Imperial Control in Cyprus: Education and Political Manipulation in the British Empire 9781350986787, 9781786732514

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of Illustrations
Acknowledgements
Foreword
Introduction
1. The Education System During the First Fifty Years of the British Administration, 1878–1931
2. Making a British Atmosphere in Cyprus, 1931–5
3. Towards the End of “Palmerocracy”: British Educational Policy in Cyprus, 1936–9
4. Education and Politics in Wartime Cyprus, 1940–5
5. Education, Enosis and the Revival of Politics in Postwar Cyprus, 1945–50
6. A Chaotic Situation: The Role of Schools in the Preparation for the Revolt, 1950–5
7. Schools in Uproar: The EOKA Revolt and the End of British Rule in Cyprus
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Plates

Citation preview

Antigone Heraclidou is an adjunct lecturer at the Open University of Cyprus. She has taught at the University of Cyprus and the European University Cyprus. She holds a PhD from the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London.

‘Antigone Heraclidou’s book is important for anybody wanting to engage with modern Cypriot historical experience. [It is an] excellent book.’ Robert Holland, Visiting Professor, Centre for Hellenic Studies, King’s College London

IMPERIAL CONTROL IN CYPRUS Education and Political Manipulation in the British Empire

ANTIGONE HERACLIDOU

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2017 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd Paperback edition first published 2020 Copyright © Antigone Heraclidou, 2017 Antigone Heraclidou has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. vii constitute an extension of this copyright page. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-7845-3952-8 PB: 978-0-7556-0276-6 ePDF: 978-1-7867-3251-4 eBook: 978-1-7867-2251-5 Series: International Library of Twentieth Century History, volume 106 Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

To my grandmother, Ortoula, who is always by my side . . .

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations Acknowledgements Foreword Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

The Education System During the First Fifty Years of the British Administration, 1878– 1931 Making a British Atmosphere in Cyprus, 1931– 5 Towards the End of “Palmerocracy”: British Educational Policy in Cyprus, 1936– 9 Education and Politics in Wartime Cyprus, 1940–5 Education, Enosis and the Revival of Politics in Postwar Cyprus, 1945– 50 A Chaotic Situation: The Role of Schools in the Preparation for the Revolt, 1950–5 Schools in Uproar: The EOKA Revolt and the End of British Rule in Cyprus

ix xi xiii 1 7 37 73 103 133 177 221

Conclusion

255

Notes Bibliography Index

265 301 311

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Plates Plate 1 Sports at the English School. H.E. the Governor Sir Alan Francis Harding presents medals to winners, around 1955 (PIO archive) Plate 2 The English School for boys, 1960 (PIO archive) Plate 3 Lady Harding visits the Turkish School children’s painting exhibition, around 1955– 6 (PIO archive) Plate 4 The official opening of the Pedagogical Academy in the presence of Archbishop Makarios and Dr Constantinos Spyridakis, 2 October 1959 (PIO Archive) Plate 5 Imposing of the curfew regulations, around 1955 (Takis Ioannides Archive) Plate 6 Students of the Agios Ioannis Elementary School sitting in front of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, around 1955– 6 (Takis Ioannides Archive) Plate 7 Closing of the Samuel Commercial School, 12 November 1955 (Fanis Parpairis Collection) Plate 8 Schoolgirls on their knees during Charalambos Mouskos’s funeral procession, 18 December 1955 (Fanis Parpairis Collection) Plate 9 Clashes with students during a procession in Eleftheria Square, 28 October 1957 (Fanis Parpairis Collection)

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Plate 10 Protest outside the Severios Library, 11 December 1957 (Fanis Parpairis Collection) Plate 11 Schoolchildren protest on the occasion of the Greek National Day anniversary, 25 March 1958 (Fanis Parpairis Collection)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is the result of my PhD research, which was made possible and bearable thanks to the help and support of a number of people to whom I ought to extend my sincerest gratitude. My parents, Marios and Maria, are the reason I was able to bring this assignment to completion – their endless emotional, psychological and financial support helped me overcome every difficulty. They were always just a phone call away. I thank them from the bottom of my heart, and I will always be grateful to them. This study, however, could not have been achieved without the immense help of my supervisor, Professor Robert Holland, who unreservedly offered me the most valuable academic advice and the best feedback a supervisor could give. He kept me motivated, piqued my curiosity and cultivated my critical thinking. He has been amazingly supportive and he, and his lovely wife, Hillia, shared my joys and disappointments. It would not be an exaggeration to say that every student should have a supervisor as brilliant, caring and humane as Rob Holland. I wholeheartedly thank him for everything, and I feel genuinely grateful for his constant and generous support and friendship. I could not but thank my brother Andreas and my sister Elena for their endless support. Although during the writing of this thesis we were living in three different countries, we managed to beat the distance, and I thank them so much for this. Anastasia Yiangou is a true friend, a real “treasure”, and I thank her: she was always willing to lend me an ear, comfort me and put me back on track. Her valuable advice and her keenness to give me useful tips, to proofread and to help me find my way

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when I was completely lost will never be forgotten, and it is my hope that someday I can reciprocate. Additionally, I would also like to thank my PhD thesis examiners, Professor Sarah Stockwell and Dr Klearchos Kyriakides, for their helpful comments, as well as for the support and encouragement they have given me since my examination. I would also like to thank the staff of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, the Senate House Library, the Public Record Office (Kew), the Public Information Office, the Archbishop Makarios III Foundation, the University of Cyprus Library and the State Archive in Nicosia for their professional assistance during my research. A big thank you also to my copy editor, David A. Porter, and to my I.B.Tauris editors, Dr Lester Crook and Joanna Godfrey, for their invaluable assistance and impeccable cooperation. Last but foremost I would like to thank my wonderful husband, Yiannis Trimithiotis. His boundless love made everything much easier. He was always there for me, ready to lift my spirits, erase any doubts and make all of my insecurities disappear. He was the one who, with great patience and persistence, supported me through thick and thin, believing in me more than I believed in myself.

FOREWORD

If there is one institution that has, over centuries, been at the heart of Cypriot society (and especially its Greek– Cypriot majority) more than any other, it is surely the school. Its presence at the core of communities has symbolised the endurance of identities and social beliefs – plural, because they are never exactly the same everywhere and never frozen in time – even when political regimes have come and gone. To this day the schoolteacher has a status in society that has long since been lost elsewhere, like Britain, for example, where teachers are regarded like any other municipal worker. Schooling and education therefore lies at the heart of the history of Cyprus. Being at the centre of history means being, for any particular present, also at the heart of instability and conflict. This was certainly the case during the decades of British rule in Cyprus. British decisions to act, and equally importantly not to act, in the educational sphere were tell-tale signs of underlying realities. This was the case at the start of colonial administration after 1878 when the new occupiers shirked the challenge of introducing English educational principles; when conscious that their position was slipping in the 1920s and 1930s, they sought to ‘reform’ schools and educational committees; and true at the sad climax of the 1950s when in desperation the British Army was sent into educational premises to chase striking Greek– Cypriot pupils. But schooling always reflected wider society, and society is never simple or a mere reflection of adversary politics. The huge growth in the numbers of schools from the end of the nineteenth century measured more surely than anything else the hunger for social betterment amongst

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the poorer classes. Modernity came to Cyprus not least – and perhaps above all – through education, but it did not do so smoothly and without difficult adaptations. Under twentieth-century conditions, the curricula could not remain purely classical, as if contemporary needs might be met by endless reiterations of Homer or learning ancient grammar. British-led reform was also designed in part to meet such nonpolitical purposes, and to that extent was forward-looking in a way that attracted some Cypriots, including teachers who welcomed better wages. Educational questions before independence in the 1960s therefore touched on blockages within Cypriot society itself, as well as between the local population and colonial rulers. Nor did the sensitivities involved go away after 1960. Indeed, their intractabilities have been ongoing ever since, and have also been relevant in a university sector that was merely a fleeting aspiration in colonial times. This book by Antigone Heraclidou is important, but not by any means because it is the first to deal with these issues. Constantine Spyridakis, a leading figure in modern Greek – Cypriot intellectual history, and ex-headmaster of the Pan-Cyprian Gymnasium, many years ago provided an historical overview of education in the colonial era from a particular (essentially Hellenic nationalist) vantage-point. Afterwards as Minister of Education in the 1960s he had to grapple with the practical issues involved, including how to adapt traditional classicism with the needs of contemporary development. At the end of the 1970s Panayiotis K. Persianis covered the same period of Cypriot educational history from the perspective of the role of the Orthodox Church. More recently there has been published work on educational experience in particular provinces, on Turkish –Cypriot education, and books and articles – as by Yiannis Papadakis – integrating the topic into sociological analysis of modern Cyprus. What Antigone Heraclidou presents in this volume, however, is an up-to-date, comprehensive exploration of Cypriot education from British occupation through to the eve of independence, taking account of the historiographical evolution in recent decades, and, very importantly, based on primary research both in Cyprus and colonial archival materials in the United Kingdom. One of the chief contributions made by Dr Heraclidou is to mesh the well-known political struggles surrounding education defined by colonial rule and Hellenic aspirations into equally – perhaps even more profound – questions of modernity

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(including its professional needs), social change and popular consciousness. The latter issues are the most important, historically speaking, in relation to understanding Cyprus as it faces twenty-firstcentury challenges. Antigone Heraclidou’s book is important for anybody wanting to engage with modern Cypriot historical experience in these senses. It has been a privilege for me to be associated with the research that has culminated in this excellent book. Robert Holland Visiting Professor, Centre for Hellenic Studies, King’s College London

INTRODUCTION

Modern Cypriot historiography has been steadily expanding, especially over the last two decades, shedding light on previously understudied aspects of the colonial history of the island, mostly in relation to the periods before the 1930s and after the outbreak of the anti-British revolt in April 1955. There remains a lack of analysis, however, with respect to the intervening period, more precisely from the October uprising in 1931 until the beginning of the armed struggle that eventually lead to independence. Though several historians have studied the causes and the conduct of the two uprisings, little has been said so far on the political and social developments between these two landmark events. The originality of the current study lies in an analysis that approaches the period from 1931 to 1956 as a coherent whole. Much of the existing historiography of British colonial Cyprus consists of political narratives and, generally speaking, thematic concerns have been largely absent. The value of such approaches, however, is that they can more effectively link political events to the changing social and political realities of the island. This work seeks to help fill part of this gap by focusing on education as a basic element in Cypriot society and one which, as we shall see, played a vital role in shaping political life during the first half of the twentieth century. During Ottoman rule and the first decades of the British administration, the schools, under the control and guidance of the Church, were seen as the safeguard of Greek language and Hellenic tradition, and their purpose was to prove, strengthen and perpetuate the Hellenic identity of the Greeks of Cyprus. Most importantly, it was through these institutions that the ideal of

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enosis (union with Greece) was cultivated and promoted to an extent that, ultimately, jarred against British perceptions of the status of the island as a colony under their sovereignty. Unfolding British efforts both to modernise and improve the Cypriot education system in accordance with up-to-date secular principles and to break the political link between the schools and the ranks of enosis supporters rendered education a first-rate issue. As a result, paradoxically, the schools themselves were to become weapons in the process of political mobilisation and “modernisation” in Cyprus. It is therefore entirely in keeping with the logic and argument of this work to underline that the schools finally became one of the incubators for the protracted pre-independence struggle in the 1950s and an indispensable component of the success of this struggle. By the same token, the role of the students themselves emerged as part of the enduring mythology of Greek–Cypriot politics. Turning to the historiography, British educational policy in Cyprus has been described in several accounts, some highly critical, but so far it has not been the subject of a systematic examination in relation to the island’s shifting colonial politics. Writing in 1952, W.W. Weir, the principal of the American Academy in Larnaca, provided a perspective from a British educational expert, one focused on external influences and the content of the various educational laws up to that time.1 Panayiotis Persianis’s seminal work has approached the modern history of Cypriot education from a sociological vantage point and with special reference to the role of the Church. Little is mentioned in his analysis, however, about the political developments that shaped educational policies.2 Constantinos Spyridakis, a prominent educationalist, has given a broad overview of the growth of secondary education from his perspective as a leading exponent of right-wing Hellenic nationalism.3 A number of other works in this field, such as those by Kleovoulos Myrianthopoulos and Andreas Polydorou, are essentially in narrative form and in Greek.4 Education has been grafted into the analysis of more general studies, such as those by George Kelling and Michael Attalides, or into studies of the EOKA revolt (Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών – National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters – the anti-British revolt waged by EOKA started in April 1955 and lasted until 1959), such as those by Nancy Crawshaw, Robert Holland and David French, but only to a limited degree.5 This study builds on such earlier work by examining the interplay between education and Cypriot political development based on a

INTRODUCTION

3

thorough exploration of relevant archival sources in both English and Greek. Such an analysis of the politics of education and of factors that played a significant role in the evolution of the education system, including financial pre-occupations and social relations, will hopefully shed fresh light on the modern history of Cyprus. Our chronology will begin when educational issues were increasingly coming to the forefront, during the early and mid-1920s, a time when British colonial rule was bedding down (the island became a Crown Colony proper in 1925, in the wake of the Treaty of Lausanne, which affected Greek–Turkish relationships throughout the eastern Mediterranean). One trait of this bedding down was a British determination to achieve and maintain a more effective “grip” on the internal institutions of Cyprus, of which education was seen as the most important. In keeping with the dialectic of our subject, this tendency became intertwined with the revival of enosis, climaxing in the troubles of 1931. Although unpremeditated, the uprising marked a serious turn in the administration of the island, and following the uprising the British administration remained a repressive regime for nearly a decade. During the 1930s, elementary education continued to undergo an overhaul, but this period was driven by the British attempt to root out, or at least marginalise, the forces of enosis, and to inculcate a ‘British atmosphere in Cyprus’ that had hitherto been so noticeably lacking.6 The resulting contest was still being played out when World War II intervened. Inevitably, education, as with most aspects of the internal affairs of Cyprus, was pushed into the background by the immediate impact of war, and especially by the eastern Mediterranean drama of 1940–1, when the future security of the island seemingly hung in the balance. As the threat receded, however, and Cyprus became one of the Mediterranean islands that was neither fought over nor devastated, the island’s political development, including its elections, resumed earlier than they did in other parts of the region. This study will show the part played by education in the revival of partisan politics, particularly at the municipal level, by the end of hostilities in July 1945. The postwar years witnessed an evolving and increasingly bitter three-way struggle between the Greek–Cypriot Left, the Right and an increasingly nervous British colonial administration. This book will show how, in line with previous developments, education provided a touchstone for growing tensions. Driven by this struggle, the schools became an essential part of the enosis

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campaign after 1950 and eventually indispensable to the conduct of the anti-British armed struggle in 1955–9. The methodology of the book does not involve a detailed engagement with the pedagogy of Cypriot education: such matters will enter into discussion, but only where they are relevant for the interplay with wider political issues. More precisely, this study will try to illustrate, explain and analyse the educational decisions made in Cyprus from 1931 until the end of the EOKA revolt in 1959 against and because of the contemporary political background: the rising controversy between Right and Left, the increasing national aspirations of both Greek and Turkish – Cypriots, and Britain’s determination to keep the island. Education in Cyprus was primarily a political issue and it lacked the “missionary factor” which was central to education in much of the colonial empire, especially in Africa. Unlike in other colonies, in Cyprus there was an alternative educational allegiance or orientation (viz. to Greece and to some extent Turkey, respectively), instead of to British educational ideals. This study will not attempt, however, to analyse local colonial policies across a broad front, but it is inherent in my treatment that from the 1920s, and especially after 1931, the British assessment was that their only hope of combating the enosis movement lay within the sphere of education. In pitching this battle they subsequently made themselves open to allegations of seeking to de-Hellenise Greek – Cypriot society, a claim that was to be so warmly proclaimed in the 1950s. Therefore, this book has a clear focus on education in the policymaking context as the one point – alongside perhaps agriculture and forestry – where the British were most closely involved in Cypriot society. As such it provides a seminal means of highlighting the sources of misunderstanding between the British and the Greek–Cypriot community over the two decades leading to the Emergency. The book consists of seven chapters divided by chronology. The first chapter offers a description of the education system from 1878 until 1931, based mostly on secondary sources. Chapters 2 and 3 give an extensive analysis of educational developments during the repressive regime of the 1930s, while Chapter 4 examines the situation during World War II. Chapter 5 deals with educational developments in the aftermath of the war and against the background of the Consultative Assembly and the increasing difficulties the Empire faced in India and the Middle East. Chapter 6 deals with the first half of the most turbulent decade of British

INTRODUCTION

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rule in Cyprus, while the final chapter studies the role of the schools during the Emergency. Indiscipline and absenteeism in schools become a fundamental security problem during the last years of the British administration, and the government desperately sought a solution. All chapters aim to give an extensive analysis of the link between political developments and educational policies in Cyprus from 1931 until 1959. It is important also to stress at this point that our focus will be on education within the majority (80 per cent), the Greek–Cypriot community. British educational legislation naturally applied to both of the main communities on the island, and Turkish–Cypriot schooling will enter into the treatment. It will only do so, however, where this connects with the central preoccupations of the study. By extension, the Turkish– Cypriot schools in Cyprus merit a full study of their own. Altay Nevzet’s thesis, for example, provides considerable detail on where education fit into Turkish–Cypriot political development.7 In the course of this research, an extensive range of both secondary and primary sources have been consulted. A key source has been the records of the Mediterranean Department of the Colonial Office available at the National Archives of the United Kingdom in Kew (TNA). The papers of the British Colonial Secretariat and the Education Department held in the State Archive in Nicosia (SA) have been consulted. Private papers drawn upon include those of Sir William Battershill and Sir Arthur Creech-Jones, both held at Rhodes House Library in Oxford (RH), of Archbishop Leontios (LA), now held at the Archbishopric of Cyprus, as well as of the late Klearchos Kyriakides, a teacher at the village of Spilia.8 Indispensable to the research was the large collection of newspaper material held at the Archbishop Makarios III Foundation in Nicosia. Secondary sources including books, articles, seminar papers and previous doctoral theses have also been fully exploited.9 One elusive dimension in the writing of this account has been the impressions and views of the teachers themselves. Where possible these have been culled from official documents, such as the personal archive of Klearchos Kyriakides, an interview conducted with a teacher of an elementary school in the village of Fikardou and from a consultation of the Museum of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, the leading institution of secondary education in the Greek – Cypriot community. A more exhaustive exploration of this aspect would, as with Turkish – Cypriots, require a dedicated study of its own.

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Finally, the essential conclusion of this book should be noted here. Our underlying theme is that the ultimate failure of British-led educational reform in Cyprus epitomised a wider inability to penetrate Cypriot society, meeting as it did the resilient opposition of Greek – Cypriot institutions to outside interference. Of these institutions, the schools offer the prime example. This is not to say British initiatives in this area were completely misplaced or wholly lacked success. In seeking to create a more professional cadre of teachers, not least in the area of training, the colonial administration tapped into the authentic aspirations of the teachers themselves. The elementary schools were indeed brought more closely under the control of the British authorities, but the latter were unable to do the same in the secondary sector, and in making the attempt the British progressively triggered responses they could not handle. Eventually this led to the breakdown of the education system under the stress of the Emergency at the beginning of 1956, when even elementary pupils were recruited against continuing British rule. Today, educational issues retain their centrality in Cypriot politics and society, something that came about during a critical passage in the history of the island during the twentieth century.

CHAPTER 1 THE EDUCATION SYSTEM DURING THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS OF THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, 1878—1931

As was mentioned in the Introduction, the present chapter will provide background for the events leading to 1931 and for the broad context of educational change. Through a review of the literature, a comprehensive description of educational affairs in Cyprus from 1878 until 1931 will be attempted. Such a description will help us understand the significance of the educational reforms after 1931, the storms of protests they unleashed and, finally, their political implications. After 1920 the education system in Cyprus would enter a centralisation process which would be consolidated and fully implemented as the 1930s began. During this process, Cypriot communities were deprived of the extensive powers they enjoyed over the education system in favour of increased government control. This chapter provides a comprehensive picture of how the education system worked in Cyprus and the steps taken towards its centralisation up to 1931 in the context of the most important political developments during this period. In 1878, when Britain acquired Cyprus from a declining Ottoman Empire, it was met with a warm welcome from the largely Greek population.1 To them, Muslim authoritarian rule was to be replaced by a Christian, liberal power, and the fulfilment of the national aspirations of the Greek people of Cyprus now seemed more feasible – the long-desired

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aim of enosis, union of the island with the Kingdom of Greece, came into view. The Greeks of Cyprus expected the British to show the same generosity they showed in 1864 when Britain ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece. The Ionian example and, at a later stage, the liberation of Crete, would act as points of reference for the Greek Community. Holland remarks that although the enosis movement remained patchy and incidental in its extent for some years after 1878, nonetheless, compared with anti-colonial phenomena elsewhere in the British Empire, it exhibited a relatively high degree of continuity and fixity of purpose.2 Upon his arrival on the island, Sir Garnet Wolseley, the first High Commissioner to serve in Cyprus, was instantly impressed by the “danger of the Hellenic propaganda” encouraging annexation to Greece.3 The desire for union, although real and tangible, was until 1931 expressed peacefully by the majority of the population, especially by the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, which had acquired much power and many financial and political privileges during Ottoman rule. One-fourth of the population were Muslim Turkish who, despite the change of government, were willing to cooperate with the British authorities. The political developments which occurred during the British administration of Cyprus not only affected enosis but they also had a great impact on every aspect of life on the island, including its economy and, of course, education. From 1878 to 1960 education became increasingly subject to the changing political conditions which affected the island while it was part of the British Empire. Given the doubt expressed in some quarters in Britain concerning the acquisition of Cyprus and its usefulness, the British Government used realpolitik arguments to justify its decision. The Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield), claimed the island, together with Alexandretta on the adjacent coast of Asia Minor, afforded “the keys to Asia”, providing a commanding naval position in the eastern Mediterranean from which power might be projected in several directions. Even if Cyprus’ value was to be somewhat diminished after the occupation of Egypt in 1882, Disraeli’s decision struck a chord with British opinion when he argued that, “in taking Cyprus, the movement is not Mediterranean, it is Indian”.4 Britain’s attachment to her Mediterranean possessions wasn’t principally for economic reasons. The colonies were intended to be financially self-supporting and not become liabilities to the British

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Treasury,5 and in this, Cyprus was treated no differently than other British colonies. But in one respect it was distinctive: it was the only colony forced to directly subsidise the British Treasury, which it did through a mechanism that became known as the “Cyprus Tribute”. According to an annex to the Cyprus Convention, Britain undertook to pay the Porte the excess of revenue over expenditure, to be determined by the average of the five years prior to the day of the convention. The annual payment was eventually not made directly to the Porte, however, but to the British Treasury, to reimburse the bondholders of the Turkish Guaranteed Loan of 1855. Markides, in a recent study, actually ascertains that the reason Cyprus was chosen was not so much because of its strategic importance, but due to its capacity to raise enough revenue to secure half of the interest on the 1855 Crimean War loan, an amount not raised by the Egyptian tribute in 1877.6 The burden was widely seen as so inequitable that even Winston Churchill, during his visit to Cyprus in 1907 as Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, criticised it and warned that “wherever there is economic injustice there will also be found political discontent”.7 Cypriots were also heavily taxed. The Turks had left hardly any commodities untaxed, and inevitably indirect taxation weighed heaviest on the poorest classes. Taxation, including the Tribute, became the object of many memorials and deputations, and was to remain a thorny issue for Anglo-Cypriot relations until the end of the 1920s.8 Financial limitations were therefore the main reason the administration of education was left to local communities and the religious authorities. This was especially relevant with respect to the Greek Orthodox Church, which traditionally controlled education, a privilege it had enjoyed without interference or interruption under Ottoman rule. As Bryant aptly writes, religion in Cyprus was immanently political, and religion and education were inextricably entwined.9 Government aid to schools was essentially token, leaving the schools themselves dependent on fees from pupils and private donations.10 Both the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus followed largely in theory and practice the respective Hellenic and Ottoman systems of education: in the curriculum of the secondary school of Famagusta – established in 1899 – there was even a drawing lesson which involved depicting heroes of the Greek War of Independence.11 Duties such as the appointment, dismissal, discipline, payment and promotion of elementary teachers; the establishment and maintenance of primary schools and the

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prescription of the school curriculum were shared by the Town or Village School Committees, the District Committees and the Boards of Education, all of which were separately provided for by Greek and Muslim communities. Each school was attached exclusively to one religion, as reflected in the management committees. The District Committees comprised four elected and two ex-officio members, that is, the District Commissioner and the Bishop of the District, and were responsible for the appointment and dismissal of teachers and to hear appeals from the Town or Village Committees. These Committees had between three and five elected members and had more or less the same responsibilities as the District committees in their areas. The two Boards of Education were composed partly of members elected by the District Committees, partly of persons nominated by Greek or Muslim members of the Legislative Council and partly of ex-officio members representing the religious interests of either ethnicity. Each Board was responsible for prescribing the curriculum used in schools and for recommending to the Government the grants to be allowed to the schools and the number of teachers to be appointed. Indeed, Lord Kimberley, Secretary of State for the Colonies in Gladstone’s Liberal Government of 1882, supported the collaboration of the Government with the local authorities, and he unreservedly rejected the axiom declared by Wolseley’s successor, High Commissioner Sir Robert Biddulph, that only by learning English would the inhabitants reach a higher civilisation and acquire “access to every branch of human knowledge”.12 During the first fifty years of British administration, Lord Kimberley’s position was generally respected by all the subsequent Secretaries of State and Governors. According to Georghallides, Lord Kimberley laid down two principles regarding education. The first was that the educational policy should be suitable to the conditions of Britain’s tenure in Cyprus, conditions which would hardly justify the Anglicising tendencies of the proposals earlier recommended by Biddulph and the Rev. Josiah Spencer, the first Director of Education. The second principle was that any action which would excite the islanders’ opposition should be avoided; the aim of the Government should therefore not be the gradual assumption of responsibility of education but merely participation, in an auxiliary fashion, in the schools’ financial and administrative arrangements.13 Crawshaw points out that Britain’s educational policy in the early years appears to have been motivated by a

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general respect for classical learning and an overarching preoccupation with economy. She notes that the early British administrators, with their own grounding in the classics, found little reason to quarrel with a curriculum which was dedicated to the achievements of Ancient Greece no matter how much these might be taught for the purpose of furthering Greek irredentism.14 Persianis describes this educational policy, undertaken between 1878 and 1919, as laissez-faire, shaped above all by a scarcity of resources to support any alternative approach.15 A much more recent scholar, however, has argued that there lay behind the original decision by Lord Kimberley not to introduce English in the schools a British liberal reverence for Greek culture, and that this decision was freighted with consequences for relations between the occupying power and the majority population.16 This may be debated, since from the start the British were keen to avoid repeating in Cyprus their uncomfortable experience of facing an aroused Hellenism similar to that which had created so much trouble in their former Ionian Protectorate prior to 1864. What can be said for sure is that government education policy in Cyprus reflected the ambiguous and constrained nature of the occupation in the years after 1878.17 Stavrinides points out that the Church, under a modernising, secular British regime, soon realised it must remain alert to challenges to its authority and leadership of the Greek community, thus it continually reminded its flock they were of the Greek Orthodox faith and that the liberated mainland Greeks were their brothers. Therefore, Stavrinides argues, the emergent conception of “Helleno-Christian” ideals became the guiding force of Greek education in Cyprus, as it had been in Greece herself.18 Kelling equally maintains that the education system in Cyprus was emblematic of the tightrope on which British rule balanced: too much reform along anglicising lines would alienate the Greeks; too much support for Hellenic institutions, on the other hand, would lessen the always tenuous loyalties of the Greek– Cypriots to the new regime and encourage Greek nationalism and enosis.19 Throughout the British period, the form and administration of the education system in the Greek community of Cyprus underwent several changes which can be attributed to the social and financial conditions of the island. National aspirations, political aims and strategic interests exerted steady pressure on the education system and deepened the gap that always existed between the British authorities, on the one hand, and

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the Greek – Cypriot politicians and the Orthodox Church on the other. Yet, although some historians have analysed the transformations affecting the education system during the British administration, few of them have traced their consistent interaction with Cypriot political development. Exploring this linkage is a critical preoccupation of the present volume. In 1878 the rate of illiteracy in Cyprus was significantly high, and secondary schools were only found in Nicosia, Limassol and Larnaca. Notwithstanding financial constraints, by the end of the century some progress had been made. Nicosia High School, which in 1896 was renamed the Pancyprian Gymnasium, found a new role, apart from serving as a secondary school, in the training of elementary school teachers.20 Furthermore, the total numbers of the pupils and the schools increased. Katsiaounis explains that during the Ottoman period only Turkish schools were in receipt of state aid, with Greek schools making ends meet with communal contributions, but that under early British rule this discrimination was eliminated. Government aid had risen by 1886 to an average subsidy of £15,40 for each school. Whereas in 1881 there had been ninety-one schools on the whole island, by 1901 there were 273.21 This can be attributed not only to the increasing amounts provided to the schools, but also to the increasing demand for more and better education within Cypriot society. The desire for literacy motivated the more affluent villagers, no matter how ineffective the transportation system, to send their children to the towns where they could receive better education.22 To this argument Persianis adds that, even before the advent of British rule, there were signs of growing social mobility amongst Greek –Cypriots, with school attendance perceived as a key means for securing a better material future for their children.23 The beginning of the twentieth century saw two additional educational developments. The first was the establishment of the English School in 1901 by the Director of Education, Rev. F.D. Newham. Newham and his colleagues were concerned fundamentally with the shaping of “character” and with training young men for government employment.24 The other development was the extraordinary flourishing of the press. Greek newspapers began to appear almost immediately after the commencement of British occupation. In 1900 there were already seven, signifying a rapid expansion in the movement of ideas.25 Meanwhile, a trend towards the promotion of archaeology emerged with the foundation of the Museum of

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Nicosia in 1883, which heralded a new cultural linkage between Britain and Cyprus.26 The Cyprus Museum was established and was for a long time maintained entirely by private subscriptions since Lord Salisbury, more interested in science than in archaeology, refused to sanction the expense of sending an archaeologist from the British Museum to the new museum. It was an important step towards the promotion and protection of Cypriot culture and heritage and, despite Salisbury, a close link between the British Museum and the Cyprus Museum was to develop over time. The spread of literacy and ideas in this period released forces which could not be fully controlled by the Greek clerical and lay establishment any more than they could by the British. As Katsiaounis explains, nurtured as an Ottoman institution, the Church had hitherto enjoyed dominion over a largely illiterate populace whose intellectual facilities did not extend beyond religious texts. Literacy as such, however, tended to produce self-awareness and consciousness, more exigent needs and higher aspirations. What is more, the emphasis of the whole set of ideas imparted to school children was shifting from Christianity to Hellenism, from religious faith to a more strictly cultural orientation.27 This shift can be explained by the growth of nationalism, which was so intense at the beginning of the twentieth century and from which Greek irredentism could not be left untouched. According to Augustinos: Hellenism is to Greeks a shared national culture, the growth and elaboration of which took place simultaneously with the creation and development of the nation state, in 1830. Politicians in Greece argued that if all the Greeks were brought within the frontiers of an enlarged state, the country would become economically selfsufficient and politically stable. It was a dream of salvation by expansion, of what became known as the Megali Idea.28 Orthodox Christianity was no longer the sole connecting link between Greeks. The phenomenon of nationalism was increasingly based on secularism, on a common language, a common culture and unbreakable geographical boundaries. Greek – Cypriots considered themselves Greeks, and they felt that only by strongly affiliating themselves with Greece could they assert their identity vis-a`-vis both the Turkish community and the British and, ultimately, fulfil their dream of enosis. They looked to the precedent of the Ionian Islands and the struggles

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of Crete for union with Greece for hope and inspiration. After 1834, however, when Athens became the capital of Greece, it began its cultural dominion over Greek culture, and the importance of the Ionian Islands, Constantinople, Crete, Epiros, Smyrna and Alexandria, as areas of intellectual activity was, over time, proportionately reduced. The establishment of the University of Athens in 1837, and the achievement of real economic progress between 1860 and 1880, resulted in the growth of an urban middle class with ambitious aspirations, both cultural and political, radiating from Athens. This distinctive New Hellenism, with Athens as the acknowledged “National Centre”, quickly developed a Cypriot dimension, and the process intensified in the first decade of the twentieth century. The victorious Balkan Wars of 1912–13, in which many young Greek–Cypriots volunteered, erased the debacle of the Greco–Turkish war of 1897 and raised the prestige of an Athenian elite not only in Europe but amongst the Greek populations throughout the region.29 The vocal expression of national aspirations in Cyprus during the first decades of the twentieth century raised the first real alarm in British circles, as the enosis aspiration of the Greek –Cypriots assumed a definite form. Taking a cue from the autonomy of Crete in 1898, in 1901 members of the Cypriot intelligentsia in Athens organised an exhibition of costumes and handicrafts testifying to the Hellenic character of their island.30 A regular ferry route for Greek– Cypriots to Athens was established and, subsequently, 3,000 Cypriots volunteered to fight with their Greek compatriots in the Balkan Wars.31 Athens-educated Cypriots began to return home and became a new generation of politicians and community leaders who believed the demand for enosis should be expressed with greater determination, that it should be heard inside the Legislative Council and not just in meetings outside the chamber.32 As Markides points out, while the Greek Government’s position on Cypriot enosis remained ambivalent, growing civic interaction within the island and the eastern Mediterranean region ensured that Greek – Cypriots felt part of a broader movement for national consolidation.33 An expanding Hellenism could not but affect educational matters. The exposure of an increasingly educated Greek – Cypriot majority to a broader enosis movement made Cyprus not more British, but demonstratively Greek. Nationalist feelings were so intense that many

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Greek – Cypriot leaders saw foreign schools, especially the English School, as a threat to the national struggle,34 and they tried, through the newspapers, to deter students from enrolling in these schools lest they “would fail to develop a love of Greece and would be no asset to the great movement towards freedom from the yoke of the foreigner and towards union with Mother Greece”.35 Language became a critical factor in stimulating “national ideas”. From a sociological viewpoint the educational network became a vector through which the growth of nationalism the eastern Mediterranean (mainly Cyprus and Asia Minor) can be better understood. In Kitromilides’s words: The construction of a Greek educational network represented a process of political socialization involving a radical break with past attitudes and values. In this perspective the expansion of the system of Greek schools in the East constitutes the foremost indicator of the penetration of Greek national ideas into distant and inaccessible regions with no direct ties with the Greek state. Thus the educational effort of the nineteenth century promoted the homogenization of the Christian Orthodox populations of the East, as the basis of their incorporation into the broader community of the Greek nation. It is significant that language was replacing religion as the major unifying bond of nationality under the new conditions.36 It was therefore inevitable that Greek – Cypriots would react negatively to an educational law taking the curriculum and the appointment of teachers out of the control of their communities. Teachers were expected by the local politicians and the clergy not only to support the cause of union with Greece, but also to propagate this policy in their speeches in the villages to which they were appointed.37 Teachers held a highly respected position within the Greek – Cypriot community, to the extent that illiterate people spent much time at the coffee shops listening to these social leaders reading the newspapers and expressing their opinions on current matters. Literate villagers and priests, who had occupied teaching roles, were rapidly displaced by those who had studied in the secondary schools of the three main towns; in other words, a process of professionalisation was under way, but very much

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trending toward a Greek system of education, rather than a British one. These secondary schools were modelled on their counterparts in Greece and staffed by graduates of the University of Athens – the curriculum and the books were chosen by the Greek Ministry of Education, with roughly a third of the teachers coming from Greece. Notably, all but one of the principals of the Pancyprian Gymnasium between 1893 and 1936 came from Greece.38 As Koutsellini deftly observes, educational policy in Cyprus had a social-national mission which supported the adoption of the Greek curricula, as this would connect Cyprus with Greece straightforwardly, and linearly, with no discourse on educational issues.39 The result of this system was summed up at the turn of the century by the High Commissioner Sir W.F. HaynesSmith who, alarmed by enosis agitation, advised on his departure from the island that the small military British garrison be increased and that the constitution of 1882 be radically altered or even abandoned:40 The whole of the Greek school system is being based as an organisation for the Hellenic propaganda. The masters of the Elementary schools are trained at the Gymnasium and other secondary schools to believe that their proper aim is to instil into the minds of the youth of the island that their great objects in life are to advance the cause of union with Greece and to get rid of the payment of the Tribute to Turkey and further to oppose the English Administration.41 As Persianis argues, it was only natural – given that most of the laymen and clerics were educated in these schools and the Church controlled the schools – that the British felt any financial aid to these schools stir up hotbeds of anti-British propaganda in Cyprus.42 Anti-British sentiments, however, were not only engendered by Britain’s opposition to enosis. From the very beginning of their administration the British kept aloof from the Cypriots. Governor Wolseley, who shared the scepticism of many in Britain as to the real value of the new acquisition, described Nicosia in his diary as “a filthy hole”, and he spent very little time there during his stay.43 His disaffection with the Cypriots was forthrightly expressed in descriptions of them such as “cunning deceitful and essentially untruthful”.44

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He especially disliked Orthodox priests and tried to avoid any dealings with them, not to mention his detestation of the Orthodox holy services: I went to the monastery church to attend a great function in honour of hoisting the English flag upon it: first we had Mass – such a mockery of everything sacred, dirty greasy priests attempting to intone some dreary dirges that were utterly devoid of music and melody.45 These feelings clearly coloured his decision to minimise the influence of the Church by curtailing its revenues. It has been argued that here lie the origins of a pronounced “distance” between British occupation and Greek society,46 also demonstrated early on in Britain’s refusal to designate Greek as an official language, as requested by a Greek deputation at the outset of the new regime. The cultural vibrations were bound, sooner or later, to affect debates on a matter as vital as education. In general, British officials in Cyprus – as elsewhere in Britain’s Mediterranean possessions – maintained an aloofness from their subjects and showed little interest in establishing social relations, not even with the educated class. Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Cyprus between 1926 and 1932, aptly observed that even students who, after an education in England “returned full of enthusiasm for everything English found themselves excluded from the English Club and from most English society”.47 Sir Charles Orr, Chief Secretary to the Cyprus Government from 1911 to 1917, criticised this: It must be admitted that there is amongst the majority of the English officials a spirit which can be best expressed by the Greek word “ύbri6” (hubris), a kind of contemptuous arrogance, which forms a barrier greatly resented by the educated Cypriots, from which the elected members of the Legislative Council are drawn. This attitude is by no means unknown in other parts of the British Empire, and is no less deplorable because it is for the most part unconscious. The Englishman is incorrigibly insular, and the characteristic is more apparent when he leaves the island than when he remains in it.48

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Meanwhile, the funding of education had become increasingly prominent in public debate, including within the Legislative Council.49 In the Session of 1909 the Greek elected members put forward a resolution that “the people should be entirely relieved of any direct financial responsibility for the maintenance of the schools, but should at the same time retain the direct control and management of elementary schools vested in them by the existing law”. They also requested that “a fund should be established for providing pensions for schoolmasters, the indefatigable pioneers of the moral and material progress of the country”.50 Nevertheless, High Commissioner Sir Charles King-Harman pronounced in 1910 that he was unwilling to sanction any further increase in the annual appropriation of grants in aid to elementary schools without an independent report on the state of education in Cyprus. Accordingly, in 1913 two educational experts, J.E. Talbot and F.W. Cape, were appointed by the British Government as Inspectors of Education. They provided a full analysis of the education system, identified its defects and made extensive suggestions for improvement. Talbot and Cape, indeed, provided a template for much British thinking concerning Cypriot educational questions for many years after. In 1913 the popular control of elementary education in Cyprus was exercised through three legally constituted authorities: the Village or Town Committees, the District Committees and the Boards of Education. None of these three popularly elected authorities, however, was held explicitly responsible under the terms of any statute for the efficiency of the teaching provided. According to Talbot and Cape, the educational system suffered from many deficiencies. Most importantly, teachers’ salaries were very low and liable to fluctuate from year to year, owing to the peculiar method of yearly appointments that often made these appointments political favours. Additional shortcomings were found in the unsatisfactory classification of teachers; the lack of any pension scheme; the absence of any prescribed limit to the number of children who may be taught by one teacher; the absence of a separate provision, either in the town or in the countryside, for children under eight years old, and the small proportion of girls attending elementary schools. Noticing “the genuine zeal for education which has inspired and still inspires the Cypriot people”, Talbot and Cape underlined the need for a substantial increase in the amount devoted to public education

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from the island’s revenue and proposed improvements, such as the establishment of schools for girls and younger children, a new way of classifying teachers, a pension scheme and three alternative schemes for combating the erratic and not necessarily merit-driven method of teacher appointments, dismissals and remuneration. The conclusion derived from these proposed schemes, however, was that any substantial increase in government aid should be accompanied by increased governmental control of the schools, meaning the Government should appoint, dismiss and pay teachers.51 The Muslim deputies accepted the proposals, but the Greek elected members of the Legislative Council and much public opinion rejected them: the Greeks treasured their long-standing autonomy in running their schools and considered this freedom a precondition for their further pursuit of political liberty.52 The Greek members, Orr recalled, had repeatedly declared “they would sooner dispense with State Aid altogether than surrender to an alien Government the control of teachers which, they asserted, they have always possessed alike under Turkish and British rule, and which they deemed to be vital to their political aspirations”.53 The outbreak of World War I, however, shelved, for the present, the educational question. On 5 November 1914 Britain annexed Cyprus to His Britannic Majesty’s Dominions without signifying any fundamental change for the island’s ultimate future.54 Almost a year later, however, during October 1915, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, communicated a formal offer by Britain to relinquish Cyprus if Greece was willing to enter the war on Serbia’s behalf following the invasion of Serbia by Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Germany.55 Amidst the shifting circumstances of the war, Greek –Cypriot hopes for enosis were intensified, but they were disappointed when the Government of Alexandros Zaimis in Athens turned down the offer. At the time, the risks for the Greek Kingdom to enter the war were too great, even if they would be compensated for by the acquisition of Cyprus. The relative quietness with which the failure of the offer was greeted in Cyprus itself was sometimes interpreted by the British as a lack of fervour for enosis, but this was far from the case. The “Greekness” of most Cypriots might be said to have been reflected in their understanding of the considerations which led Zaimis and his colleagues to respond as they had. Afterwards, Greek – Cypriot politicians were able to exploit what

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had happened by pointing out that, by making the offer, the British admitted that the demand for enosis was justified and their presence on the island was by no means necessarily permanent.56 The demonstrations by pupils in the Greek –Cypriot schools at this time were a sign of a growing politicisation within education generally. In Limassol, in a demonstration organised by N.K. Lanitis, the Boy Scouts were sworn under the Greek flag, while in Larnaka, on Greek Independence Day, 25 March 1916, the Boy Scouts took an oath of allegiance to the King of the Hellenes.57 This came at a juncture, particularly in relation to affairs in Greece, where any instability in Cyprus was highly inopportune for the British. The High Commissioner was quick to call the attention of the newly elected Archbishop, Kyrillos III, to the swearing of allegiance by Cypriot Boy Scouts to a foreign secular flag flying on the churches. Kyrillos – whom Harry Luke, then serving in the Cyprus district administration, described as a “religious pope” because of his devotion to ecclesiastical rather than political activities58 – promised to see that proprieties were better observed. When he visited Famagusta in 1917, however, he was received by schoolboys ostentatiously carrying the Greek flag, the latter appropriated by the police, and the Archbishop himself joined the protests.59 In fact, the main fissure in wartime Cyprus was not between the British and the protagonists of enosis but, as in politics on the Greek mainland, between the supporters of King Constantine I and Eleftherios Venizelos. Nevertheless, such incidents demonstrated the enosis issue had not evaporated, and that whenever it surfaced, the schools were ardently involved. Once Eleftherios Venizelos had attained the premiership, Greece finally entered the war on the side of the Allies. When peace at last returned, and the victorious powers convened a great conference in Paris during early 1919, a wide variety of nationalist representatives from colonial territories were on the sidelines hoping to publicise their cases, one of them an enosist delegation from Cyprus led by the Archbishop. They received only lukewarm support, however, from Venizelos himself, for whom cooperation with Britain was an absolute necessity, and shortly thereafter the Greek –Cypriots left Paris for London. Furthermore, as Britain’s new Middle Eastern empire bedded down in the immediate wake of the war, any lingering idea amongst British officials of agreeing to cede Cyprus to Greece dissipated. By the

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time of the Treaty of Se`vres in July 1920, although Venizelos secured what he famously termed a Greece ‘of five seas and two continents’, there was no prospect of this enlarged space embracing Cyprus. Against the backdrop of all the external complexities and upsets of the early 1920s, not least the disastrous Greco –Turkish war in Asia Minor (1919– 22), Greek –Cypriot political discourse itself returned to considerations of purely internal policy. This naturally included educational issues, which once again became a reflection of the increasing friction between the Greek– Cypriot community and the Government. In 1920 the problem of the inadequacy of teachers’ salaries re-emerged and became more acute due to wartime expenses and the increasing cost of living. As soon as the war ended the teachers demanded pay increases, but their salaries could not be raised by the local education committees, since the taxpayers were refusing to pay higher educational assessments.60 Therefore, the newspapers and the Greek and Turkish elected members of the Legislative Council lost no opportunity in demanding the Government should assume its responsibilities toward education. The 1920 Elementary Education Law, clearly shaped by the 1913 proposals of Talbot and Cape, provided that should the Government increase its financial assistance to the education system through taxation, it would have the right to make decisions concerning the appointment, dismissal and transfer of teachers as well as the establishment of schools, while the Boards of Education were to retain the right to decide the curriculum and select textbooks. The Turkish members of the Legislative Council accepted the law, without which, they said, “there could have been no elementary education for the Muslims of Cyprus”.61 In contrast, the Greek members viewed the law as a government attempt to undermine teachers. An additional criticism of the legislation was that although “from the very ancient times the churches were the greatest supporters of education and the Bishops have always held seats on all Education Boards and Committees but under the present bill the Bishops were to be alienated from the education of the country”.62 The law, which was eventually amended to apply only to non-Christian Orthodox schools, brought the Turkish minority closer to the Government and exacerbated the divide between the two communities. In the 1920 session of the Legislative Council, Irfan Bey defended the Government’s decision to pass the law and criticised the Greeks for their

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decision to vote against the Estimates (because of their opposition to their educational proposals): He (D. Severis)63 seems to forget that the government discussed this matter with them (the Greek –Cypriot deputies) on many occasions and that the failure to arrive at a satisfactory settlement was due to their own fault. Many suggestions have been put forward by the Government but they always approach them with distrust. Whenever the Government touched upon the question they promptly conclude that it wished to anglicise them. The question has today become an instrument of propaganda in their hands. If they are sincere in their desires for education they should approach the matter in a proper spirit and I am sure the Government will be willing to discuss with them any suggestions or offers that may be put forward.64 By the end of 1921, opposition to the education legislation was endorsed by all the major Greek– Cypriot newspapers and many political and ecclesiastical figures. The elected members of the Legislative Council resigned. The Government responded with the imposition of martial law: seditious publications were suppressed and two alleged “agitators”, Nicolaos Katalanos and Philios Zanettos, were deported.65 In Greek – Cypriot historiography, these actions marked the commencement of a growing British absolutism in Cyprus. The opposition policy created some turbulence in Cypriot politics but eventually failed. Shortly before the October elections of 1921, Cypriots became more divided amongst themselves. Those who wanted to abstain from elections still hoped the outcome of the Greco–Turkish war would create more scope for political change in Cyprus; their opponents were convinced the war in Asia Minor made it highly unlikely Britain would dispose of the island. Eventually the Greeks abstained from participation. They instead engaged in setting up the Cyprus Political Organisation (Κυπριακή Πολιτική Οργάνωση), a new national council presided over by the Archbishop and comprising the elected nationalist leadership of the community, for the pursuit of liberty through union with Greece. Despite the careful drafting of its regulations, however, the Organisation did not make much progress: for one thing, people’s attention at this stage was very much fixed on the drama taking place beyond the island.

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The eventual disaster for Greeks in Asia Minor meant the nationalist leadership had to adjust their course once more. Circumstances made it necessary to re-establish more friendly relations with the Government and, rather than push for enosis, to instead to aim at a greater degree of autonomy. The December 1922 elections were a serious defeat for the National Council66 and a success for the more moderate politicians, and emphasis was now given to progressive constitutional advance and the prosperity of the island. It was in this context that the Government managed to enact the Elementary education law despite Greek opposition within and outside the Legislative Council. At the January 1923 Session of the Legislative Council, the Greek elected members immediately voiced their disapproval of the Government’s decisions on various issues. Together with the Turkish members, they succeeded in passing an address in reply to the Governor’s speech calling on the Government to establish an Agricultural Bank and expressing their hope for the amendment of the education law (as we shall see, agrarian and educational matters were always to be closely connected). They strongly protested against the Government’s decision to withhold the share of the 1920 to 1922 tax increases, totalling £66,000, due to Greek education: the Government declared this money would be set aside and paid when the Greek community accepted the education bill.67 To the elected members’ further irritation, many teachers, disappointed by the deficiencies of their profession, petitioned the Government to secure their salaries and substitute, as their appointing authority, for the Boards of Education.68 In February 1923 the Government, with the agreement of the Greek members of the Legislative Council, convened a committee made up of official and elected members to discuss education. The Greeks proposed to meet the additional educational costs through indirect taxation, but the Government declined, stating it was prepared to fund the gap through direct taxation but would insist on taking direct control of the schools. Reluctantly, Greek members accepted the Government’s decision. They also agreed to a reduction of the costs of Greek primary education from an estimated £80,000 to £70,000 and to be funded mainly from taxes on immovable property and on ships and goats. The stand taken by the elected members alarmed the National Council. Not only did it feel the Greek elected members were too yielding towards the Government, but its members believed they had been

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ignored with regard to these important transactions.69 The educational debate set in motion a broader debate, whether Greek– Cypriots should press for increased political liberties (“autonomy”) or pursue an intransigent line on the cause for enosis. There was a clear line of division across the Greek– Cypriot political world. Despite objections raised by the Nicosia School Committee and the Church, with both organisations maintaining the bill abolished ecclesiastical and communal rights, and petitions by teachers, both the British Government and the Government of Cyprus were determined to push the educational law through, but there was no grant of autonomy on their agenda. At the legislative session of August 1923, the Government introduced the bill. Educational funds would be provided by indirect and direct taxation, 60 per cent and 40 per cent respectively, whilst the teachers would be appointed by the High Commissioner on the recommendation of the Board of Education, so “there would be no need for schoolmasters to enter into bonds to give part of their salaries as a reward to anyone who had obtained a position for them, and they would not be indebted to anyone, but they would be promoted according to their merits as teachers”.70 Whatever their own views on enosis amidst these debates, the majority of teachers resented being “tools in the hands of the so-called leaders and tyrants and were utilized by them for the purpose of promoting their political views”.71 They wanted to see a sharper focus on the practical improvement of their working conditions. Not all teachers favoured greater government intervention, however. The Pancyprian Teachers’ Union, under its President, Charalambos Papadopoulos, opposed the bill on the grounds expressed by clerical and lay nationalist politicians.72 In the same spirit, a former principal of the Pancyprian Gymnasium wrote: the “Educational law represented the desire of the Government to attack the national movement of the island. Instead of helping the communities to face the financial difficulties, it deprived them of their main powers in the management of education”.73 The Elementary Education Law of 1923 was a major blow to Greek – Cypriot politicians and the senior schools teachers and a setback for the Greek Orthodox Church. It became one of the reasons the National Council decided to abstain from the Legislative Council. It also opened the way to the centralisation of education, which was ultimately completed with the Laws of 1929, 1933 and 1935 and deeply resented

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by some Greek– Cypriots. The Locum Tenens, in a memorandum sent to the Governor in 1934, referred bitterly to the 1923 law: Yes, the education of the Greek Orthodox Cypriots before the British occupation was the responsibility of the Church . . . But the evil year came and the Government enacted the educational law of 1923, abolishing the traditional, holy and inviolable rights of our communities and causing a serious wound in the national spirit of Cyprus.74 Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that the Greek authorities in Cyprus, specifically the Legislative Council and the Church, were not opposed to such centralisation in principal. After all, in Ottoman times, power within the Greek community had been effectively centralised under the aegis of the Church.75 Weir persuasively explains: Through the years the Greek conception of democracy has not conflicted greatly with centralization of authority. Even the opposition of the Greeks of Cyprus to the gradual centralization in the administration of education in the Island has not been due to their hatred of centralization even to the point of dictatorship though the plea of “democracy” has been used. The opposition to centralization has continued fundamentally, because the “wrong government” has been doing the dictating.76 Meanwhile, the Treaty of Lausanne brought the Greco– Turkish confrontation begun in 1920 to an end, but it was a great disappointment for the Greek –Cypriots, a disappointment mitigated only by Turkey’s recognition of the annexation of Cyprus and its relinquishment of all claims to the island. After decades of turmoil in the Near East, however, long-standing animosities between Greece and Turkey had been resolved without any account being taken of Cypriot enosis.77 Furthermore, the new Labour Government in London was in no mood to contemplate any constitutional changes regarding the island. In 1924, replying to a question in the House of Commons, Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald made clear that “His Majesty’s Government are not contemplating any change in the political status of Cyprus”.78 In early 1925 Cyprus was proclaimed a Crown Colony. In February, by an Order

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of the King in Council, a new constitution was introduced increasing the number of the members of the Legislative Council to 25, but keeping the ratio of Greek, Turkish and British officials the same, and Greek – Cypriots were greatly disappointed: despite the introduction of the new constitution, they felt they were still denied their rightful share of political influence, and that the Government were treating them like “a pack of animals”.79 As before, the ratio did not allow the Greek majority in Cyprus to promote any reform, since the British and Turkish votes combined were numerically equal to the Greek votes. The reconstituted Legislative Council met for the first time on 6 November 1925. A few days later the 12 Greek elected members presented a memorandum demanding union with Greece or, as a second best, a greater measure of self-government; counter-memoranda were also sent by the Muslims, Catholics, Armenians and Maronites. The Turkish – Cypriots proclaimed they “can never consent to the transfer of the Sovereign Rights over the Island to Greece,” and that they were “unswervingly loyal to Britain”.80 The British Government’s reaction to the Greek –Cypriot memorandum was limited to a comment written by A.J. Dawe, junior officer in the Mediterranean Department of the Colonial Office, which expressed doubt about popular support for the enosis movement: In the last decade Cyprus has been the only place in the troubled region of the Eastern Mediterranean to maintain continued ordered Government without serious political commotion. Having survived this period there is not likely to be any strong popular wish to change the present form of Government.81 Dawe’s comment persuasively illustrates how secure the Government of Cyprus felt at the time since, despite the immense changes and turbulence elsewhere in the region, including the Greco – Turkish war and the associated population movements from and to Asia Minor, Cyprus remained stable. This perhaps explains why events on the island were soon to take the Colonial Office, and British officialdom more generally, so much by surprise, and to effect such a stern reaction to restore normalcy. A tendency to view Cyprus as a permanent element in the regional framework of British interests could now be seen in the appointment of

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Sir Ronald Storrs as Governor in 1926. Storrs was certainly a more distinguished figure than his immediate predecessors. His appointment, however, came at a time when the traditionally sensitive matter of the Tribute was once again in the local spotlight. Greek and Turkish representatives in the legislature had combined to reject the Colonial Estimates of revenue and expenditure for 1927 to declare their strong opposition to the “Tribute”, always one of the most contested issues in Cypriot politics.82 In fact, Leo Amery, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, was already in favour of relieving the Cypriots from such a burden. A few days before Sir Ronald Storrs’s arrival in Cyprus, Amery wrote to Winston Churchill at the Treasury, reminding him of his own past criticism of the Cyprus Tribute, adding: I do trust you will be able to do something to help, because as I told you in my last letter the island is crying aloud for development and I am sure you will agree with me that we owe the island something for the huge sum we took from it since the earliest days of the British occupation until the fixing of the Grant-in-Aid. It would be a great thing for Storrs in assuming the Governorship if we were able to tell the people that he had an assurance that H.M.G. were prepared to assist the Island either by cutting down the amount it has to pay or else increasing the Grant-in-aid.83 Churchill, then struggling to introduce economy at home, did not himself reply. Instead, a formal letter was sent by the Treasury to the Colonial Office stating that a proper examination of the matter was necessary. Amery’s interest in the development of the island, including education, was one of the reasons he decided to appoint Ronald Storrs as a replacement for the unpopular Stevenson. Storrs’s ability to speak Greek (he had a first degree in Classics from Cambridge), his broad experience and cosmopolitan outlook and, especially, his record as Governor of Jerusalem, which involved all of its religions and races and concomitant emotional issues, prompted Amery to send Storrs to grapple with the problems of Cyprus. Storrs’s appointment inspired a generally favourable reaction on the island. C.A. Constantinides, editor of Neos Kypriakos Phylax, called on the political leaders to refrain from any renewal of opposition, since it

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was important not to damage Anglo-Cypriot relations at a time when there were signs of a change in British attitudes. From the beginning of his arrival, Storrs did try to connect with the Cypriots. He visited factories, schools and hotels; he had meetings with leading Cypriot figures and toured the island extensively. According to Georghallides, Storrs deliberately courted the good opinion of the Cypriots, especially Greek– Cypriots, presenting himself as a dedicated admirer of the Hellenic literary and cultural heritage. His dealings with notable Greeks in Alexandria and Jerusalem brought him even closer to Greek culture, and his political resolution was to restore the old warmth in AngloCypriot relations. He wanted, Georghallides notes, “the Cypriots to think of him not as another cold, arrogant and unconcerned foreign ruler, but as a friend of Cyprus and of its people and as a scholar of its history”.84 During his first year in Cyprus Storrs promoted the establishment of hospitals in Cypriot towns, set up a Public Library and a Music School, implemented judicial reform, organised the first Chamber of Commerce, and appointed a Greek– Cypriot, Neoptolemos Paschalis, as SolicitorGeneral, despite the Colonial Office’s hesitations.85 His biggest success, however, was the abolition of the Tribute. In a dispatch to the Colonial Office in April 1927, he underlined how radically flawed the calculation of the Cyprus surplus was. He also highlighted how detrimental this Anglo-Turkish agreement had been to Cyprus, since no money at all had been spent on agriculture, education, forestry or harbours. Storrs also proposed that in exchange for the Treasury’s assumption of the net payment of £42,800, Cyprus would pay the amount of £10,000 a year to the British Treasury and renounce its claims to the accumulate surplus of the island’s budget (though this latter point was long to rankle Cypriot opinion).86 The Treasury was finally persuaded to accept such a settlement, and Storrs convened an extraordinary Legislative Council in August to confirm the Tribute was finally abolished. Despite this, Storrs’s “honeymoon” in Cyprus only lasted a year. Realising the Governor was not contemplating any fundamental political changes for the island, and annoyed by the way the issue of the Tribute had been settled, the Greek members of the Legislative Council voted against the financial estimates for 1928. Storrs’s reputation for sympathy towards Greeks, including for their heritage and aspirations, began to slip. His flamboyant gestures, like wearing blue-and-white or red-and-white ties

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depending on whether he found himself in predominantly Greek or Turkish company, became the object of mockery.87 The key to the growing sensitivity within Greek–Cypriot politics may be found in a Greek– Cypriot sense of vulnerability and even isolation. Eleftherios Venizelos, after an interval of three years, returned to power in Greece, and in 1928 signed a Greco–Italian Treaty in which it was stated that “no Dodecanesian question exists however between Greece and Italy, as no Cypriot question exists between Greece and Great Britain”.88 In Cyprus there was disappointment at how this assertion undermined the enosist position, though inevitably the press excoriated Great Britain, rather than Venizelos and Greece. Eleftheria, for example, called for a more “independent” national policy and an end to “moderation”.89 The following years saw a sharp deterioration in Anglo-Cypriot relations, culminating in the uprising of October 1931 that forms the backdrop of this study. It is essential to our subsequent analysis that by the end of 1920s the imperatives of an English attachment on the one hand, and the enosis aspiration amongst a Greek majority on the other, were intensifying in different ways. This was symbolised both by Storrs’s perhaps ill-advised decision in 1928 that the administration should celebrate 50 years of British occupation and, in sharp contrast, the multiplying demonstrations of affinity with Greece by Greek – Cypriots. In particular, the Greek national ideas continued to be inculcated in students and boy scouts. As Storrs recalled in his Orientations: There was no definite anti-British curriculum in the Schools, but they are all actively Hellenising. All Greek elementary schools use the “Analytical Programme” as published in Greece, and adopted by the Board of Education. No reading books are allowed in these schools except those that have been approved by the “Critical Committee” in Athens. The Gymnasium of each town and the Teachers Training College were recognized by the Greek Ministry of Education, and worked under Regulations issue there from. Portraits of King Constantine and Queen Sophia, of Venizelos and other worthies, but of no English Sovereign, adorned the walls of the class-rooms, together with elaborate maps of Modern Greece; while that of Cyprus, if to be found at all, was as a rule small, out of date, worn out and frequently thrust behind the blackboard.90

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In Storrs’s judgment, even if it was indeed true that in a secret ballot the great majority of the population would vote for the closest union with Britain, it was nonetheless doubtful “how far the young generation brought up under this Pan-Hellenic curriculum would continue so to vote”.91 That British administrators subsequently found themselves in a race against time to undercut the roots of Pan-Hellenism will be at the heart of our treatment. The ensuing sequence in which the Greek –Cypriot petition to the new Labour Government in Britain during 1929 met an emphatically negative response need not be recounted here in any detail. “This subject [of enosis ]”, the new Colonial Secretary of State, Lord Passfield, stated, “is definitely closed and cannot profitably be further discussed”.92 Indeed, even a move towards responsible government, or extended autonomy, was ruled out. Passfield’s rejection led to a storm of telegraphs sent by athletic clubs and village and town committees in protest. Inevitably, schools were drawn into the controversy. The teachers and scholars of the Pancyprian Gymnasium added their own protestation that “mindful of the glorious history of Cyprus we protest against the adverse answer the minister of the Colonies gave to the union petition because union with our mother country is our fervent desire”.93 Alongside this general political polarisation, however, the education question in particular continued to evolve. Although the desire for enosis was shared by the majority of teachers, 622 still subscribed to a petition to the Government asking that their salaries should be increased from £40– £120 to £100– £250 a year and that pensions should replace retirement gratuities. The same petition also included the desire to incorporate teachers within the civil service, because under the 1923 law appointments, promotions and transfers, vested in the Greek Board of Education, exposed them to the whims and to the political and other interests of elected councillors serving on educational bodies.94 On 22 July the Greek deputies sent a letter to the Colonial Secretary to request an acceleration of educational reform. The Greek politicians, though they favoured an increase in teachers’ salaries, even if it was at the cost of fresh taxation, opposed government control over teachers. At this point Storrs seized the opportunity to make further changes in the education system that would later create more friction between the Government and Greek politicians. In a secret despatch to the Colonial Secretary justifying his proposal that the Government should acquire

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complete control over elementary school teachers, Storrs mentioned that the teachers enjoyed neither the income nor the status their work provided them. He therefore proposed to curtail the powers of the Board of Education and to subject the teachers to the control of the Department of Education and debar them “like Government servants, from all interference of politics”.95 Despite their financial implications, Storrs’s plans were sanctioned by the Colonial Office as necessary for the preservation of British rule.96 One could hardly argue, however, that there was a central educational policy outlined and enforced by the Colonial Office at that time. After World War I, the Colonial Office and local colonial governments did adopt a more positive role in the promotion of schooling, but this was more obvious in Africa, the almost exclusive preserve of the Christian missions, which led to the establishment of the Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Native Education in Africa.97 Christian missions were never really a factor in Cyprus, though, and this explains why Cyprus only entered the Colonial Office’s educational agenda in limited and marginal ways, except to some degree on the very eve of the Emergency, when Educational Advisers from London visited the island to study the situation in the schools and make recommendations. Overall, however, there was no central policy, even though most educational problems in Cyprus were identical to those in all British colonies: there was a shortage of teachers, and children in towns, and boys had a better chance of attending schools than children in rural areas and girls. According to the law published in the Cyprus Gazette of 18 December 1929, the Governor would be responsible for the appointment of teachers, with salaries graded by seniority. Additionally, the three elected members of the Legislative Council would be eliminated from the Greek Board of Education and the six members of the Board, so far elected by the District Committees, would be appointed by the Governor, though the Boards of Education would retain their right to prescribe the curriculum and choose the textbooks.98 Teachers belonging to the Permanent Staff Register would continue to receive their salaries even if they were unemployed, and their salaries would be funded by additional taxes on property and on sheep, pigs and goats. It might be said that, in its effort to avoid criticism from the urban and middle classes, the Government chose to cover the additional expenses by taxing the most vulnerable class, namely the peasantry. It should be noted that, as in 1923, the education reforms of

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1929 were linked to issues of taxation. While everybody wanted the education system to be better funded, the landowners and proprietors objected to any increase in direct taxation to pay for such social improvements. The education law of 1929 was one of the reasons for the uprising of 1931: it undermined the role of the communities, on the one hand, while aggravating tax burdens on the other. By such means Storrs was clearly bent on squeezing Pan-Hellenic propaganda out of the schools, but this did not necessarily mean he was setting out on a programme of de-Hellenisation on the island as his Greek– Cypriots critics alleged. Indeed, in Egypt – where Storrs’s ideas about the Eastern Mediterranean had been largely shaped over many years’ service – he had developed a strong opposition to any idea of denationalising or Anglicising cultures that were already so deeply embedded. “It was already”, he said in his diary, “too late in the twentieth century to think in such terms”: The Greekness of Cypriots is . . . indisputable . . . A man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greekthinking, Greek-feeling, Greek, just as much as the French Canadian is French-speaking, French-thinking, French-feeling and French.99 What he did not accept either in Egypt, or especially as Governor in Cyprus, was that authentic cultural loyalty or identity should be allowed to slip into political sedition. It was this distinction – manifestly open to objection by others – which led him to see the urgent need for educational reform in Cyprus. The resulting bill instigated a vigorous debate within the Legislative Council. M.H. Michaelides protested that the “Cypriots who paid the taxes for education in the Country demanded that they should appoint their own teachers”, while Sir Panayiotis Cacoyiannis deplored the law for giving the Government “the right to interfere with national education”. Reactions culminated with Zenon Rossides’s resignation from the Council over this issue: The reason which had forced on me, as a duty, the resignation of my seat in the Legislative Council is the imposition of the new

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Education Law on the country whereby teachers, the humanizing factors of the present and future generations, are being made the slaves of the foreign invader, the national and educational instruction of the people being thus also enslaved and those who by virtue of their position and power are the leaders of the various communities deprived of their mission to guide the people in the advancement and fulfilment of their just aspirations, both historical and human.100 The months following the enactment of the Educational Law saw an intensifying estrangement between the Government and Greek politicians and, significantly, a rupture in Anglo-Muslim relations: this was always a combination of pressures which made the British administration in Cyprus quite nervous. Nationalism was gaining ground in the Turkish community, too, threatening to undermine an important foundation of Britain’s position on the island. The efforts of the Consul of Turkey in Cyprus led to the victory of Nejati Bey over Munir Bey, a traditional ally of the British, as the general elections spread excitement amongst that minority. The pupils of the Nicosia Lyce´e, the only Muslim secondary school, went on strike because their English headmaster refused to hoist the Turkish flag at the school.101 The development of a strong patriotism102 was a key educational principle endorsed by Kemalists in Turkey and, to some degree, in Cyprus. Nejati Bey also wanted to reduce the Evcaf’s dependence on the Government and thus sought to put an end to the Anglo-Turkish coordination in the Legislative council, even voting with the Greeks in a couple of instances. One Colonial Office official recorded in alarm, “the machinery now threatens to break down completely owing to the fact that Munir Bey’s successor has joined the Greek opposition”, and underlined the necessity for some way out of this dilemma.103 On 1 May 1931 Nejati Bey convened a “National Congress”, which passed a resolution calling for: the appointment of a Mufti as political and religious representative; a committee to take over the Evcaf department; the same powers and privileges as other communities in connection with secondary education and the independence of the Sharia courts.104 Meanwhile, Hellenic nationalism was further strengthened through the establishment in January 1930 – with the involvement of the Church – of the new National Organization. Its sole aim was enosis and the creation

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of fifty national youth clubs throughout Cyprus. The growing influence of a more radicalised anti-British wing in the Church was to become more obvious in the years ahead, especially in relation to the island’s educational affairs. What triggered the uprising of October 1931, however, was the growing economic distress aggravated by a series of new taxes introduced by the Government to fund various reforms, not least in the educational sphere. Storrs’s decision to apply, by an Order in Council, the Customs Bill, which had already been rejected by the Legislative Council, made Greek–Cypriots more determined to act. After four meetings at Saittas village, the Greek members of the Legislative Council and members of the higher clergy issued a manifesto advocating resistance to British rule and demanding its overthrow. On 21 October 1931 the members of the Legislative Council resigned and a large procession arrived at the gates of Government House to present the governor with a petition. The lively crowd got out of control and, amidst the mayhem, the old Government House – in situ since 1878 – was burned to the ground, the most humiliating blow sustained by the British in a Crown Colony in the years between the two wars.105 We have seen that, under British occupation, education has always been part of the warp and woof of Cypriot politics. By the time the island became a Crown Colony in the mid-1920s, the connection had become especially entrenched. Overall, in the first half-century of British rule, education in Cyprus had undergone radical changes. Although still poor in many ways, greater prosperity in society meant more private investment which, combined with government aid, underpinned an expansion of educational facilities. The establishment of new schools staffed with capable teachers led to a significant increase of students, both of boys and girls, Turkish–Cypriot and Greek–Cypriot, combating illiteracy to a great extent. By 1931 there were 1,063 schools attended by 53,010 students and staffed by 1525 teachers. Libraries became compulsory in every primary school, and a scheme of scholarships for studies in England was initiated by the Government,106 in response to an increasing desire for learning. In addition, the education system, because of the growth of nationalism, first in Greece and afterwards in Turkey, not only became more secular, but also intensified popular attachment to what were seen as respective motherlands. Most importantly, education in Cyprus became subject to a process of centralisation that became a feature

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of late-colonial Cyprus. With the laws of 1920, 1923 and particularly 1929, the Government, in exchange for increased financial aid to the schools, became responsible for the appointment of teachers, depriving local (mostly Greek–Cypriots) politicians of the power to manipulate teachers for their own political aims. This was widely interpreted as a policy to de-Hellenise the dominant “national” culture on the island, and to eventually undermine the enosis movement, since teachers were seen as the propagators of Greek–Cypriot national aspirations. Cyprus since 1878 had been largely a law-abiding British possession, but the uprising of 1931 marked a watershed in the administration of the island. In the following years, fearing a repetition of the October riots, the Cyprus Government was to apply a firmer control over the island, and education provided one of the critical levers it they sought to exploit for its own purposes. The next chapter will trace this process over the first half of the 1930s.

CHAPTER 2 MAKING A BRITISH ATMOSPHERE IN CYPRUS, 1931—5

The 1931 disturbances, however spontaneous, marked a serious turn in the administration of the island. They provided the pretext for a stern repressive policy subsequently instituted by the Colonial Office and the Cyprus Government, the fundamental aim of which was to tame the enosis movement. The years ahead were to witness the enactment of a series of authoritarian laws to ensure law and order and to transform Cyprus into a loyal Crown Colony. Since it was now taken as axiomatic that the island was to remain British, Cypriot identities, hitherto allied and identified with Greece or Turkey, had to be thoroughly transformed. Alexis Rappas has recently argued that British colonial policy in Cyprus sought, through a radical programme of social engineering, to inculcate colonial loyalty and social transparency through discipline, punishment and persuasion.1 Since the British themselves always recognised the centrality of educational questions in such a process with regard to Cyprus, this chapter will take the historiographical discussion further by exploring how the education system was reformed during the first half of the 1930s. We shall see how the enactment of successive laws affecting schools were enacted to introduce a “British atmosphere” on the island, cutting its links with foreign countries and making colonial citizens out of Cypriot subjects. The responses that such efforts produced amongst Cypriots themselves and their institutions, especially the Church, will inevitably enter our analysis.

