Implementing the Climate Regime : International Compliance 9781849771689, 1849771685

Table of contents :
Content: Cover
Implementing the Climate Regime
Copyright
Contents
Preface
Notes on Contributors
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Introduction and Main Findings
Part I: The Kyoto Compliance Regime
Chapter 1. The Negotiation of a Kyoto Compliance System
Chapter 2. The Kyoto Compliance System
Part II: Challenges to Effective Operation of the COmpliance Regime
Chapter 3. Flexibility, Compliance and Norm Development in the Climate Regime
Chapter 4. Reporting and Verification of Emissions and Removals of Greenhouse Gases
Chapter 5. Effective Enforcement and Double-edged Deterrents. Part III: External Enforcement --
Parties and Non-partiesChapter 6. The Pros and Cons of External Enforcement
Chapter 7. Trade Measures, WTO and Climate Compliance
Part IV: Compliance, NGOs and International Governance
Chapter 8. The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance
Chapter 9. Major Oil Companies in Climate Policy
Chapter 10. Enhancing Climate Compliance
Epilogue: The Future of Kyoto's Compliance System
Index.

Citation preview

implementing the

CLIMATE REGIME

Edited by Olav schram stokke, Jon Hovi and Geir Ulfstein

IM P L E M E N T IN G TH E C L IM A T E R E G IM E

IM P L E M E N T IN G T H E C L IM A T E R E G IM E I n te rn a tio n a l C o m p l ia n c e

Edited by Olav Schram Stokke, Jon Hovi and Geir Ulfstein

IQHKÎElSâHKI London • Sterling, VA

First pu b lished by E arth scan in the U K and U SA in 2005 C o p y rig h t © T h e F rid tjo f N an se n Institute, 2005 All r i g h t s r e s e r v e d IS B N :

1 -8 4407-161-8 hard b a ck

T ype se ttin g by T h e F rid tjo f N an sen Institute Printed and b ou nd in the U K by C ro m w e ll Press Ltd. T ro w b rid g e C o v e r design by D a n n y Gillespie F o r a full list o f p u b licatio n s please contact: E arthscan 8 - 1 2 C a m d e n H igh Street L o n d o n , N W I 0JII, U K T e l : + 4 4 (0)20 73 87 8558 Fax: + 4 4 (0)20 7387 8998 Email: e a rth in fo @ e a rth sc a n .c o .u k W eb: w w w .ea rth sc a n .c o .u k 2 288 3 Q u ick silv er D rive, Sterling. V A 2 0 1 6 6 -2 0 1 2 . U SA E arthscan is an im p rin t o f J a m e s and Jam es (S cien ce Publishers) Ltd and pub lishes in association with the International Institute for E n v iro n m e n t and D ev e lo p m e n t A cata log ue record for this b oo k is available from the B ritish Library Library o f C o n g re ss C a ta lo g in g -in -P u b lic atio n D ata Im p le m e n tin g the clim ate re g im e : in ternational c o m p lia n c e / edited by O lav Schram S to kk e, Jon H ov i, G e ir Ulfstein. p. cm. Includes b iblio g rap h ic al references and index. IS B N 1-8440 7-16 1-8 (hardb ack) 1. U nited N ations F ra m e w o rk C o n v e n tio n on C lim ate C h a n g e (1992). Protocols, etc., 1997 Dec. 11. 2. C lim atic ch an g e s. 3. C lim a tic c h a n g e s - G o v e r n m e n t policy. 4. G ree n h o u se gas m i tig a tio n -in te rn a tio n a l c oo pe ratio n. I. S tokke, O lav S chram , 1961- II. H ovi, Jon, 1956- III. Ulfstein. G eir, 1951Q C 9 8 1.8.C 5I457 2005 3 6 3 . 7 3 8 ’7 4 5 2 6 - d c 2 2 2004022850 Printed on elem en tal c hlorine-free p ap er

Contents P reface

vii

N o tes on C o n trib u to rs

ix

A c ro n y m s and A b b rev iatio n s

xiii

In trod uctio n and M ain F in ding s

1

P a r t I: T h e K y o to C o m p l i a n c e R e g i m e : E m e r g e n c e a n d D e sig n 1

T h e N ego tiatio n o f a K yoto C o m p lia n c e S ystem

17

2

T h e K yoto C o m p lia n c e Sy stem : T o w a r d s H ard E n fo rc e m e n t

39

P a r t II : C h a l l e n g e s to E ffe c tiv e O p e r a t i o n o f th e C o m p l i a n c e R e g im e 3

Flexibility, C o m p lia n c e and N o rm D e v e lo p m e n t in the C lim ate R eg im e

65

4

R ep o rtin g and V erificatio n o f E m issio n s and R e m o v a ls o f G ree n h o u se G a ses

85

5

Effective E n fo rc e m e n t and D o u b le -e d g e d Deterrents: H o w the Im pacts o f S an ction s also A ffect C o m p ly in g P arties

107

P a r t III: E x te rn a l E n fo rc e m e n t - P a rtie s a n d N o n -p a rtie s 6 7

T h e Pros and C o n s o f E xtern al E n fo rc e m e n t T rad e M e asu res, W T O and C lim ate C o m p lia n ce: T h e Interplay o f In tern ation al R e g im e s

129

147

P a r t IV : C o m p l i a n c e , N G O s a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l G o v e r n a n c e 8

T h e R ole o f G reen N G O s in P ro m o tin g C lim ate C o m p lia n c e

169

9

M a jo r Oil C o m p a n ie s in C lim ate Policy: Strategies and C o m p lia n c e

187

10 E n h a n c in g C lim ate C o m p lia n c e - W h a t are the L esso n s to L earn from E n v iro n m e n ta l R e g im e s and the E U ?

209

Epilogue: T h e F uture o f K y o to ’s C o m p lia n c e S ystem

233

Index

237

v

C o n te n t s

VI

Figures, Tables and Boxes Figures 4.1

T h e g lo b a l m e a n ra d i a ti v e fo rc in g o f the c li m a t e sy s te m fro m v a rio u s a g e n ts fo r the y e a r 2 0 0 0 re la tiv e to 1750

88

4 .2

E x a m p l e o f d e c is io n tree fo r s e le c tin g the m e t h o d fo r e s t im a ti o n o f C 0 2 e m i s s i o n s fr o m s t a ti o n a ry c o m b u s t i o n

93

4 .3

E m i s s i o n e s t im a te s o f H F C - 1 3 4 a

97

4 .4

E m i s s i o n e s t im a te s o f S F 6

97

4.5

M e a n e s t im a te d n et s o u r c e s ( e x c e p t fossil fuel) an d u n c e rt a in t ie s for 2 2 r e g i o n s a c ro s s the g lo b e

98

4.6

M o d e l p re d i c te d an d o b s e r v e d c o n c e n t r a ti o n s ( d e v ia tio n s fr o m the b a s e lin e ) o f C F C - 1 2 at M a c e H e a d , Ire la n d

100

S u h e rn a tiu illu s tra tio n o f ta r g e ts a n d 2a- (dashed* lin es) an d 4a* ( d o tte d lin es) c o n f i d e n c e in te rv a ls u n d e r th e K y o to P ro t o c o l

102

4.7

Tables 2.1

E n fo rcem en t branch m em bership

47

2.2

E nforcem ent consequences

54

4.1

C h a n g e s in the c o n c e n t r a ti o n s o f s o m e im p o rt a n t G H G s

87

4 .2

I m p o r ta n c e o f the v a ri o u s K y o to g a s e s in te r m s o f ra d i a ti v e f o r c in g sin ce p re - in d u s tria l tim e s , an d re la tiv e i m p o r t a n c e o f c u rr e n t e m i s s i o n s in term s o f C 0 2- e q u iv a Ie n ts

89

4.3

G W P 1 0 0 v a lu e s fro m IP C C ( 1 9 9 6 a ) for the G H G s in c l u d e d in the K y o to P ro to c o l 90

4 .4

A s s e s s e d u n c e rta in tie s in e m i s s i o n s o f e a c h K y o to G H G , total e m i s s i o n s a n d tren d ( p e r c e n ta g e p oin ts)

95

5.1

A lte r n a tiv e c o m p o s i t i o n s o f th e E n f o r c e m e n t B r a n c h

114

5.2

B ila te ra l im p o rt s , 1997

121

5.3

B ila te ra l e x p o rts , 1997

123

7.1

P a rtic ip a to ry r e g i m e in terp lay : F o u r c a te g o r ie s o f ta rg e ts o f c li m a t e re la te d tr a d e m e a s u re s

155

8.1

R e la t io n s h i p b e tw e e n N G O ty p e an d re s o u rc e s , levels ta r g e te d and

9.1

stra te g ie s

172

O il in d u s try p a rtic ip a n ts in the U K e m i s s i o n s tr a d in g s c h e m e

195

Boxes 2.1

M a n d a t e o f the E n f o r c e m e n t B r a n c h

48

Preface

U n lik e m o s t b o o k s on c li m a t e p o litic s, this v o lu m e h a s a sh a r p fo c u s on o ne p a r t ic u ­ lar a s p e c t o f the g lo b a l c lim a te r e g i m e - the s y s te m set up to im p r o v e c o m p l ia n c e w ith c o m m i t m e n t s u n d e r the 1997 K y o to P ro to c o l. T h e d e sig n o f a c o m p l ia n c e s y s te m has b e e n c o n tr o v e rs i a l e v e r sin ce the a d o p ti o n o f the 1992 F r a m e w o r k C o n ­ v e n tio n on C li m a t e C h a n g e . T h e o u tc o m e , laid o u t in the 2001 M a r r a k e s h A c c o rd s , is in n o v a t iv e in in te rn a tio n a l e n v i r o n m e n t a l law an d its o p e ra t io n will b e d e c is iv e for the e ff e c ti v e n e s s o f the c li m a t e r e g im e . T h is b o o k h a s b e e n p r e p a r e d u n d e r a p ro j e c t c o o r d i n a te d jo i n tl y by three N o r w e g i a n r e s e a rc h in s titu tio n s targ e tin g in te rn a tio n a l c li m a t e politics: C I C E R O C e n t e r for I n t e rn a t io n a l C li m a t e an d E n v i r o n m e n t a l R e s e a r c h - O s l o , T h e D e p a r t m e n t o f P u b lic an d In te rn a tio n a l L a w at the U n i v e r s ity o f O s lo , and the F r i d tj o f N a n s e n In stitu te. T h e b o o k also in v o lv e s p r o m i n e n t s c h o la rs fr o m the U S . T h is tr a n s n a tio n a l g ro u p o f a u th o r s m e t fo r s e v e r a l w o r k s h o p s in the c o u rs e o f the p r o j e c t to e n s u r e a h ig h lev el o f in t e g ra t io n o f the b o o k ' s v a rio u s c h a p te rs . P r i o r to the last w o r k s h o p , the c h a p te r drafts w e re s u b je c t to in d iv id u a l a n o n y m o u s re v ie w b y e x te r n a l e x p e rts in the v a rio u s field s c o v e re d . W e are v e ry g ra te fu l to S c o tt B a rre tt, T h o m a s G e h rin g , M a r c L e v y , S e b a s t ia n O b erth lir, L a s s e R in g i u s , D e t l e f S p r i n z an d D a v id V ic to r for g e n e r o u s ly o ff e rin g a d v ic e on h o w the d ra fts c o u ld be fu r th e r a d v a n c e d . In late 2 0 0 3 , th e c h a p te rs w ere a s s e m b l e d in to a c o h e r e n t m a n u s c r ip t and s u b m it te d to J a m e s & J a m e s /E a r th s c a n . W e are h ig h ly a p p re c i a ti v e o f E a r t h s c a n ’s c o m m i s s i o n i n g e d ito r, R o b W e s t , for his a m i a b le e ff ic i e n c y in g u id i n g the j o u r n e y fro m m a n u s c r ip t to b o o k . T h a n k s arc d u e to the p u b l i s h e r ’s a n o n y m o u s re v i e w e r s w h o p ro v i d e d in s ig h tfu l an d c o n s t r u c ti v e s u g g e s tio n s o n in d i v id u a l c h a p te rs as w ell as the b o o k s tru c tu re. W e w o u ld also like to th an k M . J. M a c e fo r h e r e x c e l le n t e d ito ria l se rv ic e s, w ith r e s p e c t to b o th c o n te n t s and p re s e n ta tio n . W e are in d e b t e d to M a r y a n n e R y g g fo r v a lu a b le e d ito ria l and p r a c t ic a l a ss is ta n c e th r o u g h o u t the p r e p a r ­ ation o f this b o o k an d to R o w a n D a v ie s an d L y n n P N y g a a r d for ed itio ria l serv ices. T h e p ro j e c t h as b e e n f u n d e d by the S a m s t e m t P r o g r a m m e u n d e r the R e s e a r c h C o u n c il o f N o r w a y an d b y the p a rt ic i p a ti n g in s titu tio n s. O slo , J u n e 2 0 0 4 O la v S c h r a m S to k k e , Jo n H o v i and G e ir U lfs te in

Notes on Contributors

S t e i n a r A n d r e s e n is a p r o f e s s o r at the D e p a r t m e n t o f P o litic a l S c ie n c e at th e U n i v e r ­ sity o f O s lo an d a s e n i o r re s e a rc h fe llo w at the F r i d tj o f N a n s e n In stitute , N o r w a y . H is re s e a rc h f o c u s e s o n in te rn a tio n a l m a n a g e m e n t o f n a tu r a l re s o u r c e s an d the e n v i r o n ­ m e n t w ith an e m p h a s is o n w h a lin g , m a r in e p o llu tio n , c li m a t e c h a n g e a n d the role o f the U N in g lo b a l e n v i r o n m e n t a l g o v e r n a n c e . A n a ly tic a lly , A n d r e s e n h a s e x a m i n e d fa c to rs th a t in f lu e n c e th e e ff e c ti v e n e s s o f in te rn a tio n a l c o o p e r a t io n , su ch as the i n t e r ­ a ctio n b e tw e e n s c i e n c e an d p o lic y , p r o c e s s e s o f le a d e rs h ip an d sp ecific in s titu tio n a l featu re s. A n d r e s e n h a s p u b li s h e d b o o k s , m o s tly w ith c o - a u t h o r s , fo r the S c a n d i ­ n a v ia n U n iv e rs ity Press, B e lh a v e n , M a n c h e s t e r U n iv e rs ity P re s s an d M I T , an d a n u m b e r o f articles in su c h j o u r n a l s as M a r i n e P o l i c y , In t e r n a ti o n a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l A g r e e m e n t s , G lo b a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o litic s an d G l o b a l G o v e r n a n c e . T e r j e B e r n t s e n h o ld s a D r S c ie n t d e g re e fr o m the U n iv e rs ity o f O s lo an d is a s e n io r re s e a rc h fe llow at C I C E R O C e n t e r for I n te rn a tio n a l C li m a t e an d E n v ir o n m e n ta l R e s e a r c h - O s l o . H e also h o ld s a p a rt-tim e p o s itio n at the D e p a r t m e n t o f G e o s c ie n c e s , U n iv e rs ity o f O slo . H is r e s e a rc h in terest is m o d e l li n g o f a t m o s p h e r i c d is trib u tio n , s o u r c e s an d sin k s o f g r e e n h o u s e g a se s , air p o llu ta n ts a n d a e ro s o ls. H e h as p u b lis h e d a n u m b e r o f r e s e a rc h articles in th e se fields in in te rn a tio n a l p e e r - r e v ie w e d jo u r n a ls , in c l u d in g the J o u r n a l o f G e o p h y s i c a l R e s e a r c h , T e ll u s , G e o p h y s i c a l R e s e a r c h L e tte r s an d C lim a tic C h a n g e . B e rn ts e n has c o n tr ib u t e d to se v e ra l o f the p r e v i o u s a s s e s s m e n t re p o r ts fro m W o r k i n g G r o u p 1 o f the I n te rn a tio n a l P a n e l on C li m a t e C h a n g e ( I P C C ), an d h as re c e n tly b e e n e le c te d as lead a u th o r fo r C h a p t e r 2 o f th e ir fo u rth a s s e s s m e n t report. J a n F u g l e s t v e d t h o ld s a D r S c ie n t d e g r e e fr o m th e U n iv e r s ity o f O s lo an d is r e ­ s e arch d ir e c to r at C I C E R O C e n te r fo r In te rn a tio n a l C li m a t e and E n v ir o n m e n ta l R e s e a r c h - O s l o . H is re s e a rc h in te re sts in c lu d e the ro le o f a tm o s p h e r i c c h e m i s t r y in the c o n te x t o f c lim a te c h a n g e , c a lc u la ti o n s o f c o n tr ib u t io n s to c lim a te c h a n g e , s t r a te ­ gies fo r r e d u c i n g m a n - m a d e im p a c ts o n c li m a t e and a p p li c a ti o n o f g lo b a l w a r m i n g p o te n tia ls ( G W P s ) and a lte rn a tiv e s in c lim a te p o lic y . H e h as p u b li s h e d a n u m b e r o f re s e a rc h artic les in th e se field s in in te rn a tio n a l p e e r - r e v ie w e d j o u r n a l s in c lu d in g T e l l u s , G e o p h y s i c a l R e s e a r c h L e t t e r s , A m b i o an d C lim a tic C h a n g e . D r F u g lc s tv c d t h a s also c o n tr ib u t e d to the a s s e s s m e n t re p o r ts fro m W o r k i n g G r o u p 1 o f the IP C C . L a r s H . G u l b r a n d s e n is a re s e a rc h fe llo w at th e F r i d tj o f N a n s e n Institute, N o r w a y . H is re s e a rc h in terests are in the area o f e n v ir o n m e n t a l p o litic s, w ith a p a rt ic u l a r fo cu s o n in t e r n a t i o n a l - d o m e s t i c an d p u b l i c - p r i v a t e g o v e r n a n c e in te ra c tio n s. H e h a s p u b ­

