Immigration in Singapore 9789048523429

Table of contents :
Contents
Introduction
1. Immigration in Singapore
2. Angst, Anxieties, and Anger in a Global City
3. The Politics of Immigration
4. Social Integration of Immigrants into Multiracial Singapore
5. Reconstructing Singapore as a Cosmopolitan Landscape
6. “Family, Worker or Outsider”
7. Whither Integration?
8. Permanent Residents Serving National Service
Bibliography
Biographies of Contributors
Index

Citation preview

Immigration in Singapore

Publications The International Institute for Asian Studies is a research and exchange platform based in Leiden, the Netherlands. Its objective is to encourage the interdisciplinary and comparative study of Asia and to promote (inter)national cooperation. IIAS focuses on the humanities and social sciences and on their interaction with other sciences. It stimulates scholarship on Asia and is instrumental in forging research networks among Asia Scholars. Its main research interest are reflected in the three book series published with Amsterdam University Press: Global Asia, Asian Heritages and Asian Cities. IIAS acts as an international mediator, bringing together various parties in Asia and other parts of the world. The Institute works as a clearinghouse of knowledge and information. This entails activities such as providing information services, the construction and support of international networks and cooperative projects, and the organisation of seminars and conferences. In this way, IIAS functions as a window on Europe for non-European scholars and contributes to the cultural rapprochement between Europe and Asia. IIAS Publications Officer: Paul van der Velde IIAS Assistant Publications Officer: Mary Lynn van Dijk

Asian Cities The Asian Cities Series explores urban cultures, societies and developments from the ancient to the contemporary city, from West Asia and the Near East to East Asia and the Pacific. The series focuses on three avenues of inquiry: evolving and competing ideas of the city across time and space; urban residents and their interactions in the production, shaping and contestation of the city; and urban challenges of the future as they relate to human well-being, the environment, heritage and public life. Series Editor: Paul Rabé, IIAS, The Netherlands Editorial Board: Henco Bekkering, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands / Charles Goldblum, University of Paris 8, France / Stephen Lau, University of Hong Kong / Rita Padawangi, National University of Singapore / Parthasarathy Rengarajam, CEPT University, Ahmedabad, India / Neha Sami, Indian Institute of Human Settlements, Bangalore, India / Hui Xiaoxi, Beijing University of Technology, China

Immigration in Singapore

Edited by Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin and Chan Wen Ling

Amsterdam University Press

Publications

Asian Cities 1

Cover illustration: Wilson Wong, US Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden Typesetting: Crius Group, Hulshout Amsterdam University Press English-language titles are distributed in the US and Canada by the University of Chicago Press. isbn 978 90 8964 665 1 e-isbn 978 90 4852 342 9 (pdf) nur 754 © Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin and Chan Wen Ling / Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2014 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owners and the authors of the book.

Contents Introduction 7 Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin & Chan Wen Ling

1 Immigration in Singapore

25

2 Angst, Anxieties, and Anger in a Global City

37

3 The Politics of Immigration

67

4 Social Integration of Immigrants into Multiracial Singapore

93

An Overview Yap Mui Teng

Coping with and Rightsizing the Immigration Imperative in Singapore Eugene K.B. Tan

Unpacking the Policies of the PAP Government and Opposition in Singapore Bilveer Singh

Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

5 Reconstructing Singapore as a Cosmopolitan Landscape

115

6 “Family, Worker or Outsider”

129

7 Whither Integration?

147

8 Permanent Residents Serving National Service

175

The Geographies of Migration and its Social Divisions that Extend into the Heartlands Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho

Employer-Domestic Helper Relations in Singapore Theresa W. Devasahayam

Managing the Politics of Identity and Social Inclusion Leong Chan-Hoong

Round Pegs in a Square Hole? Ho Shu Huang & Yolanda Chin

Bibliography 199 Biographies of Contributors

215

Index 219

Introduction Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin & Chan Wen Ling We are seeing large numbers coming in now. I can give you one statistic you may not be aware of. For every two babies that are born in Singapore, we bring in one foreign permanent resident. Also, one in four marriages among Singaporeans is to a foreigner. This has doubled in the last 10 years. We have become a migrant society all over again. Along the streets, you now hear a cacophony of accents. But it is something we have to manage politically. Some Singaporeans who found themselves displaced from jobs or lost out on promotions are unhappy, and we had to explain that having all these foreigners living in our midst is good for Singapore overall. Former Minister for Trade and Industry George Yeo in 2000

The above excerpt from an interview with Singapore’s former Minister for Trade and Industry George Yeo raises interesting questions concerning the issue of immigration for the city-state.1 In the decade since then, Singapore’s population increased from 4,027,900 to 5,076,700. Of this total, the number of Singaporean citizens went up by 244,800 (to 3,230,700 as at 2010) and the number of permanent residents by 253,500 (to 541,000 as at 2010), while nonresidents went up by 550,500 (to 1,305,000 as at 2010).2 In 2011, 39.4 percent of Singaporeans married non-citizens.3 It appears then that more than ten years on, Singapore has continued to sustain “a migrant society.” However, as the above quote also implies, the notion of “becoming a migrant society” is nothing new for Singapore. Since its founding in 1819, immigration has been the main contributor to population growth for the city-state. This persisted until the 1930s when domestic population growth

1 The above is an excerpt from an interview conducted by Business Week in 2000 with then Minister for Trade and Industry BG (NS) George Yeo, published in the Straits Times. See “We have become a migrant society all over again,” The Straits Times, 11 June 2000. Available from Factiva (accessed 16 August 2013). 2 Singapore Department of Statistics, Population Trends 2013 at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/ publications/publications_and_papers/population_and_population_structure/population2013. pdf. 3 Singapore Department of Statistics, Population in Brief 2012 at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/ statistics/browse_by_theme/population/statistical_tables/popinbrief2012.pdf.

8

Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin & Chan Wen Ling

began to contribute to overall population growth.4 However, notwithstanding the historical significance of immigration in populating the country, the strains of sustaining a migrant society have started to appear. How will Singaporeans manage “having all these foreigners living in our midst” this time around? Is the situation something that can be managed politically? More importantly, will this state of affairs be “good for Singapore overall”?

Immigration and Singapore: A “globapolis” or “a cacophony of accents”? Over the years, Singapore has achieved and maintained impressive economic results. The World Economic Forum for example, has consistently ranked the country high in terms of global competitiveness.5 With no natural resources, Singapore’s economic achievements are underpinned by many different government initiatives, one of which is the liberal immigration policy in place. This policy has been credited with facilitating the expansion of the country’s labour force to meet the needs of industry and encourage foreign investment. As George Yeo explained in the same interview in 2000, “the key to our continuing economic vitality is our willingness to keep our doors open to foreign talent and our ability to make multinationals feel completely at home in Singapore.”6 In this respect, both Singapore’s history and economic progression has “always been closely intertwined with migration.”7 The country has encouraged labour migration across the spectrum, from the low-skilled manual workers undertaking jobs deemed dirty, dangerous, and difficult to semi-skilled workers all the way to highly skilled “foreign 4 See chapter one of this volume for a brief background on immigration in Singapore prior to the country’s independence (1965). 5 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 at http://www3. weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf, 3. In the latest 2011-2012 report by the World Economic Forum, Singapore maintained its second place ranking “as a result of an outstanding performance across the entire Index.” See The Global Competitiveness Report, 2011-2012 at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf, 11. 6 “We have become a migrant society all over again,” The Straits Times. 7 See Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Weiqiang Lin, “Rapid Growth in Singapore’s Immigration Population Brings Policy Challenges,” Migration Information Source, April 2012 at http://www. migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=887, 1; Hui Weng-Tat and Aamir Raf ique Hashmi, “Foreign Labour and Economic Growth Policy Options for Singapore,” CLMR Discussion Paper Series 04/2, Centre for Labour Market Research.

Introduc tion

9

talent,” the latter as a result of the country’s bid to build a knowledge-based economy.8 Overall, the policy structures in place seek to attract and in some cases retain those with the highest skills and qualifications while at the same time allowing companies the flexibility of employing foreign labour, especially in areas that are shunned by local Singaporean workers. The ability to attract highly skilled labour plays an important part, not only in maintaining the country’s economic vitality but also in bringing the city-state on par with other global cities. Such policies are part of Singapore’s strategy of transforming itself into a global city comparable to places such as London, New York, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. It is with this in mind that then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong announced the aim of turning Singapore into: a ‘globapolis’, with people from all over the world and well connected to all parts of the globe – by air, sea, telecommunications and the Internet, in market access and investments, and in areas such as education, sports and the arts.9

Cities such as London and New York have often been employed as reference points in envisioning the trajectory of the future development of Singapore. As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong surmised during his 2012 National Day Rally speech: ... New York, Los Angeles, London, these I believe will continue to thrive because they are not only connected to their countries and the problems in those countries, they are connected to the whole world. Talent flows in, resources flow in, ideas come in, new projects, new companies start up, new changes which influence the world. And we have to see ourselves against those cities and ask us where do we want to be.10 8 This dependence can be seen in the existing employment structures covering the country’s foreign workforce. There are two general categories: (a) low or semi-skilled workers regulated under work permits; (b) highly skilled or professional workers regulated under employment passes. For more information, refer to the Ministry of Manpower website at http://www.mom. gov.sg/Pages/default.aspx. 9 Transcript of Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s National Day Rally 2001 Speech at the University Cultural Centre, National University of Singapore on Sunday, 19 August 2001 at 8.00 PM, downloaded from the National Archives of Singapore at http://a2o.nas.sg/stars/public/ viewHTML.jsp?pdfno=2001081903 (accessed 25 September 2013). Former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong was the country’s second prime minister and is currently Emeritus Senior Minister. 10 Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s National Day Rally 2012 (speech in English) downloaded from the Prime Minister’s Off ice website at http://www.pmo.gov.sg/content/

10 

Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin & Chan Wen Ling

A liberal immigration stance is in line with the country’s global ambitions. In fact, official government discourse has often placed and justified the need for a liberal immigration policy as an economic imperative, often through survivalist, pragmatic language and descriptions. Former Prime Minister Goh referred to Singapore’s need for global talent as a “matter of life and death for us in the long term.”11 For the country’s first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, the danger is that “if we don’t welcome them, make them stay, we will be out of this race because conditions have changed... So if we just stay in our little pond, we will perish.”12 Furthermore, the search for global talent goes further than the desire to keep Singapore economically competitive, according to Lee Kuan Yew, who sees immigrants as “spurs” that keep the local-born population driven.13 However, the ambition to become a global city may not be completely complementary with the country’s nation-building project – with the possibility that Singapore the global city is antithetical to Singapore the nation. For while Singapore aspires to be a vibrant global city built up with the help of liberal immigration, the constant influx of new citizens and residents may hinder the development of Singapore’s narrative as a nation. The influx of each new wave of immigrants effectively acts as an ideational reset button that disrupts a settled narrative by keeping conceptions of the nation in perpetual Brownian motion. And in this regard, there is a need to balance its global self with the challenges of maintaining a coherent national one. Recently, tensions that arise from straddling both a global and a national identity have become more evident. Despite its economic achievements, levels of dissatisfaction with the growing number of immigrants in the country are increasing. A survey carried out by The Straits Times in late March 1999, showed that “[m]ost Singaporeans believe the government should bring foreign talent into the labour market despite current economic difficulties faced by the nation.”14 However, in a 2009 survey carried out by the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) involving 2,016 citizens, two out of three “felt that national unity would be compromised by the presence of pmosite/mediacentre/speechesninterviews/primeminister/2012/August/prime_minister_leehsienloongsnationaldayrally2012speechinenglish.html (accessed 5 September 2013). 11 Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s National Day Rally 2001 Speech. 12 “Foreign talent ‘key to S’pore’s future’,” The Straits Times, 15 August 1999. 13 See Transcript of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Mark Jacobson from the National Geographic on 6 July 2009 (for National Geographic Magazine Jan 2010 Edition) at http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/pmo/transcript/T-20091228-1. print.html?AuthKey= (accessed 25 September 2013). 14 “S’pore Survey Shows Foreign Talent Policy Support,” Reuters News, 23 April, 1999.

Introduc tion

11

foreigners, whether they intended settling down or were just temporary workers. Over 60 percent of respondents agreed that attracting more foreign talent would weaken the Singaporean nationalistic feeling of ‘one nation, one people’.”15 Another survey conducted in 2013 by IPS further highlighted the discomfort felt by Singaporeans in dealing with immigrants who are “new” citizens, disclosing that while “94 per cent of non-Chinese accept a local-born Chinese as their boss, that share falls to 74 per cent for a boss who is a new citizen originally from China.”16 The dissatisfaction was more apparent after the country’s 2011 general elections. An illustration of how immigration has become the source of much unresolved social tension and is a hot-button issue with the nation may be found in the replacement of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs Wong Kan Seng – a position that would have made him responsible for immigration matters – after the elections in 2011.17 The ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) saw its total vote share fall from 66.6 percent in 2006 to 60.1 percent in 2011, the decline being attributed in large part to dissatisfaction over its immigration approach. Prior to the elections ample anecdotal evidence appears to bear testament to the emerging unease between what is termed “local-born” Singaporeans – employed in the parlance of the times to capture citizens born in the city-state – and foreign immigrants who reside in Singapore as “foreign workers” (Gastarbeiter), permanent residents (PR) or “new” citizens. For example, in an interschool badminton competition, traditional school rivalry was put aside when a team comprised of mainly foreigners was entered by one school, leading to customarily rival schools supporting each other over the foreigner-stocked school team.18 Also, in some residential estates, the presence of foreign workers clustering together on weekends at and near housing estates has caused friction with Singaporeans, with violence sometimes erupting.19 15 “Singaporeans Worried Over Excessive Inflows of Foreign Talent,” Singapore Government News, 2 August 2010. 16 Leonard Lim and Andrea Ong, “Colleagues of another race OK, but not spouses: Survey,” The Straits Times, 12 September 2013. 17 Then Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng was given the role of Minister-in-charge of Population Issues in 2004 which effectively made him “Singapore’s new population czar” in charge of “all population-related matters – from procreation and immigration to the integration of foreigners and ensuring citizens feel valued…” See Lydia Lim, “Wong Kan Seng to oversee population issues,” The Straits Times, 30 August 2004. 18 Seah Chiang Nee, “Sports Highlight the Growing Ire,” Star Online, 13 June 2009. 19 Tan Dawn Wei, “The ‘Them and Us’ Divide,” The Straits Times, 12 October 2008; Jeremy Au Yeong, Lynn Lee, and Keith Lin, “Crossing the Them-and-Us Divide,” The Straits Times, 10 November 2007.

12 

Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin & Chan Wen Ling

Residents of some housing estates have erected steel barricades around their apartment block with the concurrence of the government. Others use resident patrols to prevent loitering. The stark symbolism of barricades and patrols should not be overlooked. It is clear that these actions illustrate how the “we” feel an imperative to protect themselves from a very different “them.” Finally, in the political sphere, the tension between the “local-born” and the “new” has also spilled over into domestic politics, where fears have been expressed about relatively new citizens becoming office holders in the PAP.20 In the 2011 general elections, this us/them divide became part of the election hustings. During the campaign, the PAP’s organizing secretary, Ng Eng Hen, questioned Workers’ Party (WP) candidate Chen Show Mao’s Singaporean-ness because Chen had lived abroad for over 30 years.21 Likewise, the WP highlighted how Janil Puthucheary, a PAP candidate, became a citizen only in 2008 but had never undergone the commonly considered sine qua non of male Singaporeans’ rite of passage, national service.22 With regard to the manner in which the city-state is divided on the issue of immigration, two, largely distinct camps may be identified.23 The first camp is composed of individuals who express unease with the current liberal immigration policy. This group has argued that the increased inflow of foreigners has taken its toll on Singaporeans, as this is claimed to have brought about rising property prices, an overcrowded transport system, depressed wages, and increased competition for jobs. In addition, the tensions felt have also resonated deeper than bread-and-butter issues to include matters such as national identity, culture, and pride. The second camp, unsurprisingly, is composed of individuals far more comfortable with the current policy. While acknowledging the short-term costs involved, members of this pro-immigration camp posit that it is necessary nonetheless to keep Singapore’s doors open. They argue that foreigners are required to supplement the city-state’s greying population as well as its low fertility rate. In addition, the pro-immigration camp also points out the indispensability of foreigners in keeping businesses afloat by performing jobs at the 20 Li Xueying, “New Citizens, Influx of Foreigners Worry Tampines Residents,” The Straits Times, 21 February 2011. 21 Teo Cheng Wee and Robin Chan, “PAP Salvo Targets Workers’ Party ‘Star’ Chen,” The Straits Times, 19 April 2011. 22 Teh Joo Lin and Cheryl Lim, “Stand for Election? ‘Ensure Male Candidates do NS First’,” The Straits Times, 3 May 2011. 23 See Yolanda Chin, Nadica Pavlovska, and Norman Vasu, “An Immigration Bonus for Singaporeans? Making the Foreigner More Acceptable,” RSIS Commentaries, 7 August 2012 at http:// www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1452012.pdf.

Introduc tion

13

lower end of the economic spectrum that are shunned by Singaporeans and supplementing a shortage of talent at the higher end of the spectrum. Moreover, in response to the non-bread-and-butter issues raised by opponents of the current immigration policy, pro-immigration proponents highlight Singapore’s immigrant past and stress that the integration of new immigrants is possible.24 The concerns and unhappiness of local-born Singaporeans comes at a time when the country is facing a milestone event in terms of its population demographics: the country’s baby boomers – those born between 1947 and 1965 – have started to reach the retirement age of 65 years. In 2030, the number of citizens aged 65 years and above will triple to 900,000, supported by a smaller base of working-age citizens between 20-64 years.25 Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew warned that the country’s diminishing population will slow the country’s economy and called the task of increasing the population the country’s “biggest challenge.”26 This has prompted much discussion on the social consequences of an ageing population, an issue that has been repeatedly highlighted by the government of late. The crux of the government’s concerns was restated in starkly pragmatic terms by Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean: I think it is better to think in terms of if we are going to have 900,000 people over the age of 65 compared to the 340,000 that we have today, a three-fold increase, then we really need to ask ourselves who is going to help, say, in the home. Some will want to have domestic help. Who are going to staff up all the healthcare and hospital facilities that we would need? Who are going to staff up, say, the nursing homes and community 24 One of the most vocal proponents of the fact that immigrants, especially second-generation immigrations, will be able to successfully integrate into Singaporean society has been former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. An example of this can be found in a welcome speech for new citizens on 12 April 2009, where he told the audience that: “Growing up in the same schools, playing on the same fields and sharing the same experiences, your children will become as Singaporean as if they were locally born. For the boys, their Singaporean identity will be further strengthened when they go through National Service.” See Transcript of Speech by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Minister Mentor, at the SPH integration Seminar, 12 April 2009 downloaded from http:// stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/viewDocx.jsp?stid=40467&lochref=viewHTML.jsp?pdfno=2009 0420001&keyword=integration (accessed 12 September 2012). 25 Transcript of DPM Teo Chee Hean’s Speech on Population at the Committee of Supply 2012, 1 Mar 2012 downloaded from the National Population and Talent Division website at https://www. nptd.gov.sg/content/dam/nptd/DPM%20Teo%20Chee%20Hean%20%20speech%20on%20 population%20at%20COS%202012.pdf (accessed 12 September 2012). 26 Rachel Chang, “Shrinking population will hurt economy, says Lee Kuan Yew,” The Straits Times, 4 February 2012.

14 

Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin & Chan Wen Ling

step-down facilities that we would need? We may not have enough Singaporeans to do that. Therefore, even just in these sectors alone, we are going to need many more people in order to make sure that our older population will be properly looked after.27

Hence, while recent discomfort and discourse has been about what Eugene Tan has termed in his chapter here as the “immigration imperative,” this is not fully indicative of the challenges facing the country in the coming years. Rather, it is intertwined with a “social imperative” involving far wider and interdependent consequences of the decisions taken by Singaporeans on purely social matters such as marriage, parenthood, ageing, and ultimately whether to remain as Singaporeans or to emigrate and start life anew in another country. In light of the present situation, the aim of this volume is to uncover and examine the socio-political implications faced by Singapore in its quest to sustain a “migrant society.” It attempts to provide a multidisciplinary view of what it means to be a migrant society from the perspective of the receiving or host society. While many have written on the topic of immigration and its impact on Singapore – especially from an economic perspective – this volume sees the problems as essentially a complex social issue.28 Featuring researchers from disciplines such as political science, sociology, human 27 Hansard, vol. 89 (14 May 2012) per Mr. Teo Chee Hean. 28 Many books and journal articles capture the extensive arguments and rationale concerning Singapore’s immigration stance from an economic and public policy perspective. A sample of such works include Hui Weng Tat, “Singapore’s Immigration Policy: An Economic Perspective,” in Public Policies in Singapore: Changes in the 1980s and Future Signposts (eds.) Linda Low and Toh Mun Heng (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992); Chiew Seen Kong, “Citizens and Foreign Labour in Singapore,” in Crossing Borders: Transmigration in Asia Pacific (eds.) Ong Jin Hui, Chan Kwok Bun, and Chew Soon Beng, (Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1995), 472-486; Pang Eng Fong, “Foreign Talent and Development in Singapore,” in Competing for Global Talent, (eds.) Christiane Kuptsch and Pang Eng Fong, (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 2006), 155-170; Linda Low, “The Political Economy of Migrant Worker Policy in Singapore,” in Migrant Workers in Pacific Asia (ed.) Yaw A. Debrah, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 95-118. Other works analyzes specif ic social aspects of immigration for example from the perspective of challenges to community and ethnic relations or issues with foreign domestic workers. See for example Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Shirlena Huang, “‘Foreign Talent’ in our Midst: New Challenges to Sense of Community and Ethnic Relations in Singapore” in Beyond Rituals and Riots: Ethnic Pluralism and Social Cohesion in Singapore (ed.) Lai Ah Eng (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004), 316-338; Brenda S.A. Yeoh, and Shirlena Huang, “Civil Space in a City-State: Foreign Domestic Workers in Singapore,” in Migration in the Asia Pacific: Population, Settlement, and Citizenship Issues (eds.) Robyn Iredale, Charles Hawksley, and Stephen Castles (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003), 341-354.

Introduc tion

15

geography, public policy studies, cultural studies, security studies, and demography, this collection leverages on their individual expertise in analyzing the social impact of immigration from their respective fields.29 Effectively, the volume captures the manner in which immigration has impacted various spheres of Singaporean life.

Demographic patterns and disagreements As a whole, Singapore’s population has grown substantially, primarily fuelled by the country’s aggressive immigration stance. Yap Mui Teng’s chapter provides a clear snapshot of the numbers underpinning the country’s population landscape. Accordingly, immigration was the main contributor to population growth for much of the island’s colonial history. This “net migrational surplus” was sustained until the 1930s, when domestic population growth rose. Domestic growth then took over as the main contributor to population growth from 1960 to 1980, in part as a result of restrictive immigration policies put in place. While this period allowed for a gradual “indigenisation” of the population according to Yap, the ensuing years saw rapid changes taking place, driven by the country’s economic objectives. Policies were relaxed to allow in foreign labour to augment the local labour force in meeting the needs of industry and to encourage foreign investment. This increase in foreign manpower has caused a situation where the proportion of local-born citizens dropped from 78 percent in 1980 to 57 percent in 2010. The number of non-residents (comprising those who are not citizens or permanent residents) grew to 1,305,000 in 2010 from 131,800 in 1980, accounting for a third of the total population of the country today. However, while informative, these numbers do not adequately convey the perspective of what it means to be a migrant society. A closer examination of the social implications is necessary to tease out what are essentially complex undercurrents of issues and perceptions. The social dissonances of being a migrant society is put into perspective in Eugene Tan’s chapter on the “angst and anxieties” of the Singaporean population, coming from the lived experiences of over-crowded buses, trains, and roads and of having to increasingly compete for places in schools, for houses, and for jobs. There have also been complaints about the differ29 For an analysis of migration research in the Asian region, see Maruja M. B. Asis and Nicola Piper, “Researching International Labor Migration in Asia,” The Sociological Quarterly, 49 (2008): 423-444.

16 

Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin & Chan Wen Ling

ences in languages, habits, and lifestyles that are not representative of the Singaporean way. This is juxtaposed against the anxieties felt by the government in trying to manage today’s extremely competitive global immigration landscape. As Tan explains, a nation’s citizenship and immigration policies have to be both sensitive to local concerns and nation-building objectives as well as be able to aggressively participate in the increasingly competitive global pursuit of talented individuals between developed countries. This friction between building a “globapolis” and living amidst a “cacophony of accents” also featured prominently on the political front. While many of the contributors in this volume have discussed the significance of the immigration issue in the 2011 general elections within their various spheres of interest, Bilveer Singh’s chapter brings sharper focus to the political discourse surrounding the country’s immigration policy from the perspective of the PAP and some of the key opposition parties in the elections. Singh argues that while no political party in Singapore – whether incumbent or opposition – would take a completely anti-immigration stand, the issue nevertheless became a constant refrain of the opposition parties in the run-up to the elections. Across the board, the opposition took issue with the pace and scale of the immigration inflow as well as the quality of immigrants entering the country. A further point of interest is the fact that debates over the government’s immigration stance has come not only from the country’s opposition parties but also, going as far back as the 1990s, from its own ranks as well. To illustrate, Singh highlights the 1999 statement by then Member of Parliament for Ayer Rajah, Dr. Tan Cheng Bock, to “think Singaporeans first.” Perhaps rather presciently, Dr. Tan noted back then that “the minister is worried that I’m sending the wrong message to foreigners. I think we should be worried that we send the wrong message to Singaporeans.”30 Ultimately, it would appear that the question of sustaining a migrant society is not one than can be managed purely through politics. From the political landscape, Ho’s chapter explores the changing landscapes of “heartland” Housing Development Board (HDB) estates, normally the bastion of the majority of ordinary Singaporeans as opposed to the more cosmopolitan, “globally oriented” Singaporeans.31 These estates have 30 “Minister misinterpreted call to tone down foreign talent message,” The Straits Times, 13 March 1999. 31 The “cosmopolitan” and “heartlander” dialectic was referred to by then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in his 1999 National Day Rally speech. According to Goh, the cosmopolitans were mainly bilingual with an international outlook and lifestyle while the heartlanders spoke Singlish with skills that were not marketable beyond Singapore. He noted however that both were important to the country’s well-being: the cosmopolitans were indispensible in generat-

Introduc tion

17

seen a steady increase in the “middling transnational” which she defines as immigrants with tertiary level education or who are relatively well-off in their home countries, who have come to Singapore to occupy precarious jobs or have been employed on local terms of employment rather than the far more generous packages extended to expatriates. Given their circumstances, they are more likely to be found living in HDB estates rather than in the customary expatriate enclaves. Such close encounters have seen frictions arise between Singaporeans and immigrants over more ordinary, pedestrian, every-day issues such as the offending smell of unfamiliar cooking. According to Ho, the contemporary nature of such relations have become so evident in the mainstream that it has even been profiled in a sitcom on television depicting Singaporean families living in close proximity with other nationalities. However, not only has spatial proximity failed to foster good relations between locals and immigrants, it has instead been the production house of misconceptions deployed later as stereotypes of immigrants from similar backgrounds. In addition, even more divisive than cultural stereotypes is arguably the perception that these immigrants are directly competing for finite benefits such as housing facilities, places in schools, and employment opportunities – the argument being that locals should benefit from such opportunities first. In resolving such differences, Ho argues for the need for all parties to engage openly with underlying social prejudices and to move beyond mere tolerance toward attitudes of mutual positive respect. The impact of immigration cuts even closer to home when the sizeable number of foreign domestic workers employed in Singaporean households is considered. Although foreign domestic workers fall under the category of temporary non-residents, with more and more women tasked with the responsibility of being economically productive in the modern workplace while also encouraged to produce more children to halt the slide in the population replacement rate, Singaporean families are finding it a necessity to employ domestic help to run their households, look after their children, and also increasingly care for their elderly relatives. Hence, these temporary foreign domestic workers appear to be increasingly a permanent solution in many Singaporean households. Theresa Devasahayam examines the ing wealth and economic reach while the heartlanders were instrumental in maintaining the core values and stability of Singaporean society. See Transcript of the Prime Minister’s National Day Rally Speech 1999, First World Economy, World Class Home downloaded from the National Archives of Singapore website at http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/viewDocx. jsp?stid=17649&lochref=viewHTML.jsp?pdfno=1999082202&keyword=goh (accessed 25 september 2013).

18 

Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin & Chan Wen Ling

impact of immigration on the average household in Singapore by exploring the boundaries drawn in homes in managing the “otherness” of foreign domestic workers. As of December 2013, the country had about 214,500 migrant women employed as foreign domestic workers in households. For Devasahayam, the home is also marked by the social frictions of being a migrant society, with reinforcements of boundaries between “us” and “them” underpinning the state’s own preferred “demographic regime.” On a macro level, the integration of immigrants within the multicultural ethos that frames the country’s overarching social order is not an easy task. Singapore officially adopts a form of “hard multiculturalism” where group differences are institutionally recognized and protected.32 This, as Mathew Mathews and Danielle Hong contend, becomes the social terrain in which immigrants have to navigate in order to integrate with Singaporeans. The idea of multiculturalism is central to Singapore – put in practice through the institutionalization of racial categories over its citizens. This “hard multiculturalism” has to now cater to the diversification that the country is seeing as a result of its immigration policy. As Mathews and Hong pinpoint in their chapter, how the commonly practised idea of multiculturalism in Singapore intersects with increasingly diverse immigrant communities is becoming a matter of some concern for the government, given that a number of social frictions have occurred between local-born Singaporeans and foreign nationals. As Mathews and Hong observe, while the country’s multi-racial profiles and policies may be tacitly understood and even appreciated up to a certain point by immigrants, the reality of living together day after day is another matter altogether. Whether “hard multiculturalism” can assist in acclimatizing both local-born Singaporeans and immigrants to each other is an issue that needs further thought. Further, while the country relentlessly continues to pursue its economic objective of building and sustaining a viable knowledge-based economy, questions regarding social cohesion and mobility continue to be keenly debated. The fault line between local-born Singaporeans on the one side and new citizens and PRs on the other seems to manifest itself in the inability of either group to arrive at an agreement on what the sine qua non of integration is. Hence, while local-born Singaporeans view national 32 For a discussion on the various approaches to managing a polity’s multicultural condition – including hard multiculturalism – see Norman Vasu, “(En)countering Terrorism: Multiculturalism and Singapore,” Asian Ethnicity, February 2008, vol. 9 (1): 17-32. For a detailed discussion on the employment of hard multiculturalism as a policy to manage ethnic differences in Singapore, see for example, Norman Vasu, “Locating S Rajaratnam’s Multiculturalism,” in S. Rajaratnam on Singapore: From Ideas to Reality, (ed.) Kwa C.G., (Singapore: World Scientific Press, 2006).

Introduc tion

19

service (NS) and proficiency in English to be important, this view is not necessarily shared by all new citizens or PRs. While it is easy to point to the fact that first-generation citizens and PRs do not have to undergo NS and therefore are not likely to place as much importance in it as male local-born Singaporeans who are required by law to perform NS, this misses the point when it comes to the integration process. As noted in the chapter by Leong Chan-Hoong, this dissonance fuels and “underscores the consternation and angst in the relationship” between Singaporeans and newly naturalized citizens or PRs owing to what is seen to be an unequal burden being carried by the former. To bridge the divide, Leong proposes integration strategies be recalibrated to include the two “flashpoints” of NS obligations and proficiency in English. The importance of NS obligations should be reinforced and made known to newly naturalized citizens and PRs. In this regard, realigning immigration policies that prioritize the granting of citizen and PR status to applicants with family members who have taken up the obligations of NS or are NS-liable would serve to underscore the importance of such service to the country. Leong further recommends that the Singapore Armed Forces increase their public engagement and outreach exercises in order to share the relevance of NS in the overall national defence of Singapore to new citizens and PRs. Similarly, the importance of English as a tool of communication for Singaporeans should be impressed upon newcomers; this would enable them to acquire the right attitude towards the need to become proficient in English. While the above may serve to alleviate the divide between Singaporeans and newly naturalized citizens and PRs, what are the national security implications of allowing foreigners (i.e. PRs) to serve in the country’s armed forces? The revelation in parliament in 2011 that nearly a third of PRs eligible to perform national service renounced their residency status before they reached enlistment age has fed into the dissonance described by Leong, stirring up the debate that such PRs are “freeloaders” who are basically in the country to enjoy the benefits but refuse to take up the onerous obligations of armed service to defend it. In their chapter, Ho Shu Huang and Yolanda Chin analyze the logic of requiring foreigners to be conscripted by exploring the tension between a reliance on those whose allegiance to the country is uncertain at best and the demands that whoever benefits from the state should share the burden of its defence. The history of enlisting PRs was traced back to a time when those under such a status were stateless following Singapore’s abrupt separation from Malaysia in 1965. During this period, PRs were in effect “Singaporeans-in-waiting,” with the expectation that serving NS would improve their eligibility for citizenship. Today’s PRs are inherently different:

20 

Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin & Chan Wen Ling

they are citizens of another country whose parents have come to Singapore more often than not for employment purposes. Hence, it is quite possible that contemporary PRs do not have the same motivation to perform NS as the PRs of yesteryears. However, the scheme for second-generation male PRs based upon the idea of benefit-burden sharing adds to the uneasy relationship between local-born citizens and PRs. Admittedly, there are no easy solutions as Ho and Chin conclude; it is but one of the many interdependent elements that form Singapore’s complex immigration conundrum.

A question of “what is good for Singapore overall” In 2010, Singapore’s Economic Strategies Committee signalled a change in orientation. The 2010 Report, while acknowledging past strengths, nevertheless stated the need to “do things differently.”33 This included growing the capabilities and expertise to take advantage of opportunities and to remain relevant with a “more slowly expanding workforce.”34 This shift is arguably in part a result of the realization that what has sustained the country economically in the past may no longer be conducive in sustaining the nation as a whole in the future. The challenge of sustaining a nation-state in a period of increasing globalization is one that many Asia-Pacific countries are grappling with, according to Castles.35 Labour migration policies are often driven by shortterm considerations of economic profits to the detriment of long-term social and political implications. Guided by the anticipation that migrants will stay for only a short term or that their presence would not bring about social change, governments mainly fall back on three social mechanisms in managing what Castles terms “the controllability of difference”: assimilation, multiculturalism, and differential exclusion. For Castles, assimilation refers to governmental efforts to ensure that migrants take on the cultural practices of the local community, with the assumption that “the immigrants’ descendents will be indistinguishable from the rest of the population.”36 33 Economic Strategies Committee, “Report of the Singapore Economic Strategies Committee: High skilled people, innovative economy, distinctive global city,” February 2010 at http://app. mof.gov.sg/data/cmsresource/ESC%20Report/ESC%20Full%20Report.pdf. 34 Ibid. 35 Stephen Castles, “Migrant Settlement, Transnational Communities and State Strategies in the Asia Pacific Region,” in Migration in the Asia Pacific: Population, Settlement and Citizenship Issues, (eds.) Robyn Iredale et. al., (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2003), pg. 3-26. 36 Ibid, 10.

Introduc tion

21

Multiculturalism applies in diverse, heterogeneous societies; it seeks to control differences through social mechanisms that “maintain the idea of a primary belonging to one society under one nation-state.”37 On the other end of the spectrum, differential exclusion connotes the acceptance of immigrants as workers under strict employment and social conditions; this mechanism is purely transactional in nature.38 Singapore has long understood the need to control social differences. Key policies have been in place since the country’s independence in 1965 to manage and maintain social harmony and public order amongst the mostly immigrant population at that time. In a parliamentary sitting in 1967, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew explained this need: … we are confronted, as a young migrant community, with the problem of continuing a tolerant, meaningful society for some two million people, nearly all of whom cannot trace their links with the Republic for more than 150 years. For when Stamford Raffles landed here in February 1819, there were only 120 Malays and 30 Chinese, and there cannot be very many of us here who can trace our ancestors to those 120 Malays and 30 Chinese. Multi-racialism in a permissive, tolerant society becomes an imperative for us and those societies like us, which, for one reason or another, have taken into one geographic whole large components of people with diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious backgrounds.39

The result of this has been strong institutional structures – through existing legislation and public policies – in place that have seen the young migrant society grow into today’s multicultural Singapore. In this sense, the city-state has adapted its own version of the mechanisms in incorporating immigrants. While under no illusions that new immigrants would take on the culture and social practices of the local population, there was nevertheless the assumption that the second generation of immigrants would assimilate, through being educated in national schools and taking up the obligation of national service for males. This approach – one that is transformational in nature – is reserved for those who possess the requisite criteria for permanent residency and ultimately citizenship. Assimilation here would infer that the immigrants learn and take on the cultural practices of the society. However, being a multicultural society, the 37 Ibid, 11. 38 Ibid, 11. 39 Hansard, vol. 25, col. 1283 (15 March 1967).

