r d e r e r s k n e w t h a t t h e C h e k a h a d k i l l e d d e f e n s e l e s s p r i s o n e r s i n R u s s i a (a s u p p o s i t i o n f o r w h i c h h e p r o v i d e s n o e v i d e n c e ) , t h i s still says l i t t l e a b o u t t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e C o m m u n i s t s i n G e r m a n y . C o m m u n i s m has always varied f r o m c o u n t r y to country, and the indications are that had a G e r m a n C o m m u n i s t revolution succeeded, it w o u l d have b e e n substantially different f r o m the Russian one: Russian dominance over international C o m m u n i s m was b yno means complete until the mid-1920s. A n d N o l t e himself notes that Rosa L u x e m b u r g criticized t h e " R e d T e r r o r " i n Russia. M o r e over, t h e so-called " R e d T e r r o r " i n M u n i c h i n 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 was t o a l a r g e e x t e n t t h e c r e a t i o n o f fascist p r o p a g a n d a ; t h e f e w excesses w h i c h d i d o c c u r i n t h e h e a t o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y e v e n t s

"ASIATIC

DEEDS"

• 37

paled i n t o insignificance i n comparison to the reign of m u r d e r and terror imposed by the paramilitaries w h e n the revolution w a s finally p u t d o w n . N o r d i d K u r t T u c h o l s k y — a p a c i f i s t — c a l l for gassing the bourgeoisie, a n allegation N o l t e can sustain o n l y b y t a k i n g a n i r o n i c r e m a r k o f T u c h o l s k y ' s o u t o f its c o n t e m p o r a r y context.33 F i n a l l y , H i t l e r d i d n o t l a u n c h his beer-hall putsch i n 1923 i n defense of capitalism. N o l t e himself argues that there w e r e strong anticapitalist elements i n the N a z i Party b o t h a t t h i s t i m e a n d l a t e r o n . H e is c o n f u s i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d the socioeconomic, too, and largely ignoring the fact that it was mainly the democratic political system that was under attack f r o m t h e Nazis a n d t h e C o m m u n i s t s i n 1923. T h e p o i n t surely stands that conservative judges w e r e u n d e r m i n i n g W e i m a r democracy—and the rule of l a w — t h r o u g h their leniency toward violence f r o m the right. W h a t H i t l e r m e a n t b y t h e " r a t - c a g e " w h e n h e said, p r i v a t e l y , t h a t at least s o m e o f t h e G e r m a n officers c a p t u r e d at t h e b a t t l e of Stalingrad w e r e l i k e l y to go over to t h e Russian side because t h e y w o u l d b e p u t i n t o t h e " r a t - c a g e " (Rattenkäfig) i n M o s c o w , is n o t n e c e s s a r i l y w h a t N o l t e c l a i m s i t w a s . H a n s - U l r i c h W e h l e r has q u e r i e d N o l t e ' s suggestion t h a t t h e " C h i n e s e t o r t u r e " des c r i b e d i n O r w e l l ' s 1984 w a s d e s c r i b e d a l r e a d y i n t h e a n t i B o l s h e v i k R u s s i a n a u t h o r S . P . M e l g u n o v ' s The Red Terror in Russia ( p u b l i s h e d i n L o n d o n i n 1 9 2 5 ) . T h e s o u r c e o n w h i c h M e l g u n o v r e l i e d , a n a n t i - S e m i t i c t r a c t p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 2 0 , says Wehler, described quite a different f o r m of torture, not involvi n g a c a g e a t a l l . I n a n y c a s e , l i k e so m a n y o f t h e p r o d u c t s o f t h e u n d e r g r o w t h of anti-Communist literature a tthe time, it cann o t b e r e g a r d e d as r e l i a b l e u n l e s s c o n f i r m e d b y a n o t h e r , i n d e p e n d e n t s o u r c e , o f w h i c h n o n e h a s so f a r c o m e t o l i g h t i n t h i s c a s e . N o r is t h e r e a n y e v i d e n c e o f e i t h e r m e t h o d h a v i n g b e e n u s e d b y t h e C h i n e s e . O r w e l l ' s i m a g e o f t h e t o r t u r e w h i c h finally b r o k e t h e s p i r i t o f W i n s t o n S m i t h i n 1984 w a s , a c c o r d i n g t o h i s biographer, derived not f r o m anti-Bolshevik literature, but f r o m E n g l i s h h o r r o r stories. T h e s e criticisms are n o t entirely fair. N o l t e does show that H i t l e r was likely to have read the "rat-cage" story, because it a p p e a r e d i n t h e N a z i P a r t y n e w s p a p e r , t h e Völkischer Beobachter, i n 1 9 2 0 , a n d t h a t t h e " r a t - c a g e " w a s a t o r t u r e t h a t m a y w e l l h a v e b e e n t h a t d e s c r i b e d i n O r w e l l ' s 1984. B u t h e d o e s n o t

38

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

establish its c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e C h i n e s e C h e k a units. N o r does Nolte provide enough evidence to show that the belief i n , and fear of, this t o r t u r e , was a n i m p o r t a n t factor i n H i t l e r ' s m i n d . N o l t e does succeed m o r e generally i n d e m o n s t r a t i n g the m u r derous intentions and spirit of Bolshevism i n the Civil W a r p h a s e u p t o 1 9 2 1 . B u t h e is l e s s s u c c e s s f u l i n s h o w i n g t h a t t h e y c o n t i n u e d o n t h r o u g h all t h e subsequent phases of t h e regime's d e v e l o p m e n t . E v e n i f N o l t e is r i g h t a b o u t t h e " r a t - c a g e " a n d o t h e r aspects o f B o l s h e v i k violence i n t h e C i v i l W a r , i t seems a n e x t r e m e l y t e n u o u s a n d flimsy i n f e r e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e o n w h i c h t o base such a far-reaching hypothesis. T o p r o v e that t h e Nazis deliberately copied Stalin's m e t h o d s because t h e y w e r e afraid t h e y w o u l d be Stalin's v i c t i m s d e m a n d s a great deal of h a r d e v i d e n c e , far m o r e t h a n N o l t e presents. M o r e o v e r , i t fails t o a c c o u n t f o r N a z i a c t i o n s s u c h as t h e m a s s m u r d e r o f t h e i n m a t e s o f m e n t a l h o s p i t a l s , w h o c o u l d h a r d l y b e r e g a r d e d as p a r t o f a C o m m u n i s t threat. I n this and m a n y other ways, Nolte's argum e n t s o n this point do n o t m a t c h u p w i t h the evidence available.34 T h e e v i d e n t i a l shakiness o f Nolte's a t t e m p t s t o argue t h a t t h e Nazis w e r e reacting to real threats of violence w h e n they i n stituted their policies o f w a r f a r e , terror, a n d e x t e r m i n a t i o n , b e c o m e s e v e n clearer w h e n w e t u r n t o t h e case o f C h a i m W e i z m a n n a n d his statement i n 1939 that t h e Jews w e r e b o u n d to s t a n d o n t h e s i d e o f B r i t a i n i n t h e w a r . N o l t e , as w e h a v e s e e n , suggests, f o l l o w i n g t h e radical r i g h t - w i n g B r i t i s h j o u r n a l i s t D a v i d Irving, that this justified Hitler's " i n t e r n m e n t " of the J e w s i n t h e s a m e w a y as t h e J a p a n e s e a t t a c k o n P e a r l H a r b o r justified A m e r i c a n i n t e r n m e n t of U.S. citizens of Japanese origin. I n fact, f e w p e o p l e t o d a y w o u l d d e f e n d t h e U.S. t r e a t m e n t of these people at t h e t i m e , h o w e v e r h a r d one m i g h t t r y to u n d e r s t a n d i t as a n e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e s h o c k o f t h e s u d d e n Japanese act o f w a r . E v e n i f o n e d i d w a n t t o d e f e n d i t , i t should be r e m e m b e r e d , however, that the Jews had not b o m b e d G e r m a n n a v a l bases o r a t t a c k e d G e r m a n t r o o p s i n 1939. T h e Jews w e r e n o t a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y recognized n a t i o n a l group, n o r w e r e the m a j o r i t y of Jewish citizens i n G e r m a n y immigrants or the children of immigrants f r o m another country, let alone a g r o u p w h i c h was at w a r w i t h t h e G e r m a n s . M o s t of t h e m came f r o m families w h i c h had lived i n G e r m a n y for

"ASIATIC

D E E D S " • 39

centuries, and considered themselves fully G e r m a n . Most i m portant of all, W e i z m a n n was only offering the British governm e n t t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e J e w s i n Palestine, as t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e letter m a k e s clear. H e was w r i t i n g to N e v i l l e C h a m b e r l a i n , i n fact, to assure h i m t h a t t h e Jewish A g e n c y i n Palestine w o u l d back m i l i t a r y measures t a k e n by the British M a n d a t e " i n this h o u r o f s u p r e m e crisis"; h e was i n n o w a y r e f e r r i n g to Jews i n G e r m a n y or a n y w h e r e outside Palestine. I n a n y case, J e w s w o r l d w i d e w e r e n o t a n a t i o n a l i t y i n 1939, a l t h o u g h N o l t e t r e a t s t h e m t h r o u g h o u t h i s w o r k as s u c h . T h e Zionist W o r l d Congress could n o t i n a n y w a y speak at t h a t t i m e for Jews w o r l d w i d e even had it w a n t e d to; indeed, very m a n y G e r m a n Jews rejected the idea of Z i o n i s m . T h e congress was a p r e s s u r e g r o u p , b u t i t h a d n o i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y i n t h e sense, say, t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t w a s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y r e c o g n i z e d as t h e representative of the Japanese. T h e r e was n o conceivable justification for a G e r m a n i n t e r n m e n t of G e r m a n citizens of Jewish o r i g i n i n 1 9 3 9 . M o r e o v e r , " i n t e r n m e n t " is f a r t o o m i l d a w o r d for the harsh, brutal, and eventually murderous discrimination m e t e d o u t t o J e w s b y t h e N a z i s at t h e t i m e . S u c h acts o f v i o l e n c e and oppression had reached their height i n prewar G e r m a n y t h e year before, i n t h e p o g r o m s o f t h e so-called " N i g h t o f B r o k e n Glass" o n N o v e m b e r 9 , 1938. O n orders f r o m Goebbels, local Nazis all over G e r m a n y arrested m o r e t h a n 20,000 Jews, maltreating and abusing t h e m , and killing a n u n d e t e r m i n e d n u m b e r , p r o b a b l y a r o u n d a h u n d r e d . J e w i s h p r o p e r t y , shops, houses, a n d businesses w e r e d a m a g e d a n d destroyed, a n d synag o g u e s i n v i r t u a l l y e v e r y G e r m a n t o w n w e r e s e t o n fire. G e r m a n y was not atwar w i t h anyone atthe t i m e . 3 5 T h e victims of 1938 w o u l d have b e e n surprised to learn that in comparison to the Soviet U n i o n under Stalin, the N a z i regime, according to Nolte, " m u s t be t e r m e d practically a liberal idyll i n w h i c h the rule of l a w obtained." Because H i t l e r critic i z e d G e r m a n j u d g e s f o r w h a t h e s a w as t h e i r l e n i e n c y d u r i n g the war, N o l t e argues that the rule of law continued to be strong at least u n t i l 1942 i n G e r m a n y . H e accepts N a z i l a w y e r s ' leader H a n s F r a n k ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f h i m s e l f as a " p r o t a g o n i s t o f s e c u r i t y under the law and the independence o fthe judiciary." Evid e n c e s u c h as t h i s is h i g h l y u n p e r s u a s i v e , h o w e v e r . T h e r u l e o f

40

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

l a w was i n fact u n d e r m i n e d f r o m t h e v e r y start of t h e T h i r d R e i c h , a n d j u d g e s p r o v i d e d a n i n c r e a s i n g l y t h r e a d b a r e fig l e a f for rapidly g r o w i n g arbitrariness i n criminal and civil l a w . 3 6 As m a n y of those w h o survived these events, along w i t h millions o f o t h e r J e w s f r o m a l l o v e r E u r o p e , w e n t i n t o t h e gas c h a m b e r s of A u s c h w i t z a f e w short years a f t e r w a r d , t h e y w o u l d have been e v e n m o r e a s t o n i s h e d t o l e a r n t h a t a r e s p e c t e d h i s t o r i a n , less t h a n h a l f a c e n t u r y l a t e r , w o u l d d e s c r i b e t h e i r e x e c u t i o n e r s as v i c t i m s t o o , i n t h e i r w a y . A l t h o u g h i t is e v i d e n t l y s h a r e d b y m e n s u c h as U . S . P r e s i d e n t R o n a l d R e a g a n a n d S i r A l f r e d S h e r m a n , one-time adviser to British P r i m e M i n i s t e r M a r g a r e t Thatcher,37 this v i e w , e v e n t h o u g h it m i g h t seem to spring f r o m the breadths and depths of a universal h u m a n sympathy, cannot be sustained either o n legal, or o n m o r a l , or o n historical g r o u n d s . A m u r d e r e r is a m u r d e r e r , h o w e v e r p e r s u a s i v e t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e a c t . T h e r e is i n a n y c a s e n o t m u c h evidence of m i t i g a t i n g circumstances i n this instance. As the expert witnesses i n the A u s c h w i t z trials demonstrated i n great d e t a i l a q u a r t e r o f a c e n t u r y ago, n o o n e b e c a m e a n executioner i n an extermination camp w i t h o u t having taken m o r a l decisions at a n u m b e r o f possible escape points a l o n g t h e w a y . N o t o n l y w a s i t p o s s i b l e t o a v o i d j o i n i n g t h e SS, o r , o n c e in, to avoid being posted to an extermination camp, or, once t h e r e , t o a v o i d h a v i n g t o c o m m i t acts o f m u r d e r a n d b r u t a l i t y , i t w a s also possible t o e x t r i c a t e o n e s e l f f r o m t h e s e s i t u a t i o n s o r e v e n use t h e m to t r y a n d h e l p t h e victims. Difficult t h o u g h such choices w e r e , a small n u m b e r of G e r m a n s d i d indeed take t h e m , a n d n o t a l w a y s at t h e cost o f t h e i r o w n l i v e s . 3 8 Nazi anti-Semitism was gratuitous: it was not provoked by anything, it was n o t a response to anything. I t was b o r n o u t of a political fantasy, i n w h i c h the Jews, w i t h o u t a shred of justification, w e r e held responsible for all that the Nazis believed was w r o n g w i t h the m o d e r n w o r l d . O f course, the Nazis, seen i n broad perspective, w e r e exploiting i n a demagogic fashion an a r r a y o f p r o b l e m s , f r o m mass u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d business failure i n the Depression to widespread public anxiety about n e w f o r m s o f a r t a n d n e w s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a s u c h as s e x u a l f r e e d o m and women's emancipation, w h i c h w e r e part and parcel of the "crisis o f m o d e r n i t y " i n t h e W e i m a r R e p u b l i c . 3 9 T h e s e p r o b lems included t h e rise of a strong C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t w h i c h

"ASIATIC

DEEDS" •41

w a s n o t l e d b y J e w s , b u t w h i c h w a s u n d o u b t e d l y s e e n as a s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l t h r e a t b y m a n y o f t h e N a z i s , a l t h o u g h t h e r e is l i t t l e evidence that they considered this was actually murderous. P r o b l e m s s u c h as t h e s e w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n t h e r e w i t h o u t industrialization. I t is equally t r u e t h a t M a r x i s m , a n d later, C o m m u n i s m , also a d d r e s s e d i t s e l f t o p r o b l e m s a t t e n d a n t u p o n t h e g r o w t h o f i n d u s t r y . B u t t o s a y t h i s is r a t h e r l i k e s a y i n g t h a t both N a z i s m and Bolshevism w e r e radical political m o v e m e n t s , or that b o t h of t h e m established dictatorial regimes: the level o f g e n e r a l i z a t i o n i n v o l v e d is so b r o a d t h a t i t d o e s v e r y l i t t l e t o l i n k t h e t w o m o v e m e n t s , except b y suggestion. O n a m o r e det a i l e d l e v e l , t h e c o m p a r i s o n fails t o c o n v i n c e . T h e social basis o f Nazism was m u c h m o r e diverse, w i t h a h i g h proportion of m i d dle- and lower-middle-class elements, t h a n that o f C o m m u n i s m , w h i c h i n G e r m a n y was by the early 1930s the party of the working-class unemployed. Nolte cannot explain w h y Stalinism stabilized itself successfully, w h i l e N a z i s m d i d n o t . A n d h e ign o r e s a l t o g e t h e r t h e f a c t t h a t H i t l e r ' s fight a g a i n s t " M a r x i s m " w a s d i r e c t e d a s m u c h a g a i n s t t h e S o c i a l D e m o c r a t s as a g a i n s t t h e C o m m u n i s t s , a n d t h r o u g h t h e m , against t h e W e i m a r dem o c r a c y t h a t t h e S o c i a l D e m o c r a t s h a d b e e n so i n s t r u m e n t a l i n creating. Nazi propaganda claimed that there was real danger o f a C o m m u n i s t r e v o l u t i o n i n G e r m a n y i n 1932-33: the Reichstag fire w a s p r o c l a i m e d a s c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e f o r t h i s v i e w . B u t t h e fire w a s s t a r t e d b y a s i n g l e d i s t u r b e d i n d i v i d u a l , a n d t h e r e is r e a l l y v e r y l i t t l e h a r d f a c t u a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t N o l t e ' s assertion that C o m m u n i s m was threatening to take over Germany. T h e Communists, o n the contrary, w e r e weak i n political t e r m s , w o n o n l y h a l f as m a n y v o t e s as t h e N a z i s i n N o v e m b e r 1932, w e r e h a m p e r e d b y mass u n e m p l o y m e n t and p o v e r t y , and w e r e faced w i t h far stronger violence f r o m the right. A n d i t is q u i t e w r o n g t o s u p p o s e t h a t t h e b o u r g e o i s i e i n R u s s i a h a d b e e n physically e x t e r m i n a t e d , o r t h a t — d e s p i t e t h e sarcastic r h e t o r i c a l e x a g g e r a t i o n s o f a p u b l i c i s t s u c h as T u c h o l s k y — t h e y were threatening the same i n Germany. O n the other hand, the Nazis did far m o r e t h a n m e r e l y threaten to destroy " t h e V e r sailles s y s t e m . " N a z i a n t i - S e m i t i s m i n a l l its v i r u l e n c e w a s t h e r e , i n essence, i n H i t l e r ' s m i n d , l o n g before t h e Bolsheviks c a m e to p o w e r , a n d i t w a s a l r e a d y w r e a k i n g its t e r r i b l e v i o l e n c e a n d

42

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

injustice u p o n the Jewish population before the outbreak of the Second W o r l d W a r .

Ill Nolte's a r g u m e n t that N a z i s m was a defensive react i o n t o t h e C o m m u n i s t t h r e a t finds i t s w a y i n t o h i s a c c o u n t o f t h e o r i g i n s o f t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r as w e l l . H i t l e r ' s a i m , h e says, w a s t o a l l y h i m s e l f t o t h e " W e s t e r n w o r l d , " a n d h e s a w h i m s e l f as fighting f o r W e s t e r n i n d i v i d u a l i s m , f o r t h e r u l e o f civilized people over barbarians, a v i e w w h i c h N o l t e describes as " t h e e x a g g e r a t i o n o f a n i n s i g h t w h i c h w a s b a s i c a l l y r i g h t i n i t s e s s e n c e . " N a z i G e r m a n y , h e says, w a s r i g h t t o f e e l t h r e a t ened by the USSR. H a d there been a violent civil w a r i n Germ a n y , t h e U S S R w o u l d h a v e p u s h e d its f r o n t i e r s f o r w a r d t o t h e Elbe. I t was the G e r m a n s w h o , o n June 22, 1941, accused the Soviet U n i o n of marching troops up t othe border ready t o invade. Thus, Hitler "understood the invasion o fthe Soviet U n i o n as a p r e v e n t i v e w a r . " T h e Russians h a d f r e q u e n t l y threatened t o carry C o m m u n i s m westward. These threats " m u s t b e s e e n , " says N o l t e , "as m e n t a l acts o f w a r , a n d o n e m a y e v e n ask w h e t h e r a c o m p l e t e l y i s o l a t e d a n d h e a v i l y a r m e d c o u n t r y d i d n o t constitute a dangerous t h r e a t t o its n e i g h b o r s o n these grounds alone." Stalin was, i n Nolte's v i e w , convinced that the decisive struggle b e t w e e n C o m m u n i s m and capitalism was i m m i n e n t , t h o u g h n o t necessarily i n 1941 a n d n o t necessarily i n t h e f o r m of a w a r against G e r m a n y . Nevertheless, w h e n H i t l e r launched it, it was i n his understanding a r e n e w e d episode i n t h e " E u r o p e a n civil w a r " w h i c h h a d b e e n started b y t h e Bolsheviks i n 1917.40 A substantial n u m b e r o fG e r m a n historians have recently b e e n a r g u i n g a l o n g s i m i l a r l i n e s . O n e o f t h e s e is K l a u s H i l d e ¬ b r a n d , professor o f h i s t o r y at B o n n U n i v e r s i t y a n d a u t h o r o f t w o w e l l - k n o w n a n d v e r y u s e f u l t e x t b o o k s , The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich ( 1 9 7 3 ) a n d The Third Reich ( 1 9 8 4 ) , as w e l l a s o f a massive m o n o g r a p h o n N a z i policies o n t h e colonial quest i o n . H i l d e b r a n d c a m e close t o N o l t e ' s p o s i t i o n i n a n article p u b l i s h e d i n t h e flagship j o u r n a l o f t h e G e r m a n h i s t o r i c a l p r o f e s s i o n , t h e Historische Zeitschrift, e a r l y i n 1 9 8 7 . H e r e h e

"ASIATIC

DEEDS"

• 43

d r a w s so m a n y p a r a l l e l s b e t w e e n t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s o f H i t l e r ' s G e r m a n y a n d Stalin's Russia that i t becomes virtually impossible i n the e n d to distinguish b e t w e e n the t w o . H i l d e b r a n d reg a r d s i t as a n o p e n q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r S t a l i n ' s p o s t w a r t e r r i t o r i a l a g g r a n d i z e m e n t , a n d his establishment of a n effective Soviet empire including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and East G e r m a n y , was areaction to the experiences of the w a r or represented the c u l m i n a t i o n of l o n g - t e r m plans. H i t l e r ' s Germ a n y a n d S t a l i n ' s Russia, h e says, p u r s u e d w a r - a i m s p r o g r a m s which were autonomous and w h i c h i n the long r u n could not avoid c o m i n g i n t o conflict w i t h one another. W h i l e Stalin held his troops ready to spring, H i t l e r a t t e m p t e d t h e " f l i g h t f o r w a r d " (Flucht nach vorn)—an u n t r a n s l a t a b l e G e r m a n t e r m w h i c h m e a n s t h a t i n s t e a d o f fleeing a d a n g e r b y r e t r e a t i n g f r o m i t , t h e t h r e a t e n e d p e r s o n or state goes i n desperation t o m e e t i t heado n . " I n d e p e n d e n t l y , " H i l d e b r a n d c o n c l u d e s , " t h e N a t i o n a l Socialist p r o g r a m o f c o n q u e s t m e t t h e e q u a l l y f a r - r e a c h i n g war-aims p r o g r a m w h i c h Stalin had d r a w n u p i n 1940 a t the latest."41 I f t h e suggestion h e r e still falls short o f a r g u i n g t h a t N a z i G e r m a n y invaded the Soviet U n i o n i n 1941 i n order to forestall a Soviet invasion of G e r m a n y , it nonetheless points i n that direction. O t h e r s h a v e n o t b e e n so cautious. B e t w e e n A u g u s t 1 9 8 6 a n d F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 7 t h e Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung c a r r i e d a series o f articles d e b a t i n g t h e t h e o r y t h a t S t a l i n i n tended to invade G e r m a n y i n 1942 or even i n the s u m m e r of 1 9 4 1 . H i t l e r s t r u c k first, i t w a s a r g u e d , a n d so " g a v e S t a l i n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to present t h e w a r , w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to its c o m p l i c a t e d p r e h i s t o r y , as a w a r t o d e f e n d R u s s i a , as a g r e a t p a t r i o t i c war." It was therefore a " w a r of the dictators" i n w h i c h both sides w e r e a c t i n g o n m o r e o r less e q u a l t e r m s . C e r t a i n l y , t h e e n d r e s u l t o f t h e d e b a t e w a s p r e s e n t e d b y t h e n e w s p a p e r as inconclusive. N o one could really k n o w , it was claimed, until the Soviet archives w e r e opened. B u t this did not p r e v e n t others f r o m going further. T h e military historian Joachim Hoffmann, for e x a m p l e — a staff m e m b e r o f t h e r e s p e c t e d M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y Research Office i n F r e i b u r g — a r g u e d explicitly that H i t l e r took t h e last c h a n c e available t o h i m o f f o r e s t a l l i n g a S o v i e t i n v a s i o n w h e n h e l a u n c h e d his attack o n Russia i n t h e s u m m e r of 1941. A l r e a d y i n that year, h e argued, Stalin's i n t e n t i o n s h a d b e e n

44

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

m a d e clear i n a speech, d e l i v e r e d o n M a y 5, i n w h i c h h e h a d said t h a t " t h e e r a o f a policy o f peace o n t h e p a r t o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n is i n a n y c a s e o v e r , a n d e x p a n s i o n w e s t w a r d b y a r m e d f o r c e is n o w n e c e s s a r y . " T o b a c k t h i s u p , R u s s i a n t r o o p s b e g a n practicing offensives o n the w e s t e r n Soviet borders. H o f f m a n n , w h o h a d also d e v e l o p e d his thesis i n v o l u m e 4 o f t h e R e s e a r c h Office's official h i s t o r y o f G e r m a n y a n d t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , w a s s u p p o r t e d b y a n o t h e r h i s t o r i a n , B e r n d S t e g e m a n n , as w e l l as b y a s e r i e s o f a c a d e m i c , s e m i a c a d e m i c , a n d p o l i t i c a l c o m m e n t a t o r s , i n c l u d i n g V i k t o r S u v o r o v , a Soviet officer w h o rec e n t l y d e f e c t e d t o t h e W e s t a n d also c l a i m e d t h a t t h e Russians intended to attack N a z i G e r m a n y i n 1941.42 These claims, h o w e v e r , have n o t been t a k e n v e r y seriously b y m o s t professional historians. E v e n H i l d e b r a n d still describes t h e N a z i i n v a s i o n as a n Überfall, a w o r d t o w h i c h t h e d e t e r m i n e d s u p p o r t e r s o f t h e p r e v e n t i v e - w a r thesis t a k e s t r o n g exc e p t i o n because b y stating t h a t H i t l e r " f e l l u p o n " Russia, i t u n d e r l i n e s t h e a u t o n o m y o f his policy a n d its lack o f d e p e n d e n c e o n alleged S o v i e t w a r plans. A l e a d i n g c o n s e r v a t i v e specialist i n this area, A n d r e a s H i l l g r u b e r , has r o u n d l y c o n d e m n e d the preventive-war theory.43 Indeed, the general tenor of the multiauthored history of W o r l d W a r I I i n which Hoffmann's c o n t r i b u t i o n a p p e a r e d w a s so c r i t i c a l o f t h e G e r m a n A r m y ' s role o n the eastern f r o n t that the Research Office became the object o f vociferous attacks f r o m t h e right. T h e absurd result was that H o f f m a n n ' s account of the invasion of Russia was p r i n t e d b e t w e e n t h e s a m e b o o k c o v e r s as a d i a m e t r i c a l l y o p posed account b y o n e o f his colleagues. T h e conservative critics of the Research Office m a n a g e d to persuade the B o n n governm e n t to install a t h r e e - m a n c o m m i t t e e , consisting of conservative historians Klaus Hildebrand, Michael Stiirmer, and T h o m a s Nipperdey, under the chairmanship of an octogenarian retired general, t o v e t its publications. T h e g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e o f t h e c o m m i t t e e c a n b e g a u g e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y t u r n e d d o w n t h e first publication that came into their hands, a massive, t h o r o u g h l y researched but deeply critical biography of Gustav Noske, the "bloodhound of the r e v o l u t i o n , " and the m a n ultimately res p o n s i b l e , as t h e W e i m a r R e p u b l i c ' s first A r m y m i n i s t e r , f o r t h e murder of Liebknecht and Luxemburg. T h e book eventually appeared, b u t w i t h a f o r e w o r d b y t h e R e s e a r c h Office's n e w

"ASIATIC

DEEDS"

• 45

d i r e c t o r ( a r e t i r e d A r m y m a j o r ) , w h i c h d i s t a n c e d i t as f a r as p o s s i b l e f r o m t h e b o o k s c o n t e n t s w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y g o i n g so f a r as t o r e m o v e i t s i m p r i m a t u r . W h a t t h e c a s e d e m o n s t r a t e d w a s o n the one h a n d , therefore, the degree to w h i c h politics and scholarship are b e c o m i n g entangled i n the conservative intellectual atmosphere i n W e s t G e r m a n y , a n d the pressures t o w h i c h historians i n g o v e r n m e n t - s p o n s o r e d , official historical i n stitutions are being subjected. B u t o n the other h a n d , it s h o w e d t h e resilience of serious scholarship. H o f f m a n n r e m a i n s a n outsider, a n d t h e p r e v e n t i v e - w a r thesis r e m a i n s u n a c c e p t e d b y serious historical research.44 T h e reasons f o r i t s failure t o w i n m a i n s t r e a m support s h o u l d n o t d e t a i n us l o n g . T h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e supp o r t e r s o f t h e p r e v e n t i v e - w a r t h e s i s is w e a k . T h e v i e w s o f V i k t o r S u v o r o v , as o u t l i n e d i n h i s a r t i c l e o n t h e s u b j e c t , r e s t o n s p e c u l a t i o n a n d hearsay. Stalin's s p e e c h o f M a y 5 , 1 9 4 1 , exists i n a t least f o u r d i f f e r e n t s e c o n d h a n d versions, b u t n o reliable firsthand d o c u m e n t a t i o n has b e e n f o u n d , so t h a t little o r n o w e i g h t can be placed o n t h e passage q u o t e d . T h e Russian border maneuvers i n 1941 w e r e defensive and are no proof of an intention to invade G e r m a n y . O n the other hand, a good deal m o r e is i n f a c t k n o w n a b o u t S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n d p l a n s a t t h i s t i m e t h a n e i t h e r H i l d e b r a n d o r t h e Frankfurter All¬ gemeine Zeitung w o u l d a p p e a r t o b e a w a r e o f . S p e c i a l i s t s o n Soviet history seem agreed that the USSR had been gravely w e a k e n e d b y t h e successive purges unleashed b y Stalin d u r i n g t h e 1930s. S o m e t h i n g l i k e t w o - t h i r d s o f t h e h i g h e r - r a n k i n g officers o f t h e S o v i e t A r m y h a d b e e n k i l l e d o r o t h e r w i s e r e m o v e d f r o m o f f i c e , i n c l u d i n g t h r e e o u t o f five m a r s h a l s , s i x t y out of sixty-seven c o m m a n d i n g generals, all eight senior a d m i rals, a n d vast n u m b e r s o f o t h e r senior m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l . M o r e o v e r , the purges affected a substantial part of the m a n agement o fthe munitions, transport, communications, vehic l e , a n d o t h e r i n d u s t r i e s , as w e l l as r e m o v i n g l a r g e n u m b e r s o f skilled w o r k e r s f r o m these a n d o t h e r areas. N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t a n d its m i l i t a r y advisers r e g a r d e d t h e R e d A r m y as h o p e l e s s l y d e m o r a l i z e d i n 1 9 3 9 . S t a l i n w a s w e l l aware i n 1941 that it was i n n o condition to launch an attack o n G e r m a n y ; a n d t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e first m o n t h s o f t h e w a r w a s t o p r o v e t h e p o i n t i n t h e m o s t d r a m a t i c f a s h i o n , as

4 6 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

thousands of square miles of Soviet territory and millionso f Soviet troops fell to the G e r m a n invader.45 J u s t as i m p o r t a n t , h o w e v e r , w a s t h e f a c t t h a t H i t l e r a n d h i s generals w e r e also a w a r e o f R u s s i a n w e a k n e s s at t h i s t i m e . T h e y d i d n o t e x p e c t a n y s e r i o u s o p p o s i t i o n f r o m t h e Russians, s t i l l less a general offensive. T h r o u g h 1940 and w e l l i n t o 1941, the Nazis w e r e thus able to concentrate t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g mass o f their troops i n the West for the invasion and subjugation of France, Belgium, H o l l a n d , D e n m a r k , and N o r w a y . I n all the records of H i t l e r ' s m i l i t a r y c o n f e r e n c e s a n d discussions, t h e r e is n o t t h e slightest h i n t that h e feared a Russian attack. F o r the Nazis, the R u s s i a n s w e r e S l a v i c Untermenschen, s u b h u m a n s , f r o m w h o m bestial ferocity m i g h t b e expected, b u t n o serious, organized r e s i s t a n c e . A s e a r l y a s 1 9 2 6 , i n Mein Kampf H i t l e r d e c l a r e d t h a t Soviet Russia was o n t h e v e r g e o f collapse. I t was, h e thought, r u n by Jews, and Jews w e r e incapable of anything but destruction. H i t l e r h a d n o t changed his m i n d b y 1941. I t d i d n o t s u i t t h e p u r p o s e s o f N a z i p r o p a g a n d a , s t i l l less t h e n e e d t o motivate the troops, to advertise the Nazis' and the G e r m a n A r m y ' s knowledge of the weakness of the R e d A r m y . T o conv i n c e t h e t r o o p s o f t h e n e e d t o fight, t h e i r c o m m a n d e r s a s k e d in 1941, during the early months of the invasion, " W h a t w o u l d have happened had these Asiatic M o n g o l hordes succeeded i n pouring into Europe, and particularly into Germany, laying the country waste, plundering, m u r d e r i n g , raping?" O n the eve of t h e i n v a s i o n , a n o t h e r o r d e r o f t h e d a y d e s c r i b e d i t s p u r p o s e as the eradication of Bolshevism, "the deadly e n e m y of National Socialism." But, w i t h the w e l l - k n o w n cynicism of the N a z i propaganda machine (which was operating v e r y w e l l i n the G e r m a n A r m y b y t h i s t i m e ) , a l l t h i s w a s v e r y f a r f r o m t h e a c t u a l assessm e n t o f t h e R e d A r m y ' s s t r e n g t h a r r i v e d at b y H i t l e r a n d t h e leading G e r m a n generals i n private. H i t l e r t h o u g h t that i t w o u l d t a k e n o m o r e t h a n f o u r m o n t h s t o defeat Russia. H i s generals w e r e contemptuous of Soviet m i l i t a r y strength. T h e recently published Goebbels diaries show that the i n n e r leadership of the N a z i r e g i m e t h o u g h t the Soviet U n i o n w o u l d keep o u t o f t h e w a r as l o n g as p o s s i b l e , u n t i l a l l s i d e s w e r e e x h a u s t e d , a n d t h e n use t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o e x t e n d its p o w e r . I n 1 9 4 1 , h o w e v e r , t h e N a z i leaders, according to Goebbels, h a d n o fear of Russian m i l i t a r y action a t all.46

C H A P T E R

T H R E E

BULWARK A G A I N S T BOLSHEVISM?

I W h i l e some West G e r m a n conservatives w e r e t r y i n g to boost national self-confidence by r e w r i t i n g t h e history of the origins of W o r l d W a r II, others w e r e concentrating their attent i o n o n t h e e n d o f t h e w a r . T h e debate was o p e n e d at a serious l e v e l of discussion b y A n d r e a s H i l l g r u b e r . H i l l g r u b e r , b o r n i n 1 9 2 5 , is a l e a d i n g s p e c i a l i s t i n t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y E u r o p e a n , a n d especially G e r m a n , d i p l o m a t i c a n d m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y . H e has p u b lished a major w o r k o n Hitler's strategy i n the conduct of w a r i n 1940-41, a massive scholarly edition of the w a r " d i a r y " of the G e r m a n A r m y H i g h C o m m a n d , a textbook on G e r m a n history since 1945, a n d a study o f t h e w a r aims a n d strategy o f the combatant nations i n the Second W o r l d W a r . 1 I n 1982, he was t h e subject o f a n article i n t h e l e a d i n g A m e r i c a n specialist j o u r n a l Central European History, w h i c h s h o w e r e d l a v i s h p r a i s e o n h i m f o r h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e field.2 L i k e N o l t e , i n o t h e r w o r d s , H i l l g r u b e r is a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y k n o w n a n d r e s p e c t e d h i s t o r i a n . I n 1 9 8 6 , h e p u b l i s h e d a s h o r t b o o k e n t i t l e d Two Kinds of Downfall (Zweierlei Untergang).3 T h e b o o k , j u s t o v e r a h u n d r e d p a g e s l o n g , b r i n g s t o g e t h e r t w o essays, o n e o n t h e e x p u l s i o n o f

48 • IN H I T L E R ' S

SHADOW

GERMAN RULE IN THE EAST 1941Six million Jews were murdered in the concentration camps and cities plus an equal number of non - Jewish Russians and Poles, two million of whom were children. Two million Soviet prisoners of war also were starved or beaten to death, and this policy of mass-murder led to partisan activity behind the German front line.

UNOCCUPIED TERRITORY

]] Areas ruled by the German military. Administered by the General - Government of Poland. j | Administered by the Ostland and Ukraine Reichkommissariats. •

Annexed by Germany.

a

Main concentration camps.

*

Partisans active in these areas.

200 Miles

BULWARK

AGAINST

BO LS H EV IS M ? • 4 9

t h e G e r m a n s f r o m E a s t - C e n t r a l E u r o p e a t t h e e n d o f t h e Seco n d W o r l d W a r , a n d t h e other (rather shorter) o n t h e N a z i genocide o f Europe's Jews. " B o t h catastrophes," H i l l g r u b e r remarks, "belong together." T h e mass m u r d e r o f t h e Jews, h e says, w a s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e r a d i c a l r a c i s m o f H i t l e r ' s G e r many. T h e expulsion of the Germans a n d the destruction of the G e r m a n Reich w e r e n o t m e r e l y responses t o t h e Nazis' c r i m e s — w h i c h i n a n y case w e r e n o t f u l l y k n o w n d u r i n g t h e w a r — b u t also, m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , c o r r e s p o n d e d t o t h e l o n g t e r m aims of the Allied powers. T a k i n g t h e t w o events together makes i t clear, according t o H i l l g r u b e r , that t h e w a r i n v o l v e d not just a Jewish catastrophe a n d a G e r m a n catastrophe b u t rather a catastrophe f o r t h e w h o l e o f E u r o p e , especially its center. H e argues that t h e events o f the w a r have h i t h e r t o been s e e n i n f a r t o o s i m p l e a n d m o n o c a u s a l a w a y as c o n s e q u e n c e s of H i t l e r ' s expansionism a n d its racist foundations. T h e destruct i o n o f G e r m a n y also h a d i n d e p e n d e n t r o o t s i n t h e l o n g - h e l d aims o f t h e Allies.4 H i l l g r u b e r t u r n s h i s a t t e n t i o n first t o t h e e n d o f t h e G e r m a n Reich i n 1945. H e notes that i t has been argued that t h e mass e x t e r m i n a t i o n of Jews at A u s c h w i t z a n d other camps i n t h e East could have been ended m u c h sooner i f t h e G e r m a n troops h a d y i e l d e d t o t h e onslaught o f t h e Soviet A r m y faster t h a n t h e y did; indeed, t h e Christian D e m o c r a t i c politician N o r b e r t B l u m has c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h i s is e x a c t l y w h a t t h e y s h o u l d h a v e d o n e . H i l l g r u b e r does n o t directly criticize this a r g u m e n t , b u t h e suggests t h a t t h e areas earlier occupied t e m p o r a r i l y b y t h e Russians r e v e a l e d a p i c t u r e o f t h e r a p e a n d m u r d e r o f w o m e n a n d children that m a d e i t only t o o clear w h a t t h e G e r m a n population could expect i f t h e A r m y gave in. T h u s they fought o n to p r o t e c t t h e p o p u l a t i o n f r o m a Soviet " o r g y o f r e v e n g e . " A Soviet v i c t o r y w o u l d have been n o " l i b e r a t i o n , " argues H i l l gruber, except for the surviving victims of the concentration camps. E v e n t h e W e s t e r n Allies a i m e d at far m o r e t h a n t h e m e r e r e m o v a l o f N a t i o n a l Socialism f r o m G e r m a n soil. T h e y h a d l o n g since agreed that t h e R e d A r m y should be a l l o w e d t o o c c u p y a l a r g e p a r t o f C e n t r a l E u r o p e . H e r e , as t h e G e r m a n armies w i t h d r e w , t h e soldiers o f t h e R e d A r m y c o m m i t t e d countless m u r d e r s a n d rapes a n d enforced t h e mass d e p o r t a t i o n of hundreds of thousands o f Germans into t h e interior of t h e

50

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

U S S R as w e l l as w e s t w a r d . T h e s e e x c e s s e s r e f l e c t e d t h e b a r b a r i s m of Soviet ideas of w a r u n d e r Stalin, r a t h e r t h a n a desire for r e v e n g e o n t h e G e r m a n s . D e f e n d i n g t h e Prussian East against such barbarism called f o r t h great h e r o i s m f r o m the G e r m a n armies and the civilian population, w h o w e r e not helped by the fanaticism a n d cowardice of some local N a z i leaders. B u t despite their h e r o i s m , t h e e n d of t h e w a r was f o l l o w e d b y t h e flight a n d e x p u l s i o n o f t h e G e r m a n s f r o m t h e s e a r e a s . I n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e s e m a s s d e p o r t a t i o n s a n d e x p u l s i o n s , h e says, o v e r 2 m i l l i o n G e r m a n s lost t h e i r lives, a l t h o u g h t h e P o t s d a m C o n ference between the Allied powers had demanded on August 2, 1945, t h a t this policy s h o u l d be c a r r i e d o u t h u m a n e l y . 5 H o w did these events relate to the w a r aims of the combatant nations? D i d t h e y result f r o m l o n g - t e r m plans, or w e r e t h e y the outcome of short-term developments—of the course of the w a r itself? H i l l g r u b e r discusses f o u r c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e f u t u r e o f C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e . H e first p o i n t s o u t t h a t H i t l e r ' s plans for a postwar E u r o p e a n settlement included n o t only the m a s s m u r d e r o f t h e J e w s b u t also t h e e x p u l s i o n o f m o r e t h a n 3 0 m i l l i o n Slavs f r o m E a s t - C e n t r a l E u r o p e i n t o Siberia t o m a k e w a y f o r G e r m a n s e t t l e r s . T h e o l d P r u s s i a n r u l i n g class, h e says, d i d n o t share this radical, racist vision. T h e i r aims w e r e a g o o d deal m o r e modest, even though they included the incorporation of Austria and the Sudetenland into a Greater Germany, t h e r e c o v e r y of t h e territories lost at Versailles, a n d t h e reduct i o n o f P o l a n d a n d C z e c h o s l o v a k i a t o G e r m a n client states. T h e s e plans w e r e essentially those of the m a i n l y aristocratic groups w i t h i n t h e A r m y w h o t r i e d to kill H i t l e r i n July 1944. B u t the plot failed, p u t t i n g an e n d to this option. B o t h G e r m a n c o n c e p t i o n s o f a p o s t w a r s e t t l e m e n t t o o k as t h e i r f u n d a m e n t a l premise the creation of a E u r o p e led—or dominated—by Germ a n y as i t s c e n t e r . H o w e v e r , t h e W e s t e r n A l l i e s s a w t h e p r e s e n c e o f a s t r o n g G e r m a n y i n C e n t r a l E u r o p e as t h e r o o t c a u s e o f b o t h w o r l d w a r s , a n d t h e y t h e r e f o r e sought its p e r m a n e n t subjection. Influenced by exiled Polish nationalists, they agreed t o a c h i e v e t h i s b y c r e a t i n g a n e n l a r g e d P o l a n d s t r e t c h i n g as f a r w e s t as t h e O d e r - N e i s s e L i n e . C e n t r a l E u r o p e ' s s e c u r i t y w o u l d be strengthened by an alliance b e t w e e n Poland, Czechoslovakia, H u n g a r y , and perhaps Austria. G e r m a n disarmament and

BULWARK

AGAINST

B O L S H E V I S M ? • 51

the expulsion of the potentially destabilizing G e r m a n populat i o n f r o m P o l a n d a n d C z e c h o s l o v a k i a w e r e t h o u g h t o f as f u r t h e r necessary measures t o w a r d this end. T h e eastern areas of the G e r m a n Reich w e r e to be r e m o v e d and m o r e ethnic Germ a n s e x p e l l e d as a c o n s e q u e n c e . R u s s i a w a s t o b e a p p e a s e d b y the transfer of territory o n the eastern edge of the n e w Central Europe.6 T h e last t h i n g S t a l i n w a n t e d , h o w e v e r , w a s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a strong, nationalist, anti-Soviet Poland led by a r i g h t - w i n g government similar t othe one w h i c h had ruled the country before the w a r . T h e Russo-Polish conflict of the early 1920s was w a r n i n g e n o u g h of the consequences. T h u s , H i l l g r u b e r notes, the Soviet U n i o n largely accepted the boundary changes and d i r e c t e d i t s a t t e n t i o n t o w h a t i t s a w as t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t t a s k : t h a t o f m a k i n g t h e cordon sanitaire a g a i n s t t h e G e r m a n s i n t o a protective girdle for itself by installing C o m m u n i s t regimes i n all of E a s t e r n E u r o p e , especially i n the n e w , enlarged Poland. T h e W e s t e r n Allies w e r e obsessed w i t h a crude i m a g e of Prussian m i l i t a r i s m and anxious t o continue s m o o t h cooperation w i t h t h e Russians. T h e y also o v e r e s t i m a t e d t h e p o t e n t i a l p o w e r of a n enlarged Poland. S ot h e y ignored the possibility of this Russian action and carried o n supporting the boundary changes that w o u l d destroy the G e r m a n East. T h u s , according to Hillgruber, every city, every village o v e r r u n by Soviet troops o n the eastern f r o n t was "lost f o r e v e r f o r G e r m a n y a n d f o r its G e r m a n inhabitants," e v e n t h o u g h this was by n o m e a n s clear to the G e r m a n s at t h e t i m e . T h e G e r m a n A r m y o n t h e eastern f r o n t w a s a last p r o t e c t i o n " f o r a c e n t u r i e s - o l d a r e a o f G e r m a n settlem e n t , for the h o m e of millions of Germans w h o lived i n a core land of t h e G e r m a n E m p i r e — n a m e l y , i n eastern Prussia, i n t h e p r o v i n c e s o f E a s t Prussia, W e s t Prussia, Silesia, E a s t B r a n d e n b u r g , a n d P o m e r a n i a . " A n d i t w a s t h e i n h a b i t a n t s ' last h o p e f o r preservation f r o m the terrible fate that awaited t h e m a t the h a n d s o f t h e R e d A r m y . H i l l g r u b e r insists t h a t t h e G e r m a n r o l e i n E a s t e r n E u r o p e h a d b e e n at least i n p a r t c i v i l i z i n g a n d Christianizing. H e does concede that d u r i n g t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y conflict became m o r e and m o r e prevalent b e t w e e n the Germans and the indigenous populations, and under the Nazis the G e r m a n s b e c a m e identified w i t h t h e c r i m i n a l policies of t h e

52

• IN H I T L E R ' S

SHADOW

T h i r d Reich. B u t t h e i m p r e s s i o n h e leaves, n o t least b y t h e l a n g u a g e h e u s e s , is t h a t t h i s w a s o n b a l a n c e o u t w e i g h e d b y t h e legacy of the previous centuries.7 L i k e N o l t e , H i l l g r u b e r sees a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e N a z i "Final Solution" and other twentieth-century horrors: The mass expulsion of the Germans from a quarter of the territory of the 1937 Reich was a provisional end station on the journey that had begun with the spread of the idea of a rationalization of territory according to national allegiance and that had led to the nationality struggles on the European periphery during the First World War. These struggles were followed by the first genocide—that of the Armenians in Turkey—and by the mass expulsions of Greeks from Asia Minor. The extermination and resettlement practices of Hitler and Stalin in their respective "spheres of influence" in the period of their partnership in 1939-40 had continued such "exchanges of populations," and mass murder then reached an extreme degree in Hitler's "Eastern War" from June 1941 onward; first the Jews in Poland and in the entire East were to be exterminated, then those in the whole of German-occupied Continental Europe. The idea of mass resettlement in East-Central Europe won ever more support—first in Great Britain and then in the United States, in a complete departure from their humanitarian traditions—as victory became more certain and as the aim of the destruction of Prussia as the allegedly permanent hard core of the German Reich became more and more clearly an actual war aim. 8

T h e hard core of Prussianism, i n turn, was seen to b e i n the eastern provinces, and their r e m o v a l was to b e the means o f destroying Prussianism's historical influence. T h u s the m y t h i c a l idea that G e r m a n expansionism was the result o f traditional Prussian m i l i t a r i s m — e n u n c i a t e d by British F o r e i g n Office m a n d a r i n Sir E y r e C r o w e i n his f a m o u s m e m o r a n d u m o f January 1 , 1907, a n d shared fully by P r i m e M i n i s t e r W i n s t o n C h u r c h i l l — resulted i n the expulsion of the Germans f r o m the alleged Prussian core t e r r i t o r y , t h e Prussian East. H i l l g r u b e r contends that Europe's chance to be aw o r l d p o w e r had depended o n G e r m a n leadership. T h i s vision was clear e n o u g h i n t h e 1920s a n d 1930s, as C h a m b e r l a i n h a d r e c o g n i z e d , b u t i t w a s l o s t b e c a u s e o f H i t ler's racial ideology a n d his a m b i t i o n t o d o m i n a t e totally t h e w h o l e of Europe. T h e threat of d o m i n a t i o n could only be countered by Russian and A m e r i c a n i n t e r v e n t i o n and by the division

BULWARK

AGAINST

BO LS H EV IS M ? • 5 3

o f G e r m a n y — a n d w i t h that, t h e d i v i s i o n o f E u r o p e itself. T h u s the gradual g r o w t h o f G e r m a n n a t i o n h o o d since 1 8 7 1 w a s stopped, a n d w h o l l y n e w social f o r m a t i o n s e m e r g e d i n w e s t e r n and central Germany. T h e question of whether the destroyed center o f E u r o p e can be reconstructed, Hillgruber concludes, remains open.9

II H i l l g r u b e r ' s b o o k is w r i t t e n w i t h a l l t h e a u t h o r i t y o f a l e a d i n g , i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y r e s p e c t e d s p e c i a l i s t i n t h e field. M u c h of w h a t h e has t o say a m o u n t s t o a s u m m i n g u p o f r e c e n t r e s e a r c h , s o m e o f i t h i s o w n . I t is f o r t h e s e r e a s o n s , p e r h a p s , t h a t m a n y contributors to the ensuing controversy—among them, historians M a r t i n Broszat, G o r d o n A . C r a i g , I m a n u e l Geiss, Hans Mommsen, Heinrich August Winkler, and Eberhard Jackel—have objected to Hillgruber's a n dNolte's being l u m p e d together, have largely exonerated t h e f o r m e r , a n d have conc e n t r a t e d t h e i r fire o n t h e l a t t e r . S i m i l a r l y , a t l e a s t o n e c o n t r i b u t o r t o t h e d e b a t e f r o m t h e o t h e r side, K l a u s H i l d e b r a n d , h a d p r e f e r r e d t o d i r e c t his r h e t o r i c a l shafts against critics o f H i l l g r u b e r a n d has largely left N o l t e t o f e n d f o r himself.10 B u t those w h o reject t h e v i e w that Nolte's a n d Hillgruber's argum e n t s p o i n t i n s i m i l a r d i r e c t i o n s d o so o n l y b y o v e r l o o k i n g t h e fact that b o t h authors, i n t h e i r different ways, a t t e m p t t o relativize t h e N a z i policy o f genocide t o w a r d t h e Jews. W h i l e Nolte's arguments are relatively obvious, Hillgruber's are m o r e c o m p l e x a n d c a n o n l y b e teased o u t b y a close analysis o f t h e t e x t , w h i c h is p e r h a p s w h y t h e y i n i t i a l l y f e a t u r e d s o l i t t l e i n t h e e n s u i n g debate. B o t h N o l t e a n d H i l l g r u b e r set A u s c h w i t z in a broader twentieth-century context. B o t h o f t h e m concede its s i n g u l a r i t y i n s o m e d e g r e e : N o l t e sees i t i n t h e m e t h o d o f e x t e r m i n a t i o n u s e d , w h i l e H i l l g r u b e r sees i t i n i t s e x t r e m i s m . I t has b e e n a r g u e d b y W e s t G e r m a n h i s t o r i a n H a g e n S c h u l z e t h a t to c o m p a r e A u s c h w i t z w i t h t h e actions o f P o l P o t o r t h e liquidat i o n o f t h e k u l a k s is n o t t o e q u a t e t h e m . 1 1 B u t c o m p a r i s o n i n volves w e i g h i n g t h e differences a n d similarities a n d reaching a c o o l , s o b e r b a l a n c e a t t h e e n d . N o l t e is c o n c e r n e d m e r e l y t o o b scure t h e differences. A s w e have seen, h e regards A u s c h w i t z

54

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

as b o t h a c o p y o f a n d a r e p l y t o t h e G u l a g A r c h i p e l a g o . H i l l g r u b e r , as w e m i g h t e x p e c t , is m o r e s u b t l e a n d l e s s d i r e c t . H i s i n t e n t i o n i n t h e l o n g p a s s a g e q u o t e d a b o v e s e e m s t o b e , first, t o relativize Auschwitz by setting it i n the context of genocide— Stalin's " e x t e r m i n a t i o n practices" i n 1 9 3 9 - 4 0 a n d t h e massacres o f t h e A r m e n i a n s b y t h e T u r k s i n 1915. H i l l g r u b e r ' s use o f t h e terms " e x t e r m i n a t i o n " and "genocide" here really does place h i m i n t h e s a m e c a m p as N o l t e o n t h e i s s u e . 1 2 H i l l g r u b e r takes a second step b y situating all these policies o f g e n o c i d e a n d e x t e r m i n a t i o n i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e mass resettlement of European populations. Hitler's " F i n a l Solution" represented a n e x t r e m e v e r s i o n of such policies, b u t t h e clear i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p a s s a g e is t h a t i t w a s n o t q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e m . T h i s v i e w a l l o w s H i l l g r u b e r t o p o r t r a y t h e expulsion of ethnic Germans f r o m East-Central E u r o p e after the w a r as a n o t h e r f a c e t o f t h e s a m e p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n t h a t l e d t o A u s c h w i t z — e v e n to the extent of being based o n a political f a n t a s y ( t h e m y t h o f Prussia). H e also p r o t e c t s h i m s e l f f r o m t h e accusation of being overcritical of the W e s t e r n Alliance by r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e e x p u l s i o n as a t e m p o r a r y a b e r r a t i o n i n t h e n o r m a l l y h u m a n i t a r i a n practices of B r i t a i n and the U n i t e d States. T h e l a n g u a g e t h a t H i l l g r u b e r uses r e g a r d i n g t h e R e d A r m y ' s c o n d u c t i n t h e i n v a d e d t e r r i t o r i e s derives m u c h o f its s t r e n g t h f r o m this c o n t e x t u a l i z a t i o n a n d stands i n m a r k e d contrast to t h e n e u t r a l w a y i n w h i c h he describes the " F i n a l Solut i o n " i n the second part of the book. T h u s the destruction of Prussia a n d the G e r m a n Reich really does appear i n Hillg r u b e r ' s b o o k as c o m p a r a b l e t o t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e E u r o p e a n J e w s . T h i s i m p r e s s i o n o f c o m p a r a b i l i t y is a c h i e v e d p r e c i s e l y b y p o r t r a y i n g t h e m b o t h as c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a t h i r d f a c t o r — t h e g r o w i n g practice of population resettlement and extermination—and by implicitly downplaying any direct links between t h e m . T h e political consequences of this a r g u m e n t are u n s p o k e n e x c e p t i n t h e c o n c l u d i n g s e n t e n c e o f t h e first e s s a y , w h e r e H i l l g r u b e r describes the question of the reconstruction of Central Europe, presumably meaning the reunification of E a s t a n d W e s t G e r m a n y a n d t h e l o s t e a s t e r n t e r r i t o r i e s , as s t i l l open. B u t clearly h e means to suggest that a E u r o p e a n settlem e n t based o n such crimes cannot be defensible. T h e silent implication of these arguments, therefore, w o u l d seem to be

BULWARK

AGAINST

B O L S H E V I S M ? • 55

t h a t i t is t i m e t h e q u e s t i o n o f G e r m a n r e u n i f i c a t i o n w a s p u t o n the political agenda once more. These views are echoed by p o w e r f u l voices o n the right of the West G e r m a n political spectrum. T h e parliamentary majority leader of the Christian Democrats, A l f r e d Dregger, for i n stance, was already saying similar things i n 1985. W r i t i n g o n A p r i l 2 0 t o fifty-three U . S . s e n a t o r s w h o h a d r e q u e s t e d P r e s i d e n t R o n a l d R e a g a n t o cancel his visit t o B i t b u r g , D r e g g e r d e s c r i b e d t h e i r r e q u e s t as a n i n s u l t t o h i s b r o t h e r a n d o t h e r s w h o h a d d i e d o n t h e e a s t e r n f r o n t fighting a g a i n s t C o m m u n i s m . H e t o l d t h e m t h a t h e h i m s e l f h a d f o u g h t t o d e f e n d Silesia against t h e Russians. Dregger's v i e w , e n l a r g e d u p o n i n a n o t h e r speech, delivered i n 1986, is that the G e r m a n troops o n the eastern f r o n t w e r e soldiers l i k e a n y others, d o i n g t h e i r d u t y for their country. T h e responsibility for the crimes of the T h i r d Reich lay w i t h H i t l e r and the N a z i leadership. Most G e r m a n soldiers, h e said, k n e w l i t t l e o r n o t h i n g o f t h e c r i m e s o f N a t i o n a l Socialism. T h u s although the m i l i t a r y opposition w h i c h culm i n a t e d i n the unsuccessful b o m b plot of July 1944 was carried out by people w h o " i n v i e w of the situation behaved honorably, w e r e conscious of their responsibility, and w e r e patriotic i n the b e s t s e n s e , " t h o s e w h o d e c i d e d t o c a r r y o n fighting t o t h e b i t t e r e n d a l s o b e h a v e d h o n o r a b l y . " T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e c a s e , " h e added, " f o r t h e soldiers of t h e G e r m a n A r m y i n t h e East, a n d f o r t h e G e r m a n N a v y , w h i c h h a d t o c o v e r t h e flight o f m i l l i o n s o f G e r m a n s i n t h e E a s t f r o m t h e R e d A r m y i n t h e last m o n t h s of the war."13 A l l this reflects, a m o n g o t h e r things, a w i d e l y h e l d v i e w o f t h e G e r m a n A r m y ' s c o n d u c t d u r i n g t h e w a r , w h i c h s a w i t as broadly c o n f o r m i n g to the n o r m a l rules of combat. I n the 1950s, as t h e s u r v i v i n g G e r m a n g e n e r a l s c a m e t o w r i t e t h e i r m e m o i r s , they insisted that the w a r had b e e n fought o n their part accordi n g t o the best G e r m a n m i l i t a r y traditions. P a t r i o t i s m and a sense of d u t y h a d b e e n t h e m o t i v e s ; N a z i ideology h a d always b e e n k e p t at bay. W h a t e v e r " e x c e s s e s " t h e r e w e r e d i d n o t exceed those c o m m i t t e d by A l l i e d troops and w e r e n o m o r e t h a n could b e expected i na l o n g a n d hard-fought conflict. T h e c r i m e s o f N a z i s m w e r e c o m m i t t e d b y t h e SS. O n e g e n e r a l d e scribed the battles fought by his c o m m a n d , the T w e l f t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n , as " a l w a y s f a i r l y c o n d u c t e d , t h o u g h t o u g h a n d

5 6 • IN H I T L E R ' S

SHADOW

bitter. Its n a m e , " h e a d d e d "its coat o f a r m s , a n d its w e a p o n s r e m a i n e d u n s u l l i e d t i l l t h e v e r y l a s t d a y , as e v e n t h e e n e m y h a s conceded." A n d indeed a leading British military historian, B. H . L i d d e l l H a r t , e v e n claimed that " t h e G e r m a n A r m y i n the field o n t h e w h o l e o b s e r v e d t h e r u l e s o f w a r b e t t e r t h a n i t d i d i n 1914-18." T h a t m a n y senior m i l i t a r y m e n objected to those N a z i excesses o f w h i c h t h e y w e r e a w a r e , a n d t h a t s o m e o f t h e m eventually took the step of t r y i n g to r e m o v e H i t l e r altogether, w a s w i d e l y s e e n as f u r t h e r p r o o f o f t h e A r m y ' s h o n o r a b l e c o n duct during the w a r . 1 4 T h e s e v i e w s a r e i n m a n y respects also e n d o r s e d b y E r n s t N o l t e , w h o cites w i t h s o m e s y m p a t h y a n official i n H i t l e r ' s F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y w h o said t h a t t h e w a r w a s b e i n g f o u g h t i n defense of W e s t e r n values and i n order to liberate the oppressed peoples of t h e USSR. H i t l e r was a " E u r o p e a n c i t i z e n , " w h o i n essence r e p r e s e n t e d t h e E u r o p e a n m i d d l e class i n i t s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e a t t e m p t o f B o l s h e v i s m t o destroy i t . H e suggests t h a t w h a t m a d e this basically justifiable a i m o f l i b e r a t i o n impossible to sustain was Hitler's " t o t a l egocentrism" i n w a n t i n g to go o n to e x t e r m i n a t e t h e Slavs a n d t h e Jews. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n N o l t e ' s v i e w t h e n a t u r e o f t h e e a s t e r n c a m p a i g n as a n e p i s o d e i n t h e " E u r o p e a n C i v i l W a r " b e t w e e n C o m m u n i s m a n d fascism, b e g u n b y t h e B o l s h e v i k s i n 1917, m a d e at least s o m e aspects o f its harshness justifiable. G e r m a n brutality i n the East was conditioned b y m e m o r i e s o f Soviet b r u t a l i t y i n 1 9 1 7 - 2 1 . I n this sense, N o l t e defends the G e r m a n c o m m a n d to execute all political commiss a r s i n t h e R e d A r m y u p o n c a p t u r e — t h e n o t o r i o u s Kommissar¬ befehl. " I n s o f a r as t h i s c o m m a n d is t o b e s e e n i n t h e c o n t e x t o f the w a r b e t w e e n t w o ideologies, it was thus n o t ' c r i m i n a l ' b u t c o n s i s t e n t . " I n a n y case, h e adds, t h e c o m m a n d w a s m o s t l y disregarded, a n d was rescinded i n 1942. M o r e o v e r , " t h e w a r against P o l a n d began w i t h a t e n d e n c y to genocide o n t h e Polish side, n a m e l y t h e so-called ' B r o m b e r g B l o o d y S u n d a y , ' t h e g u n n i n g - d o w n of some thousands of citizens of G e r m a n origin by furious Poles. W h e t h e r t h e G e r m a n m i n o r i t y w o u l d h a v e surv i v e d , " h e adds, " i f t h e w a r h a d lasted l o n g e r t h a n t h r e e m o n t h s , m u s t appear d o u b t f u l . " So i n this sense t o o , h e i m p l i e s , G e r m a n harshness t o w a r d t h e occupied populations was justifiable. B u t i t is r a t h e r s o p h i s t i c a l t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e G e r m a n A r m y was justified i n executing all captured Soviet political commis-