ix

X

N o te s on C o n tr i b u to r s

lish ed article s in E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o litic s an d G l o b a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o litic s an d b o o k c h a p te rs in e d ite d v o lu m e s . C a t h r i n e H a g e m is a p o s t - d o c to r a te s t u d e n t at the U n iv e rs ity o f O slo , D e p a r t m e n t o f E c o n o m i c s . H e r re s e a rc h in te re st is e n v i r o n m e n t a l e c o n o m i c s , w ith sp e c ia l e m p h a s is on the d e s ig n o f in te rn a tio n a l c li m a t e a g r e e m e n t s an d d o m e s ti c c lim a te p o lic y . H e r re s e a rc h in this field in c lu d e s th e o r e tic a l s tu d ie s o f the i m p a c t o f a s y m m e t r i c i n f o r ­ m a tio n , m a r k e t p o w e r an d lim ite d p a rt ic i p a ti o n on the p e r f o r m a n c e o f c li m a t e a g r e e ­ m e n ts. S h e h a s also c o n d u c te d th e o r e tic a l and e m p i r i c a l w o rk o n the in te rp la y b e tw e e n fo ssil fuel m a r k e ts a n d m a r k e ts for e m i s s i o n p e rm its . S o m e o f this w o rk f o c u s e s o n th e lin ks b e tw e e n stra teg ic a c ti o n s in th e e n e rg y m a r k e t a n d p e rm it m a rk e t. H e r w o rk has b e e n p u b li s h e d in su c h in te rn a tio n a l j o u r n a l s as T h e E n e r g y Journal, E nergy and R esource E c o n o m ic s, E n viro n m en ta l a n d R esource E co n o m ics a n d the J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l E c o n o m i c s a n d M a n a g e m e n t . J o n H o v i is p r o f e s s o r o f p o litic a l sc ie n c e , U n iv e r s ity o f O s lo , an d a s e n i o r re s e a r c h e r at C I C E R O C e n te r for I n t e rn a t io n a l C li m a t e and E n v i r o n m e n t a l R e s e a r c h - O s l o . H is m ain re s e a rc h in terest is the d e s i g n and e n f o r c e m e n t o f in te rn a tio n a l r e g i m e s . He is the a u th o r o f G a m e s , T h r e a ts a n d T r e a t ie s : U n d e r s t a n d in g C o m m i t m e n t s in I n t e r n a ­ t i o n a l R e l a t io n s (P in te r, 1998). R o n a l d B. M i t c h e l l is an a ss o c ia te p r o f e s s o r w ith te n u r e in th e D e p a r t m e n t o f P o li ti­ cal S c ie n c e , U n iv e rs ity o f O r e g o n . H e e a rn e d his P h D in p u b lic p o lic y at H a rv a rd U n iv e rs ity in 1992 an d w a s a v isitin g a ss o c ia te p r o f e s s o r at the C e n te r fo r E n v i r o n ­ m e n ta l S c ie n c e an d P o li c y fr o m J u n e 1999 to D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 1 . H is p u b li c a ti o n s i n c lu d e the a w a r d - w i n n i n g b o o k I n t e n ti o n a l O il P o llu tio n a t S e a : E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o li c y a n d T re a ty C o m p l ia n c e (M IT P res s, 1994 ), article s in I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a ­ t i o n , I n t e r n a ti o n a l S tu d ie s Q u a r te r ly an d G l o b a l G o v e r n a n c e , and c h a p te r s in n u m e r o u s e d it e d v o lu m e s . H is r e s e a rc h fo c u s e s on the e ff e c ti v e n e s s o f in t e rn a t io n a l in s titu tio n s in in f lu e n c i n g the b e h a v i o u r o f state a n d n o n -s ta te a c to rs, as w ell as on the in f lu e n c e o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c ie n c e o n in t e rn a t io n a l p o li c y - m a k in g . H e h as b e e n a m e m b e r o f the U n ite d S ta te s N a tio n a l R e s e a r c h C o u n c i l ’s C o m m i t t e e on the H u m a n D i m e n s i o n s o f G lo b a l C h a n g e an d is c u rr e n tl y a m e m b e r o f the e d ito ria l b o a r d s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , the J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a n d D e v e l o p m e n t and G lo b a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o litics. H e le a c h e s c o u rs e s on in te rn a tio n a l r e la tio n s th eo ry , in te rn a tio n a l e n v ir o n m e n t a l p o litic s an d in te rn a tio n a l re g im e s . J o n B i r g e r S k j a ? r s e t h is a se n io r r e s e a rc h fello w and r e s e a rc h d ir e c to r at the F r i d tj o f N a n s e n In s titu te, N o r w a y . H is r e s e a rc h in te re s ts are in t e rn a t io n a l e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o o p e r a t io n , n atio n a l e n v i r o n m e n t a l p o lic y an d the s tra te g ie s o f n o n -s ta te a cto rs, p a r ­ ticu larly m u lti n a ti o n a l c o m p a n i e s . H e h as p u b li s h e d e x te n s iv e l y in th e s e fields, i n c l u d in g th e b o o k s N o r th S e a C o o p e r a ti o n : L in k in g I n t e r n a ti o n a l a n d D o m e s t ic P o llu tio n C o n tr o l ( M a n c h e s te r U n iv e rs ity P res s, 2 0 0 0 ), R e g i m e E ffe c tiv e n e s s : C o n ­ f r o n t i n g T h e o r y with E v id e n c e ( M I T P res s, 2 0 0 1 , w ith E. L. M ile s , A. U n d e r d a l, S. A n d r e s e n , J. W e tt e s t a d an d E. M . C a rlin ), C lim a te C h a n g e a n d th e O il In d u s try : C o m m o n P r o b le m , V a ryin g S tr a te g i e s ( M a n c h e s t e r U n iv e rs ity P res s, 2 0 0 3 , w ith T. S k o d v in ) and I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e g i m e s a n d N o r w a y ’s E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o lic y : C ro ss fir e a n d C o h e r e n c e (e d ito r, A s h g a te , 2 0 0 4 ). H e has also p u b li s h e d e x te n s iv e l y in in t e r n a ­

N o i e s on C o n tr i b u to r s

xi

tio nal j o u r n a l s su c h as C o o p e r a ti o n a n d C o n fl ic t, E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o li ti c s , G lo b a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o li ti c s , the J o u r n a l o f C o m m o n M a r k e t S tu d i e s an d M a r i n e P o licy. O l a v S c h r a i n S t o k k e is a s e n io r re s e a rc h fellow at the F r i d tj o f N a n s e n Institute, N o r w a y . H is re s e a rc h in te re s t is in te rn a tio n a l p o litic al e c o n o m y , w ith spec ial e m p h a ­ sis on r e g i m e th e o r y , re g io n a l c o o p e r a t io n a n d in te rn a tio n a l m a n a g e m e n t o f r e s o u rc e s an d th e e n v ir o n m e n t . H e h as p u b li s h e d e x te n s iv e l y in th ese fields, in c l u d ­ ing the e d ited v o l u m e s G o v e r n in g H ig h S e a F ish er ies: T he In t e r p la y o f G l o b a l a n d R e g i o n a l R e g i m e s ( O x fo rd U n iv e rs ity P re s s, 2 0 0 1 ), G o v e r n in g the A n ta r c tic : The E ffe c ti v e n e s s a n d L e g i t i m a c y o f the A n t a r c t ic T re a ty S y s te m ( C a m b r i d g e U n iv e rs ity P re s s, 1996, w ith D . V id a s ) an d T h e B a r e n ts R e g io n : C o o p e r a ti o n in A r c t i c E u r o p e ( S A G E , 1 99 4, w ith O . T u n a n d e r ) . S to k k e is c o - e d i to r o f th e Y e a r b o o k o f I n t e r n a ­ t i o n a l C o -o p e r a t io n on E n v i r o n m e n t a n d D e v e l o p m e n t (E a rth s c a n ), and his w o rk has b e e n p u b li s h e d in su ch in te rn a tio n a l j o u r n a l s as M a r i n e P o l i c y , O c e a n D e v e l o p m e n t a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w , O c e a n a n d C o a s ta l M a n a g e m e n t an d the A n n a l s o f th e A m e r ­ ican A c a d e m y f o r P o litic a l a n d S o c ia l S c ie n c e . H e is a m e m b e r o f th e e d ito ria l b o a rd o f G lo b a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l P olitics. F r o d e S t o r d a l is a p r o f e s s o r in m e t e o r o l o g y at the U n iv e rs ity o f O s lo , N o r w a y . He also h o ld s an a d ju n c t p o s itio n at the N o r w e g i a n In stitu te for A ir R e s e a r c h (N I L U ) , N o r w a y . H e has a D r S c ie n t d e g r e e from the U n iv e r s ity o f O slo . H is re s e a rc h in te re st is m o d e l li n g a n d o b s e r v in g g r e e n h o u s e g ases , air p o llu ta n ts a n d a e ro s o ls . H e h as p u b li s h e d a n u m b e r o f r e s e a rc h a rtic le s in th ese fie ld s in in t e rn a t io n a l p e e r - r e v ie w e d j o u r n a ls , in c lu d in g the J o u r n a l o f G e o p h y s i c a l R e s e a r c h , T e llu s, G e o p h y s i c a l R e s e a r c h L e tte r s an d N a tu re . S to r d a l has c o n tr ib u t e d to sev eral o f the p re v i o u s a s s e s s m e n t r e p o r ts fr o m W o r k i n g G r o u p 1 o f the IP C C . H e h a s p a rt ic i p a te d in m o re than 20 p ro j e c ts fin a n c e d b y the E u r o p e a n U n io n ( E U ), an d is c u rr e n tl y c o o rd i n a ti n g tw o E U p ro je c ts. G e i r U lf s te in is p r o f e s s o r o f law an d d ir e c to r o f the N o r w e g i a n C e n tr e f o r H u m a n R ig h ts, U n iv e r s ity o f O slo . H e h as b e e n d e p u ty d ir e c to r at the D e p a r t m e n t o f P ub lic an d In te rn a tio n a l L a w , U n iv e rs ity o f O slo . H e h a s w ritte n e x te n s iv e l y on the law o f the sea, in te rn a tio n a l e n v ir o n m e n t a l law an d the la w on the u se o f fo rce. H e is c o ­ e d i t o r - i n - c h i e f o f the Y e a r b o o k o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l L a w ( O x f o r d U n i v e r ­ sity P ress). J a c o b W e r k s m a n is s e n io r a d v is e r to the G lo b a l In c lu sio n P r o g r a m o f the R o c k e f e l ­ ler F o u n d a ti o n , w h e re he s u p p o r ts g r a n t - m a k in g d e c is io n s in the a re a o f in te rn a tio n a l in te lle c tu a l p r o p e r ty rig h ts p o li c y an d in te rn a tio n a l trad e p o lic y . P ri o r to this, he s e r v e d as e n v i r o n m e n t a l in s titu tio n s an d g o v e r n a n c e a d v is e r to the U n ite d N a tio n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) . H e j o i n e d U N D P after n e a rly ten y ea rs at the F o u n d a ti o n fo r In te rn a tio n a l E n v ir o n m e n ta l L a w and D e v e l o p m e n t ( F I E L D ) w h e re h e s e r v e d as a la w y e r, p r o g r a m m e d ir e c to r an d, m o s t re c e n tly , m a n a g i n g d ire c to r. He is c u rr e n tl y an a d ju n c t p r o f e s s o r o f law at N e w Y o r k U n iv e rs ity , an d w a s a le c tu re r in in te rn a tio n a l e c o n o m i c law at th e m a s te rs level at the U n iv e rs ity o f L o n d o n . He has he ld v is itin g a c a d e m ic p o sts at the U n ite d N a tio n s U n iv e r s ity Institute o f A d v a n c e d S tu d ie s , the U n iv e rs ity o f E d in b u r g h , th e U n iv e r s ity o f K e n t an d at the U n iv e rs ity o f C o n n e c ti c u t L a w S c h o o l. B e fo re jo i n i n g F I E L D in 199 2, M r

X11

N otex on C o ntrib uto rs

W e rk s m a n practised energy anti e n v iro n m e n ta l re gu lato ry law in C aliforn ia, where he rem ain s an active m e m b e r o f the State Bar. He holds d eg rees from C o lu m b ia U n iversity (AB 1986, E nglish L iterature); the U n iversity o f M ic h ig an (Juris D octor, cum laude, 1990); and the U niversity o f L o n d o n ( L L M , 1993, Public International Law). H e g c W e s t s k o g is a sen io r research fellow at C I C E R O C e n te r for International C lim a te and E n v iro n m e n ta l R e s e a r c h - O s l o . A n e c o n o m ist, her research interests are focused on the design o f policy in stru m en ts. Specifically, she has w orked on the design o f an e m issio n trading system to re du ce em issio n s o f clim ate gases. This inclu des both theoretical and em p irical studies o f strategic b e h a v io u r (the ex ercise of m arket po w e r) in perm it m ark ets and the effects o f different design s o f intertem p oral em issio n trading sy stem s. She has also b een in vo lv ed in analy sing the e c o n o m ic effects o f dif ferent design s o f clim ate a g reem en ts . H er w ork is p u blish ed in jo u r n a ls such as the E n erg y J o u r n a l, the J o u r n a l o f E n v ir o n m e n ta l E c o n o m ic s a n d M a n a g e ­ m e n t and E n v ir o n m e n t a n d D e v e lo p m e n t E c o n o m ic s. J o r g e n W e t t e s t a d is a senio r research fellow at the F rid tjo f N an se n Institute, N o rw a y . His research interest is regim e theory and EU politics, with a special focus on q u e stio n s related to the effectiven ess and design o f international en v iro n m en tal institutions. H is p articu lar em piric al focus is on air p ollu tio n and clim ate ch an g e. He has pu b lish e d extensiv ely, m o s t recently: C learin g the Air: E u ro p e a n A d v a n c e s in T ackling A c id Rain a n d A tm o s p h e r ic P ollution (A sh gate, 20 02 ); E n v ir o n m e n ta l R e g im e E ffectiveness: C onfron tin g Theory with E v id e n c e (M IT Press, 2002, with E. L. M iles, A. U n d erd a l, S. A nd resen, J. B. Skjierseth and E. M. C arlin); S cience a n d In tern a tio n a l E n v ir o n m e n ta l R egim es: C o m b in g Integ rity with In v o lv e m e n t ( M a n ­ ch ester U niv ersity Press, 2000, with S. A nd re se n , T. S k od vin and A. U nd erd al); and D e sig n in g Effective E n v ir o n m e n ta l R e g im e s : The K ey C o n dition s (E d w a rd Elgar, 1999). He is m e m b e r o f the E ditorial A dv iso ry B oard o f C lim ate Policy.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAUs ALTENER A O SIS API BAU em issions BP

a s s ig n e d a m o u n t u nits an E U p r o g r a m m e / d e c i s i o n o n r e n e w a b le e n e rg ie s A llia n c e o f S m a l l Is la n d S ta tes A m e r i c a n P e tr o le u m In stitu te ( U S ) b u siness-as-usual em issions B ritish P e tr o le u m

BTU CAN CDM CEE CEITs CEO CERs CFCs CF4 CH4 C IE L C IT ES

B ritish t h e r m a l unit C li m a t e A c tio n N e tw o r k C le a n D e v e l o p m e n t M e c h a n i s m C e n tr a l and E a s te r n E u r o p e a n (c o u n trie s) c o u n tr ie s w ith e c o n o m i e s in tra n sitio n C h i e f E x e c u ti v e O ffi c e r c ertifie d e m i s s i o n r e d u c t io n s c h l o r o f lu o r o c a r b o n s c a r b o n te tra f lu o rid e m ethane C e n t e r fo r In te rn a tio n a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l L aw C o n v e n ti o n on I n t e rn a t io n a l T r a d e in E n d a n g e r e d S p e c ie s o f W il d F a u n a an d F lo r a C o n v e n t i o n on L o n g - r a n g e T r a n s b o u n d a r y A ir P o llu tio n carbon m onoxide

CLRTAP CO CO2 C 0 2e COP C O P /M O P EB CTM ECCP ECE ECJ ED EEA EFTA EMEP E M IT G roup

c a r b o n d io x id e c a r b o n d io x i d e e q u iv a l e n t C o n f e r e n c e o f the P arties C o n f e r e n c e o f the P a rtie s s e r v in g as the M e e t in g o f the P a rtie s E x e c u ti v e B o d y c h e m i c a l tr a n s p o rt m o d e l E u r o p e a n C li m a t e C h a n g e P r o g r a m m e E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n for E u ro p e E u r o p e a n C o u r t o f J u s tic e E n v ir o n m e n ta l D e f e n s e (U S E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c A re a E u r o p e a n F re e T r a d e A s s o c i a tio n C o o p e r a ti v e P r o g r a m m e fo r M o n i to r i n g an d E v a lu a t io n o f the L o n g - R a n g e T r a n s m i s s i o n o f A ir P o llu ta n ts in E u r o p e G r o u p on E n v i r o n m e n t a l M e a s u r e s a n d In te rn a t io n a l T r a d e

XIV

ERTs ERUs ESA EU E U R O P IA FCCC F IE L D FoE GATS GATT GCC GEF GEM S GHG GOOS GRULAC GW Ps HFCs IC C A T ICJ IGO IM IPCC IW C JI JU SC A N Z JW G LULUCF MARPOL MCP MEA M M PA N 20 NEPP NGOs N IL U NOx NRDC O3 ODSs OECD OH

A c r o n y m s a n d A b b re v ia tio n s E xp ert R ev iew T e a m s em issio n reduction units E F T A Su rv eillanc e A u thority E u ro p e a n U n ion E u ro p e a n P etro le u m Industry O rg aniz atio n F ra m e w o r k C o n v e n tio n on C lim ate C h ang e F o u n d a tio n for International E n v iro n m e n ta l L aw and D e v e lo p m e n t (U K ) Friends o f the Earth G en eral A g re e m e n t on T ra d e in Services G en e ra l A g re e m e n t on T ariffs and T ra d e (1947) G lobal C lim ate C oalition G lo b al E n v iro n m e n t Facility G lo b al E n v iro n m en tal M o n itoring S ystem g re en h o u s e gas G lo b al O zo n e O b se rv in g S ystem G ro u p o f Latin A m e ric an and the C a rib b e a n (countries) global w arm in g potentials hydro flu oroc arb on s International C o m m is s io n for the C o n se rv atio n o f Atlantic Tunas In ternational C o u rt o f Justice in terg o v ern m e n ta l organ ization inverse m o de llin g (or inversion m odelling ) In terg o v ern m en tal Panel on C lim a te C h an g e In ternational W h a lin g C o m m iss io n jo in t im p le m en ta tio n loose A n n ex 1 gro u p in g includ ing Japan , U S, Sw itzerland, C an ad a, A ustralia, N o rw a y and N ew Z ealan d Joint W o rk in g G ro u p (on C o m p lia n c e ) land use, land-use c h a n g e and forestry In tern ation al C o n v e n tio n for the P rev ention o f P o llution from ships m ultilateral co nsu ltativ e process m ultilateral e n v iro n m e n ta l agreem en t M arin e M a m m a l P rotection A ct (U S) nitrous oxide N atio n al E n v iro n m e n ta l Policy Plan (the N eth erland s) n o n -g o v e r n m e n ta l org anizatio ns N o rw eg ia n Institute for A ir R esearch nitrogen o x ides N atural R eso u rces D efe n se C o u n cil (U S) tr o po sp heric o zon e o z o n c -d c p le tin g substances O rg an iza tio n for E c o n o m ic C o o p e ra tio n and D e v e lo p m e n t hy droxyl

A c r o n y m s a n d A b b re v ia tio n s OPEC PB L PF C s ppbv PPM ppmv pptv QELRCs RF RMUs SAVE SBSTA SCM sf6 S ID S SO, SOGE SPS S T E P System TBT T R IP S UKAS UNCED UNCLOS UNDP UNEP UNFCCC U N IC E VOCs WBCSD WEOG WMO WRI W SSD WTO WWF

xv

O rg anization o f Petro le u m -E x p o rtin g C o un tries plan etary b o u n d a ry lay er (the lo w er 5 0 - 2 0 0 0 m o f the atm o sp h ere ) p erflu o ro ca rb o n s parts p e r billion by vo lum e process and p ro d u ctio n m ethod parts p er m illio n by v olum e parts p er trillion by volum e quantified em issio n lim itation o r red uctio n c o m m itm e n ts radiative forcing rem o v al units Specific A ctio n s for V ig o ro u s E n e rg y E ffic ienc y (an EU e n erg y e fficien cy f r a m e w o rk directive) Su bsid iary B o d y fo r Scientific and T e c h n o lo g ic a l A dvice Su bsid ies and C o u n terv ailin g M e a s u re s ( W T O ) su lp h u r hexafluo rid e sm all island d e v e lo p in g states su lp h u r dioxide S y stem for O b serv a tio n o f halo gen atial G re e n h o u se gases in E u ro p e S anitary and P h yto sanitary M e asu res ( W T O ) Shell T ra d a b le E m issio ns Perm it System T e c h n ic a l B arriers to T rad e (W T O ) T rad e-rela ted A sp e cts o f Intellectual P roperly Rights U nited K in g d o m A ccred itatio n Service U nited N atio n s C o n fe re n c e on E n v iro n m e n t and D ev e lo p m e n t United N ation s C o n v e n tio n on the L aw o f the Sea United N ation s D e v e lo p m e n t P ro g r a m m e U nited N a tio n s E n v iro n m e n t P ro g r a m m e UN F ra m e w o r k C o n v e n tio n on C lim ate C h a n g e U n ion o f In dustrial and E m p l o y e r ’s C o n fe d era tio n o f E uro pe volatile organic c o m p o u n d s W o rld B u sin ess C ouncil for Sustain able D e v e lo p m e n t W e ste rn E u ro p e a n and O th ers G rou p W o rld M ete oro log ic al O rg anization W o rld R eso u rc es Institute (U S) W o rld S u m m it on Su stainab le D e v e lo p m e n t W o rld T rad e O rg aniz atio n W o rld W id e Fund for Nature