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Some quarters in London were of the opinion the riots would have never occurred if Sir Ronald Storrs had not pursued a timid and yielding policy for four years leading up to the riots, and British reaction to the events was prompt and ruthless.2 By mid-November 1931, with the suspension of the 1882 constitution, both the Legislative Council and the municipal councils ceased to exist, and “full power and authority to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the colony” was granted to the Governor.3 Letters patent were issued as an emergency measure until the question of the constitutional future of the island could be reviewed, to ensure the immediate enforcement of the Government’s new decisions, all of which restricted the involvement of Cypriots in the island’s political affairs. Governor Storrs initiated the deportation, without trial, of ten people who had an active role in the disturbances: among them were the Bishop of Kitium and member of the Legislative Council, Nicodemos Mylonas, as well as the Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios.4 Apart from the negative impact the deportations had on both Cypriots and on some segments of British public opinion, Storrs’s decision to deport two influential prelates inaugurated a prolonged period of bitterness and hostility between the colonial authorities and the Church of Cyprus.5 Measures taken by the Government to restore order on the island and to prevent similar events in the future included the prohibition of foreign flags (Greek or Turkish), the “illegal” ringing of Church bells (as they were used as a means to gather people for processions) and the prohibition more than five people gathering in one place without police authority. One of the most important new laws, though, was the Statute on Newspapers, Books and Printing Presses. Given the large distribution of Athenian and Greek –Egyptian newspapers on the island, as well as the correspondence between various Greek– Cypriot leaders and sympathisers with the Cypriot cause among the wider Hellenic diaspora in the region, strict censorship was enforced to prevent the publication of any article or the distribution of any letter without the prior approval of the Press Censor. As the Governor informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the immediate aftermath of the disturbances the control of the mail was so thorough and persistent that it had necessitated the appointment of nine postal censors acquainted with the local languages.6 As A.J. Dawe – now head of the Mediterranean Department of the Colonial Office – said, “Cyprus is one

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of those countries where you must either ‘govern or get out’ and an elementary necessity in the government of this type is a firm control over the press”.7 Censorship laws in Cyprus were subsequently relaxed, depending on the political situation. For instance, in January 1932, Governor Stubbs abandoned the requirement for prior approval of an article before its publication, since other effective methods were discovered for the control of the press. One of these was depriving a newspaper of its permit of circulation once an editor had been condemned for the dissemination of false news or seditious action.8 Finally, with the enactment of the new Criminal Code, agitation in favour of enosis was declared a criminal offence. Neither the Church nor Cypriot politicians were able to mount an effective resistance to the Government’s repressive measures, especially as little active sympathy was forthcoming from Greece. Despite the existence of groups and individuals who sympathised with the Cyprus cause, like the Athens-based Greek Committee for Cyprus, which included some prominent Greek politicians, as well as demonstrations organised by students and criticism of the Cyprus Government in the Athenian press, the official line was far from encouraging. Greece’s foreign policy was directed towards rapprochement with its former enemies and strengthening ties with its important allies. Venizelos’s current premiership was therefore cautious and avoided any irredentist claims. Linking the Dodecanese issue with the Cyprus question, Venizelos explicitly declared: However deep the echo in Greece of the national aspirations of the Greek of Cyprus and the Dodecanese, it was impossible for the Greek state to assist their realisation, or tolerate the use of Greek soil for upsetting the tranquillity of the islands. Vital interests imposed on Greece the maintenance of imperturbable friendship with Great Britain and with their great Mediterranean neighbour, Italy.9 By the end of 1931, law and order were restored on the island. The British military presence had been reduced. Once the authorities were confident calm had returned, the emergency reinforcements returned to Egypt and the island garrison once more shrank to a single company. The anniversary of the Greek Declaration of Independence (25 March 1932) passed without incident.10 In September 1932, after a tour of inspection

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in the towns and villages of the island, the local Colonial Secretary, Herbert Henniker-Heaton, reported he was well received everywhere and that “there is no hostility against the Government amongst the great body of the people including members of the intelligentsia”.11 During the 1930s, the absence of any form of political representation of the Greek– Cypriots in the island’s political machinery, as well as the vacancy of the Archbishopric after the death of Kyrillos III in 1933, meant opposition to the regime was restricted to a section of the Church led by Leontios, the Bishop of Paphos, and the clandestine communist party.12 The prolonged political inactivity could also be attributed to the island’s severe economic situation: the world economic crisis hit Cypriot agriculture and diminished its exports, the closure of the mines sent unemployment skyrocketing, and a drought destroyed crops and reduced livestock herds. With food often in short supply and living standards stagnating, issues of constitutional development seemed less important to most people than getting by under harsh economic conditions. Education was amongst the sectors of Cypriot life most directly affected by the Government’s tough new policies – as in the past, the education system could not be isolated from wider political developments. The October riots constituted the most serious political incident the British had endured so far, and schoolboys had played a prominent role in them. Acting on the powers given to him by the 1929 Elementary Education Law, the Governor promptly suspended 21 schoolmasters for their involvement in the disturbances and eventually dismissed eleven of them.13 After the uprising, the Government set out to assume greater control over the education system to prevent any kind of political interference in the schools by seditious elements. Strikingly, the educational reforms pursued in Cyprus in the first half of the 1930s resemble those pursued by the Italians in the Dodecanese for some years. Rome’s policy after 1925 was, according to Barros, “one of religious assimilation and Italianization”.14 In compliance with this policy, municipal and privately-endowed schools were assimilated to the model created by the Italian state system, with local principals deprived of any control over the employment of teachers and allusions to Greece forbidden in the classroom.15 Key elements of these policies in the Italian Dodecanese were adopted by the British authorities in Cyprus, and with much the same rationale.

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In a letter to Governor Storrs, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Philip Cunliffe-Lister, agreed with Venizelos’s view that there was no inconsistency in a man having pride of race and at the same time being entirely loyal to the state of which he was a subject, and he suggested “this loyalty would be encouraged if children were to be taught to know more of the Empire to which they belonged”.16 Henceforth, educational laws and decisions, apart from being intended to deal with normal administrative and technical problems relating to schools, were aimed at ending or at least weakening the links between Cyprus and Greece. This should not necessarily be interpreted as an attempt to anglicise, or deHellenise Greek– Cypriots, as many politicians and prelates suggested, but as the only effective way to make future generations in Cyprus loyal to the Empire. At that moment the fundamental British position was very clear: “no question of union with Greece can be entertained and the determination of the future constitution should be deferred until the present agitation has died down in Cyprus and Greece as well”.17 Britain had many interests at stake in Cyprus, and therefore no serious contemplation existed for giving it to Greece. Harold Nicholson, journalist at the Evening Standard and a former diplomat, though himself in the past a fervent Hellenist and admirer of Venizelos, did not hesitate to support this view in public on a BBC programme a few days after the recent riots: were we to evacuate the island we should not only be surrendering an important strategic asset, we should not only be giving Greece a valuable present and receiving nothing in return but we should be proving false to the Moslem minority who would be subject to persecution.18 The British Government was certainly not contemplating any further constitutional reforms. After the riots it followed the same tactic as in Malta, where trouble had occurred after the introduction of a measure of self-government: the colonial authorities suspended the constitution and then reduced the elected legislative council to an advisory body consisting of members nominated by the Governor.19 The establishment of an Advisory Council in November 1933 was really aimed at satisfying concern in the Colonial Office, where it was felt that somehow or other local opinion had to be given some place in the machinery of the

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government. Nevertheless, with no decision-making power, the Advisory Council was essentially a decorative feature of the Cypriot political scene, whilst any laws could be enacted directly by Orders in Council. Although its four Greek –Cypriot members immediately came under attack by the local Press for cooperating with the authorities, the British would refuse to increase the Council’s powers and thus give it more local credibility.20 With the Legislative Council no longer a barrier, Storrs pushed for the introduction of a new Elementary Education law that would give the Government the power to decide the curriculum in elementary schools. In his telegram to the Colonial Office, he asked permission to enact laws that would place the syllabus and discipline of all elementary schools in the hands of the Government and give it, as far as possible, control of secondary education.21 He believed British rule in Cyprus could not continue unless a strong line was taken on this matter as soon as possible. Storrs, who had always been a keen supporter of educational reform in Cyprus, seized the momentum to persuade the Colonial Office of the pressing need to act: The Board of Education had been turned by the local politicians into a political machine. Appointments, promotions, transfers and dismissals are regulated by considerations of party politics without regard to the educational welfare of the island. As the teacher is very often the only person in a village with any education, his services as a political agent are indispensable to the politicians who are exclusively town-dwellers. Throughout the schools there is a great deal of anti-British propaganda which may in future have serious effects.22 His suggestions were discussed at a Colonial Office meeting where Henniker-Heaton reiterated Storrs’s view that “control of the curriculum was the key point, and that unless Government obtained such control, the trouble in Cyprus would inevitably continue”.23 Among Storrs’s initial and most important steps towards this ultimate goal was to diminish the Church’s role in the political affairs of the island and, specifically, to reduce its involvement in educational matters. It became axiomatic in local official British circles after late 1931 that if the influence of the Church could be removed,

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Philhellenism would quickly expire.24 The Colonial Office fully supported the curtailment of the political role of the Church, which it considered responsible for the agitation in favour of enosis. A.J. Dawe put it very clearly: The Archbishop contends that the participation of all the clergy in political affairs should be judged as beneficial. This might have been all right as long as the Church confined itself to legitimate and constitutional activities. But when “beneficial” comes to cover sedition and rebellion, then it’s clearly time for the state to step in and teach the Church a lesson.25 In Cyprus, as again in Malta, events occurred which provided an opportunity to push a dominant local Church (Orthodox in this case, Roman Catholic in the other) out of the secular sphere and into a narrowly religious role. Tensions surrounding this process were to intensify throughout the 1930s. The issue of the revision of the salaries of the teachers as a means to cut the Government’s expenses, in a time of fiscal retrenchment, instigated discussions on the amendment of the Elementary Education Law of 1929. Opinions among British officials in Cyprus as to how sweeping the educational reforms should be and when they should be introduced, however, varied. Some were in favour of radical and speedy reforms, while others supported more gradual changes. In a letter to Herbert HennikerHeaton, the Director of Education, J.R. Cullen, expressed his concerns about the intention of the Greek–Cypriot Board of Education to use all their available powers to follow the practices of Greece wherever possible. Indeed, recent regulations had reiterated the longstanding custom of encouraging both teachers and pupils to look to Greece as a model and inspiration. Cullen believed that only by enhancing the Government’s control over the educational system would these problems be solved. He stated that “this divided control should cease, that the Government should be the only ultimate authority for all matters connected with elementary education”, and that the Boards’ deliberations should be strictly limited to those matters entrusted to them by the law.26 Cullen went on to clarify that the removal of this function from the Boards did not imply the immediate substitution of a new curriculum, since these changes should be effected at an ordered and not-too-drastic pace.

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Not everybody on the British side appreciated this more measured approach. The Acting Commissioner of Nicosia supported more radical means to ensure ties between Greek – Cypriots and Greece were eroded, and suggested ties between the island’s inhabitants and the British Empire should be strengthened: While Greek remains the prevailing language of the island, patriotism and affiliation to Greece are bound to be present in the minds of the Greek Christian community. Even though the villager may know little or nothing of Greece, and care less for what happens there, he is certain to regard British residents as intruders and to imagine that there is a formidable barrier between the native and the British official that cannot be done away with . . . The villager or the peasant is concerned with agriculture and if undisturbed by agitation and subversive propaganda, he could take little interest in politics. He would have little to say against British Administration for agricultural problems would fill his horizon.27 According to the Acting Commissioner, the schools with loyal and unbiased teachers were to make a start in depriving agitators and nationalists of any raw material. With an eye perhaps on recent Egyptian experience, where the colleges, especially those of law, had been breeding grounds for anti-British feeling, the Acting Commissioner went on to remark: History has proved that the student class generally plays a prominent part in an insurrection, especially if it has been reared on wrong principles. The events of the last few weeks have shown that the action of this class in Cyprus had been no exception to the rule. Educational reforms must aim at eliminating insubordination in this class at teaching the British standard of discipline and that of making loyal subjects. They must mould it and guide it along the right lines. School masters play a very important part in the moulding of the character and . . . they are to blame for deliberately infusing patriotism and thoughts of affiliation to Greece in young students.28

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To this end, he believed, it was imperative that the teaching of English in all schools of the island be made compulsory and English recognised as the official language. Additionally, he stated, “the books used in the schools should be carefully revised and any that have obviously been printed for students in Greece, discussing martial prowess to patriotism and the Greek flag, should be banned”.29 Against this background, on 7 March 1932, Storrs, in a telegram to Cunliffe-Lister, requested approval “for enactment of legislation to amend the Elementary Education Laws 1929–31 with a view to reducing the influence of Boards of Education and increasing the control of the Government over the teachers”, and expressed his desire that the measure be passed without delay.30 In Storrs’s letter the connection between enosis agitation and the new elementary law was prominent, and he asserted that the education system in Cyprus remained highly affected by political developments. Storrs pointed out that “past events culminating in the disturbances have adequately shown that it is essential in the interests of administration that the control of elementary education, and in particular Greek elementary education, should be mainly in the hands of the Government”.31 A key recommendation was the reduction of the role of the Boards of Education, particularly with regard to the curriculum, text books and public holidays. The apparent necessity of such a measure arose from the politicisation of all three. In Storrs’s words: The curriculum at present enforced in the schools has slight regard for the educational requirements of the population; the texts books are chosen for their value as instruments of propaganda rather than of instruction; days are fixed as holidays which are of more proper interest to Greek citizens than to Cypriot British subjects.32 Storrs here undoubtedly refers to the annual celebration of Greek Independence on 25 March. In the same spirit, Cullen had already sent a strict letter to all elementary teachers to warn them that “the Government will not tolerate the penetration of politics in the schools”, explaining that “politics meant the analysis of any party, national or international issue that affects Cyprus.”33 It had been made clear that failure to comply would result in punitive measures.

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Storrs, however, did not see the implementation of his proposals, since in June 1932 he was asked to leave Cyprus to take over the governorship of Northern Rhodesia. He was succeeded by Sir Reginald Edward Stubbs, former Governor of Jamaica, who arrived in Cyprus on 4 December 1932. Stubbs was to stay in Cyprus for a year before taking up the post of Governor in Ceylon, and in November 1933 was himself succeeded by Richmond Palmer. In the interim period between Storrs’s departure and Stubbs’s arrival, Acting Governor Henniker-Heaton presented a draft bill on elementary education to the Colonial Office. According to the last Education Law, that of 1929, schoolteachers were brought under the direct control of the Government for appointment, promotion, dismissal and all disciplinary purposes, their salaries paid by the Government. Boards of Education, one for each religious community and consisting for the most part of elected members, retained control of curricula and books, of the local rates to be assessed yearly in each town or village, and the Education Funds – they were also empowered to make recommendations to the Governor on all matters related to elementary education. For the school year 1932 –3, 56,667 boys and girls were enrolled at 1,023 elementary schools across the island, increasing the percentage of enrolment to 86 per cent for Greek–Cypriot children and 74 per cent Turkish –Cypriot children.34 The draft of the 1933 bill went a step further, for it made the Governor “the central authority for all matters relating to elementary education in the Colony”.35 This meant the Government had the power to decide the appointment, promotion or dismissal of teachers, the selection of school textbooks, the curriculum to be followed and the conduct of business of the Committees and the Boards. In effect, the Boards of Education had been deprived of most of their powers and would henceforth act only as advisory bodies. Even their unofficial members would be nominated by the Governor instead of being selected by the elected members of the Legislature, a change even Dawe characterised as far-reaching. In addition, the Governor would be responsible for the duties and powers of teachers, school attendants and inspectors, the discipline enforced at schools, the grants and loans to be made from the Education Fund, the mode of payment and the assessment of the qualifications of teachers. The proposals produced a lively discussion in the Colonial Office. A consensus emerged that should the Cyprus Government want to

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eliminate enosis propaganda in the schools and strengthen its position on the island, it was imperative to assume complete control over education. G.D. Chamberlain declared, since “the schools in Cyprus have been in the past entirely connected with the movement of Union with Greece and that they have been the media of pro-Greek propaganda”, the Department should follow the advice of the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of Education in the Colonies, Arthur Mayhew, and reduce the Boards of Education to simply advisory bodies. Having advised a few additional changes on purely technical points, the Colonial Office gave its unanimous approval to proceed with the law, since “the case both politically and educationally for the Government now to assume complete control is unanswerable”. Another official asserted “the rebellion had made it essential to do away with enosis propaganda in the schools”, while Mayhew pointed out that the “main point to be considered when disciplinary action is contemplated is whether a teacher’s action has been prejudicial to education or to the school in which he is employed”.36 A heightened fear of local communism, stemming from the recent outbreak, only accentuated this momentum. In June, Cullen informed the Colonial Secretary of his intention to send a letter to four candidate schoolmasters and twelve teachers of the Permanent Register Staff who were suspected by the police of being registered communists, warning them he would not recommend them for appointment or promotion unless they had proved they did not subscribe to communist ideas.37 Stubbs, for whom communism rapidly became a beˆte-noire, took action to ensure an article making communist organisations illegal was added to the criminal code.38 How important the education reform was to the Government can be demonstrated by the allocation of funds. The education fund was one of the biggest in the Estimates, along with the police fund, with £110,000 budgeted to cover the employment of teachers. Due to the economic situation, however, the Government closed forty schools of the existing 1,063, on the grounds that their enrolments were not viable. Most of these schools were in small villages, where there were not enough children from each community to justify the existence of two schools. Therefore, since parents refused to send their children to a mixed school, the Government decided that one central school would accommodate children from various small villages, and many children from poorer – and especially rural – families simply stopped attending school, thus

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reducing attendance and giving the government a reason to execute further school closures. Fourteen of these schools were for girls, for whom educational opportunities were already limited. To the Government’s credit, the education bill made elementary education free of charge, hence making the provision of education more universal, at least for boys. Removing fees at the elementary stage was especially important for girls since, again, poor families were far less inclined to send their daughters to school. To an extent, these innovations increased popular support for the Government as it continued its efforts to repress enosis. Nevertheless, when the bill was published for general information on 1 April,39 it aroused the anger of the Church and the press, which denounced it as “the enslavement of Greek education”.40 Leontios, the bishop of Paphos,41 emerged as the most vocal opponent of the law. The Church remained without an Archibishop since the prior November, when Kyrillos III died, and, with some of the other bishops in exile, holding of the Holy Synod was rendered impossible. Hence, pending elections for a permanent successor, Leontios assumed the position of Locum Tenens, or acting Archbishop, the beginning of a prolonged and enigmatic contest with the British authorities. Leontios sent two memoranda to the Governor of Cyprus in which he protested against the enactment of the Law, the abolition of the ancient rights of the Church and the enslavement of Greek national education.42 He described the 1933 law as the “ultimate blow maintained against elementary education” and he underlined the Church’s rejection of it: it deprives of the people their rights over their orthodox Christian education and their human rights to determine, according to their traditions, the Greek education of the youth; rights that were respected by the Turkish occupation and, for a long time, by the British Administration as well.43 To Leontios, Church and education were inseparable, and as the Church had always been the guardian of Hellenism, the new law had to be withdrawn since “it denied to Hellenism the right to manage our national education, putting it instead under the absolute control of the Government”.44 A particularly strong objection here was that teachers of foreign languages and certain other subjects at elementary schools were not required to profess one of the two main religions of the island, a

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provision deeply resented in the Church, which believed it indispensable that teachers be Orthodox Christians. Furthermore, ecclesiastical control in this sphere was also reduced by the provision that, henceforth, the Governor had the power to directly order the closure of a school where Church interference “has been such as to render it impossible of the teacher to carry out his duties”.45 Leontios saw in this a British move to entrench their position, not by sheer power but, more subtly, through an essentially internalised and psychological process of “Anglicisation and the stultification of Cypriots’ Greek character”. That is why, as Leontios believed, the Government “turned not to the older generations but to the schoolchildren, as they could more easily get emotionally influenced”.46 Both Kyrillos, before his death, and then Leontios advised parents to keep their children away from schools should the law come into effect but, given the real desire for education in Cyprus, such advice could eventually leave the Church at odds with the general aspirations of its congregants. The Government, however, managed to sideline Leontios by depriving him of the right to participate in the Greek Board of Education, explaining that, as Locum Tenens, he was not legally entitled to do so.47 The new education law was certainly not well received by the Press, either. Even before its official enactment, Paphos, a weekly newspaper, wrote it was incomprehensible “why the Government wanted to deprive a people with such an educational zeal . . . and a genuine interest in the progress and good administration of schools of the right to decide for its own education”.48 Kypriakos Fylax argued the legislation only undermined both the Boards of Education and teachers themselves by curtailing their own proper professional responsibility.49 Generally, the press deplored the apparent willingness of local politicians to allow the Government to force the educational changes through. There was a suggestion this passivity arose from a reaction to the October uprising, after which there was a tendency to opt for a return to ‘the quieter life’.50 The Greek press also criticised the proposed amendments, which it described as an attempt “to extend to Greek education the anti-Hellenic spirit of the British Administration”.51 Resentment for the new law surfaced amongst the members of the Board of Education in their meetings of May and July 1934, both in the presence of the Governor and the Director of Education. The British officials defended the law: not only did it satisfy the requirements for

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teaching the future citizens of Cyprus to become loyal subjects of the British Empire, but it also contributed to the direct state control and secularisation of education, a process well underway and generally accepted in other countries. The members of the Board, however, argued the law deprived the people and the Board of their educational rights, and that it could not be applied in Cyprus, even though it was the tactic followed in other countries, because in Cyprus “the voice of the people is not taken into consideration”. After the meeting, the Board submitted a memorandum to the Governor: the interests of education as a whole lies in wide and active participation of the people in its affairs . . . It is a matter of justice and responsibility because, since the Cypriot people pays £130,000 annually for education and sends 55,000 children to the schools (they) should have (a) direct voice in the education and the religious edification of their children.52 To this argument, the Committee for the Greek Schools of Nicosia added that the “people’s loyalty in fact is not secured in the main by restricting his rights, but by means of a good understanding between the Governed for the work of the Government and of the Government for the rights of the Governed as a civilised people”.53 It will therefore be clear from these Greek –Cypriot and Greek reactions that the Education Law was seen as an attempt to anglicise young people and to detach them from both Hellenic ideas and the Church. There was some truth in this, though certain distinctions need to be made. Stubbs and his colleagues certainly wanted to create a more “British atmosphere”, though this might be said to have been a vaguer intent than “Anglicisation”. Furthermore, the colonial administration had indeed always distrusted the Church, but they did not necessarily relish a head-on clash with it. Their desire – echoing the original recommendation of Weir on educational life in Cyprus for more secular control and a shift towards scientific and vocational subjects54 – had a secular and non-political logic of its own. Nevertheless, the uncontroversial reality, given conditions on the island, was the reforms were bound to put the British and the Church at loggerheads. On 29 May 1933 the Cyprus Government duly passed what the Colonial Office in London admitted was “certainly one of the most

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important laws they have ever enacted”.55 Accordingly, given that the proposed law granted the Governor complete power over teachers and the curriculum, putting elementary education in Cyprus therefore on a thoroughly sound footing, the Colonial Office unreservedly gave the green light for its enactment.56 Notably, the distinction made in the new law was no longer between Turkish and Greek schools but between Muslim and Christian schools, thus emphasising the religion, rather than the nationality, of each community.57 In the following years, the Government would take a step further by making the teaching of English in the last two classes of elementary school obligatory, and by introducing a new curriculum. In conjunction with education reform, the organisation of the Boy Scouts, as a leading youth organisation, had also attracted official attention. In his report on the October disturbances. Storrs underlined that closer government control was necessary in this sphere as well, since although the Scouts recruited from expatriates and commercial cadres – and were under the direct supervision of the Governor’s own aide-decamp – a considerable number of loyal, indigenous Cypriots in the Scout ranks were subjected to the indoctrination of enosis.58 The permeation of such a quintessentially imperial and British phenomenon as the Boy Scouts with the ideology and attachment of enosis is itself striking. Stubbs also attached great importance to the Boy Scouts as an organisation, and from 1932 onwards various laws were passed to ensure that, whatever might be true of foreign nationality, Cypriot scouts should only be in troops under British control, subject to the Governor’s sanction. In his detailed report on the riots, Storrs also emphasised that “fresh generations of youth sedulously indoctrinated with disloyalty had been launched by the secondary schools on all the professions”,59 pinpointing the absolute necessity of putting secondary education under government control. Although up until the riots elementary education, not secondary, had been the Government’s main concern, by the middle of 1933 the discussions for a reform of the latter had come to be seen as touching “the heart of the problem for the future of Cyprus”.60 The secondary schools in Cyprus were administered by Town Committees usually presided over by the Bishop of the District, and in addition to the fees paid by the students, the Church was the greatest financial contributor.61 The Muslim community had the Lyce´e for Boys and the Victoria School for Girls, as well as the Shakespeare School, a

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mixed school chiefly teaching in English. For the Greek Christian community there were five Gymnasia for boys, one in each district, each admitting a small number of girls, and a Commercial Lyceum in Larnaca mainly for boys. There were three High Schools for Girls, one each in Nicosia, Limassol and Famagusta. There were also fifteen private schools in various areas, most of them for boys. There were six schools which admitted children from all communities, and the most important of these was the English School, established in 1901 by the former Director of Education, Canon Newham, and the American Academies for boys and girls.62 These schools accepted students from all communities, mainly from the commercial classes, as well as the children of British officers living in Cyprus. The teaching staff of the Greek schools usually comprised Greek – Cypriots who had completed their studies in Greece or, on rare occasions, in France, and a small number of English teachers.63 The curricula of the Muslim schools were precisely laid down by the Ministry of Public Instruction in Turkey, and that of the Greek Gymnasia and High Schools were similarly prescribed by the Ministry of Education in Greece. The books, the examinations and the curricula were fully in accordance with the Greek or Turkish Ministries, and they were designed to prepare students for higher education in those countries. Altogether, this orientation towards foreign regulation was rather remarkable in what was supposedly a British colony. Additionally, due to the lack of post-secondary educational facilities in Cyprus, anybody interested in entering the teaching profession had to go to either Greece or Turkey, which only confirmed the need for government control over secondary education. Since the Government was unable at the time to make provisions for post-secondary education, it had to at least take control over secondary schools. In Stubbs’s words, “the secondary schools must no longer be used to foster sedition in the rising generation”.64 Eradicating this danger soon became a vital part of the Cyprus Government’s strategy as its new interventionist priorities took shape. In a letter to Cunliffe-Lister, Governor Stubbs outlined what he saw as the imperatives required in secondary schooling: to subject to control, in the light of actual and practical needs, the present rigid conformity of most of the instruction with exclusively academic standards set at Athens and [I]Stambul; to extend the teaching of English and, if possible, the employment

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for this purpose of English masters; to see that the teachers appointed are properly qualified and to give them security of tenure in their appointments; and as far as this may be practicable, to introduce into the curricula subjects and text-books calculated to inspire in the pupils a higher conception of their responsibilities as Cypriots and of the position of Cyprus as part of the British Empire.65 According to Stubbs, the first step towards these ends was the enactment of legislation to provide for the compulsory registration of secondary schools and to make the Government responsible for their finances. According to the preliminary bill which emerged, secondary schools would be divided into two categories: the first category would comprise schools receiving grants-in-aid from the Government and thereby fully subject to state control; the second category consisted of schools receiving no grants-in-aid and subject solely to inspection by the Education Department. These schools could be struck off the register, however, if it was shown to the satisfaction of the Governor that any member of the teaching staff had used their position to influence the pupils politically. The Governor was also accorded the power to prohibit the use in school of any book which in his opinion was morally or politically undesirable. Crucially, however, Stubbs, whilst fully aware “of the nature and extent of the influence exercised at present over the local Greek Orthodox Secondary Schools by the Ministry of Public Instruction in Greece”, thought it was educationally necessary in Cyprus that this continue, simply because Greece offered many Greek –Cypriot families the only viable opportunity for more advanced education, not least because going to Britain was far too expensive. In short, whilst it was important for the Government to take closer internal control of what went on in the schools, it was equally necessary that “the powers of internal control which this Government now proposes to assume may not either on political or educational grounds have to be exercised in such a way as to preclude the pupils from those schools from proceeding to Athens from higher studies”.66 Significantly, the Colonial Office – as usual affected by its greater distance from the practical limitations of Cypriot reality – had a different opinion. Stubbs’s proposals were praised there as “a very necessary prolongation” of the educational reform and as “the next big

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move in our attack on the old educational regime in Cyprus”. Nevertheless, they were held to be “defective upon a fundamental point”.67 A.J. Dawe, always prone to take a radical view of Cypriot affairs, rather sharply observed: Our object in recasting the secondary school system is, as I understand it, a political one. We wish to set up an educational system which will have a definite pro-British bias in place of a system which has proved to be a breeding-ground for the proGreek agitation. If this is the fundamental desideratum the Governor’s proposals miss their objective altogether. Under his scheme, the secondary school system will be dominated by the educational requirements of Athens and Istanbul. The primary object of the school courses is still to be to prepare pupils for higher education in Greece and Turkey. The scheme is framed on the assumption that there is no alternative avenue to higher education for Cypriots than the facilities afforded in those countries . . . We could not prohibit Cypriot students from going to Athens; but that is quite a different thing from allowing the whole system of secondary education to be moulded upon the Greek model.68 A.J. Dawe had been in the Mediterranean Department of the Colonial Office since the mid-1920s, and his attitude towards Cypriot affairs was far from lenient. Under the impression Greek– Cypriots suffered from ill-will and “lack of aptitude for working representative institutions”69 and convinced enosis aspirations were not enjoying the support of the mass of the population, he emerged in favour of greater government interference in all aspects of Cypriot life, not least education. The critique, in suitably polite form, was transmitted to Stubbs in a personal letter from the Secretary of State, informing him that the Advisory Committee of Education – a body within the Colonial Office – would turn its attention to alternative avenues for higher education in the case of Cyprus and eventually make some recommendations.70 Clearly, secondary education and tertiary issues went together. One of Stubbs’s suggestions the Colonial Office immediately endorsed concerned the appointment of an Inspector of Secondary Schools who would be responsible for the internal control of the

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schools. Perhaps inevitably, this suggestion was immediately criticised by some in Greece as the thin end of the wedge. Eleftheria considered the creation of such a post as extravagant, especially at a time when the Government was closing rural nursery schools due to financial stringency.71 In Greece, newspaper Hestia wrote: “education is the principal means of maintaining and cultivating the nationalism of the Cypriots and it cannot be taken out of the hands of the Greek communities”.72 On the British side, of course, this was exactly the situation Britain wanted to change. Still, when these matters came before the Advisory Committee of Education, that body’s Chairman, Arthur Mayhew, maintained that government control over secondary education should be extended to matters relating to the health and moral welfare of the students, so the Government “would avoid the charge that they are concerned only with the political aspects of the schools”.73 As an example, Mayhew mentioned Palestine, where insanitary accommodation and the employment of morally undesirable teachers were also grounds for non-registration and occasional suppression of schools. Of course, what might be considered “morally undesirable” was just as tendentious, and maybe even more so, than anything “political” in Cyprus as in Palestine. Nevertheless, when the Advisory Committee met on 28 September it discussed the Cypriot issues on purely educational grounds, establishing a sub-committee to consider the overarching aim of secondary studies in Cyprus which, “while opening an easy and obvious avenue to a higher education of the British Empire and Beirut as well, would yet furnish some profitable instruction for students who do not propose to carry their studies to a University standard”.74 It is vital to observe that whilst in the Cypriot context the political motivation was wholly transparent, on a broader plane the logic was entirely consistent with fresh trends in educational and social innovation, not least in the Near East, where many Western-style educational institutions had developed over previous decades. This can also be attributed to Arthur Mayhew, “the Nestor of British Colonial Education”, as Whitehead called him. Mayhew, who studied Classics at Oxford, served in the Indian Educational Service for twenty years and in 1929 was appointed Joint Secretary of the revamped Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies. During the next ten years he held a pivotal role in colonial education both as an author – he wrote

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several books and was editor of the journal Overseas Education – and as a key figure on the committee.75 Lee and Petter state that in the 1930s and after the Depression there was a growing awareness of the need to equip the Colonial Office with an internal organisation to respond to the needs of governing a colonial empire. A key facet of the change at the metropolitan level was a reduced emphasis on the strictly geographical organisation of the Colonial Office’s work and an increased focus on subject areas spanning colonies and regions. Education was one of these subjects or themes, usually conceived within the framework of social science and welfare within the Overseas Empire as a whole. In July 1939, therefore, the joint Secretaries of the Advisory Committee on Education were replaced by an Adviser and Assistant Adviser in Education, laying the ground for a more active intervention in the field of education.76 The need for a central policy was to intensify after 1943, when postwar planning became more pressing.77 In this spirit, a Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies was appointed in August 1943. This initiative built upon and expanded the system of “special relationships” of indigenous colonial institutions with the University of London and intended to guide their evolution towards full university status.78 These tendencies could not but have been the result of a fully fledged educational initiative in Britain after the War. The Educational Act of 1944, steered through Parliament by the Education Minister, R.A. Butler, provided free secondary education for all pupils, giving the opportunity for higher education to poorer children. This did not change much in the colonies, however, since there was not enough funding to do anything ambitious. Education Departments in the colonies themselves remained essentially responsible for local education, even after 1945, and their activities were constrained within their local budgets. Cyprus was no exception, though it is true that Cyprus never fit into the general picture. For one thing, one could say Cyprus fell by the wayside, as it simply did not have a University or any institution of advanced studies. Had this type of institution been established earlier, Cyprus might at least have “fit into” postwar development model later in the 1940s. Most importantly, though, metropolitan intervention could have been effective if colonial Governments were in control and able to apply agendas drafted in London. This was not the case in Cyprus during and especially after the war, as we will see in the following chapters.

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In the middle of these various discussions on secondary education, Reginald Stubbs’s governorship came to an end when he left the island in November 1933 to take up the governorship of Ceylon. A month before his departure, Stubbs composed a memorandum on the constitutional position of Cyprus which the Secretary of States for the Colonies dubbed “the best survey of the situation we have had so far from Cyprus”.79 Arguably and critically, this memorandum imbued his successor, Sir Richmond Palmer, with a negative impression of the island and instilled in Palmer an urgent desire to administer the colony with a firm hand and to introduce a British atmosphere: Palmer’s experience in northern Nigeria, which was governed very conservatively, provided fertile ground for Stubbs’s opinion of Cyprus and how it should be governed. Reflecting an impression many British officials had of Cypriots, Stubbs stressed that he knew no community “which is so utterly unfit to take any responsible part in the Government of its own country as is that of Cyprus”. He believed that, due to continuous foreign occupations, Cypriots had developed and retained a typical slave mentality. “Intrigue, deceit and suspicion”, he remarked, “meet one at every turn. No Cypriot will trust another, and it is probably very wise not to do so. And public spirit is a thing not only unknown but practically inconceivable to him”. He therefore considered it as the first task to be undertaken by the new Governor “to endeavour to breed a class with a tradition of public service”, and to this aim he regarded as an “essential preliminary the reform of the system of secondary education by the introduction of an English atmosphere”.80 By the time of Palmer’s arrival on Cyprus, Stubbs’s letter had become an essential code in the language of the administration. Stubbs’s final testament on Cypriot affairs, combined with the new Governor’s very forthright remarks on arrival, made it clear that Palmer was bent on a strongly reformist course at the outset and that education would be central to it. It was usual for newly arrived Governors to be welcomed by the Greek press with calls to meet Cypriot aspirations, and in this case Eleftheria urged Palmer to satisfy “the desire of its people and its inalienable right for progress”.81 Instead, a number of regulations were soon tightened up. The “oriental method of administrative tactics”, a kind of English liberalism in the East, by which Storrs had tried to govern Cyprus, was to be replaced by a much simpler method: coercion.82 From the outset, Palmer was called to deal with a poor and

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politically restless island. Unemployment was high, and the situation in the countryside especially bad – many held the Government’s inactivity responsible.83 The murder of Antonis Triantafyllides, a member of the Advisory Council, in March 1934, electrified the political atmosphere. The Governor promptly intensified censorship of the press, postponed municipal elections for five years and ordered a platoon of infantry from Polemidia, the traditional garrison in the hills, to Nicosia. Still, Palmer was convinced “the root causes of the extreme difficulty of the present political situation are economic rather than strictly political”.84 Here the thorny old matter of the Cyprus Tribute came back into the frame. Its payment had been abolished by Storrs in 1927, but the British Treasury had then refused to allow any return of payment, which incited the anger of the people of Cyprus. Subsequently, Stubbs stated his belief that “Cyprus has a strong moral claim on this accumulated fund” and urged “for the sake of peace and contentment in this island and for the sake of the reputation of Great Britain in the Levant, the difference between the sums taken from Cyprus in the years 1914– 1927 should be repaid”.85 Certainly there was a general feeling, even in the Colonial Office, that the Italians, in pouring funds into Rhodes, were doing a better job at entrenching their position than the British were in Cyprus. Italy was successfully gaining its ends by providing material benefits for the Dodecanesians, especially in Rhodes.86 This was another idea Palmer took to the island, and its current economic conditions only confirmed its value in his mind. He soon reiterated that all of the “big questions come back to the Tribute question”, that is, money, adding, “if we want to make this place British we shall have to put money into it – there is no escape”. Believing, therefore, that “because both the peasants and townsmen alike feel a sort of economic despair and for different reasons are losing more and more their faith in the good will of the Government”,87 he recommended a Financial Commissioner be called to investigate economic conditions in Cyprus. It was decided that Sir Ralph Oakden was to visit Cyprus in March 1934 with the task of suggesting ways to curb the Government’s expenditures and propose cost-effective incentives to stimulate the local economy. Knowing all too well the intense parsimony of the Treasury towards any question of colonial finance, however, Secretary of State Cunliffe-Lister refused to raise the matter with them, blocking any immediate hope of putting cash back into Cypriot pockets. In the years ahead, however, based on

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Oakden’s recommendations, the Cyprus Government tried to alleviate agricultural indebtedness through the enforcement of laws for the protection of farmers from the exploitation of moneylenders, the strengthening of cooperative and credit societies and the reform of the agricultural bank. The economic advance of the island was, after all, linked to the success of the new regime and the marginalisation of nationalist aspirations. In addition, Palmer himself saw a link between the old Tribute and the question of secondary education, especially given his belief in the need for additional legislation on the latter “at an early date”.88 Chief Commander of the Police, W.C.C. King, was in favour of pressing on with changes to secondary education, which he saw as an absolute prerequisite to ensure the enosis movement “would die a natural death”.89 With the Advisory Committee’s next meeting approaching, Palmer, eager to deal once and for all with secondary education, decided to take the initiative. He started by taking up a personal matter concerning the Director of Education, whom Stubbs had identified as “a real danger” since he was allegedly “under the thumb of his Greek wife” (the allegation indicates a longstanding tension within the administration surrounding those officials with some known attachment to the Greek community). Palmer recommended that “though Cullen would do well enough for the Greek Schools, there should be a man above him who would be more experienced and not unpalatable to the Turks”. He went on to underline the need for the Government to control all education and stressed that the proposed Training Centre for Elementary School Teachers should proceed as a priority.90 Since the riots the Government had been highly concerned about the training of elementary school teachers, whom they considered as among the most active agitators. The Government might have succeeded in taking control over the appointment and dismissal of teachers, but as long as teachers were graduating from secondary schools uncontrolled by the Government, they continued to be a source of sedition. Henniker-Heaton averred that tackling the question of the training of teachers had more political importance than elementary education itself, since “all those with whom we have to deal politically are the intelligentsia and not the great majority of schoolchildren turned out by elementary schools. That a profound change is necessary is self-evident. The objective

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must be to break away completely from the idea that the students in the secondary schools must look towards Greece and Turkey”.91 At its meeting of 26 April 1934, the Subcommittee of the Colonial Office’s advisory body on education made its final recommendations regarding Cyprus. Whilst noting views on the matter differed, the Committee concluded: “it seemed unwise in a predominantly agricultural community not to lay emphasis on that subject”.92 Despite the necessity for the existing Agricultural College to be shuttered for financial reasons, and the inevitable tendency, under prevailing economic conditions, for many children in poorer rural families to be kept working on small holdings, it was suggested there should be at least one institution in Cyprus assisted by public funds to provide post-elementary education with an agricultural bias.93 The committee also found that the most suitable external examination for the needs of Cypriot students was the Cambridge Local Examination, and for this English teachers should be recruited. Since the number of pupils wishing to study at a higher level was likely to remain small in the years ahead, it was decided this was not a priority, and that these pupils should attend institutions outside Cyprus. Instead, the Committee felt, in addition to classic Secondary Schools, a more dedicated vocational establishment should be created for those wishing to find skilled non-professional jobs on the island. Perhaps the most important issue the Committee raised, however, was the introduction of English language as the medium of instruction, especially for entry to British Universities. An extended quotation is relevant to give the full favour of the discussion: This involves the introduction of English as a medium of instruction some considerable time before the examination actually taken. We understand that English is now regularly taught in all the secondary schools of Cyprus and is becoming much more widely diffused in the Island through other channels. We are also informed that a knowledge of English is now required of candidates for teachers’ posts in elementary schools. In so far as the use of English as a medium is likely to improve the pupils’ knowledge of English it seems likely to receive considerable local support. As very few pupils will enter on the secondary courses with a sufficient knowledge of English to be able to follow

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instruction in that language we think that the medium in the lower forms should be Greek or Turkish as the case may be, with English as an important language subject. There may be a stage where both the mother tongue and English should be used. For those who have higher studies in view, the transition to the medium of English should be as early as is consistent with sound instruction. The teaching of Greek or Turkish will presumably be continued. The need for English is no reason for ignoring the educational value of the study of the mother tongue. Schools with a rural bias and other schools that do not aim at preparation for higher studies may prefer to retain Greek or Turkish throughout as the medium of instruction and there is no objection to their doing so, if competent teachers with an adequate knowledge of these languages as well as of the subjects taught can be obtained.94 This was a thorough and dispassionate analysis of where English usage fit into the Cypriot educational pattern, and it did not underestimate the indispensable, leading role of local languages. At the same time, however, cruder political factors were present. Mayhew, in a minute, disagreed with Cullen’s belief that “the adoption of English as a medium of instruction in the higher stages should not be regarded as an inevitable condition of aid from public funds”. He argued that the Cyprus Government “should refuse to negotiate at all with the Universities of Athens and Turkey”.95 Instead, the Government should fund those courses and only those courses prescribed by the English Examining Body. If schools currently in receipt of grants still wanted to provide teaching leading to Matriculation in Athens or Istanbul, they should be free to do so, but they would receive no public funding for it. “I feel”, Mayhew stated, “that such an attitude would be from the educational and political standpoint quite reasonable”.96 Cunliffe-Lister sent the Subcommittee’s proposals to Palmer, underlining that “education may be regarded as the key to the political future of Cyprus”. The Secretary of State was of the view that the imposition of the new courses should be gradual, but that every effort was to be made to establish the new system “without avoidable delay”.97 By December 1934, therefore, Palmer had prepared a draft bill based on Stubbs’s proposals of 15 June and the Subcommittee’s recommendations. This was submitted to the Colonial Office for

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consideration while Mayhew prepared to visit Cyprus to get a better grasp on the situation. Nine months later, in September 1935, based on the proposals of the Advisory Committee and the correspondence between the Colonial Office and the Government of Cyprus, the Acting Governor, William Battershill, enacted the Secondary Education Law, which marked a new era for post-elementary education in Cyprus. According to the law, “no person can register as a secondary school teacher unless the Director is satisfied that such person is educationally, morally and in all other respects a fit and proper person to be a secondary school teacher”;98 all teachers had to be British Subjects, excluding thereby any teachers coming from Greece or Turkey. Additionally, in compliance with earlier discussion within the Colonial Office, the Government assumed the power to inspect all secondary schools “both as regards education imparted in them and in order to control the sanitary and hygienic conditions”. Most importantly, the new law granted the Director of Education the power to control the curriculum and to prohibit the use of any book which was considered seditious and morally harmful. This above all finally and substantially diminished the power of the Governing Bodies of the Schools.99 Indeed, 1935 was to witness fundamental changes affecting the history of education in Cyprus. The reform of the education system accelerated after the introduction of a new curriculum in elementary schools, the conversion of the English School into a government school and the implementation of the plans for the establishment of a Teachers’ Training School. The essential principle of introducing a more British “atmosphere” infused discussions about changes to the curriculum based, as Cullen himself summarised it, “on a comparative study of the curricula and suggestions for teachers in numerous other countries, particularly those of Palestine, Ceylon and Northern Ireland”. Indeed, at this stage, Palestinian models were frequently used for Cyprus in the field of land as well as educational reforms; the outbreak of Arab rebellion in 1936, however, on a scale far surpassing the Cyprus revolt in 1931, was to make that particular analogy less appealing. According to Cullen, the main objects of curriculum revision were: to make the elaborate curriculum in almost all subjects simpler and more practical; to give a new orientation to geography, history and nature study, substituting the life and history of Cyprus for those of Greece and

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Turkey as the centre and basis of the programme; to give a rural bias to teaching, especially by the inclusion of elementary instruction in agriculture and forestry in the nature study syllabus; readers and textbooks for the teaching of geography and history would be prescribed (and if necessary written) to eliminate “nationalist” reading material and, in general, tailored to suit the needs of schools and children in Cyprus, rather than in Greece or Turkey.100 This amended new curriculum was to be introduced in the 1935– 6 school year. The local press paid particular attention to amendments to the elementary curricula. Paphos published the regulations for geography and history for the six classes of elementary school, presumably to show a separate lesson on the geography and history of Greece was no longer prescribed.101 There was general surprise at the introduction of English in the two top classes of elementary schools, with at least three teachers, despite Cullen’s initial fears that such a move would be educationally unsound. By the end of 1934 the revised draft of the curriculum was ready for submission to the Colonial Secretary. In addition to the amendments to geography and history, the British Monarchy had been included in the subject of citizenship. The new curriculum also gave more emphasis to agriculture, allocating three hours per week for these lessons, the same as for history.102 Forestry and gardening were given a prominent position in the new curriculum, and special awards were given to schools with horticultural facilities.103 This turn towards agricultural and practical education was seen by critics as part of the attempt to curtail national aspirations in the schools by directing attention away from the public sphere and, therefore, away from enosis. In a letter to the Secretary of State, Palmer revealed how important a significant revision of the curriculum was for the elimination of Greek propaganda in the schools: Under the revised syllabus history will be related to geography and will proceed from an outline study of the world on a regional basis, to a study of the individual regions in which the geography and history of ancient and modern Greece, as a part of the Near East, will be given their proper place. Special attention will be devoted to Cyprus and to the position of the British Empire within the world framework. In effect, the anomaly whereby in a British possession the teaching of history has taken the form of national

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propaganda by a foreign state will be abandoned in favour of a system free from political objection and in accord with generally accepted educational principles.104 In the meantime, the English National Anthem was also distributed for instruction in the schools.105 Furthermore, the Director of Education recommended the introduction of educational cinemas in schools and villages that would show films on such subjects as geography, hygiene and nature: They are of obvious assistance in awakening and broadening the interests of both teachers and children, and would help materially to break the bonds which have hitherto fettered education in Cyprus by linking it rigidly to education in two neighbouring countries. The addition of captions in English might help the spreading of English in the country.106 Cyprus had been a member of the newly established British Film Institute since January 1934 and paid an annual subscription of £110 to the institute.107 The English-language and officially approved newspaper, the Cyprus Mail, was circulated free to 80 of the schools where it was proposed English should be taught, for the use of both staff and pupils.108 Finally, after the establishment in 1934 of the British Council, an organisation which was to have a considerable role in the Greek-speaking world, the Cyprus Government was quick to put forward a scheme under the Council to make past “runs” of English newspapers and periodicals available on the island.109. One of the innovations suggested for the elementary schools, however, incited vigorous discussions until its eventual introduction. After the Commissioner of Famagusta noted that none of the schools of his district had “displayed a photograph of His Majesty the King”, he suggested portraits of the Royal Family be given to the schools. A similar suggestion was also made by Sir George Hill who, on his visit to Cyprus, noticed the only portraits one could see in the schools and other public places were those of Greek Royalty. Cullen was against the compulsory introduction of portraits of His Majesty the King, recommending instead that the School Committees at least be left to apply for them:

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To compel School Committees to buy and display portraits of their Majesties is a form of propaganda by pin-pricks to which I am strongly opposed. We cannot make Cypriot children English, and I personally do not want to try: if we cannot make them loyal subjects otherwise, cramming these emblems down their throats will not succeed.110 Given Cullen’s background, however, and the fact that “the idiosyncrasies of a particular officer cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the development of a policy”,111 the Colonial Secretary arranged, in connection with the coming Jubilee, that over a thousand of portraits of the King should be sent to elementary schools. In contrast to the Muslim community, which embraced changes in the curriculum and especially the teaching of English,112 the Church and the Greek press reacted with some hostility. For the Church, it was a double blow: not only did the new curriculum diminish the emphasis given to Greece, but it sought to marginalise the stoutly defended influence of the Church in the schools. The Locum Tenens prepared a report taking issue with the educational reforms, which prohibited: the teaching of Greek geography and history; the prohibition of the Greek national anthem and the circulation of maps of Greece and of pictures of Greek heroes and famous public figures. In his report, Leontios alleged the Government’s aim was to obliterate any links Cypriots had with modern or ancient Greece, with their national descent and with their nation’s glorious past.113 In a letter he sent to Palmer on Christmas Eve, 1935, Leontios criticised the new curriculum, which he found detrimental to the general education of the Greek youth of Cyprus both educationally and politically. He believed it was educationally incorrect to teach the pupils of elementary schools a foreign language, as this would limit their ability to learn comprehensively their mother tongue and therefore understand the ecclesiastical hymns. Politically, he believed the new curriculum was unjust to the people of Cyprus, and he asked the Governor to consider that “justice may be done to our people by the restitution of its sovereign rights which survived even during the Turkish times and remained in its possession until the recent years of the British occupation”.114 The short, even slightly acid, reply from the Government to Leontios neatly reflected its intense suspicion of the

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Church as the ultimate propagator and repository of the enosis ideal. On behalf of the Governor, the Acting Colonial Secretary merely informed the Locum Tenens that “His Excellency regrets that it is not possible to enter into correspondence with you on this subject. Such proposed changes in the curricula relate exclusively to secular education and have been fully considered by the responsible authorities”.115 In this setting, it is vital to underline that while the role of the Greek language could not possibly be dispensed with within Cypriot education, in the minds of the great majority of British officials, Greek-speaking Cypriots were not necessarily Greek by culture or ethnicity. During his tenure Stubbs had emphasised that the teaching of English “in my opinion is absolutely essential to stop the nonsense about Cypriots being Greeks (which they never were)”.116 Similarly, a Colonial Office analysis asserted forcefully: It is very doubtful that the Greek-speaking Cypriots can be said to be of the Greek race. The many nations which have passed over the island from antiquity onwards have left their mark upon it and ethnologically there is no question that the Cypriots are of mixed provenance.117 Such views had long been entertained amongst British officialdom. It marked, after all, a default position in the counter-ideology which, in a somewhat fumbling way, the British tried to construct in defence of their position on the island. In tandem with the educational reforms we have described, such broader arguments became sharper and more frequent, and in this context allegations of outright “de-Hellenisation” were credible. The Government did not intervene in the curriculum of the secondary schools, and Greek Gymnasia and Turkish Lyce´es regulated from outside Cyprus were allowed to exist as they were. Mayhew said there was no prospect of these institutions developing along the lines contemplated by the Advisory Committee, and he thought “it would be unwise to aim at such developments by means of grants-in-aid because the Cypriot cannot afford now to cut himself off from Athens or Istanbul”.118 Since the introduction of the teaching of English history and the introduction of the English language as a medium of instruction would not be educationally beneficial for those schools adhering to the

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curriculum prescribed by Athens or Istanbul, these schools were free to follow their existing curricula. It was decided, however, that the present allotment for these secondary schools “could not be increased and that grants-in-aid would be given to these merely for the teaching of English”.119 Palmer believed that if the eight Greek Gymnasia did comply with the new regulations, the Government had to consider establishing a secondary school managed strictly as recommended by the Subcommittee, with the professed object of preparing candidates for the Civil Service or for Advanced Studies; “otherwise there would be an unfortunate break in the development of English teaching”.120 At the end of his visit to Cyprus, however, Mayhew discovered such an institution already existed in the English School, which was especially suitable for this purpose: for some time the English School had experienced considerable financial problems trying to maintain its elevated standards, and both the trustees and its long-serving head, Canon Newham, wished to transfer their responsibility to the Government. The transformation of the English School into a government school, therefore, was the best solution. As Mayhew stated: There is no other school so distinctively English in character. It is essential that it should be retained and strengthened on the lines now approved. Otherwise Cypriots taxpayers will remain unprovided with a single institution conducted on English lines and capable of preparing pupils effectively for higher education in the British Empire, a most deplorable state of affairs on which several Cypriots commented most severely. Moreover there will continue to be no institution where the would-be teachers of elementary schools or candidates of Government service can receive a really appropriate general education.121 With the Secretary of State in full accord with this proposal, on 4 December 1935, the English School was officially placed under the auspices of the Government.122 It is interesting to note that in the summer of 1933 the Education Committee of Karavas asked the Governor to consider the possibility of establishing an English School there, given the numerous population of Karavas, Lapithos and the

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adjoining villages, which demonstrates the establishment of a purely English school enjoyed some considerable support in Cyprus.123 In the meantime, discussions were taking place for the establishment of a training school for teachers. The founding of such an institution was the logical next step in educational change within Cyprus, and such an institution was very much in the mind of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Cunliffe-Lister. “There has always stuck in my mind”, he told Palmer, reiterating why he himself had always seen education as the key to solving Britain’s problems in Cyprus, “the advice Venizelos gave me when he said that a man may be proud of his race, but loyal to the country of which he is a citizen”. In surveying the changes already under way in this sphere, the Secretary of State identified a weak link: Greek – Cypriot teachers all came more or less directly from the secondary schools, with all of the educational and political problems endemic to those schools. “I am therefore very glad”, Cunliffe-Lister stated, “that you are now contemplating the establishment of a training college. I have always felt that this would be essential and that the sooner it is done the better. Indeed, as at present advised, I would much rather concentrate on getting a satisfactory training school established for elementary school teachers, than dissipating that effort by starting a Government Secondary School”.124 In other words, if you got the teachers right, the desired sort of schooling would follow, rather than the other way round. The need for the establishment of a training college seemed evident to British officials. Even Sir Ralph Oakden, in his financial report, recommended founding such an institution and suggested the Government should contribute £6,000 if the Colonial Development Fund would not provide a grant.125 The matter was, in Palmer’s words, “of first-rate political importance”.126 Hitherto, Greek Orthodox teachers had received their training in the Pankyprion Didaskaleion attached to the Nicosia Gymnasium, while Muslim teachers received no training, as completion of the ordinary course at the Muslim Boys’ Lyce´e was considered a sufficient qualification. Nicosia Gymnasium was under the management of the Nicosia Town School Committee and was not controlled or inspected by the Government, except with regard to the teaching of English; its teachers were recruited mainly from Greece and its instruction was mainly academic and of questionable standards. Qualitatively, the instruction provided to Muslim teachers was even less

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satisfactory: the training at Muslim Boys’ Lyce´e was inadequate, not least because it had no link to agricultural science, even though 80 per cent of the children attending Muslim schools came from rural areas. It was decided the only remedy lay in the immediate establishment of a training college under direct control of the Government. Its remit would be to equip professional staff to teach the revised school programme. To this end it was essential that recruitment be limited and selective, that the institution itself be situated in a rural district, and that its graduates had a genuine interest in the countryside and its problems. Clearly a cosmopolitan, urbane schoolmaster, with either experience of or indeed any aspiration to Athenian life, was the very antithesis of the ideal schoolmaster for this facility. According to official proposals, the new Agricultural Training College, to be run by an English principal, would be a boarding establishment, with fees charged to cover boarding costs. The courses were to be of two years’ duration and include not only the elementary school curriculum and teaching theory and practice but also practical agriculture (supervised by the Agricultural Department). Candidates were not to exceed fifty in number every year (both Orthodox Christians and Muslims) and were to be selected by examination and interview.127 The Colonial Development Fund, however, refused to offer a grant for such a training college, thus Mayhew suggested that part of the recurring net cost could be met from the grant of £800 now paid to the Turkish Lyce´e and Nicosia Gymnasium for the training of teachers; for the remainder of the expenditure, Mayhew suggested a reduction of some items in the budget: “the need is so imperative that if the Education Budget cannot be increased for this purpose it would be better to reduce some items in the Budget, e.g., grants to private secondary schools, than to abandon or curtail the scheme”.128 It was decided the College should probably start admitting students in 1937, and two teachers, one from each community, were sent to England for training so as to form the school’s core staff upon their return. Another idea that came under serious consideration in the spring of 1935 was the possibility of establishing a British university in Cyprus that would attract students from various Near East countries. The originator of the idea was the British Consul in Port Said, who envisaged “a very large organisation embodying elementary and secondary boarding schools and a well-equipped university and technical college”

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that could “solve the Cyprus problem not only educationally but politically”.129 Simultaneously, it could counteract American influence in the area, which was mainly disseminated via the American University of Beirut: Other western nations are alive to the danger of this American influence and are seeking to combat it. Italy especially, in addition to the numerous schools she had founded and is still founding all over the Levant, is now trying to establish a centre for Italian culture in Rhodes. Great Britain, however, has shown no sign of instituting a system for the spread of British culture though many Orientals would welcome the opportunity of sending their children to schools conducted on British lines, and numerous British subjects have to send their children to foreign schools (French or Italian) owing to the lack of British schools.130 Three countries were suggested: Cyprus, Egypt and Palestine, and, of the three, Cyprus was considered the most suitable for climate and political reasons, providing the Government would help in the acquisition of land. Despite the interest expressed by both the Colonial and Foreign Offices, however, as of the end of the year no decision had been made. By the middle of 1935 the Colonial Office had come to believe the “benevolent autocracy” of the Government of Cyprus had produced a state of contentment among the native populations unknown in previous British rule.131 Indeed, attitudes of cooperation with the Government had been displayed by the moneylenders and the merchants, who filled the posts reserved for Cypriots in various advisory bodies during the 1930s, as well as by the monastic clergy and the intelligentsia.132 One might say the Government was enjoying relative support from the middle class, which believed, in a calmer and less rebellious environment, it was better off than before. In 1935 Cypriots were allotted responsibility for the hoisting of the Pan-Hellenic flag flown at the Acropolis in Athens and provided annually to different parts of the Hellenic diaspora. The ceremony passed almost unnoticed in Cyprus, however, and there was no Cyprus detachment among the student societies marching past the saluting base.133 In the economic sphere, as a result of Oakden’s report, a number of economic schemes were in progress, and the police had been successfully reorganised. The British, if

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not quite pouring money into Cyprus, had at least eased their traditional parsimony, reflected quite clearly in measures taken for the protection of antiquities. After long being accused of doing little to protect the antiquities of Cyprus, unlike the Italians in Rhodes, the British authorities cooperated with Sir George Hill, the Director of the British Museum, and with Sir Charles Peers, a former President of the Society of Antiquaries, who visited the island and issued reports on the measures necessary to protect the island’s archaeological heritage. An unofficial committee, the Cyprus Committee, was formed in England to raise funds for the work, and steps were taken for the enactment of a new Antiquities law.134 With the Cyprus Government seemingly making rapid progress in instituting educational reforms, and doing so with a political agenda of fundamental importance which it did little to conceal, it is scarcely surprising that those whose interests and beliefs were in direct opposition to the Government’s objectives felt threatened, even a little desperate. Of none was this truer than the Locum Tenens. In November Leontios sent an inflammatory memorandum to the Governor in which he reiterated that the Apostolic Church of Cyprus had always been the supreme responsible authority for the lay and religious education of the Greek Orthodox people of Cyprus. He then severely criticised the Government’s educational policies: It should be noted that there is no justification whatsoever for this coup d’e´tat on the part of the government because this noble people, being under political servitude and in spite of his great poverty, owing to his great and inherit love for learning maintained with much deprivation of his own self both before but more especially after the English occupation . . . And caring above all for the freedom of his education he refused and resisted from time to time any interference with it by a foreign to his sentiments and aspirations Government.135 Leontios also characterised the new curriculum as “a most clear proof that the intention of the Government is none else but a pernicious influence on the conscience of Cypriot Greek children”.136 The memorandum was sent to the new Secretary of State, Malcolm MacDonald. “You will notice”, Palmer rather scathingly observed in

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passing the letter on, “that the Locum Tenens claims the right to Ethnarchy and the right of the Church to interfere in secular affairs. The new educational policy does not in any way interfere in the religious rights of the people. If it did there might be some excuse for his intervention. But as it does not there can be no excuse for this hotchpotch of political tenets masquerading as a protest against educational reforms”.137 The Government’s attitude towards the concerns of the ecclesiastical leadership, in fact, was consistently distant and even contemptuous. In the years before World War II the attitude of Bishop Leontios and the British for each other would become increasingly dismissive. By the end of 1935, the Cyprus Government and Colonial Office had together made some progress introducing a “British atmosphere” in Cyprus and sidelining enosis as a movement (though they couldn’t eradicate the enosis idea itself). The measure of their success was that everybody recognised an essentially repressive system had nonetheless secured enough local consent and cooperation to operate with some degree of effectiveness. Education was a key lever – one might call it the “flagship policy” – of the endeavour, alongside government measures to create prosperity in the countryside. These two branches of policy, as we have seen, intersected at vital points. That the British were prepared, albeit with much reluctance, to depart from their traditional stinginess towards their Mediterranean colonies and actually spend money on Cyprus indicated their commitment to remaining on the island. Amidst a deteriorating security situation in Palestine, and with Britain’s weakening hold over the Central Mediterranean, including Malta, after 1935, following the crisis with Italy over Abyssinia, the strategic significance of Cyprus was enhanced. During the second half of the 1930s, in an atmosphere of continuing political repression, the Cyprus Government pressed on with the vital educational policies it had already set in motion whilst searching to contain the political backlash they inevitably unleashed. This will be the theme of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3 TOWARDS THE END OF “PALMEROCRACY”:BRITISH EDUCATIONAL POLICY IN CYPRUS, 1936—9

As argued in the previous chapter, in the years immediately after the uprising of 1931, the purpose of the new educational policy was to encourage a British atmosphere in the schools to make the younger generations loyal to the Empire, less attached to Greece (and Turkey) and, most importantly, less devoted to the ideal of enosis. To this end the Government enacted two radical educational laws: the first gave the Government complete control over elementary education, including the curriculum and the selection of textbooks, while the second subjected the character, development and function of the secondary schools to a degree of supervision determined by the provision of financial aid. In the second half of the 1930s, amid significant international uncertainty and domestic tension, education did not fade from view. Having successfully laid the foundations of its new educational policy, the Government turned its attention to such educational issues as the proposed scheme for the establishment of a British University in the Near East and the development of rural education. At the same time it attempted to undermine the role of the Church in the island’s educational affairs by stalling any resolution to the archiepiscopal question and giving short shrift to the criticism and demands of the Locum Tenens. Introducing a British atmosphere in Cyprus continued to

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be the main thrust of the island’s administration during the second half of the 1930s. After 1931, the aim of the British was to make Cyprus a loyal colony and turn Cypriots into British subjects, something that, of course, gained ground immediately after the riots in the form of new educational legislation. The fulfilment of such an aim could not have been more imperative in the very important year of 1936, when British authority in the wider Mediterranean seemed weak. The Abyssinian crisis spurred an internal debate over British vulnerability in the region, raising the spectre of British abandonment of the Mediterranean. The Secretary of State for the Colonies declared that the Government intended to face these new and difficult problems and “make our future position secure”, an argument which was reinforced after the First Lord of the Admiralty’s visit to Malta and Cyprus.1 Britain decided to strengthen its Mediterranean fleet, mobilising army and air units in the area for ten months, until June of 1936.2 The prospect of a permanently antagonised Italy severely complicated Britain’s global position: this was a development that could put intolerable demands on Britain’s limited resources and undermine its system of priorities with far-reaching consequences in the Far East.3 Against this backdrop, the attraction of Cyprus as an alternative British base increased since, in any war with Italy, the naval base on Malta would probably be neutralised because of its vulnerability to the Italian air force.4 Therefore, as a potential base for British operations in the Mediterranean, Cyprus required a strong local government and loyal subjects. On the local political plane, in 1936, two prominent deaths provided an index of ambivalent feelings and identities. Eleftherios Venizelos’s passing became the occasion for sentimental speeches, sermons and requiems. The funeral – which took place on 24 March, one day before the Greek National Day, in Crete – became an opportunity for an excessive display of the Greek national colours, on flags and in wreaths, and students were of course mobilised for these manifestations. The Deputy Police Commander anxiously noted: It is worthy of comment that in a British Colony, this display of Greek national propaganda is still carried on. It is a fact that there is still a number of the political agitators in this Colony whose views will never change, but it is difficult to see what good can

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come from allowing young school boys, the future generation of British subjects in Cyprus, to be taken to a service of this kind – a service held in memory of a foreigner and a Republican – at which prayers are said for a foreign King. In this way the youth of the Colony is being brought up to serve, admire, pray for and be loyal to a foreign King and thus the future citizens of this British Colony are growing up in the atmosphere which created all the political agitators of the past who have been such a curse to the peace of Cyprus.5 At the same time, the news of the death of His Majesty King George V was also received with profound regret by the various Cypriot classes, whilst the proclamation of His Majesty Edward VIII inspired impressive tributes.6 While gestures of emotional allegiance to Greece were still prevalent, many Cypriots also showed a continuing strain of loyalty to Britain, as they considered themselves members of the Empire. Although a certain relaxation of press censorship saw the resurfacing of criticism of the Government, an ostensible calm prevailed, particularly on account of the absence of any prospect of municipal elections or constitutional change likely to unleash pent-up political energy. Nonetheless, the repressive legislation passed after 1931 remained firmly in place. By the summer of 1936 the main provisions of the recent Secondary Education Law had been accepted by every gymnasium on the island. Considering the political orientation of many schools, this surprised both the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of Education in the Colonies, Arthur Mayhew, and the Cyprus Government. Palmer, however, was sceptical as to how sustainable this cooperation would prove.7 The largest part of the government grant to secondary schools, £2,000 out of £7,000, was allocated to the English School, the rest shared amongst thirty other secondary schools that qualified for grants. The grant given to the Nicosia Gymnasium and Girls School, the Larnaca Commercial Lyceum and the American Academies only covered the teaching of English. In the middle of July, however, the Church intervened and the situation changed. The Throne Committee, responsible for the administration of dioceses, discontinued its customary annual grant to schools accepting funds from the Cyprus Government, and the Gymnasiums of Nicosia, Paphos, Kyrenia and Morphou decided not to alter their curricula.8 This decision

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created severe financial problems which the schools nonetheless accepted so as to keep their classical and, inevitably, Greek character.9 For instance, at the Gymnasium of Paphos, the teachers’ willingness to accept a reduction of their salaries, coupled with the increased fees accepted by parents, kept the school alive.10 A classical education was also seen as a valuable asset in seeking better-paid urban employment. Indeed, in his report for the school year of 1936–7, the principal, Paschalis Paschalides, disagreed with the Government that an agricultural or a commercial school, rather than a school providing a classical education, could better satisfy the needs of the countryside, declaring that no villager would send his son to learn a trade that would prolong his miserable living conditions.11 A preference for classical education was widespread among the intellectual elite of the island, something that could explain the emergence, in 1936, of a journal called Cypriot Studies dedicated to the study of Cypriot art, history and language. Among its founding members were Constantinos Spryridakis and the great Cypriot painter, Adamantios Diamantis.12 As the leading indigenous representative, and to quote Anagnostopoulou, as the “only remaining source of national and political aspiration”,13 the Church was inevitably the fiercest opponent of the Government’s educational policy, and it continued to express its disagreement with the new law mainly, through the Locum Tenens. In a letter to Palmer dated 30 January 1936, Bishop Leontios complained that while Great Britain showed its sympathy to Ethiopia and proclaimed that its own role in the Mediterranean was sensitive to national traditions, language, education and religion, it was inexplicable why this was not so in Cyprus.14 Interventions by the Church were, under the circumstances more, unwelcome than ever by the colonial power. We may note here that during those years the British were also at odds with ecclesiastical power in their overwhelmingly Catholic colony of Malta.15 In this respect, then, Cyprus fit into a wider regional pattern. Educational grievances were no longer restricted to the Greek – Cypriot community. One of the problems the Government also had to deal with was the increasing resentment expressed by the Turkish – Cypriots who, influenced by their modern and secular leadership, sought to make their educational aspirations an issue. The differences between the conservative and religious Turkish – Cypriots and those influenced by the secular and nationalist ideas of Kemal grew, and these differences

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compromised relations with the British. This feeling of discontent was expressed mainly through the frequent emigration of young Muslims to Turkey and direct attacks in the Turkish –Cypriot Press on the Government’s educational policy. Having only one high school for boys, the Turkish Lyce´e, the Muslim community demanded equivalent provision with Greek– Cypriots. The matter was noticed by Jumhuriet which, prompted by the delay in appointing an English principal for the Turkish Lyce´e, argued that its community suffered educational discrimination, and that it’s only High School was the victim of political quarrels among local parties which divided the population. The British administration was held responsible for the division: The dissemination of hatred amongst various classes in order to prevent the formation of a united front which characterizes the main line of conduct of the British policy has probably been a hindrance to this cooperation. This state of discord of ours is perhaps due to our own lack of understanding. Be that as it may, one thing is certain and that is the need of a Turkish Director for the Turkish Lyce´e.16 The newspaper, while spotting a “systematic tendency towards Anglicisation”, protested that many lessons were taught in English, that fewer text books were imported from Turkey, an English headmistress presided over the Victoria School for Girls. As with Greeks and Greek – Cypriots, whose identity, beginning in the nineteenth century, had a more consciously secular foundation, thanks to a common demotic language and general culture, so Turkish –Cypriot thought was shifting away from religion. This was not something which the colonial administration welcomed. Governor Palmer, with his trademark conservatism stated it was: Essential in Cyprus, for political reasons, not to encourage Cypriot Moslems to look to Turkey for guidance nor to look upon that country as their spiritual home; but rather to attempt whilst raising the educational and economic standing of local Moslems, to keep them fully attached to their old customs and religion and to retain them as British subjects looking only to Great Britain for help and assistance.17

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This provided a telling case, however, as back in London the views of the Colonial Office were of a more flexible tone. A.J. Dawe countered: He (Palmer) believes that by supporting the diehard Turks of the old regime he will prevent the Cypriot Turks from becoming Kemalists. In fact, I believe that this attitude is driving all the younger generation into the arms of the Kemalists. The only way to win them over to the British side is to give them a chance of becoming “modern” in Cyprus.18 Still, before long the Seditious Publications Law in Cyprus prohibited the importation of maps suggesting the island belonged in any sense to a foreign country other than Britain.19 By this point, however, Muslim discontent had subsided following the Governor’s plea for cooperation. A few months after the incident Palmer reiterated his desire to keep the Muslim community satisfied: It is my intention to take all legitimate measures that may be practicable, both in the field of action and that of propaganda, to raise the position locally of the Moslem section of the Community and to prevent them from becoming, either in fact or in their own minds, a depressed and impoverished minority; and as a first step in this policy, you may be interested to learn that I recently sanctioned certain changes in the organisation and curriculum of the Moslem Lyce´e designed to assist in improving the prospects of Moslems in the island and of rendering it more easy for them to obtain locally, after completion of their education, employment of a nature likely to satisfy their aspirations and induce contentment.20 A rapprochement with the Turkish community in Cyprus, especially with its reformist elements, was also encouraged by international developments, and in this the Montreaux Convention of 1936 played a local role. Turkey claimed its right to greater control over the Straits, as it had previously, and the denial of these claims – and the much-hated capitulation Turkey was forced to make regarding these claims – was finally brought to an end thanks to British support, which was vital to Ankara’s success in securing this control.21 Britain’s desire for a closer

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understanding with Turkey was to increase as tension gathered in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the end of the summer, the Governor clarified there was no prospect of any constitutional move in Cyprus. Much to the annoyance of the Government, the Greek – Cypriot press reported the organisation of a deputation to travel to London to request a revision of the existing, though suspended, constitution.22 In this, perhaps, the Greek –Cypriot leadership was aware that Malta, another British colony in the Mediterranean whose constitution had recently been suspended, had just renewed a revised constitution.23 In a letter to the Colonial Secretary the petitioners requested a constitution “suited to people who have full consciousness of their rights as men, and who naturally feel it harsh, being British subjects, to be given no better consideration in the Colony than that appropriate to uncivilised people”. Among their demands was for Cypriots to have a representative voice on finances, education and local affairs, and for the re-introduction of elections, since the “present system of Government in the Colony practically amounts to an absolute dictatorship”. During their trip to London, of the three men only George Vassiliades, as a member of the Advisory Council, was granted an interview at the Colonial Office, merely to be informed there was no disagreement between London and the Cyprus Government and that there was no intention, on the part of either, to change the political situation on the island.24 After all, months earlier, at a meeting with the former member of the Advisory Council, George Pavlides, A.J. Dawe reiterated the statement made by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons on 24 March that “it would be undesirable to alter the present constitution of the central government of Cyprus”.25 By 1937 two of the three members were marked for deportation while Eleftheria, which covered the whole incident, was suspended for three months. The deputation, along with the London Committee for Cyprus Autonomy (recently founded by leftist Cypriots in London), though they were later to come into alignment with the demand for enosis, was seeking to explore an alternative to the administration of Cyprus in the form of extended self-government within the British Empire. Whether such a programme was any more likely to win British acceptance, however, was doubtful. At the same time, in Cyprus, news of the deputation inspired a strong rural reaction in favour of the Cyprus Government. Tens of petitions

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from several villages of Famagusta and Limassol were sent to Palmer to express their “absolute loyalty (to) and full confidence (in)” the Government and their opposition to those who wished to restore the old status quo, including elections: The people . . . have always been the victims of the acts of these people who purported to represent them in the Legislature, and we have received no benefits during their time in the Legislative Council as our representatives.26 The villagers, encouraged by pro-Government Mukhtars, also expressed their opposition to the re-introduction of divisive elections and their satisfaction with policies which divorced the appointment of the teachers and officials from the patronage of Cypriot politicians. Instead of representation, these rural voices called for such improvements as a relief for debt burdens, the improvement of irrigation, better marketing tactics and the introduction of direct taxation on urban wealth.27 Among the educational policies receiving a boost during this period were the teaching of the English language and the promotion of English culture. The Director of Education, James Cullen, was not satisfied with the existing curriculum, according to which the teaching of English was limited to three hours per week and taught simultaneously to the two upper classes. This arrangement confined the teaching of English to a limited period of time and only offered restricted opportunities for pupils to proceed to a more advanced level. Cullen therefore proposed the lesson should be given to each class separately, something that would require three extra hours to be taken from other classes. He also proposed the provision for English should be expanded at the expense of time devoted to handicrafts and Greek and Turkish: In my opinion the reduction of the hours allotted to Greek or Turkish will still leave sufficient time for teachers to cover the programme, but the obvious criticism presents itself that English is being fostered at the expense of the native languages. The alternative would be to reduce the time allotted to lessons in Religion but this I think is open to even greater objection.28