22 

Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin & Chan Wen Ling

question remains as to which cultural practices are to be adopted by the new immigrants? Or do they form their own version of the “Singaporean identity”? If so, how will the country’s “hard multiculturalism” approach assimilate such “new” identities? Concerns over the ability of local-born Singaporeans and foreigners to adjust to each other’s presence do not extend to those considered as migrant workers – this category of foreigners are managed by way of differential exclusion. Transactional in nature, this mechanism sees the majority of migrants allowed into the country to work on a temporary basis under a work permit scheme for those deemed to be semi or low skilled. They are, as Castles puts it, welcomed as “workers, but not as settlers; as individuals, but not as families or communities; as temporary sojourners, but not as long term residents.”40 The temporary nature of this category of foreigners has meant that they are not considered a significant factor in managing the country’s migrant society, a fact that is often stressed by the government. However, despite the temporary nature of their stay in the country, there appears to be a general acceptance across the board that low-skilled foreign workers will continue to be needed to supplement the local workforce. The numbers support this (see Table 1). Of the 1.39 million non-resident population in Singapore as of June 2011, 60 percent are work permit holders (low-skilled workers), a majority consisting of construction and domestic workers. 41 A 2012 report by the National Population and Talent Division on manpower needs for healthcare, construction, and foreign domestic workers projected that there will be a continual need to supplement these areas with foreign recruitment.42 How would a “structural dependence”43 on the presence of temporary workers affect the ability of local-born citizens to come to terms with the constant presence of foreigners in their midst? 40 Stephen Castles, “Migrant Settlement, Transnational Communities and State Strategies in the Asia Pacific Region.” 41 Parliamentary Written Answer, 28 February 2012 downloaded from the National Talent and Population Division website at http://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/dam/nptd/Parliamentary%20 reply%20on%2028%20Feb%202012%20%28on%20breakdown%20of%20non-resident%20 population%29.pdf. 42 National Talent and Population Division, Prime Minister’s Office, “Projection of Foreign Manpower Demand for Healthcare Sector, Construction Workers and Foreign Domestic Workers,” November 2012 at http://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/news/_jcr_content/par_content/ download_84/file.res/OP-Projection%20of%20foreign%20manpower%20demand%20for%20 healthcare%20sector%20construction%20workers%20and%20foreign%20domestic%20workers.pdf. 43 Stephen Castles, “Migrant Settlement, Transnational Communities and State Strategies in the Asia Pacific Region.”

23

Introduc tion

Table 1  Percentage Breakdown of Non-Resident Population (as of June 2011) Non-Residents Employment Pass Holders S Pass Holders Work Permit Holders (including foreign domestic workers) Dependents of Singapore Citizens, Permanent Residents and Work Pass Holders Foreign Students Total

% 12% 8% 60% 14% 6% 100%

Source: Singapore Parliament Reports (Hansard)

Singapore’s journey as a migrant society: What lies ahead? Despite all the grim issues arising, there is a silver lining behind the heated debates and tensions that have emerged so far. This is the fact that the immigration debate has, as Singh puts it in his chapter here, invigorated the “politics of nation building and national identity.”44 All too often referred to as a paternalistic state with a politically disinterested population, the country is now seeing greater ownership of issues that affect its future. 45 Recent calls for national dialogues over the immigration conundrum are serving as platforms for increased citizen participation in issues that matter for the country. This was highlighted by the prime minister in his 2012 National Rally Speech: We have to set a clear direction. We cannot just be blown off course or drift with the tides onto the rocks. So I asked Heng Swee Keat [Minister for Education] to lead a national conversation on Our Singapore to define what sort of country we want and how we can achieve it. So please join in this national effort, think seriously about our future, contribute your ideas, work together to make it happen. 46

44 See chapter three of this volume. 45 Singapore has often been referred to by the Western media as a “nanny state” with a paternalistic government. See Henri Ghesquiere, Singapore’s Success: Engineering Economic Growth (Singapore: Thomson Learning, 2007), 119. 46 Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s National Day Rally 2012.

24 

Norman Vasu, Yeap Su Yin & Chan Wen Ling

As it turns out, the framing of the national conversation – referred to as “Our Singapore Conversation” (OSC) – has taken on a broad perspective, seeking to find consensus over the country’s values, concerns, and ultimately its future objectives. 47 The immigration imperative has, it would seem, led to some progression in Singapore’s nation-building efforts. However, it remains unclear as to how this informs the direction of the country in engaging with its immigrant population. A survey conducted at the end of the OSC found that “more Singaporeans prefer reducing the inflow of foreigners even if it translated to slower growth and jobs.”48 This appears to be squarely at odds with the economic-driven immigration agenda that has been the cornerstone of Singapore’s economic vitality so far. While it is too early to be able to foretell the direction the country will take in negotiating a policy that has been economically beneficial but has at the same time caused much social insecurity, the following chapters in this volume will explore in detail the socio-political landscape of Singapore’s journey as a migrant society that had led to such negative sentiments from its people.

47 “Panel spearheading national conversation on Singapore’s future unveiled,” Channel NewsAsia, 12 September 2012, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/ view/1224786/1/.html. 48 Our Singapore Conversation Survey at https://www.oursgconversation.sg/wp-content/ uploads/2013/08/OSC-Survey.pdf.

1

Immigration in Singapore An Overview Yap Mui Teng

Introduction Debates on immigration and foreigners have become highly topical and controversial in Singapore in recent years. Both have been “blamed” for a variety of woes that Singaporeans currently face, including a widening income gap and wage stagnation among the lower income groups; rising competition (for jobs, housing, communal space, and the like); and a rising cost of living. Immigration and foreigners also featured prominently in the debates leading up to the general election in May 2011, and they are also said to have contributed to the decline in the ruling People’s Action Party’s share of parliamentary seats and popular votes.1 The level of resentment expressed has been unprecedented. The tipping point appeared to be the influx of foreigners in the latter half of the 2000s, when there was, in some years, double-digit growth in the number of foreigners and permanent residents. This resentment has only become evident now, even though Singapore has had a long history of in-migration and the majority of Singaporeans are immigrants or descendants of immigrants. Whatever the veracity of the perceived association between public sentiments and electoral votes, on returning to power, the government set about addressing Singaporeans’ unhappiness by promising to build more public housing and by increasing the frequency of public transportation, for example. It also tightened the rules for entry and made the benefits of citizenship more apparent. Regardless, immigration is likely to remain an integral part of Singapore’s demographic development, as the government has maintained that Singapore will continue to require immigrants for economic and demographic reasons (see, for example, the speech by Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean on population at the Committee of Supply on 1 March 2012).2 1 “Rising home prices hit PAP’s vote share: Mr. Lee,” The Straits Times, 14 August 2011. 2 Transcript of DPM Teo Chee Hean’s Speech on Population at the Committee of Supply 2012 at https://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/dam/nptd/DPM%20Teo%20Chee%20Hean%20%20 speech%20on%20population%20at%20COS%202012.pdf.

26 

Yap Mui Teng

This chapter begins with a review of the role played by immigration (or more preferably, in-migration because it is less emotive) in Singapore’s demographic development from its founding until the present. Large-scale in-migration is not new to Singapore, and like the present, it was in-migration rather than domestic growth that had been the main contributor to population growth for much of Singapore’s history. However, the nature of this migration and the context in which the present inmigration has taken place have changed, which probably accounts for the largely negative reactions evident in recent years. These differences, which include the greater diversity of the in-migrants and the greater density of population, are reviewed in the section that follows. The final section discusses projections of future population trends and explains why immigration will likely remain an integral part of Singapore’s policy for development.

History of immigration and population growth Net in-migration or “net migrational surplus” was the main contributor to Singapore’s population growth from the time of its founding in 1819 until the 1930s.3 Over this period, immigrants more than made up for those who left the island (hence there was a “net migrational surplus”) and the shortfall in domestic growth as deaths exceeded births. Without in-migration, the Singapore population would have shrunk (Table 1.1). The early immigrants were mainly from China and India, and mainly male. 4 They were also mainly sojourners who were attracted by economic opportunities in the region or pushed by poor economic conditions in their home countries. Most had left their families behind and had no intention of settling permanently.5

3 Arumainathan, P., Report of the Census of Population 1970, Singapore, volume 1, Department of Statistics, 1973. 4 Ibid, 31. 5 Saw Swee Hock, The Population of Singapore, 2nd edition (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 56-81.

27

Immigr ation in Singapore

Table 1.1  Population Growth and Components, 1881-1970 Intercensal Years 1881-1891 1891-1901 1901-1911 1911-1921 1921-1931 1931-1947 1947-1957 1957-1970

Population Increase

Natural Increase

Net Migrational Surplus

Population Growth Rate (%)

Natural Increase (%)

43,857 45,980 75,729 115,037 139,387 380,399 507,785 628,578

-30,932 -42,542 -59,978 -35,594 -18,176 178,296 395,571 595,614

74,789 88,522 135,707 150,631 121,211 202,103 122,214 32,964

2.8 2.3 2.9 3.3 2.9 3.3 4.4 2.8

-1.9 -2.1 -2.3 -1.0 0.4 1.5 3.3 2.6

Source: Adapted from Table 5.1 in Arumainathan (1973)

It was only from the 1930s that domestic growth through natural increase (excess of births over deaths) began to contribute to overall population growth in Singapore (Table 1.1). The birth rate rose as the sex ratio improved, with more women (especially those from China) joining the migration streams and settling in Singapore. At the same time, the death rate declined as health and other conditions improved. The contribution of net in-migration declined even more after further restrictions on immigration were introduced after World War II and after Singapore attained full independence in 1965. As elsewhere, Singapore experienced an extended post-World War II baby boom that lasted until the early 1960s. Figure 1.1 shows that the annual population growth rate has exceeded the rate of natural increase (RNI) for most of Singapore’s history since 1931. It was only during the period from around 1960 to 1980 that natural increase became the dominant contributor to population growth. This was due mainly to the restrictive immigration policy adopted by the PAP government upon taking office in the late 1950s. Immigration was restricted to Malaysians but even that was stopped when immigration controls were introduced upon independence as part of a two-pronged strategy to reduce the rate of population growth (the other being the stringent family planning programme to reduce births). The government had to relax its immigration policy soon after independence to take in more migrant workers to support economic growth while it also had a policy in place to attract talented professionals and entrepreneurs (called the Professional, Technical Personnel and Skilled Workers Scheme, or PTS). Immigration policy was further relaxed from the 1980s to attract more people who could contribute to the country’s economic growth,

28 

Yap Mui Teng

Figure 1.1  Population Growth Rate (GR) and Rate of Natural Increase (RNI), 1931-2011

Sources: Report of the Registration of Births and Deaths, various years, from the Registry of Births and Deaths; Population Trends, various issues (actual and computed), by the Department of Statistics. Information for the war years is not available.

defined then as professionals and skilled workers (and dubbed as “foreign talent”). It was also around the mid-1980s that an earlier aspiration for an all-Singaporean workforce by 1991 was replaced with a policy of continuing to admit unskilled foreign workers (commonly referred to as “foreign workers” following the Employment of Foreign Workers Act) on a rotating basis, as they provided a buffer against economic fluctuations and changes in the demand for labour.6 Foreign workers also filled jobs where it had been difficult to attract local workers. The continued liberalization of immigration, both for work and permanent settlement, is also driven by the recognition that Singapore’s workforce and population will age rapidly and eventually decline as the country’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has fallen to below the level required for population replacement since the mid-1970s and to ultra-low levels since the early 2000s. The switch from the earlier anti-natalist policy to a pro-natalist one from the mid-1980s has not forestalled fertility decline (although there was an initial rise in the TFR and number of babies born). Thus, the rationale for a more liberal immigration policy has been that immigrants would make up for the shortfall in births, top up skills that were required for 6 Ministry of Trade and Industry, “The Singapore Economy: New Directions,” Report of the Economic Review Committee 1986, 109.

Immigr ation in Singapore

29

economic growth that Singapore did not have, and ameliorate the ageing of the population (see, for example, the deputy prime minister’s speech on population at the Committee of Supply on 4 March 2010).7 In 2009, however, immigration policy was tightened amid much discontent among Singaporeans, as noted above.

In-migration: Then and now With the rise in in-migration in recent years and the growing concern among Singaporeans about its impact, Singapore’s leaders often turn to the country’s history as an immigrant society to persuade Singaporeans to accept newcomers. Quite aside from the political reality of Singapore now being an independent nation as compared to its previous status as a colony (which will not be discussed here as it is outside the scope of the present chapter), the nature of in-migration and the context in which in-migration is taking place have changed considerably over time. These are likely to have contributed to the recent emergence of resentment among the local population. As mentioned earlier, the majority of the early immigrants to Singapore were sojourners who did not plan to settle down permanently. The restoration of the sex ratio due to the increase in female migrants contributed to the settlement of the economic migrants while others were, for various reasons (such as poverty), forced to remain behind. As a result, there was a gradual “indigenization” of the population, with the proportion of the population that was local-born growing from only a minority of the population in the 1920s and 1930s to about 60 percent in the years following World War II (Table 1.2). This proportion grew further to 74 percent in 1970 and 78 percent in 1980 after independence and as domestic growth became the dominant factor in population growth. However, the share of local-born has declined as immigration again became the main contributor to population growth. In 2010, only 57 percent of the population was local-born, close to the proportion in 1947. This has probably fuelled concern among local-born Singaporeans about the possibility that further in-migration would one day lead to them becoming a minority in their own country. 7 Transcript of DPM’s Speech on Population at the Committee of Supply March 2010 at https://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/news/_jcr_content/par_content/download_34/f ile. res/DPM’s%20speech%20on%20population%20at%20COS%2020100304%20-%20final.pdf.

30 

Yap Mui Teng

Table 1.2  Proportion of Local-Born among Overall Population Year

Population (000s)

1921 1931 1947 1957 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

425.9 567.5 938.2 1,445.9 2,074.5 2,413.9 3,047.1 4,027.9 5,076.7

Local-born (%) 29 37 56 64 74 78 76 67 57

Sources: Figures from 1921-1970 are adapted from Table 8.4 in Arumainathan (1973). Figures from 1980 onwards were computed by the author based on various census reports.

With a more restrictive immigration policy and a greater contribution of indigeneous growth to overall population growth, more than nine out of 10 persons in the population in 1970 and 1980 were Singapore citizens. As the immigration policy became more liberalized from the 1980s, however, the share of citizens declined such that by 2000, only 74 percent held Singapore citizenship. This proportion fell further to 64 percent in 2010. The higher proportion of citizens compared to the share of local-born reflect the naturalization of foreigners – as a result of a deliberate policy to encourage foreigners to take up citizenship to build up the “Singaporean core” (see, for example, the deputy prime minister’s speech on population at the Committee of Supply on 27 February 2008).8 In spite of this effort, the growth in the number of citizens was slowest, compared to non-residents and PRs (Table 1.3). In contrast to the declining citizen share, non-residents and permanent residents, particularly the former, have comprised increasingly larger segments of the population. In 2010, more than one-quarter of the total population was made up of “non-residents,” i.e. foreigners who were not citizens or permanent residents (PRs). These were mainly work pass holders 8 Transcript of DPM’s Speech on Population at Committee of Supply, 27 February 2008 at https://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/news/_jcr_content/par_content/download_41/f ile. res/DPM’s%20speech%20on%20population%20at%20COS%2027%20Feb%202008.pdf. From 2001-2010, on average 13,000 persons were granted citizenship (NPTD 2011). Over the period 2007-2011, the number granted citizenship averaged 18,500 annually, compared to an annual average of 8,172 granted over the period 1987-2006 (see Parliamentary Written Answer, 14 May. http://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/dam/nptd/Parliamentary%20reply%20on%2014%20May%20 2012%20(on%20persons%20granted%20SC).pdf). Information prior to 1987 is not available.

Immigr ation in Singapore

31

(80 percent), students (6 percent), and dependents (14 percent).9 In absolute terms, there were more than 1.3 million non-residents out of a total population of about 5.07 million. In the same year, the share of non-residents had grown nearly ten-fold in proportionate terms compared to 1970 when only 2.9 percent were non-residents. The size of non-residents in absolute terms doubled every decade between 1970 and 2000. The number of foreigners who have been granted PR status has also risen substantially since 1990. Comprising essentially foreigners who had been on employment passes for at least two years and their families, the average annual growth rate of this group over the 1990-2000 decade rate was 9.9 percent as compared to 2.3 percent over the previous decade. Over the period 2000-2010, the average number of PRs granted annually was 48,000 compared to figures of about 25,000 to 30,000 that were reported in the mid-1990s.10 Not only have there been more in-migrants and at a growing speed, the composition of these in-migrants is also more diverse (Figure 1.2a-c). For one, the source countries of the foreign-born population have changed. In 1947, majority of the foreign-born were from the greater China area (China, Hong Kong, Taiwan). These were followed by those from South Asia and Malaysia (11 percent each). There were more Malaysian-born and proportionately fewer of those born in the greater China area in 1970 (the first post-independence census) compared with 1947 (the first post-WWII census). While the data on place of birth are only available for the resident population from 1980 onwards, the greater diversity in source countries in 2010 is obvious (see Figure 1.2c). The diversity has grown especially in the 2000s (in 2010, 14 percent were born elsewhere including 10 percent from other Asian countries, as compared to only 6 percent born elsewhere in 2000). The rapid in-migration that took place in the most recent decade also contributed to the rapid increase in the overall density of the population (Figure 1.3). In 2010, there were more than 7,000 persons per square kilometre of land as compared to about 3,500 in 1970 (a doubling of the density). This, together with the infrastructure bottleneck, has probably contributed to the feeling of competition for space. 9 Parliamentary Written Answer by Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean dated 28 February 2012 at https://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/dam/nptd/Parliamentary%20reply%20on%2028%20 Feb%202012%20(on%20breakdown%20of%20non-resident%20population).pdf. 10 Parliamentary Questions for Written Answer, 22 November 2011 at https://www.nptd.gov. sg/content/dam/nptd/Parliamentary%20reply%20on%2022%20Nov%202011.pdf

4,265.8 4,401.4 4,588.6 4,839.4 4,987.6 5,076.7 5,183.7

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

3,467.8 3,525.9 3,583.1 3,642.7 3,733.9 3,771.7 3,789.3

2,282.1 2,735.9 3,273.4 3,771.7

Total

3,081.0 3,107.9 3,133.8 3,164.4 3,200.7 3,230.7 3,257.2

2,194.3 2,623.7 2,985.9 3,230.7

Citizens

PRs

386.8 418.0 449.2 478.2 533.2 541.0 532.0

87.8 112.1 287.5 541.0

Singapore Residents

(‘000s)

797.9 875.5 1,005.5 1,196.7 1,253.7 1,305.0 1,394.4

131.8 311.3 754.5 1,305.0

Non- Residents

2.4 3.2 4.3 5.5 3.1 1.8 2.1

1.5 2.3 2.8 2.3

Total Population

1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.5 1 0.5

1.3 1.7 1.8 1.4

Total

0.8 0.9 0.8 1 1.1 0.9 0.8

1.6 1.7 1.3 0.8

Citizens

PR

8.6 8.1 7.5 6.5 11.5 1.5 -1.7

-4.5 2.3 9.9 6.5

Singapore Residents

Average Annual Growth Rates (b) (%)

5.9 9.7 14.9 19 4.8 4.1 6.9

8.0 9.0 9.3 5.6

Non- Residents

Sources: Department of Statistics, Census of Population 2010 Advance Data Release and Population Trends 2011. Growth rates for 2010 computed by the author. Notes: (a) Census year (b) Growth rates for 1980-2010 refer to average annual growth rate over the last 10 years.

2,413.9 3,047.1 4,027.9 5,076.7

1980(a) 1990(a) 2000(a) 2010(a)

Total Population

Number

Table 1.3 Population Size and Growth Rates by Residency Status

32  Yap Mui Teng

Immigr ation in Singapore

Figure 1.2  Country of Birth among Foreign Born Population (a)  1947 census

(b)  1970 Census

(c)  2010 Census

Sources: For 1947-1970, data was adapted from Table 8.3 in Arumainathan (1973). For 2010, data was extracted from the census report Note: HK = Hong Kong; Pak = Pakistan; SL = Sri Lanka; Aus = Australia; NZ = New Zealand

33

34 

Yap Mui Teng

Figure 1.3  Density of Population 1921-2010

Source: Computed by author based on Department of Statistics’ Population Trends, various years

Going forward In-migration has been explained as necessary for the augmentation of the workforce and the population due to more than three decades of belowreplacement-level TFR. In fact, the TFR is currently well below the replacement level at only 1.2 births per woman. Projections by the government and by the Institute of Policy Studies show that the domestic population will age rapidly and decline in the next decade if it is not supplemented by in-migration. A recent occasional paper published by the National Population and Talent Division of the Prime Minister’s Office shows that the citizen population will begin to decline by 2025 if the citizen TFR remains at 1.2 births per woman and there is no addition of new citizens through immigration. However, an inflow of 20,000 to 25,000 new citizens annually would stabilize the population. The Institute of Policy Studies’ projection of the resident population (i.e. citizens and PRs) shows a similar declining trend if TFR remained at 1.24 births per woman and there is no in-migration.11 Population ageing will still occur even if 30,000 new residents were added annually although the decline will be arrested. With 11 The Institute of Policy Studies projections can be accessed at http://www.lkyspp.nus.edu. sg/ips/docs/events/RT_Singapore%20Demographic%20Challenges_030512/SI_Yap%20Mui%20 Teng_web.pdf

Immigr ation in Singapore

35

the inclusion of non-residents, the population will age more gradually but the ultimate population size will be larger. While the number of working age population available to support each elderly will improve with in-migration, population density will also increase. In the population white paper, titled A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore released in January 2013, the National Population and Talent Division of the Prime Minister’s Office set out a roadmap for maintaining economic dynamism (and thus fulfilling the aspirations of better-educated, younger Singaporeans for quality jobs and wages), national identity, and a high quality of life in the face of rapid population ageing and potential decline.12 The proposed pathways include (a) encouraging Singaporeans to marry and have children; (b) in-migration for work and settlement, albeit at a more measured pace than has been the case in recent years, and better integration of newcomers; and (c) better planning and forward thinking in infrastructural development. The public reactions and debates on the population white paper were, unfortunately, bogged down by its allusion to a possible increase in the Singapore population to a projected 6.5 to 6.9 million by 2030. In fact, the attention was focused entirely on the latter figure. The discussions appeared to have missed what Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean took pains to point out in his opening speech at the parliamentary debate on 4 February 2013 that: We are not deciding now on the population trajectory beyond 2020. Nor are we deciding that we will have a population of 6.9 million in 2030. We are using this figure (which is at the high end of the 6.5 to 6.9 million range) only to prepare infrastructure plans. This population range up to 2030 provides a common set of parameters so that we can make long term plans that will be sufficient to cater even to the high end of possible populations. This is especially important for infrastructure plans that may take many years to implement, and once built will be there for decades. If we under-provide in our land use and infrastructure plans now, Singaporeans will have less flexibility in the future, and if things turn out unexpectedly, we will face bottlenecks and constraints. In fact, these are precisely the problems that we are facing today. We do not want to repeat these scenarios by under-providing.

12 National Population and Talent Division, Population White Paper: A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore at http://population.sg/whitepaper/resource-files/population-whitepaper.pdf

36 

Yap Mui Teng

What the population will actually be in 2030 will depend on the needs of Singaporeans, and the decisions we make on economic and workforce policy along the way (emphasis added). We hope that with restructuring and productivity gains, with Singaporeans living healthier and longer and therefore choosing to remain in the workforce longer, and more women joining the workforce, our population will not reach 6.9 million. It is the ability to meet the needs of Singaporeans and provide a good quality of life that is the driver. That is our objective, and not the numbers per se. If we are able to achieve this with a smaller population, whether 6.5m or lower, there is no reason to go higher. But it is prudent to plan our infrastructure for the upper end of the range, so that we do not get caught out. Furthermore, this is not a one-off exercise. Every few years, we should look at our plans again, decide the path we actually take, especially beyond 2020, and make changes to refine the plan, based on our needs, and as domestic and external circumstances change.13

As alluded to in the Deputy Prime Minister’s speech above, the future size of Singapore’s population is not pre-determined; likewise, the level of in-migration, though necessary, is not pre-determined and will depend on adjustments made elsewhere, including changes in important economic, family, and other social institutions. The imperative that adjustments will have to be made in response to prolonged low fertility and the ageing of the population is not unique to Singapore; countries that are at or somewhat ahead of Singapore in their demographic development are having to do the same, including the option of in-migration.14

13 Transcript of the opening speech by Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs Mr. Teo Chee Hean at the Parliamentary Debate on Population White Paper” at http://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/news/_jcr_content/ par_content/download_99/file.res/DPM%20Opening%20Speech%204%20Feb%202013.pdf. 14 See “At last, Japan opens its doors wider,” Today, 31 August 2012; “Korea’s immigration problem,” The Wall Street Journal, Asia Edition, 11 June 2013.

2

Angst, Anxieties, and Anger in a Global City Coping with and Rightsizing the Immigration Imperative in Singapore Eugene K.B. Tan

The global city welcomes global citizens Singapore is amongst the world’s most globalised nations. Among the international community, it is also ranked “Best place to live, work and play in Asia.” From its humble beginnings as a young migrant nation, Singapore has taken on a unique identity drawing on the strengths, spirit and sprightliness of its migrant citizens. Adding more interesting facets to its social landscape and history, the little dynamo has earned its reputation as a cosmopolitan country, rich in contrast and colour with its harmonious blend of diverse cultures, customs and cuisines. Attracted to the diverse, multicultural and cosmopolitan Singapore, many foreigners have flocked to our shores. Foreign students have come to obtain a good education from a global school. Foreign employers and employees have come to be part of a vibrant city, globally renowned for ease of doing business. Their accompanying family members have found a safe haven here. Many become Permanent Residents and eventually make Singapore their home. These new citizens together with their local compatriots have worked hard, and contributed to Singapore’s continued prosperity. Hand-in-hand, we are shaping our future, our best home.1 Immigration and Checkpoint Authority of Singapore

Singapore was, and remains, an immigrant society. Its immigration policy is heavily inflected by a pervasive sense of insecurity and economic vulnerability. Immigration in Singapore reflects two competing, perhaps even conflicting, anxieties. One is the state’s anxiety that if the population is not topped up adequately, quantitatively and qualitatively, then Singapore will 1

http://www.ica.gov.sg/page.aspx?pageid=273, accessed 4 June 2012. On file with author.

38 Eugene K .B. Tan

go down the path of economic malaise, social vulnerability, and political irrelevance. Thus, the policy imperative to keep the immigration doors open must be abidingly strong and not waver. As former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew put it recently: “Our choice must be the other one – taking in immigrants. I know Singaporeans do not feel very comfortable seeing so many strange new faces, but the alternative is economic stagnation and worse, nobody to look after our old people later on.”2 The state’s angst revolves around the average Singaporean’s apparent lack of receptivity to the government’s immigration policy, which in the official discourse is portrayed as a sine qua non for Singapore’s long-term well-being and success. Contrast this with the average Singaporean angst and anxiety that there are already too many immigrants in Singapore and that it is taking in too many immigrants. This view is particularly strong as the Singaporean economy undergoes restructuring at a time of global economic uncertainty. The liberal immigration policy is perceived as resulting in more competition in schools, for housing and jobs, a cause of runaway property prices, over-crowdedness in public spaces, the cheapening of the value of Singapore citizenship, the dilution of the Singaporean identity, and more. Even as the immigrant, whether transient or long-term, is being made a scapegoat for the various issues, the average Singaporean’s sense of being overwhelmed by the hordes of transient foreign workers and new immigrants further impinges on the fear factor that a liberal and rapid immigration evokes. A popular perception is that the immigration policy will ultimately do more harm than good to Singapore and Singaporeans alike. In turn, the average Singaporean’s apparent lack of acceptance of the immigration policy negatively affects the state’s efforts to recruit new immigrants. Indeed, the anti-foreigner sentiments are being more openly expressed on social media platforms as well as mainstream media.3

2 “Lee Kuan Yew calls for understanding towards immigration policy,” Channel NewsAsia, 3 February 2012, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1180821/1/. html. See further Lee’s views on immigration in Han Fook Kwang et al. (eds.), Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2011), chapter 7. 3 See, for example, “Call to ‘stand up against anti-foreigner tirades’,” The Straits Times, 2 June 2012, http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/Singapore/Story/STIStory_806218.html. Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, Minister for the Environment and Water Resources, was quoted in the article as saying: “We need to keep Singapore open and I am very disappointed with the tone of anti-foreigner feelings that I was reading on Facebook…We should never forget how we got here and succeeded because we are an open society and took in talented people, and so we flourished. We need some of you to stand up for us and say this … The person who contemptuously speaks about immigrants could also be capable of turning against the minorities here at home.”

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

39

What is obvious is the atmospherics of angst, anxiety, and even latent anger about immigration in Singapore ironically, an immigrant society and one still in need of immigration. At the same time, the “us” (Singaporeans) and “them” (foreigners/immigrants) divide is evident. Most Singaporeans can recite the rationale, especially the economic ones, for the large influx of people in the last decade, especially between 2005 and 2009. As the 2010 advanced census data revealed, the number of non-residents (foreigners working, living or studying in Singapore without permanent residence status) almost doubled from 754,500 in 2000 to 1.305 million in June 2010. Similarly, the number of permanent residents (PRs) almost doubled from 287,500 to 541,000 in the same period. In contrast, the number of citizens grew more modestly from 2,985,900 in 2000 to 3,230,700 in June 2010. By June 2012, there were 3,285,100 citizens and 533,100 PRs. 4 Indeed, reflecting Singapore’s cosmopolitanism and global city aspirations, one out of every four persons living in Singapore is a foreigner. Add to that another million or so of tourists a month visiting Singapore and it is easy to see why the apparent sense of displacement within one’s own backyard has been disconcerting for many Singaporeans. To compound the palpable concern in all quarters, the challenge in getting citizens to embrace a national policy like immigration is that not every citizen gains from it – at least at the personal level. It is not unusual for foreign workers and new immigrants to be blamed for a local job lost, stagnant wages, high property prices, and public infrastructure unable to keep up with the influx of immigrants. In short, the opportunity cost of a liberal immigration policy is perceived by the average Singaporean to be very high. The concern at all levels of the workforce is that local talent is being passed over given the preference for “foreign talent.” There is also a strong perception that Singaporeans are doing the bulk of the “heavy lifting” while the newcomers have it easy. In particular, Singaporeans regard National Service as a crucial marker of commitment and loyalty.5 So the societal ambivalence and visceral angst towards immigration is not only real but to be expected. This chapter is organized as follows. Part II briefly examines the global contextual realities in which Singapore’s immigration regime operates. I 4 2012 figures taken from Population in Brief 2012 (Singapore: National Population and Talent Division, September 2012), 2. See also chapter one of this volume for more details on the population increase. 5 See website of Institute of Policy Studies Conference on Integration on 21 May 2012 for presentations and newspaper articles on the conference at http://www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips/ Conf_Integration_210512.aspx.

40 Eugene K .B. Tan

argue that immigration-seeking countries, like Singapore, compete with each other for the same talent pool. At the same time, a country’s immigration regime, while packaged to appeal to the prospective immigrant, also needs to engender domestic acceptance and buy-in. Very often, the interests and needs of the foreign and domestic audiences not only compete but may also conflict. Parts III and IV are the meat of the chapter. Part III explores the evolving official discourse of immigration since the 1980s, considered against the backdrop of economic pragmatism and political realism. Notable is how the discourse has been robustly consistent even if the approaches to tackling persistent issues are adapted to the contextual realities. In Part IV, the immigration imperative in Singapore is examined given the significant demographic challenges posed by persistently low fertility rates and an ageing population, as well as the growing economic needs of an aspiring global city. Part V describes the recent efforts to integrate new immigrants better in light of continuing immigration. The chapter concludes by arguing for the need for an affective connection to the immigration policy if Singapore is to succeed in her global city aspirations.

The harsh reality and dilemma of the political economy of immigration With migration and globalization, boundaries between states, peoples, and identities have become more porous.6 Seemingly innocuous individual decisions and life-events – like marriage, starting a family, and migrating – collectively have significant public policy implications. The decision to migrate invariably challenges in various ways state sovereignty, the state’s ideology on citizenship, and the application of immigration and citizenship laws. For a young nation like Singapore, which still suffers from an acute sense of vulnerability as an “improbable nation,” these issues have become more poignant and contested in recent years. A state’s citizenship and immigration regime in the global political economy needs to be sensitive at two levels, both of which may have competing, if not, contradictory objectives. At one level, it needs to be responsive to local constituencies in the nation-building quest. Immigration inflows have to be managed so that the native population buys into and accepts the 6 Stephen Castles & Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 2000).

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

41

policy. All things being equal, prospective immigrants are more likely to migrate to a country where there is less opposition to immigration. Politically, immigration can be a vote-loser for governments if it is not managed properly and the local population resists the policy and new immigrants. At another level, a sovereign country’s citizenship and immigration regime needs to be responsive to the competitive and aggressive immigration regimes internationally that seek to attract migrants from the same talent pool. This race for talent is intense. Immigration is no longer about augmenting a country’s population or promoting family unity. The politicoeconomic dimension is increasingly significant, as the qualitative aspect of immigration becomes a crucial differentiator in deciding who should be admitted. It is no longer about numbers but more about attracting the right type of immigrant. Singapore’s global pursuit of human capital is also made more compelling given that developed countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and many European Union countries are competing to make themselves attractive immigration destinations. All these countries, like Singapore, have to appeal to and attract the well-educated and talented segment of the potential migrant pool to augment their human resource capability in their knowledge-based economies. As Shachar notes of the race for talent and knowledge workers, “... it is the human in ‘human capital’ that makes it a unique, distinct, and irreplaceable resource.”7 Besides the demand for such quality immigrants, the supply of such immigrants is likely to fall. The race for immigrants, particularly from the traditional source countries of Singapore immigrants, will only become more intense. Increasingly, the usual immigrant sources for Singapore – China, India, and Southeast Asia – are also experiencing demographic slowdowns. Furthermore, they are also experiencing significant economic growth as a result of which the push factors for emigration are weakened. Economic success in the emergent sites of growth in Asia is increasingly dependent on the state’s ability to articulate with transnational networks and global professionals who not only embrace self-enterprising values but also practise “flexible citizenship” in tandem with their mobility. 8 Thus, Singapore has to adroitly manage the competition for human capi7 Ayelet Shachar, “The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes,” New York University Law Review, vol. 81 (2006): 148-206 at 152. See also the essays in this volume of the New York University Law Review. 8 See generally Ong Aihwa, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

42 Eugene K .B. Tan

tal in a world marked by competitive immigration regimes. This reflects the larger reality that Singapore’s immigration regime can ill-afford to remain isolated from global developments. The citizenship regime and the immigration and emigration policy need to be as competitive as other countries seeking to attract the best-qualified migrants. Like many other developed countries, Singapore has had to reconceptualize membership boundaries for its citizenry in order to attract foreign talent and also not to lose homegrown talent, especially those in international marriages and the 200,000 Singaporeans who live overseas.9 However, the state’s rational, pragmatic, and economically driven discourse has lost much traction in the last few years. Growing resistance and stronger objections to the liberal immigration policy have been festering. The first significant manifestation of the general unhappiness and unease was during the 2011 general elections. Immigration was a ‘sleeper’ hot-button issue. Neither the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) and the opposition parties campaigned vigorously on population and immigration issues. The immigration issue was the proverbial elephant in the room. However, the PAP did not want to draw unnecessary attention to the issue given the brewing unhappiness. Similarly, the opposition parties did not want to be labelled as being anti-immigration. If there was any doubt about the public unease over immigration, the public uproar following the release in late January 2013 of the government’s controversial population white paper, A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore,10 made abundantly clear Singaporeans’ deep reservations about the long-term immigration plans proposed by the government. This included a “planning parameter” of a population of 6.9 million in 2030 which was widely interpreted instead as a population target. Much as the white paper was the government’s attempt to have Singaporeans understand the demographic and economic challenges and to seek support for the blueprint to start implementing some solutions for the long term, the population was not persuaded that the proposals would be in their 9 Ong Aihwa, “Please Stay: pied-a-terre subjects in the megacity,” Citizenship Studies, vol. 11 (2007): 83-93. For an examination of transnationality of international marriages in the Singaporean context, see Eugene K.B. Tan, “A Union of Gender Equality and Pragmatic Patriarchy: International Marriages and Citizenship Laws in Singapore,” Citizenship Studies, vol. 12, no.1 (February 2008): 73-89. 10 National Population and Talent Division, Population White Paper: A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapor, found at http://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/news/_jcr_content/ par_content/download_98/file.res/population-white-paper.pdf.

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

43

long-term interests and that Singaporeans came first. The angst and anxiety of Singaporeans over the rapid influx of immigrants was evident prior to and subsequent to the parliamentary debates on the population white paper. The population’s concerns include whether there was an undue emphasis on economic growth, and whether the long-term plans would distract from and compromise the ability to deal with current bread-and-butter issues such as the cost of living, rising property prices, and the inadequacy of public infrastructure to cope with the rapid increase in population in the past decade. Another set of concerns relate to identity, citizenship, and belonging and how large-scale immigration will dilute the Singaporean core and the Singapore identity. A third category of concerns revolve around whether the immigration policy will introduce heightened competition for jobs and admissions to schools, and whether the population policy would put the foreigner ahead of the Singaporean, with the benefits of the population policies not flowing to Singaporeans. In particular, this concern stems from the perception that Singaporeans are being discriminated in the workplace. There was also a strong perception that Singaporeans were doing the bulk of the “heavy lifting” while the newcomers have it easy and that local talent was being passed over for “foreign talent.” Put simply, the government’s proposals contributed to and heightened the palpable sense of displacement for many Singaporeans. Ultimately, immigration is often regarded as a political and economic necessity by the political elites. Immigration in the twenty-first century for rapidly ageing societies like Singapore becomes a means of managing, if not countering, an existential threat. Despite the demographic slowdown globally and domestically, the need for a vibrant economy as well as the maintenance of an optimal-sized workforce for economic growth remains. With intense competition for talented immigrants, Singapore cannot afford to adopt a citizenship and immigration regime that is unappealing and which is not cognizant of the competition. With more Singaporeans overseas and Singapore’s own urgent need for foreign talent to drive its economy and maintain its population, Singapore has to increasingly adopt international practices and norms in order to be able to compete for its share of talent. At the same time, absent citizens are increasingly being factored into the political economy dynamics of human capital, nation-building, and foreign policy. For Singapore, a healthy and sustained immigration is taken as a key competitive advantage. For the government, this policy has to be pursued steadfastly, even in times of economic slowdown.

