Immigration, Security and the Liberal State: The Politics of Migration Regulation in Europe and the United States 9781009298018, 1009298011

Table of contents :
Cover
Immigration, Security, and the Liberal State
Dedication
Contents
Figures
Tables
Preface and Acknowledgements
1. Introduction: The Migration Trilemma
2. Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security
3. Expanding the Migration Policy Playing Field: Enlisting the Cooperation of Non-central State Actors
4. Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation
5. Immigration and the Politics of Threat
6. Securitizing and Politicizing Immigration: Political Party Competition in Spain, UK, and the US
7. Conclusions: Liberalism Compromised?
References
Index

Citation preview

Immigration, Security, and the Liberal State

Contextualizing the regulation of human mobility in a new security framework, this book offers an original perspective on the dominant mode of politics and evolving norms shaping the immigration policies of contemporary liberal states. In doing so, the authors challenge existing paradigms that privilege economic and cultural factors over new security ones in explaining the critical institutional and normative changes in migration management, from the early post-WWII through the post-Cold War era. Drawing on evidence from multiple sources, including media and elite discourse, policy tracking, party manifesto data and public opinion across Europe and the US, the book exposes the restrictive nature of immigration politics and policies when immigration is framed as a security threat, and considers its implications for civil liberties. Informed by a rich breadth of scholarly sub-disciplines, the findings contribute both empirically and theoretically to the literatures on international migration, security and public opinion. Gallya Lahav is Professor of Political Science at Stony Brook University,  SUNY. Professor Lahav was recipient of the MacArthur Foundation award for this project’s early development. She is the a­ uthor of Immigration and Politics in the New Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2004), and co-editor of several expert compendia on migration. Her work has also appeared in numerous books, handbooks, and journals including Comparative Political Studies, the American Journal of ­Political Research, Political Behavior, and International Migration Review. Anthony M. Messina is John R. Reitemeyer Professor in the Department of Political Science at Trinity College, Connecticut. Professor Messina specializes in the politics of immigration in Europe. He is the author of Race and Party Competition in Britain (1989) and The Logics and Politics of Post-World War II Migration to Western Europe (2007) and has edited or co-edited six volumes, including The Politics of New Immigrant Destinations (2017).

Immigration, Security, and the Liberal State The Politics of Migration Regulation in Europe and the United States Gallya Lahav Stony Brook University, State University of New York

Anthony M. Messina Trinity College, Connecticut

Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia 314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India 103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467 Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge. We share the University’s mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009298018 DOI: 10.1017/9781009298001 © Gallya Lahav and Anthony M. Messina 2024 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment. First published 2024 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library A Cataloging-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the Library of Congress ISBN 978-1-009-29801-8 Hardback ISBN 978-1-009-29799-8 Paperback Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

In memory of two A+ professors and human beings, Asher Arian and Aristide Zolberg, my beloved teachers, mentors, and friends, and the intellectual forefathers of much of this book’s thinking about the phenomenon of human mobility; and to the members of my loving family, Michael, Odeya, and Erez Rosenband, who emotionally sustained me as I traversed the long and arduous journey of translating thoughts into words. – Gallya Lahav For Millie, an irresistible force of nature and a radiant light in my life. – Anthony M. Messina

Contents

List of Figurespage viii List of Tables xiii Preface and Acknowledgements xv 1 Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

1

2 Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

30

3 Expanding the Migration Policy Playing Field: Enlisting the Cooperation of Non-central State Actors

94

4 Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation

188

5 Immigration and the Politics of Threat

236

6 Securitizing and Politicizing Immigration: Political Party Competition in Spain, UK, and the US

262

7 Conclusions: Liberalism Compromised?

320

References Index

357 472

vii

Figures

1.1 Migration trilemma: Markets, rights, and security page 11 1.2 Immigration threat politics paradigm 20 2.1 Political ideology and support for immigration restrictions in US 43 2.2 Newspaper articles on immigration referring to crime, illegality, or terrorism in US, 1981–2010 (in percentages) 45 2.3 Trends in salience of immigration and proportion of coverage on immigration in American Newspapers, 1991–2014 46 2.4 Word cloud of pre-11 September media content regarding immigration in US 47 2.5 Word cloud of post-11 September media content regarding immigration in US 47 2.6 Share of culture, economic, and security keywords cited in immigration-related articles pre- and post-11 September 48 2.7 Share of aggregated culture, economic, and security keywords cited in immigration-related articles pre- and post-11 September 49 2.8 Culture, economic, and security keywords in immigration-related articles, 1989–2013 50 2.9 Culture, economic, and security keywords cited in immigration-related articles pre- and post-11 September 51 2.10 Number of news segments citing both immigration and terrorism in US, 1991–2013 53 2.11 Media coverage on immigration and terrorism, by threat perception in US, 1991–2013 (in percentages) 54 2.12 Popular immigration attitudes and media coverage of terrorism and immigration in US, 1991–2014 55 2.13 Electoral performance of anti-immigrant parties in select European countries, 1985–2016 63 2.14 Mean electoral support for ERWPs in EU-15, 1990–2015 63 viii

List of Figures

2.15 Rate of change in migration to Europe and US, 1999–2013 (in percentages) 2.16 Share of immigration population and immigration salience, 2006 (in percentages) 2.17 Rate of immigration change and anti-immigration attitudes across countries, 2002–13 2.18 Overestimate of immigrant and Muslim populations, 2006 2.19 Public perceptions of percentage of Muslims in select countries, 2015 2.20 Immigration as nation’s most important problem in US, 1994–2014 (in percentages) 2.21 Salience of immigration across select EU countries, 2002–16 2.22 Salience of immigration across EU, 2005–17 2.23 Immigration as an important issue for EU, 1997–2012 2.24 Salience of immigration and terrorism in 2016 US elections (in percentages) 2.25 Popular concerns about immigration in US, 2017 (in percentages) 2.26 Immigrants negatively impact crime, culture, and economy, 2002–14 (in percentages) 3.1 Non-central state actors involved in managing immigration and human mobility 3.2 Number and nature of national policy changes across countries and time 3.3 Number of local immigration laws in US, 2005–17 3.4 International student destinations in top country markets, 2001 and 2017 3.5 Immigrant detainees and total number removed in Europe, 2014–17 3.6 Detention and deportation ratios in US, 2001–17 4.1 Entry controls for non-EU nationals should be strengthened, 2003 (in percentages) 4.2 Popular attitudes on control of non-member state immigrants in EU, by ideology, 2003 (in percentages) 4.3 Best policies for reducing illegal migration across select countries, 2011 4.4 Popular support for national ID cards and stronger checks on travellers to US, 2001–11 4.5 Popular support for data protection intrusions and privacy rights, 2008 (in percentages) 4.6 ‘Acceptable to monitor group communications’, 2015

ix

70 72 73 76 77 85 86 87 88 89 89 90 105 114 143 172 179 181 191 192 193 194 196 197

x

List of Figures

4.7 Popular attitudes towards body scans at US Airports, 2010 4.8 Immigration salience and popular anti-immigration attitudes in the US, 1992–2014 4.9 Popular anti-immigration attitudes in US, 1992–2014 4.10 Popular anti-immigration attitudes within EU, 2002–14 4.11 Popular attitudes towards Immigrants in Europe, 2002–14 (in percentages) 4.12 Country ‘made a better place to live’ (by ideological self-identification), 2014 4.13 Migration ‘good for [country]’s economy’ (by ideological self-identification), 2014 4.14 Cultural life ‘generally enriched’ (by ideological self-identification), 2014 4.15 Political trust and popular anti-immigrant sentiment in Western Europe, 2008 4.16 Political trust and popular anti-immigrant attitudes in Western Europe, 2016 4.17 Mean institutional trust and popular anti-immigrant attitudes across Europe, 2016 4.18 Popular support for joint national government-EU decision making on immigration, 1998–2011 4.19 Popular attitudes towards joint EU decision making by policy area, 1998–2007 4.20 Perceived added value in EU actions on immigration and asylum policy, 2009 4.21 Popular support for EU burden sharing on African migrants, 2011 4.22 Popular support for EU deciding national immigrant admissions numbers, 2010–11 (in percentages) 4.23 Popular support for joint-decision making on crime and terrorism in EU, 2009 (in percentages) 4.24 Popular view that Schengen area contributes to EU security, 2018 4.25 Public trust in levels of government in EU, 2015–17 (in percentages) 4.26 Public trust in national parliament, national government, and EU, 2004–18 4.27 Public trust in national government and preference for common immigration policy, 2000–11 4.28 Partisan assessments of border security between US and Canada and Mexico, 2006 (in percentages)

198 200 201 201 202 203 204 205 208 209 210 214 215 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 227

List of Figures

4.29 Favourable view of governments in US, 1997–2018 (in percentages) 4.30 Public confidence in local and state governments in US, 1972–2018 (in percentages) 4.31 Popular support for enforcement of immigration law by level of government in US, 2010–11 (in percentages) 4.32 Public trust in protection of data by institution in Europe, 2008 5.1 Recorded hate crimes in US, 1991–2020 5.2 Popular view that terrorist policies have gone ‘too far’ in US, 2004–15 (in percentages) 5.3 Partisan concern about terrorism in US, 2002–16 (in percentages) 5.4 ‘Immigration’ or ‘illegal immigration’ should be priority for president and congress (2008–20) 6.1 Net immigration rates in Spain, UK, US, and EU, 2000–14 (thousands) 6.2 Perceived salience of immigration and terrorism in Spain, 2003–16 (in percentages) 6.3 Perceived salience of immigration and terrorism in UK, 2003–16 (in percentages) 6.4 Perceived salience of immigration and terrorism in US, 2003–15 (in percentages) 6.5 Public concern with illegal immigration in US, 2001–17 (in percentages) 6.6 Popular anti-immigration/immigrant sentiment in Spain, UK, and US, 1989–2012 (in percentages) 6.7 Congruence of immigration salience within the public, press, and parliament in Spain, 2000–08 6.8 Perceived group threat and negative immigration-related news stories in Spain, 1996–2007 6.9 Political elite opinion on illegal immigrants in US, 2017 (in percentages) 6.10 Political elite opinion on large numbers of immigrants and refugees as a ‘critical threat’ in US, 1994–2016 (in percentages) 6.11 Share of words devoted to immigration in party election manifestos in Spain, 1993–2011 6.12 Share of words devoted to immigration in party election manifestos in UK, 1992–2010

xi

228 229 230 232 241 244 247 252 268 274 275 277 278 281 287 290 300 301 303 304

xii

List of Figures

6.13 Evolution of immigration positions in political party manifestos in Spain, 1993–2011 6.14 Evolution of immigration positions in political party manifestos in UK, 1997–2010 6.15 Evolution of immigration positions in presidential party platforms in US, 1992–2012 6.16 Public perceiving controlling and reducing illegal immigration ‘very important goal’ in US, 1998–2016 (in percentages) 6.17 Public perceiving large numbers of immigrants and refugees as a ‘critical threat’ in US, 1994–2016 (in percentages) 6.18 Public concern about illegal immigration in US, 2001–17 (in percentages) 6.19 Agree number of immigrants should decrease in US, 2008–18 (in percentages) 6.20 Agree immigrants strengthen US, 1994–2020 (in percentages) C.1 Perception of economic benefits of immigration by age cohort among Europeans, 2002–14 C.2 Popular sentiment on whether country is a ‘better place to live’ across age cohorts in Europe, 2002–18

305 306 307 311 312 312 314 314 350 351

Tables

1.1 Immigration paradigms, institutions, non-central state actors, and policy proclivity page 24 2.1 Support for restrictive immigration policies and civil liberties 42 2.2 Political ideology and support for immigration and civil liberty policies 42 2.3 Importance of immigration among MEPs in EU-15 countries, 1993–2004 (in percentages) 58 2.4 Salience of immigration among publics in EU-15 countries, 1997–2015 (in percentages) 60 2.5 Trends in salience of immigration among MEPs and publics in EU-12 countries, 1993/97–2004 61 2.6 Stocks of foreign citizens in EU-15 countries, 1999 and 2014 (in percentages) 71 2.7 Muslim population in US and select European countries, 1982–2030 (in percentages) 74 2.8 Immigration frames and their effects, 1940s–2020s 82 3.1 Types of immigration policy and politics 102 3.2 Select immigration-related measures across countries, 2000–17 111 3.3 Select non-central state actors at migrant entry, stay, and exit 119 3.4 EU institutions involved in immigration 127 3.5 Select state immigration-related resolutions and policies in US, 2017 145 3.6 Private sector actors involved in managing immigration 153 4.1 Support for Muslim ban and database in US, 2015 (in percentages) 198 4.2 Popular support for joint national government-EU decision making on immigration by country, 2000–15 (in percentages) 216 xiii

xiv

List of Tables

4.3 Popular attitudes towards US-Mexico joint-decision making, 2004–05 (in percentages) 5.1 Partisan support for civil liberties in UK, 2005 (in percentages) 5.2 Partisan opinions about immigration and terrorism in post-11 September US, 2001–04 (in percentages) 5.3 Popular support for government anti-terrorism policies in US, 2005 (in percentages) 6.1 Priority issues influencing individual’s general election vote in UK, 1997–2019 6.2 Popular attitudes in Britain and Spain towards migration from the Middle East and North Africa, 2002–07 (in percentages) 6.3 Immigration-related news items per frame in Spain, 1997/98 and 2006/07 (number) 6.4 References to immigration in election manifestos in Spain, 2000–11 6.5 Popular political-ideological differences regarding immigrants in Spain and UK, 2014–16 (in percentages) C.1 Major immigration management measures adopted by EU countries and US, March-May 2020 C.2 Partisan opinion on possible policy responses to Covid-19 in US, March 2020 (in percentages) C.3 Popular attitudes towards migrants during Covid-19 pandemic in Europe, 2020 (in percentages)

226 248 248 249 276 283 291 293 313 342 347 348

Preface and Acknowledgements

This book is the product of many years of conversations and ­investigations. It has experienced several incarnations, all of which involved much sober reflection about the nature and political well-being of contemporary liberal democratic states as they are reflected in the politics associated with the movement of people across national borders. What began as a solo project for Gallya Lahav eventually led to a renewed collaboration between the two authors whose scholarly agendas have periodically and productively intersected, culminating in several co-authored p ­ ublications during the past two decades. The seeds of the project for Lahav were sown at Charles de Gaulle Airport, Paris in December 1995, where she joined a group of her globally dispersed childhood friends and their spouses to celebrate the coming New Year. Their high-spirited reunion unfortunately ended with an unforeseen disruption at the departure gates, where an airline representative barred one of the American foreign residents in the group from boarding his flight to the US, claiming that he lacked the proper travel documentation. As a consequence of the US federal government shutdown which dragged on for eleven days between 16 December 1995 and 6 January 1996, her friend’s departure to the US was derailed by an airline check-in agent, who acted as a proxy of the American state in France, scrutinizing the visas and travel documents of all US bound passengers that day. Without recourse and lacking due process, this seemingly arbitrary and unanticipated interruption in her mate’s travel schedule prompted Lahav to ponder the disturbing implications of the burgeoning role of private sector gatekeepers like airlines, and eventually other non-state actors such as university officials, employers, and hospital administrators, in sorting citizens from migrants at the various stages of human mobility, including those of migrant entry, stay, and exit. Located at the intersection between human mobility and human rights, the engagement of these non-state actors in the migration process and, particularly, their increasing authority to regulate the flow of persons across national xv

xvi

Preface and Acknowledgements

borders seriously undermined, in her mind, many of the key norms, policies, and practices of the liberal immigration and human mobility regime that had hitherto prevailed during the post-WWII period. Despite the personal inconveniences imposed by such impediments to travel, Lahav is eternally grateful to the Helmers and Darvasis (especially to Amit, and the late Ariel) for their practical professional insights and so much more. From that point forward, the liberal state’s adoption of exceptional and even draconian practices in managing human mobility only accelerated. Its formal operationalization of security norms regarding human mobility regulation precipitated the proliferation of gatekeepers at all points of entry and stay. It spurred an exponential growth in the number of new actors enlisted by the state in the service of an ever-expanding migration policy playing field. The business of sorting the vast universe of people on the move has exponentially grown since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, the infamous shoe bomber episode two months later, and the terrorist incidents which followed at other transportation hubs like Brussels, London, Madrid, and Paris. In this ‘new security’ era, human mobility regulations have been increasingly linked to national security concerns which have severely compromised rights and even market priorities. With the generous financial support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Lahav applied her normative concerns about securitization to her scholarly investigations of the changing migration gatekeepers and shifting liabilities across Europe and the US. Transcending the analytical framework that she had developed on the state previously, she set out to identify the central causes and consequences of the liberal state’s devolution of many of its responsibilities for managing immigration to non-central state actors. Her objective was to explain the role of the security driver in influencing the trajectory of political party competition on immigration-related issues and, more importantly, immigration policy outcomes across the liberal states. Along the way she became indebted to many accommodating a­ cademic hosts who facilitated the project’s development. The scholars affiliated with the Robert Schuman Center at the European University Institute in Fiesole, Florence provided her with a lifetime of treasured ­inspiration and insights. She is especially grateful to Luciano Bardi, Helen ­Wallace, ­ éritier, Martin Philippe Fargues, Philippe Schmitter, Adrienne H Rhodes, Rachel Epstein, Elena Jileva, Filipa de Sousa, and the late Peter Mair for their f­ riendship and fellowship. She is also indebted to Virginie Guiraudon whose close collaboration on earlier projects inspired her to inquire more deeply into the mechanisms driving the new migration ­policy playing field and the values and norms underpinning it. Lahav’s research and thinking about the project were also enriched during her residence at the Swiss Forum for Migration and Mobility Studies

Preface and Acknowledgements

xvii

(SFM), at the University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland. There she reunited with her former German–American Academic Council (GAAC) ‘young scholar’ classmate, Gianni D’Amato, who hosted her under the most delightful conditions at the vibrant SFM Center he has prominently led as part of the Swiss National Science Foundation’s NCCR-On the Move program. Her roommate, Nicole Wichtman, and office mates, Didier Ruedin, Denise Efionayi-Mäder, Rosita Fibbi, and Robin Stünzi, made her research as stimulating as the beautiful walks and lunches they enjoyed together. So too, did her many Swiss colleagues, especially Sandra Lavenex, Christin Achermann, Ola Söderström, Janine Dahinden, Mihaela Nedelcu, and Laurence Crot whose respective wisdoms were generously extended. She is also grateful to Nadja Rinchetti and Elena Pascale for sharing their spaces, families, and meals, as well as the guidance and encouragement they provided during her fieldwork. The project was also enhanced by time Lahav spent at Tel Aviv University, Israel and particularly because of the generous hospitality of Noah LewinEpstein, Moshe Semyonov, Yossi Shain, Anastasia Gorodzeisky, Michal Shamir, Azar Gat, Tal Sadeh, Hanna Lerner, the late Avi Beker, as well as the members of its resourceful staff, Maya Politis Ginzburg and Yonit Shahar, and the exceptional graduate students in the International Migration program and the Political Science ­Department, especially Orni Livny and Adi Hercowitz-Amir. They not only shared their expertise about the notable Israeli case regarding the security challenges posed by migration and human mobility for liberal democratic policy makers, but their grounded approach to investigating such a sensitive subject was inspiring. In Israel, Gal Ariely, Orit Hochman, Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom, and Jack Jedwab (from Canada) were terrific collaborators who encouraged Lahav to refine her threat politics model and apply it the politics of immigration more generally. She is also thankful to two renowned scholars in the field, Rivka Reichman and Sergio Della Pergola, who introduced the Israeli case to students of migration, as well as the Ruppin Academic Center, and particularly, Shosh Arad and Karin Amit. They have considerably expanded the professional networks and scholarship in the field by developing, organizing, and advancing regular educational programs for a meeting of the minds in the maturing research stream of international migration. So too did the many scholars on the American west coast who graciously welcomed Lahav during the book’s final production. She is grateful to Jack Citrin, as well as the Immigration Policy Lab (IPL) at Stanford University, and the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS) at the University of California, San Diego for hosting her, especially David Laitin, Adam Lichtenfeld, David FitzGerald, Claire Adida, Warren Tam, and the great researchers there. Many other professional colleagues also influenced the course and contents of the project. Martin Schain, Gary Freeman, Asher Arian, and

xviii

Preface and Acknowledgements

Aristide Zolberg particularly shaped both authors’ perspective regarding the unique contributions political scientists and behaviourists can make to the study of international migration. Lahav would be remiss if she didn’t acknowledge her home academic institution, Stony Brook University, and especially its Political Science Department. She is not only grateful to her faculty colleagues, Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Jeffrey Segal, Frank Myers, and Mathew Lebo, for their professional support and life friendship, but also to the outstanding student research assistants who contributed to the project. She is especially thankful to Daniella Alva, Brandon Bennes, Robert Bird, Ellen Birk, Bowen Cho, Marie Courtemanche, Samuel Jens, Akhtra Khan, Patrick Lown, Sen Payel, Joseph Sandor, Zachary Truelson, Yamil Velez, Johanna Willman, and Yangzi Zhao. Messina wishes to recognize the valuable contributions Sarah Thomas and Leslie Angus made in preparing the book’s bibliography and the resources provided by the John R. Reitemeyer endowment at Trinity College which defrayed the financial cost of their assistance. Both authors extend thanks to John Haslam of Cambridge University Press for his unwavering support and editorial guidance during the book project’s long gestation and to the anonymous reviewers for their insightful criticisms of the original manuscript and sage advice. We also extend our appreciation to Tobias Ginsburg, Robert Judkins, Carrie Parkinson, and Santhamurthy Ramamoorthy at the Press for their respective interventions in facilitating the production process. We assume responsibility for any errors in the book. Our personal debts are numerous. Lahav wishes to recognize the many people who offered emotional relief and sanity over the many months and years during which the project percolated and ultimately came to fruition. Like her venerable co-author, many congenial academic hosts and colleagues were not only precious teachers and gifted fellow researchers but became dear friends. Their unwavering support matched the contributions offered by the reliable and unshakeable cheers of many lifetime friends, neighbours, and family, especially members of her Zoomily and Fab 4 groups, as well as the wise Lurdes Potzenek, Jill Gross, and Karen Schwartz. Lahav is especially and forever indebted to her beloved husband, Michael, her children, Odeya, and Erez Rosenband, her mothers, Eva Meyerowitz and Rosalie Rosenband, and her sisters and their families – the Lieblings, Agmons, and Franklins. She also wishes to acknowledge the lessons she learned from her now deceased fathers, Eitan Lahav, Mike Meyerowitz, and Paul Rosenband, concerning the virtues of unadulterated truth and perseverance. Their lives continue to illuminate her own life’s path. Messina is particularly indebted to his best friend, colleague,

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xix

and wife of 43 years, Frances Hagopian, whose patience with him during the writing process was constantly tested. She repeatedly reminded him that the end of his labours was in sight and, in so doing, buoyed his spirits during the inevitable moments of frustration and discouragement. As always, she was his intellectual and emotional North Star.

1 Introduction

The Migration Trilemma

[T]he increasing love of well-being and shifting character of property make democratic peoples afraid of material disturbances. Love of public peace is often the only political passion which they retain, and it alone becomes more active and powerful as all others fade and die. This naturally disposes the citizens constantly to give the central government new powers, or to let it take them, for it alone seems both anxious and able to defend them from anarchy by defending itself. (de Tocqueville 1969: 671)

In its immediate response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States (US) closed its civilian airspace, and rerouted all passenger traffic to Canada, the latter which vacated its own skies to act as a proxy for its American neighbour. Code-named Operation Yellow Ribbon, Canadian officials grounded more than 255 planes across 17 of their country’s airports to allow potentially dangerous civilian aircraft to be diverted from their intended American destinations. Although extraordinary, the Canadian Government’s assistance to its North American neighbour on 11 September was but the initial step in accelerating the extensive international political cooperation and coordination that would become the norm among the formal gatekeepers of immigration and human mobility. It underscored the expansive degree to which contemporary liberal states are committed to cooperate with one another across global networks of trade, work, study, and travel.1 As we will see across the pages of this book, the events of 11 September specifically spurred the liberal states in Europe and the US to erect unprecedented domestic barriers to international migration and human mobility, restrictions that affected citizens and border crossers, including migrant workers, tourists, foreign students, asylum seekers, and refugees

1 Koslowski (2005: 529) argues that the grounding of commercial aircraft and implementation of strict border control measures by the Bush administration in response to the 11 September attacks resulted in ‘the US doing to itself what no enemy had done before: an embargo on trade’.

1

2

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

(Carrera and Bigo 2013; Koslowski 2011b; Zolberg 2001).2 For example, at a closed meeting of the EU Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers, and Asylum, on 26 October 2001, the head of the American delegation told EU Member State representatives that, ‘since the events of 11 September 2001, the whole system of visas, border control, and management of legal immigration had come under close scrutiny … [as] a need for a more effective system across the board, not targeted specifically at terrorism but taking the events of 11 September as the trigger for developing a new approach’ (Council of the European Union 2001). In pursuit of this mission, the liberal states recalibrated their m ­ igration equation, re-evaluated or redefined their ‘control’ mechanisms, and ­reassessed their normative priorities regarding immigration and human mobility.3 Among the immediate and universal policy responses by the ­liberal states were their imposition of stringent border restrictions and visa requirements, carrier and employer sanctions, accelerated migrant return policies, stricter migrant labour law enforcement practices, stronger work authorization and student verification procedures, accelerated detention and removal of criminal aliens, and the creation of territorial buffer zones and biometric databases.4 The traumatic terrorist events facilitated the expansion of what we label the ‘migration policy playing field’, an o ­ ngoing project that co-opts or coerces numerous non-central state actors to i­mplement and enforce the liberal state’s immigration and human mobility policies. In contrast to the early post-World War II (WWII) period when immigration was primarily framed as an economic and/or cultural issue (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and often 2

Immigration and human mobility have been framed differently in elite discourse (Koslowski 2011; Weinar et al. 2018). Generally, whereas immigration tends to be negatively framed as a problem or threat, human mobility tends to be positively portrayed as contributing to social capital and economic growth (Weinar et al. 2018: 2). Nevertheless, the two terms have been conflated since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, as states were forced to monitor all border flows and distinguish between citizens who enjoy the right to free movement, from those who do not possess this right, that is, non-citizens. For these reasons, some scholars have advocated for a more comprehensive framework that considers all types of international human mobility within a global mobility regime (see Koslowski 2018). 3 The emphasis shifted from ‘control’ associated with the implicit assumptions of ‘zero net immigration’ to the more selective notion of ‘management’ or ‘regulation’ of populations flows (de Haas et al. 2018; Helbling and Leblang 2018; Massey 2013; Meissner 2004). According to Meissner et al. (2013: 6), the last Director of the American Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), ‘the American Department of Homeland Security’s newly reinstated DHS’s adoption of a risk-management approach to border security has meant that the state’s objective is managing and not sealing borders’. 4 The 2001 American Patriot Act and 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act paved the path for enhanced visa screening, racial and ethnic profiling, and robust security checks at US ports of entry.

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

3

‘depoliticized’ by governments and mainstream political parties (Freeman 1979: 99–130; Messina 1989: 21–52; Schain 2008: 178–79; Simon 1989), the subject is now primarily framed as a public safety or national security concern ranking high on the political and policy agendas of liberal states (Hampshire 2009: 109; Rudolph 2006, 2017). The involvement of foreigners in planning and executing the terrorist attacks perpetrated in the US and Europe effectively consolidated an implied association between immigration and security. The 11 September 2001 and subsequent terrorist events in Europe during the 2000s brought to the fore a multiplicity of ‘new security’ threats that are now closely linked, however misleadingly, with immigration and human mobility.5 In the process, immigration-related issues were thrust onto the national security and foreign policy agendas of the liberal states in Europe and the US (Adamson 2006; Buonfino 2004; Geddes 2005; Givens et al. 2009; Pastore 2007; Rudolph, 2003, 2006; Greenhill 2016a; Koslowski 2001; Lahav 2003, 2006). In so doing, they reinforced the perception that the primary threats associated with immigration and human mobility, including ethnic conflict and terrorism, are linked to ‘new security’ issues which transcend state territorial boundaries, challenge societal security (Buzan 1983; Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1998), and elicit public anxiety (Papademetriou and Banaluescu-Bogdan 2016). In addition to altering the trajectory of state immigration policies, this book will argue that the events of 11 September also seriously challenged many of the assumptions underpinning the liberal immigration and human mobility regime which had hitherto prevailed during the post-WWII period (Hampshire 2009; Hollifield 1992). They specifically sparked apprehension among policy makers and their publics that open territorial borders and expansive immigration policies, the hallmarks of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Hollifield 1992), were in tension with the core responsibility of liberal states to provide public safety and national security. In contrast to the early post-WWII period when immigration was primarily framed by political elites and the media through the lenses of the economy and/or of civil and human rights (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and largely ‘depoliticized’ by governments and mainstream 5

See the proliferation of scholarship regarding immigration and security during the early 2000s (Adamson 2006; Aradau 2001; Bigo 2001; Bilgic 2013; Buonfino 2004; Burgess and Gutwirth 2011; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Chebel d’Appollonia 2008, 2012; Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich 2008, 2010; Collyer 2006; Croft 2012; Diez and Squire 2008; Faist 2006; Freedman 2004; Geddes 2001, 2005; Givens 2010; Ginsburg 2010; Guild 2009; Guild and Baldaccini 2006; Huysmans 2006; Kaya 2012; Rudolph 2006; Tirman 2004; van Munster 2009; Watson 2009).

4

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

political parties (Freeman 1979: 99–130; Messina 1989: 21–52; Schain 2008: 178–79; Simon 1989), the post-Cold War era is punctuated by the ascendance of immigration as a public safety and national security concern that ranks high on the political and policy agendas of the liberal states (Hampshire 2009: 109; Rudolph 2006). As a non-partisan Vox/ Morning Consult (2016) opinion survey revealed, Americans reported that they are far more anxious about public safety, specifically crime and terrorism, than jobs and the economy. Against this backdrop, the overarching objective of this book is to assess the capacity of the liberal states to manage immigration in a postCold War global threat environment. Toward this end, it raises and addresses two interrelated questions: To what extent can liberal states in Europe and the US reconcile the inherent contradictions of a migration trilemma that pits the values and imperatives of markets and the liberal state’s commitment to protect citizen and immigrant rights against the political pressures to circumscribe them? Is the capacity of liberal states to implement liberal immigration and immigrant policies severely constrained, as many scholars claim? In investigating and answering these questions, this book will illuminate the inherent trade-offs confronting liberal states whenever the requirements of the domestic economy (e.g., satisfying the demand of employers for foreign workers), protecting civil liberties (e.g., respecting due process and personal privacy),6 honouring humanitarian commitments (e.g., sheltering asylum seekers and refugees), and providing public safety and national security (e.g., averting terrorism and crime perpetrated by migrants) unavoidably conflict. Wedding studies of post-WWII migration to Europe and the US with the numerous insights of scholars working within and across the fields of international relations, comparative political behaviour, and political psychology, this book situates the migration trilemma, described below, within a dynamic threat context. It traces the processes by which the subject of immigration episodically has been politicized and securitized in Europe and the US since the end of the Cold War and the implications of these trends for the governance of human mobility and the future of the liberal order. The neo-institutionally inspired analytical framework of ideas, interests, and institutions, described below, links contemporary immigration policies and politics with the ‘soft’ or informal norms (de 6

Though we use the term civil liberties interchangeably with civil rights throughout the book, the former refers to freedom from government intervention (e.g., discrimination, privacy, due process, freedom of persons/movement), whereas the latter refer to rights extended to citizens by government (e.g., citizenship, residence, work). Broadly speaking, civil rights in immigration discourse refer to both universalistic (humanitarian) principles and social membership inclusion (Rodrìguez 2013).

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

5

Haas et al. 2018) that underpin them, such as public opinion and political discourse.7 Utilizing a variety of original and secondary sources, we delineate the effects of public safety and national security threat frames on issue salience, popular attitudes, political party politics and, ultimately, immigration policy outcomes. Adopting a dynamic perspective of the security driver as it conditions contemporary immigration policy outcomes offers a new perspective on the dominant mode of politics that influences the course of immigration politics and policies across the member states of the European Union (EU) during the current millennium.8 The book’s collective findings suggest that an immigration management regime now prevails across the liberal states that significantly deviate from the values, norms, policies, and practices of its more liberal predecessor. Moreover, it concludes that the immigration policies of the liberal states and, especially, those which govern the conditions of human mobility, have substantially converged and their burdens of managing immigration-related responsibilities have been substantially alleviated (Longo 2018). Contrary to the thesis that their immigration policy prerogatives are significantly circumscribed by the imperatives and norms of markets and/or rights (Hollifield 1992: 94, 2004; Hollifield et al. 2008; Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994), the evidence presented in this book’s chapters will demonstrate that the liberal states currently enjoy greater decision-making freedom than previously. By forging bilateral and multilateral policy agreements (Kunz et al. 2011; Lavenex 2006a) and devolving many of their responsibilities for implementing immigration and human mobility policy to non-central state actors (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 2006b), contemporary liberal states exercise considerable control over immigration and human mobility flows in the new security era. The tensions generated by the long-standing commitments of liberal states to simultaneously maintain free markets and respect for the rights 7

A neo-institutional lens links state immigration policies and practices with soft or subjective norms in ways that mirror what scholars of international relations describe as the soft power of global governance, including the ‘formal and informal bundles of rules, roles, and relationships that define and regulate [the] social practices of state and non-state actors’. 8 Given their relatively recent experiences with immigration and, consequently, the subject’s historically lower salience in the post-2004 EU enlargement countries (European Commission/Eurobarometer 2006a), we largely exclude the latter from our analyses and instead focus on the EU-15 member states in this book. Our cross-national analyses of public opinion reveal a significant difference (p < 0.05) between EU average salience among the EU fifteen- and twenty-seven-Member State countries. On average, 18 per cent of pre-2004 EU member publics reported immigration was salient compared to 13 per cent when the twelve post-2004 member states were included. Central and East Europeans exhibit considerably greater social distancing from immigrants than populations from European countries with comparatively longer experience of immigration ˇ ermáková and Leontiyeva 2017; Lehne 2019; Peshkopia et al. 2022). (C

6

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

of migrants have been explored by numerous scholars (Boswell 2007; Boswell and Geddes 2011; Etzioni 2004; Hollifield 1992; Joppke 1998a, 1998b; Roos and Laube 2015; Sasse 2005). However, hitherto the normative and psychological dimensions of the contemporary politics of immigration have been largely ignored. Scholars of the politics of immigration especially have underestimated the influence of political elites and the media (Atwell Seate and Mastro 2016) in shaping norms and policy outcomes. They have discounted the extent to which public discourse and public opinion circumscribe contemporary immigration and human mobility policy in a perceived public safety and/or national security threat environment. Furthermore, the myriad ways in which non-central state actors contribute to the liberal state’s immigration control agenda have been insufficiently explored. The numerous subnational, international, supranational, and private spaces where immigration and human mobility policies are formulated and implemented have been largely undertheorized. It is in these spaces, we argue, that the implementation of policies pertaining to immigration and human mobility are devolved to non​-central state actors in a process in which state sovereignty is partially, albeit unevenly, ‘pooled’ (Cerny 2010: 54; Krasner 1999, 2004). Rectifying these oversights is one of the major objectives of this book. I

Immigration as a New Security Threat

To many scholars of contemporary immigration (Manges Douglas and Sáenz 2013; Woods and Arthur 2014), the tumultuous events of and following 11 September marked a ‘critical juncture’9 in the evolution of public and political discourse about immigration and human mobility within the liberal states. Although political discussion about these 9 Critical junctures are ‘events and developments in the distant past, generally concentrated in a relatively short period, that have a crucial impact on outcomes later in time’ (Capoccia 2015; Capoccia and Keleman 2007). Political economists and sociologists often refer to critical junctures in explaining collective behaviour pertaining to structural transformations to changes in societal attitudes. According to Pierson (2000), critical junctures can radically modify the geopolitical landscape, and alter the policy paths future decision makers choose. Public policy scholars also refer to ‘focusing events’ as providing insights into the post-crisis policy formation process (Birkland 1997). Defined as events that are sudden, relatively uncommon, harmful, concentrated in specific geographic areas or community of interests, and known to policy makers and publics simultaneously (Birkland 1998), they catapult previously neglected issues to the top of the public policy agenda (Birkland 2004). In this sense, the European equivalent of the focusing event of 11 September occurred with the 11 March 2004 Madrid bombings and the 7 July 2005 London bombings. Though years apart and following different policy contexts and a trajectory of historical explanations, the cases are linked by their association to foreign networks, and expression in public discourse on national security (Lahav 2010).

I  Immigration as a New Security Threat

7

subjects was often impassioned and contentious before 11 September 2001, its tenor nevertheless became decidedly more illiberal (Berezin 2009) thereafter.10 Indeed, the mass media and politicians across Europe and in the US have not only been more inclined to identify immigration as a serious problem post-11 September, but also an existential threat (Claude-Valentin 2004; Faist 2002) associated with terrorism (Chacón 2006; Wadhia 2018) and national security (Kerwin 2005; Rudolph 2003). For example, in a conspicuous departure from precedence, ‘war’ has displaced in elite discourse alternative terms that had previously described terrorist atrocities perpetrated in other settings (Montgomery 2005: 176).11 Echoing in many ways the mass and elite hysteria aroused by the ‘Red Scare’ in the US during the early 1920s, the events of 11 September have indeed triggered what sociologists describe as a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen 1973), or a significant cause for concern that ‘need not bear a close relationship with the concrete harm or damage that the condition poses or causes’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009: 149).12 In the former instance, communists, and in the latter, Muslims, were framed rhetorically as ‘dangerous others’ and scapegoated as endangering the American way of life and posing an imminent threat to public safety and national security (Kerwin 2005; Rudolph 2006; Salehyan 2008, 2009). In this climate immigration has shifted from a ‘low’ politics issue, or one focused on its economic and/or social effects, to a matter of ‘high’ politics with implications for public safety, national security, and foreign affairs (Geddes 2003: 3). Prior to 11 September, political discourse about immigration, asylum, and the mass immigrant settlement of ethnically and racially diverse minorities often aroused economic and cultural fears within the public. However, it was not until the public’s anxieties about ‘societal security’ (Wæver 1998) and quality of life issues (Alexseev 2005: 66–67) intersected with its fears about immigration as a threat to public safety and national security during the 1990s (Huysmans 2002: 752) 10 That immigration and terrorism were so quickly conflated in the aftermath of 11 September, in the absence of substantial political dissent (Hammerstad 2011), underscored the extent to which it had already been subsumed within a discourse of unease and fear (Huysmans 2006). 11 In Israel, for example, the discourse around African asylum seekers became embedded in laws about ‘infiltrators’, a military term that has been associated with Palestinian terrorists since the 1950s (Hochman 2015). 12 Resonating with an earlier and darker period in American history involving the infamous trial of Italian anarchists and communist immigrants, Sacco and Vanzetti, during the ‘Red Scare’ of the early 1920s, the fixation with migration triggered what sociologists described as a moral panic (Cohen 1973), a fear that a person, group, or related episode are sources of evil which threaten societal well-being.

8

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

that the social construction of immigration as an issue for public safety and national security became embedded within the domestic politics of the liberal states (Lahav and Messina 2005).13 In doing so, immigration became a valence issue, similar to crime or poverty, about which voters and major political parties chiefly agree or have a common preference (Stokes 1963; Putnam 1973).14 In this vein, it is easy for politicians of all backgrounds to support immigration enforcement measures, and difficult to oppose them. (Tichenor and Rosenblum 2011: 621). The elevated political salience of immigration and its ascent to the top of the public policy agenda across the liberal states post-11 September is noteworthy. They significantly deviate from its status during the postWWII, Bretton Woods era when the subject was ranked relatively low on the political and policy agenda (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011) and largely framed by the media and political elites as an economic and/ or social issue.15 At the apex of this earlier, more liberal period, state immigration policy was primarily driven by the interests of influential economic and political actors. Consequently, across the liberal states it purportedly fell under the influence of ‘client politics’ and was more expansive than most publics would have preferred (Joppke 1998b: 270). As we will argue in this book, current immigration policy outcomes no longer covary with a largely economic-driven client or distributive mode of politics but, rather, with an entrepreneurial mode (Freeman 2006). This, we argue, is the prevailing mode of politics across most liberal democratic states in the new security era. In this entrepreneurial mode the liberal state co-opts or coerces a plethora of non-central state actors from the private, international, and subnational sectors who have the economic, political, and/or technological resources to assist liberal states in circumscribing immigration and human mobility (Lahav 1998, 2003). Distinct from ‘non-state actors’ typically associated with civil society (Held 1993) or security governance (Bello 2017), non-central state actors include both public and private actors, who sit outside of national or central governments. Specifically, 13

With some exceptions (Doosje et al. 2009; Greenhill 2016a, 2016b; Helbling and Meierrieks 2020a; Jacobs et al. 2017; Malhotra and Popp 2012; Spilerman and Stecklov 2009), scholars have mostly focused on the physical threat posed by crime (Bigo 2016; Dinas and van Spanje 2011; Fitzgerald et al. 2012; Froestad et al. 2015; Raijman 2013; Semyonov 2013; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). 14 Putnam (1973: 112–13) suggests issues like crime and poverty do not involve competing interests among social groups, but rather, common problems afflicting the community as a whole. 15 During the early post-WWII period, political parties largely neglected or were indifferent towards immigration (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011; Messina 2007) and, consequently, it ranked low on the political and policy agenda.

II  Managing Contemporary Immigration and Human Mobility

9

actors such as airlines and transport companies, travel agencies, hospitals, universities, employer groups, local governments and foreign states have been co-opted in an expansive regulatory framework of immigration and border control (Lahav 2002, 2003, 2007; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 2006b). Variously referred to as ‘deputy sheriffs’ (Torpey 1998), ‘agents’ (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000), ‘tools of government’ (Bennett 2008) and public–private partnerships (Lahav 2008), airlines and transport companies, travel agencies, hospitals, universities, employer groups, local governments, and foreign states have been co-opted by the liberal state in a regulatory framework through the processes of ‘remote control’ (FitzGerald 2020; Zolberg 1999), delegation (Guiraudon 2000; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000), externalization (Boswell 2003; Lavenex and Uçarer 2002), outsourcing (Morris 2023; Mountz 2018), privatization (Lahav 1998, 2002, 2005; Menz 2010), and commercialization (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sø´ rensen 2013; Harney 1977; Koser 2007). In all cases, the relationship between liberal states and non-central state actors in pursuing security goals is driven by the former’s objective to better manage human mobility (Bigo 1996), and the latter’s aim to avert or minimize financial costs (Tichenor and Rosenblum 2011: 622), sanctions, or impediments to business operations. As we will see in Chapter 3, the liberal’s state’s security-driven migration agenda has been significantly facilitated by its co-optation or coercion of a plethora of non-central state actors who help it navigate and reconcile the inherent contradictions of the migration trilemma and, thus, achieve its preferred policy outcomes. II

Managing Contemporary Immigration and Human Mobility: The Trilemma

Sovereign states largely dictated the conditions under which foreigners entered and remained within their territories for most of the twentieth century. Indeed, with the introduction of the modern passport system during the 1920s, the state became the dominant actor in managing human mobility, thus allowing it to better exercise its sovereign authority and protect its citizens from possible physical harm perpetrated by external actors or forces (Torpey 1998, 2000).16 During this period, 16

Zolberg (2006a: 222), following de Vattel (1758), argues that controlling the entry of foreigners into its territory is the sine qua non of state sovereignty. Against this backdrop, the proliferation of regulations pertaining to human mobility since the twentieth century have spawned the erection of physical barriers and administrative checkpoints at the territorial borders of states and the creation of standardized documents such as passports to identify the nationality of border crossers (Torpey 1998)

10

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

non-central state actors played little role in formulating and implementing immigration and human mobility policy. However, the marginality of these actors to the processes of making and implementing policy began to change during the 1970s in Europe and the 1980s in the US. As Chapter 3 will document, liberal states have now devolved much of their decision-making authority regarding immigration and human mobility policy upwards to intergovernmental or international institutions, downwards to subnational governments, and outwards to private sector actors, including airlines, employers, and private security agencies (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). As we will argue in the chapter, by utilizing numerous and various remote-control strategies (FitzGerald 2020; Zaiotti 2016; Zolberg 1998, 1999), the liberal state has expanded its capacity to manage immigration and human mobility. The contemporary liberal state’s efforts to successfully devolve many of its responsibilities related to immigration and human mobility policy is nevertheless circumscribed on three fronts. First, it confronts numerous legal, constitutional, and normative hurdles, especially regarding its ambition to pursue an exclusionary policy course that abrogates the rights of migrants and refugees. These strictures include but are not limited to the pervasiveness of liberal values and norms within and across the liberal states (Hollifield 1992: 222–23) as well as their commitment to adhere to domestic and international human rights law (Sassen 1996: 63–105). Indeed, one need only contrast the pervasive practices of denaturalization, ‘round-ups’ of foreigners, and mass migrant deportations in Europe and the US at the turn of the nineteenth century to appreciate the revolution in liberal norms and practices that has occurred regarding state immigration policy since the beginning of the post-1945 liberal epoch (Weil 2013; Wong 2015).17 Second, the states that are most committed to facilitating cross border trade, commerce, and tourism, that is liberal states, cannot easily embrace policies that unreasonably or indefinitely impede human mobility. Their long-standing commitments to free trade and rights protections are especially antithetical to the imposition of onerous border restrictions (Sassen 1996) that discriminate against and thus inhibit the movement of people across national borders (Haubrich 2003). Finally, the elevated salience of immigration during the new security era has catapulted the subject to the forefront of public discussion, thus pressuring political elites to discern and respond to the public’s views 17

Consider, for example, the massive expulsions of Poles and Jews from Prussia during the mid-1880s, or the passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act in the US. See Reinecke and Loehr (2020) for historians’ views of the reflexive turn in migration studies.

II  Managing Contemporary Immigration and Human Mobility

11

Rights

Political Right

Political Left

Security

Markets

Figure 1.1  Migration trilemma: Markets, rights, and security

when formulating and implementing policy. While the liberal state’s devolution of many of the responsibilities for managing immigration to non-central state actors is not necessarily incompatible with the public’s general policy preferences, it is nevertheless the case that it is not always so. For example, as we will see in Chapter 2, the liberal state’s considerable investment in and expansion of the migration policy playing field, despite its numerous successes, has not abated the political advance of Extreme Right-Wing Parties (ERWPs) whose supporters continue to clamour for greater political voice and ever restrictive immigration and human mobility policies. Transcending these constraints has been complicated by the destabilization of the immigration political and policy equilibrium which prevailed across the liberal states during the post-WWII period. As represented in Figure 1.1, this equilibrium implied that the liberal state’s pursuit of the major objectives of the three dimensions of state immigration policy – markets, rights, and security – could occur in relative decision-making isolation; that is, the state’s policy decisions along one dimension of immigration did not much affect or circumscribe those of others (Lahav and Messina 2015; Messina 2016: 240–41). However, since the end of the Cold War and especially post-11 September, the validity of this premise has been irrevocably shaken, as the security

12

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

dimension has almost universally become more salient for policy and politics than that of markets and rights.18 Because of the 11 September attacks and their continuing political aftershocks, the commitments of policy makers to maintain relatively open borders and generous immigrant policies are now perceived by many, if not most, of their constituents to conflict with their core responsibility to ensure public safety and national security.19 The three dimensions of the migration trilemma thus represent a triad of competing interests and values which policy makers in all the liberal states must reconcile in the new security era, although one dimension can be, and often is, prioritized over the others at different points in time. Figure 1.1 indicates that the strongest gravitational pull for political Left partisans and mainstream political parties is their long-standing commitment to protecting and expanding rights. On the one hand, the proclivity of the contemporary mainstream Left to conditionally embrace free markets (Bacchus 2020) has always coexisted with its more robust ideological commitment to defend the civil liberties of citizens and the rights of immigrants (Dancygier and Margalit 2020: 739; Freeman 1979). On the other, the natural ideological proclivity of political Right partisans and mainstream political parties is to promote free markets, state sovereignty, public safety, and national security. A reflexively stronger supporter of free markets than the Left, the political Right is nevertheless conflicted whenever the values of and the domestic interests invested in free markets conflict with its commitments to public safety and national security and aversion to cultural pluralism (Dancygier and Margalit 2020: 739). The security axiom highlights the intrinsic ideological cross-­pressures and values trade-offs facing publics and politicians regarding the ­management of borders, immigration, and human mobility. Though the Left is inclined to prioritize rights over security over the long term, as we will show in Chapters 5 and 6, they converge with the Right on the need for stronger border controls and, generally, on many if not most ­immigration-related issues in the near aftermath of terrorist-related or public safety threatening events (English et al. 2016). The politicization 18

A prominent example of the operationalization of this trend was the transfer of most of the functions on the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to three new entities – the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) – within the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) post-11 September. 19 Moreover, facilitated by political pressures exerted by anti-immigration political actors and ERWPs, the previous and mostly positive political and public discourse regarding immigration and human mobility has been displaced by a far more negative and disquieting one (Weiner et al. 2018).

III Questions

13

and securitization of immigration made it a potent cross-cutting issue (Enns and Ramirez 2018; Neiman et al. 2006; Tichenor 2008: 1; Tichenor and Rosenblum 2011), exacerbated the tendency of political parties to straddle the traditional liberal-conservative divide (Berkhout et al. 2015; Tichenor 2002), and distorted established patterns of political competition and behaviour (Helbling 2014; Ruedin 2017; Ruedin and Morales 2019; van der Brug et al. 2015). The triangulation among markets, rights, and security has mitigated traditional political alignments and destabilized the contemporary politics of immigration politics. As represented in Figure 1.1, the immigration issue often defies the traditional ordering principle since it is linked to various values and interests, which frequently follow different logics and pose different priorities for its regulation. In this context, the securitization of immigration has become instrumental to political parties in their appeal for support. The contemporary politics of immigration across the liberal states eventually evolved along what political behaviourists refer to as the ‘freedom versus order’ cleavage (Malka et al. 2017), a schism that potentially pits one set of values and interests against others. This clash between alternative values fosters political competition over which values should shape public policy (Arian 1995; Shamir and Shamir 1995). III Questions As cited above, this book’s main goal is to assess the ability of liberal states to reconcile the inherent tensions or trade-offs confronting policy makers when their commitments to public safety and national security objectives conflict with their long-established economic, humanitarian, and rights obligations. Following from this objective, the chapters in this book address three sets of questions. The first pertains to the opportunities for and constraints on the state’s management of immigration and human mobility whenever politics are primarily driven by a security imperative. Does a securitarian-driven policy agenda allow liberal states to manage immigration and human mobility more effectively? On what basis and to what degree can they persuade or coerce non-central state actors to assist it in formulating and implementing a more restrictive immigration regime? Moreover, can they successfully reconcile the conflicting values and interests inherent to the migration trilemma? Following from these policy challenges, a second set of questions asks whether the public supports trading off its civil liberties and those of migrants for the goals of enhancing public safety and national security. To what degree does the public embrace the onerous measures employed

14

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

by the liberal state’s restrictive immigration and human mobility regime and its contravention of liberal values? Given that the restrictive policies of the new migration policy playing field considerably abridge the civil liberties of and economically burden both citizens and migrants, why do most Europeans and Americans continue to tolerate them beyond the events that initially precipitated their adoption and implementation? A third set of questions addresses whether the migration trilemma impacts political party competition within the liberal states. For example, what is the impact of the heightened salience of immigration and the antecedent changes in the international and domestic security environments on political elite opinion as well as the immigration-related discourse and policies of mainstream political parties? As immigration has become more salient post-11 September, has it become less politically polarizing? Which is more prevalent in a new security world: interpolitical party convergence or competition on these issues? The collective answers to these and the above questions will illuminate the degree to which contemporary liberal states can manage immigration and human mobility effectively. IV

Immigration and Security: Contending Perspectives

Given that the concept of security pervades the pages of this book, it must be minimally defined before proceeding further. It is also necessary to briefly survey the various ways in which scholars have hitherto associated security with immigration. There is currently little scholarly consensus regarding how and to what degree the phenomenon of immigration intersects with public safety and national security. Until relatively recently, insufficient attention has been paid within the pertinent literature to the normative implications of the securitarian turn in the liberal state’s immigration management policy agenda. What is ‘security’ and in which ways have scholars associated it with the phenomenon of contemporary immigration? The meaning of the concept, as it has been applied to international and cross border affairs is varied (Baldwin 1997; Choucri 2002) and contested (Herington 2015:  29). Moreover, it has considerably evolved since the end of the Cold War. This said, in contrast to its original and almost exclusive association with the military, traditional defence matters, and protection of sovereign peoples and states within the international arena, the concept of security is now understood by most observers to include nearly every facet of human life, including the challenges confronting states to combat cross-border pollution, environmental degradation, and the spread of disease, drugs, and crime (Miller 2005; UN 2004).

IV  Immigration and Security: Contending Perspectives

15

As noted above, the association of immigration with security is not new. The two concepts were linked by scholars working within the ‘realist’ school of international relations during the 1980s. While Weiner (1985, 1993, 1995) was the first political scientist to explicitly make this association, several others nevertheless implied it in their study of refugees and American foreign policy (Mitchell 1992; Teitelbaum 1984; Zolberg 1981; Zolberg et al. 1989). This said, scholars of European politics have since expanded this linkage to include the cultural, existential, and societal dimensions of security (Chebel d’Appollonia 2010; Huysmans 1998; Wæver et al. 1993; Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001). The concept has been associated with societal security, or ‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats’ (Wæver 1993: 23). As we observe below, it has also been linked to demographic change (Goldstone et al. 2012; Koslowski 2000, 2001 Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001) and the welfare state (Bommes and Geddes 2000; Garand et al. 2015; Goodhart 2004; Wagle 2014). Four streams of scholarship offer different, and often conflicting, perspectives concerning the intersection of immigration and security: the realist or neo-realist paradigm; the school of interdependence, international political economy (IPE), or liberal-normative scholarship on human security; the constructivist paradigm within the field of international relations or critical security studies; and the scholarship on political behaviour and social psychology. Each provides a unique take on the liberal state’s role in providing security and managing immigration and the urgency by which it must do so. According to the realist paradigm, security first and foremost implies the state’s protection of its citizens from aggressive acts perpetrated by external actors, and particularly by foreign states. Perceived through this prism, security-related threats primarily are defined by and, hence, the preoccupation and responsibility of sovereign states (Waltz 1979). During the period of its ideational dominance within the political science subfield of international relations during the early post-WWII period, realism largely neglected the subject of immigration since it was perceived as peripheral to the competition for influence and power among states interacting within the international arena. This paradigm typically makes few or no distinctions among the different streams of and pressures for certain types of immigration or human mobility. Rather, realists assume that irregular migrants, foreign students, skilled workers, asylum seekers, and refugees are largely equivalent populations in the sense that the persons from all these streams are third-country nationals whose entry into the immigration receiving-societies should be restricted

16

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

by the state to ensure national security and stability (Rudolph 2006). This paradigm ignores or downplays the possibility that the liberal state’s decision-making prerogatives regarding immigration are circumscribed by public opinion and vary, depending upon the type of migrant group (e.g., high-skilled workers and asylum-seekers) involved, and the distinct interests of the state. Although neorealist scholars also assume that states are sovereign within the international arena, they nevertheless acknowledge that non-foreign state security threat sources exist, including threats emanating from various transnational actors such as migrants. Neorealist scholars thus blur the realist distinction between internal and external security threats (Andreas 2003; Rudolph 2006) and, in so doing, discard the assumption that the security of individual states can only be threatened by other states (Lavenex and Stucky 2011; Lavenex and Wichmann 2009; Miller 2000: 13; Simmons 2005, 2019). Consequently, they prescribe that the vigilant policing of its borders and its erection of barriers to prevent an inflow of unwanted persons are among the liberal state’s most important responsibilities (Andreas 2003; Guild and Bigo 2010; Rudolph 2006). Liberalists or students of interdependence, on the other hand, ­emphasize ‘human security’ in defining the concept of security as it pertains to immigration. They especially emphasize the liberal state’s responsibility to safeguard human rights and individual civil liberties, including the rights of all persons (citizens and non-citizens alike), to free speech, unfettered movement (Haubrich 2003), privacy, and ­freedom from physical harm.20 It is in this vein that the liberalist paradigm ­promotes the right of refugees and asylum seekers to seek and obtain the state’s protection (Lavenex 2001a, b). Thus, for liberalists, the liberal state’s policy prerogatives regarding immigration and human mobility are inherently circumscribed, since much of its responsibility for insuring human security must be devolved to the international community (Ikenberry 2012; Mearsheimer 2019), especially whenever the state is the primary cause of insecurity (Haaland Matlary 2008; King and Murray 2001; Rothschild 1995).21 For interdependence theorists (Keohane and Nye 2001), the realms of domestic and international security are inextricably linked and the 20

There are political cultural differences. In highly individualistic societies (e.g., US, Canada), privacy is limited to individual rights, sometimes at the expense of collective and communitarian rights (Zureik and Stalker 2005: 12). Because privacy is weighed against other common goods, it is never absolute (Etzioni 2004). 21 Consequently, individual rights rather than border security are the central concern of this school of thought. This school also prescribes states act as good ‘civic’ members within the international community.

IV  Immigration and Security: Contending Perspectives

17

contemporary state’s ability to project power beyond its borders does not primarily derive from its military prowess. Hence, theorists of interdependence perceive the pertinence of immigration for security as twofold: internally, regarding the state’s formulation and regulation of domestic immigration policy; and externally, regarding the liberal state’s interaction and cooperation with other states to resolve immigration-related conflicts and dilemmas (Helbling 2014). As this perspective implies, the intersection of immigration with other public policy domains often results in immigration-related outcomes that are influenced or mediated by exogenous developments, including those across the realms of markets and rights. Yet a third stream of scholarship, inspired by the school of social constructivism or critical security studies (Peoples and Vaughn-Williams 2015), posits the view that immigration less poses an objective than a socially constructed or subjective threat to the security of states and peoples (Balzacq 2010; Bigo 1996, 2001; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008, 2009; Buzan et al. 1998; Huysmans 2000, 2006; Wæver et al. 1993).22 According to students of the Copenhagen School of security studies, security lacks a fixed meaning, and thus it can be defined by its discursive rather than its objective content (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver et al. 1993). According to this school of thought, securitization is the process by which ostensibly non-security issues, such as immigration, are transformed into urgent security matters because of securitizing speech acts.23 The process of securitizing immigration is thus said to occur whenever self-interested actors – usually but not exclusively the mass media and political elites (Caviedes 2015; Doty 2000: 73) – adopt discourses that frame immigrants as an existential, material, and/or public safety threat (Diez 2005; Diez and Squire 2008; Huysmans 2000: 752; Karyotis 2007; Kiçinger 2004). Political elites and security professionals are perceived by students of critical security studies as manipulating the public’s perception of security to serve their economic, political, and/ or social ends. Implied in this perspective is the assumption that the media and elites securitize immigration in a deliberate and calculated manner. According to Wæver (1995: 54), ‘by definition, something is a security problem when elites declare it to be so’. Bigo (2001) further 22

According to Lowi’s (1964) the key issue is how relevant actors perceive the stakes in particular policies and then define the terms of debate. Accordingly, ‘adversaries may seek to shape public discussion to turn a policy normally perceived as distributive into one that is understood to entail redistribution, thus mobilizing new constituencies of demobilizing others’ (Freeman 2006: 242) 23 The ‘securitization-of-immigration’ thesis has been advanced by many studies which focus on surveillance, security measures, and policing (Bigo 2002, 2016).

18

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

argues that the securitization of immigration is largely determined by the political games of Western democracies, the media games that influence politicians, and the bureaucratic practices that stoke popular fear in the service of inflating government budgets. While acknowledging that objective security threats to states and peoples exist, constructivists nevertheless perceive the process of securitizing immigration as largely inter-subjective (Lahav et al. 2014) in the sense that for a securitizing actor to mobilize her/his target audience, the latter must accept the legitimacy of the securitizing actor’s claims (Balzacq 2005). Once such claims are widely accepted as valid, decision makers can extricate these issues from the sphere of conventional politics and policy making. In this way, they transfer them to the realm of emergency  politics where they can be expeditiously resolved outside of the normal policymaking process (Hampshire and Saggar 2006). This said, the discourse or ‘speech acts’ of elites are purported to resonate with the public mood.24 Consequently, the liberal state’s management of immigration and human mobility is assumed to be consonant with a society’s widely held norms and values (Checkel 1999; Roos and Zaun 2014). A fourth stream of scholarship intersects with constructivism in emphasizing the psychological underpinnings of the process of securitizing immigration (Alkopher 2015; Kinnvall 2004; Kinnvall and Lindén 2010; Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2009, 2011b). Specifically, this stream investigates the ontological insecurities and existential anxieties which motivate elites to securitize and essentialize their collective identity perceptions and, in turn, adopt restrictive immigration and refugee policies (Börzel and Risse 2018; Bruter 2001; Kinnvall 2004; Olesker 2014).25 Alkopher and Blanc (2017), for example, explore the psychological underpinnings of elite responses to the immigration-related identity crises and reactions that precipitate their adoption of different identity management strategies and, consequently, different acculturation/cultural immigrant integration policies. Based on her investigation of the EU’s and its member states’ responses to the 2015 refugee crisis, Alkopher (2018: 329) concludes that the manner in which individual states ‘respond to immigration-related ontological and societal insecurity is socio-psychologically dynamic and subject to internal change and difference in behaviours between states’. 24

The ‘public’ consists of academics (Huysmans 2006: 46), media discourse (Bigo 2009: 586) and the pertinent scholarly literature on immigration (Caviedes 2017). 25 Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking (2011) expand the spectrum of the socio-psychological reactions to ontological/societal insecurity, developing the idea of identity strategies adopted by the majority as well as Muslims in response to the structural and cultural characteristics of citizenship regimes, patterns of immigration, and political cultures.

V  An Immigration Threat Politics Paradigm

19

In focusing on the behaviour of elites and publics, political psychologists and behaviourists offer complementary perspectives to those of international relations scholars on the role of security in influencing immigration-related outcomes. Assuming popular attitudes and norms influence political behaviour and immigration policy outcomes (Citrin et al. 1997; Fetzer 2000; Lahav 2004b; Quillian 1995), scholars provide diverse disciplinary interpretations of the impact of threat perceptions on migration thinking and policy preferences. According to social and political psychologists who study individual level policy behaviour, attitudes and preferences towards out-groups are largely influenced by threat perceptions (Bobo 1983; Branton and Jones 2005; Huddy 2001; Levine and Campbell 1972; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Wright and Esses 2019). Studies of aggregate trends have corroborated the myriad threat perceptions attached to out-groups, as they inform exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants and foreigners (Esses et al. 2001; Semyonov et al. 2004; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Stephan et al. 1998). These findings provide a standpoint by which to disaggregate and evaluate the concept of securitization and its effects on the course of policy preferences and output. V

An Immigration Threat Politics Paradigm

Our security driven perspective on the politics of immigration offers a macro-view of the central role of threat framing in explaining the recent restrictive and illiberal turn in immigration politics in the liberal states. Inspired by the numerous insights generated by the perspectives cited above and especially those springing from the political psychology and comparative behaviour scholarly literature, we assume that political elites and publics mutually shape the parameters of policy choice. An immigration threat politics paradigm, presented in ­Figure 1.2, suggests that issue frames are a major, albeit an indirect and nonexclusive, driver of immigration politics and contemporary immigration policy outcomes. The chain of causation represented in the figure indicates that the manner in which immigration-related issues are framed by the media and political elites, especially in the wake of either a subjective or an objective security threat event, such as 11 September in the US or the bombings of 11 March 2004 in Madrid and 7 July 2005 in London, largely determines whether and to which degree they are salient for citizens. Moreover, once these issues are highly salient and/or politicized, they are filtered through a prism of interactive attitudinal influences, including an individual’s ideological and/or partisan orientation, dominant norms,

20

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma Liberal/ Expansive Policies

Media/Political Elites

Objective/ Subjective Security Threat(s)

Threat Frame Economy Rights/Culture Physical Safety

Issue Salience

Attitudinal Influences Ideology Partisanship Values/Norms Emotions

Policy Preferences

Public Opinion

Party Politics

Illiberal/ Restrictive Policies

Figure 1.2  Immigration threat politics paradigm

values, and emotions (Schlueter and Davidov 2013) which, in turn, inspire the latter to support general policy preferences. The electorate’s collective perception of and policy preferences regarding immigration subsequently inform and influence how mainstream political elites and parties consider and discuss the issue and, when in government, formulate and adopt either predominantly liberal or restrictive policies.26 In deviating from a static, elite-driven model of decision making, our immigration threat politics model assumes that public discourse and opinion impact the course of immigration and human mobility policy in a new security world (Levy et al. 2016; Morales et al. 2015b; Scheepers et al. 2002). Moreover, it suggests that political elites and publics interactively establish the parameters and content of policy. As Chapter 6 will argue, the two sides are entwined in an interdependent influence relationship in which each camp’s perspective on immigration-related issues, and particularly its perception of its salience, influences and reinforces those of the other. Our immigration threat politics paradigm thus elevates to the fore what constructivists refer to as the soft norms underpinning state immigration policy and practices, thus challenging the usefulness of paradigms that ignore or minimize the importance of societal norms and public opinion in explaining immigration policy outcomes.27 This paradigm identifies the attitudinal foundations that 26

The application of framing selection to norms has shown that, under certain conditions, norm conformity (e.g., civic duty) transcends rationality or cost-benefit calculi (Kroneberg et al. 2010). especially concerning liberties and rights (Kellstedt et al. 2019). Roos and Laube’s (2014) study of the EU found that collective actors draw on liberal cosmopolitan norms to critique domestic policies that regulate global mobility. They argue that actors’ interpretation of key norms such as equality, hospitality and social justice varies significantly. See also Leach and Zamora (2006). 27 Norms are socially bounded individual attitudes that either are subjective or objective (Fishbein and Ajzen 2011). Scholars distinguish between regulative norms which constrain behaviour, constitutive norms which shape interests, and prescriptive norms

VI  Key Concepts

21

support the adoption of the most restrictive and illiberal immigration policies during the post-WWII era. VI

Key Concepts: Issue Salience, Polarization, Politicization, and Securitization

Given their import for the analyses presented throughout this book, and particularly their centrality to the phenomenon of threat framing (Höglinger et al. 2012; Stephan et al. 2005) it is necessary to define, however briefly, the concepts of issue salience, polarization, politicization, and securitization. Each of these concepts, we argue, are central to understanding the effects of threat framing on contemporary immigration and human mobility policy across the liberal states. Issue salience is a multi-faceted concept that is often measured by analyses of parliamentary roll-call vote patterns (Hix et al. 2007, 2009; Ivaldi et al. 2016), the content of political party manifestos (Dancygier 2012; Dancygier and Margalit 2020; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Lehmann and Zobel 2018a, 2018b; Livny 2020; Morales et al. 2015b; Odmalm 2014; Ruedin 2017; Volkens et al. 2016) or policy texts (Laver and Garry 2000; Laver et al. 2003), the breadth of coverage the mass media affords an issue (Epstein and Segal 2000: 6), and/or the findings of public opinion surveys. Although its meaning is invariably underspecified (Dennison 2019), sensitive to measurement or instrument differences (Wlezien 2005), and contested by scholars, we employ the term here to include personal and public issue attachment. Simply defined, issue salience is the degree to which an individual or a group perceives a particular subject as important relative to others, for themselves, or for their country or community. Moreover, as Paul and Fitzgerald (2021: 373) have observed, salient issues are those about which individuals have more easily retrievable attitudes. According to Boswell (2019: 23) political salience is ‘the level of attention devoted to the issue in political debate – as measured by, for example, mass media coverage and political claims-making – as well as the importance of the issue for voters’.28 In this view, political salience includes the weight individuals assign to their perceived distance on an issue from a particular which prescribe what actors ought to do. The effects of norms can be determined by a logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences; the former entails that actors follow norms because it is socially appropriate, and the latter as a result of cost-benefit calculations (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 28 Personal salience refers to issue attachment, which may or may not coincide with polarization (Givens and Luedtke 2004; Roos 2018; Ruedin 2015; van der Brug et al. 2015). Although scholars often refer to salience as having a broader political relevance

22

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

political candidate or party (Bernstein 1995: 488). Consequently, when an issue, such as immigration, is highly salient politically, it will likely influence individual vote choice (Franklin and Wlezien 1997: 350) and, in turn, motivate one or more political parties to define it as an ‘urgent’ problem.29 Polarization, in contrast, inherently suggests divisiveness. Policy polarization is the degree to which citizens and/or political parties hold contradictory values and/or opinions on an issue, as well as the process by which their differences increase over time. Policy polarization is the process whereby extreme views on matters of public policy become increasingly prevalent across political parties and/or among voters (McCarty 2019). On both scores, polarization, as we will see throughout the pages of this book, is founded on belief or value differences. Consequently, whether citizens, political elites, and/or political parties are polarized on matters of immigration and human mobility primarily results from their subjective perceptions of a set of circumstances or events and, thus, does not necessarily or directly follow from their objective experiences. Politicization is the elevated political salience of an issue, as measured by the level of elite and public attention given to it, and the high level of political contestation or polarization over it (Boswell 2007).30 An issue is politicized within the realm of political party competition when it is both salient within the electorate and two or more political parties explicitly stake out opposite positions on it (Messina 1989: 126–49; van der Brug et al. 2015: 4–9).31 Politicization is thus a ‘top-down process, in which government parties play an especially important role’ (Hutter et al. 2016; Van der Brug et al. 2015: 195). This book’s primary concern pertains to the ways immigration and human mobility are politicized as well as with its causes and consequences. Particularly consequential is the degree to which politicization often expands the parameters of public and political in society, we use the term here to include personal and public issue attachment (as personally significant and relevant to public behaviour/agenda). Political psychological studies of electoral behaviour have shown that attitude accessibility is more closely associated with the personal salience of an issue than its perceived national importance (Duncan and Stewart 2005; Krosnick 1988; Lavine et al. 1996). 29 Popular attitudes about the ‘most important problem’ is the most common measure of issue salience. Some scholars criticize this measure and favour survey questions which do not force respondents to choose only a single issue (Bèlanger and Meguid 2008; Wlezien 2005). 30 Birkland (1997) suggests that politicization must be preceded by public, political discourse. Such discourse oftentimes spawns popular demands for policy change. 31 Some scholars (Iyengar 2016; Poole and Rosenthal 1997) measure political party polarization as the difference between major parties on the left-right dimension as reflected by the DW-Nominate score, a measure of ideological distance between them, in roll call votes (ranging from liberal extreme of −1 to conservative extreme of 1). Conversely, Muste (2014) focuses on measures of policy extremism or inter-social group hostility.