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To avoid adverse criticism, the Department of Education eventually decided these three extra hours would be taken from auxiliary subjects, such as drawing and music.29 By the end of the 1937–8 school year, the English language was taught in 107 Greek and seventeen Turkish schools. Additionally, secondary pupils of the English School, the Muslim Lyce´e and the Famagusta Gymnasium who scored high marks in English classes were to be awarded prizes.30 Teachers, as well as pupils, were encouraged to learn English, and the British Council offered various grants to schoolmasters to study at an English University.31 Short English lessons were offered in print in the newspapers, where the Principal of Cyprus College, L.J. Grant, systematically published dictionary definitions – Cyprus College itself was registered as a secondary private school under the provisions of the Secondary Education law. At the same time, the Government substituted a certain number of GCE passes for the Secondary School leaving certificates as requirements for the Civil Service. The English School and similar institutions, therefore, were given preferential status and became the first destination for young men who wanted to join the civil service. One could say this is relatively understandable, on the one hand, since government services and institutions were using the English language as the official means of communication; on the other hand, this reform provided the chance for the Government to strengthen the institution which they considered as their “most important experiment”.32 Inevitably, Bishops and Greek educators in Cyprus felt compelled to introduce English into secondary schools, rather than French, under the auspices of the Greek Government (French cultural models were often predominant in Greek law and in general amongst the Athenian intelligentsia).33 Additionally, students applying for admission at the Training College at Morphou had to pass the Government Ordinary Examination, since the teaching in the College was carried on in English. This was made stricter by successful completion of the more advanced Government Distinction Examination. Spyridakis, who characterised these examinations as “peculiar”, believed that, in this way, pupils from a variety of schools – classical, commercial and technical, of foreign languages – were admitted to the Teachers’ Training College, even though they were ignorant of the elements of the Greek language which they were responsible for teaching at the elementary level.34 Subsequently a priest, Kyprianos Kyriakides, later

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Bishop of Kyrenia, used one of his sermons to protest against the orientation of the schools: They tell us that our schools – Greek schools – are not worthy as secondary schools. They have established a school in Morphou where students of various races are attending, i.e., Armenians, Turks and Maronites. They study for one year where they learn how to cultivate the earth and then they are appointed as schoolmasters . . . [T]hey do not know how to write their names or a letter, and after attending a year in the school of Morphou they are appointed as schoolmasters again. After twenty years’ time the people will not know how to read and write.35 As Whitehead accurately noted, an adherence to English-language syllabi and examinations had been noted in most colonial schools throughout Empire, a trend Ormsby Gore called the “cult of certificate”.36 This was very much applied in Cyprus, where certificates for the English language were indispensable for future teachers and civil servants. Furthermore, in the context of introducing a British atmosphere in the schools, the Department of Education proclaimed 12 May 1937, the day of the coronation of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth, a school holiday,37 and specific instructions on how the national anthem should be taught and sung – “gently, like a prayer” – were given to teachers.38 In this same spirit, the contract of the Inspector of Secondary Education, who had been on probation for a year, was not renewed because he was “not at all adaptable and cannot see things in their local perspective or appreciate local points of view and the interplay of personal and political motives involved in all educational work here”.39 By 1937 it was apparent that the Government had successfully entrenched its position in the elementary schools and, to a great extent, pupils in Cyprus followed the curricula and regulations of elementary schools in England. Michalis Maratheftis, a pupil during Palmer’s Governorship, describes the atmosphere: At elementary school I was never taught the history and geography of Greece, nor did I see pictures of the heroes of the Greek Revolution. I, however, learned a lot for the history and geography of England. We celebrated the birthday of the English King and

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the Empire Day. At every festivity we used to sing the English National Anthem and hoist the English flag.40 These measures, although to a great extent effective, were not enough to eradicate enosis sentiment. As Evelyn Shuckburgh from the Colonial Office perceptively noted, “the movement of enosis . . . is scotched rather than killed; and there is always the risk of breaking out afresh if a suitable opportunity presents itself”.41 Despite reassurances of loyalty given to the Government by segments of the rural population, Palmer warned that the enosis movement was still alive and dangerous. An example of this, according to the Governor, was the 1937 arrival in Cyprus of the Greek– American wrestler, Jim Londos, and the immediate public enthusiasm his visit inspired. Such events, Palmer insisted, were easily exploited by “political agitators and by all the disloyal elements of the community”.42 He warned the Secretary of State: In spite of a contrary impression which might have been gathered by a usual spectator of the loyal gatherings and demonstrations held recently at the time of the Coronation, Cyprus is by no means free from deep undercurrents of Greek nationalist feeling[.] [. . .] that the soil is everywhere fruitful for the seeds of Greek propaganda, that Greek propagandists are not lacking or easily to be deterred from their mission and finally that the dangers of a return to any form of popular franchise or conditions in which mass psychology could again be exploited against British rule cannot be overemphasized or too carefully guarded against.43 The need for the inculcation of British values and ideas was further reinforced at the end of 1938, when a significant increase of German propaganda was noticed on the island, particularly in the schools.44 In Limassol, Gymnasium pupils received leaflets on German literature stressing the ideals and vigour of young Germans, and the appearance of Hitler on the newsreels at cinemas was met with cheers and applause.45 This gelled with the pro-German sympathy then current in Greece under the dictatorship of General Metaxas. To counter this sentiment, the British Council was called on to expand the screening of documentary films that conveyed appropriate cultural messages.46

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In the meantime, the teaching of Italian was suspended in the Terra Santa schools financed by Rome,47 as it was deemed incompatible with the teaching of two other foreign languages whilst, under the Secondary Law of 1935– 6, schools teaching Italian were refused government aid.48 The Commissioner of Nicosia was anxious not only about political propaganda within the schools, but also about contemporary pressures on youth and their use of leisure time, which “may easily prove a curse rather than a blessing especially from a political standpoint”. He therefore suggested the establishment of institutes, one for young men and one for young women, providing educational and recreational opportunities along distinctively British lines.49 Towards the end of the decade, when Italian and German interest in the Mediterranean became apparent, the strategic value of Cyprus was reconsidered, though the thought of turning the island into a naval base was quickly abandoned.50 As Naomi Rosenbaum accurately put it, Cyprus would act as gauge of interest and of token opposition to incursions since, from a military point of view, the island was a gesture more than anything else.51 Within the context of promoting the English language, we may note developments regarding the English School itself. Firstly, with an amendment law enacted on 2 June 1936, the management and control of the English School was put under a Board of Management which, whatever happened, would safeguard its premises for the benefit of the youth of Cyprus.52 In conformity with the characteristics of an English public school, the English School was made accessible to every community without, of course, eliminating religious routines, despite Palmer’s efforts to reverse this.53 Palmer proposed to remove the hourly prayer introduced by Canon Newham from the curriculum, lest it make the Muslims feel “obliged to attend functions of a Christian religious complexion”.54 The proposal was denied, however, since an hour’s prayer “could hardly be said to import to the school a Christian character”, especially when Muslim pupils were also spending time studying the Koran. One could see this proposal as an attempt to sublimate community or religious affiliations at an elite level to a more overarching and shared British identity. Certainly the English School was the closest one came to what, in British colonial circles, was conceived as “Cypriotism”. As already mentioned, the Government considered the English School as “probably the most important educational experiment on which the Colony has embarked” and was under a general obligation

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to provide financial support for what had originally been a private initiative.55 In April 1938 the British Council announced that a grant of £4,000 (out of £11,000, the total cost) would be given to the English School for the erection of a boarding house, since “the real inculcation of English ideals will be immeasurably helped by an institution where pupils live under English supervision and control”.56 Even at a time of financial constraint, it was believed better to go ahead with a smaller and less costly building rather than none at all.57 In this spirit, in July 1938 a Cypriot athletic team of seventeen pupils accompanied by three masters visited the Bedford School of Boys, toured London, and met with members of Parliament.58 Cyprus received various external grants for its rural educational development during the second half of the decade. Among the most generous benefactors were the British Council and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.59 Beginning in early 1936 Carnegie gave £15,000, over a four-year period, for a programme of educational development in Cyprus.60 In April the Director of Education presented his proposals for the expenditure of the grant, giving emphasis to the development of agricultural education through the establishment of a rural school, the training of village teachers and the introduction of a travelling rural cinema. The Director of the Near East Foundation (the Carnegie Corporation department responsible for the administration of the grant), Dr Allen, warmly welcomed these proposals, as they “would re-orientate rural education on a practical and self-help basis, instead of on theoretical and institutional models, which in my experience always take the peasant off the land instead of educating him to stay on”.61 A British expert, B.J. Weston, was sent to America, to Cornell University, to be trained to organise a concentrated rural agricultural educational effort in Morphou.62 Rural improvement was at the core of educational development in Cyprus. As argued in the previous chapter, British officials shared the view that in an agricultural country like Cyprus it was essential for its people, especially the younger generation, to stay on the land: this would keep them immunised from the disease of urban politics and such chimerical ideas as union with Greece. British interest in rural matters, not least the encouragement given to the growth of Cooperative Societies and providers of cheap farm credit, may be seen in this light. It should be noted that between the years 1937 and 1939, forty-nine Mukhtars were awarded a Certificate of Honour and

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seventy-four received honorary Silver Badges. The award of such marks of favour – and of honorary knighthoods to a very small number of prominent Cypriots – was an important feature of Palmer’s governorship.63 In 1937, in a memorandum issued by the Governor, the aims of this rural educational effort were set down in detail. Palmer explained that one of the primary tasks of education in an agricultural country “should be to assist in the growth of rural communities securely established on the land, progressing economically and socially”. He stressed the intimate connection between education and economic development, arguing that educational policy must be planned with reference to the kind of life pupils may be expected to lead once they leave school: Schools of the villages should not only prepare pupils for agricultural vocations but also teach them how to be healthy and build a moral character . . . There is much evidence to show that the progress of a backward community will be greater and more rapid if the education of the adults is taken in hand simultaneously with that of the young. This is likely to be especially true in Cyprus where society is undergoing rapid change. If the difficult transition from traditional ideas and institutions to forms better adapted to the rapidly changing environment is to take place successfully, conscious and deliberate efforts must be made to guide and assist the evolution.64 The issue of funding education in Cyprus, however, was inevitably connected with taxation. Being the single most costly sector of public life, one-sixth of total tax revenue, education exposed the deficiencies of a taxation system largely based on indirect taxes and leaving the merchants, proprietors and townsmen largely untouched. A solution to this problem could not easily be reached, however. British officials maintained that because Cypriots lacked any tradition of citizenship, the introduction of direct taxation would meet with strong resentment. The British also believed education spending could not be cut for two key reasons: the Government was “committed to the continuance of the system”,65 and the demand for education remained voracious, especially among Greek – Cypriots. As the Financial Commissioner, Ralph Oakden, wrote in his report, although there were several complaints

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that the salaries of the teachers were too high, there was scarcely any criticism on the amount spent on education as such, or any doubt as to the value of the education to the community as a whole.66 Apart from the revenue from general taxation, the cost of education was covered by a local education tax imposed on all towns and villages.67 Oakden, although he underlined that the general burden of taxation should not be regarded as excessive, believed that the Government should take every opportunity of extending further taxation relief to the farmers.68 The farmers indeed bore the lion’s share of taxation and, no matter how much they wanted their children to receive a proper education so as to break out of the misery of rural life, the situation compelled them to keep their children, especially the girls, at home. Therefore, the support of the rural population for the Government’s educational policy could only be sustained with a simultaneous reconsideration of the taxation system and rural indebtedness. The success of the new educational policy was also dependent on the financial satisfaction of the teachers and, in this regard, after a number of petitions from teachers’ organisations and committees, in the spring of 1939 the issue of a proper pension system for teachers similar to that for other government servants was finally taken under consideration.69 We should note that year after year the number of children registered at schools was growing. By 1939 the estimated number of children of elementary school age surged to 77,000, secondary age to 60,000: 46,926 children were actually attending elementary schools and 4,784 secondary schools. Ten per cent of the pupils in elementary schools and 100 per cent in secondary schools received instruction in English.70 Compulsory education had not yet been introduced in Cyprus, as it required additional funds for the building of schools and the remuneration of teachers, something for which the Government had been criticised in the Press.71 Meanwhile, preparations were under way for the new Teachers’ Training College at Morphou, which was due to admit its first students in September 1937.72 In a letter to the Secretary of State, the Colonial Secretary in Cyprus, William Battershill, emphasised the importance of having such an institution in Cyprus, which he believed was “the foundation of all future developments in elementary education”. Therefore, he said, “its construction should not be delayed, especially when two officers were already undergoing training in England with the view to join the staff of the school.”73 The problem of funding the

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College – its cost amounted to £6,000 – still needed to be resolved. The British Council was not very keen to sponsor it, as it found the project outside its sphere of activity. According to a draft curriculum, the instruction to be given in the school would be mainly in practical farming, while classroom work would be confined to reading, writing and arithmetic. The entire course of training was designed primarily to make the boys good farmers, not to impart to them an understanding of British life and thought (as fitted the Council’s own remit). The Treasury had sanctioned the project on the condition that “the school will bring to its scholars knowledge and understanding of things British in the cultural, as distinct from the agricultural, sense and will promote closer cultural relations between Great Britain and Cyprus”. The British Council therefore asked for the curriculum of the school to be redrafted along the lines proposed by the Treasury, that it should include instruction in the English language and some elementary grounding in the history and geography of the Empire. “In short”, the Council stated, “while the detailed adaptation of the scheme must be a matter for local expert advice, the general effect of the changes made must be to give the school a distinctly British cultural tone while maintaining its special devotion to agriculture”.74 Given the importance of such a school, it was decided that even if the Colonial Development Plan was unable to give its financial support, the money required should be drawn from the Colony’s Education Funds. In this context we should also note that candidate elementary schoolmistresses attended training classes organised by Phaneromeni High School in Nicosia until 1937, when the school closed due to lack of funds. A few years later, however, the increasing number of schoolgirls was to make the establishment of such a specialist training school necessary. In 1939 the issue of providing rural education for secondary schoolboys, an idea proposed by James Cullen in 1935, was again brought to the fore. Given that a large number of elementary school pupils did not proceed to further education because they were needed on their parents’ land, a proposal was made for the establishment of five rural middle schools. In the beginning of the year Cullen came up with two proposals. The first proposal was to open a Rural Central School at Morphou, nearby and under the protection of the Training College. According to the Director of Education, the purpose of this school would be: to provide two years’ duration of practical training for the sons of

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farmers who intended to remain employed in agricultural pursuits; to provide for such boys an education higher than that obtainable at the elementary schools; to “produce villagers of broader culture, knowledge and intelligence who have not been spoilt or ‘de-ruralised’ by passing through a town secondary school”, and to further these students’ knowledge of English and England, largely through the history and geography of the British Empire. Cullen’s second proposal pertained to the Training College. Without suggesting that schoolmasters should become experts in agriculture, he argued that the time required during a two-year course of training in general school subjects and methods of teaching, “to say nothing of cultural interests, renders it impossible to provide for more than three two-hour periods a week in agriculture and nature study”. He therefore proposed to extend the course at the Training College for selected students, preferably of rural origin, for a third year, during which they would be given a year’s intensive course in practical agriculture.75 Although this third year was not wholeheartedly supported by the Colonial Office, a grant from the British Council rendered the scheme plausible. The emphasis the Government was giving to agricultural education in Cyprus, both for practical and political reasons, was plain. In his letter to MacDonald, the Acting Governor, A.B. Wright, gave details of the scheme and underlined the importance of rural education: Agriculture, as the main source of livelihood and chief hope of profit and progress for the people of Cyprus, would seem to be the obvious subject to choose to form the basis of the extended training. From the political standpoint it appears to be the most likely subject in eradicating the traditional and still widespread tendency to associate education with unreal theories and aspirations about the polity and culture of Greece.76 Eventually the Treasury approved the scheme and MacDonald gave his agreement, leaving the final decision to the new Governor, William Battershill, who was to officially assume his duties on 10 August 1939. Following the changes in the school curriculum, and in the context of eliminating nationalist propaganda in the schools in favour of the inculcation of British ideas or, even, the development of “Cypriotism”, Palmer suggested the writing of a new history book to be used as a

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text-book and by the general public. In a letter to the Secretary of State Palmer explained the need for such a book: In schools, up till recently the teaching of history has been confined either to Greek history in the Orthodox Christian books, in which Cyprus was treated as “Hellas Irredenta”, or Turkish history which, since the changes in Turkey itself, has made extravagant claims both for the Turks themselves as a race, and for their language. There has never (so far as I am aware) been any attempt to portray or teach the history of Cyprus itself as a unit giving a proper perspective to the various places or periods of its existence in historical times. In the eyes of the population at large the past history of Cyprus has thus been distorted and portrayed entirely out of historical perspective according as its teachers were Greek Orthodox or Turkish educationalists with Kemalist leanings.77 The Governor suggested the book should be between 300 and 350 pages, and that the Government of Cyprus should defray any necessary expenses and own the copyright, while giving the author a percentage on receipts from sales. The Secretary of State thought it essential the book be written so as to stimulate interest in the record and the public memory of the history of Cyprus, as well as in the development of Cyprus under British rule and the role Cyprus played in the British Empire, and that the illustrations should be selected with special reference to these purposes. In Palmer’s view no one in Cyprus currently was suitable to perform such a task, and therefore the writing of such a history book should be assigned to a trained writer and scholar who had some acquaintance with Cyprus. Various distinguished names came up: Professor George Hill, the Director of the British Museum (although he was preoccupied with writing his own book on Cyprus, mainly archaeological), Harry Luke and Professor R.M. Dawkins, Chair of Greek, Byzantine and Modern Language and Literature at Oxford.78 Ormsby Gore eventually suggested A.B. Steel, History Lecturer at Cambridge. Steel visited Cyprus in August to conduct all the necessary interviews for his book and, while there, he informed Palmer it would take him a year to finish the book due to the emergence of several technical questions, including the form of the language, the style of the

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book (textbook or tourist), its length, the illustrations, the level of the pupils who would use it and the educational standards in Cyprus. Taking these issues under consideration, Palmer suggested the book should not be specifically designed for educational purposes, but that publication of an attractive short history of Cyprus would appeal to educated persons accustomed to read in English and would eventually be adopted in the schools.79 Steel, however, informed Palmer that no publisher in London would agree to publish the book unless an immediate sale of 900 copies could be guaranteed, something that was almost impossible, given that a number of other interesting books on Cyprus were to be published in the near future and that the Cypriot market was, anyway, rather small. He added: It has been suggested to me from one source that the maximum effect would be obtained if new Elementary school histories, incorporating the desired objective of view, were written to order, not by an English man but by a native Cypriot or Cypriots, since this would create less suspicion of an attempt at deliberate Anglicization among the more refractory teachers. I have been told that some suspicion of an Anglicizing policy, analogous to the very thorough Italianizing of Rhodes, already exists in connection with the extension of compulsory English, and this suspicion might be increased, if an English history written by an Englishman was forced upon the village schools.80 Steel therefore questioned the value of producing such a book and instead suggested the production of an elementary school book in Greek and in Turkish, one members of the local Education Department were capable of producing. In the face of these challenges and the divergence of opinions, the Secretary of State eventually decided to abandon the idea of preparing either a history textbook or a popular book.81 Meanwhile, the attention of the Government was drawn to another educational issue bearing economic and political implications: the pensions paid by the Greek Government to 114 Cypriot Schoolmasters. The matter was brought to the attention of the Government in 1934, when several discussions took place regarding how the issue should be approached. It was only in 1936 that the Cyprus Government decided to make a formal plea to the Greek Government to discontinue paying

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pensions to those Cypriot teachers who were already receiving gratuities from the local government. British officials perceived these increments as Greek propaganda, an allegation the Greek Government regarded as “an indefensible interference in Cyprus affairs, something that could not be further from the mind of the Greek Government”. It also assured the Cyprus Government that pensions were paid only to Cypriot schoolmasters who in the past worked in schools in Greece and were therefore entitled to such sums.82 The Greek Government rejected the proposal for an amendment of the law on the grounds that such an action would enable the Albanian, Italian and Turkish Governments to pay small gratuities to Greek schoolmasters in their territories and so debar them from receiving pensions from the Greek Government.83 The Greek Government also requested that if the Cyprus Government decided to make it illegal for schoolmasters to receive pensions it should give them two or three years warning, which irritated Palmer: The request seems to me to presuppose that the Greek Government has a right to concern itself with the welfare of Cypriot schoolmasters in Cyprus; and to make an admission of this sort might, I think, be distinctly harmful. I should be grateful if it could be made clear to the Greek Government that the conditions of service and welfare of schoolmasters in Cyprus, other than Greek subjects, is the concern of the Cyprus Government solely and that no undertaking such as they request can be given.84 In the spring of 1938 Greek Prime Minister Metaxas made known that, although he was prepared to give a personal and verbal assurance that his Government would not grant any further pensions to Greek schoolmasters in Cyprus, he did not feel it was possible for the Greek Government to give this desired assurance in writing. He nevertheless assured the Cyprus Government “that as far as future Greek Governments were concerned, there would always be a British Legation in Athens to protest against any contrary proposal”.85 Palmer, however, was adamant. He could not accept verbal assurances – he wanted the Greek Government to take concrete steps, and he proposed adherence to the decision made by the Cyprus Government that it would not supply any official information about its schoolteachers to the Greek

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Government unless such requests were made through the diplomatic channel.86 The issue continued to rumble on for some time, but it showed how, even against the backdrop of rising Mediterranean tensions, that Cypriot issues, including educational matters, could cause a degree of friction between the British authorities and Athens. At a time when Britain’s ability to bring effective diplomatic and military leverage to bear in the region was ebbing, attention turned toward what we would today term “soft” rather than “hard” power. The project of a distinctively British University-level institution based somewhere in the area clearly dovetailed with this tendency. It also made sense, if possible, to choose a site associated with British authority and, at a meeting of the Near East Sub-committee in the Foreign Office, the idea was floated that Cyprus would be a suitable location. For this to be feasible, however, it was essential to be able to attract and host students from beyond the island as well as from it. The British High Commissioners in Egypt and Palestine were therefore asked to comment on whether or not young people from those countries would be likely to contemplate advanced education in Cyprus. From his own perspective, Palmer was a strong supporter of the scheme.87 He told the Secretary of State in London: More facilities for British higher education would provide the missing apex of the Government’s new educational policy. In our efforts to secure that the instruction of the youth of Cyprus is not tied to the curricula of foreign countries, we are handicapped by the fact that very few of those Cypriot students who qualify for advanced studies could ever afford the expense of a university training in England, and that the majority must at present continue to be drawn to Athens and [I]Stanbul, or at best, Beirut or Cairo.88 As this suggests, the reference to Beirut and Cairo shows the thinking behind the establishment of a university in the area was not just about eliminating enosist influences from Athens, but also about counteracting an existing and strong French influence on the higher institutions of those countries. Cyprus would therefore act as a cultural asset for Britain in a time when diplomatic competition with France in the Eastern Mediterranean had by no means died out. Certain problems remained,

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however. Egypt already had several universities of its own, and it was not clear that students from Egypt could be attracted to Cyprus.89 The British Minister in Athens, Sir Sydney Waterlow, also expressed some serious doubts regarding the need for a British University in Cyprus. He believed such an innovation could be regarded as a challenge to the “general revival of Hellenism”, one of the maxims of the Metaxas regime, and would “provide fuel for further agitation for the ‘unredeemed’ Cypriots”.90 Dawe challenged Waterlow’s argument: We feel here that a renaissance in the University of Athens makes it all the more desirable for us to provide an academic counterattraction in Cyprus. I do not myself for a moment believe that the choice of Cyprus would provide fuel for further agitation about the “unredeemed” Cypriots. The more we make clear to the Cypriots that we intend to pursue a firm and forward pro-British policy in the island, the more are they likely to incline their sympathies in our direction and abandon their flirtation with Hellenism. That, I think, is the moral of the policy which has been successfully pursued during recent years . . . It is true that such a university will have to provide real counter attractions in the way of low fees and good tuition.91 In the middle of these official exchanges, the British Council came up with proposals of its own in which Cyprus had a prominent role. After all, the Council believed “Cyprus might be to the British Empire what Rhodes is intended to be to the Italian, namely a standing demonstration to the whole Near East of a civilised Colonial Government”. The memorandum underlined that Greek and Turkish propaganda had until recently been allowed to spread their influence without effective restraint and, as a consequence, Cypriots who studied in Greece or Turkey had returned as propagandists for the Greek or Turkish cause. Accordingly, two tasks should be undertaken to win the allegiance of the Cypriots: One is to ensure that their foreign influences shall at least not be free to operate unchecked in spheres such as education which in any State normally come under Government supervision. The other and far more important task is to provide increased opportunities for education on British lines and in general, for a closer understanding of the British empire; and at the same time to

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make available to the Cypriots the technical training which would enable them to improve in the towns their chances of good employment, and in the country the general standard of land development. In the attainment of these ends the British Council can give most valuable help.92 Not all of the British officials in Cyprus who had a say with regard to this matter were free from doubt. The Director of Education, James Cullen, was of the view that since the majority of the Cypriots studying abroad were medicine or law students, there was neither need nor room in Cyprus for an institution specialised in arts and science.93 He believed advanced Turkish– Cypriot students would continue to go to Turkey, and Greek– Cypriots to Greece, for their higher education, so long as qualifications from those countries were more likely to lead to employment opportunities back on the island: The local understanding of the economic, social and cultural life of Great Britain and the rest of the Empire would be less increased by the establishment of a British university here than by raising the numbers of Cypriots who, by scholarships from this Government or from imperially-minded institutions at home, are enabled to go to England for higher studies and return with definite prospects of employment here.94 By the beginning of 1938, however, the realisation of the scheme seemed extremely difficult, not least due to the uncertainty of the situation in Palestine.95 Furthermore, after Cullen’s discouraging memorandum on the matter, Palmer, fearing an increase of unemployment on the island, lost his enthusiasm, while the Treasury emerged reluctant to assist. By summer 1938 no definite decision had been reached and, in the wake of the outbreak of the war, the idea was eventually shelved. This was to be the last serious discussion of the prospect of a university in Cyprus before Independence. It wouldn’t be until 1989 that a university was established on the island. If a substantial amount of British money was going to be spent on Cyprus in the latter 1930s, the colony’s “loyalty” had to be guaranteed and, as Dawe emphasised “we should take firm action to cut at the root of its seditious movement”. This root was of course the Church, which also

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gave “moral grounds for interference,” as it was “notoriously corrupted; it administers its affairs badly and is held in little respect by local opinion”.96 Indeed, Palmer warned the Secretary of State that although the radical orientation of the recently adopted educational policy was working out quite satisfactorily, the Church was still to be considered a pernicious influence: If we allow the Bishops – at present either deported, or sterilised in the case of the Locum Tenens – to resume the position, especially in regard to education, which they occupied before the riots, we shall not only jeopardise our educational policy itself but, in all other spheres of administrative work undo much of the good that has been done in the past five years. He also underlined that unless the Government was prepared to give way to the demands of the Church for a properly appointed Archbishop, they should expect nothing less than non-cooperation on behalf of the clerics. The time had arrived, therefore, for the Government to take definite action to “convince all the diehards, both in Cyprus and outside it, who are relatively not very numerous, that the cause of Ethnarchy and enosis is hopeless”. This, he argued, would facilitate the election of an Archbishop: if they realised that “a political Hellenist cannot effectively function as such, even if elected, they will . . . pay more attention to the alternative of finding a man who is an Archbishop and who preaches the Gospel and does nothing else”. An Archbishop who restricted his activity specifically to the religious duties of his office was the British ideal for this distinguished post. Owing to the deportations of certain senior ecclesiastics and the absence, after 1933, of an elected Archbishop, the Mayors in the larger towns had often replaced clerics on School Boards with pro-Government functionaries, which had aided the Cyprus Government in pushing through its educational policy. Palmer wanted to consolidate this advantage by introducing the requirement that such appointments in future be restricted to British subjects, thus excluding the possibility of Greek, or indeed Turkish, nationals being considered. Palmer stated: It seems essential now to alter the 1933 law in some way, so as to recognise the fait accompli of the last six years and thus prevent the Church on the appointment of an Archbishop and Bishops,

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being able to regain its former dominant position with regard to Education. The two above measures, if enacted at an early date, would do much to undermine the former ecclesiastical political power on which Ethnarchy really rests.97 Colonial Secretary, William Ormsby-Gore, however, was doubtful as to the efficacy of the Governor’s proposed method. He favoured a simple exclusion of senior clerics from the education boards and committees for the Orthodox Christian schools, as per the provisions of the Elementary Education Law of 1933. Without such ex-officio representation, and most of all without the dominating presence of figures like Leontios, it was likely these bodies would cooperate easily enough with the Government.98 After further discussion in Nicosia, this course was duly followed and, accordingly, the Elementary Education Amendment Law of 1937 altered the composition of the Board of Education and Town Committees for Orthodox Christian schools, depriving the Archbishop of Cyprus, the Metropolitan of the Diocese and each Mayor of the seats they had hitherto held ex-officio.99 Following Cullen’s proposal, it was decided that money standing to the credit of one of the education funds could be utilised by the Director of Education for loans for a school belonging to a religious denomination other than that for which such fund was established.100 This reform constituted another step towards depriving the town committees of their rights over elementary education. It was also another blow to the Church, which had so far been the major financial contributor to the schools. Nevertheless, seen from a purely educational angle this had certain beneficial effects: given that the fiscal burden of education was borne mainly by the poorer classes, this provided a method for directing money to schools according to need and independently of community or religious affiliation. Behind these official deliberations, however, there still lay the possibility of a much more wide-ranging attack by the Cyprus Government on the prerogatives and standing of the Greek Church in Cyprus. It was clear that, if such a radical approach were to be taken, it should focus on the Church’s finances. This was assumed to be its weakest and most sensitive spot. For one thing, the Government, in doing so, could hope to sway some local opinion, particularly of those who believed the Locum Tenens was culpable of irregular conduct.

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Indeed, the Throne Committee in Nicosia itself discontinued his salary on the grounds he was not taking any substantial steps towards the resolution of the archiepiscopal. Sensing he was losing the trust of much of the clergy and the laity, he decided to subsidise Neos Kypriakos Fylax in exchange for support.101 From a British perspective, the worsening security situation in Palestine, where an Arab rebellion was underway, heightened fears of a possible contagion within the region and made a crackdown on sedition in Cyprus imperative. From London A.J. Dawe, himself in favour of a bolder policy towards the Church of Cyprus, reasserted the importance of making sure any future election of an Archbishop, at the head of a Church which was “the next power in the land after the Government”, should be guaranteed to ensure an outcome that did not further undermine the status quo.102 Accordingly, on 27 September 1937, the Church Audit Law provided for the investigation of administrative affairs and for the audit of the accounts of Churches and monasteries. A few months later, on 12 November, two additional bills were published in the Government Gazette. The first was the Archbishop’s Disqualifications Law, which prevented any person who had been deported or accused of sedition (as was the case with the two prelates who remained in exile), as well as any non-Cypriot, from becoming candidates. The second, widely known as the “Berat Law,” provided for the approval by the Governor of any person elected to fill the vacancy.103 The enactment of the law was delayed for almost a year by the intervention of the Anglican Church in Britain: Lambeth Palace, always keen to keep good relations with Eastern Churches, argued that nothing should be done to infringe the spiritual autonomy established over many centuries of the autocephalous Church of Cyprus. At a time when British policy-makers in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean were keen to retain the sympathy of local Orthodox hierarchies, such advice could not be ignored.104 Thus it was that neither during the late 1930s, nor after, did the British ever quite summon up the courage for a broad-based attack on the Cyprus Church. Action against individual Bishops involved in sedition, however, was another matter. After all, that Rubicon had been crossed in 1931. Now, Leontios’s habitually seditious speeches provided a pretext for the Cyprus Government to try and clip his wings, and in April 1938 the Locum Tenens was prosecuted on more than twenty charges for “subversive” speeches and actions, chiefly in the district

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of Paphos.105 His trial, which took place between 15 and 17 May, became a major political event. In his own defence, Leontios took the opportunity to attack the Government for its educational policy: The purpose of the Church is to save and retain the paternal tradition of its people. When, however, the Government calls us non-Muslims and insists on teaching to Greek children at schools global history instead of Greek history, it is possible our children become cosmopolitans and communists. Therefore, while the Government tries to insult the national creed of Greek –Cypriot children, we say that it creates a communist youth because it’s impossible for the youth of Cyprus to become English.106 Throughout the final months of 1938 and into the fateful year of 1939, the duel between Bishop Leontios and the British authorities, including in the legal sphere, continued. This coincided, not only with a vigorous petitioning movement in the rural districts highlighting the grievances of the peasantry, so that by May 1939, 73 such petitions were circulating in towns and villages, but with a wider uncertainty about what the position of Cyprus might be should the increasing likelihood of war come to pass.107 Inevitably these overlapping anxieties were felt in the schools. The Acting Governor, for example, reported that during the proceedings in Limassol against the Locum Tenens, schoolboys wore badges exhibiting the flags of the Greek Army and Navy in the streets near the court, large crowds gathered in the streets and every appearance of the Bishop and his attendant priests was met with applause, cheering and occasional cries of Zito Enosis (Long Live Union). There was yet one further source of uncertainty in Cyprus at this time – a change of Governor. Palmer’s intense conservatism had not always gelled with British officialdom or even with his own senior advisers in the Cyprus administration. As the spectre of war took shape, and with the absolute need to ensure the cooperation of the people of Cyprus, London began to see Palmer as something of a liability. He was therefore gently eased into retirement and, on 10 August 1939, he was replaced by Sir William Battershill, who arrived to the usual ceremonies in Larnaca.108 As an old Cyprus hand himself he was pleased to return to the island, particularly given the unpleasant situation he had faced

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during his recent posting in Palestine. Battershill understood all too well the difficulties of governing Cyprus as a British colony. These difficulties were about to be greatly compounded by the wide-ranging effects of war. During the second half of the 1930s, against a background of international tension and regional uncertainty concerning the ambitions of Italy, the so-called “Palmerocracy” – the repressive regime in Cyprus following the breakdown of 1931 – had gradually run out of steam. Whilst it lasted, nevertheless, educational reform had remained at its heart. The essence of these reforms was to inculcate a more British atmosphere on the island. Alexis Rappas has seen this as only part of a wider experiment of social engineering, designed to penetrate Cypriot society much more deeply than hitherto and to effect colonial control on a sustainable and permanent basis.109 The curtailment of the powers of the Church, long considered as the higher educational authority in the Greek– Cypriot community, the introduction and dissemination of the English language (not least in the schools), the development of the English School, the advancement of rural education and even the discussions for establishing a university of British standards all contributed to the encouragement of a British way of thinking and living among Cypriot youth. In this respect, educational reform played a significant role in Palmer’s efforts to secure a more efficient control of the country, enhance loyalty towards Britain and, consequently, stifle dissent. A new and more consciously “British” system of education was seen by Palmer as an essential prerequisite for any return to elective and representative politics on the island – were this return to occur, however, it would only be at a municipal level. This brand of administration, backed by the British Government, gave rise to allegations of de-Hellenisation and increased Greek – Cypriot mistrust for the authorities and inflamed their suspicion of the former’s educational reforms. Eventually, not only did Palmer’s regime fail to create the ideal polity of his imagination and inculcate loyalty (it failed even to introduce a sense of “Cypriotism”) but, as the following years would prove, the regime was unable to crush the Greek –Cypriot desire for enosis. Colonial Secretary in Cyprus John Reddaway would admit some years later that the attempt to launch a policy of “Cyprus for the Cypriots” in the 1930s was a short-lived experiment: to suggest that Cypriots should put Cyprus first may have been naive in the

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circumstances then existing, although this did not amount to a denial of their ties with Greece and Turkey.110 While in most other places in the region “normal” politics had become frozen by 1937/8 because of fears about the future, such as in Malta, where passionate arguments about the constitution had completely come to a halt,111 in Cyprus this was not to be the case. Educational developments during this period show how debate and division on the island never ceased, even in 1939 and, during the war, the island’s “politics” would continue and even expand. As always, Cyprus bucked the trends observable in other colonies – its internal preoccupations remained resistant to interruption from outside. The arrival of a new governor in August 1939 signalled the beginning of a new era in Cyprus, as Palmer’s authoritarian regime came to an end. The following chapter will examine the development of the education system on the island in conjunction with the political activities that took place in Cyprus against the backdrop of World War II.

CHAPTER 4 EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN WARTIME CYPRUS, 1940—5

Immediately following the October riots of 1931 the Government instituted a radical educational policy that would shape education in Cyprus throughout the 1930s. Having largely achieved its aim, by the end of the decade, this policy became less assertive and, of course, increasingly overshadowed by the approaching war and by political developments on the island. Between 1939 and 1945, both despite and because of the war, Cypriot politics were progressively re-invented, especially after the announcement calling for municipal elections and the creation of the leftist party, AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People). Education became integrated in electoral campaigning, especially at a time when enosis agitation seemed to be growing. It was during this period that secondary educational matters which had not been given proper attention in the previous decade, like the training of female teachers and the development of British Institutes, were put on the agenda. Sir Richmond Palmer’s departure from the island filled Greek – Cypriots with hope. Not only was an outdated regime coming to an end, but Palmer’s successor was a familiar and sympathetic administrator. Sir William Denis Battershill had served as a Colonial Secretary in Cyprus from 1935 until 1937, when he was appointed Chief Secretary of Palestine, a desirable promotion which, however, made him “dreadfully sorry to leave this very pleasant place”.1 His classical education and basic knowledge of Greek – he had successfully taken the Greek Preliminary Examination – had brought him comparatively closer to the people than

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his predecessors. The English-language newspaper Embros wrote that Battershill’s previous experience in Cyprus would “provide him with a flying start in administrative matters. Many of us had hoped for this appointment but few of us dared to dream that our luck would be so great as to see it a reality. Let it be an omen of ever greater progress and prosperity for Cyprus Crown Colony”.2 Welcoming articles filled with hope for a better future were also published by almost every newspaper on the island. The restoration of the administration of the island’s education to local authorities, and its liberation from the Department of Education’s “autocratic rule”, was one of the first demands made in the press.3 William Battershill’s return to Cyprus was seen as a way out of the existing constitutional stalemate and the repressive regime Cyprus had endured since 1931 – it was common knowledge that Battershill was appointed precisely because he was not in agreement with Palmer’s policies.4 Battershill himself was more cautious, however: “The people here”, he wrote to his mother, “seem to have a pathetic faith in me but I fear that they will soon be disillusioned”.5 For the moment, no plans for a significant change in the administration of the island were under consideration, either in London or in Cyprus. In Battershill’s words: The newspapers continue to say what a fine fellow I am. But they are being more honest as to why they are saying this. They give as the reason that they feel sure I shall give self-government to the Cypriots, which of course is all bunkum. When they know what I am indeed going to recommend – I have not made my mind up yet but it certainly won’t be self-government or anything like it – then they will be furious and the reaction from this popularity will be fierce. It would be a rather good thing actually. All this popularity isn’t healthy, I feel sure.6 A warm welcome was not what Leontios had in mind, however. The Locum Tenens, who was still in confinement in Paphos following his recent trial, lost no time in underlining his – and, by extension, the Church’s – disagreement with the Government’s policies. The relationship between the island’s two major institutions had become extremely tense after the enactment of the 1937 laws. Leontios, who was not invited to Battershill’s welcoming ceremony, greeted the new Governor with a letter of protest:

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While protesting against our national persecution by the Cypriot propagating and authoritative Government, I and my agonizing, glorious and English-sympathizing Greek people, we welcome you, as the representative of England and as an angel of freedom . . . Our inalienable rights, our acquired privileges and our national desires are looking for their recognition, restoration and fulfillment. The Greek youth of Cyprus ask to be given back their traditional, national education.7 As it happened, the outstanding issue of the appointment of a new Archbishop, as well as a range of other issues, failed to be resolved during the war, despite the major effect the conflict was to have on the island. The inevitable financial constraints brought about by the war clearly had a lot to do with this – indeed, had the war not intervened, the advent of Battershill might well have signified more far-reaching change in affairs in Cyprus than ultimately proved possible. On Battershill’s arrival Cyprus remained calm, since politicians and the press refrained from any severe criticism. Italy’s delayed entry into the war, in June 1940, was to bring Cyprus to its front lines and make them even more apprehensive about the future.8 Despite this precarious situation, in mid-April, a group of Greek– Cypriot journalists put several demands forward on the occasion of a trip to London as guests of the British Council. The journalists explained that the basic and primary demand of the people of Cyprus was a Constitution based on selfgovernment and the solution of their “just and legal claims”, these being the election of an Archbishop, the return of the exiles, the remediation of the island’s severe economic situation and, of course, the education question. They pointed out that “the people of Cyprus demanded complete control of education”, and that Greek – Cypriots in particular “take the justifiable view that the education of the island must preserve its local colours and traditions, which were preserved under Turkish rule”.9 There was little possibility of any sweeping initiatives in the sphere of Cypriot education, particularly amidst all the wartime uncertainty that lay ahead, but it remained one of the nodal points whenever the future of the island was discussed. Generally speaking, at the beginning of the new decade education in Cyprus was, from the Government’s point of view, on a sound basis. Elementary education, free but not obligatory, was under the complete

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control of the Government, while salaries and gratuities were paid to teachers and administrators from central funds. In 1939 there were 706 elementary schools, 1,246 teachers and 46,927 pupils. Secondary schools were still managed by local governing bodies but registered and inspected by the Education Department. There were Roman Catholic Schools for boys and girls in Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol, all under religious management; Armenian mixed schools in Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca and Limassol, and the Melkonian Educational Institute outside Nicosia, a large secondary school founded as an orphanage for refugee children. English language was taught to the two top classes in the larger elementary schools and in all secondary schools, and it was the medium of instruction at the English School, the American Academies and the commercial school of Lemithou. Proficiency in English was also a condition for the promotion of teachers. According to Battershill, in the villages where English was taught, “the attractions of the subject are already beginning to counteract the tendency of children to leave school before entering the two highest classes”. The introduction of the English language in the schools had been fundamental to the success of the Government’s educational policy, and at the beginning of the 1940 it seemed to be bearing fruit. The British Council was one of the most significant promoters of the English language and British culture on the island and closely connected to the Education Department. The Council had contributed to various educational projects in the island, including the Rural Secondary School and the English School– it had also founded a training programme, in England, for a new cadre of Cypriot teachers. The Council was now ready to embark on a new project on the island, the establishment of a number of British Institutes. The need for these institutes was initially noted in 1939 by the Commissioner of Nicosia, L.S. Greening, who believed pupils should spend their leisure time at an Institute providing educational and recreational opportunities along British lines, which would keep them away from any form of political propaganda.10 We should parenthetically note that during its early years the Council’s work had a strong Mediterranean dimension, especially with regard to Greece, where cultural diplomacy was seen as reinforcing old political ties. It was therefore natural for the British Council to take a modest interest in Cyprus as part of its general commitment to Anglo-Hellenic ties. Early in the summer of 1940 the British Council considered appointing more

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staff at the British Institute in Nicosia, but the precarious situation in the Mediterranean prohibited large expenditures. Given the significant role the Institutes were destined to play in Cyprus, however, it was agreed that in the autumn of 1940 three more institutes – in Larnaca, Limassol and Famagusta – would be established.11 To gauge the potential response to these Institutes in each district, the Council sent out application forms inviting prospective students to register for the forthcoming season at the Institute in each of the four towns. Surprisingly, more than 200 students registered in each town, forcing the Council to stop accepting other admissions. The Director of the British Institute in Nicosia, David Abercrombie, enthusiastically stated: not only has the interest taken in the Institutes greatly exceeded the prophecies made when I first arrived in the island, but the opposition I had been led to expect is very much less. In fact I have been unable to discover the existence of any active opposition; a certain amount of suspicion that the Council is “getting at” the Cypriots in some way is all it appears to amount to. This suspicion usually takes the form of saying that this is “another attempt to impose English at the expense of Greek culture” (no opposition of any kind of course comes from Moslem circles).12 To counteract this attitude, Abercrombie proposed the arrangement of a Cyprus Room in each Institute with a small library of modern Cypriot poetry and fiction, specimens of village lace work, watercolours, peasant attire and other artefacts of Cypriot life, all of which would give more of a distinctively Cypriot colour to the work of the Institutes. By 1942 there were British Institutes in Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca and Kyrenia, and arrangements had been made to establish an Institute in Limassol. The institutes also undertook the teaching of English to the Cyprus Regiment, a group of Cypriot soldiers preparing to travel to England to contribute to the war effort, at Polemidia, and they were requested to cooperate with management of the mines at Skouriotissa, where 2,000 employees were already receiving a certain amount of instruction in English. The experiment seemed to be working more than satisfactorily, and the reduction (and sometimes abolition) of fees for poor students played a significant role in this success.13 More and more young people were now able to learn English, and this change couldn’t

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be reversed with ease. Indicatively, for the school year 1941– 2 the British Council approved three-year bursaries for civil engineering, two new three-year student scholarships to British Universities, six one-year bursaries for teachers of English and five vacation course grants for secondary schoolteachers, all worth £3,035, a total of £14,281 just for one school year.14 At the beginning of 1940 the Director of Education presented the Cyprus Government Treasury with a rough plan for future educational projects. A key priority was the establishment of a Mistresses Training College by September of 1941. Battershill had commented on the absence of such an institution, and he warned the Secretary of State that, unlike schoolmasters who enjoyed the benefits of the Morphou School, women had been left without equivalent institutions, especially after the Orthodox Christian Training School closed in 1937, when it became clear the Government would take control of training elementary teachers.15 At the moment Greek –Cypriot candidate schoolmistresses received their training from women who had already attended that school, while their Muslim counterparts received their training from a college attached to Victoria High School. To combat this deficiency, Cullen recommended the establishment of a residential training college, where students would be given, in advance of admission, a year’s probation as assistant mistresses.16 According to Cullen, the previous system of training, although educationally sound, was old-fashioned, excessively formal and politically undesirable. To meet this immediate need the British Council paid for the extended training, in England, of two Greek –Cypriot schoolmistresses, each expected to play a key role at Cullen’s proposed training college. This institution, however, would not be operational until August 1940 at the earliest. Meanwhile, girls of British nationality from any recognised secondary school of no fewer than four classes could pass a qualifying examination and be appointed as probationary assistants in selected elementary girls’ schools for a period of one year (under the supervision of the Headmistress and Inspectors); successful candidates could then attend the Mistresses Training College for two years’ professional training free of charge. It was also proposed the place agriculture normally took in masters’ studies should be given, in the case of mistresses, to domestic science, child welfare and home nursing, which would be taught cooperatively with the Medical Department and the Nicosia Hospital. It was believed this would

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encourage schoolmistresses to “play a more effective part in the village home life”.17 The proposals were approved by the Colonial Office, as the establishment of such a college “should help to eliminate Greek influence”.18 With female education poised for rapid growth, it was all the more necessary for girls’ teachers to be educated according to British standards. A scheme of this character could not but provoke a reaction by the local educational authorities, whose control over another vital aspect of their work was now in jeopardy. In May 1940 the Town Committee of Greek schools in Nicosia sent a letter to the Colonial Secretary to express its indignation: since by the abolition of the Pancyprian Training School for schoolmasters and schoolmistresses “the Greek majority in Cyprus have been deprived of the right possessed by them until recently to be directly interested in the education of those whom the instruction of their children is to be entrusted”.19 The Committee argued that the measures taken by the Education Office would not only fail to promote education, but would actually be regressive – this was because the various secondary schools were all placed on the same footing, regardless of status (private or communal), type (classical or commercial) or language of instruction. “It is therefore to be expected”, the Committee reiterated, “that complete lack of uniformity of knowledge, purpose and aim, and of moral and spiritual outlook will be observed amongst future candidates. This state of things cannot be remedied by required entrance examinations”. The Committee also maintained that attendance for a period of four years (not six) at any recognised school of Secondary Education in Cyprus and completion of the age of seventeen were not sufficient qualifications for future assistant Schoolmasters. Unlike the Education Office, the Committee reckoned this policy enabled “immature young men, uneducated, ignorant and undeveloped both in mind and character”20 to end up serving as schoolmasters on probation. The Committee also deplored that pupils coming from practical and commercial schools, as well as from schools where instruction was provided in a foreign language, would be recruited as teachers to teach the Greek language. “Any right-minded person”, the Committee argued, “will agree that a training school for teachers should be grounded on a school in which the Greek language is being mainly cultivated”.21 The newspaper Paphos warned that if Cullen’s proposals

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were followed, assistant mistresses would be appointed without receiving proper linguistic or pedagogical education, with harmful consequences for the Greek language.22 We should mention that the linguistic issue was at that time more sensitive than ever, since a debate was ongoing in both Greece and Cyprus as to which of the two language formats, katharevousa, closer to ancient Greek, or demotiki, a simplified form of Greek (supported by the majority of teachers), should be taught.23 In the same spirit, the Nicosia Town Committee, in a memorandum to the Governor, complained about the multilingual – and, therefore, to some degree, multiracial – character of both colleges and expressed its outrage that instruction would be given in English: the Committee believed this was “diametrically opposed to the principle that any would-be teacher should in the first instance learn and know well the language in which he will teach”. While the Committee clarified it had no “wish to foster any racial differences against friendly people who live peaceably with us”, they declared “that each one should be allowed to develop in his own particular environment, his own customs, traditions and family and social principle”. For all of the above reasons the Committee came to the conclusion that what was needed was not another Government Training College but the establishment of Greek training schools for teachers, connected to the colony’s classical gymnasia.24 According to the Colonial Secretary, however, the old training schools attached to the Nicosia Gymnasium and Girls High school were closed by the Town Committee in 1935 because the number of students graduating from the training schools outstripped demand. As for the absence of a common secondary education, this showed a wide variety in curricula and was considered advantageous. As the Colonial Secretary explained, “a formal and stereotyped education is not likely to provide teachers with sufficiently varied knowledge and outlook to be suitable for employment under varying rural and urban conditions in the schools of Cyprus”. He also argued that “the co-instruction of OrthodoxChristian and Moslem Cypriots at the Training College at Morphou is regarded as advantageous in serving to impress upon the students a sense of the essential unity, despite differences of language and religion of the Cypriot people”. He also explained that a Greek-speaking master was teaching Greek, while all students were free to use their own language

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among themselves and encouraged to observe their own religion and distinctive customs. “The same”, he stated, “will be true of the training school for women teachers when that is established”.25 It was also made clear that the Government had no intention of assisting in the reestablishment of the Phaneromeni Training School.26 Unfortunately, owing to wartime conditions and lack of funds, the opening of the school was postponed until 1948, and teaching vacancies in girls’ schools were essentially filled by masters. The Government was determined to continue its efforts to introduce a sense of “Cypriotism” in educational institutions, and it largely succeeded at both the English School and the Morphou Training School, but it continued to experience friction from the Greek– Cypriot’s strident allegiance to Greece. Censorship had been significantly relaxed for some time, and there was a greater degree of freedom of expression: in conjunction with the outbreak of the war, it made Cypriots believe they were fighting for their freedom, and it unleashed a revival of Hellenic aspirations. Indicative of this revival was a letter decorated with the Greek flag written by a fifteen-year-old schoolboy and sent to Leontios a few days before the anniversary of Greek independence in March 1940. Andreas Michaelides blamed the teachers for not giving enough instruction on Greek history and informed Leontios that schoolboys, if asked what their nationality was, would say, “I am a Cypriot”. “The Director of Education”, he wrote, “continues his propaganda by demanding from the Inspectors to remove from the schools the map of Greece and blue pencils and by compelling the teachers to teach English”. Michaelides warned that in the next 50 years nobody would speak Greek in Cyprus, and he expressed his wish that Greece had accepted the British proposal to cede Cyprus in 1915.27 It appears that the Colonial Government had not been able to successfully instill a distinctively Cypriot identity in the island’s schoolchildren, but it had been able to dent the monopoly of Greek history and culture in most of the Colony’s educational institutions. Yet, as the schoolboy’s letter demonstrates, secondary education still very much fell within the shadow of the Church. From the beginning of 1940 until the municipal elections of 1943 a series of events accelerated political activity in Cyprus that proved the “enosis movement was alive and kicking”.28 Italy’s June 1940 entry into the war alongside Germany brought war closer to Greece.

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Greek participation in the war would inevitably raise the prospect of a wave of pro-Hellenic and, by extension, pro-enosis feelings in Cyprus.29 Cypriots responded wholeheartedly to the British recruiting scheme, and by the middle of October 1939 the first troops of the Cypriot Section of the Royal Army Service Corps left Larnaca for Egypt: by February 1940 6,000 men had volunteered for service; by the end of the war 30,000 Cypriot men had enlisted in the British Army, while thousands of men and women provided other voluntary services. The island’s warm response to the war persuaded Battershill the people of Cyprus should at least be rewarded with the revival of elected municipal administrations, which he believed would bring Greek– Cypriot moderates to the fore.30 It was therefore announced on 22 March 1940 that Municipal Elections would take place sometime during 1941. Greece’s entry into the war, however, and the fall of Crete in May 1941, necessarily led to a postponement of the elections until March 1943. On 28 October 1940, the Greek Government, led by General Metaxas, decided to resist Italy’s demand to cross, and violate, Greece’s borders: Greek –Cypriots were, as a Greek– Cypriot teacher later recalled in tears, profoundly saddened but overwhelmed with pride.31 The news inspired spontaneous demonstrations of enthusiasm “bordering on hysteria”, and within a few hours, demonstrators carrying Union Jacks and Greek flags, and singing “God Save the King” and the Greek national anthem with equal enthusiasm, paraded through the streets of Limassol and Larnaca. Special editions of newspapers were published, and crowds gathered to hear every broadcast news bulletin. The Government commented on these expressions of national solidarity in its monthly political report of October 1940: This popular enthusiasm was the inevitable result of the Hellenic patriotism which has been instilled into the people for generations but it was also inspired by a sense of satisfaction at the union of British and Greek interests in the war and by widespread confidence in the ability of Greece with British aid to administer to the hated Italians the punishment they deserved . . . The spectacle of unimpeded demonstrations, the Greek flag flying everywhere notwithstanding that it was generally accompanied by the Union Jack, and the strains of the Greek national anthem overwhelmed the populace with excitement and induced belief

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that the enosis millennium was fast approaching, the wholesale repeal of “oppressive” legislation imminent and the early election of an Archbishop certain.32 Battershill was greatly impressed with the willingness of Greek– Cypriots to contribute in any way possible to the Greek effort. He wrote to his mother: “People are pawning their wedding rings to give money to the Greek War Fund. I am afraid any British war charity will fare ill here at the moment when all the local inhabitants are giving to Greek funds”.33 Donations were made by almost every part of the population, not least by the schools: pupils made donations and schoolgirls knitted clothes for the soldiers; many students at the Pancyprian Gymnasium became friends of the Greek Air Force, making a monthly donation of between £6 and £10 each. After all, according to the school’s principal, the involvement of the students with the national cause was beneficial, as it kept them away from communist influences.34 When Greece won a series of engagements against the Italians in late 1940, people in Cyprus were overwhelmed with hope that Cyprus would, at the end of the war, achieve enosis. More immediately, the victories against Italy stirred immense sympathy for the war effort and, concomitantly, for Britain’s cause. For the first time, Cypriots displayed Greek and British flags side by side, and the Church ended its boycott of the Government. Leontios, signed the Government House visitor’s book, and he encouraged the contribution of Cypriot men in the war effort.35 A few months later, however, the Colonial Secretary John Shaw, alarmingly reported: “the period between March and June 1941 has seen the enosis movement swell to a climax such as has not been seen for years”,36 while Sir Cosmo Parkinson from the Colonial Office admitted, “it is an unhappy thought that after all those years of British administration we have failed in Cyprus to win over the people to loyal and sincere friendship”, and even stated, “one is bound to feel uneasy at the prospect of ‘holding’ Cyprus against its wishes”, though “this was not a matter” as he said, “to be taken up at this stage”.37 The Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Arnold Toynbee, in his officially commissioned report on Cyprus, had suggested the cession of Cyprus to Greece as a viable solution for the Cyprus problem.38 After the fall of Crete, the Southern Department of the Foreign Office briefly toyed with the idea of giving Cyprus to the

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now-exiled Government of Greece, as a way of boosting its fragile position, though such an idea was not to hold British favour for long.39 Such views were only expressed within official circles, though, and had no impact on the people of Cyprus. Articles such as that published by Compton Mackenzie, a longstanding philhellenist, in Reynold’s News in January 1941 – and reproduced in Athenian newspapers – advocating the cession of Cyprus and the Dodecanese to Greece at the end of the war, caused a stir on the island.40 Great excitement was also ignited on 15 November when Greek Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsouderos, speaking in London, stated that he visualised “a Great Greece – including North Epirus, Dodecanese and Cyprus”.41 A.B. Acheson, a Colonial Office official, warned that such statements would strengthen the enosis movement, which he alleged was not “a unifying but a dividing force in the colony”, as it divided “Greeks from Turkish–Cypriots; those who have supported the British regime from those who have opposed it; and by encouraging the people to direct their loyalty to a foreign power it undermines the authority of the Government and weakens the whole political structure”.42 London made clear to the exiled Greek Government that such an issue was not under consideration, and a statement was read in Cyprus that no negotiations regarding the future of Cyprus were in progress between Britain and Greece.43 This position was reinforced by Winston Churchill’s statement in June 1941, when he made clear he believed it would be better “to leave all questions of territorial readjustment until after the war” and to not “cede an inch of British territory during the war”. As he had in 1907 when he visited Cyprus, Churchill explained, “there is a substantial Moslem population which has been very loyal to us and who would much resent being handed over to Greeks”.44 In the meantime, emergency measures were taken to protect schools in the event of an air raid. In May 1941 a circular from the Department of Education was distributed to teachers calling on them to remain calm and to take all necessary precautions.45 Many people were advised to go to the villages if they had any relatives there. Spyros Achilleos, then an elementary pupil at Fikardou village, remembers that people in the villages were barely conscious of the war.46 By the end of the summer, the Government had evacuated the English School from Nicosia, and it urged other governing bodies not to reopen schools in the main towns after the summer holidays concluded. As a result, of fourteen schools in

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three towns, ten were evacuated, and the army requisitioned six of these buildings. Given this confusing situation, Cullen believed the Education Department had an obligation to assist the schools: emergency legislation was introduced to cover the costs for providing additional assistance to grant-aided schools to balance their budgets; a smaller grant was given to unaided schools, and maintenance grants were provided so poor pupils could meet boarding expenses. Fortunately, the total enrolment in secondary schools suffered very little, the number of boarders increased considerably and several elementary schools managed to accommodate nearly 700 refugee children from Greece.47 Interestingly, during the war the number of school gardens increased from two to 331, probably because gardening was seen as a good distraction;48 it was also in everybody’s interest to increase the production of vegetables, given rising food prices and the insecurity of supply. Loyalty – and as much normality as possible – had to be maintained in the schools, especially during such difficult times. To this end, under the 1933– 5 educational reforms, in certain cases licences for teachers were denied on the grounds that these individuals were politically unreliable.49 In October 1941 William Battershill left the island to take the post of Assistant Undersecretary of State back in the Colonial Office, bringing his governorship to a premature end. The war had precluded any longterm developments during his tenure but, during his incumbency, a small but significant step was made towards the constitutional future of the island with the proclamation of municipal elections. Additionally, the formation of a party of the Left, AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People), in April 1941 – and the development of syndicalism – would completely change the Cypriot political scene. As the only political formation with a proper party structure and mechanisms, AKEL managed to attract the vast majority of Greek– Cypriot wage earners and some of the middle classes, and to make alliances with other political forces and personalities, all of which resulted in the party’s impressive electoral performance in 1943.50 On 25 November a new governor arrived in Cyprus. Sir Charles Campell Woolley had served in Jamaica and Nigeria before his appointment to Cyprus, and he would prove to be the island’s most liberal Governor,51 though time would tell if he would be more successful than his predecessors. The drama of the Italian– Greek war

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and the unreserved expressions of solidarity with Greece, which brought heightened enosis aspirations to the surface, provided the perfect background for raising several issues regarding the role of the Government in education on the island. Coupled with this, the forthcoming municipal elections gave the political parties, especially AKEL, the opportunity to raise local issues, including the education system. One of the first signs of renewed enosis agitation in the schools appeared when the Education Department announced its intention to discontinue the use of elementary books from Greece and replace them with books written by Greek– Cypriot authors and published in Cyprus. This infuriated the Pancyprian Teachers’ Organisation, which sent a letter to Cullen in February 1942: Educational experience of 120 years and freedom were required for the creation of the existing reading books. How is it possible for Cyprus to acquire such an experience since we have been deprived of our freedom and we lack specialists in educational sociology? Since we are ethnologically connected with Greece, what is the purpose of using different books? The sole remaining thing bearing the national colours that the Government had so far tolerated is the reading books. We do not think that today, when the whole civilised humanity led by Great Britain is struggling for the supremacy of freedom, any effort on behalf of the local government to deprive the schools of the only freedom left to them could be justified. It is painfully surprising for the Greek teachers of Cyprus that the Government, instead of allowing us to return to the educational regime which complied with our national ideals, never misses a chance to hurt the last piece of our Greek heart.52 In the wake of the prominent attention the matter received in the press, the Government decided to seek permission from the Greek Government to reprint the books in Cyprus, a practice it followed until 1948, when the issue surfaced once more, again in the midst of emerging political conflict.53 A month later, on the occasion of the anniversary of Greek independence, on 25 March 1942, 2,000 AKEL supporters passed a resolution praising the “heroic battles” of Greek soldiers. It also declared the Cypriot people’s commitment to do everything in their power to

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liberate Hellas and demanded, in honour of the service rendered by Greece to the Allied cause, the restoration of all of the heroes and martyrs of 1821 in the Greek elementary schools of the island and a return to an emphasis on Greek history in these schools. Finally, the resolution sought the final termination of a policy which had hitherto deprived the Greeks of Cyprus from being called “Greeks, the only genuine denomination bestowed upon them by History”.54 A similar demand was also expressed by the leftist Limassol Trade Unions, who petitioned the Government to recognise the sacred rights of the Greek nation and introduce Greek history and pictures of Greek heroes in all of the Greek schools on the island to “ensure all those possibilities of national prosperity and development of the Greek – Cypriot population”.55 The reply to the trade unions’ letter was predictably negative and prompted the Secretary of the organisation, Cleanthis Charalambous, to send a letter of complaint to the Commissioner of Limassol: The answer by Government to such a reasonable and just application has been a source of disappointment and bitterness; for, in fact, no one who can understand the meaning of the cosmohistoric struggle of the peoples for their self-government and national restoration and who has sense of what the high objects are of the war that is fought by Great Britain and the Allied Nations, who could not understand that so reasonable a demand, which is fully consistent with the spirit of the Atlantic Declaration, should have met with such a reception in the hands of the Government of Cyprus.56 Charalambous also criticised the Government for continuing to refer to the Greek schools as having a “Christian Orthodox” – rather than a Greek Orthodox – allegiance, terms embedded in the educational legislation of the 1930s. This caused some resentment, and Greek – Cypriot opinion was against the division of the population on religious, rather than national, criteria. A few days later, AKEL condemned the “merciless exclusion” of Greek History from the schools as incompatible “with the democratic principles for which the British nation along with all Allied Nations has shed so abundantly her honest blood”.57 In another letter, sent in October, the party’s Nicosia committee demanded the return of the administration of education to the local authorities and

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the restoration of “the right of communion with the creators of civilization to those who have been deprived of it in the days of a dark period”.58 In anticipation of the municipal elections, AKEL sought to establish a dominant position in the island’s politics, and one way of securing this position was to attack the Government on issues, particularly education, which were important to voters. In July it was the schoolteachers’ turn to voice their demands. On 16 July 1942, the Pancyprian Schoolteachers Association drafted a resolution which the Government saw as proof that “agitation of this nature was still alive not only among professional politicians but also among schoolteachers and trade unionists”.59 The resolution was addressed to the Governor: We protest against the unjustified insistence of Government that contrary to all justice and pedagogical principles bans from the Greek elementary schools of Cyprus the teaching of the history of our fatherland, Greece, which all civilised mankind is proud to teach. We protest against the refusal of Government to allow the teaching of (the) Greek National anthem and Greek national songs and the hanging of the Greek national emblems and of the portraits of the Greek heroes and politicians in the Greek elementary schools of the island.60 Education had indeed become the defining issue of enosis. This was well understood in London, which admitted that education in Cyprus had been and still is “a first class political issue”. According to a Colonial Office principal: The moment the Government of Cyprus gives way on any matter of education, or departs from the policy now in force, then at that moment the whole political structure is likely to come crashing to the ground. I have always maintained that the pass is sold if the Government gives way to the enosis mongers on the educational issue. It can, with little effect, proceed to a more liberal policy towards local self-government and to some change in the present form of the constitution. But it must maintain its hold on educational policy. Once the enosists run amok amongst education then we shall have a rapid and progressive decline in good

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government, and shall I think be heading straight and rapidly for considerable trouble”.61 The introduction of a British atmosphere to curb enosis aspirations, as intended in the aftermath of the October 1931 uprising, was still central to the Government’s educational policy. An educational system drawn along British lines was essential to good government and tranquility. The island’s schools had always held a central position in the dissemination of nationalist ideas and, if they were left to slip into the control of local politicians, British policy on the island would be jeopardised. The Government’s decision to merely send an acknowledgment to the teachers’ union, without publishing the resolution, infuriated the Greek – Cypriot press. Esperini assured its readers the silence of the Government on such an important question would neither discourage Hellenism nor stop people from asking for the alteration of the education system.62 It also expressed its view that the sooner the situation changed, the better relations would be between the Government and the people.63 The leftist newspaper Anexartitos criticised the Government for removing Greek history from the curriculum, which it asserted was contrary to what liberal forces were fighting for in the current war;64 it also accused the Education Department of being invested with dictatorial power because it put teachers under severe control, both in the schools and in their private lives, by forbidding them to talk about politics, making the very task of teaching dull and unpleasant. “It is time”, the newspaper underlined, “to liberate Cypriot education and untie the chains imprisoning our teachers”.65 Neos Kypriakos Phylax called on teachers to be patriotic and liberate education from the dictatorial regime; it labelled the present education system as wrong and the cause of the mistrust between the people and the Government. Finally, the paper also exposed, in a series of articles published over the course of a month, the efforts of British administrators to anglicise the education of the island since 1878 until “Cullen’s dictatorship, which is exercised without any reservation, even now when the English Government is making vivid democratic and liberal declarations, and which neither Battershill’s nor Woolley’s governorship has managed to bring to an end”.66

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While political life in Cyprus was revitalised under wartime conditions, the Governor thought it proper to raise the issue of the island’s constitutional future with London. From the beginning of his tenure, Woolley showed a willingness to relax the regime and to strengthen the relations between the people and the authorities, in the hope of tamping down enosis sentiment and any political trouble it might cause in the future. The first step he took was to ask the Colonial Office to consider a repeal of the 1937 Church laws, otherwise “we shall never get loyalty, cooperation or friendly relations from the Church. On the contrary we must expect increasingly active hostility and political intrigue”. He believed the repeal of the laws would “throw the onus on the Church to secure the selection of the Archbishop”, and if Leontios, “who by no means enjoys unblemished popularity, failed thereafter to take action, he would be discredited and public opinion would harden against him”.67 The Colonial Office was unwilling to take such a risk, however, as repealing the laws provided no certainty subsequent elections would bring someone acceptable to London to the archiepiscopal throne. In September 1942, Woolley, aware that future policy regarding Cyprus remained decidedly vague, pointed out to the Colonial Office that the present system of administration could not continue after the war, however sound the reasons were for imposing it after 1931: I have the impression that it was the intention to effect constitutional changes during Battershill’s regime and steps to that end would have been taken but for the war. But I may be wrong. Not only do I feel that changes in this direction are overdue, but I believe that some statement now on the lines I suggest would considerably strengthen the position of the Government in its efforts to secure a greater contribution to the war effort especially if it followed shortly after taking the action on the Church question . . . Nor do politically minded persons and the entire local press fail to seize any and every opportunity to accuse us of failing, in so far as Cyprus is concerned, to practice what we have professed in the Atlantic Charter, in the recent debates in Parliament on Colonial Policy and in annually recurrent assurances in the same place of our desire to give to the Colonies, in an increasing measure, share in the management of their own affairs.68

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Woolley believed such an announcement, while it would not appease the enosis propagandists, “would take a good bit of wind out of their sails and render easier an answer to their demand that when the time comes to make it one can assume that answer is to be in the negative. A definite pronouncement on the enosis question should precede the actual introduction of any reform measures”.69 The Secretary of State, however, believed the situation in Cyprus was not so critical as to make it imperative to protect the Government from criticism.70 At this stage the long-running controversy surrounding the use of the term “Christian Orthodox” came again to the fore. Cullen, as Director of Education, suspected the official classification arose from a desire to deny the Greek-speaking population had in fact been Greeks, though in his opinion this was “historically unsound and indefensible even on ground of expediency”.71 The Governor himself recommended a new approach: I can say without hesitation that nothing has caused more irritation and resentment among the Greek-speaking people here than this. Whatever justification there may have been for the change it has done no good but to the contrary caused a great deal of friction. If it was intended to put a break on the enosis movement it has been quite futile and produced the very opposite effect. This is the view of all my advisers including the Director of Education who strongly recommends dropping this artificial expression which has accounted for much of the hostility and ill-feeling towards the Education Department and, I believe, to the Director personally. Classification of schools must be by religion and for the Greek-speaking inhabitants the proper term is Greek Orthodox and they should be designated accordingly by an amendment of the law.72 The Colonial Office authorised Woolley to act accordingly if he thought it politically desirable, and Woolley did, as he was convinced that “not only has the change served no useful purpose whatsoever but that it has been and still is a superfluous constant irritation to Greek –Cypriot susceptibilities”.73 Anticipation of the elections inevitably generated lively public debate and a spate of new demands. Churchill’s visit to the island, on 31 January 1943, though of no practical significance regarding the

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future of Cyprus, strengthened the loyalty of its people to Britain during a period when the tide was beginning to turn for the Allied forces, which made the possibility of enosis after the war seem more feasible. This demonstration of loyalty to Britain within the context of enosis crystallised in June 1943, when AKEL, now formally committed to the enosis claim, called upon its members to enrol in the Allied forces.74 During the municipal elections of 21 March 1943, AKEL had won two of the most important municipalities, Famagusta and Limassol, while Themistocles Dervis’s National Combination, the main representative of the Right in Cyprus, won Nicosia. Apart from the matter of terminology, at this time educational issues remained temporarily quiescent. They were discussed during Woolley’s visit to London, in March 1943, and the Governor assertion that “education in Cyprus was bound up with enosis and the question would certainly boil after the war” made it all the more necessary that schooling remained a state responsibility, especially now that the colony’s teachers were more content under government control.75 Education, however, was still receiving the attention of the newly founded AKEL, the Teachers’ Organisations, the Trade Unions, the press and even the Governor himself: it served as a platform for people to express their national aspirations and, simultaneously, as a powerful tool in the political parties’ electoral campaigns. The political orientation of Cypriot teachers was another contributor to the complexity of the situation. While educational policies were at the heart of myriad critiques of the colonial regime, the Government had, with the island’s teachers, a source of leverage. The position of these teachers was not clear-cut under the colonial administration: they might have secured their position against politicians who were using them to promote their political interests, but they were not considered full government employees. In 1943 the Secretary of State approved a scheme regarding teachers’ salaries and pensions. The scheme provided for the abolition of the categories in which teachers were divided, mostly by their working experience, and for two salary scales – one for teachers and one for mistresses. On retirement teachers were eligible for pensions, instead of gratuities (which had been the practice so far). The salary scales were subject to revision according to the cost of living, and in 1947 the retirement age for teachers was to change to fifty-five, from sixty, and for mistresses to fifty from fifty-five. The purpose of this law was to hasten the retirement of older teachers who maintained conservative educational

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ideas and employed older teaching methods. In 1948 the Director of Education proposed the introduction of a reasonable percentage of difference in salary between head teachers and assistant teachers to “build a greater sense of responsibility in head teachers on whom the efficiency of the schools ultimately depends” and to give them “a greater degree of incentive and recognition”. The Elementary Education Amendment law of 1949 made it so female teachers did not have to retire when they married, therefore making them eligible to receive a pension.76 By the summer of 1943 enosis manifestations had reached an alarming level. In this incendiary political climate, Lord Farringdon’s statement in the House of Lords on 21 March 1943, in favour of an autonomous Cyprus within the British Empire, resulted in a wave of telegrams petitioning for constitutional advancement that would eventually lead to enosis. The commotion could not but affect the island’s teachers and students. The “Association of Teachers of Kyrenia”, in a telegram to the Prime Minister, underlined the inconsistency of Britain’s position with previous promises made by the Allies for the Liberty of Nations and opposing any solution other than union with mother Greece.77 Similarly, the boys and girls of the senior classes of Kyrenia Gymnasium testified that their sole aspiration was the union of Cyprus with Greece.78 Telegrams in this spirit were also sent by athletic clubs, by the Christian association Agapi, by the Greek students of Terra Santa School, by the Committee and Staff of Lapithos Greek High School and, of course, by the masters of the ultra-nationalist Pancyprian Gymnasium, the oldest Gymnasium on the island, who sent a letter to Churchill: We contradict the contention that a section of the Greek population of Cyprus is well disposed towards self-government within the frame of the British Empire. The unique aspiration of every Greek– Cypriot is the union with Motherland Greece and not autonomy of any form as all the Greek –Cypriots have had in every period of our history: Greek origin, language, religion and above all Greek feelings. The real feelings of the Greek population of Cyprus forming more than the five sixths and not the two thirds of the whole population, have been accurately expressed by the recently elected by the inhabitants “Municipal Councils” and every opposite or other aspect us a result of false interpretation or misinterpretation of the Greek– Cypriot feelings.79

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Telegrams in the same vein were sent to the Greek and American Governments, while articles advocating enosis were published daily in the Greek –Cypriot newspapers; predictably, members of the island’s Muslim community sent telegrams expressing their opposition to enosis and their desire for Cyprus to remain within the British Empire. While Greek– Cypriots were looking forward to union with Greece, their Turkish compatriots turned to Turkey, not to Britain, for support and as a bulwark against enosis.80 Nationalist manifestations became more vocal within the Turkish– Cypriot community during this period, and many grievances were exploited for political purposes. A characteristic example of this was the case of the Muslim Lyce´e which, in the summer of 1942, after its premises had been occupied by the Army, was forced to move from Nicosia to Lapithos, much to the inconvenience of the Turkish population. When the Government refused to remove the school to Nicosia for financial reasons, the decision was dubbed anti-Turkish and was the subject of outraged comments in the press.81 Once again, politics had coloured educational disputes. Worried by the growing discontent, Woolley recommended the island’s press should be censored, and that the Government should become a little tougher to stave-off any trouble, but agitation continued unabated: at the 1943 Flower Carnival in Limassol there were enosis displays; several meetings of a non-political character ended with demands for enosis, and in Famagusta students and schoolboys marched with Greek flags and shouted for enosis.82 Woolley believed these outbursts were pro-Greek in character, rather than anti-British, “though there is perhaps an undercurrent of anti-British feeling” and the potential danger of the situation should not be underestimated.83 To counteract this flare-up of enosis agitation, during his February 1943 visit to London Woolley proposed drafting of a statement on the future sovereignty of the island. This, in conjunction with some necessary measures, such as stricter censorship, would quell unrest and reinforce the Government’s authority by reassuring the elements on the island which were loyal to it. The Colonial Office, however, remained adamant it had nothing concrete to add, regarding enosis, to the statement made after Tsouderos’s speech in November 1941.84 A petition was also sent by the “Club of the Graduates of the Pancyprian Gymnasium” to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, requesting the immediate provision of political liberties and reiterating the desire of the Greek people of

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Cyprus for union with Greece. The Colonial Secretary, John Shaw, asked for the petition to be wholly ignored because, as he said, “if any section of the Cypriot community has been more reluctant than another to make a sacrifice for the allied cause in this war it is that section typified by the Gymnasium graduate”. According to Shaw, “a reply was only justified if those members had, in the past, demonstrated their sincerity and affection for Greece by enlisting for active service in the Armed Forces of the United Nations”.85 The occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, in May 1943, celebrated in conjunction with a revived nationalist spirit, became an opportunity for criticism of the Government’s educational policy. Phoni tis Kyprou accused the Department of Education of causing “pedagogical, educational and ethical damage to Cypriot youth”,86 while several newspapers published speeches from the celebration praising the role of the Pancyprian Gymnasium in Greek education.87 Interestingly, the Throne Committee of the Archbishopric undertook the cost of the establishment of a new teaching room at the school “as a token of its appreciation of the religious and national work of the school”.88 The anniversary also provided a good opportunity for the school’s Graduates Association to send a memorial to the Governor regarding elementary education. This memorial asserted that the people of Cyprus had an ab antiquo right to control and manage the education of their children and therefore ask for the repeal of the “oppressive, undemocratic laws that passed since 1923”, the revival of the Pancyprian Training School for Teachers – which they considered “indispensable for the healthy and fruitful education of the country’s Greek children” – and the abolition of the Morphou College, which was not “in conformity with the well-known needs of our country”.89 In this context, D.N. Pritt, MP, whose interest in Cyprus affairs was well known in London, took the opportunity to confront the Secretary of State on the teaching of Greek History. In his reply, Oliver Stanley merely explained that the change in curricula after 1933, although “naturally unpopular with those political elements in Cyprus which endeavour to encourage nationalist Greek and Turkish sentiment”, represented, from an educational point of view, “a marked advance on the old system and provided a sounder and more balanced curriculum”.90 Interestingly, as the numbers suggest, Morphou Training College appeared to have a great appeal among secondary school

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graduates: by 1945, the number of its students rose to 143, from 48 in 1937, with 20 per cent remaining for a third year to study Agriculture.91 Arguably, during this period a subtle solidarity seemed to develop between the Pancyprian Gymnasium and Leontios which reflected their overlapping interests. In February 1944 Leontios sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, wherein he alleged the anti-canonical Church laws of 1937 were the main reason for the present impasse because they were designed “as a political punishment, based on alleged precedents, with the goals of enslaving the Greek Church just as Greek Education had been subordinated to the Anglicization of Cyprus”. He therefore asked for the laws to be repealed and for “Greek education of Cyprus to be set free”.92 A few days later, in a telegram to the Secretary of State, the Pancyprian Gymnasium Graduates Association condemned the Government for the “illegal and dictatorial enactments on the archiepiscopal election imposed against the will, the wishes, the traditions and the Canon Law of the Church and the people of Cyprus”.93 The Colonial Office continued its policy of marginalising Leontios and dismissed his argument as illogical since Leontios, in a previous letter (7 November 1943) had said the election should take place immediately after the liberation of Greece, now wanted the immediate repeal of the laws.94 The Director of the Morphou Training College, Dr G.F. Sleight, subsequently forbade the college’s Greek students to attend the celebration of the Greek national anniversary, thereby inciting the anger of the Municipality of Morphou.95 This prompted Leontios to express his support for the Mayor of Morphou and, by extension, for the Pancyprian Gymnasium, which would benefit from the closure of the Training College – he also congratulated the Municipal Council for standing against the “anti-Hellenic and illiberal educational policy of the British Government”.96 As the Colonial Office noted, Leontios, apart from demanding the repeal of the Church laws, added to his demands the repatriation of exiles and the liberation of education. As the end of the war was approaching, Leontios sought to present himself as an Ethnarch, the leader of Greek –Cypriots, and as the most suitable member of the clergy to be elected Archbishop, and by including these two vital issues in his agenda he hoped to attract the support of the population and prove his indispensability.