BULWARK

AGAINST

B O LS H E V IS M ? • 5 7

sars m e r e l y b e c a u s e o f a g e n e r a l b e l i e f i n t h e b r u t a l i t y o f B o l s h e v i k r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s t w o d e c a d e s e a r l i e r . N o r is t h e p u t a t i v e existence of a twenty-year ideological " w a r " any justification e i t h e r , f o r i n t h e e n d t h e n o t i o n o f a n i d e o l o g i c a l w a r is a m e t a p h o r , a construct p u t u p o n the political struggles of t h e t w e n t i e s a n d t h i r t i e s b y t h e h i s t o r i a n , b y N o l t e . M o r e o v e r , i t is a substantial exaggeration to claim that the Poles w e r e bent o n exterminating the Germans in their territory in September 1939. W h a t seems to h a v e h a p p e n e d , according to t h e m o s t t h o r o u g h a n d c r i t i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s (as u s u a l , n o t c i t e d b y N o l t e ) is t h a t s o m e f o u r t h o u s a n d t o s i x t h o u s a n d e t h n i c G e r m a n s i n P o l a n d m e t their death i n the G e r m a n invasion of 1939, a n u m ber of t h e m by G e r m a n aircraft o n b o m b i n g or strafing missions, o t h e r s at t h e h a n d s o f p a n i c k y P o l i s h t r o o p s — e n r a g e d i n m a n y cases, i t s e e m s , b y t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f s o m e o f t h e e t h n i c G e r m a n s as fifth-columnists f o r p u r p o s e s o f s u b v e r s i o n a n d sabotage b y t h e G e r m a n A r m y (against t h e advice o f t h e G e r m a n F o r e i g n Office). T h e events at B r o m b e r g o c c u r r e d o n S e p t e m b e r 3 , a f t e r t h e o u t b r e a k o f w a r , as P o l i s h t r o o p s c l a i m e d t o h a v e b e e n fired o n b y l o c a l e t h n i c G e r m a n s . M a n y i n n o c e n t e t h n i c G e r m a n s suffered appallingly i n t h e process; b u t these sufferings, inflicted i n a v e r y short space o f t i m e , i n n o w a y c o m p a r e d w i t h the prolonged and m u r d e r o u s savagery m e t e d out to the Poles by the occupying G e r m a n s i n the f o l l o w i n g years.15 I n m a k i n g h i s p o i n t s , N o l t e is r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t G e r m a n y d i d i n d e e d e m p l o y g r e a t b r u t a l i t y o n t h e e a s t e r n f r o n t . T h i s is a n i n s i g h t w h i c h h a s o n l y g r a d u a l l y b e c o m e a c c e p t e d as a r e s u l t o f research carried o u t i n G e r m a n y a n d abroad, a n d based o n still barely explored documentation i n the G e r m a n Military Archives at F r e i b u r g , i n t h e c a p t u r e d N a z i d o c u m e n t s , a n d elsew h e r e . I n accepting the G e r m a n generals' account of their c o n f o r m i t y to n o r m a l standards of military conduct, A m e r i c a n a n d B r i t i s h w r i t e r s i n the postwar years w e r e to a large extent reflecting the experiences of Allied troops o n the western front a n d i n N o r t h Africa. T h e y p o i n t e d to t h e fact that o n l y 4 percent of British and A m e r i c a n troops captured by the Germans died i n captivity, and contrasted this w i t h the b r u t a l t r e a t m e n t m e t e d out by the Japanese to Allied prisoners of war, of w h o m over a q u a r t e r — 2 7 p e r c e n t — d i e d i n captivity. Massacres i n G e r m a n o c c u p i e d W e s t e r n E u r o p e , s u c h as t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e F r e n c h

58

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

village o f O r a d o u r a n d its i n h a b i t a n t s b y G e r m a n a r m e d forces, gained their notoriety precisely because o ftheir rarity. Y e t conditions o n the eastern front w e r e completely different. Fiftyeight percent of Soviet prisoners of w a r taken by the Germans died i n captivity—some 3,300,000 out of 5,700,000 all told. A n d in German-occupied East-Central and Eastern Europe there was not one O r a d o u r but thousands. According to Soviet figures, t h e G e r m a n s d e s t r o y e d s o m e 1,710 t o w n s a n d 7 0 , 0 0 0 villages, along w i t h most o f their inhabitants. Altogether the Soviet U n i o n lost 13,000,000 soldiers a n d 7,000,000 civilians k i l l e d b y the Germans d u r i n g the Second W o r l d W a r , or 40 percent of all deaths caused b y t h e conflict. T h e s e a p p a l l i n g figures r e f l e c t t h e f a c t t h a t , i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e campaigns o n the western front, the G e r m a n invasion of the S o v i e t U n i o n , as H i l l g r u b e r a d m i t s , w a s f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g a n ideologically m o t i v a t e d w a r of total subjugation and extermination. Almost f r o m the very beginning, long before the outbreak o f t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , as w e h a v e s e e n , H i t l e r a n d t h e N a z i s s a w t h e c r e a t i o n o f s o - c a l l e d " l i v i n g s p a c e " (Lebensraum) f o r G e r m a n s i n t h e E a s t as a c e n t r a l a i m o f t h e i r p o l i c y . T h o s e w h o i n h a b i t e d t h e s e a r e a s w e r e d i s m i s s e d as S l a v " s u b h u m a n s " ; t h e Russians w e r e declared t o be u n d e r t h e leadership o f e v i l C o m m u n i s t fanatics, w h o m t h e N a z i s , i n defiance o f a l l t h e facts, t h o u g h t w e r e m o s t l y Jewish, T h u s c o n t e m p t f o r t h e Slavs w a s joined w i t h hatred of Communists and Jews into a potent ideological m i x t u r e . T h i s was used b y t h e Nazis t o j u s t i f y a series o f orders sent via the G e r m a n H i g h C o m m a n d to the A r m y i m m e diately before t h e invasion of Russia i n 1941. T h e A r m y was t o l d t o a l l o w f r e e r e i n t o t h e SS d e a t h s q u a d s (Einsatzgruppen) s e n t i n t o t h e i r areas u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of R e i n h a r d H e y d r i c h to begin the e x t e r m i n a t i o n of the Jews. I twas told to shoot all political commissars i n the R e d A r m y immediately o n capture. It was e m p o w e r e d to execute all guerillas a n d partisans a n d those civilians t h o u g h t t o be h e l p i n g t h e m , a n d t o take collective reprisals against w h o l e c o m m u n i t i e s i f n o i n d i v i d u a l culprits could b e f o u n d i n t h e a f t e r m a t h o f partisan actions. Finally, t h e official " G u i d e l i n e s for t h e C o n d u c t of t h e T r o o p s i n Russia" o r d e r e d t h e A r m y to e l i m i n a t e all resistance (even passive resistance) a n d t o take ruthless measures against " B o l shevik agitators, guerillas, saboteurs a n d J e w s . " 1 6

BULWARK

AGAINST

B O LS H E V IS M ? • 5 9

A n u m b e r o f d i f f e r e n t i n f l u e n c e s c o m b i n e d , as h i s t o r i a n O m e r B a r t o v has s h o w n , t o dispose t h e A r m y o n t h e eastern f r o n t , at all levels, f r o m t h e c o m m a n d i n g generals to t h e c o m m o n soldier, to take full advantage of these orders, w h i c h w e r e s u b s e q u e n t l y c o n d e m n e d as " c r i m i n a l o r d e r s " b y t h e N u r e m berg Trials after the end of the war. T h e troops w e r e exposed t o m a s s i v e i n d o c t r i n a t i o n t h r o u g h films, r a d i o p r o g r a m s , l e c tures, newspapers, books, a n d leaflets. T h i s w a s c a r r i e d o u t n o t o n l y b y " N a t i o n a l Socialist L e a d e r s h i p Officers" a p p o i n t e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e , b u t also, r i g h t f r o m t h e start, b y t h e j u n i o r officers. U n l i k e m a n y of the senior c o m m a n d e r s , w h o w e r e o f t e n aristocratic and w h o p r o v i d e d most of the leaders of the opposition i n 1944, these m e n w e r e m a i n l y middle-class a n d w e r e y o u n g e n o u g h to have b e e n exposed for most of their adolescent and adult years to the N a z i i n d o c t r i n a t i o n w h i c h was such a central part of the education system f r o m 1933 o n w a r d . A b o u t a t h i r d of t h e m w e r e members of the Nazi Party. As victory turned to defeat, a n d t h e A r m y b e g a n its l o n g w i t h d r a w a l i n t h e face o f the Soviet onslaught, N a z i ideology became ever m o r e import a n t , as t h e t r o o p s s o u g h t f o r a s e t o f b e l i e f s w h i c h w o u l d m o t i vate t h e m to carry o n the struggle.17 Conditions were e x t r e m e l y harsh. Casualties w e r e h e a v y f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e c a m p a i g n , a m o u n t i n g i n t h e e n d t o as m u c h as t h r e e t i m e s the n u m b e r of troops w h o originally took part i n the invasion. T h e troops h a d to m a r c h vast distances o n foot, to l i v e off t h e land, and to survive the extreme conditions of the Russian w i n ter w i t h totally i n a d e q u a t e c l o t h i n g a n d shelter. F a t i g u e , illness, exhaustion, a n d desperation increased still f u r t h e r t h e d e g r e e of brutalization. T h u s t h e A r m y c o m m a n d e r s at t h e f r o n t increasingly used N a z i t e r m i n o l o g y i n t h e i r e v e r y d a y orders. T h e Jews w e r e des c r i b e d as " v e r m i n " i n i n f o r m a t i o n i s s u e d t o t h e t r o o p s d u r i n g t h e i n v a s i o n of P o l a n d i n O c t o b e r 1939, a n d t h e soldiers w e r e told f r o m t h e start that t h e Russians w e r e "Jewish-Bolshevik s u b h u m a n s " or " M o n g o l hordes." B y 1945, indeed, the troops w e r e b e i n g s u p p l i e d w i t h battle slogans calling f o r resistance a g a i n s t t h e " A s i a n flood" a n d t h e " r e d b e a s t . " T h e j u n i o r o f f i c e r s w e r e g i v e n a special responsibility for instilling such beliefs i n t o t h e i r t r o o p s . G i v e n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , i t is h a r d l y s u r p r i s ing that the conduct of the G e r m a n A r m y o n the eastern front

60

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

was brutal i n the extreme. T h e West G e r m a n historian Christ i a n S t r e i t has s h o w n , f o r e x a m p l e , h o w t h e G e r m a n soldier f r o m t h e outset refused to regard his c o u n t e r p a r t i n t h e R e d A r m y as a n o r d i n a r y f e l l o w s o l d i e r , t o b e t r e a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e n o r m a l rules o f w a r . Russians t a k e n prisoner b e h i n d t h e l i n e s — a n d t h e r e w e r e m a n y t h o u s a n d s o f t h e s e , as a r e s u l t o f t h e G e r m a n s ' success i n e n c i r c l i n g a n d c u t t i n g o f f R u s s i a n u n i t s — w e r e s h o t as " p a r t i s a n s , " w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y w e r e i n regular units. T h e rest w e r e m a r c h e d off o n foot, after h a v i n g b e e n stripped of their w i n t e r clothes a n d boots, deliberately deprived of adequate food rations, and often decimated by massacres, s o m e t i m e s against t h e o r d e r s o f t h e A r m y c o m m a n d . Those w h o survived to reach the prisoner-of-war camps cont i n u e d t o b e t r e a t e d as " s u b h u m a n s " a n d w e r e e f f e c t i v e l y c o n demned to death by starvation and neglect.18 N o t only did the G e r m a n troops i n the East behave, o n the whole, with extreme brutality and barbarism toward the Red A r m y , t h e y also l a i d w a s t e w h o l e areas o f t h e t e r r i t o r y t h e y occupied and massacred or otherwise caused the deaths of m i l l i o n s o f i n n o c e n t c i v i l i a n s as a m a t t e r o f p o l i c y . L i v i n g o f f t h e land m e a n t p l u n d e r a n d theft o f livestock a n d food supplies to such an extent that the inhabitants had n o t h i n g left. Harvests w e r e destroyed, a n d agriculture collapsed. T h e G e r m a n A r m y forcibly evacuated large areas o f t e r r i t o r y b e h i n d t h e f r o n t , e i t h e r s h o o t i n g t h e c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n because o f so-called "partisan" operations or leaving t h e m without adequate food supplies. Civilians f o u n d " w a n d e r i n g a b o u t " w e r e shot; houses suspected of sheltering partisans w e r e b u r n e d d o w n , together w i t h the people inside t h e m ; people thought to be "tolerating partisans" w e r e publicly hanged. W h e n the G e r m a n A r m y began to retreat after the battle of Stalingrad, it embarked u p o n a "scorched-earth" policy i n w h i c h t h e areas i t evacuated w e r e systematically destroyed, the villages b u r n e d , the livestock killed, and the machinery wrecked. T h e people were driven out i n the direction of the advancing Red A r m y into the "desert zone," where many of t h e m died.19 A l l this makes it difficult to sustain the idea that the G e r m a n A r m y i n t h e E a s t w a s fighting t o d e f e n d G e r m a n c u l t u r e a n d c i v i l i z a t i o n a g a i n s t C o m m u n i s t b a r b a r i t y i n 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 . S t i l l less does it support t h e idea that the G e r m a n troops w e r e n o r m a l

BULWARK

AGAINST

B O L S H E V I S M ? • 61

soldiers e n g a g e d i n c o n v e n t i o n a l m i l i t a r y conflict a n d largely free f r o m the taint of Nazism. It was not the Soviet A r m y w h i c h adhered to a fundamentally barbarous concept of war, but the G e r m a n A r m y . As the Soviet troops advanced, it was inevitable u n d e r the circumstances that they should be m o t i v a t e d by feelings o f h a t r e d a n d revenge against t h e e n e m y w h i c h h a d i n flicted s u c h t e r r i b l e d e s t r u c t i o n o n t h e i r l a n d a n d o n t h e o t h e r areas o f E a s t e r n E u r o p e t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e y passed. M o r e o v e r , m a n y e t h n i c G e r m a n civilians i n these areas h a d w i l l i n g l y t a k e n part i n atrocities against o t h e r ethnic groups d u r i n g t h e conflict. T h e crimes c o m m i t t e d by G e r m a n troops i n the East w e r e w e l l k n o w n long before the full extent of the mass e x t e r m i n a t i o n of E u r o p e a n Jews b e c a m e clear. Secret police reports indicate widespread guilt feelings w i t h i n the G e r m a n civilian populat i o n inside t h e R e i c h e v e n before 1945, i n c l u d i n g a n oftrepeated popular belief that it was only to be expected that the Russians w o u l d c o m m i t atrocities i n v i e w o f w h a t t h e G e r m a n s themselves had previously done i n Russia.20 N o n e o f this o fcourse excuses t h e conduct o f t h e Soviet troops, the mass rape o f G e r m a n w o m e n , the looting and plundering, the deportation and lengthy imprisonment i n Russia of m a n y G e r m a n troops, or t h e u n a u t h o r i z e d killing of m a n y G e r m a n civilians. B u t i t has t o b e said t h a t t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e R e d A r m y i n G e r m a n y w a s b y n o m e a n s as b a r b a r o u s as t h a t o f t h e G e r m a n A r m y i n Russia. T h e Russians d i d n o t deliberately lay waste w h o l e t o w n s a n d villages i n G e r m a n y , n o r d i d they systematically exterminate w h o l e communities d u r i n g their occupation o f G e r m a n territory. O u t o f an estimated 3,155,000 G e r m a n prisoners o f w a r t a k e n b y t h e Russians, just o v e r a t h i r d , i t has b e e n c l a i m e d , d i e d i n c a p t i v i t y , b u t these figures, w h i l e far better t h a n those quoted above for Russian troops i n G e r m a n hands, have been disputed by recent Soviet scholarship, w h i c h claims they are m u c h exaggerated. M o r e over, w i t h a substantial part o ftheir territory under e n e m y occupation, and their o w n military position i n disarray, the Russians w e r e scarcely able to look after t h e i r o w n troops i n t h e e a r l y a n d m i d d l e stages o f t h e w a r , let a l o n e care a d e q u a t e l y f o r captured Germans, w h i l e most Russian prisoners of w a r died i n G e r m a n captivity d u r i n g t h e years of t h e T h i r d Reich's greatest p o w e r a n d success. F i n a l l y , w h i l e t h e r a p e o f G e r m a n w o m e n

62

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

was a c o m m o n accompaniment of the Red A r m y ' s takeover of G e r m a n t o w n s a n d villages, r a p e w a s also, d e s p i t e denials o f G e r m a n officers i n t h e i r s u b s e q u e n t m e m o i r s , w i d e s p r e a d d u r i n g t h e G e r m a n o c c u p a t i o n o f W e s t e r n Russia. H e r e t o o t h e r e was a sharp contrast w i t h the w e s t e r n front. I n France, for example, the rape of F r e n c h w o m e n by G e r m a n troops was d e s c r i b e d as s u c h i n c o u r t s - m a r t i a l a n d s u b j e c t t o d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n ; o n t h e e a s t e r n f r o n t , s u c h c a s e s w e r e d e s c r i b e d as " f r a t e r n i z a t i o n " or "racial offenses" or e v e n "collaboration w i t h part i s a n s . " T h e y w e r e n o t , i n o t h e r w o r d s , d e s c r i b e d as " m o r a l offenses," a n d w e r e n o t severely punished. I n t h e context o f t h e mass killings of Russian m e n , w o m e n , and children by G e r m a n troops, such offenses w e r e b o u n d to be considered r e l a t i v e l y trivial.21 I t is h a r d t o s e e h o w a n y o n e a w a r e o f t h e s e f a c t s c o u l d w i s h to " i d e n t i f y " w i t h the G e r m a n troops o n the eastern f r o n t d u r i n g t h e final p h a s e s o f t h e w a r . M o r e o v e r , t h e i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s a r g u m e n t is t h a t p r e s e n t - d a y S o v i e t c i t i z e n s s h o u l d identify w i t h the Red A r m y troops w h o overran the eastern G e r m a n t e r r i t o r i e s i n 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 a n d c o m m i t t e d so m a n y c r i m e s against ethnic G e r m a n s . T h i s w o u l d surely n o t be acceptable to Hillgruber. A n d the contrast w i t h the w e s t e r n f r o n t makes identification by a present-day West G e r m a n w i t h the Germ a n A r m y of 1944 e v e n m o r e difficult. T h e conduct of Germ a n troops i n the W e s t was generally far better; yet n o one has suggested t h a t p r e s e n t - d a y G e r m a n s s h o u l d i d e n t i f y w i t h these troops, for the very good reason that they w e r e not fighting against C o m m u n i s m b u t against t h e W e s t e r n d e m o c racies. D e n y i n g t h e m t h e grace o f p o s t h u m o u s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w o u l d s o m e h o w s e e m t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e y w e r e less h e r o i c , less h o n o r a b l e t h a n t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s o n t h e e a s t e r n f r o n t b e c a u s e t h e y h a d t h e m i s f o r t u n e t o b e fighting a g a i n s t a d i f f e r e n t e n e m y . T h e f a c t is t h a t a l l t h e G e r m a n t r o o p s w e r e fighting f o r t h e s a m e c a u s e . T h e y w e r e n o t fighting t o p r e serve E u r o p e f r o m C o m m u n i s m . A l m o s t to t h e e n d , t h e y bel i e v e d t h e y w e r e fighting f o r H i t l e r a n d fighting f o r G e r m a n y . E v e n as l a t e as J a n u a r y 1 9 4 5 , o p i n i o n p o l l s c a r r i e d o u t a m o n g G e r m a n prisoners o f w a r s h o w e d t h a t t h e great m a j o r i t y still retained their faith i n Hitler.22

BULWARK

AGAINST

B O L S H E V I S M ? • 63

III According t o Hillgruber, the majority o f G e r m a n t r o o p s , a t l e a s t i n t h e E a s t , w e r e , i n c a r r y i n g o n fighting u n t i l the bitter end instead of joining the opposition and ending the w a r i n July 1944, acting o u t o f a m o r e realistic sense o f m o r a l responsibility t h a n that s h o w n by their colleagues w h o took part i n the resistance. H i l l g r u b e r draws a distinction b e t w e e n the ethical stand of the plotters, b o r n out of inner conviction, and t h a t t a k e n b y t h e local p a r t y , state, a n d m i l i t a r y leadership i n t h e E a s t , w h i c h , h e says, w a s b o r n o u t o f t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n a g i v e n situation. H e expresses s y m p a t h y for Germ a n A r m y commanders o n the eastern front w h o failed t o s u p p o r t t h e p l o t . H e is s u r e l y c o r r e c t i n c a s t i n g d o u b t u p o n t h e realism of the 1944 conspirators. T h e i r vision of a conservative Greater G e r m a n y , leading E u r o p e but not dominating or ens l a v i n g i t , w a s , as H i l l g r u b e r , d e s p i t e h i s s y m p a t h y f o r i t , c o n cedes, c o m p l e t e l y unrealistic b y this t i m e . 2 3 T h e m o s t l i k e l y outcome, had Stauffenberg's b o m b succeeded i n killing H i t l e r , a n d h a d the A r m y succeeded i n t a k i n g c o m m a n d of the situat i o n , w o u l d h a v e b e e n confusion a n d chaos. T h e m o r e fanatical N a z i s a n d SS m e n w o u l d h a v e r e s i s t e d , a n d a r a p i d w o r s e n i n g of Germany's military situation w o u l d have led to surrender to t h e A l l i e s s o m e m o n t h s b e f o r e i t finally o c c u r r e d . B e l i e f i n H i t ler was an i m p o r t a n t factor i n m a i n t a i n i n g m o r a l e a m o n g the troops b y this stage; his r e m o v a l f r o m t h e scene w o u l d h a v e s e r i o u s l y w e a k e n e d t h e w i l l t o fight. E v e n t h o u g h t h e i r w i d e r aims w e r e doomed to failure, the plotters' immediate purpose, t h a t o f assassinating H i t l e r , was still w e l l w o r t h a c h i e v i n g . T h e plotters w e r e conscious of their historic mission of demonstrati n g to the w o r l d that " a n o t h e r G e r m a n y " existed besides t h e G e r m a n y of the T h i r d Reich. T h e y sought to show that some G e r m a n s w e r e p r e p a r e d t o oppose N a z i c r i m i n a l i t y e v e n at t h e cost o f t h e i r o w n lives. E v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t , h o w e v e r , was t h e fact that h a d t h e y succeeded, t h e y m i g h t w e l l h a v e halted the e x t e r m i n a t i o n of the E u r o p e a n Jews. A l t h o u g h the great majority of G e r m a n m i l i t a r y leaders w e r e heavily implicated i n the m u r d e r of the Jews, the m i n o r i t y w h o organized or carried out t h e B o m b P l o t w e r e i n s o m e cases d e e p l y o p p o s e d t o t h e e x t e r -

64

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

m i n a t i o n of the Jews o n m o r a l grounds. T h e i r action could be said t o h a v e reflected a sense o f responsibility f o r t h e lives o f t h o s e J e w s w h o w e r e y e t t o e n t e r t h e gas c h a m b e r s . T h i s w a s in no w a y morally or ethically inferior to the other A r m y commanders' responsibility to the G e r m a n populations i n the East.24 O f course, i t m i g h t be objected that each nation's p r i m a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is f o r t h e l i v e s o f its o w n c i t i z e n s . E v e n i f t h i s p o i n t is c o n c e d e d , h o w e v e r , i t r e m a i n s t h e c a s e t h a t t h e p r o l o n gation of the w a r f r o m July 1944 to A p r i l 1945 brought w i t h it t h e d e a t h s o f m i l l i o n s o f G e r m a n s o l d i e r s a n d c i v i l i a n s as w e l l . T h e i r lives m i g h t h a v e been saved h a d t h e w a r e n d e d sooner. Moreover, the Nazis wreaked a terrible revenge for the B o m b Plot, not only o n those w h o had planned it and carried it out, b u t also o n e v e r - w i d e r circles o f those aristocratic, C h r i s t i a n , and other groups w h o m they considered sympathetic to it. A n d as i t b e c a m e c l e a r t h a t t h e w a r w a s b e i n g l o s t , t h e y s e t a b o u t eliminating non-Nazis w h o m they t h o u g h t likely to take a leading role i n postwar G e r m a n y . A l l these people too m i g h t have been spared by an earlier e n d to the N a z i regime. I f the choice is f o r p r e s e n t - d a y W e s t G e r m a n s t o i d e n t i f y w i t h t h e s o l d i e r s o n the eastern f r o n t or t h e conspirators of July 1944, all these considerations point categorically i n favor of the latter.25 Y e t t h e c h o i c e as i t is p o s e d h e r e is t o o r e s t r i c t i v e . I t i m p l i e s that t h e G e r m a n resistance to H i t l e r began a n d e n d e d w i t h t h e July conspirators. T h i s does a grave disservice to the far m o r e n u m e r o u s C o m m u n i s t a n d Social D e m o c r a t i c resistance groups w h o s e m e m b e r s actively opposed t h e Nazis f r o m t h e v e r y beginning, o f t e n p a y i n g for i t w i t h their lives. T h e y m a y n o t have been i n a position to topple the regime, but they did all they could to keep alive the spirit of opposition to it. I n this their behavior contrasted sharply w i t h that of the m e n of July 1944, most of w h o m had begun by collaborating w i t h the regime and generally a p p r o v i n g o f w h a t i t was doing. T h e ideals o f m o s t o f the conspirators w e r e far f r o m democratic; they believed, o n the whole, i n an authoritarian political system for G e r m a n y and i n G e r m a n h e g e m o n y over the rest o f E u r o p e . O n l y gradually d i d t h e y c o m e t o see t h a t H i t l e r , w h i l e h e c e r t a i n l y s h a r e d t h e s e b e l i e f s , a l s o w e n t f a r b e y o n d t h e m . W h e n t h e y finally m o v e d against h i m , i t was m u c h too late. N o n e o f this should be t a k e n

BULWARK

AGAINST

BO LS HEVIS M? • 6 5

as b e l i t t l i n g t h e i r t r e m e n d o u s c o u r a g e , o r as a n a t t e m p t t o m i n i m i z e the importance o f their gesture. B u t i t certainly should b e taken to m e a n that there are grave problems i n the w a y of an identification w i t h these m e n o n the part of West G e r m a n democrats today. Federal President Richard v o n Weizsäcker w a s r i g h t t o s a y i n h i s a d d r e s s t o t h e W e s t G e r m a n p e o p l e o n M a y 8 , 1 9 8 5 , t h a t i t is i m p o r t a n t t o h o n o r t h e m e m o r y o f all t h o s e w h o s a c r i f i c e d t h e i r l i v e s i n t h e r e s i s t a n c e : t h e civil, military, and religious resistance, the resistance i n the t r a d e u n i o n s a n d t h e w o r k i n g class, a n d t h e r e s i s t a n c e o f t h e Communists.26

C H A P T E R

F O U R

AUSCHWITZ AND ELSEWHERE

I N o one i n the present debate is seriously d e n y i n g e i t h e r t h e v i r u l e n c e o f N a z i a n t i - S e m i t i s m or t h e h o r r o r s o f its e v e n t u a l realization. Y e t v i e w s differ considerably o n t h e quest i o n o f h o w i t c a m e a b o u t . N o l t e , as w e h a v e s e e n , r e g a r d s i t as a response to Bolshevism. H i l l g r u b e r is m o r e precise. I n t h e second p a r t of his book, he t u r n s to t h e "historical location of the a n n i h i l a t i o n of the J e w s " a n d attempts to trace back the r o o t s o f H i t l e r ' s " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " as f a r as h e c a n . I t s l o n g - t e r m o r i g i n s , h e says, l a y i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f a n t i - S e m i t i s m t h a t h a d h a u n t e d E u r o p e since Christian m e d i e v a l times, t h e n i n the fluctuating currents of hostility accompanying the emancipation of the Jews i n the nineteenth century. These culminated i n t h e rise of a strong w a v e of a n t i - S e m i t i s m i n t h e G e r m a n E m p i r e f o u n d e d b y B i s m a r c k a n d i n t h e last decades o f t h e Habsburg monarchy. Before the First W o r l d War, however, anti-Semitism was beginning t odecline i n Germany. T h e r e w a s , t o b e s u r e , a n e w , m o r e v i r u l e n t k i n d o f r a c i a l , as o p p o s e d to religious, anti-Semitism, but it was restricted to very l i m i t e d a r e a s o f G e r m a n s o c i e t y u p t o 1 9 1 4 . I t w a s , says H i l l g r u b e r , f a r

AUSCHWITZ

A N D E L S E W H E R E • 67

68

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

stronger i n A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , a n d m o s t m a r k e d o f all i n tsarist Russia. T h e progress f r o m o n e stage o f a n t i - S e m i t i s m t o t h e n e x t was by no means inevitable. Auschwitz was not preprog r a m m e d i n the history of either G e r m a n y or Europe.1 A n e w stage was r e a c h e d d u r i n g t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r , w h e n , H i l l g r u b e r argues, a n t i - S e m i t i s m b e c a m e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e nationalist ideology of the short-lived but extremist and widely supported Fatherland Party f o u n d e d i n 1917 by retired G r a n d A d m i r a l Alfred v o n Tirpitz. F r o m here it was taken up into the p r o g r a m of the reorganized, expanded far right. W h i t e Russian émigrés a n d A u s t r i a n i n f l u e n c e s b r o u g h t n e w e l e m e n t s i n t o G e r m a n anti-Semitism, w h i c h was further radicalized by the influx of numerous Jewish refugees f r o m Eastern Europe and by the equation of the Bolshevik threat w i t h an alleged Jewish w o r l d conspiracy. These developments c u l m i n a t e d i n the e m e r g e n c e o f t h e N a z i P a r t y . H i l l g r u b e r says t h a t a n t i - S e m i tism played a vital integrating role for the Nazis, even t h o u g h its i m p o r t a n c e i n w i n n i n g v o t e r s t o t h e N a z i cause w a s o n l y secondary. F r o m 1933 a n t i - S e m i t i s m b e c a m e a state ideology. T h e Second W o r l d W a r saw the c u l m i n a t i o n of Hitler's longheld idea of a "racial revolution" i n w h i c h the destruction of the Jews was to be t h e essential p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e p e r m a n e n t e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h as a w o r l d p o w e r . H e r e , argues H i l l g r u b e r , H i t l e r p a r t e d c o m p a n y w i t h his f e l l o w Nazis i n t h e e x t r e m i t y of his anti-Semitism. T h e " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " was his alone. H i s e x t r e m i s t v i e w s d e p e n d e d o n w a r for t h e i r realization and w e r e quite different f r o m previous anti-Semitic traditions i n G e r m a n y . T h e y f o u n d their expression i n the mass m u r d e r of over 5 million Jews i n Auschwitz and elsewhere, bringing a violent end to the two-thousand-year history of European Jewry. I f the historical constellation of the year 1 9 4 1 — w h e n H i t l e r t h o u g h t h e h a d a u n i q u e chance to p u t his plans into action—was w i t h o u t parallel, then, Hillgruber concludes, t h e f a c t t h a t so m a n y o t h e r w i s e c i v i l i z e d a n d e d u c a t e d p e o p l e took part i n the mass m u r d e r , that it occurred u n d e r the advanced conditions o f t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y civilization, gives i t a u n i v e r s a l r e l e v a n c e a n d challenges us all t o e n s u r e t h a t i t does not happen again.2 N o t all of these views are equally open to objection. Understandably enough, m a n y historians have seen a certain inevita-

AUSCHWITZ

A N D E L S E W H E R E • 69

bility about t h e rise of a n t i - S e m i t i s m i n G e r m a n y . T h e y h a v e r e g a r d e d h a t r e d o f t h e J e w s as a n i n t e g r a l c o m p o n e n t o f t h e m o d e r n G e r m a n national character.3 B u t this is a dangerous v i e w t otake. I f w e are t o uncover the roots of racism and a n t i - S e m i t i s m a n d t o u n d e r s t a n d w h y t h e y flourished m o r e i n some countries and i n some conditions than i n others, t h e n w e have to be v e r y careful i n our j u d g m e n t of the true extent and v i r u l e n c e o f a n t i - S e m i t i s m at a n y g i v e n place a n d t i m e . I f w e blur distinctions i n this area, w e r u n the risk of r o b b i n g ourselves o f t h e ability to j u d g e t h e degree o f danger w h i c h racism p o s e s i n o u r o w n s o c i e t y , a n d so t o t a k e a n a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l o f action against it. D r a w i n g distinctions here, difficult t h o u g h i t is, s h o u l d i n n o w a y b e t a k e n t o i m p l y a t o l e r a n c e o r a t r i v i a l i z a t i o n o f lesser f o r m s o f r a c i s m a n d a n t i - S e m i t i s m . T h e b e h a v i o r of r o w d y G e r m a n s w h o t h r e w Jewish citizens out of H a m b u r g ' s coffeehouses i n the anti-Semitic disturbances of the 1830s rem a i n s u t t e r l y r e p u l s i v e a n d o b j e c t i o n a b l e . 4 B u t i t is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e v i c t i m s o f these acts o f v i o l e n c e w e r e J e w i s h b y virtue of their religion, not just by ethnic identity, and that they w e r e m a n h a n d l e d and beaten up, but not tortured or m u r dered.5 Nevertheless, Hillgruber's account does substantially underestimate the degree and importance of anti-Semitism i n Germ a n y before t h e First W o r l d W a r . I n t h e 1880s a n d early 1890s, racist a n t i - S e m i t i s m p u s h e d o u t C h r i s t i a n a n t i - S e m i t i s m , a n d eugenic and social-Darwinist elements inserted themselves into anti-Semitic ideology. An u m b e r of small parties and organizations emerged whose central a i m was to r e m o v e ethnic Jews f r o m t h e i r supposed positions of influence i n G e r m a n society. A f t e r e n j o y i n g a b r i e f e l e c t o r a l success a n d g a i n i n g a h a n d f u l o f seats i n t h e G e r m a n p a r l i a m e n t , t h e s e g r o u p s s u d d e n l y declined a n d by 1914 h a d all b u t vanished f r o m t h e scene. B u t this d i d n o t reflect a general decline o f racist a n t i - S e m i t i s m : o n t h e contrary, w h a t had happened was that the mainstream political parties, above all the Conservatives and the Catholic Center Party, feeling themselves threatened by this n e w development, h a d r e s p o n d e d b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g racist a n t i - S e m i t i s m i n t o t h e i r o w n ideologies. M o r e o v e r , a n t i - S e m i t i s m was g i v e n p o w e r f u l official b a c k i n g t h r o u g h its u n d o u b t e d p r e s e n c e a t C o u r t , w h e r e Kaiser W i l h e l m I I a n d his friends c o m m o n l y i n d u l g e d i n

7 0 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

virulent anti-Semitic prejudice, language, and behavior. T h u s racist a n t i - S e m i t i s m m o v e d f r o m t h e backwaters o f t h e political scene i n t o t h e m a i n s t r e a m . I t b e c a m e respectable, a n d i t bec a m e widespread, t h o u g h some political parties, notably the S o c i a l D e m o c r a t s , o n t h e l e f t , r e m a i n e d m o r e o r less i m m u n e . 6 T h e radicalization of the G e r m a n right w h i c h accompanied the g r o w i n g realization of defeat d u r i n g the First W o r l d W a r did indeed m a r k a f u r t h e r step i n the spread o fracial antiSemitism, culminating in the emergence and growth o f the Nazi Party. B u t this had little to do w i t h the influence of W h i t e R u s s i a n émigrés. N o r d i d H i t l e r b r i n g a n y s t a r t l i n g n e w c o m p o nents of anti-Semitic ideology w i t h h i m f r o m Austria. O f course, additional touches w e r e added here and there, but Russian and Austrian influences had already been present i n G e r m a n antiS e m i t i s m b e f o r e t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r , as i n t h e n o t o r i o u s p r o p a g a n d a f o r g e r y , t h e s o - c a l l e d Protocols of the Elders of Zion. M o r e o v e r , i t is i m p o r t a n t n o t t o e x a g g e r a t e t h e i m p a c t o f J e w i s h refugees f r o m E a s t e r n E u r o p e d u r i n g t h e W e i m a r years. T h e i r n u m b e r s w e r e relatively insignificant compared t o those o f Jews already resident i n Germany. Nazi anti-Semitism was i n a n y case d i r e c t e d p r i m a r i l y a t t h e mass o f l a r g e l y assimilated Jews w i t h i n G e r m a n y itself, n o t against a h a n d f u l o f i m m i grants. Finally, although the Bolshevik " t h r e a t " was indeed equated w i t h an alleged Jewish w o r l d conspiracy d u r i n g the W e i m a r era, this was n o t h i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y n e w , since t h e ascription of socialism to "Jewish" influences was a central feature of anti-Semitic propaganda i n G e r m a n y before the First W o r l d W a r . I t is i m p o r t a n t , t h e r e f o r e , t o r e s t a t e t h e w e l l - k n o w n f a c t t h a t t h e m a j o r causes o f t h e spread a n d r a d i c a l i z a t i o n i n G e r m a n y o f racist a n t i - S e m i t i s m lay w i t h i n G e r m a n y itself; t h e y cannot b e a t t r i b u t e d t o Austrians, Russians, or Jewish i m m i grants f r o m the East.7 T o b e s u r e , t h e N a z i s d i d n o t find a n t i - S e m i t i s m t o b e a m a j o r v o t e - w i n n e r a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i r greatest e l e c t o r a l success b e t w e e n 1 9 3 0 a n d 1 9 3 3 . O f t e n , i n d e e d , t h e y p l a y e d i t d o w n i n order n o t to p u t voters off.8 Far m o r e i m p o r t a n t was their promise, i n w o r d and deed, to destroy the hated W e i m a r R e p u b l i c , e n d t h e m i s e r y o f t h e D e p r e s s i o n , a n d c r u s h t h e Social D e m o c r a t s a n d C o m m u n i s t s . O f course, for a n y o n e w h o thought about these things, the Nazis' anti-Semitism was obvi-

AUSCHWITZ

AND

E L S E W H E R E • 71

ous e n o u g h , a n d those w h o v o t e d for t h e m h a d n o excuse for p r e t e n d i n g that i t did n o t matter. B u t i t does n o t s e e m t o have b e e n the m a i n reason w h y the Nazis w o n such populari t y i n t h e last elections o f t h e W e i m a r p e r i o d . I t w o u l d b e q u i t e w r o n g t o see t h e m a s s o f G e r m a n e l e c t o r s c l a m o r i n g f o r the opportunity t o unleash their anti-Semitic hatred on the G e r m a n Jews. T h e political respectability w h i c h anti-Semitism had attained i n G e r m a n y rendered i t acceptable t o the 3 7 p e r c e n t o f t h e v o t e r s w h o s u p p o r t e d t h e N a z i s at t h e m o m e n t of t h e i r greatest t r i u m p h a t t h e polls i n July 1932. B u t w h e n t h e Nazis t r i e d to stir u p public hostility t o w a r d t h e Jews, i n t h e b o y c o t t t h e y i n s t i t u t e d as s o o n as t h e y c a m e t o p o w e r i n 1933, t h e y m e t w i t h o n l y a l i m i t e d response. A n d the mass violence of the pogroms of N o v e m b e r 1938 aroused such public d i s m a y a n d disquiet t h a t i t was n o t repeated: o n t h e contrary, the Nazis w e n t to some lengths to k e e p the realities o f the " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " h i d d e n f r o m the mass o f the G e r m a n p e o p l e , a l t h o u g h a n y o n e w h o w a n t e d t o find o u t c o u l d d o u b t l e s s h a v e d o n e so. " T h e r o a d t o A u s c h w i t z , " t h e r e f o r e , i n t h e m e m o r a b l e phrase o f historian Ian Kershaw, "was built b y hate, but paved w i t h indifference."9 Hillgruber's attempts to p i n the responsibility for the " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " o n H i t l e r a l o n e a n d t o p o r t r a y h i m as i s o l a t e d w i t h i n t h e N a z i leadership o n this issue h a v e l e d t o charges t h a t h e intends to exculpate t h e G e r m a n people. Nevertheless, n o serious r e a d i n g of H i l l g r u b e r ' s text could possibly support t h e c l a i m t h a t h e m a i n t a i n s t h a t H i t l e r p u s h e d t h r o u g h his policy of exterm i n a t i o n "against t h e w i l l " of his lieutenants. O n t h e contrary, Hillgruber delineates the levels o f responsibility quite precisely, r a n g i n g f r o m H i t l e r t h r o u g h his i m m e d i a t e subordinates to the " m u c h greater n u m b e r of people" w h o carried out the f o r c e d d e p o r t a t i o n s ; h e also considers t h e m a s s o f t h e G e r m a n p e o p l e as c u l p a b l e i n t h e i r i n d i f f e r e n c e . 1 0 W e s t G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h e r J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s has criticized H i l l g r u b e r ' s b o o k f o r its s u b t i t l e , The Destruction of the German Reich and the End of European Jewry. T h i s i m p l i e s , s a y s H a b e r m a s , a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n a v i o l e n t process f o r c e d o n t h e G e r m a n R e i c h against its active opposition, w i t h a n almost spontaneous process of t e r m i n a t i o n n e i t h e r actively w i l l e d by the Nazis n o r actively resisted b y t h e Jews. G o r d o n A . C r a i g has p o i n t e d o u t that, i n contrast

72

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

t o t h e t i t l e ( w h e r e t h e w o r d " e n d " is u s e d ) , H i l l g r u b e r a l w a y s uses t h e t e r m s " m u r d e r " o r " d e s t r u c t i o n " i n t h e t e x t o f t h e l e c t u r e . H o w e v e r , as o t h e r c o m m e n t a t o r s h a v e n o t e d , t h e n e u tral phrasing o f t h e second part o f t h e book does contrast strongly w i t h t h e o f t e n passionate, c o m m i t t e d , a n d a r g u m e n t a t i v e s t y l e o f t h e first p a r t , so H a b e r m a s , a l t h o u g h p e r h a p s u s i n g a n u n f a i r e x a m p l e , h a s p u t h i s finger o n a r e a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the t w o texts.11 T o H i l l g r u b e r , A u s c h w i t z s e e m s t o a p p e a r as s o m e t h i n g r e m o t e a n d distant; i n his account of t h e eastern f r o n t at t h e e n d o f t h e w a r , t h e r e is a r e a l s e n s e o f p e r s o n a l i n v o l v e m e n t . T h i s sense o f distance isn o t fortuitous. T h r o u g h o u t his account o f a n t i - S e m i t i s m , H i l l g r u b e r seems c o n c e r n e d t o e m p h a s i z e its lack of deep roots a m o n g the G e r m a n people. T h e distinction he draws b e t w e e n H i t l e r a n d t h e other N a z i leaders helps to u n d e r l i n e t h i s p o i n t . Y e t i n t h e e n d i t is u n c o n v i n c i n g . M a n y of Hitler's i m m e d i a t e subordinates yielded little t o t h e "fiihrer" i n the fanaticism o ftheir anti-Semitic convictions. M e n s u c h as G o e b b e l s , S t r e i c h e r , a n d H i m m l e r w e r e u t t e r l y c o n v i n c e d o ft h e Tightness o f t h e " F i n a l S o l u t i o n , " a n d t h e language they used i n public and private can leave no doubt in the m i n d of the reader about the depths of their hatred for the Jews. W h e n H i l l g r u b e r describes the motives of Hitler's l i e u t e n a n t s i n t h i s q u e s t i o n as " a p o l i t i c a l , " h e m a y b e t h i n k i n g , p e r h a p s , o f m e n such as A l b e r t S p e e r , H i t l e r ' s w a r t i m e minister o f munitions. Both at the N u r e m b e r g Trials, and subsequently i n his m e m o i r s , Speer painted a skillful p o r t r a i t o f h i m s e l f as a n a p o l i t i c a l t e c h n o c r a t , s e d u c e d b y t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f m o d e r n t e c h n o l o g y i n t o c o m p l i c i t y w i t h c r i m e s , s u c h as Auschwitz, w h i c h he k n e w n o t h i n g about. B u t historian M a n f r e d S c h m i d t , i n a r e c e n t b o o k , has relentlessly exposed t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n s a n d falsifications u n d e r t a k e n b y Speer i n o r d e r to persuade posterity that he was not a N a z i f r o m ideological conviction. Speer certainly k n e w all about Auschwitz. A n d e v e n i f h e w a s less a f a n a t i c t h a n a t e c h n o c r a t , t h i s s t i l l m a k e s n o difference t o t h e fact t h a t t h e great m a j o r i t y o fH i t l e r ' s h e n c h m e n , f r o m his i m m e d i a t e entourage t h r o u g h t h e local N a z i Gauleiters i n t h e p r o v i n c e s t o t h e s e n i o r m e n i n t h e S S , w e r e anti-Semites f r o m conviction, not "apolitical" instruments of one man's will.12

AUSCHWITZ

A N D E L S E W H E R E • 73

II T h e question of w h e t h e r the " F i n a l Solution" was the product of Hitler's will alone, or the outcome of broader historical processes, has b e e n d e b a t e d b y historians f o r m u c h l o n g e r t h a n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t r o v e r s y . I t has b e e n b e d e v i l e d b y several major problems of evidence. Hitler's regime was not an orderly, bureaucratic administration, nor was Hitler an orderly, bureaucratic r u l e r . Decisions at t h e t o p w e r e o f t e n m a d e i n a casual, ad hoc w a y b y w o r d o f m o u t h , i n a so-called " f l i h r e r c o m m a n d " ; only subsequently w e r e they incorporated into the m o r e conventional administrative machinery of implementation. Hitl e r ' s r e l u c t a n c e t o m a k e firm d e c i s i o n s o n m a t t e r s o f d o m e s t i c policy was w e l l k n o w n . O f t e n h e left it to his subordinates to fight o u t p o l i c y b e t w e e n t h e m s e l v e s , a n d o n l y u n d e r s o m e p r e s sure did he t h e n endorse the one or the other. W r i t t e n evidence o f p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s a t t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l is a l o t l e s s e a s y t o c o m e by t h a n i t is for t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of such policies f u r t h e r d o w n t h e l i n e . M o r e o v e r , t h e N a z i s ' p r o p a g a n d a , as w e h a v e a l r e a d y s e e n i n t h e case o f t h e R e d A r m y i n 1 9 4 1 , a n d t o a m o r e l i m i t e d e x t e n t i n t h e case o f a n t i - S e m i t i s m d u r i n g t h e elections of 1930 t h r o u g h 1932, was sometimes a tvariance w i t h their personal beliefs a n d intentions. F i n a l l y , t h e language t h e y used cannot always b e t a k e n a t face value. A t the level of public rhetoric, for example, it m a y have served the purpose of intimidating opponents b y incorporating frightening but unspecific threats, w h i l e a t t h e l e v e l o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i t was frequently designed to conceal the true nature of w h a t was going o n . 1 3 D u r i n g t h e 1960s a n d 1970s, some of t h e m o r e conservative G e r m a n historians, including Andreas Hillgruber and Klaus H i l d e b r a n d t e n d e d t o p l a c e m o s t stress o n t h e i n d i v i d u a l r e sponsibility of H i t l e r and to portray the events of the T h i r d Reich i n terms of the unfolding of Hitler's will. T h e war, the i n v a s i o n of Russia, a n d t h e e x t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e Jews, h a p p e n e d above all because he intended these things to happen. N a z i s m w a s a radical, e x t r e m i s t ideology, a n d its m a j o r e l e m e n t s w e r e i m p l e m e n t e d b y H i t l e r w i t h a ruthless determination that transformed virtually all other Germans i n t o m o r a l automata. Thus Nazism could m o r e properly b etermed "Hitlerism"; it

74

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

was a unique p h e n o m e n o n , the product of one man's ability to m a n i p u l a t e beliefs a n d forces present i n i n t e r w a r G e r m a n y a n d t u r n t h e m t o his o w n purposes. O v e r t h e last t w o decades, h o w e v e r , some W e s t G e r m a n historians, broadly associated w i t h t h e Social D e m o c r a t s a n d t h e liberals, h a v e m o u n t e d a d e t e r m i n e d attack o n this v i e w . W h i l e it does n o t relieve the Germans f r o m the burden of guilt for the crimes of Nazism, it does, t h e y believe, m i n i m i z e t h e responsibility o f t h e established G e r m a n elites for t h e rise a n d e v e n t u a l t r i u m p h o f t h e Nazis, and it underestimates the extent to w h i c h Nazism represented the culmination of long-term developments i n G e r m a n history.14 T h e r e can be little d o u b t t h a t this r e c e n t w o r k has b r o a d l y succeeded i n establishing the central role of the A r m y , the business elite, t h e senior civil service a n d t h e G e r m a n aristocracy i n the early years of the T h i r d Reich, and i n u n d e r l i n i n g t h e extent to w h i c h m a n y o f t h e i r aims a n d beliefs coincided w i t h those of the Nazis.15 G e r m a n conservatives too w a n t e d a Greater Germany, dominating Europe and ruled by an authorit a r i a n d i c t a t o r s h i p ; e v e n as l a t e as 1 9 4 4 , as w e h a v e s e e n , t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o s i t i o n t o H i t l e r w a s s t i l l firmly w e d d e d t o t h e s e i d e a s . 1 6 B u t as t h e a t t i t u d e s o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n a l s o s h o w e d , a n u m b e r of G e r m a n conservatives did n o t approve of the barbarities of Hitler's " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " or the crimes c o m m i t t e d d u r i n g t h e w a r i n Russia; a n d a c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e eastern f r o n t f r o m 1941 to 1943 w i t h the eastern f r o n t a quarter of a century earlier, i n 1914-18, indicates that the G e r m a n s d i d n o t a t t e m p t to exterminate the population of the occupied territories i n the earlier war; indeed, it seems that Russian prisoners of w a r i n 1 9 1 4 - 1 7 actually p r e f e r r e d to stay i n G e r m a n hands r a t h e r t h a n escape back to t h e chaos a n d m i s e r y of their o w n lines. N o r , for all t h e strength of t h e i r anti-Semitic prejudices, d i d G e r m a n or Austrian A r m y commanders encourage or countenance atrocities against t h e J e w s i n P o l a n d a n d o t h e r areas u n d e r t h e i r control during the First W o r l d War.17 T h e problem therefore arises o f h o w t o e x p l a i n t h e w i l l i n g n e s s o f t h e b u l k o f t h e G e r m a n elites to take p a r t i n t h e e x t e r m i n a t i o n policies o f t h e Second W o r l d War. T h e answer g i v e n by historians o f a broadly Social D e m o c r a t i c p e r s u a s i o n , s u c h as H a n s M o m m s e n , p r o f e s s o r o f h i s t o r y

AUSCHWITZ

A N D E L S E W H E R E • 75

a t t h e R u h r U n i v e r s i t y i n B o c h u m , is t h a t t h e T h i r d R e i c h u n d e r w e n t a process of c u m u l a t i v e radicalization. As the various satraps of t h e N a z i r e g i m e f o u g h t for p o w e r a m o n g themselves, the all-important approval of H i t l e r could best b e gained b y p r e s e n t i n g h i m w i t h t h e m o s t N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s t , t h a t is t o s a y , the most radical policy t o w a r d the matter i n hand. W h e n i n 1941 the Nazis w e r e faced w i t h the administrative p r o b l e m of l o o k i n g after m i l l i o n s o f Jews i n t h e occupied areas o f E a s t e r n E u r o p e , t h e y d e a l t w i t h i t first b y s e n d i n g i n t h e S S m u r d e r s q u a d s , t h e n b y s e t t i n g u p t h e gas c h a m b e r s . F i n a l l y , t h i s p o l i c y , once it h a d b e e n established, was t h e n extended by the same process of radicalization to the Jews i n the other parts of occupied Europe. T h u s the actual unfolding of N a z i genocide was t h e p r o d u c t of ad hoc decisions f o l l o w i n g o n t h e i n v a s i o n o f Russia, n o t just t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a l o n g - h e l d i n t e n t i o n i n the m i n d o f A d o l f H i t l e r . I n order t o back this a r g u m e n t , M o m m s e n has t o suggest t h a t N a z i r h e t o r i c b e f o r e 1 9 4 1 r e vealed n o clear a i m of e x t e r m i n a t i n g the Jews. T h u s for example w h e n H i t l e r declared, i n a notorious speech delivered o n January 30, 1939, that i f a w o r l d w a r c a m e , this w o u l d lead to t h e t o t a l d e s t r u c t i o n (Vernichtung) o f t h e Jewish race, M o m m s e n argues that this m e a n t not physical e x t e r m i n a t i o n but merely their removal f r o m the economy.18 I t is i m p o r t a n t t o c o n s i d e r t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s a r g u m e n t v e r y c a r e f u l l y . M o m m s e n is o n e o f t h e m o s t e l o q u e n t a n d d e t e r m i n e d critics o f Nolte's a t t e m p t to r e l i e v e t h e G e r m a n s of t h e b u r d e n o f t h e past. I n his v i e w , p i n n i n g t h e b l a m e o n H i t l e r a n d r e d u c i n g e v e r y o n e else t o t h e status o f t e r r o r i z e d i n s t r u m e n t s o f his w i l l lets t h e G e r m a n s off far t o o l i g h t l y . B y p o r t r a y i n g N a z i g e n o c i d e as t h e o u t c o m e o f a c u m u l a t i v e a n d u n p l a n n e d process o f collective decision-making, M o m m s e n seeks to pose the a w k w a r d question of h o w i twas that so m a n y Germans could participate i n such an active w a y not just i n c o m m i t t i n g such a crime, but actually i n originating it. B u t w h i l e recognizi n g a l l t h i s , i t is s u r e l y t h e c a s e t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t h a s n o w b e e n c a r r i e d a l i t t l e t o o f a r . I m p o r t a n t t h o u g h i t c e r t a i n l y is t o a v o i d the perils of hindsight and to refrain f r o m reading into every hostile reference to the Jews o n the part of G e r m a n politicians and writers before 1941 the intention to exterminate t h e m , it s t i l l s e e m s v e r y u n l i k e l y t h a t w h e n H i t l e r t a l k e d o f t h e Vernich-

76

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

t u n g of the Jews i n 1939 he m e a n t a n y t h i n g other t h a n w h a t c o m m o n sense dictates h e m e a n t , n a m e l y t h e i r physical des t r u c t i o n . As B r i t i s h h i s t o r i a n J o h n P. F o x has c o m m e n t e d , b e f o r e c o m i n g t o a j u d g m e n t s u c h as M o m m s e n ' s , o n e " r e a l l y o u g h t t o e x a m i n e t h e film o f H i t l e r ' s s p e e c h , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r the split second w h e n H i t l e r strikes u p o n that w o r d , a n d relate all this to t h e l e i t m o t i v w h i c h h a d d o m i n a t e d his political t h i n k ing and language throughout." Moreover, Hitler repeatedly referred to this speech d u r i n g the w a r , after the " F i n a l Solut i o n " g o t u n d e r w a y . I t is c l e a r e n o u g h , t h e r e f o r e , w h a t h e himself meant by the w o r d . 1 9 T h e arguments advanced by M o m m s e n , despite their i n t e n t i o n s , h a v e also b e e n a c c u s e d o f c o n t a i n i n g a n e l e m e n t o f e x c u l pation. Historians w h o p u t f o r w a r d such views have been accused b y t h e i r conservative critics o f absolving H i t l e r f r o m b l a m e a n d o f t r i v i a l i z i n g t h e e n o r m i t y o f his crimes. A n d certainly w h e n G e r m a n historians claim that Hitler's anti-Semitic u t t e r a n c e s w e r e n o t e v i d e n c e o f " a n y firm i n t e n t i o n t o t r a n s l a t e the m e t a p h o r of e x t e r m i n a t i o n i n t o r e a l i t y , " this does h a v e the a p p e a r a n c e o f e x c e s s i v e c a u t i o n . B u t t h i s is s t i l l a w o r l d a w a y f r o m the assertion of r i g h t - w i n g British w r i t e r D a v i d I r v i n g that Hitler was unaware of the extermination of the Jews w h i l e it was t a k i n g place. As the responsible leader of N a z i G e r m a n y , h e certainly was a w a r e of i t a n d p u t all his a u t h o r i t y b e h i n d it. N o s e r i o u s h i s t o r i a n i n f a c t d e n i e s t h i s ; t h e a r g u m e n t is s i m p l y about w h e t h e r he i n t e n d e d it all along and seized the o p p o r t u n i t y w h e n i t c a m e , or w h e t h e r his action was a response to the particular circumstances of the late s u m m e r and a u t u m n of 1941. T h e degree of exculpation implied by the latter position would seem, i n v i e w of the enormity of the crime involved, r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l . M o r e s e r i o u s , p e r h a p s , is t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t less m o r a l b l a m e w o u l d a t t a c h t o so m a n y G e r m a n s f o r v o t i n g for or failing seriously to oppose H i t l e r d u r i n g the years 1 9 3 0 - 3 2 a n d t h u s p r o v i d i n g t h e basis f o r his s e i z u r e o f p o w e r t h e f o l l o w i n g year i f t h e r e h a d b e e n n o real i n t e n t i o n o n his part at t h a t t i m e to e x t e r m i n a t e t h e Jews. Y e t G e r m a n v o t e r s c o u l d see w i t h t h e i r o w n e y e s t h e v i o l e n c e a n d m u r d e r , t h e m i l i t a r i s m a n d t e r r o r i s m exercised daily i n t h e streets by t h e Nazis i n 1 9 3 0 , 1 9 3 1 , a n d 1 9 3 2 , a n d i t is s t i l l d i f f i c u l t t o a c c e p t t h a t t h e y

AUSCHWITZ

A N D E L S E W H E R E • 77

could m e r e l y have discounted all this w h e n giving their vote to Hitler.20 W i t h all due accounting for the benefit of hindsight and after all d u e allowances h a v e b e e n m a d e for t h e h a p h a z a r d , chaotic, a n d o f t e n unpredictable n a t u r e of Hitler's rule, it does i n the end stretch credulity to believe that the will to exterminate the Jews was absent f r o m N a z i s m before the late s u m m e r of 1941. W e have already seen, for example, h o w the " c r i m i n a l orders" issued to t h e G e r m a n A r m y o n t h e eve of t h e i n v a s i o n o f Russia in June 1941 included the c o m m a n d that Jews, along w i t h "partisans" a n d " B o l s h e v i k agitators," should be shot. I n m a t t e r s of foreign policy a n d m i l i t a r y strategy, H i t l e r was m o r e decisive a n d i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t t h a n i n h o m e affairs, w h i c h s e l d o m really captured his i m a g i n a t i o n . T h e creation of " l i v i n g space" i n the East was one of his central aims, a n d n u m e r o u s studies h a v e demonstrated that the idea became inextricably i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h t h e disposal t h r o u g h m u r d e r o f t h e Jews w h o l i v e d there. H i t l e r a n d his f e l l o w Nazis saw t h e Jews f r o m t h e v e r y beginn i n g as s u b h u m a n " p a r a s i t e s " w h o w e r e c o n s p i r i n g , a b o v e a l l t h r o u g h C o m m u n i s t a n d socialist politics, t o u n d e r m i n e t h e T e u t o n i c race. I f t h e y could be eliminated, G e r m a n , Soviet, and E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i s m w o u l d collapse, since t h e mass f o l l o w e r s of the "Jewish-Bolshevik" creed w o u l d be left leaderless.21 T h e Nazis conceived of the "Jewish threat" i n biological terms; it was "Jewish blood" that was threatening, and f r o m the N u r e m b e r g L a w s o f 1935, w h i c h forbade i n t e r m a r r i a g e bet w e e n Jews and " A r y a n " non-Jews i n G e r m a n y and required e v e r y o n e , m a n , w o m a n a n d child, t o s h o w p r o o f o f t h e i r ancestry a n d descent, there could be n o doubt that w h e n the Nazis spoke of destroying the Jews, they m e a n t this i n a comprehensive, biologically defined w a y . T h e e n t i r e Jewish "stock" o r " r a c e " w a s t o b e r e m o v e d , so t h a t n o c h a n c e w o u l d r e m a i n t h a t Jewish "blood" could "contaminate" the " A r y a n master race" i n t h e f u t u r e . O f c o u r s e , t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l i m p e r a t i v e o n l y set t h e context and the agenda for the "Final Solution"; i tdid not determine w h e n , or h o w , it w o u l d b ecarried out. But there s h o u l d s u r e l y b e n o d o u b t as t o t h e f a c t t h a t a m u r d e r o u s i d e o logical anti-Semitism p r o v i d e d the d r i v i n g force b e h i n d the progressive radicalization o f N a z i policies t o w a r d t h e Jews.