VII  Ideas, Interests, and Institutions

23

discourse on an issue (Messina 1989; Triandafyllidou 2000) and influences popular values and institutional norms. Securitization, like polarization, is a process or strategy that involves a relationship of influence between political elites and the public. As we observed above, when a political issue is securitized, it is presented by the media and/or by political elites as a pressing matter for public safety and/or national security. In the context of immigration, securitization can be understood as the discursive and institutional presence of the subject regarding matters of defence, policing, and/or border control (Bourbeau 2017). An immigration-related issue therefore is securitized when a critical share of the public generally agrees on the nature of the threat it poses and supports the state’s adoption of extraordinary measures to combat or resolve it (Eroukhmanoff 2015, 2018). In defining securitization in this way, we heed Bourbeau’s (2011) advice not to conflate the politicization with the securitization of immigration. Rather, we assume that the two are independent phenomena that imply somewhat different and often inter-active relationships between political elites and their publics (Dennison and Geddes 2020; Givens and Luedtke 2004; Roos 2019; Ruedin 2015; van der Brug et al. 2015; van der Brug and Berkhout 2015). VII

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: A Neo-institutional Analytical Framework

Considering the thesis of neo-institutionalists (Hall 1997; Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 1999; Thelen and Steinmo 1992) that interests, ideas, and institutions constrain political action, we must consider the institutional developments, as well as the ideas, norms, culture, identities, and discourse, associated with a changed security context. In forging a dialogue between critical security international relations theorists and comparative behaviourists, our analytical framework, described below, goes beyond formal rules (e.g., policies, institutions) and considers the informal norms (e.g., attitudes, discourse) or the subjective attitudes that constructivists refer to as soft norms underlying migration policy practices. In doing so, we address the long-standing ambition of comparativists to isolate the macroscopic context (i.e., rules, norms, institutions, and other social structures) within which individual behaviour occurs and is linked to policy preferences and outcomes (Lowi 1970: 314). Our neo-institutional framework thus allows us to disaggregate the formal institutions, policy orientations, actors, and sites of the management of immigration against the evolving soft norms and ground practices (de Haas et al. 2018), including public discourse, opinion, and political party

24

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

Table 1.1  Immigration paradigms, institutions, non-central state actors, and policy proclivity

Paradigm Era Markets

Rights

Security

Frame

Dominant Actors

Non-central State Actors (involvement)

Policy Proclivity

Post-WWII/ Labour Employers/ MNCs/GATT Inclusionary Bretton Requirements Trade (voluntary) Woods Unions System Courts/Ethnic NGOs/IGOs/ Inclusionary Post-WWII/ Protection of Geneva Human/ and Civic INGOs Refugee Immigrant Groups (voluntary) Regime Rights Post-1989/ Threats to Law Private/Local/ Exclusionary Fall of Iron National Enforcement/ International Curtain or Societal Intelligence/ (coerced) Security Bureaucracy

Source: Freeman (2006: 230).

politics that define the management of immigration since the end of the Cold War. It offers a dynamic analytical model to evaluate the formal institutional shifts related to migration regulation, linking them to informal or soft norms, as reflected in changing values, attitudes, and norms. Changes in formal (policies, institutions, actors) and informal structures (norms, discourse, attitudes), we suggest, circumscribe the strategic choices that are available to decision makers, and reconfigure the goals and ideas that animate political action (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 27). It is in this vein that Table 1.1 situates the politics of post-WWII immigration within their appropriate historical settings and decisionmaking logics and delineates the relations among the different immigration paradigms, historical periods, dominant policy frames, major institutional actors, involvement of non-central state actors, and proclivities of state immigration policy across Europe and the US. As the table suggests, the ascension of security as the dominant immigration paradigm since the early 1990s follows in time the liberal state’s previous orientation toward markets and rights. As a result of this shift, the liberal state’s commitments to satisfy the labour requirements of domestic employers and protect immigrant rights have largely been neglected and displaced by its preoccupation with averting potential threats to public safety and national security. Taken together, these developments suggest the predominance of an exclusionary immigration and human mobility policy regime whose norms, policies, and practices significantly deviate from those of the previous, more liberal

VIII  Plan of the Book and Chapter Overview

25

regime. In this new regime domestic interest groups and the judiciary have been displaced in importance by law enforcement, intelligence, and other security-oriented agencies and actors. VIII

Plan of the Book and Chapter Overview

The book’s organization is guided by the chain of causation among the variables represented in our immigration threat politics paradigm. It is inspired by the imperative to reevaluate, from a dynamic, securitarian perspective, the usefulness of paradigms that represent the immigration and human mobility policies of the contemporary liberal states as inevitably and severely circumscribed by market and rights norms and commitments (Hollifield 1992: 94, 1998, 2004; Hollifield et al. 2008; Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994). In doing so, the book’s chapters challenge perspectives which privilege economic and/or cultural (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Malhotra et al. 2013; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) over new security ones in explaining the course of the contemporary politics of immigration. In adopting a neo-institutional framework, the chapters link institutions with norms and normative constraints with policy outcomes to explain the politics of immigration politics in the new security era. Specifically, the book’s main chapters sequentially consider: the effect of threat frames in influencing the trajectory of contemporary immigration policy outcomes; the strategies contemporary liberal states pursue to reconcile the cross-pressures engendered by the migration trilemma; the foundations of public support for these strategies; the factors facilitating their continuity; and the pattern of political party competition regarding immigration before and after 11 September. The book begins with Chapter 2 which situates the migration trilemma within a dynamic, securitarian framework. Informed by empirical evidence gathered from cross-national public opinion surveys, media content analyses, an experiment, and original surveys of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) executed at two different points in time, the chapter evaluates the ways in which different frames have influenced the course of the politics of immigration and the content of immigration policy in post-WWII Europe and the US. It underscores the considerable influence media and political elite frames have on popular attitudes regarding immigration and, indirectly, on whether and when immigration and human mobility policies will converge and become more restrictive across the liberal states. The chapter’s main insight is that the way immigration is primarily framed largely determines whether the subject is highly salient,

26

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

and if so, how it influences human mobility considerations. Its central argument is that as the public safety and national security dimensions of immigration have become more salient in the new security era, liberal states have adopted more restrictive immigration policies. The chapter is organized in several parts. First, it briefly surveys the evolution of the politics of immigration in post-WWII Western Europe and the US. Part two considers the general effects of framing and its application to the phenomenon of immigration over time. Part three examines the respective roles of the media, mainstream political elites, ERWPs, and the public in the framing process and, specifically, across each of the three major frames that have most influenced the course and content of immigration politics and policy during the post-WWII period. Part four considers the problematization of immigration during the postCold War era and its possible objective and subjective explanations. Part five of the chapter offers a framework which predicts when immigration will be salient, politically polarizing, precipitate low or high levels of political conflict, and spawn either liberal or restrictive policy outcomes. The final section of the chapter offers several hypotheses regarding the effects of a public safety frame on public opinion, including its capacity to generate attitudinal consensus and engender popular support for restricting immigration and civil liberties. Chapter 3 identifies and delineates the numerous strategies the contemporary liberal states have adopted to navigate the cross-pressures engendered by the migration trilemma during the post-Cold War period, and especially since 11 September. Contesting scholarly claims that the liberal states cannot avert unwanted immigration, its main argument is that they have considerably reconciled the tensions inherent in the trilemma by forging bilateral and multilateral policy agreements and devolving many of their responsibilities for implementing immigration and human mobility policy to subnational and private sector actors. In pursuing this multifaceted course, the immigration policies of states have converged, their burdens in managing their immigration-related responsibilities have been partially alleviated, and the liberal norms inspiring their once steadfast commitments to maintaining relatively open borders and safeguarding citizen and immigrant rights have been compromised. Utilizing public opinion data derived from the Gallup, Pew, European Social Surveys (ESS), Eurobarometer Surveys; European Value Surveys (EVS) and World Value Surveys (WVS), Chapter 4 investigates the degree to which the public endorses the institutional and policy developments described in the previous chapter. It considers the informal or soft norms that underpin and legitimize the exclusionary immigration and human mobility policies that currently prevail across the liberal states.

VIII  Plan of the Book and Chapter Overview

27

The public opinion evidence presented in the chapter reveals that an expansive migration policy playing field and its restrictive immigration measures are endorsed by most Europeans and Americans. An oftensupermajority of the public on both sides of the Atlantic prioritizes regulating immigration strictly even when, in the process, its basic civil liberties and those of migrants are contravened. The chapter’s main argument is that the success of the liberal state’s immigration and human mobility policies not only depends upon the compliance and active cooperation of non-central state actors, but also the public’s trust that the state and its surrogate immigration gatekeepers are acting on its behalf and in its best interests. In short, the liberal state’s policies must be perceived by the public as legitimate. Having established that the immigration and human mobility policies of the new migration policy playing field are supported by most Europeans and Americans, Chapter 5 asks why they continue to do so given the considerable economic and rights costs they incur for both migrants and citizens? To address this puzzle, the chapter identifies the predominant values informing and facilitating the liberal state’s governance of contemporary immigration and its implications for restricting human mobility. Expanding upon the discussion of frames introduced in previous chapters and informed by our immigration threat politics model, it assesses the effects of a perceived threat environment in sustaining the more onerous policies of the new migration policy playing field. The chapter’s main argument is that the persistence of these policies in Europe and the US post-11 September can largely be explained by two inter-related phenomena. First, the threat environment precipitated by immigration-related focusing events and, particularly, the framing of these events by political elites and the mass media, make immigration especially salient and facilitate its conflation with public safety and national security in the public’s thinking. In this environment, political elites can more credibly claim immigrants pose a serious threat to public safety. Consequently, they are freer than previously to maintain immigration and human mobility policies that abrogate their previous liberal commitments, including those which abridge the civil liberties of both citizens and migrants. Second, once adopted, these policies are difficult to revoke, even as popular attitudes toward immigrants and immigration become more liberal or open. However, the stickiness of these policies, we argue, is not exclusively driven by the phenomenon of path dependence. Rather, policy stasis largely occurs because the popular legitimacy of these policies is politically sustained by the discourse of centre and extreme Right politicians and political parties.

28

Introduction: The Migration Trilemma

Chapter 6 investigates the politicization and securitization of immigration-related issues and their variance over time in Spain, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US, countries that experienced traumatic acts of foreign-inspired terrorism during the early-mid 2000s. Following our immigration threat politics paradigm, it plots the interaction of its key variables as these are illuminated in the political context of each country. Among the variables examined are the predominant threat frames, attitudinal influences, popular policy preferences, and patterns of inter-political party politics regarding immigration within each country over time, and particularly since 11 September. The major objectives of the chapter are to shed light on the trajectory of inter-political party competition regarding immigration and the propensity of the major political parties across these states to securitize and politicize immigration-related issues. Expanding upon the hypotheses (H1-4) presented in Chapter 2, the chapter conjectures that when immigration-related issues primarily are conflated with public safety (in contrast to being mostly perceived by  the public and/or framed by the media and political elites as an ­­economic and/or a cultural threat), political party platforms and policies, political elite attitudes, as well as public opinion (H2), on these issues will converge. Specifically, a shift from a dominant economic and/or cultural threat frame to a public safety one will precipitate an inter-political party and popular consensus regarding immigration and, thus, the depoliticization, or the diminution of political party competition. As the evidence in the chapter will show, these expectations are mostly confirmed. Consistent with our immigration threat politics paradigm, the terrorist-related events between 2001 and 2005 did precipitate interpolitical party convergence on immigration-related issues in Spain and UK in the near term, that is, they became more salient and the policy positions of the major political parties more similar. Moreover, in each country, restrictive policies and norms were institutionalized. However, politicization rather than depoliticization was the dominant trend in the UK, US, and to a lesser extent Spain over the medium to long term. Even as, as we will see in Chapters 4 and 5, a restrictive immigration and human mobility policy regime in each country persisted well past the immigration-related terrorist events, partisan divergence regarding immigration salience and policy within the electorate reinforced and/or facilitated political elite and party polarization on the subject. In each country the major political parties and elites promoted disparate and competing frames. The book’s Conclusions summarize the findings of the previous chapters and revisit the question of whether and to what degree contemporary liberal states can manage immigration and human mobility

VIII  Plan of the Book and Chapter Overview

29

in a new security world. Moreover, in underscoring the expansion of the contemporary migration policy playing field, the concluding chapter considers its implications for the civil liberties of citizens and migrants. It also briefly surveys the early effects of the 2019–23 Covid-19 pandemic on the course of human mobility worldwide and considers whether they resonate with the assumptions of the book’s immigration threat politics paradigm and the role of emotions in mitigating partisanship and influencing policy preferences (Renström and Bäck 2021). Finally, the chapter reflects upon the normative implications of the emergence of a securitarian immigration policy regime. It asks: How closely and adequately are non-central state actors being supervised by national governments, that is, by the pre-eminent political authority whose legitimacy to govern immigration and human mobility derives from the direct consent of the governed? Moreover, how compatible is the execution of many of the responsibilities for policy making and implementation with the core values and principles upon which liberal states are founded?

2

Framing and Reframing Immigration



The Politics of (In)Security

This chapter situates the migration trilemma cited in this book’s Introduction within a dynamic securitarian threat framework. Informed by evidence gathered from cross-national public opinion surveys, media content analyses, original experiments, and our surveys of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) executed at two different points in time, the chapter evaluates the ways in which various frames have affected the course of the politics of immigration and the content of immigration policy in post-WWII Europe and in the US. Specifically, it highlights the ability of media and political elite frames to influence public opinion on immigration and, indirectly, immigration policy. In focusing on the relatively recent emergence and effects of a public safety or security frame, the chapter illuminates when immigration and human mobility policies are likely to become more restrictive and converge across states (de Haas et al. 2018b; Helbling and Kalkum 2018; Mau et  al. 2012; Messina 2007; Rosenblum and Cornelius 2012). These emergent trends during the post-11 September period will be investigated in depth in the next chapter. The chapter’s key insight is that the way immigration is predominantly framed – a process Bures (2011: 52) characterizes as an intersubjective social construction among various actors and audiences – largely determines whether the subject is politically salient and, in turn, influences the trajectory (i.e., broadly inclusionary or exclusionary) of state immigration and immigrant policy. The chapter is organized in six parts. First, it briefly surveys the evolution of the politics of immigration in post-WWII Western Europe and the US. As we will see below, this history is divided into four discrete phases, with the most recent of these marked by the securitization of immigration, or the conflation of immigration with numerous purported challenges to public safety and/or national security. Part two considers the general effects of framing and its application to immigration over time. The latter includes the effects of frames on popular perceptions of immigration and civil liberties. Part three examines the participation of the media, mainstream political elites, ERWPs, and the public in the framing 30

I Historical Overview of Post-WWII Immigration

31

process and, specifically, their respective roles across each of the three frames that have influenced immigration politics and policies during the post-WWII period. This section offers empirical evidence of the reframing of immigration-related issues and the conflation of immigration and terrorism in American print and broadcast media and European print media following the events of 11 September (Fryberg et al. 2011). Part four considers the problematization of immigration during the post-Cold War era and its possible objective and subjective explanations. As we will argue below, this phenomenon is inadequately explained by the rate of change in immigration flows, an increase in the size of the Muslim population, or greater public concern about immigration in Europe and the US. Elaborating upon our theoretical model, part five of the chapter anticipates when immigration is salient, politically polarizing, precipitates low or high levels of political conflict, and spawns either liberal or restrictive policy outcomes. Doing so illuminates the contemporary politics of immigration through a prism of the different threat frames. Finally, the last section offers several hypotheses to test empirically the effects of a public safety frame on public opinion, including its influence on issue salience, capacity to generate attitudinal consensus, and increase popular support for restricting immigration and civil liberties. I

Historical Overview of Post-WWII Immigration and Phases of Politicization

That immigration is inextricably linked with state sovereignty and, ultimately, to public safety and national security is not revelatory (Arendt 1972: 278; Teitelbaum 1984; Weiner 1993, 1995). The voluntary and involuntary mass movement of persons across national borders posed major challenges for politics and policy long before immigration emerged as a high priority on political and policy agendas in contemporary Europe and the United States (Zolberg 2006b). As Koslowski (2009: 5) observes, ‘those who argue that [im]migration has recently become a security issue … conveniently ignore much of world history’. Indeed, immigration was salient for state sovereignty and national security at least as far back as the founding of the modern nation-state system during the seventeenth century (Messina and Lahav 2006: 1), a system that erected political–territorial boundaries around distinctive ethnocultural communities. Nevertheless, several countries excepted (Messina 1989: 126–49), immigration-related issues were mostly excluded from public political discourse and suppressed as a subject of inter-political party competition across Europe and in the United States for most of the post-WWII period (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011: 10; Freeman

32

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

1997: 49; Messina 2007: 29; Tichenor 2002: 239–40). As we shall see below, these issues have become especially salient in most liberal states only since the 1990s (Freeman 2011: 1541). Against this backdrop, the politics of immigration in post-WWII Western Europe can be divided into four discrete phases (Lahav 2004a; Messina 2007).1 The first, unfolding from the end of WWII through the middle to late 1970s, was primarily defined by the mass migration of surplus workers from the less developed countries of the Mediterranean, parts of Eastern Europe and, in its latter stages, select areas of the Third World to the major immigration-receiving countries. Its main catalyst was the onset of the post-WWII economic boom which created acute labour shortages and rigidities in domestic labour markets (Castles and Kosack 1973; Messina 2007: 20–30). To address these and other intractable economic challenges, private employers and governments actively recruited or abetted the flow of legions of foreign workers into their countries. Economically motivated actors and interests primarily drove this phase of immigration policy making, a phase during which decision making about immigration largely occurred out of public view. The second phase of the post-WWII politics of immigration commenced when the economic and social dislocations precipitated by the 1973 and 1979 OPEC oil crises, and specifically the economic stagnation and rising unemployment following these crises, fostered political conditions antithetical to the continuation of mass immigration (Castles and Kosack 1973). In responding to these challenges, numerous governments in Western Europe decelerated or halted the inflow of immigrant labour and implemented programs to repatriate settled foreign workers (Messina 2007: 36–38). As in the first phase, state immigration policy continued to be formulated outside of the public, political arena. Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, immigration incrementally morphed into a political dilemma (Levy 2005: 54). During this phase immigration-related issues were increasingly politicized and a subject of inter-political party competition (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Grande et al. 2019; Kriesi et al. 2012; Messina 1989: 126–49). Although the politicization of immigration originated with the permanent settlement of hundreds of thousands of ethnically and culturally distinctive populations in Europe (Alexseev 2005; Bigo 2001; Huysmans 1995, 2000; Weiner 1995) and covaried with the unease about the economic implications of immigration within the general public, it was primarily cultural-related anxieties that were the most politically potent and 1

As we will see in Chapter 6, the contemporary politics of immigration in the US followed a somewhat different course.

I  Historical Overview of Post-WWII Immigration

33

universal. Popular anxieties stemmed mostly from the challenge immigration purportedly posed to national and subnational identities (Choucri 2002; Citrin et al. 1990; Esses et al. 2006; Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993; Schnapper 1994; Smith 1991).2 During this phase immigrationrelated issues permeated the rhetoric of domestic election campaigns and facilitated a surge of popular support for ERWPs (Schain 2002: 237– 40).3 In the process, immigration metamorphized from a latent economic and/or cultural issue into a highly visible and contentious political one. The fourth and most recent phase of the politics of contemporary immigration emerged during the early 2000s. While rooted in previous stages, it was not until the public’s fear that immigrants threatened its collective identity (Buzan 1993; Buzan et al. 1998)4 intersected with its anxiety about public safety that immigration became securitized (Alexseev 2005; Choucri 2002),5 a phase propelled by the end of the Cold War (Bello 2017; Gheciu 2018; Lavenex 1999, 2006a) and the globalization of immigration (Castles et al. 2014; Weiner 1995). Indeed, the geopolitical shifts precipitated by the end of the Cold War coincided with the ascension of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) to the EU.6 They were further propelled by the social and political unrest effected by the uprisings associated with the Arab Spring and the followon effects of the Gulf, Afghanistan, Syrian, and Iraq wars. These events spawned considerable involuntary migration. They also prompted the 2

Smith (1991: 61) contends that while the emergence of the modern nation–state was made possible by economic and bureaucratic modernization, ‘the presence of a core ethnicity around which strong states could be built made the creation of nations possible’. 3 The British case is an exception to this trend, as immigration emerged as a significant political issue during the early 1960s (Messina 1989: 21–52). 4 The concept of ‘societal security’ advances the idea that traditional definitions of security are insufficient in going beyond the defense of the state against threats to its national sovereignty and territorial integrity from foreign enemies. In contrast to state-centric approaches, societal security includes any existential threat to the state and/or national identity (Buzan 1993; Wæver et al. 1993). While a neo-institutional view of national security includes existential threats, we are more directly interested in investigating the role of a public safety threat and, therefore, subsume under the new security banner both societal and state security. 5 Although most immigration flows do not pose a direct security threat, immigration control, according to Rosenblum (2009: 14), becomes a ‘legitimate security concern when unwanted immigration overlaps with or reinforces other (sic) security threats’. 6 The collapse of communist regimes in the Eastern bloc countries that had been dominated by repressive security forces resulted in the liberation of independent actors with experience of the public and private sectors of the so-called ‘security society’ (Gheciu 2018: 31). According to Lavenex (1999, 2006a), the end of the Cold War and the ascension of the Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC) to the EU were major motors behind the securitized migration policy agenda. These countries’ geographic positions as major transit routes for migrants and asylum-seekers heading toward Western Europe prompted the EU member states to include them in a system of immigration control (Carrera et al. 2015; Guild et al. 2017; Lahav 2010: 135; Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi 2013).

34

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

reorganization of the economic production of domestic industries and, with it, certain economic interest groups (Peters 2017) and their political influence (Bello 2017) within the liberal states.7 The emergence of a post-Cold War new security paradigm, accelerated by the fallout from the events of 11 September, effected a shift away from the assumption that threats to national security primarily emanate from the aggressive behaviour of foreign states to the those posed by transnational movements (Faist 2004; Jakobi and Wolf 2013; Kerwin 2005) and phenomena (e.g., climate change, terrorism, and human trafficking) (Bigo 2002; Faist 2004; Guild 2009; Karamanidou 2015), broadly referred to as new security issues. On the one hand, new security narratives spawned by incidences of international terrorism, a surge of radical Islamic fundamentalism, proliferation of human smuggling, and other phenomena associated with immigration and human mobility during this phase precipitated the ‘governmentality of unease’ (Bigo 2002; Foucault 2004) or a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen 1973; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009; Saux 2007).8 On the other hand, alternative narratives promoting the virtues of economic markets and the moral imperative to safeguard human rights recommended more inclusive immigration policy choices (Ruhs 2013a; Tazreiter and Martin 2017; Wellman and Cole 2011). As we will see below, the tension between these competing narratives resulted in the superimposition of a public safety frame on what previously would have been a predominantly economic and/or cultural dimension of immigration. 7

These events disturbed a distribution of power which had hitherto been organized along the concentrated benefits of liberal clientelist interests. They significantly affected oil prices, sectoral power relations, labour patterns, as well as ethnic, religious, and national rivalries (Bello 2017). Furthermore, the rising interests of a transnational policy network populated by displaced businessmen and professionals from the former Soviet orbit’s extensive security sector reflected a reorientation of the global market (Bigo 2002). Gheciu (2018: 31) asserts that the tremendous changes carried out during the 1990s and 2000s led to the emergence of a powerful private security domain governed by the laws of the market. While this period generated a set of institutions and security practices diametrically opposed to those that prevailed under communism, Gheciu’s analysis reveals that some of the key security actors associated with the old (communist) regime were able to protect important privileges and power even after the collapse of communism, and strategically employed the discourse and practices of liberalization to legitimize their (re)constitution as a powerful public and private security providers in the new era. 8 According to Cohen (1973: 9), a moral panic occurs when ‘a condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible’. Saux (2007: 63) applies moral panic theory in arguing that the perceived threat of terrorism caused Spaniards to identify illegal immigrants as an enemy and, thus, to construct a divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

II  Framing and Reframing Immigration

II

Framing and Reframing Immigration

A

General Effects

35

Because of their pertinence for agenda setting generally (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993 [2010], 2002; Jones and Baumgartner 2004; Maher 2001; McCombs 2014; McCombs and Shaw 1972), it is necessary to consider how frames affect the content and course of contemporary immigration politics and policy (Dunaway et al. 2010; Merolla et al. 2013a; Valentino et al. 2013). Since different frames influence whether and to which degree issues are perceived by the public as salient, analyzing the framing process can illuminate the soft norms embedded in immigration policy making (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008).9 As Entman observes (1992: 52), framing involves ‘select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text’. According to Goffman (1974: 4), issue framing is the ‘selection, emphasis, and exclusion of news frames that furnish a coherent interpretation and evaluation of events’, a process that, in turn, influences which specific issues or problems citizens perceive to be salient (Chong and Druckman 2007; Iyengar 1990, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1981).10 Frames not only facilitate the ability of an individual to adopt opinions about a particular issue (Druckman et al. 2006), they make it more likely that she or he will subsequently pay attention it (Kleinnijenhuis and van Atteveldt 2014). Moreover, even when not explicitly cued by either the media or politicians to do so, both actors influence which issues the public perceives as important (McCombs and Shaw 1972: 62; Valentino and Nardis 2013). Given the circumscribed ability of most individuals to process basic facts (Kuklinski et al. 2000; Lau 1989; Lupia 1994; Nelson et al. 1997; Plous 1989; Taber and Lodge 2006), frames simplify what would otherwise be complex and inaccessible information. They enhance an 9 Scholars of policy agenda-setting suggest policy decisions are significantly affected by two facets of issue framing: individual-level problems and/or collective issues (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008). Social psychologists and behaviouralists draw a distinction between personal and national or collective (sociotropic) threat salience (Huddy et al. 2002b; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lahav 2004b; Sniderman et al. 2004) in explaining variation in public opinion. 10 In contrast to rational choice models, where decision makers are assumed to prefer options that will maximize their individual utility, non-decision makers often shift their preferences depending upon how a problem is framed. According to individual-level analysis of Swiss and German popular attitudes, regional context proves to link visible diversity with negative attitudes – moderated by threat. Individuals who were especially sensitive to multicultural threats were more negative about diversity, particularly among those on the political right (Karreth et al. 2015).

36

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

individual’s ability to adopt consistent opinions about a subject (Kinder 2003; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Zaller 1990). Moreover, in promoting specific values (Bansak et al. 2016; Chong 1996; Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 1989; Katz and Hass 1988; Malka et al. 2014; Schwartz 1999; Winter 2008) frames offer individuals a short cut for distilling, interpreting, and prioritizing an often-wide range of possible policy options (Keren 2011; Zaller 1990). Publics are especially likely to be influenced by media frames in crisis circumstances (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009; Hutter and Kriesi 2019; Malka et al. 2014; Scholten and Van Nispen 2015; Triandafyllidou 2018),11 including during uncertain or ‘critical discourse’ moments pertaining to immigration (Benson 2013: 10) or refugee influxes (Consterdine 2018a; Nawyn 2019).12 As we will see in Chapters 4–6, frames can also dispose an individual to embrace or tolerate specific policies (Iyengar 1990; Tversky and Kahneman 1981), and/or associate them with distinct groups (Winter 2008), stereotyped character attributes (Burns and Gimpel 2000) or values (Bansak et al. 2016). For example, in a study about the effects of news frames on Americans’ tolerance for the American Ku Klux Klan, Nelson et al. (1997) discovered that those who watched coverage of a Klan rally on a local new broadcast were significantly more forbearing when it was framed as a narrative about free speech than a public order disturbance. They concluded that while support for the principle of free speech is a powerful current within public opinion and the general principle of tolerance is widely embraced by Americans, the volatility of an individual’s support for civil liberties in specific cases or for specific groups nevertheless reveals the ambivalences permeating the thinking of many, if not the majority. Since immigration triggers multi-dimensional threat perceptions (Hellwig and Kweon 2016), different threat frames suggest the appropriateness of adopting different policies (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and, consequently, engender varying degrees of popular support for them (Brader et al. 2008; Citrin and Sides 2007; 2008; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hellwig and Sinno 2017; Lahav and Courtemanche 2012). Several studies, for example, have discovered that individuals who are especially concerned about their country’s economic welfare 11

According to Luedtke (2015: 89), immigration policy correlates with ‘narratives of societal crises or issue salience – immigration’s prominence in the media – rather than statistics on economics, demographics, or social conflict’. 12 Even during the protracted humanitarian asylum crisis of 2015–16, most EU memberstates fiercely avoided the ‘crisis’ label until the end of 2015, when the massive flows of unmanaged Middle Eastern populations became inescapable. According to one report (Collett and Le Coz 2018: 4), the reticence of political actors to embrace the use of crisis terminology reflected the attempts to avoid appearing to lack control and authority, and thus diminishing public confidence in their leadership.

II  Framing and Reframing Immigration

37

are disposed to be tolerant of Muslim immigrants and, hence, be more supportive of generous immigration policies. Conversely, those who feel culturally threatened by immigrants or are especially uneasy about the prospect of crime are more likely to welcome East European over Muslim immigrants into their community (Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 2015; Hellwig and Sinno 2017; Semyonov et al. 2012). In contrast, terrorism-related threats appear to exacerbate the public’s cultural and economic distance from and its hostility toward immigrants from the Middle East (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015: 532; Harell et al. 2012; Schildkraut 2011). Frames are pertinent for our purposes because the public’s immigration-inspired fears are frequently more subjectively than objectively founded. Along these lines, several experimental and survey opinion research studies have discovered that security frames can evoke images of Middle Easterners without explicitly mentioning them and that certain cues can elicit the perception that certain racial and ethnic groups pose a latent threat (Brader et al. 2008; Lahav and Courtemanche 2012: 497).13 Indeed, the utilization of in-group versus out-group or ‘us against them’ categories in framing Muslims in Europe or Latinos in the US14 has activated ethnocentric (Banks 2016; Branton et al. 2011; Kalkan et al. 2008; Kinder and Kam 2010; Valentino et al. 2013), authoritarian (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Unger 2002), and/or exclusionary impulses (Bleich and van der Veen 2018; Brooks et al. 2016; Helbling 2012) among individuals, reinforced by the significant correlation found between antiimmigration attitudes and authoritarian values at the aggregate level (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 194). Stereotypes promoted by immigration frames often erroneously prompt the perception that migrants are irregular (Wang 2012) and/or disproportionately engaged in criminality (Figgou et al. 2011; Foner and Simon 2015: 127). This misperception testifies to the fact that crime frames increase the salience of immigration and generate more negative attitudes towards migrants than economic frames (Doosje et al. 2009; Igartua and Cheng 2009; Johnston 2018). As the empirical evidence presented below will underscore, an individual’s aversion to immigration is uncorrelated with either the objective size of the settled immigrant population or change in the velocity of immigration 13 According to an experimental study of 186 individuals who were exposed to a newspaper story of the consequences of immigration in Spain, the positive economic contributions of migrants were overshadowed by the negative crime growth effects, which stimulated more negative cognitive responses toward immigration, increased the salience of immigration as a problem, and generated more negative group cues (i.e., Latinos vs. Moroccans) (Igartua and Cheng 2009). 14 On the comparative logic of conceptually equating Latinos in the US and Muslims in Europe see Zolberg and Long (1999).

38

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

flows within a given society (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994: 7; Lahav 2004a, 2004b; McLaren 2001; Stockemer 2016). Along these lines, Jacobs et al. (2017) discovered that watching television in Belgium is more positively correlated with an individual’s fear of crime or her/his unease about ethnic diversity than with either the objective degree of ethnic diversity or number of crimes committed.15 In their study of 21 European countries, Semyonov et al. (2012: 1) similarly found that a neighbourhood’s ethnic composition causes an individual to feel less safe even after controlling for her/his previous personal exposure to crime or perception of the impact of minorities on crime.16 US data has shown that Black and Latino outgroups have long been characterized in the American media as posing a corporal threat to whites (Entman 1992).17 Media frames trigger implicit out-group associations, stereotypes (Sides and Gross 2013), or ‘categorical judgements’ (Wright et al. 2016) in ways that shape popular attitudes to immigrants and policies (Igartua et al. 2012). Other studies also offer evidence that the public’s support for immigration is ‘fundamentally and continually influenced by political elites and the manner in which their arguments are presented in the media’ (Igartua and Cheng 2009; Lakeoff and Ferguson 2006; Miller et al. 2020; Thorbjø´ rnsrud 2015: 775).18 A wealth of scholarship has corroborated that the media’s extensive coverage of immigration primes the public to perceive the subject as salient (Haynes et al. 2016; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; MacKuen 1984; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Miller and Krosnick 2000), an important finding upon which we expand below. Not only do media frames influence popular attitudes about immigration (Druckman 2001; Haynes et al. 2016; Merolla et al. 2013a; Nelson et al. 1997; Pantoja and Segura 2003), they also shape an individual’s perceptions of the implications of negative focusing events (Schlueter and Davidov 2013), the legitimacy of the liberal state’s methods to circumscribe civil liberties and deter human mobility (Mužik and Sˆerek 15

Inglehart (2018: 215) observes that ‘foreigners are easy to visualize – we see them every day (especially on television) in ways that reinforce a deep-rooted tendency to view them as dangerous’. According to Hopkins (2010: 58), the media tends to focus disproportionately on the negative aspects of immigration. 16 These perceptions persisted even after controlling for socio-demographic attributes, the degree of racial and ethnic neighbourhood segregation, and personal exposure to crime, and thus viewed as evidence of contextual stereotyping (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Fiske et al. 2002; Lin and Fiske 2006). 17 Studies have shown that Latino groups have been overinflated relative to their victimhood in real-world events (Dixon and Linz 2000; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Mastro 2009). 18 According to Lakeoff and Ferguson (2006), migrants have been variously labelled illegal immigrants, illegal aliens, illegals, undocumented workers, undocumented immigrants, guest workers, and temporary workers. The meaning of these labels is not neutral (Merolla et al. 2013b) since each implies a problematic population requiring a policy response.

II  Framing and Reframing Immigration

39

2021), and/or the specific dimension(s) on which immigrants pose a threat (Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Miller and Krosnick 2000). For example, in surveying German students before and after the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Paris in November 2015, Jungkunz et al. (2018) found that the attacks did not precipitate negative attitudes about immigration and immigrants generally; rather, they only did so among individuals who perceived national security issues as very important. In yet another investigation, Hosein (2005: 140) discovered that an individual’s support for biometrics, a method employed by state agencies to identify individuals in a group under surveillance, varied according to the keyword with which it was associated: that is, ‘security’ was a positive keyword for those who supported the technology, while ‘surveillance’ and ‘control’ were negative keywords for those concerned about its propriety. Moreover, the findings of other scholars (Augoustinos and Quinn 2003; Every and Augoustinos 2007; Hochman 2015; Huysmans 2006; Lindemann and Stolz 2014; Merolla et al. 2013b; Mullen et al. 2000; Tazreiter and Martin 2017) have revealed that the labels ‘foreigner’, ‘illegal migrant’, and ‘asylum-seeker’ can cue an individual to perceive immigrants as either a cultural, material, racial, and/or identity threat (Tsoukala 2005). Fear-inciting discourse and texts directly and indirectly influence public preferences on immigration policy (Kopytowska and Chilton 2018; Nacos and Bloch-Elkon 2011). In a new security world, elite threat frames influence publics to perceive immigration and immigration regulation policies through a prism that is primarily informed by public safety values. For example, since individuals who fear terrorism are more likely to be concerned about it than those who are not (Dolan and Ilderton 2017), negative elite frames influence the attitudes of the former by priming specific concerns and values (Djupe and Calfano 2013) as, for example, by emphasizing religious values (Bansak et al. 2016) to engender popular support for immigration reforms (Margolis 2018).19 Data suggest that the framing of minority groups may be a contextual factor of specific prejudices (Blinder 2015; Blinder and Allen 2016a; Landy et al. 2017; McAdam et al. 1996; Meeusen and Jacobs 2015). People who value social dominance or score high on right-wing authoritarianism have been found to share ideological tendencies to hold negative beliefs about out-group members (Altemeyer 1998), and are disposed to 19

Djupe and Calfano’s (2013) study of the effects of religious principles on public attitudes substantiates the claim that elites do not directly inform policy attitudes, as much as they influence them by priming specific values. According to Devos et al. (2002), differences in value priorities account for the fact that religious individuals and right-wing supporters express more trust in institutions than non-religious individuals and left-wing supporters.

40

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

‘abdicate moral responsibility to an outside agent’ (Marcus et al. 2019; Unger 2002). For these reasons, fear-inducing political discourse, like Enoch Powell’s infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in 1968 which fed the perception of immigrants as lawbreakers, appeals to individuals who are especially concerned about issues of law and social order and legitimize initiatives to exclude out-groups (Fitzgerald et al. 2012; Kopytowska and Chilton 2018). Elite messages are filtered through values which influence an individual’s policy preferences (Pantoja 2006), especially when attitudes are strong and pre-existing (Lodge and Taber 2013; Thomsen and Rafiqi 2020). Political elites and the media influence which narratives are salient or credible, as well as which values are accessible to citizens (Clawson and Oxley 2013). In this way, Dennison and Geddes (2019: 111) argue, issue salience energizes electorates and serves as a proximal causal effect of immigration policy preferences among some voters (Dennison 2019; Hopkins 2010; Paul and Fitzgerald 2021). According to Chong and Druckman (2007b) being frequently exposed to a weak frame is unlikely to lead individuals to change their issue position. In contrast, being exposed to a strong frame influences individuals from the start, and increased exposure to it strengthens this relationship. Thus, the strongest framing of an issue is persuasive in causing ‘people’s opinions to deviate from their values’ (651).20 The struggle for ideological primacy over threat narratives means that political parties cue values that differ on both issues of centrality and position (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Furthermore, political party cues can guide information processing (Duncan and Stewart 2005) and moderate policy preferences. As demonstrated by the evidence presented in Pratto and Lemieux’s (2001) study of American voters, party affiliation predicts an individual’s preference for specific immigration frames, in that Democrats respond most positively to egalitarian frames and Republicans to hierarchical ones (Kopacz 2008). Survey data suggest that evoking both threat and countervailing humanitarian narratives can trigger certain values, like empathy, and condition or moderate threat effects related to immigration (Every 2008; Hercowitz-Amir 2017; Newman et al. 2015). Threat frames thus promote values and political party competition (Budge 2015; Odmalm and Bale 2015; van der Bruge and Berkhout 2015) for issue ownership (Petrocik 1996).21 Indeed, in a cross-national 20

The effects of framing depend more on an individual’s evaluation of the quality than the frequency of frames. Thus, elite framing is particularly important (Chong and Druckman 2007a). 21 According to Ivarsflaten (2005a), the Right owns immigration issues in electoral competition because its positions on these matters are consistent with the views of the average voter.

II  Framing and Reframing Immigration

41

and longitudinal study of migration policy framing among Canadian and American legislators between 1994 and 2016, Hajdinjak et al. (2020) concluded that political parties focus their discourse on the subcomponents of immigration policy over which they have established issue ownership. This means that liberal parties emphasize the welfare and humanitarian aspects of immigration while conservative parties primarily focus its security and legal dimensions. Scholars have also underscored the different sets of moral foundations upon which liberals and conservatives rely (Graham et al. 2009; Haidt 2003).22 Such convictions may generate further differences regarding whether individuals are thinking about legal or illegal migration, with the latter category more rooted in values associated with adherence to established rules and laws (Wright et al. 2016). B

Applied Effects of Frames on Popular Perceptions of Immigration and Civil Liberties

To evaluate the veracity of these and other findings, Lahav and Courtemanche (2012) designed an experiment to discover whether different threat frames generate different value trade-offs regarding immigration and civil liberties among individuals. Specifically, they asked a sample of undergraduate students to disaggregate the nature of immigration as a cultural, economic, and public safety threat. At the start of the experiment their subjects were randomly assigned the task of reading different invented news stories about US congressional hearings on the effects of immigration. The stories were largely identical except for the few sentences added to their conclusion that cued the respective threat frames. The subjects were then asked a set of questions regarding immigration policies and civil liberty practices. Considering the laboratory setting in which the experiment was conducted, the differences in the subjects’ responses can be attributed to their exposure to the different frames. As the findings represented in Table 2.1 demonstrate, their exposure to different threat frames resulted in the subjects preferring different immigration policies and choosing different civil liberty trade-offs. Specifically, the subjects exposed to a public safety frame were significantly more inclined to concur that immigration was a salient issue. Moreover, 22

According to Day et al. (2014), the moral foundations of liberals and conservatives are different (e.g., harm, fairness, in the former versus authority, in-group loyalty for the latter), and work differently in either changing or entrenching attitudes towards policy change. Moreover, Thomsen and Rafiqi (2020) show that the moral community and ability of social trust to reduce perceived outgroup threat is not uniform across the ideological divide. That is, Right-wing trusters are more pessimistic about the consequences of non-Western immigration than their Left counterparts.

42

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security Table 2.1  Support for restrictive immigration policies and civil liberties Immigration Policies

Civil Liberty Policies

Frame

Mean (Std Dev)

Mean (Std Dev)

Frequency

Cultural Economic Security Control Total

0.501 (0.285) 0.509 (0.282) 0.584* (0.271) 0.551 (0.257) 0.536 (0.275)

0.29 (0.22) 0.354 (0.252) 0.358* (0.238) 0.30 (0.229) 0.326 (0.237)

97 105 99 99 400

Source: Lahav and Courtemanche (2012: 492). Table 2.2  Political ideology and support for immigration and civil liberty policies Liberals

Conservatives

Immigration

Civil Liberties

Immigration

Civil Liberties

Frame

Mean (Std Dev)

Mean (Std Dev)

Mean (Std Dev)

Mean (Std Dev)

Cultural Economic Security Control

0.406 (0.23) 0.429 (0.28) 0.523* (0.25) 0.511 (0.27)

0.231 (0.18) 0.281 (0.22) 0.279* (0.21) 0.238 (0.21)

0.699 (0.26) 0.707 (0.25) 0.660 (0.28) 0.583 (0.24)

0.381 (0.23) 0.503 (0.26) 0.449 (0.26) 0.442 (0.24)

Source: Lahav and Courtemanche (2012: 493).

at least in the near term, they were generally less inclined to support expansive immigration policies. This said, self-identified political liberals and conservatives responded very differently to each frame (Table 2.2), a finding upon which later chapters will elaborate. Specifically, the views of self-identified political conservatives were far more consistent across the frames and, thus, less influenced by each, a finding that will be corroborated by the case study evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 6. In contrast, the views of self-identified liberals were more fluid; that is, when prompted about the cultural implications of immigration they were more likely to support a less restrictive immigration policy than when the subject was framed as a public safety challenge. In sum, a public safety threat frame attenuated support for liberal immigration policies among political Left-of-center identifiers. Furthermore, exposure to a public safety frame resulted in agreement among the subjects that the infringement of their civil liberties was justified to restrict immigration, thus suggesting that an individual’s attachment to non-material values ebbs whenever her/his material needs is

III  Roles of Media, MEPs, ERWPs, & Public in Threat Framing

43

0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Control

Cultural Frame

Economic Frame

Conservative

Security Frame

Liberal

Figure 2.1  Political ideology and support for immigration ­restrictions in US Source: Lahav and Courtemanche (2012: 493).

perceived at risk (Figure 2.1). As Davis and Silver (2004) discovered in their survey of Americans soon after 11 September, whenever an individual’s safety is threatened, the desire for safety reflexively trumps her/his attachment to civil liberty. Given this proclivity, it is reasonable to conclude that politicians who aspire to restrict immigration are best served to advance and/or exploit a public safety frame in their public discourse; conversely, those who are inclined to advance a cultural and/ or economic frame will likely succeed in mobilizing voters along existing ideological or partisan cleavages. This said, whether the dominance of a public safety frame can be sustained over the long term and/or the degree to which the public’s safety and cultural-related anxieties can and will be conflated are unclear; moreover, as we will see in Chapter 6, they will largely depend upon the incentives and behaviour of the media and political elites and parties. III

Respective Roles of Media, MEPs, ERWPs, and the Public in Threat Framing

While the events of 11 September in the US and subsequent acts of terrorism in Europe indisputably increased the political salience of immigration during the late 1990s and early 2000s, their more important impact, we argue, was the manner in which the subject was ultimately reframed by the media and political elites and, consequently, perceived

44

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

by the public (Caviedes 2017; Frederking 2012; Haynes et al. 2016; Lahav and Courtemanche 2012; Triandafyllidou 2000, 2018). The respective roles of each of these actors in facilitating immigration-related policy outcomes are delineated below. A Media That the media informs and generally influences public opinion is well documented (Baker et al. 2013; Benson 2013; Dekker and Scholten 2017; Fryberg et al. 2011; Iyengar 1991; Jacobs et al. 2017; Meeusen and Jacobs 2017; Thorbjø´ rnsrud 2015). More pertinently for our purposes, a wealth of empirical evidence has established that the media’s attention to an issue heightens the public’s concern about it (Kleinnijenhuis and van Atteveldt 2014; Weaver 1991). As Haynes et al. (2016: 30) observe, the media primes issues by bringing them to the public’s attention. McCombs (2014: 51) further reflects that the ‘attributes of issues that are prominent in media presentations [inevitably] become prominent in the public mind’; moreover, ‘it is the agenda of attributes that define an issue and, in some instances, tilt public opinion towards a particular perspective or preferred solution’. Indeed, it is now well established within the pertinent scholarly literature that the media’s expansive coverage of immigration primes the public to perceive the subject as important (Dunaway et al. 2010; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; MacKuen 1984; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Picard 2014). Numerous studies also offer compelling evidence that media frames primarily determine the degree to which the public associates immigration with its safety (Benson 2013; Fryberg et al. 2011; Knoll et al. 2011; Winter 2008; Woods and Marciniak 2016).23 A comprehensive report on the media’s impact on American immigration attitudes suggested that the media politicized immigration-related discourse and created a policy stalemate (Banu et al. 2008). The comparative analysis of French and American media framing of immigration further demonstrates that the media in both countries have a significant influence on promoting public support (Benson and Saguy 2005). In the context of these findings, it is evident that the mass media’s dominant frame on immigration across the liberal states shifted in favour of emphasizing the risk that immigrants, and especially Muslims, pose to public safety in the West after 11 September (Roggeband and 23 A longitudinal study of media coverage on migration to Switzerland from 1970 to 2004 not only found a 15 per cent increase in a public safety frame, but also a proliferation of ‘subframes’ that connected Muslim foreigners to criminality and terrorism (Lindemann and Stolz 2014).

III  Roles of Media, MEPs, ERWPs, & Public in Threat Framing

45

70 60 50 40 30 Sept.11 20

1st WTC Bombing

10

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

NYT

WSJ

Figure 2.2  Newspaper articles on immigration referring to crime, illegality, or terrorism in US, 1981–2010 (in percentages) Source: Woods and Arthur (2014: 30).

Vliegenthart 2007: 537; Sides and Gross 2013). Benson (2013: 85), for example, reports a surge in the American media’s promotion of a public order frame in the wake of 11 September. Moreover, as Woods and Arthur’s (2014) content analysis of news stories on immigration published in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal reveals, from a peak of 47 per cent around the 1993 World Trade Centre bombings, the share of negative frames pertaining to immigration in the two newspaper organizations steadily declined through 2000 (Figure 2.2). However, thereafter, negative media frames about immigration spiked, after which time they failed to revert to their lower, pre-September levels. To confirm the strength of these findings and discover if and to what extent the salience of immigration for Americans is correlated with newspaper coverage of the subject, we analyzed the content of front-page news articles published in The New York Times, USA Today, and The Wall Street Journal between 1991 and 2014.24 Front-page content was determined 24 The data were compiled by executing a Lexis Nexis search of articles of each year. The front-page sample was obtained by searching front page news without any headline search terms. The first number (total immigration front page coverage) was then divided by the second (total front-page coverage) to obtain the share of front-page

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security 0.9

10.00

0.8

9.00

0.7

8.00 7.00

0.6

6.00

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4.00

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3.00

0.2

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0.1

1.00

0

0.00 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Proportion of Frontpage Coverage

46

Immigration Salience

% Immigration Coverage

Correlations Immigration Salience Immigration Salience

Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N % Immigration Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) Coverage N

1 24 .803** .000 24

% Immigration Coverage .803** .000 24 1 24

Figure 2.3  Trends in salience of immigration and proportion of coverage on immigration in American Newspapers, 1991–2014 Note: Data points for immigration salience represent yearly averages compiled from surveys by Gallup. Total number of surveys ­compiled = 191. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

by searching for the terms ‘immigrants’ or ‘immigration’. Each data point of ‘immigration coverage’ in Figure 2.3 represents the share of front-page news coverage devoted to the subject. Building upon a battery of individual-level analyses of threat framing, our series of media content analyses permitted a robust test of aggregate trends. As the data reveal, the salience of immigration was highly correlated with the share of frontpage coverage (r = 0.803, p < 0.01, two-tailed). coverage on immigration. The salience of immigration was measured as the share of respondents citing the subject as the ‘most important problem’ in Gallup surveys.

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47

Figure 2.4  Word cloud of pre-11 September media content regarding immigration in US Source: Authors’ content analysis.

Figure 2.5  Word cloud of post-11 September media content regarding immigration in US Source: Authors’ content analysis.

In line with this result, the word clouds in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 represent the media’s coverage of immigration-related news stories before and after 11 September (Frederking 2012). As the data indicate, the content of these stories significantly shifted over time: prior to 11 September, immigrationrelated news stories in the three newspapers primarily emphasized the themes of immigrant workers, rights, and integration; post-11 September, their stories privileged the subjects of crime, justice, and illegality. Furthermore, to assess the degree to which media discourse in the US became more negative about immigration, we analyzed the contents of 2,500 immigration-related articles published in three major national newspapers: The New York Times, USA Today, and The Washington Post.

48

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

Proportion of Keyword to Total Words

0.0025

0.002

0.0015

0.001

0.0005

Crime** Terrorism** Terrorist** Terror** War Fear** Threat security** attack Fence** Border/Borders** Control* Visa* Welfare** Jobs Unemployment Labor Taxes** Services Business* Farming Skilled Unskilled** Employment** Economy** work** workers Market* Students** Culture Society* Language** Education* Values Religion Race** Racism Ethnicity Rights** Citizenship**

0

Keywords

Total Pre

Total Post

Figure 2.6  Share of culture, economic, and security keywords cited in immigration-related articles pre- and post-11 September Source: Authors’ content analysis.

between 1980 and 2013. Specifically, we plotted the frequency with which cultural, economic, and public safety/security keywords appeared in the newspapers before and after 11 September. The keywords linked to a cultural frame were culture, citizenship, education, ethnicity, identity, language, race, racism, religion, rights, society, and values. The keywords associated with the economy frame were business, economy, employment, farming, jobs, labour, market, services, skilled, students, taxes, unemployment, unskilled, welfare, work, and workers. Finally, the keywords linked to the public safety frame were attack, border(s), control, crime, fear, fence, terror, security, terrorism, terrorist, threat, visa, and war. Each keyword was analyzed independently and aggregated within each frame. The differences between the two numbers were then assessed for their significance. As the data in Figure 2.6 reveal, the number of security-linked keywords significantly increased over time while that of economic-linked keywords did not. The number of cultural-related keywords also significantly rose, an outcome likely resulting from the fact that unease within the media and

Proportion of Keywords to Total Words

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49

0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0 Security**

Economy

Culture**

Keyword Frames Pre-9/11

Post-9/11

Figure 2.7 Share of aggregated culture, economic, and security keywords cited in immigration-related articles pre- and post-11 September **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05 Source: Authors’ content analysis.

the public about certain ethnic groups and their cultures became inflated after 11 September. In contrast, the economy and security keywords were not linked in the articles. As the data shows, the economy was the dominant frame in the media’s discourse about immigration prior to 11 September. However, not only did the number of security-related keywords in articles about immigration significantly increase thereafter, but a security frame superseded an economic one as the dominant discourse frame. Figure 2.7 further plots the longitudinal change across the three frames when their respective keywords are aggregated. It represents the share of all cultural, economic, and security-related keywords before and after 11 September. As the data suggests, the change in security-linked keywords is significant (p < 0.01), while that of the economic keywords is not. Moreover, the share of security-linked keywords citing immigration significantly increased post-11 September. To verify the robustness of these findings, we investigated whether they were an artifact of our testing instruments. Based on a random sample of six immigration articles per annum (i.e., two articles per publication) between 1989 and 2013, we parsed out the rise in the number of individual articles versus the number of keywords per article. We conducted an

50

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security 120

Number of Appearences

100

80

60

40

20

19

89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 20 99 01 20 (P 200 01 re 0 (P 9/1 os 1) t9 /1 1 20 ) 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13

0

Year Security Keywords

Economic Keywords

Culture Keywords

Figure 2.8  Culture, economic, and security keywords in immigrationrelated articles, 1989–2013 Source: Authors’ content analysis.

in-depth test by further coding the articles. As in the first test, securitylinked keywords were aggregated into one total measure per frame. For example, the total number of keywords cited in the economic, cultural, and security frames for each article was recorded and plotted. Had most of the keywords appeared in relatively few articles, flat lines should have appeared with random spikes. That is not what our data analysis ultimately revealed. Rather, as ­Figure 2.8 shows, the number of economic-linked keywords increased just before 11 September and declined precipitously thereafter. Moreover, there was an uptick in the number of security-linked keywords post11 September. The economic and cultural threat frames were eclipsed by a security frame.25 25

Aside from the spike in the number of economy keywords prior and the nosedive directly after 11 September, the number of economic- and cultural-linked keywords remained relatively steady and were well distributed both before and after 11 September. The result of our omnibus test confirmed that immigration-related concerns were evenly distributed across articles and years pre-11 September, with exception of a spike immediately following 11 September.

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51

40 35

Number of Articles

30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Security

Economy

Culture

Article Frame Pre 9/11 Post 9/11

Figure 2.9 Culture, economic, and security keywords cited in immigration-related articles pre- and post-11 September. *p < 0.05 Source: Authors’ content analysis.

Figure 2.9 presents the total number of articles that could be coded within either a cultural, economic, or security frame before and after 11 September. From this set we selected 156, of which 149 were ultimately suitable for testing. As our analysis of the data reveals, the number of security framed immigration articles significantly increased, the number of economic framed articles decreased, and the number of cultural framed articles remained constant following 11 September. We then conducted multiple tests to confirm the robustness of these findings and to determine if the print media’s discourse pertaining to immigration shifted from a strong economic to a strong public safety/security frame after 11 September. An analysis of the data not only met this expectation, but it also revealed that the number of immigration articles linked with an economic frame after that September declined, although this change only began to approach statistical significance. In short, the data show that the three newspapers reframed the issue of immigration following the 11 September events, a finding consistent with those of other, non-US studies (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2008, 2009; Helbling 2014).

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Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

Media content analyses in Europe have similarly discovered that the dominant frame pertaining to immigration changed over time. Despite similar, negative effects of media discourse on European public opinion (Eberl et al. 2018), media frames in Europe did not change immediately following 11 September. Rather, the shift mostly postdated the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings (Ettinger and Imhof 2011). A prominent exception to this trend is in the UK where 11 September marked a turning point in that country’s mass media’s coverage of immigration and immigrants. As Baker et al. (2013: 182) report, the provocative narrative of Muslims as disproportionate recipients of state welfare spending was largely absent in the British press prior to 11 September; however, it was widespread thereafter. Not only did the frequency of coverage about immigration in the American media increase, but so too did its coverage of terrorism (Ulrich and Cohrs 2007). Our analysis of news broadcast transcripts reinforces what other researchers (Bleich et al. 2015; Caviedes 2015; Greussing and Boomgarden 2017) have discovered: immigration and terrorism became conflated in the media’s discourse after 11 September (Cho 2014: 41). To explore the frequency of media coverage on immigration and terrorism and the extent to which these subjects became conflated, we conducted a search in Lexis Nexis Academic for the phrase ‘immigration and terrorism’ in broadcast transcripts from ABC News, NBC News, and CBS News from 1991 to 2013. The results represent the frequency with which immigration and terrorism were cited in the same news segment. We also searched front-page immigrationand terrorism-related news stories in the The New York Times, USA Today, and The Wall Street Journal during this period.26 Our analysis of the data presented in Figure 2.10 is based on a random sample of American front-page migration-related feature stories. They reveal that the number of news segments citing both immigration and terrorism significantly increased after 11 September. Figure 2.11 confirms that as coverage of the one issue rose, so too did that of the other. Furthermore, the confluence of coverage within the print media appears to mirror the broadcast news coverage of 26 We restricted our search to front-page news on the assumption that doing so provided a valid measure of major stories (McCombs and Shaw 1972: 178). The New York Times, USA Today, and The Wall Street Journal were selected because they were the most widely read national newspapers as measured by their average weekday circulation (Associated Press 2013) and their clear ideological orientation based on quantitative estimates (see Ho and Quinn 2007). Because popular immigration attitudes have been shown to be more strongly influenced by national, or sociotropic, concerns than personal considerations, only searching national publications is justified (Lahav 2004a: 1165–67).

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53

300

70

250

60 50

200

40 150

30

100

20 10

0

0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

50

BroadcastNews

Media CoverageImmigration

Media CoverageTerrorism

Figure 2.10 Number of news segments citing both immigration and terrorism in US, 1991–2013 Each data point of the ‘BroadcastNews’ variable comprises a Lexis Nexis search of transcripts from ABC News, CBS News, and NBC News for ‘immigration and terrorism’ for a span of one year. Each data point of the ‘Media Coverage-Immigration’ variable comprises a Lexis Nexis search of front-page news articles in the The New York Times, USA Today, and The Wall Street Journal between the dates 1 January and 31 December of a single year using the headline search terms ‘immigrants’ or ‘immigration’. Each data point of the ‘Media Coverage-Terrorism’ variable comprises a Lexis Nexis search of frontpage news articles in the The New York Times, USA Today, and The Wall Street Journal between the dates 1 January and 31 December of a single year using the headline search terms ‘terrorists’ or ‘terrorism’.

‘immigration and terrorism’, especially in the years immediately following 11 September. The data make clear that the perception of threat, as measured by the combined share of individuals who reported to be ‘worried’ or ‘very worried’ about a terrorist attack, was congruent with increased media coverage about terrorism and, to a greater extent, immigration. However, as we see below, the latter trend did not influence popular attitudes towards immigrants directly, since we will find little to no congruence between the quantity of media coverage and popular attitudes as measured by the share of respondents that favoured decreasing immigration (Cho 2014: 42). In confirming the veracity of the assumptions of our paradigm (Figure 1.2), the findings in Chapter 5 will instead underscore the indirect effects of threat

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Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

70 60 50 40 30 20 10

19 9 19 1 9 19 2 93 19 9 19 4 95 19 9 19 6 9 19 7 9 19 8 99 20 0 20 0 0 20 1 02 20 0 20 3 04 20 0 20 5 0 20 6 07 20 0 20 8 09 20 1 20 0 11 20 1 20 2 13

0

Media Coverage-Immigration

Media Coverage-Terrorism

Worried About Terrorist Attack

Figure 2.11  Media coverage on immigration and terrorism, by threat perception in US, 1991–2013 (in percentages) Note: Threat perception is based on pooled data sources of those who respondent that they were ‘worried’ and ‘very worried’ about terrorist attacks. Combined proportions were calculated by summing the annual averages. Source: Roper Center Archives.

perception on the values influencing popular attitudes about immigration (Dunaway et al. 2010). From Figure 2.12 we note that more extensive media attention of immigration and terrorism does not precipitate greater popular opposition to immigration. Popular anti-immigration attitudes especially are not influenced by the frequency (intensity) of media coverage (r = −21; p > 0.10). Instead, we speculate that the media’s influence on popular attitudes is through its transmission of values through frames, and particularly threat frames. Popular immigration attitudes also do not appear to be influenced by the proportion of media coverage (r = −0.26, p > 0.10, two-tailed). The data in Figure 2.12 indicates co-variance between peaks in the salience of immigration and terrorism, but limited effects on attitudes towards immigrants. Figure 2.12 represents fluctuations in the media’s coverage of immigration and terrorism as they shadow each other over time. The data also reveal their limited impact on predicting immigration rejection. As we will see later in this chapter, threat frames have uneven effects on individuals.

Immigration Preferences

Media Coverage-Immigration

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

0 2005

0 2004

10

2003

10

2002

20

2001

20

2000

30

1999

30

1998

40

1997

40

1996

50

1995

50

1994

60

1993

60

1992

70 % In Favor of Decreasing Immigration

55

70

1991

Media Coverage Intensity

III  Roles of Media, MEPs, ERWPs, & Public in Threat Framing

Media Coverage-Terrorism

Figure 2.12  Popular immigration attitudes and media coverage of terrorism and immigration in US, 1991–2014 Total number of surveys compiled = 29. (Note that for the year 2001, data that were available prior to the month of the 11 September attacks were deliberately excluded from calculation of the yearly average since including those data would have masked the heightened level of antiimmigration sentiment after 9/11) Each data point for immigration attitudes is measured as the average annual percentage of respondents who answered affirmative to the question, ‘Should immigration be decreased?’ Each data point of the ‘% Immigration Coverage’ variable represents the percentage of front-page news coverage within a given year devoted to immigration. Data were compiled by conducting a Lexis Nexis search of front-page news articles in the The New York Times, USA Today, and The Wall Street Journal between 1 January and 31 December of a single year.27 Source: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Archives. Public opinion data derived from surveys by Gallup, Princeton Survey Research Associates, and ANES. 27

Front-page immigration coverage was found using the headline search terms ‘immigrants’ or ‘immigration’. Total front-page sample sizes were obtained by searching front page news without any headline search terms. The first number (total immigration front page coverage) was then divided by the second number (total front-page coverage) to obtain the proportion of front-page coverage on immigration. Each data point of the ‘% Terrorism Coverage’ variable represents the percentage of front-page news coverage within a given year devoted to terrorism. Data were compiled by conducting a Lexis Nexis search of front-page news articles in the The New York Times, USA Today, and The Wall Street Journal between 1 January and 31 December each year. Front-page terrorism coverage was detected using the headline search terms ‘terrorists’ or ‘terrorism’. Total front-page sample sizes were obtained by searching front page news without any headline search terms. The

56

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

B

Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) as Political Elites

Our immigration threat politics paradigm suggests that political elite framing of immigrants and minorities can significantly influence an individual’s perception of them (Czymara 2020; Fetzer 2012; Flores 2018; Haynes et al. 2016).28 Though the causal direction of influence between elite and public opinion is somewhat uncertain, it is not randomly associated (Aberbach et al. 1981; Putnam 1973).29 Consequently, and in anticipation of a fuller analysis of the influence relationship between domestic political elite opinion and popular immigration-related attitudes in Spain, the UK, and the US in Chapters 5 and 6, the data presented below measure the degree to which the opinions of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the public at the EU level were congruent post-11 September.30 The evidence of MEP opinion was derived from our original surveys, executed at two critical points in time, one executed before and the second after 11 September.31 The first survey, conducted in 1992–93 during the third legislative assembly (1989–94), coincided with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (Commission of the European Union 1992), but before the EU expanded to include Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Each of the then 518 MEPs was sent a closed-ended questionnaire in English, French, or Italian. The 167 MEPs (32 per cent of the total) who participated in the survey were broadly representative of the members of the then twelve country parliamentary delegations and the nine official party groupings,

28



29



30

31



first number (total terrorism front page coverage) was then divided by the second number (total front-page coverage) to obtain the proportion of front-page coverage on terrorism. McLaren (2001) attributes the bivariate patterns of immigrant group preferences within the public to elite opinion leadership which provides ideological cues that polarize publics. ‘Collective correspondence’ is often cited as the appropriate measure by which the congruence between elite and public opinion can be determined (Dalton 2020; Weissberg 1978). Numerous scholars have attempted to measure issue salience among political elites as well as the propensity of mass publics to use the heuristics supplied by elites to form opinions (Sanders and Toka 2013). Among other sources, political scientists have utilized rollcall (Hix 2009), election manifesto (Budge 2015; Budge et al. 2001; Dancygier and Margalit 2020; Lehmann and Zobel 2018; Livny 2020; Ruedin et al. 2017; van der Brug et al. 2015), elite rhetoric data (Statham 2003) and political discourse (Czymara 2020; Furuseth 2003; Korkut et al. 2013; Larrson 2013) to measure political salience and/or ideological positions on immigration (Van Dijk 1995) There are three reasons to sample and analyze MEP opinion. First, MEP discourse influences political debate at both the national and European levels (Tsebelis 1994) and, in so doing, likely circumscribes policy choice (Aberbach et al. 1981). Second, in contrast to their peripheral status prior to the mid-1980s, MEPs are now significant policy makers (Corbett et al. 2000; Lopatin 2013). Finally, it is reasonable to assume MEP opinion reflects, however imperfectly, the diversity of political elite perspectives on immigration-related issues within their respective countries (Lahav 2004a). For an explanation of the limitations of this particular sample see Lahav (2004a).