Introduction and Main Findings Jon Hovi, Olav Schram Stokke and Geir Ulfstein

Purpose and plan T h e c li m a t e re g i m e n o w e m e r g i n g is the p r o d u c t o f a p ro c e s s tha t s p a n s m o r e th an tw o d e c a d e s . In 1979, the first W o r l d C li m a t e C o n f e r e n c e w a s h eld u n d e r the a u ­ s p ic e s o f the W o r l d M e t e o r o lo g i c a l O r g a n iz a t io n ( W M O ) . T o g e t h e r w ith th e U n ite d N a tio n s E n v i r o n m e n t P r o g r a m m e , the W M O e s ta b lis h e d the I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l P a n e l o n C li m a t e C h a n g e ( I P C C ) in 1988, to ass ess p e e r - r e v ie w e d s cien tific literatu re r e l e ­ v a n t fo r u n d e r s ta n d in g the risk o f h u m a n - i n d u c e d c li m a t e c h a n g e . A t the U N C o n f e r e n c e on E n v i r o n m e n t an d D e v e l o p m e n t ( U N C E D ) held in R io in 1992, th e U N F r a m e w o r k C o n v e n t i o n on C li m a t e C h a n g e ( U N F C C C ) w a s sign ed . H e re , d e v e lo p e d c o u n tr ie s c o m m i t t e d th e m s e l v e s to the a d o p ti o n o f p o lic ie s and m e a s u r e s th a t w o u ld lim it m a n - m a d e g r e e n h o u s e g as e m i s s i o n s an d p r o t e c t and e n h a n c e sin k s an d re s e rv o ir s w ith i n th eir te rrito ries, w ith the a im o f sta b iliz in g g r e e n ­ h o u s e g as e m i s s i o n s at th e ir 1990 level by th e y e a r 2 0 0 0 .' T h e s e su b s ta n tiv e c o m ­ m i tm e n ts w e re ‘soft" in th a t th e ir w o r d in g w a s c ith e r a s p i ra ti o n a l, v a g u e o r legally n o n -b i n d in g . T h e f o r m o f th ese c o m m i t m e n t s is r e f le c te d in the U N F C C C ’s p r o v i ­ sio n for a s o ft c o m p l i a n c e m e c h a n is m in the fo r m o f a ‘m u ltila te ra l c o n s u lta tiv e p r o c e s s ’ ( M C P ) “ - a b o d y w h o s e d e lib e r a t io n s w e re to be c o n d u c te d in a ‘fac ilitative, c o o p e r a t iv e , n o n -c o n f r o n ta t io n a l , t r a n s p a re n t a n d tim e ly m a n n e r , and be n o n ju d i c ia l . T h e K y o to P ro to c o l, a g re e d in 1997, r e p r e s e n te d a larg e step fo r w a rd . T h e p r o ­ to co l p r e s c rib e s q u a n tifie d lim its an d r e d u c tio n o b lig a tio n s on e a c h A n n e x I p a r t y ’s (d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r y ’s) a v e r a g e g r e e n h o u s e g a s e m i s s i o n s o v e r a first c o m m i t m e n t p e rio d , to run fro m 2 0 0 8 to 2 0 1 2 , a im e d at re d u c i n g the o v e ra ll e m i s s i o n s o f such g a s e s b y at le ast 5 p e r c e n t b e lo w 1990 levels. A n u m b e r o f ‘f le x ib le m e c h a n i s m s ’ w e re c r e a te d to e n a b le the p a rtie s to a c h ie v e th ese r e d u c t io n s in a c o s t - e f f e c ti v e w a y .4 T h e s e b in d in g an d a m b i ti o u s c o m m i t m e n t s b y d e v e lo p e d states w e re la te r s u p ­ p le m e n te d b y a c o m p l i a n c e sy s te m , e la b o r a te d in the 2001 M a r r a k e s h A c c o rd s , w h ic h e s ta b lis h a C o m p l i a n c e C o m m i t t e e w ith b o th a F a c ilita tiv e B r a n c h an d an E n f o r c e m e n t B ra n c h . W h il e the F a c ilita tiv e B r a n c h w ill p ro v i d e ‘a d v ic e and fa c ilita tio n to P a rtie s in im p l e m e n t i n g the P r o t o c o l ’, the E n f o r c e m e n t B r a n c h will d e te r m i n e w h e t h e r a p arty is in n o n - c o m p l i a n c e w ith its e m i s s i o n targ e t an d its re p o r tin g re q u i r e m e n ts , an d d e te r m i n e w h e t h e r it sa tisfies elig ib ility re q u i r e m e n ts for p a rtic ip a tio n in the f le x ib le m e c h a n i s m s .5 T h e M a r r a k e s h A c c o r d s also s p e c ify a list

1

2

I n t r o d u c ti o n a n d M a i n F in d i n g s

o f ‘c o n s e q u e n c e s ’ to b e im p o s e d b y the E n f o r c e m e n t B ra n c h in the s e c o n d c o m m i t ­ m e n t p e ri o d ( 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 7 ) on c o u n tr ie s w h ic h fail to c o m p l y w ith th e ir first p erio d co m m itm ents. T h is b o o k e x p lo r e s th e n a tu r e and e ff e c ti v e n e s s o f the c lim a te r e g i m e ’s c o m ­ p lia n c e sy s te m . T h e p u rp o s e o f this in tro d u c t io n is to p in p o i n t the m a in f in d in g s o f the c h a p te rs that fo llo w . W e b e g in by d e s c r ib in g in m o r e d e tail the m a i n fe a tu re s o f the c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m an d h o w it c a m e a b o u t. W e th en go o n to ask, in light o f the s u b s e q u e n t c h a p te rs , h o w e f f e c tiv e th e K y o t o - M a r r a k e s h c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m is lik ely to be. C a n w e e x p e c t this s y s te m to h e lp p a rtie s o v e r c o m e c h a l l e n g e s re la te d to e ff e c tiv e v e rific a tio n , re v i e w an d re s p o n s e ? W e a ls o ask if e x te r n a l m e a n s o f e n f o r c e m e n t h a v e a role to p lay. A rc th e r e g o o d r e a s o n s to restric t the use o f ex te rn a l e n f o r c e m e n t ? W h a t r e l e v a n c e can tr a d e s a n c t io n s h a v e in the c li m a t e c o n te x t ? A g a in s t this b a c k g r o u n d , w e e n d by d is c u s s i n g the c ritic is m s th a t h a v e b e e n m a d e o f K y o t o ’s c o m p l i a n c e sy s te m , and w h a t th e s e c ritic ism s im p ly fo r the s y s t e m ’s ability to f u n c t io n in pra ctice .

K yoto’s compliance system: emergence and design A n y in te rn a tio n a l c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m m u s t a d d re s s at least th r e e tasks: the v e r i f ic a ­ tio n o f fa c tu a l i n f o r m a t io n a b o u t c o m p l ia n c e , the re v i e w o f this fa c tu a l in f o rm a tio n in light o f the leg al c o m m i t m e n t s tha t states h a v e a s s u m e d , and the id e n tif ic a tio n o f an a p p ro p r ia t e re s p o n s e to v io la tio n s o f c o m m i t m e n t s .6 V e rific a tio n e n ta ils an a s s e s s m e n t o f the c o m p l e t e n e s s an d a c c u r a c y o f c o m p l i a n c e - r e la t e d in f o r m a t io n an d its c o n f o r m it y w ith p r e - e s ta b l is h e d s ta n d a rd s for re p o r tin g (L o re ti et al, 2 0 0 1 , p3). A s is th e c a se w ith m o s t m u ltila te ra l e n v ir o n m e n t a l a g r e e m e n ts ( M E A s ) , v e ri fic a tio n u n d e r the K y o to P ro t o c o l is p rim a rily b a se d on re p o r tin g b y the p a rtie s th e m s e l v e s . A sp e c ia l f e a tu re o f the c li m a t e r e g i m e is, h o w ­ e v e r, the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f E x p e rt R e v ie w T e a m s (E R T s ) , w h o s e ta s k it is to c o n d u c t a ‘th o r o u g h an d c o m p r e h e n s i v e te c h n ic a l a s s e s s m e n t ’ o f the p e r f o r m a n c e o f e a c h A n n e x I p a rty to the p ro to c o l; sec C h a p te r 2 by U lfs tc in an d W e r k s m a n . T h e E R T s are to p ro v i d e in d e p e n d e n t in f o r m a t io n to the r e v ie w p r o c e s s and id e n tify ‘q u e s t io n s o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ’. H o w e v e r , th ey d o n o t h a v e the c o m p e t e n c e to d e te r m i n e n o n - c o m p li a n c e in a p a r t y ’s p e r f o r m a n c e . W h il e in o th e r M E A s the C o n f e r e n c e o f the P a rtie s d e te r m i n e s c a s e s o f n o n - c o m p l i a n c e , the M a r r a k e s h A c c o r d s d e le g a te th ese p o w e r s to the E n f o r c e m e n t B ra n c h o f the C o m p l ia n c e C o m m it te e . W ith r e s p e c t to th e third task o f a c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m , re s p o n s e to v io l a ti o n s o f c o m m i t m e n t s , w e m a y u s e f u lly d is ti n g u is h b e tw e e n f a c i l i t a t i o n , a im e d at e n h a n c i n g the c a p a c i ty o f states to c o m p l y w ith th e ir c o m m i t m e n t s , an d e n f o r c e m e n t , a im e d at d e te r rin g fu tu re n o n - c o m p li a n c e . U n d e r the M a r r a k e s h A c c o rd s , the F a c ilita tiv e B ra n c h is to p r o v i d e a d v ic e and facilitate the tr a n s fe r o f te c h n o l o g ic a l o r fin a n c ial re s o u rc e s to p a rtie s s h o w n to b e in n o n - c o m p li a n c e an d to c o u n tr ie s w ith a p o te n tia l fo r n o n - c o m p li a n c e . T h e E n f o r c e m e n t B r a n c h is to d e t e r m i n e the re s p o n s e to n on c o m p l i a n c e in the fo r m o f e n f o r c e m e n t ‘c o n s e q u e n c e s ’. F o r a fa ilu re to m e e t q u a n tifie d g r e e n h o u s e g a s lim ita tio n or re d u c tio n c o m m i t m e n t s , th es e c o n s e q u e n c e s are: (i) a d e d u c ti o n fro m the p a r t y ’s a s s ig n e d a m o u n t fo r th e s e c o n d c o m m i t m e n t

Intro du ction a n d M a in F in d in g s

3

p eriod o f 1.3 tim es the a m o u n t o f that p a r t y ’s ex ce ss e m ission s in the first c o m m i t ­ m en t period; (ii) a req u irem en t that the n o n -c o m p lia n t party d ev elo p a c o m p lian ce action plan; and (iii) suspen sio n o f the p a rt y ’s eligibility to en g ag e in transfers u nd er the p ro t o c o l’s em issio n s trading p ro v isio n s until th at right is re in sta te d .7 In prescrib ing the use o f su ch radical e n fo rc e m e n t m ea su res, the parties have also been d e term in ed to include sa fe gu ard s against the ab use o f such p ow ers. First, the parties have agreed to p rom ote auto m aticity in e n fo rcem en t, rather th an entrust the E n fo rc e m e n t B ra n c h with discretion with regard to possible en fo r c e m e n t c o n s e ­ quences. A cc ord ing ly , the M a rra k e sh A cco rd s clearly establish w hich e n fo rc e m e n t co n se q u e n c e s shall attach to w h ich violations. S eco n d , the c o m p lia n c e s y s te m 's exten sive p o w e rs to im p o se e n fo r c e m e n t c o n ­ seq u e n c es have necessitated a strong fo cu s on the esta b lish m e n t o f a fair and credible institutional regim e. T h e C o m p lia n c e C o m m itte e and its E n fo rc e m e n t B ran ch are co m p o s e d o f a n o m inate d group o f in d e p e n d e n t ex perts, w h o reflect an agreed b alan cc b etw ee n A nn ex I and n o n -A n n e x I countries, w hile also taking into acco un t rep resen tatio n from different reg io ns o f the world. T h ird, the p roced ural pro tection o f the party w h o se co m p lia n c c is u n d e r c o n s id ­ eration is e n sured in several w ays. T h e party in qu estion has the right to be re p r e ­ sented before the B ran ch, to have acc ess to any inform ation prov id ed by others, and to c o m m e n t on such inform ation . T he C o m p lia n c c C o m m it te e ’s decision to allocate a question o f im p le m e n ta tio n to the E n fo rc e m e n t B ran ch, rather than the Facilitative B ranch, will be taken by a m ajo rity o f the four B ureau m e m b e rs, tw o o f w h o m are from A nn ex I Parties and tw o from n o n -A n n e x I parties. F or the E n fo rc e m e n t B ranch to decide on w h e th e r to pro c eed with a case after a p relim in ary e x a m in a tio n , and to m a ke a d eterm in atio n o f n o n -c o m p lia n c e , a th ree-q uarters m a jo rity is required and m u s t include a m ajority o f both A n n ex I party m e m b e rs and n o n -A n n e x I party m e m b e r s .11 A party found to be in n o n -c o m p lia n c e m ay a pp eal a n o n -c o m p lia n c e decisio n to the M e e tin g o f the Parties, if that party believes it has been denied due process. T h e decision o f the E n fo rc e m e n t B ran ch m ay then only be o ve rridd en by a three-qu arters m ajority vote o f the M O P , w hich then refers the m atter b ack to the E n fo rc e m e n t B r a n c h .9 W h ile these in stitutional and p ro ced u ral features run parallel to the due process e le m e n ts o f d o m estic courts, the bip artisan c h a racte r o f civil courts and the p ro s e c u ­ tion aspect o f a crim in al case are avo ided . W e discu ss b e lo w to w h at extent this system can be ex p e cted to m ake effective decisions. T h e parties have not only b een co n c e rn e d with the co n ten t o f the e n fo rc e m e n t co n se q u e n c e s and the institutional and proc ed ural f r a m e w o rk for th eir a do ption , but also the legal status o f those co n se q u e n c e s . W h ile legally b in d in g co n se q u e n c e s m ight be a ss u m e d to be m ore effective in ensu rin g c o m p lia n c e , Article 18 o f the K y oto P ro toco l prov ides th at p ro c e d u re s and m e c h a n ism s entailing bin din g c o n s e ­ q u e n c es can only be a d o p ted by the p r o t o c o l’s c u m b e r s o m e a m e n d m e n t p roced ure. Ulfstcin and W c rk s m a n argue in C h a p te r 2 that w h e th e r o r not a c o n se q u e n c e should be c on sidered binding u n d er Article 18 m ay d e p e n d on w hic h c o n s e q u e n c e s arc ex am ined . S om e en fo r c e m e n t m easu re s, such as the su spe nsion o f eligibility to participate in the flexible m e c h a n ism , cou ld be c o n sid e red part o f the ‘im plied p o w e r s ’ o f international institutions. O th ers, such as the d edu ction o f to nn es o f a

4

In tro d u ctio n a n d M ain F ind ing s

p a r l y ’s assign ed am o u n t at a p enalty rate in a su b s e q u e n t c o m m itm e n t perio d, are a rg uab ly o f such a nature as to require an a m e n d m e n t o f the protocol. T h e lack o f clarity on these issues m a y result in an u n clear political situation after the first c o m m itm e n t period, for e x a m p le if certain A n n e x I parties that are found to be in n o n -c o m p lia n c e have not ratified an a m e n d m e n t that reflects the bin ding nature o f th ese penalties. Ind eed, th ose cou n tries w hich find it most difficult to fulfil their o bligation s are also the least likely to ratify such an a m e n d m e n t (Barrett, 2003). As W e rk s m a n describ es in C h a p te r 1, the d ev e lo p e d countries to ok a leading role in d e sign ing the M arrak esh c o m p lia n c e sy stem , relying in the neg otiatio ns on their d o m estic ex perien ce and legal culture. A lth o u g h m a n y d e v e lo p in g cou ntries had o p p o se d the esta b lish m e n t o f a strong c o m p lia n c e system in the nego tiatio n o f the F ra m e w o r k C o n v e n tio n ( W e r k sm a n , 1996, p95), they w ere united in th eir support o f a strong e n fo r c e m e n t m e c h a n ism u n d er the K y o to Pro to co l - but they insisted that it should only apply to A n n e x I parties. S o m e w h a t parad ox ica lly, w hile the US s u c ceed ed in a c hie vin g a g re e m e n t on its fav ou red elem en ts, including predictable and clearly d efin ed en fo r c e m e n t c o n scq u cn ccs , it cho se not to ratify the P rotocol. T h e m ore relu ctan t A n n e x I states - Jap an, A ustralia and the R ussian F ede ration s u c cccd cd in prev enting a clear definition o f the legal status o f the s y s te m ’s en fo r c e m e n t m easu res. T h is p rov ed to be one o f the m o s t c o nte ntio us issues in the final rounds, and the qu estion w as u ltim ately left for the M e e tin g o f the Parties to resolve.

Challenges and prospects: an effective compliance system? Like o the r key e le m e n ts o f the clim ate reg im e, such as the flexibility m ech a n ism s, the clim ate co m p lia n c e sy stem is still in a form ativ e phase. T he M a rrak esh A cco rds flesh out the b ro ad co n to u rs p ro v id e d by the K yo to P ro to col, but the institutions defined here have yet to constitute th e m se lv e s and begin fulfilling their functions. A ccordin gly , an ob jection that it is too early to ev alua te the system w'ould not be u nreaso nab le. On the o th e r hand, w hile the p r o o f o f the value o f the K yoto c o m p l i­ ance system lies in w hat it actually delivers, we m ig h t m ake a qualified ju d g e m e n t at this stage no neth eless, b ased on the s y s te m ’s characteristics. T h e fact th at the M a rrakesh A cco rd s pro vid e a rather detailed fram ew o rk for the clim ate c o m p lia n c e system is exactly w hy the co n trib u to rs to this b oo k have v olu nte ere d their view s on the likely effec tive ness o f this system . T h e K yoto co m p lia n c e system is part o f a b ro a d e r international institution, the clim ate regim e - and as students o f reg im e effe ctiv en ess have sh o w n , institutions can influence b e h a v io u r that is relevan t to a dd re ssin g international ch allen ge s, such as global w arm in g , in several distinctive w a y s . 1" O n e w ay is to sh ape the incen tiv es o f parties by rend erin g n o n -co m p lian ce m o re costly o r a d h eren ce with international n o rm s m o re profitable. T h is 'logic o f c o n s e q u e n t i a l l y ’ is e m p h a s iz e d by c on trib utors to the so-called en fo r c e m e n t school in the study o f international co m p lia n c e (eg Barrett, 20 03 ; D o w n s et al, 19 9 6 )." A s arg ued by the so-called m an ag e rial school, h ow ev er, the level o f co m p lia n c e with in ternational ag re e m e n ts is generally quite good despite the fact that m o st in ternational reg im es have paid relatively little attention to en fo r c e m e n t (C h a y e s and C h ay es, 1995). T his co n c lu s io n has been

I n t r o d u c ti o n a n d M a i n F in d i n g s

5

s u p p o r te d b y e m p i ri c a l s tu d ie s o f in te rn a tio n a l e n v ir o n m e n t a l a g r e e m e n ts ( B r o w n W e is s an d J a c o b s o n , 1999; J a c o b s o n an d B ro w n W e is s , 1998). A c c o r d i n g to the C h a y e s e s , the e x p la n a tio n is that c o m p l i a n c e is g e n e ra lly n o t d e t e r m i n e d th ro u g h d e lib e ra te d e c is io n s by states, m a d e o n the b asis o f e x p e c t e d c o sts an d b e n e fits. In s te a d , it is la r g e ly the res u lt o f n o r m - b a s e d b e h a v i o u r and b u re a u c r a tic ro u tin e s. S im ila rly , F r a n c k (1 9 9 0 ) e m p h a s i z e s th at c o m p l i a n c e is the re s u lt - at lea st in p a rt o f th e r e l e v a n t ru le b e in g p e rc e i v e d as le g i ti m a t e b y th o s e to w h o m it is a d d re s s e d . T h e s e v a rio u s p r o c e s s e s and d y n a m i c s th a t u n d e rly th e e ff e c ti v e n e s s o f in t e r n a ­ tio n al r e g i m e s are r e l e v a n t w h e n e x a m i n i n g the role o f the K y o to c o m p l i a n c e sy s te m in o v e r c o m i n g c h a ll e n g e s to e f f e c tiv e v e rific a tio n , r e v ie w a n d re s p o n s e in the c lim a te co n te x t.