44 Eugene K .B. Tan

Immigration: A Singaporean way of life?11 As the conventional wisdom goes, when Stamford Raffles of the British East India Company founded Singapore on 29 January 1819, Singapore had a miniscule population of about 150 comprising of about 120 Malays and the rest Chinese. With the establishment of an entrepôt, Singapore attracted droves of immigrants from Malaya, the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), other Southeast Asia countries, China, and the Indian sub-continent. To be sure, many of them saw themselves as sojourners rather than permanent immigrants. By the first headcount in 1824, the population had grown to 10,683. By 1849, the population had increased by about five times to 52,891. By the turn of the twentieth century, ethnic Chinese constituted 72.1 percent of the local population, Malays 15.8 percent, and Indians 7.8 percent. This racial distribution has remained constant since then. As Saw notes, by 1836, seven years after the founding of modern Singapore, the Chinese had already outnumbered the Malays. Put simply if not starkly, immigration occurring in the past had changed the racial complexion of Singapore indelibly. Today, Singapore remains the only sovereign country in Southeast Asia where (former) immigrants dominate political and economic life. Yet, immigration remains a constant in Singapore, its abiding presence and impact evident and continuing. As Saw’s statistical tabulation of the post-World War II period demonstrates, net migration inflows overwhelmingly took over indigenous population growth as the primary contributor to population growth from 1990 onwards: Period 1947-57 1957-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 2000-2010

Population growth 507,800 628,600 339,400 633,187 970,601 1,058,988

Natural Increase

Net Migration

395,600 438,249 315,400 438,249 330,030 394,905

112,200 164,185 24,000 194,938 640,571 664,083

Source: Saw Swee Hock, The Population of Singapore, 3rd Edition (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012)

Since 2000, the presence of immigrants has become particularly conspicuous as the number of foreigners in Singapore has grown visibly. In 2000, 11 Figures in this section are obtained from Saw Swee Hock, The Population of Singapore, 3rd edition (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), chapters 2 and 3.

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

45

there were 754,524 non-residents. This number jumped to 1.305 million in 2010, 1.394 million in June 2011, 1.494 million in June 2012 and 1.554 million by June 2013. One-third of the workforce in Singapore is foreign, most of whom are in Singapore on short-term work permits (such as domestic workers from the Philippines and Indonesia, or construction workers from China, India, and Bangladesh) or employment passes. The others are foreign students on student visas or dependants of employment pass holders. Given the numbers and the inability of the public infrastructure to cope with the influx of immigrants, the presence of foreigners has been experienced by Singaporeans as grating. Complaints range from their behaviour in public to crowded public transport, shopping malls, beaches, and parks. There are also complaints of Chinese nationals in the service industry who cannot serve Singapore’s non-Chinese population due to their limited English language proficiency. In Singapore, the nature of the discourse on immigration has, naturally, evolved over the last four decades. From the 1960s through to the late 1990s, the regulatory focus dominated the immigration regime, with stringent and punitive laws regulating family reunions and illegal immigrants respectively. In the early 1970s, concerns over foreign visitors bringing in inappropriate values resulted in the policy that all longhaired foreigners had to cut their hair as a pre-condition for entering Singapore. Notwithstanding these operational concerns, the theme of immigration for economic objectives has been salient throughout Singapore’s history since independence. In 1983, then Minister of State for Law and Home Affairs Professor S. Jayakumar explained the government’s policy on granting of permanent residence to foreigners: … our policy on the granting of permanent residence to foreigners is a strict one and is geared to protect and advance the national interests of Singapore. Singapore is only a small island with one of the highest population densities in the world. We cannot afford to grant permanent residence as liberally as other countries endowed with larger land areas and natural resources. Our policy on permanent residence, like other Government policies, must give paramount consideration to safeguarding the interest of the vast majority of Singaporeans. We must also bear in mind that permanent residence is a first step towards acquisition of Singapore citizenship. It also carries other privileges, such as, in the area of housing, education, medical facilities, which are not available to other foreigners. Therefore, our immigration policy on the grant of permanent residence has to be consistent with our national goal of

46 Eugene K .B. Tan

promoting economic growth and maintaining a high standard of living for our people. Our policy on permanent residence seeks to attract foreign investors, skilled entrepreneurs, professionals and skilled workers who can contribute to our economic well-being.12

The problem of illegal immigration gained ascendency as Singapore’s economy prospered in the halcyon days of the 1980s to the mid-1990s. In 1998, amendments to the Immigration Act were passed by parliament to provide for enhanced penalties to tackle immigration offences, and ultimately “to make Singapore a safer and more secure home for all Singaporeans.”13 Slightly more than a decade earlier, in 1986, then Home Affairs Minister Professor S Jayakumar responded in parliament to concerns that Singapore’s strict immigration policy lacked humanitarianism: … our immigration policy must be shaped by the constraints, the problems and circumstances of our own country. Certain key statistics already indicate the dimensions of our problem. All of us know the size of our country, the available resources, the density of population, the scarcity of land which has been outlined by the Minister for National Development before. As a backdrop, last year more than 198,000 people applied for extension of the various passes. They are potentially long-term social visit pass holders and potential de facto permanent residents. More than 11,000 persons applied for permanent residence. … As it is, we have about 130,000 permanent residents, each one of them a potential citizen. Last year there were more than 46,000 persons who overstayed illegally and they tried desperately to stay on in Singapore, even if it meant illegal presence. The ideal perhaps is to take a humanitarian approach to our problems: open the floodgates, let everyone who wants to become a permanent resident and citizen become a permanent resident and citizen. But every decision that we take on permanent residence or citizenship has implications for the rest of society. It has implications for the rest of Singaporeans, the vast majority of our citizens, because permanent residence and citizenship bring along with it not only rights but it also brings privileges to education, housing, medical and other facilities. When it comes to citizenship, it also brings along with it political rights of voting, standing for elections, and so on.

12 Hansard, vol. 42, cols. 736-737 (14 March 1983). 13 Hansard, vol. 69, col. 939 (4 September 1988).

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

47

I would like Members to bear in mind these parameters, the realistic dimensions of our problems. I therefore do not hide the fact that we have a strict immigration policy but I make no apology for it because this is necessary by the very nature of our circumstances, our constraints and our problems. It would be disastrous to take a purely humanitarian approach to our immigration policy and to let in all who apply. We must and we will be cautious. Permanent residence and citizenship is not a right. It is a privilege. Persons will be assessed on the merits of each case. There is a balance between considerations of whether they will be an asset, useful to Singapore, together with considerations of compassion, connections with Singapore, family roots and so on. This is the backdrop which we must never lose sight of, for it is very easy and tempting to talk about a very liberal policy on immigration.14

By the mid-1980s, the tenor of Singapore’s talent approach to immigration was clear. The presumed threat that immigration posed to Singaporeans was already flagged then. For instance, then Home Affairs Minister S Jayakumar said in parliament in 1988: High calibre and trained people from abroad are essential to supplement our limited talent pool. Larger and more developed countries like Canada and Australia have also recognized the importance of infusion of foreign talents to help the development of their countries and they are actively recruiting from the same sources as us. The present inflow of qualified immigrants is still low and is not sufficient to counter our decline in population fertility and offset the number of talented Singaporeans who have emigrated. Given the small numbers involved, it is unlikely that Hong Kong or other foreign professionals and entrepreneurs can adversely affect the career prospects of Singaporeans with similar qualifications or business acumen. On the contrary, such foreign talents will bring with them the kind of skills, enterprise and drive which will provide additional impetus for our economic growth and, in fact, create economic opportunities for more Singaporeans.15

The debates in parliament on the topic of Singapore’s immigration policy picked up pace in the 1980s with the increase in the number of immigrants 14 Hansard, vol. 47, col 1391 (27 March 1986). 15 Hansard, vol. 51, col. 363 (28 June 1988).

48 Eugene K .B. Tan

in Singapore, in tandem with Singapore’s growing economic performance. Emigration had by the mid-1980s become a rather significant issue that appeared on the horizon and which continues to resonate today. For example, it was reported in parliament that between 1977 and October 1987, 8,144 persons had renounced their Singaporean citizenship while 2,772 persons had their Singapore citizenship terminated on the grounds that they had taken up other citizenship in the same period. The approach and belief that “talent begets and attracts talent” and the need to make Singapore a vibrant, cosmopolitan global city were well-rooted in the official discourse: There are, however, others who have emigrated but have not yet renounced their citizenship. These statistics tell one part of the story. During the same 10-year period, 88,132 persons acquired Singapore citizenship. Another 67,400 persons became permanent residents. Every Singaporean, especially a skilled and talented person, who decides to leave permanently is a loss to Singapore. Although more people are sinking their roots in Singapore than those who are leaving, there is no room for complacency. Many who might in the past have come to Singapore are now going to countries such as Australia and Canada. Even some Singaporeans are going to these countries. If nothing is done and the trickle turns into a torrent, the well-being of all Singaporeans will be seriously affected. Singaporeans are free to travel. We cannot prevent people from leaving. Therefore, we must make life in Singapore more satisfying so that fewer people will want to emigrate. While we cannot duplicate the ski slopes and natural sceneries of Vancouver or Perth, we can and must recognize and reward talent and ability and make Singapore a more pleasant place to live in. Then more foreigners who can contribute to our society will want to settle here, and fewer Singaporeans will be tempted to leave.16

Today, the government remains steadfast in its belief that Singapore must welcome immigrants as a way of augmenting Singapore’s population but also as a way of keeping Singaporean talent. In a speech to pre-university students in May 2012, Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean noted: One of the dilemmas we have is that making you world-ready has also made you world-mobile. In fact, you can go and find your future anywhere in the world. But we also don’t want to do the opposite – which is to 16 Hansard, vol. 50, col. 160 (11 January 1988) per Minister of State for Home Affairs Dr Lee Boon Yang.

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

49

limit the way you are educated so you can’t go anywhere. I think, in the end, what we do want to do is … continue to strive to make Singapore as vibrant and attractive a place for Singaporeans.17

As immigrant numbers grew rapidly along with the stresses they placed on the infrastructure and social fabric, public concern over immigration grew strongly in tandem. Yet, anti-immigrant sentiments were not overtly expressed even during economic recessions. Very often, foreign workers were the first to be let go. Conflict was avoided since economic resources were never in short supply even during the downturns. Further, due to their transient existence in Singapore, immigrants never wielded sufficient political and economic clout nor constituted a viable electoral bloc. N. Ganesan succinctly describes the contribution that transient foreign workers make to Singapore’s political economy: … [T]heir presence allays fears regarding the long-term sustainability of the country, sustains high economic growth levels, and lowers the cost of social reproduction. Additionally, migrants from Asia are comfortable with the status quo in Singapore and less likely than citizens to challenge the tone and temper of the domestic political culture.18

But the rapid immigration influx that occurred between 2005 and 2009 made immigrants a pervasive presence in every segment of Singapore society. Unsurprisingly, immigration was a hot-button issue in the May 2011 general elections. No political party campaigned vigorously on population and immigration issues, although the Workers’ Party manifesto dealt with it at some length. The reason was simple. No party wanted to be labelled xenophobic even as Singaporeans became increasingly concerned about the rapid influx of immigrants. But there was no mistaking the fact that immigrants were made the scapegoat for increased costs of living, crowded public transport, rising housing prices, job insecurity, and depressed wage levels among low-income workers. The multitude of feelings associated with Singapore’s immigration policy certainly gained traction across broad swathes of the electorate from lowincome Singaporeans to upper middle-class Singaporeans. During the 2011 election campaign, the opposition took the ruling People’s Action Party to 17 “Unemployment, recession top concerns of students,” The Straits Times, 30 May 2012, p. B2. 18 Narayanan Ganesan, “Singapore in 2008: A Few Highs and Lows while Bracing for the Future,” Asian Survey, vol. 49 (1) (2009): 213-219, 218.

50 Eugene K .B. Tan

task for not effectively managing these problems before they arose. The theme of protecting the home turf was a powerful one. Low Thia Khiang, the leading opposition leader from the Workers’ Party, captured voters’ concerns well in his team’s victory speech on 8 May 2011: “Your votes tell us that the government that you want is a home, not just a house. Your votes tell the world that Singapore is not just an economic success to you. Singapore is our home.” Significantly, in the “new normal” politics of Singapore, newly elected President Tony Tan Kheng Yam pointed to the dissatisfaction with immigration as a “new fault line” in Singapore society: Even as we pursue our different interests, we must also deepen our sense of common purpose. Our diversity must not divide us. Fault lines in our society have to be carefully managed. We have done well in strengthening racial and religious harmony. Now we must try hard to prevent a new fault line from forming between local-born Singaporeans and recent immigrants. The Government is slowing the inflow to ensure that new arrivals not only contribute economically, but also embrace our values and integrate into our society. Singaporeans, for our part, should help them become part of our Singapore family, just as our forefathers settled here in earlier generations.19

This description of the divide between local-born Singaporeans and recent immigrants as a fault line is new. Prior to this, race and religion were the widely accepted fault lines in Singapore society. This points to a divide within Singapore society caused by immigration and highlights the contrasting positions of the government and citizens on immigration. Yet, all politics is local in that the immigration regime (including the legal framework as well as state policy and practice on immigration from recruitment to arrival to settlement), while ostensibly addressed to a foreign audience, has to be mindful of and accountable to the local audience. The rapid intake of immigrants in Singapore in the first decade of the twenty-first century, which came on top of an already relatively large immigrant base, added to citizens’ growing wariness, antipathy, and even nascent antagonism to the immigration regime and the new immigrants. Ironically, much of the 19 Hansard, vol. 88, col 37 (10 October 2011). On the “new normal” in Singapore politics, see Eugene K.B. Tan, “Transitioning to a ‘New Normal’ in a Post-Lee Kuan Yew Era,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2012 (eds.) Daljit Singh & Pushpa Thambipillai (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012): 265-282.

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

51

antagonism is directed at immigrants from mainland China, the cultural motherland of ethnic Chinese-Singaporeans. The anti-foreigner rhetoric went into overdrive following a fatal traffic accident in May 2012 involving a Ferrari owned and driven by a Chinese national residing in Singapore with his family, a Singaporean taxi-driver and a Japanese taxi passenger. All three died in the accident. In an unprecedented move, the Consular Department of the Chinese Embassy in Singapore issued a statement: We are saddened and regret this unfortunate accident. We offer our sincere and deep condolences to the victims and their families. We hope that Chinese citizens living in Singapore will respect life, value the safety of themselves and others, abide by its laws and regulations, and live responsibly and gracefully. We hope that such tragic and unfortunate incidents will not recur.20

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that immigration control alone, while necessary in any effective immigration regime, is not sufficient. Immigration control, particularly at a time of growing immigration, must be complemented by efforts to integrate new immigrants. Integration should not be left to chance, and efforts must be made to ensure that immigrant enclaves do not develop. Such enclaves are not just physical manifestations of how citizens and immigrants lead separate lives but – more worryingly – may also reflect the reluctance of new immigrants to integrate. The most notable shift in the Singapore case is that the government’s previous emphasis on immigration control has given way to a combination of immigration control and immigration integration. This is because immigration can and will continue to generate socio-economic insecurities among Singaporeans. In addition, with Singaporeans’ sense of national identity now stronger, the cultural and behavioural differences between immigrants and natives contribute to the latent angst and anxieties. With stringent immigration control always a given in Singapore’s immigration regime, the focus on immigration integration has become a growing focal point in Singapore’s context. Specifically, issues surrounding immigrant-native integration should be critical work areas for policymakers if they are to avoid immigration becoming a political hot potato with ramifications for economic and social policies, let alone the political implications. 20 See letter to The Straits Times (17 May 2012, p. A33), “Respect S’pore laws: Chinese Embassy” by Wen Penghui, First Secretary, Consular Department, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Singapore.

52 Eugene K .B. Tan

The immigration imperative A well-calibrated immigration policy is a boon to a receiving country, especially if that country is experiencing a lack of native demographic generativity. As Singaporeans are severely under-reproducing, the demographic need to top up Singapore’s population and import foreign labour to meet its economic needs are critical policy imperatives. In 2004, Singapore’s total fertility rate (TFR) had reached a historic low of 1.24 (i.e. an average of 1.24 babies per woman), among the lowest in the world. In 2010, the figure went down further to 1.15. This precipitous decline is not a recent phenomenon, as Singapore’s TFR had already fallen below the replacement level of 2.1 by the late 1970s. This can be attributed to an overly successful population control regime which coincided with a period of rapid economic growth. Both contributed to changed social attitudes even as Singapore’s TFR declined to below replacement level as early as 1976. As of June 2013, Singapore citizens and permanent residents (PRs) accounted for 61.4 and 9.84 per cent of the total population of 5.4 million. The immigration of new citizens and temporary workers has become, and will continue to be, the primary means by which the population is replenished and rightsized for its demographic and economic requirements.21 This heavy reliance or even dependence on foreign manpower, whether high-skilled or low-skilled, is an abiding feature of Singapore’s economic life.22 For without foreign manpower: … [O]ur industries would have been handicapped and we would not have been able to achieve robust levels of growth. Overall, our flexible foreign workforce policies have enabled us to maintain a critical competitive edge over competing economies by allowing companies to expand their 21 Then Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong analyzed the problem starkly: “This means that we are not replacing both parents. The last time we were replacing both parents was 30 years ago [1976]. And that was a Dragon Year! If the total fertility rate falls further, we will not be replacing even the mother! Will Singapore last 100 years if local-born Singaporeans are becoming an endangered species?” (Goh, The Singapore nation: A work in progress, speech by the Senior Minister at the Marine Parade National Day Dinner, 19 August 2006.) In the Chinese horoscope, the Year of the Dragon (which occurs once every twelve years in the Chinese zodiac cycle) is regarded as an auspicious time to have a child. By 2005, all races in Singapore were reproducing below replacement level. 22 For a general overview, see Brenda S.A. Yeoh & Natalie Yap, “Gateway Singapore: Immigration Policies, Differential (Non)Incorporation, and Identity Politics,” in Migrants to the Metropolis: The Rise of Immigrant Gateway Cities (eds.) Marie Price & Lisa Benton-Short (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 177-202.

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

53

workforce quickly to capitalize on opportunities, at the same time creating more and better jobs for our citizens.23

The political leadership has urged Singaporeans to accept the “trade-offs” that result from an economy heavily dependent on foreign labour. Then National Development Minister Mah Bow Tan put the stark choices when it came to Singaporeans’ “not in my backyard” attitude towards the siting of housing for these foreign workers: “If we want more foreign workers, we must collectively make adjustments to resolve the social problems. If we want fewer foreign workers, we must be prepared for slower growth, higher costs, lower service levels and delays in the completion of our flats, our roads, our rail lines.”24 Although the relatively liberal immigration policy has discomforted Singaporeans to varying degrees, the government is steadfast in its commitment to the open-door immigration policy. The premise remains consistent and unwavering: Singapore must continue to attract new immigrants and foreign workers to boost the population numbers and to support the economy. The consequence of straying from this commitment is presented in stark terms: If Singapore is uncompetitive in the race for talented migrants, the population will decline quantitatively and qualitatively. Consequently, the economy will slow down and this will add to the relative unattractiveness of Singapore as an immigrant destination. In short, immigration is seen in the governance perspective as a sine qua non, a must-have if Singapore is to manage the triple whammy of a very low birth rate, an ageing population, and a maturing economy. There are two scenarios as presented in Lee Kuan Yew’s Hard Truths: Scenario 1: Migrants continue to come in significant numbers. The flow slows in later years as development and standards of living in China and India catch up with Singapore’s. Some outflow is expected every year as a 23 Home Affairs Minister’s written answer of 20 October 2008 to a parliamentary question whether future immigration policies would be tightened given that population statistics then revealed that citizens comprised only 65% of the total population. 24 “Fewer foreign workers? The price is slower growth,” The Straits Times, 21 October 2008. The rapid increase in the number of foreign workers in Singapore had led to a lack of decent housing for them. Some Singaporeans are concerned that a foreign worker dormitory in their residential neighbourhood would lead to increased crime, disorderly behaviour, and that the value of their residential properties would be negatively affected. See “A dangerous divide,” TODAY, 18 September 2008; “Serangoon Gardens dorm to go ahead,” The Straits Times, 4 October 2008; “Margaret Drive to get foreign worker dorm,” The Straits Times, 4 December 2008.

54 Eugene K .B. Tan

number of citizens and permanent residents relocate overseas. But with a healthy inflow of immigrants, the workforce is dynamic enough to allow Singapore to maintain robust economic growth. There are enough young people to defend the country and look after the elderly. Scenario 2: No migration. The labour force contracts overnight. Economic growth slows down straightaway and even becomes negative in subsequent years. The economy shrinks. The working population feels squeezed by higher healthcare and social costs rise as the number of older people goes up. Talented Singaporeans leave for greener pastures. Singapore may never recover once trapped in this downward spiral.

Lee Kuan Yew asserts with characteristic determination that “we cannot be diverted from this course, which has been carefully calculated, just because of a recession and the grumbles.” Indeed, the government approaches immigration not just as a mere question of demographic top-ups and ensuring that there are sufficient manpower resources for the city-state’s economic needs. Immigration is pursued with an instrumental bent. Immigrants are also seen as integral to the state effort to rejuvenate the native population, providing not only the opportunity to “top up” the population but also with immigrants who are hungry and determined to make a success of their new lives in Singapore. As Lee puts it, “I see them as a spur to make Singaporeans strive harder to compete, which is a good thing. If we’re able to spread them out, they cannot influence us more than we influence them. The change will not be that great. Their children become Singaporeans.”25 Given the political elites’ penchant for pragmatism in policy and governance, Singaporeans are familiar with the economic logic of an open-door immigration policy, as the government has consistently trotted out the economic arguments. In a very recent articulation on immigration vis-à-vis the realities of a declining and ageing population, Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean noted: I think it is better to think in terms of if we are going to have 900,000 people over the age of 65 compared to the 340,000 that we have today, a three-fold increase, then we really need to ask ourselves who is going to help, say, in the home. Some will want to have domestic help. Who are going to staff up all the healthcare and hospital facilities that we would need? Who are going to staff up, say, the nursing homes and commu25 Han Fook Kwang et al. (eds), Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths, 279.

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

55

nity step-down facilities that we would need? We may not have enough Singaporeans to do that. Therefore, even just in these sectors alone, we are going to need many more people in order to make sure that our older population will be properly looked after. So just in these areas alone, I think there will be considerable needs for foreign manpower. So I think when we put the question across in this way and say, “All right, who is going to look after you?” I think that is a question which people will then begin to think, well, okay, maybe we do need some foreign nurses, foreign healthcare assistants, and so forth. Or who is going to build the homes that you want? Or who is going to build the MRT system that we all want? Is it going to be done all by Singaporeans? I think the answer is “no”. And so then we will need some of these foreign manpower.26

However, this rendition emphasising the need for immigration – contrasted with the alternative scenario of a lower quality of life and increased costs of living – remains quintessentially material and pragmatic. There is limited appeal to the affective dimension that a contested major public policy like immigration is so badly in need of. To compound matters, as a consequence of close to half a century of nation-building, Singaporeans are beginning to imbibe an aspirational and affective approach towards citizenship. This precipitation of a stronger, more nuanced Singaporean national identity and belonging mean that a hyper-rationalistic justification of immigration is not likely to nurture an affective acceptance of the immigration policy and regime.27 Singaporeans’ growing sense of national identity has made them more protective of the home turf; the economic and other rationalistic justifications seem all too expedient and enervating of the national spirit. The immigrant is often seen, quite mono-dimensionally, as an economic migrant. As first-generation male immigrants are exempted from Singapore’s compulsory national service requirements, this is another sore point for Singaporean males, who serve two years of conscript service followed by reservist duties up to 40 or 50 years of age depending on their rank. Hence, it is not surprising that questions and doubts persist over the ability and willingness of new immigrants to integrate and nurture a sense of belonging and loyalty to Singapore. Singapore’s over-exuberance and determination to attract foreigners to be permanent residents, and subsequently to become citizens, had resulted 26 Hansard, vol. 89 (14 May 2012). 27 As is often said, the longest distance is between the head and the heart.

56 Eugene K .B. Tan

in permanent residents being granted similar privileges as citizens, save for the right to vote in national elections. For instance, for the purpose of admission to primary schools and healthcare subsidies, permanent residents were treated on a par with citizens. This policy of privileging permanent residents through parity with citizens was unpopular. Consequently, a conscious retreat from such privileging was necessary not only to assuage public anger but also to bolster the “Consider Singaporean First” credentials of the immigration regime. The state’s dominant discourse in the immigration regime slowly but surely elicited a reaction from Singaporeans feeling the economic and social impact of the swift uptakes of new citizens and permanent residents in the past decade. The state’s immigration imperative was perceived in a different light, necessitating not so much a retreat but a re-calibration of the policy: not just of numbers but also the need to assure Singaporeans that their status as citizens is not at risk of being diluted. In this regard, immigration control remains a constant, with the numbers watched carefully against the context of the comfort level of the Singaporeans. As such, the augmentation of new citizens and PRs will not reach the unprecedented numbers in high-water mark years of 2008 and 2009. Another significant change lies in the emphasis on immigration integration to ensure, even with the reduced intake of immigrants, that there is better cohesion between the new citizens and the established citizenry. Taken together, there is the recognition that immigration control and integration are central to a politically and socially sustainable immigration regime. This need to secure a political buy-in has now become a political imperative as well, given that immigration is seen to be the primary cause of higher costs of living, runaway property prices in land-scarce Singapore, and public infrastructure and transport becoming stretched to its limits. Using the platform of his 2010 National Day Rally, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong sought to address the public’s general discontentment and ambivalence over the government’s immigration policy.28 He reiterated the commitment to citizens first, reflected in a pecking order of citizens being treated better than PRs, and PRs better than non-residents. Prime Minister Lee also announced a slew of measures and policy tweaks designed to emphasize that citizenship has its privileges (and responsibilities). This included the National Service Recognition Award (NSRA) for national 28 A transcript of the Prime Minister’s National Day Rally speech delivered on 29 August 2010 can be found at http://www.pmo.gov.sg/content/pmosite/mediacentre/speechesninterviews/ primeminister/2010/August/national_day_rallyspeechenglishbyprimeministerleehsienloongon29a.html.

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

57

servicemen to “recognise (their) contributions and sacrifices.” In education, the government gave the assurance of sufficient school and university places while also creating more educational opportunities and recognizing different peaks of excellence. To cope with the demands on public infrastructure as a result of the influx of immigrants, Lee pledged that the government is “doing everything we can” in public transport, such as expanding the capacity of the mass rapid transit system to deal with congestion. On housing, a perennial hot-button issue, Lee promised that more HDB flats would be built and that public housing choices for the “sandwiched class” – who were previously priced out of the private property market – would be widened. Anti-speculation property measures were also introduced to curb the overexuberance in the property market.29 The premise of this commitment is to “always keep HDB flats within the reach of Singaporeans.” Are these initiatives, pledges, and commitments enough to reassure Singaporeans that the current immigration regime is not to their detriment? Reactions, not surprisingly, were strong and varied. There were criticisms that the NSRA amount was too small and almost demeaning. At the other extreme was the view that the NSRA “cheapens” citizenship and national service. Critics charge that the anti-speculation measures aimed at the property market were too late in that the property price froth was already well entrenched in both the public and private real estate markets. In essence, the government’s efforts on this front were “too little, too late.” Concerned that Singaporeans were not distinguishing between transient immigrants and long-term or permanent immigrants, Lee also urged Singaporeans to draw a distinction between the two broad categories of immigrants. It is the latter group comprising primarily of permanent residents and new citizens who must feel that they belong if they are to grow their roots in Singapore. As the census data allude to, the conversion rate of PRs to citizens is not that promising. At the same time, the low conversion rate is perceived by Singaporeans as an expression of the immigrants’ lack of commitment to Singapore and of how the immigration regime did not provide enough impetus to non-citizens to acquire Singaporean citizenship. Given the deep ramifications of a liberal and aggressive immigration policy, it was surprising that the government’s famed “pre-emptive” approach in policymaking – that of managing, if not resolving, problems before they arise – was seemingly absent, resulting in the design of its immigration policy throwing up a variety of problems. Even as record numbers 29 Since 2009, the government has implemented seven rounds of measures designed to cool the housing market.

58 Eugene K .B. Tan

were admitted into Singapore, the government – reacting to strong public sentiment – was compelled to implement several measures to manage domestic concerns over the immigrant influx. The imperative to assuage domestic discontent necessitated a series of measures since 2009 designed to fine-tune the immigration policy. The National Population and Talent Division (NPTD) was created under the Prime Minister’s Office to effect better whole-of-government policymaking and implementation.30 The immigration framework was tightened in late 2009 resulting in a less liberal issuance of permanent residencies. The number of persons granted PR status fell from 79,167 in 2008 to 59,460 in 2009 and declined further to 29,265 in 2010 and 27,521 in 2011. In 2012, 29,891 new PRs were granted. Controls on Singapore’s transient foreign workforce were tightened as a quick way to manage the burgeoning numbers. The slew of measures included higher qualifying salaries for holders of the Employment Pass (EP) and the S-Pass, the tightening of eligibility requirements for EP holders, and increments to the foreign worker levy rates and tiers for S-Pass and Work Permit (WP) holders.31 The focus is to reduce Singaporeans’ dependence on low-skilled/unskilled foreign workers with as much haste as possible while keeping the doors open to long-term skilled immigration. Leveraging on the first major priority of the government’s fiscal year 2012-13 budget of “restructuring our economy, to grow on the basis of skills, innovation and productivity,” the goal is to “avoid its proportion of the total workforce increasing steadily beyond one-third.”32 The finance minister emphasized that Singapore “should not indefinitely increase our dependence on foreign labour” even with full employment for Singaporeans and the shortage of labour in many sectors of the economy. From 2010, to catalyze the reduction of demand for foreign workers, phased increases in foreign worker levies were introduced and fully implemented by July 2013. In addition, the eligibility criteria for Employment Pass (EP) and S Pass holders were raised again (i.e., 30 “The National Population and Talent Division (NPTD) strives to achieve a sustainable and cohesive population that supports a vibrant economy, with a strong Singaporean core. To do this, NPTD drives the coordination and implementation of population policies across Government agencies. These include policies and programmes across four strategic thrusts: supporting marriage and parenthood, engaging and rooting talent, naturalising and integrating our new immigrants, and engaging overseas Singaporeans.” Obtained from NPTD’s website at https:// www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/home.html 31 Hansard, vol. 88, cols. 81-82 (16 January 2012) per Deputy Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister Teo Chee Hean. 32 Quotes in this section are taken from the Budget Speech delivered on 17 February 2012; available at http://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/budget_2012/budget_speech.html.

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

59

tighter criteria and higher qualifying salaries) in January 2012.33 Underlining the government’s intent, the finance minister said in his February 2012 budget statement: “We have no alternative but to slow down the growth of our foreign workforce.” Specifically, the government introduced a calibrated reduction in the dependency ratio ceilings (DRCs) in the manufacturing and services sectors.34 It also gave notice that it would consider further increases in the foreign worker levy beyond July 2013. Collectively, these measures have the important effect of demonstrating the government’s commitment to reduce the number of foreign workers. Singaporeans were warned that Singapore’s growth could be curtailed for as long as three years as Singapore weaned itself off its dependence on cheap foreign workers while improving its productivity against the backdrop of urgent economic restructuring.35 Restrictions to Singapore’s foreign manpower policy were introduced to help manage the perceptions of runaway immigration. The policy intent is to ensure that the quantitative concern (regarding the number of temporary immigrants) does not imperil the qualitative imperative (the raison d’être of long-term immigrants). The discussion above might suggest that the government is backtracking on its immigration policy. However, it is worth noting that the government is focused on reducing the transient foreign worker population but, while left unsaid, the race for talented immigrants continues unrelentlessly for sure. Similarly, the need to retain talent is also a key concern for Singapore. Take, for example, the state’s response to talent leakage through international marriages. The data over the last decade reveals that about four in ten marriages registered in Singapore involved a Singaporean resident (citizen or permanent resident) marrying a non-Singaporean resident. In response to the growing trend of international marriages among Singaporeans, the constitution was amended in 2004 to make Singapore’s citizenship law gender-neutral by enabling Singaporean women married to foreign spouses to transmit their Singaporean citizenship to their foreign-born children. The state’s attempt to embrace international marriages involving Singapore citizens, while a welcomed and belated move, was also inevitable. Much as the citizenship law changes positively affect children born of such unions, the state also benefits by embracing this societal change. Indeed, Singapore stoically resisted the liberalization of its citizenship laws and had

33 This was also to keep pace with the improving salaries of Singaporean PMETs (Professionals, Managers, Executives, and Technicians). 34 The DRCs specify the maximum proportion of foreign workers that companies can hire. 35 “Spore may take 3 years to ease reliance on foreign workers: Goh,” TODAY, 7 June 2013, 2.

60 Eugene K .B. Tan

stubbornly refused to remove its discriminatory policy towards foreign-born children of Singaporean mothers married to a foreign spouse for too long. In Singapore’s context, women professionals are more likely than not to marry their educational equals.36 Given the state’s belief that better educated parents beget brighter children, the prospect of “losing” Singaporean mothers and their foreign-born children is a potential human resource loss that should be avoided. There are also consequent “losses” if children born overseas to Singaporean mothers do not identify with Singapore simply because they lack the affective nexus to Singapore without Singaporean citizenship. Thus, I argue elsewhere that the changes were motivated by pragmatic considerations of demographic necessity, the political economy of migration, talent augmentation and international marriages, as well as the political and economic realities of a globalizing world.37 Seen in the larger context of Singapore’s quest for “talent” to boost its economy and population, Singapore is forced to re-strategize. What might the economic benefits to Singapore be from taking a more nuanced and less paternalistic view of international marriages? Singapore’s economy is not dependent on remittances from its overseas-based nationals. Rather, it is the intangible human capital “losses” that worry the political elites. In addition, absent citizens or former citizens with positive affective bonds to Singapore may create economic opportunities in/for Singapore through investments or entering into economic partnerships with Singaporean businesses or individuals whether in Singapore or overseas. The government has also not precluded the return migration of overseas Singaporeans and, to a lesser extent, ex-citizens. Here the Singapore government is learning from the network capitalism experience of diasporic Indian, Chinese, and Jewish entrepreneurs who move regularly between the United States and their ancestral homelands, establishing substantial cross-border economic activity, capital transfers through investments, collaborative technology transfer, access to markets, entrepreneurial connections, and information networks.38 36 Singaporean men tend to marry “down” (hypogamy) while Singaporean women tend to marry “up” (hypergamy). This results in proportionately more lower-educated men and more better-educated women remaining unmarried. Graduate females show the highest tendency to remain single. In the 40-44 age group, 26 percent of graduate females were single in 2005. This compares with 11 percent for females with below secondary qualifications. On the other hand, male Singaporeans with below secondary qualifications have the highest tendency to remain single (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2006a, 7). 37 Eugene K.B. Tan, “A Union of Gender Equality and Pragmatic Patriarchy: International Marriages and Citizenship Laws in Singapore,” Citizenship Studies, 12 (1) (2008): 73-89. 38 Some works dealing with this topic include Anna Saxenian, The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Bernard P.

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

61

Immigration integration The immigration imperative, as espoused by the state, does not take away the concomitant imperative for the immigration policy to be socially sustainable so that it can remain politically feasible. Notwithstanding the social and political impact of immigration policy in recent years, the government abidingly believes that the policy is socially and politically sustainable. On the other hand, while sentiments are hard to gauge in the absence of reliable data, Singaporeans appear not to share the same optimism envisaged in the population white paper of 2013 that Singapore is able to cope with a growing population. These doubts as to the sustainability of the immigration roadmap makes it likely that the immigration regime will remain contested for the foreseeable future. Renewed efforts are now directed at bolstering immigrant integration against this challenging landscape, where the disconnect between the government’s and the people’s perception of immigration policy is more real than apparent. Although the National Integration Council (NIC) was set up in April 2009 to promote and foster social integration among Singaporeans and new immigrants, its establishment was somewhat belated.39 Prior to the NIC’s establishment, Singapore’s immigration regime had not paid sufficient attention to the integration of immigrants into Singaporean society. Given the rapid influx of immigrants, especially permanent residents and new citizens, integration has become even more urgent and important. Integration efforts can help reduce the angst and anxiety experienced by the native population as well as by new immigrants. Integration can also help new Singaporeans and PRs to imbibe the values of Singaporeans. Inchoate as “Singaporean values” may be, a case can be made that multiracialism, meritocracy, and anti-corruption are core values. For Lee Kuan Yew, the most Singaporean trait is the ability to accept others into the family of Singaporeans: “My definition of a Singaporean, which will make us different from any others, is that we accept that whoever joins us is part of us.”40

Wong, The Chinese in Silicon Valley: Globalization, Social Networks, and Ethnic Identity (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). On India’s extensive plans to have a constructive relationship with the Indian diaspora, see also Ministry of External Affairs, India, Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (New Delhi: Government of India), available online at http:// indiandiaspora.nic.in/contents.htm (accessed 4 June 2012). 39 For more information on the NIC, see its website at http://app.nationalintegrationcouncil. org.sg/ (accessed 4 June 2012). 40 See Han Fook Kwang et al (eds), Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths To Keep Singapore Going, 292.