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The newly elected Municipal Council of Limassol believed local authorities needed to be more involved in the island’s educational issues, and suggested that Cypriot towns should have school committees that would cooperate closely with the Elected Municipal Councils for the promotion of the educational question. The Council thus suggested the amendment of the education law so the elected municipal councils could elect individuals who would undertake the administration of educational matters so as to establish the “identity of opinions and cooperation between the two Bodies which are indispensable to the smooth functioning of the Municipal and School Services”.97 The Executive Council, however, decided the present system of appointing town committees by nominating persons elected for their individual knowledge of and interest in education should be maintained, as it would be premature, at least for the present, to make any changes: municipal elections had only recently been re-introduced, the municipal administration was still on trial, and the Executive Council feared the schools would end up in thrall to local party politics.98 Aside from municipal elections, Whitehall was unwilling to make any more concessions to the constitutional advancement of the island, let alone agree to union with Greece. Though its recommendations were soon rejected, in March 1944 a memorandum from the Foreign Office Research Department triggered renewed debate. In the memorandum the Foreign Office Research Department admitted the majority of the Greek community, including the politically conscious, educated and vocal section (namely teachers, priests and journalists), now wanted enosis. As for the rural population, apathetic though it might be, did not actively oppose enosis. The memorandum admitted that Greece had a moral claim to Cyprus. As for the Turkish population on the island, the memorandum stated that although it would prefer British to Greek rule, Turkish – Cypriots would ultimately be given the choice to either join the Greek state or migrate to Turkey.99 By the end of 1944, however, Greece was in no position to absorb Cyprus. The country might have been liberated, but it was suffering from both the war and civil strife and was almost entirely dependent on British aid and support. The country had many preoccupations other than Cyprus, including a soaring cost of living and a dire need for postwar reconstruction, so it wasn’t surprising when the question of Cyprus was absent from George Papandreou’s speech when he became the Prime Minister of a pro-British coalition

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government. According to Katsiaounis, the government in Athens, which represented the traditional forces of the Right and Centre and was locked in a deadly combat with the forces of the Left, viewed the anticolonial movement of the Cypriots with a suspicion bordering on hostility.100 Moreover, British intervention in Greek politics against the National Liberation Front EAM Greece’s major left-wing resistance movement, demonstrated Britain’s determination to pursue its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Given these dire circumstances, the Greek claim on Cyprus, and Cypriot enosis itself, could only be aspirations.101 This had been indicated a few months earlier by the British Commanders-in-Chief in the region, who had reached the unanimous conclusion that it was essential Cyprus should be developed as Britain’s main naval base, as it would be the only naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean impervious to attack from the rear. This conclusion, of course, rendered the cession of Cyprus to Greece an impossibility.102 During his second visit to London, in December 1944, Woolley again raised the issue of a statement regarding the future of Cyprus, namely a declaration of the integrity of Cyprus within the Empire and a promise of constitutional development. He recommended a joint declaration with Greece, declaring this would be strategically advantageous for both Britain and Greece if Cyprus remained under British administration – enosis agitation would be calmed, and administrative progress could be achieved. A.J. Dawe from the Colonial Office demurred. He believed the involvement of Greece in such an exercise would only confirm the erroneous belief that Greece had a locus standi in the matter. It was eventually decided no such statement would be made, but the Governor was advised to take every opportunity to make clear that no change in the sovereignty of Cyprus was under consideration.103 It was also agreed Cyprus was drifting toward a political situation similar to that which had given rise to the disturbances in 1931, and that active measures such as the censorship of telegrams and the press, the prohibition of meetings of trade unions and the enactment of laws permitting the deportation of British subjects should be taken to curb enosis agitation. Britain’s preoccupation with the reconstruction of Greece, however, overshadowed any of its problems in Cyprus. Much to the embarrassment of London, on New Year’s Day 1945, C.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times reported on American policy towards the Greek national claims. The article, apparently based on information from top

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State Department officials, stated: “if Greece can obtain British agreement – apparently a matter of some doubt – the American Government favor the British cession of Cyprus to Greece”. The State Department immediately denied this rumour, but the revelation engendered bitter resentment in England. When questioned on the matter in the House of Commons, Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee responded with a reference to Churchill’s Mansion House speech of 10 November 1942: “We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King’s first minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire”.104 After the war ended a disagreement arose between the Foreign and the Colonial Offices, with the former unconvinced as to the necessity of retaining Cyprus. With issues such as Palestine at stake, however, decisions regarding Cyprus were allowed to drift.105 Accordingly, since no plans to relinquish Cyprus were under consideration, the Government decided to embark on a long-term project for the expansion and development of the island’s administration, including education. Such a project would of course require the training of Cypriots at university level. The proposal was put forward during Woolley’s first visit to London in 1943, when the issue of higher education was raised. It was noted at this meeting that, unlike in Malta, where the long-established University of Malta met a popular demand, in Cyprus the popular desire was to attend university in Athens, so it was therefore proposed that one way of meeting the need for higher education in the colony was to offer scholarships to universities in the United Kingdom.106 Thus at the end of 1944 Woolley duly applied to the Colonial Office for a grant of £134,000 under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act to meet the cost of a five-year programme for training Cypriots abroad, with a view to their later employment in the Cyprus Government service in technical, executive and administrative posts – the grant was intended to cover the period 1945– 55, from the departure of the first students until the return of the last. Woolley argued that while other colonies were able to rely to an increasing extent on their own universities or training colleges, leaving education overseas to private enterprise, in Cyprus conditions precluded the possibility of leaving higher education to private initiative. In the first place, Cypriots preferred law and medicine, to the exclusion of other professions but, even more important, if no special assistance was forthcoming Cypriot students would, for reasons of economy and

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national feeling, prefer to seek higher education in Greece or Turkey. Finally, in the absence of any public scholarship system, to rely on private initiative to supply trained officers for government service would restrict employment in senior posts to those families that could afford the cost of education abroad – this would clearly be unfair to the poorer classes, to those Cypriots already in government service, and to those who had served in the Armed Forces during the war.107 The plan was required to meet the urgent need to train candidates for responsible government appointments, since the number of Cypriots qualified to fill higher government posts was inadequate to meet even present requirements, let alone those of postwar development. Promoting Cypriots to higher posts, a tactic applied for years with the posts of Solicitor General and Crown Counsel, served the Government’s goal of strengthening the ties between the Cypriot population and Great Britain and “had a great political value in stabilizing at least a section of the Cypriot population by giving them and their relations a stake in the administration”.108 Cypriot officers had performed their duties satisfactorily during the war, which proved they would be able to assume higher positions, after proper training, and to this end matriculation classes were promoted to prepare students for British universities. According to Woolley, the training of Cypriots in London had several important advantages: politically, it would bring Cypriots closer to the Government; administratively, it would expand the activities of the Government in various sectors and, financially, it would save the Government the huge cost of hiring personnel from abroad.109 Both London and the Government of Cyprus were determined to develop Cyprus into a “proper” British colony. As in 1931, when the inculcation of a British atmosphere had its roots in the re-organisation of the education system, in 1945 the reconstruction of the island included the education of future civil servants along British lines. During the war years, Cyprus saw a remarkable revival of enosis agitation – this revival was spurred by Greece’s participation in the war and Cyprus’s contribution to the Allied effort. Inevitably, enosis manifestations were immediately endorsed by the educational institutions and other associations which, through articles and petitions, condemned the Government’s educational policy as inconsistent with Greek– Cypriot national ideals and aspirations. During this period, education policy accurately reflected the tense atmosphere on the island

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and became a powerful tool as wielded by Cypriot political parties in the colony’s first electoral campaign since 1931. In Cyprus, in striking contrast with other Mediterranean islands and, more generally, Mediterranean societies, politics continued to evolve, and even accelerate, along established lines. Cyprus had a relatively “lucky war”: it escaped the devastation other places in the region experienced and even gained enough leverage over Britain to demand a fuller range of political expression. The emerging new politics focused to some degree on specific wartime issues, such as inflation and wages, but also on such longstanding preoccupations as education; this new politics was sharpened by the Left– Right rivalry on the island, which became pronounced on the island, as it did in Greece, toward the end of the war. Inevitably, uncertainty prevailed as to the future of the island and, for the British, the need to fill a dangerous vacuum seemed imperative. Much to Greek– Cypriots’ disappointment, though, enosis was not an option the British were at any time willing to entertain. British intervention in Greece demonstrated London’s determination to pursue its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the necessity of this intervention convinced British officials that, without Britain, Cyprus would, like Greece, fall into chaos.110 In these circumstances, the British administration in Cyprus had to dispel the sense of uncertainty surrounding the future of Cyprus. The publication of a Ten-Year Development Plan provided a sense of direction and a feeling of stability without committing Britain to actual political developments. Education was crucial to the preservation of the status quo on the island, and to this end it received £940,000 out of the total £4,528,700 spent in Cyprus during this period. In the following chapter we will try to follow educational developments in the years leading to the turbulent decade of the 1950s alongside the solution of the archiepiscopal problem and the introduction of more sweeping constitutional proposals.

CHAPTER 5 EDUCATION, ENOSIS AND THE REVIVAL OF POLITICS IN POSTWAR CYPRUS, 1945—50

The end of World War II did not bring political stability to Cyprus; on the contrary, it signalled the beginning of a more turbulent era.1 The growing influence of AKEL alarmed both the British Government and the Cypriot Right, especially after the successes of leftist EAM during the civil war in Greece. The end of the war therefore found the Cypriot Right and Left acutely divided on almost all but one issue, enosis.2 Cypriot war efforts, in conjunction with a new international order promoting self-determination, invigorated local Greek nationalism and inflamed impatience for a change in the administration of the island. Enosis was seen as a just reward for Cypriot contributions to the Allied cause, but it was Britain’s unyielding position that no change in the administration of the island was possible. In reality, uncertainties in the Middle East and the shadow of the Cold War rendered Cyprus, if not yet indispensable, at least of potential importance to the Empire. Besides, Greece was itself in serious political turmoil and seemed incapable of taking over the administration of additional territory. Nor were British plans the sole obstacle to the fullfilment of enosis aspirations. The postwar period was to be marked by a gradual rise of Turkish nationalism, with Turkish – Cypriots insisting on the preservation of the status quo. Against this backdrop, educational decisions on the island were bound to have strong political implications.

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In this unsettled atmosphere, the British administration had to offer something to ease the tension. As early as June 1945, S.E.V. Luke of the Colonial Office stated: It is clearly incumbent on us to ensure that we give to the Cypriots in return an enlightened and vigorous administration. It is indeed essential that we should neither be, nor appear to be, purely negative in our attitude towards them. On the highest political grounds therefore there are arguments of exceptional importance for carrying out an extensive, well balanced, and long term plan of development . . . It is therefore generally accepted that we must combine firmness on the major political issue with a determination to develop the social services and economic resources of the island.3 There was agreement in London that Cyprus should be offered a new constitution and a programme of development. This would, after all, be the most Britain could offer, since enosis and self-determination were contrary to its interests, since Cyprus was the only real British “possession” in the Eastern Mediterranean where the British could make plans unfettered by treaties.4 As for the development programme, this would, on one hand, bring prosperity to Cyprus and contribute to the stability of the island by keeping the people contented and, therefore, less drawn to nationalist propaganda; on the other hand, the promotion of economic and social prosperity was a general practice in the postwar years, as Britain depended on its colonies to avert a fundamental economic crisis and stand up to a much wealthier America,5 and the TenYear Development plan was drafted to serve these aims. Education received £940,000 out of the colony’s total budget of £4,528,700. An enhanced education system was a prerequisite for prosperity and stability and, as experience had already proven, an effective tool in the Colonial Adminstration’s hands. Education in Cyprus was therefore gaining a new dynamic, both political and educational. For the latter, part of the responsibility lay with the new Director of Education, Dr G.F. Sleight, a former principal of the Morphou Training College who assumed his new role in September 1945 after James Cullen was transferred to Uganda6 (only to be sacked in 1952 for “alleged lack of drive and vision”).7

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Following Sleight’s appointment, whenever educational policy came under attack, Sleight had the advantage of being a dedicated educationalist. Antigone Kyriacou Michaelidou, one of the two teachers who had received a scholarship to England for training in the early 1930s, believed that although propaganda was the motive behing the introduction of the subject of English in the elementary schools, Sleight nonetheless had a genuine interest in the education of the people of Cyprus: He seemed to love the children, their teachers and their country. He was devastated when he was forced to leave Cyprus after he had refused to close down the schools which had borne the Greek flag during the Emergency. “I came to open schools not shut them down”, he said then.8 By 1945 there were 686 elementary schools in Cyprus. Of these, 473 were Greek Orthodox, 203 were Muslim and ten were Maronite or Armenian. The total number of children enrolled was 54,518, of whom 29,574 were boys, 24,944 were girls, and 931 schoolmasters and 407 mistresses were employed in these schools.9 In 1945, due to the island’s social revolution, which had accelerated during the war, there was a marked increase in the attendance of girls at the island’s schools, a 116 per cent increase as compared to the last school year before the war, 1938–9. The year 1945 also saw a significant increase in the number of women who applied for elementary teacher training.10 One of the main problems, however, was that the increase in the number of pupils was not matched by an increase in the number of teachers, and the Government was therefore unable to plan for compulsory education. Before making any move in this direction, both the Teachers’ Training College in Morphou and the newly established Women’s Training College desperately needed to be enlarged. Meanwhile, Governor Woolley’s view was that it was more important to concentrate on improving the conditions of those currently in elementary education than to increase their overall numbers through compulsion. Despite all previous legislative efforts, the Government still did not have full control over secondary education: the management of secondary schools in Cyprus remained within the jurisdiction of governing bodies appointed by the Governor and the Town School Committees, and these

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bodies funded their schools through pupil fees, public donations and, in certain cases, from government grants. The Education Department only exercised limited control over all such schools, though wherever the Colonial Government provided a grant-in-aid the Education Department was able to exercise wider control over a particular school. There were 43 secondary schools in Cyprus, of which 27 were Greek Orthodox, six were Muslim, three were Armenian and seven were open to all denominations. Half of these were in receipt of government grants (£26,000 in total for 1945), while the rest operated unaided. 7,657 pupils attended secondary schools, of whom 5,750 were boys and 1,907 were girls, with a teaching staff comprised of 287 masters and 101 mistresses.11 Per the Ten-Year Development plan, the Pancyprian Gymnasium was to be enlarged and improved, and both secondary and agricultural vocational education were to be extended in the rural areas, something to which Governor Woolley attached great importance. It was impossible, however, for the Development Commissioner, Sir Douglas Harris, to frame specific proposals for the re-organisation of secondary education in the context of postwar political issues which, as Woolley said, “must be settled before anything can be done in this matter, but it is probable that this question will have to be tackled and a solution of its difficulties devised during the decennium”.12 Education in Cyprus nevertheless made considerable advances, despite economic problems and various administrative deficiencies. This did not mean the communities were satisfied with the situation prevailing at the time. The Greeks felt they remained deprived of the right to have a say in the education of their children, while the Turks felt they were not being treated equally. This dissatisfaction would become more apparent in the following years and would be part and parcel of the crucial political developments of the postwar era. The continuing strategic importance of Cyprus was underlined by London immediately after the end of the war. When, on 10 September 1945, the Greek Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, requested the cession of Cyprus to Greece at a meeting at 10 Downing Street, the Chiefs of Staff made clear they believed it was necessary to Britain to retain the island – for them, Cyprus remained essential if Great Britain was to remain the principal external power in the Middle East. Maria Roussou identifies an ‘Egypt-centred policy’, including military facilities at the Suez Base, at the

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core of British regional strategy. Cyprus, though itself of questionable military significance, lay at the middle of this wider strategy and had to be kept as a colony.13 Yet, as we have already seen, it was precisely because the cession of Cyprus to Greece had been eliminated as a possibility that it was vital for the British administration to be visibly, energetically engaged on tackling the challenges facing Cyprus, and education was evidently one of these challenges. One of the island’s unresolved issues was the protracted Archiepiscopal question. Governor Woolley was anxious to find a speedy solution, one that would ease the political tension the Archiepiscopal questions caused without having to make a firm declaration regarding the colony’s future. He wrote to A.J. Dawe: The enosis bubble goes on incessantly. The agitation is now taking on all the characteristics of a runaway horse, and a direct statement is likely to have the effect of stopping it in full career – with the very probable consequence of upsetting the cart. Setting aside the very deep significance which the Church question had for the people of Cyprus, a gesture of easement would now have the most advantageous effect upon the whole political situation and would cushion the impact (as nothing else would) of the enosis pronouncement when it is made. I am also confident that the gesture would be of far greater value if it made now, rather than after the enosis pronouncement.14 A few years later, in 1954, a statement made in the House of Commons by Minister of State for Colonial Affairs Henry Hopkinson to stop the “runaway horse” actually did “upset the cart” – the cart was the Greek – Cypriots who had embarked on a mission to take the Cyprus question to the United Nations and subsequently incited a revolt. On 23 October 1946, the Secretary of State for the Colonies addressed the House, finally giving the green light for the repeal of the various Church Laws of 1937 and, after fourteen years without an Archbishop, the Church of Cyprus placed Leontios on the Archiepiscopal Throne on 20 June 1947. An election was held, one that created even more friction between the local Right and Left, but the Locum Tenens, Leontios, was duly elected to the throne with the support of AKEL. Leontios, however, died a month later from typhus. The aged Bishop of Kyrenia, therefore, was

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permitted to return from exile and was named Locum Tenens until his ascendancy to the Archiepiscopal Throne on Christmas Day of 1947. With the issue of Church leadership resolved, however bumpily, the need to clarify the future of the island became even more pressing. Woolley remained in favour of a statement to make clear His Majesty’s Government had no intention of abandoning Cyprus, as he believed no real progress could be achieved on the island in the absence of such a declaration. The Secretary of State, however, felt any explicit statement would, in effect, give the Greek supporters of enosis “too much weight in the counsels and deliberations of the Cyprus Government”, and he suggested the Governor himself should take every opportunity “to make it clear that no change in the sovereignty is contemplated and that, pending any particular statement by His Majesty’s Government, he should refer to general declarations made by Churchill when Prime Minister and by the present Prime Minister when Mr Attlee was Churchill’s Deputy”.15 As always, regarding Cyprus, Whitehall preferred to push responsibility for defeating the forces of enosis onto the Governor. Woolley, however, was correct in his conviction that enosis agitation would not be easily calmed. In May 1946, on the anniversary of the 1453 loss of Constantinople, Leontios and the Ethnarchy Council, an advisory board of six members established by Leontios in 1945 to make the Church’s interventions in political affairs more effective, sent a letter to Prime Minister Attlee to demand union with Greece yet again. According to the Council, the people’s desire for national liberation outweighed their pro-British feelings, and it requested a resolution compatible with postwar ideals.16 In August 1946 Leontios also sent telegrams to the Foreign Secretary and to the Greek Premier requesting that the final solution of the Cyprus question should be decided at the imminent Peace Conference in Paris. In the meantime, differing perceptions began to emerge among the Greek–Cypriot political leadership as to an appropriate strategy. The Right was willing to tolerate the Greek Government’s cautiousness, while the Left, hardly sensitive to the right-wing politicians in Athens, favoured a more rumbustious approach.17 Woolley reiterated his position, but to no avail. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin declared he did not “want to complicate the already difficult situation in the Balkans and the Middle East by starting a controversy about the future of Cyprus. You can imagine the play

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which the Russians and their Communist agents in Greece will be able to make with any statement to the effect that Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) have definitely decided to hold on to Cyprus indefinitely”.18 Given the situation in Cyprus and that AKEL had confirmed its position as the island’s leading political party in the 1946 elections, retaining its control in Limassol, Famagusta and other areas,19 it was imperative for London to check further developments in Cyprus.20 On 23 October 1946, the day both the Ten-Year Development Plan and the repeal of the Church laws were announced, Secretary of State for the Colonies Sir Arthur Creech-Jones informed the House of Commons that no change in the status of the island was under consideration by His Majesty’s Government. He also informed the House that “the British Government had invited the cooperation of the people of Cyprus in a more liberal constitution and in a programme of social and economic welfare”.21 Plans were therefore put forward for the establishment of a constitutional Assembly that would provide a forum for full discussion of the various problems in Cypriot public affairs and, very importantly, ensure that any local solutions were arrived at while keeping a careful eye on the general international situation. With this new proclamation, it was understood that London believed the 1882 constitution, which had been suspended in 1931, was open to serious criticism and needed to be updated. But as Leventis has argued, it was also clearly axiomatic that self-government within the Empire was as far as Whitehall could go under the prevailing circumstances.22 Despite this announcement, in November 1946 the Locum Tenens and an all-party delegation prepared to travel to Athens to seek assurance that Athens had taken up enosis with the British Government and to plead for self-determination and union with Greece. The President of the Chamber in Athens, however, refused to allow a reading of the Delegation’s resolution.23 During their subsequent trip to London the delegation delivered a resolution to Secretary of State Arthur CreechJones expressing its disagreement with the proposed constitutional reforms and the development scheme and reiterating its belief that enosis and self-determination were the only way to enhance the people’s moral and material advancement. As for the Turkish minority, the delegation declared it “should not become an obstacle to the rights of liberty of the overwhelming majority”, although all minorities were to be respected and “they should participate equally with us in all the rights and

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privileges of full citizenship in a free state”.24 The Secretary of State at least agreed to see the Delegation on 7 February. The delegation was not the only source of political turbulence on the island: discontent also found a vent through an increasingly vocal Greek Board of Education. For the Board, both the delay in enforcing compulsory education and the proposed development of the new Training Colleges at the expense of the old Greek Training Schools was unacceptable. On 13 December 1945 the Board sent a strongly-worded memorial to the Governor condemning the educational regime on the island and admonishing the Government for not taking any of the Board’s suggestion under advisement. The Board argued that “the school curriculum had been set up contrary to the views of the Greek Board of Education and against the traditions of the Greek people of the island who have thus been deprived of the right to know the national historic past of their race”. They also warned that the abolition of the Greek Teachers’ Training Schools would eventually lead to an “intellectual downfall”, since the new Training College could neither satisfy the quantitative need for teaching recruits nor the their required pedagogical quality: the Board alleged this would result in children finishing elementary school incapable of skilled or semi-skilled employment and incapable of matriculating to secondary school. Also, the Board declared the people of Cyprus had never been properly consulted on educational matters, and that the Bishops had been deprived of their supervision of the school committees. The Board accused the Government of a failing to implement the law enacted in 1931 providing for compulsory education and noted that the rural population “which comprises 80 per cent of the population has no opportunities to receive an agricultural education. After 55 years of British administration the Board of Education has been modified in a way that it has practically no relation at all with education”. The Board requested the Government comply with its recommendations: This body bears the honourable title ‘Board of Education’ probably in order to give the impression that it is an organisation which administers the educational affairs of the country as in other countries, especially in England, while in reality every substantial educational matter of the island is on delegation of power by His Excellency the Governor and settled exclusively by the Education Office.25

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Suggestive of the extent to which enosis sentiment had affected educational matters was an article in Paphos condemning the Government’s educational policy. The article accused the Government of ignoring the Pancyprian Teachers Committee’s memorial and of refusing to appoint a Greek Director of Education.26 The memorial and the questions it raised were given much attention in the press, though the memorialists themselves were under fire for continuing to serve on a Board so denuded of real responsibility, and they threatened to relinquish their posts. Colonial Secretary R.E. Turnbull admitted their replacement would present great difficulty, since the Board members were without question representative of the Greek community and enjoyed public confidence.27 Two of its members were Constantinos Spyridakis, the well-known and widely respected headmaster of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, and Loizos Philippou, a prominent elementary teacher and the publisher of Paphos.28 Constantinos Spyridakis was probably the most important educational figure in Cyprus and therefore merits attention here. He was born in 1903 to Spyridon Spyridakis, from Epirus, Greece, and Aglaia Economides of Cyprus. He graduated from the Pancyprian Gymnasium in 1919 and studied philology at Athens University on a Holy Archbishopric scholarship. After he had served for eight years as a literature teacher at the Pancyprian Gymnasium, in 1931 he commenced the study of Ancient History, Classics and Philosophy in Berlin – in 1934 he submitted his doctoral thesis on Evagoras I, King of Salamis (410– 374 BC ). As Michalis Maratheftis wrote in his tribute to Spyridakis, “the choice of the subject of the thesis was not accidental. It was the natural consequence of his experience as a Greek in an unredeemed part of Hellenism who aimed at the strengthening of the bonds with the cultural centre of free Hellenism”. As early as his graduation from the Pancyprian Gymnasium, Spyridakis believed Greek education was the main factor that would ensure the survival of the Greek– Cypriot people. In 1936 Spyridakis was appointed principal of the Gymnasium, a post he held until 1960, when he was elected President of the Greek Communal Chamber of Cyprus. During his leadership of the most prominent Greek Gymnasium on the island, when he was also a member of the Greek Board of Education, Spyridakis was known as the “head of Greek Secondary Education”. He had been one of the founders, in 1936, of the “Society of Cypriot Studies”,

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whose object was to encourage research into Cypriot history; in 1947 he played a leading role in the establishment of the Greek “Cultural Society of Cyprus”, which sought to instil Greek values in the people of Cyprus – both of these institutions continue their activities today. Spyridakis rejected the Government’s educational policies and became one of the most ardent advocates of the independence of Greek education, which he believed was a prerequisite for safeguarding Hellenism and, of course, preparing the ground for enosis. For his efforts, the Church asked him to participate in the Ethnarchy Office, the Ethnarchy Council and the Educational Council of the Ethnarchy.29 For good or ill, Spyridakis’s lasting legacy was his highly assertive – and in some ways archaic – vision of Hellenic education in Cyprus. Turnbull admitted the “Board was indeed vested with no effective authority, and that the late Director of Education made little effort to give it any semblance of authority. Nevertheless the Board exercised one important function – that of imposing taxation for the purpose of education – and any failure to secure the completion of its membership would, therefore, have been embarrassing in the extreme and would be so at any time in the immediately foreseeable future”. Turnbull invited the six members of the Board to discuss matters, and Spyridakis managed to persuade his colleagues to retain their positions while their complaints were under investigation. A full meeting was finally arranged for 16 February, but the members had been widely urged to refuse any discussion and to offer their immediate resignation coupled with a demand for union with Greece. Implicit in this was a process fundamental in modern Cypriot affairs: how the aspiration for enosis became a touchstone for a whole range of popular discontents and hopes, in this case educational. The meeting was held and, perhaps, Turnbull tried to address the Board’s concerns, but it is unlikely that he had much success. One of the thorniest educational issues under discussion was the Teachers’ Training College in Morphou (Normal School) which had been provoking reactions since its establishment in 1937. Greek–Cypriot politicians and educators resented not only that the College was founded at the expense of the older training schools, but that its nondenominational character rendered English necessary as the medium of instruction. The Committee of the Greek Orthodox Schools in Nicosia raised the matter in January 1946 with a letter to the Governor reiterating

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its previous criticisms of the Training School and to complain about the absence of a proper training establishment for schoolmistresses. The Committee pressed for the re-establishment of the previous training schools as an imperative step before the implementation of compulsory education.30 Political reasons were admittedly driving this demand since teachers, though the Government now had more control over them, were still regarded as indispensable to the dissemination of enosis propaganda. The Acting Director of Education certainly thought so: he agreed with the Committee that the “establishment of the Normal School at Morphou is not destined to promote the Greek education of the country – it was never intended to” – and that additional attention should indeed be given to the training of schoolmistresses. He rejected a solution, however, that would involve surrendering the responsibility to the Nicosia School Committee and the Phaneromeni Girls’ School, as he thought the quality of teachers trained by the Government was satisfactory and even superior to “graduates” of the old Training School.31 The Schoolmistresses’ Training College had opened in 1943, with inadequate funds, in the room of a very old Turkish school, but by 1947 the College was under the control of the Morphou College and conditions had generally improved, although it was not yet fully equipped and staffed.32 As for Turnbull, he was annoyed that while the Board continued to disapprove of the College, none of the Board’s members had ever visited the institution, despite repeated invitations. “The Board’s main grievance”, Turnbull said, “is the loss of monopoly which they enjoyed until 1935 over the training of Orthodox teachers which gave them full opportunity for the spreading of enosis propaganda”. Turnbull proved none of the allegations were well founded: he countered the accusation that the College’s students were illiterate by declaring that 65 per cent of its students were the best of the Gymnasia, and that only 35 per cent came from other schools, such as the English School and the American Academies. He also rejected as unfounded the allegation that the establishment of the College had reduced the number of students entering secondary schools since, over the nine years, the number of pupils at the Pancyprian Gymnasium had increased from 600 to 1,600. As to the language of instruction, the argument that teachers would not be able to master their own language if classes were in English was

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invalid to Turnbull, as he believed it was more than enough that students had the chance to learn the structure of their language during their Greek language classes – not all lessons needed to be taught in Greek, and Turnbull pointed out that the Greek examination paper was so rigorous that most candidates failed to pass it. He also could not agree to segregate Greeks from Turks, since there was no friction between the two cultures and especially since “Greek as a language of instruction would mean a separate institution, a Greek staff and a Greek Principal, in short a Greek College with unlimited opportunities for political propaganda”. He argued that the temporary shortage of teachers was not a fault of the College itself but to several limiting factors governing the selection of candidates, such as the supply of adequately qualified teachers and the provision of adequate accommodation.33 Accordingly, the request for the re-establishment of the Pancyprian Gymnasium and the Phaneromeni Training Colleges was declined. In a telegram to the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Cyprus Teachers Union, Andreas Pavlides, wrote: “Greek schoolmasters of Cyprus strongly protest against the expressed intention of the Government to prolong the life of the Normal School at Morphou against the wish of the Greek people to see their Greek teachers Training College re-established and their education free of Government interference until the day of the accomplishment of their desire of the union with Mother Greece”.34 As for the students at the College, not all seemed to share Pavlides’s opinion. Spyros Achilleos, a student at the College during the late 1940s, retained fond memories of his time there: he recalled the easy interaction of Greeks and Turks, the flexibility of the teaching, the careful preparation for teaching and that special emphasis was given to the teaching of Greek. “Eventually”, he cryptically recalled, “the best students became EOKA fighters”.35 Two years later and contrary to the Board’s desire for the re-establishment of the Training Colleges, the Cyprus Government requested a free grant of £80,000 under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act to cover the cost of enlarging the main buildings of the Teachers’ Training College in Morphou to alleviate overcrowding. In 1948 the schools had 70 students whilst their capacity was only 40, despite the acute shortage of teachers. The grant was eventually approved.36 This was a significant success for the Government, which had managed to safeguard its control over the training of elementary teachers and, in tandem, its control elementary education.

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The other major issue on the meeting’s agenda was the enforcement of compulsory education, a request which, according to Turnbull, was “one of the most frequent grounds of complaint against the Government by those who see education only an additional field for political propaganda”.37 One of the Board’s proposals, the introduction of a system of compulsion, was not favoured by the Director of Education, who supported a staggered introduction of the principle, initially for children aged six and, thereafter, to raise the age for compulsory attendance year by year to the age of twelve and, eventually, perhaps, fourteen.38 Another proposal Turnbull did not comment upon was the implementation of a programme according to which the four older classes would attend school in the morning and the rest in the afternoon, which would solve the problem of overcrowding in the schools and enable children to help their parents in the fields39 – it was also a way to get parents to abide by the new arrangement. Although the proposal addressed a real problem and could have been implemented immediately, it was eventually abandoned. For one thing, it would not make much sense to impose compulsory education while significantly reducing school hours. The Board’s views were not immediately submitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones, since Turnbull, after consulting Sleight, decided to defer their submission until the current agitation died down and the future context of Cypriot education became clearer. Educational policy inevitably depended on wider political developments: London felt Cyprus needed to remain, provisionally at least, a British colony, and thus it must retain its control over education. Partly because of Sleight’s own inclinations, however, and partly due to an overall policy of keeping Cypriot opinion as pliable and apolitical as possible, the Department of Education was careful to consult the Greek Board as often as its own purposes required. However, Turnbull warned the Colonial Office that even though the Board had softened its stance somewhat, renewed trouble might be anticipated for a simple reason: The Board is not really concerned with education. Its representations are only another flowering of the aspirations of the more politically-minded members of the Greek community. The attitude of the Board towards educational matters is quite unreal and that their attacks on the efficiency of the present system are at root political and not educational.40

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Given Turnbull’s critique, the timing of any outright rejection of the Board’s requests would dovetail with the issue of union with Greece which, the British believed, was the backbone of the educational question. There was anyway a persuasive argument that since education was bound to come within the purview of any restored constitution and legislative measures, the whole matter should be left in abeyance until such a moment arrived. Turnbull admitted that when the Greek–Cypriot community as a whole, including the members of the Board of Education, accepted a foreseeable future within the British Empire, he “could contemplate with equanimity the inevitably greater influence of what they regard as Hellenic culture”,41 an admission that demonstrates British views on education were just as “political” as those of Greek–Cypriots. Despite Turnbull’s agreement with Governor Woolley that the Government should declare it had no intention of divorcing itself from educational policy, the matter was nonetheless left unresolved for some time. This did not mean, however, that Cypriot education was no longer a worrisome issue for the Colonial Office. Creech-Jones was forced to write another letter to Bevin to explain that recent developments made it necessary for him to raise the question as to whether a firm declaration along the lines originally suggested would be made.42 Meanwhile, Lord Winster replaced Woolley as Governor – the former had been Minister of Civil Aviation in the postwar Labour Government, but he had alienated some of the private aviation interests, and Prime Minister Attlee took the opportunity presented by Woolley’s departure from Nicosia to make Winster Governor, a post Winster would not have sought himself.43 With neither colonial nor Cypriot experience to draw on, Winster was predictably reluctant to depart radically from his predecessor’s stances. Due to take up his post in March 1947, Winster told Creech-Jones he shared Woolley’s view that “the prospects of the success of our new policy will be gravely prejudiced unless the question of sovereignty is effectively dealt with at the outset”,44 and he was reluctant to assume his post without a decision on the question – due to meet the delegation from Cyprus, Creech-Jones also wanted a definite answer, one he could offer to the delegation. “If they are allowed to return to Cyprus with any impression of hesitation on the part of the British Government”, he concurred, “the position of the Administration will undoubtedly be rendered in the highest degree difficult”.45 The situation made him nervous. In a memorandum on the future of Cyprus,

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he elaborated that the campaign for union with Greece continued unchecked, and that the loyalty of the civil service, and of all those sympathetic to the British connection, remained severely strained: I am assured that we cannot look for cooperation from the people of Cyprus in the carrying out of our policy of either constitutional reform or economic and social development in the present atmosphere . . . It seems that unless the issue of Cyprus is placed beyond question at this stage, our policy will be abortive.46 Creech-Jones eventually met with the delegation on 7 February but, without having the approval of the Foreign Office to make a definitive statement, he could only reiterate his 23 October 1946 statement to the House of Commons that no change in the administration of the island was under consideration, and that emphasis would instead be given to its social and economic development. Telegrams supporting the cause of the delegation were sent by various organisations, youth associations and rural communities, most of them affiliated with AKEL, and prior to the delegation’s return to Cyprus on 16 February an all-party mass meeting was held in Nicosia to protest the Secretary of State’s reply to the delegation and to send telegrams to him, to the Prime Minister and to the authorities in Greece. 25,000 Greek–Cypriots attended the demonstration, and the event was covered extensively by the Greek–Cypriot press. The success of the demonstration indicated the majority of the Greek–Cypriot population wanted self-determination – it was common ground for the parties, and at this particular time the Greek people of Cyprus would be satisfied with nothing less. That the administration, however, allowed such a gathering to occur, all the while keeping its fingers crossed that no great disorder erupted, indicates how worried it had become about maintaining public order merely through repression. A few days after the Greek –Cypriot delegation to London had presented its demands and requirements to the Colonial Office, the Cabinet discussed the broad lines of Cyprus policy, and in this discussion the longstanding divide over tactics resurfaced: the Colonial Office wanted a crystal-clear statement ruling out enosis, whilst the Foreign Office opposed anything that might simply transfer the issue to an international plane. The context of this discussion was a delicate phase wherein the British Empire was undergoing significant political reform.

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Between 1947 and 1948 Britain lost much of its power in South Asia, especially after the independence and partition of India. Additionally, with the loss of Palestine in 1948, the British were determined to remain in the Canal Zone in Egypt, but uncertainty about the long-term British future in Suez gave military installations in Cyprus greater centrality.47 The Foreign Office was afraid if the question of Cyprus migrated to the international sphere the Soviet Union would urge a course of action similar to that taken in the Dodecanese: cession to Greece coupled with demilitarisation. The Chief of the Air Staff held that in view of the uncertainty in Egypt and Palestine any proposal to surrender British sovereignty over Cyprus was unwise, and the Chiefs’ collective conclusion was that “if all our bases in the Mediterranean and the Middle East were lost, the strategic foundations of our defence of the UK and the Commonwealth would be undermined”. Ultimately, the Cabinet agreed that, for the present, no public declaration should be made about the future of Cyprus, and it enjoined the Foreign Secretary to explore the possibility of reaching an understanding with the Greek Government, the terms of which would be that neither Britain nor Greece would raise the question of the status of Cyprus for some years to come, and that the Greek Government would endeavour to discourage agitation in Cyprus.48 In view of this, the Secretary of State assured the Governor he would have all the necessary support he needed to execute constitutional advancement in Cyprus and to implement a programme of social progress and economic development. He was also privately assured, since a public statement was still out of question, that no change of the political status of the island was being contemplated in London.49 Meanwhile, the British smothered any attempt by Athens to press its own claim regarding Cyprus. On 28 February, after a storm of letters sent from Cyprus to Greek politicians, the Greek Parliament approved a resolution calling for the union of Cyprus with Greece, with the aim to pass it to the British Government.50 Prime Minister Dimitrios Maximos (January– August 1947) said, “a happy settlement of this question is being sought in the spirit of the ancient, cordial and tried relations between Greece and Great Britain. If this materialises, it will evoke the eternal gratitude of the Hellenic Nation”.51 Greece was not in any position to pursue a policy which was not in step with Britain’s plans, however, and after several warnings from London Greek Prime Minister

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Konstantinos Tsaldaris announced that despite the unanimous vote of the Greek Parliament, he would not press Britain to hand over Cyprus.52 Disturbed by British attitudes, the Greek –Cypriot political parties, at least superficially, put aside their differences and decided to harmonise their activities and boycott the celebrations for the arrival of the new Governor.53 The boycott prompted the Government to dismiss the four Greek– Cypriot members of the Advisory Council, as it deemed the protest an insult to the King, but this only undermined an already weakened body. On the same day as the dismissal of the Advisory Council members, the six members of the Greek Board of Education, irritated by the delay in the reply to their earlier memorial, tendered their resignation to the Director of Education, and this again illustrates the constant interaction between educational issues and wider political developments on the island. Although the Board admitted the Government had accepted some of its proposals and was undertaking new educational schemes, the Board’s members had decided to resign because the Government had made clear it was “not prepared to part with its rights which it acquired through the recent education laws” or to grant more powers to the Boards.54 Against this backdrop the Cyprus Government made another effort to persuade London to agree to a firm declaration on enosis. Turnbull, as always, was opposed to any suggestion of enosis: Until, in one way or another we have succeeded in associating the local Greeks with our Government and they have attained political maturity, enosis will always recur as a political slogan, but we should at suitable intervals rap their knuckles, as they expect us to do, before it becomes an issue as it has done now . . . Our reluctance to deliver the rap is causing grave anxiety and I foresee that in the end the issue, even to our best friends, will become one of ‘Govern or get out’ . . . I can only assure anybody who . . . thought it his duty to promote the union of Cyprus with Greece, that he would be contributing to the most grave desertion from our responsibilities to a happy, friendly and intelligent people whose only fault is that they lack the political courage that comes with the responsibility which they have been denied in the past and which we ourselves have not yet given them.55

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Not even Turnbull’s response was enough to persuade London to make a formal and explicit declaration about the future of Cyprus. Notwithstanding Turnbull’s exhortations, both London and the Cyprus Government managed, at various junctures, to make Britain’s intentions clear: Creech-Jones’s reply to the deputation, Winster’s dismissal of members of the Advisory Council and the reply to the Board of Education’s memorandum all underlined Britain’s unwillingness to concede to Greek– Cypriot demands. This did not mean, however, that the situation on the island had failed to improve since the repression that followed the troubles of 1931. After the war the British were genuinely and keenly interested in a new cooperation with the Cypriot public, but of course only on terms acceptable to London. The British knew any new constitution would not satisfy Greek– Cypriots, but they calculated that a new constitution, combined with an ambitious Ten-Year Development Plan, could push enosis to the margins and perhaps, one day, displace it altogether. Whether it was already too late for such a scenario to be credible was a matter for dispute. Invitations were duly issued in July, to a number of organisations and personalities across a broad spectrum of Cypriot society, for the establishment of a Consultative Assembly to be charged with framing proposals for constitutional reforms.56 The Archbishop issued a proclamation against participating in the Assembly, and his sudden death on 26 July 1947 only served to make his warning more urgent.57 Chronos wrote that those who were to participate in the Assembly did not represent the majority of the Cypriot people, thus it would be impossible for the Assembly to secure any public consensus. The newspaper added that nobody prevented the Government from drafting and implementing a constitution, but by asking for people’s cooperation when the Government had refused to do so would only “provoke divisions which remind us of an old fashioned diplomatic handling of political problems”.58 Referring to the Assembly, Paphos averred that nobody in Cyprus had requested a constitution, and that following Greek– Cypriot participation in the war the Greek population in Cyprus was merely looking forward to its national restoration, enosis. Paphos also criticised Greek– Cypriots for failing to come together and develop a common policy at such an important juncture in their history.59 AKEL was initially against participation in the Assembly, but it then shifted its position, though without softening its commitment to enosis.60

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The Right, however, given the control AKEL and its allies retained in key areas after the recent elections, began to fear a legislative assembly dominated by the Left. As Holland has noted, what emerged in 1947/8 was a bitter struggle between the ecclesiastical Right and the secular Left for dominance within the Greek community.61 This division was also a consequence of the political polarisation tormenting Greece: in September 1946 the Greek civil war had commenced a new phase, with both sides undertaking daily, systematic military operations.62 An invitation to the Assembly was also sent to Spyridakis, and the Government asked him if secondary school teachers intended to participate collectively in the Assembly. Spyridakis’s response was that the Pancyprian Organisation of Greek Secondary Education Teachers authorised him to reply that, after the decision at their April 1947 meeting to reject any new educational policy within the framework of the island’s continuation as a Crown Colony, the island’s secondary school teachers declined to take part in any new discussions.63 The teachers at the Pancyprian Gymnasium issued a declaration calling on Cypriots to do away with petty party politics and unite around the Ethnarch to fight for national liberation.64 Apart from the reactions within Cyprus, however, Winster brought the problem of propaganda from Greece to the attention of the Secretary of State. Athens Radio devoted one hour each evening to Cyprus, with a broadcast featuring support for Cypriot enosis, stigmatising government supporters as traitors, advocating support for the Bishop of Kyrenia, “the apostle of non-cooperation”, and calling for abstention from the Consultative Assembly. Athens Radio also announced the intention of the National Hellenic Theater to establish a branch in Cyprus. Winster said of the Theater’s sojourn on the island, its “recent visit to this island resolved itself into an enosis propaganda campaign”,65 and he recommended the cultural programme be cancelled. A few days later, on 27 August 1947, Winster realised that, despite his insistence, London had no intention of making any statement as to the future of Cyprus, and he made a statement himself excluding any likely prospect for union with Greece: In view of the widespread rumours . . . I am now authorised by HMG to deny any suggestion now current or which may be made to the effect that the idea of the cession of Cyprus to Greece is

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being entertained in responsible quarters in the UK. No agreement between the British and Greek Governments concerning the union of Cyprus with Greece is in existence in any form whatsoever. Further, no such agreement is contemplated.66 The Assembly, consisting of ten Greek– Cypriots, seven Turkish – Cypriots and a Maronite, finally set to work on 1 November 1947, but without the participation of the Right or the Church. Pointing to Malta, which had just been given a restored constitution with a large degree of self-government, the Assembly’s Greek –Cypriot representatives asked for a similar degree of constitutional autonomy, including Cypriot control of all ministries other than foreign affairs and defence. The British rejected these demands, but the Assembly Chair, Chief Justice Sir Edward Jackson, conceded the constitution could provide for a Greek– Cypriot elected majority in the legislature, as well as for the “association” of Cypriot political leaders with government departments. The Ethnarchy launched a severe attack against the Left, accusing it of giving in to British pressure and accepting a “phoney constitution”.67 In the meantime, on 14 November 1947, the Colonial Office circulated an internal memorandum titled “The Future of Cyprus” which made “the withdrawal from Palestine next year will leave Cyprus as the only remaining territory in the Near and Middle East under direct British Administration”. The situation could not have been clearer. Now that the “British strategic interests in the Middle East were even bigger” than they had been in 1878, Cyprus was seemingly becoming an indispensable part of the Empire.68 At subsequent meetings of the Assembly differences arose between the Chairman and the Greek –Cypriot members as to terms of reference, the latter insisting those terms must cover a demand for “selfgovernment”. The demand for self-government had aroused strong opposition among right-wing Greeks, but even more particularly among the colony’s minorities, who remained unconvinced by protestations of the benevolent intentions the majority had toward them. At the meeting of 18 November a letter requesting self-government was prepared by the petitioning members and the Chairman for the Secretary of State’s consideration. The Greek members accepted the wording of the letter, even though one of its passages precluded any use of new constitutional powers to promote union with Greece. The Left now seemed to be

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veering towards internal self-government.69 A parallel discussion was underway in London. Prime Minister Attlee, always in favour of colonial freedom as a matter of principle, supported radical changes in Cyprus, including government departments under full Cypriot control. The Colonial Office remained far more cautious about the way ahead, however, and their hesitancy had more support in and around the Cabinet than Attlee enjoyed.70 The British tried to break the deadlock during April and May of 1948 by putting forward a constitutional plan which, though it did not concede control of the ministries to Cypriots, hinted it might transpire in the future, which was a major departure from previous British policy. The Colonial Office, despite its hesitations, stressed that the Cypriots should be aware it was offering liberal constitutions to other colonial peoples it regarded as less developed politically, and that failure to introduce a “real” constitution would only strengthen the position of those Cypriots who were against British rule on the island.71 According to this plan, the Executive Council would be responsible to the Governor, rather than to the Assembly, whilst the leaders of the parliamentary majority would be join the Executive Council and be “associated” with government departments.72 Moreover, there would be a clear Greek– Cypriot majority in the Assembly, thus satisfying a major demand that Greek– Cypriots had been making since 1882. Discussion of enosis in the Assembly would, however, be forbidden. The proposal was immediately rejected by the Ethnarchy. On 20 May, when the Assembly reconvened, the Greek –Cypriot members insisted the ministries should immediately be conceded to Cypriots. When this demand was rejected, the Greek – Cypriot representatives voted against the proposal and left the Assembly. For their part, the Turkish– Cypriots accepted the May 1948 proposals but made clear they would not consent to Greek– Cypriot demands for self-government, as this would place the Turkish– Cypriot minority under the dominion of the majority Greek– Cypriots.73 By July 1948 the discussions for a constitution had reached a dead end, though the proposals were not withdrawn completely. Chronos declared this measure was “just a way out for Britain from the difficult situation it got itself in Cyprus”, and this opinion reflected a general suspicion.74 AKEL once again reverted to the Ethnarchy’s line of “enosis and only enosis” and took leadership of the enosis movement until 1949,

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when the defeat of EAM– ELAS (Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό ΜέτωποΕλληνικός Λαϊκός Απελευθερωτικός Στρατός (National Liberation Front – Greek Popular Liberation Army) – Resistance organization affiliated to the Greek Communist Party (formed September 1941) and its military wing (formed December 1942), which operated in occupied Greece during World War II against the Italians and the Germans) in mainland Greece dealt the party a severe blow.75 The failure of the Assembly only accentuated the centrality of enosis in Cypriot political life. It was during this period that King Paul of Greece gave an interview to the New York Times in which he stated that while he thought bases in Cyprus were essential to Britain, this was not in conflict with the cession of the island to Greece, something that would accord with the desires of Greek –Cypriots and of Greeks throughout the world. He also said that if arranged within the framework of the United Nations, Greece would be willing to provide facilities for Great Britain or the United States in Crete or elsewhere on its territory.76 King Paul’s statement was warmly supported by the Athenian newspapers, though the Greek Government distanced itself from the interview. On 3 October 1948, however, the Archbishop and the three Bishops organised a mass meeting of right-wing parties in Nicosia to reiterate their demand for enosis.77 The development heightened the resentment of Turkish– Cypriots, who continued to insist on a continuation of British sovereignty. According to Reddaway, “their overriding concern was not that enosis might be imposed on them by some sudden coup de main, but rather that it might be foisted on them gradually by stealth and in the form of creeping annexation disguised as self-government. They were apprehensive that a gradual devolution of power to representative institutions in Cyprus might sap the will of Britain to maintain sovereignty and withstand enosis”.78 The support of Turkish–Cypriot representatives for the British position at the Consultative Assembly reinforced the minority’s ties with the government, and the Turkish– Cypriot community commenced its effort to promote its views more effectively. To this end a Committee of Turkish Affairs was established, with the reform of education one of its most pressing concerns. While enosis agitation seemed far from waning, the British found themselves also having to cope with heightened Turkish nationalism expressed through educational matters. Behind educational priorities, however, lay an even more fundamental opposition amongst Turks to

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enosis and a deep suspicion of Greek– Cypriot aims. In the aftermath of the war a growing Turkish – Cypriot political consciousness fuelled demands for better education for Turkish –Cypriots, something similar to that enjoyed by Greek – Cypriots, and this demand was supported by mainland Turks. Under the banner, “let young Cypriot Turks seek higher education in Turkey but let them return to work for the benefit of their compatriots in Cyprus”,79 various nationalist parties in Turkey tried to help Turkish – Cypriots improve their education, first in Cyprus and then in Turkey. The increasing number of mainland teachers in Turkish – Cypriot schools was bound to have political effects and potentially widen the distance between the two communities. The matter inevitably caused concern in the Colonial Office. Thus, when the proposal to assist the Turkish community through scholarships and the development of its lyce´e was put forward, the Colonial Secretary emphasised purely educational criteria. Suggestive of the nationalist surge had been a meeting at St Sophia Square on 28 November 1948 in Nicosia attended by 15,000 Turks who unanimously protested against the Greek demand for enosis and self-government, as Turkish– Cypriots were convinced it would inevitably relegate them to a distant and weak second in the determination of the island’s affairs.80 All this came to the fore in the summer of 1948, when a party of Turkish schoolteachers visited Cyprus to study educational conditions amongst Cypriot Turks. The visit quickly acquired political colour. Cypriot Turks of all classes expressed their growing concern about the Government’s tolerance of enosis agitation. Judge Zekia Bey assured the Colonial Secretary that “any idea that the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus were friendly disposed towards each other or would live of their own free will in amity, was completely mistaken”, that cultural and social contacts were almost completely absent, and that no responsible Turk would have any political dealings with the Greeks, a statement Turnbull confirmed. Bey assured the Government the only political ambition of the Turkish population of the island was to perpetuate British administration, and the Turkish– Cypriot community began to press the Turkish Government to bring all possible influence to bear to protect the community’s interests.81 The visit increased the interest of mainland Turkish organisations, including the Turkish Cultural Association, which was sponsored by the Ministry of Education, and the Cypriot Association of Istanbul, in

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the education of Turkish – Cypriots. These organisations noted that the opportunities of Turks for education in Cyprus were limited “not so much by any failure of Government to allocate a fair share of its funds to the purpose, but because of the comparative poverty of local Turks and their inability to finance higher education such as is available to the Greek population from its own charitably minded members”.82 Both associations were prepared to subsidise higher education among the Turks of Cyprus by assuming financial responsibility for a new lyce´e (the purposes of which would be academic and cultural) and, until the new lyce´e was built, by providing Turkish teachers free of local charge to the existing lyce´e and by offering scholarships in Turkey, with the quid pro quo that these fortunate scholars would return and make their lives in Cyprus. Zekia made clear that, as Turkey’s leader Ismet Inonu had agreed, this proposal should unofficially require the consent of the Cyprus Government so as to avoid objection by the Greek community.83 The proposals were discussed by the Cyprus Government and the Colonial Office. According to Turnbull: The emphasis would naturally be upon education on Turkish lines. Turks in Cyprus make considerably more use than do the Greeks of the institutions such as the American Academy and the English School and I have no wish that their recourse to Western ideas of education should be discouraged. If it were decided, for this or any other reason, that Turkish intrusion into local education was undesirable it is possible that informal discouragement by myself would secure the abandonment of the Turkish government, a step I doubt whether the British Government would wish to make. But in any case the provision of additional facilities for Turkish education is not necessarily incompatible with the continued use of the instructions for higher English education and on the whole I would not wish to offer objection to the extension of the proposed assistance provided the manner in which it is offered is acceptable. He also pointed out that he preferred financial assistance should be offered to the Turkish – Cypriot community by the Cyprus Association of Istanbul, rather than through diplomatic channels, and should be used for a polytechnic institution rather than an academic and cultural lyce´e. “A suggestion that the money should be so diverted”, he said,

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“would doubtless be a test of the non-political nature of the purposes of the Turkish Government”.84 The Colonial Office’s first reaction was to “deplore anything which would significantly increase the ‘Turkishness’ of the Turkish speaking Cypriots”.85 According to J.M. Martin of the Colonial Office, the “familiar song” of the Turkish – Cypriots, that they wanted nothing better than to perpetuate the British administration as a means of securing peace between the two communities, was actually an attempt to secure British support for their community and to widen the gulf between themselves and the majority Greek – Cypriots. “In the long run”, he said, this “is against the interest of all three parties because the minority can easily appear as an obstacle to the development of self-government. We know what happened under the Constitution in Cyprus with the Turks behaving like an Irish party and combining with the official members against the Greeks”.86 John Bennett, an assistant secretary in the Colonial Office who had always been an advocate of self-government, was very concerned about the recent growth of minority consciousness among the Turks in Cyprus, and he feared the Committee of Turkish Affairs established by Lord Winster may have unwittingly encouraged this. He warned that the superficial attractions of a loyal minority supporting the Government of a foreign protecting power was too well known to Britain for it to fall into the kind of trap into which it had fallen in places as dissimilar as India and Ulster, and that the only way out was for the minority to make its peace with the majority without seeking protection elsewhere.87 Educational adviser W.E. Ward agreed that the only ultimate hope was for Turkish– Cypriots “to reach a modus vivendi with their Greek counterparts; but that modus vivendi is not to be reached through Anglicisation which neither group desires. The Cypriot Turks want to be educated. We cannot educate them – at least we are not doing it – so I think we should be on a very unsafe ground in flatly refusing to allow their brothers to do so”. It can be argued that decisions of this kind, while originally aimed at retaining good inter-communal relations, eventually helped to create a chasm between the two communities by accentuating their national differences and increasing their allegiance to their motherlands, rather than to their common country. Ward also added that Turks would not agree to the establishment of a Turkish polytechnic as Turnbull had proposed:

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The Turks explained to me more than once that they were soldiers and farmers; handicrafts and trade they left to the Greeks and Armenians. Education in Cyprus means “book-education” Greek, and the Turks want equality with the Greeks and so “bookeducation”. Ward therefore was in favour of the provision of Turkish assistance, including the introduction of Turkish reading books and more scholarships, on the condition that the Government would have a say in the selection of the latter, but he was against the establishment of another lyce´e until the existing one was brought thoroughly up to date.88 An immediate consequence of the surge of nationalism in the Turkish– Cypriot community was a trend towards classical (academic) education, which it now considered a necessary stepping stone for achieving equality with Greeks. What is noteworthy about these exchanges is not least a nascent awareness on the part of the British of the risks in encouraging any degree of Turkish–Cypriot and, especially, Turkish, assertiveness. If such an arrangement took hold in the sphere of education, it was bound to infiltrate into other areas of Cypriot public life. In the meantime, in Turkey, press references to Cyprus aroused deep interest in official circles. Hurriyet declared “the people of Turkey are determined not to remain indifferent to the position of Cyprus as they were to that of the Dodecanese”.89 Those islands, under British Military administration after May 1945, had recently been handed over to Greek sovereignty, a departure Turkey had not been capable of opposing. Other newspapers stated that, in the long run, British rule in Cyprus was only second best, and the only permanent solution was the island’s restoration to Turkish control. Turks were also afraid that if Cyprus became Greek it would fall into Communist hands. Eventually, in 1949, the Committee of Turkish Affairs drafted an interim report in which it recommended various legislative and administrative actions. Education could not be absent from the report, and its treatment therein was an apt reflection of the desires and ambitions of the Turkish community. Recognising that education was not a subject the Government could consider as related exclusively the Turkish – Cypriot community, but a subject set against the background of a general educational policy, the Committee demanded educational equality, since they could admit “of no reason why our control should be

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less”. Since the Turkish– Cypriot community could not itself support a polytechnic for further education without a large subsidy, the Committee called for such an institution to be available to all Cypriots. As for the control and management of both secondary schools, according to the Committee these schools were to be handed over to a representative body of the Turkish community: “whatever might be the reasons for the Government keeping some control over these schools we submit that there is no reason justifying the Government in continuing a policy which will only cause the fostering of ill-feeling and disaffection against the Government”. The Committee also complained that the Greek– Cypriot community on the island “is left free and unfettered to manage their secondary schools provides a constant source of complaint in Turkish circles which rightly compare the system of management imposed on them with that of the Greek community”. As for elementary education, the Committee proposed the alteration of the composition of the Boards for the Turkish schools so they would include 12 elected Turkish – Cypriot members,90 which would restore the representative character it had lost over the years. Recommendations also included the introduction of the text books used in Turkey, the training of teachers in Turkey, the election of village and town committees, the application of compulsory education and the appointment of only Morphou graduates to elementary schools.91 Implementation of the proposals would have given Turkish–Cypriots greater control in their educational affairs than the Greek–Cypriots possessed, which raised key questions. The British authorities had no wish to reduce their stake in Turkish education in Cyprus and allow Ankara to fill the gap.92 On the other hand, Mary Fisher, in the Colonial Office’s Mediterranean Department, did not see why the Turkish Government should not go as far as the Greek Government in advancing the educational needs of its Cypriot compatriots. In a discussion with the Foreign Office, Fisher raised several queries. The first was whether education at a university in Turkey was “likely to promote inconveniently strong irredentist feelings in the Turkish–Cypriots when they eventually returned to Cyprus”, something that seemed all too likely. The second was, “how far Athens does actually go in helping Greek–Cypriots educationally? We know what is done at the school level; but we do not know much about the university level except that a number of Cypriots go to Athens under their own steam”. Significantly, Fisher’s queries

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illustrate the colonial administration’s relatively sparse knowledge of Greek–Cypriot society, except where it had directly engaged, as it had increasingly in schools. In particular, Fisher wanted to find out whether direct encouragement was given by the University of Athens to induce Cypriots to attend though, as she cryptically put it, “I imagine the answer is that in the case of Athens no particular encouragement is needed”.93 Subsequently, the British Embassy in Athens confirmed that students from Cyprus and other territories outside Greece considered “unredeemed” were admitted to the university without having to pass an entrance examination or pay examination fees, but that no special scholarships were offered to Cypriots.94 Eventually, at the beginning of 1949, six Turkish – Cypriot candidates were awarded scholarships to the Turkish Lyce´e of Marash in southeastern Turkey. In January, Turkish students demonstrated in solidarity with the Turkish – Cypriot community, though an official of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a member of the British Embassy staff that the whole agitation was probably fomented by those interested in poisoning Turco – Greek relations, and he asked the British Embassy to refuse visas to a delegation from Turkey which wished to visit Cyprus,95 and the visit was postponed. As a result of the student demonstration the National Association of Greek Students in Athens staged their own strike on 24 January, with thousands of students taking part. It was therefore obvious that, after the debacle of the Assembly, Turkish – Cypriots were seeking to strengthen their position and press their demands for educational autonomy. The British tried to avoid anything which compromised inter-communal relations, as this would prejudice the stability and development of Cyprus upon which their position depended, thus letting education in Cypriot bifurcate under the dual interference of Athens and Ankara posed a real danger. As this approach to education suggests, at least at this stage, “divide-and-rule” in any crude form was not a hallmark of British colonial Cyprus. Both the failure of the Consultative Assembly and the looming municipal elections of 1949 increased political tension. AKEL was gradually consolidating its recent gains. The youth organisation AON (Progressive Youth Organisation) was entrusted with the dissemination of Communist and enosist propaganda among Cypriot youth, though it soon came under the surveillance of the Cyprus Government.96 The dissemination of communist ideas among Greek–Cypriot youth worried

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the right-wing Pancyprian Gymnasium Committee, and it distributed a circular to teachers to defend the values of Greek nationhood and civilisation.97 AKEL nevertheless was becoming progressively more involved in educational matters, which made the schools a critical element in Greek–Cypriot politics more than ever. General Secretary Fifis Ioannou pressed the Director of Education to clarify whether “the functionaries of elementary and secondary education have the right of voting at elections or presenting themselves for election to public offices”.98 The Attorney General of the Cyprus Government, when called to comment on the matter, said that although he was not responsible to “advise AKEL on questions which they choose to put for political reasons”, there was nothing in the Municipal Corporations Laws disqualifying teachers from voting or from being elected, but he advised the Government not to be drawn into correspondence with AKEL on the matter “unless indeed there is already a well settled decision and rule laid down in the Education Office that teachers, though they are free to have their own opinion on matters political, they are not to import politics into, and are not to let politics interfere with, their duties and work in schools”.99 It was clearly becoming imperative to clarify the conditions and the extent to which teachers could be involved in politics. Although they were under government control, teachers were not strictly considered government employees. They were pensionable, however, and this gave the Government the right to exercise control on the participation of teachers in politics. The Attorney General made clear, however, that although “there is clearly no suggestion that anybody should not record his vote or have his opinion on political matters, it is certainly improper that teachers should forget themselves as to become tools in the hands of a political party or of taking an active part in politics”.100 Hitherto each secondary school had its own regulations on the matter. According to the regulations of the Town School Committee of Limassol, teachers were not permitted to carry out any work not concerned with the Gymnasium or to engage in out-of-school activities which were, in the opinion of the Committee, likely to disturb the peaceful working and discipline of the school. According to the Director of Education, these regulations were primarily intended to control political activities of masters, particularly any association with the Left: “There seems to be no doubt that the teachers should be allowed to exercise their votes and to hold their own opinions on political matters.

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Their more active participation in party politics, including the right to serve as councillors or mayors is a more difficult problem which requires further consideration”. He therefore urged the Government to issue a statement as to whether or not the Limassol Secondary School Regulations should stand.101 He argued that under this system, where each town committee could draft its own regulations, schoolteachers would not know where they stood as professionals.102 One important case in point was that of Adam Adamantos, a leading light of AKEL and Mayor of Famagusta, who at the time of his election had been a master in the gymnasium there but had been forced to give up his job after pressure from the Town School Committee. It was eventually proposed that the Limassol Town School Committee legislation regarding the extracurricular activities of secondary school teachers should be introduced at other secondary schools receiving grantsin-aid, and if a particular school refused to comply, the grant would be withheld.103 Governor Winster believed, however, that instead of asking the committees to adopt regulations it would be more effective if circulars were sent to all schoolmasters, including those at elementary schools.104 The Executive Council thus prepared a circular informing schoolteachers that while they could hold political opinions of any colour and vote in elections, they were not permitted to express their opinions, spoken or written, in public.105 The instructions were to be put into effect at the next municipal elections, since some teachers were intending to stand for election to Town Councils. The matter was raised again in 1948 and in 1949 when a similar circular was sent to schoolteachers: like government officials, school teachers were expected to remain neutral in politics, and failure to do so might lead to dismissal.106 The Director of Education reported that the majority of teachers welcomed such guidance as, by remaining aloof from local politics, it strengthened their position and placed them on firm ground.107 While there were instances where teachers became involved in politics, in general they expressed no objections to being government employees. Up to 1944 the profession was not pensionable, and on their retirement teachers received gratuities. Beginning in 1944, however, though teachers were not deemed public officers and their status was regulated by the Elementary Education Law, they had been enjoying privileges similar to those enjoyed by public officers. This changed in 1947 when, with a new amendment, pensions and a retirement age for teachers were brought in line with those of public

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officers. For the Government this was great leverage over the teaching profession, as compared to the slight leverage it had over local politicians and the Church. Arguably, creating a cadre of genuinely professional teachers resistant to politicisation was a key British objective, and by 1948 the Government seemed to be making some progress towards this, even if this progress was later overwhelmed by the sheer weight of political events. The increasing polarisation within Greek –Cypriot political life was further intensified by the sharp debate surrounding language use in schools. When it was suggested to introduce new text books from Greece which were written half in demotiki and half in katharevousa, the press reacted strongly against this change, while the Pancyprian Teachers’ Organisation declared it felt it was “our duty to retain the old reading books as they constituted a type of connection with our national centre”.108 The desirability of revising the curricula of the elementary schools and of preparing a new set of books designed specifically for Cypriot children was, according to government official John Reddaway, fully recognised. The prewar books were clearly obsolete whilst the new ones, available in Greece and Turkey for supply to Cyprus, were more modern in language and content.109 Language use and medium remained politically controversial, however, and to understand the sensitivities involved we need to say a bit more about the ongoing “language question” in the cultural politics of Hellenism. As Peter Mackridge has described, the contest between demotiki (“popular”) and katharevousa (“pure”) in the Greek language initially arose in the wake of the French Enlightenment, and katharevousa was institutionalised as the language of government, administration, education and the press following the establishment of the Greek state in 1830. Thereafter, there was a growing reaction, not least in some literary circles, against its archaism. The publication of the New Testament in demotiki was a watershed, whilst a principal demand of the demoticists was that the more accessible language should be made the official medium of education. In a reactionary attempt to stave off the demoticists, a clause was inserted in the Greek constitution of 1911 making punishable any attempt to dislodge katharevousa as the official state medium. Despite this, however, demotic texts were introduced into primary schools in 1913, and by 1920 demotiki had established a primacy in the educational sphere. For some years thereafter, however, the situation remained fluid, depending on the government in power.

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During 1941, under Axis occupation, a distinguished Classical scholar was dismissed from his teaching post at the University of Athens after publishing an article with the simplified “accent system”. Also in 1941, the use of demotic took a crucial step forward with the publication of a Modern Greek Grammar under the auspices of the Education Society, which was founded in 1910.110 Gradually this language controversy became part of the Left – Right rivalry, first in Greece and then, inevitably, in Cyprus. During July and August of 1945 the ideological conflict in the civil war became more sharply defined after the Communists and EAM published a radical programme based on the policies they had developed under German occupation. The programme provided for an egalitarian system of education and the use, for official purposes, of the vernacular demotiki. Conversely, the anti-Communists were in favour of an educational system in which Classical and religious studies were a prominent component. The medium of instruction (katharevousa) was the language of the state: it was closer than the vernacular to classical Greek and intelligible only with difficulty to the poorly-educated majority of the population.111 Cypriot political actors responded accordingly to this controversy. The decision of the Greek Board of Education on 10 January, 1947 to promote the new demotic textbooks from Greece, even in the classes currently using katharevousa, provoked vitriolic reactions in the press. Phoni tis Kyprou, for example, called demotiki a “battered and barbarian linguistic idiom” and accused Greek educationalists of wounding Greek civilisation. Politics and language could not be separated. The choice between demotiki and katharevousa involved, not only an attachment to classical tradition, but deep differences over political issues embedded in the controversy itself, and any attempt to enforce innovation under these circumstances was liable to have explosive effects. This was particularly so because the Church had begun to mobilise against the new readers, since they undermined the use of katharevousa in liturgies and sermons. To counteract government activities and propaganda in the elementary schools, the Church had begun to set up new catechetical establishments beyond government control. These establishments taught religious subjects with an eye toward reinforcing the “national” feeling of Greek – Cypriot pupils in elementary and secondary schools. The teachers were recruited from the clergy, and classes were held on Sundays or in the evening.