Verification: reliability o f national reports A h ig h q u a lity s y s te m fo r g a th e r in g a n d v e rify in g i n f o r m a t io n o n s o u r c e s an d sinks o f g r e e n h o u s e g a s e s is a p r e r e q u is i te fo r a u th o r it a ti v e r e v ie w an d le g itim a te r e s p o n s e . N a tio n a l re p o r ts on in v e n t o ri e s o f c lim a te e m i s s i o n s are m a d e a c c o r d i n g to d e ta ile d g u id e l in e s an d re p o r tin g in s tru c t io n s d e v e lo p e d by th e I P C C an d a g r e e d u p o n c o l l e c t ­ iv ely by r e g i m e m e m b e r s (see C h a p te r 4 b y B e rn ts e n an d a s s o c ia te s ) . 12 C o m p a r e d to th o s e o f o t h e r in te rn a tio n a l e n v ir o n m e n t a l r e g i m e s , the c lim a te v e rific a tio n sy s te m h as a fairly c e n tr a li z e d c o m p o n e n t in the E x p e r t R e v ie w T e a m s , w h o s e m e m b e r s arc c h o s e n for th e ir te c h n i c a l e x p e rt is e an d o p e ra t e in th eir p e rs o n a l c a p a c ity . T h e m a in p u r p o s e o f th es e t e a m s is to e n s u r e a h ig h le v e l o f m e t h o d o lo g i c a l c o n s i s te n c y a c ro s s n a tio n a l re p o rts, in c l u d in g by m e a n s o f a d ju s ti n g n a tio n a l e m i s s i o n s in v e n t o r i e s if th ese in v e n to rie s are fo u n d to be in c o n s is t e n t w ith the g o o d p ra c tic e g u id a n c e . T h e im p a c t o f su c h c e n tr a liz a tio n is to li m it the l e e w a y fo r o p p o rtu n is tic e s t i m a ­ tion o f n a tio n a l e m i s s i o n s an d re m o v a ls . G iv e n the c o m p l e x i t y an d v a rie ty o f the a c tiv itie s th a t a ffect a tm o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a ti o n s o f g r e e n h o u s e g a se s , th e c lim a te v e rific a tio n sy s te m f a c e s su b s ta n tia l c h a ll e n g e s . E m i s s i o n s fro m m a n y s o u r c e s will be m e a s u r e d b y in d ire c t m e t h o d s - fo r in s ta n c e , m e t h a n e e m i s s i o n s on the b a sis o f c o u n ts o f t y p e s o f liv e s to c k an d a c re a g e u n d e r c u lt iv a t io n , a n d v e h ic le c a rb o n d i o x ­ ide e m i s s i o n s on the b a sis o f fuel c o n s u m p t i o n d a ta (see C h a p t e r 3 by M itc h e ll and C h a p te r 4 by B e r n ts e n and a ss o c ia te s). U n c e r ta i n ti e s w ill a b o u n d in s u c h e s t im a ti o n s , an d the a p p r o p r ia t e c o n v e rs io n p a r a m e te r s w ill be d e b a ta b le . F o r e x a m p l e , a c re a g e e m i s s i o n s fr o m m a n a g e d e c o s y s te m s , su ch as n itro u s o x id e fro m a g ric u ltu re , can be h ig h ly v a ri a b le a c ro s s g e o g r a p h i c a re a s an d o v e r tim e. O n the o th e r h a n d , the K y o to ru le s p e rt a in i n g to re p o r tin g on e m i s s i o n s an d on o th e r c li m a t e -re l a te d a c tiv ities c re a te not on ly o b li g a ti o n s , b u t also an a p p a r a t u s for e n h a n c i n g th e c a p a c i ty o f p a rtie s th at h a v e d if fic u ltie s in m e e t in g their re p o r tin g re q u i r e m e n ts . T h e F a c ilita tiv e B r a n c h o f the C o m p l i a n c e C o m m i t t e e w ill se r v e as an in s titu tio n al hu b fo r s u p p o r t a ctiv ities , w h ic h m a y in v o l v e t e c h n o l o g y tr a n s f e r and v e rific a tio n c a p a c i ty e n h a n c e m e n t . 13 S u c h a ctiv itie s w ill p r e s u m a b l y be p a rtic u la rly r e le v a n t fo r d e v e lo p i n g c o u n tr ie s e n g a g e d in p ro j e c ts u n d e r the C le a n D e v e l o p m e n t M e c h a n i s m ( C D M ) , b u t m a y also p ro v e u sefu l to A n n e x I e c o n o m i e s in tr a n sitio n . T h e r e is c le a rly a p o te n tia l fo r d r a w in g o n e x p e r i e n c e s in o th e r in te rn a tio n a l r e g i m e s in the o p e ra t io n o f the c li m a t e v e rific a tio n sy s te m , n o t le a s t b e c a u s e m a n y

6

I n t r o d u c ti o n a n d M a i n F in d i n g s

p ra c titio n e rs w ith in the c lim a te re g im e h a v e b e e n in v o lv e d in the o z o n e a n d tr a n s ­ b o u n d a r y air p o llu tio n r e g i m e s (see C h a p t e r 10 b y W e tt e s t a d ). In p a rtic u la r, e x p e r i e n c e s o f the i m p le m e n ta t io n c o m m i t t e e s u n d e r th o se r e g i m e s will p ro v e v a lu a b le to th e e ffo rts o f E x p e r t R e v ie w T e a m s in i m p r o v i n g the c o m p i la t io n and re p o r tin g o f n atio n a l c li m a t e data.

Alternative sources o f information D e s p it e its d e ta ile d g u id e l in e s , stru c tu r e s for c a p a c i ty e n h a n c e m e n t , an d the p o s s ib ility o f a d a p ti v e le a rn in g , the c li m a t e v e rific a tio n s y s te m w ill be m o r e e ffectiv e if it ca n d ra w u p o n o t h e r s o u r c e s o f re lia b le d a ta in a d d itio n to n a tio n a l re p o rts. T h e E x p e r t R e v ie w T e a m s are n o t ex p lic itly o b lig e d to s e e k a n d c o n s i d e r in p u ts fro m civil so c ie ty o rg a n i z a ti o n s , but th e ir m a n d a t e to p ro v i d e a ‘th o r o u g h and c o m p r e ­ h e n s i v e ’ a s s e s s m e n t s u g g e s ts that th e y w ill d o so. T h e r e are also c le a r in d ic a tio n s th at the o p p o rt u n it ie s in the M a r r a k e s h A c c o r d s fo r n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l o rg a n i z a ti o n s (N G O s ) an d o u ts id e e x p e rts to p ro v id e r e l e v a n t fa c tu a l a n d te c h n ic a l i n f o r m a t io n to the r e l e v a n t b r a n c h o f th e C o m p l i a n c e C o m m i t t e e w ill a c tu a lly be u s e d . 14 A n d r e s e n an d G u lb r a n d s e n s h o w in C h a p t e r 8 th at se v e ra l larg e e n v i r o n m e n t a l o rg a n i z a ti o n s are d e t e r m i n e d to m o n i to r the c li m a t e b e h a v i o u r o f k e y sta tes an d d is s e m in a te p e r t in e n t in f o r m a t io n b y the m e a n s a n d c h a n n e l s a v a ila b le to th e m . N o t o n ly e n v i r o n ­ m e n t a l o r g a n i z a ti o n s a rc lik ely to m a k e use o f th e s e p ro c e d u r a l o p e n in g s ; in d u s trial c o m p a n i e s , in c l u d in g th o se a s s o c ia te d w ith p ro d u c t io n a n d d is trib u tio n o f fo ssil fu els, also h a v e the in c e n tiv e an d the r e s o u rc e s to fe ed the s y s te m w ith r e le v a n t in f o rm a t io n (sec C h a p t e r 9 by Skjaerseth). A m o r e ra d ic a l w a y to o b tain in d e p e n d e n t c h e c k s on n atio n a l re p o r ts - in v e rse m o d e l li n g - has b e e n u sed w ith c o n s i d e r a b l e su c c e s s in th e m a n a g e m e n t o f t r a n s ­ b o u n d a r y air p o llu tio n . In v e rse m o d e l li n g is b a se d on n u m e r ic a l tr a n s p o rt m o d e ls , o b s e r v a tio n s o f a tm o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a ti o n s an d d a ta o n e m i s s i o n s fro m a n t h r o p o ­ g en ic an d natu ral s o u r c e s (see C h a p t e r 4 b y B e rn ts e n an d a ss o c ia te s ). H o w e v e r , the m u l ti tu d e o f so u r c e s a n d sin k s fo r g r e e n h o u s e g a se s , an d the lack o f r e p r e s e n ta tiv e m e a s u r e m e n t s , lim its the p o te n tia l o f this a p p r o a c h in the c li m a t e c o n te x t, at least w ith the c u r r e n t d e n s i ty o f the o b s e r v a tio n a l n e tw o rk . W h il e at p r e s e n t in v e rse m o d e l li n g c a n n o t d e m o n s tr a t e w ith s u f fic ie n t ce rta in ty th a t e m i s s i o n s from a g iv en c o u n tr y are h ig h e r th an th o s e r e p o r te d in its in v e n to ry , B e rn ts e n a n d a ss o c ia te s a rg u e in C h a p t e r 4 th at th es e te c h n i q u e s m a y s u p p l e m e n t the M a r r a k e s h v erific a tio n sy s te m b y id e n tif y in g c a s e s th at w a r r a n t c lo s e r e x a m i n a ti o n .

Review: mixed blessings o f the flexibility mechanisms T h e p a rtie s h a v e a g re e d th at th e y m a y m a k e use o f th e so -c a lle d ‘fle x ib ility m e c h a n ­ i s m s ’ in m e e t in g th e ir c o m m i t m e n t s u n d e r the K y o to P ro t o c o l. T h r o u g h th e se m e c h a n i s m s , p a rtie s m a y ad d to th eir a s s ig n e d a m o u n t s , as d e fi n e d by the lim ita tio n an d r e d u c t io n c o m m i t m e n t s u n d e r A n n e x B to the P ro t o c o l, ass ig n e d a m o u n t units a q u ir e d th r o u g h in te rn a tio n a l e m i s s i o n s tra d in g , e m i s s i o n re d u c t io n units o b ta in e d th r o u g h j o i n t im p le m e n ta t io n , certified e m i s s i o n re d u c t io n u n its o b ta i n e d th r o u g h C D M p ro je c ts , a n d r e m o v a l units a c h ie v e d th r o u g h sink e n h a n c e m e n t . 15

I n t r o d u c ti o n a n d M a i n F in d i n g s

7

T h e flex ib ility m e c h a n i s m s are im p o rt a n t to the c o st e ff e c ti v e n e s s o f the c lim a te re g im e - the r e g i m e ’s ability to tr ig g e r m itig a tio n o r a d a p ta tio n m e a s u r e s th at m i n im iz e the w a s te f u l u se o f s c a r c e re s o u rc e s. G iv e n the scale o f the e fforts re q u ire d fo r re d u c i n g a t m o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a ti o n s o f g r e e n h o u s e g ases , co st e ff e c ti v e n e s s is also e s s e n tia l to th e s o cial a c c e p ta b ility o f th e re g im e . H o w e v e r , th e o v e ra ll i m p a c t o f the fle x ib ility m e c h a n i s m s on the e f f e c ti v e n e s s o f the c li m a t e r e g i m e r e m a in s u n c le a r, b e c a u s e w ith this in c r e a s e d flex ib ility c o m e s the e n h a n c e d tr a n s a c t io n s co sts a s s o c ia te d w ith v erific a tio n and r e v i e w . W e h a v e n o te d a lr e a d y th at la rg e c o m p o ­ n e n ts o f g r e e n h o u s e gas e m i s s i o n s w ill be m e a s u r e d in d ire c tly by m e a n s o f c o n v e r ­ sion p a r a m e te r s th at are v u ln e r a b le to c h a ll e n g e in th e c o n te x t o f a n o n - c o m p li a n c e p ro c e e d in g . M o r e o v e r , the e m i s s i o n s r e d u c t io n s o r r e m o v a ls a s s o c ia te d w ith j o i n t im p l e m e n ta t io n , the C D M o r sink e n h a n c e m e n t p ro je c ts face c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o b l e m s o f c a u s a l su b s ta n tia tio n , in c l u d in g r e s o lv in g c o u n te r f a c t u a l q u e s t io n s o f w h a t level o f e m i s s i o n s an d r e m o v a l w o u ld h a v e o c c u r r e d in th e a b s e n c e o f th o se p ro je c ts. T h is situ atio n h a s led s o m e o b s e r v e rs to c o n c lu d e th a t e m i s s i o n i n v e n t o ry s y s te m s will lack d ata o f su ffic ie n t q u a li ty to p e rm it d e t e r m i n a ti o n s o f n o n - c o m p l i a n c e an d s u b s e ­ q u e n t e n f o r c e m e n t m e a s u re s . If this is the c ase, the ‘c a r r o t s ’ o f the c li m a t e r e g i m e c o u ld u n d e r m in e the ‘s t ic k s ’. T h e v e rific a tio n an d r e v ie w c h a ll e n g e s in t r o d u c e d by the fle x ib ility m e c h a n is m s m a y re d u c e the le g i ti m a c y o f c lim a te c o m m i t m e n t s . C e rta in ly , o n e f u n d a m e n ta l c o n ­ trib u tio n o f a w ell fu n c t io n i n g c o m p l i a n c e sy s te m to a r e g i m e ’s le g i ti m a c y is to e n su r e that the v io la tio n o f the f u n d a m e n ta l n o r m s o f the r e g i m e tr ig g e rs s i g n ifi c a n t c o sts for the r e l e v a n t p arty . W it h o u t su ch p ro v i s io n s , the c re a to rs o f a r e g i m e signal that th e y d o n ot c o n s i d e r these n o r m s su f fic ie n tly im p o r t a n t to ju s ti f y c o n s t ra in t s on h o w th ey are in te rp re te d . T o the e x te n t tha t th e v erific a tio n a n d re v i e w c h a ll e n g e s o f the flex ib ility m e c h a n i s m s u n d e r m in e the lin k a g e b e tw e e n v io la tio n an d re s p o n se , the ab ility o f the c li m a t e rules to c o m p e l n o r m a ti v e b e h a v i o u r w ill suffer. H o w e v e r , this m a y be an e x c e s s iv e l y p e s s im is tic view . M itc h e ll a rg u e s in C h a p te r 3 that, o v e r tim e , the b o d ie s th a t o p e ra t e the ‘tra n s a c tio n l o g ’ s y s te m , track e x c h a n g e s b e t w e e n c o u n tr ie s an d a c ro s s p e ri o d s , an d c e rtify a n d v erify e m i s s i o n s r e d u c t io n s , m a y w ell d e v e lo p b a s e l in e s an d m o n i to r in g p r o c e d u r e s that are su f fic ie n tly a c c u ra te for the p a rtie s in v o lv e d to a c c e p t the results. M a n y N G O s w ere a d a m a n t l y o p p o s e d to the flex ib ility m e c h a n i s m s d u ri n g the n e g o ti a ti o n o f th e K y o to P ro to c o l. A n d r e s e n an d G u lb r a n d s e n s h o w in C h a p t e r 8 th a t s o m e g reen a d v o c a c y g r o u p s are p re s e n tly d e v e lo p i n g the c a p a c i ty to m o n i to r an d e v a lu a te certifie d C D M and sink p ro j e c ts in o r d e r to c lo s e w h a t th ey p e rc e i v e as ‘l o o p h o l e s ’ o f the c lim a te re g im e . T h e s e e ffo rts m a y serv e to s u p p o r t th e ‘s t i c k s ’ o f the c o m p l i a n c e re g im e , d e s p ite the a d d e d c h a ll e n g e s o f the fle x ib ility m e c h a n is m s .

Naming and shaming R e v ie w b o d ie s in e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e g i m e s a re b e c o m i n g m o r e o u t s p o k e n a b o u t no n c o m p l ia n c e , an d the n a m i n g a n d s h a m in g o f states w h o s e p e r f o r m a n c e s fail to m e e t a g re e d s t a n d a rd s is no l o n g e r u n u s u a l. It is w o rth n o tin g tha t e v e n b e fo r e an y fo r m a l r e v i e w o r r e s p o n s e a c tiv ities arc u n d e r t a k e n , th e in f o r m a t io n c o m p i le d u n d e r the c li m a t e v e rific a tio n s y s te m m a y tr ig g e r p o litic a l c o sts to g o v e r n m e n ts . T h e lev el o f

8

I n t r o d u c ti o n a n d M a i n F in d i n g s

tr a n s p a r e n c y o f v e rific a tio n an d c o m p l i a n c e p r o c e d u r e s is th e r e fo re im p o r t a n t as it h e lp s r e l e v a n t in f o rm a t io n e n te r d o m e s ti c p o litical d e b a te s. A t the s a m e tim e, c li m a t e tr a n s p a r e n c y is n o t a lw a y s n e g a ti v e for a g o v e r n m e n t. B y s ta n d a r d iz in g p r o c e d u r e s an d r e d u c i n g the m a r g in fo r o p p o rt u n is t ic b o o k k e e p in g , the c li m a t e v e rific a tio n an d c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m p e rm it s g o v e r n m e n t s to illu s trate to th e ir c o n s t it u e n c ie s th at th ey ta ke th e c li m a t e c h a ll e n g e , an d c o m p l i a n c e w ith re la te d c o m m i t m e n t s , serio u sly . S im ila rly , the e n h a n c e d av a ila b ility o f c li m a t e i n f o r m a t io n m a k e s it e a s ie r for civil so c ie ty o r g a n i z a ti o n s to e s ta b lis h s h a m in g in f ra s tru c tu re s p ara lle l to th o s e o f the c lim a te r e g i m e itself. T h is m ay a lr e a d y be se e n in w e b s it e s an d re p o r ts s p o n s o re d by la rg e N G O s tha t w a rn a g a in s t p u r c h a s in g c o m m o d i t i e s fr o m firm s th e y d e e m as p a rtic u la rly c lim a t e - u n f r ie n d l y . It is als o seen in in itiativ es by N G O s to id e n tify and s h a m e b u y e r s o f ‘hot a i r ’, i.e., tr a d e d a s s ig n e d a m o u n t u n its th a t d o n o t res u lt fr o m o n e s t a t e ’s m itig a tio n e ffo rts b u t r a t h e r fro m a d e c re a s e in th a t s t a t e ’s in d u s tria l p ro d u c t io n (a nd th us e m i s s i o n s ) since the b a se y e a r o f the K y o to ta r g e t s . 16 T h e d e sire to use in f o r m a t io n to a p p ly p o litic a l p re s s u re to g o v e r n m e n t s an d the p riv a te s e c to r a d d it io n a l ly e x p la i n s the c o n c e r n o f e n v ir o n m e n t a l as w ell as in d u s tria l o rg a n i z a ti o n s w h e n the first set o f m e e t in g s u n d e r the C D M E x e c u ti v e B o a rd p ro v i d e d fo r only v ery lim ite d p a rtic ip a tio n b y n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l o b s e r v e r s ( J a c o b , 2 0 0 2 ). A t the s a m e tim e , f o r m a l c o m p l i a n c c w ith in te rn a tio n a l c o m m i t m e n t s is not a lw a y s s u f fic ie n t g r o u n d s for a g o v e r n m e n t to e s c a p e p o litic al c riticism in a c o n t e s t ­ ed p o lic y field; la w y e rs an d the g e n e ra l p u b lic o ften u se d if fe re n t m e tric s in e v a lu a tin g n o n - c o m p l i a n c e an d r e s p o n d in g to it. If a s t a t e ’s a n n u a l n a tio n a l g r e e n ­ h o u s e g a s in v e n t o r y d is p la y s a ste p w is e in c r e a s e in n atio n a l g r e e n h o u s e g as e m i s ­ sio n s, d o m e s ti c a c to r s f a v o u r in g m o r e fo rc e fu l c li m a t e m e a s u r e s are likely to p r e s e n t this as e v id e n c e that g o v e r n m e n t p o lic ie s la ck the teeth re q u ire d . F in a lly , as d e s c r ib e d b y S k jæ rs e th in C h a p t e r 9, g re a t e r atte n tio n to c o rp o r a te c li m a t e a c c o u n t a n c y p r o v i d e s o p p o r t u n it ie s fo r e n e r g y in te n s iv e c o m p a n i e s to d if fe re n tia te th e m s e l v e s fr o m c o m p e t it o r s b y w a v in g fla g s o f c li m a t e fr ie n d sh ip . T h is ‘b r a g g i n g ’ s tra te g y is a p p a r e n t ly o n e p u rs u e d b y c e rta in E u r o p e a n p e tr o le u m c o m p a n i e s , in c l u d in g B ritis h P e tr o le u m (B P ), A m o c o and S hell. S u c h p r o c e s s e s , and c o n c o m i t a n t a ctiv itie s s u c h as r e s e a rc h o n e n e r g y e f f ic ie n t p ro d u c t io n an d c o n s u m p ­ tion, will be i m p o r t a n t fo r the a b ility o f states to m e e t th e ir c li m a t e c o m m it m e n t s . T h a t said, there are c le a r lim its to the fo r c e o f n a m i n g , s h a m in g an d b ra g g in g . As A n d r e s e n an d G u lb r a n d s e n b rin g o u t in C h a p t e r 8 , p u b lic in tere st in c li m a t e c h a n g e is su es is d w in d li n g in m o s t W e s t e r n s o cieties, p artly b e c a u s e the so p h is tic a tio n o f the c lim a te r e g i m e m a k e s the c o n te s te d is su es r a th e r te c h n ic a l an d d iffic u lt to fo llo w .