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excluding the Independents, in the EP (Lahav 2004b: 238). The representativeness of the sample in terms of the distribution of the larger MEP population by country is supported by a chi-square test of association that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The second survey in 2003–04 repeated most of the questions posed in the first but added several others to reflect the changes that had occurred within the international security environment and on the immigration front since the first questionnaire was executed. Each of the 625 MEPs32 of the fifth assembly (1999–2004) was sent a written questionnaire in one of five languages: French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, or English. In all, 148 MEPs participated in the survey, a sample which comprised 24 per cent of the total group. In addition to administering a written questionnaire, fifteen MEPs were personally interviewed. As in the first survey, the respondents were selected from each of the member countries (15) and the then eight formal political party families. As in 1992– 93, the backgrounds of MEPs in our second sample well reflected the proportional distribution of MEPs by country and party family within the Parliament. However, since chi-square tests of the sample and population based on country and party family were not statistically significant, we are less confident that our 2004 sample was as representative as our 1993 sample. There is little doubt, based on the empirical evidence presented in Table 2.3, that MEPs viewed immigration-related issues as more salient in 2004 than in the previous decade. Unsurprisingly considering the deteriorating international and regional security environment during the period between our two surveys, fewer MEPs in 2004 than previously identified the issue of immigration as ‘not important’, a difference statistically significant at the 0.05 level based on a Wilcoxon rank–sum test, which was used as a non-parametric alternative to a t test. As the data also reveal, there were several notable shifts in the distribution of MEP attitudes within several of the twelve original national delegations. Specifically, while the share of MEPs who identified the issue of immigration as ‘not important’ remained relatively constant in Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal, the percentage perceiving it as ‘very important’ increased by between 29 per cent and 83 per cent in Ireland, Spain, and the UK between 1993 and 2004. As anticipated, a greater share of MEPs in 2004 than in 1993 identified immigration as ‘very important’. However, beneath the aggregate 32

With the inclusion of Austria, Finland, and Sweden as EU members, the number of MEPs increased to 626. During the conduct of the survey one seat in the Parliament was vacant.

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Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

Table 2.3  Importance of immigration among MEPs in EU-15 countries, 1993–2004 (in percentages)

Country

1993

2004

1993 2004

Change Very Important in Not Important 1993 2004 1993–2004

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK Total

– 0 0 – 4 9 13 83 4 0 14 14 26 – 12 13

0 17 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 6 0 0 3

– 20 25 – 9 5 50 0 12 0 0 29 21 – 36 17

– 80 75 – 87 86 38 17 84 100 86 57 53 – 52 70

Not Important

Neutral

0 0 14 50 19 13 0 0 7 0 0 17 12 25 13 12

100 83 88 0 81 83 100 100 95 100 100 67 82 75 88 85

– +17 0 – –4 –9 –13 –83 –4 0 –14 +3 –20 – –12 –10

Change in Very Important 1993–2004 – +3 +13 – –6 –3 +62 +83 +11 0 +14 +10 +29 – +36 +15

N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004). Question: ‘How important do you think the immigration issue is to you?’ Source: Lahav et al. (2014: 216).

shift of MEP opinion between the two surveys were varied patterns among the twelve original national parliamentary delegations. Specifically, while the share of MEPs from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Italy who cited immigration as very important was relatively steady from the first to the second survey (i.e., either increasing or decreasing between 3 and 11 per cent), those from Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, UK, and the EU-12 expressing this view significantly increased over time. How to explain the change, or lack thereof, in MEP attitudes within the 12 original national delegations across the two surveys? Although definitively answering this question is beyond the scope of this chapter, at least two explanations are plausible. First, with the UK delegation excepted, the salience of immigration for MEPs from the traditional immigration-receiving countries was already at a very high level in 1993 and, perhaps not surprisingly, it simply remained high (Belgium, Luxembourg), decreased only slightly (France, Germany), or increased, but not significantly so (Denmark, Netherlands), after 11 September. For

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many of these MEPs, as well as for their respective electorates, it is probable that immigrants were already well-established as an object of general insecurity before 2001 (Chebel d’Appollonia 2012). On the other side of the coin, given their relatively recent experience with mass immigration and its societal effects, the salience of the subject among MEPs from the newer countries of immigration (Ireland, Portugal, and Spain), Italian MEPs excepted, increased over time. Second, there is little reason to expect that MEP attitudes would perfectly reflect the existing national circumstances: that is, the especially high share of settled immigrants within their country or other objective variables pertaining to immigration would influence MEPs to perceive immigration as more salient post-11 September. Indeed, one plausible explanation for the null effect on MEP opinion in some countries after 11 September is implicitly suggested by Bourbeau (2011). According to Bourbeau, for political elites to engage in securitizing rhetoric successfully, as securitization theory presumes that they routinely do, the relevant historical and domestic sociocultural contexts must be favourable. That is, whenever/wherever these contexts are unfavourable, the public is less likely to respond positively to elite securitizing rhetoric and, hence, political elites have less incentive to engage in it. For example, Bourbeau points to the reticence of most Canadians, for reasons linked to Canada’s long history as a major country of immigration, to perceive immigrants as an existential security threat, including after 11 September. Because of their reserve, he concludes, the potential for Canadian political elites to securitize immigration successfully was and continues to be significantly circumscribed, a finding that, while not universally applicable, nevertheless probably applies elsewhere and especially to the traditional countries of immigration in Europe (Messina 2012). In short, long-embedded national historical and sociocultural factors likely caused at least some variation in the propensity of European political elites to perceive immigration-related issues as salient and, consequently, actionable in the wake of 11 September and subsequent incidences of domestic terrorism within Europe (Council for European Studies 2015; Jungkunz et al. 2018). How congruent were the opinions of MEPs and that of their respective national publics regarding the salience of immigration? Although the data in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 are not strictly comparable, we can nevertheless justify plotting the direction of change or lack thereof in the trajectory of MEP and national public opinion across time. As the data in Table 2.5 show, the trajectory of MEP and public opinion regarding the salience of immigration was identical in two-thirds of countries; that is, nine of twelve MEP national delegations and their national publics moved in the same direction post-11 September. This was also the case

23 11 15 5 15 25 2 6 12 8 8 2 4 5 18 15

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK EU 15

17 14 13 9 13 22 16 9 17 10 16 3 6 6 20 16

2000 10 16 25 5 11 5 6 10 13 10 8 2 17 10 32 13

2003 10 18 23 5 8 8 6 12 12 17 16 2 20 11 41 16

2004 23 19 22 5 12 7 5 13 14 11 14 2 30 11 33 14

2007 None + + None – – + + + + + None + + + –

Change 1997–2007 14 14 12 9 5 9 9 3 12 8 7 1 8 7 23 9

2009 16 21 10 7 10 7 5 6 14 21 11 1 6 9 21 11

2011 13 15 14 5 10 16 6 8 6 12 4 1 2 13 30 10

2013 31 23 36 6 12 47 11 7 31 15 23 3 6 28 36 21

2015

+ + + – + + + + + + + + – + + +

Change 2000–15

Sources: Eurobarometer 53 (2000); 59 (2003); 61 (2004); 66.1 and 67.2 (2007); 70.1 and 71.3 (2009); 74.2 and 75.3 (2011); 78.1 and 79.3 (2013); and 83.3 (2015).

1997

Country

Table 2.4  Salience of immigration among publics in EU-15 countries, 1997–2015 (in percentages)

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61

Table 2.5  Trends in salience of immigration among MEPs and publics in EU-12 countries, 1993/97–2004 Country

MEPs

Public

Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain UK EU12

+ + – – + + + None + + + + +

+ + – – + + None + + None + + +

+ refers to net gain in percentage difference between the two data points. – refers to net loss of percentage points in immigration salience. Calculated based on those respondents who said immigration ‘was very important’ on the political agenda. Sources: Eropean Commission: Eurobarometers 53 (2000); 59 (2003); 61 (2004); 66.1 and 67.2 (2007); 70.1 and 71.3 (2009); 74.2; Lahav and Messina (2005).

regarding MEP and European public opinion in the aggregate. That MEP and popular attitudes, at least regarding the salience of immigration, were congruent after 11 September is not surprising. Lahav (2004a: 106) had previously discovered that MEPs and their constituents were generally in agreement on immigration-related issues during the 1990s – including with respect to the salience of immigration. Hence, the later evidence of MEP-public opinion congruence conforms to the previous finding. To be sure, the relationship between domestic political elite and public opinion does not necessarily mirror that of MEP and public opinion. As we will see in Chapter 6, the former relationship can and often does diverge from the latter. Nevertheless, it is illuminating that public and MEP opinion on immigration post-11 September were closely aligned. At least at the EU level, it is plausible that the opinions of the two sides were mutually reinforcing.

62

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

C

Extreme Right-Wing Parties (ERWPs)

As we will see in Chapter 6, depending upon the circumstances, mainstream political elites have either more or less incentive to frame immigration and human mobility as a public safety threat (Wright and Esses 2019). Moreover, although both centre-Right and Left parties in various countries have politicized and securitized immigration-related issues over time, it is the former which has politically and electorally profited from these trends disproportionately.33 This said, the chief political beneficiaries of the politicization and securitization of immigration are political parties located on the far right of the ideological spectrum, or ERWPs, a party family whose political ideologies, policies, and public discourses are inspired by nationalist, xenophobic, and/or chauvinistic ideas (Mudde 2016).34 Although scholars disagree about which features, characteristics, or even nomenclature best describe and unite these illiberal political actors (Fennema 1997; Ivarsflaten 2008; Mudde 1996; Schain et al. 2002; Van Spanje 2010), most concur that ERWPs have the greatest political and electoral incentives to keep immigration-related issues at the forefront of public political discourse (Akkerman 2015; Ivarsflaten 2008). Consequently, these parties are especially incentivized to respond to terrorist and other negative focusing events by cueing the public to perceive immigrants as a threat to its safety. The data in Figure 2.13 demonstrate the ubiquity of ERWPs across Europe, with many, if not most, having attracted a historically high vote share within their country in recent years (BBC 2019). Indeed, the share of the vote for these parties has steadily risen since the early 1990s, increasing from an EU-15 mean of approximately 4 per cent between 1990 and 1995 to 8 per cent between 1996 and 2010 and 13 per cent from 2011 and 2015 (Figure 2.14). Revealingly, only one ERWP, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) with 23 per cent in 1994, received more than 20 per cent of the vote during the early 1990s. However, between 2011 and 2015, three European parties received more than 20 per cent of the vote (FPÖ in Austria, 21 per cent; DPP in Denmark, 21 per cent; and SVO-UDC in Switzerland, 30 per cent) and an additional three garnered more than 15 per cent (the FN in France, 18 per cent; FRP in Norway, 16 per cent; and PVV in the Netherlands, 16 per cent) (European Election Database 1990–2015).

33

While some scholars (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011; van der Brug and van Spanje 2009) dispute the view that the Right is the ‘issue owner’ of immigration, Ivarsflaten (2005) argues that it is so because its positions are congruent with those of the average voter. See Pardos-Prado (2015) on patterns of mainstream versus niche political party competition regarding issue salience and ownership. 34 Ignazi (2003) argues that polarization of mainstream parties on immigration may facilitate the emergence of ERWPs.

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63

40

Percentage of Vote

35 30 25 20 15 10

Freedom Party (Austria)

National Alliance (Italy)

Flemish Intererst (Belgium)

National League (Italy)

Peoples’ Party (Denmark)

Progress Party (Norway)

National Front (France)

2016

2014

2011

2008

2005

2002

1999

0

1996

5

Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland) Election Year

Figure 2.13  Electoral performance of anti-immigrant parties in select European countries, 1985–2016 Sources: Chart compiles data from Archives of The Federal Assembly, The  Swiss Parliament (www.parlament.ch/en/%c3%bcber-dasparlament/archives), European Election Database (www.nsd.uib.no/ european_election_database/country/norway/), Historical Archive of Election (http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php), Elections in Europe, a Data Handbook (Nohlen and Stover, 2010), and How Far Is Europe Swinging to the Right by Aisch, Pearce, and Rousseau, The New York Times (www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/22/world/europe/europeright-wing-austria-hungary​.html?_r=0).

14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%

1990–1995

1996–2000

2001–2005

2006–2010

2011–2015

Figure 2.14  Mean electoral support for ERWPs in EU-15, 1990–2015 Source: European Election Database: www.nsd.uib.no/european_ election_database.

64

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

Regarding policy, most ERWPs in Europe are especially driven by the objectives to halt all new immigration and reverse the trend toward a multicultural society, the societal outcome most closely associated with significant, Third World immigrant settlement (Veugelers 2000: 28–29). Indeed, almost every ERWP that has appeared and achieved even a modest measure of political and/or electoral success since the mid-1970s has two features in common. First, as demonstrated by an abundance of crossnational public opinion and election exit poll data, much of the popularity and electoral support of ERWPs is attributable to the societal tensions precipitated by the arrival and settlement of post-WWII immigrants and the waves of dependents, asylum seekers, refugees, and labour migrants that followed them (Art 2011: 24; Betz 1994: 67). Based on the empirical evidence it is fair to conclude that ERWPs would be far less politically relevant if it were not for the phenomena of mass immigration and immigrant settlement (Mudde 2012). Second, to varying degrees, ERWPs have successfully cultivated a climate of public hostility towards and/or fear of asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants, which, in turn, has fostered a more favourable political environment for themselves (Gibson 2002: 128; Schain 1988). As their ‘signature issues’ (Akkerman 2018: 3), it is imperative for ERWPs to keep immigration and immigrant integration at the forefront of public political discourse (DeClair 1999: 191). Although it is self-evident that ERWPs foster and exploit popular hostility toward and unease about immigrants across Europe, it is less clear to what extent they exercise significant political influence (Biard et al. 2019; Minkenberg 2001; Perlmutter 2002; Pettigrew 1998), an important question that only has been addressed rigorously since the mid2000s (Giugni and Passy 2006: 202–7; Ignazi 2003; Ivarsflaten 2005b; Norris 2005: 266–72; Schain 2006). According to Williams (2006), the political impact of anti-immigrant groups can be empirically assessed along three dimensions: their influence on the positions or policies of mainstream parties within the national party system; on public policy, including legislation; and on shaping the political agenda. On the first score, the question is: Have anti-immigrant groups pressured mainstream parties to alter their positions on immigration-related issues? Although the evidence is somewhat mixed (Heinisch et al. 2019), it appears that the most ‘successful’ ERWPs do substantively impact, however modestly (Akkerman 2015: 63), the policy positions of mainstream political parties (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020: 839), although less so among center-Left parties (Joon Han 2015: 571; Mudde 2013: 9) and whenever mainstream parties on both sides of the ideological divide are in government (van Spanje 2010: 578). This said, ERWPs exert more influence on mainstream parties on issues of immigration control than on immigrant integration (Mudde 2013: 9).

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65

Regarding the question of whether ERWPs impact legislation on immigration-related issues, the evidence is clearer: their influence is uneven, limited, and varies depending upon the nature on the electoral system (Bolin 2015; Pereira Gomes 2019; Williams 2006: 202). While there is a positive correlation between the improved electoral performance of ERWPs and the adoption of a more restrictive posture on immigration and human mobility by center-Right parties, it is likelier than not that the latter have been responding independently to the concerns of their voters, and thus not directly bowing to political pressure from ERWPs (Akkerman 2018: 8; Heinisch et al. 2019: 10). In this vein Mudde (2013: 1) persuasively concludes that ERWPs are catalysts rather than initiators of illiberal policy change and, thus, ‘neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the introduction of stricter immigration policies’. The ERWPs with the most influence in effecting illiberal policy change in Europe have been those, like the Freedom Party in Austria, Lega Nord in Italy, and Fidesz in Hungary, whose ideological proclivity and identity straddle the boundary between the categories of an ERWP and a mainstream party (Zaslove 2004) and, as a result, have ascended to national office alone or as a member of a governing coalition in recent years. What of the possible role of ERWPs in influencing political discourse and the political agenda on immigration-related issues? There is greater scholarly agreement on this dimension of their potential influence. While ERWPs do not significantly change popular attitudes on immigration and immigrant integration (Mudde 2013: 7), their impact on public, political discourse and the political agenda nevertheless is considerable on two scores. First, they ‘normalize’ Islamophobia (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2012) and other expressions of anti-immigrant sentiment within the electorate and politically incentivize mainstream political parties to ‘parrot the pariahs’ (Biard 2020; Messina 1989: 127–28; Valentim and Widmann 2021; Williams 2006: 208), although their influence on the discourse of centre-Left parties is less than on that of centre-Right parties (Carvalho and Ruedin 2020: 386). Second, depending on the available opportunities, ERWPs place and/or keep immigration-related issues on the political agenda and play an active role in politicizing immigration-related issues (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020: 843; Carvalho 2014; Mudde 2013: 11). However, as we will see in Chapter 6, their intervention is not a necessary condition for politicization. This said, ERWPs do not influence mainstream political discourse and the political agenda directly. Rather, they do so indirectly through the media. Since most ERWPs ascend the political ladder as disadvantaged outsiders or niche parties (Meguid 2005), media attention allows them and their issue agenda access to the ‘political game’ (Ellinas 2018). To

66

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

a greater degree than their better-established, mainstream counterparts, media access and exposure gives ERWPs validation, political momentum, and legitimacy (Ellinas 2018). Second, the media can amplify the aspiration of ERWPs to radicalize mainstream values pertaining to immigration and human mobility (Mudde 2013: 16). Specifically, by framing immigration as a potential threat source – that is, by securitizing the subject – the media advances the objective of ERWPs to make the subject more salient and politically polarizing (Ignazi 2003), thus making ERWPs the primary political ‘winner’ of the securitization of immigration (Karyotis and Skleparis 2013). These trends are mutually reinforcing, as increased public discourse about and the politicization of immigration (Morales et al. 2015b; Odmalm and Bale 2015; Semyonov et al. 2006; van der Brug et al. 2015b) have been linked to the improved political fortunes of ERWPs (Bale 2003; Bale et al. 2010; Carvalho 2014; Laffan 1996: 88; Lehmann and Zobel 2018a; Odmalm and Hepburn 2017; Schain 2006).35 To the extent that the electoral gains of ERWPs reflect their success in mobilizing voters who are concerned about immigration, their rhetorical effectiveness in linking immigration to security have further exacerbated immigration-inspired anxieties within the public (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011; Rydgren 2008).36 In so doing, these parties have prompted many mainstream parties to compete for voters by making immigration prominent in their electoral platforms (Dancygier 2010; Dancygier and Margalit 2020; Livny 2020; Morales et al. 2015b; Ruedin 2017) and/or by adopting explicit xenophobic rhetoric (Barreto et al. 2011; Dolezal and Hellström 2016; Lehmann and Zobel 2018; Minkenberg 2017; Mudde 2016; Pérez 2015). D Public What of the role of the public in the framing and policy making processes? A large body of scholarship suggests that policy makers in liberal democracies ignore the immigration-related preferences of most citizens 35

The causal direction has been debated among immigration scholars (Schain 2006). Cross-national and longitudinal research on European political parties have concluded that the impact of the extreme right on electoral behaviour of mainstream right parties has been overstated (Akkerman 2015; Alonso and da Fonseca 2011). Drawing on evidence from seven European countries from 1995–2009, Carvalho and Ruedin (2018) show that the impact of extreme-right parties (ERP) on the political claims of mainstream left parties are limited. 36 According to Rydgren (2008), media and elite frames linking immigration to criminality and social unrest have been particularly effective in mobilizing voter support for ERWPs and anti-immigrant parties. Hajer and Versteeg (2009) attribute the reframing of crises in the media to the political rhetoric of the extreme right.

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67

most of the time (Levy et al. 2016). In this view, the mass public plays little if any role in the policy making process.37 The dominant perspective within this scholarship is that there is a ‘disconnect’ between mass opinion and immigration policy (Camarota and Beck 2002; Hansen 2000; Schuck 2007), with governments in nearly every liberal democracy admitting many more immigrants than most citizens prefer (Freeman et al. 2013; Morales et al. 2015a). This purportedly happens for several reasons. First, it has been argued that because decision makers and the policy making process are insulated from public scrutiny, popular preferences regarding immigration policy are routinely ignored (Guiraudon 1997; Tichenor 2002). Second, in a globalized economy where human rights and the free circulation of persons are purported to be ‘embedded’, the ability of liberal states to regulate immigration and, hence, to accede to the public’s preference for less immigration, is assumed to be circumscribed (Hollifield 1992; Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1991, 1996; Soysal 1994). In this view, the subjective and structural problems inherent in executing national, interest-driven immigration policies, problems arising from the fact that liberal states are and have been committed to open international economic markets as well as expansive political rights for all their permanent residents, has resulted in governments ignoring and, thus, frustrating the popular will (Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1992; Wright 2014). Finally, it has been argued that liberal immigration policies often prevail because public opinion is largely uninformed (Freeman 1995). As a result of its ignorance handicap, the public exerts little influence on decision making concerning immigration policy. Whatever their previous merits, the restrictive immigration trends that will be described in Chapter 3 and evidence of the public’s concern about and attentiveness to immigration policy now cast doubt on the veracity of these perspectives. In particular, they neglect how current political discourses and public opinion are facilitating, if not precipitating, ever more restrictive immigration policies and practices in Europe and the US (Geddes 2008; Givens and Luedtke 2004; Joppke 1998b; Koslowski 2002, 2008; Lahav and Luedtke 2013; Lavenex 1999). Furthermore, there is evidence that the public, through its participation in trade unions (Gorodzeisky and Richards 2013; Haus 2002),38 interest 37

Even when considered a residual variable, public opinion is often regarded as peripheral to policy making. The literature on opinion leadership, for example, suggests that the most cognitive publics play a role in policy making, but it assumes that they are susceptible to elite persuasion because of their weakly held preferences (Zaller 1992). 38 According to Wrench (2004), the contrast between the consensus and conflict frames of reference and the quality of the national political discourse are important factors in explaining cross-national differences between trade unions. If there is widespread

68

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

groups, religious organizations (Margolis 2018),39 and civil society associations (Bail 2012) indirectly influence the formulation (Böhmelt 2019; Marino et al. 2015) and implementation (Baird 2017) of immigration policy.40 Finally, and perhaps most revealingly, they ignore evidence that political elites and publics often hold similar views about immigration (European Commission 1996, 2018; Lahav 2004a, 2004b; Lahav et al. 2014, 2016; Morales et al. 2015b; Ruedin 2017; Statham and Geddes 2006; Zapata-Barrero 2009), thus suggesting a more influential role of the public in policy making than is often presumed.41 This said, as our immigration threat politics paradigm suggests, public opinion does not determine the course of immigration policy. Rather, its influence is typically indirect. In this vein van Dijk (2013: xvii–viii) observes that ‘the discourse of politics and the media both express elite attitudes and ideologies on immigration, as well as shape those of the public at large – which elites in turn use to legitimate their own prejudices and policies’. Indeed, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ thesis applies here in that public opinion establishes the norms or ‘rules of the game’ by which political elites structure their discourse and, subsequently, formulate and implement public policy (Checkel 1999; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; March and Olsen 1983; Roos and Zaun 2014; Thielemann 2003). Thus, the primary roles of the public in the agenda setting and implementation processes are to provide input and oversight. The institutional opportunities and circumstances under which the public influences policy making vary cross-nationally (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006) and across political opportunity structures, especially for ERWPs (Pardo-Pardos 2015).42 Public pressure to restrict immigration, for

39



40

41

42

racist, anti-immigrant, and Islamophobic discourse by political leaders and the media is widespread they may be incorporated into union policies and practices and/or pose a dilemma to unions in interactions with their rank and file. Margolis (2020) argues that religious leaders, clergy or evangelical Christian elites try to encourage evangelicals to adopt and act on a policy position that does not conflict with other social identities, to ensure their mobilization on immigration. She emphasizes that individuals are more likely to act on their attitudes when they perceive these opinions to be congruent with group norms. An analysis of the imposition of carrier sanctions in Europe between 2000 and 2014, for example, revealed that the variations in political pressure and public opinion impacted the number and cost of fines, or more specifically the degree to which regulations were enforced (Baird 2017). To secure re-election governments must respond to the public’s policy preferences and demands (Arnold and Franklin 2012; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Policymakers are expected to give greater attention to issues citizens care about most (Morales et al. 2015b: 1496). The judiciary in the US is often susceptible to public pressure. For this reason, Etzioni (2004, 2015) argues that civil libertarians fear judges who are elected or politically appointed and thus vulnerable to the influence of a jingoistic or unpredictable public since 11 September.

IV  Problematizing Immigration

69

instance, is frequently effective in the UK, whose form of parliamentary government and two-party system are especially responsive to majority voter sentiment (Money 1999). Majoritarian systems in other countries also enhance the public’s voice (Breuning and Luedtke 2008). National referenda in Switzerland too allow majority public opinion to influence the course of immigration policy making directly (Mahnig and Wimmer 2003; Ruedin and D’Amato 2015). Moreover, in the case of the US, Hunt (2006) persuasively argues that three developments since 11 September have enhanced the influence of the electorate over elected policy makers. First, Americans have altered their thinking about the salience of immigration issues. Second, their attentiveness to immigration as a national issue has increased. Finally, as popular awareness of immigration-related issues and policy divisions between the major political parties have risen, Americans have begun to use immigration as an evaluative criterion for their vote choice. The number of policy access points has also expanded for immigration issue publics over time, access that amplifies the public’s collective voice on migration-related issues. First, the democratization of policy making institutions such as the European Parliament provides an entry point for Europeans to influence the course of immigration policy (Gabel 1998; Marcinkowski and Donk 2012). Second, the forces of globalization have led to the proliferation of a wide range of news sources (e.g., cable television, social media) as well as a plethora of social networks (e.g., blogs). These venues have facilitated the activities and promoted the agendas of numerous grassroots civil society actors and organizations engaged in public debate, and have expanded channels for claims-making about immigration, beyond the act of voting (Ruedin 2015).43 Such alternative public outlets have the potential for magnifying a collective voice and channelling a more diverse and pluralistic ‘issue public’ which include not only extreme Right partisans (Calhoun 1988; Hajer and Versteeg 2009), but also grass-roots civil libertarians and pro-immigrant supporters (Bechtel et al. 2014). IV

Problematizing Immigration

A

Objective Factors

Which factors explain the increased salience and problematization of immigration across the liberal states? Their causes are numerous and will 43

According to Ruedin and Berkhout (2012), political claims-making is a form of political representation, and has been subject to changes in framing (Berkhout 2012).

70

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security 10.5

7.7

7.6 6.9

5.9

5.7

5.9 5.1

4.6

5.2

5

4.2

4

3.8

3.1 2.3 2.2

2.9 2.3

2.1

2.1

1.3 0.6

3.9

3.8

4

3.2 2.6

2.4

2.5 2.1

1.7

0.7

Average annual rate of change (%) 1999−2000

US

UK

Sweden

Spain

Portugal

Netherlands

Luxembourg

Italy

Ireland

Iceland

Greece

Germany

France

Finland

Denmark

Belgium

Austria

–0.1

Average annual rate of change (%) 2000−2013

Figure 2.15 Rate of change in migration to Europe and US, 1999– 2013 (in percentages) Source: UN Population Division (2013).

be further explored in the following chapters. Here we can confidently conclude, based on the empirical evidence presented below, that neither the rate of change in immigration flows, an increase in the size of the domestic immigrant or Muslim population, nor greater popular hostility to immigration over time explain these phenomena.44 Indeed, as the data in Figure 2.15 indicate, the rate of change in migration flows to Europe and the US changed little between 1999 and 2013. Apart from the Mediterranean countries and Germany, it was relatively stable over time. Similarly, while the absolute size of their immigrant populations expanded in most of the EU-15 member state countries, their share of the total population either grew modestly (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden), 44

In 1960, migrant ratios worldwide constituted roughly the same proportion (approximately 2.9) of the total population when the world was smaller (75 million migrants out of a population of roughly three billion). While the absolute numbers of migrants have grown to approximately 275 million migrants in the world by 2015, this figure constitutes 3.5 per cent of the world’s population of 7.3 billion persons. Despite the increase in the absolute numbers of people living outside of their country of origin, the proportion of migrants has remained relatively stable, and its share of the total population increased by only 0.2 per cent from 2.9 to 3.1 per cent over the last decade (roughly 0.6 per cent in a half a century). See OECD (2013, 2018); UN Population Division (various dates).

IV  Problematizing Immigration

71

Table 2.6  Stocks of foreign citizens in EU-15 countries, 1999 and 2014 (in percentages) Third Country Foreigners/All Foreigners

Foreigners All Foreigners

Member State

Third Country

Third Country

Country

1999

2014

1999

2014

1999

2014

1999

2014

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK

9.0 9.0 4.3 1.4 6.4 8.8 1.5 3.2 2.0 34.1 4.7 1.7 1.3 6.0 3.4

12.5 11.3 7.1 3.8 6.3 8.7 7.8 11.8 8.1 45.3 4.8 3.8 10.1 7.2 7.9

– 5.5 0.9 0.4 2.4 2.2 0.4 2.0 0.2 27.3 1.2 0.4 0.6 2.0 1.4

6.1 7.4 2.8 1.5 2.2 3.8 1.8 8.1 2.4 39.0 2.4 1.0 4.3 3.0 4.1

– 3.6 3.3 1.0 4.0 6.6 1.0 1.2 1.8 6.8 3.5 1.3 0.7 4.0 2.0

6.4 3.9 4.2 2.3 4.1 4.9 6.1 3.7 5.7 6.3 2.5 2.9 5.8 4.2 3.8

– 40 77 71 75 75 67 38 90 20 74 76 54 67 59

51 35 59 61 65 56 78 31 70 14 52 76 57 58 48

Source: Eurostat (2015: 4).

was stable  (the Netherlands), or declined (France and Germany) (Table 2.6). During this period the share of immigrants in the population only increased in the traditional emigration countries (Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and the UK, the former of which currently suffer from the problems of population decline and ageing. More importantly, the rise in the share of foreigners in the general population in the UK is mostly attributable to greater intra-EU immigration (Eurostat 2018). Given the region’s demographic deficit (Fargues 2005c; Schoenmaeckers and Kotowska 2006) – a deficit that cannot be closed by higher intra-EU immigration – and the persistently low level of intra-EU immigration, the declared ambition of most national governments in Europe to reduce the number of non-EU immigrants is puzzling. Along these lines, only four per cent of EU citizens currently reside and work in an EU country outside their country of origin (Pew 2016; Wormald 2015). While this share has risen since 2004, when it was closer to two per cent, intra-EU mobility nevertheless continues to be a cause of considerable consternation among European policy makers. Efforts by the European

72

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Belgium

France

Germany

Italy

Immigration as Important Issue

Netherlands

Spain

UK

Percentage of Immigrants

Figure 2.16  Share of immigration population and immigration salience, 2006 (in percentages)* *Immigration salience is based on aggregate national averages in percentages of those who identified immigration as among top 2 issues to the question, ‘What do you think are the most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) in the moment?’ (Max. 2 answers). Sample size: 29,152. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm; see also www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/search-data-access/ebtrends-trend-files/list-of-trends/polit-issues-national/. Sources: See Chapter 2 for migration statistics; OECD 2006; Eurobarometer: 66.1 (2006).

Commission to dedicate 2006 to the ‘Year of Workers’ Mobility’ and to initiate a European Mobility Bus tour (Ingham and Ingham 2006) only modestly increased intra-EU mobility and failed to facilitate the emergence of a vibrant pan-European labour market. It is, of course, also not unreasonable to assume that the salience of immigration among citizens is closely correlated with the share of the immigrant population within a country (Allen 2010: 86–88; GilliatRay 2010: 224). The empirical evidence does not support this assumption, however. As the data in Figure 2.16 indicate, at the height of the salience of immigration across Europe in 2006, Germans, Spaniards, and Frenchmen expressed very different degrees of concern about immigration despite having the same share of immigrants within their overall population. Consequently, based on the cross-national data of seven of the major countries of immigration in Europe, it is fair to conclude that

IV  Problematizing Immigration

73

0.7 2002–2012 Anti-Immigration Attitudes

Portugal

0.6

Austria

Finland

France Denmark Belgium

0.5

USA Germany Netherlands

0.4

Spain UK Ireland

0.3 0.2

Sweden

0.1 0 0

2

4 6 8 10 Average Annual Rate of Change Between 2000 and 2013

12

Figure 2.17 Rate of immigration change and anti-immigration attitudes across countries, 2002–13. R = 0.087; p < 0.78. Sources: Data on average annual rate of change in migrants are from Eurostat. Data on anti-immigration attitudes derive from ESS, presented in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. European Social Survey (various), Waves 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012) and OECD International Migration Database. Data for inflows and stock of foreign population by nationality are from the OECD International Migration Database. Anti-immigration attitudes measured as the percentage of respondents who responded that they would ‘allow a few’ or ‘allow none’ in response to the question (B30), ‘How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?’ (Unknowns or undecideds (no response) were coded as system missing, i.e., excluded from calculations.) Post-stratification weight applied.

there is little if any correlation between the salience of immigration and the share of the immigration population. Although, as we will see in Chapter 5, popular immigration attitudes can become more averse to immigration after a negative focusing event, they are not, as the evidence in Figure 2.17 indicates, especially sensitive to a change in the annual rate of immigration flows. Indeed, an analysis of the data from 12 EU countries and the US shows there was no significant correlation (r = 0.087, p = 0.788) between the average annual rate of change of immigration flows and average level of antiimmigration popular attitudes between 2000 and 2013. For example, anti-immigration sentiment in Denmark, the UK, and Spain was like

74

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security Table 2.7  Muslim population in US and select European countries, 1982–2030 (in percentages) Country

1982

Early/Mid-2000s

2010

2030

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland UK United States Total

1.1 3.6 0.7 – 4.6 2.9 1.6 – 0.2 – 2.8 – – 0.3 0.3 – 2.2 – –

4.2 6.1 4.0 0.6 9.8 4.2 4.0 0.5 1.8 2.1 5.5 1.7 0.1 2.8 5.6 4.3 2.7 0.5 –

5.7 6.0 4.1 0.8 7.5 5.0 4.7 0.9 2.6 2.3 5.5 3.0 0.6 2.3 4.9 5.7 4.6 0.8 4.5

9.3 10.2 5.6 1.9 10.3 7.1 6.9 2.2 5.4 2.3 7.8 6.5 0.6 3.7 9.9 8.1 8.2 1.7 7.1

Sources: Kettani (1986, 2010) and Pew Research Center (2011: 124).

that in the US (45 per cent), despite all three countries having higher average annual rates of change in immigration flows during this period. As discussed previously and as will be validated in our attitudinal analyses in Chapters 4 and 5, there is little relationship between the number of foreigners and anti-immigration popular sentiment (Citrin and Sides 2008; Fetzer 2011; Legewie 2013; Stockemer 2016). The problematization of immigrants is also uncorrelated with the objective size of the Muslim population in Europe and US. Of the 17 countries represented in Table 2.7 only Norway45 and the UK experienced a significant rise in their per capita Muslim population between the early to mid-1990s and 2010. In the remaining 15 countries the per capita Muslim population either was stable, increased slightly, or actually declined during this period. Of course, especially disturbing to many Europeans is the estimated 33 million Muslims already resident 45 Norway is not an EU member, but rather belongs to the European Economic Area (EEA), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Nordic Council, the latter of which was formed in 1952 among Scandinavian countries to promote free movement of persons and labour.

IV  Problematizing Immigration

75

in Europe, including 5.7 million Muslims in France, 4.9 million in Germany, 4.1 million in the United Kingdom, and 2.8 million in Italy (Pew 2017). Moreover, even in the absence of new immigration, the size of the Muslim population is expected to grow in most countries because of its relatively high fertility rate.46 The American public’s view of Muslims is like that of their Italian and Spanish counterparts with smaller Muslim populations. For example, when asked in 2014 to rank every major religious group on a ‘feeling thermometer’ ranging from 0 to 100 – with 0 reflecting the coldest, most negative possible rating and 100 the warmest, most positive ­rating  – Americans viewed atheists and Muslims most ‘coldly’, with atheists accorded an average rating of 41 and Muslims an average rating of 40 (Pew Research Center 2014: 1). In contrast to Europe, relatively few Muslims have ever permanently resided in the US. According to one estimate (Pew Research Center 2016: 158), there were approximately 3.5 million Muslims living in the United States in 2010, or approximately one per cent of the country’s total population. Their share of the population is projected to rise to only two per cent by 2050, or less than half of the share of Muslims currently residing in Europe. B

Subjective Perceptions

Given that demographic trends do not adequately account for the problematization of immigration and immigrants in contemporary Europe and the US, it is appropriate to consider alternative explanations. Specifically, it is necessary to investigate the subjective foundations of the popular demand for ERWPs and illiberal immigration and human mobility policies. On this score, one obvious factor is the persistent disparity between the public’s perception of the size of the immigrant population and its 46 Despite the relatively smaller shares of Middle Eastern or Muslim immigrants as compared with European, Christian, and Asian groups within Western countries, the predominant target group has been Muslims (in some cases, second or third generation migrants). According to one report (Pew 2010), an estimated 26 million Christian immigrants (56 per cent of the foreign-born population) and nearly 13 million Muslim immigrants (27 per cent) resided in the then 27 member state countries of the European Union in 2010. Though Muslim immigrants constituted less than 27 per cent of EU-27 migration, they constituted 39 per cent of the non-EU migration flows. That means that despite demographic distortions, the reality of 1 per cent decade growth rates in Muslim populations (8 per cent since the 1940s), coupled with a magnified rate within non-EU populations, has at least some objective basis for concerning the public.

76

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security Sweden

Germany

7

12 10

Spain

11

Great Britain

11

Poland

13 14 16

12

Canada

14

Hungary

14

France

5 18 7 18

Belgium

19

US

19

Italy

23 23 14 23

% Point of Overestimate on Percentage of Immigrants

16 % Point of Overestimate on Proportion of Muslims

Figure 2.18  Overestimate of immigrant and Muslim populations, 2006 Immigration salience is based on aggregate national averages in percentages of those who identified immigration as among top two issues to the question, ‘What do you think are the most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) in the moment?’ (Max. two answers). Sample size: 29,152. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm; see also www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/search-data-access/ebtrends-trend-files/list-of-trends/polit-issues-national/. Share of immigrants refers to percentage of immigrants relative to total population. Sources: See Table 2.7 for migration statistics; OECD (2006); Eurobarometer: 66.1 (2006)

objective size. As the data in Figure 2.18 underscore, this disparity is indeed significant across Europe and the US (Bleich and van der Veen 2018; Jacobs et al. 2016; Landy et al. 2017; Meeusen and Jacobs 2017; Migration Observatory 2011).47 It is particularly large in Belgium, France, Italy, and the US where the public overestimates the size of the immigrant population resident by no less than 14 per cent. However, these discrepancies are also great in Hungary (14 per cent) and Poland (12 per cent), both of which have comparatively small immigrant populations. 47 For example, according to a 2011 Migration Observatory/IPSOS opinion survey, British respondents are more likely to think of immigrants as asylum seekers (62 per cent), and least likely to think of students (29 per cent). Yet, according to the official ONS statistics, students represented the largest group of immigrants coming to the UK in 2009 (37 per cent of arrivals) while asylum seekers were the smallest (4 per cent). According to social psychologists, ‘emotional innumeracy’ in thinking about questions is as much accountable for these biases, as a reflection of public worries than an ‘index of ignorance’ (Lawrence and Sides 2014; The Guardian 2014).

IV  Problematizing Immigration 15

US

1

SWEDEN

17

SPAIN

16

POLAND

GERMANY

5

12

2

14

20

4

16

19

6

13

0.1

31

FRANCE BRITAIN

21

CANADA

20

8 5

18

2

18 6

2

23

16

29

BELGIUM AUSTRALIA

14

0.1

ITALY HUNGARY

77

23

16

Mean Guess

Actual

Difference

Figure 2.19 Public perceptions of percentage of Muslims in select countries, 2015 Source: IPSOS Global.

As the data also reveal, publics across Europe and the US are especially inclined to overestimate the share of the domestic Muslim population. In six of the ten countries represented in the figure, natives were in greater error about the share of the Muslim population than that of immigrants generally. As Figure 2.19 shows, publics in almost all Western countries were likely to overestimate the presence of Muslims in their midst. Perhaps more revealing, only in Hungary and Poland, both of which have relatively few Muslim residents, was the public’s overestimation of the size of the Muslim population less than 12 per cent. This said, the disparity between the estimated and actual share of Muslims in the national population was greatest in the US where, as we saw above, relatively few Muslims reside. The long-standing proclivity of Europeans and Americans to overestimate the size of the immigrant population, and particularly Muslim immigrants, residing within their country raises an obvious question about its causes. The majority population’s perception that immigrants, and especially Muslims, are slow or reluctant to integrate culturally into the host society and adopt its dominant norms and values is undoubtedly a leading if not the major explanation. However, this and other negative public perceptions of immigrants do not originate in a vacuum. Rather, they tend to follow the identification of immigrants

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Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

as a threat source or a problematized population (Bleich et al. 2016; Bleich and van der Veen 2018; Jacobs et al. 2016; Landy et al. 2017; Meeusen and Jacobs 2017; Migration Observatory 2011) by the media and political elites (Haynes et al. 2016). Consequently, the gap between the public’s perception and the actual size of the domestic immigrant population across both major and minor countries of immigration is at least partly if not mostly attributable to media and/or elite frames which encourage popular biases toward or ‘blind spots’ about immigrants (Valentino et al. 2013). As we will see in Chapter 5, the tendency of the media and political elite frames to foster an environment of fear of and anxiety concerning Muslims cues the public to perceive most immigrants as a potential threat source (Farny 2016: 6–7), especially in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack (Bove and Nussio 2021; Solheim 2021). Within such an environment it is thus unsurprising that publics would overestimate the size of immigrant populations generally and the Muslim population specifically. Despite the significance we can attribute to numerical misperceptions, the differences in assessments of immigrant numbers and actual numbers is instructive about negative attitudes (IPSOS/MORI Global Online 2015), according to a survey of 24 countries (see also Landy et al. 2017; Wong 2007).48 These overestimates underscore the fact that the problematization of immigrants, especially Muslims, is uncorrelated with the objective size of this population. As Figures 2.17 and 2.18 suggest, the difference in error sizes may derive from subjective perceptions about problematized groups (Bleich et al. 2018; Jacobs et al. 2016; Landy et al. 2017; Meeusen and Jacobs 2017; Migration Observatory 2011).49 The public does tend to differentiate among immigrant groups and problematize them differently, however. The findings of the Migration Observatory (2011), for example, reveal that Britons prefer that the number of low-skilled workers rather than high-skilled workers or students be reduced. These data indicate that popular attitudes are not necessarily focused on the numerically largest migrant groups (Migration Observatory 2011: 4). Despite their modest share of the total 48 According to social psychologists, ‘emotional innumeracy’ in thinking about such questions reflects what worries people more than an ‘index of ignorance’ (Duffy 2014). 49 According to the Migration Observatory/IPSOS report (2011) of British public attitudes, respondents are more likely to think of immigrants as asylum seekers (62 per cent), and least likely to think of students (29 per cent). Yet, according to the official ONS statistics, students represented the largest groups of immigrants coming to the UK (37 per cent of 2009 immigrant arrivals) while asylum seekers were the smallest group (four per cent in 2009).

IV  Problematizing Immigration

79

migrant population, Britons are especially averse to asylum seekers; in contrast, foreign students generated the least popular unease, despite being among the most numerous immigrant groups in Britain (Migration Observatory 2011: 5; Sturge 2020). As we will see in Chapter 6, this popular bias may not be arrived at independently. Both Labour and Conservative Governments have long securitized asylum seekers in their political rhetoric and policies (English et al. 2016), a propensity that preceded the events of 11 September by almost a decade (Hansen 2014: 207). Indeed, the British case is notable for the aversion of its major political parties and elites (Statham and Geddes 2006) and the public toward asylum seekers since the 1990s, a hostility that eventually spilled over politically to all three dimensions of the migration trilemma post-11 September. As documented elsewhere, popular concerns about and hostility towards immigration too is less correlated with the size of the immigrant population than with the types of immigrants (Brooks et al. 2016; Lahav 2004a, 2004b; Schneider 2008) and/or their ethnic or cultural characteristics (Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 2015).50 Czymara (2020), for example, finds that publics are more hostile toward Muslim immigrants in countries where political elites are exclusionary, and more inclusionary in cases where elites are more welcoming. However, these trends are not applicable to views about ethnically similar immigrants, which are largely unaffected by discourse. Based on these findings, he claims that political elite discourses perform better in explaining natives’ attitudes than national demographic or economic factors.51 Might the problematization and, specifically, the rise in salience of immigration possibly be a function of elite discourse and the public’s specific unease about the prospect of a further influx of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries post-11 September? It is, of course, not unreasonable to presume it is (Esses et al. 2002; Kam and Kinder 2007; Strabac et al. 2014). The emergence of multicultural societies and the proliferation of religious pluralism in Europe in recent decades have undoubtedly fuelled the public’s perception that Muslim immigrants are an omnipresent threat source. On the informational supply side of the public opinion equation, for example, Nyiri (2010: 98) observes that ‘although Muslims have been living in some areas of Western Europe in relatively large numbers since the second half of the twentieth century, 50

Similarly, the framing and salience of refugee and asylum populations with humanitarian-based migration (Hochman 2015; Newman et al. 2015) can generate more favourable views, despite the number. 51 This said, the evidence in Chapters 4 and 5 shows that threat framing can turn specific fears (e.g., terrorism) related to Muslims to spillover to all immigrant groups.

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Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

their presence generated political debate only when it became associated with a possible threat after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001’.52 Moreover, Kaya (2012: 205–6) forcefully argues that since, if not before, 11 September ‘Muslim origin migrants and their descendants have been primarily seen by European societies as … associated with illegality, crime, violence, drug, radicalism, fundamentalism, conflict and in many other respects represented in negative ways …’.53 In short, it would not be surprising if immigration generally, and Muslim immigration specifically, were viewed negatively by more Europeans post-11 September and/or other focusing events (Frederking 2012). However, as survey opinion data presented in Chapters 5 and 6 will demonstrate, the degree to which Muslim migration to the liberal states provokes popular unease should not be overestimated. Even in the intermediate aftermath of negative focusing events, popular attitudes toward Muslims and Muslim immigration are not always or everywhere more unfavourable. In sum, neither the rate of change in immigration flows, increase in the size of domestic immigrant or Muslim populations, nor greater popular concern about immigration over time explain the problematization of immigration in Europe and US. Moreover, although the salience of immigration within the public was greater in the 2000s than previously, this trend did not coincide with increasing popular hostility towards immigration. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the problematization of immigration does not exclusively or perhaps even primarily follow from objective circumstances, but rather with the interpretation or framing of these circumstances by the media and political elites. These observations reinforce the import of politicization or, as Hopkins (2010) explains, the interaction effects between migrant numbers and threat framing in shaping immigration attitudes. As we’ve argued above, frames play a vital role in problematizing immigration along one or more threat dimensions. As a ‘situational trigger’ of attitudinal predispositions (Sniderman et al. 2004), a public safety frame causes immigration to be more salient and problematized. These findings concur with trends cited by political behaviourists (Wright and Esses 2019) and policy analysts (Scholten and Van Nispen 2015: 3) who conclude that politicization during the 2000s is largely a function of the foreign-inspired terrorist attacks or other security threats. 52

Most non-native Muslims arrived in Europe as foreign workers beginning the 1950s (Buijs and Rath 2006). In contrast, Muslim migration to the US was dominated by streams of asylum seekers and refugees. 53 These perceptions reinforce what numerous studies have established, namely that it is not the objective size of immigration groups, but rather the types or stocks of immigrants that primarily determine popular attitudes (Lahav 2004a, 2004b).

V  Effects of Immigration Frames: Issue Salience and Politicization 81

V

Effects of Immigration Frames: Issue Salience and Politicization

Assuming immigration-related issues are formulated and politicized in ways that determine the salience, intensity, and scope of political conflict (Riker 1996; Schattschneider 1960), it is necessary to consider the impact of threat framing on immigration policy outcomes. To the extent that the problematization of immigration is more closely linked to framing and subjective threat perceptions than to objective factors (Kilroy 2018), we gain insight into the effects of immigration frames on issue salience, polarization, political conflict, securitization, and the trajectory of immigration policy. Cultural frames advanced by the media and political elites, for example, often suggest that the core cultural beliefs, values, and/or norms of the dominant group are threatened by immigrants (Pantoja 2006).54 It is in this context that immigration is frequently promoted by elites and, hence, perceived by the public as a threat to national identity and/or social solidarity (Citrin and Sears 2009; Citrin and Sides 2008; Citrin and Wright 2009; Huntington 2004; Kinder and Kam 2010; Schnapper 2004; Stokes 2017; Wright et al. 2012). An economic threat frame, conversely, can advance the narrative that immigrants undermine native worker wages and employment and the equitable distribution of welfare state resources (Butz and Kehrberg 2015; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Malhotra et al. 2013; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Finally, while a public safety threat frame frequently conflates immigration with terrorism (Samples and Ekins 2014; Spencer 2008), it can also promote the narrative that immigrants disproportionately engage in violence and crime (Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011; Fitzgerald et al. 2012).55 Because they influence the degree to which immigration-related issues are salient, politically polarizing, conflictual, and securitized, different safety frames invariably promote different immigration and human mobility policy outcomes, as is suggested in Table 2.8. For example, when the dominant frame pertaining to immigration was economic or humanitarian, as it generally was in the liberal states up until the 1980s or so, immigration-related issues were not especially politically 54

According to Leong and Ward (2006), there are four clusters of cultural values related to immigration attitudes: humanitarianism-egalitarianism, conservation, collectivism, and instrumentality. 55 Though some scholars (Kroh and Bug 2016) suggest that the media effects of both issues crime and terrorism are worthy of unpacking at the individual attitudinal level to determine attitudes, for our purposes we combine their impact as they manifest themselves as public safety threats.

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Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

Table 2.8  Immigration frames and their effects, 1940s–2020s

Period

Dominant Frame

Salience

Political Polarization Conflict

Securitization

Policy Trajectory

1940s–50s 1960s–70s 1980s–90s 2000–20s

Humanitarian Economic Cultural New Security

Low Low Moderate High

Low Low High Uneven

Low Low Moderate High

Liberal Liberal Mixed Restrictive

Low Regulated Latent High

salient or polarizing and, hence, either not politicized or depoliticized ­(Messina  1989: 21–78).56 Moreover, during this period the issue was not securitized, engendered little to only moderate political conflict and, more pertinently, liberal policies prevailed. These, indeed, were the conditions which generally prevailed until ERWPs in Western Europe and the Republican Party in the US incited and exploited immigration-related popular fears, particularly in the realms of culture and personal and national identity, during the 1980s and 1990s (Messina 2007: 54–96).57 The political conflict over the issue thus remained low and latent.58 In contrast, the predominance of a new security frame since the 2000s ushered in a period during which immigration is highly salient and unevenly polarizing, thus engendering higher political conflict, securitization, and restrictive immigration and human mobility policies.59 The securitization of immigration emerged as the dominant political discourse across the EU during this period (Buonfino 2004). In the US, 56

According to Alonso and da Fonseca’s (2011) analysis of political party manifesto data, major parties were relatively indifferent towards immigration during the first few decades after WWII. Except for the extreme political fringe however, Europeans were not particularly engaged by the politics of immigration, the issue was not particularly salient nor able to mobilize a significant share of the electorate or political entrepreneurs. 57 The ‘contagion effect’ argument suggests that the surge of electoral support for extreme Right or anti-immigrant parties motivated governments and mainstream political parties to adopt restrictive immigration policies (Bale et al. 2010; Norris 2008; Schain 1988; van Spanje 2010). On the other side of the coin, the polarization of the mainstream parties on immigration may have facilitated the success of ERWPs (Ignazi 2003). The immigration issue was no longer only the purview of ERWPs but became a central concern of mainstream political parties in Western Europe and North America (Meguid 2008; Odmalm and Hepburn 2017; van Spanje 2010). 58 van der Brug et al. (2015) argue that opposing positions and polarization may exist when the issue is not on the political agenda or salient, but the conflict may be latent. 59 According to Dancygier and Margalit’s (2020) analysis of political party manifesto data in Europe, the prominence of security threat (specifically cultural) has varied over time, even while the economic dimension has remained prevalent. Longitudinal Harris (2015) polls further indicate that although economic issues have consistently preoccupied Americans, public concern about terrorism has been much more spontaneous in nature, peaking in 2001/2 (22/17 per cent) and again in 2015 (24 per cent).

V  Effects of Immigration Frames: Issue Salience and Politicization 83

too, the index of the salience of immigration was below its mean for the first 8 months of 2001, before spiking thereafter (Hopkins 2010: 51).60 Moreover, many if not most political parties in the liberal states have made immigration more prominent in their electoral platforms post-11 September (Dancygier 2010; Dancygier and Margalit 2020; Livny 2020; Morales et al. 2015b; Ruedin et al. 2017). An increase in the number of roll-call votes (Hix et al. 2007, 2009; Ivaldi et al. 2016) and higher media content on the subject also underscore the ascent of immigration on the political agenda (Bleich et al. 2015; Jacobs et al. 2017; Livny 2020). Notably, in framing immigration as a public safety threat, the issue shifted from a low to a high priority requiring an urgent policy response, thus suggesting the need to close territorial borders (Schain 2019; Spencer 2008; Rudolph 2006) and issue temporary ‘exceptions’ that circumscribe civil liberties (Flynn and Flynn 2017; Guild and van Selm 2005; Haubrich 2003; Huysmans and Buonfino 2008; Keeble 2005). Furthermore, as a major research study of media coverage on the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe revealed, there was a temporal shift in the framing of the crisis from a humanitarian to a securitarian crisis, corresponding with an evolution in public attitudes from empathetic to hostile or suspicious (Consterdine 2018a). In all cases, as the salience of immigration increased, so too did its potential to become politicized (Grande et al. 2019; Kriesi et al. 2012).61 That immigration and terrorism were quickly conflated in the aftermath of 11 September, without substantial political debate (Hammerstad 2010), underscored the extent that it was already subsumed within a discourse of unease and fear (Huysmans 2006: 63; Tirman 2004), ‘as the ground had already been laid for perceiving immigrants and asylum seekers within a security perspective’ (Hammerstad 2010: 174). In the face of these challenges to the liberal markets and rights agenda, most Western politicians (ERWPs excepted) agreed that it served them best to contain the ‘scope of conflict’ (Grande et al. 2019; Schattschneider 1960) and expand regulation. Specifically, politicians depoliticized (Burnham 2001; Hampshire 2013; Kunz 2011; Scholten and Van Nispen 2015) the conflict by devolving the issue to technocrats (Caramani 2017; 60 While the new security era began in earnest in post-2001 period, threat frames have considerably fluctuated (Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017; Haynes et al. 2016; Ruedin and D’Amato 2015). After 11 September, its salience rose to 94th percentile (Hopkins 2010: 51). In contrast to the American experience, media frames in Europe did not shift immediately in response to the events of 11 September; rather they mostly postdated the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings (Ettinger and Imhof 2011). 61 According to Downs’ (1972) theory of political party competition, politicization involves diverging views on a topic that challenges the status quo and polarizes the debate on it.

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Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

Kawar  2013), bureaucrats, information entrepreneurs, policy experts (Boswell 2008; Boswell et al. 2011; Scholten and Timmermans 2010; Scholten and van Nispen 2015), as well as non-governmental security stakeholders (Bigo 2002; Guild 2009; Lemberg-Pederson 2018). Mainstream politicians were thus able to adopt enforcement strategies that could both defuse the issue and undermine the electoral appeal of ERWPs (Lahav 2013). Against this backdrop, there is little doubt immigration became politicized in Europe and the US during the 1990s (Schain 2012: 481) – that is, the subject became especially salient and polarizing among political elites and within the electorate (Freeman 2011: 1541; Kessler and Freeman 2005; van de Brug et al. 2015b). Prior to this juncture, immigration-related issues generally were not high on the political agenda. Mainstream parties were generally indifferent to these issues, as indicated by their absence from their election manifestos (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011). Perhaps more importantly, these issues did not influence voter choice. Though 11 September was not the starting point of the securitization of immigration, the prominence of the subject on the political agenda, as we will see in Chapters 5 and 6, has facilitated the conflation of immigration and terrorism since the 1990s. In keeping with Table 2.8, these developments suggest that the way immigration is politicized or framed affects how important the issue is to the public (salience), the divisions and intensity of debate (polarization), the level of political conflict (politicization), and ultimately, the direction of policy regulation and outcomes (e.g., liberal or protectionist). The changes in issue salience and frames, we argue, have generated noteworthy differences in levels of political conflict over time (Table 2.8). Considering Schattschneider’s (1960) claim that political conflict is a product of the early portrayal of arguments and strategies of political leaders and parties (Helbling 2014; Iyengar 2016; Schain 2012: 370), framing issues is therefore fundamental to the political process. According to Figure 2.20, the salience of immigration, as measured by the share of persons citing the subject as nation’s most important problem,62 increased significantly in the US. From less than six per cent between 1994 and the mid-2000s, the salience of immigration surged to more than ten per cent at numerous points since. The prominence of immigration also increased in Europe during the 2000s. Indeed, 62 Note that despite the problem with the ‘most important’ measurement of issue salience (Dennison 2019; Wlezien 2005), this variable has been increasingly used to confirm trends in political behaviour, like anti-immigrant sentiment (Dennison and Geddes 2019).

V  Effects of Immigration Frames: Issue Salience and Politicization 85 20

18

18 16

15

14 12 10

9

8

6

6

6

5 5

4 2

3

2

3

3

2

1

2

8

3

2

5

5

4

2

0 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 2.20  Immigration as nation’s most important problem in US, 1994–2014 (in percentages) Source: Gallup (2016).

the salience of immigration at both the national and EU levels largely appears to mirror the American pattern (Figures 2.21 and 2.22). As the data in Figure 2.20 indicate, the salience of immigration initially peaked during in 2006 when one in five Europeans identified immigration as one of the two most important issues facing their country. Although it subsequently declined, it ascended to new heights after 2015, with more than 35 per cent of EU respondents identifying immigration as one of the two most important issues facing their country. The survey evidence concerning the policy priorities of EU citizens compliment the above-cited trend. When asked to cite the critical policy areas that should be addressed by the European Parliament, Europeans identified immigration as a high priority over time (Figure 2.23). The salience of immigration for Europeans was greater in the 2000s than during the 1990s, peaking in 2003–04. As our media analyses above revealed, the import of immigration substantially increased as the subject became securitized in the immediate post-11 September era. As we will demonstrate in Chapter 6, the proclivity of citizens to perceive immigration as important transcended partisanship in the early 2000s. Partisans of both major American political parties came to view immigration as a major concern, although they differed on the appropriate policy responses to the phenomenon. The ascent of immigration as a salient political issue cross-nationally has occurred, not coincidentally, with the rise in the prominence of the subject on foreign policy and security agendas (Kerwin 2005; Lahav 2010; Martin and Martin 2004; Spencer 2008). The terrorist events of 11 September, followed by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London

Percentage of Citizens Seeing Immigration as Top Two Iusses

86

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Austria

Finland

Greece

Netherland

Belgium

France

Italy

Spain

Denmark

Germany

Luxembourg

Sweden

2014

2016

United Kingdom

Figure 2.21 Salience of immigration across select EU countries, 2002–16 Sample size: EB 57.2: 19,721; EB 59.1: 16,307; EB 61: 11,840; EB 63.4: 29,328; EB 66.1: 29,152; EB 69.2: 15,501; EB 71.3: 15,585; EB 73.4: 15,513; EB 75.3: 15,585; EB 77.3: 15,483; EB 79.3: 15,416; EB 81.2: 15,630; EB 83.1: 11,802; EB 85.2: 9,977. Sources: Data is compiled from Standard Eurobarometer surveys, 2002 to 2016. Eurobarometer (EB 57.2, EB 59.1, EB 61, EB 63.4, EB 66.1, EB 67.2, EB 69.2, EB 71.3, EB 73.4, EB 75.3, EB 77.3, EB 79.3; 81.2; 83.1; 85.2). They include Sweden and 12 of the 15 pre-2004 EU member states (and exclude Ireland and Portugal).

bombings, reinforced the perceived linkages between immigration and public safety that had been implicit in European societies previously (Bigo 2002). The evidence presented from our three country cases in Chapter 6 will underscore the fact that the focusing events of 11 September and the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings were critical turning points in the elevation of immigration as a salient political issue (Chebel d’Appollonia 2012: 1–3; Woods and Arthur 2014). While there is generally no causal relationship between the rise in the salience of immigration and terrorism (Castanho Silva 2018; Jungkunz et al. 2018), there is, as we will see in Chapter 6, considerable

V  Effects of Immigration Frames: Issue Salience and Politicization 87 40%

36%

35% 30% 25%

28% 26% 21%

21%

23% 18%

20% 15%

15% 10%

18% 15%

14%

14%

15%

10%

9% 9% 9%

5%

12%

15%

22% 18%

11%

0% 2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Figure 2.22  Salience of immigration across EU, 2005–17 Question: ‘What do you think are the most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) in the moment?’ (Maximum two answers). Data points are based on aggregate national averages for each year, 2002–10 among select EU countries, including Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Great Britain. Sources: Eurobarometer: 57.2 (2002); 60.1 (2003); 62 (2004), 64.2 (2005).66.1 (2006), 67.2 (2007), 69.2 (2008), 72.4 (2009), and 73.4 (2010) Source: Eurobarometer (2005–16).

co-movement. That is, a critical number of citizens became concerned about both immigration and terrorism during the post-Cold War period. Persons who cited immigration as either extremely or very important in influencing their vote during the American 2016 presidential election, for example, were also likely to cite terrorism as salient (Figure 2.24). This finding dovetails with the above-cited evidence that individuals who are especially concerned about national security will view immigration negatively (Jungkunz et al. 2018). Moreover, as the data in Figure 2.25 reveal, Americans expressed a range of concerns about immigration in 2016 but their unease about crime and terrorism was greater than that of either employment or the economy. These data corroborate evidence presented in other studies (Gadarian 2010; Igartua and Cheng 2009; Paul and Fitzgerald 2021) that immigration is frequently conflated with crime. The debate about immigration is easily provoked by the mere elite reference to (Heritage Foundation 2011), or investigation of terrorism statistics (Davis and Nixon 2018; Hirschfeld et al. 2018), Our tracking of media discourses above confirm that the salience of immigration has coincided with the cross-bundling of these issues (Chong 1993; Nelson et al. 1997). Public opinion evidence from Europe shows similar results. In mining data from nearly twenty European countries, Cruz et al. (2020)

88

Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1997

2000

2003 Foreign Policy/Security

2007

2009

2012

Immigration

Figure 2.23  Immigration as an important issue for EU, 1997–2012 Percentage of total respondents each year that mentions this particular issue as a priority or concern (top 3 or 4 priority). Round 47.2: ‘Here is a list. Can you tell me which policy area or areas the European Parliament should pay particular attention to?’ (Max three answers). Round 53: ‘Here is a list. Can you tell me which policy area or areas the European Parliament should pay particular attention to in order to defend your interests?’ (Max three). Round 59.1: ‘Do you think the next European Parliament election campaign should mainly focus on…?’ (No maximum). Round 68.1–77.4: ‘The European Parliament promotes the development of certain policies at the European Union level. In your opinion, which of the following policies should be given priority?’ (Maximum four). Sources: Eurobarometer Rounds 47.2(1997), 53(2000), 59.1(2003), 68.1(2007), 71.1(2009), and 77.4(2012).

discovered that acts of terrorism and anxiety about crime diminished an individual’s support for immigration, and particularly Muslim immigration (Doosje et al. 2009; Legewie 2013; Peffley et al. 2015; Spilerman and Stecklov 2009). Along these lines the data in Figure 2.26 suggest that Europeans are more likely to perceive immigrants as a source of crime than an economic burden or a cultural threat. This finding replicates those found in other cross-national studies (Ceobanu 2011; Igartua and Cheng 2009; Paul and Fitzgerald 2021; Semyonov et al. 2012). Indeed, several studies have discovered that citizens are concerned about the potential prospect of terrorism even in countries not directly

V  Effects of Immigration Frames: Issue Salience and Politicization 89 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Extremely Important

Very Important Terrorism

Somewhat Important

Not Important

Immigration

Figure 2.24  Salience of immigration and terrorism in 2016 US ­elections (in percentages) Source: Gallup (2016).

Increases Crime Weakens American Values Weakens the Economy Hurts National Security Don’t Know/No Opinion 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Figure 2.25 Popular concerns about immigration in US, 2017 (in percentages) Source: Vox (2017).

afflicted by it. According to a survey data analysis by Merolla and Zechmeister (2009: 6), anxiety among Americans about becoming a victim of terrorism was not only widespread in the wake of 11 September, but also after the 2004 bombings in Spain and 2005 attacks in the UK. Castanho Silva (2018) similarly found that the coordinated terrorist attacks in France in November 2015 influenced popular attitudes elsewhere in Europe, and especially in countries with high contextual vulnerability.

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Framing and Reframing Immigration: The Politics of (In)Security

Norway 2014 Norway 2002 Netherlands 2014 Netherlands 2002 United Kingdom 2014 United Kingdom 2002 France 2014 France 2002 Finland 2014 Finland 2002 Spain 2014 Spain 2002 Denmark 2014 Denmark 2002 Germany 2014 Germany 2002 Sweden 2014 Sweden 2002 Belgium 2014 Belgium 2002 Austria 2014 Austria 2002

76.1 85.9

24.4

69.4

80.7 52.6 61 46.3 60.1 64.9 71.1 63.7 70.7 59.2 69.8 64.4 76.3 56 69.5 66 75.2 72.7 67.8 Crime

36.2 38.5 40.7

44.3

28.3

23.9

Economics

26.3

26.7 33.9

19.8 40.2

33.3 33.2 11.5 5.1 22.5 20.2 27.2

32.1 29.6 34.5 25.8 35.6 40.7 24.3 20.8 30.8 9.8 26 9.5 43.8 38.8 38.5 25 23.9

24.5 19.3 33.9

23.6 17.8

24.8 22.2

39.9

Culture

Figure 2.26 Immigrants negatively impact crime, culture, and economy, 2002–14 (in percentages) Questions: ‘Are [country]’s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?’ ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?’ and ‘Would you say that [country]’s crime problem/economy/cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?’ The questions are measured on a 11-point (from worse to better). We merge responses 1 to 4 into negative value. Sources: European Social Survey (2012, 2014); Questions D30, D9, D27, B32, D28 and B33.