62 Eugene K .B. Tan

Albeit belatedly, the government has sought to integrate new immigrants into Singapore society, principally through its housing policies. In so doing, it drew inspiration from the Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) wherein ethnic quotas are imposed in public housing estates, which house more than 80 percent of the population. The EIP’s primary aim is to ensure that there is a balanced inter-racial mix in residential areas, promoting inter-racial interaction and preventing the formation of racial enclaves. Observing that new immigrants had a tendency to reside in precincts where other recent immigrants congregate, the government remains vigilant in preventing new citizens and PRs from forming enclaves of their own. Mindful that it is natural to congregate among those of one’s own kind, the state is also acutely aware of the need not only for new immigrants to integrate into the mainstream but also for Singaporeans and new immigrants to interact and engage with each other. In March 2010, the government introduced a separate quota, known as the Singapore Permanent Resident (SPR) Quota, for PRs buying resale flats to prevent them from forming enclaves in public housing estates. Thus, permanent residents seeking to purchase a resale housing development board (HDB) flat will have to meet both the SPR and the EIP quotas. However, the SPR quota applies only to non-Malaysian SPRs; Malaysian SPRs are not subjected to the SPR quota “in view of their close cultural and historical similarities with Singaporeans.”41 Maximum proportion for Non-Malaysian SPR Households Immigration Status Citizens Malaysian SPRs Non-Malaysian SPRs

Neighbourhood

Block

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

5%

8%

The philosophical underpinning of integration of new immigrants was put forth by Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, then Minister of Community Development, Youth and Sports, in 2009: Let me start by saying that this [integration] is a long-term, multi-faceted and complex challenge that all stakeholders in our society, and not just the Government, will have to take up. First, Singaporeans have to 41 Information obtained from the Housing and Development Board: http://www.hdb.gov.sg/ fi10/fi10321p.nsf/w/BuyResaleFlatEthnicIntegrationPolicy_EIP?OpenDocument.

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

63

understand the need for immigrants and be comfortable with the social adjustments that are needed in order to maintain an open and welcoming society. We do so with our own enlightened self-interests in mind. Second, the new immigrants must subscribe to our core values of multi-racialism and meritocracy in a fair and just society. Third, we need to build more social bridges to connect these new Singaporeans to the already existing much larger pool of Singaporeans in order to build a larger united and cohesive community. The children of new immigrants must grow up and be indistinguishable from the children of local Singaporeans. That is the way we build a long-term united society. … Both locals and newcomers must realise that integration is a two-way process and it does not come about by accident. Much effort and commitment will be required from all of us in order to make integration work, and I encourage newcomers to be proactive in learning about Singapore, widening their social circles, participating and contributing to the larger Singapore family. 42

Four key sites were identified to promote integration: the community, in schools, at the workplace, and in the media. Four National Integration Working Groups (NIWGs) were also created to facilitate integration efforts at these four sites of interaction. The overarching strategy – “Opening Doors, Hearts and Minds” – has a three-pronged strategy. Under the “Opening Doors” approach, the strategy is to encourage newcomers and locals to expand their social circles to include each other. A hands-on approach is promoted by encouraging people to become active members of community organizations and societies. Friendships can then be forged as they take part in the same activities and work together in organizing events. The “Opening Minds” strategy entails enhancing communication between locals and newcomers to “facilitate a meeting of minds for integration.” To do so, language barriers will have to be overcome while also creating platforms for all to share ideas and knowledge on integration. In the “Opening Hearts” strategy, Singaporeans, old and new, are urged “to open their hearts and achieve greater mutual understanding, and reinforce their commitment to Singapore as their permanent home.” They will be encouraged to give back to society to strengthen community bonding. To support the various activities, a three-year Community Integration Fund worth $10 million was create to co-fund up to 80 percent of the social integration projects.43 42 Hansard, vol. 86, col. 1171 (23 November 2009). 43 “‘Opening Doors, Hearts and Minds’: National Integration Council Outlines Broad Strategies to Promote Integration”,

64 Eugene K .B. Tan

In February 2011, the government launched the Singapore Citizenship (SC) Journey to replace its predecessor Naturalisation and Integration (N&I) Journey. The SC Journey comprises online elements (Singapore Citizenship e-Journey) and experiential learning programmes (Singapore Experiential Tour and Community Sharing Sessions), and culminates in a citizenship ceremony to officially welcome the new citizen as a full-fledged member of the Singaporean family.44 Site visits of key historical landmarks and national institutions such as the National Museum of Singapore and Parliament House enable the new citizens to have a better idea of Singapore’s history, social norms, and core values. Through the community sharing sessions, new citizens are introduced to grassroots communities and encouraged to take part in volunteer activities.45 There are also Integration and Naturalisation Champions who seek out and welcome newcomers into the neighbourhood, and encourage them to join and participate in community activities. Volunteering is seen as a useful avenue for new citizens to get to know the wider community.

Conclusion If Singapore is unable to raise its TFR to near replacement level, then immigration will continue to be a prominent feature in Singapore’s political, economic, and socio-cultural landscape. This means that immigration will continue to be politicized and will remain a contested issue in the short to medium term. Regardless of the pace of immigration, more openness over the direction of the immigration regime can help secure buy-in. The government and Singaporeans should not shy away from a frank discussion over the pluses and minuses of immigration. Singaporeans will be persuaded, at both cognitive and affective levels, if it can be shown that overall welfare has increased, their interests have been adequately looked after, and their identities are secure and protected. More importantly, special efforts will have to be made for those affected negatively by the immigration policy. ht t p://w w w.ne w s .gov. sg/publ ic/sg pc/en/med i a _ relea ses/agenc ies/mc y s/pres s _ release/P-20090916-1. 44 For more information, see http://app.nationalintegrationcouncil.org.sg/SingaporeCitizenshipJourney.aspx (accessed 4 June 2012). 45 On the role of community associations in the integration process, see Jean Michel Montsion, “When Talent Meets Mobility: Un/desirability in Singapore’s New Citizenship Project,” Citizenship Studies, vol. 16 (3-4) (2012): 469-482.

Angst, Anxie ties, and Anger in a Global Cit y

65

One such group is low-skilled and unskilled Singaporean workers whose wages have been depressed by the large numbers of transient foreign labour. Mitigation efforts are necessary to prevent immigration from being seen as an existential threat. In his 2010 National Day Rally speech, Prime Minister Lee also highlighted the importance of personal ties and friendships in the process of integration. The state can only facilitate and encourage integration but it cannot orchestrate integration. Integration is ultimately a two-way street and must be organic, bottom-up, and sincere. The various integrative mechanisms discussed earlier provide opportunities for the new immigrants to integrate into Singaporean society. Nonetheless, doubts persist over whether new immigrants are willing to integrate and imbibe the values and norms of Singaporeans. Similarly, it is not at all clear that Singaporeans are willing to walk the integration journey with the new immigrants. Given the relatively large number of new immigrants from China and India, the need for such new immigrants to break out of their enclaves and particularistic networks of support is less pressing. Furthermore, there is also the persistence of stereotypes of “us” and “them” which hinder integration efforts. But they can be surmounted. How can Singapore better promote integration? As Singapore seeks to top up her population, immigration policy must assiduously strive to ensure that Singaporean citizens are not made to feel inferior or that they are being taken for granted. The “Consider Singaporean First” policy approach must not be mere lip service. It must have substantive merit and meaning. For a start, the government should drop the use of “foreign talent.”46 Long used in official discourse to reinforce the message that newcomers add value to our society, this superlative buzzword is terribly marginalizing and patronizing. More significantly, it harks back to a neo-colonial mindset that assumes that locals are not good enough and that the local talent pool is impoverished. 47 Yet, as any nationalistic Singaporean will retort: “Mind you, it is we, the descendents of peasants and the illiterate, who have built this fine city and made it an attractive place to live, work, study, and play in.” Secondly, anecdotal evidence suggests the liberal granting of permanent residence and citizenship has provoked an adverse reaction among 46 For an examination of “foreign talent”, see Jerrold Hong, “The Evolution of ‘Foreign Talent’ in Singapore’s Lexicon,” IPS Update, July 2013. 47 See further, Pak Tee Ng, “The Global War for Talent: Responses and Challenges in the Singapore Higher Education System,” Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, vol. 35 (3) (2013): 280-292.

66 Eugene K .B. Tan

Singaporeans to new immigrants. The latent concern is the devaluation of or the commoditization of Singapore citizenship. Much as Singapore needs to rightsize its population, it is crucial that those who seek the Singapore franchise understand Singaporean society, her foundational ethos, her shared values and heritage, and her limitations. They need to know what they are pledging allegiance to. It will take a while before the intended outcome of the integrative mechanisms will result in Singaporeans becoming more accepting of immigration. If it does, it will enable Singapore to keep an open door to new immigrants while assuring Singaporeans that their interests are “protected” and the Singaporean national identity secured. However, if Singaporeans are not persuaded and do not accept the evolving immigration regime and the new immigrants, then Singapore will have to search for viable alternatives to help deal with the reality of a declining, ageing population and the socio-political and economic implications that flow from it. Needless to say, the political consequences are considerable for the government of the day and for Singaporeans.

3

The Politics of Immigration Unpacking the Policies of the PAP Government and Opposition in Singapore Bilveer Singh

Introduction In today’s Singapore, immigration has become a highly politicized issue. This can be seen through a number of political “pathways”: the politics of depravation, the politics of race, the politics of authoritarianism and illiberal democracy, and – somewhat unforeseen – the politics of nationbuilding and national identity. These pathways came about primarily through the government’s stance of adopting an open-door policy towards immigration. This was initiated without much fanfare – with the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) leaders announcing that the country needed and would benefit from an influx of “foreign talent.” Foreign talent became a euphemism for the trickle and eventual flood of immigrants entering Singapore, already one of most densely populated states in the world.1 The government argued consistently that there would be very obvious benefits for all Singaporeans in sharing the “little red dot” with incoming immigrants. This was despite the fact that the immigrants had little or no commonality with the bulk of Singaporeans or the “Singapore core” in terms of political experience, history, political culture, ethos, and most importantly, the sense of inter-racial, religious, and cultural harmony that had been meticulously put together since 1965 in creating “Singapore as a nation in being.”2 Despite criticism and objections by various individuals and groups of Singaporeans, including some from the ruling party itself, the open-door policy continued uninhibited, justif ied now on the grounds that the country needed to sustain a population of 6.5 million people. The ruling party believed that the criticism and whatever little costs, political and otherwise, would be absorbed either through its constant expounding on 1 See chapter one of this volume, especially figure 3 on density of population. 2 Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew argued that Singapore was still a ‘work-in-progress’ project and that it will take many more years to foster national unity. See Elgin Toh, “Singapore still a work in progress: MM Lee,” The Straits Times, 22 January 2011.

68 

Bilveer Singh

the importance of attracting and retaining foreign talent or by simply ignoring the growing chorus of criticism by Singaporeans who were beginning to pay the price for the “march of PAP’s folly on immigration.”3 Between 2005 and 2009, there was a massive inflow of immigrants into Singapore, drastically changing the country’s economic and social-cultural landscape. Mainly due to the negative fallout of this, the electorate and opposition parties have been increasingly vocal in raising objections to what was being undertaken by the ruling PAP; this led to what became known as the great immigration debate. With Singapore graduating rapidly from a “little red dot” to “an over-crowded little dot,” the political costs of maintaining such immigration policies was made clear for the ruling party. This reached a pinnacle in the two elections held in 2011, namely the general and presidential elections, where the issue of immigration was hotly debated and anyone championing the causes of bringing in more foreign talent found themselves at the receiving end of the electorate’s wrath. The issue of immigration was again raised in two subsequent byelections held in Hougang (May 2012) and Punggol East (January 2013), which the ruling party lost. The issue of immigration was given a new lease of life, at least from the point of view of the opposition political parties, when the government released its white paper on population titled A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore in January 2013 that was heavily criticized not only by the public at large but also by some members of the ruling party. 4 It is in view of this that the issue of immigration has emerged as one that has been widely and emotionally discussed among Singaporeans in the last decade or so.5 The issues were constantly spurred on by the rising number of immigrants – apparently with no end in sight. Compounding this was the government’s justification as to why the inflow should not be stopped. The national statistics agency has been regularly updating the growth of immigrant numbers, confirming the dramatic rise in Singapore’s

3 This was adapted from a book entitled The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984) by Barbara W. Tuchman. 4 National Population and Talent Division, A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore at http://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/news/_jcr_content/par_content/download_98/file. res/population-white-paper.pdf. 5 According to Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, immigration “is a very emotional issue. Understandably, it is an issue on which views are very strong. It is also a very complicated issue”. See Toh Yong Chuan, “Government will study lessons from White Paper debate, says PM Lee,” The Straits Times, 10 February 2013.

The Politics of Immigr ation

69

population. Inderjit Singh, a PAP parliamentarian argued that in the last decade: we added more than one million resident population, and in the last 25 years, which is close to one generation of Singaporeans, we have added close to 50% more to our resident population. I believe this must be the fastest rate of population growth in the world!6

Against this backdrop, this chapter will focus on the politics surrounding immigration in Singapore. It will first analyze the present government’s rationale for its liberal, open-door immigration policy followed by reactions from opposition political parties, especially during the period leading up to the 2011 general elections. The fallout following the publication of the population white paper and the various reactions to population policies and planning parameters are further explored. Singapore’s position, politically, on the immigration issue, concludes the discussion in this chapter. For the purpose of this chapter, as the PAP has formed the government in Singapore since 1959 to this day, the terms government and the PAP will be used interchangeably, especially for policies since 1965. As for the opposition in Singapore, this refers to registered political parties that have expressed views and opinions on the issue of immigration.

The PAP government’s population policies in perspective Since coming into power in 1959, there has been a wide spectrum of population policies initiated by the PAP. First, policies were put in place to curb population growth. This was later reversed to promote population growth from its resident population; then came the move to encourage immigration to make up for what the PAP leadership argued was insufficient critical mass to promote economic growth. From the late 1950s when the PAP took over the cudgels of political power in the Republic, right through to the 1960s, Singapore experienced a population boom. This was brought about by the post-Second World War economic boom and stability that saw rapid economic growth taking place. The population growth placed immense pressure on housing, jobs, education, 6 See Hansard, vol. 90 (5 February 2013) per Mr. Inderjit Singh (Ang Mo Kio). Reference can be made to chapter one in this volume for figures on the population increase for Singapore, especially Table 3.

70 

Bilveer Singh

health, and social services. Fearing that this would be economically and socially unsustainable, the PAP government began promoting population control policies aimed at producing smaller families. Particularly from 1965 to 1981, family planning policies through the Singapore Family Planning and Population Board were promoted through nation-wide campaigns, the encouragement of contraception, and even liberalized legalized abortion. Stop at Two became the national slogan during this period. Punitive measures against large families were introduced including, among others, no paid maternity leave for the third and subsequent child, no priority for government housing for large families, and no income tax relief for the fourth and subsequent child. By 1981, the fertility rate had dropped to 1.82 percent, well below the replacement level. Other than such punitive measures, rising living costs, new attitudes towards marriage and childbearing, a general disinterest in large families, and priority being given to careers led to late marriages and, in some cases, many professionals – both male and female – opting out of the marriage cycle. As a result, from 1980 onwards, the country faced a declining population, as was the case in most developed countries. In addition to the adverse replacement ratio, there were also concerns that the country would become unattractive to foreign investors, especially multinational corporations, should there be serious shortfalls in terms of manpower needs and in the longer run, an ageing population that would have to be supported by the society at large, especially with increasing life expectancy.7 A series of measures were introduced, including the Graduate Mothers Scheme, reversing the Stop at Two policy and promoting Three or more if you can afford, introducing various pro-family measures (subsidized childcare facilities, permitting women to make medical claims for children and maid levies, grandparents caregiver relief, extended maternity leave). This also included policies to attract foreign talent into Singapore by relaxing immigration policies, making it easier for foreigners to gain Singaporean citizenship. In the Singaporean context, immigrants refer mostly to work permit holders such as maids from Indonesia and the Philippines and construction workers from China, India, and Bangladesh. A smaller number of skilled and professional workers in technical, service, and financial industries were also “imported” into the Republic. There were also many foreign students

7 According to the government’s statistics, the proportion of residents aged 65 and above increased from 7.2 percent in 2000 to 9.3 percent in 2011. See Singapore Department of Statistics, Population in Brief 2011 at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/people/popinbrief2011.pdf, 6.

The Politics of Immigr ation

71

or dependents of employment pass holders, which on the whole make up the non-resident population of the Republic in increasing numbers. The statistics also clearly indicate that Singapore’s citizen population has been declining in percentage terms vis-à-vis the total population due to the rise of the number of foreigners. This was mainly the result of an increase in the number of PRs and the non-resident population, a deliberate move by the PAP government in meeting the objective of increasing the national population to a new level, projected to be capped at 6.5 million people.8 In 2007, then National Development Minister Mah Bow Tan published an article in the PAP’s publication arm, Petir, on why Singapore needed a population of 6.5 million people.9 His central thesis was that Singapore needed a larger population “to grow and create more and better jobs” and for this to happen, it had to “remain open, competitive and relevant to the global market place.”10 When the targeted 6.5 million population would be reached was left vague. However, this would appear to be well within the range of PAP’s population expansion programme if the trend of the last 10-15 years is any guide. However, the government’s white paper on population released in January 2013 stated that “by 2030, Singapore’s total population could range between 6.5 and 6.9 million.”11

Why did the ruling PAP government decide on a course of rapidly increasing foreign presence in Singapore? Beginning from 1980 onwards, when then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew first highlighted the issue of a declining population, various arguments and justifications were put forward for the need to increase the country’s population through immigration. Lee Kuan Yew has constantly championed the cause of bringing in immigrants into the land-scarce and densely populated city-state. The most poignant argument put forth was that the Republic 8 In 2007, National Development Minister Mah Bow Tan announced that the government had increased its long-term population estimate and for planning purposes, the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) would be using a projected population of 6.5 million, up from the 2001 projection of 5.5 million. In the URA 1991 Concept Plan, when the 1990 population stood at three million, the planning parameter projected a population of four million after 2010. This target was quickly reached and by 2007, Singapore already had 4.6 million people, brought about by the government’s open-door policy on migration. 9 Mah Bow Tan, “Why We Need 6.5 Million People,” Petir, March/April 2007, http://www.pap. org.sg/articleview.php?folder=PT&id=1758 10 Ibid. 11 National Population and Talent Division, A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore.

72 

Bilveer Singh

is facing a declining population brought about by declining birth rates. Consistently, the Republic’s birth rates have fallen short of replacement levels, and if this was not addressed, corrected, and reversed, Singapore would face all-round multiple crises. In 2009, Lee argued that it was only common sense for immigrants to be brought in to correct the declining population in the Republic. He argued that Singapore’s resident population of 3.7 million had a total fertility rate of 1.22, well below the replacement rate of 2.1. In 2010, the total fertility rate reached a low of 1.15.12 Fertility rates were unlikely to increase even with all the incentives in place for Singaporeans to produce more babies. Hence, the only way to stop this was to “top up the population with high-quality immigrants.”13 Secondly, more immigrants and a larger population were needed for economic growth. Lee argued that without immigrants and at the dismal rate Singaporeans were reproducing themselves, there would be 1.5 workingage people to support two elderly people by 2050. This, Lee argued, “was untenable” and “the whole economy would collapse.” According to Lee, If the economy is growing because we have got these migrants, then at least you have the resources to cope with a declining population and to support the elderly. If you don’t have the economy growing, like Japan, then you have had it. Japan cannot get the economy to grow. Old people don’t spend, they do part-time work, they get lower pay and the productivity is low. Despite one stimulus package, another stimulus package, third stimulus package, they just can’t get it started.14

In view of the declining population and the need for economic growth, Lee argued that no one would take issue with the logic of bringing more immigrants into Singapore. From his perspective, the need to replace the declining population was too obvious. However, if there was any issue, it was the quality of immigrants and the impact of the type of immigrants flooding Singapore since 2005 or 2006. For him, addressing the scarce labour shortage was of utmost importance. Also, in his thinking, as most Singaporeans were themselves from immigrant backgrounds, the presence of foreigners was not really an issue. More critical was how the immigrants would be managed in order to minimize social tensions and allow for integration. Mr. Lee stead12 See Population in Brief 2011, 7. 13 Ibid. 14 See Han Fook Kwang et al. (eds.), Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2011), 267.

The Politics of Immigr ation

73

fastly believed that the entry of immigrants into Singapore would benefit the Republic on the following counts: make up for the declining population; help economic growth; help to keep the cost of living low; help Singaporeans afford convenient services like domestic help; and spur Singaporeans to work harder. While there were rising grumbles against the increasing number of immigrants in the Republic, these were dismissed. Lee dismissed the notion that immigrants were threatening and taking away jobs meant for Singaporeans. Instead, he argued that Singaporeans were the main beneficiaries of the government’s open-door policy, which kept the costs of services low due to the presence of a large pool of low-cost foreign workers. Lee also believed that eventually, the new immigrants would integrate into mainstream Singaporean society: So you see, the orientation is already shifted. And there is no intention of going back. New immigrants like them will lose their sense of being foreigners because they want to fit in. They may not fully integrate but their children will grow up and become Singaporeans by attending our schools and mixing with other Singapore children.15

Thinking in Machiavellian terms, Lee also thought that immigrants would spur Singaporeans to work harder and undermine rising perceptions of complacency. While Lee recognized that there was some unease among Singaporeans regarding foreigners, especially as parents were unhappy with hardworking immigrants’ children outperforming their own children in school examinations, he countered by arguing that, instead of being unhappy, Singaporeans should work harder to beat them. He argued that he was for bringing immigrants into Singapore regardless of Singaporeans’ fear of losing out to them. As he argued, “my answer to that is, in a tug of war, do you want this bright chap on our side or the other side, pulling for the Vietnamese or the Chinese team.”16 A report titled Population in Brief 2011 released by the Singapore Department of Statistics echoed the pro-immigration posture and policies put in place thus far: As a small city-state whose key resource is its people, Singapore has benefited from the contributions of immigrants. Immigration also helps sustain our population and mitigate our ageing profile. 15 Ibid, 266. 16 Ibid.

74 

Bilveer Singh

Highly skilled people are sought after globally. In Singapore, they contribute their skills and knowledge, help create jobs and add vibrancy to our country. To attract and retain talent, Singapore must be a home for all. It goes beyond improving Singapore’s economic prospects and creating attractive opportunities. It means having a more gracious and liveable city where people will want to sink roots and stay permanently. The government manages the pace of immigration to ensure that immigrants are of good quality and able to integrate well into Singapore society. Since the tightening of the immigration framework in 2009, the number of new PRs granted has fallen from 59,460 in 2009 to 29,265 in 2010. A large majority of the new residents in 2010 hold diplomas or university qualifications. 17

While rationally speaking, the position of the government can be defended to some extent, it is not something that is shared by all, especially an increasing number of Singaporeans who have begun to feel threatened by the policies adopted by the PAP government. While overcrowding has become an issue, there are also other concerns that have made the PAP government’s narrative on immigration an increasingly hard sell to the Singaporean electorate at large. Still, there remains overpowering arguments to justify the continued inflow of immigrants, especially talented ones, into Singapore. As Singapore has emerged as a successful trading nation with a world-class economy, remaining competitive globally is a major economic imperative. Lee Kuan Yew once equated foreign talent as the second rocket of the space shuttle that will boost Singapore into space.18 Some have also argued that there is the need to replace the “brain drain” that has taken place and continues unabated due to the loss of “talented Singaporeans” to other countries.19 Another senior minister who has championed the implementation of the country’s foreign talent policy has been Goh Chok Tong, who took over from Lee Kuan Yew as prime minister in 1990. In a speech in 2008, he clearly articulated the dilemmas faced by Singapore in adopting a pro-immigrant policy: Partly due to our history as a nation of immigrants, Singaporeans find it easier to accept intellectually and emotionally that foreign manpower 17 Population in Brief 2011, 14. 18 See “Singapore’s Policy on Foreign Talent” found at http://members.fortunecity.com/ prcsm298/rason.htm 19 Ibid.

The Politics of Immigr ation

75

is overall a plus for our economy. They understand that investors come because they are able to tap a foreign pool of labour to supplement local labour, especially with our ageing population. But still, it is important for the government to recognise the anxiety and fear of Singaporeans in the job market with so many hungrier foreign workers willing to do their jobs for less. They worry too, that their children may be edged out in our schools and universities by foreign students. These are legitimate concerns that governments must deal with.20

While many have associated Lee Kuan Yew with the pro-immigration policy of Singapore, there have also been views that it was in fact Mr. Lee’s then deputy, Goh Chok Tong, who took the policies further.21 According to Chua Sun Tong, writing in The Online Citizen, the driving force behind the pro-immigration policy, especially the influx of permanent residents (PRs) into Singapore, was Mr. Goh. According to Chua, given the decline in the fertility rate to a low of 1.4 in 1987, Goh initiated the pro-immigration policy as a stop-gap measure. What Chua has described of Goh is somewhat surprising, as “all along [Singaporeans] believed the immigration policy was solely his predecessor Lee Kuan Yew’s idea.”22 Even if Mr. Goh was not the initiator, he has enthusiastically implemented the policy that culminated in the declining ratio of Singaporeans to foreigners.

The opposition and immigration in Singapore It is next to impossible to imagine any political party, including the opposition political parties in Singapore, adopting an anti-immigration policy. Rather, as was stated by Sylvia Lim, Workers’ Party (WP) chairperson and presently an opposition Member of Parliament for Aljunied Group Representation Constituency (GRC), her party has “great concerns over

20 Transcript of Speech by Mr Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister at the Singapore Human Capital Summit, 22 October 2008, Shangri-la Hotel, Singapore at http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ viewHTML.jsp?pdfno=20081030 (accessed 7 September 2012). 21 See Seah Chiang Nee, “Who opened the f loodgates to immigrants?” Singaporescene, 16 November 2011 found at http://sg.news.yahoo.com/blogs/singaporescene/opened-floodgatesimmigrants-033514188.html 22 See “Immigration to Singapore” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/immigration_to_singapore.

76 

Bilveer Singh

the pace, scale and quality of immigration.”23 Putting the argument more poignantly, she elucidated her opposing views in the following manner: … the blistering pace at which the foreign population had grown over the last 20 years had changed dramatically, with citizens now accounting for only 64% of the population in 2009 whereas it was 86% in 1990. The current population of 5 million meant a density of 7,000 persons per square kilometer and if the Ministry of National Development’s planning parameter of 6.5 million by 2040 came through, it would be 9,100 persons per square kilometer. Was this ecologically sustainable for an island of 700 square kilometers, looking at the current squeeze on resources such as public transport, housing and healthcare services?24

Similar views were expressed by the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) when the party’s Secretary General Dr Chee Soon Juan challenged the government’s policy of wanting to create a 6.5 million population base.25 Pritam Singh, also a WP Member of Parliament for Aljunied GRC, presented a more detailed analysis of the rising costs of attracting more foreign talent into Singapore from a number of perspectives. First, there is the view that the PAP’s foreign talent policy does not benefit the lower income group. If anything, the perception is not only that there is no benefit, such a policy “instead squeezes prospective job opportunities and drives their real wages down.”26 Second, the term foreign talent is loosely used to obfuscate the issue, especially by the PAP government and then Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew.27 Third, there appears to be two separate prongs to the PAP’s foreign talent policy. First, it involves population regeneration, something most Singaporeans may appreciate until the issue of what is the optimum level for the city-state is debated. Pritam questioned the notion that there was a dire need to increase the Republic’s population, as has been argued by Lee Kuan Yew, who has continuously maintained that failure to do so will lead 23 See The Worker’s Party, “Immigration Policies Forum,” 28 January 2010 at http://wp.sg/2010/01/ immigration-policies-forum. 24 Ibid. 25 See Singapore Democratic Party, “PAP must unambiguously say it will stop 6.5 m pop. Plan,” 9 September 2010 at http://www.yoursdp.org/index/php/news/singapore/4104-pap-must-. 26 Pritam Singh, “TOC Special Feature: Foreign Talent Policy Remains Contentious and for Reason Too,” theonlinecitizen, 18 August 2009 at http://theonlinecitizen.com/2009/08/foreigntalent-policy-remains-contentious-and-for-reason-too/. 27 Ibid.

The Politics of Immigr ation

77

to Singapore slipping economically the way Japan has; this forms the PAP’s second prong in championing immigrant inflows into Singapore. This, Pritam argued, is by no means clear, particularly when the costs (overcrowding, competition for public services and jobs, etc) appear to be rising for ordinary Singaporeans. There is also the concern with rising class distinctions, as it is the big businesses that tend to benefit from immigrants. The number of migrants has the effect of depressing local wages, thus causing a rise in income inequality in the Republic. Pritam also questioned Lee’s and the PAP’s basis for the greater inflows of Chinese immigrants from China when population decline was afflicting all communities, Indians and Malays included and not just the Singaporean Chinese. The impact of the massive inflow of immigrants on nation-building was also something that needed to be factored in, as this tended to “roll back progress made by Singaporeans since independence in the national unity and political maturity arenas in particular.”28 It was due to this that Pritam argued that Lee Kuan Yew’s oftrepeated “foreign talent is vital” mantra was being increasingly questioned by the general public, demonstrating the wide gulf between the general electorate and the ruling PAP government.29 In general, this seems to the basic policy thrust of opposition political parties in Singapore. While they may not be against the PAP’s policy of welcoming foreigners into Singapore, what has been increasingly questioned and criticized is the pace and quantum at which the immigrants have been allowed in. This was cogently put forward by Professor Kenneth Tan from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy: It is very tempting for speakers [from the Opposition Parties] to point to foreigners as the source of problems – foreigners after all do not get to vote. However, the more influential and charismatic speakers such as Vincent Wijeysingha and Nicole Seah have also been very careful to say that they and their parties are not anti-foreign but are critical of the government’s policies that they argue have enabled unsustainably high levels of immigration without preparing Singaporeans adequately for it. The alternative parties are, in their own ways, advocating a ‘Singapore first policy’ for jobs that Singaporeans can and want to do – which strikes me as reasonable.30 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 See Leah Hyslop, “Singapore Opposition Stirs Up Anti-Foreign Sentiment,” The Telegraph, 5 May 2011.

78 

Bilveer Singh

This thrust as interpreted by Kenneth Tan was also evident in the position of the National Solidarity Party (NSP), a party that did relatively well in the 2011 general elections. In essence, it involved reducing dependence on foreign workers and expanding the capacities of public infrastructure and services. The following was unveiled in its election manifesto for 2011: i) Foreign labour force should be allowed in at a more moderate pace, and at a rate that our public infrastructure is capable of coping with; ii) Work permits should continue to be allowed for industries or jobs that are unpopular with Singaporeans; iii) Reduce mid-skilled foreign workforce (entry-level graduates, diploma holders and technicians); and iv) Grant priority to Singaporeans in employment.31 Following the PAP government’s announcement of its budget in February 2012, the NSP maintained its position on immigration and criticized the government for “an absence of a population plan for Singapore” which made “it difficult to assess the adequacy of the proposed expansion in capacity for buses and hospitals.”32 The NSP argued that the Ministry of Manpower should “regulate the population growth target to no more than 50,000 (which is double the 23,000 identified by the government for the shortfall of babies) per year over the next 10 years.”33 The NSP maintained that “over the last 10 years, Singapore’s population growth was 100,000 per year.”34 The party also called for “the population target to be reviewed every 3 years and adjusted to the needs of Singapore.”35 The government was also criticized for failing to introduce new measures “to address the problem of the falling total fertility rate.”36 While the opposition parties are not adopting an anti-foreigner posture, it cannot be denied that they have been tapping into growing anti-foreigner sentiments among the public, partly to win votes and place the PAP on the defensive. Still, the vociferous opposition to the government’s proimmigrant policy is a relatively new thrust even among the Singapore opposition parties. This is because, despite objections to the foreign talent 31 See National Solidar it y Par t y Manifesto 201 1 at http://w w w.scr ibd.com/ norganisubg/d/53562332-National-Solidarity-Party. 32 See National Solidarity Party, “Response to Budget 2012,” 18 February 2012 found at http:// nsp.sg/2012/02/18/response-to-budget-2012/. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid.

The Politics of Immigr ation

79

policy promoted by the PAP, the opposition was trying to demonstrate its “difference” from the government rather than there being pathologically different perspectives from the PAP’s immigration focus. However, over the years, this has changed fundamentally, with both the WP and even SDP strongly registering their opposition to massive immigrant inflow, especially when this is undertaken at the expense of local citizens.

Growing Singaporean opposition to rising immigration The PAP’s open-door policy had a clear and immediate impact on Singapore’s political, economic, and social-cultural landscapes. The presence of immigrants was hard to miss. Over the years, this could be discerned in overcrowded buses, trains, beaches, parks, and hawker centres. There was increasing pressure on social services such as health, housing, and education. There were also increasing complaints against Chinese nationals in the service industry who could not speak English and were unable to serve the non-Chinese population, in turn enhancing inefficiencies in various sectors, including in public hospitals. To cope with increasing inflows of foreign workers, the government resorted to building dormitories for them. This caused a backlash from neighbourhoods where these were established, such as in Serangoon Gardens where the PAP eventually suffered a serious electoral defeat in the Aljunied GRC.37 While not surprising, the Singaporean public view was easily confirmed when The Straits Times conducted a national survey on the public’s attitude towards foreign workers and the inflow of immigrants as a whole. Some 86 percent of those polled objected to government’s open-door policy, as they feared losing their jobs to foreigners.38 Additionally, two-thirds believed that skilled foreigners, often referred to as foreign talent, enjoyed many of the benefits accorded to citizens without the responsibilities shouldered, particularly national service obligations. The grievances against the PAP government for continuously championing the causes of foreigners have spread across the board. Indeed, due to the government’s pro-immigration position, many Singaporeans are 37 See “Serangoon Gardens Dormitory Debate: Why residents want foreign workers to … stay away” at http://www.ngejay.com/?p=560; Cheryl Ong and Shuli Sudderuddin, “‘Not in my backyard attitude’: How MPs handle it” at https://es-es.facebook.com/notes/reachsingapore/ not-in-my-backyard-attitude-how-mps-handle-it/10150544096778795. 38 “The Dollars and Sense of Citizenship,” The Straits Times, 20 January 2007.

80 

Bilveer Singh

increasingly beginning to see these outsiders as scapegoats. Every time someone from the government champions and defends the need for immigrants, there is a strong and emotional response from segments of the population against the policy. Hence, when Lee Kuan Yew defended the policy once again in July 2011, the new media went viral, accusing him of undermining Singaporeans. One response sums up the frustrations felt by certain Singaporeans: These foreign talents come in just to earn a quick buck and then go back to their countries, they do not have to serve National Service, they jack up the cost of living and reduce our standard of living, jamming up our roads, shopping malls and everywhere else. And obviously, without having to do NS they are therefore a brighter prospect to employers compared to us.39

The government’s position has not been helped by the realization that while immigrants do bring some benefits, the political costs may simply be too high and in the longer term unbearable for the polity. One of the costs is the rising income inequality in Singapore. While globalization and technological advances have definitely widened the income gap, the inflow of immigrants exacerbated the situation. This was clearly pointed out by Manu Bhaskaran at a seminar conducted by the Institute of Policy Studies in January 2012. He argued that by appealing to the global elite and top talents, especially as wages of the lower income had stagnated or even fallen in real terms, income inequality in Singapore had worsened. 40

The politics of immigration: Where is Singapore today and what is the likely scenario in the coming years? Despite growing concern and opposition to the influx of immigrants, the PAP government has continued to hold steadfast to its position that this inflow can only be stalled to the detriment of the Republic and its people. Despite the opposing views articulated by the opposition parties during the 2011 general elections and the swing of votes against the ruling party, in July 2011, some ten weeks after the general election, Lee Kuan Yew continued 39 See “Massive Outcry Over Lee Kuan Yew’s call to welcome more ‘foreign talent’”, 27 July 2011, at http://www.tremeritus.com/2011/07/26/massive-outcry-over-lee-kuan-yews-call-towelcome-more-foreign-talent/. 40 See “Foreign Talent Policy Had Effect On Income Gap,” The Straits Times, 17 January 2012.