Facilitation P o s itiv e in c e n tiv e s , to a g r e a t e r e x te n t th a n s a n c tio n s , are c u rr e n tl y the n a m e o f the c o m p l i a n c e g a m e in in t e rn a t io n a l e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e g i m e s w h e n e v e r d e v e lo p i n g c o u n ­ tries, e c o n o m i e s in tr a n s itio n o r o th e r p a rtie s e x p e r i e n c e d if fic u ltie s in c o m p l y in g w ith th e ir c o m m i t m e n t s . T h is is c le a rly v isible in the c li m a t e r e g i m e as w e ll, an d n o ta b le in th e m a n d a t e o f th e F a c ilita tiv c B r a n c h o f th e C o m p l i a n c c C o m m it te e . T w o s u b s id ia r y b o d ie s u n d e r the F C C C , the S u b s i d ia r y B o d y fo r S cie n tif ic an d T c c h n o lo -

I n t r o d u c ti o n a n d M a i n F in d i n g s

9

g ical A d v ic e a n d the S u b s i d ia ry B o d y fo r I m p l e m e n ta t io n , will r e m a in im p o r t a n t for the r e g i m e ’s ability to b rin g life to this m a n d a te . T h e e f f e c ti v e n e s s o f the F ac ilita tiv e B r a n c h w ill u ltim a te ly d e p e n d on the actu a l r e s o u rc e s a v a il a b le fo r s u p p o r t a c tiv ities . E x p e r i e n c e fr o m o th e r e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e ­ g im e s s u g g e s ts that fu n d s fo r suc h s u p p o r tiv e activ itie s are lik ely to fall c o n s i d e r a b l y sh o r t o f the n e e d s. T h e G lo b a l E n v i r o n m e n t F a c ility ( G E F ) , set up to p ro v i d e ne w an d a d d it io n a l g r a n t an d c o n c e s s io n a l f u n d i n g for e n v i r o n m e n t a l p ro je c ts , in c lu d in g in the c li m a t e area, is the m a in in t e rn a t io n a l in s tr u m e n t fo r c li m a t e c a p a c i ty e n h a n c e ­ m e n t an d it is e x p e c t e d th at s o m e U S S 3 b illio n w ill be a v a ila b le fo r the 2 0 0 2 - 2 0 0 6 p e rio d , up fro m U S $ 2 . 4 b illio n in the p r e c e d i n g fo u r y e a r p e r i o d . 17 E n v ir o n m e n ta l o rg a n i z a ti o n s se e k to in f lu e n c e the o p e ra t io n o f this in s tru m e n t, e s p e c i a ll y w ith r e ­ g ard to tra n sfe r o f t e c h n o l o g y to d e v e lo p i n g c o u n tr ie s , b y p a rtic ip a tin g in the G E F ’s A d H o c W o r k i n g G r o u p on G lo b a l W a r m i n g an d E n e r g y (see C h a p t e r 8 by A n d r e s e n an d G u lb r a n d s e n ) .

Enforcement: institutional and political constraints T h e m o r e s e v e r e or ‘h a r d ’ the e n f o r c e m e n t m e a s u r e s a v a ila b le u n d e r a r e g i m e , the m o r e im p o r t a n t is p ro c e d u r a l p ro t e c ti o n a g a in s t th e ir a b u s e . M e e t in g du e p ro c e s s c o n c e r n s is im p o r t a n t fo r the a c c e p t a b ili ty o f the c o m p l i a n c e sy s te m . A t th e s a m e tim e , o n e c o s t o f e x te n s iv e p ro te c tio n a g a in s t u n ju s tifie d c la i m s o f n o n - c o m p li a n c e is th a t e x c e s s iv e d u e p r o c e s s p ro t e c ti o n s m a y c a u s e the r e je c tio n o f s u b s ta n ti a te d c la im s as well. F o r e x a m p l e , as a res u lt o f the v o tin g p r o c e d u r e s w ithin th e C o m p l i a n c c C o m m i t t e e e x p la i n e d a b o v e , tw o m e m b e r s fr o m A n n e x I p a rtie s w ill in p ra c tic e be ab le to p r e v e n t a q u e s t io n o f n o n - c o m p l i a n c e fro m m o v i n g f o r w a r d fo r su b s ta n tiv e c o n s id e r a t io n by the E n f o r c e m e n t B ra n c h . M e m b e r s o f the E n f o r c e m e n t B ra n c h are to s e r v e in th e ir p e rs o n a l c a p a c itie s . S o m e m e m b e r s m i g h t n e v e rt h e le s s c o n s i d e r the in terests o f th e ir h o m e c o u n tr ie s w h e n fulfillin g th e ir tas k s. A s s h o w n by H a g e m an d W e s t s k o g in C h a p t e r 5, the im p li c a ti o n s o f su ch s i d e w a y s g la n c e s at the n a tio n a l in te re st can be fa r -reach in g . E s p e c ia lly if the p a rty s c r e e n e d fo r n o n - c o m p l i a n c e is a large e c o n o m y , th e s u s p e n ­ sion o f its rig h t to e n g a g e in tra n sfe rs u n d e r A rtic le 17 will in f lu e n c e p ric e levels in the e m i s s i o n s tr a d in g m a r k e t, an d m a r k e ts f o r fo ssil fuels an d e m i s s i o n in ten siv e p ro d u c t s . In su ch cases , an E n f o r c e m e n t B r a n c h m e m b e r m a y be s u b j e c t to p re s s u re fro m its c o u n tr y o f o rig in , sin c e the d e c is io n o f w h e th e r to sa n c tio n a n o n - c o m p li a n t c o u n tr y c o u ld im p ly s ig n if i c a n t e c o n o m i c lo s ses o r g a in s , d e p e n d i n g on the p a r t i c i p a ­ tion o f its h o m e c o u n tr y in th e s e m a r k e ts an d its b a la n c e b e t w e e n im p o rt s an d ex p o rts . C o n c e i v e a b l y , a p arty in t e n d in g to be a net se lle r m i g h t e x p e c t E n f o r c e m e n t B ra n c h m e m b e r s fr o m p a rtie s th a t a re b u y e rs to vote a g a in s t the s u s p e n s io n o f its a u th o r iz a tio n to e n g a g e in tra n sfe rs, sin c e su c h a s u s p e n s io n w o u ld c a u s e p rices to rise m a r k e d ly . T h is p o te n tia l for in f lu e n c e m a y r e d u c e th e d e te r re n t e ffect o f the c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m . It m a y also e n h a n c e the risk tha t o v e r ti m e the e n f o r c e m e n t s y s te m m i g h t tre at s im ila r c a s e s d if fe re n tly , u n d e r m in i n g its o w n le g i ti m a c y (F ra n c k , 1990).

10

In tr o d u c ti o n a n d M a i n F in d in g s

External m eans of enforcem ent G iv e n the stre n g th s an d lim ita tio n s o f the c li m a t e r e g i m e ’s in tern al c o m p l ia n c e sy s te m , e x te r n a l m e a n s o f e n f o r c e m e n t m i g h t ad d sig n ific a n tly to the r e g i m e ’s o v e r ­ all d e te r re n t effect. A s a r g u e d b y H o v i in C h a p t e r 6 , th is is p a rtly b e c a u s e e x te r n a l th re ats o f p u n i s h m e n t c a n im p ly m o re s e v e r e c o n s e q u e n c e s fo r the n o n - c o m p li a n t c o u n try . E x te rn a l threats m i g h t a lso, at least in s o m e c a se s , c a rr y m o r e c r e d ib ility th a n in te rn a l m e a s u re s . A t the s a m e tim e, e x te r n a l p re s s u re c a n s u p p l e m e n t in te rn al r e s p o n s e o p tio n s , th e r e b y m a k i n g in te rn a l m e a n s o f c o m p l i a n c c m o r e e f f e c tiv e th a n th e y m i g h t o th e r w i s e h a v e b een . In p a rtic u la r, e x te r n a l p re s su re m i g h t p r e v e n t a party fro m d ro p p i n g o u t o f the r e g i m e in re s p o n s e to th e th reat o f in te rn a l s a n c tio n s. O n the o th e r h a n d , e x te r n a l e n f o r c e m e n t also en tails c c rta in p o te n t ia l ly s e rio u s p r o b l e m s . R e s o r t to e x te r n a l e n f o r c e m e n t m i g h t u n d e r m in e th e r e g i m e ’s le g itim a c y , t h o u g h this is lik ely to d e p e n d on the p a rtic u la r c ir c u m s t a n c e s in v o l v e d , an d on the m e a n s an d l a w fu l n e s s o f the e x te r n a l s a n c t io n s e m p l o y e d . T h e p o te n c y o f c lim a te re la te d tra d e m e a s u re s , to ta ke o n e p r o m i n e n t e x a m p l e , will be affe c te d b y h o w the c lim a te r e g i m e in te ra c ts w ith the g lo b a l ru les a d m i n is te r e d by the W o r l d T r a d e O rg a n iz a t io n ( W T O ) . A t the c o re o f this in terp lay , d is c u s s e d b y S to k k e in C h a p t e r 7, is the n o r m a ti v e c o n s i s te n c y o f tr a d e -re la te d ru le s in the tw o r e g i m e s an d an y h ie r a rc h i c a l re la ti o n s h ip b e tw e e n th e m . T h e s t r o n g e r c lo u t o f the W T O an d its c o m p u l s o r y d is p u te s e t tl e m e n t s y s te m s u g g e s t th at is su e s in v o l v in g c o m p e t in g c la i m s w o u ld lik ely b e re f e rre d to W T O b o d ie s , w h ic h h a v e so far b e e n re s tric tiv e r e g a r d in g e x c e p t io n s to the g e n e ra l b a n on d i s c r im in a t o r y trad e m e a s u re s . A m o n g W T O m e m b e r s , the f in d in g s o f a d is p u te s e t tl e m e n t b o d y w o u ld p r e s u m a b l y be a ffe c te d by the status o f th e ta r g e t u n d e r the K y o to P ro to c o l. A n o n - c o m p l i e r w ith K y o to c o m m i t m e n t s w o u ld be m o r e s h i e ld e d th a n a n o n -p a r ty to K y o to , b e c a u s e by jo i n i n g the K y o to r e g i m e a n o n - c o m p l i e r has e x p o s e d its e lf to in tern a l an d less trad ei n tru s iv e c o m p l i a n c e m e a s u r e s th at s h o u ld be e x h a u s t e d b efo re re s o rt to e x te r n a l c o m p l ia n c e m e a s u re s . I f e x te r n a l e n f o r c e m e n t ta k e s p la c e w ith in b o u n d a r i e s set by o th e r in t e rn a t io n a l ru le s, an d at the s a m e tim e a d d s sig n ific a n tly to the d e te r re n t e ff e c t o f a r e g i m e ’s in tern al c o n s e q u e n c e s , it is likely to e n h a n c e c o m p l i a n c e w ith o u t n e c e s s a rily b e in g d e tr im e n ta l to the r e g i m e ’s le g i ti m a c y . T h u s a lt h o u g h the b e st o p tio n is p r o b a b l y an in te rn a l s y s te m o f e n f o r c e m e n t tha t is b o th e ffe c tiv e and fair, a s e c o n d b e s t m a y be e x te rn a l e n f o r c e m e n t in a c c o r d a n c e w ith o t h e r to o ls o f in te rn a tio n a l law .

Com pliance, NGOs and international governance T h e c lim a te r e g i m e illu s tra te s the in c r e a s i n g ly g lo b a l c h a r a c t e r o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s , and the n e e d to r e s o lv e s u c h p r o b l e m s th r o u g h c o lle c tiv e r a th e r than i n d i ­ v id u a l a c tio n . S ta te s h a v e , th r o u g h the K y o to P ro t o c o l, a c c e p t e d fa r -re a c h in g and b in d in g c o m m i t m e n t s . W h il e the c li m a t e r e g i m e is a im e d at re s o lv in g an e n v i r o n ­ m e n ta l p r o b l e m , it w ill h a v e s ig n ific a n t effe c ts o n e n e r g y p ro d u c t io n an d c o n s u m p ­ tion, as w ell as o u r life styles. T h e r e g i m e ’s re s tric tio n s o n s o v e r e ig n ty arc th u s not

Intro du ction a n d M a in F in d in g s only im p ortan t from an en v iro n m en tal point o f view , but also e co n o m ic a lly and politically. T h is im p o rta n c e is reflected in the m o bilization o f N G O s in the d e v e lo p m e n t o f the c o m p lia n c e regim e. As brou gh t out in C h ap ters 1 and 8 , e n v iro n m en tal N G O s have con sistently fav ou red a strong and tra n sp aren t en fo r c e m e n t regim e. T h e c o m p l i­ ance system elab orated in the M a rra k e sh A cco rd s c o n fo rm s to a great d egree to r e c o m m e n d a tio n s m ade by N G O s , a lth ou gh it is difficult to separate the distinct c on trib utio ns o f these o rg anizatio n s from c on trib utio ns m ade by certain m e m b e r states. In C h a p te r 10, W ette stad points out that several m ultilateral e n v iro n m en tal ag re e m e n ts share basic features in their sy s te m s for verific ation, review and r e ­ sponse. H o w e v e r, as he also ob serv es, there seem s to be a ten d e n c y tow ard s co m p lia n c e system s with m ore teeth. W h ile the M a rra k e sh A c c o rd s con tain both a facilitative and an en fo r c e m e n t a p p ro a c h tow ards n o n -c o m p lia n c e , the e n fo rc em e n t aspect is clearly the m o st striking innovation. H o w im po rtan t this inno vation will be in practice d e p e n d s on the ability o f the p rov isio ns fo r hard e n f o r c e m e n t to induce c o m p lian ce. A s po inted out by B arrett (2002; 2003), the K yo to c o m p lia n c c regim e suffers from a n u m b e r o f w ea k n e sse s that m igh t potentially w ea k e n the system . First, if a co u n try th at has been found by the E n fo rc e m e n t B ranch to be in n o n -c o m p lian ce in the first c o m m it m e n t period also fails to co m p ly in the secon d period, it must p res u m ab ly m ak e up for the d ifferen ce (plus 30 per cent) in the su b s e q u en t c o m m i t ­ m en t period. H o w ev er, this im plies that the p u n is h m e n t m ig h t be forev er d elay e d an a sp ect o f the system that o b v io u s ly d im in ish e s its deterren t effect. S eco n d , an exp ectatio n o f b eing found o ut o f c o m p lia n c e in the first c o m m it m e n t period is likely to induce cou ntries to hold out for a g e n e ro u s a llo w a n c e in the u p c o m in g n e g o tia ­ tions for seco nd period em ission targets. T h is itself redu ces the de fa cto p u n is h m e n t resu ltin g from n o n -c o m p lia n c e in the first p e r i o d .1* T hird, the M a rra k e sh A ccord s include no e n fo rc e m e n t p rov ision s to add ress the failure by a n o n -co m p lian t co un try to co m p ly with en fo r c e m e n t c o n seq u e n c es . H en ce, the c o m p lia n c e m e c h a n ism d e ­ p end s on the co o p eratio n o f the n o n -c o m p lia n t party. F ou rth, any party is entitled to w ith d raw from the K y oto p ro to c o l upon giving 12 m o n t h s ’ notice. It fo llow s that a cou ntry that anticipa tes e n f o r c e m e n t c o n se q u e n c e s m ight evad e th ese co n se q u e n c e s sim ply by w ith d ra w in g from the p r o t o c o l.19 Finally, it has been argued that the c o m p lian ce m e c h a n is m is not legally binding, and can be m ad e so only th ro u g h an a m e n d m e n t w h ich requires a th ree-q ua rters m ajority vote o f the M e etin g o f the Parties; even if such an a m e n d m e n t is agreed, the c o m p lian ce m ech a n ism b eco m e s b in d in g only on th ose co un tries th at ch o o se to ratify this a m e n d m e n t. T h e problem identified by H ag cm and W e stsk o g in C h a p te r 5 add s to this list. Even th ou gh the M arrak esh A cc o rd s state u n a m b ig u o u sly that (all of) the hard co n se q u e n c e s sh a ll be im p o sed if a co u ntry is fou nd not to be in c o m p lia n c e , it is not o b v io u s that a n o n -co m p lian t cou n try actu ally will be pun ished . T h e reaso n is that ‘d e te rm in in g w h e th e r or not a co un try is n o n -c o m p lia n t requires ju d g m e n t and d is c re tio n ’ (sec C h a p te r 2 by U lfstcin and W c rk s m a n , and R yp dal ct al, 20 03 ). M o r e ­ over, if hard c o n se q u e n c e s are im p o se d on a n o n -c o m p lia n t co un try , o th er countries that op erate in related m arkets, e sp ecially for fossil fuels, will also suffer due to price effects. F or this reason, so m e co un tries (such as N o rw a y ) m ig ht even suffer m ore if

12

In tro du ctio n a n d M a in F in din gs

an o th e r co u n try is p un ish ed than if they are pu n ish e d th em selves (H ovi and K allbe kk e n, 2004). Effects o f this type are no t only likely to be seen as unfair; they m a y also create in centives for strategic b e h a v io u r in the E n fo rc e m e n t Branch. If at least tw o m e m b e rs o f the E n fo rc e m e n t B ranch take these effects into con side ratio n, a co untry that is te chn ica lly in n o n -c o m p lia n c e m ight be able to avoid pu nish m ent. T a k e n to gether, the abo ve ob jection s p rovide an im p ortan t criticism o f the co m p lia n c e system . Y et it is co nc eiv able that in practice, these w ea k n e sse s will not be as disruptive for its fun ctio nin g as one m ight think. P ro p o n en ts o f the c o m p lian ce system seem to believe that w hen hard c o n s e q u e n c e s are im p osed, the relevant co untry is likely to a ccep t the p u n is h m en t, the abo ve o b je ctio n s no tw ith stand ing . O ne reaso n w hy it m igh t c h o o se to do so is that it w ou ld o the rw ise risk jeo p a rd iz in g the entire c o m p lia n c e system . A n o th e r reason is that, as e m p h a s iz e d by H ovi in C h a p te r 6 and S tokke in C h a p te r 7, o th er cou ntries m igh t use ex tern al pressure to co n v in ce a n o n -c o m p lia n t party that it should accep t the p un ishm ent. O verall, it is th erefore no easy task to predict h ow w ell K y o to ’s c o m p lian cc system is g oin g to w ork in practice. T h e fo llo w in g chap te rs should give the re ad er a b etter u n d e rstan d in g o f the nuts and bolts o f the c o m p lia n c e system and the factors that will d e term in e its effectiv en ess.

Notes 1

2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11

12 13

UNFCCC, Art 2. Developed countries, for this purpose, are listed in Annex I of the Convention. Annex II parties, a group comprised of those Annex I parties that are also Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members, have further commitments to provide financial and technological resources to enable developing countries to address their Convention commitments (UNFCCC, Arts 4(3), 4(4), 4(5)). In addition to their substantive commitments, developed countries also have more extensive reporting obligations than developing countries (UNFCCC, Art 12 (2)). UNFCCC, Art 13. UNFCCC COP Decision 10/CP.4. The flexible mechanisms are: (i) emissions trading, (ii) joint implementation and (iii) the Clean Development Mechanism. Marrakesh Accords, Decision 24/CP.7, Sec IV, Arts 4 - 6 (Facilitative Branch) and Sec V, Arts 4—6 (Enforcement Branch). The usage of terms like ‘verification’ and ‘review’ varies significantly among authors; our usage is compatible with the definitions provided in U N E P's 2001 Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Marrakesh Accords, Decision 24/CP.7, Sec XV. Marrakesh Accords, Decision 24/CP.7, Sec II, Art 8-9. Marrakesh Accords, Decision 24/CP.7, Sec XI, Arts 1 and 3; see Chapter 2 by Ulfstein and Werksman. For leading contributions to the study of regime effectiveness, see Haas et al, 1993; Young, 1999; and Miles et al, 2002. The ‘logic of consequentiality’ has been coined by March and Olsen (1989, pp23-4). Note that the enforcement school highlights the need for negative consequences of noncompliance, whereas the logic of consequentiality extends to capacity enhancement and rewards as well. See also Chapter 6 by Hovi. Kyoto Protocol, Arts 5 (l)-(2 ) and 7-8. Marrakesh Accords, Decision 24/CP.7, Secs IV and XIV; cfr Kyoto Protocol, Arts 5 and 7.