Among other contextual factors, he hypothesizes that the way the national media and politicians framed the attacks and contextualized them to their audiences may have been pivotal in precipitating greater or less xenophobia in these countries (Castanho Silva 2018: 848). The predominance of a public safety frame in recent European and American media and political discourse as well as public policy has not, of course, gone unchallenged (Balch 2016; Roggeband and Vliegenthart 2007). Rather, a public safety frame now competes with alternative frames, like humanitarian ones (Huerta 2013) that, to different degrees, justify (or not) a more expansive and inclusive immigration policy regime (Van Gorp 2005). A pro-immigration, economic frame, for example, has been promoted in numerous UN reports (UN Population ­Division, various dates) that highlight the need for the liberal democracies to admit more immigrants to mitigate the strains on their social insurance systems and compensate for the shortage of labour due to population aging (UN Population Division 2001). Moreover, an economic frame is oftentimes

VI Hypotheses

91

advanced by domestic policy makers in the liberal states to justify their recruitment of highly skilled immigrant labour (Temple et al. 2016). Nonetheless, these more positive, pro-immigration narratives have vied for attention and political legitimacy at a moment in time when the general public’s aversion to new immigration is widespread (Brader et al. 2008; Freeman et al. 2013; McLaren 2015: 51–85) and its support for ERWPs and other illiberal actors at its zenith (Mudde 2017). It is reasonable to assume that these trends can and likely do circumscribe immigration policy choices in ways that ultimately privilege restrictive over expansive immigration policy outcomes. VI Hypotheses Informed by the wealth of social science scholarship on framing as well as social psychological theories postulating a hierarchy of individual needs and values (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Inglehart 1977, 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Malka et al. 2014; Maslow 1954; Schwartz 1992), we suggested above that public safety frames will elicit different responses from the public than either cultural or economic frames. In contrast to cultural and economic threats, which are often politically polarizing because they spring from previously and strongly held values (Feldman and Stenner 1997), public safety concerns most often result in consensual views concerning immigration (Hammar 1985; Putnam 1973). Specifically, perceived threats to public safety will tend to make immigration more salient and thus engender a popular consensus in favour of protectionism and immigration restrictions; conversely, inter-societal discord and political and policy dissensus about immigration will prevail when higher order needs are perceived at risk. We further postulated that partisan attitudes converge whenever basic survival needs are perceived to be under threat. Moreover, because it makes the value of public safety prominent in both media and political elite discourse, the process of securitizing immigration will persuade a critical share of citizens to support or tolerate public policies that circumscribe fundamental civil liberties (Huddy et al. 2005; Peffley et al. 2015). Based on these arguments and observations, we offer the following hypotheses regarding the relationship between different threat frames, the salience of immigration and the public’s policy preferences: H1: Immigration will be more salient to mass publics when it is primarily framed as a public safety threat. H2: Public opinion will be more consensual when immigration is primarily framed as a public safety threat.

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H3: Popular support for restrictive immigration policies will increase when immigration is primarily framed as a public safety threat. H4: Popular support or tolerance for restricting civil liberties will increase when immigration is primarily framed as a public safety threat. Collectively, these hypotheses suggest that public safety concerns will motivate citizens to accept restrictions on immigration and the circumscription of their civil liberties. In examining and describing the policy developments and political trends pertaining to immigration that have occurred during the post-Cold War period, Chapters 3–6 will scrutinize the veracity of each of these hypotheses. VII Conclusions This chapter situated the migration trilemma cited in this book’s Introduction within a dynamic securitarian framework. Informed by evidence gathered from cross-national public opinion surveys, media content analyses, an experiment, and our two surveys of MEPs, it evaluated the ways in which frames have affected the course of the politics of immigration and the content of immigration policy in post-WWII Europe and US. The chapter also illuminated the effects of threat frames in shaping popular attitudes about immigration and evaluated the respective roles played by the media, political elites, and public in the framing process. Based on the evidence presented, we concluded that the way immigration is predominantly framed by the media and political elites largely determines whether the subject is politically salient and, in turn, influences the trajectory of state immigration policy. The chapter began by surveying the evolution of immigration as a domestic political issue between the post-1945 period through the end of the Cold War. It proposed that a safety frame elicits a different set of responses from the public than either a cultural or economic frame. In contrast to perceived cultural and economic threats (Valentino et al. 2019), which are polarizing because they spring from embedded and strongly held values (Feldman and Stenner 1997), popular concern for public safety results most often in fostering consensual views on immigration. When immigration is linked to a public safety frame, popular attitudes tend to coalesce around a more restrictive immigration policy, at least in the short term. Primed by both media and political elite discourse to perceive its safety is at risk (Norris et al. 2003), the public’s desire for safety trumps its attachment to civil liberty. The data presented in the chapter suggest that the increased salience and problematization of immigration since the end of the Cold War are

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not sufficiently explained by the rate of change in the velocity of immigration. Nor are they a consequence of a rise in the size in the immigrant or Muslim populations. Rather, the starting point for explaining these phenomena are the different threat frames that prevail in contemporary media and political elite discourse. Reinforcing the findings of previous studies, the empirical evidence presented in the chapter pointed to the reframing of immigration-related issues by the mass media following the events of 11 September, a process during which a public safety threat frame became predominant. The extent to which immigration is now predominantly framed and perceived by a substantial share of the public as a safety threat has, as we will see in the next chapter, profound consequences for policy. Contesting claims that liberal states cannot avert the so-called scourge of ‘unwanted’ immigration (Bhagwati 2003; Cornelius 2005; Hollifield et al. 2014), it offers evidence that under heightened public safety threat conditions state immigration and human mobility policies will converge around protectionism, and individual states will enjoy greater latitude for decision making than previously.

3

Expanding the Migration Policy Playing Field



Enlisting the Cooperation of Non-central State Actors

As we saw in Chapter 2, the demand for and supply of security-driven immigration policies across Europe and in the US predate the events of 11 September. Nevertheless, the emergence of a security-driven immigration policy regime post-11 September marks a turning point or critical juncture in the contemporary liberal state’s efforts to manage immigration and human mobility.1 Integral to the enforcement and maintenance of this regime is the state’s cooptation and/or coercion of international, subnational, and private sector actors to serve as surrogate immigration gatekeepers (Bello 2017; Bloom 2015; FitzGerald 2019; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Lahav 1998; Zaiotti 2016). As the evidence presented below will demonstrate, the participation of these actors in an expanded migration policy playing field springs from the liberal state’s policy agenda, beginning in the 1990s and accelerating post-11 September, to better secure its territorial borders (Herz 1957) and circumscribe the inflow of so-called ‘unwanted’ persons, particularly asylum seekers, refugees, and irregular migrants (Freeman 2004; Joppke 1998b). Against the backdrop of the ‘decline of state sovereignty’ debate (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Heisler 1986; Messina 2007; Sassen 1996), the objectives of this chapter are to identify and enumerate the strategies adopted by contemporary liberal states to navigate the crosspressures engendered by the migration trilemma. Contesting the claim that they cannot avert the scourge of unwanted immigration and/or immigrants (Bhagwati 2003; Cornelius 2005; Hollifield et al. 2014), its main argument is that the liberal states have largely reconciled the tensions generated by this trilemma by forging bilateral and multilateral policy 1 Some advocate for an international ‘travel regime’ (Koslowski 2011b, 2018), whose rules and norms would be more inclusive, based on ‘mobility instead of migration’ (2018: 263). In particular, the Model International Mobility Convention (MIMC), which was developed by a Commission of academic and policy experts in the fields on immigration, human rights, national security, labour economics, and refugee law, addresses the paucity of a legal framework to regulate the increasing movement of persons across national borders, especially workers and refugees, but also tourists, visitors, and students (Koslowski 2018).

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agreements (Kunz et al. 2011; Lavenex 2006b) and devolving many of their responsibilities for implementing immigration policies to subnational and private sector actors. In pursuing this multifaceted course, the immigration policies of states have converged, their burden in managing immigration-related responsibilities has been partially alleviated (Longo 2018). The liberal norms inspiring their once steadfast commitments to maintaining relatively open borders, implementing inclusive immigrant integration regimes, and safeguarding citizen and immigrant rights have been compromised (Adamson et al. 2011; Chebel d’Appollonia 2012; Sager 2017). The chapter’s first section offers an overview of the major perspectives and paradigms discounting the ability of contemporary liberal states to manage human mobility effectively. It scrutinizes the veracity of their common claim that the state’s prerogatives to manage immigration and human mobility are now highly circumscribed. The second section describes the various modes of immigration politics, the dominant actors, immigration types and policy outcomes with which they are associated. Section three identifies the broad categories of surrogate gatekeepers with whom contemporary liberal states now closely engage (Zolberg 1999, 2002b). Section four describes the expansive universe of non-central state actors the liberal state coopts and/or coerces to manage immigration (Guild and Bigo 2010; Hansen et al. 2011; Scholten 2014). Furthermore, it describes the incentives states offer and/or coercive measures they impose to gain the cooperation of these actors. Finally, the chapter discusses the roles of several major private sector actors play in managing human mobility at the sites of migrant entry, stay, and exit. Focusing on select representative cases, this section considers the functions performed by commercial airlines at the site of migrant entry, employers and universities during the tenure of migrant stay, and privately-owned and operated detention facilities in processing and expediting migrant exit. I

Immigration and the Liberal State in the New Security Era

Is the liberal state’s capacity to resolve the tensions embedded in the migration trilemma severely circumscribed, as numerous scholars of contemporary immigration claim? Can it successfully reconcile its need to meet the labour requirements of domestic employers and honour its traditional humanitarian commitments in the face of political pressures to abandon them? These questions have provoked debate about the capacity of liberal states to reconcile the tensions between their market

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and rights-based commitments and their political and security imperatives to circumscribe immigration and human mobility. The pertinent scholarship has generated several competing perspectives regarding these questions. The first, advanced by Hollifield (1992, 2000), has been labeled the liberal state thesis.2 This perspective underscores the subjective and structural problems inherent in executing interest-driven immigration and immigrant policies, problems arising from the fact that liberal states are, and have been throughout most of the post-WWII period, committed to open economic markets as well as expansive rights for all their permanent residents, regardless of their formal citizenship status. In this view, the capacity of the liberal state to manage immigration flows and execute a self-serving immigrant policy is constrained by domestic and international laws and institutions that are extremely difficult, although not impossible, to revoke (Hollifield 2000: 150). Due to powerful economic pressures, the pervasiveness of extensive immigrant networks, and the ascension of rights, the volume of migration to the liberal states is greater than both policymakers and publics would prefer. Closely related to the liberal state thesis is the embedded realist paradigm, perhaps best represented in the scholarship of Joppke (1999).3 As Hansen (2002: 262) describes this paradigm, it ‘is realist because it recognizes an interest among (rationally motivated) nation states in limiting certain categories of immigration; it is embedded because it attends to the role of institutional constraints in limiting this aim’. Although intersecting with the liberal state thesis, embedded realism deviates from it in insisting that the liberal state’s ethical obligations to particular groups, 2

This term was coined by Schmitter Heisler (1993). International political economy and political sociology scholars (Hollifield 1992; Hollifield et al. 2014; Sassen 1996, 2013a, 2013b; Soysal 1994) argue that liberal states in the post-WWII international system are considerably constrained by the attributes of their regime, namely embedded liberalism. They contend that rights expressed in the form of international agreements, constitutional norms and principles constrain the power and autonomy of states both with respect to their treatment of individual migrants and in their relations to other states (Hollifield 1992; Rawls 1971; Ruggie 1982; Walzer 1990). See also, Guild and Marin (2009) on constitutional challenges to the proposal of a European arrest warrant. 3 Hansen (2002) cites Freeman (1995, 1998) as the major architect of the embedded realist paradigm even though, to the extent that Freeman sees immigration policy-making as constrained, he privileges contextual and political over embedded and institutional factors (1998: 102–3). Moreover, Freeman (1994a) generally places greater emphasis on the considerable freedom states and governments enjoy rather than the constraints they confront in framing contemporary immigration and immigrant policy. According to Freeman (1995: 885), ‘the dynamics of consensus management among the major parties, combined with the limited electoral clout of extremist movements, mean that governments typically enter office with no serious binding commitments on immigration’ [emphasis added].

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rather than to immigrants generally, circumscribe policy choice. According to Joppke (1998b: 262), the state’s normative obligations combine with the logic of domestic client politics4 and the autonomy of the legal process to limit its interdependence sovereignty (Messina 2007: 11–13). This said, these constraints are purportedly self-imposed and not exogenously inflicted. In contrast to the liberal state thesis and embedded realist paradigm, which assume states are sovereign and predominant in the international system, the paradigm of globalization supposes that transnational forces beyond the state’s administrative reach and influence have severely eroded its sovereignty in recent decades (Bhagwati 2003; Heisler 1986; Koslowski 2000; Sassen 1996). According to this view, the transaction costs of international immigration have diminished, national borders have become more porous (Krasner 1999), and citizenship rights in the postindustrial polity have been reconfigured so that they are routinely exercised by ‘postnational’ members (Soysal 1994), including migrants and other noncitizens. Consequently, the prerogatives of liberal states to manage immigration flows and decide the conditions under which immigrants are incorporated within the domestic polity and society have been significantly and irreversibly compromised (Jacobson 1996; Schuck 1984). While the emergence of a ‘migration state’ (Hollifield 2004), characterized by the phenomenon of embedded liberalism, is accepted as a given by many scholars, this thesis, we argue, underestimates the dynamic political contexts and security paradigms informing contemporary immigration and human mobility policy practices and norms. In ignoring the critical geo-political shifts in international politics that have occurred in the new security era (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ikenberry 2012, 2018; Katzenstein et al. 1999; Mead 2014; Ruggie 1982, 1993), liberal accounts largely overlook the politicization of immigration and the change in elite discourse about the subject in recent years, as was described in the previous chapter.5 Specifically, they ignore the 4

According to Freeman (1995: 886), ‘the typical mode of immigration politics … is client politics, a form of bilateral influence in which small and well-organized groups intensely interested in politics develop close working relationships with those officials responsible for it’. 5 Beyond the change of actors, Peters (2015, 2017) argues that the transformation of the global economy means that deindustrialization has reduced the need for foreign labour, and hence the impact of traditional pro-immigration business lobbies on the state. According to Peters (2017), the remarkable shift in the Republican Party from a more pro-business and pro-immigration views of Reagan conservatives to post-Cold War views of Republican Party stems from the changing needs of business groups, not their changing relevance in policymaking. By the end of the Cold War, globalization was sending

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new mode of politics that has defined contemporary immigration practices since the end of the Cold-War, when an entrepreneurial mode of policy making displaced client, majoritarian, and interest group modes. They deny their own ‘path dependent’ assumptions about possible critical junctures that can alter the policy paths previously chosen by policymakers (Pierson 2000).6 Furthermore, as documented in Chapter 2, once politicized across the EU countries and the US, immigrationrelated issues no longer exclusively fall within the purview of bureaucrats and employers (Ellermann 2006; Hopkins 2010; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006a: 212). The politicization and securitization of migration displaced the expansive, interest-based mode of client politics, long characteristic of a political phase in which immigration policies were largely made behind closed doors (Guiraudon 1997; Hansen 2000). With the elevated salience of immigration, especially following immigration-related terrorist events, it is evident that Freeman’s (1995) client politics model does not now well represent the role of an attentive public in determining the course of immigration policy (Levy et al. 2016).7 Thus, while these perspectives are not without merit, their assessment of the state’s ability to resolve the tensions embedded in the migration trilemma overlook the adaptive strategies, practices, and mode of policy implementation that contemporary liberal states have adopted to manage immigration and human mobility. More specifically, they disregard the plethora of non-central state actors (Risse-Kappen 1995), operating on multiple levels, that act on the liberal state’s behalf and are mobilizable whenever the latter’s policymaking and implementation prerogatives pertaining to immigration appear to be circumscribed (Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Schmidt 2008). Indeed, while how immigration poses manufacturing jobs abroad. Business groups cared less about recruiting workers (De Parle 2019). 6 Constructivists look to what public policy scholars have referred to as a ‘focusing events’, a framework seen to provide insights into the post-crisis policy formation process (Birkland 1997). Political economists and sociologists refer to ‘critical junctures’ or ‘strain theories’ to explain collective behaviour that relates structural transformations to changes in societal attitudes. Social movement scholars have especially emphasized ‘the importance of “bringing the notion of threat back in the study of movement emergence”’ (Van Dyke and Soule 2002: 513), and, ultimately, to explain ‘the role of threats or structural social changes on collective behaviour’ and its causality (Steil and Vasi 2014: 1106). 7 This model assumes that liberal immigration policy outcomes have prevailed during the post-WWII period because immigration has created both concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. Because the benefits are concentrated (to employers, ethnic lobby groups, etc.) and diffuse costs are spread to the public (who are more hostile), the former can more easily overcome the costs of collective action and influence government for openness. In contrast, because the costs are diffuse, publics don’t easily organize. Thus, immigration policy is based on a clientelist relationship wherein politicians predominantly respond to organized interests and ignore the unorganized public.

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policy and political challenges has been extensively discussed in the pertinent literature on the subject (Adamson et al. 2011; Hollifield et al. 2014; Mau et al. 2012; Ruhs 2013a), insufficiently explored are the liberal state’s responses to these challenges (Helbling 2016; Steil and Vasi 2014). First, with some notable exceptions (Calavita 1991; Ellerman 2009; Gest et al. 2014; Infantino 2016; Satzewich 2015; Schain 2019; Tennis 2020; Varsanyi 2010), few scholars have disaggregated the state and identified the set of intra-state agencies and actors that manage contemporary immigration, especially at the level of policy implementation.8 Second, they fail to consider the numerous responsibilities subnational governments have assumed for formulating and especially implementing immigration policy (Butz and Kehrberg 2019; Thielemann 2003; Thielemann and Armstrong 2013), especially at ‘street-level’ (Ellerman 2009). As we will see below, local governments are instrumental to the liberal state’s efforts to manage immigration. Third, they underestimate the eclectic set of private sector actors that facilitate the state’s remote management of immigration and human mobility. Through the processes of privatization and outsourcing, for example, these private sector actors act on behalf and in the interest of the liberal state across the domains of migrant entry, stay, and exit. Fourth, these perspectives ignore the dense bilateral and multilateral networks contemporary liberal states have established to exchange information and cooperate on matters of borders, migration, and human mobility (Longo 2018). Slaughter (2004, 1997: 183), for example, generally observes that such networks expand the state’s regulatory reach, thus allowing it to better master the challenges that traverse national territorial borders (Schain 2019; Simmons et al. 2018a, 2018b).9 Finally, in discounting the public’s role in policy making, the existing scholarship overlooks the extent to which statecraft is not only about the politics of power and distributing material resources (Baldwin 1985),10 but also about symbolic politics (Edelman 1988) and the distribution of symbolic resources (Andreas 2003: 110–11; Bail 2008). 8 Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1984) pioneering study on policy implementation defined it as the ability of governments ‘to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete’ its objectives. 9 The fragmented and state-centric nature of immigration politics and infrastructure means that immigration policy has not necessarily fallen within the purview of ‘global governance’, (Newland 2010) defined by Slaughter (2004: 371) as the ‘formal and informal bundles of rules, roles, and relationships that define and regulate the social practices of state and non-state actors in international affairs’. 10 To influence non-central state actors, states engage in what Baldwin (1985: 18–20) refers to as ‘statecraft’ by employing ‘both sanctions and rewards, both signals (or threats) and actual interventions, both carrots and sticks’.

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Indeed, the emergence of a new international relations paradigm regarding global governance, and especially transnational neopluralism (Cerny 2014), represents a ‘new architecture’ (Cerny 1990) and power shift resulting in the rise and fall of old and new categories of political, social, and economic actors, and the ‘hybridization’ of the public and private’ sectors. Issues like ethnicity, religion, human security, climate change, and human mobility are being assessed through a dense interaction of actors, among which the sovereignty of individual states is ‘pooled’ through the development of intergovernmental institutions and processes (Cerny 2010: 54; Krasner 2004). The new state sovereignty is at the heart of the liberal model of sovereignty transformations (Krasner 1999; Lake 2003, 2007), whereby the state’s devolution of authority to international or supranational institutions occurs on a cost-benefit basis (Hägel 2009: 354), especially regarding security (Katzenstein 2016).11 It is in this context that an international immigration regime complex (Alter and Meunier 2009; Betts 2009, 2010) and the multi-layered governance of immigration have now emerged that expands the immigration management prerogatives of individual states (Kunz et al. 2011; Lahav and Lavenex 2013; Lavenex and Stucky 2011). Such governance has spawned a new security architecture to purportedly ‘rescue’ states’ control prerogatives because of enhanced cooperation concerning security (Kunz et al. 2011; Goodman and Schimmelfennig 2020; Walters 2008a). Within this paradigm non-central state agents serve the state’s interests (Wiarda 1985: 62). Acts of cooptation through neo-corporatist arrangements (Streeck and Schmitter 1985) subordinates each non-central state actor’s interests to those of the state. A neo-corporatist framework represents the central state as an actor (rather than a subject) in managing immigration and human mobility and considers the interaction among groups as extensions of the state that can facilitate the realization of its preferred policy outcomes. Specifically, it reduces the relationship to a unidimensional rational economic exchange (Hiemstra and Conlon 2017). As the state’s administrative capacity expands, its linkages among official bodies and social groupings of all kinds proliferate. Against this backdrop, a neo-corporatist perspective captures the ‘webbing’ among the various societal actors and the state more accurately than is represented by liberal–pluralist perspectives which reduce these relationships to ones of power.12 Paradoxically, as the state devolves its 11 We distinguish here between power and authority, as the latter is not necessarily the ability but rather the prerogative or legitimacy to regulate (Peters et al. 2009). 12 In contrast to a pluralist perspective (Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1992) which characterizes state policy as the outcome of competing interests, comprised of the relative political strengths of different dominant groups, our neo-corporatist perspective postulates

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decision-making authority, the administrative reach of the state expands, often significantly, as new actors assume many of the responsibilities of the state’s enforcement functions (Cerny 2010: 50). However, the noncentral state actors enlisted by the state do not undermine its authority in a linear fashion (Peters et al. 2009: 22). Moreover, the expansion of the state’s administrative reach is not the enlargement of a single entity, but rather the increased density of relationships that centre on the official apparatus of the state. Invariably, the dominant arm of the state to orchestrate and oversee such compliance of non-central state actors has become more pervasive. While the diffusion of responsibility among the actors whose interests do not necessarily coincide appears to compromise the effectiveness of the entire mobility regime, the increasing reach of the state to manage all the moving parts is a key feature of this new immigration policy architecture. The devolution of state functions to actors with a competitive advantage in the sites and tools of regulation thus resolves its control dilemma and empowers the state in immigration-related matters (Collyer and King 2015). Contemporary ‘migration management’13 thus not only results in a multiplicity of control instruments and an explosion in the number of non-central state actors engaged by the state, but also in a normative shift in the state’s policy objectives. As we noted earlier, contrary to the common assumption that liberal states wish to achieve the goal of ‘zero’ immigration, their primary ambition appears rather to selectively manage or regulate population flows (de Haas and Natter 2015; Helbling and Leblang 2018).14 II

Immigration and Decision-Making Modes of Politics

As represented in Table 3.1, the shift from a policy type of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs to a regulatory policy type with diffuse benefits and concentrated costs covaries with a change in the mode of a regulatory framework in which non-central state agents serve the state’s interests (Wiarda 1985: 62). 13 The emergence of a migration management paradigm represents a rhetorical shift from migration control to managerial and technical regulation (Kalm 2010) or neo-liberal public management (Menz 2009). Decision-makers too have referred to such ‘management’ to emphasize administrative sorting (Meissner et al. 2013). Some political sociologists and geographers have referred to this emerging immigration complex as ‘spatiality’ (Hiemstra and Conlan 2017; Mountz and Hiemstra 2013; Söderström et al. 2014) de-territorialization (Coleman 2007; de Genova 2010; Sassen 2013a) or extra territorialization (FitzGerald 2019, 2020). 14 According to Doris Meissner, the last Director of the American INS, the newly reinstated DHS’s adoption of a risk-management approach to border security has meant that the state defines its task as managing and not sealing borders (Meissner et al. 2013: 6).

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Table 3.1  Types of immigration policy and politics

Policy Type

Mode of Politics Policy Frame

Immigration Type/Policy

Immigration Outcomes

Concentrated Client Distributive (concentrated benefits/costs) Diffuse Majoritarian Distributive (diffuse benefits/costs) Redistributive Interest Group (concentrated benefits/costs)

Economic busi- Permanent resiLiberal/ ness and dence/work Inclusionary labour visas interests Tourism, trade, Non-immigrant Liberal/ general visas for purInclusionary interest poses other than work Fiscal and Non-immigrant Restrictive/ welfare state visas for work; Exclusionary burdens, welfare for taxes, rights immigrants, non-immigrants, and asylees/ refugees Regulatory (dif- Entrepreneurial National sover- Asylum claims; Restrictive/ fuse benefits/ eignty, physical deportations; Selective concentrated safety, national amnesty; costs) security adjustments of status; temporary protection; detention Source: Freeman (2006: 230).

politics, policy frames, dominant actors, immigration type, and policy outcomes across the liberal states. Inspired by the scholarship of Lowi (1964) and Wilson (1980), Freeman (2006) argues that four policy types respectively predict when either a client, majoritarian, interest group, or entrepreneurial mode of politics will prevail across the liberal states at a given point in time.15 Table 3.1 revises and expands upon Freeman’s typology to include the state’s major policy proclivities regarding immigration across each mode. As in Freeman’s typology, distributive immigration policies typically result in the non-zero-sum distribution of benefits. Redistributive policies, conversely, precipitate the zero-sum transfer of resources between actors or parties. Finally, regulatory policy 15 Wilson’s taxonomy (1973, 1980) of policy types, distinguished by their different distributions of costs and benefits, suggests that these distributional patterns spawn different political dynamics. In Lowi’s (1964, 1972) typology, both concentrated and diffuse are conflated as distributive policy type.

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distributes the gains or benefits of immigration to some actors and parties to the detriment and deprivation of others (Freeman 2002). As Table 3.1 suggests, whenever the benefits of immigration policy are concentrated and its costs diffuse, client politics prevails. This, we argue, was the dominant mode of politics when the liberal states in Europe and the US were recruiting or facilitating the entry of tens of thousands of foreign workers into their economies between the early 1950s and mid-1970s (Freeman and Birrell 2001; Messina 2007). The subject of immigration was primarily perceived by political elites and the public through an economic lens. In this mode, which prevailed in most of the liberal states through the early 1990s, political opposition to the state’s liberal immigration policies was minimal and/or ineffective and the economic interests of business and organized labour were privileged by policymakers. Most importantly for our purposes, client politics facilitated the formulation and implementation of a relatively expansive and open immigration policy regime (Freeman 1995). At the other end of the spectrum, whenever the benefits of immigration are diffuse and its costs concentrated,16 the mode of politics will primarily be entrepreneurial. In this mode the liberal state coopts or coerces a plethora of private sector, international, and subnational actors within an expansive migration policy playing field. This, we argue, is the prevailing mode of politics across most liberal democratic states in the new security era. The transition from a predominantly client to an entrepreneurial mode of politics in recent decades coincides with three related developments. First, an entrepreneurial mode prioritizes public safety, law and order, border enforcement, national sovereignty and security, broadly understood. As cited above, in so doing, the interest of employers in securing an adequate supply of foreign labour is subordinated in state immigration policy.17 This said, the liberal state’s restrictive immigration policy course continues to coexist with its ongoing, albeit subordinated, humanitarian and rights commitments. Second, the tenor of elite discourse pertaining to immigration changed. As our content analyses of the national media’s coverage of immigration in Chapter 2 demonstrated, immigration 16 Among its diffuse benefits, Freeman (2000: 2) cites the ‘economies of scale, a larger domestic market, higher gross domestic product, an enriched and more dynamic cultural stew’. 17 Reflecting upon the changes wrought by the end of Cold War, Peters (2015, 2017) argues that a transformed global economy, and particularly the changes brought about by deindustrialization and the diminishing demand for foreign labour, reduced the political influence of traditional pro-immigration business lobbies which had dominated the agenda during the era of client politics.

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was primarily framed within the context of the economy, rights, or challenges of integrating settled immigrants prior to 11 September; thereafter, immigration-related news sources disproportionately promoted the frames of border control, public safety, and immigrant criminality. Although numerous elements of this playing field were in place by the late 1980s, when immigration was associated with criminality, both rhetorically and in public policy (Waters and Kassinitz 2015), the consolidation and more vigorous enforcement of these policies at the national, subnational, and international levels have irrefutably expanded in recent decades. Third, the elevated salience of immigration and an entrepreneurial mode of politics coincides with the proliferation of more restrictive immigration and human mobility policies. Now subsumed within the discourse of human mobility, contemporary immigration policies focus on enforcement, privilege the state’s law and order institutions. They aim to diffuse the benefits (i.e., public safety) and concentrate the costs (e.g., economic) of control. As we will see below, liberal states coerce or coopt a plethora of noncentral state actors, often at the latter’s considerable cost, to help them navigate and reconcile the inherent contradictions of the migration trilemma and, thus, achieve their preferred policy outcomes. Together, these developments facilitate the predominance of a new, exclusionary immigration paradigm whose norms, policies, and practices significantly deviate from the those of the post-WWII liberal period. III

Expanding the Migration Policy Playing Field: An Analytical Framework

In theorizing about the state’s management of immigration and human mobility, it is necessary to open the ‘black box of migration’ (Lindquist et al. 2012), and identify the actors involved in formulating and implementing policy. An analysis of institutions and process-tracking norms reveals a complex playing field which includes a universe of non-central state actors coopted or coerced by the state. Suspending the assumption that the state is a unitary actor allows us to understand the range of responses available to the liberal state whenever it confronts policy constraints, and the numerous actors and strategies which can be incorporated and deployed at its disposal to implement its policies. Eschewing a monolithic view of the state, Figure 3.1 conceptualizes the migration policy playing field and the variety of actors and levels available to the state to manage human mobility by proxy or remote control (FitzGerald 2019, 2020; Zaiotti 2016; Zolberg 1997, 2000, 2002b). As Figure 3.1 portrays, several major categories of actors participate in the migration policy playing field. To a greater degree than

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Inter/Supranational Actors European Union NAFTA Schengen/Dublin Foreign Governments

Private Actors Central State Actors Executive Legislature Bureaucracy Courts

Transport Carriers Employers Travel Agencies Educational Institutions NGOs Healthcare Providers Visa Processing Centers

Substate Actors Local Government State/Regional Government Local Law Enforcement

Figure 3.1  Non-central state actors involved in managing immigration and human mobility

previously, liberal states have now devolved their authority to manage immigration upward to international and supranational institutions, downward to subnational governments, and outward to private sector actors (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000: 176, 2006; Lavenex 2001a, 2001b, 2006b). The p ­ rimary value of these actors to the state is the former’s ability to provide it with the means and infrastructure (Xiang and Lindquist 2014) to manage human mobility more effectively, especially at its source (Bloom 2015; Gheciu 2018; Lahav 1998; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006a, 2006b; Zaiotti 2016). Mirroring the delegation strategies that the state has adopted in other policy areas (Lupia and McCubbins 2000; Pollack 1997, 2003),18 foreign governments, private security agencies, healthcare providers, and local law enforcement, among others, are inextricably linked in a border control regime (Simmons 2005), including virtual or non-territorial borders (Rosecrance 1996; Ruggie 1993; Simmons 2019). 18

Delegation assumes that states (i.e., ‘principals’) coopt ‘agents’ in an exchange of gains (Lupia and McCubbins 2000; Pollack 1997, 2003). This is primarily a principal-agent analytical model derived from the work of Williamson (1975, 1993). In applying a delegation model of asylum practices in non-democratic states such as Egypt, Turkey, and Kenya, Abdelaaty (2021) refers to the role of foreign states and international organizations as an instrumentality of state discrimination of certain ethnic groups.

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The labels applied to and the methods by which these non-central state actors are coopted or incorporated vary. Characterized in the scholarly literature as ‘deputy sheriffs’ (Torpey 1998), ‘agents’ (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000), ‘entrepreneurs’ (Gheciu 2018), and public–private partners (Golash-Boza 2009), the state in some instances offers these actors financial incentives to assure their cooperation (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013; Sørensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2012) while, in others, it imposes financial penalties if they resist cooperation. Similar to Assaf’s (2009) regulatory continuum ranging from greater to less state intervention, the state’s cooptation/coercion strategies run the gamut. They include devolution (Lahav 1998), delegation (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000), venueshopping (Guiraudon 2000; Lavenex 2001a, 2001b), externalization (Boswell 2003; Lavenex 1999, 2006a; Lavenex and Uçarer 2002, 2004; Lavenex and Wichmann 2009; Zaiotti 2016), outsourcing (Côté-Boucher et al. 2014; Infantino 2016; Sánchez-Barrueco 2017; Tennis 2020), offshoring (Morris 2017; Mountz 2010), privatization (Bloom 2015; de Lange 2011; Hiemstra and Conlon 2017; Kritzman-Amir 2011; Lahav 1998, 2002, 2005; Menz 2009; Scholten 2015), and commercialization (Bello 2017; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013; Gheciu 2018; HernándezLeón 2013). Yet whichever strategy the state adopts or the non-central state actors it enlists, its main objective remains constant: All facilitate the liberal state’s management of immigration and human mobility. While the form of cooperation varies, most subordinate the interests of non-central state actors to those of the state, the latter which maintains the prerogatives to reverse course and claw back its policymaking authority, particularly through ‘emergency’ (Dershowitz 1971), ‘exceptional’, and ‘public order’ clauses(Huysmans and Buonfino 2008). In contrast to a client mode of politics in which the competition among interest groups results in an expansive immigration public policy, an entrepreneurial mode of politics assumes the liberal state only devolves responsibility for managing immigration to achieve its objectives of safeguarding borders and resisting the political pressures of organized interests, and especially domestic employers, who prefer more expansive immigration outcomes. As the role of non-central state actors in the state’s management of immigration expands, so too does cooperation among official bodies and social groups. In contrast to a client mode of politics which is inspired by liberal norms and facilitates expansive immigration policy outcomes, an entrepreneurial mode involves the state commanding its surrogates to circumscribe human mobility. Consequently, the expansion in the number and density of surrogate immigration gatekeepers should be viewed less as the state abdicating its traditional decision-making authority, and more as its deliberate devolution of  such  authority

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to limit human mobility. In what might be characterized as an example of renationalization (Lupia and McCubbins 2000), non-central state actors  are enlisted by the state to achieve its restrictive immigration objectives. Though considered by some observers to have agency as ‘standards setters’ (Peters et al. 2009; Wheatley 2009), non-central state actors face great pressure to cooperate with and respond to the central state. Compelled by incentives or sanctions instituted by central states (Gilboy 1991, 1998), the compliance of non-central states actors is largely motivated by financial considerations. In this way, central governments transcend the ‘negative externalities’ of migration control (e.g., rights’ concessions, market integration) by imposing conditionalities on subordinate actors (d’Humières 2018; Stetter 2000). Due to their different institutions and constitutional arrangements, different states will enlist the cooperation of non-central state actors dissimilarly and to varying degrees (Breuning and Luedtke 2008). For example, in a federal system of government, such as in the US, subnational governments enjoy greater decision-making autonomy than in unitary states such as France (Schain 2019), thus making them less susceptible to the state’s coercion and, thus, more free to pursue an independent policy path. Because of these differences, it is reasonable to expect that immigration policies will significantly differ across states. Thus, whenever they are similar, we need to ask why. IV

Migration Policy Playing Field

To evaluate the extent to which the liberal state can successfully manage immigration in a new security era, it is necessary to discover how it pursues this objective. The proliferation in the number of non-central state actors managing immigration thus require a consideration of the state’s power and method of governance. A cost-benefit matrix inspired by our neo-institutional framework addresses the questions regarding ‘who has been setting the agenda, who is delegating, and who is the agency’ (Pollack 1997). Inspired by the linkages represented in Figure 3.1, we thus consider the central state’s objectives regarding human mobility and identify the universe of non-central state actors available to it and in its service. A

Central State

Immigration-related matters primarily fall within the jurisdiction of central governments. Although the national legislature typically enacts

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immigration-related law, the executive branch of government exclusively exercises the authority to issue circulares, or orders, that empowers its subordinates to act, orders that are oftentimes unpublicized and, more importantly, can be subsequently modified or revoked. Regardless of their origin, how laws or executive orders pertaining to immigration are ultimately implemented is usually within the discretion of national government ministries, including foreign affairs, home affairs, justice, and labour.19 While legislation and executive orders are the most common means by which the state manages human mobility, the bureaucracy tends to dominate the policy implementation process. The key to the state’s efforts is its creation of admissions and classification categories and its ability to create and recreate migrant categories like temporary protection status for asylum-seekers. The decision-making discretion that administrative agencies enjoy in this regard is expansive. However, given that bureaucratic and implementation practices are often publicly opaque, drawing national comparisons is problematic (Lahav 1997: 27). Variations in administrative or political cultures tend to yield dissimilar organizational structures (Jordan et al. 2003a, 2003b). Public policy generally progresses through the stages of agenda-setting, formulation, elaboration, and implementation (Jordan et al. 2003a; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006; Zampagni 2016). Each stage in turn involves different participants (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). The multifaceted processes of policy formulation and implementation result in immigrationrelated issues falling along multiple dimensions, domains, and competences. Some scholars have also suggested that these processes vary across different streams of immigration in that those most closely associated with the perceived national interest tend to be adjudicated by the executive branch while others are primarily within the purview of the national legislature (Rosenblum 2003). Moreover, the intersection of immigration with other policy domains, such as foreign affairs, national security, and social welfare, often results in immigration policy outcomes being mediated by developments in these policy areas (Geddes 2001, 2008; Geddes and Scholten 2016; Lahav 2010; Lavenex and Uçarer 2002). 19

In the US, besides the DHS, the Department of State houses several bureaus with related missions (e.g., the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Immigration, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The US Department of Labor (e.g., Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals Decision, Bureau of International Labor Affairs) and the Social Security Administration is required to approve applications for certain types of immigration benefits. Most crucial are the US Department of Justice (Executive Office for Immigration Review), Board of Immigration Appeals, Office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Employment Practice.

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State immigration and immigrant policies are inextricably linked (Hammar 1985; Freeman 1992). In positing his classic immigration policy dichotomy (i.e., immigration and immigrant policy), Hammar acknowledged that distinguishing between the two is increasingly inappropriate since states have shifted their immigration control mechanisms inwards by re-bordering their welfare state (Brochmann and Hammar 1999). According to some experts, the criminalization of undocumented migration has led to a legal regime of ‘post entry social control’ (Kanstroom 2007). In considering both internal and external ‘control mechanisms’ (Helbling and Kalkum 2018), Helbling et al.’s (2017) finegrained index building identifies IMPIC categories that include arange of policy areas and categories, such as citizenship, family reunification, labour, detention, and asylum.20 The intersection of these policies have not only expanded the migration policy playing field, but it has widened the scope, functions, and breath of the stakeholders involved in managing immigration and human mobility.21 These clearly have varying effects on different categories of immigrants (Bjerre 2017; Helbling et al. 2017; Hellwig and Sinno 2017; Ruhs 2013a) and discrete aspects of immigration policies (Beine et al. 2016; Bjerre 2017; Boucher and Gest 2018; Freeman 1994a; Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Helbling and Leblang 2018; Money 1999).22 Given that immigration policy making and implementation are multi-faceted, the assumption that central governments exclusively formulate and subsequently implement immigration policy is problematic. In practice, liberal democracies can and do deploy a considerable number of policy instruments and enlist a variety of surrogate gatekeepers to manage immigration and human mobility. More so than ever, the state’s expanded reach has been facilitated by an administrative apparatus known as ‘bureaucratization’ or for-profit, ‘bureaucratic 20

They measure this policy category along the following legislative measures: carrier sanctions, aliens’ registrations, information-sharing, biometric information, documentations, employer sanctions, detention, and irregular immigration. 21 Such interdependence recommends the subject of international immigration as a subset of the all-inclusive category of global mobility. According to Koslowski (2011a: 2), regulatory distinctions among foreign travellers, students, labour, migrants, and asylumseekers warrant different policy logics and constituencies. 22 Recent efforts to build indices and large-N analyses have complemented case studies and provided a systematic data base for immigration policy research. These include the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) project by Helbling et al. (2017) the International Immigration Law and Policy Analysis (IMPALA) database by Beine et al. (2016); the Immigrants’ Climate Index (ICI), the Determinants of International Immigration (DEMIG) project by de Haas et al. (2014); DEMIG (2015); Global Citizenship Observatory on EUDO Citizenship; and large-n-size country policy comparisons by Gest et al. (2013, 2014) and Boucher and Gest (2018).

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capitalism’ (Flynn 2016: 12). Bureaucratic discretion has expanded the number of private stakeholders and beneficiaries (Martin 2017), which range from aerospace and defence industries, information analysts, insurance companies, private providers for visa managements, etc. that work with national consular staffs (Zampagni 2016), law enforcement officers (Daems and Vander Beken 2018) or military representatives (Gheciu 2018; Lemberg-Pedersen 2018). Assuming national immigration officers and mid-level administrators share a particularly strong law enforcement ethos (Ellerman 2009: 7; Satzewich 2015; Weissinger 1996), it is not surprising, given the conflation of immigration with public safety, that the institutional momentum has trended towards bureaucratic cooperation and the sharing of institutional competence and (Satzewich 2015).

Cross-National Policy Developments

The volume of immigration-related legislation, and especially that which restricts immigration, has increased across all the liberal states in recent decades. To be sure, its pace has accelerated. As Table 3.2 reveals, other than measures to facilitate return migration, most European countries enacted little immigration-related legislation during the 1970s (UNECE 1997: 168). In contrast, almost every EU-15 country and the US adopted more immigration-related legislation during the first decade of the 2000s than during the 1990s (Figure 3.2). However, not all recent legislation has been restrictive. Rather, contemporary immigration policies are focused less on deterring all immigration streams than select ones (de Haas et al. 2018a).23 At least one-third of all countries have adopted inclusive policies (typically in the realm of immigrant integration policies) as indicated by the positive balance of aggregate policy reforms. This, of course, is to be expected given that contemporary immigration policies are not exclusively mediated by security-related developments. Rather, they are also influenced by the ideological orientations of governments in power (de Haas and Natter 2015), as well as the competing policy agendas of groups concerned with human rights, civil liberties, and/or the labour requirements of the domestic economy. The resulting ‘mixed bag’ of policies (de Haas and Natter 2015: 3), orientations (restrictive/inclusive), and dimensions (immigrant admissions/integration) is especially evident in the numerous reforms liberal 23 The DEMIG data, covering the period between 1946 and 2013, reveal a trend of increasing selective control of immigration by the liberal democracies, resulting in more restrictive visa and border control measures aimed at reducing the number of asylum applicants and other categories of unwanted migrants.

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Table 3.2  Select immigration-related measures across countries, 2000–17

Country

Measures

Austria

Aliens Law Package: Regulates labour immigration and long-term residence within a framework of a double quota and double permit system (2005) Action Plan against Radicalism (‘Plan R’): Provides for more police officers, domestic intelligence service members, extra surveillance cameras, greater security at airports (2006) A new general residence condition introduced that requires foreign nationals to demonstrate their willingness to integrate into society (2006) Higher migrant application fees imposed (2006) A ‘24-year rule’ establishes a minimum age of marriage between a Danish citizen and a non-EU or Nordic foreign national at 24-years old (2003) Ad campaign launched in Lebanon warning potential asylum seekers that benefits were being reduced and rejected applicants would be deported (2015) Law passed that allows the government to seize valuables from asylum seekers to help cover its expenses (2016) The Aliens Act sets minimum standards for qualifying for refugee status (2004) The Finnish government (2016) President Macron proposed bill that would make permanent certain special policing powers, including placing suspects under house arrest, closing places of worship, expanding police ‘stop-andsearch’ operations in designated areas; Macron has also proposed to reduce France’s ‘consideration period’ for asylum applications to a maximum of 6 months; to make illegal crossing of borders a punishable offense; and to deport economic migrants (2018) Immigration Law: regulation for self-employed migrants are implemented (2005) Self-employed regulations eased (2007) Government suspends Dublin Procedure but, a couple of months later, border controls are reestablished between Germany and Austria (2015) Acceleration of migrant deportations (2017)

Belgium

Denmark

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Act 2910 passed allowing immigrants a second opportunity to legalize their status (2001)

More/Less Restrictive More

More

More

More

More

More Less Suspension of Dublin conference is less restrictive but border control re-establishment more so More Less

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Table 3.2  (cont.)

Country Ireland

Measures

Carriers made liable for transporting unauthorized migrants (2003) Italy Government proposed reduction in jurisdictional guarantees (2017) Luxembourg Bill 6992 introduces five new residence permits for investors, a validity extension for EU blue cards, and allows families with children asking for asylum to be held in detention centres for a longer period (2017) Netherlands Aliens Act: Asylum applicants can be granted a single form of temporary status for one year (renewable twice) if they fulfill the listed criteria (2001) All prospective permanent migrants from countries for which the Netherlands requires an authorization for temporary entry must take a Dutchlanguage and social-orientation examination as prerequisite for entry. (2006) Portugal New laws criminalize hiring illegal immigrants and the expulsion of migrants receiving prison sentences of more than one year. (2012) Spain Operational cooperation among Spain and Senegal, Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria reduce the number of migrants to Spain. Towns located between Spain and Morocco are heavily fortified (2012–15, 2017) Sweden Government proposes offering recognized refugees three-years’, temporary residence instead of permanent status; also proposes restricting access to family reunification to immediate family members of recognized refugees. (2016) United Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act: Created Kingdom first English test and citizenship exam for immigrants and introduced measures against bogus marriages. (2002) 2UK Borders Act: Gave immigration officers policelike powers, such as increased authority to detain migrants and a search-and-entry. Act brought in the power to create compulsory biometric cards for non-EU immigrants. (2007) Points-based immigration system established constructing five tiers for labour-related immigration. (2008) Temporary cap on immigration to UK from outside EU imposed. (2010) United States USA Patriot Act: Expanded search and surveillance powers of federal law-enforcement and intelligence agencies. (2001)

More/Less Restrictive More More Less

More

More

More

More

More

More

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Table 3.2  (cont.)

Country

Canada

Measures

More/Less Restrictive

Law required creation of a data system containing information and intelligence used for determining the admissibility or deportation eligibility of foreignborn individuals. It also increased funding for border security by authorizing funding for new personnel for the INS and by authorizing funding for training for federal employees that staff the border. (2002) USA FREEDOM Act: Restored in modified form several provisions of the Patriot Act, which had expired. Imposed limits on the bulk collection of telecommunications metadata on US citizens by American intelligence agencies (2015) REAL ID Act: although passed in 2005, it takes effect in early 2018 and requires fliers who reside in some states, even if they’re flying domestically, to have identification other than a driver’s license to pass through TSA security checkpoints at airports Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: More Established qualifications for who can immigrate to Canada by setting up three major categories for migrants: economic migrant, family migrant, and refugees; Also explained who can be removed from Canada listing reasons such as security and criminality (2001)

Source: OECD (various).

states  adopted  to achieve an optimal immigration policy equilibrium during the 1990s and 2000s.24 This said, among the notable security-inspired immigration policies introduced post-11 September are the imposition of tighter visa requirements, more restrictive readmission agreements, transportation carrier sanctions, creation of territorial buffer zones and foreigner surveillance databases, and implementation of employer sanctions, work authorization checks, and biometrics.25 While these developments are some of the 24 Our DEMIG analysis demonstrates that despite the number of reforms, many of them were ‘less restrictive’. In our analysis of major reforms across the 15 EU countries and the US, we found that some countries adopted more liberal policies and especially related to immigrant integration policies. 25 As discussed in Chapter 2, although these initiatives began in Europe by the late 1980s, they multiplied after 11 September.

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formal and institutional responses to a post-11 September domestic and international security environment, largely overlooked by many scholars has been the state’s cooptation or coercion of non-central state actors to implement its immigration policy agenda. Consequently, to better understand the nature of the new migration policy playing field the noncentral state actors upon which liberal states increasingly rely need to be identified. The next section surveys some of the internal institutional changes liberal states have made in adapting to a new security era.

State Institutions

Perhaps the most direct evidence of the liberal state’s internal efforts to surmount the challenges posed by contemporary immigration is its establishment of new agencies and commissions with jurisdiction over immigration and human mobility. Italy, for example, created an Extraordinary Commissioner for Immigration during the mid-1990s who initially reported directly to the President of the Council of Ministers (OECD/SOPEMI 1995: 99) and, subsequently, to the Interior Minister (as part of the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration).

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Portugal established a High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Relations under the direct authority of its prime minister in 1996. Similarly, France created the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Immigration Control in 2005 followed by the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Co-Development in 2007. Even more illuminating is the relatively recent merger of previously independent governmental institutions. The trend of merging immigration policymaking bodies is evident in the flurry of new state ministries mandated to address markets, rights, and security issues. Austria, for example, created a Federal Office for Asylum and Immigration in 2014 to diminish ‘inconsistent practices within the country’. Belgium similarly established a Minister for Immigration and Asylum in 2008 (OECD/ SOPEMI 2015). Especially revealing has been the proclivity of national governments to place these institutions under the jurisdiction of their interior ministry and, in so doing, shift their policy focus away from immigrant integration to national security. For example, immigration and asylum policy was folded into the portfolio of the Finnish Ministry of Interior in 2008. Spain shifted the immigration-related responsibilities of the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Foreigners to its Ministry of Interior. Ireland introduced the Irish Naturalization and Immigration Service (INIS) that assumed the functions of the Minister for Justice and Equality on matters of asylum, immigration, and citizenship (DEMIG 2015). The INIS also collaborates with the Department of Jobs, Enterprise, and Innovation to issue work permits. However, possibly the most substantial intra-state change since 11 September has been the displacement of institutions traditionally charged with executing immigration-related policy, such as the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the absorption of its responsibilities into the unwieldy Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In bringing together twenty-two separate federal agencies under a single organizational umbrella in 2002 (see Appendix B), the DHS was the first major agency created within the executive branch of the US federal government since 1947 (US Department of Homeland Security, www.dhs.gov). Persistently plagued by low employee morale and a dearth of resources, the INS experienced a major reorganization during the 1990s. However, even before its abolition,26 the INS’s foci 26

In the lead-up to 11 September, numerous actors were involved in managing immigration, including the US Customs Service (Treasury); Immigration and Naturalization Service (Justice); Federal Protective Service; Transportation Security Administration (Transportation); Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (Treasury); Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (Agriculture); Office for Domestic Preparedness (Justice); Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); Strategic National

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had shifted from its traditional roles of enforcing immigration law and processing immigrants to devolving these responsibilities to local actors, such as churches, schools, and trade unions. The absence of INS offices or federal legal services in some areas of the US contributed to expanding the role of municipal law enforcement officers and detention centres in monitoring migrant stay on behalf of federal officials.27 These institutional reforms not only involved the organizational restructuring of the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) (service-oriented) but they also reflected a shift in jurisdiction from the Department of Justice (DOJ) (rights-oriented) to the newly created DHS (security-oriented).28 In addition to assuming most of the INS’s functions, which previously had been located within the DOJ, the DHS absorbed the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS). The DHS identified its comprehensive mission as ensuring the ‘protection’ of the US homeland (US Department of Homeland Security 2002).29 In defining its mandate to shield Americans from both physical harm and potential threats to their ‘freedoms’, the contradictions embedded within a comprehensive framework (Schildkraut 2013) made the migration trilemma more prominent.

Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System (HHS); Nuclear Incident Response Team (Energy); Domestic Emergency Support Teams (Justice); National Domestic Preparedness Office (FBI); CBRN Countermeasures Programs (Energy); Environmental Measurements Laboratory (Energy); National BW Defense Analysis Center (Defense); Plum Island Animal Disease Center (Agriculture); Federal Computer Incident Response Center (GSA); National Communications System (Defense); National Infrastructure Protection Center (FBI); Energy Security and Assurance Program (Energy); US Coast Guard; US Secret Service. In March 2003, INS functions were transferred to DHS and largely split into three new bodies: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (Customs and Border Protection), ICE, and BCIS. 27 Author’s interview, 13 July 1996. 28 In particular, the landmark Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2002, authorized the creation of the Aviation and Transportation Security Agency. This new federal government agency was designed to strengthen the security of the nation’s transportation systems while also ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. With a precipitous growth of budget and manpower, the effort constituted one the largest mobilizations of the federal government since WWII. 29 The US DHS issued a report with the National Visualization and Analytics Center (NVAC), Illuminating the Path, that defined its mandate to develop a program to counter future terrorist attacks in the US and around the globe. It specified that protection entailed ‘safeguard[ing] our people and their freedoms, critical infrastructures, property, and the economy of our nation from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies’ (objective 3.7). But, in safeguarding ports and borders, the Agency noted that ‘the most innovative analytical tools can be ineffective or even harmful if implemented without regard to security and privacy considerations’ (Thomas and Cook 2005: 157).

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A comprehensive approach to managing immigration also was institutionalized in the amalgamation of the disparate policy areas of immigration and asylum in the EU. On this score, the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty created an expansive area of justice and home affairs (JHA) – now referred to as the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ) – to protect the safety of citizens by developing common actions among the member states in the fields of policing, judicial cooperation, and criminal matters and by combating racism and xenophobia (European Parliament 2019). As the focus on managing immigration has shifted from primarily verifying traveller documents at the EU’s external borders to uncovering potential public safety threats foreigners pose, the instrumental role of national foreign affairs ministries and diplomatic and consular authorities in managing human mobility across the Union has become more important (Bigo and Guild 2005: 213). Most notably, the inclusion of the principles of freedoms, security, and justice into the AFSJ’s comprehensive mission pressured institutions to cooperate on matters pertaining to public order and safety. In so doing, they undermined their institutional mission to safeguard basic rights and freedoms.30 The conflation of immigration with security has also precipitated normative change, as reflected in the liberal state’s proclivity to pursue institutional burden sharing. For example, prior to 11 September, administrative barriers isolated security agencies in the US such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from one another. However, post-11 September, the federal government demolished many of the walls that separated these agencies. One example of the trend of inter-institutional collaboration was the change effected by the 2002 US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) which permitted information sharing across intelligence agencies and criminal investigations (Etzioni 2004: 31). This degree of inter-agency cooperation poses potential problems for safeguarding civil liberties. Specifically, whenever agencies share information with one another in one mission-related context (e.g., apprehending terrorists) and apply it to an unrelated one (e.g., apprehending irregular migrants) civil liberties can be compromised. Such coordination has not only been evident among the EU’s member states, which have a long history of forging neo-corporatist arrangements, but also in the US, which promoted burden sharing as an objective in the 1995 Report of the Commission on Immigration Reform. Regarding 30

Ministers of justice and the interior in Europe generally have prioritized security goals while foreign affairs and finance ministers and judges have supported the privileged the protection of rights.

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the latter, the US government mandated inter-agency coordination not only within and across its own national institutions, but also among civil rights groups, outreach programs, and international police forces, the most successful of which is the joint US–Mexico Border Patrols. The establishment of the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) in 2005 was an especially comprehensive response to the growing threat to border security and public safety. It lowered the barriers between federal and local investigations and bridged the gap with international partners in multinational criminal investigations (US Department of Homeland Security 2018).31 There were as many as twenty-five US– Mexico law enforcement partnerships in 2015 (Pew 2015). Although, as we saw in Chapter 2, the markets-rights-security equilibrium was destabilizing prior to 2001, it only became evident thereafter in the initiatives that merged institutions that once had distinctive and often conflicting missions. Across the board, liberal states adopted burden-sharing strategies to manage human mobility and, in so doing, conflated the policy dimensions of markets, rights, and security (Sasse and Thielemann 2005; Thielemann 2009). This new fused course was primarily driven by a security-related agenda (Kerwin and Stock 2007), as reflected in the liberal state’s increased commitments to greater immigration enforcement, an expanded migration policy playing field, and a change in the mode of politics pertaining to immigration policy making. B

Non-central State Actors

Through the mechanisms and processes of externalization, decentralization, or privatization, as described below, liberal states have delegated considerable responsibility for implementing and managing immigration and human mobility to non-central state actors situated at the intersection of immigration and security. The participation of these actors in an enlarged policy playing field reinforce the broader trend 31

HSI created the first BEST in Laredo, Texas, in partnership with US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and other federal, state, local and international law enforcement agencies in 2005. BEST Laredo represented HSI’s first combined, direct response to growing violence along the border with Mexico and established the baseline for implementing the program elsewhere. According to an ICE report: ‘The success of the BEST investigative model is predicated on all BEST partner special agents and Task Force Officers (TFO) working together in one location, recognizing and leveraging a threatbased risk-mitigating investigative task force model’ www.ice.gov/best [Retrieved on 8 January 2019]. The model leverages the unique resources and abilities of all participating law enforcement partners, and the availability to designate partner law enforcement officers with Title 19 customs authorities. This has led to the expansion of the BEST investigative model to northern border and commercial seaport locations’ (US DHS 2018).

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Table 3.3  Select non-central state actors at migrant entry, stay, and exit Private

Local

International

Entry

Transport Companies, Visa Centres

Police

Stay

Higher Education, Labour, Business, Hospitals, Civil Actors Detention Centres, Security Services, Transport Companies

Law Enforcement, Schools, Mayors, Courts Law Enforcement

Supranational, Intergovernmental, Foreign States International Nongovernmental Organizations Foreign States, International Non-governmental Organizations

Exit

associated with the securitization of immigration. The proliferation of non-central state actors on the world stage, largely within international security regimes, has been expanded incrementally to include a variety of domestic and international policy areas (Bello 2017).32 To varying degrees, they are coopted and/or coerced by liberal states to monitor sites that determine the conditions of migrant entry, stay, and exit. Foreign states, international and supranational institutions, commercial airlines, and private security services now serve on the front lines of managing immigration and human mobility (Table 3.3). Regarding controlling migrants internally, this responsibility is increasingly devolved to employers, institutions of higher education, and other societal actors such as NGOs, trade unions, and health providers. Broadlyspeaking, three categories of actors – international, subnational, and private – now play a prominent role, albeit to varying degrees in Europe and US, in monitoring external and internal control sites. The execution of their responsibilities at the respective sites of immigrant entry, stay, and exit are enhanced by their considerable and often unique technological and surveillance resources. To the extent that the contemporary politics of immigration privileges security actors who can assist national policy makers sort migrants, 32

The plethora of participants that are characterized as non-state actors has expanded dramatically since its original application of the concept to civil society actors outside of the state’s direct control (Held 1993; UN 2004). The multifaceted composition of non-state actors has varied from its original Lockean ‘civil society’ interpretation to one predominantly associated with private actors (Held 1993: 6), mostly associated with security governance or policy surveillance (Bello 2017: 64–65). Especially since the Gulf Wars of the 1990s, the concept has been conflated with military contractors (Bello 2017: 64). Gheciu (2018) argues that ‘security entrepreneurs’ have become important transitional actors during the post-Cold War era because of their military resources and to powers to surveil.

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actors like private detention contractors, construction and surveillance operators, or state and local law enforcement may have a vested interest or financial stake (Arbogast 2016; Tichenor and Rosenblum 2011: 622) in complying with the central state (e.g., the DHS), particularly in shirking concentrated costs. The efforts of liberal states to avoid the externalities of policymaking has been especially visible in the penal domain and in security services (Daems and Vander Beken 2018). Focusing on intelligence strategies, the linkage between counterterrorism and immigration policies, for instance, has ushered in new interoperable databases and interfaces, as well as a plethora of intergovernmental negotiations, lobby organizations, security fairs, funding opportunities, research and technology developments, fences and drone industries across the international policy environment. These activities foster new opportunities for a multitude of non-central state stakeholders who profit from and further reinforce the securitization of immigration. Indeed, the working relationship between liberal states and noncentral state actors in pursuing human mobility management goals is marked by both a political desire to control borders and actors willing and able to capitalize on the linkages among migration, crime, and security (Andreas 2004; Andreas and Nadelman 2006; Bigo 1996, 2002; Coleman 2007, 2009; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 2006a; Gheciu 2018; Scholten and Minherhoud 2008; Valeriano and Powers 2010). This trend is evident in the proliferation of public–private cooperation on criminal and penal matters, and the wider trends of privatizing and marketing security (Akkerman and Buxton 2018; Daemes and Vander Beken 2018). In many cases, the repurposing or ‘retooling’ (Gibney and Hansen 2003; Scholten 2015) of security entrepreneurs (Gheciu 2018), formerly key actors in the former communist or authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe, has facilitated the ‘militarization’ (Akkerman 2016; Andreas 2000, 2009; Avdan 2019) or criminalization of immigration that privileges new actors and new spaces (Coleman 2007, 2009).33

International and Foreign Actors: Externalization and Outsourcing

The proliferation of multilateral and bilateral initiatives to manage immigration and human mobility across most of the EU and North America institutionalizes the view that immigration represents a collective action 33

According to Avdan (2019: 20), a new post-11 September security paradigm has blurred the distinction between the liberal state’s domestic and international missions (e.g., military/police; war/law enforcement; internal/external security).

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security problem for the international community (Groff 2005; Lahav 2010; Thielemann 2003; Thielemann and Dewan 2006; Valeriano and Powers 2010) that can only be effectively addressed through extraterritorial immigration controls (Mitsilegas 2010; Ryan 2010). International and foreign actors have become strategic agents in supporting the liberal state’s efforts to manage immigration and human mobility, although their role in serving its security-related agenda has been generally underestimated by students of globalization. Indeed, the pooling of decision-making sovereignty regarding human mobility advances ‘common interests’ (Keohane and Hoffmann 1990) and empowers the liberal state. Although the process of institutionalizing an immigration-related policy agenda internationally was initially driven by economic and social development objectives, a security agenda has incrementally displaced these.34 The UN pursued this change of course in creating the Global Commission on International Immigration (GCIM), United Nations High-Level Dialogue on International Immigration and Development (HLD), and Global Forum on Immigration and Development (GFMD) at the turn of the century (Thouez and Rosengartner 2007). Building upon these initiatives, the UN Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was established in 2018 to better ‘manage immigration at the local, national, regional and global levels’.35 Though these and other international institutions prioritize economic development goals, they nevertheless foster inter-state dialogue and enhance the 34

The salience of immigration on the international agenda formally emerged on the forefront of international discussions as linked with development. The UN Population and Development meetings in Rio, Johannesburg, and Cairo institutionalized immigration within the socio-economic and demographic frameworks. These platforms exposed the nature of political contestation around immigration and development. The issue was namely divided in some binary form between south versus north, poor versus affluent, developing versus developed countries, population growing versus population depleting countries – of which the interest of one side has been to create better terms for outimmigration and the other – to restrict immigration. 35 According to UN Secretary General António Guterres, this framework aims ‘at facilitating safe, orderly and regular immigration, while reducing the incidence and impact of irregular immigration’. He noted that this historic achievement reflected ‘the shared understanding by Governments that cross-border immigration is, by its very nature, an international phenomenon and that effective management of this global reality requires international cooperation to enhance its positive impact for all’. (UN News July 2018). The global private sector, parliamentarians, trade unions, National Human Rights Institutions, the media and other relevant contract adopts a ‘whole-of-society approach’, promoting ‘broad multi-stakeholder partnerships to address immigration in all its dimensions by including migrants, diasporas, local communities, civil society, academia, the stakeholders in immigration governance’. UN Global Compact for Safe Orderly, and Regular Immigration (11 July 2018). See www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/ uploads/sites/51/2018/07/immigration.pdf.

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capacity  of  states to cooperate more effectively with one another on security-related matters pertaining to immigration.36 The infusion of immigration into other, ostensibly related policy domains has meant that immigration-related issues have been increasingly folded into a ‘global mobility regime’ (Ghosh 2000; Koslowski 2011a). The number and diversity of international actors involved in this regime are vast. Though not typically cited as an example of international cooperation on immigration, international agencies that regulate cross-border travel (e.g., ICAO, INTERPOL, WHO, WTO) partner the liberal states with international law enforcement institutions that complement and advance their domestic efforts to manage immigration (Ghosh 2000, 2005; UN 2003; Koslowski 2008: 17). Even where international cooperation existed previously, the focus of such collaboration has nevertheless changed. The international travel regime offers an illuminating example. Originally facilitating cross-border travel prior to 11 September, the regime has focused more recently on circumscribing the conditions by which it is permitted and facilitated. The institutionalization of a global immigration-security regime also has been extended to the realms of refugee protection and asylum policy (Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004). In the immediate aftermath of 11 September, for example, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted counter-terrorism measures linked to human mobility.37 Moreover, well before the humanitarian refugee crises that unfolded between 2008 and 2016, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that bound states to ‘ensure, in conformity with international law that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts’ (UN Security Council Resolution 1373, 23 September 2001). International and Regional Actors in Europe The proclivity of European governments to view immigration-related challenges through the prism of security has precipitated greater bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Huysmans 2006; Levy 2005; Goodman and Schimmelfennig 2020). The most prominent strategy to pursue this agenda in Europe, for example, have been the international 36

For example, linking refugee protection issues with security and trade has promoted reciprocity between the immigration-sending and receiving countries (Lahav and Lavenex 2010: 760). These initiatives facilitated cooperation among states and actors with profound power asymmetries, in what has often been characterized as a ‘suasion game’ (Betts 2009, 2010). 37 This act was deemed by some to rely on inherently faulty logics, because the vetting process of information-sharing for refugees was more stringent than flows of voluntary crossings.

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and regional agreements struck on border and visa controls (Lahav and Luedtke 2013; Mau 2010). Toward this end, the EU has expanded its policymaking jurisdiction in issuing visas, processing asylum applications, and implementing measures to discourage irregular immigration (Furuseth 2003). The joint visa list the EU adopted following the 1993 Dublin Convention, for example, imposed visa requirements on travellers from seventy-three non-EU countries, a number that swelled to 105 in 2018.38 Furthermore, the adoption of restrictive entry rules has slowly been extended to new member and non-EU states through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) partners. EU agencies such as Frontex and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, operating in nonEU countries and on the high seas, have had their budgets significantly increased over time (Akkerman and Buxton 2018), especially within a security framework (Léonard and Kaunert 2020).39 With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the shift away from intergovernmental decision-making on immigration, directives have been issued requiring the listing of third countries whose nationals must possess a visa to enter the EU and the institutionalization of common consular instructions for vetting visa applications. These reforms have narrowed the legal pathways by which foreigners can enter the EU (Neumayer 2006; Rosenblum and Tichenor 2011). EU asylum policies have also reduced the share of asylum seeker applications that succeed. EU initiatives include the Dublin I and II Conventions that determine which EU member state is responsible for examining an individual’s application for asylum lodged in one of the member states and the creation of the European Asylum Dactyloscopy (Eurodac) database in 2003, which allows EU member states to determine which state is responsible for examining an asylum application by comparing fingerprint datasets. They also established rules on the temporary protection for humanitarian migrants not qualifying for refugee 38

Though the refugee/asylum crises of 2015–16 threatened the entire agreement, as member states recalculated their individual visa lists and border controls, but the European Council managed to contain with its distribution and relocation plan (Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 ‘Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of International Protection for the Benefit of Italy and Greece’). 39 Frontex was mandated to ‘proactively (sic) monitor and contribute to the developments in research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders’. (Akkerman and Buxton 2018: 21–23). In 2016, Frontex was designated by the European Commission (Article 54(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 COM (2016) 747) to be a European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG). It markedly went from a budget of 0.006 billion Euro to 0.320 billion Euro in 2016 (Akkerman and Buxton 2018). In February 2018, the European Commission signed an agreement with the Albanian Interior Minister for operational cooperation between the European Border and Coast Guard Agency to deploy on Albanian territory (European Commission February 12, 2018c).