The Politics of Immigr ation

81

to hold the view that his pro-immigration position and policy was tenable regardless of what the electorate thought of it: For some time, the Singaporean has felt the competition from talented foreigners. But these are people who have come here to become our citizens and I am a f irm believer that the more talent that you have in a society, the better the society will grow. If Singapore depends on the talent it can produce out of three million people, it is not going to punch above its weight. It is because we have been drawing talent from across the globe – South Asia, Northeast Asia, China, India and beyond that – you have a vibrant economy which is way beyond what three million Singaporeans with the talent they can produce can do. So you have got to accept the discomfort, which the local citizens fear they are competing unequally for jobs. It cannot be helped. But without them, the jobs will not be there to begin with. So … we will continue to welcome talent. 41

As far as managing the increasing resentment directed at foreigners for crowding out local-born Singaporeans, Lee’s response was curt: You just have to assuage it. What is the choice – slow growth with no input of talent or faster growth with input of talent and the feeling that some of the top jobs are going to the foreigners. You may get no jobs if there were no growth. 42

This was despite Lee’s earlier admission that the electoral support of the PAP had declined due to the public’s unhappiness with the government’s policies on immigration. On being asked to explain the drop in votes for the PAP at the general election, Lee partly blamed this on rising home prices resulting from too many new PRs and citizens buying property. 43 Related to this was the public’s discontent with the influx of foreign talent. Even though he recognized that many Singaporean citizens felt uncomfortable seeing “new, strange faces on over-crowded trains and buses,” this to him “cannot be helped.”44 Despite stepping down from the cabinet following the 41 “Singapore cannot do without talent: Ex-MM Lee,” 26  July 2011 at http://leewatch. info/2011/07/26/spore-cannot-do-without-foreign-talent. 42 Ibid. 43 Alicia Wong, “Lee Kuan Yew: Why PAP lost votes in the May elections,” 14 August 2011 at http://sg.news.yahoo.com/blogs/singaporescene/lee-kuan-yew-why-pap. 44 Ibid.

82 

Bilveer Singh

2011 elections, Lee continued to believe that Singapore should stay open to young, talented immigrants due to the declining birth rates. Otherwise, he foresaw Singapore ending up like Japan, which was suffering from a shrinking population and a stagnant economy. He warned that due to the still declining fertility rate, “if we do not take in migrants, we will become an old, diminished society with no vitality and no drive.”45 At the same time, with the ruling party coming under pressure from the electorate, its members of parliament are likely to face greater hostility from their constituents. That there are members of parliament in the PAP that are not overtly comfortable with the ruling party’s pro-immigration policy was made evident as far back as 1999, when Dr Tan Cheng Bock, then Member of Parliament for Ayer Rajah and later a candidate in the country’s presidential elections in 2011, argued: Our message to Singaporeans must be clear and loud. We will take care of their basic needs. We will have schemes for our citizens to upgrade their skills training and education, and they will get priority over others, including Permanent Residents. Now this is a more important priority call than foreign talent. I can understand the rationale and need to inject such talent into our society. But many still don’t and especially in this time, such a call makes them feel threatened, bearing in mind that a good number of jobs are lost from the middle management level. I feel that at this juncture, this call for foreign talent might be a bit misplaced. Let’s think Singaporeans first. 46

This brought an immediate retort from then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew: So, when I heard Dr Tan Cheng Bock, I decided I would stand up and tell him he’s wrong … you have to decide whether you think he knows more or I know more. You have to decide whether he will give you the answer to Singapore’s future – or that I am likely to give you the better road to the future. 47

45 Ibid. 46 “Foreign Talent: Think Singaporeans first,” The Straits Times, 9 March 1999. 47 Quotation obtained from “Dr Tan Cheng Bock and George Yeo’s clash over immigration” at http://www.tremeritus.com/2011/06/13/dr-tan-cheng-bock-and-george-yeos-clash-overimmigration/

The Politics of Immigr ation

83

Earlier, George Yeo, the former foreign minister who anchored the Aljunied GRC which was lost to the Workers’ Party in the 2011 general elections, had also criticized Dr Tan along the following lines: So precisely at a time like this, when we need many foreigners to help us take our economy to the next phase, we must not send the wrong signal … such an emotional line of attack would do great disservice to Singapore and to ourselves in the long term. 48

Dr Tan’s reply to Yeo was equally illuminating, highlighting the tension within the PAP between those prepared to champion foreigners and those who were more interested in putting Singaporeans first while not totally opposing the regulated inflow of foreigners into Singapore. As was argued by Dr Tan: I’m surprised that the minister chose to misinterpret my call for the toning down of the foreign talent message as a call against foreign talent. In this crisis, charity begins at home. Did I ask that we sack them and replace their jobs with Singaporeans? No. All that I ask is for the government to play down the message in this crisis. Is it wrong to ask that Singaporeans should take priority on the Government’s plans to tackle the economic crisis? The minister is worried that I’m sending the wrong message to foreigners. I think we should be worried that we send the wrong message to Singaporeans. 49

The coalescence of national opposition to immigration and PAP’s rethink The debates concerning immigration are not new. However, what was significant was the fact that the PAP government paid dearly for it many years later, especially following the build-up of public criticism in 2010 and 2011. Following the 2011 general elections, if there was one clear national consensus, it was the electorate’s objections to the PAP’s liberal policy on immigration. Very clearly, through the opposition parties, there was an emphatic message from the electorate: “No to free flow of migrants into 48 “Don’t send ‘wrong signals’ to foreigners,” The Straits Times, 12 March 1999. 49 “Minister misinterpreted call to tone down foreign talent message,” The Straits Times, 13 March 1999.

84 

Bilveer Singh

Singapore.” To this, the PAP reacted pragmatically and agreed to adjust its policies and be more judicious in bringing in foreigners. In a way, the PAP was already responding to the groundswell through a number of policies in 2010. This is because while there is general consensus that bringing in immigrants selectively is a good idea, it was understood that this should be regulated in a way that would prevent citizens from being harmed disproportionately. The need for a “new balance” was made evident by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in his 2012 New Year Message: Population is a particularly complex and critical challenge. Like most developed societies, Singaporeans are having too few babies and our population is ageing. We must f ind workable solutions to keep our society vibrant and forward-looking, maintain our economic vitality and strengthen our Singaporean core … We are tightening the inflow of foreign workers to a more sustainable rate.50

Why did the public backlash materialize in 2011 and not prior to that? A number of factors provide possible explanations to this question. First, the sheer number of foreigners brought into Singapore was constantly referred to by various interests groups and opposition politicians. The constant narration and socialization of being “crowded out” by foreigners due to government policies resonated well with the general public. Second, flowing from the first, were two inter-related factors. Following the 2007-8 global economic crisis, many Singaporeans felt threatened by the huge presence of foreigners in terms of competition for jobs that Singaporeans believed should be theirs. However, unlike in the past when the inflow of foreigners tended to be mostly those in high-skilled and professional categories who interacted very little with the majority of Singaporeans, the larger number of unskilled and low-skilled foreigners entering Singapore from around 2006 directly affected the majority of Singaporeans. The “foreign presence” was everywhere, competing with the masses of Singaporeans for all kinds of public spaces, and this greatly angered the local citizens. Thus, when the issue of immigrants was raised, everyone could relate with and understand the problems, and as most of the experiences tended to be negative in nature, the government was squarely blamed for it. The government suffered even more when it continued to argue that these immigrants were needed, which in effect signalled that the anger felt by most Singaporeans 50 Transcript of the Prime Minister’s 2012 New Year Message can be found at http://www.pmo. gov.sg/content/pmosite/mediacentre/speechesninterv.

The Politics of Immigr ation

85

was irrelevant and could be ignored. More than anything else, this was what led Singaporeans from almost every constituency to express their unhappiness against the PAP at the 2011 polls. Interestingly, while a number of PAP leaders promised to look anew at the immigration issue especially in the aftermath of the general elections, some, including Lee Kuan Yew, continued to argue that there should be no change in government policies towards immigration. Finally, an unintended consequence of the government’s pro-immigrant policy has been to galvanize the nation-building process. While the PAP leadership has been energetically working towards the creation of a “Singapore Nation”, many discontinuities tended to weaken and undermine its efforts. However, following the introduction of a large number of immigrants totalling almost one-third of the population, the sense of “Singaporeanness” among the original core residents seemed to strengthen. There appears to be an increasing “us versus them” situation with the traditional CMIO (Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others) categories, and fault lines being increasingly blurred in the context of the “new threat” of immigrants. To that extent, the sense of a Singaporean identity seems to be emerging even more strongly than in the past. The rising criticism against the PAP for letting in so many non-Singaporeans to unfairly share the country’s limited resources was perceived not just as undermining Singapore and Singaporeans but to be even anti-Singapore in character. As was argued by Seah Chiang Nee, “the current wave of migrant workers from China and India has had an unintended side benefit for Singapore – blurring differences between local Chinese and Malays. The new competition they introduced into the workforce has helped to get these once quarrelling races to put aside old discords and jointly face the common challenge.”51 In sum, all these issues culminated in the politics of immigration where the politics of blame led to rising political costs for the PAP. Buttressed by the rising sense of nationalism, one of the key beneficiaries of this backlash was the opposition political parties contesting in the 2011 general elections.

The debate over the 2013 white paper on population The population white paper released in January 2013 argued that as the first cohort of baby boomers turned 65 in 2012, Singapore was expected to 51 “Narrowing racial divide in S’pore due to ‘foreign threat’?” Singaporescene, 27 June 2011 at http://sg.news.yahoo.com/blogs/singaporescene/narrowing-racial-divdi.

86 

Bilveer Singh

“experience an unprecedented age shift between now and 2030,” with the number of working-age Singaporeans declining.52 The country’s low fertility rates would lead to a rapid decline of the citizen population. In view of this concern, the white paper was supposed to be a “roadmap for Singapore’s population policies to address this demographic challenge,” with the main thrust being to take in new immigrants.53 Interestingly, despite the general population angst with the inflow of immigrants, the white paper proposed that the city-state should be prepared to accommodate a population range of between 6.5 to 6.9 million.54 The white paper was severely criticized by the public, opposition political parties, and even some members of the ruling PAP. While the white paper was praised as a possible useful planning tool, many expressed unhappiness over the tradeoffs between economic growth and other aspects of making Singapore a more liveable city-state. This included issues of overcrowding, rising income inequality, and its impact on the quality of life of Singaporeans. The projected reduction of the “Singapore Core” vis-à-vis foreign immigrants was also a major issue. The disquiet over the white paper was best expressed by Inderjit Singh, a PAP parliamentarian from the Ang Mo Kio GRC. Singh argued that while the white paper has “some compelling arguments for the 6.9 million population figure projected,” it was essentially “based on economic considerations.”55 However, if the white paper had “focused on things like building a cohesive nation with a strong national identity, the outcome would likely be very different.”56 Instead, Singh argued that the time had come “to find a better balance between economic growth and social cohesion.”57 In his view, it was better to have some tradeoffs between economic growth and “a cohesive, united nation where the people feel taken care of at home and are confident of their future.”58 As the past policies of rapid population growth had already “created too many problems,” it was prudent to solve them before taking “the next step” of welcoming more immigrants into Singapore. Singh argued that “the most important thing is for us as a Government to take care of the Singaporean core, and therefore I have a big issue with the number of PRs and new citizens we are planning to add to the population. That part of the White Paper is something that I 52 National Population and Talent Division, A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Hansard, vol. 90 (5 February 2013) per Mr. Inderjit Singh (Ang Mo Kio). 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid.

The Politics of Immigr ation

87

cannot agree with.”59 In view of his disagreements, he urged the government “to slow down and plan on reaching their population target over a longer time horizon … I do not think that we can live with 6.9 million population here in Singapore by 2030.”60 As such, it was necessary to take a breather from re-growing our population again. We have too many problems. As the Government, we need to rebuild the trust and confidence among Singaporeans that our citizens matter most to us and that we are willing to take a break from our relentless drive for growth to solve their problems and our problems, make their lives more comfortable, give them a better quality of life and show them that any future growth of population will not create similar social and cost of living problems that they had faced in the past.61

Mainly due to the ruling party’s strong majority, the white paper was passed by parliament after an amendment was made to the motion making it clear that the 6.9 million population figure was not a target, that the government would not be deciding now on any specific population size before 2020, and that it was only making planning provisions for infrastructure and land use.62 The manner in which the government mishandled the white paper, including labelling nursing as a “low-skilled job” was yet another setback in its management of immigrants into Singapore, with the prime minister promising that the government would study the lessons learned from the white paper debate so that it could do better the next time. Interestingly, the position of the opposition political parties was something that stood out, highlighting the fact that they were not only interested in criticizing but also in providing credible policy alternatives. This was not the opposition’s forte in the past. In riposte, the WP published a paper entitled A Dynamic Population for a Sustainable Singapore.63 The crux of the WP paper was that: ... the path proposed by the White Paper will further dilute the Singapore core and weaken our national identity. It will also lead us to require 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Toh Yong Chuan, “Government will study lessons from White Paper debate, says PM Lee,” The Straits Times, 10 February 2013. 63 Worker’s Party, A Dynamic Population for a Sustainable Singapore at 1-38at http://wp.sg/ wp-population-policy-paper/.

88 

Bilveer Singh

unsustainable population injections in the future. We believe that the greater well-being of Singaporeans lies in sustainable economic growth driven by increases in our productivity and in our resident workforce, rather than further increases in our dependency on imported foreign labour. Singapore’s demographic challenges must be addressed fundamentally and urgently by focusing on increasing the total fertility rate (TFR) and growing our resident labour force participation rate. In short, we should instead strive for “A Dynamic Population for a Sustainable Singapore64

The WP proposed “deep and comprehensive structural reforms” rather than a focus on “immigration solutions” in overcoming Singapore’s demographic challenges. In this connection, it called for the implementation of policies that would deal with “work-life balance, housing affordability and the cost of living” problems.65 The WP also expressed “serious reservations about the Concept Plan outlined in the Land Use Plan,” arguing that it would make Singapore “the most densely populated urban area in the world” with the Land Use Plan also criticized for being “silent on the environmental effects” that could adversely affect Singapore’s physical sustainability.66 The other two leading opposition parties, the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Solidarity Party (NSP) also came out with their own written responses to the white paper. The SDP’s paper entitled Building a People: Sound Policies for a Secure Future67 where it was argued that the government’s policies in the past failed to address the demographic challenges and that the white paper was likely to aggravate the situation. It argued that “over-crowding and the failure of our infrastructure to effectively deal with the population load has led to escalating housing prices, diminished job opportunities, an over-extended public transport system, increased stress and a general lowering of quality of life for Singaporeans.”68 Instead, a new approach was needed, as the government’s “population policy that places economic growth as its main objective and GDP as its key performance indicator cannot handle the totality of factors that promote quality of life.”69 The SDP believed the new approach should focus “on an immigration 64 Ibid, 5. 65 Ibid, 2. 66 Ibid, 3. 67 Singapore Democratic Party, Building a People: Sound Policies for a Secure Future, 2013, 137. 68 Ibid, 1. 69 Ibid.

The Politics of Immigr ation

89

mechanism designed to attract and retain the best talent while preserving the obligation to provide citizens with a fair and equitable labour market.”70 Similarly, the NSP rejected the white paper. Its key spokesperson, Nicole Seah, captured this sentiment by arguing that “the prospect of building a country primarily to serve economic needs and turn into a transient place for others seeking to use Singapore as a stepping stone is indeed a bitter pill to swallow.”71 Instead, the NSP proposed that a national referendum be held on the white paper and the government’s population policies in order to ascertain “a representative view of what Singaporeans want for our future.”72 It also rejected the adoption of the amended motion of the white paper on the grounds that it did not “reflect the views of Singaporeans because the PAP Members of Parliament voted along party lines.”73 It appears that the various opposition parties and even some members of the PAP were at odds with the content of the white paper. This was evidence of continued apprehension of the government’s pro-immigration policy, underlining the fact that the government had not succeeded in allaying public fears. The thirteen who opposed the white paper in parliament were nine WP members, Lina Chiam, the non-constituency member of parliament and three nominated members of parliament (NMP), namely, Janice Koh, Faizah Jamal, and Laurence Lien. Eugene Tan, one of the NMPs, abstained on grounds that despite his apprehension, he had taken “a leap of faith” after listening to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s passionate parliamentary address calling for support for the motion. 74 The intense debate over the white paper also made apparent that while important policies are being debated more robustly, politics has also crept into policymaking due to the changing political architecture, especially following the 2011 general elections. In this regard, despite the claim by the public and the opposition that immigration is being driven by the government’s single-minded drive for economic growth at the expense of other priorities, a closer examination will show that this is not really the case. Singapore’s largely developed economy is expected to grow between 2 to 70 Ibid. 71 Nicole Seah, “Why I oppose the White Paper: Nicole Seah,” 9 February 2013. See http:// sg.news.yahoo.com/blogs/singaporescene/why-oppose-white. 72 Ibid. 73 “NSP urges PM Lee, President to call for National Referendum,” 9 February 2013. See http:// sg.news.yahoo.com/nsp-calls-for-national-referendum-sends74 See “Parliament endorsed Population White Paper by 77 votes to 13,” 8 February 2013 at http://sg.news.yahoo.com/pm-lee-makes-passionate-appeal-for-population-white-paper-inparliament-082910512.html.

90 

Bilveer Singh

3 percent per year for the next decade or so. This is definitely not a “high growth” trajectory, especially in the Southeast Asia region where Singapore could well be the “slowest growing economy” in probably the fastest growing region in the coming years.75 This is especially the case if the economies of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam take off, as is expected. Very clearly, the debate about the need for and value of immigration, the government’s rationale, and the general public disquiet are unlikely to disappear as the political economy of Singapore moves forward in the next decade or so.

Conclusion From content in both the mainstream and non-mainstream media, immigration has emerged together with housing and health care costs as probably the most keenly debated political issue in Singapore in the last two to three years. This was clearly played out in the 2011 general elections and thereafter, especially following the release of the population white paper in 2013. Granted that the country’s origins owe much to immigration – this was a sensitive issue even then and partly explains Singapore’s exit from Malaysia – it remains today a sensitive issue in terms of the various divides that have emerged, especially between the one-time former migrants and their children, who are now second or third-generation citizens, and the various categories of new immigrants – permanent and temporary: the new citizens, PRs, employment pass holders and work permit holders. On the one hand is the official government view which tries to justify the enlarged presence of these immigrants in the name of the need for “foreign talent” as a necessary strategy for the Republic’s growth and prosperity, the dwindling population, ageing, the need for a bigger population to enhance productivity to augment its competitiveness, and what has been called the “ideal population size” of around 6.5 million or so. On the other hand, there is the discourse involving increasing concerns with the rising number of foreigners who are threatening various aspects of Singaporeans’ lifestyle and comfort zone – jobs, public housing, hospital beds, wives, husbands, social ills, etc – and overcrowding what is already an over-crowded and small island. Some observers have credited a positive spin to this, ironically being the rise of local nationalism, also referred to as the “local versus foreigner” 75 “Singapore ‘risks being Asean’s slowest growing country’: Shanmugam,” The Straits Times, 5 September 2013

The Politics of Immigr ation

91

divide. Former Senior Minister Goh has talked about a divide opening up between Singaporeans and new settlers, not just between different ethnic groups but also within various races. Similarly, retired civil servant Ngiam Tong Dow has said that he would think twice before setting a target of a population of 6.5 million but focus instead on talent. He warned that if we get this policy wrong, it will forever change Singapore’s economic and social system, not to mention cause further political fallouts.

4

Social Integration of Immigrants into Multiracial Singapore Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

Introduction While most modern nation-states are multicultural to some degree in that they are composed of people with distinct ethno-racial, linguistic, or religious cultures, the level of interaction and exposure of those who are culturally different is sometimes limited based on geographical boundaries and group segregation practices. Globalization and its concomitant immigration has, however, increased population diversity particularly in economically developed societies. This has led a number of societies to adopt multicultural policies to deal with immigration. Essentially such policies are meant to ensure the inclusion of immigrant populations into mainstream society, improve their social and economic position, and accord them equal rights. While previously seen as crucial for social cohesion, in more recent years a number of European societies have questioned the utility of such policies.1 The cultures of immigrants are handled differently depending on the framework of multiculturalism that is used in a particular nation-state. Vasu distinguishes between two broad forms of multiculturalism – mild and a hard form.2 Mild multiculturalism, as found in the United States, acknowledges the reality of a plural society and guarantees that a spectrum of identities will mark society. Nevertheless, it does not commit to any one identity thriving in the nation-state and so does not find a compelling reason to preserve a particular group. Embracing hard multiculturalism on the other hand means that nation-states work to preserve individual group rights. Politics in such nation-states is intricately connected to the greater project of ensuring that groups are able to affirm their differences and that minority groups are recognized, protected, and given political representation. Canada, for example, passed the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act, making it the first country 1 Gallya Lahav, Immigration and Politics in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 2 Norman Vasu, “(En)countering Terrorism: Multiculturalism and Singapore,” Asian Ethnicity, February 2008, vol. 9 (1): 17-32.

94 Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

to pass a national multiculturalism law affirming multiculturalism as a “fundamental value of Canadian society.”3 Besides constitutional measures and legislation, Canada also has multicultural programmes operating from the municipal to the provincial and federal government levels. Although nation-states that adopt the hard multiculturalism model endeavour to preserve minority rights, their official positions may not resonate with the interests of mainstream populations. Research on European societies, many of which practice hard multiculturalism, shows that the mainstream population is generally neutral about multiculturalism – objectionable to discrimination of new immigrants but not open to new immigrants maintaining their culture. Australia, as another example, also embraced multiculturalism as a government policy during the late 1970s after it dismantled the White Australia Policy, but it fell out of favour by the mid-1990s to the early 2000s at the federal level. Immigrants on the other hand desire to maintain their cultural characteristics and at the same time build positive relations with other groups. This aspiration does not seem contradictory to them although held suspect by the mainstream which assesses their commitment to the nation-state by the extent to which they cut cultural links with their country of origin. Nevertheless, for immigrants, their preferred combination leads to the best possible outcomes in both their psychological and social well-being. Such immigrants adapt better to their host societies with lower rates of mental illness and greater satisfaction with life, and they integrate better into the host economy where they garner reasonable rates of social mobility.

The Singapore experience The context of multiculturalism in Singapore arose early on in its development as a colonial state. With the setting up of a colonial outpost, migrants from different parts of China, India, and the Malay Archipelago settled here seeking economic opportunities. They were classified by the colonial government into racial categories of Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Europeans through census and urban planning.4 As such, the Chinese were relegated to 3 Annie Legault, “Multiculturalism: The Canadian Approach” in Social Resilience in Singapore: Reflections from the London Bombings (ed.) Norman Vasu (Singapore: Select Publishing, 2007), 100. 4 Daniel P.S. Goh, “State carnivals and the subvention of multiculturalism in Singapore,” The British Journal of Sociology, 2011, vol. 62 (1): 112-33; C Hirschman, “The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial Ideology,” Sociological Forum, 1986, 1 (2): 330-61.

Social Integr ation of Immigr ants into Multir acial Singapore

95

social and economic activities, while the Indians worked in plantations or as municipal workers. The Malays were considered the indigenous population regionally as well as locally. However, the imposed multiculturalism was not a coherent whole and was fragmented at best. By the 1930s, the colonial state was faced with internal conflicts from anti-imperialists, Indian nationalists, and conservatives who demanded the return of Malay customary authority.5 The racial classification inherited by the British was further pursued with the onset of Singapore’s merger with Malaysia and its subsequent independence in 1965. The push for a Malaysian Malaysia was “one of the earliest discursive expressions of the ideology of multiculturalism whereby different ethnic groups were accorded equal rights and where cultural diversity was to be protected.”6 It also meant that the Malaysian Malaysia state was impartial to any particular race or community.7 Taking into account the commitment of the People’s Action Party (PAP) to a Malaysian Malaysia, the centrality of race continued even after Singapore’s independence in 1965. Each ethnic group is equal under constitutional law and multiracialism – Singapore’s form of multiculturalism – was minted as an official policy. Since Singapore housed a substantial immigrant population, it was necessary to bind the different racial groups together through transforming the demographic reality into a constitutional multiracial country.8 In doing so, the ruling party also sought to homogenize “ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences within each (racial) category itself.”9 The purpose of multiracialism is multiple: to oppose ethnic discrimination, to inform the everyday lives of Singaporeans, and to be a clear marker of Singaporean culture.10 Singapore’s brand of multiculturalism – i.e. multiracialism – is central to state discourse because it inscribes essentialized racial categories on its citizens. Tan tracks the evolution of the management of ethnic relations from post-independence till today. From 1965 to 1979, a “putative SingaporeanSingapore identity” was sought to create a national identity through “an 5 Daniel P.S. Goh, “State carnivals and the subvention of multiculturalism in Singapore,” 114. 6 Terence Chong, “Cultural Identity Formation in Singapore: The Role of Multiculturalism and Beyond,” paper presented at the Asian Culture Policy Symposium, 2007. 7 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings, 1998). 8 Chua Beng Huat, “Multiracialism as Official Policy: A Critique of the Management of Difference in Singapore” in Social Resilience in Singapore: Reflections from the London Bombings, (ed.) Norman Vasu (Singapore: Select Publishing, 2007), 53. 9 Ibid, 2. 10 Geoffrey Benjamin, “The Cultural Logic of Singapore’s ‘Multiracialism’” in Singapore: Society in Transition, (ed.) Riaz Hassan (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976).

96 Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

eclectic mix of civic integration, quasi-consociationalism and hegemonic control.”11 This was followed by the era of the “hyphenated-Singaporean”, marked by compulsory bilingualism and ethnic self-help groups driven by the need to “return to cultural roots” which inevitably encouraged racial consciousness.12 The third phase saw an “increased ethnic consciousness within Asianisation” which saw Singapore being a prime example for “Asian Values” and an assertion of Chinese-ness in Singapore.13 The present mode of ethnic management is best explained by then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, who envisioned each racial group as “four overlapping circles” where the overlapping area is a space “where all Singaporeans, whatever their race, can work and play together.” Outside of the overlapping space, where the circles do not overlap, is each community’s playing field. According to Goh, “in this separate area, each community can retain and speak its own language and practice its own culture and customs.”14 Goh stressed that while there is a common space for interaction, the four circles are distinctly homogenous and therefore possessing “fixed, stable and clear boundaries.”15 Trespassing these circles is inhibited. What constitutes as Singaporean-ness can only emerge from the common space and not from any one racial circle.16 This common space is only possible when all Singaporeans share similar values and interests, highlighted by then Muslim Affairs Minister Dr Yaacob Ibrahim as “tolerance and mutual respect, respect for diversity, Singapore’s national interests and so on. The values that permeate the common space must also be operating in the private spaces.”17 Another speech by Dr Ibrahim18 also cites how the melting pot approach of the early years gave way to the mosaic approach that culminated in “multiculturalism,” “an approach that combines both the melting pot and mosaic

11 Kevin Tan, “The Legal and Institutional Framework and Issues of Multiculturalism in Singapore” in Beyond Rituals and Riots: Ethnic Pluralism and Social Cohesion in Singapore, (ed.) Lai Ah Eng (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2004), 68. 12 Ibid, 70. 13 Ibid, 71. 14 Speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong on Singapore 21 Debate in Parliament on Wednesday, 5 May 1999, at 2.30 pm at http://www.singapore21.org.sg/speeches_050599.html. 15 Chong, “Cultural Identity Formation in Singapore,” 33. 16 Ibid. 17 Speech by Muslim Affairs Minister Dr. Yaacob Ibrahim at the Institute of Policy Studies Forum on Ethnic Relations at http://app10.internet.gov.sg/data/sprinter/pr/2002102402.htm. 18 Speech by Muslim Affairs Minister Dr. Yaacob Ibrahim at the Singapore Management University on 2 Aug 2003 at the Wee Kim Wee Seminar on Cross-Cultural Understanding.

Social Integr ation of Immigr ants into Multir acial Singapore

97

approaches.”19 While the melting pot policy “met the exigencies of Separation and industrialization,” the mosaic policy “engaged a democratizing society and the problems resulting from the success of amalgamation.”20 The current multiculturalism thus seeks to address the success of hyphenated Singaporeans unable to deal with ambivalent cultural differences stressed by the impact of globalization. Goh posits that the current Singaporean identity imagined by the state today is a cosmopolitan Singaporean able to “move comfortably between diverse ethnic cultures.”21

Ethnic management policies The recognition and preservation of the four official races of Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others (CMIO) can be seen through the various policies directed at managing inter-ethnic relations. Chua points out the formal equality of the racial groups that are overt in the areas of religion, festival, and language. All major religious festivals are public holidays, with festivals receiving state sponsorship. “Mother-tongue” languages – e.g. Mandarin for Chinese – are compulsory subjects in schools, as a means to instil traditional Asian values amidst Western influences in Singapore.22 Likewise, public broadcasting such as free-to-air television channels and print media are available in English, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil. Lastly, the CMIO framework is celebrated through events such as National Day and Racial Harmony Day, where overt features of each ethnic group, such as music, foods, costumes, and “other manifestations of ethnic cultures are elaborately displayed and partaken of in schools, community centres and organizations.”23 Besides these, policy intervention is also apparent in areas such as public housing via mandatory spatial integration and political representation via the Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs). Spatial integration in the Housing Development Board (HDB) flats through the Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) is promoted via “creating ethnically integrated communities” in the HDB block on the micro level and the HDB neighbourhood on the macro level through mandating a similar racial composition to that of 19 Daniel P.S. Goh, “Multiculturalism and The Problem of Solidarity,” in Management of Success: Singapore Revisited, (ed.) Terence Chong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 561. 20 Ibid, 562. 21 Ibid, 561. 22 Chua, “Multiracialism as Official Policy,” 54. 23 Lai Ah Eng (ed.), Beyond Rituals and Riots: Ethnic Pluralism and Social Cohesion in Singapore (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2004), 6.

98 Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

the national scenario.24 It is “premised on the contact hypothesis, where inter-group relations are predicted to be more positive … where contact is more personal, of equal status, cooperative, and supported by institutional authorities.”25 Additionally, political representation of members of parliament is done via electing a GRC, which must include at least one candidate of a minority race so that minority interests will be represented in parliament. 26 However, candidates of minority races must undergo verification of his/ her minority status, and the number of minority members in parliament is capped, following the national scenario of the current Chinese majority, followed by Malays, Indians, and thereafter Eurasians and other races.27 Vasu pinpoints three inadequacies of the multiracialism logic. First, CMIO categories create artificial differences in order for the categories to be sustained. Second, negative stereotyping occurs and third, there is constant emphasis on differences between racial groups which hinders the fostering of a cohesive environment where commonalities can be acknowledged.28 The top-down approach in managing race relations through the imposition of the CMIO categories has been critiqued widely. One such criticism is that in creating hyphenated Singaporeans – e.g. Chinese-Singaporean and so forth – racial identification is clearly tied to the national identity.29 In being used as a rationale for policy decisions, it has also reified the state as being race-neutral and therefore being the most capable of managing race relations in Singapore.30 Additionally, the logic of Singapore’s multiculturalism cannot be touched upon without engaging recurring thematic issues. Tan mentions key themes such as the need to maintain the racial ratio among the races which reinforces the “belief in a hierarchy of cultures and core values of the various races.”31 Such a hierarchy of cultures is also associated with ethnic essentialism and the practice of ethnic self-help groups. Self-help groups, 24 Eugene K.B. Tan, “Multiracialism engineered: The limits of electoral and spatial integration in Singapore,” Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 4 (4) 2005: 413-428. 25 C. McCauley et al., “Contact and identity in inter-group relations” in The Psychology of Ethnic and Cultural Conflict Y. T. Lee, C. McCauley, S. Worchel et al. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 312. 26 Alexius Pereira, “Does Multiculturalism Recognise or ‘Minoritise’ Minorities?,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 2008, 8 (2): 349-356. 27 Ibid. 28 Norman Vasu, “(En)countering Terrorism: Multiculturalism and Singapore,” 153. 29 Daniel Goh, “Multiculturalism and the Problem of Solidarity,” 571. 30 Terence Chong, “Cultural Identity Formation in Singapore: The Role of Multiculturalism and Beyond.” 31 Tan, “The Legal and Institutional Framework,” 76.

Social Integr ation of Immigr ants into Multir acial Singapore

99

which started with Mendaki in 1982, would ensure that no self-help group would operate against the overarching framework of multiracialism. The government rationale behind this was also that a national body addressing problems faced by low-income Singaporeans would not be sensitive to the peculiarities of each ethnic group’s problems and thus would not be able to find culturally relevant solutions. However, Tan suggests that such an initiative only remains “a potent symbol of distinctiveness, separateness and the lack of cohesion” and is thus contrary to the goals of nation-building.32 The associated underlying concern also relates to the closely linked model of multiracialism and meritocracy in Singapore. With the presence of ethnic self-help groups, the perception is that certain racial communities – the Malay-Muslim community in particular – are weaker, backward, and lagging behind the other racial groups.33 The obfuscation of socio-economic conditions and problems is then problematized as essentialized racial stereotypes. Third, there is the “constant refrain of the dangers of ethno-violence with race and religion as fault-lines” and an emphasis on the racial riots of 1964.34 Chua questions if the danger of these riots have been “exaggerated by mythologizing past events.”35 Similarly, such deterrence operates in a closed logic – it is never lifted and thus can never be tested for validity of the assumption of recurring racial violence.

Integrating into a multicultural society Berry introduces the fundamental issues of immigration, where different cultural groups come into contact with each other through the process of acculturation which results in “subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups.”36 Berry also highlights four main acculturation strategies that are derived from two issues: the need for cultural maintenance (to what extent is cultural identity important and should be pursued) and contact and participation (to what extent should the immigrant become involved in other cultural groups). As such, integration only takes place with mutual accommodation, 32 Ibid, 79. 33 Ibid, 78. 34 Ibid, 77. 35 Chua, “Multiracialism as Official Policy,” 62. 36 John Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation and Adaptation,” Applied Psychology: An International Review, (1997) 46 (1): 5-68.

100 Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

where there is “some degree of cultural integrity” at the same time as an active seeking and participation in “the larger society/social network.”37 Plural societies are in existence because of three factors: voluntariness, mobility, and permanence. Since Singapore is a multiracial society, the influx of multi-ethnic immigrants into the CMIO framework makes for an interesting case. Singapore fulfills the criteria of Berry and Kalin’s notion of a multicultural society – one which has a positive multicultural ideology, low levels of prejudice, a general positive mutual attitude among cultural groups, and a sense of attachment to the larger society. However, social cohesion and ethnic pluralism on the ground is very different from the state-imposed official narratives, conditions, and parameters.38 Singapore is also at a stage that Vertovec defines as super-diversity, “a situation that challenges existing conventional understandings of and practices around, multiculturalism.”39 It is characterized by numerous variables, such as country of origin (which consists of local identities, religious tradition, cultural values), migration channel (related to gender flows, social networks, and labour market niches), and legal status (a myriad of categories determining the hierarchy of entitlements and restrictions). These main variables co-condition integration outcomes along with other factors. 40 Such a state of super-diversity thus challenges not just state policies on ethnic management but also everyday multiculturalism at the grassroots level. Wise and Velayutham point out that multiculturalism has generally been a “top-down perspective as a set of policies concerned with the management of diversity,” which has overlooked “lived experiences of the phenomenon” via everyday multiculturalism.41 As such, Semi et al. also point out that everyday multiculturalism does not just deal with the “acceptance or celebration of difference, but its active and situated use – in a strategic or tactical way,” which goes beyond just “positive situations of intercultural communication.”42 37 Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation and Adaptation,” 9. 38 Lai, “Beyond Rituals and Riots,” 10. 39 Steven Vertovec, “Super-diversity and its implications,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, (2007) 29 (6): 1024-54. 40 Steven Vertovec, “New Complexities of Cohesion in Britain: Super-Diversity, Transnationalism and Civil-Integration,” Commission on Integration and Cohesion United Kingdom, June 2007 at http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/Reports/Vertovec%20-%20 new_complexities_of_cohesion_in_britain.pdf, 583. 41 A Wise and S Velayutham, “Introduction: multiculturalism and everyday life,” in Everyday multiculturalism (eds.) A. Wise and S. Velayutham (London: Palgrave, 2009), 2. 42 G. Colombo Semi, I Camozzi and A Frisina, “Practices of difference: Analysing multiculturalism in everyday life,” in Everyday multiculturalism (eds.) A. Wise and S Velayutham, (London:

Social Integr ation of Immigr ants into Multir acial Singapore

101

Aims of research In a society that practices the brand of hard multiculturalism, group differences in Singapore are continually affirmed through the institutional recognition of these differences in the public sphere including political representation. Second, the state continually strives to protect group rights and relations. 43 In 2009, 59,460 people were granted permanent residence (PR) and 19,928 new Singapore citizenships. 44 As of 2010, only 63.6 percent of residents were citizens, while 10.7 percent were PRs and 25.7 percent non-residents. 45 In such a context this study aims to examine the experience of immigrants from different cultural backgrounds living in Singapore. It questions the commitment of these immigrants to the ideals of multiracialism given their interest in maintaining their own cultural heritage. It also reveals how new immigrants navigate a cultural space which is different from their previous lived-in experiences.