Intro du ction a n d M a in F in d in g s

13

14 15 16 1' 18

Marrakesh Accords, Decision 24/CP.7, Sec VIII, Arts 4 and 5. Kyoto Protocol, Arts 3, 6 , 12 and 17. Kyoto Protocol, Art 3.5. Stokke and Thommessen, 2003, p265. According to the Marrakesh Accords, targets for the second commitment period should be agreed on well before the end of the first period and thus prior to any assertion of noncompliance. However, if past is prologue, one cannot take it for granted that this deadline will be met - and even if it is, states are likely to act strategically in light o f at least rough expectations of whether they will be able to meet their Kyoto targets. 19 The option of withdrawal is of course available in most other international treaties.

References B arrett. S. (2002) ‘C o n se n su s T re a t ie s ’, J o u r n a l o f In stitu tio n a l a n d T he oretic al E c o n o m ic s, vol 158, no 4, 5 2 9 - 4 7 Barrett. S. (2003) E n v ir o n m e n t a n d Statecraft, O x fo rd U n iversity Press, O xfo rd B row n W eiss, E. and Jaco bsso n, H. (1999) ‘G etting C o u n trie s to C o m p ly with In ternational A g r e e m e n t s ’, E n v iro n m e n t, vol 41, no 6 , 1 6 -2 0 , 3 7 - 4 0 . C h ay cs, A. and C h ay e s, A. H. (1 9 9 5 ) The N e w So vereignty: C o m p lia n c e with T reaties in In tern a tio n a l R e g u la to ry R e g im es, H arv ard U n iv e rsity Press, C a m b rid g e , M A D o w n s, G. W ., R o ck e, D. M. and B arso o m , P. N. (1 99 6) ‘Is the G o o d N e w s a b o u t C o m p lia n c e G o o d N e w s abo ut C o o p e r a ti o n ? ’, In te rn a tio n a l O rg an izatio n, vol 50, no 3, 3 7 9 - 4 0 6 F ranck, T. M. (1 99 0) The P o w e r o f L eg itim a c y A m o n g N a tion s, O x fo rd U niversity Press, N e w Y ork H aas, P. M ., K eo h an e. R. O. and L evy . M. A. (eds 1993) In stitution s f o r the Earth: S o u rc e s o f E ffective In te rn a tio n a l E n v ir o n m e n ta l P rotec tion , M IT Press, C a m b rid g e , M A H a g e m , C., K a llb e k k e n , S., M * s t a d , O. and W e stsk o g , H. (f o rth c o m in g 2 00 4) ‘E nforcin g the K yoto Pro tocol: S anctio ns an d Strategic B e h a v io r,’ E n e rg y P olicy Hovi, J. and K a llb ek ke n, S. (2 0 04 ) ‘T h e Price o f N o n -c o m p lia n c e with the K y oto Protocol: T h e R e m a rk a b le C ase o f N o r w a y ’, C I C E R O w ork ing p a p e r 2004:7. Jaco b , T R (200 2) ‘R e flec tion s on B onn C lim a te M e e t in g s ’, D u P o n t S en ior A dviser, G lo bal A ffairs, m em o , limited circulation by T o m .J a c o b @ U S A .d u p o n t.c o m , I 7 June Jaco b s so n , H. and B ro w n W eiss, E. (19 98 ) E n g a g in g Countries: S tre n g th en in g C o m p lia n c e with In te rn a tio n a l E n v ir o n m e n ta l A c c o rd s, M IT Press, C a m b rid g e , M A and L o nd on . L oreti, C. P.. Foster, S. A. and O b b a g y , J. E. (2001) A n O vervie w o f G re e n h o u se G as E m issio n s V erification Issues, P ew C e n te r on G lo bal C lim ate C han ge, A rlington, VA. M arch, J. G. and O lsen , J. P. (1989) R ed isco v erin g Institutions: The O rg a n iz a tio n a l B a sis o f Politics, T h e Free P res s/M acm illan , New' York

14

In tro du ctio n a n d M a in F in din gs

M iles, E. L., U nd erd al, A., A nd re sen , S., W ettestad , J., Skjserselh. J. B. and C arlin, E. M. (20 02 ) E n v ir o n m e n ta l R eg im e E ffe c tiv e n e ss: C o nfro ntin g T h eo ry with E vid en ce , M IT Press, C a m b rid g e , M A R yp dal, K., Stordal, F., Fu glestv edt, J. S. and B erntsen, T. (2 00 3) ‘A ssessin g C o m p lia n c e with the K yoto P rotocol: E x p e rt R eview s, Inverse M o d e lin g or B o t h ? ’, w ork ing p ap er 20 03 :07 , C IC E R O , O slo S tok ke, O. S. and T h o m m e s s e n , 0 . B. (eds 2 0 0 3 ) Y ea rb o o k o f In te rn a tio n a l C o ­ op eratio n on E n v ir o n m e n t a n d D e v e lo p m e n t 2 0 0 3 /2 0 0 4 , E arthscan , L o n d o n W e rk s m a n , J. (1 99 6) ‘D esign ing a C o m p lia n c e S y stem for the U N F ra m e w o r k C o n v e n tio n on C lim ate C h a n g e ’ in C a m e ro n , J.. W e rk s m a n , J. and R o derick, P. (eds) Im p ro v in g C o m p lia n c e with In te rn a tio n a l E n v ir o n m e n ta l Law , E arth scan . L o n d o n , 8 5 - 1 1 2 W e rk s m a n , J. (1 99 9) ‘G ree n h o u se G a s E m issio n s T rad in g and the W T O ' , R e v ie w o f E u ro p ea n C o m m u n ity a n d In tern a tio n a l E n v ir o n m e n ta l L a w , vol 8 , no 3, 1 14 Y o u n g , O. R. (ed 1999) T he E ffectiven ess o f In tern ation al E n v iro n m e n ta l R eg im es: C au sal C o n n e c tio n s and B eh av io ra l M e c h a n is m s , M IT Press, C am b rid g e , MA

Part I The Kyoto Compliance Regime Emergence and Design

Chapter 1

The Negotiation of a Kyoto Compliance System Jacob Werksman

Introduction At the seventh session o f the C o n fe re n c e o f the P arties (C O P -7 ) to the U N F r a m e ­ w ork C o n v e n tio n on C lim ate C h a n g e (U N F C C C ), the C o n v e n ti o n ’s parties resolved m a ny o f the ou ts tan d in g issues ne cessary to bring the K yoto P ro to col into operation. T h e se a g re em en ts are co ntain ed in the report o f C O P -7 kn o w n as the M arrak esh A cco rd s. O ne o f the last p ieces o f the K yo to m a ch in ery to be d esign ed w as the c o m p lian ce system : a set o f rules, p ro ced u res and institutions intended to ‘facilitate, p ro m o te and enforce c o m p l ia n c e ’ with the P r o t o c o l’s c o m m it m e n t s . 1 T h e co m p lian ce system rep re se nts o v e r a d eca d e o f effort by clim ate ch a n g e neg otiators to tailor a m e c h a n ism to fit a reg im e w h ose features c o n tin u o u sly shifted shape. T h e design cho ices th at w ere m ade pro vide a crucial insight into the w ay in w hich delegatio ns perceive the legal and political cha rac ter o f the their c o m m it m e n t s u n d e r the P rotocol. T his c h a p te r exp lo res, through a n on -scq u cn tia l. them atic negotiating history o f the c o m p lia n c e -re la te d elem en ts o f the M arrak esh A cc o rd s, the theoretical and political positions th at u nde rp in the K yo to P ro t o c o l's c o m p lia n c e system . The starting point for the ne g o tia tio n s was A rticle 18 o f the Protocol, w hich prov ides that: The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the provisions o f this Protocol, including through the development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol. O th e r than the p roced ural obligatio n to prepare a c o m p lia n c e system in time for ado ptio n at the first session o f the C o n fe re n c e o f the Parties serv in g as the M e e tin g o f the Parties (C O P /M O P ) , the A rticle 18 m an d ate had only a limited im p a ct on the ou tco m e o f the n e g o tia tio n s.2 Instead, the ne go tiatio n s w ere shap ed by a series o f desig n ch oices centred on the follow in g th em es:

17

18 1

2

3

4

5

6

The K yoto C o m p lia n c e R eg im e: E m e r g e n c e a n d D esign T h e ex perien ce o f Ihe C o n v e n tio n parties in d esig n in g no n-co n fro n tatio n al, facili­ tative a p p ro ach es to n o n -c o m p lia n c e , and the shift in attitude o f the m ajority o f d eleg a tio ns tow ards the need for a ‘stro n g ' c o m p lia n c e system in light o f the K yoto P ro to c o l’s bind ing and quantified c o m m itm e n ts and the in tro du ction of m a rk et-b ased flexibility m e c h a n is m s into the clim ate regim e. T h e in fluence and attitudes o f A n n e x I party d eleg a tio n s for and against the d e v e lo p m e n t o f a strong c o m p lia n c e system , inclu din g do m e stic e x p e rie n c es in the U S , regio nal a p p ro a c h e s in the EU and the tension b e tw e e n ‘due p ro c e s s ’ and ‘a u to m a tic ity ’. T h e influence and attitudes o f d e v e lo p in g co u n try party d ele ga tion s fo r and against the d e v e lo p m e n t o f a strong c o m p lia n c e sy stem , and tensions betw een pro gressiv e en v iro n m e n ta l ob jectives and c o n c e rn s a b o u t the erosion o f national sovereignty. T h e role and co ntrib utio n o f n o n -g o v e rn m e n ta l o rg an izatio n s ( N G O s ) in the d e v e lo p m e n t and testing o f p rop osals during the negotiations, focusing on p r o ­ posals fo r tough penalties and transp are nt procedures. T h e im p act o f the fra g m e n te d structure o f the B u e n o s A ires P ro g r a m m e o f A ction neg otiatio ns on the linkages b e tw een the c o m p lia n c c sy s tem , the K yoto m e c h a n ­ isms and the reporting and review p rocedures. T h e issue th at both laun ched and e n d e d the ne go tiatio ns on a c o m p lia n c c system for the K yoto P rotocol: the legally bind in g c h a racter o f the en fo r c e m e n t c o n s e ­ quences.

A fter a b rief lin ear history o f the neg otiation s, and an o ve rv iew o f the c o m p lian ce system , each o f th ese th em es is e x p lo red in m ore detail.

Overview of the compliance system T h e reccn t history o f nego tiatio n o f the K yo to co m p lia n c c system begins w ith the a d o ptio n at C O P - 4 o f the B u en o s Aires P ro g r a m m e o f A ction, w hich set an ag en d a for the p rep aratio n for entry into force o f the Protocol. It estab lished a Jo in t W o rk in g G ro u p ( J W G ) on C o m p lia n c e with a m a n d a te to ‘d ev e lo p p ro ce d u res by w hich c o m ­ p liance with o blig atio n s u n d er the K yo to P rotocol should be a d d r e s s e d ’.3 D e v e lo p ­ m en ts since then can be traced through the s u b m iss io n s o f parties to the J W G 4 and the reports and c o m p ilatio n s m ad e by the J W G c o -c h a irs .5 T h e p enu ltim ate stage o f the neg otiatio ns w as the B o n n A g re e m e n t, a political a g ree m en t on e le m e n ts o f the co m p lia n c e system reach ed at C O P - 6 , part 2, in B o n n .6 T h e B on n A g re e m e n t reso lved m ost o f the m ain co n ten tio u s is sues that had divided delega tion s and th at had con tribu ted to the b re a k d o w n o f n eg otia tion s - and the near co llapse o f the regim e - at the first part o f C O P - 6 , in T he H ag ue (B o dan sk y, 2001). D ele g a tio n s reached C O P - 7 in M a rra k e sh , and the final stage o f the n e g o tia ­ tions, h avin g agreed on the co m p lia n c e s y s te m ’s objective, prin ciples and scope, the co n se q u e n c e s to be app lied by the E n fo rc e m e n t B ran ch, the scope o f an appeals p ro ced ure, and the size, c o m p o s itio n and d ecis io n -m a k in g p ro c e d u re s o f the C o m p l i­ ance C o m m i t t e e .7 C O P - 7 ’s c o m p lia n c e-rela ted task w as to translate these political a g reem e n ts into p roc edu re s, m e c h a n ism s and institutions, and to d ecid e on the legal

The N eg o tia tio n o f a K yoto C o m p lia n c e System

19

form by w hich the c o m p lia n c e system w ould be ad o p ted by the parties and c o m e into force. T h e form o f ado ptio n for the co m p lia n c e system and its im plicatio ns for the legal c h a racter o f its c o n se q u e n c e s p rov ed to be tw o o f the last and m ost difficult o f the is sues to be resolved. A s several chapters in this v o lu m e will illustrate, w hat em e rg ed from these neg otiation s is a re m a rk able c o m p lia n c e system draw in g on p re ce d e n t from , and yet unique to, international law. In stitutionally, the K y o to system relies upon tw o fu nc ­ tioning b ranch es w ithin a single C o m p lia n c e C o m m itte e . T h e m an d a tes o f these b ranch es are divided in ac c o rd a n c e with the P ro t o c o l’s c o m m itm e n ts. W h ile all c o m ­ m itm e n ts and all parties can be b ro u g h t before the C o m m i t t e e ’s Facilitative B ranch, the E n fo rc e m e n t B ran ch has ex clu sive ju r isd ictio n o v e r the specified, legally bin ding and ta rget-related c o m m itm e n ts o f the A n n ex I (industrialized) countries. T h e te c h n i­ cal co m p lia n c e o f the A n n e x I parties is re v ie w e d an nu ally by E x p e rt R e v ie w T e a m s (E R T s), w hich are tasked w ith id entifying any qu estion s o f im p le m e n ta tio n that arise from their review s. A n y party can also raise a question o f im p lem e n ta tio n with regard to itself or with regard to any oth er party. T he B u reau o f the C o m p lia n c c C o m m itte e will allocate the q u estio n s to one o r the oth er branch, d e p en d in g upon the c o m m itm e n t bein g q u estio ned and the m an d ate o f each branch. E ach b ran ch can then screen out questio ns it c on siders to be u n fo u n d ed o r de m inim is. F o llow ing its d elib eration s, each b ran ch has available to it ‘c o m p lia n c e c o n s c q u c n c c s ’ w hich it can apply to a party, with the E n fo rc e m e n t B ranch w ielding the h ard e r ‘en fo r c e m e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s ’. T h e E n fo rc e m e n t B ranch has the additional function, unique to the K yoto P ro toco l, o f p olicing the operation o f the P r o t o c o l’s flexibility m e c h a n ism s. T h ese m e c h a n ism s allow parties with c o m m itm e n ts to bu y and sell em issio n s allo w an c es and offsets in ternatio nally and to invest in em issio n reduction projects in d e v elo pin g cou ntries in e x c h a n g e for offsets. T h e effective op eration o f these m e c h a n ism s requires an accurate and transparent a c co u n tin g system th at can track the m o v e m e n t o f credits from one p a r t y ’s n ational registry to a n o th e r ’s. In o rd er to rem ain eligible to participate in these m e c h a n ism s, the A nn ex I parties m u s t m e e t the criteria for m e c h a n ism participation ag reed in M arrak esh. T h e E n fo rc e m e n t B ranch will review any q u estio ns raised reg ard ing these criteria and has the authority to susp end and restore eligibility th rou gh a special ex ped ited procedure. T h e most distin g uishin g feature o f the K yoto P roto col c o m p lia n c e sy stem is w h at d elega tion s and o bserve rs refer to as its strength o r to ug hn ess. T his to u g h n es s is exp ressed th ro ug h the e n f o r c e m e n t c o n seq u en ces , and in the authority o f a sm all b od y o f exp erts to im p o se these c o n s e q u e n c e s w ith only limited political oversight. W h ile these co n se q u e n c e s and the E n fo rc e m e n t B ran ch will be treated in detail in C h a p te r 2, th ey form a central aspect o f the story o f the nego tiation o f the co m p lia n c e system as a w hole. T h e to u g h n es s o f th ese c o n se q u e n c e s can be div id ed into their prescriptiv eness, their p un itive ne ss and their legal character. P rescriptiv eness de sc rib es the exten t to w hich the system limits the discretion o f the E n fo rc e m e n t B ra n c h in d eterm in in g w h a t c o n se q u e n c e w o u ld apply in a p articu lar situation, by attaching an auto m atic, p rc -d ctc rm in cd response. P un itiv cnc ss describ es the ‘s t in g ’ or ‘b ite ’ o f the co n scq u cn cc: in e c o n o m ic term s, the ex tent to w hich the c o n sc q u c n c c raises the costs o f n o n -c o m p lia n c c ab o ve the costs o f c o m p l ia n c e .8 T h e bin ding or

20

T he K y o to C o m p l ia n c e R e g im e : E m e r g e n c e a n d D e s ig n

n o n - b i n d in g leg al c h a r a c t e r o f the c o n s e q u e n c e d e s c r ib e s the e x te n t to w h ic h a p arty fo u n d in n o n - c o m p l i a n c e is free, as a m a t te r o f law , to a v o id the c o n s e q u e n c e i m p o s e d u p o n it.

Political landscape of the negotiations B e f o r e tu r n in g to the th e m a tic a n a ly s is o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m , it is im p o r t a n t to b rie fly s k etch the p o litica l la n d s c a p e s u r r o u n d in g the s y s t e m ’s n e g o tia tio n . T h e P r o t o c o l ’s p o litical c o n to u r s c lo s e ly fo llo w the s h a p e o f the P r o t o c o l ’s c o m m i t m e n t s . T h e first fe a tu re is th e b o u n d a r y b e tw e e n N o rth an d S o u th ; the in d u s tria liz e d c o u n tr ie s c o n ta i n e d in A n n e x I o f the U N F C C C will h a v e leg ally b in d i n g an d q u a n tifie d c o m m i t m e n t s u n d e r the K y o to P ro t o c o l, w h ile d e v e lo p i n g c o u n tr ie s w ill not. W it h in A n n e x I, the e m i s s i o n s c a p s a g re e d fo r in d u s tria liz e d c o u n tr ie s v a rie d , and w e r e e x p e c t e d to r e q u ire v e ry d if fe re n t le v e ls o f c o m p l i a n c e effort. T h is is p a rtic u la rly th e case a lo n g E a s t - W e s t b o u n d a ri e s , as m a n y o f the e c o n o m i e s in tr a n s itio n fr o m E a s te r n E u r o p e and the f o r m e r S o v ie t U n io n w ere a ss ig n e d e m i s s i o n c a p s h ig h e r th an w h a t th e y are likely to n eed to m e e t th e ir d o m e s ti c r e q u i r e m e n ts . B ut, as w ill be seen , a ttitu d e s t o w a r d s n o n - c o m p li a n c e also v a rie d a m o n g th e w e a lth i e r in d u s tria liz e d c o u n tr ie s , w ith sh a r p d if fe re n c e s o f view e m e r g in g on c e rta in is su es b e tw e e n the E u r o p e a n U n i o n ,9 an d a n u m b e r o f g r o u p i n g s in the lo o s e ly - o r g a n iz e d r e m a i n d e r o f A n n e x I, k n o w n as the J U S C A N Z and the U m b r e l la g r o u p s . 10 A m o n g the n o n - A n n e x I d e v e l o p i n g c o u n tr ie s , in te rests in an d attitu d e s to w a r d s c o m p l ia n c c w ith A n n e x I ’s K y o to ta rg e ts v a rie d as w ell. G e n e r a ll y , the d e v e lo p i n g co u n tr ie s n e g o ti a te d as a b lo c th r o u g h th eir tr a d itio n a l c a u c u s , the G r o u p o f 77 and C h i n a . 11 T h e i r m a in c o m m o n c o n c e r n w a s to d e v e lo p a c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m th at re f le c te d the s a m e ‘c o m m o n b u t d if f e r e n t ia t e d ’ d e s i g n as the P r o t o c o l ’s ta r g e t s . 12 L a r g e r d e v e lo p i n g c o u n tr ie s , su ch as B razil, In d ia an d C h in a , w e re also c o n c e r n e d w ith the p o te n tia l a p p lic a tio n o f the c o m p l i a n c c s y s te m to th e m , as the P ro t o c o l m ay ev o lv e to in c lu d e ta rg ets an d ti m e t a b le s for n o n - A n n e x I c o u n tr ie s . S m a l l e r c o u n tr ie s v u ln e r a b le to the p o te n tia l im p a c ts o f c li m a t e c h a n g e an d b ro a d l y r e p r e s e n te d by the A llia n c e o f S m a ll Is la n d S ta te s ( A O S I S ) 13 w e re p rim a rily c o n c e r n e d a b o u t the e ff e c ti v e n e s s a n d e n f o r c e m e n t p o w e r s o f a c o m p l i a n c e sy s te m . C o u n tr i e s d e p e n d e n t on the p ro d u c t io n a n d e x p o r t o f fossil fuels w e re c o n c e r n e d th at a truly effe c tiv e c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m m i g h t m o v e too m a n y c o u n tr ie s too q u ic k l y to w a r d s less c a r b o n ­ in te n siv e a lt e r n a t iv e s . 14 O n e o f the m o s t s i g n ifi c a n t p o litic a l d e v e l o p m e n t s o u ts id e th e c li m a t e c h a n g e n e g o tia tio n s w a s the e le c tio n to the p r e s id e n c y o f the U S , im m e d i a te l y f o llo w in g C O P - 6 , p a rt 1, o f G e o r g e W . B u sh . A fe w m o n t h s b e fo r e C O P - 6 , p a rt 2, P re s id e n t B u s h a n n o u n c e d that his a d m i n is tr a t io n v ie w e d th e K y o to P r o t o c o l as b e in g ‘fatally fla w e d in f u n d a m e n t a l w a y s ’ an d e x p r e s s e d its ‘u n w i ll in g n e s s to e m b r a c e ’ the t r e a ty . 15 T h e U S w i t h d r a w a l from the K y o to P r o t o c o l a d d e d m o m e n t u m to the B o n n n e g o ti a ti o n s , p a rt ic u l a rly in a re a s w h e r e the U S v ie w s h a d re p r e s e n te d a s t u b b o rn and p o w e r f u l m in o rity . S o m e d e le g a tio n s w e r e also likely d riv e n b y a d e sire to s h o w the U S that the in te rn a tio n a l c o m m u n i t y w a s c a p a b l e o f f in is h in g its w o r k a n d o f d e m o n s tr a t in g its c o n ti n u e d s u p p o r t fo r the P r o t o c o l w ith o u t U S in v o l v e m e n t .