78

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

T h e r e is p l e n t y o f e v i d e n c e o f H i t l e r ' s s t r o n g a n d c o n t i n u o u s ideological pressure for a radical anti-Jewish policy. T h e opport u n i t y m a y h a v e o c c u r r e d first o f a l l i n t h e s u m m e r o f 1 9 4 1 , b u t the m o t i v e was there long before. N a z i e x t e r m i n i s m m a y b e s e e n , t h e r e f o r e , n o t s i m p l y as t h e p r o d u c t o f H i t l e r ' s i n d i v i d u a l w i l l , b u t as t h e p r e d i c t a b l e o u t c o m e of a broader, biologistic ideology, shared by m a n y leading Nazis and radical anti-Semites b e t w e e n the wars, and not a f e w b e f o r e 1 9 1 4 as w e l l . Y e t t h e N a z i s ' b e l i e f t h a t s o c i e t y a n d h i s t o r y w e r e shaped p r i m a r i l y by forces of race and heredity, by "blood and soil," w e n t far beyond the e l i m i n a t i o n of the Jews f r o m the h u m a n race i n its i m p l i c a t i o n s a n d effects, f o r t h e J e w s w e r e n o t the o n l y victims of N a z i oppression. R e c e n t years have seen a growing amount of w o r k devoted to recovering the history of t h e " f o r g o t t e n v i c t i m s o f N a z i s m , " slave laborers, i n m a t e s o f i n n u m e r a b l e s m a l l l o c a l b r a n c h e s (Aussenlager) o f t h e m a j o r concentration camps, Gypsies, Soviet P O W s , the m e n t a l l y ill, t h e d i s a b l e d , t h e r e t a r d e d , s o - c a l l e d " a n t i s o c i a l e l e m e n t s " (Aso¬ ziale), v a g r a n t s , b e g g a r s , p r o s t i t u t e s , h o m o s e x u a l s . T h e s e p e o ple too w e r e arrested, tortured, imprisoned, and killed. I n the case o f t h e b i o l o g i c a l l y , r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y p o l i t i c a l l y , d e f i n e d , s u c h as t h e G y p s i e s o r t h e m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d o r i l l , m a s s i v e e x t e r m i n a t i o n p r o g r a m s w e r e l a u n c h e d . T h e " e u t h a n a s i a " act i o n against t h e i n m a t e s o f m e n t a l hospitals p r e c e d e d t h e exterm i n a t i o n o f t h e Jews b y almost t w o years. B y r e c o v e r i n g t h e history of these groups, left-wing historians i n the Federal Republic have succeeded i n bringing h o m e the crimes of Nazism t o G e r m a n s i n a w a y w h i c h t h e y find i t e a s y t o g r a s p , s i n c e s o m e of these g r o u p s — u n l i k e the Jews—are present i n today's Germ a n y i n large n u m b e r s and are part o fGermans' everyday experience.22 T h e concentration on the "forgotten victims" o f Nazism, h o w e v e r , has m a d e l e f t - w i n g historians i n G e r m a n y increasingly reluctant t o accept the uniqueness of Auschwitz. T h e Jews, i n this v i e w , w e r e only one category of victims a m o n g m a n y , e v e n i f t h e y w e r e the most n u m e r o u s . Jews, Gypsies, the "antisocial," the m e n t a l l y ill, Soviet prisoners of war, and the other groups w e r e all comparable because they w e r e all victims of racism. Concentration o n the uniqueness of the N a z i exterm i n a t i o n o f t h e J e w s has d i v e r t e d a t t e n t i o n t o o l o n g f r o m t h e

AUSCHWITZ

A N D E L S E W H E R E • 79

N a z i s ' m a n y o t h e r v i c t i m s . R a c i s m as a p h e n o m e n o n w a s n e i t h e r directed b y t h e Nazis exclusively against t h e Jews, n o r d i d it die w i t h the e n d of the T h i r d Reich. N a z i s m , argues D e t l e v P e u k e r t , for example, was a n a t t e m p t to solve the problems of m o d e r n i t y b y t e r r o r , a n d t o dispose o f t h e "social ballast" o f m o d e r n i n d u s t r i a l society b y e x t e r m i n a t i o n — a p o i n t of v i e w n o t d i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t t a k e n b y N o l t e , a s P e u k e r t h i m s e l f acknowledges.23 H o w e v e r , t h e s e a r g u m e n t s h a v e s o m e s e r i o u s flaws. I t is d i f ficult t o s e e h o w r e g a r d i n g t h e N a z i e x t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e J e w s as a u n i q u e p h e n o m e n o n necessarily i n v o l v e s t h e n e g l e c t o f o t h e r v i c t i m s o f N a z i s m , e v e n i f i t m a y h a v e d o n e so i n p r a c t i c e . N o r does i ts e e m plausible t o suggest that t h e Nazis s i m p l y r e g a r d e d t h e J e w s as " s o c i a l b a l l a s t . " A f t e r a l l , t h e s e w e r e n o t people w h o w e r e b e i n g s u p p o r t e d b y t h e state, l i k e t h e m e n tally ill, or n o t engaged i n regular jobs, like the Gypsies, or n o t m a k i n g children for the labor force and the A r m y , like the homosexuals; o n the contrary, the r e m o v a l of Jews f r o m the e c o n o m y a n d the diversion of resources to pay for their exterm i n a t i o n was economically counterproductive by any rational c r i t e r i a . I t is e v e n l e s s p l a u s i b l e t o a r g u e t h a t t h e J e w s w e r e o n l y e x t e r m i n a t e d because o f t h e b u r d e n o n t h e state created b y t h e acquisition of a large extra Jewish population after the invasion o f Russia. T h e r e h a d already b e e n a m a j o r increase i n t h e J e w i s h p o p u l a t i o n by t h e a n n e x a t i o n of w e s t e r n P o l a n d i n 1939. T h e J e w s o f W e s t e r n E u r o p e , w h o w e r e also e x t e r m i n a t e d , w e r e i n g e n e r a l n e i t h e r p o o r n o r a b u r d e n o n t h e N a z i state. Finally, it seems to be stretching the concept of racism too f a r w h e n i t is u s e d t o c o v e r " e u g e n i c " p o l i c i e s t o w a r d t h e a l legedly hereditarily diseased o r t o w a r d homosexuals. T h e Nazis' policies t o w a r d these groups w e r e obviously part of the general m i x t u r e of biological d e t e r m i n i s m and anti-Semitism w h i c h characterized Nazi ideology, but their rationale was i n m a n y ways different. I t was n o t these people's racial i d e n t i t y that m a r k e d t h e m out for elimination, but their supposed biological inferiority, irrespective of race. N a z i policies t o w a r d t h e Gypsies w e r e m o r e clearly racist, b u t h e r e t o o a n e l e m e n t o f economic calculation was i n v o l v e d , since the Gypsies, just like " A r y a n " v a g r a n t s a n d t r a m p s ( w h o w e r e also e v e n t u a l l y t a k e n into the N a z i camps and m u r d e r e d ) , refused to be enlisted i n

80

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

the N a z i labor force and w e r e thereby t h o u g h t to be sabotaging the preparation and prosecution of the war, and i n general to be failing to m a k e their c o n t r i b u t i o n to the N a z i regime. A n d t h e N a z i s c e r t a i n l y d i d n o t r e g a r d t h e G y p s i e s as t h e p r i m e m o v e r s i n a w o r l d c o n s p i r a c y t o s u b v e r t t h e G e r m a n r a c e , as they did the Jews.

Ill For all the horrors inflicted o n the m a n y different kinds of people w h o fell victims to G e r m a n National Socialism, t h e fate o f t h e J e w s still stands o u t above t h e rest. H e r e was a c a t e g o r y o f p e o p l e , w h o i n m a n y cases r e g a r d e d t h e m s e l v e s , a n d w e r e w i d e l y so r e g a r d e d b y o t h e r s , as a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e communities i n w h i c h they lived. Most G e r m a n Jews between t h e w a r s w e r e assimilated i n t o G e r m a n society a n d w e r e n o d i f f e r e n t f r o m o t h e r G e r m a n s i n m o s t r e s p e c t s . T h e N a z i s first o f a l l d e f i n e d t h e m as a c a t e g o r y , t h e n s u b j e c t e d t h e m t o i n creasing violence a n d discrimination. T h e y r e m o v e d t h e m f r o m t h e rest of G e r m a n society b y a m o u n t i n g tide of laws a n d r e s t r i c t i o n s , a n d finally d e p o r t e d a n d m u r d e r e d t h o s e w h o failed i n t h e m e a n t i m e t o m a k e good t h e i r escape. U p o n i n v a d ing and subjugating other E u r o p e a n nations, f r o m France, the L o w Countries, Denmark, and N o r w a y i n the West, to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Soviet U n i o n , and o t h e r states i n t h e East, t h e y p r o c e e d e d t o f o l l o w t h e s a m e policies t h e r e . N o o t h e r g r o u p o f p e o p l e i n E u r o p e was subj e c t e d t o t h i s t r e a t m e n t . T h o s e w h o m t h e N a z i s r e g a r d e d as r a c i a l l y o r g e n e t i c a l l y i n f e r i o r , as " s o c i a l b a l l a s t , " as a l i a b i l i t y o n t h e s t a t e , s u c h as G y p s i e s , t h e h a n d i c a p p e d , o r R u s s i a n p r i s o n e r s o f w a r , w e r e k i l l e d i n v e r y l a r g e n u m b e r s as a n a c t o f p o l i c y . B u t t h e m u r d e r o f t h e J e w s h a s so f a r b e e n s e e n as a c r i m e o f different dimensions altogether. I t is t h i s f a c t t h a t E r n s t N o l t e , a m o n g o t h e r s , h a s r e c e n t l y tried to get a r o u n d , i n the effort to encourage a m o r e positive, less g u i l t y a t t i t u d e t o t h e G e r m a n past i n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c . N o l t e a d o p t s five d i f f e r e n t l i n e s o f a p p r o a c h . F i r s t , as w e h a v e a l r e a d y seen, h e has a r g u e d t h a t o t h e r , c o m p a r a b l e acts o f genocide have been c o m m i t t e d by other peoples i n the t w e n t i e t h

AUSCHWITZ

A N D E L S E W H E R E • 81

century, f r o m the Americans i n V i e t n a m to the Turks i n Arm e n i a . I n his m o s t r e c e n t b o o k , h e goes f u r t h e r a n d suggests t h a t G e r m a n acts o f g e n o c i d e a n d b a r b a r i s m w e r e a d i r e c t response t o s i m i l a r , p r i o r acts o n t h e A l l i e d side. T h e strategic b o m b i n g o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t G e r m a n cities, h e says, w a s a w a r o f e x t e r m i n a t i o n w a g e d b y t h e E n g l i s h against t h e G e r m a n people. I t was n o t a response to G e r m a n b o m b i n g . A n d " t h e conduct of w a r by the Soviet U n i o n was characterized by genocide to a n e v e n greater degree t h a n that of E n g l a n d was." I n this context, h e m e n t i o n s Stalin's d e p o r t a t i o n o f the C r i m e a n Germ a n s ; h e a l s o , as w e h a v e s e e n , r e f e r s t o P o l i s h a t t a c k s o n e t h n i c G e r m a n s i n 1939. So i t was n o l o n g e r , i n this v e r s i o n , a l i m i t e d threat to the G e r m a n bourgeoisie that p r o m p t e d N a z i antiSemitism, but a general threat t oexterminate the G e r m a n race.24 S e c o n d , N o l t e also argues t h a t N a z i e x t e r m i n i s m w a s a c o p y of previous genocidal policies adopted b y o t h e r nations. A varia n t o f t h i s i d e a , as w e h a v e s e e n , c a n b e f o u n d i n t h e a t t e m p t by H i l l g r u b e r to locate A u s c h w i t z i n the context of t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y f o r c e d p o p u l a t i o n transfers. B u t N o l t e goes f u r t h e r . I n s o m e places, h e says t h a t t h e N a z i s t r a n s p o s e d S o v i e t social e x t e r m i n i s m i n t o racial terms. E l s e w h e r e , h e speculates: " W e r e t h e J e w s i n t h e e n d , as f a r as H i t l e r w a s c o n c e r n e d , m e r e l y a particularly p r o m i n e n t part of the intelligentsia, and did this not p r o m p t the question o f w h e t h e r G e r m a n intellectuals u n d e r H i t l e r w o u l d i n the e n d suffer a similar fate to that of the Russian intelligentsia under L e n i n ? " N o l t e quotes i n this context a press c o n f e r e n c e at w h i c h H i t l e r , t h e day after t h e pog r o m o f N o v e m b e r 9, 1938, speculated t h a t h e m i g h t o n e d a y e x t e r m i n a t e t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l classes i n G e r m a n y i f t h e y n o l o n ger p r o v e d t o be o f use. M a n y p r o m i n e n t intellectuals, N o l t e n o t e s , w e r e J e w i s h ; so t h e e x t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e J e w s , h e i m p l i e s , m i g h t b e s e e n as a n a s p e c t o f H i t l e r ' s a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m a n d a copy of Soviet policies i n this respect.25 T h i r d , N o l t e suggests t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e G e r m a n people w e r e u n a w a r e o f w h a t was going o n i n A u s c h w i t z . I n his v i e w , it was H i t l e r , personally, w h o c o n v e r t e d a basically justifiable w a r against C o m m u n i s m o n behalf of W e s t e r n i n d u s t r i a l civilization i n t o a w a r of racial destruction. T h e G e r m a n people w e r e , as t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i m p l i e s , e n g a g e d m a i n l y i n fighting t h e

8 2 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

f o r m e r w a r . T h u s h e emphasizes Hitler's personal responsib i l i t y . " A n y o n e w h o t a k e s Hitler s e r i o u s l y " ( m y i t a l i c s ) , N o l t e says, " c a n n o t d e n y t h e e x t e r m i n a t o r y a c t i o n s o f A u s c h w i t z a n d T r e b l i n k a , n o r t h e gas c h a m b e r s . " A u t h o r s l i k e t h e A m e r i c a n specialist o n t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e E u r o p e a n J e w s R a u l H i l b e r g , w h o argue that thousands, e v e n millions, of Germans, f r o m the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n E i c h m a n n ' s office t o t h e r a i l w a y t i m e t a b l e clerks a n d t r a i n drivers w h o r a n the transportation of Jews t o Auschwitz, k n e w w h a t was happening, are i n Nolte's v i e w ignorant o f the extent t o w h i c h the extreme division o flabor i n m o d e r n societies isolates p e o p l e f r o m t h e consequences o f w h a t t h e y are doing. A n d N o l t e cites examples o f senior Nazis a n d G e r m a n g e n e r a l s w h o d e n i e d e v e r h a v i n g k n o w n a b o u t t h e gas chambers.26 F o u r t h , N o l t e implies that G e r m a n policies t o w a r d t h e Jews w e r e to a certain extent justified. W e have already seen h o w he uses W e i z m a n n ' s 1939 d e c l a r a t i o n t o suggest t h e i d e a o f t h e " c i v i l i n t e r n m e n t " o f J e w s b y t h e N a z i s . I n The European Civil War, h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e J e w s c o u l d b e s e e n a s a b e l l i g e r e n t g r o u p after t h e p o g r o m o f N o v e m b e r 1938. H e goes o n f r o m this t o h i n t that t h e G e r m a n A r m y a n d t h e SS d e a t h squads engaged i n mass executions of Jews o n the eastern f r o n t f r o m 1 9 4 1 b e c a u s e m a n y p a r t i s a n s w e r e J e w s . I t w o u l d , h e says, h a v e b e e n possible t o e x t e r m i n a t e t h e Belgians d u r i n g t h e occupation of their country by Germany during the First W o r l d War, f r o m 1914 t o 1918, because t h e y supported partisan a n d guerilla attacks o n t h e o c c u p y i n g forces, " i n o r d e r t o achieve prev e n t i v e s e c u r i t y against acts c o m m i t t e d i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f t h e law of nations." Thus, he implies, the extermination of an entire p e o p l e is a p o s s i b l e p o l i c y i f a n o c c u p y i n g a r m y w a n t s t o d e s t r o y t h e basis o f i l l e g a l resistance i n t h e o c c u p i e d p o p u l a t i o n . So " t h e actions o f t h e d e a t h squads" w e r e i n Nolte's v i e w " t h e m o s t radical and comprehensive example of a preventive attack o n the e n e m y , w h i c h w e n t far beyond all concrete demands of the i m m e d i a t e conduct of w a r . " O n c e again, therefore, he seems to suggest, t h e policy o f e x t e r m i n a t i n g t h e Jews was justifiable i n principle, b u t carried o u t to a n excessive degree. A u s c h w i t z was an exaggerated f o r m o f the preventive suppression o f partisans.27 F i f t h , h o w e v e r , N o l t e also goes s o m e w a y t o w a r d e n t e r t a i n i n g

AUSCHWITZ

A N D E L S E W H E R E • 83

t h e v i e w that t h e " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " n e v e r h a p p e n e d at all. H i t h erto, this a r g u m e n t — t h a t there was n o N a z i policy of exterm i n a t i n g t h e J e w s , t h a t A u s c h w i t z is a f a n t a s y i n v e n t e d b y J e w s for their o w n ends, that 6 m i l l i o n Jews did not die—has b e e n c o n f i n e d t o f a r - r i g h t , neofascist circles w h o s e w o r k has n o t b e e n t a k e n s e r i o u s l y b y s c h o l a r s , N o l t e says i t s h o u l d b e t a k e n s e r i ously. T h e motives of those w h o p u t f o r w a r d these arguments, h e says, a r e " o f t e n h o n o r a b l e . " T h e s e p e o p l e a r e o f t e n n o n G e r m a n ; some of t h e m are f o r m e r inmates of concentration c a m p s ; a n d so, h e i m p l i e s , t h e y p o s s e s s a c e r t a i n d e g r e e o f d e t a c h m e n t . S o m e o f t h e i r a r g u m e n t s , h e says, a r e " n o t o b v i ously w i t h o u t foundation." T h u s the Wannsee Conference, a t w h i c h , i t has h i t h e r t o b e e n a c c e p t e d , t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " was discussed, m i g h t i n fact n e v e r h a v e happ e n e d ; c e r t a i n l y , t h e r e c o r d s f o r its existence are, h e argues, o f d u b i o u s a u t h e n t i c i t y . I t is i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h a t N o l t e a d d s t h a t most of the authors w h o have w r i t t e n o n the " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " are Jewish. T h e context inevitably, and surely not unintentionally, thus arouses the impression that the b u l k of the scholarly literat u r e o n A u s c h w i t z is biased because o f its (allegedly) J e w i s h origin.28 N o l t e m a y be justified i n saying that these historians' political views are irrelevant to the validity or otherwise of the arguments they put forward. T h e reason w h y authors w h o deny the reality of the N a z i genocide of nearly 6 m i l l i o n Jews are n o t t a k e n s e r i o u s l y b y p r o f e s s i o n a l h i s t o r i a n s is, h o w e v e r , n o t b e cause these authors are r i g h t - w i n g radicals, b u t because t h e y ignore such an o v e r w h e l m i n g mass of evidence to the contrary t h a t t h e y c a n n o t b e a c c e p t e d as p o s s e s s i n g t h e a b i l i t y t o r e a c h a r e a s o n e d assessment o f t h e past. T h e i r r i g h t - w i n g radical p o l i t i cal m o t i v e s , i n o t h e r w o r d s , o v e r c o m e all barriers o f e v i d e n c e , truth, and rationality. A p p l y i n g conventional criteria of the critical assessment o f t h e available d o c u m e n t a t i o n m a k e s n o t o n l y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " b u t also t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e W a n n s e e C o n f e r e n c e indisputable. Serious research o n these subjects has b e e n c a r r i e d o u t n o t j u s t b y J e w i s h scholars b u t also by scholars of m a n y different nationalities, religions, a n d political persuasions; all o f t h e i r w o r k has b e e n subject t o t h e s a m e criteria of critical j u d g m e n t i n t h e usual processes of assessment and debate i n the international scholarly c o m m u n i t y .

84

• IN H I T L E R ' S

SHADOW

W h e n w e subject Nolte's o w n arguments to the same criteria, it quickly becomes clear that his hypotheses are unpersuasive. First, they are internally contradictory, i n v o l v i n g simultan e o u s l y j u s t i f y i n g a n e v e n t , suggesting i t h a d e v i l parallels elsew h e r e , a n d h i n t i n g that i t n e v e r happened. T h r o u g h o u t his b o o k , N o l t e p r e s e n t s f a s c i s m a n d N a z i s m as f u n d a m e n t a l l y j u s tifiable responses to C o m m u n i s m , m o v e m e n t s w h i c h a i m e d to d e f e n d t h e bourgeoisie a n d its a c h i e v e m e n t s . B u t o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n a r g u i n g f o r a p a r a l l e l w i t h C o m m u n i s m , h e also suggests t h a t N a z i s m w a s i n m a n y w a y s anticapitalist a n d a n t i b o u r ¬ g e o i s . T h e s e a r g u m e n t s a r e so c o n t r a d i c t o r y t h a t i t is i n t h e e n d difficult to take either o f t h e m v e r y seriously. Second, his v i e w s rest o n a n implausible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e evidence. W e have already seen, for example, that W e i z m a n n was not speaking for Jews i n general i n 1939. T o repeat: Jews d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 1 9 3 9 - 4 5 w e r e n o t a n a t i o n a l i t y , d i d n o t act i n u n i s o n , h a d n o internationally recognized representation, and cannot theref o r e b e r e g a r d e d as a b e l l i g e r e n t g r o u p . T h i r d , Nolte's hypotheses rest o n inferential structures of reasoning w h i c h are frequently unsupported b y evidence. T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , N o l t e fails t o cite a n y d o c u m e n t a t i o n i n support o f his v i e w that A u s c h w i t z a n d t h e previous activities of the d e a t h squads w e r e a f o r m o f counterinsurgency action. F o u r t h , m u c h o f N o l t e ' s e v i d e n c e is a n e c d o t a l o r u n r e l i a b l e . S t o r i e s o f G e n e r a l G u d e r i a n d e n y i n g k n o w l e d g e o f t h e gas c h a m b e r s i n M a r c h 1945, or u n c o r r o b o r a t e d quotations f r o m m e m o i r s of participants w r i t t e n after the event, are n o t solid or c o m p r e h e n s i v e e n o u g h as e v i d e n c e t o s u s t a i n N o l t e ' s f a r - r e a c h i n g c o n c l u s i o n s . F i f t h , N o l t e is c o n t r a d i c t e d b y a g r e a t m a s s o f o t h e r e v i d e n c e w h i c h h e c o m p l e t e l y fails t o address. T h u s w e s a w i n c h a p t e r 3 h o w J e w s w e r e a d d e d as a separate c a t e g o r y for e x t e r m i n a t i o n to partisans a n d guerillas o n the eastern f r o n t , and h o w the very t e r m "partisan" became arbitrary and meaningless i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e p r i m a r y N a z i t h r u s t to e x t i n g u i s h w h o l e populations. Similarly, not all Jews w e r e intellectuals, and m a n y Jewish intellectuals had left G e r m a n y by N o v e m b e r 1 9 3 8 , so t h a t m o s t G e r m a n i n t e l l e c t u a l s b y t h a t t i m e , i f n o t b e f o r e , w e r e c e r t a i n l y n o t J e w i s h . T h e r e is i n a n y c a s e n o e v i dence that Hitler connected the t w o i n the speech quoted by Nolte, nor that L e n i n exterminated the Russian intelligensia

AUSCHWITZ

AND E L S E W H E R E • 85

e i t h e r , t h o u g h S t a l i n c e r t a i n l y w e n t a l o n g w a y t o w a r d d o i n g so. As w e have seen throughout, m a n y of Nolte's arguments are speculative, t h e o r e t i c a l , or e v e n cast i n t h e f o r m o f r h e t o r i c a l questions. E v e n those w h o , like the B r e m e n historian I m a n u e l Geiss, t h i n k t h a t h e has b e e n u n f a i r l y c r i t i c i z e d a n d his v i e w s w i d e l y distorted, h a v e h a d to concede that N o l t e rests s o m e of his assertions o n a n e x t r e m e l y t h i n basis o f e v i d e n c e . N o t i n f r e q u e n t l y , N o l t e s i m p l y bypasses generally accepted procedures of historical verification and a r g u m e n t a t i o n altogether. H i s references and bibliography show an ignorance of—or disregard f o r — t h e r e l e v a n t s c h o l a r l y l i t e r a t u r e t h a t is f r e q u e n t l y s u r p r i s i n g . T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , i t is n o t e n o u g h f o r N o l t e s i m p l y t o d e n y that m a n y Germans k n e w about the extermination program by referring to the extent of the division of labor i n a m o d e r n i n d u s t r i a l society. T h e evidence a c c u m u l a t e d b y H i l b e r g , L a q u e u r a n d others has t o be c o n f r o n t e d d i r e c t l y . 2 9 A b r o a d gene r a l i z a t i o n such as N o l t e m a k e s r e m a i n s m e r e l y h y p o t h e t i c a l u n l e s s i t is t e s t e d a g a i n s t t h e c o n c r e t e e v i d e n c e . W h a t h e s a y s a b o u t t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o r m a y b e t r u e as a g e n e r a l s o c i o l o g i c a l principle, b u t t h e fact r e m a i n s that e v e n i n a society w i t h such a d v a n c e d b u r e a u c r a t i c s t r u c t u r e s as N a z i G e r m a n y , r a i l w a y t i m e t a b l e clerks a n d o t h e r officials h a d t o m a k e a p o s i t i v e e f f o r t to avoid the recognition that the consignments they w e r e deali n g w i t h w e r e cargoes of h u m a n beings, transported i n degradi n g a n d i n h u m a n conditions to places w h e r e t h e y w o u l d be p u t to death. Nolte's v i e w that the G e r m a n invasion of the Soviet U n i o n was u n d e r t a k e n i n defense of W e s t e r n civilizationis e v e n m o r e speculative. Certainly, the vast m a j o r i t y of senior c i v i l a n d especially m i l i t a r y officials s e e m t o h a v e h a d a d e f i n i tion of W e s t e r n civilization v e r y far r e m o v e d f r o m any w h i c h m i g h t be broadly acceptable today. Finally, Nolte's attempts to establish t h e comparability o f A u s c h w i t z rest i n part u p o n a n extension of t h e concept o f " g e n o c i d e " to actions w h i c h cannot plausibly justify being described i n this w a y . H o w e v e r m u c h one m i g h t w i s h to criticize t h e A l l i e d s t r a t e g i c - b o m b i n g offensive against G e r m a n cities, i t cannot be t e r m e d genocidal because there was n o i n t e n t i o n to exterminate the entire G e r m a n people. Dresden was b o m b e d a f t e r C o v e n t r y , n o t t h e o t h e r w a y a r o u n d , a n d i t is i m p l a u s i b l e to suggest that t h e latter was a response to t h e f o r m e r ; o n t h e

86

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

contrary, there was indeed an element of retaliation and rev e n g e i n t h e s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g o f f e n s i v e , w h i c h is p r e c i s e l y o n e o f t h e g r o u n d s o n w h i c h i t h a s so o f t e n b e e n c r i t i c i z e d . T h e r e is n o e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t N o l t e ' s s p e c u l a t i o n t h a t e t h n i c G e r mans i n Poland w o u l d have been entirely exterminated had the Nazis n o t c o m p l e t e d their invasion quickly. N e i t h e r the Poles n o r t h e Russians h a d a n y i n t e n t i o n of e x t e r m i n a t i n g t h e Germ a n p e o p l e as a w h o l e . A t t h i s p o i n t , i t is u s e f u l t o r e c a l l t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f G e r m a n h i s t o r i a n a n d H i t l e r specialist E b e r h a r d Jackel that " t h e N a z i m u r d e r of the Jews was unique because n e v e r b e f o r e has a state d e c i d e d a n d a n n o u n c e d , o n t h e a u t h o r i t y o f its responsible leader, t h a t i t i n t e n d e d t o k i l l i n its e n t i r e t y , as f a r as p o s s i b l e , a p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p o f h u m a n b e i n g s , i n c l u d i n g its o l d p e o p l e , w o m e n , c h i l d r e n , a n d i n f a n t s , a n d t h e n p u t this decision i n t o action w i t h e v e r y possible i n s t r u m e n t o f p o w e r available to the state."30 T h e attempts u n d e r t a k e n by N o l t e , H i l l g r u b e r , Fest, and o t h e r neoconservative historians to get a r o u n d this fact are all ultimately unconvincing. I t requires a considerable degree of m y o p i a to regard t h e policies of t h e U S A i n V i e t n a m i n t h e 1960s a n d early 1970s, or t h e occupation of Afghanistan b y the U S S R i n t h e 1 9 8 0 s , as " g e n o c i d e . " H o w e v e r m u c h o n e m a y d e p l o r e t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e o c c u p y i n g a r m i e s , t h e r e is n o e v i dence of any deliberate policy of exterminating the inhabitants of the countries i n question. T h e terrible massacres of the A r menians by the T u r k s i n 1915 w e r e m o r e deliberate, o n a w i d e r scale, a n d c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t o a f a r s h o r t e r t i m e , t h a n t h e destruction of h u m a n life i n V i e t n a m and Afghanistan, and they w e r e n o t c a r r i e d o u t as p a r t o f a m i l i t a r y c a m p a i g n , a l t h o u g h they d i d occur i n w a r t i m e . B u t these atrocities w e r e c o m m i t t e d as p a r t o f a b r u t a l p o l i c y o f e x p u l s i o n a n d r e s e t t l e m e n t ; t h e y d i d not constitute an attempt to exterminate a w h o l e people. Similar things m a y be said o f t h e forcible r e m o v a l o f G r e e k s f r o m Asia M i n o r d u r i n g t h e 1920s, a l t h o u g h this has n o t , i n contrast t o t h e e v e n t s o f 1 9 1 5 , g e n e r a l l y b e e n r e g a r d e d as g e n o c i d e . 3 1 T h e P o l P o t r e g i m e i n C a m b o d i a w i t n e s s e d t h e h o r r i f i c spectacle o f a nation's rulers t u r n i n g u p o n t h e i r o w n people, i n a m a n n e r comparable to that of the Ugandan dictator I d i A m i n a f e w years previously. T h e victims, whose n u m b e r s exceeded a m i l l i o n , w e r e k i l l e d , h o w e v e r , n o t o n r a c i a l g r o u n d s b u t as

AUSCHWITZ

A N D E L S E W H E R E • 87

part of a deliberate policy of terror to subdue opposition and r e v e n g e against those t h o u g h t to h a v e collaborated w i t h t h e A m e r i c a n e n e m y d u r i n g the previous hostilities. M o r e o v e r , the barbarities inflicted o n the C a m b o d i a n people by the P o l Pot regime w e r e to a considerable extent the result of a brutalizing process that h a d accompanied a terrible w a r , d u r i n g w h i c h vast quantities of bombs w e r e dropped o n the country, destroying a l a r g e p a r t o f t h e m o r a l a n d p h y s i c a l basis o f C a m b o d i a n society i n t h e process.32 T h i s i n n o w a y excuses the m u r d e r o u s policies o f t h e K h m e r Rouge. B u t i t does s h o w u p , o n c e m o r e , t h e c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e N a z i g e n o c i d e o f t h e J e w s , w h i c h , as w e h a v e seen, w a s a g r a t u i t o u s act c a r r i e d o u t b y a prosperous, a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l n a t i o n at t h e h e i g h t o f its p o w e r . Similar distinctions can be m a d e b e t w e e n A u s c h w i t z and the Gulag. T h e r e can be n o doubt of the severity of the repression begun by L e n i n and continued and extended by Stalin. I n the course of t h e 1930s, for example, Stalin pushed t h r o u g h a collectivization of Russian agriculture i n the course of w h i c h some of t h e peasantry w e r e h e l d to b e exploiting t h e rest a n d w e r e accordingly dispossessed, so t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n s c h e m e c o u l d b e p r e s e n t e d as a s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n i n w h i c h e x p l o i t a t i o n was abolished and the mass of the Russian peasantry c a m e into t h e i r o w n . A t least, this w a s t h e t h e o r y . I n practice, t h i n g s w e r e v e r y d i f f e r e n t . T h e a i m s o f c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n — t h e final s u b j u g a t i o n o f t h e c o u n t r y s i d e t o B o l s h e v i k r u l e a n d its c o n v e r s i o n t o a source of food to support the forced industrialization w h i c h Stalin was p u s h i n g t h r o u g h at t h e s a m e t i m e — w e r e achieved w i t h ruthless brutality. I t is n o t t r u e t o s a y , as s o m e o f N o l t e ' s c r i t i c s h a v e d o n e , t h a t only those w h o opposed collectivization w e r e deported o r killed, and all peasants h a d to do to survive was to agree to give u p t h e i r p r i v a t e f a r m s . L o c a l police a n d p a r t y officials w e r e o f t e n issued w i t h " q u o t a s " o f kulaks t o be dealt w i t h t h a t w e r e u n r e l a t e d to the real n u m b e r s of kulaks or opponents of collectivization. Definitions of kulaks varied w i d e l y . M a n y peasants h a d n o c h o i c e as t o w h e t h e r t h e y s u r v i v e d o r n o t . L a r g e n u m bers slaughtered their livestock and destroyed their crops r a t h e r t h a n s u r r e n d e r t h e m t o t h e state. W i d e s p r e a d f a m i n e a n d starvation accompanied the chaos of collectivization a n d was c o m p o u n d e d by the massive and arbitrary terror m e t e d out

88

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

b y t h e r e g i m e a n d its servants. T h e arbitrariness o f Stalin's terror contrasted starkly w i t h the absolute predictability oi N a z i t e r r o r , w h i c h was directed d e m o n s t r a b l y at identifiable groups w i t h i n the population, above all the Jews. Finally, claims advanced that Stalin's r e i g n of t e r r o r was responsible for a greater n u m b e r of deaths t h a n Hitler's have to be treated w i t h e x t r e m e skepticism, i n v i e w of t h e fact t h a t t h e y are generally m a d e w i t h the m o t i v e of suggesting that the Soviet U n i o n w a s — perhaps still i s — m o r e m u r d e r o u s a n d thus m o r e reprehensible than Nazi Germany. Stalin's purges o f t h e 1930s w e r e one of t h e t w e n t i e t h cent u r y ' s g r e a t e s t c r i m e s . I t is i n d e e d o n l y n o w , a t t h e e n d o f t h e 1 9 8 0 s , t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n is b e g i n n i n g t o c o m e t o t e r m s w i t h t h e m . Nevertheless, the distinctions b e t w e e n these events and those of the T h i r d Reich, some of w h i c h N o l t e himself concedes, w e r e n o t w i t h o u t significance. W h e n C o m m u n i s t s p o k e s m e n a n n o u n c e d t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o " e x t e r m i n a t e t h e b o u r g e o i s i e as a class" or " l i q u i d a t e t h e k u l a k s , " t h e y w e r e n o t stating t h a t t h e y w o u l d physically eliminate every m a n , w o m a n , and child of bourgeois or "big-peasant" origin, no matter w h a t their opinions w e r e or h o w they conducted themselves. Bolshevik and S t a l i n i s t m a s s m u r d e r w a s c a r r i e d o u t as a n i n s t r u m e n t o f t e r r o r , s u b j u g a t i o n , a n d social r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ; N a z i mass m u r d e r w a s an e n d i n itself. N o r d i d S t a l i n seek o u t k u l a k s t o e x t e r m i n a t e i n t h o s e p a r t s o f E u r o p e w h i c h f e l l u n d e r h i s c o n t r o l , as H i t l e r did w i t h the Jews, despite repressions and atrocities carried o u t o n a considerable scale i n o c c u p i e d P o l a n d a n d t h e Baltic States. T h e C o m m u n i s t use o f t h e t e r m " d e s t r u c t i o n " or " l i q u i d a t i o n " w a s , as N o l t e r e a l i z e s , n o t b i o l o g i c a l b u t p o l i t i c a l i n i t s e s s e n c e . T h e consequences of this fact for Stalin's r e i g n of t e r r o r w e r e n o t t r i v i a l , b u t t h e y d o set i t a p a r t f r o m t h e g e n o c i d e p r a c t i c e d b y t h e Nazis. A s C h a r l e s M a i e r has observed, " N o Soviet c i t i z e n h a d t o e x p e c t t h a t d e p o r t a t i o n o r d e a t h m u s t b e so i n e v i t a b l e b y v i r t u e o f e t h n i c o r i g i n s " as i t w a s f o r t h e J e w s i n N a z i - d o m i nated Europe. T h e r e was no Soviet Treblinka, built to m u r d e r p e o p l e o n t h e i r a r r i v a l . 3 4 F i n a l l y , t h e r e is n o e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e Soviet U n i o n under Stalin planned to launch a w a r of conquest against t h e W e s t , n o r that it i n t e n d e d t h e mass m u r d e r o f t h e W e s t e r n bourgeoisie. Serious historical scholarship o v e r w h e l m i n g l y accepts t h a t Stalin's suspicious a n d n a r r o w m i n d l o o k e d

AUSCHWITZ

A N D E L S E W H E R E • 89

u p o n t h e W e s t i n p r i m a r i l y d e f e n s i v e t e r m s . T h e r e is v e r y l i t t l e reason to suppose that Soviet intentions t o w a r d t h e W e s t of Europe even remotely resembled G e r m a n intentions toward t h e East. Engaging i n a comparative study of barbarities along these lines is a difficult a n d i n s o m e w a y s a distasteful business. As J o a c h i m Fest has r e m a r k e d , f r o m t h e m o s t basic p o i n t o f v i e w , it m a d e little difference to those at t h e r e c e i v i n g e n d o f t h e mass m u r d e r w h e t h e r they faced death because they belonged to a r a c i a l g r o u p o r a s o c i a l class. S i m i l a r l y , i t d i d n o t a l t e r t h e g u i l t of those individuals w h o carried out these appalling crimes w h e t h e r t h e y d i d so i n t h e n a m e o f a n i d e o l o g y l i k e s o c i a l i s m , with a grand humanitarian tradition, however m u c h i t may have been perverted by Stalin, or i n the n a m e of a " w o r l d v i e w " like fascism, w h i c h was evil f r o m the v e r y beginning. B u t the h i s t o r i a n cannot be c o n t e n t w i t h t h e m o s t basic p o i n t o f v i e w . D i s t i n c t i o n s h a v e t o b e m a d e , because o t h e r w i s e w e risk sacrificing a r a t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e p r o b l e m s o n t h e a l t a r o f m o r a l d i s a p p r o b a t i o n . A s s o o n as o n e m a k e s d i s t i n c t i o n s , o n e runs the risk of being accused of playing d o w n or trivializing the o n e o r t h e o t h e r p h e n o m e n o n u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n . I t is i m p o r t a n t to reiterate, therefore, that to describe the N a z i genocide of the J e w s as a u n i q u e c r i m e i n h u m a n h i s t o r y i n n o w a y e x c u s e s o r condones the m a n y other terrible collective crimes that have disfigured the face of the t w e n t i e t h century, and for w h i c h parallels a n d p r e c e d e n t s c a n also b e f o u n d i n t h e m o r e d i s t a n t past. N o r does i t i m p l y t h a t such a c r i m e m a y n o t r e c u r i n a similar f o r m i n the f u t u r e , elsewhere. Secular historians can surely m a k e this point w i t h o u t i n any w a y placing themselves o n t h e g r o u n d o f religious w r i t e r s w h o suggest that t h e N a z i " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " was an e v e n t o f almost sacred significance, explainable only i n terms of the relation of the Jewish people t o G o d — a " H o l o c a u s t , " i n fact. T h e fact t h a t a n e v e n t w a s u n i q u e does n o t m e a n that i t cannot be rationally explained.35 N o r is i t n e c e s s a r i l y w r o n g t o s t r e s s t h e e x c e p t i o n a l n a t u r e o f Nazism's crimes o n an a r r o w e r front, i n comparison to the policies a n d t r a d i t i o n s o f o t h e r a d v a n c e d E u r o p e a n societies such as B r i t a i n o r F r a n c e . H i l l g r u b e r , i n d e e d , s i n g l e s o u t f o r s p e c i a l m e n t i o n t h e fact that the e x t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e Jews t o o k place under the conditions of a highly developed m o d e r n civilization,

90

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

and that those w h o took part i n it included m a n y well-educated and otherwise cultivated individuals.Joachim Fest regards this l i n e o f a r g u m e n t as a r e g r e s s i o n i n t o t h e o l d N a z i d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n "superior peoples" and "peoples o n a m o r e p r i m i t i v e level," or, by implication, the "master race" and the "subhum a n . " B u t i t is s u r e l y n o t N a z i o r e v e n r a c i s t t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t G e r m a n y is i n E u r o p e , a n d s h a r e s i n E u r o p e ' s h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i ence of the Enlightenment, the g r o w t h of constitutionalism and democracy, and the establishment of a general respect for fund a m e n t a l h u m a n rights. So a c o m p a r i s o n w i t h o t h e r E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s at t h e s a m e stage o f e c o n o m i c , social, a n d p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t is m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e t h a n , s a y , a c o m p a r i s o n w i t h the M o n g o l E m p i r e under Genghis K h a n , or Cambodia under Pol Pot. N o one seems to have tried to compare G e r m a n y w i t h J a p a n i n t h e p r e s e n t d e b a t e , f o r e x a m p l e , b e c a u s e i t is c l e a r t h a t Japanese b r u t a l i t y d u r i n g t h e Pacific w a r , i n C h i n a , K o r e a , a n d the Philippines, was not part of a planned attempt to exterminate w h o l e peoples although it caused the deaths of millions i n the most horrifying circumstances. M o r e to the point, there s e e m e d t o be a n "absence i n t h e Japanese social s y s t e m o f a g e n e r a l i z e d c o d e o f e t h i c a l b e h a v i o r , " as o n e h i s t o r i a n h a s p u t it. T h o s e m o r e l i m i t e d traditions w h i c h p r e v a i l e d i n t h e A r m y dictated that a defeated e n e m y w h o failed to take the honora b l e c o u r s e o f c o m m i t t i n g s u i c i d e w a s n o t w o r t h y o f r e s p e c t as a h u m a n being. A n d , m o r e generally, racism, imperialist ambition, a n d t h e b r u t a l i z i n g effects o f a l o n g p e r i o d of bitter w a r all c o m b i n e d to destroy w h a t e v e r w e a k restraints o n m i l i t a r y barbarism might have remained.36 I t d o e s s e e m t h e c a s e , as h i s t o r i a n O m e r B a r t o v h a s p o i n t e d o u t , t h a t a r e f u s a l t o r e g a r d o p p o n e n t s i n a w a r as h u m a n b e ings, convictions o f racial superiority, a n d ideological fanaticism ( w h e t h e r of a political or a religious nature) are all factors w h i c h have tended throughout h u m a n history to encourage brutality, massacre, a n d lack of ethical restraint i n warfare. B u t the N a z i w a r i n t h e East, a n d t h e connected p h e n o m e n o n o f t h e N a z i policy of genocide t o w a r d the Jews, was different. N o t even the T h i r t y Years' W a r , f r o m 1618 to 1648, i n w h i c h large n u m b e r s of people i n Central Europe w e r e slaughtered for no other reason than that they belonged to the w r o n g religious d e n o m i nation, had the same features of deliberate genocide, or was

AUSCHWITZ

A N D E L S E W H E R E • 91

fought w i t h the a i m of enslaving millions of people and killing i n its e n t i r e t y a w h o l e racial g r o u p . 3 7 A s C h a r l e s M a i e r r e m a r k s , " N o w h e r e else b u t i n G e r m a n - o c c u p i e d E u r o p e f r o m 1941 to 1 9 4 5 w a s t h e r e a n a p p a r a t u s so s i n g l e - m i n d e d l y e s t a b l i s h e d t o c a r r y o u t m a s s m u r d e r as a p r o c e s s i n i t s o w n r i g h t . " 3 8 T o p o i n t t h i s o u t is n o t t o s a y t h a t t h e r e l e v a n c e o f N a z i s m is l i m i t e d , o r to take Nazism out of history, or to render it i m m u n e to rational e x p l a n a t i o n . Just because i t has o n l y h a p p e n e d o n c e does n o t m e a n it w i l l not happen somewhere, s o m e t i m e i n the decades or c e n t u r i e s t o c o m e . T h e act o f h i s t o r i c a l c o m p a r i s o n does n o t involve an equation of t w o or m o r e events, or a b l u r r i n g o f distinctions b e t w e e n t h e m ; o n the contrary, it means isolating w h a t t h e y h a v e i n c o m m o n i n o r d e r t o find o u t h o w t h e y d i f f e r . T h i s a p p l i e s t o A u s c h w i t z a n d t h e G u l a g as m u c h as i t a p p l i e s to a n y t h i n g else. O n l y b y e n g a g i n g i n this exercise w i t h r i g o r a n d dispassion can w e g u a r d against t h e i r r e p e t i t i o n i n t h e future.

C H A P T E R

F I V E

R E S H A P I N G CENTRAL EUROPE

I Unless w e bear constantly i n m i n d the horrors visited n o t o n l y u p o n t h e J e w s b u t also o n t h e e n t i r e r e s i d e n t p o p u l a tion of occupied Eastern Europe by the Germans during the first h a l f o f t h e 1 9 4 0 s , i t is i m p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e e v e n t s w h i c h f o l l o w e d o n t h e e n d o f t h e w a r i n t h i s a r e a . A l r e a d y as the G e r m a n armies retreated, millions of ethnic Germans i n t h i s r e g i o n fled t h e i r h o m e s b e f o r e t h e a d v a n c i n g R e d A r m y . A s t h e R u s s i a n t r o o p s a r r i v e d , t h e y c a r r i e d o u t m a n y acts o f b r u t a l ity, rape, a n d m u r d e r against those G e r m a n s w h o w e r e u n f o r t u nate e n o u g h to fall into their hands. N o r was this by any means t h e e n d o f these people's sufferings. As t h e boundaries o f EastCentral Europe were redrawn atthe Potsdam Conference in the s u m m e r of 1945, t h e victorious Allies decided u p o n a farreaching compulsory transfer of ethnic Germans to the West. I n fact, t h e expulsions h a d already b e g u n . T h e y w e r e accompanied, particularly i n the early m o n t h s o f1945, by n u m e r o u s atrocities. T h e y c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h 1946. B y 1950, some 1 1 million Germans had been d r i v e n f r o m the eastern territories. I n t h e process, t h e official W e s t G e r m a n account of t h e e x p u l -

RESHAPING

CENTRAL

EUROPE-93

94

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

sions, p u b l i s h e d i n 1969, estimates t h a t m o r e t h a n 6 1 0 , 0 0 0 G e r mans w e r e killed by R o m a n i a n troops, Polish militia, Czech people's guards a n d Y u g o s l a v i a n partisans. A f u r t h e r 2.2 m i l l i o n r e m a i n e d unaccounted for, a l t h o u g h t h e official account explicitly w a r n s that it w o u l d be w r o n g , given the chaotic circumstances o f t h e t i m e , t o c o u n t all o f these a m o n g t h e dead.1 T h i s w a s n o t , as N o l t e p u t s i t , a p o l i c y t h a t " i s t o b e c a t e g o rized . . . under the concept of genocide."2 It was not, i n other words, an attempt to exterminate the G e r m a n people. It was n o t a n o t h e r A u s c h w i t z , a l t h o u g h N o l t e is b y n o m e a n s a l o n e a m o n g neo-conservative G e r m a n historians i n i m p l y i n g that it was. A n d it w o u l d n o t have happened had n o t H i t l e r launched his ideological w a r o f conquest a n d e x t e r m i n a t i o n against t h e East i n 1941. T h e destruction w r e a k e d o n these areas d u r i n g the "scorched-earth" retreat of the G e r m a n A r m y during the last phases o f t h e w a r , a n d b y t h e i r o c c u p a t i o n policies p r e v i ously, r e n d e r e d t h e m w h o l l y unfit for sustaining t h e masses of civilians w h o w e r e d r i v e n f r o m their homes by the resettlement p o l i c y . I t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t m a n y o f t h e e t h n i c G e r m a n s expelled f r o m Eastern Europe i n 1945-46 died on their w a y to t h e west, since t h e y h a d to traverse h u n d r e d s o f miles of territ o r y devastated b y t h e G e r m a n A r m y d u r i n g its r e t r e a t a short t i m e before. T h e violence of the R e d A r m y t o w a r d the expellees was a p r o d u c t o f a b r u t a l i z i n g o f e t h n i c relations i n this area w h i c h the Germans themselves had initiated. Similarly, the o f t e n m u r d e r o u s a n d b r u t a l behavior o f the Czechs a n d Poles toward the ethnic Germans within their territories i n 1945-46 w a s also t h e p r o d u c t o f years o f s u f f e r i n g , h a r d s h i p , t e r r o r , a n d d e a t h at G e r m a n hands. N o n e o f this excuses t h e crimes w h i c h accompanied t h e expulsions. B u t i t does help p u t t h e m i n perspective. T h e expulsion of ethnic G e r m a n s f r o m Eastern E u r o p e at t h e e n d of W o r l d W a r I I was accomplished w i t h appalling harshness. B u t i t was n o t equatable w i t h A u s c h w i t z . T h e Russians w e r e n o t t r y i n g to e x t e r m i n a t e t h e e n t i r e G e r m a n population, nor w e r e the Czechs or the Yugoslavs or the other Eastern European nationalities w h o expelled ethnic Germans f r o m t h e i r territories at t h e e n d of t h e w a r t r y i n g to do this e i t h e r . T h e r e has o f t e n b e e n a t e n d e n c y i n p o s t w a r W e s t G e r m a n y to w r i t e about the expulsions either i n isolation f r o m the barbaric policies of t h e previous G e r m a n occupation of E a s t e r n

RESHAPING

CENTRAL

EUROPE-95

E u r o p e , o r i n t e r m s t h a t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e y w e r e a c r i m e as g r e a t as t h e N a z i s ' " F i n a l S o l u t i o n . " N e i t h e r p o s i t i o n , i t s h o u l d b e clear f r o m t h e p r e c e d i n g chapters i n this book, is tenable. M o r e o v e r , i t is o f t e n f o r g o t t e n that t h e process o f forced removal and resettlement o fethnic Germans f r o m Eastern E u r o p e was begun by the Nazis themselves. Hitler's a i m was to bring all Germans w i t h i n the boundaries of the Reich, and the p r o c e s s b e g a n a s s o o n as t h e N a z i s m a r c h e d i n t o P o l a n d i n S e p t e m b e r 1939. O v e r three-quarters of a m i l l i o n e t h n i c Germans were removed f r o m their homes (including m a n y f r o m S o v i e t - o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r i e s as w e l l ) a n d p u t i n t o c a m p s , w h e r e they w e r e subjected t oe x a m i n a t i o n and interrogation by SS officials. T h o s e w h o w e r e d e e m e d t o be " r a c i a l l y u n f i t , " o r w e r e o p p o n e n t s o f N a z i s m , o r d i s l i k e d b y t h e SS f o r s o m e o t h e r r e a son, w e r e h a n d e d over to the Gestapo to be killed. Thousands remained i n the camps for months on end, living often i n quite harsh conditions, w h i l e the SSdecided w h e t h e r to send t h e m to t h e o l d R e i c h or t h e East. A n d t h r o u g h this action, o f course, n u m e r o u s villages a n d o t h e r areas of G e r m a n s e t t l e m e n t w e r e e m p t i e d , destroyed, o r t u r n e d over t o the Poles ( w h o w e r e forcibly deported u n d e r far m o r e b r u t a l and m u r d e r o u s conditions, and i n far greater numbers). T h e N a z i definition of w h a t constituted a " G e r m a n " or a "Slav" area of settlement for the p u r p o s e s o f t h i s a c t i o n w a s , as c a n b e i m a g i n e d , a r b i t r a r y a n d elastic.3 A s f a r a s t h e p o s t w a r r e s e t t l e m e n t is c o n c e r n e d , i t is s u r e l y clear that the w h o l l y unacceptable means by w h i c h the expulsions w e r e effected c a n a n d m u s t be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e e n d sought by the expulsions themselves. H e r e Hillgruber's account is c o n t r a d i c t e d b y r e c e n t r e s e a r c h b o t h i n i t s d e t a i l a n d i n i t s overall thrust. T h e emphasis w h i c h he puts o n the alleged desire o f t h e W e s t e r n Allies, u n d e r t h e influence o f t h e Polish g o v e r n m e n t - i n - e x i l e i n L o n d o n , to w e a k e n G e r m a n y b y creating an "enlarged Poland," seems particularly misplaced. T h e Allies certainly agreed i n principle to m o v e the western bounda r y o f P o l a n d f u r t h e r w e s t as e a r l y as 1 9 4 3 , a l t h o u g h i t s p r e c i s e position r e m a i n e d to be d e t e r m i n e d . B u t this step was taken not l e a s t i n o r d e r t o c o m p e n s a t e t h e P o l e s f o r t h e p r o s p e c t i v e loss o f m u c h o f t h e i r e a s t e r n t e r r i t o r y t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . I t w a s also a g r e e d , a t t h e first A l l i e d w a r c o n f e r e n c e , h e l d i n T e h e r a n a t

96

• IN H I T L E R ' S

SHADOW

the e n d of N o v e m b e r 1943, that the Russo-Polish border w o u l d be m o v e d w e s t w a r d t o r u n a l o n g t h e so-called " C u r z o n L i n e . " T h e eastern territories w h i c h P o l a n d thus lost h a d c h a n g e d hands a n u m b e r of times over t h e previous decades. T h e y h a d b e e n part of t h e Russian E m p i r e since t h e p a r t i t i o n of P o l a n d in the eighteenth century. They had been reconquered by the P o l i s h a r m y i n t h e w a r w i t h R u s s i a i n 1 9 2 0 - 2 1 ; less t h a n t w e n t y y e a r s l a t e r , i n 1 9 3 9 , t h e y f e l l i n t o R u s s i a n h a n d s o n c e m o r e , as Poland was divided between Stalin and H i t l e r under the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. T h e C u r z o n L i n e thus f o r m e d the weste r n boundary of the Soviet U n i o n b e t w e e n 1939 and 1941. Ironically, Hitler's G e r m a n y , by agreeing to this line of demarcation, h a d i n effect p r o v i d e d the precondition for the westw a r d shift of Poland after the war. I t w a s c l e a r as e a r l y as 1 9 4 1 t h a t S t a l i n w a s u n l i k e l y t o g i v e u p t h e t e r r i t o r y east o f t h e C u r z o n L i n e . A r e s u r r e c t e d P o l a n d w o u l d therefore require territorial compensation f r o m Germ a n y i n t h e west. B r i t a i n a n d the U n i t e d States w e r e s i m p l y r e c o g n i z i n g t h i s f a c t , a n d b o w i n g t o t h e fait accompli o f t h e occupation of the territory i n question by the Red A r m y i n the later stages o f t h e w a r , w h e n t h e y a g r e e d t o t h e b o u n d a r y c h a n g e s . A n d t h e y d i d so n o t u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e e x i l e d P o l i s h g o v e r n m e n t i n L o n d o n , b u t against its i m p a s s i o n e d opposition. T h e P o l i s h exiles w e r e d e t e r m i n e d n o t t o a b a n d o n t h e territory their predecessors had conquered i n the w a r of 1920¬ 2 1 . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e y w e r e also r e l u c t a n t t o c o u n t e n a n c e a w e s t ern boundary of their country r u n n i n g along the Oder-Neisse L i n e , since t h e y t h o u g h t this w o u l d w r e c k a n y chance o f reestablishing good relations w i t h a reconstructed G e r m a n y after t h e w a r . B y 1944, i t was clear to t h e W e s t e r n Allies, m o r e o v e r , t h a t t h e Soviet U n i o n was i n t e n t o n g i v i n g p o w e r to its o w n puppet Polish g o v e r n m e n t i n L u b l i n . Bypassing the L o n d o n exile g o v e r n m e n t e v e n m o r e clearly t h a n before, the Allies n o w t r i e d t o u s e a p r o v i s i o n a l a p p r o v a l o f t h e n e w b o u n d a r i e s as a b a r g a i n i n g c o u n t e r to persuade t h e Russians t o reconstruct t h e L u b l i n g o v e r n m e n t o n a b r o a d e r basis.4 T h a t a l l o f t h i s w o u l d i n v o l v e a t r a n s f e r o f as m a n y a s 7 million ethnic Germans f r o m Eastern Europe to the West was c l e a r t o t h e B r i t i s h as e a r l y as 1 9 4 1 , t h o u g h a r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h i s c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e b o u n d a r y c h a n g e s w a s n o t t h e s a m e as a n

RESHAPING

CENTRAL

EUROPE-97

actual decision t o expel t h eG e r m a n s until the boundary changes themselves had been agreed. T h e Allies w a n t e d naturally e n o u g h t o c r e a t e a p o s t w a r s e t t l e m e n t t h a t w o u l d last. I t was o u t of the question that P o l a n d should disappear f r o m the m a p a g a i n , as i t h a d d o n e i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y — P o l i s h n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g was t o o strong. T h e n e w P o l i s h state h a d b e e n created at t h e e n d o f t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r b y t a k i n g back m u c h of t h e t e r r i t o r ya n n e x e d b y Russia, A u s t r i a , a n d G e r m a n y i n t h e original partitions. B u t a substantial area—East Prussia—rem a i n e d i n G e r m a n hands, cut off f r o m t h e rest of Prussia a n d G e r m a n y b y t h e " c o r r i d o r " w h i c h g a v e t h e P o l e s access t o t h e B a l t i c Sea. O n c e t h e w e s t w a r d s h i f t o f P o l a n d a f t e r t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r h a d b e e n agreed to, i t was fairly clear t h a t t h e b u l k of East Prussia w o u l d have to go to Poland. As a consequence, the Americans agreed i n 1943 that the G e r m a n p o p u l a t i o n of this t e r r i t o r y w o u l d have to leave.5 W h a t m a d e the W e s t e r n Allies believe that expulsions w e r e necessary was n o t least t h e h i s t o r y o f G e r m a n m i n o r i t i e s i n Eastern Europe between the wars. T h e m a n y millionsof ethnic G e r m a n s w h o f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s l i v i n g i n n e w l y c r e a t e d states s u c h as P o l a n d a n d C z e c h o s l o v a k i a a t t h e e n d o f t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r w e r e never fully reconciled t o this situation. T h e y rem a i n e d r e l u c t a n t c i t i z e n s o f t h e n e w states t h r o u g h o u t t h e i n t e r w a r years. C e r t a i n l y , t h e m a j o r i t y nationalities, Poles a n d Czechs, did little to help reconcile their G e r m a n fellow citizens t o t h e n e w state o f affairs. B u t e v e n i n t h e p e a c e f u l years o f t h e W e i m a r Republic, neither the G e r m a n government nor the e t h n i c G e r m a n s i n t h e P o l i s h state gave u p w o r k i n g for a t e r r i torial r e v i s i o n t h a t w o u l d restore these " l o s t " areas to G e r m a n y . I t is i m p o s s i b l e t o s a y w h a t t h e o u t c o m e o f t h i s w o u l d h a v e b e e n i n the long r u n . Hitler's advent to p o w e r i n G e r m a n y i n 1933 a l t e r e d t h e s i t u a t i o n at o n e b l o w . P u b l i c l y c o m m i t t e d to t h e a i m of gathering all G e r m a n s together i n t o a single Reich, H i t l e r i m m e d i a t e l y set a b o u t m a n i p u l a t i n g t h e r e s e n t m e n t s o f e t h n i c G e r m a n s u n d e r Czech and Polish rule i n order to destabilize these t w o states a n d p r o v i d e a n excuse f o r i n v a d i n g t h e m . I n addition, increasing numbers of Sudeten Germans became enthusiasts for K o n r a d H e n l e i n ' s h o m e g r o w n v e r s i o n o f t h e N a z i P a r t y after 1933. B y 1935 H e n l e i n was s u p p o r t e d b y o v e r t w o thirds o f Sudeten G e r m a n voters. B y 1937 h e was w o r k i n g

98

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

full-time for Hitler. T h e bitter m e m o r y of the role played by the S u d e t e n G e r m a n s i n t h e s e y e a r s — i n first d e s t a b i l i z i n g C z e c h o slovakia a n d t h e n , via the M u n i c h A g r e e m e n t i n 1938, i n prov o k i n g the country's d i s m e m b e r m e n t — w a s a major factor i n the violent hatred displayed by the Czechs to the G e r m a n popu l a t i o n i n t h e i r m i d s t at t h e e n d o f t h e w a r . 6 T h e Allies' consciousness of t h e disruptive p o t e n t i a l of m i n o r i t i e s s u c h as t h e S u d e t e n G e r m a n s , as r e v e a l e d i n t h e i n t e r w a r years, was o n e o f t h e p r i n c i p a l reasons b e h i n d t h e decision to expel such G e r m a n minorities f r o m the resurrected s m a l l states o f E a s t e r n E u r o p e i n 1945. F o r t h e areas i n q u e s t i o n w e r e not simply " G e r m a n . " O n e can sympathize w i t h Hillgruber's passionate c o m m i t m e n t to the v i e w that t h e y constituted a "centuries-old area of G e r m a n settlement," since he himself was b o r n and g r e w u p i n East Prussia (and indeed fought briefly o n the eastern front t o w a r d the end of the war). B u t h e k n o w s as w e l l as a n y o n e t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n w a s f a r m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n this. T h e G e r m a n presence i n areas l i k e U p p e r Silesia w a s t o s o m e e x t e n t t h e result o f f o r c e d G e r m a n i z a t i o n beginning i n the Bismarckian period. E v e n after this, the Germans w e r e only one a m o n g a n u m b e r of ethnic groups i n these p a r t s o f E a s t - C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e . I n s o f a r as t h e y l i v e d w i t h i n the G e r m a n E m p i r e before 1918, t h e other ethnic g r o u p s w e r e , as H i l l g r u b e r c o n c e d e s , a l r e a d y b e i n g s u b j e c t e d t o increasing discrimination and oppression by their G e r m a n rulers.7 I n d e e d , it was t h e sheer c o m p l e x i t y o f ethnic divisions i n this part o f E u r o p e that r e n d e r e d ethnic rivalries a n d conflicts so i n t r a c t a b l e . T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e p r e v i o u s h a l f c e n t u r y , a n d above all the experience of the G e r m a n destabilization, invasion, a n d occupation o f E a s t e r n a n d E a s t - C e n t r a l E u r o p e bet w e e n 1938 and 1945 p r o v i d e d p o w e r f u l arguments for the c o m p u l s o r y r e m o v a l o f e t h n i c G e r m a n s f r o m these areas. W h a t t h i s e x p e r i e n c e s h o u l d also h a v e d o n e , o f course, w a s t o h a v e persuaded the Allies that such population transfers could n o t be accomplished peacefully and h u m a n e l y w i t h o u t a great deal m o r e p l a n n i n g , a great deal m o r e official supervision, a n d above all a great deal m o r e t i m e t h a n was actually p r o v i d e d . W h i l e these plans w e r e b e i n g discussed, o t h e r ideas w e r e a l s o b e i n g floated f o r a d i v i s i o n o f G e r m a n y i t s e l f a f t e r t h e w a r . B u t t h e s e w e r e n o t , as H i l l g r u b e r c l a i m s , firm A l l i e d p o l i c i e s .