Methodology Qualitative in-depth interviews were conducted with 25 new immigrants: ten Chinese from the People’s Republic of China, ten Indians, and five Filipinos. All of them had been residents in Singapore for between three to twenty years, at least half having already obtained Singapore citizenship. The respondents were recruited through the first author and his research assistant’s social network. Respondents had semi-professional to professional employment, with several having started their life in Singapore as tertiary students. Most of them were of the middle-income bracket living in HDB neighbourhoods. Interviews were conducted at a place of convenience to the participant and were recorded. Transcripts were made from recordings and analyzed by the research team. The convenient sampling technique clearly prevents us from generalizing the results to the level of the larger immigrant population in Singapore. Palgrave, 2009). 43 Norman Vasu, “(En)countering Terrorism: Multiculturalism and Singapore,” 148. 44 Transcript of DPM’s Speech on Population at the Committee of Supply 2010, 4 Mar 2010 at https://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/news/_jcr_content/par_content/download_35/f ile. res/Charts%20for%20DPM%27s%20speech%20on%20population%20at%20COS%202010%20 -%20final.pdf 45 Singapore Department of Statistics, http://www.singstat.gov.sg/

102 Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

Respondents were also familiar with the interviewers, which raises the possibility that they constituted the immigrant population that is more open to Singaporeans. However, their familiarity with the interviewers was much needed for trust to be established and to allow for more candid discussions on the topic. These interviews were complemented with quantitative data from the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) Survey on Immigrants (2010). This survey involved 1,000 new immigrants and 1,001 local-born citizens. The methodology of the study as well as the sample has been reported elsewhere in this volume and as such no further details will be provided in this chapter. 46

Findings: Experience of immigrants living with people of another culture Recognition of differences Respondents perceive early on the differences between them and Singaporeans in their host society. This was apparent not just in navigating the physical environment, but the socio-cultural habits and ways of living that were distinctly contrary to their practices in their native societies. As this female respondent who was formerly from China and currently married to a Singaporean remarked, … when I go out to eat with Singaporeans, they will count to the exact cents, with GST and service charge the amount that everyone has to pay …

Citing an example of having a meal with Singaporeans, the respondent felt that such behaviour – ”being particular” – was at odds with her usual practice of eating with friends back home: When we go out to eat with friends in China, we will treat each other food. Like this time round I will pay for everything, the next time round, my friends will return the treat. We treat each other a lot and we are not particular about small changes.

She thus concluded that this meant that Singaporeans’ relationships with their close ones were “not as rich as us (PRC Chinese)” and that this disjunc46 See Chapter 7 of this volume.

Social Integr ation of Immigr ants into Multir acial Singapore

103

ture of behaviour was due to a culture clash. In attributing this and other behaviours – such as Singaporean’s predilection for polite greetings – to the cultural context, respondents reconciled themselves to having to negotiate “two different channels” or possessing an “I have my way, they have their way” attitude. While acknowledging this, the respondents also chose to decide which channel to follow at any point in time, as opposed to strictly following their own cultural practices or the socio-cultural practices of Singaporeans. As one respondent formerly from China but living in Singapore since her school days expresses: Some things I choose to do it my way. Singaporeans can do things their own way, but I hope they don’t try to convert me into a Singaporean in all ways.

At the same time, this attitude was coupled with the necessity to keep a safe distance from Singaporeans – ”I think it would still be good to keep some boundaries” – perhaps to avoid further incidents which could culminate in more problematic culture clashes. The duo channels are aligned with the idea of bifocality, “transnational practices of exchange, communication and frequent travel impact upon the outlook and daily experiences of migrants,”47 which is akin to Bourdieu’s habitus – incorporating the social position of the migrant and the context in which transmigration occurs. Guarnizo also points out the similarities of migrants from the same social grouping (class, gender, generation) and “the generation of transnational practices adjusted to specific situations” which are also due to the impact of bifocality. 48 With regards to possessing an attitude that incorporates “two different channels,” there were two approaches in which the respondents differed from each other. Some exoticized the cultural differences they encountered. One respondent formerly from China but living in Singapore for seven years since her university days made this comment on Malay culture: I think it is quite interesting actually! No such thing in China, so it is very interesting to get to know these races. 47 Steven Vertovec, “Super-diversity and its implications,” 974. 48 L.E. Guarnizo et al., “Assimilation and transnationalism: Determinants of transnational political action among contemporary migrants,” American Journal of Sociology, (2003) 108 (6): 1211-48.

104 Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

This stemmed from an overall positive mindset towards the differences, as the respondent did not see them as “difficulties” but rather as a “learning experience.” The other approach was to f ind parallel comparisons to get used to the differences they encountered. As referred to by Berry49 in his adaptation model, the ethnic integration factor refers to “identification with an immigrant’s own ethnic culture.”50 One respondent formerly from India and living in Singapore for five years offered the example of rituals commemorating relatives who had passed on: I have asked my friends who are Chinese and they tell me that by burning they are providing for the loved ones who have passed away to make them comfortable and also to care for their needs. For us, we do offer food but mostly, we offer it at the sea or river maybe once a year, so it is a different practice.

Most respondents sought to question these differences by asking local Singaporeans, and once doing so, were able to come to terms with them and thus were “not offended” by practices that were unknown to them. Importantly, this acknowledgement and acceptance also had its boundaries. Respondents agreed that they were not resentful of such socio-cultural divergences unless Singaporean norms or ways of behaving were imposed or forced on them. New immigrants coped better with the cultural differences they were confronted with when they had previous exposure to a different culture. A number of respondents emphasized their inter-cultural contact in their country of origin. As one Indian immigrant living in Singapore for five years remarked when asked how he handled the cultural differences he noticed in Singapore: While working in India I have moved and worked in different states over a period of four years. And I am used to mixing with different people. As a student I stayed in a hostel and also mixed with different people so I am able to mix. 49 John Berry, “Conceptual approaches to acculturation,” in Acculturation: Advances in theory, measurement and applied research, (eds.) K. Chun et al., (Washington DC: APA Press, 2003), 17-37. 50 John Berry et al., “Immigrant Youth: Acculturation, Identity, and Adaptation,” Applied Psychology: An International Review, (2006) 55 (3): 303-332.

Social Integr ation of Immigr ants into Multir acial Singapore

105

For these respondents, having already had to move out of culturally familiar settings in their countries of origin and thus being exposed to and needing to interact with other cultures provided them “shock-absorbers” to negotiate some of the terrain associated with inter-cultural differences in Singapore. More Indian respondents reported early exposure to other cultures compared with the Chinese respondents. Perhaps the substantial diversity in India given its many religious practices, linguistic diversity, and the strong Aryan-Dravidian cultural divide provided upwardly mobile Indian professionals the setting in which to constantly deal with the culturally “other.” New norms were increasingly accepted among immigrants as they acculturated to the Singaporean space. For some of them, this was partly the result of their children adopting aspects of Singaporean culture early through the school system. With children as mediators and early adopters of the new norms, it was easier to discuss and come to terms with the different cultural landscape. Living together without overt conflict Upon coming to terms with new norms, new immigrants articulate their ability to live side by side with individuals of other racial groups. They often explain that there is no overt friction. A lack of overt conflict is often used as an affirmative sign to benchmark positive race relations. This is especially pertinent in Singapore where the 1964 racial riots are often used by the state to reference the supposed lack of racial harmony at that time and its need to use state action to protect racial harmony here. The vision for racial and religious harmony is also normally couched in the ability to tolerate other cultural differences and characterized by a willingness to show respect to cultural preferences. What Berry terms as mutual accommodation or the “acceptance by groups of the right of all groups to live as culturally different peoples”51 is apparent in the initiatives taken by this Chinese respondent, who has been living in Singapore for eight years, to understand the Malay culture: Sometimes, I know I have to be more aware of the differences, like the Malays eat halal food etc. I will pick these up and change some ways I do things to take into consideration their lifestyles.

51 John Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation and Adaptation,” 10.

106 Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

The respondents agreed that such a change can only happen with effort and time. Initially, a Chinese respondent who has lived in Singapore for eleven years commented that she was not used to interacting with Indians in Singapore, citing that it was also foreign to her because “they carry this funny smell around.” However, she conceded that it was due to her lack of knowledge about the racial group and expressed a change of mindset after some time: When I slowly get to know them, colour and race does not really have much of a difference to me anymore. Because when I make friends, I am making friends with a person. I am not making friends with a race or nationality. Now, I have Malay friends, Indian friends.

To her, what was necessary for the process of adaptation is the willingness to respect. Citing how “Indians will use their hands to eat” and “Malays will pray four to five times at the mosque,” what she deems as important was just basic respect and the non-denial of others’ cultural practices. While such themes as the recognition of differences and the willingness to accept and respect different cultural practices point to a positive affirmation in adapting to Singapore’s multicultural model, immigrants also experienced some form of conflict. Some respondents perceived that Singaporeans had the tendency to look down on them. As one immigrant from India who has been living in Singapore for seven years expressed: My frank opinion of Singaporean Indians is that they are too proud and look down on us foreign Indians. When they (local Indians) speak to us, it is with a mask and it is superficial.

Such a perception was triggered by the fact that he had previously heard local Singaporeans making fun of the Indian dress sense, language, and mannerisms. When negative prejudicial feelings are thought to be held, the respondents either chose to abandon these interests and concentrate on their own migrant ethnic community or persevered in their attempts to integrate. One Indian respondent felt that Singapore had provided a bounty of material benefits for which he was grateful. In return, he aimed to persevere in his efforts to integrate as much as he could into Singaporean society, regardless of the prejudice he felt:

Social Integr ation of Immigr ants into Multir acial Singapore

107

I am grateful to Singapore that I can come here, it is safe, secure, and free, and we can do anything safe here. Unlike India, I am not worried when my wife is not back after midnight. I may not be full accepted, but I will try to mix and not give up.

Commitment of immigrants to multiracialism The commitment of immigrants to integration is tightly linked to their commitment to the idea of multiracialism in Singapore. This is evident from the IPS Survey on Immigrants (2010), which questioned 2,001 Singaporeans and immigrants on what social marker/characteristic was important for immigrants to be considered “Singaporean.” The social marker ranked most important by 86.7 percent of Singaporeans and 75.9 percent of immigrants was the need for respect of multiracial and multireligious practices. Immigrants in Singapore were well versed with how important multiracialism was in the city-state. Emphasizing this point in a speech to Singaporean Indians, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong cited some thoughts from a new citizen formerly from India who wrote to him: “here in Singapore, I have discovered that ideals actually mean something in politics. Multiracialism, meritocracy, integrity and efficiency are not just words in the wind mouthed by changeable politicians and passing parties, but are objective standards that leaders are willing to be judged by. As a result, multiracialism and meritocracy have transformed Singapore.”52 The fact that the ideal of multiracialism is well preserved in Singapore and is a seemingly unchangeable feature of its political landscape and not subject to majority sentiments made it a feature that was well regarded by immigrants. In fact, when new immigrants were asked what was different between Singapore and their country of birth, they would often discuss the fact that Singapore was multiracial. The following quote from a Chinese reflects this: I think it is multiracial and generally Singaporeans are very tolerant of each other’s beliefs. I am very fond of Singaporeans because of this. There are so many kinds of habits and beliefs but Singaporeans are very nice to respect each other’s individual way of life. I will treat this as an area that I can learn from Singaporeans. It is very nice to have so many different races living in harmony together. It is a good thing. 52 Transcript of PM Lee Hsien Loong’s speech at the Indian Community Tribute Dinner on 29 Jan 2005 at http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view-html?filename=2005012901.htm

108 Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

While there was much consensus on the salience of multiracialism to the Singaporean identity even among immigrants, about 25 percent of them did not hold such views. Statistical analysis using logistic regression techniques showed that immigrant respondents who stated “Yes” to the specific social marker of respecting multiracial and religious practices compared to those who had stated “No” were those who had been in Singapore for a longer period of time, and possessed less of an orientation towards their country of origin. The f indings from the regression analyses are fairly intuitive. The process of acculturation into the multi-racial logic requires immigrants to spend some time in Singapore, where they are constantly exposed to the functioning of a multiracial society. The many features of such a society ranging from the constant calls for tolerance and the celebration of cultural diversity in state discourse are bound to form an impression of the salience of multiracialism in Singapore. As new immigrants become less concerned about their country of origin and find ways to root themselves in Singapore, they become committed to national values and goals. One immigrant born in China but living in Singapore for ten years and married to a Singaporean explained: Because of my husband and my children (who are Singaporeans), I would feel that there is a greater need for me to integrate into society. I feel the need for me to better understand the different cultures in Singapore and familiarise myself with it and respect them.

Immigrants’ need to maintain the culture of their country of origin Since the acculturating process is always a tussle between cultural maintenance and the initiative taken to participate in the host society, the respondents also differed in their response towards the need to preserve their original culture. The IPS Survey on Immigrants showed that 28 percent agreed it was important to preserve their original culture rather than adopting the Singaporean culture, with another 4 percent strongly agreeing, 30 percent disagreed, 33 percent remained neutral while 5 percent strongly disagreed. The majority of the 33 percent remaining neutral shows how great the tension is in manoeuvring along the spectrum between cultural maintenance and acculturation.

Social Integr ation of Immigr ants into Multir acial Singapore

109

Statistical analysis using multiple regressions also showed that immigrants who tended to agree to the need to preserve their original culture over adapting to Singaporean culture possessed certain characteristics: they had been in Singapore for less time and had more of an orientation towards their country of origin. Additionally, these immigrants tended to be from India rather than China or Malaysia. Again, the analysis reiterates that the period of residence and national orientation have much to do with cultural maintenance. But why Indians were more likely to show a greater inclination to hold on to their original culture rather than adopting the Singaporean culture is not clear. Our interviews did, however, show that Indian respondents felt strongly about aspects of their culture, particularly the religious and linguistic aspects they believed were crucial to their selfidentity. There was also the sense that a major part of the Singaporean culture was influenced by the predominant Chinese cultural majority. Thus Indians as a minority may feel a greater need to preserve their original culture in what they might consider a Sinicized Singaporean culture.

Discussion As Vasu points out, Singapore’s practice of hard multiculturalism is seen through its “institutional recognition of cultural diversity” from the compulsory learning of mother-tongue languages to the ethnic spatial segregation and political representation.53 As such, immigrants entering Singaporean society are placed in the CMIO framework, where their differences are made even more prominent and salient. The need to understand the gravity of preserving racial harmony is also emphasized, as can be seen by the result of the IPS survey, where multiracialism was signalled by both immigrants and local Singaporeans as the most important social marker of being a Singaporean. However, as seen by the findings of this study, although there is a commitment towards the values of multiracialism, the concept is translated at a superficial level as the avoidance of overt conflicts and a general tolerance of the cultural preferences of others. Although these differences were occasionally exoticized by the immigrants, cultural interactions were seldom met with appreciation or admiration. Immigrants often saw multicultural interactions as a necessary part of life in Singapore where they had to make

53 Norman Vasu, “(En)countering Terrorism: Multiculturalism and Singapore,” 150.

110 Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

adaptations, rather than an opportunity to learn about the rich traditions and practices of a civilization. Second, as mentioned previously, immigrants who take on more initiative to acculturate themselves into the CMIO framework are influenced by various factors. Adaptation variables include the length of residence, generational status, education, language mastery, social disadvantages, and cultural distance.54 For immigrants who have inter-married with Singaporeans, the attitude towards acculturating is made more positive via boundary blurring, where the clarity and social boundaries of being an immigrant is made more clouded.55 Similarly, children of these inter-marriages are able to act as cultural brokers for their immigrant parents. They are also most likely to possess a bicultural identity, where they perceive “mainstream and their ethnic cultural identities as compatible.”56 Third, the findings also showed that immigrants who were inclined towards preserving the culture of their country of origin were more often than not from India as opposed to China. Again, as new immigrants are constantly being absorbed into the CMIO framework, there is increasing pressure for them to fit into the distinct social markers of these individual racial categories. One can posit that it is somewhat easier for an immigrant Chinese to acculturate into the markers expected for the Chinese in the CMIO framework. Although accents may differ, the ability to use Mandarin and the celebration of cultural festivals such as Chinese New Year and the Mid Autumn Festival easily places immigrant Chinese into the CMIO framework. This is in contrast to North Indian new immigrants who speak Hindi rather than Tamil, the official Indian language under the CMIO framework, and observe rather different festivals depending on linguistic and religious variations. Since minorities are less likely to fit into the strict racial moulds prescribed by state rhetoric, they are likely to have greater resistance to giving up their cultural identity while at the same time subscribing to the ideals of multiracialism. This is in line with Berry’s multicultural hypothesis, which notes that “confidence in one’s cultural identity involves a sense of security” which is a psychological precondition for acceptance of those who 54 Z. Aycan & J.W. Berry, “Impact of employment-related experiences on immigrants’ well-being and adaptation to Canada,” Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 28 (1996): 240-251. 55 R. Baubock, A. Heller, & A. Zolberg, The challenge of diversity: Integration and pluralism in societies of immigration (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996). 56 V. Benet-Martínez & J Haritatos, “Bicultural Identity Integration (BII): Components and psychosocial antecedents,” Journal of Personality, 73: 1015-1050.

Social Integr ation of Immigr ants into Multir acial Singapore

111

are culturally different. Thus, when people feel that their cultural identity is threatened, they are likely to reject others.57 Fourth, there is a difference between the common space that immigrants navigate and their own private spaces. As suggested earlier, the common space is one in which all Singaporeans can work and play together, sharing similar values and interests such as mutual tolerance and respect for diversity aligned with national interests. From the responses given, it is apparent that efforts are made to understand the differences between local culture and immigrant culture, be it through the exoticization of local ethnic cultures or finding parallel comparisons to their own cultures. The lack of overt conflict is also a clear indicator of the willingness of immigrants to show respect in their daily interactions with Singaporeans. However, this might not necessarily extend to their private spaces of the neighbourhoods they live in. This is in line with Appold and Chua’s claims that the neighbourhood is becoming a less salient place for building social connections.58 It is also plausible that home to new immigrants is the Goffmanian backstage where they can carry out practices such as laundry and cooking that they are accustomed to back in their country of origins.59 Additionally, the social connections of immigrants are increasingly built outside of the environment of the neighbourhood, and are likely to come from the workplace or pre-existing social connections with other fellow immigrants. Moving forward, there is also the issue of fitting immigrants into the tightly categorized CMIO framework. The influx of foreign talent adding to “the already kaleidoscope of four ‘separate but equal’ foundational races” and its impact on Singapore’s “carefully managed plurality” have been questioned for some time now.60 Yeoh and Huang also mention that this kaleidoscope of ethnicities is characterized not just by differences in immigrants’ skills and talent but also by their “specific histories, geographies and cultures”61 57 John Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation and Adaptation.” 58 S. Appold and Chua K.Y., “Crossing the domains: Can workplace affirmative action achieve social peace in urban neighbourhoods?” Conference paper, American Sociological Association, 2006 at http://www.unc.edu/~appolds/research/progress/AANeignborhoodsASA.pdf. 59 Mathew, Mathews (in press), “Integration in the Singapore Heartlands,” in Migration and Integration in Singapore: Policies and Practice. Yap, Mui Teng., Koh, Gillian & Soon, Debbie. (ed) Migration and Integration in Singapore: Policies and Practice. London: Routledge. 60 Brenda Yeoh and Shirlena Huang, ““Foreign Talent” in our Midst: New Challenges to Sense of Community and Ethnic Relations in Singapore,” in Beyond Rituals and Riots: Ethnic Pluralism and Social Cohesion in Singapore (ed.) Lai Ah Eng (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2004), 317. 61 Ibid, 334.

112 Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

as well – resulting in multiple identities along “dimensions of culture, custom, religion” etc.62 Recently, Deputy PM Tharman Shanmugaratnam also pointed out that “we must ensure that diversity is a benefit to Singapore, by maintaining and actively promoting communal harmony.”63 However, with the presence of many immigrant “Others” from the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and other parts of Asia, there is an implication that they should likewise align themselves to similar cultures, perhaps through Sinicization or associating themselves with the local Malay culture. Though efforts are being made via national channels such as the National Integration Council (NIC) to “provide opportunities for new immigrants, foreigners and locals to interact and communicate with each other,”64 thereby “improving their understanding of each other’s culture, values and norms,” there is a consensus in establishing a common Singaporean space. Thus, the benefits for these immigrants in keeping and practicing their cultural heritage here is minimal, since the state makes no attempt to preserve these other migrant cultures. Additionally, the choice of immigrants in choosing the degree of acculturation to any particular racial framework in Singapore – i.e. being Chinese, Malay, or Indian – is mitigated by various factors, such as the level of comfort and familiarity with the racial culture in relation to their original culture, as well as socio-economic benefits that could be gained in claiming allegiance to one racial culture over another. The acculturation process for immigrants also alters the state of the host society in so far that the host society’s values, beliefs, attitudes, and practices accommodate those of the immigrants, refashioning new practices and beliefs. This is apparent when there is a convergence of heritage cultures as immigrant Indians and Chinese interact and participate in local Indian and Chinese communities. Sinha explains that one can see this syncreticism at work during religious festivals such as Deepavali in Singapore, where North and South Indians celebrate together even with their different mythologies and deities.65 This syncretic space extends beyond Hindu religiosity to encompass even Taoist gods by some Hindus, resulting in “a fair level of religious openness” today akin to the historical convergence of Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Islamic, and Chinese faiths in the Southeast Asian 62 Ibid. 63 See http://www.todayonline.com/Singapore/EDC120414-0000076/Ensure-diversity-is-abenefit,-says-DPM 64 See National Integration Council Singapore at http://app.nationalintegrationcouncil.org. sg/FAQonIntegration.aspx 65 “It is a port city through which spiritual traffic flows, says NUS prof,” The Straits Times, at http://files.campus.edublogs.org/blog.nus.edu.sg/dist/0/610/files/2011/10/Vineeta.pdf

Social Integr ation of Immigr ants into Multir acial Singapore

113

region. This phenomenon of religious convergence pinpoints Singapore as a port of “spiritual traffic flows,”66 which allows not just opportunities of experimentation but also the provision of related services/businesses and the injection of migrant habits into local cultures. This could also change the shift in power relations between locals and immigrants, where immigrant needs are increasingly catered to. Although there might be shifts in cultural centres, with immigrant cultures having greater importance in the Singaporean cultural space, the infusion of immigrant culture also signals a positive revitalization of otherwise dying cultural practices. Ethnic cuisines, art forms, and other cultural rituals have been given a much-needed boost with the injection of new immigrants. The obvious case of Indian churches and temples that were struggling to keep their membership in the 1990s have seen substantial rejuvenation in the past decade as a result of the influx of Indian immigrants. While this kind of cultural infusion might be experienced by both the Chinese and Indian communities, with very limited immigration in the Malay case, such injection of new cultural vibrancy is unlikely. Lastly, the impact of the acculturation of immigrants inevitably brings up the anxieties borne by locals. Chong points out three forms of national anxiety directed towards immigrants – firstly, the ability of immigrants to leap-frog obligations and duties to the state; secondly, a constant reminder of limited resources being fought over between locals and immigrants; and lastly, the myth of meritocracy perpetuating a low sense of self-worth among locals who are told that they lack skills, talent, and vigour compared to immigrants.67 These anxieties are further exacerbated among local minorities – in particular, the Malays. The impact of immigrants on Malays is intensified given that they lag behind the other communities in socioeconomic terms and are overrepresented in the lower-skilled job categories. Based on future projections, the Malay total fertility rate (TFR) will continue to decrease,68 while the community’s average growth rate of 1.5-2 percent is lower than the national level’s 4 percent, with the unemployment rate remaining higher than the national average. Incoming immigrants who provide cheaper 66 Ibid. 67 Chong, Terence (in press), “Stepping Stone Singapore: The Cultural Politics of Anti-Immigrant Anxieties in Singapore”, Integration in the Singapore Heartlands,” in Migration and Integration in Singapore: Policies and Practice. Yap, Mui Teng., Koh, Gillian & Soon, Debbie. (ed) Migration and Integration in Singapore: Policies and Practice. London: Routledge. 68 Centre on Research on Islamic and Malay Affairs, “CIR Seminar 2011: Demographic and Immigration Trends: Impact on Malay/Muslim Community,” at http://www.rima.sg/subindex. asp?id=A001-12.

114 Mathew Mathews & Danielle Hong

labour are thus a threat and could potentially drive down the socioeconomic status of the Malays even further. The myth of meritocracy only exacerbates the frustrations of the working and lower-middle classes, who are unable to compete with the elites on the same playing field. There is a possibility, then, that immigration can aggravate the marginalization of the Malays even further. This may have the inadvertent consequence of dismantling the multiracial framework so central to Singapore due to the apparent class divide that follows ethnic lines.

5

Reconstructing Singapore as a Cosmopolitan Landscape The Geographies of Migration and its Social Divisions that Extend into the Heartlands Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho

Introduction Almost a decade ago, Kong and Yeoh argued, in the context of Singapore, that “landscapes play an integral role in the (re)construction of ‘nation’ [and] national identity … Particular ideological constructions of ‘nation’ are made to appear natural when concretised in the landscape.”1 In the book, they address this with respect to landscapes of death, religion, housing, toponymic inscriptions, heritage, and the arts. However, in the last ten years Singapore’s cultural landscape has metamorphosed significantly as a result of the twin pressures of globalization and new immigration, prompted by state-led exhortations to transform Singapore into a global cosmopolitan city. This chapter takes stock of these changes by analyzing them through the lenses of the geographies of migration and its inflections on Singapore’s cultural landscapes. The chapter argues that spatial proximity in the heartlands not only fails to promote meaningful social interactions but results in stereotypes being attached to immigrants that prompt social tensions. The chapter then suggests there is a need to go beyond mere tolerance for social difference towards an attitude of mutual positive respect that would promote the furthering and flowering of cosmopolitanism. This approach includes a willingness to engage openly with underlying social prejudices so as to move towards a constructive relationship regardless of immigrants’ class, ethnicity, or nationality backgrounds.

1 Lily Kong and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore: Constructions of “Nation” (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 2.

116 El aine Lynn-Ee Ho

Landscape, migration, and cosmopolitanism In its simplest form, landscape is defined as the “visible material surface of places”2 but it can also refer to a way of seeing or interpreting, the social relations and spatial arrangement of a delimited area.3 Landscapes act as a bridge between space and society, culture and environment, but as containers of meaning, landscapes are a fluid and contested concept especially as various social groups may appropriate their meanings in different ways.4 In a critique of the extant scholarship on landscape, Rose5 argues that scholars working on landscape tend to reify culture as a system of representation (i.e. culture as a map or blueprint) instead of accounting for how this representation works.6 Rose argues that, other than asking why landscape matters, and by whom and for whom it is socially constructed, it is also important to “search out the various practices that surround landscape and make it matter.”7 With respect to the geographies of migration, this chapter thus questions how migration shapes the cultural landscape of Singapore and in what ways these features of landscape are called forth to impact upon other social relations and processes. Migration in the Singaporean context has often been linked to discourses and debates on cosmopolitanism, partly because of the purposeful invocation of a cosmopolitan urbanism by the Singaporean state. In the broader literature on cosmopolitanism, it is common to see it equated with the lifestyle practices of mobile elites, 8 conflated with the co-existence of diversity and multiculturalism9 and/or lauded as a normative ethos and political project towards managing difference.10 Beaverstock, using the 2 James S. Duncan and Nancy G. Duncan, “The aestheticisation of the politics of landscape preservation,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 91 (2001): 387. 3 Mitch Rose, “Landscape and labyrinths,” Geoforum, 33 (2002): 456. 4 Michael Jones, “The concept of cultural landscapes: discourse and narratives,” in Landscape Interfaces: Cultural Heritage in Changing Landscapes, (eds.) Hannes Palang and Gary Fry (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 22. 5 Rose, “Landscape and labyrinths,” 458-459. 6 Culture is seen here as a symbolic context mediating materialist relations of power through interpretative systems of meaning; it is not a thing but a web of significance that gives life to various forms of practice and grasped through objects and practices that emerge in everyday life (Rose, “Landscape and labyrinths,” 458-9). 7 Rose, “Landscape and labyrinths,” 465. 8 Magdelena Nowicka, “Mobile locations: Construction of home in a group of mobile transnational professionals,” Global Networks 7 (2007): 69-86. 9 Ayona Datta, “‘Mongrel city’: Cosmopolitan neighbourliness in a Delhi squatter settlement,” Antipode, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00928.x, in press. 10 Mica Nava, Visceral Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2007).

Reconstruc ting Singapore as a Cosmopolitan L andscape

117

case of British expatriate clubs in Singapore, argues that such clubs serve the everyday needs of their members that comprise both foreign and local clientele, thus helping to reproduce the ordinariness of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism in the city-state.11 Despite the claim of ordinariness, the exclusive nature of these clubs (associated with expensive membership fees that only the considerably wealthy can afford) indicates the elitist biases inherent in this claim to transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. Other scholars writing on cosmopolitanism and migration in the Singaporean context problematize in several ways such claims of cosmopolitanism. Yeoh argues, for example, that as an urban project mooted by the Singaporean government, cosmopolitanism should be examined critically for its underlying economic imperatives and resultant unequal citizenship positionalities amongst different categories of social groups in Singapore.12 For Ho, cosmopolitanism in Singapore should be further probed for the underlying social prejudices that locals have towards foreigners, as well as the classed and nationality dynamics that they use to differentiate between various groups of foreigners.13 In subsequent work on Singaporeans living abroad, Ho adds that cosmopolitanism is capitalized upon strategically by overseas Singaporeans to acquire cultural capital that is construed as cultural sophistication for the global marketplace.14 Ye and Kelly, in a study on expatriates in Singapore, also suggest that Singaporean notions of cosmopolitanism are restrictive in that they stipulate, in written and unwritten codes, who is considered cosmopolitan, defined in terms of accent, attire, bodily comportment, and even ethnic acceptability.15 In other words, a more circumspect view of mobility and cosmopolitanism in the Singaporean landscape is called for in order to better understand the power relations implicated in the “embodied politics of identity and difference.”16 The research informing this chapter draws on observations of the Singaporean landscape as well as archival research from newspapers 11 Jon V. Beaverstock, Transnational elites in global cities: British expatriates in Singapore’s financial district,” Geoforum, 33 (2002): 525-538. 12 Brenda S.A. Yeoh, “Cosmopolitanism and its exclusions in Singapore,” Urban Studies, 41 (2004): 2431-2445. 13 Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, “Negotiating citizenship and perceptions of belonging in a transnational world: Singapore, a cosmopolis?” Social and Cultural Geography, 7 (2006): 385-401. 14 Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, “Identity politics and cultural asymmetries: Singaporean transmigrants ‘fashioning’ cosmopolitanism,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37 (2011): 729-746. 15 Junjia Ye and Philip F. Kelly, “Cosmopolitanism at work: Labour market exclusion in Singapore’s financial sector,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37 (2011): 691-707. 16 Alison Blunt, “Cultural geographies of migration: Mobility, transnationality and diaspora,” Progress in Human Geography, 31 (2007): 684-694.

118 El aine Lynn-Ee Ho

(dated 2006-2011), Singapore parliament reports, government speeches and recent Internet forum discussions focusing on migration issues. In addition, the chapter is informed by two earlier research projects conducted with Singaporean residents and overseas Singaporeans on their attitudes towards mobility, national identity, and citizenship. The next section examines the impact of immigration and class differentials on the landscapes of Singapore. Following that, it considers the co-presence of middling transnationals in the heartlands and the impact of spatial proximity on their social relations with Singaporeans. Lastly, the chapter focuses on the limits to which a cosmopolitan project is being achieved in Singapore and the alternative potential presented by reframing discourses of hospitality as equality instead.

The changing landscapes of Singapore Cities all over the world are reinventing themselves … We cannot stand still … If we become a backwater, just one of many ordinary cities in Asia, instead of being a cosmopolitan hub of the region, then many good jobs will be lost and Singaporeans will suffer … We need to do many things to become a global city … An IR [integrated resort] is one significant idea we must consider and that will help us reinvent Singapore. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong17

With the above statement by the prime minister, the decision to build two integrated resorts (IRs) in Singapore was considered sealed in spite of ongoing controversy. The integrated resorts, encompassing casinos, museums, food and beverage outlets, and retail stores, are seen by Singaporean political elites as integral for ensuring Singapore is ahead of the competition in the global race to become a city of choice. It represents a part of the infrastructure strategy to make Singapore a world-class city that is attractive not only to Singaporeans but also to tourists and elite migrants. The integrated resorts, like the Esplanade, Gardens By the Bay, the Marina Barrage, and the new Marina Bay financial centre, are part of a “cultureled regeneration”18 approach manifested in the Singaporean landscape that are helping to project “aesthetic power”19 for the city-state. Alongside 17 Hansard, vol 80, col 54 (18 April 2005) per Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. 18 Brenda S.A. Yeoh, “The global cultural city: Spatial imagineering and politics in the (multi) cultural marketplaces of Southeast Asia,” Urban Studies, 42 (2005): 946. 19 Ibid, 952.

Reconstruc ting Singapore as a Cosmopolitan L andscape

119

these architectural innovations, well-heeled foreigners are also snapping up luxurious private housing in Singapore. “Property-viewing tours” for wealthy mainland Chinese clients are organized by developers who pay the travel tab for their privileged customers once a down payment for the new property has been made.20 According to developers, such exclusive invitations are necessary to compete with other popular investment destinations in Australia and the United States. Singaporeans have, however, verbalized their anxieties over the affordability of such highly desirable properties for themselves and the prohibitive costs of consumption in the glamorous cosmopolitan retail landscapes. Several academic studies have also pointed to a division of immigrant labour reflected in the Singaporean landscape and its unequal social impacts. On the one hand, Beaverstock 21 and Pow22 have brought to attention the lifestyles of privileged expatriates (known in local parlance as “foreign talent”), whose presence is manifested ostentatiously in the Singaporean financial, private housing, and leisure landscapes. Other writings also consider the experiences of expatriate-trailing spouses.23 On the other hand, the marginalization of low-paid immigrant labourers (known in local parlance as “foreign workers”) who have limited employment rights in Singapore has also been the subject of considerable debate within academic circles and civil society.24 The presence of this latter group of migrants is at times, starkly visible in the Singaporean landscape, while at other times, strikingly invisible as well. We will discuss this in more detail in the next section. Sandwiched between the privileged expats and low-paid migrant workers in Singapore are what can be considered the “middling” transnationals in Singapore.25 In the Singaporean context, this category refers to migrants 20 “Developers go all out to woo Chinese home buyers,” The Straits Times, 28 September 2011. 21 Jon V. Beaverstock, “Servicing British expatriate talent in Singapore: Exploring ordinary transnationalism and the role of the ‘expatriate’ club,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37 ( 2011): 709-728. 22 Choon-Piew Pow, “Living it up: Super-rich enclave and transnational elite urbanism in Singapore,” Geoforum, 42 (2011): 383-393. 23 For example, Brenda S.A. Yeoh, and Louise Khoo, “Home, work and community: Skilled international migration and expatriate women in Singapore,” International Migration, 36 (1998): 159-186. 24 Examples include Leonore Lyons, “Transient workers count too? The intersection of citizenship and gender in Singapore’s civil society,” SOJOURN, 20 (2005): 208-348 and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, Shirlena Huang, and Theresa Devasayaham, “Diasporic subjects in the nation: Foreign domestic workers, the reach of law and civil society in Singapore,” Asian Studies Review, 28 (2004): 7-23. 25 David Conradson and Alan Latham, “Transnational urbanism: Attending to everyday practices and mobilities,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31 (2005): 229.

120 El aine Lynn-Ee Ho

who may have university qualifications or are comfortably well off in their countries of origin, but in Singapore they occupy precarious jobs or they may have moved to Singapore on local, rather than expatriate, terms of employment. An example of middling transnationals is the Japanese expatriate women studied by Thang et al. They refer to these women as “expatriates on the margin” because they arrive in Singapore independently (rather than as trailing spouses) and work on the same conditions of employment as local Singaporean employees and thus are not privy to the perks and privileges associated with the typical (usually male) Japanese expatriate who has been transferred by a parent company to work in Singapore.26 Yeoh and Huang also study the pei-du mama (literally translated as the ‘study mothers’) accompanying their children who are enrolled in primary and secondary schools in Singapore.27 Their visa status limits their right to employment in the country but they argue that they need to work in order to support themselves and their children. Thus some have little choice but to work in the informal economy instead. Apart from these two examples, there are other diverse types of middling transnationals in Singapore who have received limited attention thus far because of their perceived ordinariness. As we will see in the next section, more studies need to be done to conceptualize systematically the experiences and positioning of middling transnationals in Singaporean society in view of the simmering tensions that have become apparent because of their insertion into the daily lives of the heartlands.

Preserving the heartland? Years earlier, former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong had signalled the possibility of a growing divide amongst “cosmopolitans” and “heartlanders” in Singapore.28 Goh invoked this discourse with reference to the socioeconomic distinction between (a minority of “cosmopolitan”) globally oriented Singaporeans compared to their less sophisticated “heartlander” counterparts who make a living within Singapore. However, the label 26 Leng Leng Thang, Elizabeth MacLachlan, and Miho Goda, “Expatriates on the margins: A study of Japanese women working in Singapore,” Geoforum, 33 (2002): 539-551. 27 Shirlena Huang and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, “Transnational families and their children’s education: China’s ‘study mothers’ in Singapore,” Global Networks, 5 (2005): 379-400. 28 Transcript of the National Day Rally speech delivered in 1999 can be found at http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/viewHTML.jsp?pdfno=1999082202&keyword=national&d ocref=null, (accessed 13 January 2011).