The N eg o tia tio n o f a K yoto C o m p lia n c e System

21

H o w ev er, the w ith d raw al o f the US from the nego tiation s did not have a m ajo r im pact on the o u tco m e o f the c o m p lia n c e system. As will be seen, since K yoto the US had co n sistently s u p p o rted a strong c o m p lia n c e system and, with one im p ortant e x cep tio n (the c o m p o s itio n o f the E n fo rc e m e n t B ra n c h ), m an y o f the elem en ts ado pted at M arrak esh had either derived from US s u b m iss io n s or w ere su pp orted by the US d ele ga tion at so m e point in the n e g o tia tio n s. 16 W h ile m uc h o f the final design o f the co m p lia n c e system can be e xp lain ed by c on trib utio ns and trade-offs b e tw e e n political g ro u pin gs, sign ificant credit for the sh ape o f the final p a c k a g e m u st be given to vario us ind ividu als w ho chaired or steered the p ro c e s s . 1 T h e topic had the potential to b eco m e po litic ally -ch arg ed, but up until the last few sessio ns o f the J W G , the d isc ussion s m ain tain ed an analytical, at tim es alm o st acad em ic a tm osp here . T he J W G invited p resen tatio ns from academ ic in stitutions, N G O s and the secretariats o f o ther institutions w ith n o n -c o m p lia n c e and dispute settlem e nt m e ch a n ism s. T h e J W G w as also aided by the c o nsisten t p a rtic ip a­ tion o f a significant core gro up o f ind iv id ual d eleg ates w h o prov ided institutional m e m o ry and a m o m e n tu m beh ind the process. T his a tm o sp h ere o f trust allo w ed the J W G co -chairs to m ak e a n u m b e r o f sig n ifica nt c o n so lid a tio n s and ad v a n c e s in the d e v e lo p m e n t o f the text.'*

From facilitation to enforcement: Conventional wisdom revisited A ssessin g the extent to w hic h the K yo to P r o t o c o l’s c o m p lia n c e system reflects a m ajo r shift in thinking a m o n g d ele g a tio n s requ ires a q u ic k look back at previous efforts to d evelop c o m p lia n c c sy stem s for the clim ate ch a n g e reg im e. T h e c o m p l i­ ance sy stem is the third to have b een a ttem pte d by clim ate ch an g e n ego tiato rs over the past decadc. T he first effort, m ade during the neg otiatio n o f the C o n v en tio n , was ab a n d o n e d in fav o u r o f an ‘enab lin g p ro v i s io n ’ in Article 13 o f the U N F C C C , w hich calls upon the C o n v e n tio n parties to ‘c o n sid e r the esta b lish m e n t o f a multilateral con sultative process ... for the reso lu tion o f questio ns reg ard ing the im p lem en tatio n o f the C o n v e n ti o n ’. A s it b e c a m e ap parent during the nego tiation s o f the F C C C that the treaty w o uld not result in specified, legally bind in g em issio n s reduction c o m m i t ­ ments, d eleg a tio ns d ete rm in ed th at a co m p lia n c e system could aw ait the d e v e lo p m e n t o f m o re specific treaty c o m m itm e n ts. T h e seco nd effort fo llow ed the entry into force o f the C o n v e n tio n and w as based on the Article 13 m andate. T h is tim e, nego tiato rs built a p ro ced ure in its entirety, but the parlies to the C o n v en tio n h ave yet to bring it into operation (Szell. 1995). As part o f a neg otiating p ro cess that ran in parallel to the n egotiation o f the K yoto Protocol, clim ate neg otiators d esig n e d a multilateral con sulta tive pro cess (M C P ), and agreed on all elem en ts but the size and co m p o s itio n o f the institution that w ould run the M C P . 19 T h e m ain ch aracteristics o f this p roce du re reflect w hat, from a theoretical point o f view , has b een d escribe d as a ‘m a n a g e ria l a p p ro a c h ' to n o n -c o m p lia n c e (D o w n s et al, 2 00 0; D anish . 1997).20 T he design o f the M C P w as heav ily influenced by the e x p erien ce o f the design and initial o p eratio n o f a n o n -c o m p lia n c e sy stem for the M o n tre a l P ro to col on O z o n e S ub stan ces th at D ep lete the O zo n e L a yer (K o sk e n n ie m i, 1992; V ictor, 1998; W erk sm an , 1996; see also C h a p te r 10 by W ettestad ). A m ultilateral c o m m ittee, c o m p rise d o f experts n o m in a ted by the parties,

22

The K yoto C o m p lia n c e R eg im e: E m e r g e n c e a n d D esign

offers tech n ical advice and financial assistance to parties facing co m p lia n c e difficulties in an effort to head o ff potential n o n -co m p lian ce . Liberal standing p r o v i­ sions, n o n -co n fro n tatio n al p ro ce d u res and soft c o n se q u e n c e s invite parlies e x p e ri­ en cin g difficulties to a con stru c tiv ely en g ag e w ith the system . T he M C P ’s o bjectives are to provide advice on assistance to p arties to o v e rc o m e difficulties en co u n te red in their im p le m e n ta tio n o f the C o n v e n tio n , to pro m o te un d ersta n d in g o f the C o n v e n ­ tion, and to prev ent dispu tes from arising. Its m a n d ate is limited to p rov id in g advice and m a k in g r e c o m m e n d a tio n s . L ike the M o n tre a l P ro toco l co m p lia n c e system , re c o m m e n d a tio n s m a d e by the clim ate c han ge r e g i m e ’s M C P w ould have to be a p p ro v e d by the parties as a whole. T h e M C P w as desig n ed to ap ply to the C o n v e n tio n and its v agu e obligations. H o w e v e r, the M C P w as bein g n eg otia ted in parallel to the P ro to col, and delega tions could have opted sim ply to app ly this e m e rg in g m an ag e rial system to the to u g h er c o m m itm e n ts e m e r g in g from the P r o t o c o l.21 It is im p ortant to recall that a dv oc ates o f the m anag erial app ro ach to n o n -c o m p lia n c e have not tied their th eories su pporting the effectiv ene ss o f a soft a p p ro a c h to soft c o m m itm e n ts. O n the co ntrary, soft a p p ro ach es to co m p lia n c e arc th o ug ht to m ake to u g h e r targets m ore politically acccp tablc. N o n -co n fro n tatio n al a p p ro ach es arc indeed m ade n cccssary by difficult c o m m itm e n ts , and fav o u r the p ra g m a tism o f e n g a g e m e n t o v e r the futility o f e n fo r c e ­ m e nt ag ainst noto riou sly resistant so vereign states. As has been indicated, the m odel p rec ed en t for the m an agerial ap p ro ac h was the M on treal P rotocol n o n -co m p lian ce p ro ce d u re, w hich c on tain s highly specific, legally bin d in g c o m m itm e n ts. N on eth ele ss, as the P rotoco l to ok shape, d e le g a tio n s ’ attitudes to w ard s nonco m p lia n c e p ro c ed u res shifted aw ay from the m an ag e rial a p p ro a ch es represented by the M C P and to w a rd s to u g h e r en fo r c e m e n t p roc edu res. T h ree basic reason s can be p rov id ed for this shift: 1

2

3

C o m p e titiv e n e ss c o n c e rn s in the co ntex t o f a m b itio u s targets d e m a n d a m ea n s for id entifying and d isco uragin g parties from free-riding by m a k in g the costs o f nonc o m p lian ce h ig h er th an the costs o f c o m p lian ce. T he introduction o f m ark et-b ased instru m e nts carries with it the need to assure traders in carb on a llo w an c es and offsets th at the benefits o f their bargains will be backed by a rule-based response. T he legally binding c h aracter o f the K y oto P ro t o c o l’s targets d e m a n d s a c o m p u l ­ sory and bin din g m e a n s o f en fo rcin g them . ( W e r k sm a n , 1999)

T h e first and second reaso ns pro vide the cle arest ratio nales fo r dep artin g from the m a n a g e ria l ap proach . T h e m ana ge ria l ap p ro ach is d esig n ed to resp on d to p arties that wish to c o m p ly , but lack the financial and technical m e a n s o f d oin g so. T h e M ontreal P ro toco l system has w o rk ed well, in large part b ccau sc it has fo cu scd on solving the co m p lia n c e p ro b le m s o f th ose co u n tries that are eligible to receive financial and technical assistance from international financial m e c h a n ism s such as the M ultilateral F u nd o f the M o n tre a l P roto col and the G lo bal E n v iro n m e n t Facility (G E F). The financial and political costs o f c o m p lia n c e to these co un tries are lo w ere d through the transfer o f te c hn olo gy and financial resources.

T he N e g o ti a ti o n o f a K y o to C o m p l i a n c e S y s te m

23

In c o n tr a s t to the M o n t r e a l P ro to c o l, m a n y p e rc e i v e the K y o to P r o t o c o l ’s c o m ­ m i tm e n ts as im p o s i n g s e r io u s e c o n o m i c an d political c o sts on in d u s tria liz e d c o u n ­ tries. T h e s e c o u n tr ie s a re d o n o r s r a th e r th an r e c ip ie n ts o f d e v e l o p m e n t ass ista n c e . T h e y also tend to be d riv e rs o f te c h n o l o g ic a l i n n o v a t io n an d th e r e fo re the h o m e o f in n o v a t iv e in d u s tria l p ate n ts. F o r th ese r e a s o n s , tr a d itio n a l c o m p l i a n c e in c e n tiv e s su c h as tr a n s fe r s o f fin a n c ia l a nd t e c h n o l o g ic a l re s o u r c e s m a k e little sen s e as a re s p o n s e to the p a rtie s m o s t lik e ly to e x c e e d th eir K y o to ca p s. T h u s , at the o u ts e t o f n e g o ti a ti o n s , d e le g a tio n s fro m N o r th an d S o u th w e re c a ll in g fo r a ‘s tro n g an d e f f e c ­ t i v e ’ c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m th at w o u ld ‘p ro v i d e p a rtie s w ith c e rta in ty and c o n f i d e n c e ’.22 T h e s e c o n d r e a s o n also illu s trates the c e n tra l ro le th a t K y o t o ’s m a r k e t- b a s e d flex ib ility m e c h a n i s m s 23 p la y e d in the d e sig n o f th e c o m p l i a n c e p r o c e d u r e . T h e s e m e c h a n i s m s w ill a llo w A n n e x I c o u n tr ie s an d c o m p a n i e s to m e e t th e ir o b li g a ti o n s by in v e s tin g in e m i s s i o n s r e d u c t io n o p p o rt u n it ie s in o th e r c o u n tr ie s , w h e r e v e r the c o sts o f c o m p l i a n c e are lo w e st. B y lo w e r i n g the co st o f c o m p l i a n c e th e y p ro v i d e a c ru c ia l s a fe ty v a lv e fo r c o u n tr ie s stru g g lin g to c o m p l y . H o w e v e r , m a r k e ts in th ese offsets d e p e n d u p o n the re g u l a to r y in c e n t iv e s c re a t e d b y a c re d i b le c o m p l i a n c e sy s te m . O ffs e ts and a l l o w a n c e s o n ly ta ke on a m a r k e ta b l e v a lu e w h e n th e y arc in d e m a n d by re g u la to r s as p a rt o f a stro n g c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m . T h is clo se d e s i g n lin k b e tw e e n the stre n g th o f the c o m p l i a n c c p r o c e d u r e a n d the e f f e c tiv e o p e ra t io n o f the P r o t o c o l ’s m a r k e t- b a s e d m e c h a n i s m w a s k e y to b u ild in g a c o n s e n s u s a r o u n d a stro n g c o m ­ p lia n c e sy s te m . E v e n th o se A n n e x I d e le g a tio n s th at re m a in e d a m b i v a l e n t w ith re g a r d to to u g h e n f o r c e m e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s f o u n d it d iffic u lt to s q u a r e a so ft a p p r o a c h w ith th e ir u n s h a k a b l e e n th u s ia s m fo r the P r o t o c o l ’s m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m s .24 T h e th ird r e a s o n is b a c k e d b y a s o m e w h a t c o m p e l l i n g log ic: as a r e g i m e ’s ta r­ g ets are s t r e n g th e n e d , so s h o u ld the p r o c e d u r e s an d m e c h a n i s m s to e n fo r c e it. T h is v iew is no t, h o w e v e r , a lw a y s r e f le c te d in the d e s ig n o f m u ltila te ra l e n v ir o n m e n t a l a g r e e m e n ts , a n d , as h as b e e n in d ic a te d , th is logic is n o t a lw a y s s u p p o r te d by the a c a d e m ic literatu re (see the In tro d u c tio n ). T h e e s s e n c e o f the m a n a g e r ia l a p p r o a c h d o e s, h o w e v e r , r e m a in w ith in the F a c ilita tiv e B r a n c h o f the M a r r a k e s h p ro c e d u r e , w h ic h s h a r e s m a n y c h a ra c te ris tic s w ith b o th the M o n t r e a l P r o t o c o l s y s te m an d the C o n v e n t i o n ’s M C P . T o a les ser e x ­ tent, it h as also left its m a r k on the E n f o r c e m e n t B ra n c h . A lth o u g h the E n f o r c e m e n t B r a n c h h as b e e n a u th o r iz e d to i m p o s e su b s ta n tia l sa n c tio n s , an d h a s a n u m b e r o f q u a s i-ju d i c ia l /a d m in i s tr a ti v e trib u n a l-lik e fe a tu re s, th e b ra n c h c o n ti n u e s to o p e ra te in a rela tiv e ly m u ltila te ra l, p re v e n t a ti v e a n d n o n - c o n f r o n ta t io n a l fa s h io n . F o r e x a m p l e , a p arty th a t in itiates the e n f o r c e m e n t p ro c e s s d o e s n ot ta k e on the ro le o f c o m p l a i n a n t o r p ro s e c u to r, b u t m e r e ly tr ig g e rs the p r o c e s s , w h ic h is th e n left to the C o m p l i a n c e C o m m i t t e e an d its b ra n c h e s . K y o t o ’s c o m p l i a n c c s y s te m d o c s re flec t a shift in p o litic al a ttitu d e th a t m ay u n d e r m in e the th e o r e tic a l u n d e r p i n n in g o f the m a n a g e r i a l a p p ro a c h . It w o u ld a p p e a r th a t m a n y o f th e a s s u m p ti o n s o f the m a n a g e r ia l a p p r o a c h are no l o n g e r c o n s i d e r e d by p o li c y - m a k e r s to be o f g e n e ra l a p p lic a tio n . A f te r K y o to , fa c ilita tio n a p p e a rs to be c o n s i d e r e d a p p ro p r ia t e , b u t on ly to r e g i m e s o r th o s e a s p e c ts o f r e g i m e s w h e r e nonc o m p l ia n c e is lik e ly to be a ttrib u ta b le to a lack o f te c h n ic a l o r fin an cial r e s o u rc e s. H o w e v e r , the m u ltila te ra l n atu re o f the K y o to s y s te m s u g g e s ts th a t th e o rists and

24

T he K y o to C o m p l ia n c e R e g im e : E m e r g e n c e a n d D e s ig n

p ra c t it io n e r s c o n ti n u e to a g re e on the im p o r t a n c e o f a p r o c e s s o f e n g a g e m e n t fo c u s e d on p re v e n t in g r a t h e r th an p u n is h in g n o n - c o m p li a n c e .