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status as well as minimum standards of asylum seeker reception. Additionally, an EU directive establishing a uniform procedural standard for scrutinizing an asylum claim, including an applicant’s access to due process, was adopted in 2005 (Lavenex 2006c: 1295).40 While these and other initiatives that harmonize asylum standards across the EU appear, on their face, to be a positive development, they have been criticized by NGOs, the European Parliament (EP), European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and UN High Commissioner for Refugees. With some exceptions, most of the common measures adopted by the member states allow them to lower their national refugee protection standards (van der Klaauw 2004). Notably, the inter-EU member state cooperation agreements struck on immigration and asylum since the Amsterdam Treaty was implemented in 1999, have generally resulted in tighter immigration restrictions (Arcarazo and Geddes 2013). These include measures to reduce legal immigration, reinforce the EU’s external borders, and safeguard national borders (Nicholls 2015). Even the common labour agreements that have been forged have focused more on discouraging irregular immigration than protecting the rights of foreign workers. In this vein, the ‘Employers Sanctions Directive’ (2009/52/ EC) that incorporated the labour rights of undocumented migrants into EU law also established the criteria by which sanctions could be levied on employers that hire them (European Commission Communication 2009).41 On the other side of the policy divide, a far smaller set of EU directives has been concerned with improving the legal position of migrants within the member state countries (Borkert and Penninx 2011; van Selm and Tsolakis 2004). Except for anti-discrimination directives (De Burca 2012) and those pertaining to the recruitment of high-skilled labour (e.g., 2009 Blue Card directive), the EU’s immigration policies have enabled many member states to lower their national standards (Bonjour and Block 2013). Moreover, national politicians not only gained a convenient scapegoat 40

A uniform format for visas includes a common training manual to assist border guards in determining an immigrant’s legal status, whether coming legally for work, illegally, or on family/humanitarian grounds. 41 The Directive has fallen short of its demands that member states create an effective complaint mechanism. One of the biggest issues is that, by lodging a complaint, undocumented migrant workers risk retaliation from employers, a loss of income, and possible detention and deportation. Following inspections, it remains common practice to issue removal orders and detain undocumented workers without examining the violation of their labour rights. This means there is no real choice for undocumented workers, and the repercussions for employers are very limited (Knockaert 2017). According to PICUM (2018), exploitation can continue with impunity (https://picum .org/employers-sanctions-directive-law-address-exploitation-undocumented-workers/).

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for immigration-related conflicts, but they have also acquired a supranational ally in policing the EU’s external frontiers. According to Velluti (2007), EU policy has assisted national politicians in enforcing stringent domestic measures targeting irregular migrants. As Lavenex (2006c: 1292) has observed, ‘the metaphor of “fortress of Europe” expresses well the emphasis on downgrading existing domestic [migrant] rights … through limiting [their] access to territory and full asylum procedures, rather creating common European standards’. Several of the bilateral and multilateral agreements among the EU’s member states for sharing information and cooperating on operations pertaining to immigration have been struck since the late 1990s. Examples include the French–German border zone and Anglo-French police cooperation around the Channel Tunnel, a 31-mile rail tunnel linking Folkstone, Kent, in England with Coquelles, Pas-de-Calais, near Calais in northern France.42 To discourage irregular immigration on Europe’s southern borders and to coordinate the activities of the police, custom agents, and navy ships following the 2002 Seville European Council meetings, for example, Britain, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain implemented Operation Ulysses. This initiative was the first time that the EU’s member countries formally cooperated on border enforcement in this way. According to Angel Acebes, Spain’s former interior minister, the operation was intended as a precursor to a common European border police force (The New York Times, 29 January 2003).The securitization of internal and external controls generally has been advanced by the progress of deeper European integration (Bigo 1996; Miller 2005). EU–US cooperation post-11 September also has brought together agencies and institutions on both sides of the Atlantic that had never collaborated previously. For example, in September 2002, John Ashcroft became the first American Attorney General to consult formally with his EU counterparts, the ministers of Interior and Justice (JHA Council). Another notable development in April 2004 was the creation of the Policy Dialogue on Border and Transport Security that brought officials, and especially those from the US Department of Homeland Security, Department of State and Justice Department, together with 42

The 1991 Sangatte Protocol, which came into force in 1993, allowed border controls as the implementation of ‘a model of remote-sovereignty’ (Martin 2016). It paved the way for the first Touquet agreement between the French and the British governments and provided for ‘juxtaposed controls on a number of cross-Channel routes’. These juxtaposed controls prescribed that border checks on certain cross-channel routes would occur before passengers boarded a train or ferry, rather than upon their arrival at their destination.

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representatives from the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the EU presidency, to discuss ways to improve mutual security. In September 2004, the then US Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, followed up this EU–US dialogue by meeting with European Commissioner Antonio Vitorino and representatives of the EU presidency. These initiatives have been formalized over time through increased law enforcement cooperation, especially between Europol and counterparts at the DHS, FBI, and Secret Services (Marin 2011: 469).43 In this vein, the EU and US have reached two major agreements regarding foreign fighters and irregular immigration.44 The EU’s most expansive growth as a security actor has occurred in the fields of immigration, asylum, and border control. Security-related concerns, and particularly, the inability of European states to stem unilaterally the flow of so-called unwanted immigration, have facilitated the growth of the EU’s bureaucracy and policymaking competence of EU institutions, especially the European Commission (Uçarer 2001, 2013) and European Parliament (Lahav 1997, 2004a; Lopatin 2013), over Europe’s external borders (Table 3.4). While the AFSJ has incrementally embraced communitarian decision-making under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, it has preserved shared competence with the member state countries regarding crime, policing, and judicial cooperation.45 On this score, the European Council dedicated approximately 40 per cent of its meetings and workload either directly or indirectly to matters related to the AFSJ (derived from the 1999 TEU) during the early 2000s. Over 732 common policies were adopted under the AFSJ’s rubric between 2000 and 2014 (Monar 2005, 2014). 43

According to Europol (2015), law enforcement relations between the US and the European Union was built upon the cooperation agreement signed 2004. This includes the US liaison bureau at Europol headquarters in The Hague, the Netherlands, and 11 US federal law enforcement agencies. Europol also has two senior liaison officers stationed in Washington as an efficient and reliable point of contact for US authorities. Every year Europol supports approximately 500 cases involving US authorities, of which 50 are high impact operations. 44 The Focal Point Travelers’ agreement supports EU and US law enforcement efforts to counter foreign fighters when they return to Europe or the US from Syria or Iraq, including identifying facilitators of travel and recruitment as well as sources of financing. Equally the Focal Point CheckPoint agreement enhances EU and US cooperation in combating illegal immigration, especially as exploited by organized crime (Europol 2015). 45 The Treaty of Lisbon, or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), came into force on 1 December 2009. It extended the community method to virtually all aspects of the field of justice and home affairs, thus essentially abolishing the so-called third pillar of the Union. Article 4 declared that shared competence between the Union and the member states applies, inter alia, in the areas of freedom, security, and justice.

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Table 3.4  EU institutions involved in immigration European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs Council of the European Union Justice and Home Affairs European Commission Home Affairs Justice European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights European Economic and Social Committee Employment, Social Affairs, and Citizenship Section Committee of the Regions Commission for Citizenship, Governance, Institutional Affairs and External Relations (CIVEX) European Data Protection Supervisor (2004) European External Action Service (2011) EU agencies Eurojust (2002) EU Agency for Operational Cooperation at External Borders (FRONTEX) (2004) European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2010) European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) (1993) European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) (2004) European Police College (CEPOL) (2000) European Police Office (Europol) (1998) European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) (2016) European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2007) European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) European Maritime Safety (EMSA) (2002) European Defence Agency (2004) Coordination Centre for Maritime Surveillance of Coasts and Borders (2013)

The proliferation of the number of actors now involved in managing immigration and human mobility at the supranational level supports Hollifield’s (1998: 597) argument that the overriding objective of intermember state cooperation within the EU is controlling borders (Roos 2018). Whereas the free movement of persons promotes “ever closer European union”, the benefits of abolishing internal border checks within Schengenland has been somewhat negated by the proliferation of control measures, implemented by intergovernmental, supranational, and non-state actors, that restrict human mobility more than previously. Following a series of terrorist attacks in Europe during the early 2000s, for example, the European Commission’s 2005 Hague Programme established a five-year agenda for the EU in the areas of justice, freedom, and security by identifying the building blocks of the EU’s immigration policies to include ‘cooperation with third countries’,

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‘integrated management of external borders’, an integrated management of external borders’, ‘an integrated technological approach’, and ‘improving exchange of information’ (European Commission 2005b; European Council 2005). Combatting irregular immigration, in particular, plowed the unprecedented path of cross-country information sharing that spawned the creation of the 2013 European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), a system that facilitates cooperation between the EU’s member states and Frontex to improve situational awareness and increase reaction capability at the EU’s external borders (Akkerman 2016: 11).46 Building upon the former second intergovernmental pillar of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and, particularly, its third pillar frameworks (e.g., TREVI, Ad Hoc Immigration Group, Rhodes Group), the creation of border management institutions such as Frontex and EUROSUR in Europe represented an advance towards the militarization of the EU’s external borders (Akkerman 2018a).47 The codification of the 2016 Schengen Border Code further harmonized member state standards via a smart border Entry/Exit System (European Commission Migration and Home Affairs 2018). Many of these new arrangements were in the mould of the Schengen Group whose decisions are typically formulated with little or no prior formal public discussion or scrutiny (Guiraudon 2000; Hansen 2000). Intergovernmental actors typically do not have to answer to international courts, the European Parliament, or the European Court of Justice. This lack of transparency and accountability not only makes it difficult to scrutinize their decisions, but it allows them to circumvent many if not most domestic constraints on immigration policy making (Bunyan and Webber 1995; Wheatley 2009), and to depoliticize the issues in the 46

The budget of this border control agency is estimated to have risen from €6.3m to €238.7m between 2005 and 2016 (Akkerman 2016: 3). 47 Frontex has developed the following joint operations between states experiencing pressure at their borders, over the last ten years: MINERVA (2011–17); HERA (2009, 2011–15); INDALO (2009, 2011–12); AENEAS (2014); HERMES (2009, 2011); JUPITER (2011); NEPTUNE (2009); TRITON (2014); POSEIDON (2009, 2012); RABIT (2010); and THEMIS (2018). These operations have mostly benefited Spain, Italy, Greece, as well as the Eastern countries and Turkey. The renowned Mare Nostrum saved thousands of lives in 2013 during the height of the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean, but was mostly shouldered by the Italians, with little support from the EU, ultimately led to Frontex’s Triton missions, and further efforts to cooperate. EU Naval Force-Mediterranean Operation Sophia (EUNAVFOR MED) launched in 2015 was criticized for focusing on military confrontation of smuggling networks rather than rescuing refugees for example (Akkerman 2018b: 1112). In addition, NATO’s role in aiding Frontex to patrol the Mediterranean has gone from low level to active participation in information sharing and technological resources such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) and high-tech border fences (see Marin and Krajcikova 2015) on the employment of drones for policing.

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process (Pécoud 2015). Perhaps more importantly, supranational provisions regarding screening processes, tracking systems, immigrant hearings and detentions, as well as fortified document and identity security (France Ministry of Interior 2017; Global Detention Project 2018; Mittelstadt et al. 2011) displace national standards. The expansion and thickening of professional policy and criminal justice networks across Europe have indeed proliferated under the original, intergovernmental third pillar, as well as the second pillar’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which supports NATO’s mission to provide European and transatlantic security (Lewis et al. 2018: 23).48 The 2016 NATO–EU Joint Declaration forged mutually reinforcing efforts. These included countering hybrid threats, broadening operational cooperation at sea and on immigration, expanding coordination on cybersecurity and defence, developing coherent, complementary, and interoperable defence capabilities, facilitating a stronger defence industry, increasing coordination on exercises, and building defence and security capacities of partners in Eastern and Southern Europe (Council of European Union 2016). Since then, the EU has adopted initiatives to manage externally generated crises, thus bringing immigration and asylum within its policymaking jurisdiction. Three major coordination mechanisms, the Western Balkans Contact Group, the rapid alert system (ARGUS), and the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR), have emerged to coordinate member state efforts, evaluate the best options for action, and determine the appropriate common responses during an emergency.49 Notably, their institutional charge largely involves information sharing and crisis management (Collett and Le Coz 2018: 18). The events associated with the 2015 EU migrant/refugee crisis influenced how and to what degree the member states cooperated with one another on immigration. Though challenged by human rights advocates, France’s adoption of an ‘at-risk’ border-crossing system was justified in the aftermath of the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris by a ‘state of emergency’ clause in the French Constitution which granted special powers to the executive branch in the case of exceptional circumstances (Law No. 2015-1501 of 20 November 2015) (France Ministry of Interior 2017: 58). This state only expired after five extensions, in November 48

European External Action Service (2018), ‘The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)’. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/431/commonsecurity-and-defence-policy-csdp_en (retrieved 13 February 2018). 49 As the flow of Syrian asylum seekers was reaching its apex, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM), originally established in 2001 to coordinate and respond to natural and man-made disasters, became a tool for managing immigration and asylum in times of crises (Collett and LeCoz 2018: 13).

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2017. Similar terrorist events prompted many European countries to reestablish border controls not only on short-term migrants, but also on EU citizens and TCNs. The crisis frame promoted by national medias across the EU led to the 2015 emergency European Summit which established the basic tenets for a common operational response. Despite the near collapse of several provisions of the Dublin Convention, which made transparent the different and often competing national interests of so-called hard-liners, front-liners, and hold-theliners (O’Doherty 2018), the member states ultimately converged around a ten-point plan to regulate immigration. In reflecting upon the plan, Collett and Le Coz (2018: 5) observed that ‘time and again, crisis situations have birthed new means of coordination and effective operational response’. In the wake of the asylum crisis, a series of European Council meetings spawned the European Agenda on Immigration (European Commission 2015c). The EU Commission’s 2011 Global Approach to Immigration and Mobility (GAMM) went farther in specifically citing the Arab Spring uprisings in appealing to member state governments to develop a ‘coherent and comprehensive immigration policy for the EU’ (European Commission 2011: 2). Researchers at the JHA (Akkerman and Buxton 2018; Carrera and Parkin 2013) documented the proliferation of ‘mutually beneficial partnerships’ with third countries driven by the Frontex and Council agencies promoting inter-state cooperation on human mobility. Aiming to deal with emergency relocation, increased resources for maritime operations, and the creation of ‘hotspots’, this European Agenda exhorted EU agencies to ‘work on the ground with frontline member states to identify, register, and fingerprint incoming migrants’ (Collett and Le Coz 2018: 10).50 The EU has also adopted readmission agreements with third countries to address both ‘low’ (e.g., economic and social development) and ‘high’ (e.g., political unrest and military proliferation) security threats. In the process it has expanded the number of non-EU countries involved in safeguarding borders and managing immigration. For example, the EU has forged readmission agreements with Macao, Hong Kong, Pakistan, countries in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Sri Lanka, as well as visa 50

According Collett and Le Coz (2018: 12), the idea of creating hotspots to manage irregular maritime arrivals was first formally integrated into EU policy through the European Agenda on Immigration in May 2015. Designed to undertake the preprocessing of asylum requests in transit countries, the outsourcing of hot spots has been criticized by human rights activists as compromising the principle of non-refoulement and other rights pertaining to family life, privacy, and indefinite criminal detention (d’Humières 2018: 8).

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agreements with Western Balkan countries and Russia. Formally cooperating on immigration control as a condition for dispensing development aid, the Council of the EU adopted and the European Commission published the principles for the ‘intensified cooperation on the management of immigration flows with third countries’, most notably Turkey, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was established by the 2003 Wider European Initiative on the eve of EU enlargement preparations. A product of the post-Cold War security environment, this foreign policy initiative sought to tie countries to its east and south to the EU. The proliferation of EU partnerships with African, Caribbean, Pacific, and Central and East European countries after 2001 (International Organisation of Migration 2019) shifted the focus of inter-regional cooperation away from an economic development agenda toward a securitydriven one. As d’Humières (2018: 1) has observed of the EU’s external relations, the issue of immigration flows between the African countries and the EU now pervades all aspects of inter-regional cooperation. The 2016 EU-Turkish agreement underscored the import of third country relationships and the cooperation of foreign governments in enforcing the Union’s immigration policies. In response to the protracted Syrian refugee crisis on Europe’s eastern frontier, the European Council forged an agreement with Turkey to reduce the flow of irregular migrants precipitated by the crisis (European Parliament 2016a, 2016b).51 Utilizing development and military aid for Turkey as political leverage, the EU negotiated the redirection of immigrant flows away from its borders to Turkish bases. Some critics characterize readmission agreements as outsourcing the management of immigration (Council of Europe 2010), and are concerned about third-country implementation practices that jeapordize rights or asylum claims (Carrera 2016; McNamara 2013). On the other hand, Coleman (2009: 22) argues, these agreements provide ‘transparency, since they clearly state the procedural conditions for [migrant] admission prior to the enforcement of a return decision’. Whatever is the case, operational missions like Mare Nostrum, an air and naval operation executed by the Italian government in 2013 to tackle the increased flow 51

This agreement stated that any irregular migrant, who did not apply or qualify for asylum, must be returned to Turkey. It also agreed that Syrians could be returned to Turkey from Greece, and other Syrians would be resettled in the EU. The EU also promised Turkey it would lessen the visa requirements for Turkish citizens and pledged to grant the Turkish government €6 billion by the end of 2018 (European Council 2016; European Parliament 2016 www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/ theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan).

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of asylum seekers resulting from migrant-carrying ships operating off the coast of the island of Lampedusa, reveal that the objectives of humanitarian missions are not always incompatible with a security agenda (Bello 2017: 58; Marin 2011; Marin and Krajcˇíková 2015). International and Regional Actors in the Americas Although the extent of US–Mexico border cooperation has not ascended akin to that of the externalization of immigration effected by many EU member state agreements, the two countries nevertheless have cooperated on border enforcement since the 1990s (Wayne 2018). The joint US–Mexican border patrol taskforces, for example, were charged with mitigating the problem of irregular immigration within the context of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Andreas 1996). While NAFTA did not directly address the issue of migrant labour, negotiations over the agreement nevertheless paved the way for several institutional reforms enacted during the mid-1990s. It led to the adoption of immigration management strategies that shifted the operational priority from apprehending irregular migrants after their entry into the US (e.g., ‘Operation Hold the Line’ in El Paso in 1993 and ‘Operation Gatekeeper’ in San Diego in 1994) to deterring their entry.52 The introduction of pre-clearance remote spaces was raised in discussions about national security and cooperation on border control.53 These strategies were operationalized with the erection of US pre-clearance zones of travel in foreign airports during the early 2000s.54 Inter-state cooperation was not restricted to the US and Mexico. Rather, in including Canada, it evolved to expand collaboration on counterterrorism and information sharing.55 When negotiations between American President Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox about a possible amnesty program for irregular Mexican migrants were abruptly 52

In the US success was marked by a significant reduction in petty crime and street vending, which was said to derive from strong public support and the perception of enhanced public safety because of the discontinued chases of border patrol and undocumented aliens near the border (Cornelius 2001). 53 In 2015, the then US DHS Secretary, Jeh Johnson, cited the creation of US preclearance zones in airports across Europe, North Asia, and the Caribbean as a homeland security priority (Centre for Aviation/CAPA 2015). 54 A 2014 DHS initiative to extend pre-clearance arrangements, which are already in place for flights from Canada, the Caribbean, one city in the Gulf, and two airports in Ireland, are designed to ease congestion at US airports. However, the fact that the initiative was crafted by the department whose responsibility it is to safeguard the US from internal and external threats suggests that a counter-terrorism agenda drove the process rather than passenger convenience considerations (Centre for Aviation/CAPA 2015). 55 After Mexico’s accession to NAFTA, and particularly after 11 September, joint border management cooperation expanded (Mau et al. 2012: 169).

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halted on 11 September, the American focus shifted to the Canadian border. The discovery that several 11 September hijackers had surreptitiously crossed the Canadian border prompted the US to pursue what has been referred to as a ‘Mexicanization’ of US–Canada border politics (Andreas 2003b: 9) and to include Canada and Mexico within a security perimeter around the three NAFTA countries. The 2005–09 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) specifically paved the way for the North American Trusted Traveler Program (White House 2011) which allowed expedited travel for low-risk travellers as well as joint intelligencesharing task forces ‘to target criminal gang and trafficking organizations and reduce violence’ (Mau et al. 2012: 168).56 These initiatives built upon the NEXUS (US–Canada) and SENTRI (US-Mexico) border agreements of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, a stepchild of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. North American cooperation also spawned the smart border accords between the US and its Mexican and Canadian partners which created a virtual border wall monitored by cameras and sensors (Ackleson 2005).57 On 12 December 2001, Canada and the United States signed the Smart Border Declaration and its companion thirty-point Action Plan to enhance the security of the shared border while facilitating the legitimate flow of people and goods between the two countries. Their main objective is to differentiate between wanted and unwanted travellers along the US–Canada and US–Mexico borders (Ackleson 2005; Koslowski 2005; Mau et al. 2012). The Action Plan introduced four pillars: secure the flow of people and flow of goods, safeguard infrastructure, share information, and facilitate the enforcement of the first three pillars. To be sure, the North American trade partnership, as well as shared human rights concerns, continue to influence US border policies. However, the greatest change on the part of the case came about in the shape of a northern border marked by little more than customs stations at border-crossing points prior to 11 September (Bhattacharyya 2002; 56

The pursuit of a joint security perimeter was initially meant to avoid compromising a friendship and economic interest by resorting to physical and administrative barriers along the border (The New York Times, 27 September 2001). The 2005–09 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) was the product of these earlier efforts to get the Mexico deal back on the table and resume the earlier talks with President Fox to include Canada and Mexico within a security perimeter around the three NAFTA countries. 57 In April 2016 the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal for smart borders, including the establishment of an entry/exit system and a proposed amendment to the Schengen Borders Code to integrate the technical changes required to operationalize the system (European Commission Migration and Home Affairs 2018, https:// ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing_en).

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Mau et al. 2012: 169). Transnational border agreements were extended to what was once characterized as the ‘longest undefended border in the world’– the Canadian–US perimeter (Bradbury 2013: 140). Most notably, the formal agreement signed between the US President Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Harper in 2011 expanded state efforts to address potential security-related immigration threats (ACLU 2011; Bradbury 2012). The ‘Beyond the Border Declaration’ outlined a formal Action Plan that focused on visa cooperation, immigration information sharing, security screening and a common no-fly list (US DHS 2011).58 Extending 160 kilometres inland from the US–Canadian border, the US Customs and Border Patrol exercises jurisdiction over American destinations popular among Canadians, including all the New England states (Ring 2018). As immigration has become increasingly securitized in the US over time, the scope and breadth of its inter-state cooperation on the US– Mexico border has expanded to include curbing the illicit flows of drugs (Andreas 2004). In 2007, Mexico and the US launched the Mérida Initiative, a security and rule-of-law partnership to address drug trafficking, smuggling, corruption, and gang violence (CRS/Seelke and Finklea 2017). This bilateral partnership between the Bush and Calderon administrations established guidelines for US-Mexico cooperation as well as standards for information sharing. Such expansive cooperation has been instrumental in addressing the flows of unaccompanied minors and migrant caravans originating from Central America. In the face of a growing ‘cottage industry’ in human smuggling, (Spener 2004), gang-related crime, and unaccompanied minors crossing the US border, government pressures to respond has increased. Regional cooperation on policy implementation has soared between the United States, Mexico, and the Northern Triangle since the early 2010s, covering much of border enforcement policies across Central America (Rosenblum 2015; Valeriano and Powers 2010). Furthermore, new data security protocols have made the standardization and information sharing of big data about border crossings a cornerstone of regional cooperation (Longo 2018: 17). Continued calls within the US to stem the large migrant flows from Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador have been largely framed within counter-terrorist and 58 These included the sharing of ‘no-fly’ lists, entry/exit programs, joint privacy principles (See, DHS www.dhs.gov/beyond-border). In addition, American checkpoints have also been erected along highways in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont where officers have been reported to ask motorists about their citizenship status (MacDonald 2018).

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crime political discourses (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). The Central American caravan crises that peaked in 2018 particularly exposed American dependence on foreign states to enforce its immigration policy agenda. Among the recent examples of such inter-state cooperation was the ‘remain in Mexico’ policy that required many non-Mexican migrants claiming asylum at US ports of entry to wait in Mexico while their cases were being processed (Partlow and Miroff 2018). Under the Trump Administration the populations of US–Mexico border towns, such as Tijuana, were swollen with aspiring refugees and asylum seekers. In abrogating its obligations under American and international law, the US was accused of ‘metering’, or limiting the number of claimants processed and diverting asylum seekers away from American ports of entry to discourage them from filing formal claims (Kanno-Youngs and Malkin 2019; Wiley 2018). Although the Biden administration began its tenure by unwinding some of the harshest border control measures imposed during the Trump presidency, it continued to pursue border cooperation with Mexico and empowered US border agents to swiftly expel irregular migrants (Kanno-Youngs and Shear 2021). International Actors in Comparative Perspective Although inter-state cooperation occurs most often in the domains of migrant entry and exit, it has also expanded to other dimensions of human mobility. The devolution of policy implementation upwards to international actors for the conditions of migrant stay in the areas of education or work, for example, has been extensive. The cooptation and/or enlistment of foreign actors especially has created transnational spaces in the employment sector, where the liberal state often contravenes the rights of foreign workers (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). For example, at the end of the Cold War shifting liabilities within the employment domain took the form of bilateral contracts or work agreements that allowed foreign workers, especially from Eastern Europe, access to domestic labour markets across the EU. In the case of France, resident foreign workers could neither claim French social insurance benefits nor were they protected by national labour law (Faist 1995). International and regional educational partnerships like Erasmus and Fulbright,59 as well as international agreements concerning technical visas or youth exchanges have also facilitated greater state control over migrant stay. The objectives of regulating these exchanges are to ensure that migrant stay is temporary and any rights-claiming by migrants occurs in the country of origin. The 59

One of Brexit’s contentious issues involved the status of Erasmus grants awarded to British students after March 2019 (Day 2019).

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tightening of these regulations however has prompted concerns about a shortage of domestic or childcare services (Jones 2019). Another example of national border expansion in Europe is the ENP, or Schengenland, which makes each member state country the beneficiary of the migrant screening efforts of other countries, that is, before migrants arrive at their national borders. As underscored by the 2015–16 crisis of British-bound asylum-applicants in the French port-city of Calais, the policies of preemptive deterrence strategies have relied upon the compulsion and cooperation of foreign state actors as well as local politicians.60 Similarly, the North American Security Perimeter/US–Mexico joint border patrols and the ‘remain in Mexico’ policies represent a shift of priority from apprehending irregular migrants after crossing national borders to deterring their entry. Transnational spaces (e.g., cyberspace, airspace, seas), offshore spaces (e.g., detention centres), and international zones (e.g., airports, bridges) can be a juridical ‘no man’s land’ where it is difficult for lawyers and human rights associations to defend the rights of migrants (Centre for Aviation CAPA 2015; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Sassen 2013b).61 Such spaces have been accused by human rights groups of being virtual rules-free zones (The New York Times 2006: A16), which empower states by ‘shifting borders’ (Shachar 2020) and expanding their territorial reach (Collyer and King 2015; Mitsilegas 2010; Ryan 2010). They also violate refugee non-refoulement principles and asylum-seeking protections (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006) In this vein, revisions to the EU Schengen Border Code in 2017 facilitated the deployment of new surveillance procedures in and 60

The bulldozing of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp in 2016 led to the updating of the Treaty of Touquet between the UK and France. The updated border treaty signed in January 2018 by French President Macron and UK Prime Minister Theresa May pledged to give France an extra £44.5million to bolster security along the Anglo-French border. The money brings total British funding for security and policing in Calais since the ‘Jungle’ camp was bulldozed in 2016 to more than £150m (The Guardian, 18 January 2018a). The accord, which was first approved in February 2003, to allow the UK to set up checkpoints in Calais and Dunkirk, now further allows British immigration officials to carry out border checks in northern France rather than in Dover. Under the new, legally binding treaty, Britain agrees to accelerate procedures for accepting legitimate asylum seekers currently blocked in Calais, including unaccompanied children and those seeking to join their families in the UK, and will pay more for transport, security, and border maintenance in the port. 61 In dealing with the influx of Central American asylum-seekers, for example Americans have set up new booths halfway across the McAllen–Hidalgo International Bridge so agents can stop travellers before they make it to the official port of entry on the US side. Immigration lawyers have complained that these ‘proactive border policies’ have been unprecedented, and the new midpoint booth on the bridge is about more than ‘managing’ migrants; it serves to ‘prevent people from stepping onto American soil so that they could ask for asylum’ (www.texastribune.org/2018/10/01/ border-asylum-port-of-entry-texas-mexico/).

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around railroad stations, a migrant arrival venue long excluded from international agreements (Lahav 1998). In France, Article 78–2 of the French Criminal Procedure Code authorized traveller checks around international railway stations (France Ministry of Interior, Annual Report 2017: 59). In both instances, the state’s devolution of the responsibility to regulate immigration to foreign actors and agencies expands its prerogative to ignore migrant rights (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 2006a).62 Critics of the trend of the state’s externalization of the management of immigration have argued that beyond the abrogation of its humanitarian commitments (Mellen 2018; Watson 2009), the costs of creating offshore or virtual moats equal those incurred in receiving asylum seekers onshore (Flynn and Cannon 2009).63 Given that the extraterritorialization (FitzGerald 2020; Ryan 2010) or deterritorialization of border control (de Genova 2010; FitzGerald 2019; Gibney 2005; Gibney and Skogly 2012; Guild and Bigo 2010; Rosecrance 1996; Sassen 2013a) expands the liberal state’s administrative reach by deterring human mobility at its source, some of the immigration-receiving countries can be perceived as perpetuating their colonial relationship with peripheral or undeveloped countries (de Genova 2010; LembergPedersen 2019; Martin 2016). For example, France, a country with one of the oldest and most extensive administrative migrant detention systems in Europe, responded to a record number of asylum applicants in 2017 by detaining half of them in its outré-mer, or overseas territories 62

According to US federal law, for example, Customs and Border Patrol agents can search electronic devices at international airports without reasonable suspicion or probable cause – an egregious violation of the US Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable searches and seizures (Feeney 2018: 4). 63 Consider the development of detention centres in transit countries (Hyndman and Mountz 2008), offshore (Morris 2017; Mountz et al. 2013), remote uninhabited laboratory or penal islands (Mellen 2018), as well as an assortment of developing countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Indonesia, Nauru, and several other Central American and North African states (Hiemstra and Conlon 2017). Incentivizing poor countries or remote island states, like Nauru or Papua New Guinea, for example, transition from lucrative phosphate industries to booming refugee resettlement sites, immigration receiving countries like Australia have created robust ‘offshore’ detention centres which serve to isolate unwanted populations as far as possible from destination borders (Morris 2017, forthcoming; Mountz and Briskman 2012). Thus, over the course of several years, the major industry of the small nation of Nauru changed from phosphate mining to refugee services, with an increase in local population employment in this sector from 7 to 31 per cent in four years (Morris 2023). Mining land is now being leased to the government for infrastructure used for refugee services, with a second court being built strictly to handle refugee land lease appeals. While the Australian government has started a small business grant program for the Nauruan population to stimulate the local economy, refugees protest their gloomy future, which prohibit them from leaving the small nation.

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(Global Detention Project 2018).64 Critics claim that by outsourcing the processing of asylum cases to non-democratic countries such as Libya, Turkey, or Morocco, EU member states have liberated themselves from domestic normative and legal constraints (Paoletti 2010).65 This and other illiberal practices also have invited perverse humanitarian outcomes, as illustrated by the example of a Syrian refugee who languished in transit limbo at Malaysia’s airport for nearly seven months (The Straits Times 2018; Zhao 2018). Subnational Actors: Devolution and Decentralization The liberal state’s devolution of immigration policy has not only pushed national borders outwards, but it also has pulled them inward, that is, from the national to subnational level (Coleman 2007; Pham and Van 2013; Varsanyi 2008; Walker and Leitner 2011). For example, central governments have devolved significant decision-making authority to local actors in ways that compromise both the rights of citizens and foreigners (Roos and Laube 2015). The participation of these actors in deterring migrant stay or hastening migrant exit marks a significant departure from their primary function of facilitating immigrant integration. As Wishnie (2002) observes of the US, ‘two of the most important legal trends of recent years have been the dramatic changes in the nation’s immigration laws and the general devolution of decision-making authority from federal to state and local governments’. In many cases, local government policies affecting migrants have been implemented by administrative fiat, that is, without a public hearing or legislative vote (O’Neil 2010: 2). The strategic role of local authorities as ‘the first port of call’ stems from their wide range of domestic responsibilities, including health, housing, employment, and their capacity to provide political, administrative, organizational, logical, and financial resources. The participation of subnational actors in managing immigration is associated with three broad trends. First, the prerogative of local governments to enact immigration law has expanded. Second, the enforcement of national 64

France’s administrative immigration detention regime extends from continental Europe to overseas territories in the Indian Ocean and the Americas (Global Detention Project 2018). 65 In February 2017, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Italian and Libyan governments aimed at curbing the flow of illegal immigration, human trafficking, fuel smuggling, and reinforcement of border security (Palm 2017). The agreement states that Italy will help the Libyan coast guard intercept boats and return migrants to Libya to local reception camps pending repatriation or voluntary return to their country of origin. The Italian government was widely criticized by human rights groups for making such deals with tribesmen that control Libya’s southern border and for seeming to persuade clan-based militias to prevent boats from leaving Libya (Ceccorulli 2022).

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immigration law by local and/or regional agents has compromised basic civil rights. Finally, to the extent that local and/or regional immigrationrelated policies vary within a given country, the formulation and implementation of coherent national policies are inevitably compromised. (a)  US Local Actors  Local and state efforts to manage immigration in the US pre-date the enactment of federal law determining the ­conditions of immigrant admission. Nonetheless, immigration was largely a marginal issue at the subnational level until the mid-1980s, when several towns, counties, and states proposed making English the official language within their respective administrative jurisdictions. Though some localities have supported pro-immigrant measures, a growing number of local governments have pursued policies to discourage migrant settlement and/or mitigate its effects on the community (Hopkins 2010). These include initiatives to prevent local employers and landlords from conducting business with undocumented migrants, imposing worker personal identity verification requirements on employers, passing ‘Englishonly’ local ­service laws, and prohibiting the employment of migrant day labour (O’Neil 2010).66 The involvement of local authorities in immigration-related matters covaries with national initiatives to restrict the rights of foreigners. The US 1996 Welfare Reform Act, for example, barred non-citizens from receiving federal benefits such as food stamps and supplementary security income assistance (The New York Times, 21 February 1997). The law also granted the states the authority to operate their own welfare programs financed by lump sum federal grants. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA or IIRAIRA) also encouraged state and local law enforcement officials to collaborate with national agencies to enforce federal immigration laws67 by mandating state and local law enforcement officials to enter into cooperation agreements with the INS. It also outlawed state and local ‘anti-snitch’ ordinances, such as those adopted in New York and Chicago, that had prohibited communication between local

66

According to O’Neil (2010: 5), numerous localities broke new ground in the 2000s by passing laws intended to prevent unauthorized immigrants from obtaining housing by requiring landlords to verify the legal status of their tenants or requiring tenants to obtain rental licenses from the local authorities (e.g., Fremont, Nebraska). Many of these policies, however, were legally challenged. 67 According to Massey and Pren (2012a: 16), before the 1996 laws internal enforcement activities did not play a very significant role in immigration enforcement, but ‘afterward, these activities rose to levels not seen since the deportation campaigns of the Great Depression’.

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agencies and the INS; moreover, states were restricted from issuing a driver’s licence and offering in-state tuition benefits at public institutions to persons not lawfully present in the US. The Act also required states receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families grants, grants in which the names, addresses, and other identifying information of persons known to be not lawfully present in the country (Wishnie 2002), to share this information with the INS. The 1996 IIRIRA provisions that authorized the INS to train and deputize local police officers to enforce immigration laws received an uneven political reception and politicized the domestic immigration debate along security-rights fault lines.68 For example, in New York City, home to one of the most diverse immigrant populations in the US, the then Mayor Bloomberg, under pressure from immigration groups and the City Council, reversed his previous posture and made it more difficult for city agencies to report irregular migrants to federal authorities (The New York Times, 18 September 2003: B1). In contrast, Governor Brewer of Arizona signed a controversial bill in April 2010 empowering local police officers to question persons about their immigration status. It also would have permitted lawsuits against local government agencies which hindered the enforcement of national immigration laws (Associated Press, 23 April 2010).69 The events of 11 September accelerated the trend toward enlisting local governments in enforcing immigration policy.70 Numerous persons arrested in the dragnet following the attacks were charged with immigration-related offences and detained in county jails. Perhaps most significantly, in 2002 the US DOJ, in reversing its longstanding position, announced that state and local law enforcement officials have the authority to execute arrests for civil immigration violations (Wishnie 2002: n22).

68

In addition, the Crime Control Act of 1993 appropriated almost 50 million dollars to implement many proposed asylum reforms, the most notable of which was the doubling of the number of INS asylum officers (OECD/SOPEMI 1995), as well as the adoption of new technology and automation. 69 ‘Arizona Governor signs immigration enforcement bill’ http://news.yahoo.com/s/ ap/20100423/ap_on_re_us/us_imimmigration_enforcement [retrieved 26 April 2010]. Despite calls from President Obama to enact immigration reform at the national level to avoid ‘irresponsibility by others’, and the opposition of civil rights advocates against abuses and racial profiling, the Arizona governor claimed that the new state law would protect Arizonans. 70 For instance, the Attorney General requested that local officials interview of Middle Eastern men of a certain age, a demand that met was resisted on the grounds that it was discriminatory, inefficient, and injurious to good police-community relations (Wishnie 2002).

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In 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) exposed a 2002 Department of Justice internal memo regarding federal devolution of enforcement functions to local governments. In justifying the powers of the federal government to track, detain, and deport Muslim and Arab visitors to the US, the then Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that state and local police have the ‘inherent authority’ to enforce civil and criminal violations of immigration law, but that such authority should only narrowly apply to the anti-terrorism mission (Coleman 2009: 909). The Bush Administration insisted that such local enforcement powers were consistent with the 1996 Immigration Reform Act, which granted local police and governments the ability to receive training and partner with the federal government to enforce immigration laws. But Ashcroft’s announcement nevertheless signaled a major shift in the enforcement practices that were independent of the federal government. It paved the path for the proliferation of local laws whose legality and constitutionality were then, and continue to be, in dispute. In particular, the adoption of police surveillance and facial recognition technologies have been seen to compromise minority and immigrant communities (Brennan 2019; Lee and Chin 2022; Rivlin-Nadler 2019). As state immigration policy regimes have increasingly intersected with the criminal justice system (Chacón 2009, 2017; Stumpf 2006), the participation of local law enforcement agencies and private security companies (Pham 2007) in implementing immigration policy has become more prominent. Because federal immigration authorities have integrated their data systems with local and state police, national officials need not search for unauthorized immigrants but rather are to be informed when they encounter the criminal justice system (Waters and Kassinitz 2015: 125). In the US, the Secure Communities Program and the 287(g) ­Program launched in 2008 facilitated agreements between Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and local governments to cross-reference information about targeted individuals with the immigration records of the DHS (Walker and Leitner 2011: 15; Weissman et al. 2009: 8).71 By 2009 over 60 law enforcement agencies across the US 71

Passed in 1996, § 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), empowers US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to enter into agreements with state and local police enforcement agencies to execute immigration monitoring and enforcement functions 8USC§1357(g)  (2008). These Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), for the first time, formally ‘deputized’ state and local law enforcement officers to enforce certain immigration laws (American Immigration Council 2011; Weissman et al, 2009: 10). The Secure Communities Program was suspended from 20 November 2014 through 25 January 2017 when President Trump signed an executive order to reinstate the program. According to the Department of Homeland Security, the program is ‘a simple and

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had entered into such agreements and began enforcing national immigration laws. As of 2 August 2011, Secure Communities had increased from 14 jurisdictions to 1,508 state and local jails in 2011 (US Department of Homeland Security 2011). In the same year the Secure Communities agreements modified the program from voluntary to mandatory participation (Mittelstadt et al. 2011). Furthermore, since then, the proliferation of local ordinances targeting immigrants have come ‘through the backdoor’ (Varsanyi 2008) via the enforcement of housing codes and labour laws (Walker and Leitner 2011: 156). The number of local immigration laws enacted by state and local governments increased more than five-fold between 2005 and 2009 (Capps et al. 2011; Gómez-Aguiñaga 2016; Kretsedemas 2012: 70). By 2013, the number of bills enacted by the states alone grew to 436 (National Conference of State Legislatures 2014). According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 154 laws pertaining to law enforcement alone were enacted by state and local governments between 2008 and 2013 (Figure 3.3). Immigration lawmaking at the local level in the US indeed has increased significantly. Local legislation in 2013 rose 18 per cent over the same period in 2012. Between 2007 and 2013, 1,300 bills on average were introduced and 200 laws enacted each year (NCSL 2014: 2). The total number of immigration-related laws enacted was 206 in 2017, excluding 263 resolutions. A longitudinal perspective reveals the consistent, if not expanding, intervention of local immigration initiatives in the fields of law enforcement, personal identification, and driver documentation between 2005 and 2017. Aggregated over time (Figure 3.3), the data reveal local actors are very much occupied with the numerous budget and law enforcement issues associated with immigration (Provine et al. 2016; Varsanyi 2017).72 The surge of restrictive immigration policies at the subnational level is evidenced by the growth in the number of ordinances seeking common-sense way to carry out ICE’s enforcement priorities for those aliens detained in the custody of another law enforcement agency’. Under the program, participating jails submit arrestees’ fingerprints not only to criminal databases, but to immigration databases as well, allowing Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) access to information on individuals held in jails (American Immigration Council 2017). 72 An analysis of American geographical distribution of municipalities that have proposed or implemented local-scale immigration policies reveals statistically significant regional differences in the nature of local immigration ordinances (Walker and Leitner 2011). While in many metropolitan regions of the US for example, local policy responses are pro-immigration (Varsanyi 2017; Provine et al. 2016), in many Southern states, local governments have overwhelmingly proposed or enacted some sort of exclusionary policy (Walker and Leitner 2011: 158–59).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2006

2007

2009

Law Enforcement Education Employment

2008

2011

Health Human Trafficking ID/Drivers License

2010

2013

Misc Ominibus Public benefits

2012

2015 Voting Budget

2014

Figure 3.3  Number of local immigration laws in US, 2005–17 Source: National Conference of State Legislatures Immigration Database, 2005–17.

2005

2016

2017

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immigration ‘enforcement through attrition’ such as requiring local businesses to access the national E-Verify database, a web-based system allowing employers to confirm the work eligibility of their employees, passing ‘English-only’ ordinances, and placing restrictions on soliciting work in public places (Steil and Vasi 2014). The proliferation of state and local adoption of E-Verify laws across the fifty states has also coincided with significant local variations in workplace employment (Newman et al. 2012), as revealed by the different local initiatives in 2017 represented in Table 3.5. The volume of immigration ordinances in the US have also increased since 2000. This trend coincides with the fact that more cities are applying to participate in the 287(g) program which permits state and local law enforcement agencies to enter into agreements with the DHS to designate local officers to perform limited immigration enforcement functions (Steil and Vasi 2014: 1111). By FY 2017 the program had 78 participating law enforcement agencies across twenty states, as compared with none prior to 11 September (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement/ICE 2010, 2018c). The involvement of local law enforcement at the site of migrant stay dovetails with national strategies to deter immigration. In fulfilling its mission to remove criminal noncitizens, the DHS has been assisted by state and local law enforcement officers.73 Particularly after 11 September, the federal government requested that the police ‘become the eyes and ears of homeland security on America’s highways’ (The Washington Post 2014). Acting in this role, local and state law enforcement officers are trained to search for suspicious persons with the assistance of a cottage industry of private police-training firms that teach the techniques of ‘highway interdiction’ (The Washington Post 2014).74 The 73

While other DHS agencies can also access these local law enforcement databases, past reports suggest that ICE is the primary department accessing this information. According to a 2011 DHS report, for example, between August 2010 and February 2011, ICE conducted 77 per cent of all DHS agency searches of local law enforcement databases. Most of these searches pulled from state databases, such as those of Arizona and Texas, and metropolitan regional databases, such as those of the greater Los Angeles, Seattle, San Diego, and Washington, DC areas. Past estimates have found that these states and metropolitan regions feature some of the deepest concentrations of unauthorized immigrants nationwide (Capps et al. 2020). 74 One firm, Black Asphalt Electronic Networking and Notification System, created a private intelligence network that enabled police nationwide to share detailed reports about American motorists – criminals and the innocent alike – including their Social Security numbers, addresses, and identifying tattoos, as well as hunches about which drivers to stop. Many of the reports have been funneled to federal agencies and fusion centres as part of the government’s burgeoning law enforcement intelligence systems – despite warnings from state and federal authorities that the information could violate privacy and constitutional protections (The Washington Post, 5 September 2014).

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Table 3.5  Select state immigration-related resolutions and policies in US, 2017

State/Bill

Date

California HR 15

11 February California State Assembly resolution rejects all 2017 provisions contained in President Trump’s executive order, ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States’, which imposes a travel and immigration ban on certain individuals and repeals the Syrian Refugee program. Resolution requests President to repeal executive order. 27 June Budget law prohibits local law enforcement 2017 agencies from entering into or modifying a contract with the federal government after 15 June 2017, to house or detain an adult noncitizen in a locked detention facility for civil immigration custody. Law similarly prohibits detention of accompanied or unaccompanied minors except for temporary housing. 17 July Resolution says the University of California 2017 maintains in-state tuition, scholarships, fellowships, and grants to benefit undocumented students throughout President Trump’s presidency and it will protect and support all of its students, faculty, and staff, and consider supportive housing options for those at risk of being negatively impacted by executive orders relating to immigration. 5 October Law prohibits employers from providing a vol2017 untary consent to an immigration enforcement agent to enter nonpublic areas of a place of labour without a warrant and prohibits them or other persons acting on the employer’s behalf from providing voluntary consent to an immigration enforcement agent to obtain employee records without a subpoena or court order. 5 October Law prohibits school officials and employees of 2017 school districts, county offices of education, or charter schools from collecting information or documents regarding citizenship or immigration status of their pupils or their family members. Also requires superintendents of school districts and principals of charter schools to report information requests by a law enforcement agency for purpose of enforcing immigration laws.

California A 103

California HR 35

California A 450

California A 699

Summary

Pro/AntiImmigrant Pro

Pro

Pro

Pro

Pro

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Table 3.5  (cont.)

State/Bill

Date

District of 7 March Columbia 2017 R 75

Georgia H 37

27 April 2017

Georgia S 149

9 May 2017

Indiana S 243

2 May 2017

Maine S 536

1 June 2017

Missouri H3

30 June 2017

Mississippi S 2710

27 March 2017

Summary Resolution states the District of Columbia’s commitment to its status as a Sanctuary City and its intention to strengthen those policies to ensure that the District government will not participate in any federal immigration enforcement strategies that endanger the rights and well-being of its residents, workers, and visitors. Law prohibits postsecondary institutions from adopting sanctuary policies and adds penalties for violations. Law requires school resource officers to undergo training prior to being assigned to a public elementary or secondary school. It also expands the definitions of penal terms. The definition of an ‘inmate’ expanded to include an ‘immigration detainee’. Law specifies it is unlawful for public and private universities in Indiana funded by the state or federal government to interfere with the enforcement of federal immigration laws. It requires their employees to reveal information regarding an individual’s immigration status to law enforcement officers. Law amends the policies and regulations for eligibility to receive unemployment benefits. ‘Employment’ does not include work done by aliens who entered the U.S. as agricultural labourers. Education appropriations law states that no funds shall be expended at public institutions of higher education that offer a tuition rate to any student with an unlawful immigration status in the U.S. that is less than the tuition rate charged to international students, and no scholarship funds shall be expended on behalf of students with an unlawful immigration status. Law prohibits state agencies, localities, or college institutions from prohibiting cooperation with federal agencies or officials to verify or report the immigration status of any person.

Pro/AntiImmigrant Pro

Anti

Anti

Anti

Anti

Anti

Anti

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Table 3.5  (cont.)

State/Bill

Date

Summary

New Jersey SR 50

22 June 2017

Oregon H 3464

15 August 2017

Texas S 4

7 May 2017

Vermont S 79

28 March 2017

Resolution condemns the arrests made by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency on courthouse premises and requests that the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency cease arresting immigrants on courthouse premises unless the situation is deemed an emergency. Law prohibits public officials from distributing personal information for the purpose of enforcing federal immigration laws. Public officials may decline to distribute such information unless they are legally required to do so. Law prohibits localities, institutions of higher education, police departments, sheriffs, and municipal or county attorneys from adopting policies prohibiting enforcement of state and federal immigration laws. Violations can result in civil penalties. Law does not apply to hospitals, public health departments, or school districts. Law enforcement must comply with federal detainer requests. Law prohibits Vermont’s state and local government officials from sharing information with the federal government regarding the religion, immigration status, or national origin, among other personal information, of Vermont residents. Law does not prohibit compliance with 8 USC Sections 1373 and 1644. Law establishes criteria for eligibility to receive unemployment benefits in West Virginia. Among other criteria, it declares that an individual cannot receive unemployment benefits for any time in which he or she did not possess legal resident status in U.S.

West Virginia 8 April S 222 2017

Pro/AntiImmigrant Pro

Pro

Anti

Pro

Anti

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (2019).

shift in gathering information before rather than after a crime or terrorist attack occurs is among the most important changes in law enforcement practices since 11 September (Etzioni 2004: 33). Towards this end, the states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas signed a memoranda of agreement with the federal government in 2006 which permitted their National Guard units to participate in Operation Jump

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Start (Pew Charitable 2015), a military operation led by the US C ­ ustoms and ­Border Protection, to enforce border security and construct a fence along on the US–Mexico border. Another notable trend is the role local law enforcement plays in monitoring and regulating the access of migrants to rights. For example, by devolving to local and state governments the responsibility for barring the children of undocumented migrants from attending public schools or granting driver licenses to non-citizens, the federal government assumes that undocumented persons will be discouraged from migrating to the US or, once inside, settling permanently. Initiatives such as Proposition 187 and the Gallegly Amendment which bar undocumented persons and their children from public schools and accessing welfare programs (though ultimately struck down by the US Supreme Court) followed in the spirit of the IIRIRA in devolving the responsibilities for implementing federal laws to local actors. Six states (Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana Missouri, and South Carolina) prevent unauthorized migrant students from accessing in-state tuition benefits (NCSL 2015). The 2011 iteration of the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act) failed to eliminate IIRIRA’s 1996 penalty on states for providing in-state tuition without regard to an individual’s immigration status (National Immigration Law Center 2011; US Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) 1996).75 The proposed 2017 Graham-Durban DREAM Act would have repealed that penalty by restoring the decision to the states (US Congress 2018). While US federal law does not prohibit undocumented migrants from being admitted to public or private universities, they can nevertheless be denied federal financial aid (National Immigration Law Center 2017). This said, subnational governments do sometimes have interests that significantly diverge from those of national governments. Conflict between 75

This 2011version attempted to repeal section 505 of the 1996 IIRIRA, which discourages states from providing in-state tuition or other higher education benefits without regard to immigration status. Under section 505, states that provide a higher education benefit based on residency to undocumented immigrants must provide the same benefit to US citizens in the same circumstances, regardless of their state of residence. Since section 505 became law, twelve states have enacted laws permitting anyone, including undocumented immigrants, who attended and graduated from high school in the state to pay the in-state rate at public colleges and universities. States that pay the section 505 penalty include California, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, NY, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. The Dream Act was reintroduced in the House of Representatives by Reps. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) on 26 July 2017, and in the Senate by Sens. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Dick Durbin (D-IL) on 20 July 2017. During the 115th Congress on 15 February 2018, the Senate considered several proposals that would have provided a path to citizenship for the more than a million Dreamers in the United States. All of the proposals failed to receive the 60 votes needed to proceed in the Senate. See National Immigration Law Center (2017).

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local and central governments is most likely to occur in federal systems (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2007). The American ‘sanctuary city’ conflict exemplifies the kind of political tug of war that can occur between different tiers of government that can yield uneven immigrant rights outcomes.76 The controversy surrounding sanctuary cities became an issue of state rights versus plenary power shortly after President Trump signed an executive order in 2017 compelling sanctuary cities to comply with federal immigration law or risk losing their access to federal funding. This executive order was ultimately found unconstitutional because it violated the principles of federalism, the separation of powers, and the Tenth ­Amendment to the US constitution barring the federal commandeering of state governments. However, it was a source of subnational–federal ­government friction. With the devolution of immigration enforcement powers to local officials, advocates on both sides of the conflict over immigrant rights have staked out their respective claims (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2012). In so doing they have pressured local governments to adopt positions on immigration that oftentimes clash with those of central government, a trend that has been particularly acute in the US (Walker and Leitner 2011). Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, anti-immigrant activists pressed local municipalities to enact ordinances that fine landlords and businesses which enter into agreements with undocumented migrants, while others banned hiring migrant day labourers (Walker and Leitner 2011: 157). In response, other localities and states passed measures to make undocumented migrants eligible for in-state educational tuition and providing them with a driver’s licence and and/or personal ID (Center for Popular Democracy 2013). Thus, the devolution of policy enforcement powers to subnational governments contributed to the formulation of local immigration policies that either reinforced or resisted federal government policy. This tension has precipitated conflict among federal, state, and local authorities (Neuman 1993; Olivas 1994; Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram 2012). The highly controversial Arizona law, SB 1070 reflected the 76

A sanctuary city, county, or state is a municipality with policies that limit the use of local police in enforcing federal immigration laws. The goal of such policies is to protect undocumented immigrants who are not engaged in criminal activity from being detained or deported solely based on their immigration status. In 2015, more than 200 state and local jurisdictions did not honour requests from ICE to detain individuals and refused to give the ICE access to their jails and prisons (Kopan 2018). In contrast, several states such as Mississippi, North Carolina, Alabama, Iowa, Texas, South Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee have passed legislation banning sanctuary policies state-wide and similar legislation is currently pending in several other states. (Kopan 2018; Somin 2017). Ironically, those opposing sanctuary cities (generally conservatives) are often advocates of state rights.

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struggle between subnational and central state actors. Although parts of the law were found unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court in June 2012, legislators in more than twenty states nevertheless announced plans to introduce bills modeled after it. However, it is ultimately within the jurisdiction of the US Congress to authorize states to play a role in immigration policy, as the latter did with respect to social welfare benefits in 1996. Thus, while the federal government retained the right to regulate the entry and exit of immigrants at the national border, the Welfare Reform Act has devolved responsibilities for the social welfare of immigrants to subnational government since the mid-1990s (Fix and Haskin 2002; Wells 2004). (b) European Local Actors  In Europe, the devolution of immigration-related responsibilities to local actors occurs not only among statist but also in decentralized polities. Nationally elected officials depend upon local elected officials, who are at the intersection of central government and private agencies, and who may be under financial and political pressure to attract more funds and votes by adopting exceptionally harsh measures against immigrants (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). Local actors too gain some prestige from their expanded policy responsibilities. The strategic role of local authorities is evident on several levels, ranging from health to housing, employment, and security. However, while subnational government has long been a stakeholder in the process of immigrant integration (Ellis 2006), what has changed since the 1990s is its assumption of responsibility to manage immigration (Nicholls 2015; Walker and Leitner 2011: 156). As the central state’s security agenda has expanded, its devolution of immigrationrelated responsibilities to subnational government has transformed them from predominantly immigrant integration facilitators to immigration regulators. The ‘double hat’ local actors wear in performing traditional roles such as providing social services for migrants or facilitating their settlement has made them pivotal to documentation procedures and enforcement.77 National governments have increasingly shifted the function for monitoring immigrant stay downwards to subnational government. National governments in Europe, for example, have relied on the

77

Paradoxically, pro-immigrant NGOs, such as the IOM applaud local authorities for providing a missing link to harness immigration and development (Riallant et al. 2014), but they have undermined the transformed ‘double hat’ of local non-state actors. Because these civil actors traditionally focus on integration, social services, and civic rights, they have overlooked the morphed role of local actors as gatekeepers.

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issuance of local residence permits to track the location of foreigners. In a region that has traditionally focused on internal control measures, there has been a tendency to police foreigners (Council of the European Union 2004: 41; Lahav 2010; Nicholls 2015). These strategies have included checking personal identification, imposing stringent conditions for issuing permits for residence, work, and study, creating automated systems for registering foreigners, broadening the categories of potential deportees, and issuing fines for assisting irregular migrants to settle and work.78 In France, for example, mayors assist the central government in managing immigration due to their expansive authority to issue marriage and residential certificates (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Weil 1997). Ever since the 1982 Deferre laws on decentralization were enacted, French city halls have exercised the prerogative to scrutinize the legality of marriages between nationals and foreigners. A 1993 law permitted mayors to refer a marriage involving a foreigner to the office of the Procureur de la République (state prosecutor) which can delay a marriage up to a month and, if it sees fit, block it (Act 93-1027).79 Since 1993, the certificates can be refused by a mayor after an investigation by the International Immigrations Office (OMI). In practice, some mayors refused to distribute the forms, and over 50 per cent were reported to have asked for documents not required by law (Le Monde 1997). Before these changes, there had been numerous instances in which mayors had exceeded their authority to target aliens and, consequently, they were condemned in court for their conduct. Since the 1990s, it is not so much that the attitudes of local officials have changed but, rather, their acquisition of new means by which they can intervene in the management of immigration (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000).80 According to Wihtol de Wenden 78 For example, a new immigration regime for international students took effect In Ireland beginning in January 2011, whereby non-EEA students had their time capped according to type of course enrolment, but generally limited to seven years (OECD 2013). This has had serious constitutional implications that took the issue to the Supreme Court arguing that these laws potentially interfere with their right to respect for private and family life such as to engage Article 8 (Carolan 2017). 79 The Constitutional Court declared several clauses unconstitutional, including the detention for up to three months of foreigners without valid identity documents, the ban on students to take family members to France, and the one-year entry ban for deportees. A slightly modified version of the law was passed on 30 December 1993 (93–1416). 80 A 1996 survey (Weil 1997) revealed significant geographic and political differences in how the laws were implemented. Forty two per cent of the marriages suspended by mayors involved an undocumented alien. Mayors in urban areas or the Southeast, where the neo-fascist National Front had then made substantial electoral inroads, exercised to their fullest their prerogative to monitor the status of immigrants (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). On the other hand, many politically left mayors facilitated ‘parrainage’ (symbolic

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(2011: 72), the 1993 Pasqua laws effected a paradigmatic reorientation in immigration-related public policy away from social to internal security matters. Despite the termination of the controversial 1982 prerequisite of ‘housing certificates’ administered by city hall in order to be eligible to host a foreigner (Le Monde, 12 December 1997), residence permits, and reception certificates (attestation accuiel) have continued to serve as an immigration control tool in the hands of mayors. The ability of foreigners to stay in France became more difficult when a resident’s card was made necessary for their integration in November 2003. Many NGOs viewed this change as undermining the basic rights of foreigners in France (Péchu 2006). Human rights activists pointed to the irony that while irregular migrants were treated as criminals by the administration, in many instances they only became irregular after their residence permit renewal applications were denied. Regional governments elsewhere in Europe are not only responsible for social security and citizenship but, in the case of Austria, they are involved, within the framework of the country’s Settlement and Residence Act, in establishing annual quotas for immigrant residence permits. As immigration has become increasingly linked to internal security in Austria (Infantino 2014) provincial authorities, like police forces in the UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, have acquired the authority to manage immigration through residence (Zincone et al. 2011). Among the measures adopted to clamp down on ‘bogus marriages’ under the Policing Aliens Act of 2005, for example, potential immigrants were required to apply for a residence permit while still abroad and civil registrars were obligated to report marriages involving a TCN to the Aliens Police. The Act also extended the maximum period from six to twelve months during which time a migrant facing deportation could be detained (Kraler 2011: 38). The proclivity of European governments to view immigration through the prism of security has also been evident in their use of integration policy to affect immigration flows. For example, foreigners residing within France illegally no longer qualify for social security benefits (Isidro 2020) following the passage of the 1993b Act on Immigration Control and Conditions of Entry and Residence of Foreigners. Similarly, before it was modified, the 1998 Dutch Linking Act required public service providers in the areas of education, health, and housing to deny services to undocumented immigrants (Nicholls 2015: 514; van der Leun 2006). sponsorship) ceremonies of persons ‘sans’ papiers, or irregular migrants without French identification or proper documents.

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Table 3.6  Private sector actors involved in managing immigration

Country

Transport Companies (sanctions)

Employers (sanctions)

Immigrants (punishment for irregular status)

Civil Society (sanctions for harbouring illegals)

Belgium Canada Denmark Finland Germany Italy Netherlands Sweden UK USA

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Perceived as a cornerstone of border enforcement these internal control strategies have increasingly placed local or private actors in a compromising position regarding settled immigrants.81 As Table 3.6 suggests, European states have utilized numerous actors to implement immigration checks. Even in countries that do not require prolonged residency for a foreigner to obtain a marriage certificate, background checks can take longer than four weeks before being issued by a national registry or local town hall. Notably, while local and regional authorities have been traditionally involved in the reception and integration of migrants (e.g., the ‘end phase’ of the migration process), most European countries have made the former a precondition of entry (O’Neil 2010). Thus, the role of these actors in facilitating migrant integration has now been extended to the realm of entry/exit controls. (c) Local Actors in Comparative Perspective  Local actors are frequently more willing to participate in immigration gatekeeping than national policymakers would prefer. Given they are oftentimes major financial stakeholders in managing immigration (Spiro 1994), cooperation can precipitate competition and political conflict among actors, as described above between levels of government in the American federal system. Such political wrangling can not only result in different actors pursuing divergent and conflicting objectives, but it also can blur the 81

Thus, while local and regional authorities have been traditionally involved in the reception and integration of immigrants, most European countries have now made the latter a precondition of entry (O’Neill 2010).

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lines  of responsibility regarding which actor is responsible for formulating and/or implementing policy (Schain 2019: 220). This nebulous situation can result in a scenario in which no actor assumes primary competence for implementing policy, a risk in the event of an unanticipated emergency (O’Neil 2010). For example, despite the institutional agreements between the two countries (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1993), the absence of a clear line of responsibility for housing refugees located along the French–UK border resulted in NGOs primarily assuming the responsibility for doing so (Council of Europe 2016). The consequences of central governments devolving responsibility for managing immigration to local actors are fraught with risk. Cooperation between national and local actors in surveilling foreigners has frequently resulted in racial profiling, institutional discrimination, and/or the misuse of an individual’s personal information. Opponents of the US Immigration and Nationality Act’s Section 287(g), for example, have claimed that the federal government’s deputation of local police to enforce immigration law poisons police-community relations and engenders political distrust (Feeney 2018: 9; Lee and Chin 2022). Though the formalization of immigration gatekeeping at the subnational level is relatively recent, the incorporation of subnational governments in managing immigration is not. In the US, for example, state and local governments have long regulated the movement of persons across borders via the use of criminal, vagrancy, quarantine, and registration laws (Neuman 1996). Until the middle- to late-nineteenth century, the American states exercised numerous prerogatives regarding immigration, including granting American citizenship to aliens (Schuck 1998). However, during the twentieth century, Supreme Court decisions emphasized the exclusivity, via the plenary power doctrine, of federal prerogatives regarding immigration regulation (Vialet 1980).82 Some of the earliest decisions establishing the federal government’s supremacy on immigration issues scrutinized laws passed by New York State in 1824 and 1847 that granted the mayor of New York City the power to register immigrants and collect bonds and taxes against their use of public support. Thus, although the US federal government’s devolution of immigration-related responsibilities to the states is increasing, it is not an entirely new phenomenon (Kretsedemas 2017).

82 Coleman (2007: 61–62) describes the federal plenary power as a ‘foreign-policycentric’ one which emerged from the Chinese Exclusion Acts. Through its decisions the Supreme Court has consistently linked immigration law to foreign affairs and national security.

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The ability of subnational governments to manage immigration successfully depends, in part, on how effective national governments are in identifying who is a citizen or lawful resident. In this context there are significant differences, stemming from different civic traditions and political cultures, between the American and European systems of border control (Zaiotti 2011) and personal identification (Castells 2000). In contrast to the US and common law countries like the UK, almost all EU countries compel an individual to carry a national identity card or some form of officially-issued personal identification, thus facilitating government surveillance of local residences and/or workplaces.83 Furthermore, even in countries that do not require residents to carry these documents, many citizens do so.84 American constitutional tradition deviates from this practice, repudiating civil monitoring and state intrusions through residence and registration systems (Krajewska 2017). Notwithstanding, American proposals to create a National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NEERS) during the early 2000s were modelled after European registration systems (US Department of Justice (DOJ) 2002).85 Towards this goal, the 2005 REAL ID Act operationalized the 11 September Commission’s recommendation that the federal government establish ‘standards for the issuance of sources of identification, such as driver’s licenses’ (DHS 2018). Specifically, the Act creates minimum security standards for the issuance of a licence and prohibits federal agencies from accepting for certain purposes a driver’s licence or an identification card issued by a state that doesn’t satisfy the Act’s specifications. Opponents of national identity cards in the US have expressed three major concerns: their historical association with totalitarian governance; potential to violate personal privacy; and possibility to foment

83

See Appendix D for countries that make national identity optional, compulsory, or opt for some form of national identification. All EU member states except Denmark and Ireland issue national identity cards to their citizens. Citizens of the EU, EEA, and Switzerland holding a national identity card not only can use it as an identity document within their home country, but also as a travel document in their exercise of the right of free movement within and across the three areas. 84 In France, for example, though lacking a mandatory national identification document system, in the early 1990s, it was estimated that over 90 per cent of Frenchmen carry a national identity card (Miller 1995: 26) but police have powers to check a person’s identity in many situations. In Germany and the Netherlands, national identity cards are optional until aged 16 and 14 respectively and carrying a valid identity documentation is compulsory for other EEA citizens. 85 In introducing the National Security Entry Exit Registration System, Ashcroft promised the system would ‘expand substantially America’s scrutiny of those foreign visitors who may pose a national security concern and enter our country. And it will provide a vital line of defense in the war against terrorism’ (Ashcroft 2002; Coleman 2009: 909; Wishnie 2002).