Reconstruc ting Singapore as a Cosmopolitan L andscape

121

“heartland” can also be used to understand the spatial association made between place and local identity or belonging. In other words, heartland spaces are those ordinary landscapes often taken for granted, inhabited by Singaporeans on a daily basis, but which are also taken to represent the core of Singaporean life and quotidian meanings of Singaporean identity. While the label “heartland” is used in Singaporean popular discourse to refer to the housing development board (HDB) estates where the majority of the population lives, in this chapter it is applied more broadly to landscapes where a Singaporean identity is attached, resulting in contestations between the way Singaporeans claim those spaces and the way it is used by different groups of new immigrants in Singapore. Compared to the clearly defined pro-immigration strategy promoted by the Singaporean government in earlier years, the immigration issue in Singapore today has evolved into a murky terrain of competing claims. While the ubiquitous presence of foreign domestic helpers in HDB estates is now a common way of life for many Singaporean families, there are other concerns expressed over the growing numbers and expanding diversity of foreign nationals in the Singaporean heartlands. Local residents have complained to their political representatives, for example, about the co-presence of low-paid foreign workers in HDB estates, such as Pioneer, Boon Lay, and West Coast, where dormitories have been built to accommodate these immigrants.29 The foreign workers are seen as a social nuisance and are thought to pose a potential danger to residents and their families. The leisure landscapes that they occupy, along with their co-nationals from other occupational backgrounds, is also perceived by some Singaporeans as exclusionary zones because of the changing character of these spaces, such as Chinatown, Little India, and Geylang, even though these are recognized as Singaporean heritage sites. However, it is the inflow of the category known as “foreign talent,” especially from the middling spectrum, that has prompted Singaporeans to voice most strongly their concerns that they feel encroached upon in their homeland. For example, The Straits Times reported on the proceedings of an undergraduate forum with former PM Goh: 23-year-old Lim Zi Rui raised eyebrows for declaring that after the last five years or so of quick policy changes and rapid influx of foreigners: “We don’t really feel comfortable in our country anymore.”30 29 “GE 2011; Foreign worker cap poses real dilemma, says Lim Hng Kiang,” The Straits Times, 2 May 2011. 30 “No respite from the global city,” The Straits Times, 6 November 2010.

122 El aine Lynn-Ee Ho

The sentiment voiced by the undergraduate is not unusual amongst the Singaporean population, especially the younger spectrum who claim to feel the heat of foreign competition more intensely and further perceive that preferential treatment is given to ‘foreign talent’ at the expense of Singaporeans. Indeed, the presence of new middling transnationals is visible even in the housing, work, and schooling landscapes of the heartlands. Unlike the cosmopolitan landscapes associated with the privileged expatriate, in the heartlands we find a variety of middling transnationals, and it is here that the need to preserve the heartland is often felt most keenly. The increasing number of middling transnationals who come to Singapore on local terms of employment means that they are more likely to rent or purchase homes in HDB estates than their expatriate counterparts of yesteryear who were likely to have substantive housing allowances included in their relocation package. In addition, these middling transnationals also tend to compete in the same labour market for positions that Singaporeans apply to. Zero-sum beliefs31 contribute to attitudes such as that expressed below by a Singaporean interviewed in a news report: With so many foreigners, there is more competition for jobs. I see it even in my current job. The jobs we are handling can be done by Singaporeans, and we don’t need foreigners to do it, yet they are being hired … Five years ago, such a fear was not so apparent. I think I am less happy now as compared to five years ago. Such issues have been brought up before but the voices of the people have been put aside rather than addressed.32

Apart from the perceived job competition, there is also resentment expressed by Singaporeans over the congested nature of public transportation, as articulated below by a Singaporean interviewed in The Straits Times: [It is a] daily struggle to board the packed trains to get to work in Raffles Place. “I can leave my home in Ang Mo Kio at 8 am and still be late for work at 9 am,” said the corporate communications executive.33

The crowded trains are attributed to the Singaporean government’s goal to increase population numbers in Singapore, estimated at 5.18 million in 31 Victoria M Esses et al., “The immigration dilemma: The role of perceived group competition, ethnic prejudice, and national identity,” Journal of Social Issues, 57 (2001): 390. 32 “Immigration: Heat diffused by govt measures,” The Straits Times, 7 May 2011. 33 “Facilities for growing population,” The Straits Times, 14 October 2011.

Reconstruc ting Singapore as a Cosmopolitan L andscape

123

2010 (compared to 4.4 million in 2006), noticeably with immigration as the main thrust of the policy. The foreign population in Singapore grew from 1.3 million in 2006 to 1.85 million in 2010.34 The geographies of migration have the potential to disrupt supposedly mundane features of the heartland and the way it naturalizes notions of national identity and belonging.35 New immigrants bring into contact with the heartland not only phenotype distinctions but also social and cultural differences that are juxtaposed against what is assumed and claimed to be a “Singaporean identity.” An example is the “Curry Protest” that was triggered by the media story of a mainland Chinese family’s complaint over the smell of the culinary preference of their Singaporean Indian neighbours for curry. A newspaper report claimed that local officials mediated to bring about a compromise in which the Singaporean Indian family agreed to cook curry only when the mainland Chinese family was not at home. News of this slight towards the unofficial national dish and respect for multicultural relations in Singapore spread when a Facebook petition started to mobilize Singaporeans into cooking curry on a specified Sunday to demonstrate their national solidarity. Although the reported story was later found to be inaccurate, the movement succeeded in stirring up debate over the integration of new immigrants in Singapore. Strikingly, the incident also further entrenched a negative impression of mainland Chinese immigrants in Singapore and their (in)ability to adapt to “the Singaporean way of life.”36 Singaporeans have, furthermore, demonstrated concern over notions of the “ungrateful foreigner.” A YouTube parody of Singaporeans making racist remarks about the language, social habits, and Singaporean women from a minority group, posted by a mainland Chinese student, resulted in an outcry amongst netizens. A local member of parliament lodged a police report against the student for inciting racism. As a result, the student was expelled from his institution and his student visa subsequently cancelled.37 An earlier incident involving a mainland Chinese deliveryman who made racist remarks on a Chinese language online forum, frequented by other mainland Chinese users, sparked even greater furore. When the police questioned the deliveryman after his remarks were exposed, other users of the Chinese language forum rallied around their mainland Chinese 34 “How govt and MPs should tackle home affordability,” The Straits Times, 27 April 2011. 35 See Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho and Madeleine E. Hatf ield, “Migration and everyday matters: Materiality and sociality,” Population, Space and Place, 17 (2011): 707-713. 36 “A day for curry and camaraderie,” The Straits Times, 22 August 2011. 37 “Racist Chinese was a ‘guai’ boy’,” The Straits Times, 29 July 2011.

124 El aine Lynn-Ee Ho

counterpart by threatening to “expose Singaporeans” for making similarly racist remarks. This backlash prompted other netizens, presumably Singaporeans, to express outrage over the pro-immigration policy in Singapore, especially the significant influx from mainland China. To them, foreigners should respect and abide Singaporean culture since they have been given the opportunity to live in Singapore.38 The hostility and suspicions towards new immigrants in Singapore, particularly from Mainland China, is not limited to cyberspace. At a ministerial dialogue in Tampines, the appointment of a foreign-born new Singaporean citizen to the executive committee of the PAP Youth Wing led some residents to question their minister if, and when, new immigrants-turned-citizens can be considered ready for leadership roles in the heartlands.39 The banal tensions apparent within the heartlands of the HDB estates was also illustrated in a Mediacorp television series, Love Thy Neighbour. The drama illustrated the prickly aspects of Singaporean families living in proximity with their neighbours of other nationalities. However, it provoked controversy due to the negative light in which it depicted Singaporeans, leading some indignant viewers to call for it to be removed from screen time. The indignation expressed by Singaporeans leads one to wonder whether Singaporeans are prepared to confront their own prejudices towards new immigrants in Singapore with whom they experience a mutual “throwntogetherness.”40 Troubling new immigration in Singapore The preceding discussion demonstrates the troubling aspects of the immigration issue in Singapore, especially the prejudices that Singaporeans hold of new immigrants, not only from the low-paid spectrum but also the middling transnationals who are perceived to be in direct competition with Singaporeans for scarce resources yet unable to integrate successfully into Singaporean society. The glamorous landscapes of cosmopolitan Singapore are only one aspect of the foreign/local divide. Within the heartlands, we see simmering tensions that are more complex and defined not only by class but also ethnicity and nationality. 38 “Forumers in PRC forum rally around Zhou Hou and threaten to ‘expose’ Singaporeans for making racist remarks on SPH forums,” TR Emeritus, 20 June 2011 (accessed 20 June 2011). 39 “New citizens, influx of foreigners worry Tampines residents,” The Straits Times, 21 February 2011. 40 Doreen Massey, For Space (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 181.

Reconstruc ting Singapore as a Cosmopolitan L andscape

125

The stress of the immigration issue has not gone unnoticed by the ruling elites who try to balance what they consider competing priorities, namely the demands of Singaporeans versus the need for Singapore to maintain its openness to foreigners who can contribute to Singapore’s economic development. In a National Day Rally speech, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong announced new restrictions that would be placed on applicants for employment visas in Singapore in view of the concerns expressed by Singaporeans over job competition. But he also cautioned: The tighter rules on Employment Pass holders are meant to reduce the temptation, all too real for employers, to substitute cheaper foreign labour for Singaporeans. However, the rules do not, and cannot, amount to an anti-foreigner stance because that would ultimately weaken the economic ground on which Singaporeans themselves stand. A particular type of foreigner contributes to Singapore’s competitiveness in a globalised world, and that foreigner must be welcome in its self-interest. 41

Despite the tone set by the prime minister in his speech, the newspapers subsequently reported a decline in permanent residency approvals given to foreigners. Permanent residency status was granted to 29,265 foreigners in 2010, fewer than half of the 59,460 passes given out the year before. 42 Accordingly, even high-income earners were rejected in their quest for Singaporean permanent residency status. Letters to the forum also suggest that some foreign spouses of Singaporean citizens failed to receive permanent residency. The rise in unsuccessful applications suggests that the Singaporean government is responding to vociferous demands by Singaporeans who want immigration numbers capped. In December 2011, the Singaporean government also announced an additional stamp duty tax on private property in an attempt to manage housing demand and prices in Singapore. The amount of tax due is staggered based on the buyer’s nationality status: foreigners will pay an additional 10 percent for any private property while Singaporean permanent residents buying a second or subsequent property will pay an additional 3 percent. As for Singaporean citizens, they are required to pay the additional 3 percent only if they are buying a third property or more. Observers infer from these measures that the Singaporean government is making efforts to sharpen the distinction between the rights and privileges accorded to Singaporean 41 “Creating more space for Singaporeans,” The Straits Times, 18 August 2011. 42 “Chasing that elusive PR,” The Straits Times 22 January 2011.

126 El aine Lynn-Ee Ho

citizens and those of Singaporean permanent residents and foreign nationals. This is in addition to restrictions on the purchase of HDB flats placed on Singaporean permanent residents who are eligible to buy resale flats only and foreign nationals who are not qualified to buy HDB flats at all. Singaporean citizens may applaud the above actions by the Singaporean government, but foreign nationals in Singapore have mixed responses to the new climate in which they live. According to the same article reporting on the decline in permanent residency application approvals, foreign nationals are hesitant about remaining in Singapore given the lacklustre welcome they are receiving from Singaporean society. The newspaper reported that for some, “now that the security is not there anymore, they are looking for alternative places to move to”. 43 Some observers may critique these foreigners for being opportunistic, but negative attitudes harboured by Singaporeans towards new immigrants actually deter successful settlement and integration. Integration is a dialogical relationship after all. While the Singaporean political elites strategize to enhance the cultural landscapes of Singapore and make it a global cosmopolitan city that is appealing to new immigrants, the issue of social prejudices held by Singaporeans towards these new immigrants still needs to be addressed. Some efforts have been made to integrate new immigrants-turned-citizens such as through the activities run by the People’s Association (PA) and the dispersed community clubs it runs island-wide. 44 In addition, grassroots organizations such as the Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA), Yayasan MENDAKI, and the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC) run government-funded programmes to further integration efforts. Chinese clan associations, both the pioneer as well as newly formed ones, also run programmes for new Chinese immigrants in Singapore. 45 A newspaper report also suggests that some new immigrants-turned-citizens are volunteering with these grassroots organizations to strengthen their connection to other Singaporeans. 46 Integration, however, is not limited to one party’s initiatives. The earlier discussion shows that Singaporeans have yet to adapt themselves to the new milieu in the heartlands despite everyday encounters with new immigrants from different walks of life. For Datta, who examines cosmopolitanism 43 Ibid. 44 “Giving new citizens a community welcome,” The Straits Times, 13 April 2007; “Pilot scheme to help citizens-to-be blend in here,” The Straits Times, 13 January 2010; “PA reaches out to new immigrants,” The Straits Times, 17 May 2010. 45 “Immigration on/off switch needs fine-tuning,” The Straits Times, 26 January 2010. 46 “Avoid ‘irrational fear’ of new immigrants,” The Straits Times, 5 April 2010.

Reconstruc ting Singapore as a Cosmopolitan L andscape

127

through the case study of a religiously mixed slum neighbourhood in India, physical “proximity produces a transformation in social relations.”47 Likewise, Nava’s study of historical London suggests that ethnic and cultural difference can be transcended through a cosmopolitan modernity. 48 However, this chapter demonstrates that proximity in the heartlands may in fact reinforce negative attitudes towards bearers of cultural differences, especially if the purported perpetrators belong to particular ethnic and/or nationality groups where an undesirable impression has already been formed through personal encounters or circulating stereotypes. This is matched with a parallel process compelling Singaporeans to preserve the intelligibility of the heartlands as landscapes of personal attachment and national identity. So, despite the possibilities for everyday encounters in the heartlands to help foster ordinary cosmopolitanism, its potential for extending notions of nationhood beyond the national imagination is left unfulfilled.49 In Valentine’s paper on forging civic cultures out of difference, she presses for a more critical consideration of “meaningful (everyday) encounters” in the city that goes beyond mere tolerance for otherness to one that is characterized by mutual positive respect for differences.50 In other words, are we extending an ethos of hospitality or equality? The nuances are different. Hospitality tends to be premised on the terms of engagement that are extended by the host whereas equality calls for the terms of engagement to be continuously negotiated and re-negotiated between the different social groups co-existing in the city. For the latter to happen, Singaporeans themselves need to be willing to engage openly with the underlying social prejudices that determine their attitudes towards new immigrants in Singapore, with the aim of moving towards a constructive relationship regardless of immigrants’ class, ethnicity, or national backgrounds. In parallel, zero-sum beliefs about scarce resources should be targeted in a persuasive manner such as by emphasizing “the perceived similarity and familiarity of immigrants.”51 Only by taking such deliberate steps will Singaporean society come closer towards what Glick-Shiller et al. terms as a cosmopolitan sociability that “allows for the simultaneity of difference and sameness.”52 47 Ayona Datta, “‘Mongrel city’,” 14. 48 Nava, Visceral Cosmopolitanism. 49 Beaverstock, “Servicing British expatriate talent.” 50 Gill Valentine, “Living with difference: Reflections on geographies of encounter,” Progress in Human Geography, 32 (2008): 323-337. 51 Esses et al., “The immigration dilemma,” 508. 52 Nina Glick-Shiller, Tsypylma Darevia and Sandra Grumer-Domic, “Defining cosmopolitan sociability in a transnational age: An introduction,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34 (3): 399-481.

128 El aine Lynn-Ee Ho

Conclusion This chapter considers the changing landscapes of Singapore, drawing attention to the multiple and intersecting divides resulting from new ‘middling’ immigration and their relationship to ethnicity, class, nationality, and social differences. The chapter argues that the spatial distinction between foreign and local is not limited to cosmopolitan versus heartlander landscapes. In considering the way landscape features are called forth within the heartlands through discourses of us against them, this chapter illustrates the manner in which the geographies of migration impact claims to space, place, and resources, with stakes placed on personal attachment and national identity. Finally, the chapter suggests that the potential for ordinary cosmopolitanism to flourish has been elided in everyday encounters in the heartlands. Although heartlanders are not usually associated with a cosmopolitan modernity connoting the lifestyles of mobile elites, cosmopolitanism is not reducible to class categorizations. Moreover, the Singaporean heartlands are arguably populated by “middling” Singaporeans who participate in aspects of cosmopolitan modernity in other ways whether at their workplaces or leisure spaces. Entrenched social prejudices in the Singaporean heartlands hinder the prospects of furthering an ordinary cosmopolitanism that goes beyond urban infrastructure towards developing mutual positive respect for differences on an everyday basis and also a project of increasing equality between groups as much as possible. Such changes in mindset accompanied by appropriate actions are particularly critical given the present context of mutual suspicion between Singaporeans and foreigners towards perceived privileges one group has compared to disadvantages posed to the other group.53 Part of the initiative towards addressing this requires Singaporeans to demonstrate at an everyday level their readiness to acknowledge their own negative attitudes towards particular groups of new immigrants and work towards mutual positive respect. The Singaporean state must also be willing to tackle the systemic processes leading to antagonism between groups.54

53 See Felicia Pratto and Anthony F. Lemuix, “The psychological ambiguity of immigration and its implications for promoting immigration policy,” Journal of Social Issues, 57 (2001): 413-430. 54 See Valentine, “Living with difference,” 333.

6

“Family, Worker or Outsider” Employer-Domestic Helper Relations in Singapore Theresa W. Devasahayam

Since 1960, Singapore’s aim in its national development agenda was to create conditions in which multinational corporations (MNCs) could be wooed to the country’s shores to invest in its fledgling labour-intensive manufacturing industries. Soon there was a burgeoning of job opportunities especially for cheap low-skilled labour that came to be filled mostly by women. While in the 1960s, one out of five women was working,1 the female labour force participation rate (FLFPR) continued to rise steadily to reach 44 percent by 1980.2 Since then, the female labour force participation rate has only gradually increased: in 1990, it was 50.7 percent, in 2000, 52.6 percent, and in 2010, 56.7 percent.3 While an expansion in job opportunities was a critical factor for women’s increased participation rates over those years, changing attitudes towards work outside the home has also been instrumental as a push factor for Singaporean women to gain strides in the economic sphere. 4 Moreover, the slow but gradual rise in the cost of living has also meant that engaging in wage work has become inevitable among growing numbers of women, with the dual-career couple becoming the norm and supplanting the male breadwinner model. Noteworthy is that from the start in Singapore’s march towards development, women have been recognized as equal partners to men, and the leadership of the country at that time was cognizant of the importance of addressing women’s rights in several domains. The first area in which gender equality had to be ensured was within marriage, leading to the promulgation of the Singapore Women’s Charter in 1961. In addition to 1 Kanwaljit Soin, “National Policies: Their Impact on Women and the Family,” in “The Ties that Bind: In Search of the Modern Singapore Family,” (Singapore: Association of Women for Action and Research, 1996). 2 Eng Fong Pang, Education, Manpower and Development in Singapore (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1982). 3 “Singapore Female Labour Force Participation,” TheGlobalEconomy.com at http://www. theglobaleconomy.com/Singapore/Female_labor_force_participation/. 4 Eng Fong Pang, “Labour Force Growth, Utilization and Determinants in Singapore,” in Labour Force Participation in Low Income Countries, (eds) Guy Standing and Glen Sheehan (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1978), 215-34.

130 Theresa W. Devasahayam

ensuring monogamy within marriage, the charter was a momentous legal instrument, according rights to women in the areas of property ownership and divorce settlements.5 In spite of Singaporean women having achieved a considerable degree of gender equality in these spheres as well as having gained strides in the economic arena, an obvious inequality persists in the family: cultural norms continue to ascribe the primary role of caregiving to the woman. In this regard, men are rarely found to take on the role of caregiver even when their wives have a full-time job. As a result of the ageing population in the country, Singaporean women have also had to extend their caregiving role to ageing parents and parents-in-law.6 In this case, being career women as well as actively contributing to the household economy has not exempted them from their caregiving duties. Caught in this situation, women are pulled in the directions of resistance and accommodation. With large segments of the female population having attained a higher educational level, many are reluctant to abandon their careers. Choosing to work has become an inevitable decision among many women, which suggests that they must find ways to juggle their caregiver role. As state-provided childcare facilities are lacking, the most common solution among these women has been to transfer their domestic chores to other women – either female relatives or women coming from poorer countries in the Asian region.7 It was in the late 1970s that the purchase of cheap migrant labour provided by women from the region into Singapore began.8 As the years progressed, these women came from the less affluent neighbouring countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia, followed by countries further away in the Asian region such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and India. Filling the domestic shoes of their career-oriented sisters in Singapore, the growing influx of low-skilled female migrants has become a reality for the country in the 5 Leong Wai Kum, “Significant Provisions in the Women’s Charter” in Singapore Women’s Charter: Roles, Responsibilities and Rights in Marriage (ed.) Theresa W. Devasahayam (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011). 6 See Peggy Teo, “The National Policy on Elderly People in Singapore,” Ageing and Society, 14, 3 (1994): 405-27; Theresa W. Devasahayam, “Organisations that Care: The Necessity for an Eldercare Leave Scheme for Caregivers of the Elderly in Singapore,” Asian MetaCentre Research Paper Series, No. 10, January 2003 found at http://www.populationasia.org/Publications/ResearchPaper/AMCRP10.pdf. 7 Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Shirlena Huang, “Singapore Women and Foreign Domestic Workers: Negotiating Domestic Work and Motherhood” in Gender, Migration and Domestic Service (ed.) Janet Hershall Momsen (London: Routledge, 1999). 8 Ibid.

“Family, Worker or Outsider”

131

last four decades9 as the numbers of these migrant women have only been steadily increasing, indicating that the reliance of Singaporean women on foreign low-skilled women has hardly abated.10 Representing a visible presence in Singapore’s labour force today, these migrant women are recruited into Singapore by employment agencies, and work on temporary contracts subject to renewal after two years. That Singapore’s labour policies aim to prevent this migrant group from staying on in the country is a reflection of the state’s larger immigration project of patrolling its national borders through the prohibition of certain migrant workers from putting down roots while encouraging others to settle down (such as highly-skilled professionals).11 More significant is that a scrutiny of the country’s labour laws related to this migrant group reveals a consistent “othering” of these workers. For example, these women do not enjoy protection under the Employment Act, a statute regulating the work conditions of all other labour sectors save for domestic workers12 – the rationale being that computing overtime payment becomes difficult for this sector since the line between domestic workers’ work and free time is not clearly defined and thereby cannot be regulated in the same way as office or factory employees. Furthermore, the laws of the country do not allow these women to unionize themselves.13 While these measures signal an obvious reluctance on the part of the Singapore government in according this migrant group the status of worker, the country’s labour laws go one step further in marginalizing these women: these laws prohibit these women from becoming pregnant or giving birth to a child in Singapore during the validity of their work permit – a condition that applies even after the expiration, cancellation, or revocation of their work permit. In spite of these discriminatory labour conditions, about 214,500 migrant women were employed in Singapore as foreign domestic workers

9 Shirlena Huang and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, “Ties that Bind: State Policy and Migrant Female Domestic Helpers in Singapore,” Geoforum, 27 no. 4 (1996): 479-93. 10 Janice Heng, “Eye on Singapore: Do we need 100,000 more maids?” The Straits Times, 22 November 2012, A32. 11 Leong Chan-Hoong, Patrick Rueppel, and Danielle Hong, “Managing Immigration and Integration in Singapore,” EU-Asia Dialogue Project on Cluster Migration and Integration, unpublished paper for Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2013. 12 Huang and Yeoh, “Ties that Bind: State Policy and Migrant Female Domestic Helpers in Singapore.” 13 Shirlena Huang and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, “The Difference Gender Makes: State Policy and Contract Migrant Workers in Singapore,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 12 nos. 1-2 (2003): 75-97.

132 Theresa W. Devasahayam

as of December 2013.14 Among them, the main motivation for working in low-skilled jobs in countries such as Singapore is financial.15 As described by Yeoh and Huang, “most migrant women who enter domestic service see it as an economic passport to better things”.16 Thus, working abroad for these women is synonymous to “a form of secular pilgrimage in a quest for economic bounty and life experience.”17 While the pursuit of a better life is the primary motivation of these women who cross transnational borders in search of employment, the intent of Singaporean women has been bound up with the “material and social reproduction of [their] middleclass families.”18 By appropriating the nurturing qualities of these migrant women in their effort to reproduce the social and cultural norms expected of them, Singaporean women have had to depend on these migrant women to manage their households and to provide care for their children and the growing numbers of elderly in around one out of six Singapore households.19 The intent of this chapter is to focus on the relationship of these migrant women to their employers. More specifically, while the analysis takes as a point of departure that the employer-domestic worker relationship cannot be defined independently from the labour laws governing this migrant group since all employers are obliged to adhere to them, this chapter queries the strict demarcations of “self” and “other” mapped onto the employerdomestic worker relationship proposed by other scholars.20 Rather, this chapter shows that while there are employers who operate within the paradigm of “us” and “them” in their relationship with their domestic workers, based on the assumption that they are “‘worlds apart’ in many ways …

14 Ministry of Manpower, “Foreign Workforce Numbers” (last updated 14 March 2014) found at http://www.mom.gov.sg/statistics-publications/others/statistics/Pages/ForeignWorkforceNumbers.aspx. 15 See E.M. Pernia, “Migration, Remittances, Poverty and Inequality: The Philippines,” University of the Philippines, UPSE Discussion Paper No. 0801 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines School of Economics, 2008). 16 See Yeoh and Huang, “Singapore Women and Foreign Domestic Workers,” 292. 17 Aguilar 1996a, p. 114 cited in Yeoh and Huang, “Singapore Women and Foreign Domestic Workers: Negotiating Domestic Work and Motherhood” in Gender, Migration and Domestic Service (ed.) Janet Hershall Momsen (London: Routledge, 1999), 292. 18 Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 206. 19 Ann Brooks and Theresa Devasahayam, Gender, Emotions and Labour Markets: Asian and Western Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2011). 20 Yeoh and Huang, “Singapore Women and Foreign Domestic Workers”; Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception.

“Family, Worker or Outsider”

133

participat[ing] in negotiations around similar issues”21 relating to domestic work and motherhood, reflecting and in turn reinscribing the position of the state, there are also employers who have “incorporated” these women into the lives of their families and have become “family” to these women. This is a narrative that is more common among domestic workers who have worked with the family for longer periods of time and have developed close bonds. In understanding the interactions between employer and domestic worker, the assertion here is the need to contextualize these relationships in an effort to uncover the complexity and fluidity of employer-domestic worker relationships. Field research for this chapter, based on interviews with 17 Singaporean (female) employers and ten domestic workers, was conducted initially in November and December of 2011, later in March, and subsequently in June and July of 2013. Among the Singaporean employers were nine Chinese, five Indians, two Malays, and one Eurasian. Bearing in mind that not all employers would be forthright about their opinions, secondary materials were also co-opted, namely, findings discovered through online surveys and polls. Among the domestic workers, four were from the Philippines, four from Indonesia, and two from Sri Lanka. In addition to the interviews conducted with Singaporean employers and domestic workers, the author had the opportunity to speak with staff from the Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2), a local NGO working on migrant worker issues. Nonetheless, the author wishes to highlight that because she has spent close to twelve years documenting and studying the lives of this migrant group, she has developed a deep familiarity with the issues related to the working conditions of these women.

Working behind “closed doors”: What does this mean? Southeast Asia has become a nucleus of migratory labour flows in recent decades.22 In the region, Singapore has the highest proportion of foreign 21 Yeoh and Huang, “Singapore Women and Foreign Domestic Workers: Negotiating Domestic Work and Motherhood” in Gender, Migration and Domestic Service (ed.) Janet Hershall Momsen (London: Routledge,1999), 298. 22 Theresa Wong et al., “Migration and the “Asian” Family in a Globalising World: A Selective Review” in Researching Migration and the Family, (eds.) J. Pflegerl, S.-E. Khoo, B.S.A. Yeoh and V. Koh (Singapore: National University of Singapore/Asian MetaCentre for Population and Sustainable Development Analysis, 2003); Nicola Piper, “Gender and Migration Policies in Southeast and East Asia: Legal Protection and Sociocultural Empowerment of Unskilled Migrant Women,”

134 Theresa W. Devasahayam

workers in its labour force, with the numbers having swelled throughout the decades, turning the country into one of the major labour-receiving economies in Southeast Asia since the late 1970s.23 Some 612,200 foreign workers were present in Singapore in 2000, constituting 29.2 percent of the country’s total labour force.24 In 2010, their numbers jumped to around 41.7 percent according to estimates by the Ministry of Manpower.25 Singapore’s contingent of foreign workers consists of both skilled and unskilled workers. In December 2013, there was a total of 985,600 foreign workers employed under the category of work permit holders, a category of workers that includes both construction workers (almost exclusively male) and domestic workers (almost exclusively female).26 Unlike other employment sectors, the work of a domestic worker blurs the boundaries between home and workplace since the “private sphere of the employer is the public sphere of the employee.”27 In this case, the presence of the woman migrant in her employer’s home may be construed as intrusive to the employer and her family. As much as employers are forced to adjust to the presence of a non-relative in their home, the situation also requires adjustment on the part of the domestic worker as to how she should relate to her employer and members of her employer’s family. While initially there may be a degree of anxiety, uncertainty, distrust, and suspicion towards the other, over time, there have been domestic workers who have become fairly well incorporated into the families for whom they work. By “incorporation” I mean having a sense of belonging to the family such that the domestic worker comes to feel like a member of the family. Having said that, this does not mean that “strangers” become kin in this case, but rather that they become “close” to each other as a result of living together, sharing meals, doing things together with members of the family Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 25, 2 (2004): 216-31; Jerrold W. Huguet, “International Migration and Development: Opportunities and Challenges for Poverty Reduction,” in Fifth Asian and Pacific Population Conference, Asian Population Studies Series No. 158 (New York: United Nations, 2003), 117-136. 23 Nicola Piper, “Migrant Labor in Southeast Asia: Country Study: Singapore,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Project on Migrant Labor in Southeast Asia, n.d found at http://www.fes.de/ aktuell/focus_interkulturelles/focus_1/documents/8_000.pdf. 24 Ibid. 25 Manpower Research and Department of Statistics, Singapore, “Singaporeans in the Workforce,” Occasional Paper, October 2011 at http://www.mom.gov.sg/Publications/mrsd_singaporeans_in_the_workforce.pdf. 26 Ministry of Manpower, “Foreign Workforce Numbers” (last updated on 14 March 2014). 27 Lesley Gill, Precious Dependencies: Gender, Class, and Domestic Service in Bolivia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 9.

“Family, Worker or Outsider”

135

as well as sharing common spaces within the household. In various ways and contexts, that which comes to be emphasized is “similarity to each other” while there is a simultaneous “den[ial] [of] the differences between them.”28 The incorporation of the domestic worker such that she is treated as a member of the family occurs despite the possible lack of cultural commonalities with her employer. Domestic workers falling into this category often speak about being invited to family functions, eating at the dining table with the rest of the family, receiving gifts or money on special occasions such as their birthdays, Chinese New Year, and Christmas, and being given clothes, toiletries, and other personal effects on a regular basis and, in turn, feeling “like family.”29 At the other end of the spectrum is the domestic worker who is considered and treated as an “outsider” from day one of her commencement of work in the family – a situation that lends to little change over the years in spite of the length of time the domestic worker may have worked for the family. Seldom are these domestic workers invited to family functions, or receive gifts or money on special occasions. Neither would they receive clothes, toiletries, and other personal effects from their employers, but instead would end up using their own savings to buy these items. It is of no surprise that such working relationships develop, as we are reminded by Ong that “in postcolonial nations … questions of who is considered human or subhuman are still inscribed by ethnic biases or hostilities.”30 These differences in identity become accentuated between a Singaporean employer and a foreign domestic worker since these domestic workers come from different cultures, racial origins, and nationalities − differences that underscore their undesirability even though they may provide a critical service to the families for whom they work. Yet somewhere in between is the domestic worker who is recognized as a “worker” and whose rights and entitlements are respected, including having the right to her own space within the household. While the relationship between the domestic worker and employer resembles that of the relationship between “worker” and “employer” more strictly akin to a workplace in the public domain, these domestic workers tend to enjoy certain rights granted to “workers” more generally such as receiving a day off every Sunday 28 Janet Carsten, The Heat of the Hearth: The Process of Kinship in a Malay Fishing Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 13. 29 Maruja M.B. Asis, Shirlena Huang, and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, “When the Light of the Home is Abroad: Unskilled Female Migration and the Filipino Family,” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 25 no. 2 (2004): 210. 30 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception, 198.

136 Theresa W. Devasahayam

as well as on public holidays. In some cases, a deeper relationship develops between the employer and domestic worker, leading to friendships and a considerable measure of trust even if the domestic worker is generally not regarded as a family member. Samantha, a 42-year-old employer, best epitomizes the kind of relationship detailed above where relationships are fluid in nature because of the element of time: It’s important to treat a domestic worker with dignity and to make her feel that the home is a safe environment for her to work in, but no, I don’t think a domestic worker needs to be integrated into the family, if by that you mean treat her exactly like I would a family member … I do think it’s healthy to remember that she is a ‘worker’ first, to the extent that it means our relationship is firstly a professional one and therefore has professional boundaries that need to be maintained … But just as in the office, working relationships cannot be purely transactional, so too at home, you can’t just order her around and not look after her well-being … Domestic workers are with us 24/7 except on off days so as they do their part professionally to discharge their duties … I do my part to provide for their physical and emotional well-being … And over time, they do become like family, as mine has after 14 years.

Delineating the boundaries between “family” and “worker” was also not uncommon, as gleaned from the narratives. In these cases, the employers felt strongly that a distinction should be drawn for whatever reason they held to be important. For example, Lisa, a 33-year-old working mother, said: I’ve always educated my children that ‘Aunty’ is not our family member … she works for our family though and that is a clear distinction … We’ve always operated on that premise.

For Lisa, she is primarily concerned with how her domestic worker can help her manage the household and achieve her roles as mother and worker on a day-to-day basis so that she can pursue her career. For her, incorporating her domestic helper into her family has been the “least of [her] concerns”. Santosh, a 51-year-old Indian Singaporean, echoed this view, although her circumstances appeared to be markedly different: [She is] very much a worker … Honestly, despite having employed a domestic worker for 14 years, I’m not comfortable with the arrangement … I find the whole situation awkward – part of the household, yet not

“Family, Worker or Outsider”

137

of the family … I’d be much happier with a worker who could go home to her own family/life at day’s end … I find it odd when employers refer to domestic workers as ‘part of the family’ … One doesn’t pay family members a wage for their contribution to household chores … And there’s give and take in kind amongst family members – e.g. I ask you to iron my shirt because I’m busy cooking dinner … So if a domestic worker is part of the family, would you tidy her room/iron her clothes while she was cooking/cleaning? Could she go to my drawer and use my cream/ make-up etc like my daughter could? Given that she is separated from her family and in the thick of mine, it’s important that she be able to share her joys and sorrows with me … That said, she isn’t my friend or a family member which again is why I find the whole situation so wrong – the personal and professional is all mixed up.

Siti, also a working mother, said that drawing the distinction between “family” and “worker” is essential but for other reasons. Because she feels “protective of [her] children and … want[s] to maintain the status as the main caregiver,” she is concerned that her children may confuse her domestic worker’s role in the family with her own role as mother and caregiver. She is, however, not against the idea of incorporating her domestic worker into the family since, according to her, generating familial-type relations with her domestic worker would ease her role as caregiver. But in her case, she is also mindful that her helper does not usurp her role as caregiver but rather that her helper facilitates her role as primary caregiver in the family. But whether a domestic worker comes to be regarded as “family” or “outsider” or, for that matter, a “worker” undoubtedly has an impact on her work conditions. While the majority of domestic workers in Singapore are fortunate to work in a safe environment, working in confined spaces has the potential of leading to any number of abuses. In fact, domestic workers who are treated as “outsiders” are more likely to experience slave-like conditions primarily because of the unequal power relationship between employer and employee, where differences rather than similarities between the employer and domestic worker prevail.31 Given that domestic work is work carried out in the private domain, making these migrants in effect “invisible,”32 they are 31 Brenda S.A. Yeoh, Shirlena Huang, and Theresa W. Devasahayam, “Diasporic Subjects in the Nation: Foreign Domestic Workers, the Reach of Law and Civil Society in Singapore,” Asian Studies Review, 28, issue 1 (2004): 7-23; Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception. 32 Cf. Mika Toyota, “Health Concerns of ‘Invisible’ Foreign Domestic Maids in Thailand,” Asian Metacentre Research Paper Series, No. 19, Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2004, URL:.

138 Theresa W. Devasahayam

open to an array of mental, verbal, physical, and sexual abuses with limited access to escape. At times, these circumstances even lead to death. Reports of sexual and physical abuse were relatively common at one time, surfacing in The Straits Times. The incidence of such abuses appears to have dipped in the recent decade, probably as a result of the stricter penalties applied to recalcitrant employers such as the amendment of the Penal Code in 1998 in which penalties were raised by 50 percent, indicating the state’s seriousness in dealing with such abuses.33 By virtue of the fact that domestic work is carried out behind closed doors and work contracts fail to stipulate the number of hours of work, it is impossible to “regulate specific aspects of domestic work” such as the number of hours worked as well as work on rest days or public holidays. For this reason, migrants who work as domestic workers risk working longer hours than expected compared with workers in any other labour sector. Frequent complaints of not receiving adequate rest and sleep because employers demand long working hours may also occur. Some domestic workers have also experienced being denied food, as most are unaware that receiving adequate food is a basic entitlement explicitly stated in the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Chapter 91A). In fact, such work-related problems are seldom rectified unless the domestic worker launches a complaint to the relevant authorities, which rarely occurs. In most instances, these abuses are reported only after a more serious complaint such as physical abuse or the withholding of wages is raised, lending to the idea that abuses tend to occur in clusters. Needless to say, the vulnerability of domestic workers to exploitation will always remain because the work they engage in is highly gendered and class-inflected, reinforcing the subordinate position of these migrant women to both their female and male employers.