Annex I ‘one-upm anship’ T h e m a in fo c u s o f n e g o ti a ti o n s w a s o n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f e n f o r c e m e n t p ro c e d u r e s ra t h e r th a n o n fa c ilita tiv e p ro c e d u r e s , a lt h o u g h d e v e lo p i n g c o u n tr y d e le g a tio n s p la y e d an im p o r t a n t p a rt in s h a p i n g the K y o to c o m p l i a n c e sy s te m . T h e c e n tra l n e g o ­ tia ting d y n a m i c d e v e l o p e d a m o n g th o se d e v e l o p e d c o u n tr y p a rtie s to w h ic h to u g h e r e n f o r c e m e n t p r o c e d u r e s w o u ld a p p ly . A s c o u n tr ie s w ith c o m m i t m e n t s , A n n e x I p a rtie s a rg u a b ly ha d the d e e p e s t in te re sts in the d e s ig n o f the c o m p l i a n c e sy s te m . A lth o u g h th e ir n e g o ti a ti n g p o s i ti o n s w e re m o r e d iv e r s e th a n th o s e o f d e v e lo p i n g co u n tr ie s, th e m a jo rity o f A n n e x I c o u n tr ie s s h ared a b a sic set o f o b je c t iv e s t h r o u g h ­ o u t m o s t o f the n e g o ti a ti n g p ro c e s s . T h e U S , C a n a d a , N e w Z e a la n d , S w itz e r la n d and the E U s h ared a c o m m o n c o m m i t m e n t to d e s i g n in g a stro n g and e f f e c tiv e c o m p l i ­ a n c e sy s te m , c h a ra c t e r i z e d by an e n f o r c e m e n t fu n ctio n. T h e e n th u s ia s m o f th e s e c o u n tr ie s fo r a stro n g c o m p l i a n c e s y s te m in the a b stra c t s e e m e d to feed o n itself, le a d in g to a k in d o f v ir tu o u s c o m p e t it io n . H o w e v e r , w h e n the s tre n g th o f th e sy s te m w a s e x p r e s s e d in te r m s o f c o n c re t e p r o p o s a ls , strong th e o r e tic a l an d c u ltu ra l d iv i d e s e m e r g e d . U S p r o p o s a ls fo r a stron g c o m p l ia n c e s y s te m d e riv e d p rim a rily fro m its e x p e r i e n c e w ith its o w n C le a n A ir A c t and related e m i s s i o n s tr a d in g s c h e m e s d e s i g n e d to r e g u la te acid rain e m i s s i o n s fr o m larg e p o w e r p l a n t s .2' T h e m a in le s s o n the U S d re w fro m th is e x p e r i e n c e w a s th a t a su c c e s s fu l r e g i m e is b a s e d on c le a rly d e fi n e d p e n a ltie s e n f o r c e d a g a in s t e m i tt e rs in a h ig h ly p re d i c ta b l e a n d a u to m a ti c m a n n e r . T h e m a r k e t d e p e n d s u p o n a p re d ic ta b ility s p e c ific a lly d e ri v e d fro m the a u to m a ti c n a tu r e o f th e se p e n a ltie s , w h ic h im p o s e a co st o n th e e m i tt e r th a t is w e ll a b o v e the m a r k e t price o f p e rm its . T h e p e n a lt ie s are, in p ractic e, n e v e r e n fo r c e d , as e m itte rs u se the m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m s to re m a in w ithin th e ir targ ets, d riv e n b y the d e s ire to a v o id the h ig h e r c o st o f n o n - c o m p li a n c e . A n o b v io u s a s s u m p ti o n u n d e rl y in g th is a p p r o a c h is th a t the m a j o ri ty o f the m a r k e t p la y e r s in the K y o to r e g i m e w o u ld be p riv a te c o m p a n i e s th at c o u ld e it h e r b u y t h e m ­ s e lv e s into c o m p l ia n c e , or r e d u c e th e ir e m i s s i o n s as they are f o r c e d o u t o f b u sin e ss. O n the b a sis o f this e x p e r i e n c e , U S p ro p o s a ls , b a c k e d b y o t h e r s u p p o r te rs o f the m a r k e t m e c h a n is m s , w ere a im e d at lim itin g the d is c re tio n o f th e E n f o r c e m e n t B ra n c h to a te c h n ic a l e x e r c i s e o f c o m p a r i n g e m i s s i o n s to targ ets. It also led to a re l u c ta n c e to in c l u d e the s u s p e n s io n o f e lig ib ility to p a rtic ip a te in the m e c h a n i s m s - the s u p p o s e d r o u te to w a r d s c o m p l i a n c e - as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f n o n - c o m p li a n c e . A s is d i s c u s s e d in m o r e detail in C h a p t e r 2, u n d e r the US a p p ro a c h , the a u to m a ti c it y o f the p r o c e d u r e h e lp s to d e li v e r d u e p r o c e s s b y lim itin g the p o te n tia l fo r p o litic a l in te rfe re n c e , an d e n s u r in g th a t all p a rtie s in the s a m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e c e i v e the s a m e tr e a tm e n t. B y c o n tr a s t, E u r o p e a n n e g o tia to r s a p p r o a c h e d the K y o to c o m p l i a n c e sy s te m w ith w h a t a p p e a r e d to be a less m e c h a n ic a l v ie w o f e n f o r c e m e n t . E U p o s itio n s e m p h a s i z e d the ne ed f o r d o m e s ti c a c tio n , an d s o u g h t to c a p the e x te n t to w h ic h any o n e party c o u ld rely on e m i s s i o n s r e d u c t io n s g e n e ra t e d o u ts id e its j u r i s d i c ti o n to m e e t its ta r g e t (see also C h a p te r 10 by W e tt e s t a d ). O n c e u se o r a c c e s s to the f l e x i­ bility m e c h a n i s m s is c a p p e d in s o m e w a y , an e n f o r c e m e n t s y s te m m u s t b e g in to

The N eg o tia tio n o f a K yoto C o m p lia n c e System

25

c o n tem p late how best to resp on d to a party that has failed to m eet its do m estic o bligations. S uch a system m ay need to take a m ore n u a n ced ap p ro ach to nonc o m p lia n c e , looking al each party on a c ase-b y -c ase b asis and c o n stru ctin g d o m estic c o m p lian ce action plans that to u ch upon the ind ivid ua l circ u m sta n c e s o f the party co nce rn ed. It could be argued that E u ro p e a n n e g o tia to rs' m e m b e rsh ip in a su p r a ­ national c o m m u n ity with central e n fo r c e m e n t p o w e rs in flu enced their view o f the political accep tab ility o f this m ore intrusive app ro ach. Som e have also su gg ested that the E U ’s preference for a c ase-b y -case a p p ro a c h resulted from its inability to agree early in the ne gotiatio ns on w hat p re-d efin ed pen alties w ould be appropriate. U n d e r the E u ro p e a n ap pro a ch , due pro cess is g u aran teed by a c ase-b y -case a p p ro a c h w hich in vo lves hearin gs and the c o n sid ered j u d g e m e n t o f exp erts, rath er th an autom aticity. W ithin the A n n e x I g ro up in g, but on the fringe o f the central debate, were d e le ­ gatio ns from Japan, A ustralia and the R u ssian F ed eratio n, w h ich rejected the need for a h ea v y -h a n d e d e n fo rc e m e n t system . U ntil the final stages o f the negotiations, they re m a in e d u n co n v in ce d that the K yoto P ro to c o l’s targets and m e c h a n is m s were sufficiently different in their c h a ractcr to ju stify a rev o lu tio n ary new a p p ro a c h to en fo rcem en t. G o o d faith and n o n -bind ing co n sc q u c n c c s sh ou ld, a cco rd in g to these dele ga tion s, suffice u n d e r in ternational law. T h e choicc b etw een a purely facilitativc and an e n fo rc e m e n t ap p ro ach also dep en d s, in part, on the p erce ptio n s o f the target n o n-c om plie r. T h e negotiating stances o f m any o f these d eleg a tio n s se em ed to be p re dic ated on the ass u m p tio n that it w o uld be a country o th e r than its ow n that w o uld find itself facing the E n fo rc e m e n t B ranch. D espite dom estic a ss e ssm e n ts o f the likely high e c o n o m ic and political costs o f its target, the US deleg ation c on siste ntly sent the m e ssa g e th at o nce the US c o m m its to a target, the ro bu stness o f its do m estic legal and reg ula tory sy stem , in c o m b in a tio n w'ith the m arket m e c h a n is m s , w o u ld de liv er the re s u lts .26 US scepticism s eem ed to focus on the risk o f a ‘c lim a te r o g u e ’ that m ight, for e x a m p le , oversell and th en e x c eed its e m issio n s a llow anc e. T he U S d ele ga tion also pressed hard for close scrutiny o f the E U ’s in ternal a rra n g e m e n ts u n d er its ‘Article 4 b u b b le ’.2 T h e E u ro p ean s seem ed equ ally c o nfide nt that their c o m p lia n c e w o uld not be challenged. T h e y reserved most o f th eir sc epticism for the o pe ration o f the K y oto m e ch a n ism s, out o f c on cern, p erh aps, th at the U S , h avin g inspired and desig ned th ese instrum ents, w ould find so m e m ea n s o f taking a dv an ta g e. A d v o ca tin g a strong a p p ro a c h also im plicitly a ss u m e s that the n o n -c o m p lia n c e o f o thers will eith er be successfully d eterred , o r at the very least it will be co ntained to relatively few parties. W id e s p re a d n o n -c o m p lia n c e co n fro n te d w ith to ug h pen alties w o u ld likely g enerate either defection s from the reg im e, or a rene go tiatio n o f its rules. From this persp ective, the J ap an es e , A ustralian and R ussian m in o rity positions take on a deg ree o f rea s o n a b le n e ss , in that th ey w'crc w illing to im ag in e the p o ss i­ bility o f their o w n n o n -co m p lian cc. T he K yo to targets arc both difficult and arbitrary, and in the m o n th s and y ears that hav e fo llow ed their a do ption , m an y cou ntries have beg un to reassess h ow c h allen g in g these targets m ay be to reach. Jap an and Australia m a y have ta ken less co m fo rt in the safety valve o ffered by the P ro t o c o l’s m ark et m e c h a n ism s, as m a ny p redicted that the U S and US c o m p a n ie s w o uld c o rn e r the m ark e t in c h eap offsets.

26

The K yoto C o m p lia n c e R eg im e: E m e r g e n c e a n d D esign

Ironically, R ussia, with its g e n e ro u s target, w as (for m an y o b se rv ers) the E n fo rcem en t B r a n c h ’s m o st likely client. A lth o u g h on its o w n R ussia w o uld have m ore em issio n s allo w an c es that it cou ld use during the c o m m it m e n t period , these add ition al tonnes, k n o w n as ‘hot a ir’, have attracted substantial c o n tro ve rsy. D uring the neg otiatio n, ru m o u rs circulated that the R ussian g o v e rn m e n t h ad already p r o m ­ ised its ton nes in bilateral deals with o th e r so vereig ns, and that G a z p ro m , R u s s i a ’s partially privatized g as m o n o p o ly , had pro m ise d the sam e to n n es to o th e r s .2f! The w e a k n e ss o f R u s s i a ’s do m e stic institutions raised additio nal co n ce rn s that reductions w o uld not be m e asu red reliably, and that the E R T s and the E n fo rc e m e n t B ranch w o uld be forced to reveal these w eak nesses. A lth o u g h the U S played only a b a c k g ro u n d role in the final stages o f the neg otiatio n o f co m p lia n c e system , the m ain e le m e n ts o f its vision for a strong and auto m atic e n f o r c e m e n t sy stem rem ain intact. E u ro p e a n discretion will, h o w ever, be introduced th ro ug h the inclu sio n in the e n fo r c e m e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a C o m p lia n c e A ctio n Plan for cach A n n ex I party found to have e x c eed ed its cap. T he plan, w h ich will be re v iew ed and assessed by the E n fo rc e m e n t B ranch , will includc an analysis o f the c au ses o f n o n -c o m p lia n c e and describe the actions the party in tend s to im p lem en t to m e e t its target, ‘giving priority to d o m e s tic policies and m e a s u r e s ’. In the end. A ustralia, Jap an, C an a d a and R ussia acc cp tcd the c o m p lia n c c s y s te m ’s tou gh and auto m atic c o n sc q u c n c c s , but m a n a g e d to blo ck c o n se n s u s on the legally b inding c h arac ter o f those c o n seq u e n c es . T he im p lication s o f this result are d is cu ssed below .

Developing countries and the burdens of sovereignty G iv en the po tential div erg e n c e o f interests, d ev elo p in g c o u n try n ego tiato rs, through the G ro u p o f 77, rem ained re m a rk a b ly united and c on sistent in their p articip ation in the design o f the co m p lia n c c system . A lth o u g h ind iv id ual d eleg a tio ns c on trib ute d specific pro po sals, the G ro u p w as stron gest in its insistence on tw o design elem ents: a strong en fo r c e m e n t sy ste m , and one a pp licable ex clu sively to A nn ex I p a rtie s .29 W h ile the rationale for their general sup po rt for the seco nd e le m e n t is clear, e x p la in in g the first ele m e n t o f the G -77 position is no t straigh tfo rw ard . As has been de sc rib ed , altho ug h d e v elop in g co u n tries will not have specific and bin din g c o m ­ m itm en ts u n d e r the P ro to col and will not be subject to its ju risd ictio n , they do have a lo ng sta nd ing tradition o f d efence ag ainst international org an iz atio n s m ak in g inroads into sovereignty. If one c o m p ares, for e x a m p le, C h ina, S a m o a and S aud i A rabia, these G -77 m e m b e rs have very different national interests with regard to the lo n g ­ term d e v e lo p m e n t and effe ctiv ene ss o f the clim ate regim e. N ev erth eless, the first m a jo r sub m issio n m ad e by So uth A frica on the G r o u p ’s b e h a lf co n tain s c le a r su pp ort for prescriptive, punitive and legally bin d ing c o n s e q u e n c e s . ,0 A s the neg otiatio ns reached their final round, d e velo ping co u n try p ositions b ecam e m o re nu an ced and frag m en ted , and in the last rou nd sev en d e v e lo p in g cou ntries m ad e su b m iss io n s w ith out a c o m m o n g ro u p p a p e r .’1 H o w e v e r, none o f the su b m iss io n s strayed from the basic g rou p position in su p p o rt o f a strong c o m p lia n c e system . O n the con trary , a n u m b e r o f d e v elo p in g co un try d e lega tion s su pp orted the inclusion o f even to u g h er san ctio ns th an th ose c o n te m p la te d by A n n e x I co un tries, inclu din g the im po sition o f financial p e n a ltie s.32

The N eg o tia tio n o f a K yoto C o m p lia n c e System

27

Ii w ould he possible to c o n c lu d e th at d ev elo p in g cou n trie s were c o m fo rta b le in pressing for a lough co m p lia n c e system in anticipation th at even d ev elo p in g cou ntries with significant em issio n s could avoid c o m m itm e n ts indefinitely. U n d er this theo ry , d ev e lo p in g cou ntry n eg otiators w ould be co m fo rta b le in desig n in g a to ugh system in anticipation that it w ould n ev er app ly to them . T he G -77 did. indeed, insist that the m an d a te o f the E n fo rc e m e n t B ran ch clearly limited its ju r isd ictio n to parties included in A n n ex I. T he struggle to get d ev elo p in g co u n tries to undertake quantified and bin din g c o m m itm e n ts un der the clim ate reg im e will be a long and difficult one. H o w e v e r, the design o f the c o m p lia n c e sy stem does not su p p o rt the c o n clu sion that once th at threshold has been crossed, the ju r isd ictio n o f the E n fo rc e m e n t B ran ch will rem ain exclu sive to industrialized countries. T h e d istin ctio ns in ju risd ictio n are b ased on the status o f the party u n d e r the Protocol (w h e th e r it is included in A n n e x I, and w h e th e r it has a c o m m it m e n t under, for e x am p le , Article 3.1 o f the P ro tocol), and not w h e th e r it is c o nsid ere d d ev elo p e d or dev elop in g. A n u m b e r o f d ev e lo p in g cou n tries sought to build in p roced ural protections again st the p o w e r o f the C o m p lia n c c C o m m itte e , efforts w h ich could be e xp lain ed as an ticip ating a tim e in w hich the sam e tough co n sc q u c n c c s th at app lied to ind ustrial­ ized co untries m ight ap ply to them selv es. Brazil, for e x a m p le, con sistently raised the need to prov id e the c o m p lia n c c system with a d eg ree o f political oversight, to p re ­ vent ‘m ere te c h n ic ia n s ’ from im p o sin g en fo r c e m e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s on sovereign states.*' B ra z il’s p ro po sal, w hich received so m e sup po rt from o th er G -77 m e m b e r s ,34 was that the C O P / M O P should, through a su b c o m m itte e o f parly representatives, provide a kind o f political filter al both ends o f ihe c o m p lia n c e process. F or Brazil, both the initial q u e stion s o f im p lem en tatio n and the ultim ate findings o f the C o m p lia n c e C o m m itte e w ould need to be vetted by the C O P / M O P su b co m m ittee . H o w e v e r, even this prop osal w ould have placed a relatively mild con straint on the p o w e r o f the C o m p lia n c e C o m m itte e . In B ra z il’s last iteration o f the role o f the C O P / M O P s u b co m m ittee , that su b c o m m itte e w ould only have been able to overturn a decision o f the C o m p lia n c e C o m m itte e by co n se n s u s (the so-called reverse c o n s e n ­ sus ru le ) .35 A n n ex I cou ntries o v e rw h e lm in g ly resisted a p ro m in e n t role for the C O P / M O P in regulating the o u tc o m e o f the C o m p lia n c e C o m m itte e . T h e y saw the potential politicization o f the pro cess by a su b c o m m itte e o f parties, or by the C O P / M O P as a w ho le (w h ere d e v e lo p in g c o u n try d ip lo m ats w ere likely to d o m i n ­ ate), as a g reater threat to their sov ereign ty and to the integrity o f the process, than the p rom in en t role p ro po sed for the C o m p lia n c e C o m m i t t e e ’s technicians and experts. A s the A n n ex I c o u n tr ie s ’ so v ereign ty w'as m ore im m e d ia te ly at stake in the p roccss, it w as difficult to build su p p o rt for B ra z il’s proposal. A n o th e r p otential sourcc o f resistan ce to a strong c o m p lia n c c system m ig ht have been cxp cctcd from oil-ex po rting d e v e lo p in g countries. O P E C (O rga niz atio n o f P e tro le u m -E x p o rtin g C o u n tries) nations have b een frequ ently a ccu scd o f playing an ob structio nist role in the n egotiations o f a clim atc regim e. T h e y have, h ow e v e r, alw'ays play ed a subtle g a m e, often resisting but n e v e r fully b lo cking p ro g r e s s.36 In light o f the wide support, within the rest o f the G -7 7, for a strong co m p lia n c e system , the app ro ach o f O P E C d eleg a tio n s was to bro a d e n the m an d ate o f the E n fo rcem en t B ranch, rath er than to narrow its po w e rs. In particular, Saudi A rab ia so u g h t to build

28

The K yoto C o m p lia n c e R eg im e: E m e r g e n c e a n d D esign

sup p o rt within the G -77 for the ap plication o f to u gh c o m p lia n c e c o n s e q u e n c e s to the P ro to c o l’s c o m m itm e n ts related to the potential im p acts o f A n n ex I p a rtie s ’ response m e asu re s on c o u n tries p articularly d ep e n d e n t on the p rod uction o f fossil fu els.37 Such a strategy ap p eared to be aim ed either at stren gth ening the legal c h a racte r o f these rather lo o s e ly -w o rd e d c o m m itm e n ts , o r at w e a k e n in g the design o f the e n fo rc e m e n t system by linking it to vague and un enforcea ble provisions. W hile the prop osal gained so m e supp ort in early G -77 positions, it e ve ntu a lly fell a w ay to the more c o m p e llin g logic o f a co m p lia n c e system fo cused on c lea r and p recise c o m m itm e n ts. A further, specific protection that d e v elo pin g c o u n tries sought in the design o f the c o m p lia n c e sy stem w as their insistence on eq u itab le g e og rap hic represen tation w ithin all institutional asp ects o f the system , including in the E n fo rc e m e n t B ranch, ev en th o u g h this b ran ch w o uld not rev iew d ev elo p in g cou n try c o m m itm e n ts . The G77 pressed for a m e m b e rsh ip fo rm u la based on the U N ’s five traditional regional grou ps, a fo rm u la that w ould ensure a m ajority o f d ev elo p in g co u n try slots. W hile the EU signalled flexibility to w ard s this app ro ach , the U m b re lla G ro u p steadfastly resisted the notion o f a m ajority o f d ev elo p in g c o u n try a p p o in tee s sitting in ju d g e m e n t on A n n ex I perfo rm anc e. As is discu ssed in greater detail in C h a p te r 2, this p rov ed to be a very c o n ten tio u s part o f the n ego tiation s and co ntrib ute d to the b reak d o w n o f at C O P - 6 , part 1, in T he H ague. W h e n dele ga tion s w ere reco n v en ed for p art 2 o f C O P - 6 , in B onn, the C h airm an o f the neg otia tion s (Jan Pronk o f the N ethe rla nd s) held a high-level all-nig ht session aim ed at resolv ing the rem ain in g d ifferen ces (L efebere, 2002). T he E U ’s gestures o f a c c o m m o d a tio n to w ard s the G -77 e x p o se d the U m b re lla g ro up m e m b e rs as the ones w h o w ere holding out, and Pronk d e p lo y e d a classic te chn iq ue for reaching co m p r o m ise : he requested the U m b re lla cou n tries to prioritize their co ncern s. By this point, the U m b re lla g r o u p ’s n u m b e r s and strength had been severely d im inish ed by the d efectio n o f N o rw a y , Iceland and N e w Z e a la n d ,38 and by the now sym bolic participatio n o f the U S (w hich had re n o u n ced the P rotocol). T h e g r o u p ’s rem aining m e m b e rs set their priorities as follows: 1 2 3

R e m o v e the possibility o f financial penalties as an en fo r c e m e n t c o n seq u en ce. C larify that the m od e o f a d op tion o f the c o m p lia n c e sy s tem w o uld not lead to legally binding c o n s e q u e n c e s .39 P rov ide for ex clu sive o r m ajo rity participatio n o f A n n e x I parties in the c o m p o s i­ tion o f the E n fo rc e m e n t B ranch.

T h e G -7 7 , w hich had n ev er seriously b eliev ed that financial penalties w ou ld be part o f the final p a c k a g e ,40 c o n v erg ed with the EU on the C h a ir m a n ’s strategy, and isolated the ru m p o f the U m b re lla group. T h e co n ccp t o f financial penalties w