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While the introduction of the new textbooks was a controversy mostly contained within the Greek–Cypriot community, the introduction of new readers or auxiliary books, as they were usually called, became a matter of debate between Greek–Cypriots and the Government. In December 1948 the Department of Education distributed a circular seeking the views of teachers as to what should be included in new reading material for the older cohort in elementary schools, particularly new material that touched on cultural and social life in Greece and Cyprus. The Government’s aim was to give a Cypriot flavour to elementary education, which could be accomplished only if the textbooks in use ceased to present Cyprus as part of an unredeemed Greek world. Undoubtedly some teachers felt a strong compulsion to stick with the existing texts which had been sent from Greece.112 In January 1949 the Greek press reported that the Education Department of Cyprus had informed schoolmasters that new readers were to be written to replace those in use, and that the Archbishop, the Union of Schoolteachers and other organisations were lodging a protest. The Athenian press was also strongly critical of these measures, which it described as “anachronistic, tyrannical and calculated to undermine Greek national feeling in Cyprus and to cut off the existing ties between the Greek education and the schools in which children of Greek–Cypriots are brought up”.113 Spyridakis, no longer on the Board of Education, wrote to Sleight on behalf of his school’s teachers to protest the introduction of books published in Cyprus, rather than in Greece, to the island’s elementary schools, since such a move was simply another effort to cut the ties between Greek education in Cyprus and Greece.114 Actually, despite the views various actors expressed against such a move, at its meeting on 11 March 1949 the Greek Board of Education agreed the Education Department policy, with regard to this matter, had in general been in accordance with the advice offered from time to time by the Board, and it approved the use of readers written in Cyprus, as well as in Greece, in the schools.115 The Nicosia Greek Schools Committee protested the Government’s decision which the Committee considered “against the Government’s declarations that it will respect the will of the Greek people of the island for their continuation of ties with education of Free Greece” and “a clear injustice of the principles of freedom and the political ethics and offence of the National feelings of the Greek –Cypriots who do not want to be considered as people without a national status, but an un-detached part of the Greek nation with the

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ideals of which they live and which they are prepared to maintain in spite of any plot”.116 Unsurprisingly, the Archbishopric saw this as another attempt by the Government to de-Hellenise Cyprus.117 In tandem, the Central Committee of the Pancyprian Organisation of Religious Orthodox Establishments protested: the replacement of Greek textbooks with locally written textbooks; the prohibition of teachers participating in politics, and the instructions to save time in single-teacher schools by not providing students with religious instruction. The Committee implied that by “persecuting” religious instruction in the schools the Government was promoting Communism.118 Of course this dovetailed with the paroxysm that always characterised the Church’s attitude towards the Government. In fact, the Government was not trying to promote Communism, nor had the Left taken a stand against religion. In the face of such opposition, however, the Government abandoned its plan to replace the readers en masse and instead censored imported schoolbooks if they were deemed subversive and encouraged the publication of auxiliary books by Greek – Cypriot teachers.119 The reactions were similar when the Government introduced its first “model school”, which Spyridakis described as “consistent with the principle of anglicising the elementary schools”.120 This was an unfair critique. The model school had been introduced by Sleight in February 1947 when Agios Antonios elementary school opened in Nicosia. The school was staffed mainly by graduates of the Teachers’ Training Colleges, while the Headmaster and a Chief Assistant master had completed postgraduate studies in England, and the staff had new equipment and teaching aids at its disposal. The school had also been visited by other teachers and students in training and, during the summer, it had served as a demonstration school for a vocation course for teachers.121 During the 1948– 9 school year the Government established two more model schools, Ayios Andreas and Omorfita in Nicosia. Their pupils came mostly from the wealthy classes.122 The Government’s objective with these new schools was to demonstrate and disseminate new trends in elementary education. Sleight, in an article he wrote for The Cyprus Review in 1949, emphasised the considerable strides that had been made in the educational life of the island: he noted how parents were increasingly prepared to make sacrifices for the education of their children, that the schools had been improved, and that the professional

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standing of teachers had been enhanced.123 Yet even though the teachers themselves sometimes shared Sleight’s sense of achievement, the reaction in the press and from the Church was decidedly negative, and church leaders published a circular calling on parents not to send their children to foreign schools likely to erode a proper national consciousness.124 In the following years these “model” establishments, with their more anglicised style, faced increased resistance as the colony’s politics intensified, and this resistance illustrates how difficult and even impossible it was to bring educational innovation to the island, including seemingly “neutral” professional improvement, without becoming caught in the political traps surrounding the entire subject. The model schools were eventually closed once British rule ended because of the criticism leveled at them in nationalist circles and the unwillingness of Cypriots to entertain new educational methods, particularly methods associated with British educational ideals. As it so often happened, the development of the colony’s education system was defined and even distorted by the political contests to which it was organically connected. Within the framework of economic and social development, one emerging educational priority was to give preference to technical and vocational teaching over the classical instruction so dominant in the gymnasia – Cyprus lacked skilled workers but had a considerable supply of lawyers and doctors. According to a report drafted by the Technical Education Committee, following consultation with the heads of the technical departments, the colony’s most immediate requirements for skilled labor would be met by the early implementation of three schemes: the establishment of a comprehensive Apprentices’ Training Centre, the provision for evening classes for those unable to take advantage of daytime education and the construction of a Preparatory Technical School. According to Governor Winster: These schemes go hand in hand and should, to a large measure meet the Colony’s crying need for young men in the skilled trades; a need which will become increasingly felt as established industries expand and new development takes place during the next few years. Added to the demands of private industry are the requirements of Government itself. If the development plans are carried through efficiently, Public Works, the water supply and

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other technical departments will certainly require craftsmen in great numbers and of a higher standard of technical skill than those now available.125 The ultimate object of the Apprentices’ Training Centre was to provide a five-year course of theory and practice in engineering and allied trades – the practical segments of the course, however, would be carried out under normal trade conditions in the workshops of the Government and those of approved private employees. The total cost was estimated at £6,500, with a plan for the Centre to accommodate 100 apprentices by 1950. The evening classes were designed for young men already in either government or private employment who wished to improve their technical qualifications. The Preparatory Technical School was slated to open in 1948 with a twofold aim: to provide practical education additional to the purely academic instruction imparted in the existing secondary schools in Nicosia and to bridge the gap between the elementary school leaving age (thirteen years) and the age at which a boy may be accepted in the Apprentices; Training Centre (fifteen years). The school would provide a three-year course of training and accommodation for 180 pupils, sixty pupils per annum, with a total cost estimated at £8,500.126 Also under consideration were the enlargement of Nicosia Hospital and the construction of a training school and staff quarters for nurses. At this stage British educational policy in Cyprus was not confined to formal schooling. It also had an outreach element, driven by British concerns that enosis (and therefore anti-British) sentiments were beginning to have a greater presence in the rural areas. One scheme under consideration was the extension of village evening classes, under the aegis of the British Institutes, to teach English to youths in villages where no other facilities existed: the scheme aimed simply to extend to larger villages the facilities which the British Council already provided in the towns. The problem was, however, who would sponsor the scheme, the British Council or the Government? Turnbull believed it would be more appropriate if the Council were the sponsor because, if the scheme were sponsored by the Government, “it is certain that village authorities would press for the teaching of Greek, Turkish, History and other subjects as well as, if not instead of, English; the classes would thereby be completely altered in character even if they did not cease to function”.127

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The Secretary of State, however, was of a different opinion. He wrote Winster that he had for some time been uneasy about the large sums of money spent by the Council on the teaching of English at the institutes and in village evening classes. He proposed, with the concurrence of the Council, that the Council should withdraw from providing village evening classes and concentrate on exercising greater influence, on opinion leaders in Cyprus and other interested adults, by developing normal institute activities in wherein the study of British life and institutions played an important role.128 By the end of the decade, however, the British Council decided to abandon the teaching of elementary English on the grounds that education, including the teaching of elementary English, was the business of the Colonial Government. Another reason was the British Council believed it could work more efficiently and more economically by concentrating its efforts on the more advanced teaching in its Institutes and by helping local teachers of English in summer schools. The British Council certainly felt Whitehall neither understood the Council’s work in Cyprus, nor that Cypriots “are for the most part intelligent Europeans and are not primitive. As such, in the cultural sphere which is allotted to the British Council they have stronger claims for help than many colonial or foreign peoples”. G.H. Shreeve of the Colonial Office expressed his hope Wright’s governorship and the appointment of a new British Council representative would inaugurate a new start, adding that the island was also important for strategic reasons, and as such he persuaded the Colonial Office to at least continue allotting to the Council the current grant for their work in Cyprus.129 Shreeve’s plea is particularly interesting because of the widely held view, after violence eventually erupted in April 1955, that Cyprus had suffered because it had been consistently pushed down the pecking order in British colonial expenditure and investment. Sir Charles Jeffries of the Colonial Office explained that the “Council operated in the Colonies as an agent of the British Government and that the full cost of its work in the Colonies (£416,000 in 1949– 50) is carried on the vote for Colonial and Middle Eastern Services”. He therefore explained that the basic aim of this spending was to strengthen the links between Britain and its colonies so that gradual self-government could evolve without undermining the connection to Britain. In the end it was the British Government, he argued, which bore

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the ultimate responsibility for this problem, but the British Council could play an important role by undertaking activities outside the scope of more official organisations. Jeffries added that the Council could do valuable, positive work in countering communist propaganda, and in this light Cyprus was one of the colonies where its work was essential and of immediate importance.130 After six weeks’ stay in Cyprus, the Council’s new representative, John Graham, reported that the movement for enosis was becoming more active and that the British Institutes had been attacked in the press as “agencies of propaganda”, while the Archbishop was now “openly hostile to the Council’s work”.131 To illustrate this he recalled a conversation with the daughter of the editor of a pro-enosis newspaper, who told him many people would have nothing to do with the Institutes because of the statement published in the Cyprus Mail that the money spent by the Council in Cyprus “would one day return dividends in the shape of thousands of young Cypriots turning their backs on enosis and clamouring for the British way of life”.132 “This had made us appear in the eyes of the general public as a purely propagandist agency”, he said, and “it is certain that the British Institutes are, to a considerable extent, boycotted by order of the ecclesiastical authorities”.133 Presently there were five Institutes in Cyprus, and the teaching of English had been given up in all of them by the end of 1948. Most of the work done was “on the lines of an Anglophile society”, as Graham put it, such as lectures, discussion groups, concerts and ladies’ circles.134 Due to the abandonment of teaching classes and to limited resources, the number of British Institutes was reduced from six to three in 1950 and to just one by 1956. Persianis has argued that the Institutes closed down due to the limited response to the Council’s initiative to encourage the growth of friendship between the people of Cyprus and the British and to “assist Cypriots to form a true knowledge of England and English ways”.135 Although a large portion of the population did not speak English, the language was becoming increasingly widespread among the younger generations, mainly due to its introduction to the school curricula, though wider trends in contemporary culture were also relevant here. After all, the emerging world power by the end of the 1950s, even in the Eastern Mediterranean, was the United States. When E.V. Gatenby, Director of the English Department at the Gazi Educational Institute in Ankara, visited Cyprus for two consecutive

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summers, in 1947 and 1948, he was not convinced as to the teaching and use of English in the schools. He prepared a report in which he noted the lack of proper training of teachers, the inadequate teaching of English and the dearth of higher education. Disturbed by the report, G. Sims, Principal of the English School, stood up for the Government’s policies, stating, “it is not in accordance with British colonial tradition to enforce the English language on the whole population of a colony”.136 In 1947 more than 700 pupils had passed English language examinations. The English School was admitting 90 students per year, and several Cypriots had been trained in the UK.137 Winster, however, was anxious about Gatenby’s comments, and he warned London that Gatenby’s regular contacts with Turkish– Cypriots who went to Ankara for higher training would increase “our educational problems here if he does not obtain a correct picture of the scope and prospects of educational facilities in Cyprus”. As for the lack of a university, Winster explained this was due to the island’s small population, the difficulties in attracting overseas students, the strong cultural linguistic attraction offered by the Universities of Athens, Istanbul and Ankara and the large number of students who attended universities in the United Kingdom. Contrary to Gatenby’s assertion that very few students went to English or American universities, Winster pointed out that, since 1945, 250 students had been admitted to colleges and universities in the UK and the USA.138 It seemed that, despite the continuous attacks launched in the press by educators, various sectors of Cypriot society appreciated the Government’s educational policy. Whilst these educational developments were taking place, the general political situation on the island had entered an acute phase. At the first meeting of the Executive Council of 1949, Winster, disappointed by the failure of the Consultative Assembly in which he had reposed “high hopes”, tendered his resignation: The action of certain members of the Assembly, in refusing what was possible because they were not given what it would have been disastrous to grant, was in itself a reflection upon the sense of responsibility with which I had credited them, and upon their fitness to exercise the powers they were demanding. I yield to no one in my regard for the intelligence of the people of Cyprus, but good government demands progressive experience of the exercise

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of high authority such as cannot be gained overnight. It was just that experience that I saw to secure under adequate safeguards for the chosen leaders of the local community. Winster’s resignation met with sympathy from the Colonial Office, which did not assign blame to the former Governor for economic and political developments in Cyprus. The Sunday Mail stated that Cypriots were so divided politically that it was impossible for the Governor to straddle the divide, nor should Winster be blamed for the island’s economic crisis, since he had urged Cypriots to save, in the hope of averting such a crisis.139 According to the Cyprus Mail, the Turkish – Cypriot community regretted Winster’s resignation, while his Greek – Cypriot driver was sufficiently devastated to remark to one expatriate: “Even when my father died I didn’t cry; but when I heard that Lord Winster was leaving us I did. He is such a good man”.140 Winster was replaced by Sir Andrew Wright, who was instructed by the British Government to “keep things quiet” and “to keep Cyprus out of the news”.141 Wright, who had been Governor of Gambia, had served in Cyprus for many years as Sir Ronald Storrs’s private assistant and as Colonial Secretary under Sir William Battershill. As Robert Holland points out, Wright’s instructions from the Labour Government included a cautious reminder “not to miss an opportunity to get constitutional life going again in the island”. There was little chance, though, that a man described in the Colonial Office as a “fine Victorian type now almost extinct in the British Colonial Service”, one who “looked upon the Cypriots somewhat as children who needed a firm hand [and] . . . an occasional spanking”, would do any such thing.142 By the summer of 1949 the atmosphere in Cyprus was tense. The Church, now under the guidance of Makarios II, had impressed on almost all of the Greek –Cypriots parties the doctrine of “enosis and only enosis”. The Ethnarchy urged all Cypriots to reduce their contacts with the authorities to administrative matters only, a move seen by Fisher as “the strongest since the war”.143 The Ethnarch’s remarks were made in response to an increasingly widespread desire amongst members of rightwing parties to bring about a rapprochement with the Government. An instance of the sensitivities involved was the question of attendance, at least for those invited, at the ceremonial parade and reception at Government House on the occasion of King George VI’s birthday.

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Prominent members of the Greek–Cypriot community with longstanding links to the Government, such as Sir Panayiotis Cacoyiannis, were sure to go. But even the Mayor of Nicosia, who did not, still sent a letter of congratulations, which British officials interpreted as reflecting his desire not to burn any bridges. Certainly at the event itself there was no shortage of Greek–Cypriots in attendance – indeed, in some ways relations between the English and Cypriots had improved since the 1930s. Battershill, who had returned to Cyprus after nine years away, observed that “today Cypriots and Englishmen are getting together in a way that would astonish anyone who lived here in the thirties . . . [The] Troodos club is full of Cypriots. In the Kyrenia club one sometimes sees more Cypriots than English, a state of affairs which would have been impossible ten years ago”.144 This rapprochement can be explained as a reaction to the Left and its desire to become the leading political power in the island, and it would not be erroneous to suggest that some right-wing personalities saw in the Government a plausible ally against a shared enemy. This was, after all, taking place against the backdrop of a bloody civil war in Greece which had by this time reached its peak of violence and had left the country materially destroyed, emotionally devastated and, of course, politically divided. As Close argues, both sides, in Greece and in Cyprus, turned to foreign patrons for support – the Right to Britain and the Left to the Soviet Union.145 There were obviously more complicated patterns at work than a simple British – Cypriot dichotomy. At the municipal elections of 22 May 1949 the left-wing majority of 1946 was ousted by a large right-wing majority, though the Left triumphed in Famagusta. Violent clashes resulted in two fatalities and fifty minor casualties. In all of the towns more than 90 per cent of the electorate voted. J.S. Bennett comments that the results show that both parties were “equally wedded to enosis and opposed to the British connection”. This was all too true. Despite their grave disagreements, both the Left and the Right were in favour of enosis, and by the end of the decade Greek nationalism had reached such a level that even Turnbull began to depart from his earlier assertion that the largest part of the population did not want enosis: “If Greeks were asked today at a referendum for union, probably 100 per cent of then would say yes because the question for them is not if but when”, and he attributed this to the persistent irredentist propaganda from Greece which London had

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failed to halt. “Greece’s prestige was increased due to the fight against Communism and Greek– Cypriots, fearful of Communism turned to the Church and through it to Greece”.146 In September 1949 the civil war in Greece came to an end after the left-wing Democratic Army suffered a decisive defeat on the massif of Grammos on the Albanian frontier.147 Both the Cyprus Etharnchy and AKEL interpreted the return to relatively more normal conditions in Greece as an opportunity to make progress on resolving the future of Cyprus and in shaping that future according to their own and very different notions. On 21 November 1949, the Ethnarchy Council, the municipalities, the political parties and other associations signed an appeal to the UN to accuse Britain of denying the people of Cyprus their right to self-determination under the UNO charter. Everyone believed that Greece would stand with Cyprus and persuade its friends at the United Nations to grant self-determination to the island. Greece, however, was still unable to pursue a policy independent from Britain. While discussions were taking place in and outside the Greek Parliament, Prime Minister Tsaldaris felt bound to declare that Greece would continue its policy of addressing the question of within the context of the Hellenic Republic’s cordial relationship with Great Britain. As such, the prospect of a successful appeal to the United Nations seemed dim, but the Greek – Cypriot community was determined to petition for self-determination. To support the appeal to the United Nations, on 1 December 1949 the Ethnarchy announced a plebiscite on enosis would be held in January 1950. It was, in fact, AKEL that had initially proposed a plebiscite, in September. After the Ethnarchy had rejected AKEL’s proposal to cooperate on an appeal to the UN, the party decided to send a letter the Security Council and the Secretariat of the United Nations to condemn the regime in Cyprus and suggest that any doubts regarding the desire of the Greek– Cypriots for enosis would be obviated by a plebiscite held under UN supervision.148 The Ethnarchy, however, refused to permit AKEL to take the lead in the enosis struggle, and it made the plebiscite its own. According to the Ethnarchy’s announcement, widely reported in the press, in the event the Government refused to carry out the plebiscite, the Ethnarchy would do so itself. The reply to the Archbishop’s letter of 4 December from the Cyprus Government merely stated that the issue of sovereignty over the island was completely and permanently closed. Two days before the

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referendum of 15 January 1950, the Governor requested a grant of special powers to curb press activity, prosecute sedition and, under a new Deportation Law, to act decisively against troublemakers.149 In the Turkish press the plebiscite was described as a harmful step, and it pressed the Government to take action to prevent disturbances. The Turkish National Party informed the Secretary of State that in a huge meeting in Nicosia on 11 December 1949, the Turks of Cyprus had passed a resolution against enosis: Such a union, if realised, would bring economic ruin, racial and social disorders and a civil war into Cyprus and will thus derange the peace of our island and probably of other Middle East countries. We believe that it is essential for the security of the island and the protection of minorities and a balanced defence of the Mediterranean to continue the status quo in Cyprus. Therefore there is no utility in applying a plebiscite in Cyprus. Nevertheless, if Great Britain will ever wish to abandon the Island then we claim for it to be returned to Turkey, the nearest neighbour and the only state in the near East able to properly defend it.150 The voting took place, however, between 15 and 22 January 1950, and the entire week was calm and without incident.151 The result of the referendum was 96.5 per cent in favour of union with Greece. In light of later events, the resulting deadlock between Britain and the Greek– Cypriot community heralded an era of bitter political conflict. In the aftermath of World War II, Cyprus entered a period of political instability, one marked by a sharper division between the Right and the Left, by Britain’s determination to hold onto Cyprus, and by growing Turkish nationalism. These parameters inevitably affected relations within the Greek –Cypriot community, deepened the gap between the Greek –Cypriot and the Turkish –Cypriot communities, and eroded relations between the Government and Greek– Cypriots. The education system became an excellent example of the extent to which political developments had now infiltrated every aspect of Cypriot life. The relations between Right and Left were dealt a severe blow as a result of the civil war in Greece: during the Consultative Assembly this polarisation became acute on the island and was reflected in the schools, in the language controversy and in the active participation of some

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teachers in political affairs. Both sides had one shared goal, however, which was enosis, and this posed an intractable problem for the British administration. At a time when Cypriots were asking for nothing less than self-determination, which they hoped would lead to enosis, Britain could only offer the island a revised constitution coupled with social and economic development (many of which were significant). After the watershed year of 1947–8, the British Empire had entered a period of rapid political change, and London sought to retain its military facilities in the Suez Canal and to maintain its sovereignty over Cyprus. Cypriot nationalist sentiment reached new heights during the postwar era, and it was then that even the more sceptical colonial officials came to realise the desire for enosis ran uniformly throughout the entire Greek – Cypriot community and educational issues, riddled with suspicion and contrary visions for a future direction, became intertwined with enosis agitation. The Church, the Greek – Cypriot press and educators all attacked the Government for its determination to retain control over elementary education, to continue financing the Teachers’ Training Schools, to introduce new teaching methods and techniques, and to replace the textbooks imported from Greece. All of these endeavours were interpreted as part of a comprehensive effort to anglicise Greek– Cypriot youth and were vituperatively resented. Meanwhile, a revived Greek nationalism and the failure of the Consultative Assembly contributed to the surge of Turkish nationalism which, like Greek nationalism on the island, was also expressed through educational demands. Turkish –Cypriots made their opposition to enosis perfectly clear and, taking advantage of the flexibility they maintained during the constitutional discussions, they intensified their connection to their own “national centre”, again through educational links. As a matter of course, the postwar period in Cyprus saw inter-communal relations sustain significant damage. In the years ahead, many of these fissures were to deepen and become far more acute. We shall see that in the period leading up to the uprising of 1955, education, always closely interwoven with Cypriot politics, would move even closer to its very heart, not least through the mobilisation of youth in the national struggle.

CHAPTER 6 A CHAOTIC SITUATION: THE ROLE OF SCHOOLS IN THE PREPARATION FOR THE REVOLT, 1950—5

The first half of the 1950s was one of the most turbulent periods in Cypriot history, as the ground was prepared for the armed revolt in 1955 that ended in 1960, not with enosis, but with independence. These years were crucial in shaping the history of the island. In 1950 Makarios III was elevated to the leadership of the Cyprus Church, ultimately to become the most important political and religious personality in the island’s modern history. At the same time, the involvement of a Cypriot-born general in the island’s affairs, George Grivas, was to lead to the outbreak of the EOKA revolt, one of the most important anticolonial movements of the twentieth century. Alongside the ascension of Makarios III and the EOKA uprising, in 1954, for the first time, the Cyprus issue appeared on the agenda of the United Nations, heralding the internationalisation of the Cyprus problem. Against all these significant developments, education in Cyprus remained a crucial political problem. Indeed, politics and education were never so interwoven as during the years before and after the beginning of the armed struggle. This chapter will not explore the detailed political narrative of the first half of the 1950s, including the emergence of EOKA, but it will focus on the implications political developments had on the education system, the logic behind certain educational decisions

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and the participation of the schools in the preparation for and the conduct of the revolt. In the aftermath of the plebiscite of 1950, the Church emerged as the most fervent and loyal supporter of enosis, thereby decisively reasserting the religious flavour of Hellenic nationalism.1 Perhaps inevitably, the plebiscite triggered Turkish– Cypriot reaction. An early indication of how growing Hellenic nationalism exacerbated the growing distance between the two communities was the flag episode in Paphos. In February 1950, members of the town’s Muslim community welcomed a group of Turkish students with flags depicting a red and white map of Cyprus with a star and a crescent superimposed on it. The flag infuriated the Mayor of Paphos, and his supporters mobilised their own mass of Greek flags and slogans, including placards declaring, “Welcome to Hellenic Cyprus”. The incident alarmed the Government, which considered reintroducing the Flags Law of 1931, but the Colonial Office believed this legislation in particular “would bring Britain to a far more openly anti-enosist position than any other law” and would “incidentally put [paid] to any hope of concessions to Hellenism”.2 It was decided that prior to granting Governor Wright the powers he had been requesting so as to implement more repressive policies in Cyprus, the Chiefs of Staff were requested to reassess the strategic value of the colony to Britain. In anticipation, a memorandum compiled jointly by the Colonial and Foreign Offices in April stated, “the cession to Greece of sovereignty over the only British territory in the Eastern Mediterranean, even if accompanied by the retention of all necessary strategic facilities would be regarded as another manifestation of the growing weakness of the United Kingdom” and “would strengthen the hand of those who are working to persuade the Arabs that their future lies with Russia and not with the Western powers”.3 Issued in June of 1950, the Chiefs of Staffs report duly precluded the abandonment of Cyprus, their contention being continued British sovereignty over Cyprus was essential to the United Kingdom’s interests in the Middle East, and it was recommended that this arrangement should be preserved as long as the United Kingdom wished to retain its position in the wider region.4 Uncertainty about Greece’s political direction – despite the defeat of the Communists in 1949 – helped undermine any idea of transferring Cyprus to Greece whilst retaining base areas, as the Athenian authorities suggested.5 Middle Eastern strategic requirements

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and apprehension about the spread of Communism were, therefore, the two most important arguments against the cession of Cyprus to Greece. In the following years, this preoccupation would come to define British attitudes towards the increasing clamour for self-determination. Ironically, Greek–Cypriot rights also feared Communism, not least within educational quarters. In April 1950 six students of the Pancyprian Gymnasium were expelled by the headmaster, Constantinos Spyridakis, who found them guilty of initiating a Communist conspiracy, after school authorities found books by Stalin and left-wing leaflets in the students’ possessions.6 These “Communist” leaflets included the poem Dodekalogos tou Gyftou by the great Greek poet Costis Palamas and poems by Cypriot poet Tefkros Anthias.7 Meanwhile, the Greek general elections in March 1950 resulted in a victory for the Conservatives and, for the first time, the Chamber included deputies from the Dodecanese; this renewal of Greek territorial expansion helped to fuel Greek–Cypriot expectations.8 The latest political developments in Greece and, of course, the results of the plebiscite in Cyprus furnished Greek–Cypriot politicians and the Church with the confidence to promote their cause. Accordingly, an Ethnarchy delegation travelled to Greece to ask the Government’s support in taking the Cyprus issue to the United Nations. The mission failed to do that but it did make headway towards injecting Cypriot inspirations into the mainstream of metropolitan politics in Athens, and in that sense the spirit of Hellenism over the Cyprus question contributed to the knitting-together of a society torn apart in a civil war.9 The delegation toured all the main Greek cities and handed over the plebiscitary volumes to the Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament in a crowded meeting at the Athens Stadium on 21 July10 – mass meetings in favour of enosis were also held in Salonika and all the other large towns in northern Greece. On 26 July the Greek Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution stating: “if the members of the House of Commons raise the voice on behalf of the union of Cyprus with Greece they will perform an act of justice” and “fortify the age long ties of friendship existing between them”.11 For the Foreign Office, Athens’ reception of the delegation amounted to interference in the affairs of the United Kingdom and the establishment of a dangerous precedent. “The Greek Government”, it announced, “would realise that with the Cold War in its present phase any agitation by the Cypriots was playing straight into the hands of the

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communists”.12 The Ethnarchy delegation arrived in London on 3 August. The Secretary of State, Jim Griffiths, refused them an interview, and the delegation decided to hold an island-wide rally upon its return to Cyprus. The Governor refused to permit the rally, and this created a path for an appeal to the United Nations, a course of action the Church had already contemplated. Another delegation, this once comprising AKEL members and representatives from left-wing trade unions, met a similar response in London. On the way back to Cyprus, this delegation wrote Griffiths that his refusal to meet with the delegation constituted an admission by the British Government that it had decided to maintain its policy in Cyprus irrespective of the wishes of the people, and that these people “will continue to fight for their national freedom”.13 While the Ethnarchy delegation was still in Athens, on 28 June 1950, Archbishop Makarios II died. The next day, at his funeral, the managing Committee and Executive Council of SEKA (Coordinating Committee of the Cypriot Struggle) named the Bishop of Kitium as their candidate for Archbishop,14 and on 18 October Makarios III was elected Archbishop of Cyprus. Thirty-seven years old at the time of his election, Makarios III was born Michael Mouskos on 13 August 1913 in the village of Ano Panayia in Paphos. His farmer father, unable to pay for his secondary education, agreed to enrol him, as many poor families did, as a novice at the Kykkos Monastery, which provided a good standard education for the first three forms of the six-year secondary course, and the Abbot subsequently helped Mouskos finish his secondary education at the Pancyprian Gymnasium. In 1938 he was ordained Deacon and took the name Makarios. He then won a scholarship from Kykkos to study Theology and Law at the University of Athens. He received a scholarship to study for a higher degree in the Sociology of Religion at Boston University, which began in 1946 and, in 1948, while still studying in Boston, Mouskos received a telegram informing him he’d been elected Bishop of Kitium, and he returned to the island.15 With Makarios as Archbishop, the Cyprus issue entered a new, combative phase in which the international arena offered a fresh – though dangerous – outlet. Meanwhile, support continued to come from Athens, much to Greek– Cypriots’ satisfaction, as such encouragement hadn’t been the recent norm. On 21 January 1951 the Pan-Hellenic Committee for the Union of Cyprus with Greece held a meeting to mark the first anniversary of the

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plebiscite in Cyprus.16 On 15 February, at the opening session of the Greek Chamber, Prime Minister Venizelos, challenged by the opposition, declared, “ever since 1915 the demand for union of Cyprus with Greece had been stated systematically” and that it still “constitutes the ardent desire both of the Cypriot and Greek people”.17 The University of Athens was the most vocal supporter of the enosis cause. At a mass meeting on 15 March 1951, students from the University of Athens, the Athens Polytechnic and other schools passed a resolution calling on the Greek Government to raise the question of Cyprus with the British Government and, if this “just Pan-Hellenic claim” was not satisfied, to bring the matter before the United Nations. Around 10,000 demonstrators then marched through Athens, carrying placards and shouting slogans, to the hotel where the Archbishop of Cyprus was staying. The Archbishop thanked them from a balcony and promised to convey their greetings to their brothers in Cyprus. He expressed confidence that the Greek Government would lay the matter before her friend and ally, Great Britain and if need be, before the United Nations.18 In the meantime, in Cyprus, 25 March, Greek Independence Day, was celebrated widely with parades and school celebrations, athletic contests, folklore dances and flamboyant speeches.19 The Archbishop eventually returned to Cyprus on 13 April. A fortnight later, Clifford J. Norton reported from Athens that a storm had been raised in the Greek press by the publication on 22 April of an interview in which the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs was reported to have said the geographical position of Cyprus in relation to Turkey, the presence on the island of many fellow Turks and Turkey’s historical ties to Cyprus naturally gave Turkey a lively interest in the island. “The Turks”, he said, “saw no reason for a change in its present juridical status. But if a serious question of a change developed they would be unable to allow it to be resolved in a manner contrary to their rights”.20 Greece was getting more involved in the Cyprus issue, but Turkish interest in the island was also increasing. Amidst these political developments, in the summer of 1950 two new elementary education reforms were responsible for renewed controversy over education on the island. The first of these reforms was the censorship of readers and the publication of new auxiliary books for History, while the second was the tax on behalf of education: the former should be analysed as part of the general political context created by

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increasing enosis propaganda. Resistance to educational plans was mainly organised by the Educational Council of the Ethnarchy, which was appointed by the Holy Synod on 17 April 1950 and comprised the Archbishop, an Archimandrite and three secondary school headmasters, one of them Constantinos Spyridakis. The Council soon became a shadow policy-making authority in the Greek education of Cyprus.21 In June 1950 the Director of Education, Dr G.F. Sleight, authorising readers for elementary schools from the Greek Ministry of Education, requested the deletion of a map showing Cyprus as part of Greek territory and an enosis poem titled “Cyprus Irredenta”. The Committee of the Pancyprian Teachers’ Organisation, a registered trade union of leftist elementary teachers, protested to the Director of Education that this intervention was “bold and tends to suppress national feeling of Greek children of Cyprus”, and they accordingly petitioned the Greek Minister of Education to reject the Director’s request – the Governor then dismissed these seven teachers for failing to obey the educational regulation forbidding schoolteachers in government service to advocate a change of sovereignty in the colony.22 The leftist tendencies of these individuals of course coloured the Governor’s decision: in its letter to the Colonial Secretary, the Committee defended its actions, as its duty was “to keep vigilant over the genuine national education of the children and consequently on the material to be taught”. They added that, according to the Conventions approved by the Government: One of the objects of the Organisation was the improvement of the elementary education in accordance with the Cyprus Greek reality. And Cyprus Greek reality in this case is: That the pupils are Greeks, the schools are Greek and the culture must necessarily be genuinely Greek; that Cyprus forms an inseparable part of Greek civilisation and culture and that the aspirations for the national rehabilitation of the island are general among the Greeks. The effort of concealing the reality and truth on these questions is, in our opinion, contrary to the fundamental principles of education. In this spirit and in our effort to serve the Greek Education of the island we took the steps referred to in your letter.23 Eventually, of the seven teachers only two were allowed to remain in their posts, while the other five were dismissed temporarily, and this

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was questioned both in Cyprus and in London. George Thomas, MP, wrote to Griffiths, “there is certainly a prima facie case for a thorough investigation into the attitude adopted by the Governor”, as it was deemed autocratic, an allegation with which Griffith disagreed.24 In a letter to Thomas, the Teachers’ Organisation said the map which so offended the Director of Education did not in fact show Cyprus as part of the Greek state, but simply served as an illustration that the island was Greek in civilisation and culture and formed an integral part of the Hellenic world: “The statement that Cyprus has never formed part of Greek territory is wrong and calls for an answer in as much as Cyprus was part of the Byzantine Empire (which was Greek) for 800 years”.25 Subsequently, only one of these five teachers “unreservedly recanted his act of insubordination”, and he was reinstated as a member of staff.26 In September, the Executive Committee of the Organisation sent a letter to the Governor to express its regret over the incident, particularly as the extraction of the map had been approved by the Greek Ministry of Education, and to seek the re-appointment of the four remaining dismissed teachers, a request the Governor refused.27 This affair provided a clear example of the real dilemma facing many Greek – Cypriot teachers: they were affected by the growing clamour for enosis but were reluctant to prejudice the improving conditions of their employment. Financial leverage over elementary schools was indeed a powerful weapon in the Government’s hands. Another example of the conundrum facing Greek– Cypriot teachers had its genesis in the attitude of elementary school teachers, in contrast with that of secondary school teachers, towards such issues as textbooks which, although educational in nature, were of course pregnant with important political implications. In October 1951 the headmaster of the independently funded Pancyprian Gymnasium unleashed an attack on the new auxiliary texts on the “History of Greece and Cyprus” which had been published by the Education Department for elementary school forms III and IV. Spyridakis said the Department’s argument against auxiliary books was flawed in purely pedagogical terms, whilst their special production in Cyprus and England, even though perfectly good auxiliary texts could be readily procured from the ministry of Education in Greece, was merely an attempt to erode the foundations of Hellenic culture:

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If that is the policy of the Department of Education it is time we initiated a crusade against this policy of the Government. We want Greek auxiliary books and the primers in elementary schools and not Greco-British devices of the Department of Education here . . . We want our children to be educated with the same means with which other Greek children are educated . . . And we cannot tolerate the educational independence cultivated by the Department of Education gradually, carefully, systematically and sometimes very quickly with a view to undermining the island’s national claim.28 The criticism voiced by the Church and in various educational circles made the Department of Education reconsider, even though by 1953 Sleight had organised a plan for the efficient preparation of auxiliary books.29 At the beginning of 1956, the question was reviewed by the Government and, following discussions with the teachers’ unions, of the 24 books approved for the curriculum, only three (Composition, Grammar and Arithmetic) were to be written and printed in Cyprus.30 The second issue put under scrutiny was the cost of elementary education and the extent to which this could be covered by general taxation. At the Executive Council meeting on 30 October 1951, the Governor invited a general exchange of views on the report of the Committee of Elementary Education on funding matters. During the meeting, the Council, excepting the Commissioner of Labour, favoured a proposal that in the future the entire cost of elementary education should be paid with government revenue and therefore form part of the colony’s financial estimates. An increase in the Immovable Property tax for educational purposes was rejected, since any such increase in taxation, imposed simultaneously with the Government taking full responsibility for the provision of elementary education, would diminish any political advantage it might otherwise accrue.31 During its subsequent meetings, the Executive Council decided the Government was prepared to take complete financial responsibility for elementary education: specifically, the Government should give a per capita grant of forty shillings for every pupil attending school in the six district towns and twenty-five shillings for pupils elsewhere. Annual grants of £10 per teacher were to be made to schools not qualifying for the per capita grant, whilst an amount of £6,500 per annum would be

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allotted to the Director of Education to distribute grants for the improvement of buildings.32 Such financial disbursements increased the Government’s popularity and helped mitigate negative reactions to the increased government control that accompanied the money. Besides, during the year many improvements were made in various educational projects that were beneficial to local communities. The grants given to elementary schools, for transport expenses to and from small villages, to the English School and the Blind School, and for the training of Cypriot staff abroad had all been increased. A new Rural Central school for Turkish students was established in Pergamos, while Greek students continued attending the Rural School in Morphou.33 Influenced by the pro-enosis atmosphere in Cyprus and Greece, seventy-eight representatives of Greek secondary schools recognised by the Ministry of Education in Athens34 gathered on 3 May 1951 in Nicosia for the First Pancyprian Educational Conference. Everybody agreed that education in the colony needed to be developed and in the least made more universal, but the question was on what cultural and political bases. Present at the Conference were Archbishop Makarios and several other senior clerics, the Greek consul, the President of the Nicosia Schools Committee, Socrates Evangelides, Mayor of Nicosia Themistocles Dervis, the President of the Paphos School Committee and the Secretary of the Ethnarchy Office. Archbishop Makarios, in his speech, said that despite all the difficulties facing the Greek people of Cyprus, its national character and education had not changed, and all these laws with which the Government tried to disengage education from the Church had invariably failed. Spyridakis, who was elected President of the Conference, said secondary education was in bigger jeopardy than ever, and that the Greek –Cypriot community must not lose control over it. He therefore proposed the Church should take over secondary education and form an Educational Advisory Body that would remain in continuous contact with the School Committees – a central educational fund provided for by the churches and other lay contributions would sponsor secondary schools. Spyridakis also called on the school committees to recognise the authority of the Church, to decline government grants and to refuse any alteration to the curricula. He then proposed a cooperative effort between the Church and the unions for the establishment of agricultural and technical schools, and that the training colleges should break free from government control.

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Spyridakis’s proposals were eventually adopted by the Assembly.35 The Church, which during the Ottoman period and for the first 50 years of the British administration had been in charge of most schools in Cyprus, had never accepted the diminution of its influence. It was of increasing importance that the Church defends its stake in the secondary schools, and its young, dynamic, educated Archbishop enhanced its credibility in this respect. Makarios, who was keen to take more active control over education, immediately indicated he was willing to subsidise all secondary schools not in receipt of grants-in-aid to enable them “to maintain their pure Hellenism”.36 From now on, professional teachers and the Church would be in direct communication regarding all matters relating to secondary education, something bound to cause considerable problems for the Government. In December, Makarios wrote an encyclical to school teachers attacking the Government’s educational policy. He referred in passing to all of the educational measures taken by the Government since 1923, the object of which, he said, was to “cut all ties between our Greek education and our free Mother Country, Greece”, he condemned the policy of allocating grants-in-aid to secondary schools: It is obvious that these Government measures aim at cutting all ties between education in Greek Cyprus and education in free Greece, the ultimate object being to create nationally colourless young men and gradually to achieve the de-Hellenization of the island’s Greek inhabitants. We denounce to the Greek people of Cyprus and the whole civilised and freedom-loving world the new designs of the British Government upon what is sacred to us, such as the education of our children. Protesting against the continuation of these antiHellenic measures of the foreign Government we call on the whole of the Greek people of Cyprus to make a stand against Government policy and to protest against it.37 The publication of the encyclical was followed by a lengthy wrangle in the newspapers between Spyridakis, who argued that the Government exploited educational grants as a means of checking the growth of enosis, and Sir Panayiotis Cacoyiannis,38 the Chairman of the Limassol Town School Committee, who vigorously denied such conditions had ever been imposed on or accepted by the Limassol School in exchange for a

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grant-in-aid.39 According to the political report for the month, the public was satisfied Cacoyiannis was the winner, since “a gentle reference in one of his letters to the ease with which patriots on the one hand and traitors on the other are created in Cyprus was particularly telling”.40 Sir Panayiotis Cacoyiannis was a former member of the Advisory Council and enjoyed the respect of both Cypriots and the British. Whilst by no means insensitive to Greek – Cypriot aspirations, he was not an ardent enosist. Here was a further illustration of how education served as a dividing line between those who interpreted what it meant to be both a Greek– Cypriot “nationalist” and a Hellenist in rather different ways. By the end of 1951, the Government realised that, since it was almost impossible to enforce loyalty in the schools, it had to at least deny them any further financial help.41 In the new year, though, it became imperative for the Government to face the emerging challenge in the secondary schools as embodied by the January manifestations in favour of enosis in all the major towns, wherein schoolboys actively participated. At the outset of 1952, both the Ethnarchy and the Communists were preoccupied with rival plans for the celebration of the second anniversary of the plebiscite. Apprehensive about possible clashes, the Governor prohibited any public assembly between 11 January and 15 January.42 Despite the Government’s warning, small gatherings were held in every major town, and schoolchildren played a conspicuous role. Party rivalries, however, were prominent, and each side accused the other of trying to monopolise enosis. Because of the prohibition, Makarios took advantage of the Sunday service on 13 January at Phaneromeni Church in Nicosia to deliver one of his most passionate speeches calling on the people of Cyprus to renew their oath of 1950.43 In front of 6,000 people, he called for the intensification of enosis, while the crowd, which included Communists, nationalists and youths, shouted anti-British slogans. “Every signature to the Enosis plebiscite”, he said, “was a pitiless J’accuse against the foreign ruler who keeps the Cyprus people enslaved under the unjust law of material might and force.”44 Makarios promised to succeed in bringing the Cyprus question to the United Nations, with or without Greece’s support, a pledge that signalled both his determination to intensify the struggle and the great confidence he had in himself as the Ethnarch of Cyprus. Most importantly, this speech was characterised as a “Call to Youth”,45 with the inauguration of the Pancyprian National Youth Organisation (PEON) soon to become the nursery of many EOKA

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fighters. He called on the pupils and students to find the courage to fight for enosis: Cyprus’s promising youth, who are the joy and the pillar for tomorrow, are now regrouping and organising their forces and entering upon the road of high ideas with the flag of freedom and justice unfurled. Inside the ranks of our young men, who will be well-disciplined and well-organised, the Pan-Hellenic demand for enosis will gain new strength and new support . . . In their steady hands our demand is assuming a new dynamic character. But through the systematic assumption of these duties their life, too, is acquiring a new meaning and a fullness and securing to them courage and self-confidence, as well as a promising future and genuine and well-understood rights.46 Makarios’s speech marked the beginning of the active involvement of schoolchildren in the struggle for enosis. As Holland has noted, under the Archbishop’s aegis the enosis campaign had grafted onto it an institutional apparatus which it had never previously possessed. This apparatus encompassed the schools (principally through PEON), the farmers and the Free Trade Unions. For many years, enosis had been a high Greek aspiration mediated through the ecclesiastical and professional elite, but whose popular roots had been mostly sporadic in their expression; by early 1952 enosis was on its way to becoming, within the constraints of a small island society, a mass movement with an autonomous institutional life of its own, which was something new and much more dangerous to colonial authority.47 Following Makarios’s speech processions and gatherings were also held in Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos with the participation of hundreds of boys.48 At an Executive Council meeting on 15 January, it was decided the Governing Bodies of secondary schools that had applied for increased assistance should be informed the Government would not authorise any blanket increase in aid but was prepared to accept responsibility for the payment of teachers, on the following conditions: that 20 per cent of students should be admitted for free; that a maximum amount of student fees for each class should be set; that secondary school teachers would enjoy the same conditions of service as elementary school teachers, and that the grant-in-aid for any school participating in the new scheme

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would be discontinued.49 At a meeting held in February in the Colonial Office, Wright suggested teachers in secondary schools should be paid entirely by the Government, including their pensionable rights. In his opinion, this would give them a greater feeling of responsibility towards government and might have a similar effect to what happened after “the putting of elementary school teachers upon the Government payroll. From being the leaders of agitation in the villages the elementary schoolteachers had come to regard themselves as agents of Government”. He argued that, apart from the advantage to be gained from the beneficial effect it would have on the teaching staff, it would also make it possible to reduce school fees and increase the number of students who could attend for free. He therefore proposed an ordinance under which town school committees would be able to apply to be brought within the scheme, but they could make no attempt to influence the curriculum or the running of the school which applied. He underlined that only after the introduction of an inspectorate of secondary schools, to ensure that government money was being used properly, would the Government be able to exert useful influence on the curricula and exercise effective control over day-to-day administration of schools.50 The reform of secondary education was therefore imperative for both academic and political reasons. Following discussions of these proposals, the Acting Director of Education reported to the Executive Council that the Governing Body of the Turkish Secondary schools had indicated its readiness to accept the Government’s offer, with some conditions. The Governing Body sought guarantees that the Headmasters and Headmistresses of Turkish secondary schools would be either Cypriot Turks or Turkish nationals, and that its advice would be sought by the Director of Education whenever he had occasion to engage secondary school teachers from Turkey. The Governing Body also asked for an increase in the number of teachers in Turkish High Schools and for the recognition of Turkish national and Muslim religious holidays during the school year.51 As in the past, the Turkish community was the first to accept the Government’s educational proposals, seeing them as a way to make up for the existing gap in the quality and provision of education between the two main communities. For Turkish – Cypriots, a greater degree of state control was an acceptable price to pay to secure these gains. We should note that while Turkish – Cypriots had hitherto been happy

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with English Headmasters in their Secondary Schools, as in the Turkish Lyce´e and Victoria High School, they now demanded these positions be held by Turkish nationals or Turkish – Cypriots. This was indicative of the increasing interest of Turkey in educational and political affairs on the island, which went hand-in-hand with rising nationalism within the Turkish – Cypriot community. It was therefore decided a scheme should be submitted to the Secretary of State to request his permission for the preparation of the bill along these lines. This scheme would enable the Government to respond to requests for financial assistance from Turkish secondary schools and requests made by other schools, such as the Limassol Gymnasium, for substantial increases in their financial grants. Furthermore, it was decided individual teachers should not be allowed to remain on the old terms of employment if the Governing Body of their school accepted the Government’s offer. Most importantly, under this scheme, the proposed limit of £24 per pupil per annum for school fees in the top classes would be reduced to £15 per annum for all classes, so as to continue the general trend toward wider provision.52 Makarios sent a letter to schoolteachers to assure them the Church recognised their work but also reminding them some teachers were not making the “necessary efforts to create the Hellenic consciousness in their pupils and content themselves with disseminating the knowledge laid down in the curriculum”, an attitude tantamount to “treason to their national mission”. This was essentially a call to schoolteachers to more actively instil Hellenic ideals in their students, to enhance their national feelings and prepare them for the struggle ahead: If for the furtherance of the national struggle of the island the cooperation of every Greek –Cypriot is needed, the positive contribution of all Greek teachers of the island, in whose hands the cultivation of the new generation is entrusted, is still more needed . . . The teachers must proudly remember that the priests are the religious and themselves the national and intellectual shepherds of the communities they serve . . . The complete subjugation of the elementary education of our country aims at de-Hellenising our children. But we must not allow such a thing to happen. We have a responsibility towards history. We are sure that the Greek teachers of Cyprus will rise to the height of the traditions which have been bequeathed to them by their high national descent.53

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In March 1952 Wright went to London to discuss the measures to be taken to prepare the ground for the introduction of a constitution with the Colonial Office. The Secretary of State, however, thought that given colonial difficulties elsewhere, as in Malaya for example, Cyprus “should probably be left undisturbed as long as possible”.54 Wright’s request for the introduction of repressive measures was therefore rejected as likely to make matters worse, rather than better. The Governor’s return to Cyprus on 9 April triggered rumours of a constitution to such an extent that the Archbishop felt it “incumbent upon him to embark upon a more vigorous campaign for the cause of enosis”. Two days later the Ethnarchy Council met to receive a report on its representatives’ activities in Paris during the last General Assembly of the United Nations and, at this meeting, it was decided to convene a Pancyprian National Assembly on 25 April to restore public confidence in the national struggle. The Assembly was largely composed of right-wing groups and was much less representative than its name suggested. The Archbishop told his audience that the Cyprus question was now in the limelight of international politics and that it might become necessary to call upon the people to follow a more uncompromising line and, if needed, “we shall cease paying taxes and declare civil disobedience”. The Bishop of Kyrenia and Spyridakis yet again accused the British of de-Hellenising Cypriot education,55 and the General Secretary of PEON suggested that all those who had received British decorations during the Coronation should return them “if they wanted to be called Greeks”. The assembly passed a resolution denouncing the British regime and calling on the Greek Government to take up the Cyprus question at the United Nations.56 It was at this time that the new Council of the National Students’ Union in Athens (EFE) declared, to Makarios, its commitment to the national struggle of Cyprus.57 The enosis rally in Athens on 8 May, followed by the Archbishop’s mission of enlightenment to neighbouring countries, which was the commencement of his “non-aligned” stance, stimulated further enosis agitation. School demonstrations took place in several cities but principally in Famagusta, where about 250 boys and girls of the Communist-inclined English High School disrupted traffic. In Nicosia it was again in the two left-wing secondary schools where demonstrations were intended, though the discreet presence of the police prevented any trouble. According to security reports, the right-wing Pancyprian Gymnasium only withdrew

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from the planned procession to the Archbishopric when it seemed the demonstrations were to be under the control of the Left.58 Despite their supposedly common aim, left- and right-wing parties and their supporters remained greatly divided. PEON, meanwhile, was gaining ground, and its members spent the greater part of the month daubing paint on walls and streets. The letter “A”, which stood for Antistasis (“resistance”), was particularly popular, while a slogan painted on the wall of a monastery in Larnaca read “Greeks, liberty is won with blood – enosis. A.A.A.”59 During the next month the Archbishop paid numerous visits to various sympathetic Greek politicians in Athens to request the referral of the Cyprus question to the United Nations General Assembly. While in Athens Makarios had a secret meeting with Grivas, and their communion, along with several associates, in a “Holy Sacred Oath” binding them to the cause of enosis, was followed a few days later by the establishment of EOKA.60 George Grivas – known as ‘Digenis’ during the revolt – was born in 1898 in Trikomo, in Famagusta. He attended the Pancyprian Gymnasium and in 1916 earned a place in the Military Academy in Athens – in 1919 he was placed on active service in the Greek army. During the German occupation he was arrested, and he continued his activities underground. He formed royalist, paramilitary groups comprised of “trustworthy Greek Officers” which became the nucleus for his “private army”, “X”, after the Greek letter which symbolised the unknown, and he turned against the Communists and the British. In 1944 he was arrested by the Greek Government. He returned to Cyprus in 1951, after twenty years away, and proposed guerrilla warfare against the British to Makarios. At their meeting on 2 July 1952, Grivas told Makarios they should prepare a two-pronged attack, with guerrillas in the mountains and saboteurs in the towns, but Makarios was sure not even 50 men would be found who would follow Grivas. Nevertheless, after several discussions, in October Grivas began implementing his plan, travelling back and forth between Greece and Cyprus. At this stage he put much emphasis on mobilising Greek – Cypriot youth through PEON and its fellow Church organisation, OHEN,61 and the nucleus of the organisation was soon formed in and around the five main towns. Every member was administered a solemn oath, which is today known as the EOKA oath. In February 1955 Grivas issued detailed instructions and orders regarding the objectives of the organisation, which was eventually named EOKA.62

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To mark the occasion of Makarios’s visit to Greece, PEON held a proenosis meeting in Nicosia followed by a procession through the town calling for the British to leave Cyprus and asking for American help to liberate the island. As a result, proceedings were initiated PEON members for taking part in an illegal assembly – the case was heard on 29 July.63 The General Secretary and a Committee member were fined £5 each, and the others were bound over to keep the peace for two years.64 The Government was determined to discipline PEON and reduce its level of activity, since it saw the organisation as the main instigator of the growing dissent in the schools. PEON was not the sole nuisance for the Government, however, when it came to juvenile disturbances. For their part, Turkish–Cypriots were becoming more ardently nationalist and anti-government, both in the press and in their public activities. For instance, on the annual sports day of the Victoria Girls’ School, government officials were prevented from attending. “Never before”, said the political report, “has there been any question of playing the Turkish National Anthem at this function, nor of the girls forming pyramids in the shape of the Turkish star and crescent, as happened on this occasion”.65 On 16 July 1952, the Government was finally in a position to issue a Secondary Education Bill which addressed the alarming situation in the secondary schools. Accordingly, a new category of schools, the “Public Aided Secondary Schools”, was to be created, in addition to the existing two categories (those which received grants-in-aid from the Government and those which did not). For those schools in receipt of such aid: the Government would pay the salaries, pensions and gratuities of all teachers; the teachers would be appointed by the Government after consultation with the governing body of the school concerned; the Government could remove any pupil from the school if it chose to; tuition fees would be limited to £15 (compared to the usual amount of between £28 and £50; 20 per cent of pupils would be admitted free, and the curriculum could only be varied with the permission of the Director of Education. Finally, the governing bodies would be appointed by the Governor and empowered to regulate admission, attendance, discipline, punishment and expulsion of pupils. 66 The Greek press and the Turkish press immediately attacked the bill. The cry of de-Hellenisation of Greek– Cypriot youth had become common in the Greek newspapers, which accused the Government of attempting to bribe the teachers and the Town School Committees to

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relinquish their national aspirations in exchange for material benefits.67 Negative reaction to the bill also arrived in the form of telegrams from various organisations. Pezoporikos Athletic Club, in a cable to the Colonial Secretary, accused Britain of “the worst type of pharisaism”, for “its actions are different from its declarations” in international organisations.68 Trust Athletic Club protested the bill, which “aims, by affording financial assistance, at subjugating the national education of the island” and it claimed the effort of the Government was futile because “no Greek will sign an application to ‘sell’ the Greek education of the island to the Government”.69 Right-wing municipalities also sent telegrams to the Colonial Secretary, as did organisations such as the Cyprus National Party, OHEN, the Gymnasium Committees, Women’s Organisations and Religious and Cultural Societies. AON said the bill was “anti-popular and undemocratic”: “a Government which is not accountable to the Cyprus people has no right to interfere with the people’s educational matters”. AON suggested the withdrawal of the bill, the resignation of the appointed School Committees, and that “administration [to] be entrusted to the elected Municipal Councils in towns”.70 AKEL also sent a letter of protest regarding the Government’s effort to “weaken the national liberation struggle of the Cypriot people” and “strangle the free and democratic thinking of the teachers”.71 As for the Turkish press, it attacked the bill for enabling the Government to take over the administration of secondary schools: since the Governing body of each school was appointed by the Government these bodies could no longer be considered representative of the Turkish community, thus the bill merely aimed to “keep the Turks down”.72 In a telegram to the Secretary of State, Dr Fazil Kucuk, on behalf of the Turkish National Party, declared Turkish–Cypriots strongly opposed the bill.73 Nevertheless, on the Turkish side there was some divergence of views. Nedjati Ozkan of the Istikial Party stated: “we Cyprus Turks approve the law and . . . Dr Kucuk and his party don’t represent the Cyprus Turkish Community”.74 The Office of the Federation of Turkish Associations in Cyprus stated: Whilst members of the Community awaited with exercise of selfrestraint the restoration of its rights, the Government sprang a surprise on the Community . . . The Bill would appear to savour of

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a nature calculated to strike at the root of Turkish centres of culture and learning in the island.75 Turkish – Cypriot reactions were suggestive of subtle shifts within a community which no longer unreservedly supported British decisions, including those pertaining to education. Despite this loud chorus of negative reactions to the bill, it became law on 29 August. The only amendment to it was the inclusion of a provision to the effect that, in public-aided schools, the teaching staff would normally be of the same religious denomination as the community to which the school catered.76 On his return from Greece, Makarios lost no time in returning to the matter of secondary schools, which was discussed at a meeting of the Ethnarchy Council, after which the Archbishop stated the Church would tackle the economic problem of secondary education to safeguard the Greek upbringing of the children of Cyprus. The Archbishop, with the agreement of the Holy Synod, published an encyclical to condemn the secondary education bill and announced the establishment of education funds in each district town and a central fund at the Archbishopric. Everyone was invited to support these funds, and the Church opened the appeal with an initial contribution of £10,000 for the settlement of the Pancyprian Gymnasium’s debt and a contribution of £5,000 to the general fund in aid of secondary education.77 Like his predecessors, Makarios condemned foreign elementary and secondary schools in Cyprus and called on parents to refrain from sending their children to such schools, though there was little likelihood his admonition would have much effect.78 AKEL attacked the Church and the nationalists who ignored the demand of the people for cheap education and, at the same time, appeared to be “surrendering the schools to the Government”.79 In a similar vein, Kucuk wrote in Halkin Sesi that 29 August was a day that would “plunge the Turks of Cyprus into darkness and despair”, and he savagely attacked those Turks who had tried to frustrate opposition to the bill.80 Amidst this “terrific hullabaloo”, the Cyprus Mail bemoaned that “rabid nationalism [should] triumph over common sense and realism”: “All this commotion is due to the fury of the Cyprus Church voiced by its Press, at the fear that the control of education in Cyprus may slip out of its hands and that consequently, the coming generation of Cypriots may not become so fervently pro-enosis as their fathers were

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educated to be”. The newspaper, aware of the financial stringencies of the schools, expressed its regret that very few Greek – Cypriot schools would be willing to approve the law, much to the detriment of both teachers and pupils.81 By the end of the 1952– 3 school year five Turkish High Schools – including the Turkish Lyce´e and the Victoria Girls School in Nicosia and the Turkish Technical School at Lefka – had become PublicAided Schools, but the Turkish Lyce´e and the Victoria School retained control over their curricula. The governing body of the Famagusta secondary schools refused public assistance, however, and established the Namik Kemal Lyce´e with financial assistance from Turkey. The Polemi High School became the first Greek secondary school to adopt the provisions of the law followed by the Commercial School of Lemythou.82 On Christmas Day 1952, Makarios, while in the United States, announced that Cypriots residing there had contributed $50,000 to the cause of secondary education on the island,83 and by January 1953 the total contribution from America had amounted to £28,500. At the same time, the Turkish Government announced it would contribute £12,000 to Turkish secondary education in Cyprus, in addition to £4,045 already received from Turkish banks.84 A few weeks prior to these announcements AKEL celebrated the fourth anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights in several towns and villages, where its representative protested the illiberal laws in Cyprus and drew special attention to educational matters. The party called on the Director of Education to cease interfering in the curriculum of schools and demanded both improved local welfare and recognition of the unanimous will of the people for union with Greece.85 Although AKEL and the Church both sought enosis, and each condemned the Government’s educational policy, they remained far apart. With the third anniversary of the plebiscite approaching, AKEL called on the Ethnarchy for joint celebrations, only to be informed that the Right would hold its celebrations on a different day. Right-wing parties, with the support of the Church, seemed to succeed in gaining the upper hand during this period. In May 1953 municipal elections were held, the last before the end of British rule, and resounding right-wing wins confirmed the outright supremacy of the Ethnarchy and the Right, as well as the weakness of the Left, which was unable to impose a political programme of its own regarding the Cyprus Question.86 Greek–Cypriot teachers attempted to effect a rapprochement: the leftist Pancyprian Teachers’ Organisation (PDO) and the rightist Pancyprian

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Organisation of Greek Teachers (POED) organised meetings in December throughout the island, in an endeavour to form a united body. It seems whatever their politics, the teachers must have been rather worried about trouble in their own establishments and keen to see it averted if at all possible.87 A second and disguised measure to control secondary education was under consideration during the summer of 1952, the establishment of technical schools. In February of that year Sleight indicated there was still a great lack of technical education in Cyprus. He informed the Colonial Office the Apprentice’s Training Centre, though it had been operating for five years, was still a pilot scheme, while the Government should assist secondary schools to run technical streams parallel to their academic streams. During this period the Cyprus Mines Corporation had approached Sleight regarding the establishment of a technical school at Xeros, which attracted support in certain Greek business circles; the establishment of a Turkish Technical school at Lefka was in process.88 Sleight’s plans were endorsed by F.J. Harlow, Educational Adviser for Technical Education, who visited Cyprus and came to the conclusion that if the Department went ahead with these initiatives, “industrial leaders in the island will be found most responsive and there is likely to be strong public support”.89 Harlow discussed his ideas with the Commissioner of Limassol, who believed the establishment of a technical school was a much more effective measure to deal with the political situation in the secondary schools, rather than limiting financial support as mandated by the recent education law. The Commissioner saw such government-controlled establishments as a more radical alternative to the classical Gymnasia that had so far been contemplated, and be believed such technical schools would have academic as well as political significance: There is no doubt whatsoever that the whole teaching in the Pancyprian Gymnasium at Nicosia, under the direction of a fanatical, narrow-minded partisan of enosis, is designed to poison the minds of pupils against Great Britain in general and the British Administration of Cyprus in particular . . . With increasing alarm I contemplate the future, when the young men and women now at the Pancyprian Gymnasium will assume positions of leadership in the Island’s community; in 15 or 20 years’ time we

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shall bitterly regret our failure to suppress the poisonous Dr Spyridakis and others of that sort and our failure, if the present opportunity is lost, to provide a sound system of secondary education for the benefit of many children whose parents are more concerned about equipping them with the means to live as decent citizens and to earn a decent livelihood than about preserving the ideals of Hellenic education in the Island.90 He said: “the simplest, most effective and in the long run the most economical course would be to grasp the nettle of de-Hellenization”; to withdraw the offer in the Secondary Education Law; to withdraw the grants-in-aid to existing secondary schools and, as an alternative, to provide well-run and well-staffed government secondary schools where children could receive a quality, low-cost education. Although he was certain these actions would provoke feverish protests, despite the silent support from parents, this was the only way to approach secondary education, “so long as the policy of the British Government is to maintain its rule here, without concession or compromise”. He therefore suggested that since there was a general acceptance among the public of the idea that the Government should provide technical schools, this was an excellent way to control secondary education without exposing the Government to strident opposition. He agreed with Harlow that the schools would be “modern”, not mere trade schools, and the curriculum would include the teaching of modern languages. He stressed that instead of trying to liberalise the Gymnasia by adding some practical work in their curricula, the Government should provide, under the guise of meeting the accepted need for technical education, an effective alternative to the wholly objectionable system of the Gymnasia, no matter how costly this would be, “for it is an investment that will pay handsome dividends in producing a class of educated Cypriots less disposed to disloyalty and subversion and incomparably better to live and work in the world of today”.91 Based on these proposals, in 1953 the Government would prepare for the introduction of technical schools so as to pull pupils away from the island’s classical Gymnasia. Wright informed the Colonial Office that his advisers recommended the establishment of three institutions: a preparatory technical school providing a pro-vocational course for two years for boys leaving elementary school; a technical trades school providing a three-years’

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course, to train skilled craftsmen and to enable students who desire to do so to proceed to the Technical Institute, and a broad-based Technical Institute. Wright averred emphasis should also be given to technical education for women, and that more girls should be sent to England to train as instructors.92 In spite of political tension, the Education Department continued planning for a long-term future. As of 1948 the Treasury in London agreed to a grant of £180,000 from the Colonial Development and Welfare Funds for the extension of the Teachers’ Training College in Morphou and the establishment of a Women’s Training College. Given the difficulty experienced by Cypriot students in securing entry into British Universities, it was decided that the extension of the Morphou College should be deferred pending examination of a project for the establishment of a Cyprus College at which both men and women teachers would be trained, and where facilities for other post-secondary education would be provided. The primary purpose of such an institution would be the training of teachers for the elementary service, but from the outset it would also promote other forms of post-secondary education. Wright proposed the establishment of a single institution within reach of a major town providing accommodation for 120 male teachers and 120 female teachers, all boarders, and for 100 day students; its conditions were to be superior to any existing facility and would permit arrangements much superior to the two smaller institutions. As for the Morphou College building, it could be used as a school for handicapped children, since its tranquility and isolation had recommended it to the Blind Welfare Delegation which visited the facility in 1946. Up until this time no dedicated facilities had been established for the training of secondary schoolmasters.93 The plans for Cyprus College, however, stumbled over financial hurdles. The Colonial Development and Welfare Fund was unable to support a Cyprus College, as it wasn’t a fully fledged university, which the Colonial Universities Advisory Committee had indicated was a prerequisite for such support. Therefore, any funds over and above those already hypothecated for the two teachers’ training colleges would have to be obtained from local sources.94 Wright deployed a series of arguments, including the need for training facilities for secondary school teachers, the elevation of the College to a cultural centre, and that other colonies had obtained grants for similar institutions, all in the hope of

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persuading the Colonial Office the proposed College could eventually become a university and, as such, be given a provisional grant.95 While initial reactions were positive, discussions at the Colonial Office appeared to rule out reliance on Colonial and Development Funds. John Bennett, a Colonial Office official concerned with Cypriot affairs, argued, “there is at present no suggestion that it [Cyprus College] should develop on these lines”.96 Despite this setback, Cyprus was seen as a suitable location for a Forestry School, as proposed by Dr Mouat Jones, who was touring the Middle East under the auspices of the British Council to investigate the possibility of establishing a British technical school for Middle Eastern Countries. The idea of a Technical School was rejected since Cyprus, apart from mining companies, had little industry of note, but Cyprus certainly had forests, and a forestry school could attract students from all over the Middle East. The new Forestry College, at Prodromos, “the only one of its kind in the Middle East”,97 duly opened on 27 February 1951 and admitted its first students in September, 36 in all, fifteen from overseas. The college ran two courses, one for Forest Guards (juniors) and one for Foresters (seniors), each course lasting a year. Instruction was in English, thus all trainees were expected to have a working knowledge of English and some secondary education.98 Since the plans for a college in Cyprus proved abortive, the Education Department had to enhance and develop the existing Teachers’ Training Colleges. Apart from the increase in the number of children attending elementary schools, which demanded an analogous increase in the number of teachers, it was also necessary to improve the training of secondary school teachers. In November 1952, this became a matter of controversy between Sleight and the Cyprus Secretariat when three Greek– Cypriot students at the Teachers’ Training College Morphou received scholarships from the Greek Government to attend the University of Athens. Despite its political implications, Sleight nevertheless welcomed this development, since Cyprus was “desperately short of competent philologists who are at the same time trained to engage Greek subjects”, and suggested all assistance be given to these three students to take up the offer.99 Some officials in the Cyprus Government criticised Sleight’s attitude, as they feared these three students might well return to the island as enosis propagandists. Later on Sleight’s perceived “leniency” was to hasten his departure from the island.