RESHAPING

CENTRAL

E U R O P E • 99

M a n y possible options w e r e b e i n g m o o t e d at this t i m e , i n c l u d ing the notorious " M o r g e n t h a u P l a n " for the deindustrialization of postwar Germany. Neither the Morgenthau Plan nor the idea of d i v i d i n g G e r m a n y was ever officially adopted, a l t h o u g h it was agreed that Prussia should be b r o k e n u p i n t o smaller units w i t h i n a united Germany. It was the Cold W a r that brought about the division of Germany; the future development of t w o G e r m a n states w a s f a r f r o m i n e v i t a b l e i n 1945. I n a n y case, t h e E u r o p e a n settlement of 1945 cannot stand or fall by the w a y i n w h i c h it was brought about. W i t h all due reservation, it m u s t u l t i m a t e l y be j u d g e d b y its l o n g - t e r m effects. T h e E u r o p e a n boundaries d r a w n at the conferences o fPotsdam and Yalta h a v e n o w l a s t e d o v e r t w i c e as l o n g as t h o s e d r a w n a t V e r s a i l l e s a n d T r i a n o n i n 1919. T h e political stability a c h i e v e d b y t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f 1945 has p r o v e d m o r e d u r a b l e t h a n t h e a r r a n g e ments reached by almost any comparable European settlement of m o d e r n times, including those brought about by the Congress o f V i e n n a i n 1815 o r t h e C o n g r e s s o f B e r l i n i n 1878. F o r t y years of u n i n t e r r u p t e d peace add u p to a n u n a n s w e r a b l e defense of t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s r e a c h e d i n 1945. A r m e d conflict i n Europe over the previous century had been generated mainly b y nationalist passions a n d e t h n i c rivalries. T h e transfer o f populations a n d t h e d i v i s i o n of E u r o p e i n t o t w o blocs, each w i t h a d i f f e r e n t social s y s t e m a n d e a c h d o m i n a t e d b y a n outside s u p e r p o w e r , has, b y o n e o f history's savage i r o n i e s , b r o u g h t this century of conflict to an end. H i l l g r u b e r , as w e h a v e s e e n , s u g g e s t s t h a t i t w o u l d h a v e b e e n a good t h i n g i f E u r o p e , led by G e r m a n y , had established itself as a w o r l d p o w e r i n t h e i n t e r w a r y e a r s . N o l t e , t o o , s u g g e s t s t h a t " i f E u r o p e w a s t o s u c c e e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s e l f as a w o r l d p o w e r o n a n equal f o o t i n g [ w i t h , presumably, t h e U n i t e d States a n d the USSR], t h e n G e r m a n y had to be the core of the n e w ' U n i t e d States.' " A m i l i t a r i l y w e a k G e r m a n y i n t h e 1930s w o u l d h a v e f a l l e n p r e y t o h e r n e i g h b o r s a n d so d e s t r o y e d t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . 8 B u t n e i t h e r o f these speculations seems v e r y realistic. E v e n t h e present-day E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y , w i t h its d r i v e t o w a r d E u r o p e a n i n t e g r a t i o n a n d its p l e t h o r a o f s u p r a n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h h a d n o p a r a l l e l i n N e v i l l e C h a m b e r l a i n ' s d a y , is s e l d o m able to speak w i t h a single voice o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s of m a j o r i m p o r t a n c e . N o r is i t a t a l l c l e a r t h a t t h e w o r l d w o u l d b e

1 00

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

a better place if E u r o p e had become a w o r l d p o w e r along the l i n e s H i l l g r u b e r a n d N o l t e s u g g e s t . I n a n y c a s e , s i n c e t h e first half of the t w e n t i e t h century proved that Europe was unable t o o r d e r its o w n affairs peacefully a n d was liable t o i n v o l v e t h e rest of t h e w o r l d i n m u r d e r o u s conflict, i t was probably n o bad thing that the continent was brought under outside control i n 1945. S o m e m a y argue that t h e price paid b y those w h o n o w l i v e u n d e r Soviet h e g e m o n y has b e e n p a r t i c u l a r l y h i g h . Y e t inhabitants of m a n y countries i n Eastern E u r o p e k n e w little personal f r e e d o m or respect for h u m a n rights even w h e n they w e r e w h o l l y s e l f - g o v e r n i n g , a n d t h e r e is l i t t l e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e y w o u l d h a v e b e c o m e m o r e liberal after 1945. Finally, the postwar settlement i n E u r o p e effectively r e m o v e d t h e c o n t i n e n t f r o m t h e field o f c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e t w o superpowers. O f course, there w e r e m o m e n t s of tension, most notably over B e r l i n , d u r i n g the airlift i n 1948 and t h e n over the building of the wall i n 1961. But on the whole, it w o u l d b e r e a s o n a b l e t o say t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n o f E u r o p e i n t o t w o c a m p s , c e m e n t e d b y t h e t r a n s f e r o f p o p u l a t i o n , has e l i m i n a t e d m o s t p o t e n t i a l sources o f serious clashes b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d States a n d the U S S R i n the region. I f there h a d b e e n millions o f discontented G e r m a n s u n d e r Russian, Polish, or C z e c h rule, or i f the Soviet r e g i m e , still r e e l i n g f r o m t h e terrible experiences of t h e G e r m a n invasion, had b e e n confronted w i t h massive and bloody n a t i o n a l conflicts i n postwar East-Central E u r o p e , conflicts f r o m w h i c h t h e W e s t e r n A l l i e s w o u l d h a v e f o u n d i t v e r y difficult t o stand aside, e t h n i c a n d political instability i n p o s t w a r E u r o p e m i g h t easily h a v e p r o v i d e d t h e t i n d e r b o x w i t h w h i c h to ignite a fresh w o r l d conflict, this t i m e w i t h all the destructive p o t e n t i a l available t o i t i n t h e n u c l e a r age. I n E u r o p e i n t h e s e c o n d h a l f o f t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , i t is n o t j u s t f e a r o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s t h a t has p r e v e n t e d t h e r e e m e r g e n c e o f t h e t e r r i b l e c o n f l i c t s w h i c h t o r e t h e c o n t i n e n t a p a r t i n t h e first h a l f . A m a j o r factor has b e e n a r e s o l u t i o n o f s o m e o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l causes o f t h o s e conflicts, e t h n i c a n d social, b y t h e d i v i s i o n o f E u r o p e i n t o t w o halves b y social s y s t e m a n d t h e d e f u s i n g o f e t h n i c a n t a g o n i s m s t h r o u g h t h e m a s s t r a n s f e r o f p o p u l a t i o n s . I t is i n r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e benefits o f stability t h a t n e i t h e r side has m a d e a serious a t t e m p t to i m p o s e its o w n values a n d n o r m s upon the other.

RESHAPING

CENTRAL

EU ROPE • 1 01

II A l t h o u g h t h e final c o l l a p s e o f t h e e m p i r e c r e a t e d b y B i s m a r c k clearly h a p p e n e d at t h e e n d o f t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r w i t h the zonal division of G e r m a n y and the w e s t w a r d shift of Russia a n d P o l a n d , t h e boundaries established i n 1871 h a d i n f a c t b e e n r e v i s e d i n a n u m b e r o f stages. T o b e g i n w i t h , less t h a n half a century later, after Germany's defeat i n W o r l d W a r I , Alsace-Lorraine was r e t u r n e d t othe F r e n c h and substantial parts o f Prussia w e r e lost to t h e Poles. M u c h m o r e significant, h o w e v e r , w e r e t h e steps t a k e n b y H i t l e r i n 1938, w i t h t h e Anschluss o f A u s t r i a a n d t h e a n n e x a t i o n o f t h e S u d e t e n l a n d . This marked the definitive abandonment of the Bismarckian kleindeutsch s o l u t i o n o f t h e G e r m a n q u e s t i o n t h r o u g h a " l i t t l e G e r m a n y " without Austria or Bohemia and a reversion to the e a r l i e r grossdeutsch i d e a f a v o r e d b y G e r m a n l i b e r a l s i n t h e years leading u p to t h e 1848 R e v o l u t i o n . Indeed, it was o n l y Allied pressure that had p r e v e n t e d German-speaking Austria f r o m m e r g i n g w i t h G e r m a n y f o l l o w i n g t h e collapse o f the Habsburg empire i n 1918-19. T h e Bismarckian version of Germ a n u n i f i c a t i o n thus lasted all o f sixty-seven years. M o r e a n d m o r e , i t a p p e a r s n o t as t h e c u l m i n a t i o n o f G e r m a n h i s t o r y b u t as a m e r e e p i s o d e i n i t . N i n e t e e n e i g h t y - e i g h t m a r k e d t h e fift i e t h a n n i v e r s a r y o f its demise. E v e n l e a v i n g aside t h e d r a m a t i c b o u n d a r y changes of 1938, i t is i m p o s s i b l e t o g e t a r o u n d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d i s m e m b e r m e n t of G e r m a n y i n 1945 w o u l d not have occurred had the Nazis not launched an u l t i m a t e l y unsuccessful ideological w a r o f conquest a n d e x t e r m i n a t i o n against t h e rest of E u r o p e , a n d particularly t h e East, shortly before. As G e r m a n historian H e i n r i c h August W i n k l e r points out, the Reich of 1871 was ultimately destroyed by the Germans themselves. " I n v i e w of the role that G e r m a n y played i n t h e origins of the t w o w o r l d w a r s , " h e cautions, " E u r o p e cannot and the G e r m a n s should n o t desire a n e w G e r m a n Reich, asovereign nation-state, any longer." G e r m a n y , as a n o t h e r G e r m a n h i s t o r i a n h a s p u t i t , is n o w a " p o s t n a t i o n a l society." T h e Austrians, w h o w e r e f o r m a l l y part of G e r m a n y for centuries before Bismarck t h r e w t h e m o u t i n 1866, a n d w e r e p a r t o f i t again f r o m 1938 t o 1945, possessed n o s t r o n g n a t i o n a l consciousness of their o w n before t h e Second W o r l d W a r . Since

10 2 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

t h e n , h o w e v e r , t h e y h a v e c o m e t o t h i n k o f t h e m s e l v e s as v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e W e s t G e r m a n s . T h e s a m e m a y be said, t h o u g h f a r less e m p h a t i c a l l y , o f t h e d e v e l o p i n g n a t i o n a l c o n sciousness o f t h e East G e r m a n s . G e r m a n n a t i o n a l consciousness n o l o n g e r exists e v e n i n t h e sense i n w h i c h i t d i d , w i t h i n l i m i t s , b e t w e e n 1 8 7 1 a n d 1 9 4 5 . 9 T h e r e is n o f u n d a m e n t a l r e a s o n w h y a l i n g u i s t i c o r c u l t u r a l g r o u p s u c h as t h e G e r m a n s s h o u l d n e e d t o be u n i t e d u n d e r a single state, a n y m o r e t h a n t h a t t h e s a m e principle should be applied to other linguistic or cultural g r o u p s , s u c h as t h e E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g n a t i o n s . T o a r g u e f o r reunification i n the name of freedom for the people w h o live u n d e r C o m m u n i s m i n t h e G D R is t o r i s k s e r i o u s i n t e r n a t i o n a l conflict and upheaval, e v e n i n the altered political climate of t h e late 1980s. M o r e o v e r , f o r its m o s t vociferous advocates i n side W e s t G e r m a n y , r e u n i f i c a t i o n m e a n s , n o t t h e e x t e n s i o n o f W e s t e r n f r e e d o m to t h e East, b u t t h e resurgence o f a n old-style G e r m a n nationalism whose c o m m i t m e n t to f r e e d o m a n d dem o c r a c y is e x t r e m e l y d o u b t f u l . 1 0 M o r e t h a n o n e c o n t r i b u t o r t o t h e d e b a t e has r e m a r k e d t h a t as f a r as t h e G e r m a n s ' r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e i r o w n p a s t is c o n c e r n e d , i t is u l t i m a t e l y i r r e l e v a n t w h e t h e r A u s c h w i t z w a s u n i q u e o r n o t . 1 1 W e s t B e r l i n h i s t o r i a n H a g e n S c h u l z e asks, " D o e s t h e special responsibility o f t h e G e r m a n s for t h e misdeeds that w e r e c o m m i t t e d i n their n a m e depend o n their s i n g u l a r i t y ? A r e t h e m a s s m u r d e r s a n y l e s s r e p r e h e n s i b l e , is t h e G e r m a n s ' o b l i g a t i o n t o d r a w lessons f r o m t h e misdeeds o f t h e N a t i o n a l Socialist era a n y smaller, i f c o m p a r a b l e misdeeds h a v e b e e n c o m m i t t e d elsewhere a n d at o t h e r t i m e s ? " 1 2 Y e t i n v i e w of the Germans' position and reputation i n the world, the uniqueness or otherwise of A u s c h w i t z surely does m a k e a difference. F o r if the Germans did not c o m m i t a crime that stood o u t f r o m all others i n its h o r r o r , t h e n t h e y h a v e n o m o r e t o be a s h a m e d o f t h a n a n y o t h e r n a t i o n , a n d so i t b e c o m e s p o s s i b l e for t h e m to t r e a d t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l stage u n b u r d e n e d b y a historical responsibility w i t h o u t parallel a n y w h e r e else i n t h e w o r l d . I f t h e r e l a t i v i z a t i o n o f A u s c h w i t z succeeds, a n i m p o r t a n t obstacle t o a resurgence o f G e r m a n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d t o t h e c a m p a i g n f o r G e r m a n r e u n i f i c a t i o n is t h e r e b y r e m o v e d . N o t o n l y N o l t e b u t m a n y o t h e r h i s t o r i a n s as w e l l a l s o c l e a r l y t h i n k i t is i m p o r t a n t f o r W e s t G e r m a n s t o i d e n t i f y m o r e p o s i -

RESHAPING

CENTRAL

EUROPE-103

t i v e l y w i t h t h e i r n a t i o n a l past. H a g e n Schulze, for e x a m p l e , has d e c l a r e d that n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y is f a r m o r e p o w e r f u l t h a n a n identity based o n loyalty t o t h e Federal G e r m a n constitution. Schulze combines a clear desire for a takeover of East G e r m a n y b y W e s t G e r m a n y ( " a r e u n i f i c a t i o n u n d e r f r e e , W e s t e r n auspices") w i t h a n e q u a l l y clear r e c o g n i t i o n o f its i m p o s s i b i l i t y i n the foreseeable future and a w a r n i n g that i t must b e part o f a European scheme of unity, echoing Hillgruber's linking o f Germ a n p o w e r w i t h E u r o p e a n power. H e warns that i f historians do not play their part i n molding that identity, then other, m o r e dangerous groups will. Schulze identifies a "danger f r o m t h e r i g h t " a m o n g t h e G r e e n s a n d t h e "classical l e f t , " w h i c h h e alleges have t a k e n u p virtually a l l t h e traditional t h e m e s o f G e r m a n c o n s e r v a t i s m . B u t h e n e v e r says w h a t t h e s e t h e m e s a c t u a l l y a r e . T h e G r e e n s h a v e , i t is t r u e , a r g u e d f o r r e u n i f i c a t i o n o n t h e basis o f d i s a r m a m e n t a n d n e u t r a l i t y , b u t this is a l o n g w a y f r o m the reunification demands o fthe radical right, w h i c h regards a reunited Germany's right t oindependent armaments as a x i o m a t i c . E v e n i f s o m e o f t h e i r t h e m e s , s u c h as t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t , c a r r y e c h o e s f r o m t h e völkisch past, t h e r e c a n surely b e n o d o u b t about t h e i r c o m m i t m e n t t o d e m o c r a c y a n d h u m a n r i g h t s , as t h e i r r e l e n t l e s s u n c o v e r i n g o f political corruption a n d their determined opposition to intrusive state i n f o r m a t i o n - g a t h e r i n g i n W e s t G e r m a n y has s h o w n . 1 3 If historians a r ebusy t r y i n g t o manufacture a national ident i t y , i t is n o t b e c a u s e t h e r e is a n e e d t o p r e v e n t a n y o n e e l s e f r o m d o i n g so. W h y t h e y a r e e n g a g i n g i n this business h a s b e e n p u t m o s t c l e a r l y b y M i c h a e l Stürmer. I n h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e Römerberg C o l l o q u i a — a n a n n u a l s e r i e s o f d e b a t e s h e l d i n F r a n k f u r t , w h i c h i n 1 9 8 6 d e a l t w i t h " t h e p a s t t h a t w i l l n o t pass a w a y " a n d w h i c h f o r m e d t h e o r i g i n a l s t i m u l u s f o r N o l t e ' s essay o f t h e s a m e title—Stürmer c o m p l a i n e d o f t h e G e r m a n s ' " o b s e s sion w i t h their guilt," their lack of national identity, their inabili t y t o d e c i d e w h e r e t h e y stood i n t i m e a n d space. T h e 1960s i n particular s a w t h e destruction o f any r e m a i n i n g sense o f cultural i d e n t i t y — a result, h e implies, o foveremphasizing the i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e T h i r d Reich i n G e r m a n history. I t is t i m e , a r g u e s Stürmer, t o g i v e h i s t o r y a m e a n i n g — S i n n s t i f t u n g i s t h e w o r d h e u s e s — o n t h e basis o f w h i c h t h e G e r m a n s c a n b u i l d a g e n u i n e sense o f n a t i o n h o o d : " W e cannot l i v e b y m a k i n g o u r

10 4 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

o w n past . . . i n t o a p e r m a n e n t source o f endless g u i l t feelings."14 Stürmer h i n t e d h o w t h i s m i g h t b e a c h i e v e d w h e n h e r e f e r r e d d u r i n g t h e Römerberg C o l l o q u i a t o " t h e d e a d l y i d i o c i e s of the victors of 1918" and suggested a significant parallel to the peace s e t t l e m e n t o f 1945. H i t l e r , h e asserted, c a m e to p o w e r because G e r m a n y h a d lost its sense o f o r i e n t a t i o n a n d h a d n o d e f e n s e s a g a i n s t t h e c r i s i s o f m o d e r n i t y . Stürmer s u g g e s t s t h a t the W e i m a r Republic was destroyed by the heavy burden o f guilt laid o n it by the T r e a t y of Versailles, clearly i m p l y i n g that t h e s a m e is, o r c o u l d b e , h a p p e n i n g t o t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c . H i s u s e o f t h e p h r a s e "as S t a l i n ' s m e n sat i n j u d g m e n t i n N u r e m b e r g " seems to suggest that G e r m a n guilt after 1945 was t h e p r o d u c t o f a C o m m u n i s t p l o t . 1 5 H e has also a t t e m p t e d t o d o w n play G e r m a n responsibility for the outbreak of the First W o r l d W a r b y r e t u r n i n g t o the old n o t i o n o fgeopolitical determinism—the notion that Germany's position i n the center o f E u r o p e caused it to b e c o m e embroiled i n major international a r m e d c o n f l i c t s . 1 6 Stürmer's e m p h a s i s o n g e o p o l i t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f G e r m a n h i s t o r y is w o r t h a l i t t l e c l o s e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , n o t l e a s t b e c a u s e i t is s h a r e d b y a n u m b e r o f o t h e r n e o c o n s e r v a t i v e G e r m a n historians. H a g e n Schulze, f o r e x a m p l e has d e c l a r e d t h a t " G e r m a n y ' s f a t e is g e o g r a p h y . . . t h e l o g i c o f g e o g r a p h y , t h e position of G e r m a n y [on t h e m a p ] remains a decisive explan a t i o n o f its i n t e r n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . " 1 7 K l a u s H i l d e b r a n d t o o has p l a c e d a s i m i l a r e m p h a s i s o n w h a t h e s e e s as t h e p o l i t i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s o f " t h e c o u n t r y i n t h e m i d d l e . " 1 8 L i k e S c h u l z e , Stürmer has a r g u e d t h a t G e r m a n y ' s l o c a t i o n i n t h e c e n t e r o f E u r o p e meant that it was threatened o n t w o fronts (namely by France a n d b y Russia). T h i s i n t u r n m a d e i t necessary f o r reasons o f national security for the country to be governed by an authoritarian system, u n d e r Bismarck and, later, W i l h e l m I I ; and conversely, it rendered the durability of a democratic polity under Weimar extremely problematical.19 According to Schulze, the democratization that had already begun to take place before 1914 was the p r i m e factor i n underm i n i n g G e r m a n y ' s stability i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system a n d so i n u n l e a s h i n g t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r . S c h u l z e has also d e f e n d e d the paramilitary Freikorps of the early W e i m a r Republic, the m u r d e r e r s o f K a r l L i e b k n e c h t a n d Rosa L u x e m b u r g , as essen-

RESHAPING

CENTRAL

EUROPE-105

tial g u a r a n t o r s o f p o l i t i c a l stability, a n d has p l a c e d a large p a r t of the blame for the Republic's demise o n left-wing intellectuals a n d C o m m u n i s t s . 2 0 Stürmer h a s a r g u e d a l o n g s i m i l a r l i n e s . 2 1 These views represent a recrudescence of traditional conservative beliefs going back to the early years of t h e W e i m a r Republic. G e r m a n y , i n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was " e n c i r c l e d " b y h e r enemies before 1914; the T r e a t y of Versailles, t h e C o m m u n i s t s , and i n general the replacement of authoritarian stability by an excess o f d e m o c r a c y c o m b i n e d t o d e s t r o y W e i m a r . 2 2 S u c h views are quite w i d e l y held o n the political right. A l f r e d D r e g ger, for e x a m p l e , c l a i m e d i n 1986 t h a t Versailles a n d reparations d e l i v e r e d W e i m a r i n t o H i t l e r ' s h a n d s . 2 3 A n d at t h e a n n u a l c o n v e n t i o n o f t h e association o f G e r m a n expellees f r o m Silesia i n 1985, attended by H e l m u t K o h l , journalist T i m o t h y G a r t o n A s h r e p o r t e d t h a t " a p r o v i n c i a l C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c l e a d e r is hissed a n d b o o e d w h e n h e suggests t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n o f Germ a n y w a s t h e r e s u l t o f a w a r Hitler b e g a n . A b r a v e Y o u n g L i b e r a l w h o suggests i n a public discussion t h a t t h e Versailles T r e a t y w a s a l s o t h e r e s u l t o f a w a r G e r m a n y b e g a n is m e t w i t h h o o t s o f d e r i s i v e l a u g h t e r . W h a t , Germany b e g a n t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r ? Preposterous suggestion!"24 I t is t h i s k i n d o f t h i n g , s u r e l y , t h a t P e t e r P u l z e r , p r o f e s s o r o f g o v e r n m e n t at O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , m e a n s w h e n h e w a r n s t h a t " i t is w i t h fire t h a t s o m e o f t h e W e s t G e r m a n c o n s e r v a t i v e h i s t o r i a n s a n d t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a l l i e s a r e p l a y i n g . " T h e d a n g e r i s , as P u l z e r says, n o t n a t i o n a l s e n t i m e n t i n itself, b u t " a n a t i o n a l s e n t i m e n t t h a t a r o u s e s u n f u l f i l l a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s . " 2 5 F o r i n s o f a r as t h e r e v i v a l o f n a t i o n a l i s m i n W e s t G e r m a n y is l i n k e d w i t h t h e d e m a n d f o r r e u n i f i c a t i o n , as i t u n d o u b t e d l y i s , f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e e d i t o r i a l c o l u m n s o f t h e Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, i t is i n d e e d indulging i n dangerous political fantasies.26 Better contacts and easier times for East G e r m a n s can o n l y c o m e i f East G e r m a n s t a t e h o o d is a c c e p t e d . A n " A u s t r i a n s o l u t i o n " — r e u n i f i c a t i o n o n t h e basis o f n e u t r a l i t y a n d d i s a r m a m e n t — w o u l d still l e a v e o p e n t h e q u e s t i o n o f guarantees t o t h e 17 m i l l i o n E a s t G e r m a n s t h a t t h o s e t h i n g s m a n y o f t h e m e v i d e n t l y b e l i e v e i n , s u c h as a n extensive w e l f a r e state a n d social security, w o u l d n o t be t a k e n away f r o m t h e m by a government brought to power by a majority of electors a m o n g the 60 m i l l i o n West Germans and determ i n e d to dismantle these things. T h e degree of a u t o n o m y that

106

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

w o u l d h a v e to be a l l o w e d the t e r r i t o r y of the G D R w o u l d be s u c h as t o c r e a t e a d e c e n t r a l i z e d , n o n u n i t a r y n a t i o n a l s t a t e w i t h a v e r y w e a k center along the lines of the old G e r m a n Confederat i o n set u p b y t h e V i e n n a C o n g r e s s i n 1815. O n e w o n d e r s w h e t h e r it w o u l d really be w o r t h the trouble.

Ill M e n t i o n o f t h e G e r m a n C o n f e d e r a t i o n r e m i n d s us that the present debate implicitly involves questions relating to t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h as w e l l as t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . I n s o m e w a y s i t is t h e o l d c o n t i n u i t y d e b a t e i n a n e w guise. T h e r e has b e e n a v e r i t a b l e e x p l o s i o n o f g o o d historical research o n m o d e r n G e r m a n history since t h e 1960s. W e n o w k n o w a great deal m o r e about it t h a n w e did w h e n the views represented by Sturmer and Schulze, and to some extent Hilde¬ brand and Hillgruber, w e r e m o r e w i d e l y current. Virtually all t h e historians w h o h a v e l o o k e d closely at t h e origins o f W o r l d W a r I h a v e c o m e t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n , o f t e n o n t h e basis o f i m p r e s sive archival research, that t h e r e was n o question of G e r m a n y b e i n g " e n c i r c l e d " b y a g g r e s s i v e f o e s as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f i t s geographical p o s i t i o n after 1870. G e r m a n y itself, above all b y starting a massive arms race t h r o u g h the construction of an e n o r m o u s n a v y , a n d t h e n b y repeated, aggressive i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n E u r o p e a n , N o r t h A f r i c a n , a n d o t h e r w o r l d t r o u b l e spots, brought about a coalition of the powers w h i c h rightly felt threatened by this n e w policy after the t u r n of the c e n t u r y — B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , a n d Russia. G e r m a n y was i n n o sense f o r c e d to t r e a d t h i s p a t h as a r e s u l t o f h e r g e o g r a p h i c a l s i t u a t i o n ; t h e experience of the previous t h i r t y years m a d e that a b u n d a n t l y clear.27 N o r was it inevitable that the G e r m a n government should respond to g r o w i n g internal discontent, expressed above all i n t h e increasing p o p u l a r i t y o f t h e Social D e m o c r a t s , w h o b e c a m e t h e largest p a r t y i n t h e G e r m a n p a r l i a m e n t i n 1912, b y playing t h e nationalist card. T h e r e w e r e voices w i t h i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t that favored defusing the campaign for democratization t h r o u g h t i m e l y r e f o r m s s u c h as t h e e x t e n s i o n o f v o t i n g r i g h t s i n Prussia. M o r e i m p o r t a n t still, t h e pressures inside G e r m a n y for

RESHAPING

CENTRAL

E U R O P E • 107

a n aggressive foreign policy w e r e by n o means simply the crea t i o n o f a n a n x i o u s r u l i n g class: t h e s t r i d e n t a n d v o c i f e r o u s radical n a t i o n a l i s m o f t h e p r e w a r years d r e w m u c h o f its strength f r o m a nindependent dynamic o f self-mobilization f r o m b e l o w . H e r e s o m e significant social groups, n o t a b l y t h e petty bourgeoisie, engaged i n an increasingly desperate search f o r s u r v i v a l b y s t i r r i n g r a d i c a l ideologies, a n t i - S e m i t i s m , ext r e m e nationalism, hostility t om o d e r n economic structures, and demands for political authoritarianism into a potent m i x that was to be b r e w e d u p again after the war, to m u c h greater effect, b y t h e Nazis. F i n a l l y , t h e evidence for supposing t h a t t h e G e r m a n government launched the First W o r l d W a r primarily i n order to escape f r o m i n t e r n a l pressures for m o r e democracy is e x t r e m e l y t h i n . 2 8 F o r a l l t h e s e r e a s o n s , t h e r e f o r e , i t is i m p o s s i b l e t o a c c e p t t h e v i e w that the First W o r l d W a r came about for the geopolitical reasons suggested b y Stlirmer. T h e r e can b e n o doubt that G e r m a n y bore p r i m a r y responsibility for the outbreak of the war. W i t h i n a m o n t h , the G e r m a n government had d r a w n up an ambitious plan of annexation and conquest. G e r m a n w a r aims w e r e far-reaching, a n d greatly exceeded those of other c o m b a t a n t nations i n t h e i r scope. T h e y i n c l u d e d t e r r i t o r i a l g a i n s a n d financial r e p a r a t i o n s t h a t f a r o u t w e i g h e d t h o s e i m posed by the Allies after the G e r m a n defeat, i n the T r e a t y of Versailles. W h a t e v e r t e r m s h a d b e e n concluded i n 1919, it is v e r y unlikely that nationalists and conservatives i n G e r m a n y , having backed astrongly annexationist program during the war ( a n d i n m a n y c a s e s b e f o r e i t t o o ) w o u l d h a v e f o u n d t h e m acceptable. T h e treaty did, t o b e sure, contain m a n y dubious provisions. Instead of taking the w i n d out of the nationalists' sails, i t m e r e l y s u c c e e d e d i n g i v i n g t h e m f u r t h e r r e a s o n s f o r d i s c o n t e n t . Y e t as t h e c r i t i c i s m s v o i c e d o f t h e t r e a t y b y t h e Liberals, t h e Social D e m o c r a t s , a n d t h e Catholic C e n t e r P a r t y — t h e so-called " W e i m a r c o a l i t i o n " — s h o w e d , o p p o s i t i o n to the treaty did not have to m e a n opposition to democracy. N o r was t h e t r e a t y t h e sole or e v e n t h e m a i n cause o f W e i m a r ' s demise: a far greater role was played by the Depression of 1929 to 1933, w h i c h o w e d little to t h e effects of Versailles a n d was only marginally influenced by the impact of reparations.29 It was not the C o m m u n i s t s w h o brought about the Republic's

108-IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

collapse: after all, t h e y n e v e r succeeded i n w i n n i n g m o r e t h a n 17 p e r c e n t o f t h e v o t e . N o r w a s i t W e i m a r ' s l e f t - w i n g i n t e l l e c t u als, m a n y o f w h o m d i d m o r e t o t r y t o s t r e n g t h e n W e i m a r d e mocracy than to u n d e r m i n e it. T h e destruction of the W e i m a r R e p u b l i c , as n u m e r o u s s c h o l a r l y s t u d i e s h a v e s h o w n , w a s i n t h e first p l a c e t h e w o r k o f t h e N a z i P a r t y , w h i c h g a i n e d 3 7 p e r c e n t of the v o t e i n 1932, m o r e t h a n any other p a r t y h a d done i n the whole history of the Republic, and of the conservative groups w h i c h t o l e r a t e d i t or collaborated w i t h i t i n its e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p i n t h e first s i x m o n t h s o f 1 9 3 3 , n a m e l y t h e A r m y , the industrialists, the large landowners, the senior civil service a n d o t h e r elites w h o w a n t e d t h e e n d of d e m o c r a c y a n d w e r e n o t t o o p a r t i c u l a r as t o h o w i t c a m e a b o u t . T h e r e is s t i l l , of course, considerable controversy about t h e degree of responsibility borne by each of these groups, but the research of the last t w o decades leaves l i t t l e r o o m f o r d o u b t t h a t , s e e n i n b r o a d perspective, i t was t h e alliance o f t h e Nazis a n d t h e elites that destroyed W e i m a r , not the activities of C o m m u n i s t s and leftw i n g intellectuals or the T r e a t y of Versailles.30 S e e n f r o m t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w , a m o r e a u t h o r i t a r i a n , less d e m o cratic f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t i n G e r m a n y after 1919 w o u l d o n l y have benefited the nationalists, w h o w a n t e d to r e e m b a r k o n a course of military expansionism, because the checks imposed o n their activities b y t h e Social D e m o c r a t s a n d o t h e r democratic forces w o u l d have b e e n largely r e m o v e d . W h a t G e r m a n y n e e d e d i n 1919 was a m o r e d e t e r m i n e d a t t e m p t b y t h e Social D e m o c r a t s to establish democracy. T h e i r failure to b r i n g t h e A r m y u n d e r firm c i v i l i a n c o n t r o l w a s t o p r o v e a f a t a l m i s t a k e , w h i l e their encouragement of the m u r d e r o u s activities of the paramilitary Freikorps d i d n o t h i n g to stabilize the Republic. Instead, the Freikorps seriously u n d e r m i n e d the Republic by a t t e m p t i n g a coup i n 1920 and t h e n by channeling their activities i n t o t h e assassination o f l e a d i n g r e p u b l i c a n politicians b y far-right d e a t h squads. A n d t h e Social D e m o c r a t s ' use o f t h e Freikorps, instead of a workers' militia, to deal w i t h C o m m u n i s t uprisings and revolutionary activities a tthe beginning of the R e p u b l i c l e d t o n u m e r o u s excesses against C o m m u n i s t p o l i t i cians a n d t h e i r supporters. T h e s e stored u p bitter r e s e n t m e n t s for the future and contributed not a little to the division of the

RESHAPING

CENTRAL

EUROPE-109

labor m o v e m e n t w h i c h was t o w e a k e n its resistance t o N a z i s m later o n . 3 1 As w e have seen, the advent of N a z i s m to p o w e r led w i t h i n a f e w years to the launching of a second m a j o r w a r by G e r m a n y against B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , a n d Russia, this t i m e i n p u r s u i t of a p r o g r a m of conquest and d o m i n a t i o n that was, above all i n the East, far m o r e radical a n d e x t r e m e t h a n its c o u n t e r p a r t i n the First W o r l d W a r . T h e crimes c o m m i t t e d by the Nazis i n the process surely d e m a n d e d a reassertion b y the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y of the principle that wars, w h e n t h e y occur, m u s t be conducted according to generally accepted rules designed to m a i n t a i n as f a r a s p o s s i b l e u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e b a s i c principles o f h u m a n decency, and that, however they a r e fought, wars should not be launched w i t h o u t reasonable justification. I t was for these reasons, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , t h e U n i t e d States, a n d Russia decided t o t r y those responsible f o r t h e s e c r i m e s , b o t h a t N u r e m b e r g a n d i n lesser trials elsew h e r e . I t m a y be possible t o criticize these procedures o n legalistic g r o u n d s , 3 2 b u t i n v i e w o f w h a t h a d h a p p e n e d o v e r t h e previous f e w years, it was b o t h necessary a n d justifiable to b r i n g the culprits to trial and to c o n d e m n the crimes they had comm i t t e d . I t w a s n o t j u s t " S t a l i n ' s m e n " w h o sat i n j u d g m e n t a t N u r e m b e r g , but the representatives of all the major w a r t i m e Allies; i n a w i d e r sense, i t was h u m a n i t y . T h e experience of the previous half century had s h o w n ano t h e r t h i n g too. T w i c e w i t h i n t h e space of a f e w decades, Germ a n y had unleashed global conflict o n h u m a n k i n d . T e r r i b l e suffering and destruction h a d been the result. W a s it n o t reasonable, t h e r e f o r e , t o t a k e steps this t i m e t o e n s u r e t h a t i t w o u l d n o t h a p p e n again? T h e decision to reduce G e r m a n p o w e r , t o give the eastern territories to Poland and the Soviet U n i o n , to deport the Germans f r o m East-Central Europe, and to divide the G e r m a n y that r e m a i n e d was defensible i n the light of this experience. I t was n o t carried o u t i n p u r s u i t of a fantasy. Sir E y r e C r o w e ' s famous m e m o r a n d u m of January 1907, i n w h i c h h e m a d e clear to his colleagues t h e danger to w o r l d peace that G e r m a n y was t h e n c o m i n g to pose, was n e i t h e r the reflection of a m y t h nor did it m a r k the creation of one. T h e dismemberm e n t of G e r m a n y and the transfer of populations did not simply

110

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

reflect a long-held desire o n the part of the British to destroy P r u s s i a . I t c o u l d b e j u s t i f i e d , as w e h a v e s e e n , i n m a n y w a y s . Nevertheless, t h e role o f t h e o l d elites, o f m i l i t a r i s m a n d authoritarianism, i n G e r m a n history f r o m 1870 to 1945, clearly d e m a n d s closer scrutiny. T h e Prussian influence o n G e r m a n y h a s b e e n w i d e l y i n t e r p r e t e d b y h i s t o r i a n s as a n i n f l u e n c e p u l l ing the country away f r o m " W e s t e r n " values of f r e e d o m and d e m o c r a c y t o w a r d a n " E a s t e r n " m o d e l o f t h e strong state. I n t h e final c h a p t e r , t h e r e f o r e , w e t u r n t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f G e r m a n y a n d its r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e W e s t , a n d ask, i n c o n c l u s i o n , w h e t h e r t h e p r e s e n t d e b a t e gives us cause f o r a n x i e t y f o r t h e f u t u r e o n this account.

C H A P T E R

GERMANY THE

S I X

AND WEST

i Reviving the idea of a reunited G e r m a n y d o m i n a t i n g C e n t r a l E u r o p e i s n o t t h e o n l y w a y i n w h i c h , as P e t e r P u l z e r has p o i n t e d o u t , t h e n e w historical c o n s e r v a t i s m i n W e s t G e r m a n y is p l a y i n g w i t h fire. D a n g e r o u s t o o i n h i s v i e w is i t s a s s e r t i o n o f " a p a t r i o t i s m t h a t seeks t o suppress g e n u i n e p l u r a l i s m of o p i n i o n a n d i n t e r e s t s . " M i c h a e l Stürmer a n d H a g e n S c h u l z e a p p a r e n t l y believe t h a t G e r m a n y can o n l y be a stable, peaceful p o w e r , as i t w a s u n d e r B i s m a r c k , o n t h e b a s i s o f a n a u t h o r i t a r i a n political system allied to a strong a n d u n i f i e d n a t i o n a l consciousness. I f t h e logic o f geopolitics h o l d s g o o d , t h e n t h e s a m e m u s t b e t r u e t o d a y . Stürmer a r g u e s r e p e a t e d l y t h a t t o o m u c h p l u r a l i s m of values and interests, unchecked by a u n i f y i n g national consensus, destabilized W i l h e l m i n e G e r m a n y and helped overt h r o w the W e i m a r Republic once it got i n t o economic difficult i e s . T h u s f o r t o d a y h e s e e k s n o t h i n g less t h a n t h e c r e a t i o n o f a substitute religion, a nationalist faith held by all, w h i c h will lend calculability to West Germany's foreign policy by providi n g its citizens w i t h a n e w sense o f i d e n t i t y h e l d t o g e t h e r b y patriotism, and resting o n a unitary, undisputed, and positive

11 2 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

consciousness o f G e r m a n history unsullied b y negative guilt feelings about t h e G e r m a n past.1 I t w a s p e r h a p s a b o v e a l l o n t h i s p o i n t t h a t Stürmer d r e w t h e fire o f Jürgen H a b e r m a s , i n a n e w s p a p e r a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 8 6 . A s t h e first p e r s o n t o p l a c e N o l t e , H i l l g r u b e r , a n d Stürmer i n t h e same context a n d to s o u n d t h e a l a r m about t h e i r collective contribution to the revision of G e r m a n history, Habermas has g o o d c l a i m t o b e c o n s i d e r e d t h e o r i g i n a t o r o f t h e w h o l e debate. H a b e r m a s , w h o teaches a t F r a n k f u r t U n i v e r s i t y , is probably Germany's best-known contemporary philosopher, b u t h e is e q u a l l y a t h o m e i n t h e fields o f h i s t o r y a n d s o c i o l o g y . T h i s b r e a d t h o f i n t e r e s t — a n d influence—reflects his i n d e b t e d ness t o t h e " F r a n k f u r t S c h o o l " o f M a r x i s t social scientists, w h o s e most p r o m i n e n t m e m b e r was probably Herbert Marcuse. T h e M a r x i s m of the F r a n k f u r t School was anything but politically activist, despite Marcuse's i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e radical m o v e m e n t s of t h e 1960s, a n d i t h a d l o n g since b e c o m e detached f r o m any real identification with C o m m u n i s m . Indeed, Habermas considered the thrust o fthe neoconservative historians' program, toward a "reconstruction o f the destroyed center o f E u r o p e " i n a G e r m a n y unified by an undisputed national cons c i o u s n e s s , as a c a l l t o a b a n d o n t h e " u n r e s e r v e d o p e n i n g o f t h e Federal Republic t othe political culture of the West . . . the great intellectual achievement of our postwar period." Yet w h a t Habermas meant by "the W e s t " was not the same as w h a t w a s m e a n t b y t h o s e w h o m h e c r i t i c i z e d . W h i l e Stürmer considered "the W e s t " to m e a n N A T O , Habermas v i e w e d "the W e s t " i n terms of the liberal and democratic politicaltradition established b y the eighteenth-century E n l i g h t e n m e n t . L i k e m o s t liberal a n d Social D e m o c r a t i c G e r m a n intellectuals o f his generation, Habermas considered that the history of G e r m a n y before 1945 had t a k e n a "separate p a t h " f r o m that of the W e s t (by w h i c h w a s m e a n t B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , a n d t h e U n i t e d States). G e r m a n intellectuals and academics i n the late n i n e t e e n t h and e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s t e n d e d t o r e j e c t v a l u e s s u c h as p l u r a l ism and democracy, and regarded the " G e r m a n w a y " of thinking, with its emphasis given t o nationalism a n d a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m , as s u p e r i o r . T h i s s i t u a t i o n w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y e v i d e n t i n t h e W e s t G e r m a n h i s t o r i c a l p r o f e s s i o n , w h i c h , as H a b e r m a s p o i n t e d out, h a d b e e n all b u t h e r m e t i c a l l y sealed

GERMANY

AND

THE

WEST*

113

against alternative points o f v i e w u n t i l l o n g after t h e Second World War.2 I t is w o r t h digressing f o r a m o m e n t , t o e x p l o r e b r i e f l y t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of W e s t G e r m a n historical scholarship since 1945, i n order t om a k e clear precisely w h a t are the developments a g a i n s t w h i c h Stürmer is r e a c t i n g . U p t o t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s , t h e o l d school of historians trained i n the W e i m a r Republic c o n t i n u e d to d o m i n a t e the academic scene i n the Federal Republic. Politically a n d methodologically conservative, t h e y perpetuated the t r a d i t i o n o f G e r m a n h i s t o r i c i s m , w i t h its c l a i m to u n d e r s t a n d t h e past o n its o w n t e r m s , its c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n h i g h politics a n d d i p l o m a c y , a n d its allegiance t o a f u n d a m e n t a l l y nationalist v i e w p o i n t . T h e y absolved G e r m a n y f r o m any special b l a m e for t h e o u t b r e a k o f t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r , s a w t h e T h i r d R e i c h as a n aberration f r o m the sound traditions of G e r m a n history, and i n m a n y w a y s t h e i r v i e w s w e r e s i m i l a r t o t h o s e w h i c h Stürmer n o w expresses. T h e n H a m b u r g h i s t o r i a n F r i t z F i s c h e r b r o k e ranks b y presenting a meticulously documented account o f Germany's far-reaching plans for E u r o p e a n h e g e m o n y and w o r l d p o w e r b e t w e e n 1914 a n d 1918 a n d a c h a l l e n g i n g thesis of a continuity between Imperial Germany and the Third Reich. A heated controversy ensued. Fischer was accused o f besmirching Germany's good name. A government grant enabling h i m to lecture i n America was withdrawn. P r o m i n e n t conservative historians refused to shake hands w i t h h i m i n public. A l l t h e m e t h o d s w h i c h h a d p r e v i o u s l y g u a r a n t e e d u n a n i m i t y i n the historical profession w e r e brought into action. B u t this t i m e things w e r e different. T h e political and intellectual scene i n W e s t G e r m a n y was n o w too o p e n for such a discussion to be strangled at b i r t h . C o n t a c t w i t h A m e r i c a n hist o r i a n s a n d t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l scholarly c o m m u n i t y m a d e isolation impossible. T h e debate continued unabated over several years i n t h e 1960s, w h e n i t was f o u g h t o u t n o t o n l y i n books, l e a r n e d j o u r n a l s , a n d a c a d e m i c c o n f e r e n c e s , b u t also i n t h e mass m e d i a . Finally, t h e dust b e g a n to settle. I t b e c a m e clear that Fischer's w o r k had inspired a wholesale revision of Germ a n historiography undertaken b y a generation o f younger historians. H i s t o r i c i s m was o u t , social science w a s i n . G e r m a n y was assigned the lion's share of responsibility for the outbreak o f w a r i n 1 9 1 4 . T h e T h i r d R e i c h a p p e a r e d n o t as t h e n e g a t i o n

1 1 4 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

o f G e r m a n n a t i o n a l i s t h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n s b u t as t h e i r c u l m i n a tion. T h e b l a m e was laid squarely at t h e feet o f t h e Prussian aristocracy, w i t h its a n t i d e m o c r a t i c , m i l i t a r i s t i c i d e o l o g y a n d its e v e r - g r o w i n g willingness to e m p l o y radical m e t h o d s to w a r d off t h e d e m o c r a t i z i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l age. B y t h e early 1970s, historians w e r e speaking of a " c h a n g e of p a r a d i g m " i n G e r m a n historical scholarship w h i c h h a d succeeded i n establishing the intellectual dominance of a " n e w orthodoxy" that was i n m a n y respects highly critical of the G e r m a n past.3 C e n t r a l t o t h i s v i e w is a n a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e s i n g u l a r i t y o f G e r m a n h i s t o r y . I t is a r g u e d t h a t , u n i q u e l y a m o n g m o d e r n n a tions, G e r m a n y experienced industrialization w i t h o u t going through a bourgeois revolution. T h u s economic m i g h t was s u b o r d i n a t e d t o p o l i t i c a l r e a c t i o n . T h e m i d d l e classes w e r e bribed into political quiescence through the lure of "feudalizat i o n " — t i t l e s , honors, a n d other trappings o f t h e aristocracy. T h e proletariat was d e n i e d full p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e political process. T h e p e t t y bourgeoisie was m o b i l i z e d against democracy b y t h e demagogy of the ruling elite. This u n i q u e path to m o d e r n i t y eventually culminated i n the unique phenomenon of National Socialism, w h o s e crimes w e r e w i t h o u t parallel i n h u m a n history. O n l y w i t h t h e destruction i n quick succession of t h e Prussian aristocracy a n d of the T h i r d Reich itself could G e r m a n y finally achieve a n o r m a l modernity. T h e price paid was total m i l i t a r y d e f e a t a n d (as i t i n c r e a s i n g l y s e e m e d ) p e r m a n e n t p o l i t i c a l d i s m e m b e r m e n t . I t is t i m e , i n t h i s v i e w , t o c o m e t o t e r m s w i t h the G e r m a n past—time to a d m i t a n d ruthlessly to expose its s h o r t c o m i n g s , t i m e t o m a k e a f r e s h start. T h e c o n t i n u e d success o f a p l u r a l i s t , W e s t e r n - s t y l e d e m o c r a c y i n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c d e m a n d s , i t is a r g u e d , t h a t t h e G e r m a n s f r e e t h e m selves f r o m t h e b u r d e n o f t h e G e r m a n past. N i n e t e e n f o r t y - f i v e was zero hour. T h e rest belonged to history.4 T h u s t w o diametrically opposed routes to overcoming the G e r m a n past have b e e n presented. Conservatives like S t u n n e r e m p h a s i z e t h e m o d e r n i t y o f N a z i s m , its lack o f roots i n G e r m a n history, its c o m p l e t e d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e d e m o n i c genius o f H i t l e r , a n d i t s a f f i n i t i e s w i t h S t a l i n i s m as a " t o t a l i t a r i a n " c r e e d . T h e w a y t o p r e v e n t i t f r o m h a p p e n i n g a g a i n , t h e y s u g g e s t , is t o r e t u r n t o t h e sounder traditions o f t h e G e r m a n past, t o C h r i s tian morality, to the old Prussian virtues of honor, rectitude,

GERMANY

AND

THE

WEST -

115

disinterested service t o t h e state b y its servants, a n d o b e d i e n c e t o its dictates b y its subjects. L i b e r a l a n d Social D e m o c r a t historians l i k e H a n s - U l r i c h W e h l e r e m p h a s i z e t h e t r a d i t i o n a l aspects o f N a z i s m , its h a r k i n g b a c k t o a p s e u d o m e d i e v a l past, its i n h e r i tance of the Prussian legacy of militarism and authoritarianism, a n d its roots i n t h e disaffection o f a g r a r i a n a n d aristocratic elites a n d peasants a n d " p r e i n d u s t r i a l " artisans f r o m t h e m o d e r n w o r l d . T h e w a y t o p r e v e n t i t f r o m h a p p e n i n g again, t h e y sugg e s t , is t o e m b r a c e f u l l y t h e a c h i e v e m e n t s o f m o d e r n i t y : t o r e t u r n f r o m the "special p a t h " by w h i c h G e r m a n y h a d failed to emulate the West's conjunction of economic industrialization, social openness, a n d p o l i t i c a l d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h century, to a w o r l d of " W e s t e r n " values of m o d e r n life i n w h i c h these things h a d l o n g since b e e n j o i n e d . Y e t it m a y be appropriate for an outsider to the debate to suggest t h a t o t h e r p o s i t i o n s a r e also possible. W e h a v e a l r e a d y seen, for example, h o w H i t l e r ' s o w n beliefs a n d aims can n e i ther be plausibly left out of account i n t r y i n g to explain the course of anti-Semitism i n the " T h i r d Reich," n o r o n the other h a n d can they be m a d e convincingly responsible for the entire t i m i n g a n d sequence of t h e terrible events w h i c h those beliefs a n d a i m s so f a t e f u l l y e n c o u r a g e d . O n a l a r g e r h i s t o r i c a l t i m e scale, i t s e e m s e q u a l l y reasonable t o a r g u e t h a t N a z i s m w a s n e i t h e r w h o l l y a p r o d u c t o f t h e m o d e r n age, n o r w h o l l y a v e h i c l e f o r p r e - a n d a n t i m o d e r n i d e o l o g i e s a n d s o c i a l classes. T o o m u c h emphasis has b e e n placed o n " p r e i n d u s t r i a l t r a d i t i o n s " i n t h e explanations offered by liberal a n d Social D e m o c r a t i c historians for t h e rise o f N a z i s m . A c o m p a r i s o n w i t h o t h e r i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g c o u n t r i e s i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y s u g g e s t s t h a t i t is v e r y difficult to m a i n t a i n that industrialization failed to b r i n g democr a c y w i t h i t o n l y i n t h e G e r m a n case. F r a n c e , f o r i n s t a n c e , u n d e r w e n t a u t h o r i t a r i a n episodes b o t h after its successful r e v o l u t i o n (under N a p o l e o n I) a n d at t h e h e i g h t of t h e industrialization process (under N a p o l e o n I I I ) , w h i l e B r i t a i n industrialized only under conditions of a very l i m i t e d franchise and, f r o m the 1790s to t h e 1820s, w i t h draconian laws against political radicali s m that far o u t d i d a n y o f t h e restrictions i m p o s e d o n t h e Social D e m o c r a t s i n I m p e r i a l G e r m a n y i n the late n i n e t e e n t h century. T o m a k e these points does n o t m e a n a b a n d o n i n g the location

11 6 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

o f N a z i s m ' s r o o t s i n t h e G e r m a n past. B i s m a r c k i a n G e r m a n y h a s b e e n s e e n e i t h e r as a s t a b l e , w e l l - r u n s t a t e w h i c h s h o u l d h a v e b e e n a m o d e l f o r l a t e r r e g i m e s , o r as a n a u t h o r i t a r i a n , semifeudal dictatorship w h i c h preserved m a n y of the features o f P r u s s o - G e r m a n t r a d i t i o n a l i s m so t h a t t h e y c o u l d s u r v i v e a n d eventually come to fruition i n the T h i r d Reich. Yet if w e argue t h a t b o t h p i c t u r e s o v e r e s t i m a t e its stability a n d its i n a b i l i t y t o r e f o r m itself a n d suggest that b o t h B i s m a r c k i a n a n d W i l h e l ¬ m i n e G e r m a n y w e r e d y n a m i c , r a p i d l y d e v e l o p i n g societies w i t h a c o n s i d e r a b l e c a p a c i t y f o r c h a n g e , t h i s is n o t t o d e n y t h a t a m o n g the changes that took place i n that era w e r e some that w e r e later, t h o u g h by no means inevitably, to lead to Nazism. T h e rise of racial a n t i - S e m i t i s m a n d radical n a t i o n a l i s m at this t i m e m i g h t b e a case i n p o i n t . P r e - 1 9 1 4 G e r m a n y s a w m a n y p r o g r e s s i v e d e v e l o p m e n t s , s u c h as t h e b e g i n n i n g s o f w e l f a r i s m o r t h e r i s e o f a f e m i n i s t m o v e m e n t a n d t h e first a d u m b r a t i o n s of women's emancipation, which, whatever their limitations, and whatever the direction they eventually took, m a k e it i m p o s s i b l e t o r e g a r d t h e e r a m e r e l y as o n e o f c o n s e r v a t i v e s t a g n a tion. T h e beginnings o f t h e "crisis o f m o d e r n i t y " w h i c h was to engulf W e i m a r w e r e already there before the First W o r l d War. T o p o i n t t h i s o u t is n o t t o p r e s c r i b e a s o l u t i o n i n v o l v i n g t h e r e j e c t i o n o f m o d e r n i t y a n d a r e t u r n t o s o m e i m a g i n a r y past s t a b i l i t y . I t i s , r a t h e r , t o s a y t h a t h i s t o r i c a l p r o b l e m s s u c h as t h e preservation of democracy i n the W e i m a r Republic m u s t be addressed i n t h e i r r e a l h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t . I n t h i s case, t h e c o n t e x t w a s a m o d e r n i z a t i o n t h a t n o b o d y , least o f a l l t h e h i s t o r i a n , c o u l d w i s h a w a y . T h e task o f a v o i d i n g t h e collapse i n t o barbar i s m c o u l d o n l y b e u n d e r t a k e n o n t h e basis o f a n a c c e p t a n c e o f democracy and welfare and a rejection of m i l i t a r i s m and national aggrandizement. It was Weimar's tragedy that, i n the e n d , circumstances conspired t o p r e v e n t this task f r o m b e i n g s u c c e s s f u l l y a c c o m p l i s h e d . 5 Y e t h i s t o r i a n s l i k e S t u n n e r a r e less i n t e r e s t e d i n t r y i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d W e i m a r ' s collapse t h a n i n using it for their o w n political purposes i n the present day. A n d their opponents react against t h e n e w conservatism w i t h a veh e m e n c e t h a t is s i m i l a r l y t h e p r o d u c t n o t l e a s t o f c o n t e m p o r a r y political c o m m i t m e n t . T h u s f r o m t h e v e r y start, t h e d e b a t e has b e e n l o c k e d i n t o t w o o p p o s i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . E a c h side has b e c o m e increasingly

GERMANY

A N D THE

W E S T - 117

entrenched i n i t s o w n p o s i t i o n , a n d t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f a m o r e n u a n c e d v i e w , i n w h i c h a synthesis of t h e m o s t persuasive feat u r e s o f e a c h c o u l d b e a c h i e v e d as t h e b a s i s f o r m o v i n g r e s e a r c h f o r w a r d , h a s b e e n r e n d e r e d a l l b u t i m p o s s i b l e . S u c h is t h e p o l i t i c a l s e n s i t i v i t y o f t h e i s s u e s i n q u e s t i o n , s u c h is t h e m o r a l c h a r g e w i t h w h i c h each a t t e m p t to stake out a position o n these m a t ters has b e c o m e loaded, t h a t e v e n t h e slightest m o v e t o criticize t h e one or the other, to m e d i a t e b e t w e e n t h e m , or to go b e y o n d t h e m , has m e t w i t h v i o l e n t polemics, accusations o f trivialization, m o r a l denunciation, and allegations o f trying t o underm i n e the W e s t G e r m a n political system. T h u s the bitterness a n d r a n c o r w i t h w h i c h t h e c o n t r o v e r s y has b e e n w a g e d . Scholarly decency and civilized standards of academic debate have b e e n a m o n g t h e m o s t o b v i o u s losers i n t h e p r e s e n t debate. As a h i s t o r i a n o f t h e y o u n g e r g e n e r a t i o n , D e t l e v P e u k e r t , has rem a r k e d , t h e c u l t i v a t i o n o f c i v i l i z e d c o n t r o v e r s y is n e c e s s a r y i n e v e r y a c a d e m i c d i s c i p l i n e i f p r o g r e s s i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g is t o b e achieved. This means, however, the ability to give and take and above all to m o d i f y one's position i n t h e l i g h t o f n e w a r g u m e n t s o r n e w facts. T o a n o u t s i d e r , t h e standards o f h i s t o r i c a l c o n t r o versy i n W e s t G e r m a n y have long seemed rather l o w i n this respect. T h e r e can b e little d o u b t that i n t h e present debate they have plumbed n e w depths.6 T h a t is n o t t o s a y , o f c o u r s e , t h a t a l l t h i s is t h e p r o d u c t o f s o m e innate predisposition to quarrelsomeness i n the West G e r m a n academic profession.7 British historians, for example, can look b a c k o n a n o less c o m b a t i v e t r a d i t i o n , s t r e t c h i n g f r o m t h e g r e a t c o n t r o v e r s i e s w a g e d i n t h e V i c t o r i a n e r a b e t w e e n J. H . R o u n d and E. A. F r e e m a n over the meaning of the N o r m a n Conquest, t h r o u g h t h e p e r e n n i a l a l l - o u t fight t h a t s e e m s t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e historiography of the English Civil W a r , to the notorious rows of the 1950s a n d 1960s b e t w e e n E r i c H o b s b a w m a n d R . M . Hartwell o n the standard of living during the industrial revolut i o n , o r b e t w e e n A . J. P . T a y l o r a n d H u g h R . T r e v o r - R o p e r o v e r the origins of the Second W o r l d W a r . Similarly, F r e n c h historians h a v e a n e v e n l o n g e r t r a d i t i o n o f a r g u i n g w i t h o n e a n o t h e r , sometimes w i t h considerable bitterness and rancor, about the origins, meaning, and consequences of the great F r e n c h Revol u t i o n o f 1 7 8 9 . Odium scholasticum is n o t a G e r m a n m o n o p o l y . I t has, i n d e e d , f r e q u e n t l y m a n i f e s t e d itself i n t h e U n i t e d

118

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

States—recently, for instance, i n the debate o n the role of heavy industrial and agrarian interests i n the c o m i n g of the T h i r d R e i c h s p a r k e d b y D a v i d A b r a h a m ' s c o n t r o v e r s i a l Collapse of the Weimar Republic.8 T o d e c l a r e t h a t o n e ' s o p p o n e n t s h a v e been manipulating quotations, are l u m p i n g together people a n d a r g u m e n t s that do n o t belong together, are accusing one of s a y i n g t h i n g s o n e h a s n o t s a i d , a r e filled w i t h i l l w i l l , a r e i g n o r a n t o u t s i d e r s , o r d o n o t d e s e r v e t o b e t r e a t e d as c o l l e a g u e s a t all—these methods of a r g u m e n t seem to be the stock-in-trade o f scholarly debate once i t reaches a certain stage o f a n i m a t i o n . Nevertheless, the degree o f rhetorical aggression compatible w i t h respect for one's colleagues a n d t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of reasonable h u m a n relations w i t h i n the historical profession n o w seems to have been exceeded i n W e s t G e r m a n y . T h e actual purpose of it all seems to have been largely submerged under an accumulation of personal animosities.9