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discrimination (Etzioni 2004: 95–98; Privacy International 2021). These concerns generally have not been raised in Europe where similar systems have been in place locally for a long time. Nonetheless, the security climate in the US since 11 September has resulted in increasing calls among political elites and within the public for issuing national identity cards, as we document in Chapter 4. In these and other examples, the state’s devolution of immigration enforcement responsibilities to subnational actors facilitates the surveillance of foreigners. In all cases, the ‘securitization of identity’ (Bennett and Lyon 2008; Jenkins 2004: 174; Lyon 2007b: 35–36) has reinforced the ‘power of identity’ (Castells 2000) and the state’s administrative capacity. Private Sector Actors: Privatization and Commercialization Also included among the non-central state actors involved at the intersection of the immigration-security nexus is an eclectic group of private sector actors. Through privatization and/or other outsourcing strategies (Lahav 1998) private sector actors have become key agents in facilitating the liberal state’s management of contemporary immigration and human mobility. Included among these actors are commercial airlines, insurance companies, shipping carriers, transport companies, technology, and security services for migrant entry; employers and trade unions for migrant work; and universities, propriety schools, hotels, health care facilities, churches, trade unions, and NGOs for migrant stay. They also include private detention centres. The liabilities private actors incur in sharing the burden of immigration regulation are uniform across Europe and in the US and manifested in the state’s utilization of incentive structures and financial sanctions against transgressors. Despite the different mechanisms by which states delegate policy implementation functions to private sector actors, their logic is similar. All provide the state with the means to differentiate between the entry and stay of wanted tourists and other lawful persons and overstayers (Gonzalez 2019) and irregular migrants (Weber 1998). Specifically, they provide the infrastructure and know-how to distinguish between humanitarian or business flows and unwanted ones (Akkerman 2018a; Assaf 2009; Boswell 2008a; Côté-Boucher et al. 2014: 196; Lemberg-Pedersen 2018). These strategies which operate before the border or at the control site facilitate the movement of tourists, workers, and businessmen while preventing unwanted immigration. Liberal states have adopted stringent methods to deter immigration by incorporating or contracting out regulatory functions to private sector enterprises. To the extent that the primary role of private sector actors has evolved from contractors to regulators we can speak of the

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‘privatization’ of immigration management (Feigenbaum and Henig 1994). The transfer of state responsibilities to private sector actors or independent experts derives from the view that market activities can be regulated in areas perceived as important and in need of protection.86 In exchange for the smoother flow of business, trade, and labour, the central government gains the cooperation of independent or private actors. The devolution of a governmental function to the private sector can expand the state’s administrative reach. Given that privatization only changes the way national governments devolve the responsibility to service, regulate, or finance their immigration-related functions (Zohlnhöfer et al. 2008: 97), it usually occurs in forms that do not compromise state sovereignty (Feigenbaum et al. 1998). Consistent with an entrepreneurial mode of politics, the utilization of private sector actors to achieve public goods enhances the freedom of central states to pursue diffuse collective benefits. Private sector actors often have limited recourse (GAO 2004) and incurred significant costs because of their inclusion in the state’s regulatory immigration regime. For example, the introduction of innovative technologies and procedures for monitoring human mobility have substantially increased the financial burden of commercial airlines in the areas of staffing, cockpit-door reinforcement, personnel security training, and higher insurance premiums.87 Travel industry groups have complained that post-11 September airport security requirements threaten their economic position (CNN, 29 October 2003). In the UK, for example, the government’s imposition of a £50,000 fine on airlines for improper passenger control in airports was seen as a hefty price for border regulation (Hall 2018). Similarly, the focus on security in recruiting foreign students has compromised the interests of higher education in Europe and the US (Altbach 2004; Brown and Bean 2009; Institute of International Education 86

The devolution of inter-state regulation to expert bodies in the US may be traced back to the federal government’s adoption of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 regulating the railways and setting up a corresponding regulatory body (Interstate Commerce Commission). The US Congress thereby delegated its own power to regulate an important part of interstate commerce, namely railway traffic to an agency designed especially for the purpose. This was an important institutional innovation at the federal level (Majone 1996: 16), reflecting the federal state’s initiative to incorporate expert bodies in its regulation strategy. 87 It is telling for security and civil liberties that a large part of increased air-carrier security expenditures is not devoted to personnel training. A study of European airlines revealed that among additional expenditures for 2002, more than 50 per cent was delegated to insurance premiums, compared to 2 per cent for training (Irish Aviation Authority/IIA, 23).

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2017a; The Economist 2011). For example, the creation of a digitalized Student and Exchange Visitors Program (SEVP), as part of the efforts of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement to centralize the monitoring of international students and scholars, has been criticized by higher education administrators as inefficient, costly, and intrusive (Dodds 2005; NAFSA 2019). More importantly, it has been perceived as compromising the competitiveness of American higher educational institutions in recruiting foreign students (IIE 2017; Anderson and Svrluga 2018; ICEF 2018).88 The state’s security mandates have been counterbalanced somewhat by the exponential growth of firms that have profited financially because of the events of 11 September (Gheciu 2018).89 The number of private facilities detaining migrants in the US, for example, grew by 75 per cent between 2003 and 2015, a trend that was mirrored in the UK (Hiemstra and Colon 2017: 1; Sumption and Vargas-Silva 2019; Migration Observatory 2015). State transfer payments to private migrant detention providers in the US were estimated to be $2 billion in FY 2017 (Luan 2018). The soaring profits generated in the private migrant detention sector are paralleled in privately operated visa processing centres (Bello 2017; Bloom 2015; Sánchez-Barrueco 2017). Furthermore, the revolutionary changes in centralizing US aviation security have spawned a new surveillance and remote sensing industry (Lahav 2008). The introduction of innovative technologies and new visa and passport procedures has expanded the number of regulatory actors operating beyond national borders and increased the business traffic for visa processing centres (Bloom 2015).90 According to Akkerman (2016: 1), the size of the border security market was estimated at €15 billion in 2015 and is projected to rise to €29 billion in 2022. Variously characterized by scholars as the ‘economy of border security’, ‘immigration industry’, or the ‘business of control’, private firms have become major gatekeepers in an ‘accelerated hybridization of migrant management’ (Rodier 2013: 2). The privatization of the management of immigration (Menz 2008, 2009) has contributed to 88

According to enrolment surveys conducted by the Institute for International Education (IIE), there was an overall flattening of the total number of international students in the US, and a decline amongst new international students by the fall of 2017 (Baer 2017). 89 Gheciu (2018: 31) argues that the changes carried out in the 1990s and 2000s after the collapse of communism and the first (1993) and second (2001) World Trade Center bombings led to a new era marked by the emergence of a powerful private security domain governed by the laws of the economic market. 90 Bloom (2015) cites the example of the large visa processing company, VFS Global, that was reported to have processed more than 88 million visa applications across 117 countries in 2014.

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the proliferation of ‘micro-economies’ external to the central state (Conlon and Hiemstra 2014). Characterized by Golash-Boza (2009b) as an ‘immigration industrial complex’, this public–private partnership tends to criminalize and securitize immigration. (Trujillo-Pagán 2014). Private sector actors involved in managing immigration on behalf of the state can be differentiated according to their role in controlling, facilitating, or assisting human mobility (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013). To better understand the nature of these public–private partnerships, the following section describes the activities of several major private sector actors in regulating migrant entry, stay, and exit. Specifically, it considers the role of commercial airlines in migrant entry, employers and universities in migrant stay, and private citizens and detention facilities in migrant exit. V

Private Sector Actors: Select Cases of Migrant Entry, Stay, and Exit

The role of private sector actors in managing immigration is sectoral-, industry-, and venue-specific. Although some are profit-driven and others wary of being fined by the state, the transactional dynamic within these public–private relationships is relatively similar. A

Migrant Entry: Transportation Companies and Ports

Of the approximately 362 million travellers entering the US in 2013, more than 242 million people arrived by land, 102 million by air, and 18 million by sea (Pew Research Center 2015; World Bank 2022). In all, approximately 76.5 million foreigners entered the US between August 2014 and July 2015, representing half of all overseas (citizens and noncitizens) travellers (Yanofsky 2017). Transport companies are an important private sector actor in managing immigration at ports of entry.91 For example, airports, which account for approximately 25 per cent of all border crossings, are a no-man’s land. By virtue of owning the airspace into which commercial airlines fly, they are dependent on the central government to conduct their business. While the participation of private sector actors in managing immigration is not new, it nevertheless has become more formal over time 91 According to Zolberg (2001), at the turn of the century, approximately one million persons entered the US daily through one of the more than 300 air, sea, and land ports of entry and pre-clearance stations in Canada and the Caribbean, monitored by Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

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(Lahav 2008), particularly as air travel has become more accessible globally (Burgueño Salas 2022). Indeed, the US Congress enacted legislation in 1819 to regulate the transport of passengers in ships arriving from abroad.92 The act required ship captains to submit a list of passengers to the collector of customs in the district in which the ship docked. To induce compliance, sanctions against ships came into force as a result of the Passenger Act of 1902. Shipping companies have continuously lobbied for more lenient immigration entry policies (Feys 2015). Since the adoption of guidelines issued by the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO), transport companies have been compelled to assume the role of international immigration officers. The convention’s standards specifically established that airlines are responsible for seeing that their passengers possess the required travel documents. Since 11 September, the ICAO, a specialized agency of the UN, has established the standards for biometric passports and personal identification documents and assumed the lead role in facilitating transatlantic cooperation in the aviation area (European Commission 2003; Koslowski 2005).93 Many countries have adopted laws in recent years that increase the immigration-related responsibilities of carriers and fine them for not fulfilling their obligations. Within the EU, Article 26 of the 1990 Supplementation Agreement of the Schengen Convention compels carriers to serve as de facto immigration officers. With the exclusion of Ireland, Spain, and Luxembourg, all EU countries adopted laws increasing the liabilities of carriers in 1994. In the wake of 2015–16 terrorist attacks 92 According to Harney (1977), many radicals were encouraged by the big Italian steamship companies to skirt 1880s legislation that sought to regulate the activity of recruiters and reduce the numbers of official subagents and steamship companies. Towards this goal, the investigations of the Dillingham Congressional Commission of 1911 reported that the steamship companies and their subagents profited greatly from the lucrative business of such passages (e.g., businessmen, local authorities, translators, brokers, innkeepers, loan sharks). The Commission estimated that the Cashiers Office at Ellis Island, as a depository of alien funds, held approximately $500,000 monthly for such crossings (1977: 47). Of the forty-seven Italian immigrant bankers investigated by the Dillingham Commission in 1911, all served as agents or subagents for steamship companies (Harney 1977: 48). 93 Notably, the ICAO’s efforts to ‘provide secure facilitation of travel’ began earlier in the l950s, in response to a series of commercial airline hijackings. Its formal work on documentation standards, especially machine-readable travel documents can be traced to the establishment of a Panel on Passport Cards by the Air Transport Committee of the Council in 1968. However, it was only in 1998 that the New Technologies Working Group of the TAG/MRTD when ‘the most effective biomentric identification system’ was born (ICAO 2021), Thus, it wasn’t until after the first World Trade Center that the ICAO began in earnst to systematically operationalize the system. They paved the institutional path for increasing digitalization after the subsequent terrorist attacks.

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in Brussels and Paris, the EU adopted additional border controls on passengers from outside the Schengen Area. The new regulations introduced both entry and exits checks for non-Schengen travellers, with passenger information cross-referenced against the data in the Schengen Information System and Interpol travel document records. As the airport trade industry braced itself to deal with the impact of tighter state and EU requirements (EU 2017/458) for vetting passengers from outside the Schengen Area, sporadic delays across Europe during the summer 2017 compromised the efficiency of the travel market (Lo 2018).94 Enplanement processing procedures and security measures are reported to have significantly increased passenger check-in and boarding times, thus resulting in higher costs (Baird 2017: 329). Moreover, the stringent security check of identity cards, tickets, boarding passes, baggage, and body scans at airports have partially negated the freedoms of individual mobility (Bloom 2014), and the advantages of abolishing passport controls within the Schengen area. Liberal states vary according to whether aviation-related security within their borders is centralized or decentralized (IAA 2004: 9). The primary feature of centralization is the state’s oversight of airport security via government bodies such as the Ministry of Transportation. Conversely, decentralization mainly delegates security-related responsibilities to semi-independent authorities who manage the airport (IAA Civil Aviation Security Financing, 2004).95 In contrast to the public–private partnerships that dominated the implementation of aviation security standards in Europe, the US effected a shift towards a centralized model of aviation security post-11 September (Smith 2011). Specifically, the federal Transportation and Security Agency (TSA) assumed the primary responsibility for security at US airports (IAA 2004: 44).96 94 According to Thomas Reynaert, Managing Director of trade association Airlines for Europe, ‘Member States need to take all necessary measures now to prevent such disruptions and deploy appropriate staff and resources in sufficient numbers to carry out the requested checks’ (Lo 2018). 95 In Europe, Austria, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Sweden have adopted centralized models, whereas France, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the UK have traditionally followed a decentralized model. In 2003, the Netherlands switched to a decentralized approach to aviation security, and Norway enacted Regulation EC No. 2320/2002 in 2004, thereby making the provision of primary security activities at Norwegian airports the responsibility of the airport operator or outsourced to third parties (IAA 2004: 9). 96 The TSA was created as part of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and signed into law by President Bush on 19 November 2001. Originally part of the US Department of Transportation, the TSA was moved to the DHS on 9 March 2003. The agency’s proponents, including Transportation Secretary, Norman Mineta, argued that only a single federal agency would better protect air travel than the private companies who

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The US federal government is estimated to have transferred almost $32 billion to the domestic aviation industry between 2002 and 2004 (IAA 2004: 44). The largest share (40 per cent) of its expenditures during the beginning of this period was for passenger and baggage screeners, a federal job created after 11 September, and a position that until 11 September, had been handled exclusively by private companies (Chattanooga Times Free Press, August 26, 2003). By 2011 not only was the DHS the only agency that received an increase in funding in the President’s budget ($56 billion), but its two units which most benefitted were the Customs and Border Protections and the TSA, both of which are charged with the responsibility of screening passengers (US Department of Homeland Security 2011a). Between fiscal year (FY) 2002 and FY 2010 the DHS’s budget expanded from 19.5 to 55.3 billion dollars (US DHS 2011a). Furthermore, its budgetary and manpower priorities privilege border patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Mittelstadt et al. 2011). Even as the Trump Administration attempted to reduce the agency’s administrative costs, the growth of government expenditures for the agency resulted in an increase in private outsourcing (Inserra 2017) and in what the DHS described as an ‘enterprise-wide enforcement effort … involving other federal, state, and local actors’ (US DHS 2017: 3). Bolstering border security is like national defence in that it not only yields concentrated costs (e.g., for providers and customers), but produces diffuse benefits (i.e., increased safety for the entire country).97 Nonetheless, the aviation industry’s involvement benefits those who use its services, thus fueling the argument that security measures should be privately funded (Haveman and Shatz 2006: 22). The riposte to this view is that imposing user fees can result in diverting passenger traffic to ports elsewhere in North America and the adoption of alternative modes of transportation by passengers. In the event, the federal government has changed course in this policy area several times since 11 September. In 2002, the TSA levied a passenger surcharge of $5.00 for personal airline travel to defray the costs of enhanced aviation security. However, recognizing its potentially negative impact on US carrier profitability, operated under contract to single airlines or groups of airlines that used a given terminal facility. Prior to its creation, private security firms managed air travel security. Private screening did not disappear under the TSA, which allows airports to opt out of federal screening and hire firms to do the job instead. Such firms must still get TSA approval under its Screening Partnership Program (SPP) and follow TSA procedures (see www .huffingtonpost.com/entry/airports-before-911_us_57c85e17e4b078581f11a133). 97 This follows the thesis that whenever the benefits of immigration are diffuse and its costs concentrated, as they are in the new security era, the dominant mode of politics is primarily entrepreneurial (see Chapter 2).

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Congress later suspended the surcharge. In May 2003, the TSA reimbursed $2.4 billion to sixty-six US air carriers for expenses incurred and revenue forgone due to their new security-related responsibilities (IAA 2004: 44).98 Since centralizing aviation security in 2001, the remuneration of key security activities has been primarily financed by the TSA’s budget (IAA 2004: 44).99 Several thorny issues have arisen regarding public–private partnerships in the realm of aviation security (Berndtsson and Stern 2011); Salter 2008). These include the imposition of no-fly lists (Bennett 2008; Schlangenstein and Levin 2022), passenger screening and Passenger Name Recognition (PNR) databases, and carrier sanctions (Rodenhauser 2014; Scholten 2015). Among these, PNR-related issues are particularly controversial (Lahav 2008).100 For example, the PNR mandate that commercial airlines must provide EU-origin passenger information for flights to the US (2004) and Canada (2005) has raised concerns about its implications for personal privacy. As elaborated upon below, the tension between the need of government to gather personal information while simultaneously respecting individual privacy raises four broad issues: the criteria that should be applied in retaining personal data; the procedures that should be employed to share information with third parties; establishing appropriate redress for individuals who wish to challenge the information collected about them; and the appropriate procedures for sharing personal data between national governments and the private sector. Perhaps more importantly, conflict has ensued regarding whether such data should be used for general law enforcement purposes or combating terrorism and/or organized crime exclusively. B

Migrant Stay: Employment and Education

Private sector actors have similarly assumed responsibility for managing immigrant reception and/or integration. Employers, institutions of 98 According to IIA/AviaSolutions (2004: 45), the financial aid was distributed in proportion to the amount of security-related fees eligible carriers have paid the TSA since February 2002. Subsequent payments have been made to carriers, and by 2004, when the summary report was concluded, the total of $4.6 billion had been reimbursed. 99 The difference between centralized and decentralized models of aviation security refers to the degree of exclusive and direct government jurisdiction and responsibility over the security activities (i.e., government bodies versus relevant non-state actor such as airport or outsourced security company). 100 Passenger transportation data or PNR consists not only of all details of reservations, payments, and preferences, but all types of social and psychological profiling. Of further contention has been the statute of limitations. It was initially proposed that data gathered would be retained for 50 years, though in a subsequent between the European Commission and the TSA, this period was reduced to 3.5 years.

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higher education, healthcare providers, private landlords, and numerous civil society actors are among the participants in the expanded migration policy playing field at the domestic level (Motomura 2008). The role of these private sector actors in serving as immigration gatekeepers is especially evident in employment. For example, private employers in the US sponsor approximately 160,000 foreign workers annually. To illustrate: As compared with the approximately 31,500 officials within the DHS charged with making admissions/screening decisions in 2007 (US CIS, 2007), private employer sponsors in the construction and manufacturing industries numbered over one million (Lee 2009). Employers are thus positioned to act as gatekeepers in service of the state’s mission to discourage irregular immigration (Lee 2009: 1129, 1131; Manns 2006). As a former DHS manager observed during the construction of a wall along the Mexican border during the Trump administration, in contrast to physical fences, employer sanctions are the ‘real wall’ in deterring irregular immigration (Carcamo 2017). Employers

The workplace is a prominent space for managing immigration internally. Agreements in Europe and the US have been struck between governments and employers in this sphere which permit the latter to monitor instances of irregular migrant participation in the labour force. From the early to mid-1970s, most European countries instituted provisions like those adopted by the French government as early as 1926,101 and have adopted and refined employer sanctions (Lahav 1998). The French approach to stem irregular immigration at the work site serves as a model for other countries, including the US (Miller 1995). The French model of department-level commissions brought together concerned enforcement services, elected officials, and representatives of employers and employees (Miller 1995: 27). The imposition of sanctions on undocumented migrants and the businesses hiring them has been a central aspect of enforcing French immigration law, especially through civil and criminal penalties.102 The system of worksite control represents a 101



102

France decreed employer sanctions again in 1976. The UK adopted legislation prohibiting the harbouring of illegal aliens, though not their employment, in 1971. Switzerland has had anti-harbouring statutes since 1931 and adopted an employment statute in 1984. West Germany first prohibited the employment of clandestine aliens in 1975; the Netherlands in 1974, Austria in 1981, and Italy, Spain, and Belgium thereafter (Miller 1995). Failure to comply with the law governing foreign workers to France can precipitate the imposition of various sanctions, including criminal sanctions. Courts can impose fines and imprisonment on the employer (up to ten years in prison and a fine of up to €750,000 for individuals, and €3,750,000 for legal entities) while French authorities

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coordinated effort by the state to curb unwanted migrants, while permitting employers experiencing a shortage of labour access to an adequate supply of foreign workers.103 Prior to the European Union Employers’ Sanctions Directive in 2009, 26 of the then 28 EU’s member states had implemented legal prohibitions against the employment of undocumented workers, with 19 allowing the option of applying criminal sanctions (PICUM 2015). However, their content and enforcement differed across the member states. Since the Directive was issued, minimal sanctions and measures against employers of irregular third country nationals and the labour rights of undocumented migrants have been incorporated into EU law. Civil rights activists have argued that instead of protecting the rights of undocumented migrant workers, it has legitimized immigration control (OECD 2013). European and American labour law substantially differ. European governments, for example, have traditionally protected the economic bargaining power of native workers by limiting the access of irregular migrants to the labour market. In most countries, the agency with the most labour market expertise, the labour agency, is responsible for discovering and subsequently removing unauthorized foreign workers from the workplace. Conversely in the US, INS inspectors have historically been more concerned with the legality of workers rather than their wages or working conditions, while labour inspectors in the states are concerned about their wages but not their legal status. In contrast to most European countries, where employer sanctions have long been part of national labour law, illegal aliens in the US were considered, before passage of the IRCA, to have violated federal law by entering the country and working, while employers were exempted from legal scrutiny. The imposition of employer sanctions addressed this anomaly by making the hire of irregular migrants a violation of federal labour law. However, these sanctions were only vigorously enforced beginning in the late 1990s (Lee 2009: 1129), as evidenced by the paucity of workplace enforcement activity or raids. In this vein, the agreement struck between the US Department of Labor and the INS during

103

can withhold the employee’s authorization to work or stay in France. Additional criminal or administrative sanctions can be incurred, such as the confiscation of all or part of the assets, exclusion from public procurement and dissolution (Dauthier and SmithVidal 2018). For example, the 1996 US Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act granted temporary work visas to approximately 250,000 foreign farm workers. The plan was designed to delimit permanent stays by withholding 25 per cent of foreign workers’ wages until their return (The New York Times, 6 March 1996: 14).

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the 1990s which allowed government inspectors to verify, via the completion of Form I-9 by employers, the identity and employment status of individuals hired employed in the US represented a step in the direction of the European and especially the French approach.104 Although few employers were convicted in the US, the number of inspections and I-9 audits nevertheless increased threefold between 2009 and 2013. In 2016, the US DOJ increased the size of the fines levied on employers for violating federal immigration law by as much as 96 per cent, depending on the nature and severity of the offence (Covington 2016).105 In particular, the financial and criminal exposure of corporate giants such as the Walmart Corporation, Tyson Foods Inc., and TJ Maxx in 2003–04 that failed to comply with their gatekeeping responsibilities became salient (Zimmerman and Valbrun 2003). In addition to labour enforcement raids and business audits, stiffer penalties for improper I-9 documentation, unauthorized employment, and engaging in unfair immigration-related practices increased the pressure on private firms to comply with federal law.106 Along these lines, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (US ICE 2018a) initiated approximately twice as many worksite investigations and I-9 audits in the first seven months of FY2018 than in all FY2017. The high volume of migrant apprehensions and crackdowns on ‘magnet’ businesses employing undocumented workers shone a spotlight on the federal government’s new approach towards workplace immigration control throughout the 2000s (Carcamo 2017). Operation Rollback, a 104



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Operation Jobs, originating in Dallas in 1995 and expanded to eighteen states, and Operation SouthPAW (Protect American Workers) in six southern states accounted for most of the 11,000 irregular migrants the INS removed from worksites in fiscal 1995 (INS 1996). The Department justified this compliance incentive as an adjustment for inflation, the fines for employer violations of IRCA increased. Under federal law, employers are required to verify the identity and employment eligibility of all individuals they hire, and to document that information using the Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9. ICE uses the I-9 inspection program to promote compliance with the law, part of a comprehensive strategy to address and deter illegal employment. Inspections are one of the most powerful tools the federal government uses to ensure that businesses are complying with US employment laws. A notice of inspection alerts business owners that ICE will conduct an audit of their hiring records, and employers are required to produce their company’s I-9s within three business days, after which ICE will conduct a compliance inspection. If employers are not in compliance with the law, an I-9 inspection of their business will likely result in civil fines and could lay the groundwork for criminal prosecution if they are knowingly violating the law. Unauthorized workers are subject to administrative arrest and removal from the country. In FY17, businesses were ordered to pay $97.6 million in judicial forfeitures, fines, and restitution, and $7.8 million in civil fines, including one company whose financial penalties represented the largest payment ever levied in an immigration case (US ICE 2018a).

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federal investigation conducted by ICE, for instance, resulted in thirteen felony indictments and two janitorial contractors fined $5 million (The Wall Street Journal, 24 October 2003). According to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, contractors are responsible for ensuring their workers are legally eligible to work. The minimum penalty imposed on offending employers by the DOJ was reported to be $548 per unauthorized employee (Carcamo 2017). The maximum fine the DOJ can impose can be as high as $21,916 (Carcamo 2017). This said, and notwithstanding the growing costs to American business interests, the fines levied on employers have often been less onerous in the US than in Europe.107 A pro-business political culture averse to government intervention in the economy in the US makes American employers less vulnerable to government penalties than their European counterparts. For example, while the federal government deported more than 2.5 million persons between 2009 and 2016, only 1,337 business managers were arrested for hiring irregular migrant workers, evading taxes, and laundering money during this period (Carcamo 2017). Although monitoring places of employment requires the capability to verify the authenticity of required documents, there are significant differences between the US and Europe, stemming from different civic traditions and political cultures, regarding personal identification systems. In the absence of a national personal identification system, American strategies to regulate the worksite are handicapped in tackling the problem of document counterfeiting. Also, the degree to which employment eligibility rules are enforced across American state and local jurisdictions varies (Newman et al. 2012). Nonetheless, incremental advances have occurred on this front. In 1996 the then-INS replaced some of the older work authorization forms with a tamper-resistant Employment Authorization ­Document (EAD).108 It also created databases for businesses to verify a 107



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The sanctions conditioned in EU Employment Directives have only deterred employers, since the risk of being inspected combined with the financial sanctions is in most cases much lower than the costs associated with fully declared and formalized work contracts (PICUM 2015). These EADs revised the ‘green card’ and were, based on a social security number (SSN), and on improved breeder documents to establish a person’s identity. Prior to IRCA, employers were not required to verify the identity and employment authorization of their employees; after, for the very first time, this reform ‘made it a crime for undocumented immigrants to work’ in the US. The Employment Eligibility Verification document (I-9) was required to be used by employers to ‘verify the identity and employment authorization of individuals hired for employment in the United States’. While this form is not to be submitted unless requested by government officials, it is required that all employers have an I-9 form from each of their employees, which they must be retain for three years after day of hire or one year after employment

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potential employee’s work eligibility. In November 2003 legislation was passed expanding nationwide the 1996 law then in use by employers in six states (The New York Times, 19 November 2003). Under the law employers must now check with the Social Security Administration and the DHS to verify a potential employee’s social security number and alien identification number.109 Moreover, they must maintain records of their examinations. As a result of this more intensive vetting process, US employers have incurred substantial costs (Galeano et al. 2018). A survey of over 1,000 American executives found that among the most frequently elicited responses to the question about which part of their job kept them up at night was ‘my company’s immigration matters’ (Galeano et al. 2018).110 The creation of the EAD in the US was viewed by some as a first step towards the adoption of a national ID card, a proposed measure that, unsurprisingly, is resisted by civil rights groups and those generally opposed to expanding the federal government’s regulatory reach into business employment practices. Furthermore, while the effectiveness of employer sanctions was evidenced by a rise in employer-initiated outreach to the DHS to request inspection of their workplaces, the removal of unauthorized workers has led to an increase in migrant rights abuses. This type of business–government cooperation has been characterized as perverse (Lee 2009: 1107) as it stems from ‘a law-breaking employer who may invoke the formidable powers of the government’s law enforcement apparatus to terrorize its workers and suppress worker dissent is terminated (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2017, www.uscis.gov/i-9). The E-Verify system as it has been commonly referred to has also been complemented more recently by a SelfCheck voluntary electronic verification program which takes the burden off the employer and puts it on prospective employees to prove their eligibility (Carcamo 2017). 109 Many Democrats in the House of Representatives argued that giving employers access to a federal database with inadequate privacy protections would invade personal privacy and could lead to a nation-wide identification system. Other controversies involved provisions that would have allowed the Homeland Security Department to use the program for other verification purposes and giving states and local governments access to the information. 110 According to Littler’s (2018) Employer Survey, immigration policy changes and increased enforcement ranked as the most or second-most concerning workplace issue over the past year for 28 per cent of those surveyed. In reflecting on the immigration policy changes that they expect to significantly impact their workplaces over the next year, 48 per cent selected tighter restrictions on visa adjudications, and 36 per cent expressed concern with increased workplace immigration enforcement. Other notable concerns for employers were issues regarding Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) changes (29 per cent), tighter controls on green card adjudications (26 per cent), and the travel ban executive order (16 per cent) (See Littler 2018, www.littler.com/files/2018_lit tler_employer_survey.pdf).

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under threat of deportation’. In this regard, the role of employers as immigration regulators makes workers legally vulnerable, especially during labour disputes.

Higher Education

The recruitment of private sector actors to manage immigrant stay has now expanded considerably beyond the work site to include institutions of higher learning and trade schools (Dodds 2005).111 Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since 11 September and the subsequent war on terror, foreign youth exchanges and international student mobility, traditional matters for the State Department, resurfaced on the US foreign policy agenda. The regulatory framework that can either facilitate or hinder foreign student exchanges has dominated political discourse on international education since 2001, with the result that stricter visa requirements and screening processes for foreign students and exchange visitors are now tied to protecting homeland security. The devolution of immigration management functions to non-central state actors such as universities and other educational institutions has become increasingly enforced and demanding. For example, to qualify for a visa, foreign students in the US have long been required to sign a waiver permitting their educational institution to inform national immigration officials about their enrolment status. Given the notorious participation of foreign students in the 11 September attacks, it was hardly surprising that educational or vocational institutions and their international student population would be scrutinized more closely by the federal government. In this context, 220 institutions of higher education were asked by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) for information about their Middle Eastern students in the immediate aftermath of the attacks (The New York Times, 12 November 2001: B8). The number of background checks on visa applicants reportedly increased tenfold, and in 2003 scientists had to wait for a decision on their Visa Mantis clearances an average of sixty-seven days (Campbell 2005: 151).112 Despite strict federal prohibitions against sharing information regarding a student’s citizenship status, as stipulated by the 1974 Family 111



112

According to MPI and Brookings Institute data, international students have transitioned into US jobs at lower rates since the availability of work visas became scarcer (Zong and Batalova 2018). The assumption is that receiving an education in the US becomes less of an incentive, if finding a job after graduation is more difficult. The 1998 Visa Mantis program was a security review process introduced to prevent the illegal transfer of technology from the US. Most requests for Mantis visas reportedly come from China, Russia and Ukraine (Campbell 2005: 151).

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Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), loopholes in the law precipitated judicial intervention.113 The ensuing amendments to the original privacy law have been subject to ‘exceptional clauses’ that have expanded and justified the federal government’s intervention.114 The last of the nine amendments to the 1974 FERPA laws in 2001 paved the way for greater intervention by the state and the formal incorporation of institutions of higher education. In an amendment to the USA Patriot Act of 2001, FERPA added a subsection permitting the US Attorney General to apply for an ex parte court order requiring an educational agency or institution to allow the Attorney General to collect and use education records relevant to investigations and prosecutions of acts of terrorism and certain crimes. The Attorney General must certify that there are specific facts giving reason to believe that the records are likely to contain the required information (www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ ferpa/leg-history.html). In 2001 the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) database was launched by the federal government to track the movement of foreign students within the US. SEVIS implements Section 641 of the IIRIRA, which requires the DHS to collect information on international students and exchange visitors during their stay in the US.115 It also provides a mechanism to identify persons who violate their visitor status so that appropriate law enforcement decisions can be taken, including the denial of benefits or their removal from the US. The SEVP, under the jurisdiction of ICE, was created to maintain SEVIS and centralize the monitoring of international students and researchers.

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The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) (20 USC. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99) is a 1974 federal law that protects the privacy of student educational records, and prevents schools from sharing student information, including their citizenship status, with ICE. The law applies to schools receiving funding from the US Department of Education. These FERPA laws were qualified during the late 1990s (www2.ed.gov/ policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/leg-history.html). While schools are required to provide education to all minor students regardless of immigration status, and are prohibited from insisting on certain forms of residency proof due to a 1980s Supreme Court case of Plyler vs. Doe, they may disclose information with consent or based on court order or subpoena (American Immigration Council 2016). The protective language employed by some school districts, for example explicitly instructing staff on what to do if ICE should contact them, suggests that the possibility of ICE interference exists, and makes the lack of such language in other districts much more notable (Von Hoffmann 2016). The 1998 Higher Education Amendments added a provision that allows disclosure to authorized representatives of the Attorney General for law enforcement purposes. Although SEVIS was first introduced in the IIRIRA of 1996, it was only implemented by the 2001 Patriot Act of 2001 and Enhanced Border Security.

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SEVP’s focus on security has been criticized for undermining the competitiveness of American educational institutions and the international leadership of US higher education (Johnson 2018; Zong and Batalova 2018). Early on, when the DHS, which operates SEVIS, promised that it would be able to handle the massive influx of work, college officials expressed concern that they and their international students would suffer (Chronicle of Higher Education, 1 August 2003). In 2018 the federal government proposed instituting fee hikes to help SEVP achieve its objective of enhancing national security and preventing immigration fraud (DHS ICE Bulletin 7/7/2018). Facing new government proposals to increase student application fees and imposing new ones on higher education institutions utilizing the SEVP system, education officials objected to what they perceived to be the imposition of a twofold burden: a reduced number of student applications and higher operational costs.116 Educators have been especially frustrated by the lack of communication from and conflicting information provided by the DHS and DOS, the steep charges associated with SEVIS compliance, the time-consuming work of ensuring accurate data reporting, interface software, and the cost  of training staff. Not only has SEVIS consumed a significant proportion of the international budget of higher education, but it inhibits the ability of institutions to recruit and enroll international students in a timely manner. Moreover, in the view of some higher education officials (PIE 2018), SEVIS has changed the culture of their international student office from a person-oriented to a bureaucratic, data-driven one. Because contemporary liberal states prioritize security over the labour needs of employers, the number of international students in the US plateaued following 11 September (Altbach 2004a). Since 2003, the American higher education has lost ground in recruiting international students and scholars (Bagnato 2005; Danley 2009), a consequence due in large part to the difficulties they face in obtaining and renewing educational visas (Figure 3.4). Despite the continued American dominance of global higher education market shares, for the first time in decades, foreign student numbers not only failed to grow substantially, but they declined. Indeed, as the number of the world’s foreign-student population increased from 2.1 million in 2001 to 4.6 million in 2017, the

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These hikes are estimated to bring in $75.2 million to cover the SEVP operational shortfall of $68.9 million projected in 2019 (PIE 2018). According to PIE, a network of professionals in international education, the proposed fee hike is perceived by some members of the international education community as yet another impediment to the recruitment of international students, https://thepienews.com/news/department-ofhomeland-security-proposes-increase-in-international-student-visa-fees/.

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si a C an ad a

us R

C hi na

Sp ai n Be lg iu m

ni te d

U

U

ni te

d

St

at es Ki ng do m G er m an y Fr an ce Au st ra lia Ja pa n

30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%

2001

2017

Figure 3.4  International student destinations in top country markets, 2001 and 2017 N = 2.1 million students in 2001/4.6 million in 2017. Sources: IIE, Project Atlas, 2017; UNESCO (2017).

American share of this population decreased from 28 to 24 per cent.117 Particularly notable has been the declining share of South American, Saudi Arabian, South Korean, and other Asian students attending institutions of higher education in the US (Johnson 2018).118 Higher education in the UK, also among the world’s leaders in higher education (Figure 3.4) with an industry generating $39.4 billion in revenues in 2009 (The Economist, 5 August 2010), has similarly suffered 117



118

Before reaching its peak in 2016, the number of international students (1.1 million by 2016) – including US program called Optional Practical Training (OPT) OPT students – grew by as much as 36 per cent over the decade between 1990s and 2000s (IIEA 2017). After a remarkable liberal expansive period of student work permits, the proportion of foreign student increase has consistently declined in the last period with 10 per cent in 2014–15 to 7.1 per cent in 2015–16, to 3.4 per cent in 2016–17, according to IIE’s Open Doors annual report on international students in the US. By 2018, SEVP reported that international students on F and M visas decreased by 0.5 per cent overall when compared to the previous year (https://thepienews.com/news/sevp-dropasian-students-south-america/). During the March 2017–18 reporting period, the total number of F and M international students decreased by 6,210 (−0.5 per cent) and J-1 exchange visitors increased by 8,160 (+4 per cent). (ICE, 4) www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/ pdf/byTheNumbersApr2018.pdf. According to IIE’s 2016 report, many MENA (Middle East and Near East Africa) students also enrol in intensive English programs (IEPs), which provide a pathway to degree programs once students improve their English skills. After several years of growing IEP enrolment from MENA, in 2015 there was a 1 per cent decline in IEP students at higher education institutions and independent providers (see Institute of International Education/IIE 2017, Table 3.5). According to the report, ‘this drop may portend future declines or slowing growth among students in degree programs, as fewer MENA students enter the IEP pipeline to further study in the United States’. (IIE 2017, Report on the World on the Move).

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because of the strictures enforced by the UK Border Agency (The Guardian, 1 November 2011). A reform of the student visa system intended to discourage bogus student applications was estimated to have reduced the international student population in the UK by 11,000, and led to more than 450 colleges abandoning the market for international students (The Guardian, 1 November 2011). In 2017, the IIEC Project Atlas reported that the UK had barely maintained its share of 11 per cent of the international student market. Similarly, Spain, a top host destination country for students for over 15 years, experienced a decline in its share of the global market for international students from 2 per cent in 2001 to less than to less than a half per cent in 2017 (IIE Project Atlas 2017a). Due in large part to an inhospitable political environment in Europe and the US, international students have migrated to alternative destination countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and China (Altbach 2004a). The erosion in the number of international students enrolled in higher education has coincided with the growth of opportunities in Russia, China, and Australia (IIE Project Atlas 2017a). In sum, linking security and human mobility has compromised the competitive position of a critical industry in Europe and the US (The Economist 2011).119 Government policies targeting higher education have trickled down to the labour market and the social integration of foreigners generally in the US and Europe. Trends in Optional Practical Training (OPT) visas have generally paralleled those of international student enrolment on American college campuses (IIE 2017b). That is, the relatively recent decline in the percentage of international students enrolled in American higher education contrasts with the Cold War era when foreign student graduates were in demand among employers and often settled in the US permanently after graduation. For higher education and, particularly the US scientific community, the follow-on effects of the growing intervention of government in the recruitment practices of American institutions of higher learning has exacted economic costs. For taxpayers, the opportunity costs are measured in lower tax revenue and lost jobs. According to the National Association of International Educators (NAFSA 2019), international students contributed nearly $37 billion to the US economy in 2017 which created or supported more than 450,000 jobs (Zong and Batalova 2018). To the extent that central governments regulate foreign student employment via visa restrictions, they act as an intermediary between 119 Thus, the share of international education market gained by five per cent of all US higher education enrolments needs to be compared to the proportion of international students in higher education in Australia (21 per cent), Canada (13 per cent), or New Zealand (12 per cent), for example (IIE 2017b).

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markets and security.120 A securitarian agenda has emphasized a holistic approach that links foreign students, workers, and targets actors at the interface of monitoring immigrant stay. The expansion of the migration policy playing field in enlisting employers and institutions of higher education that are at the intersection of immigrant stay and integration comports with the state’s growing policy constraints on market actors at the stay site. The struggle to maintain a youthful, skilled, and educated labour force means that educators are pivotal agents and stakeholders in both securing long-term competitive advantage in the higher education market and ensuring selective control. The goal of continued growth of foreign student enrolments makes the enlistment of these actors more cost-effective to the state in ensuring reliable implementation and social sorting. As the American sanctuary college campus debates of 2016 revealed, both public and private educational institutions defer to the authority of the federal government.121 Although the movement to create sanctuary zones to protect irregular foreign students had its partner on college campuses, security clauses circumscribe the prerogatives private sector actors. During US Senate hearings in February 2018, the American intelligence community explicitly identified the country’s academic institutions as vulnerable to espionage, arguing that they provide a collaborative environment where cutting-edge research and technology are openly handled and developed (Capaccio 2018; Yoon-Hendricks 2018).122 120 The link between foreign students and foreign workers is captured by the lower share of foreign students that enter the employment market. According to MPI and Brookings Institute data, international students have transitioned into US employment jobs at lower rates since work visas became more difficult to obtain (Zong and Batalova 2018). 121 As stated by the chancellor of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, she ‘does not have independent authority to declare the campus a sanctuary. She has authority to administer and operate the university but must do so within the limits of applicable federal and state laws’ (Inside Higher Ed, 16 November 2016). These institutional limitations in serving as ‘sanctuary campuses’ exist for private actors as well. For example, Brown University said that based on its consultation with legal counsel, ‘we understand that private universities and colleges do not have legal protection from entry by members of law enforcement or Immigration and Customs Enforcement’ (Inside Higher Ed, 16 November 2016). These statements reflect the legal norms that limit ‘sanctuary campuses’ and that acknowledge where power lie in a new-security context. 122 Promoting a comprehensive approach to immigration thinking, the FBI director, Christopher A. Wray, in context of international student visas, warned lawmakers of China’s efforts to undermine the United States’ economy and security through ‘the use of nontraditional collectors, especially in the academic setting’ (The New York Times, 25 July 2018). Justifying the focus on the incorporation of institutions of higher education into the security framework, Mr. Wray further noted: ‘One of the things we’re trying to do is view the China threat as not just a whole-of-government threat, but a whole-ofsociety threat on their end. And I think it’s going to take a whole-of-society response by us.’ In June 2018, the State Department began to restrict visas for Chinese graduate

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State enforcement pressures have gradually collided with the business model of higher education. Challenges by powerful business figures about high rates of H-1B visa denials (Anderson 2019) and repressive homeland security measures have sparked joint protests by giant technology companies, scientific, and educational communities (Kably 2018; Redden 2016), as well as civil rights advocates against central government intrusions and demands.123 The fallout has not only been evident in the slowed growth of student enrollments in Western countries, but also in symbolic terms of defining state power. The classic view of international education programs as a component of ‘soft power’ (Frankel 1965) with the ability to decrease American gaps in science and engineering and ‘win the hearts and minds of others’ has led critics (Nye Jr. 2004) to protest the increasing government barriers and its negative implications for human mobility norms (Altbach and Peterson 2008; Neumayer 2006: 2011). C

Migrant Exit: Detention Facilities and Private Sponsors

The role of private sector actors both in migrant stay and exit has expanded. Private citizens are now among those responsible for the conditions under which migrants stay and exit. In the US, more restrictive rules and practices have burdened individual immigrant sponsors, like businesses and families.124 Until 1996, immigrant sponsors were required to assure authorities that persons they brought into the country would not become a ‘public charge’. Largely unenforced, more recent legislation has made this commitment binding. Private sponsors now

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students studying in sensitive research fields to one year, with the chance to reapply every year. The move rolled back an Obama-era policy that allowed Chinese citizens to secure five-year student visas (The New York Times, ‘Visa Restrictions for Chinese Students Alarm Academia’, 25 July 2018). Democratic opponents equated this policy change to targeting ‘an entire ethnic group of people for suspicion that they’re spies for China’ (Yoon-Hendricks 2018). These alliances were particularly vocal in lobbying against the Trump Administration’s Muslim immigration ban and H1B visas for high skilled labour from former Mantis countries (Collins et al. 2017). The immigration bills changed the legal admissions system by increasing the minimum income a sponsor must have to sponsor relatives for admission (to 125 per cent of the poverty line in the Senate bill, and 200 per cent in the House (The New York Times, 28 May 1996). According to US law, when one signs the affidavit of support, they accept legal responsibility for financially supporting the sponsored immigrant(s), generally until they become US citizens (or can be credited with 40 quarters of work). Divorce does NOT end the sponsorship obligation (www.uscis.gov/greencard/affidavit-support). Furthermore, if the migrant receives any ‘means-tested public benefits’, (government assistance) the sponsor is responsible for repaying the cost of those benefits to the agency that provided them. In 2018, the Trump Administration went further and proposed to rescind green cards for migrants making these requests.

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provide a substantial safety net for migrants by making their affidavit of support a legally enforceable I-864 document (up to ten years or until an immigrant becomes a citizen). For the first time defining a migrant as a public charge makes it a justification for deportation (Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 212). After the passage of the 1996 laws, internal enforcement activities became a prominent feature of immigration control, as demonstrated by the significant surge in the number of migrants who were deported, a surge unmatched since the Great Depression (Massey and Pren 2012a). As part of the post-11 September US Patriot Act’s anti-terrorist campaign, the then Attorney General John Ashcroft implemented sweeping policy changes that included the indefinite detention of persons entering the country illegally. While the denial of release previously required a court ruling that the accused person was dangerous or would flee if released, beginning in 2001 an illegal immigrant can be denied entry if he/she is deemed a security risk by a federal government agency (The Boston Globe, 25 April 2003). Section 412 of the Patriot Act permits the indefinite detention of migrants. The 2012 National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal 2012 (NDAA) preserved their indefinite detention without charge or trial.125 As reflected in the 438,000 undocumented criminal migrants detained and deported by the US in 2013 (US ICE 2018a), the federal government has focused much of its energies regarding immigration-related matters on facilitating migrant exit (US News, 6 September 2011). On this score the American Congress passed several laws criminalizing immigration during the 1990s, including the 1990 Immigration Act, 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and 1996 IIRIRA. These acts expanded the criminal grounds on which migrants can be deported and they circumscribed scrutiny of their cases by the courts, a trend that accelerated post11 September. As suggested by the evidence that a greater number of migrants have been removed because of administrative orders than those issued by immigration judges since 11 September, these acts empower immigration enforcement officials (Meissner et al. 2013: 15). They reflect an immigration strategy former INS Director Meissner characterized as an ‘enforcement-first’ policy (Meissner et al. 2013: 65). 125



Section 412 of the Patriot Act permits the indefinite detention of migrants, and the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2012 (NDAA) approved bi-partisan and signed by US President Obama preserved their indefinite detention without charge or trial provision of the law. It was denounced by the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union, 2011 December) as a ‘historic assault on American liberty’ (Turley 2012), in line with excessive harshness of the broader detention system (Karaim 2015).

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Not only did the 1996 legislation grant considerable authority to state and local police officials to detain aliens when a migrant deportation order is issued, it also increased the penalties for document fraud, including civil fines and barring the future entry of irregular migrants into the US (Kretsedemas and Brotherton 2018). In addition to expanding the number of crimes that made migrants vulnerable to deportation, the IIRIRA required the federal government to hold more migrants in detention before deporting them, thus making it substantially more difficult for the latter to gain access to legal assistance or counsel (Kerwin 2018). Moreover, by eliminating the authority of federal courts to review INS decisions in deportation and legalization cases, it essentially stripped foreigners of the right to file complaints against the agency in court and generally inhibited the courts from intervening in what had previously been a last line of defence against the overreach of executive branch authority (Detention Watch Network 2016). For all intents and purposes, the Act shielded the INS from judicial scrutiny. The precipitous increase in migrant deportation orders and the inability of the courts to keep pace with the mounting number of administrative adjudicative decisions have spurred the emergence of an American ‘detention machine’ (Finnegan 2013). After peaking in 2012, the number of migrant deportations credited to ICE dropped by 41 per cent to a total of 240,255 persons in 2016 (US ICE 2016). However, it has surged since, with the 2016–20 Trump Administration detaining the largest number of migrants since ICE was established in 2001 (Sands 2018). As of August 2016, nearly three-quarters of the average daily detainee population were incarcerated in facilities operated by private prison companies – a sharp contrast from the previous decade when most migrants were held in ICE-contracted local jails and state prisons (Luan 2018). The detention of migrants by private companies has been extremely profitable for the latter, with federal government expenditures for this purpose estimated to be nearly $187 billion over approximately twentyfive years (Meissner et al. 2013: 16). More than 48,000 persons were being held in over 200 migrant detention facilities in 2018, with over two-thirds incarcerated by private companies (Law 2019). Indeed, the expansion of for-profit migrant incarceration facilities has sparked the emergence of, ‘everyday micro-economies’ of migrant detention in supporting service industries (Conlon and Hiemstra 2014). These numerous support service industries include food provision companies and other operational support services such as transportation, construction, and facility maintenance (Scholten and Minderhoud 2008). As cited above, the development of this market has paved the way for an immigration industrial complex to emerge (Cranston et al. 2018: 295; Doty and

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Wheatley 2013), defined as ‘the confluence of public and private sector interests in the criminalization of undocumented immigration, immigration law enforcement, and the promotion of “anti-illegal” rhetoric’ (Golash-Boza 2017, 2009b). This ‘commodification of imprisonment’ (Mitchelson 2014: 328) presents migrant detention as a range of services that are priced (Martin 2016: 40), offering the private sector tools to thrive in the ‘border security economy’ (Clochard and Rodier 2013: 69). The mandates both to detain and house migrants and earn profit have placed private sector actors in a conflicted position.126 A business model approach to the utilization by government of private prisons assumes the latter are more efficient, while allowing the former ‘to free up public funds for pursuits that mean more to most taxpayers than how felons are jailed’ (Haberman 2018). However, if the core mission of incarcerating socially deviant individuals is their rehabilitation (Bryant 2015), then this goal is at odds with the objective of private industry to earn higher profits because of an ever-expanding prison population. This tension underscores that the motives of private sector actors may diverge significantly from the primary interest of central governments to implement migrant exit as cost effectively as possible. The expanded role of private sector actors in migrant detention also has been criticized as politically conflicted. For example, with the revelation that Canada’s largest public pension fund was invested in two US companies that operate major American prisons, critics questioned the incentives underlying its investment.127 Specifically, they protested the fact that Canada’s Pension Plan Investment Board invested $5.9 million in firms that profit from the controversial US ‘zero-tolerance’ policy that separated migrant families along the US–Mexico border. They highlighted the contradiction arising from the Canadian government’s 126



127

For example, Southwest Key Programs and the International Educational Services, two of the largest private (nominally, ‘charity’) organizations that shelter migrants in the US (especially children) with federal grants have been attacked for misuse of funds, questionable management practices, and huge ‘profiteering’ (Barker et al. 2018; The New York Times, 2 December 2018). According toThe New York Times report, Mark Weber, spokesman for the Department of Health and Human Services, the substantial growth of migrants has led the US federal government to hire an accounting firm to review shelter grant recipients in 2018. Further in this vein, the Office of Refugee Resettlement which has the responsibility to oversee migrant shelters, has created a new division to monitor shelters’ spending (Barker et al. 2018). According to data obtained by the National Immigrant Justice Center, approximately 70 per cent of migrants detained by the US government were held in facilities run by CoreCivic or GEO Group in 2017. The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board manages $366.6 billion in pension funds on behalf of approximately 20 million Canadian retirees. It has been documented that the CPPIB grew its shares in Geo Group almost 13-fold between 2017 and 18, and more than doubled its investment in CoreCivic up to its current estimated worth of $1.7 million (Siegelbaum 2018).

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official position of criticizing American migrant detention and family separation practices while allowing its Pension Plan Investment Board’s investments (Siegelbaum 2018). This double standard also operates in the US, where ICE contracts with private facilities, chasing ‘local lockup quotas’, incentivize migrant imprisonment. The acceleration of migrant apprehensions and deportations has also increased the demand for private, for-profit migrant detention centres in Europe. For example, like many EU countries bound by the 2015 EU Council Directive on EU Reception Conditions, Austria has expanded its use of private contractors to detain migrants (Global Detention Project 2017b). Moreover, an estimated 570,660 individuals were held in various types of detention centres across the then 27 EU member states in 2011 (Hiemstra and Conlon 2017: 1–2). According to the UK Home Office, the number of migrants detained in that country increased annually by 10 per cent between 2010 and 2014 (Hiemstra and Conlon 2017: 1). As the data in Figure 3.5 demonstrate, numerous migrants are detained and removed ‘offshore’ (Flynn 2014). This said, the privatization of migrant detention is especially pervasive in the US, UK, and Australia (Flynn 2016; Jing 2010; Wood 2007). With the US having the largest migrant detention infrastructure worldwide, 80,000

75,815

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Total Number of Persons Removed (voluntary and involuntary)

Figure 3.5  Immigrant detainees and total number removed in Europe, 2014–17 *Number of persons removed includes deportation as well as voluntary repatriation and involuntary return. Source: Global Detention Project, Country Profiles, 2014–17.

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62 per cent of detention beds were provided by private prison companies in 2015 (Detention Watch Network 2016: 1).128 Nearly all of Australia’s migrant detention system is operated by private companies and the UK has the highest share (73 per cent) of migrant detainees held in private facilities in Europe (Hiemstra and Conlon 2017: 3). Even in France, which typically has had the shortest maximum period of migrant detention in Europe, policy has trended towards increased detention times. The French government recently budgeted more than 116 million Euros to maintain and expand its migrant detention system (Global Detention Project 2018). Differences in national migrant detention and deportation ratios tend to stem from diverse socio-structural factors and corporate cultures, especially between Anglo-Saxon and southern, northern, and social democratic corporate models (Flynn 2016: 9). They are also a function of administrative (Ellerman 2005) and political factors (Flynn et al. 2018). Jing (2010), for example, demonstrates that politically conservative American states are those most likely to out-source migrant detention. Although progressive national governments in the US, such as the Clinton and Obama presidential administrations, accelerated the pace of migrant deportations during their tenure, politically centre-Right governments have significantly expanded migrant detention practices. In part, this seeming contradiction is a consequence of different legal contexts (Hiemstra 2019); in total, however, the estimates of detention and deportation across the board capture the enormous growth of criminalizing immigration at the point of migrant exit (Figure 3.5). As Figure 3.6 reveals, there is generally an inverse relationship between the rise of in the number of migrant detentions and a decrease in migrant deportations. However, the two trends have been converging since the 2000s. D

Public–Private Partnerships: Security, Markets, Rights

The role of private sector actors in immigration regulation are sector specific, as is evident in the select cases of the airlines, institutions of higher education, and the private migrant detention industry investigated here. However, in each instance, considerations about the appropriateness of utilizing instruments of human sorting transcend those of economic profitability and efficiency. Security-related concerns have precipitated 128



According to the report, the reason for such high rates stems from an arbitrary quota created by Congress on 28 October 2009 (DHS Appropriations Act of 2010), which required ICE to always maintain a minimum of 34,000 detention beds (2016: 1). The report notes that this ‘detention bed quota policy’ is unprecedented, as no other law enforcement agency operates on a quota system for the number of people to incarcerate.

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18,00,000

Number of Detainees

16,00,000 14,00,000 12,00,000 10,00,000 8,00,000 6,00,000 4,00,000 2,00,000 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 2016 2017

Year Total number  of  detainees

Number of persons   removed/returned (voluntary)  

Figure 3.6  Detention and deportation ratios in US, 2001–17 Source: Global Detention Project, 2001–17.

the liberal state’s cooptation and/or coercion of private sector actors in ways that not only undermine human mobility and markets, but rights as well (Coleman 2009). Indeed, the involvement of private sector actors in implementing the state’s security-driven immigration policies has compromised basic freedoms and civil liberties. Private actors have been criticized for violating the spirit if not the letter of national laws regarding privacy, non-discrimination, freedom of movement, and informational selfdetermination (Haubrich 2003). Their unaccountability and opaqueness also have been condemned. A lack of knowledge and training among private immigration gatekeepers undermine the rights of an individual to privacy, due process, and free movement. They also endanger the right of asylum seekers to non-refoulement (Côté-Boucher et al. 2014; Infantino 2016; Scholten 2015; Zampagni 2016). According to Sager (2017: 49), the dispersion, externalization, and privatization of immigration enforcement have resulted in ‘many people suffering arbitrary detention and deportation, excessive force, and even death’. The widespread use of migrant detention has resulted in various civil rights abuses (The New York Times, 7 July 1996: A1, 2010).129 As a result 129 Critics claim the detention system leads to youth warehouses, physical and mental abuse, the breakup of immigrant families and, in some cases, death by suicide or neglect. Most detainees pose no risk of flight or criminal behaviour and should be free pending their hearings, immigrant supporters contend. But groups seeking tighter

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of false accusations or wrongful arrests, the rights of American citizens are frequently violated, as evidenced by reports that more than 40 citizens were wrongly detained in 2013 (Finnegan 2013), or on a given day as many as one per cent of detainees are American citizens. The number of legal permanent residents falsely detained also has been high (Feeney 2018). Moreover, prioritizing security over safeguarding human rights has facilitated the externalization and militarization of border policies that blur the distinction between unwanted migrants and those deserving legal protections, such as unaccompanied migrant children (Vives 2020) or asylum-seekers and refugees. Public–private partnerships also undermine liberal norms. For example, in implementing the state’s securitarian agenda, private sector actors have often circumvented legal constraints. In the wake of 11 September, for example, the American TSA threatened to compel airlines to share passenger reservation records so that the federal government could discover potential terrorists (The Washington Post, 27 September 2003). In numerous instances private companies have been placed in a precarious legal position, as exemplified by the JetBlue Airways case in which the airline surrendered its passenger itineraries to a Defence Department contractor, Torch Concepts, a private technology business, an action that led to a 2003 class action lawsuit filed on behalf of five million passengers.130 The case was the first of many that politicized the relationship between public and private partnerships regarding immigration control in the US. This episode especially underscored the frequent trade-off these partnerships engender between respecting an individual’s privacy rights and safeguarding public safety (NYTimes, 28 September 2003). Another major problem springing from the participation of private sector actors in an ever-expanding migration policy playing field stems from the fact that the level of protections concerning privacy and personal data differ among public and private agencies. The utilization of biometrics and other related technologies have evolved faster than their corresponding legal regulation, thus resulting in liberal states adopting a ‘risk-centered’ approach (Ackleson 2005; Decker 2001; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2006).131 Migrant deterrence is affected

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curbs on immigration claim detention is necessary to protect public safety and to ensure that undocumented immigrants do not disappear into the general population before their cases are decided and before US officials can determine whether they should be deported. The incident involved the sharing of customer records to a military contractor for a test program to blend the data with personal financial information from another company to spot likely terrorists. A risk-oriented approach perceives transnational terrorism and crime through the lens of risk. It is perceived to explain security and social changes prompted by the inherent complexity of the new information-derived industrialism and modernization that makes

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by private companies employing instruments and pursuing strategies that are typically unavailable to democratic governments. In the US, for example, the REAL ID requirement that passengers demonstrate proof of identity prior to boarding a flight effectively creates an internal passport; consequently, several lawsuits against the FAA and the DOJ were filed challenging its constitutionality. During the final implementation phase of the Act,132 then the DHS Secretary Johnson argued that ‘given today’s threat environment, this requirement is as relevant now as it was when the 11 September Commission recommended it’ (DHS 2016). As of May 2027, all domestic passengers travelling within the US will be required to show a Real ID to board a plane or enter a federal facility. In a similar development, international and regional instruments adopted by the EU’s member states have established a coordinated authorization system to implement obligatory checks (France Ministry 2017). Another concern voiced by civil rights advocates involves the transferability of personal information and diminished public accountability (Moore 2008). As noted above, critics of the FISA’s provision for information-sharing have opposed outsourcing the authority to scrutinize the eligibility of visa applicants, and especially those within especially vulnerable groups, including ‘sans-papiers’, asylum-seekers, unaccompanied minors, to insufficiently knowledgeable or trained bureaucrats who in the course of their work violate established democratic (Boswell 2008) and human rights norms (Infantino 2012; Rodier 2012; SánchezBarrueco 2017; Scholten 2015).133 Considering that structural and regulatory developments reflect national civic traditions (Castells 2000) as well as cultural differences and economic norms related to capitalism (Flynn 2016), it is not

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calculating external risk much more difficult than in the past (Beck 1992, 2000). The US Government Accountability Office (GAO), the federal governments’ chief fiscal and program watchdog recommended that the country allocate its security resources based on a risk management approach (i.e., based on assessments of threat, vulnerability and criticality) (Decker 2001; GAO 2004). Ackleson applies this approach to US border security to examine this balance between the risks of terrorist incursions versus the risks of high micro- and macroeconomic and social costs if cross-border interaction is overly curtailed or impeded (Ackleson 2005: 139). In accordance with that recommendation, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, which prohibits federal agencies from accepting for official purposes driver’s licences and identification cards issued by states that do not meet the law’s standards for secure issuance and production. For a licence or identification card to be REAL ID compliant, the state issuing it must incorporate anti-counterfeit technology into the card, verify the applicant’s identity, and conduct background checks for employees involved in issuing driver’s licences (US DHS 2019b). The US federal government has also been accused of insufficiently training agents in using intrusive new technologies, such as facial recognition technology (GAO 2021).

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surprising that the documentation verification and surveillance practices that obtain across countries differ. A corporate friendly culture in the US as well as the political strength of the ACLU and other civil rights activist groups have resulted in immigration enforcement decisions that often diverge from de jure liability for private employers. In contrast, most European governments have vigilantly embraced the right to personal privacy enshrined in the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. These differences inevitably raise tensions regarding transAtlantic data sharing and protection practices. Conflicting norms have generated calls for international cooperation and norm-building regarding the principles for safeguarding personal information (Lewis et al. 2018: 13). To bridge the perceived trans-Atlantic gap regarding the protection of data privacy, the European Commission and US Department of Commerce created the EU–US Privacy Shield. This framework, operationalized in July 2016, provides private companies with a mechanism for complying with EU data protection requirements whenever they transfer personal data from the EU to the US. It also formalized the legal parameters in preparation for the implementation of the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which established European privacy rules about regulating personal and commercial data exchanges. Efforts to protect the data of citizens gathered by business and governments have been challenged by both those who find the rules excessively restrictive and those ready to compromise privacy in favour of greater security (Lewis et al. 2018: 11). Broadly speaking, legal rights norms struggle to keep pace with global technological trends regarding human mobility and its regulation. This said, while a lack of transparency and insufficient accountability in disseminating information can lead to rights abuses, (Baird 2017: 334), excessive restrictions can make agents reluctant to act (Etzioni 2004: 66). Indeed, those who advocate for non-central state actors to be involved in managing immigration have argued that the latter’s unique resources enable liberal states to identify targeted individuals more effectively, redirect them to secure areas, and create uniform and verifiable standards in scrutinizing their legal status. While acknowledging that the current procedures need to be improved, proponents claim that they can safeguard civil liberties. Specifically, the less information governments require to identify an individual, the better protected the innocent are, and crimes such as identity theft and voter fraud are deterred (Etzioni 2004: 120–25; Greenberg 2018). Moreover, the claim is that technology and the law’s strictures can effectively limit the liberal state’s investigative reach. Finally, proponents of cooperation between non-central state gatekeepers and national governments point to the former’s numerous

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contributions to the public good. Following this logic, those who favour the utilization of bioterrorism security measures at the border argue that regardless of whether they prevent terrorism, they promote public health in combatting the spread of SARS, influenza, AIDS, COVID, and so on. Accordingly, public safety is jeopardized not when robust preventative measures are implemented and territorial borders vigorously guarded, but rather when they are not. VI

Conclusions: Expanding the Liberal State’s Administrative Reach

This chapter has identified and enumerated the various strategies liberal states have adopted in pursuing their restrictive immigration policy agenda beginning in the 1990s and accelerating after 11 ­September 2001. Broadly speaking, national governments in the EU and the US have largely reconciled the tensions generated by the migration trilemma. They have done so by forging inter-state policy agreements, participating in decision-making international and supranational fora, and sharing or devolving their numerous responsibilities for implementing immigration policy to subnational and private sector actors. The main outcomes of these strategies are an expansive migration policy playing field which enhances the contemporary liberal state’s ability to address a wide variety of immigration-related challenges. Against this backdrop it is reasonable to conclude that the post-11 September era marks a critical juncture in which a more effective immigration policy regime has emerged in Europe and the US. In an interdependent world where immigration is perceived as a threat emanating from the international environment, patterns of immigration regulation and enforcement increase the state’s enforcement capacities as a result of its devolution of its immigration policy enforcement functions to international, private sector, and subnational actors. According to numerous measures, the immigration policies of liberal states have now become more selective, if not exclusionary (Helbling and Kalkum 2018; Helbling et al. 2017). Moreover, recent events in Europe and the US reveal that as the instruments and policies of liberal states have converged, they have adopted a new, entrepreneurial mode of politics, described in Chapter 2. In enlisting the cooperation of a plethora of non-central state actors to implement their restrictive immigration policy agenda, liberal states have also compromised their liberal norms. Specifically, they now routinely contravene their long-held commitments to maintaining relatively open borders, implementing inclusive immigrant integration regimes, and safeguarding citizen and immigrant rights.

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Considering the breadth of the evidence presented in this chapter, it appears that contrary to the claim that they cannot avoid the scourge of unwanted immigration and/or immigrants, liberal states can traverse very far in managing immigration and human mobility. Moreover, in devolving many of its responsibilities for immigration policy making and implementation, liberal states are not permanently ceding sovereignty. Rather, they are responding to an increasingly interdependent regional and international environment in a manner that maximizes their chances for policy success while retaining the prerogative to renationalize or reclaim policymaking authority if and whenever circumstances change. On this score the effectiveness of the liberal state’s immigration policies at a given moment in time should not exclusively or even primarily be measured by the number of migrants flowing across its territorial borders, but rather by the considerable resources, flexibility, and tools individual states now possess to manage human mobility (Bloom 2015). It should also be evaluated against the degree to which the state can transcend the existing normative and political constraints that purportedly restrict its policymaking prerogatives. including the long-held commitment to respect the individual right to privacy, non-discrimination, and due process. The liberal state’s strategy to share or devolve responsibility for managing immigration to non-central state actors has perhaps equally enhanced its political capacity to manage human mobility, thus enabling it to avoid legal and public scrutiny. For example, by flexibly responding to immigration and human mobility pressures, policymakers make their authority visible (Andreas 2009) and send ‘control signals’ that respond to popular pressures for tighter immigration regulation (Wright 2014).134 Moreover, the participation of non-central state actors in monitoring borders and implementing internal controls on migrant entry, stay and exit diverts the public’s attention away from the political arena (Schrefler 2014; Lemberg-Person 2018; Léonard 2010), where the state’s abridgement of rights and civil liberties is largely depoliticized.135 Indeed, an

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Money and Lockhart (2018: 85) suggest that if interior enforcement is opposed by citizens who bear the costs of controlling immigration, then outsourcing the control of immigration to the sending or transit states provokes less opposition. According to some scholars (Lemberg-Pedersen 2018; Léonard 2010), routine technocratic and bureaucratic practices, like population profiling, risk assessment, and statistical calculations which are communicated by experts within specialist circles have had much greater influence on the securitization of borders than the propensity of political elites to speak security with an innate ethos of secrecy. Kawar (2014) argues that the framing and reframing of immigration as a threat source is facilitated by the ‘technocratic shepherding’ or ‘engineering’ of immigration policies by diverse set of actors.

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entrepreneurial mode of politics, which often relies on the technological expertise of bureaucrats (Caramani 2017; Kawar 2014), information entrepreneurs, policy experts (Boswell 2008b; Scholten et al. 2013; Scholten and van Nispen 2015) and security officials (Bigo 2002; Guild 2009; Pedersen-Lemberg 2018; Rodelli 2019), limits public discussion and scrutiny (Boswell 2016; Burnham 2001; Guild et al. 2009; Hampshire 2013; Liberatore 2005: 2; Scholten 2015). In this vein, the shift in the dominant mode of immigration politics and emergence of a new migration policy playing field raises two related questions: How has the public responded to this development? To what extent does it endorse it? The next chapter investigates these questions.