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As for the establishment of a joint college, it was eventually decided it would be built in Nicosia and would accommodate male and female Turkish – Cypriot and Greek – Cypriot students.100 One could say Sleight was actually not being lenient so much as realistic – the additional teachers Cyprus needed were bound to come from Greece, and here lies the paradox. Wright could get rid of all Greek teachers and therefore achieve his aim of eradicating enosis agitation in the schools, but he would shut down the entire secondary system! It was during this time that the matter of female education came increasingly to the fore. In March 1953 Miss Freda Gwilliam, the “star educationalist” at the Colonial Office, as George Sinclair from the Office referred to her, visited Cyprus and prepared a report on the issue. Miss Gwilliam was the first woman educational adviser at the Colonial Office, a post for which, at the age of forty, she abandoned the security and status of a senior teaching position. Her appointment was the beginning of a unique partnership with Sir Christopher Cox, the Chief Educational Adviser to the British Government. During her twentythree years of service, 1947– 70, Gwilliam played a unique role in the promotion of education, particularly teacher training and the education of women and girls, throughout the British Empire. From the outset she proved an inveterate and indefatigable traveller, in an age which largely preceded jet travel, and one of the best-known of the Whitehall advisory staff to numerous directors of education in the far-flung outposts of Britain’s empire. A staunch Anglican, her religious affiliations were to prove a distinct advantage in her dealings with missionary bodies in the colonies. She was a constant and invaluable source of knowledge for Cox. She enabled hundreds of indigenous women teachers from the colonies to study in the UK, and she knew most of them by name.101 Gwilliam observed that, in Cyprus, “socially, women are still greatly segregated since coffee shops were still male preserves and too few women were on committees”. She said the type of secondary education for girls was “a slavish imitation of boys”, though the introduction of Domestic Science helped in this respect. Gwilliam proposed girls be encouraged to join such organisations as Girls’ Guides, the British Red Cross Society and the St John’s Ambulance Brigade. She also suggested Adult Education Centres serve as venues for Women and Voluntary organisations, such as Town Women’s Guilds, as these organisations would broaden civic society. One important effect would be to move the

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island’s everyday politics beyond the male-dominated coffee-shop. In the same vein, Gwilliam raised the prospect of enfranchising women at local elections.102 Sleight also deplored the absence of women from public life in general, which he attributed to the “Eastern character” of Cyprus, but he believed a first step had been made with the appointment of women to education committees. He disagreed, however, with enfranchisement, as “there is already too much politics in Cyprus and too little service”.103 The discussions surrounding Gwilliam’s visit to the island, including expanding the teaching of English in secondary schools and the role of women generally, illustrates how issues of educational reform cut across Cypriot society at a number of sensitive points. As such, they were bound to become embroiled in the rising political temper of the times. The year 1953 was marked not only by increasing political turbulence but, inevitably, by more instability in the schools, and discipline came under strain as pupils were drawn more frequently into anti-British demonstrations. The Turkish– Cypriots, meanwhile, were losing confidence in the ability of the Cyprus administration to control the enosis movement. Their fears led to the formation, in many parts of Turkey, of the Cypriot Turkish Association, which endeavored to bring the problem of Cyprus to the attention of the Turkish Government and the Turkish public.104 During the celebrations for the third anniversary of the plebiscite, secondary school children in Evrychou, Lapithos, Larnaca and Limassol organised illegal processions despite a determined effort on the part of their schools’ teaching staffs to prevent them from demonstrating.105 Immediately following the demonstrations, the authorities initiated legal procedures against the adults and school students who took part.106 One of the cases was heard before the district court of Nicosia on 23 February. The defending Counsel, Mr G.N. Chrysafinis, a former member of the Executive Council, stated: They [the pupils] neither regret nor repent for what they have done and they are ready to suffer any punishment. All the accused without exception stress that they would be unworthy of the culture and education which, as children of the immortal Greek motherland, they received had they not acted in the way they have done. As an advocate I express my astonishment because penal

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measures have been taken against male and female pupils with an unblemished character on the ground that they have marched in procession from their school to the Church to celebrate something which all the Greek– Cypriots feel and honour. Eventually, each student was bound over for the sum of £20 for one year.107 Such costs could be defrayed by the remittances being sent to Cyprus for secondary education by Cypriots living in the United States. At the end of the year, £36,000 was distributed amongst eighteen secondary schools, again with the largest sum given to the Pancyprian Gymnasium. On 27 April, Makarios invited the Governor “to promote the realisation of the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination by giving effect to the verdict of the plebiscite of 1950”.108 Wright merely replied to Makarios that HMG did not contemplate any change in the sovereignty of Cyprus “and regarded as closed the question which you seek to raise”.109 Makarios’s move annoyed the Turkish National Party in Cyprus, which protested that the plebiscite could not “determine the real Cyprus question” and was contrary to British obligations, under the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, to safeguard the Turkish minority in Cyprus.110 Turkish – Cypriots vehemently expressed their dissatisfaction with ongoing developments in Cyprus during a meeting in Nicosia on 17 May, during which the Turkish National Youth Organisation was established. Indeed 600 Turkish– Cypriots attended the meeting, during which they called for the cession of Cyprus to Turkey: The present condition of the Turkish– Cypriots is not satisfactory. Government on one side and the Greek – Cypriots on the other side have mobilised their powers to root out Turkish –Cypriots. Our object is to make Cyprus the sixth province of Turkey and in the very near future we will achieve our purpose. The way which will lead us to success is thorny and difficult but the Turkish blood in our veins will overcome any difficulties we may encounter. We must make the English understand that we are not their “loyal subjects” and servants. We are the sons of a historic nation and we cannot live under slavery. Cypriot Turkish youth is ready to shoulder full responsibility for leading the Turkish people to prosperity and freedom.111

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One speaker made the telling point that the next Mufti should be a real Cypriot Turk of local nationality and not, by implication, a “stooge” of government like the current and previous Muftis – such a Mufti would be able to play a role equivalent to that of the Archbishop of Cyprus. These speeches were frequently interrupted by enthusiastic applause, and references to the British were occasionally accompanied by shouts of “down with them”!112 A couple of months later the Nicosia Turkish National Youth Organisation held another meeting to enrol members and approve regulations. The principal speaker told the assemblage this new organisation would work with the Federation of Turkish Associations to: transfer the administration of Turkish secondary schools to committees elected by Turkish– Cypriots people; hand over the Evcaf to Turkish responsibility; open a secondary school at Lefka free from government control and, should any change of sovereignty be contemplated, to demand the cession of Cyprus to Turkey.113 Following the Nicosia Turkish National Youth Organisation meeting the slogan, “Cyprus is Turkish and will remain Turkish”, appeared on a bus carrying a party of Turkish university students who were visiting the island – the students themselves became involved in unlawful processions and seditious meetings during their visit. The Turkish Consul-General in Cyprus intervened to prevent the appointment of Turkish teachers to the local public-aided Turkish secondary schools, and as a result several schools became seriously understaffed. The Cyprus Government warned Ankara that the Turkish Ministry of Education should not participate in the selection of local candidates.114 There was, obviously, an educational dimension to the deterioration of relations between the two communities. The celebration of the Queen’s Coronation in June 1953 triggered further anti-British demonstrations, with schoolchildren at the forefront. The Archbishop, under pressure from the Bishop of Kyrenia, called for a total abstention from the festivities, whilst both the Right and the Left distributed anti-coronation pamphlets. PEON was entrusted with disrupting the Government programme but, by the end of the month, the district towns were nonetheless decorated and illuminated, and most shop windows in the main shopping centre of Nicosia were sporting tokens of the Coronation.115 In Larnaca there were performances of Coronation films for schoolchildren at the Pallas cinema, Coronation ceremonies at elementary schools and a free showing of a

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Coronation film at Rex Cinema for schoolchildren. In the same spirit, government representatives made a series of visits to elementary schools in Larnaca, during which Coronation mugs were presented to all the children in the top classes and representatives of all the other classes – Coronation medallions were also distributed.116 During the Coronation festivities the students of Morphou College performed Oedipus in the ancient Roman Theatre of Soli: this combination of a colonial “British” loyalism alongside a significant expression of Hellenic culture was the essence of the local imperial ideal. It validates Persianis’s view that there was no organised colonial government propaganda to “de-Hellenise” the Greek students or “de-Turkise” the Turkish students and instill in them new national loyalties.117 The towns may have been decorated in British colours, but most Cypriots were determined to boycott any royal celebrations. On 31 March, in Larnaca, hundreds of Coronation mugs intended for presentation to elementary school children were smashed inside school premises.118 In Nicosia, on the evening of 31 May 1953, 200 to 300 right-wing students from Pancyprian Gymnasium and another Nicosia secondary school formed a rowdy procession which visited the Archbishopric, the Greek consulate and the main shopping area, where they spat on windows decorated for the Coronation and smashed two of them. On the evening of 1 June a riotous clash occurred between the police and around 800 Paphos secondary schoolboys, who demanded the removal of Union Jacks from the local stadium.119 The clash assumed an anti-Turkish character when some Paphos youths stoned Turkish elementary schoolchildren who had entered the town to take part in the Coronation celebrations.120 This and similar incidents, a byproduct of the mobilisation of juveniles, contributed to the fatal alienation between the island’s largest ethnic communities. Wright noted with alarm the aggressive and violent behaviour of the students at two Paphos secondary schools, Paphos Gymnasium and Paphos College – the gymnasium was a public secondary school managed by the Town School Committee. According to the Director of Education, the students and masters at these schools had a striking record of pro-enosis activity over the course of several years, and their headmasters were unable or unwilling to exercise proper control over staff and secondary students.121 A few days after the disturbances in Paphos, the Town Court tried thirteen youths and seven adults charged

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with taking part in demonstrations at Paphos. Twelve of the youths were sent to prison for six weeks, and one was bound over for two years; on 24 July, the headmasters of the two Greek secondary schools in Paphos were suspended under the provisions of the Secondary Education law.122 On 28 June 1953, during a passionate speech at Phaneromeni Church in Nicosia, Makarios declared that even if Britain considered the question of Cyprus closed, “the question is open and will remain open and will be closed only when Cyprus is united, as it will be, with Greece . . . Freedom is not given as a present but is gained as a reward of struggle”. He demanded the Greek Government bring the Cyprus question before the United Nations and seek for the application of selfdetermination. ”We neither depend entirely on the United Nations”, he said, “nor do we entirely rely on the Greek Government, we merely rest on our strength, and chiefly we rely on our struggle here within the island”.123 The meeting was attended by a mass of students, people from rural districts and members from the Right and the Left. As Cyprus Government Colonial Secretary John Fletcher-Cooke reported, “the Archbishop found some difficulty in leaving the Church after the service owing to the enthusiasm of the Communist leaders, who tried to draw him and the Bishops into forming a procession”.124 The Daily Mail reported on 29 June that Archbishop Makarios invoked the example of the Mau Mau in Kenya, telling Greek– Cypriots, “Britain never gives freedom to the people of Colonial territories unless they ask for it forcefully”.125 By that time Greece had decided appeal to the United Nations, paving the way for the internalisation of the Cyprus problem when, after a meeting between Greek Prime Minister Marshal Papagos and Anthony Eden in Athens, on 23 September, the latter refused to discuss the issue of Cyprus, and this meeting was regarded as one of the most important factors in persuading Greece to appeal to the UN.126 Greece did so without undermining the role of Alexis Kyrou, who had served for many years as Greece’s permanent representative at the UN and, in 1954, as the Secretary-General of the Greek Foreign Ministry. Kyrou had been proclaimed a persona non grata by the British, and had been deported, after the events of 1931, for actively supporting the cause of enosis. After the events in Paphos and Nicosia, the Executive Council unanimously decided, for security reasons, to take a larger measure of control over the conduct of secondary schools, as it was obvious the

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colonial authorities now viewed the schools as part of a wider security problem. A solution was, for the moment, found in the form of an amendment to the Secondary Education Law so that the members of Town School Committees would be limited to nine, thus the appointment of any seditious individuals to the Paphos Town Committee could be terminated. The Council hoped its immediate response in Paphos would demonstrate to the Government that it would not hesitate to replace School Committees in other places: These proposals represented the speediest and most effective method of securing a larger measure of Government control over activities of staff and students of secondary schools which is necessary if these schools are to be prevented from developing rapidly . . . into hotbeds of irresponsible nationalism with a consequent threat to public safety.127 On 5 July an amendment to the Elementary Education Law was published regarding the appointment of Town School Committees – they would henceforth comprise fewer than nine members, and membership would no longer be restricted to those of Greek Orthodox faith. This was followed on 16 July by the termination of the appointments of the members of the Paphos Committee and the nomination of three Greek–Cypriot civil servants in their place. Makarios said this law constituted “the most terrible blow on our national education, strangling what little education freedom is left and affronting elementary human rights in the meanest way”.128 Spyridakis characterised it as “the most fearsome weapon in the hands of the Government against the national education of the island”.129 AKEL also denounced the measure, declaring the incidents in Paphos merely provided an excuse for the Government to impose repressive measures.130 On 13 July the Ethnarchy informed the teaching staff of the Paphos Gymnasium it was prepared to pay each teacher one year’s salary, provided they would refuse to accept appointments made by the new school committee, but the following day, at a staff meeting, the offer was unanimously rejected.131 Clearly the Ethnarchy’s offer provided little compensation for the material risks they were being asked to take. Similarly, although a right-wing campaign was in effect to prevent any “traitor” – a term increasingly in vogue – from applying for the advertised post of Headmaster at the prominent Paphos Gymnasium,

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several applications were nonetheless submitted.132 Money remained an important lever in the Government’s hand in the educational sphere. Still, when the new school year began that fall and the new committees assumed their responsibilities, the authorities remained nervous about the maintenance of discipline in the schools. Meanwhile, PEON was declared illegal, and its network of clubs refused to register. As Holland has argued, this was probably a mistake, because at the youth level it inspired dissent before government security organs had penetrated this stratum of Greek –Cypriot society.133 On 16 July the Archbishop launched another broadside against the new educational law, accusing the Government of aiming to de-Hellenise the Greek people of Cyprus by appointing members of school committees regardless of their race or creed: Confronted with this danger let us reply to our ruler with courage “No”. We shall not allow the foreign Government to subjugate our schools through its organs. We rather prefer to close them down and re-establish the clandestine schools which operated during the dark ages of the Turkish rule than allow the Government to become master of our holy and sacred possessions. We shall react with all our power against the foreign Government’s plans regardless of the consequences for which the oppressing Government will be solely responsible.134 For Makarios, the involvement of schoolchildren in the “national struggle” was now a key part of his strategy. He believed control over the schools would give the Church greater leverage in society and strengthen his position against the authorities. While Grivas would recruit youth for EOKA in the following years and involve them in sabotage, Makarios would appeal to them with emotion and rhetoric – both methods made Greek– Cypriot schoolchildren an indispensable part of the armed struggle. Taking a position as to whether or not this was legitimate or ethical would be a bold thing to do but, either way, Cypriot education was clearly sustaining tremendous damage. On 9 February, Governor Wright left Cyprus for retirement after a long tenure on the island. The Greek– Cypriot press seized the occasion to publish some harsh comments. Alithia said there was “nothing to be counted to his credit”, whilst Neos Democratis compared him to the

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detested Palmer, architect of the post-1931 repression.135 Ten days later, on 19 February, Sir Robert Armitage arrived in Nicosia. Holland notes that it was the unfortunate fate of Sir Robert Armitage, previously Chief Secretary in the Gold Coast Colony, to succeed Wright as Governor of Cyprus at such a difficult juncture. He was a man of limited ability, modest imagination and sincere and well-meaning convictions. When he arrived in Nicosia he carried with him no political programme to offset his own natural indecision, since the Colonial Office still maintained there was “no seething discontent, chronically threatening internal order” on the island which might have justified a more dynamic approach.136 In February 1954, discussions began in Whitehall regarding the intention of the Greek Government to bring the Cyprus issue to the UN that September unless Britain agreed to bilateral talks with Greece, but these talks were never a realistic possibility. Early diplomatic action was required to ensure a satisfactory attitude among delegations in New York.137 According to Armitage, in presenting the case of Cyprus to the American public, emphasis could be given to the Communist danger and to the Island’s strategic value.138 The United Kingdom Delegation at the United Nations was instructed that the most important strategic consideration with regard to Cyprus was that continuing British sovereignty on the island guaranteed Britain’s continued presence in the Middle East.139 The prospect of an appeal to the United Nations filled Greek – Cypriots with hope that they were a step closer to selfdetermination, and various non-political bodies re-asserted their commitment to enosis. On 6 March 1954 the Greek Intellectual Club of Cyprus (Ellhnikό6 Pn1ymatikό6 Όmilo6 Kύproy), presided over by Spyridakis, organised a conference. In attendance was the editor of Neos Kypriakos Fulax, who suggested the establishment of a Pancyprian National Union of Cypriot Scientists which would, with the cooperation of the Ethnarchy, wage a more active national struggle and take over the cultural life of the island. The suggestion was unanimously adopted, and the participants then shouted enosis slogans and sang the Greek national anthem.140 At the end of April, OELMEK (Greek Secondary School Teachers’ Organisation) held a general assembly on the occasion of Greek Foreign Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos’s statement, in Paris, that Greece demanded of Britain nothing more than the introduction of a constitution enabling the Cypriots to finally decide their fate within a

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certain time limit.141 The Assembly passed a resolution assuring the persistence of Greek educationalists in demanding enosis and the satisfaction of the national aspirations of Greek– Cypriot people. The Assembly suggested teachers should stop teaching to protest the Government’s intention to transform the Pancyprian Gymnasium into a public-aided school, and they called on students to stop attending classes until the Government reversed its decision.142 The visit of the celebrated Greek poet, George Seferis, at the Pancyprian Gymnasium in the spring of 1954 enhanced the militant mood.143 Against the background of this popular and cultural swell, the Government was increasingly drawn to the idea of cutting it off at one of its principal roots, the schools. With the enactment of the Secondary Education Amendment Law in April 1954, any teacher who wasn’t a British subject and a native of the colony (which meant the exclusion of Greek and Turkish nationals) could be appointed to the permanent and pensionable staff by the Governor after consultation with the governing body – the law also enabled the Director of Education to track appointments more carefully with the creation of a Register of PublicAided Secondary School Teachers.144 According to the report, the amendment was introduced to give the Governor the power to see that all registered secondary schools functioned properly, and that the Governor could intervene to impose conditions on the control, management and conduct of a school otherwise liable to be struck off the register, rather than striking the school off the register at once when it was determined to be administered improperly.145 The Governor informed the Secretary of State this was done “for mere political reasons as it tends to achieve the desired purpose without making it too conspicuous and thus entailing much adverse criticism”.146 Reaction in the Greek press was similar to that during the previous July, and the Greek– Cypriot newspapers accused the Government of intervening in Greek secondary education. On 3 May the Greek Government issued a statement supporting the just request of the 400,000 Greeks of Cyprus who, “trusting in the ideals in the cause of which English and Greeks fought side by side, desire to share the destiny of all the other Greeks”. They warned the British Government that, should its negative attitude towards Cyprus continue, Greece would be left with no alternative but to make an appeal to the United Nations to include the Cyprus issue on the agenda of

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21 September 1954.147 This was bound to encourage even hesitant Greek– Cypriots to enter a hard political contest. The Commissioner of Paphos noted that even the Government’s most loyal supporters were beginning to waver, and he interpreted the conduct of government employees at a recent sports meeting at the Paphos Gymnasium as “an indication of how deeply enosis agitation is penetrating”. The Greek flag was the only flag flying, and the meeting ended with the singing of the Greek National Anthem. The Commissioner pointed out that this was the first time in many years that civil servants had participated openly in activities of a “seditious nature”, indicating “how far the rot of enosis has spread”. The Commissioner of Limassol had a similar impression during a Welfare Department conference in Platres attended by the whole of the judiciary: “Cyprus is passing through one of these circles when nearly everyone – Turks, officials, villagers, possibly even the politicians themselves – have got to believe that enosis is on the way”.148 Indeed, the higher reaches of British officialdom in Cyprus, for the first time, really, began to feel the situation was slipping from their control. Although an older rhetoric of continuing ‘Development and Welfare’ under beneficent British rule continued to be espoused, not least by the Secretary of State for Colonies in London, in Cyprus it now rang hollow. The major review of the Cyprus issue on 29 June 1954, chaired by the Minister of State, Selwyn Lloyd and attended by Ambassador Peake, who was brought home from Athens, was crucial in trying to reassert the status quo in Cyprus. Amongst the key principles established were “any British statement of policy for Cyprus should declare self-government and not self-determination to be the ultimate goal. Cyprus should remain a Commonwealth fortress” and “bad relations with Greece (are) the inevitable price we must pay if we (are) to keep Cyprus”.149 In early July the Government announced the British Middle Headquarters for Land and Air Forces in the Middle East would be moving from the Suez Base in Egypt to Cyprus. The Suez Canal Zone experience confirmed British fears that leased bases or installations were not sufficient, since they depended on the goodwill of the host country, and thus Whitehall was convinced it should retain full sovereignty over Cyprus.150 It became axiomatic at this point that maintaining full control over Cyprus was essential to the fulfillment of British strategic obligations, both in NATO and in the Middle East in general.151 Taking all of this into consideration and in pursuit of American support at the United Nations,

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on 23 July the British Cabinet approved both the terms of a parliamentary statement on the future of Cyprus. This statement proposed the announcement of the introduction of a constitution, to attract the moderates, with self-government as the ultimate aim, and an “anti-sedition warning” to be issued simultaneously in Nicosia – the goal being to crush enosis from both sides. As Armitage had noted, “there was no point making a stern declaration in Westminster unless it was linked to moves against sedition in the colony itself”.152 On 28 July, in Parliament, the British Government’s intentions regarding the future status of the island were made clear. The proposed new constitution, though it offered some progress towards selfgovernment, was even less progressive than the arrangements of 1882, as it provided for a majority of appointed members in the Cyprus legislature.153 During question time, junior Colonial Office Minister Henry Hopkinson “went completely off his prepared brief” and made a statement which generated fierce reaction in many quarters: It has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances can never expect to be fully independent. [Hon. Members: Oh!] I think the right Hon. Members will agree that there are some territories which cannot expect to be that. I am not going as far as that this afternoon, but I have said that the question of the abrogation of British sovereignty cannot arise – that British sovereignty will remain.154 Despite Hopkinson’s protestations that his remarks weren’t made explicitly in relation to Cyprus, his words inevitably reverberated in Cypriot affairs, increasing the clamour for enosis and uniting the island’s political parties. The General Secretary of AKEL, Ezekias Papaioannou, asserted that Communists, nationalists and the Church had achieved unprecedented unity.155 During Makarios’s sermon at Phaneromeni on 22 August, the presence of the Left was facilitated by free transport provided by the Church.156 Makarios, in a fervent and enthusiastic speech, which was to became known as the “Phaneromeni Oath”, called on the Greeks of Cyprus to swear they would remain “loyal till death to our national cause, enosis, and only enosis”.157 In contrast, Turkish – Cypriots expressed their satisfaction with the statement in Westminster

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and declared they were prepared to accept the constitution with adequate safeguards.158 At a meeting at St Sophia Mosque organised by Kucuk’s National Party, over 10,000, Turkish –Cypriots approved a resolution to the Secretary of State stating they desired the continuance of British sovereignty and rejected enosis or any form of self-government. They also asked that the proposed Constitution safeguard the rights and interests of the Turkish Minority: they demanded equal rights, administration of the Evcaf by an elected committee and control over their own secondary schools, including elected committees.159 Accordingly, the AttorneyGeneral of Cyprus permitted the re-enforcement of the Cyprus Criminal Law of 1929 and the Press Law of 1947 to suppress seditious activities.160 As a result, a general strike was held on 12 August, and for three days about 15,000 Greek – Cypriots participated in the general strike and concomitant pro-enosis demonstrations. Demonstrations in support of enosis took place in Athens, with the University of Athens at the forefront. Professor Daskalakis, the Rector, declared “an active struggle for the liberation of Cyprus from foreign repression” and withdrew English from the university curriculum. Whilst reaffirming the University’s commitment to Anglo-Hellenic friendship, including intellectual exchange, he stated that under present circumstances solidarity with the people of Cyprus had to take precedence161 (his patriotism aside, the Rector’s contract wasn’t renewed the following August). Other intellectual elements in Athenian society were less restrained in a telegram to the British Embassy in which they declared that as long as Cyprus remained under British oppression “we will not refrain from inspiring the Greek people with wrath and hatred against the British”. They promised that in every educational establishment the freedom of Cyprus would become “a national idol”.162 In such a milieu, the appeal to the United Nations was celebrated all over Greece. Thousands of Greeks filled Constitution Square when the Archbishop of Athens, Spyridon, almost drowned in applause, addressed himself to the “noble and liberal British people”, the vast majority of whom, he claimed, did not support their Government’s policy on Cyprus.163 On 22 August 1954 Makarios sent a petition to the UN SecretaryGeneral requesting the inclusion of the Cyprus question on the agenda of the General Assembly. At the same time, Savvas Loizides, a prominent member of EOKA and a close accomplice of Grivas, informed Grivas he

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was not hopeful about the outcome of the Greek recourse to the United Nations and, therefore, no further delay ought to be permitted in going ahead with guerrilla operations in Cyprus. Preparations thus began accordingly, with Grivas and Makarios meeting four times between 1 and 12 October 1954.164 In September a Greek –Cypriot delegation led by Makarios himself left for the United Nations, whilst a parallel Turkish – Cypriot group, encouraged by the British, followed. At a meeting with the Secretary of State, Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Turkish – Cypriot delegation reaffirmed its opposition to any change in British sovereignty over Cyprus and was assured by Lennox-Boyd that their rights would be protected in any new constitution.165 Meanwhile, on 24 September 1954, the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly voted in favour of the inscription of the Cyprus issue on the agenda. The British mobilised support to prevent the passage of any resolution; on 28 October 1954 Lennox-Boyd made a statement in the House of Commons to reaffirm HMG’s position on the question of Cyprus and quash all discussion about affairs on the island. Criticism of Britain’s handling of the Cyprus issue was becoming embarrassingly widespread, especially regarding its anti-sedition laws and the constitutional stalemate. Defending the sedition laws, which had been passed in 1931, the Secretary of State parried that “the agitation by certain Church leaders and by the Communists for enosis must not be allowed to obscure the real achievements of British rule in Cyprus especially since the war”. He admitted that constitutional progress had so far lagged behind economic betterment, but that the policy of the British Government was to encourage political responsibility, within the framework of a new constitution, as the first step toward internal self-government. Agitation for a change of sovereignty would only hamper these efforts: “in the present troubled state of the world we cannot foresee a time when a relinquishment of our sovereignty over Cyprus would be compatible with our responsibilities for security in the Middle East”.166 By this stage, however, there was little chance any Greek –Cypriot protagonists would accept anything less than self-determination. In an interview with Neos Democratis, the leader of the Left, Papaioannou, rejected the idea of any colonial-type constitution barring the way to enosis.167 The Bishops of Kyrenia, Paphos, Kitium and Papastavros Papagathaggelou, the priest at Phaneromeni, were all preaching for

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enosis. British manoeuvres to prevent this activity were closely examined, especially when it came to educational matters. The Educational Council of the Ethnarchy issued an appeal to parents and Greek school authorities to boycott the Educational Department’s new school journal, Pure Magazine, to protect the “national conscience” of Greek –Cypriot children. The Council criticised the magazine for making no reference to the original settlement of Greeks in Cyprus, or indeed to anything Greek in Cyprus, and for failing to stress that one of the greatest achievements of Alexander the Great was spreading Greek civilisation across the known world: “Cypriot children are not cosmopolitan but Greek, with Greek consciences, and they should only read magazines of that nature”.168 The Governor responded that their complaint was invalid, since every issue contained at least one article on a Greek theme. He described the new magazine as one that could not be used for propaganda purposes, as it was of a strictly non-political character, was published in Greek and Turkish – not English – by Greek and Turkish–Cypriots and contained nothing more than educational material for the two top classes of elementary schools.169 The Council also labeled a pamphlet called Evening Institutes a “farce”, and that “English cunning” was seeking, under the pretext of education, “to corrupt the soul of our children”.170 Cypriots even stopped listening to broadcasts, or to play football in schools, since the sport was considered very “British”. Students in Paphos boycotted shops where the proprietors were loyal to the existing regime, such as those shopkeepers who had served Mukhtars in local administrations. More than ever, indiscipline in schools became a troublesome issue for the colonial administration. In a pamphlet issued by the Secretariat titled Monopoly of Enosis it was underlined that although there was little opportunity for indoctrination in the elementary schools, this was not the case in the Greek – Cypriot secondary schools. “Secondary education in Cyprus strives to be more Greek than Greeks”, since these schools were seen by the Communists and the Church as fertile ground for political propaganda.171 Very soon, however, even elementary school children would be drawn into the struggle. Papastavros Papagathaggelou admits in his memoirs that in the beginning of December 1954, at a meeting with Grivas, the General asked him to start recruiting people to become members of EOKA, and Papagathaggelou naturally turned to OHEN, for he

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believed for “a struggle of life or death, these people should be conscious Christians”.172 Preparation for the revolt was well underway, and Greek – Cypriot youth were destined to play a prominent role. Yet, despite what was happening, a number of British in Cyprus still believed the status quo was not in jeopardy. Battershill, who was now a permanent resident of Cyprus and Governor of the English School, told his mother: “You need not trouble yourself about Cyprus going to Greece. If the English language means anything then Cyprus will remain part of the Empire”.173 Such sang-froid was to last a bit longer. On December 15 the UK succeeded in persuading the members of the General Assembly to vote for a resolution deferring, for an unlimited period of time, further consideration of the Cyprus issue. The resulting protests, with Greek–Cypriot youth at their epicentre and very much involving school cadres, marked a fault line in the developments that followed. On the morning of 16 December there were several outbreaks of indiscipline in a number of schools. Three days later, at the Pancyprian Gymnasium in Nicosia, a group of about 150 senior boys set off in a procession but were, with difficulty, forced by the staff to return to the school as they neared the American consulate. From the Famagusta Gymnasium a party of 300 marched through town shouting anti-British, anti-American and enosis slogans. They were soon joined by pupils from other schools, and the procession, now numbering about 1,000 students, finished at the stadium, where they took an oath to faithfully serve their country, Greece, and if need be to shed the last drop of their blood for liberation. There were also demonstrations by elementary schoolchildren in a number of villages. The colonial authorities believed the news supplied by Athens Radio and supplemented by reports of students demonstrations in Athens and Salonica taken from Greek newspapers stimulated reflexive action in Cyprus. Apprehensive of still more serious consequences, the Department of Education sent the Governing Bodies of all secondary schools a warning, calling upon them to preserve law and order or pupils and teachers would be dismissed and the schools closed down.174 On 18 and 19 December 1954 peaceful mass protests broke out spontaneously throughout the island. The Greek Delegation to the United Nations accused the Cyprus Government of embarking on “a policy of brutal repression in order to stifle any expression of the will of the people”. The delegation also condemned the

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use of British troops against “peaceful and disarmed demonstrators”, something that “gives rise to the Cypriots’ legitimate fears concerning the real purpose of the influx of British military forces in the island” following the evacuation of the Canal Zone. “The bloodshed has started in Cyprus”, the delegation warned.175 Among the 135 people arrested and fined following the demonstrations, the majority of them were under twenty years-old; seven were school pupils. The United Nations debate over Cyprus and its aftermath marked the beginning of a new phase in the struggle for enosis and led to the outbreak of armed revolt in April 1955. The December demonstrations were just the beginning of a much more active enosis campaign in which schoolchildren were to play a vital role. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the plebiscite, in January 1955, Archbishop Makarios made a passionate speech at Phaneromeni extolling enosis and rejecting any constitution that would prolong the “slavery of Cypriots”.176 His speech was greeted with cries of “shame”, ”The English must leave” and ”Freedom or Death” from the younger members of the congregation. Makarios made clear that while the Greek Government would take the case of Cyprus to the UN, the struggle was now primarily one for the Cypriots themselves. This message, that Greek–Cypriots couldn’t simply rely on Greece, that they had to rely on themselves, became a hallmark of Makarios’s position on enosis, and the involvement of the schools – those quintessential Greek– Cypriot Institutions – became even more important in this context. Makarios also seized the opportunity to attack the Government’s educational policy: “If the Government implements its threat to close our schools we shall organise underground schools”. He urged his listeners to do their utmost to oust the British, but he reminded them that they weren’t fighting the English people but the policy of their government, with which many in England, including the press, disagreed.177 Indicative of the opposition the British Government faced in London, indeed, was the article by Richard Crossman, MP, in The Sunday Pictorial. Crossman characterised the situation in Cyprus as an example of “blind folly”: Unlike other peoples in the Middle East, the Cypriots are horrified at the idea of using force against their British allies. Everyone I spoke to expresses a simple touching faith that if they put their case peacefully, Britain is certain to grant them self-determination. But the only thanks they get is the hearty contempt of the British

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officials on the spot . . . By refusing to concede to peaceful protests what we have conceded elsewhere to violence, we are inciting the Cypriots to follow the example of Palestine and Egypt. Unless the Government changes its tune, I prophesy that, before the barracks and the aerodromes are completed, we shall have turned a small friendly people into an embittered enemy. Then we shall be faced with the prospect of yet another ignominious scuttle.178 Crossman could not have been more right. Enosis propaganda in Cyprus reached such levels that there was no way back. The application at the United Nations, the Archbishop’s repeated visits to Athens, followed by flamboyant speeches inciting the Cypriot people to fight for their liberation, and the political parties’ commitment to enosis created a heated political atmosphere, one that could only be cooled with the granting of self-determination or with bloodshed. Hyam notes that while many British officials regarded the campaign for enosis as artificial and a bit of a joke, the beginning of the struggle made Cyprus second only to Egypt as a leading problem for the British Government.179 The consignment of arms and explosives from a Greek fishing boat bound for Khlorakas, the Aghios Georgios, some days later, was actually the first real suggestion that force would be used in Cyprus against the British.180 However, in the eyes of the British, the situation in the schools became the most acute expression of insubordination. Schools, especially the Pancyprian Gymnasium, had indeed become hotbeds of reaction, and the situation henceforth could only get worse. Charles Foley, the ex-Daily Express journalist who founded The Times of Cyprus in 1955, noticed the demonstrators were mostly from the Pancyprian Gymnasium, “the Eton-and-Harrow of Cyprus, which under a benevolent British eye and at the least possible expenditure of government funds produced the leaders of Greek – Cypriot life”. He was impressed with the political atmosphere surrounding the school, where “Greek history and national songs were learned in an atmosphere of religious fervour”.181 Lawrence Durrell, who at the time was teaching English at the Pancyprian Gymnasium, admitted “one could feel the true temperature of nationalist feeling among the older students”. The school was, according to Durrell, “the perfect laboratory in which to

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study national sentiment in its embryonic state – indeed a Greek island within Cyprus, with its spiritual and political aspirations condensed around the person of the Ethnarch and embodied in Greek language and Greek institutions”.182 On 7 February 1955, OELMEK asked its members to prevent their students from entering an essay competition conducted by the Cyprus Mail which they claimed “emanates from factors outside the school circles” and was “not conducive to educational aims”.183 The topics of the competition were innocuous, but the mere fact that the competition was conducted by an English newspaper was reason enough to boycott it. It soon became evident that teachers like Spyridakis were the main instigators of insubordination. For instance, a comment by one of the Pancyprian Gymnasium teachers on a student essay titled, “The British Never Leave a Country without Bloodshed” was “Bravo! This is the way to liberation”.184 Teachers were expected to maintain such a stand; if they did not they could expect to come under considerable pressure. According to a broadcast on Athens Radio, itself an important influence on Cypriot youth, when the Commissioner of Nicosia and the Director of Education attended the opening of a new village school, the villagers hung Greek flags and posted enosis slogans. The event was boycotted by all except the Mukhtar and one Greek teacher, who declared himself “an Anglophile to my very bones”. The next day the village constable and the priest demanded the teacher’s transfer.185 Given the involvement of most teachers in the enosis cause, the Department of Education’s announcement that it would appoint an Englishman to the post of Chief Inspector for Secondary Schools was controversial in both Cyprus and Greece. The post was created following the Department’s decision to strengthen the inspectorates for more efficient control of the schools. On 29 January 1955 Stephanopoulos, in a letter to the Athens Embassy, indicated his government’s surprise at the refusal of HMG and the Government of Cyprus to allow a School Inspector from Greece to inspect the colony’s schools, and he argued that Cypriot schools could not offer essential guarantees that their certificates of studies concurred with the proficiency required for higher studies in Greek without the proper accreditation from Greek educational authorities. Stephanopoulos therefore asked the British Government to re-examine its decision.186 Such interference from Athens was now firmly rejected by Whitehall.187 Unsurprisingly,

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the usual Greek national celebrations for the anniversary of Greek independence on 25 March 1955 were livelier than ever, with a great many secondary school children participating in athletic contests, traditional dances, parades and demonstrations. At the main entrance of the Nicosia Stadium an illuminated banner inscribed with OXI – a reference to Greece’s heroic defiance of Mussolini in 1940 – was hung. The demonstrators proceeded toward the British Institute in Nicosia and on their way threw stones at an RAF bus. Grand celebrations took place in every town.188 Students at the Morphou College started singing patriotic songs, and the Principal asked them to stop, and when they refused he asked them to leave and come back at noon. The students attended the church service waving Greek flags and were cheered by the crowd. When they returned to the college they began a hunger strike to protest the Principal’s behaviour. They also sent telegraphs to Archbishop Makarios, the Greek consul and the Director of Education announcing their participation in the national struggle.189 A few days later, the island would wake up from the sound of explosions, the beginning of an armed revolt undertaken to unite Cyprus with Greece. During the first half of the 1950s the Cyprus question entered a more militant phase, which culminated in the outbreak of armed revolt in April 1955. Makarios’s ascendance to the archiepiscopal throne, Grivas’s emergence on the scene and London’s insistence on retaining its only remaining Mediterranean island, coupled with the absence of constitutional reforms, all contributed to the intensification of enosis clamour on the island. Heightened nationalist feelings and the sheer determination to resist British were endemic to all of the Greek – Cypriot political parties and to the Church, and this was shared by the teachers at the island’s schools. Despite the Government’s efforts to exert more influence in the secondary schools, the relationship between these schools and the Ethnarchy grew increasingly closer following World War II. Thus the main Greek Gymnasia would become one of the primary sources for EOKA recruits.

CHAPTER 7 SCHOOLS IN UPROAR:THE EOKA REVOLT AND THE END OF BRITISH RULE IN CYPRUS

Between 1955 and 1959 Cyprus experienced the climatic struggle of its colonial history, which significantly impacted on its post-colonial future. The EOKA revolt has been extensively documented and remains highly controversial to this day. This chapter examines the role schools played in the revolt and how the island’s education system was affected by the political and military developments of this era. The extent of youth participation in the EOKA effort testifies to the bankruptcy of British educational policy during the final 30 years of the colonial administration. Greek –Cypriot youth responded eagerly to EOKA leadership. As Morgan accurately points out, “in his appeals to the youth Grivas was pushing out at a door which, largely to British education policy on the island, was already wide open”.1 In addition to recruiting boys from the secondary schools, EOKA also recruited girls and elementary school children for the struggle, with severe educational consequences. On 1 April 1955 a series of explosions in Nicosia, Larnaca and Famagusta signalled the beginning of the armed struggle. The more serious of these first attacks were against important colonial administration establishments: the Cyprus Broadcasting Station, the Government Secretariat Offices, the Education Department and the Wolseley Barracks in Nicosia.2 In the following days, pupils from gymnasia in Nicosia, Limassol and elsewhere were taken into custody

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for illegal gatherings, for distributing EOKA leaflets and for other offences.3 In early May, Grivas ordered the intensive recruitment of schoolchildren who could be “electrified and carried away to national excitements”, and these schoolchildren gradually became an integral part of the struggle.4 Their duties included participation in demonstrations, the distribution of leaflets and the surveillance of British agents. The most promising and reliable would eventually graduate to the fighter groups, which guaranteed a constant supply of recruits. On the anniversary of Empire Day, 24 May, which Armitage described as “restless day”, 700 schoolchildren, mostly girls, demonstrated, shouting slogans and throwing stones. The police were called, but 500 boys, mainly from the Pancyprian Gymnasium, managed to approach Government House and throw stones. That evening, Governor Armitage narrowly escaped injury when a bomb exploded at a cinema event in aid of the British Legion.5 Over the next few days students of Limassol Gymnasium demonstrated outside the Court House. Twenty-four students were charged with taking part in protests during the Aghios Georgios trial, the police found explosives in the basement of Scala Elementary School and secondary school boys were arrested for carrying arms and bombs.6 Inevitably, some officials were beginning to feel the strain of events. The Director of Cyprus Broadcasting Service had a breakdown, the Director of Information Services, Lawrence Durrell, was “most depressed” and the police saw a number of resignations by Greek – Cypriot personnel. As for Armitage himself, he gave the impression he was unable or unwilling to grasp the gravity of the situation. His wife told his parents, “he takes it all so calmly and says he could go on forever with the enosis question”.7 Nevertheless, speculation about his future in the post was mounting in British political circles. On 30 June 1955 Prime Minister Anthony Eden informed the House of Commons that Her Majesty’s Government had given further consideration to the strategic and other problems affecting Britain, Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, and he invited the Greek and Turkish Governments to send representatives to confer with him in London on the political and defence questions involved, including that of Cyprus.8 As Holland notes, where Eden’s “medicine” for the ills of Cyprus was an energetic and straightforward repression, Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan’s cure lay in bringing international

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leverage to bear. The very absence of any Cypriot representatives in the Tripartite Conference would be the key to success, because only by excluding them could the internal complexion of the island be subordinated to the international and regional factors Macmillan was bent on exploiting.9 As critics at the time alleged, Macmillan was seeking an international deadlock – once that deadlock was achieved, it would be necessary to adopt a far more thorough “purge” of a Cyprus administration allegedly drifting and defeated. Only a new Governor could ensure this was done.10 On 8 July 1955 Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan LennoxBoyd arrived on the island, the first Secretary of State for the Colonies to ever visit Cyprus, “to ascertain how minds in Cyprus were working on the subject of constitutional development”. He had been instructed not to make references to self-determination. At his meeting with the Executive Council, Lennox-Boyd pointed out that opinion in the UK was now in favour of granting a liberal constitution to Cyprus, in which provision would be made for a legislature with an elected majority, as a prelude to full internal self-government in the future.11 During this meeting the provisions of the new constitution were discussed, as were security and educational policy. Armitage told Lennox-Boyd that the question of secondary schools was one of the most disturbing problems the Government faced, and that he was alarmed that “students and young boys were being recruited by EOKA to distribute pamphlets, throw grenades and so forth”. There were signs the opinion of parents was hardening against the continued misbehaviour of schoolchildren, and the Governor believed it might be possible to secure their support for whatever measures had to be taken – the Government might have to close down some schools and make sure expelled students did not enrol elsewhere. Armitage informed Lennox-Boyd that while procedures were in place for the dismissal of subversive teachers, it would not be practical for the Government to completely take over secondary schools. “Such a measure”, he said “would precipitate a head-on collision with the Greek Government and the Orthodox Church. There was no real solution to the problem unless or until a constitution had been brought into operation”.12 Over the next few weeks the intimidation of Greek –Cypriot personnel in the police continued. The murder on 13 August 1955 of a Special Constable was a serious defeat for the Cyprus Government, which

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soon formed an Auxiliary Police Force staffed exclusively by Turks.13 The failure of the Tripartite Conference, as evidenced by the eruption of anti-Greek riots in Istanbul on 6 September, as well as the second Greek application to the United Nations, exacerbated the tension in Cyprus. The Colonial Office advised the introduction of emergency powers in the colony, though it was generally agreed Armitage was not the right man for this. The slow response of the police to the burning of the British Institute in Nicosia, and the breakdown of law and order in the capital that followed, only underlined this conclusion.14 Ominously, the burning of the Institute was followed by the distribution of leaflets by a new Turkish – Cypriot secret organisation Volkan, which criticised lapses in security and reflected the growing anxiety of the Turkish –Cypriot minority.15 On 25 September, Armitage was abruptly replaced by FieldMarshal Sir John Harding, a highly experienced soldier who excelled as commander of the British forces in the Mediterranean theatre after the war. At the time, Harding was Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and giving up this very distinguished post to become Governor of Cyprus, at Eden’s strong insistence, was proof of the importance Whitehall ascribed to getting control of the situation in Cyprus. Harding’s first task was to negotiate with Makarios, to see if some compromise could even now be struck. They therefore held the first of a series of meetings at the Ledra Palace Hotel on 4 October 1955. The highly complicated discussions which ensued, and which are cited in the literature as the Makarios-Harding talks, have been charted and analysed by other scholars, and their efforts will not be repeated here. Alongside these negotiations, Harding believed it was equally essential to improve security on the island and, in this regard, the schools were an enormous challenge. The law prohibiting the flying of flags was therefore reintroduced, mainly because elementary schools were flying Greek flags, and Harding wanted to make sure the practice, which had become common in the secondary schools, did not spread further. He warned elementary school Headmasters that if the Greek flag were flown at their schools, classes would be cancelled and the children sent home. “The Cyprus Government”, he said, “has undertaken the responsibility for elementary education in this country and does not intend to discharge this responsibility under the flag of another country. It is therefore for the communities concerned to decide whether flags hoisted on school buildings should be left there at the price of depriving the

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children of the school of their education or whether they should be removed so that the school can begin functioning again”.16 Despite several warnings the practice continued, and a series of closures commenced. Socrates Evangelides, President of the Nicosia Town School Committee, was adamant that this practice constituted de-Hellenisation: “It is a thousand pities”, he said, that “our countries which have been the best of friends for a whole century should now come to grips over a question that could be settled so easily by the recognition of our right to self-determination.”17 De-Hellenisation as a key British objective had become a dominant motif in the Greek – Cypriot political campaign, one in which the schools provided the main context for discussion. In October 1955, the Secretariat tried to rebut accusations of de-Hellenisation and counterattack with a pamphlet titled The Myth of De-Hellenization. The pamphlet explained that Greek was spoken everywhere: in the schools, in nine-tenths of the communications between government departments and in the courts; broadcasts in Greek were predominant on Cyprus radio and books and newspapers were freely imported from Greece. The pamphlet underlined that Greek schoolteachers in elementary schools, by law, had to be Greek Orthodox, and classroom readers were imported from Greece. As for secondary education, the Greek gymnasia in Cyprus had the same curricula as the gymnasia in Greece, the same textbooks and the same teaching methods, while the staff were appointed, paid and supervised by governing bodies composed of members of the Greek – Cypriot community served by each individual school: It is difficult to see what more the Cyprus Government could do to “set free Greek education”, short of abjuring all responsibility for this important branch of public administration. Cyprus must already be one of the few places in the world where secondary education is not regarded as primarily the responsibility of the state . . . If the Greek –Cypriot people wish to take a more effective part in the management of their public affairs including education, the way is open for them to do so. For years past it has been the earnest wish of the British authorities to see democratically elected representatives of the people of Cyprus accepting political responsibility. If in truth Greek education in

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Cyprus needs to be “set free”, the fault lies not with the British Administration but with the intransigent sterility of enosist politics.18 This was a view shared by the majority of British officialdom in Cyprus. The Colonial Secretary in Cyprus, John Reddaway, said: “‘Fear of DeHellenization’ of Cyprus – a favourite cry which the fanatics of the Cyprus Question employed – had no substance. Cyprus had preserved its Greekness for thousands of years of Ottoman occupation. How was it possible for it to be ‘de-Hellenized’ in a few tens of years under the British Administration which was tolerant in the highest degree”?19 Such arguments, however, although not without their own moral force, failed to persuade Greeks of the honesty of the Government’s intentions to safeguard the Hellenic character of Cypriot education, especially when schoolchildren had become vital to the struggle. Indeed, since the 1954 December riots, “strikes” in the schools had become a form of action quite different from earlier, spontaneous demonstrations. According to the Director of Education, the strikes were now highly organised, and the intimidation of pupils was a regular part of the organisers’ techniques. These school strikes provoked outright public disorder and clashes with the police.20 The first Greek –Cypriot to receive a death sentence for an EOKArelated crime was Michael Karaolis and, inevitably, his sentence elicited censorious reactions. Karaolis was tweney-two years old and, as a graduate of the English School and a clerk in a government office, he was the sort of individual who might otherwise have been expected to look favourably on continuing British rule. Karaolis was testimony, however, to the extent that enosis, and EOKA itself, had permeated Greek – Cypriot life, not least through its school system. Though during the final years of British rule more than 6,000 Cypriots were employed in government services, with a few who, thanks to their professional merits, had managed to reach even higher positions in the colonial administration, many of them became fervent EOKA supporters.21 Indeed, the intensifying indiscipline in the schools was now closely calibrated to the trial of Karaolis. The Government came under enormous pressure to “get a grip”, and Governor Harding warned that in the event of continuing disturbances or absenteeism in secondary schools, the school(s) concerned would be struck off the register. At the beginning of

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the uprising EOKA had to cope with the opposition of some teachers to student strikes for obvious pedagogical and professional reasons, and even Spyridakis, the Principal of Pancyprian Gymnasium and one of the most active and ardent supporters of enosis, was accused by Grivas of being a traitor. On 20 November, a group of students assaulted Spyridakis and his Assistant Headmaster in their own homes – threatening letters from EOKA were also left for each of them.22 Indiscipline was tolerated by the majority of the teachers, however, as they believed their students’ response – including strikes – to the island’s illiberal regime was justified. The first school to be struck off the register and deprived of financial aid was the Samuel School. This took place on 16 November 1955, despite the Headmaster’s efforts to explain that his pupils had not organised the strike. The situation was widely discussed in the press. According to Ethnos, the removal of the school from the register “point(s) to the nervousness with which the Government is facing the situation”; Neos Democratis described the Government’s closure of schools as a “medieval measure”. In Hur Soz, one columnist wrote that in arresting pupils and closing schools, the “Government had got hold of the wrong end of the stick”, and that responsibility for this situation lay with “fanatic teachers who do not realise the value and sanctity of their mission” and for that they should be dismissed.23 Halkin Sesi, however, justified the Government’s actions because the Greek schools “have ceased to be educational centres and have become nests of sedition”.24 Telegrams of support for the Samuel School were sent by other Greek gymnasia. On 17 November 1955, Harding wrote to the Secretary of State, “now that we have to come to grips with the Greek secondary schools it is essential that we should have the means of securing effective control of them”. He therefore proposed the appointment of more District Officers and the expansion of the Secondary Schools Inspectorate with the immediate appointment of additional overseas staff.25 Commissioners were instructed to warn the governing bodies of schools that grants-in-aid would be withdrawn from any schools not being conducted in a proper manner.26 On 21 November 1955, at a meeting with the Archbishop, the Governor explained that despite the difficulties inherent in the present situation, recent developments in the Middle East had prompted the British Government to review the Cyprus question, and it was now

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prepared to offer a new formula for the constitutional matter. According to Harding, “it was not the position of HMG that self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus but that it is now not a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account of the consequences of the relations between NATO Powers in the Eastern Mediterranean”. He added that London was prepared to consider a wide measure of self-government, provided the Cypriot population cooperated freely in its implementation. Once such an experiment was successfully under way, and Cypriots had proven their political maturity, the British Government would be prepared to invite representatives of the main communities to discuss the ultimate future of the island within the framework of existing treaties and alliances. According to Holland, this formulation was known thereafter as “the double negative”, since it outlined what the intentions of the British Government were not, rather than by clearly describing what they were. It did at least formally dispose of the pure negativism of July 1954.27 Although Makarios said he considered the statement unacceptable, in that it amounted to a negation of the principle of selfdetermination, he agreed to put it before the Ethnarchy Council, only to inform Harding a few days later that the Council had turned down the new formula.28 As it was widely noted at the time, the island was now caught in a “crisis of trust”,29 and this bedevilled the protracted discussions between Harding and Makarios. Following their most recent discussion, a student demonstration in the courtyard of Phaneromeni church resulted in clashes with the police. On 26 November, following a twenty-four-hour general strike organised by the Central Strike Committee, Harding declared a State of Emergency and announced harsh regulations. Anyone found carrying or using guns, bombs or explosives could receive the death penalty, while anyone sabotaging communications, electricity lines or the water supply would be subject to life imprisonment, and strikes unrelated to labour differences were proclaimed illegal. In this context, he took the opportunity to request the removal of Dr Sleight from his post as Director of Education, something he was eager to do from the start of his governorship.30 The removal of Sleight reflected the importance Harding attributed to controlling the schools during the ongoing political turbulence on the island. Sleight, an educational rather than political figure, had never fully agreed with the closure of schools.

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Indeed, as Cox himself admitted, Sleight was “keen and devoted”, but he was a “centraliser and not a good administrator, so his handling of the staff was faulty”, and his flaws became more evident, and more acute, in the face of ongoing unrest in the colony. Sleight was replaced by W.B. Tudhope who, in Cox’s words, had “a reputation for ruthlessness” and “behind him the most powerful Governor of the history of the Colony, carrying out a strong policy with the full backing of HMG; a Governor moreover who regards education as one of the keys to the Cyprus problem and as having top priority”.31 By the end of 1955, the idea that the British were merely up against a few hotbeds of sedition had evaporated. Although EOKA was operating with a clandestine network, one so secret that no one even knew if their friends or relatives had enlisted in the organisation, participation was unexpectedly wide.32 Not only was EOKA recognised to be a “proper organisation”, but the Government deduced that Dighenis was Colonel George Grivas, thus confirming long-held British suspicions that “fanatical” Greek Army figures were behind the trouble.33 Harding was absolutely determined, as a prelude to any constitutional concessions, to bring five main elements of disorder and subversion under control: EOKA, the secondary schools, the Church, the Communists and the organs of hostile propaganda, including the press. Accordingly, on 14 December the Governor proscribed AKEL – over 100 Communist leaders were detained and the Party’s newspaper was shut down. This was a serious blow, one that further diminished AKEL’s ability to influence events, particularly amongst Turkish –Cypriots, given that the colonial authority also banned Inkilapci, AKEL’s Turkish-language newspaper.34 Holland notes how ironic it is that the detention camps, destined to be such a feature of Cypriot life, were first filled up with leftists who were deeply opposed to EOKA. From 1 April 1955 onwards, for example, in those areas where AKEL was dominant there were markedly fewer security incidents than elsewhere. In pressing for authorisation, the Governor was spurred by the traditional belief that the liquidation of AKEL was a prerequisite for any safe experiment in Cypriot selfgovernment – if the Party were not liquidated, the Communists would sweep the board. As it was at the time of the Consultative Assembly in 1948, the problem was AKEL was the only credible counterweight to clerical nationalism in the colony. For the duration of British rule the Communists had little choice but to line up behind Archbishop

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Makarios, partly for defence against the British and, ultimately, for protection against the right-wing excesses of EOKA.35 Regarding the secondary schools, Harding believed they “have long been the principal instrument for the indoctrination of enosist sedition among the Greek– Cypriot people” as well as “a dangerous agency for organised intimidation and the disruption of society”. Effective government inspection was therefore essential if they were to be prevented from becoming “the vehicle for organised island-wide defiance of authority”. Harding furthermore thought it might also be necessary to provide an alternative system of secondary education under government control, despite the violent reaction this would provoke in Cyprus and Greece, since it would be futile to pursue a policy of firmness and increased security while simultaneously permitting the seditious indoctrination of the rising generation at the secondary schools to continue: “The reform of secondary education will require delicate handling and is likely to prove a costly undertaking but I am convinced that it is fundamental to the success of any policy that aims at maintaining the British position in Cyprus.”36 As a result, the Secretary of State’s Educational Adviser, Sir Christopher Cox, made a two-week visit to Cyprus towards the end of November. On the occasion of Cox’s visit, The Times wrote that the authorities faced a dilemma, since on one hand a complete shutdown of the secondary schools would put more children on the streets to create trouble, but on the other hand the British could not provide sufficient teachers at present to take over secondary education: “A new tyranny of youth has been set up here which on the lines of the Hitler Jugend threatens teachers and parents”.37 Collapsing discipline in the schools preoccupied many British people living on the island. Expatriate Simon Wardell wrote to Julian Amery, MP, that the breakdown of the educational system was “by far the most serious thing that has happened here since the terrorists started up last April”. The Headmaster of the Larnaca Lyceum told Wardell in a rather graphic manner, “Do you suppose that the 1,000 children who are attending the schools which the Government has closed down are sitting at home knitting? They are sitting at home making bombs! If you are not careful, you’ll come to terms with us over self-determination only to find fresh troubles breaking out in a few years because you’ve bred a generation of terrorists”.38 On 10 December 1955, a letter to Harding from the Cyprus

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Teachers’ Organisation, which was presided over by Spyridakis, attacked the Government for closing schools, revoking teaching licences and expelling and sentencing pupils, all under the pretext of maintaining law and order. The letter defended the island’s children: The pupils of this island know better than anyone else, what respect for the laws means but the laws should be enacted by their own country, not imposed by a foreign Government . . . Grant, Your Excellency, the right of self-determination to the people of Cyprus, rid the schools of the suppressive measures at once and then you will see that order and calm in this island and its schools will be restored; because reaction and lack of discipline are due to Government policy.39 During Cox’s visit a five-year plan for education was drafted which included suggested measures to be taken for dealing with the current turbulence. According to the plan, the Department of Education should: spend £100,000 on training Greek teachers and £40,000 on Turkish teachers; enhance technical education through the expansion of a combined preparatory and vocational school and preparatory technical schools, in addition to an advanced Technical Institute in Nicosia; establish four secondary technical schools and four trade schools, all providing free or low-fee education, to absorb pupils from the existing secondary schools, which would eventually be taken over by the Government. The costs for the realisation of these schemes for the period 1956–61 amounted to around £3,000,000 for technical education, £1,250,000 for capital costs, £2,000,000 for recurrent costs, around £500,000 for secondary education, including grants to public-aided schools, equipment and new buildings, and approximately £750,000 for Turkish schools and the appointment of district officers. The total cost of the proposals amounted to £4 million, plus additional recurrent costs for elementary education.40 Harding advised the immediate implementation of these measures to get education “on a sounder footing” and asked whether the British Government would make any funds available to see the programme through.41 The Secretary of State informed Harding he shared his views “on the fundamental importance of tackling the secondary school problem with utmost vigour and minimum delay”, and he provisionally agreed with Harding’s proposals, though he was

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concerned about finding the necessary funds, as the Treasury had opposed extra social expenditure in Cyprus.42 Harding’s efforts to persuade Whitehall to obtain the necessary funds to enable the government to take over secondary education would intensify over the following months as the situation in the schools collapsed. On 11 January 1956, a Turkish – Cypriot policeman was killed, the first incident of this kind, and his funeral was followed by Muslim demonstrations. This communal tension was overshadowed, however, by the breakdown in the Greek schools, since disorder in the schools seemed to have risen from “an unbroken crescendo to a pitch”.43 Even the students at the individual schools devoted to educating each of the island’s significant minorities began to express disaffection of one kind or another. The sole exception was the English School, where discipline and the normal academic standards were still maintained.44 During January 1956 there was a serious incident every second day on average. The radio programme from Athens, “Voice of the Fatherland”, continued urging Greek– Cypriot youth to resist British plans, telling them the closure of the schools was “one of the most refined anti-Greek steps” taken by the colonial government, which wanted “to create schools of traitors ready to serve British interests”.45 On 13 January, the Commercial Academy in Limassol was voluntarily closed by its Headmaster for a few days, in an attempt to enforce discipline, while 30 pupils at Polis Gymnasium went on strike to protest the Education Department’s refusal to renew the licences of the Gymnasium’s teachers.46 Harding had no illusions about the challenge of eradicating sedition in the schools. School closures were, as he saw it, a necessity to calm things down, but above all he wanted to target individual ringleaders in the most troublesome schools, however difficult or undesirable it would be to prosecute and confine them.47 These issues were discussed at a meeting in the Colonial Office on 21 January 1956. Harding explained it was vital for education in Cyprus to remain under British control in the event of an agreement between the Government and the Archbishop. He explained that the educational programme put forward after consultation with Cox would, in four or five years, bear fruit, particularly at the technical schools. “It was essential”, he underlined, “that HMG should seek to give as many Cypriots as possible an interest in the maintenance of the British connection, if HMG’s strategic interests in the Middle East were to be maintained”. Harding underlined that the control and reform of

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secondary education was necessary on purely educational grounds, regardless of the need for political control, though he maintained it was impossible at this stage to make known that HMG intended to retain control of education without risking a breakdown in the current negotiations. Sir Thomas Lloyd said that while HMG’s constitutional offer “should be as generous as possible subject to the needs of security”, it might be possible to justify retaining control of education on the grounds that the schools had been scenes of obstreperous disorder, and that the Turkish schools could not be handed over to a Greek Minister. According to Harding, this was the time for the Ministers to decide: (i) whether they felt control of education must be retained in the hands of HMG without making a relevant announcement, as it would risk a breakdown in the present talks, and (ii) the cost HMG would pay in order to keep the Cyprus Government out of grant-in-aid”.48 It was testimony to the enduring centrality of education to the Cypriot political struggle that crucial constitutional talks at this stage depended, to a great extent, on how the Government managed the schools. Harding, however, believed it was impracticable in the present circumstances to take over the whole secondary school system, either by compulsory requisition or by bringing the pressure of competition to bear directly on the schools. Such a step would so arouse Cypriot opposition as to bring education of any kind to a grinding halt; in any case, the Government could not find sufficient staff to run these schools if it did take them over. Thus the Cyprus Government proposed a number of alternative measures, including the purchase of the premises of schools voluntarily offered for sale, which would be staffed and run directly by the Director of Education, and increased government financial assistance to unprofitable schools in exchange for control over the schools, including management of the facilities and discipline of the teachers and students. The proposals were closely allied to the proposals outlined in the Public-Aided Schools scheme, but more generous. The community schools, including the gymnasia, were also eligible to apply for inclusion in this scheme, or to remain as they were, and those schools to which a grant-in-aid was now paid would continue to receive it. As for the private, for-profit schools, these schools could apply to become non-profit and take advantage of government assistance, or carry on as they were. Harding anticipated that 18 Greek and nine Turkish secondary schools would transfer into one of the two categories over a

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period of three years.49 Yet as the wider political struggle developed, simply staying in the saddle against EOKA preoccupied the British authorities, and such long-term educational planning became impossible to actually finance or implement. Harding returned to Cyprus with instructions to present Makarios with a final draft of the formula for self-determination and secure a pledge from the Archbishop that he would denounce violence. The situation must have looked somewhat hopeless to the British, as Macmillan admits in his diary the position in Cyprus was still obscure: although the Governor had “undoubtedly succeeded in getting a proper organisation started, it will be a long time before it becomes efficient. 50 or 60 years of Colonial Office neglect have produced a tragically unfavourable situation in an island . . . where we could easily have built up some loyalties to the Commonwealth and Empire had we made any real effort to so”.50 As soon as Harding gave Makarios the formula, the Archbishop called a “national consultation”. He pressed Grivas to accept the formula for selfdetermination whilst requiring specific guarantees for a “wide measure of self-government towards a restored Legislative Assembly with a Greek elected majority”. Grivas agreed reluctantly to a two-week lull in EOKA activities to give the talks a chance, but he also asked for amnesty for those implicated in EOKA actions since 1 April. Makarios informed Harding he provisionally accepted the formula and presented him with a list of demands. It was now up to Harding to take the next step.51 The situation in the schools would cast a dark shadow over the negotiations, however, and for this Grivas had his share of responsibility. He wrote in his memoirs, “one of the most important weapons in my hands, while these talks were in progress, was the youth movement, which rose to the occasion splendidly”. Indeed, as of 29 January, following an order from Grivas, elementary school children became part of the struggle: See that the Greek flag is flown from all elementary schools and is kept flying. This will certainly mean that these schools will be closed, but it will also show our unshakeable will to fight to the final victory.52 Frequent clashes between armed troops and crowds of small children followed in the wake of the order. Flag staffs were mined, and troops

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were often injured as they tried to haul down the flags. Grivas also ordered the formation of a schoolgirls’ section to take part in street demonstrations alongside elementary school boys, an initiative that proved very successful. “The young girls of Cyprus not only did not fall short in courage and self-sacrifice among the young but appeared to be real Spartans, women from Souli and from Messolongi”, Grivas wrote in his memoirs.53 Two days earlier, on 27 January, about 300 Pancyprian Gymnasium pupils gathered at the school to demonstrate. They threw stones at the police, and soldiers were called to disperse the crowd with tear gas and baton charges. The incident is remembered by Greek – Cypriots as the Battle of Severios, as the demonstration took place at the Severios Library. Two students, then thirteen years old, recall that while attending their Ancient Greek class they saw older students breaking classroom windows with poles bearing Greek flags and calling for everyone to leave their classes. Younger students fetched buckets of water to prevent a fire, whilst the young demonstrators shouted at the soldiers, “Cyprus is Greek”! and “Get out of Cyprus”!54 For many of the soldiers themselves, mostly national servicemen, as opposed to hardened veterans, dealing with these angry Cypriot schoolchildren was a perplexing and unpleasant duty. The following day Harding ordered the Director of Education to strike the Pancyprian Gymnasium of Nicosia off the register. The great number of pupils attending the schools – 2,200 – and the inadequate control exerted by the staff, contributed to a collapse of discipline and, in Harding’s opinion, the Gymnasium had become “a forcing ground for young nationalist(s) of the extreme kind”. Harding pointed to the school’s prominence in subversive activities, as seventy-five per cent of secondary school strikes in Nicosia over the previous three months could be attributed to direct instigation by Pancyprian Gymnasium pupils.55 The Governor’s action against the Pancyprian Gymnasium only served to stimulate agitation at other schools. On 29 January students at the Morphou Gymnasium went on strike, and both Karavas elementary schools were closed down after students raised Greek flags.56 Two days later disturbances broke out in all districts in support of the Pancyprian Gymnasium and, of 14,700 pupils in secondary schools, 10,100 had not attended school on account of strikes or closures. There was rioting in Kyrenia, Morphou and Paphos, where secondary school pupils attacked

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security forces with stones, and in Nicosia the Neocleous School was shut down.57 Along with educational weakness and political indoctrination, the complete breakdown of discipline at all levels, including governing bodies, teachers and parents, had progressed, according to the Director of Education, from “an exaggerated respect for all things Hellenic to a thoroughly warped outlook on all things British”. He was convinced there was no other choice for the Government but to assume control over a reasonable number of secondary schools.58 What the British referred to as “the Famagusta triangle” had been the most troubled area in Cyprus since April 1955, as EOKA’s penetration here was at its deepest, and it was therefore logical that Famagusta was at the forefront of the school upheavals as they reached their climax. On 6 February 1956, Harding ordered the Director of Education to strike the Famagusta Gymnasium off the register – the school had about 1,000 pupils and one of the worst records of indiscipline and mass absenteeism. The day the school was struck off the register its students formed a procession through town and attacked security forces with stones and other missiles.59 Petrakis Yiallouros, the eighteen-year-old pupil who was carrying the Greek flag during the procession, was killed. Yiallouros became a hero to the island’s children, while the Government’s embarrassment over its activities in the colony intensified. Although at no point had the Government closed elementary schools, nonetheless these schools had been inexorably drawn into the crisis. Individual teachers were under instruction to discontinue classes when Greek flags were hoisted, mostly by students from secondary schools, at school buildings. By the end of the month, classes had been interrupted at 289 elementary schools, interrupting instruction for 44,750 out of a total of 62,000 pupils. Amongst the secondary schools themselves, the Government closed four,60 while governing bodies closed 15, effectively putting some 12,000 students onto the streets.61 As Harding himself told Lennox-Boyd, as ever trying to impress upon him the seriousness of the situation, events had now “[brought] Greek– Cypriot education to a standstill.”62 The Colonial Office stood no chance of obtaining the funding for the educational plans already discussed with Harding, however, unless the Foreign Office offered its support. Lennox-Boyd therefore asked Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan to assist in procuring the money, since “the subject has such a vital bearing on the maintenance of our strategic

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position and interests in the island”. Lennox-Boyd informed Macmillan the Ethnarchy had maintained its hold on Greek secondary schools, especially the Gymnasia (despite the efforts of the Cyprus Government to dislodge it), which recent events had made clear. He therefore sketched out the secondary educational proposals made during Cox’s visit to Cyprus which were intended to form part of a new Five-Year Development Plan. The cost of the Plan amounted to £38 million, with an additional annual recurrent burden of £14– 21.5 million, a cost Cyprus could not bear due to the Emergency. Lennox-Boyd emphasised, though, that under the circumstances Britain could not afford to leave secondary education in its current state: If we are to hold Cyprus, as we must for strategic reasons, we have got to break down the Ethnarchy’s hold on Greek –Cypriot secondary school youth. I believe that we must view Harding’s educational plan not so much in terms of a colonial educational development project, but rather as being an integral part of the maintenance of our strategic and political position in the Middle East.63 Macmillan agreed. “We must do everything possible to get secondary education in Cyprus out of the hands of the Greek Orthodox Church”, he said, and he expressed surprise that proposals to this end did not play a larger part in the latest development plan: “The improvement of agriculture, forests, roads and ports will do very little to consolidate our position in Cyprus if the education of the more intelligent young people is left in such large measure under Greek influence”. Given the considerable cost involved, he suggested cutting other parts of development spending in Cyprus, rather than seeking fresh funding from the always parsimonious Treasury.64 It became crystal clear the deadlock in the wider political situation in Cyprus was mirrored by the collapsing educational system. There was never any possibility, however, that Cyprus could meet the cost of the programme from its own financial resources, especially at a time when costs incurred by the security forces were escalating. In June 1956, the Colonial Office had reluctantly concluded that, given the financial pressures on the island, they had no alternative but to permit the Treasury a large measure of control over its finances in return for an increase in aid, even if that meant it would have

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to slow the development programme it had initiated to “get the Cypriots thinking other things than enosis”, as Lloyd had said to Eden.65 Nevertheless, David French in his close study of the insurgency, aptly states that, despite the large amounts spent on development projects, especially on the police and on inter-communal education, these projects did almost nothing to wean Greek –Cypriots away from their commitment to enosis.66 During 1956, EOKA activities, including the indiscipline it fomented in the schools, reached a worrying pitch. The Government had managed to capture some EOKA documents and establish the authenticity of Grivas’s diaries, which indicated the organisation was planning: to reorganise its militant groups for coordinated action; to prepare Greek– Cypriot youth for further demonstrations, including girls and elementary school children; to liquidate traitors; to attack isolated servicemen and to push students and teachers to raise the Greek flag at all elementary schools.67 Meanwhile, the trouble at the schools continued as the Harding-Makarios negotiations reached their fateful climax. After the negotiations reconvened in early February, it was not long before the obvious impediments to any agreement became plain, including control over internal security during a transitional regime, amnesties and, perhaps most importantly, the vexing issue of a Greek – Cypriot majority in a restored legislature. The final unsuccessful meeting between the Governor and the Archbishop took place on 29 February 1956. On that same day a renewed EOKA campaign commenced with explosions, and two Greek –Cypriots were killed. On 3 March, a Hermes aircraft was destroyed by a time bomb and, had it not been for an unforeseen delay in the scheduled departure time, 68 passengers would have died.68 On the same day, Harding requested permission from London to immediately deport Makarios for his leading part in guiding and inspiring the “terrorist” movement, which was now well-entrenched in the schools. As for the schools themselves, Harding was certain “the necessity of this Government’s assuming general control of secondary education is inescapable” for “indiscipline and lawlessness in the Greek– Cypriot secondary schools have become a grave menace to public security” and undermined the educational credibility of the entire system.69 Six days later, on 9 March 1956, Makarios and three others70 were arrested and deported to the Seychelles. In his announcement, issued on the day of the deportation, the Governor explained he had

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reached this decision because, “while overtly and in apparent good faith conducting negotiations for a political settlement of the Island’s future, the Archbishop has surreptitiously encouraged and abetted the terrorists in order to improve his own bargaining position in the negotiations”. Harding also elaborated on Makarios’s involvement with EOKA and PEON since the beginning of the decade, and he found it abhorrent that the religious leader of the Greek Orthodox Christian community never openly condemned violence, even though Harding had encouraged him to do so.71 The decision to deport Makarios raised the question that perhaps other, less provocative measures would have sufficed. French notes that banning the Ethnarchy Council would have been one way of curtailing the Church’s political influence, but doing so smacked too much of Soviet practices and would only discredit Britain on the international stage.72 With the deportation of Makarios, Grivas emerged determined to continue the struggle. Shortly after the security measures imposed during the deportation were lifted, EOKA resumed its offensive with the murder of P.C. Rooney on 14 March. A week later EOKA operatives placed a heat sensitive bomb under Harding’s bed, but if tailed to explode, thanks to Harding’s habit of sleeping with the windows open.73 Greek – Cypriots were angered by the deportation of Makarios, but increased security measures meant there were few avenues for them to express their anger. Shop owners pulled down their shutters as the Greek– Cypriot community commenced a three-day strike, while the only Greek representative left on the Executive Council, Ioannis Clerides, duly resigned, announcing that the deportation of Makarios was “like throwing oil on a fire”.74 Even English School students reacted to the news by refusing to sing hymns at morning assembly, prompting a stand-off with their Headmaster that continued for several weeks.75 Makarios’s deportation was followed by other emergency regulations such as curfews and collective fines. The Governor also forbade all Greek– Cypriots to ride bikes, as he alleged they were used for seditious activities, a measure that infuriated Paul Griffin, the Headmaster of the English School, who demanded its revocation: I have 375 Greek Cypriot boys who are not allowed to ride bicycles and 200 Turkish Cypriots and other nationalities who are. The battle to keep this community friendly has been prolonged and

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hard, and looked like being successful . . . Unless some exceptions can be made to permit me to run this school without constant harassment, under which some boys are privileged, some boys cannot attend, others cannot take part in school activities, and even masters are kept locked in their houses for days on end, the School cannot function. It is important that it should.76 EOKA had succeeded in causing a stir, and the colonial administration was anxious to control the situation, especially in the schools. Harding had been wondering for some time what would be the best way to enforce certain measures that would help the Government gain control without provoking a reaction from the Greek– Cypriot community. He did not underestimate the political difficulties and risks involved, but he was convinced that the Government had to make a number of decisions, and that these decisions must be based on political reasons, rather than on educational reasons: “the control of secondary education – perhaps even more than the deportation of the Archbishop – is the crucial test of our determination to stay and rule in Cyprus.”77 Harding initially sought a more radical solution to the problem by proposing the operation of only two kinds of schools, government schools owned and managed directly by the Government, established in the main towns and gradually becoming inter-communal, in the manner of the English School, and government-aided schools run by governing bodies. Schools belonging to the second category would be able to decide their curriculum, but their financial assistance would be subject to certain conditions, including discipline, number of pupils, use of donations and appointment of teachers, and their income would come from government funds and fees only. According to Harding, the Pancyprian Gymnasium, the Gymnasia of Limassol, Paphos, Famagusta and Kyrenia and the Larnaca Lyceum would belong to this second category because, while he recognised their Hellenic character, “the present chaos cannot be allowed to continue”.78 Similar arrangements would be enforced in the Turkish –Cypriot Schools as well, while special status would be given to certain schools in the government-aided category.79 Of course, this plan raised serious questions in the Colonial Office, such as who would staff the new schools, the content of the curriculum, the possibility that EOKA would victimise children enrolled in these

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government schools, the reactions and criticism this new policy would provoke, and the possibility that many of the schools would be closed down by their governing bodies. Although Harding had a response to these questions and was even willing to appoint new governing bodies if the existing ones would not cooperate, in light of comments from the Secretary of State and warnings from the British embassy in Athens that these plans would probably result in “a campaign denouncing the Cyprus authorities for attempting to de-Hellenize education in the Colony”, he decided to take a less controversial approach.80 Harding thus came to the conclusion that since efforts had been made for the introduction of constitutional reforms through Lord Radcliff, it would be more politic, for the time being, to refrain from any announcement on education policy and simply permit all schools to reopen with a warning that if there are further serious disturbances at any school, that school will be placed under government control.81 Eventually, in August 1956, pending the completion of British lawyer Lord Radcliffe’s three-month exploratory visit to the island, the Cabinet agreed with Harding’s suggestion that no formal announcement on a new policy would be made, but certain administrative measures would be taken on security grounds. Firstly, it was agreed the Governing bodies of the five Greek secondary schools closed by the Government would reopen, but the Government would have control over staff, discipline, the number of pupils and financial donations. If the governing bodies resigned, new ones consisting of government officials would be appointed. The Government would not have a say over the curriculum, which guaranteed “these measures would have the support of the parents” and that “in view of the risk that even these modified measures will be represented as a repression of Greek culture, they should be taken in good time before the next opportunity arose for discussion of Cyprus at the United Nations”. The Cabinet authorised the Colonial Secretary to put into effect the proposals Harding made in April after the breakdown of political discussions, under the pretext that many secondary schools had to remain closed for security reasons. The proposals stipulated that the Government would acquire, manage and staff seven schools with a total of 3,500 students, that it would establish four technical schools in different parts of the island, the town gymnasia would be forced to accept government-aided status if they wished to open or reopen, and the village gymnasia would eventually be

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taken over by the Government. For the present, the village gymnasia were permitted to remain open, but if their students demonstrated or participated in processions, the school would be struck off the register, and the resident permits of their Greek teachers would not be renewed.82 The replacement of the geography and history readers used in the elementary schools was also considered. Two committees had been established to evaluate the schoolbooks used in Greek –Cypriot and Turkish – Cypriot elementary schools, and these committees recommended a reconsideration of the syllabi for geography and history.83 Even if it was considered “advisable in the present political climate to exacerbate public opinion by changing the books which have been in use for a long number of years”, due to the high cost involved in producing new readers and the lack of adequate time for their introduction by the new school year, it was decided a representative would be sent to Athens to order the books and discuss the possible deletion of one or two offensive passages84 – in the readers then in use, Cyprus was portrayed, along with Epirus, as a part of Greece still under slavery. With regard to the Greek teachers, the Government acted immediately to cancel their residence permits and deport them, as Harding was of the opinion that indiscipline in the schools was “ascribed in large part to the action and influence of Greek teachers”.85 At the time there were about 501 Greek teachers – 147 of them were from Greece, while 290 had graduated from Greek universities. Harding believed Greek teachers “have introduced political indoctrination into their academic teaching” and “they have deliberately set themselves to inflame the minds of the children in their care, in order to promote Greek pretensions to the annexations of Cyprus”.86 Although he recognised the removal of Greek teachers, without substitutes, would create staffing difficulties, this had to be accepted “as a lesser evil than allowing Greek teachers to continue poisoning the minds of the children attending those schools”.87 With the Prime Minister’s approval, the measure was duly enforced, causing a great stir in the Greek –Cypriot community and giving credit to the chorus of voices accusing the Government of de-Hellenising Greek –Cypriot education. PEON seized the opportunity to launch an attack on the Government, describing this action as “yet another blow on the Greek education of Cyprus” and demanding all schools that had been closed by the Government be reopened, that all

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deported Greek teachers be allowed to return, and that pupils who had been imprisoned or confined in detention camps, as well as all political detainees, be released.88 Even Director of Education W.B. Tudhope, though he recognised that some Greek national teachers were not propagating in favour of enosis, acknowledged that their mere presence in the schools was enough to encourage nationalist feelings in their pupils, who looked up to them as representatives of their motherland, Greece.89 As a result of the measures taken against teachers, more than 100 teachers were deprived of their licences, outlawed, arrested or imprisoned. Among them were Ourania Kokkinou, a prominent educational figure in Cyprus and a great supporter of Archbishop Makarios, and Nicos Kranidiotis, who later served as Councilor to the Ethnarchy and Ambassador of Cyprus in Athens. Teachers also died in the active struggle, including Fotis Pittas, who lost his life at the battle of Liopetri on 2 September 1958. Inevitably, Grivas ordered the establishment of “secret schools” operating in churches, with great results90. This was further proof that EOKA had managed to infiltrate so deeply into the schools that even drastic measures, such as the removal of Greek teachers, had failed to undermine its authority. On 7 November 1956, the Governor informed the Town School Committee that the Pancyprian Commercial Lyceum Larnaca was to be permanently struck from the registry of secondary schools because it was inefficient, and its Headmaster, a Greek national, was instructed to return to Greece.91 It would not be an exaggeration to say that measures taken against teachers who were Greek nationals may have amplified EOKA’s hostility towards the English School and other English-speaking schools, which they regarded as foreign and incompatible with Greek ideals. From the very start of the 1956 school year, in September 1956, PEKA (Political Committee of the Cypriot Struggle) leaflets were distributed in the schools praising the “endurance of the Greek soul” and warning the Government that its “deceitful methods, will as usual, be met with vigorous resistance from all teachers parents and pupils”. PEKA asked the teachers to apply themselves: Zealously to the task of giving our children a Greek education. While you are teaching them the Greek language, history, myths, habits and customs, and all the general things which form the