II M a k i n g these points should cause us t o reflect o n t h e implications of the present debate for the future study of m o d e r n G e r m a n history. I n m a n y ways, t h e discussion w e h a v e b e e n following i n this book, despite—or perhaps i n part because o f — t h e passions i t has aroused, has v e r y l i t t l e t o offer a n y o n e w i t h a serious, scholarly i n t e r e s t i n t h e G e r m a n past. I t b r i n g s n o n e w facts t o light; i t e m b o d i e s n o n e w research; i t m a k e s n o n e w c o n t r i b u t i o n to historical u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; i t poses n o n e w quest i o n s t h a t m i g h t s t i m u l a t e f u t u r e w o r k . I t is q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m the Fischer controversy, w h i c h was fought out by traditional scholarly m e t h o d s , f o r all t h e v i o l e n c e o f its r h e t o r i c , a n d b r o u g h t a m a s s o f n e w d o c u m e n t a t i o n t o l i g h t , as w e l l as f a c i l i tating the e m p l o y m e n t of a variety of n e w methods i n the study o f t h e G e r m a n p a s t . S o i t is s c a r c e l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t s o m e c o m m e n t a t o r s o n t h e present discussion h a v e w a n t e d to stop t h e w h o l e affair a n d get historians back to w r i t i n g real h i s t o r y . 1 0 B u t t h e d e b a t e is m u c h m o r e t h a n a d i v e r s i o n . I t h a s o b v i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e w a y i n w h i c h h i s t o r y is w r i t t e n . W h a t s e e m s t o b e g o i n g o n , as M a r t i n B r o s z a t h a s c o m m e n t e d , is a n a t t e m p t t o r e v i v e t h e o l d P r u s s i a n t r a d i t i o n o f h i s t o r i c i s m , w h i c h as-

GERMANY

AND

THE

W E S T - 119

signed t o h i s t o r y t h e f u n c t i o n o f s u p p o r t i n g t h e political status quo. L i k e a substitute r e l i g i o n , i t served t h e interest o f t h e state b y c o n f i n i n g itself t o a n a f f i r m a t i v e c h r o n i c l i n g o f t h e state's past.11 H i s t o r y seems t ob e understood b y this tradition i n a m e t a p h y s i c a l s e n s e as t h e p a s t i n i t s e l f , n o t as t h e p a s t c r i t i c a l l y reconstructed b y historians—hence, o n em i g h t note, Hillgruber's assumption that the historian "identifies" w i t h a particu l a r past actor o r actors ( i n his case, t h e G e r m a n A r m y fighting o n t h e eastern f r o n t i n 1944-45) a n d his failure to u n d e r s t a n d that these actors are i n p a r t constructed b y t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s that h e h i m s e l f advances. Y e t historians cannot s i m p l y content themselves w i t h taking o n w h a t they imagine to b e the viewp o i n t o f t h e past itself; t h e y m u s t also a d o p t t h e i r o w n v i e w points, i n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d self-consciously, w i t h benefit o f hindsight. T h e diplomatic historian Paul Kennedy observed s o m e years ago t h a t nationalist h i s t o r i o g r a p h y was o n t h e w a n e i n t h e W e s t . Politically speaking, t h e t r a d i t i o n of G e r m a n historicism resulted i n generations of G e r m a n historians becoming t h e w i l l i n g tools of G e r m a n great-power ambitions, u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g t h o s e o f H i t l e r . S u r e l y , t h i s s h o u l d s e r v e as a w a r n i n g to those w h o w o u l d seek a r e v i v a l of this t r a d i t i o n i n the present.12 A t a less p o l i t i c a l , m o r e s c h o l a r l y l e v e l , m a n y o f t h e n e w n a t i o n a l i s t W e s t G e r m a n h i s t o r i a n s also s e e m t o s h a r e a c o m m o n belief i n political history o f the most traditional kind, w h e r e b y t h e study o f t h e past o n c e m o r e b e c o m e s t h e study of k i n g s a n d b a t t l e s , c h a n c e l l o r s a n d c a b i n e t s , a n d h i s t o r y is a g a i n s e e n as b e i n g m a d e n o t b y b r o a d , g e n e r a l f o r c e s b u t b y g r e a t ( o r n o t so g r e a t ) m e n s u c h as H i t l e r o r S t r e s e m a n n , B i s m a r c k o r Brüning. S u c h , a t a n y r a t e , i s t h e m e s s a g e o f H a g e n S c h u l z e ' s Weimar a n d o f M i c h a e l Stürmer's r e c e n t b r i e f b i o g r a p h y o f B i s m a r c k . 1 3 S o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c h i s t o r y is c o n d e m n e d as i r r e l e v a n t o r s i m p l y i g n o r e d a l t o g e t h e r . I t is e n t i r e l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , for e x a m p l e , t h a t H i l l g r u b e r suggests t h a t t h e task of e x p l a i n i n g h o w otherwise civilized G e r m a n people could take part i n the crimes of t h e Nazis belongs n o t to historians b u t to psychologists a n d a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s . 1 4 A n a p p r o a c h t o t h e past t h a t dismisses social a n d e c o n o m i c factors m a y h e l p d e l i v e r a n e w n a t i o n a l i s t i d e o l o g y , b u t i t c a n n o t d e l i v e r g o o d h i s t o r y . I t is w h a t o n e c r i t i c has called " a n a t t e m p t t o t u r n t h e clock b a c k t o 1955, w h e n t h e

1 20

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

W e s t G e r m a n historical scene had not yet been cluttered w i t h social h i s t o r y " a n d w h e n historical scholarship m o v e d " w i t h i n the relatively familiar and comfortable parameters of party politics a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . " 1 5 S u c h a n a r r o w i n g o f focus r e p r e sents a real i m p o v e r i s h m e n t of historical u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d i t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t , i n a r g u i n g a g a i n s t t h e n e o c o n s e r v a t i v e s , some of West Germany's leading historians of the W e i m a r and N a z i periods h a v e explicity d e f e n d e d social-historical app r o a c h e s t o G e r m a n y ' s r e c e n t past. T h e s e p r o p o n e n t s o f social h i s t o r y i n c l u d e M a r t i n Broszat, w h o e l s e w h e r e has also a r g u e d f o r w h a t h e calls a " h i s t o r i c i z a t i o n " o f N a t i o n a l Socialism. T h i s fact s h o u l d a l e r t us t o t h e n e e d to avoid confusing the neoconservative "historicism" w i t h the call for " h i s t o r i c i z a t i o n . " T h e latter involves a r a t i o n a l approach to Nazism rather than a simple reliance o n m o r a l condemnat i o n . N a z i s m a n d its effects c a n n o t be m a d e r e a l t o p e o p l e w h o , like m o s t o f today's W e s t G e r m a n s , w e r e b o r n l o n g after the event, if they are presented i n crude terms of heroes and villains. T h e n a t u r e o f t h e m o r a l choices people h a d t o m a k e can only be accurately judged by taking into account the full complexities of the situations i n w h i c h they f o u n d themselves. N o t everything that happened under Hitler was equally evil; not e v e r y o n e w h o resisted was equally good. G e r m a n society shows m a n y c o n t i n u o u s d e v e l o p m e n t s c u t t i n g across t h e p e r i o d 1 9 3 3 ¬ 45, w i t h d e e p e r roots i n t h e past a n d w i t h consequences stretching b e y o n d t h e collapse o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h i n t o t h e pres e n t . 1 6 T h i s a p p r o a c h has y i e l d e d m a n y i m p o r t a n t n e w insights into the nature of Nazism. Far f r o m blurring m o r a l distinctions, as s o m e h a v e c l a i m e d , i t m a k e s t h e m m o r e p r e c i s e . T h i s is s u r e l y a g a i n r a t h e r t h a n a loss f o r h i s t o r i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 1 7 T h e g r o w t h of such a broader, m o r e nuanced approach to the h i s t o r y o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h is a w o r l d a w a y f r o m t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n h i g h p o l i t i c s a n d o n t h e p e r s o n a l i t y o f H i t l e r , t h e calls f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h G e r m a n t r o o p s fighting C o m m u n i s m i n 1945, or the search for exculpatory parallels a n d circumstances t h a t are t h e h a l l m a r k s o f t h e neoconservatives. I t suggests t h a t i n t h e e n d , t h e d e m a n d t h a t h i s t o r y s h o u l d f o r m t h e basis f o r a n e n t i r e n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s is m i s p l a c e d . S u c h a d e m a n d overestimates the historian's influence by a considerable marg i n . A n d s e v e r a l c o n t r i b u t o r s t o t h e d e b a t e h a v e also a r g u e d

GERMANY

A N D THE

W E S T - 121

t h a t i t is n o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e i n a p l u r a l i s t i c s o c i e t y s u c h as W e s t G e r m a n y to impose a single i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of history o n the p o p u l a r c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 1 8 N o r is i t l i k e l y t h a t n e a r l y t w o d e c a d e s o f i n t e n s i v e research o n social a n d e c o n o m i c h i s t o r y can s i m p l y be f o r g o t t e n about a n d t h r o w n away. I n a d e m o c r a t i c society, historical events are inevitably going t ob e understood i n a v a r i e t y o f w a y s . A n y o v e r a l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e past i n a f r e e intellectual culture must take account of these different points o f v i e w . S o n o o n e is g o i n g t o o b t a i n a m o n o p o l y o n t h e p o r t r a y a l o f G e r m a n y ' s past w h i l e t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Germ a n y r e m a i n s a r e l a t i v e l y free society. O f c o u r s e , t h e d e b a t e w i t h i n W e s t G e r m a n y is t a k i n g p l a c e in a context i n w h i c h Chancellor Kohl's conservative coalition has f o r s o m e t i m e b e e n p u r s u i n g a p o l i c y o f p l a c i n g its o w n a d h e r e n t s i n c h a r g e o f t h e c o u n t r y ' s r a d i o a n d t e l e v i s i o n stat i o n s ; t h e p r e s s is h e a v i l y d o m i n a t e d b y s u p p o r t e r s o f t h e r u l i n g coalition; a n d state c o n t r o l o v e r t h e schools c u r r i c u l u m , o v e r history text books, a n d over senior historical a p p o i n t m e n t s , is e x t e n s i v e . A n e w g e n e r a t i o n o f t e a c h e r s a n d s c h o o l d i r e c t o r s is steering the teaching of recent G e r m a n history back t o the l a m e n t a b l e situation of the 1950s, a n d t h e critical history teachers w h o e n t e r e d t h e profession after 1968 are s l o w l y b e i n g m u z z l e d b y pressures f r o m parents a n d politicians. B u t the federal system places strict limits o n the ability of the conservat i v e s t o i n f l u e n c e m e d i a p o l i c y i n states s u c h as H a m b u r g , Schleswig-Holstein, o r the Saarland, w h i c h are r u l e d b y the opposition Social D e m o c r a t s a n d t h e i r partners. P r i n t i n g techn o l o g y allows critical dailies to be p r i n t e d far m o r e cheaply t h a n w a s o n c e t h e c a s e , as t h e r i s e o f t h e l e f t - w i n g Die Tageszeitung has s h o w n . N o o n e has y e t f o u n d a w a y t o stop critical v i e w s o f t h e past b e i n g w r i t t e n a n d sold i n books w i t h a v e r y w i d e circulation. I n 1985, 54 percent of W e s t G e r m a n s questioned i n a n o p i n i o n p o l l said t h a t t h e y d i d n o t w a n t t o h e a r a n y m o r e a b o u t the Third Reich i n the media. But among eighteen-to-twentyfive-year-olds, 61 percent disagreed w i t h the point of v i e w and thought that they had not heard enough.19 Conservative historians h a v e c e r t a i n l y b e e n t a k i n g t h e " l o n g m a r c h t h r o u g h t h e institutions," and have gained considerably i n influence rec e n t l y i n t e r m s o f a c a d e m i c p o l i t i c s . T h i s is a w o r r y i n g d e v e l o p m e n t for those w h o w a n t to encourage a critical attitude to the

1 2 2 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

G e r m a n p a s t . B u t i t is a n e x a g g e r a t i o n t o s u p p o s e t h a t c o n s e r v a t i v e s h a v e b e e n g e t t i n g a l l t h e p l u m j o b s as a r e s u l t o f c o n c e r t e d m a n e u v e r s b e h i n d t h e scenes. M o r e o v e r , G e r m a n history does n o t s i m p l y belong to the G e r m a n s . T h e rest o f t h e w o r l d has a n i n t e n s e a n d l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n G e r m a n attitudes t o t h e r e c e n t past a n d G e r m a n s ' feelings about their national identity and purpose. A f t e r a n initial slowness to react, historians a n d c o m m e n t a t o r s i n m a n y countries have t u r n e d their attention to the present debate. I n F r a n c e , discussion c e n t e r e d o n t h e issues r a i s e d b y t h e t r i a l o f Klaus Barbie for crimes committed i n France during the war. I n Italy, Nolte's theses i n particular aroused strong disapproval i n the media, w h i l e reactions to the debate i n Israel, the U n i t e d States, a n d t h e S o v i e t bloc (especially East G e r m a n y ) c o m b i n e d the language of m o r a l outrage w i t h a reaffirmation of the uniqueness of A u s c h w i t z . 2 0 E v e n those f e w conservative comm e n t a t o r s w h o w e r e w i l l i n g to go along w i t h N o l t e to some e x t e n t o n t h e l a t t e r issue w e r e u n w i l l i n g t o f o l l o w h i m d o w n t h e r o a d o f j u s t i f y i n g a p u t a t i v e " i n t e r n m e n t " o f G e r m a n J e w s as prisoners o f w a r i n 1 9 3 9 . 2 1 I n t e r n a t i o n a l surprise a n d d i s m a y at the conservative revisionists' a t t e m p t to trivialize N a z i c r i m e s — a s i t has w i d e l y b e e n s e e n o u t s i d e G e r m a n y — h a s b e e n general and strongly felt. Perhaps the reaction f r o m other countries has c o n c e n t r a t e d t o o m u c h o n o n e issue a n d o n e h i s t o r i a n and, therefore, neglected or passed over too m a n y of t h e o t h e r issues i n v o l v e d . P e r h a p s also i t has e x p r e s s e d i t s e l f t o o m u c h i n the language of m o r a l outrage and not enough i n the calmer tones o f scholarly debate. B u t t h e fact t h a t i t has b e e n o v e r w h e l m i n g l y negative confirms the failure of the revisionists to achieve their aims i n a w i d e r international context. I n d e e d , i f w e t r y t o d r a w u p a b a l a n c e o f gains a n d losses i n t h e p r e s e n t d i s p u t e , t h e r e c a n b e l i t t l e d o u b t as t o w h i c h s i d e has c o m e o u t t h e w i n n e r i n t h e a r g u m e n t . T h e revisionists h a v e n o t b e e n able to p u t f o r w a r d any convincing n e w interpretat i o n s , n o r h a v e t h e i r d o c u m e n t a r y finds b e e n a b l e t o s t a n d t h e t e s t o f s c h o l a r l y s c r u t i n y . I n d e e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Stürmer's c a s e , t h e y h a v e resurrected a r g u m e n t s l o n g since discarded by serious scholarship w i t h o u t p r o v i d i n g a n y r e a s o n a b l e case f o r d o i n g so. T h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f h i s t o r i a n s i n W e s t G e r m a n y w h o h a v e e n g a g e d t h e s e issues h a v e c o m e o u t c l e a r l y against t h e i d e a t h a t

GERMANY

AND

THE

W E S T - 123

A u s c h w i t z w a s a c o p y o f t h e G u l a g , o r i n d e e d t h a t i t has significant historical parallels a n y w h e r e . T h e y have responded w i t h considerable skepticism t o t h e idea t h a t G e r m a n y ' s r e c e n t history was determined by the country's geopolitical position. A n d w h i l e t h e y h a v e b e e n g e n e r a l l y less c r i t i c a l o f H i l l g r u b e r t h a n of N o l t e , t h e y h a v e f o u n d i t impossible t o accept his idea that present-day West Germans should " i d e n t i f y " w i t h the G e r m a n A r m y o n t h eeastern front i n 1944-45. T h e debate has done some damage t ot h enational, and i n particular t h e international, scholarly standing o f Hillgruber, considerably m o r e t o t h a t o f S t u r m e r , a n d a g r e a t d e a l t o t h a t o f N o l t e . A s f a r as t h e w o r l d o f historical scholarship a n d research is concerned, t h e a t t e m p t t o escape f r o m H i t l e r ' s s h a d o w has clearly failed. T h e b i d t o f o r g e t a b o u t A u s c h w i t z , i f t h a t is w h a t i t is, has r e s u l t e d s i m p l y i n t h e m o s t intensive discussion o f t h e subject that has taken place for years.22 T h e argument, however, has n o tsimply been fought o u t w i t h i n the confines o f learned journals and university confere n c e s a n d s e m i n a r s . I t h a s also b e e n c a r r i e d o n i n t h e m a s s m e d i a . H e r e t h e r e s u l t s h a v e b e e n less c l e a r - c u t . E v e n i f — a s with t h e treatment o f the "preventive-war" theory b y t h e Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung—the o u t c o m e i n t e r m s o f t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e v a r i o u s theses a d v a n c e d has e i t h e r b e e n i n c o n clusive or generally a defeat, once m o r e , for the revisionists, the fact r e m a i n s t h a t N o l t e i nparticular, a n d perhaps o t h e r r e v i s i o n i s t s ( s u c h as H o f f m a n n a n d S t e g e m a n n ) a s w e l l , h a v e s u c ceeded i nlending a degree o f respectability t o arguments w h i c h a f e w years ago w e r e o n l y t o b e f o u n d i n t h e i n d e c e n t o b s c u r i t y o f t h e r a d i c a l - r i g h t a n d n e o - N a z i press. D i s c u s s i o n o f t h e p r e v e n t i v e - w a r thesis, assertions o f t h e p r i o r i t y o f t h e G u l a g a n d t h e r e l a t i v i t y o f A u s c h w i t z , a n d pleas f o r a n e w , sanitized version o fG e r m a n history have become relatively c o m m o n p l a c e i n o r g a n s s u c h as t h e Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, w h e r e they w o u l d not have found an outlet before the present controversy.23 W i t h t h ebacking o f the Kohl government and provincial Christian Democrats w h e n it comes to academic appointments and careers too, revisionist historians have achieved positions o f influence f r o m w h i c h they m a y well have a n impact o n t h e theories and methods adopted b y t h eyounger generation o f

1 24

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

G e r m a n historians, especially n o w that academic jobs are h a r d t o c o m e b y . W e m a y , t h e r e f o r e , see a s h i f t a w a y f r o m t h e r e c e n t b r o a d approach to t h e past a n d t h e r e c e n t willingness to take i n t h e m e t h o d s a n d c o n c e r n s o f social, e c o n o m i c , a n d d e m o graphic history, sociological t h e o r y , a n d q u a n t i t a t i v e m e t h o d o l ogy, back to a n a r r o w e r concentration o n the history of h i g h politics using t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l tools o f G e r m a n historicism. B u t t h i s t o o s h o u l d n o t b e e x a g g e r a t e d . M o r e o v e r , i t is i m p o r tant to emphasize that G e r m a n historians are not abandoning " t h e W e s t " i n seeking to c o n t r i b u t e m o r e positively t o a sense of national identity. Since the e n d of the 1960s or thereabouts, t h e historical profession i n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c has b e c o m e w e l l integrated i n t o the international c o m m u n i t y of historians, and the t u r n to a m o r e nationalist understanding of history to a large extent reflects a c u r r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e n d . For the emergence of a neoconservative historiography w i t h p r o n o u n c e d h i s t o r i c i s t a n d n a t i o n a l i s t t e n d e n c i e s is f a r f r o m being a p h e n o m e n o n peculiar to the Germans. Britain and the U n i t e d States, i n t h e decade o f P r i m e M i n i s t e r T h a t c h e r a n d P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n , h a v e also e x p e r i e n c e d a r e s u r g e n c e o f c o n s e r v a t i v e t h o u g h t . C o n s e r v a t i v e B r i t i s h h i s t o r i a n s s u c h as H u g h T h o m a s a n d G. R. E l t o n h a v e b e e n calling for a r e t u r n to studyi n g the past i n order to help b r i n g about a resurgence of national pride. Others, like D a v i d Cannadine, have lamented the alleged collapse of a coherent a n d positive vision of the nation's p a s t o r , l i k e J. C . D . C l a r k , h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o r e a s s e r t t h e centrality of Church and C r o w n i n the making of m o d e r n Britain.24 Such initiatives have been supported by P r i m e Minister T h a t c h e r ' s crusading conservatism, w h i c h seeks to resurrect " V i c t o r i a n v a l u e s " s u c h as " s e l f - r e l i a n c e . . . s e l f - r e s p e c t . . . p r i d e i n y o u r c o u n t r y . " T h a t c h e r h e r s e l f has i n v e i g h e d against t h o s e w h o , as s h e s e e s i t , " g n a w a w a y a t o u r n a t i o n a l s e l f - r e s p e c t , r e w r i t i n g B r i t i s h h i s t o r y as c e n t u r i e s o f u n r e l i e v e d g l o o m , oppression a n d f a i l u r e — a s days o f hopelessness, n o t days o f h o p e . " 2 5 H e r calls f o r a p o s i t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h past are clearly i n t e n d e d to be reflected i n t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of h i s t o r y i n a " n a t i o n a l c u r r i c u l u m " i n t h e schools. S i m i l a r l y , U.S. Secretary of Education W i l l i a m Bennett urged "the study of history" i n order to "give our students a grasp of their nation, a nation that the study of history and current events will reveal

GERMANY

AND

THE

WEST -

125

is s t i l l , i n d e e d , ' t h e l a s t , b e s t h o p e o n e a r t h , ' " a n d h e h a s b e e n b a c k e d u p b y c o n s e r v a t i v e h i s t o r i a n s s u c h as G e r t r u d e H i m ¬ m e l f a r b , w h o has l a u n c h e d a sharp a n d p o l i t i c a l l y l o a d e d attack o n t h e s t u d y o f social h i s t o r y . 2 6 Y e t these pleas, p o w e r f u l t h o u g h t h e y m a y be, i n e v i t a b l y c o m e u p v e r y q u i c k l y against t h e limits of possibility. H i s t o r y can h e l p us t o g a i n i d e n t i t y , b u t t h a t i d e n t i t y m u s t necessarily t r a n s c e n d t h e past. B e i n g G e r m a n , or B r i t i s h , o r A m e r i c a n i n the late t w e n t i e t h century inevitably means something differe n t f r o m w h a t i t m e a n t fifty y e a r s a g o . N a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y is always changing. I n continually constructing and reconstructing it, w e have to decide w h a t w e w a n t to keep and w h a t w e w a n t t o j e t t i s o n , w h a t w e a g r e e is g o o d a n d w h a t w e r e j e c t as bad. W i t h i n the same nation, people w i l l always define their h i s t o r i c a l i d e n t i t y i n d i f f e r e n t w a y s , a n d i t is p a r t o f t h e r i c h n e s s o f n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g t h a t t h e y s h o u l d d o so. A s f o r m e r W e s t G e r man President Gustav H e i n e m a n n once pointed out, the Federal Republic owes m o r e to the tradition of Bebel and Liebknecht, w h o w e r e sitting i n jail w h e n the G e r m a n E m p i r e was founded, t h a n to the example of Bismarck or Kaiser Wil¬ h e l m . G e r m a n y h a s b e e n d e s c r i b e d as a p o s t n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y ; 2 7 local and regional traditions have p r o v e d m o r e durable t h a n n a t i o n a l o n e s a n d i n s o m e cases a r e b e i n g c r e a t e d w h e r e t h e y never existed before. Indeed, G e r m a n art, music, and other cultural achievements o w e a great deal to traditions of political d i s u n i t y a n d d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . 2 8 I t is n o a c c i d e n t , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t recent years have seen a t r e m e n d o u s upsurge of interest i n history o n a smaller, m o r e i n t i m a t e scale—one that can help p e o p l e i d e n t i f y w i t h s m a l l e r g r o u p i n g s s u c h as t h e f a m i l y , t h e street, the n e i g h b o r h o o d , or the village. A t a t i m e w h e n the n e g a t i v e aspects o f l i v i n g i n a n a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y — f r o m mass u n e m p l o y m e n t to e n v i r o n m e n t a l p o l l u t i o n and the threat of nuclear catastrophe—have suddenly become m o r e o b v i o u s , i t is s c a r c e l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t h i s t o r i a n s h a v e b e g u n i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e h u m a n cost o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n a n d t h e n a t u r e o f e v e r y d a y life i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l a n d p r e i n d u s t r i a l past, n o t j u s t i n G e r m a n y , b u t i n m a n y o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e d e v e l o p e d w o r l d as well. T h e recent g r o w t h of "grass-roots" history i n W e s t G e r m a n y has m o s t l y b e e n c a r r i e d o n b y local " i n i t i a t i v e s " o u t s i d e t h e

1 2 6 * IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

a r e n a o f professional u n i v e r s i t y h i s t o r y . Its focus has b e e n o n recovering the history of everyday life i n G e r m a n y , above all d u r i n g t h e N a z i a n d postwar periods, a n d especially t h o u g h n o t exclusively by using oral-history interviews w i t h those w h o h a v e l i v e d t h r o u g h t h e p e r i o d . T h i s is a v e r y w i d e s p r e a d a n d d i v e r s e m o v e m e n t w h i c h has p r o d u c e d w o r k o f v a r y i n g q u a l i t y . A t i t s w o r s t , i t is o p e n t o t h e c h a r g e t h a t i t t r i v i a l i z e s t h e p h e n o m e n o n of N a z i s m by concentrating o n private lives w h i c h — i n the m e m o r i e s of those questioned—were barely touched by it. B u t t h e r e are a n u m b e r o f i m p o r t a n t points to be m a d e i n d e f e n s e o f t h i s " a l t e r n a t i v e " h i s t o r y . I t s t h r u s t is o v e r w h e l m i n g l y critical. T i m e a n d again, i t has u n c o v e r e d local c o m p l i c i t y i n N a z i s m a n d its c r i m e s b o t h i n t h e f o r m o f t h e acts o f i n d i v i d u als a n d i n m a j o r , c o l l e c t i v e e v e n t s , w h i c h o f f i c i a l l o c a l t r a d i t i o n , preserved by politicians, official histories, archivists, a n d adm i n i s t r a t o r s , h a s f o r so l o n g t r i e d t o s u p p r e s s . U n d e r l y i n g m u c h o f t h i s " a l t e r n a t i v e " w o r k is t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t e v e r y d a y normality and Auschwitz w e r e interdependent, that the Germ a n s w h o c o n f o r m e d w e r e d o i n g so b e c a u s e t h e y h a d b e e n selected for survival,because they w e r e n o t subject to the various f o r m s of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n t h a t g o v e r n e d life i n N a z i G e r m a n y . L o c a l h i s t o r y o f this k i n d has r e v e a l e d , a n d t r e a t e d i n a posit i v e sense, n u m e r o u s f o r m s o f resistance t o N a z i s m at a local l e v e l , a n d h a s c o n s c i o u s l y t r i e d t o u s e t h e s e as a m e a n s o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e possibilities a n d l i m i t a t i o n s o f resistance to fascism t o t h e i n h a b i t a n t s o f today's G e r m a n t o w n s a n d cities. A l t h o u g h this has s o m e t i m e s b e e n at t h e cost o f n e g l e c t i n g t h e history of collaboration and affirmation i n the T h i r d Reich, this has nonetheless c o n s t i t u t e d a r e a l a t t e m p t t o c r e a t e t r a d i t i o n s of resistance w i t h w h i c h o r d i n a r y people can i d e n t i f y , i n contrast to the r e m o t e a n d largely conservative and aristocratic figures o f J u l y 1 9 4 4 . H e r e t o o " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , " as w i t h t h e r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t case o f H i l l g r u b e r a n d t h e soldiers o n t h e e a s t e r n f r o n t , has s o m e t i m e s b e e n n a i v e a n d u n c r i t i c a l . B u t i t does m a k e it difficult to sustain the a r g u m e n t that o r d i n a r y people w e r e n o t a w a r e of t h e evils of N a z i s m , or that m u r d e r , brutality, and e x t e r m i n a t i o n happened only far away, s o m e w h e r e i n the E a s t . F o r a l l i t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a n d i t s flaws, t h e r e f o r e , t h e p o p u lar m o v e m e n t for the recovery of the history of everyday life does i n t h e e n d place a n i m p o r t a n t barrier i n the w a y of conser-

GERMANY

AND

THE

WEST -

127

vative attempts to m a n u f a c t u r e a n e w G e r m a n nationalist ideo l o g y o n t h e basis o f r e l a t i v i z i n g o r f o r g e t t i n g a b o u t t h e c r i m e s o f N a z i s m . I n t h e last f e w years, i t has d o n e a n e n o r m o u s a m o u n t to spread the recollection of those crimes and extend p o p u l a r k n o w l e d g e o f t h e i r scope. F i n a l l y , those w h o associate this m o v e m e n t w i t h the G e r m a n G r e e n Party (not entirely u n j u s t i f i a b l y ) , a n d s e e b o t h as t h e v e h i c l e s o f a r e v i v e d G e r m a n nationalism i n their o w n w a y , w o u l d be w e l l to r e m e m b e r that the G r e e n deputies w e r e the only ones i n the Federal G e r m a n P a r l i a m e n t to v o t e to cancel the invitation to U.S. President R o n a l d R e a g a n t o visit t h e m i l i t a r y c e m e t e r y at B i t b u r g i n 1985.29 Besides h e l p i n g recover national or local identities, history c a n also c o n t r i b u t e t o o u r i d e n t i t y i n t h e w i d e s t possible s e n s e — as h u m a n b e i n g s . I t i l l u m i n a t e s t h e h u m a n c o n d i t i o n b y c o n f r o n t i n g us w i t h w a y s o f t h i n k i n g a n d b e h a v i n g t h a t m a y s e e m a l i e n because t h e y are s e p a r a t e d f r o m us b y t i m e b u t t h a t are nevertheless directly relevant because they are h u m a n . T h u s history can illustrate t h e possibilities of h u m a n b e h a v i o r i n w a y s t h a t n o o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e c a n . T h a t is w h y t h e T h i r d R e i c h r e mains of abiding interest not just to the Germans themselves b u t a l s o t o h u m a n k i n d as a w h o l e . I t c o n t i n u e s , r i g h t l y , t o b e s e e n as t h e p a r a d i g m o f t h e c o l l a p s e o f c i v i l i z a t i o n i n t o b a r b a r i s m . 3 0 I t s t a n d s as a d r e a d f u l w a r n i n g o f t h e d e s t r u c t i v e p o t e n tial of technology. I t shows the ultimate consequences of r a c i s m ; i n d e e d , t h i s is o n e r e a s o n w h y r a c i s m h a s b e e n c o n d e m n e d so u n i v e r s a l l y s i n c e 1 9 4 5 a n d w h y S o u t h A f r i c a s t a n d s isolated i n the w o r l d c o m m u n i t y today. T h e T h i r d Reich's b u r e a u c r a t i c d e f o r m a t i o n o f language, its e x a l t a t i o n o f ideological f a n a t i c i s m , its c u l t o f u n t h i n k i n g o b e d i e n c e t o o r d e r s — a l l this, a n d m u c h m o r e , c o n f r o n t s us w i t h t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e pale r e f l e c t i o n s o f t h e s e t h i n g s t h a t s o m e t i m e s find p l a c e s i n o u r o w n lives. I n m a n y ways, therefore, the experience of N a z i s m a n d i t s c r i m e s is o f u n i v e r s a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . Y e t t h i s s t i l l l e a v e s u n a n swered the original questions w i t h w h i c h the neoconservative revisionists b e g a n : W h a t has t h e significance o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h b e e n for the g r o w t h and d e v e l o p m e n t of W e s t G e r m a n society? H o w s h o u l d G e r m a n s r e g a r d t h e i r past, a n d i n particular this episode w i t h i n i t , n o w t h a t h a l f a c e n t u r y has passed a n d m o s t o f those r e s p o n s i b l e a r e d e a d ? A n d f o r those o f us o u t s i d e p r e -

1 28

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

s e n t - d a y G e r m a n y , w h a t does i t m e a n f o r t h e w a y w e see G e r m a n y a n d t h e G e r m a n s n o w ? W h a t significance does i t h a v e f o r Germany's place and reputation i n the c o m m u n i t y of nations?

Ill T h e emotive language w i t h w h i c h m a n y of the argum e n t s of the W e s t G e r m a n revisionists have been greeted, the s t o r m o f m o r a l a n a t h e m a s w h i c h has r a i n e d d o w n u p o n t h e i r heads, t h e o f t e n personal t o n e of t h e attacks o n t h e i r theses—all this m a y reflect to some extent t h e customary m a n n e r i n w h i c h h i s t o r i c a l a n d p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y is c o n d u c t e d i n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c . B u t since s u c h responses h a v e also b e e n c o m m o n a m o n g o u t s i d e o b s e r v e r s , i t c l e a r l y also c o n s t i t u t e s a p h e n o m e n o n o f a b r o a d e r a n d m o r e g e n e r a l n a t u r e . F o r j u s t as p o s i t i o n s h a v e b e c o m e e n t r e n c h e d i n t h e d e b a t e i t s e l f , so a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d G e r m a n s a n d t h e i r N a z i past h a v e b e c o m e d e e p l y e m b e d d e d i n w i d e a r e a s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n as w e l l . T h e r e is s t i l l a great deal of anxiety about G e r m a n y and the Germans i n the w o r l d . T h i s is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e e n o u g h a n d , as s o m e o f t h e f a c t s and arguments presented i n this short book m a y indicate, i n s o m e w a y s i t is d e f e n s i b l e . Y e t t h e r e c a n b e n o d e n y i n g t h a t i n s o m e respects, a n d o n s o m e occasions, i t has l e d t o o v e r r e a c t i o n . J u s t as N a z i s m h a s b e c o m e a s y m b o l f o r a b s o l u t e e v i l , so t o o everyone w h o had any connection w i t h it runs the risk of being r e g a r d e d as a n a b s o l u t e l y e v i l p e r s o n . Y e t t o m a k e r e a s o n a b l e and meaningful m o r a l judgments, a careful degree of different i a t i o n is r e q u i r e d . T w o r e c e n t e x a m p l e s m i g h t h e l p t o m a k e this clear. T a k e first t h e c a s e o f A u s t r i a n P r e s i d e n t D r . K u r t W a l d h e i m , f o r m e r secretary-general of the U n i t e d Nations. L i k e m a n y A u s t r i a n m e n of his g e n e r a t i o n — h e was b o r n i n 1 9 1 8 — W a l d h e i m served i n the G e r m a n A r m y after Hitler's annexation of Austria i n 1938. H e was badly w o u n d e d i n t h e Russian camp a i g n i n 1 9 4 1 , a n d , according to his a u t o b i o g r a p h y a n d his m a n y subsequent public statements, h e spent t h e rest of the w a r i n V i e n n a , convalescing a n d c o m p l e t i n g his doctorate i n law. W h i l e h e was r u n n i n g for president, h o w e v e r , his opponents discovered he had been lying. N o t only had he recovered

GERMANY

AND

THE

W E S T - 129

f r o m his w o u n d s , h e also s e r v e d l a t e r i n t h e w a r w i t h t h e G e r m a n A r m y i n Y u g o s l a v i a a n d G r e e c e , w h e r e h e h a d b e e n attached to units w h i c h w e r e heavily i n v o l v e d i n w a r crimes such as t h e m a s s a c r e o f c i v i l i a n s a n d t h e d e p o r t a t i o n o f J e w s t o Auschwitz. International reaction was immediate. " W a l d h e i m W a s S S B u t c h e r , " c l a i m e d t h e New York Post; a n d a flood o f s t o r i e s i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s , as w e l l as a t l e a s t o n e b o o k length publication, accused W a l d h e i m of h a v i n g b e e n a " w a r criminal."31 T h e t r u t h , h o w e v e r , t u r n e d o u t to b e m o r e prosaic. A v e r y thorough investigation by historian Robert Herzstein, commissioned by the W o r l d Jewish Congress, c a m e to the conclusion t h a t W a l d h e i m w a s n o t g u i l t y o f a n y w a r c r i m e s as d e f i n e d b y the N u r e m b e r g Tribunal. H ehad not personally m u r d e r e d civilians or ordered the deportation of Jews. A n International Historians' Commission, appointed by W a l d h e i m himself, but consisting o f e x p e r t scholars o f u n d o u b t e d i n t e g r i t y , c a m e t o similar conclusions. B u t a t the same t i m e , there was a m p l e e v i d e n c e t o s h o w t h a t , as a n i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r i n G r e e c e a n d Yugoslavia, W a l d h e i m had been well aware of the crimes that w e r e being c o m m i t t e d . Indeed, o n one occasion he had e v e n ventured to pen a report to higher authority that questioned the w i s d o m of the savagery customarily s h o w n by the G e r m a n A r m y t o w a r d the occupied population i n these countries, a n act t h a t r e q u i r e d a considerable d e g r e e o f courage. W a l d h e i m was n o t a c o m m i t t e d N a z i b u t a n o p p o r t u n i s t . I n this sense, h e w e n t along w i t h the Nazi regime, even, apart f r o m the one instance just quoted, w h e n i t was engaged i n c o m m i t t i n g crimes of great c r u e l t y a n d barbarity. I n c o v e r i n g u p his past after the w a r — e v e n m o r e , i n tacitly c o n d o n i n g the anti-Sem i t i c u n d e r t o n e s w h i c h w e r e apparent i n his election camp a i g n — W a l d h e i m d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e c o m p l e t e f a i l u r e o f his c o u n t r y t o c o m e t o t e r m s w i t h t h e past. I n its stifling corporat i s m , its c o n t i n u i n g t r a d i t i o n o f p o p u l a r a n t i - S e m i t i s m , a n d its n a t i o n a l e v a s i o n o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r its r o l e i n t h e c r i m e s o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h , c o n t e m p o r a r y A u s t r i a has d e m o n s t r a t e d disturbing continuities w i t h the Austria o f the "clerico-fascist" a n d N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s t p a s t , c o n t i n u i t i e s t h e figure o f K u r t W a l d h e i m s y m b o l i z e d . I t is f o r t h i s r e a s o n , b e c a u s e o f h i s t h o r o u g h l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r , t h a t W a l d h e i m h a s n o t so f a r

13 0 * IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

c o m e u n d e r o v e r w h e l m i n g pressure f r o m his f e l l o w Austrians to resign.32 I f o n e w e r e t o ask w h e t h e r a n a f f a i r s u c h as t h i s w o u l d b e possible across t h e b o r d e r i n W e s t G e r m a n y , t h e a n s w e r w o u l d probably have to b e i n the affirmative, but w i t h reservations. I n d i v i d u a l s w i t h f a r m u r k i e r p a s t s t h a n W a l d h e i m 's h a v e m a d e it t o t h e t o p o f W e s t G e r m a n civil a n d political society. A recent e x a m p l e is t h a t o f H a n s F i l b i n g e r , C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c m i n i s t e r - p r e s i d e n t o f t h e s o u t h w e s t G e r m a n s t a t e o f Baden-Württemberg, and therefore, i n West Germany's federal system, one o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t politicians i n t h e c o u n t r y . W h i l e i n office, Filbinger was discovered t ohave been a military judge w h o passed d e a t h s e n t e n c e s o n a n t i - N a z i G e r m a n soldiers i n t h e last days o f t h e w a r . F i l b i n g e r , l i k e W a l d h e i m , insisted h e h a d d o n e nothing wrong. Unlike Waldheim, however, h e had t o go. Subsequently, h e has b e e n active i n p r o p a g a t i n g t h e idea t h a t G e r m a n s of his g e n e r a t i o n h a v e b e e n u n j u s t l y m a l i g n e d . 3 3 B u t public o p i n i o n i n W e s t G e r m a n y is a good deal m o r e hostile t o w a r d this p o i n t of v i e w t h a n i t is i n Austria. T h e collective a m n e s i a o f t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d i n t h e 1950s has c o n t i n u e d i n Austria u p to the present; i n G e r m a n y d u r i n g the 1960s and 1970s, h o w e v e r , t h e r e was at least a p a r t i a l r e c o v e r y o f p u b l i c m e m o r y . A figure l i k e W a l d h e i m m i g h t h a v e b e c o m e p r e s i d e n t of W e s t G e r m a n y , b u t h e w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n able to c o n t i n u e i n office a f t e r t h e d i s c o v e r y o f his d u b i o u s past. A v e r y d i f f e r e n t c a s e f r o m t h a t o f P r e s i d e n t W a l d h e i m is t h e u n f o r t u n a t e episode of P h i l i p pJenninger, w h o until N o v e m b e r 1988 was Speaker of the W e s t G e r m a n Parliament, the Bundestag. I t f e l l t o J e n n i n g e r t o d e l i v e r a s p e e c h t o t h e G e r m a n p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s a n d i n v i t e d g u e s t s o n t h e fiftieth a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e N a z i p o g r o m against t h e Jews, t h e " N i g h t o f B r o k e n Glass," o n N o v e m b e r 9 , 1938. T h e s p e e c h w a s a disaster. Several deputies w a l k e d out i n protest shortly after it had begun, and uproar ensued i n the news media after i t had finished. Jenninger was accused of justifying N a z i s m and had to resign. T h e n o v e l i s t S t e f a n H e y m said t h a t J e n n i n g e r w o u l d b e des c r i b e d i n l i t e r a t u r e as a n a d v o c a t e o f t h e d e v i l . T h e I s r a e l i m a g a z i n e Maariv h e a d l i n e d i t s s t o r y " J e n n i n g e r d e f e n d s N a z i era." T h e East G e r m a n news agency A D N m o r e cautiously d e s c r i b e d t h e s p e e c h as " g i v i n g t h e i m p r e s s i o n o f a j u s t i f i c a t i o n

GERMANY

A N D THE

W E S T - 131

o f N a z i r u l e . " T h e I t a l i a n d a i l y n e w s p a p e r Corriere della Sera h a d n o s u c h r e s e r v a t i o n s : " H i t l e r g a v e us a fantastic t i m e , " w a s its s u m m a r y o f t h e s p e e c h , a n d its c o n c l u s i o n w a s t h a t " a n t i S e m i t i s m b l o w s u p again i n t h e G e r m a n p a r l i a m e n t . " A spokesm a n o f t h e W o r l d J e w i s h Congress said, " W e are s h o c k e d . " Reading the text of Jenninger's speech i n cold p r i n t after the e v e n t , h o w e v e r , i t is d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t a l l t h e f u s s w a s about. M u c h of t h e criticism s e e m e d e i t h e r exaggerated or beside t h e p o i n t . J e n n i n g e r described t h e events o f t h e p o g r o m accurately a n d m a d e clear his c o n d e m n a t i o n o f t h e m . H e w e n t o n to o u t l i n e t h e anti-Semitic policies that preceded a n d foll o w e d i t , c u l m i n a t i n g i n t h e e x t e r m i n a t i o n at A u s c h w i t z , T r e blinka, a n d elsewhere. M o r e t h a n this, Jenninger located these events i n G e r m a n history, traced back the course of G e r m a n anti-Semitism into the nineteenth century, and criticized the suppression o f consciousness a n d m e m o r y i n W e s t G e r m a n y after 1945. A n d h e explicitly rejected w h a t h e called t h e "sensel e s s " d e m a n d t o d r a w a l i n e a f t e r fifty y e a r s a n d s t a r t a f r e s h . " O u r past," h e said, i n a d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e t o N o l t e ' s article t h a t had started off the debate o n the place of N a z i s m i n W e s t Germ a n p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n 1 9 8 6 , " w i l l n o t r e s t , n e i t h e r w i l l i t pass a w a y . " A l l this was far r e m o v e d f r o m the shibboleths of the neoconservatives. E v e n m o r e r e m a r k a b l e was Jenninger's admission that the majority of Germans had supported or tolera t e d H i t l e r as h e r e s t o r e d G e r m a n y ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n 1933 a n d 1938. " W h o w o u l d w i s h to d e n y , " h e asked rhetorically, "that the great m a j o r i t y of G e r m a n s stood b e h i n d h i m i n 1938 a n d identified w i t h h i m a n d his policies?" H e r e , h o w e v e r , lay t h e essence of Jenninger's blunder. F o r h e w e n t o n to describe the " t r i u m p h a lpolitical progress" duri n g H i t l e r ' s first y e a r s o f d i c t a t o r s h i p i n t e r m s t h a t f a i l e d t o m a k e i t clear t h a t Jenninger h i m s e l f d i d n o t share this v i e w of t h e Nazis' " a c h i e v e m e n t s , " t e r m s that suggested, indeed, that h e r e g a r d e d t h e m as r e a l . M o r e o v e r , a c a r e l e s s c h o i c e o f w o r d s r e p e a t e d l y i m p l i e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e e a r l y passages o f t h e speech, that present-day G e r m a n s should identify w i t h the m a j o r i t y w h o supported H i t l e r i n 1938, r a t h e r t h a n w i t h the m i n o r i t i e s w h o s u f f e r e d at his h a n d s . M a n y c o m m e n t a t o r s also f o u n d t h e b a l a n c e o f t h e s p e e c h o f f e n s i v e . " W h e n o n e is d e l i v ering a funeral speech for a m u r d e r victim," one journalist

13 2 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

c o m m e n t e d , " o n e does n o t d w e l l o n the good qualities o f t h e m u r d e r e r . " F i n a l l y , those w h o w a t c h e d t h e s p e e c h w e r e dism a y e d b y t h e r o u t i n e t o n e o f i t s d e l i v e r y . I t w a s as i f J e n n i n g e r w e r e r e a d i n g a s e m i n a r p a p e r , r a t h e r t h a n t r y i n g t o find w o r d s of a t o n e m e n t f o r a h o r r i f i c c r i m e . Nevertheless, f o r all its inadequacies, t h e speech was far m o r e o p e n a n d honest i n its c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e past t h a n o n e has c o m e t o e x p e c t f r o m t h e K o h l g o v e r n m e n t a n d i t s s u p p o r t e r s . A n d t h a t , o f c o u r s e , is w h y t h e K o h l g o v e r n m e n t f o u n d i t so e a s y t o l e t J e n n i n g e r g o . K o h l ' s first c h o i c e as h i s s u c c e s s o r w a s t h e r i g h t - w i n g p o l i t i c i a n A l f r e d D r e g g e r , w h o s e v i e w s o n t h e N a z i past are m u c h closer to those o f N o l t e a n d H i l l g r u b e r . O n l y t h e fact that D r e g g e r eventually resisted being " k i c k e d upstairs" i n this m a n n e r prev e n t e d t h e p o s t — w i t h its duties i n c l u d i n g t h e d e l i v e r y o f a n u m b e r o f speeches o n s e n s i t i v e h i s t o r i c a l issues i n t h e a n n i v e r s a r y y e a r o f 1 9 8 9 — b e i n g filled b y a m a n w h o r e a l l y d o e s b e l i e v e in drawing a veil over Nazism.34 T h e J e n n i n g e r a f f a i r t h u s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t t h e r e is a t l e a s t some truth i n w h a t Nolte and the other neoconservatives have b e e n s a y i n g : W e s t G e r m a n a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n is i n d e e d often oversensitive t o w a r d any event i n the Federal Republic t h a t , s u p e r f i c i a l l y a t l e a s t , a p p e a r s a t first s i g h t s u g g e s t i v e o f a r e v i v a l o f t h e N a z i p a s t . T h i s is n o t t o s a y , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e r e are n o connections at all b e t w e e n present-day W e s t G e r m a n y and Hitler's Third Reich—only that the continuities w i t h the N a z i p e r i o d a r e s u b t l e r a n d less o b v i o u s i n W e s t G e r m a n y t h a n i n A u s t r i a . T h e r e a r e o f c o u r s e l e g a l c o n t i n u i t i e s , as m a n y o f t h e legal decisions t a k e n u n d e r t h e T h i r d R e i c h c o n t i n u e for vario u s r e a s o n s t o b e r e g a r d e d as v a l i d . T h e w i d e s p r e a d o f f i c i a l refusal to clear t h e names of C o m m u n i s t s unjustly c o n d e m n e d u n d e r t h e Nazis, t h e c o n t i n u e d official reluctance t o c o m p e n sate i n d i v i d u a l s subjected b y t h e Nazis t o c o m p u l s o r y sterilization, the persistent failure to b r i n g the perpetrators of N a z i crimes, and the servants of N a z i "justice," to b o o k — a l l these disgrace the n a m e of the Federal Republic and give a m m u n i t i o n t o t h o s e w h o r e g a r d i t as a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e N a z i s t a t e u n d e r o t h e r a u s p i c e s . T h e r e a r e e c o n o m i c c o n t i n u i t i e s t o o , as m a n y o f t h e g r e a t i n d u s t r i a l a n d financial e n t e r p r i s e s w h i c h flourished u n d e r t h e T h i r d R e i c h c o n t i n u e t o d o so t o d a y : c o m p a n i e s , f o r i n s t a n c e , s u c h as D a i m l e r - R e n z , t h e m a k e r s o f t h e

GERMANY

AND

THE

WEST -

133

M e r c e d e s car, w h i c h d i d v e r y w e l l u n d e r N a z i s m , t h a n k s n o t least t o t h e e m p l o y m e n t , u n d e r barbarous, i n h u m a n , a n d o f t e n deadly conditions, o f m a n y thousands o f slave laborers to w h o m e f f e c t i v e i n d i v i d u a l c o m p e n s a t i o n is s t i l l d e n i e d . I n c e l e b r a t i n g t h e c e n t e n a r y o f its f o u n d a t i o n i n 1986, t h e c o m p a n y chose to i g n o r e its r o l e i n H i t l e r ' s G e r m a n y a l m o s t c o m p l e t e l y . O n l y t h e intervention of a group of radical historians w o r k i n g outside the university system managed to r e m i n d the world of the true facts.35 B u t the point needs to be m a d e equally strongly that West G e r m a n society a n d politics consist o f far m o r e t h a n c o n t i n u i ties w i t h t h e N a z i past. T h e r e a r e also c o n t i n u i t i e s w i t h a l o n g e r h i s t o r y , o r h i s t o r i e s ; m u c h o f w h a t is G e r m a n a b o u t t o d a y ' s G e r m a n y derives f r o m older traditions, not all of w h i c h led i n e v i t a b l y to t h e rise of N a z i s m . N o r are these traditions, w h e t h e r t h e y b e l o n g t o areas o f belief, l i k e r e l i g i o n , or social a c t i o n , l i k e y o u t h protest, o r politics, l i k e socialist i d e o l o g y a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n , s t a t i c a n d u n c h a n g i n g . T h e y a r e i n e v i t a b l y affected b y t h e historical context. A n d this has c h a n g e d i n m a n y respects b e y o n d recognition. Prosperity a n d affluence, alt h o u g h b y n o m e a n s e v e n l y d i s t r i b u t e d across a l l areas o f society, h a v e b e e n t h e central experiences of W e s t G e r m a n s since t h e 1950s. T h e y h a v e d o n e m o r e t h a n a n y t h i n g else t o reconcile t h e p o p u l a t i o n t o d e m o c r a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n d e e d , so s u c c e s s f u l a n d so p o w e r f u l h a s W e s t G e r m a n c a p i t a l i s m b e c o m e t h a t i t h a s begun to u n d e r m i n e democracy through a lengthy and seemi n g l y n e v e r - e n d i n g series o f c o r r u p t i o n scandals. A m o n g these m u s t b e c o u n t e d t h e f a c t t h a t G e r m a n firms h a v e b e e n s u p p l y ing the chemicals necessary for chemical warfare to Libya, either w i t h the connivance or t h r o u g h the negligence of West G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t officials. T o l i n k this scandal d i r e c t l y t o t h e u s e o f gas i n A u s c h w i t z is g r o t e s q u e . B u t t h e r e is n o d o u b t i n g t h e f a c t t h a t m o n e y , as so o f t e n i n W e s t G e r m a n y , h a s w o n out over political rectitude and responsibility. Political morality i n W e s t G e r m a n y is n o t a t a v e r y h i g h l e v e l a t t h e m o m e n t . B u t w o r r y i n g t h o u g h t h i s is, i t has r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e t o d o w i t h t h e N a z i past. M a n y of the travails of W e s t G e r m a n democracy are not u n t y p i c a l o f t h e p r o b l e m s a s s a i l i n g d e m o c r a c i e s e v e r y w h e r e as t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y d r a w s t o a close. F o r all its u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,

1 34

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

W e s t G e r m a n d e m o c r a c y d o e s s e e m t o h a v e found a w a y o f s u r v i v i n g a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n g i t s e l f o v e r t h e last c o u p l e o f decades. T h e chances of r e v e r t i n g to a n a u t h o r i t a r i a n system, h o w e v e r desirable this m a y seem to neoconservative intellectuals, s e e m r e m o t e . T h e r e h a v e a l w a y s b e e n d e m o c r a t i c f o r c e s i n G e r m a n society, b u t w h i l e t h e y w e r e generally o n t h e losing side u p t o 1945, t h e y h a v e clearly b e e n i n t h e a s c e n d a n t at least o v e r t h e last t w o decades. T h e legacy o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h a n d its c r i m e s f o r p r e s e n t - d a y W e s t G e r m a n y has b e e n f a r f r o m w h o l l y negative.36 G e r m a n y ' s place i n the w o r l d today m a y be l e s s p r o m i n e n t t h a n i t w a s b e t w e e n 1 8 7 1 a n d 1 9 4 5 , b u t w h o is t o say, i n v i e w o f w h a t h a p p e n e d b e t w e e n t h o s e t w o dates, t h a t t h i s is a b a d t h i n g ? W e s t G e r m a n y is m e r c i f u l l y f r e e f r o m t h e postimperial illusions that are d e f o r m i n g the foreign and dom e s t i c p o l i c i e s o f o t h e r E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s s u c h as B r i t a i n a n d France. T h e experience of Nazism's i n h u m a n i t y to non-Germ a n s has l e d t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c t o a d o p t a n official policy, admittedly not always carried out i n the spirit i n w h i c h it was intended, of giving asylum to political refugees. Public o p i n i o n i n W e s t G e r m a n y , u n l i k e t h a t i n G r e a t B r i t a i n , is firmly a g a i n s t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y : 3 7 t h e s a n c t i t y o f h u m a n l i f e is a n c h o r e d i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n n o t l e a s t as a r e a c t i o n t o i t s d e s t r u c t i o n d u r i n g t h e N a z i period. W e s t G e r m a n y thus avoids t h e degrading barbarities o f capital p u n i s h m e n t that are o c c u r r i n g w i t h increasi n g f r e q u e n c y i n t h e U n i t e d States a n d e l s e w h e r e at t h e p r e s e n t t i m e . T h e b i t t e r e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e d e s t r u c t i v e effects o f w a r has left W e s t G e r m a n s w i t h a s t r o n g a n d h e a l t h y distaste f o r m i l i t a r y a d v e n t u r i s m , as t h e G e r m a n p u b l i c ' s c r i t i c a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e American bombing of Libya and their rejection of the moderniz a t i o n o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n r y has s h o w n . 3 8 K n o w l e d g e o f t h e possibilities f o r abuse i n h e r e n t i n a n o v e r m i g h t y state has created a n equally w i d e s p r e a d fear o f i n t r u s i v e state i n f o r m a t i o n - g a t h e r i n g , has l e d t o t h e e n f o r c e d w i t h d r a w a l o f a n o v e r i n q u i s i t i v e p o p u l a t i o n census, a n d has p r o d u c e d s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n to machine-readable i d e n t i t y cards.39 T h e t r a d i t i o n o f t h e s t r o n g state lives o n i n W e s t G e r m a n y , b u t i t is e n c o u n t e r i n g m o r e w i d e s p r e a d a n d m o r e d e t e r m i n e d resistance t h a n e v e r b e f o r e . D e m o c r a t i c v i g i l a n c e has exposed t h e c o r r u p t i o n o f politics b y b i g business a n d has b r o u g h t t h e culprits to account. Federalism a n d the respect for regional and

GERMANY

AND

THE

WEST -

135

local i d e n t i t i e s i n h e r e n t i n W e s t G e r m a n y ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n has m u c h t o t e a c h c e n t r a l i z i n g s t a t e s s u c h as c o n t e m p o r a r y B r i t a i n . W e s t G e r m a n y t o d a y is n o t a p e r f e c t s o c i e t y , b u t n e i t h e r is i t c r i p p l e d b y t h e l e g a c y o f t h e past. T h e r e c e n t d e b a t e a b o u t t h e N a z i past has i n m a n y w a y s b e e n a n i n w a r d - l o o k i n g a n d r a t h e r p a r o c h i a l debate; those of us w h o c o n c e r n ourselves f r o m t h e outside w i t h G e r m a n y ' s past h i s t o r y a n d present c o n d i t i o n k n o w t h a t t h e i m a g e o f t h e G e r m a n s i n t h e w o r l d t o d a y is n o t as u n f a v o r a b l e as s o m e G e r m a n h i s t o r i a n s i m a g i n e : o n t h e c o n trary, G e r m a n s are w i d e l y a d m i r e d . I f o p i n i o n polls h a v e s h o w n t h a t G e r m a n s a r e less p r o u d o f t h e i r n a t i o n a l i t y t h a n o t h e r E u r o p e a n n a t i o n s a r e a n d m u c h less p r o u d o f b e i n g G e r m a n t h a n Americans are of being A m e r i c a n , this should not be a cause for a l a r m — r a t h e r t h e reverse.40 " S h r e w d , sober, calculating, reliable, w i t h o u t illusions—these," according to the same o p i n i o n polls, " c o u l d be the adjectives for the political attitudes o f t h e G e r m a n s . " 4 1 T h e r e a r e w o r s e t h i n g s t o b e . T h e r e is l i t t l e evidence i n all this of a neurotic search for identity. I f the G e r m a n s are m o r e concerned t h a n others about the dangers of war, the destruction of the e n v i r o n m e n t , the perils of nuclear p o w e r , t h e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i c e s o f a m a l e - d o m i n a t e d socie t y , t h i s is n o t , as s o m e c o m m e n t a t o r s h a v e m a i n t a i n e d , b e c a u s e t h e y a r e s u f f e r i n g f r o m a n i n h e r i t e d s t a t e o f Angst,42 b u t because they are m o r e affected by these things t h a n other peoples o f E u r o p e . Nevertheless, w h i l e t h e legacy o f t h e past does n o t determ i n e everything i n the Federal Republic, it remains crucially i m p o r t a n t f o r G e r m a n p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , a n d r i g h t l y so.43 Joac h i m F e s t h a s r e m a r k e d t h a t t i m e is o n t h e n e o c o n s e r v a t i v e s ' s i d e , a n d t h a t as t h e g e n e r a t i o n s w i t h d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e N a z i p e r i o d d i s a p p e a r i n t o h i s t o r y , so p u b l i c m e m o r y t o o w i l l fade. B u t i n the p o s t m o d e r n w o r l d , history plays an increasingly i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , as t h e b e n e f i t s o f m o d e r n industrialization seem increasingly counterbalanced by problems ranging f r o m u n e m p l o y m e n t to environmental pollution and the threat of nuclear war. M o r e o v e r , there are some cont e m p o r a r y political cultures w h i c h r e m a i n p r o f o u n d l y shaped b y p a s t t r a u m a s . N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d is a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r i k i n g e x ample, i n w h i c h the events of the year 1690 are b u r n e d into popular consciousness w i t h the indelibility of a b i r t h m a r k , polit-

13 6 ' IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

ical o r g a n i z a t i o n s t a k e t h e i r cue f r o m w h i c h side t h e y i d e n t i f y w i t h i n t h e Battle o f t h e B o y n e , a n d t h e activists i n t h e m a j o r i t y Protestant c o m m u n i t y c o n t i n u e to take t h e i r colors a n d t h e i r name from the seventeenth-century Anglo-Dutch monarch W i l l i a m o f O r a n g e . T h e r e is e v e r y r e a s o n t o s u p p o s e t h a t t h e years 1 9 3 3 - 4 5 w i l l continue, therefore, to play a central role i n W e s t G e r m a n p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , i n a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t b u t n o less p o w e r f u l w a y t o t h a t p l a y e d b y t h e past i n t h e p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of m o d e r n Ireland. West Germans, like Americans, m a y well take their primary n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y f r o m t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , o r i n t h e i r case t h e Basic L a w o f 1 9 4 9 : t h e r e is n o p o l i t i c a l o r h i s t o r i c a l r e a s o n w h y t h i s s h o u l d b e a n y less p o w e r f u l a n i n t e g r a t i n g f a c t o r t h a n a b r o a d e r sense o f n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y based o n a n i m a g i n e d linguistic o r cultural c o m m u n i t y stretching farther back i n time. Americans have no difficulty i n distinguishing w h a t they have i n c o m m o n as A m e r i c a n s , d e f i n e d first a n d f o r e m o s t b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , f r o m w h a t they have i n c o m m o n w i t h other English-speaking countries i n t h e c u l t u r a l sphere. I n this sense, G o e t h e belongs equally to the W e s t Germans, the East Germans, and the Austrians, j u s t as S h a k e s p e a r e b e l o n g s e q u a l l y t o t h e B r i t i s h , t h e Americans, the Australians, and other English-speaking peoples, w i t h o u t t h e r e b y d i m i n i s h i n g t h e separate n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y o f a n y o f t h e m . T h i s is n o t t o say, o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e W e s t G e r m a n c o n s t i t u t i o n is a p e r f e c t d o c u m e n t ; b u t a t l e a s t i t p r o vides a guarantee of democratic structures that, by and large, has stood t h e test o f t i m e . T h a t is w h y t h e p o l i t i c a l r e p e r c u s s i o n s o f t h e p r e s e n t d e b a t e a r e so w o r r y i n g . F o r w h a t N o l t e a n d t h e o t h e r n e o c o n s e r v a t i v e s have d o n e is t om a k e far-right t h i n k i n g respectable i n W e s t G e r m a n y again. As a result of the preaching of national pride and the relativizing or trivializing of N a z i crimes by respected, professional university historians, journalists and politicians are finding it easier t oadopt a n d p r o c l a i m u l t r a r i g h t v i e w s t h a n t h e y d i d a d e c a d e o r so a g o . T h e first c l e a r e v i d e n c e f o r t h i s h a s c o m e i n t h e d r a m a t i c rise o f W e s t G e r m a n y ' s Republicans (Republikaner), w h o g a i n e d 7 . 5 p e r c e n t o f t h e v o t e i n t h e W e s t B e r l i n state elections a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f1989. T h e i r leader, f o r m e r SS soldier F r a n z S c h o n h u b e r , has p r o c l a i m e d G e r m a n r e u n i f i c a t i o n as h i s " G o d - g i v e n m i s s i o n , " a n d d e m a n d s W e s t

GERMANY

AND

THE

W E S T - 137

Germany's withdrawal f r o m the European C o m m u n i t y and N A T O , followed b y a merger w i t h East G e r m a n y t o f o r m a n e u t r a l G e r m a n state equipped w i t h a full m i l i t a r y arsenal, i n c l u d i n g a t o m i c w e a p o n s . H i s p a r t y has w o n s u p p o r t o n t h e b a s i s o f a s t r o n g p a n - G e r m a n n a t i o n a l i s m w h i c h is d i r e c t e d n o t o n l y against t h e U n i t e d States a n d t h e W e s t , b u t also against foreigners a n d i m m i g r a n t s w i t h i n W e s t G e r m a n y itself, w h o m Schönhuber a c c u s e s o f i m p o r t i n g c r i m i n a l i t y a n d t a k i n g a w a y G e r m a n s ' jobs; he wants the constitution a m e n d e d to r e m o v e t h e i r rights, a n d a l t h o u g h h e denies accusations of racism, his supporters s h o w n o i n h i b i t i o n s i n t h e use o f t h e slogan " F o r eigners out!" and display m a r k e d anti-Semitic prejudices. Schönhuber's v i e w o f G e r m a n h i s t o r y is v e r y m u c h i n k e e p i n g w i t h this k i n d of n a t i o n a l i s m . H e defends his role i n t h e SS a n d says h e has n o t h i n g t o b e a s h a m e d o f i n his past. H e d e s c r i b e s t h e T h i r d R e i c h as a n " a b s o l u t e l y u n j u s t s t a t e " a n d s a y s its r a c i s m l e d t o a f r i g h t f u l catastrophe, b u t w h e n asked b y a journalist whether West G e r m a n president Richard v o n Weizsäcker s h o u l d p a y a f o r m a l v i s i t t o W a r s a w t o c o m m e m o r a t e t h e fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Poland, h e replied t h a t Weizsäcker s h o u l d i n t h a t c a s e a l s o g o t o B r o m b e r g ( B y d goszcz) to c o m m e m o r a t e t h e massacre of G e r m a n s by Poles a t t h e s a m e t i m e . H i s party's p r o g r a m states t h a t " t h e w a r p r o p a g a n d a o f t h e v i c t o r i o u s p o w e r s has e n t e r e d o u r h i s t o r y books, a n d o u r y o u t h m u s t b e l i e v e t h e i r exaggerations a n d falsifications to a large degree, because a n objective h i s t o r i o g r a p h y is still n o t c o m p l e t e l y possible." Its j o u r n a l has said t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f " t h e s i n g u l a r i t y o f G e r m a n c r i m e s " h a s b e e n u s e d as a " t o o l against G e r m a n interests for f o u r decades." T h e w e e k l y magaz i n e Der Spiegel h a s c o m p a r e d Schönhuber t o t h e c h a r a c t e r s o f Dr. Jekyll and M r . H y d e , created by Robert Louis Stevenson: to journalists a n d critics h e shows a k i n d l y , s m o o t h , a n d r e l a t i v e l y m o d e r a t e f a c e , b u t a m o n g h i s o w n s u p p o r t e r s h e i s f a r less i n h i b i t e d . T h e g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y o f C h a n c e l l o r K o h l ' s C D U has d e s c r i b e d t h e R e p u b l i c a n s as " a n e x t r e m i s t p a r t y w i t h N a z i slogans." M e m b e r s h i p i n this a n d o t h e r far-right parties i n W e s t G e r m a n y rose b y 10 p e r c e n t i n 1988 t o a b o u t 2 8 , 0 0 0 , a n d t h e r e are a l r e a d y signs t h a t K o h l ' s o w n p a r t y is m o v i n g t o t h e r i g h t t o t r y t o p r e v e n t a n y f u r t h e r e r o s i o n o f its s u p p o r t t o t h e extremists.