4

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation

The evidence presented in Chapter 3 revealed that beginning in the 1990s, and especially after 11 September, the liberal states redoubled their efforts to manage immigration and restrict the inflow of so-called unwanted migrants. They responded to the challenges posed by the migration trilemma in part by expanding the migration policy playing field and devolving numerous responsibilities for implementing immigration policy to non-central state actors. In the process, many of their immigration and human mobility policies converged. More importantly, they compromised the liberal norms that had previously underpinned their commitments to relatively open borders, inclusive immigrant integration regimes, and expansive immigrant rights (Adamson et al. 2011; Sager 2017). This chapter contextualizes the institutional trends delineated in the previous chapter within a normative framework. In investigating what ­ ­neo-institutionalists cite as the influence of informal or soft norms on policy making (Hall and Taylor 1996; Jobert 1989; Katzenstein 1996; Risse et al. 1999), it examines popular attitudes towards the measures that contemporary liberal states have adopted to regulate immigration and the expansive participation of non-central state actors in the new migration policy playing field. As we saw in Chapter 2, the public is very much concerned with and influences the broad course of immigration policy (Fetzer 2000; Freeman et al. 2013; Lahav 2004b; Levy et al. 2016; Zamora-Kapoor et al. 2013). Against this backdrop, this chapter assesses the extent to which the ­enlargement of the migration policy playing field is endorsed by the public. It poses two questions: Do Europeans and Americans endorse the institutional and policy trends delineated in Chapter 3? Moreover, why do citizens broadly tolerate the negative externalities of these intrusive policies, including the abridgement of their civil liberties and those of migrants? In focusing on popular attitudes towards the measures that contemporary liberal states have adopted to regulate immigration, the chapter will assess the inherent value trade-offs between rights and safety (Farber 2008; Norval and Prasopoulou 2019; Sasse 2005) evoked by the liberal state’s management of contemporary immigration and human mobility. 188

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These include the dilemmas that arise whenever the state creates intrusive informational databases, sanctions employers, implements restrictive border controls, and/or devolves many of its responsibilities for managing immigration and human mobility to non-central state actors. For example, which level of government does the public believe should shoulder the primary responsibility for managing human mobility? Are ethnic and racial profiling and national identity cards appropriate security measures? Should the state restrict the mobility of persons from certain countries or religious backgrounds? Should government share the personal information of individuals with the private sector and/or foreign governments? Utilizing data garnered from Eurobarometer Surveys (EB), European Social Surveys (ESS), European Value Surveys (EVS), Gallup surveys, Harris polls, Pew surveys, World Value Surveys (WVS), and other public opinion sources, the chapter investigates popular attitudes towards the policies that operationalize and elicit the value conflicts between freedom and order (Malka et al. 2017; Norris and Inglehart 2019) or the trade-offs between liberal and protectionist norms (Pantoja 2006). The ability of liberal states to manage immigration effectively, it argues, not only depends on their capacity to enlist non-central state actors to serve as surrogate gatekeepers; rather, equally critical is their ability to contravene embedded liberal norms and garner popular support for implementing these measures. Put differently, the success of the liberal state’s immigration management agenda also depends on the degree to which the state and its surrogates are trusted by the public to act in its best interests and perceives their policies and methods as legitimate. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section assesses the degree to which Europeans and Americans accept the negative externalities of the liberal state’s security-driven policy agenda, and especially the contravention of their civil liberties and those of migrants. Next, the chapter investigates whether the trends described in Chapter 3 are primarily a function of a spike in the public’s antipathy towards immigrants and immigration. This section considers whether the permissive public opinion environment which facilitates the formulation and implementation of rights-compromising policies is caused by a rise in popular resentment of immigrants and/or the size of the immigrant population over time. Finally, the chapter explores the role of trust in facilitating popular support for the liberal state’s restrictive immigration policies and its surrogate omit gatekeepers. This section specifically discusses the role political trust plays in enhancing the popular legitimacy of the liberal state’s rights-compromising policies and methods. Our analyses of the public opinion data and trends suggest that the expansion of the migration policy playing field and the ensuing restrictive

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measures described in Chapter 3 are, indeed, endorsed by most Europeans and Americans. In the new security era, most citizens tolerate the attenuation of their civil liberties and those of migrants to better restrict human mobility and control borders. As the survey evidence presented below will demonstrate, an often-large majority of the public on both sides of the Atlantic approves of these measures even at the cost of sacrificing its civil liberties, including the rights to privacy, due process, and non-discrimination. Although most Europeans and Americans prefer that their national government manage immigration, they largely consent to the liberal state’s strategy to delegate many of its management functions to surrogate gatekeepers. I

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Management and Civil Liberties

There is little doubt that most of the public in the liberal states supports robust restrictions on immigration as well as the strategies and measures that were described in Chapter 3 to implement them. As the data in ­Figure  4.1 underscore, no less than two-thirds of the respondents surveyed in each EU country only two years after 11 September believed that entry controls on persons originating from non-EU member states should be strengthened. An average of 80 per cent of EU citizens endorsed this view, including 73 per cent of self-identifiers on the political Left and 86 per cent on the Right. Other than in Italy, popular support for greater controls on the entry of persons from non-EU countries in each Member State was evident across the political-ideological spectrum (Figure 4.2). Popular support for restrictions was highest in Greece (89 per cent), Italy (89 per cent), and Luxembourg (84 per cent), and weakest in Sweden (65 per cent), Denmark (70 per cent), and the UK (73 per cent). This said, there was less agreement about how to reduce the scourge of unlawful or irregular immigration. In 2011, for example, Europeans were much more inclined than Americans to favour increasing development aid to immigration-sending countries as a strategy to combat the phenomenon (Figure 4.3). A plurality of Italians, the French, and Spaniards preferred the policy option of increasing development aid. In contrast, ‘border controls’ were the popular course among Britons and ‘employer sanctions’ among Americans and Germans. As might have been anticipated, and as we will see in greater detail in Chapter 5, the 11 September terrorist attacks influenced Americans to consider compromising civil liberties that intersect with immigration (Etzioni 2004; Faist 2004; Keeble 2005; Sullivan and Hendriks 2009; Zureik et al. 2010). Americans who felt especially threatened in the six months following 11 September were more inclined than in the previous

Agree

UK

Sweden

191

Spain

Netherlands

Luxembourg

Italy

Germany

France

Finland

Denmark

Belgium

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Austria

I  Popular Attitudes to Immigration Management

Disagree

Figure 4.1 Entry controls for non-EU nationals should be strengthened, 2003 (in percentages) Question: ‘Controls of entry into the European Union for persons coming from non-Member States should be strengthened.’ ‘Absolutely agree’ and ‘rather agree’ are combined as are ‘rather disagree’ and ‘absolutely disagree’. Source: Eurobarometer 155 (2004), European Commission.

six months to support the initiation of military operations overseas, the curtailment civil liberties, and imposition of tighter immigration restrictions for Arabs (Huddy et al. 2005). According to Sides and Gross (2013), individuals with a less favourable view of Muslims, especially regarding their trustworthiness and potential for violence, were more likely to endorse several aspects of the so-called ‘war on terror’.1 Threat perceptions not only especially provoked authoritarians to support expansive state policies associated with counterterrorism (Hetherington and Suhay 2011). They also prompted a temporary ‘rally around the flag’ effect that generated public support for strong state intervention among a diffuse public (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). It is noteworthy that the share of Americans who were prepared to surrender some freedoms to combat terrorism in the aftermath of 11 September was markedly higher than following the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995 (Huddy et al. 2002: 420; 1 According to Fiske et al. (2002), when individuals encounter unfamiliar others, they categorize them along their motivations and abilities. Thus, we expect that individuals who are primed to categorize others as hostile or untrustworthy will be more likely to endorse exclusionary policies than those who attribute warmth and competence to outgroups.

192

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation

Left

U.K.

Sweden

Finland

Austria

Netherlands

Luxembourg

Italy

France

Spain

Germany

Denmark

Belgium

100 90 89 89 87 89 88 86 86 90 83 83 82 81 81 79 78 77 75 80 73 74 72 70 70 68 70 56 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Right

Figure 4.2 Popular attitudes on control of non-member state immigrants in EU, by ideology, 2003 (in percentages) Question: ‘Could you tell me if you absolutely agree, rather agree, rather disagree, or absolutely disagree that controls of entry into the European Union for persons coming from non-Member States should be strengthened.’ Question originally was asked on a four-point scale and we use 2 as the cut-off point. The ideological placement was originally measured on a six-point scale and we use 3 as the cut-off point. Source: Eurobarometer Flash 155 (2004).

Piazza 2015). As we will see in Chapter 5, the findings of several opinion surveys reveal that, at least for a time, negative popular attitudes towards Arabs and Islam markedly increased following 11 September, thus suggesting these attitudes and support for restricting civil liberties were linked (Bleich et al. 2016; Edling et al. 2016; Marmura 2010: 122).2 Americans have also supported the racial and ethnic profiling of Arab Americans, greater invasion of personal privacy by the FBI, and close surveillance of asylum seekers and legal immigrants in the post-11 September era (Fox Polling Report 2005; Pew 2015, 2018). They are also more likely than previously to accept inhibiting the freedom of persons to enter the US (Harris 2011; Ziller and Helbling 2021). Moreover, although below its 2001 apex, a high share of Americans between 2002 2 Along these lines, Jungkunz et al.’s (2018) survey of German students conducted immediately before and after the 2015 attacks in Paris discovered that individuals who attached a great importance to national security issues were more likely to hold negative attitudes toward Muslims.

Percent Choosing Each Option as Most Effective

I  Popular Attitudes to Immigration Management 100%

5% 21%

90% 80%

31% 22% 38%

60% 50%

28%

18%

38% 19%

45% 14% 40%

20%

0%

8%

19%

16%

30%

10%

11% 24%

70%

40%

22%

193

18%

33%

45%

27% 10%

Great Britain Germany

Development Aid

47%

Spain

Border Control

Italy

United States

Employer Sanctions

France

Ease Legal Entry

Figure 4.3 Best policies for reducing illegal migration across select countries, 2011 Question: Thinking about the policies designed to reduce illegal immigration that could be adopted in [Country] at the national level, which one of the following do you think would be the most effective in reducing illegal immigration? Dataset Citation: Ziebarth, Astrid, Bernstein, Hamutal, Nyiri, Zsolt, Isernia, Pierangelo, Diehl, Claudia, and Martin, Susan. Transatlantic Trends: Immigration, 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 4 February 2013. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34423.v. Source: ICPSR catalogue. Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (2011). N = 6002. Question 15a. TNS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews.

and 2011 favoured adopting national identity cards and a super majority agreed that there should be stronger security checks on travellers entering the US (Figure 4.4). An illiberal public opinion environment similarly prevailed in Europe post-11 September. For example, the public in Britain, France, and Germany was less likely to support the accommodation of Islam or hijab attire in state-run schools (Bleich 2009; Fetzer and Soper 2005). Moreover, a 2006 survey of Europeans from nine countries (Doosje et  al. 2009) found that popular support for institutional out-group discrimination and anti-immigration policies was closely tied to the perception that Islamic terrorism posed a threat (Cruz et  al. 2020;

194

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

2001

2002

2003

Favor Adoption of National ID

2004

2005

2011

Favor Stronger Security Checks

Figure 4.4  Popular support for national ID cards and stronger checks on travellers to US, 2001–11 N: 2,073 (2011 survey). Question: ‘Here are some increased powers of investigation that law enforcement agencies might use when dealing with people suspected of terrorist activity, which would also affect our civil liberties. For each, please say if you would favor or oppose it.’ ‘Stronger document and physical security checks for travelers.’ ‘Adoption of a national ID system for all U.S. citizens.’ Source: Harris (2011).

Keeble 2005). Although mean levels differed across countries, a relationship between perceptions of threat and popular support for antiimmigration policies held up in both the attacked and non-attacked countries, those in which people perceived either low or high terror threat, and countries differing in the share of Muslims within their population (Doosje et  al. 2009: 228). Surprisingly, the linkage between the perception of the threat of terrorism and support for antiimmigration policies was stronger in countries in which there had not been an attack, those with comparatively low levels of perceived terrorist threat, and where the share of Muslims in the population was smaller (Doosje et al. 2009: 225). The public’s reception of new surveillance and control measures and technologies has also been overwhelmingly favourable. For example, a 2016 opinion survey found that popular attitudes towards Passenger

I  Popular Attitudes to Immigration Management

195

Name Records (PNR), a computer reservation system that stores the personal information and itinerary of a passenger, was high even among individuals who were most knowledgeable about it. (YouGov 2014, 2016). A different survey discovered that approximately 75 per cent of Germans and 90 per cent of Britons perceived that sharing PNR across countries enhanced their security (Bug 2013). Empirical results from survey experiments in four European countries show that citizens will approve the introduction of far-reaching state surveillance practices (e.g., facial recognition) for targeted groups whenever they perceive their safety is at risk (Ziller and Helbling 2021). Considering these findings, it is no surprise that a large majority of EU respondents in 2008 believed that it was acceptable for the government to compromise their data privacy rights in fighting international terrorism, a threat source often conflated with immigration (Figure 4.5). Specifically, 82 per cent agreed that it should be possible for authorities to monitor passenger flight details, 75 per cent usage of the internet, 72 per cent telephone calls, and 69 per cent credit card transactions. Moreover, between 2003 and 2008 the share of EU citizens who approved the monitoring of internet usage and telephone calls by government increased by 13 per cent and 12 per cent respectively (European Commission Eurobarometer 2008: 50, 52). Americans too have largely resigned themselves to the negative externalities of their government’s campaign against international terrorism, as indicated by the steep increase (from 29 to 43 per cent) between 1997 and 2003 in their readiness to compromise their civil liberties (Pew 2006). According to the results of a more recent survey (Figure 4.6), 82 per cent agreed that it was acceptable to monitor the communications of suspected terrorists, 54 per cent of foreign citizens, and 40 per cent of American citizens. Like many of those cited above, there were no statistically significant inter-partisan differences of opinion among the respondents in the survey (Pew 2015). However, persons over 50 years of age were more likely than those under 50 to accept the need for all types of surveillance (Rainie and Madden 2015). Although some Americans were wary of the introduction of intrusive state measures to combat terrorism in the aftermath of 11 September, 81 per cent supported the use of full-body scans at airports in 2010 (­Figure  4.7). Yet again, Republicans, Democrats, and Independents were almost equally favourable. Most Americans also endorsed permitting airport personnel to conduct extra checks on passengers who appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent (Pew 2002), including 68 per cent of self-identified moderate conservatives. Self-identified Democrats, on the other hand, were divided on the issue, with a bare majority

196

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation

35 31

30 25 20

25

22

22

19 18

17

15

27

25

24

19 17

16

15

13

24

23 20

19

13

29

28

14

12

19

16 12

10

18

25 19 18 18

23

29

30

31

25 21 21 19

19 17

22 17

22

15

14

11

Telephone

Internet

Credit Card

UK

Sweden

Finland

Austria

Netherlands

Luxembourg

Italy

France

Spain

Germany

Denmark

0

Belgium

5

Personal Details

Figure 4.5  Popular support for data protection intrusions and privacy rights, 2008 (in percentages) N: Belgium = 1,000; Denmark = 1,001; Germany = 1,005; Spain  = 1,004; France = 1,002; Italy = 1,001; Luxembourg = 1,000; Netherlands = 1,004; Austria = 1,001; Finland = 1,004; Sweden = 1,005; United Kingdom = 1,001. Question: ‘In light of the fight against international terrorism, do you think that, in certain circumstances, it should be possible to (a) have people’s telephone calls monitored; (b) to have people’s internet use monitored; (c) to have people’s credit card use monitored; (d) to have people’s details monitored when they fly? – No. – Yes, but only people who are suspected of terrorist activities. – Yes, but even suspected terrorists should only be monitored under the supervision of a judge or with equivalent safeguards. – Yes, in all cases.’ Source: Eurobarometer 225 (2008).

(52 per cent) of conservative and moderate Democrats but only 37 per cent of liberals favouring greater scrutiny of persons of Middle Eastern origin at airports. The American public’s hostility to Muslims eventually receded after 11 September. However, as we will see in Chapter 5, it has not done so uniformly. For example, 54 per cent of Republicans surveyed in 2015 supported and 36 per cent opposed then presidential candidate Donald Trump’s proposal to severely restrict the entry of Muslims from foreign countries into the US (CBS News 2015). On the other side of the partisan divide, three-quarters of Democrats and 55 per cent of Independents rejected a travel ban on Muslims. A similar partisan chasm was evident

I  Popular Attitudes to Immigration Management

197

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40%

82%

30%

54%

20%

40%

10% 0% Suspected Terrorists

Citizens of Other Countries

American Citizens

Figure 4.6  ‘Acceptable to monitor group communications’, 2015 N: 475 U.S. adults. Questions: ‘In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American government to monitor communications from individuals suspected of terrorist activities?’ ‘In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American government to monitor communications from American citizens?’ ‘In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American government to monitor communications from citizens of other countries?’ Source: Pew Research Center; GfK panel 26 November 2014–23 January 2015.

regarding whether a Muslim ban would safeguard the US from terrorism and whether the federal government should keep a database of Muslim names. As the data in Table 4.1 reveals, while 45 per cent of Republicans endorsed the view that a Muslim ban would make the US safer, 52 per cent of Democrats and 49 per cent of Independents disagreed. A partisan divide was widest regarding whether a Muslim name database should be created and maintained, with 60 per cent of Republicans in favour and an equal share of Democrats opposed. In sum, the public opinion evidence presented above confirms that most Europeans and Americans, albeit to different degrees, are willing to compromise their civil liberties and those of migrants to allow the state to better manage immigration and monitor its internal and external

198

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation

Table 4.1  Support for Muslim ban and database in US, 2015 (in percentages) Ban Muslims from other Countries

Total

Rep.

Dem.

Ind.

Should Should Not Don’t Know/No Answer

36 58 6

54 38 8

23 73 5

35 59 7

Keep Muslim Name Database Favor Oppose Don’t Know/No Answer

44 46 10

60 31 9

31 61 7

44 44 12

Ban Makes Safer from Terrorism Safer Less Safe No Effect Don’t Know/No Answer

28 19 46 6

45 15 35 5

14 27 52 7

27 17 49 7

Questions: ‘Do you think the U.S. should temporarily ban Muslims from other countries from entering the United States, or not?’ ‘Would you favour or oppose the federal government keeping a database containing the names of Muslims in the United States?’ ‘If Muslims are temporarily banned from entering the US do you think the United States will be safer from terrorism, less safe from terrorism or will temporarily banning Muslims from entering the US have no effect on the United States’ safety from terrorism?’ Source: CBS News (2015).

Percent in Support/Favor

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

87

84

81 64

63

54 46 36 13 Should

16

19

Should Not Republican

37

Democrat

Favor

Oppose

Independent

Figure 4.7  Popular attitudes towards body scans at US Airports, 2010 Question: ‘Some airports are now using “full body” digital x-ray machines to electronically screen passengers in airport security lines. Do you think these new x-ray machines should or should not be used at airports?’ Source: CBS News (2010).

II  Explaining Popular Attitudes

199

borders. Even as the media has underscored its negative externalities for civil liberties (Whitley 2009: 13), popular support for a so-called ‘surveillance society’ remains robust (Liberatore 2005; Zureik et al. 2010; Zureik and Salter 2013). These findings suggest that the restrictive policies described in the previous chapter are consonant with the public’s majority support for the liberal state’s securitarian agenda and its devolution of much of the management of immigration and human mobility to surrogate gatekeepers, including entrepreneurs, technocrats, and policy experts (Bug and Bukow 2017; Röllgen and Bug 2012). II

Explaining Popular Attitudes

As demonstrated above, most Europeans and Americans embrace immigration-related measures which contravene embedded liberal norms and often forfeit their liberties and those of migrants. Why are they disposed to do so? One possible answer is that they tolerate rightsrestricting practices and policies due to their deep-seated and perhaps accumulative antipathy toward immigrants and immigration (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Muste 2013: Reyna et al. 2013; Simon and Alexander 1993). In this view, the events of 11 September were perhaps a tipping point which influenced most Europeans and Americans to tolerate the negative externalities of the liberal state’s immigration management strategies. This explanation cannot be summarily dismissed; nevertheless, its veracity is doubtful given the post-11 September public opinion trends cited in Chapter 2. As the data presented in that chapter revealed, neither the rate of change in immigration flows nor an increase in the size of the domestic immigrant population explains the political problematization of immigration in Europe and the US post-11 September. Moreover, the phenomenon is also uncorrelated with a growth in the size of the domestic Muslim population or the public’s anticipation of a future influx of Muslim immigrants. Hence, it is highly unlikely these factors caused most Europeans and Americans to embrace the rights-restricting strictures of the liberal state’s securitarian immigration and human mobility policy regime. Popular antipathy toward immigrants post-11 September too does not explain this phenomenon. Indeed, even as it perceived immigration as a more salient problem after the early 1990s, and especially during the mid-2000s, the share of the public in favour of decreasing the level of immigration either remained steady or declined. The data in Figure 4.8. show the percentage of respondents in favour of decreasing immigration against those citing immigration as among the top two problems facing the US. They suggest that a preoccupation with immigration does not necessarily lead to a rejection of it.

70

10 9 8 7 6 5

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Immigration Preferences

4 3 2 1 0

% Naming Immigration Most Important Problem

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

% In Favor of Decreasing Immigration

200

Immigration Salience

Figure 4.8 Immigration salience and popular anti-immigration attitudes in the US, 1992–2014 Anti-immigration attitudes = Annual average percentages of respondents who answered affirmative to the question, ‘Should immigration be decreased?’; Immigration salience is measured as the percentage naming immigration as the United States’ most important problem. These report spontaneous unprompted replies when asked about ‘top two issues’ confronting the country. Source: Gallup (1992–2014).

As we will see in greater detail in Chapter 6, there is little if any evidence that the events of 11 September fundamentally altered the longterm course of popular aversion towards immigration. Interestingly, public opposition to immigration in the US declined post-11 September, falling from its pre-11 September apex of 65 per cent in 1993–94 to 39 per cent in 2014. As the trend line in Figure 4.9 shows, the aversion of Americans to immigration was greatest during the mid-1990s and not, as might have been reasonably expected, post-11 September. Surprisingly, on the opposite side of the opinion equation, popular support for a higher level of immigration incrementally increased after 11 September, rising from its low point of 8 per cent in October 2001 to 34 per cent in May 2020 (Gallup 2020; Younis 2021). Conversely, those Americans favouring less immigration declined from 58 to 28 per cent over this period. Popular opposition to immigration within the EU too did not surge after 11 September. Rather, as the data presented in Figure 4.10 demonstrate, it was remarkably stable between 2002 and 2010 and declined

65 65 64 58 45 39

43

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

35 35

39

2014

45

2008

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

50 43

2007

49 47 48

41

2000

1999

44

47

2006

52

49

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

46

1993

1992

47

Figure 4.9  Popular anti-immigration attitudes in US, 1992–2014* N = 30 surveys. *Note: When more than one survey was conducted each year, data from multiple surveys were averaged with equal weight. Results prior to the 11 September were excluded from the calculation of the yearly average since including those data would have masked the heightened level of anti-immigration sentiment following the attacks. Sources: Roper Center Public Opinion Archives (collected from Gallup, Princeton Survey Research Associates, and ANES). Based on average annual percentage of respondents who answered affirmative to the question, ‘Should immigration be decreased?’ 60

Anti-Immigration Attitude (%)

55

50

48.22

48.92

48.84 47.87

47.93

45

45.02 43.44

40

35

30

2002

2004

2006

2008 Years

2010

2012

2014

Figure 4.10  Popular anti-immigration attitudes within EU, 2002–14* Source: European Social Surveys (2002–14).

202

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Austria Belgium

Germany Denmark

Finland France

Switzerland

Spain

United Kingdom

2014 Netherlands

Figure 4.11  Popular attitudes towards Immigrants in Europe, 2002–14 (in percentages) Questions D29, B40, and B34. The questions originally worded as ‘Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?’ Answers were scaled from 0 (worse) to 10 (better) and dichotomized with 6 as the cutoff point. N size: 2014: 23,840. Source: European Social Survey (2002–14).

thereafter. Revealingly, aggregate hostility to immigration never commanded majority popular support post-11 September. Furthermore, in comparing popular attitudes toward asylum policy between 2002 and 2016 in the 12 EU countries for which there was available ESS data, Van Hootegem et al. (2020: 9, 12) discovered that Europeans generally had become more tolerant of immigrants. Popular attitudes only became significantly more restrictive in Austria and Italy. Conversely, citizens in the Southern and Nordic countries were generally receptive to liberal asylum policies (Van Hootegem et al. 2020: 9). A similar, receptive pattern was also visible regarding popular attitudes in Europe toward immigrants post-11 September. As the data in Figure 4.11 show, greater than half of respondents in ten of the major immigration-receiving countries in Europe held the belief that foreigners

II  Explaining Popular Attitudes

203

80

72

70

66

Percentage

60

52

50 40

31

30 20

44

39

35

52 35

48

48

45

34

34 23

20

10 0

Austria Belgium Germany Spain

Finland

Left

Right

France

U.K.

Sweden

Figure 4.12  Country ‘made a better place to live’ (by ideological selfidentification), 2014* Question: Those reporting that immigration made the (country) ‘a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries’. *N = 16,593 adults in total (Austria = 1,795, Belgium = 1,769, Germany = 3,045, Spain = 1,925, Finland = 2,087, France = 1,917, Great Britain = 2,264, Sweden = 1,791). Source: European Social Survey Round 7 (2014).

made their country a ‘better’ place to live, including supermajorities in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Spain, Germany, and Belgium. In only one country, Austria, was public opinion toward foreigners significantly less positive in 2014 than in the aftermath of 11 September. Conversely, in six of the ten countries, it was more positive. Although the increased salience of immigration in the media and in political discourse did not engender greater popular hostility towards immigrants over the long term, it did, however, precipitate inter-ideological opinion differences, a divide that will be explored at length in Chapter 6. As the longitudinal data in Figure 4.12 reveal, selfidentifiers on the ideological Left were more inclined than Right identifiers to perceive immigrants as making a positive contribution in each of the eight European countries surveyed in 2014. Inter-ideological differences on this question were greatest in France and Austria, countries with electorally successful ERWPs. Conversely, inter-ideological differences were narrowest in Germany and the UK. As the data in Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show, inter-ideological divisions were also the norm regarding the contribution immigrants make to a country’s economy

204

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation 70 63

61

60

Percentage

50 40

55

54

51

50

50

49

51

49

41 34

37

37

34

30

27

20 10 0 Austria Belgium Germany Spain

Finland

Left

Right

France

U.K.

Sweden

Figure 4.13  Migration ‘good for [country]’s economy’ (by ideological self-identification), 2014* *N = 16,593 adults in total (Austria = 1,795, Belgium = 1,769, Germany = 3,045, Spain = 1,925, Finland = 2,087, France = 1,917, Great Britain = 2,264, Sweden = 1,791). Question: ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?’ (0. Bad for the economy; 10. Good for the economy). Source: European Social Survey Round 7 (2014).

and cultural life in 2014, thus suggesting that differences in elite framing have fostered this divide.3 In sum, contemporary popular support for restrictive and even draconian immigration-related measures which contravene liberal norms is at variance with public opinion trends pertaining to immigration in the EU and US. Even as the liberal state has expanded the migration policy playing field and its immigration control measures have proliferated, popular opposition to immigration has not sustainably risen, thus casting doubt that the latter phenomenon has influenced these trends. 3

In a 2002 study of partisanship and immigration in California, an American state with a high rate of immigration, Neiman et al. (2006) found that though Republicans were more likely than Democrats to perceive immigration would negatively affect social and policy outcomes, they nevertheless shared similar concerns, thus making immigration issues a potential valence issue that allowed Republican political candidates to appeal to Democrats.

III  Political Trust and Attitudes on Managing Immigration 90

81

80

72

Percentage

70 60

55

55

50

84 78

52

56

53

40 30

79

69

67

63

205

36

37

29

20 10 0

Austria Belgium Germany Spain Left

Finland

France

U.K.

Sweden

Right

Figure 4.14 Cultural life ‘generally enriched’ (by ideological selfidentification), 2014* *N = 16,593 adults in total (Austria = 1,795, Belgium = 1,769, Germany = 3,045, Spain = 1,925, Finland = 2,087, France = 1,917, Great Britain = 2,264, Sweden = 1,791). Question: ‘Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?’ Answers were scaled from 0 (worse) to 10 (better) and dichotomized with 6 as the cutoff point. Source: European Social Survey Round 7 (2014).

Although popular antipathy to immigration and immigrants can and frequently does surge in the immediate aftermath of focusing events such as 11 September, it insufficiently fails to explain, particularly over the long term, the public’s support for policies and measures that compromise the civil liberties of both migrants and citizens. Consequently, alternative explanations need to be considered. III

Political Trust and Attitudes on Managing Immigration

The public’s expectations of its political leaders are relatively unchanging. Protection from potential foreign and domestic-origin threats to their safety is universally perceived as a fundamental responsibility of governments and states. Consequently, the ability of the liberal state to safeguard its citizens from unwanted and/or potentially dangerous foreigners is self-evidently critical to maintaining its popular legitimacy (Citrin et al. 2014; McLaren 2015: 126). Since the public’s attitudes towards

206

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation

immigrants are influenced by perceptions of threat (Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 2015; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2008; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2016; Lahav and Courtemanche 2012; McLaren 2012; Quillian 1995; Raijman and Semyonov 2004), the ability of government to attenuate the public’s immigration-related fears by capacity-building and engendering trust (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington and Husser 2012; McLaren 2012; Norris 2011) influences the latter to view the immigration-related policies of the state as effective and legitimate (Schmidt 2013). Political trust is generally important for state governance (Newton 2001; Rothstein 2005). As Wilkes and Wu (2019: 2) observe, ‘government cannot make effective policy or difficult decisions if its citizens do not trust it to do the right thing’. Political trust, or popular confidence in government and its institutions (Turper and Aarts 2017: 417), facilitates a belief among citizens that government is cognizant of and is trying its best to address their concerns (McLaren 2012). In this context, the information about immigration provided by non-state actors or specialized experts enhances the state’s ability to achieve its objectives and bolsters its public credibility and legitimacy (Boswell 2007b). Political trust is also critical to the success of a range of policies upon which the public’s support depends. As Levi and Stoker (2000: 491) observe, among the key ‘findings of the literature on government regulation are that the more trustworthy citizens perceive government to be, the more likely they are to comply with or even consent to its demands and regulation’. Specifically, trust in government influences individuals to behave in ways that can advance the former’s policy priorities (OECD 2013: 22; Rothstein 2005), including those pertaining to immigration (Papademetriou and Banulescu-Bogdan 2016; Rosenblum and Cornelius 2012) and asylum policy (Jeannet et al. 2020). Consequently, it is reasonable to project that wherever and whenever citizen trust of government is relatively high, popular support for an expansive migration policy playing field, as well as the involvement of non-central state actors in the state’s management of immigration, are also likely to be robust. Furthermore, social or interpersonal trust – the feeling that ‘most people can be trusted’ and one that engenders a shared identity or ‘wefeeling’ (Bruter 2001; Easton 1965: 185) – positively affects popular attitudes towards immigrants and immigration (Mitchell 2020). Scholarship on social capital and political behaviour (Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Hooghe et al. 2009; Putnam 2007; Stolle et al. 2008) underscore the significant influence of interpersonal trust on prejudice and tolerance (Bäck 2016; Sipinen and Bäck 2016). Individuals who ‘trust most people in general’ are more tolerant of persons who are different from themselves and less apprehensive about the empowerment of new out-groups

III  Political Trust and Attitudes on Managing Immigration

207

(Uslaner 2002: 197). Given that general societal trust can diminish threat perceptions, it influences popular attitudes towards immigration regulation (Macdonald 2020, 2021; Ziller et al. 2019).4 Though more volatile and less organic than interpersonal trust, political or institutional trust reflects an individual’s views about authority and core democratic principles.5 While trust in political institutions is sensitive to micro- (e.g., party in power) and/or macro-level (e.g., economic growth, unemployment, corruption, scandals) developments, the public’s expectations of its leaders is fundamentally tied to legitimacy and, thus, reflect the relationship between elites and masses (Norris 2011). This heuristic is particularly valuable under conditions of uncertainty or crises, such as those precipitated by terrorism, a health pandemic, environmental disasters, or other unforeseen events which amplify demands on national governments to implement or reform public policies.6 These claims not only affirm the relevance of political trust in buffering threat (Hetherington 1998), but also the relationship between political trust and the liberal state’s immigration management agenda(Citrin and Stoker 2018). Whether based on ideological convictions and partisanship, ‘performance’ evaluations (McLaren 2012), or projections of competence (Schmidt 2008), trust in political institutions is pertinent for the implementation of new policy measures whenever the public’s knowledge of them is scant. In this sense, in addition to national government, non-central state actors can influence the public to accept policies that it would otherwise reject (Bug and Bukow 2017). This type of trust feeds into Soroka’s and Wlezien’s (2010) democratic ‘thermostat’ regarding citizen representation and elite responsiveness.7 4

Students of democratic institutions further distinguish between generalized and particularized trust, the latter which is related to trust of in-groups or familiar others, in contrast to general trust (Uslaner 2002). Despite their differential effects, both generalized and particularized interpersonal trust critically impact an individual’s perceptions towards migrant or minority out-groups. For example, general trust leads people to be more open, to underestimate personal safety, and to be less risk-averse regarding newcomers. Particular trust is more inward-looking (towards one’s group) and selective. Consequently, we can assume that the general trusters are least likely to support intrusive border controls. 5 Scholars tend to combine institutions of trust (e.g., parliament, public administration, the government, local authorities, and the courts) as an index measuring particular institutional trust. 6 According to Fiske et al. (2002), whenever individuals engage with unfamiliar social others, they seek to learn if they are trustworthy, based on their motivations and abilities (competence). During this learning process, elites can be particularly effective in framing immigrants as a threat in order to mobilize reosources (Massey 2020), especially if particular issues are made salient (Ziller and Helbling 2021). 7 Bug and Bukow (2017) argue that general trust in actors may not be as important as specific trust. Their study makes clear that citizens evaluate distinct policy measures.

208

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation

Figure 4.15 Political trust and popular anti-immigrant sentiment in Western Europe, 2008 Country Labels: AT: Austria (N = 2,010); BE: Belgium (N = 1,766); DE: Germany (N = 2,852); ES: Spain (N = 1,958); FI: Finland (N = 1,925); FR: France (N = 2,070); GB: United Kingdom (N = 1,959); IE: Ireland (N = 2,757); IT: Italy (N = 2,626); NL: Netherlands (N = 1,681); PT: Portugal (N = 1,270); SE: Sweden (N= 1,551); weights applied. Source: European Social Survey 4 (2008).

Despite the paucity of empirical data linking trust with the new security-driven immigration measures, analyses of the former’s effects suggest there is an inverse relationship between political trust and negative popular attitudes towards the inflow of persons of a different racial or ethnic group (Bug 2013; Bug and Bukow 2017; Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Röllgen and Bug 2012; Trüdinger and Steckermeier 2017).8 With respect to Europe, for example, the pertinent opinion survey evidence demonstrates that, Britons excepted (McLaren 2012), West Europeans who were more trustful of government or the legal system were also less likely to harbor xenophobic sentiments (Figure 4.15). 8

The findings of a 2013 public opinion survey conducted in Australia revealed that persons who held a higher opinion of political elites in that country were much more inclined to believe that immigrants increase the crime rate and take jobs away from native Australians (Australian Election Study as cited in Bean 2018: 22). Among survey respondents who agreed that ‘people in government look after themselves’, 71 per cent embraced the suggestion that ‘immigrants increase crime’ and 72 per cent concurred that ‘immigrants take jobs away from people born in Australia’. On the other side of the coin, of those who took a much more positive view and were more trustful of political elites, less than a third agreed with these statements.

III  Political Trust and Attitudes on Managing Immigration

209

Figure 4.16 Political trust and popular anti-immigrant attitudes in Western Europe, 2016 N = (EU-12) 23,557; r2(correlation) = −0.23; OLS 2.18 (coefficient) p > 0.000. Country Labels: AT: Austria (N = 2,010); BE: Belgium (N = 1,766); DE: Germany (N = 2,852); ES: Spain (N = 1,958); FI: Finland (N = 1,925); FR: France (N = 2,070); GB: United Kingdom (N = 1,959); IE: Ireland (N = 2,757); IT: Italy (N = 2,626); NL: Netherlands (N = 1,681); PT: Portugal (N = 1,270); SE: Sweden (N= 1,551); weights applied. Political Trust derived from responses to question: ‘How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?’ (1. Not at all; 5. A great deal) Anti-immigrant sentiment derived from responses to question: ‘To what extent do you think [country] should allow people a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?’ (1. Allow many to come and live here; 4. Allow none) Source: European Social Survey 8 (2016).

Danes, Finns, Norwegians, and Swedes especially reported high levels of political trust and comparatively low levels of xenophobia. Data derived from a survey of the populations of the EU-12 countries in 2016 provide further evidence of a robust relationship between political trust and popular hostility toward immigrants. As Figure 4.16 reveals, an increase in political trust was significantly correlated with a decrease in anti-immigrant attitudes by −0.23 per cent

210

Popular Attitudes towards Immigration Regulation

Figure 4.17  Mean institutional trust and popular anti-immigrant attitudes across Europe, 2016 N = (EU-12) 23,557; r2(correlation) = −0.23; OLS 2.18 (coefficient) p > 0.000. Country Labels: AT: Austria (N = 2,010); BE: Belgium (N = 1,766); DE: Germany (N = 2,852); ES: Spain (N = 1,958); FI: Finland (N = 1,925); FR: France (N = 2,070); GB: United Kingdom (N = 1,959); IE: Ireland (N = 2,757); IT: Italy (N = 2,626); NL: Netherlands (N = 1,681); PT: Portugal (N = 1,270); SE: Sweden (N= 1,551); weights applied. Questions about Institutional Trust: B6. Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0–10, how much you personally trust each of the institutions…. Firstly: country’s parliament? B7. …country’s legal system. B8. …country’s police? B9. country’s politicians? B10. …country’s political parties? Questions about Anti-immigration Attitudes: B38. Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here? (1. Allow many to come and live here; 4. Allow none) B39. How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? (1. Allow many to come and live here; 4. Allow none) B40. How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? (1. Allow many to come and live here; 4. Allow none) B41. Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries? (0. Bad for the economy; 10. Good for the economy)

III  Political Trust and Attitudes on Managing Immigration

211

(p < 0.001).9 The data also indicate a modest inverse relationship between individual attitudes towards national institutions and anti-immigrant popular sentiment (Figure 4.17); that is, as trust in national institutions increases, anti-immigrant sentiment decreases (0.08, p  3 months No, EU nationals allowed to enter for short business trips or study, but only with up-to-date negative test Yes, if purpose for entering is deemed worthy by Danish police Yes, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Finnish citizens for employment or study reason, diplomats, humanitarian grounds. No

Other Permit Holders

Exemptions of Entry Ban For:

Table C.1  Major immigration management measures adopted by EU countries and US, March–May 2020

Limited to some border crossing points with Austria, Denmark, France, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Yes, with others (Cross border workers: N/A) Truck drivers can enter. Yes, in designated border crossing points with some restrictions on distance

Yes, restricted to people with a permanent employment contract Yes

Yes, if the purpose for entering is deemed worthy by Danish police Yes

Yes, fiscal adjustments for telework Yes, with some restrictions

Yes

Cross Border Workers and Truck Drivers Allowed to Enter

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Lithuania

Latvia

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Poland

Portugal

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

Source: OECD (2020: 10–12).

United Kingdom Yes United States Yes

Yes

Ireland Italy

Yes (EEA, UK and associated Schengen countries) Yes (EEA, UK and associated Schengen countries) – Yes

Yes (EU)

Yes (EEA, UK and associated Schengen countries) Yes (EEA, UK and associated Schengen countries) Yes, only with residence card or working in Poland Yes (EEA, UK and associated Schengen countries) Yes (EU)

–

Yes Yes

No

all permits > 3 months

No

No

Long-stay visa, including persons with a temporary residence permit Work permits (incl. seasonal work permits) All valid permits

Foreign citizens by private vehicle from other Schengen member countries was still allowed All valid residence permits

No restriction for people with valid visa or residence card Yes (EEA, UK and associated Passengers traveling on business Schengen countries) Yes All valid residence permits

– Non-essential cross border movements restricted

Yes

Yes, but some conditions apply to cross-border workers, with special conditions for health-care workers Yes, but some conditions apply to cross-border workers, with special conditions for health-care workers Yes

Yes, with some restrictions

Only in crucial sectors with a special vignette Yes, with some restrictions

Yes

Yes Yes, special lanes and crossings dedicated to cross border workers Yes, but from 8 April 2020 truck drivers with clear symptoms will not be allowed to continue on. Yes

344

Conclusions: Liberalism Compromised?

Economist 2021: 10), international tourist arrivals declined by 85 per cent at the height of the crisis. While its effects on public health at its peak were unprecedented during the post-WWII period, the Covid-19 pandemic nevertheless intersected with the politics of human mobility and immigration within and across the liberal states in several ways that conform to our immigration politics threat paradigm. They also confirm the veracity of several of the book’s major findings. First, like the focusing events earlier in the millennium, the recent public safety crisis underscored the thorny challenges the migration trilemma poses and, specifically, the ongoing need of the liberal states to reconcile its competing values and priorities in a new security era (Deane and Gramlich 2021). In virtually halting human mobility, for example, the central governments of the liberal states chose to side with the domestic political voices demanding closure (Paul 2020: 247). After decades of pursuing free trade and expansive immigration and human mobility policies, governments quickly capitulated to domestic pressures to shutter their economies and societies (Bove and Di Leo 2020: 3). According to UN estimates (UN DESA 2021), by mid-2020, the Covid-19 crisis had slowed the growth in the stock of international migrants by approximately two million, or 27 per cent less than its expected growth. A longitudinal analysis of air travel trends revealed that international travel had plummeted to levels unforeseen since its three-year descent post-11 September (World Bank 2022). According to the ICAO and World Travel Organization, the number of international passengers fell by approximately 60 per cent, or from nearly 4.5 billion in 2019, to 1.8 billion in 2020 (McAuliffe et al. 2020: 160), a decline in the air transportation system akin to that which followed 11 September (Lahav 2010). The steep reduction in international passenger travel between 2020 and 2022 highlighted the continuing, pivotal role of non-central state actors in stemming the inflow of foreigners. The global aviation industry, for example, experienced an 63 per cent reduction in commercial flights (World Bank 2020), resulting in a profit loss of approximately $137.7 billion in 2020, and $53.8 billion 2021 (Burgueño Salas 2022). Predictably, employers who protested that the state’s restrictions subverted their efforts to recruit foreign workers were among the more prominent opponents of travel bans (Chamie 2020: 235).18 The imposition of travel restrictions across the liberal states during 2020–21 also severely jeapordized the rights of asylum seekers. The 18 Travel companies and airlines have been especially concerned about the deputization of flight attendants and airline crews, which make them front-line actors in implementing ‘flight risks’ and ‘no-fly’ lists banning passenger flight (Schlangenstein and Levin 2022; Stoddart et al. 2022; Washington Post 2022).

VI  Covid-19 Pandemic as a Threat to Immigration

345

Trump administration in the US particularly exploited the Covid-19 health crisis to achieve its pre-pandemic aspiration of closing the country’s border to asylum seekers. Citing the pandemic as justification, the Trump administration banned nationals from 31 countries from entering the US (Ramji-Nogales and Lang 2020: 594). Moreover, the initial decision of Democratic President Biden in 2023 not to rescind Title 42, an exclusionary migration tool originally adopted by the Trump administration at the start of the pandemic, violated the right of asylum seekers to non-refoulement (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011). Another major pattern common to both focusing events was their effect on political discourse and the politics of threat. As occurred following the terrorist attacks of the early 2000s, the Covid-19 crisis precipitated a rhetorical assault on liberal values and norms by numerous political elites in the US and Europe. As Bove and Di Leo (2020: 3) observe, from the pandemic’s earliest stages, many politicians adopted ‘a combative, wartime vocabulary … to describe the threat stemming from Covid-19 and the actions undertaken to counter it, in a fashion that resembles, in its framing, the debate characterizing the aftermath of terrorist attacks’. Consistent with the evidence presented in Chapter 6, the escalation of illiberal and anti-immigration discourses was especially pervasive among political Right and especially ERWP politicians (Falkenbach and Greer 2021; Macías 2021).19 Third, the pandemic unambiguously bolstered the liberal state’s decision-making authority and sovereignty, thus further discrediting the thesis that the latter has irreversibly declined. In this vein, Eckardt et al. (2020: 1) persuasively argue that the pandemic’s outbreak precipitated the ‘massive return’ of the state.20 According to Owen (2020: 152), the liberal state’s response to Covid-19 reasserted the ‘fundamental form of the statist imaginary according to which the “state” is pictured as an answer to the question of who is responsible to, and for, whom in the modern world, where states see themselves as responsible to, and for, their own citizens’. A prominent example of how the liberal state’s policy-making prerogatives expanded following the arrival of the pandemic was the decision of the 17 Schengen states within the EU to impose border restrictions during the first half of 2020, thus tarnishing what had been one of the seminal achievements of the project of an ever-closer Europe Union:

19

An unlikely coalition of protesters who opposed Germany’s vaccine mandate was forged between Eco-Leftist and the far-Right partisans (Bennhold 2022). 20 This observation confirms Slaughter’s (1997: 184) view that the traditional state is not disappearing, but rather it is ‘disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts’.

346

Conclusions: Liberalism Compromised?

a border-control-free area (Ramji-Nogales and Lang 2020: 595–96). As Guild (2020: 2) observes, member state policy coordination during the Covid-19 pandemic’s first phase was virtually non-existent, ‘let alone promotion of this EU duty’.21 Instead, the ‘border control reflex took priority over the EU cooperation on public health…’ (Guild 2020: 2). Fourth, the pandemic prompted numerous liberal states to adopt special or extraordinary legal regimes, thus allowing them to skirt the normal policymaking process (Civil Liberties Union for Europe and Greenpeace European Unit 2020: 23). On this score, their responses to the pandemic mirrored their efforts to securitize immigration following the events of 11 September. For example, ten EU member states declared a formal ‘state of emergency,’ and an additional six states adopted either a ‘state of danger’, ‘declaration of epidemic disease’, an ‘emergency situation’, a ‘state of alarm’, a ‘state of sanitary emergency’, or a ‘state of epidemic threat’ (Civil Liberties Union for Europe 2020: 2). As Marzocchi (2020: 3) notes, a state of emergency expands the powers of the executive branch of government at the expense of those of the legislature and the judiciary, thus ‘causing a disbalance in the system of checks and balances that are at the basis of democracy’. Among the major collateral outcomes resulting from the state’s pandemic response in the US, for example, was the further erosion of the already limited due process afforded to foreigners facing deportation in immigration courts (Tosh et al. 2021: 14). Fifth, as occurred in the immediate aftermath of post-11 September, a bipartisan consensus emerged in favour of restricting international travel to the US. As the data presented in Table C.2 reveals, this defensive measure was almost universally embraced by Americans in 2020, achieving a degree of bipartisan agreement well above its preferences for alternative or additional policies to combat the pandemic. Against this backdrop, it is not unreasonable to speculate that the Covid-19 pandemic may, like the events of 11 September, represent a focusing event regarding immigration and human mobility. Although it has not yet disturbed or radically altered the regulation regime which has prevailed since 11 September, it has nevertheless reinforced the securitarian norms guiding most contemporary human mobility. Specifically, the public safety threat associated with immigration has laid the foundation for establishing global standards of health documentation for cross-border travellers. For example, discussion in the US about 21

Although the EU’s Free Movement Directive permits the member states to refuse entry to EU nationals based on public health risks, the Schengen Borders Code does not (Guild 2020: 2).

VI  Covid-19 Pandemic as a Threat to Immigration

347

Table C.2  Partisan opinion on possible policy responses to Covid-19 in US, March 2020 (in percentages) Dem/Lean Dem

Rep/Lean Rep

Total

Restricting international travel to the U.S.

94 

 96

95

Canceling major sports and entertainment events

  

 95

91

  

 94

90

85 

Closing K-12 schools Asking people to avoid gathering in groups of more than 10

78 

Limiting restaurants to carry-out only Requiring most businesses other than grocery stores and pharmacies to close Postponing upcoming state primary elections

  

 92

87

   

 91

85

82 

61 

        61 

   

 81

 81

71 70

Question: ‘Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?’ Source: European Social Survey Round 1–9 (2002–18) and Pew Research Center (2020).

establishing new monitoring institutions and public health regulations for travel and immigration raises the prospect of adding a health arm to the TSA (Koslowski 2020). In this event, non-state actors, such as airlines, will likely be coerced to assume a larger role in implementing health checks and regulating international human mobility, thus deputizing airline employers to enforce vaccination and mask mandates, as well as a foreigner ‘no-fly’ list (Washington Post 2022). Consistent with public opinion trends post-11 September, what did not much change in the immediate wake of the pandemic were the public’s general views about immigrants. As indicated in the opinion data presented in Table C.3, most of the public reported no change in their view about accepting migrants in the six European countries surveyed in 2020. Indeed, at 57 per cent, Poles were the only Europeans for whom less than a super majority reported that the pandemic did not alter their opinion about immigrants.22 22

It is possible, however, that popular attitudes towards immigration and border policies in the context of Covid-19 may be mitigated by perceptions of how citizens perceive

348

Conclusions: Liberalism Compromised?

Table C.3  Popular attitudes towards migrants during Covid-19 pandemic in Europe, 2020 (in percentages).

France Germany Italy Netherlands Poland UK

Much More Opposed

Slightly More Opposed

Slightly No Change, No Change, More in Opposed in Favour Favour

Much More in Favour

11 11 14 10 15 10

14 17 15 16 19 9

37 26 27 30 28 31

3 2 4 2 3 3

28 39 33 33 29 44

7 6 7 7 7 4

Question: ‘Since the Covid-19 pandemic began, how have your views changed about accepting migrants into [COUNTRY], if at all?’ Source: More in Common (2020: 55).

VII

Present as Prologue? Intergenerational Shift

While the future trajectory of popular attitudes toward immigration and human mobility cannot be confidently predicted, it is clear, based on the evidence presented in this book, that the contemporary politics of immigration considerably deviate from those of the recent past (Messina 1996). In contrast to most of the post-WWII era, immigration is now a politically salient and contentious subject, albeit to different degrees, across most liberal states. Primarily due to the receptivity of a large share of the electorate to their anti-immigration appeals (Messina 2007: 54–96), ERWPs are firmly entrenched in political party systems across Europe, as is their right-wing factional counterpart within the Republican Party in the US. Moreover, despite the exhortation of numerous scholars that immigration and human mobility be ‘desecuritized’ (Aradau 2004; Roe 2004; Wæver 1995: 57, 2000: 253), messages to the contrary are likely to resonate indefinitely with numerous citizens. In short, the securitization of immigration is now embedded in the politics of, and especially the political discourse concerning, immigration and refugees. In this context it is reasonable to ask if inter-generational attitudinal differences regarding the benefits and costs of immigration (McLaren et al. 2021: 727) will result in citizens becoming somewhat immunized they are affected. In this context, Dietrich and Crabtree (2019: 352) suggest publics often evaluate rights trade-offs, depending on whether they apply only to others or to themselves. According to Ziller and Helbling (2021), Europeans’ support for extensive state surveillance measures is greater if it is targeted at potential criminals, rather than universally. Regarding their propensity to make this distinction, see Benhabib (2004) and Brooks and Manza (2013).

VII  Present as Prologue? Intergenerational Shift

349

to the negative frames of the media and political elites, and particularly those promoted by ERWPs. In question is whether inter-birth cohort differences of perspective regarding immigration will lead to a greater popular tolerance of immigrants and immigration. In this event, the incremental effects of generational replacement could result in less well educated, older cohorts that are averse to immigration being replaced by younger, better educated, and more tolerant cohorts. As McLaren and Paterson (2020: 677) have framed the question: In a time when immigration is having significant lasting effects on European societies and will likely to do so for the foreseeable future, it is important to consider when it will also continue to be one of the most divisive topics facing these countries, or whether – much like Inglehart’s vision of a postmaterial society – we are moving towards increasing levels of tolerance of immigrant-related diversity.

Assuming popular attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are primarily formed early in life and derived from an individual’s formative experiences (Dennison and Geddes 2019: 108; Inglehart 1977), it is reasonable to expect that generational replacement will eventually result in greater social tolerance of immigrants and immigration (McLaren et al. 2021; Schotte and Winkler 2018), even if a permissive public consensus in favour of protectionist immigration management policies persists.23 Cross-national evidence of inter-generational, attitudinal differences about immigration is abundant (Dražanová 2022; Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 17–18; Quillian 1995). In mining data from the British sample of the European Social Survey (2002–17), for example, McLaren et al. (2021) discovered that, because younger generations were socialized in an environment of high immigrant-origin diversity, they are more tolerant of immigrants than older cohorts (Schmidt 2021). As indicated in Figure C.1, between 2004 and 2014, there was a considerable opinion gap, between the cohort of Europeans born before 1945 and generation Y (persons born after 1980) regarding whether immigration was good for the economy. This inter-generational gap that has generally widened over time. Moreover, younger age cohorts are significantly more positive than older cohorts about the contributions immigrants make to their society. As the data in Figure C.2 indicate, the tendency to view immigration as an overall benefit is much more prevalent among more recent cohorts than persons born prior to or immediately following WWII. However, a recent study of European social attitudes by McLaren and Paterson (2020) challenges the assumption of inevitable intergenerational opinion change. Based on their multi-level analysis of the 23

Alternatively, if norms are transmitted through social learning, then more recent developments may signal greater public intolerance over the long term (Chong et al. 2021).

Percent Who Answered Immigration is Good for the Economy

350

Conclusions: Liberalism Compromised?

20

17.42 16.8 16.14

16.15

16.04

16.54 14.77 14.14 14

13.25 13.31

14.93

14.56

14

11.13

10.75

13 12.22

11.88

15 14.39

14.48

12.31

11.47

14.9

11.97

12.04

2012

2014

11.72 9.17

8 2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Years Pre-war (%)

Baby boomer (%)

Generation X (%)

Generation Y (%)

Figure C.1 Perception of economic benefits of immigration by age cohort among Europeans, 2002–14 Question: ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?’ *Pre-War (pre-1945); Baby Boomer (1945–85); Generation X (1966– 79); Generation Y (1980–97, i.e., millennials); Generation Z (1998– 2012). For all years prior to 2014, N size for ‘Generation Z’ < 500. Up until then, they were under 18 years of age. Answers were scaled from 0 (worse) to 10 (better) and dichotomized with 6 as the cut-off point. The question measures the opinion of respondents on ‘Immigration good or bad for the country’s economy’ over 2002 through 2014. Answers were scaled from 0 (worse) to 10 (better) and dichotomized with 6 as the cut-off point. Source: European Social Surveys, (2002–14).

2002–14 rounds in sixteen countries of the European Social Survey, they discovered that, although the youngest and most educated cohorts were more positive about immigration than older ones, the combined effect of cohort and education was less for individuals who were socialized during their formative years in the context of a ‘strong far-right anti-immigration presence’ (665). The authors (2020: 677) conclude that although ‘attitude change may be happening … powerful anti-immigration far-right parties may be capable of influencing the attitudes of young people, including those with low and high levels of education’, in ways that counteract the otherwise positive effects of youth and education on tolerance.

VII  Present as Prologue? Intergenerational Shift

351

60 55

Percentage

50 45 40 35 30 2002 Pre War

2004

2006

Baby Boomers

2008

2010

Generation X

2012

2014

Generation Y

2016

2018

Generation Z

Figure C.2  Popular sentiment on whether country is a ‘better place to live’ across age cohorts* in Europe, 2002–18* Question: ‘Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?’ *Pre-War (pre-1945); Baby Boomer (1945–85); Generation X (1966– 79); Generation Y (1980–97, i.e., millennials); Generation Z (1998– 2012). For all years prior to 2014, N size for ‘Generation Z’ < 500. Up until then, they were under 18 years of age. Answers were scaled from 0 (worse) to 10 (better) and dichotomized with 6 as the cut-off point. Sources: European Social Survey Rounds 1–9 (2002–18).

Moreover, they (2020: 677) advise that ‘if European societies and leaders wish to avoid extraordinarily divisive political events that have been prompted by anti-immigration sentiment, they will need to understand how the mobilizing effects of the far-right can be countered’. This said, as immigration becomes more salient, individuals across age cohorts become more informed about its nuances and thus less misinformed (Jerit 2008; Kuklinski et al. 2000) and more liberal. Indeed, public opinion data gathered from 2001 forward indicate that information significantly alters popular attitudes towards specific groups of migrants (e.g., Muslims), and inclines individuals to adopt a more positive attitude to migrants (CBS News 2001). In a 2002 poll (CBS/NYT 2002), Americans who had followed the news after 11 September reported that Arab immigration should be decreased at a lower rate than those who had not been following the news. Half of those who reported following the news wanted Arab immigration to decrease, as compared to 57 per cent who

352

Conclusions: Liberalism Compromised?

did not follow the news. Support for non-Arab immigration also varied according to whether respondents followed the news, with 40 per cent of news watchers and 53 per cent of non-watchers preferring a decrease in non-Arab immigration.24 Similarly, the longer the Trump administration’s immigration ban (2016) was on the policy agenda, the less it was supported by the public (Gallup 2018; Wright and Levy 2020). These findings concur with the those of other studies (Dennison and Geddes 2020; Grande et al. 2019; Hopkins 2010) and suggest that the salience of immigration and its politicization significantly explain immigration policy outcomes. Our research findings underscore the paradoxical effects of media and elite discourse on popular immigration attitudes and norms (Haynes et al. 2016). Elite frames either can positively or negatively impact on the public’s support for immigrants and immigration regulation. On one hand, the longer immigration is salient, the more likely popular attitudes towards regulation will be informed.25 On the other hand, as Conejero and Etxebarria’s (2007) investigation of Spanish public opinion following the 7 March terrorist bombings revealed, these events may cultivate emotional biases. Issue salience can emotionally charge individuals and compel them to embrace reflexive protectionist norms – in this case, those of embedded securitism. However, it is also true that knowledge and social capital may mitigate emotional responses (Cote and Erickson 2009; Trüdinger and Steckermeier 2017; Hopkins et al. 2019). It is not unreasonable to assume that knowledge derived from increased and prolonged issue salience may have discriminating effects on policy attitudes. Consequently, in context of protracted issue 24 Information seemed to yield similar differences, as indicated by the results of a 2010 Gallup poll conducted days after Arizona Governor Jan Brewer’s signed an immigration bill making illegal immigration a state crime and allowing Arizona law enforcement officials to detain suspects. While more Americans supported (39 per cent) than opposed the bill (30 per cent), 31 per cent had no opinion about it. However, once information was factored in (based on self-reported familiarity with the Arizona law), 54 per cent favoured and 41 per cent opposed the bill. Despite relatively equal familiarity among political partisans (57 per cent of Democrats reported to have heard or read ‘a great deal or fair amount’ about the new immigration law as compared with 62 per cent of Republicans), information had different effects on the latter voters than on the former. With information, 34 per cent of Democrats remained in favour (compared to 27 per cent), while 56 per cent (compared to 45 per cent without exposure) were opposed to the bill. Support for Republicans moved the opposite direction; that is, while 62 per cent of Republicans (with or without information) favoured the Arizona immigration law initially, once information was factored in, this number jumped up to 75 per cent support for the bill. Only 3 per cent of Republicans dropped their support from their initial opposition to the bill (14 per cent). 25 Of course, this does not preclude the possibility that biased information assimilation and knowledge result from an individual consulting self-selected media sources. See Cho (2013) on the import of information and its sources for democratic governance.

VIII  Research Implications

353

salience, cognitively mobilized people may be more likely to differentiate between the positive contributions and negative costs of immigration (Davidov et al. 2008). Popular attitudes towards immigration thus are not only sensitive to different threat frames, but also to the consequences (e.g., more personal surveillance, decreased economic competition, cultural diversity), or policy trade-offs (e.g., civil liberties), once they are explicitly framed by the media and politicians. Popular attitudes are also likely to change whenever individuals move beyond the abstract dimensions of their opinions on issues and consider their concrete consequences (­Yankelovich 1991: 24–26).26 VIII

Research Implications

Our research findings confirm that the rise in the salience of immigration precipitated greater popular support for restrictive immigration management policies over the past two decades. However, as we have seen, this uptick has not coincided with an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment. To the contrary, popular attitudes towards immigrants have become more tolerant, if not more favourable, over time (Dennison and Geddes 2019). In the US, longitudinal public opinion trends indicate that popular opposition to immigrants is at its nadir (Pew 2018). Moreover, more than two decades after 11 September, the percentage of Americans who prefer less immigration has declined to a post-1967 low (Gallup 2021).27 In Europe too, the data confirmed growing positive assessments of the contributions of immigrants. If a public safety threat environment does not necessarily fuel higher anti-immigrant sentiment, it may be that the relevance of this metric for politics and policymaking needs to be reconsidered. Specifically, fixating on popular hostility towards immigrants ignores the normative 26

Applying Yankelovich’s (1991) 7-stage modelling of opinion formulation, the critical last stage involves an acceptance of costs and trade-offs, as well as consequences. Popular support for greater limits on imports, for example, declined from 51 to 19 per cent once people were presented with the possible consequences of protectionism (e.g., restrictionism on the variety and choice of products, higher prices, and poorer quality. 27 Even as Americans assessed the contributions of immigrants more positively after 2001 (CBS/NYT 2002), they also strongly supported greater immigration regulation. A CBS/ NYTimes Poll survey in May 18 to 23, 2007 of 1,125 adults, reported that 75 per cent of those who responded favoured tougher penalties for employers of undocumented workers, and 82 per cent said the federal government should do more to reinforce the border. In the poll, 57 per cent said that recent immigrants had contributed to the United States. But 35 per cent said that in the long run the new immigrants would make American society worse, while only 28 per cent said they would make it better (Suro 2009).

354

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attitudinal shifts that can occur as a result of perceptions of threat. As Cˇermáková and Leontiyeva’s (2017) survey of the populations of nineteen European countries suggests, individuals can perceive immigrants positively (e.g., be willing to accept them in everyday life) and yet simultaneously have reservations about immigration generally (Dennison and Geddes 2019). These two dimensions of public opinion move differently over time and are sensitive to different macro-level variables (Hatton 2017), and especially negative events in the security environment.28 Indeed, attitudes towards the regulation of immigration may be less sensitive to immigration or the presence of immigrants, and more responsive to the policies of government and its capacity to govern (Gilligan 2012; Zapata-Barrero 2009).29 A critical distinction thus needs to be drawn between popular attitudes toward immigrants and immigration regulation, since the latter evokes core value trade-offs pertaining to concerns about an assault by government on individual rights, including freedom of movement, nondiscrimination, and privacy (Haubrich 2003). To the extent that policy decisions touch upon core principles and values, elites may be said to seek norm conformity rather than rationality or cost-benefit calculi (Kroneberg et al. 2010), especially concerning liberties and rights (Kellstedt et al. 2019). According to Chong (1993: 897), individuals have difficulty ‘reconciling their desire to conform to general democratic values with their fears and apprehensions about the consequences of granting freedom to individuals or groups that violate the norms of society’.30 Where citizens in a democracy are asked to reconsider their support for civil liberties for themselves and non-citizens, the threat context is discerning (Sullivan and Hendriks 2009). In this context, the emergent institutional dynamics and an expansive migration regime reflect a weak or passive demand structure of an entrepreneurial mode of politics – a permissive consensus around immigration regulation whenever the public perceives its safety is at risk. 28 According to Hatton (2017), existing studies have focused on the responses to survey questions on whether an individual would prefer more or less immigration but not on his or her assessment of its importance as a policy issue. In his study of restrictive attitudes, he therefore distinguishes between issue preference and salience. 29 If appraisals of control for example can moderate the affective dimension of threat politics (Lerner and Keltner 2001), then attitudes towards regulation may more readily rely on ideological cues towards immigrants. 30 Wright et al. (2016) distinguish between attribute-based and categorical evaluations as the sources of popular attitudes towards immigration policy. In contrast to the former, which is based on the individual characteristics of immigrants, the latter arise when a policy issue triggers considerations of justice and evoke overriding beliefs about the desirability of policy generally.

IX  Future Path?

355

Moreover, exclusively focusing on the public’s negative attitudes towards immigrants can obscure the importance of other immigrationrelated attitudes that may influence an individual’s policy preferences and, ultimately, feed into policy outcomes. Although anti-immigrant popular sentiment matters for policy making, whether immigration is a salient issue is more important. As we have argued throughout this book, the salience of immigration in media and political discourse did not engender hostility towards immigrants over the long term, although it did stoke inter-partisan divisions regarding immigration regulation (Birkland 1998).31 Given that media and political elite discourse and framing strongly influence popular attitudes by priming values, interpartisan differences regarding the salience of immigration generate differences in electoral choice. As Dennison and Geddes (2019: 111) contend, issue salience energizes the electorate, and serves as a proximal cause of immigration policy preferences among voters (Paul and ­Fitzgerald 2021). IX

Future Path?

Whatever its effects on popular immigration-related attitudes, perhaps the most enduring legacy of the securitization and politicization of immigration and human mobility since the end of the Cold War, and particularly the watershed events of 11 September and its aftermath, are the various ways in which the phenomenon of securitism is now embedded in the institutions and practices of the migration policy playing field. As we saw in Chapter 3, by devolving many of their immigration management responsibilities to a multiplicity of non-central state actors, liberal states have formalized and institutionalized the latter’s role and functions. Consequently, the involvement of these actors in managing immigration and human mobility is likely to persist. Supported by their acquiescent publics, political elites can implement their respective immigration agendas relatively unchecked. As the epigraph at the beginning of this Chapter suggests, public safety crises tend to spawn policy change that persists well past the threat conditions and perceptions which politically justified them (O’Connor 2016). They do so even when, as our immigration threat paradigm politics suggests, these perceptions are primarily subjectively rather than objectively founded. In this context, Walker’s reflections, although referring to the 31

Analyses of political party manifestos across European countries (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011; Dancygier and Margalit 2020; Livny 2020) confirm the political salience of immigration.

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legacy effects of 11 September on air travel, were inspired by his similar curiosity about the possible future effects of the Covid-19 crisis on human mobility.32 While it is premature to draw firm conclusions, based on our analysis of the politics of immigration post-11 September, it is likely that the implications of the pandemic crisis for immigration and human mobility policy, however subtle or incremental, will be significant and long-lasting. Moreover, it is probable that they will likely follow a path, as the negative focusing events which preceded it in time did, that compromises rights and many of the core values, including those underpinning the civil liberties and rights of citizens and migrants – upon which liberal states are founded. If so, it will validate the acuity of de Tocqueville’s (1969: 671) observation which opened this book. That is, even the citizens of liberal democracies are predisposed to grant the state formidable powers whenever they perceive the ‘public peace’ is at risk. Consequently, as the evidence presented in this book suggests, their witting support of the state’s illiberal immigration and human mobility policies, however troubling, is ultimately compatible with democratic governance in the twenty-first century.

32

See Hartig and Doherty(2021) for its broad effects on public opinion.