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Greek spirit, the central idea must always be the idea of freedom. Do not forget that you have a great responsibility to the history of our nation and of the Cyprus struggle. We entrust to you our children, fully confident that you will be worthy future handlers of the mission of all those Greek teachers who enlightened the souls of Greek youths with Greek principles during the dark days of the Turkish slavery and the German occupation. In the same tone, PEKA addressed the parents as well and reminded them it was their duty to furnish their children with a Greek education, and that there would be no excuse for those parents registering their children at foreign schools.92 By foreign schools PEKA not only meant the English School and other English-speaking schools, but technical schools as well, because these were considered a threat to the classical gymnasia. It is worth noting that 20 years after the conversion of the English School into a government school, British expectations for the creation of a Cypriot identity were collapsing, as even the English School did not remain unscathed by the enosis movement. By the end of 1956 the island’s Greek– Cypriot students were completely involved in the EOKA struggle. Pupils, following the example of adult fighters, not only participated in protests and carried weapons and leaflets but sacrificed their lives for enosis. Makis Georgallas and Petrakis Kyprianou, both eighteen years old, were killed in battle, while Evagoras Pallikarides, a graduate of Paphos Gymnasium, was sentenced to death for carrying a gun and bullets. At his trial Pallikarides admitted he was guilty, but he declared that he did what he did “as a Cypriot who demands his freedom”.93 Pallikarides was hanged on 14 March 1957, one of nine EOKA fighters executed by hanging. Radcliffe’s proposals were eventually discussed in December, and these discussions were accompanied by a statement from LennoxBoyd on 19 December 1956, in which he recognised that both communities “shall in certain circumstances be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty’s Government recognises that the exercise of self-determination in such mixed population must include partition among eventual options”.94 It was now evident the partition of Cyprus was henceforth a possible option for British officialdom. Besides, the Suez debacle had made Britain realise its position in the Middle East was in serious jeopardy

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and was now depended on support from the US which, under the Eisenhower Doctrine, was itself seeking to “fill the vacuum that was assumed to be left by Britain’s eclipse”.95 In this context, London began to doubt the strategic significance of Cyprus while admitting that maintaining good relations with Turkey would require some acknowledgment of the latter’s desire for the petition of the island. The Radcliffe Constitution, though a “notable text”,96 was eventually rejected by both the Greek and Turkish Governments. The Greek Government thought the constitution gave unlimited authority to the Governor and would not guarantee Greek –Cypriots the right of self-determination, while the Turkish Government felt Turkish – Cypriot demands had not been taken into consideration, and that partition was partition was not a viable solution. In 1957, although the situation in the schools was not as alarming as it had been in 1956, Greek– Cypriot youth were organised on a more systematic basis, as ordered by Grivas. In the middle of the year the youth section was named Άlkimo6 N1olaίa EOKA (ANE)97 and gradually attracted 50 per cent of the island’s Greek – Cypriot pupils, including the younger ones.98 Thanks to this system, EOKA had at its disposal enthusiastic youth in every town willing to write slogans on walls, organise protests, collect information, throw bombs, transfer secret messages and distribute food and weapons – the most passionate of these students were also taking part in sabotage and battles. By the end of the year around 875 pupils were taken to the courts for participating in illegal activities, while 165 youths between seven and 18 years of age were whipped, provoking severe criticism in London of the Cyprus Government for this barbaric and medieval practice.99 Among other things, ANE published leaflets and magazines for the moral and national education of children. “Eg1rtήrio Sάlpisma”100 was the magazine for secondary education pupils; “Agvgή tvn Nέvn”101 was the magazine for elementary school pupils. The responsibility for the circulation of these two magazines rested with PEKA, which Grivas created in 1957 with a mission to coordinate the political and military struggle, to maintain a solid internal front, to raise the morale of the people and to fight enemy propaganda.102 Under the leadership of Tassos Papadopoulos, later President of the Cyprus Republic, PEKA had a significant role in the creation of an anti-communist climate in Cyprus and was soon a target of AKEL.103 Both magazines included articles that

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railed against Communism and against PEOM, the pupils’ organisation affiliated with AKEL. Frixos Demetriades, who was responsible for the circulation of Agogi ton Neon, announced, on 10 September 1957, the circulation of the magazine: New pupils must join the new groups and the older groups should increase. Also, the efforts to persuade pupils not to register in Government schools should be enhanced. And, enlightenment against the communist PEOM should become more intense so that PEOM lose all its members . . . It is now necessary to make every effort to persuade pupils of elementary schools to join ANE groups . . . They will be called to participate in the ongoing struggle.104 In its first issue, Agogi ton Neon called upon Greek –Cypriot youth to fight for enosis, declaring that if they died for Greece, their sacrifice would be heroic.105 Both magazines were indeed very popular with students, and they succeeded in persuading them of the necessity of the struggle by criticising the colonial administration and by inculcating an adoration of the EOKA fighters who died in action. Some months later, when General Grivas decided to launch a campaign of passive resistance, these magazines became essential to its success. On 14 March 1957, EOKA declared a “unilateral truce” and abided by it for some time, with the exception of a few isolated attacks, on the condition that Archbishop Makarios and the other deportees would be released from the Seychelles. Two weeks later, on 28 March, LennoxBoyd announced the Archbishop’s release, and some of the emergency measures, like the curfews and the death penalty, were relaxed. Archbishop Makarios was not permitted to return to Cyprus and instead, inevitably, went to Greece. Meanwhile, the situation in Cyprus had taken a different turn. As Holland notes, with the release of Makarios and the declaration of the truce by EOKA in April, the Emergency, as a classic military insurgency, was soon to give way to a more intensely political phenomenon.106 This meant it was not just an Anglo-Greek rivalry but also a communal and politically motivated conflict. Besides, for some time Turkish councillors had been seeking municipal separatism: they maintained that if the British departed the island, the principle of self-determination should be applied separately to the

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Turkish community. On 3 June 1957, under the popular pressure for partition encouraged by Ankara and disappointed by the stance of the Cyprus Government regarding their demands, the Turkish –Cypriot municipal councillors resigned en masse from the municipal councils of the five main towns in Cyprus.107 During a second visit to Ankara in June, the leader of the Turkish – Cypriot community, Dr Fazil Kucuk publicly announced that the resignation of the Turkish –Cypriot municipal councillors proved the two communities could not live together and that, more specifically, “the rights of Turks could not be protected in an administration based on majority rule”. By 19 July 1957, Kucuk was triumphantly claiming that “partition had effectively begun”.108 A few months later, at a press conference, Kucuk stood in favour of partition as the only solution to the Cyprus problem, declaring that the Turkish side will accept “neither self-determination nor independence because either of this will leave Turkish community at the mercy of the Greeks”.109 There was no political solution in sight, and violence resumed on 14 October with the murder of the Mukhtar of Dali by EOKA. Field Marshal Harding resigned a few days later, having failed to deal effectively with the situation on the island. Harding left Cyprus on 4 November and was replaced by Sir Hugh Foot, a more “sympathetic healer of divisions” whose idealism was expected to succeed where Harding’s “honest but doomed integrity” had failed.110 Foot was already familiar with Cyprus, since he had served as Colonial Secretary from 1943 to 1945. When he returned as Governor, though, he was surprised to see the “peaceful and friendly island” he had left in 1954 in the midst of “a rebellion and imminent civil war which threatened to set aflame the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean.”111 Within days of his arrival, Foot received letters from the Greek Secondary School Teachers Association (OELMEK) and the School Committees of Greek Secondary Schools demanding self-determination, the immediate return of Archbishop Makarios and the abolition of the state of emergency.112 OELMEK actually offered solutions to the problems created by the “Government’s anti-Hellenic educational policy followed so far”. OELMEK proposed: the termination of the foundation of government inter-communal schools, for they only served the “Government’s propaganda political purposes”; reopening the closed Greek secondary and elementary schools; the restoration of detained

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teachers and students, and the restoration of the permissions granted to teachers who were Greek nationals.113 Such letters from the Greek educational establishment in Cyprus were a common practice during British rule and are emblematic of the connection between politics and education on the island. In 1958, Cyprus would suffer from the military struggle against the British and also from communal and politically motivated riots, which in the long run would cause much trauma for the people of Cyprus. On 21 January, two masked EOKA members entered two coffee shops, in Koma tou Yianou and Lyssi, where they killed two active leftist trade unionists. PEO (Pancyprian Federation of Labour), the leftist trade union, ordered a general strike, protests were held around the island, and there were confrontations between supporters of the Left and supporters of the Right. A few days later, on 27 January, thousands of Turkish youth, hurling bottles and stones, besieged Ataturk Square for several hours. As the crowds began to leave the Square an army truck drove through the mob, knocking down several people and killing a man and a woman. The incident precipitated a new wave of rioting, which culminated in a pitched battle with British forces. Several Turks were killed during the next two days. TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation) banned all contact between the British and Turkish–Cypriots and called upon the Turkish Mukhtars to resign.114 Between March and May 1958 more than 100 Cypriots were killed, and twice that number seriously wounded, in inter-communal and politically motivated killings, making the spring of 1958 “the worst time in Cyprus”.115 There were such violent intercommunal riots in June 1958 that it was referred to “Black June” in a recent study.116 The inter-communal tension had an impact on the denominational Teachers Training College,117 and in February 1958 the medium of instruction at the College became an acute political problem. The student body sent an ultimatum to the Government demanding an immediate change of the medium of instruction in the Greek–Cypriot section of the College and an increase in the students’ allowances. The Government asked the students to dissociate themselves from the ultimatum, but the students refused and were suspended. The press presented the matter as additional proof of the Government policy to destroy Greek education, while the Educational Council of the Ethnarchy praised the students for defending their “national dignity” and supported them in their strike action. The students returned to their classes after the

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Education Department promised them their demands would be favourably considered and, eventually, their demand for a change of the medium of instruction was fully met – by the end of the year the Turkish students at the College were moved to a building in the Turkish sector of Nicosia. Remarkably, the English School managed to remain open until July, although the staff, as Griffin recalled, “lived on a knife edge. Every time I saw a boy congratulate another of a different community on the sports field I thank God for our tradition”.118 In June 1958, London presented the Macmillan Plan, named for the British Prime Minister, to the people of Cyprus. The Plan, among its other provisions, accorded Ankara a formal role in Cypriot affairs for the first time since 1923.119 In a nutshell, the Plan provided for Cyprus to remain British for seven more years, but during this period Greece and Turkey would assist in the administration of the island. It was of great importance that the Plan could be implemented partially, without the concurrence of Greece and Turkey. The Plan was not well received by Greek– Cypriots, and even Agogi ton Neon condemned it as a “freedomkilling device”, a “monster plan” which gave non-existent rights to the Turkish.120 In August 1958, a revised version of the Plan, from which the dual nationality provision had been stripped, was accepted by Turkey and Britain with the full backing of the US. It was thus decided to move forward with the Plan, even in the face of Greek objections.121 London therefore accepted the appointment of a Turkish representative in Cyprus, as provided by the Plan, the return of Turkish state authority to Cyprus for the first time since 1878.122 In addition to processions and strikes, schoolchildren were also instructed to play an active role in passive resistance by boycotting any activities initiated by the Department of Education. This included the boycott of the Cyprus Certificate and other examinations organised on behalf of examining bodies by the Department; the boycott of teachers’ summer courses; the boycott of the Children’s magazine produced by a Greek– Cypriot committee and distributed by the Department and the burning of English textbooks issued by the Department to elementary schools. Elementary school children were also told to demand that English be dropped from the curriculum and that the time previously spent on English should be spent on Greek language and history.123 Indicatively, for the 1958 GCE examinations, of 19,496 eligible students only 6,570 took the examinations.124 In 1959, the entries for

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the exams were 12,907, despite assurances from District Commissioners that English-language classes were still very popular.125 PEKA also circulated a leaflet to all elementary school teachers asking them to boycott the courses organised by the Department of Education every summer in Pedoulas, as “an indication that Greek teachers refuse the Government offer and they too take part in the struggle of the Cypriot people through Passive Resistance against the dynast. Any teacher who will accept the offer will be stigmatised”.126 Indicative of this frenzy in the schools was the announcement by Yialousa Elementary School pupils: “Today, 10.08.58, we, the schoolboys and schoolgirls of the Yialousa Elementary School, we burned our English books in our schoolyard. We declare that we will never attend again the English language class and that we will not even enter the classroom when this subject is taught. We ask for the replacement of the English language class with Greek language class”.127 It is obvious schoolchildren of this age would not make this kind of decision on their own – they were of course influenced and encouraged by their parents and their teachers, by older students, and by articles in the EOKA magazine Agogi ton Neon.128 Inevitably, the English School found itself at the heart of the boycott. In a proclamation circulated among pupils, PEKA said it considered it “unthinkable that there are Greek parents who send their children to alien schools . . .” The leaflet demanded that Greek parents should take their children to Greek schools only because a Greek soul should receive Greek education, there was no security in a school where the Headmaster can expel students and where “bloodthirsty Turkish students attend”.129 This was followed by similar proclamations warning students that if they did not comply with the orders regarding the English School they would suffer the consequences.130 While many Greek –Cypriots resisted PEKA’s threats, the English School was seriously affected by PEKA’s hostile campaign. When the school reopened in September 1958, it had only thirty-two Greek pupils, as compared to 270 the previous year: in 1957 the English School student body comprised 317 Greeks and Maronites, 193 Turks and forty-one pupils from other communities, but in 1958 it comprised thirty-two Greeks, forty-two Maronites, 176 Turks and forty-eight pupils from other communities. We should note that in 1957 the English School for Girls opened its doors, but it, too, suffered from the Emergency, despite the warm welcome it had received from parents. In 1957, the school welcomed fifty-nine Greeks, sixty Turks and

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nineteen pupils from other communities. In 1958, only thirty-eight Greek girls attended the school, along with fifty-three Turks and twenty-one students from other communities.131 In order to face the withdrawal of Greek students from the English School, and in response to pleas from parents to put a halt to EOKA and PEKA intimidation, the Governor prohibited the publication, by any pupil or parent, of any notice stating pupils would leave one school to attend another.132 On 30 August 1958, Emergency Regulations were published in an extraordinary gazette – these regulations informed Headmasters that they were not permitted to enrol students who had attended another secondary school within the last year without the consent of the Director of Education. It was also now illegal for a secondary school to have more registered pupils than it did in September 1956 unless permission had been obtained from the Director of Education.133 The Pancyprian Gymnasium, however, seized the opportunity to step in and provide education, for tuition, to pupils who had left the English School.134 Indeed, Spyridakis claimed the number of pupils enrolled in the school exceeded 3,100 without including boys and girls from government schools who, although attending lessons, had not been registered on account of the recently decreed secondary school regulations.135 On the first day of the 1959–60 school year, enrolment at the English Schools for Boys and Girls was similar to that of the previous year and therefore higher than had been expected, something the colonial authority saw as proof that “there was still basic demand for the kind of education these schools offered” and therefore “we should continue to fight for these schools”.136 Eventually, at the end of British rule, London managed to get both leaders of the two communities to agree to the continuation of the operation of the English Schools for Boys and Girls and the Junior School for two more school years. The agreement provided for HMG to pay £160,000, provided the Government of Cyprus allotted the buildings and grounds rent-free to enable the schools to continue on their present course – the British Council would administer the schools with the assistance of a local Board.137 The British wanted these schools, which were modeled after British schools, to continue operating even after Cyprus became a republic. On the political plane, the offer of the Plan forced Makarios to modify his position on the enosis question. While in Athens, on 22 September 1958, he made a statement to Barbara Castle, MP, that if the British Government abandoned the Plan he would be willing to accept,

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after a fixed period of self-government, a regime of independence.138 Besides, due to the Turkish element, enosis would be very hard to achieve. After this, Greece made its final appeal to the UN for the island’s independence. Since the Plan was gradually being implemented, Athens and the Ethnarchy wanted to halt the process and force the representative of the Turkish Government from the island. Neither the Macmillan Plan nor Makarios’s statement in favour of independence, however, met with agreement from Grivas, who unleashed a new offensive in October, one of the bloodiest in the history of EOKA. During what became known as “Black October”, forty-five people were killed and 370 were injured, including six British civilians and ten soldiers.139 The British retaliated with arrests and attacks, killing nine Cypriots. EOKA continues its attacks throughout the autumn and early winter while, after the death of two RAF soldiers on 11 November, all Greek – Cypriots in the employ of the British administration were replaced by volunteers from Britain.140 In the middle of November Grivas reluctantly agreed to suspend operations for a short time, pending the discussion of Cyprus at the UN. Against this background, the situation in the schools was still unsettling. In 1958, the majority of elementary and secondary schools in both towns and villages were involved in the struggle, always with the approval or at least the tolerance of their parents and teachers.141 In his report for the week 21–7 November 1958, the Commissioner of Troodos wrote, “the seditious activity at Agros High School made education a farce”.142 Acting Director of Education T.B. Lightbody, speaking after several incidents at Famagusta Gymnasium, said teachers were encouraging their pupils to participate in EOKA activities, and that “the Greek secondary schools still regard their primary function as the inculcation of national ideals, at present largely identified with the aims and methods of EOKA”.143 This was after the Famagusta Gymnasium had declared a three-day period of mourning in honour of Kyriakos Matsis, who had been killed in Dikomo; Lightbody believed the period of mourning was “indoctrination in its most dangerous form”: “It is in my views monstrous that such an action should be taken by a Town School Committee appointed by the Governor, and moreover one which is in receipt of a substantial annual grant-in-aid from the Cyprus Government”.144 On the evening of 4 December 1958 an Iranian resolution on Cyprus was adopted supporting the continuation of efforts by the parties

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concerned to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution, though the resolution did not offer a concrete solution to the problem. What then ensued was a negotiation process between Greece and Turkey, which resulted in the Greek– Turkish meeting in Zurich from 5 –11 February 1959. The meeting resulted in an agreement to establish an independent Cyprus, one where neither enosis nor partition would be possible – a Treaty of Guarantee would be signed by Britain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to safeguard the independence, the constitution and the territorial integrity of the new republic. A week later, from 17 –19 February, Britain, Greece, Turkey, Greek– Cypriot representatives and Turkish – Cypriot representatives participated in the London Conference, where Britain accepted the Zurich Agreements145 on the precondition it would, as a sovereign power, retain sovereign bases in the island. Britain’s need for sovereign bases on the island was supported by Sir John Harding, after his departure from the island and before the Zurich Agreements were signed – he maintained this need was dictated by the island’s military importance.146 It is not possible here to provide a full account of these Agreements, but it would suffice to say that they started Cyprus on its path to becoming independent and began the process of bringing a long colonial rule and a bloody conflict to an end. Immediately after the London Conference three committees were established to oversee the transition to the new regime, a transition estimated to take approximately fifteen months. Within this framework, the administration of education was returned, after many years, to the communities. On 1 May 1959, the Governor, in agreement with President Archbishop Makarios, appointed a Greek Educational Board to administer education during the transitional period. Already, some months earlier, POED had demanded the release of all detained teachers and their reinstatement. Its other requests included the abolishment of the teaching of English to make more time available for the teaching of Greek and for the selection of students for the Teachers Training Collection to be the responsibility of the Republic.147 It was obvious the orientation Greek–Cypriot education would take following the establishment of the Republic. Spyridakis, the most prominent educational figure in Cyprus, hitherto Headmaster of the Pancyprian Gymnasium and a member of the Educational Office of the Ethnarchy, was duly appointed President of the Board. The Governor relinquished his rights to educational issues

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but retained his right to approve any regulations made by the Council and to regulate any financial and legal issues.148 Four months later, in a rather symbolic gesture, the Greek flag was hoisted at the Offices of the Board. 149 In the same spirit, all schools were instructed to hoist the Greek flag on school holidays and on Sundays, a move that had a major psychological effect, considering that during the EOKA revolt schools were closed down for this very activity. Schools were furthermore instructed to teach Greek national songs and the Greek national anthem, to honour Greek national days, to put pictures of Greek heroes and great personalities on classroom walls alongside pictures of the heroes of the EOKA struggle, Makarios and Grivas. The aim was, in Spyridakis’s words, to “Hellenise Greek Education” so the schools would “acquire Greek national character, type and expression”.150 Additionally, one of the first measures instituted by the newly established Greek Educational Board was to convert the Teacher’s Training School into the Pedagogical Academy and commence instruction along the lines of the pedagogical academies in Greece, and its curriculum was accordingly revised.151 It is interesting that with the end of the British rule Greek–Cypriots embarked upon an education policy neither genuinely Cypriot nor purely independent. With the establishment in 1960 of two Communal Chambers, a Greek Communal Chamber and a Turkish Communal Chamber, each with the authority to exercise legislative power with regard to religious, educational, cultural and teaching matters, affiliation between the communities and their respective motherlands would grow stronger than ever, with detrimental consequences for the new Republic.

CONCLUSION

In this book we have examined the crucial role political developments played in the evolution and reformation of the education system in Cyprus between 1931 and early 1959, the end of the physical struggle in pre-independence Cyprus. As has become evident, education was a vital part of Cypriot society throughout this period and served as a means for the Government to entrench its position on the island and for politicians to express their resistance to the Government and simultaneously emphasise their inter-party differences. Most importantly, education came to be the platform for the vocal support of enosis and for those who sought its eradication. Throughout the entire period education was a flagship policy for London and the Cyprus Government as they tried to introduce a British atmosphere on the island and inculcate loyalty to the Empire so as to safeguard Britain’s leading position in the Mediterranean and the Near East, especially after World War II. Simultaneously, education was by and large for Greek– Cypriots and, much later, for Turkish –Cypriots, the banner beneath which they sought justification for their nationalist claims. In short, education was central to the interlocking polarities of Cypriot political life. The study started with a comprehensive summary of the educational situation in the first 50 years of the British administration until the enactment of the Education Law of 1929 which, along with economic grievances, fuelled a spontaneous uprising against the regime in 1931 that constituted, among other things, the first vocal demand for enosis. The uprising marked the beginning of a repressive but also reforming administration in Cyprus: its survival was to a great extent based on the

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reorganisation of the education system, a reorganisation spearheaded by a further series of Education Laws, enacted in the 1930s, that inspired fierce reactions. During the war years, education, though overshadowed by more pressing issues, still had a telling presence in the electoral campaign of 1943. In the second half of the 1940s, amidst discussions for a Consultative Assembly to bring a revised Constitution in the island, Cypriot educationists used their posts to exert pressure on behalf of enosis. Lastly, in the 1950s, the politicisation of education reached such levels that schools became a forcing ground for the rebellion against British rule, and the island’s education system almost broke down completely. Education was highly politicised in Cyprus, as well as in other British colonies, and this reflected ongoing political developments and local controversies. It also held a central role in Britain’s preoccupations in the colonies and, as with all aspects of colonial government, the British chose to import professional talent from home to fill the highest administrative and technical positions in the education sector. The Indian Civil Service [ICS] was the epitome of this practice, for all of the main services were run at the highest levels by British officials recruited in Britain.1 This was the case in Cyprus, too. All the Directors of Education, Headmasters and Headmistresses of schools and colleges where instruction was in English, the inspectors of schools and many other professionals were all brought from England. The Colonial Office paid much attention to the advancement of education in the colonies. In 1924 the Advisory Committee of Education was established to coordinate and advise the overseas departments, while its milestone 1925 report and subsequent reconstitution as a standing Committee on Education in the Colonies was to dominate the formulation of colonial educational policy for the next 35 years.2 Indeed, the later 1920s in particular marked the beginning of a new phase of state involvement in education – this phase progressed against the backdrop of a new approach to colonial development and welfare, not least as an evolving response to the economic depression of the 1930s. Departments of Education were now established in many colonies for the first time, with a primary task of supervising the growth of schools run by voluntary agencies and, where deemed appropriate, to set up and maintain separate government institutions.3 Although there were recurring themes such as the reduction of illiteracy, the use of

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English, the enhancement of female education and the development of technical and rural education, there could, given the vast diversity of colonial circumstances, be no single template for colonial education. Very significantly, however, the Colonial Office did begin to exercise a guiding influence across the broad front of policy, epitomised by the appointment of a former teacher of Ancient Greek at New College, Oxford, Christopher Cox, as Education Adviser in 1939.4 These tendencies became more pronounced with the reformulation of colonial policy incorporated in fresh Development and Welfare Acts in 1940 and 1945. Partly because of its particular challenges, and also perhaps because of his own interest in Hellenism, Cox took a particular interest in Cyprus during the late 1940s and 1950s. Because of its geographical and cultural setting, however, the real analogies for Cypriot education lay not so much in the colonial empire in some undifferentiated manner, but in the Mediterranean itself, because the conditions there were so distinctive. Both Malta and Cyprus, for example, lacked the missionary factor we encounter in the African colonies on account of their powerful religious authorities. But even in the colonies where Christian missions played a significant role in the advancement of Western education, the character and content of mission education varied, and these variations reflected the variety of societies and ideologies the Empire comprised.5 At the time and since, the colonial government’s educational policy in Cyprus was accused of being based on two fundamental principles: the policy of de-Hellenisation and the dogma of divide-and-rule. Not only are these two principles to some extent contradictory, but taken together they constitute an over-simplification. Educational decisions such as changes in the teaching of History and Geography, the introduction of the English language in the Primary Schools, the singing of the British National Anthem in classrooms and the closure of the Teachers’ Training Schools of the Pancyprian Gymnasium in favour of the establishment of a denominational Training College were seen by Greek –Cypriots as attempts at de-Hellenisation. Notwithstanding the intended dissemination of British ideas and values among the younger generations, the Cyprus Government never aimed to de-Hellenise Greek – Cypriots (and, by extension, deprive Turkish –Cypriots of their Turkish heritage) in any conscious or systematic sense. Lessons were taught in the students’ own mother tongues, while children were allowed to profess their religion.

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Teachers at the Training Colleges studied in their mother tongues and were encouraged to study the cultural heritage to which they belonged. Moreover, despite the British need to weaken the links between Cypriots and their motherlands, the colonial administration never prohibited Cypriots from traveling to Greece or Turkey to continue their studies. What mattered more to the administration was to have educated and professional teachers to staff the island’s schools, even if they graduated from “hostile” universities. Britain was a colonial power that strove to maintain its supremacy in areas that safeguarded its interests. Cyprus remained a potentially important colony in a period often marked by Mediterranean tensions and as such could not be subject to constant subversion, not least through such a central set of institutions as the schools. Recent studies argue that following the 1931 uprising the British Government in Cyprus decided to guide the Cypriot educational system onto the path of de-nationalisation, since the dissemination of nationalist doctrines in the communal schools presented a direct threat to the colonial government. The British educational reforms described in detail in this book probably came too late in British rule to achieve their essential aims, as a recent study has asserted, since by the 1920s nationalist curricula, according to the norms of the Greek mainland, had already become deeply entrenched.6 It might even be said that the persistent attempt by the colonial power to reshape Cypriot education along “modern” lines from the mid-1920s onward proved counter-productive by stimulating a Greek– Cypriot educational response along even more self-conscious and assertive Hellenic lines. Otherwise, it might have developed more flexibly and in an autonomous manner. The role of schools in the troubles of the 1950s only compounded this situation. To that extent there was, in educational terms, “a burden of the past” in Cyprus that carried over after independence in 1960. Many scholars have accused the British Government of implementing a divide-and-rule policy in Cyprus to segregate the two communities for its own benefit, a policy in which education played a large part. Adamantia Polis contends that to portray British policy solely in terms of a divide-and-rule concept would be insufficient, as in Cyprus the politicisation of separate religious communities and the creation of a representative system based on religion instead of territory worked against the evolution of a Cypriot nationality as a possible reference

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group and favoured the development of separate Greek and Turkish nationalities. She underlines that there was no logical, national reason why the Cypriot dialect could not have developed into a language of its own, just as several languages have sprung from Latin and particularly since Cypriot grammars and dictionaries were being published in the nineteenth century.7 Instead, two Boards of Education were created and control was vested in Athens and Constantinople, respectively. “In time”, she argues, “the Cypriots came to view themselves just as the British did: separate antagonistic nationalities, Greek and Turk fighting for political power and for control over the same territory”.8 The English School was, in educational terms, one of the few places where the desire to construct a single Cypriot identity assumed a practical form, though the attempt was always to be full of pitfalls. For instance, the first EOKA fighter to be sentenced to death was an English School graduate. We could therefore argue that if de-nationalisation was resisted even at the English School, its implementation in the Gymnasia would have been impossible. Any efforts in this direction were continuously and strongly resisted by politicians, Greek educationalists, the Press and, most importantly, the Church, and thus the policy of divide-and-rule was arguably inevitable. Had the Government reformed education along pro-British lines as early as 1878, the construction of a Cypriot identity might have been more feasible, though even then Greek–Cypriot reactions would probably have dogged any such attempt. Such efforts were attempted in Malta much earlier than they were in Cyprus. In 1878 the Commissioner responsible for the education system, Patrick J. Keenan, proposed the rapid Anglicisation of Maltese education through the immediate adoption of “English and English only”, taught through the medium of Maltese, as the language of education. Sigismondo Savona, a teacher turned politician and a staunch campaigner for the teaching of English in Maltese schools, was appointed Director of Public Education and Rector of the University, and in 1883 the curriculum was revised so more hours would be allotted to the teaching of English to both pupils and teachers.9 Despite strong reactions, the English language was gradually introduced in schools, courts and public administration, which might be interpreted as the beginning of the Anglicisation of Malta. By 1921 the English language seemed to have overtaken Italian, especially among the educated members of Maltese society, although it never seemed to penetrate the

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deeper layers of Maltese culture as Italian had done, so in 1931 the Royal Commission prompted the eventual removal of Italian from the courts and schools.10 During World War II the Italian language was pronounced lingua non grata, and the teaching of the English language and the promotion of English culture received a great boost, a tactic soon adopted in other colonies. Eventually, the 1939 Constitution made English one of the official languages alongside Maltese and, with the Malta Independence Constitution in 1964, English was made the official language after Maltese. Conversely, in Cyprus, English was never made an official language of the Republic. Ironically, however, whilst in Malta so much struggle had surrounded the English and Italian languages, the language that finally came to dominate everyday culture was the vernacular, demotic language of Maltese, although higher education on the island today is overwhelmingly in English. Whilst in postIndependence Malta there has been a fierce ideological and factional struggle between Left and Right, the Malta Labour Party and the Nationalist party, respectively, this has evolved without quite the same linguistic and cultural baggage as it carried during the colonial era. The different political history of Cyprus has meant that the continuity in these spheres, with all their difficulties, is much more pronounced. Although this has been a historical study, many of the underlying issues at its heart – for example, fissures between Church and State, or the tension between a classic, Hellenic education and a more secular and professional education – remain controversial in Cyprus. It is therefore appropriate for us to reflect on some of the connections with the more contemporary scene in the Cyprus of today. After independence, the institutional, educational and to some degree cultural connections with Britain inevitably slackened. As Joseph argues, the removal of the colonial administration left the way open for the two mainlands to develop close relations with the newborn state and seek promotion of their national goals on the island, and cross-boundary ethnic ties played a significant role in shaping developments in Cyprus.11 Since education was segregated, the two communities followed the instructions given by the Greek and Turkish Ministries of Education, and religious instruction became a major part of the curricula. This fully fledged allegiance to the Greek education system was not, however, shared by everyone in Greek – Cypriot officialdom. From the 1960s onwards the dilemma between Hellenocentric or Hellenocypriocentric education sparked a number of

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confrontations.12 One of these occurred in 1963 between Spyridakis and the Headmaster of the Pancyprian Gymnasium and later Minister of Education, Frixos Petrides. According to a scholar this confrontation was between the conservative and the progressive, the old and the new, the idea of continuing with the complete alliance of Greek –Cypriot education with the Greek one and its emancipation from it.13 Petrides criticised Greek curricula and textbooks as inadequate under acceptable pedagogical principles and of teaching the glory of the past and the achievements of ancestors whilst neglecting modern social and economic needs. A similar confrontation happened around 1967, two years after the unilateral establishment of the Ministry of Education, when the Ministers of Finance and Interior called for changes in education to meet the emerging needs of the newly established and fast-developing Republic while at the same time maintaining a broader, Hellenocentric philosophical orientation. Conversely, Spyridakis, as Minister of Education, supported the full identification of Cyprus Education with Greek education and the preservation of classical studies.14 The bifurcation in the practical working of the constitution in 1963 and the bi-communal conflicts that followed, along with the Turkish invasion of 1974 and the occupation of a third of the island by Turkey, could not but render the education system a first-rate political issue. Attalides contends the Greek – Cypriot Communal Chamber and, later, the Ministry of Education, was staffed with individuals who were themselves imbued with the paraphernalia of rigid and highly idealistic official Greek culture: this culture was transmitted to the schoolchildren of Cyprus and subsequently contributed to the mental and cultural barriers between the two main communities on the island. Nonetheless, Greek– Cypriots were quite willing to remain politically separate from Greece if they could remain culturally Greek.15 Since 1974 and the division of the island, history is taught in the schools based on selective memory. Greek –Cypriot schoolchildren know very little about the period after independence until the invasion and are taught to see Turkish – Cypriots and Turkey, by extension, as the culprit for all the evils that have occurred on the island. North of the Green Line, Turkish – Cypriot schoolchildren blame Greek– Cypriots and Greece for their current isolation. Even the English School stopped admitting Turkish – Cypriot students for a period of a time after the invasion. According to Joseph, since education was a major instrument of ethnic

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socialisation, it also served as an instrument for the transplantation of the broader Greek –Turkish antagonism into Cyprus. For this a great share of the responsibility lies with the religious institutions on both sides, as they contributed to the creation of mutually negative predispositions and attitudes between the two communities.16 Educational issues continue to be a source of confrontation, while educational policy depends to a considerable extent on which political parties are in power. AKEL’s victory in the presidential elections of 2008 was combined with the preparation of new curricula in the state schools, in accordance with other European states, as well as discussions for new History textbooks. This, coupled with President Demetris Christofias’s decision not to seek the approval of the Archbishop for the appointment of a Minister of Education, infuriated the Church, which never stopped being actively involved in the educational matters of the island. The Committee appointed to write the new History textbooks inspired a series of reactions. The Church spoke of historical distortions, and the Holy Synod demanded to participate in the formation of the new guidelines for the schools. The issue was temporarily shelved and, during the last government re-shuffle, the new Minister of Education hurried to assure the Archbishop that education is offered in the context of the Greek civilisation as it has been formed through the years in relation to other civilisations.17 Meanwhile, a significant effort was made a few years ago in the Turkish –Cypriot schools, with the introduction of new textbooks, to balance the responsibilities of the two communities and eventually stimulate a mutual trust for the solution of the Cyprus problem. This policy was, however, reversed by the newly elected nationalist leader of the Turkish –Cypriot community. On 25 November 2015 President Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akkinci announced the establishment of a new bi-communal technical committee for education that will be tasked with reviewing educational practices to combat racism, xenophobia and extremism, to build trust among the two communities and to promote peace.18 According to UN Special Adviser on Cyprus Espen Barth Eide, the Committee will work on devising a mutually acceptable mechanism for the implementation of confidence-building measures in the schools of the two educational systems and promote contact and cooperation between students and educators from the two communities. In addition, best policy options and a course of action that will enable coordination of the two

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educational systems will be recommended, “thus contributing to a viable, sustainable and functional bi-communal, bi-zonal federation”.19 In a recent interview, the Minister of Education, Costas Kadis, embraced the establishment of the Committee and stated that education can and should enhance the efforts being made at the moment to reunify our country.20 On 1 June 2016, in the context of the ongoing peace negotiations, the Committee organised its first ever event, bringing together 100 children, aged eleven to twelve years old from both communities, at the Home for Cooperation and Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone. The leaders of the two communities, Mr Anastasiades and Mr Mustafa Akıncı, joined the activities and interacted with the children, sending the message that contact between the two communities should start from an early age to increase understanding and respect between the communities for the betterment of Cyprus. The event was supported by Teacher Trade Unions Greek – Cypriot POED and Turkish – Cypriot KTOS, by the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and by the Home for Cooperation.21 The establishment of the Committee was well received by the larger political parties of the Left and the Right, but it was met with suspicion and scepticism from others. Simerini, a newspaper of the extreme Right, accused the Committee of being a group of twenty-six wealthy educationalists, graduates of foreign-sponsored seminars who entertain the illusion the Turkish Army does not occupy Cyprus and that the only issue is a psychological problem between the two communities, something that will be overcome with the introduction of Turkish and Greek in Greek – Cypriot and Turkish –Cypriot schools, respectively, and with teacher and student exchanges.22 The article obviously referred to the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research which, since its establishment in 2003, has charged members from various ethnic, linguistic and professional backgrounds working at various educational levels in Cyprus with a mission to contribute to the advancement of historical understanding amongst the public and, more specifically, amongst children, youth and educators, according to relevant declarations by the UN and the Council of Europe.23 AHDR has made some progress towards bringing the two communities together, and its EU-funded project, ‘Education for a Culture of Peace as a Vehicle for Reconciliation in Cyprus’, which aims to use education as a platform

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to bring structural changes in society, has the support of the Ministry of Education and Culture. 24 Today, the attachment of Greek –Cypriot education to nationalist ideas and to Greece is also evident at the English School, which has almost completely lost its denominational character. The school has become, through the years, greatly susceptible to political interference.25 Since Turkish– Cypriot pupils are once again admitted to the English School, beginning in 2003, the school’s board and management team have been trying to bring about changes reflecting the bi-communal character of the English School, but on every decision they have encountered the vehement opposition of a group of parents who do not want any allowances made for Turkish –Cypriot students. Nationalist elements have infiltrated the school, and its Board is appointed by the current government, makes it difficult for the English School to overcome external political differences. Even if the school gained autonomy and independence, however, such disputes would not cease as long as the Cyprus problem remains unsolved. To conclude, education in Cyprus during the last 30 years of British administration became highly politicised. Shifting colonial and international politics came to define the character of British rule and, consequently, the administration of various sectors of Cypriot society, not least the education system. Fifty years after independence, both the “remnants” of the colonial past and the post-1960 political situation still leave education extremely susceptible to political developments and confrontations. What has changed is the communities are no longer trying to protect their “national” identities and educational structures from British influences, but rather from each other’s distinctive, but also overlapping, cultures. The challenge of building a truly unified Cypriot identity, a challenge that proved well beyond the capacity of British rule in colonial times, remains to be met in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

Introduction 1. W.W. Weir, Education in Cyprus, Limassol, 1952. 2. Panayiotis K. Persianis, Church and State in Cyprus Education, Nicosia, 1978; Panayiotis K. Persianis, Ta pοlitikά th6 1kpaίd1y sh6 sthn Kύprο katά tοy 6 t1l1ytaίοy 6 dύο aiώn16 (1812 – 2009), Athens, 2010. 3. Constantinos Spyridakis, The Educational Policy of the English Government in Cyprus: 1878– 1954, Nicosia, 1954; Constantinos Spyridakis, The Greek Secondary Education of Cyprus, Nicosia, 1959. 4. Kl1όbοylο6 I. Myrianuόpοylο6, H paid1ίa 1n Kύprv 1pί Agglοk ratίa6 1878 – 1946, L1m1sό6, 1946; Andrέa6 P.Pοlydώrοy, H anάpty jh th6 dhmοtikή6 1kpaίd1y sh6 sthn Kύprο, 1830– 1944, L1ykvsίa, 1995. 5. George Horton Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939– 1955, New York, 1990; Michael A. Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics, Edinburgh, 1979; Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954– 59, Oxford, 1998; Nancy Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt: Origins, Development and Aftermath of an International Dispute, London, 1978; David French, Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955– 59, Oxford, 2015. 6. The motives behind this policy will be extensively analysed in Chapter 2. 7. Altay Nevzat, “Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave”, PhD Thesis, Department of History: University of Oulou, 2005, available at http://herkules.oulu.fi/isbn9514277511/isbn9514277511.pdf. 8. I would like to express my gratitude to the family of the late Klearchos Kyriakides who kindly allowed access to his personal archive. 9. The secondary sources used in this book were found at the following libraries: The British Library, the British Library of Political Science (LSE), the Senate House Library, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies Library, the Institute

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of Education Library, the Cyprus Library, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation Libraries, the Severios Library of the Pancyprian Gymnasium and the University of Cyprus Library.

Chapter 1 The Education System During the First Fifty Years of the British Administration, 1878 –1931 1. Cyprus was ceded to Britain as part of the “Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey with respect to the Adriatic Provinces of Turkey”, which was signed at the Berlin Conference. The Alliance is commonly known as the “Cyprus Convention” and, according to it, Great Britain was engaged to join Turkey in defending the provinces of Batum, Ardahan and Kars should those be retained by Russia; in return the Sultan assigned the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by Britain. The Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey signed on 4 June 1878 and the Annex to the Anglo-Turkish Convention, dated 1 July 1878, are reproduced in: Murat Metin Hakki (ed.), The Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878– 2006, London, 2007, 3 – 5. 2. Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954–1959, Oxford, 1998, 5. 3. Robert Holland and Diana Markides, Britain and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850– 1960, Oxford, 2006, 166. 4. Holland and Markides, Britain and the Hellenes, 2006, 164. 5. G.S. Georghallides, A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918– 1926, Nicosia, 1979, 16. 6. Diana Markides, “Bailed In: Strategy, Finance and the Acquisition of Cyprus, 1878”, in Yiangou, Kazamias and Holland (eds), The Greeks and the British in the Levant, 1800 –1960s: Between Empires and Nations, London, 2016, 90. 7. Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 17. 8. For a detailed account of the taxation system and the Tribute see: Sir George Hill, The History of Cyprus: The Ottoman Province, The British Colony 1571–1948, Vol. IV, Cambridge, 1952, 443–88. 9. Rebecca Bryant, Imagining the Modern: the Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus, London, 2004, 81. 10. Among the benefactors was High Commissioner Sir Walter Sendall who, in 1897, provided financial assistance to the Phaneromeni Girls’ High School of Nicosia to enable graduates to pursue higher studies abroad. His wife, Lady Sendall, also organised concerts at the school to raise money for the Anglican Church. As Markides notes, the venue indicates an early and fairly intimate interaction between the High Commissioner and the Archbishop, forged by their mutual interest in education. Diana Markides, Sendall in Cyprus 1892– 1898: A Governor in Bondage, Nicosia, 2014, 49. 11. Panayiotis K. Persianis, Church and State in Cyprus Education, Nicosia, 1978, 26.

NOTES 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

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Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 27 – 9. Ibid., 47 – 8. Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, 1978, 23. Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 61. Andrekos Varnava, British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878 – 1915: The Inconsequential Possession, Manchester, 2009, 164– 5. Antigone Heraclidou, Politics and Education in Cyprus and Malta during the Inter-War Years, Journal of Mediterranean Studies, Special Issue; Y. Katsourides and A. Heraclidou (eds), Nationalism and Decolonisation in the Mediterranean: Cyprus and Malta Compared, 1918 –1964, Vol. 23 No.1, 2014, 75 – 88, 77. Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict: National Identities and Statehood, Nicosia, 1976 (1999), 14. Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion, 1990, 8. Spyridakis, Greek Secondary Education, 1954, 3 – 4. Rolandos Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the 19th Century, Nicosia, 1996, 93. Myrianuόpοylο6, H paid1ίa 1n Kύprv, 1946, 26. Panayiotis Persianis, “The British Colonial Education ‘Lending’ Policy in Cyprus (1878 – 1960): An Intriguing Example of an Elusive ‘Adapted Education’ Policy”, Comparative Education, Vol. 32 No.1, 1996, 45 – 68. Weir, Education in Cyprus, 177. Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics, 1996, 94. The first scientific excavations were launched by a German, Max OhnefalschRichter. He was employed by Sir Charles Newton, Director of the British Museum, to dig in Salamis in 1880. The first excavation involving the British Museum took place in 1893. See Hill, 1952, 108. Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics, 1996, 94. Gerasimos Augustinos, Consciousness and History: National Critics of Greek Society 1897– 1914. New York, 1977, 3 – 4. Augustinos, Consciousness and History, 1977, 18; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question 1878– 1960: The Constitutional Aspect, Minneapolis, 2002, 32. Holland and Markides, Britain and the Hellenes, 2006, 171. Diana Markides, Cyprus 1878– 1925: Ambiguities and Uncertainties, in Hubert Faustmann and Nicos Peristianis (eds), Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism 1878 2006, Mannheim, 2006, 28. Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 83. Markides, Cyprus 1878– 1925, 2006, 28. The American Academy, which was established in 1908 by missionaries of the Reformed Presbyterian Church of North America, also used English as its medium of instruction. Weir, Education in Cyprus, 1952, 106. Pashalis M. Kitromilides, “Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26 No. 1 (1990), 3– 17. Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 17.

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16 –20

38. Myrianuόpοylο6, H paid1ίa 1n Kύprv, 1946, 198. From 1926 until 1930 the post was held by the Cypriot Ioannis Ioannides, while in 1936 the position was assumed by C. Spyridakis. His father was Greek, however, from Epirus. 39. Mary Koutsellini-Ioannidou, “Curriculum as political text: the case of Cyprus (1935 90)”, History of Education: Journal of the History of Education Society, Vol 26. No. 4 (2016), 395–407, 399. 40. Holland and Markides, Britain and the Hellenes, 2006, 172. 41. Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 94 – 5. 42. Persianis, Church and State, 1996, 53. 43. Holland and Markides, Britain and the Hellenes, 2006, 166. 44. Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 59. 45. Anne Cavendish (ed.), Cyprus 1878: The Journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley, Nicosia, 1991, 51. 46. Holland and Markides, Britain and the Hellenes, 2006, 166. 47. Ronald Storrs, Orientations, London, 1937, 558. 48. C.W.J. Orr, Cyprus under British Rule, London, 1918, 171. 49. The constitution of the Legislative Council was first created in 1882. It was headed by the High Commissioner, who nominated the rest of its members: three official members, who were senior British functionaries of the Government, and three unofficial members, who were Cypriots. For more information on the political organisation of early colonial Cyprus see: Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics, 1996. With the Order in Council of 6 February 1925 its members increased to 25: the Governor, 15 elected members (12 Greek – Cypriots and 3 Turkish – Cypriots) and 9 official members (British officials). 50. J.E. Talbot and F.W. Cape, Report on Education in Cyprus, London, 1913. 51. Talbot and Cape, Report on Education, 1913, 39 – 44. 52. Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 51. 53. Orr, Cyprus, 1918, 130. 54. The Cyprus Convention collapsed according to a doctrine of international law which rules that bilateral agreements are extinguished by an outbreak of war (World War I) between the two parties. Arnold Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1931, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1931, 357; Holland and Markides, 2006, 177. 55. S.P.P. Cosmetatos, The Tragedy of Greece, London, 1928, 70 – 1, quoted in Toynbee, 1931, 358. 56. Holland and Markides, Britain and the Hellenes, 2006, 178. 57. Hill, A History of Cyprus, 1952, 524– 5. 58. Sir Harry Luke, Cities and Men: An Autobiography, Vol. II, London, 1953, 33. Archbishop Kyrillos III (1859–1933) studied Greek philology at the University of Athens and taught at the Gymnasium of Limassol before his election as Bishop of Kyrenia in 1895. Kyrillos III and Kyrillos II contested for the Throne during the famous archiepiscopal issue of 1900, which left the Church of Cyprus without

NOTES

59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

64. 65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82.

TO PAGES

20 –27

269

an Archbishop for ten years. See L. Kοydοynάrh6, Biοgrawikό L1jikό Kyprίvn, 1800–1920, L1ykvsίa, 1989, 74. A full description of the event is given in Hill, A History of Cyprus, 1952, 525. Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 186. Ibid., 188. Louisou, 11 September 1920, Minutes of the Legislative Council, Session of 1920, TNA, CO 69/37. Demosthenis Ch. Severis (1878 –1955), born in Nicosia. He studied Literature and Law at Athens University and did his postgraduate legal studies in Paris and London. From 1913 until 1931 he served, intermittently, as member of the Nicosia School Committee, the Greek Board of Education, the Legislative Council and the National Council. Kοydοynάrh6, Biοgrawikό L1jikόn, 1989, 156. Session of 1920, 20 April 1920, TNA, CO 69/37. Alastos, Cyprus in History, 1955, 345. The National Council was the main body of the Political Organisation of Cyprus. It consisted of 46 councillors and members: the Archbishop, the three Bishops and the Abbot of Kykkos were ex officio members. For this and for a detailed account of the opposition policy, see Katsiaounis Rolandos, “Society and Politics during British Rule”, in Cyprus: from Ottoman Province to European State: Minutes of a Conference at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 1993. Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 241. Ibid., 246 Ibid., 248. Chief Inspector of School, Session of 21 August 1923, TNA, CO 69/37. Session of 21 August 1923, TNA, CO 69/37. Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 262– 71. Spyridakis, Educational Policy, 1954, 10. Weir, Education in Cyprus, 1952, 98. Ibid., 80. Ibid., 87. Holland and Markides, Britain and the Hellenes, 2006, 182 (emphasis in the original). Storrs, Orientations, 1937, 464. Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 340. Stavros Panteli, History of Cyprus: From Domination to Troubled Independence, London, 2000, 105; Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 353. Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, 1979, 354. The Tribute amounted to £92,800 of which £50,000 was given back to Cyprus as a grant-in-aid. Not only was it unjustified, but by the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, Britain was under no obligation to pay any debt to Turkey following its 1914 annexation of Cyprus. It also created severe financial problems and hampered any development plans.

270

NOTES

TO PAGES

27 –38

83. L.S. Amery to W. Churchill, 20 October 1926, TNA, CO 67/217/3. 84. G.S. Georghallides, Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis, Nicosia, 1985, 11. 85. Georghallides, Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs, 1985; Panteli, A History of Cyprus, 2005; Justin O’ Brien and Ronald Storrs, The Handbook of Cyprus, London, 1930; Storrs, Orientations, 1937. 86. Georghallides, Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs, 1985, 43 – 4. 87. Ibid., 65. 88. South-Eastern Europe Department, Confidential, 8 October 1928, TNA, CO 67/228/1. 89. Eleftheria 17, 20 October 1928, quoted in Georghallides, Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs, 1985, 98. 90. Storrs, Orientations, 1937, 547. 91. Ibid., 548. 92. Passfield to Storrs, 28 November 1926, TNA, CO 67/277/6. 93. Director of Pancyprian Gymnasium to MacDonald, 6 December 1929, TNA, CO 67/228/4. 94. Georghallides, Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs, 1985, 253. 95. Ibid., 257. 96. Ibid., 260. 97. Clive Whitehead, “Education in British Colonial Dependencies, 1919 – 1939”, Comparative Education, Vol. 17 No. 1 (1981), 71 – 80. 98. Cyprus Gazette, 18 December 1929, TNA, CO 67/41. 99. Storrs, Orientations, 1937, 550. 100. Rossides to Storrs, 20 January 1930, TNA, CO 67/232/2. 101. Georghallides, Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs, 1985, 469. 102. Weir, Education in Cyprus, 1952, 77. 103. W.R. Shipway, 16 June 1931, TNA, CO 67/239/14. 104. Governor’s despatch to the Colonial Office, 4 June 1931, TNA, CO 67/239/7. 105. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 4. 106. Report of the Department of Education for the School Year 1930– 1, TNA, CO 64/42.

Chapter 2 Making a British Atmosphere in Cyprus, 1931 –5 1. Alexis Rappas, Cyprus in the 1930s: British Colonial Rule and the Roots of the Cyprus Conflict, London, 2014. 2. Boyle to Samuel, October 1931, TNA, CO 67/241/4. 3. The Cyprus Gazette (Extraordinary), 16 November 1931, TNA, CO 67/242/8. 4. Nicodemos Mylonas, Bishop of Kitium, studied in Jerusalem, Nicosia and Athens. He was a member of the National Council and of the Legislative Council until 1931, when he resigned to organise Cypriot reaction against the

NOTES

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

TO PAGES

38 – 45

271

British administration. He was one of the instigators of the October uprising, during which he assumed a leading role similar to an Ethnarch’s. As a result of the riots he was deported to Israel, where he died in 1937; Kοydοynάrh6, Biοgrawikό L1jikόn, 1989, 115 – 16; S1lίd16, “M1gάlοi Kύpriοi”, Supplement of newspaper Phileleftheros, Issue No. 2 (May 2011), 24– 9. G.S. Georghallides, “The Cyprus Revolt and the British Deportation Policy, October 1931– December 1932”, Cypriot Studies, Vol. NZ’ – NH’ (1993 –4), 37 – 114. Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, 16 December 1931, TNA, CO 67/242/3. Minute by A.J. Dawe on the proposed “Newspapers, Books and Printing Presses Amendment Law 1932”, 16 March 1932, TNA, CO 67/246/2. Heinz A. Richter, Geschichte der Insel Zypern, Vol. I, Athens, 2007 (Greek edition), 552. Ramsay to John Simon, 19 November 1931, TNA, CO 67/241/3. Hill, A History of Cyprus, 1952, 552. Henniker-Heaton to Cunliffe-Lister, 7 September 1932, TNA, CO 67/248/3. Katsiaounis, Society and Politics, 1993. Leontios A. Bishop of Paphos: He studied Theology at the University of Athens and at Columbia University and worked as a teacher in Larnaca and Paphos. He was elected Bishop of Paphos in 1930 and from 1933, when Archbishop Kyrillos III died, until 1947, he served as Locum Tenens. See Kοydοynάrh6, Biοgrawikό L1jikόn, 1989, 83 – 4. Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 103. James Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions: Ethiopia, 1935 – 1936, London, 1982, 5– 6. Ibid. Private and Personal Letter from Cunliffe-Lister to Storrs, 5 February 1932, TNA, CO 67/243/7. Cunliffe-Lister to Storrs, 17 November 1931, TNA, CO 67/240/11. Nicholson on BBC, October 1931, TNA, CO 67/241/13. See D.B. Swinfen, “Lord Strickland, the Ultra Vires Cases and the Maltese Constitution, 1934– 39”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. XVII No. 3 (May 1989), 413– 32. Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question, 2002, 39. Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, 5 November 1931, TNA, CO 67/242/8. Ibid. Colonial Office meeting, 6 November 1931, TNA, CO 67/242/8. Memorandum by Sir R.E. Stubbs, 16 November 1933, TNA, CO 67/251/3. A.J. Dawe minutes, 24 March 1932, TNA, CO 67/243/4. Cullen to Henniker-Heaton, 18 December 1931, SA, SA1/1468/1931. Acting Commissioner of Nicosia to Henniker-Heaton, 12 November 1931, SA, SA1/ 1468/31. Ibid. Ibid.

272 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

NOTES

TO PAGES

45 –51

Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, telegram, 7 March 1932, TNA, CO 67/246/12. Ibid. Ibid. This letter, dated 16 October 1932, is from the personal archive of the late Klearchos Kyriakides, who served as a schoolmaster during the British administration. Report of the Department of Education for the School Year 1932– 3, TNA, CO 69/42. Draft Bill, 4 October 1932, TNA, CO 67/246/12. All the previous quotes are from the Minutes of the Colonial Office, March – December 1932, TNA, CO 67/246/12. Cullen to Colonial Secretary, 28 January 1932, SA, SA1: 953/1929/3. Richter, Geschichte der Insel Zypern, 2007, 553. The Cyprus Gazette (extraordinary), 1 April 1933, TNA, CO 70/21. “History of education in Cyprus” written by the editor of Phoni tis Kyprou, 21 March 1936, LA, Book IQ’. Bishop Leontios, despite being a keen supporter of enosis, was not deported because, during the disturbances, he was abroad. He was not allowed to return to Cyprus, however, until June 1932, provided he would not make any seditious speeches or propagate in favour of enosis. Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 105. Date unknown – The document was probably written in 1936, LA, Book IQ’. Leontios to Stubbs, 6 May 1933, LA, Book IQ’. The Cyprus Gazette (extraordinary), 29 May 1933, TNA, CO 70/21. Exact date unknown, LA, Book IQ’. H.W. Blackwall (Attorney General) to Colonial Secretary, 25 January 34, SA, SA1: 1468/31. Paphos, 17 February 1933. Kypriakos Fylax, 12 April 1933, 19 April 1933. Eleftheria, 29 April 1933; Foni tis Kyprou, 8 April 1933. P. Ramsay to J. Simon (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), 19 April 1933, TNA, CO 67/249/13. Paphos, 21 April 1933; Foni tis Kyprou, 13 May 1933; Myrianuόpοylο6, 1946, 110 – 11. Nicosia Committee to Colonial Secretary, 9 February 1933, SA, SA1:1468/1931. Weir, Education in Cyprus, 1952, 193. The Cyprus Gazette (extraordinary), 29 May 1933, TNA, CO 70/21; Minute by A.J. Dawe, 23 May 1933, TNA, CO 67/249/13. Colonial Office minutes, 22 May 1932–5 December 1932, TNA, CO 67/246/12. Thomas Papageorgiou, “The enforcement of suffocating control in the elementary education of Cyprus after the October revolt”, Cypriot Studies, No. 69 (2008), 137 – 51. Ibid. Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, 11 February 1932, TNA, CO 67/243/1.

NOTES

TO PAGES

51 – 61

273

60. Henniker-Heaton’s words repeated by A.J. Dawe in his minutes of 11 July 1933, TNA, CO 67/249/14. 61. Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 132. 62. The first American Academy for boys at Larnaca in 1908 was established by the Reformed Presbyterian Church of North America. 63. For a detailed account on the schools see Notes by A. Mayhew, circulated on 21 September 1933, TNA, CO 67/249/14. 64. Stubbs to Cunliffe-Lister, 15 June 1933, TNA, CO 67/249/14. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. A.J. Dawe minutes, 11 July 1933, TNA, CO 67/249/14. 68. A.J. Dawe minutes, 15 August 1933, TNA, CO 67/249/14. 69. Georghallides, Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs, 1985, 180. 70. Cunliffe-Lister to Stubbs, 16 September 1933, TNA, CO 67/249/14. 71. Eleftheria, 6 December 1933. 72. Hestia, 21 December 1933, TNA, CO 67/252/14. 73. Minutes of the Advisory Committee, A. Mayhew, 17 July 1933, TNA, CO 67/252/14. 74. Mann (Chairman of the Sub-Committee) to Shuckburgh (Colonial Office), 20 October 1933, TNA, CO 67/249/14. 75. Clive Whitehead, Colonial Educators: The British Indian and Colonial Education Service 1858– 1983, London, 2003, 149 –71. 76. J.M. Lee and Martin Petter, The Colonial Office, War and Development Policy: Organisation and the Planning of a Metropolitan Initiative, 1939– 45, London, 1982, 35. 77. Ibid., 172. 78. Ibid., 200. 79. Cunliffe-Lister to Stubbs, 11 December 1933, TNA, CO 67/251/3. 80. Memorandum by Stubbs, 16 October 1933, TNA, CO 67/254/4. 81. Eleftheria, 14 October 1933. 82. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 9. 83. Eleftheria, 9 December 1933, 13 December 1933. 84. Palmer to Cunliffe-Lister, 19 January 1934, TNA, CO 67/253/10. 85. Stubbs to Cunliffe-Lister, 7 June 1933, TNA, CO 67/251/13. 86. Elizabeth Monroe, The Mediterranean in Politics, London, 1938, 159. 87. Palmer to Cunliffe-Lister, 19 January 1934, TNA, CO 67/253/10. 88. Palmer to Cunliffe-Lister, 17 January 1934, TNA, CO 67/253/10. 89. Criminal Investigation Report: W.C.C. King to Governor, 4 February 1934, TNA, CO 67/254/1. 90. Palmer to Allen, 25 January 1934, TNA, CO 67/255/8. 91. Minute by Henniker Heaton, 19 October 1932, TNA, CO 67/246/23. 92. Memorandum by A. Mayhew, 25 January 1934, TNA, CO 67/249/14. 93. Ibid. 94. Advisory Committee meeting, 26 April 1934, TNA, CO 67/255/8.

274 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129.

130.

NOTES

TO PAGES

61 –70

Mayhew, 27 April 1934, TNA, CO 67/255/8. Ibid. Cunliffe-Lister to Palmer, 20 June 1934, TNA, CO 67/255/8. Secondary Education Law, 2 September 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/12. Ibid; Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 134. Director of Education to Colonial Secretary, 14 May 1934, SA, SA1:731/1934/1. Paphos, 26 July 1934. Andrέa6 Pοlydώrοy, H anάpty jh th6 dhmοtikή6 1kpaίd1ysh6 sthn Kύprο, 1830–1944, L1ykvsίa, 1995, 215 – 16. Department of Education Circular, 14 June 1935, K. Kyriakides’ Archive. Palmer to Cunliffe-Lister, 13 February 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/10. Education Office circular, March, 1936, SA, SA1: 641/1935. Cullen to Henniker-Heaton, 25 July 1934, SA, SA1:872/1934. Officer Administering the Government (OAG) to Cunliffe-Lister, 31 July, 1933, SA, SA1:1253/1930/2. Cullen to Battershill, 14 January 1935, SA, SA1:561/1934. MacDonald to Palmer, 23 October 1935, Palmer to MacDonald, 22 November 1935, SA, SA1:1303/1935. Cullen to Henniker-Heaton, 13 August 1934, TNA, CO 67/258/6. Mayhew to Palmer, 21 November 1934, TNA, CO 67/258/6. Director of Education to Battershill, 24 December 1934, SA, SA1:731/1934/2. LA, Book IQ’, 1935 (exact date unknown). Leontios to Palmer, 24 December 1934, LA, Book IQ’. A.B. Wright to Leontios, 31 December 1934, TNA, CO 67/259/12 Palmer to Allen, 25 January 1934, TNA, CO 67/255/8. Memorandum by the Colonial Office, 15 August 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/10. Memorandum by A. Mayhew, 5 April 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/15. Ibid. Palmer to Cunliffe-Lister, 13 February 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/12. Memorandum by A. Mayhew, 5 April 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/15. The Statute of Laws, No. 35 of 1935, 4 December 1935, TNA, CO 67/260/4. Karavas Committee to Governor, 26 June 1933, SA, SA1:780/1933. Cunliffe-Lister to Palmer, 27 February 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/12. Palmer to Cunliffe-Lister, 19 October 1934, TNA, CO 67/255/1. Palmer to Cunliffe-Lister, 13 February 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/12. Proposed Government Training College for Teachers at Morphou – Objects and Advantages, August 1935 (Education Department), SA, SA1:1061/1935/1. Note by A. Mayhew, 1935, SA, SA1: 599/1934. Memorandum on Education in the Near and Middle East by the British Consul, undated (approximately April 1935), TNA, CO 67/259/16, See also Martin Stohmeier, “A plan for a British University in the Middle East (1935–1940)” in Faustmann and Peristianis (eds), Britain in Cyprus, 2006. Memorandum on Education in the Near and Middle East by the British Consul, undated Colonial Office, approximately April 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/16.

NOTES

TO PAGES

70 –77

275

131. James McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919 – 1939: The Political and Diplomatic Interaction Between Great Britain and Turkey in the TurkishCypriot Community, New York and London, 1987, 111. 132. Katsiaounis, Society and Politics, 1993. 133. Hill, A History of Cyprus, 1952, 554. 134. Memorandum by the Colonial Office, 15 August 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/10. 135. Leontios to Palmer, 18 November 1935, TNA, CO 67/260/3. 136. Ibid. 137. Palmer to MacDonald, 27 November 1935, TNA, CO 67/260/3.

Chapter 3 Towards the End of “Palmerocracy”: British Educational Policy in Cyprus, 1936 –9 1. Monroe, Mediterranean in Politics, 1938, 9. 2. Martin Kolinsky, Britain’s War in the Middle East: Strategy and Diplomacy, 1936– 42, London, 1999, 1. 3. Lawrence Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain’s Mediterranean Crisis 1936– 39, Cambridge, 1975, 30. 4. Eleftheria, 14 July 1936; Douglas Austin, Malta and British Strategic Policy, 1925– 43, London, 2004, 52. 5. Police Intelligence Report for March 1936, TNA, CO 67/265/11. 6. Political report, 1 January 1936– 31 March 1936, TNA, CO 67/265/11. 7. Battershill to Ormsby-Gore, 31 July 1936, TNA, CO 67/264/12. 8. Ibid. 9. The Pancyprian Gymnasium in Nicosia continued to receive grants because it was the only one recognised by the Government as a proper classical Gymnasium. 10. Myrianuόpοylο6, H paid1ίa 1n Kύprv, 1946, 86. 11. Magda Khtrοmhlίdοy, Ta 1llhnikά grάmmata stοn alύtrvtο 1llhnismό: M1tajύ Mikrά6 Asίa6 kai Kύprοy , L1ykvsίa, 1998, 42 & 234. 12. Alastos, Cyprus in History, 1955, 261 and Cypriot Studies’ (Kypriakai Spoudai) webpage, available at http://www.cypriotstudies.org/English% 20HTMLs/ENedu.html. 13. Sίa Anagnvstοpούlοy, “H Ekklhsίa Th6 Kύprοy Kai O Eunarxikό6 Th6 Pόlο6: 1878– 1960: H “Qrhsk1ytikοpοίhsh” th6 “Kypriakή6” Pοlitikή6 Drάsh: Έnvsh” Sύgxrοna Qέmata (1998 – 9), 198– 227. 14. Letter to Governor, 30 January 1936, LA, Book IQ’. 15. Swinfen, “Lord Strickland”, 1989, 414. 16. Ibid. 17. Palmer to Secretary of State, 4 December 1936, TNA, CO 67/268/4, cited in Altay Nevzat and Mete Hatay, “Politics, Society and the Decline of Islam in Cyprus: From the Ottoman Era to the Twenty-First Century”, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 45 No. 6 (2009), 911– 33.

276 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

NOTES

TO PAGES

78 – 84

Ibid. Government Gazette, 23 December 1936, TNA, CO 67/272/18. Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 27 April 1937, CO 67/281/14. McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1987, 71. The deputation consisted of D.N. Dimitriou, former member of the Executive Council, I.C. Clerides, lawyer, and G.S. Vassiliades, member of the Advisory Council. Swinfen, “Lord Strickland”, 1987, 417. Note by A.R. Thomas, Colonial Office, 27 July 1937, TNA, CO 67/279/6. Dawe to Palmer, 8 April 1937, TNA, CO 67/279/6. Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 17 June 1937 (including the text of the Famagusta petition) and Mukhtars of villages of Limassol to Palmer, 15 April 1937, TNA, CO 67/272/16. Ibid. Cullen to Battershill, 19 July 1936, SA, SA1: 731/1934/2. Cullen to teachers of Christian schools, 16 October 1936, K. Kyriakides’ Archive. Cullen to Wright, 6 November 1937, SA, SA1: 1349/1937. Extract of memo of the British Council – Allocation of Grants for 1936– 37, SA, SA1: 978/1936. Minute by Cullen, 8 August 1939, SA, SA1: 1350/39. Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 183. Spyridakis, Educational Policy, 1954, 21 – 2. Commissioner of Police to Wright, 1 March 1939, TNA, CO 67/293/1. Clive Whitehead, “Education in British Colonial Dependencies, 1919 – 39: A Re-appraisal”, Comparative Education, Vol. 17 No.1 (March 1981), 71 – 80. Cullen to teachers, 23 April 1937, K. Kyriakides’ Archive. Cullen to teachers, 23 October 1937, K. Kyriakides’ Archive. Cullen to Wright, 25 October 1937, TNA, CO 67/272/21. Mixalάkh6 I. Marau1ύth6, “Tο kypriakό 1kpaid1ytikό sύsthma: Staumοί kai Qέmata, L1ykvsίa. 1992, 151 cited in Qvmά6 Papag 1 vrgίοy, Br 1 tanikέ6 Ep 1 mbάs 1 i6 sthn 1 kpaίd 1 ysh th6 Kύprοy: H p1rίptvsh tvn analytikώn prοgrammάtvn”, Kl1iώ: P1riοdikή έkdοsh gia th N1όt1rh Istοrίa, No. 5 (September 2009), 79. Shuckburgh to Orme Sargent (FO) (1937 – exact date unknown), TNA, CO 67/281/1. Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 16 June 1937, TNA, CO 67/272/17. Ibid. Minute by Cullen, 16 January 1939, SA, SA1: 872/1934. Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 21 January 1938, TNA, CO 67/274/5. Minutes by Treasury, 23 August 1939, SA, SA1: 872/1934. Missionary schools established by Franciscan Friars and Sisters. The school for boys opened in 1841 and for girls in 1923. Further information can be found

NOTES

48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67.

TO PAGES

84 –87

277

on the school’s website, available at http://198.62.75.1/www1/ofm/cust/TSs chool.html, accessed on 20 March 2010. E. Drummond, British Embassy Rome to O. O’Malley, FO, 12 February 1937, TNA, CO 67/277/5. L.S. Greening to Cullen, 19 July 1939, SA, SA1: 1152/1939. Note by A.J. Dawe, 31 May 1937, TNA, CO 323/1503/18. Naomi Rosenbaum, “Success in Foreign Policy: The British in Cyprus, 1878– 1960”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 3 No. 4 (December 1970), 605– 27. A Law to amend the English School (Management and Control) Law, 1935, Published on 2 June 1936 and Legal Report by N. Paschalis (Acting AttorneyGeneral), 15 June 1936, TNA, CO 67/265/1. Battershill to the Chairman of the Board of Management of The English School, 4 May 1936, CO 67/265/1; Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 23 October 1936, Ormsby-Gore to Palmer, 15 December 1936, TNA, CO 67/265/1. Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 23 October 1936, TNA, CO 67/265/1. Minute by Director of Education, 8 August 1939, SA, SA1: 1350/39. British Council Memorandum sent by Cullen to Wright, 13 April 1938, SA, SA1: 644/1938. Governor to Secretary of State, 8 November 1938, SA, SA1: 644/1938. Cullen to Wright, 30 January 1939, TNA, CO 67/304/4. The Carnegie Corporation was founded by Andrew Carnegie in 1911 to “promote the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding.” See http://carnegie.org/about-us/mission-and-vision/, accessed on 20 March 2010. Secretary of the Carnegie Corporation to the Executive Secretary of the Near East Foundation (representative of the Corporation in the Near East), 18 January 1936, TNA, CO 67/265/2. Dr Allen to Palmer, 8 May 1936, TNA, CO 67/265/2. Blunt to Stockdale, 13 May 1936, TNA, CO 67/265/2. The award of the Certificate of Honour was approved in August of 1936 and was given to Mukhtars or other members of the Cyprus district administration who had rendered to the Government loyal and valuable service. See M.L. Santamas, British Awards in Cyprus, 1878–1960, Nicosia, 1986. Rural Education in Cyprus, Memorandum by the Governor, 1936– 7, TNA, CO 67/276/1. Memorandum on the finances of Cyprus written by Cyprus Treasury for 1926– 35, TNA, CO 67/270/7. Ralph Oakden, Report on the Finances and Economic Resources of Cyprus, London, 1935, 80. Oakden, Report, 1935, 53 – There were three Central Educational Funds, one for Greek education, one for Muslim and one for the education of other communities. These funds were built up originally from money derived from withholding one-twelfth of teacher’s salaries to provide the wherewithal to pay

278

68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93.

NOTES

TO PAGES

87 –95

gratuities, an obligation now met with ordinary revenue, and the funds were now used for making loans bearing interest to village or town committees for educational purposes. Oakden, Report, 1935, 80. Cullen to Wright, 29 May 1939, SA, SA1: 1183/35. Office Administering the Cyprus Government to the Secretary of State, 17 July 1939, TNA, CO 67/298/5. Phoni tis Kyprou, 23 April 1938; Paphos, 26 May 1938. Details for the staff, the students, the infrastructure and the life of the Teacher’s Training College can be found in.F.Ivannίdh6 & S.G. Kaminarίdh6, Tο Didaskalikό Kοlέgiο Mόrwοy, 1937 – 59, L1ykvsίa, 2011. Battershill to Ormsby-Gore, 31 July 1936, SA, SA1: 1061/1935/1. British Council note sent to Foreign Office, 28 September 1938, TNA, CO 67/289/2. Extract from Report of Director of Education, 24 January 1939, TNA, CO 67/294/5. Wright to MacDonald, 20 May 1939, TNA, CO 67/294/5. Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 4 November 1936, TNA, CO 67/271/8. R.M. Dawkins was an ex-Director of the British School at Athens and his career is discussed in Michael Llewellyn Smith, Paschalis Kitromilides and Eleni Calligas (eds), Scholars, Travels, Archives: Greek History and Culture through the British School at Athens, Athens, 2009, 48 – 57, 111– 23. Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 9 September 1937, TNA, CO 67/271/8. Ormsby-Gore to Palmer, 22 October 1937, TNA, CO 67/271/8. Ibid. Waterlow to Eden, 27 January 1936, CO 67/268/12. Battershill to Ormsby-Gore, 18 September 1936, CO 67/268/12, Waterlow to Eden, 23 November 1936, TNA, CO 67/268/12. Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 11 January 1937, TNA, CO 67/277/7. Waterlow to Viscount Halifax, 2 May 1938, TNA, CO 67/287/14. Palmer to Secretary of State, 13 May 1938, TNA, CO 67/287/14. Copy of the draft minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Near East SubCommittee sent by A.J. Sullivan to A. Mayhew, 28 May 1936, CO 67/264/15. Palmer to Secretary of State, 20 December 1936, CO 67/273/2; Meeting about the proposed British University in the Near East, 19 February 1937, TNA, CO 67/264/15. Meeting about the proposed British University in the Near East, 19 February 1937, TNA, CO 67/273/2. British Legation, Athens, to Eden, 7 May 1937, TNA, CO 67/273/2. A.J. Dawe to K.R. Johnstone (FO), 17 June 1937, TNA, CO 67/273/2. Memorandum by the British Council for the financial year 1937 – 8, May 1937, TNA, CO 67/273/2. Cullen to Wright, 24 May 1937, TNA, CO 67/273/2.

NOTES 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111.