13 8 • IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

It w o u l d be w r o n g to b l a m e t h e rise o f r i g h t - w i n g e x t r e m i s m i n W e s t G e r m a n y o n the neoeonservative historians; they t h e m selves are i n s o m e m e a s u r e a reflection of a broader developm e n t of the " N e w Right" i n the Federal Republic. But there can be n o d o u b t that t h e y h a v e m a d e i t a lot easier for such e x t r e m i s m t o flourish; a n d i n so d o i n g , t h e y a r e c o n t r i b u t i n g substantially to the reorientation of W e s t G e r m a n politics along m o r e n a t i o n a l i s t i c a n d a u t h o r i t a r i a n l i n e s . T h i s , t h e n , is t h e u l t i m a t e political significance of t h e debate about N a z i s m . W e s t G e r m a n p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n W e s t a n d E a s t is s h a p e d n o t o n l y b y t h e l e g a c y o f p o s t w a r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n b u t also b y t h e e v e n t s t h a t p r e c e d e d i t . H o w p e o p l e r e g a r d t h e T h i r d R e i c h a n d its c r i m e s provides a n i m p o r t a n t k e y t o h o w t h e y w o u l d use political p o w e r i n t h e p r e s e n t o r f u t u r e . T h a t is w h y t h e n e o c o n s e r v a t i v e s ' r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e G e r m a n p a s t is so d i s t u r b i n g . F o r m a n y i f n o t most of the arguments they are advancing are derived, consciously or unconsciously, f r o m the propaganda of t h e Nazis themselves. T h e call for W e s t G e r m a n s to i d e n t i f y w i t h t h e soldiers w h o f o u g h t o n i n t h e East i n 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 echoes t h e N a z i s ' c a l l f o r t h e t r o o p s t o fight t o t h e l a s t d i t c h i n d e f e n s e o f t h e " F a t h e r l a n d " against w h a t Goebbels called t h e " i n d e scribable atrocities" c o m m i t t e d b y t h e R e d A r m y i n t h e Germ a n E a s t . T h e t h e s i s t h a t G e r m a n y w a s fighting a p r e v e n t i v e w a r b y i n v a d i n g t h e S o v i e t U n i o n i n 1 9 4 1 also appears i n t h e N a z i p r o p a g a n d a o f t h e t i m e . T h e a r g u m e n t t h a t fascist v i o lence was always a response to prior violence f r o m the left was t h e v e r y a r g u m e n t t h a t fascists t h e m s e l v e s u s e d i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e i r crimes. T h e use o f t h e w o r d " A s i a t i c , " e v e n w i t h t h e l i m i t e d distance l e n t i t b y its enclosure i n q u o t a t i o n m a r k s , t o describe t h e misdeeds o f t h e Bolsheviks, i n e v i t a b l y recalls years o f racist s c a r e m o n g e r i n g , i n w h i c h c o m m u n i s m was p o r t r a y e d as t h e c r e e d o f s l i t - e y e d s u b h u m a n s t h r e a t e n i n g G e r m a n y f r o m t h e East. T h e allegation that the Poles w e r e bent o n e x t e r m i n a t i n g the ethnic G e r m a n s i n their t e r r i t o r yi n September 1939 resembles N a z i d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e e v e n t s i n B r o m b e r g as t h e " l a r g e s t bloodbath of all t i m e , " supposedly part of the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of "the extermination of the G e r m a n people openly proclaimed t o d a y b y t h e J e w i s h p l u t o c r a t i c d e m o c r a c i e s , " as G o e b b e l s ' s propaganda machine put it. T h e claim that N a z i G e r m a n y was

GERMANY

AND

THE

WEST -

139

d e f e n d i n g W e s t e r n c i v i l i z a t i o n i n i t s fight a g a i n s t C o m m u n i s m g o e s b a c k a t l e a s t as f a r as G o e b b e l s ' s s p e e c h t o t h e N u r e m b e r g Rally i n S e p t e m b e r 1935, w h e n he described the T h i r d Reich as a c t i n g o n a " w o r l d m i s s i o n " i n d e f e n s e o f " W e s t e r n c u l t u r e . " T h e suggestion t h a t t h e b o m b i n g o f G e r m a n cities b y t h e A l l i e s was a piece of gratuitous aggression, r a t h e r t h a n retaliation, goes b a c k to N a z i p r o p a g a n d a against " t e r r o r b o m b i n g , " i n w h i c h no reference was m a d e to previous G e r m a n terror bombing of Warsaw, Rotterdam, Coventry, and Guernica. T h e c l a i m t h a t H i t l e r m a y h a v e b e e n justified i n his " i n t e r n m e n t " of the Jews because the Jews w e r e Germany's enemies, brings to m i n d H i t l e r ' s notorious speech of January 1939, i n w h i c h he threatened destruction u p o n the Jews should they—as he saw i t — l a u n c h a w a r against G e r m a n y , a n d has a t r o u b l i n g affinity w i t h t h e N a z i l e a d e r s ' b e l i e f d u r i n g t h e w a r t h a t t h e A l l i e d fight to defeat t h e m was orchestrated by a Jewish conspiracy. I t was, indeed, A d o l f E i c h m a n n , the orchestrator of the " F i n a l Solut i o n , " w h o p u t f o r w a r d at his t r i a l i n J e r u s a l e m t h e v i e w t h a t " W e i z m a n n declared w a r o n G e r m a n y i n 1939." T h e implied i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f J e w s w i t h p a r t i s a n s b y a h i s t o r i a n s u c h as N o l t e bears a d i s t u r b i n g s i m i l a r i t y t o t h e Nazis' o w n obsessions, i n w h i c h partisan activity i n the East was given a vastly overrated significance, b l a m e d o n the Jews, a n d m e t w i t h repeated orders f o r " r e p r i s a l s " o f a scope a n d savagery t h a t b o r e n o r e l a t i o n at all to t h e reality of t h e m i l i t a r y p r o b l e m w h i c h partisan bands w e r e posing. T h e assertion that G e r m a n y ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l stability requires an authoritarian regime backed up by a strong n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s is t o o c l o s e t o t h e s l o g a n s o f t h e N a z i s a n d their sympathizers i n 1933 for c o m f o r t . 4 4 As w e h a v e seen t h r o u g h o u t this book, these ideas d o n o t lack o p p o n e n t s i n G e r m a n y . B u t n e i t h e r d i d t h o s e o f t h e N a z i s . I t is u p to those i n t h e rest of the w o r l d w h o care about G e r m a n y ' s f u t u r e to d o e v e r y t h i n g possible to encourage a sober a n d ration a l a t t i t u d e t o G e r m a n y ' s past. G e r m a n y , E a s t a n d W e s t , a n d Austria too, continues to bear a heavy responsibility for the c r i m e s o f N a z i s m . B u t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is n o t t h e s a m e as g u i l t . Nations conventionally accept a degree of historical responsib i l i t y f o r t h e i r p a s t a c t i o n s , as B r i t a i n d o e s , f o r e x a m p l e , f o r t h e legacy o f h e r e m p i r e . So t o o does W e s t G e r m a n y , especially i n relation to Jews and other victims of N a z i t y r a n n y and geno-

1 40

• IN

HITLER'S

SHADOW

cide. T h i s does n o t m e a n that e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l G e r m a n needs to feel g u i l t y about t h e crimes o f t h e T h i r d Reich, least o f all i f h e o r s h e w a s b o r n a f t e r 1 9 4 5 , as m o s t G e r m a n s n o w l i v i n g were. Germans are entitled to object if they are all held equally a n d p e r s o n a l l y g u i l t y , i f t h e y a r e t r e a t e d as p a r i a h s i n t h e r e s t of the w o r l d , or if every m i n o r outbreak of neo-Nazism, h o w e v e r o f f e n s i v e , is t r e a t e d as a s i g n t h a t n o t h i n g h a s c h a n g e d . N o l t e is r i g h t i n s a y i n g t h a t i t is t i m e t o t r e a t G e r m a n y a n d t h e G e r m a n s w i t h c a l m n e s s , r a t i o n a l i t y , a n d o b j e c t i v i t y . B u t h e is w r o n g i n saying that this requires releasing t h e m f r o m Hitler's shadow. T h e s u r v i v a l a n d strengthening of W e s t G e r m a n democracy, and the continued stability and calculability of West G e r m a n y i n E u r o p e a n and w o r l d politics, require, n o w m o r e than ever, a continuing, open, and honest confrontation w i t h t h e N a z i past.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1: THE BURDEN OF GUILT 1. The literature on the Second World War is obviously enormous. A very useful now updated and reissued one-volume survey is Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War: Causes a n d Courses o f t h e Second World War (London, 1972; new ed., New York, 1989). Two recent, clearly written accounts of the war's origins are William Carr, P o l a n d to Pearl H a r b o r . The M a k i n g o f t h e Second World War (London, 1985) and P. M. H. Bell, The O r i g i n o f t h e Second World War in E u r o p e (London, 1986). In the following notes, general introductory and background references are confined as far as possible to publications in English. 2. See Robert H. Abzug, I n s i d e t h e Vicious H e a r t : A m e r i c a n s a n d t h e L i b e r a tion o f Nazi C o n c e n t r a t i o n C a m p s (New York, 1985), for the following account. For other eyewitness accounts, see Derrick Sington, Belsen Uncovered (London, 1946), Marcus J. Smith, D a c h a u : The H a r r o w i n g o f H e l l (Albuquerque, 1972), and Michael Selzer, D e l i v e r a n c e D a y : The L a s t H o u r s at D a c h a u (Philadelphia, 1978). 3. Abzug, I n s i d e , pp. 27-30, citing Omar N. Bradley, A S o l d i e r ' s Story (New York, 1951), pp. 539. See also Charles R. Codman, D r i v e (Boston, 1957), pp. 281-82. 4. Abzug, I n s i d e , pp. 31-33. 5. Ibid., pp. 127-40. 6. Among numerous accounts, see Konnilyn G. Feig, H i t l e r ' s D e a t h C a m p s : The S a n i t y o f M a d n e s s (New York, 1979), and Raul Hilberg, The D e s t r u c -

142 • N O T E S Hon o f t h e E u r o p e a n Jews, 3 vols. (2nd ed., New York, 1985). Among many memoirs written by camp inmates, see for example Primo Levi, If this Is a Man (2nd ed., London, 1960), and Wieslaw Kielar, A n u s M u n d i : F i v e Years in A u s c h w i t z (London, 1981). 7. Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: M e d i c a l K i l l i n g a n d t h e Psychology o f G e n o c i d e (New York, 1986) is a useful introduction in English. 8. Intensive research in this area has only recently begun. The most thorough and useful survey so far is Ulrich Herbert, F r e m d a r b e i t e r : Politik und Praxis des "Ausländer-Einsatzes" in der K r i e g s w i r t s c h a f t des D r i t t e n Reiches (Bonn, 1985). However, see also E. L. Homze, F o r e i g n L a b o r in Nazi G e r m a n y (Princeton, 1967). 9. Walter Laqueur, T h e T e r r i b l e Secret: S u p p r e s s i o n o f t h e Truth A b o u t H i t l e r ' s " F i n a l Solution " (London, 1980), provides a meticulous documentation and analysis of the problem of acceptance and belief. Laqueur notes that "Holocaust" is a "singularly inappropriate" term for the genocidal policies of the Nazis toward the Jews. Its meaning—to bring a wholly burnt offering—is inapplicable. As Laqueur notes (p. 7, n.), "It was not the intention of the Nazis to make a sacrifice of this kind, and the position of the Jews was not that of a ritual victim." See also the account of the term's evolution in Geoff Eley, "Holocaust History," L o n d o n Review o f Rooks, March 3-17,1982, pp. 6-9. Eley argues that the term's religious overtones remain in a transmuted form, now implying "a certain mystification, an insistence on the uniquely Jewish character of the experience." Saul Friedländer has noted "the growing centrality of the ' S h o a h ' (Hebrew for Holocaust) among Diaspora Jewry, particularly in the United States. The " ' S h o a h , ' " he notes, "is almost becoming a symbol of identification, for better or for worse, whether because of the weakening of the bond of religion or because of the lesser salience of Zionism and Israel as an identification element" (Saul Friedländer, "West Germany and the Burden of the Past: The Ongoing Debate," J e r u s a l e m Q u a r t e r l y 42 [Spring 1987], pp. 3-18, here p. 16.) As a non-Jewish, secular historian, I find Laqueur's reservations unanswerable, and for this reason avoid the use of the term "Holocaust" in the present work. 10. For an impressive synthesis of a large quantity of this material, see Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust: The J e w i s h T r a g e d y (Glasgow, 1986). Much of the original material is preserved at the Fred R. Crawford Witness to the Holocaust Project, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322, which has also published a number of extracts. 11.

Internationaler Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg, D e r Nürnberger gegen d i e H a u p t k r i e g s v e r b r e c h e r , vom 14. N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 5 - 1 . 1 9 4 6 (Munich, reprint, 1984).

Prozess Oktober

12. Some idea of the range and scale of the documentation available can be gained from Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945: A D o c u m e n t a r y R e a d e r (4 vols., Exeter, 1983-89), which, with its excellent summaries and linking commentaries by Noakes, forms the best and

N O T E S • 1 43 most comprehensive documentary history of Nazism now available. In view of the mass of documentation extrant, the present book does not deal with neofascist attempts to deny the reality of Nazism's crimes. Such denials are the product of political fanaticism, not of serious investigation, and are not susceptible to rational argument. For a useful guide to some of this distasteful literature, see Gill Seidel, The Holocaust Denial: Antisemitism, Racism a n d t h e New R i g h t (London, 1986). 13. Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, vol. I. For useful studies of Nazism up to 1933, see also W. S. Allen, The Nazi S e i z u r e o f Power: The Experience of a S i n g l e G e r m a n Town 1 9 3 0 - 3 5 (2nd ed., New York, 1984); Richard Bessel, Political V i o l e n c e a n d t h e Rise o f Nazism: The Storm Troopers in E a s t e r n G e r m a n y 1 9 2 5 - 1 9 3 4 (New Haven, 1984); Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter: The Social F o u n d a t i o n o f F a s c i s m in G e r m a n y , 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 3 3 (Chapel Hill, 1983); Michael Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of M e m b e r s a n d L e a d e r s 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 4 5 (Oxford, 1985); Jeremy Noakes, The Nazi Party in L o w e r Saxony, 1 9 2 1 - 1 9 3 3 (London, 1971); and Dietrich Orlow, The History of t h e Nazi Party, V o l u m e 1, 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 3 3 (Pittsburgh, 1969). The best short introduction to the political history of the Weimar Republic is now Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar R e p u b l i c (London, 1988). The most useful general introductory survey remains Georges Castellan, L A l l e m a g n e de Weimar, 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 3 3 (2nd ed., Paris, 1972), which has unfortunately neither been translated nor updated. 14. Karl Dietrich Bracher, The G e r m a n D i c t a t o r s h i p : The Origins, Structure, a n d Consequences o f National Socialism (New York, 1970), pp. 243-51 ("Reflection: The 'Legal Revolution'"). Bracher's book is still the best one-volume history of the subject. 15. Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, pp. 288-494.

vol. 2; Bracher, The G e r m a n

Dictatorship,

16. On Nazi foreign policy, see Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, vol. 3; William Carr, A r m s , A u t a r k y , a n d A g g r e s s i o n : A S t u d y in G e r m a n F o r e i g n Policy 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 3 9 (2nd ed., London, 1979), and Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Fore i g n Policy o f H i t l e r ' s G e r m a n y (2 vols., Chicago, 1970-80). 17. Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, in n. 1, above.

vol. 3, pp. 755-875; see also the works cited

18. Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, vol. 3, pp. 997-1208. As with other references in the present chapter, this is intended simply to point to a useful introductory text; more detailed discussion of some of the controversies surrounding the events summarized here, together with fuller references, is reserved for later. 19. Tony Sharp, The Wartime A l l i a n c e a n d t h e Z o n a l Division of Germany (London, 1975); Peter H. Merkl, The O r i g i n of t h e West G e r m a n R e p u b l i c (New York, 1963); J. Schechtmann, Postwar Population Transfers in E u r o p e , 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 5 (London, 1962). For a general account of the peace settlement, see J. W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, The Semb l a n c e of Peace (London, 1972).

1 44 • N O T E S 20. For a lively account by a journalist, see Norman Gelb, The B e r l i n Wall (London, 1986). Useful background histories include Volker R. Berghahn, M o d e r n G e r m a n y (2nd ed., London, 1987), and Alfred Grosser, G e r m a n y in O u r Time: A Political History o f t h e Postwar Years (London, 1974). 21.

See the indictment of Allied policy by Tom Bower, B l i n d E y e to M u r d e r : B r i t a i n , A m e r i c a , a n d t h e P u r g i n g o f Nazi G e r m a n y — A P l e d g e B e t r a y e d (London, 1981).

22. The failure in West Germany to come to terms with the Nazi past during the first two postwar decades has perhaps received insufficient attention in the present debate. For exceptions, see William E . Paterson, "From Vergangenheitsbewältigung to the H i s t o r i k e r s t r e i t " (unpubl. typescript, July 1988); Geoff Eley "Nazism, Politics, and the Image of the Past: Thoughts on the West German Historikerstreit 1986-87" P a s t a n d P r e s e n t 121 (1988), pp. 171-208; and Wolfgang Benz, "Die Abwehr der Vergangenheit: Ein Problem nur für Historiker und Moralisten?" in Dan Diner (ed.), Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Z u r H i s t o r i s i e r u n g und Historikerstreit (Frankfurt, 1987), pp. 17-33. A key critique of the silences of the 1950s was Alexander and Margarethe Mitscherlich, T h e I n a b i l i t y to M o u r n (London, 1975). Useful texts on Allied policy in postwar Germany include Constantine Fitzgibbon, Denazification (London, 1969); J. Tent, Mission on t h e R h i n e : R e - e d u c a t i o n a n d Denazification in A m e r i c a n occupied G e r m a n y (Chicago, 1982); N. Pronay and K. Wilson (eds.), The Political R e - e d u c a t i o n o f G e r m a n y a n d H e r A l l i e s A f t e r World War II (London, 1985). A. Rückerl, T h e Investigation o f Nazi Crimes, 1945-1978 (London, 1979), provides an introduction to the later period. 23. For critical accounts of the historical writings of this period, see Richard J. Evans, R e t h i n k i n g G e r m a n History: N i n e t e e n t h - C e n t u r y G e r m a n y a n d t h e O r i g i n s o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h (London, 1987), pp. 23-54; and Pierre Aygoberry, The Nazi Question: A n Essay o n T h e I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f National Socialism, 1 9 2 2 - 1 9 7 5 (New York, 1981), esp. pp. 109-148. There is a differentiated account of the development of West German attitudes toward the Nazi past in Eckard Jesse, " 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung' in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," D e r Staat 26 (1987), pp. 539-65. See also Bernd Faulenbach, "NS-Interpretation und Zeitklima," A u s Politik und Z e i t g e s c h i c h t e : B e i l a g e z u r W o c h e n z e i t u n g "Das P a r l a m e n t " 22 (1987), pp. 19-30. 24. Classic texts include Carl Friedrich, Totalitarianism (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship a n d A u t o c r a c y (2nd ed., New York, 1966); and Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism (New York, 1951). In Germany, the main applications of the term to the history of Nazism were by Karl Dietrich Bracher (n. 14 above). See his The Age o f I d e o l o g i e s : A History o f Political Thought in t h e Twentieth C e n t u r y (London, 1982), for a recent defense of this approach. 25. See B. H. Liddell Hart, The O t h e r S i d e of t h e H i l l (London, 1948), p. 29; Heinz Guderian, P a n z e r L e a d e r (London, 1952).

N O T E S • 145 26. Irmgard Wilharm (ed.), D e u t s c h e G e s c h i c h t e 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 8 3 : D o k u m e n t e in zwei Bänden (Frankfurt, 1985), vol. 2, p. 27 (Brandt's government declaration of October 18, 1969). 27. For a more detailed exposition of this interpretation, see below. Useful guides to the reinterpretations of the 1960s and 1970s include Hans¬ Ulrich Wehler, "Historiography in Germany Today," in Jürgen Habermas (ed.), Observations on "The S p i r i t u a l Situation o f t h e A g e , " (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), pp. 221-59; Georg Iggers, "Introduction," in Georg Iggers (ed.), The Social History of Politics: Critical Perspectives in West G e r m a n Historical Writing since 1945 (Leamington Spa, 1985), pp. 1-48; Kenneth D. Barkin, "From Uniformity to Pluralism: German Historical Writing Since World War I , " G e r m a n L i f e a n d L e t t e r s 34 (1981), pp. 234-47; David Blackbourn, "Introduction," in David Blackbourn, Populists and Patricians: Essays in M o d e r n G e r m a n History (London, 1987), pp. 1-32; and Geoff Eley, F r o m Unification to Nazism: R e i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e G e r m a n Past (London, 1986), pp. 1-18. 28. For the background to this event, see Günter Berndt and Reinhard Strecker (eds.), P o l e n — e i n Schauermärchen, oder: Gehirnwäsche für G e n e r a t i o n e n (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1971), with useful criticisms of textbook accounts of the history of Polish-German relations current in the 1960s. 29. Thus the key word of the period, Vergangenheitsbewältigung—"mastering the past." The public debate can be followed through the essays of Martin Broszat, N a c h H i t l e r : D e r s c h w i e r i g e U m g a n g mit unserer Ges c h i c h t e , ed. H. Graml, K.-D. Henke (Munich, 1986), esp. pp. 42-49, 230-33, 271-86. 30. See Martin Broszat et al., D e u t s c h l a n d s Weg in d i e D i k t a t u r (Berlin, 1983), for the proceedings of one of the largest such conferences; for a characteristically vigorous summing-up, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, A u s der G e s c h i c h t e lernen? (Munich, 1988), pp. 44-60. 31.

James Wald, "German History Backwards," New G e r m a n C r i t i q u e 21 (1980), pp. 154-80; Hellmut Diwald, G e s c h i c h t e der D e u t s c h e n (Frankfurt, 1978).

32. Diwald, G e s c h i c h t e , pp. 15-16. See also the same author's "Deutschland— was ist es?" in Wolfgang Venohr (ed.), D i e deutsche E i n h e i t k o m m t bes t i m m t (Bergisch Gladbach, 1983), and Hellmut Diwald, Mut z u r G e s c h i c h t e (Bergisch Gladbach, 1983). Venohr is a prominent figure in the West German "New Right." 33. Karl Otmar, Freiherr von Aretin, quoted in Wald, "German History," p. 157, n. 8. Other straws in the wind could be found in the writings of Hermann Lübbe, "Der Nationalsozialismus im Bewusstsein der deutschen Gegenwart," F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , January 24, 1983, and "Der Nationalsozialismus im deutschen Nachkriegsbewusstsein," Historische Zeitschrift 236 (1983), pp. 579-99; see also his contribution and the ensuing discussion in Broszat et al., D e u t s c h l a n d s Weg (esp. pp. 329-49), and the commentary by H. Dubiel and G. Frankenberg,

146 • N O T E S "Entsorgung der Vergangheit," D i e Zeit, March 18, 1983, p. 44. See also Alfred Heuss, Versagen und Verhängnis: Vom R u i n deutscher Geschichte und i h r e s Verständnisses (Berlin, 1984), for another relatively early example of the same tendency. 34. Geoffrey Hartman (ed.), R i t b u r g in Moral a n d Political Perspective (Bloomington, 1986), pp. xiii-xiv; Bernd Faulenbach, " 'Sinnstiftung' durch Geschichte?" L i n k s , November 1986, pp. 48-49. 35. Ibid., p. 11. For the popular resonance of this event in Germany, see Hajo Funke, "Bitburg, Jews, and Germans: A Case Study of Anti-Jewish Sentiment in Germany During May, 1985," New G e r m a n C r i t i q u e 38 (1986), pp. 57-72. 36. Hartman, Ritburg, pp. 182-83, reprinting Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Rush to Reconcile," Wall Street J o u r n a l , May 9, 1985. 37. Timothy Garton Ash, "Germany After Bitburg," New R e p u b l i c (July 15¬ 22, 1985) pp. 15-17, reprinted in Hartman, Bitburg, pp. 199-203. The Washington Post, on May 6, 1985, also complained that at Bitburg "our president was in that eight minutes forever being cued, nudged, positioned—stage-managed—by the Chancellor" (Hartman, Bitburg, p. 177). Among the analyses printed in Hartman's volume, Saul Friedländer, "Some German Struggles with Memory" (pp. 27-42) and Jürgen Habermas, "Die Entsorgung der Vergangenheit: Ein Kulturpolitisches Pamphlet," D i e Zeit, May 24, 1985, pp. 43-45, an attack on Lübbe (see n. 33 above), are particularly noteworthy. 38. The Times (London, April 8,1987). See also Kohl's speech at Belsen (Hartman, Bitburg, pp. 244-50). Weizsäckers speech is reprinted on pp. 262-72 of the same volume. Jewish leaders refused to attend the ceremony at Belsen because of the politicians' insistence in going straight on to hold a similar ceremony at Bitburg. Jewish protesters were barred from the camp memorial by police and afterward held their own ceremony there to "reconsecrate" the memorial after its "desecration" by Kohl and Reagan (John Tagliabue, "The Two Ceremonies at Bergen-Belsen," New York Times, May 6, 1985, in Hartman, Bitburg, pp. 141-43.) 39. Richard von Weizsäcker, A Voice f r o m G e r m a n y (London, 1985). 40. D e r Spiegel 46 (November 10,1986), pp. 17-30. See also Hans Mommsen, "Aufarbeitung und Verdrängung des Dritten Reiches im westdeutschen Geschichtsbewusstsein," G e w e r k s c h a f t l i c h e Monatshefte 3 (1987), pp. 129-41. 41.

See Heinrich August Winkler, "Auf ewig in Hitlers Schatten? Zum Streit über das Geschichtsbild der Deutschen," F r a n k f u r t e r R u n d s c h a u , November 14, 1986. Like many of the contributions to the debate which is the subject of this book, this has been reprinted in R. Piper (ed.), "Historikerstreit": D i e D o k u m e n t a t i o n der K o n t r o v e r s e u m d i e E i n z i g a r t i g k e i t der nationalsozialistischen J u d e n v e r n i c h t u n g (Munich, 1987), pp. 256¬ 63. In the following notes, the original place of appearance of such contributions is given on first appearance, together with the reference to the

N O T E S • 147 Piper volume in parentheses; subsequent references to the same piece also cite the Piper volume. A second collection, often reprinting the same pieces again, is less comprehensive: Reinhard Kühnl (ed.), V e r g a n g e n h e i t , d i e n i c h t vergeht: D i e N S - V e r b r e c h e n und d i e G e s c h i c h t s s c h r e i b u n g der W e n d e (Cologne, 1987). This was then withdrawn for legal reasons and replaced by a similar collection under a different title. Some of the main participants have reprinted their own contributions yet again in short collections of their own works. Reference is made to these mainly where they contain material not reprinted in the Piper volume. 42. Martin Broszat, "Zur Errichtung eines 'Hauses der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland' in Bonn," in Broszat, N a c h Hitler, pp. 304-9; Michael Stürmer, "Berlin und Bonn: Suche nach der Deutschen Geschichte," M u s e u m s k u n d e 3 (1984), pp. 142-53, reprinted in Michael Stürmer, D i s s o n a n z e n des Fortschritts: Essays über G e s c h i c h t e und Politik in D e u t s c h l a n d (Munich, 1986), pp. 289-304. See also Ulrich Rose, "Geschichte, zur Schau gestellt in Vitrinen: Die Diskussion um zwei Museen und ein Mahnmal," in Gernot Erler et al., G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? E n t s o r gungsversuche z u r deutschen G e s c h i c h t e (Freiburg, 1987), pp. 35-61; Hans Mommsen, "Verordnete Geschichtsbilder: Historische Museumspläne der Bundesregierung," G e w e r k s c h a f t l i c h e Monatshefte 1 (1986), pp. 13-24; Karl-Heinz Janssen, "Die Qual mit der Geschichte: Streit um zwei Deutschland-Museen," D i e Zeit (January 10, 1986); Freimut Duve (ed.), Anhörung der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion z u m "Haus der G e s c h i c h t e der B u n d e s r e p u b l i k " : Protokoll vom 9. Mai 1 9 8 4 (Bonn, 1984); Geschichtswerkstatt Berlin (ed.), D i e Nation als Ausstellungsstück: Plan u n g e n , Kritik, und Utopien zu den Museumsgründungen in B o n n und B e r l i n (Geschichtswerkstatt no. 11, Hamburg, 1987); and Die Grünen (ed.), Wider d i e E n t s o r g u n g der deutschen G e s c h i c h t e : Streitschrift gegen d i e g e p l a n t e n h i s t o r i s c h e n M u s e e n in B e r l i n (W) und B o n n (Bonn, 1986). Although they form an important part of the Kohl government's strategy for the presentation of a positive view of German history, and therefore play a role in the present debate, the planned museums are not in existence at the time of writing, so detailed comment would be premature. 43. Broszat, N a c h Hitler, pp. 304-9. See also the various contributions in D i e Nation als Ausstellungsstück (n. 42, above). 44. Broszat, N a c h Hitler, p. 304. See also Lothar Gall, Klaus Hildebrand et al., Überlegungen und Vorschläge z u r E r r i c h t u n g eines H a u s e s der Ges c h i c h t e der B u n d e s r e p u b l i k D e u t s c h l a n d in B o n n (Bonn, 1984); Jürgen Kocka, "Die deutsche Geschichte soll ins Museum," G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 11 (1985), pp. 59-66; and the special issue of D a s P a r l a m e n t 36, nos. 20-21 (1986) on this subject. 45. D i e Nation als Ausstellungsstück provides a variety of examples; see for example the feminists' contribution, "Nicht Kohl und nicht Wirsing—Brot und Rosen wollen wir!" pp. 109-10. 46. D i e Welt, January 19, 1987; further, F r a n k f u r t e r R u n d s c h a u , January 14, 1987; Süddeutsche Z e i t u n g , January 16, 1987. The quotations are from Franz Josef Strauss, Rede des B a y e r i s c h e n Ministerpräsidenten

148 • N O T E S F r a n z Josef Strauss b e i m F e s t k o m m e r s a u s A n l a s s des 130jährigen Bestehens des C a r t e l l V e r b a n d e s der K a t h o l i s c h e n D e u t s c h e n S t u d e n t e n v e r b i n dungen a m 19, Juni 1 9 8 7 (Munich, 1987). Some of Strauss's speeches are collected in Franz Josef Strauss, V e r a n t w o r t u n g vor der Politik: Beiträge z u r deutschen und i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n Politik 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 5 (Munich, 1985). The phrase is also used in Michael Stürmer, "Braucht die Republik eine Mitte? Von den geistigen Tauschplätzen einer Zivilisation," in Stürmer, D i s s o n a n z e n des Fortschritts, pp. 265-77, here p. 267, and discussed in Ernst Nolte, D a s Vergehen der V e r g a n g e n h e i t : A n t w o r t a n m e i n e K r i t i k e r im s o g e n a n n t e n Historikerstreit (2nd ed., Berlin, 1988), p. 41. See also the discussion in Erler et al., G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? , pp. 32-33 (Thomas Schnabel, "Geschichte und Wende: Vom heutigen Gebrauch der Vergangenheit bei konservativen Politikern und Publizisten," pp. 9-34). 47. Karl Carstens, "Demokratie und Vaterland," D i e p o l i t i s c h e M e i n u n g 31 (1986), pp. 34-41; see also Erler et al., G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? , pp. 142-44 (Rolf-Dieter Müller, "Geschichtswende? Gedanken zu den Ursachen, Dimension und Folgen des 'Historikerstreits,' " pp. 128-47). 48. See below, pp. 35, 43-45, and 123. 49. Müller, "Geschichtswende?" in Erler et al., G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? , pp. 141— 42. For the central role of the F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g in the encouragement and orchestration of neoconservative historical revisionism in the Federal Republic, see Hermannus Pfeiffer (ed.), D i e F A Z : Nachforschungen über e i n Z e n t r a l o r g a n (Cologne, 1988), esp. the contributions by Otto Köhler ("Die FAZ und der Historikerstreit," pp. 144-63) and Wilfried Meisen (" 'Beispielhafte Feldherrnkunst'—Der Mythos von Hitlers Generälen," pp. 164-73). Unfortunately, in their critique of the apologetic account of the F A Z ' s history in the Third Reich and before which has been published by F A Z editor Günther Gillessen (Auf v e r l o r e n e m Posten—Die F r a n k f u r t e r Z e i t u n g im D r i t t e n R e i c h [Berlin, 1986]), the authors ignore the excellent, and devastating, account by Modris Eksteins, The L i m i t s o f Reason: The G e r m a n D e m o c r a t i c Press a n d t h e Collapse of Weimar D e m o c r a c y (Oxford, 1975). For further points on the FAZ, see Imanuel Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e . E i n deutscher Streit (Berlin, 1988), pp. 98-99. 50. Müller, "Geschichtswende?" in Erler et al., G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? , pp. 141— 44, and more generally Pfeiffer, D i e FAZ. For further references to the role played by this newspaper, see index. 51.

Printed in the Piper volume, pp. 39-47, and in Nolte, D a s Vergehen, pp. 171-78. The full title is "Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will: Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber nicht gehalten werden konnte." The suggestion that the speech was banned refers to the fact that the article was originally written in response to a request from the organizers of the annual Römer berg Colloquia organized by the city of Frankfurt in 1986 on the theme of political culture in West Germany. In the publication which emerged from the discussions, the organizers provided detailed evidence to demonstrate that Nolte himself refused to give the speech: there was no question of censorship. See Hilmar Hoffman (ed.), Gegen den

N O T E S • 149 Versuch, V e r g a n g e n h e i t zu v e r b i e g e n : E i n e Diskussion u m politische K u l t u r in der B u n d e s r e p u b l i k a u s A n lass der F r a n k f u r t e r Römerberggespräche 1 9 8 6 (Frankfurt, 1986), pp. 13-15, n. 8. 52. This is the burden of most of the articles collected in Stürmer, Disson a n z e n des Fortschritts. See, for example, "Deutsche Identität: Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nationalgeschichte," pp. 201-9, or "Die Deutsche Frage: Kein Eigentum der Deutschen: zum 17. Juni 1953," pp. 223¬ 34. But see his letter to the F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g of August 16, 1986, (in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 98-99). 53. Stürmer, D i s s o n a n z e n , p. 272. 54. Ibid.; see also p. 266. 55. Ibid., pp. 267, 269-70. Stürmer's recent writings are discussed in Volker R. Berghahn, "Geschichtswissenschaft und Grosse Politik," A u s Politik und Z e i t g e s c h i c h t e : B e i l a g e z u r W o c h e n z e i t u n g D a s P a r l a m e n t ' (March 14, 1987), pp. 25-37; and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, "Die Neue Ruhelosigkeit: Michael Stürmers nationalpolitischer Revisionismus," G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 13 (1987), pp. 382-99. 56. Saul Friedländer, "West Germany and the Burden of the Past: The Ongoing Debate," J e r u s a l e m Q u a r t e r l y 42 (Spring 1987), pp. 3-18; Konrad Adam, "Wo bleiben die Verschwörer?" F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , October 9, 1986; Klaus Hildebrand (ed.), Wem gehört d i e deutsche Geschichte? D e u t s c h l a n d s Weg vom a l t e n E u r o p a in d i e europäische M o d e r n e (Cologne, 1987). 57. For some early adumbrations of the attack on these neoconservative positions, see Hans Mommsen, "Die Last der Vergangenheit," in Jürgen Habermas (ed.), S t i c h w o r t e z u r "Geistigen Situation der Z e i t " (Frankfurt, 1979), Vol. 1, pp. 164-84; and idem, "Rückwärtsrevision des Gechichtsbildes?" D i e N e u e Gesellschaft, Vol. 32 (1985), pp. 366-86. 58. Gordon A. Craig, "The War of the German Historians," New York R e v i e w o f Books, January 15, 1987. 59. Charles S. Maier, The U n m a s t e r a b l e Past: History, Holocaust, and German N a t i o n a l I d e n t i t y (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), gives an intelligent account of these complex problems. For my own reservations about some aspects of Maier's generally excellent book, see Richard J. Evans, "A 'Normal' Act of Genocide?" New York Times Book Review, January 29,1989. For a brief guide to the literature, see the "Further Reading" section of this book. Commentaries and bibliographies written from various points of view include Konrad Repgen, "Der 'Historikerstreit' (I). Einige Anmerkungen zu den aktuellen Veröffentlichungen über kontroverse Grundprobleme unserer Geschichte," Historisches Jahrbuch 107 (1987), pp. 417-30; Stefan Melnik, "Annotierte ausgewählte Bibliographie zur Historikerdebatte," L i b e r a l 29 (1987), pp. 85-95; Eckard Jesse, "Ist der 'Historikerstreit' ein 'historischer Streit'? Zugleich eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Literatur," Zeitschrift für Politik 35 (1988), pp. 163-97; Anson Rabinbach, "German Historians debate the Nazi Past," D i s s e n t

(Spring, 1988), pp. 192-200; Andrei Markovits, "Related to the Historikerstreit," G e r m a n Politics a n d Society 13 (February, 1988), pp. 41-42; Barbara Menke, "Auswahlbibliographie," in Streitfall Deutsche Geschichte, G e s c h i c h t s - und G e g e n w a r t s b e w u s s t s e i n in den 80er Jahren (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Essen, 1988), pp. 251¬ 67.

CHAPTER 2: "ASIATIC DEEDS" 1. See the entry for Nolte in Wer ist Wer?,

vol. 25, (Lübeck, 1986), p. 963.

2. Ernst Nolte, T h r e e Faces o f F a s c i s m : A c t i o n Française, I t a l i a n Fascism, N a t i o n a l Socialism (New York, 1965; originally published in German in 1963). References below are to the Mentor paperback edition, published in 1969. 3. Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds.), The E u r o p e a n R i g h t : A Historical Profile (Berkeley, 1966); Walter Laqueur and George L . Mosse (eds.), "International Fascism 1920-1945," J o u r n a l o f C o n t e m p o r a r y History I , no. 1 (1966); F. L. Carsten, The R i s e o f F a s c i s m (London, 1967); John Weiss, The Fascist Tradition (New York, 1967); S. J. Woolf (ed.), E u r o p e a n F a s c i s m (London, 1968) and The N a t u r e o f F a s c i s m (London, 1968); A. James Gregor, The I d e o l o g y o f F a s c i s m (New York, 1969); Eugen Weber, Varieties o f F a s c i s m (New York, 1964). 4. For a good survey of the historiography, see Walter Laqueur (ed.), Fasc i s m : A R e a d e r ' s G u i d e — A n a l y s e s , I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , B i b l i o g r a p h y (New York, 1976). S. U. Larsen et al. (eds.), Who Were t h e Fascists?: Social Roots o f E u r o p e a n F a s c i s m (Bergen, 1980), provides a comprehensive account, together with critiques of totalitarianism theory (e.g., B. Hagtvet, "The Theory of Mass Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic: A Reexamination," pp. 66-117). 5. Nolte, T h r e e Faces, pp. 539-40, explaining that the book's purpose is to integrate philosophy and history in the Hegelian manner. 6. See the useful critique by Zeev Sternhell, 'Fascist Ideology,' in Laqueur (ed.), Fascism, pp. 325-406, esp. pp. 396-99. Nolte's method of reducing complex historical phenomena and processes to pairs of philosophical opposites and then manipulating these as if they were real is subjected to a devastating critique by Hans Mommsen, "Das Ressentiment als Wissenschaft. Anmerkungen zu Ernst Noltes 'Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus,' " G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 34 (1988), pp. 495-512. It is usefully related to Nolte's philosophical premises by Charles Maier, The U n m a s t e r a b l e Past: History, Holocaust, a n d G e r m a n N a t i o n a l I d e n t i t y (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), pp. 26-27, 86-87. 7. Thus Sternhell notes that "Nolte is clearly floundering in problems of methodology"; his concentration on ideas misleads him into elevating

N O T E S • 15 1 Action Française into "the status of a fascism equivalent to Nazism." Sternhell suggests that Nolte's focus on the individual leaders implies "that it was almost by accident, by a mere conjunction of political circumstances, that the Nazis arose in Germany" (pp. 396-97). As George L . Mosse noted (Journal o f t h e History o f I d e a s 27 [1966], p. 624), Nolte's statement, made apparently without any sense of irony, that "after the fiihrer's death the core of leadership of the National Socialist state snapped back, like a steel spring wound up too long, to its original position and became a body of well-meaning and cultured Central Europeans," ( T h r e e Faces, p. 504), reduced Nazism to the individual figure of Hitler. By implication it exculpated everyone else. As Sternhell remarks (p. 397), "This sort of statement casts doubt on Nolte's understanding of Nazi ideology as well as on his analysis of bourgeois society." Moreover, Nolte's definition of fascism ("Fascism is anti-Marxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a radically opposed and yet related ideology and by the use of almost identical, and yet typically modified, methods, always, however, within the unyielding framework of national self-assertion and autonomy" [ T h r e e Faces, p. 40]) comes close to being a restatement of totalitarianism theory and now reads rather differently in the light of Nolte's later work, which develops this view more consistently than some of his critics maintain (Hans-Ulrich Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g der deutschen V e r g a n g e n h e i t ? E i n p o l e m i s c h e r Essay z u m "Historikerstreit" [Munich, 1988], pp. 13-20). As Sternhell already pointed out in 1976, "Fascism was n o t . . . as Nolte would have us believe, simply a shadow of Marxism. It was an entirely separate phenomenon and had a reality of its own which Nolte, transported into other realms by the phenomenological method, does not always perceive" ("Fascist Ideology," p. 399). 8. D e u t s c h l a n d und der K a l t e K r i e g (Munich, 1974). Neither this nor any of Nolte's more recent books has appeared in English. However, a sample of his shorter pieces is available in his Marxism, Fascism, Cold War: Essays a n d L e c t u r e s 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 6 (New York, 1982). 9. Felix Gilbert, in A m e r i c a n Historical R e v i e w 81 (1976), pp. 618-20; Nolte's protest and Gilbert's reply appeared in the same journal, vol. 82 (1977), pp. 235-36. 10. Peter Gay, F r e u d , Jews, a n d O t h e r G e r m a n s : Masters M o d e r n i s t C u l t u r e (New York, 1978), pp. xi-xiv. 11.

a n d Victims

in

Ibid., citing Nolte, D e u t s c h l a n d , pp. 528, 159-60.

12. M a r x i s m u s und I n d u s t r i e l l e R e v o l u t i o n (Stuttgart, 1983). 13. See Marxism, Fascism, C o l d War, for a sample of this work; also Nolte, Was ist bürgerlich? (Stuttgart, 1979). 14. D e r europäische Bürgerkrieg 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 4 5 : Nationalsozialismus und Bols c h e w i s m u s (Berlin, 1987). See Heinrich August Winkler, " E i n europäischer Bürger namens Hitler: Ernst Noltes Entlastungsoffensive geht weiter," D i e Zeit, December 4, 1987, for a review. Further reviews are listed in the notes on Further Reading at the end of this book.

152 • N O T E S 15. Nolte, "Vergangenheit" (Piper, pp. 39-47). 16. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The G u l a g A r c h i p e l a g o 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 5 6 : A n E x p e r i m e n t in L i t e r a r y Investigation (3 vols., London, 1974-78); Nolte, "Vergangenheit." E . Klug, "Das 'Asiatische Russland': Über die Entstehung eines europäischen Vorurteils," H i s t o r i s c h e Zeitschrift 245 (1987), pp. 265-89, casts an interesting light on these questions. For a detailed consideration of Nolte's position on the uniqueness and comparability of Nazi exterminism, which is more complex than the article's emphasis on the technical procedure of gassing would imply, see Chapter 4. 17. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, p. 517, and "Vergangenheit." 18. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, pp. 147-48. 19. Ibid., pp. 181-85, 190, 204-9, 240, 317-18, 393. Nolte admits that the Communists wanted only to e x p r o p r i a t e the bourgeoisie in Germany, but at the same time persists in referring to their V e r n i c h t u n g s k o n z e p t (p. 182). 20. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, pp. 317-18; also, Nolte, "Vergangenheit." Nolte has attempted to distance himself from some of these views by using the subjunctive ("müssten") when discussing whether the Nazis should (might) have interned the Jews, and now prefers the use of the term "civil internees" to "prisoners of war" (Nolte, D a s Vergehen, pp. 109,145,185). His convoluted reasoning and language seem almost intended to enable him to dispute whatever interpretation his critics put on these statements, and so to avoid confronting the real substance of the issue (Das Vergehen, passim). The inescapable implication of the arguments advanced by Nolte, however, seems to me to be a justification of, or an excuse for, the Nazis' mass murder of German and European Jews. If this is not the case, then it is impossible to see why Nolte is making these points. This is particularly the case since a number of these arguments have for long been common currency among far-right and neofascist publicists. For his original discussion of the argument, see Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 24-25. 21.

Nolte, "Vergangenheit"; Piper, Historikerstreit,

22. Nolte, D a s Vergehen,

pp. 25-26, 42.

p. 90.

23. Nolte, "Vergangenheit." 24. "Between Myth and Revisionism?: The Third Reich in the Perspective of the 1980s," in H. W. Koch (ed.), Aspects o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h (New York, 1985), pp. 17-38. The arbitrariness of the book's construction extends to the editor's parenthetic intervention in his authors' texts and his abridgement of contributions without the authors' permission. These procedures make the volume generally unreliable as a source (see Nolte's own critique of Koch's procedures in Nolte, D a s Vergehen, p. 129). Nolte's essay was also reworked by the editor; the original, full version is in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 13-32. Here he also puts forward many of the views familiar from his essay ("Vergangenheit") and subsequent book (Bürgerkrieg), and makes clear the source of more than one of them in the writings of the far-right British publicist and admirer of Adolf Hitler,

N O T E S • 1 53 David Irving. The article was not, as Koch stated, specially written, but had in fact first appeared in a shorter version as "Die negative Lebendigkeit des Dritten Reiches," F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , July 24,1980. For Irving, see below, pp. 166-68. For the " P L O " argument, see "Between Myth and Revisionism?," pp. 19-22; like many of Nolte's other speculations, the reference to the PLO has a suggestive power which makes it easily open to misinterpretation, and so it is, to say the least, unfortunate; Bürgerkrieg, pp. 554, n. 26, and 593-94, n. 29. 25. Imanuel Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e . E i n deutscher Streit (Berlin, 1988), pp. 55-57; Helmut Müller, in D a s Parlament, March 25, 1988. 26. In particular, Geiss and Müller (n. 25 above), Joachim Fest (n. 27 below), and Eckhard Jesse (page 177, n. 6, below). In English, see in particular the editorial remarks of Koch, an exiled German now teaching at the University of York, England, in Aspects o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h . Koch argues that the Weimar Republic was destroyed above all by the hostility of Germany's opponents in the Treaty of Versailles (p. 461), and that "Hitler achieved power by perfectly legal means" (p. 54). He attacks those who have argued that Hitler intended a war of European conquest as being ignorant of proper historical methods (pp. 181-95). He portrays Hitler's launching of the war against Russia as an unplanned response to Soviet ambitions for predominance in East-Central Europe, which became clear to Hitler in the course of 1940. Thus the Nazi invasion of Russia in 1941 was in part "a preventive stroke" (p. 319, also pp. 320-22). German rearmament in the 1930s, he says, was a "myth" (pp. 325-30). M e i n K a m p f is, in Koch's view, not a reliable guide to Hitler's early life or later views: he denies there is evidence that Hitler was anti-Semitic before September 1919. Koch says that Hitler became an anti-Semite because "it was in the revolutionary upheaval in Germany in 1918-19, and in Bavaria, in particular, that Jews played a very prominent part in the Bavarian Soviet Republic" (pp. 374-75). Koch goes on: "It seems to have been completely forgotten that the boycott of Jewish businesses in Germany on April 1, 1933, was in retaliation for a boycott against German goods and businesses in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in Great Britain" (p. 376). He endorses Nolte's view that Nazi anti-Semitism was further radicalized in response to the Weizmann declaration and other attacks on Germany from abroad (pp. 378-79). The Waffen-SS were, according to Koch, ordinary soldiers (pp. 380-85), and their war crimes in Poland in 1939 "took place against the background of mass murder by Poles of the German minority immediately after the outbreak of war" (p. 385). British war crimes, Koch adds (p. 385), have conveniently been forgotten. Koch excuses the destruction of the French village of Oradour by the Waffen-SS as a normal act of war, justifiable according to the terms of the FrancoGerman armistice in 1940 (pp. 386-89). The factual accuracy of these arguments is as dubious as their moral status. They are dealt with in more detail in the following chapters. Here it may be noted that Jewish shopkeepers in Germany were not responsible for a boycott on German goods in Britian and the United States, and that burning women and children alive in church, which is what happened at Oradour, hardly qualifies as

154 • N O T E S a normal act of war. Koch's views may be pursued further through his books D e r D e u t s c h e Bürgerkrieg: E i n e G e s c h i c h t e der deutschen und österreichischen F r e i k o r p s (Berlin, 1978); T h e H i t l e r Youth: O r i g i n s a n d D e v e l o p m e n t 1 9 2 2 - 4 5 (London, 1978); A History o f Prussia (London, 1978); and A Constitutional History o f G e r m a n y i n t h e 1 9 t h a n d 2 0 t h C e n t u r i e s (London, 1984). 27. Joachim C. Fest, "Die geschuldete Erinnerung: Zur Kontroverse über die Unvergleichbarkeit der nationalsozialistischen Massenverbrechen," F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , August 29, 1986, (Piper, pp. 100-112). See also Fest's The Face o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h : Portraits o f t h e Nazi L e a d e r s h i p (London, 1970; first published in German, 1963); H i t l e r (London, 1974, first published in German, 1973); and Hitler, eine K a r r i e r e (film, 1977). Fest's film was widely criticized as too favorable toward Hitler. It made only the briefest of references to the murder of the Jews. 28. Koch's sweeping dismissal of M e i n K a m p f (n. 26, above) on these points cannot be sustained. See Fest, Hitler, for example; also Eberhard Jäckel, 'Die elende Praxis der Untersteller: Das Einmalige der nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen lässt sich nicht leugnen," D i e Zeit, September 12, 1986 (Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 115-22). For a more general critique of the "Asiatic deed" argument, see Hans Heinrich Nolte, " 'Die Qualen ihr erdachtet nach Barbaren Art.' Der 'Historikerstreit,' die 'Asiatische Tat' und die Sowjetunion," W i d e r s p r u c h . Münchner Zeitschrift für P h i l o s p h i e 10 (1987), pp. 10-16. 29. For a discussion of Nolte's tenuous chain of reasoning on this point, see Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g ? , pp. 40-46. 30. Eberhard Jäckel and A. Kuhn (eds.), Hitler, Sämtliche A u f z e i c h n u n g e n 1 9 0 5 - 1 9 2 4 (Stuttgart, 1980); Jäckel, H i t l e r ' s W e l t a n s c h a u u n g (Middletown, Conn., 1972); H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), H i t l e r ' s Table Talk 1 9 4 1 ¬ 1 9 4 4 (London, 1953). 31.

Adolf Hitler, M e i n K a m p f , trans. Ralph Manheim, with an introduction by D. C. Watt (London, 1969).

32. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, pp. 88-89. J. P. Nettl, Rosa L u x e m b u r g (Oxford, 1966), pp. 766-80, provides a detailed description of the murders, which were carried out in a context of revolutionary defeat and vindictive reactionary triumphalism. For a suggestive study of the mentality of the Freikorps, see Klaus Theweleit, Male F a n t a s i e s (Minneapolis, 1987). For the general point behind these cases, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Waren die Bolschewisten an allem schuld? Ein Buch vereinfacht Geschichtsdeutung," Kölner S t a d t a n z e i g e r , January 12, 1988. 33. Heinrich Hillmayr, R o t e r und Weisser Terror in B a y e r n n a c h 1 9 1 8 (Munich, 1974). The revolutionaries' murder of the hostages on April 30,1919, although absolutely indefensible, was the product of embitterment and outrage at the numerous murders and acts of violence already committed by the Freikorps. See the account in D i e Münchner Tragödie: E n t s t e h u n g , Verlauf, und Z u s a m m e n b r u c h der Räte-Republik München (Berlin, 1919), p. 25, and the balanced assessment in Heinrich August Winkler,

N O T E S • 155 Von der R e v o l u t i o n z u r S t a b i l i s i e r u n g : A r b e i t e r und A r b e i t e r b e w e g u n g in der Weimarer R e p u b l i k 1 9 1 8 bis 1 9 2 4 (Berlin and Bonn, 1984), pp. 184¬ 90. For the Tucholsky quotation, see Wolfgang Schieder, "Der Nationalsozialismus im Fehlurteil philosophischer Geschichtsschreibung. Zur Methode von Ernst Noltes 'Europäischem Bürgerkrieg,' " G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 15 (1989), pp. 89-114, esp. pp. 102-3. 34. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g der deutschen V e r g a n g e n h e i t ? E i n polem i s c h e r Essay z u m "Historikerstreit" (Munich, 1988), pp. 147-54, and pp. 237-38, nn. 77, 78; Jürgen Kocka, "Hitler sollte nicht durch Stalin und Pol Pot verdrängt werden: Über Versuche deutscher Historiker, die Ungeheuerlichkeit von NS-Verbrechen zu relativieren," in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 132-42, here p. 142 (originally in F r a n k f u r t e r R u n d s c h a u , September 23, 1986, but without this point). The "rat-cage" argument assumes more prominence in Nolte's article, and hence in the controversy, than it does in his book, and it must be pointed out that Nolte succeeds in establishing overall that the Bolsheviks committed many acts of brutality, terror, and murder, in 1917 and subsequently, during the Civil War, and that the early Nazis, including Hitler, knew about these from right-wing radical and Russian émigré circles in 1920-21 (Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, p. 115). However, see also the discussion in Niels Kadritzke, "Zweierlei Untergang in düsterer Verflechtung: Zur politischen Dimension der 'Historiker-Debatte,' " P r o b l e m e des K l a s s e n k a m p f s , no. 66 (March, 1987), pp. 169-84, Wolfgang Schieder, "Der Nationalsozialismus im Fehlurteil," esp. pp. 99-102, and Heinrich August Winkler, "Ein europäischer Bürger namens Hitler: Ernst Nolte's Entlastungsoffensive geht weiter," D i e Zeit, December 4, 1987. 35. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, pp. 359-60, 370. Nolte points out that the pogrom of 1938 was less serious than the Stalinist purges or the tsarist pogroms, and argues that before 1938 the Jewish position in the German economy had been "scarcely affected" by Nazi hostility (Bürgerkrieg, pp. 294-95). There is certainly no denying that plenty of larger-scale pogroms than that of 1938 can be found in history, though this again belongs to Nolte's technique of "comparative trivialization." Nolte's emphasis on what he sees as the moderation of the Reichskristallnacht, rather than what it actually did to those who were its victims, is one-sided. As for the Jews' economic position, this was surely affected from the very start of the Third Reich, with mass dismissals from the civil service, the universities, hospitals, and other areas of the economy on racial grounds, and expropriations of department stores, publishing houses, and similar actions. Nolte, however, appears to condone anti-Semitic policies in the early years of the Third Reich, by pointing out that British Ambassador Sir Horace Rumbold referred to "the ostentatious kind of lifestyle of Jewish bankers and monied people" which "inevitably aroused envy, as unemployment spread generally." Rumbold, notes Nolte, went on to refer to "the sins of the Russian and Galician Jews" who came to Germany in 1918 (Nolte, Bürg e r k r i e g , p. 556, n. 17). For a brief summary of the events of Reichs¬ kristallnacht, see Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, vol. 3, p. 554. For a more extended treatment, see Walter H. Pehle (ed.), D e r J u d e n p o g r o m 1 9 3 8 :

156 • N O T E S Von der " R e i c h s k r i s t a l l n a c h t " z u m Völkermord (Frankfurt, 1988). For the Weizmann declaration, see L e t t e r s a n d P a p e r s o f C h a i m W e i z m a n n , Series A : L e t t e r s , Vol. XIX, J a n u a r y 1935-June 1 9 4 0 (Jerusalem, 1977), p. 145. A secondary dispute has arisen over whether Nolte actually argues that Weizmann "declared war" on Germany on behalf of Jews everywhere, or whether he has merely critically summarized this argument in a discussion of the support which it has received from David Irving (Imanuel Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e . E i n deutscher Streit [Berlin, 1988], pp. 55-57, 70-71). As the "original" source for this idea, however, Geiss cites an account in a Nazi magazine dating from September 1939, without noting the propagandistic manipulation of Weizmann's statement by the magazine in question (p. 200, n.5). The fact that Nolte used the ideologically neutral term "the Jews in the whole world" and not, as Habermas implied, the Nazi term "World Jewry," seems beside the point in view of Nolte's original and quite unjustifiable extrapolation of Weizmann's statement onto a global basis. The very notion of such an entity as "the Jews in the whole world" was Nazi in its essence. The overall thrust of Nolte's argument, Hans Mommsen has noted, is to hint that the Jews were somehow to blame for their own destruction (Mommsen, "Das Ressentiment als Wissenschaft," p. 501). 36. Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g , p. 15; Gay, F r e u d , Jews, a n d o t h e r G e r m a n s , p. xiii; Nolte, D e u t s c h l a n d und der K a l t e K r i e g , p. 360. In Bürgerkrieg, p. 370, Nolte returns to this argument and suggests that Germany was "liberal" in 1939 in comparison to the USSR: the concentration camps were liberal in comparison to Soviet labor camps; and the judicial system was relatively independent, as were the churches, the economy, and the Army. These points are disputable. For example, Nolte takes Hitler's continuing attacks on German judges as evidence that the latter were still acting as guarantors of legal norms (Bürgerkrieg, pp. 427-48), whereas in fact the rule of law had been undermined from the very start of the Third Reich; large areas of the law were increasingly governed by Nazi ideological criteria and subjected to direct or indirect political interference. See Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, vol. 2. pp. 471-567. Nolte has received support on these points from Hans Koch, whose book D e r Volksgerichtshof. Politische J u s t i z im D r i t t e n R e i c h (Munich, 1988) argues somewhat unconvincingly that there was nothing more to Nazi justice than the simple application of the rule of law. 37. See p. 16 above. Sherman made the point during an unsuccessful attempt to invite French right-wing radical Jean-Marie Le Pen to a fringe meeting at the British Conservative Party Conference in 1987. 38. Helmut Krausnick et al., A n a t o m y o f t h e SS State (London, 1968), esp. pp. 303-96 (Hans Buchheim, "Command and Compliance"). As Buchheim remarks, opportunities to avoid carrying out criminal orders "were both more numerous and more real than those concerned are generally prepared to admit today" (p. 373). 39. See Detlev Peukert, D i e Weimarer M o d e r n e (Frankfurt, 1987).