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Index

1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, 10 1924 National Origins Act, 269 1965 Hart-Celler Act, 269 1987 Carriers Liability Act, 268 1991 Sangatte Protocol, 125 1993 World Trade Center bombings, 45, 158, 160, 282, 318 1995 Report of the Commission on Immigration Reform, 117 1996 Immigration Reform Act, 141 1998 Higher Education Amendments, 170 2001 American Patriot Act, 2 2001 World Trade Center bombings, 158, 282 2002 Enhanced Border Security, 2 2003 Wider European Initiative, 131 2004 Madrid bombing, 52, 83, 85, 86, 283 2005 Hague Programme, 127 2005 London bombing, 52, 83, 86, 283 2008 financial crisis, 274, 303 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, 240 2015 refugee crisis, 18 2016 Brexit referendum, 278, 298 2016 Schengen Border Code, 128 2017 Manchester bombing, 240 Aarts, K., 206 Abdelaaty, L.E., 105 Aberbach, J.R., 56 Abou-Chadi, T., 64, 65 Abramson, P., 91 Acebes, Angel, 125 Ackleson, J., 133, 182, 183 ACLU. See American Civil Liberties Union Adamson, F. B., 3, 95, 99, 188 Ada˘sca˘li¸tei, D., 338 AFSJ. See Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice agents, 9, 105 Agrela, B., 265

472

Air Transport Committee of the Council, 160 Ajzen, I., 20 Akdenizli, B., 254, 255, 285 Akkerman, M., 62, 64, 65, 120, 123, 128, 130, 156, 158, 302 Akkerman, T., 66 Alabama, 149 Alexander, S. H., 199 Alexseev, M. A., 7, 32, 33, 242 Alkopher, Dingott, 18 Allen, C., 72, 282, 283 Allen, N., 303 Allen, W., 267, 297 Alonso, S., 8, 31, 62, 66, 69, 82, 84, 266, 273, 294, 302, 337, 355 Altbach, P., 175 Altbach, P. G., 157, 171, 173 Alter, K. J., 100 Altheide, D., 285 Amati Puigsech, D., 266 American citizens, 182 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 141, 176, 184 American college campuses (IIE), 173 American Congress, 176, 308 American Department of Homeland Security, 2 American foreign policy, 15 American higher education, 171 American Immigration Council, 142 American Ku Klux Klan, 36 American labour law, 165 Americans, 27, 69, 190, 191, 195, 197, 199, 200, 225, 226, 229–34, 240, 243–5, 250, 251, 259, 275, 277, 282, 284, 285, 310, 311, 317, 324, 339, 352, 353 Amsterdam Treaty, 1999, 117, 124 Andersen, H., 237, 246 Anderson, C., 206 Andreas, P., 16, 99, 120, 133–5, 186, 329

Index anger, 325, 335 anti-immigrant sentiment, 84 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 176 Arab immigration, 284, 351 Arab Spring, 33 Arab Spring crisis, 215 Arab spring uprisings, 130 Arabs, 191, 192 Aradau, C., 3, 348 Arango, J., 264, 266, 289, 290, 292, 294 Arcarazo, D. A., 124 Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ), 117, 126 Arendt, H., 31 Arian, A., 13 Ariely, G., 206 Arikan, G., 238 Arizona, 144, 147, 270 Arizona immigration law, 352 Arjona, A., 289 Arkansas, 270 Armstrong, C., 99 Arnold, C., 68 Arthur, C. D., 6, 45 Ashcroft, J., 125, 141, 155, 176 Assaf, D., 106, 156 Astrada, M., 280 Astrada, S., 280 asylum seekers, 1, 15, 16, 39, 64, 76, 78, 79, 83, 94, 108, 123, 132, 135, 137, 181, 182, 215, 256, 265, 294–7, 318, 341, 344, 345 Augoustinos, M., 39 Australia, 173, 208 Australian government, 137 Austria, 57, 161, 164, 202, 203 Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), 62 Austrians, 213, 214 Avdan, N., 120, 238, 257 Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 116, 161 aviation security, 163 Bacchus, J., 12 Bäck, H., 29 Bäck, M., 206, 211 backlash effects, 253 Baer, J., 158 Bagnato, K., 171 Bahrain, 215 Baird, T., 68, 161, 184, 332 Baker, P., 44, 52 Baker, W., 91 Balcells, L., 307, 317 Balch, A., 90, 293

473 Baldaccini, A., 3 Baldwin, D., 14, 99, 322 Baldwin-Edwards, M., 38 Bale, T., 40, 66, 82, 295 Ballinger, S., 307 Balzacq, T., 17, 18, 234, 281 Bandura, A., 212 Banks, A., 37, 250 Bara, J., 303 Barber, M., 299 Barker, K., 178 Barreto, M., 66 Batalova, J., 169, 173, 174 Baumgartner, F., 35, 333 Baur, P., 246 Beck, R., 67, 183 Beine, M., 109 Bélanger, E., 22 Belgians, 214, 215 Belgium, 76, 115, 161, 164, 203 Bello, V., 8, 33, 34, 94, 106, 119, 132, 158, 317 Bennett, C., 9, 163 Ben-Nun Bloom, P., 37, 79, 206, 238 Benson, R., 36, 44 Ben-Yehuda, N., 7, 34, 36 Berkhout, J., 23, 40, 69 Bernstein, H., 22 Berry, M., 294 Betts, K., 100, 122 Bhagwati, J., 93, 94, 97 Bhattacharyya, S., 133 Biard, B., 64, 65 Biden, Joe, 135, 257 Big Brother, 330 Bigo, D., 3, 8, 9, 16–18, 32, 34, 84, 86, 95, 117, 120, 125, 137, 187, 324, 329 Bilgic, A., 3 Billiet, J., 353 Birkland, T., 6, 22, 98, 203, 355 Birrell, B., 103 Bjerre, L., 109 Black Asphalt Electronic Networking and Notification System, 144 Blanchard, A.E., 246 Bleich, E., 37, 52, 76, 78, 83, 192, 193 Blinder, S., 39, 242, 267, 297, 298 Block, L., 124 Bloom, T., 94, 105, 106, 158, 186, 258, 330 Bobo, L., 19 bogus marriages, 152 Böhmelt, T., 239 Bolin, N., 65 Bonjour, S., 124 Boomgaarden, H., 32, 52, 83 Boomgaarden, H.G., 239, 242

474

Index

border control, 104, 130, 132, 135, 137, 161, 189, 190 border enforcement, 103 Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST), 118 border security, 16, 118, 162 Borkert, M., 124 The Boston Globe, 176 Boswell, C., 6, 9, 21, 22, 84, 98, 106, 156, 183, 187, 206, 294, 329 Boucher, A., 109, 341 Bourbeau, P., 23, 59, 272 Bouvier, L. F., 338 Bove, V., 336, 344 Bowler, S., 279 Bozzoli, B., 243 Bracero Program, 270, 271 Bradbury, S., 134 Brader, T., 36, 37, 91, 249 Branton, R. P., 19 Bretton Woods era, 8 Breuning, C., 69 Brewer, Jan, 231, 352 Brewer, P., 326 Brexit Party, 269 Briskman, L., 137 Britain, 79, 125, 193, 255, 267, 297, 308 British Foreign Office, 268 British governments, 125, 267, 268 British House of Commons, 308 British Parliament (MPs), 275 British public opinion, 283 British Social Attitudes, 267, 298 Britons, 78, 79, 190, 195, 208, 213, 216, 218, 243, 244, 274, 275, 282, 297, 309, 318 Brochmann, G., 109 Brooks, C., 37, 79, 325, 336 Brouard, S., 249 Bruquetas-Callejo, M., 292, 294 Bruter, M., 18, 206 Bryant, S., 178 Buchanan, Patrick, 280 Budge, I., 40, 56 Bug, M., 81, 195, 199, 207, 208 Bukow, S. U., 207 Bunyan, T., 128 Buonfino, A., 3, 82, 83 burden-sharing, 117 bureaucratic capitalism, 109–10 bureaucratic discretion, 110 bureaucratization, 109 Bures, O., 30 Burgess, J. P., 3 Burgueño Salas, Erick, 344 Burke, M., 242

Burnham, P., 83, 187, 329 Burns, P., 2, 3, 25, 38 Burscher, B., 254, 256 Bush, George W., 1, 132, 161, 279 business of control, 158 Butz, A. M., 99 Buzan, B., 3, 17, 33 Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, 136 Calavita, K., 99 Calfano, B., 39 California, 147, 270 Camarota, S., 67 Campbell, D., 19, 169 Canada, 1, 59, 132, 133, 159, 163, 173, 178, 226 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, 178 Canadian Government, 1 Canary Islands, 268 Canetti, D., 336 Canetti-Nisim, D., 51, 206 Canning, V., 268 Capaccio, A., 174 Capelos, T., 191 Caramani, D., 83, 187, 329 Carcamo, C., 164, 166–8 Carey, J., 308 Carolan, M., 151 Carrera, S., 33, 130 Carvalho, J., 65, 66, 292, 296 Cassese, E., 325 Castanho Silva, B., 86, 89, 90 Castells, M., 155, 156, 183 Castles, S., 32, 33 Caviedes, A., 17, 18, 44, 52, 256, 284, 297 cayuco humanitarian crisis, 289 Cea D’Ancona, M.A., 266, 282, 292–4 center-Left party, 64 center-Right party, 62, 65 Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC), 33 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 117 centralization, 161 Centre for Aviation (CAPA), 132 Ceobanu, A., 88, 199 ˇ ermáková, D., 334, 354 C Cerny, P.G., 6, 100, 101, 328 Chacón, J. M., 7 chain of causation, 19, 25 Chamie, J., 341, 344 Chapman University, 284 Chapman University Survey, 251 Chaqués-Bonafont, L., 288 Chattanooga Times Free Press, 162

Index Chauvin, S., 149 Chavez, L., 280 Chebel d’Appollonia, A., 3, 15, 59, 86, 95, 241, 307 Checa, J. C., 289 Checkel, J.T., 18, 68 Cheng, L., 37, 38, 87, 88 Chicago, 139 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 225 Chilton, P., 39, 40, 242 China, 173 Chishti, M., 299 Cho, Bowen, 52, 53 Chong, D., 35, 36, 40, 87, 234, 325, 337, 349, 354 Choucri, N., 14, 33 Christian immigrants, 75 Christmann, P., 221, 222 Chzhen, K., 295 Cisneros, J.D., 284 Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), 116 Citrin, J., 2, 3, 19, 25, 33, 36, 74, 81, 205, 211, 223, 277, 325, 332 Civil Aviation Security Financing, 161 civil liberties, 4, 41, 212, 346 civil rights activists, 165 civil society, 119 Claude-Valentin, M., 7 Clawson, R.A., 40 Clayton, G., 268 Clochard, O., 178 Cohen, S., 7, 34 Cold War, 4, 11, 14, 24, 33, 92, 97, 98, 103, 135, 169, 173, 327, 330, 337, 355 Coleman, M., 101, 120, 131, 138, 141, 154, 155, 181 collective correspondence, 56 Collett, E., 36, 129, 130 Collyer, M., 101, 136 Colorado, 270 commercialization, 9, 106 common foreign and security policy (CFSP), 128 complex reality, 262 Conejero, S., 292 Congress of Deputies, 286 congressional approval, 223 Conlon, D., 100, 101, 106, 158, 159, 177, 179, 180 Conservative Government, 79 Conservative Party, 269, 295–7, 303, 305, 316, 318 Consterdine, E., 267, 269, 295, 296, 298 Constitutional Court, 151

475 contagion effect, 82 contemporary immigration, 27, 99, 114, 156, 223, 237 policy, 4–6, 19, 21, 25, 35, 97, 104, 110 politics of, 33 practices, 98 contemporary liberal states, 1, 5, 10, 14, 25, 26, 28, 94, 95, 98, 99, 171, 185, 188, 233, 321, 324, 340 Conti, N., 216, 224 control, 2, 39 Cook, K., 116 Cooper, C., 298 Corbett, R., 56 Cornelius, W. A., 30, 93, 94, 206, 265, 292, 294 cost-benefit matrix, 107 Côté-Boucher, K., 106, 156, 181 Council for European Studies, 59 Council of Europe, 131, 154 Council of Ministers, 114, 126 Council of the European Union, 2, 129, 151 Courtemanche, M., 17, 36, 37, 41, 44, 206, 238, 239, 245, 253, 325, 326 COVID crisis, 237 Covid-19 pandemic, 2, 29, 272, 321, 340, 341, 344–8, 356 Covington, K., 166 Cranston, S., 177 crime, 219, 256, 297 Crime Control Act, 1993, 140 criminal justice system, 141 crisis terminology, 36 critical juncture, 6 Croft, S., 3 Cruz, E., 87, 193, 239, 242 cultural frames, 81 cultural pluralism, 12 Curtice. J., 318 Curtis, K. A., 81 Customs and Border Patrol agents, 137 Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 12, 116, 118, 148, 159, 162 Czymara, C. S., 56, 79, 241 da Fonseca, S. C., 8, 31, 62, 66, 69, 82, 84, 302, 337, 355 Daems, T., 110, 120 Dahl, R., 330 Dahrendorf, R., 330 Dalton, R. J., 56 D’Amato, G., 69, 83 Dancygier, R., 12, 21, 56, 66, 82, 83, 239, 302, 355

476

Index

Danes, 209 Danley, J. V., 171 Davidov, E., 20, 38, 91, 317, 324, 353 Davis, D., 43, 242, 244, 246, 330 Day, J., 135 Day, M. V., 41 De Burca, 124 De Genova, N., 101, 137 de Haas, H., 5, 23, 30, 101, 109, 110 de la Garza, R., 270 De Laet, D., 330 De Lange, T., 106 De Parle, J., 98 de Tocqueville, A., 356 de Vattel, E., 9 de Vreese, C. H., 239, 242 decision makers, 35 Decker, R. J., 182, 183 DeClair, E. G., 64 decline of state sovereignty debate, 94 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), 168 deindustrialization, 103 Dekker, R., 44 delegation, 9, 106 DEMIG analysis, 113 DEMIG data, 110 democratic deficit, 330 Democratic Party, 299, 306, 308, 316 Democrats, 168, 195–7, 204, 225, 226, 231, 248, 249, 251–3, 255, 272, 279, 299, 310, 311, 313, 352 Dempster, H., 256 Denmark, 58, 73, 161, 190, 203, 219 Dennison, J., 21, 23, 40, 84, 211, 269, 298, 317, 329, 334, 338, 349, 352–5 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 12, 115, 116, 118, 120, 125, 126, 134, 141, 144, 162, 164, 168, 170, 171 Department of Justice (DOJ), 108, 116, 140, 166, 167, 183 Department of State, 108, 125 dependents, 64 depolitization, 28, 128 deputy sheriffs, 9, 106 DeSipio, L., 270 Detention Watch Network, 180 Determinants of International Immigration (DEMIG), 109 Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act), 148 devolution, 106 Devos, T., 39, 231, 235, 246, 323, 324 Dewan, T., 308 DHS. See Department of Homeland Security

d’Humières, V., 107, 130, 131 Di Leo, R., 344 Diez, T., 3, 17, 307 Díez Nicolás, J., 264 Dillingham Congressional Commission, 160 DiMaggio, P. J., 68 Dimitriadi, A., 220 Dinas, E., 8, 307, 324 dispersion, 181 Dixon, T. L., 38 Djupe, P., 39 Dodds, A., 158, 169 DOJ. See Department of Justice Dolan, T., 39 Dolezal, M., 66 domestic security, 16 domestic security environment, 114 Donk, A., 69 Doosje, B., 8, 37, 88, 193, 194, 324 Doty, 177 Doty, R.L., 17 Downs, A., 83 Dražanová, Lenka, 349 Druckman, J. N., 35, 38, 40, 337 Dublin Convention, 123 Duffy, B., 298, 309, 310, 317, 349 Dunaway, J., 35, 44, 54 Duncan, L., 22, 40 Durand, J., 280 Dustmann, C., 36 Dutch, 213, 215 DW-Nominate score, 22 Eastern Europe, 130 Easton, D., 206 Easton, M., 246, 253, 259 The Economist, 158, 173 economy of border security, 158 Edelman, M., 99 Edling, C., 192 Edwards, J., 271, 280, 299 Egypt, 105, 215 Ekins, E. E., 81, 228 El Ejido riots, 289 El Mundo, 286 El País, 286 El Salvador, 134 Elchardus, M., 239, 242 elite discourse, 281 elite safety frames, 239 Ellermann, A., 98, 99, 110 Ellinas, A. A., 65 Ellis, M., 150 embedded liberalism, 96 embedded realist paradigm, 96, 97

Index embedded securitism, 257–259, 340, 352 emergency clause, 129 emotional innumeracy, 76, 78 empirical evidence, 317, 331 employer sanctions, 190 employers, 164 Employers Sanctions Directive, 124 Employment Authorization Document (EAD), 167 Enns, P., 13, 230 ENP. See European Neighbourhood Policy Enten, H., 314 Entman, R. M., 35, 38 entrepreneurs, 106 Epstein, L., 21 Erasmus, 135 Erisen, C., 325 Eroukhmanoff, C., 23 ERWPs. See Extreme Right-Wing Political Parties Escandell, X., 199 Espenshade, T. J., 270 Esses, V. M., 19, 33, 62, 79, 239, 242, 257, 259, 279, 318 Ettinger, P., 52, 83 Etxebarria, I., 292 Etzioni, A., 6, 16, 68, 117, 147, 156, 184, 190, 330 EU. See European Union (EU) EU Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM), 129 EU migrant crisis, 129 EU Naval Force-Mediterranean Operation Sophia (EUNAVFOR MED), 128 EU Schengen Border Code, 136 EU Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum, 2 Eurobarometer, 68, 195 Eurobarometer Surveys (EB), 26, 189 Europe, 3, 4, 27, 31, 70, 113, 117, 150, 152, 156, 157, 161, 167, 216, 231, 254, 260 European Agenda, 130 European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG), 123 European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), 128 European Commission, 71, 123, 126, 128, 130, 131, 133, 160, 163, 184 European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, 128 European Council, 126, 131 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 124 European Court of Justice, 128 European Economic Area (EEA), 74, 341

477 European External Action Service, 129 European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 74 European governments, 122, 152, 165 European labour law, 165 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 123, 131, 136 European Parliament (EP), 69, 85, 124, 126, 128 European politics, 15 European Social Surveys (ESS), 26, 189, 349, 350 European Union (EU), 5, 33, 75, 126, 127, 130, 265, 296 European Value Surveys (EVS), 26, 189 Europeans, 27, 85, 190, 197, 199, 220–2, 233, 234, 242, 244, 282, 317, 324, 333, 339 Europol, 126 EU-Turkish agreement, 131 Evans, G., 295, 297 Ewing, W., 269 executive orders, 108 externalization, 9, 106, 181 Extraordinary Commissioner for Immigration, 114 Extraterritorial, 121, 267, 308 process of, 137 Extreme Right-Wing Political Parties (ERWPs), 11, 12, 26, 30, 33, 62, 64–6, 68, 75, 82, 84, 91, 203, 258, 269, 279, 319, 338, 345, 348, 349 extreme-right parties (ERP), 66 Facchini, G., 25 Faist, T., 3, 7, 34, 135, 190 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 170 Fargues, Philippe, 71 Farny, E., 78, 239 FBI. See Federal Bureau of Investigation fear, 335 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 117, 126, 169, 192 federal government, 115–17, 141, 144, 147–50, 154, 155, 157, 162, 166–71, 174, 176–8, 182, 197, 225, 228, 229, 271, 353 Federal Office for Asylum and Immigration, 115 Feeney, M., 137, 154, 182 Feigenbaum, H.B., 157 Feldman, S., 79, 91, 92, 189, 239, 325 Femmine, L.D., 268 Fennelly, K., 308, 309 Fennema, M., 62

478

Index

Ferguson, S., 38 Fernández-Albertos, J., 292 FERPA. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act Fetzer, J. S., 19, 56, 74, 188, 193 Fidesz, Hungary, 65 Figgou, L.A.S., 37 financial considerations, 107 financial penalties, 166 Fine, S., 265 Finkelstein, E. A., 246 Finklea, K., 134 Finland, 57, 161, 203 Finnegan, W., 177, 182 Finnemore, M., 21, 97 Finnish Ministry of Interior, 115 Finns, 209, 213 Finotelli, C., 266 fiscal year (FY), 162 Fishbein, M., 20 Fiske, S. T., 38, 191, 242 FitzGerald, D. S., 10, 94, 101, 104, 137, 324 Fitzgerald, J., 8, 9, 21, 40, 81, 87, 88, 109, 324, 355 Flores, R. D., 56, 259 Flynn, M., 83, 110, 179, 180, 183 Flynn, M. B., 83 Focal Point CheckPoint agreement, 126 Focal Point Travelers’ agreement, 126 Foner, N., 37, 211, 242, 318 Ford, R., 298 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 117 foreign labour, 103 foreign policy, 3, 15, 85, 88, 113, 154, 169 foreign states, 15 foreign students, 1, 15 foreigner, 39 Fox, Vicente, 132 France, 76, 115, 125, 137, 138, 151, 152, 161, 164, 165, 193, 203, 219, 233 France Ministry, 183 France Ministry of Interior, 129, 130 Franklin, M., 68 Franklin, M. N., 22 Frederking, L. C., 44, 47, 80, 278, 279, 307, 318 free markets, 12 Freedman, J., 3 Freedom Party, Austria, 65 Freeman, G. P., 3, 4, 8, 17, 31, 32, 67, 84, 91, 94, 96–8, 100, 102, 103, 109, 188, 236, 263, 266, 267, 272, 320, 331, 332 Freitag, M., 212

French, 190, 214, 232, 240 French Constitution, 129 French Criminal Procedure Code, 137 French governments, 125 French immigration law, 164 Frere-Smith, T., 298, 309, 349 Friedhoff, K., 252 Friedman, Uri, 275 Froestad, J., 8, 324 Frontex, 123, 128 Fryberg, S. A., 31, 44 Fulbright, 135 Gabel, M., 69 Gadarian, S. K., 254 Galeano, H., 168 Gallup, 26, 200, 231, 243, 310, 313, 352, 353 Gallup surveys, 189 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T., 9, 106, 159 Gamson, W. A., 36 Garcés-Mascareñas, B., 149, 266, 289 Garrido, A. A., 266, 294 Gaston, S., 263, 265 Gavett, E. E., 270 Geddes, A., 3, 7, 23, 40, 67, 68, 79, 84, 108, 124, 211, 296, 317, 329, 334, 338, 349, 352–5 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 184 Georgia, 149 German Marshall Fund, 216, 218 Germans, 190, 195, 213, 218 Germany, 152, 155, 161, 193, 203, 216 Gest, J., 99, 109 Gheciu, A., 33, 34, 105, 106, 110, 119, 120, 158 Ghosh, B., 122 Gianfreda, S., 256, 297 Gibney, M., 120, 137 Gibson, R., 64 Gilliam, F., 38 Gilliat-Ray, S., 72, 283 Gilligan, Chris, 354 Gimpel, J., 2, 3, 25, 38, 271, 280, 299 Ginsburg, S., 3 Giugni, M., 64 Givens, T. E., 21, 23, 67, 323 Gjelten, T., 269, 270 Glazer, N., 269 Global Approach to Immigration and Mobility (GAMM), 130 Global Commission on International Immigration (GCIM), 121 Global Detention Project, 138, 179, 180, 265

Index global economy, 103 global financial crisis, 273 Global Forum on Immigration and Development (GFMD), 121 global governance, 5 global immigration-security regime, 122 global mobility regime, 122 globalization, 97 Godenau, D., 265 Goffman, E., 35 Golash-Boza, T., 106, 159, 178 Goode, E., 7, 34, 36 Goodman, S.W., 100, 122, 269, 274 Goodwin, M., 267, 269, 298 Gorodzeisky, A., 37, 66, 67, 199, 206 government policies, 173 governments, 164 Graham, J., 41 Grande, E., 32, 83, 289, 332, 352 Gravelle, T. B., 325 Great Depression, 139, 176 Greece, 58, 190, 216 Green, J., 269, 295 Greenhill, K., 3, 8, 234, 259, 324 Greussing, E., 83 Grim, B., 239 Gross, K., 191, 242 Gualtieri, T., 291 The Guardian, 173, 243 Guatemala, 134 Guay, B., 78 Guild, E., 3, 16, 33, 34, 83, 84, 95, 117, 137, 187, 262, 329, 346 Guiraudon, V., 5, 9, 10, 67, 68, 94, 98, 99, 105, 106, 108, 120, 128, 135–7, 150, 151, 328, 331 Gulf Wars, 119 Guterres, António, 121 Gutwirth, S., 3 Haaland Matlary, J., 16 Haus, L., 67 Haberman, C., 178 Hägel, P., 100 Hagendoorn, L., 8, 324 The Hague, 126 Haidt, J., 41 Hainmueller, J., 2, 3, 25, 37, 40, 81 Hajdinjak, S., 41, 319, 335, 336 Hajer, M., 66, 69, 242 Hall, P. A., 23, 188 Halperin, E., 206, 325 Hamlin, R., 272 Hammar, T., 91, 109 Hammer, B., 251 Hammerstad, A., 7, 83, 341

479 Hampshire, J., 3, 4, 18, 83, 98, 187, 295, 329 Haner, M., 237, 238, 243, 245, 246, 252, 254, 257, 259 Hansen, R., 67, 79, 95, 96, 98, 120, 128, 267, 295 Harell, A., 37, 212 Harney, R., 9, 160 Harper, Stephen, 134 Harris poll, 82, 192 Harris surveys, 189 Harrison-Evans, P., 263, 266 Hart-Celler, 299 Harteveld, E., 255, 256, 284, 285 Hartman, T. K., 79 Hass, R. G., 36 Hatton, T. J., 223, 224, 354 Haubrich, D., 10, 16, 83, 181, 235, 307, 354 Haveman, J., 162 Haynes, C., 38, 44, 56, 78, 83, 286, 326, 352 health providers, 119 Heinisch, R., 64, 65 Heisler, M., 33, 94, 96, 97 Helbling, M., 8, 13, 17, 30, 37, 51, 84, 99, 101, 109, 185, 237, 238, 282, 307, 324, 332, 335, 336 Held, D., 8, 119 Hellström, J., 66 Hellwig, T., 36, 37, 109, 237, 239, 240, 258, 259, 298 Hendriks, H., 190, 234, 239, 240, 242, 246, 250, 258, 354 Henig, J.R., 157 Hepburn, E., 66, 82 Herington, J., 14 Herrmann, R. K., 213 Herz, J. H., 94 Hetherington, M. J., 37, 206, 234, 239, 254, 299, 317 Hiemstra, N., 100, 101, 106, 158, 159, 177, 179, 180 High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Relations, 115 higher education, 172, 173 Hiscox, M.J., 2, 3, 25, 81 Hitlan, R.T., 240 Hix, S., 21, 83 Hobolt, S., 269, 295 Hochman, O., 7, 39, 79 Höglinger, D., 21 Hollifield, J. F., 3, 5, 6, 10, 25, 67, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 127, 321 Homeland Security Department, 168 Honduras, 134

480

Index

Hong Kong, 130 Hooghe, L., 206 Hopkins, D. J., 37, 38, 40, 80, 81, 83, 98, 139, 239, 240, 332, 352 Hosain, G., 39 House of Representatives, 168, 309 Huddy, L., 19, 44, 91, 191, 238, 242, 245, 250, 325, 335 Hughes, C., 269 human mobility, 5, 9, 10, 15, 95, 118, 122, 130, 135, 137, 157, 159, 186, 220 immigration and, 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 22, 62, 65, 66, 98, 99, 114, 119, 121, 127, 186, 188, 199, 321, 322, 327, 331, 340, 341, 346, 355 policy, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 20, 21, 25–8, 30, 75, 82, 97, 104, 188, 242, 257, 260, 261, 321, 324, 331, 334, 335, 337, 339, 340, 344 regime, 3, 14, 320 Hungarians, 232 Hungary, 76, 77 Hunt, V. F., 69 Huntington, S. P., 81 Hurwicz, L., 331 Huysmans, J., 3, 7, 17, 18, 32, 39, 83, 122, 234, 341 Hyndman J., 137 ICAO. See International Civil Aviation ICE. See Immigration and Customs Enforcement Iceland, 161 ideological Left, 219 ideological Right, 219 Igartua, J., 37, 38, 87, 88, 290 Ignazi, P., 62, 64, 66, 82 IIE Project Atlas, 173 IIEA, 157 IIEC Project Atlas, 173 IIRIRA. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act Ikenberry, G. J., 15, 97 Ilderton, N., 39 illegal immigrants, 300 illegal immigration, 277, 311 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 139, 148, 170, 176, 177, 271 illegal migrant, 39 Imhof, K., 52, 83 immigrant criminality, 104 immigrant policies, 109 Immigrant Responsibility Act, 165

immigrants, 64, 83, 251, 318 Immigrants’ Climate Index (ICI), 109 immigration ascent of, 85 association of, 15 contemporary politics of, 13, 31 elevated salience of, 10 globalization of, 33 infusion of, 122 political salience of, 8 politicization of, 32 politics of, 6, 82 problematization of, 80 prominence of, 253 and public safety, 86 salience of, 72, 84, 86 securitization of, 84 and security, 15 and terrorism, 7, 52–4, 83 Immigration Act, 176 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 12, 116, 118, 141, 142, 158, 162, 166, 167, 170, 177, 179, 180 Immigration and Nationality Act, 141, 154, 176 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 12, 115, 116, 139, 140, 165, 167, 169, 177 immigration industry, 158 Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC), 109 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), 165, 271, 299 immigration-related issues, 31, 81, 84, 289, 292, 308, 339 imminent public safety threat, 239 inclusive policies, 110 independents, 57, 195, 197, 226, 248, 251, 253, 310, 311, 313 individual rights, 16 Indonesia, 137 Infantino, F., 99, 106, 152, 181, 183 informal norm, 4, 23, 24 information environment, 325 Ingham, H., 72 Ingham, M., 72 Inglehart, R., 37, 38, 91, 189, 211, 239, 253, 261, 325, 326, 335, 340, 349 in-group foundation, 246 INS. See Immigration and Naturalization Service insecurity, 235 Inserra, D., 162 Institute of International Education (IIE), 158, 172, 173 institutional arrangements, 237

Index Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR), 129 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 133 intensive English programs (IEPs), 172 interdependent regional environment, 186 intergovernmental actors, 128 intergovernmental third pillar, 129 Interior Minister, 114 Inter-Ministerial Commission for Foreigners, 115 Inter-Ministerial Committee on Immigration Control, 115 International Civil Aviation (ICAO), 160, 344 international community, 16 international education market, 173 International Educational Services, 178 international environment, 185, 186 International Immigration Law and Policy Analysis (IMPALA), 109 International Immigrations Office (OMI), 151 International Organization of Migration (IOM), 341 international political economy (IPE), 15 international relations, 15 international security, 16 international security environment, 57, 114 international terrorism, 195 international travel regime, 94, 123 international zones, 136 inter-party polarization, 254 Interpol travel document records, 161 Interstate Commerce Act, 1887, 157 inter-state cooperation, 132 inter-state regulation, 157 Iowa, 149 IPSOS MORI, 275, 298 Ireland, 58, 115, 160, 161 Irish, 214 Irish Aviation Authority, 157, 163 Irish Naturalization and Immigration Service (INIS), 115 irregular immigrants, 265 irregular immigration, 277 irregular migrants, 15, 94, 131, 341 Islam, 192 Islamic fundamentalism, 252, 259 Islamic terrorism, 193 Islamophobia, 65, 256, 282 issue salience, 21, 36 and frames, 84 issues crime, 81 Italian government, 138 Italians, 190, 213–16, 218

481 Italy, 76, 125, 138, 161, 164, 190, 202, 216 Ivaldi, G., 21, 83 Ivarsflaten, E., 40, 62, 64, 338 Iyengar, S., 22, 35, 36, 38, 44, 84, 254, 335 Iyer, D., 237 Jacobs, L., 8, 38, 39, 44, 76, 78, 83, 242, 324, 336 Jacobson, D., 5, 25, 67, 97 Jacoby, T., 280 Jakobi, A., 34 Jeannet, A. M., 206, 220, 234, 297 Jenkins, R., 156 Jerit, J., 351 Jing, Y., 179, 180 Jobert, B., 188 Johnson, Jeh, 132 Johnson, K., 172 Johnson, M., 239, 246, 279 Johnston, C., 37 Johnston, R., 206 Jones, B., 35, 333 Jones, B. S., 19 Jones, J. M., 253 Joon Han, K., 64 Joppke, C., 6, 8, 67, 94, 96, 97 Jordan, B., 99, 108 Jost, J., 325 Jungkunz, S., 39, 59, 86, 87, 235 justice and home affairs (JHA), 117 Justice Department, 125 Kafura, C., 251 Kahneman, D., 35, 36 Kaji, M., 344 Kalkum, D., 30, 109, 185 Kalm, S., 101 Kaltwasser, C., 266, 273, 294 Kam, C., 37, 79, 81, 239 Kanno-Youngs, Z., 135 Kanstroom, D., 109 Karamanidou, 34 Karreth, J., 35 Karyotis, G., 17, 66, 280, 284 Kassinitz, P., 104, 141 Katwala, S., 295, 296, 307 Katz, I., 36 Katzenstein, P. J., 97, 100, 188, 332 Kawar, L., 84, 186, 187, 329 Kaya, A., 3, 80 Keeble, E., 83, 190, 194, 227 Kehrberg, J. E., 99 Kellstedt, P., 20, 354 Keltner, D., 325, 335, 354

482

Index

Kenya, 105 Keohane, R., 16, 121, 223, 330 Keren, G., 36 Kerwin, D., 7, 34, 85 Khatib, N., 191 Kilroy, R. J., 81 Kinder, D., 36–9, 44, 79, 81, 239 King, G., 16 King, R., 101, 136 Kinnvall, C., 18 Kleiner-Liebau, D., 292, 294 Kleinnijenhuis, J., 35, 44 Klotz, A., 322 Knoll, B. R., 44 Kopacz, M., 40 Kopan, T., 149 Kopytowska, M., 39, 40, 242 Kosack, G., 32 Koser, K., 9 Koslowski, R., 1, 3, 15, 31, 67, 94, 97, 109, 122, 133, 160, 330, 347 Krajcikova, K., 132 Kraler, A., 152 Krasner, S., 6, 97, 100 Krause, W., 64, 65 Kretsedemas, P., 142, 154 Kreutz, C., 246, 253, 259 Kriesi, H. P., 32, 83, 324 Krikorian, M., 280 Kritzman-Amir, T., 106 Kroh, M., 81 Kroneberg, C., 20, 354 Krosnick, J., 22, 39 Krosnick, J.A., 39 Kuklinski, J. H., 35, 351 Kunz, R., 5, 95, 100 Kustov, Alexander, 253, 261, 329, 334, 340 Kweon, Y., 237, 258, 259 labour agency, 165 labour migrants, 64 Labour Government, 79, 267, 269 Labour Party, 295, 303, 305, 316 Laffan, B., 66 Lafita, M. J. R., 265 Lahav, G., 3, 5, 6, 8–11, 17–20, 31–3, 36–8, 41, 44, 52, 56, 57, 61, 67, 68, 79, 80, 84, 85, 94, 98–100, 105, 106, 108, 120–3, 126, 135–7, 150, 151, 156, 158, 160, 163, 164, 188, 199, 206, 220, 223, 233, 238, 239, 242, 245, 253, 321, 323, 325, 326, 328, 331, 332, 344 Lake, D., 100 Lakeoff, G., 38

Lampus, N., 254 Landy, D., 39, 76, 78, 242 Lang, I. G., 345, 346 Lau, R., 35 Laube, L., 6, 20 Lavenex, S., 5, 9, 16, 33, 67, 95, 100, 105, 106, 108, 122, 124, 125 Lavine, H., 22 law and order, 103 Law, V., 177 Lawrence, D., 81 Layton-Henry, Z., 33, 99, 266, 295 Le Coz, C., 36, 129, 130 Leach, M., 20 Leblang, D., 101, 109 Lee, N. T., 141, 144 Lee, S., 164, 165, 168 Left party, 62 Lega Nord, Italy, 65 legal permanent residents (LPRs), 309 Legewie, J., 74, 88, 242, 273 legislation, 108 Lehmann, P., 21, 56, 66, 254, 302 Lehne, S., 5 Leimgruber, P., 326, 335 Leitner, H., 138, 141, 142, 149, 150 Lemberg-Pedersen, M., 84, 110, 137, 156, 186, 187, 329 Lemieux, A., 40 Léonard, S., 186 Leong, C. H., 81, 324 Leontiyeva, Y., 334, 354 Lerner, J., 242, 325, 335, 354 Levi, M., 206 Levin, A., 344 Levine, R., 19 Levy, C., 32, 122, 334 Levy, M., 20, 67, 68, 98, 237, 257, 271, 272, 277, 317, 325, 332, 352 Lewis, G., 226 Lewis, P., 129, 184 liberal democracies, 109, 110 Liberal Democratic Party (LD), 306 liberal immigration, 3, 320 liberal norms, 106, 204 liberal parties, 335 liberal state thesis, 96, 97 liberal states, 1–6, 8–19, 24, 26, 27, 32, 38, 44, 67, 80, 81, 83, 91, 93–6, 99, 101, 103–6, 110, 114, 117–21, 137, 138, 156, 161, 181, 182, 184–6, 188, 189, 199, 206, 207, 212, 234–8, 241, 250, 257, 259, 263, 265, 320–3, 327, 328, 331–3, 338, 339, 341, 344–6, 348, 355, 356 liberal-normative scholarship, 15

Index liberals, 246, 337 Liberatore, A., 187, 199, 323, 329 Libya, 131, 138, 215 Lin, S., 226 Lindemann, A., 39, 44 Linz, D., 38 Lisbon Treaty, 123 Listhaug, O., 282 Livny, O., 56, 66, 83, 355 Lo, C., 161 local governments, 141 Lockhart, S., 186 Lodge, M., 35, 40, 325 Longo, M., 5, 95, 99, 134, 323 López-Sala, A., 265 Los Angeles, 144 Lowi, T., 17, 23, 102, 322 Lown, P. L., 79 Luan, L., 158, 177 Luedtke, A., 21, 23, 36, 67, 69, 123, 323 Lundgren, L. L., 255, 285, 286, 288 Lupia, A., 35, 105, 107, 234 Lutter, M., 240 Luxembourg, 160, 161, 190, 219 Lyon, D., 156, 323, 330 Maastricht Treaty (1992), 56 Macao, 130 Macdonald, D., 207 MacDonald, T., 134 MacKuen, M., 38, 44, 336 Macron, Emmanuel, 136 Madden, M., 195 Mahnig, H., 69 Mahoney, J., 237 Maile, A., 344 mainstream political parties, 12 Majone, G., 157 Malhotra, N., 8, 81, 237, 242, 246, 247, 250, 255, 258, 324, 337 Malka, A., 13, 36, 91, 189, 335 Malkin, E., 135 Mancosu, M., 240, 242 Manns, J., 164 Manzano, D., 292 March, J. G., 68 Marciniak, A., 44 Marcinkowski, F., 69 Marcus, G. E., 40, 238, 240, 242, 249, 250, 325, 336 Mare Nostrum, 131 Margalit, Y., 12, 21, 56, 66, 82, 83, 302, 355 Marghetis, T., 78 Margolis, M., 39, 68, 302, 325, 338 Marin, L., 126, 132

483 Marino, S., 68 Marmura, S., 192 Martin, D., 125, 137, 178, 269 Martin, I., 266, 291, 294 Martin, L., 34, 39, 110 Martin, P., 85 Martin, S., 85 Martín-Pérez, A., 292, 294 Maslow, A. H., 91, 325, 326 mass media, 281 Massey, D. S., 139, 176, 270, 272, 280 Mastro, D., 6, 38, 250, 334 Mau, S., 30, 99, 132, 134 Mauritania, 268 May, Theresa, 136 Mayblin, L., 298 Mayda, A. M., 25, 81 Mayer, J. D., 246, 249 Mayerl, J., 237, 246 Mayor Bloomberg, 140 McAdam, D., 39, 242 McAuliffe, M., 284, 285, 344 McCarty, N., 22, 299 McCombs, M., 35, 38, 44, 52, 285 McCubbins, M., 105, 107 McElmurry, S., 251 McElroy, R. C., 270 McGill, A., 246 McLaren, L. M., 38, 56, 91, 205–8, 211, 223, 239, 246, 260, 297, 348, 349 McMahon, S., 289, 292 media, 44 media content analyses, 52 mediacracy, 286 Meeusen, C., 39, 44, 76, 78, 242 Meguid, B., 22, 65, 82 Meierrieks, D., 237, 307, 336 Meissner, D., 101, 176, 177, 271 Mellen, R., 137 Mellon, J., 297 Members of the European Parliament (MEP), 25, 30, 56–9, 61, 92 Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), 141 Memorandum of Understanding, 138 Mena Montes, N., 286, 288 Menning, J.O., 234 Menz, G., 9, 101, 106, 158, 268 MEP. See Members of the European Parliament Mérida Initiative, 134 Merolla, J., 35, 38, 89, 326 Messina, A. M., 3, 4, 8, 11, 22, 23, 30–3, 59, 65, 82, 94, 95, 97, 103, 220, 259, 263, 266, 267, 273, 281, 289, 295, 304, 317, 318, 348 Messing, V., 246

484

Index

Meuleman, B., 91, 317, 324, 353 Meunier, S., 100 Mexican immigrants, 240 Mexicanization, 133 Mexico, 132, 134, 135, 137, 225, 226, 270 Michigan, 270 Middle East and Near East Africa (MENA), 172 Middle Eastern immigration, 283 migrant workers, 1 migrants, 246 Migration Observatory, 78, 79, 158 migration trilemma, 14, 92 Milazzo, C., 267, 298 military contractor, 182 Miller, J. M., 16, 39 Miller, M. J., 33, 155, 164 Miller, T., 14, 125, 272 Minderhoud, P. E., 120, 177 mining land, 137 Minister for Immigration and Asylum, 115 Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development, 115 Ministry of Interior, 115 Minkenberg, M., 64, 66 Miroff, N., 135 Mississippi, 149 Mitchelson, M. L., 178 Mitsilegas, V., 121, 136, 137 Mittelstadt, M., 129, 142, 162, 280 mixed bag of policies, 110 mobility instead of migration, 94 Model International Mobility Convention (MIMC), 94 Modigliani, A., 36 Moffette, D., 265, 266 Mogahed, D., 245, 246 Monar, J., 126 Money, J., 67, 69, 109, 186 Montgomery, M., 7 Montijano, M. M., 291 Moore, A., 183 Moore, K. M., 283 moral panic, 7 Morales, L., 13, 20, 21, 66–8, 83, 289–94, 303, 305, 331, 332 Morales-Marente, E., 292 Moravscik, A., 330 Moreno‐Fuentes, F. J., 292 Morgan, Kimberly, 233, 328 Moroccan immigrant, 289 Morocco, 131, 138, 215 Morris, J., 9, 106, 137

Mountz, A., 9, 101, 106, 137 Mudde, C., 62, 64–6, 91 Müller, C., 243 Mullor, M. R., 292 Mulvey, G., 267, 268, 297, 298 Murray, C. J. L., 16 Muslim immigrants, 37, 75, 79 Muslim immigration, 88, 283, 284, 318 Muslim migration, 80, 284 Muslim population, 75 Muslims, 75, 194, 196, 235, 241, 246, 251 Muste, C. P., 22, 199 Mužik, M., 38, 234, 325, 336 Mythen, G., 256, 258 Nadelman, E., 120, 135 NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA Superhighway myth, 226 Nägel, C., 240 Nail, T., 237 Nardis, Y., 35 nation state, 216 National Association of International Educators (NAFSA), 158, 173 National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 142, 148 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2012 (NDAA), 176 National Front (NF), 151, 296 national governments, 29, 71, 115, 148, 150, 157, 180, 184, 185, 190, 212, 213, 216, 221, 223, 228, 232, 234, 236, 265, 330 National Guard, 147 National Human Rights Institutions, 121 national identity card, 155, 156, 193 National Immigrant Justice Center, 178 National Immigration Law Center, 148 national labour law, 135 national security, 3, 4, 7, 12–14, 23, 24, 26, 27, 31, 320, 340 and stability, 16 National Security Agency (NSA), 117 National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NEERS), 155 national security threat, 4 national sovereignty, 103 National Visualization and Analytics Center (NVAC), 116 Nauru, 137 Nauruan population, 137 negative externalities, 107 Neiman, M., 13, 204, 279

Index Nelson, T. E., 35, 36, 38, 87 neo-corporatist arrangements, 233 neo-institutional, 4, 26 neo-realist paradigm, 15 Nesbitt-Larking, P., 18 the Netherlands, 58, 126, 152, 155, 161, 164, 219 Neuman, G. L., 149, 154 Neumayer, E., 123, 175 New Commonwealth immigration, 318 New Mexico, 147, 270 new security, 3, 34 new security era, 5, 8, 10, 12, 25, 26, 97, 103, 107, 114, 260, 320, 332, 333, 338, 339 new security paradigm, 321, 322 new security world, 14, 20, 29, 39, 321, 323 New York, 139, 227 New York State, 154 The New York Times, 45, 47, 52, 55, 169 New Zealand, 173 Newland, K., 99 Newman, B. J., 40, 79, 144, 167 Newton, K., 206 Ngai, M. M., 271 NGOs, 119, 124, 150, 152, 154 Nicholls, W., 124, 150–2 Nicolás, J. D., 265 Nielson J., 282 Nisbet, E. C., 239 no-fly’ zone, 134, 163, 344, 347 non-Arab immigration, 352 non-central state actors, 8, 13, 27, 29, 104, 106, 107, 120, 169, 328 non-central state gatekeepers, 184 non-native Muslims, 80 non-refoulement, 130, 181, 345 non-securitized environment, 273, 280 non-state actors, 8, 119 non-Western immigration, 41 Nordic Council, 74 norm conformity, 20 normative environment, 331 norms, 20 Norris, P., 37, 64, 82, 189, 206, 239, 261, 335, 340 North African immigration, 283 North America, 82, 225 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 132, 133 North American neighbour, 1 North American Trusted Traveler Program, 133 North Carolina, 149 Northern Triangle, 134

485 Norval, A., 188, 234 Norway, 74, 161 Norwegians, 209 Nowrasteh, A., 228, 275 Nussio, E., 318 Nye, J., 16 Nye Jr., J. S., 175 Nyri, Z., 79 O’Doherty, C., 130 O’Neil, K., 138, 139, 153, 154 Obaidi, M., 239, 242 Obama, Barack, 134, 140 Odmalm, P., 21, 40, 66, 82, 249 OECD, 165, 206, 341 Office of Refugee Resettlement, 178 offshore spaces, 136 off-shoring, 106 Oklahoma City bombings, 191 Olivas, M., 149 Olmos, J. C. C., 266, 294 Olsen, J. P., 68 Operation Jobs, 166 Operation Jump Start, 147–8 Operation SouthPAW, 166 Operation Ulysses, 125 Operation Wetback, 271 Operation Yellow Ribbon, 1 OPT. See Optional Practical Training Optional Practical Training (OPT), 172, 173 Orriols, L., 307, 317 outsourcing, 9, 99, 106 Oxley, Z. M., 40 Page, B., 285 Pakistan, 130 Palm, A., 138 Panagopoulos, C., 239, 245 Panel on Passport Cards, 160 Pantoja, A., 38, 40, 81, 189 Paoletti, E., 138 Papademetriou, D. G., 206 Papua New Guinea, 137 Pardos-Prado, S., 62, 68, 266, 329 Parkin, J., 130 parliamentary intervention, 291 Partido Popular (PP), 266, 291, 292, 294, 302, 304, 305, 316 Partido Socialista Obrero (PSOE), 266, 291, 292, 294, 302, 304, 305, 316 partisan convergence, 317 partisan opinion, 313 partisan polarization, 251 Partlow, J., 135 Partos, R., 295, 296, 298

486

Index

Paskeviciute, A., 206 Passenger Act, 1902, 160 Passenger Name Records (PNR), 163, 195 Passy, F., 64 Pastore, F., 3 path dependence theory, 237, 260 Patriot Act, 272 Paul, H. L., 21, 40, 87, 88, 344, 355 Peffley, M.A., 88, 91, 245, 250 Pelletier, S. R., 283 Penninx, R., 124 Pension Plan Investment Board, 179 Pereira Gomes, A. E., 65 Pérez, E. O., 66 Pérez-Nievas, S., 266, 291, 294 performance evaluations, 207 Perlmutter, T., 64 personal salience, 21 Peters, A., 100, 101 Peters, M., 34, 97, 103 Peterson, P., 175 Petrocik, J., 40 Pettigrew, T. F., 64 Pew Research Center, 26, 71, 75, 118, 148, 159, 189, 192, 195, 229, 231, 243, 251, 253, 257, 272, 344, 353 Pham, H., 138 physical insecurity, 239 physical safety, 256 physical threat, 336 Picard, R. G., 44, 255, 285, 296, 297 Pierce, S., 279, 299 Pierson, P., 6, 98, 237, 257 PImPo, 301 Platform for International Cooperation for Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), 124, 165, 167 plenary power, 149, 154–155 Plous, S., 35 Poland, 76, 77 Polarization, 22 Policy Dialogue on Border and Transport Security, 125 policy polarization, 22 political conflict, 330 political conservatives, 337 political discourse, 7 political elites, 59, 79, 237, 256, 273, 280, 288, 293, 296, 323, 334, 337 American, 279, 280, 318 attitudes of, 316 Britain, 297 Canadian, 59 cues of, 259 deliberate strategy of, 254 domestic, 330

European, 59 and media, 3, 6, 8, 17, 19, 27, 30, 40, 43, 78, 80, 81, 92, 237, 242, 249, 257, 260, 262, 264, 286, 288, 315, 335, 336, 339, 349 numerous, 345 and parties, 256, 335, 338 and publics, 19, 20, 23, 26, 68, 92, 103, 156, 188, 223, 262, 264, 286, 294, 315, 326, 327 and security professionals, 17 states and, 321 political environment, 64, 318, 324, 327, 336 political ideology, 253 political Left partisans, 12, 246, 261, 337 political party competition, 14 political party manifestos, 301 political Right, 12, 238, 258, 345 partisans, 12, 246, 255, 261, 337, 340 voters, 257, 259, 340 political salience, 21 political trust, 206 politicization, 22 phenomenon of, 293 second dimension of, 315 Pollack, M. A., 105, 107 Polling Report, 192 Poole, K., 22 Popp, E., 8, 237, 242, 246, 247, 250, 255, 258, 324, 337 popular antipathy, 199 popular attitudes, 353 popular will, 67 Portugal, 115, 125, 161, 216 Portuguese, 215 Powell, Enoch, 40 Powell, W. W., 68 Powers, M., 120, 121, 134, 225 PP. See Partido Popular Prasopoulou, E., 188, 234 Pratto, F., 40 Pren, K., 139, 176, 270, 272 Pressman, J. L., 99, 108 Preston, I. P., 36 privacy, 16 privacy rights, 182 private sector actors, 10, 105, 156, 157, 159, 163, 232, 328 privatization, 9, 99, 106, 156–8, 179, 181, 230 proactive border policies, 136 Procureur de la République, 151 Professionals in International Education (PIE), 171

Index protectionism, 325 PSOE. See Partido Socialista Obrero public, 66 public charge, 175 public discourse, 66 public opinion, 67, 281, 317 environment, 189, 193, 238, 250, 256, 259, 261, 323, 340 evidence, 87 public policy, 108, 281 public policy scholars, 6 public safety, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12–14, 17, 23, 24, 26–8, 30, 31, 33, 39, 44, 62, 91, 92, 103, 104, 118, 182, 185, 237, 239, 245, 257, 263, 267, 272, 297, 315, 320, 323, 326, 329–31, 333, 340 crises, 355 dilemma, 32 lens, 294, 317, 336 risks, 318 threat, 83, 93, 237, 246, 251, 254, 257–61, 280, 292, 321, 324, 325, 333–5, 339, 340, 346 threat environment, 237, 245, 262, 320, 353 public safety frame, 34, 41–3, 48, 51, 80, 81, 91–3, 241, 242, 280, 290, 318, 322, 335, 337, 338 predominance of, 90 public trust, 232, 234, 236, 260 public–private partnerships, 182 Putnam, R. D., 8, 56, 91, 206, 212 Quillian, L., 19, 206, 349 Quinn, C., 39 Quirk, P. J., 35 Rafiqi, A., 40, 41, 246, 325 Raijman, R., 8, 66, 206, 324 Raines, T., 282 Rainie, L., 195 Ramakrishnan, S. K., 149 Ramirez, M. D., 13, 230, 231 Ramírez-Lafita, J., 264 Ramji-Nogales, R., 345, 346 rapid alert system (ARGUS), 129 rapists, 279 Rathod, J.M., 237 Rawls, J., 96 REAL ID Act, 155, 271 realist paradigm, 15 Red Cross, 265 Red Scare, 7 refugee policy, 18 refugees, 1, 15, 16, 64, 94, 135, 182, 215, 240, 246, 251, 253, 294, 341

487 regional governments, 152 Reich, S., 3 remote control, 9 Renshon, J., 242 Renström, E., 29 The Republic, 331 Republican Party, 82, 259, 279, 280, 299, 308, 316, 348 Republicans, 195, 196, 204, 225, 226, 231, 246, 248, 249, 251–3, 272, 279, 299, 310, 311, 313, 352 restrictive immigration policy, 11, 18, 26, 28, 42, 67, 82, 92, 103, 104, 185, 189, 234, 246, 323, 332, 335, 337, 340 surge of, 142 Retis, J., 289 Reyna, C., 199 Reynaert, Thomas, 161 Riallant, C., 150 Richards, A., 67 Ridge, Tom, 126 Right-wing trusters, 41 Riker, W. H., 81 Ring, W., 134 Risse, T., 188, 213 Risse-Kappen, T., 98 Rodier, C., 158, 178, 183 Roe, P., 348 Roggeband, R., 44, 90 Rolfe, H., 298 Röllgen, J., 199, 208 Romero, L., 256 Roos, C., 6, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 68 Ros, V., 289, 290, 292–4, 303 Rosecrance, R., 105, 137 Rosenblum, M. R., 8, 9, 13, 30, 33, 108, 120, 123, 134, 206, 271 Rosengartner, S., 121 Rosenthal, H., 22 Rothschild, 16 Rothstein, B., 206 Rudolph, C., 3, 4, 7, 16, 83, 237 Ruedin, D., 13, 21, 23, 56, 65, 66, 68, 69, 83, 291, 292, 294, 296 Ruggie, J. G., 96, 97, 105 Ruhs, M., 34, 99, 109 Russia, 130, 173 Ryan, B., 121, 136, 137 Rydgren, J., 66, 192 Sager, A., 95, 181, 188 Saggar, S., 18 Ságvári, B., 246 salience, 289 Salter, M., 163, 199

488

Index

Samples, J., 81, 228 San Diego, 144 Sanchez-Barrueco, M., 158, 183 Sánchez-Cuenca, I., 307 Sandell, R., 192 Sanders, D., 56 Sanders, L. M., 36 Sands, G., 177 Sasse, G., 330 Sassen, S., 6, 10, 25, 67, 94, 96, 97, 101, 118, 136, 137 Satzewich, V., 99, 110, 329 Saux, M. S., 34, 237, 258 Savillo, R., 226 Schain, M. A., 3, 4, 33, 38, 64, 66, 82–4, 99, 107, 154, 227, 271, 299, 320, 335 Schattschneider, E. E., 81, 83, 84, 335 Scheepers, P., 20, 332 Schengen area, 161, 219, 221 Schengen Borders Code, 133 Schengen Information System, 161 Scheve, K. F., 2, 3, 25, 81 Schildkraut, D., 37, 241 Schimmelfennig, F., 100, 122, 269, 274 Schlangenstein, M., 344 Schlueter, E., 20, 38 Schmidt, P., 353 Schmidt, V. A., 98, 206, 207, 349 Schmitter Heisler, B., 96, 262 Schneider, S. L., 79 Scholten, P., 36, 44, 83, 84, 95, 106, 120, 163, 181, 183, 187, 329 Scholten, S., 120, 177, 187 school of interdependence, 15 Schotte, S., 349 Schrefler, L., 186 Schuck, P., 97, 154 Schumacher, S., 298, 299 Schwartz, S., 91 scope of conflict, 83 Screening Partnership Program (SPP), 162 Sears, D., 81 Seate, A., 6, 38, 250, 334 Seattle, 144 second pillar’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), 129 Secret Services, 126 Secure Communities, 142 Secure Communities Program, 141 securitization, 17, 23 securitization-of-immigration thesis, 17 security, 14, 16, 39, 103 ascension of, 24 entrepreneurs, 119 environment, 354

frame, 30, 50, 51, 322 -linked keywords, 48, 50 society, 33 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), 133, 226 Seelke, C. R., 134 Segal, J., 21 self-legislator, 330 Semyonov, M., 8, 37, 38, 66, 88, 199, 206, 324 Senegal, 268 Sˆerak, J., 38, 234, 325, 336 Settlement and Residence Act, 152 SEVIS. See Student and Exchange Visitor Information System SEVP. See Student and Exchange Visitors Program Shachar, A., 136 Shatz, H., 162 Shaw, D. L., 35, 38, 44, 52 Shear, M., 135 Sides, J., 36, 74, 81, 191, 211, 242, 245, 246 Siegelbaum, M., 178, 179 Sikkink, K., 21, 97 Silver, B., 43, 242, 244, 330 Simmons, B.A., 16, 99, 105, 328 Simmons, K., 298 Simon, J., 3, 4 Simon, P., 37, 211, 242, 318 Simon, R. J., 199 Sinno, A., 36, 37, 109, 239, 298 Sipinen, J., 206, 211 skilled workers, 15 Skleparis, D., 66 Slaughter, A. M., 5, 99 Slaughter, M. J., 2, 3, 25, 81 Smart Border Declaration, 133 Smeltz, D., 252, 259 Smiley, K. T., 256 Smith, A., 33 Smith, M., 161 Sniderman, P., 8, 239, 324 Snow, R., 285 Sobolewska, M., 298 Social Security Administration, 108, 168 social security number (SSN), 167 societal crises, 36 societal security, 7, 33 Söderström, O., 101 soft norm, 4, 23, 24 Soledad, A., 262 Solheim, Ø. B., 240, 241 Somerville, W., 267, 295, 296 Somin, I., 149 Soper, J. C., 193

Index Sø´ rensen, N. N., 9 Soroka, S., 68, 206, 207 Soule, S., 98 South Carolina, 149 Southwest Key Programs, 178 sovereign states, 9 Soysal, Y. N., 5, 25, 67, 96, 97 Spain, 28, 58, 73, 125, 160, 161, 164, 173, 203, 216, 233, 261, 263–6, 268, 282, 289, 290, 292, 294, 296, 302, 304, 308, 312, 315, 317, 336 Spaniards, 190, 213, 216, 218, 232, 266, 273, 275, 281, 283, 286, 293, 294, 317 Spanish Catholic Migration Commission Association, 265 Spanish Commission for Refugee Aid, 265 Spanish parliament, 291 spatiality, 101 Spencer, A., 81, 83, 85 Spilerman, S., 8, 88, 234, 324 Spirling, A., 308 Spiro, 153 Spruyt, B., 239, 242 Squire, V., 3, 307 Sri Lanka, 130 Stansfield, R., 297, 298 state immigration, 109 state sovereignty, 6, 9, 12, 31, 157 sine qua non of, 9 Statewatch News Online, 265 Statham, P., 56, 68, 79, 296 Steckermeier, L. C., 208, 212 Stecklov, G., 8, 88, 234, 324 Steenbergen, M., 326, 335 Steil, J. P., 98, 99, 144 Steinmo, S., 24, 322 Stenner, K., 91, 92, 189, 239 Stephan, C. W., 238 Stephan, W. C, 21, 239 Stephan, W. G., 238 stereotypes, 37 Stetter, S., 107 Stevens, D., 242 Stewart, J., 246 Stoddart, M., 344 Stoker, L., 206 Stokes, D. E., 8 Stolle, D., 206, 212 Stolz, J., 39, 44 Stone, B., 297, 298 Strabac, Z., 79, 282 The Straits Times, 138 Streeck, W., 100 Stucky, R., 100

489 Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), 170, 171 Student and Exchange Visitors Program (SEVP), 158, 170–2 Stumpf, Juliet, 141 suasion game, 122 subframes, 44 subnational governments, 10, 99, 105, 107, 148–50, 154, 155, 330 Suhay, E., 325 Sullivan, Eileen, 237 Sullivan, J. L., 190, 234, 237, 239, 240, 242, 246, 250, 258, 354 Super, B., 249 Supreme Court, 151, 154 Suro, R., 353 surveillance, 39 society, 199 Surveillance Project, 232, 233 Sweden, 57, 161, 190, 203, 219 Swedes, 209, 214, 215 Switzerland, 44, 164, 341 symbolic theory, 238 Syria, 215 Syrian refugee, 138 Syrian refugee crisis, 131 Syrians, 131 Taber, C. S., 35, 40, 325 Tajfel, H., 19 Taras, R., 282 Task Force Officers (TFO), 118 Taylor, R. C., 23, 188 Tazreiter, C., 34, 39 Teitelbaum, M., 15, 31 temporary protection status (TPS), 108, 168 Tennessee, 149 Tennis, K., 99, 106 terrorism, 39, 53, 81, 246, 259, 273, 277, 278, 281 salience of, 86 Texas, 144, 147, 149, 270 Thatcher, Margaret, 295 Thelen, K., 24, 322 Thielemann, E., 68, 99, 118, 121 third country national (TCN), 15, 152, 165 Third World, 32 Third World immigrant settlement, 64 thirty-point Action Plan, 133 Thomas, J., 116 Thomsen, J. P. F., 40, 41, 246, 325 Thorbjø´ rnsrud, K., 38, 44 Thouez, C., 121 Threadgold, T., 297

490

Index

threat environment, 27, 231, 237, 238, 245, 258, 260, 337–9 Tichenor, D., 8, 9, 13, 32, 67, 120, 258, 263, 269, 271, 272, 299 Tijuana, 135 Tirman, J., 3, 234 TJ Maxx, 166 Tog˘ ral Koca, B., 293, 294 Toka, G., 56 Torcal, M., 221, 222 Torch Concepts, 182 Torpey, J., 9, 106, 330 Torreblanca, J. I., 265 Tosh, S., 346 Totten, R. J., 322 tourists, 1 trade unions, 119 Transnational border agreements, 134 transnational policy network, 34 transnational spaces, 135, 136 Transportation and Security Agency (TSA), 161–3, 182, 231, 347 Trasciani, G., 268 trauma, 277 Traunmüller, R., 212 Treaty of Lisbon, 126 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 126 Triadafilopoulos, T., 188 Triandafyllidou, A., 23, 33, 36, 44, 220, 284, 288 trilemma. See migration trilemma Trudinger, E. M., 208, 212 Trump, Donald, 149, 164, 196, 254, 258, 259, 279, 280, 284 TSA. See Transportation and Security Agency Tsebelis, G., 56 Tsolakis, E., 124 Tunisia, 131, 215 Turkey, 105, 131, 137, 138 Turley, J., 176 Turnbull-Dugarte, S. J., 266 Turner, J. C., 19 Turper, S., 206 Tversky, A., 35, 36 Tyson Foods Inc., 166 Uçarer, E. M., 9, 106, 108, 126 UK Border Agency, 173 Ullán de la Rosa, F. J., 291 UN Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 121 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 124 UN Population Division, 90

UN Security Council, 122 UN Security Council Resolution, 122 unaccompanied minors, 134, 145, 183 Unger, R., 37, 40, 240 United Kingdom (UK), 28, 58, 73, 74, 152, 155, 161, 172, 190, 261, 263, 264, 266, 269, 296, 304, 312, 315, 317, 336 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 269, 274, 306, 310 United Nations High-Level Dialogue on International Immigration and Development (HLD), 121 United States (US), 1, 3, 4, 27, 28, 31, 70, 74–6, 126, 132–4, 157, 159, 163, 167, 225, 233, 260, 261, 263, 264, 269, 270, 282, 304, 315, 317, 348, 353 unstable security environment, 239 unwanted immigration, 93 unwanted persons, 94 Urbano, J., 213, 223 US. See United States US Border Patrol, 271 US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 12 US Congress, 157, 160 US Department of Commerce, 184 US Department of Homeland Security, 269 US Department of Labor, 108, 165 US Department of Transportation, 161 US government, 118, 243 US Government Accountability Office (GAO), 183 US Illegal Immigration Reform, 165 US News, 176 US scientific community, 173 US Secretary of Homeland Security, 126 US Supreme Court, 150 USA Today, 45, 47, 52, 55 Uslaner, E., 207, 211, 213 US-Mexico Border Patrols, 118 Valentim, V., 65 Valentino, N., 35, 78, 241 Valeriano, B., 120, 121, 134, 225 Van, P., 138 van Atteveldt, W., 35, 44 Van de Vyver, J., 246 van der Brug, W., 13, 21–3, 40, 56, 62, 66, 82, 84, 288, 289 Van der Klaauw, J., 124 Van der Leun, J., 152 Van Dijk, T. A., 68, 294

Index Van Dyke, N., 98 Van Hootegem, A., 202, 236 Van Munster, R., 3 Van Nispen, F., 36, 84, 187, 329 Van Selm, J., 83, 124 Van Spanje, J., 8, 62, 64, 82, 324 Vander Beken, T., 110, 120 Varsanyi, M., 99, 138, 142 Vasi, I. B., 98, 99, 144 Vasilopoulos, P., 254 Vaughan-Williams, N., 242 Velluti, S., 125 Ventura, E., 226 venue-shopping, 106 Versteeg, W., 66, 69, 242 Veugelers, J., 64 VFS Global, 158 Vialet, J., 270 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 176 Visa Entry Reform Act, 2 Visa Mantis, 169 Vitorino, Antonio, 126 Vives, L., 182 Vliegenthart, C., 45, 90 Vliegenthart, R., 32 Volkens, A., 21 Von Hoffmann, E., 121, 170 Vox Party, 266 Wadhia, S. S., 7 Wæver, O., 3, 7, 15, 17, 33, 348 Walczak, B., 254 Waldman, P., 226 Walker, K., 138, 141, 142, 149, 150 Walklate, S., 256, 258 The Wall Street Journal, 45, 52, 55, 167 Walmart Corporation, 166 Waltz, K., 15 Walzer, M., 96 war on terror, 191 Ward, C., 324 Washington DC, 144 The Washington Post, 47, 144, 182, 347 Waslin, M., 279 Waters, M., 104, 141 Watson, S. D., 3 Webber, F., 128 Weber, F., 156 Weber, T., 338 Weber, Mark, 178 Weil, P., 10, 151 Weiler, J., 37, 239, 254, 299, 317 Weiner, M., 12, 15, 31–3, 329 Weissberg, R., 56

491 Weissinger, G., 110 Weissman, D., 141 Welfare Reform Act, 139, 150 Wells, M. J., 150 Welzel, C., 211 West Europeans, 208 West Germany, 164 Western Balkans Contact Group, 129 Western Europe, 32, 82, 302, 329 Western Hemisphere, 225, 269 Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, 133 Westphalian sovereignty, 328 Wheatley, E. S., 178 Wheatley, S., 128, 330 White, T., 291 Whitley, E. A., 199 Wiarda, H., 100, 101 Widmann, T., 65 Wihtol de Wenden, C., 151 Wike, R., 239 Wildavsky, A., 99, 108 Wilkes, R., 206 Williams, 64, 65 Williamson, A. F., 142, 263 Wilson, G. K., 308 Wilson, J. Q., 102 Wimmer, A., 69 Winkler, H., 349 Winter, N., 36, 44 Wishnie, Michael J., 138, 140, 155 Wlezien, C., 21, 22, 68, 84, 207 Wolf, B. Z., 279 Wolf, K., 34 Wong, T., 78, 149 Wood, P. J., 179 Wood, R., 231 Woods, J., 6, 44, 45, 86 World Bank, 344 World Trade Center, 241 World Travel Organization, 344 World Value Surveys (WVS), 26, 189 Wormald, B., 71 Wray, Christopher A., 174 Wrench, J., 67 Wright, C. F., 67, 329 Wright, J. D., 19, 62, 242, 257, 259, 279, 318 Wright, M., 41, 81, 186, 271, 272, 277, 317, 325, 332, 352, 354 Wroe, A., 270, 279, 299 Wu, C., 206 WWII, 32, 82, 116, 349 Yankelovich, D., 349, 353 Yanofsky, D., 159

492

Index

Yoon-Hendricks, A., 174, 175 YouGov, 195, 231 Zaiotti, R., 10, 94, 104, 105 Zaller, J., 36, 67, 335 Zamora, A., 20 Zamora-Kapoor, A., 188 Zampagni, F., 108, 110, 181 Zapata-Barrero, R., 68, 265, 290, 292–4, 354 Zarrugh, A., 256 Zaslove, A., 65 Zaun, N., 16, 18, 68

Zechmeister, E., 89 zero net immigration, 2 Zick, A., 282 Ziller, C., 207, 231, 246 Zincone, G., 152 Zmigrod, L., 296 Zobel, M., 21, 56, 66 Zohlnhöfer, R., 157 Zolberg, A., 2, 9, 10, 15, 31, 95, 104, 159, 188 Zong, J., 169, 173, 174 Zureik, E., 16, 190, 199, 232