Forging bonds and the “trust” factor Yet there have been many domestic workers who have found their relationship with their employers to be relatively happy. In these relationships, “trust” emerged as an important factor. In this regard, it was found that employers who had greater trust in their domestic workers were more likely those who also considered their domestic workers as part of the family. 33 Theresa W. Devasahayam, “Placement and/or Protection?: Singapore’s Labour Policies and Practices for Temporary Women Migrant Workers,” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 15, no. 1 (2010): 45-58.

“Family, Worker or Outsider”

139

Additionally, among domestic workers whose employers demonstrated “trust, openness and concern,” their employer’s families often became “like family” to them.34 But as some employers explained, trust does not “happen overnight” but rather develops over time. Saroja, a 53-year-old employer, remarked: “Trust needs to be built over time and then the maids will realize how important it is and they will also develop self-dignity and will enjoy their freedom … I have zero tolerance for maids who misbehave when they are respected and trusted … I will terminate the contract once that trust is breached”. A 64-year old Chinese employer who had her domestic worker for a little more than a year mentioned that she initially had to “spy” on her domestic worker to be assured that the latter was doing what she was instructed to do. She mentioned that she would normally not do this if she could trust her domestic worker. That trust was the tipping point in shaping relationships was also found to lead to situations where domestic workers were denied the right to communicate with their family and friends, resulting in them working in “slave-like conditions.” Often the reason employers provide for not permitting their domestic workers to speak to others is that “they are here to work and not to talk.” On this matter, a Singaporean Chinese employer in her late 50s had this to say: I think the older generation tends to complain more about maids talking on the phone … Yes, my helper talks on the phone but after she finishes her work … that’s fine … how expensive can that be … I mean would I stop my sister from talking on the phone … Of course not … As long as I have my meal on the table when I get back from work … and if the bathroom is clean, that is fine … I don’t care if she spends time on the phone talking to friends or her relatives as long as she gets her work done.

In this case, where the employer fervently holds on to the idea that there should be “give and take” between the employer and the domestic worker, it is more likely that problems can be averted. In fact, she describes her relationship with her helper who has been with her for more than twenty years as “family” and does not see her helper as only providing her with a service.

34 Maruja M.B. Asis, Shirlena Huang, and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, “When the Light of the Home is Abroad: Unskilled Female Migration and the Filipino Family,” 210.

140 Theresa W. Devasahayam

Rosalyn, a 52-year old employer of a Sri Lankan domestic worker who has worked for the family for more than a decade, explains how she has always regarded her helper to be a member of the family and admits that without her, she would not be able to hold down a full-time job. In fact, Rosalyn is thankful for Sreya, whom she has entrusted not only to complete the household chores everyday but also to assist in providing care for her invalid brother. She emphasizes the reasons why she sees her helper as part of the family: Definitely our domestic helper is part of the family … She has been with us for almost twelve years now and has looked after my parents and brother for all this time … She has compassion and is definitely a part of the family … As a natural progression, our domestic helper has served us well and has become an integral member of our family.

Because these migrant women play a critical role in these families as care­ givers in the absence of their own employers who seek instead to engage in wage work outside the home, this reconfiguration of responsibilities in the household has only served to forge bonds between domestic helper and employer. Another employer remarked that she made every effort to make her domestic worker feel at home and part of the family since “she is the main caregiver during [her] absence”. A 49-year-old Eurasian employer who has a busy career as a school principal and who leaves her parents at home under the care of her domestic helper describes the inevitability of how her parents have bonded with her domestic worker since she is at home with them every day and sees to their daily needs without fail. Because of the bonds formed between the employer and members of the family and the domestic worker, some have said that it is difficult to see their domestic worker as a “stranger” or mere “worker.” Some instead have made an active decision to ensure that their domestic workers are incorporated into their own families. Such is the case of a 49-year-old banker who employs a Filipina domestic worker. She opined that she is always concerned that she does not want her helper to feel “left out” of the family and thus consciously makes an effort to invite her helper to all their family excursions. While time, sharing the same private space, and recognition of the role domestic helpers play in the family facilitate the process of building bonds, the relationship may also have an effect on how these migrant women cope with separation from their own families. Marianne, a 77-year-old employer, says that she frequently inquires about how her domestic worker’s parents are keeping and that every time she broaches the topic, her domestic worker “gets very happy that I care”. In fact, how they cope with separation from

“Family, Worker or Outsider”

141

loved ones has also depended on the generosity exhibited by their employer. 39-year-old Priya from Central Java remembers the time she started working in Singapore about thirteen years ago when cellphones were not commonly used and the option of sending text messages was not available.35 She spoke of how her employer was “generous” and “understanding” in allowing her to use the home phone to call her family back home so that the latter would not worry about her. She went on to say that her employer was very kind to her as she did not have to look for a public telephone to make a long-distance call. While some employers have developed a familial-type relationship or at least close bonds with their domestic workers, the converse also occurs where a domestic worker may be cast as an “outsider” and marked by suspicion even though she shares the same private space as her employer. Living in close proximity to a stranger also suggests that employers inevitably end up “keeping a close eye” on their domestic worker’s movements, a response on their part that becomes more pronounced because of a lack of trust between employer and domestic worker. Checking on a domestic worker may also be deliberate, as is the case of Lisa who candidly described why she and her husband decided to install two surveillance cameras in her home. Having done that, she is also aware that her domestic worker would not get into any mischief since “she knows she is being watched” because the cameras are turned on each morning before she and her husband leave for the office. Suspicious employers have also been found to read all correspondences their domestic workers receive through the mail or letters their domestic workers send to their loved ones. In these instances, these employers may have been afraid that their domestic workers may be “leaking information” about their family affairs to outsiders. Checking on all letters going out and coming in not only ignores the sensitivities of these workers but also conceals abuses that the domestic worker may be facing, as this disrupts her capacity to communicate with others beyond the household in which she works.

Who keeps the passport and why? Among employers, it is not uncommon to retain the migrant woman’s passport instead of allowing her to hold on to this document. Interest35 Theresa W. Devasahayam and Noor Abdul Rahman, “Mothers on the Move: Experiences of Indonesian Women Migrant Workers,” in Growing Up Transnational: Identity and Kinship in a Global Era (eds.) May Friedman and Silvia Schultermandl (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011).

142 Theresa W. Devasahayam

ingly, among the 17 employers interviewed, seven reported retaining their domestic workers’ passports, two of whom admitted they would not mind if their domestic workers kept their passports themselves since it would be “one less document to keep,” as remarked by one employer. Another said that: “I don’t retain [it], I just keep it for her … She even knows where her passport is and the drawer is unlocked.” Fearing that their domestic workers may abandon them should the former not be happy with their work conditions has been the underlying reason cited to justify this strict measure undertaken by employers. On this issue, Fatimah, a 47-year-old Malay employer, maintained: I do retain her passport and honestly I didn’t know it is illegal to do so … But even now that I know it is legal (sic), my approach is to still keep the passport … There are horror stories out there where helpers have run away from the employer’s home and employers too have to pay a bond … should they insist on keeping the passport, I will not employ them … The idea of getting a helper is to get help at home so that I have the peace of mind to do stuffs that I have and want to do … But if by having a helper, it adds to my problems, then I would rather not have one.

A similar mental model was found in another Singaporean employer. For Gandhi, aged 60, she felt “more comfortable” retaining her domestic worker’s passport since she is fearful that her domestic worker could be making trips to Johor Bahru or Batam during her days off where she may become involved in illegal activities. Among many employers, the fear that a domestic worker could run away and, in turn, put the employer in a dilemma of losing the security bond of Singapore $5,000 continues to be a real concern, although these migrant women are working within the confines of a home and the employer need not necessarily lose the bond since it is covered by insurance. That employers see it as their “right” to retain the passports of their domestic workers has to be framed within the power differentials between employer and employee where the migrant woman works in slave-like conditions and, as such, is unable to negotiate and make a claim for why she should retain her own documents.36 36 Cf. Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception; CEDAW Shadow Report: Singapore 4 th Periodic Review. “Discrimination against Women Migrant Workers and Human Trafficking in Singapore,” Singapore: Transient Workers Count Too; and Bangkok: Global Alliance against Traffic in Women, June 2011, found at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/ GAATW_TWC2_for_the_session_Singapore_CEDAW49.pdf

“Family, Worker or Outsider”

143

But while the law is very clear that the employer should not retain the passport of his/her domestic worker, since under the Passports Act 2007, administered by the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, it is an “offence for a person to possess or control a foreign travel document that was not issued to him without reasonable excuse,” many employers continue to engage in this practice and there is nothing to stop them from doing so because of the lack of enforcement of this law.37 On this law, a 53-year old employer said the following: “But the law is the law – but does the law help employers who are stood up and cheated by dishonest maids?” Retaining the passports of their domestic workers has the potential of resulting in negative consequences for these women. For example, should there be a case of an actual abuse, the domestic worker would face difficulties reporting her dilemma to the police although she could use her work permit as a form of identification if this too is not withheld from her. Because of the lack of enforcement of this law, it is not surprising that close to half of the women interviewed continued to retain their domestic worker’s passports. Curiously, among them, more than half were unaware that it was unlawful to retain another person’s passport. Among the rest, some still felt that they would continue to retain their domestic worker’s passport since they did not “trust” her enough to keep this document.

“Is it debt bondage?”: The pitfalls of securing work in Singapore It is widely known that domestic workers do not receive their full salaries if they are new arrivals into Singapore. The majority of new arrivals, for example, usually run up a debt for the costs they would have incurred in finding jobs in Singapore. These costs include the payment for the passage to Singapore; the training undergone prior to coming to Singapore; fees owed to the recruitment agency through which employment was secured, including the costs incurred for the health check-up undergone prior to departure; as well as processing the necessary documents for work abroad. For these reasons, many new domestic workers starting up jobs in the destination country do not receive their full salaries. The repayment period has become longer since the late 1990s, when it took an average of three months for the domestic worker to repay a recruitment agency. Since then, the time taken for repayment has been inching up; 37 Esther Ng, “Foreign Worker Contracts” in “Behind the Headlines,” Today Online, 6 February, 2010 found at http://blogs.todayonline.com/behindtheheadlines/2010/02/06/foreign-workercontracts/ (last modified 6 February 2010).

144 Theresa W. Devasahayam

in 2003, it was close to six months. The period of repayment at the time of writing (July 2013) is on average seven to nine months, although periods as long as twelve months have been recorded before.38 For the migrant woman, this situation is serious since she is unable to remit money back to her family during that period. As a point of comparison, male migrant workers also face a similar situation, although they tend to pay up front, resulting in their families in their home countries being constantly harassed by loan sharks.39 With this in view, indebtedness is a huge concern for low-skilled migrant workers, generating much anxiety among migrant women and sometimes having a spill-over effect on their level of productivity and the relationship they may develop with their employers and their families. Because of this predicament, a domestic worker is also more likely to endure ill treatment by her employer or any other poor working conditions for fear that she might find herself in more trying circumstances if she chooses to leave her employer. Although many migrant women may be aware that securing a new employer through a “transfer” would solve the problems she may be facing, many are unlikely to adopt this solution because of the additional costs incurred. In order to secure a transfer of employer, a decent recruitment agency would charge about a month’s salary; there have been others who have been found charging an amount closer to three to four months of her wages. The issue of transfers, however, has been thorny, reflecting not only the unequal power relationship between the domestic worker and employer but also how the labour laws reinscribe the otherness of this group. The Singapore state has been silent on this labour practice even though it presents a breeding ground for exploitation on the part of recruitment agencies. Moreover, in all instances of transfer, the domestic worker relies on the goodwill of her employer to write a release letter. But there are many instances in which the employer chooses not to and decides instead to repatriate the worker – a right s/he has without giving any justifiable or valid reason, clearly indicating the power imbalance tipped in favour of the employer. But if the current employer does decide to write a release letter, under current labour laws the migrant woman has only seven days to find a new employer, after which she is liable of breaking the law because of having overstayed in Singapore. 40 38 Sim Chi Yin, “Maid’s Debt Dilemma: Want Transfer? Pay Penalty. Suffer $10 Salary,” The New Paper, 9 August 2005, 6-7. 39 Philip Lim, “Foreign Workers in Singapore ‘Bear the Brunt’,” AFP News, 12 June 2011 found at http://sg.news.yahoo.com/foreign-workers-singapore-bear-brunt-021924424.html. 40 Theresa W. Devasahayam, “Placement and/or Protection?: Singapore’s Labour Policies and Practices for Temporary Women Migrant Workers.”

“Family, Worker or Outsider”

145

In any case, a transfer entails not only costs on the part of the domestic worker but also on the employer, should the latter be looking to employ a new worker. But in cases where the domestic worker has been more fully integrated into the family or who has had an employer who recognises her rights as a worker, she would have less of a problem securing a transfer letter. In one case, a Sri Lankan domestic worker explained that her employer was also willing to undertake the payment of the transfer fee. But her case appeared to be an exception. She was leaving the family because her employer’s children had left for their studies abroad and because her employer and her husband felt that they did not need a domestic worker any longer, they volunteered to pay the transfer fee. On enquiring further, it appeared that this domestic worker had developed a fairly close bond with her employer over the years and continues to visit her former employer in spite of her working for another family.

Conclusion Globalization has transformed the world of women in Singapore as well as those arriving into the country for wage work. This chapter hoped to have provided an analysis of the working relationship between an immigrant group of women in Singapore and their employers. As the lives of these two groups of women become intertwined, this has led to “shifting boundaries of [the] … concepts [of] ‘public’ and ‘private’ and the ongoing reconfigurations of ideas of ‘home’, ‘domesticity’, ‘worker’, ‘father’, ‘mother’ and ‘child’ – in essence, the ‘family’.”41 More specifically, the nature and form of the working relationships these employers and this group of migrant women develop depend on the social distance between employer and domestic worker. The data collected for this chapter revealed three archetypes of employerdomestic worker relationships: (a) employers who treat their domestic workers as part of the family; (b) employers who treat their domestic workers as “workers” with rights and entitlements; and (c) employers who treat their domestic workers as “outsiders” in the family and, at worse, the latter group are devoid of their rights as workers. In the former two archetypes of relationships, it may be said that labour abuses tend to be less frequent 41 Maila Stivens, “Post-modern Motherhoods and Cultural Contest in Malaysia and Singapore,” in Working and Mothering in Asia: Images, Ideologies and Identities, (eds.) Theresa W. Devasahayam and Brenda S.A. Yeoh (Singapore and Denmark: National University of Singapore Press and Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2007), 29.

146 Theresa W. Devasahayam

since greater measures of trust characterize these working relationships. But these relationships may not strictly fall into either the “family” or “worker” category but rather along a continuum. Conversely, in the latter case, that is when a domestic worker is perceived as an “outsider” to the family, boundaries between “self” and “other” would be made clear and it is in such relationships that labour abuses may surface since the employer is operating within a paradigm where the relationship is generally framed from her perspective. Having said that, these archetypes are not set in stone, especially among the domestic workers who fall into either the “worker” or “family” categories. Often employers are ambivalent about whether they see their maids as “family” or “worker” but this tends to be framed by context. Perhaps closer to the truth is that many of these employers view their domestic workers as “workers” in some contexts while in others, they become “family”. Because of the sharing of the private spaces of a home, it is not difficult to see how these migrant women might become “family” to the families they serve especially as time passes; but because labour laws demand certain obligations on the part of the employer, it is in these contexts that the employer’s formal identity becomes reinforced and the identity of their domestic worker as “worker” become pronounced – identities that cannot be erased however much an employer might want to regard her domestic worker as “family”.

7

Whither Integration? Managing the Politics of Identity and Social Inclusion Leong Chan-Hoong

Introduction Singapore, like many other modern developed economies, faces a rapidly ageing society and a low fertility rate. In 2011, the total fertility rate (TFR), or average number of newborn to each female resident hit an all-time low of 1.15. At the same time, the old-age support ratio or number of working adults supporting a Singaporean aged 65 years old and above stands at 7.0.1 If there is no increase in the birth rate or immigration, by 2030 this support ratio is projected to fall to below 3.0.2 Without sufficient labour replacement, future generations of Singaporeans will be saddled with escalating social expenses associated with an ageing society. As a global city and regional business hub, Singapore constantly needs to broaden its talent base to maintain its economic vibrancy and dynamism. Failure to do so would see the country lose its edge in innovation, entrepreneurship, and commence. With this demographic backdrop in mind, the population growth of Singapore must be augmented by inbound migration if it is to satisfy its socio-economic imperatives. Between 2001 and 2004, an average of 35,250 people a year were granted permanent residency. This number peaked at an average of 63,100 per annum between 2005 and 2010.3 This influx of global talent and long-term residents has proved to be politically and socially unpalatable, exposing underlying tensions in the social structure. Empirical and anecdotal feedback shows that the affective division between foreign-born and local Singaporeans has escalated in recent years.

1 Singapore Department of Statistics, Population in Brief 2011 at http://www.singstat.gov.sg (accessed 1 February 2012). 2 Saw Swee Hock, The Population of Singapore, 2nd edition, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007). 3 National Population Talent Division Singapore, “DPM Wong Kan Seng’s speech on population delivered at the Committee of Supply, 4 Mar 2010,” at https://www.nptd.gov.sg.

148 

Leong Chan-Hoong

Empirically, much of the disquiet could be delineated into two components: resource constraints and the sense of cultural encroachment.4 First, with a larger resident population, the competition for finite economic resources has intensified. The burgeoning population has resulted in the overloading of public infrastructures and amenities, with insufficient places in schools, under-provision of health care services, and an overcrowded transport system. This competition for resources consequently feeds into a higher cost of living and elevated levels of anxiety arising from job and resource insecurity. Apart from tangible resource woes, there is a sense that the Singaporean identity has been steadily eroded by the staggering number and proportion of foreigners living in the city-state. This perception of being under siege is not unfounded. In 2000, the proportion of citizens to total population was 74 percent; in 2010, this ratio fell to 63 percent. In the same period, the number of permanent residents increased from 287,500 to more than 541,000 whilst the number of transient workers exploded from 754,500 to more than 1.3 million. The seismic shift in the demographic landscape has unleashed a protectionist instinct among concerned citizens and the fear of being crowded out by foreigners in their own backyard. Beyond the numbers, the foreign-local debate has been further compounded by the lack of effective integration among certain quarters of new migrants and opaque immigration policies. Exacerbating the situation is the fact that income inequality has significantly risen over the last 10 years and real wages for households in the lowest decile have declined.5 In response to this negative ground sentiment, policymakers scrambled to recalibrate the inflow of migrants, limiting the number of new permanent residents to no more than 30,000 in 2011.6 The qualifying criteria for all categories of job employment visas were also revised upward to reflect this more cautious stance towards immigration. Provisions of public infrastructure and amenities were ramped up to meet the surge in demand from the expanded population.7 Grassroots organizations, civic societies, and other non-government sectors have all stepped up their efforts to reach out, engage, and integrate the new arrivals. The National Integration Council, for example, was established in 2009 to facilitate and support community initiatives that promote the har4 V. Esses et al., “Intergroup competition and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration: An instrumental model of group conflict,” Journal of Social Issues, 54 (1998): 699-724. 5 Census of Population 2010, (Singapore: Department of Statistics) at http://www.singstat. gov.sg (accessed 1 February 2012). 6 “DPM Teo Chee Hean’s speech on population delivered at the Committee of Supply, 1 Mar 2012” at http://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/news (accessed 1 February 2012). 7 D. Soon, “The Year in 2011,” IPS Update, January 2012, http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/ips/Jan2012. aspx (accessed 1 February 2012).

Whither Integr ation?

149

monious coexistence of foreigners and locals. Since 2011, prospective citizens have to undergo a mandatory induction programme prior to finalizing their application for citizenship. The rights, duties, and obligations of citizenry are duly reiterated in this final stage of their transition.8 Collectively, the fine-tuning of these policies is meant to ensure that the social fabric of the nation remains intact even as the texture of the populace changes over time. While these concerted efforts to bridge the affective divides are laudable, there is a long way to go before both immigrants and native-born can forge a common denominator of identity. In the watershed 2011 general elections, the ruling People’s Action Party received the lowest share of popular votes in its history. Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew conceded that immigration was one of the key issues that caused the vote swing.9 Immigration remains a controversial issue even though the policymakers have since 2009 been advancing a “Singaporean first” agenda. The amount of subsidies, welfare entitlement, and service priority receivable by citizens and non-citizens (including permanent residents and non-residents) are differentiated in favour of Singaporeans.10 This policy aims to reassure Singaporeans that the basic thrust of governance has the interest of citizens at heart, with the implication that sharpening the distinction between permanent residents and citizens will encourage the former to convert to Singapore citizenship. Notwithstanding the tweaks to policy, the notion of integration remains a nebulous idea. Beyond articulating the need to stay united, show mutual respect, and exercise tolerance for diversity, social cohesion is a concept that is not clearly defined. The lack of articulation stems from the tenuous definition of the Singaporean identity: What does it mean to be a Singaporean? To date, little is known about the efficacy of the “Singaporeans first” policy in encouraging more collegial intercultural relations. Many areas concerning the social representation of integration remain untested. What are the key attributes that naturalized citizens should be cognisant of? Is there consensus or at least common ground between native and naturalized citizens on the meaning of integration? While there are periodical surveys on the social network pattern among immigrants and Singaporeans, there is no clear working definition of integration that identifies the gaps between the two acculturating groups. 8 “DPM Wong Kan Seng’s speech on population at the Committee of Supply, 2 Mar 2011” at https://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/news (accessed 1 February 2012). 9 “Rising home prices hit PAP’s vote share: Mr Lee,” The Straits Times, 14 August 2011. 10 “Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s National Day Rally 2011,” (speech in English) 14 August 2011 at University Cultural Centre, National University of Singapore,” at http://www.pmo.gov. sg/content/ (accessed 1 February 2012).

150 

Leong Chan-Hoong

The survey by Leong at the Institute of Policy Studies on the social markers of integration is a step in this direction.11 Two categories of Singaporeans representing local-born and naturalized citizens were asked to select from a checklist of characteristics on what they consider indicators of integration. The attributes most frequently endorsed by both categories of residents are regarded as the critical markers of intercultural adaptation. They exemplify what Singaporeans expect from new immigrants and the yardsticks used in determining a full participating member of society. The list of attributes can be found in Table 7.1. In order of priority, the major dimensions include: “Respects multi-racial and multi-religious practices,” “Is gainfully employed,” and “Able to speak conversational English.” Not surprisingly, the average number of items endorsed by the foreign-born citizens is significantly lower, as they impose fewer barriers to becoming a naturalized citizen of the city-state. Interestingly, the rank ordering of most items are similar in both categories of respondents; this suggests a certain consensus in the hierarchical ordering of needs and priorities. Table 7.1 Social Markers of Integration Item 1.

Respects multi-racial and multireligious practices 2. Gets on well with neighbours 3. Is gainfully employed 4. Gets on well with workplace colleagues 5. Able to speak conversational English 6. Has lived in Singapore for a period of time 7. His/her male child completes National Service 8. Completes National Service himself (for men) 9. Able to speak a language of one of Singapore’s main racial group 10. Owns residential property in Singapore 11. Has completed tertiary education

Overall (%)

Local- ForeignBorn (%) Born (%)

Difference % points

84.5

87

76

11

76.0 72.8 69.5

81 78 75

59 55 51

22 23 24

66.0 65.2

71 70

49 49

22 21

63.1

69

43

26

60.6

64

49

15

59.8

63

49

14

58.1

59

55

4

51.7

56

37

19

11 Leong Chan-Hoong and Yang Wai Wai (forthcoming), “Social Markers of Singapore: What Matters Most to Singaporeans,” in Integration of Immigrants in Singapore, (eds.) Yap Mui Teng & Gillian Koh (Singapore: Routledge, 2013).

151

Whither Integr ation?

Item 12. Has children who are Singapore citizens 13. Belongs to one of Singapore’s main ethnic groups 14. Has a social circle comprising mostly local-born Singaporeans 15. Works in a field where there is a shortfall of talent in Singapore 16. Has retired or plans to retire in Singapore 17. Attended or attends government or government-aided schools 18. Marries a local-born Singaporean 19. Lives in a HDB flat 20. Invests in or sets up a Singaporebased company 21. Works for a Singapore-based company 22. Participates in the work of local charity organizations or self-help groups 23. Supports Singaporean products and brands 24. Able to speak Singlish (Singaporean English, a colloquial form of English) 25. Participates in grassroots activities 26. Enjoys ‘typical’ Singaporean pastimes 27. Behaves like a ‘Singaporean’ 28. Works for a government ministry or statutory board 29. Gives up foreign cultural norms or behaviour 30. Participates in local politics

Overall (%)

Local- ForeignBorn (%) Born (%)

Difference % points

50.7

55

36

19

53.9

53

57

-4

49.3

52

40

12

46.0

51

29

22

47.0

50

37

13

43.9

46

37

9

46.1 40.5 34.4

45 43 38

50 32 22

-5 11 16

33.9

36

27

9

30.3

33

21

12

28.9

30

25

5

28.8

29

28

1

26.3 20.2

27 22

24 14

3 8

18.9 18.9

21 18

12 22

9 -4

10.9

13

4

9

10.8

11

10

1

Source: Leong Chan-Hoong and Yang Wai Wai (forthcoming), “Social Markers of Singapore: What Matters Most to Singaporeans,” in Integration of Immigrants in Singapore, (eds.) Yap Mui Teng & Gillian Koh (Singapore: Routledge, 2013)

While it is instinctive to look for items that receive a strong mandate, it is equally important to scrutinize items that demonstrate significant discordance between the two acculturating groups. Markers that show a huge discrepancy in percentage-point difference represent the likely fractures between the recipient society and the immigrant community. This divergence in

152 

Leong Chan-Hoong

transnational orientation is a well-established source of intercultural tensions; immigrants who embrace different norms and expectations from the recipient nationals experience more rejection, intergroup threats, and animosity.12 In Leong’s research, two areas of contestation highlight the foreign-local divide: fulfilment of National Service obligations (conscription) by the male offspring of immigrants (-26%) and competence in conversational English (-22%) showed some of the widest discrepancies between the two groups.13 In additional to the list of markers, the respondents were asked if they would be amenable to adjusting their outlook to accommodate the needs of foreigners. This includes changing their attitudes and behaviours to facilitate immigrants’ adaptation and expanding the range of mother tongue languages for immigrants from non-traditional ethnic backgrounds (e.g., Thai, Vietnamese).14 The two questions collectively offer a snapshot of intercultural readiness in meeting the evolving population landscape. The call for an accommodating and inclusive attitude is one of the more hotly debated topics in recent years. When juxtaposing these questions, the items measuring conversational English and mother tongue language policy jointly offer a glimpse into the linguistic identity of Singaporeans. The results are reported in Table 7.2. Not surprisingly, naturalized citizens, as opposed to the local “born-and-bred,” 12 U. Piontkowski et al., “Predicting acculturation attitudes of dominant and non-dominant groups,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 24 (2000): 1-26; U. Piontkowski et al., “Concordance of acculturation attitudes and perceived threat,” Group Processes and Intergroup Relation, 5, no. 3 (2002): 221-232; A. Rohmann et al., “The role of discordant acculturation attitudes in perceived threat: An analysis of host and immigrant attitudes in Germany,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30 (2006): 683-702; A. Rohmann et al., “When attitudes do not fit: Discordance of acculturation attitudes as an antecedent of intergroup threat,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34 (2008): 337-352. 13 “Able to speak conversational English (-22%)” is picked for further analysis over similar discrepant items [e.g., Gets on well with neighbours (-22%), Is gainfully employed (-23%), Gets on well with workplace colleagues (-24%), Works in a field where there is a shortfall of talent (-22%)] because of its immediate socio-economic and political implications. The mastery of English is a widely contested issue in the public discourse on immigration. Unlike other items, the impact of English proficiency straddles both economic and social space, e.g. “Just English will do,” The Straits Times, 16 December 2012. 14 “Mother Tongue Language Policy,” at http://www.moe.gov.sg/education/admissions/ returning-singaporeans/mother-tongue-policy/ (accessed 1 February 2012). The existing educational policy requires all pupils in government-funded or government-aided schools to master a second language on top of English as the compulsory subject. The range of mother tongue languages is primarily catered to the dominant races, including Chinese, Malay, Tamil, Bengali, Punjabi, and Malayalee. Few if any students are exempted from the second language requirement; non-traditional minority races (e.g., Thai, Myanmar, Filipinos) are asked to take the available language options spoken by the dominant races (e.g., Chinese, Malay, and Tamil) as their mother tongue requirement.

153

Whither Integr ation?

are more open to changing their stance to facilitate new arrivals’ settlement (80.2 percent vs. 47.4 percent). They also indicated more allowance in broadening the number of mother tongue languages (35.7 percent vs. 32.8 percent). Linguistic contestations are the hallmarks of acculturation, as they epitomise the underlying intergroup dynamics and tension surrounding the host-immigrant relationship.15 In Singapore’s context, the debate on English proficiency is also symptomatic of the broader socio-linguistic climate, in which the mastery of this lingua franca is taken as a sign of respect for the country’s multicultural heritage. It remains the public perception that English is the social glue that unites an otherwise linguistically disparate population.16 The markers of integration and intercultural inclusiveness therefore constitute the centrepiece of the current investigation. This study will examine in detail the demographic profile and individual differences of those who endorse selected items and markers. Viewed in the larger context, the answers to the four questions reflect an overall sentiment to acculturation. Respondents who advocate National Service and English proficiency as pre-requisites for integration and those who are not inclined to compromise have a less favourable perspective on immigration. Table 7.2 Willingness to Change (Percentage who said yes) Item 1.

2.

Should local-born Singaporeans change their behaviour and attitudes to make immigrants feel they can settle in easily? Should our school system introduce new languages in the mother tongue programme to cater to immigrants from diverse ethnic backgrounds (e.g., French, Tagalog, Thai?)

Overall

Local-Born Foreign- Born

63.8

47.4

80.2

29.7

23.8

35.7

Predictors and outcome of acculturation There are many theoretical frameworks in intercultural contact and change. Two of them stand out in migration studies: the notion of perceived threats and the concept of multicultural ideology, or multicultural hypothesis. 15 Richard Alba, “Language Assimilation Today: Bilingualism Persists More Than in the Past, but English Still Dominates,” Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, University at Albany, Working Paper no. 111, November 2004. 16 “Just English will do,” The Straits Times, 16 December 2012. Available from Factiva [25 June 2013].

154 

Leong Chan-Hoong

According to Stephan’s model of integrated threat theory, there are four fundamental aspects of intercultural threats known to influence attitudes.17 The components are: realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, and stereotypes. Realistic threats highlight the perception of competition for economic resources like jobs, education, and welfare. Symbolic threats stress the encroachment of identity and space arising from increased cultural diversity in the environment. Intergroup anxiety underscores the degree of personal discomfort in interacting with a member from another racial or cultural community. Stereotypes are cognitive schemas about people; it serves as a short cut to making a quick though sometimes biased judgment about an individual. Realistic and symbolic threats are group-based experience. They focus on the community’s experience. Intergroup anxiety and stereotypes, on the other hand, are individual-centred experiences interacting with a specific member of an outgroup, whereby the person has a pre-existing opinion. Realistic and symbolic threats are the focus of empirical studies on intercultural relations, as they are the drivers of immigration attitudes among members of the recipient society.18 In Leong’s thesis, intercultural contact produces two opposing experiences among members of the recipient culture: invasion and enrichment.19 For the “invasion” experience, inflow-migration infuses competition and engenders the perception of economic resource scarcity. The re-settlement of people from other ethno-cultural backgrounds are said to erode the identity and space in the host society, as it imposes new cultural behaviours and norms on an established social eco-system. This perspective embodies both realistic and symbolic aspects of threats as asserted by Stephan. At the other end of the acculturation spectrum, the injection of immigrants nurtures a culturally more dynamic society, and this consequently augments the plurality of ideas and innovation. Immigrants who complement or contribute to the host nation will bring about a more tolerant and resilient multicultural society. Lastly, proponents of multicultural theories posit that the impact of intercultural threats is mitigated by the sense of socio-economic securi17 W.G. Stephan et al., “Prejudice towards immigrants: An integrated threat theory,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 29 (1999): 2221-2237. 18 V. Esses et al., “The immigration dilemma: The role of perceived group competition, ethnic prejudice, and national identity,” Journal of Social Issues, 57 no. 3 (2001): 389-412. V. Esses et al., “Intergroup competition and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration.” Leong Chan-Hoong, “A multi-level research framework for the analyses of attitudes towards immigrants,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, no. 32 (2008): 115-129. 19 Ibid, 115-129.

Whither Integr ation?

155

ty.20 Individuals who feel confident of the economic outlook and of their ethno-cultural status will demonstrate greater inclusiveness, tolerance, and mutual respect vis-a-vis other communities, including immigrants. Variables that exemplify economic and social security include national pride, economic optimism, degree of life satisfaction, and family bonding. By the same token, the positive impact of migration – e.g., contribution to the workplace or meeting social obligations – will be appreciated more by those who exhibit a high, as opposed to low, sense of security. This attenuating effect is known as the multicultural hypothesis.21 In line with these postulations, threat perceptions, both realistic and symbolic, are likely to exert a strong influence on the endorsement of the integration markers. Singaporeans who think their jobs are undermined and their cultural identity eroded by the influx of foreigners will more likely demand that the newcomers fullfill National Service obligations and possess conversational English skills. On the other hand, the sense of security – predicated by personal resources like emotional bonding with family, strength of ties to the country, the degree of economic optimism, and general well-being – are believed to have a positive impact on acculturation attitudes and inclusiveness. Singaporeans who are satisfied with life, feel confident about the economy, and feel rooted to the family and nationhood are less likely to demand that immigrants fulfill their National Service duty or acquire the ability to speak English. These variables are further hypothesized to shape intercultural inclusiveness. Those who feel threatened are less accommodating and will not want to expand the range of mother tongue options for immigrants from non-traditional ethnic backgrounds. On the other hand, the perceived contributions by migrants and other factors measuring socio-economic securities will have a positive impact on the willingness to change and to allow mother tongue languages to flourish. Finally, there is a conceptual need to differentiate between native-born citizens and foreign-born, naturalized citizens, i.e., a non-citizen of Singapore at birth who acquires citizenship. Intuitively, the latter are more likely to dem20 J.W. Berry, “Mutual attitudes among immigrants and ethnocultural groups in Canada,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30 (2006): 719-734. J.W. Berry et al., Multiculturalism and ethnic attitudes in Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1977). M. Verkutyen, “Ethnic group identification and group evaluation among minority and majority groups: Testing the multiculturalism hypothesis,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, no.1 (2005): 121-138. 21 J.W. Berry et al., “Multiculturalism and ethnic attitudes in Canada.” M. Verkutyen, “Ethnic group identification and group evaluation among minority and majority groups: Testing the multiculturalism hypothesis,” 121-138.

156 

Leong Chan-Hoong

onstrate greater intercultural inclusivity than local-born citizens in endorsing the markers and in the level of willingness to accommodate diversity. In other words, fewer naturalized citizens would view the social markers as important; they are more prepared to compromise for the sake of new immigrants. Further to the distinction between local- and foreign-born, it is anticipated that the predictors are less influential in explaining acculturation attitudes among naturalized residents compared to local-born Singaporeans. This is because both threats and resource perceptions have less consequential impacts for the immigrants than for the natives. Naturalized citizens are beneficiaries of Singapore’s open-door policy, and as such there is little reason to expect immigration threats, contributions, and socio-economic security to affect intercultural attitudes for this group.

Method Participants The current study was part of a larger research study on the social indicators of adaptation performed by the Institute of Policy Studies. The study sampled two groups of residents in Singapore: local-born (i.e., native) and foreign-born (i.e., naturalized) citizens, comprising 1,001 and 1,000 people respectively. The sample is representative of the population in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity. Table 7.3 Psychometric Properties and Descriptive Statistics Variables National pride Life satisfaction Family ties Economic optimism Perceived contributions Perceived threats

No of Items 5 5 3 3 5 8

Cron. Alpha

Overall Mean (SD)

Local-Born Mean (SD)

Foreign-Born Mean (SD)

0.51 0.82 0.73 0.72 0.60 0.90

3.47 (0.54) 3.54 (0.66) 4.21 (0.49) 3.68 (0.65) 3.57 (0.58) 2.87 (0.84)

3.46 (0.52) 3.42 (0.70)** 4.25 (0.48)* 3.56 (0.64)** 3.37 (0.60)** 3.41 (0.68)**

3.49 (0.55) 3.67 (0.60)** 4.18 (0.50)* 3.80 (0.63)** 3.76 (0.48)** 2.32 (0.61)**

** Significant differences between local- and foreign-born citizens at p