R e p u b l i k : K r i s e n j a h r e der

klassischen

N O T E S • 157 40. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, pp. 211, 218, 251. 41.

Klaus Hildebrand, "Krieg im Frieden und Frieden im Krieg: Über das Problem der Legitimität in der Geschichte der Staatengesellschaft 1931¬ 1941," H i s t o r i s c h e Zeitschrift 244, no. 1 (1987), pp. 1-28 (quotations on pp. 23-26; see also his n. 21). See also Wolfram Wette, "Über die Wiederbelebung des Antibolschewismus mit historischen Mitteln, oder: Was steckt hinter der Präventivkriegsthese?," in Erler et al., G e s c h i c h t swende?, pp. 86-115, esp. pp. 91-95. For Hildebrand's earlier works in English translation, see his F o r e i g n Policy of t h e T h i r d R e i c h (London, 1973) and The T h i r d R e i c h (London, 1984).

42. Ernst Topitsch, Stalin 's War: A R a d i c a l New Theory of t h e O r i g i n s o f t h e Second World War (New York, 1987); Joachim Hoffmann, "Stalin wollte den Krieg," F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , October 16, 1986; Günther Gillessen, "Der Krieg der Diktatoren: Wollte Stalin im Sommer 1941 das Deutsche Reich angreifen?"; Gillessen, "Der Krieg der Diktatoren: Ein erstes Résumée der Debatte über Hitlers Angriff im Osten," F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , February 25,1987; Viktor Suvorov, "Who Was Planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin? " J o u r n a l o f t h e Royal United Services I n s t i t u t e f o r Defence S t u d i e s 130 (1985), pp. 50-55; Suvorov, "Yes, Stalin Was Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941," ibid., 131 (1986) , no. 2, pp. 73-74; Joachim Hoffmann, "Hitler or Stalin? A German View," ibid., p. 88; D. Kunert, E i n Weltkrieg wird p r o g r a m m i e r t (Frankfurt, 1986); Ernest Topitsch, "Psychologische Kriegsführung-einst und h e u t e , " A l l g e m e i n e S c h w e i z e r i s c h e Militärzeitschrift 152, no. 7-8 (1986), pp. 415-20; Topitsch, "Perfekter Völkermord," R h e i n i s c h e r M e r k u r ( C h r i s t a n d Welt), January 16, 1987, p. 20; Bernd Stegemann, "Geschichte und Politik: Zur Diskussion über den deutschen Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941," Beiträge z u r K o n f l i k t f o r s c h u n g : Psycho-politische Asp e k t e 17, no. 1 (1987), pp. 73-97; Joachim Hoffmann, "Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs," in D a s D e u t s c h e R e i c h und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 4 : D e r Angriff a u f d i e Sowjetunion (Stuttgart, 1983); Max Klüver, Präventivschlag 1 9 4 1 : Z u r V o r g e s c h i c h t e des Russ¬ landfeldzuges (Berg, 1986); Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner, "Angst vor einem Raubtier, das absolut tot ist: Streit um die deutsche Geschichte: Eine Antwort an den Politologen Kurt Sontheimer," R h e i n i s c h e r M e r k u r ( C h r i s t und Welt), December 12, 1986; Adolf von Thadden, "Der Russ¬ landfeldzug—Überfall oder Präventivschlag?" Nation E u r o p a , no. 3 (1987) . The last-named author, Adolf von Thadden, was leader of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) in West Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and was quick to take up the preventive-war thesis once it had been publicized in the press. The NPD's own view of history in the 1960s emphasized what its leaders saw as the innate terrorism and violence of Communism and the justifiable nature of Nazism as the only viable response to the Communist threat in 1933. According to this view, the Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia was in the Czechs' own interest, to protect them against the Russian threat; the invasion of Poland in 1939 was defensive; America was mainly to blame not only for the Second World War, inspired by Jewish influence, and in an unholy alliance with

158 • N O T E S Britain and Russia, but also for the First World War; and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 was a "counteroffensive." See the analysis of the NPD press, and interviews with von Thadden, in Reinhard Kühnl et al, D i e NPD: Struktur, Ideologie, a n d F u n k t i o n einer neofaschist i s c h e n Partei (Frankfurt, 1969), esp. pp. 131-44. More generally, see Lutz Niethammer, A n g e p a s s t e r F a s c h i s m u s : Politische Praxis der NPD (Frankfurt, 1969). 43. Andreas Hillgruber, H i t l e r s Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung 1 9 4 0 ¬ 1 9 4 1 (2nd ed., Munich, 1982); Hillgruber, "Das Russland-Bild der führenden deutschen Militärs vom Beginn des Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion," in A. Fischer et al. (eds.), R u s s l a n d - D e u t s c h l a n d - A m e r i k a (Wiesbaden, 1978), pp. 296-310; Hillgruber, "Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion," F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , November 28, 1984; Hillgruber, "Noch einmal: Hitlers Wendung gegen die Sowjetunion 1941," G e s c h i c h t e in Wissenschaft und U n t e r r i c h t 33 (1982), pp. 214-26. 44. For an informative account of this affair, see Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g , pp. 192-96. The book in question is Wolfram Wette, Gustav Noske: Eine p o l i t i s c h e B i o g r a p h i e (Düsseldorf, 1987). For the background, Volker Berghahn, "Das Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt in Freiburg," Gesc h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 14 (1988), pp. 269-74. Nolte, however, cites Hoffmann's work (and that of Ernst Topitsch) in support of his view that the validity or otherwise of the preventive-war thesis has not yet been determined by historical scholarship (Bürgerkrieg, p. 459). 45. Bianka Pietrow, "Deutschland im Juni 1941—ein Opfer sowjetischer Aggression? Zur Kontroverse über die Präventivkriegsthese," G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 14 (1988), pp. 116-35; Gabriel Gorodetsky, "Was Stalin Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941?" J o u r n a l o f t h e R o y a l United Services I n s t i t u t e f o r Defence Studies, no. 2 (1986), pp. 72-79; Gerd Ueberschär, " 'Historikerstreit' und 'Präventivkriegsthese,'" Tribüne 103 (1987), pp. 108-16; Ueberschär, "Zur Wiederbelebung der 'Präventivkriegsthese': Die neuen Rechtfertigungsversuche des deutschen Überfalls auf die UdSSR 1941 im Dienste 'psychopolitischer Aspekte' und 'psychologischer Kriegführung,' " G e s c h i c h t s d i d a k t i k 1987, pp. 331-42; John Erickson, The R o a d to S t a l i n g r a d : Stalin 's War with G e r m a n y (London, 1975); Bianka Pietrow, S t a l i n i s m u s - S i c h e r h e i t - O f f e n s i v e : D a s D r i t t e R e i c h i n der K o n z e p t i o n der sowjetischen A u s s e n p o l i t i k 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 4 1 (Melsungen, 1983); Wolfram Wette (ed.), " U n t e r n e h m e n Barbarossa": Der deutsche Überfall a u f d i e Sowjetunion 1 9 4 1 (Paderborn, 1984); Wolfram Wette, "Verteidigungslügen. Warum die Mär vom Präventivkrieg gegen Russland neubelebt wird," D i e Zeit, August 7, 1988. 46. Willi A. Boelcke (ed.), T h e Secret Conferences o f D r . Goebbels, October 1 9 3 9 - M a r c h 1943 (London, n.d.), pp. 176-77; Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, vol. 3, pp. 798-818 (including the initial directive for "Operation Barbarossa" issued by Hitler on December 18, 1940, pp. 809-10); Fred Taylor (ed.), T h e G o e b b e l s D i a r i e s 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 1 (London, 1982) (not always reliable, however); Omer Bartov, The E a s t e r n F r o n t , 1 9 4 1 - 1 9 4 5 : G e r m a n Troops a n d t h e B a r b a r i z a t i o n o f Warfare (London, 1985), pp. 84-85; H.

N O T E S • 159 R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), H i t l e r ' s War Directives, 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 5 (London, 1964); Ueberschär, "Hitlers Entschluss," p. 109; Wette, "Über die Wiederbelebung," p. 109. For a recent, carefully argued account of the genesis of "Operation Barbarossa," see William Carr, P o l a n d to Pearl H a r b o r : The M a k i n g o f t h e Second World War (London, 1985), pp. 112-27.

CHAPTER 3: BULWARK AGAINST BOLSHEVISM? 1. Andreas Hillgruber, H i t l e r s Strategie; Hillgruber (ed.), D a s K r i e g stagebuch des O b e r k o m m a n d o s der W e h r m a c h t (Wehrmachtsführungsstab), vol. I I , pts. 1 and 2 (Frankfurt, 1963); D e u t s c h e G e s c h i c h t e 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 7 2 : D i e "deutsche F r a g e " in der Weltpolitik (Berlin, 1974; 2nd ed., extended to 1982, Berlin, 1985); D e r Zweite Weltkrieg: Kriegsziele und S t r a t e g i e der grossen Mächte (Stuttgart, 1982). (Hillgruber died in May 1989, after this book was in press.) 2. Holger H. Herwig, "Andreas Hillgruber, Historian of 'Grossmachtpolitik,' 1871-1945," C e n t r a l E u r o p e a n History 15 (1982), pp. 186-98. For a rather less sympathetic account of Hillgruber's career, see Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g , pp. 20-24. For a sample of Hillgruber's work in English, see his G e r m a n y a n d t h e Two World Wars (Cambridge, Mass., 1981). 3. Hillgruber, Z w e i e r l e i U n t e r g a n g : D i e Z e r s c h l a g u n g des D e u t s c h e n Reiches und d a s Ende des europäischen Judentums (Berlin, 1986). 4. Ibid., pp. 9-10. The claim that these two events are comparable is thus advanced not simply on the dust jacket, as some of Hillgruber's defenders have maintained (e.g., Craig, "The War"); it is made explicitly in the text. The effect, as Martin Broszat has commented, borders on the apologetic (Martin Broszat, "Wo sich die Geister scheiden: Die Beschwörung der Geschichte taugt nicht als nationaler Religionsersatz," D i e Zeit, October 3, 1986; also Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 189-95). 5. Hillgruber, Zweierlei, pp. 18-19, 21, 24-25, 34-37, 40, 42. The claim that Hillgruber refers sympathetically to the local Nazi leaders (Jürgen Habermas, "Eine Art Schadensabwicklung: Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung," D i e Zeit, July 11, 1986; also in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 62-63, and in Habermas, E i n e A r t S c h a d e n s a b w i c k l u n g [Frankfurt, 1987], pp. 120-37, this last-named version being the fullest) is not borne out by the relevant text (Hillgruber, Zweierlei, p. 37), which Habermas manipulates in order to create this impression (Klaus Hildebrand, "Das Zeitalter der Tyrannen: Geschichte und Politik: Die Verwalter der Aufklärung, das Risiko der Wissenschaft und die Geborgenheit der Weltanschauung: Eine Entgegnung auf Jürgen Habermas," F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , July 31, 1986; also in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 84-92). As Gordon A. Craig has pointed out ("The War"), the charge is misplaced. Hillgruber's text reads: "Some of the senior Nazi officials stood the test in the crisis of the last, desperate defense, of collapse and flight; others failed, some of them in a miserable way." Habermas creates out of this statement a quotation—"tested senior officials"—which

160 • N O T E S in the absence of the rest of the passage must give the impression that Hillgruber's attitude toward Nazi officials in the East is uncritical if not downright positive. This may appear a legitimate procedure to a polemicizing philosopher; to the historian, it looks like the manipulation of a source (see also Hillgruber, "Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz Janssen, und die Aufklärung Anno 1986," G e s c h i c h t e in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 37 (1986), pp. 725-38, here p. 731; also in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 331-49.) Hans-Ulrich Wehler's defense of Habermas on this point rests somewhat insecurely on the ground that it is a matter of secondary importance (Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g , pp. 160-61). Habermas's defense of his procedure, which simply reaffirms that it was "justified," is equally unconvincing (Habermas, "Leserbrief," F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , August 11, 1986; also in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 95-97, and "Anmerkung, 23. Februar 1987," in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 383-86, here p. 384; and in Habermas, E i n e Art, pp. 149-58, here p. 150). Imanuel Geiss, in his D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e . E i n deutscher Streit (Berlin, 1988) devotes considerable space to Habermas's treatment of this quotation (pp. 52-55) and of other quotations from Hillgruber, Nolte, and others (pp. 55-72, 190-3); he also subjects Habermas's defenders to the same type of criticism (pp. 72-79). All this misses the overall context and thus the point of the controversy. This subdispute in the debate seems to me to indicate one of the many disadvantages of the polemical style, namely that its "no-holds-barred" approach detracts attention from the actual contest and diverts it onto the secondary issue of whether or not the rules are being adhered to. 6. Hillgruber, Zweierlei,

pp. 47-48, 50-52, 55.

7. Ibid., pp. 56-57, 61-62, 64-65. 8. Ibid., pp. 66-67. 9. Ibid., pp. 68, 70-72, 74. Hillgruber's view that the "German question" is still an open one was given more extended treatment at a conference held in Augsburg in 1981, where he argued for a liberal nationalism linked to human rights as a means of keeping open links between East and West Germany and preventing either being permanently divided from the other. Hillgruber regarded this as more important than the constitutional form taken by reunification, and opposed it to a more right-wing approach which he rejected as arguing for the revival of Germany as a great power. The problem was, he said, convincing the younger generation of Germans that this "national-liberal" idea of reunification was worth supporting. See Otto Büsch and James J. Sheehan (eds.), D i e R o l l e der Nation i n der deutschen G e s c h i c h t e und G e g e n w a r t (Berlin, 1985); Josef Becker and Andreas Hillgruber (eds.), D i e D e u t s c h e F r a g e im 19. und 2 0 . J a h r h u n d e r t (Munich, 1983); and the discussion in Eley, "Nazism, Politics, and the Image of the Past," pp. 190-94. 10. Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g , is an exception. So too is Adelheid von Saldern, "Hillgrubers 'Zweierlei Untergang'—der Untergang historischer Erfahrungsanalyse?" in Heide Gerstenberger and Dorothea Schmidt (eds.),

N O T E S • 16 1 Normalität oder N o r m a l i s i e r u n g ? Geschichtswerkstätten und Faschism u s a n a l y s e (Münster, 1987), pp. 160-9. But see, on the other hand, Broszat, "Wo sich die Geister scheiden"; Craig, "The War"; Imanuel Geiss, "Auschwitz, asiatische Tat,'" D e r Spiegel, October 20, 1986; Hans Mommsen, "Suche nach der 'verlorenen Geschichte'? Bemerkungen zum historischen Selbstverständnis der Bundesrepublik," Merkur, SeptemberOctober 1986, pp. 864-74, esp. n. 7; Heinrich August Winkler, "Auf ewig in Hitlers Schatten? Zum Streit über das Geschichtsbild der Deutschen," F r a n k f u r t e r R u n d s c h a u , November 14, 1986; Eberhard Jäckel, "Die elende Praxis der Untersteller: Das einmalige der nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen lässt sich nicht leugnen," D i e Zeit, September 12, 1986; (all except Craig reprinted in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 189-95, 220-22, 156-73, 256-63, 115-22, as is Hildebrand, "Zeitalter," pp. 84-92). More recent contributions have been more willing to criticize Hillgruber. See for example Niels Kadritzke, "Zweierlei Untergang in düsterer Verflechtung: Zur politischen Dimension der 'Historiker-Debatte,' " P r o b l e m e des K l a s s e n k a m p f s , no. 66 (March, 1987), pp. 169-84; Dieter Schellong, "Nationale Identität und Christentum," in Wieland Eschenhagen (ed.), D i e neue deutsche I d e o l o g i e : Einsprüche gegen d i e E n t s o r g u n g der Vergang e n h e i t (Darmstadt, 1988), pp. 139-62 (a theological critique); Friedländer, "West Germany and the Burden of the Past," pp. 6-8; also, for an earlier critique, Micha Brumlik, "Neuer Staatsmythos Ostfront: Die neueste Entwicklung der Geschichtswissenschaft der BRD," D i e Tagesz e i t u n g , July 12, 1986 (also in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 77-83). 11.

Hagen Schulze, "Fragen, die wir stellen müssen: Keine historische Haftung ohne nationale Identität," D i e Zeit, September 26, 1986 (also in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 143-50).

12. Compare Hans Mommsen, "Suche," p. 871 (Piper, Historikerstreit, p. 168). See also Hillgruber's statement that the mass murder of the Jews was a unique crime in the "Western" world but "cannot qualitatively be judged different" from the murder of the kulaks and others by the Russians ("Für die Forschung gibt es Kein Frageverbot: Ein Gespräch mit dem Kölner Historiker Andreas Hillgruber, der eine Bilanz der Revisionismus-Debatte zieht," R h e i n i s c h e r M e r k u r (Christ und Welt), October 31, 1986; also in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 232-240, here p. 236). Support for Hillgruber and Nolte is also provided by Klaus Hildebrand, "Wer dem Abgrund entrinnen will, muss ihn aufs genaueste ausloten: Ist die neue deutsche Geschichtsschreibung revisionistisch?" D i e Welt, November 22,1986, and Joachim C. Fest, "Die geschuldete Erinnerung: zur Kontroverse über die Unvergleichbarkeit des nationalsozialistischen Massenverbrechens," F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , August 29, 1986 (also in Piper, Historikerstreit, respectively pp. 281-92 and 100-112). For counterarguments, see Hans Mommsen, "Neues Geschichtsbewusstsein und Relativierung des Nationalsozialismus," Blätter für deutsche und i n t e r n a tionale Politik 31, no. 10 (1986), pp. 5-18 (Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 174-88), concentrating on Fest, Hildebrand, and Nolte. 13. Alfred Dregger, "Im Wortlaut: 'Beleidigung meines Bruders': Offener Brief an 53 US-Senatoren," F r a n k f u r t e r R u n d s c h a u , April 23,1985; Dreg-

162 • N O T E S ger, "Aus der Rede zum Volkstrauertag: 'Alle Toten verdienen die gleiche Ehrfurcht,'" F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , November 17, 1986; Thomas Schnabel, "Geschichte und Wende," in Erler, G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? , pp. 24-25, 27-28; the full version of Dregger's speech can be found in B u l l e t i n des Presse- und I n f o r m a t i o n s a m t s der B u n d e s r e g i e r u n g , no. 140, November 18, 1986, pp. 1164-72. These views also reflect a widely held belief among conservatives that Germany was fighting two wars in the 1941-45 period, and that in the East, it was, as it were, on the right side. Such was the implication of Bitburg (see above). Such is also the explicit argument of Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, in The C o n d u c t o f War 1 7 8 9 ¬ 1 9 6 1 : A S t u d y o f t h e I m p a c t o f t h e F r e n c h , I n d u s t r i a l , a n d R u s s i a n Revol u t i o n s on War a n d its C o n d u c t (London, 1961), a book that has been highly praised by the Regius Professor of History at Oxford, Michael Howard, (see his comments on the back cover), and used as a set book by Britain's Open University. Fuller wrote: "There can be no doubt whatsoever that in 1939 the best policy for France and Great Britain would have been to keep out of the war, let the two great dictatorial Powers cripple each other, and in the meantime have re-armed at top speed. Had they done so, a time would have come when they could profitably intervene. Should Russia then be winning, Hitler would be discredited, and support could be given to Germany" (p. 264). Fuller is thus heavily critical of Churchill ("Blinded by his hatred of Hitler," p. 266) and Roosevelt (whom he describes, quoting U.S. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, as "surrounded by intrigues and soft-on-Communism eggheads," pp. 268-69). Russian foreign-policy aims, Fuller wrote, were more dangerous to the democracies than German (p. 249). 14. Bartov, E a s t e r n Front, pp. 2, 142. For Nolte's arguments on these points, see Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, pp. 502-3, 465-67, 470, 485, 499. Mention should be made here of the American lawyer Alfred de Zayas, who in a series of publications has drawn attention to Allied war crimes (and there were undoubtedly violations of the rules of war committed by Allied troops) without, however, balancing this out by situating them in the context of the far more widespread and serious war crimes committed by the Germans. See Alfred de Zayas, D i e W e h r m a c h t - U n t e r s u c h u n g s s t e l l e : D e u t sche E r m i t t e l u n g e n über a l l i i e r t e Völkerrechtsverletzungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg (4th ed., Munich, 1984), a book which Nolte describes as showing "happy evidence of the will to objectivity on the part of a foreigner" (Bürgerkrieg, pp. 512-13, n. 26). See also the favorable review of Bürgerk r i e g by de Zayas in D i e Welt, November 20,1987, and further comments below, p. 172, n. 4. 15. Michael Burleigh, G e r m a n y T u r n s Eastwards: A Study o f Ostforschung in t h e T h i r d R e i c h (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 181-85; Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 4 5 (2nd ed., Frankfurt, 1965), pp. 119-122; Helmut Krausnick, H i t l e r s E i n s a t z g r u p p e n . D i e T r u p p e des W e l t a n s c h a u u n g s k r i e g e s 1 9 3 6 - 1 9 4 2 (Frankfurt, 1985), pp. 45-50. 16. Bartov, E a s t e r n Front, pp. 152-54, 106. See also Christian Streit, K e i n e K a m e r a d e n : D i e W e h r m a c h t und d i e sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen,

N O T E S • 1 63 1 9 4 1 - 1 9 4 5 (Stuttgart, 1978); and Theo Schulte, The G e r m a n A r m y a n d Nazi Policies i n O c c u p i e d Russia (Deddington, 1988). 17. Bartov, E a s t e r n F r o n t , pp. 142-49. 18. Ibid., pp. 80, 83, 85, 94, 112, 117. 19. Ibid., pp. 121, 134. 20. See Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust: The J e w i s h T r a g e d y (London, 1986), pp. 20-21, 141-42, 154, 289, 304, 509; however, for examples of ethnic Germans helping Jews, see ibid., pp. 253,776, 808 (the last two at the very end of the war). 21.

Bartov, E a s t e r n Front, raden.

pp. 27, 29, 116, 153-54, and Streit, K e i n e K a m e -

22. Bartov, E a s t e r n Front, p. 104. For Bartov's own comments on Hillgruber, see Bartov, "Historians on the Eastern Front: Andreas Hillgruber and Germany's Tragedy," Jahrbuch des Instituts für deutsche G e s c h i c h t e , T e l A v i v 16 (1987), pp. 325-45. See also Kadritzke, "Zweierlei." It is unfortunate that the conduct of the German Army on the Eastern front is nowhere alluded to in Imanuel Geiss's defense of Hillgruber (Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e , pp. 44-46). 23. Hillgruber, Zweierlei, pp. 20, 47. That Hillgruber's own advocacy of a Central Europe dominated by a strong and united Germany is shared by Nolte is also noted by Hans Mommsen, "Das Ressentiment als Wissenschaft. Anmerkungen zu Ernst Noltes 'Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus,' " G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 14 (1988), pp. 495-512, here p. 499. 24. For popular attitudes toward Hitler, see Ian Kershaw, "The H i t l e r Myth ": I m a g e a n d Reality in t h e T h i r d R e i c h (Oxford, 1987); for the plotters' attitudes to the extermination program, see Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans, a n d t h e J e w i s h Question (Princeton, 1984), pp. 273-77, 282. 25. Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g , pp. 54-57 and Schnabel, "Geschichte und Wende," in Erler et al., G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? , p. 25. 26. Schnabel, "Geschichte und Wende," p. 27; F. L. Carsten, "Stauffenberg's Bomb," E n c o u n t e r , September 1964, pp. 64-67; there is a useful discussion of the aims of the 1944 opposition movement in J. C. G. Röhl (ed.), F r o m B i s m a r c k to H i t l e r : The P r o b l e m o f C o n t i n u i t y in G e r m a n History (London, 1970), pp. 164-82.

CHAPTER 4: AUSCHWITZ AND ELSEWHERE 1. Hillgruber, Zweierlei, p. 77, following in particular Hans-Günter Zmarzlik, "Antisemitismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich, 1871-1918," in Bernd Martin and Ernst Schulin (eds.), D i e Juden als M i n d e r h e i t in der Ges c h i c h t e (Munich, 1981).

164 • N O T E S 2. Hillgruber, Z w e i e r l e i , pp. 79-81, 83-85, 89, 90-91, 97-99. 3. Such oversimplifications are often present in inevitably brief introductions to standard works on the fate of the Jews under the Third Reich—for example Lucy Dawidowicz, T h e War A g a i n s t t h e Jews 1 9 3 3 - 4 5 (London, 1975), chap. 2. 4. Hans-Georg Stümke, " 'Wo nix is, hett de Kaiser sien Recht verlor'n' oder 'Der Stein auf dem Sofa der Frau Senatorin': Die Hamburger Unruhen vom 31. August bis 5. September 1830," in Jörg Berlin (ed.), D a s a n d e r e H a m b u r g : F r e i h e i t l i c h e Bestrebungen in der H a n s e s t a d t seit d e m Spätm i t t e l a l t e r (Cologne, 1981), pp. 48-68. It is difficult to understand why this article on anti-Semitic disturbances should appear in a volume devoted to "progressive and democratic movements" in the city. See also Mosche Zimmermann, "Antijüdische Sozialproteste von Unter- und Mittelschichten 1819-1835," in Arno Herzig et al. (eds.), A r b e i t e r i n H a m b u r g (Hamburg, 1983), pp. 89-94. 5. See the useful survey in Eleonore Sterling, Judenhass: D i e Anfänge des p o l i t i s c h e n A n t i s e m i t i s m u s i n D e u t s c h l a n d ( 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 5 0 ) (Frankfurt, 1969). 6. See Geoff Eley's comments, reviewing (among other books) Richard S. Levy, The D o w n f a l l o f t h e A n t i - S e m i t i c Political Parties i n I m p e r i a l Germ a n y (New Haven, 1975), in Social History 2, no. 2 (1977), pp. 691-95; Blackbourn, Populists a n d Patricians, pp. 168-87; Hans-Jürgen Puhle, A g r a r i s c h e I n t e r e s s e n p o l i t i k und preussischer K o n s e r v a t i s m u s im Wilhelm i n i s c h e n R e i c h , 1 8 9 3 - 1 9 1 4 (Bonn, 1975), pp. 111-42, 274-92; Röhl, B i s m a r c k to Hitler, pp. 39-53. For the Social Democrats, see Rosemarie Leuschen-Seppel, S o c i a l d e m o k r a t i e und A n t i s e m i t i s m u s i m K a i s e r r e i c h (Bonn, 1978), comprehensively demolishing the thesis of "socialist antiSemitism" advanced by E . Silberner, Sozialisten z u r Judenfrage (Berlin, 1962) and others. Further evidence on this point is presented in Richard J. Evans, Kneipengespräche i m K a i s e r r e i c h : D i e B e r i c h t e der H a m b u r g e r P o l i t i s c h e n Polizei 1 8 9 2 - 1 9 1 4 (Reinbek, 1989), pp. 302-21. 7. Donald Niewyk, The Jews i n Weimar G e r m a n y (Baton Rouge, 1980); Niewyk, Socialist, A n t i - S e m i t e , a n d Jew (Baton Rouge, 1971); Peter Pulzer, T h e R i s e o f Political A n t i - S e m i t i s m i n G e r m a n y a n d A u s t r i a (New York, 1964). 8. Gordon, Hitler, pp. 88-90, W. S. Allen, T h e Nazi S e i z u r e o f Power: The Experience o f a S i n g l e G e r m a n Town 1 9 2 2 - 1 9 4 5 (rev. ed., New York, 1984), p. 84. 9. Ian Kershaw, P o p u l a r O p i n i o n a n d Political D i s s e n t in t h e T h i r d R e i c h : Bavaria 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 4 5 (Oxford, 1983), pp. 224-77, esp. p. 277; Gordon, Hitler; Ian Kershaw, "How Effective Was Nazi Propaganda?" in David Welch (ed.), Nazi P r o p a g a n d a : T h e Power a n d t h e L i m i t a t i o n s (London, 1983), pp. 180-205. 10. Rudolf Augstein, "Die neue Auschwitz-Lüge," D e r Spiegel, October 6, 1986 (also in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 196-203). On the genesis of the

N O T E S • 165 "Final Solution," there is a balanced survey of the arguments in Ian Kershaw, T h e Nazi D i c t a t o r s h i p (2nd ed., London, 1989), pp. 82-105. Hillgruber's own account is available in greater detail in his articles "Die ideologisch-dogmatische Grundlage der nationalsozialistischen Politik der Ausrottung der Juden in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion und ihre Durchführung, 1941-44," G e r m a n S t u d i e s R e v i e w 2 (1979), pp. 264¬ 96, and "Die 'Endlösung' und das deutsche Ostimperium als Kernstück des rassenideologischen Programms des Nationalsozialismus," in Manfred Funke (ed.), Hitler, D e u t s c h l a n d , und d i e Mächte (Düsseldorf, 1975), pp. 94-114. The emphasis placed in the 1970s by conservative historians such as Bracher and Hildebrand on the determining influence of Hitler is usefully discussed by Tim Mason, "Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy About the Interpretation of National Socialism," in Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), The "Führer State": Myth and R e a l i t y (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 23-40. 11.

Hillgruber, Zweierlei, pp. 97-98; Habermas, "Eine Art Schadensabwicklung" (Piper, Historikerstreit, p. 66); Craig, "The War," p. 16. Peter Steinbach, "Unbestechlich und unabhängig: Andreas Hillgrubers Essay über 'Zweierlei Untergang,' " F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e m e i n e Z e i t u n g , July 8, 1986, also notes the contrast. Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e , pp. 66-69, misses the point once more.

12. Hillgruber, Zweierlei, pp. 97-98; Albert Speer, I n s i d e t h e T h i r d R e i c h (London, 1979); Manfred Schmidt, A l b e r t Speer: D a s Ende eines Mythos (Munich, 1982); Kershaw, Nazi D i c t a t o r s h i p , pp. 82-105. The evidence for the anti-Semitic convictions of many leading and second-rank Nazis is extensive: for a sample, see Joachim C. Fest, The Face o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h (London, 1970). See also the account in Ian Kershaw, The H i t l e r Myth: I m a g e a n d Reality in t h e T h i r d R e i c h (Oxford, 1987), pp. 229-52, presenting evidence of the enthusiastic anti-Semitism of Nazi officials at least down to the level of K r e i s l e i t e r . 13. See the remarks of Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 61-81. Failure to distinguish between propagandistic and rhetorical statements on the one hand and genuine statements of belief and intent on the other is a major weakness in Nolte's analysis, perhaps reflecting a more general weakness of the philosophical, "phenomenological," or history-of-ideas approach. 14. Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 61-81; Mason, "Intention"; Klaus Hilde¬ brand, "Nationalsozialismus ohne Hitler?" G e s c h i c h t e in Wissenschaft und U n t e r r i c h t 31 (1980), pp. 284-305, and the following acrimonious debate in ibid., 32 (1981), pp. 197-98, 738-42, and G e s c h i c h t s d i d a k t i k 5 (1980), pp. 325-57, and 6 (1981), pp. 233-38. See also Martin Broszat, "Soziale Motivation und Führer-Bindung des Nationalsozialismus," Vierteljahrshefte für Z e i t g e s c h i c h t e 18 (1970), pp. 392-409; and Hans Mommsen, "National Socialism: Continuity and Change," in Laqueur (ed.), Fascism, pp. 151-92, for criticisms of the more conservative point of view; for a classic exposition of the latter, see Bracher, The G e r m a n Dictatorship.

166 • N O T E S 15. Martin Broszat, The H i t l e r State: T h e F o u n d a t i o n a n d D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e I n t e r n a l S t r u c t u r e o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h (New York, 1981). This work has not been invalidated by Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., G e r m a n Big Business and t h e R i s e o f H i t l e r (New York, 1985), although Turner does succeed in disposing of many of the more colorful legends about the role of big business. See the review by F. L. Carsten in B u l l e t i n o f t h e G e r m a n Historical I n s t i t u t e L o n d o n (1986), pp. 20-23. The objections raised to Turner's work by David Abraham, "Big Business, Nazism, and German Politics at the End of Weimar," E u r o p e a n History Q u a r t e r l y 17 (1987), pp. 235-46, are overstated, to say the least. 16. See above, pp. 50, 63-65. 17. Bartov, E a s t e r n F r o n t , pp. 155-56. 18. Hans Mommsen, "The Realization of the Unthinkable: The 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' in the Third Reich," in Hirschfeld, Policies, pp. 93-144, here pp. 134-35, n. 36. 19. G e r m a n History 229-52.

6, no. 1 (1988), p. 109; also Kershaw, H i t l e r Myth,

pp.

20. Broszat, "Wo sich die Geister scheiden"; Broszat, "Hitler und die Genesis der 'Endlösung': Aus Anlass der Thesen von David Irving," in Hermann Graml and Klaus-Dietmar Henke (eds.), N a c h H i t l e r : D e r S c h w i e r i g e Umg a n g mit unserer G e s c h i c h t e : Beiträge von M a r t i n Broszat (Munich, 1986), pp. 187-229—a convincing analysis of Irving's work. In his books H i t l e r ' s War (London, 1977) and T h e War Path (London, 1978), Irving seeks to argue that Hitler had no aggressive intentions toward Western Europe, and only "mundane" territorial ambitions in Central Europe and the East ( T h e War Path, pp. xii-xiv). Irving also claims that the K o m m i s sarbefehl, Hitler's order that political commissars in the Red Army should be shot if captured, was a response to the Soviet intention of exterminating the ruling classes in Western Europe. As this suggests, Irving also supports the preventive-war thesis. In a number of respects, indeed, these arguments are now taken up by Nolte in his book D e r europäische Bürg e r k r i e g . In 1982 Irving temporarily abandoned his writing in order to try to unify various splinter groups of the ultraright in Britain under the aegis of an organization called Focus (Paul Wilkinson, The New Fascists [2nd ed., London, 1983], p. 169). Irving was reported as admitting to the Oxf o r d Mail that he had "links at a low level" with the National Front. He was also reported as referring to Spotlight, the magazine of the neo-Nazi "Liberty Lobby" in the United States, as "an excellent fortnightly paper." Correspondents to F o c a l Point, the magazine of Irving's organization, included John Tyndall, of the British National Party, perhaps the most significant of postwar British neofascists; and the magazine carried advertisements for E x c a l i b u r , the journal of the Nationalist Party, a spinoff from the National Front (Gill Seidel, The Holocaust D e n i a l , [London, 1980], pp. 54-56). This move into politics, regarded at the time as highly important by Irving himself and very significant by observers of the neofascist scene such as Martin Walker, author of the standard work on postwar British fascism, failed for lack of funds. However, Irving continued to be observed

N O T E S • 1 67 speaking regularly at fascist and neofascist meetings on the Continent, including those of the Deutsche Volks-Union, at which a number of members of the Wikinger Jugend, described by author Robert Harris as "a fanatical sect of young neo-Nazis," were present. See Robert Harris, Selli n g H i t l e r : T h e Story o f t h e H i t l e r D i a r i e s (London, 1986), esp. pp. 338-39 and 344, recounting Irving's conversion to the belief that the forged "Hitler diaries," "discovered" in 1983, were genuine. Harris's excellent and very entertaining book, however, seriously underplays the political motives behind the diaries' emergence from Nazi and neo-Nazi circles in the Federal Republic. Despite his denial that Hitler knew about the extermination of the Jews, Irving admitted that he had, pinned to his wall, a copy of Hitler's January 1939 speech in which he said that if the Jews provoked a world war, it would end with their destruction (Seidel, The Holocaust D e n i a l , pp. 122-23). See also B. Smith, "Two Alibis for the Inhumanities: A. R. Butz, The Hoax o f the Twentieth C e n t u r y , and David Irving, H i t l e r ' s War, " G e r m a n S t u d i e s Review, October 1978, pp. 327-35; and Charles W. Snydor, Jr., "The Selling of Adolf Hitler: David Irving's H i t l e r ' s War," C e n t r a l E u r o p e a n History 12, no. 2 (1979), pp. 169-99. Irving's political beliefs can also be gauged from his book Uprising (London, 1981), in which he apparently suggests that the Stalinist regime in Hungary was run by Jews, and the 1956 uprising was anti-Semitic, the latter implicitly therefore being understood in a positive sense, with the implication, as Seidel (Holocaust D e n i a l , pp. 127-28) points out, that anticommunists should be anti-Semitic too. 21.

Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 99-100. See also Christopher Browning, The F i n a l Solution a n d the G e r m a n F o r e i g n Office (New York, 1978), and Gerald Fleming, H i t l e r a n d t h e F i n a l Solution (London, 1986).

22. For a sample of this work, see Projektgruppe für die vergessenen Opfer des NS-Regimes (ed.), Verachtet—verfolgt—vernichtet: Z u den "vergessenen" Opfer des N S - R e g i m e s (Hamburg, 1986); also, Angelika Ebbinghaus et al. (eds.), H e i l e n und V e r n i c h t e n im Mustergau H a m b u r g (Hamburg, 1984); Hans-Georg Stümke and Rudi Finkler (eds.), Rosa Winkel, Rosa L i s t e n : H o m o s e x u e l l e und "Gesundes V o l k s e m p f i n d e n " von A u s c h w i t z b i s h e u t e (Reinbek, 1981); Tilman Zülch (ed.), I n A u s c h w i t z vergast, b i s h e u t e verfolgt: Z u r Situation der Roma ( Z i g e u n e r ) in D e u t s c h l a n d und E u r o p a (Reinbek, 1979). 23. Detlev Peukert, "Alltag und Barbarei: Zur Normalität des Dritten Reiches," in Dan Diner (ed.), Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zur H i s t o r i s i e r u n g und Historikerstreit (Frankfurt, 1987), pp. 51-61. Traces of the same argument can also be found in Geoff Eley, "Nazism, Politics, and the Image of the Past: Thoughts on the West German Historikerstreit 1986-1987," P a s t a n d Present 121 (1988), pp. 177-208. For the contribution of the German History Workshop to the current debate, see Heide Gerstenberger and Dorothea Schmidt (eds.), Normalität oder Norm a l i s i e r u n g ? Geschichtswerkstätten und F a s c h i s m u s a n a l y s e (Münster, 1987). However, as Jürgen Kocka has pointed out, the contributions mostly concentrate on local research and fail to address the central issues in the debate ("GeschichtsWerkstätten und Historikerstreit," D i e Tages-

168 • N O T E S zeitung, January 26, 1988). Nevertheless, the contribution by Barbara Hahn and Peter Schüttler, "Jürgen Habermas und das ungetrübte Be¬ wusstsein des Bruchs," pp. 170-77, does provide an interesting critique of Habermas's identification with "the West" from a left-wing point of view. And for another discussion of the view from the left, see Mary Nolan, "The Historikerstreit and Social History," New G e r m a n C r i t i q u e 44 (1988), pp. 51-80. 24. See above, and Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, pp. 502-4. 25. Ibid., pp. 297-98. Nolte goes on to ask whether Hitler might not have been about to realize the "main tenet" of Marxism by eliminating the "dying bourgeoisie" in the interests of the "rising proletariat." The speculation is characteristic of Nolte's style of argument. It rests solely on an anecdote told in a speech by Hitler, who reported that as he had seen motorcars full of well-off bourgeois Germans passing a gang of roadworkers, he had said to himself that the two groups should really change places. Quite apart from its inadequacy as evidential support for a speculation as far-reaching as that which Nolte bases on it, the story also has to be understood as an aspect of Nazi rhetoric rather than a genuine statement of intent; here as elsewhere, Nolte does not distinguish properly between the two. Pseudoegalitarian rhetoric of this kind was a commonplace in the public utterances of Hitler and the other Nazi leaders, and has been extensively discussed in the literature, although Nolte seems unaware of this historiography. See for example David Schoenbaum, H i t l e r ' s Social R e v o l u t i o n : Class a n d Status in Nazi G e r m a n y 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 3 9 (London, 1967), esp. pp. 77-118; Kershaw, P o p u l a r O p i n i o n , pp. 66-110; Kershaw, Nazi Dictators h i p , pp. 130-148. When defending Nolte, the Bremen historian Imanuel Geiss also frequently resorts to speculation, claiming, for instance, to know how Nolte would stand on points which he has not in fact discussed in his writings at all (Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e , pp. 101, 105). 26. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, pp. 515-16. For the comparable attempts by Hillgruber and others to isolate Hitler, see above, pp. 71-74. 27. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, pp. 509-13, 500. It is worth noting in this context the claim of the "revisionist" Arthur Butz, in his Hoax o f t h e Twentieth Century (1976), that the concentration camps mostly contained people detained "for punitive or security reasons" (G. Seidel, The Holocaust Denial, p. 72). The resemblances between Nolte's arguments and right-wing extremist "revisionism" are also noted in Hans Mommsen, "Das Ressentiment als Wissenschaft. Anmerkungen zu Ernst Noltes 'Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus,'" Ges c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 14 (1988), pp. 495-512, esp. pp. 502, 509. 28. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, pp. 592-93, nn. 26, 29. It is characteristic of Nolte's procedures that he should simultaneously cover himself against criticism by explicitly conceding the reality of the "Final Solution." However, the novelty, and the emphasis, of Nolte's account clearly lie in his willingness to take seriously the neofascist "revisionists" on this subject, and to lend support, however qualified, to some of their arguments. Nolte's insistence that those who deny the reality of the "Final Solution" have to be taken

N O T E S • 1 69 seriously as objective scholars follows the line taken by another neoconser¬ vative writer, Armin Möhler, in C r i t i c o n : Zeitschrift für K o n s e r v a t i v e s D e n k e n 56 (November-December 1979). Möhler is a Swiss journalist, former secretary of the writer Ernst Jünger, and, like Nolte, a recipient of the Adenauer Prize. As Gill Seidel has remarked, "His contention that 'revisionist' arguments represent a respectable, academic interpretation of history is entirely consonant with the pseudoobjective, pseudoacademic stance favored by Butz. . . . It is exemplified as a whole in the J o u r n a l o f t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r Historical Review, the magazine of the anti-Semitic propagandists" (Seidel, The Holocaust D e n i a l , pp. 52-53). Arthur Butz, in The Hoax o f t h e Twentieth C e n t u r y (1976), one of the most influential attempts to deny the reality of the "Final Solution," has, as Seidel points out, a pseudoacademic style, and adorns his book with 450 footnotes, 5 appendices, and 32 plates and diagrams. Butz maintains that the professional historians who assert the reality of the "Final Solution" are Jews. In this context, it is also relevant to note the resemblance between Nolte's self-proclaimed status as an outsider to the German historical profession (see the jacket blurb to Bürgerkrieg) and Butz's attack on "academic historians" and "established scholarship" for allegedly avoiding a critical examination of what he regards as the "Holocaust hoax" (Seidel, The Holocaust D e n i a l , pp. 74-75). For further resemblances, see Hans-Georg Betz, " D e u t s c h l a n d p o l i t i k on the Margins: On the Evolution of Contemporary New Right Nationalism in the Federal Republic," New G e r m a n C r i t i q u e 44 (1988), pp. 127-58. The contradictions of Nolte's various arguments are also noted by Mommsen, "Das Ressentiment." Nolte's Bürgerk r i e g received a critical review from Möhler ("Missverständnisse um Ernst Nolte. Über sein Buch 'Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945,' " Criticon 17 [1987], pp. 104, 267-70) and a positive one from Adolf von Thadden ("Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945," Nation E u r o p a 38 [1988], pp. 4-10). Möhler evidently took Nolte's gestures in the direction of the "uniqueness of Auschwitz" view too seriously. It is impossible to take seriously, however, Eckard Jesse's statement that Nolte fails to deliver any ammunition for extreme right-wing propaganda (Jesse, "Ist der 'Historikerstreit . . . ? ' " p. 177). For evidence to the contrary, see Rolf Kosiek, Historikerstreit und G e s c h i c h t s r e v i s i o n (Tübingen, 1987). 29. See Hilberg, D e s t r u c t i o n ; and Walter Laqueur, The T e r r i b l e Secret: S u p pression of t h e Truth A b o u t H i t l e r ' s " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " (London, 1980). For Geiss's views on Nolte's general procedures, which he expresses with a restraint and delicacy which he altogether fails to show toward Nolte's opponents, see Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e , p. 39. Geiss disqualifies Habermas as a competent historian and accuses him of arbitrary methods of citation, instrumentalization of the past for political purposes, and procedures that have no connection with rational scholarship (p. 83). These criticisms should, however, more properly be directed at Nolte. See Mommsen, "Das Ressentiment," pp. 497, 509. 30. Jäckel, "Elende Praxis" (trans, in Craig, "The War"). 31.

Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g , pp. 167-71; Jäckel, "Elende Praxis"; Jürgen Kocka, "Hitler sollte nicht durch Stalin und Pol Pot verdrängt werden: Über Ver-

170 • N O T E S suche deutscher Historiker, die Ungeheuerlichkeit von NS-Verbrechen zu relativieren," F r a n k f u r t e r R u n d s c h a u , September 23, 1986 (Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 123-31). See also Hildebrand, "Das Zeitalter der Tyrannen" (in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 84-92), with an equation of Auschwitz and the Gulag along similar lines to those laid down by Hillgruber. 32. William Shawcross, Sideshow: C a m b o d i a (London, 1979).

K i s s i n g e r , Nixon,

a n d the Destruction o f

33. Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g , pp. 169-70; Stefan Merl, " 'Ausrottung' der Bourgeoisie und der Kulaken in Sowjetrussland? Anmerkungen zu einem fragwürdigen Vergleich mit Hitlers Judenvernichtung," G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 13 (1987), pp. 368-81; M. Lewin, R u s s i a n Peasants a n d Soviet Power: A S t u d y o f Collectivization (London, 1968); Merle Fainsod, Smol e n s k U n d e r Soviet R u l e (Cambridge, Mass., 1950). Robert Conquest's T h e Harvest o f Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization a n d t h e Terror F a m i n e (New York, 1986), argues that the "dekulakization" of the early 1930s led to the deaths of 6,500,000 people. But this estimate is arrived at by extremely dubious methods, ranging from reliance on hearsay evidence through double counting to the consistent employment of the highest possible figures in estimates made by other historians. The most conservative estimate of the numbers of victims of this terrible and criminal policy gives a figure of about 300,000. See Stephen Merl, "Wie viele Opfer forderte die 'Liquidierung der Kulaken als Klasse'? Anmerkungen zu einem Buch von Robert Conquest," G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 14 (1988), pp. 534-40; and more generally, on Conquest's overestimation of the numbers of victims of Stalin's purges, S. G. Wheatcroft, "On Assessing the Size of Forced Concentration Camp Labour in the Soviet Union, 1929-1956," Soviet S t u d i e s 33 (1981), pp. 265-95; idem, "Towards a Thorough Analysis of Soviet Forced Labour Statistics," ibid. 35 (1983), pp. 223-37; and the contributions by Conquest and others to the same debate in Slavic R e v i e w 39 (1980), pp. 559-611; ibid., 43 (1984), pp. 83-88; ibid., 44 (1985), pp. 505-36; and Soviet S t u d i e s 34 (1982), pp. 434-9; 36 (1984), pp. 277-81; and 39 (1987), pp. 292-313. Further downward revision of Conquest's figures, on the basis of documentation in the Smolensk Archive, is provided by J. Arch Getty, O r i g i n s o f t h e Great Purges: The Soviet C o m m u n i s t Party R e c o n s i d e r e d , 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 3 8 (Cambridge, 1985). Charles S. Maier, in The U n m a s t e r a b l e Past (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), pp. 74-75, estimates that Stalinism was responsible for 20 million deaths up to 1953, Nazism 8 million. But these figures include deaths indirectly caused by Stalinism, through famines, deportations, etc., and accept Conquest's implausible and inflated estimates without question, while omitting deaths caused by Nazi aggression in the East (which also, apart from military and exterminatory action, led to famines and deportations). The number of deaths caused by Nazism's eastward drive may itself have been as many as 20 million. As Maier remarks, however, the issue of numbers, though important, is not relevant to the issue of uniqueness. It is perhaps just worth noting that Habermas, in his critique of Nolte, initially described Stalin's policy toward the kulaks as an "expulsion," and admitted later that "extermination" would have been a better word. But this point scarcely deserves the importance accorded it by

N O T E S • 17 1 Geiss (Die H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e , p. 69), who altogether fails to tackle the central point of comparison at issue. Finally, none of this of course excuses the appalling barbarity of Stalinism; it merely exposes the limitations of attempts to equate it with the barbarity of Nazism by mathematical means. 34. For Maier's stress on the unpredictability of Stalinist terror, see The Unm a s t e r a b l e Past, pp. 74-84. 35. Fest "Die geschuldete Erinnerung" (Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 100-112). Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, p. 82; Hagen Schulze, "Fragen, die wir stellen müssen: Keine historische Haftung ohne nationale Identität," D i e Zeit, September 26,1986 (Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 143-50); Beatrice Heuser, "The Historikerstreit: Uniqueness and Comparability of the Holocaust," G e r m a n History 6, no. 1 (1988), pp. 69-78, here pp. 72-73; Helmut Fleischer, "Die Moral der Geschichte: Zum Disput über die Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will," Nürnberger Z e i t u n g , September 20, 1986 (Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 123-31); Yehuda Bauer, The Holocaust in Historical Perspective (London, 1978), p. 31. The argument that Auschwitz's uniqueness means that it cannot be "historicized" because it stands outside history (Dan Diner, "Zwischen Aporie und Apologie. Über Grenzen der Historisierbarkeit des Nationalsozialismus" in Diner [ed.], Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte?, p.73) seems to me to mystify the event in a manner more appropriate to a theologian than a historian. 36. Hillgruber, Zweierlei, p. 98; cf. the comments of Habermas, "Eine Art," (Piper, Historikerstreit, p. 17); Fest, "Die geschuldete Erinnerung"; Kocka, "Hitler"; Bartov, E a s t e r n Front, p. 155. 37. Bartov, E a s t e r n Front, pp. 155-56. For further comments on these issues, see Julius Schoeps, "Treitschke redivivus? Ernst Nolte und die Juden," D e r Tagesspiegel, January 10, 1988 (reply by Nolte in D a s Vergehen, pp. 204-14 [full version: edited original in D e r Tagesspiegel, February 21, 1988]). 38. Maier, The U n m a s t e r a b l e Past, p. 82. See also, Heinz Galinski, "Beweiszwang für die Opfer, Freispruch für die Täter," Blätter für deutsche und i n t e r n a t i o n a l e Politik 32 (1987), pp. 20-24.

CHAPTER 5: RESHAPING CENTRAL EUROPE 1. See Wolfgang Benz (ed.), D i e V e r t r e i b u n g der D e u t s c h e n a u s d e m Osten: Ursachen, E r e i g n i s s e , F o l g e n (Frankfurt, 1985), for a recent, balanced survey of these events, including an extensive critical bibliography. The official West German account was published in five volumes: D o k u m e n t a tion der V e r t r e i b u n g der D e u t s c h e n a u s Ost-Mitteleuropa (Bonn, 1953¬ 64; repr., Munich, 1984). The editors included respected West German historians Theodor Schieder, Hans Rothfels, and Werner Conze; their assistants, who did much of the actual research, included Martin Broszat and Hans-Ulrich Wehler. For the numbers involved in the expulsions and murders, see Benz, D i e V e r t r e i b u n g , pp. 12, 226.

172 • N O T E S 2. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, p. 504. 3. Robert L . Koehl, B K F D V : G e r m a n B e s e t t l e m e n t a n d Population Policy 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 5 . A History o f t h e B e i c h Commission f o r the Strengthening o f G e r m a n d o m (Cambridge, Mass., 1957); Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 4 5 Vol. 3 (Exeter, 1988), pp. 940-6. 4. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, in Benz, V e r t r e i b u n g , pp. 51-52 (Henke, "Der Weg nach Potsdam—Die Alliierten und die Vertreibung," pp. 49-69); Ibid., See also Delef Brandes, G r o s s b r i t a n n i e n und seine osteuropäischen A l l i i e r t e n 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 3 . D i e Begierungen Polens, der Tschechoslowakei und J u g o s l a w i e n s i m L o n d o n e r E x i l vom K r i e g s a u s b r u c h b i s z u r K o n f e r e n z von T e h e r a n (Munich, 1988). This work makes clear the numerous and varied weaknesses of Alfred M. de Zayas, D i e A n g l o - A m e r i k a n e r und d i e V e r t r e i b u n g der D e u t s c h e n (Munich, 1977). For further notes on de Zayas, see above, p. 162, n.14. 5. Henke, in Benz, V e r t r e i b u n g , p. 55. 6. See in particular Rudolf Jaworski, "Die Sudetendeutschen als Minderheit in der Tschechoslowakei 1918-1978," in Benz, V e r t r e i b u n g , p. 29-38; Norbert Krekeler, "Die deutsche Minderheit in Polen und die Revisionspolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1919-1933," ibid., pp. 15-28; and Wolfgang Benz, "Der Generalplan Ost: Zur Germanisierungspolitik des NSRegimes in den besetzten Ostgebieten 1939-1945," ibid., pp. 39-48. 7. See also Martin Broszat, Z w e i h u n d e r t Jahre nich, 1963).

deutsche

Polenpolitik

(Mu-

8. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, p. 211. See, more generally, Peter Bender, "Mitteleuropa^—Mode, Modell oder Motiv?" D i e neue Gesellschaft 34 (1987), pp. 297-304. 9. Winkler, "Auf ewig"; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Weder Leugnen noch Vergessen befreit von der Vergangenheit," F r a n k f u r t e r B u n d s c h a u , December 1, 1986 (Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 300-321); and the summary of Wolfgang Mommsen's contribution to the debate in Hilmar Hoffmann (ed.), Gegen den V e r s u c h , V e r g a n g e n h e i t z u v e r b i e g e n : E i n e Diskussion u m p o l i t i s c h e K u l t u r i n der B u n d e s r e p u b l i k a u s A n l a s s der F r a n k f u r t e r Bömerberggespräche 1 9 8 6 (Frankfurt, 1987), pp. 116-17. See also James J. Sheehan, "What Is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography," J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n History 53 (1981), pp. 1-23. On Austrian national consciousness, see Robert Knight, "The Waldheim Context: Austria and Nazism," Times L i t e r a r y S u p p l e m e n t , October 3, 1986, pp. 1003-4. On West and East Germany, see Gebhard Schweigier, N a t i o n a l Consciousness inDivided Germany (London, 1975). 10. See below, pp. 136-7. 11.

See Jäckel, "Die elende Praxis" (Piper, Historikerstreit,

12. Schulze, "Fragen" (Piper, Historikerstreit,

p. 145).

p. 119).

N O T E S • 173 13. Schulze, "Fragen"; see also Hagen Schulze, Wir s i n d , was wir g e w o r d e n s i n d : Vom N u t z e n der G e s c h i c h t e für d i e deutsche G e g e n w a r t (Munich, 1987), pp. 189-95 (reprinting "Auf der Suche nach einer deutschen Identität: Ein Gespräch mit Adelbert Reif," Börsenblatt für den deutschen B u c h h a n d e l 42 [1986], pp. 690-95). 14. Unlike Nolte, Stürmer did not decline the invitation to attend, but he did refuse to allow his contribution to be printed in the colloquium proceedings, complaining of the "defamations and denunciations" to which he had allegedly been subjected by the other participants. The published version of his contribution ("Weder verdrängen noch bewältigen: Geschichte und Gegenwartsbewusstsein der Deutschen," S c h w e i z e r Monatshefte 66 [1986], pp. 689-94) is heavily amended to remove many of the more controversial statements. Even so, Stürmer did not give his permission for it to be reprinted in Piper, Historikerstreit. The tape-recorded account of the colloquium is therefore used as the basis for the account of Stürmer's contribution given here (Dieter Kramer, "Die Diskussion der "Römerberg-Gespräche 1986," in Hoffmann [ed.], Gegen den Versuch, pp. 105-39). The advisory committee on the Römerberg Colloquia has a well-established tradition of producing a politically "balanced ticket," with invited speakers from both right and left. For an independent account, see Verena Auffermann, "Fragen nach politischer Kultur: Zu den 13. Römerberg-Gesprächen in Frankfurt," Süddeutsche Z e i t u n g , June 13, 1986 (Stürmer criticized this account, however, in a letter to the newspaper on June 25). For the quotations here, see Hoffmann (ed.), Gegen den Versuch, pp. 122-23, 116. See also the account in Craig, "The War," who rightly comments on the declamatory obscurity of Stürmer's style. 15. Hoffmann (ed.), Gegen den Versuch, p. 112. See also the critiques of Stürmer by Hans Mommsen in ibid., pp. 118-19, and Michael Schneider, ibid., p. 120, and the quotation in Michael Wildt, "Instandsetzung der Zitadelle: Beim Deutschen Historischen Museum geht's um kulturelle Hegemonie," in Geschichtswerkstatt Berlin (ed.), D i e Nation als Ausstellungsstück: P l a n u n g e n , Kritik, und Utopien z u den Museumsgründungen i n B o n n und B e r l i n (Geschichtswerkstatt No. 11, Hamburg, 1987), pp. 25-28, here p. 26. 16. Michael Stürmer, D a s r u h e l o s e R e i c h : D e u t s c h l a n d 1 8 6 6 - 1 9 1 8 (Berlin, 1980). Stürmer's historical essays are collected in his D i s s o n a n z e n des Fortschritts: Essays über G e s c h i c h t e und Politik in D e u t s c h l a n d (Munich, 1986). 17. Hagen Schulze, Weimar. 22.

D e u t s c h l a n d 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 3 3 (Berlin, 1982), pp. 16,

18. Klaus Hildebrand, "Deutscher Sonderweg und Drittes Reich," in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), D i e nationalsozialistische M a c h t e r g r e i f u n g (Paderborn, 1984), pp. 388-90, 392. 19. Thus the argument of Stürmer, D a s r u h e l o s e R e i c h . For a jaundiced view of Stürmer's career and writings, see Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g , pp. 28-36, 138-45. In addition, see Heinrich August Winkler, "Bismarcks Schatten.

174 • N O T E S Ursachen und Folgen der deutschen Katastrophe," D i e N e u e Gesellschaft 35 (1988), p. 121. Perhaps the strongest criticism of Stürmer is advanced in Hans-Jürgen Puhle, "Die neue Ruhelosigkeit. Michael Stürmers nationalpolitischer Revisionismus," G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 13 (1987), pp. 382-99. See further, Hans Mommsen, "Rückwärtsrevision des Geschichtsbildes?" D i e N e u e Gesellschaft 32 (1985), p. 364. 20. See my review of Schulze, Weimar, (1986) , pp. 363-66. 21.

in J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n History

58

Michael Stürmer, "Nation und Demokratie," D i e p o l i t i s c h e M e i n u n g 230 (1987) , p. 22.

22. See the discussion in Thomas Schnabel, "Geschichte und Wende," in Erler, G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? , pp. 22-23. 23. Alfred Dregger, "Der Friede ist das Werk der Gerechtigkeit," B u l l e t i n des Presse- und I n f o r m a t i o n s a m t s der B u n d e s r e g i e r u n g 140 (November 18, 1986), pp. 1169-72. 24. Timothy Garton Ash, "Germany After Bitburg," New R e p u b l i c , July 15¬ 22, 1985, pp. 15-17, reprinted in Geoffrey Hartman (ed.), B i t b u r g i n Moral a n d Political Perspective (Bloomington, Indiana, 1986), pp. 199¬ 203. 25. Peter Pulzer, "Germany Searches for a Less Traumatic Past," The Listener, June 25, 1987, pp. 16-18. 26. See Winkler, "Auf ewig," and more generally, Hermannus Pfeiffer (ed.), D i e F A Z : N a c h f o r s c h u n g e n über e i n Z e n t r a l o r g a n (Cologne, 1988). 27. See for example Paul Kennedy, The R i s e o f t h e A n g l o - G e r m a n A n t a g o n i s m 1 8 6 0 - 1 9 1 4 (London, 1980); D. C. B. Lieven, Russia a n d t h e O r i g i n s o f t h e F i r s t World War (London, 1983); John F. V. Keiger, F r a n c e a n d t h e O r i g i n s o f t h e F i r s t World War (London, 1983); and Zara S. Steiner, B r i t a i n a n d t h e O r i g i n s o f t h e F i r s t World War (London, 1977). 28. See Geoff Eley, R e s h a p i n g t h e G e r m a n R i g h t : R a d i c a l Nationalism and Political C h a n g e A f t e r B i s m a r c k (New Haven, 1980); Roger Chickering, We M e n Who Feel Most G e r m a n : A C u l t u r a l S t u d y o f t h e P a n - G e r m a n L e a g u e (Winchester, Mass., 1984); and the critique of Stürmer in Bernd Faulenbach, " 'Sinnstiftung' durch Geschichte?" L i n k s , November 1986, pp. 48-49. 29. Fritz Fischer, G e r m a n y ' s A i m s i n t h e F i r s t World War (London, 1967); Schnabel, "Geschichte," in Erler, G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? , pp. 22-23. 30. Schnabel, "Geschichte." The literature on the collapse of Weimar is obviously immense. A starting-point may be made with Eberhard Kolb, T h e Weimar R e p u b l i c (London, 1988), which includes a useful guide to the literature. 31.

Heinrich August Winkler, Von der R e v o l u t i o n z u r S t a b i l i s i e r u n g (Bonn, 1984), D e r Schein der Normalität (Bonn, 1985), and D e r Weg i n d i e Katas t r o p h e (Bonn, 1987).