TO PAGES

95 –104

279

Ibid. Minute by J.B. Williams, 13 January 1938, TNA, CO 67/273/2. Minute by A.J. Dawe, 30 July 1936, TNA, CO 67/267/9. All previous quotes are from Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 27 January 1937, TNA, CO 67/276/1. Ormsby-Gore to Palmer, 16 March 1937, TNA, CO 67/276/1. Education Report for the period 1936 –9, TNA, CO 67/308/4. Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 31 December 1937, TNA, CO 67/273/1. Palmer to Dawe, 9 August 1937, TNA, CO 67/276/1. Minute by Dawe, 19 August 1937, TNA, CO 67/276/1. Embros, 13 November 1937, TNA, CO 67/276/2. A good analysis of Church matters during the 1930s is provided by Rappas, Cyprus in the 1930s, 2014. One could also consult, TNA, CO 67/297/4 Archiepiscopal Question (December 1938 –December 1939). Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 21 April 1938, TNA, CO 67/286/1. Apology, 20 April 1938, LA, Book IG΄. Petitions by several villages, July 1939, TNA, CO 67/293/10. Anastasia Yiangou, Cyprus in World War: Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, London, 2010, 21. Alexis Rappas, “The Elusive Polity: Imagining and Contesting Colonial Authority in Cyprus during the 1930s”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 26 (2008), 363 –97. John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection London, 1986, 16 – 17. For Malta one could consult John Manduca (ed.), The Bonham-Carter Diaries: What the British Governor Thought of Malta and the Maltese, San Gwann, 2004.

Chapter 4

Education and Politics in Wartime Cyprus, 1940 –5

1. Battershill to his mother, 6 March 1937, RH, Papers of Sir William Denis Battershill, Mss. Brit. Emp. S 467, Box 4 File I. Battershill was Assistant Colonial Secretary in Jamaica, 1929–35, before assuming the post of Colonial Secretary in Cyprus, 1935– 7. He then served as Chief Secretary to the Government of Palestine, 1937 – 9, and in 1939 he became Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Cyprus. After 1941 he spent a year at the Colonial Office and ended his career, in 1949, in Tanganyika Territory. He spent the last ten years of his life in retirement in Cyprus. 2. Embros, 3 February 1939, RH, Mss. Brit. Emp. S 467, Box 7 File I. 3. Eleftheria, 12 August 1939; Paphos, 29 August 1940; Neos Kypriakos Phylax, 15–17. August 1939, 20 August 1939, 27 August 1939. The phrase “autocratic rule” was mainly used by Kypriakos Phylax, which was especially sensitive to educational issues, due to its close bonds with Leontios, the biggest opponent of the Government’s educational policy.

280

NOTES

TO PAGES

104 –113

4. Tabitha Morgan, Sweet and Bitter Island: A History of the British in Cyprus, London, 2010, 142. 5. Battershill to his mother, 11 August 1939, RH, Mss. Brit. Emp. S 467, Box 4 File II. 6. Battershill to his mother, 18 August 1939, RH, Mss. Brit. Emp. S 467, Box 4 File II. 7. Leontios to Battershill, 10 August 1939, LA, IE book. 8. Battershill to Secretary of State, 3 August 1940, TNA, CO 67/308/10. 9. Journalists to the Secretary of State, 15 April 1940, TNA, CO 67/309/8. 10. Cullen to Wright, 6 November 1939, SA, SA1: 1152/1939. 11. British Council Report, 9 June 1940, TNA, CO 67/310/13. 12. Abercrombie to G.A.F. Dundas, 17 May 1940, TNA, CO 67/310/13. 13. Ibid. 14. Extracts from the Memorandum of the British Council, 31 May 1940, SA, SA1: 946/1938/1. 15. Battershill to MacDonald, 11 October 1940, TNA, CO 67/310/10. 16. Ibid. 17. Battershill to MacDonald, 11 October 1940, Cullen’s memorandum, TNA, CO 67/310/10. 18. Colonial Office to Battershill, 6 September 1940, TNA, CO 67/310/10. 19. Town Committee of Greek schoolteachers in Nicosia to Wright, 29 May 1940, SA, SA1: 554/1940. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Phoni tis Kyprou, 6 April 1940. 23. Paphos, 9 May 1940. According to the referendum which took place in May 1940, 999 teachers voted in favour of the introduction of demotiki in all classes of elementary schools, 22 against. 24. Town Committee of Greek schoolteachers in Nicosia to Wright, 29 May 1940, SA, SA1: 554/1940. 25. M.V. Spurway (Acting Assistant Secretary) to the President of Committee, 9 August 1940, SA, SA1: 554/1940. 26. Ibid. 27. Michaelides to Leontios, 17 March 1940, LA, Book IE’. 28. Woolley to Parkinson, 17 February 1942, TNA, CO 67/314/12. 29. Yiangou, Cyprus in World War II, 2010, 54. 30. Battershill to MacDonald, 20 January 1940, TNA, CO 67/306/15. 31. Interview with former elementary school teacher Spyros Achilleos, 27 March 2010. 32. Battershill to Secretary of State, 1 November 1940, CO 67/308/10; Political report, October 1940, TNA, CO 67/314/10. 33. Battershill to his mother, 18 November 1940, RH, Mss. Brit. Emp. S 467, Box 4 File II. 34. Pagkύpriο Gymnάsiο, Ekatοnta1thrίda 1893–1993, S1lίd16 apό thn istοrίa kai th zvή tοy Pagkyprίοy Gymnasίοy , L1ykvsίa, 1993, 132.

NOTES 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

TO PAGES

113 –119

281

Yiangou, Cyprus in World War II, 2010, 83. J.V.W. Shaw to Lord Moyne, 15 September 1941, TNA, CO 67/314/10. Minute by Acheson, 2 October 1941, TNA, CO 67/314/10. Royal Institute of International Affairs’ report, 1941, TNA, CO 67/316/3. Kelling, 1990, 30. Battershill to Acheson, 24 March 1941, TNA, CO 67/315/19. Shaw to Lord Moyne, 19 November 1941, TNA, CO 67/311/11. Acheson to Eden (draft), 22 November 1941, TNA, CO 67/311/11. Acheson to Shaw, 11 March 1942, TNA, CO 67/311/11. Prime Minister’s minute, 5 June 1941, TNA, PREM 3/113. Department of Education Circular, 2 May 1941, Kyriakides’ Archive. Interview with retired teacher Spyros Achilleos, 27 March 2010. Approximately 12,000 refugees from Greece fled to the island, where they were provided with shelter and services. A brief account of Cypriot participation in the war is provided by a booklet published in Nicosia immediately after the war whose profits went to comfort of Cypriot soldiers: Born of thee: The Cyprus War Record, Nicosia. Annual Education Report for the school year 1941 – 2, TNA, CO 67/313/20. Acting Director of Education to Wright, 31 October 1939, SA1/ 1379/39; Commissioner of Famagusta to Wright, 20 July 1940, 10 August 1940, SA, SA1: 1379/39. Yiannos Katsourides, The History of the Communist Party in Cyprus, London, 2014, p.186. Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion, 1990, 41. Pancyprian Teachers’ Organisation to Cullen, 28 February 1942, LA, Book IQ’. Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 170; Phoni this Kyprou, 4 July 1942. Resolution addressed by Minos Perdios, 25 March 1942, SA, SA1: 1230/1934. C. Patsalides to Governor, 25 March 1942, SA, SA1: 1230/1934. Cleanthis Charalambous to Commissioner of Limassol, 2 June 1942, SA, SA1: 1230/1934. Extract from AKEL memorandum, 5 June 1942, SA, SA1: 1230/1934. AKEL-Nicosia section to Governor, 29 October 1942, SA, SA1: 1230/1934. Woolley to Viscount Cranborne, 13 August 1942, TNA, CO 67/311/20. Resolution of Pancyprian Schoolteachers Union, 16 July 1942, TNA, CO 67/311/20. Colonial Office Minute, 28 August 1942, TNA, CO 67/311/20. Extract from Esperini, 10 August 1942, TNA, CO 67/311/19. Extract from Esperini, 6 August 1942, TNA, CO 67/311/19. Extract from Anexartitos, 16 August 1942, Article by L.K. Mountakis, TNA, CO 67/311/19. Extract from Anexartitos, 9 August 1942, Article by N.K. (member of AKEL), TNA, CO 67/311/19.

282

NOTES

TO PAGES

119 –128

66. Extracts from Neos Kypriakos Fylax, 21 July – 20 August 1942, 12 August 1942. 67. Woolley to Viscount Cranborne, 28 April 1942, TNA, CO 67/313/9. 68. Woolley to George Gater, 7 September 1942, TNA, CO 67/317/11. 69. Ibid. 70. Shaw to Woolley, 1 December 1942, TNA, CO 67/317/11. 71. Minute by Cullen, 31 August 1942, SA, SA1: 1468/31/2; Phonitis Kyprou, 23 November 1940; Neos Kypriakos Phylax, 23 March 1942, 2 October 1942; Paphos, 8 October 1942. 72. Woolley to Gates, 3 December 1942, TNA, CO 67/317/11. 73. Woolley to Stanley, 10 July 1943, TNA, CO 67/311/19. 74. Yiangou, Cyprus in World War II, 2010, 148. 75. Meeting at the Colonial Office, 10 March 1943, TNA, CO 67/311/19. 76. Pοlydώrοy, H anάpty jh th6 dhmοtikή6 1kpaίd1y sh6, 1995, 47 – 50; Cullen to Turnbull, 25 May 1948, SA, SA1: 628/1945. 77. Telegram to Churchill, 11 April 1943, TNA, CO 67/317/12. 78. Ibid. 79. Resolution sent to Churchill, 10 April 1943, TNA, CO 67/317/12. 80. Yiangou, Cyprus in World War II, 2010, 148. 81. Political report, August 1942, TNA, CO 67/314/12. 82. Woolley to Stanley, 9 June 1943, TNA, CO 67/319/4. 83. Ibid. 84. Woolley to Stanley, 9 June, 1943, Despatch to Cyprus, 27 March 1943, TNA, CO 67/319/4. 85. Shaw to Stanley, 9 April 1943, TNA, CO 67/311/16. 86. Phoni tis Kyprou, 13 May 1943. 87. Eleftheria, 17 May 1943, Phoni tis Kyprou, 23 January 1943. 88. Archbishopric’s auditor to C. Spyridakis, 27 May 1943, LA, Book IQ’. 89. Pancyprian Gymnasium Graduates Association to Secretary of State, 16 May 1943, TNA, CO 67/311/16. 90. Stanley to Pitt, 7 April 1943, TNA, CO 67/317/9. 91. Weir, Education in Cyprus, 1952, 39. 92. Woolley to Stanley, 25 February 1944, TNA, CO 67/321/6. 93. Pancyprian Gymnasium Teachers’ Association to Stanley, February 1944, TNA, CO 67/321/6. 94. Minute by Acheson, 28 February 1944, TNA, CO 67/321/3. 95. Morphou Municipality to Leontios, 27 March 1944, LA, Book IE’. 96. Leontios to Mayor of Morphou, 2 April 1944, LA, Book IQ’. 97. Servas to Governor, 30 November 1943, SA, SA1: 1468/31/2. 98. Extract from E.C. minutes, 31 December 1943, SA, SA1: 1468/31/2. 99. Foreign Office Research Department memorandum, 20 March 1944, TNA, CO 67/319/5. 100. Rolandos Katsiaounis, “Cyprus 1931– 1959: The Politics of Anti-Colonial Movement”, Epetiris of the Cyprus Research Centre XXXIII (2007): 441 – 69.

NOTES

TO PAGES

128 –138

283

101. Yiangou, Cyprus in World War II, 2010, 213. 102. Acheson to D.F. Howard, 30 August 1944, TNA, CO 67/319/5. 103. Notes of the meeting, 23 November 1945, TNA, CO 67/323/3 Meeting at the Colonial Office, 21 November 1944, TNA, CO 67/319/2. 104. Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion, 1990, 45 – 7. 105. Ibid., 48. 106. Meeting at the Colonial Office, 10 March 1943, TNA, CO 67/311/19 107. Minute by Gilles, 5 January 1945, TNA, CO 67/329/14. 108. Ibid. 109. Woolley to Stanley, 19 December 1944, TNA, CO 67/329/14. 110. Yiangou, Cyprus in World War II, 2010, 213.

Chapter 5 Education, Enosis and the Revival of Politics in Postwar Cyprus, 1945 –50 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Yiangou, Cyprus in World War II, 2010, 158. Ibid., 159. Minute by S.E.V. Luke, 7 June 1945, TNA, CO 67/328/11. Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945– 1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Post-war Imperialism, Oxford, 1984, 206, 210. Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonization, 1918 – 1968, Cambridge, 2006, 130– 2. Political report, August 1945, CO 67/323/4. Whitehead, Colonial Educators, 2003, 93 –4. Pagkύpriο Gymnάsiο, Anamnήs1 i6 Paliώn M auhtώn K ai Kauhghtώn Tοy Pagkyprίοy Gy mnasίοy , Nicosia, 1994, 57 – 62. Ten-Year Development Plan by Sir Douglas Harris, Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 27 May 1945, CO 67/328/11. Report of the Department of Education for the period 1945– 47, TNA, CO 67/332/7 and Panagiώth6 P1rsiάnh6, Istοrίa th6 1kpaίd1ysh6 tvn kοritsiώn sthn Kύprο: m1lέth th6 pοr1ίa6 kοinvnikού kai 1kpaid1y tikού 1ksygxrοnismού th6 Kύprοy , L1ykvsίa, 1998, 88. Ten-Year Development Plan by Sir Douglas Harris, Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 27 May 1945, TNA, CO 67/328/11. Woolley to Stanely, 27 May 1945, TNA, CO 67/328/11. Rousou Maria, “Cyprus’ Role in British Defence Strategy 1945– 57”, Epetiris of the Cyprus Research Centre XXIX (2003): 321 –40. Extract from top secret letter from Charles Woolley to Sir Andrew Dawe, 23 March 1946, CO 67/321/8. Note of a meeting at the Colonial Office, 23 November 1945, TNA, CO 67/323/5. Leontios and Ethnarchy Council, 29 May 1946, LA, Book IG’.

284

NOTES

TO PAGES

138 –148

17. Yiorgos Leventis, Cyprus: The Struggle for Self-Determination in the 1940’s: Prelude to Deeper Crisis, Frankfurt, 2001, 148. 18. Bevin to Hall, 17 September 1946, TNA, CO 537/1878. 19. Pοlάndο6 Katsiaούnh6, H Diask1ptikή 1946 – 1948: M1 Anaskόphsh Th6 P1riόdοy 1878 –1945, L1ykvsίa, 2000, 145. 20. Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question, 2002, 47. 21. Colonial Office to Governor, 7 February 1947, CO 67/352/1; Extract from official report, 23 November 1946, CO 537/1878. 22. Leventis, Struggle for Self-Determination, 2002, 147. 23. Sir Clifford J. Norton (Athens) to Foreign Office, 30 November 1946, TNA, CO 67/352/1. 24. Memorandum submitted to Creech-Jones by “National Delegation of Cyprus”, 7 February 1947, TNA, CO 67/352/1. 25. Members of the Board to the Governor, 13 December 1945, TNA, CO 67/332/1. 26. Paphos, 12 June 1947. 27. Turnbull to Creech-Jones, 24 January 1947, TNA, CO 67/332/1. 28. Pagkύpriο Gymnάsiο, Diakriuέnt16 Apόwοitοi tοy Pagkyprίοy Gymnasίοy , L1ykvsίa, 1993, 75 – 80. 29. Michalakis Maratheftis, Constantinos Spyridakis (1903 – 1976) in, Constantinos Spyridakis: A Hundred Years from his Birth, Nicosia, 2002. 30. Nicosia Committee to Governor, 8 January 1946, SA, SA1: 876/1940. 31. Minute by the Acting Director of Education, 15 January 1946, SA, SA1: 876/1940. 32. Pοlydώrοy, H anάptyjh th6 dhmοtikή6 1kpaίd1ysh6, 1995, 130. 33. Turnbull to Creech-Jones, 24 January 1947, TNA, CO 67/332/1. 34. Andreas Pavlides to Creech-Jones, 27 October 1946, SA, SA1: 876/1940. 35. Interview with elementary schoolteacher Mr Spyros Achilleos, 27 March 2010. 36. Winster to Creech-Jones, 24 February 1948, TNA, CO 67/356/1. 37. Turnbull to Creech-Jones, 24 January 1947, TNA, CO 67/332/1. 38. Ibid. 39. Myrianuόpοylο6, H paid1ίa 1n Kύprv, 1946, 146. 40. Turnbull to Creech-Jones, 24 January 1947, TNA, CO 67/332/1. 41. Ibid. 42. Creech-Jones to Bevin, 6 January 1947, TNA, CO 537/2483. 43. Ivor Bulmer-Thomas, Fletcher, Reginald Thomas Herbert, Lord Winster, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (www.oxforddnb.com.catalogure.ulrrls.lo.ac.uk), 2004, 11. 44. Creech-Jones to Bevin, 6 January 1947, TNA, CO 537/2483. 45. Ibid. 46. Memorandum by Creech-Jones, February 1947, TNA, CO 537/2483. 47. Nicolas J. White, Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945, London, 1999, 1, 13. 48. Cabinet meeting, 11 February 1947, TNA, CO 537/2483.

NOTES

TO PAGES

148 –155

285

49. Creech-Jones to Winster, 22 February 1947, TNA, CO 537/2483. 50. The Times, 1 March 1947, TNA, CO 67/352/2. 51. Greek Information Office London, Greek Bulletin, 3 March 1947, LA, Book IE’. 52. Daily Sketch, 26 June 1947, TNA, CO 537/2483. 53. Leventis, Struggle for Self-Determination, 2002, 156– 8. 54. Spyridakis, Philippou, Antoniou, Christis to Sleight, 4 June 1947, TNA, CO 67/332/1. 55. Turnbull to Martin, 3 March 1947, TNA, CO 537/2483 (underlined in the original). 56. According to the Government, the Assembly would consist of: Mayors of Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, Paphos, Kyrenia, Lefka; Muslim municipal councils of the six main towns; representatives from rural municipalities, the Cooperative Central Bank, Chambers of Commerce, Trade Unions of both communities, the Union of Industrialists, the Lawyer’s Association, Secondary School Teachers, the Press, the Medical Company, the Agricultural Unions and four people who were not affiliated with any organisation (Katsiaούnh6, Diask1ptikή, 200, 261– 2). 57. Political report, July 1947, TNA, CO 67/341/7. 58. Chronos, 9 August 1947. 59. Paphos, 6 November 1947. 60. Leventis, Struggle for Self-Determination, 2002, 166. 61. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 15. 62. David H. Close (ed.), The Greek Civil War, 1943 –1950: Studies of polarization, London, 1993, 3– 14. 63. PagkύpriοGymnάsiο, Ekatοnta1thrίda, 1993, 239. 64. Ibid., 147. 65. Winster to Creech-Jones, 20 August 1947, TNA, CO 537/2483. 66. Turnbull to Creech-Jones, 26 August 1947, TNA, CO 537/2483. 67. Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question, 2002, 44 –7. 68. Colonial Office memorandum, 14 November 1947, TNA, CO 537/2486. 69. Political report, November 1947, TNA, CO 67/341/1. 70. Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question, 2002, 44 –7. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. Chronos, 14 August 1948. 75. Yiangou, Cyprus in World War II, 2010, 159. 76. Norton to Foreign Office, 28 July 1948, TNA, CO 537/4047. 77. Winster to Creech-Jones, 3 October 1948, TNA, CO 537/4047. 78. John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection London, 1986, 43. 79. Political report, September 1945, TNA, CO 67/323/4. 80. Kucuk to Creech-Jones, 30 November 1948, TNA, CO 67/342/1. 81. Turnbull to Martin, 22 November 1948, TNA, CO 67/342/1.

286 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117.

NOTES

TO PAGES

156 –166

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Martin to Turnbull, 13 December 1948, TNA, CO 67/342/1. Ibid. Minutes by Bennett, 13 December 1948, TNA, CO 67/342/1. Minutes by Ward, 17 December 1948, TNA, CO 67/342/1. Sir David V. Kelly (Ankara) to Foreign Office, 28 December 1948, TNA, CO 67/342/2. Until now Turkish – Cypriot Boards of Education comprised the Director and Assistant Director of Education, delegates of Evcaf and six elected members. Interim Report of the Committee of Turkish Affairs, 1949, TNA, CO 67/342/2. Extract from Executive Council minutes, 5 April 1949, TNA, CO 67/342/2. Fisher to E.H. Peck, 17 January 1949, TNA, CO 67/342/2. Norton to Foreign Office, 9 March 1949, TNA, CO 67/342/2. Kelly to Foreign Office, 29 January 1949, TNA, CO 67/342/2. Turnbull to Creech-Jones, 1 November 1945, TNA, CO 67/323/5. PagkύpriοGymnάsiο, Ekatοnta1thrίda, 1993, 175. Fifis Ioannou to Sleight, 2 October 1945, SA, SA1: 921/1945. Minutes by the Attorney General, 31 October 1945, SA, SA1: 921/1945. Minutes by the Attorney General, 19 November 1945, SA, SA1: 921/1945. Minutes by Sleight, 5 November 1945, SA, SA1: 921/1945. Minutes by Sleight, 20 December 1945, SA, SA1: 921/1945. Minutes by the Attorney General, 25 February 1946, SA, SA1: 921/1945. Minutes by Winster, February 1946, SA, SA1: 921/1945. Executive Council’s draft circular, 16 March 1946, SA, SA1: 921/1945. G.F. Sleight to elementary schoolteachers, 22 September 1948, TNA, CO 67/332/2; Circular sent to teachers by G.F. Sleight, 22 September 1948. A similar circular was also sent some months later, on 29 April 1949, Kyriakides’ Archive. Governor to the Secretary of State, 22 August 1949, TNA, CO 67/332/2. Typos, 8 May 1946. Minute by Reddaway, 14 May 1946, SA, SA1: 1078/38. Peter Mackridge, Language and National Identity in Greece, 1776– 1976, Oxford, 2009. Close (ed.), The Greek Civil War, 1993, 3 –14. Letter from Klearchos Kyriakides, 12 January 1949, Kyriakides’ Archive. Norton to Foreign Office, 5 January 1949, TNA, CO 67/332/2. Spyridakis to Sleight, 10 January 1949, Pancyprian Gymnasium, Ekatοnta1thrίda, 1993. Turnbull to Norton, 22 March 1949, TNA, CO 67/332/2. S. Evangelides (Secretary to the Nicosia Greek School Committee) to Sleight, 11 January 1949, TNA, CO 67/332/2. Circulated by Archbishop Makarios II, 28 December 1948, Apostolos Varnavas, January 1949.

NOTES 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151.

TO PAGES

166 –175

287

Arnopoulos to Winster, 5 February 1949, TNA, CO 67/332/2 Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 171. Spyridakis, Educational Policy, 1954, 23. Report of the Department of Education for the period 1945 – 7, TNA, CO 67/332/7. Pοlydώrοy, H anάptyjh th6 dhmοtikή6 1kpaίd1ysh6, 1995, 135 – 6. Ibid. Circular signed by Archbishop Makarios and the three Bishops, 17 September 1948, Apostolos Varnavas, July – September 1948. Winster to Creech-Jones, 22 May 1947, TNA, CO 67/356/3. Ibid. Turnbull to Creech-Jones, 1 May 1948, SA, SA1: 1151/1939. Creech-Jones to Winster, 17 August 1948, SA, SA1: 1151/1939. G.H. Shreeve to Wright, 28 November 1949, SA, SA1: 1881/1949/1. C. Jeffries to A.B. Wright, 28 November 1949, SA, SA1: 1881/1949/1. Report by John Graham, Representative of the British Council in Cyprus, 14 December 1949, SA, SA1: 1881/1949/1. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 26. Acting Director of Education to Turnbull, 11 December 1947, SA, SA1: 1060/1947. Ibid. Winster to E.H. Keeling, MP, 2 February 1948, SA, SA1: 1060/1947. Extracts from Sunday Mail, 21 November 1948, papers of Arthur CreechJones, RH, Mss. Brit. Emp. S.332, Box 29, File II. Cyprus Mail, 23 November 1948 and White to Winster, 15 November 1948, papers of Creech-Jones, RH, Mss. Brit. Emp. S.332, Box 29, File II. Colin Baker, Retreat from the Empire: Sir Robert Armitage in Africa and Cyprus, London, 1998, 101. Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1998, 16. Minutes by Mary Fisher, 9 June 1949, TNA, CO 537/4979. Papers of Sir William Denis Battershill, RH, Mss. Brit. Emp. S.467, Box 10, File VII. Close, The Greek Civil War, 1993, 3 – 14. Turnbull to Martin, 27 June 1949, TNA, CO 537/4979. Close, The Greek Civil War, 1993, 3 – 14. Franc
ois Crouzet, Le conflit de Chypre, 1946– 1959, Vol. II, Bruxelles, 1973 (translated in Greek in 2011), 249 – 50. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 17 – 18. Kucuk to the Creech-Jones, 13 December 1949, TNA, CO 67/352/2. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 17 – 18.

288

NOTES

TO PAGES

178 –184

Chapter 6 A Chaotic Situation: The Role of Schools in the Preparation for the Revolt, 1950 –5 1. Michael A. Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics, 1979, 34. 2. Minutes by Mary Fisher, 19 April 1950 and J.S. Bennett, 21 April 1950, TNA, CO 67/368/11. 3. Colonial Office and Foreign Office memos on Cyprus, April 1950, TNA, CO 537/6244. 4. Chiefs of Staff to J.M. Martin, 5 June 1950, TNA, CO 537/6244. 5. Memo on Cyprus, April 1950, TNA, CO 537/6244. 6. National Union of Students to Secretary of State, 25 April 1950, TNA, CO 67/365/4. 7. Bennett to NUS, 10 May 1950, TNA, CO 67/365/4. 8. Norton to Foreign Office, 23 April 1950, TNA, CO 67/368/7. 9. Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1998, 24. 10. Norton to Foreign Office, 22 July 1950, TNA, CO 67/368/7. 11. Wright to Griffths, 31 December 1950, TNA, CO 67/368/7. 12. Griffiths to Wright, 9 May 1950, TNA, CO 67/370/3. 13. Delegation to the Secretary of State, 22 June 1950. The members of this delegation were Adam Adamantos, Evdoros Ioannides and Ezekias Papaioannou, TNA, CO 67/370/3. 14. Wright to Griffiths, 13 July 1950, TNA, CO 67/367/1. 15. The biographical information about Makarios is taken from P.N. Vanezis, Makarios: Life and Leadership, London, 1979. 16. Norton to Foreign Office, 24 January 1951, TNA, CO 67/368/8. 17. Norton to Foreign Office, 16 February 1950, TNA, CO 67/368/8. 18. Norton to Foreign Office, 16 March 1951, TNA, CO 67/368/8. 19. Eleftheria, 27 March 1951. 20. Norton to Foreign Office, 27 April 1951, TNA, CO 67/368/8. 21. Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 109. 22. Wright to Griffiths, 12 June 1950, TNA, CO 67/365/2. 23. Pancyprian Teachers’ Organisation to Turnbull, 14 June 1950, TNA, CO 67/365/2. 24. Thomas to Griffiths, 18 December 1950, TNA, CO 67/365/2. 25. General Secretary of Pancyprian Teachers’ Organisation, to Thomas, 28 February 1951, TNA, CO 67/365/3. 26. Fletcher-Cooke to Griffiths, 3 August 1951, and Fletcher-Cooke to Griffiths, 11 August 1951, TNA, CO 67/365/3. 27. Pancyprian Teachers’ Organisation to Wright, 29 May 1951, TNA, CO 67/365/3 Fletcher-Cooke to Bennett, 17 November 1951, TNA, CO 67/365/3. 28. Eleftheria, 10 November 1951, SA, SA1: 864/49/2. 29. Sleight to Fletcher-Cooke, 4 December 1953, SA, SA1: 864/49/2. 30. Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 171.

NOTES TO PAGES 184 –192

289

31. Executive Council meeting, 30 October 1951, TNA, CO 926/42. 32. Executive Council meetings, 6 November 1951, 5 February 1952, TNA, CO 926/42. 33. Address by the Governor to the Executive Council, 30 January 1951, TNA, CO 67/367/7. 34. These were: Pancyprian Gymnasium, Pancyprian Commercial School of Larnaca, Limassol Gymnasium, Paphos Gymnasium, Famagusta Gymnasium, Kyrenia Gymnasium, Lapithos Gymnasium, Pedhoulas School and Poli Chrysochous School – the Gymnasiums of Morphou, Lefkonikou and Lefkaron did not sent representatives. 35. Eleftheria, 4 May 1951, Ethnos, 4 May 1951. 36. Political report, November 1951 and Cyprus Mail, 22 September 1951, TNA, CO 926/19. 37. Political report, December 1951, TNA, CO 926/19. 38. Panayiotis Cacoyiannis was the father of Michalis Cacoyiannis, the film director famous for his production in 1964 of Zorba the Greek. 39. Political report, December 1951, TNA, CO 926/19. 40. Ibid. 41. Executive Council meeting, 30 October 1951, TNA, CO 926/42. 42. Wright to Lyttleton, 10 January 1952, CO 926/10. 43. Message from Archbishop Makarios, 14 January 1952, TNA, CO 926/10. 44. Political report, January 1952, TNA, CO 926/19, Eleftheria, 16 January 1952. 45. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 27. 46. Message from Archbishop Makarios, 14 January 1952, TNA, CO 926/10. 47. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 29. 48. Wright to Lyttleton, 17 January 1952, TNA, CO 926/10. 49. Executive Council meeting, 15 January 1952, TNA, CO 926/42. 50. Minutes Colonial Office, February 1952, TNA, CO 926/51. 51. Executive Council meeting, 14 March 1952, TNA, CO 926/52. 52. Executive Council meeting, 15 March 1952, TNA, CO 926/42. 53. Encyclical to school teachers by Makarios, 20 March 1952, TNA, CO 926/10. 54. Note of Wright’s visit, 19 March 52, TNA, CO 926/12. 55. Political report, April 1952, TNA, CO 926/19; Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, 1978, 52. 56. Wright to Lyttleton, 5 May 1952, TNA, CO 926/10. 57. Eleftheria, 15 April 1952. 58. Political report, May 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. 59. Ibid. 60. Political report, July 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. 61. Orthodox Christian Youth Union (OHEN) was established in 1939 in Limassol to imbue the lives of catechetical school graduates with spiritual content. It developed significant spiritual, athletic and cultural activity, and until 1945 it had 241 members. On 10 October 1946, during a Pancyprian assembly convened in Makedonitissa in Nicosia, the organisation was officially established

290

62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96.

NOTES

TO PAGES

192 –200

as OHEN of Boys and Girls. Its leader was the Phaneromeni Priest, Papastavros Papagathaggelou. The biographical information on Grivas is taken from Charles Foley (ed.), The Memoirs of General Grivas, London, 1964. Political report, June 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. Political reports, June – July 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. Political report, May 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. Political report, July 1952, TNA, CO 926/19; Cyprus Mail, 17 July 1952. Political report, July 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. Pezoporikos Club to Fletcher-Cooke, 24 July 1952, SA, SA1: 1566/1952. Trust Club to Fletcher-Cooke, 22 July 1952, SA, SA1: 1566/1952. AON to Fletcher-Cooke, 31 July 1952, SA, SA1: 1566/1952. AKEL to Fletcher-Cooke, 23 August 1952, SA, SA1: 1566/1952. Political report, July 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. Turkish National Party to Lyttleton, 30 July 1952, SA, SA1: 1566/1952. Istikial Party to Lyttleton, 31 July 1952, SA, SA1: 1566/1952. Federation of Turkish Associations, 5 August 1952, SA, SA1: 1566/1952. Executive Council meeting, 2 August 1952, TNA, CO 926/42. Political report, August 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. Ethnos, 2 September 1952. AKEL’s Bulletin, August 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. Political report, August 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. Cyprus Mail, 22 July 1952. Report of Education, 1952– 3, TNA, CO 69/55; Ali Shua, “Turkish Education in Cyprus”, Society of Cypriot Studies, Volume III, 1973, 357– 75. Political report, December 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. Political report, January 1953, TNA, CO 926/20. Political report, December 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. Prvtοpapά6, EklοgikήIstοrίath6Kύprοy : Pοlit1ytέ6, kόmmata όmmatakai1klοgέ6sthnAgglοkratίa, 1878–1960, Auήna, 2012, 528, 530, 562. Indicatively, in the rural areas, the Right received 58.8 per cent, compared to 45.3 per cent for the Left; in the towns, the Right won 54.2 per cent against 45 per cent for the Left. Police intelligence report, 11 December 1952, SA, SA1: 1813/1952. Sleight to Harlow, 7 July 1952, TNA, CO 926/51. Martin to Wright, 31 October 1952, TNA, CO 926/51. Commissioner of Limassol to Sleight, 26 April 1952, TNA, CO 1045/677. Ibid. Wright to Lyttleton, 18 September 1953, TNA, CO 926/51. More information about these proposals can be found in Wright to Griffiths, 19 April 1950, TNA, CO 67/365/5. Griffiths to Wright, 4 July 1950, TNA, CO 67/365/5. Wright to Griffith, 12 December 1950, TNA, CO 67/365/5. Minute by Bennett, 31 May 1950, TNA, CO 67/365/5.

NOTES

TO PAGES

200 –208

291

97. Cyprus Mail, 28 September 1951, TNA, CO 67/371/4. 98. Cyprus secretariat note on Forestry School, 13 February 1950, TNA, CO 67/371/3; Cyprus Mail, 28 September 1951. 99. Cullen to Fletcher-Cooke, 25 November 1952, SA, SA1: 1706/50. 100. Minutes by Secretariat, 4 December 1952, SA, SA1: 1706/50; Note of meeting with Wright at the Colonial Office, 26 March 1952, TNA, CO 926/56. 101. Whitehead, Colonial Educators, 2003, 244– 60; Oxford Dictionary of National Biography http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/64198. 102. Extract from Miss Gwilliam’s report, March 1953, TNA, CO 926/53. 103. Extract from a letter by Sleight, 30 October 1953, TNA, CO 926/53. 104. Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, 1978, 55. 105. Political report, January 1953, TNA, CO 926/20. 106. Ibid. 107. Political report, February 1953, TNA, CO 926/20. 108. Wright to Lyttleton, 27 April 1953, TNA, CO 926/10. 109. Wright to Makarios, 11 May 1952, TNA, CO 926/10. 110. Wright to Lyttleton, 28 April 1952, TNA, CO 926/10. 111. Political report, May 1953, TNA, CO 926/20. 112. Ibid. 113. Political report, July 1953, TNA, CO 926/20. 114. Political report, August 1953, TNA, CO 926/20; Wright to Griffiths, 6 September 1953, TNA, CO 1045/452. 115. Political report, May 1953, TNA, CO 926/20. 116. Coronation Proclamation, June 1953, TNA, CO 1069/704. 117. Persianis, Church and State, 1978, 213. 118. Wright to Lyttleton, 8 June 1953, TNA, CO 926/10. 119. Ibid. 120. Political report, July 1953, TNA, CO 926/20. 121. Wright to Lyttleton, 17 June 1953, TNA, CO 926/10. 122. Political report, July 1953, TNA, CO 926/20. 123. Makarios’ speech, 28 June 1953, TNA, CO 926/10. 124. Fletcher-Cooke to Lyttelton, 11 July 1953, TNA, CO 926/10. 125. Daily Mail, 28 June 1953, TNA, CO 926/10. 126. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955 – 59, Minneapolis, 1997, 12– 14. 127. Wright to Secretary, 17 June 1953, TNA, CO 926/10. 128. Political report, July 1952, TNA, CO 926/19. 129. Spyridakis, Educational Policy, 1954, 38 – 9. 130. Political report, July 1953, TNA, CO 926/20. 131. Ibid. 132. Political report, August 1953, TNA, CO 926/20. 133. Robert Holland, “Never, Never Land: British Colonial Policy and the Roots of Violence in Cyprus” in R. Holland (ed.), Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945, London, 1994, 162.

292 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169.

NOTES

TO PAGES

208 –215

Ethnos, 17 July 1953; Political report, July 1953, TNA, CO 926/20. Political report, February 1954, TNA, CO 926/209. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 33 – 4. Intel – Foreign Office, 25 June 1954, TNA, CO 926/180. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 10 August 1954, TNA, CO 926/180. Secret – UK Delegation New York, August 1954, TNA, CO 926/180. Alithia, 6 July 1954. Political report, April 1954, TNA, CO 926/209. Eleftheria, 4 May 1954. Pagkύpriο Gymnάsiο, Anamnήs1i6, 1994, 116. Law, 1 April 1954, TNA, CO 926/164. Legal report, Armitage to Lyttelton, 3 April 1954, TNA, CO 926/164. Armitage to Lyttelton, 21 January 1954, TNA, CO 926/164. Sir Charles B.P. Peake (Athens) to Foreign Office, 5 May 1954, TNA, CO 926/355. Political report, May 1954, TNA, CO 926/209. Notes of meeting of 29 June 1954, TNA, FO 371/112848 in Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1998, 35. Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question, 2002, 50. British Information Services Report on Cyprus (an agency of the British Government in Washington), 19 August 1954, TNA, CO 926/179. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 36 – 7. Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question, 2002, 52. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 38. Political report, August 1954, TNA, CO 926/209. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 3 December 1954, TNA, CO 926/157. Pάnο6 Myrtiώth6, Makάriο6: Istοrikά Ntοkοy mέnta, L1ykvsίa, 1977, s.8 Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 13 August 1954, TNA, CO 926/171. Telegram to Prime Minister, 6 August 1954, TNA, CO 926/309. Foreign Office Confidential, 13 August 1954, TNA, CO 926/180. Athens Greek Home Service, Commentary by the Rector of Athens University, 16 August 1954, CO 926/171; Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, 1978, 82. Peake to Foreign Office, 19 August 1954, TNA, CO 926/355. Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, 1978, 82. Stephen Xydis, “Toward ‘Toil and Moil’ in Cyprus”, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 20 No. 1, Winter 1966, pp. 14 – 15. Press announcement, 22 September 1954, TNA, CO 926/309. House of Commons Report, 28 October 1954, TNA, CO 926/252. Ezekias Papaioannou interview to Neos Democratis, 23 September 1954, TNA, CO 926/503. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 3 December 1954, TNA, CO 926/157. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 8 December 1954, TNA, CO 926/157; Circular of the Department of Education, 23 February 1954, Kyriakides’ Archive.

NOTES

TO PAGES

215 –221

293

170. Enosis, Issue No. 10, 1 December 1954, TNA, CO 926/503. 171. Pamphlet, “The Monopoly of Enosis”, by the Cyprus Secretariat, October 1954, TNA, CO 926/171. 172. Papάstayrο6 Papagauaggέlοy, H Marty rίa mοy : Pώ6 έzhsa thn prοparask1y ή kai tοn agώna th6 EOKA, L1ykvsίa, 1995. 173. Battershill to his mother, 26 September 1954, RH, Mss. Brit. Emp. S.467 Box 5, File II. 174. Political report, December 1954, TNA, CO 926/209. 175. Greek delegation in New York to UN Secretary General, 20 December 1954, TNA, CO 926/180. 176. Phaneromeni speech, 16 January 1955, TNA, CO 926/503. 177. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 16 January 1955, TNA, FO 371/117622. 178. Sunday Pictorial, 23 January 1955, TNA, FO 371/117623. 179. Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, 2006, 203. 180. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 49 – 50. The second shipment of arms from Greece (the first was in March 1954 on the Siren and all the arms were received in total secrecy) reached the coast of Cyprus on the Agios Georgios in January 1955. Following information given to the British authorities, the ship was spotted off the coast of Paphos, near Khlorakas village on 25 January. The ship was captured and its contents confiscated – the crew and the Cypriots waiting on the coast to receive the shipment, 13 in all, were arrested. They were tried and sentenced to prison. Andreas Varnavas, A Brief History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA, 1955 – 1959, Nicosia, 2001, 12. 181. Charles Foley, Island in Revolt, London, 1962, 13. 182. Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons, London, 1958, 127 183. Petrides and Spyridakis to OELMEK, 7 February 1955, TNA, FO 371/117626; Essay Competition announcement, TNA, FO 371/117626. 184. Government of Cyprus, Corruption of youth in support of terrorism in Cyprus, Nicosia, 1957. 185. Athens Radio, 27 February 1955, TNA, FO 371/17626. 186. Stephanopoulos to Peake, 29 January 1955, TNA, FO 371/117623. 187. Lennox-Boyd to Fletcher-Cooke, 21 February 1955, TNA, FO 371/117623. 188. Eleftheria, 27 March 1955. 189. Ibid.

Chapter 7

Schools in Uproar: The EOKA Revolt and the End of British Rule in Cyprus

1. Morgan, Sweet and Bitter Island, 2010, s. 213. 2. Eunο6, 1 April 1955, «All1pάllhlai c1sinaί 1krήj1i6 1i6 th L1ykvsίan kai Lάrnaka».

294

NOTES

TO PAGES

222 –229

3. A Chronological Record of the part played by students of Cypriot schools in acts of violence and disorder between August 1954 and 31 January 1956, TNA, CO 926/166, Eleftheria, 14 April 1955. 4. Strathgού G1vrgίοy Grίba – Dig1nή, Apοmnhmοn1ύmata Agώnο6 EOKA 1955– 1959 (Auήna 1961), s. 37. 5. Baker, Retreat from the Empire, 1998, 140; Foley, Memoirs, 1964, 36. 6. Chronological Record, TNA, CO 926/166. 7. Baker, Retreat from the Empire, 1996, 141. 8. Discussion in House of Commons, 30 June 1955, TNA, FO 371/117623. 9. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 59 – 60. 10. Ibid., 71. 11. Executive Council meeting, 9 July 1955, TNA, CO 926/190. 12. Ibid. 13. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 60. 14. Ibid., 79. 15. Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, 1978, 139. 16. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 20 November 1955 and 24 February 1956, TNA, CO 926/192. 17. Evangelides to Martin, 3 October 1955, TNA, CO 1045/678. 18. The Myth of De-hellenization, Secretariat Pamphlet, 30 September 1955, TNA, CO 371/117665. 19. Reddaway, Burdened, 1986, 26. 20. Sleight to Administrative Secretary, 24 December 1955, TNA, CO 1045/678. 21. Reddaway, Burdened, 1986, 24 – 5, S.D. Pavlides was the first Cypriot to hold the post of the Attorney-General and a great supporter of EOKA, P. G. Prοdrόmοy, K ύpriοi Pοlit 1 y tέ6 , 1878 – 1950: K οinvnikό6 m1tasxhmatismό6 kai pοlitikή 1lίt, L1ykvsίa, 2010, 249. 22. Chronological Record, TNA, CO 926/166. 23. Newspaper cuttings, TNA, CO 1045/678. 24. Newspaper cuttings, 20 November 1955, TNA, CO 1045/678. 25. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 17 November 1955, TNA, CO 1045/678. 26. Minutes of the Executive Council, 16 November 1955, TNA, FCO 141/3435. 27. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 94. 28. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 22 October 1955, TNA, CO 926/545. 29. Robert Holland, “The Cult of Makarios: Archbishop Makarios III and the British, 1950– 59”, Society of Cypriot Studies (TrίtοKyprοlοgikόSynέdriο), Nicosia, 2001, 577 –81. 30. Note for Sir Christopher Cox, 22 November 1955, TNA, CO 1045/678. 31. Note by Cox, 31 January 1957, CO 926/157 32. Elenitsa Seraphim-Loizou, The Cyprus Liberation Struggle, 1955– 1959: Through the eyes of a woman EOKA area commander, Nicosia, 23. 33. Ward minute, 4 November 1955, TNA, CO 926/455.

NOTES

TO PAGES

229 –238

295

34. Rolandos Katsiaounis, “Cyprus 1931 – 59: The Politics of the Anti-Colonial Movement”, Epetiris of the Cyprus Research Centre, XXXIII, Nicosia, 2007, 441– 69. 35. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 105. 36. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 31 December 1955, TNA, CO 926/546. 37. The Times, October/November [?] 1955, TNA, CO 1045/677. 38. Simon Wardell to Julian Amery, 18 November 1955, TNA, CO 926/149. 39. Cyprus Teachers’ Organisation to Harding, 10 December 1955, TNA, CO 926/166. 40. Harding to Lyttleton, 16 December 1955, TNA, CO 926/169. 41. Ibid. 42. Lyttleton to Harding, 24 December 1955, TNA, CO 926/169. 43. Harding to Lyttleton, 26 March 1956, TNA, FO 371/123949. 44. Report of Education 1955– 6, TNA, CO 69/58. 45. Voice of Our Fatherland, 5 January 1956, TNA, CO 1045/677. 46. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 13 January 1956, TNA, CO 1045/678. 47. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 2 January 1956, TNA, CO 926/547. 48. Colonial Office Meeting, 21 January 1956, TNA, CO 926/169. 49. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 22 January 1956, TNA, CO 926/196. 50. Peter Catterall (ed.), The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years, 1950– 1957, London, 2003, 525. 51. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 109– 10. 52. Foley, Memoirs, 1964, 62. G1ώrgiο6 Grίba6 Dig1nή6, Xrοnikόn agώnο6 EOKA 1955– 1959, L1ykvsίa6, 1997, 13. 53. Foley, Memoirs, 1964, 40. 54. Pagkύpriο Gymnάsiο, Anamnήs1i6, 1993, 150. 55. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 28 January 1956, TNA, CO 926/166. 56. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 29 January 1956, TNA, CO 1045/678. 57. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 31 January 1956, TNA, CO 1045/678. 58. Director of Education to Adm, Sec., 31 January 1956, TNA, FCO 141/3435. 59. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 6 February 1956, TNA, CO 1045/678. 60. Famagusta Gymnasium, Lefkoniko Gymnasium, Pancyprian Gymnasium of Nicosia, Limassol Gymnasium. 61. Governor to Secretary of State, 26 March 1956, TNA, CO 926/166. 62. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 25 and 28 February 1956, TNA, CO 926/192; Telegrams from Harding, January, February, March and April 1956, TNA, CO 1045/678. 63. Lennox-Boyd to Macmillan, 17 February 1956, TNA, CO 926/169. 64. Macmillan to Lennox-Boyd, 9 March 1956, TNA, CO 926/169. 65. Cited in French, Fighting EOKA, 2015, 184. 66. French, Fighting EOKA, 2015, 187. 67. Terrorism in Cyprus: the captured documents/ translated extracts issued by authority of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, [1956] 62.

296

NOTES

TO PAGES

238 –245

68. Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, 1978, 166. 69. Harding to Secretary of State, 5 March 1956, CO 926/254. 70. Papastavros Papagathaggelou (Priest of Phaneromeni Church and leader of OHEN), Bishop of Kyrenia and Polykarpos Ioannides (Secretary of the Bishopric of Kyrenia and a militant journalist). 71. Terrorism, 1956, 78 – 81. 72. French, Fighting EOKA, 2015, 178 (CO 926/937, 15 June 1957). 73. Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, 1978, 174– 5. 74. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 120. 75. Morgan, Sweet and Bitter, 2010, 226. 76. Griffin to Director of Education, 3 October 1956, TNA, FCO 141/4736. 77. Harding to Secretary of State, 1 May 1956, TNA, CO 926/169. 78. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 11 April 1956, TNA, CO 926/169. 79. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 11 April 1956, TNA, CO 926/169 Melkonian, Terra Santa, Polemi, American Academies. 80. Athens to FO, 14 May 1956, TNA, CO 926/169. 81. Harding to Boyd, 31 August 1956, TNA, CO 926/169. 82. Cabinet minutes, 13 – 14 August 1958, TNA, PREM 11/1244. 83. Tudhope to Admin. Sec. 7 December 1956, TNA, FCO 141/3445. 84. Tudhope to Admin. Sec. 6 April 1957, TNA, FCO 141/3445. 85. Harding to Secretary of State, 27 March 1956, TNA, PREM 11/1244. 86. Harding to Sec. of State, 25 July 1956, TNA, PREM 11/1244. 87. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, telegram, 25 July 1956, TNA, PREM 11/1244. 88. PEOM to Harding, 10 July 1956, TNA, FCO 141/3443. 89. Minute by Deputy Governor, 8 July 1958, TNA, FCO 141/3912. 90. Nίkο6 Papanastasίοy, ‘Organvtikέ6 dοmέ6 th6 n1οlaίa6 katά thn p1rίοdο tοy Agώna’, stο SIMAE (1p), H n1οlaίa stοn ap1l1y u1rvtikό agώna th6 EOKA 1955 – 59, L1ykvsίa, 2000, 59 – 65. 91. Harding to Secretary of State, 7 November 1956, TNA, CO 926/166. 92. Proclamation by PEKA, 29 September 1956, TNA, CO 926/166. 93. Eleftheria, 9 August 1956. 94. Cited in French, Fighting EOKA, 2015, 191. 95. Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East, London, 2003, 528– 9. 96. Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question, 2002, 61. 97. Alkimos Neolaia EOKA (EOKA Robust Youth). 98. Dhmήtrh6 L1bέnth6, ‘Mοrwέ6 drάsh6 th6 N1οlaίa6 th6 EOKA’, stο SIMAE (1p) H n1οlaίa stοn ap1l1y u1rvtikό agώna th6 EOKA 1955– 59 (L1ykvsίa, 2000) s. 65 – 70. 99. Crouzet, Le conflit de Chypre, 1973 (Translated in Greek in 2011), 579. 100. Egertirio Salpisma (Reveille). 101. Agogi ton Neon (Education of the Youth). 102. Varnavas, Brief History, 2001, 44.

NOTES

TO PAGES

245 –251

297

103. Mixάlh6 Mixaήl, Dimέtvpο6 ο Agώn: EOKA kai Arist1rά thn p1rίοdο 1955– 59, L1m1sό6, 2016, 76 – 7. 104. Frίjο6 Dhmhtriάdh6, Agvgή tvn nέvn: tο parάnοmο p1riοdikό th6 EOKA gia tοy6 mauhtέ6 tvn dhmοtikώn sxοl1ίvn, L1ykvsίa, 1994, 26. 105. Dhmhtriάdh6, Agvgή (t1ύxο6 1, 6 October 1958), 1994. 106. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 181. 107. Diana Markides, Cyprus 1957– 1963: from Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis: The Key Role of the Municipal Issue, Minneapolis, 2001, 16 – 17. 108. Ibid., 17. 109. Cyprus Mail, 4 September 1957. 110. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 212. 111. Sir Hugh Foot, A Start in Freedom, London, 1964, 149. 112. Representatives of the School Committee to Governor, 19 December 1957, TNA FCO 141/4738. 113. OELMEK (Spyridakis) to Foot, 5 December 1957, TNA, FCO 141/4738. 114. Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, 1978, 277. 115. Foot, Start in Freedom, 1964, 149. 116. Niyazi Kizilyu¨rek, Mia Epοxή th6 Bίa6: Tο skοt1inό 1958, L1m1sό6, 2015, 12. 117. In 1958 the Teachers’ Training College and the Mistresses’ Training College were merged into the Cyprus College and transferred to Nicosia. 118. Morgan, Sweet and Bitter, 2010, 245. 119. Robert Holland, Blue Water Empire: The British in the Mediterranean since 1800, London, 2012, 322. 120. Agogi ton Neon, issue, 4, 20 October 1958. 121. Hatzivassiliou, Cyprus Question, 2002, 71. 122. Ibid., 70. 123. Tudhope to Adm. Sec, 4 July 1958, TNA, FCO 141/3364. 124. Lightbody to Adm. Secretary, 23 June 1958, TNA, FCO 141/3363. 125. Lightbody (Ag Director of Education) to Admin. Secretary, 6 February 1959; T.P. Lightbody to Adm. Secretary, 26 January 1959, TNA, FCO 141/3364. 126. Lightbody to Adm. Secretary, 2 May 1958, TNA, FCO 141/3363. 127. Students of Elementary school of Yialousa to the Governor, 10 June 1958, TNA, FCO 141/3447. 128. Agogi ton Neon, issue 3, 13 October 1958 & issue 12, 5 January 1959. 129. PEKA, Summer 1958, TNA, FCO 141/3363. 130. PEKA leaflet, July 1958, FCO 141/3363 underlined in the original. 131. Note by the Director of Education, Summer 1958 (estimated), TNA, FCO 141/3256. 132. Order made by the Governor Under Regulation 41(1), 7 August 1958, THA, FCO 141/3363. 133. Extraordinary Gazette, 30 August 1958, TNA, FCO 141/3363. 134. Lightbody to Adm. Secretary, 21 October 1958, TNA, FCO 141/3363. Government Schools were the English Schools for Boys and Girls, Preparatory

298

135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151.

NOTES

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Technical School Nicosia, Technical Institute Nicosia, Technical School Lefka, Secondary Technical School Limassol. Report from the office of the Attorney-General, 16 October 1958, TNA, FCO 141/3363. Minute by deputy Governor, 17 September 1959, TNA, FCO 141/3256. Secretary of State to Cyprus, 31 October 1959. TNA, FCO, 141/3256 Governor to the Secretary of State, Telegram, 18 March 1958, TNA, FCO 141/3256. Cited in Vanezis, Makarios, 1979, 50. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 1998, 290. Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, 1978, 329. Ag. Director of Education to the Colonial Secretary, 17 January 1959, TNA, FCO 141/4743. Extract from DIC report, Troodos, for period 21 –7 November 1958, & Ag Admin. Sec. to Commissioner, 9 January 1959, TNA, FCO 141/3439. Lightbody to Admin Sec, 24 November 1958, TNA, FCO 141 – 3440. Ag. Director of Education to Admin. Secretary, 24 November 1958, TNA, FCO 141/4739. Hatzivassiliou, Cyprus Question, 2002, 77 –80. Field Marshal the Lord Harding of Petherton, “The Cyprus Problem in Relation to the Middle East, International Affairs, Vol. 34 No. 3 (July 1958), 291– 196. POED to Governor, 24 January 1959, TNA, FCO 141/3992, POED to Director of Education, 25 March 1959, TNA, FCO 141 – 3683. Lightbody to Germanacos, 1 May 1959, SA, E1/951. Germanacos to District Offices, 2 September 1959, SA, E1/952. Kvnstantίnο6 Spyridάki6, Έku1si6 p1rί tοy έrgοy tοy Graw1ίοy Ellhnikή6 Paid1ίa6 katά tο sxοlikόn έtο6 1959– 1960, 8 – 10. Ivannίdh6& Kaminarίdh6, Didaskalikό Kοlέgiο, 2011, 68 – 9.

Conclusion 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whitehead, Colonial Educators, 2003, 6. Anthony Kirk-Greene, Forward in Whitehead, Colonial Educators, 2003, viiii. Whitehead, Colonial Educators, 2003, 82 –3. Clive Whitehead, “Sir Christopher Cox”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 5. Norman Etherington, “Education and Medicine”, in Norman Etherington (ed.), Missions and Empire, Oxford, 2005, 266. 6. Eleni Apeyitou, “Turkish–Cypriot Nationalism: Its History and Development, 1571–1960”, in Herbert Faustmann and Emilios Solomou (eds), Colonial Cyprus 1878–1960, Nicosia, 2010, 247–75. 7. Adamantia Pollis, “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy”, Comparative Politics, 1973, Vol. 5 (4) (1973), 575 –99.

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299

8. Adamantia Pollis, “Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism: Determinants of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus”, in Peter Worsley and Paschalis Kitromilides (eds), Small States in the Modern World: The Conditions of Survival, Nicosia, 1979, 45 – 79. 9. G. Cassar, Politics, “Religion and Education in 19th century Malta”, Journal of Maltese Education Research, Vol. 1 No. 1, 2003, 66 –118, 110, 113. 10. Henry Frendo, Europe and Empire: Culture, Politics and Identity in Malta and the Mediterranean, Malta, 2012, 61, 349. 11. Joseph S. Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, London, 1985, 39 –40. 12. In August 1962, in an interview with the Cyprus News Agency, the Director of the Education Office advocated in favour of further enhancement of the cultural and spiritual relations between Greece and Cyprus, as anything less would constitute national treason and attempted genocide (!). He underlined that political independence is a panacea, and beyond that our initial demand is still there and will be reinforced by the spiritual and cultural connection of our forcibly politically separated countries. He therefore suggested that further steps should be taken to further connect the educational policy of the two countries. 13. P1rsiάnh6, Ta pοlitikά, 2010, 44 – 7. 14. Panagiώth6 P1rsiάnh6, H 1kpaίd1y sh th6 Kύprοy mprοstά sthn prόklhsh th6 Ey rώph6, Auήna, 1996. 15. Attalides, Nationalism, 1979, 124. 16. Joseph, Ethnic Conflict, 1985, 41. 17. Cyprus Mail, 27 August 2011. Information on the current educational developments is also based on cuttings from Phileleftheros, http://www.phi lenews.com/, Kathimerini http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/ and Sigma Live http:// www.sigmalive.com/ The relation between the two communities in the postindependence period and their respective education systems was studied by social anthropologists Rebecca Bryant, Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus, London, 2004 and Yiannis Papadakis, Echoes from the Dead Zone: Across the Cyprus Divide, London, 2005; Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Persianis, Gisela Welz (eds), Divided Cyprus, Bloomington, 2006. You could also see PRIO Cyprus Centre Report 2/2008P study: Yiannis Papadakis, History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Schoolbooks on the “History of Cyprus”, available at http://www.prio.no/Cyprus/Publications/. 18. Cyprus Mail, 25 November 2015, available at http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/ 11/25/leaders-take-sa-in-education/#, accessed on 26 October 2016. 19. Cyprus Mail, 25 November 2015, Haravgi, 26 November 2015, available at http://dialogos.com.cy/haravgi/sistinete-techniki-epitropi-pedias/, accessed on 26 October 2016. 20. Interview of Costas Kadis at Politis, 29 November 2015. 21. Dialogos.com, available at http://dialogos.com.cy/blog/den-se-xero-kala-maimaste-to-mellon-as-ginoume-paradigma-simviosis/#.WBBgyVR95dg, 5 June

300

22. 23. 24. 25.

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2016, accessed on 26 October 2016; Paid1ίanewswww.paideia-news.com, 2 June 2016, accessed on 26 October 2016 – The Home for Cooperation is a community centre located along the Green Line. It was established in 2011 with the aim to promote inter-communal cooperation. Since then it has contributed to the collective efforts of civil society in its engagement with peace-building and intercultural dialogue. http://www.home4cooperation.info/. Simerini, 20 February 2016, article by Anthos Erotocritou, accessed on 26 October 2016. http://www.ahdr.info/about_ahdr.php, accessed on 26 October 2016. http://www.ahdr.info/viewarticlesub.php?scid¼70, Costas Kadis interview (as above). Cyprus Mail, 27 June 2010.

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Primary Sources (Unpublished) The National Archives (TNA), Public Record Office (Kew Gardens) Colonial Office: CO 69/42, CO 69/37, CO 70/21, CO 67/41, CO 67/217/3, CO 67/228/1, CO 67/228/4, CO 67/232/2, CO 67/239/7, CO 67/2394/14, CO 67/240/11, CO 67/241/3, CO 67/241/4, CO 67/241/13, CO 67/242/3, CO 67/242/8, CO 67/243/1, CO 67/243/4, CO 67/243/7, CO 67/246/2, CO 67/246/12, CO 67/246/23, CO 67/248/3, CO 67/249/13, CO 67/249/14, CO 67/251/3, CO 67/251/13, CO 67/252/14, CO 67/253/10, CO 67/254/1, CO 254/4, CO 67/255/1, CO 67/255/8, CO 67/258/6, CO 67/259/10, CO 67/259/12, CO 67/259/15, CO 67/259/16, CO 67/260/3, CO 67/260/4, CO 67/264/12, CO 67/264/15, CO 67/265/1, CO 67/265/2, CO 67/265/11, CO 67/267/9, CO 67/268/12, CO 67/270/7, CO 67/271/8, CO 67/272/16, CO 67/272/17, CO 67/272/18, CO 67/272/21, CO 67/273/1, CO 67/273/2, CO 67/274/5, CO 67/276/1, CO 67/276/2, CO 67/277/5, CO 67/277/6, CO 67/277/7, CO 67/279/6, CO 67/281/1, CO 67/281/14, CO 67/286/1, CO 67/287/14, CO 67/289/2, CO 67/293/1, CO 67/293/10, CO 67/294/5, CO 67/298/5, CO 67/304/4, CO 67/306/15, CO 67/308/4, CO 67/308/10, CO 67/309/8, CO 67/310/10, CO 67/310/13, CO 67/311/11, CO 67/311/16, CO 67/311/19, CO 67/311/20, CO 67/313/9, CO 67/313/20, CO 67/314/10, CO 67/314/12, CO 67/315/19, CO 67/316/3, CO 67/317/11, CO 67/317/12, CO 67/317/9, CO 67/319/2, CO 67/319/4, CO 67/319/5, CO 67/321/3, CO 67/321/6, CO 67/321/8, CO 67/323/3,

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CO 67/323/4, CO 67/323/5, CO 67/328/11, CO 67/329/14, CO 67/332/1, CO 67/332/2, CO 67/332/7, CO 67/341/1, CO 67/341/7, CO 67/342/1, CO 67/342/2, CO 67/352/1, CO 67/352/2, CO 67/356/1, CO 67/356/3, CO 67/365/2, 67/365/3, CO 67/365/4, CO 67/365/5, CO 67/367/1, CO 67/367/7, CO 67/368/7, CO 67/368/8, CO 67/368/11, CO 67/370/3, CO 67/371/3, CO 67/371/4, CO 323/1503/18, CO 537/1878, CO 537/2483, CO 537/2486, CO 537/4047, CO 537/4979, CO 537/6244, CO 1045/452, CO 1045/677, CO 1045/678, CO 1069/704, CO 926/10, CO 926/12, CO 926/19, CO 926/20, CO 926/42, CO 926/51, CO 926/52, CO 926/53, CO 926/56, CO 926/149, CO 926/157, CO 926/164, CO 926/166, CO 926/169, CO 926/171, CO 926/179, CO 926/180, CO 926/190, CO 926/192, CO 926/196, CO 926/209, CO 926/252, CO 926/254, CO 926/309, CO 926/355, CO 926/455, CO 926/503, CO 926/545, CO 926/546, CO 926/547. Foreign Office: FO 371/117622, FO 371/117623, FO 371/117626, FO 371/117665, FO 371/123949. Foreign and Commonwealth Office: FCO 141/3435, FCO 141/4736, FCO 141/3445, FCO 141/3447, FCO 141/3443, FCO 141/3912, FCO 141/4738, FCO 141/3364, FCO 141/3363, FCO 141/3256, FCO 141/4739, FCO 141/4743, FCO 141/3439, FCO 141/3440, FCO 141/3992, FCO 141 /3683. Prime Minister’s Office: PREM 3/113, PREM 11/1244.

Cyprus State Archives (SA) (Nicosia) Secretariat: SA1:1468/1931, SA1:1468/1931/2, SA1:953/1929/3, SA1:731/1934/1, SA1:731/1934/2, SA1:641/1935, SA1:872/1934, SA1:1253/1930/2, SA1:561/1934, SA1:1303/1935, SA1:780/1933, SA1:1061/1935/1, SA1:599/1934, SA1:1349/1937, SA1:1350/39, SA1:1152/1939, SA1:872/1934, SA1:644/1938, SA1:1183/35, SA1:946/1938/1, SA1:1379/39, SA1:1230/1934, SA1:921/1945, SA1:876/1940, SA1:1078/38, SA1:1151/1939, SA1:1881/1949/1, SA1:1060/1947, SA1:864/49/2, SA1:1566/1952, SA1:1813/1952, SA1:1706/50, SA1: 554/1940. Education: E1/951, E1/952.

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IMPERIAL CONTROL

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INDEX

Abercrombie, David, 107 Adamantos, Adam, 162, 288(n.13) Advisory Council, 41 Africa, 4, 31 Agricultural Bank, 23, 59 AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People), 103, 115, 122, 133, 137, 139, 147, 150, 153, 160, 174, 180, 194, 207, 212, 229, 245, 246, 262 Akkinci, Mustafa, 262 Alexandretta, 8 Alexandria, 14, 28 Amery, Julian, 230 Amery, Leo, 27 Anastasiades, Nicos, 262, 263 ANE (EOKA Robust Youth), 245, 246, 296(n.97) AON (Progressive Youth Organisation), 160, 194 Armitage, Sir Robert, 209, 212, 222– 4 Asia Minor, 8, 15, 21, 22, 23, 26 Attlee, Clement, 129, 146, 153 Battershill, Sir William, 62, 87, 89, 99, 103– 6, 108, 112, 113, 115, 119, 120, 172– 3, 216, 279(n.1) Bennett, John, 157, 173, 200

Berat Law, 98 Bevin, Ernest, 138 Bey, Munir, 33 Bey, Nejati, 33 Biddulph, Sir Robert, 10 British Council, 64, 81, 83, 85, 88, 89, 94, 105, 106, 108, 168, 169, 200, 251 Cacoyiannis, Sir Panayiotis, 32, 172, 186, 187, 289(n.38) Cape, F.W., 18, 21 Castle, Barbara, 251 Christofias, Demetris, 262 Churchill, Sir Winston, 9, 27, 114, 121, 123, 129, 138 Clerides, Ioannis, 239, 276(n.22) Constantine I, King of Greece, 20 Consultative Assembly, 4, 139, 150, 151, 160, 171, 175, 256, 285(n.56) Cox, Sir Christopher, 201, 229, 230– 2, 237, 257 Creech-Jones, Sir Arthur, 139, 145, 150 Crete, 8, 14, 74, 112, 113, 154 Crossman, Richard, 217, 218 Cullen, J.R., 43, 45, 47, 59, 61 – 3, 64– 5, 80, 88, 89, 95, 99, 108, 115, 119, 121, 134

312

IMPERIAL CONTROL

Cunliffe-Lister, Philip, 41, 58, 61, 68 Cyprus Convention, 9, 266(n.1), 268(n.54) Cyprus Political Organisation, 22 Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens, 136 Dawe, A.J., 26, 38, 43, 46, 54, 78, 79, 94, 95, 98, 128 demotiki, 110, 163, 280(n.23) Dervis, Themistocles, 122, 185 Diamantis, Adamantios, 76 Disraeli, Benjamin, 8 Dodecanese, 39, 40, 114, 148, 158 Durrell, Lawrence, 219, 222 EAM (National Liberation Front), 128, 133, 164, 154 Eden, Sir Anthony, 206, 222, 224, 238 EFE (National Union of Students), 191 Egypt, 8, 32, 39, 70, 93, 94, 112, 136, 148, 211, 218 Eide, Espen Barth, 262 ELAS (Greek People’s Liberation Army), 154 EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), 2, 4, 144, 177, 187, 192, 208, 213, 215, 218, 220, 226, 227, 229, 230, 234, 236, 238, 239, 240, 243, 250, 254, 259 Epiros, 14 Evangelides, Socrates, 185, 225 Executive Council, 153 Fisher, Mary, 159, 172 Fletcher-Cooke, John, 206 Foley, Charles, 218 Foot, Sir Hugh, 247 Gladstone, William Ewart, 10 Grey, Sir Edward, 19 Griffin, Paul, 239, 249

IN CYPRUS

Griffiths, Jim, 180, 183 Grivas, George, 177, 192, 208, 213–14, 220 –2, 227, 229, 234, 235, 238– 9, 243, 245– 6, 252, 254 Gwilliam, Freda, 201, 202 Harding, Sir John, 224, 226– 42, 247, 253 Harlow, F.J., 198 Harris, Sir Douglas, 136 Haynes-Smith, Sir W.F., 16 Henniker-Heaton, Herbert, 40, 42, 46, 59 Hill, Sir George, 64, 71, 90 Hopkinson, Henry, 137, 212 Ionian Islands, 8, 11, 13, 14 Irfan Bey, 21 Italy, 29, 58, 70, 72, 74, 100, 105, 111, 113 Kadis, Costas, 263 Karaolis, Michael, 226 Katalanos, Nicolaos, 22 katharevousa, 110, 163 Kimberley, Lord, 10, 11 King-Harman, Sir Charles, 18 Kokkinou, Ourania, 243 Kucuk, Fazil, 194, 195, 213, 247 Kyrillos III, Archbishop of Cyprus, 20, 40, 48, 49, 268(n.58), 271(n.12) Lanitis, N.K., 20 Legislative Council, 41, 268(n.49) Lennox-Boyd, Alan, 214, 223, 236, 237, 244, 246 Leontions, Archbishop of Cyprus, 40, 48, 49, 71, 72, 76, 97, 111, 113, 120, 126, 137, 138, 271(n.12), 272(n.41) Lightbody, T.B., 252 Luke, Sir Harry, 20, 90

INDEX MacDonald, Malcolm, 71, 89 MacDonald, Ramsay, 25 Macmillan, Sir Harold, 222 – 3, 234, 236– 7, 249, 252 Makarios II, Archbishop of Cyprus, 38, 172 Makarios III, Archbishop of Cyprus, 177, 180, 185– 8, 190– 3, 196, 203, 206– 8, 212– 14, 217, 220, 224, 228, 230, 234, 238, 239, 246, 247, 251–4 Malta, 41, 43, 72, 74, 76, 79, 101, 129, 152, 257, 259, 260 Martin, J.M., 156 Matsis, Kyriakos, 252 Maximos, Dimitrios, 148, 174 Mayhew, Arthur, 47, 55, 61, 62, 66, 67, 69, 75 Metaxas, Ioannis, 83, 92, 94, 112 Mylonas, Nicodemos (Bishop of Kitium), 38, 270(n.3) National Council, 23, 24, 269(n.66) Newham, Rev. F.D., 12, 52, 67, 84 Norton, Sir Clifford J., 181 Oakden, Sir Ralph, 58, 60, 70, 86, 87 OELMEK (Organisation of Greek Officers of Secondary Education of Cyprus), 209, 219, 247 OHEN (Orthodox Christian Youth Union), 192, 194, 215, 289, 289(n.61), 296(n.70) Ormsby-Gore, William, 97 Ottoman Empire, 7 Palestine, 55, 62, 70, 72, 93, 95, 98, 100, 103, 129, 148, 152, 218 Pallikarides, Evagoras, 244 Palmer, Sir Richmond, 46, 57, 63, 65, 67, 68, 71, 75-78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 89, 90–3, 95–6, 99, 100, 104, 209 Papadopoulos, Tassos, 245

313

Papagathaggelou, Papastavros, 214, 215, 289(n.61), 296(n.70) Papagos, Alexander, 206 Papaioannou, Ezekias, 212, 214, 288(n.13) Papandreou, George, 127 Paschalides, Paschalis, 76 Paschalis, Neoptolemos, 28 Passfield, Lord, 30 PDO (Pancyprian Teachers’ Organisation), 196 Peer, Sir Charles, 71 PEKA (Political Committee of the Cypriot Struggle), 243, 244, 245, 250, 251 PEO (Pancyprian Federation of Labour), 248 PEOM (Pancyprian United Organisation of Pupils), 246 PEON (Pancyprian National Youth Organisation), 187, 188, 191– 3, 204, 208, 239, 242 Petrides, Frixos, 261 Philippou, Loizos, 141 POED (Pancyprian Organisation of Greek Teachers), 197, 253, 263 Radcliffe, Lord, 241, 244, 245 Reddaway, John, 100, 154, 163, 226 SEKA (Coordinating Committee of the Cypriot Struggle), 180 Sendall, Sir Walter, 266(n.10) Shaw, John, 113, 125 Sims, G., 170 Sleight, G.F., 126, 134, 145, 165, 182, 184, 197, 200, 228 Smyrna, 14 Spencer, Rev. Josiah, 10 Spyridakis, Constantinos, 2, 81, 141, 142, 151, 165, 166, 179, 182, 183, 185, 186, 191, 198, 207, 209, 219, 227, 231, 251, 253, 254, 261

314

IMPERIAL CONTROL

Steel, A.B., 90, 91 Stephanopoulos, Stephanos, 209, 219, 220 Storrs, Sir Ronald, 17, 27, 34, 38, 42, 45, 46, 51, 57, 58, 172 Stubbs, Sir Reginald Edward, 46, 47, 50, 57, 58, 61, 66 Talbot, J.E., 18, 21 TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation), 248 Treaty of Lausanne, 3, 25, 269(n.82) Treaty of Se´vres, 21 Triantafyllides, Antonis, 58 Tribute, 9, 16, 27, 28, 58, 29, 269(n.82) Tsaldaris, Constantinos, 148 Tsouderos, Emmanouel, 114, 124 Tudhope, W.B., 229, 243 Turkish National Youth Organisation, 203, 204 Turnbull, R.E., 141, 142, 150, 155, 168, 173

IN CYPRUS

Venizelos, Eleftherios, 20, 21, 29, 39, 44, 68, 74, 181 Volkan, 224 war Balkan, 14 Greco – Turkish, 14, 21, 22 World War I, 19, 31 World War II, 72, 101, 133, 175, 220, 255, 260 Ward, W.E., 157, 158 Waterlow, Sir Sydney, 94 Weston, B.J., 85 Winster, Lord, 146, 150, 157, 162, 167, 171 Wolseley, Sir Garnet, 8, 16 Woolley, Sir Charles Campbell, 115, 119, 122, 124, 128, 135, 146 Wright, Sir A.B., 89, 169, 172, 178, 189, 191, 198, 199, 201, 203, 205, 209 Zaimis, Alexandros, 19 Zanettos, Philios, 22

Plate 1 Sports at the English School. H.E. the Governor Sir Alan Francis Harding presents medals to winners, around 1955 (PIO archive)

Plate 2

The English School for boys, 1960 (PIO archive)

Plate 3 Lady Harding visits the Turkish School children’s painting exhibition – around 1955 – 6 (PIO archive)

Plate 4 The official opening of the Pedagogical Academy in the presence of Archbishop Makarios and Dr Constantinos Spyridakis, 2 October 1959 (PIO Archive)

Plate 5 Imposing of the curfew regulations, around 1955 (Takis Ioannides Archive)

Plate 6 Students of the Agios Ioannis Elementary School sitting in front of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, around 1955 – 6 (Takis Ioannides Archive)

Plate 7 Closing of the Samuel Commercial School, 12 November 1955 (Fanis Parpairis Collection)

Plate 8 Schoolgirls on their knees during Charalambos Mouskos’s funeral procession, 18 December 1955 (Fanis Parpairis Collection)

Plate 9 Clashes with students during a procession in Eleftheria Square, 28 October 1957 (Fanis Parpairis Collection)

Plate 10 Protest outside the Severios Library, 11 December 1957 (Fanis Parpairis Collection)

Plate 11 Schoolchildren protest on the occasion of the Greek National Day anniversary, 25 March 1958 (Fanis Parpairis Collection)