N O T E S • 175 32. Bartov, The E a s t e r n Front, 1979).

citing Werner Maser, N u r e m b e r g (London,

CHAPTER 6: GERMANY AND THE WEST 1. Pulzer, "Germany," pp. 16-18; Michael Stürmer, D i s s o n a n z e n des Fortschritts: Essays über G e s c h i c h t e und Politik in D e u t s c h l a n d (Munich, 1986), pp. 766-76,195-96,266-67,273,293-94, 326-29 (Stürmer reprints here an unpublished speech from 1981, given at the opening of an exhibition; an article from N e u e Zürcher Z e i t u n g , May 3, 1986; a school speech delivered on October 28, 1984; a lecture, "Berlin und Bonn: Suche nach der deutschen Geschichte," first printed in M u s e u m s k u n d e [1984], pp. 142-53; and "Mitten in Europa: Versuchung und Verdamnis der Deutchen," first printed in a collection of essays presented to Franz Josef Strauss on his seventieth birthday [reference not given]). It is worth noting that the concept of "civil war" (Bürgerkrieg) runs right through Stürmer's collection; at various points he writes of Weimar as living in a state of civil war, of the years 1918-1945 as those of a European civil war, and of the present day as experiencing a world civil war. He thus engages in the same inflation of the concept that Nolte does. The implication of describing a country or a continent as existing in a state of "civil war" would seem to be a justification of emergency repressive measures, including the curtailment of civil liberties and possibly even violence, undertaken in the name of restoring order. Certainly this is the import of the claim that—for example in Argentina or E l Salvador, or indeed in Northern Ireland— suppressing terrorism involves the state and the armed forces in a "war" rather than in the simple enforcement of the law of the land. Once more, Geiss, in concentrating on the manner in which Stürmer's assertions have been quoted by his critics, misses the broader, and surely more important issue at stake (Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e , pp. 58-62). For further comments on Nolte's use of the "civil war" metaphor, see Hans Mommsen, "Das Ressentiment als Wissenschaft. Anmerkungen zu Ernst Noltes 'Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus,' " G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 14 (1988), pp. 495-512, here p. 495. 2. Habermas, "Eine Art" (Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 62-76); Pulzer, "Germany." For a more extended discussion of the relation of the Historikerstreit to Habermas's thought, see Charles S. Maier, The U n m a s t e r a b l e Past (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), pp. 39-42. For Nolte's defense of the Freikorps, see above, p. 29. 3. For a useful, if rather one-sided, view of these events, see John A. Moses, The Politics o f I l l u s i o n (London, 1975); also Imanuel Geiss, S t u d i e n über G e s c h i c h t e und Geschichtswissenschaft (Frankfurt, 1972); and Arnold Sywottek, "Die Fischer-Kontroverse," in Imanuel Geiss and Bernd-Jürgen Wendt (eds.), D e u t s c h l a n d in der Weltpolitik des 1 9 . und 2 0 . J a h r h u n -

176 • N O T E S derts (Düsseldorf, 1973), pp. 19-74; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Historiography in Germany Today," in Jürgen Habermas (ed.), Observations on "The S p i r i t u a l Situation o f t h e A g e " (Cambridge, Mass., 1984); Volker R. Berg¬ hahn, "West German Historiography Between Continuity and Change: Some Cross-Cultural Comparisons," G e r m a n L i f e a n d L e t t e r s 34 (1980¬ 81), pp. 248-59; Kenneth D. Barkin, "From Uniformity to Pluralism: German Historical Writing Since World War I , " ibid., vol. 4, pp. 234-47. 4. For more detailed expositions of the following arguments, with full references, see David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, T h e P e c u l i a r i t i e s o f G e r m a n History (Oxford, 1984); Eley, From Unification to Nazism (London, 1985); Blackbourn, Populists a n d Patricians (London, 1987); Richard J. Evans, R e t h i n k i n g G e r m a n History (London, 1987). 5. However, these arguments should not be misunderstood. Recently, a group of American historians has produced a book which argues for a more positive picture of Wilhelmine Germany (Jack Dukes and Joachim Remak [eds.], A n o t h e r G e r m a n y : A R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e I m p e r i a l E r a [Boulder, Colo.: 1987]). The book's contributors claim, for example, that Germany was justified in increasing the size of its Army in 1913 because it was encircled by foreign powers; that French, British, and Russian policies and politicians were "strident," "threatening," etc., while the Germans were "modest" and "moderate" and based their diplomacy on rational assessments of intelligence data; that the Great Powers should have been "mature" enough to give Germany equality on the international scene (Dukes, "Militarism and Arms Policy Revisited"); that service in the Prussian Army was a valuable experience for those who went through it, a "rite of passage" whose benefits have been underplayed by a generation of middle-class American historians blinded to the pleasures of the soldier's life by overreaction to the Vietnam War (D. Showalter, "Army, State, and Society"); and that Wilhelmine Germany was a progressive society dominated by modern attitudes, with a powerful, free press and a go-ahead educational system which encouraged scientific research. As many of the authors (e.g., Charles McLelland, Andrew Lees, Alan Beyerchen, Konrad Jarausch, Ronald J. Ross), given the more balanced picture in their other writings, must know, this is as one-sided a view as the opposing perspective, which sees Wilhelmine Germany as a backward or semifeudal dictatorship. The claim advanced by the editor in his concluding remarks, that Wilhelm IPs Germany resembles Ronald Reagan's America, casts a light on the latter in a way that perhaps was not intended (Remak, "Summing-Up"). It should be pointed out that the contributions on militarism and foreign policy in particular fail to take account of recent literature and fall well short of the normally high standards of modern American scholarship in this field. 6. Detlev Peukert, "Wer gewann den Historikerstreit? Keine Bilanz," in Peter Glotz et al. (eds.), V e r n u n f t r i s k i e r e n : K l a u s von D o h n a n y i z u m 6 0 . G e b u r t s t a g (Hamburg, 1988), pp. 38-50; A. Trus, "Die blinden Flecken des Historikerstreit: Über das kommunikative Beschweigen sogenannter Aussenseiterpositionen," A r e n a 8 (1988), pp. 4-6. For two (more or less

N O T E S • 177 random) examples, see Ernst Nolte, D a s Vergehen der V e r g a n g e n h e i t : A n t w o r t a n m e i n e K r i t i k e r i m s o g e n a n n t e n Historikerstreit (2nd ed., Munich, 1988), p. 215, with its accusation that Nolte's opponents in the debate had encouraged acts of terrorism against him (his car was set on fire by left-wing political extremists on February 9, 1988, while it was parked outside his office); or Rudolf Augstein, writing in D e r Spiegel on October 6,1986, calling Hillgruber a "constitutional Nazi" and urging his dismissal from his university post (for what else can he mean by the statement that "any teacher who told his pupils this kind of thing would have to be dismissed from the education service"?)—even though Augstein himself on an earlier occasion wrote that "whether the anti-Hitler allies committed fewer crimes than Hitler is not at all certain. The one who initiated such crimes against humanity was, in any case, Stalin, in 1928" (Augstein, "Auf die schiefe Ebene zur Republik," D e r Spiegel, 1985, no. 2, p. 32, quoted by Saul Friedländer, "Some German Struggles with Memory," in Hartman [ed.], Bitburg, p. 36). See also Augstein's review of Nolte, Bürg e r k r i e g , "Herr Noltes Umwälzung der Wissenschaft," D e r Spiegel, 1988, no. 1, pp. 141-44. For some earlier, unhelpfully polemical overreactions to interpretations of German history which did not fit established categories, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, " 'Deutscher Sonderweg' oder allgemeine Probleme des westlichen Kapitalismus? Zur Kritik einiger Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung," M e r k u r 5 (1981), pp. 478-82; or Wehler's contribution to Franz-Josef Brüggemeier and Jürgen Kocka (eds.), " G e s c h i c h t e von u n t e n — G e s c h i c h t e von i n n e n " : K o n t r o v e r s e n u m d i e A l l t a g s g e s c h i c h t e (Hagen, 1985). In this context it is also appropriate to note the contribution to the debate by Imanuel Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s K o n t r o v e r s e . E i n deutscher Streit (Berlin, 1988). Geiss argues, along similar lines, that the debate has been too polarized. He suggests that, despite the difficulties of advancing an intermediate position, it is time for a sober and calm approach to the questions at issue, time to start building bridges between the opposing camps (pp. 9-12). Geiss's criticism of the strong language used by Hillgruber and others in the debate (pp. 28-30) is well taken; but the language he uses against Habermas, Wehler, Hans Mommsen, and other opponents of Hillgruber and Nolte is every bit as strong as the language he criticizes in others (pp. 82-83). In a similar category is the attempt at a balance by Eckhard Jesse, who also criticizes the polemical style of Wehler and other supporters of Habermas, while saying little or nothing about the strong language used on the other side. Jesse's assertion that "the time is not yet ripe" for a full appreciation of Nolte's "great and bold work," the value of which will only be fully appreciated after several decades have passed, must surely rank as the most fatuous statement made by anyone during the entire controversy (Eckhard Jesse, "Ist der 'Historikerstreit' ein 'Historischer Streit'? Zugleich eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Literatur," Zeitschrift für Politik 35 (1988), pp. 163-97, here p. 176). For further comments on the polarization of opinion, see Karl-Ernst Jeismann, "Die deutsche Geschichte als Instrument im politischen Streit," D i e neue Gesellschaft 34 (1987), pp. 362-9.

178 • N O T E S 7. As suggested in Gordon A. Craig's characteristically learned and entertaining survey of the debate ("The War"). 8. For an account of the role of controversy among British historians and philosophers in the 1950s and 1960s, see Ved Mehta, F l y a n d t h e F l y Bottle: E n c o u n t e r s with B r i t i s h I n t e l l e c t u a l s (London, 1963). The "Abraham Debate" ( C e n t r a l E u r o p e a n History 17 [1984], pp. 159-293) is not, in my view, related to the discussion analyzed in the present book. The point at issue—the role of big business in the collapse of the Weimar Republic—has played no part in the present debate. The argument was fought out over issues of detailed historical scholarship and research, unlike the present one, where archival research does not feature at all. 9. To claim that the underlying purpose of the debate has been, on both sides, to achieve "cultural hegemony" in West Germany seems exaggerated on the one hand and neglectful of the international dimensions of the debate on the other ("Kampf um die kulturelle Hegemonie? HansUlrich Wehler im Gespräch mit Rainer Erd über Ziel und Folgen des Historikerstreits," F r a n k f u r t e r B u n d s c h a u , February 11, 1988). See the reasoned contribution to the debate by Christian Meier, in his capacity as president of the West German Historians' Association ("Eröffnungsrede zur 36. Versammlung deutscher Historiker in Trier, 8 October 1988," in Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 204-14); and Geiss, "Zum Historiker-Streit," E v a n g e l i s c h e K o m m e n t a r e , February 1987 (Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 373-80). Wehler's description of Geiss's criticism of Habermas, which forms part of a seven-page article, as schier e n d l o s , seems rather inappropriate in a book which takes up 249 pages in Habermas's defense, (Wehler, " E n t s o r g u n g , " p. 234, n. 69). However, it has now been retrospectively justified by the appearance of Geiss's book, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e . E i n deutscher Streit (Berlin, 1988). 10. Craig, "The War"; Thomas Nipperdey, "Unter der Herrschaft des Verdachts: Wissenschaftliche Aussagen dürfen nicht an ihrer politischen Funktion gemessen werden," D i e Zeit, October 17, 1986, (Piper, Historikerstreit, pp. 215-19). ; Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e , pp. 14-16. Geiss attacks the critic Volker Ullrich for making this point without alluding to the fact that Hillgruber had been the first to advance it (Volker Ullrich, "Die Fronten sind geklärt. Zwei Dokumentationen des 'Historiker-Streits' und ein Nachwort von Jürgen Habermas," F r a n k f u r t e r B u n d s c h a u , September 5, 1987). But this is mere polemics, as is Geiss's criticism of Ullrich for failing to provide (in a review printed in a daily newspaper!) proper references for the views he puts forward (Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e , pp. 195-6, n.3). Geiss himself admits (p.9) that his own study of the controversy "makes no claim even to come near being a comprehensive account of the arguments." 11.

Broszat, N a c h Hitler, pp. 305-6 ("Zur Errichtung eines 'Hauses der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland' in Bonn"); Broszat, "Die Ambivalenz der Forderung nach mehr Geschichtsbewusstsein," in Hoffmann (ed.), Gegen den Versuch, pp. 67-82, (also in Broszat, N a c h Hitler, pp. 310-23, here p. 315).

N O T E S • 1 79 12. Hillgruber, Z w e i e r l e i Untergang, pp. 23-24; Habermas, "Eine Art"; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Weder Leugnen noch Vergessen befreit von der Vergangenheit," F r a n k f u r t e r R u n d s c h a u , December 1, 1986 (Piper, Historikerstreit; pp. 300-21); Paul M. Kennedy. "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970," J o u r n a l o f C o n t e m p o r a r y History 6 (1973), pp. 77-100. For an illuminating example of the disturbing lengths to which nationalist history can go, see Michael Burleigh, G e r m a n y T u r n s E a s t w a r d : A S t u d y o f Ostforschung in t h e T h i r d R e i c h (Cambridge, 1988). 13. Schulze, Weimar; Michael Stürmer, B i s m a r c k — D i e G r e n z e n der Politik (Munich, 1987). See the devastating review by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Bismarck—der Durchbruch zur 'eigentlichen' Biographie? Michael Stürmer's Versuch über den ersten Reichskanzler oder: Die Nemesis der Hektik," D i e Zeit, April 10, 1987. 14. Hillgruber, Zweierlei, mas, "Eine Art").

pp. 98-99 (cf. the remarks on this point in Haber-

15. Richard Bessel, in B u l l e t i n o f t h e G e r m a n Historical Institute London, issue 9 (1982), pp. 3-5, reviewing Karl Dietrich Erdmann and Hägen Schulze (eds.), Weimar: S e l b s t p r e i s g a b e e i n e r D e m o k r a t i e (Düsseldorf, 1980). Bessel adds: "This volume appears in many places to be less about the fate of Weimar than about attitudes of influential historians towards political developments in the Federal Republic." The view of Mary Nolan, that the neoconservatives have manipulated social history and A l l t a g s g e s c h i c h t e to their own ends, seems to me entirely misplaced and without convincing foundation (Mary Nolan, "The Historikerstreit and Social History," New G e r m a n C r i t i q u e 44 [1988], pp. 51-80). 16. Broszat, N a c h Hitler, pp. 305-6, 311-13; W. J. Mommsen, "Weder Leugnen"; Rolf Bade, "Die Wende im Verständnis des Nationalsozialismus: Von der Harmonisierung zur Verharmlosung," B r e m e r L e h r e r - Z e i tung, February 1987, pp. 23-25; Martin Broszat, Saul Friedländer, "A Controversy about the Historicization of National Socialism," New Germ a n C r i t i q u e 44 (1988), pp. 85-126. 17. Broszat, Nach Hitler, pp. 239-44, 159-73; Saul Friedländer, "West Germany and the Burden of the Past: the Ongoing Debate," J e r u s a l e m Quarterly 42 (Spring 1987), pp. 3-18, here p. 10; Saul Friedländer, "Überlegungen zur Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus," in Diner (ed.), Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte?, p. 34-50. 18. "Wir können jetzt durchregieren," D e r Spiegel, April 21, 1987. Stürmer writes: " I n geschichtslosem Land, die Zukunft gewinnt wer die Erinnerung füllt, die Begriffe prägt und die Vergangenheit deutet"—"In a land without history, he who fills the memory, defines the concepts, and interprets the past, wins the future" (from Stürmer, "Weder Verdrängen" translation from Craig, "The War"). The phrase deliberately or coincidentally echoes the Party slogan called to mind by O'Brien in Orwell's 1 9 8 4 : "Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past" (George Orwell, 1 9 8 4 [Harmondsworth, 1965], p. 199).

1 80 • N O T E S Compare the discussion of recent events at the Military History Research Office in Freiburg, above, pp. 44-45 and 158, n. 44. Moreover, the claim that there has been a concerted policy of making politically conservative but otherwise undistinguished appointments to the directorships of the German Historical Institutes in London, Paris, and Washington loses some of its force when the general lack of applications for these posts is taken into consideration (Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g , pp. 190-91). See further Claus Leggewie, "Der Geist denkt rechts," D i e Zeit, October 16, 1987. Ernst Nolte has recently had a government-funded grant for a joint project with Israeli historians withdrawn as a result of Israeli disapproval of his views (see Nolte, D a s Vergehen, pp. 90-150, but also "Der Umgang des Historikers Ernst Nolte mit Briefen aus Israel: Otto Dov Kulka, Professor für Neuere Geschichte an der Jerusalemer Universität, schlägt ein neues Kapitel im 'Historikerstreit' auf," F r a n k f u r t e r R u n d s c h a u , November 5, 1987). 19. The opinion-poll figures were reported in D i e Zeit, February 15,1985, p. 10. See also Schnabel, "Geschichte und Wende," in Erler et a l , G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? , p. 19. 20. Gian Enrico Rusconi, "Italien und der deutsche 'Historikerstreit,' " in Diner (ed.), Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte?, pp. 102-19; Claus Leggewie, "Frankreichs kollektives Gedächtnis und der Nationalsozialismus," ibid., pp. 120-40; A. Bolaffi, "Polemiche Storiche: Hitler l'asiatico," L'Espresso, December 21, 1986; Ian Kershaw, "Nuova Inquietudine Tedesca? Le Reazioni Internazionali," Passato a presente 16 (1988), pp. 159-64;Alfred Cattani, "Die Last des Bösen," N e u e Zürcher Z e i t u n g , September 26, 1986; André Gisselbrecht, " L e Débat des historiens sur le Nazisme," A l l e m a g n e s d ' a u j o u r d ' h u i 99 (1987), pp. 233¬ 64; Gernot Erler, "Ohne Rücksicht auf Verluste: Der deutsche 'Historikerstreit' im Spiegel des Auslands," in Erler et al., G e s c h i c h t s wende?, pp. 116-27; Walter Grab, "Kritische Bemerkungen zur nationalen Apologetik Joachim Fests, Ernst Noltes, und Andreas Hillgrubers," 1 9 9 9 : Zeitschrift für S o z i a l g e s c h i c h t e des 2 0 . und 2 1 . J a h r h u n d e r t s 2 (1987) , pp. 151-57; G. Lozek, "Der Streit geht weiter: Zum Versuch einer apologetischen Revision des Faschismusbildes durch rechtskonservative Historiker der BRD," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 36 (1988) , pp. 5-12; Kurt Pätzold, "Wider die 'neue Auschwitzlüge,' " 1 9 9 9 : Zeitschrift für S o z i a l g e s c h i c h t e des 2 0 . und 2 1 . J a h r h u n d e r t s 2 (1987), pp. 158-69; Pätzold, "Wo der Weg nach Auschwitz begann", Blätter für deutsche und i n t e r n a t i o n a l e Politik 32, (1987), pp. 160-72; Pätzold, "Von Verlorenem, Gewonnenem, und Erstrebtem: Wohin der 'neue Revisionismus' steuert," ibid., 31 (1986), pp. 1452-63; H. Freeden, "Eine Debatte unter Deutschen: Wie israelische Geschichtsforscher auf die 'neue Unbefangenheit' reagieren," F r a n k f u r t e r R u n d s c h a u , November 14, 1986; P. Stadler, "Rückblick auf einen Historikerstreit. Versuch einer Beurteilung aus nichtdeutscher Sicht," H i s t o r i s c h e Zeitschrift 247 (1988), pp. 15-26. Some of the contributions to the debate have been published in G e r m a n i a : il passatio che n o n passa (Turin, 1987). The Piper volume on the Historikerstreit has been published in a French

N O T E S • 18 1 translation. Gustavo Corni, "Neue deutsche Unruhe? Das Ausland und der innerdeutsche Streit um die National- und Zeitgeschichte aus italienischer Sicht," in Streitfall D e u t s c h e G e s c h i c h t e . Geschichtsund G e g e n w a r t s b e w u s s t s e i n in den 80er Jahren (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Essen, 1988), pp. 131-40. Accounts of the debate in English include Geoff Eley, "Nazism, Politics, and the Image of the Past: Thoughts on the West German Historikerstreit, 1986-87" P a s t a n d Present 121 (November 1988), pp. 171-208; William E. Paterson, "From Vergangenheitsbewältigung to the Historikerstreit" (unpubl. typescript, July 1988); James H. Markham, "German Book Sets Off New Holocaust Debate," New York Times, September 6, 1986; Judith Miller, "Erasing the Past: Europe's Amnesia About the Holocaust," New York Times M a g a z i n e , November 16, 1986; Charles S. Maier, "Immoral Equivalence: Revising the Nazi Past for the Kohl Era," New R e p u b l i c , December 1,1986, pp. 36-41; Gordon A. Craig, "The War of the German Historians," New York Review o f Books, January 15, 1987, pp. 16-19; Jane Kramer, "Letter from Europe," New Yorker, October 12, 1987, pp. 130¬ 44; Peter Schneider: "Hitler's Shadow: On Being a Self-Conscious German," H a r p e r ' s , September 1987, pp. 49-54; Saul Friedländer, "West Germany and the Burden of the Past: The Ongoing Debate," J e r u s a l e m Q u a r t e r l y 42 (Spring 1987), pp. 3-18; Konrad H. Jarausch, "Removing the Nazi Stain? The Quarrel of the German Historians," G e r m a n S t u d i e s R e v i e w 11 (1988), pp. 285-301; Dan Diner, "The Historians' Controversy: Limits to the Historicization of National Socialism," Tikkun 2 (1987), pp. 74-78; Karen J. Winkler, "German Scholars Sharply Divided Over Place of Holocaust in History," The C h r o n i c l e o f H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n , May 27,1987, pp. 4-7; Amity Shlaes, "More History," The A m e r i c a n Spectator, April 1987, pp. 30-32; Hagen Schulze, "The Historikerstreit in Perspective: Report on a Conference About T h e Unresolved Past,' " G e r m a n History 6 (1988), pp. 65-69; Beatrice Heuser, "The Historikerstreit: Uniqueness and Comparability of the Holocaust," ibid., pp. 69-78; Peter Pulzer, "Germany: Whose History?" Times L i t e r a r y S u p p l e m e n t , October 2-8, 1987, pp. 1076-88; Peter Pulzer, "Germany Searches for a Less Traumatic Past," T h e L i s t e n e r 117, no. 3017 (June 25, 1987), pp. 16-18; Omer Bartov, "Historians on the Eastern Front: Andreas Hillgruber and Germany's Tragedy," Jahrbuch des Instituts für deutsche G e s c h i c h t e , Tel-Aviv 16 (1987), pp. 375-45. 21.

Erler, "Ohne Rücksicht," in Erler et a l , G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? , p. 124, citing articles by Lothar Höbelt in D i e Presse (Vienna) on October 18, 1986, by Alfred de Zayas in D i e Welt on December 13,1986, and by an anonymous writer for L e M o n d e on January 22, 1987. But see the outline of the views of Hans Koch given above, pp. 153-54, n. 26.

22. Saul Friedländer, "West Germany and the Burden of the Past: The Ongoing Debate," J e r u s a l e m Q u a r t e r l y 42 (Spring 1987), pp. 3-18, here p. 4; Peukert, "Wer gewann," p. 45; also, Gerd R. Ueberschär, "Deutsche Zeitgeschichte in Hitlers Schatten: Ein Überblick zum 'Historikerstreit' über die Ursprünge und Vergleichbarkeit der NS-Verbrechen," in Erler et al., G e s c h i c h t s w e n d e ? , pp. 62-85. The claim that Nolte and Hillgruber have encountered little opposition within the historical profession and have

182 • N O T E S somehow won the argument (Michael Buckmiller, "Vergangenheitsbemächtigung und die Gefahren für die Zukunft: Zur Auseinandersetzung über die Normalisierung der deutschen Geschichte," Vorgänge 25 [1986], pp. 47-59) is not borne out by the evidence, and rests on a number of faulty judgments (e.g., taking Joachim Hoffmann's views as representative of the Military History Research Office). 23. Ursula Homann, " E i n Ende ist noch nicht abzusehen: Historikerstreit: Chronologie, Fragen, und Probleme," Tribüne, 26 (1987), pp. 103-18. 24. David Cannadine, "British History: Past, Present—and Future?" Past a n d Present, no. 116, (August 1987), pp. 169-91; J. C. D. Clark, E n g l i s h Society, 1 6 8 8 - 1 8 3 2 : I d e o l o g y , Social S t r u c t u r e , a n d Political Practice D u r i n g t h e A n c i e n Régime (Cambridge, 1985); Clark, R e v o l u t i o n a n d R e b e l l i o n : State a n d Society in E n g l a n d in t h e 1 7 t h a n d 1 8 t h C e n t u r i e s (Cambridge, 1986). 25. Harvey J. Kaye, "The Use and Abuse of the Past: The New Right and the Crisis of History," in Ralph Miliband et al., (eds.), Socialist R e g i s t e r 1 9 8 7 (London, 1987), pp. 332-64, for a general account of this trend; Margaret Thatcher, "Let Me Give You My Vision," (1975), in Thatcher, L e t O u r C h i l d r e n Grow. Selected Speeches, 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 7 (London, 1977), p. 29, for the quotation. See also G. R. Elton, The F u t u r e o f t h e Past (Cambridge, 1986); Elton, The History o f E n g l a n d (Cambridge, 1984); Colin Hughes, "History Teaching Should Foster Pride in Britain, Joseph Says," The Times, August 24, 1984 (referring to the views of the then secretary of state for education); Keith Joseph, "Why Teach History in School?" The Historian 2 (1984), p. 12 (The Historian is the history teachers' magazine of the British Historical Association); Hugh Thomas, History, Capitalism, a n d F r e e d o m (London, 1985); Hugh Thomas, A n Unfinished History o f t h e World (London, 1979); Paul Johnson, The R e c o v e r y o f F r e e d o m (London, 1986); Johnson, A History o f t h e M o d e r n World (London, 1983). 26. William J. Bennett, "Lost Generation: Why America's Children Are Strangers in Their Own Land," Policy Review 33 (1985), p. 43; Gertrude Himmelfarb, The New History a n d t h e O l d (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); Theodore Draper, "Neo-conservative History," New York R e v i e w o f Books, January 16, 1986. 27. Winkler, "Auf ewig"; W. J. Mommsen, "Weder Leugnen noch Vergessen." 28. Mommsen, "Weder Leugnen"; also Lutz Niethammer et al. (eds.), D i e M e n s c h e n m a c h e n i h r e G e s c h i c h t e n i c h t a u s f r e i e n Stücken, a b e r sie m a c h e n sie selbst: E i n l a d u n g z u e i n e r G e s c h i c h t e des Volkes i n Nordrhein-Westfalen (Bonn, 1984), for a recent example of the "history" of a newly created L a n d . 29. See above, and, for work directly related to the current debate, Lutz Niethammer, " 'Normalisierung' im Westen: Erinnerungsspuren in die 50er Jahre," in Diner (ed.), Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte?, pp. 153-84; Peukert, "Alltag und Barbarei," ibid., pp. 51-61; Gerstenberger and Schmidt, Normalität. For a sample of A l l t a g s g e s c h i c h t e , see Hannes

N O T E S • 183 Heer and Volker Ullrich (eds.), G e s c h i c h t e e n t d e c k e n (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1985) or Detlev Peukert and Jürgen Reulecke (eds.), D i e R e i h e n f a s t geschlossen: Beiträge z u r G e s c h i c h t e des A l l t a g s u n t e r m Nationalsozialismus (Wuppertal, 1987). Most of this work is focused on urban or big-city communities. It should not be confused with the nostalgic recovery of the rural past exemplified in the film H e i m a t (see Kenneth D. Barkin, "Modern Germany: A Twisted Vision," Dissent, Spring 1987, pp. 252-55). 30. Broszat, Nach 31.

Hitler,

p. 321.

Luc Rosenzweig and Bernard Cohen, W a l d h e i m (New York, 1987).

32. Robert E. Herzstein, W a l d h e i m : The Missing Years (New York, 1988) is the most thorough and balanced treatment of the subject. Michael Palumbo, The W a l d h e i m F i l e s (London, 1988), is an attempt to exonerate Waldheim; it is unbalanced in its treatment and highly speculative in its theories about the role of various national intelligence agencies in the affair. Richard Bassett, W a l d h e i m a n d A u s t r i a (New York, 1988), is a superficial, journalistic account. For connections to the present debate, see Gerhard Botz, "Österreich und die NS-Vergangenheit: Verdrängung, Pflichterfüllung, Geschichtsklitterung," in Diner (ed.), Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte?, pp. 141-52. More generally, see Anton Pelinka and Erika Weinzierl (eds.), D a s grosse Tabu. Österreichs U m g a n g mit seiner V e r g a n g e n h e i t (Vienna, 1987). 33. Hans Filbinger, D i e geschmähte G e n e r a t i o n (Munich, 1987). Filbinger welcomes the neoconservative reinterpretation of recent German history (pp. 249-55), and expresses the hope that critical histories of Nazi crimes will be balanced by information on the "terror bombing" of Dresden and the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe after the war. For a recent critical study of the military justice system under the Nazis, which Filbinger portrays as an area of resistance to Nazism (pp. 86-88), see Manfred Messerschmidt and F. Wüllner, D i e Wehrmachtsjustiz im D i e n s t e des Nationalsozialismus (Baden-Baden, 1987). Messerschmidt was a member of the Historians' Commission appointed by Waldheim to investigate the Austrian president's war career. 34. The sources for this account of the Jenninger affair, including the full text of the speech, are in D i e Zeit 47 (November 18,1988), pp. 1-7. Here again, however, most of the journalists who comment on the speech are at a loss to find convincing reasons for the uproar. The most sensible commentary is by Walter Jens, "Ungehaltene Worte über eine gehaltene Rede," ibid., p. 3. 35. Jörg Friedrich, D i e kalte A m n e s t i e : NS-Täter in der B u n d e s r e p u b l i k (Frankfurt, 1985); see also Niels Kadritzke, "Zweierlei Untergang in düsterer Verflechtung: Zur politischen Dimension der 'Historiker-Debatte,' " P r o b l e m e des K l a s s e n k a m p f s , no. 66 (March 1987), pp. 169-84; Angelika Ebbinghaus (ed.), D a s D a i m l e r - B e n z B u c h : E i n Rüstungskonzern im "Tausendjährigen R e i c h " (Nördlingen, 1987). 36. See the attempt at a balance in Eckhard Jesse, " 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung' in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," D e r Staat, 26 (1987), pp.

184 • N O T E S 539-65. This is more sensible than Jesse's subsequent intervention (p. 177, n.6, above). For further reflections, see Arno Klönne, " 'HistorikerDebatte' " und " 'Kulturrevolution von rechts,' " in Reinhard Kühnl (ed.), V e r g a n g e n h e i t , d i e n i c h t vergeht. D i e "Historiker-Debatte. "Darstellung, D o k u m e n t a t i o n , K r i t i k (Cologne, 1987), pp. 317-30. 37. Karl-Heinz Reuband, "Sanktionsverlangen im Wandel: Die Einstellung zur Todesstrafe in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit 1950," Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und S o z i a l p s y c h o l o g i e 32 (1980), pp. 535-58. 38. H. Mommsen, "Suche nach der verlorenen Geschichte," p. 873. 39. Ibid.; see also above. 40. Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, D i e verletzte Nation: Über den Versuch der D e u t s c h e n , i h r e n C h a r a k t e r z u ändern (Stuttgart, 1987). 41.

Werner Weidenfeld, "Am Pulsschlag der verletzten Nation: Was die Bundesbürger hoffen und fürchten," D i e Zeit, April 10, 1987 (reviewing Noelle-Neumann and Köcher).

42. Walter Laqueur, G e r m a n y Today:

A Personal

R e p o r t (London, 1985).

43. Some years ago, it seemed that this was not so, and that West Germany was losing its historical consciousness like other advanced industrial societies were. This view, which reflected the assumptions of modernist culture, no longer seems very plausible today. See Richard J. Evans, "Rethinking the German Past," in W. Paterson and G. Smith (eds.), The West G e r m a n M o d e l : Perspectives o n a S t a b l e State (London, 1981), pp. 134-48. 44. " 'Unser Endziel ist der Bundestag?' Der Parteivorsitzende Franz Schönhuber über die Zukunft der Republikaner," D e r Spiegel 6 (1989), pp. 28-32; Hans-Georg Betz, " D e u t s c h l a n d p o l i t i k on the Margins: On the Evolution of Contemporary New Right Nationalism in the Federal Republic," New G e r m a n C r i t i q u e 44 (1988), pp. 127-57, here pp. 145,148 (Betz's translations). 45. Thus, for example, Saul Friedländer notes that Nolte's claim, based on an argument advanced by David Irving, that Hitler would have been justified in "interning" the Jews because of Weizmann's alleged statement that they could fight on Britain's side in the war, derives ultimately from a pamphlet used by Goebbels in Nazi propaganda and employed repeatedly since 1945 in neo-Nazi literature denying the existence of the "Final Solution." See Friedländer, "West Germany," pp. 12-14; and Wolfgang Benz, "Judenvernichtung aus Notwehr? Die Legenden um Theodore N. Kaufman," Vierteljahrshefte für Z e i t g e s c h i c h t e 29 (1981), pp. 615-30. Gill Seidel ( T h e Holocaust D e n i a l , p. 95) notes that characteristic neofascist arguments, such as those advanced by the self-proclaimed fascist writer Maurice Bardeche, include the assertions that the Allies were also guilty of war crimes, that the Nazis were fighting a preventive war, that the Treaty of Versailles enslaved the Germans, and that a strong state is necessary to fight Communism. See also Arno J. Mayer, Why D i d t h e

N O T E S • 185 H e a v e n s Not D a r k e n ? : The " F i n a l S o l u t i o n " in History (New York, 1988), esp. pp. 145-46, 246, 298, 321, 335-36, and 415, for the examples of Nazi propaganda referred to above. See also Hannah Arendt, E i c h m a n n in J e r u s a l e m : A R e p o r t o n the Ranality o f E v i l (New York, 1964). For Nazi claims about the "Bromberg massacre," see Burleigh, G e r m a n y T u r n s Eastward, pp. 182-3. For a characterization of Nolte's arguments as a "regression back to the brew of racist-nationalistic ideologies of the interwar period," see Hans Mommsen, "Das Ressentiment als Wissenschaft," p. 512. As Mommsen notes, Nolte deliberately seems to wipe out the distinction between Hitler's view of anti-Semitism and that of his interpreter (p. 502). For the relation of a number of Nolte's theses to Nazi propaganda, see Ian Kershaw, T h e Nazi D i c t a t o r s h i p : P r o b l e m s a n d Pers p e c t i v e s o f I n t e r p r e t a t i o n (2nd ed., London, 1989), pp. 174-8.

FURTHER R E A D I N G

Contributions to the debate which is the subject of this book now number well over a thousand, and the degree of repetition is such that no useful purpose would be served by providing a full bibliography. The following notes are intended merely as an introductory guide to the major and most representative publications, up to the end of 1988. The main contributions to the debate have been conveniently collected in R. Piper (ed.), "Historikerstreit": D i e D o k u m e n t a t i o n der K o n t r o v e r s e u m d i e E i n z i g a r t i g k e i t der nationalsozialistischen J u d e n v e r n i c h t u n g (Munich, 1987). This is the essential starting point. An English translation is in preparation. Charles S. Maier, The U n m a s t e r a b l e Past: History, Holocaust, a n d G e r m a n N a t i o n a l I d e n t i t y (Cambridge, Mass., 1988) is a recent survey of the debate that is especially good on the theoretical and methodological aspects. A guide to the political background is provided by Geoffrey Hartman (ed.), B i t b u r g i n Moral a n d Political Perspective (Bloomington, 1986). The most useful general introduction to the way in which historians have approached the history of Nazi Germany is Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictators h i p : P r o b l e m s a n d Perspectives o f I n t e r p r e t a t i o n (2nd ed., London, 1989). This edition contains two new chapters on the Historikerstreit and the "historicization" of Nazism. The most comprehensive general introduction to Nazism itself is Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), Nazism, 1919-1945: A Docum e n t a r y Reader, 4 vols. (Exeter, 1984-91). The final volume in the set is still under preparation at the present time. When completed, it will, with excellent commentaries by Jeremy Noakes, constitute the best single history of Nazism in English. Older, but still valuable, is Karl Dietrich Bracher, The G e r m a n D i c t a t o r s h i p (London, 1969). Michael Burleigh, G e r m a n y T u r n s Eastwards: A S t u d y o f Ostforschung i n t h e T h i r d R e i c h (Cambridge, 1988), is a brilliant and

FURTHER

R E A D I N G • 187

chilling study of how historians who play politics can become involved in mass murder; it also casts light on a number of points at issue in the present debate, as does Omer Bartov, The E a s t e r n F r o n t 1 9 4 1 - 4 5 . G e r m a n Troops a n d t h e B a r b a r i z a t i o n o f Warfare (London, 1985), a book which is, however, so badly written as to be scarcely readable at times. The best account of the debate is by a group of historians associated with the Military History Research Office in Freiburg: Gemot Erler, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Ulrich Rose, Thomas Schnabel, Gerd Ueberschär, and Wolfram Wette, Ges c h i c h t s w e n d e ? E n t s o r g u n g s v e r s u c h e z u r deutschen G e s c h i c h t e (Freiburg, 1987) . The authors' attempts to distinguish among the politicians between Kohl and Weizsäcker on the one hand, and Strauss and Dregger on the other, are not always very persuasive, however. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, E n t s o r g u n g der deutschen V e r g a n g e n h e i t ? E i n p o l e m i s c h e r Essay z u m "Historikerstreit" (Munich, 1988) , engages usefully with the central issues, but sees the debate too much in terms of individual personalities. Imanuel Geiss, D i e H a b e r m a s - K o n t r o v e r s e . E i n deutscher Streit (Berlin, 1988) is a painstaking and well-written attempt to redress the balance in favor of Nolte; essential reading, but concentrates too much on secondary issues. Stefan Melnik, "Annotierte ausgewählte Bibliographie zur Historikerdebatte" L i b e r a l 29 (1987), pp. 85-95, is a good basic guide to the early literature. Reinhard Kühnl (ed.), V e r g a n g e n h e i t , d i e n i c h t v e r g e h t : D i e "Historiker-Debatte": D a r s t e l l u n g , D o k u m e n t a t i o n , K r i t i k (Cologne, 1987) , is a collection of the major contributions with commentaries from a point of view more or less identified with the West German Communist Party, but the contributions have in many cases been abridged, and the Piper volume is preferable. Dan Diner (ed.), Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Z u r Historisierung und Historikerstreit (Frankfurt, 1987), is a very stimulating collection of articles, many of which reflect the international dimension of the debate. Hilmar Hoffmann (ed.), Gegen den Versuch, V e r g a n g e n h e i t z u v e r b i e g e n : E i n e Diskussion u m p o l i t i s c h e K u l t u r in der B u n d e s r e p u b l i k a u s A n l a s s der F r a n k f u r t e r Römerberggespräche 1 9 8 6 (Frankfurt, 1986), contains the proceedings, and some of the papers, of the conference which began the debate. Streitfall Deutsche G e s c h i c h t e . G e s c h i c h t s - und G e g e n w a r t s b e w u s s t s e i n i n den 80er Jahren (hg. von der Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Essen, 1988) is an outstanding set of papers, broadly speaking by supporters of the Habermas line. The same source has also produced a thoughtful account of the debate in its broader historical and political context: Bernd Faulenbach and Rainer Bölling, G e s c h i c h t s b e w u s s t s e i n und historisch-politische B i l d u n g in der B u n d e s r e p u b l i k D e u t s c h l a n d . Beiträge z u m "Historikerstreit" (Düsseldorf, 1988) . Wieland Eschenhagen (ed.), D i e neue deutsche I d e o l o g i e : Einsprüche gegen d i e E n t s o r g u n g der V e r g a n g e n h e i t (Darmstadt, 1988), a collection based on lectures delivered at Paderborn (with one exception) by nonhistorians, is less useful; the lectures either tend not to address themselves to the central issues, or, if they do, overshoot the mark. Helga Grebing et al., Von der Verdrängung z u r B a g a t e l l i s i e r u n g . A s p e k t e des s o g e n a n n t e n Historikerstreits (Hanover, 1988), is preferable. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Vom hilflosen A n t i f a s c h i s m u s z u r G n a d e der späten G e b u r t (Berlin, 1987) a markedly left-wing contribution to the debate, makes

1 88 • F U R T H E R

READING

some provocative points, but buries them in a style that is so dense and so complex that it is often nearly impossible to tease them out. Heidi Gerstenberger and Dorothea Schmidt (eds.), Normalität oder N o r m a l i s i e r u n g ? Geschichtswerkstätten und F a s c h i s m u s a n a l y s e (Münster, 1987), prints articles from the German "history workshop" movement that are mostly, at best, tangential to the debate. Eike Hennig, Z u m Historikerstreit: Was heisst und z u w e l c h e m Ende s t u d i e r t m a n Geschichte? (Frankfurt, 1988), like Haug's book, contains previously published work not directly relevant to the discussion, and is written in rather inaccessible language. Probably the most stimulating discussion of the debate from a position to the left of Habermas is Heinrich Senfft, D e r B l i c k zurück: H i n t e r den F a s s a d e n des Historikerstreits (Nördlingen, 1989). Geoff Eley, "Nazism, Politics and the Image of the Past: Thoughts on the West G e r m a n Historikerstreit 1986-1987," Past a n d Present 121 (1988), pp. 171-208, is the best treatment from the left in English. The original participants in the debate have mostly printed their contributions, with additional material, in books of essays: Hans Mommsen, A u f der Suche n a c h h i s t o r i s c h e r Normalität: Beiträge z u m G e s c h i c h t s b i l d s t r e i t i n der B u n d e s r e p u b l i k (Berlin, 1987), is one such collection. Another is Christian Meier, 40 Jahre n a c h A u s c h w i t z : D e u t s c h e G e s c h i c h t s e r i n n e r u n g h e u t e (Munich, 1987). Jürgen Habermas, E i n e A r t S c h a d e n s a b w i c k l u n g (Frankfurt, 1987) , contains the full versions of his contributions; Michael Stürmer, Disson a n z e n des F o r t s c h r i t t s : Essays über G e s c h i c h t e und Politik i n D e u t s c h l a n d (Munich, 1986), omits some of his. Michael Stürmer, D e u t s c h e F r a g e n : O d e r d i e Suche n a c h der Staatsräson (Munich, 1988), is a collection of his more directly political pieces. N e w G e r m a n Critique, one of the liveliest American journals covering German cultural life, devoted its issue number 44 (Spring/Summer 1988) to the debate; the issue contains an excellent selection of translated original contributions (including two of Habermas's articles) and commentaries (by Mary Nolan and Anson Rabinbach, among others). Of particular interest is the exchange between Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer on the "Historicization of National Socialism" (pp. 81-126) originally published in the Vierteljahrsheftefür Z e i t g e s c h i c h t e 36 (1988), pp. 339-72. Hagen Schulze, Wir s i n d , was wir g e w o r d e n s i n d : Vom N u t z e n der G e s c h i c h t e für d i e deutsche Gegenwart (Munich, 1987), gives a broad-based selection of Schulze's views. Stürmer's D a s r u h e l o s e R e i c h and Schulze's Weimar are also essential; both volumes appear in the Siedler history series D i e D e u t s c h e n und i h r e Nation, and together are an important statement of some central themes of the neoconservatives. Andreas Hillgruber has added to his original contribution, Z w e i e r l e i Untergang: D i e Z e r s c h l a g u n g des D e u t s c h e n Reiches und d a s Ende des europäischen Judentums (Berlin, 1986), one new text, D i e Zerstörung E u r o p a s : Beiträge z u r G e s c h i c h t e der W e l t k r i e g s e p o c h e (Berlin, 1988), which, however, is not always directly related to the central questions in the debate. Ernst Nolte has produced a major book, D e r europäische Bürgerkrieg 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 4 5 : Nationalsozialismus und B o l s h e w i s m u s (Frankfurt, 1987), and a collection of essays and critiques, D a s Vergehen der V e r g a n g e n h e i t : A n t w o r t a n m e i n e K r i t i k e r im s o g e n a n n t e n Historikerstreit (2nd ed., Berlin, 1988). Thefirstbook is perhaps the central text in the whole controversy: the second, unfortunately, contains numerous extracts from correspondence, interviews, and articles instead of the complete

FURTHER

R E A D I N G • 189

texts, has little of substance to add to Nolte's original exposition of his theses, and makes virtually no attempt at a direct reply to the criticisms which have been made on grounds of historical accuracy or persuasiveness. Some of Nolte's views are available in English in Ernst Nolte, "Between Myth and Revisionism?: The Third Reich in the Perspective of the 1980s," in H. W. Koch (ed.), Aspects o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h (New York, 1985), pp. 17-38 (abridged by the editor without the author's permission). Among the more interesting reviews of Nolte's Bürgerkrieg are D. Beyrau, "Archipel Gulag und Auschwitz," G e s c h i c h t e , Politik und i h r e D i d a k t i k 16 (1988), pp. 95-104; Heinrich Senfft, in 1 9 9 9 : Zeitschrift für S o z i a l g e s c h i c h t e des 2 0 . und 2 1 . J a h r h u n d e r t s 3 (1988), 134-7; the magisterial critique by Hans Mommsen, "Das Ressentiment als Wissenschaft. Anmerkungen zu Ernst Noltes 'Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus,' " G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 14 (1988), pp. 495-540; and the detailed account by Wolfgang Schieder, "Der Nationalsozialismus im Fehlurteil philosophischer Geschichtsschreibung. Zur Methode von Ernst Nolte's 'Europäischem Bürgerkrieg,' " G e s c h i c h t e und Gesellschaft 15 (1989), 89-114, which usefully links Nolte to the recent controversy about the pro-Nazi sympathies of his teacher Martin Heidegger. Klaus Hildebrand (ed.), Wem gehört d i e deutsche Geschichte? D e u t s c h l a n d s Weg vom a l t e n E u r o p a in d i e europäische M o d e r n e (Cologne, 1987) is a useful guide to the wider field of conservative thinking on modern German history. The political and ideological background to the debate has also been the subject of some discussion. Claus Leggewie, D e r Geist steht rechts: Ausflüge in d i e D e n k f a b r i k e n der W e n d e (Berlin, 1987) and Hermannus Pfeiffer (ed.), D i e F A Z : N a c h f o r s c h u n g e n über e i n Z e n t r a l o r g a n (Cologne, 1988), are useful guides. A particularly significant text is the attempt by the right-wing extremist Rolf Kosiek to draw comfort from the dispute: Historikerstreit und G e s c h i c h t srevision (Tübingen, 1987). Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker's moderate and conciliatory views are available in his A Voice f r o m G e r m a n y (London, 1985). Finally, the most extreme manifestations of "revisionism" are discussed, against their contemporary background in the emergence of the New Right, by Gill Seidel, The Holocaust D e n i a l : A n t i s e m i t i s m , Racism, a n d t h e New R i g h t (London, 1986). Those who want to delve further into the debate are referred to the numerous articles and other contributions cited in the notes above.

INDEX

Abraham, David, 118 Adenauer, Konrad, 11, 21 Amin, Idi, 86 anti-Semitism, 66, 68-71; see also Jews, Nazi campaign against Aretin, Karl Otmar von, 15 Armenians, Turkish massacre of, 27, 86 Ash, Timothy Garton, 17, 105 Aspects o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h (Koch), 31 assassination plot against Hitler, 63-65 Auschwitz Trials of 1964, 13 Austria, 50 annexed by Germany, 8, 101 national consciousness, 101-2 Waldheim affair, 128-30 Barbie, Klaus, 122 Bartov, Omer, 59, 90 Bebel, August, 125 beer-hall putsch of 1923, 29, 37 Bennett, William, 124-25 Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, 17 Berlin, 10, 100

biologistic ideology of the Nazis, 77-80 Bitburg cemetery affair of 1985, 16-17, 127 Blüm, Norbert, 49 Bradley, Omar N., 5 Brandt, Willy, 13, 14 Bromberg Bloody Sunday incident of 1939, 56-57 Broszat, Martin, 18-19, 53, 118-19, 120 Cambodia, 86, 87 Cannadine, David, 124 capitalism in West Germany, 133 capital punishment, West Germans' attitude toward, 134 Carstens, Karl, 19 C e n t r a l E u r o p e a n History, 47 Chamberlain, Neville, 39, 52 Chelmno concentration camp, 9 Churchill, Winston S., 52 Clark, J. C. D., 124 Collapse of the Weimar Republic (Abraham), 118 conservative perspective on Nazism, 113-15

192 • INDEX Nazi propaganda as basis for arguments of, 138-39 see also T e n d e n z w e n d e movement; specific writers, e.g., Hillgruber, Andreas; Nolte, Ernst constitution of West Germany, 136 Contemporary History Research Center, 19 C o r r i e r e d e l l a Sera, 131 Craig, Gordon A., 53, 71-72 Crowe, Sir Eyre, 52, 109 Curzon Line, 96 Czechoslovakia, 8, 50, 101 ethnic Germans in, 97-98 Daimler-Benz company, 132-33 democracy in West Germany, 133-35 "destruction of Germany as war aim of Allies" theory, 49-53 division of Europe, positive aspects of, 99-100 division of Germany, 10, 98-99 Diwald, Hellmut, 15 Dregger, Alfred, 19, 55, 105, 132 "economic miracle" of postwar years, 11 Eichmann, Adolf, 13, 139 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 5 Elton, G. R., 124 Erhard, Ludwig, 11 ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe, transfer of, 92, 94, 109-10 Allies' purpose in, 49-53, 54, 95-98 brutality toward Germans, 94 as genocide, 94-95 Hillgruber's interpretation of, 49-53, 54, 95, 98, 99, 100 long-term effects, 99-100 Nazi program for, 95 Nolte's interpretation of, 94-95 eugenics, 79 E u r o p e a n Civil War (Nolte), 27, 28, 33, 82

"Europe as world power led by Germany" proposal, 99-100 euthanasia program, 9, 12, 78 fascism, studies of, 24, 26 Fatherland Party, 68 Fest, Joachim, 35, 89, 90, 135 Filbinger, Hans, 130 Final Solution: see Jews, Nazi campaign against Fischer, Fritz, 113 F o r e i g n Policy o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h (Hildebrand), 42 "forgotten victims" of Nazism, 78-80 Fox, John P., 76 France, 8, 61-62, 115, 117, 122 Frank, Hans, 39 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15, 19, 20, 21, 27, 35, 43, 105, 123 "Frankfurt School" of Marxist social scientists, 112 Freeman, E . A., 117 Freikorps, 104, 108 Gay, Peter, 26, 27 Geiss, Imanuel, 33, 53, 85 geopolitical explanation of German history, 104-5, 106-7 German Army's conduct on eastern front, 49-50, 55-62 German Democratic Republic (GDR), 10, 12, 22, 102, 105-6, 122 German Historical Museum, 18 "German way" of thinking, 111-13 Germany, West, and connections with Hitler's Third Reich: economic continuities, 132-33 legal continuities, 132 oversensitiveness to, 128-32 political culture and, 135-40 positive developments from Nazi experience, 133-35 responsibility for crimes as opposed to guilt, 139-40 ultrarightists, emergence of, 136-38

INDEX • 193 G e r m a n y a n d t h e C o l d War (Nolte), 26-27 Gibbon, Edward, 34 Goebbels, Joseph, 18, 39, 46, 72, 138, 139 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 18 "grass-roots" history in West Germany, 125-27 Great Britain, 8, 117, 124 "great man" approach to history, revival of, 119-20 Green Party, 103, 127 Guderian, Heinz Wilhelm, 84 Gypsies, 78, 79-80 Habermas, Jürgen, 71, 72, 112-13 Hanns-Martin-Schleyer Foundation, 21 Hartwell, R. M., 117 Heinemann, Gustav, 125 Henlein, Konrad, 97-98 Herzstein, Robert, 129 Heydrich, Reinhard, 58 Heym, Stefan, 130 Hilberg, Raul, 82 Hildebrand, Klaus, 42-43, 44, 53, 73, 104 Hillgruber, Andreas, 47, 49, 73, 119 on anti-Semitism, 66, 68-69 on assassination plot against Hitler, 63 on campaign against the Jews, 49, 53-55, 68, 71-72, 73-74, 89 "destruction of Germany as war aim of Allies" theory, 49-53 "Europe as world power led by Germany" proposal, 99, 100 on German national identity, 21-22 international standing of, 123 on invasion of Soviet Union, 44, 58 on transfer of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, 49-53, 54, 95, 98, 99, 100 Himmelfarb, Gertrude, 125 Himmler, Heinrich, 72 historical scholarship in West Germany, vii-viii, 22-23

bitterness of the current debate, 116-18 critical attitudes toward the past, stifling of, 121-22 future of, 123-24 geopolitical focus, 104-5, 106-7 government's influence on, 121 "grass-roots" history, 125-27 "great man" approach, 119-20 historicization of Nazism, 120 international interest in, 122 liberal and conservative factions, division into, 113-15 media's role, 121, 123 "Nazism as accident" perspective of postwar years, 11-12 outsider's view of, 115-16 political significance, 135-40 Prussian tradition of historicism, 118-19 social history, 119-20 "victory" for liberals in current debate, 122-23 Western scholarship and, 124-25 see also conservative perspective on Nazism; liberal perspective on Nazism historicization of Nazism, 120 "historiography of Third Reich as written from the perspective of the victors" theory, 32-33 H i s t o r i s c h e Zeitschrift, 42 History o f t h e G e r m a n s (Diwald), 15 Hitler, Adolf, 7, 29 administrative style, 73 assassination plot against, 63-65 Bolshevik violence in Germany, alleged fear of, 31-32, 37-38 campaign against the Jews, alleged sole responsibility for, 68, 71-72, 73-74, 81-82 ethnic Germans, plans for, 95, 97 Jews, fear and hatred of, 30-31, 35-36, 38-39, 68, 75-76, 77 postwar European settlement, plans for, 50 postwar portrayal of, 11-12 Soviet Union, invasion of, 9, 42-44, 46

194 • I N D E X Hitlerism, Nazism as, 73-74 Hobsbawm, Eric, 117 Hoffmann, Joachim, 43-44, 123 House of the History of the Federal Republic, 18 Ireland, Northern, 135-36 Irving, David, 38, 76 Israel, 12, 122 Italy, 122 Jäckel, Eberhard, 53, 86 Japan, 90 Japanese citizens in U.S., internment of, 38-39 Jenninger, Philipp, 130-32 Jewish World Congress, 129, 131 Jews, Nazi campaign against ("Final Solution"), 6, 8, 9 assassination of Hitler, possible impact of, 63-64 biologistic ideology, outcome of, 77-80 Communist threat, alleged response to, 27-29, 30-32, 35-39 concentration camp conditions, 5-6 cumulative and unplanned process of collective decision-making, outcome of, 75-76 denial of reality of, 83 genocidal acts of twentieth century, comparison with, 27, 31, 53-54, 80-81, 86-89 genocidal policies adopted by other nations, alleged copy of, 27-29, 81, 84-85 German elites' complicity in, 74-77 German people's alleged ignorance of, 71, 81-82, 85 as gratuitous and based on fantasy, 40-41 Hillgruber's interpretation, 49, 53-55, 68, 71-72, 73-74, 89 Hitler's sole responsibility, portrayed as, 68, 71-72, 73-74, 81-82

Japanese internment in U.S., comparison with, 38-39 "Jewish threat," alleged response to, 30-31, 38-39, 82, 84 Nazi hierarchy's support for, 72 Nazis' intentions prior to 1941, 75-78 Nolte's interpretation of, 27-29, 30-32, 35-39, 80-89 policies and traditions of advanced European societies, comparison with, 89-91 policy decisions, evidence of, 6-7, 73 postulated similar, prior acts by Allies, alleged response to, 81, 85-86 racist anti-Semitism, development of, 66, 68, 69-71 resettlement of European populations, alleged context of, 54-55 as unique phenomenon, 27, 78-79, 89, 90-91 Kennedy, Paul, 119 Kershaw, Ian, 71 Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, 11 Koch, Hans W., 31 Kohl, Helmut, 15, 16, 17, 18, 105, 121, 132, 137 Lanzmann, Claude, 6 Lenin, V. I., 81, 84, 87 liberal perspective on Nazism, 12-14, 113-15 Liddell Hart, B. H., 56 Liebknecht, Karl, 29, 36, 104-5, 125 Luxemburg, Rosa, 29, 36, 104-5 Maariv, 130 Maier, Charles, 88, 91 Marcuse, Herbert, 112 Marxism a n d the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n (Nolte), 27 Mein K a m p f (Hitler), 29, 36, 46 Melgunov, S. P., 37

INDEX • 195 Mommsen, Hans, 53, 74-75, 76 Müller, Helmut, 33-34 Munich Agreement of 1938, 8, 98 museums on history, 18-19 national identity of^the Germans, 18-22, 101-4, 105-6 "Nazism as accident" perspective of postwar years, 11-12 "Nazism as response to Communism" theory, 27 campaign against Jews, interpretation of, 27-29, 30-32, 35-39 criticisms of, 35-42 German Army's conduct on eastern front, interpretation of, 56-61 Gulag-concentration camp relationship, 27-29, 35 invasion of Soviet Union, interpretation of, 31, 42-46 as supposedly justified reaction, 29-30 New York Post, 129 "Night of Broken Glass" (Reichs¬ k r i s t a l l n a c h t ) of 1938, 39 Jenninger's speech on, 130-32 1 9 8 4 (Orwell), 31, 37 Nipperdey, Thomas, 44 Nolte, Ernst, 20-21, 53, 140 apology for modern Germany, 26-27 campaign against the Jews, interpretation of, 27-29, 30- 32, 35-39, 80-89 criticisms of his work, 26-27, 84-89, 122, 123 "Europe as world power led by Germany" proposal, 99, 100 fascism, study of, 24, 26 "historiography of Third Reich as written from the perspective of the victors" theory, 32-33 international standing of, 123 manner of argument, 33-34 on rule of law by Nazis, 39-40 on transfer of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, 94-95

see also "Nazism as response to Communism" theory Nordhausen concentration camp, 5 Noske, Gustav, 44 Nuremberg Laws of 1935, 8, 77 Nuremberg Trials of 1946, 6, 59, 72, 109 Orwell, George, 31, 37 "Past That Will Not Pass Away" (Nolte), 20 Patton, George S., 5 Peukert, Detlev, 79, 117 Poland, 8, 50, 97 ethnic Germans killed by partisans, 56-57, 86 western boundary extension after World War II, 51, 95-97 political culture of modern West Germany, 135-40 Pol Pot, 86, 87 Potsdam Conference of 1945, 50, 92 Protocols o f t h e E l d e r s o f Zion, 70 Prussian tradition of historicism, revival of, 118-19 Pulzer, Peter, 105, 111 Reagan, Ronald, 16-17, 40, 55, 124, 127 R e d Terror in Russia (Melgunov), 37 • Republican Party, 136-37 resistance to Hitler in Germany, 64-65 reunification of Germany, 22, 54-55, 101-2 national identity developed through, 102-4, 105-6 relativization of Nazi crimes and, 102 ultrarightists' demand for, 136-37 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 27 Rosenberg, Alfred, 35 Round, J. H., 117 "rule of law" under Nazism, 39-40

196 • INDEX Scheubner-Richter, Max Erwin von, 27, 35 Schickel, Alfred, 19 Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 17 Schleyer, Hanns-Martin, 21 Schmidt, Helmut, 13, 15 Schmidt, Manfred, 72 Schönhuber, Franz, 136-37 Schulze, Hagen, 53, 102, 103, 104-5, 111, 119 Sherman, Sir Alfred, 40 S h o a h (film), 6, 31 singularity of German history, 114 social history, proponents of, 119-20 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, 28 South Africa, 127 Soviet Union: Army's conduct in Germany, 61-62 German invasion of, 9, 31, 42-46, 56-61 Gulag labor camps, 27-28, 29, 35 nonaggression pact with Germany, 8 terror under Stalin, 87-89 Speer, Albert, 72 Spiegel, Der, 137 Stalin, Josef, 8, 31, 42, 43-44, 45, 50, 51, 85, 87, 88-89, 96 Stegemann, Bernd, 44, 123 Strauss, Franz Josef, 19 Streicher, Julius, 72 Streit, Christian, 60 Stürmer, Michael, 21, 44, 103-4, 105, 111, 112, 114, 116, 119, 122, 123 Suvorov, Viktor, 44, 45 Tageszeitung, D i e , 121 Taylor, A. J. P., 117 Teheran Conference of 1943, 95-96 T e n d e n z w e n d e ("change of tack") movement: conference of conservative historians (1986), 21-22 government leaders' role in, 15-18

positive historical orientation promoted by, 18-22 right-wing research and, 19-20 Thatcher, Margaret, 124 T h i r d R e i c h (Hildebrand), 42 Thomas, Hugh, 124 T h r e e Faces o f F a s c i s m (Nolte), 20, 24, 26 Tirpitz, Alfred von, 68 Trevor-Roper, Hugh R., 117 Tucholsky, Kurt, 30, 37 Two K i n d s o f Downfall (Hillgruber), 47, 49 Ulbricht, Walter, 30 ultraright views, proliferation in modern West Germany, 136-38 United States, 9, 38-39, 117-18, 122, 124-25 universal significance of Nazism, 127 Versailles Treaty of 1919, 104, 105, 106, 107 Waldheim, Kurt, 18, 128-30 Wannsee Conference, 83 Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, 37, 115 Weimar (Schulze), 119 Weimar Republic, destruction of, 107-9, 116 Weizmann, Chaim, 30-31, 38-39, 82, 84 Weizsäcker, Richard von, 17-18, 65, 137 Western political culture, Germany's opening to, 112-13, 115 W i e d e r g u t m a c h u n g ("putting things right") process, 12 Wiesel, Elie, 17 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 69 Winkler, Heinrich August, 53, 101 World War I , origins of, 104-5, 106-7 Zionist World Congress, 31, 38, 39

ABOUT THE

AUTHOR

R i c h a r d J. E v a n s has b e e n professor o f E u r o p e a n hist o r y a t the U n i v e r s i t y of East A n g l i a since 1983, a n d the author and editor of n u m e r o u s books o n m o d e r n G e r m a n history. I n 1989, h ewas a p p o i n t e d professor of history atBirkbeck College, University of L o n d o n .